THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN *RES SIGNIFICATA* AND *MODUS SIGNIFICANDI* IN AQIDNAS'S THEOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY

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ST. THOMAS AQUINAS often refers to the distinction between *res significata* and *modus significandi.* He asserls that, whie the :absolute and analogical predicates of positive theology may be pveditcatedof God with regard to their *RS,1* they mrust ,be denied of God with regard to their *MS.*[2] The distinotion, then, is an imporlant element in his

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[1] For brevity's sake I will refer to *res significata,* by *RS* and to *modus significand.i* by *MS;* I will also speak of the *res/modus* distinction. The following abbreviations for Aquinas's works will be used: *BDH =Flropositio in librum Boethii De hebdomadibus* (Marietti ed., 1954); *DA=the* disputed question *De anima* (ed. J. H. Robb [Toronto: PIMS, 1968]) ; *DDN =Flropositi<> super librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus* (Marietti ed., 1950); *DP=De potentia* (Marietti ed., 1949); *DSS=De substantiis separatis* (Leonine Commission, vol. 40, 1969); *DV=De veritate* (Leonine Co=ission, vol. 22, 1972-76); *Herm.=Sententia libri Peri hermeneias* (Marietti ed., 1955); *John= Leotura super Johannem* (Marietti ed., 1952); *Meta.=Sententia libri Metaphysioorum* (Marietti ed., 1950); *Phys.=Sententia libri Physioorum* (Marietti ed., 1965) ; *Quod.= Quaestiones quodlibetales* (Marietti ed., 1956) ; *BOG= Summa contra gentiles* (Marietti ed., vols. 2-3, 1961) ; *SDO=Eropositio super librum De causis* (Marietti ed., 1955) ; *SS=Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (Paris: Lethielleuro,* 1929, 1933, 1947); *ST=Summa theologiae* (Alba/ Rome: Editiones Paulinae, 1962). The English translations are my own. For Thomas's positive theology of the divine names, see Gregory Rocca, "Analogy as Judgment and Faith in God's Incomprehensibility: A Study in the Theological Epistemology of Thomas Aquinas" (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1989) 540-615.

[2] A characteristic text: "In every name predicated by us [of God], imperfection is found with respect to the name's mode of signifying *[MS],*

theological epistemology and onomatofogy .3

For some, however, the distinction wou1d ultimately lead us back to the univocist camp of Duns Scotus,4 for they see it as hiding within itself a latent core of univocity. One writes that the predication involved in 1anafogy of attribution is both univocal and equivocail: " It is univocal, insofar as it ai1ways denotes the siame *proprietas rei;* it is equivoca,J since, through a differrent *modus significandi,* it •connotes ' a different existentiail mode of the denoted *proprieta.'J.'*5 Another writes, in simil.ar fashion, that "the :same property is signifi·ed, hut the way in which the property inheres in the subject is different." a Another contends tha;t the idis:tinJCtion between *RS* and *MS* is a" bogus distinction between what words realily mean and what they mean to us." 7 If the *res/niodus* distinction is an im-

which does not belong to God, though the thing signified [RS'] is suitable to God in some eminent manner " (*SOG* l.30.277) ; the same sentiment is found in many other texts such as *SS* L35.LL ad2 and *ST* 1.13.3. Thomas often explains the saying of Pseudo-Dionysius, that negations about God are true while affirmations are vague, by claiming that affirmations are true as regards their *RS* but not as regards their *MS (SS* 1.22.l.2. adl; l.4.2.l. ad2; *SOG* 1.30.277; *DP* 7.5 ad2; *ST* 1.13.12. adl; *SDO* 6.161).

a Hampus Lyttkens, however, thinks the distinction plays no essential role in Thomas's theory of the divine names (" Die Bedeutung der Gottespr1tdikate bei Thomas von Aquin," *Neue Zeitschrift fur systematisahe Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 6 [1964] 277-80). Klaus Muller claims the application of the *res/modus* distinction to the divine names " says really nothing at all" *(Thomas van Aquins Theorie und Praxis der Analogie. Der Streit um das rechte Vorurteil und die Ana,lyse einer aufsohlussreichen Diskrepanz in der "Summa theologiae* ", Regensburger Studien zur Theologie 29 [Frankfurt am Main/Bern/NY: Peter Lang, 1983] 100).

4 See Richard Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism* (Oxford: Clarendon, HJ77) 78-80.

s Jan Pinborg, *Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter: liJin uberblick,* Afterword by Н. Kohlenberger, Problemata 10 (Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Frommann0Holzboog, 1972) 101; but cf. G. Scheltens, "Die thomistische Analogielehre und die Univozitatslehre des Duns Skotus," *Fra,nziskanisohe Studien* 47 (1965) 323.

e Jonathan Kvanvig, "Divine Transcendence," *Religious Studies* 20 (1984) 378.

r John Morreall, *Analogy and Talking about Goit: A Critique of the Thomistic Approach* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978)

portant component in Aquinas's theology of the divine names
and if it 11ests ultimately on univocity--either   because the
names we predicate of creatures and God really have the same
meaning or hecaiusethe reality they refer to is really the same-
then Thomas's contention that the 1abso1utenames of positive
rtiheologylalle predicated anafogiically of God cannot be upheld,
and therefore God's transcendence will be sJighted by all di-
vine predication. This investigation of what Thomas means
by the distinction between *res significata* and *modus signifi-
candi* begins by looking at ;the actual historieal genesis of the
          terminology.

I. *Historical Background*

   Thanks to rthe combined efforts of several scholars, today
we have a fairly good picture of the We:stern ancestry of the
term *modus significandi,* which began its ual'eer in grammar
but was later incorporated into logic and epistemology and
whlch in its later ioontexts was distinguished from the *res
significata.*[8]

114. For Morreall, the *RS* is what the word *really* means, but we do not
know what that is; the *RS* is a "core meaning" that has picked up limited
connotations by being applied to creatures for so long; supposedly, after
stripping away the " encrustations   of the *MS,* we are left with the "pure"
meaning or *RS.* But at this point no one can describe that pure meaning,
and so in the end it is no meaning at all.

   [8] See Charles Thurot, *Emtraits de divers manuscrits latins pour servir a
l'histoire des doctrilnes grammaticales   au moyen age* (Frankfurt: Minerva,
1964; repr. from *Notices et emtraits des manuscrits de la Bibliotheque Im-
periale,* vol. 22/2 [Paris, 1868]), especially pp. 148-60; Ueberweg-Geyer, *Die
patristische und soholastische Philosophie,* vol. 2 in *Grundriss der Geschiohte
der Philosophie,* 11th ed. (Berlin: Mittler, 1928), section 37, especially pp.
455-60; Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches   Geistesleben,* 3 vols. (Munich:
M. Hueber, 1926; 1936; 1956), especially vol. 1, chap. 4, and vol. 3, chaps. 3
and 12; M.-D. Chenu, "Grammaire et theologie aux XIIe et XIIIe siecles,"
Archwes d'histoire dootrinale et litteraire du moyen ,age 10 (1936) 5-28;
idem, *La theologie au douzieme sieole,* Preface lly E. Gilson, :Etudes de philo-
sophie medievale 45 (Paris: Vrin, 1957) ; Franz Manthey, *Die Sprachphilo-
sophie des hl. Thomas von Aquin und ihre Anwendung auf Probleme der
Theowgie* (Paderborn: SchOningh, 1937); Brendan O'Mahoney, "A Medieval
Semantic: The Scholastic *Tractatus de modis signiffoandi," Laurentian-um* 5

The remote foun:dations of the term are to be found :in Aristotle, Boethius (, and the Latin grammarian Prisoian, a contemporary of Boethius. Chapters two .and thl"'ee of Aristoble's *On Interpreta.tion* teach that rthe noun and verb "signify" *(semainein)* something, and that the verb" signifies time in addition" *(prossemainein chronon):* e.g., *health* is a noun and *is healthy* a verb, the fatter s1ignifyingin aiddition (to whait the noun signifies) ithat cthe health is *now* presently existing. In his commenta.ry on Aristotle's *On Interpretation,* Boethius understands the Philosopher to mea:n that while the noun may signify *(signifioare)* ·time in one sense (in words Hk!e *today* or *tomorrow)* , only the veTb neoessarily and as pairt of its very naturre consignifies *(consigniffoare)* time according to its" proper mode" *(proprius modus)* .⁹ Boet:hius's *consignificare* is very olose in meaning to Aristotle's *prossemainein,* and the Boetihian ve11b consigni:fies time aocol'ding to a *modus* .¹⁰ Finally, in his *Institutiones grammaticae* Priscian refers to the "semantic properties" *(proprietates significationum)* of the v;arious parts of discourse, wh1oh by the middJe of the twelfth century will be disicussed under the term *modi significandi.*

In the ea:rly middle ages, from the eighth to the beginning

(1964) 448-86; idem, "The Medieval Treatise on Modes of Meaning," *Philo·sophioal Studies* 14 (1965) 117-38; Geoffrey Bu:rsill-Hall, *Speculative Grammars of the Middle Ages,* Approaches to Semiotics **II** (The Hague/ Paris: Mouton, 1971) ; Jan Pinborg, *Die Entwicklung der Spraohtheorie im Mittelalter,* Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42/2 (Munster: Aschendorff, 1967) : idem, *Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter: Ein Uberblick* (Stuttgart/Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1972); idem, "Speculative Grammar," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,* ed. A. Kenny, N. Kretzmann, J. Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1982) 254-69; for the old logic of the Middle Ages, see *The Cambridge History* 101-57, and for the logic of the high Middle Ages, see section four of the same work; other relevant literature may be found in E. J. Ashworth, *The Tradition of Medieval Logic and Speculative Grammar from Anselm to the End of the Seventeenth Century: A Bibliography from 1836 Onwards* (Toronto: PIMS, 1978).

9 *In librum Aristotelis De interpretatimie,* 2nd ed., "De nomine" (*PL* 64:421D-422B); cf. idem, *De divisione (PL* 64:888D-889A).

io Cf. Pinbo:rg, *Die Entwicklung* 30-45.

of the twelfth century, grammar-in conjunction with dialectic
and rhetoric, the other two parts of the trivium-was   taught
in the cloister and cathedral siohools, mainly as a commentary
on Priscian and Donatus. In its middle third, however, the
twelfth century experienced a logicizing of grammar, under the
influence of the translations of Aristotle's logical organon,
especiaMy as it was interpreted by the commentaries and logi-
cal treatises of Boethius and by other Arabic commentaries. [11]
This logicizing took p1ace especially at the hands of Peter Abe-
la11d (d. ll4Q) [12] and Peter Helias, a professor ait Paris around
1140 who is actually the founder of the medieval logic of lan-
guage, exp1aining Priscian',s *Institutiones grammatiaae* through
Aristotle's *Categories* and *On Interpretation.* [13] He teaches that
the parts of speech ail'e distinguished from one another by their
modi sigriificandi, which is his understanding of Priscian's
proprietates significationum. A part of speech is a sound in-
dicating the mind's conoept, i.e., it is a way *(modus)* of sig-
nifying or consignifying something. Thus, the noun is that
which signifies "srnhstance with quaility." He a.rgues for seven
parts of speech-noun, verb, participle, pronoun, adverb,
preposition, and conjunction---,on the grounds that there are
only seven modes of signification and rejects the interjection
since it does not have a per se mode of significakion. The "es-
sentirul modes" are what pertain always and univcersa11lyto the
parts of speech as 'Such, and the " 'aicc1dental modes " are
either species of the essentiaJ parts of speech (a noun may he
eiither appellative or proper) or something seicondary to the

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[11] For Boethius's influence on medieval logic, see *Ohenu, La theologie,* chap.
6. The early period of medieval logic, which runs from the beginning of the
twelfth century to about 1230, is sometimes called *logiaa antiqua* and fur-
ther subdivided into *logica vetus* and *logiaa nova:* the former is founded on
Porphyry's *lsagoge,* .Aristotle's *Categories* and *On Interpretation,* and
Boethius's logic treatises; the latter is founded on the remaining treatises of
.Aristotle's logical organon.

[12] Note that .Abelard distinguishes the *nomen* from the *verbum* by the way
(modus) each signifies time (see Thurot 150) .

[1a] For the very early logic before .Abelard and Peter Helias, see Grabmann,
3:94-113.

essential mode as such (e.g.• the Single or plrural number of a noun) .u

The thirteenth century deepened the logical advance with treatises dealing with sentence and enunciation, the properties of terms (like supposition and distribution) , and the syncate-gorematicals, which are various connective, modaJ, or numeral ·terms (like *omnis, totus, non, et, an, necessario,* etc.). The most famous treatise of this period is Peter of Spain's *Sum-mulae logicales* (ca. 1240-45),15

FinaHy, from 1270-1350 a new genre flowe11ed, known as *grammatica speculativa,* whose works were commonly called *Tractatus de modis significandi* or *Summae modorum signifi-candi,16* and whose authors were named *Modistae.* Relying on Aristotle's logicail corpus (as interpreted by Boethius), Pris-cian, Donatus, and Peter Helias, the *Modistae* treatises merged grammar with logic ·and even metaphysics, aittempting to con-struct a philosophy of language that could describe a universal linguistics and grammar that are isomorphic with and depend-ent upon common reality. The *Modistae* take for granted a realistic epistemofogy, especiai1ly in the celebrated triad of *modus essendi, modus intelligendi,* and *modus significandi,* the first of which grounds :the *res,* which is represented by the *con-ceptus* (grounded in the second) , which is signified by the *dictio* (grounded in ·the third). A physical noise (vox) be-comes a woro *(dictio)* and part of speech *(pars orationis)* by hamg a determinate *modus significandi* within the language, ibut this latter is directly conditioned by the wiay in which in-tell.ecilU'rul knowl,edge gra:sps reality intentionally *(modus in-telligendi)* , which is itself repI1esentative of it:he various cate-gories and kinds of reailiity *(modus essendi)* .11

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u See Thurot 153-55, 170.

11 The treatise is divided into seven smaller ones: enunciation, universals, predicamentals, syllogism, topics, fallacies, and properties of terms.

16 Cf. Grabmann, 1: 115-46. The *Modistae* tra.ctates diminished with the rise of nominalism, which could not abide their realism of universals.

11 See Boethius of Dacia, *Opera,: Modi 8ignifica1114isi-ve quaestionetJ Bupe1' PriBoianum Ma.iorem* (written ca. 1270), ed. J. Pinborg, H. Roos, S.S. Jensen,

The *modus Signifir;andi* gmdua.hly be1came]identified with a *oonsignifir;atio,* which couM mean two things: the syintactic meaning of a *dir;tio,* i.e., how a word needs to be il'e1atedto others in a statement in o'l.1derto signify syntactica.Hy; or the secondary, connotative meaning in addition to the primary, denofative one (e.g., the v;erb consignifies tense, one of its1 aiccidentrul modes) .[19] The *MS,* then, which is a *r;onsigni-fiootio* and which establishes the paoc:ts of speech, can be different even when the reality *(res)* referred to l'emains the same because the *modus intelligendi* on which the *MS* is based is also different. The usual example is rbhat of pain: *dolor* and *doleo* signify the same *res,* some sort of pain, but the former does so *per modum permanentis* and the latter *per modum fiuxus vel fieri.*[20] Jan Pinborg offers a concise summary of the grammatical ana1lysiisof the *Modistae:*

According to modistic analysis words consist of a phonological element *(vox)* and two levels of semantic components, one concerned with specific or lexical meanings *(significata specialia),* the other with more general meanings, called *modi significandi,* on which in turn the syntactical component depends .... By a first imposition the expression is connected with a referent, insofar as a name is instituted to refer to a definite object or attribute of an object. How this happens is almost never discussed in any detail. The relation holding between the expression and the object referred to is called the *ratio significandi.* It is often described as the 'form ' which turns a mere sound into a lexeme *(dictio)* .... In a secondary imposition the lexeme receives a number of *modi significandi* which determine the grammatical categories of the word .... A given lexeme can be associated with different *modi,* so that the same lexeme may be realised as different parts of speech and as

vol. 4/1-2 of Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi (Hauniae: Gad, 1969) 4.15ff, 7.42ff, 27.36, 64.77ff, 81.25, 83.51, 262.83. Michael de Marhais (late 13th century) writes: "Unde ratio intelligendi sumitur ab ipsa re; quam rationem intelligendi presupponit ratio significandi existens in dictione" (Thurot 156).

[1]s For the details of this process, see Pinborg, *Die Entwioklung* 30-45.

[19] Bursill-Hall 54-55; Thurot 155-56.

[20] O'Mahoney, "A Medieval Semantic " 466-86; idem, "The Medieval Treatise " 124·28.

different grammatical forms.... Obviously then, the *modi* are a kind of semantical modifiers, further determining the lexical meaning of the *dictio,* thus preparing it for various syntactical functions.21

Aquinais certainly recognizes the traiditional triad of *modus essendi, modus intelligendi,* and *modus signifioondi (Berm.* 1.8.90), and he also knows how to empfoy the purely grammatical distinctions of the *Modistae* and other medieval logicians and grammarians, especially in his Trinitarian thoology.22 Nevertheless, he probably did not know ,any of the *Modistae* texts properly 1speaking,for he does not use the modal definition for the parts of speech, and the first real texts of the *Modistae* genre only appear about four years before his death, in 1270, with Martin and Boethius of Dacia.23 Still, some of the ideas and concepts of the *grammafica speculativa* were probably known and discussed some time before they began to be formally published in 1270.

Three points conclude this section. Fil"st, the *res/modus* distinction has its historical roots in the discipline of grammar, from Beter Helias to the *Modistae.* Aquinas, however, incorporates the distinction into his theological   **and**

21" Speculative Grammar" 257-58. For the plethora of *mocU significandi* used by the *Modistae* in order fully to define each part of speech, see O'Mahoney, "The Medieval Treatise" 128-38; Bursill-Hall 345-91.

22 *ST* 1.39.3, for one example. James Egan shows how Thomas uses the grammatical distinction between the concrete and abstract modes of naming in his teaching on the Trinity (" Naming in St. Thomas' Theology of the Trinity," in *From an Abundant Spring,* ed. by *Thomist* staff [NY: P. J. Kenedy, 1952] 152-71). For a commentary on *ST* 1.39 from a semantic perspective, see Michael-Thomas Liske, "Die sprachliche Richtigkeit bei Thomas von Aquin," *Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie* 32 (1985) 373-90. Cf. Fernando Inciarte, " La importancia de la uni6n predicado-sujeto en la doctrina trinitaria de Tomas de Aquino," *Scrip ta Theologica* 12 (1980) 871-84; idem, "Zur Rolle der Pradikation in der Theologie des Thomas von Aquin: Am Beispiel der Trinitatslehre," in Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13/1, *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981) 256-69.

2a Pinborg agrees with Manthey and O'Mahoney on this point *(Die Elntwicklung* 69, n. 19). For some background to the "modes of discourse" in Aquinas, see Mark Jordan, "Modes of Discourse in Aquinas' Metaphysics, *New Scholcwtici1m* 54 (1980) 401-16.

justifies it, as we shall see, by recourse to theological truth. [24]
Second, while some of the *modi* are essential. to the various
parts of speech, they are accidental to the specific, lexical
meanings of individual words. [25] This opens up the possibility,
then, of e:xdsing the *modi* in oroer to penetrate to the pure
lexiool meaning of divine names. But Thomas will not allow
this in his understanding of the *modi,* for the *ratio nominis* of
.any divine name is *always* a creaturely meaning such that we
can never cut away a creaturely mode in order to come up with
a *ratio nominis* that applies purely ·and properly to God. [26]
Thmd, the grammatical employment of the *res/modus* distinc-
tion has a propensity to Slllpport univocity to the degree that
it refers to an inner-worldly reality that remains the same in
itself even though the ways of understanding and signifying
it may vary (e.g., pain is the same in itself even though the
ways of understanding and signifying it as a noun or verb are
different). Aquinas's use of *modus intelligendi* and *modus sig-
nificandi* is more mysterious and diffioolt to grasp: the *res* of
the tmnscendent God and the finite creature is *not* the same,
and yet in true theologicwl judgments the same creaturely
ratio nominis, with its attendant creatureily *modi* of !Understand-
ing and signification, somehow rewches: past the creature to

[24] Pinborg sees Thomas's use of the *MS* as grounded in real existential dif-
ferences, whereas the *Modistae* relied more on Avicenna's "existence-indif-
ferent conception of being" *(Die Entwiaklung* 38-39, 44-45, and n. 68). Keith
Buersmeyer shows how Thomas knows that the polysemy of the word *est*
depends on first knowing the truth about reality and how he is more flexible
than the *Modistae* of his time and later in not attempting to make grammar
adjudicate for metaphysics ("The Verb and Existence," *New Soholastioism*
60 [1986] 145-62). D. Salman writes that the theory of the *modi signifioand.1:,*
"classic in grammar since Peter Heliae, had undergone at the hands of St.
Thomas a daring epistemol-Ogical transposition, based on a very deliberate
psychology of knowledge and on a new conception of the metaphysical struc-
ture of the object" *(Bulletin thomiste* 5 [1937] 184) .

:[25] We note in passing that Thomas holds, contrary to those known as
the *Nominales* and to some of the *Modistae,* that the verb's consignification
of time is not accidental but essential to its very meaning *(DV* 1.5; *Quod.*
4.9.2) ; cf. Chenu, " Grammaire et theologie " 9-22.

[211] On this point, see Rocca 540-54.

posit ,a, *res* in the infinite God. This wilJl 'become dearer in the
next section.

II. *Res Significata and Modus Significandi 'in Aquinas*

Every proper and positive divine name can be <CionsideTed
f,romtJhvee perspectiv;es: that of the *res significata,* the ultimate
rerulity which divine prediica:tionsignifies ito exisit pr:opedy and
with priority in God; that of the *ratio nominis,* the conceptual
meaning or proper signiliorutionwh:iichis ahvays   and
is only said properly of the cveabme; that of the *modus sig-
nificandi,* which is a consequence of our conceptual mode of
understanding and which ailso is only said properly of the
creature. 21 But what does Thomas mean by the phrase *modus
significandi?* By denying the *MS* of God, he usruaJilyintends to
reject anything composite in God, since our mode of significa-
tion always entails composition, but rejecting composition also
involves refusing anything accidental or anything merely ab-
stract or concl'ete in God. Moreover, his denial of the *MS* :rests
upon the ontolog1cal truth that God lacks any finite mode and
upon the epistemologioal truth of the oreatme's conna.tural
mode of understanding.

A. God's Modelessness and the Creature's Mode

Thomas identifies God with the pure perfection of infinite
and moddess heing.28 "Nothing is said of God by participa-
tion, for whatever is prurticiprutedis determined to the mode of
that which is participated and so is possessed in a partial way
and not wccording to every mode of perfection" *(SCG*
1.32.288). God's rnodelessness is the divine infinity and vice
versa. As *esse purum,* God " is not limited to some mode of the
peirfeotion of being but possesses the tota.lity of being in him-
self." 29 Thus:, God "does: not exist by any mode, i.e.$ aiccord-

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21 See *DV* 2.1 adIl; *BOG* 1.34.298; *BT* l.13.3; l.13.6.

:2s For texts and discussion, see Rocca 481-93.

29 *DP* 2.L "Every act inhering in something else receives its termination
from that in which it is, because whatever is in another is in tha-t thing

ing to :some finite and limited mode, but he has. universally and infinitely encompassed *(aooipere)* in himself the totality of being" *(DDN* 5.1.629); thait is, God's not existing by any mode *means* t:hat he has the totality of heing "simply and without limitation *(incircumscriptive)"* *(SCG* 1.28.267). When Thomas, then, speaks of God as having a mode,[30] or of having perfections wcco:Ning to the noblest moide,[31] we must understand him to he speaking loosely :Since he alrea.dy knows that the divine infinity precludes God from possessing any strict mode whatsoever. Other indications also show that he has nQ intention of claiming a strict mode in God: God's " noblest mode " of possessing being turns out to be tantamount to the identity of being and essence in God, which is Thomas's principail reason for claiming God to be infinite;[32] certain phrases containing *modus* as predicated of God 1are oxymoronic;[33] finally, if God's mode is the divine essence,[34] and if God's esseIllce is the divine being, and if God's being is infinite and without determinate mode, then to speak of God's mode is really to signify the divine modclessness.

Correlatively, therefore, the crea.ture's mode is first of all the ·limited, determinate, and finite level or grade of being the creature enjoys;[85] " The different grades of beings are consti-

through the mode of the recipient. The act that exists in no other thing, therefore, is terminated in no other thing ... and God is the act that in no way exists in another" *(SOG-* 1.43.360). Cf. *SS* 1.43.1.l; 1.43.1.2. ad4; *DV* 29.3.

so *SS* 1.43.1.2. adl; *BDH* 3.51; *DV* 5.8. ad3; *BOG-* 1.29.270; 1.31.281; 1.34.298; *DP* 3.15.adl9.

sɪ *SS* 1.2.1.2; 1.23.1.2.

32 Cf. *SS* 1.8.4.1, *sea contra* 3. *Modus* may be used of God in the context of an article that rests upon acknowledging God as infinite in being *(ST* 1.13.11).

ʙs In distinction from all creatures which have a determinate, particular mode of existing, God is said to have "a universal mode of being" *(DDS* 8.199-218, 253-61), though God's "mode " must be indeterminate, infinite, and thus modeless. For similar reasons, God's "mode of supereminence" *(SOG-* 1.30.276, 278) would also seem to be an oxymoron.

ʜ ".Any mode of God is the divine essence" *(John-* 1.11.213); cf. *DV* 2.11.103-18; 8.2.ad2; *SOG-* 1.32.285.

85 *BB* 1.19.2.l.ad3; *SOG* 1.31.280; *Quod.* 4.1.l; *BT* 1.44.2.

tuted from the different modes of being (*essendi*)." [36] The
mode proper to the creature is its own species *(SCG* 1.30.276) .
Since every mode entails a thing's determination, [87] the mode
of every created thing is finite. [88] All things are given their
mode *(modificantur)* by God (SS l.3.2.3.ad3), insofar as no
creature receives being according to its total power but has it
contracted to its own speciaJ. mode of excellence *(SCG*
1.28.260).

The truth that God is mode1essly infinite is perhaps *the*
primary contention of Aquinas's qualitrutive negative theology [39]
and is the result of knowing God as *ipsum esse subsi,stens,*
which is itself the consequence of faith's view that God is the
absolutely transcendent and totalJy free creator .[4-0] The primary
truth of qualitiativie negative theology denies of God that
which is at the root of the creabure's imperfection *qua*
creature-limifation, determination, finitude, mode-and an-
nounces that God has no mode distinct from the divine nature
itself; but this means that qualitative negative ·theology lies
behind the eoncerns of modaJ. negative theology to excise from
God even the imperfect connotations of the perfection-denoting
terms we predicate of God. It also means, moreover, that we
can never pretend to conreive some pure, "unmoded" per-
fection in God by distilling out its "divine mode." Since God
has no mode, surch a pmcedure would leave us, pariadoxically,
either with a quidditative knowledge of God's perfect nature,

[36] *SOG* 1.50.424; same idea in 1.93.790; cf. 1.50.426; 1.69.579; *SS* 2.18.2.2.

[37] *De propositi-Owibus modalibus* (Leonine Commission, vol. 43 [1976]) lines
3-7. The work, if authentic, is one of Thomas's very earliest.

[as] *SS* 1.8.1.2, *sed contra* 2.

[89] Qualitative negative theology denies of God imperfect creaturely quali-
ties like corporeality or emotion. To deny mode and finitude of God is to
deny in principle every other possible creaturely imperfection, since creaturely
imperfection as such is most fundamentally the creature's status as limited,
partial, "moded." For the distinction in Aquinas between qualitative nega-
tive theology and modal negative theology, see Rocca 149-58. Modal nega-
tive theology denies of God the imperfect creaturely " modes " (in being and
understanding) of even pure perfections like wisdom and goodness.

[4o] On this point, see Rocca 423-28, 457-80, 493-509.

since perfection and mode do not differ in God, or with no
knowledge of God at aiN, smce to separate the divine mode from
a perfection woulid be to separate God from the perfection.

Negative theology's separation from God of creaturely im-
perfections and of the imperfect manner in which creatures
possess perfections is the basis for Thomas's rejection of the
modus significandi of God, by whioh he :u.suaililyintends to deny
composition or aiccidents in God. But sometimes by denying
the *MS* he ·simply wanrts to note that, whil.e our names signily
finite and de.finite forms distinct from one another, in God the
perfections signified are infinite, indefinite, ,and not really dis-
tinct fTom one another. [41] Of course, the fact that creaturely
perfections are definite and finite imp1ies that one will be dis-
tinct from the obhe:r whenever more than one are found in the
same creature.

Aquinas reoognizes a proportion between modes of being,
modes of understanding, and modes of signifying, the first coos-
ing the second, and the seoond the third. Since creatures re-
ceive perfections from God in an imperfect manner, and since
the signillcaition of a;ny name used by us is grounded in our
knowledge, which is based on the ilnpemect manner in which
creiatures participate in God, any name can he denied of God
with respect to its manner of signification *(SS* 1.22.1.2). Even
in the cas'e of terms that denote absolute perfections there is
ailway;s a creaturely connotation (*consignificatio)* insofar as
our manner of understanding the perfection is necessarily based
on sensible reality (ibid., ad.2). Ail three modes, in their proper
011der of influence, can he denied of God: " Ahl the things af-
firmed of God ean ailso be denied of him since they are not
fitting to him in the way they are found in created things and
as they 1are understood and signified by us" *(DDN* 5.3.673) .

B. The Human Mode of Unde:rstanding

In generaJ, " e'Very knower has knowledge of the thing
known not through the mode of the known thing but through

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41 *DP* 7.5ad2; *DDN* 1.3.101.

the mode of the one knowing" *(SS* VU.l). Our intellect is "informed iby created things" *(SS* 1.4.2.1.ard.2), and more particufa11ly, takes its proper mode of understanding *(mod!us mtelligendi)* from sensible things. [42] Hut God transcends whatever we can know or say of the divine being on the basis of material and created: rieality, for God transcends that rea,lity and the *modus intelligendi* founded on it. [43] *DP* 7.2ad7 signruls in a striking fashion our intell:ect's ability to transcend its own mode of understanding. [44] The inte>llect naturally understands being *(esse)* in the way rit is found in the things from which the inteHect receives its knowl!edge, and being is in these things not as suhs1isting simply but as inhering concreteJy in some substance.

Reason discovers, however,. that there is some subsistent being; and so, although the word *being* signifies in a concrete fashion, [45] when the intellect attributes being to God it transcends its own mode of signifying, attributing to God that which is signified but not the mode of signifying.

Thomas is trying to prove herie that God's being and essence are identical, that God is subsistent being *(esse).* The objection Thomas responds to claims we should not attribute being to God since God is simple i3.Jld subsis1tent whereas being is always attributed to something as if it were a concrete, inhering aiccidrent But *if* we ha,ve discov,ered a subsistent being, Thomas reasons, then the truth that " God is subsistent being " must be upheld, even though the mind rerulizes in the assertion itself that its concepts and way of understanding cannot do jusrrace to the truth it affirms of God. Tvuth outstrips the very

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[42] *SS* 1.22.l.2ad2;   cf. *ET* l.13.3.ad3.

[43] See *SDO* 6.170-71 (cf. *DDN* 1.3.77), where Thomas constructs an elaborate schema to show how we come to affirm things of God and harmonizes it with other schemas he has found in the *Liber De causis* and Pseudo-Dionysius's *On the Divine Names.* All three schemas begin at the most basic level of sensation.

[44] Cf. *DP* 7.4.adl.

[45] *Per modum conoreationis* must be a typographical mistake for *per modum ooncretionis.*

manner in which we understand as humans.   Indeed, unless: we
a:lready knew that God is ,subsistent being, we wouM never he
able to assert that our way of understanding *this very truth
itself* falls short of God, since we only know it falls short of
God hecruuse, whereas it connotes God's being as something
concrete and composed, we know that God's being is reaUy
simple and subsistent.

   We may generalize, then, and state that the *modus intelli-
gendi* ,oan be denied of God only beeause some already known
divine truth contradicts: what the *modus intelligendi,* left to
         woruldconnote or imply about God. Thomas's exampJes of
denying the *modus intelligendi* always follow this pattern.
sea 2.12 demonstrates that God cannot be reaUy related to
creation, since this would imply that God :is dependent on
something created;   and *sea* 2.13.919-20 proceeds to argue
that, since sU!ch relations are not rerully in God and yet are still
predicated of him, they must be attributed to him   on
oocount of our way of unders1tanding, " for when our intellect
understands one thing as referred to a second it also under-
stands at the same time *(cointelligere)* a !'elation of the sec-
ond to the first e¥en though the second is sometimes not really
related to the first." [46] If such relations are predicated of God
and yet we know that they cannot acturully be in God, then by
a process of elimination we know that their predication and
significlation are the result of our naturail way of understand-
ing. Again, ailthough creation is not really a process of change,
it seems to be so aJCcordingto our mode of understanding since
we imagine and understand the same thing la,s existing both be-
fore and after its creation; and since the *MS* foMows the *modus
intelligendi,* we also signify creation as if it were a change. [41]

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[46] The mind cannot escape its way of understanding   and yet also knows
that it cannot escape and so judges its predications   about God accordingly.
Temporal relations are predicated of God insofar as they result from our way
of understanding,   not that the intellect discovers any real relation of God
to the world, "but more from a certain necessity that is consequent upon
the mode of understanding"   *(DP* 7.11).

[47] *SCG* 2.18.953; *S'l'* 1.45.2ad2.   *SCG* 2.10.903 states that power is attrib-

For Aquinas, composition is the mos:t salient feature of the human way of understanding that must always be denied in divine predication. Our intellect knows the simpae in the mode of the .composite, apprehending the simple form as a subject and .attributing something to it *(ST* 1.13.U.ad2), for the in-:teJJ.ectforms   areo11dingto the mode of composite thlngs, from which it natumhly takes its knowledge (SS 1.4.2.1). Nevierthe1ess,the intellect rises above its natura1 way of know-mg and does not rattrihute the 'composition to God, UII!derstand-mg that whwt corresponds to ail·l its different concepts is one and simple: " For the intehlect does not attribute to the things it understands the mode by which it understands .them, as it does not attribute immateriality to the stone though it knows the &one immrutecirully" (SCG 1.36.302). The mind is not false when it understands the simple God :in a composite fash-ion, for there is ·a double meaning to the proposition " the in-tellect is false thrut understands ra thing otherwise than it is":

The adverb *otherwise* can determine the verb *understand* in rela-tion to the thing understood or to the one understanding. If the former, then the proposition is true, and the meaning is: any in-tellect is false that understands a thing to be otherwise than it ac-tually is; but this is not the case here, for when our intellect forms a proposition about God it does not say that he is composite but that he is simple. If the latter, then the proposition is false. For the intellect's mode of understanding is different from the thing's mode of being, and it is clear that our intellect understands in an immaterial fashion those material things that exist on a level be-low itself, not that it understands them to be immaterial but that it possesses an immaterial mode of understanding. Similarly, when it understands simple things above itself,. it understands them ac-cording to its own mode, i.e., in a composite fashion, but not that it understands them to be composite *(ST* 1.18.12.ad8).

C. The Ruman Mode of Signification

Based on rllaithin God as the transcendent and free creator, on the truth that God is the pure positivity of *lpsum esse sub-*

uated to God with respect to immanent actions only according to the *modus iinteUigendi*and "not according to the truth of the matter."

sistens, on qualitative negative theology's rejection of all mode, finitude, imperfection, and composition in God, on modal negative theology's rejection of anything imperfoot in God's possession of perfections, and on Qlllr characteristic *modus in-telligendi,* Thomas's rejection of the *modus significandi* of any divine predication primarily intoods to bolster and uphold God's simplicity and substi.stence and thus to separate from God the inevitable connotations of composition, abstraction, and concretion that arise whenever our mind forms and signi-fies ·any predication, as well as the related eonnotation that would imply anything aiccidental in God. Because he already knows thait nothing composite, concrete, abstract, or accidental rea1ly exists in God, he can reject what the *MS* would seem in-directly to posit in God, and he can impute such connotations to the characteristic fashion in which our mind understands and signifies what it knows rather than to any reality in God.

He explains the different *modus essendi* or *modus subsistendi* of various substances by referenee to their level of simplicity or complexity. Materiail substances have a different mode of *esse* from that of separate substances, and separate substances from that of God, for God is the divine *esse* and nature, sepa-rate S1Ubstances are not their own nature, and material S1Ubstancesal'e neither their own *esse* nor their own nature but only S1Ubsistas individruals.'⁴⁷ But even though we know these di:ffierent modes of being exist, the mode of signification of " God is good " and " that woman is good " is the same in both

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4'BDA 17.adlO. *DA* 17 argues that the essence of the separated soul belongs to the genus of separate intellectual substances and has the same *modus subsistendi,* since both kinds of entity are subsistent forms. Material things, however, do not belong to the same genus as separate quiddities and have a different *modus essendi (DA* 16). Cf. *DP* 7.7 on the different *modus ea:is-tendi* of the house in material reality and in the builder's mind. Thomas can also refer to the ten Aristotelian predicaments or categories as diverse grades of material entity that give rise to diverse modes of being *(DV* 1.1.114-61). *Ens* is divided into the ten categories according to a different *modus essendi,* and since the modes of being are proportional to the modes of predication, the ten highest genera are called the ten predicaments. *(Phy£:.* 3.5.322; cf. *SS* 1.8.4.3; l.22.l.3ad2).

cases; in fact, rit is only because he realizes God's mode of exist-ence :is not the same as the mode implied 1and connoted when we say " God is good " that Thoma1s teHs us we mrust deny the *MS* when we predicrute goodness of God. 49 A ,similar situation obtains m the oase of concrete and a.bstmrct names.

In all the reality that exists below the first cause, certain things are found that are complete and exist perfectly, while others are imperfect and incomplete *(diminutus).*   The perfect things are those that are per se subsistent in nature, which we signify through concrete names *(human, wise,* etc.); the imperfect things are those that are not per se subsistent, like forms, which we signify by ab-stract names *(humanity, wisdom,* etc.) .... Every name we use either signifies a sharing in something complete,. as concrete names do, or signifies something as an incomplete formal part, as abstract names do. Hence no name we use is worthy of the divine ex-cellence.50

The *MS* is directly dependent on the l'eai composition of s111b-sis1tent, concrete things with nonsuhsistent, ahsitraiet qualities and forms; it !'enders every name unworthy of God since we know that God is neither ,concrete in a composite fashion nor abstract in an incomplete or imperfect fashion.

    SCG 1.30.277 teJ.ls us more exaotly why the *MS* renderis eve:ry name we use unworthy of God's transcendent e:imeNence.

   49 It is not universally true, then, to say that for Thomas " a difference of *modus essendi* of a referent corresponds to a difference of *modus signifi-oandi* of a predicate" (James Ross, *Portraying Analogy* [Cambridge Cam-bridge University, 1981] 165), though it is true in the case of the ten Aris-totelian categories, which are the ultimate *modi praedioandi* corresponding to the ten most fundamental *modi essendi* among material realities *(Phys.* 3.5.322). It is precisely because the creaturely and material objective mode connoted by a predicate's mode of signification does *not* correspond to God's objective mode as the predicate's referent that Thomas feels constrained to deny our human mode of signification in all divine predication.
   50 *sna* 22.378; 383. While *humanity* and *human* both refer to the whole human e,ssence, the former does so *per modum partis* and the latter *per modum totius* (SB 1.23.1.l) ; *homo* signifies the human as a concrete whole and *humanitas* signifies that formal element by which a human is a human *(Meta.* 7.5.1379-80). Since *Deus* signifies divinity in the concrete while *Deitas* does so in the abstract, the latter, on account of its *modus signifi-oandi,* cannot be used in place of one of the personal names of the Trinity whereas the former can *(John* 1.l.44).

