THE DOMINICAN SCHOOL OF SALAMANCA AND THE SPANISH CONQUEST OF AMERICA: SOME BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

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SALAMANCA, northwest of Madrid and Avila and not far from Spain's border with Portugal, preserves the atmosphere of a medieval, Renaissance, and Baroque university even as it develops the schools and clinics of a contemporary center of studies. There are associations with Teresa of Avila, who spent the night there just after her reform was approved by Rome, with the young Cervantes, with Luis de Leon and Ignatius Loyola, and with John of the Cross, who was a student there. A bridge from the time of Trajan spans the river Tormes, and the Romanesque cathedral still reserves a chapel for the Mozarabic rite.

The University of Salamanca

The city brings to mind sixteenth century Dominicans like Francisco de Vitoria, often called the founder of international law, and Domingo Bafiez, confessor to Teresa of Avila. The Order of Friars Preachers, however, came to Salamanca in 1222 at the same time that Dominic's missions were taking root in ·Paris and Bologna; the friars founded a priory and soon a school under the patronage of St. Stephen (San Esteban). The " Dominican School of Salamanca " means formally the line of great theologians reaching from Diego de Deza at the end of the fifteenth century to Tomas de Lemos, a main protagonist in Rome in 1607 in the controversy over grace entitled *De Auxiliis.* Today, after seven and a half centuries of existence, the Salamancan

Dominicans remain a vital community, active m teaching, research and publishing.

My attention was directed to the Dominicans at Salamanca by two volumes of essays reporting on congresses concerning the "Dominicans and the Discovery of the New World." My interest was not church history but the history of theologies of how grace might exist outside of explicit faith and sacramental baptism. The following report is a bibliographical survey of recent research on a theological era and school. Focusing on the thought of the theologians stimulated by the experiences of the missionaries in the Indies, it treats the Dominicans during the first decades after the voyages of Columbus.

In the 1480s, as it entered its golden age, the University of Salamanca had a hundred professors and almost *7000* students. University records begin late, but they show that in *1546/47,* one hundred thirty-four Dominicans were studying at the university, and in 1598/99, eighty. J. L. Espinel has written. a historical guide to the Dominican buildings and institutions.[1] The great period of the Dominican school at the University began with Diego de Deza (1480-1486), professor and archbishop of Seville, and Matias de Paz (1518-1519), a professor of Scripture. Francisco de Vitoria (1526-1546) and Domingo de Soto (1532-1549) were its most gifted thinkers, but the school's achievements continued with Melchior Cano (1546-1552), Juan de la Pefia (1561-1565) and Domingo Banez (1581-1604). These

t *San Esteban de Salamanca, Historia y Gufa, Siglos, XIII-XX* (Salamanca: Editorial San Esteban, 1978); see also R. Hernandez, "Convento y estudio de San Esteban," *La Universidad de Salamanca* (Salamanca: Universidad, 1989), pp. 369ff.; A. Martin Melquiades, "La Escuela de teologia de Salamanca," *Atti del Congresso internazionale, Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario, Tommaso d'Aquino nella storia del pensiero,* 1:2 (Naples: Edizione Domenicane Italiane, 1975), pp. 242ff. A Salamancan Dominican of the 1930s, Vicente Beltran de Heredia, pioneered research in the history of the university and in the writings of the Dominican speculative masters. His writings can be found in past issues of *Ciencia Tomista* (CT), and some of his books and several recent collections of his most important essays are available from Editorial San Esteban. Similarly initial research in the United States can be found in the writings of Lewis Hanke.

are joined by lesser figures like Pedro de Sotomayor (1560-1564), Mancia de Corpus Christi (1564-1576), and Bartolome de Medina (1576-1581). The occupants of the chair in theology of the liturgical hour of prime from Vitoria in 1526 to Bafiez's retirement in 1604 were all Dominicans, while the chair of vespers was held by Dominicans from Domingo de Soto's inception in 1532 to Pena's concluding lectures in 1565.

In the late autumn of 1486 and the winter of 1487, Christopher Columbus was in Salamanca to explain his transoceanic plans to professors in cosmology and the arts. While the university cosmologists were unreceptive, a *catedratico* in theology, Diego de Deza, became his supporter (according to a letter from Columbus in 1504), and according to firm tradition Columbus resided in the Dominican's buildings for a while. De Deza was also tutor for the son of Isabel and Ferdinand, Prince Juan, and so he could support Columbus's plans at the court of the Catholic Monarchs, and that support continued later when de Deza became archbishop of Seville.[2]

The sixteenth century is often designated "the golden age " of the university and of the Dominican studium of San Esteban. An important neo-scholastic and neo-Thomist revival was underway. Some of the theologians who worked for a humane policy in the Americas were later to be important figures in the deliberations of the Council of Trent and in the changing theological discussions over spirituality, grace and free will, and moral theology.

Research and Congresses

In October, 1508, Thomas de Via Cajetan, the superior general of the Dominicans, urged the Spanish Dominicans to send men to the Indies, and the first group arrived in 1509 or 1510. This theme of Dominicans in the Americas, as Spain and Europe were extending their geographical perspective, has called forth a

[2] Ramon Hernandez, "Fray Diego de Deza, un hombre entre dos mundos," *CT*, 81 (1990), 495ff., and L. Espinel, "Colon en Salamanca," *Congreso Internacional sabre los Dominicos y el Nuevo Mundo* 2 (Salamanca: ESE, 1990), pp. 16ff.

flood of research, finding expression in congresses and books. In the early 1980s, Spanish Dominican historians founded a special group, HIVEDA, to work in this area in an intensive way, and they planned a set of congresses, leading up to the Columbian anniversary. The first assembly was held in Seville in 1987, and forty essays from it have been published as *Actas del I Congreso Internacional sobre Los Dominicos y el Nuevo Mundo.*[3] A second congress was held in 1989, and its dozens of specialized articles are published by Editorial San Esteban (ESE) as *Congreso Internacional sobre los Dominicos y el Nuevo Mundo. Actas de II Congreso Internacional.*[4] A third congress focusing on the seventeenth century was held in 1990 (that volume will also appear), while a concluding assembly will take place in Cadiz in the anniversary year, 1992. In Rome in 1985, a conference was held on the two figures of Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolome de Las Casas; among those thirty-one studies are essays on the relationship between the two Dominicans, on Vitoria's education, world-view and influence, and on natural law or pastoral practice in Las Casas.[5] All in all, these hundreds of articles treat a wide range of topics (pastoral as well as theological) like free will, natural law, styles of evangelization, catechisms, schools, bishops, canon law, and libraries. ESE has also published the early catechism by Pedro de Cordoba, O.P., *Doctrin'a cristiana para instrucci6n de los Indios;* writings by Las Casas *(Brevissima Relacion .. .)* and Vitoria *(Doctrina sobre los Indios);* the diary of Tomas de la Torre, O.P., *Diario de Viaje, Desde Salamanca a Ciudad Real de Chiapas, 1544-1545.*[6] Recent issues of the Salamancan Dominican journal in theology *Ciencia Tomista (CT)* give further reports and articles in this area.

s (Madrid: Deimos, 1988), 1056 pages.

4 (Salamanca, ESE, 1990), 1037 pages. J. Barrado gives a history of HIVEDA in *Los Dominicos* 2, pp. 7ff. and a lengthy report on the second congress in *CT* 80 (1989), 393ff.

5 *I Diritti dell'Uomo e la pace nel pensiero di Francisco de Vitoria e Bartolome de Las Casas* (Milan: Massimo, 1988), 684 pages, including a bibliography of essays (pp. 309-321ff.).

6 All recent publications of Editorial San Esteban.

The Dominicans have not been alone in studying their history. Two volumes of similar essays on the Franciscans in the Americas can be found in *Archivo-lbero-Americano,7* and a second pair of books offers two thousand pages of essays on their theology and praxis in this period.[8] The Franciscans bring different, often creative approaches to pastoral problems, as well as sometimes a certain mystical and millenarian mentality. Stimulated by the important Augustinian in Mexico, Alonso de Veracruz, two volumes of essays from an Augustinian congress in Valladolid in 1990 are being published.[9] There are also dozens of essays in *Evangelizaci6n y teologia en America (Siglo XVI).*[10] Mention should be made of an on-going series, *Corpus Hispaniorum de Pace,* begun in 1963. Thirty volumes have appeared: some give documents on issues confronting the imperial government and the church from the first decades after 1492; others treat topics like evangelization. Two particular volumes are devoted to the Dominicans Pefia and Vitoria. Volume twenty-five, *Francisco de Vitoria y la Escuela de Salamanca. L'Etica en la Conquista Americana (1492-1573) (FVE),*[11] stands out as a collection of fourteen essays on two topics: the polemics and deliberations between professors and government, and the influence of Salamanca. The Society will offer its own theologians writing on these issues, for instance, Francisco Suarez, but with its foundation only in 1541 it does not take part in the work of the first decades. In the tenth volume of this *Corpus* there is a good survey of the activity of the

1 Volumes 46 (1986) and 48 (1988).

s *Actas del I Congreso Internacional sobre los Franciscanos en el Nuevo Mundo* (Madrid: Deimos, 1987); *Los Franciscanos en el Nuevo Mundo, Actas del II Congreso Internacional* (Madrid: Deimos, 1989); see L. Gomez Canedo, *Evangelizaci6n y conquista: experiencia franci'scana en Hispanoamerica* (Mexico: Pordua, 1977).

9 For the works of Veracruz see volumes published by E. J. Burrus between 1968 and 1976, publications of the publishing house of *Estudio Agostiniano* at Valladolid, and P. Cerezo de Diego, "El Pensamiento Americano de un Discipulo de Vitoria: Alonso de Veracruz," *I Diritti,* pp. 255.

1.0 (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1990).

11 (Madrid: C. S. I. C., 1984). A bibliography of manuscripts and early publications in this area is in A. Rodriguez, "Fuentes y Bibliografia. Manuscritos," *FVE,* pp. 546ff.

Jesuits and in volume twenty-five the thought and project of Jose de Acosta from 1576.

Colonists and Critics in Espanola

The first Dominican missionaries to Espanola had been educated in a major theological center and were members of a province influenced by reform movements (Cajetan's letter had mentioned that " the friars may take their books with them " [12]). Articles by Ramon Hernandez and others give a picture of Dominican evangelization in the years after 1510 through letters, reports, and descriptions coming from the Dominican missionaries.13 There was a sense of being a community evangelizing through preaching and an exemplary life; to this was joined a conviction that living a poor life was necessary to preach the Gospel to the Indians, and particularly to those who had already begun to suffer from imperial Spain. The Christian message was presented by beginning with the creation of the world and then by tracing the nature and love of God up to Christ and his saving cross.[14] In the following decades, despite contacts with many peoples, many Dominicans rejected rapid evangelization and hasty baptism; they noted that Aquinas held that it was not enough for those who freely wished to become Christians to know the creed, but they had first to show by their life that they in-

12 *Registrum litterarum fr. Thomae de Via Cajetani, O.P., Magistri Ordmis (1508-1153),* A. Meyer, ed. (Rome, 1935), p. 7.

13 See R. Hernandez, " Pobreza y evangelismo de los dominicos en Indias," *CT* 8 (1987), 437ff., and "Rasgos modelicos de la primera evangelizaci6n lascasiana en America," *CT* 81 (1990), 499ff.; D. Barobio, et al, *Evangelizacion en America* (Salamanca, 1988); P. Castenda, *Los Memoriales del P. Silva sabre le predicaci6n pacifica y las repartimientos* (Madrid: C. S. I. C., 1983); A. Huerga, "La Obra intelectual de la Orden de Predicadores en America," *Los Dominicos* 1, pp. 689-714; the lengthy article by M. A. Medina, " Metodos y medios de evangelizaci6n de los Dominicos en America," *Los Dominicos* 1, pp. 157-207 as well as other articles from the first congress and the essays in "Special Number Dedicated to the V Centenary of the Discovery and Evangelization of America: 1492-1992," *International Dominican Information* 291 (September, 1991), 114ff.

14 B. de Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias* 2 (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Espaiioles, 1961), p. 134b.

tended to be followers of Christ.[15] The Dominicans were convinced that a native clergy must be established and that a range of educational projects would benefit the indigenous peoples. Needless to say, this pastoral theology was not universal or dominant.

On the Fourth Sunday of Advent, 1511, Anton de Montesinos, one of the first four Dominicans in America, delivered in Santo Domingo an initial, dramatically critical sermon against the mistreatment of the Indians.[16] Montesinos did not hesitate to call this cruelty to the Indians-they were human beings like the Spaniards-a mortal sin which would bring eternal damnation (some scholars think that later back in Spain he wrote a defense of the Indians which is now lost). Bartolome de Las Casas described Montesinos : " He had the grace of preaching, was sharp in criticizing vicious people, heated, effective. . . . With great animation he gave the first sermon on this subject, totally new among the Spaniards on this island."[17] Letters of protest against Montesinos soon reached Spain, and the royal court commanded the superior of the Dominicans in Espanola, Alonso de Loaisa, that he advise his preachers to temper their inflammatory preaching.

In 1512 the Royal Council requested from the superior in Espanola (and perhaps in Salamanca) Dominicans who would present the critical position, and the Dominicans sent Montesinos and Pedro de Cordoba to explain in person the situation. A commission of experts in theology and law was assembled the same year in Burgos to consider colonial policy, for King Ferdinand had accepted the idea that these issues needed study. The result-

15 J. A. Barreda, " Primera anunciaci6n y bautismo en la obra de Bartolome de Las Casas," *CT* 80 (1989), 291ff.; I. Perez, "El 'tiempo dorado' de la primera evangelizacion de America, hechura del Padre Las Casas," *CT* 80 (1989), 27lff. (both in *Los Dominicos* 2).

16 R. Hernandez, " Primeros dominicos del convento de San Esteban on America," *CT 77* (1986), 392ff.; "Doctrina Americanista de los te6logos de San Esteban." in *Humanismo cristiano* (Salamanca: Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Salamanca, 1989), pp. 205ff.

11 B. de Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias* 3.

ing laws treated largely conditions of work; in terms of admitting the rights of the Indians, they were incomplete and deficient. Matias de Paz, Dominican professor of Scripture at Salamanca, was present at this first moment of Spanish critical reflection on the *conquista.* Paz was reacting to both the Burgos meeting and the reports of Montesinos' preaching when he wrote in 1512 *Del Dominio de los Reyes de Espana sobre los Indios,* the first intervention of theologians on the problems of the Indies.[18] Paz rejected denying the Indians their rights, dominion or social structure because they lacked Christian faith (some Spaniards even thought that the new life of baptism deprived the Indians of their goods).

> Now it is that the Indians, as is stated, after knowledge of the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ has arrived, have most freely received the sacrament of baptism. And so it seems that in no way is it licit to hold them as slaves with " despotic rule " and those who so burden them are held to restitution. . .. For through grace divine *"jus"* does not take away that which is of human *"jus* ".[19]

But Paz's work is a circumscribed treatise of aspects of dominion and is concerned with justifying papal jurisdiction over all peoples, albeit for preaching the Gospel.

By 1516 the Dominican superior in the Indies, de Loaisa, although defending a papally approved presence of the Spanish, was questioning the growing number of opportunistic invasions. Meanwhile back in Spain in the 1520s, Bernardo de Mesa, preacher at the Spanish court and designated bishop of Cuba, denied that the Indians were natural slaves or were condemned to any loss of freedom by their lack of faith; he observed that whatever commission was given to European monarchs by Pope Alexander VI was given solely to preach Christ to new lands. A group of Dominicans had already met in 1513 at the priory of St. Paul in

[18] V. Beltran de Heredia, "El tratado del Padre Matias de Paz, O.P. Acercera del Dominio ...," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 3 (1933), 133ff.: see Hernandez, "Doctrina americanista," pp. 197ff. and "La Escuela Dominicana de Salamanca ante el Descubrimiento de America," in *Los Dominicos* l, pp. lOlff.

[19] "El tratado ...," p. **141.**

Valladolid to discuss ways of opposing further invasions (which some Spaniards justified by recalling Joshua). [20] The reports of Cordoba and later of Las Casas gave their confreres in Salamanca a picture of the increasingly horrible conditions in the colonies. This began, through countless letters and personal visits, an exchange in theory and praxis concerning the mistreatment of the Indians, a conversation lasting for fifty years between the university professors in theology and the friars at work in what was for them a new world. Carlos Baciero writes : " The Dominicans were deeply involved with the problems of the Indians . . . and possessed better information concerning the changing situation in America, and they kept working to expand their knowledge." [21]

Bartolome de Las Casas

Bartolome de Las Casas (1474-1566) was a missionary and a colonial chaplain, but he was also a social activist, a writer and speaker, and his thinking built upon the neo-Thomism of his Salamancan confreres.

He went to Espanola in 1502 as a colonial adventurer and participated in various expeditions and received an *encomienda,* land with indentured Indians. Perhaps the first person ordained in the Americas, he became a priest about 1512 and took part as chaplain in the conquest of Cuba. Having first resisted the critical preaching of the Dominicans, he was converted on the feast

[20] On these very early critics of Spanish policies, not all Dominicans, see A. Garcia y Garcia, " El Sentido de las primeras denucias," *FVE,* pp. 72ff.

[21] " Conclusiones definitivas de la secunda generacion," *FVE,* p. 416. There is the rather eccentric theory that the efforts of the Salamancan friars were not aimed at the Indians but at the refutation of the ideas of Protestant reformers; see Q. Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 2, pp. 135ff.; A. Pagden, "Dispossessing the barbarian, . . . " *The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 79ff. The presentation mixes together Dominican and Jesuit thinkers from over fifty years, and finds a few vague references to Luther in works on civil society or church. For the Dominicans in Salamanca after 1510, Wiclif is a condemned figure from the distant past, while Calvin's writings have yet to arrive. This view runs contrary to the close link between the Dominican friars, theologians or mission2ries.

of the Assumption, 1514, and soon announced he was setting free the Indians and working to end the *encomienda* system. He sought advice from Pedro de Cordoba (whose letters must be considered as very early defenses of the Indians [22]) on how to present to the king the agonizing situation of the exploited Indians. Las Casas returned to Spain in 1515 to formulate a peaceful alternative to colonialization. Diego de Deza, now Archbishop of Seville, recommended him to the court. Ferdinand was dying and Cardinal Cisneros supported the *Plan para la reformacion de las Indias,* a plan for ideal communities of Spaniards and Indians; it was written in the same year, 1516, that Thomas More published *Utopia.* The plan was brought back to America but was blocked by the colonial administration and a further plan for an enlightened missionary approach by Hieronymite friars, who could not withstand the pressure of the colonists, failed.

Las Casas defended the Indians before the Spanish parliament and Charles V in 1518 and 1519, and the Emperor accepted the idea of founding free towns, for farming rather than mining, of Indians and Spaniards in Venezuela. Violence on all sides in the Americas made this project unsuccessful; returning to Santo Domingo, Las Casas entered the Dominican novitiate in 1522 and retired to work in parishes while laboring on historical studies of the exploitation of the Indies (which he requested be published after his death). In 1530 he was again stirred into action for the Indians and published his pastoral plan *The Only Method of Attracting All People to the Faith* in 1537 and then, while awaiting an audience with the Emperor in Spain, composed his *Very Brief*

[22] R. Hernandez, "Pedro de Cordoba, primer mentor de la lucha por los derechos del Indio," in "Doctrina Americanista de los teologos de San Esteban," *Humanismo cristiano,* pp. 213ff.; see Saranyana, "Principales tesis teologicas," *Los Dominicos,* 1, pp. 323ff.; V. Rubio, "Una carta inedita de Fray Pedro de Cordoba, O.P.," *Communio* 13 (1980), 417ff. S. Boria, *Fray Pedro de Cordoba, O.P. (1482)-1521* (Tucuman: Universidad del Norte Santo Tomas de Aquino, 1982); M. A. Medina, *Una communidad al servicio del indio. La obra de Fr. Pedro de Cordoba, 0.P., (1482-1521}* (Madrid: Instituto Pontificio de Teologia 0.P., 1983); on Cordoba's catechism see J. I. Saranyana, "Principales tesis teologicas de la 'Doctrina cristiana' de Fray Pedro de Cordoba, O.P.," *Los Dominicos* 1, pp. 323ff.

Account of the Destruction of the Indies. "The reason," Las Casas wrote, " why the Christians have killed and destroyed such an infinite number of souls [which Las Casas estimated in 1531 to be over a million] is that they have been moved by their wish for gold and their desire to enrich themselves in a very short time." [28] The practice of *requerimiento* was to announce (in Spanish) to an Indian village the arrival of the preaching of the Gospel and then to use any indigenous resistance to justify force and bondage; in that way evangelization was joined to colonial expansion. The "New Laws" of 1543, owing something to Las Casas, seemed to guarantee some improvement. Las Casas was named bishop of Chiapas (Guatemala), but his strict rejection there of holding the Indians as bestowed property alienated the laity and even some clergy who were arguing for exceptions. His prophetic stance ended with him leaving his diocese, and travelling north to Mexico City, the center of opposition to the New Laws. He was requested by the viceroy to remain in Oaxaca until the threat of a riot over the arrival of the Dominican reformer diminished. The New Laws remained but with a modification which permitted the *encomienda.* After attending a meeting of all

2a *Brevissima relacion* ..., p. 36. For the works of Las Casas in a critical edition see P. Castaneda, ed., *Obras Completas* (Madrid: Allianza, 1980), 9 vols., and *De Regia Potestate, Corpus Hispaniorum de Pace,* vol. 8. For the work *Unico Modo* ... in English, see H. R. Parish, *The Only Way* (New York : Paulist, 1991). On Las Casas and others see the essays in *I Diritti dell'Uomo* ..., *Bartolome de Las Casas* and in *Symposium Fray Bartolome de Las Casas. Transcendencia de su obra y doctrina* (Mexico City, 1985), and the volumes of *Los Dominicos.* An extensive bibliography of works by and on Las Casas can be found in *En El Quinto Centenario de Bartolome de Las Casas* (Madrid: Instituto de Cooperacion Iberoamericana, 1986), pp. 185-222. Recent works on Las Casas and the Dominicans of the first decades have appeared in France: *Le Rendez-vous* d S. *Domingo* (Paris, 1990), *Autour de Las Casas* (Paris, 1987), F. Orhant, *Bortolome de Las Casas, Un Coloni-' sateur saisi par l'evangile* (Paris, 1991), and books by Marianne Mahn-Lot like *Bartolome de Las Casas et le droit des Indiens* (Paris, 1982) and her editions of his writings. From Germany there are M. Neumann, *Las Casas* (Freiburg: Herder, 1990), T. Eggensperger, *Bartolome de Las Casas, Dominikaner, Bischof, Verteidiger der Indios* (Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald, 1991), J. Meier, *Zeuge einer befreienden Kirche, Bartolome de Las Casas* (Leutesdorf: OTC, 1988).

the bishops in New Spain he returned to Spain for good in 1547. There at the age of seventy-six he vigorously opposed in verbal and written debates after 1550 the arguments of Juan Gines de Sepulveda (whom Juan de la Pena described as " gifted in canon law but mediocre in theology " [24]) that the Indians were children entrusted to Spain. At ninety he was still publishing works critical of the colonial system, opposing policies at the court and revising his historical writings. The ideals of Las Casas continued and expanded in the work of some professors and in the lives and writings of dozens of zealous followers throughout the Americas like the Franciscan Juan de Zumarraga, first bishop of Mexico, and bishops in Guatemala, Panama and Columbia. No small number of priests, little known today, wrote their own " relations " attacking the condition of the Indians and offering alternatives. [25]

The Salamancan School

Ramon Hernandez's articles sketch the tradition of the Salamancan school from 1500 to 1600 in its theological critique of colonial exploitation. [26] This " second Thomism " was a conservative theology, drawn from the scholasticism of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and expounded in occasional pieces and in commentaries on the *Summa theologiae* and the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. If Vitoria and Soto were the central and catalytic figures, the tradition of writing on the Indies continued in Banez and Cano, and some experts think that Juan de la Pena, lecturing on the *Summa theologiae* in the 1550s and 1560s, ranks with

[24] *Debello contra insulanos, Corpus Hispaniorum de Pace,* vol. 9, p. 212.

[25] For a list see G. Lohmann Villena, "La projecci6n en las Indias de las doctrinas de Vitoria y Las Casas: de la teoria a la praxis," *I. Diritti,* pp. 140-151.

[26] The best survey of the school's theology defending the Indians as stimulated by Dominican missionary reports is R. Hernandez, " Doctrina americanista de los teologos de San Esteban" in *Humanismo cristiano,* pp. 197-351 (a shorter version, "La Escuela Dominicana de Salamanca ante el Descubrimiento de America," appears in the acts of the first congress ; *Los Dominicos* I, pp. IOlff.).

Vitoria.[27] One stimulus for the Spanish theological *Renacimiento* in the sixteenth century was the burning issues raised by the meeting of new peoples in the Americas.[28] Andres Martin Melquiades lists the following characteristics of this Spanish Dominican school, and aspects of its tradition and approach: (1) the elimination of useless, antique or linguistic issues; (2) a continuity with the past, not only with Aquinas and previous Salamancan friars but with Scripture and the Fathers; (3) an attention to contemporary moral and pastoral issues; (4) a literary clarity and balanced judgment; (5) an interest in methodology but also a search for truth in ideas which reflect realities-in short, a practical realism but one opposed to a positivism of logic and authorities.[29]

In researching this school there is much work to be done. Some writings on the Indians (for instance, by Cano) exist only in manuscripts, while some of the commentaries on the *Summa theologiae* by professors like de Soto and Banez-precisely in the areas of divine image, faith, baptism, grace and the headship of Christ-are not yet published.

Thomist Theologians and the Human Person

L. Perefia gives a bibliography of " Academic Sources on the Indies " which lists eighty-nine authors from all religious orders between 1534 and 1588 who wrote on the situation of the Indians.[30] Experts distinguish three periods in the sixteenth century of theological and pastoral conflict over the Indies as the church came to the Americas. The years 1540 and 1570 were dividing lines. A marked creativity existed in the first period; next came

27 For biographical and bibliographical information on Juan de la Pena see his *Ecclesiologia. Replica a la Iglesia de Lutero,* R. Hernandez, ed. (Salamanca: ESE, 1987), essays by Hernandez, and *Corpus Hispaniorum de Pace,* vol. 9.

28 V. D. Carro, "Introducci6n General," to Domingo de Soto, *De la Justicia y del Derecho ... Introducci6n Hist6rica y Teol6gico-Juridico,* V. D. Carro, ed. (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1967-1968) 1, p. Liii.

29 Melquiades, pp. 243£.

30 "Fuentes Academicas Indianas (1534-1588), *"FVE,* pp. 661-699.

a time of expanding theological reflection on the directions already established; the third period brought an acceptance of fixed ecclesiastical and colonial institutions, discussions over precise ethical and colonial issues, and a reflection of the problems and themes of the Council of Trent.[31] Vitoria represented the central period of exposition. His colleague and successor, Domingo de Soto, presented in his *De Dominio* of 1535 and *De Justitia et Jure* of 1553 mature critiques through natural law of using the preaching of the Gospel to exploit the Indian nations : the Indians have true civil power," for faith does not destroy nature but leads it to its fullness."[32] The tradition continued with theologians like Cano and Banez, well known for their writings in other theological areas. The Salamancans worked to formulate and present convincingly a theory which was also a praxis. Rapid colonial expansion, traditional and new issues brought shifts in philosophical and theological emphases. And yet, the authority of Aquinas kept the thought-forms and conclusions much the same.

The Dominicans worked largely in a philosophy of human rights grounded in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Maurice Beuchot sums up : " The school of Salamanca defended natural law, a natural law based on the divine law and itself establishing the basis of the law of nations. This key perspective of a theology of law defended divine law because this proceeded from the free and gratuitous revelation of God which helped the natural without destroying it. It defended a positive law of nations because

si For the 1560s and 1570s, see L. Perena, " La Escuela de Salamanca y la duda indiana," *FVE,* pp. 319ff.

s2 *De Justitia et Jure* lib. IV, q. 4, a. 1. See *Relecci6n "De Dominio". Edici6n critica :Y Traducci6n con Introducci6·n . . .* , J. Brufau Prats, ed. (Granada, 1964). On Domingo de Soto see V. Beltran de Heredia, *Dominga de Soto, Estudio biografico documentado* (Salamanca: ESE, 1960); see also Carro, *La Teologia :Y los Teologos-juristas espanoles ante la Conquista de America* (Salamanca: ESE, 1951), *El Maestro Fr. Pedro de Soto* (Salamanca: ESE, 1944). See too J. Brufau, " Revision de la primera generacion de la escuela," *FVE, pp.* 383ff., a summary of his *La Escuela de Salamanca ante la conquista de America* (Salamanca: ESE, 1988); "Francisco de Vitoria y Domingo de Soto," *Los Dominfros* 2, pp. 43ff.

this law, as interpreted within an Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, ... offered some universal norms," [33] It is a mistake to view the thought of the Dominican Thomists as only political philosophy. In some works and authors biblical themes and patristic citations are prominent and in some they are not. Nonetheless, the foundation of this political theology lay in the scholastic interpretation of the essentials of the Gospel through philosophy; this theology had not yet been compartmentalized into, e.g., dogmatic and moral theology. Behind the defense of natural rights lay a view of the Creator as 'a planning and loving intellect whose orders of creation and of holiness followed similar patterns respecting the activities of created causes: this was not the view of an Ockham or a Luther. The view of human nature, the challenge of the fallen human condition, and the "time of grace" after Christ form the background to philosophical and juridical questions. The ultimate principle is a theology of the incarnation brought to an intense form in Aquinas : grace does not remove, destroy or create human nature but heals and enhances it, leading to that deeper life which is its destiny.[34] Sermons, treatises, commentaries, lectures and meetings unfolded their reflections on civil law, canon law, philosophy and theology defending the Indian nations. A dominant theme was the defense of the rights of the Indians against the various justifications for invasion, war, conquest and enslavement. Here one can see five sets of issues: (1) the justifications for violence against native peoples based upon their religious practices; (2) the justifications for violence against native peoples in terms of the natural law articulating true human behavior; (3) the pretensions of papacy and emperor to have dominion over non-Christian peoples; (4) the conditions for evangelization, the depth of preaching and the order of catechesis, the degree of commitment of the neophyte and the timetable for baptism and the other sacraments ; (5) brief allusions to a theology

as B. Beuchot, "El primer planteamiento teologico-juridico sobre la conquista de America: John Mair," *CT* 68 (1976), 213.

34 *Summa theologiae*, I, 1, 1.

of the image of God, the extent of the influence of original sin, and implicit faith and the absence of faith.[85]

Principles from the Summa Theologiae

The Dominican professors lectured on the thought of Thomas Aquinas in Salamanca's university halls. Their basic arguments affirming the rights of the Indians and criticizing the increasingly violent methods of the Spanish conquest (even the entire *conquista)* were drawn from a few articles of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae.* The neo-Thomist revival and membership in the Dominican school kept them focused on the works of Aquinas. They knew and argued against nominalist and Scotist positions, and they referred briefly to a distant precursor of the Reformation, John Wiclif (1329-1384), condemned by an ecumenical council, because his two books on divine and civil *dominium* suggested that jurisdiction and political exercise and rights depended upon the presence of grace. This theology was cited as an opinion which might justify the treatment of infidels as creatures without rights (something Wicliff never foresaw), but no Spaniard would want to be associated with a distant position ecclesiastically condemned. The Salamancans' creativity, informed by two to six decades of contacts with missionaries, teachers, and bishops in the Indies, lay in applying a few ideas to a dramatically new situation.

The Salamancan defense of the Indians found support in one particular question on faith by Aquinas. Indeed, from Paz to Cano this question is a central source, and some of the writings on the Indies are a gloss on the tenth question of the II-II in the *Summa theologiae.* To combat the colonial excuses for exploitation the friars in chairs of theology expounded the distinction between negative and positive infidelity. " If unbelief is taken as a pure negation," Aquinas wrote, " it is not a sin " (10, 1). Ignor-

as Las Casas lists six similar issues in his debate with Sepulveda (R. Hernandez, "Las Casas y Sepulveda frente a frente," *CT* 102 [1975], 232) and Vitoria lists four ([1] servants or slaves by nature? [2] sinners who cannot exercise social dominion? [3] infidels who can have no human or social power? [4] creatures lacking reason ?) ; *De lndis,* pp. 13f.

ance of Christ (and consequently life without baptism) did not in itself damn. The absence of the Christian message and faith were not excuses for conquest, nor was forced entry into the church for individuals or groups encouraged. Through no fault of their own the Indians had not heard of Christ; their lack of belief was not a sin but an absence. Like Cornelius they might have " implicit faith since the truth of the gospel was not yet manifest " (10, 4, 3).

In the same articles on faith Aquinas spoke against coercing anyone, child or adult, into religion and church. The Dominican of the thirteenth century rejected coercion in religion (" *nullo modo"* [10, 8,]) because it was contrary to natural justice *("repugnat justitiae naturali"* [10, 12]). The later Salamancan Dominicans often mentioned that Scotus had offered an exception or two.[36] If an Indian people was involved in perpetuating superstitious religion, dubious rituals, and practices against the natural law, should they not be conquered? Were not actions against the natural law (cannibalism and human sacrifice were prominent examples) reasons for conquering and controlling these nations? Soldiers, adventurers, viceroys, and colonists expected an affirmative answer. The Thomist theologians, however, responded that civil leaders were not obliged to try to correct every evil, to play God. In the Americas greater evils like warfare, conquest, and enslavement would result. Aquinas had written that war might come " not indeed for the purpose of forcing belief ... but to stop those impeding faith " (10, 8), but force in this defensive mode was always dubious because of scandal, i.e., permanently alienating a people from any interest in the Gospel (10, 10).

The Indian culture had its special nature, goodness and identity. Indian political structures emerged out of natural law and

[36] " Scotus argued that forcing infidels, even if they do not become true believers in their spirit, is less evil, for then they do not serve illicit laws with impunity . . ., and later their offspring will be among the faithful." Domingo de Soto, *Commentariorum in IV Sententiarum* (Salamanca, 1557-1560), dist. V, q. 1, a. 10.

not from a humanity totally corrupted by the fall. Aquinas had concluded: "Divine law's realm, which is from grace, does not take away the realm of human law which is from natural reason" (10, 10). Neither the fact that the Indians were not Christians nor their involvement in questionable forms of cult or immorality argued for the employment of violence against them, although such excuses had been eagerly sought and applied by colonizing forces. Evangelization and baptism did not render political structures invalid.

To fashion arguments against the justifications for war brought forth by figures like Sepulveda-Aristotelian natural servitude and sins against the natural law-the Thomists built upon two basic principles: the natural liberty of the Indians as rational creatures made in the image of God, and a critique of the colonizing state's reasons for invading, conquering and enslaving the Indian nations. Wars whose legitimacy can even be discussed, Vitoria stated, result not from attacking people for their religious and moral limitations but from a clash of positive quests for freedom.[37] Baciero describes the generation of the 1530s and 1540s in this way: "They are preoccupied above all with resolving the human problem, with safeguarding the concrete rights of the Indians by giving a new and definitive orientation .... They want to offer a new model of Indian society which fosters a peaceful coexistence among Spaniards and Indians. The Indian problem has been amplified by so many direct testimonies from experience and direct contact, and this is a characteristic of this second generation at Salamanca. The serious problem of the Indians in this phase of maturation calls for the application of definitive remedies ..." [38]

This movement reached even to Rome and the papacy. Around 1535 a Dominican missionary, Bernadina de Minaya, interrupted his evangelical labors to return to Spain to protest the treatment of the indigenous. Since he found little support, he went to Rome to complain to Paul III that the view of the Indians as subhuman

37 Baciero, "Conclusiones," p. 455.
38 Baciero, "Conclusiones," p. 456.

was used as a shallow excuse for conquest. Minaya was continuing approaches to the papacy by Dominicans begun in 1512 and still pursued in 1535 by Julian Garces, bishop of Tlaxcala (Las Casas in 1517 and Vitoria in 1532 had also challenged the charge that the indigenous lacked freedom and intellect). Apparently taking seriously these representations and overcoming his tendency to vacillation, Paul III issued in 1537 the pastoral letter *"Pastorate 0 fficium"* to the Archbishop of Toledo, Primate of Spain. The Pope began with the picture of one human race called to eternal life and possessing " the nature and faculties enabling it to receive that faith." Those living in all the vast regions of "the Indies" were human beings with liberty and dominion, capable of faith and salvation, and they were to be drawn to the Gospel by preaching and good example. The letter threatened with excommunication those who deprived them of their goods and dominion or who led them into slavery.[39] Two years earlier Las Casas had written to the court that from Nicaragua twenty-five thousand slaves had been sent to Panama, and the same number to Peru.[40]

We want to look further at theologians from two periods: Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo Bafiez.

Francisco de Vitoria

Vitoria's is not the first theological protest, but he is a theologian of human rights from that century and that school. Entering the Order in 1505, he studied in Paris and was exposed through Erasmus and others to humanist and nominalist perspectives which perhaps directed him toward concrete problems. He studied in Paris with Peter Crockaert, a professor who in the

[89] Denzinger-Schonmetzer, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (Freiburg: Herder, 1963), 1495; on the papal documents of this period see J. Muldoon, "The Spanish Experience," *Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels. The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250-1550* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1979), pp. 137ff., and on the Dominicans' influence on Paul III, Lewis Hanke, "Pope Paul III and the American Indians," *Harvard Theological Review* 30 (1937), 65ff.

