TOWARD A THOMISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON ABORTION AND THE LAW IN CONTE:MPORARY AMERICA

M. CATHLEEN KAVENY

Yale University
New Haven, Oonnecticut

Introduction

WHEN THE SUPREME COURT handed down its abortion decision *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services*[1] in the summer of 1989, it was widely pre-

[1] 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). All further citations to *Webster* will be given parenthetically in the text. To summarize the most significant aspects. of the decision:

A. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored an *opinion of the Oourt* (of the highest precedential value) which was joined by Justices White, Kennedy, Scalia, and O'Connor. The majority found the lower courts to be in error in striking down as unconstitutional the preamble to a Missouri statute which asserted that "the life -0f each human being begins at conception." The opinion of the Court also found that Missouri could constitutionally prohibit the use of public employees and facilities in the performance of abortions not necessary to save the mother's life.

B. The Court also upheld the Missouri statute's provision requiring a doctor to perform viability tests before aborting a fetus the doctor believes is of 20 or more weeks gestational age. In the *plurality opinion* (of less precedential value than an opinion -0f the Court, since it is not joined by a majority of the justices), Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Kennedy argued that since most fetuses are not viable at twenty weeks, the provision would impose substantial restrictions unrelated to the health of the mother upon what are, in fact, simply sec-0nd trimester abortions. Because they believed such restrictions to be in tension with *Roe's* trimester system, the plurality decided to abandon that system, along with its stipulation that the state's interest in unborn life became compelling only at viability. The plurality contended, however, that *Webster* presented no occasion for reconsidering *Roe's* holding, which deemed unconstitutional a statute prohibiting all abortions except those necessary to save the life of the mother.

In a *concurring opinion,* Justice Scalia went further, arguing that the Court should explicitly overrule *Roe v. Wade.* On the other hand, Justice O'Connor,

dieted that this would exaicerbate a dangerously bitter social ·struggle. In its 1973 decision *Roe v. Wade* (410 U.S. 113), the court had e1abo:raJted.a woman's right to abortion, and, in rthe sixteen years that fo11owed it, it ga,V'e that right unwavering support. *Webster* 'seemed to mark a retl.'eat from that support. The new scope it offered for state regulation of rubortion promised rto ignite gra,ss-roots forvor and a stiate..:by-state battle between those seeking rto maintain the abortion rights est1ab-1isihed by *Roe* and its *sequalia* and those st:dving to limit the s1oope of these rights in significant ways.

Much of the criticism of *Webster* has foosed narrowly upon how weM the ,decision has aiocoridedwith various views on the morality of abortion. Yet important 1as this issue is, thorough ethicaJ ana:lysis of *Webster* must address severa1l additional tors. The ethiicatl aidequacy of positive law, induding judicial interpretations of faw siuch as *Webster*, must he ev1alruatedin terms of whetheir it aidvanices or impedes the common good. The common good requires not only that we consider the moml substance of legal requirements but tha:t we ailso attend to the *manner* in which law is made, promulgated, ml!d interpreted. Such an analysis is ,sorely needed; it should. specify the severa1lfactors involved in determining whether any given legal

also *concurring* in the plurality's judgment, maintained that this provision of the statute could be upheld without any reconsideration of *Roe*, since it co·hered with that decision's recognition of the compelling state interest in viable fetal life.

C. Justice Blackmun authored an opinion *dissenting* from the majority on the issues discussed above, and he was joined by Justices Brennan and Mar·shall. The thrust of his opposition is directed against the plurality's treatment of the viability testing ,provisions. Blackmun first suggested that i.f understood according to the canons of proper statutory interpretation, these provisions unconstitutionally restrict the attending physician's discretion in determining fetal viability. Alternatively, he argued that, under the construal of the provisions which the plurality did in fact adopt, they were clearly consistent with *Roe*. Consequently, he accused the plurality of overreaching itself in its eagerness to undercut that decision. Also writing a predominantly *dissenting* opinion was Justice Stevens. Focusing upon the Missouri statute's declaration that human life began at conception, he contended that it violated the Establishment Clause since it could be supported only on a :religious and not a secular basis.

response to abortion will contribute to or detract from the commonweal in late twentieth-0entJury America. I suggest that at least some of the critical leverage necessary for this task can ·be found in the philosophy of liaw developed by Thomas Aquinas in I-II of his *Summa Theologica,* questions 90-97.

Taking Thomas's analysis of rthe nature, purpose, and limits of secmJar law as my criteria of assessment, I will argue in the first section of this essay that the plruraJlityopinion in *Webster* is a bad piece of jurisprudence. To anyone who acknowledges rthe intimate nexus Aquinas describes between wise faw and a srtable common good, it should come as no surprise that *Webster* has only intensified the polarization in our society il."egardingahortion. Recognizing that *Webster* returned some of the responsibility for forging wise and practicaible abortion laws to the state legislatures, the focus of the essay's second section shifts from constitutional interpretation to statutocy draftsmanship. I suggest that the pro-lifre·conviction of the immorality of abortion too often translates into a caJ11 for stringent criminaJl penalties, hurt that this caH ignores the proper differences between moral and legal sanctions. Consequently, the pro-life movement needs to ·supplement its analysis of the *aot* of abortion with analysis of the *law* of abortion. What is necessary, in other words, is a pro-life jurisprudence. Taking Aquinas's co111ceptof the .law as a teacher orf virtue as my ing theme, I attempt to sketch the concerns a pro-life jurisprudence must face in our culture.

I. A Thomistic Critique of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services

In question *95* of his *Treatise on Law,* Thomas Aquinas approvingly cites Isidore of Seville's enumeration of the features which positive law ought to exhibit. According to Isidore, " Law shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, ·according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the

common good."[2] One might properly view Isidore's list as a thumbnail sketch of the considerations Thomas himsellfheld to he important in ev.aluiatingpositive laiw. Taken together, it is clear that they are pragmatic in focus, multi-faceted in concern, and mutiua1lyillll.J:cinatingFor no law can 3.ICI0000 with a oountcy's customs unless it aiLso takes cognizance of the specific pla1ce and time in which it is enacted. Similarly, without making alilowancesfor the inevitruble limitations of human nature, no law can be neioessary or use:liul. The general tenor of Thomas' s philosophy of law requires us .to reject straightaway three common ways of mounting .a critique against *Webster,* because they are insufficiently prootical or e:roessively narnow in their conrerns. With .this .a;ooomplished‡he path wi11 he clear for ·a mo11e nuanced and rcons:tructive analysis of the opinion'·sflaws.

A. Three Unhelpful Criticisms

Isidore's criteria emphasize that good law must be fonnulated with sensitivity to the particular ·character and needs of the community whose life it wirll regiulate. We should not judge *Webster* without iconsidering its context in the history of American constitutionail Given this contem, even the most committed pro…choiice advocates must admit that not evien a liberal Court couLd (at this time) justify giving Constitutional protection to a woman's ruutonomous decision to 1ahort through rto the stages of heT pregnancy.[3] However imporrtant the rights to privacy and bodily self-deter-

[2] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica,* 3 vols., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benzinger Bros., 1948), I-II. 95.3.1. All further dtations from the *Summa* will be given parenthetically in the text.

[3] Beverly Harrison, for example, considers *Roe* already a compromise, albeit not a totally unjustified one, in that it balances fetal life in late gestation against the claims of women to full autonomy o:ver their own bodies. See her *Our Right to Choose* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 225-26, and chap. 8. For a more recent argument, see Barbara Katz Rothman, *Recreating Motherhoo<l,* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), esp. her chapter "Recreating Motherlli:iod: Toward Feminist Social Policy."

mination have been in Anglo-American jurisprudence, the Court has stopped short of ho1ding them absolute.[4] For it to do so now in the oonterl of the abortion ·oontroversy would mark a decisiv1ebreak with its past decisions, particularly since it is hotly disputed whether a.bortion is exJC11usivelya ma1bberof a woman's self-determination.

Even those convinced that the unborn *should* ideally hold constitutional rights equal to the rest of us ought not to fault the Court for £a:iiling *here and now* fo directly *Roe's* claim :that 1they are not 1egal persons. One might have p1ausibly argued in or hefol'e 1973 that the Constitution required recognition of the unborn as persons; in fact, there was as much evidence for this position as for *Roe's* contrary one.[5] However, at the present time, that argument carries far 1ess practical weight. The *Roe* Court's denial of feta1l personhood has shaped this country's understanding of the Constitution and other laws dependent upon it for over a decade and does have at least some precedential weight. For the Court not only to withdraw its influence in this area but to eX'ert it in a diametrically opposed :£ashion would radically alter settfod expectations of constitutional protections.

A *second* common way of *Webster* proves: to be unhelpful when we l'ecognize that it is the last of Isidore's mquir:ements rthat is paramount. For Aquinas, the fact that " a law, properly speaking, Tegal'ds first and foremost the ol'der to the common good" (I-II.90.3) both encompasses and surpasses the other features on Isidore's rlist. To specify more precisely the requirements of the common good is notoriously diffiioult; we do know, however, that it indudes a mandate to consider the well-being of the whole, of " the body poJitic " over an extended period of time rather than of any partioular

4 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), where the Court held in a 5-4 decision that the right to privacy does not protect the right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.

5 See, e.g., David W. Louisell and John T. Noonan, Jr. "Constitutional Balance," in *The Morality of Abortion,* ed. John T. Noonan, Jr. (Harvard University Press, 1970), 220·260.

subgroup or 'srpecial interest (I-II.96.l) . It follows that a critique of *Webster* from the perspective of Thomas's legal philosophy must be distinguished from the charge that it impedes the narrowly focused political goals of either camp in the abortion debate, he it pro-life or pro-choice. One does not have to believe thrut both sides are ethically comparahle in thei:r goals or methods (or to believe that it is illegitimate to engage in "single issue "political lobbying) in order to recognize that the function of a Supreme Court justice writing an opinion with precedential weight is very different from that of a political partfaan. The task of political partisans, like that of advocates in our adversary system, is to present a particular viewpoint ,BJs rus possible, resolving ,ruJ:l doubts: in its favm and its dear priority in the distribution of social re-.sou11oes. Both rudvoicates and political partisans attempt to communicaite sharply the urgency of their particular relaims and :notnecessarily .to elaborate how they a11e to he halanoed against other legitimate inte1'1ests. To take a non-cont1'1oversial example, both the American Heart Associartion and the American Cancer Society viigorously promote the worthiness of their caiuses without .addressing the question of how a finite amount of money is to be distriburteid between them. By contrast, a ibroruderview is of those whose task it is to assess these competing claims. Government officials administering the budget must distribute limited funds, considering not the fights against cancer and heart disiease but also other worthy medical resieaoochprojects 1as Anafogiously, the obligation of judges, and *a fortiori* of Supreme Court jus1mces,is to weigh the relativ;e merits of the arguments whlch advocates present to them, {Jonsidering not mel'ely the effect of their decisions upon the pal"ties at hand but also possible :ramifications in other areas of the 1aw. For exampJe, advocates of rubortion rights ha-voe welcomed a Supreme Court opinion constitutionailly requiring funding of a;bo:rtions for indigent women. Yet in facing this question, the Court hrud to consider not only the right to abortion as delineated in *Roe* but also the

fact that the legislative branch of government, not the judicial branch, is constitutionally vested with the power of the purse. [6]

The misguided nature of a *third* criticism of *Webster* is entailed by the fact that, while "justice" and "virtue" are prominent on Isidore's list, they are not its oniy components. This would suggest that a critique of the jmispmdence of *Webster* must not be limited to scrutiny of the eth:i1eal princip[,es it directly embodies. Wise law is not identical to fully aidequate moral counsel. Fau1ting *Webster's* plurality opinion from 1a legal petspective is not *synonymous* with charging, on the one hand, that it does not affirm the fuU humanity of the unborn or, on the other, that it does not take jurdioia1lnotice of the often unbea,rab1e burdens an unwanted pregnancy can place upon a woman in this society. This is not to claim that moral concerns are irrelevant to law. Unlike some contemporary Legal positiv;ists,7 Thomas ho1ds that the binding *legal* force of any given law significantly depends upon whether it advances or hinders justice. But his account of the proper relation between faw and morality wil1l receive ful1ler treatment in the second section of this essay.

So far we havie 1seen that in cr.ilticizing *Webster* from the perspective of Thomas's philosophy of law it is not enough to complain that it does not interpret the Constitution for an rideal world, or to object tha;t it does not advance a particular political agenda, or even to charge that it does not enough espouse partioula.r moral values. What, then, might it include?

B. Clarity

Let us first consider Isidore's criterion of olarity: good law is dear law, "lest by its ohs1curity it lead to misunderstanding." .According to Aquinas, the justification for this requirement is pragmatic: if their attempts to follow the law are not to cause

[6] See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), where the Court held in a 5-4 decision that women do not have a right to federally funded abortions.

[7] For a succinct, classic statement of liberal legal philosophy, see H. L. A. Hart, *Laiv, Liberty, and Morality* (Stanford University Press, 1963).

more harm .than good, citizens needs to understand what the lawgiviermeans for them to do in a particufar situation. Otherwise, their vecy respect for faw might impel them to do the wrong thing and, in too many cases, ili11Jtoou M be worse :than doing nothing .at ;rulJ..

Isidore':s mandate for clarity can ,shed light on *Webster* in two interrelated 1.1espects. First, we can .ask precisely how *Webster* fits into the continuing ,conviersation'that is constitution11Jl interpretation. What a;spects, of p11evious opinions of the Court does it exp.and or unde11oot? Correlatively, we can consider what precisely *Webster* itseM will require or permit with 11egard to future srate and £ede1111Jl legislation on abortion.

While Supveme Court justices might fo]forw, modify, or in rare cases overrule previous decisions from their bench, in every instance they have ·an obligation to, situate their justificatory arguments in relation to those found in these prior opinions. It is only by so doing that the justices can lend the detailed context necessary for us to understand their modifications of our *de facto* constitutionaJ. obligations and rights. With respect to *Webster,* the relevant context comprises *Roe v. Wade* and the other Supr:eme Court decisions which have shaped the aibortion ·right iin the sixteen or so years following it.[8]

To ask what *Roe* stands for is to ask an impl"ecise question. Like other ground-breaking decisions, siUCh as those in the civiil rights cases, irt has at two srulient components. First, the *holding* of *Roe* 11efors to the narrow legrul rule to which the decision is strictly committed and from which a later Court cannot depart without overruling that decision. *Roe* held UlllCOnstitutional the strute statute which prohibited abortion in aM cases except those necessary to save the life of the mother.

s The most important of these are: Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), Harris v. McRae, 448 U..S. 297 (1980), Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 426 U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. .American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).

Secondiy, the *legal policy* initiated by *Roe* serves notice upon state and federal legisJ,atures l'egarding what other sorts of re-stri(ltions on abortion the Court is likely to strike down if they aJ."e brought before it. *Roe's* policy is grounded in its declaration that a woman's fundamental right to privacy is broad enough to include her right, together with that of her doctor, to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. As a fundament,al right, it can he restricted only by a "compelling state interest " and by Legislation that is " narrowly tailored " so as to impinge upon the affected right as little as possible. The *Roe* Court conduded that virtually no restrictions would meet these criteria during the *first trimester* and that only the Staite's irrteresit in pl'oteating mateTnal health was a s1uffieient basis for regulation from the beginning of the *second trimester* until viability. Only at the point of fetal *viability* did the state's interest in potential life become compeM:ing,empowering it to I'lestrict or even prohibit late abortions, eX!cept those necessary to preserve the life. or health of the mother.

As 1long as it does not disturb the narrow holding, a later Court can modify or even abandon this *legal policy* without technically ov;er:ml1ing*Roe.* In fact, this is precisely the course fo1lowed by the pilmality opinion in *Webster v. Reproductive Health Servioes.* Aocm.ding to that opinion's author, Chief Justice Rehnquist, *Webster* did not offer the occasion to reconsider *Roe's holding.* two key elements of *Roe's legal policy* wel'e abandoned by the *Webster* plrurailiity. *Roe's"* rigid" t11i-mester system wa1s rejected, ha,ving proved to be" unsound in principle and unworkable in practice" (3056). Further, the state's int1el'estin the " potentia,l Hfe" of the fetus was deeme1d. to he compeMing throughout pregnancy, not merely at the point of .fietalviabiJlity.

In capitwlizing on a somewhat te1chn1cail distinction between *Roe's* holding and the iegal po'1i1cy it inaugurated, the *Webster* plurality did a poor job in communicating how its reading of the Constiitution shouM alter people's expectations of their civil rights. The of the position is eonvoluted,

and its proclamation that it did not o¥erru1e *Roe* is especiaMy misleading. The Court ignored the fact that most people are 11.mschooledin the details of law and their information generally oomes from television news briefs.[9] Most persons equate *Roe* with the policy it inaugurated and not merely with its narrow holding. Moreover, since comparatively few women seek abortions to save their lives, it is not *Roe's* holding but its policy that has shaped their reproductive plans. *Webster* may well have ,confused many persons about the status of .abortion law.

Thus the *Webster* pluraility is guilty of obscurity in communicating its relationship to the landmark *Roe*. While careful study of the opinion can oV'eroome that defect, the piuraility opinion is also flawed by 1a second sort of unclarity, which no amount of scholarly attention can cure. Nowhere in this opinion can one find a dear statement about what is required of states contemplating Illew 1abortionlegislation, and nowhere can one find a perspicuous exposition of the jurisprudentiail bases of any such requirements.

Consider first the theoretical framework the *Webster* plurality constructs for assessing the constitutionaility of future abortion strutiutes. On the one hand, the piurality opinion holds thait .the state's inte11estin £etal life is compelling from conception. On the other, :iit sitrutes thrut the woman's right to choose :abortion is " a liberty interest protected by the Due Pil."ocess Clause." Inexplica;bly, the p!l.rurality considers it fruitless to elaborate the :lieatures differentiating this "liberty interest" from either a fundamental right, as the Court described the abortion choice in *Akron,* or a" limited fundamental constitutional right," ,as Justice Blruckmun caJJ.s: it in his: dissent to *Webster* (3076). Yet S1Uch is necessary for the Court to clarify how rits j111risprudencein ·the general area of £undamental rights might be changing.

oOne might reply that the Court's rulings on matters of securities law or the commerce clause are often unintelligible to the average layperson. Yet I woud contend that such intelligibility is not as crucial in these cases, which are usually the province of lawyers, as in matters such as abortion, which concretely affect the lives of the populace at large.

For example, one right which the Court has consistently held to be fundamental for the ilast two decades is conspicuous by its absence from the plurality opinion. This is the right to privacy. What is its place in the post-*Webstet* landscape? *Roe,* of course, did not discern a right to an abortion *per se* in the Constitution, but it diid find a right to privacy " broad enough to include a woman's decision, together with her physician, whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." As delineated in *Roe* alone, the privacy right is fundamentally ambiguous. On the one hand, it oould have been interpreted quite plausibly as creating a sphere of medical discretion, that is, as protecting the best judgment of a doctor with respect to the welil-being of her pregnant patient even while tmsting the doctor to further in alil appropriate ways the state's strong interest in childbirth. On the other hand, the right to priv,acy could also be viewed as focused almost entirely on the woman herself, as securing her capacity to determine whether or not she wishes to bear a child entil'ely free of all outside influences. The role of the physician as advisor fades into the background in this second constr:ual of privacy, and the emphasis shifts to the woman's privileged position as an autonomous decision-maker. In later Supreme Court decisions, the ambiguity has ,tended to he resolved in terms of the second interpretation of priva;cy. CorrelativeJ.y, the state's intel'est in encouraging ch:i!ldbirth has been downplayed because of judicial efforts to insure that the power of the majority would not compromise foU autonomy for individual women deciding about abortion.

How does *Webster* affect the privaicy right defined by *Roe* and its *sequalia?* Consider first the effects of its assertion that the state's interest in fetail life is compelling throughout pregnancy. In *Roe,* the Court held that once a state's interest in the devdoping fetus became compelling, it could restrict or even prohibit abortions, those necessary to p11eserve the life or health of the mother. Thus in situations where a compeUing interest is: at stake, legisilatures must at the very least be able to ask for some sort of justification from those who

would interfere with that interest. At whatever point the protection of fotal <life becomes compelling, then, a woman's right to privacy can no longer entail the right to complete decisional aiutonomy regal'ding abortion. In a very relevant sense, the decision at this point is no longer private; she must defend it in response to the legally cognizabJe concerns of others. The *Webster* plurality's admowledgement of a compelling state interest in fetal life throughout pregnancy, conjoined with its 1insistencethat the state cou1d validly prefer childbirth to abortion, might very weU suggest that the expansive right to privrucy as developed in the post-Roe years no longer hoMs sway.

On the other hand, it is not fore-ordained that the woman's :privacy interests will e:x;ert no control on the Court's future treatment of abortion. Even while granting the state's compeUing interest ri.n fetal life post-viability, *Roe* and its progeny consis:tently stressed the unequivocal e:imeption to this interest: in no event cou1d it supersede the mother's own interest in her life and health. Nothing in the *Webster* plurality opinion wou1d pl"event the *post-Webster* Court from also aclmowledging this eXJception.Further, it might plaice the decision whether a woman's situation is sufficiently grave to justify an abortion in the hands of that woman and her physiician. Thus for all intents and prnposes, this Court could reinstitute the first, more medicahly oriented notion of privwcy prominent in *Roe* but downplayed in its progeny ..

Yet there is more ambiguity stilt Such a scenacio might naturally issue in a nal"row.right to abortion controil<tedin large part by But it could just as easily result in about the same incidence of abortions: as we have at present. Having located 1the determination of what is ne1ciessary for health in the hands of a woman and her doctor, the Court could continue to construe its constitutive features in the broad terms adopted in *Roe's* companion case *Doe v. Bolton.* The Court aiccepted the W oirlid Health Organization's definition of heaJth as complete " physi:ea.il,emotionail, . , , well""heing" (410

U.S. 179, 192). Despite the state's compeillring interest in na,scent life, :iits mol'e fundamental intel'es1tin 1the welil.-beingof the woman eoiuwd thereby be interpreted to prevent significant restrict1ons on rubor,tion. Under these cir:oomstances, the changie from the *Roe* regime wou1d he a purely rtheol'etical matter; ahorition would be under:stood more as 1a medical procedure than 1a:s a civil right but wou1d be resorted to just as fl'equently.

Thus the *Webster* plurality has given precious litt[e guidance regarding ,this opinion's place in the development of the Court's ongoing jurisprudence of privacy. Moreover, matters are further compliJC:atedby the :llaict that Justice O'Connor's concmring opinion rev<eails very little about her own jurisprudence of abortion. Since she is the swing vote in a Court whose other members al'e equaHy divided between support and opposition to *Roe,* it is even more di:ffioolt to pvedict how the Court will rule on other types of abol'.tion restrictions. In the years following *Roe,* the Court struck down parental and spousal consent p11ovisions, a waiting period, and deta,iled informed consent requirements, as weH as most regulations designed to in1sure that a fetus undergoing a late abortion procedure wouLd have the maximum chance of survivaL How does *Webster* alter the constitutionafity of suich statutes? We have no firm answer to this question. Other than duplicating the Missouri provisions whi1ch the Court upheld in this1 case, state legisfatures can take V'ffiJ' few steps which are certain to be deemed acceptable. The decision in *Webster* serv<es not to guide behavior in fu11themnceof the common good, or even to guide behavior at all, but to invite confusion, disputes, and uneasy inaction.

The *Webster* p1uraJity opinion demonstrates, then, how a law can be so conceptually uncertain that it ceases to p11ovide any real dil'ection to citizens at all. How are we to assess this second, mo11e fundamental form of und.m·ity? I suggest that careful consideration of Aquinas's philosophy of law indicates that when this point is reached far more is <at stake than the deileterious practical ramificrutions, whlch alluded :to.

The function of law, oocording to Aquinas, is to aot as ,a rule and measure of human acts. enta.il:ed by this fm:mtion is his requirement that legal sanctions must be pl'omulgated to those persons whose ads they propose to bind. A law that is not promulgated is not valid law, for it cannot hope to giuide behavior. Unfortunately, Aquinas £ails to specify the elements of effootive promulgation, but one CJ.1u:cial element can be gleaned from his theory of human act;ion. Aquinas ho1ds that the most immediate rule and measure of each per- a1ots is heT 'oapaicity for prructicail reasoning. If the purpose of law is to guide human action, its VJaJid promulgation would seem to entail that the requirements. which it imposes be genemUy ruccessibJeto human reason (I-Il.90) . From this we might conclude that no law has been validly promulgated if its colllceptuail unolarity is so great that it is impossible for an agent to *understand* what behavior might count as conformity and what as disobedience. In such a situation, her practical reason can no more employ the putative faw as an action-guide than if the law were ·left in the legisfative chambers.

We might, then, charge the *Webster* p1urality with such a lack of olarrity that it is no longer truly a law, that is, an wction-guide promulgated to serve the common good. Moreovier, this kind of failure may eV'en threaten the respect due to citizens as rational agents. For Aquinas, it is the human capacity to undersfand to incorporate it aetively through purposeful action into moral and social identity, that ,distinguishes us from the rest of God's creation . Since the Divine Ruler promulgates His law by respecting rather than circumVienting human reason, so too ought human rulers. In failing to provide dear direction to the society, *Webster* fails to meet this obligation.

C. Suitability to Place and Time

Isidore's enumeration of the proper charaicteristiJcs of law also mentions that it must be" suitable to [the] plaice and time" in

which it is enacted. Aquinas interprets this as ia specification of the mandate that positive law be helpful to discipline, that it further respect for the natural law in a way that is helpful: to the community it guides (I-Il.95.3). QuintessentiaUy practical, he !l'ecognizes:that good law must be dJJafted with sensitivity to specific temporal and political currents.

What would the relevant ciJJcumstances and pitfa1ls he for the *Webster* Cou'.1.'.t? I ·submit thait in .an era ·sruch1as ours when there is skepticism about the authority o[law and the integrity of the jud:gies who interpi'et it, the11e are special problems inViOlved in ·al!beringeV1en a ·controversirul interpretation of the Constitution. The pillurality opinion failed to tiake these prohJems sufficien1Jlymto consideration. Sixteen years earlier, *Roe* itself masticaJ.ly undel'cm1t common understandings of constitutional :vequirements; it struck down abortion laws in aill filty states and thrust the Court into the middle of divisive politicrul controversy. Even those who find its interpretation ruid of the right to privacy must ·acknowledge that *Roe* created problems. The .£act that there is no specific mention of the right to privwcy in the text of the Constitution ignited suspicion that .the *Roe* Court was furthering its own politiical program rather than enunciating the oonstrruints of our government's charter.[10] More recently, ;the unabashed effol'lts of the Reagiam conservatives to reshape the Count in their own poilit:iJoolimage demonstr:aite that the Supreme Court is inC['ea;singilyperreivced as one more ideological tool of the party mpo1wer.

Thus the ruuthocity of the Constitution is threatened in the contemporary social context, and the nucleus of this threat is the jurisiprude'll'ceof abortion. To a great degree the damage has already been done; the mere fact that the Court reverses

[10] In legal circles, the interpretive practice in which the *Roe* Court engaged is termed "substantive due process " by its opponents. The Court is charged with surreptitiously advancing its own political agenda by claiming that the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth .Amendments protect not only procedural rights but also substantive rights not explicitly mentioned in the text.

Roe will not suffice to ameliorafo it. MO'l'oover,the problem is complircaibedhy :the fact that the *Roe* majority's peirspootiveon oons:ti.tutionailrightrshas insel'lteditseilfinto the expootations. of ·ageneraition of women and men. A slri:ftaway from *Roe* will inevitably desrtabiilize their firm sense of the Constitution. Aquinas himself notes that even a just change in settled law can undermine its aJuthority. He writes,

> To a certain extent, the mere change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters, is looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed, the binding power of the law is diminished, in so far as custom is abolished (I-11.97.2).

This is by no means to suggest that the *Webster* majority was ID.tistaken*per se* in altering the Court's legal oonstrual of abortion; but it does need to he stressed that, paroticula.J."lyin areas of frundamentrulroncern, evien beneficial changes in law come at .a heavy price, and this must be taken into ruocountby lawmakers. To .those who see *Roe v. Wade* as manifesting and inoolcating a deeply objectionable drisregard for the most vulnerrublemembers of the human family, the urgelllcyof supplrunting it is self-evident. To those who regard the *Roe* Court as unjusbly usurping the role of the legislative branch of government, .the need to· 1imirt its impruct is also not insignificant. Nevertheless, even such compelling Teasons for abandoning *Roe* do not preci1uidea concurrent obligation to mitigate the deleterious effects of a 'Change in settled law. UnfortunaJtely, the plrurail.ityopinion in *Webster* does not meet this obligation.

The Court harl. two straightforwall'd options in considering *Websiter,* each with its benefits. First, it rouW: have aiooeded rto Justice ScaJfa's plea fo:r forthright consideration of the question whether or not *Roe* shO'll1d be Suich an approach wouM have had the not insignificant advantage of settling for the foreseeable fu1:Jure the constitutional status of a right to abortion. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia writes,

Perhaps ... abortions cannot constitutionally be proscribed. That is surely an arguable question, the question that reconsideration of *Roe v. Wade* entails. But what is not at all arguable, it seems to me, is that we should decide now and not insist that we be run into a corner before we grudgingly yield up our judgment (3066).

If the judges haid been wi1ling to decide, then citizens would havie been able to form a stable conception of the freedoms guaranteed hy the Constitution ·and to plan their personal lives'--"'and political ructivities-a:ocol'dingly.

SecondJy, the Corurt couM ha.ve decided *Webster* without re-considering *Roe* at all. As Justice O'Connor points out in her ·Concurrenceand Jiustioe Bl1ackmunin his dissent, it wouM havie been possible to uphold the p1urality's interpreta.tion of the Missouri statute without rernohing beyond the boundaries established by *Roe*. The most problematic issue before the Court was this requirement: that doctors impJement tests to determine viability before aborting fetuses who they had reason to belieV'ewere of twenty or more weeks of gestation. Most fetuses at twenty weeks are not viah1e. Did this requirement, the1refore, contradict *Roe's* mandate that the only rncceptabfo regiulations of se1cond trimester, pre-viability abo·rtions were aimed at preserving the health of the mother, not the fetus? The paruraJity dedded it d]d and abandoned *Roe's* anailys1i1s in 01ider to uphold the statute before it.

For O'Connor, on the other hand," the State's compeilling inte11est in potential J.if0 postviability renders its interest in de,. termining the critical point of viability equaJily compelling" (3063) • .A!ooo:l.'ding to re1ia.ble mediml evidence, the eariliest age of viwbility is twenty-three and one-half to twenty-four weeks of gestation; however, the margin of error in determining gestational 1age is four weeks. Justioe :Bi1aickmuncondudes, "Nothing in *Roe,* or any of its progeny, hoiLds that a State may not effect its compelling inte11estin the potentiaJ life of a viable fetus by seeking to ensure that no vi,ahle fetus is mistakenly aborted because of the inherent lack of precision in estimates of gestational age" (3070-71).

Lt seems to me that O'Connor and Blackmun are quite convincing in their ·arguments: the plurality's interpretation of the Mis:souri statiubes plausibly could have been upheld without reconsidering *Roe's* trimester framework. Moreover, the benefits of a cruutious jurisprudence of abortion are not negligible. First, as Justice notes, " (i) tis not the habit of the court to decide questions of a oonstitiutionrul nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case" (3061).[11] One mark of the diffel'ence between the legislative and judicial branches is the reructive rather than proructive nature of the latter. The Court cannot simply promulgate its view of constitutional requirements whenever the spirit mo¥es it. Rather, a constitutionrul isS1Ue must be unavofdably raised by a controversy brought before its bench for a.djU!dication.

Unfortunately, the plurality opinion itself bears none of the aidvantages of either of the two options we have mentioned, and it hews more than the sum of their disadvantages. First, m not overruling *Roe* but eviscerating its normative force, it casts the constitutional law of abortion into confiusion. Secondly, the p1umlity does nothing to buttress the authority of the Constitution or nurture any periception other than that the Cour:t is imposing its own policy pl'efere:rmes under the guise of constitutional interpretation. Its half-h:erurted reconsideration of *Roe* may have 11esuilted in an increase in j'llldicial sympathy towa11d restrictive abortion statutes, but it does seem to exemplify the same oiLd philosophy of constitutional interpretation. The opinion does not ho1d, as Justice Scalia advocated, that in principle a pmper understanding of the Constitution requires abortion law to fall under the province of the legislative not the judicial branJCh of go¥ernment. Rather, it continues *Roe's* tradition of judicial " balaincing " of the claims of the fetus .against those of the mother. In referring to abortion as a "libel'ty interest " rather than a " fundamental right " and in upgraiding the status of fetrul life to a " compelling state interest," the *Webster* plrrmality simply indicates that it prefers

[11] Citing *Burton v. United States*, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905).

a balance .difl'el'ent from that of the Berger Court, which deuided *Roe.* What justifies the Court's continued involvement in the abortion issue and on what basis did the plurality decided to strike this specific balance? The jurisprudential answers to these questions .are no dearer under *fVebster* than they were under *Roe.*

In sum, the law expressed in the *Webster* plurality opinion does not fare weM according to Thomistic criteria. It faifa to exemplify the sensitivity to time, place, and concrete needs of the society it purports to regulate. More specifically, it evades the duties incumbent upon those who would change settled legislation, duties which Aquinas deems integral to wise jurisp:riudence.

II. The Pedagogical Function of the Law: Teaching a Virtuous Response to Abortion

The first section of this essay has barely acknowledged one aspect of jurisprudence which no Thomist can rightfuHy ignore: the integrwl relation of morality to law; in terms of Isidore's requirements, wise legislation must be "virtuous, just," yet " possible to nature." This will be the topic of this second section. My focus, howevier, wacll shift from constitutional law to statutory la.w, for the following, largely pragmatic reaison: The plurality opinion in *Webster* may weH augur a return of significant contro,l over aborrtion legislation to the states. Whether or not one believes the regulation of abortion shouM in fact be the proper province of the legislature, the onus of formulating just and wise regulations regarding the issue will fa.11 upon this branch of state and feder:vl goviemment in the neair £uture.

What sort of legislative response to abortion would manifest proper sensitivity to its moral Obvious,Iy, one's answer to the legal question depends in part upon one's moral assessment of abortion. Two moral as'51umptionsand correlativie requirements stand at the core of the lega;l anailysis which I propose to develop. First, good rubortion faw must he con-

sistent with the view that abortion constitutes the killing of a being which is fully human from very early on in pregnancy.[12] Like other types of Irn1ing, it objectively be justified in certain instances and mercifully pal'doned in others. In the va:st majority of the cruses, however, it is an ootion which is objectively unj'l.1Jstifi1d 1and is therefore strongly :to be discouraged. Secondly, any acknowledgement of the objective wrongne.s1s of abortion must have as it8 counterpoint utmost sensitivity to the diffiooities facing women who confront unplanned pl'egnancy and parenthood in this ,society. These di:ffioolties often seem insuperable because our society does not treat with gentleness the weak or vulnerable at any st:age in life.[13]

By itself this mocal construal of abortion does not yield a determinate legal policy. Th01Ughtfulpersons sucli as Governor Mario Cuomo can consider abortion genera.Nyto be wrong but, beyond the power or province of law to remedy.[14] Thus at the core of a pro-choice po•sitionis an argument in legal it:heorymther than in moral philosophy or theology. It is true that many pro-choice advocates fail to develop concrete ethical guidelines for how women should exereise their right to choose in specific instances. On the other hand, a contrapuntal criticism coulid be lodged against pro-lifers. In their intense foous upon the *mCYral* wrong of aJboN.ion, rbhey often neglect to consider in a nuanced and prootiical way the *legal* component of their struggle against it. Just as the pro-choke position must dev:elop substantive moral norms governing the act of aiboction, so a pro-life posture must attend to the unique concerns of jurisprudence in formulating its legia.l policy. In the realm of legal philosophy, the most .strikting difference between the

12 I do not wish here to settle the ques.tion of the precise moment a.t which full humanity should be attributed to the fetus.

1a For a probing and original theological analysis of this issue, see William Werpehowski, "The Pathos and Promise of Christian Ethics: A S.tudy of the Abortion Debate." *Horizons* 12 (1985) : 284-302.

14 Mario Cuomo, "Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's View," in *Abortio'll. wnd OathoUcism,* ed. Patricia Beattie Jung and Thomas A. Shannon (New York: Crossroad, 1988), 202-216.

1ood pro-life stanoos is that the latter, unlike the former, wi11: include !law :as Ollie instrument among many wrach can be used to 11educethe number of aboruonai.

A. Construing Law as a Teacher

I suggest that Thomas's 8Jooountof the relationship between law and morality provides a heilpfol s:tarting point for a pro-ilife legrul philosophy. His unique image of law as teacher is a particular useful one. It is at once both more optimistic and more pragmatic than that normally invoked by either the pro-choice or pro-Jife camps. As Harvaru Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon argues, despite their differences, both of these groups share a propensity to deploy the " rights:" language of liberal mdividualism.[15] This, includes a taJciit oom.miitment to liberal Jegwl philosophy, which construes the purpose of law a:s essentia11y that of restraint. Lilre marshaUs in the Old West, law constructs protective fences around the rights of individuails in order to keep the pooce. Perceiving law as inevitably rough-hewn and iooerciVie,liberal theorists strive to 1imit its sphere of in&ence, particrulraclythe influence of crimin8Jllaw. It seems to be a violation of human aiutonomy to use legal power in regulating the rea1m of "private morality," which centl'tally comprises the ariena of seXlllwlityand reproduiction.[16] Cast in tmms of ,liibe:valphilosophy, the abortion debate centers around whether the fetus is an appropriate bearer of rights '.anrd, if so, hOIW or whether its rights can compete with those of the woman who ·carries it.

Unlike theorists, Aquinas enoornragesus to think of l1aiw not primarily as an enforcer or a policeman but more as

·1sMary Ann Glendon, *Abortion and Divorce in Western Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 39. To my mind, Glendon provides the most perceptive and judicious analysis of the interrelationship between law, public sensibilities, and morality in the case of abortion to a.ppear in many years.

1GSee, e.g., Joel Feinberg's four volume work on *The Moral Limits of the Orimiinal Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1988).

a teacher, and speicificwlly,as a teacher of virtue. Law does inc1ude coe11cion and restraint. Yet these functions are not ends in but subordina,ted to the goal of inculcating virtue and concern for the common good in .a.M citizens.

> Since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves., by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous (I-II.95J.).

Thus one £unction of the criminal law is ito priovide .an external incentive strong enough to the vicious out of their normal patterns of behavior. Moreover, it also provides guidelines about fundamental area,s of right and wrong to those who lack sufficient virtrue to appreciate surch matcbers for themselves.

In appJying Aquinas's philosophy of law to the present-day problem of abo11tion, it is crucial for two l1easons to remember that the restraining function of Law is S1Uboridinateto and in servioe of the goal of education to virtue. Ffrst, the former is (Jentrailily appropriate only in the case of the criminal code, which is hut one of many types of legisil·ationin our complex, post-industrialist society. Correlatively, in formulating a proper legal 'response to abortion, we need to follow Mary Ann Glendon's suggestion and broaden our focus beyond the criminal law. Of the protections for nascent life mandated by West German Basic Law (the West German Constitution), she notes, "what 1is important is that the *totality* of abortion regiulations-that is, all criminal, public health, a:nd sociaJ. weMare laws relating to aibortion-be in proportion to the importance of the legal vwlue of life, and that, as a whole, they work for the continuation of the pregnancy." [11] Unlike the image of restraint, Aquinas's more fundamental image of educating toward viritue can fruitfully be applied :in spheres of law.[18]

[11] Glendon, 28.

[18] See, e.g., the U.S. Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on the Economy,

Secondly, paternal restraint is hut one smaH, elementary part of leading a person towal'd virtue. According to Thomas's theory of virtue, no action performed solely under the threat of coe11cion oan count as virtuous. External threats may accustom a person rto performing the *physical* acts that .a virtuous person does (I-II.6.6) . Yet unless and until she performs them for the proper motivations, they do not count as virtuous a!Cts. Teaching someone to act virtuously, howevier, entaiJ.s not just informing her how to behaive on a particular occasion hut also giving her reasons why thi,s behavior is appropriate, reasons which she can truly come to view as her own.[19] If she incorporates these reasons into her own decision-making, she may begin to discern how to act appropriately on similar hut not identical oecasions, strengthening her habits of prudenJCe and good judgment. The faict tha;t law cannot perform the whole fundtion of teaiching virtue does not mean it must nevier venture beyond the first step of !'estraint and coereion.[20]

B. Convergences and Disagreements with and Liberalism

A proper stress upon the :m1e of the law in reducing the incidence of abortion in this country might also open up the possibility of real consonance with some important elements of feminist and liberal theory. Since good law builds upon (as well as fosters) consensus, this linkage is by no means

Economic Justice For AU (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1986). In arguing for a restructuring of U.S. economic policy to achieve the goal of full employment, they point to the moral significance of work for individuals in society (50). Thus administrative, commercial, and corporate law is to be used, not to restrain harmful individuals but to foster human flourishing.

J.9 Thomas Aquinas, *De Magistro,* in Mary Helen Mayer, *The Philosophy of Teachmg of St. Thomas Aquinas.* (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Bruce Publishing Company, 1929), Art. l, esp. pp. 53, 56.

20 A good example of the creative, pedagogical power of law is the current coordination of effort designed to combat substance abuse in this country. Stringent extradition laws and stiff prison sentences do not stand alone but with generous bills of appropriation underwriting a panoply of anti-drug educational campaigns.

to he unde11esitimafod. One of the most mfluential defenses of a pr:o-ichoicefeminist position has been that of Hevierly Wildrung Harrison. She hoMs rbhat 1suhsitan:tiail reprodru1ctivefreedom is a necessary component of every woman's autonomy. Women must recognze rthat they no less than men are morrul agents. Througholl!t the long history of paitriaJ.1chalociety and thought, the fu11 moral agency of women has been denied. Concomitantly, rigid c:ont110J over women's power to reproduce remained fargely in the hands of men, from the Roman *pater familias* to the medieal esitablishment of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[21] A element in thart control ha,s heen rthe coerch'ie power of the :system.

A Thomistic emphasis on the pedagiogiica1l:rather than the coe.!.'civefunction of law wou1d demand serious respoot for the moral agency and ruutonomy of women that feminists like Harrison find essential. .AiocoJJdingto Thorna,s, a good teacher ail.ways recognizes her student as an independent agent for whom true knowledge means appropr1iating the truth for herself and maiking it her own. Unlike animals, who can he *trained* to respond to stimuli, human persons can be taught to *think*, to bring their knowledge to bear crea;tively and f,veely in a variety of situa,tions. Thomas makes it dear that ultimately, "the proces1sof education is a process of 1self-,educa<tion.'For 1earning to occJUr, "rbhe 1cooperrut:iion of the student is .self..,ruetiV'e,s1e[f-dfoec:bed,sielf-motiv:abed·oooper1atfon."[22] The terucher is in the :roJe of an intellectual mid1wife,facilitating but not ultimately responsible for the student's birth of knowledge.

Thus a prro...,Jifejurisprudence consonant with Thomas's view of eJdrncation worui1d encourage women's own recognition. that a;bortion is not an adequate :solution to t:herir problem preg-

z1 The move first to criminalize and then later to liberalize abortion laws was led by the overwhelmingly male membership of the American Medical Association. See Jonathan B. Imber, *Abortion and the Private Practice of Medicine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), chap. I, and Kristen Luker, *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), chaps. 2-4.

22 Edward A. Fitzpatrick," Editor's Introduction" to Mayer, 21.

nancies. It wouM a1bjure laws whose aim or vision does :not transcend ·effective restmint against abortions, recognizing that they tl'eat women as if they wel'e mel'e animals ca:pa:hleonly of being trained, not taught. For legislative attempts thrut .threaten a woman with loss of important family goods, such ras welfarre or payments, a.re inappropriate forms of" behavior modification." When a state tlweatens the tenuo1us economic well-being of children already born in the name of those yet unborn, it can ha1d1ly be said to *teach* the va;1ue of eruch indiviiduail human life; it only *trains* women not to hav<e abortions. This is not to Cllaim that penal sanctions can ha,vie no pedagogica,l vaJ.ue, but I do suggest that the vast majority of the ,sanctions already proposed exhibit little concern for pedagogy.

Of course feminists ,wou1d !StilJ have gmve objections ito a legal policy which attempted to teaioh a pro-life l'esponse to problem pregnancies. With a different morail evaluation of the act of abortion and a lower estimation of the status of the fetus, many feminists judge that to tewch that abortion is justifiarble only in very 1imited circumstances is to teach moral error. This is the irreducible nub of the abortion controversy, and it is not lik:ely to disa:ppea:r very soon. On the other hand, every effort must he made to ensure that feminists have no caiuse to charge those responsihle for a pro..,1ifelegal pedagogy with failing to tak:e women seriously as moral agents. Such a failuve worulrd be not only a denial of what is good in the feminist movement brut a betraya,l of the best insights of Thomas Aquinas.

