PROFESSING THE CREED AMONG THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS

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The Creed, the Created Order, and the Religions

THE CHRISTIAN CREED is a *particular* profession of faith, *yet* it is not the creed of a sect; it is essentially *universalist.* Both are clear not only from the Creed's *content* but also from the *act* by which it is professed.

By means of the Creed, one particular, identifiable ("visible") community---the Christian Church-professes, both to its own membership and to every particular person or community that wants to listen, its faith in God in the name of Jesus Christ. The particular profession is offered with a universalist intent, in the context of a communal missionary commitment to the whole world and, beyond that, in the perspective of the supernatural, all-encompassing, eschatological "life of the world to come." It is not surprising, that even those primitive trinitarian creeds that lack every trace of christological narrative (and thus also every reference to Christ's coming to do justice to the living and the dead) still include a profession of at least a few eschatological articles of belief at the end. The most notable among these features are the universal church (which represents and anticipates the final gathering of the saints), the (definitive) forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the flesh, and the life that lasts forever.[1]

But the Creed harbors another universalism as well. It is

[1] Cf. DS 1-6.

natural, fuilldamentail, p:mtoilogiical. In !the text of the Creed, this univiersalism surfaces in the professwn of God ,as Creato!l' of aJil ,thait is, whether seen or unseen, and of Jesus Christ a:s God's 1agent in creation. In .addressing itself to humanity at the Creed relies on this. It 'appeals to humanity's native *eras-its* native .attunement .to God am!d 1to the whole worLd, its limitless caipacity for ;authentic understanding, and its unquenchable thirsit for ioommunion.

In the rhetoric of the Christian profiession of £aith, :the fO!l'IDeruniviersalism enjoys pride of plare. The Creed's *primary* profession is *positive:* thematiicailly, the Creed is designed to formuilate the Christian £aiith in its mnc11ete, historic partiioofarity, :in :i:ts commitment to the Christian mission to the whole worLd, and in its anticipation of :the eschaton. But if it is rtrue that the Creed primariily ·addresses itself to :ail:l of humanity with the es1chato1ogiteruhmessage thrut is the horizon of the Christi,an faith, this positivie profoss,ion is undergirded by a commitment to humanity alllld the wol'lld in their integrity, by means of ra "suhsidiairy universwlism." If, in the actualiity of its hisrboric the Coorch ·aiddresses itself to all of humanity :and the wor1d with its partrowlar message of sru1vati.on, it is only by virtue of .a fundam.entail, natural universalism thrut it *can* so aiddress them. And it is on the strength of this 1aitber univiersailism that the Christian community it·self, itoo, acknowledges an whl-iillclusive natura.l order which it shares with all. of humanity.

" All of humanity " is no:t an 1abs:tmntion; it comes in the form of ithe greiat variety of "rull nations" (Mt 19), along with their great religions. The theologircail.'bask of interpreting the Creed in light of ilts .commitment to £UDJdamentail universalism, therefo11e, must .somehow raise the issue of Christianiity';srelationship with the world's great religions.

In taking on this issrue, we must remind oursel v;es of an important ooail:ity-one heavy with consequence, as will be1come ·dear in the oomse of this essay. This 11eality was not unknown to the first Christian apologists: the Consrtantinian

and Theodosian settlements of the fourth century slowly but surely, and ever more fo11cefolly, eased it abeyance. But it began to with a vengeance in the early eighteenth century, when the Enlightenment, iinereasingJy fascinated by the variety of religions and cultures in the wor1d, began to irrt1erpreitthem all in a perspective as shapes and manifestations of one and the siame natural human l'eHgiosity. This amounted to a demand, issued to the Christian West, to tafoe its place among the woiild !l)eligions as one of them and to reshaJpe :iJts self-consciousness in light of that demand. Moiie than two oenturies bter, this rea:lity is 1stiil>l very much wi:th us, only in much sharper relief. In the globa.l vilJ,age of the twentieth century, it has not only become impossible to over1ook lthe world's great religious traditions; they are also a presence whose *complexity* is only just beginning to dawn on us.

In view of :aM this, it is wise to r:emind ouuselves right a:t the outset of a fundamenta1l fact about the wor1d religions and to do :so, at 1least initiaHy, simply for the of ,reaJlismand fairness, that is, without immediately entering into much busy tiheoreitical argument or jumping to of historic importance. The £act is this: the great world religions do not rcontent themselves with purely foca1l or :regional relevance; they ofFer an encompassing interpretation of human me in the world and of the wor1d is, of course, what makes them so transplantable 1to other areas in the wo11ld nowadays. In other words, Christianity (along with Judaism, to wh:iich it owes the faith in the One True God that remains]ts root commitment) [2] is not alone in !'elating a *particular* profession of

2 Gerd Theissen has made a point of stressing the relevance of the spedfically Jewish tradition of monotheism to modern Christianity: "It is to Judaism that we owe the faith in the One and Only God. J‹or a long time this faith was self-evident. Today it is a minority opinion. Since it is, historically and objectively, the most important presupposition of Jesus' preaching, it must be made accessible anew today" *(Der ffchatten des GaliUiers,* 5th impr. [l\fiinchen: Chr. Kaiser, 1988], p. 55; English: *The Shadow of the Galilea1i: The Quest of the Historical Jesus in Narrative Form* [Philadelphia:

faith to a nwbural wor1d-oroer *universally accessible to humanity.* Nor is Christianity alone in pro.fessing that ithere preViails, by transcendent design, .a deep *co-ordination* between, on ;the one hand, that aihl-inciLusive world order and, on the other ha.I1Jd, the pro£ession of rliaith shared among its members. Consequenltlly,rthe ·Christian mission to the 'WO['ld must 1acknowledgesome basic *structural parallels* between itself and orther giieat religions. They .are the fol:lowing. The (Judaeo-) Christian. tmdition i:s not ialone (I) in distinguishing between *the particular ortler created by the* " *revelation* " (or :its functionrul equiv.alent) that is the oontent o:f its own 1specia1 profess.ion of f.aith and *a universal o'l'<ler of "nature,"* [8] (2) in having conceptions about *the integrity of the natural o'l'<lerand its relativity,* (3) in recognizing, on the basis of :this order, a *natural comparability between itself and other great religions,* and hence, (4) in thinking that theve is *a natural basis for encounter and debate among the great religions.*

These ;an:alogies,but especiall.y the last two, may be disronoerting, but at least they ·serve to emphasize the Christian conviction that the Greed is not :the creed of ·a ·sect. They also suggest a ba;sic eonolrusion: *the Creed itself implicitly invites and mandates a Christian dialogue with humanity's great religions.* Why?

Fundamental Christok>gical Warrants for Encounter

If an acknowiledgment of the uniV1e['salorder of nature undergivds the Christian pmfession of the order of grace, then

Fortress Press, 1987], p. 36). While commending the encounter with all of the world's great religions, Vatican II's Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions *Nostra LEtate* (n. 4) gives Judaism pride of place. In the present context, however, it must suffice to note the theological primacy of the Jewish-Christian dialogue. The Jewish theologian David Novak has also affirmed this important issue, in his *Jewish-Ohristian Dialogue: A Jewish Justification* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), esp. pp. 26-41.

s Cf. Ninian Smart, *The Philosophy of Religion,* new ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 99-137.

this acknowledgment must naturally emend to the ways in which thait nruturail order has been 1acknowledged and interpreted, nortably in the grieat ,religions. Consequently, *attentive encounter with world religions, precisely inasmuch as they make their particular claims in a universalist perspective, must undergird the Christian mission.* Since it is important rto understand this ,thesis wetoul'lrutely,let us clarify it in :some detail.

What has heen asiserbedis that it is *the Creed* that mandates an attentive e11J00unter. Our thesis, in other words, is presented as .a *theological* proposition predicated on positively *Christian* warrants. **It** is not pmposed in deference to- any 'al:leged1y superior general principle to which all the world's religious traditions would supposedly owe obedience on grounds rthat naturaJJly command universal ooceprtance. In acco1.1d with this, the Catholic Chu:reh at Vatican **II** :aclrn.owledgedpositively *Christian* grounds for professing itself as respectfully and even vitaJly l'lelated rto the great l'leligions[4].

The background of rthls profession :Us the whole complex of christological doctrines, no matter how often they have been misinteT'preteld. The two interrelated christologicail affirmations that ,anchor our rthesis are: £rst, that God is not seit ag,ainst C11eaJtion, and :secondJy,that, in being united with the divine *Logos,* human nature (1and the whole natural order along with it) is not climinished but enhanced iand dignified.[5] In other wol'lds, Jesus Christ is professed as ,the Son of God and ,ag the Savior of .all. of humanity iand of the whole world because he embodies and incrudes and welcomes all ways and aM !Souls,,aJSsaysand chastens them, and perfects rthem by putting them in :an ultimate perspective.[6] He is *not* so professed because he (or faith in mm) *displaces* other ways to God,

4 Vatican II, *Nostra llJJtate,* n. 3; cf. *Gaudium et Spes,* n. 92.

5 Cf. Constantinople III (681 A.D.): Christ's human will is not taken away, but rather enhanced by being deified: DS 556.

6 On this " rhetoric " of "inclusion," "obedience," and "hope," cf. F. J. van Beeck, *Ohrist Proclaimed.* (New York, Ramsey, NJ, and Toronto: Paulist Press, 1979), esp. pp. 145-262. Cf. also "Ten Questions on Soteriology and Christology," *Ohicago Studies* 25 (1986) : 269-278, esp. pp. 277-78.

a1long with the great souls that have found, liv;ed, and taught them. Very importantly, Christ incorporates the natuml oroer by virtue of *sov-ereignty,* not by dint of *supenority.7* It is mis- therefore, to cha.r:ructe:cizethe classical Christian profes- ·sionof Christ's *sole* Saviiorship as "exclusivist."

Consequently, I am convinced that Paul F. Knitter's pro- posal [8] to mak!e some kind of distinction in the Chrisrtian faith between a universalist *theological* focu:s and a particularist *chmtological* profession of faith is premature; it creates more than it solves. From the point of view of the Creed, it .oomes close to compromising :the inextricaMe and mutual ·bond between Jesus Christ and the Hving God, both in the oroer of grace and in the created order. If that bond is loosened, Jesus Christ ends up being entirely defined by the particularity of his humanity, 1and .any claims made on his behalf involving a speciM universalism booome :an offensive e:xiercisein Western superiority 1and prejudioe. In Knitter's proposal, therefore, *both* Ohrist's uniqueness *and* his inclusiv;enessare jeopardized.

However, if tthe present treatment makes no OOillCeSsionsin the area of Christ's uniqueness in regard iboth ro God and to humanity and the world, it does wish to .state that, to the ex- tent rthat Chrisibianity has presented itself .a;s e:xclusivist, it has miSU11Jderstoodboth Jesus Christ and its own normative profes- sion of faiith and, heme, rbhe significance of the great religions as welt Now as a matter of historicaJ. fact, the proposition that the Creed mandates an aitbentive encounter with woirild reli- gions has been heeded at least •as much in the breach as in ,the mmphlance, and affhming it ras integtt"alto Chnistianity calls for a firm *mea culpa,* on the part of both the Christian Church and the Chrisitian thooloigiain. But :the problem has roots in a mis- guided christoilogy. In interpreting victory over sin rand .death in !triumphalist rterms, and in uncriticall.y aligning it-

1 Cf. F. J. van Beeck, "Professing the Uniqueness of Christ," *Ohicago Studies* 24(1985): 17-35.

s *No Other Na,me? A Oritica,l Survey of Christian Attitudes Towa,rd the World Religions* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985).

se1f with poEtieail pnwer, the Church has often professed the C11eed: (and, hence, Chrises universrul Lordship) in *exclusivist, intolerant* rterms, totaHy unw:armnted by either the example of the histor:]cal Jesus or the rt.rue sense of the conciliar definitions. This error came to he compounded by dubious developments in the 1cruJrtural shape of Western Christianity .. Undue deferenoe on the part of the simple faithfol to eeolesiast:Ucal-politiowl esta;blishments became the norm; an increasing preoocuprution with salvation from sin 1as the cenhal theme of the Christian faith contributed to the dev:elopment of an ever more starkly adversary relationship between Chris:tendom and non-Christian eultiures.[9] In time, these developments provided spurious theofogical warrant1s for the" conversion" of the non-Christian wodd; missionary campaigns cou1d be 1as intolerant and aggressiv<e as the inquisitorial 'and aidrninistr:a:tiv<e"de-£ense" of rthe Christian faith at home.

One very serious blot on the his:tory of the CathoJic Church in rthe Western hemispheve deserves specific mention, if only bemuse it shaped the Chmch in Latin Ameriea to such :a 1arge extent. the s1lave traders, who made only the feeblest of attempts a:t offering a 11eligious justification for their crimes against humaniity, the 1eadership of the Spanish *Conquista* explicitly interpreted Christ's victory ov:er the demons ars a rationale for brutal treatment of the native Americans 1ai1J1d the desh1uction of rtheir cultu11e; the protests of aiuthentic Christian pr:opherts Iikie Bartofome de },as Casa;s (1474-1566) [10] were disrega;rded. The pl'oh1em 1coulrd come to the forie so vil'ui1ently because *it* was really as widespcread as Chris:tendom itself. The ecclesiastica1l triumpha1l:ism estab-

9 Cf. F. J. van Beeck, *Loving the Torah More than God? Towards a Catholic Appreaiation of Judaism* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1989), pp. 69-77.

io See especially his *A Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies. Breuissima relaoion de la, destruycion de las Indias,* in Coleccion de documentos ineditos para la historia de Espana, 71 (Madrid: Imprenta de Miguel Ginesta, 1879), pp. 1-199. English: *Tears of the Indians* and *The Life of Las Casas,* by Sir Arthur Helps (Williamstown, Mass.: .J. Lilburne, [1970]).

lished in Emope rthe rise of Christian and post-Christian Deism. Arnd while it is unfair rbo e:mggerate the links between co:lonialist imperialism and :the Christian missionary endeavor in and twentieth centuries, it is unwise to deny them ,a;ltogether. The efforts of contemporary 1S1chofars like Wil£red Cantwell Smith, John lliok, ,and even Paul Knitter :to reinterpvet the Christian faith a.nd its 11e1ationship to other J'leligionsin " inc1usivist " or " plumlist ,, terms may welil. have to, be j1udged thoologicaJily unsrutisfactocy in the end; what cannot be denied is that the scandals of the Christian past ccy out for the *kind* of remedial theologicail reflection ithey offer. With this cautiona;cy :bale in mind, then, let us reburn to the main theme.

Interreligious Dialogue and the Positive Elements

It must be carefuUy noted that the affirmation that the Creed mandates a respootfutl dialogue has a limited t3Jl'get area. The thesis states that rthe wcknowledgment o[the natural order-an ;rucknowiledgmel1itthat Christianity sha:res with the great religions-furnishes the i;nrterreligious:diafogue with its *foundation;* it does not state that it furnishes it with its all of its *content.* In fam, when it comes to rbhe *content* of the inter.religious 'dialogue, rthis essay is oommitted to a much hoo8ider (thait is, much more caitholic) proposition, namely, that the religions' *particular, potntive elements* shouwd be the principail.ool1itentof :the interreligious «li:alogue. This must be furrther

First of ail[, positive elements, as (of ,a;Jl people) Schleierm31cher reminds us, are integral ito iaCtu81l reiligions.[12] That

11 For much of the remainder of this essay I am deeply indebted to conversation with and suggestions from Charles Hallisey and Francis X. Clooney, S.J., capable scholars in this history of religions, loyal friends, and reliable and constructive critics.

12 *Ober die Religion: Reden an die GebUdeten unter ihren Veroohturn,* 6th ed., ed. by Rudolph Otto (Giittingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), pp. 186-187. English: *On Religion: Speeches ta its Oultured Despisers,* trans. by John Oman (New York, Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 234-235.

means, any 1.1eal *dialogue* between or among actual religions must take into aocount their positivie elements. It is a rationalis:t mistake to think tha;t religiosity can exist in its " natural " form, separately; in fact, only an understanding and interpretation of a l1eligion's positiv;e elements: is capable of laying hal1'e, in an indi11ectfashion, its true nature as a *religion.13* Secondly, it is good Christian theology to in:terp1'et the positi¥e eJements in Christianity (and, arguably, in other religions as we11)[14] as the concrete shape of the human l'esponse to God's self-revealing graciousness, that is, as the concrete shape of gr:we and, consequently, as superior to natural religion.15 lit would, therefol'!e, be a theoiogica.l mistafoe of the first magnitude to exdude the great l''eligions' positive e1ements from the agenda of the dialogue, no matter how intractah1e they may seem. For, thirdly, e¥en from a humanistic, purely anthropoJogicail. point of v,i<ew, it is a mistake to want to subdue the concrete particulars of a different religion by fitting them into some large, ovem1,ching framework thait claims to explain everything. A far mol''e 11di:ah1etest of the sieriousness of any encounter is a genuine, unprejudiced interest in the conc11etepa rticulars of other people's convictions and practices, no matter how particular and paritiail they may be. For it is a sign not of respect but of prejudice and ,a false sense of superiority to belittle and disregard the specific meanings, pract:i!oes, and intentionalities of others and, hence, of any positive religion not one's own. This warning applies no 1ess whenever it is proposed, however polit,ely, that we oan a;ocount for these specifics by .regaJ.'dingthem as conventional difFerentiations of one aHegedly univ:ersal (i.e., natural) religion.

1s Cf. F. J. van Beeck, *God Encountered: A Systematia Theology, vol.* I, *Understanding the Christian Faith* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), §26, 3; §25, 3; cf. §24, 2, a.

14 Cf., Heinz Robert Schlette, *Die Religionen als 'Phema der Theologie: Uberlegungen zu einer «Theologie der Religionen>»* Quaestiones Disputatae, 22 (Freiburg, Basel, and 'Wien: Herder, 1963), pp. 43-65. English: *Towards a Theology of Religions,* Quaestiones Disputatae, 14 (Freiburg: Herder; London: Burns & Oates, 1966), pp. 41-6L

15 Cf. *God Encountered,* §26, 2; §31.

Let us sum up. Our thesis *affirms* ;that the great religions have an awa11enessof :a universail order of nature in common 1and that this awareness p:rovides the inber11eligiousd.:iaJogiue with a common pofot of depa11tul'e. Our thesis *disputes* the pl'opositi:on that the diaiLogue requires that each religion he exhauSitiviely interp11eted within the f:mmewo11kof one, aHeged-1ly aJl-inc1usiV'e,naturaily acoesrsiMe order. This l'equwes1 some oar-eful undergirding, by means of a reflection of a rather more phi1osophicail nrutwe amounting to 1a full-B1oale *excursus.* Cumbersome though this p11ocedure may he, it will at the very least 1serv:e to bring home the delicrucy of the task in hand.

Participative Knowledge

Let us begin by going back to the basic quesrtion. The Christian arcknowledgment ·Of rthe all-encompassing order of nature, it wias 1sltated, must extend .to the ways in which *other religions* have acknowledged that universal naturaJ ol'lder. Why exarotly is this so?

The answer to rthis question is as pl'ofound as :i:t is obvious. No human group or individual can daim to have 1an *objective, comprehensive* gmsp of the aill-encompassing ol'dier of natul'e, for the ;simple il."earsonthat they al'e all pa:rit of it. Human persons can no more gmsp or comprehend or he objective about humanity and the wor1d in their totrulity than fish can 1about the wa:ter that sustains rthem or, for that maU1er, individual persons can 1about the V'ery persons they al'e. Just 1as we are unable :to rudopt a point of view *outside* ourseilves in order rto grasp ourselves in our totrulity as whole persons (which is why a:ll self-knowledge remains ever so precarious and provisiona1l), so we •are unah1e fo aidopt a point of view *outside* our personail reh:utionships w:ith others and, even move, *outside* humanity and the world in such a way .a,s to get them in e1ear focus in their totality.

To reailize this may he at disconcerting. The idea of the woir1d and humanity :as cons1t:iibutinga giVien, 1aH-indusive order of reality "out 1therie" comes so naturrully rto the think-

ing mind, and it is such an indispenrsa.ble ingmdient in all the great cultural and religious t:mditions in the world as we know it, that we natJuraHy assume that " we know what we are talking about" when we say "humanity and the wodd" or, for that matter, when we say " I " or " me " or " you " or evien "us." ¥et critical re:flreotion, as Immanuel Kant has so conclusively shown in his *Critique of Pure Reason,* ioompels us to aocept the fact that our cognitivie grasp of eertain realities is subject to serious limits. These l'ea.lities include our own selves and other persons, humanity and the world in their totality (and then the11e is the transcendent rerulity of God). Whatever it may he that oorresponds "out there in the real wodd" to the *ideas* we have of ourselves and of other persons, of humanity ,and the wo111d, we sm1ely do no:t know them as (judging from the definite way we talk about them) we *appear* .to know them, that is, we do not know them simply *as objects of knowledge.* [16]

Does this mean that our knowledge of oursdves, other persons, ailJid humanity and the wodd is a complete illusion? That it amounts to nothing? Of course not.

First of aH, it makes littile sense to say that we hav;e an iidea but no 11eal knowledge *of* reaJities *about* vvhich we can, in fact, know so much objectively. After aH, in our quest for understanding, we approach humanity an:d the world in a great variety of distinctive (if partia,l) ways, altl of which are in some way mtionaJ. By means of these approa:ches, we do suoeeed in grasping a thousand pa;rticular, ohjectiv;e things, *about* ours:elvies, *about* others, *about* humanity and the world. All the while, of course, we 11eaiizethat not even the Ja1rgest accumulation of such pa11tioular items of knowJedge *about* ourseJ,ves, others, and humanity and the world wiM ev;er add up to *ex-*

[16] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft,* in *Werlce seehs Banden,* Ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel, ([Wiesbaden]: Insel-Verlag, 1956-64), vol. 2, pp. 327-39. English: *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (London, Melbourne, and Toronto: St. Martin's Press, 1968), pp. 315-26.

haustive comprehension. Yet we will insist, diespit:e this essentiail pl'ovisionality and incompJeteness of our knowledge *about* ourselves, others, and humanity and the world, that we somehow realily *know them.* Is this insistence me11ely naive, or does it stand up fo critfoal examinwtion? This questfon lea.ids to a second, more important point.

In understanding ourselvces, others, and humanity and the world, we reJy not only on detailed, objective, rationrul (!and sometimes even purely mtional) knowledge hut also on knowledge a diffei'ent sort. A l'lealist lik:e Thomas Aquinas, for all his es1teem of knowledge of the precise and mtional kind, is futl1ly awa11e of this second type of knowledge. The most sruccinct fornmlaition of his understa,nding of this issue occurs in the context of an ·disoussion .in the *Summa theologica;* but the concept itself occurs throughout his matme work, whel.'1e it has a va:dety of applications. He explains:

> Right judgment can come about in two ways. The first way follows the path of the accomplished use of :reason *[perfectum usum rationis].* The second way is based on a certain natural affinity *[connaturalitatem]* with the things about which, as it happens, we have to form judgments. [17]

In other words, knowfodge-especiaHy .the knowledge rthat is a reliable guide ito the liV'ed life and in that sense "practiCiwl"-is not limited to the rationail kind. When rthe occasion arises, knowJeidge is also available on the basis of *familiarity* or *participation.* Saints know about God. from :their experience of lov:e (*caritas)* in pmyer and pmctice; people to ·their ma.rciage vcows know about chastity f11om the experience of :the pains: and joys of loya1ty; and 1cobbler1s1 know about leather from the experience of working with it every day. AU of this is so tme that saying that *they* are the ones: that *really* know is not jus:t 1an unp1eas:ant att,ernpt *wt* edilioation or morwlizing or an instanoe of the mmantic idealization of oM-f.ash-

[17] *S. Th.* II-II, q. 45, a. 2, *in* c.: "Rectitudo autem iudicii potest contingere dupliciter, uno modo, secundum perfectum usum rationis; alio modo, propter connaturalitatem quandam ad ea de quibus iam est iudicandum."

ioned CI'laftsmanship. *They obviously know.* Only prigs and rationrulists wihl maintain that saint'S: and chaste folks and cobblers "don't really *know"* just bemuse they have not studied either faith or eithlcs, or the physiology of the animal skin and the chemistry of the tanning process, or just because *they do not sucooed in explaining in articulate, objective terms what they do know.*

It is true, of course, that many people who know by familiarity are conserv;ative; they often resist the findings of rational investigaition. But on the other hand, even without being prigs or rationalists, intellectuals (and other smart people out to win an ·airgument) rtend to be so impressed by dertai1ed, objectivie knowledge ("the facts" or "the state of :the art") that they end up, in pmctice, <eonsideringit the only " real " knowledge. Even more importantly, they tend to be unaware of the extent to which detailed, objective, airtioulate, rationrul ("objectifying ") knowledge of every kind is and remains *dependent on participative knowledge,* the sound understanding implicit in the relationship of familiarity with the (for lack of a better word) " object " of knowledge.

This last proposition, which will. ,be crucial to our argument, can be further •exploredand clarified.

Perspective, Convergen()e, Interpretation

The pu.rsuirt of panticufar pieces of detailed, objective, rational knowledge is never entirely self-justifying, not evien in stricibly academic endeavors. Establishing, say, whether there is ammonia on the planet Jupiter assumes:, ,at the very lea:st, that rthe researcher *cares.* Theroe is no pursuit of academic knowledge without some type of *interest.* That interest and the grounds [orr it may very well not be entireily amenable to articulation, yet they iare not, for that reason ,alone, altogether irrational. Educated interest of some sort motivates eviery particul1ar ,scholiarlyinqruiry ,and givies it a provisional sense of direction; if evrerything goes welJ, that sense of direction improves ais ithe :inquiry moves ailOilg and ·a:s the druta confirm or

modify it. Thrus there results 1a dynamic process. On the one hand, ,as rthe detailed data aJecumulate, they contribute to the researehers' bro,rud, participative familiarity with the problem and make it more assured; on the other hand, the pursuit of dettail1ed,objectifying knowledge is guided more and more by the perspective furnished by this brorud, initially unthematic, bwt in'Ol'leasinglyinformed, participative knowiedge. Only to the e:xitentthat researehers devielop sounder participative judgment will their particular theoretical pursuits make more sense; without such judgment, rthe objectifying l'esearch will "frall 'apart" .and disinitegrate, or simpJy become insignificant. We conclude that objectifying knowledge needs the *perspective* offered by participative knowledge if it is to makle ·sense, and that participa.tiv e know.ledge gains in assurance as it is informed and artieufated by objectifying knowledge.