[40] B. M. Biermann, "Zwei Briefe von Fray B. de Las Casas," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 4 (1934), 187ff.

lecture hall had replaced Lombard's *Sentences* with Aquinas's *Summa theologiae.* Vitoria's lectures drew together contemporary social and ecclesial issues and the medieval text.[41] After 1523, he taught in Valladolid and after 1526 in Salamanca. He wrote fifteen special treatises, among them the famous *De lndis* (finished in 1532 and published in 1557) and *De jure belli.* As his commentary shows, he found in Aquinas both framework and insights for the issues of imperial Spain and Christianity.[42] But in 1539 a letter came from Madrid, from Charles V to the Dominican superior in Salamanca: it demanded the theologian's cessation of publication and lecturing, the seizure of his manuscripts, and the prohibition of their circulation. Vitoria was already exhausted and sick; he stopped teaching in 1540, was unable to guide his texts toward publication, and died in 1546.

Victoria's thought was fashioned by what he learned of the invasions of Peru, Mexico, Guatemala and Chile, and this led him to conclude that civil and canon law were not the field of battle. Rather, the central issue was the theological and philosophical nature of the human being. He saw all human beings as fundamentally equal: all were free and all were images of God; differences came from culture and education. Therefore, the Spanish were not to exploit the riches of the Americas to the detriment of the populations. The Indians had domination over their own goods; their nations and towns were autonomous. Differences between them and the Spaniards did not provide reasons for depriving them of their social and human rights. For Vitoria the only reasons for a conquest which could be brought forward were those which protected human rights-but such reasons were not

[41] On Vitoria's intellectual life see the many essays in *I Diritti,* particularly R. Hernandez, "Francisco de Vitoria en la crisis de su tiempo," pp. 31-62; Hernandez's *Un espanol en la ONU, Francisco de Vitoria* (Madrid: EDICA, 1977), and his introductions to *Doctrina sobre los Indios* and *Derechos Humanos en Francisco de Vitoria, Antologia* (Salamanca: ESE, 1984), and "La Hip6tesis de F. de Vitoria," *FVE,* pp. 345ff. On the legal and canonical sources of Vitoria and the issue of *"dominium"* see Muldoon, pp. 143ff.

[42] And yet he could observe: "Some treat Aquinas or Scotus like a Gospel." Hernandez, "Francisco de Vitoria," *I. Diritti,* p. 55.

present in Spain's expansion of its empire. The Indians could be confided to the tutelage of the Spaniards for a time so that their human life might be improved, but free and prior consent must be present. The emperor should rule over a community of free peoples, and his laws were just when they preserved and promoted the totality of their life. The Indians had a right to good government, one which was gradual and progressive, one which expanded education and permitted the imperfect social structures it could not correct. At the end of his examination in *De Indis* of the eight false " titles " which Spain proffered justifying its colonialization, Vitoria concluded: "From this entire study it appears one must conclude, that, if all these titles are false, the Hispanic expeditions must cease." [43] L. Perefia observes: "This project of colonial society defined by Vitoria and his disciples surely constitutes the greatest revulsion ever against European colonialization." [44] In his daily lectures, scholarly commentaries and public " *relecciones"* Vitoria worked to attract committed followers to his view.

The main university chairs of theology were occupied by disciples of Vitoria. His manuscripts passed from hand to hand . . . The doctrine of peace acquired its real dynamism and identity in a community of thought; it unfolded within a common approach which found completion in some great academic syntheses. For the faculty of theology constituted the center of the schools, and the chairs of theology were the main channels for presenting his doctrine of dynamic peace and helping it infiltrate national awareness.[45]

Professors of a legalistic and conservative mentality, not to mention ministers of imperial power, objected to his beneficent principles admitting of few exceptions. But Vitoria saw Spain's dominance as temporary and legitimated by the free agreement of the

·*4BRelectio de lndis*, L. Perefia, ed. (Madrid: C. S. I. C., 1967), p. 98; *Relectio de lure Belli o Paz Dinamica*, L. Perefia, ed., *Corpus Hispaniorum de Pace* vol. 6 with bibliography, essays and writings from other Dominicans on the topic of war in the Indies.

44 L. Perefia, "La Escuela de Francisco de Vitoria," *I Diritti*, p. 93.; see L. Perefia, "Francisco de Vitoria: consciencia de America," *Los Dominicos* 2, pp. 93ff.

45 Perefia, "La Escuela de Francisco," p. 94.

occupied nations. He argued for a new approach, a renewal which was expressive of a theology and a philosophy of human rights; it would end the numerous evils and unjustified institutions in place in Cuba and Peru. Such a renewal would offer guidelines for fashioning societies where all human beings, European and Indian, Christian and non-Christian, would live not only in justice but in increasing cultural progress.[46]

Domingo Banez

Experts see in Bafiez, who occupied a chair of theology in Salamanca after 1581, someone continuing the teaching of Vitoria. Bafiez did not compose many monographs on the Indies but treated these issues in his commentary on the *Secunda secundae* of the *Summa theologiae,* in the questions on faith, hope and charity published not long after he began his lectures on this text.[47] Elaborating the ideas of Aquinas on the perdurance of natural rights in non-believers and on the positive relationship of natural law to the arrival of grace, Bafiez (explicitly referring to Las Casas and Vitoria) treated at length certain specific issues like arguments cited to support the invasion of Indian villages because of human sacrifice. The problem of Christian " liberty " (Mt. 17:26) had become prominent. This liberty might encourage the Indians to abandon all social structures and leadership after baptism; or, strangely, it might imply that baptismal new life brought the new Christian to the lowest rung of every social ladder. Christian freedom is a deeper reality than escaping from one society to another, and grace does not destroy the structures of natural society. Moreover, non-Christians could have dominion over Christians. Interestingly, while compulsion was repugnant to true faith, Bafiez concluded that Indian peoples could be compelled to hear preaching on the Gospel "at least once," but then they should be free of pressure.

Decades of colonial expansion explain why issues and conclusions were complex. Like the practical issues of the Indies,

[46] Perefia, " La Escuela de Francisco," pp. 94£.

[47] See R. Hernandez, " Domingo Banez, Continuador de Francisco de Vitoria en la doctrina internacionalista sobre las Indias," *Los Dominicos*2, pp. 6Uf.

the theological issues had become intricate. And yet, seventy years after his confrere, Matias Paz, first addressed the situation, the same Thomistic texts were being employed to combat the same colonial abuses.

We might end our considerations of the Salamancan theologians defending the Indians by looking at two facets of this theological enterprise : one of strength, one of weakness. Study and experience led this school to conclude that neither the pope nor European Christian monarchs had jurisdiction over the Indian nations. The natural law which brought individual rights also brought the structures of human societies, and these grace met but did not destroy. Vitoria's chapter headings in the *De Indis* repeatedly demolished the tenets "that the pope could entrust to the Spanish alone the preaching of the Gospel," or that the pope is civil or temporal lord of the whole world or has any jurisdiction over the Indies. De Soto concluded: "In the pope there is no power which is merely temporal." [48]

A marked weakness in their thought was the view of slavery. Generally they could not escape from the texts of Aristotle holding that slavery was in theory possible. The Salamancans thought that slavery could result from only one situation, being a prisoner of a just war. Consequently war became for the colonists an instrument of legitimizing slavery: they sought excuses for wars against towns so that the losers might legitimately be enslaved. So abstract principles, even in their minimal exemplification, opened the door to slavery in the Indies and were used to justify the condition of slaves from Africa then beginning to arrive m the western hemisphere. [49]

[48] *In IV Sent.,* dist. 5, q. unica, a. 10.

[49] Tomas de Mercado after spending some years in Mexico entered the Dominicans in 1552 in Santo Domingo; at Salamanca he received further education so that he might teach in the Mexican university, and at the end of his schooling in Spain published his *Suma de Tratos y Contratos* which discussed slavery. While he bemoaned the extension, conditions and effects of slavery (his example was African slaves), he said there was general agreement that such commerce could be " a licit sale and *de jure gentium."* See L. Sastre, "Teoria esclavista de Tomas de Mercado," *CT* 80 (1989), 27ff. and his articles in *Los Dominicos* 1, pp. 675ff. and *Los Dominicos* 2, pp. 287ff.

Wider Grace

For Christianity-for Augustine and for Aquinas-there were no people existing in a state of pure nature. The Indians were neither automatically damned nor inhabitants of paradise but they too lived in a world permeated by two atmospheres, sin and grace. Aquinas had briefly pursued the mystery of how wider worlds beyond Christendom might be touched by grace.[50] Grace might reach the nations who had not heard the Gospel through theologies of baptism *ex voto* (III, 68, 2), implicit faith (II-II, 2, 7, 3), and the orientation of 'the first adult human act (I, 89). There had been historical degrees of belonging to Christ (III, 8, 3), and the image of God was universally present in human intelligence and freedom (I, 93). Aquinas concluded that God's grace is not limited to sacraments (I-II, 113, 3). Scholars have yet to examine all these themes in the commentaries of all the Salamancan Dominicans in the sixteenth century.

Unfortunately for us, these theologians did not discuss the issue of the existence of grace in the Indians' lives to any great extent.[51] As an illustration of the shock of the discovery of the Indies, we find Mattias Paz convinced that surely in the distant past an Apostle or an apostolic disciple had once brought the Gospel to "the Indies." But Vitoria's lectures on the *Summa's* questions on faith (given between 1527 and 1534) did treat what he called "this major question" of salvation and faith in Christ. He noted that faith is a kind of knowledge and comes not as a test or an obstacle but as a help moving us towards God. Vitoria noted the different degrees of faith even among Christians, some of whom are little instructed in the Gospel. Observing that

[50] See Otto Pesch, *Thomas von Aquin* (Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald, 1988); J. Quigley, *Salvific Faith and the Non-Evangelized: An Appraisal of Aquinas' Theology of Implicit Faith* (Rome: Angelicum, 1984); G. Sabra *Thomas Aquinas' Vision of the Church* (Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald, 1987); M. Seckler, "Dan Haupt alter Menschen," *Virtus Politica* (Stuttgart: Fromann, Holzboog, 1974), 107ff.; "Das Heil der Nicht-evangelisierten in der Sicht des Thomas von Aquin," *Theologische Quartalschrift* 140 (1960), 38ff.

[51] Slight information drawn from often inaccessible texts of Vitoria, de Soto, Cano and Banez is in L. Caperan, *Le Probleme du salut des infideles, Essai historique (Toulouse: Grand Seminaire,* 1934), pp. 251ff.

Aquinas considered the question of how people had faith in Christ before the incarnation of Jesus, he concluded (but without ever mentioning the populations newly contacted):

> It must be said that those (living) in natural law were able to be saved, as all say, if they believed God to be a rewarder to all seeking him, and in that faith is included the faith in a Mediator.... So this is the resolution of the Doctor (Aquinas) : in the law of nature human beings can be saved with that faith which Paul states in *Hebrews,* chapter eleven. We do not deny that in the law of nature revelation of Christ has been revealed to many; moreover, in general, if anyone following nature's light would know those two things-namely, that God is and that God is a rewarder to those seeking him-and worship God, that one would be saved.[52]

Vitoria concluded (apparently alluding to a special treatment of this topic which he was planning) that an adult, even invincibly ignorant of the Gospel, can be met by grace, " for a special conversation of God with the human being occurs always in the condition of the natural law and so a kind of revelation takes place." [53] Here we have an early theory of how, in a psychological milieu of grace, grace discloses in free action some kind of orientation and even content of " revelation " related to meaning and love.

In the 1540s, Domingo de Soto found this an uncertain problem. For him the acknowledgements of God's existence and of his rewarding relationship to humanity as well as a respect for the natural law were openings toward justification. A kind of actual grace aided these movements. There were degrees of implicit and explicit faith. And yet, too implicit a faith might require one more explicitly Christocentric before attaining its eschatological reward. [54]

In the 1580s, Bafiez's theology of salvation outside of baptism and prior to evangelization centered around the issue of implicit

[52] Francisco de Vitoria, *Commentarios a la Secunda secundae de Santo Tomas,* V. Beltran de Heredia, ed (Salamanca: ESE, 1932), 1, pp. 66f., 77ff.

[53] Vitoria, *Comentarios a la Secunda secundae,* 1, p. 1, n. 11.

[54] *De Natura et Gratia* (Venice, 1547), II, xi. An edition of this work two years later (Paris, 1549) holds that more than reason's acceptance of natural law is required.

faith and baptism of desire. This had been debated at length in the second half of the sixteenth century by his predecessors like Cano and de Soto but also by Franciscan and Jesuit theologians. He began a treatment of baptism by noting that faith and grace are necessary not as arbitrary rules from God but as unavoidable means of encountering grace and eschatological life. Baptism exists not only in its liturgical form but " *in voto* " : an intention, will or orientation from which arise faith and love. At issue is not the legitimacy of an acceptance of grc:1.ce by desire but the intensity and religious content of that desire. Does an implicit desire for that which baptism sacramentally and symbolically offers suffice? It does when this intention holds a general but real intent of keeping the law of God and of pleasing God.[55] This is present in the newly discovered lands when people "do what lies within them by observing the law of nature", for the Gospel has not been universally preached effectively.[56] On the one hand, Banez argues against the purely spiritual baptism of some of the Protestant reformers; on the other hand, his commentary shows breadth but also careful qualifications in the treatment of grace outside of baptism.

Still, the Salamancan Dominicans were sparse in their theologies of this topic. They were concerned with warding off the attacks of those who believed that the Indians were by birth or nature evil, that they were non-human, incapable of faith, fixed in sin, or intrinsically immoral. From the Gospel and Aquinas they learned that grace was tied to faith, and so, as the sixteenth century progressed, discussions of degrees of implicit faith adequate for the arrival of salvific grace proliferated. The theologians were obviously convinced that all Indian life would benefit from the teaching and the morality of the Gospel as well as from learning arts and crafts. Perhaps the reports of cannibalism and human sacrifice were exaggerated, but both Augustine and Aquinas

55 *Comentarios ineditos a la tercera parte de Santo Tomas,* q. 68, 2; V. Beltran de Heredia, ed., II (Madrid: C. S. I. C., 1953), p. 179; see D. Banez *De Fide, Spe et Charitate ... Scholastica Commentaria in 2am 2ae* (Venice, 1602) II, a. 8, dub. ult. col. 362ff.

56 *Commentarios ineditos a la tercera parte ...*, pp, 182, 185.

taught that original sin, unchecked by grace, was a contagion which spread and easily corrupted human life, individual and social. That central text of the *Summa theologiae*, II-II, 10, 1, after stating that negative infidelity was no sin, implied that damnation might come not infrequently from other sins exacerbated by original sin. The theologians presumed evangelization to be of value, indeed worth the sacrifice of the lives of their many brothers who left Salamanca for Espanola, Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and even more remote lands.

Salamanca and the Americas

Salamanca and the Dominicans at San Esteban contributed to the modern law of nations, the foundations for social ethics, and the defense of human rights over against encroachment by state or religion. In theology they became famous for their positions in the argumentation and exposition of Tridentine and Baroque theologies of grace and freedom. Their writings, however, also touched on the historical stages of religion and revelation and on the psychological modes of the acts and degrees of faith.

Historians today are busy describing what they call the " projection" of Salamanca-the university and the Dominican school -into Central and South America. That university provided the first teachers, bishops and university professors in the Americas. Scholars have researched several hundred people of some significance who studied at Salamanca and were connected with the Americas.[57] The Dominicans founded a studium in Espanola in 1533, a single university chair of theology in 1534, and a uni-

[57] See A. Rodriguez Cruz, *Salmatica docet, La Proyeccion de la Universidad de Salamanca en Hispanoamerica,* 1 (Salamanca: Universidad, 1977); two more volumes are to appear. See A. Ortega, "El Humanismo Salmantino en la conquista de America," *Humanismo cristiano,* pp. 135ff. and F. Martin, "Universidades, colegio y otros centros de formacion," *Humanismo cristiano,* pp. 7ff. A. Rodriguez Cruz, "La Influencia de la universidad de Salamanca •.. , " *Los Dominicos* 1, pp. 663ff. offers an alphabetical list of 136 Dominicans active as teachers or missionaries in the sixteenth century; see also Cruz' wider list, "Alumnos de la universidad de Salamanca en America," in *FVE,* pp. 503ff.

versity in 1538.[58] And then they founded (from 1538 to 1791) universities in Lima, Mexico City, Bogota, and Santiago, as well as the universities of San Carlos in Guatemala, of Santo Tomas in Quito, Ecuador, and of San Antonio in Cuzco, Peru.

A bibliographical study similar to these pages could be done for the Franciscans or Augustinians, or for particular regions. The range of the hundreds of essays appearing in this anniversary year is wide. They treat unknown theologians and early bishops, juridical tracts and theological commentaries, Matias Paz and Juan de Zumarraga, Indian grammars and Indian art, catechisms, styles of evangelical preaching, and the canon law of marriage as interpreted for the culture of the Indians. A few of these articles are repetitive and some are summaries of other essays. But anyone interested in the philosophy of human rights and ethics, in issues like the presence of grace outside of baptism or the pastoral expression of the Gospel in new cultures will be excited and sobered by many thousands of pages of research with more volumes yet to appear.

[58] A. Huerga, "La Obra intelectual de la orden de predicadores en America," *Los Dominicos* 1, pp. 703ff.

AQUINAS ON DISORDERED PLEASURES AND CONDITIONS

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IT IS A COMMONPLACE that various philosophies, besides being supremely important intellectually and morally to individuals, have exercised a powerful influence on culture through their proponents acting individually and in schools. Sometimes, too, philosophers and theologians made venerable by antiquity are cited in policy disputes, both secular and ecclesiastical, which have a definite political aspect. The obvious hope is that the struggle can be won more easily with the added support of a revered authority.

This seems to have been the case recently in the debate over homosexuality. Bruce Williams, O.P., wrote a commentary [1] on a letter from the Roman Catholic Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, " On the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons," in which he adopts the position that the homosexual condition cannot be considered "all right". He bases his argument explicitly on the scholastic maxim ' agere sequitur esse' (acting follows being) ; if the action is distorted, so is the condition from which it follows. But in disputing this position another commentator on the Roman letter, Gerald D. Coleman, S.S.,[2] has named Thomas Aquinas as a key scholastic philosopher who should logically be counted as his own ally. Coleman seems to say

1 "Homosexuality: The New Vatican Statement," *Theological Studies* 48(1987), pp. 259-77. My thanks to Jesuit Fathers Harry R. Kloeker, Robert W. Mulligan, and David A. Wayne for advice and encouragement during the preparation of this article.

2 "The Vatican Statement on Homosexuality," *Theological Studies* 48(1987), pp. 727-34.

that although Thomas" would name the homosexual activity ... as ' distorted '," he would not think of the homosexual condition in this way.[3]

Before entering in detail into Thomas's actual thought on the matter, it seems important for humanitarian reasons to note specifically, as did the Roman Letter, Williams, Coleman, and Thomas himself, that a disordered condition need not imply moral culpability. The case is clearer when the disordered condition is a physical handicap.[4] In that case it isn't morally wrong to be handicapped, yet it isn't " all right " to be physically handicapped either, except insofar as "it's all right" means that a person would rightly accept and love himself or herself, handicap and all. A disordered condition may involve a physical evil or perhaps a psychological evil, but does not necessarily involve a culpable moral evil.

With this proviso the way is open for a frank discussion of Thomas' s actual ideas about homosexuality. They are certainly worth the consideration of any contemporary philosopher or theologian who might be interested in this issue, and for others the subject involves a facet of the history of ideas well worth noting, expecially since from this angle it is easy to focus on Thomas's general thought about disordered conditions and pleasures. The investigation also forms a case study in the way Thomas used philosophy in forming and articulating his theology. Here, despite the fact that much of the material as Thomas expressed it has a theological formality and purpose, it is from philosophy that he derives his arguments, their thought structure, and their underlying insight.

Pleasures, Actions, Habits, and States

In order to help him refute Williams's point that a homosexual

[8] Coleman, "Statement," pp. 732-34 (quotation from p. 733); Williams, "Homosexuality," pp. 263-69.

[4] See Williams, " Homosexuality," p. 266, quoting Marc Oraison, *The Homosexual Question* (London: Search, 1977), p. 115; Coleman, " Statement," p. 734 and n. 30 (Coleman does not think of homosexuality as a distorted condition). Thomas's thought on the matter is treated below.

orientation is a disordered condition, Coleman quotes Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, 31, 7.[5] Coleman argues that Thomas had no idea of the contemporary notion of " homosexual orientation", but were he aware of it or something like it, he would logically have to call homosexual acts distorted, but would not call the homosexually oriented person distorted. This seems to mean Thomas would not call the homosexual orientation objectively disordered.[6] Coleman's use of "person" here seems to contravene Williams's caution not to confuse the person as a whole with a condition which is only part of the picture.[7] But perhaps Coleman has simply not attended sufficiently to the distinction discussed above between a moral evil and a physical evil such as a handicap.

In any case, a straightforward reading even of the occasionally misleading translation of Article 7 offered by Coleman (p. 733) indicates just the opposite from what he suggests it means. Homosexual relations along with cannibalism and bestiality are classed there by Thomas as activities which can be enjoyed only by someone ailing psychologically. Parallel to these activities are the eating of earth and coals, pleasurable to one suffering from some dispositional disorder, and finding sweet things bitter, and vice versa, as fever patients do. Thomas's obvious point is that these activities are pleasurable to those who do them out of some disordered state, either physical or mental. The pleasures, the acts, and the states from which they proceed are inextricably bound together and all are seen as disordered.

The point becomes inescapable when one looks at the whole of Article 7, "Whether any pleasure is unnatural." According to

5 The reference as given in Coleman's article, 1-2, 31-39 (p. *733* n. 29), appears to have been a slip of the pen. It corresponds to the questions contained in vol. 20 of the Blackfriars edition of the *Summa* [St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae: Latin Text and English Translation, Introductions, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries* (New York and London: Blackfriars in conjunction with McGraw-Hill and Eyre & Spottiswoode); vol. 20, *Pleasure,* 1975, tr. Eric D'Arcy].

6 Coleman, " Statement," pp. *733-34.*

7 Williams, "Homosexuality," pp. 267-69.

his usual format, Thomas first gives the view contrary to his own "It seems that no pleasure is unnatural." This seems to be the case, the argument continues, first because only something connatural can satisfy a bodily appetite. Secondly, whatever is against nature is violent and painful, not pleasant. Third, to become confirmed in one's proper nature, when this is sensed, causes pleasure. But to become confirmed in one's proper nature is natural, since a movement which tends toward the natural completion of each thing is a natural movement. The third point identifies the process of realizing the potential of one's proper nature as a pleasurable process. But since the change or movement which accomplishes this is natural in that it tends toward the natural end or the complete development of each thing, no pleasure is unnatural. [8]

Thomas argues against these opinions when he expresses his own view on the matter. Unnatural pleasures are in a sense natural, he says, but only in that they are connatural with the state capable of enjoying them, which in this case is itself contrary to human nature. Thus, strictly speaking and in an unqualified sense these pleasures and their connatural states are contrary to human nature; nevertheless, in a qualified sense these pleasures are natural to the state capable of enjoying them.

Te:i:tual Interpretation

Although this interpretation of Article 7 is arguable even from the translation offered by Coleman, the translation should be purged of its misleading elements if the case is to be made totally clear. The translation appears to be in fact a verbatim copy of Eric D'Arcy's version in the Blackfriars edition (vol. 20, p. 25). What follows is a transcription of the Coleman translation with italicizing of phraseology I consider misleading in this context and with numbering for easy reference.

[8] Praeterea, constitui in propriam naturam, cum sentitur, causat delectationem; ut patet ex definitione Philosophi supra posita. Sed constitui in naturam, unicuique est naturale : quia motus naturalis est qui est ad terminum naturalem. Ergo omnis delectatio est naturalis (Leonine edition).

Now with regard to pleasures of either of these two kinds, there are some which are unnatural, absolutely speaking, (1) *but may be called natural from a particular point of view.* For it sometimes happens that (2) *one of the principles which is natural to the species as a whole* has broken down in one of its individual members; the result can be that something which runs counter to (3) *tho nature of the species as a rule, to be in harmony nith nature for a particular individual,* (4) *as it beco1nes natural for a vessel of water which has been heated to give out heat.* (5) *Thus* something which is (6) *"against human nature"* either as regards reason or as regards physical preservation, (5) *may happen to be* (7) *in harmony with the natural needs of* this *man* (8) *because• in hini nature is ailing.* He may be ailing physically: either from some particular complaint, as fever-patients find sweet things bitter, and vice versa; or from some dispositional disorder, as some find pleasure in eating earth or coals. (9) He may be ailing psychologically, as some men by habituation come to take pleasure in cannibalism, or in copulation with beasts or with their own sex, (10) *or in things not in accord with human nature.*

The original Latin runs

Secundum utrasque autem delectationes, contingit aliquas esse innaturales, simpliciter loquendo, (1) *sed connaturales secundum quid.* Contingit enim in aliquo individuo corrumpi (2) *aliquod principiorum naturalium speciei;* et sic id quod est contra (3) *naturam speciei, fieri per accidens naturalo huic individuo;* (4) *sicut huic aquae calefactae est naturale quod calefaciat.* (5) *!ta igitur contingit quod* id quad est (6) *contra naturani hominis,* vel quantum ad rationem vel quantum ad corporis conservationem, (5) *fiat* (7) *huic homini connaturale,* (8) *propter aliquam corruptionem naturae• in eo existentem.* Quae quidem corruptio potest esse vel ex parte corporis, sicut ex aegritudine, sicut febricitantibus dulcia videntur amara et e converso; sive propter malam complexionem, * sive aliqui delectantur in comestione terrae vel carbonum, (9) *vel aliquorum huiusmodi:* vel etiam ex parte animae, sicut propter consuetudinem aliqui delectantur in comedendo homines, vel in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum, (10) *aut aliorum hujusmodi, quao not sunt secundum naturam humanam.*[9]

[9] Emphasis added throughout. The Latin here, and in all the quotations from the *Summa* which follow, is from the Leonine edition. Here it varies from the Piana edition employed by the Blackfriars edition only in punctua-

If only the elements I consider misleading were changed, the new translation would read

Now with regard to pleasures of either of these two kinds, there are some which are unnatural, absolutely speaking, (1) *but which are in harmony with nature in a qualified sense.* For it sometimes happens that (2) *one of the natural principles of the species* has broken down in one of its individual members; the result can be that something which runs counter to (3) *the nature of the species becomes natural to a particular individual in respect to the qualification it has undergone<,* (4) *just as it is natural for sonie particular heated water to give out heat.* (5) *Thus it comes about that* something which is (6) *against human nature* either as regards reason or as regards physical preservation, (5) *becomes* (7) *proportioned with his own nature in the case of* this *man* (8) *'.be·cause of some corruption of nature which exists in him.* He may be ailing physically: either from some particular complaint, as fever-patients find sweet things bitter, and vice versa; or from some dispositional disorder, as some find pleasure in eating earth or coals (9) *or things of this sort.* He may be ailing psychologically, as some men by habituation come to take pleasure in cannibalism, or in copulation with beasts or with their own sex, (10) *or with othe-r such things which are not in accord with human nature.*

I want the quotation marks removed from " against human nature " (6) because they seem to imply that Thomas does not mean the phrase literally. In so far as this is implied the D'Arey translation is misleading since there are no grounds in the Latin text for such an interpretation. The other emendations represent a closer approach to a word-for-word translation. The freer D'Arcy translation seems at these points to soften Thomas's theme that unnatural pleasures are in a qualified sense natural to an individual, but only in so far as a corresponding corruption of nature exists in him; and that absolutely speaking the pleasure in question and the corresponding corruption of nature are both contrary to human nature. In the case of the last phrase (10), the clause " or in copulation with beasts or with their own sex, or in things not in accord with human nature" cannot be made to re-

tion and in that the Piana edition has *sicut* for the Leonine *sive* marked with an asterisk above. In his translation D'Arey, and after him Coleman, followed the Leonine edition in this detail.

place "or in copulation with beasts or with their own sex, or in *other such* things not in accord with human nature." Curiously the translation of Eric D'Arey in the Blackfriars edition reads " or in *other* things not in accord with human nature " for Coleman's "or in things not in accord with human nature." Even D'Arcy's translation, arguably, would be more accurate, I think, if it read, " as some men by habituation come to take pleasure in cannibalism, or in copulation with beasts or with their own sex or *with* other *such* things, *which are* not in accord with human nature."

Thomas's point about water (4) seems to be that in its natural state water is cool and cooling, but if heated it becomes hot and warming. He obviously uses the example of water for purposes of illustration and doubtless does not mean to imply that hot water is contrary to nature in the same sense that cannibalism is.

Implications

In Article 7 Thomas is paraphrasing a passage in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics.* Aristotle's point, which is discussed further below, is the same as Thomas's 'agere sequitur esse ', acting follows being. For both, if the action is in a primary sense and without qualifications unnatural, it proceeds from a disordered state.

My overall inference is that even if either Thomas or Aristotle had been convinced (along the lines suggested by Coleman) that the homosexual orientation is in a primary sense not contrary to nature, neither would have fallen into the inconsistency of saying, on the one hand, that homosexual activities and their corresponding pleasures are disordered, and on the other hand that the condition from which they spring is not disordered. They would instead have classed homosexual pleasures among those natural pleasures enjoyed by some persons and not by others (such as enjoying hot food in preference to cold food), a category listed by Aristotle at the beginning of his discussion of pleasures contrary to nature and noted, received favorably, and illustrated with

examples by Thomas in his commentary on that section of the *Nicomachean Ethics.*[10]

In this commentary Thomas expresses succinctly his view of the relationship among actions, habits, and states. "Because habits are diversified by a complete distinction of objects," he says "corresponding habits will answer to these individual pleasures under discussion; thus some habits will be natural and others unnatural."[11] Unnatural pleasures (delectabilia non naturaliter) arise in turn from a congenital malignant nature (ex natura corporalis complexionis quam acceperunt a principio) or from the onset of physical or mental sickness (propter aliquas supervenientes aegritudines corporales aut etiam tristitias animales). As a third possibility Thomas says such habits can arise over time through conditioning (propter malam consuetudinem). He does not specify whether this conditioning is freely chosen or imposed by others. In either case the habit itself becomes a quasi nature, a quasi mental illness (fit quasi quaedam natura).[12] Thus he views actions, habits, and states as linked together forming a whole which is either natural or contrary to nature.

In this Thomas is on the side of Williams, who worries about the inconsistency of viewing the homosexual condition as not involving an objective disorder and yet maintaining for ecclesiastical reasons that the activities connatural with it are not to be practiced.[13]

10 See Aristotle, *E.N.* 7.5, in the Oxford edition [Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea,* ed. I. Bywater (London: Oxford University Press, 1894)], p. 139 (1148b), 11. 15-16; and Thomas Aquinas, *In Eth. Nie.* 7.5, in the Leonine edition, vol. 47.2, p. 399, 11. 18-28. See at n. 19 below.

11 Thomas Aquinas, *In Eth. Nie.* 7.5: Et quia secundum diversitatem objectorum diversificantur habitus, necesse est quod singulis praedictorum delectabilium respondeant similes habitus, puta quod sint quidam habitus naturales, et quidam non naturales (Leonine edition, vol. 47.2, p. 399, 11. 42-46). The Translation is that of C. I. Litzinger, *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964), p. 641. Cf. *S.Th.* I-II, 96,3,R.; 54,2,3; 60,1; 62,2.

12 See *In Eth. Nie.* 7.5, in the Leonine edition, vol. 47.2, p. 399, 11. 29-35; p. 400, 11. 82-89. See at n. 29 below.

13 Williams, "Homosexuality," pp. 264-65.

As a curious consequence of this line of thought, if the homosexual condition is in fact contrary to nature one would conclude, as Williams does, that a homosexually oriented person would be under some sort of obligation to change his or her orientation if possible.[14] But on the other hand, if homosexuality is to be classed among conditions experienced by some but not by others, all of them natural in the primary and unqualified sense, not only homosexuals but heterosexuals too (and that is the curious point) would presumably be free either to remain as they are, or if it be possible, to change their orientations as they see fit.

My point here, though, and in what follows, is not so much to argue the question whether or not a homosexual orientation is in fact an objective disorder, nor is it to discuss a possible obligation to change orientation, but only to set the record straight on the historical question of what Thomas actually said.

The Homosexual Orientation

As a crucial part of his argument Coleman maintains that St. Thomas had no concept of homosexual orientation similar to what is current today.[15] The basic elements of this concept include, according to Coleman

> a predominant, persistent, and exclusive psychosexual attraction toward members of the same sex. A homosexual person is one who feels sexual desire for and a sexual responsiveness to persons of the same sex and who seeks or would like to seek actual sexual fulfillment of this desire by sexual acts with a person of the same sex. A distinction is drawn by a majority of authors on the subject between the homosexual *condition* and the homosexual *act.*[16]

To this Coleman adds the notion that many or perhaps most persons do not choose to have a homosexual orientation; instead they discover it as part of their makeup.[17] Thus we have a con-

[14] Williams, "Homosexuality," pp. 267, 274-75. See Coleman, " Statement," pp. 731-34.

[15] Coleman, " Statement," p. 733.

[1s] Coleman, " Statement," p. 732, quoting George A. Kanoti and Anthony R. Kosnik, " Homosexuality: Ethical Aspects," *Encyclopedia of Bioethics* 2 (New York: Free Press, 1978), p. 671.

[11] Coleman, "Statement," pp. 731-34.

cept of the homosexual orientation which envisions 1) an abiding condition, 2) which is sometimes if not most times discovered rather than chosen, and, implicit in this point, 3) a disagreement discussed by Williams as to whether the homosexual condition arises genetically, through conditioning, through both together, or variously in various cases.[18]

The Nicomachean Ethics

The textual evidence will not support the claim, though, that Thomas, and before him Aristotle, were unaware of the basic elements embraced by today's concept of the homosexual orientation; on the contrary, it is completely possible and even fairly likely that they thought something very similar to it. This is born out in the case of Aristotle in the passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (7.5) which Thomas paraphrases in Article 7. The relevant sections are as follows

(1) Epei d' estin enia men hedea physei, kai touton ta men *(a)* haplos ta de *(b)* kata gene kai z66n kai anthr6p6n, ta d' (2) ouk estin, alla ta men *(a)* dia per6seis ta de (*b)* di' ethe ginetai, ta de (c) dia moktheras physeis, esti kai peri touton hekasta (2) paraplesias idein hexeis·leg6 de *(2c)* tas theriodeis ... hoiois kairein phasin enious ton apegri6men6n peri ton Ponton, tous men 6mois tous de anthr6p6n kreasin, taus de ta paidia daneizein allelois eis euokian, e to peri Phalarin legomenon. hautai men theriodeis, hai de *(2a)* dia nosous gignontai (kai dia manian eniois, h6sper ho ten metera kathiereusas kai phagon . . .) hai de nosematodeis e (*2b)* ex ethous, hoion trikon tilseis kai onukon troxeis, eti de antharkon kai ges, pros de toutois he ton aphrodision tois arresin·tois men gar physei tois d' ex ethous sumbainousin, hoion tois hybrizomenois ek paidon.[19]

(1) Some things are pleasant by nature, partly *(a)* without qualification, and partly (*b)* pleasant for different classes of animals and

1s See Frank M. DuMas, *Gay ls Not Good* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1979), pp. 55-103. Even if cast in a deliberately polemic style and featuring sometimes questionable generalizations drawn from the history of culture, philosophy, and religion, this book is an interesting and scientifically informed discussion of the issue of homosexuality. See Williams, "Homosexuality," pp. 265, 273-75, and n. 26 below.

rn Taken from the Oxford edition, p. 139 (1148b), 11. 15-19, 21-31.

humans. Then *(2)* there are things which are not pleasant by nature, but which come to be pleasant *(a)* through physical disability, *(b)* through habit, or *(c)* through an [innate] depravity of nature. We can observe characteristics corresponding to each of the latter group *(2),* just as [we did in discussing *(1),* things pleasant by nature]. I mean *(2c)* characteristics of brutishness, for instance ... what is related about some of the savage tribes near the Black Sea, that they delight in eating raw meat or human flesh, and that some of them lend each other their children for a feast; or the story told about Phalaris.