In addition to affinities with important asrpects of feminist theory, [23] Aquinas's recognition of the need for educated, refiectiV'e individual choice ailso ha,s certain points of conco!l'dance

2a I do not mean to suggest that feminist theory is univocal. For example, many feminists would worry that Harrison's stress on and construal of autonomy is too indebted to the liberal tradition. For a useful survey of four basic types of feminist argument, see Alison M. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (Totowa, New Jersey/Es.sex, Great Britain: Rowman & Allanheld/The Harvester Press Ltd., 1983).

with libeml thought. The past twenty years have seen the burgeoning of a va,st crop of liberal treatises in medi1eal ethics, many dedicated to l'easserting the patient's right to self-determination against a preva.iling ethos encouraging doctors to decide "paternaJis:tically" what is besit for those in their professional care. Yet many thoughtful liberal ethicists do not equate a fie.rice respect for patient choice with from the opinions, questions, and advice of others. In fact, several ethicists argue that true patient aJUtonomy is norma11ly served by pl'ecisely that sort of interaction. For example, Tom Beauchamp and Ruth :Brudenhold that doctors who honor their patients' capacities for autonomous decision-making wiU not only provide them with a core set of facts pertinent to their medical situation hut will ail,so facilitate their broader rdlection through sustained conv:ersation.[24] In this context, respect for aiutonomy does not preclude the doctor from s1t:rongly irecommending a particular course of ruction. Citing John Stuart Mill as his philosoph:iica1lauthority, psychiatrist Jay Katz is particularily insistent upon the need for challenging and even eritical conversation in order to enhance the patient's psychofogioal autonomy .[25]

Thomas's theory of virtuous action anticipates the inter-relationship among conversation, education, and reflective human decision-making defended by liberal medical ethicists like Beauchamp, Faden, alllld Katz . .Aicco11dingto Thomas, the virtue of pmdence is indispensable for right aiction. While other virtues which regulate one's desires ensure that one decides to act for the right ends, the function of the virtue of prudence is to enable us to choose means which are best suited to achieving our ends. Since this choice regards individual actions whose desirabi:1ity depends upon a myriad of contingent cfocumstances (I-II.14.3), no riu1e book can tell us specifically what to do in

[24] Ruth R. Faden and Tom L. Beauchamp, *A History and Theory of* fo,-*formed Consent* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 307.

[25] Jay Katz, *The Silent World of Doctor and Patient* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 122-3.

any given case. According to Aquinas, an agent"s best recourse at this point is to seek *counsel* from others, partioulady from the wise (I-IL14.1.rep.ob.3). Yet Aquinas knows that wisdom is often in extremely short supply. The!l.'efore, he also suggests that taking counsel shouM involve talking with a number of persons, in the hope that quantity wiill compensate somewhat for lack of quaHty.

> Counsel properly implies a conference held between several; the very word (*consilium)* denotes this, for it means a sitting together *(considium),* from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into consideration,. which it is not easy for one to consider, but are considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of escapes the notice of another (I-II.14.3).

I suggest that the pedagogical function of the law can fruitftUlly be construed a.s facilitating each person's process of taking counsel.[26] With regard to abortion, this might inolude mandating the public dissemination of information not only about fetal devcelopment and the various methods of performing abortions but also about possible aHJematives to abortion. Given the aim of sunnounting the crisis of an unwanted pregnancy, priudence requires women to consider the ra.nge of ways to ,achieve it. In manda,ting informed consent, the law would he fostering such pmdenioe. Their own commitment to fuH information as a prerequisite to aiutonomous action would seem at first glaniCe to pree1ude liberal theorists from objecting to this sort of dissemination of information, provided care was taken not to couch it in a particularily incendiary fashion.

Yet matters are not that simple. Liberals might well take issue with the strong natme of the value judgments impJied by the provision of this information a,s part of a pro-life legal

[26] .As just noted, this has to do with choosing right means to ends already accepted. .As will be discussed later in this essay, another aspect of pro-life pedagogy would be to transform persons' desires so that they seek better ends.

policy. They might note that the 1iheml hope for informed consent l"equi:vements is that they foster a choice which best *reflects* the patient's own vaJues. By a Thomisrbic understanding of education towal'd virtue hopes to *transform* the paitient and *elevate* her values. within this fundamental di:ffel'ence in ahn, there stiM are striking points of concovdance. A first of tres:ponse to liberal worries would he to emphasize that n01t onily Aquinas but 1ihe11al 1theorists al1low (Jonver1srution to include strong, iwasoneiddeforrne of a particular point of view. As long as the State does not resort to scare tructics, misinformation, or threats to withdraw cmoiail forms of support sruch a:s we1fiare if a woman does go ahead with 1an abortion, it is simply engaging in vigorous moral advocacy.

Libemls might r:eply, however, that there is a vast diffe:rence between the va1ue of conversation and counsel among private citizens, such as doctor and patient, and the State's advoc11Jcy of a pa:vticrular moral position. The inherent imbalance of power between the private citizen and the State, conjoined with the faok of dialogiical interaction, renders it likely that the latter's attempt at moral persuasion is more likcely to resemble unaicoeptable manipulation o:r coercion.[27] The11efore, perhaps the State ought to remain morally neutral about abortion.

An aideqiuate response to this most serious objection can only be sk:etched here. My fast point is ju:rispruidentiail. The" police power " of the state has traditionaHy comprised it,s concern as to the " safety, health, peace, good o:vder *and morals* of the community."[28] While thel'e are definite constitutional limits upon the means which the State can employ in safeguarding moraility, rthe goal itself has a 1ong-sitanding social and jurisprudential legitimacy.

My second point is epistemological. As recent "post-mod-,em" philosophy has argued, the aim of Hbemls to achieve a va1ue-neutr al stance above or beyond competing conceptions

[21] For a description of the differences between these categories, see Faden and Beauchamp, chap. 10, "Coercion, Manipulation, and Persuasion."

[2s] Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 524 (1924), emphasis mine.

of the good life is unrea1istic.[29] Law is always and inevitably a tea;cher; sorely needed is critical self-reflection about what it teaJCh es. Liberal individuailism does in fact :choose certain goods over others, and so does a society which conceives of abortion ais a private matter of individual choice.[30] Of course, repudiation of belief in the pure neutrality of liberal values does not prevent one from rudvocating them as the best *political* way of ordering our society ;ai Nor does it out the posrsibility rthat scr:upulous neutrality is the appropriate mo:ral stance for the state to take regarding abortion. However, it does mean these positions must really be *defended* as the best way to order our common li£e. No longer is it inteMectually respectable to short cimuit the political conviersation by declaring them *ab initio* to be the embodiment of neutraJ standards of justice. In this sense, we are 1aM on the same level; would-be teachers who disagvee about the curriculum.

My thil'ld and final point is, for want o.f a better word, metaphysical. Post-modern phiJosophy has also highlighted the inaidequacy of the anthropoilogies presupposed by certain liberal "social ‹contraict" theories of *Pace* ,such theories, human beings are not isolated, atomistic selves who autonornorusly choose aill of their attruchments. Rather, they are essentially soc1iail creatures, embedded in and shaped by historically particula1r communities. A recognition of the inevitable char-

29 See Robert N. Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985); Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) and *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justiae* (Cambridge University Press, 1982) ; Jeffrey Stout, *The Flight From Au·· thority* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) and *Ethics After Babel* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988).

so For an interesting if somewhat unsettling exploration of the radically different worldviews of pro-life and pro-choice activists, see Luker, chap. 7.

31 See Richard Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," in *The Virginia S'tatute for Religious Freedom,* ed. Merrill D. Peterson and Robert C. Vaughan (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 257-282, and Jeffrey Stout, "Liberal Society and the Languages of Morals," *Soundings* 69 (Spring/ Summer 1986) : 32-59.

acter of human sociality would seem for at least three reasons to support an admowledgement of the pedagogicSJl function of faw in rega11d to abortion. First, every woman facing the abortion decision is part of a larger community, whose reflective judgment on that issue can he found in its laws. In Aquinas's r!"Je:rms, for such a woman to giv;e careful consideration to the viewpoint of ,a majority of her fellow citizens might -very well be part of taking good counsel. Secondly, even if a woman is not 1interested in what the majority thinks about abortion for intel1ectual or moral reasons, she might do well to consider it on more pmgmatic grounds. She will, after all, continue to live in this community after making her decision. Knowing what sort of readion to expect from her fellow citizens wiill help her to assess its consequences. Thfodly, those who oppose the pedagogy of a pl'evailing p:ro-life ethos might neverthetess benefit une:xpeetedly from it,s ·concrete reflection in the law. To begin with, no pro-li£e legal pTogram wiM achieve the status of unless it reflects the of a substantial portion of the 'society. This means that the values supporting :it will havie akea;dy been operating, albeit in an inchoate and unstructured way. The v;ery process of formulating legislation may force those who ::i!dhere to p:ro-life val1ues toward critical l'e:flection and ,self-scrutiny, and this ,oan only be welcome to those who tame issue with them. Correlatively, it is easier to oppose and counteract a position whi:ch has been straightforwardly delineated than one which :remains lairgely :implicit in the fabric of society. In sum, then, liberals may oppose the moral stand entailed by a legal pedagogy, a.long with the sort of society it would try to foster. However, tHeir reasons for objecting in prin1cipleto the use of the law to l.'e:flectand support communal values are far more tenuous.

C. The Limits of Law as Restraint

Feminists and libemls are not the only on;es who wou1d criticiz.e a strong focus upon the faw as a teacher of pro-life values. Some committed *pro-life* ad1vncates might object that the at-

tempt to subordinate the restraining arm of la,w to its educa-th:ce role is sorely inadequate in the matter of ahortion, for it fails to consider matters from the perspective of the victims. The deterrence provided by the criminal code may or may not serve to lead wouM-be misfeasants to virtue, but it does secure a definite advantage for those who would otherwise suffer at their hands. Impelled by the logic of this objection, some persons who hold a high regard for fetal life would model anti-a:bortion legislation on existing murder statutes.

This is not a criticism easily countered, at least by those who consider a fetus to be a member of the human community from very early on in the pregnancy. One *unsuccessful* response is suggested (although not necessarily a;dvocated) by Vincent J. Genov;esi when he discusses the legal aspects of abortion and, in particular, when he cites John Courtney Murray's app:ropriation of Aquinas's philosophy of law. Genovesi notes Murray's daim that "Law seeks to establish and maintain only that minimum of a:ctualized mora1ity that is necessary for the healthy fundion of the social order .... It enforces only what is minimally acceptable, and in this sense socially necessary ...." [32] It is undear what Genovesi takes this quotation to imply. Perhaps he believes it to suggest that, since the legal protection of fetuses is not integral to the " healthy function of the social order," it is a matter about which Thomas would ho1d that law, *qua* law, might be *indifjerent.* [33] If so, he fails to app!'eciate the complexity of Aquinas's thought on the relation among law, the commonweal, and morality. Law must always

a2 John C. Murray, S.J., *We Hold These Truths: G&tholio Reflections on the American Proposition* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), p. 166; quoted in Vincent J. Genovesi, S.J., *In Pm·suit of Love* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1987), 393. My view of the function of human law is more optimistic than Father Murray's, who seems here to be highlighting the continuities between Thomistic and liberal legal philosophy while downplaying their discontinuities.

sa Genovesi himself favors some legal strictures against abortion, although he remains quite tentative about what would be appropriate. Murray is cited as a strong counter-argument to those who would rush too quickly to criminalize abortion, not as a decisive reason to abstain from legal action entirely.

serv<e the common good. Thomas is equa1ly insistent, however, that this good cannot be achieved at the expense of justice, in which "each person without exiCeption has a claim on her fellows and on the community for immunity from bodily harm. . . ." [34] At whaibever point £u11 humanity is predicated of fetuses, the11efore,law cannot he *indifjerent* to their protection.

To say that law cannot he *indifferent* to the well-heing of the unborn, however, does not mean that stringent erirnina1lpenalties for abortion al'e the best way for it to express its concern. Careful consideration of Aquinas's own multifaceted reflections on the interrelations disitinctions between law and morality suggests that a broad use of such penalties is contraindicated in certain cases. His general position that it is not appropriate for human law fo l'epress all vices or require ru11 virtues is well-known. But what specific guidance can he giv;e us in formulating a workable legal stance toward abortion which should be aooeptable even to those who consider the fetus an equally protectable member of society from very early in the pregnancy? It must be possible to a judicious path between callous indiffe'l.'enceto abortion and mandating fu11 criminal pena,lties for its performance in alil instances. A faint outline of this path can be found in Aquinas's remark that" human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving of them, hut as being unable to direct them .... It would be different, wer:e human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns" (I-II.93.3.:rep. obj. 3).

The eternal law condemns aill violations of moral noirms; thus the outer limits of fiexibiility for human legislation is set by the ma,ndate not to condone such violations. But what precisely are the uncondonahle violations in this aillea? One obvious possibility would be to prochim that the law must not sanction abortion, hut this would he misleading. Our

[34] Jean Porter, "Moral Rules and Moral Actions: A Comparison of Aquinas and Modem Moral Theology," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 17 (Spring 1989) : 141.

primary concern is not abortion *per se* but recognition of the sanctity of unborn human life. The concerns may overlap, but they are not identical. To hold that abortion is to be enjoined against is at once too broad and too narrow a claim. On the one hand, just as there a.re forms of killing (such as in a just war or in seif-de£ense) that are he1d not to violate the sanctity of human life, so too there might be forms of " licit " abortion.35 On the other hand, comparatively few pro-choice positions would admit to *condoning* abortion *per se.* l\!Iany, like Bevedy Harrison, claim to value *reproductive autonomy,* in that they do not advocate compulsory abortion as a matter of population control, but they do champion the woman's full contml over the fate of her pregnancy. Although such a pro-choice stance does not advocate abortion directly, the expansiv;e freedom it underwrites is inconsistent with true respect for unborn life. Anything that sanctions insensitivity to the sanctity of human life, even at the earliest stages of its development, is preduded by Thomas's philosophy of law. Generally speaking but not absolutely, abortion manifests such insensitivity.

State legislatures can certainly insure that their general preference for childbirth over abortion is clearly stated in the law. But what other measures can appropriately be taJ,cen to reinforce this preference and in particular what measures of criminal 1law? For ,instance, wha1t does Aquinas's suggestion rthat there are unfortunate ciroomsfances where the criminal law is "unable" to do anything more imply? I suggest that this inability comprises two distinct but converging components. The

s5 What these are is, of course, a matter of dispute, even for those prepared to grant full human status to the fetus. On one end of the spectrum stands the orthodox Catholic position, which sanctions only indirect abortion to save the mother's life. Toward the middle, one sees arguments that *direct* abortions can be justified in this instance, since the fetus is an innocent but nevertheless materially lethal aggressor upon its mother's life and she is allowed to defend herself against it. On the more liberal end of the spectrum, one can expand the argument from self-defense to include the mother's right to protect not only her life but also other crucial aspects of her well-being.

first of these I call *practical inability,* in which the law enforcement sy,stem is ina:dequate to ,deter, detect, and punish the relevant harm. This might wel,l he the case with early abortion. The advent of such ahortifacent techniques as RU486 makes it possible for women to terminate p11egnancies very early in their term and in the privrucy of their own homes. In addition, v'acuum asrpiration, the most common method of abor tion in the :frrst trimester, is not technica1ly difficult to perform. In the wake of the *Webster* decisiion, many feminist groups have committed to mastering this procedure. [56] Finally, after well over a decade of legalized abortion, there is no shortage of physicians capable of and committed to insuring a woman's choice in this maUer. Therefore, giv;en the continued *de faato* avaiilability of abortion, it is unlikely that criminalizing the procedure will in itself deter women desperate to terminate their pregnancies.

Moreov;er, a moment's reflection suggests thait under no circumstances would criminal sanctions *ever* be sufficient to insme the well-being of the unborn. The project of giving birth to a healthy baby requires the active cooperation of the mother in a way which could never be secured by penal prohibitions. She must eat right, rest and ex<ercise pmperly, a.bstain from drugs and alcohol, and obtain adequate medical care. A pregnant woman must acquire, sometimes in tremendously difficult cirmunstances, many of the virtues of a mother, often putting the good of the one she canies ahead of her own wishes and desires. Mo11eover, even under the best conditions, her efforts are required at a tll:ne of great physical and emotional upheaval. The woman feels the life growing within her "as at once an enrichment and an injury .... A new life is going to manifest itself and justify :i:ts own separate existence, she is proud of it; but she also feels herseU tossed and driv:en, the plaything of obscure forces." [37]

[86] Anastasia Toufexis, "Abortion Without Doctors," *Time* (28 .August 1989) 66.

[a1] Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sem* (Bantam, 1953), 466-67; quoted in

Most poignantly, a woman who goes through with an undesired pregnancy faces an even more anguishing trusk upon giving birth. Somehow, she must find it within herseU to make a heroirc choice. Such a woman might, on the one hand, steel herself to sevier the bonds created against her will during the nine months of pregnancy, enduring empty arms anid aching breasts, because it will be better i£ the baby is reared by someone else. On the other hand, she could face the no less diffi-

task of assembling the resouroes to love and nurture a chi1d. Clearly, a legal policy which is triuly pro-life (and not simply anti-abortion) must find way;s to encourage and facilitate these sorts of maternal courage, which are in any case beyond the scope of law's command.

Thus ,the *practical inability* of the restraining arm of law pushes us to draw upon its more fundamental pedagogical function. Efforts must foous on identifying and creating the sort of l,egaland social systems likely to lead women to act virtuously, even heroically, with regard to their unplanned and unwanted unborn offspring. In so doing, unblinking attention must be devoted to Thomas's insight that certain extremely strict lega,l sanctions may on occasion undercut the formation of virtue. Under such circumstances, these sanctions exhibit a second sort of impotence, not practicail but what I call *moral inability* to servie the eommon good.

Aquinas describes this morail inabBity in terms of Isidore's 'I'ecognition that "law should be possible both according to nature, and according to the customs of the country"

. He writes,

> The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet

Margaret A. Farley, "Liberation, Abortion and Responsibility," in *On Moral Medicine,* ed. Stephen E. Lammers and Allen Verhey (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1987), 436.

greater evils.... The precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break out into evils worse still.

One of the benefits of a virtue theory of morality is that it is capable of recognizing that it is mol'e difficult for some people than others to do the right thing, and that 1the11e are times when i1t is smpassingly diffioult for most of us to do so. Murder is always wrong, yet how difficult it wou1d be to refrain from that crime if someone threa1!Jenedto kill us unless we shot an innocent third party in cold blood. Apostasy is ·a mol'bal sin; yet how many of us can hones1tly say we would srur:ely refrain from foreswearing God if foriced to choose between rbhat and undergoing tortme and death? Motives for doing evil afle not always selfish: who does not have rut leasit some sympathy with the person who commit,s euthanasia in order to spare a loV'ed one a pm1onged and painful death foom cancer? One wouM need an .almost superhuman amount of oourage ml!d hope to refrain from doing evil in t:he situations just described. l!t is not for nothing that the Lo11d's Prayer indudes: the petition " Lead us not into 1temptartion."

Aquinas contends that law ought to cognizance of the varying degrees of difficulty which different situations can present to those desiring to ad welt Further, he suggests that legislatures ought to .set legal penalties aecording to the capabilities of the majority, not of those rich in virtue. Yet how can law aocommoda.te itself to the limited moral abilities of most of us without impennissiNy sanctioning our moral failures? Returning to the :issue of abortion, :is it possiible for the law to recognize that it is sometimes beyond the capacity of women of ortdinary virtue to carry certain pregnancies to term without condoning the destruction of fotal life? I suggest that there are meaningful diffe11ences between: a) asserting that abortion is generally *morally acceptable* or mora.lly neutral; b) recognizing that it is morally *justified* in ex<ceptionalinstances; and c) holding that certain extenuating ciroumstanoes can render it *inappropriate to punish* a woman who obtains an objectively un-

justified abortion. [38] These are the differences between acceptance, limited justification, and pardon or excuse. A pro-life legal policy obviously must not claim that wbortion is generally a matter of moral indifference. It does, however, need to consider in what *exceptional* situations it might be a moral and hence legalJy *appropriate* act. Finwlly, recognizing that law is framed for the average person (and not the saint) means that some 'aibortions which we cannot consider just takings of human life ne'"ertheless ought not to bring down upon those who obtain them the £u:ll weight of ilhe criminal law. E1ements of mericy, pardon, and excuse ave characteristic of wise law.

Acknowledgement of this third type of case is, in Isidore's words," wcco11dingto the custom of [our] country's" legal tmdition in other maitters of life and death. For example, consider the famous nineteenth-century British case *Regina v. Dudley & Stephens* (L.R. 14 Q.B. The defendants, two sailors who haid been set adrift in a lifobo·at after a shipwreck, aidmitted to killing and eating their cabin boy in orider to stave off stall."Vation. The judge sentenced them to death, arguing that murder is nev<er permissib1e, no matter how dire the circumstances. The Crown, ho,wever, commuted their sentence to six months of imprisonment, recognizing that the desperate situation they haid faced rendel'ed the death penailty inappropriate. In so doing, the Crown did not *justify* their action but did go a long way toward *excusing* it. [39]

A pro-life legal philosophy, then, needs not only to consider what oiroumstances justify or render blameworthy any given

as For elaboration of this point in the context of West German Basic Law, see Glendon, 33.

39 See Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., *Criminal Law*, 2nd ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1986), Section 5.3 "Duress" and Section 5.4 "Necessity." "Duress" is defined as a defense to a criminal charge which applies when a defendant, under the unlawful threat of another, is forced to do something which is normally against the law as the only way to avoid imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another. The necessity defense concerns difficult situations brought about by natural occurrences rather than the unjust threats of others.

abortion before it instiburtes coerciv;e criminal penalties; it also needs to discern when criminal sanctions against aborticon are inappropriate, because they do not take into account the capabilities of persons of ordinary rather than superhuman virtue. Those of us who are pro-life must begin by asking hard questions of ourselves. Most of us can imagine situations in which we could not say "I would *never* seek an abortion, even then." This do,es not mean that we approve of abortion under those circumstances, even for ourselv,es. It does not mean that we have anything less than an urgent obligation to prevent such situations from occurring. It might mean, however, that we have a realistic sense of the limits of our own virtue, and by implication, that of others as well. For Thomas Aquinas, the limits of *criminal* sanctions are the limits of ordinary virtrue. The morie pru1:1ely foa;tu1:1es of faw will have to take ovierfrom the1:1e.

D. Teaching a Virtuous Response to Abortion in Our Soviety

U the prime thrust of a pro-me jurisprudence is to teach a virtuous response to abortion, what might that concretely demand in our society? We must begin with the unvarnished l"ooognition that many persons do not shal'e a high estimation of the sanctity of unborn life. Helping them to view abortion diffel.'ently will not be a simple matter, for it is not merely a question of prowding more information about fetal development or inculcating the isoJated "moml fad" that abortion is nearly always wrong. Nor is it sufficient to refer them to the opinion of respected moralists; otherwise, being a virtuous person would require no more than a quick perusal of AristoUe's *Ethics.* Rather, the ground of ruction is not faictua1 Oir rucrudemic knowledge but desire, ultima:tely the desire for hruppiness or human flourishing. Since persons can be wrong aborut what constitutes human flourishing, the function of morail education is, first of all, to ,en::1Jble people to judge and desire ,aright, so that they will seek afl:ierthe correct finrul and intermediate ends; moral education then seeks to assist peopfo to eultivate char-

acter traits appropriate to these ends, so that on particrular occasions their ructions will be in serwoe of these ends.

Thus, as the discussion of Aquinas's view of peda.gogy earlier in this paper wouM ;suggest, a major pm-life task is to encourage persons to adopt as the soume of their *own* motivation for acting a eertain view of the woriLd and of the components of human happiness. While this view wiiU apply to all sorts of .situations, we are here interested in the particular attitude it will encourage towa11d problem pregnancies. Psyichofogist Sidney Calilahan, who is both feminist and pro-life, has aptly summarized the patterns of response necessary to support a high regard for fetal life.

> Feelings of sacrificial love and gifts of self to others are called for. Empathy and nurturing feelings are focused on the fetus, which is fiercely identified with,. either as a family member or as a powerless, helpless being in need of protection. Communal memberships and the giving and receiving of love are seen as the highest emotional fulfillments, and attractions to achievement and independent autonomy are secondary. Life is with people, and being a good person is the all-important good. Creative receptivity to unplanned events is admired as a display of basic trust in the goodness of life and the universe. One has a duty to meet new personal demands with love and sacrificial work, even if they entail suffering, for relief of suffering is not the most important human goal. To suffer is preferable to doing harm or choosing evil because trust in the order of the universe delivers the individual from the lonely exercise of control and from a final autonomous responsibility for the future.4'0

This view of life cannot remain an abstract ruca:demic reflection; it must become a con:c11ete of action. But for this to be the case, pro-lifers must somehow convince others that it 11eads fo human :flourishing, to a life persons wou1d *want* to live. Helpful dlues for showing the plausibility of this view can be found in the work of the virtue theorist Alasdair Madntyre. In the past decade, Mruclntyre has brought into

40 Sidney Callahan, "Value Choices in Abortion," in Sidney and Daniel Callahan, eds., *Abortion: Understanding Differences* (New York: Plenum Press, 1984), 300.

renewed prominence Aristotle',s fundamental insight that human persons a11e essentiwlly social. No individual pmsues her particular understanding of flourishing apart from the context of a historicaJ.ly specific community .. Further, living out any of the good entails participation in the socially defined practices and activities which ave seen to constitute the eommunity. Indti.vidua1sstrive to themselves aiccoroing to the various roles which their sodwl and institutional context aUows them and to develop the charaJCtertraits or virtues they will need to fiill those roles suocessfully.[41]

Thus the plausibility of any particular virtues or patterns of behavii.oris di:rnctly dependent upon the character of the society to which they al'e proposed. The pro-life movement, thel'eto1Je,must ask how likely it is that in late twentieth century America the virtues enumerated by Sidney Callahan can constitute the vision of the good life. Honesty requires us to consider several factors which might impede the attractiveness of such a vision, notwithstanding its truth.

One crucial factor is the moral integrity of those who advocate restrictions on abortion. Margaret Farley noted long ago thrut "one can not help wondering about the increased credibility of anti-abortionists were their voices to be heard leading the cha11enge against cultural and societal frameworks which still give to women almost tortal msrponsibility for the rearing of chmidren."[42] Farley perceptively identifies the proh1em as one of "bad faith" and hypocrisy. How can pro-lifers believabJy da1im that their cause is grounded in a commitment to the weak and fragile if they exhibit extreme callousness to unjust treatment 01£ the socially vulnexahle in other contexts? Relatedly, if commitment to unborn life is unmatched by deep concern for the well-being of women, many persons wili continue to think it a thin disguise for unjust patriarchal at-

41 See Macintyre, *After Virtue,* chap. 14.

42 Margaret A. Farley, "Liberation, Abortion and Responsibility," in *On Moral Medicine,* ed. Stephen E. Lammers and Allen Verhey (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1987), 436.

tituides. Not uncommonly, the validity of the moral message is judged aocording to the moral rectitude of the messenger.

Another concern was fast raised by Valerie Saiving in 1960, and expanded upon by Judith Plaskow, Christine Gudorf, and others in mol'e recent years.[43] It might be appropriate, argues Saiving, to urge values of self-sacrifice and suffering upon men in positions of power, who a11e tempted by social training and expectation to sins of pride and domination. However, it is most unwise to urge these character traits upon contemporary women, many of whom bear the scars of their upbringing in a patria11chal culture. Their flaws are more to be self-abnegation and self-derogation. To those concerned with the e:ffieict of various moral ideals upon women who have been oppressed, Callahan's list of virtues might seem disturbingly dose to inappropriate self-abasement.

Yet the triue extent of the problem may be far more radical than Farley and Saiving indicate. Despite the power of their critiques, both oontinue to l'ecognize the intrinsic worth of the virtues CaUahan proposes. Fa1'1ey is simply po[nting out that it is possible to adhere to even the most noble causes hypocriticailly alld in b11Jd faith, while Saiving argues that inculcating certain oharacter tmits in persons who already have them to e:xicess is :beaching not virtue hut vice. The deerper question that must be asked is whether most persons in our society can rieoognize list of chamcter traits as genuinely desirable at all. Is a society which values money, physical attmctiy;eness, autonomy, and wollldly honor likely to perceive or present pro-life values in a way which will make its citizens in genern1 want to deveJop them? If an unmarried Yale unrdergmdruate woman wel'e to «:lisrupt her schooling to giy;e birth to

43 See Valerie Saiving [Goldstein], "The Human Situation: A Feminine View," *Journal of Religion* 40 (April 1960) : 100-112, Judith Plaskow, *Sew Sin and Grace* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980), and Christine Gudorf, "Parenting, Mutual Love, and Self-Sacrifice," in *Women's Consciousness, Women's Conscience,* ed. Barbara Hilkert Andolsen, Christine E. Gudorf, and Mary D. Pellauer (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 175-191.

a baby, how would we respond? Would we praise her courage, or wou:ld we criticize her for stupidly and naively " throwing away her life? "

My fear is that this country is not :at ·aU prepared to *admire* a woman who carries an unwanted child to term, to hold her up as an example of virtue for her willingness to endure no smal,l discomfort, disruption, and vulnerability for the sake of one more fragile than she. Yet it is crucial that pro-lifers cuiltivate this sort of admiration in our society. It is oruy fair to recognize the courage of women who choose to make the sacrifices invohned in carrying an unwanted child to term. From a pragmatic perspective, if women believed that their unplanned pregnancies would be met with a posirtive rather than a negative reaction in the wider society, then perhaps fewer would obtain abortions. Finally, since the social acknowledgement of part.ioolar viirtues is organicaiMyrelated to the institut,ions and prructices which support them, a general perception of a woman's decision not to abort as courageous would foster the development of social structures designed to deal positively with problem pregnancies.

However, making Callahan's l.ist of virtues *generally* believabl-e in our society is only part of the problem. We also need to consider a second troublesome issue. The extraordinary circumstances of certain women facing unwanted pregnancies may mean. that Callahan's virtues wi1l seem foolish to them in *particular,* no matter what sort of respect they gamer in the wider 1society. In the final chapter of her *The Fragility of Goodness,* Marlha Nussbaum brilliantly desicribes the disintegration of communal vru1ues in the mind and heart of a single person, the heroine of Euripides's *Hecuba.* Having seen her husband, children, and grandchildren slain in the fall of Troy, Hecuba, regal wife of Priam, is captured and ensJaved by the Greeks. Through overwhelming rudversity she maintains her commitment to the noble virtues that mark the nomo.s--the conventional morality-of her society. Yet Hecuba has yet to face the ultimate betrayal. With utmost confidence, she entrusts her

one surviving child Polydorus, her one remaining hope, to the safekeep[ng of her dearest "guest-friend" Polymestor. Even though he lmows the plaice of that child in Hecuba's heart, Polymestor mmders the chiM for his money, deliberateJy defiling the most saicred bonds of guest-friendship. When he next meets with Hecuba, he feigns shock and horror at the sight of the chi1d's broken and bloated body. Recognizing Polymestor's brutal tl'eaichery all too cleady, she sees that " the deepest trust was not itmstwo:rthy. ·what is firmest is, can be, heedlessJy set aside." [44] InexorabJy confronted with the failul'e of *nomos,* Hiecuha is left with two chofoes. She either cov;ers her eyes to it, " in which case she is a fool and corrupt, or else she allows herself to see, in which case she becomes contaminated." [45] Taking the latter course, Hecuba creates a new *nomos* for herself, the *nomos* of revenge, brutally slaying Polymestor's children even as he ,slew hers. Nussbaum vividly depicts how circumstances fo!'ce Hecuba to choose between her rationality and her ethical character; she can no longer :rationally accept the ,binding force of her community's *nomos,* for it is impotent to prevent even someone tied close to her from performing a monstrous act.

The story of Hecuba furnishes us an analogy with which to pursue Margaret Farley's point. When particularly oppressed woman are asked to make the sacrifices involved in carrying their unwanted chi1dren to term, may it not sometimes happen that they not only perceive those who are asking them as hypocritiical but also experience Callahan's virtues as hollow or futile in themselves, no matter how much they are praised in the world a;t large? For a twenty-year-old woman bearing her fourth baby in a ghetto, without a husband and with little ehanee of adequately supporting and educating her children, what can a commendation o.f self-sacrifice and serendipity posmean? She knows full well that society has aJready

[44] Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness,* (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 408.

[45] Ibid., 409.

abandoned her as worthless; why should she treat her offspring any differently? She wouM feel like a fool if she were to accede to pious requests to "cherish her unborn baby." The equal vaJue of a11 human lives may garner lip service or even real commitment in our society. But what 1does that matter to a woman about to bear a 1severely handicaipped infant, if our society is also transrfi:xiedupon the ideai of physical perfection? Is nolt he[' only mtiona:l option lik!e of Hecuba, to 11ejectthese apparently s:a:notimonious vawues 1and fend for herself?

At this point, some Thomists might object quite vociferously to my line of analysis and stress the crucial difference between Aquinas and Nussbaum's reading of Hecuba. While the latter does not belieV'e anything undergirds or surpasses the *nomos* of the community, the former holds that the transcendent character of God and divine wisdom are the ultimate source of morail norms. Moreover, Aquinas allows individuals some ruccess to this souuce through the human capacity for *synderesis*, the ability of the human mind to grasp the " first of divine orid.ering of human lifo. This capacity ensures that even under extl'leme circumstances per'sons can identii.fy the minimal demands of the naturrul law and appreciate to some extent the values and actions consonant with it. At the very least, the capacity for *synderesis* should stave off the nihilism to which Hecuba suooumhed. It should 1ailso prevent an utter lack of perception of the vafoe of unborn life on the part either of a particular woman or of a soci:ety in general.

In 11epiy, I would stress that Thomas himself recognizes that this common human capa:crity operates effectively at only the most general level and is far from entirely aciCurate in specific cases.[46] AU persons shouJd he able to recognize the principle "do good and avoid evil" and to :devefop a basic appreciation

[46] My analysis on this point resembles that of .Anthony Battaglia, *Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1981). I do not, however, agree with all of Battaglia's analysis, although we both are heavily indebted to our teacher Victor Preller and to his *Divine Science wnd the Soienae of God: A Reformulation of Thomas Aquinas* (Princeton University Press, 1967).

for the need to accommodate the natural human inclinations (self-preservation, the sexual drive, a des!i.re to live in society, the need .to learn and to know, and so forth) . Yet while Thomas affirms that awareness of such fundamental human needs and desires cannot be permanently blotted out of the mind of any individual, he also hoilds that the more specific normative conclusions to be drawn from these generalities will not be known by all persons or even aH cultures. How these inclinations are to be accommodated or ordered, especially when they conflict, is by no means self-,evident. Aquinas writes,

> But as to the other, i.e., the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states (Rom. i.), were not esteemed sinful (I-II.94.6) .

.A!ecol'dingto Aquinas, even the commands of the Decalogue fall among these secondaxy precepts which might be eradicated from whole societies of human hearts (I-II.100.1). Since this is the case regarding even these basic moral norms, how much more likely is it that a proper attitude towa11d unborn life could be lacking ,in an entire culture.

What, then, are we to say about those who spurn Callahan's virrtues as nonsensical in Olli' society, if we wccept the fact that an appreciruti on for vuillemble human life in all its: stages has in large part a;lrerudybeen blotted out among us? I suggest that Tilromas's insights about the dependence of correct moral knowledge on proper education within a wrtuous community might be furthered by incorporating some insights of twentieth century post-modern philosophers. Partioo1arly important is their stress upon the historicaJ.ilyconditioned nature of what counts as reasonable moral behavior. Jeffrey Stout points out that " being jrusti:fiedin believing something is a relation among a person, a proposition, and an epistemic context. Epistemic contexts obviously vary. Heca;use one context differs from the next, not everybody is justified in believing the same proposi-

tions." [47] Thus persons in the high Ages who were imbued with the iJenerts of a hieIJarchicaiUyoroered society were *justified* in 1oonsrideringnobles superior to peasants and men wperiOil'rto women. Their whole world, aiJ.ong with the whole structure of itheir society, seemed intertwined with ruch claims. Moreover, par:bioofarly for the v·asrtmajority who imaginative aroe:sisto other oultures through bookS', it was impossible to oonreivie of •a world thart was ordered any differently. One cannot *blame* them, then, for failing to think 1as we do. Yet it is crucial rto emphaisize that being *justified* in believing something, given the limitations of one's time and oulture, is not the same as being *correct* in that belief. In the course orf history, shifts in •epistemic contexts maide sy•stems which rated human beings ruccordingto their gender or social station seem incongoorus. Most importantly, rthese shillts aJso allowed persons rto peroeiivethat roaieties ordered in more egalitarian f"<!JShion were neither mere utopian dveams nor anarchistic nightmares but via.b1eways of organizing communal existence. Those of us who ha¥e benefited from changes in ·epistemic contert with regard ito social and gender equality shoruM be 1ruble to judge that our predecessors were mistiaken .and to col'l1ect for rtheir :mistakes, without arousing them of moral turpitude for that reason.[48]

Analogously, we need *w* cons:iJder the that persons completely immured in or victimized by the individoolistic, materia.listic values of contemporary America might be *justified* aJthorugh terribly *wrong* in their attitudes towa:vd abortion. This is more likely to be the case with very young women, who have grown up under the aegis of *Roe's* right to abortion and honestly cannot conceive of ihow their lives coUILd be lived without this £:veedom. But more than self-:interest is at stake here, jusrt as it wais with regard to those who

41 Jeffrey Stout, "On Having a Morality in Common," unpublished ma.nu·script, 10.

48 However, this is not to deny that one can be morally blameworthy for other reasons, and ignorance does not always excuse from blame. See Jeffrey Stout's "Response" to reviews of his *lilthics After Babel* in *Theology Today* 46 {April 1989): 73.

a.dvocafod hierarchical political systems in the Middle Ages. ':Do extend Stout's point, I would argue that persons ave more likely to be *justified* e¥en if *wrong* in their moral position on a ,particular issrue if they see it as a neces,sary entailment of other deeply he1d values which can be recognized as such even by those outside that society. Many persons in the Middle Ages could not see how God's sovereignty over humanity could be adequately reflected, nor the order required for human society sufficiently secured, without a hierarchical society structured in consonance with the G11eat Chain of Being. Analogousily, for many pro-choice advocates, intertwined with their inadequate view of na&cent life is a laudable determination to further the newly recognized and fragi1e va1ue of women's foH equality with men. Many simply cannot fathom how the dignity of women can be protected without insuring for them substantial 11eproduetive fveedom, inct1udingthe choice of abortion. Just as imagination, oourage, and determination were necessary to show how values justifiably important to those in the MiddLe Ages could he preserv;ed in a more sooiety, so too are t:hose quailities needed by pro-lilers in conversation with the pro-choice mo¥ement today. In short, it is a great disappointment that the pro-Jife moviement has not yet supplied the imaginatrivce vision which would alter the epistemic context that now l'enders a len}ent attitude towa11d abortion a;ll too plausible. [49]

In the meantime, how are we to treat those we might be *justified* although tragically *wrong* in their beliefs about abortion? Both elements must he fully :acknowledged. The faot that they are *wrong,* coupfod with fulil awa11eness of the consequences of that wrongness, prevents us from sliding into a cheap relaitivism. Efforts to change minds, heal'ts, and. behavior must he Uil!cea:sfog. Ney;ertheless, the fact that others may he

[49] The most promising move toward this goal taken by the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical establishment is Joseph Cardinal Bernadin's advocacy of a" consistent ethic of life." For a critical exploration of this concept, see Thomas G. Feuchtaman, ed., *Consistent Ethic of Life* (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed & Ward, 1988).

justified m their opposite belierfs about abortion ailso means that we are obliged to treat them with a certain respect. As Stout indicates, the integrity of honesrt moral belief itself compels a certain regard and deference. At the very least, we can conclude that pro-lifers ought scrupulously to refrain from incendiary polemical labels such as " baby killer " or " murder " in dealing with p110-choiceadvocates. Reciprocal respoot on the part of the latter ought also to be forth:coming.

In response to a possible objection from more tmditional Thomists, I hav;e attempted to show that Aquinas's affirmation of the human capacity for *synderesis* does not guarantee that all persons are immediateJy capable of grasping the moral truth regarding abortion; indeed it allows that an entire society may be blind to it in a way which greatly mitigates the culpability of inclividual women seeking abortion. But does that mean that I must oocede to the possible charge of nihilism? If not, in what practical way can my " posibliberal" Thomism be distinguished from Euripides's *Hecuba,* a:ocrn.idingto which moral vailues can be utterly 'disintegrated afong with the roolture and persons who embody them? Does not claiming that some women in our society are *wrong* although *justified* in seeking aborlions merely hold onto the me11est sh:ried of moral reailism while aidopting .a *de facto* vicious moral relativism? [50] F1inally, what conel'ete diffe:rienredoes positing capacities for *synderesis* make, if those capacities can be so easily overrun with corrupt desires and judgments?

I hold that it is *precisely* Thomas's recognition of the human capacity for *synderesis* which provides the dike against moral relativism in his ,theory of morwlity and, by extensrion, in my own. it furnishes us witih neither easy answers nor pat so1utions. It only gives a promise: To acknowledge the capacity for *synderesis* is to affirm the hope of moral conversion and

[50] The debates about aleitheology (theories of truth) and epistemology (theories of justification) still rage heavily in circles concerned with ethics. Without the space to defend it, I am here advocating a realist theory of truth with a coherentist theory of justification.

to justify ceaseless efforts at education toward vivtue. In effect, irt is the reaison why we need never tiurn, as did Hoouba to the bloody business of a despairing revenge. If ead1 human being is endowed with an ineradicable capacity for *synderesis,* an awareness at some level of the most fundamental and true mmal principles, then none of us can ever be beyond the possibility of moml improvement. Human nature is not so completely plarstic that it can be bent entir e[y toward wrongidoing, without some toward right behavior, however slight. In the hope for sruch improv;ement, a properly chastened" naturnl law optimism" can be found. This sort of realistic optimism is reflected in Aquinas's decision :fimv1ly to subsume ·even the more coericive aspoots of the criminal law under the broader aim of education towwd virtue. To remain faithful to that optimism, his inteili1ectuailheirs can never relinquish the goal of *teaching* persons to vru1ue nascent life in formulating a pro-life legal strategy. And so we end this section where we began: with the overaI1ching need to fooos on the pedagogical function of the 1aw in the protection of the unborn.

E. Suggestions fol/' Legal Policy

It would not be true to the inherently practical thrust of Thomas's philosophy of if this paper failed to outline some suggestions for an appropriate pro-me legis1ativ;estrategy. The legal program which I suggest can only be tentative; it is based in part on prudential judgments tha.t are quite oorrigiMe. It also cannot he an ideal instantiation of pro-ilife values but only an attempt to grapple in a practical fashion with the exigencies posed by the contemporary situation. If we take serioruffiy Aquina.s's injunction to formu!late l1aw that will *gradually* lead persons to virtue, the following poilicy should be considered a small first step on. what will certainly prorve to be a tortuous path.

I begin with a general point. The need to safeguard a fundamental respe1ot.for law as such militates ag,ainst a situation in

which states have seriously conflicting views of abortion. In his *Law's Empire,* Ronald Dworkin offers the argument that so-called " chookerboard sta;butes " [51] the criterion of integrity in law, "which a1sks to try to make the totaJ. set of laws mora1'ly coherent." [52] The principle of integrity promotes a cohesive sense of community and .augments the moral ruutihority of law by giving citizens a way to "fuse [their] moral and politiool lives." Since they can make some sense out of the la.w that governs them, citizens see law as an expression of the ethos that binds them together rather than as the arbitrary expression of power.

Dworkin points out that the criterion of integrity aipplies only within a political community, suggesting that the nation as a whole, not inidividruaJstates, ought to be ronsli.dered the relevant group. Even one who disagrees with his fow view of fodemlism would have rto acknowledge the wisdom of the states' working towaiid a fairly uniform poJicy in the case of abortion. A series of cheokerboard-Jike aibortion laws, dependent on the vicissitudes of local politics, would serve only to undermine respect for law as such. Mol'eoVier, it might very weLI erode respect for unborn life as well, even in the "conservative" states. Rather than looking seriouSly at the moral message undergirding 1extremely ,strict legiSlation, many wiH dismiss it .as the polirticrul spoils of a conserv:ative coalition, to be uncere- replwced with a cihange in the prevailing political wind. would do better, thel"eifo:re, to start with a struWe mor:a1 consensus and aittempt to augment it over time rather than to take rudvant.ageof ephemeral political opporbunli.-ties.

As Mary Ann Glen:don S1Ugges:ts, the law as a whole should clearily express a bias on behalf of unborn life. Yet, at the incipient stages of instituting a pro-life 1egisfative pO!licy, criminal sanctions shou1d be reserved to solidify the moral consensus

[51] Ronald Dworkin, *Law's Empire* (Cambridge: The Belkna,p Press of Harvard University Press, 1986), chap. 6.