Participa;tive knowledge ,also ·oocounts for something else; the sense that what I know is (lohel'ent. Researeh will reward and confirm the researcher's initiail interest oooording as the particular dafa begin to arrange ithemselves into *patterns;* here if ·anywhere the whofo ,again and again pmV1es to be mo11e than the SIUIII of its parts. A good analogue of this is found in the everyday experience of *conversation.* In ordinary, everyday oommunication situations, the experienre of the dynamics of live speech (the" rhetoric") makes intelUgent listeners of us. We understand the dri:fit of the ronversation better as we be-(lOme better *partUdpants* in it, and we are better participants if we do *not* bore each other ,to tears by insisting on complete explicitness 1ab01Ut every last detail. Understailiding a oonversrution is indeed dependent on knowiledge of rthe objective meaning of words and the precise subject-matter of the conversation, but our ability :bo "rerud" whrut peopiLe ,are saying to each other in the situation is far more important. Fo'l" the understanding ,aclrieved in live speech is not dependent on the pamcipants' aWial'enessof *each and every one* of the discrete linguistic *elements* that make up the sipeeich-situ;a;tion,even though the precise meaning of all those (phonetioa.J, gram-

matical, syntarctic, 1erica.l, idiomatic, etc.) elements *can* be analytically esibablishecL UndeTstanding depends on the lived experience of *relevance.* Relevance is dependent, among other things, on the experience of *convergenoe* of aH (or rut last most) of the elements in a speech-siturution; ,and that experience is primarily ·a matter not of attention to details but of participation in the process as a who1e. If the speech-situation comes off, all (or ·at least most) of rthe objectifiab1e e1ements of speech 1conspil'e to function as " pointers," and from the way they point we wilJ sipontaneousily infer what the story is. The opposite happens when the speech-situation fails to come off. To the eXJtent that we *don't* get the story, discrete e11ements in the conversation wi11l become prominent in a haphazarid way, only to distract and confuse and us, and further explanation or accumulation of detail (especially of the "helpful" kind) may only serve to make matters worse. Not until " :the penny ·d'I'ops" (ofiten at the drop of the " right word ") [18] will we get reconnected and catch up and thus begin to understand again, understand both the broad meaning (i.e., :the "point") of the conversation in the first place and, in that context, most of the details, itoo.

All of this, constitutes *interpretation.* The two kinds of know1edge mentioned by Aquinas a:re indeed distinguishable hut are not doomed to l'emain forever sepamte; normaHy, they function in interplay. Let us takJe a literacy example. "Genuine poetry," T. S. Elfot wrote in his great essay on Dante, "can communioa:te before it is understood." [19] The broad, intuithlie, participative understanding which the first encounte!r with a poem awakJens in me remains inarticulate at first, hut that understanding, no matter how unthematic, does furnish me with a :first *perspeotive* by which to guide my critical investigartion. Then as the detailed knowledge

1s Cf. Ian Ramsey, *Religious Language,* 2nd ed. (London: SCM Press, 1967), esp. pp. 11-48.

19 *Selected Essays 1917-1932* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932)' p. 200.

thrut I 'Wcqufoe about the poem £a1Js into a *convergent* pattern, I wi11 proceed, thanks to my " illative Siert]'se," inm1easingly to *interpret the poem as a whole in the light of its details and the details in the light of the poem as a whole.* Thus in the process of interpretation the poem (and my own spiritual world aiong with it) get both mor:e complex and more unified. DelightfuJ-ly, my inner wmilid gets both furnished and organized; it de-velops in:to a hroader, more coherent ,1ands1oape,with more pat-terned, cherished detail. In the process, my horizon is ex-panded and my peirspeotive is enlarged to make room for even mo,re 1reality. Thus I grow and find both enrichment and en-:lightenment, in virtue both of what I come to know in rthe way of obj,ectivity ,and of what I come to undersfand ,by participa-tion.

Let us sum up this analysis :and come to a siert of con-clusions. The fact that things and persons resist comprehension by means of objectifying knowledge does not previent us from truJy knowing ;them, for we ean also under-stand them in a more integral (if iless m1ticrulai1Je) way, by par-Hcipativ;e knowledge. Far from being irmtional, such partici-pative knowiledgieservies to inspire and guide and lend perspec-tive to ohj1ectifying knowledge, while obje1ctifying knowledge in its turn serves :to istmcture 1and artioularte participative knowl-edge.

In being known in this twofo1d way, alil *reality reveals its structure.* There is ihoth unity and multipJ.:iicityto every thing, to persons, ,and ito humanity and the world in their totality. The multiplicity in them ailJows us to approach aud appreciate them hy means of detailed, objectifying yiert we realize that they *are* morie than a conglomerate of objecrti:fiable elements; for a filller undeirs:ta,nding of their integrity (ithat is, their unity) we iremain dependent on participative knowledge.

The pmsuit of knowledge of every kind thus invariably 1turns out ito he :an exiercise in *interpretation;* put dillerently, it is mterp11eta:tion that media1tes between reality and our-selvies. On the one hand, things and our own selves and other

persons and humanity and the wor!1d can indeed he known in their integrity but only *interpretatively,* that is, acco11ding as our participative unders:tanding of them increasingly makes sense of, accommodates, and integrates objectifiable elements arranged in significant structures. And on the other hand, aU the details we objective1ly kn:ow *about* thlngs and ourselves and other persons and humanity and the world are indeed a matter of time knowledge, but they acquire meaning only to the extent that they, .too, are known *interpretatively,* that is, in their re1evance :to the whoJe.

Our anailysis has shown that totally objective, definitive knowledge of humanity and the wodd as such is and remains inaccessible to us. We know the order of nature in its all-encompassing integri:ty only by way of familiar-· ity and pa:rticipation. That is, we kno·w it interpretatively, a:s we let ourselves be guided hy the patterns of convergence that strike us and the perspeotiv1e we construe.

This ha:s consequences. The task of interpretation faces human understm1:ding with redoubtable standar:ds of ence. Indeed the standards wiH recede forever; .interpretation, like tmdition, is never done. If no individual person and no human community oan know humanity and the world con-·olusively iand definitivdy, then no individual, no group can ever claim exemption from interpretation; none can claim knowledge that is neither perspectival nor ba,sed on convergence.

Interpretation 'in an Eschatological Perspective

This is the moment to return to our principal thesis: the Christian respect for the universal order of nature must nruturalJ,y extend to the ways in which other reHgions have rucknowledged and interpreted that naturail order. The lengthy analysis just conduoted leads to a conclusion: in today's world community no individuail, no community, a.nd not ev;en the Christian Chmch (with its divinely aiuthorized, univers:alist missionary commitment) can propose one understanding of

the natul'laJ.order of humanity and the wor1d as definitive and, in thait 'Sense, exdusivre; none can affol'ld rto dismiss alternative interprretation:s of the world ·and humanity as definitively ir-;vei1evant,dated, or unworthy of oonsiderrution.[20]

This can he put differently. We, non-Christians and Christians profess positive faiths that aJ.so imply a fundiamentrul understanding of the natural order of the world and humanity. Not surprisingly, our positiV1e statements of faith differ a gireat deal, hut then, it is in the nature of positive J:1eligious tmditions to be very different. Our understandings of the world and humanity are different, too, but it is clearly the same worM and the same humanity we iare referring to, even though we do nort comprehend just *how* they are rthe s1ame, thrut is, we agree they a.re the same even rthough we interpret them differently.

Where do we get the idea that it is the :same world and the same hrumanity we are •referring to? What makes us rthink we can get pa:st our inte11pretations of them? The answer must be: the *implications of the act of interpretation itself.*

Lert us start with a parallel. We know from experiell!Cethat hearing someone speak a different language conveys, in and of itself, the present situation's potential, both for tinued :incomprehension (with the 1likelihood of hostility) and for mutual understanding (with the possibility of peace). This is so becaiuse it is obvious to us that we both speak *languages,* and we know that languages, no matter how foreign-soU]]lding they may 1be, .a.ire (must he) *interpretable,* at Jeast to an aippreciab1e extenrt. Thrus *the speech-situation in and of itself lays bare the faot that we cannot not communicate: we are meant to communicate even if we do not understand each other's language.* But this of 1oommunioation *below* the 1eveil of langiuage faces us with a choice: we can either decide not to pm1srue the process, or we can decide to learn how to cross the Jingui:stie boundary and to communicate with

[20] For the way in which this applies to Judaism, cf. *Loving the Torah More than God?,* pp. 3-4, 66-82.

eruch other by particular linguistic means, thrut is, by linguistic interpretrution. Thel'e is 1something else that speech-situation conveys as well., lea:st unthematicruUy: neither commumcation nor interpretation has anything to gain from the assertion, on the pa.rt of either party, rthat its particular language is superior :to the other's.

Positive faith-professions, ,a,,g George Lindbeck has rightily iargued, have basic chamcteristics in common with languages; chief ·among these is that languages are ·cultur:al in nature; rthey must and can be *learned*.[21] Just as we must both resolve to communicaite ac:mss linguistic divides 1and develop ,the interpretative skills to do it, so it takes willingness rrus well as interpretativ;e sikiJJ to communicate aicross the divides mrude visible by the encounter between the great reJigions. Both the will.ingness .and rthe :skills ,to deail with the pa1ticulars are a matter of foaming. To those open to learning, the simple encounter with a different world-view, like the simple encounter with a speaker of a foreign language, invohnes the reaJiz.aition th•at the stated convictions we ho.th live by are *interpretations*, our particular interpretations of humanity and the wol'lld. It also makes us realize that these interpl"etations harbor, in and of themselves, the potetntial for muturul understanding and enrichment, simply because they are *interpretable* to others, at least to a large eXitent (that is, others can foam about them).

This :recognition hrus implications. Most of rull, in our very attempts :ait interpreting our va:riorus interpretations of the naitm:al order to eruch other, there is implicit .a twofo1d *fundamental* .affirmation on which we find oursel¥es in pmotioal agreement: the wor1d and humanity are basiicailly intelligibfo, iand we humans .are one at least in ·the sense that we recognize eruch other as essenitia1ly equipped for 1the kind of iu-belligent, interpretative communication rthat can foad *w* growth in shared, participaitive understanding of truth.

This final affirmation, which is *'implicit in the persistent*

[21] Cf. *The Nature of Doctrine: Reli,qion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), esp. pp. 32-41, 73-84.

practice of interpretative communication, must guide the diialogue among the gl'eat l'eligions, rather than any *explicit* profossfon of a single, common, overa,l'lching, *systematic* philosophical or religious faith. **It** is only by pal'lticipation, that is, by ,interpretation, 1aU of us know humanity and the world in their natural integrity. Does it not .stand to :reason, then, tha1t it is by the patient <.sharing of our several perspseretival understandings of humanity and the world we are likely to come to a better (if never definitive) understanding of the wor1d and the humanity we shaTe? Such a persistent practice of hermeneutics wilil also help reveal two fundamental implicit truths about the natural order we appear to have in common: the essentfal inteJ!igibility of humanity and the world, and the fiundamenta,l unity of humanity in virtue of its capacity to find and app11eciatetruth, that is, our native resemblance to the transoendent One. We will also convey that as believers we profess faith-commitments that we find enlightening allld which we expect wiH guide us to the end. As believers we arie not living by the affirmation and imposition of totalitarian ideologies that brook no questioning. And thus the interp11etative dialogue could :reveaJ, by implication, that our faith-commitments do indeed aspire beyond the fur:thest imaginable horizon to the One that many of us-Jews, Christians, and Mus1ims--<worshipfully oaU God.

Despite some appearances to the contrary, the proposal just advanced is not an attempt to 1trade in the mistafoen Christian triumphaJism of the past for •an equally mistaken relativist pluralism. There a11e several reasons why this is not so.

Eirst of all, the proposal, which is fundamentally indebted to Hans-Georg Gadamer's work, understands traidition as a process of ongoing interpretation, which keeps alive a continuous ,adjustment of perspectiv;es (in Gadamer's term, a "fusion of horizons") across times and places.[22] In interpreting

[22] CL *Wahrheit und Method.e,* 2nd ed. (TU.bingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1965), pp. 289-90, 356-57, 375; English: *Truth and Method,* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975), pp. 273-74, 337-38, 358).

the judgments of ,the past, we try to recollSltrnct the historic oonoerns that prompted, inspired, and thus prejudiced rthe judgments :in srucli a way that they were appropriate (or rut least runderslbandable) to those concerns. But what happens Lin rthis prooess of interpretation is that the past puts *us* on the line. Under :the impacl of our own questioning, judgments made in ;the past turn oUJt to be able to challenge *us;* the judgments of the pa;st fay bare the conoerns that prompt, inspire, and thus prejudice the judgments *we* live by. Thus the ex.amined rand interpreted past reveals us to ourselves.

Implicit in Gadamer's hermeneutioal theoil'y is the affinnation of 1rubso!liute:truth :as a living *reality,* ultimately itr:anscendent, yet endilessly :fruscinatingin the present. Those truly dev:oted to tihe process of inb&pretrution will. find themselves continuaHy chastened as: well ·as delighted by the discovery :that knowledge of this uLtimate reaility is av:ailiable only by participation, in. perspectivail fashion, even asymptotically, and not in a form that ·will. ever be exhaustive or definitive.

SoooncNy, it is true that rthe Christian Church professes its faith in an overaiiching divine design, namely, that it is in Jesus Chrisit risen that God has definitiviely welcomed humanity and the worM into the <la.vine life. Still, the fuil:fihlmentof :this divine .oommitment remains a matter of hope, that is, of *a profession of faith that remains true only to the extent that it is interpreted perspectiV'ally.*[28] Presioot faith does not give the Christian Churich any present grasp of the *shape* of the esohatofogical £uHilllmentof humanity :and the world. The Church makes eschatological :afiirmations, which shows ,that it claims some iaccessto the fulfillment; but ·this access rests entirely on discernment, that is, it opemtes on *interpretation.*

To maintain rthis mnsistently eschatologicaJ perspective, it would seem to he of the utmost importaJ11Ceto recall. thirut the

:23 Cf. *Christ Proalwimed,* pp. 308-09, 331-42. Cf. also *God lihwountered,* §40, 1; §42, 1.

central theme of the Christian faiith is the glory of God and God's commitment to shaire the divine natlll:re with humanity and the world; *not* the question" Who is saved?" (cf. Lk 13: 23-24).[24] Thus I cannot .agree with Paul F. Knitter's decision to seek .for a firmer foothoM .for pluralism in " sorteriocentrism." [25] If the s:aJ.v,ationissue is allowed to become if:heir dominant p11eoooupation (as it has in many ways 1Since the sixteenth century), Christiams are likely, by an exercise known to psyichologists as projrection, to interpret other religions as narrowly as Christianity itself. This undiscerning approach iturns other 11eligionsinto *competing systems of salvatwn* (and eventuaUy, under the influence of rationalist toJ.-emnre, into .alternative ones,.--even though a liberalized version of Christianity usually oontill!Uesto be presented as a superior salvation system). In the long mn, gveat, original figiu:veslike Gaiutama Buddha .then get ignorantly 1umped together under the rubric "Savior figures" or even "Christ figures"; whether this .alien charnctecization is imposed on them in 1adtrniirationor in disquiaJification is irrelevant.

The great Tmdition of the undivided Chmch has been less prejudiood. It hais viewed, with deeper discernment, the gverut souls in ,the histo1-y of 11efilgions as revelations of the eternal *Logos* in creation and the religions themselves *as* exp11essions of humanity's natural desire foir God and thus as worthy of ca;refrwl, :appreciative (if critirntl) undm"standing.[26] It has also been prepa11edto distrust parts of them as potentially misleruding manifositations of human depravity, which makes them worthy of careful, criticaJ. (if compassionate) derstanding. And when it comes to the question who is saved, 1smelya pilgrim Church that can commit some of its own sinful members to God's judgment by excommunicating them with a view to their saJv:atiion (1 Cor 5: 4-5) can entrust to

[24] On this essential theme, cf. *God Encountered,* §20, 2.
[25] *The Myth of Ohristian Uniqueness,* p. 187.
[26] Cf. *Nostro, 2FJtate,*nn. 2-3.

God's merciful judgment those who, a's a matter of simpJe fact, seek God with an upright heart along other pilgrim paths?

There is ,a further point. The catholic trwdition holds that the nrutuml order is £uHy revcealed on[y in the act of being divinely e:xcoeeded. This has a c:onsequence for our present argument: in not claiming to grasp the ;shape of the *fulfillment* of humanity and the world to come, the Christian faith impHes that it has no definitiv;e understanding of !them *in their natural, integrity* either. For aLl the es:chatologicial assurance inherent in 1the Christian profession of faith, it is in the nature of Christianity (.and heme of]ts universalism) to be *transitional.* Consequently, the Christian Church need not (and indeed must not) think it incumbent upon itself, simply by virtue of its total commitment to the profession of Christ's sovereignty and uniqueness, to sit in judgment on other religions or to assign de:finitivce places to them, either in God's kingdom to come or in God's worM as we know it alreaidy. Just *how* Christ is Lord, 'already in the present moment, of all the dead and all the living (cf. Rom 14: 9) a mystery of es:chatologicrul faith and hope, not a matter of present comprehension. This mystery, in other words, is inaccessibJe to Christians except by way of perspective, the kind of perspectiv;e that is designed to foster in the Chmch the attitude of the pilgrim, not the arbiter.

What, then, are we to of Karl Rahner's proposal to ca11 the countless peopJe who live well and nobly the Christian community, by the light available to them, "anonymous Christians " ? The expl'ession, unfortunately, has elicited as least as much misundel'standing as genuine Christian openness. It is dear that it must not be understood :as an expansionist gestu11e by which countless admirable non-Christians, unbeknownst to themselves, are captured by a totalitarian church that brooks no goodness in the world outside itself. It is dear, too, that it is one way to express the Christian marvel a,t the free revelation of God and the *Logos* in the worM; hence, it ailso conveys the Christian commitment ,to respectful missionary effort.

Unforbunately, however, it must also he said that Rahner's insight has encouraged a whole generation of systematic theologians to content themselves with a generous waVie of the hand in the direction of the great non-Christian religions and to think of themselve:s .as dispensed from all attempts at a detailed understanding. This amounts to turning the phrase " anonymous Christians " into pure theory. To be credible, marvel at the mani£estation of the *Logos* at work in the world must inspire encounter at close qurarter:s. For :that reason, too, this essay has argued that the intm-religious dialogue must oonoern itself with the religions' positive .elements.

FinaJ:ly, the mention of close quarters calJ.s to mind :the figure of the historical Jesrus. The imitation of Christ would seem to commend to the pilgrim Chmch truly Christ-like ·approaches to other 11eligions, not to mention Judaism. Time and again, Jesius made J!srael's universa:list his own (cf., for example, Is 66: 18-21!); he found and admired true faith 01Utsiide Is:r:ael and glorified the Father for it. The Gospel of Luke goes so far 1as to have Jesus address the Christian community with an eschatofogical rthreat based on that same Jewish univ:e:rsalism (Lk 13: 24-29) .

The memory of that :threat, it is true, does not come naturally :to a triumphalist Christianity stiiLl residually acoustomed Ito the attractive (and ofren quite con:structive) privileges of the Constantinian establishment and its aftermath. But now that rthe Christian faith no longer defines the preva.ilent ooltural climate, it is easier to see ithat those privileges had ·a dark side to them, too. They caJUsed the Chureh :to fose its pre-Constantinian ability to giv;e an :aoooruntof its £aith from a position of equrulity ,and even :subordination, amidst a variety of n.on-Christian religions: and philosophies ,allJd often before the tribunal of rthe powers that he. The second…oentury apologists and Origien had sitiLJ. been ready to do that. In aooepting establishment, il::he Chureh losrt touch with some of the patience and neighbol'llrinessthat the early ·communities, in imitation of the historical Jesus, had shown vis-a-vis 01Uts:iders. In the process,

it also lost, in all Jikel:ihood, some of]ts original sense of Jesus' God, as Gero Theissen pointed[y (if somewhat testily) reminds us:

> Christian faith in God has often been fundamentally compromised by its entanglement with power and domination. A persecuted minority for centuries, Jews have more credibly testified that the God of the Bible is not on the side of the powerful and the dominating. [37]

Some Reflections on Today's Discussion

Recent years hav;e seen a vigorous disoos:sion of fresh proposa1s---.aimed at understanding a11 the great religions, 1as a matter of stated principle, in a p1ur:alist perspectiV'e. But some of these proposals are strongly reminisicent of questionable eighteenth-ieentury precedents, [28] becaiuse they rthoroughly relativize partiooJar religions by "placing" .them in an all-encompassing framework. In this setting, aill the religions' allegedly runiversalist intentions tend to be viewed as equally right, .and 1aM their allegedly parlioularist claims as equally mistaken. [29] While allegedly promoting *dialogue among* .the religions, this approaich in reality favors " a new *monologue containing them* instead." [so]

The more general .theologicail writings of the learned islamici·st Wilfred Cantwell Smith, no matter how inspiring and attractive, are a good example of this unsatisfactory approach. The problem is that Smith offers, under cover of a visionary exhortation to dialogue, what is in reality a hier:archical classification of all. positive religions. As long as he simply discerns

[21] Gerd Theissen, *Der Schatten des GaZiTJi,ers,* p. 55; *The Shadow of the Galilean,* p. 36.

[2s] For a competent discussion of no less than 14 recent books related to this issue, cf. the twin review essays by Francis X. Clooney (" Christianity and World Religions: Religion, Reason, and Pluralism") and Paul F. Knitter (" Making Sense of the Many") in *Religious Studies Review* 15 (1989): 197-204; 204-07.

[29] Cf. *God Encountered,* §28, 4, a, *[d].*

[Bo] David Novak, *Jewish-Ohristian Dialogue,* p. 80; italics added.

a " vision of world brotherhood " as a dev;elopment that " we *bel-ieve* to be *a step towards* God's vision," there is still a welcome note of provisionality and perspective, ev;en though Smith's reference to God's vision ,as the point of perspective raises doubt.si The doubt is reinfo11cedby the very title of the essiayfrom which this quote was taken: "Mankind's ReligioU&-ly Divided History Approaiches Self-Consciousness." Are we to understand that human self-ioonsciousness the essence of religion, and is the God whose vision Smith wishes to approximate simply human self-consciousness writ large? s2 There is even more reason to enter firm reservations when Smith proposes that *it* is the task of theology " to formulate *rwt a view of others seen through Christian eyes,* but rather a view, in global perspective, of humankind, ... *a God's-eye view,* one might *almost* wish to say, of *all the human family."* Are eyes other than Christian ones avairlab1eto us? Fin.ally, reservation should turn into firm rejection when the " almost " is dropped and the ruling is handed down in a1l its. undisguised immodesty: ". . . in God's ey:es there is genuine pluralism." ss Elsewhere, Smith can write, with an .astonishing lack of awareness of the relativity of his own position: " I iain ready to argue with a Christian theologian, on Christian premises, ,th·at the modern comparative religionist's vision of the religious history of mankind provides a truer vision of that *total* history-that is, a vision closer to *God's way of seeing it,* a more authentic *Heilsgeschichte-than is any interpretation of this wide-ranging matter formulated within the Church* before the present information, *or indeed any serious historical information,* was

s1 "Mankind's Religiously Divided History Approaches. Self-Consciousness," in *Religious Diversity: Essays by Wilfred Oantweii Smith,* ed. by Willard G. Oxtoby (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 111; italics added.

s2 Cf. *God Enoountered,* §25, 4, d; §35, 2-3.

ss "The World Church and the World History of Religion: The Theological Issue," in *The Oatholio Theological Booiety of America: Prooeedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Convention* 39 (1984) : 52-68; quotations pp. 54, 63 (italics added for emphasis).

available. *Lt* is significant to add this: that I would argue :the corresponding point with Muslim theologians, on Islamic premises. I write that sentence not glibly, but in full seriousness, rea.lizing that *the radically new visWn* that it implies *would have to be* defended before and ultimately *assimilable by Muslims themselves* . . . . [T]his religious. roonceptualization is not simply my wish hut is: *necessitated by the advance of modern knowledge."* [34] Helle both Kant and Christian doc*trine--bien etonnes de se trouver ensemble-must* rise in protest, for this is iHegitimate theological language. It cries out :for the realization that when it comes to the knowledge of ourselves, other persons, and humanity and the world (not to mention God) , there .are, in the final analysis, no judges and arbiters, only participators, discerners, and interpreters.

While I must strongly disagree with Professor Smith, I do l'ooognize that his .approach to religious pluralism bears: the marks of his lifelong ,struggle to understand a different religion. in all its: particularity, Islam. This spells the difference between Professor Smith and an 1author like John Hick, who has also treated the issue of rdigious pluralism with great frequerncy but ,alw;aysin very general terms and very frequently in reliance on 1s1econdarymaterials only. Pmfessor Hick's o£t-repeated rejection of the ahso1uteness of Chrisrt:ianity would seem to he the prirncipal source of the energy with which he has committd himself to very firm judgments about other religions. Brut the proh1em with those judgments is th,at they appear to have too easily absolved the .author, in adv:anee, from the (lonscientious, detaied study of these !l'ieligionsthemselves.

The 'C!uriousiLyhigh-handed, even authoritarian overtones of this new, enlightened orthodoxy :are due to the faict that its advocacy of tolerance comes mainly from ,above. Those who profess it tend to claiim, whether .implicitly or expilicitiy, that they oooupy il:he higher ground, that theirs is the viewpoint from which all religions, not to mention humanity and the world as

[34] *Religious Dwersity,* p. 112; italics added for emphasis.

:a whole, can be *placed,* that is, *judged.* The principwl problem with such a princip[ed plur:alism is tihat it fails to reailize that *its* understanding of the wm1d and humanity, too, is *participative,* not compr:ehensive. What is unacceptable, therefore, iis the de:finiti-\i;enessof its oLaim or, in other words, *its defic.ient awareness of the reln;timityof its own perspec.tive.*

Curiously, but not rea1ly SIU'l'prisingly,blindness to the l'le1ativity of .aJJ unde:rstanding is pl'ecisely what this new .approach wou1d seem to have inherited from the very orthodoxies it J.'legards (often with reason) *as* dated because they .are out of step with the temper of the present, aJJ.egecfilyunbiased age. Under cover of the fine--sounding, t.ole:rant S1logan of " p1urali:sm," therefol"e, this approach invites an rnfilgionsto submit to the new univers1alismiby giving up whateV'er is incompatible with it, just as the o1d orthodoxies (supposedly) had demanded that all other faiths give up whatever was iI11Compatiblewith themsel¥es. But why would .anyone wish to tmde in an oild, sburdy (if theoor:atic) orthodoxy for an almost entirely theoretiica;l,pan-humanitari.oo ideoJogy 1that looks so blatantly like :a benign form of post-Christian, rationa:list, Western imperalism?