These are characteristics of brutishness. Another set of characteristics *(2a)* develops through disease and occasionally through insanity, as, for example, in the case of the man who offered his mother as a sacrifice to the gods and ate of her. . . . Other characteristics are the result of disease or *(2b')* of habit, e.g., plucking out one's hair, gnawing one's fingernails, or even chewing coal or earth, and also sexual relations between males. These practices are, in some cases, due to nature, but in other cases they are the result of habit, when, for example, someone has been sexually abused from childhood.[20]

The numbers and letters in parentheses in the English text, which I have duplicated in the Greek text, represent the translator Oswald's interpretation of a very challenging passage. If his interpretation is in error it errs on the side of putting too much definiteness into the categories Aristotle is discussing. For instance, the translator has inserted in the second paragraph the code *'2b'* which, judging from the first paragraph, indicates " things which are not pleasant by nature, but which come to be pleasant ... through habit." The insertion of *'2b'* in the second paragraph thus seems to indicate that the items following it are said by Aristotle to be caused by habit. But this is not necessarily so, since *'2b'* has been inserted into a sentence which reads, " Other characteristics are the result *of disease or (2b) of habit*. ... "

On another front, the final sentence of the second English paragraph could refer only to " sexual relations between males,"

[20] *E.N.* 7.5. The translation is that of Martin Oswald, *Nicomachean Ethics: Aristotle* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1980), p. 189. For Thomas's comments, see at n. 29 below.

but it could as easily refer to the entire second paragraph, as seems most likely to me. It could also conceivably refer in summary fashion to all the unnatural pleasures listed in both English paragraphs. If the final sentence refers only to "sexual relations between males," Aristotle is saying that sometimes they are pleasant due to habit and sometimes due to nature. But he is not specifying here whether the natural defect which is in some cases the cause rendering homosexual relations pleasant is inborn or acquired through some disease. On the other hand if the final sentence of the second paragraph refers either to all the items in the second paragraph or to all the items in both paragraphs, it is still not clear that Aristotle is here assigning only habit as the reason why homosexual relations are pleasant to some persons. He could mean that habit is only sometimes the reason.

Nor are these the only ambiguities. Another instance is represented by the very sentence in the second paragraph which received the translator's symbol *'2b* '. It could just as legitimately be translated, " Other characteristics are the result of quasi-disease, i.e., of habit .... " But even in that case the possible interpretations of the last sentence would retain the same implications as to Aristotle's view of the cause or causes of the homosexual orientation.

Obviously the text cannot be pressed with respect to Aristotle's idea of the origins of the homosexual orientation. This conclusion is strengthened by his reference to Phalaris in the first English paragraph quoted above. " The story told about Phalaris " may refer to the sadism and cannibalism of that legendary king of Acragas in Sicily, as Oswald suggests in a footnote, but it could also refer to his pederasty, for which he was also noted. A little later Phalaris is cited as afflicted either with brutishness, which Aristotle seems to class as congenital, or with disease, which Aristotle seems to class as acquired after birth, so that in either case natural disability is the cause for Phalaris of his desire both for cannibalism and for pederasty. [21]

[21] To further complicate matters, in his commentary Thomas identifies the phrase *to peri Phalarin /egomenon* with torture: Et primo de his quae fiunt

delectabilia propter perniciosam naturam hominum qui sunt quasi bestiales . . . . . kai ton aphronon hoi men ek physeos alogistoi kai monon te aisthesei zontes theriodeis, hosper enia gene ton porro barbaron, hoi de dia nosous, hoion tas epileptikas, e manias nosematodeis. touton d' esti men ekein tina eniote men monon, me krateisthai de, lego de hoion ei Phalaris kateiken epithumon paidiou phagein e pros aphrodision atopon hedonen. . . .[22]

In the case of folly, those who are irrational by nature and live only by their senses, as do some distant barbarian tribes, are brutish, whereas those whose irrationality is due to disease, such as epilepsy, or to insanity, are morbid.

Sometimes it happens that a person merely possesses one of these characteristics without being mastered by it–I mean, for example, if a Phalaris had restrained his appetite so as not to eat the flesh of a child or so as not to indulge in some perverse form of sexual pleasure.[23]

To this last point it might be objected that Aristotle seems to refer to pederasty in the case of Phalarus, whereas his earlier reference seems to be to homosexuality generally, so that in ascribing causes Aristotle might be referring to what he considers two separate matters. Aristotle is of course aware of the difference between pederasty and homosexuality between persons of similar age.[24] But he does not seem to be making a distinction in this context, probably because he is not addressing homosexuality directly here. It comes up only as a part of his overall point that unnatural pleasures derive from unnatural conditions. Like the eye that focuses on a point of interest and leaves the rest of the scene blurred, Aristotle is frequently casual in his treatment

ea quae dicuntur circa Phalarim quendam, scilicet crudelissimum tyrannum qui in ipsis cruciatibus hominum delectabatur (Leonine edition, vol. 47.2, p. 399, 11. 49-51; p. 400, 11. 61-63). Nevertheless, he notes the pederasty of Phalaris later and may well consider it part of his brutish condition. See n. 30 below.

22 Oxford edition, p. 140 (1149a), 11. 9-15.

2a Oswald, *Ethics*, p. 190.

24 In *Politics* 2.4 Aristotle distinguishes pederasty from homosexual relations between agemates and objects to both there because in that context such love would be incestuous. Thomas interprets the whole matter as heterosexual incest. See the Leonine edition, vol. 48, p. 127, 11. 35-36, and p. 128, l 1. 44-84.

of items peripheral to his main argument. This tendency seems to be in harmony with his announced principle that in any discussion only that precision need be employed which is proper to the subject one is treating, and that strict precision is not possible when treating human behavior. He enunciates this principle at 1.3 and 2.2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and Thomas notes and accepts it in his commentary. [25]

All in all, it is quite clear that Aristotle recognized a homosexual condition, that he saw it as contrary to nature, and that, despite his vagueness and imprecision he seems to have envisioned a condition which is not freely selected by the individual who has it. Furthermore the weight of probability inclines heavily toward the view that in Aristotle's opinion the love of male for male arises either from conditioning-a man's experience of being violated as a boy, for instance-or by reason of some mental illness, either contracted or perhaps even genetic.

Since heredity and conditioning are the two factors advanced today-though not without controversy-as the putative causes of the homosexual orientation, it is highly likely that Aristotle had something close to today's notions in these respects. [26] This in itself creates a good probability that St. Thomas had the same idea.

Thomas's View

In point of fact in Article 7 Thomas names habit or conditioning (consuetudinem-not necessarily habit personally initiated, but perhaps imposed experiences, or even the custom of an area)

[25] For Aristotle see in the Oxford edition pp. 2-3 (1094b), 11. 11-14, 23-27, and p. 25 (1103b-1104a), 11. 26-27, 34-2. For Thomas's commentary see in the Leonine edition, vol. 47-1, p. 11, 11. 7-18, 76-p. 12, 1. 84, and p. 80, 11. 15-24, 30-33, 56-p. 81, 1. 67.

[26] An important controversy today centers on whether or not the homosexual condition is a mental disorder. Although the American Psychiatric Association no longer lists homosexuality under this category, thousands of psychiatrists in this country and others abroad still regard it as such. See James P. Hanigan, *The Test Case for Christian Sexual Ethics* (New York, Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1988), pp. 23-26, and the bibliography under notes 16-22 on pp. 32-33, and Frank M. DuMas's older *Gay is Not Good,* pp. 22-23, 127-28.

as a cause of the homosexual condition.[27] However, this should not be taken as the only cause he envisioned.

Like Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Thomas in Article 7 is speaking about homosexual acts only as an example of something -else which has his direct attention : acts which give pleasure contrary to nature to persons who are deficient in their constitution for one reason or another. His treatment of homosexuality is therefore a subordinate part of a larger argument, and although he should be held to what he actually says on the topic, he should not be presumed to be denying some further point-namely that there might be a physical or even a genetic cause for the homosexual orientation-simply because he has not said so in this context. Indeed, certain material discussed below from his commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans makes it appear likely that he did have heredity in mind.

Causes Variously Assigned

The subordinate nature of Thomas's interest in homosexuality in Article 7 becomes more obvious through a comparison between Article 7 and his commentary on the related portion of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (7.5). Between the two texts Thomas mixes up the putative causes of some of the conditions he considers unnatural, attributing to genetic constitution in Article 7 what he attributes to habit or conditioning in the *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics,* and vice versa.[28] Thus in Article 7 he attributes cannibalism to habit or custom (consuetudo), but in the *Commentary* he attributes it to a genetically corrupt temperament (perniciosa natura) or alternatively to acquired insanity (orbitates : furia vel mania). In Article 7 the cause of eating coals

21 Quae quidem corruptio potest esse . . . ex parte animae, sicut propter consuetudinem aliqui delectantur in comedendo homines, vel in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum, aut aliorum huiusmodi, quae non sunt secundum naturam humanum. See the section "Textual Interpretation" above for a fuller text and translation. Here *consuetudinem* seems to include cultural conditioning. See note 42 below.

2s For the text of Article 7, see the section "Textual Interpretation" above. The relevant text of the *Commenta.ry* can be found in the Leonine edition in vol. 47.2, p. 399, 1. 49-p. 400, 1. 89.

and earth is a genetic dispositional disorder (mala complexio), while in the *Commentary* it is caused by habit or custom (consuetudo).

Also, it is not clear in the *Commentary* that he rules out heredity as an alternative cause for eating coals and earth, homosexuality, and pulling out one's hair and biting one's nails, or, indeed, that he rules out any of the causes for any of the conditions.

The classifications in the *Commentary* (7.5) run as follows:

... eorum vero quae sunt delectabilia non naturaliter, quaedam fiunt propter orbitates, id est propter aliquas supervenientes aegritudines corporales aut etiam tristitias animales ex quibus transmutatur natura ad aliam dispositionem, quaedam vero fiunt delectabilia propter malam consuetudinem quae fit quasi quaedam natura, quaedam vero fiunt delectabilia propter perniciosas naturas, puta cum aliqui homines habent corruptas et perversas complexiones corporis et secundum hoc sequitur quod in his sint pervertissimae tam apprehensiones imaginationis quam etiam affectiones sensibilis appetitus, quas quidem vires, cum sint organorum corporalium actus, necesse est quod sint corporali complexioni proportionatae. (Leonine edition, vol. 47.2, p. 399, 11. 28-42).

Et primo de his quae fiunt delectabilia propter perniciosam naturam hominum qui sunt quasi bestiales, quia propter corruptelam complexionis assimulantur bestiis. (p. 399, 11. 49-52).

Secundo ibi: *Hi autem propter aegritudines* etc., exemplificat de his quae fiunt innaturaliter delectabilia propter orbitates. Et <licit quod quibusdam fiunt delectabilia ea quae sunt contra naturam propter aliquas aegritudines, puta propter maniam vel furiam aut aliquid huiusmodi.... (p. 400, 11. 65-70).

Tertio ibi: *Hi autem aegritudinales*, etc., exemplificat de his quae fiunt contra naturam delectabilia ex consuetudine. Et <licit quod quibusdam accidunt innaturales delectationes propter interiorem aegritudinem vel corruptionem provenientem ex consuetudine, sicut quidam propter consuetudinem delectantur evellere sibi pilos et corrodere ungues et comedere carbones et terram necnon et uti coitu masculorum. Omnia autem praedkta quae sunt contra naturam delectabilia possunt reduci ad duo: quibusdam enim accidunt ex natura corporalis complexionis quam acceperunt a principio, quibusdam vero accidunt ex consuetudine, puta quia assuefiunt ad huiusmodi a pueritia. Et simile est de his qui in hoc incidunt ex aegritudine corporali, nam prava consuetudo est quasi quaedam aegritudo animalis. (p. 400, 11. 74-89).

Of the unnatural pleasures, some become delightful because of privation, i.e., on account of some supervenient sickness of the body or sadness of soul by which the nature is changed into a different condition. Others become delightful because of evil habit which brings about a quasi-nature. Still others become delightful because of vicious natures, as happens when people have corrupt and perverse bodily temperaments; and, accordingly both the perceptions of their imagination and the affections of their sensitive appetite are most perverse. Likewise, since these powers are acts of bodily organs, they are necessarily proportionate to the temperament of the body. . . . first those which are delightful because of the malignant nature of men who are, so to speak, bestial since they are like beasts by reason of a corrupt temperament. . . .

Second, at " But some people [on account of diseases]," he exemplifies things that become delightful and are contrary to nature because of [privations. He mentions things which become delightful to some contrary to nature because of] particular ailments, for example, insanity or madness or something of this sort. ...

Last, at "Others become [morbid]," he offers examples of things contrary to nature that become delightful by reason of habit. Some enjoy unnatural pleasures because of mental unbalance or habitual perversion. For example, certain men out of habit take pleasure in pulling out their hair, biting their nails, eating coal and earth, and having sexual intercourse with males. All the preceding can be reduced to two classes. Some people do them because of the tendency of bodily temperament that they had from the beginning; others because of habit, becoming accustomed to things of this kind from childhood. Some people are like individuals who fall into this condition by reason of physical sickness, for evil habit is a kind of psychological sickness.[29]

In the last English paragraph the phrase " mental unbalance or habitual perversion-interiorem aegritudinem vel corruptionem provenientem ex consuetudine" (11. 77-79)-represents a single idea, an interior sickness or corruption caused by conditioning. Under this third category which is composed of those who have become "[morbid] ... by reason of habit-aegritudinales ... ex consuetudine " are included the examples of those who pull out their hair, gnaw their nails, eat coals and earth, and practice

[29] The translation is by Litzinger, *Commentary,* p. 641. Material in brackets has been inserted to conform to the Leonine text.

homosexuality. The first major category is made up of men who on account of their congenitally depraved nature are like beasts, and the second major category includes those who act contrary to nature because of diseases like insanity.

Thus in the last paragraph " All the preceding-Omnia autem praedicta " and what follows seems to refer by way of summary to the entire preceding discussion of the three major classes of unnatural conditions. This would seem to mean that in Thomas's mind any of the unnatural pleasures could be produced by any of the three causes. The case of cannibalism supports this interpretation, for in the commentary Thomas lists it under the first two categories, heredity and disease, and in Article 7 he lists it under conditioning or habit.

On the other hand if " All the preceding-Omnia autem praedicta" refers only to items listed under the third major category, " by reason of habit-ex consuetudine ", an interpretation apparently adopted by the editors of the Leonine edition who kept it in the same paragraph with the discussion of the third major category, Thomas would be indicating more clearly that he is not trying to be precise or complete in placing the various phenomena under the three categories. This because the sentence " All the preceding-Omnia autem praedicta" lists " bodily temperment . . . from the beginning-natura corporalis complexionis . . . a principio " and " physical sickness-aegritudine corporali " in addition to " habit " as causes.

As if to confirm the conclusion that he does not assign conditioning as the sole cause of the homosexual orientation, Thomas (following Aristotle) seems in the *Commentary* to class pederasty, which is not mentioned as such in Article 7, with the activities caused by congenital or brutish insanity or madness.[80]

ao Et <licit quod contingit quandocumque quod aliquis homo habeat quasdam praedictarum passionum innaturalium et non superetur ab eis, quod est simile continentiae; puta si Phalaris tyrannus teneat puerum et concupiscat eum vel ad usum comestionis vel ad incongruam delectationem veneream, ad neutrum tamen eo utatur. (Leonine edition, vol. 47.2, p. 401, 11. 181-88).

Phalaris, though, was earlier said to be congenitally brutish: Et primo de his quae fiunt delectabilia propter perniciosam naturam hominum qui sunt

The overall reason for these discrepancies in assigning causes for the unnatural pleasures seems to be the point mentioned earlier, that Thomas is not directly interested in examining these practices or in giving an exhaustive list of their causes based on a thorough examination of each of them. He lists them merely as examples of activities yielding pleasures contrary to nature and groups them together under causes which he thinks are at least sometimes responsible for them.

Direct Treatments

There are places in his writings, though, where Thomas addresses homosexuality directly, even though his treatments are brief and largely theoretical. Here again, although his theme is theological it will soon appear that his understanding and discussion is entirely philosophical. For instance in his *Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans* Thomas says homosexuality, i.e., men experiencing passion for men, not for women, and women for women, not for men, is a condition contrary to human nature because it is not open to conception.[31] Thomas's argument

quasi bestiales, quia propter corruptelam complexionis assimulantur bestiis . . . et similia sunt ea quae dicuntur circa Phalarim quendam, scilicet crudelissimun tyrannum qui in ipsis cruciatibus hominum delectabatur (Leonine edition, vol. 47.2, p. 399, 11. 49-52; p. 400, 11. 61-63).

I am presuming that Thomas considers Phalaris brutish not only with respect to his enjoyment of inflicting pain but also in his enjoyment of pederasty. Cf. n. 24 above.

[31] Alio modo dicitur esse aliquid contra naturam hominis ratione generis, quod est animal. Manifestum est autem quod secundum naturae intentionem commixtio sexuum in animalibus ordinatur ad actum generationis. Unde omnis commixtionis modus ex quo generatio sequi non potest, est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est animal. . . . *(In Rom.* 1.8, Parma edition, vol. 13, p. 20, cols. 1-2). See *S.Th.* II-II,154,11: ... repugnat ipsi ordini naturali venerei actus qui convenit humanae speciei: quod dicitur *vitium contra naturam.* Quod quidem potest pluribus modis contingere. . . . Tertio modo, si fiat per concubitum non ad debitum sexum, puta masculi ad masculum vel feminae ad feminam, ut Apostolus dicit, *ad Rom.* I: quod dicitur *sodomiticum vitium* ... Ad tertium dicendum quod luxuriosus non intendit generationem humanam, sed delectationem veneream : quam potest aliquis experiri sine actibus ex quibus sequitur humana generatio. Et hoc est quod quaeritur in vitio contra naturam. See *Contra Gentiles* 3, 122.

is not, as John Boswell alleges, that human beings should do what animals are observed to do, nor is it that he saw "animal behavior as the final arbiter in matters of human sexuality." [32] Rather, men themselves, although they are human in their species, are animal in their genus, and in Thomas's analysis human sexual organs, indeed all animal sexual organs, are intended by nature for procreation. [88]

When he speaks of the intention of nature, Thomas means that its purposes and proper uses can be discerned by reason and analysis. For Thomas the natural law exists first in the mind of God, is mirrored in the order of creation, and is recognized by the human mind. In God it is called the eternal law; as in the universe and as perceived by the human mind, it is called the natural law.[84] This natural law is derived from a consideration of nature as it manifests itself generally, not from occasional deviations from the norm. [35] In the near background is Thomas's

a2 *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginnings of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 319. In n. 63, pp. 320-21, Boswell himself gives evidence that this is not the case, for there he mentions (and dismisses) some of Thomas's substantive arguments about human sexuality based directly on the human situation and independent of any appeal to the practice among the lower animals.

as See *C.G.* 3,122; *S.Th.* II-II,154,1,R.; and n. 31 above. For a survey of Roman Catholic thought over the last 50 years concerning sexual morality see Lisa Sowle Cahill's " Catholic Sexual Ethics and the Dignity of the Person: A Double Message," *Theological Studies* 50(1989), pp. 120-50.

34 *S.Th.* I-II,91,1,R.: Et ideo ipsa ratio gubernationis rerum in Deo sicut in principe universitatis existens, legis habet rationem. Et quia divina ratio nihil concipit ex tempore, sed habet aeternum conceptum, ut dicitur *Prov.* VIII, inde est quod huiusmodi legem oportet dicere aeternam. I-II,91,2,R.: ... quasi lumen rationalis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura. See I-II, 90,4; 19,4.

ss *C.G.* 3,122: Quia rectitudo naturalis in humanis actionibus non est secundum ea quae per accidens contingunt in uno individuo, sed secundum ea quae totam speciem consequuntur (Leonine edition, vol. 14, p. 379, col. 1). For an admirable defense of this concept against contrary arguments advanced today see Theo G. Belmans, " L'immutabilite de la loi naturelle selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Thomiste,* 87(1987), pp. 23-44.

idea that nature was designed rationally by God so that it constitutes a "treaty" between God and humankind who are bound to respect it by living according to its design.[86]

As Thomas explains in his commentary on Romans, God has allowed the homosexual passions to develop among the gentiles because the gentiles have culpably failed to acknowledge him as God in his transcendent nature. Since the gentiles sinned against God's nature in this way, as a punishment God has allowed their own nature to become corrupted.[87] He did this not by actively creating persons who are homosexually oriented, but by not supplying the grace necessary to keep human nature from degenerating.[88] Here too, if the theological concept of grace and even of the activity of God are removed from consideration what is left is the philosophical idea that the homosexual orientation represents a corruption of human nature.[89]

Throughout his discussion Thomas speaks of the gentiles in the plural and in a collective sense; he does not seem to be discussing the sin and punishment of individual persons. He names three ways, for instance, in which the gentiles have sinned against God and His nature: through idolatrous public worship, through myths in their poetic expressions, and through their philosophical traditions.[40] Thus he seems to envision gentile culture collectively failing to acknowledge God and His transcendence; as a punishment the homosexual phenomenon develops, presumably in a collective way, within these cultures. When he says, for example, that gentile philosophers fail in their philosophic task of discovering and acknowledging the transcendent God (and names some of the philosophers),[41] he does not imply that these philosophers became homosexuals themselves, nor, even if some of them might have, that they are the only ones in the gentile milieu who ex-

36 "Mutaverunt jus, dissipaverunt foedus sempiternum", id est jus naturale (*In Rom.*, Parma edition, vol. 13, p. 20, col. 1).

37 *In Rom.* 1.8, Parma edition, vol. 13, p. 20, col. 2 and passim.

38 *In Rom. 1.7,* Parma edition, vol. 13, p. 18, col. 2.

39 See especially *In Rom. 1.7,* Parma edition, vol. 13, p. 19, col. 1.

40 *In Rom.* 1.7, Parma edition, vol. 13, p. 19, col. 2.

41 Ibid.

perience homosexuality as a consequence of this philosophic failure. [42]

More concretely, Thomas says that as a result of gentile failure to acknowledge God and His divine nature, "God has given them over to a base sensibility ... the interior sensibility according to which a man judges about how he should act." [43] Later in commenting on Rom. 7:14-20 he says men's judgment is sometimes perverted through conditioning *(per habitum)* or through distorted desires. Thomas means that they actually think an evil is a good. [44] He goes so far as to say that in this case the person does not act freely at all; instead the person is actually controlled by sin. [45] Thus Thomas has in mind a person who is oriented toward morally evil acts to such an extent that he perceives the acts and the orientations as goods. All of this is suggestive of the view that some men and women are rendered homosexual through

[42] Through Aristotle's *Politics* Thomas was aware of culturally conditioned homosexuality among the Celts, the Spartans, the Cretans, and among warlike peoples generally. See Aristotle, *Pol.* 2.9-10, in the Oxford edition, p. 52 (1269b), 11. 23-27 and pp. 59-60 (1272a), 11. 22-26. For Thomas's comments, see *In Pol.* 2.13,15, in the Leonine edition, vol. 48, p. 164, 11. 139-55, and pp. 173-74, 11. 72-81 and 113-25. See also n. 46 below.

[43] *Tradidit illos Deus in reprobuni sensum.* Dicitur autem hie sensus hominis ... interior, secundum quern judicat de agendis ... *(In Rom.* 1.8. Parma edition, vol. 13, p. 20, col. 2-p. 21, col. 1).

[44] ... in universali habent rectum judicium de bono; tamen per habitum vel passionem perversam pervertitur hoc judicium, et depravatur talis voluntas in particulari, ut non agat quod in universali intelligit agendum et agere vellet *(In Rom.* 7.3, Parma edition, vol. 13, p. 71, col. 1). *Tradidit illos Deus in reprobum sensuni.* ... Dicitur ... sensus ... interior, secundum quern judicat de agendis .... *Ut faciant ea quae non conveniunt,* idest ea quae a recta ratione discordant. . . . *Repletos:* ille enim videtur repleri iniquitate cujus affectus est totaliter ad peccandum dispositus . . . *(In Rom.* 1.8, Parma edition, vol. 13, p. 20, col. 2-p. 21, col. 1) .... lex naturae in aliquorum cordibus, quantum ad aliqua, corrupta erat intantum ut existimarent esse bona quae naturaliter sunt mala ... *(S.Th.* I-II, 94,5, ad 1. Cf. a. 6). Regarding culpability in following an erroneous conscience, see I-II, 19,5,6.

[45] ... ipse non agit, sed agitur a peccato: ille enim qui est liber, ipse per seipsum agit, et non ab alio agitur *(In Roni.* 7.3, Parma edition, vol. 13, p. 71, col. 2).

conditioning and strongly implies that their personal conscious choice is not the determining factor.[46]

Thomas's treatment of this topic might also reasonably be understood along the lines of heredity according to the way in which he explains original sin and its effects. In treating Rom. S:12 Thomas stipulates first that only Adam is personally guilty of the first sin in a primary sense. Others, he says, have imitated it by their own personal sin, but still the sin of Adam is not in the primary sense the personal sin of others. Nevertheless, everyone suffers its consequences because everyone receives a damaged version of human nature from Adam.

According to the theory favored by Thomas the body is the vehicle by which the defects in human nature due to original sin are transferred from one generation to another. Thus an overly irascible or mentally ill father would generate an offspring physically oriented toward irascibility or mental illness. In this scheme the soul, which is the substantial form of the body, is seen as matching the defective configuration of its body, and this is the way it participates in the corruption brought about by original sin. Obviously true homosexuals do not have offspring, but this theory might well leave room for the recurring genetic development through combined sources of a strong disposition toward homosexuality, or even of the homosexual orientation itself. In any case it seems worth noting again that in Thomas's opinion, the inborn defects in human nature brought about by original sin are not to be considered voluntary or culpable in a personal and primary sense.[47]

If Thomas's treatment of homosexuality is harmonized with his view of original sin, a likely inference would be that he might envision among the gentiles the emergence of a homosexual

[46] For an explicit statement in a family context of the role conditioning can play in determining a person's general orientation, see *S.Th.* I-II, 87,8,ad 1: . . . filii in peccatis parentum nutriti proniores sunt ad peccandum: tum propter consuetudinem; tum etiam propter exemplum, patrum quasi auctoritatem sequentes. See also nn. 27 and 42 above.

[47] *In Rom.* 5.3, Parma edition, vol. 13, p. 51. Cf. *S.Th.* I-II, 81,1,R. and pasim, qq. 81-87.

orientation in some individuals based obliquely to some extent on heredity. If this is added to conditioning as a possible cause of homosexual orientation, the upshot would be a view of the homosexual condition pretty much along the lines proposed by Coleman. In detail, Thomas could have held 1) that some individuals have a sexual attraction exclusively toward members of their own sex, 2) that they discover this orientation within themselves and do not initiate it by choice, 3) that it might be the product either of heredity or of circumstances, 4) that it and its accompanying life-style can take various forms which occur cross-culturally, though perhaps not universally, and 5) that the homosexual orientation occurs consistently, though with less frequency than heterosexuality.[48] Though not compelling with regard to every detail, the preponderance of the evidence weighs in favor of the likelihood that Thomas might have thought something very much like this, in some respects explicitly, in others implicitly.

Agere Sequitur Esse

Throughout this discussion the notion that doing follows being has been attributed to Thomas as if its meaning could be taken for granted; and indeed for the present purposes it very nearly can be. But a closer look at Thomas's idea of this principle, especially as it applies to human nature, will add clarity.

In Thomas's thought 'acting follows being' means that what an agent does-acting, or performing an operation-must be based on what the agent is.[49] This is true whether the agent is inanimate, vegetable, animal, or human. In slightly different language, an agent can act only in accordance with its potency to act, and its potency to act is a part of its makeup, a part of what it is.[50] This is true with regard to its own development, i.e., it can become only that which it has a potency to become;[51] and it is true of its operations on other things, i.e., it can only do what

[48] Coleman, " Statement," pp. 733-34.
[49] *S.Th.* I,77,1.
[50] *S.Th.* 1,54,1,3.
[51] *S.Th.* I,54,2.

it has a potency to do-and, of course what the recipient has a potency to receive.[52] Thus whenever any being is changed, with respect to the change its potencies and their corresponding actions change also.

In the case of a human being, his or her human nature is qualified by certain ' habits ', not only by habits in the sense in which the word is used in the English language, but also by other qualifications or specifications. For instance, some men or women may be healthy or unhealthy, disposed to move quickly or slowly, of irascible temperament or of placid temperament, etc. In all these cases, what the person can do depends in corresponding categories upon these qualifications or ' habits '.[58]

In the case of habits as the word is used in English, repeated action conditions the sensitive appetites,[54] or the intellect,[55] or the will,[56] so that the human potency is channelled in a certain direction,[57] and in such a way that this channelling resists change. The person strongly tends to continue doing the things in question and continues to be able to do them.[58] This is true in the case of mental habits, like thinking about geometry, and in the case of the virtues and vices. In most cases habits can be changed or weakened through neglecting to do the related activities or by doing their opposites.[59]

Habits themselves are regarded as potency with respect to the activities to be performed, but in themselves they are regarded as act in so far as each habit represents a specification of the general power to act in a certain area of life so that it becomes the power and inclination to act in a particular way. Thus a habit is act with regard to the potency represented by the general power to act in a certain area of life.[60]

The homosexual orientation as described above is a ' habit ' in Thomas's parlance, either in the sense of a condition or qualifica-

52 *S.Th.* I,54,3.
58 *S.Th.* I-II,49,2; 51,1.
54 *S.Th.* I-II,50,3.
55 *S.Th.* I-II,50,4.
56 *S.Th.* I-II,50,5.
51 *S.Th.* I-II,50,5,R.; 51,2; 54,1.
58 *S.Th.* I-Il,49,2, ad 3.
59 *S.Th.* I-II,54,1,2,3; 53,1,2,3.
60 *S.Th.* I-II,49,3, ad 1, a. 4; 50,2, ad 3; 54,3.

tion of human nature accruing from hereditary causes or diseases, or in the sense of a habit as the word is used in English, a habit induced either by conditioning beyond one's choice, or by activities freely chosen.

Pleasures

In Article *7* the topic Thomas addresses directly is whether there are any pleasures contrary to nature. Article *7* itself fits into a general treatment of pleasure, which for Thomas is a delight which follows upon the possession of a good,[61] or, following Aristotle, a delight which is the perfection of an operation or activity.[62] Thus pleasure will be good or bad in accordance with whether the activity associated with the possession of the good is itself good or bad.[63] This can be equated with whether or not the activity is in accordance with reason.[64] Pleasure can be sought for its own sake, but only as the crown or completion of an activity or of the possession of a good,[65] never without its proper

[61] *S.Th.* I-II,2,6,R.: Est igitur considerandum quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beautitudinis partem: ex hoc enim aliquis delectatur, quod habet bonum aliquod sibi conveniens, vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria.

[62] See *In Eth. Nie.* 10.6 and *7,* in the Leonine edition, vol. 47.2, p. 569, 11. *75-77,* 103-16 and p. 572, 11. 55-56, 58-62. See Aristotle, *E.N.* 10.4 and 5, in the Oxford edition, p. 207 (1174b), 11. 31-33 and p. 208 (1175a), 11. 30-33.

[63] See *In Eth. Nie.* 10.8, in the Leonine edition, vol. 47.2, p. 575, 11. 11-23. Cf. Aristotle, *E.N.* 10.5, in the Oxford edition, p. 209 (1175b), 11. 24-29.

[64] See *S.Th.* I-II,34,1,R.: ... ita et in moralibus est quaedam delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat. . . . See *In Eth. Nie.* 3.10 and 22, in the Leonine edition, vol. 47.1, p. 148, 11. 67-100 and p. 193, 11. 166-78, and Aristotle, *E.N.* 3.4 and 12, in the Oxford edition, p. 49 (1113a), 1. 29-(1113b) 1. 2 and pp. 64-65 (1119b), 11. 9-18.

[65] I-II,2,6,ad 1: Dicendum quod eiusdem rationis est quod appetatur bonum, et quod appetatur delectatio, quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus in bono. . . . Unde sicut bonum propter seipsum appetitur, ita et delectatio propter se, non propter aliud appetitur, si ly *propter* dicat causam finalem. Si vero dicat causam formalem, vel potius motivam, sic delectatio est appetibilis propter aliud, id est propter bonum, quod est delectationis obiectum, et per consequens est principium eius, et dat ei forman: ex hoc enim delectatio habet quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono desiderato. See *In Eth. Nie.,* 10.6, esp., in the Leonine edition, 11. 186-205 on p. 570 of vol. 47.2.

good, or more accurately, never through a perversion of its proper activity in such a way that it is not in accord with reason or so that the proper result of the activity cannot occur.[66]

Thus pleasure figures into Thomas' s analysis of what he regards as sexual aberations contrary to nature. In all the varieties-masturbation, bestiality, homosexuality, and heterosexual practices rendered sterile by the manner of intercourse, sex acts are engaged in which could never result in offspring. One does such things, Thomas thought, in order to get venereal pleasure,[67] but in these cases the pleasure is contrary to nature because the activities are contrary to nature.[68] In a proper act of intercourse, on the other hand, the pleasure is proper because the act is proper.[69] Thus it is not wrong to seek pleasure since as delight in the possession of the good it is the crown and completion of good activity, and it is properly sought along with the good which is sought. But it is wrong to seek pleasure to the exclusion of the good it is supposed to be associated with.

Some Possible Influences

That Aristotle might himself have been familiar with a theory of genetic homosexuality is not at all surprising, since in the *Symposium* his teacher Plato has one of the protagonists of the dialogue, the comedian Aristophanes, give a thoroughgoing statement of it in the form of the myth of the original round people in three sex groups, the members of each of which the god cut in half. Those who were originally women on both sides are lesbians according to the definition of homosexual orientation discussed above, or something very much like it. Those who were originally double men became male homosexuals, and those who were originally male on one side and female on the other became heterosexuals.[70]

66 See nn. 31, 63, and 64 above.
67 See n. 31 above.
68 See the section on " Pleasures, Actions, Habits, and States " above.
69 See I-II, 74,8,ob.4,ad4.
10 Plato, *Symposium* 189C-193E.

St. Thomas apparently had not read the *Symposium* first hand, but he knew of it through Aristotle's *Politics* and referred to it in his *Summa Theologiae.* Thomas's reference is to an aspect of the very passage which contains the myth of the round people, namely that lovers seek communion. Although it is clear Thomas realized Aristotle and Plato were speaking of homosexual lovers, I have been unable to discover whether or not Thomas knew the whole story of the round people.[71]

Yet another source known and quoted by Thomas contains a remarkable analysis of homosexuality along the lines of the modern concept of homosexual orientation. The work is the *Problemata,* a sometimes charmingly peculiar investigation of some puzzling phenomena in nature, mathematics, and music. It was thought for a while to be the work of Aristotle, but certainly is not, and may have been built up by a succession of authors, the last perhaps as late as the sixth century our era.[72]

Book four concerns sexual intercourse, and no. 26 deals with male homosexuality. The work names physical constitution and habit or conditioning as the two causes of what actually amounts to a homosexual orientation. The material dealing with physical constitution is quite bizarre and might make amusing reading. In any case, Thomas quoted no. 11 of book four in connection with homosexuality and he could easily have been aware of the material in no. 26.[73]

A fourth source ·enshrines the concept of ' agere sequitur esse ', though in a context which is certainly different from the possibly morally neutral homosexual orientation which has been under discussion here all along. Still, it ought to be introduced at this point, as a way of focusing on the principle that acting follows being. It is the Gospel dictum that "there is no good tree bearing bad fruit, nor again any bad tree bearing good fruit (Lk.

11 See *S.Th.* I-II,28,1,ad 2; Aristotle, *Pol.* 2.4; Plato. *Smp.* 191A; 192C-D.

1Z See *The Works of Aristotle,* ed. W. D. Ross, vol. *7, Problemata,* tr. E. S. Forster (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), p. vii.

73 See *In Pol.* 2.13 (Leonine edition, vol. 48, p. 164, 1. 149). Cf. n. 42 above.

6:43; cf. Mt. 7.17)." Thomas uses an alternative expression of this idea in the *Summa* when he says regarding vice, "Whenever someone is in interior disarray with a disordered sensibility it is inevitable that he be rendered incapable of performing the proper activities; because each tree is known by its fruit, that is, man by his deed, as is said at Mt. 12 [v. 33]." [74]

Finally, on the level of common sense, no one would engage in homosexual activity, even once, unless he or she were somehow disposed to do so. The same, of course, is true of heterosexual activity. Plato, Aristotle, and the *Problemata* seem to have recognized this and to have taken it as their basic starting point, and it is an explicit and crucial part of Thomas's argument reviewed above.

Summary

It is incorrect to say that *Summa Theologiae* I-II, 31, 7 leaves any room whatsoever for the possibility that St. Thomas, while continuing to maintain that homosexual activities are contrary to human nature, would not have called homosexual orientation a distortion had he been aware of today's concept of it. Such a position would be quite contrary to his whole line of thought regarding disordered pleasure.

He is at pains to point out that certain individuals do suffer from a distortion at the constitutional level. This is precisely the means he uses to answer the objections to his opinion that certain pleasures are, strictly speaking, unnatural. The objections argue that only activities connatural with a being can give it pleasure. Thomas's answer is that unnatural pleasures are in a way natural to unnatural states. Conversely, if he thought of the homosexual condition as in accordance with nature, he would also have to accept homosexual pleasures and activities as such.