With a name we express reality in the way that our intellect conceives it. Having the origin of its knowledge in the senses, our intellect does not transcend the mode found in sensible things, in which, on account of the composition of form and matter, the form and that which possesses the form are different. A simple form is indeed found in sensible things, but it is imperfect since it does not subsist; a subsistent thing that possesses the form is also found, but it is composite (*concretio*) rather than simple. Whatever our intellect signifies as subsistent,. therefore, it signifies as a composite being, and whatever it signifies as simple it signifies not as *toot which is* but as that *by which* something is. And so,. as regards the mode of signifying, every name we predicate has imperfection, which does not belong to God, though the reality signified is suitable to God in some eminent way. This is clearly the case in the names *goodness* and *good:* they signify something, respectively, as nonsubsistent and as concrete; in this respect no name is appropriately applied to God but only with respect to the reality that the name is used to signify.

Theologicail truth tells us that our names cannot do justice to God, whose   is perfeetly subsistent rather than imperfectly abstract, and whose subsistence is totaHy simple rather than concretely composite. [51]

Every name fails to signify the divine being since no name signifies at the same time something perfect and simple, for abstract names do not signify a being subsisting through itself and concrete names signify a composite being; ... rejecting whatever is imperfect, we use both kinds of name in divine predication, abstract names on account of their simplicity and concrete names because of their perfection. [52]

An inidividuaJ. suhstanioe existing with categorical accidents

[51] Cf. *SOG* 1.26.248. In *SS* l.4.2.lad2, Thomas justifies the Dionysian modal negation "God is not wise" by saying that God is not wise as other things are wise in such a. way that in God wisdom should differ from the one who is wise.

[52] *SS* l.4.1.2; same idea in *ST* 1.3.3.adl; cf. *SS* l.8.l.1.ad3; *DP* 8.2.ad7; *ST* l.13.Lad2. Chenu explains how in certain early medieval thinkers the theology of God's absolute simplicity prevents Priscian's definition of the noun ("that which signifies substance with quality") from enjoying a universal extension, since we name with nouns the God in whom there is no composition of substance and quality *(La tMologie* 100-107).

always entails ,a certain degree of composition, at least of the substance or subject and its accidents. [53] For this reason alone we woU!ld have to deny 1any 1aocidentsin God, but we also must do so because an accident implies dependence (SS 1.8.4.3) and because, since God is his own being and nature and therefore identified with .simple and pure actuality, no further perfection can -accrue to him by way of run accident. [54] Because of the theological negation of accidents in God, Thomas holds that, although we predicate of God certain perfection terms (like *wisdom)* which signify .areidents in creatures, we must not suppose they signify ruccidentsin God *(ST* 1.3.6.rudl) and must therefo!"e deny their *modus significandi.*[55] Once again, his reason for rejecting the *MS* is its connotation of something in God that he rulready knows to be untrue. Since no divine name can be taken as implying run accident in God, a name that among crea;tu:veswouM have as its highest genus one of :the nine categorical accidents (such as quality) is said to be predicated according to its proper specific meaning but not according to its generic meaning (e.g., *wisdom* denotes the perfection of knowledge in God but nothing 'accidental), since that generic meaning a;lway.sl"efers to a categorical wooident.[56]

In coDJclusion,Aquinas acknowledges the traditional triad of *modus essendi* (objective mode), *modus intelligendi,* and *modus significandi* (subjective modes), with eruch member grounding the one (s) after it. [57] As ·such, the denial of the *MS* is a short-

[53] *Meta.* 7.11.1533-36 and *SS* 1.8.4.3; cf. *Meta.* 7.5.1379-80.

[54] *DP* 7.4 and *SOG-1.23.*

[55] *SS* 1.9.1.2, and ad4.

[56] *SS* 1.8.4.3 and *DP* 7.4.ad2; cf. *SS* 1.4.1.1; l.22.l.3.ad2; l.35.l.l.ad2; l.35.l.4.ad7. Strictly speaking, a predicate falling under the category of relation could even be said of God according to its generic meaning, for relation denotes only *esse ad* and not *esse in (SS* 1.8.4.3). Only the generic categories of substance *(De Deo uno)* and relation *(De Deo trino)* are applicable to God *(SS* 1.8.4.3; cf. *SS* 1.8.4.2.adl; l.22.l.3.ad2).

[51] See W. Norris Clarke, ".Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language about God: A Reply to Kai Nielsen," *Th-Omist* 40 (1976) 75-80; Giinther Poltner, "Die Reprasentation als Grundlage analogen Sprechens von Gott im Denken des Thomas von Aquin," *Salzburger Jahrbuoh ffir Philosophie* 21-22 (1976-77) 26-37.

hand way of pointing out how every proper predication placing a *res significata* in God inevitably faHs short of God. The denial of the *MS* pmifies our assertions about God by separating from God all composition, abstra:ction, concreteness, and accidents. [58] A few texts e¥en seem to use the *MS* stratagem in order to deny of God the finite and determinate mode of creaturely perfections. The rejection of the *MS* only makes sense in the context of previously known theofog]cai1 truths, for only such truths justify and make possible the denia1 of the imperfecrtions implied and connoted by our human ways of understanding and expression. The *MS* stmtagem is negative theology in brief compass, purifying the expressions of positive theofogy by recourse to theological truth.

III. *The Res/Modus Distinction and the Analogical Nature of. Divine Predication*

Does use of the *res/modus* distinction secretly rea:dmit univocity into divine predication after he has seemingly hrunished it? Does his use of it veil a hidden univocity so that he and Duns Scotus are saying the same thing after aill? Three reasons suggest an ans:wer in the negative. [59]

First, Aquinas's 1ana1ysis disco¥ers three essential elements to 1aH divine the *res significata,* the *modus significandi,* and the *ratio nominis.* The denial of the *MS* does not leave us with a pure oolllcept exaetly fitted to God's transcendent perfection, for our concept of any perfection (the *ratio nominis)* is *always* and *ineluctably* hound to and primarily

[58] See Ralph Mcinerny, *The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961) 59-60, 157-61.

[59] David Burrell distinguishes Scotus's use of the distinction, which leads to univocity, from Thomas's *(Analogy and Philosophical Language* [New Haven: Yale, 1973] 117, 178-80). Thomas uses it but does not rely on it, since of itself it tends to direct meaning to univocity; indeed, his practice "contradicts" the distinction (ibid. 136-39). John Wippel absolves Aquinas of any "veiled univocity" in his use of the distinction *(Metaphysical Themes m Thomas Aquinas,* Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 10 [Washington, D.C.: CUA, 1984] 238).

predicated of creatures. The mind uses the *ratio nominis* :to signify the *RS* in God, .alil the while denying the *MS* of the *ratio nominis,* but it never sees or conceives anything more in the concept thc:tn the creature's perfection which the concept nat.iuraJly signirfies. There is no univocal core to the concept th.rut has been !albs"Wacled from its finite and: infinite modes; rather, anallogy comes to pa:ss when the mind :predicates the *ratw nominis* of God in an oot of judgment that clwims a truth about the holy darkness of God ·which transcends anything the concept can quidditaitively gvasp on its own, hound as it is to creatures. ₀° Confusion ensues ii we do not preserve the *ratio nominis* as part of Aquin:ais's analysis. :Bor him, the *ratio nomiriis,qua* concept, is always referred to the creature as the prime analogue; it does not become analogiml by being reconceived in ra deeper fashion with reference now to a purer divine meaning hut rather by being used in a true judgment th.alt posits some reality in God. The truth of the judgment makes us realize that the concept, as ʹ⁄.l,Sed hut not as *conceived,* has been extended beyond the creaturely reailm. We never rea:lly know in a clear con:ceptual fashion what a divine name might mean for God, and whatever we do know about such a name is a;lways a consequence of the judgments we have already made about God. The source of unity, moreover, for every analogical extension within divine predication is always the oreaturely conceptuail meaning of the *ratio nomims₆₁*

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60 See Edward Schillebeeckx, *Revelation and 7'heology,* trans. *N.* D. Smith, 2 vols. (NY: Sheed and Ward, 1968) 2:170-78, 204; "The *act of 8ign-ifymg* goes further than the *ratio nominis* ... " (ibid. 171).

61 The *ratio nominis* is the source of unity in divine predication. Both Kvanvig and Morreau (see our opening paragraph above and nn. 6-7) seem to identify the *ratio nominis* with the *RS,* which lands them in trouble: the former thinks Thomas identifies the *RS* in God and creatures, when actually Thomas speaks of the *ratio nominis* as being analogically-which does not mean conceptually-one in God and creatures; in the latter's opinion, since for Thomas the *RS* is what the name really means and since we never actually know what that meaning is, there is ultimately no meaning at all in divine predication-but while Thomas does admit that we have no concept of the *RB* in God we do have a conceptual knowledge of the *ratio mnmnit* as it

Second, the *Tes/modus* distinction is really a microcosm or encapsuiwtion of the whole combined expanse of Thomas's positive and ll!egative theology. Faith (supported by reason) in the free and transcendent Creator-God as *ipsum esse subsistens* grounds the whole of his positive theology. This view of God is the basis for the most fundamental proposition of his qualitative negative theology, the truth that expresses God's infinite modelessness and consequent incomprehensibility and thus allows the supereminent modelessness o.f God to remain -indeed demands that it remain-in impenetrable and transcendent darkness. Positive and qualitative negative theology exercise their influence upon modaJ negative theology, which denies anything imperfect even in the perfections of God.[62] The *res/modus* distinction first posits a reality *(RS)* in God (positive theology) and then, on the basis of a qualitative negative theology that denies any *modus* in God at the same time as it refuises any conceptual knowledge of God's *res* or *modus,* rejects the connotations of divine predication (the deniwl of the *MS)* that would place anything composite, abstract, concrete, or a:ccidentaJ in God (moda:l negative theofogy). Because of the judgments of   and qualitative negative theology, Thomas can deny the *MS* in divine predication even though he never pretends to know God's *res, ratio,* or *modus;* indeed, we must have recourse to negative names or names of ,supereminence in order to express the divine mode, whose quiddity escapes us *(SCG* 1.80.278). In other words, Thoma.s's theologircwl epistemology teaches us that while the *RS* can be sa.id of God in true affirmations and the *MS* of those same affirmations can be simu!l.taneoruslydenied, we still neve,r know, para.doxically, *what* that *res* or its *infinite mode* amounts to in God and this means that one can never use the *res/modus*

applies to creatures, which is then a source of unity for the meanings of divine predication.

[62] Burrell reinterprets the *res/modus* distinction as an integral part of Thomas's negative theology, which continually denies that any concept can represent God *(Analogy* 162-64).

distinction to distill a univocrulcore of meaning out of a com-
pound solution of finite and infinite modes.[63] It is ,true that the
distinction is used by Thomas in regions remote from its orig-
inal appHcation in grammar, where it cou1d easily cohabit with
.a univocal view of reality, and it is true that a too wooden or
mwterial interpretation of it quickly 1eaids baick to univooity.[0,]
It is also true that of itself it adds nothing new to his theologi-
cal epistemology. Nevertheless, 'I\homas does employ the dis-
tinction as a kind of partial compendium of that epistemology,
1and thus its proper interpretation should evoke the compJexus
of judgments that comprise his positive and negative theology.

FinaNy, ·since the analogical nature of divine predication and
the use of the *res/modus* distinction are, in Aquinas, matters
of judgment insterud of concept,[65] the danger of the " common
core of univocity " is avoided. His transcendental analogy de-
pends not on a more profound concepturulizfoghut on recog-
nizing the truth about God. One author has written that
Thomas uses the distinction to remind us we have to consider
ibwo things' any time we employ a peclection-expression for
God: " the immediate   in which it applies, and the in-
tention or scope latent within the term." [66] This " intention "
within the term, however, is not a new level of concept but
riather the fact that the term can be used to express true judg-
ments about God. When Thomas speaks of a statement's *in-
tentio signifioare,* the phrase first of ruR refers to the statement's
objective design or tendency to   the truth. [67] In Aquinas's

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[6s] Cf. Bernard Montagnes, *La doctrine de i'anawgie de   dlapres saiint
Thomas a'Aquin,* Philosophes Medievaux 6 (Louvain/Paris: Publications
Universitaires/Beatrice-Nauwelaerts,   1963) 99-103; William Hill, *Knowing
the Unknown God* (NY: Philosophical Library, 1971) 141-42. For Burrell,
the *res/modus* distinction "does not yield any privileged access to the *res
•..*" *(Aquinas: God and Action* [Notre Dame: UND Press, 1979] 10).

[64] Cf. Burrell, *Aquinas* 10; Henri de Lubac, *The Disco'IJery of God,* trans.
A. Dru from 3rd French ed. (Chicago: Regnery, 1967) 200-201.

[65] On this point, see Rocca 288-315, 339-63.

[66] Burrell, *Aquinas* 10.

[61] .Andre Hayen describes how Thomas uses *intentio/intendere* at the level
of intelligence to mean intensity, voluntary intention, voluntary attention, or

theological epistemofogy and onomatology, the *res/modus* dis-
tinction serves to underline the   cenrtra.ilposition he
gives to the truth sta.tus of our theological judgments about
God.

the mind's knowledge of the thing-an *mtentio intellecta (L'intentionnd sefon saint Thomas,* 2nd ed., Preface by J. Marechal, Museum Lessianum (section philosophique) 25 [Brussels/Paris: Desclee, 1954] 47-51, 161-201). See also H. D. Simonin, "La notion *d'intentio* dans !'oeuvre de S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 19 (1930) 445-63. *Intentio signifioare,* therefore, could refer to voluntary intention (what the proposition "means " or " wants " to say) or to the know ledge itself (" God is good " intends of itself to posit goodness in God), but the former is reduced to the latter since what the proposition "wants " to say is always at least partially and sometimes totally a function of what it *does* say. In *DDN* 4.9.412, for example, the *intentio significare* is the intelligible meaning or sense of a word or set of words as opposed to the mere physical sound or sight of syllables, words or sentences; in *John* 1.1.25, the one using the name *lapis* is said to intend to signify the actual stone.

AQUINAS ON RESOLUTION IN METAPHYSICS

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F OR AQUINAS a sequence of thoughts, even if inter-
connected in some manner, does not DJutomatically con-
stitute a scientific discipline. To justify a daim to sci-
entific status such a sequence will have ito he characterized by
those properties which raise mere thinking to the level of rea-
soning: it wiH have to proceed *rationabiliter,.* in all senses of
the term. The sequence wiM havie to he concerned with a lcor-
responding *obiectum speculabile,* with a universal concept or
ratio.1 It will have to be endowed with a direct object of in-

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1 " Et ideo oportet scientias speculativas dividi per differentias specul-
abilium, in quantum speculabilia sunt." *In Boethii de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 1;
"... scientia est de aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo et principaliter, et sic sci-
entia est de rationibus universalibus ..." *In Boethii de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 2, ad
4um. The term *ratio* in Aquinas has a remarkable multiplicity of senses.
L. Schutz, *ThomM-Lexikon* (reprinted N.Y., 1957), pp. 679-690, enumerates
eighteen principal significations. Without going into detail, I would like to
point out that I am employing the term *ratio* in the sense of a universal con-
cept (Schlitz's 'i '). This is not the universal concept taken as a particular
psychological fact or mental event, with the ontological status of an accident
inhering in the rational soul as in its subject, but rather the universal con-
cept in the sense of its notional content, taken as a particular psychological
fact. The term *ratio,* therefore, denotes the notional content which: (1) rep-
resents the intellect's understanding of the nature or essence which is in-
stantiated in a multiplicity of particulars (the nature or essence is itself
denoted by the term *ratio* according to another of its senses, Schlitz's sense
'k '); (2) is endowed with the *intentio universalitatis* whereby the multi-
plicity of particulars in which the corresponding nature or essence is in-
stantiated falls under the concept as its genus or species; (3) is verbally
expressed by a definition. This sense of the term *ratio* is, of course, not to
be confused with that wholly different sense (also of great importance for an
understanding of metaphysical resolution) whereby it denotes tbe intellect's

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vestigation, with ·a proportionate *subiectum scientiae,* which is at foast formally distinct from that of any other scientific discipline.

Aquinais affirms thrut this is indeed the case with the sequence of interconnected reasonings which consititues the *science* of metaphysics. In the Prooemium to the oommentary on the *Metaphysics* of   he states that metaphysics is concerned, in the first place, with being as sUJCh-with being as being and the properties which are immediately consequent upon it.[2] The diroot subject matter of metaphysics, its *obiectum spooulabile* as such, is the *ratio* which is the content of the concept of being in general *(ens commune)* and which is instantiated in everything which falls under this quasi-generic concept. But just how does the mind have access to this *obiectum speculabile?* How does the intellect form the concept of being in geneml and sei:z;e its content? After aH, the content of this concept which   the " nature " of being as such, the *ratio entis,* is neither readily nor immediately gmsped by ,the intellect. If it were, there wouM indeed be no need for the *discipline* of metaphysics. Just how then does the intellect attain it? This question represents the crucial prob-fom of the very possibility of the science of metaphysics as envisaged by Aquinas. Aquinas is ce:vtainly aware of this and in the same Prooemium does not neglect to answer it. The content of the concept of being in general, the *obiectum speculabile* of metaphysics, is attained by means of a process of *resolut:io*[3]

In this paper I shall examine this process of metaphysical resolution. I shall first trace Aquina;s's gradual clarification of the nature of resolutive reasoning by commencing with its most primitiv<e, albeit paraidigmatic, instantiation. I shall then

activity of discursive reasoning (Schiitz's sense 'g ') ; Aquinas contrasts this latter *ratio* with the intellect's .activity of intuitive insight or *intellectus.*

2 " **- - -** non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiootum, sed ipsum solum ens commune . . . *Metaphysica,* in quantum considerat ens et ea quae con·sequuntur ipsum." *In Meta.,* Prooemium.

a "Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia." *In Meta.;* Prooemium.

consider the peculiarities of the process of resolution as it is operative in metaphysical reasoning up to the point of mind's seizure of the *ratio entis.* Finally, in the light of the interpretation proposed, I shall reconsider an especially controversial issue which affects current discussions of Aquinas's metaphysical methodology.

I

Resolution is a type of reasoning *(ratiocinatio)* .⁴ Aquinas affirms that to say of the intellect that it proceeds in a rational manner *(rationabiliter)* involves a multiplicity of significations.5 Initially it means simply that its aotivities are performed in accmidarnce with a specifically human (as opposed to an angelic or divine) manner of acquiring knowledge. A manner which is properly human finds its point of departure in the operation of those sensitive faculties with which the rational soul is so richly endowed. But for" thinking" to attain the status of " reasoning " much more than this is required. The intellect wi11 also have to occupy itself with that multiplicity of generic and specific concepts which are the characteristic products of reason, of the mind's manifold grasp of *rationes.* Furthermore it will have fo move to those characteristics which are peculiar to a process of *discursive* reasoning. The intellect will move gradually, step by step as it were, from the knowledge of things already grasped to the discovery and intellectual appropriation of things previously unknown. But for the intellect to be successful at disoursive reasoning it cannot proceed in an arbitrary, fanciful, or opinionated manner. It will have to fulfil the requirements pmper ito *logical* thinking. Logiica,lthinking is fundamentally discursive rea;soning which in both its form and its matter is regulated and nourished by an intimate contact with first principles. With respect to its form, the structures of its argumentations, the

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⁴ " --- ratiocinatio humana ... in via iudicii, resolvendo, redit ad prima. principia. ••. " *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 79, a. 8.

See *In Boethii de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1, Responsio.

modalities of possible and aroeptable combinations of the propositions which enter these as their premises, will have to be regulated rby the laws of syllogistic inference, laws which are ultimately reducible to the first principles of the understanding, that is, the first principles of demonstration, the *dignitates* or *maximae propositiones.*[6] With respect to its matter, the propositions which enter the intellect's argumentations as premises will also have to be ultimately reducible to first principles, that is, to propositions which, if they do not have the status of *dignitates,* must at least have that of *positiones* or (in the case of subordinated sciences) of *suppositiones.*[1] When both of these conditions, formal and material, are met, thinking wiltl. proceed *rationabiliter,* in a particularly pregnant sense. It will possess the status of being not merely discursive but indeed *demonstrative* reasoning. It will be reasoning which is capable of yielding indisputably scientific knowledge, with conclusions grounded in the discernment of causes and expressed by ceritain, universal, and necessary propositions (as opposed to merely probable, particular, and contingent proposay nothing of mere opinions, surmisals, or gratuitous rhetoric) .

Within this context of the intelleces need to be grounded ultimately in first principles, Aquinas sees an initial and fundamental instantiation of "resolution." By " resolution " Aquinas means, in the first place, a process of reasoning whereby the status " der.aonstra.tive " can be shown to pertain to a sequence of discursive reaooning. I shall cafil ,this first type of resolutive reasoning " logical resolution." The task of logical ,resolution is programatically delineated by Aquinas in the Prooemium to the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle,[8] Logioal resolution seeks to display the uJ.timate

e See *In Post. Anal.,* Prooemium, #6.

1 See *In Post. Anal.,* I, Leet. 4, 5.

s "Pars autem Logicae, quae *primo* deservit processui, pars *Iudicativa* dicitur, eo quod iudicium est cum certitudine scientiae. Et quia iudicium certum de elfectibus haberi non potest nisi resolvendo in prima principia, ideo pars

rooting in the first principles of both the formail and the ma-
terial aspects of a piece of reasoning; its formal structure is
shown to be ultimately a particularized appli:cation of the first
principles of demonstration, rand its material aspect (the propo-
sitions which are its content) is shown to be ultimately de-
riv;ed from propositions which are, in one way or another,
primary propositions. By means of this two-fold "reduction"
or " analysis," the judgments which are the conc1usions of the
piece of reasoning in question ril be seen to possess the epis-
temological status of "certitude." 9 This will be displayed by
the judgments which terminate the process of resolution it-
self; in virtue of their own contact with first principles, the
judgments possess the status of certitude themselves.

Which are the salient charaicteristics of logical resolution
which make it paradigmatic for further instances of
reasoning? Which are the fundamental elements of logical
l.1esofotionwhich justify the wider and analogical extension of
the term " resolution " to designrnte other processes of reason-
ing which have such elements in common with it? I suggest
there are four. (1) Insofar as it is itself an instance of *ratio-
cinatio,* logical l.1eso1ution involves a dynamic interpfay be-
tween ;the two fundamental acts of the mind-simple appre-
hension and judgment. 10 (2) Logical resolution terminates in
intellectus-it is a discursive movement of the mind which
finds its climax and *terminus* in the intellectuail seizure of first
principles.11 (3) Logical resolution is designated by Aquinas

haec *Analytica* vocatur, idest resolutoria. Certitudo autem iudicii, quae per
resolutionem habetur, est, vel ex ipsa *forma* syllogismi tantum ... vel etiam
cum hoc ex *materia,* quia sumuntur propositiones per se et necessariae ..."
In Post. Anal., Prooemium, #6.

9 " ... in cognitionem veritatis ratio inquirendo pervenit, quam intellectus
simplici intuitu videt; unde ratio ad intellectum terminatur; unde etiam in
demonstrationibus certudo est per resolutionem ad prima principia, quorum
est intellectus ... " *In Bent.,* II, d. 9, q. I, a. 8, ad. I.

10 See *In Post. Anal., Prooemium,* #4; *In Boethii de Trm.,* q. 5, a. 3.

11" Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere.
Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem in-
telligibilem cognoscendam ... inde est quod ratiocinatio humana, secundum

as the *"via iudicii"* because its culminaiting insight into first principles enables the intellect to ascertain the status of certitude which pertains to judgments, ,both the conclusions of demonstrative reasonings and its own conclusions.[12]   (4) Logical resolution is grounded in the discernment of causes.

The fourth element warrants some remarks-. The causes whose discernment grounds the process of logicrul resolution are the " form " iand " matter " of the pieces of l"easoning which are anrulyzedby it. We have seen that these correspond to: (I) The str:uctu:veof such a piece of reasoning as an instantiation of the laws of syllogistic inference, which are ultimately reducible to the first principles of demonstmtion;   (2) The logical status of being primary which pertains to the propositions to which the content of such a piece of reasoning is ultimately reducible. It must he noticed that logical resolution has no direct interest in the particular subject matter of the propositions which are the content of such a piece of reasoning nor has it ,any direct interest in the partiouilar subject matter of the primary propositions to which they are   reducible. Logical resolution is directly concerned only with the *logical* status of these primary propositions, with whether they ·are (as they must be if we are to have ian instance of demonstrative reasoning) *digmtates* or *positiones* or at ,the very least *suppositiones.* Now, the "form" and "matter" of pieces of reasoning, taken in this sense, are the logical causes of the

viam inquisitionis   vel inventionis,   prooedit a quibusdam   simpliciter   intellectis,   quae sunt prima principia;   et rursus in via iudicii,   resolvendo redit ad prima principia,   ad quae inventa examinat." *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 79, a. 8.

12 ". ·• non posset mens humana ex uno in aliud discurrere,   nisi eius discursus ab aliqua simplici acceptione veritatis inciperet,   quae quidem acceptio est intellectus principiorum.   Similiter nee rationis discursus ad aliquid certum perveniret,   nisi fieret examinatio eius quod per discursum invenitur,   ad principia prima,   in quae ratio resolvit.   Ut sic intellectus inveniatur rationis principium quantum ad viam inveniendi,   terminus vero quantum ad viam iudicandi." *De Ver.,* q. 15, a. I. " ▪ ▪ ▪ certitudo scientiae tota oritur ex certitudine principiorum: tune enim conclusiones per certitudinem sciuntur, quando resolvuntur in principia." *De Ver.,* q. 11, a. I, a.d 13.

status of certitude which pertains to the judgments which are the conclusions of such reasonings. As "form" and "matter" they are designaited by Aquinas as being "intrinsic causes." Accordingly, i1ogka1 reso1ution is to be understood as a process of reasoning which is carried out exdusively *securtdum rationem.* As sutch it is a process of reasoning which does not 'concern itself directly with extra-mental realities but rather focuses upon certain chamoteri:stics of the constituents of the conceptual order. It is a process of reasoning which concerns itself with the *entia rationi11* or *intentiones 11ecundae* which are the subject mat.ter of ,logic.

II

Logical resolution can be performed with respect to *any* sequence of rea,soning which lays olaim to demonstrative status, regardless of the particular scientific discipline within which that sequence of reasoning is carried out. But Aquinas indicates further particula,r instances of resolutive reasoning operative within and peculiar to ea:ch of the three theoretical sciences, phys1cs, mathematics, and metaphysics. Resolutive reasoning in the three theoretical sciences needs to be clearly distinguished from logiica.l:resolution despite its notional continuity with it. I shall caU resolutive reasoning insofar as it is operative in the theoretical sciences in general " scientific resolution;" this is to distinguish it not only from logrcaI resolution but also from resolution in the specific sciences. Scientific resolution adapts itself to the particular subject matter, and thus scientific resolution in general has to he distinguished into the three subordinate and specific types whereby it is instantiated in each of the three theoretical sciences: resolution in physics, mathematical resolution, and   resoJution. But at this point I should like to ,indioate the characteristics of scientific resolution in general which differentiate it from logical resolution.

Scientific reso1ution is in notional continuity with logical l'esolution in thait it has in common with it the four elements

mentioned above: it is an instance of *ratiocinatio* and is thus
constituted by the interplay between simple apprehension and
judgment; it terminates in *intellectus,*. in the seizure of first
principles; it is designated as the *"via iudicii"*;it is grounded
in the discernment of causes. But what are the characteristics
of scientific resolution which differentiate it from logical resolu-
tion? There are four of these: (1) The first principles which
are seized as a resiult of scientific resolution (and which are its
terminus) are not at all those principles which are the con-
cern of logical resolution. They are neither the first principles
of the understanding precisely insofar as they are the first
principles of demonstration, which ground the logico-formaJ.
aspect of demonstrative reasoning, nor are they the primary
propositions precisely insofar as they are considered from the
point of view of their logical status and quite independently of
their particular subj,ect matter which, as such, groUil!d the
iJ.ogico-materialaspect of demonstrative reasoning. Rather, sci-
entific resolution is concerned with the first principles of the
theoretical sciences precisely insofar as they do yield a partic-
ular subject matter and .are thus determinative with respect to
a field of investigation. Thus, in the first place, scientific reso-
lution is concerned with *the* first principle of a theoretical sci-
ence, with its proper *sdibile* or *obiectum speoulabile* from
which, as its direct subject matter, the entire content of that
science may be said to flow.[18]   (fl) Because the first principle

    1s "In qualibet enim scientia sunt quaedam principia subiecti, de quibus est
prima consideratio ... cum rationem unitatis scientiae acceperit ex unitate
generis subiecti, rationem diversitatis scientiarum non accipit ex diversitate
subiecti, sed ex diversitate principiorum. . . . Cum ergo scibile sit proprium
obiectum scientiae, non diversificabuntur scientiae secundum diversitatem
materialem scibilium, sed secundum diversitatem eorum formalium ...• Et
ideo quantumcunque sint aliqua diversa scibilia secundum suam naturam,
dummodo per eadem principia sciantur, pertinent ad unam scientiam .•.•
Nee tamen intelligendum est quod sufficiat ad unitatem scientiae unitas
principiorum primorum simpliciter, sed unitas principiorum primorum in
aliquo genere scibili ... scientiae sint alterae secundum principia, cum per-
veniatur resolvendo ad principia prima quae sunt indemonstrabilia, quae
oportet esse eiusdem generis cum his quae demonstrantur." *In Post A.nai.,* I,
Leet. 41, #364- #368.

which is the *terminus* of scientific resolution is the *obiectum S]Jeculab'ile* which is the subject matter of the particular theoretical science within which the process of resolution is operative, the essential element (the element which effects it) of scientific resolution is the particular mental operation whereby the intellect can have aiooess to an *obiectum s-peculabile.* This is the mental operation which is designated generically by Aquinas as *distinctio* or *abstractio,* ood its three specific types, proper to physics, mathematics, and metaphysics respectively, are total abstraction, formal abs•trruction,and separation.14 (8) Scientific resolution in general may proceed both *secundum rem* and *secundum rationem,* with the exception of mathematics where it operaites solely *secundum rationem.* That is, scientific resolution can be grounded not only in the discernment of intrinsic causes, materiwl and formal, but ailso in the discernment of extrinsic causes, efficient and final.1-'
 (4) The *obiectum s-peculabile* of a theoretical science is always a *ratio* and, •even though in reality it is installltiated in par-
        entities:, as an *obie()twm s-peculabile* exists in thought as the content of a concept (and is thus charrucrterized by universwlity, necessity, ;i.mmaterialiity,and immutability).   There-

u'' Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio invenitur. Una secundum operationem intellectus componentis et dividentis, quae separatio dicitur proprie; et haec competit scientiae divinae sive metaphysicae. Alia secundum operationem, qua formantur quiditates rerum, quae est abstractio formae a materia sensibili; et haec competit mathematicae. Tertia secundum eandem operationem [quae est abstractio] universalis a particulari; et haec competit etiam physicae ..." *In Boethii de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 3.

u "... quia cum rationis sit de uno in aliud discurrere, hoc maxime in scientia natur.ali observatur, ubi ex cognitione unius rei in cognitionem alterius devenitur, sicut ex cognitione effectus in cognitionem causae. Et non solum proceditur ab uno in aliud secundum rationem, quod non est aliud secundum rem, sicut si ab animali procedatur ad hominem. In scientiis enim mathematicis proceditur per ea tantum, quae sunt de essentia rei, cum demonstrent solum per causam formalem; et ideo non demonstratur in eis aliquid de una re per aliam rem, sed per propriam diffinitionem illius rei• • • . Sed in scienti& naturali, in qua fit demonstratio per causas extrinsicas, probatur aliquid de una re per aliam rem omnino extrinsecam." *In. Boethii de Tm.,* q. 6, a. I, ad lam q.

fore, it is in s1cientific resolution *secundum   rationem,*   rather than in scientific resolution *secundum   rem,* that the operation of distinction   which is specific to a particular   theoretical   science is operative and that science's direct subject matter is grasped.

Alt this point it is necessary to clarify the distinction drawn by Aquinas between reasoning *secundum   rem* and reasoning *secundum   rationem.*   (One should note that it is not a distinction which is pecuHar to resoJutive reasoning but is also apto the rational process of *compositio)* . Aquinas tells us that reasoning *secundum   rem* is reasoning which is grounded in the discernment of extrinsic causes, efficient and final, while reasoning *secundum   rationem* is reasoning whi:ch is grounded in the discernment   of intrinsic causes, material   and formaL1[6] But just what do these affirmations imply with respect to the character of the two types of reasoning in question? I would suggest that Aquinas is saying that reasonings *secundum rem* are reasonings which are directly about realities; they are reasonings which find both their point of depa,rture and their conclusions in existentia,l propositions. On the other hand, reasonings *secundum   rationem* are reasonings which need not be ,about realities iat alil-and, if they acre, 1they are so only in a reflexive way.[17] They are rather reasonings which find both their point of departure and their conclusions in propositions which concern the conceptual   order.   They are reasonings which are concerned with the determination   of the necessary constituents of the contents of concepts; they are concerned, at least in the first place and directly, with *rationes* as such.[18]

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1a "Ratio enim ... quandoque de uno in aliud secundum rem, ut quando est demonstratio   per causas vel effectus extrinsecos.   . . . Quandoque vero procedit de uno in aliud secundum rationem, ut quando est processus secundum causas intrinsecas ... " *In Boethii de Trin.,* q. 6, 1, ad 3am q.

17 As in the case, for example, of mathematical   reasonings which are solely *secundum   rationem,* insofar as mathematics   deals with mathematical   "entities " which are no more than *rationes* but which when applied in the " *scientiae mediae"* deal with realities.

1.8 This is why I have avoided the customary   practice of translating   the

The considerations just presented enable us to appreciate why Aquinas characterizes scientific resolution in ways which, while not wholly discontinuous with the four characterizations of logical resolution mentioned aboVie, do l'epresent a significant reelabomtion of the concept of resolution. (1) It is a movement of the intellect from composites to simples.[19] (2) It is a movement of the intellect from wholes to their parts. [20] (3) It is a movement of the intellect from what is known confusedly to something which is known distinctly. [21] (4) It is a movement of the intellect from a multiplicity to a unity. [22] (5) In the case of scientific resolution *secundum rem,* it is a movement of the intellect from effects to their cause.[28] (6) In the case of scientific resolution *secundum rationem,* it is a movement of the inteUect from less universal concepts to a more universal

Latin term *"resolutio "* by the English term "analysis." The term "analysis," with its connotation of conceptual analysis, might be employed to translate the expression *"resolutio secundum rationem"* but certainly not the term " *resolutio"* without further qualification.

[10]" Est autem duplex via procedendi ad cognitionem veritatis. Una quidem per modum resolutionis, secundum quam procedimus a compositis ad simplicia, et a toto ad partem, sicut dicitur in primo *Physicorum,* quod confusa sit prius nobis nota. Et in hac via perficitur cognitio veritatis, quando pervenitur ad singulas partes distincte cognoscendas . .Alia est via compositionis, per quam procedimus a simplicibus ad composita, qua perficitur cognitio veritatis cum pervenitur ad totum." *In Meta,* II, Leet. 1, #278.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22]" Est enim rationis proprium circa multa diffundi et ex eis unam simplicem cognitionem colligere .... Intellectus autem e converso per prius unam et simplicem veritatem considerat et in illa totius multitudinis cognitionem capit .... Sic ergo patet quod rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem terminatur secundum viam resolutionis, in quantum ratio ex multis colligit unam et simplicem veritatem. Et rursum intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis secundum viam compositionis vel inventionis, in quantum intellectus in uno multitudinem comprehendit." *In Boethii de Trin.,* q. 6, a. I, ad 3am q.

[2s] "Ratio enim . . . procedit quandoque de uno in aliud secundum rem, ut quando est demonstratio per causas vel efl'ectus extrinsecos; componendo quidem, cum proceditur a causis ad efl'ectus; quasi resolvendo, cum proceditur ab efl'ectibus ad causas ... " *In Boethii de Trin.,* q .6, a. I, ad 3am q.

[2]' "Quandoque vero procedit de uno in aliud secundum rationem, ut quando

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In this paper I shaill not consider the details of resolutive reasoning as it is operative in either physics or mathematics; within these sciences it is effected by the mental operations of totail abstraclion and formaJ. abstraJCtion respectively. Rather, at this point, I shall turn directly to resoi1utive reasoning as it is operative in metaphysics. I shwhl consider in turn: (1) metaphysical resofotion *secundum rem,* and, in the next section, metaphysical resolution *secundum rationem.*

The first moment of metaphysical resolution *aecundum rem* invol¥es the presentation of one or more arguments which find their point of departure in the factual existence of sensible realities. These sensible rem1ities are most certainly grasped by tihe mind as instances of being (ens) .25 But this original grasp of being has as its content no more than a vague and confused notion of being. It is an imprecise and unclarified notion of bemg which is merely preliminary and not yet *expliditly* metaphysiool.26 :Lt is nonetheless a notion of being from which the mind can derive that knowledge of the first principles of understanding, with which it must be endowed if it is to be able to perform any process of reasoning whatsoever. The arguments which constitute metaphysical resolution *secundwm rem* commence with the factmal existence of sensible realities and focus upon their peculiar characteristics of particularity and multiplicity, of materiality, mutability, and .contingency, of being affected by potentiality. In these arguments the mind considers precisely those characteristics of sensible realities which :identify them as constituents of the Aristotelian realm of

est processus secundum causas intrinsecas: componendo quidem, quando a formis maxime universalibus in magis particularia proceditur;   resolvendo autem quando e converso, eo quod 'universalius est simplicius."   *In Boethii, ae Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1, ad 3am q.

:25 " ▰▰▰ nee primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem sta.-tum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus ... " *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 87, a. *3.*

26 See my "Aquinas on the Preliminary Grasp of Being," *The Thomi8t* 51 (1987): 555-574.

" *physis* " and which determine their inclusion within the *re-flexive* subject matter of natural sdenoe. [27] The mind's consideration of these characteristics enables it to evaluate these sensible realities as effects. For the puzzling factual existence of realities endowed with suich characteristics demands, if the intellect is to attain a satisfactory *terminus* at aH, the affirmation of the necessary existence of an ultimate and grounding reality as their principle or caiuse, a supersensible reality whose nature must be whoUy "lacking" these peculiar characteristics. The one or more arguments which constitute metaphysical resolrution *secundum rem* have thus the logical status of demonstrations *quia.* They are arguments which are grounded in the discernment of extrinsic caiuses and involve a rational movement from the grasp of the existence of a multiplicity to the affirmation of the existence of a grounding unity. As such, these arguments are no mere processes of the analysis of concepts but precisely instances of resolution *secundum rem.*

Now one of these arguments might weU correspond to that argument in the eighth book of the *Physics* whereby Aristotle seeks to prove the ,existence of a Prime Unmoved Mover, though I wou1d suggest that any other valid *a posteriori* argument for the existence of God would be equally aioceptable to Aquinas. Nonetheless, no matter which argument :might he employed, wha,t *is* necessary is that it terminate in the intellectual seizure of the " nature" of the first principle or caiuse whose existence has been demonstrated, a caiuse whose " nature " is gmsped to he, to use Aquinas's own words, *lpsum Esse Subsistens.* What I wish to stress is that it wouM not he sufficient for metaphysical resolution *secundum rem* to terminate :me11ely in the affirmation of the existence of some other immateriail or separated substance, for   it would not be sufficient for it to terminate in the affirmation of the eristence of the rational soul .and of its immaterirulity. (The reasons for my insistence wilil be evident below.)

ar I believe this to be the meaning of Aquinas's affirmation that "... scientia naturalis a.liquid tradit scientiae divinae ... " *In Boethii de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 1, ad 9.