Very sensibly, therefore, in a world torn .apart by patently unjustifiabJe differences and inequalities that beggar description, this brave, suspiciously *painless* type of liberal universailism of Western origin hais been aiocused of "view[ing] the whole wor1d as like unto itself, .and [of keeping] its disrtance, even if it be a sympathetic distance, f:vom the wretched of the earth." [35]

Envoy

This can also be put in the str:aightforward, unlC:Ompromising Language of Christian doctrine. The original unity of .a11 of

[35] Cf. Tom F. Driver's "The Case for Pluralism," the final essay in *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness* (pp. 203-18; quotation p. 206), discussing a highly critical resp<mse by Kenneth Surin to the essays in that collection. Cf. also Michael Barnes, " Beyond Inclusivism," *The Heythrop Journal* 30 (1989): 325-27.

humanity, afong W!ith the whole world, is protologicail: it is of God's fashioning, and it is in the nature of a first insta1lment on a magnificent promise. The ultimate unity of a11 humanity, along with the whole world, is eschato1ogicrul: again, it is of God's malcing-howev:er and whenever God may fulfill creation's native potentiaJ, beyond anyone's wiildest dreams.

For the here and the now, however, we will have to ho1d on to a pamdoxical proposition. We uphold the finality of the Creed we profess, but we invoke that very finality to argue that *our Christian commitment must be to the in-between,* that is, to rthe present pursuit of justice and truth. This win oonsisrtpartly in the ,respectful cherishing of alil that truly distinguishes a1l of us •and partly in the painstaking overcoming of aill that estranges us. This coll!oeption of truth and justice wiH show a11 the signs of the here and the now; it will have to submit to the dynamics of provisionaility inherent in the great Tl'aidition. In short, it wi11 have to combine modesty with hope. The modesty wiJl consisrt in reckoning with the possibility that at any time and in ,any situation, even in our best moments, .any of us may be thoroughly misguided in what we think or do. The hope will consist in :the trust that humanity an:d the world will truil.y come into their own by a design not cooooci.V!erlhy human reason nor mrude by human hand, an incomprehensible, hidden design that is as holy as it is loving, and that comes to do justice .to us from beyond us. In view of the accomplishment of that hoped-for desri.gn, neither truth nor justice is aooomplished by claiming that it is in .the nature of Christianity (or, for that matter, of any other faith or phifosophy) to give us a commanding bi:vd's-eye overview of humaD!ity and the worild, a view claimed to be a " God's eye-view." Only the Lamb who was slain, ·the Lion who has conquered, is worthy to open the scroll that has the mysteries of the sealed up in it (Rev *5: 1-5,* 12). Final justice and finaJ. truth are ours to anticipate, not grasp.

And in any oose, we know from the Gospel just how God means to direct our gaze as we view humanity and rthe world.

We are il:o view them not foom any height hut, so to speak, "f:r:om below," that is, from the tra1vielingSamaritan's patient, neighbourly For the pilgrim, servant Chureh to try to define, in the name of God, the finatl unity of humanity and tihe wor1d while it stiM finds people lying by the with no one to understand or serve them is the equivalent of walking to the hea¥enly Jerusalem with blinders on. O:r, to change the metaphor, to dveam up a common language this side of the *Halleluyah* ,amounts to compounding the already existing confusion of tongues with yet another vociferorns ideoilogical jargon; in that sense, it woiuld only help shore up the tower of BaibeL[36]

[36] The last phrase suggested by rcmarkc< in Tom F. Driver's "The Case for Pluralism," p. 205.

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE FATHER

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I. Introduction

Y ANY MEASURE, Karl Rahner was one of the principal architects of the renascence of trinitarian theology that has marked the last half of this century. Rahner found that in their pract:icaillives Christians were "a1-most mere' monotheists'" [1] while :in speculative endeavors the treatise on the Trinity stood " isofoted in the structriwe of dogmatic theology as a whoile,"[2] and so he devoted himself to-ov;ereoming both the priadicaJ and the theoretical isolation of the doctrine. He p:mposeid as a methodologicaJ *Grunda:dom* the dictum that " the ' Trinity is the 'immanent ' Trinity and the 'immanent ' Trinity is the 'economic' Trinity," [3] in 011der to preclude any sharp disjunction between how God is *in se* and how God is *ad extra,* between theofogy and the ,economy. He al:so developed a concept of self-communication, inscribed it within the heart of his trinitarian theology, amd materiaily recast the traditional account of the Trinity to with that notion.

H1s account of the 1dentity and roil.e of God the Father is a striking, although littiie noted, feature of Rahner's thought. His trinitarian theofogy trumpets the primacy of God the Father: this is evident in his oft-stated resolve to begin the

1Karl Rahner, *The Trinity,* trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 10. Hereafter cited as *Trinity.*

2" Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise 'De Trinitate '," in Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigations* IV, trans. Kevin Smyth (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 78. Hereafter cited as "Remarks."

a *Trinity,* p. 22.

;theological entel'prise, in consort with Scripture and the Greeks, with God Father, rather than the one divine es-,senoe shared by Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.[4] And that primacy, in tum, is secured by an extra.ordinary emphasis on the urnoriginatedness trruditionaUy ,ascribed to the Father. 'What unoriginatedness involves and how unoriginatedness and fatherhood bear on the identity of the Father become cmci.ail questions within Rahner's trinitarian theology.

This is no bit of trinitarian arteana, no subtlety of interest only to a scholastic mindset, but an issue whose consequenee s reverberate throughout Rahner's Two e:mmples will suffice. Insofar as Rahner on the notion of self-com-municatfon, he identifies the F1ather as the origin of the self-communication. Divinity is communicated rbo the Son 1:the HoJy Spi:cit. Issues regacvding the id.entity of the Father impinge, therefore, on questions the seH-com-munication p11eioise[y because upon the identity of the self that is communicated. In 1addition, Rahner works out the identification of being of God and the triune being of God in the person of Father. Thel'eby the question arbout ifhe :identity the Father becomes important in sett1ing the ontological status of immanent the sense in which God is 1anteoedently trinity *se*.

This essay examine Rahner's rich and compfox a1C1count of the identity of Father. It be necessary, firis:t of all, to situate that teaching, to clarify Rahner means by un-.origina.tedness, and to determine how he understands unorigi-fatherhood to be interr elat1ed constituting the identity of the the essay will argue that Rahner's account not, fo fact, succeed and ,this his theology. Rahne'l."s position can thus: be seen a,s an attempt to identify a philosophically colJJceiv;ed,abyss the Father trinitarian doctrine by re-working the unoriginatedness tr:aditionaHy ascribed to the Father.

[4] *Trinity*, p. Hl.

II. 'O 8e6c; and the Father

In an essay that appears early on in the *Theological Investigations,* "Theos in the New Testament", Rahner outlines the content of the New Testament conception of God under seveml heaidings.[5] He notes, first of 1all, the New Testament's imperious claim that its God is the one true God, O *8e6c;*. Rahner describes this as the New Testament"s doctrine of God',s uniqueness. Under a second rubric, God as person, Rmmer ranges several topics. Aocording to Rahner, as personal, God is (1) an agent who *.wets* (2) freely in (3) historioaJ. dia,1ogue with human beings and (4) in so doing discloses his attit;udes or dispositions, in contradistinction to his metaphysioohly necessary .attributes, toward human beings. Third, that unique God, a free and living God, is a God of love and is so definitively and irrevocahly because God " *has* hound himself." [6] God's *last* wo:rxl :and *last* deed is love. Fourth and finally, Rabner asserts that within the New Testament the unique God, O *8e6c;,* is identified with the one whom Jesus calls Father; the one true God is the :Father of Jesus Christ.

So far, so good. Rahner's argument is largely exegetica.l and gives new force to the deliverances of New Testament scholars. Nevertheless, systematic considerations do obtrude. Granted that rin the New O *8e6c;* is the Father, Rahner argues that O *8e6c; signifies* the Father and does not merely *stand for* the Father. [7] Prescinding from comp1exities in the theory of meaning, one can ·discern only silightly mu:ffiedechoes of a bat-:tle with scholastiicism over the con1oept of God and over the internal organization of the !treatise on God (the *De Deo Uno-De Deo Trina* sequence) . Negatively, Rahner .denies that

[5] Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigations* I, trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 79-148. Hereafter cited as "Theos."

[6] "Theos," p. 117.

[1] See Cornelius Ernst's remarks about this claim in his note in " Theos," pp. 127-8.

O*8e6<;* signifies either the divine nature or "the Trinity in general (and hence indistinctly)." [8] Were that the case, O *8e6r;* wou1d meriely stand for rather thain signify the Father. Positiii¥ely, if " God " signiifies the Father, then the one who acts freely in histo];ical diafogue with human beings and thel'eby discloses his dispositions (mther ,than attributes) is the Father of Jesus Christ. In effect, the fongthy descript:ivie phrase uniquely piieks out God the Father. So, according to Rahner,

> when the New Testament thinks of God, it is the concrete, individual, uninterchangeable Person who comes into its mind, who is in fact the Father and is called O*(JE6,;* so that inversely, when O*(}E6,* is being spoken of, it is not the single divine nature that is seen,. subsisting in three hypostases, but the concrete Person who possesses the divine nature unoriginately, and communicates: it by eternal generation to a Son too, and by spiration to the Spirit. [9]

Rabner 1tllusbs that his thesis about the Father will foster a reco¥ereid ,awareness of the trinitarian rhythm of the Christian life. Prayer and graice p1'ov]de his stock examples. If God signifies the Father, the Christian at praye:r will be mol'e ly ;awa,re,that she prays in the Spirit through Jesus Christ to the Father. [10] By the same token, if, a:s chiMren of God, we ave childl'en of the Father, then the mediatorial of Christ in our being chi:1dren of God will be underscored. }\lforeover, Rahner 1sees .a connection with the question of whether or not Father, Son, and Holy Spirit possess proper non-appropriated 'll1etlationshipsto the justified person in grace. As Rahner sees it, the justified person's refatfon to the Son and the Spirit cannot be interpreted ,a,s sonship without making "God" stanid for the T11inityin its entirety. Consequen1t;ly,the Trinity is our " Fa;ther " in grace only by appropriation. If, on the other hand, the Father in the Trinity is also om Father through grace, ,then *our* relation cannot be interpreted as sonship, :and it may need to be asserted that "each of the three persons ha:s its own p11operrelationship to the justified man." [11]

s "Theos," p. 130.
s" Theos," p. 146.
10 "Theos," pp. 129-30, 148.
n" Theos," p. 147.

Whether or not the daim ,that " God " signifies the Father leads to a recovered siense of the trinitarian rhythm of the Christian li£e, its ramifications within Rahner's theology are notew;orthy. For one thing, it is an example of Rahner's characteristic rdusaJ to develop a separate or independent doctrine of God. He pi1locies the scholastics for developing, despite their best intentions, a treatise more a:ccuratdy termed *De Divinitate Una* rather than *De Deo Uno.*[12] Instead, one ought to treat the "essence" of God only in conjunction with the being of the Father ,and 1themby only as " the Godhead of this Father." [13] It is preforah1e to handle "the geneml doctrjne of God a,s the doctrine of God the Father, the sourceless origin in the Godhead," mther ,than "as the doctrine of the na,ture of God which is common to all the :Bersons."[14]

Methodologioailly, Rahner recommends beginning the systematic enterprise with the of the Fa:ther. In Rahner's eyes this has ,the further merit of making the sequence of trhe "treatises" reflect :the histodcal unfolding of revelation itself.[15] The systemwtic yiei1d is: not a better version of the trruditionaJ *De Deo Uno-De Deo Trina* sequence but a 1.'e-v:amped sequence :that moves from "the Godhead of this Father " to treatments of Christology and then Pneumatology.[16]

12 "Remarks," p. 102.

13 "Remarks," p. 83.

14" Observations on the Doctrine of God in Catholic Dogmatics" in *Thw·logical Investigations* IX, trans. Graham Harrison (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 131.

15 "We might say at least with equal right that the history of revelation first reveals God as unoriginate person in his relation to the world, and next proceeds to the revelation of this person as the origin of intra-divine, personalizing vital process." *Trmity,* p. 20, note 15.

16 See the remarks about this at the very end of *The Trinity.* I plan in another essay to address the status of the concept of " trinity " in Rahner. That concept belongs to a different level of discourse and involves a set of considerations that go beyond a merely linear treatment of the Godhead of the Father, Christology, and Pneumatology. Where "trinity" ought to be treated and what logical shape that treatment must possess on Rahner's

F:ina:Uy, insofar as "God" signifies the Father, the divinity of the Son and Spirit will be "conceptuaHy a *consequence* of the fact that the Fa1ther communicates his whoile nat111re."[11] The doctrine of the Trinity's compatibility with monotheism is rooted in the Father's role as *fons trinitatis.* If the Father is the one true God, then if the Son .and Holy Spirit are themselves divine, they are so thanks to their origination from the Father mther than to their possess1ionof a common natu11e.

III. *The Father as Unoriginate Origin*

The equation of O Br:.6<:: and the Father engenders a dilemma that Rahner mus1t confront the minute the question of natural theology arises; he seems to havie no way out of an unpafat1able rdisjunctfon. On the basis of this daim about the Father, he 'CJouM simply deny the v:ery pos1sibil1ityof a naturaJ knowledge of God: God is 1either apprehended by faith through gmoe as the Father of Jesus Christ or God is simply not graisped rat ail.l. From Rahner's perspective, that would be tantamount to fideism a:nd would entail the sicrapping of the V'ery foundational theology he labored to construct. Conversely, Rahner could boMly affirm that God is known in natural theology precisely because the God so grasped *is* the :Fiather. li, however, the term of naitural theology iis the Father, there seems ;to be no way to 1deny the inference rl::hat the entire Trinity fa knowable by reason from the ereated order. If, that is to say, the aot of self-communication constitutes the Father, then the Father 1simply cannot be known in isolation from the Son and the Spirit. Faith, then, is rendered superfluous and supplanted by ran extr:aordinanhly virulent gnosticism.

Rahne:r',s response is to a paradoxical assertion. "It is obvious," he says, "tha1t the Father ,is not known *as* Father in natumJl theology, i.e., not *as* He who communicates his natul"e

terms are questions worth pursuing, For one attempt to discern, *inter a,Zia,* various levels of trinitarian discourse, see Robert Jenson, *The Triune Identity* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982),

[11] "Theos," p, 146.

to the Son by an eternal generat1on, and it is obviously true that the necessary uniqueness of the divine nature is discerned by na:turaJ theology." [18] In short, Rahner's position is that natural theology grasps the Father but not the Father as such, i.e., a:s Father. This 'seems, on the face of it, a contm1dietory assertion, for how can naturrul theology both know and not know the Fathm·?

In part to f!eso1v;e this problem, Rahner introduces at this porint the concept of unoTiginatedness. Natrural theology, he daims

> ascends not just to a divinity but to a God; it knows, that is, that this divine nature necessarily subsists, and subsists, what is more (or at least also), in an absolute and unqualified *unorigination (Ursprungslosigkeit).* Natural theology is quite capable of affirming the necessity of a pure and absolute unorigination in God, free from any conceivable restriction, even if its statement of this remains wholly formal.[19]

So what natu:riail. theology knows :is the *"absolutely* Unoriginate." [20] Inasmuch as Rahner medits natural theology with the ability to discern "the necessary uniqueness of the divine narbure,"[21] it is reasona:hle to infer that Rahner identifies that uniqueness with unoriginatedness.

Postitiv'ely, Rahner affirms that phifosophy grasps" this conc11ete, abso1utely unoriginate Origin of a1l reality." [22] Moreover, the Unoriginate is seen "not just ras set over against an origination by cfleation, but as opposed to *every* conceivaMe l'eal and hypothetical origination." [23] But "every conce[vabJe real and hypothetical originrution" wou1d include the begetting of the Son and the breathing of the Spirit, that is, it woruld range over origination by ·self-communication. Consequently, the absolutely Unoriginate is affirmed ito be the origin of all reaility *ad extra* as well as all reaJity *ad intra.* It is origin by creation *ex nihilo* as well as *fans trinitatis.*

18" Theos," p. 132-3.
19 Theos," p. 133.
20 "Theos," p. 134.
21 "Theos," p. 132.
22 "Theos," p. 132.
23 "Theos," p. 132.

Negatively, Rahner denies that phifosophy discerns that the concrete, absofa1telyUnoriginate is "Origin also by oommunicrution o.f the divine nature and not merely by cl"eation *ex nihilo."*[24] Tihus :the divine .self-communication, :a.rooming to Rahner, remains "utterly concealed" from natural itheofogy:[25] lts affirmation of the absruutely Unoriginate [s said to :vemain " who1ly formail," to bear on its object only " forma1ly and *a priori."*[26] Rahner's point .seems to be that the knowledge of an ,absolutely unoriginate origin of all possible reality does not entail the ability to deduce everything that has in fact ·sprung from that soul"ce. A gap, a logical hfatus, must he marked between the formal or *a priori* domain and the material or *a posteriori* domain. The fact of divine self-communicative ructivity can remain " utterly concealed," buried within the Unoriginate, became phllosophy endorses the Unoriginate oruy ·as the SOUl'ceof whatever *can* he. From that ·absolute reservoir of possibilities, however, philosophy cannot deduce the actuality of divine se1f-communillcation.[27]

Nevertheless, Rahner continues to insist that " when natural theology acquires knowiLedge o.f a single and ,absoiliutely first Principle of aN reality (not ju.st creaturely reality) , wha;t is so

[24] "Theos," p. 132.
[25] "Theos," p. 132.
[26] "Theos," p. 132.

[27] By the same token, the philosophical account of the created world can only be formal in Rahner's scheme. Philosophy can discern the *a priori* structures that any possible world, any possible creation, must take, but it cannot deduce either (a) the existence of the world, the actuality of creation or (b) the determinate content of the actual world. Rahner's doctrine of creation, in short, is conceptually tied to his account of the being of the Father and, in particular, can be tied to the twists and turns in the relation between unorginatedness and fatherhood in comprising the identity of the Father. The distinction between creation as the condition of possibility of the self-communication and creation as a consequence of the self-communication (as brought about by the self-communication in order to realize itself) mirrors the distinction between unorginatedness and fatherhood within Rahner's account of the Father. To the extent that Rahner succeeds in identifying the Unoriginate and the Father, he will succeed in identifying creation as both condition and consequence of the self-communication.

known is the Father." [28] The central feature, therefore, in Rahnercs ruccoun:t of 'the Father is the identification of the absolutely Unomginate with the Father. Thereby, to be sure, a wrinkle has been added to the original question of what O*(Je6c;,* " God," signifies. Its signification now covers both absolute unoriginatedness and fatherhood. So Rahner is elaiming that

(1) "God" signifies the Father precisely as the absolutely unoriginate Father;

The absolutely unoriginate Father is gmsped by philosophy;

(3) Philosophy grasps the concretely subsisting God *qua* the absolute Unoriginate but not *qua* Father.

This move plays an important role in RahneT's constructive theological endeav:oT. Grant Rahner his concept of the absolutely unoriginate Father and the trinitarian form of his entire project hercomes o1ear. At no step need one ever move outside the trinitarian orbit; everything 'can be brought within its purview. Rahner can plausibJy daim, for example, that on his ,terms either God [s known as Father or Son or Holy Spirit or else God is simply not known at all.[29] This is because even phHosophy's grasp of the Unoriginarte is not ,a move outside the

This may surprise reaiders of Rahner inclined to stl'ess the oomp1ete independence of the philosophiml propadeut:Uc. But grant him the identity of rthe Unor:iginate w:ith the Father and even philosophy may be brought within ,the trinitarian form as an inner moment of theo:logy. Within the Fafoer, in fact, Rahner is ;ab1e to identify the phifosophica:l or speculative first principle with Christian faith's fus1t Ultimately both spring from the same :mot, and both share an identical obdect, so that the di:fforences between philosophy and theology are absorbed into a deeper and primordiarl unity. From this per-

[28] "Theos," p. 133.

[29] Rahner says that "we can never conceive of a divinity which does not exist either as that of the Father or of the Son or of the Spirit." *Trinity*, p. 84, note 6.

speative, the thesis .about the F,ather may evien provide the v;ehlclefor bringing together *Spirit in the World* and the *Theological Invest'igations* under 1a .singleoonooptua;l and trinitarian umbrella! In any evient, the identity of the Unoriginate and the Fatiher anchors the uJtimate compatibility of a rioh series of terms whose mutuail coh.e11enooiS 11equiredfor the viahiility of Rahner's project. Natural and revealed knowJiedgeof God, na'btme and grace, creation and predestination, providence aind predestination, to name but a few, presuppose that identity for their ultimate reconciliation in Rahner's scheme.

IV. Unoriginatedness and Fatherhood

Introducing the concept of unoriginatedness, as we have seen, has only comp!licated the claim that O Oeo<; signifies the Father. In oflderfo secu:re that O Oeo<;, "God," refers to a unitary thing, Rahner needs to provide some account of the relationship between unoriginatedness and fatherhood in constituting the Father. At :stake, in other words, is the unitary identity of the Father. Mmieover, the decision :to rejoot an independent doctrine of Gord allld to treat the Godhead of God only within the aicoount of the being of the Father puts the identity of God with the F\ather (and, thereby, the Trinity) at issue as well. In particmiLa:r,Rahner must dispel any concern that the epistemo1ogicaildistinction between grasping x as unoriginate origin ,and gl'lasping x as Father opens orut into an ontoJogical distinction that so bifurcates unoriginate origin and Father as to p11eclude their reaMy being the :same x.[30] Commitment rto the identity of being and kno,wing rules out Rahner's a;hility to separate sharply how the Father 1appeairsin

so Once you operate within the parameters of Rahner's distinction, it becomes very difficult to refer to the entity under discussion in a way that clarifies the issue. Rahner himself has difficulties: when he needs a circumlocution to identify what it is that is unoriginate and what it is that is Father (without simply defining one in terms of the other), he sometimes speaks of the first hy,postasis or the first person of the Trinity. My use of x: as a placemarker for the underlying issue is not done merely out of my own sense of rigor.

relation *to us,* for *our* knowledge, and how God is *in se,* independently of our knowledge. Much is a,t stake.

It wouM be a mistake to take Ralmer's concept of unoriginatedness at face value. It looks lifoe the traditional ascription of innascihility or unbegottenness to the Father, and there is oertairuly nothing Christianly inappropl'.iate about that. Yet we shou1d not prejudge the case by fi1ling in Rahner' s concept with the traditional content; I think there are several good l'easons for not doing so.

If we al'e ever to be in a position to assess Rahner's proposal about the Father, we first need more clarity about what he means by unoriginatedness and how he sees this 11elated to fatherhood. To do that, we need to e:immine his talk of" total unoriginatedness " and " concrete unoriginatedness " in relation to three terms: uncreatedness (or aseity), unbegottenness (or innascib1lity), and fatherhood. First, "total unoriginatedness " must be situated in relation to uncreatedness and unbegottenness. Second, what is distinctive about Rahner's concept of " concrete unoriginatedness " is to be identified by ranging it alongside Aquinas's account of trinitarian characteristics.

Total Unoriginatedness. One ,legacy of the ancient trinitarian debates is the hal'ld won distinction between uncrearted-ness (or, positively expressed, aseity) and unbegottenness (or, as the Latins came to say, innascibil:ity). Tremendous confusion, in part due to similar spdling in Greek *(agenetos* and *agennetos),* 11esultedfrom a failure to distinguish the two.[31] Unoriginatedness, in other words, might be used in the sense of unereatedness or in the sense of unbegottenness. Insofar as aseity or uncreatedness was at issue, the decisive point w.as that Father *and* Son *and* Holy Spirit were uncreated or *a se ipso.* Being unoriginate in the sense of unc1,eated, therefo11e, was not a property that uniquely singled out one member of

[31] See the account of G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London: S.P.G.K., 1952), pp. 37-52.

the Trinity as opposed to another. It bore instead on the divine nature.

On the other hand, unlme aseity or uncreatedness, unbegottenness was a property peculiar to the Father, one sive of the primacy aicco!'dedto the Father within the Trinity. Logically, it :represented the denial of being begotten and, by extension, the denial of having ᴍı origin. Armed with the distinction between being uncreated and being unbegotten, it was possible to deny that whatever was uncreated (unoriginate in *this* sense) was by that V'ery foot unbegotten (unoriginate in *that* 'sense) 1and, conversely, to deny that whrutewr was begotten was *eo ipso* created. To be unbegotten, therefore, could not be what made God God. If so, the very possibility of divin:iity's·being communicated woU1ld be precluded.

Arooroing to Rahner, "before the revelation of the Trinity, the total unoriginatedness cannot yet be differentiated into aseity 1and innascibility." [82] If we follow revelation in its temporal unfolding, the sequeooe commences with an unoriginate origin subsequently shown to be the F:ather of Jesus Chl'ist. Onily at that point is total unoriginatedness divisible into aseity and innascibil.ity. Nevertheless, one can think of philosophy as logim1ly, rather than temporally, prior to :the revela;tion of the unociginate Origin as the Father of Jesus Christ and then philosophy's object is total unociginatedness·. Total unoriginatedness, in turn, must ultimately be with the Father.

The earlier t.r:adition needed to distinguish uncreatedness and unhegottenness without proposing any more comprehensive concept .capaMeof systematically unifying or bridging rthe two. The novelty of Rahner',s concept of rtotal unoriginatedness is that irt purpoiits to .accomplish juS1t that. Uncreatedness .and unbegottenness are themselves moments or dimensions of a total unorigiinatedness which includes both within itself. Therein they merge into :an linpenetrable unity and are only

s2 *Trinity,* p. 59, note 8.

to he distinguished from one another subsequently, i.e., from the vaintage point of Christian faith. Aseity hears on being the principle of all reaJlity *ad extra;* innascihility on being the principle of all :rewlity *ad intra.* Rahner's eonoept of total unoriginaibedness spans both and points towards some more encompassing reaJity in whid1 they find their root.

Concrete Unoriginatedness. Precisely how are unoriginatedness and fatherhood interrelated in Rahner',s thought? :Before turning directly to that question, we need to haV'e some sense of what might be at srtake in a theologian's decision about how to oonceptuaJize the relation between the two. Aqui11as wilJ provide a usef:uJ example.

In question thirty-two of the *Summa theologiae,* having denied tha,t the Trinity of persons may be known by natural reason, Aquinas deve1ops a theory of *notiones* or cha1racteristics to explain how the divine persons are known.[33] Characteristics are "concepts whereby the persons are known."[34] Aquinas posits five: innascibility, fatherhood, sonship, common spiration, and procession. Obviously some persons will be markied by move than one characteristic. Within Aquinas's theory of lmowiledge, human beings know what js (e.g., God) in a mmp1ex way, so the multiplicity of charaeteristics belonging to a particular person as known need introduce no diV'ersity into the person *in se.*

Nevertheless, the characteristics are not aH on a par for Thomas. Indeed only three are said to be personal chara:eteristics, inasmuch as they rconsrtitute persons; they are fatherhood, sonship, and procession. It is, in fact, preoisely because no philosopher *qua* philosopher knows " the mystery of the divine persons through the personal properties of fatherhood, sonship and pTOcession"[35] that Aquinas denies that the Trinity can be known by nat1ural reason. J\1fos1t .intriguing for our purposes is Aquinas's denial that innaseibi<lity !i.s a character-

as *Summa theologiae,* Blackfriars edition, 60 volumes (New York/London: McGraw-Hill/Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964-1981).