[52] Ibid., 176.

thrut already eX!ists. Moreover, they should be divected primarily at rather than women, who a11e likely to he obtaining even the most morally dubious abortions under conditions of duress. For example, aM third trimester abortions exroept those strictly necessary to prieserve the mother's life could he prohibited in the crimina1l code. Moreov;er, the law cou1d mandate that the technique used to perform the abortion be the one most likely to produce a living fetus. Since there is sturdy consensus in our society that live-horn infants are vested with full legwl status, adequate procedures should be instituted to protect the best interests of those infants whose "birth" is a late-term abortion. [53]

Mid-term abortions in 11esponse to tests reveailing serious genetic abnormalities in the fetus are a wrenchingly difficult situation in whiJCh to forge an adequate legal response. On the one hand, the quality-of-life-judgments implicit in many of these abortion decisions are entirely antithetical to Callahan's list of vrulues.[54] Moiieover, these abortions are performed relatively late in pregnancy, at a fairly a;dvanced stage in fetwl development. On the other hand, in our cultme, this situation is a pamdigmatic exampJe of how doing the 11ight thing can sometimes require an extraordinary amount of virtue. The iiesources to aid parents with handicapped chi1dren are scant, and the burden could ea's,ily seem intolerable to many persons. The first response of pro-lifers, the1,efore, should he to incl'ease sub-

53 What course of action is in tlrn best interests of the live-born aborted fetus is a complicated issue. Some may be, in Paul Ramsey's words, "born dying." In that case, what the baby needs is warmth and comfort, not aggressive medical treatment. My point is simply that it deserves and should get the, same care needed by a baby born dying after a normal birth procedure. See Paul Ramsey's *Ethics at the Edges of Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978) for a fiercely penetrating analysis of equality issues surrounding late term abortions and "defective" newborns.

54 See Luker, chap. 8, for a sociological analysis of why this issue is so problematic for pro-lifers. "To defend a genetically or congenitally damaged embryo from abortion is, in their minds, defending the weakest of the weak, and most pro-life people we interviewed were least prepared to compromise on this category of action " (207-08) .

stantiruMyaid for families with mentally or physicrulilydamaged offspring. Yet the fact that the limits of the criminal law are the limits of 011dinary virtue weighs against the institution of penal sanctions. In the gcim meantime, the law should certaiinly ma,k,e olear that its refosal to implement criminal penalties in such cases is a matter of ex;ouse, not justification.

What of erurtly aibortions? Again, I reluctantly conclude that the inherent limits of the criminrul law make penal sanctions inaippropriate in this case. The extrreme lack of consensus regarding this class of abortions means that laws which do institute such sanctions are likely to be unstable. The ready availability of ii1legrul,aborlions meams that Jaws agruinst them 'rure likely to be inefiootive. Instead, in this case above all, the burden must rest upon the pedagogical function of the law in supporting and graidually extending a consensru,s. As a first .informed consent requirements conjoined with a short manda-.tory waiting am.d re:flootion period could he instituted. The state's: concern for both unborn life and vruilnerable pregnant women couLd be manifested in st:vess on information not about anatomical details and abortion procedures but about practical alternatives to abor:tion. In short, counseilor:scould be trained to put together a " pro-due pmkage," attempting to show a woman how she could foasibly .carry her child to term while getting on with her own life.

For sucli a pro-life paickage to be more than a pathetic and half-hearted stab at a pervasive socirul problem, intense effort aDJd imagination will he needed. First, a concerted attempt must ·be marle effectively to hold fathers equally responsible with mothers for the well-being of their offspring. For Aquinas, this would be not a discretionary matter but a question of justice, going to the hearit of a pro-life legrul ilegitimacy. In the face of any gross unfairness, the mere fact that a given policy was designed to further a virtuous societal response to it.he unborn wouM not be sufficient to insure its moral acceptability. Of situations" when bruroens are imposed unequally on the community, ailthough with a view to the common good,"

Aquinas declares, " the like are wets of violence rather than laws; because as Augustin·e says, (De Lib. Arb. i.5) '.a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all'" (I-Il.96.4).

Second[y, we need to restructure our aid.option laws so that deciding not to mother a baby after it is: born does not seem to be such a draconian oprtion. Worthy of serious consideration are recent experiences in less secretive a.doption proceedings, whe11e the birth mother has some influence upon the choice of a.dopti\neparents and mamtains some contact with the adoptive family as the chiM she bore grows to arlulthood.[55]

ThiroJ.y, we need to insist that both public and private institutions dealing with young women provide erusily available help so that those who :find themselves p11egnant can carry their fetuses to term while continuing with their own lives. For example, how many Catholic colleges have on their staffs an rudvocate specificailly designated for women with problem p11egnancies, someone who will facilitate the arrangement of wl,ternati.ve housing and medical care, run interference with professor8 and deans, a support network, a.Ilid provide :financirulcounseling?

Fourth and most generailly, we need to· foster the plausibility of pro-life sentiment wirth respoot to abortion by nurturing the l'elevant virtues with regard to other isS1Ues as well. In the wo11ds of the Roman Bishops' pastoral letter on warfare, " When we wocept violence in any form as commonplace, our sensitivities become du11ed. . . . Violence has many faces: oppres.sion of the poor, deprivation of basic human rights, economic exploitation, se:imrul exploitation and pornography, neglect or abuse of the aged and the helpless, and innumerable other acts of inhumanity."[56] A lenient attitude toward

55 See the interesting article by Pat Windsor, "Open Adoption Program Lifts Veil of Secrecy," *National Catholic Reporter* (8 September 1989) 5.

56 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1983), para. 285; quoted by Cardinal Joseph Bernadin, " The Consistent Ethic: What Sort of Framework?" in Jung and Shannon, 260-61.

abortion, then, shouhl finally be viewed as a prismatic and poignant example of a caJ:lousness towiard life in general, a cailtl011.1snessthat mus:t be eradicated in all its forms.

Conclusion

The purpose of this long essay has been to interject some badly needed perspective into the debate about abortion and the la.w by bringing to bear the legal of St. Thomas Aquinas. Sufficiently subtle to captiu11ethe complex nature of the question, his unde1.1standingof the purpose of law is a.t once both realistic and optimistic. Law can neither mandate aH vil'buous action nor pmhibit all vires. Nevertheless, it does funJctionas a moraJ. teacher, serving to iinou.Loateand rcinfo11ce fundamentaJ. beliefs of the society which it orders. Careful consideration of how Thoma.s's philosophy of law might apply in the case of abortion does one ov;m-archinginsight: We do not need to choose between a pro-life position which would immediately and imprructiJcaJlyrecriminailire all abortions and a pro-choice view whose more pennissive legal stance is based upon a fundamental moral tolerance or neutrality regarding the procedure. This is a false dichotomy; it is the impoV'erished offspring of 1a liberal philosophy of law which focuses upon criminal legislation ais a crude instrument of restraint, justified only to protoot rights, not to Illurburemoral virbue. To see laiw as a teacher, as Thomas dioes, means that one mrusit indeed recognize the limits: and failings of the citizens it must guide. But it aJso means to look beyond those limits and to strive to correct those failings, in the steady hope that every one of us cam. booome better than we arie at the present moment.[57]

671 would like to thank Mary Ann Glendon, Jay Katz, and William Werpehowski for their suggestions regarding the revision of an earlier draft of this essay.

AQUINAS ON THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN MORAL JUDGMENT AND ACTIVITY

JUDITH BARAD

Indiana State University
Terre Haute, Indiana

MONG PHILOSOPHERS who have discussed the role of emotion in morality there is much disagreement.

At one extreme there is a tradition of ethical thinkers, represented by David Hume, who juxtapose reason and emotion and hoM that the choice of ultimate va:1uesis always made by the emotional side of our natul'e. Insisting that emotion, not reason, is the foundation of moral philosophy, Hume says "Reason is, and ought to he, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any office other than to serve and obey them." [1] Conv:erseily, Immanuel Kant adamantly insists that reason must be the sole determinant of morality. Since morality is stricrtly a rational endeavor, the emotions (or what he more generrully called the incJinations), whethei!.'beneficent or ma1e:fiicent,should never be alilowed to intrude into our moral judgments. Each extreme claims that a part of our nature, respectiv'e,ly reason or emotion, is not essentirul to the moral life. Hut the be1liefthat we shouM sev;er any part of our nature from swch a pervasive area of our lives leads to unfortunate consequen1ces. If we base our understanding of morality on Hume's call for the slavish submission of reason, we can justify all kinds of social exploitation and sensuous indulgence. On the other hand, if we follow Kant's ideal of suppressing our emotions, then bodi1ly desires can appear ba:d to us, and we may irrationaHy disaJfow many human needs, both to ourselv;es and to others.

[1] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* 3, 3.

But on this question of the role of emotion in mol'lwl judgment, Aquinas oiooupies a position intermediate between Kant and Hume. He neither dismisses reason as a guide to practical affairs nor regards emotions as mere obstacles to be overcome in form.mating a moral judgment. For Aquinas even though e&ch of the human £acmltieshas a unique role to perform, an individual £unctions in his entirety in the moral sphere. This essay will focus on how our emotions can support as well as impruir our moraJ conduct. The purpose of this study is to show thrut emotion may be either 1an impediment or a usefuJ srtimu1us to obj·ectiv;emoral decision malcing, obscuring our morrul judgments or 11einfol'lcing our commitments. Obviously, Hume's argument ·that reason cannot judge or criticize the emotions is very foreign to Aquinas's thought, and no one has yet rut-temp;!Jed1to subsume one •ruoooount under the other. Afan Donagan, however, has clwimed that Aquinas's moll"al theory " anticipates Kant's metaphysics of morals," because of what " both found to 1say about motiViation."[2] But, contrary to Donagan's claim, this study will make clear rlihat in the area of how emotions a:ffrect our moral life ·the two g11eat thinkers pal'lt company.

To understand how emotion :liun:ctions m the moral judgment, we must fust examine what Aquinas means by "emotion."[3] He describes :emotion as a spontaneous .feeling consisting of both a phy;siofogical 1and an affective response to an object.[4] He observes that emotion involves virtually ithe en-

[2] Alan Donagan, " Teleology and Consistency in Theories of :Morality as Natural Law," in *Georgetown Symposium on Ethics,* edited by Rocco Porreca (Lanham, :Md.: University Press of America, 1984), p. 96.

[a] Throughout this paper I will use the word "emotion " for the Latin *passia,* since " passion" has a more intense connotation in contemporary English than the term employed by Aquinas.

"Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica,* (Westminster, :Md.: Christian Classics, 1981), I-II, q.22. In the first article of this question, Aquinas says that " Passion . . . is only in respect of a bodily transmutation." Quoting Damascene in the third article, he says " Passion is a movement of the sensi·tive appetite when we think of good or evil." I have combined both passages to arrive at Aquinas's description of emotion.

tire human being: intd1ect, sense cognition, spontaneous volition, and bodily changes. Aquinas bases this position on his hylomorphic conoeption of rthe natme of man. A rational anima1 i.s a being constituted of soul and body in such a way that some powers pertain only to the soul while others are shared by both the soul and the body. The emotions, such as anger, fear, sadness, pleasure, love, hatred, and hope,[5] are aiots of both soul and body. In short, the psyichic .and corporeal elements of emotional experience are not characteristiics of two ·separate entities; together rthey makie up one affoctive experience.

This understanding of emotion underlies his ruocoulllt of the w:ay emotion functions in the moral judgment: just as emotion contains both psychic and phys,ical elements, so morarl judgment invoh?:es both rationaJl and emo·tionail elements. And, falling as it does between two extremes, this definition of emotion" is just as contro¥erted as his doictr:ine on the role of emotions in morality.

On the one hand, William James's interpretation of emotional experience lJeduces emotions to perceptions of physical sensations. " We feeil sorry because we cry, angry beeause we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or itremh1e, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful." [6] In this l'eversal of what is ordinarily held as the causal order of events, the physical reaction the emotion. Being "afraid" is not the cause of the physica.l 11eaotion of trembling, but instead it *is* ithe experience of t11embling. For James, emotions are immediate reflex reaiotions to certain cimumstances, independent of evaluation by reason .

.At the other extreme, Robert Solomon hoJds an intellec1tualist ,theory of 1emotion, likening emotion to judgment. For instance, he claims tha;t sa;dness1is a judgment that one has suf-

[5] Aquinas lists eleven emotions: love, hatred, desire, aversion, joy, sadness, hope, despair, audacity, fear, and anger.

[6] William James, "What is an Emotion?" in *Mind,* 1884.

fered a 1loss,7 and " fove is a :set of constitutive judgments to ithe ,effect that we will see in this person ev;ery possible virbue, ignore … ev<ery possible vice." [8] Since emotions a11e judgments, they can he rational in the same sense in which judgments can he rational. We choose our emotions 1and can be heild respons:iib1e :for them. Emphasizing their ,cognitiv;e role and sharply minimizing their phy1sfologicalaspect, Sofomon expl:idtly denies thart emotions are feeilings.

Both Solomon's and James's views run counter to our experience. James's theory fails because my pe[]11ception of crying is not identica1l with sorrow: I can easily distinguish my awal'eness of :sorrow from my awal'eness that I'm crying. [9] Moreov<er, James insists .that ewch disitinctiv;e emotion is dif£erentiated by the physiological changes in the person experiencing that emotion. But physiological changes alone do not provide us with enough information to di:ffereirntiate between emotions. Changes iSuch a1s increased respiration or pulse rate may mean we are afraid or may mean we ave pleasurably excited. I must rely upon my conscious experience, not just my physicrul sensations, to determine whether I a:m angry, foadul, or ov;erjoyedo It is rtrue that if the physical sensations are abstracted from anger or fear or joy a very subs1tantial eJ,ement of the emotion wi11l be e'X!dudedo Yet ·the residuum is no mere neutral state of perception; it is a process of consciousness con1taining an awareness of some object and a resulting impulsive state. A cognition of some object is an integr.al part of my emotional experierme, for an emotional reaiction depends upon whether I consciousily experience a situation ·as pleasant or unp1easanL Unless I am at leas1t vaguely 1a,ware of danger, I wHl not be ,£ea11f1UL Since physical sensations alone neither aiccount

[1] Robert Solomon, *The Passions* (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p0 1860

[8] Ibid., p. 199.

[9] I am indebted to my colleague Dr. G. Foulk for this point. For theories of emotion, see Cheshire Calhoun, "Cognitive Emotions? " in *What Is an Emotion?* edited by Cheshire Calhoun and Robert Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p0 327-3420

for my ability to feel nor distinguish different types of emotion-and I do, in fact, feel and distinguish various types-'this a:ocount tha:t seeks to !l'educe emotion to physical sensation is erroneous.

On the other hand, to characterize emotions a:s ,a:cts of the or judgments, is also mistaken. The command "control yourself " makes sense only when applied to one's emotions and not to one's judgments. Emotions do not always reconscious choioes, for weakness of will (a familiar state to most of us) typically oocurs when our avowed judgments are in conflrct with our emo'tions. Th1oreover, James's view is pavtia1ly cor11ectin that emoition can he found only whel'e there is some physiological change. Although James erred in claiming that emotion is *only* the perception of a physiologiml ehange, his theory does recognize that a bodily change is a necessary condition for emotion, and ithis echoes Aquinas's observ;ation that " Emotion is prope:rly to he found only where the11e is corporeal transmutation." [10] vVhile physical changes may ocour in the a:bsell!ceof emotion, when emotion is present they a1"e nev;er lacking. The physicwl changes which oocur in every emotion include changes in blood pressure, respiration, and pulse rate. For instanoe, I might my anger by speaking of my blood boiling [11] or my being in fov;e by speaking of my hear1tskipping ,a heat.

In contrast to inteUeotuaJist theories of emotion, Aquinas mainta,ins that, since emotions are sensory reactions of aUraction or repulsion wirth some physiological change, they are to be wttrihuted more directly to the physical powers than to the rational. " Emotion is more properly in the ruct of the sensi-1tivie appetite than in that of the intellectual appetite." [12] It is a matter of common experienee that arttmction and :repulsion affect our physical desires more than they affect our knowl-1edge.[13] The physical changes induced by ,a:ttraction and re-

10 *Summa theologioa,* I-II 22, 3.
11 Ibid., I-II 22, 2 ad 3.
1.2 Ibid., I-II 22, 3.
1a An exception is the attraction of knowledge itself.

pulsion a11e an integral part of the emotiona,l process, for the emotions are deeply rooted in human biology.

Yet, in opposition to James, Aquinas maintains that bodily changes are the caiuse of emotion *only* in the sense that they are its materia:l embodiment. He did not share James's view that emotion is the mere perception of physiological changes. For Aqu1inas, the fact that we are composite beings precludes ascribing emotion either solely !to our rationa,l or solely to our bodies.

> In a being made of matter and form, action comes from form and emotion from matter - - - - But no one feels any emotion unless something acts upon him, because all emotion is the effect of action. [14]

Thus to ho1d that emotions are only physical sensations is to consider the matter of the phenomenon without ithe form. And to identify ,emotfons with judgments would be to take the form withoU1t the matter. Both views run contrary to Aquinas's hyilomorphic theory of human nature.

While Aquinas asserts that bodily changes are essential to emotion, he d!Oes not regard roe perception of those changes as essential to its cogniiti¥e 'element. An emotion is .a ,bodHy Teaiction, hut it is composed of two other constituent elements, namely, apprehension and desire. Once an object i,s apprehended, an emotion involves an affective response according to whether the object is periceived as pleasant or unpleasant, useful or harmfal. The aflectivie response, that is, the desire, mediates the apprehension and communicates it 1to the body. Aquinas says that emotions like anger anid fear " can be pro-1diU!oed only if there is apprehension and desire on the part of the soul." [15] In these cases " the emotion begins in the soul in so far as ithe soul is the mover of the body, 1and so enters the body." [16] In short, Aquinas ,describes a prooess of appr1ehension

14 St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Disputed Questions on Truth,* translated by Robert Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954), 26, 2.

15 *Dispitted Questions on Truth*, 26, 2.

ie Ibid.

and desire on the one hand resu1ting in bodily change on the other. But, his centrial poinrt is that the hylomorphic composition of the hruman being muses the soul and ibody to act as a single principle of operation. Because of continuous interactions between the .rational and emotional factors in ibhe human being, rationail judgment may modify physical feelings, and physical reactions may obstruct rational judgments.

Considered apart from rational judgmelllts, Aquinas :veailized that emotions in themselves are neither mor:ally good nor mo11a1lly had.[11] My state of anger, fear, or joy, considered in itself, is a mora1ly neutral matter. These states 1are mormlly neutral: £or instance, when someone 011dersme about too sharply, I may feel a S1Uddensurge of anger befo11e giving the matter any thorught or riling tJo feel the anger. Since emotions are spontaneous feeling states, I have little control ov<er their lln.-meilirutie presence in me. I may he responsible for controMing the expression of my emotions, but I am not responsible for their onset in the first plare. An emotion in itself is not volillllltary sinoe the vo1untary "requires an aict of knowledge in the same way ais it requll.-es an act of will; namely, in 011der that it :he in one's power to consider, to wish and to acit."[18] And I should not be held responsible for that ovier which I have little control.

However, our .attitude toward our emotions, onoe they arise, can integiiate them into the activity of om will and reason. It is omy when emotions ave consrndevedby will and reason that they are amenable to rational guidanre and booome good or bad in a moral sense. If rt.he inteHectualist wccount of the emotions were correct, the emotions, being judgmeruts, wouLd not he neutral but as immediately open to evaluation as any othe:r judgment. In other wo1ids, my inner state of fear could be immediately evaluated .as good or bad in irtseH, apart from my attitude foward it. Such a theory wouJd either have us deny the spontaneity of our emotions or ho1d us responsible for our

11 *Summa theofogiaa,* I-II 24, I.

1s Ibid., I-II 6, 3 ad 2.

inner spontaneous strutes. Yet the former alternative runs counter to our experience, since emotions are deliberate in origin, while the latter would hold us responsible for that ov;er which we hwve very little control.

On the orther hand, James's theory of the emotions would destroy their moral role, since they would be as litt1e open to rational guidance as are our bodily reflexes. When a physician 'hits my knee with ,a hammer, the physical reflex is mora1ly neither good nor brud, beoouse it does not faU under my voluntary control. But shou1d I voluntarily raise my knee to injure someone, my physical reaction is subject to moral evailuation. For Aqiuinas, since emotional 11esponsesinvolve a rational element, they are mo11e intimately connected to reason than are our bodily parts, say, our arms and legs.[19] Since physical iie-aotions may ibe cahloo morally good or had insofar as they are voluntrury, 1and since emotions involve a rationrul element (rm-lilre our 1arms and legs), it foMows that emotions, insofar as they a11e voluntary, may be caililed good or evil even more properly :than physical rerucitionscan. When emotions are 131menable to rational control they .are good; when they 1are permitted to obscure reason and to us into acts which opposed to reason they are·bad.

Aquinas explains that emotions are morally good or had " either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will." [20] In other woros, failing to modify a neg,ative emotional response when one is .abLe to .so, is just rus moraHy rnrlpable ·as vo1untarily intensifying it. To experienre anger in itself is moraJ.,ly nerutral: I may not he able to control whether or not I ,£,eel .angry; anger may wei11 up in me be-fo11e I have time to refloot on it. But anger loses irts moral neutrality when I fail to keep my exp11essionof it within ra-,tional limits. For Aquinas, failing to restrain my expression of anger is just as worthy of blame as having purposefully " worked myself rup" iruto a violent rage.

10 Ibid., I-II 24, 1.
20 Ibid.

Apart from '.i.1eason, the emotions are inadequate guides to morail ruction. Since emotions lack an internal system of contrrus, they can become a destructi"\"e force within us, if they a11e pemri1tted to run rampant without ra:tional restraint. Having spontaneous[y experienced an emotion, there are appropriate and inappmpriate ways in which one can respond to its obj,ects. In order for us to respond momlly in a given situation, 11eason must determine whether 1the object of our emotion is really good or had and whether our emotion is appropriate in this situation. The evaluation of the appropriate and inappropriate, the good and bad, is made by reason. For ins1tance, Peter sees a stranger and spontaneously senses a th11eat, inducing in him an emotion of fear. However, whether or not fear is a good emotion for Peter to feel in this particular cirioumstance cannot be dete,rmined by the mere presence of 1tihe stmnger. Certainly not all strangers are ,threats to our well-being, though some may be. Yet if only .some strangers arie tlrneatening, wha:t is the c:mse for this stranger being threatening? Having discov;e11ed that Pet'er is afraid of a stranger, we may typicailly ask him "But why a1'e you afraid of this .stJCanger?"Peter's £ear wou1d he morally justifiable only if he could assign a reasonaMe cause for his fear. Only reason can rcomp1iehend causes anid mafoe compa,risons. Peter can termine whether or not his fear is reasonahle by comparing what has caused his sense of threat with what he knows can actually 1th11eatenhis well-being. If his fear stands up to this comparison and conduoes to his d!evdopment as a human being, then his emotion is moraUy good. If his emotion fails to meet mtional standards, he is, at least for the moment, emo1tionaHydisordered. For Aquinas, an emotion derivies its morail quality from its ioompatibility or incompatibility with the attainment of the human good. As as one retains his use of reason, he can refl:ect on his emotion and assess whether or not it is compat,ible with the good for his nabure considered as a totality.

A person in an emotionally excited condition such as fear is

at a when it comes to moral reasoning sill!Ce emotions servie to concentrate the mind',si attention on only certain iaspects of the alternativies av:ailable foc choice and either emphasire or Jessen the iattracliveness of these alternatives. Aquinas explains " Becaiuse when .a man is af£iecoodhy emotion things seem to him greater or smaJ1ex than they really are: thus to .a lover, what he il.oves seems better; to him :that fears, whait he fears :seems more drewdifm."[21] This haJS the effect of modifying the way in which objects are presented to rbhe mind as moral vailues. Being overtaken hy a srtrong emotion, oor reasoning ability becomes centered on the objoot of the emotion to such a degiiee rtihat we do not oonsider the oovantages of alternative objeorts .and alternaiti'Vlecourses of ad.ion. The fovier in the thr:oes of passion will not debate with himseH whether he should see his beloved or visit his siok aunt. Consequently, a strong emortion may cruuse an obj1etct to appear so attractive that it becomes for us the only worthwhile object. The more vo1rutilethe emotion, the more likely we are rto reruch an erroneous morail judgment; the less emotionally ,agiitated we are, the greater the cha.noes: that we will reach a soiU11d moral judgment.

Aiccording rto Aquinas, a morrul judgment is an act of intellect determining what is to be wilfod in regard to a mo:ool issue. It expresses a universal principle of action sucli. as, " Act justly to a11," fiiom ·which one can formulate a singrular moral jUJdgment, " Act justly to this person." Bult the moral judgment is not pul'lely a phenomenon of :in.rtehlectsince it mvoilves an admixture of will and emotion. Intelloot deliberates: about rthe value of several individual ohj1ee'tsand will oompilertesthis deliberation, making iits choice when one of these objects sufficiently .appeaJlsto it. The ithmg:s which are presented to the intelJieortand will as objeorts of choice are ju!dged as appealing or unaippea1ing not only on the basis of a rationwl appreciation of their valiue but also insofar as they evoke the various emo-

[21] Ibid., 1-11 44, 2.

tions. The emortions of sorrow and pleasure, for example, can motivate *us* toward making the right choices "since jrust as good is mor:e easily sought for the sake of pleasu11e, so is evil mo11e undauntedly shunned on acicount of sorrow." [22] Reflecting on our emotions oan motivate us 1to makre moral judgments. For seeing a starving African child on te1evision I experienoe the emotion of pity. If I reflect on my emotion as a morail good, it may prompt me to generalize about the silt1Uation wh:i!Ch my pity and I may form the morail judgment " The hungry shouM he fed."

In 011der to olarify the relationship between moral judgments and emotions, Aquinas disitinguishes a double relationship between them. Antecedent 'emotions, the emotions tha;t we experience prior to judgment, arise from a bodily disposition or from the operations of \the senses and the imagination. Aquinas explains how their derivation from the senses and imagination aC1Counts for our immedia:be l1eaictionsto oertajn objects:

> Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness.[23]

He adds thrut an aict of 1the sensitiv;e appetite "is a kind of indina:tion to the thing itself," [24] whereas an act of the intelleiet "does not consist in .a movement 1towa.l.'ds the thing, but rather the 11eviei'se."[25] Since Aquinas ,describes emotions as oots of the sensitive appetit1e, they can play a role in moral judgment by acting as intermediaries, rel,a;ting 1the mind to ,a particular obj,ect. In this way the antecedent emotions influence our judgment by making an object appear mo11e attractive or repulsive. Sometimes rthe antecedent emotion may be so stmng as to p:vev;entthe inteHect from deliberating about other objects, obseuring the moral judgment on which the va1lue of our act is

22 Ibid., I-II 59, 3.
2a *Summa theologiaa,* I-II 15, 1.
u Ibid.
25 Ibid., I-II 15, l ad 3.

bas,ed.[26] When an emotion becomes the ,soie mo1tiv1e:for an act, the a:ct is no longer voluntary and its moral value. This is why Aquinas says, " It is more praiseworthy ,to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere emotion of pity." [21] Emotions which are so overpowering 1bhat they drown out the voiee of reason impede the formation of responsible moral judgments. One's ability to ju:dge a situation objectiviely depends on the extent to which reason is able to weigh and assess the

Y:et insofar as we are ruble to deliberate over the object of the emotion and compare it with other objects, moderate emotions can actua.lly stimulate us to ponder a moraJ predicament more than we otherwise would have done. With regard to fear, Aquinas says "if the foar be moderate, withouit much disturbance of the 11eason, it conduces to working well, insofar as it causes a oertain solicitude, and makes .a man take eounsel." [28] To r:eturn to our earlier example, Peter's anrtecedent emotion of fear upon meeting 1a new person may movie him to rexamine emoition rationally: Does it arise from an unfounded prejudioe, which he ought to reconsider, or from some very r:earl worry one of this stranger's character traits may be detrimental to his phys]cail or to his psychologirnJl well.-being? The fatter case may moV1e him to '!Je:flecton this negative chara1cter trait, understand its undesirability, and form a general moral judgment regarding Aquinas notes that sorrow can have a similar effect, " Modemte 1sor:row, that does not caiuse the mind to wander, can conduce fo the a:cquisition of learning espeda1ly in regard to those things by which a man hopes to he freed from sorrow." [29] Sorrow ovier the losis of

2s Aquinas says, "If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet ... it would not result in the act being involuntary because in things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor involuntary." I-II 6, 8 ad 3.

[21] Ibid., I-II 24, 3 ad 1.

2s Ibld., I-II 44, 4.

[29] Ibid., I-II 37, 3 ad L

money, .for instance, may provide an incentive to learn about whether or not or to whrut degree money is eonnected with personal happiness. This lesson, in burn, may talm the form o.f a moraJl judgment ooncerning the importance of money to living a self-fulfiUed life. If the sorrow over money ha.d not been experienced, this kind of reflection may never haVie occurred. Thus deliberating or learning abouit the object of an emotion can draw one's attention to the moral aspects of a situation one had never previously considered.

Aquinas's observations only intimate rather than explicitly state how moderate emotions may stimuJate the formation of moral judgments. But this function of the emotions is ·certainly compatible and consistent with his teachings. Why did Aquinas not pursue this line of reasoning in greater detail? The most likely answer is that in the passages quoted above Aquinas is mel'ely describing, rather than prescribing, the effects of the emotions. Yet in view of 1the pmcticwl importance this function of the emotions can serw, namely, to make us learn and deliberate about their objects in order to .oovance our mo:rwl reasoning, a normativ;e oocounrt would have been most welcome.

Aquinas does attaich ·a normative status to consequent emotions, which follow the judgment, claiming that they increase rthe goodness of a moral act in two way:s:

> First by way of redundancy, because when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement; and thus the emotion that results in consequence is a sign of the intensity of the will." [30]

For instance, having rationally oonoluded that helping the poor is my duty, I feel an emotion of pity when I think aibout their plight. The second way a consequent emotion may incl'ease the v:aJ1ue of an act is by " w:ay of choice when a man, hy the judgment of bis reaJSon chooses to he affected by an emotion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation

[30] Ibid., I-II 24, 3 ad 1.

of the sensitive aippetite."[31] In both caises, the emotions are voluntary, since they follow a judgment and, consequently, the person is responsible for ·any act resulting from them. Thus Aquinas praises consequent emotions since they increase the moral vai111e of a good ,acl and intensify orur commitment to it. A person who is not only rationaJ:ly but also emotionally committed to a moral .wet is more resolved to accompilish it.

In addition to adding to the moral value of an aiotion, a consequent emotion ena.Mes a person to perform an ·aclion " more promptly and ·easily" than if the emotion were absent. Since emotion " is closely ·connected with a change in the ·body", the physicail moVrementis facilitated when the emotion corresponds to the choice of ithe .WiJ.J;[32] Refening to consequent emotions, Aquinas explains, " When a man is virbuous with the virtue of oour:age, the emotion of anger foll.owing upon the choice of virtue makes for greater alacrity in the .act."[83] The increased .aidl'enalinbrought on by a person's .anger can give him the boost he needs to deaJ. more efficaciously with a peroeived 1wrong.

Aquinas insists that our desires, pleasures, and fears need to be brought under the ·control of 11eason for a morally good life to ensue. Insofar as emotions participate in reasoning, they may intensify our morail ilife by becoming the instruments of moral virtue. Virtues. riequire appropriaite emotions ias instruments in the erercise of itheir activity. For instance, pity can become the instrument of mercy, and botdness can subserve courage. Temperance presupposes 'the physical desires which it keeps in chook. CouI'.a,geis compatible with fear, for the real-1ly brave person fears what he should when there is a l'leaBOnable basis for £ear but can also stand up to ithis fear and confront

81 Ibid. On the other hand, Aquinas observes that consequent emotions may also increase the malice of an act if used to serve a morally bad judgment. For instance, if I judge that the poor should not be given charity, my emo· tion of hatred or anger toward the poor would increase the malice of my failure to help them.

82 Ibid., I-II 59, 2 ad 3.

µ *Disputed Questions on. Truth,* 26, 7.

danger.[34] And we have seen that ioomage is .also compatible with anger if it conforms to the demands of reason.

Kant oouM not aooept this symbiotic relaitionship between emotion and virtue because he excluded the component of emotion fl'om morality a:s something foreign to reason. (Emotion is a b:rute fo11ce separaited from our higher l1a:tionaJ faculties, and an emotion SU!ch as fear or pain can overwhel.m rea·son.) This e:xdusion of emotion from the moral life reflects an inte1lectuaJism thrut can be traiood back ·to the ancient Stoics. Like Kant, the Stoics held emotions to be disturbances to which ithe virtuous person must not yield. Responding to the question of :whether moral virtue and emotion can be compatible, Aquinas explains that the Stoics cal1ed emotion " a mov;ement that e:xJCeeds the ilimi:ts of l'eason. Wherefore Cicero ... calls atll emotions diseases of the soul."[35] Aquinas agrees that, if emotions are defined as " inordinate passions," contrary to the order of reason, they cannot be in the virtuous person. However, he defines an emotion in a broader sense as *any* moviement in the sensitive appe1tite. In this sense "they can be in a virtuous person, insofar as they are subordinate to reason."[36] Aquinas's response to the Stoics 'Would doubtlessly extend to Kant's view itha:tvil'ltue requires a dispassionate equanimity. Kant's concept of the virtuous person as one who con-,tinuailly 1sb:1uggiles against his inclinations is different from Aquinas's accounts of boith emotion and virtue.

Kant maintained tha;t it is in itself better to do one's duty laicking or even against inolina,tion than do it wirth inclination. Now Aquinas would agree with Kant that doing ructs of kindness solely to derive a pleasurable feeling from them is not the ethical iderul. Morreover, he would ag11ee that it is better to do an aict of kindness even ·though we are otherwise disposed than to refrain from the act of kindness. On the other hand, he deemed it morally better to perform acts of kindness

34 *Summa theologica,* II-II 123, 3.
aG Ibid., I-II 24, 2.
s6 Ibid., I-II 59, 2.

w:it:h a oompLementary emotion than to do them dispassionately or indifferently and out of duty alone. Disoussmg the vation for a moral ruction, Aquinas says that 1an act can be g:ood in l'espect of its intention alone, but the best motivation wiM include both a good intention and a corl'esponding emotion.

> Just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite. [37]

My act of comforiting others is better if I feel sad over their misfortune than if I go through the motions of giving eomfort. For Aquinas, to possess 1a deeply emotional nature does not neoessarily lead to moral ruin; rather it makes for possibilities either for moral evil or for moral good.

Although Aquinas does not oppose emotions to the realm of the moml as Kant does, neither does he adopt the Humean position that emotions are ,the ground of all vafoe. Ullllike Hume, Aquinas holds that emotions afone are inadequaite guides to moral judgments; for moraJ judgments they require the assistanoe of reason. Yet emotions al'e not subject to the direot 1oontrol of reason. Distinguishing between those acts over which we have dir ect control and those over which we have only indirect eontrol, Aquinas says

> That rule is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the means to resist ... the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that rule is called politic by which a man rules over free subjects who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic rule .... But the reason is said to govern the emotions by a politic rule .... [38]

The rule of reason within the individual himself o¥er his emotions is a politiml mle: each emotion contains within itself its own freedom, its own power of res[sta.llJoe;it is the ii.1ole of a

[37] Ibid., I-II 24, 3.

[38] Ibid., I 81, 3 ad 2.

virtue to ove11comethis resistanioe, hut in such a way so as not to suppress the power itself. Following this anru1ogywe may say that, whereas Aquinas describes a politica1l rule of reason over the emotions, K!ant holds a despotic view of reason, and Hume supports a despotic view of emotion.

The power of reason is not meant, as in Kant's teaiching, to suppress the ·emotions but only to channel their responses in a manner .subject fo the diotates of reason. Rather than contribillting towards the acquisition of a " holy will," suppressing our emotions deprives our rational faculties of a gl'eat source of support. A suppressed emotional life can stand in the way of :forming moral judgmefllts and of acting on the basis of these judgments. GenemHy, if a person is dispassionate by nature or permits his emotions little expression, he can become too meek or hesiitant to formulate moral judgments independently and may 1thus indiseri:minaJtely rely on the moral judgments of others.

For Aquinas, emotion plays an integral and essential part in our moral activity since it relates us to Tu.lie concre1te," to things exis:ting in themselvies." But emotion alone does not see its object dearly enough to serve as a guide for moral living. Although an al1!tecedent emotion is not cognitively blind, it is near-sighted since it takes place mol'e in the physical powers than in the cognitive. One needs to see this object through the corrective lens of a moral judgment before one can see iit in proper perspective. Judgment looks at things from afar, from the realm of the abstract and universal. But in order for us not to become so far-sighted that we remain in the realm of the abstract, in order to attend to the specific problem we see before us here and now, we must rely on the emotion consequent to the moral judgment. Thanks to consequent emotion, affor we have seen the object of our emotion from the proper moral perspective, we can better understand how to approach the object of the emotion. In summary, Aquinas shows that emotions can have a morail significance of their own, contributing to the goodness of a morwl action and thereby tmly enriching our moral life.

AQUINAS ON THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE INTELLECT

DAVID RUEL FOSTER

Seton Hall University
South Orange, New Jersey

I. *A Controversial Question?*

HE QUESTION of the immateriailiity of the intelloot s ,an important part of the wider question about the na- u11e of the soul. The axgiumen'tsfor the immaiteriality of rthe intellect a11e particularly important to Thomas' s thought because they undergil1dhis argument for the incorruptibility of the soul; the incorruptibiility of the soul, in turn, leads towards the dootrine of the immortaility of the soruJ, a tenet of faith which Thoma.s wants to explain and deifend[1] This article will present Thomas's two most prominent arguments for the immateriality of the intieliteot and critique the first iin light of rthe seoond.[2]

Whether ,the principle of ilife must, by the very

1 .Arguments for the immateriality of the intellect do not necessarily appear in articles on the incorruptibility of the soul but are always presupposed by them in Thomas. For example, in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 6, "Whether the human soul is incorruptible?" (" Utrum anima humana sit corruptibilis "), Thomas supports the crucial premise in his argument by referring to the ,arguments for the immateriality of the intellect in articles 2 and 5 (" Utrum anima humana sit aliquid subsistens? "; "Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma?" *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, aa. 2 and 5).

2 Five important instances of the arguments are as follows: *In Sententias* II, d. 19, q. 1, a. I; *Summa contra gentiles* II, chapters 49-50; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, aa. 2 and 5; *Quaestiones Dis-putatae De anima* a. 14; *Oompendium theologiae, De fide,* chapters 79 and 84. This chronological ordering is based on Weisheipl's catalogue in *Friar Thomas D'A.quino,* pp. 355-406; and Eschmann's, *A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Work,* in Gilson's, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,* pp. 381-439. The dating of the *Compendium theologiae* is the most problematic.

natUJ.1e of its .act, be immaterial is a particularly controrverted question today. Many thinkers helie¥e that human understanding can be ex:pfained in strictly physical terms. ':Chis was not the case in Thomas's day, and it is important to takie notre of this. Thomas W1as noit foroed by any opponent to sharpen his arguments for the imma.teriality of the inteHect. The major Islamic philosophers, ailithough they disagreed among themselves about aspects of the inbe1iJiect's nature (e.g., the plaice and ro[e of the agent intellect)' md agree thait the intellectual soul was immaterial. Plato and Aristotle, according .to Thomas, agreed on this f.undamental point. In fact, although there were post-Socratic materialists, [3] Thoma;s usuru1Jy goes ha;ek to the Pre-Socratics in order rto give an example of someone who taJUghtthat the inte!IJiectuaLact. depends entirely on physicrul principles. Perhaps it is better to s1ay that, because the doctrine of runiversal hylomorphism was so widely accepted in his time, Thomas was not challenged regarding the incorporeality of the intellect. Many of Thoma:s's contemporaries, foililowingthe tewching of Awoobroin, held that the intellectuaJ. souil was composed of spiritua.l matter .and the appropriate form,4 hut this was not in opposition to Thomas's arguments for the immateriality of the intellect.

II. The Two Most Prominent Arguments

A. Type I

The first argument (hereaf·ter caUed Type 1) proceeds from the intellect's potential to know all corporeal things. It is justifiably described as Thomas' s preferred argument, [5] for

s For example, the Epicureans.

4 J. Weisheipl, "Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron," in *Albert the <h'eat: Commemorative Essays,* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), pp. 239-249. See also J. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), pp. 274-276.

5 Henry Koren, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animate Nature,* (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1955), pp. 165-167. Richard Connell, "The *Intus Apparfms* and the Immateriality of the Intellect," *New Scholasticism* 32 (April

Thomas giVies this argument first all throughout his career. When Thomas mentions in passing that Aristotlre has pmved the inbeihlectto he immaterial, it is to this argument that he refers.[6] The argument crun be summarized as foUows:

> The intellect is in potency to become all corporeal things. To be in potency, the intellect must not be that to which it is potential. Therefore, the intellect must be free of all corporeal things.[7]

is no mystery .about this argument's source: *De anima 3,* 4, whel'le Aristotle begins in ·earnest to discuss the rational soul.[8] The argument appears in the major Aristotelian commentaitors, and Albert uses the argument in a context similar to that of St. Thomas.[9] Thomas first uses the argument in his oommenbary on the *Sentences,* where he l'lefersto the *De anima* texts by way of ithe numbers in Av;erroes's *Commentarium magnum.* The clea11est instances of the argument are in the *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 2, :and the *Questiones disputatae De anima* a. 14. commentairy *In De anima* is also help£uJ. for undersrtanding his sens·eof the argument.

B. Type 2

The second argument (hereafter crulled Type 2) is based on the intellect's mode of possessing the object; its having the essenre of the object for its: formal objeet. The usual example is rthe grasp of the universrul, which transcends the limits of matter. This argument is also based on Aristotle's *De anima*[10] and can be summarized as follows:

1958): 151-186. Herbert McCabe," The Immortality of the Soul," in *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays,* ed. by A. Kenny (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Co., 1969), pp. 297-306.

a For example, see *Quaestiones quodlibet* X, q. 3, a. 2.

1 This summary and the one that follows are not intended to be in strict syllogistic form.

s Aristotle, *De anima* 3, 4 429a 10-25.

9 See Albert the Great, *Summa de creaturis* II, I, q. 61, aa. 1 & 2.

10 Aristotle, *De anima* 3, 4 429b 10-22 is perhaps the most prominent location for this argument, but there are other important references throughout the *De anima,* e.g., 2, 5 417b 17-25.

Whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. The Intellect receives what it knows in an absolutely immaterial mode. Therefore, the mode of being of the intellect is immaterial.

Although Thomas evidently preferred type 1 (because it appears in such p:mminent locations), it is actually type Q that is most pervasive in his work.[11] This is aJlso the type of argument that is moot often repeated by Thom.ists writing today, th01Ugh, as far as I know, no one has explicitJ.y ·stated that he prefeirs type Q over type 1. The expression of type Q varies more than that of type 1, for !type Q is often combined with elements. of other arguments, and rthis is an indication of its fundamental chariader among ruM the arguments. I believe that type Q is the *most* f1Undamentrul argument for the immateriality of the intellect and is the one tha.t promises to be most useful in the present day.

III. Short of Both Arguments

A. Type 1: Knower Knows All Things

Summa theologiae I, q. 75, which begins the Tract on Man, provides ,a good example of both arguments. Article Q is an example of Type 1, .and a.rrtiole5 of Type Q.

Article 2, " Whether the human soul is something subsistent? ",[12] is .an 'argument for the .spirituality of the human 1souL[13] There are rtwo parts to Thomas's ·answer: first, type 1 is used :t:o demonstrate that the inteHecbuail soul operates1 independently of matter; second, as a general principle, whatever

11 See *In Sententia,s* II, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1; *Summa contra gentiles* II, chapter 49; *Summa theofogiae* I, q. 76, a. 1; *Quaestiones disputatae* a. 14; *Oompendium theo"logiae,* chapter 79.

12 "Utrum anima humana sit aliquid subsistens." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 2.

13 More precisely, Thomas says that the argument is that the soul is incorporeal and subsistent. " Dicendum quod necesse est dicere id quod est principium intellectualis operationis, quod dicimus animam hominis, esse quoddam principium incorpoream et subsistens." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 2.

operates *per se* must first exist *per se*. While the second part can be stated ,by Thomas, ithe first part must be argued. The first part of the first argument is as follows:

> For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of [the natures ofJ [14] all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. [15]

The argument, as it appears in Aristotle, is brief and somewha1t .ambiguous as to rbhe ,sense of its term; [16] :therefore, Thomas elaborates the middle tenn in three way:s: first, he emphasizes the natul'e of potentiaility, second, he specifies what rthe intellect is in potency to know, i.e., the *natures* of all *corporeal* things, and third, he uses two .analogies based on the sense powe11s.

Thomais begins by making it clear that the natuve of potentiality requil'es the intellect to be immaterial. The intei1lect is in potentiality to know ahl things, which means that it is in

[14] I have inserted "natures" into the Benziger translation because it is in the Latin text and important for our discussion.

[15] "Manifestum est enim quod homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura, quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter impediret cognitionem aliorum, sicut :videmus quod lingua infirmi quae infesta est cholerico et amaro humore non potest percipere aliquid dulce, sed omnia videntur ei amara. Si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia corpora cognoscere. Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam. Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 2.