But it mu.st be noticed that the inteillectuaJl sec1.zure which
terminates   resolution *secundum rem* l'epresents
an insight me!rely into God's " nature " rather than into God's
nature, that is, the seizuLl.'eof God as *lpsum Esse Subsistens* is
the produiot of an entire sequence of negative judgments, of
remotiones. [28] The distinctively metaphysicwl mental operation
of *separatio* is already operativce within the various arguments
which constitute metaphysical resolution *secundum rem.* [29] In
     .first moment of metaphysicail resolution, negative
tion is cleady concerned with reaHties rather than with *rationes*
and might aocordingly he designated as "negative separation
secundum rem." This sequence of negative judgments of sepa-
mtion *secundum rem* can be succinctly expressed by the fol-
lowing proposition: "not aH   involve potentiality and
are material and mutable . . . there must a:lso be a Being who
does not involve potentiality, materiality and mutability ... " [30]
Metaphysical resolution *secundum rem* is therefore effected by
negative separation *secundum rem.* NeviertheJess, there is more
to   resolution *secundum rem* than just the pro-
cedure of negative separation which effects it. This " more "
is expressed by the positive judgment that "God is *lpsum*

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[28] "Cognito de aliquid an sit, inquirendum restat quomodo sit, ut sciatur
de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non
sit, non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non
sit .... Potest autem ostendi de Deo quomodo non sit, :removendo ab eo ea
quae ei non conveniunt, utpote compositionem, motum et alia huiusmodi."
Summa Theol., I, q. 3., introd.

[29] For Aquinas's identification of the notions of *"remotio"* and *"separatio
(secundum rem)":* " Quaedam vero sunt quae excedunt et id quod cadit sub
sensu et id quod cadit sub imaginatione .... Sed tamen ex his, quae sensu
vel imaginatione apprehenduntur, in horum cognitionem devenimus per viam
causalitatis ... per remotionem, quando omnia, quae sensus vel imaginatione
apprehendit, a rebus huiusmodi separamus." *bi Boethii de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 2.

so" ... est quaedam scientia superior naturali: ipsa enim natura, idest
res naturalis habens in se principium motus, in se ipsa est unum aliquod
genus entis universalis.   Non enim omne ens est huiusmodi: cum probatum
sit in octavo *Physicorum,* esse aliquod ens immobile. Hoc autem ens im·
mobile superius est et nobilius ente mobili, de quo considerat naturalis." *In
Meta.,* 4, Leet. 5, #593.

Esse Subsistens." A positive judgment which as such, even
while it does not do justice to God's nature, is a sruitable *ter-
minus* for a process of reasoning which wants to instantiate
Aquinas's: conception of resolution. furthermore it is 'a positive
judgment which substantiates Aquinas's characterization of
11esolutivereasoning as the " *via iudicii,"* as it is a judgment
which has certitude, heing the 'result of one or more demonstra-
tions *quia.*

   Now it is clear that for Aquinas this metaphysical resolu-
tion *secundum rem* does not yield to the mind that *ratio,* that
ob'iectum S'peculabile, which is the direct subject matter of
metaphysics.   For Aquinas, God, whose existence is affirmed
and whose "nature" is seized as being that of *lpsum Esse
Subsistens,* is the direct srubject matter not of metaphysics but
of *sacra doctrina.*[31] As we shall see, God only enters within the
ambit of metaphysioaJ. research insofar as He is the *principium
essendi* of the reflexive subject matter of metaphysics, of all
beings which, in one way or another, instantiate the *ratio entis*
and therefore fall under the concept of being in general (ens
oommune) , ·as if it were a generic concept. Nevertheless, it
might be argued, and I sha11 in fact argue, that the positive
and certain judgment, the intellectual insight, which is the
terminus of metaphysical resolution *secundum rem,* into the
"nature" of God as *lpsum Esse Subsistens,* is indispensable to
metaphysical reasoning's eventual seizure of the *obiectum
S'peculabile*of metaphysics in a manner adequate to the ground-
ing of Aquinas's metaphysics as a science.

IV

   The second moment of metaphysical resolution, *secundum
rationem,* is not directly concerned with realities, but, insofar
as it is grounded in the discernment of intrinsic causes, with
the formation of more universal concepts and the determina-
tion of the necessary constituents of their contents. It is an

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a·l See *In Boethii de Trin.,* q. 5, a.. 4.

authentic instance of .resolutive reasoning not only because by it the mind moves from the grasp of a multiplicity to that of a unity hut also because it is a process of reasoning which finds !its *terminus* in the inteHectual seizure of the very " nature" of that unity. This second moment of metaphysical resolution is also effected by the e:xce.rcise of the distinctively metaphysical mental operation of negative separation. But this further type of negative separation must not he confused with that negative separation *secundum rem* which had effected metaphysical *secundum rem.* Metaphysical resolution *secundum rationem* is effected iby wha,t might accordingly be designated as " negative separation *secundum rationem."*

Whether metaphysoocrul:resolution *secundum rationem* is necessarily dependent for the very possibility of its achievement upon a prior execution of metaphysical resolution *secundum rem* is an extl'emely controversial issue, and it is also an issue which has been formulated in variious different w;ays. Basically it corresponds to the problem of whether the very possibility of Aquinas's science of metaphysics is necessarily dependent upon a prior demonstration of God's existence and the seizure of God's "nature" as *lpsum Esse Subsistens.* What is not controversial though is that metaphysical :resolution *S'ecund!um rationem* be founded upon metaphysicai resolrution *secundum rem.* I believe that this would be a;ooeptable even to those interpreters of Aquina,s's metaphy;sicrul methodology who wouJid argue that it need not be. lit is my contention though, as I have ailreaidy intimated !in the preceding section, that in fact it must he and I sha:H take this for granted in the remainder of this .section. So as ,to avoid irksome interruptions of its continuity I shaiLl argue only my case here and consider alternative foberpretations in the next and conc1u:ding section of this paper.

As I have said, metaphysical reso1ution *secundum rationem* moves from the grasp of a multiplicity to that of a unity, and, precisely becaiuse it is a :resolution *secundum rationem,* both of these concern. the conceptual order" The initial multiplicity is

that of diverse concepts of being. These are not yet explicitly metaphysical conoopts of being, as they do not presuppose any kind of grasp of the *ratio entis* but only that vague and confused notion of being which is the content of that original apprehension of being (to which I referred in the preceding section) . They are concepts such as: " material and mutable being ·affected by potentiality," " immaterial but mutable being affected by potentiality," " immaterial and immutable, purely ructuail being." In metaphysical resolution *secundurn rationem,* the mental operation of negative separation concerns: itself precisely with such concepts. Negative separation *secundum rationem* progressively denies that the peculiar contents of these various concepts of being are necessary constituents of the *ratio entis,* which is to be ·seizedeventuaUy. It denies that they iare necessary constituents of .the content of the concept of being in general, which is thereby gradually elaborated. The reasoning which justifies these progressive negations is obvious. If, for example, either the notion of materiality or that of immateriality were nooessary constituents of the *ratio entis,* then the actual existence of either immaterial beings or material beings, resrpectiv;ely, would be ·contradictory and hence impossible. But as a matter of fact (and as was recognized through metaphysical resolution *secundum rem),* not only material beings but also immaterial beings exist. Therefore both the notion of materiality and that of immateriality must be negated of the *ratio entis.*[82] Now the great va.Iue of this procedure is that it enables the mind to move grruduaill.ytowarrls the seizure of the *ratio entis,* by negating of it (in the manner indicated) what cannot possibly pertain to it as a necessary constituent, without at the same time presupposing a prior grasp of the *ratio entis* (which would involve circular reaisoning).

a2 "· •• ens et substantia dicuntur separata a materia et motu non per hoc quod de ratione ipsorum sit esse sine materia et motu, sicut de ratione asini est sine ratione esse, sed per hoc quod de ratione eorum non est esse in materia et motu, quamvis quandoque sint in materia et motu, sicut animal abstrahit a ratione, quamvis aliquod animal sit rationale." *In Boethii de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 4, ad 5.

At this point one must be carefuJ not to interpret the role of negative separation incorrectly. Negative separation does *not* imply the *positive exclusion* from the concept of being in general of, say, the notion of materiality or that of immateriality. If this were the case would be tantamount to asserting than neither material beings nor immaterial beings could faH under the " generic " iconcept of being in genern,l whiJCh is heing formed. If this were the nature of the role of negative separa- ;tion, the result would be 'an entirely vacuous concept of being in genemL Furthermore insofar as it would place both out- side of being in general, it would transform the notions of materiality and immateriality into *difjerentiae* and the concept of being in genera,} into a generic concept. Rather, negative separation goes not further than the denial that the notions of materiaJity and immateriality are necessary constituents of rthe *ratio entis.* Thus the *ratio entis,* even though it has not as yet been grasped, is aicknow,ledged as being oapabJe of instan-

in both material and immaterial be[ngs. Both material being and immaterial beings can therefore he "subsumed" under the concept of being in general. By this" s1uhsumption" I mean simpJy that both material beings and rimmasterial be- ings, insofar as they both instantiate the *ratio entis* and there- lol'e fall under the quasi-generic concept of being in general, can be considered from the point of view of being as being *(ens in- quantum ens)* and as mch enter within the scope of meta- physical research. In other words, being as being, the concept of being in general which is being progressiV'ely elaborated, does not posritively exclude either materiarl beings or immaterial be- ings, and both can be considered under the forma.lity of being as heing, bemuse the possible instantia:tion of the *ratio entis* is not limited either to the one or fo the other. Neither the no- tion of material,ity nor tha1t of immateriality is a necessary con- stituent of the *ratio entis,* and it is precisely this that is shown through negative separation *s'ecundum rationem.*

This sequence of negative judgments of separation *secundum rationem* can be succinctly expressed rby the proposi-

tion: To the *ratio entis* does not necessarily pertain either the notion of being materirul or of being .immaterial, of being mutaihle or of being immutable. Thus, as the result of this progressive negative separation, metaphysical *aecundum rationem* invoives the movement of :the mind from all our multiple and preliminary coDJCepts of being to the formaition of 1the concept of being in general (ens *commune).* Insofar as the *ratio entis* which is the necessary constituent of rthe content of this COillCept contains no necessary reference to either materiality or immateriality, the concept of being in general is situated on the level of the third degree of separation from matter. 88 Yet, insofar ·as the *ratio entis* can be instantiated in both material and immaiteriaJ beings, both can fall under the concept of being in general, which therefore has been appropriately charaderized by interpreters 1as only " neutrally immaterial." 34

I should like to stress that metaphyfficaJ resolution *secundum raticmem* involvies more than the negative separation *secundum rationem* which effects it. It is not to be confused with negative separation, let alone identified with it. The climax, the *terminus* which is necessary to it as a process of resolution, cannot simply be the formation of a concept of being in generrul but must rather be the inteillecturulmsight into, the poffitive seizure of, the *ratio enfis.* Remember that the gradual elaboration of the concept of being in general through negative separation did not at all presuppose a seizure of the *ratio entis;* this was rather the constant goal of the process of metaphysical resolution *secundum rationem.* Just how is this achieved and just " what" is rthe *ratio entis?* I would suggest that as the result of negative separation, the mind discerns that there is at least one " conceptual " .content which, insofar as *it* is necessarily common to all the mwltiple and preliminary

ss See *Summa Theoi.,* I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2.

34 John F. Wippel, "Metaphysics and *Separatio* According to Thomas Aquinas," *The Review of Metaphysics* 31 (197&): 431-470. I shall cite from this article as republished in *Metaphysioai in- .Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, 1984), pp. 69-104. See p. 72.

concepts of being on which negative separation has been exer-
cised, positively resists negative separation and is seized by
the intellect as the *ratio entis.* This irreducible conceptual con-
tent may not be negated of the concept of being in general
without either faHing into contmdiction or ",annihilating " it.
This conceptual content is the sharing in a common existential
actuality, of participating in a common *esse ut actus*
The *ratio entis,* the one necessary constituent of the content
of the concept of being in general is the condition of partici-
pating in what Aquinas 'refers to as *"esse commune* ".[36]

The problem which immerdiately arises is that of the nature
of this act of fotellectual seizure of the *ratio entis,* which :rep-
resents the *terminus* of metaphysical resolution *secundum ra-
tionem.* What is the nature of this wot, and what are its ulti-
mate conditions of possibility, if it is to be able to ground
Aquinas's metaphysics as a science? I will not deal with this
issue at this point, but I shall return to it in the concluding
section, because I believe that the answer given to this ques-
tion affects all the controversial issues in current interpreta-
tions of Aquinas's metaphysical methodology.

Now the *ratio entis* is the one necessary constituent of the
concept of being in general which is the *obiectum speculabile,*
the direct subject matter, of Aquinas's metaphysics. The re-
flexive subject matter of metaphysics, on the other hand, is all
those entities, whatever their individual, specific, and generic
peouHarities, in which the *ratio entis* is found and which there-
fore fall under the concept of being in general as a quasi-generic
concept. This is ana:logous to the way in which sensible par-

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35 " ▪▪▪ ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur ▪▪▪ " *De Ver.,* q. l, a.
1, ad 3.; "▪▪▪ ens dicitur quasi esse habens ▪▪▪ " *In Meta.,* 12, Leet., 1,
#2419.; "▪▪▪ ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu ▪▪▪ " *Summa, Theol.,* I,
q. 5, a. 1.

₋06 *Esse commune* is our conceptualization of *esse ut actus entis* insofar as
we consider it as participated in by all *entia,* "Quod est commune multis,
non est aliquid praeter multa nisi sola ratione ▪▪▪▪ Multo igitur minus et
ipsum esse commune est aliquid praeter omnes res existentes nisi in in-
tellectu solum." *Summa Contra, Gent.,* I, Cap. 26, #241.

ticu1ars are only the reflexive subject matter of a natural sci-
ence. The direct subject matter, the *obiectum speculabile,* is
the *ratio* found in these particulars as their natures or essences;
it is the necessary content of that universal, specific, or generic,
concept which, in the resolutive moment of that natural sci-
eooe, has been formed by the mental operation of total ab-
straction. [37] We should also note that for Aquinas all the en-
tities in which the *ratio entis* is instantiated enter into the re-
flexive subject matter of metaphysics only insofar as they do
instantiate the *ratio entis* and not as they are instantiations
of different natural kinds. [38] Furthermore, in the light of the
mind's grasp of the *ratio entis* at the climax of metaphysical
resolution *secundum rationem,* it is dear why God is not the
obiectum speculabile of metaphysics and does not even enter
within its reflective subject matter: because God as *Ipsum
Esse Subiistens* is grasped by the mind at the dimax of meta-
physical reso1ution *secundum rem,* He does not exemplify the
condition of participating in *esse commune,* is not to be num-
bered among the entities which instantiate the *ratio entis,* and
falls outside of the extension of the concept of *ens commune.*
As I intimated at the conclusion of the preceding section, God
enters the ambit of metaphysical researeh only as the *prin-
cipium essendi* of :the constituents of the reflexive subject mat-
ter of metaphysics.

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al " ●●● scientia est de aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo primo et principaliter,
et sic scientia est de rationibus universalibus, supra quas fundatur. Alio
modo est de aliquibus secundario et quasi per reflexionem quandam, et sic de
illis rebus, quarum sunt illae rationes, in quantum illas rationes applicat
ad res etiam particulares, quarum sunt, adminiculo inferiorum virium. Ra-
tione enim universali utitur sciens et ut re scita et ut medio sciendi. Per
universalem enim hominis rationem possum iudicare de hoc vel de illo."
In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 2, ad. 4.

:is" ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ metaphysicus considerat etiam de singularibus entibus non se-
cundum proprias rationes, per quas sunt tale vel tale ens, sed secundum
quod participant communem rationem entis ▬ ▬ ▬ " *In Boethii de Trin.,* q. 5,
a. 4, ad 6.

V

In light of this interpretation of metaphysical resolution in Aquinas, I would now like to consider a partiiculal"lycontrover- sial issue which has received a great deaJ of attention in the contempora:ry discussion of Aquinas's metaphysical method- ology.[89] This issue has usuahly ,been expressed in the form of the question: Do we first need to prove the existell!Ceof God if the science of metaphysics envisaged by Aquinas is to be pos- sible rut all? Interpreters of Aquinas's metaphysical method- ology have given an extremely wide variety of answers to this question, but I believe they can he grouped into four basic positions.. (1) Aquinas's science of metaphysics does not pre- suppose a prior demonstration of the existence of God because the intellect is capable of forming a concept of being in gen- eral, the subject matter of this science, by means of a *distinctio* other than negative separation, for example, by means of some kind of total or formal abstraction.   (2) Aquinas's science of metaphysics does not presuppose a prior demonstration of the existence of God because the inteHect is capable of forming a concept of being in general by means of a process of negative separation, and this process need not be grounded in the demonstl'ation of the existence of any immaterial reality, let alone of God. (3) Aquinas's science of metaphysics does not presuppose a prior demonstration of the ·existence of God be- cause the intdJect is capable of forming a concept of being in geneml by negative separation and, though this process needs to be grounded in the affirmation of the existence of *some* im- material reality, for example, the rational soul, this need not be God. (4) Aquinas's science of metaphysics does presuppose a prior demonstration of the existence of God because the in- tellect is only capable of forming a concept of being in gen-

so For an invaluable guide see John F. Wippel, *op. cit.,* and the discussion of this article in *Rassegna di Letteratura Tomistica* 14 (1981) : 127-128. See also A. Moreno, O.P., " The .Subject, Abstraction and Methodology of Aquinas' Metaphysics," *AngeZioum* 61 (1984): 580-601.

eral, by means of a process of negative separation, and this process can only be grounded in the affi.rmation of the exist-em:ie of the immaterial reality who ⊲is God.

It is my contention that all four of these positions are un-satisfactory because they all fail to do justice to the problem as I think it should be reformulated. In light of the interpreta-,tion given above, I would ask: Does the intellect fust need to perform that metaphysicail resolution *secundum rem* which has as !its *terminus* the seizure of God as *lpsum Esse SubSistens* if it is to be capable of performing that metaphysrca1l reso1ution *secundum rationem* whereby it can obtain that *obiectum speculabile,* the *ratio entis,* which is the direct subject maitter of metaphysics? And can it do so in a manner which will ground Aquinas's metaphysics as a science?

In Eght of this reformulation of the problem, I see little point to entering into a detailed discussion of the four posi-tions. I consider them all to share some common failings: (1) They faiil to see that the *obiectum speculabile* which must be seized **if** the science of metaphysics envisaged by Aquinas is fo be possible at aU is not just some indeterminate concept of being in general hut precisely the *ratio entis.* (2) They fail to see that that negativie separation which effects metaphysical resolution *secundum rem* must be clearly distinguished from that negative separation which effects metaphysical resolution *secundum rationem.* (3) They fail to see that in neither case of metaphysical resoilrution (*secundum rem* and *secundum ra-tionem)* should the negative sepamtion which efferets it, *(secundum rem* and *secundum rationem* respectiviely) be con-fused, let alone identified, with the resolution that it effects; the reso•lution effected invoJves more than just the negative separation which effects it. (4) They fail to appreciate the im-plications of Aquinas's conception of resolution in general, and *a fortiori* of metaphysical resolution, ,and thereby fail to render an adequate account of the scientific status that Aquinas at-tributes to his metaphysics.

As we have seen, one of the essential elements of a process

of resolution as such is ,that it is a process of *ratio* which nec-
essarily terminates in *intellectus;* [t is a process of discursive
reasoning which has ·as its *terminus* always and necessarily
the seizme of first principil.es.This is especially and pamdigma-
ticaJ:ly tme of resolution in its initial instantiaition as logical
resolution, hut it is ,aJ.so true of scientific resolution as it is
performed within and specified by each of the three theoretical
sciences. Logical resolution culminates in the seizure of the first
principles of both the formal 1and the material aspects of rea-
sonings as such. Similarly, scientifiic   culminates in
the seizure of rthe first principle proper to a science from which
the entire content of that science flows, its *ob'ieotum specul-*
abile, which as such is 1alwaysa *ratio.* Now metaphysical resolu-
tion, if it !is to be an iauthentic process of resolution at all,
must culminate in the inteJiectool .seiZlUreof the first principle
of metaphysics, of its *obiecitum speoUlabile,* the *ratio entis,*
wh!ich is the necessary oonstitiuent of the concept of being in
general. The point that needs to be stressed is that the *term-*
inus of metaphysical resolution *secundum rationem* cannot be
just the formation of some imprecise or indeterminate concept
of being in general which wou1d still leave the mind quite un-
enlightened as to the *ratio entis.* Such a " *terminus* " would not
be 1an .arlequate *terminus* at all, and the process of " resolu-
tion " that attained it wou1d not be an authentic instance of
resolution. After all, we already have some kind of vague and
confused notion of being on the basis of the original, merely
preliminary and pre-metaphysical grasp of being which is
common to 1aJl men. Indeed, if one oould found the science of
metaphysics envisaged rby Aquinas on some merely indeter-
minate concept of being in general and without an explicit
seizure of the *ratio entis,* then surely this original apprehension
of being would be quite sufficient, and there wou1d he no need
whatsoever for either metaphysical resolution or the negative
separations which effect it. But, as I have argued, for Aquinas
it is the seizure of the *ratio entis* which represents the only
satisfactory *terminus* of metaphysical resolution *seoondum*
rationem.

At this point we need to return to the ea11lier question about the precise nature of this intellectual seizure whereby the mind attains the *ratio entis* as the *terminus* of metaphysical resolution *secundum rationem.* We have seen that this seizure is .rendered possible by that succession of negative judgments of separation *secundum rationem* which effect metaphysical resolution *secundum rationem.* Since it must have the characler of a positive seizure, this ·attainment itself cannot be a negative judgment of separation. The situation is exactly parallel to that of metaphysical resolution *secundum rem,* which is effected by a S1Uccession of negative separations *secundum rem* hut which has .a:s its *terminus* the positive judgment that " God is *lpsum Esse Subsistens,"* and while this judgment does not do justice rto God's nature, it is nonethefoss no mere negation. Simil.arly, I would suggest, the seizure of the *ratio entis* which is ithe terminus of metaphysical resolution *secundum rationem* is no mere negation but a positive judgment: "the *ratio entis* is the condition of participating in *esse commune."*

Now it is my contention that this positive judgment seizing the *ratio entis* must presuppose the positive judgment seizing God as *lpsum Esse Subsistens* if it is adequately to ground Aquinas's metaphysics as a science and if the process of metaphysical resolution *secundum rationem* of which it is the *terminus* is to be an a;uthentic instantiation of Aquinas's conception of resolution. Aquinas characterizes the process of resolution as the *"via iudicii."* An authentic process of resofotion must have as its *terminus* not just rany positive judgment but must always oulminate in a positive judgment which pos·sesses the epistemological status of being certain. A positive judgment which seized the *ratio entis* but which lacked certitude would not only be inadequate to the grounding of metaphysics as a science; it would not even represent a satisfactory *terminus* for a process of metaphysical resolution *secundum rationem* which claimed to be authentic.

W·e have seen that the positive judgmental seizing God as *lpsum Esse Subsistens,* which is the *terminus* of metaphysi-

ool resolution *secundum rem,* does possess certitude. This is becaiuse metaphysical resolution *secundum rem,* even though it is effeoted by a sequence of negative separations, is con- stituted by one or more arguments which have the logical status of demonstrations *qu'ia.* But what is the epistemological status of rthe positive judgment seizing the *ratio entis* if we consider it exclusively in terms of metaphysical resolution *secundum rati..onem?* This process of metaphysical resolution is allso effected iby a sequence of negative sepamtions, but, un- metaphysical resolution *secundum rem,* it is in no way constituted by one or more arguments which could possibly pretend to the status of being demonstrations *quia,* let alone demonstrations *propter quid.* Metaphysical l'esolution *secun- dum rationem* neither reasoning from realities grasped as effoots to the affirmation of the existence of their cause nor purely deductive reasoning, which would have as its point of departure the grasp of some *quod quid est* of being, expressed by a definition. Of course this is entirely appropriate: it would hardly do for the initial seizure of the *obiectum specul- abile* of metaphysics to be the result of demonstrative reason- ing if metaphysics is to be *first philosophy.*

Furthermore, in contrast with logical resolution, metaphysi- cal resolution *secundum rationem* is not a case of an analysis or reduction to first principles which are *principia per se nota quoad ommnes* (propositions whose truth is grasped and as- sented to by all who understand :the meanings of the terms which appear in them) . Such principles are known to begin with; they must be if the logical resolution of the piece of rea- soning being examined is to be possible at all. The proposition which expresses the seiz:ureof the *ratio entis,* " the *ratio entis* is the condition of participating in *esse commune,"* while it might *in se* be an analytic proposition, is most certainly not analytic *quoad om,nes.* If it were presupposed, we would have a *petitio principii.* Rather, it is arrived ak by the applica- tion of a finite series of negative separations *secundum ra- tionem* to a finite series of diverse preliminary concepts of be-

ing. As I said in the preceding section, it represents the seizure
of an irreducible collJceptual content which cannot be negated
of the concept of being in general without either falling into
contradiction or " annihilating " that concept. But it must be
kept in mind that this concept of being in general has itself
been formed on the basic of a necessarily finite series of diverse
concepts of being. As a matter of principle the seizure of the
ratio entis which culminates metaphys:UcaJ resolution *secundum
rationem* represents no more than a highly sophisticated con-
jecture. There is no certitude whatsoever that it represents a
seizure of the *ratio entis* as it must   be. Viewed
solely in the light of the metaphysical resolution *secundum ra-
tionem* which it culminates, the seizure of the *ratio entis* seems
to be irremediably deficient with respect to the epistemological
status that it must have if metaphysics is to be a science and
not mereJy a   discipfine, dealing at best with prob-
abilities.

It should now he dear why I believe that the very possibility
of Aquinas's science of metaphysics presupposes a prior demon-
stration of the existence of God and the intellectual seizure of
God as *Ipsum Esse Subsistens* as ithe *terminus* of metaphysicail
resolution *secundum rem.* It is only by being seen in the light
of this eertain judgment that the seizure of the *ratio entis*
which eulminaities   resolution *secundum rationem*
can itself acquire the epistemological status of certitude. In-
sofar as it does so, it becomes an aoceptahle *terminus* for the
prooess of resolution which it culminates, a process of resolu-
tion which Aquinas would call the " *via iudicii.*" Insofar as it
does so, it can also serve as a suitable point of departure for
a scientific metaphysics which finds in the *ratio entis* its
obiectum speculabile or direct subject matter. Aquinas makes
this point repeatedly, albeit implicitly, throughout his works.
It is because God is *lpsum Esse Subsistens* thait we can be cer-
tain that the condition of participating in *esse commune* is the
ratio entis, which is instantiated in e¥erything whi:chfaJ1ls under

the concept of being in geneml 'as *if* it were a generic concept. [40]
By being seen in the light of rthe certain   of God as *Ipsum
Esse Subsistens,* the proposition which expresses rthe seizure of
the *ratio entis* is grounded epistemoJogicall.yand is revealed to
be an analytic proposition, a *propoSitio immediata.* Though not
immediata quoad omnes, it is no mere *nugatio* or trivial taut-
ology. It is a suitable point of departure for metaphysics, that
is, for the judgments with respect to necessities which con-
stitute the reflexive subj·ect matter of metaphysics. ᴜ

Furthermore, I would suggest that my interpretation now
makes it possible to give la definitive account of why God must
be e:mliudedfrom the 1-e:flexivesubject matter of metaphysics.
Otherwise one sees the direct S1Ubject matter of metaphysics
as being, either some indeterminate concept of being in general,
as in the case of the four representative positions enumerated
above, o;r a *ratio entis* as the condition of participating in *esse
commune,* grasped in a judgmental seizure which culminates
metaphysical resolution *secundum rem* but which is not epis-
temologically grounded in the seizure of God as *lpsum Esse
Subsistens.* In either case, it then becomes impossible to ex-
clude God definitively from the extension of the concept of be-
ing in general *(ens commune) .* And with regard to this issue
Aquinas. himself never manifests the slightest doubt. [42]

40 " ━━━ Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. . . . Relinquitur ergo quod
omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse." *Summa Theol,*
I, q. 44, a. 1; " ... sicut hie homo participat humanam naturam, ita quod-
cumque ens creatum participat •.. naturam essendi: quia solum Deus est
suum esse ... " *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 45, a. 5 ,ad 1.

41 " ━━━ et circa naturas inferiores quas respicit ratio inferior, possunt
accipi necessariae considerationes, quae ad scientificum pertinent: alias
Physica et Metaphysica non essent scientiae ... " *De Ver.,* q. 15, a. 2, ad 3.

42 " ━━━ illud enim quo primo acquiritur ab intellectu est ens et id in
quo non invenitur ratio entis non est capibile ab intellectu • . . secundum
rei veritatem, Causa prima est supra ens, inquantum est ipsum esse infinitum.
Ens autem dicitur id quod finite participat esse et hoc est proportionatum
intellectui nostro. . . . Unde illud solum est capibile ab intellectu nostro
quod habet quidditatem participantem esse; sed Dei quidditas est ipsum esse,
unde est supra intellectum." *Sup. De Oausis,* Prop. 6, lect. 6, #174-175.

In conclusion I should Jike to make a final suggestion. The intellect's positive and certafa seizures of God as *lpsum Esse Subsi,stens* and of the *ratio entis* as the condition of participating in *esse commune,* which terminate metaphysical resolution *secundum rem* 1and metaphysicail resolution *secundum rationem,* are the pofots of departure for the two subsequent moments of metaphysical reasoning envisaged by Aquinas. They are the starting points for the two processes of metaphysical composition *Becundum rem* and metaphysical com.-position *secundum rationem* respectively. But this raises the wider issue of the preeise nature and :role of *compositio* in Aquinas's metaphysfoal methodo1ogy. The argument that I have presented in this paper is quite l'elevant to this issue. After all I have contended that :the very possibility of Aquinas's science of metaphysics is dependent upon a prior seizure of God as *lp8Um Esse Subsistens* and only in the of this seizure can the proposition which expresses the seizure of the *ratio entis* acquire the logical status of a *positio.* Thus, my argument has implied a definite commitment to the demonstrative character of at least one dimension of Aquinas's subsequent metaphysical reasoning. But this issue of Aquinas's understanding of compositive metaphysical reasoning deserves a whole artiole in its own right.

PLATO'S *PARMENIDES* AND ST. THOMAS'S ANALYSIS OF GOD AS ONE AND TRINITY

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IN HIS CRITICISM of the Neopfatonic interpretation of the *Parmenides,* Cornford says, "The fanguage throughout is as dry and prosaic as a textbook on algebra; there is little here to suggest that the One has any religious significance as there is in the other case to suggest that x, y, and z are a trinity of unknown gods." [1] I agree with Cornfo11d that the NeoplatoniJc interpreta.tion is very speculative and seriously flawed. Nonethe1ess, the "negative theology" these interpreters attribute to Plato is instruic1tive. More than this, it can be shown that opinions like Cornford's are, to say the least, unimaginative.

I intend to establish, in the first and main part of this artide, the logical agreement between the PJatonic and Thomistic analyses of an absoJuteiy simple unity. The argument at *Parmenides* 137b-142a, Blato's analysis of the absoluteJy one, prov]des a basis for determining what God, as an absolutdy simple unity, is not. By applying this 'argument in the *Parmenides* to St. Thomas's discussion of God as one, I shaill show that what appears to be " as dry and prosai:c as a textbook on algebra " has, contrary to Cornfo11d," religious significance."

In the second part of this article, I shall use the arguments at *Parmenides* 157b-159b and 159b-160b to determine what can

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[1] *Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides' Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides,* trans. with introduction and commentary by Francis MacDonald Cornford (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939), p. 131.

be predicated of God, if St. Thomas's analysis of the Trinity
is to aoco:rd with the articles of faith   (God as an abso1utely
simple unity as weU as a Trinity).   Once again, we shall see
the ":religious significance" of Plato's analysis and the irony
of Cornfo11d'ssuggestion about the meaninglessness of applying
Plato's analysis to " a trinity of unknown gods."

I

   We should first he clear about how St. Thomas uses the term
"one" as applied to God. In Q. n, A. 1 of the Prima Pars
 (The Unity of God) ,[2] he distinguishes between one as "the
negation of division" and one as "the principle of number."
The first sense, which he calls the transcendental   sense, applies
to God; in this sense the one is opposed to the many as the
undivided is :to the divided. Human beings cannot know what
God is, but we can determine   what God is not, e.g., not-many,
the transcendental   sense of being absolutely   simple. (The
human intdlect can only know the composite or tha,t which
pertains to the composite; it cannot know that which is ab-
          sample or undivided.)   St. Thomas   says, "He is
supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither ac-
tually nor potentially by any mode of division; since He is al-
together simple." [3]

   If we :compare the analysis of God as absolutely one or sim-
ple with the first hypothesis of the one in the   i.e.,
if the one is one, what can be predicated of it, then we shall
notice an important similarity.   If the one is simply one, none
of the categories which can determine the nature of the one
are predicable of it. Similarly, God as absolutely one or sim-
ple cannot be understood in ,a positive manner (His nature is
incomprehensible) . However, He can be understood negative-
ly. And what we can say negatively   about God parallels

   [2] References are to the *Summa Theologica* in *Basic Writings of Saint
Thomas Aqu-Ynas,* ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. I (New York: Random House,
1945).
   [a] *ST,* I, q. 11, a. 4, c.; Pegis, p. 90.

Plato's determination of what is not predicable of the one as simple.

To show what God is not, we must negate what does not apply to Him; this reveals the simplicity of God. If the one is one (in St. Thomas's transcendenta.l sense of "one " as simple), says Plato, it cannot be many and, therefor:e, cannot have parts and cannot be a whole, for a whole is composed of parts.

In his discussion of " The Existence of God in Things," St. Thomas says, " A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now a *part* is twofold: viz., a part of the essence, as the form and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and diHerence are calrled parts of species. There is also a pavt of quantity, into which any quantity is divided." [4] I shall use this analysis of part and whole in order to determine the simplicity of God. God cannot be a body, for He is pure actuality, and 'any body possesses potentia.lity for change or motion. Thus, God cannot be a pant of a quantity, for He does not partake of that which is materia.l. Nor is God a composite being in the sense that form and matter are par:ts of a composite whole. Since God is pure actuality, He cannot he composed of matter and form. But forms can either be received into matter and individuated by matter (composite beings) or they cannot be received into matter (self-subsistent beings). In the latter case, the form is individuated in a negative sense, beca.use it cannot be received into matter. God is said to be surch'a form.

St. Thomas is aware of the folilowing problem that Plato mises: If the one is simply one, how can we predicate anything of it, for :then it would be many and not one? St. Thomas says that since we speak of simple things only as! if they were composite, for we may predicate names of the simpJe thing, we may predicate Godhead' or life of God, but this does not mean that God is composite. " We indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, hut not that there is any composition in God." [5]

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[4] *ST,* I, q. 8, a. 2, ad 3; Pegis, p. 65.   [5] *ST,* I, q. 3, a. 3, ad 1; Pegis, p. 29.

No:r is God a composrite entity because He is composed of genus and difference. A thing may he in a genus in two ways: either properly, as a species is contained in a genus, or as a point, for example, is reduced to 1the genus of quantity. God is not in a genus as in the former case, for species is composed of genus and idifforence. Genus is to difference as potentiality is to actuality. But in God, there is no potentiality. God is not reducible to any genus, for any principle, e.g., a point, does not extend beyond the genus to which it belongs, hut God is the principle of a'11. being.

In God there are no accidents, and, therefore, He cannot be composite in this way because a subject is to its a1ocidents as potentiality is to actuality, but there is no potentiality in God. Since God does not partake of the compos ite in any way, He must he absolutely simple.

Returning to the argument in the *Parmenides,* Plato says that an absolutely simple unity cannot have a beginning, middle, and end, for it has no parts. The Trinity is, in some sense, a beginning, middle, a.nd end, but not in the sense of having pa.rts. Having no beginning, middle, or end, the one is *apeiron* (unlimited), without end or infinite.

The infinite, a;ocording to St. Thomas, can be considered with respect to form or matter. God is not infinite *qua* matter, for He is absolutely simple and pure form. Thus, He is said to be infinite in His essence raithe:r than in magnitude. Con-oe:rning form, composite beings are relatively infinite, for their forms are in potentiality to an indefinite number of acd dental forms. God alone is absolutely infinite with respect to form, for He is pure wotuality and, thus, an absolutely simple unity. Therefore, He is in potentiwlity to no accidents; He possesses an infinite number of perfections by His essenJCe alone.

Pilato says that the one, being nonmaterial, is shapeless, and sinoe it is formless (in this sense) it cannot be in ph1;ce. If it were in place, it wou1d be either in itself or in anothe r. If it were ii.Tl itseilf, it wou1d be both container and contained, and, therefore, two rather than one. Nor could it be in another, for

it would be bounded by another and touched in many p1ruces. But this is impossible if the one, being one and indivisible, is without shape and parts.

St. Thomas considers, as does Plato, the connection between infinity and plruce, although in a different way. "God is said to be everywhel'e, and in aH things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite." [6] Plato argues that the one cannot be in plruce. We notice, however, that the one is considered as a material ·entity. If the one is indivisible, in this sense, it cannot be located in the world or be in place. St. Thomas says, " God is in ruil things, not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an wocident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it aots." [7] God is said to fill every place but not in the way a rnateriaJ body does. " He fills every plwce by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill all plaices." [s]

Plato proceeds to show that the one as indivisible cannot he in motion. If it were in motion, it would either change or move in plruce. But if the one changes, it will no longer be itself (one) . If it moves in place, the motion is either circular or rectilinear locomotion. The former lcind of motion, however, implies parts (the center must he differentiated from the other parrt,s); the latter kind of motion implies coming to he in a place, which entails parts.

After considering God's omnipresence and existence, St.

[6] *ST,* I, q. 7, introd.; Pegis, p. 56.
[7] *ST,* I, q. 8, a. 1, c.; Pegis, p. 63.
[a] *ST,* I, q. 8, a. 2, c.; Pegis, p. 65. The term " indivisible" pertains either to the continuous, e.g., a point or a moment, or to that which is outside the genus of the continuous. In the first case the indivisible cannot be in many places, but in the latter case it can. " Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous as a part of it, but as touching it by its power (Ibid., ad 2) God is said to be in all things by His essence, presence, and power. He is also in all things as an object of desire and knowledge. How· ever, since God's essence cannot be known by natural reason, He is primarily in man, in this latter sense, as an object of desire. Thus, God is in all things primarily in two ways: as an efficient cause and as a final cause. We may note that St. Thomas would deny that contact between God as a cause and His effects implies parts in God. Creation is a product of God's essence which is an absolutely simple unity.