34 *S.T.* Ia, 32, 3. 35 *S.T.* Ia, 32, I ad 1.

istic that constitutes a person, The person of the Father, in Aquinas's way of speaking, is constituted by fatherhood, Innascibility is, indeed, a characteristic of 1the Father and only of the Father for aH that, it does not comprise the identity of the Father, It does not serve to distinguish the :first hypostasis from of the Son and Holy Spirit, Insofar as the Father is unbegot'oen or unoriginate, the Father oannot be as being from another. For Aquinas, one might say, innascib:iJ.,ityonly works to point out one previousJy identified by other means (specificaHy, by fatherhood),

this oontention are insrtritmtive, First, persons are l'elations of origin and these rehtions are, in turn, upon processions. Innascihility, according to is itself a relation only indirectly. In first it is the negation or denial of a relation, the of being begotten or, more broadly, having an origin. It s1upposes a prior affirmation of the act of begetting. Moreover, no proeession, no *act* innascibiEty. Therefo11e lacks ·those features: that are person-p11oducing for Aquinas. Innasoibility cannot *constitute* a trinitarian hypo.stasis:.

In a question devoted specifieally to the Father, Aquinas enter!'cains a suggestion that unbegottenness be taken both negatively positiv;ely.[36] On this supposition, unbegottenness both (1) that Father comes from no one the :Rather is the som:1ce or principle others. Aquinas eonc1udes that unbegottenness must be taken negatively, is, as exduding generation in a passive •sense. If positively, he says, there woulid be no way to distinguish it from either fatherhood or spirartion. So the meanings of mnascibility fatherhood must be heild to be diverse.

FinaUy, Aquinas inquires in another context whether 1a hypostias:is in the Trinity 11emains when by thought we isola,te the :ve!lationsfrom the personso[37] Specifica.Hy, he asks whetheir,

[36] *S.'T'.* Ia, 33, 4. [37] *S.T.* Ia, 40, 3.

if one shoruLd set aside fatherhood iin thought, ibhe unbegotten hypostasis of the Father woru1d remain ni:wertheless. Appeailing to the distinction between personal and non-personal cha:r:acteristics. Aquinas answers that if one thought 1away ·a non-personal property lllie innascibility, the person or hypostasis of the Farther would Sitill remain. If, conversely, fatherhood were swbtracbed, the hypostasis would he subt:mcted as well. Without that property, the11e no longer remain 'a hypostasis distinct horn the Son 1and the Holy Spirit. By :fatherhood, " the Father not only Father, but ' one,' i.e., a hypo-stasis." [38] .A!ll by itself, innascibility is " a negative, affirming nothing." [39]

Rahner handles :the reiLation between unoriginatedness and f.rutherhoodin his 1ooncept of "concrete unoriginatedness." He claims that" God's unoriginatedness, :as manifested in his self-oommunication, possesses a positive character: the fact that the divine unoriginate mmmunicates himseU in no way threatens or impairs his absolute integrity." [40] The implied contrast between a negiative and a po.sitivieuno:ciginatedness is wnrth noting. Negative unomginatedness, we may fairly presume, is identical with that "total" unoriginatednass that philosophy gmsps. Positive unoriginatedness, on the other hand, is ranged rulongside of the divine self-communication, a fact outside philosophy's pmview. Within .the self-communication of God, " .the esse:nieeof unoriginatedness shows itself in its conc11eteness: divinity (aseity) which ean communicate itself with011t thereby losing itself, yet without merely keeping to itself, for rt.his would do aw:ay with the eharrucrteil."of a *self*-oommumcrution."[41] The logic of Rahner's claim is that, *if* a self-oommunillcationoccurs, then unoriginatedness is conc11ete in its very essence and so the Father. [42] Thereby, in :the terms

[38] *S.T.* Ia, 40, 3 ad I.

[39] *S.T.* Ia, 40, 3 ad 3.

[40] *Trilnity,* 'P· 84.

[41] *Trilnity,* .p. 84, note 6.

[42] The status of the self-communication is left open at this point. Whether its contingent givenness can be surmounted in Rahner's thought is a question that will be addressed later.

of the self-other dirulooti.chovering in the background, God is not tmpped within the opposed alternatives of rolitruriness o:r self-foss. Concrete !Unociginatedness spehl.s God's (i.e., the Father's) ability lbo communicate himself without risk of losing himself.

So the Eather is " not only ' fatherhood ' (helllOe ' notion-a1ity ') , but the concrete God in the unity of essentirul aiseity and notionrul fatherhood, conCl'ete unoriginatedness:." [43] Care needs :to he taken, however, in specifying that unity or connection. Some specifications can certainly he ru.Jied out. For one thing, it would be misleruditllgto think of concrete unoriginatednes:s as the S1Um, .so to speak, of aseity 1and .fathe!1.1hood. Putting it that way conjm1es up the £alse picture of aseity and fatherhood as log,iicaHy prior and independently aiocessib1e eilements which are then subsequentily combined to yield concrete unoriginatedness. Even were that ruoouriate, innascibility would not be the resrULt, for nothing woillid thereby be settled about the Father'1s originlessness. Besides, Rahner invoked " tOlbal" unoriginatedness preci19ely in order to merge aseity and innascibili.ty info a unity tha:t was eonoeptrurullyimpenetrable for phllosophy. The ;twin moments of aseity and ii.nnascibility were distinguishable only giy;en the resources of specificaJily Christian revelation, that is, the ·self-communication of God.

F1urthermore, Rabner is *not* making the Thomistic claii.m tha:t innascibility is predicated of :the Father wh:iile the Faither is constii.tuted by fatherhood. On •tihat supposition, innascibillity presupposes :that the person of the F·a.therhas afoeaidy been identified hy other means. By itse1f, ii.t does, not a hypostasis. But " concirete unoriginatedneiss " does not work that way.

Rahner is :saying that concrete unoriginatedness and fatherhood 1are *identical.* He says, for eXiample, that " the Fatherhood and ilie unoriginatedness of :bhe F1ather may be distinguished, with01Ut over:looikingthe fact that *the Fatherr's unorginatedness is his fatherhood* and shouild not be conceived as

[48] *Trinity,* p. 84, note 6.

previous to it, as constituting a peJJson."[44] In other passages, he exp1,essly identii..!Jcesunoriginatedness as that which constitutes a hypostasis in contmdistinction to those of Son and Spirit. Rruhner contends that "insofar as he is unoriginate ... the Father himself has a manner of being given and of existing which distinguishes him from Son and Spirit, hut which yet does not propel'ly precede his refation to either of them."[45] Finally, Rahner corunts among the " person-constituting " reiations of onigin, "the unoriginrutedness (innascibility, unbegottenness, *Pater ingenitus)* of the Father as the origin of the Son (Fatherhood) ."[46]

Rahner's identifiicat1on of concrete unorriginatedness and fatherhood seems more nea,rly akin ito the proposal, rejected by Aquinas, thrut involves both orig:inlessness and being the somce or of others. Ce1t.ainly there is a simifarity. Rahner's deployment of "total" and "concrete" unodgina:bedness, related as negative .and posa.tive, coV1ers some of the same conceptual territory. But the differenoes run deeper. The proposal Aquinas spurned operated only on the level of trinitarian charaeteristics; it still presupposed something like the iclassica,l*De Deo Uno-De Deo Trino* sequence. From the outset, however, Rahner has refused to treat the being of God prior to and independent of the being of the Father. Aseity itself is only a moment within tota1l unoriginatedness. Thereby the dialectic of unoriginatedness and fatherhood is a diai1e!Cticwithin the very being of God, the Godhead of God, a.s well. The transition from negative ,and total unoriginatedness to positive and concrete unoriginatedness operates both on :tihe level of the Trinity and on the level of the div:ine essence.

The identifioation of concrete unoriginatedness and fatherhood is the pivotal claim. If 'they cannot be ident!ified, .a rift

44 *Trinity,* pp. 78-9. Emphasis added.

45 *Trinity,* p. 74. Here, as in a few other passages, Rabner talks (curiously) of the Father's having a manner of being given. Is this manner of being given ,something other than his self-gift in Son and Spirit? ·what could it be?

46 *Trinity,* p. 78.

opens within the viery being of God between the Unol'liginate and rt.he Father of Jesus Christ. At the decisive point of :transition from negative ·and totrul to positivie and concrete unoriginatedness stands Rahner' s apperul to the concept and the foot of a divine self-communication. As a consequence, the status of the !identity o.f the Unoriginate and the F!ather ris finally inseparruble from the status of the ,oot of self-communication.

V. Critique

There are several compeHing reasons to think that the required identity of :the Unoriginate a;nd rt.he Father cannot be carried through 1sucicessfuilJ.yon Ralmer's terms. Indeed, his scheme simultaneously requires :and precludes that identification. At worst, the two features simply exclude one another. At best, they exhibit a mere conjunction, a juxtaposition, a simultaneity that faHs 1shor:t o.f yielding insteaid a hybrid. The identity of Unoriginate and Father becomes, at best, a' necessary 'aJocident'; so too the ·oot of self-communication. The upshot is :a pervasivie ambiguity about whether the ultimate origin of ,all rerulity its indeed the Father o.f Jes1Us Christ or whether there is somethlng behind or prior to the Father. ffitimately, it seems tJhat what Rabner tis rtrying to do is to rrdentify .a philosophi!Calilyposited ,a;byss with the Father of Christian faith by reinterpretating the ,t:ra;ditionailnotion of innaooibility.

Absolute and Relative Urwrigination. Because the diwne self-commrunicattion 11emains "urtterily ·concealed" from it, natural theology misrses an important fact about the absolutely Unoriginate. It has no idea ,that "this 'absolutely Unorigiina;te possesses the diViine nature and its1 own absoliute unoriginatiion simply in being <!'elatedto its Son." [47] This, of course, is slinply ithe claim tlhat natural iheofogy does not know the F1ather as Father. The i£1eason, preS1Umrubly,is that the F1ather is who he is only in relation to the Son. Substitute the claim that un-

41" Theos," p. 134.

originateness and fatherhood are identical, however, and you generate a eontrrudiotion. The contradicbion resides ri.n Rahner's claiming about the same x (vaguely put, the first trinitarian hypostas:is) that it is both absolutely and re:1atively unorigiinate. If the Unoriginate as grasped by natural theology is *absolutely* unoriginate, " free from ·any conceivable l'esrtriction," [48] it cannot possess its unorigination *only* in l"elation to the Son. Were that the case, its unorigination itseJ.£ would be constituted by a relation and thus not be absolute. Its being absoJuooly unoriginate means its being is constituted independently from any relation, including its relation to the Son. That relation must be ,adventitious rto its being .as the absolutely unoriginate. What cannot be saffid is that a thing has its unrelatednes.s in relatedness. At this point, the absolutely Unoriginate and the Father, total and ooncrete unoriginatedness, move in opposiite directions.

Unoriginate and Self-Communfoation. The notion of self-communication is central to Rruhner's trinitarian theology. To grirusp the measure of the magnitude of the divine act, a,ooording to Rahner, one must invoke the category of selfhood rather than esseil!ce or nature. What God communicates is no less than God's very ;00J.f. The incarnation of the Son 'and the descent of the Spirit al"e the'Veforedesc:cibed as "the inner, mutually related moments of the one seH-communication, through which God (the Father) communicateS' himself unto ,the worild in absolute proximity." [49] It is characteris,tic of Rahner's scheme that the commurncator *is* the Father and so, sinJC1e the communication is a :self-communication, the seM in question is' that of the Bather. The is that "by which the Faither communicates *himself."* [50]

If, however, unoriginatedness and fatherhood are identical, a becomes logically The reason is ;straight£orwa:vd: unorriginatedness is, by definition, incommunicable. It repl"esents that in God which cannot he tJ'!ans-

[48] "Theos," p. 134. [49] *Trinity,* p. 85. [50] *Trinity,* p. 102.

mitted and the permanent Iogicail bar to the v:ery possibility of a complete 1self-communioation. Moreovier, to the extent tiiat unorigina.tedness and self-communica;tion pull apart, the Unorigina:te looks more and more like something pre-personal, something fo which the category of :selfhood does not obviously apply. It is more like a pre-pers:ona,l source of trinitarian personality.

Indeed, Rahner ,appears to link God's transcendence with unoriginatedness and God's immanence with seH-communication. Distance a;nd .inaccessibility al'e assooiate:d with unoriginatedness while nearness or o1oseness a11e p11edica:tes of the self-communication. [51] As a consequence, the reconciliation of divine tmnscendenice 1and divine is worked out with his ruccount of the being of the Father. The struggle is evident in Rahner's insistence on preserving God's "ahsoi!ute integrity" even within the self-communication. That that divine transcendence, is preservied by claiming that even in the self-commuillca;tion the Father remains "the unodginate, who keeps to himseH, who remains the incomprehensible " [52] or, a hit more pointedly, "stiays the one who is free, incomprehen- a word, [53] Insofar as unoriginatednes:s I'epcresents a log1cal bar to divine transcendence and divine immanence end up being pJayed off one another; transcendence competes with God's caparcity for £eHow1ship.

Status of the Self-Communicationo Rahner argues that,

51 Rahner, for example, regularly contrasts God as " the distant, incomprehensible and asymptotic term of our transcendence" and God as "present in the mode of closeness" in the self-communication. See *Foundations of Christian Faith*, trans. 'William V. Dych (New York: Crossroad, 1978), p. 119. Hereafter cited as *Foundations.*

52 *Trinity*, p0 640

53 *Trinity*, p. 84. See also the analogy between self-communication and the experience of transcendence in *Foundations* (pp. 121-2). Rahner argues about the term of transcendence and, by extension, Goel in the· self-communication that "while it is what is innermost in this movement, it also remains absolutely beyond ancl absolutely untouched by this transcendental movement."

given 1a se1f-communication, the Unoriginate is disclosed to be the Father. The transition from total unoriginatedness, philosophy's obdoot, to ronorete unoriginatedne&S is e:ffiooted hy apperul to <the act of self...Joommunircation.Even though it grasps the Unociginate, philooophy does not perceive therem ·that the Unoriginate is in fact the Father. Why not? Pres1Umably because, .as Rahner emphaticahly insists, the Unoriginate is both incomprehensible and free. No mel'ely *a priori* construction can deduce ·any f.ree act. *A fortiori,* the wet of self...Joomm1Unication cannot he deduced f.rom :the concept of the Unoriginate. No logicrul entailment can span .the transition from rtotal to concrete unoriginatedness or fatherhood. Thereby tihe " absolrute freedom" and the "irreduicible facmcity" of the self-communicaition is preserved.H It is only "experienced a,g an event in plllre f.ructicrity, it cannot be deduced from another point, and as such again it J.'lemains a mystery." [55]

Since it eannot be deduced, one mrust look to history to determine whether or not a 1se1£-communicationhas indeed :taken

This is what Ohristianity does. It .affirms that God has been operative historicrully in Jesus Christ and in the bestowal of the Spirit upon believers. The incarnation and the descent of the Spirit, horwevier, are facts gleaned from history ia:nd, inso.£ar as ,they are historicrul facts, represents contingent states of affairis. It could a1ways have been otherwise. If the self-oommunication ms a purely contingent state of affairs, the act of :self-communication cannot q1Ualify or determine it.he vexy being of God *in se.* So Rruhner insists tha;t

> Between *a priori* deduction and merely *a posteriori* gathering of random facts, there exists a middle way: the recognition of what is experienced .aposteriorily as transcendentally necessary, because it has to be, because it cannot be mere facticity, whatever the reasons from which this necessity may be inferred.[56]

[54] *Trinity,* p. 88, note 10.

[55] *Trinity,* p. 88, note 10. Note the close connection between freedom and mystery.

[56] *Trinity,* p. 100, note 18.

OnJy if the self-oommuniication stamps God essentiaMy *in se* is there an immanent trinity. And, to the extent •t:hat "Goo" signifies the unoriginate origin in the first place, oruy i£ the ·se1f-commmrioation intrinsically and necessarily de1termines the Unoriginate is rthat Uno:riginate essentially or nroessarily. the Father.

The status of the 1se1f-oommunication, therefore, bears on the nature of the identity of the Unoriginate and the Father. If Raimer insists, as he does, on rthe freedom of the self-communicative acl, he is forced to admit that the Unoriginate is free to be Father or not, free .to be concrete or not, and, by extension, free to be a trinity or not. I£ Rahner insists, as he also does, on the necessity of the ,seH-uommrunication, he is foroed *w* ,ooncede its ded:ucibiilrity from the concept of the Unoriginate rendering it thereby rationailly (i.e., comprehensible. That iis, if the self-communication essentially or necesoorily characterizes the Unoriginate, philosophy could not grasp that Unoriginate without graisping it precisely as Father.. What Rahner wants to affirm is the identity of unoriginatedness and btherhood as well as the non-deducihility of the self-communication. But that puts him iin the bind of saying that one and the same .act is both necessary and free. To be sure, in thought the principal stress falls on the freedom and sovereignty of the unoiciginate God. This emphasis, together with rthe simultaneous assertion of the .ad's freedom and necessity, means that the self-communicative act has the status of a 'neces:sary aocident' in God; so too, the identity of the Unoriginate and the Father is a ' nooesisary aocident.' [57]

Rahner does ·claim that the Unociginate God and the seilf-communication do not " simply coincide . . . in ili£e1ess identity." [58] The appeal r0 the category of life at just this juncture

[57] The complete argument for this claim exceeds the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say, it would involve careful attention to Rahner's account of freedom, especially the relation between freedom and eternity, as well as to his account of the being of the Holy Spirit and its role within the Trinity.

[58] *Trinity,* p. 84.

is tantalizing. Nevertheiless, Rahner settles for the negative form, the denial of :a fileless identity, r:ather than provide a positive ,account of what the divine life itself consists in. Not surprisingly, he avoids the obvious positive move, viz. the simple equation of that life with the act of seH-communication so ;that it comprises God's very be[ng. In ·a ·Slightly different 'context, ·when attempting to :veconcile God's distance (or transceil!dence) and God's nearness (or immanence as se1f-communicating), Rather says that the two" coincide in a way which subsumes both-term and object-and their difforenre into a more original and ultimate unity which can no longer be distinguished eonceptually ." [59] Agiain there is an appeal <t0 a coinciding and a species of identity. This time the coincidence titseH is described as: conceptually impenetr:able. Presumably rthe s:ame holds ;bme for the coincidence of necessity and freedom. In the absence of a positive rucoount of their compatibiility, the coincidence is indistinguishable conceptuaJJy from a ' nooessary accident '.

An Abyss. I would like to mnc1ude this discussion by making a further interpretive p1.1oposal,even though I 'Ciannot fully argue its aptness within rthe parameters of this essay. Rahne["s dtist:inctiveclaim about the identity of the unorigiinate Father, coupled with the seve:ml *aporias* rrurgued to he attendant upon that claim, gienerates the hypothesis of an abyss lying behind the Faither. Consider the evidence.

Rahner's position relies on a dialectical interplay between tortaJ and ·eonCl'e:teunoriginatedneiss, between the Unoriginate and the Bather. They ,are rto he both distinguished and identified. A sharp fogical break irS marked between them. That hiatus cannot he 1spanned conceptuaJJy. Thought cannot bridgie it, for moomprehensibility is a predicate of :the Unorignate. Only a ,completely free act which, ·as foee, is non-deduc.. iible can surmount thre fog]cal hiatus1 and effect the tmnsition. Christianity, proclaiming that a divine self-communication has

[59] *Foundations,* p. 119.

taken place, confesses the Unoriginate to be the Father of Jesus Christ.

In effect, philosophy mounts to :an ·abyss, to what it recognizes reflection cannot encompass but only endlessly approach in 1an iasymptotic fashion. That abyss is .subsequently identified, from the standpoint of Christian faith, with the unocignatedne:ss cl.assicailly.taken to be distinctive of the Father with-mtrinitari:an theology. Total unoriginatedness, .insofar as it points to the underlying 'll.llityof uncreatedness and unbegort-:flenness,·ailreadymocves in the direction of 1an abyss, ·an ontologically formless *prius.* This move, baptizing the :abyss by identifying it with trinitarian unoriginatedness, underwrites Rahner's .reconciliation of faith and reason, theological :and philosophical first principles.

Conversely, however, the •reinterpretation of the traditional notion of innascibility th11ough the category of the abyss creates p1.1oblems within Christian theology. An abyss is incomprehensible noetiicaHy. lts actions, if and insofar as it acts, 'are non-deducible: its wiLl is insorutahle and unpredictable. F1orm1es1sonrtologtlcally,the abyss can never be completely identified with any state of affairs grounded in it or, to ruse a d:ifie11ent metaphor, with :any aotion springing from it. When, thel'efore, Rahner tries to identify the phifosophical abyss with the Father of Christian faith through a reinterpreted notion of mnascibility, he runs up 1againstthe .abyss's imperviousness to any concrete determimut:ion like fatherhood. In Rahner's fangiuage, the diaJecticaJ .transition from "total" rto "concrete " unoriginatedness cannot finaLly be made.[60] Thereby

[60] The hypothesis of an abyss shows where Rahner seeks to distance himself from Hegel without reverting to a pre-critical metaphysic. It is not the destiny of the abyss to become subject, as is the case for 'substance' with Hegel. Schelling's version of romantic idealism comes closest to providing Rahner with a philosophical vehicle. (An essay well worth pondering in this connection is Emil Fackenheim's " Schelling's Conception of Positive Philosophy," *The Review of Metaphysics* 7 [1953-54]: 563-82.) The trinitarian price to be paid, however, is no leE>s heavy than what comes with electing the Hegelian option. The upshot of coupling an abyss with a self-communicative act is a trinitarian theogony, and that is no advance over Absolute Spirit,

the foee wet of .sieH-oommunicaitions,uspended over the abyss, seems 1at best ra necessary ·accident and, a:long with it, the fatherhood of God. The abyss, not the Father, is the ultimate somce of the entire Trinity (immanent as weU asi economic) and of the c11eated order. It becomes the condition of possibility of the immanent trinity. Solitariness rather than *fel*lowship threatens to be the fina:l woJ.'d about God.

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY'S PROBLEMATIC INTERPRETATIONS OF LEO XIII AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS

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"Useful falsehoods are dangerous things,
often costing something down the road."

Garry Wills

IN THE PROLOGUE to his provocative study of ithe Declaration of Independence, Garry Wills claims Abraham Lincoh1 distorted Thomas Je:fferson's document for purposes. Amid the tumult of civil war, L,incoln encouraged Amer1cans to "dedicate" themsely;es to the "proposition that all men are created equal," because on this basis their "fathe11s" had originalJy "conceiV'ed" the nation "four scoil.'eand seven years" earlier.

In fact, says Wins, the signers employed the word ' ' not to denote ,an a:titribute of indiviJdual persons but rather ito descnibe the severed colonies' political standing vis-a-vis the motiheT country. Nor did the Dedar:ation 1conceive a nation: "if anything, July 4, 1776, produced twieily;e new nations." [1]

Lincoln's 1oreatiy;euse of the Dedaration of Independence at Gettysburg bore both benefits and costs. It emboldened Union cresolvedur:ing the war and inspired a new nation in the 1aftermath. Yet it aJ.so, thinks W,i<lls, promoted the false notion that the Dechration contains a coherent political " doctrine," a doctrine one must adopt " in order to be an American." In addition, it transformed the Puritan ideaJ of a " eity set on a

[1] Garry Wills, *Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1978), pp. xiii-xvi.

hilltop " Ito .a theory of American manifest destiny-" ,a belief in our extr:ao11dinacybirth" as a "nation ·apart," with an ob-Egation to "sav;e the world." [2]

This paper argues that an anaJogorus situation exists in the way the Roman Crutholic theofogian John Oorurtney Munay used the encyclical teachings of Leo XIII and the founding documents of the American republic From 1945 to 1967, Murray presented powerful a:nrd yet flawed inteTpretations of these texts to advance two momentous projects: doctrinal rucknowledgment of religious freedom by the Roman Catholic Church and social :vooognitionof a link between Catholic and American political thought. It is important to identify rthese flruws becruuse, Eke Lincofo's reading of the Declaration, Mrnr-ray's inibwpretations have not only enhanced but also handi-capped contemporary Roman Catholic sociaJ ethics.

The argument will proceed in three ,steps. First, Murmy's case for Catholic approval of religforus freedom and American political :thought will be outlined. As the shifts and increasing complexity of Murray's thinking on these matters have been ably demonstrated by others, only a distillation of his thought be ofiiered here.[3] Second, an argrument for Murriay's mis-interpreta;tion of both Leo XIII's encyclical teruchings and American political :thought wiU be presented. The purpose will not be rbo invalidate outstanding a;chievements in American Caitholic :sociail ethics hut to estabHsh the grounds for chaiUengingit in step three. This final step wil[focus in on two persistently influential yet problematic dimensions o.f his work: ,the organic theory o.f doctrinal development and the Cartho1icincorporation of American liberalism.

[2] Ibid., pp. xix-xxii.

[a] See J. Leon Hooper, *The l!lthics of Discourse: The Social Philosophy of John Oourtney Murray* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1986) ; Thomas T. Love, *John Oourtney Murray: Oontemporary Ohurch-State Theory* (New York: Doubleday, 1965): Robert W. McElroy, *The Search for an American Public Theology: The Oontribution of John Oourtney Murray* (New York: Paulist Press, 1989); Donald E. Pelotte, *John Oourtney Mur-ray: Theologian in Ooofoict* (New York: Paulist Press, 1975).

The Two Projects

Murray's work in ethics and public affairs mveQ'ed a wide range of topics, resulting in a prodigious output of over 130 magazine and journal articles in thirty-five years. His two projects, I'eligious freedom and Catholic compatibility wjth Ameriican pohtical thought, constitute over a third of this corpus. The following offers an encapsulated version of each argument.

Reiligious F11eedom

In thirteen *Theological Studies* articles from 1945 to 1966, John Courtney Murray turned mains;tream Roman Catholic teaJChing a,bout religious freedom on its head. He claimed that the puhl.iic expression of an individual's religious faith was momHy a,ceeptabJe on grounds internal to Catholicism itseH. But what of Pope Leo XIII's nineteenth century support for Catholic confos:siona'l states and for the banning of an individual's pubrlic expression of non-Catholic religion? Murray 1said that this was "consequent upon social fact and social necessities of the hisitori:cal, not theoTetical, oridier," a position tafoen to protect church freedom a,gainst attacks by Europe's newJy constituted, anti-derieal nation-states. [4]

Murray foca.ted the non-contingent core of Catholic thought on 11eHgioiusfreedom in three interrelated ideas: the distinction between state and socrety, the freedom of the churrch, and the dignity of the person. Each idea orystalized ait different times in his thought, reaching mutual reinforcement during and after the religious freedom debates at ¥atican II.