[16] "Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible. Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block:" *De anima* 3, 4, 429al7-21, trans. J. A. Smith.

potentiality to booome any object in an intentional way. To be in porenrtiaJity to become something, the intellect must nort be thrut rthing. He takes it as a given that the soul is the principle of intelfocbuaJ.operrutions and that, by means of the inte11ect, man ean lmow the natures of all corporeal things. Given this, he argues thait to know a particular thing the knower oannort have any of it in its own naiture, because that which was in it would impede the knowledge of other thllings:. This last statement, which is so important to this argument, is the conclusion of two familiar premises, one epistemological and one ontologicail. The epistemological premise states rthat to know something is, in some way, rto become that thing. The onto1ogicrul premise reflects the demand of potentiality: for anything .to *become* something else it must :firsrt *not be* th.ait thing. The condusion is that the knower musrt not he anything that it is in potentiaJ:ity to know. In this: case, thalt which knows corporeal natures camnot have .any corporeail nruture in it, booaiuse that which is in it wouhl impede :the knowing of amything elise.

To continue this 'eLwborationof the middle term, what specifically can the intellect know when it is said that it can know a111things? Thoma:s says that rthe inteMect can know *all corporeal* things and £urthermore, that it knows the *natures of corporeal* things.[11] Regarding the range of knowing, Thomas stresses that the intcllect can know ' *all* (*omnium)* , as does Aristotle, so rthat *all* corpore,aJthings can be exiel'll!dedfrom ithe intellect's nwbure:[18] Without the qualification ' all' the argument would

11 Thomas does not mean that we can only know corporeal things, but rather that corporeal things are all that need be considered for this argument. Furthermore, corporeal things are what we come to know first, easily, and confidently. He specifies that we know the *natures* of things, perhaps to emphasize the intellectual character of the knowledge in question. The senses may know all corporeal things in a certain way, but only the intellect knows the nature of things.

18 This qualification comes, of course, from Aristotle's text, but for Aristotle it may have an added meaning that Thomas does not refer to; see below Section IV, B.

be inconciLusive. The qualification that the intellect knows all *corporeal* things [19] shows that the argiumenrt proceeds from the inte11eot's knowledge of its 011dinary and proximate objects. The knowledge of spiritua1l things need not be considered in this argument, and, in fact, the knowing of spiritual things is a separa.te argument for Thomas. [20] The neXit qua1lification, that the intellect can know the *natures* of a:ll corporeal things, distinguishes the intellectual act from the sense ad. Thomas does not simply say that the inteHeot knows aH corporeal things; rather, he says that the intellect can know the *natures* of alll things. This points out the difference between the sensitiv;e soul which knows 1the sensible form and the which knows the formal nature.

The third elaboration is two analogies using the senses of :taste and sight. The first, using taste, shows the immateriality demanded by the inteHect's pobency to aU sensible things; the second, using sight, shows the 'limited character of :a physical organ. The first assumes that the tongue's ability to taste is dependent upon maintaining a haJ.arme or harmony. [21] When this balance is losrt by the dominating presence of a certain faste, then the tongiue loses its ability to receive other flavors. He then comp1etes the analogy: likewise, if the intellect contained the natm'e of a body, it would nort know the nature of a11 bodies, becaiuse an bodies ha,ve their own det1m·minarte nature.

The second analogy, this time between sight and intellect, rules out au intrinsic dependence of the intellect upon a bodily

[19] Thus the present discussion need not consider knowledge of spiritual things, but because Thomas understands all knowledge to come through the senses (even the knowledge of spiritual things) such a consideration need not radically alter this critique.

[20] An argument from knowing spiritual things is probably the sense of *Summa contra gentiles* II, chapter 49, argument 4. This argument is also briefly suggested in the *Compendium theologiae,* chapter 79.

[21] His understanding of the sense of taste is in line with Aristotle's treatment in the *De anima* 2, 10. See Kurt Pritzl, " The Unity of Knower andl Known in Aristotle's *De anima"* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1981), pp. 134-142.

organ. The immateriaJlirtyof the intellect is not simply equivalent to that of material form. The intellectual sool .as a subsistent form is not dependent upon the body in the way the power of -sightiis dependent upon the eye.[22]

It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color.[23]

Whii1e the inte1leot is extri.nsicaJJydependent upon the senses in order to gain its object, it is nort intrinsically dependent upon .any bodiJ.yorgan.[24] Evidence for this lies in the fact that men know bodily things by wbstraction .and spiritual things by analogy to bodily ithings.[25]

B. Type Knower Knows UniverSlals

Hecwuse of the prominence of the *Summa theologiae,* q1Uestion 75, .ariticle5 of the First Part is the best known example of type 2; it is ailso, simply on its own merits, the clearest example of type 2.[26] Ar:tic1e5 asks "Whether the soul is composed of matter .and form? "[27] The fmming of this question

22 The point Thomas makes here is the same one he attributes to .Aristotle in the text from *De anima* 3, 4 - the intellect is not subject to qualities.

·2s "Et similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum, quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum; sicut si aliquis determinatus color sit non solum in pupilla, sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus ejusdem coloris videtur." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 2.

24 *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 2; and q. 84, a. 7.

25 Timothy Suttor. "How the Soul Understands," appendix 7 in *Thomas* .Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), vol. 11, pp. 263-267.

26 In the commentary on the *Sententias,* the second type of argument is not given a complete presentation; in the *Summa contra gentiles* it is presented in different combinations.

21 "Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma?" *Summa, theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 5.

rejects the doctrine of universa,l hylomorphism. Thomas, however, does not mention Avioebron nor does he address Avicebron' s doctrine directly ex;cept in the reply to objection 4.[28] Instead, Thomas uses the article to give another argument for the immateriality of the intellect.

Thomas begins by saying that the intelleot's immateriality can be shown in two ways: first, from the notion of the soul in gener:al; seoond, from 1the notion of the soul as intellectual. The first way argues that soul is the fonn of the body and as such is not materiaL If the " soul " were composed of matter and form, there wouM still need to be a strictly immaterial "part." This .argument applies to the soul of any living thing; as such, it is not an arg1Ument for substantial immateriality and hence not the concern of this article.

The second way has two arg1Uments. The first is composed of two categorical whi!ch conctude ithat the intellectual soul is an ahsoh1te form and thel'efore not composed of matter and form, i.e., Type *9t.* The second argument is a hypothetical sy11ogism *modus tollens* that confirms the first argument. The first argument is as follows:

> Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul, inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal

[28] "Ad quartam dicendum quod omne participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus ejus. Quaecumque autem forma creata per se subsistens ponatur, oportet quod participet esse, quia etiam ipsa vita, vel quidquid sic diceretur, *partioipat ipsum esse,* ut dicit Dionysius. Esse autem participatum finitur ad capacitatem participantis. Unde solus Deus, qui est ipsum suum esse, est actu purus et infinitus. In substantiis intellectualibus est compositio ex actu et potentia, non quidem ex materia et forma, sed ex forma et esse participato. Unde a quibusdam dicuntur componi ex quo est et quod est. Ipsum enim esse est quo aliquid est." *Summa theofogiae* I, q. 75, a. 5, reply to objection 4.

idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form.[29]

The premises for the firsrt argument are: anything receiv<ed is received areol'!ding to the mode of the reociv:er, and knowing inv<oh7Jes the reception of the form of the known. Hence the avgiument: major premise, .anything !'leeeivedis received :a;ccording to the mode of the receiver; minor premise, knowing inv:olves the possession of the form of the orther; conclusion, the form of the orther is received in the intellect a.oco11dingto the mode of being of the intieJ:lect.

The concilusion to the first syLlogism,which is also the minor premise of the .second syllogism, is never Sitated. His nerl sfatement is the major premise of the second syllogism: rthe inte1lect knows a rthing in its nature a:bsolutely. This is the pivotrulpremise; it is a pomt not so much controversial ·as it is diffioo!Ltto illiustrate. It is not :a new idea or new terminology. The vieT1b *absolvere* means literrully "to be free f.rom"; the adverb *absolute* means "separately," "independerutly," "simply," "absolutely." It can be synonymous with *simplioiter* and is the opposite of *ex seu sub condicione.*[80] The first level of meaning (when he says the intellect knows the forms rubso1utely) is clear from what he says in the reply: the inteUoot has the nature a.bsolubely in the sense tihat it has it free from the constraints of matter. The form freed from (.abstracted from) matter is the univel"sailform. Thomas's i11usitrartionis " it knows a s:to:ne absolrutcly as a stone; and therefore the form of

29 ".Secundo, specialiter ex ratione humanae animae inquantum est in· tellectiva. Manifestum est enim quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. Sic autem cognoscitur unumquodque sicut forma ejus est in cognoscente. Anima autem intellectiva cognoscit rem aliquam in sua natura absolute, puta lapidem inquantum est lapis absolute. Est igitur forma lapidis absolute, secundum propriam rationem formalem, in anima intellectiva. Anima igitur intellectiva est forma absoluta, non autem aliquid compositum ex materia et forma." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 5.

so Schutz, *Thomas-Lemikon,* p. 4; also Deferrari and Barry, *Lexicon ot' St. Thomas Aquinas,* pp. 3-4.

a stone absoiutely, as to its proper formal :iidea, is in the intellectual soul." [31] Hence, to have the nature rub:so1utielyis to have it *secundum pr<>priam rationem formalem,* which is :to grasp the essence of the obj,oot. Then Thom!lis draws his conclusion " therefore, ... the inte!llecrbuaJsoul itse[f is an absolute form." The conclusion that the irntellect's mode of being is immaterial, a " form without matter," follows from the premises: majorr premise, the objeclt is ,in the knower in an ahso1uite way, i.e., without matter; minor premise, the object is received in the knower .ruoooording to rthe mode of he:ing of the knower. [32] Thomas often contrasts the senses with the inte[lecrt in regard rto the way they possess the object known. The eye sees particular cars or trees, never the notion of car or tree. Senses receive the aociderutal form withourt matter but nort without the conditions of matter, hut the intellect receives the S1Uhstantial form without matter or even the conditions of matter. [33]

The second argument is a hypothetical sylfogism *modus tollens* that confirms the first .argwnent. This syllogism turns the argument around aind argues thwt, if the inteHectua,I soul were composed of matter ,and form, then impossible consequences would foUow:

For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals,. and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers, which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual sub-

a1 "Anima autem intellectiva cognoscit rem aliquam in sua natura absolute, puta lapidem inquantum est lapis absolute. Est igitur forma lapidis absolute, secundum propriam rationem formalem, in anima intellectiva." *8umma theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 5.

a2 Note that the minor premise is a more specific version of the major premise of the first argument.

as See *Ewpositio super librum Boethii De trinitate,* ed. R. P. Mandonnet (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929), English trans., *Division and Method in the 8oienoes,* A. A. Maurer. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1953.

stance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.[34]

The firs:t premise is the omy part of the argument explicitly stated (antecedent and comequent); the second premise (deniwl of consequent) is understood and is rthe same as the major pl.'lemisein the second syllogism of the first argument, namely: "but the in:te11ectualsoul knows a thing in its na;ture absolute-." The conclusion is left unstated, except insofar as it is induded in the gener:al conolrusion of ,the entire second way. Hence the argument: first premise, if the inteMect were composed of matter and form, then the forms C1.1eceived wou1d he l'!eceived a:ocol'lding to the conditions of matter, ije., they would be re1ceivied as second p11emise, but the intelloot knows forms aJbsolutely; conclusion, the intellectual soul, indeed every inte11ectua1lsubstance, must be free from the composition of matter and form.

IV. Critique

A. In General

I .argue that type l is so weak that it can he salvaged only by riecorn.'.seto type 2. Fom ohieictions to type l ave: l) it is an moompfote 11enderingof Aristotle's argument; 2) it is not in ,aiocordwith Thomas"s tewching about the interior senses; 3) it is not in ruocord with a better understanding of brain function; 4) it detr:acts from Thomas's teaching on the unity of the person. The first objecition indicates the reason for the dependence 'Of type 1 on type 2, while the other three objections point out further weaknesses in type 1.

Type 1 errs by stl'essing the intelfoct',s potentiaility to know

[34] "Si enim anima intellectiva esset composita ex materia et forma, :formae rerum reciperentur in ea ut individuales; et sic non cognosceret nisi singulare, sicut accidit in potentiis sensitivis, quae recipiunt formas rerum in organo corporali. Materia enim est principium individuationis formarum. Relinquitur ergo quod anima intellectiva, et omnis intellectualis substantia cognoscens formas absolute, caret compositione formae et materiae." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 5.

all corporeal tlrings raither than swessing its manner of knowing. The intellect can be shown to be immateTial not because :iit knows *all* corporeail things hut hecaiuse it knows things in a strictly immaterirul *manner*. The inteHect is immaterial because it knows in a unique way, i.e., by gmsping the universal. The onJy way to gert a foc1.1ceful argument from type 1 is by emphasizing what it means to *know* in the fuH irrteMectual sense. To this, howev;er, is to reduce the argument to type fl.

For Thomas, the interior senses can *know* all corporeal things hut only in a qualilled way; *know'ing* in :the strict sense is ithe of the immaterial intel1ect. *Knowing* in a broad sense can describe 1certain activitfos of the interior senses, and this broad sense ha;s a basis in both Aristotle and Thomas.[35] To show the impact of this brorud sense of knowing on type 1 is the burden of the second objection.

The second and the third objections do not oonfus:e sense kn0W1ledge with intellectual knowl1edge, nor do they suggest a type of materialism. Hut they do suggest that according rto Thomas and Aristotle (and oontempomry kno,wledge of brain function as the interior senses " know " in a limited but significant sense and that this knowing e:xfonds to all corporeal things. In light of this, type 1 must be reconsidered.

B. First Obj,eiction

The first objection is that type 1 is an incomplete rendering oif argument. Thel'e is no question that Thomas's .argument t:he main sense of Aristotle's argiument. Thel'le is, howevier, reason to believie that :an element of type 2: is implied in Aristotlie's argument.[36] In *De anima* 3, 4,[37] where

35 See Aristotle, *De anima* 3, 7 and Thomas *In De anima,* 3, lecture 10. See also *f!fumma theofogiae* I, q. 78, a. 4. Thomas often uses the word *oognitio* is this broad sense; see Deferrari and Barry, p. 164.

as This supports my position that the type l argument is inadequate when it is not undergirded by the type 2 argument.

117 " --- the intellect should be related to the object of thought in a manner similar to that in which a sense is related to its sensible object. And, since th\l intellect [can] think every [object of thought], it must exist without be·

Aristotle says tha1t 1the intellect can think eV'ery object of thought, two lines of argument come together" The more appal'ent line, inspired by Anaxagoras and based on the principle of potency, is a new argument; [38] the less apparent line, based on the grasp of essienioes,has been on Aristotle's mind since Book l"

Aristotle senses his indebtedness to Anaxagoras for the major line of a:rgumenL In *De anima* 1, 2, he notes that his predecessors (eXJcepting Anaxagoras) , following the principle "likie 1is known by ilike," claim tha1t the soul is oonstituted out of whateV1erthey take to be the most fundamental element or elemenrts" Fire, air, water all haV'e their supporters" Anaxagoras, who proposes mind as a first efficient caiuse, claims that the mind afone has nothing in common with anything elseo[39] Aristotle sees this a1s an insight into the nature of the intellect, and he t:r:ans1forms:rthis insight into an argument for the immateriality of the inteJJect based on its potential to beoome all things"

The principle for this argument is not subtle, and later Aristoteilians wi:ll someitimes use it like a cfob: THE INTELLECT CANNOT BE WHAT IT IS TO BECOMR The principle is adapted from the *Physics* [40] and the sheoc physicalness of the argument causes two confusions: one from ignoring the different types of potentiality, the other from blurring the dif-

ing blended [with something else] in order that, as Anaxagoras says, "it may rule", that is, in order that it may know. For, if it appears along [with some other thing], the [later will] prevent or obstruct [the knowledge of] another kind [of thing]." Aristotle, *De anima,* 3, 4 429a 17-20; trans. Hippocrates Apostle, *Aristotle's On the Soui,* p. 49.

ss Aristotle has discussed the potentiality of knowledge, but this is its first use as an argument for the immateriality of the intellect.

39 "Accordingly, those who assert that there is only one cause or one element, such as fire or air, posit the soul, too, to be one; but those who assert that the principles are many posit the soul, too, to be many. Anaxagoras alone says that Intelligence cannot be affected ancl that it has nothing in common with any of the other things. But how Intelligence, if it is such, will know and through what cause, he did not say anything, nor is it evident from his writings." *De anima,* 1, 2, 405b 17-24; trans. Apostle, *On the Soui,* p. *1"*

40 Aristotle, *Physics* I, 6-8.

fe11ence between iwtentional and real being. Potentiality occurs differently in different things: the potency of the inteHeet is different from the potency of prime matter, and the potency to change is different from the potency to substantial change.[41] The argument does not qualify its sense of potentiality, and this causes isome confusion. Furrthermo:re, there is 1an ambiguity in the argument between intentional being and real being. The way the apple *has* the form of apple is di:fferenrt from the way the intellect *has* the form of a,pple, y;et they are both modes of being for the form. On the one hand, the argument depends on the sameness between intentional being and real being; on the other hand it counts on the difference. This sameness and difference, however, is never acknowledged in the .argument.

The second line of argument is present in a muted fashion and apparent only when the argument is read in light of an ear:lier argument. At 1,5 409b25 Aristotle explains why it is that the princip1e " like is known by like " will not work.[42] The crux of ·the expl.anation is that intellectual knowing is a knowing of essences. Aristotrle a1dmit:s for the sake of the argument that one element might know its kind, and that a soul composed of the four elements cou1d 11ecognizethose four elements that go into the composition of ev;erything. But there is a fundamentail di:fference between knowing a mi:i"ture of earth,

41 *Summa theologiae* I, q, 75, a. 5, ad 2.

42 "Now these thinkers say that the soul [consists of elements] in order that it may both sense [all] things and know each of them, but their doctrine necessitates many impossibilities; for they posit that like is known by like, as if they are positing the soul to be the things. But these [elements] are not all that exists; there are many other things-or rather, perhaps an infinite number of them-which are distinct from the elements and consist of them. So let it be granted that the soul can both know and sense the elements of each existing thing; then by what will it know or sense the composite of each thing [which, besides its elements, has also a form], e.g., by what will it know or sense what is God or man or flesh or bone or, similarly, any other composite thing? F·or each of these is not merely its elements regardless of their relation to each other, but those elements in a certain ratio and composition," Aristotle, *De anima*, l, 5 409b; Apostle, *Aristotle's On the Soul*, pp. 14-15.

air, :fuie, an:d Wiater, and knowing a man, a dog, a tree, or any one of a potentially infinite number of knowable objects. The theory " like is known by likle" is insrufficient becaiuse what would be actually known al'e the material principles, Le., the elements, that axe only portentiailly all corporeal things. Knowl-1edge, howevier, to he knowfodge must be ructuail.; to know the obje!Ctpotentfall:y is not to know it. This pre-Socratic view of knowledge leav:es aside *form,* which is the most knowable aspect of things. [43] How is it that the mind knows man, dog, and tree a:nid not just an aggl'!egationof elements? Human knowing is explained hy a grasp of essenoes aDJd not by the grasp of their material principles. Thus, when Aristotle begins the argument in 8,4 by observing that the intenercrtcan know *all* things, this ,l"ecai1ls the .argument at 1,5: that because man knows many things, perhaips an infinite number of things, the of the elements knowing their like wi11 not suffice.

Aristotle's argument at 1,5 also provides an insight inito what it means £or the mind to become all things. The theory he re-:liuters holds thrut the intellect *is* e¥ecything thart irt knoWis (Hke is known by like). Aristotle's denies that intel1lect is ailw:ays aiotuaJ.izedbut ,affirmsrthat knowing likeness; the likeness is achieved by the intellect *becoming* everything thart it knows:.

Thus, the weakness in Thomas's argument shows up first in his rendering of Arisrtotle's axgument. That Thomas to some degree recognizies this weakness is shown by his qualification of the argument in the *Summa theologiae,* w:her:e he stress1es that the intellect lmow:s the *natures* of a;M sensible things. [44] He does not .always make this qualification, howev;er, and the qualiifioation by itself does not rescue the argument.

[43] St, Thomas *De immortalitate animae,* a recently recovered *Quaestiones disputatae.* A copy of this text, edited by Leonard Kennedy along with arguments for its authenticity, is found in *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litte'T'-aire du Moyen Age* (Paris: J, Vrin, 1978), pp. 203-223.

[44] *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a, 2.

C. Second Objection

The .second is that the .argument of type 1 is not in .accord with Thomas':s :teacl:ringon the interior senses, i.e., that the interior senses hav;e the potential to know, in a broad sense, a1l oorporeail,things.[45] Thomas fo.liowsAristotle in making sense lmowledge a function *of* a corporeal organ rather than of a spiritual substance, as Pilato truught. Thomas' *s* teaching on the interior senses is more dev;eloped than Arisitotle's and is part of a tradition begun by the Aristotelian commentators.

For St. Thomas, knowing in the full ·sense is the act of the immaterial intellect, hut ithere is a qualified knowing that is the act of the mterior senses. In *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. I, in speaking of the po•wersof the soul, Thomas says that all of the powers, evien the vegetative, transcend in some way the operation of corporeal nature.

> The reason for this diversity lies in the various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways.[46]

In the same article, ,speaking of the range of objects of the sensitivie soul, Thomas says that it has" a more universal object----'1l3.II1ely, every sensible hotly, not only the body to which the soul is united." [47] Thus Thomas ind:icrutes that the range of the sensitive soul includes: all those objects, i.e., every sensible body, that type 1 denies to it. It may be said in defense of type 1 ithrut the sensirbi.ve soul does not possess the formaJ natures of the objects as does the intehloot. This is undoubtedly true for Thomas, but to apperul to the intelJ.ect's grasp of the formal natures is to appeal to a differerut argument, i.e., type 2.

45 The internal senses are usually listed as follows: common sense, imagination, memory, cognitive sense. See *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4.

46" Et huius diversitatis ratio est, quia diversae animae distinguuntur secundum quod diversimode operatio animae ·supergreditur operationem naturae corporalis." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 1.

47 " --- quod respicit universalius objectum, scilicet omne corpus sensibile, et non solum corpus animae unitum." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. I.

Question 78, article 4, discrusses the interior sense powers. The extent to which Thomas attributes knowing power to the senses is striking. Thomas says that rthe estimative power in " perfect animals " [48] goes beyond the mere response to stimulus and some knowing power. Animals need to pe11ceive things as useful or harmful, and this is a power beyond that of the exterioil'senses.

Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through senses, the estimative power is appointed. [49]

It is partioolarly the apprehension intentions which are not l'eoeived through ,the exterior senses that points to a sort of thinking or discourse.

Thomas points out that while we see that other animals demonst:ra:te powers of the estimative sense, in the human animal this sense power is much mol'e astute.

But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas. Therefore the power which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the *cogitative,* which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions. [50]

In reply to the fourth objection, Thomas goes further along this v;ein by recognizing a simifarity between the inteHect and the cogitrutive sense in that both work by comparing, adding, and dividing. Like the intellect, the cogitative sense comes to know things that go beyond what it might be expected to lrnow by sense perception.

48 A perfect animal is one that has all the powers of the soul possible to an animal, but not necessarily the rational power.

49 "Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur ordinatur vis aestimativa." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4.

50" Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas differentia est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et ideo, quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4.

.. the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner. [51]

This affinity between the cogitative sense and the inte1lect elevates the cogiita,tive by association. To desicribe the 'how' of this association between intellect and cogitative sense is beyond us; we must settle for some type of analogica.l knowledge. One thing is clear: Thomas is not suggesting two paraHel thinking faculties, one corporeal and one spidtua,l, but rather two aspects of the thinking person. [52] In !'eply to the fifth objection Thomas points out the interplay between intellect and interior senses that results from this unity.

The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason,. which, so to speak, overflows into them. [53]

We are perhaps more familiar with Thoma:s's teaching that the inteHect is dependent upon the phantasms found in the interior sense powers for the object by which it knows. [54] The passages just ci:ted shows there is also a by the interior sense powers in the intellect's activities and an elevation of the inte,rior sense powers by this activity. Type 1 fails to recognize the significanoe of the knowing power of the interior senses.

51 "--- intellectus multa cognoscit quae sensus percipere non potest. Et similiter aestimativa, licet inferiori modo." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4, ad. 5.

52 See *De unitate intellectu& contra Averroi&tas,* chap. 3, and *Siimma theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 4.

53 "Ad quintum dicendum quod illam eminontiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis, sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quandam refluentiam." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4, ad. 5.

54 See *In De anima* Bk. 1, lectio 2 and Bk. 3, lectio 11.

D. Thi11d Obj,eotion

The thil'd objection is that the first type of argument does not permit easy assimilation of modern understandings of brain function. This objection is reil.ated to the second objection, that itype I fails to match Thomas's own description of brain function. The third objection contends that type 1 fruHs to mabch contempoirary advances in bra,in reseavch. Two consideml:tions support my thesis; and both have heen the subject of much con:tempomry invies1tigation: the study of animal havior and the study of the brain. I a,rgue not that Thomas's psychology is a:t variamce with contemporary :findings-the contrary is evident from our second objection [55]-but thait type l is inconsistent wiith contempora.ry findings as well a:s with Thomas's own psychology.

The &amat:ic increase in knowledge about animal behavior has led some to think tha.:t human knowing does not differ from animal knowingo The study of other animals is important becaruse on this level there is little ment between the materiaJrist and the Thomist. Both agl.'eethat whatewr knowing is evident in other animals is the function of a physica1 organo[56]

Thomas suggests that human brain activity far outstrips that of other animak [57] Considering this, the evidence of even animal 'reasoning' ,ability tends to support the materialistsr's elaim that a spwitual principle is not necessary to explain human reasoningo N at1urailists continue to impress us with evidence of tool-ruse by champanzees, by the rapid adaptations or learning of Japanese ma;caques, and by the ability to communicrute exhibited by dolphins and whale:s.[58] Even if

[55] See *Summa theoZogiae* I, q. 78, aa. 1, 4.

[56] I do not mean to suggest that there is no difference between a materialist and Thomist understanding on this level; the Thomistic understanding of form and the operations of the soul are significantly different.

[57] *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4.

[58] See, Binney and M. Janson, *Atlas of the Body and Mind,* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1976), pp. 20-240 Duane Rumbaugh, ed., *Language Learn-*

we are armed with a healthy skepticism regarding the many claims made for animal inteilligence, we cannot help but be impressed. Further, there the more common experience of being outsmarted by one's own dog. If we are to be respecters of the common opinion, as Aristotle was, then our arguments must somehow respect ithe opinion that animals can be ' smart.'

A1l of this is to say that other animals do manifest a significant amount of knowing [59] and that maiteriwlisrts and Thomist:s agree that this activity is carried on .by physical organs. A respoooe in the spirit of St. Thomas would somehoiw inioorporatethis information withoult making the additional but mistaken claim that human intelligence can be !'educed without remainder to brain activity.

Thomas offers a balanced approach to the reiLation of man to other animals. On the one hand, there is a vast area of commonality we share with other animals, especially other primates; on the other hand, there is a deep, unbridgeable chasm that separates the hruman person from brute animals. As with the themes of nature and grwce, the themes of the sameness and difference between men and brutes are prominent in St. Thomas. [60] The unbridgeable chasm refers to the spil'litllliaJnature of the human person that manifests itself in intellecbual oper:aitionsand free acts of the wilL The vast area of common ground that we share with other animails encompasses the vegetative and sensitive aspects of life.

Recent developments in understanding brain function form the other avea of contemporary learning that supports it.he tmro objection. Knowledge o[the intricate workings of the brain encourages olll:l'beil.iefthat interior sen:sesplay a fuller role than the first type of argument allows. Success in mapping ithe

ing by a Chimpanzee: The Lana Project, Communication and Behavior Series, vol. I (New York: .Academic Press, 1977).

59 .Again, this is ' knowing ' taken in a broad sense and not a claim that other animals have intellectual knowledge.

eo See *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, aa. 2 and 3; *Compendium th,eologiae* chap. 79.

brain has girvenmore detailed information about which areas of the brain are ronnecbed with specific mentaJ. activities, e.g., the frontal lobe 1withplanning and judgment; [61] the left hemisphere wiith fangiuage, memory, and logic; the right hemisphere with visio-.spatial ability. [62] There is :also knowledge of the mech-1anismof short- and Jong-:bermmemory, and of the devielopment of 'pruthways ' in the hrain. [63] This inCl'easein knowledge rightly cruusesone to marvel at the complexity and ability of the brain. While there is nothing in this new knowledge that contradicts Thomas's basic understanding of the relationship between the ::interior.senses and the inbelloot, it has, neverthe-1esis, ied many to believe thwt to understand how the brain works is to understand how human thinking takes place. Many rash claims for explaining human inwliligence by brain function have heen mwde (claims eXJceededonly by tho·se for axtificial :inte!IJ.igence)[64] The propeir way to confront such claims *is* to appreciate all that brain activity represeDJtsand not dismiss it as irrelev:ant or unnecessary for human knowing.

E. Eourth Objection

The fourth objection is that the first type of argument detracbs from Thomas's tewch:iing on the unity of the person.

s1 Nancy .Andreasen, "Brain Imaging: .Applications in Psychiatry," *Soienoe,* March 18, 1988, pp. 1381-1388. There is no objection to efforts to associate certain brain areas with certain types of intellectual activity, but there is an objection to claims that judgment is an act of the frontal lobe.

02 Francis Schmitt, " The Role of Structural, Electrical, and Chemical Circuitry in Brain Function," in *The Neurosciences: The Fourth Study Program,* Francis Schmitt and Frederic Worden, eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979). Jack Fincher, *The Brain,* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. News Books, 1981).

63 :Mark Rosenzweig and Edward Bennett, eds., *Neural Mechanisms of Learning and Memory,* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1975). Edward Gurowitz, *The Molecular Basis of Memory* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.). R. Binney and M. Jason, *Atlas of the Body and Mind,* pp. 120-128.

64 Stanley Jaki, *Brain, Mind and Oomputers* (South Bend, Ind.: Gateway Editions, 1969).

Anton Peg[s has pointed out the importance of Thomas's acceptance, with modificatio:rus:,of A'ristotle's doctrine that the soul is to the body as form is to matrter.[65] Thomas teruches that the soul is the form of the body and that the soul, insofar as it is inte11ootive sowl, is also a subsistent form. The human person is unique in its composition. Understanding the soul as ithe form of the body marl<'ed an important rudvance for Christian theology. This teruching provided a more satisfactory explana.tion for the unity of the human person, overcame confusions caused by Platonic dualism, and gav;e a clearer meaning to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

The argument of type 1, because it minimizes the role of the interior senses, undermines the very unity of the person that the hyfomorphic model is meant to express. Unless the full role of the body in perfecting the person is understood, the rational soul appears as the Hatonic person, and the oilid question arises as to why God imposed a body upon the S01Ul.

The objection is timely because popiufar and scholarly thinking continues to exhibit two extremes.[66] One extreme, materialism, reduces all human activity to the moviement of bodies. The other exweme, a type of Cartesian dualism, does see the mind as spfr]tual brut cannot effectiv;ely unite ,the two worlds of mind and body. Thomas has set a course between these extremes by choosing the form-matter relation as his model.

The chaJ1Iengefor Thomists. today is to artilC'ulatemore clearly this unity of soul and body. This effort is not helped by repeating arguments that unduly disparage the ability of the interior senses. Type 1 not only fails fo demonstrate the immareriaJity of the intffilect; it ru1so detracts from the unity expresis1ed by the model of form and matter.

65 .Anton Pegis, *St. Th-Omas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Oentury,* (Toronto: Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1934).

66 For an example of the materialist extreme, see R. Taylor, *Metaphysics,* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983), pp. 50-51. For an example of dualism, see C. Joad, *How Our Mind Works,* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947).

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, I judge thrut type 1 is an incomplete rendering of Aristotle and is inconsistent with Thomas's own description of the internal .sense powers. A type l argument claims that only the :intet11e1crt can know all corporeal rbhings, yet this conffiots with the significant" knowing" ascribed by Thomas to the internal sense powers. Insofar as one fortifies the first type of argument hy pointing to the diffe!Ventway the intellect has its object (e.g., it grasps the *natures* as such), one is actually using the seoond type to maintain the :first type. Furthermore, the first argument does not aUow a proper assimilation of modern findings about hra,in function, and, :finally, it does a disservice to the unity of the perrson.

MARITAIN ON RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW

THOMAS A. FAY

St. John's University
Jamaica, New York

THE WAY RIGHTS a11e viewed in our time creates urmoil in our society. But this one-sided view of rights ad]ts origin in the philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseaiu, in which the" Rights of Man" were divinized and hence made unlimited. In contrast, Maritain based his notion of rights on the natu:rail law, and this phifosophic base can ground a more balanced view of rights, one which can protoot both against those who would assert arbitmry rights without any restraints whatever and against an authoritarian State which would subordinate an individual rights to its requirements.

I. Maritain's Notion of the Natural Law

For Marita:in, the ultimate groundiing of human rights is in the natural law.[1] But just what does he mean by the term "natural law? " It is by no means obvious. Certa:inly from antiquity man has had some gmsp of a narturaJ faw, rthat is, of a law which transcends merely positive law, the law fashioned by men. In *!J1an and the State,* Maritain cites the case of Antigone, the heroine in Sophocles' pJ.ay of the same name. She breaks a positive faw in giving buriaJl to her brother 'and justifies her act by making an appeal to a law higher than any merely human law. And so she says

" Nor did I deem
Your ordinance of so much binding force,
As that a mortal man could overbear
The unchangeable unwritten code of heaven;

[1] *Les droits de l'homme et la, loi naturclle* (New York: Editions de la Maison Frnncaise, Hl42), p. 84.

This is not of today and yesterday,
But lives forever, having origin
Whence no man knows ...[2]

The Stoic philosophers spol{'eof a natural law; so did tnpian in the ancient Roman period, and St. Augus:tine in the early Middle Ages. The se-y;enteenth and eighteenth century saw the classical Law of Nature philosophers, such as Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Benedict Spinoza, and John Locke. And of course, by no means least on our list, there was Thomas Aquinas. Mal11'tain takes Thomas's to be the most perfect statement of natural law. But even here there are certain ambiguities and problems. For example, with 11egard to the "primary" and " seconda,ry" precepts of natural law, the statements of St. Thomas in early work *The Commentary On The Sentences* are at variance with the vocabulary and the teaiching of the *Summa theologiae,* I-II, q. 94. Maritain attempts to clarify these obscurities by introducing what he rtakes to he the key to Thomas's doctrine of natUl"al law-the notion of knowledge through inclination.[3] As Maritain sees it, there are two aspects of natural law, one ontological and the other gnoseologicaL4 The ontological .aspect of natural law means that man has a being-structure which is the locus of intelligible necessities, that he possesses ends which necessarily correspond to his essential constitution and which are common to all men. This means that there is, by virtue of human nature itself, an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and accol'lding to which the human will should act if lit is to attain the necessary and essential ends of being human. This order or disposition is what he means by nrutural law.

From this it follows that 001y being in nature, be it a tree or a dog or whatevier, has its own na.tural law, which is the normality of its funotioning, the proper way in which, by reason

[2] *Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 85.
[3] Ibid., p. 91.
[4] !bill., pp. 85-94.

of its specific structure and specific ends, it " should " achieve the fullness of its being, The " shou1d " here is not a moral imperative but rather an ontological one, just as we say that a "good" eye" shou1d" be :able to perceive certain objects with clarity at a certain disrtance.

But as soon as we enter the realm of free beings, human persons, this natural 1aw *becomes* the moral law. Natural law is moral law for man because he should freely obey it in order to acillevie his end, the fuHness 0£ being, which is, in the eudaimonistically ethical te:rrns of rui Aristotle or a Thomas Aquinas, happiness.

But the second aspect of natural law is the gnoseological element, that is, natural law *as known.* Accol'ding to Maritain, the natural law and the knowledge of the natural law are two quite di:ffel'ent things. True, fbo be "la,w" at aill, ,at >least according to Thomas, 1the law must be promulgated; it is only insofar as it is known and expl'essed in assertions of practical 11eason that natural faw has the fo11oe of law. For Maritain, this knowledge of natural law is not gained so much by man's abstractly reflecting on what it means to be human and what actions will oonduce to the fulfillment of this nature. Rather, knowledge of natural law-and this is a key point for Maritain-eomes ilirough *inclination.* Maritain claims that man's knowledge of the natural law is *not rational knowledge at all* hut is knowledge through inclination, and it is his belief that this is the way in which St. Thomas is to be understood. Thus he remarks: " I think that Thomas Aquinas' teaching here should be understood in a much deeper and more precise fashion than is usual. When he says that human reason discov,ers the regulations of Natural Law through the guidance of the *foclinations* of hum:m nature, he means that the very mode or manner in which human reason lmows natural law is not rational knowledge, but knowledge *through inclination,* This kind of knowledge is not clear knowledge through concepts and conceptual judgments; it is obscme, unsystematic, vital knowledge by connaturality or congeniaility, in which the intellect, in

ordex to bear jrurdgment,consults and <listensto the inner melody that the vihra.ting strings of 1abiding tendencies make present in the subject." [5] [Maritain's emphasis]

In its primordial aspe1ctsi knowledge of the natural law, acco11ding to Maritain, was fi:rst expresseid in social patterns mther than in personal judgments or conceptr111al scihemes. These enduring, genuinely human inclinations which found expression in the nabura1 law were spontaneous :and not l'efleicted upon. The moml pmhibi:tions and s:anct:ions which were generated among primitive peopJes and which came :to be called the naturrail law wel'e not arriVied at mnceptuailly, nor were they rationally deduced from some ahs1traiet moral principles. Ra,ther, they were achieved by human nature responding to existential cihaUenges; tendential forms or frameworks resulted fa dynamic schemes of mom,l regul ations. These were the first moral aichievements of the praictical reason, and they were developed out of knowledge by inclination.

II. *Maritain and Human Rights*

As Maritain sees it, the tme phi!losophy of the human person is based on 1the natural For Mal'litain, natural law does not merely prescribe things that are to he done and prohibit things that are rto be avnided. N aturia1l law also recognizes human rights, rights that [nhere in man simply becaiuse he is a human person. These rights derive foom the nature of man as man, which is to say, a:s a spiriturul agent with a transcendent destiny. In the wo11ds of Kant, which Maritain quotes with approv:al, man is never to he used as :a means hut ought ra:ther aJ,ways to he regar ded as an end. Because man is what he is, spiritual as well as material, thwt is, a human person, certain rights are inalienably embedded in him. Thus the natural law in considering this unique naitul'e, man, sees that certain relatfons are appropl'Late to man whUe others are not. Thus,

[6] Ibid., pp. 91-92.

[5] *The Social and Political Philosophy of Jaoques Maritain: Selected Readin!Js,* ed. by Joseph E:vans and Leo Ward (New York: Scribner, 1955), p. 37,

for example, to use man as a slave is not arppropriaite to his natUJ'le, which is that of a being with free-choice and a spiritual nature and destiny.

Since man is srpir.itrnal ruid has a destiny which transcends the purely temporal order, he .and he ailone among .all of the creatures of visible creation has rights. Since he has a destiny of an extra-temporal sort ito fulfill, he must be 1allowed access to the meains by which he wi11 be ruble .to fulfill this destiny. Booause he has oibligrutionsor duties to do cerlain things, he has rights to the means of performing these duties. His rights .are founded on his druties, aJ11d these ·duties are founded on the transcendent destiny of his human person.

This view of hruman rights, be it noted, srtaruls in marked contrast rto other views of human rights. Maritain criticizes the theories of the Rights of Man of some of the eighteenth century phllosophers and in particular the viiews of Je1an JiaJcqtuesRousseaJu. Rousseau heM that man should " obey only himself," since to do otherwise would ultimately destroy his freedom and dignity. Maritain is quite correct in stating tha.t it is this sort of one-sided and distorted view of human ru.ghts that has given rise to many of today's probliems oonrerning rights.. Society agonizes over the tension between an individuars wish rto express his fl'eedom withorut any restrain.it whatsoever and iaJuthority's need to maintain order and guarantee the rights of aM other members of :society.

The notion of "Rights. of Man" which grerw out of Rorussea.u's thought made those righrts divine, hence infinite, free of every objective s;tandaird, resistant :to every limitation imposed on the demands of the ego. It assumed the ·abso!Luteindependence of the human srubj.ect and his :rubsolute right rto express anything and everything that is in him, simply because it is in him, even when such •expression is iat the expense of other human persons.

lit *is* not difficult to see that men so persrua.dedhave clashed with ea.ch .other and that such .a has led to a tremendous amount of ·turmoil.. But this has given rise to a

iOounter-movement in wMch men have cynicrully given up the notion of a philosophy of human rights as totally bankrupt.

Wha.t is obviously needed is 1a more a;dequate philosophy of the human person and human rights than the one om society has inherited. Maritain's teaching on natmrul law and its relrution to human rights is most helpful in this 11espect. Maritain sees an orde:r p11evailing throughout ,the cosmos. At the apex is a ,supreme ordering principle, infinite Wis1dom and Love, God.

The eighteenth (Jentury doctrine of the Rights of Man was bwsed on a fundamental misconception of what rights ar:e, and it has gi¥en rise to the two extreme tendencies which impe:ril our society. On the one haud, some members of society, invoicing the Rights of Man as their charter of independence, attempt to vindicate tiheir right to do wha;tever they pleiase, regardless of what damage their actions may inilict on the common good. On rbhe other hand, when the survival of the staite is 1threatened by the anariehical actions of this first group, the State wants to siuppress every opinion 1and action which does not conform to its orthodoxy. [7] While in Maritain's

[7] Ibid., p. 38.

ithought theJ.'1e is everywhere elq)resseid a loV'e of oJ:9der, there is also a very cons,idemble distrust and dislike of a Leviathan stat,e. By his philosophy of natural 'law and human rights, Marit1ain aUempts to siteer ,a safe course between Scylla and Charybdis, between a mindless and arbitrary use of freedom, that jiusti:fies every egomaniooal indulgence, and .an tistic state which 11epresisies e¥ery fl'eedom exioepit those it chooses to dole oil.lit in raJJe moments of benefic:i:ence.

Maritain's philosophy of 'the human ,person is the linchpin in his ,teaiching on human rights. Because man as a human pieoc-son ha:s two facets to his personarlity, mate11ial as well as spiriturul, he 1a1so has a two-foM dest1ny. The one is incomplete and imperfect, a rtemporal end; the other is a destiny in which he will find his perf,eot foJffilment, an eternal destiny. The state may make certain legitimate claims on him, and sometimes

these claims oan he very heavy indeed; for example, in a just war the state may l"equire his in the military.[8] The human person enjoys 1benefits which onJy life in society can give: education, museums, symphony oJ.1chestras, 1i-br:aries, p:110tectionfrom those who would threaten his safety. And so man aJso has ,a series of col"J.1elative obligations or duties towards society. Maritain was very correct in pointing out that this notion of obligation or duty as: the obverse side of the rights ooin :was the most ·serious overnight of the eight-eenth oeintury notion of rights, particularly in the thought of Rousseau. The of unbJJii&edrights, divorood from any moderating docbriine of obligwtions and duties, has led to the excesses'we see today.

Because of the material element in his human personhood, man is in some sense subordinate to the state and has obligations to it, and the state may in certain insibancesmake claims upon him. Hut because there is also a spiribual co-principle constitutive of the human person, the person has an eterna;l destiny which transcends the maiterial and temporail oroer. In 1areas concerning this: aspect of his person, the state has no right to ,inberrere.

What would be examples of such rights which ought to be 1by the ,state? Examples of sruch :£undamental rights would be the right to life, the right to personal freedbm and to conduct life as master of oneself and of one's acts, responsible before God ,and the law of the community, the right ito pursue perfection of moral and rational human 'life, the right ·to pursue eternaJ. good (without whlch there is no true pursuit of happiness), the rigiht :to <bodily integrity, the right to rthe private ownership of materiail goods as a safeguard for the libemes of the person, the right to marry .according to one's choice and to estahlish a family (a family which is assured the liberties proper to it), the right of association, the right to respect and dignity whether or not one represents an economic value for society-all of these basic rights are rooted in man

s *The Person and the Common Good* (New York: Scribner, 1947), p. 59.

as a person, as a being whose destiny .is beyond the merely :tempo:mL

So .aJso in the area of dv:ic Hfe man has ioertain basic rights. In Maritain's view, Aristot11e'sceleihr1atedsaying that man is a polit:ical anima,l means more than the obvious fact thart he is destined to liv:e society. It also means that the very notion of man requires that he he aMowed to lead a politfoal life and participate actively in the life of the political community. It is on this postu:late of human naiture that political l1iberties anid political rights l1est, in particular the right of s1uffrage. No •doubt many times in the course of human hisitory, indeed throughout most of human history, men have not in fact eX'er-icisied this right. Sometimes these rights have been denied to them by tyrants, hut sometimes through their own indofo:nce men ha:ve conspired in their own oppression and slavery and !I1efusedto t:ake up the burdens which foll etitizenship imposies, But it is stiltl true rbhat 1a state in which men have an individrual right to choose those who wiH hold rauthority a more per-fect state than one in whi1ohthey do not have 1sr111ch a r1ight. The essentia.l £unction of polit:iJC::vl aiuthoriity is to dirrec:t free per-sons towards the common good, and so it is only normal that these same persons show1d themselves choose those who will have the function of .directing :them. The right to vote and 1seleotthose who will lead is the most form of active par-ticipation in civic me which man e:xoerrcisesin aocord with his politica:l natu11e.