The second point is that there are no grounds for asserting in the first place that St. Thomas was unacquainted with the essen-

[74] *S.Th.* I-II,71,1,ad 3: Necesse est enim quod quandocumque aliquis interius est male dispositus, habens inordinatum affectum, quod ex hoc imbecillis reddatur ad debitas operationes exercendas; quia *unaquaeque arbor ex suo fructu cognoscitur*, idest homo ex opere, ut dicitur Matth. XII.

tial elements of today's concept of homosexual orientation. The main ingredients of it are implicit in his view, expressed in Article *7* and in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics,* that pleasures, habits, and conditions are bound up together. His comments on the Epistle to the Romans make it not only possible but even likely that, by and large, he himself thought in terms of today's concepts.

INDIRECT METHODS IN THEOLOGY: KARL RAHNER AS AN AD HOC APOLOGIST

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THE PURPOSE of this paper is to discuss Karl Rahner's remarks upon, and use of, what he called 'indirect methods' in theology.[1] To my knowledge there has been little analysis, beyond incidental treatment, of Rahner's scattered references to these methods.[2] In the following pages I hope to remedy this gap, and argue for two interdependent theses: First, by construing Rahner's own theological practice in the light of his remarks on the indirect methods, an apologetic method can be discerned which could prove useful for contemporary theology. Second, reading Rahner from this perspective indicates that his apologetic method is much more situation-relative and occasionalist than has generally been recognized hitherto.

Two Kinds of Apologetics

A quick sketch of some aspects of the present theological scene will help make these theses a little clearer and provide some cate-

1 My discussion of the indirect methods is based primarily upon the following sources: *Theological Investigations* (New York: Crossroad, 1961-1982) (cited in the text as TI), vol. 6, "A Small Question Regarding the Contemporary Pluralism in the Intellectual Situation of Catholic and the Church", pp. 21-30; vol. 11, "Reflections on Methodology in Theology", pp. 68-114; vol. 16, "A New Task for Theology". *Foundations of Christian Faith* (New York: Crossroad, 1978) (henceforth cited as FCF), introduction, pp. 1-23, et passim.

2 See e.g., Anne Carr, *The Theological Method of Karl Rahner* (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977), pp. 267-9; Francis S. Fiorenza, *Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church* (New York: Crossroad, 1984) (cited as Fiorenza), p. 93. Both these interpreters consider the indirect methods to be synonymous with the transcendental method. They then interpret the former in terms of the latter, misguidedly, I will argue.

gories for the following discussion. According to William Placher,[8] the contemporary situation in North American theology is often characterized as one in which two rival models of theology are dominant, the revisionist and the post-liberal (Placher, *17-19).* Placher discusses many aspects of each model; here I want to look only at those features which bear upon their different conceptions of the nature of apologetics.

According to David Tracy, a leading practitioner of the revisionist model, theology in all its forms must be " determined by a relentless drive to genuine publicness ".[4] In order to maintain its public character, theology, like any discipline, must develop a preliminary systematic argument by which to ground its possibility and to ·establish its claims to truth and meaningfulness. This initial apologetics uses universal categories and proceeds in accordance with general criteria, functioning in terms, that is, which " all reasonable persons, whether ' religiously involved ' or not, can recognize as reasonable" (Tracy, *57).* Usually it takes the form of a foundational explanatory theory of religious discourse which appeals to the universal nature of the deep structures of religious experience. This general theory of religion provides criteria for the subsequent theology, thereby maintaining the latter's relevance for the general, non-Christian public. The theological method considered appropriate is one which attempts systematically to correlate Christian-specific claims with the deep structures of human experience.[5]

The post-liberal model, by comparison, is more concerned to preserve Christian identity than to maintain the publicness of Christian discourse. The task of theology is not primarily the apologetic one of justifying Christianity to a non-Christian pub-

a *Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989) (cited as Placher).

4 David Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (New York: Crossroad, 1981), p. 31 (cited as Tracy).

5 See the analyses in, e.g., George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), chapter 2; and Ronald F. Thiemann, *Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise* (Notre Dame: U. of N. D. Press, 1985), chapter 4.

lie. Instead the theologian should critically " describe and redescribe the character and relationship of Christian beliefs and practices for the purpose of sustaining and nurturing Christia,!l identity ".[6] The criteria employed in this second model are required, therefore, to be intrasystematic: they are founded on, and usually specific to, the practices of the Christian community.

Post-liberals believe that the revisionist model of apologetics clings to a number of fallacious Enlightenment assumptions concerning the nature of rational argument. One assumption is the foundationalist fallacy, i.e., the appeal to a special class of self-evident truths which are thought to be the foundation of all knowledge in a specific sphere. The incorrigibility of these truths is thought to be warranted by the peculiar way in which they are known, namely by their imposing themselves upon us through direct experience.[7] Another assumption is that we can begin an argument from a neutral viewpoint, and/ or that we can arrive by such an argument at an adequate account of some element of human experience which is universal in scope. However, both our perspectives on reality and our experience are deeply molded by our place within particular traditions of thought and practice, traditions which we are unable to transcend sufficiently to give anything like a neutral account of universal religious experience.[8]

More decisive for the post-liberals than these non-theological criticisms of systematic apologetical arguments are the theological consequences of revisionist apologetics. Whether or not the initial argument makes a strictly foundationalist move, the development of a general theory as the framework within which to assess Christian claims tends inevitably to distort the subsequent theology. Instead of Christian claims determining the explicative framework, they end up being revised in order to fit the general theory. Furthermore, the systematic correlation of Christian claims and those of the larger society according to criteria derived from a general theory diminishes not only the identity of

[6] William Werpehowski, " Ad Hoc Apologetics ", *Journal of Religion,* 66:3 (1986), p. 286.

[7] See Placher, chapter 2; Thiemann, *Revelation,* chapters 1 and 2.

[8] Placher, pp. 17, 156.

Christianity but also its critical force within society. In the interest of publicness, Christianity ironically loses its distinctiveness, thereby becoming culturally irrelevant.[9]

These philosophical and theological difficulties indicate to the post-liberals that the attempt to develop a revisionist systematic apologetics should be abandoned. Not that we should abandon apologetics as such: Placher, for instance, argues forcefully that " the logic of Christian faith drives us to conversation beyond the borders of the Christian faith" (Placher, 167f.). But when we do engage in " pluralistic conversation ", as he terms it, it must be on an " ad hoc " basis.

What makes apologetics ad hoc? Negatively, ad hoc apologetics does not try, in the words of David Kelsey, to construct a " comprehensive, coherent, and religiously neutral systematic argument designed to exhibit the credibility of belief in God in general and the Christian symbol system in particular ".[10] Positively, ad hoc apologetics develops arguments the force of which remains situation-relative. That is, the apologist is to retain her grounding within a particular tradition, and address herself not to some abstract unbeliever, but to one who lives within a particular concrete historical and cultural situation. The basis for such an address are some of the beliefs and practices both parties share. Naturally, these commonalities will vary from case to case, so no systematic rules can be developed to be applied in all cases (Placher, 167).

As I noted earlier, it is my contention that Rahner's own theological practice can be understood as compatible with ad hoc apologetics. Rahner, of course, is usually understood to be a practitioner of the revisionist model of theology.[11] Later I will

9 A point made classically by Van Harvey, "The Pathos of Liberal Theology", *Journal of Religion* 56 (1976).

10 " Church Discourse and Public Realm ", in *Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck*, ed. Bruce Marshall (Notre Dame: U. of N.D. Pr., 1990), p. 16.

n Besides the works of Carr and Fiorenza cited in note 2 above, see also, e.g., W. V. Dych's interpretation of chapter one of FCF in *A World of Grace*, ed. Leo J. O'Donovan (New York: Seabury, 1980); or Thomas Sheehan, *Karl Rohner: The Philosophical Foundations* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio U.P., 1987).

show how representative interpretations along such lines require his theology to be inconsistent. Although such inconsistency is indeed possible, the principle of charity suggests that we look for an alternative interpretation. This I sketch out by first looking at Rahner's notion of indirect methods, and then by discussing the transcendental method, particularly with reference to the kind of argument it uses and its function in Rahner's apologetics. I will argue that the most coherent reading of Rahner requires that his transcendental method be understood as an instance of the indirect method, rather than vice versa.

This paper is not, however, m_erely to be an exercise in reinterpretation and rehabilitation. I hope at the same time to show that by interpreting Rahner as an ad hoc apologist we can discern some examples of an apologetic method which may be used profitably by those who seek, like Placher, to develop a way beyond the impasse of the revisionist and post-liberal models.[12]

Rahner's Indirect Methods

Rahner's notion of the indirect methods can best be understood in the context of his views on the nature and task of theology. In general terms, theology is a "necessarily ecclesiastical" discipline whose task it is " to serve as the science of the proclamation of the Gospel and ... [to] serve the people of our time" (TI 21, 5). Its subject matter is "the act and content of Christian ... faith ", the Christian kerygma, which it represents in language used by contemporary people. Theologians are to try to distinguish what is of permanent value in the Christian life from its historically and culturally conditioned conceptual packaging, which may no longer be useful for, and may actually distort, the Church's proclamation of the kerygma.[18] As Leo O'Donovan

[12] Although I have sketched out a specifically North American context for my discussion, a similar problematic pertains in Europe. See Walter Kasper, " Postmodern Dogmatics: Towards a Renewed Discussion of Foundations in North America", *Communio* 17 (Summer 1990).

[1s] How, more exactly, Rahner does this is described in George Lindbeck's Pere Marquette Theology Lecture, *Infallibility* (Milwaukee: Marquette U.P., 1972), pp. 51-3.

points out, theology functions not only as faith seeking understanding, but as a practical and transformative discipline, " a reflective effort to open Christian life to ever greater and more active faith." [14] By showing that a Christian claim is something that "can be lived out in a genuine way" (TI 21, *77),* theology serves the kerygma by aiding its call to the decision of faith. [15]

Recent Catholic tradition has distinguished two ways in which theology is to carry out its task, namely fundamental and dogmatic theology. The latter addresses those who are already within the borders of the Christian faith, and attempts to demonstrate the coherence of particular beliefs within the Christian system. Fundamental theology has taken the form, since the Enlightenment, of a " scientific and systematic reflection upon the grounds of credibility of Christian revelation and the obligation of faith " (TI 16, 156). It is a deduction, arguing according to general criteria, addressed ad extra, with the intent to convince non-Christians of the truth and meaningfulness of (the Roman Catholic form of) Christianity. [16]

Rahner contends that there has occurred a qualitative change in the situation facing fundamental theology which has rendered the discipline as traditionally conceived practically impossible today. Three factors are responsible for this change. The first and most obvious, perhaps, is that the sheer volume of data to be considered in order to make such an argument has become overwhelming. Theologians now face a number of sub-disciplines and a plurality of methods, making them mere amateurs outside their chosen specialty. Systematic theologians, for instance, cannot hope to be sufficiently expert in exegesis, in moral philosophy and so on, to use the materials specific to these disciplines with any degree of conviction (TI 6, 23ff). In addition, they must digest the data from a large number of other sciences and learn the

14 Leo O'Donovan, " Orthopraxis and Theological Method in Karl Rahner ", *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,* 35 (1980) p. 61.

15 See Rahner and Karl Lehmann, *Kerygma and Dogma* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), p. 23.

16 See Fiorenza, for a discussion of the origins and development of fundamental theology.

many philosophical languages now used. Consequently it is impossible for any single individual (and Rahner rules out collaborative efforts) to bring together all the knowledge involved in order to present a direct and unified argument for a particular view of the world.

The practical difficulties consequent upon contemporary intellectual pluralism have led us to recognize a second factor, namely the inescapability of our situatedness with relation to truth. We cannot help but work with certain " philosophical preconceptions " which are "subject to historical conditions and the limitations of particular epochs" (TI 11, 74). Theologians must now "explicitly allow for ... the fact that their own recognition of truth is subject to historical conditioning" (ibid, 77). There is no possibility of transcending our particular view of reality to reach a neutral vantage point and so create an argument which would answer all counter-arguments to come. We can only reason within a tradition: " truth has something to do with institutional life and practice " ; it is available only within particular historical-cultural contexts (ibid., 80).

One consequence of contemporary pluralism for fundamental theology, therefore, is that it must explicitly recognize the necessity of beginning within a particular ecclesiological context. Abandoning attempts to develop a neutral, non-perspectival basis for its argument, rational apologetics must " take as its starting-point the average and representational awareness of faith to be found in the Church as it exists in the concrete" (TI 11, 81).

The methodological issue for fundamental theology is further complicated by a third factor, however, namely the new cultural situation in which the Church finds itself. According to Rahner's analysis in *The Shape of the Church to Come,*[17] the loss of Christendom has resulted in the Church becoming an increasingly marginalized community amid a neo-pagan and scientistic culture *(Shape,* 33; see TI 14, 255f.). Tfie Roman Catholic Church's membership has consequently changed from one which consisted primarily of socialized Catholics drawn from the Catholic sub-

17 New York: Seabury, 1974. Henceforth cited as *Shape.*

culture to a new kind of membership based upon personal decision. New members of the Church are called to belief in Jesus Christ by their decision " in a critical dissociation " from " current ways of thinking and behaviour in [their] social environment" *(Shape,* 23).

Even after they have made a decision for faith, Christians cannot isolate themselves from their cultural environment. They must continue to use the prevailing discourse, with its philosophical assumptions and patterns of thought which are themselves often implicitly anti-Christian *(Shape,* 23). Consequently many Christians continue to live in a way " remote from the Gospel message " even while, sociologically at least, belonging to the Church *(Shape,* 98; TI 14, 255). Each believer now lives in" a situation of crisis for their faith" (FCF 6). To be a Christian is not a once-for-all decision, but an on-going task: " a person is always a Christian in order to become one" (FCF 306). Thus in the modern Church of the diaspora (TI 10, 13) there is no clear dividing line between Christians and non-Christians *(Shape,* 74).[18]

The changed situation demands " an aggressive attitude " on the part of theologians to win over those both within and without the Church to authentically Christian ways of thought and action *(Shape,* 31). In response, Rabner proposes that apologetics be reconceived as an address not only to those outside the Church, but also, and even primarily, to those within who are engaged in the process of appropriating their Christianity (see FCF 294, e.g.). Those outside the Church, in fact, should be addressed only on the assumption that they have already implicitly said ' yes ' to Christ. For it is Christians now who need confirmation in their faith, who need help to avoid a retreat into fideism, and who

18 In *Two Types of Apologetics: a Rhetorical and Pragmatic Analysis* (forthcoming), Kathryn Tanner develops a similar position in considerably more detail. She argues convincingly that the assumption that there is such a sharp boundary between believer and non-believer is at least partly responsible for the present impasse between revisionist and post-liberal apologetic method. Recognition that this is a false assumption would thus do much to dissolve the problem.

need to be given " confidence from the very *content* of Christian dogma itself that they can believe with intellectual honesty " (FCF 12).

In response to the blurring of the borders between faith and non-faith, the apologetical thrust of fundamental theology should, Rahner believes, be combined with the perspective and material concerns of dogmatic theology. The resulting apologetics will attempt to be a " unity " of philosophy and theology in response to the unity of these two forms of reflection " already present in the concrete life of the Christian" (FCF 11).

Rahner proposes that the new apologetics use a form of argument differing from that of traditional fundamental theology. This method can itself be " rationally justified" by generalizing the probabilist approach in ethics to include philosophical and historical issues, and by borrowing some suggestions from Newman (see TI 6, 27). Rather than arguing systematically and deductively from self-evident principles, directly engaging all the material issues involved, and seeking thereby to effect a strict proof for the question at hand, an "indirect form of justification" should be attempted (TI 11, 75).

Indirect apologetics begins from a particular perspective, i.e., faith " in its normal ecclesial form " (FCF 1). It addresses the individual or group in such a way that their concrete situation will bear upon the form and material content of the argument (TI 11, 78). Instead of a universally valid argument designed to vanquish all possible counter-arguments, the indirect argument avoids direct treatment of all the material issues involved, and takes the form of a case made to convince a certain set of people to think about a particular issue in a certain way. The force of the argument is not meant to be universally applicable; it remains an "incomplete proof" (TI 6, 29£.). Instead of proceeding systematically in a linear fashion, the aim is to convince by showing a " convergence of probabilities," arguing from a variety of perspectives in order to show the reasonableness of the proposed thesis (ibid.). Consequently indirect apologetics resembles an *argumentum ad hominem,* but, Rather insists, there is nothing

to be ashamed of in this, since the very situatedness of the argument will throw light otherwise unavailable on the material issues considered (TI 11, 78).

In sum the indirect methods differ from traditional fundamental theology in three ways : a) they avoid systematic deductive arguments involving direct treatment of material questions which need expertise in a multiplicity of disciplines; b) the argument is meant to apply only " in the particular concrete situation" of those who are to be addressed; and c) as situation-relative, the case made through an indirect method does " not lay claim to any permanent or universal validity" (TI 11, 75).

Rahner's remarks on the indirect methods in theology are clearly consistent with the two norms for ad hoc apologetics I noted earlier. The summary above indicates that the force of the argument of an indirect apologetics is situation relative, and does not attempt to ground Christian discourse upon a neutral universally-applicable argument. I suggest then that these remarks on the indirect methods be understood as a description of an ad hoc apologetic method.

Rahner as practitioner of the indirect methods

In order to move beyond Rahner's remarks on indirect methods to his actual practice, I could now turn to those arguments which Rahner explicitly describes as examples of the indirect apologetics. The aim would be, of course, to show how they are in fact consistent with the ad hoc approach. There are a number of such cases made for various proposals, usually historical in nature, including, for instance, the "historically indirect and immediately existentiell argument" (FCF 335) regarding the institution of the Church by Christ (FCF 329ff.; see also TI 11, 77f.). I will call these the ' narrnw ' versions of the indirect methods, for they are all more or less brief, occur in the context of a larger work, and refer to isolated historical proposals.

However, my thesis about Rahner's work pertains to more than these narrow versions. I want to say that all Rahner's apologetic work is ad hoc, including the large-scale, philosophically-oriented apologetic treatises *Spirit in the World* and *Hearers*

of the Word,[19] together with FCF. These seem most obviously revisionist in nature and are often the basis for interpretations of Rahner's work as a whole. Hence for the remainder of the paper I will discuss Rahner' s theological practice in terms of these works, which, I will argue, are instances of what I will call the ' broad ' version of ad hoc apologetics.

The claim just made cries out for a discussion of Rahner's use of the transcendental method. Transcendental arguments are surely instances of a religiously neutral, systematic and comprehensive apologetical approach. They are meant (are they not?) to transcend particularity to arrive at knowledge of conditions which prevail universally. And they are an integral element in all three of the works just mentioned. I will very briefly examine two interpretations of Rahner's apologetics which view his work from the perspective of the transcendental rather than the indirect methods to see how they answer two key questions : First, what kind of argument is the transcendental argument in Rahner's apologetics? Second, what function does it have in his theology?

The first kind of interpretation is one which construes Rahner's apologetics as an example of the foundationalist move. Perhaps the most sophisticated example of this reading can be found in Francis Fiorenza's *Foundational Theology.*[20] Here Rahner's use of transcendental arguments is seen as an indispensable part of a theological method which attempts to establish the truth of Christian claims. The method consists of two steps : The first " presupposes nothing of Christianity ", but develops a neutral transcendental (and existential) analysis of the universal religious dimension of human existence. The second step then correlates the results of this analysis (namely that human subjectivity is grounded on a pre-apprehension of divine presence) with specific Christian claims (especially those having to do with Christology). By showing how Christian claims are explicit symbols of the transcendental dimension of human experience, the correlation

19Spirit in the World (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968) (cited as SW); *Hearers of the Word* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969) (cited as HW).

20 See note 2.

has thus confirmed the truth of Christian beliefs (see Fiorenza, 278-280).

Fiorenza's subsequent criticism of this method of correlation takes Rahner's putative use of foundationalist philosophy to task (see Fiorenza, 280-282). He explains the problems associated with the foundationalist move, making many of the same points as the post-liberals (Fiorenza, 285-291). He points out that all human experience, together with its theological interpretation, is situated within a particular cultural tradition. And so he faults Rahner's transcendental argument for its failure to take into account the " historical and hermeneutical dimension of human experience " (Fiorenza, 281).

As we have seen, Rahner is quite aware of our profound socialization. So in effect Fiorenza has implicitly accused Rahner of inconsistency: Transcendental arguments deduce universal, ahistorical conditions of the possibility for a given; yet Rahner has explicitly abandoned such arguments as impossible. The principle of charity suggests that we should see if Rahner is in fact using transcendental arguments to deduce necessary truths about the religious dimension of human experience. Perhaps, instead, he is using transcendental arguments in a more philosophically sophisticated way consistent with his views on the indirect methods.

According to Kathryn Tanner,[21] a transcendental argument differs from simple proof by deduction. If the latter is successful, belief in the premise is transferred to the conclusion. By contrast, transcendental arguments take the conclusion as the given, and it is the conditions of the possibility which are argued for. But transcendental arguments themselves come in two versions : " strong " and " qualified ". In the strong version, the given is unproblematic: it is the conditions of its possibility which are argued for as necessary preconditions, which must be accepted if we are to retain the given. If this version is used in fundamental theology, the preliminary deduction becomes a once-and-for-all

[21] *God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?* (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 20-24.

demonstration of what must pertain, if Christianity is to be credible. It is this version of the transcendental argument which Fiorenza assumes Rahner to be engaged upon.

Fiorenza is well-aware that the logic of this version of transcendental arguments is confused. S. Korner has pointed out that all that is demonstrated are merely sufficient reasons for the given; nothing can be said about their necessity.[22] In the light of cross-cultural studies showing the pluralism of human experience, the *uniqueness* of the conditions must be demonstrated in addition to their sufficiency. This requirement is ignored by the " strong " version of the transcendental argument.

The second, qualified, version of the transcendental argument is more modest in intent, and recognizes the logical possibility of a plurality of metaphysical schemes. Here it is the given-that for which the conditions of possibility are supplied-which is the problem. The point of engaging in such an argument is therefore to support the given by providing suitable conditions; that is, by demonstrating its internal coherence, getting rid of difficulties as to its credibility, and so on. These conditions are recognized as merely sufficient, and will vary depending upon time and place. Hence the qualified version of the transcendental argument "must be undertaken over and over again in relation to changing and different schemata " (Korner, 331).

This qualified version of the transcendental argument is, I suggest, compatible with Rahner's own comments. He has never claimed that his analyses are definitive, and in fact explicitly asserts that no " transcendental enquiry " is to be considered a once-for-all demonstration of necessary conditions. Rather, such enquiries "must constantly be undertaken afresh" (TI 11, 90). There is no intrinsic reason why qualified versions of transcendental arguments should not be used within an indirect apologetics. It is clear, too, that they can be compatible with the positive norm for ad hoc apologetics, namely, that the force of the argument should be situation-relative.

[22] S. Korner, "The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions", *The Monist*, vol. 51 (1967).

Yet even if Rahner can be read as using a qualified version of the transcendental argument, and thus as innocent of foundationalism, such an argument can still function as part of a revisionist apologetic strategy. A qualified transcendental argument is based upon premises which are admittedly conditioned by a particular cultural situation. But these premises may be used to formulate a general theory which appears religiously neutral and reasonable to all within that culture. The theory can then be used systematically to ground subsequent Christian claims. This use of transcendental arguments would then be in violation of the negative norm for ad hoc apologetics. The theological problems will then remain the same as for strong transcendental arguments, for particular Christian claims can be distorted as they are correlated, and revised to fit, with the general theory.

The problem of distortion is a central concern of a second kind of critical interpretation of Rahner. This interpretation is distinct from the first in that it understands Rahner to be using the transcendental method to ground, not the truth of Christian claims (which is a matter of faith), but their meaningfulness. The best recent example of this reading can be found in Bruce Marshall's *Christology in Conflict*,[23] which analyses the move from general theory to particular doctrine specifically in terms of Christology.

Marshall understands Rahner to be making two key Christological assumptions. The first is compatible with pre-modern theology, namely, that what is ultimately or salvifically significant can be known only through knowledge of the unique individual, Jesus Christ *(Conflict,* 10). Second, as a post-Enlightenment theologian, Rahner also assumes that it is absolutely necessary to develop a preliminary argument which grounds the meaningfulness of Christian claims about Christ *(Conflict,* 20). It is this second assumption which determines Rahner's theological method, which has two stages : In the first, a transcendental anthropological argument appeals to "general criteria of religious and moral meaningfulness" *(Conflict,* 15) in order to develop a theory of

23 *Christology in Conflict: The Identity of a Saviour in Rahner and Barth* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987). Hereafter cited as *Conflict.*

what salvation must be, and thus what Rahner calls an " absolute saviour " must look like. Then in the second stage, theology shows how the concept absolute saviour can be meaningfully ascribed to Jesus Christ (see *Conflict,* 21-32).

Marshall's criticism of Rahner depends upon the distinction between two kinds of identity descriptions, the "particular " and the " positive ". A person may be known concretely by reference to features which indicate aspects unique to that particular individual. These would include ostensive reference ("that's the fellow over there ") or a (more or less complete) biographical recital. Alternatively, a person may be known abstractly, with reference only to indeterminate features. In this case the individual is known positively as the one who functions in a role or is an instance of a class, but who is otherwise unknown (see *Conflict,* 42-7).

With this distinction in mind, Rahner' s Christology can be faulted on two counts. First, by moving logically from the general concept " absolute saviour " to the person Jesus Christ, the transcendental method leads to the loss of the " material decisiveness " of the particular identity description of Jesus Christ for our understanding of absolute salvation. Thereby our knowledge of the Christian notion of salvation is at least diminished and more or less distorted. Second (and this is Marshall's key contribution to Rahnerian criticism), Rahner's method as described is logically inconsistent with his initial assumption. Transcendental arguments can explicate only the general and the abstract; a transcendental Christology can thus deal only with the positive identity of Jesus Christ, not with his concrete particularity. But Rahner's first assumption is that Jesus' particularity is logically indispensable for Christology. Therefore when he engages in transcendental Christology, his method is inconsistent with this initial assumption.

Marshall's criticism of Rahner is itself dependent upon some vital hermeneutic decisions. Like Fiorenza, he understands the function of the transcendental argument to be the first stage of a two-stage revisionist apologetic strategy. He also understands the

transcendental Christology to be intended as part of Rahner's theological redescription of the particular identity of Jesus Christ. I believe both these decisions are misguided, and are responsible for the putative inconsistency in Rahner's theology. In a paper of this scope I am unable either to provide a detailed criticism of Fiorenza or Marshall's interpretations, or to offer a properly detailed alternative reading of Rahner's texts. Instead I will offer a sketch of an alternative reading of Rahner's large-scale works which is guided by his remarks on indirect methods, and which does not require inconsistency on his part.

As we have seen, for Rahner all Christian thought and action is conditioned by its location within a given cultural milieu. Christians have no choice but to make use of a selection of conceptual tools provided by their social environment. They do so, as they have done throughout Christian history, by appropriating the prevailing conceptuality for their own ends according to their own criteria. However, their environment is neither static nor universal, and so these Christianized conceptual frameworks will over time show increasing inability to cope with new forms of thought and action within the prevailing culture. Although the Church can continue its proclamation of Jesus Christ, its task becomes unnecessarily impaired by the increasing inadequacy of the conceptual framework it uses to relate Jesus Christ to other sources of knowledge and experience (see FCF 13). It becomes harder for Christians to bring their faith in Christ into every part of their lives.

One important function of theology, then, is to appropriate the prevailing conceptuality so as to broaden the impact of the Gospel on Christian life. Theologians are to formulate a mixed discourse, making use of the categories of the culture, but carefully *reinterpreting* them to accord with Christian criteria. This is not at all the same thing as trying to find a sufficiently neutral discourse that is acceptable to both Christians and non-Christians. Rather, " secular " categories will be used to develop a conceptual framework within which to summon the prevailing " mentality to the judgement seat of God" (TI 21, *77).* This task is performed by

using the (necessarily qualified) transcendental method in its broadest form, in which it functions to inquire into the linguistic conditions which are suitable to support the undermined given, i.e., the Christian kerygma.

Spirit in the World is an example of this kind of conceptual appropriation. Here Rahner is not trying to develop a neutral philosophy of religion as the first stage of a systematic revisionist apologetics. Instead, SW is a metaphysical inquiry done within the Christian tradition, subject to its criteria and its agenda. Within the parameters of similar efforts by Augustine and Thomas, Rahner appropriates and reinterprets the conceptuality prevailing in Germany at the time of his writing. Part of the conceptual apparatus which Rahner believes is useful for Christian proclamation is the transcendental method. For the turn to the subject has inextricably linked the dialect of his culture to anthropological questions. And since " every theology, of course, is always a theology which arises out of the secular anthropologies and self-interpretations of man" (FCF *7),* theology must appropriate a discourse in which the new anthropologies can be addressed by Christian proclamation (and thereby summoned to God's judgment seat).

Hearers of the Word can be read in a similar way. Leo O'Donovan [24] has argued that HW

> does not prescind from faith in order to inquire into its foundations; instead it asks what understanding of reality (general ontology) and what correlative understanding of the human world (metaphysical anthropology) theology can *appropriately use* [my emphasis] in its reflection on faith.

In both SW and HW, according to this reading, a qualified version of the transcendental method is used to develop a conceptuality by means of which the Gospel can be shown to have a bearing on all aspects of life within the prevailing culture. Subject from the outset to criteria drawn from the Christian tradition, there is no attempt at formulating a neutral conceptuality, or one which would seem "reasonable to all" within a culture.

[24] O'Donovan, "Orthopraxis and Theological Method", p. 57.

Furthermore, both works are clearly addressed to Christians who live within a particular culture: the force of their arguments are relative to those who live within the Teutonic philosophical tradition. Both works can thus be interpreted as broad versions of ad hoc apologetics.

Both SW and HW are Christian philosophies of religion, and operate at a high level of abstraction. Marshall's concerns about transcendental Christo logy can be addressed by looking at *Foundations of Christian Faith*, which, as a unity of fundamental and dogmatic theology, reflects explicitly on dogmatic material. According to Rahner, one of the most important applications of the indirect methods is in the area of the basic course for seminarians called for by Vatican II (TI 11, 79). FCF is clearly Rahner's attempt at constructing such a course. I have already noted some sections in which narrow versions of the indirect methods are used, but the work as a whole is indirect in approach. Rahner explicitly rejects the attempt to provide a systematic " foundation" for faith (FCF 9), and aims instead at presenting a " convergence of probabilities " which, it is hoped, will renew the decision for Christ of Christians as they live out their faith (FCF 10). The argument of the work should be read, then, as a " cas·e" rather than a deduction; and as having an unsystematic, inductive character, rather than a two-stage form. Its force is situation-relative, for it is addressed to a specific audience, and makes use of a local conceptuality.

The express purpose of FCF is to reflect upon the " whole" of Christianity. This does not mean that it intends to cover all the theological loci in great detail, but that it looks at Christian faith as it is lived concretely within a particular cultural situation from a single vantage point, namely, the " idea " of Jesus Christ as God-man or absolute saviour. Running throughout the early sections is the concern to open up secular discourse to a " universal pneumatology " by means of which (as an " experiment ") Rahner wants to " concentrate the whole of theology on the mystery of Christ" (FCF 3).

The sections of FCF preceding the Christology chapter can be

read as equivalent to SW and HW: that is, they are intent on appropriating the prevailing conceptuality in the interests of Christian proclamation. Operating within the framework of Christian faith "in its normal ecclesial form", FCF attempts a "justification of faith by faith" (FCF 12). It uses the transcendental method to develop a discursive context out of some commonalities between secular anthropology and Christian claims. This mixed discourse is formulated in order that specifically Christian claims can be made clearly and yet in accordance with Christian criteria, and the call to decision for Christ understood. By reinterpretation and appropriation of the self-understanding of their culture, Rahner shows seminarians and other interested parties how they can talk about Jesus Christ and his relation to all aspects of human reality without retreating into fideism or intellectual dishonesty.

The function of the transcendental Christology in FCF is to abstract from Jesus' particular identity in the interest of universalizing him. Rahner takes certain positive concepts from Christian talk about Christ-absolute saviour, God-man,- which he uses in the context of the mixed discourse. He is then able to show how the realities of the culture can be absorbed into what Christians want to claim is the larger reality of Jesus Christ. In his section on "Christology within an Evolutionary View of the World", for instance, he appropriates and reinterprets a local (Hegelian) version of evolutionary thinking in order to be able to talk of Jesus Christ "as the unsurpassable peak of a universal history of grace" (TI 19, 10; FCF, 178-203).

My reading of the Christology of FCF, then, understands it as not about the business of redescribing the particular identity of Jesus Christ. This Rahner leaves to the exegetes and the historians who construct an "ascending Christo logy" (FCF, *177).*[25] FCF is not trying to be another *Church Dogmatics* with its small

[25] Although Rahner no doubt thought of an ascending Christology as based upon some form of historical reconstruction, his remarks suggest that there is plenty of room for a narrative approach to redescribing the particular identity of Jesus Christ.

print exegesis, and cannot fairly be compared with it. Nor is FCF a *Summa Theologiae,* but is closer to the *Compendium of Theology* (see FCF, 2). Perhaps it is closer still in some ways to Barth's *Epistle to the Romans.* For in its own distinctive way FCF tries to challenge those assumptions of the day which function as conditions unsuitable to the preservation of a Christian given. In Rahner's situation the given to be preserved is not so much the Otherness of God as the fact that Jesus Christ is a constitutive element of all aspects of human life, who is ignored at our peril.

In this reading of FCF, Rahner's transcendental Christology is consistent with his assumption concerning the logical indispensability of the particularity of Jesus Christ. The logic of his Christological argument does not move from the general to the particular. Rather it proceeds from the particularity of Jesus as "the basic and decisive point of departure, of course" (FCF, *177).* It then moves on to " generalize " Christ in such a way that all reality is absorbed by him.[26] This broad apologetics is practical theology: its point is to help those who believe in Jesus Christ let their encounter with him transform all aspects of their lives.

Admittedly the attempt to universalize Jesus can easily lead to Christological and other distortions. But perhaps here too, as Hans Frei once remarked, we have to cut our losses.[27] To do so becomes "theologically disastrous", according to Frei, only "if it means *either* a complete elimination of philosophy as an issue and a means for reflection in C4ristian theology, *or* a pathetic obeisance to philosophy as the master key to certainty about all reason and certainty, and therefore to the shape or possibility of Christian theology" (Frei 31£.). Neither alternative, I have argued, is true of Rahner.

[26] For a sophisticated discussion of the notion of absorbing non-Christian-specific truth into the Christian framework, see Bruce Marshall, "Absorbing the World: Christianity and the Universe of Truths", in Bruce Marshall, ed., *Theology and Dialogue* (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1990).

[27] Hans Frei, "Barth and Schleiermacher: Divergence and Convergence", in James 0. Duke and Robert F. Streetman, edd., *Barth and Schleiermacher: Beyond the Impasse?* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988).

Conclusion

In the foregoing I have tried to sketch a way of reading Rahner's apologetics which proceeds from the perspective of his remarks on the indirect methods. Even in his large-scale works and in his use of the transcendental method, I have suggested, Rahner can be understood to operate in accordance with the norms of ad hoc apologetic method. I have also tried to indicate that in these large-scale works, especially FCF, we have a broad version of ad hoc apologetics which, if used with a different conceptuality, might be an example for apologists in the North American situation to follow in their attempt to get beyond the impasse of revisionist versus post-liberal apologetics.[28]

[28] I'd like to thank James Buckley, Bruce Marshall, Russell Reno and Kendall Soulen for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

GOD AND THE STATUS OF FACTS

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I

EVEN BEFORE mid-century, Platonism was in such retreat that Croce could call it "traditional philosophy." By "Platonism" is meant any philosophy which admits transcendent entities, be they individuals or universals. This philosophy, complains Croce,

> ... has its eyes fixed on heaven, and expects supreme truth from that quarter. This division of heaven and earth, this dualist conception of a reality which transcends reality, of metaphysics over physics, this contemplation of the concept without or outside judgment, for ever imprints the same character, whatever the denomination the transcendental reality may bear: God or Matter, Idea or Will; it makes no difference, while beneath or against each of them there is presumed to subsist some inferior or merely phenomenal reality.[1]

Though few recent philosophers would follow Croce in his identification of philosophy with history, most would applaud the Italian idealist's castigation of Platonism. Between their acts of mutual criticism, idealists, existentialists, logical empiricists, pragmatists, Marxists, philosophers of language, neo-Nietzschians, deconstructionists and most phenomenologists unite against the transcendent. The metaphysics of Plato and Kant are dead, they chant. No timeless Reality lurks behind appearences, eluding eye, ear, language and inner sense.

Insisting on the reality of at least relational universals, the early Russell for a time resisted the tide. But his abandonment

[1] Benedetto Croce, "History as the Story of Liberty" in Morton White, ed., *The Age of Analysis* (New York, 1964), pp. 50-51.

of logical atomism weakened his case for Platonism and a turn to empiricism followed. Moreover, even as he defended universals in his early days, Russell shunned transcendent *individuals.* In this effort his most celebrated ploy was the Theory of Descriptions, according to which commitment to individuals such as the king of France and the golden mountain is eschewed. Less famous was his move to spike that metaphysical individual known as substance. This he did by attacking the traditional subject-predicate form of the proposition. If all simple propositions are of the subject-predicate form and if true propositions map facts and thirdly if there are no facts which cannot be mirrored by propositions, then, says Russell, either there is only one substance or there are many substances between which there are no relations.[2] And under both alternatives-the one Spinozistic and the other Leibnizian-substance is a hidden, transcendent thing which accounts for all phenomena without itself being part of any phenomenon.