By 1951, J\./[urray folt a critioal element in understanding

[4] John Courtney Murray, "Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government," *Theological Studies* 14 (December 1953) : 556. *Theological Studies* is hereafter cited *TS* and article authors and titles will be given only in the first citation. Sec also his "The Church and Totalitarian Democracy," *TS·* 13 (December 1952) : 551; "Leo XIII on Church and State: The General Structure of the Controversy," *TS* 14 (March 1953) : 13; and "Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government, II Government and the Order of Culture," *TS* 15 (March 1954) : 15.

reiligiorus :freedom was the d:istiTI!ctionbetween state and society. The :sta:tie neither embodies society as a whole nor assumes responsihllity for .all of its needs. Instead, it is but one social institution among many and has one principa;l task: :to preserV'epublic order by wdministering essenrtia1leveis of peace, moraility, iand justice. Oare for the totail common good of so- "includes all the sooiaJ. goods, spiritual and mo11a1 as well as material, which man pursues here on earth in acoord with :the demands of his personal and sociaJ. nature" -is the province not of the state 1rulone, but of aH the social institutions (family, church, business firm, voluntary aissociation, ista:te) functioning freeJy, cooperativieily, and appropriately in their distinct arieas of ioompetence.[5]

In his iseareih for an example of this distinction in papal encyclicals, Murray 1adnrittredthat "up fo [Leo XIII's] *Rerum novarum,* rthe trruditional distirnction between ,society and state is obscured." [6] But in tihis encyclical the distinction surfaces when the pope describes :the powe[" of the :state in the economic order as "strictly limited" rto grav;e :social emergencies to which no other social unit can adequately l"espond. Murray used tthe foliliowing qruotations from the encyclical: " The law ought not to undertake more, nor ought it go farther, than the remedy of evils or the removatl of danger requires," and " Let the state protect these lawfully russociated bodies of citizens.; but let it not intrude into their internal .affairs ·and order of li£e." Leo XIII'is use of a more " paternal " and less " properuy political " notion of the state [n otiher letters was a function not of his prIDcipJes but of " the hisbo:rical conditions which this particular pope confronted." [7]

With the help of this distinction between stwte and society, Mrurray 1argrued that direct care £or the spiritual good of 1socierty

s John Courtney Murray, "The Problem of Religious Freedom," *TB* 25 (December 1964): 528. See also his "The Problem of State Religion," *TS* 12 (June 1951) : 158, n. 6.

6 John Courtney Murray, " The Issue of Church and State at Vatican Council II," *TB* 27 (December 1966): 586.

1 *TS* 14 (December 1953) : 551-54.

depends not on the ,state but on iieligious in:dividua1s and insti-itutions. "The Chu11ch and the chm:1ches, and various voluntary associations for l1eligious purposes " shoukl be neither impeded nor dir,eol'ly aided by the state.[8] While the state shou1d show ooncern for the religious condition of society, its *cura religionis* must go no farther than preserving jurid.icwl conditions " to 1the free p11ofessionand praictice of religion" by the people (the *cura libertatis religionis)* and their reJigious institutions (inc1lurding Roman Catholic concern for the *cura libertatis Ecclesiae)* .[9]

Murmy founrd arguments against state coer1cion of religious instirbutions in " 60 or more documents of Leo XIII " and saw an argument against rdircct state aid for religion in the pope's *Sapientiae christianae* statement that " the goveranice of souls *(regimen animorum)* is committed to the chunch ,alone, in such wise ithat the politicarl power has no part in it at all." From this, Murray concluded that

> When the pope says 'no part at all,' it is to be presumed that he means 'no part at all.' Not even therefore an instrumental part. Consequently, when one finds in history the civil power playing a part in the goverance of souls, one can be sure that other factors were at work beyond the exigencies of principle; they were factors inherent in special historical circumstances.1°

F11om the beginning of his deliberations on l1eiigious freedom, Murray considered the basic issue" the freedom of the human person to rrewch God."[11] But not until he established the iden-and refative :autonomies of starte :and chu11ch did he

s *TS* 25 (December 1964): 528. See also *TS* 27 (December 1966): 598.

9 *TS* 27 (December 1966): 598. See also John Courtney Murray, "Con·temporary Orientations of Catholic Thought on Church and State in the Light of History," *TS* 10 (June 1949): 189; *TS* 12 (June 1951): 173, n. 17; *TS* 25 (December 1964): 528.

10 On state coercion, see *TS* 12 (June 1951) : 156; and *TS* 27 (December 1966): 593. On state aid, see *TS* 14 (June 1953): 204; and *TS* 27 (Decem·ber 1966): 606.

11 Jolm Courtney Murray, "Freedom of Religion: I. The Ethical Problem," *1'S 6* (June Hl45): 236.

amplify this dimension of the problem. This process helped him undersfand how the dignity of the person (rooted in humanity'iS God-given Tationality and freedom) requires that individuals be allowed the freedom to negotiate the claims of citizenship and ;ve1igiosity:in their own consciences and not have these claims: negotiated for them in enactments between states and churches. Thius, the state is not to promote religiaus truth for indiviidrual,shut to protecrt the indiividiual's right to pursue S1Uch truth; the church may facilitate this pursuit tlmough its cruU to " teach, ru1e, and sanctify," hut it may not enlist the state in these :rotivities, lest individual consciences be coel"ced. " No argument can be made today," said Murray, " that would vaJidate the legal institution of religious intolerance." [12]

Murray identified " the ttmth of the dignity of the human person " as " part of the Catholic position from the beginning," though it did not" emerge as determinant of social and political doctrine " until Leo XIII's *Rerum novarum.* [18] Another important step was Leo XIII's *Immort<ile Dei* refel"enceto the pel'lsoin as both " citizen and also Christian." " Leo XIII was implicitly saying," wrote Murray, "that the human person by his action as Christian and citizen ought to be the instrument and agent of establishing this harmony in actual fact." [14]

Mur11ay heM that these three ideas undergirding 11eligious rneedom were iillcipient in Loo XIII, further elucidated in the writings of Pius: XI, Pius XII, and John XXIII, and folly maniifested Vatican's II's *Dignitatis humanae.* Few is1sues, thought Murray, gave greaiter evidence for the development of doctrine in the Roman Catholic Church thoo. religious freedom.

12 On the role of the church, see *TS* 12 (June 1951) : 156. On intolerance, see *TS* 25 (December 1964): 570.

1a Edward Gaffney, "Religious Liberty and Development of Doctrine: An Interview with John C. Murray," *Oatholio World,* February 1967, p. 278. See also *TS* 27 (December 1966): 586.

14 *TS* 10 (June 1949): 189, 220-22. See also *TS* 14 (June 1953): 209-11 and *TS* 27 (December 1966): 587.

American Political Thought

In the intmdwction and first two chapters of *We Hold These Truths*, John Courtney Murray argued thait Roman Catholic ithought the best intellectual bra.ce for the" American Proposition" contained in the Declaration of Irndependerrce, the Constibut1ion, and the Bi11 of Rights. This a1ssertion was based on four links he pe11ceiV'edbetween and the founding documents of the American republic.

First, he tmced sruch American principles as the rule of law, the imp0Tt1wnoeof consent of the governed, and the distinction between state and society baick to the Christian political theory of mec:lieV'alEurope. In the thirteenth century, for examp1e, Heney of Bradon understood that the king was "under God and under the law" because ",the faw makes' the king." Similarly, "the princip1e of consent wrus inherent in the medieval idea of kingship"; as an instance, Henry VI's Chief Justice insisted that the king "may set upon theim [the people] non imposicions without their consent *[sic]."* Finailly, the distinction between state and society was apparent in the medievail d.iftierenti:ation between *studium* and *imperium.* [15]

Second, Murray felt that the Deolamtion, like Roman Catholic thought, asisumes a " realist epistemology." Here, " the 'l.'eal" is the " measure of kno<wledge" 1and human intelligence can reach " the real, i.e., the nature of things." This epistemology was "made c1ear by the Declaration of Independence in the famous phrase: ' We hold these truths ito be ,self-evident.' " In these words, the American founders presumed the Catholic notion of "objeetiv;e truth, uniV'ersal in its import" and "accessihle to the reason of man." [16]

Murray also thought the Declarrution shares with Catholicism a commitment to the moral theory of natural law. Both the Declaration and the Bill of Rights were " tributary to the

15 John Courtney Murray, *We Hold These Truths: Oatholio Refieotions on the American Proposition* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), pp. 32-35.

16 Ibid., pp. viii-ix and 327.

rtriadirti.onof na;turaJ.law, to the idea that man has cerlain original responsibilities pr:ecisely as man, antecedent to his status as citizen." Here again, Catholicism and the Declaration draw on the ,sh:wed epistemology " that man is intelligent; that reality is intelligible; and that reality, as gra;sped by intelligeDJee, imposes on the will the obligation that it be obeyed in its demands for action m abstention." [17]

The fourth link Murray !'ecognized was mutual recognition of God. The Declaration, he wrote, " looks to the sovereignty of God 1as to rthe firsrt principle of its organization." Like Catholicism, the American foundel.ls understood God as the "Creator of nature .and the Mas.ter of his.tory." [18]

On ,the stl'ength of these four links, Murray concluded that if a rtime came when either indifference or dissent eroded the principles of the Declaration,

> The Catholic community would still be speaking in the ethical and political idiom familiar to them as it was familiar to their fathers, both the Fathers of the Church and the Fathers of the American Republic. The guardianship of the original American consensus, based on the Western heritage, would have passed to the Catholic community,. within which the heritage was elaborated long before America was.[19]

Problematic Interpretations

But in arguing for Catholic rrooognitionof the importaJ11Ceof re:ligious freedom and of rthe vaLue of Ameriioan political thought, MuNay presented flawed rinterpretations both of the encyclicaJ. teachings of Leo XIII and of the founding documenrbsof tihe Republic.

The Encyclical Teachings of Leo Xill

Close .analysis of the papal encyclicrul literature does not support the argument that Leo XIII reoo·gnized-implicitly or explicitly-the three non-contingent eilements Murray con-

u Ibid., pp. 37 and 109. 18 Ibid., pp. 28 and 37. 10 Ibid., pp. 42-43.

sidered essential to Catholic thought of religious freedom. Both a micro- and a macroscopic study of these letters rebuts Murray's olaim.

When viewed [n detail, the critioal texts that Murray used do not sus1tain his argument. This is true, first of all, concerning Murray's distinction between state and society. When Leo XIII wrote " that the faw ought not to undertake more . . . :than the ,remedy of evils," he was addressing the state's response to specific social emergencies such as labor strikes, Sun·-day labor, or work-force oppression. In such eases, the state must offer asS'istance without assuming the l'esponsibilities of the business firm itself; the latter would be an intrusion into 1an 1association's "internal affairs and order of life." In saying this, the pope was not-as Murray suggested-establishing a princip1e for the state's approach toward society under normal conditions. Leo XIII was olear on this matrter: since the state's purpose is " to serve the common good," it must monitor social life in all its dimensions. The power of the state, he said in *Rerum novarum,* " should he exercised as the power of God is e:x;e13cised-withthe fatherly solicitude which not only guides the whole, but :t'eaichesalso individuals." [20]

Murray's second element concerned church freedom. When Leo XIII declared in *Sapientiae christianae* that the political power has" no part at all" in governing souls, he was referring to taisks specific to the church: the p11ead1ingof the Gospel; the practice of s1ac11ed rites; !the distribution and discipJine of ecclesiast:Ucal offices; the enaJCtment and aid.ministration of canon *la:w;* and the of creligious congregations, associations, and institiutions. Leo XIII was not saying-as Murray maintained-thait the state 1should not assist the chm1ch in these tasks; he was stating that these are not the 1state's prerogatives. Two paragraphs far1ther along in the same letter, the pope noted: "in the public 011der itself of

[20] Leo XIII, *Rerum novat·um,* 35. All encyclical references are taken from Claudia Carlen, ed., *The Papal Encyclicals,* 5 vols. ([Wilmington, N.C.]: McGrath Publishing Co., 1981), vol. 2.

states-which cannot be severed from the laws influencing mora1s and from religious duties---'it is 1alw:ays urgent, and indeed the main preoccupation, to tail{!e thought how best to con-.sult 1the interests of Catholicism." [21]

Finally, as to MUICTay's identification of the concept of human dignity as a "determinant of sociaJ. and political doctrine " in Leo XIII, the pope nowhere employieid:this 001J1cept as a philosophioal or theologiicrul ground for understanding human conscience. In *Rerwm novarum,* Leo XIII did refer to human dignity three rtimes, hut in eacli cruse it is without elaboration, and in eruch case he associaited iit, not (like Murray) with human natrl.J.'l'le, but with "Christian character." Similarly, in *Immortale Dei,* when Leo XIII described the human person as both " icitizen and also 00.ristian," he did not mean to sugge:srt that the truth claims of state and church should be adj1udicated solely in indivdituail:conscience. Quite the opposite. Leo xm used this idea to indicate how importanit it 1was for 1state and church to coopemte "inasmurch as each of these two powers has authority o-ver rthe same subiects." [22]

On a level, the tota;l thrust of Leo XIII's communications ·across 86 encyiclica;lletters runs counter to Murmy's claims. As can be 1seen from the perBpective of his entire roorpus, Loo XIII held thait .a11 state authority comes from God for :the "welfare of those whom it govierns." This requires care of people's "external well-heing" and "the welfare of men's soruils," respectiviely called the "proximate " and " remote" ends of government. Chul'loo and state have joint jmisdiction o-ver 11emote ends iSUJCh 1as marriage, rudoilesoentediucation, and public censorship. But because rthe church possesses primary authority over matters the soul, state reguilation in these wreas m11.LSt follow churoh teruching. Thus., the ·state sh0'1.l.1d 'the Catholic Church sillICle" the profession of one

n Leo XIII, *Sapientiae ahristia-nae,* 29.

22 On human dignity, see Leo XIII, *Rerum n-0vwrum,* 20. On the two powers, see *Immortale Dei,* 13.

religion is neeesisary in <the state" and the religion pruhlidy professed must be that " which alone is true." [23]

Underling this teaching was Leo XIII' s firm commitment to Thomas Aquinas's architectomc vision of all things emanating from God, .sustained by God, 'and returning to God through Jesus Christ. This v:ision indluded a model of the world as a hiemrchy of creaited entities moving through spruce and time by virtue of orde:red causes. This mov;ement is not random, hut l'eflects'--however obliquely-God's embedded purposes for the world. From this perspective, Leo XIII believed" the principJe of civil ml'd l'elig.ious power is one and the same, namely, God. Thel'\efove, the:re can be no discol'd between the:m ... for God cannot rbe at variance with Himself." [24]

But Leo XIII also recognized two facts. First, the of institutional priodty being granted the Roman Catholic Churrch in traditionally non-Catholic states wa·s remote. Second, church insistence that Cartholic citizens press for such institutionrul status in states cou1d caruse more harm than good. As a vesuilt, out of considerations of expedience, he did aocept situations of less than optimaJ church status. In *Libertas,* 33, he

> , .. while not conceding any right to anything save what is true and honest, she [the Church] does not forbid public authority to tolerate what is at variance with truth and justice, for the sake of avoiding some greater evil, or of obtaining or preserving some greater good.

From both a m.i:cr:o- and a macroscopic perspective, John Cou'lltney Mm.ray pa.-esented a flawed interpretation of the papal texts and pr:oposed an argument for relig.i:ousfreedom in

[28] Leo XIII, *Libertas,* 21; and *Sapientiae christianae;* 25 and 29. See also *Licet multa,* 3; *Nobilissima gaUorum gens,* 2; *lmmortale Dei,* 4, 6-7, 10.

[24] Leo XIII, *Officio sanctissimo,* 13. See also *Quod apostolioi muneris,* 10; *Arcanum,* 36; *Immortaie Dei,* 32; *Sapientiae christianae,* 5-6, 11. On creation and causality, see *Officio sanctissimo,* 8; *Libertas,* 15; *Rerum novarum,* 6 and 22; *Divinum Ulud munus,* 3. On purposiveness, see *Arcanum,* 25; *Immortale Dei,* 4; *Au milieu des sollioitudes,* 6.

direct opposition to the teaclllngs of Leo XIII. Leo XIII's support for rbhe Catholic confessional state and for banning an indiviidiuail'spublic expression of non-Catholic religion cannot be explained away 1by appeals to historical eontingency; ;these were his principles.

Oatholicism .and the " American Proposition "

When Murray proposed his argument for the compatibility of Catholic and American rthorught, disagreement surfaced not oruy from ;scholars acoostomed to be wary of the Catholic presel1!ce in the United States brut wlso from some academics otherwise sympathetic to Catholicism. An ex:ample of the latter is Edrwar:d ess1ay " John Courtney Murray: Historicism as an Antidote," published in his *Peter and Caesar: The Catholic Church and Politwal Authority* (New York: Herder and Herdea."", 1965). Although the entirety of his argument will not be discussed hoce, one of his points is particularly apropos.

Contemporary rscholarship on the inteiL1ectualand historical context of the founding doC1UIDents aJso calls several of Murmy';s claims into question. We will ha¥e reootU.rse, once again, to Garry Wi1ls's *Inventing America.*

If Goerner and Wills M"e ₄oorrect, Murray's forur links between Catholic thought and the founding documents of the American republic cannot hoM. As to Murmy's first claim that American politicail thought rooted in the Christian po·litical theory of medievrul Europe, Goerner insisted that the remote origin of ea.rly American political thought was not the medieval period hut Greek and Roman civilization. The 1alternative, wrote Goerner, is a "noble, Platonic tale that Murray tells with a view to taming the e:x:cessesof both Catholics and non-Catholics so that they can li¥e rtogether." [25] For the proximate inte1lectuail origin of rthe American republic, Wills

25 E. .A. Goerner, *Peter and Caesar: The OathoUa Ohurah and Political Authority* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), p. 182.

cites the founde11s' "speciiaJ affinity" with the English revolutionaries of the l who celebra;ted ·the fact that they "ousted a CwtJ:rolicincumbent" from the throne. [26]

Contrary to Murray'1s second olaim that Catholicism and the American founders share a realist epistemology, Wills notes that Jefferson-like the buJk of his contemporaries-was a Lockean empiricist. For Jefferson, reason discerns not the ends and purposes of human action (as in Thomistic realism) but the means necessary to ends proposed by human desire; reason is not a "principle of aietion" but a "stiilJ ·arnd receptive" faculty 1assigned the tasks either of "simply registering reality" or of making pmotical chnices. [27]

But wha:t of Jefferson's "self-evident truths" which Murray identified with Catholic natural law moraJ theory? From Jef-:ferson's perspective, these were not laws discovered within natural reason but affoctiV'e sentiments of benevolence issued from :the human heart. On this basis, the Dec1aration is far firom a natural law document; fostead, it reflects the moral sense theory of the Scottish EnJ.ightenment. In this theory, moraility is a matter of a:esthetics, not dialectics. Thus, Wills asserts that Jefferson's ethical theory (following Francis Hutcheson) was not linked to lllatura:l law but to "the moral sense as :a separate fia1c1ulty." [28]

Finrully,:the deistic beliefs of Jefferson and many of his politiioail contemporaries were a far cry from Roman CathoJic theism. AHhough Jeffe:rson',s deism-unlike Toland's-incorporated a "religion of the heal't," his appeal to God in the Declaration wouM sca:11cely support Murray's belief in a mutual recognition of God hetween Catholicism and the American founders. Jefferson, writes Wills, "left no room for divine revelation " and " identified Europe with superstition because of the Catholic church." [29]

Murray's argument that Roman Catholic thought undergirded the founding poJitical documents of America cannot be

[26] Wills, *Inventing America,* p. 99.
[27] Ibid., p. 194.
[28] Ibid., p. 199.
[29] Ibid., pp. 160, 182, 283.

sustained. He misread the iouncling doooments iin ithat he :si:buaitedthem a.t .too great a distance from their- classical and Enlightenment origins. Throughout his life, Murray agonized over the prospect of America departing from its " doctrine," but, like Lincoln, he missed the extent to which this doctrine w.asof his own making.

Handicaps

John Courtney Murray endowed Roman Cathoilic social ethlcs with a rich, 1sruhsbantia.llegacy. But over the years, general aooeptance of ibis interpvetations of Leo XIII and ilihe American forundevshas served to endorse two elements of this legacy tlmt need fo he challenged. These are his m-gam.ic theory of doiotrinal development and the Catholic incorrporation of American Hberailism.

Development of Doctrine

In his commentary on Vatican Ils' Declaration on Religious Frieedom, Pietm Pavan says the Council would have rejected *Dignitatis humanae* had Murray not " put in evidence " its continru:irty with ",the teaching of the Catholic Chfil'ch." [30] But .this essay shows that Murray's concept of religious freedom ·was not in continuity with the teac:hings of Leo XIII. The problem, however, is not discontinuity but the way he ·argues for continuity.

Munay',s intel'est in the impact of historical context and change on church teaching made for a more sophisticated approooh toward doctrinal development than that held by many of his contemporaries. Beyond simple elucidation through gradrual initellecbual clarification, doctrines rulso develop dialect:icailly,"by a *ressourcement,* a creative return to the sources

so Pietro Pavan, "Ecumenism and Vatican II's Declaration on Religious Freedom," in *Religious Freedom: 1965 and 1975: A Symposiwm on a Historic Document,* ed. Walter J. Burghardt, Woodstock Studies 1 (New York: Paulist Press, 1977), p. 14.

of the tradition, .a review of traditional doctrine within a new perspectiV'e rcreat,edby history." [31]

Yiet, the heart of Murray's theory-like rthat of Bernard Lonergan, foom whom he borl'owed-retains what Joseph Stephen O'Leary caHs the " total aoceptance of the Aristotielean my,th of 1a necessary progression from mythos to logos." [32] Even with his sensitiviity to history, Murr:ay remains committed to the o'l:"ganic dictum that " living things grow without surrendering their identities." [33] Or, as P:avan describes it:

> Between repetition and contradiction *' datur tertium,'* there is a third possibility: unfolding from within. What our Lord said of the kingdom of heaven can be said analogically of Christian sociopolitical doctrine: it is a seed which becomes a tree. [34]

The organic theory of doctrinal development handicaps Roman Catholic social ethics in two ways. It masks the "discontinuities, the flaws, the tentativ;e 1and makeshift quality, the wedu1cible pluralism" of chu11ch discourse on social ethics. [35] Thus, Murray's suoces1s at Va,tican II has rullowed CathoHcs to ov;erlook the 11eality of substantive conflict and contradiction in chmch teaiching. What Ca:tholics need to do is rto devefop the theological ·capacity to concede eeclresia.lerror.

The organic 1theroryalso requil'es that new ·ethical insights be justified hy showing connections with ea11Her chm1ch utterrances. Making su:ch connections a requirement draws scholars perilously dose to what O'Leary calils a " hermeneutics of

s1 *TS* 25 (December 1964): 534. See also John Courtney Murray, "Vers une intelligence du developpement de la doctrine de l'Eglise sur la liberte religieuse," in *Vatican II: La Liberte Religieuse,* ed. J. Hamer and Y. Cougar (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1967), p. 114.

-02 Joseph Stephen O'Leary, "The Hermeneutics of Dogmatism," *Irish The·ological Quarterly, 41* (1980) : 108.

33 William E. Reiser, *What wre They Saying A.bout Dogma?* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), p. 34.

34 Pavan, "Ecumenism and Vatican II," p. 14.

as O'Leary, " Dogmatism," p. 112.

transparent ciroularity ." [86] Even Murray entered this cioole on occasion: "The ·answer [to the question of religious freedom] must be new," he wrote, "hecaiuse the question *is* new. The answer must a1so be traiditional, because it is the answer of the Ohiul1Clh."[37]

American Liberalism

Though case for the compatibility of Oatholicism and Ameriican poiliticail thought is £Lawed, ibis argument persists, buoyed by the siz·abJepM"ticipaitionof Cmtholicsin political ilife and the tremendoos material success of the American clm:rich. The sanguine alignment in most Catholics' minds be-:lJWieen American libe11alism1and Roman Oathoilicismis, in part, a problemrutic legacy of Murray's work.

American Jiheralism is .a form of cla.ssicaJ Enlightenment liberaJlism nuanced by America's unique social experiences of westwa:vd expansion and unpoooodented economic growth. Despite differences, bo:th forms of liberalism share a core undel"standing of the ·self a.ind society. Accoroing to S. I. Benn, " the model of the natural person p!l."esrupposed:by liberalism is that of a self-governing chooser"; or, paraphriasing J. S. Mill, rthe person is "sieil.:f,.determining,self-developing, and aiutonomous." [38] The 1iberaJ idea of society is a body of individuals "not for iitsel.f, or for anyrthing intrinsic :to the 1ooJJaiborative.ructivity, but only £or what each beilieves he wouM get out of :it." In this model, the inidividuaJ's commitment to the grlQlup will "ialwayis be conditional, and derive from his own standards"; complete commitment to :a community would constitute " abdication of autonomous judgement." [39] Drawing from this core understanding of sel£

[a6] Ibid., p. 98.

[37] *TS* 25 (December, 1964): 523.

[38] S. I. Benn, "Individuality, Autonomy, and Community," in *Oommumty as a Sooial Ideal,* ed. Eugene Kamenka (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 44 and 46.

[39] Jl,iid., J?l?· 44, 49, 57.

and society, America's unique experiences with westward expansion and economic growth have only tended to ampJify this emphasis on individuail self-reli:anice1and sociaJ. pragmatism.

The understandings of self and society offered in the encyclical social teaichings of the Roman Catholic Church do not conform to these liberal models. Beginning with Benedict XIV (1740-1758), through Leo XIll, and up to John Paul II, the *popes* hav;e understood the self as embedded in the community. &om this perspective, the person is defined, in p.ar:t, by "the totality of its relations with other beings and, particularily, with other selves." [40] Given these relations, the Catholic :self-unlike the "raidicaJly unencumbered " liberal self--possesses what Allen Buchanan calls" special non-voluntary obligations." Admittedly, the popes hav;e not always expLained.the origin of these obJigations in the same way. While God's will is .aJways identified as the ultimate origin of moral obligation., this will is sometimes mediated through territorial oostoms (the ·eighteenth-century position) , sometimes through cosmological nature (Leo XIII's position), and sometimes through an affective sense of soli!darity (the predominant position since Vaitican II) .[41]

Unlike largely procedural or functionalist understanding of society, the popes: have argued for ·a 'diakonic' model wherein social roles and powers are hierarehically ordered for the purpose of mutual aid. Like their explanation of the self, the popes' model of society has haid severail interpretations: some rooted in appeals ,to custom, others to nature, still others to affection.