But there are other rights which the human person enjoys as part of his political nature, and they can be summed up in the three equalities. The first is political equaiiity. This assures '1:10 eruch citizen his statU!s, security, and freedoms within .the body politic. The second is the equality of all before the law. This has been expressed such tradirtiona11dicta as, " The law should he blind," i.e., no respecter of persons. Indeed, the tra-personification of Justiee not ollJly carries a sword and holds the 1smi1es but is a1so point that is, un-fo.r!;unately, a:ll too frequently OV'erlookedin our contemporary

society. Justioe demands equality of all before the law and debars preferentia1l 1treatment of anyone merely because of the amiderrt of color, ethnic origin, or sex. The third equaility is eqUJality of opport1unity for all !Citizens with respect to employment ruccording to ea:ch one's capacity and free aocess to the various p:mfossions without rwcirul or ethnic discrimination. Here we must be carefol to point out that equa.lity of *opportunity* is not to be confused with equality of *condition* or result. Eqrurility of simply follows from the democratic principles upon which our country was founded. This means that no one, for ex;ampJe, should he e:x!diuded from any of the profossions simply because of the ,wccident of color or sex. To make a decision simply on the basis of color or sex (or something else which is purely wooidentail and e20trinsic) wou1d not he reasonable, i.e., it would go against man's natul'e, which is reasonable, and hence would be against the natuml law and immoml.

But it is one thing to say that everyone should hrave an *equal opportunity* to go to the professionral schooJs such as law and medicine, which are the doorway to the professiions, and quite another to say that there s:houildbe *equality of condition.* The one, equality of opportunity (freedom of access wirthorut any arti:fici,albars based on color, sex, or ethnic background) is dearly a corolla.ry of our democratic principles. Unfortunately, what :has happened 11ecentlyis the confusion of *equality of opportunity* with *equality of condition* or result, which has nothing at alil to do with democmcy hut 1comes out of Marxism. Equality of opportunity siay;s that we alJ shou1d have an equal oppo11tunity to go to medica,l school if we so desire; equaJity of .condition says something quite di:ffierent-if you a11e a mediowl student, I shou1d he one too. Equality of opportunity is a tenet of democracy; equrulity of condition envisions a dassless society and is dea:nly not democratic but Marxist.

When Maritain speaks of equality as for eCXJamp1e in *Les droits de l'homme et la loi naturelle,*[9] what he has in mind is

[9] *The Social and Politiaal Philosophy,* p. 42.

the democratic notion of equality of opportunity. In a socialist welfare society the human rights of its members must be progressiv,ely Slllppressed.In order to achieve the social go1als which it proposes for itse.U, the socirulis:t welfare sitate must bake an ever greater control of the lives of its members; its intervention into 'even the mo:st intimate areas of their Jives must become greaiter and greater, until even their tho1Ught comes under its ,control and they have no human rights 'left at all. Let us close with a statement by Maritain in which he sums up the dangers which the socialist welfru-e state poses to individual rights and freedom.

" From the old socialist ideas comes the temptation . . . to turn everything over to the authority of the State, administrator of the welfare of all, and to its scientific and bureaucratic machinery: which like it as we will, moves in the direction of totalitarianism ..." [10]

[10] Ibid., p. 43.

SOME DOGMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF PAUL F. KNITTER'S UNITARIAN THEOCENTRISM

PAUL D. MOLNAR

St. John's University
Jamaica, New York

REACTIONS TO Paul Knitter's *No Other Nanie?* vary from criticizing his "unitarian theocentrism" [1] and his sliding away from "creedal Chrisitology" [2] to unequivocail endorsement of his" less Christocentric approach to a theo1ogy of religions;" [3] this shows the challenge Knitter poses to current dogmatics.

This 1arHcile w1ll explore three critical dogmatic issues related to Knitter's non-normative ChristoJogy. First, can the idea that Jesus is one savior among others be defonded *froni* within the Christian-Catholic 1tradition without yie1ding the truth of Christology? Second, if "Jesus remains universailly normativ;e" for Christians while " other revelations or rev;ea:lersmight also be universaUy normative," then does this not p:vomote some form of docetic Christology and lead to a unitarianism, exduded by the naiture of the God revealed in Christ? Third, on the basis of " l'eligious experience " Knitter olaims to perceive an" evolution from ecolesiocentrism to chrfatocentrism to theocentrism" and finally to "soteriooentrism." [4] Is there 1!1ea1ly such an evolution? And if there is noit, oan those who de- the tradition succeed by arguing *from* experience and praxis rather than from revelation and faith? [5] Moreover, if

1"Review Symposium: Paul Knitter's *No Other Name?: A Critical Survey of OMistian Attitudes toward the World Religions,"* in *Horizons* 13 (1986): 116-135. This is the view of Daniel Sheridan, p. llS.

2 This is the view of Denise Carmody. Ibid., p. 122.

s This is the view of William Cenkner. Ibid., p. 127.

4 Ibid., pp. 133-34.

5 Denise Carmody, e.g., believes that we should stress praxis more than

we think the tradition should not be defended, have we not ceased to think about *theological* truth? Rather, have we not made divinity itself indis:tingiuishab1e from our human experiences and praxis at the outset? And does this not open the door to both polytheism allJd pantheism?

By making God hut noit Christ normative, Knitter's " nonnormati¥e" Christology re-1transiates the truth of Jesus' oonsubstantiality with the Father into the content of a myth, an experienice or a vailue judgment having no re1ality in itseH.[6] It then defines :reveiLationand salvation .aocording to a unitarian view of God. While Knitter denies this,[7] his reasoning aictuaUy is unitarian:

> In my proposed model, Jesus remains universally normative, but I am asking whether Christians can recognize that other revelations or revealers might also be universally normative. Could there be a *complementary uniqueness* among the religious traditions of the world? To try to answer that question, 'intellectual conversion; ... is a requisite. But it will have to be an intellectual conversion that walks more than' the way to Nicea and Chalcedon' ... only on the basis of the *praxis* of authentic dialogue-grounded in intellectual, moral, and religious conversion-can we know the ness of Christ.[8]

doctrine without relativizing Christ. Thus, for her, Rahner's Christology does not mean " that Christians cannot be open to the Buddha or Lord Krishna," Ibid., p. 126. The problem is that this very thinking already relativizes Christ.

6 Even theologians who do not intend the radical views of John Hick run a similar risk by beginning Christology from below in the manner of Paul Knitter. Cf., e.g., Edward L. Krasevac, O.P., "' Christology From Above' And 'Christo logy From Below '," *The Thomist,* 51 (1987) : 299-306, arguing that "Christological faith is an apostolic faith that has its origins in a historical process which began with the public ministry of our Lord. . . ." (p. 300) causes us to ask what makes Christology true? Is it "the actual apostolic process " (306) or is it Jesus as the Lord who is and remains the sole foundation and validation for faith in any age? Does this approach not leave the door open to the kind of evolution which Knitter claims to have discovered in Christianity, which then enables him to move beyond Jesus as the only Lord and Savior?

1 Review Symposium, *Horizons,* p. 131.

s Ibid., p. 133.

Here the ha:.sis for knowing uniqueness is a praxis grounded in an intehlooturul, mor:al, and conversion; acknowledging as true the mystery of faith recognized wt Nicaea and OhaJ.cedonis no longer ;the way to begin.

borth N:icaea and Chalcedon the starting point for perceiving Christian :rieveilatfonwas the :bruth that Jesus was ithe only Son of the F1ather, begotten 1and not made. Hut Knitter's starting poinrt is an experienroe whlch seeks oilier reveJations and revealers to complement this only Son. This proposal fails to aaknowledge Chvist's uniq1Ueness as one in being with the Father and operates outside the context of biblical faith, which finds its cerrtainrty in the truth of God disclosed in Christ and no.t in any form of pLraxis. I hope to show that this thinking compromises Jesus' uniqueness as the Wovd heco.me flesh (Jn. 1: 14), !as the Son who aJone rev;eails the Father (Matt. 11: 27 and Jn. 1: 18), and as ,the pre-existent Lord who promises and sends the Spirit. Irt imperils the oneness of God reoognized at Nfoaea, reaffirmed hy At:hanasius against the Arians,[9] and asserted :in :the trinitarian doctrine of the indestmctible ·unity and indissoluble distinction of the Father, Son, and Spirit. As Aquinas righrtly recognized, one cannot be an Arian, a tri-theist, or a (Sa.ooHian) modalist .and stiilll be th:inking of the Christian God.1°

These same issues arose in the Church's confrontation with the Gnostics.[11]

9 Cf., e.g., Athanasius's famous phrase " there was a time when he did not exist " in Charles Norris Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture: A. Study of Thought and Action From Augustus to Augustine,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 223. See also *Athanasius' Orations against the Arians, Book 1,* in *The Trinitarian Controversy,* trans. and ed. by William G. Rusch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980) and A. I. C. Heron, "Homoousios with the Father," *The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-OonstantinopoUtan Oreed A..D. 381,* ed. by Thomas F. Torrance, (Edinburgh: The Hansdel Press, 1981), pp. 59-87.

10 Cf. e.g., 'Thomas Aquinas *Summa thrologica* I, q. 31, articles 1 and 2.

11 See, e.g., Elaine Pagels, "The Gnostic Jesus and Early Christian Politics," The University Lecture in Religion at Arizona State University, 1982, pp. 1-9 and *The Gnostio Gospels,* (New York: Random House, 1979); Eduard

Far from regarding himself as the ' only begotten ' son of God, Jesus here [in the Gospel of Thomas] says to his disciples,. 'when you come to know yourselves' (and discover the divine within you) then 'you will recognize that it is *you* who are the sons of the living Father '-just like Jesus! ... One who seeks to' become not a Christian, but a Christ' no longer looks to Jesus ... as the source of all truth . . . the gnostic teacher, Silvanus, points in a different direction: Knock upon yourself as upon a door, and walk upon yourself as on a straight road ... ;[12]

For Pruul," Faith is the opposite of finding ourselves; it is being found by God," [13] while " Gnostic syn:cretis:m . . . believes eV'erything in gene:raJ fo:r 1the purpose of avoiding 'a belief in something in partiioular," i.e., "the pa:rtioularity of the Gospet" [14] We hope to sho1w that Knitter's presuppositions lead him to his unitarian position and that this approach to the tradition undermines theolog1i!Cal method, Chrisrtology, and Trinitaxian rtheology. 1¥¥e criticize Knitter's position based on the fact ithat it is Christ himself who makes Christianity true and not the !religious experiences or praxis of those who prodlaim Jesus as Savior; only if this is respected. can Christianity l'elate to other :religious trruditions without being narrow-minded, al':l'ogant,obs1oure,or confused.

Unitive Pluralism

For Knitter unitive p1urwlism means: that "plura:lity constiturtes:unity."

The many are called to be one. But it is a one that does not devour the many. The many become one precisely by remaining the

Schweizer, *Jesus,* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1911), pp. 89ff.; Gerald Hanratty, "The Early Gnostics," in *The Irish Theological Quarterly,* 51 (1985) : 208-224 and "The Early Gnostics II," pp. 289-298, esp. pp. 212 and 22lff.; Philip J. Lee, *Against The Protestant Gnostics,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), and Henry Chadwick, *The Early Churoh,* (New York: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 286.

12 Pagels," The Gnostic Jesus ... ," pp. 6-7.

13 Philip Lee, p. 32.

14 Ibid., p. 80.

many, and the one is brought about by each of the many making its distinct contribution to the others and thus to the whole.[15]

Admitting this may be a dream or even poetic rapture, Knitter says "we have no choiee hut to dream this dl'eam and try to makie it reality." He wishes to a.void hoth the o1d raitionalistic idea of " one world reiligion," a syncretism which woru1d dissolvie individual historical ,differenoes, and a1lso any imperialism which holds tha1t one il'eligion can purify or absorb the others. Accordingly,

> unitive pluralism is a unity in which each religion,. although losing some of its individualism ... will intensify its personality .... Each religion will retain its own uniqueness, but this uniqueness will develop and take on new depths by relating to other religions in mutual dependence .... The dream appears less fanciful in the light of new perspectives from sociology and social psychology .[16]

Societal inte11dependence suggests that reHgions oannot discern truth unless they encounter other religions: "We need an element of worJd citizenship in each person ... members of one religion must ,fo some extent be members of other [17]
Starting with T:meltsch, Toynbee, and Jung, Knitter develops his unitiy;e pJmralism.

Ernst Troel-tsch (1865-1923)

For Troeltsch, histor1eal relativism lewds us to inquil'e: if aH history is relative, how can any absolute chims be ma:de at all within this history? How can anyone say one reHgion is better than another if an religions are historieaHy and culturally conditioned? Theo1ogy cannot begin with a "too transicendent deity" who "swoops down from heav'eill" and intervenes in history ",at partic1ular spots," as if God were an "arbitrary parent who dispenses more parental lo-v;e to some children than

15 Paul F. Knitter, *No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions,* (New York: Orbis Books, 1985), pp. 8-9.
rn Ibid., p. 9.
11 Ibid., p. 12.

to others." Rather, " God is *coterminous with hi8tory,"* and oveatures havie 1an inbuilt driV'e toward the divine. Our innwte experioooes of trust 1and ilove 1soom to point to the experience of the divine built inrto human nature. Troe[tsch "founded his metaphysics of immanent transcendence in a psychology of transrendientail subjectivity" and heiLd that there was 1a uni-Viersal reV'elation at wo11k within 1alJ. hrumanikind. Since a;ll religions have rthis divine presence in common " no historical manirestation of the Absolute can be absolute! " While " each .religion is a manifestation of the Absolute, there can he no ·absoilrutereligion." [18]

Stihl, Tme1tsoh argiued for the superiority of Christianity because .it had the *value* of holding human hearts. despite hisitoricail and cultural Change and hecB1use the "spiritiuality" of the higher 11eligions con¥eyed siuperior values such as personalistiic redemption. [19] By 1923, howecver, he .admitted his error in judging Christianity superior to other retligions, since aill his arguments haid been shaped by " his own historical and therefore limited oonrtext and uuJture . . . . To declare Christianity higher than any oither religion, Troeltsch realized, was really to declare Western ooltiure superior to all others." Consequently, "it is impossible to make any kind of judgment about the •superiority of one religion over .ainorther." To do so "one would havie to crruwl into the roultmaJlskin of that other reiligion."[20] And since Buddhism .amJd Brahminism are humane .and carry out the same spfoitiu·rulroles of ruchieving inner certitude and devotion, their absolute c1aims are as true as Chris-1tian 'Cllaims.[21] Uncritically •ruooepting Troe1tsch's analysis, Knitter maintains that Christians " must he ;ve31dy to bring in their truths for a rbune-1Up or possibly evien for a trade-in. To demand that truth be certain and to pursue it ais such is to condemn oneself .to ultimate frustration." [22] Yet Troeltsch' s personal frustration res1UJ1ted from his own historicist view of the

1s Ibid., pp. 25-26.
19 Ibid., P- 28.
20 Ibid., p. 29.
21 Ibid., p. 30.
22 Ibid., p. 33.

"essence" of Chris1tianity, which confused Christianity and culture. Neither he nor anyone else adopting such a method oowd see that Christianity's objective truth was identicaJ with Christ. 1dentifying Christianity with some religious vrulue or viewpoint musrt 11es1ult in an impasse.

Arnold Toynbee

According to ':Doynbee all 11eligionshave a common essence, which must be distinguished from the nonessential: " one spiriturul reality ... animates them aJL" [23] " --- The inner core, the essential eJq>ecienoe and insight of wll of them is the same." [24] Knitter ag'l'ees: "The origin o.f all religion lies in the rooognition of ,evhl-ithat is, in facing the devastation that human self-interest ,can inflict on the world. To offset such havoc, humans rea1ize---0r rather, they 'believ;e '-thart they musrt recognize 1and be in harmony with some greater reality.'" [25]

The chief 1agent of self-interest .among the world religions for Toynbee is Christianity; thus," We ought ... to try to purge our Christianirty of the trruditional Christian beJief that Christianity is unique." [26] Tlris olaim was a non-essential. The same spiritual prese'Il!ce within aiJ. religions calls us away from s,elf-centeredness, tmv1wd some absolute reaility, and forbids any claims that one revelartion is uniqrue or that the:ve is only one tme religion. Hence," We can ... be folly committed to our own l'leJ.igion and at the same time £ully open to the truth of o.ther religions." [27] Faced with a choice among different religions, Toynbee " felt that personal adhe!'ence to one !'eiligion rather than ito another would not be determined hy the intrinsic superiority of that religion ov;er wlJ othffi'\S. Rather, it would be a matter of psychological need and preference." [28] Wilfred Cantwell Smith iconcrurs:

a tradition is true insofar as persons participate in it and find through it a genuine contact with transcendence. Therefore the

2s Ibid., p. 41.
24 Ibid., p. 38.
25 Ibid., p. 40.
26 Ibid., p. 41.
2; Ibid., p. 42.
2s Ibid., p. 43.

tradition of Christianity or Hinduism is not true in itself; rather it *becomes* true. And 'it can *become* true, if and as you or I appropriate it to ourselves and interiorize it, insofar as we live it out from day to day.' [29]

This faith identifies tmth with "this subjective basis" and argues that Christians must surrender traditional beliefs that their religion or their Christ is superior to or normative for others; this be less threa.tening

instead of arguing that God has been revealed 'fully' or 'normatively' in Christ, let Christians assert that God has 'really' been revealed in Christ and that this revelation is 'potentially fuller than it is actually.' This assertion still allows for total commitment to Christ, but it also leaves room for a deeper understanding of Christ through recognition of other revealers. Such a christology will also bring about ... a theology that is more theocentric than christocentric; a theology that is not limited only to what God has done in Christ but is more open to what God is doing universally in all religions. [30]

The Easbern met,aphy:sician-mystic Frithjof Schuon promotes non-dualism based on mystical experience; he provi1des the sort of unitiV'e pluralism which Knitter insists: is not simple pantheism. This is esoteric and not exoteric religion; exoteric religion cannot cope with the mystery which the esoterics describe and so makes Jesus the only Son of God (rather than just one of the rieliahle ways rto God) .[31]

Nonduality tries to express ... the experience of Ultimate Being as it manifests ... itself in and through everything that is finite. So one can say, with the mystics, that the soul *is* God, but at the same time one must also say that it is not. *God and the world are not one,* but neither are they two. This is the esoteric mystery of nonduality .... The faith of exoterics is real ".. yet they still perceive this God as some kind of Superperson distinct from the world. *They mill the deeper and more satisfying oneness between divinity and humanity.* [32]

But non-dualism inv:olves an ir,reeoncil1able(lonfl1ct which

[29] Ibid., p. 46.
[so] Ibid., p. 47.
Bllbid., p. 49.
[a2] Ibid., pp. 48-49, emphasis mine.

forms the fabric of Knitter's theology. For if the soul *is* God, then there can be no reail God independent of the soul; they are one and the same by way of synthesis. Thus, while Knitter as:serts thrut God and the wor1d *are not one,* he simuJtaneously deolares that God's relation with the wodd is a'' *more satisfying oneness between divinity and hu1nanity* ." Yet if they are neither one nor two, how can we speak of a " oneness" between two distinct entrties at all? If this esoteric mystery unites all religions, then there can be no o1ear distinction between God and creation. Etienne Gilson asse11ted that "Mystical experience itself is both unspeakable and intransmissihle; hence, it cannot become an objective experience." [33] But Knitter presumes that mysticism is an objectivie experience, and thus he is drawn directly into this impasse.

Carl Jung

Originally agreeing with Freud's projection theory, Jung later realized that the image of God wa,s necessary for psychic health; this insight adds momentum to Knitter's quest for a "common essienoe" of reHgions. Although Jung "cou1d never fully and olearly say just what the unconscious was and what it contained," he believed " it contains our true selves." [34] Thus, the archetypes, "the silent voiice of the unconscious," which al'e ;innate ideas nor pre-padmged messages, are the ".inbuilt stirrings or lures that, if we can feel and follow them, wiJ[lead us into the depths of what we are and where we are going." [35] This a!]'.>pliesito individuals and to a hidden

33 Etienne Gilson, *God and Philosovhy* (New Haven: Yale Press,. 1979), p. 119.

34 Knitter, p. 56.

35 Ibid., p. 57. This has become a popular point of departure in contemporary thought for the doctrine of God. Cf., e.g., John F'. Haught, *What is God? How to Think about the Divine* (New York: Paulist, 1986), chap. I. Unable to distinguish experiences of "depth" from the being of God, Haught, following Tillich, writes " 'God ' is a name for the dimension of depth that all of us experience to one degree or another, even if only in the mode of flight from it - - - - " (p. 15). With this equation of anthropology and the-

unity mrimaiting everything human, i.e., a " collective unconscious." This lea.ids ito severrul insights which Knitter assumes to be normative for our grasp of any religion. First, since Jung eou1d not distinguish, psychologica1ly, the realization of the seilf from the *imago Dei,* he concluded that " To realize what we are :is to real,i:lieGod." Yet," iStrictly speaking, the God-image does not coincide with the ullloonscious .as s1Uch, hut with a :special content of it, nameily the Self .... The encounter with ithe mystery of :the psyche cannot be distinguished from an experience of God." [36] Has Jung confused God with human psychic p])ooesses? Knitter responds: "To say that God can be :identified with a experieIIIC'eo;r process does not mean that God is *only* that." [37] Second, Jung's insights "aid many today in making sense of the reality of religious plurailism." Silllce for Jung revelation has its origin "or at Jeas:t part of its origin, in the individual and oolJective unconscio1Us," Knitter concludes that " The differing dogmas and dootrines are ruttempts rto give symboilic expression rto *this essentially ineffable experienve.* They do difler, and yet they are rooted *in the same archetypes."* [38] Thus, since eaich reiligion expresses. its grrusp of God and differently, no one 1.1eligion can claim to be the only way to religious truth. Third, this: thi:nlcing affecits rbhe way we perceive Christ.

' The Christ symbol is of the greatest importance for psychology insofar as it is perhaps the most highly developed and differentiated symbol of the self, apart from the figure of the Buddha.' ... Jesus is called Christ because he represents the completion of the process of individuation,. the realization of the self, the integration between the individual person and the universal God.[39]

Since Jesus is one of the " best symboils of the Chris1t, but . . . not the ocly one," when .the N.T. refers to Jesus as the one and only ReveaJlm", Savior, and Mediator, "One and only means

ology, the concept of the Christian God no longer refers to a truly transcendent being and existence.

[36] Knitter, p. 58.

[37] Ibid., p. 60.

[38] Ibid., emphasis mine.

[39] Knitter, p. 61.

the symbol really wol'ks, fake it seriously. Yet there are for Jung other symbols thrut work as effootivieilyfor othe11s."[410] In-a:SillIUlchas Jung"S analysis " convinces many conrbemporariesof the essentiail. sameness of all. religions and the contemporary need for interreligious dialogue." [n] Christians muSlt that:

> If God is actual ... then there must be some evident psychological traces of all this in one's experience ... for if religious experience is not a psychological experience ... it is no longer his or her experience . . . religious experience will be based purely on something outside one's own self, on someone else's experience or someone else's authority. It will give rise, as Gregory Baum warns, to a religion of extrinsicism, grounded mainly in ' what the bible says ' or ' what the pope declares.' [42]

Can Christian theofogians take Jung's analysis as normative withorut ai1s0 :adoprtingrthe weaknesses of Gnosticism? [43] Within rthis scheme two choices ,seem to emerge: (I) We can identify God, grace, and rey;e1ationwith M. *aspeot* of the individuail or collective Self and thereby reduce rtrue knowledge of God and of revielation to the common psychic fonction of a;ll religion within human life. We can rthen idenrtify the truth of religion without having rto make a choice ,about Jesus as Peter once did (Matt. 16: . We might even avoid having to make the required choice hetween the Christ of rthe N.T. canon and the Gnostic and Docetic portraits of Jesus. Any conflicit between orthodox Christians and Gnostics: wou1d only manifest the human failure to be faithfrul :to our own arohetypes. *Or* we can rucoeptthe authority of the hihlicrulwitness ruid the pope when one or the other telL.s us thait the foundation for truth lies in ,someone [Christ] distinct from our conscious or unconscious Self. The problem here concerns the ultima:te basis: for oothority. How e:mctly do we know if our ideas of God, revelation, and gr:ruoe point to God or to an apotheosis?

40 Ibid., p. 62.
41 !hid., p. 63.
42 Ibid., p. 66.
43 Cf., e.g., Hanratty, p. 212.

While biblicail fondamentrulism[44] all!d ·ecclesiastical frundamentailism ;are forms of extrinsicism which compromise divine and humaJU freedom, we cannot go to the other extreme and ignore 1the canonicail .a.uithorityof scriptul'le or the eoclesiaistica1 aiuthority of the pope, claiming ,that truth stems: *mily* from our

This solution, based on Jiung's presuppositions, is manifestly a Gnostic answer.[45] The very nature of theology and its norm for truth are at .stak!e here. Without denying the impol'ltanoe of our psychological needs, can theologians really aiNow ·any one (or a11) of them to dictate their understanding of God ;andJ Revelation? Is: that truth not grounded in God afone?[46] The Bible and 1t:r:aJdirtionoffer us a God who is free in

[44] For an excellent description of the problems here cf. T. F. Torrance, *Reality and Evangelical Theology (Philadelphia:* The Westminster Press, 1982), pp. 14-20.

[45] Cf. esp. Elaine Pagels' University lecture. It begins and ends with our experience. "The *Gospel of Philip* [argues] you are to 'become not a Chris· tian, but a Ohrist.' This, I suggest, is the symbolic meaning of attributing the *Gospel of Thomas* to Jesus' 'twin brother.' The statement is meant to say, in effect, that 'you, the reader, are the twin brother of Christ; when *you recognize the di'Vine within you' . . . he who has known himself has simultaneously already achieved. knowledge about the depth of all things,"* pp. 6-7, emphasis mine. Jesus, therefore, is no longer the source of all truth.

[46] When, e.g., the Fathers spoke of God as Father, they were not projecting their sensual images into the Godhead but, through revelation, were recognizing that God was our Father in an utterly unique way; no gender therefore was predicated of God, since that is part of our limited creatureliness. Allowing our needs to dictate how we speak of God compromises the meaning of the trinitarian doctrine. One recent theology follows Jung's search for a "quaternity" and argues that "Mary *in some way* represents a Jungian fourth to the Trinity .. ." and that "The Feminine principle of God is Jesus Christ risen as he is the whole Christ that includes ... the Church .... This is the Jungian fourth that makes the Trinity a quaternity ... we are the feminine fourth, we and all humanity .... Mary ... represents the feminine element, all of creation, that complements and even, in a mysterious way, completes God," Robert Faricy, S.J., "Jung and Teilhard: The Feminine in God and in the Church," in *Raising the Torch of Good News',* ed. by Bernard P. Prusak, The Annual Publication of the College Theology Society, vol. 32 (New York: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 239-250, at 244 and 246-7, emphasis mine. Here Faricy's own logic leads him to contradict his own clear statement that Catholics in no way believe that Mary is divine or a fourth in the Trinity. For more on this question and how it relates to Arianism see Thomas F. Torrance, *The Trinitarian Faith,* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,

himself and for us, while Knitter (following Jung) says "As mystics in aiU the religions have asserted (in varying terminology), *we are divine!"* [47] Yet if this so, then God's being cannot be distinguished from human being, and we al'e led to think that the truth claims of Chris1tianity can be grounded in some " arbitrary " :mthority based on e:i,,.rperienoedneed or preference. In fact this is exactly what Irenaeus acoused the Gnostics of doing. [48]

To aiooept the truth of the Gospel requires ithe same faith of us as it did of the disciples. As Jesus spoke and acted with authoirity, it hecame dear that he was no mere man but the Lord himself in the flesh. But this truth was not a universally V'erifiab1edatum of religious e:x!perience. Any attempt to grasp God's grace and revelation on 1thebasis of a 11eligionfounded on a psyiohological analysis of experience ignores this need for fia>1th; grace and revelaition then cease to be seen as *acts* of the triune God and are viewed as realities which are universally ruocessib:le to reason reflecting on experience. While Knitter propel'lly desires to avoid a dualism which" sees God as tota;lly other, unchangeable and impassabJe, and mmb1e to be a:ffecited by human events," [49] his norm for reHglious tmth is not the gmce of God revealed in Christ but mther the grace of God re-· constructed from human re11igious and experience and then equated with T:roeltsch's idea of "uniV'ersal revelation." Yet, as we shaH see, this p:vocedul'e depriv;es our !'eligious dialogue partners of the actual truth of the gospet

1988), p. 69 and Roland *M.* Frye " Language for God and Feminist Language: Problems and Principles," in *Scottish Journal of Theofogy,* 41 (1988) : 441-469. My point is that, since the truth of revelation is grounded in God alone, there is no need to find a fourth in the trinity and then assert that. this element *completes* God, who in fact *needs* no completion. This very idea of a " fourth " impedes any proper perception of the freedom of the triune God, because it allows the dogmatic question to be set by Jung's quest rather than by the simple truth that God's nature is defined only by God.

47 Knitter, p. 67, emphasis mine.

48 T. F. Torrance, "The Deposit of Faith," in *Scottish Journal of Theology,* (1983) : 1-28, at pp. 6-7 accurately illustrated the conflict between Irenaeus and the Gnostics.

49 Knitter, p. 67.

We also ha,ve a marked contmst between rthe bib1ical view of God and of Christ m1:d Jung's view. While ,the N.T. insists that the man Jesus is the one and only Messiah (e.g. Martt. 8: 27-30, Matt. 24: 24 and 1 Jn. 4: 1) and that those who hear the gospel hear 1this pafl1ticular truth, Jung sees Jes1us as *a* symbol for the Christ, which is itself a principle for describing psychic wholeness, which he equates with salvation. For Jung, Christ *cannot be* the only Messiah and Savior. While Jung insists that God is inoarnate in the world of human experience and while religious ideas, like ideas, may perform a therapeurtic function, his ideas of God and religious truth are not subo1dinate ilo the Jesus of the N.T. Thus the historical Jesus is a symbol or an appearance of the Christ, but the Christ is only a term representing the psyichic wholeness which can be pe:rceivcd1as a functional feature of a!1l :religion. This thinking is in that it makes Jesius an *appearance* of a truth which can be disoovceredorntside of a specific relation of faith to Jesus, the Messfah. It equates reason and l'evielation, nature and grace in pantheist fashion ais it claims" we are divine." Whereas the evidence suggests that the Gnostics asseflted rthat creatures are divine, [50] the canonical .scrip1t:uresteach the vcery opposite and distinguish God from creatures, insisting that Jesus the God-Man *alone* can save us. The Gospel faces us with a choice: Will the sou11ceof our knowledge of the truth he our seH-experience [Gnostic self-reliance] o:r Jesus as the unique Revealer and Reconci1er?

Knitter's *non-dualism* embodies his dream of unitivce pluralism, built on the " psychic origin " of religion. For this reason its content really can be no more than a Freudian illusion; [51] it describes merely the content of our own needs.

[50] See, e.g., Hanratty, pp. 289-90, Pagels, The University Lecture, p. 4, and Lee, pp. 26ff. For the practical effect of this thinking on American theology cf. Lee, pp. 112ff.

[51] Sigmund Freud, *The Future of !l'n Illusion,* trans. and ed. by James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1961). Religious ideas "are fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind," p. 30.

For the nondualist, God and the finite are not *one* (that would be pantheism or monism); nor are they *two* (that would lead to supernaturalism) . God and the finite are bonded in a mystical, inexpressible unity beyond 'one' and ' two'; this unity can really be known only in experience. God and the finite have their being in each other (of course in different proportions). Distinct, they cannot, however, really exist without each other.[52]

Here the irreconcilable conflict of Knirtter's method becomes ,clearer. Unable to distinguish God from 1Cl'eatures, Knitter argues that God and the finite are not one (though 1above he states that oneness is the main idea of nondua:lism and ought ito he rthe main idea of a Christianity which is not extrinsicist) . Then he asserts that they are indeed one, but in such a way that .this oneness cannot he knnwn without the mystical experience of the non-dJUa:list;God ·and the wor1d exisrt in a unity *beyond* one and two and cannort reaJJy exist without eruoh other. y;et, beoruUiSe the Creator God and creation are ·distinct in being :actually mther than proportionally, rthe truth is that God wou1d still be God evien if he never created.

Creatio ex Nihilo-Pantheism

The Christian God does not need rcreaitmes but creaites, reconciles, and redeems us w.ithout beooming dependent on us.[53] God's *freedom* with rega:rid to us cannnt be seen if he is perceived as dependent upon us; God in his freedom musrt be perceived ,as " He Who Is." Walter Kasper explains,

> if God needs the world in order to be able to be the one God, then he is not really God at all. The transcendence and freedom of God are perceived only if the world is not necessary for God to be himself.[54]

Because God is free *in* himself and in his .ructinns*ad extra,* there is 1a priority of faith ,and revelaition ov;er understanding and

[52] Knitter, p. 68.

[53] Cf., e.g., Etienne Gilson, *God and Philosophy,* chap. 3.

[54] Walter Kasper, *The God of Jesus Christ,* trans. Ma.tthew J. O'Connell, (New York: Crossroad, 1986), pp. 293-4, citing Gregory of Nazianzus.

reason. Wheveais" theology itself is a science whose conclusions necessarily follow *from* their pri:ncipJes,... those principles are artioles of faith, and faith itself is .an ,assent to rthe word of God .accepted as word of God." Thevefore, faith is no rational prob-.ability or opinion but the cevrtitude which trusts thait " what God has said is rtrue." [55] Without this foundation, oocoroi:ngto Aquinas, "' rthe Catholic faith [might] :seem to be founded on 1empty reasonings, and not . . . on the most solid teaching of God.'" [56]

Mysrt:iicailpantheism asserts a mutual need between God and ·t:he world,[57] thereby obviating the fveedom of the Christian God; [58] to 1applyrthis philosophy to the God of Christian reviela-t.ion would he to confuse God's graice and truth (which are in-conceivable apart from faith in Christ [59]) w:ith the nooessities inherent in creation itself.

Ignoring this problem, Knitter concludes that Christians can recognize Jesus' divinity as an *element within* his humanity:

> Might Jesus have discovered his divine self within his human unconscious? He would be divine *because* he achieved the fullness of 'individuation' .... From Jung's perspective, if deity has its being within our unconscious, it is not dependent on extraordinary events to reveal itself; it does not have to ' step down' and enter history here and there ... the divine is *already* there. . . . Historical events of revelation remain important. . . . But they ,are not simply mess-

55 Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages,* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1938), pp. 76-77.

56 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles,* Bk. II, ch. 38, cited in Gilson, p. 77.

57 Following Unamuno, Jurgen Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom, The Doctrine of God,* trans. Margaret Kohl (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), e.g., pp. 37ff. and 108ff., has this problem. See also *God in Oreation: A. New Theology of Oreation and the Spirit of God,* (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. 13ff. 86-89, lOlff. 'and 204ff. 'Since God needs to suffer in order to love, "God 'needs' the world and man. **If** God is love, then he neither will nor can be without the one who is beloved," *The Trinity,* p. 58.

58 See Paul D. Molnar, "The Function of the Immanent Trinity in the Theology of Karl Barth: Implications for Today," in the *Scottish Journg,l of Theology* 42 (1989) : 367-399, for more on this problem.

59 Cf. 1 Cor. 12 :3 and 1 Cor. 8 :5-6.

ages from above, messages that come to us entirely from outside ... they come from within each one of us. . . . As theologians such as Karl Rahner assert,. this process of universal revelation within all history is what one should expect to find in all religions of the world. Such universal revelation, Jung would say, is not only a theological conclusion; it is a psychological fact. [60]

Ralmer himself would reject Knitter's suggestion that Jesus' divine self might he discovered within his human unconscious. But Rahner's belief ·that Christ's humanity as such reveals his his theory of quasi-formal causality, and his appa.rent " degree " Christology leaJd logically to the conclusions Knitter draws. [61] In contrast to both Jung and Knitter, Rahner insists upon Jesus' uniqueness, yet his transcendental method does not allow him to maintain this insight consistently.[62] For Knitter, "Modern theoJogy seems to be moving in a Jungian direction by viewing Jesus more as cause' of salvwtion (thvough revelation) rather than as an 'efficient caJUSe' (through working a change in divine-human refationships);" [63] thus, Christians must change their traditional view of Christ as the only savior. Yet, the tradition perceived Jesus 1as dficient cause and not just finaJ or formal cause of salvation and revelrntion. This is an essential recognition tied to the specifically trinitarian confession. [64]

so Knitter, p. 68. He is not alone in this. For example, relying on Rahner, David Coffey, " The 'Incarnation' of the Holy Spirit in Christ," *Theological Studies* 45 (1984) : 460-80, at p. 467 writes: "The divinity of Christ is not something different from his humanity; it *is* the humanity, i.e., human nature at the peak of its possibility ---- "

s1 For a criticism of this degree Christology in Rahner, see Colin Gunton, *Yesterday and Today: A Study of Continuities in Christo logy,* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), pp. 15ff. For an extended analysis of the other items cf. Paul D. Molnar, "Can We Know God Directly? Rahner's Solution From Experience" in *Theological Studies* 46 (1985) : 228-61.

s.2 See Paul D. Molnar, "Is God Essentially Different From His Creatures? Rahner's Explanation From Revelation," in *The Thomist* 51 (1987): 575-631 for how this pertains to the relationship between philosophy and theology.

es Knitter, p. 71.

64 If Jesus *can* be viewed more as final cause "rather than" as efficient cause, then he cannot share equally the power of the Father as Creator. *Any*

Theological Method and Revelation

Knitter's method moV'es from experience (praxis) to a universal l'evefa:tion present within everyone and igno11es the contrast between philosophy and theology. Yet any theological meithod starting with experience rather than :the Word of God reveailed must make a choice hel"e. Can openness to religious ideais he equated with openness to the Christfan God without subverting our *need* for reve1ation and gr.ace?

Evien tiheologians who intend to maintain Christ's uniqueness inadve_ritently compromise our need for Christ by beginning rtheir theology of revelation by moving from a universal to the particiular. Michwel Schmaius, for exampJe, argues that " Jung 'assures us that no patient can he truly cured until he at1t1ains a religious attitude. *Such an attitude means that man is open to God."* [65] But the question use of this method rais·es is: Can we equate openness to a supreme heing of which we .are aware with openness rto the God revea:led in Christ? If we 1oan, how can anyone contest the views of the Gnostics, Deists, or non-dua1lists? Schmaus iappeailsto Rahner's supernatural exis1tential to solV'e this. Biut Knitter also appeals 1to this exisitentia[. Is ithere anything in the method of these theologians which allows Knititer to identify grace with the structul'es of human consciousness? This cannot he explored in detail here. Let me just note that, on the one hand, Rahner ·sees God's self-communicaition as "the innm·-most constitutive element in man," [66] while, on the other hand, he says it is an

idea of a choice here compromises the trinitarian doctrine by introducing subordinationism and tritheism. The traditional patristic principles of *opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa,* perichoresis, and appropriation were formulated to avoid just this predicament. On this point in relation to Rahner's theology see, e.g., William J. Hill, *The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation,* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982), pp. 14lff.

65 Michael Schmaus, *Dogma* 1, *God in Revelation,* p. 21, emphasis mine. Schmaus's method moves from the universal to the particular in chaps. l and 2.

66 Karl Rahner, *B'oimdations of Christian F'aith: An Introductfon to the*

offer that he1ongs to all as a charaeteristic of their transcendentaility.[67] Thus, Jievielation "is not something known objectively, buit something within the realm of consciousness."[68] Indeed" graee is present and 1aocepted and justifying if and when this transoendent quality of man [the supernatural existential] is accepted and sustained by man's freedom;" in fact "grace from the outset .[is] an existentiaJ of man's itranscendentality as such."[69] ConsequenUy self-acceptance means " saying ' yes ' to Christ even if [oneJ does not know it."[70]

.But the:re is a problem with this reasoning. If Rahner s1ays that revelation is not " something known objectively," he cannot then *assume* it is something within our consciousness without contradicting himsdf. If he argues that God's revelation is signified by our categorizing something within rthe realm of our conseiousness, then he cannot logically hold rtha:t we *need* Christ, .for ;then rev;elation and grace wou1d be identical with our tmnscendient.ality 1as such [which he 1does say]. Yet, to accept the gospel means [aoco:rding to Jn. 8: 31-2 'and 36] to make Jesus' word our home and then to come to know the truth which sets us free. Revelation discloses that *only* the Son can set 'll's free [this is what is known objectively], and this aieit of the Son is not identical with our transcendentality as s1Uch, even if ithis is conceived as a *supernatural* existential. It is stiM *ours,* to the creaited rewlm, and can even he categorized as God's transeendenta;l revielation without allowing God's *act* in Christ and the Spirit to determine its tmth.[71] Rahner'.s re-·

Idea of Christianity, trans. Wiiliam *V.* Dych, (New York: Crossroad, 1978), p. 11. Hereafter abbreviated *FOF.*

67 Ibid., p. 129.

6s Ibid., p. 172.

69 Karl Rabner, *Theological Investigations,* volume 18, *God and Revelation,* trans. by Edward Quinn, (New York: Crossroad, 1983), "Experience of Transcendence from the Standpoint of Catholic Dogmatics," pp. 173-188, at p. 182. [This series, which now includes 21 volumes, hereafter will be abbreviated as *TI]*

10 FCF, p. 228.

n See Rlso *TI* 6: 72-3 for more on this. Rabner even writes: "According to the Chnrch's teaching, the *world* in which we live is in fact *supernatural,* that

fosrul to make a clear choice here stems from his method; [12] it 1eaidls rto this 1conilicit in his theology opens the door to Knitter's position. Against Knitter, Rahner would insist that Christ is necessary for man's perception of revelation. in his interpretation :rev;eiation and grace cannot he differentiated in the end from the basic structures of human transcendence, becaiuse 11evdation and grace are present as "modifications" of those very ,structu:l'es. Thus, to say "yes" to our existence means that " grace is :an exis1tentiwl of *ou1·* transcendent1ality as suoh." Hence, in his description of the "supernatural existentiail," Knitter mafoes his choice and draws the logicail which Rahner refused to do:

> grace infuses and becomes part of human is, part of the psychological structures of human consciousness. . . . Grace, then, infuses or energizes this natural openness and gives it a new dynamism. . . . Therefore . . . there is no such thing as ' only nature' .... With images similar to Jung's view of divinity within the unconscious, Rahner sees our very ' existence ' as ' supernatural': nature is more than just human nature. [73]

Huit the Gospel demands that the question of method he dictated hy the itmth of who Jesus *was* and *is.* The truth of Christology is distorted by :attempting to defend the idea that Jesus is one Savior among others. A specifically theological method stands in markced cont:mst to a method of investigating the natul'e and meaning of Christian revieilation as a particullhl' instance of a generaJ. religious, psy;chological, or historical development. To the ertent that Rahner, Schmaus, and. Knitter all start theology human experiences of self-transcendence and only from there proceed to investigate revelation and faith, ·each in his own way makes it more difficult to perceive and to maintain the uniqueness of Christianity. [74]

is, a world which as a whole is ordered to the personal, Trinitarian God beyond the world" ("Theos in the New Testament," *TI* 1:70-148, at 80-81).

[12] Cf. Molnar, "Is God Essentially Different ...," for more on this methodological difficulty.

[73] Knitter, p. 125 and n. 71 above.

[74] This explains why, for example, William Collinge can say that Knitter

Special Revelation-General Revelation-Unitarianism

The central issue, then, is whether or not we will abide by the truth of Jn. 1: 14 and the principle that "what was not assumed was not savced."[75] Our definition of special revcelation must be determined not by what is found in uni- religious experiences but God alone. Knitter apperuls to genera,l revcelaition, which he identifies with his non-dualist "unitive pluralism." He wants to demonstmte that the traiditional christoi1ogies were mistaken in assigning exdus.ive uniqueness to Jesus. He feels that these christo1ogies sever any possible dialogue and perpetuaite prejudice and division. But his christology is d.iot:ated not hy the risen Lord wcting in the power of his Spirit *ad extra,* by the principles of non-diualism and ends up being doceitiic. Jesus is only *one appearance* of many possib1e "truths" which can be derived from the expedence of non-dua1ism. Knitter's presentartiion reveals a deeper problem. Both Catholics and Protestants who define 1specialrevcelation a:s 1an instance of general revelaition must face T11oevtsch's dilemma: [76] how can they hoM thait rev;elation is

presents a "systematic and coherent defence from within Christian and indeed Roman Catholic theology, of the view that we may and ought to regard Jesus ,as one Savior among others," "Review Syrn.posium," *Horizons* 13 (1986): 116, even though he is not persuaded of its truth. The point here is that this position can only be defended if one moves from the universal to the particular.