But be it from Croce or James or Dewey or Sartre or the Marxists or Quine or whomever, is this anti-platonism really justified? Are these celebrated philosophers right or even consistent in eliminating the transcendent? To see that they are not, one need only consider the case of *facts.* If facts are timeless and not temporal, then there *are* transcendent entities after all and the anti-platonists are wrong. Take, for example, the fact that Napoleon was defeated by Wellington at Waterloo on June 18, 1815. Defenders of temporalism as regards facts must either count this as being a past fact or else hold that this fact is no different from the historical event, "fact" being just another name for "event". But both of these options fail. That facts are not events is shown by the difference in how the following questions are answered: (a) " Why did I not hold class this morning in Adams Hall " ? and (b) "What is meant by saying that the statement ' I did ·not hold class this morning in Adams Hall ' is true " ? While (a) may be answered by citing some *event* which prevented my hold-

[2] Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (New York, 1975), pp. 94-95.

ing class in Adams Hall this morning (for example, a fire broke out in Adams Hall just before class), (b) is never answered this way. Though the event of the fire in Adams Hall (or some other event) may be what *prevented* my holding class this morning in Adams Hall, it is nonsense to cite either that fire or any other event as an answer to (b). Yet, a perfectly sensible answer to (b) is that the statement referred to in (b) jibes with the (negative) fact that I did not hold class this morning in Adams Hall. It seems, therefore, that facts are not reducible to events.

But the second alternative which is available to the defender of temporalism as regards facts is no better. The idea of a past fact is suspect. Facts, to be sure, may be *about* the past but from this it neither follows nor is it the case that such facts are *themselves* past. The fact in question is undeniably a fact about the past in the sense that the past event of Wellington's defeat of Napoleon is referred to in the fact. But if facts which are about the past in this sense are also *past facts,* it is wrong to say that it *is* a fact that Wellington defeated Napoleon at Waterloo on June 18, 1815; rather we should say that it *was* a fact that Wellington defeated Napoleon at Waterloo on June 18, 1815. So the notion of past facts conflicts with ordinary language.

Logic too brooks no facts which are past. Cast in standard logical form in classical logic, the statement, " Napoleon was defeated by Wellington at Waterloo on June 18, 1815" (N) becomes,

(N') "Napoleon [is] one who was defeated by Wellington at Waterloo on June 18, 1815 ".

The copula in (N') is tenseless. It does not oppose the "was" in the predicate as the present opposes the past. Otherwise, it is being claimed in (N') that Napoleon is *now* the person who was *then* defeated by Wellington at Waterloo. Then the " is " in (N') would be just like the "is" in "James is doing what he was doing yesterday at this time". But as it is a condition of the truth of any statement like this that the individual referred to in the statement have *present* existence, it follows that (N') is false

since Napoleon no longer is. But it is equally clear that the copula in (N') does not express the past tense of the verb *to be* either. Otherwise, the logical form of statements like this is systematically misleading; for the word "was " it should always be using the word "is". To that extent, the subject-predicate proposition in classical logic should in the case of true historical statements distort rather than reflect reality. Therefore, if we go by classical logic then the fact on account of which (N') is true cannot be said to be past any more than it can be said to be present. The logical form of true subject-predicate statements in classical logic indicates that the facts to which they refer are neither present *nor* past.

To this it may be replied that (N) is not a subject-predicate statement *to* begin with since " Napoleon " is not a logically proper name. Rather, (N) should be analysed (following Russell) as,

(N") "There is an x such that x was the first emperor of France and for any y, y was the first emperor of France if and only if y = x and x was defeated by Wellington at Waterloo on June 18, 1815 ".

But this substitution of modern for classical logic makes no difference. For in (N") does the first occurrence of the word "is" express present or past tense? If the former, then what (N") claims is that there is *now* an x such that x was the first emperor of France and for any y, y was the first emperior of France if and only if y = x and x was defeated by Wellington on June 18, 1815. But since there is not *now* such an x then (N") is false. But this conflicts with the evident truth of (N), and the purpose of (N") is *to* explicate (N). But if the latter, i.e. if in (N") the " is " in the logical operator, " there is an x " (3 x), expresses *past* tense then the existential (3. x) (Dx) (in which' D' stands for the predicate of ' being a dinosaur ') equally serves for "There is a dinosaur" and "There was a dinosaur". And the trouble with this is that since the former statement is false and the later true, (3 x) (Dx) ends up being both false and true. No less than is the case with the logical form of true subject-predicate

statements, therefore, the logical form of true existential statements indicates that the facts to which they refer and which make them true are neither present *nor* past.

II

But the problem with past facts runs deeper than this. It is not just that they conflict with the languages of life and logic. For if some facts are past then the statement, "There are past facts" is true. But if so, then there is a fact which makes this statement true, namely, the fact that there are past facts. But is this latter fact past or present? If it is past then it no longer exists. But then it is difficult to see how the statement " There are past facts " is true, since there is no fact to which it corresponds. But if it is present, then it must be countenanced that a present complex is made up of constituents which are past. If you compare the supposed fact that there are past facts with the fact that there are lions you find that they are alike in being existential and unlike in that past facts figure in the one and lions figure in the other. Each fact is therefore a complex of two things. Our supposed present fact that there are past facts thus includes something *past* as a constituent. But as any present complex thing evidently depends on *present* constituents, you cannot have such a complex which is composed of past constituents.

To avoid this, defenders of past facts might deny in the first instance that the fact that there are past facts *is* complex. They would hold instead that facts are ultimate and irreducible. Recall Quine's comment to the effect that while there are red barns and red sunsets, there is no thing called redness which these facts include or exemplify. Doubtless facts *are* ultimate and irreducible in a sense. The fact that A gave B to C is irreducible to the fact that C gave B to A. And the fact that A gave B to C is also irreducible to the fact that D gave B to C. Also, these same facts are ultimate in the sense that they do not include other *facts* as constituents. But facts are not irreducible in the sense that they fail to include *any* constituents. Take the facts that grass is green and spinach is green. The two facts are similar in being facts

which concern things that are green. But they differ in that the one concerns grass while the other concerns spinach. The two facts must therefore each have a respect in which they are alike and a respect in which they are different. And this implies that each fact is a complex of these two respects.

Therefore, as it cannot be said that the supposed fact that there are past facts is itself either present or past, it cannot be said that the proposition "There are past facts" is true, in which case no fact is past. But then it cannot be said that the fact that Wellington defeated Napoleon at Waterloo on June 18, 1815 is a past fact. But as it clearly cannot be regarded as being a present or a future fact either, then either the fact in question is eternal in the sense of obtaining at all times or else it is eternal in the sense of being timeless. But if it obtains at all times then so too do its constituents. But no one can say that either Wellington or the Battle of Waterloo exists at *this* time or for that matter at the time of the assassination of Caesar in 44 ;B.C. Therefore, there is no alternative to holding that the fact of Napoleon's defeat by Wellington on June 18, 1815 is timeless. And as it is with this fact so it is with all other facts.

But no sooner is it conceded that facts *are* timeless than a second problem surfaces. If any fact is timeless and is composed of constituents, must it not be admitted that these same constituents exist side by side with the fact itself? For it is difficult to see how any eternal composite can be made up of constituents which are not eternal but past. By analogy, if a certain spatial whole be given, say the pen with which I am writing, it is difficult to see how the constituents of that whole, say, the atoms which go into it, can be anything else than spatial. Unless like Leibniz we take matter to be phenomenal and not real, we should recoil at the thought that the pen is composed of spiritual atoms. But then, since it *is* a fact that Wellington defeated Napoleon at Waterloo on June 18, 1815, then Wellington must exist even now, long after his supposed death. Not only that but, on the same assumption of the eternality of facts and their constituents, it follows as well that Wellington existed even before he was born. Short of

denying the evident complexity of facts, therefore, how can it be denied *both* that some facts are past *and* that Wellington still is?

The answer to this dilemma turns on distinguishing the Ideal Wellington from the historical Wellington.[3] Under this gambit, the things which figure in the eternal fact of Wellington's defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo on June 18, 1815, Wellington included, are themselves timeless. There is the Ideal Wellington who figures in many facts, including the fact in question, and there is the real or flesh-and-blood Wellington who once figured in many events, including the defeat of Napoleon, but who no longer figures in any event at all. Thus it can be said that facts and their constituents are eternal without implying that the real Wellington still is.

This solution to the dilemma seems to imply a full-dress Platonism. The Ideal world of facts and their constituents is radically set off from the world of events in space and time. The flesh-and-blood Wellington who once engaged Napoleon is patterned after the Ideal Wellington who is a constituent of the fact in question. And as it is with Wellington, so is it with the rest of us. To the extent that we too enter into facts, we all of us have a transcendent twin in Plato's heaven.

III

The grotesqueness of this consequence suggests a modification of the Platonism. This consists of saying that facts and their constituents are eternal but Mind-dependent. Facts and their constituents are no separate entities under this revision but are rather eternal exemplars in the Mind of God. The Ideal Wellington after whom the historical Wellington is patterned remains eternal but becomes, more plausibily, an Idea in God's Mind instead of a separated Person.

Confirmatory support for this mind-dependent status of facts

[3] For a different purpose, namely, to account for the possibility of error, Josiah Royce distinguished the Ideal John and Thomas from the real John and Thomas. See Josiah Royce, "The Possibility of Error" in *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* (Boston, 1885).

comes from ordinary language. Facts are often said to refer or to be about things, just as if they had the feature of intentionality. Thus, physicians warn unconcerned patients that the medical facts which they have discovered *are about them.* " These facts are about *you,"* the physician sternly advises his unserious patient, hoping to shake his apathy. Or a fisherman may say that it is a fact *about* flounder that they feed on the bottom. In each of these two cases the things which the facts are about are the real patient and real flounder respectively, while the Ideal patient and Ideal flounder figure in the facts which are about these same things. Thus, just as some facts concern the past even though they are not themselves past, so too some facts are about real things and events even though they are not themselves real. But intentionality being the mark of the mental, facts are *about* these real things and events in the first instance only because they are mind-dependent. Therefore, while they are eternal and not temporal, facts are not Platonic entities since, though they exist independently of our minds, they do not exist independently of Mind. [4]

To this it may be replied that the sense in which facts are about something is not the intentional sense of " about ". Rather (so the objection would run), facts are said to be about something only because the " something" enters into the fact as a constituent. But if so, the conclusion cannot be drawn that facts depend on Mind, in which case no appeal to the alleged intentionality of facts succeeds in blocking the implication of Platonism to which reference was just made. But the answer to this objection is that it is plainly false. For in no intelligible non-intentional sense is *any* complex whole said to be *about* one of its constituent parts. An aggregate whole such as a pile of pebbles is not about one of the pebbles; an organic whole such as a tree is not about one of its branches; or a logical whole such as the class of all trees is not about one of its members. By the same token, a fact in

[4] This is not necessarily to imply a metaphysics of absolute Idealism such as Hegel's or Royce's. For by "Mind" here may be meant the Mind of God in a medieval Scholastic sense, and according to the Scholastics timeless truth or facts exist eternally in God's Mind.

which several things enter as constituents is not sensibly said to be about one of its constituents in some non-intentional sense of "about".

Second, it may be objected that facts are not really about something but that they are said to be about something elliptically, i.e., only because they are the ground of a true *statement* about something. Thus, it is said to be a fact about flounder that they feed on the bottom only because the fact is the ground of a true statement about flounder, namely, "Flounder feed on the bottom." The response to this objection, however, insists that the matter is just the other way around. This is shown by the previous example of medical facts. When the physician emphasizes to his patient that the facts which he has discovered refer to or concern *him,* he, the physician, is clearly speaking about the facts *themselves* and not about statements which may be made about those facts. Our physician is trying to drive home to the patient that the facts which he has discovered are about him and not about some hypothetical patient. These same facts are not about the patient only because statements which express these facts are about the patient, but on the contrary, statements which express these facts are about the patient only because the facts which they express are about the patient. Otherwise, the consequence must be swallowed that regardless of what our physician says or thinks, the facts which he has discovered are really not about his patient at all. And this despite his efforts to convince his patient that they are.

Besides, if one insists that it is the statements or judgments expressing facts, and not the facts expressed, which are intentional, then it follows that facts are independent of minds as well as being timeless. But in that case, as was said, all of us have a transcendent twin after whom we are patterned. But this is so revolting that no one who sees this implication can continue to deny that facts are non-intentional while all along conceding that facts are timeless. So either facts *are* intentional or else (since it cannot be held that facts are in time), all of us have a transcendent twin in Plato's heaven.

On the assumption that facts are intentional as well as eternal, therefore, there need not be a commitment to a Platonic Wellington as a constituent of the eternal fact that Wellington defeated Napoleon at Waterloo on June 18, 1815. Instead, it may be said that the Ideal Wellington which is a constituent of the eternal fact in question is in God's mind as is the fact of which it is the constituent.

IV

But with this we are brought to a final fork in the road. For either the Mind on which facts depend includes the world or else it transcends the world. Either Mind is like a Hegelian Absolute or it is like the Christian-Hebraic God. Though both views have difficulties, the former fails to cover the datum of memory. Suppose I am aware that I am now thinking about the same thing I remember thinking about yesterday. For this statement to make sense, the pronoun " I " in each one of its three occurrences here must refer to a self of which my thoughts and memory are modifications. But if Mind includes the world (as in the Hegelian Absolute) then I am not a self at all but a thought in a larger Self. Otherwise, Mind is not the organic unity which its defenders claim it is but is rather a loose or aggregate unity of finite selves. But to say of a *thought* that *it* is aware that *it* is thinking about the same thing that *it* remembers thinking about yesterday is not something which it is intelligible to say. Second, the same view makes it impossible to distinguish voluntary from involuntary action. Suppose one bank teller embezzles $20,000 while a second teller surrenders $20,000 to an armed robber. Here it is correctly said that the second teller acts under external compulsion whereas the first teller does not. But if Mind includes the world and is a true unity, then each teller is a thought or phase in a larger Self, namely, Mind. But then the two actions cannot be distinguished the way they just were. For to say that the one thought or phase in the larger Self acts under compulsion whereas the other thought does not is once again not something which it is intelligible to say. It is agents or selves and not thoughts, phases or moments

in a self which either act or do not act. And so it is agents or selves and not thoughts, phases or moments in a self which either act under compulsion or not. Third, if Mind includes the world and is a true unity, then it is difficult to see how any one of us is ever morally responsible. If I am nothing but a thought or a moment in the life of a larger Self then I am not a self in my own right. " My" actions are in that case the actions of this larger Self. But then it is to this larger Self and not to me that praise or blame for actions is appropriately ascribed. This is true no matter what view of moral responsibility is taken. For whether " lack of external restraint or constraint " is sufficient for moral responsibility (as the soft determinist holds), or whether in addition to this the power of choice is also required (as the free-will theorist insists), it is a self and not a thought or a moment in a self to which moral responsibility is ascribed. Thus, short of abandoning the organic unity of Mind which is the centerpiece of their system, defenders of the view that Mind includes the world fail to cover the datum of memory, the difference between voluntary and involuntary action, and the matter of moral responsibility. And this is enough to conclude that the Mind on which facts and their constituents depend transcends and does not include the world.

But then it seems that we are brought right back to the scholastic view that temporal things and events exemplify eternal Ideas and facts in the Mind of God. Stated in terms of our previous example, this comes down to saying that the *event* of Napoleon's defeat by Wellington at Waterloo has as its eternal Exemplar the *fact* of Napoleon's defeat by Wellington in the Mind of God. Event and fact are thus the temporal and the atemporal expressions respectively of one and the same state of affairs. It is one and the same state of affairs of Napoleon's being defeated at Waterloo which both *occurs* on June 18, 1815 and *is* in the divine Mind. This recalls the scholastic dictum that it is one and the same universal which occurs in things (i.e. the *universale in*

re) and which subsists in the Mind of God (i.e. the *universale ante rem).* As Aquinas puts it in his *De Veritate,*

. . . the natural things from which our intellect receives knowledge measure our intellect-as is said in the tenth book of the *Metaphysics-but* they themselves are measured by the divine intellect, in Whom are all created things, just as all artifacts are in the intellect of the artificer. Thus the divine intellect measures but is not measured ; natural things measure and are measured ; but our intellect is measured, and it does not measure natural things but only artificial things.[5]

[5] St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate* I, 2 in *Introduct-ion to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas,* J. F. Anderson, trans. (Chicago, 1969), pp. 67-68.

CREATURES OF TRUTH

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IN HIS RECENT essay Philip Clayton enters into a conversation with Wolfhart Pannenberg about the latter's notion of being. Clayton's work is a welcome contribution on the thought of an important contemporary theologian. The essay not only sets forth Pannenberg's position with clarity, but raises some significant questions about his ontology, e.g. the temporal character of being and the proleptic nature of truth. Clayton thinks with Pannenberg about these issues, questioning elements of Pannenberg's ontology and suggesting alternative ways to pursue the basic direction of his thought.[1]

In the following essay I intend to continue the conversation initiated by Clayton, focusing on Pannenberg's conception of truth. Clayton correctly indicates the importance of Martin Heidegger for Pannenberg's thought. Heidegger's understanding of human existence as temporality, and the relationship of temporality to truth and being, have directly influenced Pannenberg. Heidegger's thought also reaches deeply into Pannenberg's notions of truth and being through his retrieval of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The relationship between Heidegger, Gadamer, and Pannenberg on the nature of truth is my central topic.[2]

Pannenberg conceives of truth as the whole of history. He de-

1 Philip Qayton, "Being and One Theologian", *The Thomist* 52 (1988): 645-671.

2 For the sake of brevity I assume in this essay the basic relationship between Gadamer's thought and that of Heidegger, i.e. that Gadamer's hermeneutic has its foundation in Heidegger's philosophical anthropology. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), 225-234.

velops what Clayton calls an eschatological ontology " in which all being is dependent on the final completion of history." [3] Critical to this ontology is Pannenberg's notion of the history of the transmission of traditions. Pannenberg takes over this notion developed by form criticism. Using Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutic, he understands the history of the transmission of traditions ontologically. Specifically, Pannenberg holds that the truth of Christian texts occurs in their on-going appropriation within history. The truth of classic Christian texts (e.g. Scripture, dogma) will only fully occur at the end of history when each text finds its final meaning within universal history.

In the first section of the following essay I set forth how Pannenberg uses Gadamer's thought in order to ontologize the history of the transmission of traditions. But Pannenberg's eschatological ontology, his conception of truth as universal history, is very different from that of Gadamer and Heidegger. Section one attempts to clarify this difference, indicating why Gadamer and Heidegger insist on the radically historical and finite nature of truth, rejecting any move to universal history.

In section two I take up Pannenberg's suggestion that we think of the history of the transmission of traditions in Gadamerian fashion, i.e. as an ontological process. But I do so without Pannenberg's move to universal history. In other words, I attempt to think about the history of Christian truth from within the historicist perspective suggested by the thought of Heidegger and Gadamer.

Rejecting Pannenberg's move to universal history avoids elements of his thought (e.g. the proleptic nature of truth and the introduction of temporality into God) which Clayton finds problematic. [4] It does so, of course, by thinking about history and Christian truth in a fundamentally different way from that suggested by Clayton. It seems to me that this different way of thinking about Christian truth offers rich possibilities for contemporary theology.

s Clayton, 658.

4 Clayton, 656-667.

I

A) Pannenberg, Truth, and the Transmission of Traditions

Gadamer's thought plays a critical role in the development of Pannenberg's theological hermeneutic. In turn, this theological hermeneutic is an essential element in Pannenberg's conception of truth as universal history.

Pannenberg addresses two familiar hermeneutical questions raised by historical consciousness. First, the world views intrinsic to canonical texts are frequently strange and troublesome to modern believers. The uncovering of Jesus' apocalyptic message by historical-critical scholars is a classic example of how strange and troublesome historical consciousness can be. A good deal of modern theology has striven to repress or translate Jesus' apocalypticism into categories acceptable to the modern mind.[5]

Here the second hermeneutical question appears. Christian history is characterized by a plurality of frequently competing interpretations of Scripture and doctrine. While Christianity is rooted in the truth claim of these texts, contemporary Christians disagree with each other, and with Christians of earlier ages, on what these texts mean. How then can there be a unity of faith, a unity of Christian truth? How are we to understand the truth claim of Scripture and doctrine?

Pannenberg turns to Gadamer's hermeneutic because it offers a philosophical account of interpretation which addresses these two questions. First, Gadamer seeks to maintain the difference between the historical horizon of the text and that of the interpreter. The distance between the two horizons is underscored rather than repressed or transcended. Gadamer's description of interpretation suggests that the interpreter be aware not only of the historical distance of the text, but also of her/his own historicity. Thus, the act of interpretation exhibits the radically historical nature of human existence and understanding.[6]

[5] Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Basic Questions in Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970) 1:144-145 (hereafter cited as *EQT).*

[6] *EQT,* 1:115-117.

Second, according to Gadamer the act of interpretation applies the claim of a text from the past to a new historical context. Interpretation brings the claim of the text to expression (language) within the interpreter's historical horizon. This bringing to language is a creative act in which both the horizon of the text and that of the interpreter are modified. A classic text has its effect in history through its ongoing interpretation (application) within history's changing horizons. The text's truth is not fixed; truth occurs in the text's interpretation. The text's truth has a history, i.e. its effect within history. [7]

Thus Gadamer's account of interpretation offers Pannenberg an explanation of the second hermeneutical problem mentioned above. That is, it shows why there necessarily exists a plurality of interpretations of Christianity's canonical texts. Christian history is constituted by ongoing appropriations of the Christ event within ever changing historical circumstances. Biblical scholars have recognized this process at work in the formation of Scripture, calling it the history of the transmission of traditions. Pannenberg understands the entire history of revelation as the history of the transmission of traditions. Using Gadamer's account of interpretation, Pannenberg views the transmission of traditions as an ontological process in which the history of Christian truth occurs, a truth that will only be complete at the end of history. We must consider all of this more carefully.

For Pannenberg the truth claim of Christian texts must be understood in relationship to the revelatory events of history. Scripture and doctrine attest to the events of God's historical Self-revelation and their meaning. The relationship between event and meaning is critical to Pannenberg's hermeneutic. Every historical event occurs within an interpretive context which constitutes its meaning. The original context can be retrieved through the historical-critical method. But Scripture and doctrine also reflect the reception of the story of God's Self-revelation in a variety of contexts. The history of reception trans-

[1] *EQT,* 1:117.

forms the meaning (and truth) of events as they are appropriated in new contexts.

Jesus' resurrection is the best known and most important example, in Pannenberg's thought, of the relationship between event and interpretive context.[8] The Easter events took place within a context of eschatological expectation. That eschatological horizon is intrinsic to the meaning of Christ's rising and continues to make a claim on the contemporary interpreter. But Scripture attests not only to the eschatological meaning of Jesus' resurrection. It also evidences the meaning of Christ's rising to first century Christians in a variety of times and places. The delay in Jesus' return, the death of the apostolic witnesses, and the acceptance of the faith by gentiles unfamiliar with apocalyptic categories all led to the pluralism of theological perspectives on the Christ event reflected in New Testament texts.

The history of Christian theology, doctrine, and practice is similarly constituted by the reception of Scripture and traditions in history's ongoing contexts. The doctrine of Christ's divinity, for example, emerged in the transmission of Christian belief from the Jewish-Palestinian context (of eschatological expectation) to the Hellenistic world (which thought in ontological categories).[9] In his theological hermeneutic Pannenberg develops a notion of Christian truth which takes account of the complex and still changing relationship between God's revelatory acts in history, their Scriptural witness, and their ongoing reception (interpretation) in history.

Another example might help to clarify Pannenberg's position. Joachim Jeremias's well known study of parables distinguishes between the meaning of the parables in the context of the gospels and what the parables originally meant for Jesus and his audience. Jeremias's study seeks to identify how the application of Jesus' parables to various ecclesial settings adapted and changed their meaning. The meaning of the parables in the gospels frequently reflects how the evangelists' churches had ap-

[8] Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Jesus-God and Man* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1975), 66-73.

[9] *Jesus-God a11d Man,* 115.

propriated Jesus' stories within the contexts of their own life and problems. Identifying the effects of this process, Jeremias seeks to relocate the parables in Jesus' own life setting and, thus, retrieve their original meaning.[10]

Jeremias's form critical work thus studies the history of the transmission of the parabolic tradition. That is, it identifies what the parables meant in their original historical setting and traces the change in their meaning as these stories were applied within different ecclesial contexts. For Pannenberg this history of the parables' transmission is the ongoing history of their truth. It is a history of the effect of Jesus' parables, a history which continues to our day.

In other words, what is happening in the history of the transmission of traditions is exactly what Gadamer says occurs in any act of interpretation. Christian history is the effective history of the Christ event. It is the history of Christian truth. Scripture and doctrine reflect moments in this history. In turn, the truth of Scripture and doctrine is constituted by the history of their effect (ongoing reception, interpretation).

Thus Pannenberg's Gadamerian interpretation of the history of the transmission of traditions gives an ontological character to this history. This is a critical element in Pannenberg's argument that truth must be thought of as universal history, a conception of truth very different from that of Gadamer. The thought of Gadamer's mentor, Martin Heidegger, plays an important role in how Pannenberg distinguishes his conception of truth from that of Gadamer. We can now consider this difference.

B) Truth as Universal History

Pannenberg observes that Christianity makes a claim to be *the truth.* Thus, theology cannot avoid the question of truth itself "which in essence can only be one." Theology must offer a unified view of all human experience, a notion of truth which grasps" the unity of reality in which we live."[11]

[10] Joachim Jeremias, *Rediscoz•ering the Parables* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966).

[11] *BQT* 2 :1-2.

That truth coincides with the entirety and unity of the real is a fundamental premise within Pannenberg's thought. As we shall see, it is not a premise of Gadamer and Heidegger. But before addressing that difference let us briefly consider Pannenberg's notion of truth.

The historical nature of truth is evident in Pannenberg's account of the transmission of traditions. The truth claim of texts changes with the ever new, unanticipated events and contexts of history. Pannenberg argues that the traditional Greek notion of truth as the unchanging quiddity of beings, the underlying permanence of reality, cannot account for the historical nature of truth disclosed in historical consciousness.[12]

But the biblical notion of truth is another matter. *Emeth* is not a static quiddity but refers to the fidelity of God. It is the divine reliability which shows itself, and will continue to show itself, in the events of history.[13] Israel's historical experience was of a divine Self-manifestation of constant fidelity showing itself again and again. God alone was permanently faithful and could be relied on to manifest that fidelity anew in the future.[14] The Old Testament is the story of God's Self-revelation within history, the manifestation of truth in ever new ways.

But how can one conceive of the unity of truth if truth changes in history? Pannenberg establishes truth's unity by weaving together elements from the thought of Hegel, Dilthey and Heidegger. Clayton's essay offers an excellent summary of how Pannenberg uses these three thinkers.[15] Our concern is the influence of Heidegger and Gadamer on Pannenberg's thought. A brief mention of Hegel and Dilthey is, however, essential

With Hegel Pannenberg concludes that " historical change itself must be thought of as the essence of truth." The unity of truth is the unity of history. For Pannenberg history's unity " comes only from its end " and, in contrast to Hegel, that end remains ahead of us, open and undetermined.[16]

12 *EQT* 2:4-5, 19-20.
1a *EQT* 2:3; Clayton, 659.
14 *EQT* 2:8-9.
15 Clayton, 651-658.
16 *EQT* 2:21-23.

Pannenberg adopts and adapts Dilthey's understanding of the relationship between meaning and history. Dilthey held that the meaning of any particular is determined by its place within the whole of history. While Dilthey concluded that " all assertions of meaning are relative" since we cannot know the whole of history, Pannenberg turns to Heidegger to establish a proleptic conception of truth. [17]

Pannenberg observes that Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time* concludes that Dasein's fundamental mode of being is temporality. Dasein finds itself thrown into a world projecting itself onto possibilities. To be human is to become rather than to be something. Only in the anticipation of death, the end of Dasein's being as becoming, can Dasein conceive of itself as something complete, whole. Every act of Dasein has meaning only in anticipation of this end. Each present moment in Dasein's existence waits on death to be what it will be as a part of what Dasein finally is. The meaning of anything in Dasein's history can only be asserted in anticipation of the end. Meaning and the anticipation of the end, wholeness, are intrinsically related.

But, Pannenberg points out, Heidegger's analysis of Dasein " brackets out " and neglects one critical factor. Individual existence cannot be abstracted from history since the individual is a part of that history.

> The fore-conception of a final future which alone yields the true meaning of all individual events must therefore be, on the one hand, something that points beyond the death of the individual, and on the other hand, something that embraces the totality of the human race, indeed, of all reality.

> Only on the basis of an anticipated final future, the wholeness of universal history, " is it possible to assign to an individual event or being-be it present or past-its definitive meaning by saying what it is." [18]

[11] *EQT* 2 :61-64.
[18] *EQT* 2:62.

Thus, for Pannenberg, any assertion of meaning or truth is intrinsically related to the anticipation of a final meaning, history as a whole. The truth of texts that occurs within the transmission of traditions always implies the anticipation of a final truth ahead. In turn, the truth within history is always provisional. The final truth will only be attained at the end of history when the transmission of traditions is complete, when every text (and its effects) has its place within the whole that is universal history.

The central event of God's Self-revelation, Jesus' resurrection, not only exemplifies Pannenberg's hermeneutic. In Christ's resurrection Pannenberg finds revelatory confirmation of his conception of truth as universal history.

Jesus preached the coming of God's kingdom within a context of apocalyptic expectation. The divine fidelity manifest in Israel's history would culminate in the establishment of the kingdom. Jesus proclaimed the coming of God to power (the kingdom) at the end of time-the establishment of divine rule. While Jesus' message about the end of history and the coming of the kingdom reflects a strange view of reality for people today, the meaning of his message cannot be grasped apart from its apocalyptic context.

But, as Gadamer's thought anticipates, Pannenberg's interpretation of Jesus' apocalyptic message reflects a fusion of Jesus' ancient horizon with Pannenberg's own horizon of German Idealism. Specifically, Pannenberg interprets Jesus' message through Hegel. Jesus preached God's lordship, the divine rule, to be a future reality. " God" means rule, omnipotence, power over all things. To have power over all finite beings " is intrinsic to God's nature." Jesus identified that divine power with the future.[19] God's lordship, the divine being, remains to be accomplished at the coming of the kingdom, in the future.[20] The coming of God at the end of history is an ontological occurrence, the coming of God to be. Jesus' resurrection confirms his message in

[19] Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Theology and the Kingdom of God* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977), 55.

[20] *EQT* 2:240.

that the end of history occurs proleptically in Jesus and his identification with the final kingdom constitutes his divinity.

God and truth thus coincide as the end of history. Jesus proclaimed the meaning of history, of human existence, in anticipating that end. Christian truth, all truths, are true precisely by participating in what will finally be. Truths are provisional, waiting on what their place will be at the end of history. Truth is yet to be determined and everything in time " contributes to deciding what the definite truth is going to be, also with regard to the essence of God." [21]

Pannenberg's introduction of temporality, of history, into the being of God is the topic Philip Clayton addresses so well in his essay. Clayton treats how Being and temporality might be thought within Pannenberg's ontology. The present essay moves in a different direction. I have attempted to clarify how Pannenberg draws a notion of universal history out of his retrieval of Gadamer. I now propose to consider how theology might think of the truth if one remains with a Gadamerian understanding of the transmission of traditions, i.e. if one does not make Pannenberg's Hegelian move to thinking of truth as universal history. This task first requires that we differentiate the notions of truth held by Pannenberg and Gadamer.

C) Pannenberg, Gadamer, and Heidegger on Truth

Pannenberg radically transforms the thought of Gadamer and Heidegger when he uses it to attain a conception of universal history. In this section I will explore the nature of this transformation. That is, I will try to sort out the differences between Pannenberg and Gadamer (Heidegger) with an eye toward their conceptions of truth.

A brief summary of Gadamer's understanding of the relationship between interpretation, truth and being is in order. Gadamer's account of interpretation, and his notion of truth as an occurrence in a text's effective history, does not move toward the unity of truth in universal history. Gadamer's thought has its

[21] Pannenberg, *Theology and the Kingdom of God*, 62-63.

roots in Heidegger's philosophical anthropology which underscores the radically historical and finite character of truth. True to these roots, Gadamer rejects any Hegelian conception of universal history. Interpretation is, for Gadamer, an event which manifests the finite, historical character of human truth. [22]

Following Heidegger's philosophical anthropology, Gadamer argues that the ground of interpretation is Dasein's being as historical. To be human is to be thrown into a community with a history and, thus, to participate in what has been.[23] Gadamer understands Dasein's historicity linguistically. Existence within a linguistic community, a linguistic tradition, constitutes the possibility of interpretation. Interpretation is an event within that community, an event in which a classic text finds new expression. The interpretation of a classic text is a language event, the fusion of two horizons in which the claim of a text comes to new linguistic expression. Gadamer understands this movement of language, the linguistic occurrence of interpretation, to be the text's truth. He ontologizes language. [24]

As we have seen, Pannenberg adopts Gadamer's hermeneutic in order to establish the ontological character of the history of the transmission of traditions. But Pannenberg is aiming toward his conception of universal history rather than Gadamer's linguistic ontology. Pannenberg avoids this conclusion by criticizing Gadamer's neglect of the assertive character of language.

Recall that when Pannenberg interpreted Scripture he treated not only the distance between the text and interpreter (Gadamer's concern), but also the gap between the text and the event it nar-

22 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), 319-323. See also, Ted Peters, "Truth in History: Gadamer's Hermeneutics and Pannenberg's Apologetic Method" *The Journal of Religion* 55 (1975), n. 26, p. 42.

23 Gadamer, 235-253; Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 434-444.

24 This paragraph is a brief summary of themes that recur and are developed by Gadamer throughout *Truth and Method.* That interpretation is grounded in participation within a tradition, see especially pp. 235-258. That participation in and appropriation of the tradition occurs through language, see especially pp. 397-431. That Gadamer ontologizes language, see p. 432.

rates or interprets. Revelation, for Pannenberg, occurs in history. Scriptural texts are moments in the transmission of traditions by which events are appropriated and attain their truth. For example, we noted earlier Pannenberg' s distinction between the resurrection as an event in its original context of meaning and the later appropriations of the Easter faith in Scripture and the doctrinal tradition. Pannenberg's evaluation of Gadamer consistently returns to the fact that a linguistic ontology ignores the assertive character of language. That is, Gadamer's linguistic ontology overlooks the fact that language posits an event in history (e.g. the resurrection) to which texts and the history of the transmission of traditions refer.[25]

With this move Pannenberg fundamentally breaks with the anthropological-epistemological perspective which undergirds Gadamer's hermeneutic. That is, Pannenberg introduces the reification of truth and being Heidegger seeks to overcome. Knowing the truth of history becomes a kind of conformity between the interpreter and an objective state of affairs.[26] History takes on an objective status, as *something* happening within which we participate. This is, of course, exactly what Pannenberg intends, for he is pushing Gadamer's thought toward a conception of universal history, of conceiving of history as *something* whole. But it is exactly this kind of reifying thinking that Heidegger rejects.

This difference between Pannenberg and Gadamer on the assertive character of language has its root in a deeper difference concerning Heidegger's anthropology, a difference manifest in Pannenberg's interpretation of the anticipatory nature of human knowledge considered in the previous section. In order to establish the proleptic character of truth, that all assertions of truth and meaning imply the anticipation of universal history, Pannenberg turns to Heidegger's anthropology. Dasein's being is constituted by its self-projection into the future. Only in the antici-

[25] *EQT* 1:121-132; Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Theology and the Philosophy of Science* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), 177-179; Peters, 45-47.
[26] *Theology and the Philosophy of Science*, 178.

pation of death does Dasein conceive of itself as whole, as an entity in which each event of its existence finds its meaning and truth. Pannenberg argues that Dasein's historical-social character requires that this anticipation be extended beyond an individual's death to the end of history.

Pannenberg's interpretation of Heidegger betrays the forgetfulness of being which characterizes the metaphysical tradition. What Heidegger is after in describing Dasein's anticipation of death is not to secure meaning and truth. On the contrary, his goal is to underscore the radically finite and historical nature of Dasein, truth, and the occurrence of being.

Dasein has no essence. It is no-thing. Heidegger's philosophical anthropology describes human existence as freedom for possibilities. Dasein finds itself thrown into a historical world projecting itself on possibilities taken from that world. Dasein is its becoming. When is this becoming complete? When does Dasein attain its being? In the anticipation of death Dasein faces the fact that its becoming is only finished in death when it no longer exists (becomes). Dasein is no-thing on its way to nothing. It is never a being, a whole and completed entity, not even in anticipation since what is anticipated is nothingness (death). [21]

To imagine a human life as something whole, as the attainment of being is to miss the direction of Heidegger's thought. It is to put human existence into the category of other things, to overlook its fundamental mode of being as existence (becoming). In *Being and Time* this overlooking grounds the metaphysical tradition's reification of truth and being. A goal of Heidegger's philosophical anthropology in *Being and Time* is precisely to overcome the tradition's reification (neglect) of being and truth.