In short, Murray's: association of Catholic and American politicaJ. thought involved itw:o serious misunderstandings. First, his w:ork blurred the .degree to which central features of American liberalism are at cross purposes with the communi-

40 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, *Knowledge and Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 216.

41 Allen E. Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," *Ethics* 99 (July 1989): 872.

tarian tmdition of Catholic social ethics reflected in the encycliical tea:chings of the church. Second, his assumption that Roman Catholicism not only ' can ' brut ' must ' bolster the "American Proposition" forecfosed the question as to whether or not it should. It may be that a Roman Catholic communitada:n social ethic makes for an inherently bad dvil religion by the standards of American liberalism. It may likewise be that Catholicism pmvides not a "v:apid image of the communrul past " as in Robert Hellah's *Hab'its of the Heart* but a .substantive challenge to the polifilcialpresuppositions of American society.[42]

Conclusion

One can argue that Abraham Lincoln distorted the Declaration of Independence. This paper has argued that, in a similar fashion, John Comitney Murray presented powerful and yet flawed [nterpretations of the teachings of Leo XIII and the founding documents of the American Republic. His ,aim was to advanoe the doctrinal acknowledgment of reiligfous freedom by the Roman Catho1liic Church and public 11emgnition of 'a link between Catholic and American political thought, But his interpretations of these itexts ihave also meant tihe persistence of a theory of doctrinal development blfod to error and an insufficiently criticail appropriation of liherrulism in modern C:atholic sociail thought.

42 Criticism of Bellah is in Paul G. King, Kent Maynard, and David 0. Woodyard, eds., *Risking Liberation: Middle Giass Powerlessness· and f:fooial Heroism,* Foreword by Donald W. Shriver, Jr. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1988), p. 20.

A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER

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IN THE FOLLOWING essay I w;ant to examine some of rthe ba1Sic of Heidegger from SIOmethingof a " transcendiental Thomist " pevspective, as represented by Bernard Lonergian's " generalized empirical method." I believe that there are a nlllmber of important insights :to be gained from Heidegger's work but that it contains a fow very perilous oversights as well. To my mind, Heidegger shows with more conviction and power than any other thinker how our anxieties and our trivi al everyday concerns are apt to shut us out from 1apprehending the deep my;stery of things, and how great art :and poetry, together with a ,sustained thinking-through of the nmbure of consciousness :and of the wOJ.'11d wihich it reveals, have the power of opening up this mystery to us again.. I ailso agree with Heidegger when he says that the technicaiL fanguages of the scieDJoes and of traditional metaphysics as weH al'le, to a consi<leEableeJclJent, mea;ns for the domination and control of things by ihuman beings, and, in consequence, they are a standing pretext for self-deception aborut the real nature of the world :and of ourselves with.in it.

But I will. :argiue that Heidegger overlooks rthe fact that the specia1iz,ed langiuages of 1science and traditional metaphysics have ot:her runid other possib:iil.ities. They may be an expl'lession.and resuffit of wonder; they may even convey a grasp of a :veail inteLligible world made known to us hy inquiry into the everyday world available to common sense and described by o!l'ldinary language. What appears rto be view of s1C1ientifirc and metaphysical language (almost <always a means to control ·and domination) p.vesents us

in ·effect with a terrible dilemma: we must either abandon the scientific worM-view along with the enormous benefits which it has roo·nferredon humankind, or we must resign ourselves to existence in a wodd conceived in a way which is utteril.y hostile to the file of the human spirit. I believe that this dilemma does not exhaust the possihiLities, that .science and traditional metaphysics, on the one hand, rand the life of the rspirit, on the other, may greatly renhan.ce one another when both are properly related to their basis in human consciousness.

I

In this section, I shalil outline what I take to be Heidegger's views on human beings and their consciousness, the nature of trurth, the world of " things" which is givien to consciousness, and the role of great 1art in restoring our vision of how " things " reailily rare when this has been obfuscated or corrupted.

It is specifically human nature, as concerned with the world and capable of raising questions about it, which Heidegger refers to as *Dasein.* " In which being j,g, the meaning of Being to be found; from which being is rthe disclosure of Being to get its start?" [1] The 1answer to the question can only be, "this being which we ourselves in each case are rand which includes inquiry among the possibilities of its Being." [2] What must be most strenuously is any atrtempt to deal with *Dasein* in terms used to interpret other parts or aspects of the wodd, e.g., material objects 1and prooosses.[3] AM metaphysical questions must be approoohed explicitly on the basis of *Dasein* whirch is the ·subject of questioning, which questions.[4] Fmm

1 Martin Heidegger, *Bei!ng and Time.* Citation from the edition by David F. Krell: Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977),47.

2 Heidegger, op. cit.; Krell, 48. Cf. Heidegger, *Bei!ng and Time* (London: SOM Press, 1962; BT in subsequent references), 36-40.

s Cf. Krell, "Introduction," 19.

4 Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?"; Krell, 95-6.

this point of V>iew, one has to dismantle the conceptual appa- :vaitus which we take for granted, an appara;bus wherein the answers are given or presuppos,ed, but the questions al'e never e1q>erienced any more-least of *all* those aborut orur own nature, desbiny, and state in the wol'l1d. In asking these questions, we must be constantly ·aware of the limitations which aiccrue mom our particular historical sitruation.[5] These were not sufficiently taken account of in the dassicaJ. phenomenology of Husserl, with its "transcendental subjectivity " based on an allegedly "d!isintel'ested observer." For all. its determination to 11eturn :to" the things themselves," this did not attend sufficiently to the manner in which its own aims :and IJ[>ocedures we:ve determined historicaUy.[6] Husserl, as he himself aJC1knowledged,was very much in the tradition of Descartes, who was trying to find an uns:hakabJe basis for the practice of phll.osophy. But it is just this basis which Heidegger seeks to prut into qruestion.7 We have to a.sk what is the decisiY.e matter for ,thinking: "Is it consciousness and its objectivity or is it the Being of beings in its unconcealedness and concealment ?"[8] Access to the things themselves is best thought of in true Greek fashion as " *aletheia,* the unoonceaJ.edness of what is present, iits being revealed, its showing itself."[9] (A,s he quite often does, Heidegger is here making capital out of ·an etymological point; " *aletheia,"* the Greek word for """";..,ruuu,· i1.s eqwv:a1ent to " *a-i-eth ei,a,"* cealment)

So what is basic to truth, irt must be inferred, is not the oo['-rectness of assertions, or their cor11espondencewith states of a:fiaim, or the :agreement of subjoot and object expressed by them; it is the *self-showing* which is necessary for things if

5 Cf. Krell, "Introduction," 21.

6 Ibid., 13.

7 Cf. Walter Biemel, *Martin Heidegger* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 8-9; Krell, 31. On the alleged errors of Descartes, see BT 123-33.

sHeidegger, *On Tflrne and Bemg* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 79; Krell, 14.

oHeidegger, loc. cit., Krell, 13.

they 1arie to become objects of assertions .at all.[10] The £.act is that .rulil (lO!l'respondence," rudequation "[11] or whatev<er, between judgment run.cl state of affairs preSJUrpposes a discovery or revealing of bein:gis such as aililows them to be seen.[12] The urual '3Jooountof truth, as :rucool'dancebetween :a ;statement or proposition on rtb.e one hand and a thing or state of affairs on the other, is not wt bottom inreliligibJ.e. Suppose I say of a firve-mark COm tha:t it is rorund. How are statement and tlllng supposed to be in 1aooord!anoe? Whrut are ialleged to be related to one another ·are so diverse in their .appeairalllCeand const:itutiorn: rthe five-mark piece is round •and metallic, whereas the s:tatement is neither iSprutial noc materi®l.[13] What relation thel'e is depends on a certain *bearing* or *comportment* on the part of the one who makes rlihe statement, which is" invested with its oorrectTI!essby the openness of comportment; for only through the latter can what is opened up reru1ly become the standMid for the rpresentative correspondence."[14] (What this amounts to, I think, is that the correspondence of statements with things :in which truth is .SiUpposed to reside depends ineluicta:bly on the openness of 1consciorus subjectivity towards things; :it .is *that* in which truth fun:damenta1ly consists.) So the wad:itionrul assumption ithat truth. belongs at bottom to statements or pmrpositions rums orut to be fa.Urucious.[15] The openness of compo:r:tment which is essential to truth is in rlirurn grotmded in .freedom; freetdom being a matter of " the reso1ute-,}y open :bearing that does not closeup in iiitsel£"[16] ;and th.Ills a matter of letting things be.[17] 80 it was at the iheginning of :the Western :trad:ition, in G:r:eek thought. " If we :translate " *aletheia* " .as " unconcealment " rather than " truth," this trans-

10 Krell, 18; cf. Heidegger, " On the Essence of Truth," Krell 117ff.; and "The Origin of the Work of Art," Krell 173ff. See also BT 257-73.

11 Cf. the scholastic tag to the effect that truth is "adequatio rei et intellectus," or " adequation of thing and intellect."

12 Heidegger," On the Essence of Truth"; Krell, 115.

13 Ibid., 122.

14 Ibid., 124.

15 Ibid., 125.

16 Ibid., 133.

17 Ibid., 127.

fation i:is not merely more literal; it contains the diriective to re-think the orrlinary icoooept of t:mth (in the sense of .the co1r-reictness of statements) :and rto 1think it back to that still un-·OOIDprehendeddisc1osedness and disclosuve of being." [18]

Unfortunately, we are too prone to trrude :this friee openness for :the seC1Urityof agreeing with " them," (that is, the thought-less majority of people), with .aJCICepting without question whatev<er " they " say is true. [19] There are besides iso many things to seduce and distract rus from •attending to the presiup-positions of •aJil this secure "know1ledgie," whether it takes the guise of science or of l'leligiousfaith; whait are called "eternal truths " are •apt to be nothing more than rthe most deeply in.-prejiudi!ces.[20] The rbemptation becomes an the greater when science has made such a wide mnge of things apparent-ly familiar and well-kno.wn and when technical domination of the wo!I.'1d may well ·appear virtually lillnit1ess. More authentic ways of knowing things tend ultimately to be no longer even a matrter of iDJdifiererJJCe;they are simply forgotten. Everything beoomes 1subj·ected .to " the leveNing and planning of this omniscience, this mere knowing." [21] We distract ourselves fur-ther by proposing and pla:nning on the basis of our latest needs ·a:nd aims,[22] thus fleeing from the basic mystery of things to what is readily available, "onward from one current tlllng to the next." [23] Evenburully a who1e system of intel'llocking errors, with a long history of dev<elopment, is built urp;[24] and any thoughtfuil questioning of the system is dismissed •as " an ait-tack on, an unfortunrute irritation of, 1oommon sense." [25]

Obsession with manipulwtion 1and controi is at the very bot-tom of o·ur modern conJCeptionof what a " thing " is. Things are envisaged in modern Western thought as su.bjoots of acci-dents or predicates, as mentaihly grasped unities of sense-im-

1s Ibid., 127-8.
19 Ibid., 115. On the" they", cf. BT 163-8.
20 Krell, loc. cit.
21 Ibid., 131.
22 Ibid., 134.
2a Ibid., 135.
24 Ibid., 136.
25 Ibid., 138.

pression:s,or as paricels of matter iuvested with form; all these oonceptions reflect their origin in a specirul kind of human acrtivity, the use of tools or equipment.[26] The original Greek experience of things was expressed (notably by Aristotle) in terms whose meanings were subtly but definitely affected in their translation by medieval scholars into Latin; this transiLation is by no means as innocent '3iS it is usrually taken to *be.*[21] "Roman thorught rtakes over the Greek wo11ds withorut a corresponding, equally original 'experience of what they .say." Such is the origin of the rootlessness of thought in the modern West.[28] It seems rash irudeed to quesbion the relation which is now ,so rtaiken for granted between statements and things and between the structilll'e of strutements ·and the structure of tlllngs. y;et we hruve to a;sk whether the subject-predicate statement is realily the mirror-image of the structure of the thing (.as sllJlbstanoe chariaicterized by iaiccidents), or mther whether the stmctu:ve of the thing is not merely ·a projeotion of the stru!ctrul"eof the subjecit-predicate statement (as opposed to something existing in reality) .[29] And T'eftecitionon the matter does indeed indicate thrut the usuail concept of the thing "does not lay hold of the ·thing as it is in its own being, but makes an asswuit upon it."

It is true that people are occasionaillystI"lllCkby the •suspicion that rthorught has done v:iolenre to things, but they react to this :rarther by disavowing ,thought than ·by being more thoughtful. Yet this ream.ion in :favor of £eeling or mood may in the last analysis be more *reasonable,* in the important sense of move intelili.gentilyperoeptive 1andi open to things:, than the insensitive and domineering " rrutionality " 31gainsrt which it is a reaction.[80] Arooor<l:ing to one influential oonoeption of the thing, what we peroeiive in the fust instance is a mass of sen-

[26] Krell, 145; cf. *Being and Time,* sections 15-18.

[21] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art"; Krell, 153. For a sketch of the development and alleged distortion of Greek ontology through the history of European thought, see BT 43-4.

[28] Krell, 154. [211] Loe. cit. [so] Ibid., 155.

sations, on which we impose a unity--iI':ather than something like a storm in a chimney, an rairp1anewith three motors, or a Meroedes •as opposed to a Volkswagen.. But the fact is that the things themse1ves are closer to us, more immediately reiated to ()IUr consciousness, than the sensations:; to get •rut mere sounds, at aural impressiorus, for " we have to listen away from things, divert orur eair from them, i.e., listen abstractly." [81] The ma.tter-form ,struobure on which this colllception of a thing is based is: in its turn ultim·ately grounded in assumptions aib()IUt usefumess, where the "matter " is imposed on the "form" for a specific purpose. "A being thrut falls under usefolness is always the product of a process of making. It is maide as a piece of equipment for someithing." [82] Our oorl'ent and ,a;llegedly seilf-evident assumptions :rubout ".things" are based on rthis ·form-matter structure deriving from the medieval period, with the essentia;hly pragmatic presuppositions which underlie it; to these assumptions, Kantian and tr.anscendentru quMifioaitions have made no fund•amental difference.83

How can we 'avoid such distorting p!l.'leconceptions?Only by delibera.tely distancing oul'selves from them and leaving ea;ch thing " to rest in its own seili." Or we may aspire simply " to describe some equipment without any philosophical theory " in 011der to see whrut it is to envisage it precisely *as* equipment;34 In this a.ttempt, great works of art wiR he of the utmost assistance to us. An excellent example of how they may be is rto 'be found in Van well-known pruinting of a peasant's paiil" of shoes. This painting bcings before us the peasant's wea;rytread, ov;er furro·ws and through a biting wind, as she worries uncomplainingly abollllt food for the future and

ai Ibid., 156. One may compare the aspersions of "linguistic philosophers," notably J. L. Austin, on the "sense-data" postulated as direct objects of sensation ©y representatives of an earlier stage of analytical philosophy. Cf. Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).

32 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art"; Krell, 158.

33 Ibid., 159-60.

34 Ibid., 161.

trembles ,at the imminent a:nid deadly da:ngeT of hearing a child. So the " eqiuipme:nJtalquality" of this pair of shoes is, brought home to us, not by actual ohserviation of t:he thing itseH or of its manufacture or use, hut hy looking at Van Gogh's masterpiece. The painting does not merely evoke an emotion about or attitude to its subject; it " is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, *is* in truth." We may the point by saymg that the essell!ce of arit [s " the truth of things setting itself to work." [35] What shouM concern, us " is a fust opening of our viiBion to the fact thrut what is workly in the work, equipmentaJ in equipment, and thingly in the thing comes closer ito us oll!ly when we thfilk the Heing of ,beings." [86]

The same principles apply to art that is non-(l)epreserutation:al, a Greek temple for example. This " fits together ood at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relaitions in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline i3JCquire·the shape of destiny for human being." The temple stands against the violence of the storm and by doing 1s0 manifests that violence; its repose and steadfastness: bring out by contrast the srurging of the surf and the tumult of the sea. Again, " t:he luster and gleam of the stone . . . first brings ;to radiance the light of the day, the meaidth. of the sky, the darkness of the night." [21] In fact, " to be a work means to set up a world." [38] This insight into things (and the place of human beings among them) which is afforded by the temple remains open so long as the god of the tempLe has not le:lit it. [39] A 1similar conception of divine presellJClemay he ·applied to Greek .sooiptUT'eand Greek tragedy. The sculpture of a god is not a device for showing people how the god is ;supposed to look;" lit is a woirk that lets the god himself be present iand thus *is* the god himself." In the performance of a trngedy, the battle of new gods against old is not merely being i'epresented but ructuaJly fought.4-0

[35] Ibid., 165.
[36] Ibid., 166.
[s1] Ibid., 169.
[s8] Ibid., 170.
[39] Ibid., 169.
[40] Ibid., 170.

II

Thus far Heidegger. Blllt what tis one to make of what he has to ,gay? Aooo:riding to Richa11d Ro11ty, there is an epi:stemologioail tradition which mistakenly abbempts. to find sooure foundations for knowledge; this txadition has been central to phiJ.osophy since Desca,rtes, and Husserl (like Bertrand RusseH) is .among the last of its distinguished represent,atives. Burt Rorty say;s that this itrrudition has rightly 1been repudiated by Heidegger (together with Dewey and Wittgenst,ein), who has seen that such grounding is unnecessary and in 1any case impossiMe.41 I believe that Rorty hriJ.iliantly sets out the fundiamentrul: isSll'e in contempomry philosophy and correctly aligns itwentieth-century philosophers in relation to it; but I am convinced that he himself has chosen the wrong side on it. I haive no space here to show *this* at length, but I must sketch the most impo.rtamt of my reasons. Short of some *foundations* for knowledge, which are not simply opted for or a matter of sociaJ. consensus, there is no mo:rie *foundation* for the statement that water is a chemicail compound or that Margaret Thatcher *is* Pllime Minister of Great Britain in 1989 than for the statement that the moon is made of green cheese or that J. R. R. '.Dolkien has published a tex:tbook on thermodynamics. And the notion that the11e 'are no follil.dations of knowledge other than convention or socirul consensus appears to be incoherent as wieM 1as having paraidorica.il one is to .aicknowledge that it is merely convention or sociaJ. consensus that the forundations of knowledge are merely convention or social consensrus. It seems that one is £aioed with intolerable consequences if one denies that knowledge has foundaitions (other than convention or social coll!oensus); it was such foundrutions that Hus;serl was concemed to find.

I also believe that Hrusseril's,attempt to found knowledge in 1oonsciousnesswas right in principle. For Husse11l, as Heidegger

41 Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 4-6.

puts it, "ithe t:ransioendentaJ reduction fo absolute subjectivity gives mid 1sectwes the possibility of grounding the objectivity of ,all obj ects (the Being of these beings) in their valid stmc-tilire and consistency, thrut is, in their constitution in and through subje1ctivity." [42] In other words, only by being dear about the natul'e of conscious subjects and the way in which they can come to know objects can we pr:operly grou11d our knowledge of objeots, of things as they really are prior to and independently of the mental projections which we may impose upon them. Heidegger raises the question of whether we should be fundamentally concerned with cons1ciousness ,and its objectivity or with the Being of beings in its unconcealment. [43] But I believe thwt this is a false ,d_]Iemma,due primarily to the fact that ,a misleaJding ambiguity 1urks in the eoncerpts of "object" and "objeict1ivity." It is one thing to impose orur purposes on our environment in such a way as to envisage things as" geia'r" or" tools"; it is anorthe:r to set ourselves to find out how things really are. It is to do the latter, not merely the former, as Heidegger seems to a,ssume, that one must hav:e a clear doctrine of how the oonsdous subject is, or at least may become, suffieiently "transcendent" of its particular situation to attain such knowledge.

However firmly each of us is embedded in her own historical situation and conditioned by ,the needs aims stemming from herr past driving her towards her future, we do have a certain degree of "cognitive traJweendence," as it may be caUed, of this situation. This is to be asserted not hecaiuse it is convenient or reassuring but because denial of it leads quickly to ,absurdity. W:hen we come to know that two p1us two eq;ua1ls four, thwt the Conqueror fought and won the Battle of Has:t,ings in 1066, or thwt there is a giant planet in our sola:r system which is outside the orbit of Uranus, we know what *is so* ahsoluteJy, not just is so *for* persons in

[42] Heidegger, " The End of Phliosophy and the Task of 'Thinking "; Krell, 382.

[43] Of. note 8 above.

our particular hist:oricrulmilieu. Even to say that each human being is too 1embeddedin her own historicrul situation to state what is so aboolutely presupposes some degree of cognitive transioendence *by* ith.e speaker *of* her historical .situation. What is being said is *about* human being;s .in general and supposed to he 1rue *of* them; it is not a.bout them .as they are me.rely *for* the speaker oir *from* her particular point of view. Any statement of cognitive a:-efativism,supposed to derive from the embeddedness of eaJch knower within her own hisrtoricwl·situation, in fact presuppo.ses .the falsity of such 11elativism. Now Heidegger seems rto assume that this concern of Husserl's is either based on a mistake or a matter of indifference. Does this imply that Heidegger's ibhought iis •thereby so :foitally&wed that nothing useful is to be learned from it? I do. not see why this shouM be so. Assertion of the cognitive transcendenre of human .S1Ubject to kno.w ·whait is *real,ly* so (and not merely so *from* •a pavtioolar historical perspective, whatever this would amount to) can perfectly .weM be combined fruitfoiMy with Heidegger's concern to make consciousness more sensitive, pliable, TeceptiVre,rand refieotive. Yet only when one takes •the cognitiV1elyself-1tvanscendingsubject as the arehimedean point ean one p:mooedto dismantle those aspects of the tradition that ought to be ·dismantled and to rehabilitate those thait ought to be lflehabilitated.

The " generalized ,empiricrulmethod " described by Bernaro Lonergan [44] provides the (broadly transcendental Thomist) point of view from which I will ;assess those aspects of Heidegger's philosophy which I have summarized. Without ·spending a great deal of time describing or justifying the merthod, I do wish to set out ,those of its: principles which will be relevruntto •thedis1cussion.

1. One tends to get at the truth rubout things, by means of 11easonahle*judgments* that are based on the possibilities that *understanding* can envfaa:ge<t0 •ruoooountfor .a s1Ufficientlybroad

[44] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: .A. Study of Human Understandmg* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), 72, 243, 423-30.

of evidence *in experience.* It is self-stultifying to deny this. Suppose someone *does* deny it. Then she is advancing her denfaJ as a truth. Does she then advance this1 supposed truth as the judgment that, among the mnge of possibilities that might be envisaged, best accounts for the relevant evidence in e:xipecience? H she does not, there seems no point in attending to wha:t she says, since no defonice of it, as more liruble to be tme than its mntradicto:ry, is to be offel'ed. But if she does, she is impliciUy presupposing the v;ery conditions of stating the tmth that she is explicitly denying.

2. It is equaUy self-stultifying to deny that one is a cons1cious subject -capable of making true judgments and judgments on the basis just ,s].rntched. The that one can make true jil.l!dgmentsis itself a judgment advanced as being true. To make we11-founded judgments which are liable to he tme, I must be a srubject of (a) experience, (b) understanding such 'as is able to envisage possib:il,iitiesand concoct hypotheses which might ,a;ccorn.mt for such experience, and (c) *judgment* which is -capable of fixing on the possibility or hypothesis in eaich case whlch *does* appa:venttly best account for the experieme.45 (The merthod of this kind of philosophy is "generalized emp1rl!cai.1:. It is based on awa11eness (" exper:ience " in a *m*"de sense) of one's exevcise of all these basic conscious capa1cities, including "ex:pe11ience" in a narrow 1sense--just as "empiricism " in the usuail sense is based on " experience " in tha.t nairl'OW sense) .

3. The actual world, i.e., reality, is nothing other than what true judgments a:re about and whait prope11ly-justified judgments (those based on the widest Tange of experience and 0£ envisaged possihilities) rtend 1fo be about. Any inteUigihle contrast :between reaJity and a;prpearanJCe, or between ,the aicbuail world and ithe wo111d merely *for* or *of* a particuJar individual or group, p:vesupposes a contrast between the !N'101eess of proper

,45 There is a fourth basic kind of conscious act, that of *decision,* by which one moves from judgment to action; but this is not directly relevant to the present discussion.

justiificaition taken just so iar and the ,same process: purSJUed indefinitely.

From points (1) a.nd (3) it will be seen that one important consequence of the generail:iz,ed:empirical method is tha.t the trarlitional view of truth (that it is primarily ,a mrubter of judgments or propositions) is .to be reaffirmed, in spite of Heidegger's a.uthority. Heidegger is perfectly right, I believe, that attention ,to conscious subjects ,and to ithe way in which they may be relatively "open " or " closed " .to the world is necessary if one is to understand much about ithe nature of truth. But it does not foll.ow f,rom this that truth is not, after all, primarily a matter of the rie1ation bebween judgments or propositions and rStates of affairs. Still, while truth is rto be found primarily in jrudgments, such jrudgments are an achievement of conscious subjects, who have rto eX'erl themseives to secure and maintain :a certain openness towru.rls the wor1d in order to reach iit. And Heidegger's work is extmordinarily instructive ,as to the natu:r:e of this openness.

Arttention to point (3), I think, brings out the solution to Heidegger's puzzile :about how there can be " agreement " or " correspondellloe" between entities .so heterogeneous ,as propositions or judgments on the one hand and material objects on the other. If the real wor1d, including rull the materiail:objects which it may contain, is northing othe!r <tihan what judgments *would* he rubout, if ·all the relevant evidence in experience were attended to and all :the relevant possibilities envisaged, then the problem of how statements can :agree with things disappears.