Thomas discusses His !immutability. God cannot change, for change implies potentiality and He is pure actuality. Again, God does not move in p1ace, for He ilacks any potentiality. Since motion implies parts--for 'Something in motion "remains in part ·as it was, and in part passes 1away"-God is immutable, for He is simple rather than a composite being and, !therefore, lacks parts. ⁹

Plato says that since the one as one cannot partake of the same or the other-for it cannot be in itself nor can it he in another-the one cannot be in the same plaiee and, !therefore, ca;nnot be at rest. We can only attribute rest or motion to an obj·ect when both 1are attribUJtable to rthe object, for ·an object that is capabJe of motion must ailso be capable of rest and vice versa. Therefore, since God is not in motion, rest cannot be predicated of Him. St. Thomas says that resit is not predicable of God, but immutability is.

I shall now apply the 1logical transcendenrals same and other to the conrcept of God ·as absolutely simple, as Plato does to ithe one as simple. God as a simple unity cannot be other than Himself, for then He would not be a simple unity. Nor can He be the same with another being, for then He would be that being, but there is only one God. One with reference to its oneness is not other than other things, but only in virtue of otherness 1as a relation can the one be other than others.

Knowledge of the relation of otherness between God and beings, according to St. Thomas, is deriv;ed from our knowledge of God as the cause of all beings. Since we cannot know the essence of God by natural reason (we know Him by ex-

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⁹ St. Thomas says, "Thus, in every creature there is a potentiality to change: either as regards substantial being as in the case of corruptible things; or as regards being in place only, as in the case of celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their being and non-being. Hence, since God is mutable in none of these ways, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable." *ST,* I, q. 9, a. 2, c.; Pegis p. 73.

cellence and remotion) , we cannot determine the relation of
otherness between God and beings as we wou1d between two
known entities. As St. Thomas says at   beginning of ques-
tion three, we must remove from God all a,ttributes which do
not befit Him, and, thus, He is seen to be a simple unity. As
a simple unity, we may determine 'vvhat He is not. Perfection,
infinity, unity, and immutability do not determine the essence
of God; they, rather, determine wha;t He is not and, therefore,
His excellence and remotion.

Unity is not identical to sameness or identity. **If** the one is
to partake of sameness-be the same with itseIf-it must be
in virtue of something other than its unity, i.e.,   virtue of
sameness. Although unity is not   identical to same-
ness, if we determine God to be a   unity, we must say
that the predicates applied to Him do not differentiate His
essence hut are in ,some sense the same. God's will, for ex-
ample, does not differ from_ His understanding or His power.
Sinoe man, by his natuml powers, cannot know God's simple
essence, we must proceed to attribute these properties to God
aoco11dingto the mode   our understanding, thait is, 1a.s if God's
essence were many and not one.

Since likeness is a species of sameness and unity was seen
not to be identical 1to sameness, one cannot he like itseH or
another in virtue of unity ailone. The same reasoning holds
with respect :to unlil.0eness, otherness, m1d unity.

Since God is not contained in any genus, the effects of God
as first cause do not bear any specific or generic likeness but
only an ianalogica:l likeness to Him, **"In** this way   created
things, so far as they al'e beings, are like God as the first and
          principfo of all being." 10   may delay further dis-
cussion of likeness and equality, for these terms are predicated
of God as a Trinity.

Neither sameness nor diffe11enoein age can be predicated of
the one, for the one does not partake of equality and likeness,
nor of inequality and unlikeness, hut sameness of age implies

10 *ST,* I, q. 4, a. 3, c.; Pegis, p. 41.

equality or likeness of time 'and difference in age implies m-equality or unlikeness time. Since the one can neither be older no:r younger nor the same age with itseilf nor with an-other, it cannot be in time at all.

We saw that God is an immutable being because He is sim-ple, and this was based upon the fact that motion implies parts or a composite being. In Q. A. 2, St. Thomas says, "The notion of eternity immutability, as the notion of time !oUows movement .... Hence, as God supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be et·ernal. Nor is He eternal only, but He is His own eternity." [11] God's eternity, then, fol-lows from His simplicity. Eternity is said to be known from two facts. Eternity has no beginning or end, and it has no suc-cession (it is simultaneously whole). Time is 1de:fined as "the number of movcement according to before .and after." An en-tity which is absolutely simple lacks motion and, therefore, does not parta:kie of before and after, is not in time. Thus, that entity which does not participate in succession and is, therefore, outside of time partakes of the nature of the eternal (in its essential aspect of being that which is simultaneously whole as well as having no beginning end in time). Since, according to St. Thomas, knowledge of simple things is based upon knowledge of composite things, he says that knowledge of eternity is derived from om knowledge of time. We can attain a knowledge of simple things, in this way, by negation. Thus, eternity is defined as having no end or beginning and, essentially, as not partaking succession (eternity is simul-taneously whole).

Plato concludes his argument by maintaining that the pre-dicables used in attempting to discove:r the nature of the one as one are aU the possible modes of partaking of being. There-fore, neither is the one, one, nor does the one exist. " Then it is neither named, nor ,expressed, nor opined, nor known, nor does anything that is pe11oeiveit." [12]

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[11] *BT,* I, q. 10, a. 2, c.; Pegis, p. 76.
[12] *Parmenides* 142a.

Plato's conclusion appears to conflict with St. Thomas's be-lief that God is an absolutely simple unity. But St. Thomas agI1ees with Plato's analysis of the one as one and accepts the consequences. He agrees that God's essence cannot be known by natural reason alone and does not partake of the physical in any way. Since St. Thomas is aware of the implications of the ana,lysis, how can he argue that God is a perfect being?

God and creatures have only analogical, rather than specific or generic, likeness. Aiccording to Aristotle, we understand what a thing is by the ten categories. But if we attempt to predicate them of the one as simple, as Plato does, we see that they are not appl:i!cable. Thus, the predicaments or categories are directly applicable to creatures, but not to God (as a sim-ple being). Howevier, if God's being is not determined as the being of creatures and things is determined, how does one know that God partakes of being in any sense? Being may refer to ithe existence of something or to the properties of a thing. Since one cannot determine the existence of an entity as ab-solutely simp1e by the predicaments, St. Thomas first attempts to pl'ovie the existence of God and, then, proceeds to the ques-tion of the manner of His existence. [13]

The connection between Plato's and St. Thomas's arguments is, then, clear. For Plato, the one as one does not exist, because we cannot determine it as a physical or intelligible entity. St. Thomas, howevier, begins by proving the existence of God, and he agrees with Plato's anailysis showing that none of the pos-sible predicabies apply to the one as one. God, as an absolute-

[13] The first cause as prime mover is pure actuality. In this way, St. Thomas can show that being and perfection belong to God. In Q. 4, A. 1, ad 3, he describes the nature of being. " Being itself is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that which is act; for nothing has ac-tuality except so far as it is. Hence being is the actuality of all things, even of forms themselves " (Pegis, p. 38). God as the first cause of things is pure actuality, and, thus, must be the most perfect of beings. God is being itself in the sense that the perfections of all things are in God. "All the perfections of all things are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not ... any excellence which may be found in any genus." *BT,* I, q. 4, a. 2, c.; Pegis, pp. 38-39.

ly simple unity, cannot be known in this life, as either ·an in-
telligible or a physical entity.   Therefore, God's essence can-
not he known by the predicables by which we know the nature
and attributes of creatures and things. Howervier, the Platonic
analysis of the absolutely simple one can provide ia basis for
determining what God is not. By this analysis, the

tion of Gard's perfection rev·eals the sup]['emeeJreeilience of the
being of God, a;lthough not in the sense that His essence can
be known by human (natural) reason. Thus, St. Thomas be-
gins with the con1ception of God as first cause :and shows that
the predicables which would determine God as composite are
not applicable to Him; therefo.ve, He must be a simple unity.
From this, he proceeds to show, as Plato does: with the one as
one, that God must he immutable, infinite, ml!d eternwl.

II

    In Q. 82, A. 1, St. Thomas discusses the difference between
the inquiries about God a's one and as a Trinity. One cannot
gain knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason, although, as
we saw in the first part of the paper, one can determine what
belongs to Goc;las the first cause of all things. " By natural rea-
son," says St. Thomas, " we can know what belongs to the
unity of the essence, hut not what belongs to rthe distinction
of the persons." 14

    We may reason about .a subject in two basic ways: sufficient
proof can be £urnished of some principle, as in .the n:a.tural sci-
ences, or one can show

how the remaining effects are in harmony with an already posited
principle .... In the first way we can prove that God is one and
the like. In the second way, arguments may be said to manifest
the Trinity; that is to say, given the doctrine of the Trinity, we
find arguments in harmony with it. We must not, however, think
that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons-15

    14 *ST,* I, q. 32, a. 1, c.; Pegis, p. 316.
    15 *ST,* I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2; Pegis, p. 318.

The "posited principle," here, is an article of faith. [16]

We cannot use :the *Parmenides* to discover what belongs tQ Goo as a Trinity or even to determine God as a Trinity. However, we may use arguments in the *Parmenides* to show what must be affirmed or denied of God *qua* many in order to make the   of the Trinity ruooord with the articles of faith-that God is :an absoJ.utely simple unity and a Trinity.

I shailJ .begin :with the second part of the foUowing hypo-,thes·isin the *Parmenides:* If ;the one is, what can we say of the others? *(Parmenides* 159b-160b) An unbridgeable gap results from positing 1an absolute separation between the one and the others. As we have s:aid, if the one is an absolute, simple unity, it is not a whole composed of parts; .therefore, the others cannot partake of the one, since t:he one is wholJy separate from the others and contains no parts. The following absurd consequence results :from the above considerwti.on: Since the others do not participate in the one, they can have no unity; nor can they he many, for as many, each part would be part of a whole. But the others do not partake of .the one. Therefore, they cannot partake of whole or part.

If we say that unity belongs to God's essence but not to God as a Trinity, then neither ean the Trinity partake of God's unity •and, therefore, of what belongs to God as an absolutely simple being-which is against faith-nor cou1d the Trinity exist at aH :for without unity they could not be many. Indivisible unity pertains to both God as one and .to the Persons of :the Trinity. "So when we say, the essence is one, the term *one* signifies the essence undivided; ·and when we say the person is *one,* it signifies the person undivided; and when we say the persons are *many,* ·we signify those persons and their in-·dividual undividedness." [17] Thus, indivisibility is the formal

16 In Q. 32, A. 4, something is said to be of faith in two ways: *"Directly,* and such are truths that come to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and unity of God; . . . and concerning these truths a false opinion of itself involves a heresy. . .. A thing is of faith *indirectly,* if the denial of it involves as a consequence something against faith (Pegis, p. 323) ."

11 *ST,* I, q. 30, a. 3, c.; Pegis, p. 304.

property of unity as it pertains to both God's essence and the
Persons.

   In order to ·examine this problem further, I shall consider the
first attempt in the *Parmenides* to solve the problem: I£ the
one is, what can we say of the others?   *(Parmenides* I57b-I59b)
In this section, Plato assumes that the one and the others are
not wholly separate from one another, but the one and the
others are other than one another.   The others, being other
than the one, are not the one but, in a sense, participate in the
one. Being other than the one implies having parts, £or i£ they
did not have parts they would be a simple unity.   Parts have
a relation to a whoile which is one in the sense of having a
unity of which the parts ave parts.   Thus, i£ the others have
parts, they will partake of the whole and, in this sense, of the
one.   But the parts themselves must, in themselves, partake
of the one, £or i£ a part   a part, it must he separate from
other parts.   " Both the whole and the part must participate
in the one; for the whoile wiH be one whole, of which the parts
will be parts; and each part will be part of the whole which is
the whole of the part." [18]

   The others   (other than the one) will be many, for if they
are neither one nor more than one, they wouM not be. In the
sense that the others, as many, partake of the one but are not
the one, they are infinite.   " And, yet, when each several part
becomes a P'art, then the parts have a limit in   to the
whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to the
parts." [19]

   If God is one and yet a Trinity, in some way the Persons
must be distinguished from one another, and yet the essence
must remain the same. Alth()!Ughthe Persons are distinguished
from one another, they must participate perfectly in the unity
of God's essence. The conJCeptionof God as one and a Trinity
becomes more difficult if we say: the Trinity is other than God
as an absolutely simple unity, for if it wer:e not, it would be

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[18] *Parmenides* 15Sb-c.   [19] *Parmenides* 15Sc-d.

that unity. Being other than God's essence, ·as a unity, would then <implyhaving pams. St. Thomas wants to apply the transcendenba;l sense of one to both the Persons and God's essence so that the Trinity is not distinguished from God's essence as the others aire from the one. Both God's essence and the Persons *qua* one   indivisible. However, there must be some distinction between God's essence as an absolutely simple unity and the indivisiibility of the Persons taken as a trinity. Although the term " indivisibility " is common to God's essence 'and ,the Trinity, if God as one and a Trinity are one *qua* indivisible, then there would be no distinction between God's essence rand the three Persons; nor wouM there be any distinctions ·among the Persons themselves. The indivisibility of God's essence must differ from the indivisibiJity of the Persons, not in terms of the transcendental sense of one, hut in virtue of the fact that rthe Persons are distinguished from one another whereas God is also said to be an absolutely simple unity.

In Q. 31, A. Q, St. Thomas discusses the delicaite balance that must be maintained in eX'amining God's unity and the trinity of Persons. The terms "diversity " and " difference " do not apply to God, for His essence is a unity. There is, howe¥er, a distinction among the relations. The term " other," when applied rto God, can only mean a distinction of suppositum, for the essence of the Persons is identical to the essence of God. Thus, the term " other " cannot be used to distinguish God and the P•ersons but only the Persons themselves. But **ii** God is absolutdy one, and the Persons are not other than God but distinguished among themselves, how is God •absolutely one and, yet, many?

In Q. 39, A. 1 and Q, St. Thomas raises this question and offers the following solution. In God, relations are the divine essence and, since the Persons are relations " subsisting in the divine nature," [20] the Persons are not distinct from God's

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[20] St. Thomas says, "It is ... better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although they are distinguished in both ways, nevertheless in our mode of understand-

essence, hut they a!'le "reaiilily distinguished from each other." "The supl'lemeunity and simplicity of God exclude every kind of pJ1Urrulity taken absolutely, but not the p1ur:a.Jity of relations; for relations are predicated relatively, and thus they do not imply composition in that of which they are predicated." [21] But how oan there he a 11eal1distinction among the Persons? Are the terms " ,absolute " and " relative " meaningful when attributed to an absolutely simple ·being?

Given the above facls, it would seem that, since God is His essence ailJd He is: also an absolute unity, if one says that there are real distinctions in God (St. Thomas insists th.at the relations or Persons are real rather than .logical), there would necessarily hav;e to be some distinction 1between God as essence, which is also an ,absolute unity, and the Persons. But 00COro- ing to faith, this is inadmissible. If we say that the distinction between God and the Persons is simply "in our way of think- ing," ,this is to admit that human beings cannot understand the mystery of how God can he simple and a Trinity. We must 11emember, however, that St. Thomas says that the Trinity can- not he established a:dequately by reason but requires divine revelation. The best that one can do is to expound the doc- trine of God as one and ,a Trinity in the most consistent way possible. The theory that there are real relations in God which are not distinguished from His essooce may well be the best way to handle the problem, hut it does not remove the mystery; nor does St. Thomas think it does.

Returning to the *Parmenides,* we l"eteall that parts are parts of a whole conceived as ·a unity. Moreover, the parts as parts must partake of the one. Howe¥er, as we have seen, in God the relations are not parts of the whole, for the l'leal l'lelations which ,distinguish the Persons are the same as God's essence; if they were, this would mean that ,the part is :identical to the

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ing they are distinguished chiefly and primarily by relations." *ST,* I, q. 40, a. 2, c.; *Pegis,* p. 385.

[21] *ST,* I, q. 30, a. I, ad 3; Pegis, p. 300.

whole. (Then the part would no longer be a part; it would be the whole.)

We recall that Plato shows that in one sense the others are indefinite, whereas in another sense they, as parts, are limited by the whole and by their relations to one another. This is somewhat analogous to God as a Trinity, for there must be ;<iome factor which delimits ithe number of persons as real relations.

If we say that the Persons are somewhat analogous to parts in a whole in the above sense, St. Thomas must find some limiting factor (s) that, by analogy, applies to God (as: a whole) and thus determines their number. Since the Persons are said to proceed from God, the determina,tion of their number, aceo11dingto St. Thomas, should. be based upon what is analogous to the highest creatures, i.e., that which pertains to the mind. Smee mental acts proceed. from two sou11ces, the intellect and the will, these are the delimiting factors that determine the number of Persons.

As in the case of God's essenoe, the divine Persons can be ana1yzed negatively by considering part and whole as applied to the Persons. Parts relate to a whole in two possible ways: as matter and form are parts of a composite and as genus and difference are parts of a species. A divine person cannot be anafogous to a human person, for He is not a composite of form and matter. Furthermore, we define man by dille1,entiating the genus animal 1and thus determine the species, man. Individual men participate in the form of man. But this cannot be done with divine Persons. Divine Person iis not a species in which the three Persons participate; the term " divine person " signifies a subsisting reality as relation in the divine nature.

I shaU conc1ude this paper by discussing the divine Persons with reference to the Platonic predicables, motion, time, likeness, and equality.

Although God cannot he in motion, since there is no potentiality in Him, St. Thomas makes the folilowing st,atement:

" The other ol"der of origin in God regal"ds the procession of person from person." 22   Could this not be construed as entailing motion? Not necessarily, for although order seems to imply a before and after, before and after do not necessarily imply motion or time; there is a before and after in number. St. Thomas suggests that there is an order according to origin but without priority. Since, for example, the Son is said to be from the Father, we say that there is an order among the Persons, but not in the sense that one Person is really prior ,to another.

Since likeness is a weaker term than equality, it is more correct to say that the Persons are co-equal than to say that they are like one another. Two things may be like one another by participating in the same form, but they are co-equal only if there is a perfect participation or a perfect likeness. Since God is the same, *qua* essence, as the three Persons, the Persons must he co-equal. Nonetheless, St. Thomas does make use of the notion of lilmness. Since there is a specific likeness between father and son, image is said ito be properly attributed to the Son as a name. Moreover, eternity is said to have a likeness to the Father, species to the Son, and use to the Spirit. However, the diffioolty of applying special names to the Persons becomes manifest when we consider the divine simplicity. Although eternity and equality, for example, are predicable of aJll tlie Persons in the same degree, eternity is said to have a likeness to the Father and equality to the Son. It is difficult to under·stand how the Persons can partake of eternity and equality in equail degrees and yet not in equal degrees unless " eternity " and "equality " !al"e used equivoicwMy with reference to the specific persons and their essence.

22 *ST,* I, q. 41, a. 1, ad 1; Pegis, p. 391.

METHOD DIVORCED FROM CONTENT IN THEOLOGY? AN ASSESSMENT OF LONERGAN'S *METHOD IN THEOLOGY*

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N IDS INTRODUCTION to *Method in Theology,* Bernard Lonergan flatly maintains that he intends to· write not theology but only method in theology. [1] He therefore proposes .to concern himself solely with the operations theologians perform and to suspend consideration of the objects they seek to expound. He is looking for "a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results." [2] To arrive at his method, Lonergan relies upon the cognitional theory which he ha,d outlined with great sophistication in *Insight.* He argues that the dynamism of the human mind and the principles of its operations as revealed by introspective psycihology lead to a model of the nature of scientific method in general and, by extension, to method in theology. It is through the transcendental method that Lonergan discovers in the procedures of the human mind the basic pattern of operations by which wlll cognitiona1 activity takes plaice. This pattern, he maintains, yields cumulative results in theological inquiry as well as in any fie1d of investigation. He therefore intends to demonstrate that theology can be studied in the same manner as any other discipline.

Critics have respectfully suggested that, while Lonergan's system is an imposing one, he has introduced unworkable and

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[1] Bernard Lonergan, *Method 4ln Theology* (New York, 1979), p. XII.
[2] Lonergan, *Method,* p. 5.

misleading distinctions into his work; in particular, he has
to explicate his thoologiicaJ.p11emises and thereby leaves
uTIJc!lear the presuppositions upon which his *Method* rests.
Method, they argue, cannot be divorced from theology, and
the p11ecise writing of the form.er cannot be carried out with-
out attention to the latter. Avery Dulles, Mauri!Oe Wiles, and
Anthony Ke1ly have all leveled the charge that *Method* suffers
from this detaichment of method from content. The purpose
of this essay wiH he to discuss Lonergan's achievement in
Method in Theology but then to consider the extent to which
his critics may be right.

Um:Lerstanding Lonergan's methodologiical enterprise re-
quires a familiarity with his cognitionrul theory as delineated
in *Jnsi,ght,* for his complex theory of knowing establishes the
anthropology upon whiJCh he grounds his *Method.* Basically,
he pr:obes.for·the answers to thl"ee questions: 1) What happens
when we alle knowing? 2) Why do we that knowing? and
3) What is known when that is happening? The ans1werto the
first question yie1ds his cognitionrul theory, the second his
epistemology, .and the thi11d his met:aphysics.3 Since •all know-
ing is a quest .for explanaition, founded upon the ass111mptionof
the intelligibility of the universe, the on-going search for ex-
planation in the finite sphere implies a finail e:q>i1anationand
this is be[ng itseH. In apprehending the processes of cognition,
one can begin to recognize the means by which the search for
·this reality is universally conducted:

Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will
you understand the broad lines of all that there is to be under-
stood, but you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, open-
ing upon all further developments of understanding. 4

a Lonergan, *Method,* p. 25.

4 Bernard Lonergan, *Insight* (New York, 1957), p. XVIII. Lonergan's
cognitional theory draws from the work of Thomas and Kant but moves
creatively beyond them in his emphasis upon the dynamism of the human
mind and the nature of the reality it perceives and comes to know. For Kant,
to whom Lonergan's work is often compared, the mind imposes a conceptual
framework and an intelligible order upon that which it seeks to understand

Lonergan's use of introspective psychology reveals four levds in human consciousness, the empir1ca1, the intellectual, the rationa1l, and the moml. The empirical concentrates upon experience itself and involves the hasic questioning and intel"est in one's surroundings which all subsequent self-trans-cende1J1ce presupposes. It is " experiencing one's experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding." 5 Intellectual conscious-ness considers the elements passed on to it as " unknown " by the empirica1l consciousness, it is the level at which fresh tmderstanding of such matters is reached. Prob1ems posed by experience receive an initial, tentative so1ution through the colllceptua1linsights of intelJectua1l consciousness. In m-tiona:l cons1ciousness, which leads knower to the point of judgment, the hypotheses of the intellectual consciousness a:re tested, reflected upon, revised if necessary, and ult.h'Ilately as-sessed to he essentia.Irly a1ccurabe or inaocurate. This is: a cru-cial step, for at this juncture self-transcendence enabJes the subject to make a truth rcla.im, a claim to describe reality as it ructua1ly is. The judgment represents the "mind's: assurance that the conditions for asserting existence have been met." 6

in the very process of understanding. As a result, what is known lacks any actual reality outside of the "reality" imposed by the knower himself. What-ever order or objectivity appears to exist only does so because the mind has given to the data an intelligible structure. Apart from the order provided by the processes of the human mind, things as they are in themselves can-not be known. For Lonergan, as we shall see, both what the knower experi-ences and the intelligible pattern within which it is known to exist are aspects of a real, objective world order. This order of things confronts the knower but would still objectively exist in such a pattern even if the knower never sought to understand it.

Lonergan moves beyond Kant at another level as well. Where Kant had posited a static, organizational structure within the human mind, Lonergan finds a dynamic movement toward broader understanding and more expan-sive horizons. Built into the mind is a kind of nagging dissatisfaction with the present understanding, which drives the knower always beyond him-self.

5 Lonergan, *Method,* p. 14, 15.

s Denise Carmody, "Lonergan's Religious Person," *Religior• m Life* 44 (1975) : 225. This expTession is used by Carmody but is an accurate repre-sentation of Lonergan's perspective on the matter of judgment.

Finally, the moral ·oonseiousness makes a demand upon the
subject that he act in accol'd. wi:th his own assessment of the
>truth. This entails a call to responsibility   and moral courage
in the confrontation   with the reality he has come to under-
stand.   The agent thereby ads out of love, driV'en to uphold
the good, the :real, and the honorable,   with a commitment   to
the preservation and expansion of what he thinks ought to be.
Thus Lone:rgan's person is one who mov;es: towards   a devotion
to reality in love, the highest level of self-transcendence.

   From   these four 1levels of cons1cious intentionrulity   proceed,
l'espectiV'ely, the acts of experiencing,   understanding,   judging,
and decision-making;   by these acts the subject dmws nearer to
a full comprehension   and appDeciation of reality and to au-
thentic   self-trans1cendenee:

> **...** intelligence takes us beyond experiencing to ask what and
> why and how and what for. Reasonableness takes us beyond the
> answers of intelligence to ask whether the answers are true and
> whether what they mean really is so. Responsibility goes beyond
> fact and desire and possibility to discern between what truly is
> good and what only apparently   is good. [7]

This anaJlysis of the phenomenon   of human knowing reveals
that a:ll knowing is based on the a priori transcendental   no-
tions of being, truth, goodness, and vailue; these create for the
subject a perpetual tension which driv;es him to seek beyond
his present limitations of consciousness.   Man is urged from
within towa11ds fuUer knowledge of his universe and towards
an affirmation of vrulues. As the agent comes to know the
world around him, he attends first to the data at hand, pro-
ceeds to formulate   theories concerning the stmctul"e of the
data, and then arrivies at judgments regarding the correctness
of the theories. Thereafter, one ordinarily aiets in accord with
what one has judged to he the case, for to act otherwise would
be   inconsistent.   In short, the subject spontaneously
makes judgments and decisions in the course of living and

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7 Lonergan, *JJllethod,* p. 11.

knowing and thereby supports Lonergan's claim that being, truth, goodness, and value are a priori notions which give shape to the horizon of the knower. They are the notions which dynamica1ly form the way we seek out knowledge and ultimately appropriate it. As William Reiser expresses it:

... a study of the structure of knowing reveals its intrinsic orientation towards being; the structure of judgment, an intrinsic orientation towards objectivity; the structure of choosing an intrinsic orientation towards goodness and value. [8]

Arising from these a priori determinants are the transcendental precepts " Be attentiv;e, be   he reasonable, and be l1esponsible,"   Lonergan insists are fundamental to intellectual growth and integrity.

It should be aJdded that al-l men do not proeeed unerringly to the fullness of self-transcendence. These a priori factors do not propel all subjects inexorably into authenticity. Personal experiences, the influence of egoism, mistaken judgments, and the like contribute to the infinite variety of individual consciousness. But al-l men do possess a basic dynamism towards fulier comprehension of life: "... we all share some capacity, some desire and intimation, for mature human consciousness. If our progress is dialectica:l, forward and bruck, yet it continues, so fong as we try to grow, to become more 11ealistic and more wise." [9]

There are four decisive steps which should he taken for one to achieV1e a maitul'e and :vuthentic consciousness; Lonergan ca1ls them "conversions." In eaich conversion, a major change occurs in the subject's horizon, [10] so that he carries out the pro-

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[8] William E. Reiser, "Lonergan's Notion of the Religious A Priori," *The Thornist* 35 (1971) : 247.

[9] Carmody, p. 226.

[10] When Lonergan uses the term "horizon," he refers to the total scope of one's vision from a particular viewpoint. T'nis incluces both the "relative" horizon, which describes one's range of vision relative to one's development in psychological, cultural, and sociological terms, and the "basic " horizon, which describes the subject relative to the four transcendental conversions, intellectual, moral, religious, and Christian. For an extended analysis of

cedures of knowing with a radically revised perception of reality. Intellectual conversion consists of the subject's .appropriation of a raitional view of experience ov;er and against his previous common sense perception. It is from this: inteHectual stance that one learns to equate the real with the ¥erified and acquiesces to the demand from within to require cogent evidence before ,arriving at conclusions. Having undergone this conversion, one would ,ruooeptas real only that which conformed rto the critiical demands of reason. The morail conv;ersion is noted by its art.traction to what is right or good and consists in .sustaining a congruence between one's judgments and one's actions. It is a 1oommitmentto .the real in wovd and deed, based upon a love for the truth.

For Lonergan, the dynamism of the knowing process and the logic of the transcendental notions lead to the question of God and the affirmation of his: existence, the religious conversion. 1t is .a fact of rull knowing that it seeks out explanations in order to apprehend the rewl. This is certailli.y the ease in all scientific inquiry, ,as newer theories revise an:d replace the oM, ·ailid knowledge progresses ever nearer to an ruccurate understanding of being. The on-going differentiation in scientific knowledge demonstrates that man hopes to draw closer somehow to ultimate truth at the end of his quest. If being or reality itself were not the objective of human knowing, ·the search wouM cease or become meaningless. Implicit in aill inquiry is the underlying as.sumption that the universe is intelligible and that aill phenomena do, indeed, possess explanations. If being is intelligilie, says Lonergan, and if facts hav;e explanations, then existence its:elf must have an explanation, an unrestricted act of understanding, which we call God. The gnawing desire to know in foll, therefor·e, is dynamically directed towards the ultima;te ground and sou11ce of alil. that exists.

So for the knowing subject, the grasp of a limited reality and even the love for a finite truth leave a persistent sense of dis-

the concept of horizon, see David Tracy, *The Achie'IJement of Bernard Lonergan* (pp. 1-21) and Karl Rahner's use of the term in *HeM'ers of the Word.*

satisfaction. From the depths of consciousness comes a call for completeness, a crull for the f,tlli:fil.lmentof the person in the Jove of the unlimited, of that which ts found at the end of the chain of ca;usality. A religious conversion oocurs, then, when one comes to grips with the urging from within and opts to fo.Vle unconditionally, making love for all. of reality the absoJute ground out of which one consciously proceeds. This decision to love unconditionally in a finite wor1d is a l'le!ligious one, for it mows man beyond the constricted reality of his experieillce into the mystery of God, who presides over alt The uncl'leated reality outside the eJq>erienceof man becomes the center of his being and man's exis:tenee,becomes filly authentic in his conversion to •a;hsoiutelove. Unrestricted love becomes the principle of his aJctions and re-creates his consciousness.[11]

This .conv;ersionto :reil.igionmay remain implicit, a touch of the divine imbedided in the very core of the subject out of which proceeds his ability to transcend critical rationaJrity and to arrirvie at a stance of love and compassion. But interiority veaches its fu!Lfillmentin this and the dynamism of human cons:ciousnessdrives the subject to :ruchievefuH personhood. Man at his best is man who e:l!Jl>eriences,understands, judges, and decides in the light of the mystery of being which permeates his consciousness:

Conversion, as lived, affects all of a man's conscious intentional operations. It directs his gaze, pervades his imagination, releases the symbols that penetrate to the depths of his psyche. It enriches his understanding, guides his judgments, reenforces his decisions.12

On the specific conversion to Christianity, Lonergan does not hav;e a gl'eat deal further to add.[18] He states that it repre-

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11 This reflects the notion of the "fundamental option", a tradition which goes back to Blondel and is given fuller expression by Karl Rahner in his discussions of man's decision to love unrestrictedly in a limited world.

12 Lonergan, *Method,* p. 131.

is Lonergan has said more on the subject elsewhere, however. Writing in the *New Oatholio Erwyolopedia,* he claims that conversion is not "a change

sents the attachment to a particular historicwl tradition expres-
sing the reHgious consciousness, and that one undergoing a
Christian conversion joins his implicit religiosity with an out-
ward community and thereby makes his stance explicit. The
conv;ersion "conjoins the inner gift of God's love with its outer
manifostation in Christ Jesus and in those who fol!low him." 14
The explicit word of the Gospel has three distinct purposes:

The message announces what Christians are to believe, what they
are to become, what they are to do. Its meaning, then, is at once
cognitive, constitutive, affective. It is cognitive inasmuch as the
message tells what is to be believed. It is constitutive inasmuch
as it crystallizes the hidden inner gift of love into overt Christian
fellowship. It is affective inasmuch as it directs Christian service
to human society to bring about the kingdom of God.15

Having outlined his cognitional theory Lonergan attempts
to establish ,a means of understanding and appmpriating theo-
logical materials which corresponds to rthe manner in which
alil. knowledge is apprehended. Thus in *Method* he devotes
the first half of the work to .a review of the dynamism of
conscious intentionality and then shows how the four levels
of conscious operations (experiencing, understanding, judging,
and deiciJding) can be seen to be present and contributing to
the on-going inquiry of theology. The recognition and inte-
grrutionof the four leve!lsof oonsciorusnessinto the methodologi-
cal structures of theology serve to bring it into congruence
with :the pattern of inquiry inherent in all enterprises of knowl-
edge. Thus, theology is to be carried out at a variety of levels.
'.Uhere is a dynamic continuum of understanding in theology,
and work may be conducted ,at any point 1at which one wishes
to makes his contribution to the field.

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or even a development, rather it is a radical transformation which follows on
all levels of living, an interlocked series of changes and developments."   Yet,
as Charles Curran has pointed out in questioning Lonergan on the issue, he
has later spoken of conversion as integration, development, and enlargement.
This possible ambiguity in the matter of conversion will be discussed later.

14 Lonergan, *JJlethod,* p. 360.

15 Lonergan, *Method,* p. 362.

Lonergan first draws a distinction between two phases of theology which he calls mediating and mediated. In the first phase, the documents and materials of a religion are studied and understood as thoroughly as possible, while in the second phase the knowledge gained is mediated to others. [16] In a sense, the second phase takes the inquiry beyond the level 0£ history of religions into a theology of affirmation. [17] Comprising these two phases al'e eight functional specialties which reflect the movcement foom the compiling of data to the making of decisions concerning the data. These functional speciailties are: 1) research, 2) interpretation, 3) history, 4) dialectic, 5) foundations, 6) doctrines, 7) systematics, and 8) communications. The first four comprise mediating theology, and the final four are the work of mediated theology, yet aH are integrally related as components in the dynam:iics of human inquiry.

Sin:ce the Christian mes1sagie comes to us through •rhe documents of believing communities, the first task facing Christian inquiry is to, discern the actu:aJ content of the materials passed on. The second step is to determine what the authors aJCtually intended to convey in writing as they did, while the thfod step is to place the authors and their writings into a contextual framework out of wh1ch they lived and wrote. In short, this progressive penetr:ation into the materials of Christianity is nothing other than the first three functional specialties of researich, interpretation, and history. Further, these three specialties para:Hel the first three operations of cognition namely, experiencing, understanding, and judging. Dialectics is the final speicia1lty in the phase of mediating theology; here the knower questions the extent to which the authors were right or wrong in their histor:Ucailly-conditioned assessments. By engaging in dialectics, the knower takes positions vis-a-vis the materials at hand; this paraUels decision-making, the fourth operation of human knowing.

[16] For our purposes, the example of Christianity will be used from here on.

[11] Charles Winquist, Review of *Method, Anglican Theofogical Review* 56 (1974): 101.

In the mov;ement to mediated theology, the order of the levels of consdousness is l'eversed. Now the dynamism is from decision-making towards the mediating of one's knowledge, or from the adoption of positions to the making of the data accessible to the experience of others. The fifth specialty, foundations, delineates conversion in the intehlecitual, rationa,l, and moral spheres and 'attempts to determine which of these conversions were evident in the writers of the documents. The next specialty, doctrines', sets out the facts and values which are regarded as most essential in the tradition studied. Foundations engages in decision-making, whilie dorctrines is essentially a function of judgment. The finaJ two specialties, systematics m1d communications, the cycle rbad{: to the second and first 1e¥els of consciousness. Systematic:s attempts to form a pattern of how doctrines of a given traidition are coherentlly interl'elated, thereby exercising bhe skiHs of interpretation; communications seeks to bring the systematized body of truth to hear upon the experienee others.

Lonergan's point is that initial progression towards decision-ma.king in the mediated phase leads one onwa11d to commun:iicate the knowledge to the experienJce others, thereby bringing to full circle the unity of knowing and its conveyance to others in the perpetual devefopment of human knowledge. By tying theolog1oail method into the structure of the operations of aM human knowing, Lonergan also wants to make theology 1as subject to historicail development as any form of human knowing and just ,as with ou:r modern sense of distance from the pa.st, which constitutes the he:rmeneutical prob1em. In so doing, he reiterates his rejection of "olass1cist notions: " of culture, rconcretize periods of history as supposedly uniquely expressive of the truth, and affirms: his approval of "empiriicist notions " of culture, which acknowledge the progressive flow of knowl'edge, evoJ,vin_g through cultures and time.

As Lonergan describes his transcendental method, he maintains that it is "the concrete and unfolding of

human attentiveness, inte1ligen1oe,reasonableness and respon-
1sibility,"18and is therefore as appropriate to theology as to
a;ll other fields of inquiry. The method offers the "key to 1a
unified sicienoe," and outside of its field of application " there
is nothing at all." [19] Man progresses towards authentic self-
tr:ansoendence; his end is a life of faith, hope, and love, the
means by which he will ultimatdy fulfill the transeendental
precepts to fo1e intelligently, reasonrubily, and responsibly. In
defining the grasp of truth as the fruit of authentic subjectiv-
ity and in positing this subjectivity as a universal end which
all seek and are capa1citated to :attiain, Lonergan leaves open
the question of the specific value of the Christian faith and the
particular impact that it may have upon his proposed method.

   Critics have argued that Lonergan's programmatic division
of the labor of theology from that of method is unsatisfactory. [20]
Avery DuUes in a review of *Method in Theology* provides a
concise summary of this perceived difficulty in Lonergan's
approa,ch:

A third unfortunate separation pervading Lonergan's book is that
of method from theology. He repeatedly avers that he writes not
as a theologian but as a methodologist. On this ground he ab-
stains from discussing the nature of revelation, the authority of
Scripture, the Fathers, doctors, popes,. councils, bishops, etc. While
he evidently accepts conciliar pronouncements and staunchly ad-
heres to the teaching of Vatican I, he provides no theory of the
nature and limits of authority in theology. Granted that one's
view of authority will necessarily depend upon one's theory of
revelation, Christology, and Church, I am convinced that method
in theology cannot be adequately treated without some attention
to these questions. In theology as in other sciences, method and
content are dialectically interdependent. [21]

   is Lonergan, *JJ!ethod,* p. 24.
   [19] Lonergan, *Method,* p. 23, 24.
   [20] Other issues raised by Lonergan's critics which cannot be given proper
attention in this essay include his division of theology into his proposed eight
functional   specialties and his confidence in the scope and capacity of human
reason.
   [21] Avery Dulles, Review of *Method, Theological Studies* 33 (1972) : 555.

From this critique arise further questions riegariclingLonergan's notion of love, his understanding of the l'elationship of Christianity to other religions, and his anthropology.

Beforie analyzing the charges directed at Lonergan's *Method,* a few clarifying remarks are in order. As Dulles correctly avers, the majority of critics ,do not lrucicuse Lonergan of harboring non-Christian or, more specificaUy, non-Catholic premises; the charges tend to focus on his al,leged failure to make explicit the manner in which his Christian understanding influences the construction of his method. [22] Others have suggested that Lonergan's approa:ch domesticates the Gospel, removing its **"No"** to man's religiosity. Some argue that *Method* deprives theology of its uniqueness by advocating that it be studied as scientifically as any other discipline. Thomas TorranJoe, for example, has referred to Lonergan as the " Catholic Sdtleiermacher " and has claimed that *Method* makes man the source for theology, thereby unde11cutting the free, revelatory act of God. It will not he the purpose of this essay to answer these cha;rges. Suffice it to say that there are models in which the relationship of nature and graoe is so delineated as to permit a fruitful degree of theofog1cia1linsight based upon a descriptive analysis of the human person. This essay will look at the question of whether or not Lonergan has successfully incorporated such a model of nature and grace into his wo:rk, and whether it enables him to answer the conoerns of the majority of his critics.