For Heidegger, Pannenberg's notion of universal history is an extension of the forgetfulness of being. History is not *something*

[27] *Being and Time*, 279-311. See especially p. 310 where Heidegger describes anxiety as bringing Dasein *"face to face* with the 'nothing' of the possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety is anxious *about* the potentiality-for-being of the entity so destined, and in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility." Heidegger gives a similar description of Dasein in "What is Metaphysics?" *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). 95-112.

within which Dasein participates. Dasein alone is historical.[28] To understand what Heidegger means when he says Dasein alone is historical one must turn to his basic definition of human existence as being-in-the-world. World is an existential. It is neither an entity nor the totality of what exists. Rather world is a horizon, an environment of coherence constitutive of Dasein's being, which offers Dasein its possibilities.[29]

Dasein's being is constituted by its becoming (freedom). Its possibilities for being are taken from its world. Dasein's world is not a private projection but a common environment (being-with-others) in which Dasein finds itself already becoming (thrown and falling).[30] Dasein's world has already been established by others who have been there. When Dasein appropriates a possibility from its world history occurs. History occurs in Dasein's repeating what has been handed down.[31] History only *is* in the event of repetition.[32] Pannenberg's notion of universal history manifests the "forgetfulness" of the metaphysical tradition in that it reifies what is primordially an occurrence within the horizon of Dasein's freedom.

Gadamer's fusion of horizons is an application of Heidegger's notion of history to the hermeneutical problem. The truth of a text occurs in its appropriation, i.e. in its repetition. Truth and history cannot be conceived of or imagined as having being apart from this occurrence.[33] When Pannenberg unites the history of the fusion of horizons (transmission of traditions) into universal history he draws Heidegger's and Gadamer's thought back into the metaphysical tradition they seek to overcome. History, truth and being become *something.*

In his essay Clayton thinks with Pannenberg on the question of being. I would like to pursue a different direction. Pannen-

28 *Being and Time,* 429-434.
29 *Being and Time,* 114-122; Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 85-89.
30 *Being and Time,* 203-213.
31 *Being and Time,* 437.
32 *Being and Time,* 446.
33 Gadamer, 253.

berg's use of Gadamer to ontologize the history of the transmission of traditions seems to me a rich and pregnant insight. But how might Christian truth appear if one stays with Gadamer (and Heidegger), i.e. if one stays with the radically finite and historical character of truth? How might we think the matter of Christian truth if the history of the transmission of traditions were the history of truth itself?

II

A) The History of the Transmission of Christian Traditions

We begin with the faith conviction that the divine Word has entered history in Jesus-his life, message, death, and rising. He is God's Word spoken in history for us and for our salvation. The history of the transmission of Christian traditions reflects the dogmatic teaching of the Church that the divine Word spoken in Jesus is fully human. As with every human word, its truth occurs in its ongoing appropriation within history. In this manner the divine discloses itself while remaining ever mystery.

The divine Word was spoken at a particular time and place; its meaning cannot be abstracted from that context. Thus Christians of every age must turn to Jesus of Nazareth in his historical particularity, telling his story, repeating his words, imagining his life. This has always occurred in Christian life through the reading of Scripture, preaching, the liturgy, popular stories, dramatizations, and so on.

In the modern period the historical-critical method has offered a new and rich way to encounter Jesus. The historical method has taught us that the Jesus of history is comprehensible only within the history of the transmission of the Jewish tradition. The Christ event occurred within the Palestinian Jewish community of the first century. It was a community formed by Israel's long and turbulent relationship with God. Jesus' message interpreted the community's history and tradition. His stories, sayings and actions frequently reflected a stance on the controversial questions of his day. More, the community's tradition was the context

for Jesus' followers to understand his message and fate. He was the prophet of the eschatological kingdom. His death was the salvific act of God's servant. His rising meant he would return as Son of Man to bring God's kingdom. He was Lord, heir of David, fulfillment of the promise.

In brief, the meaning of God's Word in Jesus is intrinsically related to his historical context. But the Christ event also transformed the meaning of that context, of its classic texts and categories. For Christians the truth of the Hebrew Scripture is transformed by Jesus. The promise to Abraham, the passover, the prophets' message, the servant songs of second Isaiah, the promise to the Davidic line, all express a profoundly new truth. This new truth constituted that community which was the early Church.

The spread of the Christian community into the gentile world transformed the ecclesial community, its relationship to Judaism, its ritual, and its categories for understanding Jesus and his God. The New Testament reflects canonized moments in this history, moments disclosive of Christ's truth through that truth's appropriation by Paul, John, the synoptic evangelists, their churches, and so on. In turn the New Testament has had its effect through the appropriation of its texts in history. The history of this disclosure continues in every Christian age. Some moments of disclosure (dogma) have been raised by the Church to the same level as Scripture, while others play their various parts in the ongoing history of Christian truth.

B) Christian Truth

Gadamer, following Heidegger, understands truth as Dasein's (freedom's) appropriation of possibilities. Specifically, for Gadamer the truth of texts occurs in their interpretation when their claim (possibility for being) is applied in a new historical context.

Truth is a linguistic event. To be human is to be born into a language, a linguistic community (tradition). Language constitutes the world in which Dasein exists and from which Dasein takes its possibilities. Participating in a language is the ground for the possibility of interpretation. In interpretation a classic

text becomes an element of Dasein's world by entering that world's language, by coming to expression in a new context. In this way the matter at issue gives itself within history. [34]

Thus, the divine mystery gives itself in the history of the transmission of Christian traditions. To be a Christian is to participate in the community of faith, in a world constituted by the effective history of the Christ event. Existing in this world the contemporary believer participates in the effective history of Scripture and tradition, i.e. participates in the history of Christian truth. [85]

By world is meant the forms of speech and activity which characterize Christianity. I suggest Gadamer's linguistic tradition includes not only speech, but all the public activities that constitute the coherence of a world. World is *Mitw-elt,* an environment-with-others of coherent relationships in which things have their place.[36] It is an environment of shared intelligibility, an intelligibility one learns by being-in and with-others. Speech is an essential element within a world but world also involves shared activities and non-verbal symbol systems. A Christian community is constituted by common speech and praxis. Doctrine, Scripture, the preached word, liturgy, sacraments, popular piety, moral behavior, charitable work, and so on, together form the world in which the Christian exists.

The elements which make up the Christian's world are the effects of Christ's revelation in history. At each time and place within history Christians appropriate the faith through these elements, applying them in different contexts and, thus, carrying on

34 Again, this paragraph is an interpretation and summary of a significant section of Gadamer's *Truth and Method,* pp. 397-447.

35 This proposal suggests that the classic notion of knowledge as memory points to humanity's constitutive existence within a linguistic tradition. Memory does not refer to Plato's forms. Nor does it suggest Rahner's hermeneutic which rests on humanity's constitutive participation in the divine essence, that humanity is the event of God's Self-gift. Rather, one remembers because by coming to be in a language one already participates in what a tradition discloses.

36 Heidegger calls it a *Dingzusammenhang,* a framework or context within which things have their place. Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problems in Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 163.

the effective history of God's Word spoken in Jesus. This effective history is the history of Christian truth. Thus, truth cannot be identified with any specific application (moment) in history. Nor can truth be limited to Scripture, doctrine, or the discursive speech of theology. All the elements which make up the world of Christianity play their various parts in the disclosive history of the transmission of traditions.

The divine mystery discloses itself in this history, and in doing so draws us into itself. The call of faith is a call to submit to truth's disclosure, to the divine mystery revealed in Christ, by entering into and participating in his effective history.

While my remarks in this essay have emphasized history, this emphasis does not exclude the divine transformative power of grace. History is not reducible to varied and more complex arrangements of what has always been. At work in the history of the transmission of traditions is the creative Word, giving itself precisely in this history. Borrowing again from the thought of Wolfhart Pannenberg, each moment in history possesses an uncontrollable, contingent, and new element. What human freedom becomes in history, individually and collectively, cannot be reduced to a mere recombination of what has been. What freedom becomes in history, and what history becomes in freedom, involves a new and creative element. In this way Pannenberg argues that God's creative power ought not to be understood as an act in the past, but as a reality entering each present from the future.[37] I suggest we understand the history of the transmission of traditions as the place wherein the divine mystery grants itself. But I propose this understanding of God's creative presence in history without Pannenberg's identification of the divine with the end of history. Such an identification betrays the tradition's forgetfulness.

C) Forgetfulness

Theology and the tradition tend to identify a moment in the faith's reception with the matter *(Sache)* itself, a tendency reflecting the metaphysical tradition's forgetfulness of being and

s1 Theology and the Kingdom of God, 51-71.

truth. Heidegger sees this forgetfulness manifest in Christianity's conception of truth as the conformity of the human mind wit4 that of the Creator.[38] Pannenberg argues that the traditional conceptions of God and truth are unable to account for history.[39] But Pannenberg's own notion of truth as universal history reflects forgetfulness.

As noted earlier, Pannenberg's interpretation of Jesus' eschatological message is a classic example of the fusion of horizons. Hegel's thought allows Pannenberg to think of the coming of the kingdom as an ontological event in which God comes to be. The being of God and the final meaning of history coincide. It seems to me this is a rich and disclosive insight in the history of the transmission of traditions. But our Gadamerian perspective keeps us from Pannenberg's conclusion that in universal history we have attained the nature of truth. Such a conclusion, reflecting the tradition's forgetfulness, conceives of truth as something (even if by anticipation). It identifies a disclosive moment with the matter itself. It belies the radically finite and historical character of truth's occurrence, mistaking a moment in history's disclosure for a discursive grasp of the matter itself.

The truth of God and humanity is disclosed in the history of Christian belief and expression. Human finitude never grasps its "object" but is grasped by it in the transmission of traditions. New historical contexts disclose and conceal. While their insights may be treasured in the tradition's transmission, no moment within the tradition grasps the matter with discursive clarity. The Truth at issue is the divine mystery, a mystery spoken but concealed within its effective history.

For example, Aquinas' appropriation of the faith within the horizon of the Aristotelian tradition, as it came to him through Avicenna and Maimonides, allowed Thomas to think the divine mystery through the essence-existence distinction. In this context he could think of the divine reality as that Being in Whom

[38] Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings,* 121.

[39] *BQT* 2:2-21.

being and essence coincide. Thomas could think of creation through the Platonic category of participation, but participation in being rather than essence.[40]

All of this remains a rich and disclosive moment in the tradition. But one must eschew any notion that Aquinas' distinction attains the reality itself, a discursive grasp of the nature of God's relationship with creation. This says too much. If one might borrow from the notion of analogy, the divine mystery disclosed in Aquinas' distinction is appropriately grasped only in negation. It discloses only in the appreciation that it does not grasp the reality itself.

D) The Unity of Truth

What then of the unity of truth, the unity of the transmission of traditions, the unity of Christian belief across the ages? Pannenberg argues that Christianity's claim to be the truth requires a unified view of reality. His conception of universal history meets that requirement. But if we reject Pannenberg's notion of the truth how can there be unity?

What unites the Christian tradition is what gets interpreted in every age. The texts (Scripture, dogma, doctrine), rituals (eucharist, sacraments), praxis, etc. which are elements in every appropriation of the faith constitute the tradition's unity, the unity of truth. The world of Christian belief is constantly changing in history. Yet there are perennial elements, things present in every age. Each appropriation of the faith is precisely an application (interpretation) of these texts and practices in a new historical horizon. Thus Christians of every age participate in a common language (speech and praxis) and that commonality is the unity of Christian truth.

E) Error

Since human history is finite and sinful, every age's appropriation of the faith conceals and distorts as it discloses. Recognizing

[40] David Burrell, *Knowing the Unknown God* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986). Burrell's book shows how the work of Avicenna and Maimonides prepared the way for Aquinas' conception of God.

this requires a complex relationship with the tradition which simultaneously respects, believes, and suspects what has been.

My comments thus far have emphasized the tradition as the vehicle of truth. But our contemporary horizon of appropriation discloses the distortive elements of tradition, leading to a hermeneutic of suspicion. The Christian tradition not only carries within itself the promise of ideal community with God and among humanity, an ideal against which to judge social, economic, and political conditions. The Christian tradition has also appropriated and, thereby, abetted oppressive elements of the societies in which it exists. Scriptural and theological apologies for slavery are a classic example. Today feminist and liberation theologies, drawing on sources from both within and without the tradition, challenge the Church to recognize and rid itself of oppressive structures and ideology.

In more traditional fashion, the Church has found it necessary to exclude forms of speech and behavior it finds inconsistent with the tradition. It is to be anticipated, given humanity's finite and sinful condition, that the need for such judgments will occur. But two thousand years of experience also show that such ecclesial judgments have proved both correct and reformable. One need only consider how many Modernist heresies are now accepted as orthodox, or the rehabilitation of Nestorius. [41]

The point I would like to suggest with these observations about error is that in all cases there exists no Archimedean vantage point from which to render a judgment of truth. Error emerges and is dealt with through an inner-ecclesial conversation, a conversation that frequently continues long after participants consider the issue resolved. Disputes over error, from questions of orthodoxy to orthopraxis, from left and from right, are inevitable within the history of the transmission of traditions. It seems to this writer that a sense of the mysterious nature of what is going forth in the history of the transmission of traditions ought to give all believers pause about the certainty and finality of judgments about error.

[41] Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975), 559-568.

F) A Concluding Word

In these brief remarks I have attempted to think with the tradition from within a new context, i.e. within a perspective suggested by the thought of Pannenberg, Heidegger, and Gadamer. It seems to me that Pannenberg's use of Gadamer to offer an account of the history of the transmission of traditions is a significant contribution to the contemporary theological dialogue. Adopting Pannenberg's position, but rejecting his move to universal history, has allowed us to appropriate in a new manner the central Christian belief that God, revealed in Jesus, remains mystery. We are creatures of truth, not its masters.

MOLTMANN'S POST-MODERN MESSIANIC CHRISTOLOGY: A REVIEW DISCUSSION [1]

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OVER TWENTY-FIVE years ago Jiirgen Moltmann's response to Karl Barth's suggestion that it might be wise to " accept the doctrine of the immanent trinity of God " [2] indicated the future of his theology: " in studying C.D. at these points I always lost my breath. I suspect you are right but I cannot as yet or so quickly enter into this right." Moltmann believed he could present the " economic Trinity " in such a way that " in the foreground, and then again in the background, it would be open to an immanent Trinity ... the Holy Spirit is first the Spirit of the raising of the dead and then as such the third person of the Trinity." [3]

Moltmann's *The Way of Jesus Christ* reflects the same one-sidedness that Barth had criticized in his theology of hope, and this predicament leads to his own distinct messianic christology, as we shall see. This third volume in Moltmann's systematic theology, following his *Trinity and the Kingdom* and *God in*

[1] *The Way of Jesits Christ: Christo logy* fo *Messianic Dimensions.* By Jiirgen Moltmann. Translated by Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, a division of HarperCollins Publishers, 1990). Pp. vii + 388. $24.95. This volume has a name index only. *The Way of Jesits Christ* will henceforth be cited in the text of this article by page numbers within parentheses, without further qualification.

[2] *Karl Barth Letters 1961-1968,* ed. Jurgen Fangmeier and Hinrich Stoevesandt, trans. and ed. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981)' p. 175.

[3] Ibid., p. 348. Barth's *Church Dogmatics* is usually abbreviated as C.D.

Creation,[4] is intended to lead to a fourth volume on Redemption. Like Moltmann's other works it is tightly written, difficult, intriguing and informative. His writing is clear and his position certainly is developed with a commendable systematic rigor. Throughout this book, which contains seven chapters with clear headings indicating the topics to be treated, the reader is compelled to admire Moltmann's ability to weave together immense amounts of scriptural and systematic data without losing his own position in the process. While the wealth of information alone makes this book worth studying, there is much more than information here.

Yet the problem with this book is apparent throughout, i.e., Moltmann attempts to reconceive christology not from a superior knowledge of the person and work of Jesus Christ as presented in scripture but from the community's experience of Jesus Christ in the present. Hence he begins his own " pneumatological christology " with the experience of discipleship (xiv) and argues against the traditional christologies, on the *basis* of " Christopraxis" which he says is "the source from which christology springs " (41). But can we say that our discipleship is the "source" of christology when, according to Matt. 16:17, flesh and blood did not disclose who Jesus was-rather, this was revealed by God? This substitution of experience for a real action of the trinity within history is the weakness of Moltmann's bold attempt to revise christology.[5] I hope to show how this problem affects Moltmann's method and conclusions. While I agree with Moltmann's intention to present a christology which makes sense in a post-modern environment, I hope to illustrate that by beginning with experience rather than with the Word of God revealed,

[4] Jiirgen Moltmann, *God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. xv-365. Hereafter cited within the text of the article as *Creation.* Jiirgen Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. xvi-256. Hereafter cited within the text of the article as *Trinity.*

[5] As I indicated in *Theological Studies* vol. 51 (p. 684), this is also a serious predicament in his theology of the trinity and of creation.

he is unable to escape the "Jesuology" which he criticizes in Rahner and the metaphysical view that "de-historicizes" the events of Christ's life which he criticizes in Barth.

Method

Moltmann's synthetic method attempts to integrate various perspectives in order to find a holistic view of christology that will overcome traditional metaphysical and more modern anthropological errors. His goal is to cease thinking of Christ "statically, as one person in two natures or as a historical personality" (xiii) and instead to have a "doxological" christology grounded on "the experience of men and women who follow Christ" (xiv). For Moltmann, anyone who follows Christ will discover who he really is and this cannot be based on the christological dogma of the "patristic church" but on "the histories of the biblical tradition" (xv). Seeking "new interpretations of Christ" relevant for the present, this christology, which itself is on the way toward the consummation [as the title suggests] and is thus limited and conditioned, represents a transition from metaphysical to historical and now to a post-modern christology "which places human history ecologically in the framework of nature." This "newer thinking takes up the old metaphysical thinking again, under the conditions of 'historical thinking', and in a cosmological perspective" and "integrates human history in the natural conditions in which it is embedded" (xvi).

Among the many difficulties that follow from Moltmann's method is the idea that "Jesus *is* Lord because God *has raised* him from the dead. His *existence* as the Lord is to be found in God's eschatological *act* in him, which we call raising from the dead" (40). This very thinking refuses to admit that Jesus is Lord because Jesus *is* the Lord as the pre-existent Word who became flesh without surrendering his deity, as Augustine rightly put it.[6] For Moltmann, Jesus' pre-existence as Son can only mean

6Augustine, *The Enchiridion* (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1961), # xxxv: "He made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Himself the form of a servant, not losing or lessening the form of God. And, accordingly, He was

that in their mutual experience, the child Jesus and Abba " discover themselves ... In his relationship to Jesus, God becomes ' Abba ' ... this mutual relationship is constitutive for both persons and precedes the history they share " (143). Here Moltmann's own metaphysics of "relationality ", which cannot speak of Jesus' divinity in an ontological sense but only as the power of the resurrection working in his life, defines pre-existence by the man Jesus' historical experience of God the Father. While we are bound to the event of the resurrection to know God, Jesus' existence *as God* is traced by scripture and the tradition to his eternal sonship and not simply to the historical event of God's having raised him from the dead. God actually existed as the Lord prior to this event.[7]

According to Moltmann's understanding, we meet a Jesus who cannot have *been* the self-sufficient Lord of the universe even while a man on earth who suffered and died for us. Rather, because "The economic Trinity not only reveals the immanent Trinity; it also has a retroactive effect on it" 160), Jesus actually reveals that suffering is part of God's loving nature from eternity (173ff.; *Trinity, 57,* 83). Any real notion of Lordship applying to God's love revealed in Christ is reinterpreted by the experience of suffering drawing God into the fluctuations of creation itself.[8] In his christology this leads Moltmann to argue that " What happens on Golgotha reaches into the very depths of the Godhead and therefore puts its impress on the trinitarian life of God in eternity " *(173)* ; since the historical event and " the heart of the triune God " must be seen together

both made less and remained equal, being both in one, as has been said: but He was one of these as Word, and the other as man." P. 44.

7 This same difficulty exists in the heart of Moltmann's doctrine of the Trinity where he argues that "The Son is *the Logos* in relation to the world. The Logos is *the Son* in relation to the Father" *(Trinity,* 108), and thus introduces the world into the being of God in eternity. Hence he is unable to maintain with Athanasius, Augustine and Aquinas that the Word of God is identical with his eternal Sonship.

8 For Barth, God was deeply affected by creatures but not *because* of any mutually conditioning relationship between himself and another. See, e.g., C.D. 2, 1, pp. 307ff., 312, 496, and esp. 510-511.

"in a single perspective" *(Trinity,* 31) there can be no distinction between the immanent and economic trinity, and the essence of divine sovereignty becomes suffering love rather than lordship. This problem surfaces in many ways throughout this work; we shall briefly explore some of them.

Jesus' Person and Work and The Two-Natures Doctrine

Moltmann argues that " Jesus' personhood does not exist in isolation, *per se;* nor is it determined and fixed from eternity. It acquires its form in living relationships and reciprocities ... " (136). The metaphysical concepts of nature or essence are not helpful in understanding the person of Jesus because they define "divinity and humanity by way of mutual negations ... finite-infinite, mortal-immortal, passible-impassible ... " While the Protestant concept of Christ's threefold office is one-sided and the " more modern (and especially feminist) concepts about Jesus' being as *being-in-relationship* take us a step further" Moltmann will integrate various images to find "a fuller, richer portrait of the person of Jesus Christ " (136).

But the problem with this "holistic" method is clearly in evidence here. Believing that the kingdom of glory is a higher level of being which embraces nature and grace and will complete *both* of these *(Creation,* 8) Moltmann contends that Jesus *becomes* the Lord as he experiences the Father (Abba) and as his personhood acquires its form in relation to others. Hence, instead of seeing Jesus as " true God or true human being " in his dialogue with Judaism, Moltmann's christology will present an "integral Christ" i.e., " One who will come" (4). "Anyone who confesses Jesus as ' the Christ of God' is recognizing the Christ-in-his-becoming, the Christ on the way, the Christ in the movement of God's eschatological history " (33). Christ's titles do not signify one who *is* the Lord who freely *acts* in our favor but instead "God's eschatological history with Jesus" (33). Thus " Even the raised Christ himself is ' not yet' the pantocrator" (32). The problem here is that the Christ who will come is precisely the Incarnate Word who has already come. To

speak of an integral Christ who will come *rather* than one who is true God and true man means that we are left to choose one over the other, when no such choice is actually required or possible.

This problem is also in evidence in Moltmann's conception of the messianic secret: " Who he truly is, is to be manifested in his death and resurrection" (138). Although we cannot be sure that Jesus had hope for the resurrection Moltmann writes, " Whether it is a post-Easter addition or not, the only path that leads out of this total death is the invisible hope for the resurrection." Nonetheless " the ' messianic secret ' is a secret even for him himself " (138). Hence Jesus' titles are not crucial to his history but" His history is to provide the key to the titles " (138), and this *history* is void of any substantial deity or implication that even Jesus knew what the messianic secret might be. From this thinking Moltmann concludes that " Jesus' true ' messianic secret ' is therefore *the secret of his suffering.* He did not ' claim ' the messiahship; he suffered it " and in the obedience thus learned, he " experienced himself as Son of God and messiah" (139). Clearly, Jesus' Sonship and his being as messiah here represent a process (of suffering) which he "undergoes." Hence Jesus is *"the messiah on the way"* and " the messiah in his becoming." " Jesus does not *possess* the messiahship; he grows into it, as it were, since he is moulded by the events of the messianic time which he experiences" (139). While Moltmann wants to retain Jesus' Sonship (166) his very definition of that Sonship is subject to the nature of suffering love rather than the other way around. As such it cannot be a self-sufficient act of God which is concealed in the crucifixion and revealed to faith in the resurrection. It is only in this process sense that Moltmann admits that, at the end, Jesus "knew he was God's Son" (167).

Moltmann seeks " to come to grips with the specific experience of Jesus' history of suffering and death" (139) by formulating an " orthodox " adoptionism. But his attempt fails because he cannot ground the validity of the titles in the history of Jesus, God and man; rather it is in light of his suffering and "experience of God on the cross that the community of his people will determine what the title ' Christ ' has to mean when it is applied to Jesus "

(138-9). Hence, for Moltmann "The same Christ Jesus is not the same for everyone, because people are different" (36) and Jesus' actual resurrection becomes merged with the experiences of the disciples, as we shall see.

Here Moltmann is consistent. On the basis of experience Jesus is becoming the messiah in mutual coordination with the community, and this becoming itself can also be detached from his activity as the Son and located within the cosmos: "The *epistemological foundation* for the cosmic Christ ... is ... the Easter experience" (281). Thus the power of the resurrection is hidden *in* the cosmos (241, 280) and Christ's death itself is seen as a *transition* which is already resurrection (249ff.). For Moltmann the resurrection brings a "surplus" and added "value" to Christ's death which Barth and Anselm missed by making reconciliation the "quintessence of soteriology;" but he concludes that "Justifying faith is not yet the goal and end of Christ's history ... it is the beginning ..." Since atonement is integrated into the "event of the divine righteousness" (187), the new thing resurrection brings is not simply our reconciliation with God but a new creation which is "more than the first creation" (188). By detaching new creation from the event of reconciliation, Moltmann can describe our justification as only the beginning of Christ's history and locate it in creation itself as it evolves beyond the historical Jesus.

Moltmann also explains the differences between Jesus and John the Baptist, arguing that "they are based on Jesus' unique baptismal experience" (89). Here Moltmann separates God's Word and Spirit: "Jesus is uniquely endowed with the Spirit" and "this leads to the divine Sonship" (90). We see this especially in his treatment of Matt. 11:27. He contends that "Until the hour in Gethsemane, Jesus in his prayers always addressed God exclusively and with incomparable intimacy as 'Abba', my Father. This suggests that the 'revelation' to Jesus about which Matt. 11:27 speaks should be related to his baptism ..." (90). The "no one knows the Son except the Father ..." thus means that the man Jesus received a revelation *from* the Father; in addition, only the Gospel of John "talks about so exclusive and re-

ciprocal a knowing between Jesus and God the Father . . . The ' Abba ' name for God gives Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom a new quality, compared with John the Baptist ... " (90). The problem here, however, is that Matt. 11 :27 really intends to say that as the Son, Jesus is of the same being as the Father and so he can, as no other man can, reveal God to those whom he chooses. Significantly, Moltmann does not say that Jesus is God's only Son who alone is the Way, the Truth and the Life; rather he eliminates Jesus' eternal Sonship in this very thinking by explicitly arguing that the difference between John the Baptist and Jesus is to be traced to a new quality in his preaching of the kingdom; i.e., it is the kingdom of" the justice of mercy." Hence the source of this "new quality" in Moltmann's thought is to be found in the ' Abba' name for God *rather* than in Jesus' *unique relation* with the Father as the Son who *is* God. Failing to distinguish the immanent and the economic trinity leads Moltmann to ground the uniqueness of the kingdom in Jesus' *experience* in relation to the Baptist and then in his naming God Abba rather than his being as God and man. Instead of arguing forcefully that Jesus is the light of the world (Jn. 8 :12, 9 :5, 12-46) and does not have to become this somehow or somewhere as conditioned by human experience, Moltmann is led consistently to compromise God's freedom by arguing that Jesus' personhood acquires its form from his relationships *ad extra.* Hence Jesus cannot *be* the light of the world even if we fail to recognize or to acknowledge this ; he changes as we change.

Regarding miracles Moltmann contends that " In the context of the new creation, these ' miracles ' [of the kingdom] are not miracles at all " (107) and that " Jesus himself grows ... beyond himself ... into the One whom he will be, God's messiah " (111). Hence

> The divine power of healing does not come from his side alone . . . The heatings are stories about faith just as much as they are stories about Jesus. They are stories about the reciprocal relationships between Jesus and the faith of men and women. *Jesus is dependent on this faith,* just as the sick are dependent on the power that emanates from Jesus (112, emphasis mine).

Yet, a Jesus who is dependent upon faith in order to have and to exercise God's saving power is not the Jesus of the N.T. who was accused of blasphemy for forgiving the sins of the paralytic and then curing him; this saving faith looks away from itself toward the *sole* source of salvation, i.e., Jesus himself. But Moltmann will have none of this because for him the Protestant view of justification is too one-sided (123-4, 186) and its fear of Pelagianism is "misplaced" (96). Thus, God's Spirit acts "beyond" the person of Christ (94) and God's lordship points beyond itself *(97).* Here, detaching the Spirit from the Word means that the lordship of God, who remains one in his actions *ad extra,* can actually point beyond itself rather than toward the sovereign act of grace by which our salvation, now accomplished in the history of Jesus Christ, will one day be revealed. This explains why Moltmann redefines original sin as violence and argues for what can only be described as a modified view of works-righteousness (127-37). In this way visible peace and justice can be equated with salvation so that this power can be seen and described without faith.

There is no genuine realized eschatology governing Moltmann's thought since "justification is not a unique event ... It is a process" (183, 186). Hence, "If the whole salvation of the world has 'already been accomplished' in Christ's death on the cross as Barth maintained, then the New Testament's futurist assertions about salvation are meaningless ... Christ's parousia adds nothing new to salvation's perfecting" (318). Here Moltmann overlooks the distinction between justification and sanctification which Barth made to avoid the idea that our justification, as a divine and human event in Christ's history, in any way needs supplementation to be effective for us. Consequently our completely new lives as those converted to God by grace are really hidden with Christ in God (Col. 3.3) and still need to grow and eventually to be revealed when Christ returns. By contrast, Moltmann detaches our new life (the new creation) from Christ and locates it in an "End-time process" which the resurrection set in motion. This constantly leads him into pantheism such as when he reinterprets the Nicene "begotten not made" to mean that

" Creation Wisdom" appeared in the risen Christ, i.e., " She [wisdom] is therefore also *ine:ristant,* or inherent, in all things " (282) ; the risen Christ is "efficacious in ' the heart of creation,' " and " in the human victims of world history" as well as "in victimized nature too" *(279)* ; "the cosmic Wisdom-Christ will come forth from the heart of creation" (280). This same thing happens in his presentation of God's sabbath rest (302, *327; Creation,* 280-4). Instead of understanding the cosmic process in light of Christ as he believes he should (118, 132, 251) Moltmann finds Christ within history and nature (279ff.). To that extent he cannot distinguish the wisdom of God from the movements of the world and argues that the world is evolving toward God (291; *Creation,* 233f., 204f.) ; that "nature and grace are so closely interwoven that it is impossible to talk about the one without talking about the other; " and that " the Spirit and the Word-wait and strive in all things for the liberation of them all " (291).

According to Moltmann, Christ is reconciler and ruler *until* " he can hand over the completed kingdom to God the Father ' so that God may be all in all ' (1 Cor. 15.25-28) ... for it is only with Christ's parousia that 'the kingdom that shall have no end' begins" (319). This frequently repeated thinking (182, 191, 194) stands in contrast with the many N.T. passages that speak of the fact that the kingdom that shall have no end has already begun in Christ's history, even as it was grounded in God's eternal election to be for all people, and will be completed for us upon his return just because he is the same yesterday, today and tomorrow. "Death is swallowed up in victory" (1 Cor. 15.54) in Christ.

Moltmann's thinking leads directly to the doctrine of the *zimzum* with its inherent pantheism: Creation originally refers to a shrinkage process in God and his " issuing" forth *(Creation, 87; Trinity,* 109-10); Redemption means "God derestricts himself ... so that he may be' all in all'" (329). For Moltmann "the moment in which time enters eternity is the mirror image of when time issued from eternity" (328) and "Eternity is one of life's dimensions: it is life in depth. It means the intensity of the lived life, not its endless extension " (331). While Moltmann correct-

ly asserts that eternity is not an endless extension of time, he falsely describes eternity as "one. of life's dimensions" i.e., the dimension of depth; just as he originally incorporated nothingness into the Godhead by conceiving it as the condition for God's act of creation. Since we are still within the sphere of anthropology and cosmology, however, when experiencing "life's dimensions " any hope built upon this foundation can only be a projection based on self-experience; it cannot have the unshakable certitude of a knowledge gained from the Holy Spirit enlightening us about our past history as it was forever changed in Christ's history and our new future which will be revealed when Christ returns and consummates our salvation.

Anthropological and Metaphysical Christology

After noting the usual modern critic:isms of the traditional christologies Moltmann rejects Barth's incarnation christology (52ff.) because " It is drawn from a general metaphysics of the world " (53) even though Barth's entire theology [especially his view of knowledge of God as a miracle] actually reflects the fact that, for him, all genuine knowledge of God comes *only* from Christ through the Spirit. Thus, it is an event which takes place in faith as one's understanding is conformed by God himself to the Word Incarnate. Moltmann follows Pannenberg, however, and contends that Barth's metaphysical thinking supplants Jesus' pathos with divine apathy, and that Barth's metaphysical distinction of creator/ creature eventually reduces christology to anthropology. For Moltmann " It is more appropriate, then, to start from Jesus' special relationship to God [Abba] ... in order to elicit from this mutual relationship between the messianic child and the divine Father what is truly divine and what is truly human" (53). The N.T.

> is not concerned about the relationship between Christ's human and his divine nature. It is concerned with Jesus' relationship as child to the Father ... It is only the trinitarian concept of God which makes it possible to understand God for Jesus' sake in his relationship as Father, and Jesus for God's sake as the child and Son of the Father (53).

Moltmann feels that the reason Nicaea saw Christ as king (pantocrator), after the manner of the imperium, was because orthodoxy was "in line with the emperor's concern for a unified imperial religion" (54). A "theocratic" unity of church and Christian *imperium* led to chiliastic christology which sees Christ triumphing over "evil and death-not to speak of his enemies on earth, the Jews, the heathen and the heretics" (54). Now that this theocratic union and the chiliastic dream have vanished, we should abandon "the untimely dream of the pantocrator and the imperial church in the thousand years' empire" (54) and turn to the "one crucified." Must this not give way to a christology of history beneath the cross? Moltmann opposes both chiliastic christology and anthropological christology which arose in opposition to it. Modern christology from below (Jesuology) arose in a modern society where, for the first time, there was a world constructed by "the will of human beings" detached from "the order and rhythms of nature" (56). Modern society no longer respected nature as did agrarian societies and exercised mastery over nature [since "human interests" were its main concern], thereby creating an identity crisis. Since the Enlightenment the humans, who were lords over the earth, needed humanization. Jesuology sought to accomplish this by turning to the subject. Turning to the "historical Jesus" therefore, made metaphysical christology irrelevant. With this shift from metaphysical to anthropological christology "Salvation was no longer to be found in the deification of human beings and creation. It was now seen in the inner identity of the self-divided human being" (57-8). Christ's incarnation, resurrection and miracles "no longer fitted into the world picture of human domination over nature." Still, Jesus' sinlessness was "like a divine 'miracle of love' in the moral world ..." (58).

This turn to the subject made knowledge utilitarian rather than participatory and shaped Kant's view of doctrine with the question: "'Can anything practical be deduced from it?'" Therefore "the divine nature of Christ and the eternal Logos were replaced by 'the idea of mankind in its morally complete perfection', which Jesus embodied." Jesus became "'the personified

idea of the principle of Good,'" (59). Here Moltmann shows a profound grasp of the Enlightenment and the turn to the subject which began with Kant; his presentation of this is brilliant. Yet as we are seeing, his own christology is unable to overcome his very solid critiques of Kant, Schleiermacher and Rabner because it also begins *from* human *experience.* To that extent it precludes any real sovereignty for God at the outset by attempting to integrate views which, according to scripture, cannot in fact be integrated!

According to Moltmann " modern Jesuology " replaces the the question of essence with the question of utility and can be seen in the theology of Schleiermacher and Rabner. Since, for Schleiermacher, religion is grounded in the "feeling of absolute dependence " Jesus is seen to differ from the rest of us " through the unremitting potency of his God consciousness, which was the veritable existence of God in him,'" (59). Accordingly," Christ's divine nature becomes the existence of God in Jesus' consciousness" (59-60). As Jesus is the Redeemer because he is the prototype of human God-consciousness Moltmann objects that, for Schleiermacher, Jesus' suffering merely corroborates his God-consciousness and adds nothing new.

> Because God-consciousness,as the feeling of absolute dependence, is inherent in every human being, in however clouded and reduced a form, the Christ idea is inherent in every human being too . . . ' The Being of God' in Jesus is hence his perfect likeness to God. Jesus is what every human being ought to be . . . (60).

Thus Moltmann justifiably concludes against Schleiermacher that this "modern Jesuology" has made Jesus the "projection screen " for all the fantasies of " true " human nature (61).