Heidegger stresses rthe manner in which whait is called " knowledge," especially in an em which particlliarly prides itself on its .technology, may represent an ass1JJult on things than 'an a1lowing of them to be as they illlre. Here, I believe, he is aihluding to· a distinction whiich is of the utmost importance; hut the manner in which he makes it is unfortunate and :seems to obscure some vital issues. What is rthe proper role of mental ",aJctivity " ruJJd "passivity" in 01Ur com-

mg rto know things? It seems to be true and very important to note thrut there are two .aims in science, that of contemplating the worM as it reaHy is and that of controHiing it for our uses, and, however worthy the second a:im., something deadly happens to the human spirit if :the seoond :aim :rultogether usurps rthe place of rthe first. In foot, from aistronomers to zoologists, first-rate natu!l"rul scientists appear from their writings to be :activrubedmore by ,a love for :and wonder at the obj.ect of their study than by a desire to control it.[46] It seems to me that the " disenchantment " with nature which so many haiv;e compiLainedrbhat scienoe has broru:ght on is rerully due to the assumption rthrut scienre is about control :r:ather than :contemplativ;e wonder. But in order to know things ·as they really wre, even when one tis motivated hy love and wonder rather :than ithe urge to control, the use of ·ructivepowers of rthe mind is nooessrury. These are clearly and distinctily described by the generalized empiriicrulmethod, in a way that does not seem to he possible in terms of Heidegger's thought. In order to come rto know white dwarf stars or peregrine falcons for what they are, I hav;e rto be sufficiently *passive* to attend to observations which go against the asSJUmptionswhich I bring to the subject. But I must also *actively* propound hypotheses and envisage possibilities .and must *actively* employ my faculty of judgment to determine which of these possibilities is best S1Upported by the obsel"Vlationswhich I ihav;e mrude. It is in fact *failure* to be mentally :active in these ways which is TesponsiMe for our imposing rulien caitegomeson things, ratheT tha;n getting to· know them as :they :veally are. As Heidegger rightily ins1ists, things do not reveal themselves :to me unless I open myself to them; but he is suggesth,,e 11atherthan precise and in some ways positively misleaiding abourt the nature of rthis openness. The genel'alized empimerul method pl'ecisely airticulates the three

[46] For the physicists and cosmologists, one might refer to the writings collected in K. Wilber'.s *Quantum Questions* (Boulder and London: Shambala, 1984); and for the zoologists, to K. Lorenz's *Studies in Animal and Humwn. Behwvior* (London: Methuen, 1971).

basic types of mental operation iin which tihis openness consists. What is to be avoided is by no means the ructively wttending, hypothesizing, and judging mind but rather the mind which is ·so obsessed with its pet theories that it is blind ito other possibilities and brushes aside any conflicting evidence.

On this aocOJUnt of the basic mental oper:rut:ionsinvolved in ooming to know, it is unfair to attribute the medievaJ. account of "substance" 1as "matter " and "form" exdusively (as does Heidegger) to 1the hruman tendency rto dominate things rather than ·ru1lowingthem to be as :bhey are. For .the diffe11ent realms of e:risbenoe do in fact seem to form a hierarchy, m which "matter" is p11ogressively"informed": chemical siub-1Stanr0esinvolve the imposition of sets of" forms" or structures on fundamental particles, organic life imposes 1another such set of "forms" on chemical substances, sensitive animal life on organic life, ·and human existence in turn on sensitive anima;l life. Eruch such "form" is !to be grasped by hypothesis and verified in the data of experience; so the structure of wha.t is :to be known, which is nothing other than the veal work!, is analogous to the structure of knowing. Eruch levcl of existence has its own 1srpecial set of inte1lig;ib1eproperlies, its " forms " in the Aristot1e1ian .and mediev:aJ. metaphysical sense, which distinguish it from the levels below it, while sha1fag the properties of a1l these levels. (A human being is to some extent characterized by the special human propevties of intclfigence and reason, but she is 1also ·subject to the organ:ic laws of gmwth 1and decay and to all the ilaws of chemistry and physics.) Thus the resuJt of applying the generalized empirical method is to hring out the correctness of this basic ArisrtOibelian and medievial insight into the natwe of things :and to show that the1re is no need to attribute it or even priimarily to the human obsession with making and controlling. I believe that Heidegger is pi!.1ofoundilycorrect that Kantian and qualificwtions in 1the long run make no essen.-tirul difference to the metaphysical analysis of the "thing" wihich we have inherited from the mediev.a.ls. But he infers

from this that both are to he !'ejected, whereas ,the considerations which I hav;e a1dduced seem lto lead rather to the contrary, transcendental Thomist view that both shol!lild be accepted.

Hut evien if it is w1'ong to envisage Scholastic eategor,ies too exduSliV'elyas means to use and oorrtrol, there is no doubt rt:hat the urge eXJcessively to use and cont11ol does exist and that it may poison and deaden our apprehension of the beauty and terror of the worM. Heidegger is .sureJy right thait it is one of rthe main functions of great art to 11ea:waken us to this. We become 1so used to the uses of ·an old pair of shoes that we no longer see it for what it is. What was originally the mpbure of scientific disoov;ery becomes part of the ,stale and taken-iforgranted furniture of the mind; a viewpoint adopted with a specific purpose is taken as universrul and unquestionable, long after the specific purpose has been fost sight ot

Heidegger <assoda:besthe tmditionail "form-matter" schema with the belief 1that we mentally things out of data, mtiher than direictly apprehending things as s1uch. This association seems to me to be correct, hut, in the l"eJevant sense, so does the belief. Jit is trrue that, in the usuaJ senses of " see " and" hear," we ,see and hea1r mar1ching by :and obois1ts playing their ins1tm1ments. BUit this is no more than to say that, when using the terms " see " and "hear " in these senses, we assume not only that we havce visual and aural impressions as though of soldiers ma11chingby and oboists playing hut that the:ve are actuarlily soLdiers marching and oboists playing wheire there appear to he. In normal ,cases we leap spontaneously from a .set of sensations to judgment, from a series of experiences *as though of* our most garrulous colleague waJ.king towa11ds us down the passage to bhe judgment *that* he is doing so. Alternaitive possibilities do not ooour to us, 1et alone commend :themselv;es as likely. It is only sped.al circumstances, like deception or psycho1og,1ml experiment, which i:ndruee us to draw out the distinction between the types of mental act involvied. In a psychology l,aboratory, I may wen consider the

possibility that things have ,been set up in such a way that the11e will 'appear to be a music-stand ten reet before my eyes when no S1Uch thing is there, and I may judge with good reason tha,t this is the corl'lect explanation of my experience. But the fact that I do not attend to the distinction between the various mental acts involvied hy no means proves that no such distinction exists. I may *engage* in a number of types of mental 31Ctivity without attending to the f3icl that I am doing so. It seems dear thait it is one thing to enjoy a paittern of sensation, 1another to judge 1the state of .affairs which would noTmaMy explain that pattern ·acbuaJlyobtains.

I have tried in this 'airticleto show, on the basis of the kind of transioendenta.1Thomism exemplified hy the work of Bernal1d Lonergan, how one may derive greaJt ,eniJ.ightenmentfrom the writings of Heidegger, without accepting at face vaiLue his raspersions on traditional metaphysics as a whole.

UNREAL REAL,JSM

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Contextual Realism, a Meta-Physical Framework for Modern Science. By RICHARD *H.* SCHLAGEL. New York: :Raragon House, 1986. Pp. xxiv + 808. *$22.95* (cloth). ISBN 0-913729-20-5.

The Many Faces of Realism. By HILARY PUTNAM. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987. Pp. 98. $8.95 (paper). ISBN 0-8126-9043-5.

Varieties of Realism: A Rationale fo!f' the Natural Sciences. By RoM HARR.E. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986. Pp. vii + 375. $34.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-631-12592-2.

REN PASSMORE wrote his assessment of British moral philosophy, he lamented that the fifty years which :had elapsed since 1900 had produced nothing beitter than so many variations on utilitarianism. Equally, a lament seems in order over the ourrent state of epistemology. After so many years of grappling with the problem of v,aJi-dating !l'eailism-consider, for example, the American scene during the first severail decades of this century: Roy Wood Sellars et al. announcing the "new realism " and George Santayana et al. announcing ,the "critical realism "- one might have hoped for an oiutcome more reassuring than Hie current £deistic realism.

But if the fideism disappoints, its rationalizations fascinate. Take, for examp1e, the trio o.f books discussed herein. They undertake a common project: to forge a raitionaJ justification for realism. They shave other features, not so 1audatory, especiaUy :a merely fideis:tic ioommitment to what might best be deseribed as *generic realism,* which finally evaporaites into

idealism. The mo,sit thait the authors can muster on behalf of realism amounts: to no more than this: " Something *(what,* we don't know) must e.rist outside our minds heearuse we aict on that premise with considemhle success, not only in daily life hut in scientific prructice, aillld the theories used to explruin it aDJd its successes form a logieally coherent whoJe." In other wo11ds, whait these "defenses" of rerulism offer is a *pragmatic representationalism,* organized and ultimaitiely vindi!caited by the ideaJist criterion of coherence and der,iving overai11 inspiration from a blind faith in reality.

The tip-off ,fa ,in the books' titles: *Contextual Real-ism, The Many Fa(')es of Realism,* and *Varieties of Realism.* How can you taJk about the "contexts," " v;arieties," and "many faces " of realism if__,espreiciaJJy by your own admiss:ion-you cannot identify 11eaJ,ity itself? The answer is found in fideism: you want to affirm extramentaJ reality, even though y;ou find it impossible to justify 1that affirmation ,rationaHy. So, in a flush. of ega,1itarian fervur, you aooept au plausible claimants to the title of " reality "; and being unabJ:e to say that any one ant is more or 11eal than any other, you hope to bring matters to a happy conclusion by apperuling to "varieties," "con-:te:xJts,"and "many faces" of rea1ity.

Hut the imperatives of life and thought maroe ,a harmoniza-,tion of ail1l these " realities" inevitable if anything resembling tl'IUe and false assertions is to he sav;ed. If, for example, common sense tells us that the11e la11e ,ice cubes and scienee teHs us that the11e are only indeterminate mass particles, we will want to know how these asse11tions can both be true. Clearly, the V'enerahle correspondence criterion of truth won't do here, is:ince we are fruoed with two oompeting objects of correspondence. It thus becomes necessary to enlist :the aid of the pragmatic theory of tmth to deoide which of the " realities " wil,l be designated " xeal " in a set of circumstances. Anticipating PiUtnam's we ma.y then say that ice and pink ones aJt that__,are real when we wish to mix drinks and that iDJdeterminate mass particles reail when we wish

to produce a scientific ruoom.mt of the phenomenon caHed " ice cubes." Still, .antil(Jipating Schlagel, not even pragmatism carries us far enough because it depends on knowing which resuJtis are felicitous. We thus turn fo the cohe11ence theory of tmth as our final court of appeal. It furnishes the rational context for designating the fol:ircitous results, in addition to ha.rmonizing assertions about varied realities.

The irony of this whole process is that our " :malists " end up with the idealist standard of truth and reaJity; the *known* and the *real* merge together. what can you expect? *If* things are not the measure of mind, if they do not proclaim their reality by their ¥ery being, then how do we establish a representat1on a.s real? Surely not by appealing to "conte:xts," "varieties," and "many faces"! If " 0 x 0 = O," ·so does " *5* x 0 = O." Only the coherence of likely accounts remains, and within this coherence lurks the .identification of the *known* and the *real.* In other words, the eardina,l principJe of reaJism, " Things are the measure of mind " is reversed to read " Mind is the measu11e of things." ·what is aidvanced as 11eaHsm turns out to be in the cases of Seh1agel and Putnam, perhaps in rthe case of Harre. The fo!l'mer two authors clearly appeal to the coherence theory of truth as the ultimate criterion of rational justification. Schlagel exp:licitly enshrines it; Putnam implies it in his resort to fornmd mles of discourse, while Harre's use of Gibsonian psychology, neo-Kantian concepts, and the 1concept of a " theory-family" may ye.t prove to be cryptic versions of 1it.

Thus what fascinates in these" defenses" of realism are the echoes of Hegel's principle, " The real is the ra.tionaJ and the rrutional is the real."

Schlagel: " A Meta-Physical Framework for Modern Science "

It was said ahove that Schlagel belongs fo that group of thinfuers whose readism is in crisis: within his heal'it he is a !l'ealist, but wi·thin his mind he cannot ma,nage to pin down exactly wha,t aspects of experience count as reality. He settles

for the position that science, as weH as everyday experience, testifies rto rthe :reality of the e:x't:ramental worM, hut a;dds that rthe meanings we attribute to the things which compose ,the wodd depend ultimately on the coherenoe of our assertions about them within the multileveled historical, cu1turail, and linguistic-of human e:xJperience. This anticlimactic " defonse " belies ,iJhe puflery on the dustj acket which announces that *Contextual Realism* is a "landmark" hook. For all its preoision and scholarship, it remains no more than a variation of that fusion of pragmatism with neo-Kantfanism and Hegelianism which has been peculiar to American philosophy since fast century ha,s been exemplified chiefly in wriitings of John Dewey C. I. Lewis.

Although Schlagel's commitment to 1eads him to disavow rany rdiSitinction between *phenomena* and *noumena,* his commitment to the sensationalist theor:ry of knowledge leads him to embraee neo-Kantianis:m and finaJJy idealism. His realism, being more fideistic than mtional, lacks the inte11eebual wherewithal to jus1tify an objective, veridical know1edg,e of rthe wodd. He is thus confronted with very distinction he wouM l'eject: between things as they a1re in themselves and things as ·bhey a[l)e known (i.e., contex-'tually conditioned) by us.

Consider the preeminence and origin of his coherence theory of truth: the "... final justification of truth must depend upon *the most coherent integra.tion of knowledge* " Although emphasizing the importance for truth of "Observable ,data, p:redfotab1e consequences, 1and experimental results or discoveries," he neve:rithe1ess adds, *"but insofar as their meaning and significance depend on how they are interpreted,* the coherence of the inte!1p:retation becomes the predominant fa;ctor fo the assessment, even though 1the other criteria continue to play some (247-48) .

Hence the transformation of realism into idealism. Charaiote:ristic of the coherence theory, mill!d, not things, is the somce of inrbe!lil.,igibility:" .. , heoause the world as directly ex-

perienced and described in everyday language does not reveal its own *raison d'etre,* we !have had to create theories to represent the jnternal structures and extensive background conditions on which the foreground of experience depends. these theories consisted of analogical models oopied from the operations of the world amund us so the process cou1d he imagined, but now that our theories have become so dependent upon exceedingly esoteric experimental da:ta and highly abstra:ct mathema:tical formailisms, the test of consists of internal consistency and congruence the experimental evidence, coherence"

In the book's inti:ioduction, Schlagel tells his readers that he seeks to develop, besides 'a theory of knowJedge, " a conception of Teality consistent the remarkable developments of twentieth century science." He says that t11ese developments portray physical reality as composed a series of levels, each of which consists of entities whose distinctive properties anticipate ,the st11uctures ,interactions found on the successively deeper 1eV'els of reality. Yet the journey to each 1suoceeding levd requires a spec1ulative leap, insofar as the transitions are incomplete. Aided by increasingly sophisticated scientific instruments, we attain ,a progressively deeper penetmtion into physical l'eality, revealing a reduction from the diversity and complexity of the entities most accessible to our perceptions to an ever .increasing unity and on the levels furthest remoV'ed.

Despite the fact that these discontinuities leave us unable fo fully why the entities on the deeper levels have the distinctive properties they seem to possess, Schlagel assures us we still have aocess to enough data to suppose that, conimairy to the Kantian rd1chotomy between phenomena and II'OUmena, physical reality is continuous, albeit multi-leveled. His claim that "the meta-physical pictillre of contextual realism" is "more consistent with the achievements of contemporary science if:han Kant's notion" (294) understates matters; more than being consistent with the achievements of contemporary science, his book from start to finish enshrines science as the best available knowledge of reality.

Unfortunateily, Sehl.agers a.rmamentariurm of truth cdteTfa cannot penetrate the ourita:in separ:ating mind from the physioail. wori1d for the simple reason that all cfaims about reality, including his vaunted experimenfal evidence, a;re contextuaHy conditioned, making it impossible to know the meaning of anything <aipairt from the ultimate context, coherence. But not only does the cohe11enceof a syst:em of thought have nothing in principle to do with the latter's correspondence with extramentiail reaUty, Schlagel himself emphasizes the merely provisional status of the most coherent conceptiual system, even a system highly rega;r1ded at present.

Schlagel'·s sensationalism leads to his inadvertent embraice of neo-Kantianism. Anytime intelligibility is severed fC!:1om its basis in extramental being, it must be imporbed and imposed upon :things. When aill data from the physicial world are reduced to sensations, our knowledge o[things becomes both subjective and unreliable. If the deliveralllces of our perceptions 'are fo be inteUigihle and oridered, then intelligibility and 011der must be imposed upon them *ab extra.* Thus Schlagel's conceptual systems tell us not so much ,about the obj,ects we experienoe in the world a:s about what they must be for us to know them. How similar this a1M is 'bo the distinction Kant dmws in the *Prolegomena* between (orur srubjeetive) "judgments of pel'ception" and (our objective) "judgments of expe:cience"!

Fai1ing to grasp the significance of the ontoJogica;l basis of kno1w1edge. Schlagel has no alternative brut sensationalism: all claims about the physical world mus:t be reducible fo empiriologicail knowledge. This bia,s first 1aipperursin the book's introduction whei'e Schlagel eava;lie11ly commingles Pfato's and Ari:s:to.Ue'sphilosophical explanations with their scientific explanations; while these thinkers" provided :a guamntee of objective knowledge hut a weak explanation of natrnral phenomena, the Atomists prnv,1ded a mol'e adequarte general framework (ais attested to by later developments in science) for na.tu:r:alphenomena, brut rr:aisedintractable ques-

tions :for a geneml theory of knowledge that have challenged modern philosophy" (xix).

The po!int of depa.rbmiehe cites is the dubiety of our sense periceptions, noted both by tihe Atomists and Galitleo, to wllit, the v:ariations of tastes, odors, and oolors, etc., which seem to originate not in the objeot pemeived hut in the inte:riaction with the pe11ceiver's sense organs. These variations, aiccordiing to Schlagel, constitute one of the primary features of the modern oonoeption of the world as opposed to the "realistic ,and ,essen:tirulist:iic conceptions of Plato and Aristotle" (xx).

Whi1e the radica:l shift in phi1osopillea.lpreo1ccupation which Schlagel describes did in fruct ocour, he shows little app11eci:ation for the fact that Plato and Aristotle were prima:rily concerned with an *ontological* aoooiunt of our knowledge of things, a level on which perceptual vaciations have little relevance. Our knowledge of the being, substances, and esse:rmes of things, aJ.ong with their essentfa,},lyrelated causes, p11esupposes an intellectual rather than a mel'ely sensible knowledge. The book's expressed concern with our knowledge of *physical* rea;lity and 1aim to provide "A Meta-Phys.iicaJ Framework for Modern Science" mig;ht 'Save Schlagel from the charge of being a sensahimse:lf were it not for his failure to display 1any inclination to give rn'edence to an ontological rarther than a merely empiriological arocount. He repeatedly treiats the oorrent state of scientific knowledge as if it furnished the primary examples of our knowledge of external reaJity.

The unvei1ing of *contextual realism* occurs in successive chapters on the correspondence, pragmatrc, and coherence theories of ttiuth. That Schlagel should end up as a contextua1ist comes as no srurprise; his sensationalist epistemology leads him to find: inadequaioies in the correspondence criterion. His blindness to the ontological levei of knowledge results in his totally misunderstanding Aristotle. Aristotle's definition of truth is " sayiing of what is that it is." The most obvious interp11etation of this defifil,tion, says Schlagel, collides with too many important instances where what we ha.Vie taken to be ob-

jectiv;e features of the world were" actually a function of our experience (such as geocentrism :and motion) or interpretation (as Aristotle's convictiion that nruture abhors a vaourum or belief in a,bsolute srpace and time)" (180).

Hut not to worry. Schlagel sees a way to save tihe co;rrespondence crite:nion. Suppose " we ignore the 11ealistic assumptions of the !'est of Aristotle's philosophy ... " and suppose also that being aware of ,the dubiety of our know:ledge, !he eschewed a naive or direct rerulism in fiavor of a contextual realism in which ail knowledge is" framework dependent." Here we have a version of :the correspondence theory that Schlagel. can live with: "..... whatever we can *mean* by something ' being what it is ' depends ultimately on our conceptual-linguistic framework (aMhough whether a *particular* assertion *within* that framework is true or false will depend upon how the world happens to be a1t hat [sic] moment), as Popper, Quine, Sellers, and Feyembenid maintain" (181).

The unreJiia:bility which Schlagel detects in the correspondence criterion of truth means that even scientific knowledge must uJtimrutely be context-dependent in ol'deir to be defensible. His sens1ationalist assumptions have scotched any hope of *aic*cepting a direct oorrespondence between the assertions of science and the entities to which they p;u:rport to refor. (:Bor him the correspondence 1criteirion ha,s its greatest reJiability in the realm of ordinary experience, but even then its meaning is contextually rela:tive.) Thus he invokies the pragmatic theory of truth--as expressed in terms of hypothesis and prediction-to scientific assertions. Of course, not even this resort proves sufficient, for pmgmatism presupposes an established frameworrk within which conJs:equenoos can he determined rto be felicitous o:r not.

In the end, the highest {3omt of appeal is the coherence theory of truth. The itest of truth "depends upon the assimila-<mon of new evidence, disco¥eries, or experimental resulrbs wtithin :an oMer framework that may have to be either :revised orr rejected to accommodat,e tihe newly acquired or :reinterpreted

darta, ... [thus] rthe totail *e;oherence* of the interpretation becomes the primary frucitor in assessing its truth." (247-248).

But, if the coherenee theory is the ultimate standal'd for assessing truth-v:a1rue, it suffers from the very lirnitaitions that a:ffiict all our means of knowiing. Since aihl assertions, Schlagel eonfesses, :aJ.ie falsifiable, our state of knowledge of anything remains open to the highest, most coherent conoeptual system can be nothing more than provisional (294-95).

Putnam's "Internal Realism"

Putnam, 1ike SchJiagel, faces the rdrchotorny between thought and l'eaJity, but his ,attempt at erasure amounts to no more than. ignoring it by an appeal to a rnuseul,ar pragmatism. As his argument unfolds, however, it beconies dear that he falls victim to the very neo-Kantianism he would use for his own purposes. In the end, he must resort to *thought* (i.e., varfous forma,l rules of discourse) to determine what is real.

Putnam pmposes a " non-alii:enated view of truth and a non-alienated view of human :flom:ishing" (1). As in his earlier work, *Reason, Truth and History,* he seeks to further specify hris project of "breaking the Sitranglehold" exerted by the dichotomy between 'objective' and '1subjective' views of truth." The " alienwted views " are those which " cause one to hse one or another part of one's seH and the world " (17). Such views are metaphysical realism, which holds that the mind simply copies a wodd which 1alfows description by only one true :theory, and ,relativism, which ho1ds that the mind constructs the wor1d. PIU'tnam's non-alienated view is this, tha;t "the mind and the wodd jointly up the mind and the world."

He calls this view "Internal Rea1ism" ("Pragmatic Realism,") : " Internal realism is, at bottom, just the insistence that realism is *not* incompatible with conceptuaJ. Teiativity. One can he *both* ,a :vea1ist *and* a conceptual relativist."

Putnam begins his project by addres1sing the tension between scientific 11ealism and commonsense realism. Scientific

!retailism l'esits on mathematical physics'1s way of conceivfog external objects, apparently introduced by GaJieo':s distinction between p!l'imary and secondary qualities. The forme1r are regam:1ed rus real because they 1are desccihabde in terms of mathema;tical formU1las; the Latter are not so regartded because they are not described in that way. This viiew led to the notion of a *8'en8'e datum.* Thus secondary qualities:, viiz., tastes, etc., ai11e not *in the thing* but are instead in the *sense data,* the product of the pel'ceiv:ingsubject, mused hy 1the int1ericaictionbetween the thing's prdmary qualities and orur perceptual appar.atills. Pu1tnam notes the disastrous effect of t:his view. Its diualistic 11epresentaitionof the physical world anrd its primary qurulities, on the one hand, and the mind and it1s sense data, on the other, led to 1the "post-scientific commonsense" picture of the phySiical wor1d which colliides with the realism of everyday ex:peri:ence,a realism which affirms the exisitence of tables and 1chairs: the consistent application of the primary /seoondairy quality distinotion means that ev;en solidity !Suffers the same :fate as color and taste. Despiite the absence of decisive evidence in favor of the sense-data theory, its in:fluem:iehas perfrom the .seventeenth century down to the rtwentieth.

But the prob1em with the " ' Objectivist' picture of the wodd" goes ·deeper, observes PIU!tnam, than 1sense data, which are only its symptoms. The :mot of the problem is the idea of an " ' intrinsic ' property, a pl'operty something has ' in itself ', apart from any contribution made by language or the mind" (8) . CorreJmbiV'e with the notion of an intrinsiic property is the notion of properties thait acre merely ' .appearances ' or something we merely ' projeot ' onto the object.

The distinction between *intrinsic properties* 1a.nid *appearances* engienderisthe notion of *disposition,* which, according to Putnam, .is rthe weaik point of the whole d1istinction. Not only color and solidity, etc., but so-caUed intrinsic priopertiies of 'extern·al things such as *solubility* rburn out n:ot to he intrinsiJc p['operties of aJUy external thing. Sugar does not a1wayis dissolve in wabeT, hu:t only under normal condii.tions. Thus **"If** the 'in-

trinsic ' properties of 'external ' things are the ones that we can represent by formulas in the Language of fundamental phy.sics, by ' siu.itab1efunctions of the dynamic v:acia.bles', then *solubility* is also not an ' intrms]c ' propenty of any external thing. And, simil:arly, neither is any' otherr things being equal' disposition" **(11).** A shaxp distinction must oocordingly be dr:aiwn between dispositions and so-ca.ii.ledintrinsic properties.

Lest one he Jed to 1suppose thait dispositions ("or ·at least ' other things being equal ' disposition:s, such as solubility ") are also not in the things themseilrveshut are mther something we project onto those things, PU!tnam challenges the notion of proj.ection. Projection implies a dichotomy between mind and matter. Hut despite Descartes's distinetion between two flllndamentaJ. .substances mind and matter, Putnam 1expressesconfidence thlalt·contemporary philosophy no Longer thinks of mind rus a separate substance at a11.

Othel1Wise the result is " metaphysicail realism," which, in Putnam's viiew, ironically resembles idealism more than realism. Fl.1om the standpoint of the common .sense wor1d, the efforts of metaphy;sicaJ. realism to supply the rationale for philosophical realism comes down to a denial of objective reality and the reduction of everything to *thought* alone. This is why P.urtnam 1elects to cast his fot with the " philosophers iin the Neo-Kaintian tmdition-James, Husserl, Wittgenstein- who claim that commonsense tables and cihairis and sensations and eleet:vons are *equally relit,* and not the metaphysical reailiists" (12) . (As stated a;bovie, we shaJ:l ·see that P.utnam himseilf ends in the mire of idealism.)

At the v;ery heart of the problem of vindicating philosophical realism is the increasing tendency, :moor:dingrto Putnam., to regard rth01Ughtitselrfias a prodeetiion. And rthis is because, despite its widespread! support, it remains to be shown that the view that " th01Ughst is j1Ust ia primitive property of a mysterious 'ruhsrtanre ', mind, [has] any content" (13) .