75 Quoted in Dermot A. Lane, *The Reality of Jesus: An Essay In Ghristology,* (New York: Paulist Press, 1975), p. 108.

76 This same problem surfaces in the work of various recent theologies of world religions. See, e.g., Maurice Schepers, O.P. "Conversion and Convergence: Personal Transformation and the Growing Accord of Theology and Religious Studies," in *The Thomist* 51 (1987): 658-679. This article assumes that the truth of theology can be grasped in the assumption that all religions have a common object of study; that assumption is unwarranted in a Christian doctrine of God and Revelation and opens the door to Knitter's conclusions. For similar problems see William Thompson's "transcultural Christ," in "The Risen Christ, 'franscultural Consciousness, and the Encounter of the World Religions," in *:rheological Studies* 37 (1976) : 381-409.

known independently of Christ 1and srtiM maintain that Christ is the only Savior? [77]

Evangelic;al Theology

Knitter sees four weaknesses tin ,eviangelicaJ.theology that bring rthis problem into fooos. Fi11srt, "Any method for a .theological undersrtanding of religions that insists on Christian tradition (the Bible for Protestants, the magisterium for Catholics) as the onll.y or the final criterion of religious truth seems rto or at least blur the vision of what the othm' religions arie saying." Belief in Christ as true God 'and true man eliminates authentic dirulog;ue with other religions. Scripture, tradition, 1and human e:xiperioooe must " ,be brought into a murbuaMy clarifying and mutually criticizing correlation." [78] -y';et rthe quesrtion persists: what determines rthe truth of the correlation?

Second, evangelica:l theology sees authentic reve1rution *only* in Jesus Christ. But" contemporary N.T. scholarship, the profound experience of historicail relativity by our culture and our broader knowledge of other religions " make this untenable. We cannot follow Protestant or Catholic " models " which claim no authentic reve}aition eris1ts " .apart from Chrisrt." [79] Consequently when the N.T. refers :to Jesus as the onily be-

11 J. *A.* DiNoia, O.P. analyzes this problem in "Implicit Faith, General Revelation and the State of Non-Christians," in *The Thomist* 47 (1983): 209-241. This article argues that general revelation must be subordinate to special revelation and opposes both self-justification and a justification without Christ; thus a " theology of religions should assert that they [non-Christiansl can lead lives which are pleasing to God in ways known only to him ... they will share in the divinely willed consummation of human history which Jesus Christ makes possible and for which Christians hope," p. 237. In "Authority, Public Dissent and the Nature of Theological Thinking," in *The Thomist* 52 (1988) : 185-208, DiNoia analyzes this problem in relation to Pannenberg's theology (p. 192ff.) and "the revisionist theologians" such as David Tracy.

1s Knitter, p. 91.

10 Ibid., p. 92. Regarding historicism and N.T. as canon see Brevard S. Childs, *The New Testament as Oanon: An Introduation,* (Phila.: Fortress, 1985), pp. 16-33.

gobten Son of God we must realize that this expression belongs to the language of the N.T. writers 1and refers only to their value judgement. Thus, "Evangelicals should face the further possibility that Christians can maintain and prodaim the partioular importance of Christ ... as a universal truth for all :veJigions-without having 1to negate the importance of univ;ersal truth in other religions." [80] But the question remains: Can we know" univiers1al truth" in other religions without first knowing the truth of God revealed in Christ?

'Jihird, the Evangelicals, especially Karl Ba11th, distorted the BiMe and the Reformers by arguing that we are not justified by works but by faith and that revelation always contradicts religion. This is faJs.e since "1as much Roman Catholic and process theology contends ... the divine assumption of human na:ture in Jesrus does no't stand as one grand exception in the historical process, if mther it is the (or a) fuM expression of wha1t God is up to in history, then *it follows that grace is given as a constitutive part of nature."* [81] The question remains: Can we think of grace as *grace* while conceiving]tin this way?

Fourth, " where Christians encounter 11eligionsthat, from appea11ances, are fulJ of good recognizing the l'ea1l]ty of a Transcendent Being and living lives of love and justic:e-1here Christians should also expect to find God's revefation and graice." [82] This expectation itself dictates Knitter's theological discoveries.

Jesus and General Revelation: Protestant, Catholic, and Unitive Views

Knitter presents several mainline Pmtestants who argue for a general rev'C'lation which is called by Althaus "original revelaition," by Brunner " creation l'eve1ation," and by Tillich "gen-

[80] Knitter, p. 93.

[81] Ibid., pp. 94-95, emphasis mine.

[82] Ibid., p. 95. The weakness of William Lowe's suggested "heuristic" for interreligious dialogue is his basic agreement with this reasoning, *Horizons* 13 (1986) : 125.

era;l rievdation; "[83] they :confirm his dream of unitive plumlism. These theologians believe they are presenting the authentic Reformation doctrine, i.e., tha1t there is and must be a tion as an adion of the triiniitar,ian God 'drawing all people to the Father which cannot be the content of a naitural theology. As notes "this revelation has a va1idity and efficacy illidependent of revelation in Christ: 'It is valid through itself; i1t shines on its own light; it is not essentially bound to faith in Jesus Christ and to his Gospel.'" Experience confirms this; thus, the "prodding.s of conscience ... available to aU, attest to a divine rev;elation given in the very stuff of human existence."[84] Til:lich's argiument rests on the belief that "every human be:ing seeks and can he' gm.sped:' by an Ultimaite Concern .... Reiigion is tha:t st1a1be of gm1sped by an ultimarte concern."[85] Pannenherg confirms this by insisting that faith in Christ "is possible *only* if]t is the response to 'and fuffillment of a person's previous knowledge of God in general revefation," i.e., the idea of a benevolent and personal l'eality, a need for iredemption, and the idea thwt the various world religions are "willed by God; their gods are 'representatives' of the Almighty."[86] on experience and Scripture, Knitter shows thait these mainline Protestants idisagJ:9eewith the Evangelicals by detaching revefa1tion from faith in and identifying it with a person's knowledge of the Absolute.

Yet a conflict remains because these same theologians argue, **in V1arying wa,ys, thait Christ** i1s **the only savior. For Knitrter**

ss Ibid., p. 98.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid., p. 99. Cf. also Haught, cited above who follows Tillich. John A. T. Robinson, *Honest To God,* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963) concurs, "Belief in God is a matter of 'what you take seriously without any reservation', of what for you is *uitimate* reality," p. 55. These theologians take this to refer to our ultimate concern and identify that with God. This is compatible with Rahner's identifying the "whither" of transcendence with the term of our self-experience, then with mystery and finally with God. The problems with that thinking are analyzed extensively in Paul D. Molnar, "Is God Essentially Different. . . "

s6 Ibid., pp. 99-101.

salvation does not mean " what no eye has seen, nor ear heard ... regarding whait God has pTepal'ed for those who love him" [1 Cor. :Z: 9]. *1!t* means" •bhe beginnings of salvation in this life: what Christians mean when they talk about ' being in Christ Jesus,' funowing the Frather, the experience or a,wareness of God that brings both meaning and fll'eedom."[87] He emphasizes that the above-mentioned theologians aH argue that outside of Chris1t there is both a self-manifestation and a knowtledge of God " but it does not lead ·to salvation."[88] Pannenberg even implies thrut " salvaition, a true experience of the tme God, is ait best only partial and inadequate" in other 11eiligions. WhiJe Christ restores "the ontological stl'iuctures of the God-humanity relationship," he is "the only begotiten Son of God, not as a savior, but as the Savior .... He is the one and only Savior or he is no Savior at all."[89] The mainiline Protestants disagree with the Evangelica1ls by affirming a general re¥elation, whi1e agreeing thart the11e can be no other savior t:han Christ.

He11e Knitter distingiui:shes between an ontological and an epistemologicail need for Christ. An epistemological need meians thart " direct contaot with Christ via the wm1d is the only way salvation can be media:bed because it is the onJy way salvation can be properly undersitood. Outside Christ one simply does not know how sahnation works."[90] Thus, we are ,saved only by :llaith and graioe as a mirade and not by works. In Brunner's words, " The only power that in principle unconditionally exdudes self-redemption is the message of the mediaition of Christ."[91] Becaiuse of Christ there can be no form of self-jusitificrution. Acco11dingto Knitter, because Hans Urn von BaHhasar and Jean Danielou recognize a " cosmic revelation," they fit within this "Pmtestanrt Catholic model." Sti lil, rthey are reluotant to admit that other can be "channels of genuine salvation .... To move in this direction, they argue,

87 Ibid., p. 100.
ss Ibid., p. 102.
89 Ibid., p. 104.
90 Ibid., p. 106.
91 Ibid., p. lOG. See also p. 107.

is to flirt with Pelagianism (salv:aition by works) ." [92] Thus,

> some recognition of universal revelation is the keystone for any Christian approach to other religions .... Tillich was correct when he insisted that the :first ' presupposition' for interreligious dialogue must be ' that both partners acknowledge the value of the other's religious conviction (as based ultimately on a revelatory experience)'. Without this keystone, a theology of other religions cannot really call itself Christian. [93]

Mmieover, the religions should he evaluated positively and not negaitively as in evangeJical theology. This }eaids to Knitter's main thesis:

> It seems that both human logic and Christian theology require that if one admits the *fact* of divine revelation apart from Christ, one must also admit at least the possibility of salvation apart from Christ. [94]

Here Knitter has found the weakness of the mainline Protesitant critique of Evangelical theology. If one admits the fact of revelation apart from Christ, why can there not be salvartion apart from Christ? Is there any way to avoid 'this predicament?

I 'Suggest that we rnusrt hold faith, grace, and reviefation together in a way which Paul Knitter and these theologians do not. Since it is the one Lord [Deut., chaps. 4-5] whose objective truth wa.s recognized in different historical circumst1ances and in disparate ways by both the prophets and the apostles [e.g. Jn. 8: *56]* we are hound to believie that Jesus Christ *has* spoken through the prophets and *is* the Incarnate Word who savies:. Faith receives its truth fl'om this Word as God's unique *aot* of revelation and gr1aice within history. Therefore, the Church, which was hidden in Im·ael and disdo1sed in the history of Christ, has both a prophetic and apostoaic form. Yet, this is exactly the truth which no 'unhnersalist' or unitarian religion can It perceives religious 1fauth from a universal

92 Ibid., p. 113.
93 Ibid., p. 114.
94 Ibid., p. 116,

revela:tion and mal<!esthe content of hiblircaJ conform to it, thereby undermining the uniqueness of the triune God.

For Knitter, the " traditional insistence on the ontoJogical necessity of Chris1t for salvation" and "beiief in the universal salvific will of the Christian God" are irreconcilable assertions.[95] Either God's universal salvilic will has ontofogical results which can be described as a generail revelation or general salvation apart from Christ, or Christ canno't be ontologicaHy necessary for the salvation of alJ.[96] Could it not be thait the God-man is both ontologicaily necessary .for salvation 'and *free* to work within and without 'the Chumh? Hence his wilJ simply *cannot* he undocstood Wiithout foith in him; 1the grace of God was operative in a hidden way in Israel but folly revealed in his Hfo, death, and resurrection. If this is true, then we shouM stop trying rto define salvartion *apart* from it's adua,li1ty in the history of :the oov;enant and in the Church; Chrisbians are sanc-ti:fied by the gmce of God operative 1in history aocording to his sov;e1reignpurposes.

Knitter knows that Christians build their knowledge of God, revelaition, gr:ace, and salvaition on no other foundation than Chmst, but he desires to hwlanoe and correct these idea,s with the insights of "Jung {md contemporary psy1ehology of reili-giion."[97] Thus the norm for Christian theology shifits away from the Word of God, in whom we believe, to the insights of Jung and contemporary psychology of re1'igion. Acico1,dingrto Knitter, wha;t do .they teach us? Fi11st, "Perhaps there is no ontiologiical niit at :all between God and humanity." Our first insight, based on this .definition of geneml revelation is, in the manner of Rousseau, ,a of 1the traiditional doctrine of original sin. While some explanations of this dootrine do show the influence move of Stoic philosophy than of biblicaJ revela-

95 Ibid.

96 T. F. Torrance, "Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy," in *Scottish Journal of Theology* 39 (1986) : 451-482, captures this predicament by analyzing the Western tendency toward dualism in thinking about God and Revelation.

s1 Knitter, p. 118.

tion,[98] rthis does not justify the of what is pointed out by the doctrine, i.e., that there was an ontologi1cal rift between God anid humanity caused by Adam's sin ,and restored by Christ. Second, "Perhaps human nature, as its 'unconscious' seems to witness, in its very constiturtion at-oned with God."[99] This second insight entails a denial of the trarditionail. doctrine of atonement and ioonsequently a fiat espousal of Pe1agia:nism-our restormtion fo righteousness is par1t of our constitution [to think the thought of God is 1to think truly about God]. This shows that ,whel'e grace is not seen as gmce, ri1t must he claiimed as part of our eons1titiution. Thfod, Knitter writes: "As Rahner will put it, perhaps 'na.ture' in its: very is grace (the supernatural! ,existential)."[100] We saw abmne that, while Rahner ,aims :to distinguish our supematural ·existentia:l offer) from grruoe, 1the togic of his expfana-tiion compels him to depict grace as an element of our tmns-cendentality .[101] While for Rahner 'nature' was a necessary 11emainder concept, Knitter omits it completely. Fourth, per-haps "Jesus saYes not by 'doing' or 'repairing' .aJUything, but by showing, ,J1evealing whait is all'eiady .there. . . ."[102] In this view Jesius, as ithe God-man, does not f11eely *act* in history; ihe :simply points us to our inna1te capacity for the good. This ltousseauian logic misses the of sin ,and the nature of salvrution ,as an *aot* of the immanent Trinity *ad extra*, by whi:ch we aicbuaillyreceivcethe capaioity for the good; rit ohsom'es A:quinas'1sinsight that, since ithe God ·revcealedin the Bible be-came man in order to save us,1°[3] one ·cannot think of thls God while ignoring his aieition as s1avior. By correcting trnditionail

[98] F. R. Tennant, *The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin,* (New York: Schocken Books, 1946). See, e.g., how Tertullian's "tradu-cianist" theory of hereditary sin was influenced by Stoic philosophy, p. 330ff.

[99] Knitter, p. llS.

[100] Ibid.

[w1] For more on this cf. Molnar, *The Thomist* 51 (1987) : 588, 611, and 628ff.

[102] Knitter, p. 118.

[10s] *ST* 3, q. l, art. 3.

Christian rtheofogy with the insights of Jung and recent psychology of religion, Knitter is to 1see l1e1igious tmth *in* olthex religions but only bernmse, rat :least in these four ways, he no longer siuhs'Cribes to the truth disdosed in Christ.

Roman Catholio Theology

Knitter discusses rthe Roman Caitholic model by identifying Rahne:r's definition of tm:nsoendental revdll!tion and the supernwtuml with what mainline Protestants called "unive11sa1l reveJation." [104] Whereais Rahner himself, as we saw above, ,W0Ur1d resist describing graioe as "built into nruture," Knitter rea:sons:

> To know God in these different ways is for Rahner not just revelation. It includes salvation: a communion with the one true God. . . . Grace built into nature, universal revelation that not only reveals but saves-this is the starting point for most contemporary Roman Catholic theologians as they confront the question of other religions.[105]

Smoo he never considel'.s the possibility that Jesus might re-

[104] Knitter, p. 125.

[105] Ibid., p. 126. The following account by Rabner illustrates his own predicament: " if we start out from the Christian teaching of a universal salvific will of God . . . always and everywhere in history and thus outside the verbalized message of Christianity and the Church, then we can ... assume that what we Christians describe as Holy Spirit, supernatural grace . . . exists as such always and everywhere and therefore also outside institutionalized Christianity, even though of course in the concrete individual this supernatural existential of dynamism toward the immediacy of God can exist *either* in the mode of pure factuality from the outset *or* in the mode of rejection *or* in the mode of free acceptance," *TI* 18: 181. The problem, as noted above, is that God's salvific will is identical with his action in Christ and the Spirit and cannot be described as a universal that is present "always and everywhere in history". God is omnipresent, but bis omnipresence cannot be confused with any existential dynamism which can be described as a universal within history. Rahner believes he is preserving God's freedom by saying the supernatural existential can exist in pure factuality or in the modes of rejection or acceptance. But by equating *any* acceptance of *any* human dynamism with grace as a universal existential he has already compromised God's freedom.

veal something from *beyond* ithe sphere of whwt ean be lisheid as tl'ue *from* human expecienoe, Knitter recommends John Hick',s overtly adoptionist and docet1c Chr1i:s1bology. Hick believes that " The real point and va:Lue of the mcarnaitional doctrine is not 1indioative hut expressive, not to russ:ert a metaphysical fact but rbo a valuation and evokie an ait-t:i:tude." [10&] Beginning wiith the presupposition th1ait :religions, including Christianity ,sha.re a "common iethicaJ ideal" or "soiteriological sbucbure," lliok as1sumes that the "common :ideal 1arises from rthe fact that all of them a11e animated by anld in sea:rch of the 'same ultimrute reaility." [101] Christians can adhere to Christ as their savior, since he evokes this attitude, but :iJt is theolog]cail fundamentalism to believe thart Jesus could be unique or normaitive .for others; [108] :the incarnation is a myth pointing to this deeper :reality.

Krntrber asserts that Hick does not coHapse functiona1l ii.nto ontological Chcistofogy; for Hick, Chris1tians came to speak of God incarnaite in Chris:t "because they expeirienced him to he '1so powerfuJJy God-conscious.' " [109] It is n01t that llick denies any *real* content ito the Incarnation doctrine; raither, its content is the experience of God-consciousness which Jesus haid and which we too oan ha,ve.[110] But on this line of reasoning, :the'!'ecan he no 11eal truth independernt of people's experiences and value juidgment:S. iis not the oase that Jesrus *was'* onto-unique as: 1tme God and true man-that is the myth. Christians described. this particular man in that dis1thmtive way in order to iaeoount for their experiences ,and to evoke certain religious att[tudes. Whe:rea,s for Chris1tians it was Jesus, the Incarnate Wo11d, who was 1the Way, the Tmth, and the Life, for Hick and for Knitter, both functional and

106 Knitter, p. 151.
101 Ibid., p. 148.
10s Ibid., p. 149.
109 Ibid., p. 151.
110 Knitter ex;plains this clearly in "Theocentric Christology," *Theology Today* 40 (1983) : 130-149, at pp. 132-133.

Chrisrl:.ollogy.are mythological; they 11efer to the mntrenrt of Jesus' experienoos:, ()!Ur experiences, .and to our valuations and ia1ttitudes. Hick 1al11d Knitrter have changed the reality described in the N.T. wiitness :from hieing *the unique* God-Man with uniqruie fonotions [revelation ailid salvation] to a mythical man with a powerful God-0onsciousness. And this thinking leaids Knitter :to embrace the Christology of Raimundo Panikkar.

Raimundo Panikkar, Unitive Pluralism, and Unitarian Theology

Panikkar is "a CaithoJic theologian and an ac-CJ'leditedscholar of Hinduism" [111] who typifies Knitter's unitive plrurail:ism. Knitter contenJds that for Panikkar there is ra "fundamental .religious fact" which unites aill religions. But this is noit " 1S1chool of rommon essence " thinking, becaiusie P1anikkar "insists on the importance of diversity among r:eligiions. Differences, for him, make a vital diflierence." Indeed, " Each intm-pretation, eaich name for ithe ' fundamental religious: fact,' both ' enriches and qualifies tha;t Mystery which is neither purely :transcendent nor purely immanent." This: means:

> It is not simply that there are different ways leading to the peak, but that the summit itself would collapse if all the paths disappeared. The peak is in a certain sense the result of the slopes leading to it.... It is not that this reality [the ultimate mystery] *has* many names as if there were a reality outside the name. This reality *is* the many names and each name is a new aspect. . . . The purpose of the new ecumenical ecumenism is to deepen one's grasp and living of this mystery. [112]

Pianikkar hrus discovered here ithe mystery of mY"sticrul pall>theism, which necessarily :identifies the rewliity of God with eaich expression of :it. Thus, the peak, God, wouM not exist ii the paths leading to it, the ic11eatures,disappeared. How does this WeW ,affect his " Ch::ristofogy" ? In hi:s " .authentically universal Christology ":

[111] Knitter, *No Other Name?,* p. 152.
[112] Ibid., p. 153.

Christ is ... a living symbol for *the totality of reality: human, divine, cosmic.* This totality of reality is what he calls the ' primordial theandric fact,' or, more recently, the 'cosmotheandric reality.' These terms try to express 'that intimate and complete unity ... between the divine and the human.' Panikkar explicitly calls this unity a 'non-dualist vision.' It is essentially the same vision expressed by Schuon ... and implied by Jung. God and the finite world make up a unity neither monistic nor dualistic.113

Christ is a symbol of this non-durulist unity of God and rthe wor1d.[114] *As* 1seen here, Christ symbolizes the *totality of reality*-human., divine, .and cosmiic; thus, there oan be no clear distinction between God and crerutures. And iany theologian. who WiOlu1d hold mhat an incrurnrutionhas taken place solely, finally, and nornlaitive[y in Jesus of Naziareth is guilty of idolatrous historicism booa;nse "no historicail name or form. can be the full, fill!al expression of the Christ." Christ :Ls not unnecessary here. He is necessary as •a parrti(mlar historical embodiment of the "cosmotheandric fact."

Jesus is the ultimate form of Christ .... Though a Christian believes that 'Jesus is the Christ' ... this sentence is not identical to ' the Christ is Jesus '.... Jesus, therefore is a concrete historical name for the 'Supername '-that is, the Christ which is always 'the name above every name' .... The name above all names-the Christ-can go by many historical names: Rama, Krishna, Isvara, Purusha, Tathagata .... Jesus ... would be one of the names of the cosmotheandric principle.[115]

And this thin.king is confirmed for Knitter by John Macquarrie'1s propo·srulthat interreligious dialogue be based on " ' commitment and openness '-total commitment to Jesus and Mdical openness rto other revelaitions beyond Jesus."[116]

Douetism considers Jesus an :appearance of a genem1ly l"ooognizaible truth, a timeil.ess truth.[111] It foils to recognize that

na Ibid., p. 154, emphasis mine.

114 Ibid., p. 155.

115 Ibid., pp. 155-56.

11s Ibid., p. 157.

117 Cf. e.g. Eduard Schweizer, *Jesus,* (Atlanta, 1971), pp. 88ff. In this context Schweizer refers to Gnosticism which is itself docetic. See also Karl

Jesus *is* the Christ and that the Christ *is* Jesus because of an *act* of God (Jn. 1: 14). The starting poinJt of docetism is not the Jesus, and it is not hound to his present his1torical mediation through the Church, its teachings, and the sacraments. It can describe itself as rtotally committed to Christ and open to other revelations beyond him because it views Christ as a principle by which creatul'es attempt to synthesize their own a:ots of self-transcendence with the being of God, whom they thinlc they l'ecognize in Christ. The commitment is not to Christ as an *independently* existing *being* (the Living Lord *acting* in his1tory through power of the Holy Spirit) but ito an idea which is ,supposed to represent the truth of what Jesus was. Paniikkar's synthesis cannot respect Jesus as *the* my;stery of 'l'e¥elation because it cans us beyond him to the higher synthesis demanded by a non-dualist unitive pluralism. Consequently, Panikkar does not even begin to describe the unique union and distinction between God and creatures established 1in Christ. He has, in fact, :changed oontent of Christology from a sita,tement abourt his ,significance fm history inJto a statement about all reality, he hlen:ds together into an historical process and reduces to his cosmotheandric prrincip1e.[118]

In a viery similar foshion, Krruitter's non-nonnative Christo1ogy 1ogicailily misconstrues the meaning of the tm;ditional christo1ogie:s; it is an " honest intellectual " constrwot built upon a docetic ideaJ and ire-constructed according to his un:iti¥e pluralism. Here docetism issues in Unitarianism; its truth Dests u:pon finding experienoes in Jung, Pianikkar, and others to

Barth's descriptions of ebionite and docetic Christologies. Neither is actually willing to begin thinking about truth from the particular man, Jesus from Nazareth, who was the Word of God in the flesh. Karl Barth, *Churoh Dogmatics,* Vol. 1, pt. l, *The Doctrine of the Word of God,* ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), pp. 402ff. Cf. also *Church Dogmatics,* I, 2, pp. 16ff. and 180ff.

11s And of course John l'vfacquarrie does not realize that commitment to Jesus excludes openness to other revelations beyond him, since there is no other God who continues to reveal than the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

verify a umtarian position. Knitter cannot accept the traditional Christologies hecaiuse they olearly do not teach what he, through John P.awlikowski, teaches, i,e., thait "each human per!Son is somehow divine," .that

> Christ is the theological symbol that the Church selected to try to express this reality .... Thus in a very real sense one can say that God did not become man in Jesus. God always was man .... The Christ event was crucial,. however, for the manifestation of this reality to the world.[119]

The reality ,,signifiedhere is that of human peil'ISOns who, a:s div:ine, simply created a god for themsclves and selected Jesus to be their 1symbol.

With Tom Driver 1and Ro\SffillaryRuether, Knitter concludes that " The church 'should teach nothing 1rubout God or Jesus which does not make a positive contribwtion to social justice." [120] "Driver st/ates clearly, 'my methodoilogicaJ. proposal [is] to loca;be chrisito1ogy within ethiios and not prior to it.' " [121] Trruditiionrulnormative Chris:tology is immoral bemuse it has fositered anti-Semitism, 11rucism, and serism. [122] Irt ailso elllOOurages the " oolturrul imperiruLismof the West." [123] Thus,

> If . . . we step back from our analysis of these different thinkers, if we try to describe the forest from above the treetops, what we see is not an abrupt change but a gradual evolution. What these different theologians are part of, what they are promoting, is an evolution that has been taking place within Christian consciousness from the early part of this century, an evolution from ecclesiocentrism to christocentrism to theocentrism. [124]

From where does the truth of theocerutriism emerge? " TradirtioinaJchristology, with its insistence on finality and normativiity, jru.st doe s not :6.rt whrut is being experienced in the arena of l"eligious pLurialism. We are in the midsrt of an evoiLuti.onf11om chcistocentrism to theooentrism." Modem theologians "are

119 Knitter, *No Other Na,me'!*, p. 162.
120 Ibid., p. 163,
121 Ibid., p. 164.
122 Ibid., pp. 164-65.
123 Ibid., p. 165.
124 Ibid., p. 166.

placing God, not ·the chmch or Jesus Christ, at the center of things. And .as with all change they feel they are not negating Oll" 1rubandonmg what went befo11e."[125] Here we need to ask: is this evolution rea1l or imagined? It is a 11eail evo-Lution for those who beHeve that eaich person is somehow divine and tha.t the sour:oe of truth now the experiences of those who, because of religious dialogue, plaice God but not Ghrist at the center. Hut ·to me it is only imagined because this *very evolution* .a1ctrually *does* negate Christi·an tmth: Jesus is at the ioenter because he is none other than God himself in the :flesh. One cannot think of God and by-pass Jesus or ·the Chul'lch as .the sphere w11thin which God is met.

Here theologians must make a choice between Knitter's evolutionary ideal, which paist Christ and rthe Church to a God who oannot ultimately be distinguished from humanity, and the God of Christian revela,,tion, who caills us to sailvation in Christ and ca:lls us to be his eschatoiogical community on earth. Once truth is seen as grounded in God's aotion in Christ rand the Spirit, it wiH he seen that the traditional Chrisitofogies do not fos1ter division and keep peop1e fmm folilowing the truth; mther division is fos:te:redby Christians and others constmcting truth aoco:rding to *various* ideals grounded in mdividrual and conflicting experiernces and then using the traditiona1 Ch:ristoiogies to vail:Udaitethose "truths."

Knitter argues that his theocentrism does noit violate the N.T. and t:raditiona1l understanding of Christ. His docetic Chris1to1ogyis tme because

> all the titles and proclamations about Jesus, have their origin in the *saving experience* of Jesus by individuals and the community ... they originated in a big-bang experience .... This experience of a saving power or revelation was the source and sustenance of all the interpretations of Jesus found in the New Testament. [126]

Here Knitter at.tempts. to Link Rahner's transcendental Chris-

[125] Ibid., p. 167.
[126] Ibid., p. 175.

1Jology with pi'OCess theofogy and "panentheism" in oroer to defend his thesis.[121] Both Rabner and the process theoJogians show thait the incairnation is " thoroughly consistent with our experience of ourselv;es and the worM," even though the process modeil. differs from Rahner's. Knitter then argues that

> an experience of the world in process leads to a *panentlwistic* experience of God's relationship to the world. God is not identified with the world (pantheism), but everything and everyone in the world exists *in* God. Such a view is not, I should say, opposed to Rahner's understanding of divinity within us; but it does make for a tighter bond between the infinite and the finite. In the process model, divinity, in a limited but real sense, is dependent on the world for the unfolding of its being. Panentheism can be more clearly understood under one of its synonyms: incarnation.[12]

Whiile Rahner does aooopt a modified panentheism [1211] he differs fJJOm Knitter by holding that the Incamaition happened only once; Rahner :vejected ithe idea that the Incarnrution was a myth. Sti11, Knitter contends that " Rahner and the process theologians respoot the myth" because rthey view it as: a " true *myth,* a meaningfu[*model,* for expres,sing what Christians have 'experienced Jesrus rbo be ... they take the myth .seriou:sily,hut not 111Jrerahly."[130] Expressing confusion 1aboiut why Rahner " cannot admit other incarnations, " Knitter even ·sruggests thrut Cha1Joedon'1s:distiootions1 of nmbwes impli1ed other incarnations [which of course it did not]. Again, he asks "F01r truth to be truth, for truth to·call forth total commitment, must it be the *only* rtruth? "[131] Here, once again, Knitter has hrought rthe problem of method into focus. He accepts Rahner's: idea that the IDJcarnation "is not 'Something totaly unexpected [hut] i:s .the almost natural or logical fulfi!Llmentof the .awesome, mysterious nature that is ours as human "[132] and then logica[[y *asks*

[121] Ibid., pp. 187-89.

[12s] Ibid., p. 189.

[12a] K. Rabner and H. Vorgrimler, "Panentheism," *Theological Dictionary,* ed. C. Ernst (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), pp. 333-34.

[1ao] Knitter, *No Other Name?* p. 191.

[1s1] Ibid.

[132] Ibid., p. 187.

Rahneir amid the process theologians a very important question (giv;en their mmmon sta:riting point): If Chrisrt is the full realiz,a:tionof *potential* God ha.s given to us all, why ilimit the Incarnation only to Chrisrt?[133]

He:ve Rahner's: method returns to· haJUlltus. Accoricli.ngto the rtranscelllldentJailmethod, the Incarnation can onJy make sense in light of our .transcenidenibalexperience, i.e., in light of various potentirulrirtiesinherent in the human spirit .acting within history. If ithis is true, it is *logically* impossible to argue that Jesills iS uibberlyunique and neoess1aryas rt.he *one* and *only* savior. Instead, he must be OOillceived as the highest achievement of human po·tentia1lirtyirreversibly pl"esent among us. This very thinking compromises the truth which Rabner wished to uphoM, i.e., thait the Incarnation was an aat of the one true God becoming man in the history of Jesus, and he wia.s: the only self-expression of :the Father *ad extra.* Knitter has established that, [if we ho1d .that] the truth of Christianity rests on a " big-bang" [or 1any] eJq>erience,then it cannot be a *self-sufficient* truth----0.tneeds other ·truth "to be."[134] But, ·as: ·seen above, Christians believe that God created the wo:vld from nothing, and the truth of Christianity is seilf-sufficient. Knitter clearly summarizes his overaH prurpose in this analysis:

> Transcendental and process christologies interpret the myth of God's incarnation in Jesus as an expression of the nondualistic unity between divinity and humanity .... This is what Troeltsch and Toynbee perceived with their view of God as coterminous with history, what Jung suggested with his own myth of our divine unconscious, what the conservative Evangelicals and mainline Protestants miss in their stress on the gulf between God and the world, what the Catholic model holds with its notion of the supernatural existential, what Panikkar asserts with his 'cosmotheandric principle.' Incarnation is not a one time event. Rather it is an *ideal*

133 Ibid., p. 192.

134 This, of course, is the inherent difficulty of panentheism. It claims to make a distinction between God and creatures but really cannot. Rahner, of course, would not hold that Christianity rests on a "big bang" experience but on an experience of the nameless which itself is tied to Jesus.

for all, an *ideal* rooted in the ancient Christian belief in the one universal logos or wisdom of God.[135]

Doing Before Knowing

The aim and scope of of this should not be underestimated. Starting from experience rather than doctrine, Knitter's norm for truth has become the Christian God '!'educed to a theocentcic *ideal,* reconst1mcted from Panildmr's non-dualism. He has incorpomted a pantheism into the fabric of his theology, e¥en rthorugh Christians hav>e ail.ways l1eject<ed pantheism in order to distinguish God's action in Chrisit from the historiprocess. Knitter claims that there can he no knowledge of the :truth *before* dialogue, uncritically grounds his epist:emofogy in the hermeneutics of libe:mtion theology, and then argues tha,t authentic dialogue must be faithful to his docetic Chrisfology. His reasoning bears out the truth of Gilson's remark thait when 1someone "both knows and believes there is but one cause of aJil: that is, the God in whom he heliev;es can hardly be other than the cwuse which he knows." [136]

}ioir Knitter, ithe star1ting point for authentic dialogue among 11eiligions will not be the question of whether rthere is " one savior /:incarnation or many" but "how Christians and others can struggle, together, against those things that threaten their common humanity. Only in the praxis. of such struggle cain olarity on univ>ersal truths emerge." [137] The uni¥ersal truth which Jon Sobrino, Leonardo Boff, and Rosemary Ruether teach is that

> We cannot begin to know who this Jesus of Nazareth is unless we are following him, no matter what that demands. That is the starting point. Furthermore, everything we know or say about him

[135] Knitter, *No Other Name?,* p. 191, emphasis mine.

[136] Gilson, *God and Philosophy,* pp. 78-79. Furthermore, biblical anthropology sees people as lost and in need of redemption, i.e., they *need* to repent and believe *before* knowing the truth about God and revelation [Matt. 13: 10-12].

[137] Knitter, *No Other Name?,* p. 194.

must be repossessed and reclari:fied in the praxis of following him through the changing contexts of history. [188]

Since the historical Jesus did not preach about himsieH hut a.bout the kingdom of God, " what is most important is to put this kingdom in the center of concern and to work toward bui1d:ing it; doctrinal purity and clarity about the church, the nature of God, and Jesus himself will fonow. Christians must keep their priorities clear." [139] Knitter drnws four concfosions from this. Fir:sit, ins;bead of seeing Jesus' uniqueness in dogmatic formulas we can see it only in the *praxis* of involv;ement w:ith others. Second, " By restoring the kingdom to the center of the gospel ... We cannot speak of Jesus as having 'ful:filileid' the hopes of Israel, for these we11e hopes for the kingdom of God;" [140] it is thus impos1sible to claim for Jesus any final normativity. Third, liberaition theofogy cliarifies why normative claims for Jesus are unneoessary and impossible today.

> For liberation theology, the one thing necessary to be a Christian and to carry on the job of theology is commitment to the kingdom vision of liberating, redemptive action. . .. Jesus of Nazareth *is* a means for liberation .... *Not knowing whether Jesus is unique, whether he is inclusive or norrnative for all others, does not interfere with comitment to the praxis of following.* [141]

Fourth, " ·liberartion christology allows, even requires, rtha;t Christians recognize the possibility of other liberaitol's, or saviors, other inca.rnations." [142]

Here we have an irreconci1ah1e confliot. If we can use Jesus as a symbolic means rto abtain salvation, then we can in fact sav<e ourselv;es. FoJJowing Jesus and faithfuhiiess to the kingdom, then, can be accomplished without knowing who Jesus was. By detaching the kingdom from Jesrns 1and then defining faithfulness to it ·as an autonomous exe11cise of eithicail cultu1'1e,

1as Ibid., p. 195.
2a9 Ibid.
140 Ibid., p. 196.
141 Ibid., p. 195, emphasis mine.
142 Ibid.

these thinkexs acliually miss the !truth of the N.T. itself. The synoptic gospels stress thrut only Jesus, as the Messiah of Judaism, did indeed frullill the hopes of Is:raeL The liberation ilheoJogians say we can no longer this booruuse true lib-el'lation no means obeying Christ alone; it means creating rthe "best society " iai1!d using Christ or the kingdom ,ag *ideals* which validate thait ·enterprise. This is exacrtly the kind of ·self-3ustification exduded by the N.T. faith. Whereas ,the pl'laxis of following becomes the obj·ect of faith in Knitter' 1s reasoning it is needless to know who Jesus *really* was before aoting for society], for the N.T. ,authentic praxis meant that disciples .aooepted Jesus as the Christ ·and for that reason worlmd foc a better society; with faith they could work in good times and in bad, ·l'leaJizing they could trust in Jesus rto bring his kingdom to icompJetion as he had promised. As lo!ng as the experience of 1liberation theoJogians demands other libemtors and saviors, it is in conflict with the demands of the N.T. For fiaith, JeSJUs alone can libemte us without enslaviing UIS in some "rthis or " other wor1dly" program which promises authentic libera.tion in vain. R is decisive to know who Christ wrus :and is *before* acting (pmxis), becruuse eviery "liberator" in history whose progiram wais not ructu.aUy subo;vd!inate!to the tl'IUe God did not ·ructuaHy *free* 1runyone for service of rthat Gold in social ,action.

Yet Knitter argues tha.t "Only in the actual following of Jesus, only in J>T"ruaticing and living hfus, message in our concrete sitiua.tion, can we reaJJly know who he is a.nd what he means." Jesus' message must be 1.1eshaped by a" new form of pra:ris," ha:sed on a" new originating and 'Self-correcting fo!UilJdation for Christian belief." [143] Thus, Chrisima:ns must pass over from their religion to others *before* they can who and what Jesus really is in their own [M 4] and the founda-for Christian tl'!Uth becomes " The srpiritual .rudventure of ilialogiue," than Jesus, 1the one medirutor. Indeed this ad-

143 Ibid., p. 206.
144 Ibid., pp. 206-7.

venture *alone* can viecify or qurulify " the tmditionaJ. Chris:tian olaim that in Jesus of Naz,areth God hrus 'surprised' us .... Without dialogue, •s111ch a truth might !be S1U1spected and suggested, but it cannot he kno:wn." [145]

Here the antithesis between what Chmstiamity really tieruches and what Knitter disoovers stands in hoM relief. First, he !asserts that rthe foundation for 8Juthentic dia:logue is: " religiorus experience." Then, he alleges that

> Dialogue must be based on the recognition of the possible truth in all religions; the ability to recognize this truth must be grounded in the hypothesis of a *common ground* and goal for all religions.... Authentic listening requires a total openness to the possible truth of what the other person in pressing .... I can never understand another's position as he does ... unless I share his view; in a word, unless I judge it to be true. [146]

Consequently, "there must he rthe same ultimate reality, the same divine p:vesence ... the same God--1alllimating all reiligions." Therefore " Christian belief in a *universal divine revelation* within a11 l'eligions," seen and described by Jung, Toynbee, Troeltsch, by Protestants and Catholics: rulike, supplies the common soul.'loe and direction for all faiths.L[47] Eaith must be distinguished from belief:

> The word 'faith' indicates both the personal experience and the ineffable content behind all authentic religion. It is the intuitive contact with, the grasping and being grasped by, the ultimate .... Beliefs are the cultural, intellectual, emotional embodiment of faith. . . . Faith, in its experience and in its content, is transcendent, ineffable, and ever open. [148]

Here rthe truth of religion can be identified with a human act of surrender to an reality, without asilcing if thrut reality corresponds to the Christian God.

145 Ibid., p. 207.
146 Ibid., p. 208.
147 Ibid., p. 209.
148 Ibid., p. 212.

Critiool Analysis and Conclusion

In a Christian doctrine of God and of revelation, God *al,one* defines truth. Authentic freedom colllsisrtsin obeying the Worn heard and believed. But this Word is the ,act of God himsielfin the h:isto:ryof Jesus and the essence of the Church mits preaching, teruching, swcraments, 1and theology. Obeying arny other word will mean not thait we may possibly be 1ed rto· a deeper apprehension of truth but, rather, that we a;re necessarily led 1away from the truth. Thus, to judge as *true* some other religion which is clearly in conflict with Christianity qui'be simply misses the .fact that there is no other somoe of revelation and salviation tham the one unique savior and reveruler himself, Jesus, the God-man. Moreover, an "authentic" dialogue requires that some acruaJ. recognition of truth take plruce. To ground this in religious experi.enre (Christian or non-Chrisrtian) woru1d deprive one or both dialogue partners (Christian or non-Christian) of the viery truth of the Gospel. By arguing that we cannot ;step outside our own traiclit:ion,Knitter appears to mainrtain the uniqueness of Christianity. Yet hooause it is our experience which makes it rtrue, he is forced -to say exactly what the theology of the N.T. does not say, i.e., that there is 1another revieale‌r or savior besides Jesus.

Rejecting Jesus' uniqueness as Christians have .ailways understood it, Knitter substitutes his definition of univiers1ailreve-1ation for the truth revieai1ed in Christ. Convie11sionno Longer means repentance 3!11d .belief in Jesus but" conversion to God's truth, as it is mrude known in ·clirulogue."[141] But dia1o.guemeans .accepting a die!finitionof ultimate 11eail:iitybased upon the common essence of religions, which by definition, cannot allow Jesus to be the sole revealer or savior. Here Knitter appeails to and to John Dunne's idea of" paissing over."

> Passing over is a shifting of standpoint, a going over to the standpoint of another culture, another way of life, another religion. It is followed by an equal and opposite process we might call ' com-

149 Ibid.

ing back,' coming back with new insight to one's own culture, one's own way of life, one's own religion.... If I keep in mind the relativity of standpoints as I pass over from one standpoint to another, therefore, *I efjectively hold myself open toward mystery* .[150]

Whi1e every human stall!dpoint is indeed relative, the question here :iis whether in fact we can equate the mystery of Christ w.iith a common essell!Ceof religion, an essence which we imagine to exist and to be attainable by passing over from one reiligion to another. But we have no existential method to hoM our-'Selvesopen to God, hemll!Sethere is only *one* forundation which none of us has laid.[151] It is ChriS!t himself who keeps us open to God; in him our lives werre re-created, and baptism signifies this.[152]

There is an epistemological message here. Liberation theology and Knitter's method of do.ing-befo:rie-knowing purport to sepamte pm:xis from knowledge of the truth, rull for the purpose of distinguishing !the oulturally ooll!d:illtionedfrom the sential in the world religions. But the truth is that no one can express an ildea of p11actiioe,ethical or otherwise, except by concepturulizing it in relation to some view of the truith. Thus, the notion of pure praxis is ·the consummate myth that has been oontrived to cwoumvent the tiiuth of ChristianiJty. Instead of alfowing the kingdom of God 1and l'eligious. pmctioe to· be dictated by the person ·and working of Jesus, these thinkers focus on the kingdom and on religious practice in an effort to find a truth which is universally recognizable but which avoids the scandal of the gospe[. With Knitter's conclusion we are back to where we starited.

Knitter's claim that wie have no knowledge of tmth without pmxis is oontrrudicted by his claim that " conversaition must be anJChored in what can he milled a ' new model ' of truth," for that model presupposes a notion of truth that has aJcturul1y

150 Ibid., pp. 214-15. See also pp. 211 and 216.

151 Cf. 1 Cor. 3, esp. v. 11 " For the foundation, nobody can lay any other than the one which has already been laid, that is Jesus Christ."

152 Cf. Ac. 2: 37-38 and compare Col. 2: 6ff. and Rom. 6: 3-4.

preceded praxis. That new model begins with the mystica:l experience of panJtheism (Shuon) 1and then argues tha;t triaditionaJ Western philosophy (.following Aristotle) is impoverished, for it defines truth 10000J:1dingto the principle of contradimion, which hoMs that " Truth . . . is essentially a matter of either-or." [153] In the 1tr1aiditionalmodel, the truth of religion is defined "through exclusion." Since our new model must be " inoluffive" mther than 1excliusive,the traditional model must he called inrto question. Anid partioo1arily by modern Roman Catholics, for they realize that "insis:tence on truth-through-e:m1usion easily atrophies personal faith and reduces faith to doctrine, moraility to legalism, ritual to superstition. Cathoiliics haive 1seen how such concern for absoLute truth denigrates the vrulue of other religious tmditions." [154] Catholics haive come :to rerulize that, though the!ir symbols still mediate the mystery, .they are not the mystery itself. Yet what is *this* mystery? Acco11ding to Knitter it is the mystery " Christiains caJl God." But that is the problem we fore. Can Christi!ans call anything God in truth unless the concept is subo11dinateto Christ himself as the trinitarian self-revelation of God *ad extra?* Can ithey recognize God without the present ,action of the Ho[y Spirit Cl'eating and sustaining £aith in the risen Lord? Here Knitter's suggested method of doing before thinking reverses itself.

In the new model, truth will no longer be identified by its ability to exclude or absorb others. *Rather, what is true will reveal itself mainly by its abuity to relate to other expressions of truth and to grow through these relations-truth* defined not by exclusion but by relation .... The new model reflects what our pluralistic world is discovering: no truth can stand alone; no truth can be totally unchangeable. Truth,. by its very nature, needs other truth. If it cannot relate, its quality of truth must be open to question. Expressed more personally . . . Without you, I cannot be unique. Truth, without 'other' truth, cannot be unique; it cannot exist ... truth through relationship ... allows each religion to be unique.[155]

153 Knitter, *No Other Name'!,* p. 217.
154 Ibid., p. 218.
155 Ibid., p. 219.

Yet this hmlusivist definition o.f tmth can only work on one presupposition, nameiy, that the truth of Christianity be excluded foom the relationship.]for Christianity, as we have seen, 1speaks of a God who is free in himself 1and in his aotions *ad* God who is independent of the world and whose relationship with us ils established and maintained in his free gmce. Whereas an indrusivist and relational notion of truth sounds appealing in .a plumlistic society, this particufar model exdudes only the heresy that Jesus is the *unique (one* and *only)* re-v;eailer, savior, :and Son of God. And that view, which for KnitteT is a heresy, is the v;ery truth upon which Clwistian doctrines :rest. Here Knitter's epistemology cannot delivcer. It claims fo be ino1usive but actually is exclusive.