Moltmann argues that an " analogous constitution " is given to Christ in Rahner's later writings. His "ascendence christology " gives a " mystical reversal " to his earlier " descendence christology " setting it in the context of anthropology, " as its perfecting." Thus the human being is human when God communicates himself (as in the incarnation) and when human beings arrive at their true selves " God has communicated himself to them ... In Christ, God's self-immanence and human self-trans-

cendence coincide" (61). The idea of Christ in the "general make-up of human existence" allows people to recognize Jesus as the Christ. The "seeking idea of Christ" allows everyone to "recognize the Christ in Jesus, if they discover in Jesus the unique, supreme and perfect fulfilment of human existence in its complete commitment to God ... To be a Christian is accordingly for Rahner to be explicitly human and to be human can mean being an anonymous Christian" (62). Moltmann asserts that Rahner's reversal of incarnational christology "into a christology of self-transcendence" follows the views advanced by Kant and Schleiermacher. "Rahner too ends up with Jesus, the perfect image of God, because he equates 'the idea of Christ' with fulfilled human existence" (62). Seeking to solve the "self-divided human being" modern Jesuology fails since it localizes salvation in "the human heart;" salvation is thereby related to the inner experience of self-transcendence but "not to the external conditions of society which evoke these inner experiences and crises. In this respect it has to be termed idealistic" (63). While Moltmann certainly has recognized a malaise in modem christology here, his "holistic" christology, which begins with experience, does not solve it either.

This can be seen in Moltmann's solution to the problem of idealism. His objective referent is not Jesus Christ himself as the author and finisher of faith but the external societal conditions which evoke inner experiences. This is significant. Moltmann's correction of modem Jesuology is to mold a Jesus according to his own questions: "*Who really is Christ for the poor of the Third World?* and Who is Christ for us, when we make use of their poverty for our own purposes?" *"Who really is Christ for us today, threatened as we are by the nuclear inferno?"* (67) And *"Who really is Christ for dying nature and ourselves today?"* Consequently, the new paradigm for christology includes "the personal dimensions of modern Jesuology; and they also once more embrace the cosmological dimensions of the ancient church's christology-this time on an ecological level" (68). Clearly, Moltmann seeks to move beyond the impasse of a christology from above [this has "a general metaphysical theology as

premise"] or from below [this has for its premise "a general anthropology"] by turning to "the more complex processes of coming to know Jesus Christ" (69). Hence "Jesus is known as the Christ of God for the sake of the God of promise, and in this process God is known as the Father of Jesus Christ" (69). While Moltmann says that we must look at Jesus' humanity to know his divinity and that we have to think of his divinity in order to know his humanity, we have already seen that, since he does not say that Jesus the man really *is* God in the flesh, and since it is not Jesus in his actual uniqueness who is normative for his christology, it seems quite clear that by divinity Moltmann means that the community ascribes a power to Jesus in light of its post-Easter experiences.

This happens consistently in Moltmann's thinking. His own adoptionist perspective cannot grant that Jesus is uniquely God and man who, in this particular uniqueness, makes an absolute claim on us any more than the Jesuologists could. While Moltmann claims to overcome both Rahner and Barth, his own " metaphysical " christology of relationality dictates that he accept the basic convictions of Jesuology with the idea that he can overcome its subjectivism in a synthesis which re-casts traditional christology *from within the framework* of the above-mentioned questions set by our modern situation. And his conclusions are invariably problematic. His own " eschatological christology " appeals directly to the N.T. *against* patristic and anthropological christology (*70).* Such a christology sees a Christ who is on the road and" in all the movements and changes of this history. God's eschatological history with the world is at heart God's history with Jesus, and Jesus' history with God. To be more precise: it is *the trinitarian history* of the Father, the Son and the Spirit " *(71).* Hence" the person of Jesus Christ changes and expands" (71) and Jesus' fellowship with the poor, the sick, women and Israel shows that he was also " dependent." Thus, Jesus' divine person, for Moltmann, is not identical with the fact that he is a divine hypostasis as the Son or Word of God. Rather these are trinitarian" relations in God ... divine self-relations in which Jesus discovers and finds himself " (*72).* Here relationality

leads Moltmann beyond the man Jesus who alone [as God's eternal Word] is the answer to these questions, to the Spirit which is suffering in the world's movements toward the future (193; and *Creation,* 102) in virtue of a kenosis of the Spirit (93f.). Instead of using metaphors from history [Christ's history] to describe Christ's dying and rebirth, Moltmann uses metaphors from nature (248). On the one hand this compromises the fact that Christ actually died by claiming that "Christ's death pangs are themselves the birth pangs of his new life" (249); he makes the same claim for dying nature (194) and believes that even after death we have a chance through faith to be saved (190). On the other hand, since this is conceived as the Spirit giving birth to Christ for eternal life, the Resurrection " does not interrupt the natural laws of mortal life " and "mortal life is open for analogy with the wholly other, eternal life" (250).

Spirit Christology/Adoptionism

Moltmann's "pneumatological christology" illustrates how his merging of the immanent and economic trinity issues in adoptionism. In spite of the fact that Irenaeus and others rejected adoptionism from the very earliest years [9] and that adoptionism was rejected again in its Arian form, Moltmann writes that " The notion that there is an antithesis between an adoptionist and a pre-existence christology is a nineteenth century invention " (74). Whereas the antithesis actually arose just because seeing the truth that *before all worlds* Jesus was the *eternal Son* of God excluded *all* subordinationism and adoptionism, Moltmann asserts that Jesus' history " actually becomes the *gospel"* (75) and that Jesus is essentially God's Son as a consequence of God's Fatherhood embracing his whole existence. Christ does not become Son in *time* but is instead the messianic Son from the " beginning" i.e., his birth from the Holy Spirit (84). Here Moltmann's own attempt to overcome Jesuology confuses the Spirit's action *ad extra* in connection with Jesus' birth with what is sup-

[9] See Adolf von Harnack, *History of Dogma,* vol. 1, 19lff., and Henry Chadwick, *The Early Church,* 86-87, and 114.

posed to be recognized as a unique spiration in eternity. Hence, following Pannenberg, he believes the virgin birth is an " aetiological myth" (82) because he cannot "see any longer why Jesus as Son of God should come into the world in a different way from anyone else ... we do not have to assume any natural intervention " (85). Moreover " The continuing presence of the Spirit in Jesus is the true beginning of the kingdom of God ... This presence of the Spirit is the authority behind his proclamation" and " The divine Spirit who indwells Jesus, initiates and *makes possible* the relationship of the Father to the Son, and of the Son to the Father" (92). Consequently Jesus' temptations recorded in the synoptics mean that when the tempter " assails Jesus' divine Sonship ... What is in question here is not a metaphysical divine Sonship, but the messianic kingdom of Jesus ... " (92).

But that is exactly the problem. Moltmann separates the messianic kingdom from the divine Son who is identical with the man Jesus who was tested by Satan; yet in the traditional doctrine of the Trinity a clear order was seen in the immanent Trinity in order to avoid just this conclusion. Moltmann displaces Jesus' divine Sonship with the power and authority of the Spirit working *ad extra.* Whereas the possibility of the relationship of the Father to the Son consists in the fact that *before* creation, he was eternally begotten by the Father in the unity of the Holy Spirit, Moltmann argues, in accordance with his belief that the economic trinity has a retroactive effect on the immanent trinity, that the Spirit who indwells the man Jesus makes possible Jesus' eternal Sonship. This explains why Moltmann does not trace the true beginning of the kingdom of God to an act of one whose being already was that of God himself before its occurrence in time and *then* to Jesus' miraculous birth from the virgin Mary. It also explains why Moltmann believes that "Filled with the Spirit, Jesus becomes the messianic Son of God " (93) and that the person of the Son is actually formed because of Jesus' *experience* of God as Abba.

Here the problem of Moltmann's method is clearly in evidence. For if the N.T. accounts of the virgin birth can be described as

myths accounting for Jesus' origin rather than descriptions of " biological facts " then Moltmann can hardly avoid making their content the experiences of those who wrote them. To accept the idea of myth here means that we accept the idea that God is defined *by* the experience of believers. Hence, on the one hand it is perfectly logical for Moltmann to substitute his own belief that Jesus is eternally born by the Holy Spirit as his divine mother (83) for the Nicene belief that he was begotten by the Father " before all worlds," and to deduce from this birth metaphor his own unique emanationist pantheism. On the other hand it is entirely logical for him not to trace Jesus' origin to his eternal relationship with the Father and Spirit but to his " birth from the Holy Spirit" (84).

Instead of allowing his thought to be governed by the historical event of the Incarnation described as a miracle by the N.T. Moltmann argues that our " experience of the Spirit " allows us to grasp the meaning of Christ's birth as "non-virginal" in order to emphasize his true humanity. Yet that is the irony in his christology; he genuinely wishes to stress Christ's true humanity but cannot, because of his method. Christ's true humanity was marked by the fact that it was taken from the virgin Mary by an act of God in the person of his Son through the power of the Holy Spirit. Hence his humanity was the humanity of the Word; the idea that a non-virginal understanding of Christ's birth protects his true humanity results from a docetic idea of his deity grounded in an *experience* of the Spirit rather than in the mystery and miracle of Jesus' own unique history.

It is just here that Moltmann's adoptionist perspective eradicates a genuinely pre-existent Sonship for Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. Hence

> The Spirit does not ' create ' ; it ' engenders' and ' brings forth ', as the birth metaphor says. If the messiah is called the Son of God, then to be consistent we have to talk about the Spirit as his divine ' mother ' . . . The birth of the messianic Son of God ' from the Spirit ' is the beginning and the sign of hope for the rebirth of human beings and the cosmos through God's Shekinah (86).

This is why the feminine side of God is to be sought in the Holy Spirit rather than in Mary. Here Moltmann has merged the unique action of the Holy Spirit in the history of salvation into the inner trinitarian relations which existed before creation and would have existed even if there had been no creation. Thus, instead of admitting that Mary is the mother of God in time, Moltmann argues that the Holy Spirit is the divine mother of the Son and actually changes the creed by speaking about "the *eternal* generation and birth of the Son.mo The implications of this problem for the contemporary discussion of language for God cannot be discussed now, except to note that such a change in the creed here leads exactly to the conclusions which the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed sought to avoid, i.e., a reconstruction of the image of God *in* the image of humanity. Consequently, it opens the door both to polytheism and to pantheism.

Resurrectiow

How does Moltmann's view of the resurrection exhibit the difficulty which we have been exploring? He writes :

> This confession [of the resurrection] says *what* Jesus is [Lord], on the basis of his resurrection, but it does not say *who* he is. Only the living remembrance of his life history and his message can say that. That is why the earthly history had also to be brought into living memory after Easter. *Easter* determines the *form* of belief in Jesus Christ, but not its content. The *content* is determined by the *history of Jesus' life* (140).

Any separation of form and content here would have to mean that God's grace had become dependent upon and merged with history itself. Making this distinction Moltmann can argue that "what is most important for Jesus is his quarrel with poverty, sickness, demonism and forsakenness, not his quarrel with the teaching of the Pharisees and Sadducees" (99) whereas one cannot separate ethical questions from truth questions. While Jesus brought the gospel *to* the poor, Moltmann actually believes Jesus *"discovers*

10 *Trinity,* p. 167. Here there can be no distinction between God's eternal self-sufficient love as Father, Son and Spirit and his free will *ad intra* and to create a world distinct from himself; this is the kind of careful distinction made by Athanasius.

the kingdom of the poor, which is God's kingdom" (100) and that Jesus "discovers the kingdom of God among the poor. The poor need him, and he depends on them" (100); his view of ethics (131) and of nature and grace (291) reflect the same mutual conditioning.

Whereas the traditional New Testament presentations view the resurrection as an event in the life of Jesus which is the foundation for Jesus' Easter appearances and for the disciples' commission, Moltmann separates Word and Spirit once again and argues that faith is not based solely on the resurrection appearances but is just as strongly motivated by the "experience" of the Spirit. Hence believing in the resurrection means being possessed by the Spirit and participating in the age to come rather than believing in a fact. But, having rejected Barth's view which he believes reduces the resurrection to God's sovereignty and "de-historicizes it" (231) and having accepted Troeltsch's axioms that a study of history involves probability, correlation and analogy (while rejecting his "pantheism"), what does Moltmann mean by the resurrection?

He neither intends to adopt Bultmann's famous view nor does he intend to embrace Troeltsch's historicism (228-9). Yet his own starting point (experience) for analyzing the resurrection causes him to reach the conspicuously docetic conclusion that "Resurrection means not a *factum* but a *fieri-not* what was once done, but what is in the making: the transition from death to life" (241). Ironically Barth's view is emphatically historical at just that point, insisting that the resurrection was a free act of God's grace (justification) which "did not follow from his death" (C.D. 4, 1, 302-304). If, however, the resurrection does not refer to a fact, i.e., the fact of Jesus' Easter history, as Moltmann holds, then it can be detached from that unique history and allowed to function as a principle of becoming which Christians use to explain the transition from death to life. Moltmann argues that the resurrection is the foundation that "discloses the future and opens history" (214) and that when we talk about Christ's resurrection we must talk about "*a process of resurrection.* This

process has its foundation in Christ, its dynamic in the Spirit and its future in the bodily new creation of all things " (241).

But what dictates the meaning here? Is it a process of openness to new life which we experience and then find confirmed by Jesus' resurrection? Or is it the risen Lord himself? Moltmann contends that if we see the resurrection as a process we can integrate the ideas of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg to correct their one-sidedness (242). In this *integrated whole* Moltmann discovers that Christ's resurrection is not an exception in the nexus of causality (243) ; it is the beginning of the gathering of mortality into the " immortal interplay of the eternal presence of God " (243). Looking at the resurrection of Christ " from the perspective of nature" (250) Moltmann concludes that it does not interrupt "natural laws of mortal life," for if this were the case it would be a " meaningless miracle " (250). Instead the whole quality of mortal life has changed and with it the laws of its mortality. Accordingly, Moltmann concludes that the new creation which begins with the resurrection " issues from the cosmic annihilation of death" (252). Hence Christ's own death is *itself* already his new life (248) . And since there is a power of the resurrection even in the flesh, he identifies this as "the power of surrender" (262) and-ignoring the problem of sin-argues that " Love is ... the immanent power of resurrection in the flesh " (263). In other words Moltmann has clearly detached the power of the resurrection from the specific history of Jesus Christ and made it a principle inherent in nature itself. Since this leads him to the pantheistic idea that " loving and dying are simply the immanent sides of the resurrection and eternal life " (260) and to similar ideas expressed above it is clear that he himself is unable to overcome the pantheism he criticized in Troeltsch.

With the rest of Christendom Moltmann certainly asserts that the resurrection " is an event that happened to the Christ who died on the cross . . ." (213) but then asks : " is the resurrection an event, or an interpretation of faith?" (227). He argues that it is only in the " interrelation" of Christ's exaltation and death that " the raising acquires its special meaning" (213). Accord-

ingly, it does not acquire its special meaning from the miraculous power of the immanent trinity intervening in history from outside because miracles have already been explained as natural processes. Here Moltmann's method cannot allow Christ's actual death and resurrection to be normative; rather he argues that " The ancient church's doctrine of the two natures will have to be taken up once again in the framework of the post-modern, ecological paradigm, and will have to be newly interpreted" (215). From where does the new view emerge? Just as " Dying and death can be integrated ... if there is hope for resurrection of the body" (260) so for Moltmann our new view of the two natures emerges from experience within the new framework.

Given this approach, however, it is important to stress that Moltmann offers a docetic interpretation of the event. Consequently, Paul saw Christ (1 Cor. 9.1) " apparently in the form of an inner experience" (216). Paul's own" conversion story" included the vision of Jesus in accordance with the model of calling applicable to the prophets. Consequently, this model is appropriate to grasping the experiences of the women at the tomb and the disciples in Galilee. But it is just here that Moltmann's framework has imposed his meaning on the texts. He argues that resurrection is not a projection of faith *because* it is grounded in " visionary phenomena " which have as their foundation the " inner experience" of those who had them. The controlling factor then is not Jesus' bodily resurrection and appearances during the Easter history; rather " the ' seeing ' of the risen Christ became faith" (218).

Indeed Moltmann argues that the " visionary phenomena " were "associated with ecstatic experiences of the Spirit." Hence

> the early Christian faith in the resurrection was not based solely on Christ's appearances. It was just as strongly motivated, at the very least, by the experience of God's Spirit ... Believing in Christ's resurrection therefore does not mean affirming a fact. It means being possessed by the life-giving Spirit (218).

The expressions " Christ appeared " and " was seen" do not then refer to facts within history existing independently of our faith; i.e., facts which actually govern our faith. Rather these expres-

sions represent " the theological interpretation of these phenomena; " these " christophany conceptions " speak of a glory of the Lord which will appear only at the end of the world (219). Those who experienced these christophanies " became apostles, both women and men-Mary Magdalene and Paul and the rest. The anticipatory beholding of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ led directly to the call to the apostolate ... " (219). Notice that the visionary experiences are a self-enclosed entity. They are the substance which gives rise to resurrection language; *they* are what is then described and finally they become the basis for the call to the apostles.

Jesus, the risen Lord, is actually quite powerless to act in this scheme since the real power comes from the christophanies themselves (cf. esp. 220) .[11] The resurrection, which is the beginning of the " new creation ", then is dependent upon and indistinguishable from the experiences which give rise to the various christophanies (220). Here we see the real reason why Moltmann insists that Barth has de-historicized the resurrection, i.e., Barth insists that the " new creation " is a completed event in Jesus' history in which we *may* share by the *grace* of God through faith; hence it is to be distinguished *from* the experience of the disciples and our experiences as their *historical foundation* (C.D. 4, 1, 340-1). For Moltmann the empty tomb is the external sign of Jesus' resurrection and "the resurrection itself " is " the interpretation of the *experience* of Christ's appearances " (222). The empty tomb does not point to the *fact* that Jesus actually rose from the dead; instead it is an eschatological symbol which describes the disciples " *experiences* with Jesus " (222). Hence Christ's resurrection cannot be seen as a totally new beginning grounded in a sovereign act of God; rather " the resurrection of

11 Barth astutely describes previous attempts to grasp the resurrection as subjective or objective visions as smacking "too strongly of an apologetic to explain away the mystery and miracle attested in the texts" (C.D. 4, 1, 340). In addition Barth writes "Let those who would reject it [the empty tomb] be careful-as in the case of the Virgin Birth-that they do not fall into Docetism" (ibid.).

Christ is still dependent on its eschatological verification through the new creation of the world " (223).

This is why Moltmann actually ascribes weakness to God's nature : " If God really was in Christ . . . then Christ was crucified in the weakness of God and rose in the power of God" (225). By contrast, Karl Barth argues that " he is the One for whom it was impossible that the resurrection of the dead should not take place ... He did not have to become this. He is from the very beginning the possessor of 'the power of an endless life' (Heb. 7:16) ... Jesus Christ has the power of God because and as He Himself is it" (C.D. 2, 1, 606).

Trinitarian Implications

We return finally to the same concern which began this study: the logical developments within Moltmann's christology which result from his failure to fashion a doctrine of the immanent trinity. Moltmann brackets Jesus' eternal Sonship and traces the ground of faith to Jesus' experience of suffering and to the community's interpretation of his titles based on its eschatological *experience* of him after Easter. Thus Moltmann insists that Jesus' last experience was God-forsakenness (167) while ignoring Luke's account of Jesus commending his spirit actively into his Father's hands as the Son who had completed his earthly work. He also argues that the divine power is dependent upon faith and that one can experience the Spirit without affirming the resurrection as a fact of history. And his holistic christology blends humanity and divinity into an integrated whole: " That is why in his divine, human and natural sufferings Christ gathers to himself the whole suffering history of the world ... " (210). At times Moltmann is literally unable to distinguish the Spirit from the cosmos : " The evolutions and the catastrophes of the universe are also the movements and experiences of the Spirit of creation" *(Creation,* 16). Moltmann sees " Christ as the power in the evolution of creation " (286). " His Spirit, immanent in the world, is the pulse of the universe" (289).

For Moltmann Christ's divinity and humanity are embraced and synthesized in the kingdom of glory. The theology of the pain of God therefore is the " divine co-suffering or compassion " (178). "Israel's messiah king goes his way to the Roman cross. The Son of God empties himself of his divinity . . . it is the path of the divine love in its essential nature" (178). But what *is* the divine love in its essential nature? For Moltmann it is suffering love. Love that does not suffer is not divine. Here, again, he clearly introduces history into God's nature (178-9; *Trinity*, 180) instead of showing how, in Christ's history, this history of suffering and death has actually been transformed.

Moltmann's work is especially exciting in its perception of the way theology has moved from the Enlightenment to the present. He is very aware of the need to avoid anthropocentrism as well as metaphysical views which lead to dualism; he also insists that Christ *alone* is of central importance (42, 238). Yet, as we have seen throughout this review, by beginning with experience rather than with Jesus as the Word made flesh, Moltmann accepts the basic starting point of anthropocentrism, thereby being led into the very docetism he rejects by substituting his own metaphysics of relationality for the traditional Nicene and Chalcedonian view.

WITTGENSTEIN'S DOCTRINE OF SILENCE

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WITTGENSTEIN HOLDS in the *Tractatus* that one must be silent about certain matters, most significantly, ethical, aesthetic, metaphysical and religious ones. (4.1212, 6.42-6.421, 6.423, 6.522, 6.53, 7, etc.) This is connected with his view that " philosophy is not a body of doctrine " (4.112). John Churchill insists that these remarks mean that Wittgenstein "requires real silence" about such matters (Cl, 166), meaning that one " cannot establish a philosophical discourse about logic, the world, and mind" (C2, 327).[1] This is contradicted by Wittgenstein's own behavior, namely, *the presence of such discourse in the Tractatus and Notebooks,* and his considerable discourse about such matters with Russell, Malcolm and others. Churchill must (and does) hold, therefore, that the *Tractatus* is inconsistent since it attempts to say what, by its own lights, cannot be said (Cl, 171). He even holds that this inconsistency is intentional, i.e., he "see[s] Wittgenstein as ... willing to grasp the nettle of a self-refuting philosophical discourse" (Cl, **171).** Churchill even regards this endorsement of inconsistent philosophizing as " the plain sense "[2] (Cl, 171; C2, 328) of remark 7 of the *Tractatus!*

[1] In the text I have used the notation (Cl, x) and (C2, y) to refer respectively top. x and p. y of Churchill's original review *(The Thomist,* Jan. 1988) and his " Response to Professor McDonough" *(The Thomist,* April, 1989), and, similarly, (Ml, x) and (M2, y) to refer, respectively, to p. x and p. y of my *The Argument of the "Tractatus"* (State University of New York Press, 1986), and my reply to Churchill *(The Thomist,* April 1989).

[2] Churchill stresses that he does not hold that there is a plain sense to the entirety of what Wittgenstein wrote, but only to the injunction to silence (C2, 328). But if there are any remarks in the *Tractatus* with a plain sense, the mystical remark # 7 is not one of them.

The judgment that the *Tractatus* is inconsistent, certainly the judgment that it is intentionally inconsistent, is itself incompatible with the text of the *Tractatus.* After his remark that "What can be shown cannot be said" (4.1212), Wittgenstein immediately adds that "In a certain sense we can talk about formal properties of objects and states of affairs ... and in the same sense about formal ... and structural relations " (4.122). Following the text, one must distinguish between the sense in which one can, and the sense in which one cannot, talk about such matters.

It is for this reason, among others, that I distinguish between two different senses in which one can say something, and two different notions of communications in the *Tractatus* (Ml, pp. 216-45). One can communicate factual matters in the sense that one can encode them in a picture and mechanically transmit that picture-structure, via perceptible signs, to another subject. (Compare with the way " information ", in the form of physical structures, is transmitted, or "communicated", from one computer to another.) This model of communication is mechanistic. One cannot communicate religious and other matters because these do not concern mere structuring of objects and so cannot be encoded in a picture-structure. The conditions of the possibility of picturing, and therefore of mechanical transmission, are not satisfied with regard to ethics, aesthetics, etc. (M1, pp. 216-45). [3]

[3] I have elsewhere argued that it is among the primary aims of the *Tractatus* to articulate a mechanistic account of communication and among the primary aims of the later philosophy to undermine that very picture. See my " Towards a Non-Mechanistic Theory of Meaning," *MIND* 98 (1989); "The Limits of the Enlightenment," *Language and Communication* 10 (1990); "A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology" in *The Future of Folk Psychology* (Cambridge University Press, 1991); "Wittgenstein's Refutation of Meaning Skepticism" in *Meaning Scepticism* (De Gruyter, 1991); "Wittgenstein's Critique of Mechanistic Atomism," *Philosophical Investigations* 14 (1991); and "Plato's Anti-Mechanistic Account of Communication," *Language and Communication* 11 (1991), esp. n. 8. The point in my book is that the account of the non-doctrinal character of philosophy, and the associated doctrine of silence, are profitably understood as denials that the significance of philosophical language can be accommodated within the mechanistic account of language and communication.

But though one cannot mechanically transmit "information" about ethical, religious, etc. matters to another person, there is a sense in which one can communicate about them. "Philosophical" communication does not involve the communication of thought-structures, but it is an activity (4.112), and there is no indication in the *Tractatus* that this philosophical activity cannot influence other intelligent beings. On the contrary, philosophy sets limits to natural science (4.112, 4.113), and it is tacitly presupposed to be an intersubjective enterprise (Preface, 4.1121, 4.1122). So why does Churchill continue to object to my interpretation, and 4.122 in the bargain, that the *Tractatus* holds there is a sense in which one can say (communicate) these things?

The answer lies in Churchill's ambiguous notion of an interpretation. In his original discussion Churchill objected to my interpretation on the grounds that I "attribute *to* [my emphasis, RM] the *[Tractatus]* an argument or doctrine" (Cl, 166).[4] Note that Churchill's issue was not, of course, whether one can talk *about* the *Tractatus* from some other point of view, but was whether one can, from within its own framework, ascribe views to it. For the sake of clarity, let us call the ascription of views *to* a work "interpretation", and remarks *about* a work "criticism".

It is the question whether one can interpret the *Tractatus* to which I respond in my reply: "Just as Churchill chooses not to view his own interpretative pronouncements as violations of the silence doctrine, while mine are violations, he also chooses not to view his own ascriptions *to* [my emphasis, RM] the *Tractatus* as doctrines, while again mine are" (M2, 320). The point would seem to be clear. If Churchill objects to my ascribing '"views" to the *Tractatus*, then he cannot do so himself. But he, like all commentators, continually does, and must, do so. For example, he sees an appeal to the "use-conception" of meaning to explain

[4] Similarly, it is mere verbal manuvering to say that one cannot attribute arguments to the *Tractatus* (Cl, 166; CZ, 328). If Churchill is now prepared to admit that one can ascribe doctrines to the *Tractatus* then there is no reason not to ascribe arguments to it as well (an argument just being a series of doctrines which are cited to support another). And, in any case, what is one to call remarks such as 2.0211 or 2.02331 but arguments?

how "language links up with reality" (Cl, 169). It is pure verbalism to deny that this ascribed view is not a doctrine. This dawning realization may explain the changes in Churchill's position. Whereas he originally faulted my interpretation on the grounds that it "attribut[es] to the book an argument or doctrine" (Cl, 166), in his later reply he writes" What is at issue is construing *Wittgenstein's* doctrines in such a way that they are consistent with proposition *7* " (C2, 327-8). In his first discussion, the *Tractatus* cannot contain doctrines. In his reply it can.

Unfortunately, the founding confusion survives these terminological adjustments in Churchill's position. In his reply he writes " Professor McDonough seems to suppose that I believe that no one can consistently offer interpretative discourse *about* [my emphasis, RM] the *Tractatus"* (C2, 327). But the issue which Churchill originally raised, and to which I replied, was not, and could not be, whether one can consistently discourse *about* the *Tractatus.* (Indeed, it is even difficult to know what it could mean to hold that the *Tractatus,* or any other book, could preclude consistent discourse about it *from some other point of view!)* It is whether one can correctly, within its own framework, ascribe views to it-whether one can consistently interpret the *Tractatus,* not, of course, whether one can criticize it.

Churchill's continuing confusion over the interpretation of propositions 4.112, *7,* etc., is traceable to his contradictory hybrid notion of an *interpretation about* a text. The notion is a hybrid because it must do double duty. It is contradictory because the two duties are incompatible. The notion must refer to an interpretation so that Churchill can make his own favorite ascriptions (the use conception of meaning, etc.) *to* the *Tractatus.* It must also refer to remarks *about* the text from some other point of view, so that Churchill can claim not to violate the silence doctrine *in his interpretation.* Churchill must decide whether one can interpret the *Tractatus* or *only* criticize it. But he cannot have it both ways.

The issue is too important to lose in verbal obfuscations. There is no need to regard Wittgenstein's philosophical activity, including his claims to have learned from others, as in any way illegiti-

mate, or regarded by him in the *Tractatus* to be so. Thus, in the Preface to the *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein refers to his " task " and invites others to "do it better". The incoherence of Churchill's interpretation is that on it one can only make " interpretative remarks " about the *Tractatus,* but cannot even specify the content of those remarks which one's "interpretative remarks" are about-let alone try to do it better. It is Churchill, not Wittgenstein, who seems "willing to grasp the nettle of a self-refuting philosophical discourse."

AN OBSERVATION ON ROBERT LAUDER'S REVIEW OF G. A. McCOOL, S.J.[1]

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BECAUSE OF HIS scholarly commentary on the development of Roman Catholic theology in the 19th and 20th centuries, students interested in the history of this period owe a debt of gratitude to Fr. Gerald McCool, S.J. In a recent issue of this journal, Robert Lauder presented a clear and sympathetic account of two major works, in which McCool identifies and evaluates the figures and currents that he considers of central importance for a proper understanding of Roman Catholic intellectual life from before the First Vatican Council (1869-70) to after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).[2] On Lauder's account, McCool records in these books " the movement within Thomism from its reliance on the commentators Cajetan and John of St. Thomas and the strong influence of hard-line Dominican Thomists such as Garrigou-Lagrange to the transcendental Thomism of Rahner and Lonergan" (p. 308). In his most recent study, *From Uniity to Pluralism,* McCool concentrates on the work of Joseph Marechal, Pierre Rousselot, Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson. Lauder believes that " McCool correctly cites these four thinkers as the key to Thomism's movement towards a greater openness to other thought patterns" (p. 308), but regrets that McCool failed to go further and provide " a detailed

1 See Robert E. Lauder, "On Being or not Being a Thomist," *The Thomist* 55 (1991): 301-319.

2 Gerald A. McCool, S.J., *Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism: The Search for a Unitary Method* and *From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989). The first volume was originally published as *Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Centur31* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1977).

discussion of the presence of St. Thomas's insights in the thought of Rahner and Lonergan . . . the two most influential Catholic thinkers of the latter half of the twentieth century" (p. 318). Apart from this reservation, which even Lauder considers " a backhanded compliment " (p. 318), I observe no point either at which Lauder takes issue with how McCool narrates the history of Catholic theology from roughly the middle of the 19th-century to the present or where he suggests alternative approaches for interpreting the significance of the individuals and events that figure prominently in McCool's narrative.

In his Foreword to T. M. Schoof's *A Survey of Catholic Theology 1800-1970,* Fr. Edward Schillebeeckx warned its readers against making the book " a kind of ' theological canonisation ' of the theologians mentioned to the exclusion of others." [3] I would like to sound a similar note of caution with respect to McCool's version of the history of Thomism. For while I share Lauder's appreciation of McCool's careful scholarship, I am not at all convinced that McCool has uncovered the whole story, nor that his interpretation of the events which he chronicles warrants the lavish praise that Lauder bestows on it. In particular, I suggest that Lauder uncritically adopts McCool's attitude towards certain Dominican theologians who, even though they remain little known in the English-speaking world, still contributed to the upbuilding of theological culture *entre les deux guerres.* For example, in *From Unity to Pluralism,* McCool describes the Dominican Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange as a "conservative" Thomist (p. 212), which, in the context of the narrative as McCool relates it, sounds more like ideological pigeonholing, than an honest attempt to describe adequately what a philosopher such as Kenneth Schmitz recently referred to as the "structured" Thomism of Garrigou-Lagrange. [4] In the same

s T. M. Schoof, *A Survey of Catholic Theology 1800-1970,* Foreword by Edward Schillebeeckx (New York: Paulist Newman Press, 1970), p. 4.

4 In the first lecture, " In the Beginning : New Paths for Ancient Teachings" of the 1991 McGivney Lecture Series entitled "At the Center of the Human Drama: The Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II." The four lectures will be published by The Catholic University of America Press.

manner, McCool talks about a "Thomistic Counter-Attack" to some of the early initiatives of Henri de Lubac and Jean Danielou; moreover, and what is more important, the author pays these scholarly interventions by certain Dominican theologians little notice (pp. 212-13). Remarks of this tone and omissions of such a kind presumably explain, however, why Lauder employs without demur a phrase like "hard-line Dominican Thomists" (p. 308), but they also give one, I suggest, further reason for pause before embracing in every respect Lauder's account of McCool's work.

It is not my intention to chide Lauder for writing a review of McCool's two books different than the one that I would have written. But I do wonder whether Lauder attempted to make an independent assessment of the work done by certain Dominican Thomists, such as the French moral theologian M.-Michel Labourdette, O.P., who, until his recent death, taught at the Dominican Center of Studies in Toulouse, or the speculative theologian M.-J. Nicolas, O.P., who still remains active in theological circles. If he had, I respectfully submit that such research would have provided grounds for some critical observations about McCool's telling of the neo-scholastic story. I think that the recent work of Alasdair Macintyre demonstrates that such an expectation is not without foundation. For example, MacIntyre's discussion of the catalytic role that Antonio Rosmini played in the neo-scholastic movement at the middle of the 19th century illustrates how fresh perspectives on the data and nuanced accounts of the conclusions can open up new ways of appreciating the intellectual heritage of scholasticism.[5] To tell the truth, MacIntyre's recent research itself should dissuade scholars from read-

[5] See Alasdair Macintyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), especially chap. 3, "Too Many Thomisms?" where the author remarks on how some recent Catholic theologians, on the grounds "that Karl Rahner's theology stands in precisely the same relationship to Heidegger's philosophy as that in which Rosmini's stood to Kant's, have argued strenuously that Rosmini ought to be interpreted in a way that frees him from the imputation of pantheism" (p. 71).

ily canonizing any particular version of the Thomistic story. Furthermore, I maintain that theologians such as Labourdette and M.-J. Nicolas represent a current in 20th-century Thomist thought whose contributions to the formation of theology have not yet been fully appreciated in the standard account of how Roman Catholic theology developed in the 20th century. I would tentatively describe their brand of Thomism as " realist," and I offer the following short account in order to provide one example of how certain Dominicans tried to sustain theological pluralism in the 1940's.

* * *

A little over 45 years ago, there occurred a significant theological exchange between two groups of young French intellectuals. In the meantime, the names of the participants have gained international notoriety in most theological households. On the Jesuit side, we find Danielou, the recently-deceased Henri de Lubac, Bouillard, Fessard, and, then still among their ranks, the Swiss von Balthasar. Among the Dominicans, Labourdette, M.-J. Nicolas, and Bruckberger. But in 1945 these scholars were just emerging from the long period of theological hibernation which the recent hostilities in Europe had imposed on them. Although wartime conditions restricted such enterprises as publishing, these religious still remained intellectually active. The adversities in Europe apparently provided them with the seclusion necessary to develop their respective theological cultures. And as *Dialogue thCologique* makes clear, Jesuits and Dominicans had used this time well in order to develop their distinctive approaches to the development of the theological project. Their dispute, which effectively marks the beginning of the " conciliar " debate, effectively centered on the nature and the sources of theological wisdom.

Shortly after the Second World War, Michel Labourdette, 0.P. inaugurated the debate. In an "Etude critique," which appeared in the summer issue of *Revue Thomiste* in 1946, the Dominican moral theologian took issue with a major assumption of

" Les orientations presentes de la pensees religieuses," which referred to an article published earlier that year by Fr. Danielou in *Etudes* (April, 1946). In this _article, the French patrologist argued that the study of the Fathers should result in more than a mere presentation of historical data. Rather, he continued, patristic studies can furnish " a most appropriate nourishment for contemporary man, because we recover in the Fathers a certain number of categories which are precisely those of contemporary thought and which, moreover, scholastic theology had let slip by" (p. 10). Labourdette, however, took this remark for something more than a disinterested evaluation of current trends in theology. He rather understood it as the announcement of a program for Jesuit research. We can easily understand, then, why he felt obliged to raise some critical questions concerning the actual purpose and nature of several Jesuit scholarly undertakings. In brief, Labourdette questioned whether the Jesuits were using their interest in *la theologie du retour aux sources* as a cover to challenge the authoritativeness of Thomistic systematics in theology. But his deeper concern centered on upholding the importance which Roman Catholic theology traditionally ascribes to a metaphysics of being and a broadly-construed realist epistemology.

It may come as a surprise to some that the objects of Fr. Labourdette's "critique" included the publication of " Sources chretiennes " and the recently inaugurated collection of monographs, "Theologie." Editions Aubier-Montaigne published the latter. But Editions du Cerf undertook " Sources chretiennes," so that the celebrated translation of patristic texts owed its very existence, it seemed, to an enterprise under the auspices of Fr. Labourdette's own Dominican brothers in Paris. The irony implicit in this turn of events, it is true, belongs to another chapter of the history which narrates theological developments in postwar France. But we can surely infer that some differences of perspective prevailed among certain theologians at the two Dominican *studia* of Le Saulchoir (Paris) and St.-Maximin (Toulouse).