The esoope route fmm projection is neo-Kantianism. His warrant for this preference seems to be ·an interpretaltion of

Kant's first critique as meaning that the extmmental existence of noumena ha,s not been established and that we do not (and never will) know what mind is. Putnam insists that the a:lte!l."-native is to aissu:me, as the Objeotivists do, that *"mental phenomena must be highly deriv<ed physical phenomena in some way .. ,"* (13) .

That is to say, therre a11e two Objectivist assumptions. (1) "... there is a dear distillation to be dmwn between the properties things havce 'in themselvces' and the properties which are' projected by us' and (2) that the fondamentarl in the siingu1ar,,since only physics ha1s that status today-tells us what properties things have ' in themselves ' " (13) .

This, aocording to Putnam, has reduced modem Objectivism t:o materirulism. The latter's chief proMem is to aocount for the emergence of mind f:tiom matter. But the outlook for success in thi1s endeavor wi11 he no rosifil" than that of redru.cingcolor or solidity or solubility to fundamental phy sics--'which hias pmv;ed impossible. The functions of mind Desist reduction to brain functions for the simple reason that the 'intentional 'cannot be reidueed to the 'computational leviel' anymore than it can he to the ' physical level '.

This lea,vies the Objectivist with onJy one conclusion, namely, that intentionality as wen must he a mere "projection." But this is indefensible, for the very idea of proj ec:tion presupposes intentionality. Thus 1thought cannot he 'a mere tion. Intentiona,1ity is thought, i.e., consideration of the " aboutness " of thingis.

All of which clears the gmund for Putnam :to introduce his ·defense of 11ealism. Seventeeruth-1century philosophy has led to a dead ecnd in the twentieth century, hut the alternrutive Iis neither extreme r:elativism nor the denial of commonsense reailism. To be sure, ,,sevenrteenbh-centrnry conoeptions of the 'eX!ternal ;world', 'sense impressions', 'intrinsic pvoperties ', and 'projections', etc., have fai1ed to resoue commonsense

Putnam nevertheles1s reassures us: " There *are* tables 1and chairs and ioe cubes. There ar;e 'also elect11.1ons and space-

time regions .and prime numbers and people who ·are a menace to wocld peruoe and moments of beaiuty and transcendenre and mainy other things" (16-17). His only caveat here is that 11eailism with a capitail. R won'1t waish; in fiad it is the bane of ·OOmmon.seruserealism. The defense of commonsense reaJ,ism requi11es reali:i.sm with a smaill r.

Enter *Internal* (Pmgmatic) *realism,* which "... is, at bottom, just the msi:srtence that realism is *not* incompatible with conceptual l'elaitivity. One can 1be *both* a I"ealist *and* a conceptuaJ relativist " (17). Putnaim's claim that conceptual reLatirvity differs from triuth-11eLativismdemands ain explanation. What is the difllerence?

In anrswer, Putnam invites us to consider the foLlow:ing examples taken from the respective logics of Carnap and the Polish school. In 1a world of three individuaJs, the answer to the question " How many *objeots* are there in this world? " depends on your rules of formal discorunse. It might be supposed that, having posited a world of *individuals,* there must be three objects. After :all, how can there be non-abstmct entities which .aiie not ' indiwdru.aJs ? One possible answer is " There cannot be," if, for ·example, we :identify ' individual', 'ob;iect ', 'particrufar ', etc., and do not rega11d as absurd a world with only three objects which enjoy indepoodence and unrelatedness to each other (as ' logicail atoms ') .

Hut a different logicaJ doctrine cain jlll'stifysaying that these three mdividiuals amount to more than three objects. If, for ex:rumple, we aissume the premise of some Polish logicians rbhat ' for every two particulars there is an object which is their sum," then (ignoring the so-ca1led 'nun object ') it turns out that "the WOI'lld of ' three mdivffiduails'. . . actualJy contains seven objects ... " (18).

Now here comes the ticklish part 01 Putnam's claim thait his OOiliCeprturuJl"elativity diffor:s from truth-relativism. The ·answer to the question, "How many objects are .there?," is "three" or "seven" depending on how we use the wo:tid " object " o(r exist." The answer, a.ccoitling to him, cannot be reduced to

a matter of comnention and cannot validly he illlte:ripretedas being equivalent to oc implying *"radical* oultural relativism": "Om concepts may be ou.ltura1ly l'eiative, but it does not follow that the truth or failsity of everything we say using these coDJceptsis simply ' decided ' by the oult'l.llre. But the idea that there is 1an AI'lchMriedeampO!int, a use of ' erist ' inherent in the w:orJd itseiM, £rom w:hich ithe question ' How many objects *really* exist? ' mak!es:sense, is an illirusion" (20) .

This neo-Eantianism, then, is Putnam's be- tween commonsense realism and scientific ,realism. Depending on our formal rules of disoourse, "it may be possihle [!] to show how the ' same ' world can be described as composed of tables and chairs, with these objects described as colored an!d poossessing dispositional properties, etc., on rthe one hand, ,and composed of ·spaice-time regions, pruilides and fields, ertc., on the other hand. But '3Jl1though these two versioll!S of the worJ.d ave " deeply related," tihey cannot be reduced to ·a single vierstion; for the question " ' Whiah. are the real objects? ' " makes no sense apart from our choice of concepts (20-21).

It w::ouLd be diffioolt ito imagine a "realism" more barren and more confll'Sed than this. .Ais with Schlagel, PutDJam.'s wol'ds betray more than a mere flirtation with idealism: " Wihat is strange about the fear that only the Metaphysical Realist ·can .save fair common sense from Demon Re1ativism is that even Metaphysi.ral Realists recognize that the writ of .rationality runs farther than 1what they are pleased to call ' I'leaJlisttruth •" (30) .

Olearly, the realm of ,thoiught embraces moce than the realm of exii:stence,for more things can be thought than exisit. Brnt so what? Unless Putnam. thinks he can show that the criteria for being a thought and being an existent are the same, it does nort foJ:low from the greater extension of thought over things that the former are more decisive in establishing what is i.ieal. Putnam seems perfectly innocent of the criterion of c1assffical reaJism, " Things are the meaS1Ure of mind, not mind the measu11eof things."

Putnam's words, as do Schla.geJ's, ring witih the same iderulist imperative heard in Hegel's dictum, " The :tieal is tihe mtiona.l .and the rational is the 11ea:l." For he leaves no doubt that the forma.l ruJes of diisoourse determine what we rationally say the things in the world are like. Becaiuse, however, his "I"erulism" is fideistic, he cannot aoceprt the idealistic implications of his *Internal Realism* but insterud fervently (perhaps desper.ately) embrruces pragmatism. He follows Quine and others who urge us to reject the spectator point of view in metaphysics :and epistemology. (So much £or specufative knowledge!) We a,re to aiccept the "reality" of abstract entities because they are indispensable in mathematics, mic:roparticles and space-time points becaiuse they are indispensable in physi!Cs, 1and tables and chairs because they are indispensable in daily living.

This leap .away from idealism in favor of *pragmatic realism* can he traiced to acceptance of science as the standaJ.'d of knowledge. Despite his exho1r:t:ations to abandon ce11tain outlooks of seventeenth-"century philosophy, he seems nevertheless to cling firmly to Locke's view that the philosopher's vocation is to serve as an "undersweeper" for science. He goes so far in his a1dulation of science as to preach resignation ,to the prospect of having to live and phi1osophize without foundwtiorrs. Why? Becaruse" Science is wonder::fulat destroying metaphysical answers, but is incapa;hle of sub-,stitute ones. Science takes away foundations without prowding ll'eplaicement" (32) .

Adverting to the undermining influence whii!ch the dichofomies between common sense and knowledge have on common sense realism, Putnam seeks to show how his *Internal Realism* erases tihese dichotomies without lapsing into "sheer linguistic idealism." He insiists that on the strength of *Internal Realis1n* we ean stiH ,show that there is " ' externality ',' " ' something ' out there independent of l1anguage and mind."

But his defense against " 1sheer linguistic idealism " lays hare an *epistemological agnosticism,* itestifying to the way modern

philosophy has know1edge by separating the *object* of knowledge from the *thing.* It looks as though Putnam-despite his diso1'aimers on *internal realism* regarding the dichotomy between subject (mind) and object (thing)-ha1s whole the Ca11tesian dichotomy. He tha;t the11e are "' facts"' that we can describe them. Hut " we cannot say-because it makes no sense-is what the facts are of a11 *choices* " (3) . We can answer the ques1tion, recaU, "'How many object's are 1the1,e?"' by appealing either to the logical system of Carnap--in whrich case we answer " Three "-or to the ,system of the case we answer "Seven." Either answer correot on our "conceptual choices," is many objects there are.

The reason Putnam the indefonsibiJity of " objects existing ' independently ' conceptual schemes is that there are no for the use of even the logical notions from conceptuaJ is impossible therefore to assign an to category of Object or Substance. he we must reject the position that "... its aH " Some facts "are the!l'e rto he discovered and not by us "; we cannot embark on such discoveries before we "... adopted a way of speaking, a language, a ' co11'ceptua1scheme '." " ' F·act1s'," " ' ,exist'," "'object"' are not words us1a.ge is determined by "Reali1ty Itself" (35-6) .

would Putnam ha,V'e us suppose that his *internal real-* defends realism without acknowledging the 'thing in itself'. The latter engendem such a.s those between intrinsic and non-intrinsic properties, the former being the prope11tiespossessed things in 1thems1eilves;as we haV'e seen, accuses dichotomies undermining common sense knowledge.

Having dismissed the dichotomies, Putnam assures us that we ael'e no longer constrained to divide rernlity into a " ' sci-

entific ilnage ' aJJid a ' manifest image ' " : " T·ables and chairs (and yes, pink ice cubes) exist j111st as much as quarks and gravitrutionailfields.... The idea thait most of illllllndane reality is illusion ... is given up once and for all. But mundane rerulity [now] looks different, in that we are forced to acknowledge thait many of our familiar descriptions reflect our interests and choices" (37).

Barre's "Modest Soientifi() Realism"

Because Harre contents: llimself with working toiward a rationaJ. justification onily for *soientifio* realism, he keeps the ph:ifosopbical underpinnings of this project under wraps. NevertheJess, his appi11oach raises a question or two about these underpinnings and hence about the ultimate significance of his defense of scientific l'eailism.

Harre proposes a *modest* scientific realism, a " referential which he also caHs " policy I"ealism." In gener:al iterms, what he means by *soientifio realism* is ". . . the doctrine that science descriibes somewhat imperfectly and certainly incompiLetely, the world as it e:irists independently of the cognitive aJJid maiteriail praetices of mankind ..." (237). He quickly aidds that this reailism cannot be established by a "global rurgiument"; it is impoissib1eto ·oonstmct an argument that would justify a realist il'e3Jding of all scientific theories. He bases this disclruimer on the premise that there are three importantly different lci.nd!s of scientific object, each inhabiting ii.ts own realm and requiring its own criteria of verification. Rerulm 1 contains only objects of actual experience; Realm 2 ,contains objiecbs of possible experience; Realm 3 contains objects " which, if they we'l."e real, womd be beyond 'all possible experience ..." (237).

Harre undersicores two features of this scheme: the first is that most sciences make rnfel'ence to '3J1l three realms; the second is that the lines of demarcation between the realms are poorly defined. Where the boundaries a[l)e dmwn depends on historical and technical considerations (e.g., the invientiion of

the microscope). NevertheiLes1s,no difficu1ty e:rists iin finding representative objects for each realm.

Citing " hivalence " and " essentia1ism " as ithe chief 1sou:rces of scepticism toward scientific realism, he appeals to the principle of " material practices." The principle of bivaJ.ence, which holds that " ' The theoil'letic:akstatements of science are true or £w1se by virtue of the way the wo:v1d is'," p:vesupposes a truth-realism tihat the " best explanation " cannot defend. Essentialism, which is to proceed kom theory to pronouncemelllts aihouit what science is, misses the mark. The derense of science reqruires the appeal to material pra!C!bioos,i.e., to what scientists ·actuaJJy do when they do scieil!ce (3-4) .

Harre' *s* oonstruail of these mateciwl practices leads him to attribute a *moral,* rwther than an epistemological basis to science. The moral sensibility of ithe scientific oommunity-<which he rega:OO:s as 1aJdrn.irahle---iis needed, partiouilooly to stave off. ireJiativism, booaiuse there are no clewr-out procedrures fo.r determining common objects of peroeption and common objects of undeJJstanding. Thus a triadiition of trllJls:t must pe:vvade the scientific oonununity. Scientisrbs must have confidence in the integrity of their oo11eagues, rendering belief in the discove·ries and procedures of others reasonable. Moreo¥er, the everyday sense of truth and frusity does not emend to the unobservruble or the general, i.e., to theories and lwws. Tmth and £al,sity are, in Harre's estimate, jrusti:fied when used for confumation and disconfirmation of the trust-worthiness of expressed belief or opinion. Theiir use rorms pant of " the social netwook through which an epistemic *moral, order* is S1Ustainec1" (93) .

But despite the imtial emphasis Harre places on this mol'laJ. basis, he a11ow:s it to slip immediarteiLyfrom sight so th.rut it plays no furrther :vole in his defense of scientific realism. At aill events, iit iis haitl to understand ihow mor:ality oouild he defended .as rthe basii.s of a discipline or a family of diisciplines whose goail is undeTstanding. Also, the dffierentiation of disciplines depends on the specificity of their resrpootive objects of foous; how, then, couhl science w1timwtely be differentiaited

f11om commerce? Surely trust among rthe members of the business community is equally rnmrcial. Perhaps the impossibility of observing the putative denizens of Realm 3 science makes Ham?s emphasis on the importance of moral sensibility among scientists more undersitandah1e.

He argues t:hat realism assumes a different form in each of the three realms and aecordingly needs different defonses. Thus the project for the phifo.sophy of soience is clearly set tortih: "The pursuit of the philosophy of science becomes the effort to develop an adequate theo:i.·yof science for each realm, a theory which expJains how kno1w1edge conceirning the beings of each !'ealm is possible, and defines the extent to which the method!ologies of soience can auhieve it" (237). Although deficient, these defenses are hieramhica1ly velated: the defense of the "transcendental reaJ.ism" of Re1a;lm 3 depends on the "policy rea11ism" of Rea1lm 2 which, in turn, depends on a successful defense of the "pevceptual realist wccorunt" of Realm I.

modest 11ealist comtrurul of Realm 1 science appeaJ.s to Gihsonian ps;yochology.He argues that Gibson'>s anaJysis of pemeption speciific la constants in oiur pereep·· tiuail judgments; ecvien erroneous j111dgment.s,e.g., that there are canals on Ma.vs, can he shown rto be based on these constants (237-38).

He defonds the realism of Realm 2 science, *policy realism*, by an inductive argument. He begins with the proce-du11e of looking for so far unobserved entities whose e:icistence has been rendered plausible by the theoriz,ing of Realm 2 science. Past suooes:sesin this way of proceeding justify the practice. Ha.rre turns to the method of "]oon1c theorizing" to defond the procedure"s rationaiLity. Iconic theorizing preserves the generic natural kiinds of ReaJm 1 science, whose observability has ailverudy been established, and then proceeds to the formation of conceptions of unobserved objects by analogously e:iciending the features of observed nabural kinds into Realm 2. For eXjamp1e, Prasteur's ea11ly yea,vs in micmbio1ogy spent in-

vestiigaiting the influence of yeasts in fe:rmentation him with the " anailytical analogue " to explain the suppuration of vvuunds. 'iVerie the " ceHs " in £act bodily cells set loose by the disease, a.s Lord Lister thought? By thinking of suppu:ratfon as analogous to fermentation, Pasteur was to entertain the conception of the cells as analogous to yeast and thus to conceiVieof them as an infection: "In inducing a cloisu:rethe analytical had opened up a :research project, which cmlminated in the disco¥ery of the so-oal1ed '·attenuation of vhiuses' " (174) .

Such analogical conceptuaJiza.tion enables the formation of a "theory-family." The fatter is "1a kind of cognitive object characteroi.sticof theories that pertain to ... [Realm 2]" (193). PoJicy l'ea1ism itl]jusrconsists tin the formation of theory-families which not anticipate the manner in which new kinds of beings may be conceiV'ed but also suggest methods of constriuoting strategies for discovering of such beings.

Huit this way of proceeding oannot he extended to Realm 3 because the denizens of ithat realm e1ude aU possible ex-perielllce. Although aclmowledging some shifts in the boundary separating Realms and 3, as when technical a,dviances made viruses pos1s1ib1eobjects of visual observation with the electron mrcroscope, Harre neveritheless sees the division between these riealms as formidable: " A being which belongs to Realm 3 may or may not be of a familiar met,aphysica.l category and of one of the common natura,l kinds. At least some of the beings are not of familiar natural kinds." Harre has in mind here esotertic beings s1Uch as "the vector bosons of quantum field theory" (238-39) .

Clearly Rea1lm 3 entities create massiV'e problems for any defense of scientific realism. If rt.he putative objects of scientific discorrnrsel'emaiin fugitiv;e to possible experience, what is the wa;rrant for the ola1im that they are real? defense uses the concepts of *covariance, invariance,* and *symmetry* to justify the crucial putrutive link between the entities of Reail.m and 3. The Kantian concept of suhstance can be

analogically extended to the unobservabJ.,e entities of Realm 3, and an individual member therein is ,construed as a "conserved quantity." The proposed anrulogy then presents itself as that between substances as *permanent entity* and energy as *permanent quantity.*

Thus, depending on the Lorentz transformation, the " revision of rthe ieonoopt of mass leads directly to the popularly famous Einsrtiniainrelation E = Mc². This relation can be interpreted as introduoing a new conserved quantity, 'energy.' ... Or, to put the matter another way, the existence of this relation within ithe theory 1sh.ow:s that the laws which are covariant under the Lorentz transformation can be interpreted as being ab01Ut :a ' substance ' of unknown constitution but known dispositions: energy. A realist interpretaroion then cans for the postulation of H .being, ' energy ', to be the heart of a common ontology for physical theories. Whatever it is, the energy concept behaves like a substance concept" (250-51).

" Real " as applied to Realm *3* entities derives its meaning from the "Robustness ": "Whatever persists unchanged through chang.e is rea-1 ... " (277). This use of " real " is clearly cruciail to Harre'is adaptation of the covariance principle to validate the reality of Realm *3* entities. He ooaracter-

the Robustness Principle as" eX!ceedingpoweclul," iinsof.ar a:s it allows direct inferences from designated kinds of observable changes displayed by Realm 1 phenomena to phenomena iin Realms 2 or 3.

Harre does nort lose sight of the £act that, despite all the above strategies, the entities of Rerulm *3* remain unobserved. The properties which the <theoriesof Realm *3* science attribute to them do not reveal themselves to us. Rather it is the " affioodanoe·ś' 0i:f ibhese beings that such theonies describe. " A:ffordance" refers to the cwtegory in which Reailm *3* entities are expressed. An affo1dance is "a special kind of tendency, one for which the typioaJ. manifestation must be re1'ated to something specifiea1ly human" (283). Despite grounding in the objective properties of things, "there can never he a

wholly theory-wee reaili.ng of the natures of things from the oibservwbledisplays. of tendencies" (283). In other worlds, the w,ay the entities o[Realm 3 science appear to observation is shaped by the specifications and caprucities for display in the particular appaIDatusused: " A water dropilet can he seen by a phyisicist, but the ioniz·wtion of which it is a manifestation is !itself a manifesbation of the charge on a subatomic particle" (307).

AJlrtih.ough not importantly m-iginaJ, Harre offers a sober, thorough defense of scientific realism. His book abounds in incisive analyses .and bruJ.fa:nt critiques. His dismantJ.mg of anti-realist claims, s1U1ch as Cartwright's and Fraasen's, are cases in point. Unlike Schlagel, he is not content to acknowl1edge pomts of discontinuity between observ:able and unobservable entities and let matters stand at that; instead he appea1s ;to anrulogiuesand "theory-families" to vindicaite claims of ove!l"-all continuity in the scientific wo!l"1d view.

If there is .any point whei'e his 1approach raises a question, li.it is the absence of any aidvertence to a philosophicaJ under-1structu:re. Viewed exclusively in terms of providing " A Rationale for the Natural Sciences " (the book's subtitle) , his accomplishment, as impressive as it is, gives no clear rerudii.ng of just what " V'ariety" of realism he has S1Uoceededin defend-ing. Is it the fideistic variety which, like thwt espoused by Schilagel a:nJdi Putnam, ends in a pragmatic rep!l"esentationaJ-ism? Is it finally a cryrpto-iderulism? Harre's book unfortunate-ly provides no ·answers to these kinds of questions.

We cannot infer much about his *philosophical* ;l'eaJism from his claim that ReaJm 2 science (upon which Realm 3 science depends) depends on Realm 1 scie111ce, the obj,ects of which are observca.ble by ordinary experience. His defense of the veracity of ourr sense peroeptions, recalJ, resits on an :appeal to Gihsonian psychology, speci:fiooJJ.yto the lwtteir's structuralism, accoirling to wmch our pereeptual judgments rely on a set of l1aw...1ike oonstanrbs. As it stands, this can be interpreted in a neo-Ka:nJbiansense and thrus fits snugly with Harre's qualified neo-Kantian notion of srubstance and his concept of ,a theory-

family, whlch may also have a hard time escaping the neo-Kantian label. Insofar as a themy-family is a oognitivie object representative of theories that pertain to Reailm 2 and validated: by the consensus of the scientific community for the purpose of allowing the anticipation oi new kinds of beings, it sounds very much like Kant's set of 1a priori principles, "AnaJ.ogiesof Experience."

Of course, these things in themselves do not allow us to infer that Harre is a neo-Kantian. But if his defense of *scientific* realism does not spring from an authentic *phi"losaphical* realism-by the latter I mean a philos01phywhich ·starrtswith the knowing *immediate* and *certain* knowledge of extramentaJ. being-then wll Han-e will have aooomplisihed is to articulate the mtionally coherent manner in which science investigates real entities, *if real entities exist.* And I think !it is clear that he wishes to do more than that.

Concluding Remarks

How does realism become idealism? The proximate answer, I think, Lies in nominalism. Schlagel and Putnam deny the intellect the power to know *what* things are in themselves. The reptresentationialist theory of knowledge engendered by nomina1ism evisce['ates any iattempt to defend our ability to know exrtramenta1 realiity. For we know *that* things are at the same time thwt we know *what* they are. Abstractions suoh as " rewlii.ty" and " being " can mislewd, but when we say that we perieeive reality, we mean .thwt we perceive *things.* Things have dii.stinctive characteristics, and the less: we know these chwaJCteristics, the less we know that there are things. No one's introduction to rthe world of ertramentail reality consists of peroeptions o:f things *as such.* There are generic labels (as opposed to brand names) for products but not generic products. (Try to imagine a generic corn flake.) The world is popuiated by specific entities, and the specificity of ewch is intimately bound to distinctive characteristics.

1!f ,aJI we know are our representations of things, then what we know dil'ectily and in the first instance are the representa-

tions, not the things they pufatively represent. The cause of realism is confronted here with something mo·re serious than knowing *what the representations are* while *not knowing what the tliings they represent are.* 1t is a matter of knowing *what the represientations are and that they exist* (in *us, at least) while not knowing what and that anything beyond them exists.*

If we follow Sdalagel and Putnam in saying that we cannot know the p:roperl.iiesand characteristiies things possess in themsdves hut can only know instead our •representations of them, then like these writers we can defend realism only by ing to the pragmatic and ultimately to the coherence theories of truth,

But realism is pooDly served by pragmatism. The repeated confuma1tion of assumptions through successful action, although rendering increasingly pfausihle the dai:m that the world *is* as we represent it, does not eradicate the *de jure* possibility that the " external wor11d" is no more a dream. For aill that in principle the premises of pragmatism is that the proposition "Action x fulfii!Js the expectations of my assuming y" is coherent wibh other .assumptions by which I Jive.

Small wonder, then, that the coherence theory venerated by idealists should be brought forth as the ultimate criterion of ,truth! But by realists?

How i110n.ic that philosophers professing to he rea.lists should, in the end, embmce a I pointed to nominaJism as the "p:mximate " cause. But how account for the nomiinalism? Judging from the texts of Scihlagel and Putnam, the di-.rect cause of their nominaJism (and the penultimate cause of their idealism) is the *materialization of the mind,* Both writers discard ontoJogical knowledge in favor of sense knowledge. *A!s* the writings of and, preeminenbly, of Hume eloquently testify, the mere associartion of sensible properties bespeaks no intelligible str1ucitures, no formal cause, intrinsic to things. **If** the mind grasps only sensible prope:rt1ies,it has no experiential evidence for justifying the claim that essences are rea1l; for the *wha-tness* of ithings is not materia,l: matter itself cannot ex-

plain 0trganizrution. The knowledge that my stereo is rectangular in shape pil."esupposesmy apprehension of its *rectangularity;* to know that the indiwdual approaching my office is the .te1erphone repairman preS11.1pposesmy a;pprehens:ion of his essence, *man.* Brut the logic of materialization carries us farrther .than this. As Hume correctly saw, it leaves no evidential basis for saying even that •there are *things;* the evidence provided by seruse data or ampression:sjustifies no more than asserting the presence of mere *phenomena,* i.e., bundles of impressions.

If the proximate cruuse of the prevrulent crypto-iderulism is *nominalism* and its penuitimate cruuse the *materialization of the mind,* the ultimrute cruuse, it seems to me, is the asisumption that common sense knowledge and philosophical knowledge 1are dichotomized. This curious feature of modem philosophy bedeviiJs any attempt to defend realism. Our primary, experientirul knorw1edigetells us that *things,* not mere sensrhle erties, populate 1bhe womd. And the identillcation of an object of as a thing requires a knowledge of its *whatness,* essence, anid its *thatness* (existence, either possible or ructuail). Such spontaneous jUJdgmentsof common sense are the stuff of pmlosorphicruland scientific knowledge; they immediately proclaim their trruth to the mrnd. It is *evident* and *certain* thrut things exist outside the mind becruusethings are *ways of being,* booruuse rull things are reducible to being (.a;s indeed all concepts are reducible to the concept of beti.ng); thus being is the basis orf all intelligibility.

Once one foresakes the higher reaches of metaphy:sica1 abstraction in favor of the "clear and dtistinct," then the mruterializrution of the mind w:ith its attendant nominalism follows. As Blato observed in the *Sophist,* those who reject the doctmne of the For!Insin f.aV10r of sensible things becaiuse the latter can be grasped by ,the senses sihou1d uJ1timately take boulders to he the :most real of things, for they can be hugged!

Hut the writings of Schla.gel and Putnam unmask the irony in all this: when houLdel'lsare taken as the most real of things, they somehow transmute into the mere idea of bouillders.

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