Anthony Kelly has pursued the concerns mised by Dulles and '\!Viles[23] and has foooused specifical.J.y upon Lone.rgan's treatment of ·three interrelaited matters: man's seilf-transcendenoe in the direction of the divine, :religiosity and Christianity,

[22] Lonergan's reputation, based upon previous exegetical and doctrinal studies, is virtually unblemished. His critics have been unsettled by the lack of clarity in his recent undertaking.

[23] This is not to suggest that Kelly's concerns are completely representative of what Dulles and Wiles "might " have said, had they expanded their critiques. My point is only that Kelly's objections do arise from the concern expressed by both reviewers over Lonergan's division of content and method.

and the uniqueness and value of Christ for authentic subjectivity.

Lonergan asserts that the grasp of truth is a product of wuthenticity and that one achieves such authenticity as a :resul,t of a progression to the fovel of self-transcending love. This love is to be discovered in a variety of trnditions, promoted in a variety of oultures, and represents a human possibility not bound to a particular society or creed. Faith, hope, 1and love, as trans-cultural phenomena, are 'the means by which men everywhere are able to fulfiH the demands of the transcendentail precepts (to live intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly). With this schema, Lonergan provides a basis for understanding and collaboration in cognition which Kelly applauds: "By taking his stand on what is fundamental to an cultures, the self-transcending drive towards authentic values, he o:ffers the promise of a theoretical and practical coherence for the totaJ human enterprise." [24]

Yet EeHy remains uncomfortable with *Method* bemuse he 11egards Lonergan's treatment of the person and work of Jesus Christ as fundamentally ambiguous: "... and here precisely is my question: how does this theological method take faith in Christ into its inner vitality? How is Lonergan's *Method* a1ive to the unique, the original, the absolute element in Christian faith?" [25] Pressing the point, he qru:estions the significance of faith for the ,theological enterprise 1as Lonergan sees it. Does one's commitment to Christ and the Church impinge upon one's approach to the methodological task? EelJy argues that Lonergan is disconcertingly unclear on such matters, and he focuses his line of inquiry even more sharply as he continues:

... there is the possibility of forestalling this whole question by the rather devastating' Why should Christ make any difference to theological method? ' This type of question is quite illuminating. It suggests presuppositions about what is absolute and original in

[24] Anthony Kelly, " Is Lonergan's *Method* Adequate to Christian Mystery," *The Thomist* 39 (1975) : 439.
[25] Kelly, p. 440.

Christian experience, and more basically, an implicit approach to theological knowing. The extremes are clear. Either make theological method into a function of faith,. or see faith as any faith, a mere range of data that theology will dispassionately survey in the light of a method designed to ensure such detachment and disinterestedness. At this juncture, because of the irrationality of allowing theology to become either the ideology of a sect or a stance of concerned religious skepticism, all we can demand of a method is that it not be so generalized as to suppress some data for fear of disconcerting its anticipations. 25

The danger of generaliza,tion is thought to exist because Lonergan proposes a re,ligiously neutra,l methodological model and recommends it to Roman Catholic theologians 21 yet demurs .from providing an explicit Christology. For Kelly this is ineXiCUsabJe, since Christian faith demands that !a Christology be included within any methodological study. In its: plwce, *Method* speaks of the " data " of the human mind. 1and of the universailily discemibfo drivie for self-transcenden!ce. KeiUy asks whether theo<1ogyor the theologian can be correctly understood in terms of such   or whetiher alJ theology must begin with the " data " of God's gift of Himself, which discloses to man his human possibilities and the nature of his genuine authenticity:

The divine self-transcendence precedes and provokes the human. Is not the self-gift of God the foundation of theology rather than man's self-transcendence in the direction of the divine? Which is more fundamental to theological thinking? Here we have a question that I regard .as basic for a critical reading of *Method.* 28

Lonergan's aecount of self-transcendence, :in which he treats lthe questions just rnised, is unsatisfactory, as far as Kelly is ieonce:rned. The highest form of self-transcendence in Lonergan's s1chema is attained through religious conviersion, the dynamic stiarbe of being in love with God. 29 (This is said to attune the theologian especially for his task.) 30 The root cause

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2s Kelly, p. 441, 442.

21 Lonergan, *Method,* p. XU.   29 Lonergan, *Method,* p. 104 ff.

2s Kelly, p. 442.   so Lonergan, *Method,* p. 271.

of this conversion is said to be a form of sanctifying grace, attributed to the working of the Holy Spirit. But this rais,es a further problem for Kelly:

This would indicate the methodological presupposition that the Holy Spirit is flooding the hearts of all authentically human beings with his love. I have some hesitation at this point. Is this general reality of religious love ... to be immediately interpreted as the Christian reality of love communicated to us by the Spirit of Christ? [31]

To support his position on the significance of love, Lonergan extensivcly cites the love texits of the New Tesrbament both in *Method* 'and, in response to inquiries, in *Philosophy of God and Theology.* Yet he exo1udes any mention of the person of Christ from his discussion a:n:d allows the impression to be given that the r!Jexts refer to a kind of transcendental piety rather than a specilicrullyChristian experience and expression. The res1.Ult,Kel1lybelieves, is tihe.suggestion that rthe Holy Spirit

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s1 Kelly, p. 445. Lonergan's position on the nature of such love is spelled out in *Phil<>Bophy of G-od and Theofogy;* ·see especially p. 9 and following. He also responds tellingly to a series of questions on pages 17-20. In effect, he relies heavily upon I Timothy 2: 4 which says it is the will of God that all men be saved. From this he discusses the great varieties of human religious experience and the transforming effect of such experiences upon the lives of people everwhere. *A* particularly interesting exchange follows:

Question: "But Paul says in other places that unless the gospel is preached and unless the gospel is believed, all men will not be saved. So God is not providing the salvation of all men in any other way than to send his Son to whom the salvation of the world is owed."

Lonergan: "Well, that's another view isn't it? But what Paul has to say about charity, that there isn't salvation without it-and there's lots of evidence of people leading extremely good lives without being Christians."

Question (cont.). "But Paul never says charity is enough for salvation; for Paul it is faith in Jesus. Charity is the most important virtue, the most important response."

Lonergan: "Well, perhaps according to 'Paul.' It's an exegetical question. I was suggesting a line of thought. I am not doing detailed exegesis ... "

This exchange (and what ·precedes it) demonstrates that Lonergan is confronting the issue of religious pluralism which engaged Rahner as well. Their responses do not appear dissimilar.

is the basis of aJH self-trianscendence, an!d that the love which
the Christian observes phenomenologica.Myin others is essen-
tially identical to his own Christian religious   Both
appear to be dynamic states orf being in loV'e with God. Despite
,the fact that Lonergan uses the expression " being in love " to
serve different purposes in his hook, the fi11st (in the "Back-
ground ") to denote data submitted for interpretation •and the
second (in the " Foreground ") to indicaite rthe theofogian's
own conversion or principle of interpretation, Kelly cites a
lingering ambiguity:

... a confusion begins and persists when both are named " being
in love" in this religious sense. . . . What might have been in-
tended as a flexible methodological description seems to be already
implicitly Christian, so that the specifically Christian is read into
the general phenomenon. It could be that the general phenomenon
embraces the specifically Christian, which not only raises a theo-
retical issue hut makes one ask what the New Testament texts are
doing here. I doubt that either is completely the case, but since
Lonergan is at pains to build up a framework of creative collabora-
tion, this kind of latent confusion needs to be clarified.... We in-
vite confusion, if not regression, by identifying the general im-
pulse towards self-transcendence with the activity of the Spirit of
Christ, especially when this is a basic, though admittedly implicit,
methodological position.[32]

Lonergan's description of the distinctiveness of Christian
conversion ailm fails to satisfy Kelly:

Further, religious conversion, if it is Christian, is not just a state
of mind and heart. Essential to it is an intersubjective, interper-
sonal component. Besides the gift of the Spirit within, there is the
outward encounter with the Christian witness. That witness testi-
fies that of old in many ways God has spoken to us through the
prophets but in the latest age through his Son.[33]

Ke11y continues ·to probe for a recognition of the uniqueness of
Christian conversion in Lonergan hut fails to find it. Lonergan
speaks of the " prior wol1d" of gmce, which enables man to
transcend to a state of loving God, and of the " outward word "

a2 Kelly, p. 447.   sa Lonergan, *Method,* p. 327.

of religious expression, which is historicaHy conditioned but which nevertheless complements the prior or inner wo11d. He asserts that the Gospel serves as a particular objeotification of the implicit reiigiosity of those converted to a love of God. Kelly questions this complementary function of the Gospel:

What is the relationship of the Incarnate Word of revelation with the outward word of religious expression? Is it like any other " outward word," the declaration of an inner state? Does the incarnate event of God's love and self-giving not enter more deeply into the understanding of religious love? At this point, at least, Lonergan seems to make no demand that it should, for "the religious leader, the prophet, the Christ, the apostle, the priest, the preacher announces in signs and symbols what is congruent with the gift of love that God works within us." [34]

It thus appears that Chris1t, like the prophet and the priest, merely explicitates that which is already experienced inwardly 'by the convert to religion.

The impl'essfon is given, says Kelly, that there are two "zones of religiousness," the one prior, inwa.11d, and commonly experienced cross-culturally, and the other outward, historica,l-1ly-bound, and serving to express through specific signs and symbols the ·wctivity already occurring within. But Lonergan nullifies such an interpretation when he speaks rather dramatically of the additional value to be attached to the outwa11d, historierulwo11d of God as it comes to his peopfo:

Then not only the inner word that is God's gift of his love but also the outer word of religious trandition comes from God. God's gift of his love is matched by his command to love unrestrictedly . . . . The narrative of religious origins is the narrative of God's encounter with his people . . . . Finally, the word of religious expression is not just the objectification of the gift of God's love; in a privileged area, it is also a specific meaning, the word of God himself. [35]

Here, then, theological inquiry appears to confront unique information. A dis1tinJCt encounter with God himself has taken

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34 Kelly, p. 449.   35 Lonergan, *Method,* p. 119.

p1are, and   expects that Lonergan will adjust his method to a1lowfor the impact of SIUlchdata, perhaps   the receipt of a form of reV'elation. But Kelly is disappointed once more, for Lonergan at this point reiterates his methodolog]cial pai:ameters, " ... here we come to questions th:at are not meth-odologiicrulbut   questions concerning revielation ,and inspiration, scripture and tradition. . . . To rthe theologians we must leave them." [86] Ke1ly   no attempt to veil his dis-taste for this distinction:

Indeed. The methodologist does not feel constrained to leave to the theologians the rather momentous questions concerning the nature of grace, the universality of its occurrence, the significance of world religions; yet he hands back to theologians the specifics of Christian experience as outside the concerns of method .... I think theologians could be pardoned for indulging a little disappointment when they have such " methodological" matters handed hack to them. I think we could have hoped for an understanding of meth-od in theology more responsive to the "subject matter." But the fact remains we have an obscurity where we are most in need of clarification. [87]

Ke1ly's remarks are useful on a variety of leV'els, for they offer several lines of possible inquiry into Lonergan's *Method.* But the Barthian element in Kelly's critique wiM be left un-considered, and rthis for two reasons: first, Kelly's article and the co111cernsexpressed by DuHes and Wiles are not principal-ly addressed to that 1aspect of Lonergan's *Method* on that basis, and   the normative question of how theological inquiry ought to be conducted is not central to the purpose of this essiay. What is at issue here is the question of how weU Lonergan fulfills his own objectives .

.The :f.undamenrbaldilemma in Lonergan is that he seeks to establish a method of investigation in theofogy which is tematicaMy divm1ced from the content of theology. He con-stmcts his *Method* so tha,t it might serve what David Tracy has cruled the " revisionist model " for contemporary theologi-

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[36] Lonergan, *Method,* p. 119.   sr Kelly, p. 451.

cal inquiry. This modei   phifosophical reflection upon the signmcance of human experience and the meanings present m the Christian fact.[38] Lonergan's merthodological schema seems designed to satisfy the first four of the five theses which Tracy includes as ·components of the model. The first four theses are essentially methodological in chM"acter while the filth describes: the H1eo1ogicaltask itself:

The first thesis defends the proposition that there are two sources for theology, common human experience and language, and Christian texts. The second thesis argues for the necessity of correlating the results of the investigations of these two sources. The third and fourth theses attempt to specify the most helpful methods of investigation employed for studying these two sources. The fifth and final thesis further specifies the final mode of critical correlation of these investigations as an explicitly metaphysical or transcendental one. Upon reaching the final thesis, one should be able to provide a summary of the meaning and truth value of the present model proposed for theology, viz., the philosophical reflection upon common human experience and language, and upon Christian texts. [89]

Lonergan appropriately takes great ewe to fulfill the first **four** of these requirements, while leaving the :bask implied in the fifth thesis to the theologians:.

As can be seen in Lonergan's own works on Christian texts and later in his extraordinary efforts towwds a philosophical psychology in *Insight,* Lonergan appears committed to the satisfaction of Tl'rucy's initial thesis. Neither the texts of the faith nor common human experience can be understood apart from one another, and both must be studied with scientific neutmlirty and rigor. His phenomenological inquiry and criticwl appraisal 0£ the doouments 0£ the Church demonstrate a faithful a.dherenrceto Tracy's theses two through four as well. At this point, one can £nd Jrittle quarrel with Lonergan's methodology, but he ohooses to press onwal'd, launching his investigation into the muddier waters of the telos of human in-

88 David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order* (New York, 1979), p. 43.

89 Tracy, p. 43.

tentionality. At the ultimate horizon of consciousness, he posits a religious dimension, echoing Tracy, Langdon Gilkey, and others who haV'e similarly directed their attention ito the consideration of such " limit " questions and their answers:. Here he raises the legitimate :religious quesitions which appear at the outer edge of human capacities and understanding. God is phi<losophicaHy postulafod as the reality which fills the apparent emptiness at the end of the dynamics of human knowing. Having examined the charnoter of the human mind and demonstrated its movement towa11d being itself with philosophical iola.rity, Lonergan now maintains that this inclination of self-transcendelllce toward religious awal"eness (and, ultimately, towaJ'd a loV1e for the God at the end of the chain of causality) is propelled by a form of grace. It is this divine catalyst which fundamentally drives mankind toward a common authenticity and understanding.

This is the assertion from which Lonergan's difficulties proceed, for by speaking   grace he introduces a theologica;l category which must be unpacked in a manner consistent with the scientific premises of his methodology. It now becomes entirely 1legitimate to ask Lonergan what he means by "grruce," what its: natme is, how it is an agent of faith and love, and how it inf!Juences the methodologist who seeks to carry out his work in theology with the same scientific rigor as in any other quest for knowledge. Lonergan's introdll!ction of the category of grace draws him to the point of intersection between method and theology and clouds the distinction he has tried to make between the two enterprises. Lonergan's dilemma is   On the one hand, grace c1annot be described as offering insights into the data of theofogy wh1ch are unavailahle to the "ungraeed," for this would jeopardize the commonality of human experience upon which the entire program is founded. And if this commonality were forfeited, the universwlity of the method would immediately coHapse, as theology would then he in a realm all its own. On the other hand, an account of grace which apparently disl"ega11ds the peculiar

nature of Christian apprehension will do an injustice to the notion of graiCe as it has traditionally been understood within the Church. 40 Any refornrnlation of gmce designed to universalize its effect must certainly be formulated so as to be dear and aciceptahle to systematic theology, particularly if one claims to propose a method for use by Roman Catholics. Standing at this intersection of method and theofogy, Lonergan 'attempts to harmonize these seemingly disparate options in a manner which preservies the philosophical integrity of his system and at the same time presents a treatment of grace suitable to his Roman   audience. It is evident, however, that his account has not   the concerns of many of his readers.

The   directed at Lonergan focus upon his notion of grace, specifioa:Hyits effect upon faith and faith's subsequent effect upon method. Can one truly inviestigate matters of faith in a neutral fashion? Can a scientific objectivity properly "understand" the data of the resur1,ection? Frurther, if all undergoing a " conversion "   have equal access to the content of theology then how is the method to be of particular value to Roman Cathol:iJcs? KeHy's essay homes m on these foatmes in Lonergan's thought and exposes a Iwck of clarity, if not a fundamental flaw in his approach. Griace is, indeed, ambiguously defined and Lonergan gives the impression that he wou1d prefer not to expand his treatment of theological conoepts, even when they are integrally rehted to his method. StiU, it seems that Kelly's objections should be taken a step further; as they stand, ,they suggest a mere clumsiness in Lonergan's presentation and. this fails to highlight the core of the issue. VVe can assume with some confidence that Lonergan knows precisely what he is doing when he writes of gr:JJce in

40 Lonergan is not under attack here for a failure to provide a "traditional" formulation of grace. The concern is that his use of the term as a fundamental category within his understanding of the authentic human person obligates him to clarify its meaning. Further, if the method is to assist Roman Catholics in particular, the clarification should be appropriate to their theoiogfoal conceptualization.

such .a limited manner and when he refrains from exp[icitating his theological positions. The l.leaJ. issue passed over by Kelly is why Lonergan has chosen to withhold a thorough explanation oi these matters.

Lonergan certainly possesses the theological acumen to have pl"esented a model of nature and grace which would have answered Kelly's diffiou[rbies⁴¹ and laid to rest any suoo concern ovier his separation of method from theologicial content. In fact, it appears that such 'a theoilogiJca11model is implicit in Lonergan's *Method.* Without going inrto detail, I believe the model is not unlike that outlined by Karl Rahner in *Hearers of the Word* and various essays in *Theological Investigations.* Like Rahner, Lonergan could have explicitly and creatively affirmed a nature/grace wo:rild-view founded upon an all-embracing Christology. This wouM have enabled him to affirm a form of "1anonymous Christianity ", ·so di.srtinclive of Rahner, and point to the gracious element underlying man's authentic decision to love absolutely in a finite wor1d and limited wol"1d. It would .also have permitted him, as it does Rahner, to speak .straightforwal"dly about ,the pattern of grace as it moves across clfiltures and systems of belief. Had Lonergan made such programmatic choices ·and developed them with originality, he would have answered KeiHy's cl"it]cisms, to be sure, but he wouLd also ha¥e opened up a who[e new range of perplexing questions.

Lonergan ohose to write the way he did for sound programmatic reasons. *As* Tracy writes of the five models relevant to theological discourse he includes the work of Karl Riahner under the heading of Neo-Orthodoxy. He thereby indicates that

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⁴¹ In fairness to Kelly, I suspect that his difficulties would not have been so easily alleviated as this suggests. Kelly makes it clear that he is not attracted to Rahner's unfolding of God's universal gracious intentions and, therefore, is not pleased by what he thinks might be elements of Rahner in Lonergan's presentation. However, had Lonergan explicitly offered a Rahnerian schema, Kelly could object directly to a systematic theologian. As it stands, Kelly appears frustrated over his inability to discern precisely what Lonergan means to say about grace.

Rahner's ·emp!iasis upon the object-referent of the "Radical-
ly Mysterious God "   him in rthe network of conceptuali-
zation " proper to a systematic reartiouJation of the major
dogmatic and theologioal moments of the Cathoilic tradition." [42]
Rahner, then, and others participating in similar theological
tasks are essentially engaged in the enterprise of dogmatic
1theology. If Lonergan were to graft his methodology onto a
constructive approach SU!ch as that, he would be enmeshed in
·a rather hopeless:contradiction of intentions.   After promoting
a neutral method based upon philosophical inquiry, if Loner-
gan were to lapse into thoological formul<ationsof a neo-ortho-
dox character, he wou1d thoroughly erode his claims to ob-
j·ectivity and 1.3.y waste his methodological program.

   The point, then, is that Lonergan l'efuses to remove the
theological ambiguity that concerns Kelly not because his
thought is unclear but rather because his thought is olear and
he appreciates. the category distinotions necessary to preserve
the   of his *Method.*   For Roman Catholics, The
Rahner-like model within Lonergan' s *Method* makes it possible
for them to work within its framework.   For others, the gen-
eral theofogiral remarks need not he of interest ·and need. not
have a negativ;e impact upon their appraisal of Lonergan's
work. *Method,* therefore, may have the general appeal in-
tended by its author.   When Lonergan's purposes are clarifiedu
it oould be argued that Kelly's criticisms are somewhat mis-
directed.   Insofar as he attacks Lonergan for failing to lay out
his theological premises in a manner pleasing fo a confessional
Christian audience, he is correct yet somewhrut off the mark.
Certainly, it can be claimed that systematic theologians will
find Lonergan vague, but this is to he expected since he has
not ·attempted to formulate a complete theology.   By demand-
ing precise answers from Lonergan to specific theological ques-
tions, KeMy exhibits a certain insensitivity to his program.

   Nev;ertheless, despite his failure to penetrate fully into the

'2 Tracy, p. 27, 28.

of Lonergan's *Method,* :Kjelly has discerned a basic difficulty in the approaJCh. Whi:le it is appropriate to lend a sympathetic ear to Lonergan's objectivies, the l'esults of his effort cannot be so easily embraced. If one makes no irntl assumptions concerning re¥efation :and authority, what is to prevent a neutral method from !'ejecting the dogmas of the Cihurohwhiich it is meant to serve? Oentml tenets of the Christian faith, such as the virgin birth, the mcarnaition, and the resurrection 1are hardly self-evident to the objecti¥e observer, even to the observer touched by Lonergan's religious conversion. H such « facts " were readily   to all having undergone suich a conversion, one would expect to see their incorporation into the thought forms of alll faiths, a phenomenon which has yet to orour. Since this is dearly not the case, one mus1t ask Lonergan about the starbus of such claims. What, :for 1example, is to ,be said of claims regarding the person and work of   Christ? What wi11 be the force of such claims if theoJogy is pursued without attention to the authority upon which they rest? If Scriptme and tmdition are sources of truth which the methodologisrt eitheT brackets or contextualizes historicru1ly, how can he he expected to :arrive at theological conclusions meaningful to Roman Catholics? It would seem that the theologiJcal enrterprise within Catholicism has proceeded, by definition, upon the insights of written revelation 1and the Churich, insiights not universwHy available to reason, be it converted or unconverted. Lonergan has constructed his *Method* without expHcit reference to these authorities and yet offel'ed his work pallticulm.1lyfor Roman Catholiic use. Without a definiti¥e resoJution of these apparent difficulties, Lonergan's work does reflect the confusion wh:iich Kelly has cited.

Lonergan may have escaped the Sicy1la of Rahner's "neo-orthodoxy " but has fa.Hen prey to the Charybdis of an implicit Christian theology devoid of its ,central mystery. Method in theology presupposes theological conceptuwlization, for as Dulles has stated, the two are "dialecticalil.y interdependent," and Loneirgan's attempt to divorce the two is ill.-conceiived.

His philosophical psychofogy is impeecably done, and *lnsight* is col"I'eotly regarded as a major intellectual achievement. *Method* is a formidahle work insofar as it pursues his philosophical observations and offers an analysis of the functional specia1lties germane to theology. But his programmatic effort to sepamte method and theology is not convincing. What he has done instead is to enter the realm of theology in part, o:fFering obliique and somewha;t piecemeal theological rema.rks, saying just enough to spur critics like Kelly to demand a more systematic devdopment of his theology or a greater attention to the demands of his own method. *lJ1ethod,* therefore, provides more than a method and less than a thorough re- theology. It stands as a hybrid, to be completed when and if some folfower of Lonergan writes a theology for Roman based upon this philosophicaJ fou:nidrution. :K!eHy's critique, then, as summed up ·by Dulles and echoed by Wiles, is ess:entiaillywe1l founded.

LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND THE
INTERPRE.TATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

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" It is impossible to remain loyal to Marxism, to the Revolution, without treating insurrection as an art."

Lenin, paraphrasing Karl Marx

WHENEVER Liberation Theology ·and its contribu-
tions to theologicail discussion al'e ·concerned, no
aspect has been more controversirul than its associa-
tion with violence. There is no question that Marxism/Lenin-
ism depends on the use of violence. But all liberation theories
must take violence into consideration.   On the one hand, the
ties that hold humans in bondage may be so strong that only
violent means ca.n be effective to release us. On the other hand,
it is well known that violenre often breeds its own do·wnfall
and results in ten·or more often than peace.

  Since the beginning of time, probably every prrogram seek-
ing to release human beings to their furhl. potential has had to
consider the use of violence to achieve its ends, even while
awal'e of its potential dangers. Yet this issue takes on a new
urgency in our time because of two s[gnificant changes in our
situation: (I) Most communist proposals which have resulted
in   change have militantly asserted the necessity to
use force if we are to be set free; (2) In recent times Libera-
ti.on Theofogy has been espoused by some Christian theo-
logians even while the adoption of pacifism or the abhorrence
of violence by most Christian groups is well known. The ques-
tion of religion's intrusion into the politicaiJ.reailm is problem

enough, but add to this the question of the use of violence and
the discussion becomes very heated indeed.

Although many traditions have well-developed positions re-
garding violence and non-violence, Christianity will be our
frame of reference in discussing these issues, since Liberation
Theology has, in fact, developed in a Christian context. First
of all we havie to ask whether the use of violence to ruchieve
politicaJ ends is a;lways ruled out or whether some circum-
stances might justify it as an ruooeptabletool for Christian use.
Where Christianity is concerned, it is always instructive to be-
gin by looking at the life and work of Jesus. Trruditionally,
Jesus is seen as rejecting the use of violence and as having suf-
fered vioilence himself. Can anything so change this image as
to make violence acceptable on Christian grounds?

In ·considering this, we first have to note that Jesus himself
lived under po1itiool oppression. We must   the Jewish
expectations for the ' Messiah ' and how this role came to be
projecbed onto Jesus; their hope for release from Roman op-
pressors was what plruced mroh high political expectations on
Jesus. Christians recognized Jesus as a' Messiah', even though
he obvious1ly did not fulfill the role of a political liberato·r.
Afiter his death and for centuries fater, Jewish political for-
tunes went from bad to worse. The people's expectations of
gaining release by the hand of Jesus did not result in a change
in their political fortunes. Christians diid enter into politics
and governments in !Later years, and some welcome changes
can be attributed to Christian influence. But still, none of
these improvements can be directly attributed to Jesus' efforts
in his own file<time.

This leads us to one of the many pomts of conflict that
Christians have had with Communist programs. Following the
optimism of the modern scientific age, Marxism/Leninism
clruimsthat the age of science offers us the possibility for utopia
now. Christianity, on the other hanid, seems to offer release
only later, delayed until some eventual heaven. Thus, the
Chmstian must face the faunt that Communism offers an

achievable ideal state now, one within our reach because of sci-
entific advances, whereas Christianity ho1ds out little hope for
us in this wor1d. Oe:rtainly Liberation Theology arises at least
partly as a 01ristfa.n answer to the Marxist   As is
weill known, rin order to ,answer it, it does borrow some doc-
trines from Marxism/Leninism.   But how compatible is Chris-
tianity with Marxist/Leninist doctrine and its philosophical
assumptions?   Can Christian liberation   accept
parts of Communist doctrine without compromising the core
of their own heHef?

If Christians cannot prollli.se us immediate release, as Marx-
ists ean, then certainly they are at a disaidvantage competing
in a world dominated by revoJutionary   Marxists have
achieved the ovierthrow of oppressive politica:l regimes. What
can Cfilistian offer to :compete with this, other than a distant
heaven? Christians do claim that we human beings can be
rborn :anew, achieving an internal l'enewal, but how can this
mild and largely unseen change compete with revolutionary
          and the establishment of a new political order? (Of
course, if you are not a fan of Marxist regimes as they have
emerged historically, you might begin by questioning whether
violent :revu1utions have in foct achieved the £uH rel.ease they
promised to the citizens affected.) It cannot be denied that
revo1utiorrary violence has yielded political change in some
societies and without the use of fo1lce these societies might weU
have simply remained stagnant and unchanging. What can
Christians hope to aichieve in the way of overt change and
what means can they legitimately and cons[stently employ?

Before exploring some of these basic issues further or ex-
ploring what Christian beginnings and history would seem to
aillow as possible ilet me state the thesis I will offer. This might
seem to be reaching the condusion before the analysis of the
issue but stating a thesis at this point may in fact clarify the
issues. Anyone who deals with Christian texts and traditions
has no choice except to pick some focal point as a reference.
Once one makes this selection other notions fall into place

around it, but I believe there is no neutrail focal point. Some
selections can be easily brushed aside as minor and unuS1Ual,
but what I propose has often been selected as crucial for Chris-
tian interpretation. It may be a bit enigmatic, its interpreta-
tion may he disrputed, but the central sayings in Christianity
often are.

Recall that, when JeS1Us was asked if it was proper to pay
ta:x;es to Caesar, he asked for a coin. Showing the image of
Caesar on it, he is quoted as saying: " Render therefore unto
Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things
which are God's." ₁ Commentators have pointed out that, al-
though this seems •an astute reply, it is not so easy to interpret
in detail as it might at first seem. I would not dispute that
conclusion. After all, I think all abstract principles are difficult
to apply in detail and in concrete, and their S1Upposed precision
often becomes murky when practical decisions ·are required. I
take this as no special fauilt of Jesus' utteraDJCes but as a fact
of our moral life, that is, that no principle can be applied easily
and universally without difliooJt decisions on our part. This
does not render generail ruJes and principles useless, but it does
mean that the enunciation of general principles is only the be-
ginning of the human decision-making process.

In ,this case in particu1ar, how does Jesus' neat ·division, the
affairs of Caesar/the affairs of God, he1p uıs with the question
of whebher •a resort to vio[ence to aichieve ichange is legitimaite
for a Chris1tian or whether it is to ;be ruled out? Quite often
this saying of Jesus is appealed to in order to .argue for a rigid
separation. Christianity becomes purely a thing of the spirit,
to be conducted in isolwtion from mundane matters, and Chris-
tians 1are sometimes even ·advised :to have nothing to do with
these. Religion betcomes•an mterior, spiritual a:fFair, leaving the
affairs of state overtly unaffected. In contrast, I want to argue
the contr:ary: that in fact this important saying sho1UM be in-
terpreted 1as leaviing Christians free   the pr:aciticrulwor1d. This

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₁ Matt. 22 :21 (King James Version).

can he done with one cruoia.l provision: Christians should not
1appeal to Jesus or to religious principles to justify their politi-
crul/publ:iic activity.   Eruch person must accept responsibility
and justify his (or her) actions on his own.

Although to say this may seem to compartmentalize   religion,
it only means to authorize any raotivity the individual may see
fit to undertake, provided that he (or she) takes upon himself
the   for what is done. It does *not* ,claim tha.t reli-
gion, pavtiraularly Christianity,   is purely :an internal, spiritual
affair with no eX"bernarl applications.   It simply te1lls us that, if
you feel that some principle, such a·s compassion for those who
are poor or suffering, requil'es wction on your part, you must
undertake what you deem necessary, without putting off re-
rsponsibirlity for the decision onto others, pm·t:Ucu1arly onto
Jesus. Jesus deady   not use violence and seems to have
preruched against its use. If you think that violenJCe now is
needed to release human betings from their bonds of suffering,
fine. But the means you adopt are your choice and the con-
sequences are on your shoulldern. Of course, most liberation
theologians want to analyze Christian 'texfa and traditions so
that they justify their partircu1liaractions, even violence. But
instead, I believe, God places all responibility on our shoulders.

Any argument which seems to   that all Christians must
or shouM support some one program of action cannot he justi-
fied in the fong run. No argument within Christianity has re-
ceived (or can it receive) unanimous approval as expressing
what all Christians must beJieve or do. This does not mean
that all arguments claiming Christian support are equally
valird. But it does mean that it is dangerous to try to fix one
" Christian position " ,as binding on all. Our differences have
not ceased to exist, and the only way in which we might reach
universrul agreement is by agreeing not to try to force all of
Christianity into some s:i.ng1e form or program. Diversity may
be of Chrisrtianity's •essence. If we could accept this as fact,
it might keep us out of internally destructive arguments, ones
which make us :appear headed toward unity hut in fact pro-
mote division.

One can live in South Africa and claim justification for one's racial views, but they will always be subject to dispute since (on this thesis) neither God nor Jesus enjoins any one program. However, the stress on love and the love of enemies is so central tha.t one does need to reconcile any particular outlook with that theme of Christianity. Those who once ,asserted the divine right of kings are as much at fault as the revolutionary who argues that Jesus' offer of liberation authorizes the use of violence, if this proves necessary to break " the ties that bind " us in debilitating life styles. Surely Jesus not only did not resort to violence himself but in fact seems to have opposed it. Yet I believe even that fact does not prevent the dedicated Christian from arguing for the necessity of violence as a means, if he or she is convinced that it is the only way an oppressive structure will release us.

One 'central proh1em with this interpretation wiH he spotted quickly both by dedicated revolutionaries and Christians who want Liberation Theology to result in social change. That is, effective liberation and revolutionary movements need unified support. To he effective, dedication is required, and the group cannot simply sink into an " e'ach do as one pleases: " ,attitude. We know that effective revolutionary action is necessarily intolerant towarids 'any opposition to the new programs it envisions. The classical liberal tolerianJCe for ,diversity in viewpoints is not a virtue that breeds success for revo;Jutionary or liberation movements. We rull know that such actions have not only often been intolerant of oppsting views but have in fact felt that the destruction of the opposition ›is a prime :requfoement for success. We 'are aware of the Marxist/Leninist insistency on toeing the line on dogma, for conformity to doctrine.

But can the Christian ,aiccept the uniformity of interpretation which effective acbion seems to require? If the Christian liberation theofogian argues that aU Christians cannot be required to aiocept some one program of wction, he or she is limited by the division that plurality brings. On the other

hand, the Christian revotutionary activist should not be told that his program is " unchristian " as judged by some singular, authoritative standard. Of course, the chief complication in saying this lies with a hieI"archical church which includes authorities to formulate doctrine. The Christian who wants to act differently from what the srbructure of such a chureh allows will either: (1) have to find a way to act independently and still stay within that community; or (2) convince the hierarchy of the rightness of the position, ᴍwhich case the church's officiail position becomes his own; or (3) leave the churoh for another less doctrinaJJy rigid Christian community.

Does Liberation Necessitate the Use of Violence?

Up until this: point we have just :assumed that any effective liberation of human beings requires the use of   To deal with this ᴀssumption, we must first distinguish the inner and the outer human natUl'e. As is known, Christianity often makes this distinction 1and often clrui:ms to offer a new inner freedom. **It** talks of being "born again" in the sense of one's inner nature, not the physical human being. Of course, external change is sometimes offered rtoo, but usually it is to be at a later time, not now.

It is clear from Jesus' statements, that, no matter what later ohureh interpretations may conc1ude, Jesus' foNowers were enjoined to help the poor, heal the sick, and relieve suffering. No specific instructions are given ,as to how this i:s to be done (which is the basis for ,a Marxist complaint about the lack of action-program) , but still the intent is clear. I argue that any implementation program is the 11esponsibility of the individual and that no spooifics are enjoined; Christian doctrine says only that *some* action should be undertaken. This provokes the Christian indiviidua.il crisis: I must do something for human relief, but the burden is mine as to how I choose to do this; no group plan has been laid out.

Furthermore, two problems plague Christianity with regard to Marxism/Leninism: (1) The Marxist doctrine of "mate-

rialism" and (2) the stress on the use of revolutionary violence. The Christian appraisal does not deny that there
are material causes of unhappiness and ·enslavement, but still
it tends to stress (as Hegel does in opposition to Marx) the
spiritual or internal causes; these must he addressed first, and
they may not necessarily have been materially determined
(they may he of some other). *How,* then, one attacks the
material/economic/political situation is not specified. It may
be to work as Mother Teresa works, simply caring for the suffering individually. But it might also involve a political/material program. But whatever may be proposed it should not
be required of all hy reason of their Christian belief.

The universalism and uniformity of doctrine generally demanded by Marxism/Leninism as a condition for success
should not be demanded in Christian terms. Some church
groups have attempted to impose uniformity of doctrine, but
while this may he demanded of the members of a particular
group, no interpretation can be required of all Christians.
Uniformity of action on a" Christian" basis is e:xduded from
the beginning. All this does not bode well for a " Christian "
revolution and certainly it makes the *use* of violence to aichieve
liberation a matter of great debate.

Cornell West

With some of these issues and proposals in Inind, let us look
at some recent proponents of Liberation Theology in a Christian setting and use these as a testing ground for our thesis. We
begin with a recent (and Inild) statement, Cornell West's,
Prophesy Deliverance: An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity. [2] West profeS1Ses to " an abiding allegiance to progressive Marxist social analysis ·and political praxis." [3] But it is
hard to understand how his Christianity meshes with Marxism,
since .the latter involves an allegiance to material/economic

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[2] Cornell West, *Prophesy Deliverance: an A.fro-American Revolutionary
Christianity* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1982).
  a Ibid., p. 10.

determinism and a commitment to political revolution, using
violence as necessary. Marx stresses inevitable class strife and
the necessity to use force to break these bonds.

West describes "the Christian people" as "the self-realiza-
tion of individuality within the community." [4] That this in-
volves in principle a" this-worldly" liberation as well as other-
wor1dly salvation is hard to deny. But the issue is: what does
" this-wor1dly " liberation mean and what sort of force is to
be used to achieve it? Are the forees that bind us such that
only violence and political revolution can break them? West
notes that Marxism and Christianity   " share a similar moral
impulse." [5] This is quite true, and it often pits them against
each other as rivals . But the issue is the analysis of which
" binding structures " must be attacked   and which means
must be used. Otherwise platitudes unite us all.

West then goes on to say that the two basic challenges con-
fronting Afro-Americans are "self-image and self-determina-
tion." [6] Again, it is hard to argue with this, but what if viol-
ence and revolution are necessary to achieve self-determina-
tion? He urges a" dialogical encounter" between Afro-Ameri-
can Christian thought and progressive Marxist social analysis. [1]
Again, dialogue is harmless enough, but what if the good Mar-
xist argues for the necessity of violence, revolution, and the ex-
termination of opponents who block the revolution? West
proceeds to an histo:vcial aiccount of the Afro-American experi-
ence, but this still skirts the issue of " what is to be done "
and how.

Even if as West says "the alliance of prophetic Christian-
ity and progressive Marxism provides a fast human hope for
mankind," [8] the issue at stake still remains: the role of violence
in its reaJiziation, a question he does not address. Fiurthermore,
rther:e surely is no one agreed definition of " prophetic Chris-
tianity" which aJl Christians can support. It is hard to see

4lbid., p. 16.
[5] Ibid.
e Ibid., p. 80.

[1] Ibid., p. 83.
[8] Ibid., p. 95.

how a "lasit human hope" can rest on such a divided and splintered foundation; 1a Marxist knows this to be a formul a for political-social *inaction.* We get involved in arguing about whait program a Christian ought to foHow rather than uniting ito ruchieve transformation.   What is the evidence that " all. Christians " have or ever can be unit ed on one

One of West's principles that seems 1ocucial to his theology is: "God sides 'wth the oppressed and 1aots on their behalt" 9 Christian Hterature iClertainly is fuH of concern for the " op- pressed," but we must he careful to determine what an author means by " oppressed" and what he says the cimses of the oppression are. It cannot be argued that alil. Christians use (or ought to use) "oppressed" as a Marxist would. But more im- portantly, among both Jews 1and Christians God has been said to "act." Tl'ue, brut do the actions God has en:dorsed include revolution and violence? That would be hard to establish, par- ticufa11lysince God's incarnation in Jesus lef1t the Roman pire untouched: Jesus was crucified, and the Jews were left   ,subjugated.