Why this mutuaJJy conditioning notion of truth? Because "unitive plura:lism" demands it. " The wor1d :religions, in all their .amazing diffe11e111ces,a11e more complementary than contradictory. Wha.t this complementarity implies extends beyond the imagination of most Westerners." [156] And this: "new" insight is tha;t 11eligiousexperience is dipolar, i.e., aM :religions by their very na:bu11e incorporate the " coincidence of opposites," as we learn faiom the 'taoist principle of the yin-yang. This prinniple contradicts the Judeo-Christian idea of a self-sufficient truth. From this we learn that " the Chris1tian teaching on the distinction between the ultimaite and the finite needs the Hindu insight into the nonduality between Brahma and !31tman."[157] Thus, the norm for all tmth, mciLuidiingthe truth of Christillanity, which emerges from this anaJysis is the unitive pluraJism [non-duaJity] of F. Shuon. On this pl'esupposition, can no fonger be normartive for an unde11standing of tme Teiigion becruuse Christ himseil.fcan no longer be normative. Revelation then can only mean exactly wha,t Feuerbach thought it meant, i.e.,

> the contents of the divine revelation are of human origin, for they have proceeded not from God as God, but from God as determined

[156] Ibid., p. 220. [157] Ibid., p. 221.

by human reason, human wants, that is, directly from human reason and human wants. And so in revelation man goes out of himself, in order, by a circuitous path, to return to himself! Here we have a striking confirmation of the position that the secret of theology is nothing else than anthropology-the knowledge of God nothing else than a knowledge of man! [158]

But to think that the question of tmth in religion can be solved by detaching the messiage of Christ from Christ himself as the one mediator and then setting the message up as the Lol'd means either thait we are serving two masters or that we have col1apsieidrevefatfon into antlwopo1ogy; both alternatives compromise 1the Gosp:el.

Knitter's dream, his utopia, borrow the wol'ds of Wilfred Cantwell Smith-that "No s1tatement a:bout Christian faith is to which in a non-Christian cou1d not agree." Raimundo Panikkar, speaking of Hindu-Christian dialogue, srtates "What we aiie looking for here is not 1a Christianization of Hinduism or a Hinduization of Christianity, but insofar as it is a genuinely va1id 1theology for both Hindu and Christian." [159] We have a:ll'eaidyseen that Knirtterr's presentation of Chrisit is far 1fl'oma genuinely v;ail.idChristian theo1logy. Even the best possible evailuation of Jesus ::JJocording to Knitter's method wouM 1see Jesus ·a1s 1a "unifying symbol" for peoples. Such a symbol however can oily function as long as one's Christology is docetic. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to ahsr!Ja,infrom conceiving the Christian God according to Unital'ian presuppositions at the outsert. Hel'ein Lies the neces1sity of a trinitarian theology which 1sees God's oneness only by aicilmowledginghis thl'eeness. In such a theology the deity of the Son and Spirit will. be manifest in each of its refleetions.

For Knitter the mis:sionary's job is done if ",au are converted to a deeper grasp and following of God's tmth . . . the goal of

[158] Ludwig Feuerhach, *The E8senae of Christianity,* trans. by George Eliot, intro. by Karl Barth and foreword by H. R. Niebuhr, (New York: Harper, 1957)' p. 207.

[159] Knitter, *No Other Name?,* p. 228.

works is being achieved when announcing the gospel to aH peopleis makes the Christian a better Christian and the Buddhist a better Buddhist." [160] Yet this y;ery thinking re--dUJcesthe question of truth to a religious practice which ignores the pmblem of whether and to wha,t extent the object of reflection is any;thing other than onesieJ.f. Thus, both the Gnostics 1and foenaeus daimed ,to be raiuthenticalrly Christian, the truth was determined only by the extent to which their thinking arcLua1ly pointed towal1d Chdsrt a;s the source of all famth. And, .a;coording to Niels Nielsen, the Buddha, e.g., "did not advocate dependence on the favor of the gods or a supreme being ars a divine revdation." [161] While ther:e were many Buddhas or gurus in East Asia, [162] the Christian God cannort be recognized by arcknowledging them or a supreme being. A sup11emebeing is not necessarily the Christian God; this God is certainly supreme, but precisely as the one and only God of the DercaJogiue. This insight neither denigrates :Buddhists nor exailts Christians; *ist* simply recognizes that unless both Christians and :Buddhists perceive the gmoe of God for what it timly is, they do not recognize the tmth of the Gospel, which is that Jesus alone is the univ1ersaJ Savior and ReV'ea1er. And no one is e2iic1udedfrom this Good News.

160 Ibid., p. 222.

161 Niels C. Nielsen et al., *Religions of the World,* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 190.

162 Ibid., pp. 233ff.

A RETURN TO THE SUBJECT: THE THEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHARLES TAYLOR'S *SOURCES OF THE SELF*

JAMES J. BUCKLEY

Loyola College
Baltimore, Maryland

ECENT THEOLOGIANS have widely argued (or pve-. sumed) that modernity's 1turn to the subject creates deep p11ohlemsfor imagining, thinking about, or enacting who we m'e. These theologians do not aJwaJ"s agree on what constitutes "modernity." And they ra11e!ly agree on the 'alternative to " the turn to the :subject." That is, some theologians airgue or presume that the turn from the subject ought to he baiekwa:rid, retrieving our sou11ces prior to what Vatican II and others c:a:lrl "the modeTn world;" others argue 0'l.' presume tha:t the turn ought be forwavd to "post-modernity," either accommodating ourseh 11es to the decentered selves of the post-modern secular *avant garde* or proclaiming the strange, new wo1'1d of the Bible. Hut neo-Augustinians and Thomists, liberation theologians and pragmatists, Wittgensrteinians and Barthians all roughly agree (in spite of deep disagx,eements) that we need to turn from the subject; [1]

Charles Taylor's *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* is a massivie challenge to these presumptions and argument1s.[2] It is, we might s'ay, a call to re-turn to the :subjeict-;hut quwlified this time by a gl'e3.1tersense of this subject'is historiml context in the Enlightenment and Romantioism

1 For a summary of critiques of different turns to the subject, see David H. Kelsey, "Human Being," in *Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks,* ed. Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King, Second Edition (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985 [Firnt Edition, 1982]), Chapter 6.

2 Charles Taylor *Sources of the Sdf: The Making of the JJiodern Identity* (Harvard University Press, 1989), referred to in the body of this essay by page numbers in parentheses.

a1s weU .as this subject's constant ternptaition to undermine the very world it mak!es. A rea1der's response to the book wilil depend not only on how one rea1ds Taylor (e.g., does he under- or over-qualify his ca11 to return to Lhe subject?) but also on where the reader finds heriseilf on the tlieological spectrum. However, the fact that T.aylor',s book has been greeted with critical enthusiasm by both theologiical 'agnostics and contempomry Augustinians and Thomists suggests tha1t it is a book whose power and scope will resonabe with very different sort1s of men and women.[3]

My aim here is not to summarize or assess the riches of this book. *Soumes of the Self* is a book of such clarity, power, and 1scope that lit will takce some 1ime for rea;ders (or, ak least, this reader) fo absorb it a;nd to respond :to Taylor adequateJy. My aim is much more modest, nameJy, to pursue some of the connections between Tayl:or's proposal and theology. These connections vv:i.11 suggest some chores Taylor has discoveil'ed or crea;ted for theoilogians. I rea:lize that I risk doing an injustice to a book by a philosopher, not a theologian. Tayfor is candid about hls own theologica1l convictions, while not pretending fully to ddend or evcen fully those convictions. Nonetihe1ess,I wiill show tha:t his theses challenge n1any of us in ways tha:t justify a foous on theo1ogica,l isisues.<t

3 The theological agnostics include Martha Nussbaum, "Our Pasts, Ourselves," *The New Republic* (April 9, 1990) : 27-34 and Bernard Williams, "Republican and Galilean," *The New York Review of Books* 37 (November 8, 1990): 45-48; the Augustinian is Gilbert Meilaender, "Being Modern," *First Things* (#5, August/September, 1990) 63-66; and the Thomist is Russell Rittinger, "Critical Study: Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self," Review of Metaphysics* 44 (1990): 111-130. At this point, for comments on an earlier draft of this essay, my thanks to Steve Fowl, to Charles Marsh, and in par-,ticular to Greg Jones, who brought most of these reviews to my attention.

4 Taylor has already had an impact on Catholic and Protestant theologians; see, for example, Robert Krieg, O.S.C., *Story-Shaped Ohristology: The Role of Narratives in Identifying Jesus Christ* (New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1988); L. Gregory Jones, *Transformed Judgment: Toward a Trinitarian Aocount of the Moral Life* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), But I suspect Taylor has had much more influence on theologians (particularly in Canada) than references to him in theological texts suggest.

I. The Issues

Sources of the Self consists of fiv<e numbered parts or three sections of v;ery different length. Part One maps a set of connections " between :identity and the good." These connections include what Taylor ca1Is "strong evaluaitions; " that is, they " invoh7ie discriminations of right or wrong ... which are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and offor standa:vds by which they can be judged" (4). :Barts Two through Five al'e an " and chronological " treatment of the development of modern identity. The narrative of this dev;elopment focuses on three fa:cets of ·moaern i"dentity: " 1nwardness:" (involving the "three-sided individuwlism" of 1self-control, self-expforation, persona:l commitment [185]), " the affirmation of ordinary life," and " the voice of nature " in the Enlightenment 1allid Romanticism (in:c1uding the " languages " of a post-Romantic .age). The final chapter offers .some conclusions (Chapter , a:ltl1ough Tayilor is clear that he intends that the book be mo11e a map of where we al'e than a set of dhiections for where we ought to go.

Compl,icating his strong ev:a:luations and interpretive narrative, Taylor .ailso proposes " images of profound personal resonance like ',epiphany', ' moral sources ', ' disengagement', ' empowering ', and others," which, in other hands, might become 1a work whiich "aictualily can put us in contact with the sources it taps" (512). But Tay1or has no such pretensions: he is philosopher rather than artist, four-thumbed mechanic rather than raoe-car dri¥er (512). In any case, the central chadlenge of 11eading*Sonrces of the Self* is hoMing :together the conceptual connections 0£ P1art One, the narrativ;e of Parts Two through Fiv;e, and the final trying to determine why Taylor creates or chooses the " images of personal resona11ce" he does.

1t would be inberesting to explore the relationships between :images, nanrativ;es, and strong e1/ia,1uationsin Tayfor. Hut, for my purposes, it wiU he mol"e helpful to moy;e directJy to one of the climaxes of the book. Taylor distinguishes " multiple

sources" of modern moral oulturie: " the originail theistic foundation" and" two independent frontier:s," namely, the *human agent's* own powers (whether powers of rational order ,and oonfu'ol and/or expression articu1a,tion) and the depths of *nature* (i.e., whether in "the order of things" and/or "from within, in what wells up from my own nature, desires, sentiments, affinities") . The result is a space in the "three directions can he seen as i1iV1aJ,s a!S 'Complementary" (314, 317, 318) .

As this suggests, there a11e two kiey connections between Taylor's *Sources of the Self* and ou:rrent debates among theologians. First, God is one of Tayilor's sources of the self and this in two senses. God is where ,the (in the West) starts. Our selv;es wei:ie "originailily" theistically grounded (317, 390, 495; cp. 410, 104, 106); the story of making of modem can scarcely be to1d without God. Or shall we 1say "God"? We a:H know that many seem to do quite wen (or, in reaility, quite poody) without God But not Taylor. He not only rfinds God impor bant as originail somce of the sieM but also finds hope in " Judaeo-Christian theism (however terrible the recorrd of its adherents in history) and in cits central promise of a divine affirmation of the human, mo11e total than humans can ever attain unaided" (521). Throughout the book Tayfor dmps some clrues a1s to what he means by this " strong evaluation" (4) of theism (although he is ¥ery olear that he :cannot explain his theolog1cal stance in this book). In any case, God is both to the story Taylor tells and to the ,claims he mafiles.

Second, theologians will want to lmow (arlthough Taylor does not empha,size this) what modernity calls " the self " partly ov;edaps with the characters of biblical narratives. This self ,also overfaps with debates in the history of Chuistiamty over wha;t constitutes aiutherntically Christian (saintly) rohaJt.'-'acters, souls, or selves. Onoe again, this ov@lap is twofoM, overlapping narratives and overlapping "strong evaluations." Christian debates over what modernity calils "the self" have

been da:ve11se. For eX!amp1e,theologians will. learn from T1aylor's reading of Augustine, debates between Erasmian and Reformation Christianity, post-Reformation debates among Catholics and Pro'be:starnbs,Enlightened and Romantic Christians. The E;astern Orthodox chruliiengieto Augustine

little part in tills 'Story (except thrut ·both serve ·as a channel for Platonism) ; and Tayilor's reading of Aquinas (in contrast to, say, Alasd:air MaclntyT1e's) seems to dra.w sharp distinctions between the Augustinian and Thomist tmditions on God and the oo1f (141).[5] But Taylor is dear that he is ·telling not a " diachronic-causal story " but an " interpretive " story (203). Certainly one way Tayilor connects up with debates over theofogiical:selves is by the story he tells of the joys and griefs o[human beings m diverse ·sociwland historical circumstances.

Yet a.nother connection is that Tayilor thinks that modernity (including modem sorurces of the self) is characterized by a "unique combination of greatness and danger, of *grandeur et misere"* (x). There is an ooho of Pascal here and perhaps even an echo of the thesis sentence of V:atioan H's Pastoral Consrtibution on the Church in the Modern World. TayJor intends to come to grips with what Vatican II calils the joys *and* griefs, the hopes *and* anxieties of the men "and women of our time. example, against what I (hut not Taylor) would call

5 On a contrast or opposition between Thomas and Augustine, see p. 141. But even when Taylor finds Thomas helpful (as in the axiom that "grace perfects nature"), he finds him more akin to Erasmian Catholicism than hy;per-Augustinian Lutheranism (p. 246). There are also more substantive contrasts with Macintyre. For example, on pp. 51-52 Taylor says: "One could [and, I would say, Macintyre does] put it this way: because we cannot but orient ourselves to the good, and thus determine our place relative to it and hence determine the direction of our lives, we must inescapably understand our lives in narrative form, as a 'ques.t '. But one could [and, I would say, Taylor by and large does] start from another point: because we have to determine our place in relation to the good, therefore we cannot be without an orientation to it, and hence must see our lives in a story" (51-52 [brackets are mine]). Understanding (if not settling) such differences. between these two Catholic philosophers will be essential to Catholic theology over the next decade.

tra.dit:iona1lists and neo-1oonserv:atives who decry modern indiv:iidualism, Tayrlor 1argues that the self who is made by and makes modernity is characterized not only as "inwardness,. (Part I) aJso as an affirmer of " ordinary life " (Part HI) as well as heeder of" the voioe of nature" (Part IV) and the "subt1er Languages" of a (putativ1e) post-Romantic age (P,art V). Against liberals who unconditj,onailly support modernity, Taylor insists that "the self,,. arose in viecy specific historical ciroumstanoes--chicumsta1noes which constantly thl'ea:ten fo, destroy and muti1ate the very goods moderns have discovered created. Against :tra.ditionalists who nostalgically yearn for the past as well as radicals who seek postmodern utopias, Taylor •a1rgues that they have not surcceeded in escaping from the very modernity they criticize.

In short, Taylor's *Sources of the Self* connects two theological *loci* (God and self) in two distinct ways (in the narratives we tell and in the arguments we mak!e about them) . On each of these scores, Taylor's book ·is a go1d mine of ideas. I .aim to comment on merely two of the issues Tayfor discusses.

II. *God as a Souroe of the Self*

How does Taylor unfold God as a, souroe of the self? Part I inc1udes a mapping of some firm. iconnect:ion:sbetween " not jus:t ('a) om notions of the good and (b) our understandings orf self, hut also (c) the kinds of narrative in which we make sense of our lives and (d) conceptions of rsociety.... " (105).

regard 'bo "(a) our notions of the good," Tayilor dis-i:iinguishes various kinds of goods, indUiding "a crucial set of qualitative dis:tinctions" between "some arction, or mode of Jife, or mode of feeling " which is: "incomparably higher than the others which are more readily to us" (19). For ,example, we ansiwer the question " Who am *I?* " in part by ·sorting out" what is of importance for us" (27), what "giv;es us our fundamen:tarl oriientaition" (28), an "oirie:nita:tion in the spruce of the ultimatdy important" (42). Fior some people, 1Suich goods are 1a kind of " 'constitutive good,' " i.e., a

good which not oniy oons1titutes orr defines what good action is but "mov;es us to good a1Ction" (92, 93). Taylorr owlJ.s such goods "morarl souroes." These goods can be distorbed. For example, if I read Taylor oorrectly, what he calls "hypergoods" a:t'e " goods which not only are incompar·abJy moi'e import·ant than others but provide the standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about" (63). For example, some people "reicognize the vialue of self-expression, of justice, of famiJy life, of the worship of God, of ordinary decency, of ,sensitivity, and a host of others; hut they consider one of these -perhaps their l'elaJtion to God or perhaps of overriding importaLnJce" (62). It seems that what distinguishes "incomparable goods" from "hypergoods" is that the l1atte1.· claim to be " the [only] sitandard " for weighing other goods; their importance is suich as to "override" other goods *always.*

On this v·iew, God ·C!an dearly a -soume. For examp1e, one of Tayfor's fav;orite depictions of God is the God of the fust chaprber of Genesis. "And God saw that it was good" becomes one of the points whel'e Augustine can stitch togerther "Jewish theism and Greek philosophy" (128). The same V'erse describes ·a world in which affirming the ordinary life is a way of participating in God's affirmation of om world (218). La,ter Taylor goes one step further: " The goodness of the wodd [in Genesis] is not something quite independent f:mm God's seeing :it as good. His seeing it as good, loving it, can be conceived not simply ais a *response* to what it is, but as what *makes* it such" (449). As I mentioned in the introduction, Taylor does not aim to defond 1siud:i daims as strong eva1lua.tions in this book. For e:xiample, the context of the last quote is not 1a claim aibout God but a proposa1l that we need to develop " a human anailogue to God's seeing things as good: a seeing which al·so helps effect what it sees" (449, *516).* But such daims instance what means by calling God ·a source of the s:elf.

Now Tayfor's discussion of :such incomparable goods sounds riema,rkably the dis1cussions of "religion" among some philosophers, eulturail anthropologists, and theologians. For ex-

George Lindheok has p'1"oposerd that religions are oul-tuml-1inguisHc systems, " usually embodied ,jn myths or narratives and heavily :dturulized, which structur'e human experience and understanding of 1sieH and world" and aim to identify and organiz,e a11 lifo in relation to "what is taken to be 'more important than everything else in the univ·erse.'" [6] I suggest rt.hat what Taylor caHs "incompa:mble goods" pfoy a role analogous to the role played in reiligious ways of living by what Lindbeck calls "that which is most important."

Hut one di:ffe11encebetween Taylor .and such 1aocounts is that "l'eligion" in T'aylor sometimes becomes too quiddy identified with what he 1sometimes calls "(Judaeo-Christian) theism," thus down some of the key religious conflicts of modemity. I am not thinking here primarily of the wiay non-Western v,iiews of sources of the self are marginal to Taylor's ,story.[1] I am thinking insitead of the way that the idistinotive *otherness* of Judaism has a role in the modern reform of Christian views of our Messiah, our Scriptures, 1and the Eucharis1t, our lives as selvies situated in a post-Constantinian diaspora. T1ayrlor knovv:s about this otherness. For example, in his brilliant of "the affirmation of ol'dinary life" as a distincthnely modern affirmation, he notes that perhaps " the first .important realization" of the way the theological "halfowing of life " penetrates " the fuU extent of mundane life " was in Rabbinic Judaism (221). But, for those lil{Je Taylor interested in the history of the self in the Wiest, other movements (here, rightfully, Reformed Protestantism) must be credited

6 *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postiiberal Age* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), pp. 32-33. The internal quote is from William Christian, *Meaning and Truth in Religion* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 60ff. I presume that one can agree (or disagree) with Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic theory of religions while disagreeing with other parts, as (for example) Gordon Kaufmann does in *Theology Today* 42 (1985) : 240-241.

7 For example, Taylor says that "the 'no-self' (' *abatta* ') view of Theravada Buddhism is still a baffling and difficult subject, at least fo:r me" (535, note 4), although he offers several suggestive remarks on this topic (e.g., 30, 139, 443, 526 [note 20]).

with originating the affirmation of ordinary life. And yet, for some Christian theofogians, the 1affirmation of 011dinary life in Protestant (or, Catholic) Christendom may be less helpful than that affirmation :in conditions analogous to those that gavie rise to Rabbinic Judaism. It may be by recovering this 'Story that we will learn to think in more particrular ways aborut God. In this way we may learn, as T1aylor suggests in a Barthian (hyper-Augustinian?) moment, not only to " rder to " a God ihut primarily to call upon God by name *(525* [note 13]).

Second, re1aiting Tayi1or's dis:oussion of goods more directly to select theories of religions might suggest some mays of responding to those who disagree with Taylor's theism. For examp1e, Martha Nussbaum's sympathetic critique of Taylor ino1udes a disagr:eement with Tayilor's " hunch " that oillir public aJ.1Jd private sehnes requi11e "belief in God" or a ":veligious dimension." [8] She disagrees in part (it seems) because she dissents from Taylor's olaim that the human heart is " insufficient ito lits own highest hopes ":__that our situation is " original 1ornpability" rather than "capable :finitude." I think that Nusshamn's ta.ilk of insufficiency and oulpability may read into Taylor what Taylor mlls "hyper-Augustinianism" (e.g., a Lutheran or Pasica1ian mading of Augustine) rather than the Aiugustine Tayilor describes. In Tayfor's image, God not only responds to the good hut *makes* it good; in particula.r, he makes *us* good and creates us not only to vespond to the good but wlso to *make* it so. But this leaves unsettled the relationships between God's" making" and our own" making" of our identities. In other wol'lds, it leaves unsettled the basic theological problem with Augustine's (or, perhaps, any) theoJogy.[9]

s Martha Nussbaum, "Our Pasts, Ourselves," *The New Republic* (.April 9, 1990): 27-34, especially pp. 31-33. Note that Nussbaum seems to find no significant difference between "belief in God " and a "religious dimension."

9 See, for example, Austin Farrer, "Grace and Human Will," *Reflective Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology,* ed. Charles C. Conti (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1972), pp. 192-199.

I :reitemte that I am, in a siense, expecting more from Taylor than *Sources of the Self* promises to deliver.[10] Neither do I wan:t to suggest tha:t theology hais an essential stake in arguing that we need to be religious (in Lindibeok's sense) or moml (in Tay1o:r's sense) before we can a:rticufate a theological self; Barth and Bonhoe:ffer have ma,de it impossible for theologians to make glib use of " 11eligion," whether the natural religion of the Enlightenment or the Romantic religion of infinite s1elf-transioendence.But connecting T,aylor's constitutive goods to a cultura:l..Jlinguistic theory of reHgion may help devielop the benefit,s as welil as the burdens of "re1ligion" in modernity.

III. *Self and. Others*

Part I (as I mentioned ahovie) includes a, mapping of some furn connections between "not jus1t (a) our notions of the good and (b) our understandings of self but also (c) the kinds of narrativ:e in which we sense of our lives and (d) 1oeptions of society . . . . " (105) . 'I'.aylor's historiciai and concep1tua1lmap of 1these notions .that the11e is 1a *"dfoersity* of goods: for whlch a, valid claim can be maide" (502)' my emphasis). Thus, Taylor rejects "the uncompromisingly •revisionist ' stance " of those who " deny entirely the of any goods whi!ch stiand in the way of the hypergood" (65-66) . This would ino1ude, for example, the claims of P1ato's Socraites, what Taylor sometimes 'oaMs "hyper-Augustinians," and those kinds of natumlisms which think they can dispense with goods and the good.. Against the right and the ieft, Taylor aidv:ooaties"anthropologies of situated fl.'eedom" (515),

[10] But I cannot resist adding that, in "Religion in a Free Society" (in *Artiales of Faith, Articles of Peace. The Religious Liberty (Jlauses and the America1i Publio Philosophy,* eds. James Davison Hunter and Os Guinness [Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990], pp. 93-161) Taylor has proposed that there may be no existing intellectually or politically consistent solution to. issues of religious freedom so that it is most important for all sides to at least "gras,p the naturn of the dilemma." But a cultural-linguistic theory of religion might suggest a way beyond the dilemma, for we can share many common goods withoµt sharin15 a (reli!l'ious) incomparable good,

whi.ch can p!ro·vide" the best account " of our lives as selves in a diver se physfoal, sociail, and historical woril.d.[11]

Yet Taylor also rejects (Aristotle's) "comprehending s1trategy," where the good lifo must be understood "as one which somehow combines to the greatest possiMe degree aM the goods we seek" (66). We m1e not only individuals in a rich physical, social, and wor1d but our lives in that world are often tragically wounded, and devastated by suffering. In fact " the diiliemmaof mutilation " is that "the highest spiritual ideals and aspirations also threaten to lay the most crushing burdens on humankind" (519, 521). Taylor's centrail (but not only) contribution to theofog1ca.l apologetics may v;ery well be turning hruck on its advocates a key objection to theism: against those who claim that God as a source of the 1selℓ mutiJ,ates our selves and/or our phys1cal, social, and hisfor]cal wodd, Taylor shows that the dilemma of mutilation is a dilemma for all makers of the modern identity. Indeeid, "[t]he grea;t danger of modern morality is precisely that its steady ,self-undermining of its own credibility may end us up in nihilism" (583-584 [note 76]) .

What is unclear is how Taylor holds together both the di¥erse joys 1and the self-mutilating griefs of modernity. He clearly wishes to leave room for trag1edy, suffering, sacrifice, and rnartyl'dom; what he sees as the peculiarly modern yearning to overcome suffering is another of those facets of modernity that is both good and had. On the other hand, TaylOir hints thait" in the *restored* order that God is conferring, good doesn't need to be sacrificed for the good. The eschatologica:l promise in both Judaism and Christianity is that God w.iJH *restore* the integrity of the good" my emphasis). But what, then, is the connection between our wor1d (whe11e sacrifice seems so essential) and God's worM (where "good doesn't need to be saicri:ficedfor the good") ? " Restore " (I think Taylor would

1:1 On "the BA [best account] principle," see *Sources of the Self,* p. 58. On "situated freedom," see also Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. xx (Hegel Today).

!agree) is s1mely not the only or ev,en the primary ¥erb or image for ,articulating this connection. In the face of the Holocaust and our individual pathologies, God must do a *new* thing, not restol'e a pre-existing integrity. Taylor'·s hints at a hope centered on "a divine :affirmation of the human" (521) suggests a victory *through* sufieriing. But how?

Clearly Tay;lor wouM resist an ansrw:er to this question in 'terms of classic Reason or modern Rationality; this ought to remind theologians of the limits of our soteciofogiic3JJdoctrines (even if we focus our attention on the internal!. logic or rationality of 1sruc:h doctrines) . Just 3JS cleaJ:'ly, T\aylor is virtually repulsed by a neo-NietZ1scheanism which claims to trans1cend the good in the putati¥e beaiuty of " the most pervasive of all modern goods, i.mconstr:ained freedom" (489) .[12] Throughout *Sources of the Self* it is our 11esonancewith the good that shouild shape our liV'es as of truth and beauty. Hut eV'en we g11ant thlis focus on rthe good, hy book's end w:hart we need are not coD1cepitualconnecitions between identity and ,the good, narmtivies of tihe way intellectuals have thought about ,those connections in ,cJiv:e:rse historioa;l eras, or ev:en resonant images of gmndeur and misery. P:erhaps what we need is quite simply *examples of good peopZe* struggling with the joys and griefs of modernisty, sometimes agents 1and sometimes victims of 'such joys and griefs, seeking a new heaven aJJJd new earth from within this heaven and But perhaps Tayfor wolli!d suggest that providing examples of good people is not the task of the philosopher *qua* philosopher. Recall. that he is philosopher, not ar-tist (or theofogian).

In conclrusion I sthou1Jdnote that there 1are ailso some asides in Tay;1or that some reaiders might we1l fal>Je objecition to. Tayloi; rightly speaks of the "anti-humanism of much evange[ieail ligion today," bu:t I be1ievie he is mistaken when he fails to

1.2 He carefully distinguishes neo-Nietzscheans like Lyotard, Derrida, and even Foucault, from Nietzsche himself, who had a kind of "saving inconsistency " (489) in his simultaneous affirmation and denial of a " sense of the magnificent, of the categorically affi.rmable, of the infinitely worthy of love " (453) .

qualify lthis "murch" and also when he caMs "figures like Cardina1l Ra:tzinger" anti-humanistic (318). He !thinks that abortion debrutes a're not so murch deep disagreements as they are exceptionail disagreements that only provie h0:w suhs1tantial our agreements are (515) . But Taylor may not he aware of the diffffi'ence between the debate in his orwn homeland and that in our country, which is so eommitted to capitaJ punishment (which Talor abhors [39Q]) 1and to nuclear determnce. More cmciaHy, interprreting aibortion debates as the exception rather than the l'lu1e is diffieult to squaJ'e with Taylor's criticism of positions which do not "movie us to extend help to the irremedia:hly hl'oken, such 13JS the mentally handi!Capped, those dying withoUit dignity, fetus-es with genetic defects" (517) . But tills is a side-comment on one of Taylor's side-comments. Tayilolr's hook is a complex po11tra.yiailof a comp1ex topic. It de-1serV1es the eareful attention of all theologians.

BOOK REVIEWS

Consider Jesus: Waves of Renewal in Christology. By ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON. New York: Crossroad, 1990. Pp. 149. $14.95.

Elizabeth A. Johnson, associate professor of theology at Catholic University of America, first delivered the chapters of this present study as occasional lectures. They have already been published in book form in South Africa, hut we now have an American edition. Her purpose has been " to present the fundamental rethinking taking place in christology to persons who are actively involved in ministries in the church or who are seeking greater understanding of their faith. Given the vital interests of this audience the lectucres took on a certain character, seeking il:0 inform about the reams of scholarship pouring forth about Jesus Christ in order to open doors for more effective preaching, teaching, prayer, and pastoral action" (p. ix). Thus this book is more popular than scholarly in nature. Johnson makes no pretense of breaking new ground but offers instead a rather comprehensive and highly lucid synthesis of contemporary thinking in christology since 1950, specifically within the Catholic tradition.

Johnson has chosen the metaphor of waves breaking upon a beach to unify her subject matter. "As a wave is created by wind at sea and then rises up, rolls in, and breaks as it comes close to land, so too it seems that successive understandings of Christ have formed, swelled, and broken upon Catholic consciousness since the mid-twentieth century" (p. x). Some of the waves Johnson examines are: the re-emergence of the human Jesus; christology and the questions of justice and liberation; feminist christology; Jesus and world religions; and christology and ecology. Johnson places these christology currents in the context of doctrinal development. The vitality of contemporary christology manifests the present effort to speak anew to our world the truth of the gospel. It is the ongoing story of the Christian community blending the old and the new " or the historically given with its current form of reception" (p. 2).

The first wave to come ashore was a renewed interest in the humanity of Jesus. Given the doctrine of the Incarnation that Jesus is one person existing in two natures, Johnson explores the transcendental christology of Karl Rahner to show how this traditional doctrine can be better appreciated and proclaimed in our day.

Contemporary philosophy and psychology, unlike the Greek philosophy of classical christology, accentuate the subjectivity which defines

our humanity. As human subjects we are open to the infinite-in· finite truth and love, a hope for " infinite " life. " What is human na· ture? It is a finite reality with a capacity for the infinite, a thirst for the infinite " (p. 24) . Thus human beings are defined by their sub· jective openness to the God who is truth, love, and life itself.

In defining God's triune nature, Johnson, again following Rahner's lead, believes that the term " person " as applied to the Trinity is mis· leading within our contemporary context because it suggests that God is composed of three individual people. Instead it would be better to speak of three distinct manners or modes of self-being: the Father as the unoriginate source of all, the Son as the self-expression of God as he manifests himself outward, and the Holy Spirit as the unifying love (see pp. 25-27). Johnson admits that some theologians, such as Walter Kasper, believe this to he an inadequate interpretation, a form of modalism. Nonetheless, Johnson argues that these contemporary con· ceptions of the human and the divine natures form the basis for a more intelligible and therefore preferable articulation of the Incarnation, demonstrating and guaranteeing both the authentic humanity and di- vinity of Jesus.

If human beings are defined by their openness to the infinite and if God eternally expresses himself in self-giving love, then the closer one draws near to ,the God of love the :more truly human one becomes.

> In the case of Jesus of Nazareth we are dealing with someone who was more profoundly united to God than any of us. We even talk about hypostatic union, a union at the metaphysical level of the person. If his humanity is united with God in this most profound way, what are we to say about him as a human being? That he is genuinely human, and in fact more human, more free, more alive, more his own person than any of us, because his union with God is more profound. (pp. 29-30)

The point that Johnson makes is valid, but will it sustain a satis· factory exposition of the Incarnation? Johnson believes it will.

> As a genuinely human being, Jesus Christ is God with us... If we do not think of God literally as three different people but rather as the triune mystery of self-giving love, then it becomes possible to see Jesus existing as the Word of God in time who, in his humanness, embodies the self· emptying of the God of love... As this human being,. Jesus is the Son of God. Precisely as this human being he is God in time. He is fully human . . . and as such he is God who has self-emptied into our history. (pp. 30-31)

This expression of the Incarnation raises both christological and trinitarian concerns.

Firstly, the church's traditional understanding has been that God was incarnate in Jesus in a manner different in kind, and not just in

degree, from the way God is present in others. Jesus is more than the greatest prophet or Spirit-filled individual. Jesus is more than the highest expression of God's presence within a continuum or trajectory. [This is the error of Schleiermacher's theory of" God-consciousness"- that Jesus embraces consciousness of God to a higher degree than any· one else.] That Johnson conceives of the Incarnation in this manner becomes apparent when she concludes: since we too share the same human nature with Jesus, we also incarnate God in a similar fashion (cf. pp. 31-33).

Secondly, while it's true that what is fully human best expresses and manifests the divine, and the more intimate our relationship with God the more human we become, yet it is not true that the human *is* the divine. Jesus' authentic humanity fully reveals his divinity in a fully human manner, hut his humanity is not his divinity, contrary to John· son's suggestion: "He is fully human ... and as such he is God." This " union " which Johnson describes is reductionistic in nature and not a union of the truly divine with the truly human, in which the integrity of each is preserved.

Thirdly, the real source of difficulty is not Johnson's conception of what it means to he human (to he genuinely human is to he open to God) hut her conception of the Trinity. While the term person must he applied analogously to God (I know of no mature Christian, much less Christian theologian, who envisages God as three people), yet its use avoids both Johnson's and Rahner's flirtation with moclalism and positively upholds something essential to a true understanding of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

Within Johnson's understanding of the Trinity, the Son and Holy Spirit have no subjective depth and integrity of their own. They are only the personified, hut nonetheless impersonal, self-expressions of the one person of the Father. [This is a return to the emanationism of neo-platonic christology prior to Nicea, or a variety of more recent Hegelian christology.] The Son is more than the expression of the Father's self-giving, that is, of the Faither's own subjectivity. The Father does beget the Son and the Son does come forth from him as the perfect expression and stamp of his nature, hut the begetting and the coming forth terminates, not in some impersonal hut personified manifestation of the love of God going forth, but rather in another subject who perfectly renders the nature of God in his own unique subjective manner, different from the Father. The term "person," when applied to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, expresses, specifies, and guarantees the authentic ontological depth of each.

Thus, contrary to Johnson's claim, in the Incarnation the man Jesus does more than just embody and personify within his human person-

hood (which alone has any ontological depth and subjective integrity) ithe outward expression of the Father's love to the highest degree; rather, the unique divine subject of the Son (with his own personal integrity) comes to exist as a man and as man manifests the love of the Father. The fullness of this human love and mercy finds its source in the ontological and subjective depth of the Son's divine personhood, in his unique divine subjectivity.

These concerns are accentuated when Johnson takes up the question of the human consciousness and knowledge of Jesus. Johnson is correct in saying that as an infant Jesus (as man) had no conscious per· ception that he was God but needed to grow into this awareness. Likewise, she correctly judges as :inadequate rthe medieval and Thomist thinking that Jesus, from his infancy, possessed the beatific vision and thus (as man) always knew he was God, However, following again the thought of Rahner, Johnson's own solution is also questionable.

Johnson first argues that for Jesus to have complete knowledge of who he is and to possess a comprehensive knowledge of his mission would jeopardize his freedom, This itself is a curious argument. I agree that Jesus did not know everything: he was not an astrophysicist nor a greek philosopher; he probably thought the earth was flat and that Moses was the author of the entire Pentateuch. Nonethe· less, knowledge is not opposed to freedom hut the *a priori* precondition for it. The more one knows the more freely one can make rational choices. If this were not so, it would logically follow that an omniscient God is not free. Yet this is not the heart of the difficulty.

Johnson poses the question of Jesus' human self-consciousness in Rahnerian fashion, Did the historical man Jesus know he was God (as if the divinity were an object ,to be known, standing over against the man Jesus) ? She concludes: yes and no,

> Yes, at the subjective level; Jesus is who he is and has the intmtwe knowledge of that, No, at the objective level; he had to grow concretely into that knowledge in the course of his lifetime up to the end, In other words, he knew who he was implicitly but not in clear terms and in clear concepts, Consider this same question in a more historical way, Did this first century Jewish man think he was Yahweh? No; for a first-century Jew to think he was Yahweh would have been either idolatrous or a little crazy. Before Jesus could be professed as God by Christian believers, our very idea of God had to undergo transformation into trinitarian form. Another way to consider this question: When Jesus prayed, was he talking to himself? No; he was praying to Yahweh, the God of Israel, whom he called *Abba*, In the clear words and concepts of categorical knowledge he was not thinking of himself in divine terms, , , . During his lifetime Jesus himself did not have the benefit of later reflection about himself, (p. 46)

Johnson correctly states that Jesus needed to grow in his self-under·

standing and in the awareness of his mission. However, it is not the man Jesus, separate from his divine nature and personhood, who intuitively and preconceptually knows he is God and then gradually comes to a greater objective understanding-as if his divinity were something to he objectively known as one would know a tree. (Johnson must frame the question and answer in this manner since it is the man Jesus who is the true "who " who becomes conscious and knows and not the eternal Son who becomes conscious and knows albeit in a thoroughly human way.) Persons do not come to know themselves as objects over against themselves; rather, they come to know themselves subjectively within their own experience. From their conscious experience of themselves they conclude clearly and simply: I am a human being.

Thus within the Incarnation it is not the man Jesus, separate from his divine personhood, who came to know that he was divine in some objective manner, but rather the eternal Son as man gradually, through his authentic human experience, came to a conscious human awareness that he was the eternal Son existing as man. With a thoroughly self-conscious human " I," the Son beoame aware and able to· articulate (in terms of his own historical consciousness and milieu) that he [the Son] is both God and man.

Does this mean that Jesus would have answered "yes" to Johnson's question: Am I Yahweh? If one means by the question: Did Jesus believe that he was the Father?, the answer is a resounding No. However, did he believe that he was the Son equal to and one with the Father, and thus God [Yahweh in that sense]? The answer is: Yes.

Did Jesus then pray to himself? No, he did not pray to himself. The eternal son *as man,* for that is the manner of his existence, prayed to his Father; and, as contemporary christology has eloquently demonstrated, it was within ·that human prayer that the Son recognized, in a human manner under the auspices of a self-conscious human "I," his uniquely divine relationship to the Father *(Abba).*

Johnson implies that we, the later church, know Jesus better than he knew himself: because he was locked into his cultural milieu, he could not conceive of himself as divine and distinct from the Father; this would be the insight of the later church Fathers and councils.

Granted, Jesus was not pondering within himself whether or not to add an *iota* to *homoousios.* Nonetheless, if he had no human trinitarian self-understanding, then he could not have revealed it, and thus the later church would have no basis for its subsequent development, and the church's doctrine of the Trinity would be a groundless and untenable hypothesis. The only way the apostolic church could have broken free of Jewish monotheism and begun to grasp and articulate Christian itrinitarianism was for Jesus himself to perceive first and in

a human mode the mystery of his relationship to the Father and the Holy Spirit and then in turn to reveal this mystery in human words and actions.

This rather lengthy criticism in no way implies that Johnson is con· sciously dabbling in heresy. She is at great pains within these chapters to be true to the tradition, even while striving to :render the truth in a more intelligible manner. My conclusion is only that this contemporary attempt has many stumbling blocks and inadequacies.

The second wave to wash the christological beaches was :renewed interest in the historical Jesus. Johnson gives an excellent overview of Jesus' life and ministry culminating on the importance of his bodily resurrection (cf. p. 60). She likewise presents a creative, clear, and evenhanded exposition of Pope John Paul H's concerns for justice within a descending christology and the American bishops' statements on peace and economic justice given from within an ascending ch:ris· itology. He:r analysis of Liberation Christology is clear and concise, but she avoids addressing the more controversial issues. If aU one read was Johnson's account of Liberation Theology, one might wonder why it has caused so much heated discussion and debate.

P:rio:r to the chapter on feminist christology, Johnson makes every effort to he objective and fair in discussing the issues involved in re· cent christology. She frequently points out how others might have differing but plausible opinions. Even if one disagreed with some of her conclusions, as I have, her fairness could not be faulted. However, her tone changes in ;the chapter on feminist christology.

Jol:mson provides again an intelligent survey of the varieties of feminist ch:ristology, criticizing the most :radical expressions. She wishes to place herself in what she believes is a moderate Christian position. Nonetheless, Johnson sees no scriptural or theological obstacle to referring to God as Mother and believes that " the Son " could have become incarnate as a woman. The issues involved here are too immense to do justice to at this time, hut a few comments are in order.

Firstly, unlike previous chapters, Johnson here allows no :room for honest difference and debate. The only mocking remark within the entire hook lies within this chapter. She :implies that those who would disagree with her position do so out of fear of losing their " oppressor " status (cf. p. 112) . This is doing theology by intimidation.

Secondly, she is too facile in her presentation that God can be called Mother. She does not adequately address the genuine scripture issues involved nor does she acknowledge that there are scholarly scriptural and theological studies which differ from her conclusions and deserve a candid and open hearing.

Thirdly, she presumes that all Catholic/Christian women think as

she does on these issues; this is hardly the case. And lastly she fails to discern that some feminist christology does not spring from a love for Jesus and what he has done through his cross and resurrection; rather, Jesus is merely used (and thus abused) to further a theological and political agenda. [Men obviously are not immune from this either.]

Despite my disagreements with some of Johnson's arguments and conclusions, and despite my disappointment at the way she addresses the feminist issues, I found this hook to he a basically reliable and clear summary of the christology of the last forty years. Whether it has all been true development, as Johnson maintains, is a debatable question. Nonetheless, this book does elaborate the contemporary issues and possible answers that confront christology today, and for this makes it a book well worth reading.

THOMAS WEINANDY, O.F.M. Cap.

Mother of God Community
Washington. D.C.

The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus. By ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. Ed. Marilyn McCord Adams. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990. Pp. ix+ 356. $47.50.

Duns Scotus was a brilliant light that flashed a brief time across the medieval sky hut was destined ultimately to he outshone by other luminaries immediately preceding him (Aquinas) and following him (Ockham). Perhaps no individual in the past half century has done more to illuminate the Subtle Doctor's thought and times than Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. Both his editing and his translating of primary sources as well as his detailed readings and expositions of Scotus's theories have put medieval scholars in his debt. The present volume is a collection of thirteen essays on particular aspects of Scotus's work, preceded by an introduction. Ten of the essays have been previously published in other sources ranging from .the late 1940s to the present. But as editor Marilyn McCord Adams points out in her forward, many of these can be found only with difficulty in often inaccessible journals and books. Thus the value of this single volume.

The essays are grouped under three headings: metaphysics and epistemology, action theory and ethics, and philosophical theology. As is often true with any volume spanning a number of topics and years, the quality of exposition and analysis is uneven. Obviously, in a limited space, I cannot hope to treat all subjects in a volume as comprehensive

as Wolter's. Permit me, however, to begin by making some general comments and then to narrow my remarks to one particular issue.

Wolter's introduction to the volume is as clear and concise an overview of Scotus's ideas as one is likely to find anywhere in the literature. In general, the essays in the first part of the book on matters metaphysical and epistemological are quite solid. Here we find explicated many of the concepts which have become identified with Scotus: the formal distinction, univocity of being, the common nature and the hraecceity that constitutes distinct individuals. Wolter does justice to the subtlety and brilliance of Scotus's thinking and allows readers both old and new to Scotus to acknowledge him as a metaphysician for the ages. The author is particularly adept at explicating with helpful analogies some of the Subtle Doctor's most difficult concepts. I benefitted from his thought-provoking comparison between the formal distinction and a spotlight on a stage which can illuminate different and distinguishable aspects of the same reality.