West asknowledges that " one is hard put fo find a sketch of what liberation would aotualJy mean in the everydray lives of Mack people." i.o But even if there are any concerns that can he shared with Marxism, even these wilil fade   insignifi- cance unless a poHticalfsocfal 1action program can he agreed upon an:d particulady unless the use of or the rejection of viio1encemn be 1agreedupon. West suggests that " human lib- eration occurs only when people participate substantively in the decision-making proeess in the major institutions   which libemte their lives." 11 But this still leaves untouched the major and decisive issue of *how* this is ;to be achieved and whether any Christian program can become :identical with a Mar:xiistfo:rmu1a.

West claims that Marxism l'eoognizes "the posiitive liberat- ing aspects of popular (luilitureand religion." i 2 But there is a

9 Ibid., p. 106.   11 Ibid., p. 112.
10 Ibid., p. 11l.   12 Ibid., p. 11 7.

difference between Christianity and Marxism here that is
ci311. The Marxist sees most religion ·as haviing a subjugating
e:ffoot, and his notion of what is needed to overeome human
alienation inv:olV'esmore force. Given this difference, little can
be held in common when it comes to practical implementa-
<bion. West is strong in supporting what one might uaU a cul-
tural and intellectual revoJution in outlook, but he skirts the
complex question of whether such " ailtered perspectives " are
suffiicient to •achieve liberation, something the Marxist would
be quick to deny.

The "revolutionary aictivity" 13 which West seems; to en-
dorse is something quite different from Marxist revolution and
vio1'ell1Ce. 1£ so, one must ask West what such a " revolution "
can hope to <ochiev;e by way of mdical reform. West seems to
freel he has found a "miiddJe pathway," 14 but it is hard to get
a very dear picture of how this dew1s with revo1ution and
violence. The book ends on an extremcly vague note, and
leaves the reader puzzled as to: (1) what specifically is pro-
posed; (2) whether revofotion 1and violence are authorized; and
 (3) whether West really believes ,thaJt all black theologians
are likreilyto. •agree with what he has proposed.

James Cone

Now let us examine an earlier work which is a mo11e clear-
cut proposal cro111Cerningthe use of vti.olence: James Cone's *A
Blaok Theology of Liberation.15* I do not propose to assess all
the writings and changes in positions that Cone or other Ameri-
can liberation theologians have gone rbhrough since 1970, hut
this provides us with an early example of raising the ii.ssue of
rthe valid use of violent means. Cone srtates that Christianity
" is esisentiaMya oofilgionof liberation," 16 which is difficult to

13 Ibid., p. 131.
14 Ibid., p. 143.
1s James Cone, *A Black Theology of Liberation* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lip-
pincott Co., 1970) •
.10 Ibid., p. 11.

argue with.   But the question still :remains: liberation   from
what allJd by what means?   Simlal'lly, when Cone says tha:t the
Christian mes:s:ageis addressed to "the poor," what is the mean-
ing of "poor," e.g., economic or spiritual?

   Cone argues that the gospel bestow;s on .the poo!r "the nec-
essary power to break the chains of oppression." [17] But again,
what limits ave set, if any, on the use of power? Lime West,
Cone asserrts that hla;ck liberation   " is the work of God him-
self." [18] But is this " work" by God 1sruch that it is physically
evident now; and partim:ilady, does: iit extend to violent

tion? If it does not, it may not su!Oceed,in which case it would
be a 'strange " work " of God indeed.   Cone claims that a11 acts
which destroy white rrucism ar-e "Christian." [19] But again, does
tha;t put God on rbhe side of violence?   Cone also ha,s God" tak-
ring sides in the struggle," [20] but this is a bit hard to visualize.
How does God in foot do this?   Why is this: not evriidentto us,
to 1a11?

   Cone ,aidvocates "a ra.dica11 revolutionary   confrontation"
with white power :[21] But once :again: can this indude the use
of violence 'and human destruction, if the power structures that
interfer-e can be ovie11comein no other way? Racism probably
is " inicompat:iihle with the gospel of Christ," [22] but that is easy
to say; it :rea.Ily means nothing until the issue of   is
faced. 'Cone does argue that we cannot fak!e Jesus' actions as
a guide and that we must be free " to make decisions without
an ethical guide from Jesus." [23] But that srimpJy postpones the
issue of what criteria Christians   can use to justify an action
1as being within the Emits of Christianity.   Anyone may ca11
any ruction, violent or otherwise, "Christian";   names are free.
But how many who :identify themsdv:es as Christian wou1d
agree to use these s1ame names?

   The meaning of " rev:o1ution " is also part of this question.

u Ibid., p. 23.
1s Ibid., p. 26.   21 Ibid., p. 41.
19 Ibid., p. 33.   22 Ibid., p. 40.
20 Ibid., p. 36.   2a Ibid., p. 68.

Cone asserts that ":the black revolution in America is the rev;olution of God," 24 and he identifies the black revo11ution with   Power. However, we know from history that it is diffic:u!Lt to establish that changes reahly are revolutions, though they are often asserted to he such. And, more impor- tantly, what would "revolution" mean in the context of what has transpired in America in recent years? To say that" every :blow for liberation is the work of God " 25 leaves Gord open to '.llesponsibilityfor mass murder. Cone dearly states that" they should havie kiMed him (the oppressor) insteaid of 'loving' him "-this is ce11tainilya mdicrul reversal of traditional Chris- tian teruchings26

Perhaps his most clear-cut expression of these ideas is this sentence: "What we need *is* the divine love ·as expressed in Blaick Power whlch is the power of blruck people to destroy their oppressors here and now, by any means •at their dis- posa1." 27 Vio1enoe and destruction are thus maide "holy." We know that the history of Christianity (as well as of other reli- gions) is full of kiJlings in "holy" w:ars. But the question re- mains: Do we want ,to retreat rt:o such destruction? Also, " holy wars" can be waged by social 1a:nd politicrul conservatives as well as by rrudicwls. One cannot argiue that " Christianity " is or has been on one political side only.

Cone claims that " love " means that " God meets our needs," 28 :hurt the history of Christianity offers countless ex- •amples of religious testing which seems f.ar from" God's meet- ing one's needs." That God has oonsistentily met our needs is hard to see in l'eiligioushistory. Cone wilil not •rullowhuman suf- fering to have "divine •approval," 29 hrut that is di:ffioultif not nnpossible to claim if one aucepts God :as the world's creator as well 1as its liberator. If God created our wocr1d, then the divinity seems Ito be responsible for much of the suffering our wor1dcontains.

24 Ibid., p. 90.   27 Ibid., p. 130.
25 Ibid., p. 101.   28 Ibid., p. 138.
26 Ibid.   2s Ibid., p. 149.

The vagueness of Cone's early writing soon brought forth many objections. I do not want to give a his:tory of ensuing debate but just to pofu.t out the strange way in which Christianity is used to support violence and how " love " is made compatible with killirig.

In his later hook *God of the Oppressed,*[30] James Cone attempts to build Liberation Theofogy out of the Black church experience. The result is more mild in tone than *A Black Theology of Liberati-On.* Yet he srtates: " God came and is present now, in order to destroy the oppressor's power to hoLd people in captivity." [31] But if this is true, this surely cannot be " power " in a poilitica;lsense, eince oppressors still wield political po·wer. If that was the" power" God sought to break, God seems to have been ineffective. God's intervention cannot be as immediate as Cone claims. Cone asserts that " Jesus has not left us alone hut *is* with us in the struggile for freedom." [32] Thwt may very wehl be hue, but it says nothing about how Jesus is linked with the question of using violent means in the struggle.. Jesus is the Expected One, " coming to liberate the oppressed from silaviery." [33] Yes, but when? And what is his present action? Cone does not tell us. Cone calls Black worship " a liberruting experience " [34] and it may weN be, but S'UI"ely .such " liberation " is far from political or violent and may have 11ittleeconomic effect. But ithen Cone returns to his theme that " liberation '' mean " revolutionary action against injustice, slavery and oppression." [35] He speaks of "joining God in the fight against injustice," [36] but Cone remains vague iand ambivalent as to what means we may use.

Gustavo   Gutierrez

,As is well known, Gustavo Gutierrez first brought Libe:r:ation Theoliogy to wide aititention with his book *A Theology of Lib-*

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[30] James Cone, *God of the Oppressed* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).

[a1] Ibid., p. 99. [34] Ibid., p. 144.

[32] Ibid., p. 122. [35] Ibid., p. 152.

[38] Ibid., p. 129. [36] Ibid., p. 233.

eration.[81] Just as the situation of black people in America is unique, so it is clear that the Roman Catholic chureh in Latin America is different from what it is in most parts of the world. And just as Cone and West speak of a unified " Black" perspective, so Gutierrez speaks almost entirely in terms of "the church," as ;a unified whole, in a way no Protestant really can. Without going into detail about the Church's socio-historical context, we are concerned .about how Liberation TheoJogy relates to the use of violence. Gutierrez begins by equating " liberation " with "salvation," [88] and this is cruciail. Most Christians are familiar with the idea of "salvation," but they may not he oocustomed to link it with the notion of " liberation."

Gutierrez argues that the notion of theology changes: over the years, and that ,a notion of theology " as a critical reflection on praxis " (or action) has only recently become recognized. From a Protestant perspective one could argue that theologians have long argued Christianity's mmmitment to change, but, of course, Gutierrez is speaking from a Roman Catholic-Latin perspectiv:e. Marxism is even more committed to transform the world,[40] but the ques:bi.onis: By what means?

" Liberation," Gutierrez recognizes, implies radical change. " SaJlvation" does too, hut it is not at first glance socially and politicaiiilyoriented. Gutierrez sees the historical process as " the gradual liberation of man," [41] hut tills: implies a progresssh1le, evolutionary   which may be hard to justify by the foots of history. To present Christ "as the one who hvings liberations," [42] is to :ruocept the shift from " salvation " to the slightly broader notion of " liberation." But then there iis the question of what liberation really involves. Gutierrez recognizes these diffioulties but he argues that now, on the

[81] Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theolon of Liberation.* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1973).

[88] Ibid., p. 2.

[se] Ibid., p. 6.   [.n] Ibid., p. 29.

[•o] Ibid., p. 9.   [42] Ibid., p. 37.

basis of evolrution, " human reason has hooome political rea-
son." ₄₃ (But this may be difficult to accept without also ac-
cepting the assumption thiait there is "social evolution.")

  Gutierrez .asks the rhetorical question: Shorui1d the chureh
:aictiually lend support "to a dictatorial and oppressive gov-
ernment" by remaining friendly or silent?" ₕ (This again
assumes a Catholic sense of " the church.")   He leaves unspe-
cified what aiction the .church or any individUJal religious per-
son should engage in. As for faiitin America, he does foel that
the revolutionary process " ought to embra.ce the whol.e con-
tinent," ₄₅ but he does not provide any specifics about how this
is to be done or how far it shou1d go. He ·ailso seems to assume
a certain purity of intelllt on the part of those who oppose cur-
rent dictatorial government.   On .the other hand,
Niebuhr might be right: there may be no one right side in
these situations but only a choice of :lesser evils.

  As Gutierrez says, " the ·coming of the Kingdom implies the
building of a just so1ciety."₄₆ To be sure, hut stilil the issue is:
how, when, and by what means? No Christian needs to re-
frain from social action, hut there is a question of whether our
own actions can claim to bring about the just society (.as the
Marxist plans to bring about the classless society) or whether
its fiulil 8Jchievement is resel"V'edfor God's final 8JCtion at the end
of time. Gutierrez urges the church to "prophetic denuncia-
tions " of soci1rul injustice. There is an 'alllCienttrrudition for this
both in Judaism and in Christianity, but the question is
whether one ·Can moV'e beyond this tradirtion to violent revolu-
tion on a religious basis.

  Speaking for Latin America, Gutierrez wants the church to
" place itseM s:quarely within the process of remlrution, amid
rbhe violence which iis present in diffovent ways." ₄₇ Of course,
Christians cannot escape violence; those involved in any
struggle must still: be ministered to, and their human needs

₄a Ibid., p. 47.
₄₄ Ibid., p. 65.   ₄₆ Ibid., p. llO.
'5 Ibid., p. 89.   ₄₇ Ibid., p. 138.

may he even greater than in times of tranquility.   But can the
church, or any per,son claiming the support of Christianity,
aictivcelypromote the process and engage in violence too? The
ichuflch might put its weight behind social changes, hut shouLd
it endorse any particular program or plan or action? Gutierrez
treats "saJvation " las something "other-worldly," [48] hut one
does not have to do so. He wants a new chosen people and a
Messiah who will obviousily be more of a poJitical liberator
than Jesus was in fact.

   Gutierrez paints a moving picture of Christian commitment
to aHeviate su:fforing and of the new wodd it works towards,
but on the   unlike Cone, he skirts the issue of the nec-
essity of violence. Perhaps he comes closest to the issue when
he states: "To love one's enemies presupposes recognizing
and aiccepting thrut one has olass enemies and that it is neces-
sary to combat them." [49] Yes, but by what means? And does
this include the elimination of opposing parties by violence if
neoessary? Orthodox Marxism assumes that it often must be
necessary. Gutierrez wants us to participate in the class strng-
gle, hut does he want us to seek the elimination of certain
existing classes?

   He argues for a " solidarity with the poor and a protest
against poverty." [50] But is this protest to 11emain mainly
verbal? Marxism wou1d scoff at such ineffective "action."   In
a11 his analysis, Gutierrez has not faced the Marxist challenge
that the boilids that suppress us are materiail and that there-
fofle radical ,aJction, l'evolutionary violence is needed to break,
eliminate, and eradicate the social/political structures of our
present world. The Marxist analysis could be tme. Gutierrez
has only argued for action in general terms, without specifying
the Jimits of action ailfowed, hut this is the issue at the heart
of the matter, the origin of the surrounding controversy.

[48] Ibid., p. 151.
[49] Ibid., p. 276.
[50] Ibid., p. 301.

Oscar Cullman

To assess these athors let us briefly conside:r a book by Oscar CuUman, *Jesus and the Revolutionaries?*   Cullman argues that Jesus could havie joined the revolutionary movements of his time, but that he did not. In fact, he " cannot be simply viewed as belonging to any of the principal movcements prevailing in his time." [52] This is something all the aidvocates of revolution cons1dered here, 'West, Cone, and Gutierrez, would find hard to ,accept. They want to enlist Christian backing for specific causes. But it seems cl,ear thait Jesus joined no specific causes in his time and because of this very fact remained an enigma ro his disciples. Cone has argued that Jesus should not be the :role model for Christian ruction, but, if we accept that state- ment, we will be hard p11essedto identify any ;action as " Chris- tian!'

In JeS1Us' time the Zeailots were the group advocating a po- litical program, just as Cone, West, and Gutierrez do; yet Jesus did not join them. The Romans convicted Jesus of the ic:rime of trying to establish a political kingdom. Yet we know the irony of his cmcifixion is that he prewched the coming of the kingdom from within. Jesus and the .Zealots both pro- cl1aimedtha;t the kingdom of God was iat hand, and Jesus was condemned as a Zealot agitator.   Yet we know he advocated nonviolence and viewed Zealotry as a diabolic temptation to be shunned. Jesus' expe1ctation of a coming kingdom is undeni- able, but it is to come from God, not f:rom us.

Most importantly, Jesus did not hate his enemies, a tendency we see in M1rurxismand in some Liberation Theologies.. In fact, his attitude towarid the Samaritans 1and Gentiiles probably shocked the Zealots, " whose hate for the Gentiles was the most extreme." [53] Can violent revolution be advocated without a

[61] Oscar Cullman, *Jesus and the Revolutionaries* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).

[02] Ibid., p. vii.

[0a] Ibid., p. 23.

basis in hatred? If not, it will be repugnant to most Chris-
tians. The forgiving of enemies is difficult for a revolutionary
program, and it certainly eliminates violence as an acceptable
path. Jesus turns to the poor and to the rich; he shows no
class disrbinctions,and this is a rood block for all Marxism.

E-V'en his disciples could not understand the conception of
the kingdom of God which Jesus preached, so different was
it from the current political options. He was a strange
" Messiah." Jesus dismissed as a satanic temptation the
Zealot's political concept of the Messiah, a concept which is
olose to that of Cone, West, and Gutierrez. It is not easy to
understand the kind of "kingdom" Jesus wanted to inaug-
urate, but certainly it was not a political-economic one. The
Zealots considered 11efusalto pay taxes ®s a test of f,aithfulness.
But Jesus had his own idea of political/religious allegiance as
we noted earlier. He did not join the Zealots when the Jewish
Wax broke out but fled to .the other side of the Joroan. Ironical-
liY Jesus was condemned as a Zealot, and yet he was no Zealot-
and that is a problem for West, Cone, and Gutierrez.

The Special Problems in South and Central America

For someone living in the United States, it may be easy
enough to pursue a non-violent revolution. Miartin Luther
King, Jr., couiLd be a Cmistian pacifist, foHow Jesus and
Gandhi, and still achieve a revolution in race relations. Gandhi
inspi11ed King because he aJChieved the independence of India
while preachmg non-violence, even if violence did follow as a re-
sult of his work. Gandhi was dealing with aiuthorities ultimate-
ly SJUbjoot to a cultivated British democracy, and King had
United States coll!Stitutional ll:lippeals open to him. Although
situations vaey, it is ihavd to point ;to a singile situation in
South/Cenwrul America where military fonce is not the rule and
where civil liberties are genuinely sacred.

When you bee miilitary power thait is: openly ruthless and
political rule that is so autocratic that any protest might muse
you to disappear from society, it can easily seem that nothing

hut force can ruocomplish change. Those who hold power re-gafldless of constitutions or open democratic elections recognize that ultimately oruy represision can keep them in power. Such rulers have everything to fear from protest and revolution and little .to lose from ruthless oppression, pa;rticulaflly if it is astutely and cleverly In such situations, to talk of " liberation " without a willingness ;to resort to force and violence may he .to doom the speaker to either frustration or insignillcaooe. "The church " often has both wealth and political influence. Why shouM this not be used to achieve a change otherwise doomed to fairlrure?

In a situation of this sort, the difficulty I have pointed out in reconciling Christianity with any appeal to violence· wouLd seem to doom religion to ineffectiveness. How to change or revise Christianity's tr:aditional postme is one problem. But what puzzles me is how pofrbical interests, no matter how just their cause, could have thought of turning .to Christianity, to .any of its churches, in support of a change <that aJmost demands violence if the project is to succeed. Why not argue for change (and for any means necessary to achieve it) on a .secular basis, just as Marx does? Of course, a monolithic church in Latin America can be la powerful instrument, whereas churches in the U.S. split their power by their sheer variety.

In North America one can appeal to organiz;ed religion for spiritual or moral srupport and often raise powerful forces. But any hint of violence would at best divide support and at worst doom the movement to failure. In Latin America, violence may be necessary for success, and the Roman Chureh stands out as one of the few institutions explicitly committed to the good of the people, whate¥er its past recol'd of accommodation to political repression may be. One may be forced to consider :the church as an ally if one wants any organized support at all. Violence has been used by Christianity in the past, often as a means to :vepress dissent from within. But it still seems odd that violence might be used as an alternative to potential revo-1lutionary failure. What we must ask, however, is whether as-

sociation with violence might not in fact tear Christianity
1apart, rather than secure an otherwise unobtainable political
change.

Listening to the rhetoric of recent liberation theologians, one
detects two trends that have been dangerous in the past to
Christianity and may be potentially divisive again, especially
when unity of action is desperately needed. These are: (A) a
tendency to pit one group against another rather than to bring
peare among factions; and (B) a stress on preaching the reali-
zation of the Kingdom of God now.

(A) Insofar as Latin American Liberation Theology incites
hate against North American economic" oppressors" (or even
simply against local political oppressors), it draws its strength
from the stormy emotions of hate and retruliation, whereas
Christianity has preached the love of enemies. Can any move-
ment be accredited as " Christian " which in any way capital-
iz;es on hate for 1an enemy and not lov;e? Furthermore, it often
happens whenev;er hatred of any group or class is pI"eached that
sUJCh:appeaJ.will divide Christians rather than unite them, even
if some may rally to the call.

(B) Wher:e Christian tradition is concerned, how to under-
stand the " Kingidom of God " poses the most difficult problem.
Jesus' followers expected success in their time, and Jesus was
crucified amid disappointed hopes. The traditional expootation
of the Second Coming seems to say ·that no reaJization of the
Christian hope can come in any or exact sense until that
time. If this is the case, wha;tever Christians may do in the
interim to redress wrongs, even if they are enjoined to do it,
the final resolution still a.waits God's aiciion. to
achieve goals now appears to be even more difficult .to justify.
Vioilence, if it is to be :appealed to, can hardly be enjoined by
virtue of Christian doctrine but must he undert:aken as an in-
dividual decision.

Summary

If an individual, Christian or otherwise, chooses to resort to violence and destruction, he or she shoruld be willing to take the responsibiility for it on his own shoulders. The Marxist/ Leninist can undoubtedly find a c1ear doctcinail support for using violence to break those   class structures which prevent liberation. A ·Christian, on the other hand, may offer 'an individual reading of "Christianity" whlch 1aiuthorizes the use of violence, but neither in the life and work or Jeisrus, nor in the New Testament, nor in most major theologicwlinter:pretations oan one find justification for the use of violent means or even for advocating destruction.

Certainly you wiill D!ev:er get a1l Christians 1Jo agree to accept the use of violence, so ·antitheticaJ is it .to most Christian tradi- tions. Y:et we IDIUSt aJso firuce the Marxist/Leninist   challenge: there may he times when the structures which bin:d us can only ·be broken by the use of vi0llent means. Nevertheless, whatever any Christian may feel authorized to do, the trans- formation of the   hasic stru\Cture depends .at least in part on God's intervening power. And furthermore, even if it can he said that the divinity inte:deres partiailly and subtly now, the day of foll ,and finail release is not yet here, and we 1simply oannot be srure that the use of vioJence and terror will hasten its ooming.

A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE TRUTH
OF MORAL AND OTHER JUDGMENTS

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SIMPSON'S RECENT review of *Morals as Founded on Natural Law* [1] *so* misrepresents its main point, one so vital to civilization's continuance, that I feel obliged to try to restate that point. It was of course disconcerting that he misunderstood the main point of the hook (whetlrer he agrees with it or not), thoogh it may ,weN. be, as he says, that the book oouM have been mOire readably written.

He summarizes the book's aim as being" to establish morality on an external authoritative law "–a summary which does indeed seem close, even :identicaJ.,to what is said in the book's first paragraph. However, there is ra potential equivocation in the w;ayhe uses " externail." One should ask, external to what? What .the book speaks of in this opening paragraph is of *justifying* morality on ra principle " external to states of mind." I use "external" in the sense of that principle's being "independent of them," 'i.e., of meuba11 srtates. So :llar, this is a very open statement.

Brut how do I go on to amplify it? Not the way Simpson does. He takes me as equating this principle with " the authoritative law of God," in the sense of "a divine legislative aiuthority " which, he reports me as arguing, " is just somehow an inemdicwblegiven."

This " somehow " not only refoses to consider the meta-

1 Stephen Theron, *Mora,ls м Founded on Na,tural Lww,* European University Studies (New York: Peter Lang, 1987; 2nd ed. 1988). Reviewed by Peter Simpson in *The ThomiBt* 53 (1989): 341-342.

physical reasoning at the heart of the book's position but even seems to suggest that such reasoning was not evien offered. In fact it is precisely at this point that Simpson goes right off the raiJs as far as representing my view is concerned. claims that this foundation upon divine authority would make morals "dependent on ·divine 1a.w, not, as his title dedares, on natural law."

However, my use of " naturrul law " is rthe Thomistic use, which is sufficiently wen known in the debate so as not to be misleading. In the view of St. Thomas (and a whole established school of thought), natural law is indeed, in Simpson's words, "deriviative and secondary," or, in St. Thomas's words, "a reflected divine light." ² Brut in the famous Artiicle 2 of Question 94 of the *Prima secundae* of the *Summa theologica,* so exh81ustively discussed in .the rooent literariue, natural law is declared to be derived from the *eternal law* and not from divine law in the "external " or positivist •sense clearly intended by Simpson. (A different distinction is used in the *Contra gentiles,* but throughout my book the above text was referred to, often explicitly) .

"Divine law," the fourth type of law (eternal law and natural law being the first two types), does indeed refer, in this text, to some kind of positiv;e legisfation on the part of God in the 01d and New Testaments. (But evien here St. Thomas is oarefoil to point out that the law of the New Testament is only analogous to positive law, since it is not written on stone but poured into men's hearts by the Holy Spirit.) If I had been referring to this divine law (in such phrases as " realS0n is divine and .therefore law ") and not thait eternal law which is one with the divine being, Simpson *might* have been able to brooket me with those nominalist theologians for whom

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.2" quasi lumen r.ationis naturalis . . . nihil aliud sit quam impressio luminis divini in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura." St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica* I-II, 91. 2.

God might hav:e decreed an opposite morality if he so chose. (Though this, too, would be contrary to St. Thomas's view of such positive divine law, ev;en for the Old Testament; indeed for him even 011dinary "human" positivie law loses the sense of law if it contradict natural law.)

In any case, the eterna,l law which natural hw reflects differs from this. As the divine wisdom 011dering creation, it is con- ceived as identical *in re* with the ,divine being. This is the key concept of my book, and Simpson has either missed it or for- gotten it. It is only because   law, as expounded by St. Thomas, is a reflection of the divine wisdom that it is law at lail 3 and enables human beings to legislate valid (in the sense of obligatory) laws for their civil soc1etie8.

Now it is true, as Simpson recognizes, that in my book I equated natural law vvith "the law of our natural reason." What I said is that this law of :rea,son (and all the particular judgments commonly resulting from it) has the fo11oe which we call *obligation* only because of this re1lation of reflection. Our human nature, of which reason is the specific difference, reflects or images the eterna'l la,w, i.e., the divine nature.

We oannot question divine authority without falling into a regress. But I certainly do not mal;;,e this the rational *ground* for accepting that authority. Instead I offer a metaphysical grounding for this authority in the divine nature, in wha;t it is to be God. 4 The reference to the !'egress is made in Chapter Two as part of 1a discussion of the role of tmdition; it is not at all linked up with God. Rather, the point is made that, if there acl'e no self-evident moral p11emises, then they must at some stage he tiaken fmm outside the seJf (p. 6fl) . This, *mutatis mutandis,* is Hume's famous point. Unlike him, however, I do attempt to legitimize an ultimate epistemic or rational ruu-

s Ibid. 93, 3: "omnes leges in quantum participant de ratione recta, in tantum derivantur a lege aeterna."

4 Especially Chapter Six, Section Two, pp. 153-157. "God as the truth of all things must als.o be the truth as to what is right."

thority or criterion for mol'al principles as being true, though at this point I simply claim that if such a criterion is found anywhe11e it oan only be embedded in the human tradition. This is why I l'eferred to children; in the case of children we have .an wctUJal example of people (ourselves included) taking moral principles from a soul''Ce outside the mdividuail self.⁵ According to both Aristotle and Aquinas, the customs of tradition do ,illdood form the first principles: of ebhiool science.

But rin ,the book I hwd not yet tackled the question of just how 'such a tl13Jdition might ·be an ,authority imposing an obligiation⁶ Indood, a large part of the subsequent argument is devoted to showing tlmt custom cannot hav:e obligatory force e:xrept on the supposition of its reiftecting the divine nature, taJcing customs as being ;the distillation of human experience.

For reason either jilllstifies:itseH or requires £ur:ther justifioation.⁷ It is true, as Simpson says, that it is only by l'eason that we can recognize I'eason's validity. But this is a matter of reoogniizing the necessary condition for reruson's being valid; it is *not* to say that we " only admit the vaility of our own reason *after* we have l'ecognized the divine and reason's dependence upon it." ⁸ Hence Simpson's aittempt to show that I am myself " caught in 1an infinite regress " seems to rest upon an *ignoratio elenchi.* For we are not here invited to suspend confidelllcetin reruson ;through some kind of Cartesian H1ought-experiment. We ask rather what are ibhe rationally necessary p:ve-iconditions for that confidence in reaison we *naturally* have, to which all our J.ianguage and behavior witnesses. Irrespective

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⁵ Cf. Theron," On Being so Placed", *New Blackfria,rs,* September 1980.

⁶ See p. 63 where, after saying " there has been such a tradition because such is human nature," I expressly add, " The question why human nature is a criterion of what is right I leave for later," i.e., to the extended discussion of Chapters Five and Six (pp:lll-157).

⁷ This question is not really opened up until V, ii (p. 117) • On this topic, see also my" Morality as Right Reason", *McmMit* 1983.

⁸ Italics original.

of whether or not one aocepted the particular answer proposed, one could disallow this question, .as Simpson tries to do, only if one equated a naturaJl conviction with a scientific certainty. [9]

Hence it is quite false to say ,that "reason is seilf-va1lidating or nothing at all is valid." Morever, one can quite easily point out that the *grounds* for the validity of reason might be left igno11ed or unacknowi1ed:ged (hence reason would not be "self-va:lidating ") without at all suggesting that reason might not be vali!d.[10] By Simpson's own principle, I don't dispose of the truth of a hypothesis when I dismiss a had argument for it. My intention, accordingly, was not to dissuade secularists ·from being morrul but to point to the sole ground upon which convictions as to moral obligations and human dignity [11] can be rationally justified. It is   important for humanity that they should be rationally justifiable. For no one need pretend tha;t, if w:e routinely deny the ground upon which our human essence is based, our foeedom, our conformity to that essence- as natuve, is guaranteed. Reason can he 1and often is rejected.

Freedom, of cour•se, should not be confused with arhi.tmriness. One can ,show that there is a necessary connection between fr;eedom ,and posises.sion of an int:el1ectual naiture. Only possesision of such a nature giv;es one the power of judgment, and this power precisely *is* the power to be free from the determinism that being iconfined to a limited cognitional environment ,entails. *As* does Joseph Pieper, I have argued [12] that this

s Or perhaps **if** one were impressed by Hilary Putnam's theory of "internal realism".

10 *A* classical discussion of this matter was G. E. M. Anscombe's "A Reply to Mr. C. S. Lewis's Argument that 'Naturalism' is Self-Refuting", *Socratic Digest,* Oxford, 1947 (in her *Collected Papers,* Vol. 3). See also my "Does Realism Make a Difference to   ", *Monist,* April 1986; Augustine Shutte, "The Refutation of   ", *Philosophy* 1984.

llCf. VI, ix, pp. 170-172; also my "Duty and the Divine," *Neue Zeitschrift fur system(J,tisohe Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 31 (1989) : 308-326.

i2 On pp. 121-124.

capacity for apprehending   truth (ul.tima,teJy a conionnity to
the *divine* mind but presupposed to judgment) is the point at
which 11eason can he seen to he a refieotion of the divine mind
or *nous.* By reason I mean both theoretical reason and pmic-
t:iioal reason, induding natural law. The divine knowledge *ipso
facto* sets things in order, and these things then *inform* our
minds.

Now these darifications   make it impossible to present the
book as a " reduction,"   a reduction   " of everything,   in philos-
ophy as well as in morals, to a 1egaHstic theism."   Simpson has
simply reacted to my interp:reting moral principles as laws
without itaking a1ocount of the tho:mugrhly non-vo1untarist view
of law argued for from Chapter Three onwards.   That laws
proceed from intellect or wisdom (the *lex aeterna)* rather than
from will does not of course makie these rlaws non-obligatory-
that would be a contradiction.   However, it does remove the
conflict our vohmtarist oultme often feels between obligation
1and rationality   or freedom.   Such ,fa,ws are now an *expression*
of rrutionaility and hence of freedom precisely because, I claim,
they express the divine or wbsol1UJte mind.   For it is conneotion
with this mind which alone gives reason, as cause of our free
w:i.J.J, fl'eedom from naburaJ detell'IIlinisms [13] and renders it, in
bheo11eticwllydiscerning   truth, prwcti!cailly obHging.

F1ina.Uy,this a.cicount helps to removie the impression that oh-
1ligation is an extraneous category imposed upon an otherwise
freely mnging theoretical reason, which is bounded only by a
reaility it only wishes to apprehend, not evade. We should 11e-
cahl, first of alJ, thait practical !'eason is not a faculty separate
from theoretical 11ea:son![4] This   ,alone can lead us to wish
to get behind a brute idea of obligation and achieve a unified
view of wisdom a.s a whole.

We have claimed that, errors apart, what we judge to be so

:rn Reason is not *determinatum   ad unum,* like other natures, but able to
form diverse conceptions of anything at all.   Cf. *S.T.* I-II, 17, 1 ad 2.
н Ibid. I, 79, 11.

reaiMy is so, and that this also applies to judgments a.bout whait *is* to he done, how we *are* to behave. We know oursdves just as we know other things. Although the fact of our freedom determines tha,t ructions fall under a gerundive mode, judging is an .aict of identifying things as they *are,.* whetheil' the judgment is theoret:iJoailor practical. The sign of the judgment's truth is fo say A *is* B, despite Fregean opinion apparently to the cont:ra:ry. A t.rue judgment, bearing upon something wh:iich it is in *our* power to do, is as reaJ, true, and sderrtffic as any other. Its content, if univ:ersal, we can a law of human nature.

Now in saying tha1t such laws a.re obligations, we do not so much ,3Jdd to their strictness as bring out what is implicit in their being a law. Just as it is a law and *hence* true (as a universa1l judgment) that hot air rises, so it is a law and henice rtme that debts are fo be paid. To say that it is oMigato:ry that debts a,lle to be says no more than tha,t this is true. Obligation is ,the mode of truth *in prae-ticis;* the gemndive is the mode of pmcticail reality. In saying this we should not forget that what al'e primari11y obligatory are ha,bits, viz., the virtues, aH of them. The acts whi!cl.1 the vir·bues elicit, whether of necessity or with pmhability, *ut in pluribus,* are seoonda.rily obligatory, the obligation to unremitting exercise of the virtue remaining. In any case, the difference between the two types of law is not mel'ely " forma.l " but a difference on the part of t:he object We come to know :realities as heing (still) in our power of performance. These are in fact tiheoretrca1 judgments about practice, like the pwt]cular judgments of **It** is truth that obliges.

This, then, is the foundation of morals upon naturail law, viz., 'that the normal judgments made and principles enuncfated by men and societies are true, anid that the hahits needed for pe:rfoct fulfilment truly are virtues, i.e., objective

15 Cf. Leo Elders, "St. Thomas .Aquinas' Doctrine of Conscience", in *Lew et Libertas,* ed. L. Elders & K. Hedwig (Rome, 1987).

eX!cellenciesof human nature   (or of ,something Slllperior to na-
twe) . It further belongs to this foundation th.rut the possibility
of such true ju1dgment depends upon human reason, the specific
difforenoe of our nature, insofar as   is a reflection of the di-
vine ireason, that which oriders a1l things *(lex aeterna)* to be
what they are. To complete rthe picture I ,should have dis-
cussed how this divine order is not only reflected in the order
.veason ,setg up hut ,ailso declares itself directly in our generic
natru:re!₆ Hwt when I wrote the hook, I had not yet come to see
the lln.portanice of this.

:i.a Here should belong discussion of the *peccata contra naturam,* as in my
"Natural Law in *Humanae Vitae,"* in *"Humanae Vitae": 20 Anni dopo,*
.Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Teologia Morale (Rome, 1988), pp. 487-
494.

ON BEING OR NOT BEING A THOMIST

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Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism: The Search for a Unitary Method. Gerald A. McCool, S.J. New York: Fordham University Press, 1989. 301 pages (paper).

From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism. Gerald A. McCool, S.J. New York: Fordham University Press, 1989. 9248 pages (hardcover).

BEFORE I READ Gerald A. McCool's two volumes examining nineteenth and twentieth centrury scholast:i:cism and Thomism, if someone had asked my philosophica;l o:rientation, I would have replied "I am a Thomist." Having rerud McCool's two books, I still and with a strong sense of gratitude articulate my philosophical self-des,ignation as Thomisit, but what I mean by Thomist has become considerably more nuanced. Not only those who identify themselvies with the thought of St. Thomas but a, wider philosophical and theologiea1l community shou1d be grateful to Father McCool for- his eXiceHent scholarly contribution to the understanding of sicholasticism and Thomism. His two volumes show many of us who call ourselves Thomists where we have been an:d wheve we rare and, by illuminating our past ,and present, clarify for us our options for the future.

Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism was first published under ,the title *Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century* by The Seabury Press in 1977, but it has been re-issued hy Fordham University to ruocompany the appearance of his second volume. In this earlier work McCool ohal'ts in detail the growth and

d.wection of scholasticism, especially in relation to two influen-
tial Chmich documents: the Apostolic Consititu.tion on Faith
Dei Filius, solemnly app:rovced in 1870 by the fathers of the
First Vatican Council, and Leo XIII's 1879 encyclical *Aeterni
Patris.* The ,earlier ,document defined and darified the Church's
teaching on the supernatural and free charac1te:r of faith and
on the relation between supe:matural faith and natural reason;
the encydical was a disciplinary document concerning the
method of philosophicaJ instruction for priests. McCool
\Stresses that the linking of the two documents in the minds of
Roman authorities and theologians gave the documents enor-
mous weight and influence during the nineteenth and well into
the twentieth century, but now, more than a hundred years
fater, their influence is being   and r'easses:sed. Though
the present situation in Catholic philosophical and theological
circles is not a case   history reversing itself, it is an extra-
011dina:ry example of history leruding to the l'eopening of ques-
tions ithat ,seemed definitivdy dosed. McCool suggests that
there are at   two factors affecting contemporary Catholic
theology which indicate that ·current historical research
into nineteenth-century Catholic theology may point to a
genuine option between a deveJoped Thomism and a restored
pre-Thomistic nineteenth century system:

The first of these is the freedom given to Catholic theologians by
the Second Vatican Council to experiment with non-Thomistic
theological systems. *Aetelf'ni Patris* no longer enjoys the status of
an irrevocable theological option, based on immutable dogmatic
and metaphysical principles. Its theological signification has been
relativized. *Aeterni Patris* must now be considered an historical
moment in the dialectical progress of theological development. The
second distinctive characteristic of contemporary theology is the
current ferment over theological method. This means that the
nineteenth-century debate, which the official option of *Aetelf'ni
Patris* seemed to have closed definitively, has been reopened. The
disciples of SL Thomas and the partisans of the ' new ' theologies
are free once more to submit their diverse theological methods to
the judgment of their fellow theologians.   (p. 6)

McCool views Joseph Kleutgen as the outstanding   repre-
sentativ;e of the noo-Thomisit.ic movement in the nineteenth
century. Kleutgen was trying to strike a balance between the
extremes of fideisim and rationalism.   He felt strongly thrut if
one says positive and speculative theology are nort intrinsically
difforent in their intellootua;} questions from a philosophy of
·l'leve!Imtion then either natural veason's proper autonomy has
to be compromised by a tmditional :fideism or the distinctive-
ness and gra.tuity of supernatuml knowledge has to be blurred
by a 1Semirationrulis texaggeration of natuml reason's ability to
grasp the intelligibiility of the Christian mysteries. McCool
srtresses rthe intrinsic   ru11d influential role that Aristotle's
philloosophy played in K1eutgen's struct:uring of his theology.
W,ov;en ovier an Aristotelian mosaic, Kleutgen's theology of
grace and natrure dicbaited his theology of faith and 11e.ason, hut
both of these required an Aristotelian metaphysics of sub-
stance aTlJd accident, £ruc:mlty, habit and act. As a grounding for
metaphysics, an Aris1torbelian theo·ry of knowledge was needed,
which in turn 1ed to an Aristotelian theory of metaphysics as
a •science. These theories (and his Thomistic metaphysics of
grruce and natul'e) led Kleutgen ,to conJOeive of theology as an
Aristotelian 1S1cience, with philosophy subordinate to it as an-
other Aristotelian sdence. Apologetics in its nrutuml int•eillectual
operations was for fileutgen a scientific propadeutic to the-
        and both posirti:v;e and spemlative theo1ogy were sub-
sequent to and depell!dent on faith for their 'Supernatural op-
er:ations and the •supernatrura1 necessity of their evidence. The
logic and neatness of   schema had a gveat deal going
for   and iJt wo:u1d be diffiou1t to overempha;size its influence
on ninetoonbh-1century Thomism.   !Geutgen dmfted the final
version of *Dei Filius* and is frequently credited as the prin-
cipa;l (i£ not the sole) author of *Aeterni Patria.* But
Sltresses that, in spite of its sitrong points, KJteutgen's:Thomism
had no   at all for hisrtory or for the   but non-
1ogica1 devefopment of thought, ·e.g., through changing con-

ceptual frameworks of succeeding historical and culit:ura.lworld-
views. ParadoxicaJly Kleutgen's Thomism, which was not
open to history, led to the Thomism of the la.st quarter of the
twentieth century, as represented by Karl Rahner and Bernard
Lonergan, a Thomism that is open to history, evolutionary in
its thought, and sensitive to the plurality of diverse cultural
,and conoepturul frameworks. McCool notes the connection:

The Thomistic theory of knowledge demanded a substantial union
of soul and body in man. The Thomistic intellect was always an
abstractive intellect. Its concepts could only deal with the Holy
Mystery who is the subject of Christian revelation through the
indirect and analogous concepts of a judging intellect which, as
St. Thomas said so well, knew what God was not rather than what
God was. Abstraction and analogy rather than direct and :intui-
tive knowledge of God distinguished the scholastic approach to
God from the approach of post-Cartesian philosophy and despite
its *rapprochement* with modern thought in the twentieth century,
abstraction and analogy are still the cognitional characteristics of
Thomistic metaphysics and theologyo

McCool cleatly desiccibesthe modem theoJogies that Kleut-
gen wanted his Thomism to replace. These theologies had an
epis1temology, anthropology, and metaphysics that was rooted
in post-Kantian German ideal!ism, especiaHy that of ScheHing.
The post-Kantian :ideaJi:st1sidivided the inteHect into discursive
reason *(Ver stand)* , which wa,s limited to the worM of objec-
tiv;e phenomena, and intuitive 11eason *(Vernunft),* which was
icapahle of inte:Llectual intuition of norumem:vlor metaphysical
reality. A twofo1d proeess made up this intuitive· grasp: the
firs1t stage was intuitive reason's passive aeceptance of reality,
and the second stage was int:uitive I'eason's s1cienti:fic:reflection
upon intuited reaility *(Wissen).*   then,   this post-
Kantiian metaphysical view was taken to he a science *(Wissen-
schaft)* of faith ocr a science of revefation. The Absolute mani-
fes1ted itself through its finite self-manifestation in the dynamic
universe of spirit and nature. Eaich human community had its
own specific (lOmmunail idea, which achieved :the perfection of

its :rerulizationthrough the free 1actiwty of individual members. Of course, the aiuthentic development of the communal idea could be frustrated through wrong free chofoes of membecrs of :the community, bUJt even this frustmtion wais temporary. Evil and mistaken choices wou1d, eventually and ineviitably be ex- 'OlUJded by the members of the community. Because the history of the community rudvarmed through the free chol!ces of persons, it wrus genuine history, hut :it had an intrinsic diai1eoticailinte1ligibi.1ity because it was the communal history of the enfoMing of a formativce :i!dea, whiioh reached its perfection th11ough the conscious exclusion of its opposites. Noumenal reality re¥ealed itself through an act of intuitive faith to members of an organic community. Philosophical reason cou1d then p.vovide a scientific reconstruction which would make exp1icit the ideal system of essences which constituted the inteiLligibJestmctme of reaHty.

In the firs1t half of the nineteenth century this post-Kantian model of fiaith and reason greatly affected the re1ations between theology of revelation, apologetics, positive theology, and. specuiliative theology. The Catholic tmdiitionalist systems opposed themselves to both Kantian rationalism and Hegelian pantheism. Built upon this model were French tradition-.alism, the ·theology of the Caitholic TU.bingen School, the metaphysical dualism of Anton Gunther, and the ontologism of Rosmin[and Gilberti. The advanta.ge of this type of non-scholasitic theology •was that it was S'ensitive to the meaning of history, tmdition, and community in ways that the Aristotelian non-Thomis:t.s were not. Another contrast between the two approaches was that, while there was an appreciation among post-Kantian Catholic theologians of an apologetics of immanence rooted in the demands of the human spirit, the Aris1totelian neo-Thomists based. their apologetics on the "obiective signs " of miracle and prophecy and were suspicious of any apofogetics of im:r;nanen0e. But the victory of the neo-Thomists, as evidenced *in.Dei Filius* and *Aeterni Patris,* left a

tension between neo-Tihomistic theofogy and s1ubjectivehistori-
cal modem thought and e¥enturully led to the modernis:t crisis.
McCool stcresses thrut the tension became obvious again a de-
cade or two hefo:re the opening of foe Second Vatic1an Council.

  In his meti!cu1ou:scharting of the coru:rse of nineteenth-cen-
tury schola:sticism, McCool provi des detiai1ed treatment   of
F11encli trwditionailism, Anton Gunther's: dualism, 1and the phl-
losopihica,l <synthesis of Matteo Liberatore.   Liberrutore's neo-
Thomism became influential rth11ough a bri:Uiant series of ar-
trncles in *Civilta Cattolica* in whi:ch he argued thait Thomism
shou1d he :re1srtol'edin   thought as a unitary system of
thought. McCool notes that by the beginning of the twen-
tieith century the scho1lastic revival was wen under way, be-
cause the :religious oriders and the Church hiera:richy had. re-
sponded favorably and strongly 'to Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patria.*
Theological 1and philosophical faculties in Rome (at both the
Gregorian Univ;ersity and the Angelioum) , Louvain, and Inns-
bruck, as wel1l as in France and Switz:e:rfand,⹌mbraiced 1sohofas-
tiicism enthusias1t1ca1ly. The same spirit can he seen in the
philosophical   and theofogical journwls published in Italy,
France, Germany, Belgium, and Switzerliand. However, Mc-
Cool argues, deficient historical awal'eness was a cruuse of con-
fusion in the seholas1tics' own speculative !thought.   Seventy-
:five years a,go scholastic theologians we1le in no position to
comprehend the 1specific starting point and intrinsic consist-
,ency of any of the greaJt thirteenth ee!JJlturyscholastic systems.
MoCool insists   thrut they cou1d not dirstingiuish between
              own theology and the theologies of his baroque com-
mentart0:rs; they s1aw Thomism ·as simply another name for the
rtheoilogy of Cajetan or John of St. Thomas or fo:r a generic
scholasticism of Sua;vezian or Scotistic hue. In addition, his-
torical ignorance caused turn-of-the-century   scholastic authors
to give mis1leading a1cicounts of Sit. Thomas's thought in their
manuals. Because his distinctive metaphysics of existence was
largely iignored, the unique character of Thomas's philosophy

of man and God was ovel'llooked. Neither the role that a.b-
stmction and judgment play in Thomas's epistemology nor
the significant distinction between *ratio* and *intellectus* in
Thomas's   of lmo,wle:dge (and hence in his theology
of the Trinity, Inmrna:tion, and graice) was emphasized. The
connection between Thoma,s's, metaphysiios of God and his per-
sonml religious ex.peidence was not even noti1oe:d. Consequently,
Thomism cou1d give the impressions of being a highJy ration-
alistic system. 1t was presented as an Aristoiteilian science that
moved deductively from first p.r;inciples to conclusions. Within
it there seemed to be little room for the role of personaJ experi-
ence or nonconrcepbua1 intuition in religious knowledge of God.

   Although *Aeterni Patris* led to turn-of-the-roentury schofas-
ticism, with alll its weaknesses, the encyolica1 arlso eventually
led to the oon:temporary Thomism of Rahner and Lonergan
and its openness to pluralism. Though the drafters of *Aeterni
Patris* did not fol"esee the ev:o,lutrion of Thomism, that evolu-
tion is, a1ccording :to McCool, an outgrowth of the work that
the encyclical ina.ugurateid. He writes

Historical rediscovery of St. Thomas's thought and the systematic
development of the latent potentialities through a Thomistic
dialogue with the modern world was the work which *Aetemi Patris*
invited Catholic philosophers and theologians to undertake. The
drafters of *Aeterni Patris* did not anticipate that the work which
they invited their colleagues to undertake would inevitably result
in the evolution and radical revision of their own Thomistic syn-
theses because they did not think historically. For them a radical
change in St. Thomas' Aristotelian method or the sanctioning of a
post-Cartesian starting point in Thomistic epistemology and meta-
physics would have been inconceivable. Neither of these 'modern'
approaches would have been compatible with their own concep-
tion of Thomism as an Aristotelian *Philosophie der Vorzei-t.* Yet,
despite the limitations and inaccuracies of their understanding of
St. Thomas' thought, the sturdy confidence which the neo-Thomist
pioneers placed in the soundness and the fruitfulness of the Angelic
Doctor's epistemology and metaphysics turned out to be amply
justified. (p. 9l85)

In the last thirty pages of *Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism,* McCool sketches the course, that turn-of-the-century scholasticism would take through the influence of the non-Thomist Maurice Blonde! and the work of Pierre Rousselot, Jacques Maritain, and Etienne Gilson. This eventually opened up into the pluralism of thought welcomed and fostered by the work of Rahner and Lonergan. The dosing pages of this volume are an extraordinarily clear but brief treatment of the mo¥ement within Thomism from its reliance on the commentators Cajetan and John of St. Thomas and the strong influence of hard-line Dominican Thomists such as Garrigou-Lagrange to the transcendental Thomism of Rahner and Lonergan. A more detailed and in-depth treatment of Thomism's e¥olution appears in *From Unity to Pluralism.* In this .seoond volume McCool devotes one chapter· to Joseph Marechal and two chapters each to Rousselot, Maritain, and Gilson. McCool correctly cirtes these four thinkers as the key to Thomism's movement towards a greater openness to othe,r thorught patterns.

The theology presented by *Aeterni Patris* was modeled on Aristotelian 1science, whiich moves rto conc1usions from first principles in a timeless fashion. It leaves no room for historica;l development, hermeneutics, or diverse coneeptuaJl frameworks. In effect, the encyclic11;lcast doubt on the possibility of structruring a Orutholic theology with one of the modern pmlosophies or using their methods to serve 1the demands: of the Catholic faith. But there were Thomists whose research Jed beyond the Thomism of *Aeterni Pa:bTis.* Two of them were Pierre Rousselot, whose philosophical and theological career was abruptly terminated .during the Second World War, and Joseph Maroohall.

Rejecting Suarezian Thomism and Sootistic votuntarism, Rousselot insisted that St. Thomas was an inteillectuaJist. In *The Intellectualism of St. Thomas,* Roiusselot .argued that in violruntacisitmetaphysics the highest act of the spiritruaJ.crea-

tme, indeed the act which defines the very nature of the spirit-
ual being, is an act of voluntary tending toward the good, but
that in intellectualist metaphysics the nature of the sprirtual
creature is defined by ·an act of cognitive repose. In the Beatific
Vision rthe spiritual creature has an exhaustive vision of its
own essence as well,rus of God's own being. Rousselot argued
that in the vo1untarist scheme charity shou:Ld not be described
as reasonaMe becruuse it is an impulse to abandon one.seH com-
pletely to God. Charity certainly is not conformed to nature.
Ontological duality between lover and beloved, rather 1than a
prior ontological unity be1tween them, iiS a metaphysicial pre-
supposition of voluntarism. This constitutes a kind of violence
to nature raither than its fmfillment. But this is not the case,
claimed Rousseil.ot,with mtelJecturulism's ontological order. Ac-
co:vding to the intellectualist, the aict of charity is consequent
to the vision of God in which the essence of happiness is
Ileached. The creature's ultimate 1enid is :veached through an act
of the inte1lect, a contemplative intuition, and this contempla-
tive intuition demands, ais its ontological condition, that the
in:te1leotbe orde11ed.by naibure to grasp the fru11 range of being.
Now in St. Thomas'.s intei1lectualism, every finite intellect is
oiidered by its nature to a real g'J.1asp of the full range of being.
Rousselot ,insisted that Thomrus's mtelJectualist theology of
beatitude requires as its condition of possibility a metaphysical
realism g11ounded upon the dynamism of the inteMect. The
unity, coherence, and distinctiveness of St. Thomas's meta-
physics of   man, aIJ1d being can be 1seen m his the-
ology of the Beaitific Vision. Roussefot believed that St.
Thomas's inbellectualism and the metaphysics of knowledge
a.nd participation which 1S1Usrtains it can aooounrt for the crea-
ture's love of God as its highest good.

Having read BJondel and Bergson, Rousiselot agreed that the
vaiLue pl,aced on conceptual knowledge by rationalists and even
by some of his fellow scholastics should be rei1a.tivized. He
thought that Thomism had to a.bsorb many of the contribu-

tions that .idealism h3Jd ma1de to philosophy if it weil'e to be-
come an effective contempor:a.ry theology.   He   that
modern philosophers had confused St. Thomas'•s intelJectual-
ism with raitionailism hut that !if St. Thomas's thought were re-
covered and developed in the 1ight of the otriginail texts and
contemporary   philosophy, it could make benefiJcia1lcontact with
modern thought; it could deaJ fmitfiuilly wiith the pmhlems of
faith, its fr.eedom and dogmatic formulation, its history and its
l'ela:tion to life and religious experience---.indeed. the very prob-
lems which hrud p11ovokedthe Modernisrt crisis. Using Thomas's
metaphysics   of God and the •angels, Rousselot proposed tha,t to
know another is to 1ive the life of another liiving being.   For
Rousseilot, Thomas's inte1MectuaJ1ism could be summed up in
the formula: the intelligernce is essentialily the •sense of the reaJ,
but it is the 1sense of the veal only because it is the sense of the
divine. The mol'e unified the immanent act of knowfodge, ac-
cording to St. Thomas, the gveater in range and depth is its
transcendence.   God's creative knowledge, identical with His
lovie, is the measure of ;alil finite intelligibility.   In
Rousselot's position,   McCool writes:

Thomas therefore was fundamentally   opposed to the rationalist
position that intellection is a univocal perfection and that 'ideas
are equal in every mind.' His metaphysics of participation and
existence, and the analogy of knowledge which it demands, made
it clear to him that concentration   on intelligence in its lowest and
least developed form, discursive reason, must limit our under-
standing of its nature and distort our conception of its proper
formation.   Accurate and comprehensive   understanding   of intelli-
gence as an analogous perfection can come only from a reflection
on its higher and more developed forms.   For that reason a care-
ful study of St. Thomas' angelology is required for the proper un-
derstanding   of his intellectualism.   (p. 50)

The norrm of perfection of St. Thomas's metaphys[cs of the
intielleot is concentiiation of ideas mther than muHiplidty of
,ideas. St. Thomas claimed that rubso1utie unity wrus posstiNe in
a finite intuition in the Beaitific Vision. Rousselot points out

that lthe intehlect, the faiaulty of the real, is: "evecything in its
wiay" because it is " God in its way." In his metaphysics of
the immanence and transcendence of knowledge and of the liv-
ing God of revelation rus the goal of man's: spirituail dynamism,
St. Thomas is closer to Blondel than ,some of his critics believe.
Thomas's intell.eotualism, though it guararutees that the human
inte11eotis the faculty of the reail, relativize:s the vaJlidity of its
oonJceptual knowiled:ge, ,a,ccording to Roiusselot. Ill!tuitive *in-
tellectus* is higher than disoorsive *ratio.* The latter is: close to
those ,SO'Ul'lCes in man which he shares with the brutes, the
former he shares with angels. *Ratio* is a dri.vie toward *intel-
lec:tus.* As an intieihlectiualistThomas held discursive knowledge
in fow esteem ,and ·viewed COillCeptsas no more ithan approxima-
tions of the reail existing form, :subdecito constant revision and
de), velopment. St.. Thomas's intei!Jecturulism is a Christian
wisdom, with none of the pr01ud independeDJce rthat marks
man's rationalist phiJosophy. The meaning of human aiction
is revealed to the philosopher who a.ssen:tsfree[y in faith to the
supernatural goal of its spiritual dynamiSlfil. McCool is correct
in noting tha:t Thomas's inteUecturulism does bear some re-
!Semblaooeto B1ondel's:philosophy of .action.

In its objectiV'e affirmation of exisrbell!ce, the mind goes be-
y:oll!dthe form represented in its abstrad concept to the act of
existence couched in the judgment; this makes the mind's
judgment of existeme the dynamic subs1titution for the intui-
tion thait it seeks. Rousseilot not·es that connatura:l knowledge
is not confined to the moraJ sphere; God's conna:tural knowl-
edge is identica:l with His infinite *esse,* 'a:rud so the highest fo.rm
of *intellectus* is infinite life and action, identical with love.
Man, a form ,received in ma:tter, ha:s no intuition of his essence;
he is not immediately awa1le of his connatura:lity with other
beings nor of his sympa.thy toward them. The imperfection of
man's self-awareness ruooounts for his deficient way of know-
ing other beings. For Roussefot the *species* is an "en-
lightening sympruthization of the mind."

According to Rousselot, if a spiritual creature lorves his own good truJy, he must love God more than he loves himself. If conrtempfation is the goal of the soul's   through action in Thomas' s metaphysics, then knowledge and fove of itself and God are the goal of the spiritual love tha;t defines an intelligent nature. Rousselot suggested that to concteive being is to dream of God. Rousselot' s assigning *intellectus* a higher role than *ratio* opened contemporary schofasticism to the con-tributions that contemporary Bergsonian philosophy could make fo it. Believing that the process of £aith was not a ,cursive process of *ratio* brut rather a movement of the *intel-lectus,* the higher power of insight, Rousselot ,claimed that the intel1oot's highest certitude is a free -certitude. This theok>gy of the act of faith seems closer to the actuality of lived human experienoe than rationalist approa.ches.

:Bor Rousseilot.neither .the concept nor the impressed 'Species couM oocount for the objectivity of knowledge. Rather, the mind'!s connatum[love for God, its attitude of connatural sym-pathy for :the Fi:Iist Truth, is required for the mind to make objootive judgments. For Rousselot the inte1leot was the fac-u\Lty of the real because it was the £aou1ty of the divine.

For Marechal it was the dynamism of the mind rather than the representative content of the concepts which grounds the concepts in reality. In every jrudgment the mind aidways sig-nifies more than :ist can represent in its ioolllOepts. God is known 1through the mteHigibility of objects affirmed in judgments, but   significant intelligibility can oniy he represented in analo-gous form through inadequate con-0epts. For MarOOhalthe key Jt.o the analogy of being was metaphysica[affirmation, and saw that no objoot could be .affirmed if the Infinite Being, the term of the mind's dynamism, is denied.

The wrudition epitomiZled by Rousselot and Marechal was carried on by their Jesuit cohleagues. The relativization of ron-cep'buailknowledge, suspicion of an Aristotelian science of his-tory, ,emphasis on the ract of insight ,and upon Marechal's anail-

ysis of the judgment ito ground the truths of theology and metaphysics-alil these made Transcendental Thomism a truly new approach toward history and p1urrulism in both theology and philosophy.

While this was happening, Jacques Maritain under the in-spimtion of Thomas's commentators Cajeta.n and John of St. 'llhomas was working out his hril.Jiant synthesis and applying St. 'llhomas's principles to science, al't, morals, oulture, and politics. But because Maritain's Thomism was based on an Aristotelian philosophy and theology, and Rousselot had re-jected the possibility of an Aristotelian s1cience mediating the Chmoh's historiical revelation, 'lliiansicendental Thomism and Marifain's Thomism wel"e incompatible.

In McCool's judgment Mairitain's writings represent neo-Thomism's most successful a.ttempt to achieve the goal of *Aeterni Patris* and to integrate contempomry culture through the wisdom of 'I\homas. Grounding his metaphysics on an eiidetiic intilltion of being, Maritain thought that the trans-cendell!ta.I method was arbitrary and doomed to error. In his philosophy of person Maribain's opposition to Cartesianism is very pronounced. This philosophy of person was fed by his own inner expecience and sympathetic knowledge of contem-porary .art, literature, and euLture; in turn it became the foun-dation on which his aesthetics and political philosophy rest. (McCool thinks that Maritain's most lasting contribution is in his phiilosophizing about a,rt.) Marit ain's *Integral Humanism* is clear evidence that traditional Thomism could respond to contemporary   culture.

McCool's chief criticism of Maritain concerns the tension be-tween   experience 1and the   framework he. took ovell.· from Caj:eitan. For Maritain the valid1ty of meta-physics and the possibility of a metaphysicai interpretation of ihuman knowledge rests uJtimateJy on the concept. For an his openness :to ou1ture and his deep sensitivity ,to cultural diver-sity and historiic1a1ldeviefopment, Maritain opted for a very dif-ferent approach from Roussefort and Marechal.

Gi1son came to see that medieva.l philosophy was contained in medieval theology. It was the kuitful contact between Greek metaphysics and Christian revelation in the theology of the medieva1 Doctors which reaUy pmduced the uniqueness, originality, and powm" of   philosophy. For Gilson, Christian philosophy is !a speciail way of doing philosophy. Mc-CooJ.underlines the significance of this:

This means,. of course, that Gilson's interpcretation of St. Thomas' Christian philosophy was in open opposition to the Thomistic philosophy which had come into being in the seventeenth-century Catholic schools and whose influence could still be felt in con-temporary Thomism. The seventeenth-century Thomists had ex-tracted their 'theses ' from *both* St. Thomas' theological works and his commentaries on Aristotle, Gilson maintained, because they had, for all practical purposes, equated the philosophy of St. Thomas with the philosophy of Aristotle. Then they compounded their error when they arranged these Aristotelian-Thomistic ' theses' in the ascending philosophical order which St. Thomas himself had never used. By doing that, Gilson complained, they had treated the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas as though it were simply one more ' separated ' philosophy on the model of the modern rationalist systems. Such an unwarranted transposition of St. Thomas' philosophy to the order of a ' pure' philosophy-which was content simply to avoid contradicting the theology it systematically ignored-did violence to the essential nature of the Angelic Doctor's thought. (pp. 169-170)

Gilson sihowed rthat there was no rcommon 1sys1tem of Scho-lastic thought in the MiddJe Ages; there was rather a radical phHosophical pluralism. Augustine, Duns Scotus, Bonaventure, and Thomas had different philosophies. Though Augustine lea;rneid more from rthe " I am Who am " of Exodus than he did from Plotinus, the gl'ewt Churrch Father was sWl sufficiently in-fluenced by Plotinus not to think of being in tieorms of existence. Thooe were seveml deficiencies in Augustine's Plotinian phi-losophy whieh were not present in Thomas's metaphysics: it diid not preserve the essential unity of rthe human composite, it did not gmn:t the human body proper dignity, !it deprived

finite a.gents of the independence they deserve as true second-
ary causes, and its theory of illumination   seems an invitation
:to skepticism.   Thomas took the same divine statement from
Exodus hut went fmther than Augustine.   Echoing   Gilson,
McCool   writes that having   read the passage from Exodus,
Thomas

learned   the ' sublime   truth ' it contains.   The name of God who
made the world is **I** am Who am'.   Aquinas, however, did not con-
clude that to be meant to be an essence.   On the contrary, Thomas
concluded that if God's name is ' I am Who am,' God must be the
pure act of existence.   That the highest form of being is pure act
he already knew from Aristotle, for the pure act of self-thinking
thought, the prime mover, is Aristotle's supreme divinity.   But that
the pure act of being must be a pure unlimited act of *existence*
was his own discovery.   After Thomas had made it under the in-
spiration of Exodus, to be no longer meant to be an essence or a
form.   To be meant to exist.   (p. 182)

   B-eoause of his insight into the act of existence, Thoma.s's
metaphysics   was radically different from Augusitine's meta-
physics and even more raidicaUy di:ffeTent from Aris:totle's, with
its emphasis on substance.   Gilson stressed that Aristotle's self-
thinking thought could not be concehned as an wet which, in-
stead of making a thing to be wha.t it is, rnafues a thing to exist.
As McCool insists, Thomism is neither Platonic essen,tialism
nor Aristotelian substantia1ism and cannot he reduced to any
other metaphysics.   When the human knower affirms " it is "
of any being given in sense experience, he grasps an intelligibil-
ity thait is not the same as the intenigibility   of :form or essence.
Gilson' s stu1dy reveaJed thrut cailling iattention to the inte1lligi-
biility of existence is Thomas's unique contribution to the his-
tory of philosophy.
   G:Hson's research   revealed :bhat Thomistic   commentators,
such as Cajetan, did not really understand. Thomrus's aet of
existence.   Furthermol'e, neither the Thomas of Roussefot nor
of Marechal nor of Maritain was the aJuthentic Thomas, ac-
co:vding to Gi,lson.   Rousselot and Marechal were making the

Cartesian mistake of going from thought to being, and Mari-
tain, relying on Cajetan and John of SL Thomas, did not pre-
sent Thomas's metaphy,sics authentiic1alJy, even in his master
work, *The Degrees of Knowing.*   McCool demonstrates   what
Gilson had done, even if unwittingly, to *Aeterni Patris:*

In reality, therefore, Gilson could not accept the validity of the
program for Neo-Scholasticism's development set forth in *Aeterni
Patris.* He always referred to the encyclical in tones of agreement
and high praise. Yet, according to his own criteria, none of the
forms of Thomism which the encyclical inspired, whether they
took their inspiration from Suarez or the great Dominican com-
mentators, can be called authentic Thomism. Gilson was able to
agree with *Aeterni Patris* because he understood the encyclical to
be saying what in fact it never says: that to be a Thomist is to
adhere with absolute fidelity to the way of philosophizing St.
Thomas employed in his theological works. (p. 196)

In the world of theology in the 1940s a p1urailism was
developing, and works by two French theofogians also con-
tributed ito the undermining of neo-Thomism. Henri Bouillard
and Henri De Lubac made clear that St. Thomas had no doc-
trine of man existing in a state of pure nature.   Bouillard
showed that manuails gav;e the impression that theology was
changeless, eolllcerned with timeless problems, whereas the troth
is that theology lives iin history; tiheologica1l meaning changes
with the passage of time. In explaining Bouilla11d and De
Luhaic's contribution   to the dismantling of neo-'I1homism's
mosaic, McCool summarizes a number of important points
they made. The   affirmations of faith can never be
separ1ruted from the cont:ingent and time-condit:ioned notions
needed to e:k"Press them, hut this does not mean that truth is
:relative. The   affirmations of the   faith are
ruhsolute in spite of the relativity of the notions in which they
are exp11essed. The two F11ench theologians made it clear that
the scholastic theology of gmcie 1aind natme whiJCh *Aeterni
Patris* defends is not the theology of either the Fathers or the
medieval Doctol's. In effect ti.hey underout some of the strong-

est arguments that the Neo-Scholastics ha<l mustered in support of their case for the revival of Thomism. McCool writes

If the history of theology which *Aeterni Patris* presents corresponds to the facts, St. Thomas 'gathered together' the wisdom of the Fathers, gave it clear scientific form, and transmitted it to modern scholastics through their Thomistic and Suarezian predecessors. Yet, if as Bouillard shows,. the medieval Doctors overlooked very important elements in the Patristic tradition, how could St. Thomas have ' gathered together ' the wisdom of the Fathers without notable loss? If later scholastics abandoned some of St. Thomas' own theological positions and altered others, as both Bouillard and De Lubac show, what happens to the Neo-Scholastics' claim that their Aristotelian science of theology can guarantee the full and faithful transmission of their medieval heritage? If contingent notions constantly change their meaning, often imperceptibly, when they are used in diverse contexts, how can it be possible that an Aristotelian science that prescinds from history can provide an adequate method for theology? If theologians can forget their past, and medieval theologians had actually done so, how can one claim that a medieval system, even the system of St. Thomas, can function as the unique and all-inclusive system of Catholic theology? (pp. 207-208)

Bouillarid believed not only that concepts and systems can evolve but that they cannot fa.ill to evolv;e. If they did not pb.ilosophy and theology cou1d not preserve the change-foss truth of their affirmations as human thought passes through the various contexts of its historical evoiution. Plural,. ism in theology is demanded. by the historical nature of human thought. Bouilla11d went far beyond Gilson. While Gilson recognized ·that thought did in fact evolve in the middiLe ages, he could not hoM that it must evo1ve and still insist on the unique and normative position of Thomas' s Christian philosophy. On Bou:illard's principles no theology, including thrut of St. Thomas, cou1d be the normative, all-embracing, uniquely true philosophy that *Aeterni Patris* had wished to promote. Some Thomists tried to counterruttack, and they did hold back the tide of pluralism for ia while, hut with the Second Vwtican Council and the :inftuentiailphilosophicail and theOJlogicalopen-

ness of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan, rucceptance of pliurrulismis now predominant in Catholic rthought.

Those of us who love St. Thomas and believe that his contribution to the hisrtocy of philosophy and theology is unique are greatly indebted to McCool for his magnificent accomplishment. His study and scholarship have paid off handsomely. The one minor oriticism I offer is in a way of a backhanded icompliment. I for one would haV!e we1comed a detailed discrussion of the presence of St. Thomas',s insights in the thought of Rahner and Lonergan, simifar to the exposition McCool gave for the thought of Rousselot, Marechal, Maritain, and Gilson. The clarity and thoroughness which maa<ked McCool's treaJtment of these four would hav;e been most welcome in adding to the literature on Rahner and Lonergan, the two most inflllllentirulCatholic thinkers of rthe Latter haJlf of the twentieth century.

Where does McCool's historiJCalreseareh Jeave us? Does: the fabeil. " Thomist " have a Jegitima.te meaning? Concerning the first question, I am convinced McCooil's erudite and painstaking presentation of the neo-Thomism fostered by *Dei Filius* and *Aeterni Patris* brilliantly il1ustrates how the hisrtorian can provide the historical context of two non-infaJJih1e Church documents and 1also rev"eal the hisrtoricity of all thought systems. This sirde of heaven, human thought is conditioned by time. This does not mean it is alwiays erroneous, hut it does mean that human beings never know as God knows. With faith we see through a glass darkily, and even our best philosophy and theology 1are aJwayis a chiaroscuro, light 1and darkness.

ConJCerningthe second question, I find myself agreeing with Gilson's insisiteI11Cethat Thomas's: philosophical insights are in h:is theology and furthermore that neo-Thomism's retlianoe on the Doctor's commeJJ!tators rather than St. Thomas 1eventually led to its demise. Gilson I ibhink wrus correct in his insistence that a Cartesian starting point within the mind is doomed to failure, as it is logicruhlyand inevitably directed to-

lWMd solipsism. But the starlling point of Maroohal, Raihner, and Lonergan is not a Cartesian olosed consciousness but mther consciousness open to being. It is the Thanscendental Thomists' emphasis on the .act of existing, on analogy, and on the mind's dynamillc orientation towiard God that I find most attractivie ;and most faithful to Thomrus. Parado:ricalJ.y it is their very openness to other thought cu:rirents that made Rahner and Lonergan most faithiuJ. to tihe thought of St. Thomas .and to his willingness to aooept truth wherever it is p:r:esent. That faithfulness deserves the appelwtion " Thomist."

BOOK REVIEWS

God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?
By KATHRYN TANNER. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell,
1988. Pp. viii + 196. $39.95 (hardbound).

In describing the role of the human will in salvation, Thomas Aquinas remarks that justification indeed requires an act of human free choice, namely one which takes place when God "infuses the gift of justifying grace in such a way that he simultaneously moves the free will *(liberum arbitrium)* to accept the gift of grace" *(Summa theologiae* I-II, 113, 3, c). When they encounter this sort of remark in Aquinas-and parallel remarks can he found across the whole ecumenical tradition of Christian theology-contemporary theologians may well be puzzled by two .. One is Aquinas's evident conviction that an utterly robust view of God's power and sovereignty (such that whatever God wills to happen, happens) is fully compatible with the ascription of genuine and ineradicable freedom to human beings. But perhaps even more striking is the fact that Aquinas apparently takes this compatibility, so problematic for much of modern theology, to be *obvious:* it occasions no visible perplexity, appeal to mystery, or lengthy explanation, but is simply invoked in passing to help deal with the theological issue under discussion.

In this powerfully argued and provocative book, Kathryn Tanner undertakes to clear up both of these perplexities. She develops an original and richly textured account of how Christian thinkers could and can maintain uncompromising accounts of both divine sovereignty and creaturely independence and freedom without falling into incoherence, and she also explains how what was once obvious now so easily seems bafHing.

Tanner begins by arguing that the coherence of Christian claims about God and creatures can best be displayed by an explicitly second-order analysis which aims to lay bare the rules governing well-formed Christian discourse, rather than by constructing a first-order ontological and metaphysical account of the relationship between God and the world. The book explicitly concentrates, " not on what theologians are talking about, but on .the way they are saying it " (p. 11). Tanner undertakes this " semantic ascent," which. she articulates with considerable nuance, partly in order to proceed in a way congruent with powerful recent developments in philosophy (European as well as Anglo-

American) and theology, but more basically because she thinks the
issue itself demands this kind of treatment. However available in their
own right, accounts of the relations between God and creatures cast in
first-order metaphysical language are, theologians of quite different
conviction have often maintained, veiled in a certain inevitable ob-
scurity which limits their explanatory value; one cannot " reconcile
God's agency with the creature's active powers through any material
explanation of the actual mechanism found in some ' causal joint ' be-
tween the two" (p. 26; Thomas's way of putting this point, as Tanner
is aware, is to say that we have no *modus significandi* for descriptions
in divinis [see p. 12]). By contrast, the rules for coherent Christian
discourse about God and creatures, if we can find any, can be stated with
comparative clarity and precision: they will be straightforward direc-
tives to speak in certain ways and not in others. Moreover, the prob-
lems in speaking coherently about divine power and the contingent in-
dependence of creatures are not confined to a particular scheme of first-
order theological concepts and judgments but recur across a wide range
of differing schemes; correlatively, if we can isolate second-order rules
for Christian discourse about God and creatures those rules " may
structure very different theological schemes, schemes distinguished by
their first-order claims by vocabulary, philosophical frames of refer-
ence etc." (p. 29). Tanner's project, then, is a certain kind of trans-
cendental argument: she wants to show *"how it is possible* for Chris-
tians to affirm certain statements while holding on to others that seem
to conflict with them" (p. 20). If rules which govern apparently con-
flicting statements about God and creatures in Christian discourse can
in fact be isolated, and it can be shown how they are followed by Chris-
tian theologians, then, Tanner argues, the project will have succeeded;
the coherence of Christian discourse about God and creatures will have
been displayed.

   Tanner isolates basic rules for Christian speech about God and crea-
tures by analyzing the difference between Christian convictions about
God's transcendence and creative activity and those which dominated
the Hellenistic religious and philosophical environment in which Chris-
tianity arose. In a Hellenistic context, God is either closely associated
with the world by nature or defined by maximal opposition and contrast
to it; "Hellenistic views of divinity in relation to the world seem to
oscillate" between these two poles (p. 39). In this environment, the
Christian claim that God is *both* utterly transcendent to the world and
directly involved in the world as the creative ground upon whom every-
thing depends for its existence will simply appear incoherent; it does
not follow the established rules. But, Tanner argues, while the early
Christians freely used Hellenistic language to talk about God and crea-

tures, they were clearly following different rules. Christian discourse exhibits a rule for speech about God as transcendent which Tanner formulates as follows: "Avoid both a simple univocal attribution of predicates to God and world and a simple contrast of divine and non-divine predicates" (p. 47). This is precisely "a rule for talk of God's transcendence beyond both identity and opposition Wlth the non-divine " (p. 47). With it Tanner correlates a second basic rule, mutually implicative (see p. 82£.) with the first: "Avoid in talk about God's creative agency all suggestions of limitation in scope or manner. The second rule prescribes talk of God's creative agency as immediate and universally extensive" (p. 47).

The articulation of these rules for Christian discourse is the logical heart of Tanner's argument, but the meaning and import of the rules can be displayed only by showing how they function to structure diverse theological positions which seek to deal coherently with a wide array of issues. Tanner is extraordinarily deft at this. She shows how very different conceptualities can be shaped in conformity with these rules to generate coherent discourse about God's nature, transcendence, and creative action: Platonic language about forms, an Aristotelian metaphysics of causes (examples in these two cases ranging from Irenaeus to Thomas Aquinas) , Kantian and idealist language of transcendental structures of consciousness (different versions of which are employed by Schleiermacher and Rahner) , and personalist language of intentional agency (one sort used by Thomas Aquinas and a different one by Karl Barth, with his stress on God as self-determining agent). Against the background of these rules, otherwise puzzling Christian claims, such as (to cite one of Tanner's examples) those which conjoin the ascription of necessary efficacy to God's will with the ascription of contingency to the world, can be articulated in a coherent way—but no one conceptuality is uniquely suited to doing this (see pp. 73-76).

Tanner goes on to develop and extend considerably her account of rules for Christian discourse in a chapter devoted specifically to the relationship between a transcendent and creating God and " creatures with their own powers and efficacy "-especially creatures endowed with will and choice. Here the coherence of divine power and human freedom is displayed principally by extending the rule of transcendence to exclude any limitation on the types of effects God's power can produce, and by extending the rule of universal and immediate divine creative agency to require both a) that "everything non-divine must be talked about as existing in a relation of total and immediate dependence upon God" (p. 84), and b) "a direct rather than inverse proportion between what the creature has, on the one hand, and the extent and influence of God's agency, on the other" (p. 85).

Here again Tanner employs a broad range of examples. Specifically from Aquinas's point of view, a passage from the *De malo* (16, 7, ad 15) nicely   what she is arguing, although she attends to other texts in her own analysis of Thomas. Responding as he frequently does to the worry that, the infallibility of God's providence (always producing exactly   intends) burdens all future events with necessity, Thomas observes that " the divine will is the cause of being in its entirety (*universaliter)* and in their entirety of all things which happen in a necessary manner and also in a contingent manner. But the divine will itself is beyond the order of the necessary and the contingent, just as it is beyond the whole of created being." These are (in reverne order) essentially statements of Tanner's two primary rules, in what she calls " a material mode." Thomas goes on to infer from the mate· rially stated rules much the same point about the coherence of infallible divine volition and genuine human freedom that Tanner wants to articulate: " Therefore, necessary and contingency in things are distinguished not by relation to the divine will, which is the common cause of both, hut by relation to created causes, which the divine will o:rders in a way suited to the effects, so that for necessary effects there are unchangeable (*intransmutabiles)* causes, and for contingent effects changeable *(transmutabiles)* causes." Since God is beyond the contrast of the necessary and the contingent and the limitations that contrast imposes on agents subject to it, saying that an event is due to God's agency (that it is willed or caused to happen by him) by itself leaves open the question of whether the event is necessary or contingent: God can produce effects of both kinds equally well. And he does so precisely in virtue of a universal and immediate agency which as such is capable of producing not just a created effect but tli.e manner in which the e:ffect takes place, that is, the causes and causal relations by which a given ev:ent is rightly described as necessary or contingent. God is in this way the total cause of our free acts-save for any element of evil in them. (Following Aquinas and Barth, Tanner deliberately declines to structure her account of the normal relationship of divine and human agency around .the assumption that evil must be IIJ.11de intelligible, and so brackets the problem of evil for the purposes of this book [see p. 174, note 12] .. One hopes and expects that she will have more to say about the problem.)