The next section on action rtheory and ethics draws in part on Wolter's work which culminated in the 1986 publication of *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*. Wolter has been in the forefront of those who urge that Scotus's description of an innate affection for justice in the will is crucial in understanding the freedom Scotus thought proper to humans. What remains unclear to me is how this strand in Scotus's writing relates to others which clearly imply a libertarian view of freedom emphasizing the will's utter self-determination. The problem I see is this: if the will truly is self-determining, then an innate *affectio justitiae* seems to mean the will is gripped by something not entirely of its own choosing and so is no longer entirely self-determining. If, on the other hand, an *affectio justitiae* does not conflict with Scotus's other libertarian-sounding claims, then I fail to see the need for speaking of the former when all it could then mean is a inclination to justice autonomously chosen {or rejected) and freely consented to {or disavowed) by the will. In short, Scotus's ideas on freedom seem either to conflict or to be redundant.

The final section of this volume concerns Scotus's philosophical theology. Wolter is exactly right in his portrayal of Scotus as first and foremost a theologian who used philosophy to serve the ends of theology. The cumulative weight of the essays in this book impresses upon the reader how truly difficult an intellectual enterprise scholastic theology was. Not only did the frequently competing authority and testimony of Augustine and Aristotle have to be adjudicated, but concepts having to do with cognition and the freedom of the will needed to be applicable both to this life and the life to come. In highlighting many instances where these tasks produced special challenges to Scotus's

abilities, Wolter preserves across the centuries the evidence of a first-rate mind.

In this final section two areas stand out especially. The first is Wolter's explication of the Subtle Doctor's proof for God in chapter 11. Wolter is at his best here: a reliable guide through the intricacies of Scotus's thought, who pauses occasionally along the way to remark to us how fascinating he himself finds the views. Anyone who perceives beauty in the intricacies of human thought cannot fail to he struck by this most elegant of attempts to establish the existence of God. The second area I wish to note involves the last entry in the volume, "Scotus' Paris Lectures on God's Knowledge of Future Events." I consider this previously unpublished essay one of the most thought-provoking contributions found in the book, both for its potential impact on the future of Scotus scholarship as well as for its novelty of interpretation. In it, Wolter tries to show that Scotus's understanding of divine omniscience did not abrogate the reality of human freedom. This interpretation is at odds with that found in Professor Douglas Langston's recent monograph, *God's Willing Knowledge: The Influence of Scotus' Analysis of Ominscience* (1986), which claims that the Subtle Doctor's explanation of God's foreknowledge reduces creaturely activity to a divine determinism.

Wolter has previously reviewed Langston's hook and responds to him in the present volume in a brief footnote. The gist .of the response is that Langston has not considered all the relevant texts, has attributed to Scotus texts which are of doubtful authenticity, and has mistaken Scotus's statements *that* God foreknows all with an attempt to *explain how* God foreknows all. According to Wolter, Scotus offered no such explanation. I must, however, disagree with Wolter's interpretation of Scotus on foreknowledge for four reasons: (1) Wolter points out that the sections in the Vatican edition of the *Ordinatio* dealing with omniscience were in all probability composed by a later disciple of Scotus. This neglects to mention that there are other sections of the *Ordinatio* whose authorship is not as contested where Scotus is quite clear on how God knows. Thus, distinction 41 says, " God does not foresee that that man would use his free will well unless he wills or preordains that he would use it well, because-as seen in distinction 39-certain prescience of future contingents is from the determination of his will" [" Deus non praevidet istum bene usurum libero arbitrio, nisi quia vult vel praeordinat istum bene usurum eo, quia-sicut dictum est distinctione 39-certa praevisio futurorum contingentium est ex determinatione voluntatis suae."] God knows because God wills. That is not a lack of explanation, though it may be (as I think it is) an inadequate one.

(2) Nor can Scotus's account be saved, as Wolter attempts, by com-

paring th.e operation of divine and human will to either the concur· rence of the human intellect and free will in th.e act of volition or th.e operation of Aristotelian causes. Scotus's point here, according to Wolter, is that the four Aristotelian causes (material, formal, efficient, and final) together produce a common effect, hut none of the four has priority over the other three, and none can cause without the other three. In the same way, says Wolter, "Scotus' clear analysis of how God's causality and that of the creature are interrelated makes it clear that God's cooperation in no way determines what the creature does. In other words, it does not specify th.e act. The act could have been otherwise. This is precisely where the second reason for contingency enters in, that which stems from th.e creature's free will and ability to determine itself. The essential order that obtains between God's causality and that of the creature is literally that of a ' concursus,' not that of a ' primum movens ' or ' praemotio physica.' " There seem some obvious disanalogies in these comparisons. Neither the human will nor intellect nor the four Aristotelian causes are omnipotent agents which infallibly produce their effects. Likening their causality to God's and deducing consequences from this comparison begs several important issues. In particular, it makes it hard to see how God's lmowledge would not now somehow be dependent upon (and therefore made imperfect by) the actions of creatures.

(3) If Langston misinterpreted Scotus because of neglecting some important texts that effectively rule out divine determination of human action, then he is in very good company. Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, for example, writing only a few decades after Scotus's death. in his *De Causa Dei,* proposed a view in which God's activity imposes necessity on created causes by quoting exactly Scotus's earlier statement that " Certa praevisio futurorum contingentium, est ex dete:rminatione voluntatis suae " and explicitly attributing this view to the Subtle Doctor. Given the dangers of holding a theological determinism in the wake of the Condemnation of 1277, it is hard to believe that Scotus's disciples would not have worked assiduously to clear their master's name of the position attributed to it by Bradwardine, if resources had actually been available in Scotus's writing to do soo

(4) Wolter writes of Scotus' s view : " Where free agents are concerned, however, it is essentially the created agent th.at determines what th.e effect will he. God simply cooperates with. whatever action the creature chooses to perform. Hence in the last analysis, although God knows what the effect will be because of his willed cooperation, the effect is contingent in the sense of being what it is rather than something else because of th.e determination of the creature, not because of God's determination." This seems to place in Scotus a view which came

much later in the writings of Luis de Molina, the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit, who also said that God did not determine hut merely cooperated with the free actions of creatures. Such attribution becomes all ·the more ironic because Molina himself explicitly criticized Scotus's views, labelling them in his *De Scientia Dei* " dangerous " and " neither safe nor true " because they effectively eliminated human freedom. If Wolter is correct in his interpretation of Scotus on foreknowledge, then he owes an explanation of how others so much closer to Scotus's own time could have so badly misread him.

I tend to see Scotus as somewhat of a tragic figure, a brilliant man in unstable times. The ground was moving under his feet, and many of his most interesting theoretical constructs (e.g., instants of nature and the not-so-evident power for opposites without succession) were pro· visional at best and destined to topple in the years immediately following his death. Perhaps this explains why those standing on either side of the canyon (Aquinas and Ockham) have received more prominent notice and more favorable press than the one who historically served to bridge their gap. This instability was largely ecclesial and theological (witness the Condemnations of 1270 and 1277), hut it severely constricted what Scotus-or anyone else at the time--was able to say about two crucial issues of their day: the freedom of human beings and the activity of God. Wolter frequently takes account of some of these external influences on Scotus's thought and in general does a fine job situating Scotus in his historical context of responding to the particular issues and thinkers of his day like Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent (both a favorite foil *and* a generous benefactor) .

My final comment comes from one who has already learned much from Wolter hut hoped to learn more from this volume. Scotus has been as neglected as he has been controversial. Many aspects of his thought, especially areas concerning human freedom and divine activity, remain highly disputed. This is due largely *but certainl,y not exclusively* to the lack of a complete critical edition of Scotus's writings. In a work as comprehensive as the present volume, I wish Wolter had done more to sort through some of the recent controversies in the interpretation of the Subtle Doctor's thought. Though it is obvious that Wolter's views differ in significant places from other interpretations currently propounded, not many modern commentators are explicitly taken to task (only a few, like Langston, are mentioned in footnotes) . One wishes from someone with Wolter's stature and skills a hit more retrospective evaluation, where Scotus scholarship has come in the past half century and whither it goes. In fact, of the ten previously published essays, only one (a work from 1947 on " The ' Theologism ' of Duns Scotus ") is listed as "slightly altered" and two others are presented

in abbreviated form. The subject matter of many of the previously published essays overlaps, which produces several instances where whole passages are repeated practically *verbatim.* This can he distracting for some readers, but those largely unacquainted with Scotus may benefit froon <tl1e repetition; multiple chances afford one the opportunity to grasp ideas that can easily elude one on a single pass. Reservations aside, what is old in this volume provides a valuable retrospective and convenient resource for Scotus scholars and an engaging, though di£· ficult, introduction for those previously unfamiliar with him. What is new will nourish and stimulate further thought about a figure whose place and prominence in medieval thought merits the kind of attention Professor Wolter has lavished upon him through the years.

JOSEPH M:. INCANDELA

Saint Mary's College
Notre Dame, Indiana

Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate. By JOHN W. COOPER. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990. Pp. 262.

Like most forms of dualism, body-soul dualism has fallen out of favor of late. It lacks currency. It lacks class. It lacks credibility among most academic and scientific types, especially among those whom Walker Percy once described as " brain engineers, neuropharmacologists, and chemists of the synapses." No one wants to be caught dead being a dualist. Until he realizes that this may be the only way of catching himself dead. Or unless he or she has qualms about ignoring the authority of the Church, which has traditionally always interpreted Scripture as teaching the survival of the soul and the future resurrection of the body. Hence, the dilemma: body-soul dualism appears to be a religiously necessary but scientifically untenable tenet of the Christian faith.

For those of us stuck with that dilemma, John Cooper, a Dutch Reformed philosopher, furnishes an attractive way out. He disarms the opponents of body-soul dualism by casting out all of its most troublesome demons and then by agreeing with them that human nature is, after all, a " holistic " unity. He advocates a " holistic dualism." Is this a contradiction in terms? Evidently not; or one may be" holistic" in a *functional* sense, which recognizes, for example, that the human mind and brain function as a unity, without supposing that they reduce

to one metaphysical substance. Such *functional* "holism," is compatible with " dualism," even when understood in an ontological sense. Cooper thus provides the exhilarating prospect of permitting us to remain prop· erly and fashionably " holistic " about human nature while yet affirm· ing the " dualism " implicit in Scripture and tradition.

Cooper's hook offers a detailed survey of biblical anthropology and careful analysis of current psychological, physiological, and philosophical theories. It sketches the historical background of the controversy between traditional Christian anthropology and its modern critics; pre· sents an exegetical case for "holistic dualism" in the Old and New Testaments, as well as in inter-testamental Judaism; and offers detailed rejoinders to practical, theological, scientific, and philosophical ohjec· tions to body-soul dualism. The book concludes with a comparative analysis of the anthropological theories of John Cobb, Richard Swinburne, John Paul II (only the second pope in history trained as a philosopher) , and Herman Dooyeweerd. Alvin Plantinga calls Cooper's case for dualism "a much-needed antidote to the facile endorsements of mind-body monism so characteristic of contemporary theology and philosophy."

Why has body-soul dualism fallen out of favor? The beginning of an answer might be found in the influence of the materialistic and monistic anthropologies of Hobbes and Spinoza in early modern philosophy. But probably more decisive was the rapid acceptance of the Darwinian theory of evolution, which began undermining belief in the soul as a distinct entity in the 19th century. Brain physiologists and psychiatrists also began detecting a direct causal relation between brain functions and states of consciousness. Experimental psychologists, such as William James and Wilhelm Wundt, no longer took themselves to he dealing with the operations of an incorporeal entity; and even before B. F. Skinner, John Watson developed a behavioristic psychology that denied the significance of consciousness altogether.

The growing reaction against dualism was also reflected in historical theology, biblical studies, and in the popular outlook of many Christians that Cooper calls " dualophohic." Theologians such as Adolf von Harnack began speculating whether Greek dualism had not overcome Hebrew holism and left its indelible dichotomizing imprint on Christian theology. Reflecting this trend in biblical studies was the controversial 1950 essay by Oscar Cullmann disjunctively entitled" Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Body? " in which he challenged what he regarded as the traditional hut " Platonic " reading of the New Testament. Moreover, in the minds of many Christians, the dualism of body and soul has come to be linked, almost inseparably, to a host of fo.lse dichotomies and harmful separations. It has been linked, for ex:·

ample, to the separation of nature from grace, secular from sacred, physical from spiritual, social gospel from personal gospel, and has been implicated in a litany of spiritual, psychological, pedagogical, social, and cultural evils, including a false, " neutral " conception of secular culture, the destruction of the environment, slavery, male dominance, and sexism.

The first major step in Cooper's response to this collective challenge is directed against the Harnackian claim that Hebrew monism stands ineluctably opposed to Greek dualism. Despite the "holistic" tenor of Hebrew anthropology, there are at least two reasons why it may not he construed as a (perhaps pre-philosophical) species of monism. First, the creation references offer an indisputably composite description of human nature. God breathes the animating "breath" of life *(ruach, nephesh)* into what was formed from the " dust of the ground." Sec· ond, human life is not regarded as ceasing at death but as having a continued ghost-like existence in *Sheol, Abaddon,* or (in the Septua· gint) *Hades.* If Solomon had been versed in Greek philosophy, Cooper speculates, he might have been more sympathetic to Aristotle than either Plato or Democritus, except for the difficulty Aristotelianism presents for belief in an individual afterlife (p. 56). In fact, Cooper says, what Solomon could have really used is a combination of Aristotle and Augustinian Platonism, such as we later find in St. Thomas Aquinas (p. 80).

Cooper concludes his survey of biblical and inter-testamental literature by arguing that the texts as a whole support the traditional dualistic reading with less ambiguity than any other alternative. For example, New Testament passages that support a future resurrection (with.out excluding John Hick's alternative of possible extinction and future re-creation) *rule out an immediate resurrection;* and passages that support continued existence after death (without excluding the alternative of immediate resurrection, as proposed by Wofh.art Pannenberg, Karl Barth, and Hans Kling) nevertheless *rule out extinction and re-creation.* Hence, the traditional view comes out ·ahead.

Furthermore, the alternative of immediate resurrection actually fails to avoid dualism, since it entails the continuous identity of one per· son in two bodies: the same person is separated from a dead, earthly body in the same instant that he or she is joined to the resurrected body. And the alternative of extinction and re-creation fails to engage folly or to resolve the intractable problems of personal identity. Would a person who was completely re-created after being annihilated be the same person? Advocates of this position, says Cooper, confuse the epistemic category of being *recognized as* someone with the ontological category of actually *being* self-identical. Exact similarity, such as one

might find in a clone, is not the same thing as numerical identity. Such questions, as Cooper notes, are not merely academic; they have a direct hearing on such pastoral concerns as the assurance of believers in their personal future resurrection.

How does Cooper respond to those " dualophobic" souls who link soul-body dualism to a multitude of religious, social, and ecological evils? By drawing some badly-needed distinctions: body-soul dualism is not equivalent or even correlative to (l) the *religious* dualism between a sacred religious sphere and a "value-free" secular one, or (2) the *axiological* dualism between mundane menial activities and nobler " spiritual " ones, or (3) the *functional* dualism between a ruling rational faculty and unruly inclinations, for example, or (4) the *social* dualism between male and female, black and white, cultured and pedestrian, and the like. There is no reason why a holistic dualist cannot he as opposed to such wrong-headed dualizations as any monist.

To the challenge of modern brain physiology and psychology, Cooper, responds, first, by noting that scientists are by no means certain that a complete correlation between brain events and specific states of consciousness actually exists and, second, by arguing that such a correlation, even if it could he proved, would not demonstrate that it was unilateral-between brain events as causes and conscious states as effects. A person can generate complex brain occurrences by forming a concept, by meditating on God, or by worrying about an exam. Hence, the causality postulated on the basis of a pattern of regular association moves in both directions.

Cooper acknowledges that the available scientific and biblical data are capable of various interpretations even under the umbrella of "holistic dualism." Indeed they are compatible with a variety of philosophical theories, including dualistic interactionism (ranging from a "robust" Cartesianism to a "softer" Aristotelian-Thomism), dualistic parallelism, dual-aspect monism, idealism, and even a qualified materialism. Traditionally, of course, some theories are easier to reconcile with the entire corpus of Christian faith than others.

Cooper himself singles out four theories for special attention as credible models of holistic dualism. These include (1) the dual-aspect monism of the process theologian John Cobb; (2) the dualistic interactionism of the Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne, which Cooper places with some qualifications in the Augustinian-Cartesian tradition; (3) the Lublin Thomism of John Paul II, which is articulated in terms of European existential phenomenology but based on neo-Thomist metaphysics; and (4) the Dutch neo-Calvinist transcendental philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd.

Not least valuable about Cooper's approach is his willingness to leave

room for different theories and new developments. He does not try to tie up every loose end. Furthermore, he avoids the rut of the specialist by willingly and capably addressing questions of biblical exegesis, philosophy, psychology, science, and popular culture with even-handed competence. Space does not permit me to discuss his fascinating analysis of the psychology of near-death experiences or specific rejoinders to important objections (e.g., the Bible depicts the dead as bodily beings, not immaterial spirits; dualism is a result of the Fall; dualism implies that the whole person does not die; at death we pass out of time, and, hence, there is no intermediate state) . But I can assure you that his account is cogent and illuminating.

PHILIP BLOSSER:

Lenoir-Rhyne College
Hickory, North Carolina

The Crisis of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective. Edited by KENNETH L DEUTSCH AND WALTER SOFFER. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987. Pp. ix+ 304. $54.50 (cloth); $18.95 (paper).

For Leo Strauss, the superiority of classical political philosophy over modern social science (and political theory based on social science) lies in at least four principles. First, it treats political matters as they actually appear to man *qua* philosopher and, in a qualified way, to the good citizen. Because Strauss claims that social science (and much post-classical political philosophy) abstracts from his canon of intelligibility, he thinks that it cannot lead to a humane, rational politics. (See "What is Political Philosophy?", in *What is Political Philosophy?* [Westport: Greenwood], pp. 27-28, and "Distinction between Facts and Values" in *Natural Right and History* [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953], pp. 78-80.) Second, Plato and Aristotle believed that only the good man properly judges politics. This belief attracts Strauss, because it identifies virtue as the best claimant to political rule. ("What is Political Philosophy? ", pp. 36-38.) A third principle is derived immediately from this second: politics ought to be organized hierarchically. In the hierarchy, either the truly virtuous or gentlemen should rule, and those having a passive, obediential form of virtue should be the ruled. Fourth, this arrangement is rational and humane. For although the virtues of the ruler and the ruled are complementary in justice and necessary to it, still they are different and, in fact, require the stratification just mentioned. ("Classic Natural Right" in *Natural Right and History,* pp. 130-44.)

Because of the controversial nature of these principles and Strauss's eminence in political philosophy, one welcomes the present collection of essays by his disciples. They believe that in liberal democracies people confuse liberty with the uses to which liberty can and ought to be put. Doing so, people undermine that regime's foundations. Strauss and his disciples believe that modern natural right makes the clash between liberty and natural right inevitable, because its principal founders, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, conceived man as non-political. They conceived individuals as gaining certain advantages from governments hut as gaining no good in the exercise of politics itself. Classic natural right, by contrast, bases itself on the assumption that man is radically political. Moreover, it conceives politics as an arena for liberating, ennobling activities. Hobbes and Locke viewed the individual as independent of politics, which they placed at the low end of the range of human activity, along with everyday concerns and popular morality, rather than at the high end, as Strauss would. Thus for Strauss, liberal democracy is founded on modern principles, which are either apolitical and liberal (Locke) or apolitical and illiberal (Hobbes). Consequently, it cannot withstand the individualist and collectivist onslaughts that we have seen in this century. What, then, have Strauss's disciples to say about liberal democracy and the prospect of classic natural right in a Western world which is more or less permanently Hobbesian-Lockean?

This can be answered by describing first the hook's divisions and then its diagnoses and prescriptions. In part one the contributors appraise the work of Strauss itself; in part two they define issues in liberalism; and in part three they discuss liberalism in American political life. In the first part, Michael Platt outlines how Strauss's thought radiated from conflicts that he saw between ancient and modern philosophy, philosophy and biblical religion, and philosophy and poetry. Victor Gourevitch then argues that Strauss judged natural right theories according to one principle that he followed consistently: true virtue is philosophic virtue, and vulgar virtue is any in which opinion figures as a determining element (pp. 40-41). According to that principle, the classic natural right of Plato, Aristotle, and other Greeks can be translated into a vulgar form, whereas that of Thomas Aquinas is itself vulgar, not a philosophical natural right theory at all (pp. 42-43). An· other paper in the first section discusses Strauss's understanding of the relation between natural science and political philosophy (Roger D. Masters, pp. 49-66). Masters reexamines Strauss's claim, in his Preface to *Natural Right and History*, that Aristotelian natural right was independent both methodologically and in subject matter from Aristotelian natural philosophy. Masters agrees but with the following qualification: not natural philosophy in its totality hut only rthe general theory of

nature found in the *Physics* is unnecessary to classic natural righto For Masters, AristoteHan biology is unaffected by modern science; thus "[W]hen human social behavior is analyzed from a biological perspective o. . it is evident that Aristotle was correct to describe our species as *zoon politikon."* (Po 62.)

Other authors discuss familiar Straussian themes. Hilail Gildin agrees with Strauss that constitutionalism and liberal democracy deserve the support of liberally educated persons. For Strauss, constitutional liberalism does not disqualify virtue as a claimant to rule; but communism and fascism do, because they reduce politics to power, history, and so on. (Gildin, "Leo Strauss and Liberal Democracy", pp. 91-103, esp. pp. 100-0L) Thomas L. Pangle argues that Nietzsche, a philosopher " in his own strict sense of the term ", actually might have understood the West as deeply as possible; to answer his critique of the West is "a potentially liberating challenge". ("Nihilism and Modern Democracy in the Thought of Nietzsche", pp. 180-211, p. 208.) And Stephen Salkever, quoting Nathan Tarcov, writes: "Strauss's purpose is not to undercut liberalism practically but to find a theoretic solution to the problem posed by its having already been undercut, The opposite impression may underlie much of the political hostility to his work." Salkever urges (against Nietzsche and Pangle?) that liberality and moderation actually constitute the liberal impulse; self-esteem should flow from those virtues and sustain liberal democracy. ("The Crisis of Liberal Democracy: Liberality and Democratic Citizenship", pp. 245-68, p. 249.)

Strauss's own thought is often profound; his published work is technically proficient, notwithstanding a dense prose, and when he deals with such questions as whether politics or philosophy is man's highest calling, his approach is serious, if not reverento This book falls short of his exampleo

First there are its technical problems.

(1) The book has nearly as many proofreading mistakes as pages. Some pages have three or more errors. For some examples: the text of note 18, page 46, corresponds to the idea at the point of citation for note 19, page 40; there is ". o. a seemless web of social life ..." (p. 85); the words 'political' and 'philosophy' are misprinted throughout the book (e.g., at pp. 17 and 157) ; some people are not "desrving of suffering" (po 171); and did Weber discover a point that would "pjrovide" leverage against democratic nihilism? (p. 219).

(2) Elliptical thoughts and sentences abound in some articles. For one example: " Perhaps Weber could have told us reasonably why he

was not a nihilist if he had understood himself through Thucydides instead of Jeremiah ", p. 230. This sentence occurs under a subheading, "A Thucydidean Weber". But the corresponding section mentions Thucydides only twice, first as above and then in a quotation, and Jeremiah not at all. In another essay, two sentences, the second and third of paragraph two, p. 129, required five minutes' effort to untangle thought from grammar.

(3) In my judgment, the following errors speak for the whole of Judith A. Best's article. ("The Innocent, the Ignorant and the Rational: The Content of Lockean Consent" [pp. 167-79].) One finds: overworked idioms ("tempting conclusions" or "tempting solutions" three times on p. 172, and a "simple solution", too) ; ambiguities (inferential 'thus ' is used, where context requires adverb of manner, p. 175, paragraph three; the referent of "they", last sentence of last paragraph, p. 172, occurs seven complete sentences prior to it) ; reifications ("nature" is said to "prefer" at least seven times in two paragraphs, pp. 174-75); more than the usual number of proofreading errors (including " Only those who have reason are rat ", p. 174) ; unexplained technical expressions ("negative-passive" and "positive-active", p. 174); mixed metaphors ("begging the question with a vengeance", p. 174); and the following sentence, which demands parsing to understand: " The innocent are preferred not because nature esteems the actively worthy or noble, a qualitative form of life, hut rather because nature wills preservation, mere life, and peace (harm no one) is the condition of preservation." (Pp. 171-72.)

(4) Part three of the book, beginning on p. 243, is subdivided at p. 244. But there is no second subdivision. The table of contents (p. vi) reproduces this error, which competent proofreading would have caught.

In short, this hook deserved better editing than it received.

The thought is also defective at critical points. I shall discuss a few problems in the book itself and then broadly discuss a theme that these authors mishandle, partly because of Strauss himself.

The contributors largely prefer assertion to detailed exegesis and argumentation, and they fail to converse with 1their opponents. In consequence, some of them misunderstand the philosophy that they judge essential to improving liberal democracy. These problems undermine at least two papers already mentioned: Roger D. Masters's on evolutionary biology and Victor Gourevitch's, which classifies natural right theories. The same problems (and others to he mentioned) also make Pangle's opinion of Nietzsche suspect.

I shall here discuss only Masters's paper. It is especially important, because classic natural right depends on an interpretation of nature and

human nature. Masters argues (i) that Aristotle's biology can be preserved inasmuch as it grounds Aristotle's definition of man as a political animal, but (ii) that the general principles of nature and, in particular, of natural teleology are not necessary for that foundation's validity. He writes: " Broadly put, Aristotle uses natural teleology as a precise analytical tool in the discussion of animate beings, whereas teleology is more logical or metaphorical in the discussion of inanimate beings." (P. 56.)

As evidence of the metaphorical or logical use of teleology in the physical treatises, Masters cites Aristotle's comparison of nature to art in *Physics,* II 8, 199b30, sq. But Aristotle's controlling idea here is nature itself, not art. (See *Phys.,* II 8, 199a5-30.) Therefore his paradigm is not purposiveness in the sense of intelligent agency, the sense Masters asserts and his interpretation requires. No: nature is that which contains within itself a principle of motion and of rest *(Phys.,* II 1, 192b20-25). Accordingly, a doctor treating himself contains the principle by which he would heal himself, viz., medical knowledge. So Aristotle says that " the best illustration [of purpose in nature] is a doctor doctoring himself: nature is like that." *(Phys.,* II 8, 199b30, sq.) For Aristotle, teleology is immanent in natural objects. The definition of nature implies the subsistence of whole, natural objects, and the hylomorphic theory of the natural treatises elaborates this definition. In that hylomorphism, purpose is immanent because of the equivalence of formal and final cause. This link is expressed and consistently deployed in both the physical and the biological treatises (e.g., *Physics,* II 2, 194a28-30 and II 7, 198a25-26; *Parts of Animals,* I 1, 640al5-20 and 640bl-5). Therefore no essential, *teleological* difference exists between inanimate and animate nature for Aristotle. So it is illogical and irresponsible for Masters to divide biological and physical nature in the way that he does. As Aristotle himself understood it, his biology could not survive the collapse of his physical theory.

Masters confusedly says that Aristotle can propose a non-theistic natural philosophy, whereas Aquinas cannot (p. 57). He uses this claim to say that modern natural science and classic natural right can both he true, hut that their truth excludes biblical belief and/or Thomistic natural law from being true. But of course Aristotle does not need a theology to propose an immanent, natural teleology. Neither, however, does Aquinas need that: with the Philosopher, he thought that being, value, purpose, etc., are in natural objects, of themselves, because of what nature *is.*

Much of this would be evident to anyone who had read Aristotle comprehensively, not to mention recent studies of teleology and/or classification in Aristotle (Baime, Gotthelf, a number of neo-Scholastics,

et al.). In sum, because the general principles of Aristotle's biology and his theory of physical nature are the same, one must look outside totle to explain Masters's claim that natural teleology exists in full only at the animate level. Does Masters think that modern science has shown that inanimate nature is not purposive, hut that it has not excluded purpose from plants, beasts, and human beings? If so, .that is another question. It is probably a wrongheaded question, too, if William Wallace, for one, has not spent much of a distinguished career in vain. Here Masters not only fails to converse with opponents, hut he even fails to acknowledge them. If Masters is right, then Aristotle thinks that purpose arises at the animate level only because of the specific nature of animate being. That would make Aristotle a vitalist-idealist, which he is not.

But what are .the consequences for Masters's paper of these confusions, poor exegeses and arguments, and neglect of opponents? For him, liberal democracy's future requires that we preserve two of three opposites, of which only two can coexist at one time. Those are modern natural science, revealed religion, and classic natural right. But Masters fails to show that there is a contradiction somewhere in this triad that prevents the coexistence of all its members. In fact, they *do* coexist. The question whether they can is superfluous, because fact comprehends possibility. For Masters, philosophy denies revealed religion. So for him, whether we return to olassic natural right and to a teleology like its own depends on " what Strauss called the tension between Athens and Jerusalem" (p. 63); modern natural science and classic natural right can coexist hut only at the expense of " biblical or Thomistic versions of natural law" (p. 62). Yet, Masters acknowledges, religion compels allegiance more than science. Hence it is paramount that philosophy and natural science disprove biblical belief, as Masters thinks they have. So the question is what to do about the allegiance that religion continues to compel, when revealed religion is untrue. But if Masters does not prove that Aristotle's natural teleology is what he thinks it is, then he cannot say that Aristotle and modern science are in agreement on natural teleology to the exclusion of biblical belief and/or Thomistic natural law. For the same reason, he does not show that Aristotle's natural teleology and natural right, on the one hand, and biblical belief, on tl1e other, are incompatible. Thus he fails to prove his conclusion, that the outcome of the crisis of our times lies in how religion and philosophy fare in their mutual conflict.

As Michael Platt had argued, this same conflict was critical to Strauss for most of his career. In hopes of initiating dialogue, therefore, I turn to Strauss's position on revealed religion and philosophy.

From his earliest major work, *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*, Strauss

held an Averroist position on philosophy and revelation. Because he never acknowledged it as such, he never defended it as such. Strauss believed that the philosopher alone comprehends truth: because non-philosophic cognition is affected by opinion, it is defective and not true in the full sense. In that same early work, Strauss argued that Spinoza believed ,that God revealed truly that He uniquely exemplifies human life, hut that what God so reveals is philosophically false. By this reasoning, an orthodox Jew or Christian would he superstitious, hence impious. By the same reasoning, only the philosopher, privileged with true rand non-metaphorical knowledge, would he truly religious. *(Spinoza's Critique of Religion* [New York: Schocken, 1965], pp. 27-28. For a recent critique ·of this interpretation, see Alan Donagan, *Spinoza* [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press: 1988], pp. 25-26.) This neo-Averro-.ism affected Strauss's interpretation of Plato and Aristotle and perhaps even determined it. Consider Strauss's view that among men only the philosopher occupies the "isles of the blessed".

There are crucial fallacies in this way of thinking. In the first place, at least where Aristotle is concerned, God does not bless the philosopher. Aristotle's God does not bless any man, because He does not give of His own life to anything. (On *Nicomachean Ethics,* X 8, 1179a24-32, see my *Human Natur,e and Eudaimonia in Aristotle* [New York: Lang 1989], pp. 239-42 and corresponding notes.) Nor does it help to say that for Aristotle, God favors the philosopher over others. That may he so, hut only if Aristotle's God knows others than himself. What Arisrtotledoes say is that the philosopher is likely to he happiest (*eudaimonestatos)*, and what this probably means is: " ' The philosopher is most happy ... [because he is] the human individual who philosophizes best'". He philosophizes best, because, as a trained philosopher, he has the intellectual virtue of philosophic knowledge to a high degree. Because of that virtue, "he is best able to philosophize" *(Nature and Eudaimonia,* p. 249, n4). Therefore he can he fulfilled in philosophy more easily than others, and perhaps to a higher degree. But that in no way whatever deprives others of the same good. Furthermore, Aristotle probably does not imagine an essential difference between a trained philosopher ·and an ordinary person. Both of them, as human persons, are philosophers by nature.

But if Aristotle's God does not bless or even favor philosophers over other men, then one cannot use the presumption that He *does* to imply that the biblical God does not bless others. Yet Strauss's interpretation of Spinoza implies the latter. Jahweh does not bless orthodox Jews and Christians? He does not bless all who, in the words of Vatican II, are " variously related to the People of God " ?

Nor do these exhaust the problems. With Averroes, Straussians as-

sume that philosophy as such was perfected (or substantially perfected) in the works of Plato and Aristotle. (See Strauss's remarks to this effect in *The City and Man* [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977], "Jn. troduotion ", pp. 11-12.) A corollary to this: philosophy is the highest form of knowledge available to man as man. Philosophy's competitor for supreme status, religious belief, is not true in the full sense. It is not non-metaphorically, literally, *philosophically* true. On this point, Strauss and his disciples should acknowledge their Averroism (or neo· Averroism) and respond to Averroes's critics. Their most obvious op· ponents are Thomas Aquinas and some of his disciples, especially Gilson and Maritain. But Straussians exclude the evidence of Aquinas. (This is what Masters did, as we have already shown.) They exclude Aquinas's refutation of Averroes on philosophy and religion, because Aquinas was a religious believer and, in their minds, religious belief cannot co· exist with modern science and/or philosophy. But this only begs the question.

Straussians can only presume that Plato and Aristotle completed philosophy. This begs the question of what philosophy *is.* Since Patristic times, thinkers have denied that philosophy is what Plato and Aristotle thought it to he. For the Fathers, and most notably Augustine, philosophy is love of Christ. But even assuming that philosophy is what those Greeks thought it was, again, Aquinas denied that it is unquali- fiedly the highest human knowledge. In the first question of the *Summa theologiae,* supreme status goes to faith. That is human knowledge because in it God signifies His reality through objects naturally intelli· gihle to the human mind; it is the highest knowledge available to man as man. Moreover, both Maritain and Gilson formulated concepts of philosophy-as-perfectible-by-revelation during the height of Strauss's powers. According to their logic, Strauss would illicitly abstract from the actual, personal condition of philosophy, in conceiving it as Greek and as finished. Strauss never directly took issue with Gilson or Mari- tain, although they were his philosophical equals and sympathizers on many issues. More recently, Frederick Wilhelmsen and Robert Soko- lowski have argued against the Straussian interpretation of philosophy and revelation. (See Wilhelmsen's *Christianity and Political Philosophy* [Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1979] and Sokolowski's *The God of Faith and of Reason* [Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1983].) To my knowledge those challenges have been ignored.

Finally, one can reasonably doubt that classic natural right is strong- ly anti-democratic. True, Straussians have made a good and even con· vinoing case that it is. But they have translated their conclusion into the principle that democracy is not unqualifiedly good, and this is a different position altogether. Could not the anti-democratic conclusions

of Plato and Aristotle have resulted from some non-essential details, or even from falsehoods? For example, does not Aristotle base his justifications of slavery, abortion, infanticide, and unequal treatment of women on false biology, or false philosophy, or inherited cultural prejudices, or some combination of all these? Further, because those same practices are presumptively inhumane, would not one assent to all of classical political philosophy be unwise? In sum, there is little reason to suppose that the classics substantially completed philosophy, and there is much reason to suppose that they did noL At the same time, it is plausible to argue that for Aristotle the best life consists in philosophic *and* civic activity. That these goods would or could be actualized by each individual citizen in some way cannot be excluded. (See my *Nature and Eudaimonia,* pp. 221-26 and corresponding notes.) Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia* in the ethical treatises, on the one hand, and his mentions of political *eudaimonia* in the political treatises, on ,the other, allow for universal participation in politics and philosophy. Strauss, however, did not seriously consider that. In his mind, there were two alternatives for political justice: either hierarchical societies with ruling elites or universal philosophic enlightenment, which would he possible were all men philosophers. But Strauss denied that all men are philosophers. (See the quotation of Strauss's letter to Karl Lowith, p. 8 of Deutsch and Soffer's "Introduction".) This opinion cannot he thoroughly grounded in the political philosophy that Strauss and his disciples regard as complete. Again, Aristotle suffices as an example. One can maintain that for him, man as man is a philosopher every hit as much as a citizen, and vice versa. If Aristotle actually did not think that all men are (or can be) philosophers-and on each question his view seems to be negative-then could he not have been wrong in fact as well as inconsistent in applying his theory of human nature to politics? (For a discussion, see *Nature and Eudaimonia,* pp. 221-24.)

Did Strauss arrive at his ambivalent attitude towards liberal democracy by virtue of all the needed evidence? Have the contributors to this volume drawn conclusions about the concrete good of liberal democracy from all the necessary evidence? Or does classical political philosophy allow development of its broadest principles? To go further, should we jettison some of its principles that are inimical to democracy? In other words, should we presume with Straussians that Plato and Aristotle substantially perfected classical philosophy and classical political philosophy? If they did not perfect philosophy, then is the justice they conceived true and complete? H there are modes of knowledge higher than philosophy, hence higher than classical philosophy, then the possibility of a higher, truer, more complete justice cannot be ex-

eluded. Have Straussians proved that there is no higher human knowledge than philosophy?

One hopes that they will meet their critics, because Stmussians are deeply serious men and women, and we can all learn from their mentor.

D. T. ASSELIN

Hillsdale, College
Hillsdale, Michigan

Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory. By NOEL CARROLL. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988. Pp. 268.

This book is a provocative, clearly written, and carefully argued presentation of a philosophical critique of traditional film criticism. If film is taken as a serious art form, one which can stand alongside of music, painting, theatre, and literature, then Carroll's book is a good example of the type of philosophical study that is needed. Assistant professor of philosophy at Wesleyan University, Carroll knows the world of film well and attacks with vigor what he takes to be erroneous in traditional film criticism. His three targets are the film theories of Rudolf Arnheim, Andre Bazin, and V. F. Perkins. It would be difficult to overemphasize the influence of Arnheim and Bazin on the history of the aesthetics of film: each man is a giant in the history of theorizing about film. Though much less influential, Perkins does present an mteresting view of film.

Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory consists of an introduction, three central chapters, and a conclusion. Each of the three chapters is devoted to one of the film theorists, and each chapter begins with an explanation of the theory being discussed. In trying to present the theory in its strongest form, Carroll includes a detailed discussion of its historical setting, and this makes its contextual importance clear. But most of each chapter is devoted to criticism of the theory iii question. Thinking of film theories as a series of answers to abstract questions, Carroll suggests that Arnheim, Bazin, and Perkins address the same central questions and expect the answers to these questions to be related logically in the same way. Carroll lists three questions that he thinks suggest a similar structure in the three theories he is studying: " What is the determinant or special feature of film? What is the value or role of cinema? What are the processes of articulation in film in relation to the previous two answers? " Concerning the answers to these questions Carroll writes

> Most classical film theories-including those of Amheim, Bazin, and Perkins-relate answers to the three basic questions in the following way: the determinant characteristic stands to the role of cinema as a means to an end, while the articulatory processes are assessed as instances of the determinant characteristic of cinema (pp. 14-15).

Arnheim represents an early type of film theorizing which Carroll names the silent-film paradigm. Those who embrace this approach, and Carroll would include the Soviet montagists of the twenties such as Sergei Eisenstein, insist that film is not merely a record of reality but rather manipulates reality expressively. Though Arnheim wrote after sound had entered film, he disdained talkies and looked back to silent film to discover the paradigm of film. Carroll's treatment of Arnheim relies on the latter's 1957 *Film As Art,* which is a condensed version of his 1933 book *Film.* The 1957 condensation can he considered the authoritative articulation of Arnheim's position.

The prejudice against cinema in its early days derived from the fact that a major constituent of film was photography. Many felt that photography could not be an art form because it was merely a copying process. Arnheim's theory can be called creationist because he successfully showed how cinema could be creative in capturing and re-presenting reality. Arnheim showed that film transcends the simple viewpoint that simple recording implies. Carroll summarizes Arnheim's view:

> In summary, Arnheim holds that one role of filmmaking-the one that concerns him-is art. He also contends that the determinant characteristics of the medium-those relevant to the purpose of art making-are the various ways that the medium diverges from the mechanical duplication of reality, and finally, Arnheim spends the bulk of *Film As Art* on lengthy examinations of the various modes of cinematic articulalation, in order to demonstrate how they diverge from mechanical recording. Arnheim, moreover, is concerned with this divergence to establish that the medium can be expressive. It is the potential expressiveness of the medium that convinces Arnheim that film can be art. And, for him, it is the difference between normal perception and the cinematic image that yields the means of promoting expression. For Arnheim, the key to the production of expression is the isolation of the way in which representation by the device in question-say, a close-up-will diverge from the normal close-up view of an object in nature (p. 30).

Of course for Arnheim film editing provides a crucial difference he· tween the cinematic image and the normal image.

Carroll sees Bazin, who has been called the" Aristotle of the Cinema," as representative of a reaction against the silent-film paradigm. Carroll calls the Frenchman's aesthetic theory the sound-film paradigm" For Bazin and his followers cinematography is the es'8ential attribute of film and realism would seem to be the preferred style of fiL'll. First editor of *Cahiers du Cinema,* Bazin directly encouraged a generation of

critics/filmmakers such as Francois Truffaut, Jean-Luc Godard, Claude Chabrol, and Eric Rohmer. Carroll suggests that Bazin is probably the most influential critic and theorist in the history of film. In noting Bazin's stress on the recording aspect of film Carroll writes

> ... Bazin chose this dimension of the medium as the major source of value in film. Where established film theory urged that the filmmaker be highly interventionist or creationist-that is, manipulating and rearranging images of reality almost like a poet manipulates words-Bazin advocated the adoption of formal strategies of composition, lighting, camera movement, framing, and narration such that meaning would not be imposed on reality but would rather seem to emerge from the interaction of the recorded event with a participant (rather than a passive) spectator. Where silent-film theorists often read as if they are embarrassed by the photographic, mechanical, recording components of the medium Bazin, in the forefront of the realist movement in film theory, looks to exactly those elements of film to discover 'the cinematic' (p. 96).

Bazin's theory according to Carroll is the most decisive moment in the transition from the silent-film paradigm to the sound-film paradigm. The Frenchman's theory is that montage compels passive spectatorship while spatial realism encourages and even induces active spectatorship. In his preference for the latter, Bazin stresses the freedom of choice that it allows the spectator.

V. J. Perkins tries to combine elements of the theories of Arnheim and Bazin. What Perkins is battling is what he calls an essentialism, that is, the attempt to deduce stylistic principles from the specific identifying feature of the film medium. Perkins wants film theory to be a metacriticism and so he puts forth general standards of evaluation which he has drawn from filmed fiction. Because his standards are drawn from filmed fiction, Perkins believes that his metacriticism applies just to film, rather than to art in general. Carroll associates Perkins's attempt with what is called in philosophical aesthetics the open-concept theory of art. Perkins believes that, rather than look for the essence of film, film theory should construct general premises that film critics can use in their work and thus encourage film criticism to he a rational endeavor. One of the justifications that Carroll offers for considering Perkins, who only wrote one book on film, is that he sees Perkins as a moment of dialectical synthesis between classical film theory as represented by Arnheim and Bazin and others, that is film criticism up to the 1970s, and semiotic and post-structural theories of film that dominate film literature in the 70s and explicitly reject what they take to be the essentialism of the classical theories. Though Perkins's *Film As Film* was quickly forgotten, Carroll views it as the most original and ambitious attempt in the 1970s to construct a film theory. Perkins tried to find a balance between the creationists and the realists.

For Perkins credibility is the key to filmed fiction. Next in importance is coherence, which for Perkins seems to correspond to the degree of goodness ascribed to the work.

Though admiring the work of the three film theorists, Carroll finds all three theories wanting. He believes a film theory should be based on the uses to which fihn is put, on what is supposedly specific to the medium of film. Arnheim and Bazin (and even Perkins) are guilty of essentialism according to Carroll, who sees the conceptual framework in which media, including film, are pursued as more important than questions of media-specificity. The chief interest of Carroll is continued research involving questions about the uses that cinema serves-whether the use be art, or fiction, or representation, or nonfiction, or narrative, or whatever. This research according to Carroll should take place at the level of abstrnction found in philosophical aesthetics, and he views *Philosophical Problems in Classical Film Theory* as propaedeutic to this larger project. Carroll concludes

> More may be learned about film, however, if we spend more energy clarifying the various answers we wish to give to the question of its role o:r use than if we continue the quest for the central medium-specific features of cinema. That is, we may learn more about cinema by thinking about fiction than about *filmed* fiction and thinking about representation than *cinematic* representation. *'Use* rather than *medium'* might be the slogan of our approach. If this is criticized by the charge that such a program is not film·specific, the answer, in one sense, is ' of course.' But the reason for this is that it is the use of the medium that historically gives the medium its shape and its significant features their pertinence (p. 262).

Without minimizing the contribution of Arnheim, Bazin, or Perkins, Carroll has provided an excellent philosophical criticism of their theories. Any serious reader interested in fihn, but especially philos· ophers interested in film aesthetics, should be grateful to him.

ROBERT E. LAUDER

St. John's University
Jamaica, New York