Tanner's rich and complex discussion includes a detailed account of the way in which the rules she articulates are a ",resource for theological diversity " (p. 105). Theologies which have a relatively high estimate of human freedom (like Thomas's) and those which talk of human freedom mainly with marked suspicion (e.g., Luther's and Calvin's) need not .be regarded in the usual fashion as oppos,ites but can rather he seen   " functional complements," following the same :rules for dis·

course about divine power and human freedom in response to quite different theological and extra-theological pressures. She offers as well an account of how theologies structured by a nest of distinctively modern assumptions about human autonomy and about the nature of inquiry slid into incoherence in their discourse about God and crea· tures; an analysis of Biel on justification and of the *de auxiliis* disputes supports this account. By being bent (often unintentionally) to conform to this new and ill-suited set of rules, " in modern times the ruled struc- ture of theological discourse is deformed so as to promote persistent wrangling over traditional Christian affirmations of divine sovereignty and the creature's power and freedom" (p. 141); claims about God and the world once obvious to Christian theologians now seem desper- ately mysterious to them or are revised (not always overtly) to fit the new rules. The antidote to this deformation is a contextually and rhe· torically sensitive recognition, akin to that of Christians in the ancient world and repeatedly exemplified in the history of Christian theology, "that theological discourse is a fracturing discourse, that theological rules for discourse are critical principles for reworking those in force elsewhere " (p. 167).

Tanner's argument has the potential to be intensely controversial: if she is right, then much modern and contemporary theology and philos- ophy of religion concerned with these issues is not only mistaken in specifics but fundamentally misguided; a host of problems it has gen- erated call not for solution, but for dissolution (see p. 6). One line of resistance to Tanner's argument might go as follows.

1) Tanner's rules :themselves, it might be argued, are incoherent or are bound to generate inconsistencies when one attempts to follow them. According to the second rule, for example, even human free acts must be spoken of as immediately and entirely dependent on God's agency, and this rule licenses talk of God as the " sufficient cause" of our free acts (p. 93). But a free act, one might reasonably suppose, is precisely one for which there are no conditions antecedent to the act itself which are sufficient to bring the act about; in that sense free acts may he regarded as uncaused. So Tanner's rule not only permits but even encourages talk about God as the sufficient cause of that which has no sufficient cause. Tanner has an obvious reply to this charge of incoherence: it assumes that "cause" must mean the same thing when God is called " sufficient cause " and human acts are called " uncaused " or, more broadly, that divine agency must be assimilated to one or an- other type of created agency (so that God is either a necessitating cause, in which case human acts are not free, or human acts are free, in which case God is only a contingent cause with respect to them). But, as Tanner's first rule specifies, in Christian discourse God's agency is neither to be identified with any kind of creaturely agency no:r con·

strued as its opposite; God's causality transcends the contrast between necessity and contingency. Since there is no univocity in the uses of "cause," there is no contradiction in saying that God (in a transcendent manner unique to him) causes free acts (i.e., those which have no necessitating causes).

2) In reply, the objection might he relocated. Tanner seems to rescue the coherence of her rules at the cost of vacuity; she is able to speak consistently of God's agency only by employing a concept of it which God alone can have. We can conceive, it might be claimed, necessary agents and contingent ones (that is, those whose effects, if they occur, are respectively necessary and contingent) but not an agent which is neither necessary or contingent. This, so the objection might go, argues against adopting Tanner's rules and the obscure notions of divine agency they support. As her first chapter indicates in some detail, Tanner is willing (and indeed thinks it necessary) to concede a certain amount on this score. A God who genuinely transcends all the limitations and oppositions of created reality will he one we can speak of only by " fracturing " our rules and expectations for discourse about created things; speaking of such a God's agency will require us to bend our ordinary discourse about created agents, causes, and so forth, so that it can be applied to a genuinely transcendent agent. Such speech is not vacuous, since we understand the discourse we are bending and we understand where, how, and why we are bending it, but it will not yield a conception of God's agency as clear, satisfying, and adequate to its object as those we have of (e.g.) necessary and contingent causes. It seems as if this debate might be reduced to a stalement between those who insist that we have to get our concepts straight and those who insist that we cannot speak of God as though he were subject to creaturely limitations. But at least for those who want to develop an account of God's agency which is rooted in the scripturally normed discourse of the Christian community, this stalemate can he avoided by repairing to the basic patterns of discourse the account attempts to honor. Granted that such an account should always strive for as much clarity as the distinctive subject matter allows, the decisive question (as much exege·tical, historical, and empirical as conceptual) is whether the discourse constitutive of the Christian community is in fact structured by the rules Tanner articulates. H it is, then commitment to rthat discourse requires in all our attempts to conceive of God and God's agency a willingness to live with a readily located but quite ineluctable obscurity, built into the very structure of the discourse itself.

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Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: A Contemporary Theodicy. By
     WENDY FARLEY. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox
     Press, 1990. 150 pp.

Wendy Farley sets herself an ambitious task in her book. She is dis-
satisfied with past theodicies, which account for evil and suffering as
punishment for sin, as counterpoints in a larger aesthetic cosmic har-
mony, as means of purification and formation of character, or some-
thing that will be as compensated for by other-worldly vindication and
reward. These four theories may explain some forms of evil and suf-
fering, but in the face of " radical suffering " they are " unable to exor-
cise the demons that whisper that life is futile, suffering is meaningless,
and the cosmos an empty and evil void " (p. 22) .

By " radical suffering " Farley means that kind of suffering which
debases and destroys the human dignity of the sufferer: " Radical suf-
fering pinches the spirit of the sufferer, numbing it and diminishing its
range. The distinctiveness of radical suffering does not lie in its in-
tensity or its injustice but its power over the sufferer" (p. 54). Radical
suffering drives the person to self-loathing and despair and therefore
destroys her or his capacity to resist it. Despite its massive destructive
power radical suffering is not rare; it occurs in familial, cultural, poli·
tical, and economic relations under the forms of, e.g., child abuse,
sexism, racism, violation of human rights, poverty, and starvation. To
account for radical suffering, Farley proposes that (a) one place suf-
fering rather than sin at the center of the problem of evil; (b) one re-
place the notion of a primordial fall with that of tragedy; (c) one
repudiate the idea of divine omnipotence in favor of that of divine com-
passion (pp. 12-13). The second and third proposals are captured in
the title of the book, " Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion."

Farley's first proposal leads one to expect that she would do away
with the notion of sin altogether, hut this is not the case. Strangely, she
devotes a good deal of attention to sin, describing it as " catastrophic
because it introduces chaos and disharmony into history " (p. 43) . She
sees sin as (self)-deception, callousness, bondage, and guilt (pp. 44-
51). Whereas traditional theology perceives a causal link between sin
and suffering, the logic of Farley's alternative proposal entails her lo-
cating the origin of suffering elsewhere, namely, the tragic character of
human existence: ". . . tragic vision locates the possihilirty of suffering
in the conditions of existence and in the fragility of human freedom "
(p. 29).

A tragic vision of life does not, Farley claims, rationalize (radical)

suffering, nor is it atheistic. It recognizes, honestly and bluntly, that " the conditions of finite existence include conflict and fragility " (p. 31) . Multiplicity ·and' variety enrich creation hut they inevitably lead to division and .separation; relationships warm the heart hut they must include some and exclude others; values sometimes conflict, such as mercy and justice; embodiment allows us to enjoy the pleasures of life but it leads to decay and death. Even human freedom, Farley points out, is infected with fragility caused by anxiety and desire: "Freedom is the tragic flaw of human existence, at once the stamp of its greatness and its destruction " ·(p. 37).

What should one do in face of inevitable suffering? One must have compassion. Farley takes compassion to mean an *enduring* disposition horn of *sympathetic* knowledge of another person's suffering leading to *love* (which is a liberation from egocentrism that enables one to care for others) and working for *justice* (especially removing social in· justice). In contrast to dominating power, compassion empowers the sufferers to speak and act in their own defenses. It rejects the tempta· tion of passivity before evil and the use of violence to overthrow it. Rather, it empowers sufferers to *resist* evil.

For Farley, God's power must he understood as compassion or love. As a noncoercive form of power, divine love (a) *creates* a tragic world in which radical suffering is inevitable and (b) because of suffering *redeems* it. Hence, divine compassion is both creative and redemptive. But why does God go through this seemingly redundant exercise? Why doesn't God create a perfect world instead of a tragic one? With a caveat that divinity is incomprehensible (what she calls its " unground· edness "), Farley suggests that divine love is "erotic," that is relational. It "needs" to express itself in a tragic situation in which suffering is inevitable. And since God needs to create, " God must share respon· sibility for suffering. Creative power culminates in a world in which conflict and evil are not merely possible but inevitable " (p. 107) .

How does God " redeem " this tragic world God has created? By compassion and mercy, Farley tells us, that is, by resisting the causes of suffering and by resisting the power of suffering to dominate suf• ferers (p. 116). And God carries out this resistance by means of all-too-ambiguous instruments, such as Scripture and Church. Can God finally and radically vanquish evil? Here is Farley's answer: "If it is possible to speak of the efficacy of divine compassion at all, it is im-possible to do so in ways that would deny the existence of *absolute evil:* evil for which there is no atonement or vindication. Nothing in the past, present, or future will atone for the wanton, cruel destruction of human beings in death camps and torture chambers or through the structural evils of poverty, sexism, and racism" (p. 126, emphasis added).

I find Farley's theory of tragic existence and divine compassion dis-
tressing and depressing. To sufferers, it says: *"C'est la vie!"* Put
more learnedly, "created perfection is fragile, tragically structured.
. • . And yet, without creation, divine eros remains merely potential,
inarticulate. The fragility of creation and the nonabsolute power of
God culminate in the tragedy and rupture of history" (p. 124). Thank
God, I can now have God ,to blame. Of course, God is trying to repair
the damage, but even God's efforts are ultimately vain since "absolute
evil " will ever play havoc with history and since God himself is re-
sponsible for suffering. Furthermore, since the author does not offer
any extensive discussion of the suffering and death of God .on the cross
(she dismisses the idea: "The compassionate God is ... to he dis-
tinguished from the benevolent but impotent deity who ' suffers with '
the world" [p. 112]), nor of the resurrection of Jesus as divine vindi-
cation of innocent suffering, nor of hope for a life beyond,· her tragic
vision sheds no real light on the problem of suffering nor can it pro-
.vide impetus for the struggle against evil or hope for victims-especial-
ly when demons whisper that life is futile, suffering meaningless, and
the cosmos void.

The book is repetitive (suffering: pp. 23-24, 30-31, 51-59, 115-119;
tragic vision: pp. 31-37, 78-79, 98-99, 106-110, 124-125; compassion:
pp. 37-39, 79-81, 92-94, 110-114, 114-119, 126-128). It is oracular
("theologians have been uncomfortable about directly attributing love
to God " [p. 96], self-contradictory (it speaks of God's " aseity " and
divine " relationship " in the same breath [p. 105]) , and misleading in
its use of sources (e.g. its appeal to Thomas for its peculiar under-
standing of analogical language about God [pp. 101-103]). Mercifully,
the hook is brief.

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Time, Freedom, and the Common Good. By CHARLES M. SHEROVER.
     New York: State University of New York Press, 1989. Pp. xiii+
     314. $59.50 (cloth) ; $19.95 (paper).

Guided by the insights of traditional political philosophy and con-
temporary phenomenology and animated by 'the spirit of Tocqueville,
Sherover's book is an attempt " to secure the foundations of a public
philosophy adequate for our time" (p. xii). Like Tqcqueville, Sherover
is preoccupied with the " universal appeal of freedom," with its com-

plications, its paradoxes, and especially its possibilities. Sherover faults liberalism for its simplistic conception of freedom and its " superficial view of the nature of human existence" (p. 8). In an attempt to find a more adequate account of human experience, Sherover appeals to three existential categories: sociality, temporality, and freedom. The project of the book, which moves from the establishment and articulation of these categories to :their practical application, is ambitious. Yet the argument is lucid and persuasive.

Following Aristotle, Sherover argues for the primacy of the social in human life. He effectively argues not only that moral norms and linguistic practices are socially rooted phenomena, but also that " social membership is prior ... to any notion of differentiating individuality " (p. 20). Social atomism is but a theoretical abstraction, and individualism is as incoherent as a private language. Sherover points out that the defense ·of the social nature of human existence has at least one negative result: it undermines political theories that are rooted in a radically individualistic conception of human nature. Yet the emphasis on sociality does play a positive role in Sherover's essay: it serves as an initial justification of the relevance of the idea of the common good to political discourse. The existential category of sociality surfaces, for instance, in Sherover's cogent account of rights, wherein he argues that particular rights should not be seen as innate and absolute. The claim that rights are innate renders unintelligible the prevalent notion of "newly dis· covered" rights (p. 79). Instead, particular rights are socially recog· nized, justifiable claims which cannot he isolated from the social and political context in which they are recognized and exercised. Particular r.ights come into being over time and in intimate connection with con· crete, historical realities.

The initial result of Sherover's consideration of the second existen· tial category, temporality, is also negative. Since human existence is a" being in history," finitude characterizes all human endeavors. Given the inherent limits to human knowledge and human power, " falli- bilism " can be eradicated neither in theory nor in practice. Thus, Sherover couples the case for limited government with an argument for the limits of political philosophy. But, once again, the negative result has a positive correlate. Sherover's repudiation of the notion that gov· ernments can and ought to determine policies for public life in a com- prehensive and peremptory fashion leads him to affirm the importance of " procedure " and " pragmatics " in public life. " Procedures " regulate the sequence of political events and allow policies to be deter· mined and revised over time; " pragmatics " focus on the specific and various effects that policies will have in actual situations. The perva· sively temporal character of human life highlights the need for both (pp. 258-60).

   Sherover's discussion of freedom, the third existential category, con-
tains his most direot and sustained confrontation   with liberalism.
Classical liberal thought, in Locke and Mill for instance, saw govern-
ment as principally negative and rtlrns had little to say about the de-
gradation of the industrial revolution.   The defect in liberalism brings to
the fore its failure to distinguish between negative liberty and positive
freedom.   The former is indeed a necessary precondition for republican
government, but the stipulation of the existence of rights is without
effect if the citizens lack the wherewithal to exercise their rights.
Sherover does not, however, reject the free market economy; in fact,
he sees a commercial society as a necessary basis for republican gov-
ernment.   His book includes a persuasive defense of the tempered free-
market economy which avoids both the stagnation of socialism and the
excesses of laissez-faire capitalism.   Classical liberalism, moreover, has
had little to say about " the proper procedures for decisions " or " the
dynamics of political power " or the resolution of conflicts (p. 112) .
For a more adequate understanding of the dynamics of freedom.
Sherover turns to Machiavelli's *Discourses,* Montesquieu's *Spirit of the
Laws,* and *The Federalist.*

   This list of texts offers hut a small suggestion of the breadth of
Sherover's scholarship.   Yet, if there is a difficulty with his argument,
it lies in his synthetic use of quite varied sources. He deploys, for in·
stance, both Kantian and Aristotelian accounts of practical rationality,
and both Aristotelian and Machiavellian views of constitutional polity.
Sherover does indeed claim that the Kantian and Machiavellian theories
are developments or extensions of positions seminally present in Aris-
totle. And the assimiliation of such varied sources is at least partially
justified by the project of the hook, which is an attempt to rethink
our political principles, since a convergence of various traditions lies
at the root of the American experiment.   Still, the relation between the
various accounts could he more adequately secured. In spite of this
weakness, the integration of political philosophy and political practice
is one of the more successful features of the essay. The hook contains
an implicit argument for the inseparability of theory and practice in
western politics.

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El Primer Principia del Obrar Moral y las Normas Especificas en el Pensamiento de G. Grisez y !. Finnis. By AURELIO A.NSALDO. Roma: Pontificia Universita Lateranense, 1990. Pp. xiii+ 255.

This unusually excellent and important doctoral dissertation was written in Rome at the Istituto Giovanni Paolo II per Studi su Matrimonio e Famiglia, a component of the Lateran University. The author currently teaches at the Ateneo Romano della Santa Croce in Rome.

The volume is of special importance for three reasons: (1) it provides a comprehensive, detailed, and accurate account of the moral theory developed by Germain Grisez and John Finnis over the past quarter century (Joseph Boyle has also made important contributions to this theory, and Ansaldo has noted these); (2) it defends Grisez and Finnis against many of the criticisms which have been unjustly leveled against their thought; and (3) it raises some critically import· ant issues by way of constructive criticism. In what follows I will briefly comment on the first and second features of Ansaldo's work and discuss more fully the third important component of his scholarly study.

In the first part of his work (pp. 3-100), Ansaldo offers readers a splendid synthesis of the thought of Grisez and Finnis. He has carefully studied *everything* written by these authors from 1964 to 1988. He has included important material from Finnis that had escaped even my attention, and I have tried to study everything these authors have written. He has also succeeded in presenting their thought comprehensively and faithfully. He understands what they think, appreciates it, and presents it accurately. In short, he does justice to their thought. In this respect his study is quite superior to another doctoral dissertation, Russell Hittinger's *A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory.* Hittinger's work has been severely criticized, and rightly so, not only by Grisez but by others (e.g., Robert George and William Marshner) ; it seriously misrepresents the work of Grisez and Finnis. A criticism of this sort cannot be levelled against Ansaldo's work; it provides an accurate and very scholarly account of their thought.

In the second part of his study (pp. 103-229) Ansaldo offers a critical assessment of the work of Grisez and Finnis. Here he first shows that many of the criticisms leveled against their thought are unjust and unfounded, particularly those offered by such writers as Veatch, Rittinger, Flicken, Bourke, et al. These writers charge that Grisez and Finnis fail to show how moral principles are rooted in metaphysics and anthropology, that they completely separate ethics from metaphysics, natural law from human nature, etc. Ansaldo, by a patient and thorough

examination of their thought *and the thought of St. Thomas,* defends Grisez and Finnis from these misguided criticisms. He shows, first of all, ,that Grisez and Finnis are correct (and fully in accord with St. Thomas) in holding that our *krwwledge* of the primary principles of natural law is not derived from our knowledge of metaphysics or of human nature. By referring to appropriate texts of Grisez and Finnis, Ansaldo shows conclusively that these authors explicitly recognize the intimate *rela-tionship* between ethics and metaphysics, between natural law and human nature. They fully and explicitly recognize that, were our na-ture other than it is, namely, the nature of human beings, the goods pedective of us would be other than what they actually are. When these goods are grasped by practical reason, they serve as starting points or principles of purposeful human action. Nonetheless, our *practical krwwledge* of these goods, is not *epistemologically* derived from or de-pendent upon prior knowledge, speculative in character, of human nature.

In short, in contrast to their critics and in conformity with St. Thomas, Grisez and Finnis are correct in holding that our *practical understanding* of the primary principles of natural law is not dependent upon our prior understanding of metaphysics or human nature. At the same time they explicitly acknowledge and defend the truth that *onto-logically* ethics is grounded in metaphysics and anthropology. "Our authors," Ansaldo writes, " have always sought not only to respect but even more to defend and explain the fact that the basis, the founda-tion, of an cethics is the reality of things (their nature, what they are) and, in short, the reality that man is" (p. 106). What they propose is an epistemology or methodology proper to ethics, " not an ethics ' independent of ' or ' foreign to ' metaphysics or reality; much less do they prescind from or deny it. In other words, [they propose] an thait is ontologically grounded in nature, but not deduced from it . • . an ethics that has its own proper principles, original and not derived, known immediately and naturally by all, without need for recurring to prior metaphysical explanations, but an ethics that affirms and demands the need for metaphysical reflection for a complete and full knowledge of human nature " (p. 108). In my opinion, Ansaldo successfully de-fends Frisez and Finnis from the misguided and unfounded criticism that some have leveled against them.

But in this part of his study Ansaldo also raises important problems with their work. He believes that Grisez and Finnis have either in-adequately treated or left out of consideration entirely some matters which, if integrated more systematically into their thought, would en-hance its value. He does not challenge the basic structure of their thought, which he believes contributes greatly to deepening and clarify-

ing the understanding of natural law rooted in the thought of St.
Thomas. His intent is to offer constructive criticism. His critique
centers around the following points: (1) the metaphysical-anthropologi-
cal foundations of ethics (they are affirmed but they need to be set forth
and defended more systematically and explicitly); (2) the relationship
between human goods as " ends " of human existence and personal
union with God as *"the* end" of human existence; (3) the formulation
of the first principle of morality; and (4) the articulation of the
"modes of responsibility," i.e., of the intermediary principles between
the first principle of morality and specific moral norms.

(1) Although Grisez and Finnis explicitly affirm and defend the
truth that ethics is rooted in reality, Ansaldo thinks that their defense
lacks the philosophical rigor that is needed **if** our moral life is to be
properly understood. They need to acknowledge more fully the fact
that speculative inquiry and practical deliberation, while distinct, are
nonetheless compenetrating or interpenetrating; as a result, the truths
of practical reason, although not *derived* from truths of the specula·
tive order, are inwardly illumined and deepened by truths about reality
itself that are known to us and, in their own way, inscribed in our
hearts. **In** particular, he thinks that Grisez and Finnis need to affirm
explicitly and show that the dignity of human persons (and the in·
violability of the goods perfective of them) is grounded ultimately in
the truth that human persons are the only material, created beings
whom God has willed for themselves and to whom he has given the
vocation to know and love himself (p. 119). Grisez and Finnis are right
in affirming that the goods perfective of human persons are goods in
themselves (goods *propter* se). But they need to show that these goods,
along with the persons whom they fulfill, are *created* goods (not *per se*
goods) and utterly dependent for their being on God himself, the un-
created and supreme good, the good both *propter se* and *per se.*

(2) With Grisez and Finnis, Ansaldo repudiates an overly narrow,
intellectualist understanding of human fulfillment or beatitude. The
ultimate blessedness of human beings is rooted in a personal union
with God that surpasses all understanding (and is made known to us
only through divine revelation). But this not only does not exclude,
it fully includes participation in all the goods perfective of human per·
sons, both as individuals and as social beings, made for life in com·
munion with others (pp. 131-134). Good human actions and participa·
tion in the goods of human existence are not, as Grisez and Finnis
(and St. Thomas) insist, merely extrinsic means toward human fulfill·
ment but rather integral components thereof. Nonetheless, Grisez and
Finnis need to recognize explicitly that union with God through knowl·
edge and love is *the* end for which human persons have been made.
Such union i!!! not **a** dominating end in relation to which all others are

subordinated, in extrinsic fashion, as mere means; it is rather an "in-clusive " end, embracing within itself full participation in the " ends " or " goods " of human existence. Grisez and Finnis accord a priority to the good of religion in organizing the moral life of human persons, even though, *qua* a basic human good, it is not objectively " greater " than others. But Ansaldo notes that personal union with God far sur-passes the realization and full participation in the good of religion, and he urges Grisez and Finnis to treat this issue more explicitly. He does not charge them with the error of identifying personal union with God with participation in the good of religion. His point is rather that Grisez and Finnis need to consider more fully the relationship between created human goods as " ends " of human existence and the uncreated Good, who is God, *the* end of human existence.

(3) An excellent chapter (pp. 143-195) is devoted to the thought 0£ St. Thomas. By a patient examination of relevant texts from all of the Common Doctor's writings, Ansaldo shows that the proper way to formulate the first principle of morality is in terms of the twofold com-mand of love of God and love of neighbor. Grisez and Finnis, like Ansaldo, maintain that this is indeed the way St. Thomas formulated the first principle of morality. But they argue that this mode of formulat-ing the first principle is too intimately bound to a specific religious tra-dition and that this first principle can be translated into philosophical language by expressing it in terms of openness to integral human ful-fillment. Ansaldo argues that the way Grisez and Finnis formulate the first principle does not, in truth, " express *in its fullness* the richness of the content of human morality in all its dimensions." In fact, he thinks that Grisez and Finnis admit as much, for, in the work on nuclear deterrence which they co-authored with Joseph Boyle, they said: "The first principle of morality as we formulate it captures much, *if not all,* the moral content of those love commands " (cited, with emphasis added, on p. 206). Ansaldo contends that their formulation of the first principle of morality, while quite helpful insofar as it ex-plicitly refers to the basic human goods at stake in human choice and action, is ultimately insufficient, for it fails to take into account the re·lationship, of crucial significance for human morality, between partici-pation in created human goods and personal union with God (pp. 206-208).

(4) Finally, Ansaldo thinks that Grisez and Finnis have contributed to an understanding of natural law by showing how principles such as the Golden Rule (as explicitly recognized by St. Thomas) mediate the movement of practical reason from the first principle of morality to the formulation of specific moral norms. Nonetheless, he thinks that the complex way in which they have formulated their modes of responsi-

hility should he worked out in a way that more clearly relates these modes to the traditional moral virtues (pp. 214-221).

In my opinion, the issues raised by Ansaldo are quite important. I think that to some ex.tent at least, Grisez and Finnis have already sought to take more explicitly into consideration the first and second issues raised by Ansaldo. I would point to the very important (hut difficult and complex) article they co-authored with Joseph Boyle, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," in the *American Journal of Jurisprudence* (32 [1987]: 99-151). This article is listed in Ansaldo's bibliography, hut it actually appeared only in 1988 and evident· ly appeared too late for Ansaldo to give it the kind of extensive consideration it merits. In this article Grisez and Finnis do address to some extent the first and second points of Ansaldo's critique. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the questions he poses are by no means fully answered in this article and that further attention needs to he given to them.

With respect to the third issue Ansaldo raises, namely, the formulation of the first principle of morality, Grisez and Finnis might well defend themselves successfully. After all, even St. Thomas, as Ansaldo himself notes, frequently expressed the basic moral principle in terms of love of neighbor without explicitly referring to love of God. The love of neighbor and love of God are intrinsically interrelated and inclusive. An openness to integral human fulfillment, which requires a love for all .the goods of human persons and of the persons in whom these goods are meant to flourish, virtually includes a love for God, the source of these goods and of human persons. But it may he that here too Ansaldo's critique needs to he considered more deeply.

The final issue Ansaldo raises, namely, the formulation of the " modes of· responsibility " and the relationship between these modes and moral virtues, also merits careful attention, in my opinion.

In summary, this doctoral study is most helpful and makes a real contribution to contemporary efforts to deepen our understanding of natural law and the meaning of human moral life. The author both understands and appreciates what Grisez and Finnis (and Boyle) are doing, and he sees their work as a development of (and not a contradic· tion to) the thought of St. Thomas. He offers a splendid synthesis of their thought, successfully defends them from criticisms that are wide of the mark, and raises important matters than require careful attention.

Ansaldo notes that in preparing his study he was aided particularly by Ramon Garcia de Haro, a professor at the Istituto Giovanni Paolo II in Rome. I want to note here that Garcia de Haro, whose work is unfortunately not yet available in English, is an exceptionally good moral theologian, one steeped in the thought of St. Thomas and, indeed, the entire Catholic tradition. His student has profited from his guidance

and contributed an important and helpful study. This dissertation is a model of its kind. One hopes the author will continue his scholarly efforts.

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John Henry Newman: A Biography. By IAN KER. New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1990. Pp. xii + 764. $24.95 (paper).
The Achievement of John Henry Newman. By IAN KER. Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. Pp. x + 209.
$24.95 (cloth).

Ian Ker has inherited the mantle of the late Charles Stephen Dessain as the finest textual expositor of the Newman corpus, and Ker's biog-raphy should become a standard reference tool in the field. Ker ap-prenticed under Dessain in the production of the monumental (31-volume) *Letters and Diaries,* and his biography shows his command of the materials of that as yet unfinished project. Ker's hook joins the biographies of W. Ward (1912) and M. Trevor (1962) as significant "lives of Newman" to consider, and it addresses their earlier short-comings: Ward's inadequate appraisal of the Anglican Newman and Trevor's unconcern for Newman's theological writings. Of Newman's intellectual contribution, Ker's treatment is similar to Dessain's *John Henry Newman,* an exposition of the major themes and intellectual moves, and theologically-minded inquirers need read both.

Ker offers the hook as a personal life, a literary appraisal, and an intellectual study. The personal life and literary analysis are ably car-ried off; Ker's background in English literature and his editorial work on the letters have served him well. The intellectual study takes the form of synopses of Newman's hooks and articles, which are woven into the chronological narrative of the life. This aspect of Ker's hook is by no means "the theological achievement of JHN" (cf. Tracy's work on Lonergan); such a project still awaits Newman studies and someone of the conceptual breadth of the late Jan Walgrave to achieve it. Ker provides accurate and readable summaries of Newman's writings, and if a biography is meant to introduce the sundry aspects of a person, especially a complex thinker like Newman, then Ker's treatment of the intellectual aspect offers a fine introduction.

I shall consider these three dimensions of the biography, and first the personal life. Newman considered that a person's life is best told

through that person's correspondence. Ker's biography is approached
chronologically, and Newman's published letters guide the tale. New-
man's advice is particularly apropos for his own biographer, since New-
man's hooks and articles often displayed a "reserve" in which his true
feelings were couched and nuanced. His letters, especially to confidants,
were candid and often hard-hitting, as when he described the Curia in
these words: " And who *is* Propaganda? one sharp man of business,
who works day and night, and dispatches his work quick off, to the
East and West, a high dignitary, [perhaps an Archbishop], hut after all
little more than a clerk . . . with two or .three clerks under him " (p.
519). (Ker displays some reserve himself, omitting Newman's epis-
copal aside.)

Ker's use of the letters is most revealing during Newman's Roman
Catholic period when he encountered opposition from Archbishop Man-
ning and W. G. Ward in England, from Archbishop Cullen in Dublin,
and from Cardinal Barnaho in Rome. One senses how the laity rallied
round him. Some of Newman's most pungent thoughts on ·theological
freedom, on the suspicious nature of the clergy toward educated laity,
on the wherewithal to make an institution a genuine university, on the
role of patience and .trust in God when authorities are hearing down,
are to he found in Ker's choice of letters. With so much material to
mine-Newman wrote 20,000 letters-it is understandable that Ker
does not include, save rarely, what Newman's opponents were thinking.

Ker's account of Newman's Anglican period is equally illuminating,
and indeed it is a highlight of the biography. While the *Apologia* has
provided the main lines of the story, Ker puts flesh and hones to New-
man's struggle with his conscience. In coming to Oxford, Newman con-
tended with his early evangelical convictions, and when he divests him-
self of them for what becomes his settled and life-long immersion in
doctrine and sacrament, he must then struggle with the prevailing ethos
of the Church of England, which becomes less and less a home for him.
Newman fights to hold on, to cling to where God has providently put
him, and his fingers slip off one hy one. Ker's account of the period
from 1838 to 1845, using Newman's letters and his published articles,
is moving and does genuine credit to the ferocious struggle in consci-
ence Newman waged within himself. It is also a credit to Ker's tenacity
to have wrested from the Birmingham Oratory Newman's unpublished
letters from this period, for the lacuna in the projected thirty-one vol-
umes of published letters is precisely here. If anyone thinks that New-
man simply read the Fathers and thereby read himself into the Roman
Catholic Church, he or she must read this chapter of the biography.
One must relive the three "great blows" Newman felt: the melting
away of the Via Media, the Bishops' charge against Tract 90, and the
Jerusalem bishopric affair (p. 231-36).

As successful as Ker is with the personal life aspect, there are some absences of a psychological nature. Newman's relations with his immediate family were, on the whole, problematic. His relationship to brothers Frank and Charles was awful, and he became forever estranged from his sister Harriett in 1843. With sister Jemima he maintained contact, but one wonders how close they were. On the other hand he grieved his whole life long over his youngest sister Mary, who died in 1828. Given Newman's sensitive nature, what is one to make 0£ these alienations, and what do they tell us of Newman? The personal dealings within the Littlemore community are another unknown. With like-minded colleagues, Newman set up a monastic-like community outside Oxford in April, 1842, and these next three years were crucial, in a psychological sense, to his odyssey. Apart from W. J. Copeland, Ker never makes clear who is there with him from the first and, more importantly, how they influence one another. Lockhart, Dalgairns, and St. John are mentioned later in passing but without analysis. Perhaps in these two cases the Newman family and the Littlemore family, the information is simply not available to a biographer. But we are the less for it, when it comes to trying to fathom the *person* Newman.

The biography's second aspect, the literary appraisal, is well done, and one senses Ker to he on home ground. He identifies the disestablishment debate of 1833 as "the beginning of Newman's career as a controversialist" (p. 66). There Newman's powers of irony and sarcasm are nurtured, leading to " the satirical masterpiece of his Anglican period," *Tamworth Reading Room* in 1841, in which the "aphoristic, the colloquial, and the ironic come together in a dazzling display 0£ imagery" (p. 211). Satire is once again employed in *Loss and Gain,* his 1847 novel, this time at the service of the Newmanian real/unreal distinction and the importance of moral integrity. "A man's moral life ... lives in the tip of his fingers, and the spring of his insteps " (p. 335). The analogies with Victorian England are identified in Newman's second novel, *Callista* (p. 420).

Ker's best analyses are saved for the *Present Position of Catholics,* a work Newman considered his best written effort and in which Ker detects the humor becoming " more and more fantastically grotesque, in the Dickensian vein " (p. 367), and for the *Apologia* itself. Ker directs attention to its fifth Chapter, " perhaps the most brilliantly subtle of all Newman's writings" (p. 550). Many have analyzed the *Apologia's* literary merits, but Ker introduces a provocative reading in terms of a thesis/antithesis/synthesis structure. The paradoxical conjunction of opposites, sustained by conflict with each other, is important to Newman's theological method, as my own hook, *JHN on the Church,* argues.

The intellectual aspect of this biography is, as mentioned before, a

series of excursuses, to use the scholastic term, woven into Ker's year-hy-year story. These synopses of Newman's hooks and significant articles are readable and clear, save for that on *Grammar of Assent*-- which is surely difficult for anyone to summarize. I would like to point out some key points in which Ker adds to our understanding of Newman's doctrine and to mention a few items to complement Ker's.

The inadequacy of human language to express dogmas, at the heart of the 1845 hook on doctrinal development, is first broached in Newman's 1832 *Arians,* where it is argued in relation to the early Church's principle of 'economy,' permitting Newman to maintain both the necessarily imperfect medium of human vocabulary as well as the need for words (dogmas) when the inquiring intellect oversteps its hounds (p. 49:ff). Ker develops nicely the spirituality of the *Parochical and Plain Sermons,* reminiscent of L. Bouyer's and Dessain's studies, emphasizing the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, who works through ordinary channels-conscience, feelings, reason-and " does not come immediately l:o change us" (p. 91); consistency in doing ordinary duties well is the clue to Newman's realist spirituality. The *Lectures on Justification* continue the theme of moral duty hut now couched as a Via Media insight. Faith ruled by love steers a middle course between Luther's *sola fides* and Roman Catholicism's justification through obedience. Though he later changes his appraisal of Catholic spirituality, in 1838 he is identifying what Catholics recognize as "rote Catholicism." Ker's excursus on the Sermons is a really fine synopsis of them.

Ker rightly situates within the calculus of antecedent probability the famous seven tests of doctrinal development in Newman's 1845 *Essay*- Newman called them notes in his 1878 revision. Without this context they are misunderstood in too ruhrical a fashion (pp. 302-15). Ker underplays, however, Newman's treatment of infallibility, since it is crucial to the hypothesis of the essay. Newman's letter to Catherine Ward (LD 12:332) captures the argument. The historical fact that the Roman Church continues the Primitive Church is so clear that one should join it, save for certain objections, viz., portions of the teachings of the present Roman Church are not taught in the Primitive. One does not prove these teachings to he primitive hut rather damages the cogency of the objection against them. The theory of development is this invalidating process. Infallibility affirms a development; otherwise God would have given a revelation without a means to preserve the community in the original truth.

Ker makes a genuine contribution to understanding the *Idea of a University* by noting the differing perspectives and points of view from which Newman writes. Recollect that the discourses presently constituting the hook's chapters were either delivered or written on separate oc-

casions. At times liberal education is eulogized and at other times critiqued. So, too, the book's famous "gentleman," because Newman's evaluations of this noble product of education constantly shift accord· ing to the particular aim he is then seeking. The book cannot be read as an argument which marches straight forward. Newman's *Grammar of Assent,* on the other hand, can and ought to be so read. There is really no way to capsulate the argument and a tough argument it is for the justification of religious belief. Clearer than Ker's attempt (638-50) I believe is Newman's own effort in a letter of 1879 to William Froude (LD 29:112·20). Froude died before Newman posted the letter but the letter is an excellent way to enter into the core of Newman's argument.

Newman's 1877 Preface to a third edition of his 1837 *Prophetical Office* contains his sacramental vision of the Church. As the 1845 Essay answered objections to non-primitive doctrines and the 1866 *Letter to Pusey* treated objections to Mariology, this lengthy Preface inquired whether actual Catholic practice violated its official orthodoxy. Ker rightly notes that Newman corrects his 1837 mistake in attributing cor-ruptions to Catholic theology, noting instead that evils have a "popular or a political origin " in Church life (p. 703) . But he also could have noted that Newman prefers to situate evil within the context of theism, for if evil in the world does not tell against theism, why should eccle-siastical abuses tell against the divinity of the Church; see *LD* 19:212, 27 :260, 28 :215.

My critical annotations are rather minor, to the great merit of Ker's biography, and my esteem for his effort must not be lost. I am less tender toward Oxford UP, for I must take it to he the publisher's space-saving prescriptions that required the footnoting and index to be the way they are. The reader would have been immensely helped to know the dates of the letters and to whom Newman was writing them. It is sometimes hard to determine in what month and year the action was happening. The index is alphabetized by personal names, and under "Newman, John Henry" are subject topics followed by Works. These are not alphabetized hut rather listed by their first appearance in the pagination. Searching a topic is unnecessarily difficult.

Ker's *Achievement of JHN* is a series of five essays on Newman as educator, philosopher, preacher, theologian, and writer. Through a judicious selection of quotations and extended texts, Ker allows the reader to feel the force and gracefulness of Newman's prose. None-theless, Ker brings a viewpoint to hear upon the texts in terms of what is selected and in correcting misreadings.

The latter is clearest in the " educator " chapter. He rightly corrects the reading given to *Idea of a University* by M. Svaglic and A. **D.**

Culler by arguing that Newman's " philosophy " within a university education is not a metascience capturing the more specialized disciplines hut rather the process and mental discipline by which the mind is culti· vated and enlightened. Such disciplining of mind can he effected by any of the intellectual disciplines, though Newman preferred the Classics as the staple; it is how a subject is taught, rather than its content, which is key.

The other chapters are, in large measure, summaries of Newman's writings hearing upon the particular topic (e.g., much of "Newman as philosopher" studies *Grammar of Assent* and its central themes). Through these many texts one constantly meets Newman's preoccupa· tion with the distinction between real and unreal religion as well as Newman's method of not wishing to dissolve conflicting forces, such as the conflict between infallibility and private judgment. The sacrament· alism of Newman's theological view, however, might have been :more forcibly drawn out. As did Ker's biography, this book displays an ad· mirable familiarity with the whole corpus of Newman's writings.

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