During its roughly half-century of existence, Le Saulchoir exercised an unequivocal influence in Roman Catholic theological circles. In addition, because of the international distinction which some of its members, for example, the late Fr. Chenu and Fr. Congar, achieved, scholars commonly recognize the historical methods and motifs of Le Saulchoir theology as harbingers of a significant theological direction taken during the course of the Second Vatican Council. But the Dominican *studium* in the south of France, first at St.-Maximin (Var) and later at Toulouse, also developed its own theological emphasis, one, moreover, which retained an enthusiasm for the medieval and later scholastic tradition of realist metaphysics. The massive work of J.-H. Nicolas, *SynthCse dogmatique* (Paris, 1985) provides a contemporary sample of the work done by those formed in the Toulouse school. In any event, Fr. Labourdette decidedly represents this latter tradition of French theology.

Consequently, one could argue that in 1945 the progress of French theology owed as much to disparity of theological outlooks among certain Dominicans in Paris and Toulouse as it did to a friendly dialogue between Dominicans and Jesuits concerning the status of the patristic *auctoritates* in contemporary theology. In any case, the exchange between Labourdette and " un groupe de theologiens jesuites " was short-lived. Eventually, the Jesuits replied to the Dominican alarm sounded against what one might call today the alleged " hidden agenda" of their literary undertakings in the mid-40's. And Labourdette in turn replied to their explanations. Subsequently, the Provern;al Dominicans gathered together the " pieces of the debate " and published a small book.

Thus we possess the small book entitled *Dialogue theologique* (Les Arcades, Saint-Maximin, Var, 1947). R.-L. Bruckberger introduced the volume, which contains Labourdette's original " etude " (complete with a new series of references which help the reader identify the *points chauds* of the debate), the official Jesuit "Reponse," which had appeared in *Recherches de science religieuse* 4 (1946), and a fresh rebuttal by Labourdette. The Dominicans blandly explained the need for a special publication

as follows: " La solennite et la publicite de la Reponse qu'on vient de lire ne nous permettaient pas d'attendre la parution du prochain fascicule de la *Revue Thomiste."* In short, the matter was so pressing that they could suffer no delay. The French systematician and spiritual author, M.-J. Nicolas, 0.P., then recently elected as provincial of the Toulouse Dominican province, concluded the volume on an irenic note in which he explained his vision for " le progres de la theologie et la fidelite a Saint Thomas."

Notwithstanding the polemical context of this exchange, *Dialogue theologique* throws considerable light on the origins and subsequent directions of Roman Catholic theology in the latter half of the 20th century. The present article seeks neither to recount the details of the controversy nor to judge the claims made by either party in the debate. Suffice it to observe, however, that the Jesuits successfully continued their scholarly publications. One might, of course, argue that their desire to reach closure on the controversy so that all in the Church might single-mindedly pursue the tasks " plus ardues, mais magnifiques auxquelles nous conviait recemment le Souverain Pontife" (p. 75) probably attained a certain fulfillment at the Second Vatican Council. And even if it remains a moot point in 1991, we can only speculate to what extent Pius XII, the Sovereign Pontiff in 1945, would have accepted French theology of the late '60's and '70's as" ad majorem Dei gloriam et ad aedificationem Ecclesiae."

On the other hand, *Dialogue theologique* does offer us a succinct summary of some common starting-points which both theological traditions apparently embraced after the Second World War. Fortunately for us today, the anonymous redactor of the Jesuit reply collected in a single paragraph at the beginning of the " Reponse " the principal critiques developed by Labourdette in his " *etude."* At the time, this maneuver must have seemed like a massive example of quoting_out of context, for Labourdette railed against the Jesuit sense of fair play. But some 45 years later, we are fortunate to possess such a neat catalogue of controverted issues. Indeed, the chorus of complaints might even

appear to some as revelatory of certain manifest imbalances with which contemporary theology must eventually deal.

Allow me, then, to cite this long paragraph in which the Jesuits summarize the complaints registered by Labourdette against their way of doing theology.

> Fr. Labourdette does not want one to profess ' the essential historical relativism of each human expression of divine truths.' He does not want Christian thought to be ' wrongly ashamed of its past.' He does not want to see ' theological wisdom swept away by the here-today-gone-tomorrow.' He does not want historical method to become weighed down by a ' pseudo-philosophy ' which 'replaces the metaphysical notion of speculative truth with the more modest notion of historical truth.' He does not want one, under the pretext of critiquing 'progress in theology,' to undertake 'an interminable reformulation of our conceptions about God.' He does not want a 'nominalist philosophy ' which, through a veritable caricature ' of the intellectual life,' argues that ' human intelligence . . . can only formulate concepts, and that these concepts remain empty abstractions, so many logical symbols, as it were, of only pragmatic value.' He does not want to deny that ' the divine message addresses itself to our intellects as well.' He does not want to subscribe to ' a complete abandon of speculative truth.' He does not want to say that the truth remains ' inaccessible ' to us, nor to deny that the human spirit can grasp, ' by means of its best abilities, a truth which surpasses the limits of the merely temporal'. He does not want, in the final analysis, metaphysics and theology to be judged ' according to the categories of aesthetics.' He does not want to look for ' nothing more from a [theological] teaching than that it awake in us a sense of the beautiful or lead us into an incommunicable experience.' Finally, he does not want to doubt that there are ' in the domain of human knowledge ' some ' definite conclusions.'
>
> And isn't Fr. Labourdette correct to insist on these points! But what is more important, we share his concerns.

Thus, the Jesuit authors identify a progression of important theological concerns which they themselves judged adequate to summarize Fr. Labourdette's concerns. And they hasten to affirm that they too consider these matters serious ones for the future of theology. " Tout cela, certes, nous ne le voulons pas plus que lui" (p. 77).

However, the Jesuits do not find themselves entirely in accord with Labourdette' s views. As the rebuttal unfolds, they

argue that Labourdette seems to confuse Thomism with the Gospel. " Catholic truth," they insist, "always surpasses its conceptual formation. And this is all the more true of any attempt to formulate scientifically Catholic truth into an organized system." And for good measure, the Jesuits inform Fr. Labourdette that they personally are acquainted with several excellent Thomists who do understand the difference between "a system of thought and *the* truth" (p. 92). The Jesuits reckon, moreover, that these better deserve the name Thomist. Or, at least, they represent a superior class of theologians. All in all, the " Reponse " struck some hard blows to a young Thomist who sought only to defend his master's fundamental intuitions concerning the nature of authentic theological discourse, namely, that it ultimately derives from and depends upon the *sacra doctrina,* which, in Aquinas's view, constitutes the most personal expression of divine wisdom.[6]

It is my intention neither to resolve nor to renew the theological quarrels of a half century ago. Some authors, including Fr. McCool and Robert Lauder, see in this spirited exchange between French clerics the burgeoning of a movement which liberated Roman Catholic theology from the domination of a specific form of scholastic philosophy. At the same time, other theologians will undoubtedly recognize that the issues raised by Fr. Labourdette actually embody so many oracles against the chief weaknesses of the theology which later developed, in part, as a result of the *ressourcement* movement. At least, these shared concerns of both Jesuit and Dominican theologians highlighted the principal dangers which would mark the eventual transition from the " unity " of scholastic theology to the pluralism of contemporary theological discourse. But for the purposes of this present review, I would like to remark only on the fact that in 1945 both Jesuits and Dominicans agreed that Labourdette's complaints as formulated by the Jesuit redactor accurately pointed out directions

[6] See *Summa theologiae* Ia q. 1, a. 6: *"Sacra doctrina* goes to God most properly as deepest origin and highest end, and that not only because of what can be gathered about him from creatures . . . but also because of what he alone knows about himself and yet discloses for others to share."

ominous and undesirable for the future of Roman Catholic theology. For his own reasons, Fr. McCool chose not to point out this unusually important agreement when he refers briefly to the exchanges that took place between the Proven\al Dominicans and the Jesuits.[7]

Fr. McCool's chronicle surely provides an impetus for further work in the history of the neo-scholastic period. However, I contend that in order to make a fully-informed judgment about the evolution of Thomism, about the merits of the commentatorial tradition, especially from the mid-15th to the early 17th century, and indeed on the texts of Aquinas themselves, we require a scientific tool that presently does not exist. I refer to a proper history of Thomism *ab initio.* Such an enormous undertaking, it is true, will require the collaborative efforts of scholars of different expertise and a considerable expenditure of time and resources. But I respectfully suggest that until such a work is completed, both philosopher and theologian will be unable to assess properly whether the present status of Thomism as both McCool and Lauder understand it actually represents an advance for Roman Catholic theology.

[1] See *From Unity to Pluralism,* pp. 212-216.

BOOK REVIEWS

Men Astutely Trained: A History of the Jesuits in the American Century. By PETER McDONOUGH. New York: Free Press, 1992. xxi + 616 pp. $24.95.

Last summer in Paris, sitting at one of the sidewalk tables that line the Boulevard S. Germain, a young Jesuit priest just finishing his doctoral studies narrated some of the horror stories associated these days with "the job market." Having suffered through my own variation on that theme, I could only share with him the results of my own experience. This novelty in the Jesuit stance provides Peter McDonough with a major theme in his narrative, for he describes the change in the Society "from a rule-governed hierarchy to a role-driven network" (p. 459). He locates this transition in what he calls "the American century," roughly from 1900 to 1965. McDonough's study, an exciting and profitable read, traces the shift from Aquinas to the Age of Aquarius. Especially for an extern (i.e. a non-Jesuit), he has taken on a formidable challenge.

Generally well received by the Jesuits, *Men Astutely Trained* tells how American Catholicism moved from an immigrant church to an upwardly mobile society. In the shifting loyalties, aggravated by the Second Vatican Council, Jesuits and their institutions felt the crunch. Since this innovation, loosely identified with "the democratization of culture," has precipitated the Society of Jesus "into the most serious crisis in its history" (p. xiv), McDonough must do a counterpoint between the inner life and its external expressions. So the saga gains both breadth and depth.

Without denigrating the accomplishment, at once earnest and literate, I want to take issue with the hook. As one of my colleagues taught me many years ago, we cannot stimulate discourse if everybody is continually agreeing. First then, I want to comment on the flawed methodology. Next, I will say something about its thesis and conclude with a few reflections on "modernity."

For Jesuits of my generation, the work of Malinowski proved normative. The anthropologist spent ten years among the natives who inhabited the Trobriand Islands in Melanesia. It apparently took that long for him to understand the stories and symbols, their myths and rituals. When he put his encyclopedia together, he could describe their institutions and social structures. In short, he worked from the inside out. McDonough, on the other hand, works from the outside in. In my

opinion, this represents a major failing in methodology. Two consequences flow from this deficiency.

The author is never able to relate the works of the Society to the principal texts of the Society. The *Spiritual Exercises,* for example, does not rate even a mention. The *Constitutions* merits a fleeting reference on p. 160. St. Ignatius himself does not appear. Divorced as he is from the principal experience of Jesuits, our author cannot provide an adequate understanding for any of their priorities. This awareness makes his claim to present "the inside of the Society of Jesus" (p. 462) somewhat pretentious. Because he does not have the interior life in focus, many of the readings strike me as unnecessarily cluttered. He has yet to recognize the validity of John Stuart Mill's principle, "No man's synthesis can be greater than his analysis." While he has not left out three-fourths the data, perhaps he has neglected one-half.

Secondly, he does not acknowledge Jesuits principally as churchmen. Instead, he makes us look like an acephalous torso. The church-connection reveals a major dimension to understanding the Society's coherence and institutions. It does not occur to the author that Jesuit priests are also bound to the universal discipline of the Church as found, for example, in the *Codex Juris Canonici* (1917). According to the Pio-Benedictine Code, all priests (and not just Jesuits) are expected to recite the breviary, to stay away from politics, and to avoid all "spectacles" including baseball games. Moreover, it is not entirely true to say that Jesuits acted independently of local bishops. Jesuits were able to establish their schools precisely because the local bishop invited them and encouraged the work. The ecclesial dimension becomes especially important in estimating the relationships of the Jesuits to the pope, what St. Ignatius has called " the principle and foundation of the Company." If Jesuits, then, consider the family as a sacred unit and if they preach and teach as much, they are simply reflecting the doctrinal position of the Church, as found, for example, in the encyclical of Pope John Paul II, *Familiaris consortio* (22 Nov. 1981). McDonough's petulance on this point seems uncharacteristically jejune.

Because he neglects the interior life of the Society (all the more damaging because the documents are available) and because he either ignores or prescinds from the larger Church order, what happens? He has to read the history of the Jesuits in the United States as an allegory of the American experiment. As the larger American society went, so too did the fortunes of the local Jesuits. This kind of *hyponoia,* much prized by the Fathers of the Church, reminds me of Dr. Johnson's judgment on *Gulliver's Travels:* " When once you have thought of big men and little men, it is very easy to do all the rest." So here. Once you magnify the American context and minimize the ecclesial, the Jesuits look like silly amateurs indeed.

The hook may well have originated in an awareness of a relationship between two Jesuits: Father Daniel Lord in St. Louis and Father John LaFarge in Manhattan. Indeed, if the first half of this text reads like a tale of two cities, it really presents another variation on Merle Curti's thesis which asserts a dichotomy between the man of action and the man of thought. While McDonough writes very intelligently about the Institute of Social Order in St. Louis, he makes this institution the touchstone and norm for Jesuit orthodoxy, competence, savoir-faire. If Jesuits were not engaged in social magisterium, the argument goes, they were not doing the work of the Society. Unfortunately, this kind of reasoning leads him into a number of fallacies, all of which our author should have managed during his years at Brooklyn Prep. Right away, I see fallacies of composition and division, the false dilemma, and especially the consequent: "So-and-so is doing the work of the Society. Therefore, he must he involved in a labor school." So much for his thesis.

According to McDonough, the Jesuits in the U. S. moved from an agrarian atavism to a postmodern sensibility without ever quite becoming contemporary. In order to buttress this element in his argument, he speaks about " the detritus of modernism " (p. 353) and " the anti-modernist repertoire " {p. 363). As far as I can determine, he is claiming in various ways that Jesuits are "anti-modern" and against modernity (p. 75). In this respect, he presents us with a large, if equally obvious, equivocation. He is playing on " modernism " as used in a specifically theological context and " modernity " as found in either a cultural or an aesthetic context.

Nothing in the book persuades me that McDonough understands either the fact or the significance of the " oath against modernism " imposed by Pope St. Pius X in 1910. But to use the oath against modernism, fundamentally a religious exercise, as a hermeneutic ploy to justify the Jesuit defense of " timeless truths " and " eternal verities " seems entirely meretricious. The posture, however, enables him to rail at the classical course (p. 374), to set up a false dilemma "between authority and autonomous action" {p. 455), and to belittle the Jesuits working in the high schools as "tinkerers of genius" (p. 428). If only the Jesuits would get themselves up-to-date!

McDonough clearly knows what constitutes contemporary competence, intellectual productivity, and academic standards. If he speaks realistically about the " formidable bureaucracies " that comprise modern universities, he laments the fact that the Jesuit system "encouraged a humanistic rhetoric rather than a scientific temper" (p. 456). By his standards-fundamentally Dominican, I submit-the Jesuits do not measure up. Nor are they likely to. In the Church, the Dominicans have traditionally favored the intellectualist approach to

learning; the Jesuits lean to the voluntarist. Possessed of a unitary academic model, he is really arguing for Aristotle's analogy of attribution. Apparently, no one of his 200 plus Jesuit contacts told him that *Nastri* prefer St. Thomas and his analogy of proper proportionality.

The historian Daniel Boorstin spent 25 yeari!l writing his trilogy on *The Americans.* What emerges from this analysis? Boorstin points out that Americans like ambiguity, that they function best amid flux; ambivalence becomes their proper medium. For this reason, I have accepted Nathaniel Hawthorne as our most central writer. He situates American questions within a landscape of chiaroscuro. The Jesuit experience in the United States belongs essentially to the same landscape. But today, as formerly, it remains a landscape of questions. McDonough, on the other hand, has too many certitudes, too many answers, too much high definition-what Henry Adams regards as "mere facts." Instead of illuminating the landscape from within, his study inevitably recedes into the larger ambiguity reserved for what Wallace Stevens has called, " Prologues to what is possible."

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The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. By LINDA TRINKAUS ZAGZEBSKI. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. viii + 215 pp. $29.95.

As a Christian and a philosopher, Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski wants to understand why it is reasonable to affirm that we remain free despite God's infallible knowledge of our future acts. Moreover, she is not content simply to demonstrate that this affirmation involves no logical contradiction, for "reasonable people expect more" (p. 33) than a merely negative result. Hence the author sets herself the more ambitious task of working toward a positive solution that would explain why the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom is plausible and not a bare logical possibility. The hook sorts out recent opinions on the subject and sketches an original position that she hopes will advance the discussion.

Zagzehski begins by constructing the most formidable version of the dilemma. Assuming that God is infallible and essentially omniscient, that the past has a kind of necessity that the future lacks ("accidental necessity"), and that this necessity can he transferred (in some sense) from the antecedent to the consequent of a conditional proposition, the dilemma may he stated as follows:

(1) Necessarily, God believes at time *t* 1 that I will do *S* at *t* 3 if and only if I do *S* at *t* 3.
(2) It is accidentally necessary at *t* 2 that God believes at *t* 1 that I will do *S* at *t* 3.
(3) If (1) and (2) are true, then it is accidentally necessary at *t* 2 that I do *S* at *t* 3.
(4) It follows that it is accidentally necessary at *t* 2 that I do *S* at *t* 3.
(5) But if it is accidentally necessary at *t* 2 that I do *S* at *t* 3, I do not do *S* at *t* 3 freely.
(6) Therefore, I do not do *S* at *t* 3 freely.

Much of the first chapter is devoted to establishing that this form of the dilemma is more resistant to solution than any other, especially the so-called problem of future truth.

Zagzebski goes on to evaluate three broad approaches to solving the dilemma. In Chapter 2 she takes up the " timelessness " solution. Its proponents, among whom the author numbers Boethius, Thomas Aquinas, Eleonore Stump, and Norman Kretzmann, negate premise (2) of the foreknowledge dilemma by contending that God is not in time. Zagzebski considers this an acceptable negative solution to the dilemma and sees in it the potential to ground a more comprehensive, positive solution. Nonetheless, she refrains from subscribing wholeheartedly to the timelessness solution because it confronts one with a dilemma at least as perplexing as the one it solves. She puts the problem this way: like the past, eternity is fixed, for it is constituted by a state of affairs about which we cannot do anything; therefore my future acts are determined no less by God's timeless knowledge than by God's foreknowing them in a strictly temporal sense.

In Chapter 3, Zagzebski considers the " Ockhamist " approach. A solution qualifies as " Ockhamist in spirit if it (a) takes accidental necessity seriously . . . , (b) assumes that God exists in time, and (c) denies that God's beliefs are accidentally necessary" (p. 66). Contemporary efforts of this kind typically either distinguish between " hard " and " soft " facts about the past and attempt to show why God's past knowledge pertains to the latter category, or define accidental necessity in such a way that it does not apply to God's past knowledge. Zagzebski explains at length why she remains unpersuaded by the results of these investigations.

Rather than dismiss the whole approach outright, however, she proceeds to outline a solution of her own which meets the Ockhamist criteria but contains a crucial foreign element. Standard Ockhamist solutions tend to presuppose that " if God knows *M,* that is a bit of knowledge distinct from his knowing that *G"* (p. 88). To this anthropomorphic view Zagzebski opposes the position of Thomas Aquinas, who maintains that God's knowing is a single, simple, unchanging act whose primary object is the divine essence and whose secondary object is

everything else as grounded in the divine essence. She concludes that "God's mental state of knowing is the same in all possible worlds" (p. 88) and that "God's knowing state is *essentially* a state of knowing his own essence and only *accidentally* a state of knowing, say *A* rather than *not·A"* (p. 89). The relevant analogy, according to Zagzebski, is visual: when, for instance, we see the face of a child, we sometimes see the mother's face "reflected" in it; the child's face is the primary object of our seeing, and that object remains the same whether or not we see in it the secondary object, the reflection of the mother's face. Similarly, "the difference in contingent truths in different worlds is the difference in what is ' reflected ' in God's essence in different worlds " (p. 90). Hence Zagzebski denies premise (1) of the foreknowledge dilemma: "God's belief at *tl* does not strictly imply my act, since the numerically same belief occurs in worlds in which I do not perform the act in question" (p. 91). Furthermore, this way of conceiving divine knowledge undercuts premise (2) of the dilemma by showing that the category of accidental necessity does not apply to divine knowledge. In the first place, the author contends, if God has but a single epistemic state, then accidental necessity applies either to the whole of divine knowledge-which is implausible-or to none of it. In the second place, even if, as Ockhamists suppose, divine knowing is in some sense temporal, it is only accidentally so; essentially, it is atemporal, and so "there is no worry that [it acquires] the special property of fixity or accidental necessity that essentially temporal events acquire automatically" (p. 95). Zagzebski notes that her solution, which she dubs "Thomistic Ockhamism," is equally effective against the apparent dilemma generated by God's timeless knowledge of our future acts.

Zagzebski leads off Chapter 4 by stating that the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom implies the truth of two subjunctive conditional propositions, namely, **"If** I had done *S* at *t,* then God would have believed prior to *t* that I would do *S* at *t,"* and " **If** God had believed prior to *t* that I would do *S* at *t,* then I would have done *S* at *t* " (p. 98). But what precisely do these propositions means? Does the first imply that God's prior knowledge causes my act? Does the second imply that my act causes God's prior knowledge of it? A lengthy discussion of backward- and forward-looking counterfactuals, however, leads the author to conclude that neither of the propositions implies a causal relation.

In Chapter 5 Zagzebski reviews the third type of solution, which explains God's foreknowledge of future contingent acts by positing a " middle knowledge" whereby God knows what any free being would in fact freely choose in every possible set of circumstances. This " Molinist " position heads toward an expressly' positive understanding of the interrelationship of human freedom, sin, divine freedom, and

divine providence. But Zagzehski calls the Molinist view into question by arguing that knowing the totality of circumstances relative to some possible free act does not provide sufficient grounds for God to determine whether that act would in fact occur. What does provide sufficient grounds is God's knowledge of the actual world-which means that middle knowledge ends up being dependent on the very reality it was supposed to explain.

Chapter 6 includes two more of the author's own solutions to the foreknowledge dilemma. The first attacks premise (5) by claiming that God's foreknowledge " modally overdetermines " my free act-i.e., it makes my act accidentally necessary in some sense, hut without causing it. The second solution, which is reminiscent of Molina's theory of divine concourse, conceives of God as aiding my free choice, whatever it happens to he, so that God and I are joint causes of my free act and neither of us is able to cause the act without the other. On this view, although God foreknows and is a cause of all my acts, those acts remain free, which contradicts premise (5) of the dilemma. Both of these solutions can he applied to the timeless knowledge dilemma as well.

In an effort to get beyond the essentially negative solutions she has proposed thus far, Zagzehski suggests that we might explain God's knowledge of the future by thinking of God as perceiving the universe in four dimensions. This model shows how everything that exists in time can he present to God all at once, yet it avoids the difficulties associated with the view that God is timeless.

An appendix to the hook contains a new dilemma purporting to show that the notion of an " essentially omniscient being " contradicts our assumption that the past and the future differ in ontological status. Zagzehski says that although this dilemma is even more troublesome that the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge, Thomistic Ockhamism has the resources to resolve it.

Zagzehski provides a competent, technically detailed, and unpolemical exposition of contemporary currents of thought on this perennially engaging topic, and she does so with the reader always in mind, pausing frequently to review where she has been and where she intends to go. The text is dense hut rewards the reader with frequent bursts of incisive commentary. The author possesses a generous measure of common sense which makes itself felt in a healthy suspicion of any line of thought that wanders too far from our ordinary ways of understanding the world.

As an attempt to make progress toward solving the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, however, the hook is not entirely successful. Three shortcomings seem worth mentioning here. First, the author provides no criteria for determining whether an analogy-especially an imaginable one-is helpful or misleading. Is

she justified in conceiving God's knowing on the analogy of human seeing, or in conceiving God's relation to my freedom by using as a model the image of a benevolent neurologist who is not in time and who has placed a mechanism in my brain that allows him to reinforce all my choices? Second, the notion of a " positive solution " needs refinement. Surely Zagzehski would agree that there are limits to what we can know in this life about God; hut when she says that the kind of solution she has in mind requires an explanation of " God's knowing mechanism" (p. 178-9), it is not clear just where she thinks those limits might lie. Third, I suspect that for Thomas accidental necessity pertains as much to the present as to the past, for it attaches not only to what *was* in act hut also to what *is* in act; perhaps, at least in some cases, it is equivalent to the "necessity of the present," the "innocuous kind of necessity" (p. 39) that Boethius says is entailed by God's eternal knowledge of temporal being.

These problems all point to the hook's lack of a unifying method. Zagzehski's approach is markedly eclectic; in the end one is left wondering how-or whether-the various stances she takes throughout the hook could he worked into something at least suggestive of a comprehensive position or synthesis. " Thomistic Ockhamism " is the clearest case in point. Thomas himself reasons from divine simplicity to the unitary act of divine knowing. Zagzehski borrows the latter concept and claims that it can he predicated of God even if God's knowing is temporal, so long as one distinguishes between what God knows essentially and what God knows accidentally. But suggesting that God is in time, or positing any distinction between essential and accidental in God, is tantamount to denying divine simplicity-the very attribute that allowed Thomas to conceive of God's knowing as unitary in the first place! The elements of Thomas's synthesis are interdependent, in the sense that they are mutually defining; his concept of a single, simple act of divine understanding belongs within that precise context; in another context it may well he meaningless.

The question about God's relation to human freedom can he handled effectively only within the framework of a comprehensive philosophical synthesis. To attempt to handle it before one has assembled the basic components of that framework is to invite the kind of ad hoc solutions that not only fail to meet the issue head on, hut also tend to obscure it.

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An Apology for Apologetics: A Study in the Logic of lnterreligious Dialogue. By PAUL J. GRIFFITHS. New York: Orbis, 1991. ISBN: 0 88344 761 4. pp. 113.

Jesus Christ at the Encounter of World Religions. By J. DUPUIS. New York: Orbis, 1991 (ET: Robert R. Barr, from French, 1989). ISBN: 0 88344 723 1. pp. 301.

Griffiths presents a rigorous argument for the possibility of contradictory claims between different religious communities. His inspiration, as he acknowledges, is William Christian Snr. His basic argument is: " If representative intellectuals belonging to some specific religious community come to judge at a particular time that some or all of their own doctrine-expressing sentences are incompatible with some alien religious claim (s) , then they should feel obliged to engage in both positive and negative apologetics vis-a-vis these alien religious claim(s) and their promulgators" (3) . He takes negative apologetics to be a critique of arguments made against one's own religious claims, showing that such arguments fail or are inconsistent or incoherent. Positive apologetics shows how a particular religious community's doctrines are cognitively superior, in some respect(s), to another religious community's doctrines. It is essential for this enterprise that only methods of argumentation and criteria of knowledge acceptable to the adversary are employed. This requires the acceptance of natural theology.

Griffiths is well aware of the lion's den he is entering, as his proposals run counter to much scholarship in the area of interreligious dialogue, so he spends three chapters apologetically tackling the lions. The objectors (who mainly remain in notes) include Derrida, Barthes, Winch, Lindbeck, Hick, Huxley, Nasr, Plantinga and others, although MacIntyre is curiously missing. This technique has the advantage of isolating and presenting arguments, without falling into problems of correct exegesis of opponents. And this is also its weakness, as objectors will sometimes feel caricatured or misunderstood-as is surely the case with Plantinga and in one instance, Hick.

First, he tackles objections that sentences from one tradition are either incomprehensible or incommensurable with those of another, convincingly showing that the strong versions of both claims are self-defeating and unsustainable. Weaker versions still allow for his project-or so he thinks. This is where Maclntyre's work should have been considered. Then he tackles various theories of religious language (following Lindbeck's typology). He argues against non-cognitive accounts that reduce beliefs to the credibility of causes for holding beliefs, a position incapable of asserting its truth over other views because of its

own presuppositions. He follows Lindbeck in criticizing experiental expressivism, and then turns upon Lindbeck's own form of rule theory (which is ambivalent regarding cognitive claims), arguing convincingly that to suggest that only sentences uttered confessionally and with performative function can possess ontological truth is confused (42). In a brief review it is not possible to rehearse Griffiths's careful argumentation.

Griffiths then sets about tackling two types of universalists: Hick and Huxley. Of Hick, he argues that some criteria are required to discern true from false religions (e.g. Jim Jones) and in so doing such a position needs to support and develop such criteria, thereby effectively introducing apologetics. He neglects to deal with Hick's pragmatic criteria of beneficial 'fruits' evident in adherents, but the logic of his argument can be applied to Hick's proposals. Using Katz and Zaehner, he argues against the esoteric universalism of the philosophia perennis. (The arguments of Robert Forman's recent book, *The Problems of Pure Consciousness,* are strangely neglected, despite Griffiths's being a contributor to that collection.)

Finally, he tackles objections against positive apologetics-first, on the grounds that it has a negative effect on interreligious relations. Logically, this need not be the case, although Griffiths is well aware that the political context of apologetics can obscure its proper goal: deeper critical understanding, learning and problem solving. Then, in sustained dialogue with Planting a, he argues against the objection that success is impossible. It is impossible only if "knockdown drag-out" (64) argumentative victory is expected. Griffiths suggests the cumulative-case argument and gives instances of such successful apologetics (medieval Islam and Christianity, early Indian Hinduism and Buddhism). In response to anti-foundationalist positions that do not seek to justify themselves, Griffiths's criticism is that this is an unacceptable "retreat into fideism and its inevitable concomitant, sectarianism" (73). This is surely name-calling apologetics, for fideism and sectarianism are not logically or historically concomitant and one cannot criticize fideism for being fideistic. The same weakness can be found in Griffiths's treatment of traditions relying entirely on self-guaranteeing authoritative sources. Such communities may well be incapable of arguing without their privileged texts, and the considered rejection of natural theology for religious reasons is not adequately dealt with by Griffiths.

Believing that he has established the validity of his initial plea for interreligious apologetics, Griffiths stipulates the conditions when such apologetics should not be carried out: whenever they are part of military, economic, or cultural imperialism. The American academy is deemed neutral in all these respects and can therefore be the location

of such apologetics. This is questionable. Griffiths would have done well to consider Said and Macintyre on this point.

Nevertheless, his last chapter is a wonderful example of apologetics in action regarding the notion of ' person ' or ' self ' in Buddhist-Christian debate. Griffiths outlines a positive apologetic assault on the Buddhist notion of no-self, arguing that there is no effective way of defending individuating continua within or across lives (karmic continuity.) In so doing, he awaits a reply and a continuing debate. Here, despite his distinctions, there is apparent a thin dividing line between negative and positive apologetics.

This is a very stimulating, challenging and fresh approach to the area of interreligious dialogue which should not be ignored by anyone interested in this issue. Dupuis's concern and aim is quite different from that of Griffiths's. His central task is to show how a high Christology leads to a considered and positive evaluation of the world religions.

Dupuis begins by surveying different views of Christ found in neo-Hinduism, relying heavily on M. M. Thomas. He shows that Hindu Christologies pose important questions to Christian theology, not always dissimilar from contemporary western challenges. He then pursues the possibility of a meeting point between Hindu and Christian Christologies. Such a meeting point, following a recent tradition sterning from Abhishktananda (and the early Panikkar) , is found in the heart of Advaita with its affirmation of oneness with Brahman (aham brahmasmi) being viewed as the truth of Jesus's union with the father (ego eimi). While admitting this may not be the Advaita of Sankara (or, one may add, for most Hindus), Dupuis suggests the possibility of a Christian advaita which transforms advaita in restoring to the Absolute " a communion value, and to the human self the inalienable consistency of personhood " (66) . This is unashamedly "fulfilment theology". From advaita Christians also learn that "communion in divinity and with the divine cannot be conceived only according to a finite model " (66) .

Chapter four launches us into the theory of religions. Dupuis rejects a "narrow ecclesiocentric view of salvation" (97) allegedly in keeping with Vatican II (although he admits there are unresolved tensions within the documents) , and prefers to develop a theology of " presence ": that is, the affirmation of the presence of Christ and his Spirit within the world, which of course includes the world religions. His central argument is that as Christ is constitutive of salvation, then all grace everywhere is the grace of the triune God. Here he brings out the trinitarian dimensions sometimes lost sight of in Rahner's anonymous Christian. He then shows the biblical notion of salvation history constituting four differing, but related, covenants: Adamic,

Noachide, Abrahamic and Mosaic, and Jesus's. The second allows for a valid affirmation of God's covenanting with the world religions, and for their continuing validity up until a proper existential confrontation with the gospel. At times Dupuis is dangerously close to an *a priori* affirmation of all religions (120), and like Rahner sometimes neglects the ubiquity of sin and the possible distortion of truths when contained within an entire system which may obscure or misconstrue them-as Congar has so rightly noted.

Dupuis brings out the implications of this theology of presence arguing that salvation comes through the structures of other religions, analogously to Israel in the Hebrew bible. Hence, salvation is possible without explicit confrontation with the gospel. Here two points are worth making. First, he rightly defends Rahner against the charge of gnosticism: that the only difference between explicit and implicit Christianity is a matter of knowledge. Second, he is wrong to equate and then quickly dismiss von Balthasar's with Kiing's (superficial) criticisms of Rahner (150, note 44). Von Balthasar's critique of the supernatural existential goes to the heart of the nature-grace debate which may be said to be the key to both Christology and the subsequent view of other religions. In failing to engage properly with von Balthasar, Dupuis's case lacks full rigour and credibility.

His development of Rahner's thesis is most clearly seen in chapter seven, where he introduces the Spirit to make sense of the notion of Christ's hidden presence, such that "the influence of the Spirit reveals and manifests the activity of Christ" (153) found, for instance, in agape. He also employs the category of inspiration, associated with the Spirit and neglected in recent theology, to argue for the inspirational status of non-Christian " holy " texts. I agree with Dupuis's argument, although I think he tends to promote a depersonalised form of pneumatology as text, rather than co-equally stressing the role of the Spirit in the community as interpreter. After all one can have the New Testament being read and practiced heretically. The promise of the Spirit as interpreter and performer of texts is more dynamic and fruitful and further justifies Dupuis' own argument for the incorporation of non-Christian texts into the Christian liturgy. This neglect of the ecclesiological dimension of Christology is a major weakness.

Dupuis then inspects the relationship of the Jesus of history to the Christ of faith in the context of religious pluralism. He maintains the indissoluble link between the two and criticizes the prevalent tendencies to separate them (Hick, Knitter, Race on the one hand, and Troeltsch, Tillich and Pannikar on the other. This is a welcome detailed critical appraisal of Pannikar's work.) He also criticizes Christologies that deny Jesus as constitutive of salvation, although what could have been a useful critique of Kiing is somewhat dissipated. There are some ex-

tremely incisive judgments on a range of modern writers and tendencies. What is outstandingly useful here is the way Dupuis shows how the most conservative of high Christologies can also he the most open and critically fruitful in engaging with other religions.

The final chapters contain a fine exegesis of Vatican II and post-conciliar documents regarding the confused and fluid status of inter-religious dialogue in relation to evangelization and mission. Dupuis promotes the view of dialogue as mutual evangelization and as essential to the mission of the church, although there is slight ambivalence in his comments that dialogue does not involve explicit proclamation (228). Why not, in some instances?

While Dupuis's hook is an excellent statement of an orthodox inclusivist high Christology, there are certain weaknesses within his approach. First, the clash of faiths and the fragmented discontinuities so clearly evident are too easily harmonized in an evolutionary picture of salvation history. Second, his Christology could he more trinitarian and ecclesiocentric. For example, he neglects the apophatic elements of Christianity and its possible relation with traditions like Buddhism, and while he denies any real difference between eastern and western pneumatologies, his own preference for the western tradition could have been more starkly contrasted with some dangers that have entered the debate by those trying to utilize an allegedly more eastern pneumatology. His ecclesiocentric neglect diverts attention from the way in which communities are so deeply shaped by their practice of texts and the consequent difficulties of comparison across different textual world views. Such problems should not however obscure Dupuis' incisive and powerful vision of Christ at the center of all salvation history.

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Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of Truth. By HOWARD A. NETLAND. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1991. xii + 323 pp. $17.95 (paper).

This hook, written by an assistant professor of religious studies at Tokyo Christian University who is also an Evangelical Free Church missionary in Japan, contains a lucid and coherent argument in defense of Christian exclusivism. Its author values clarity and reasoned argument over sentiment, and has faith in the power of those virtues to solve deep problems, such as those set for Christians by the facts of

religious pluralism. This faith has enabled him to produce a book of considerable power; it has also led him at points to oversimplify exceedingly complex problems. This is scarcely surprising since oversimplification is a perennial temptation for those who value clarity.

Netland understands Christian exclusivism to assert at least the following claims: that the "defining beliefs" of Christianity-nowhere listed, but defined formally as that set of beliefs whose acceptance is entailed for any individual just by being an "active Christian in good standing "-are all true; that the defining beliefs of non-Christian religious communities are false where they conflict with those of Christianity; that salvation is to be had only through hearing and properly responding to the gospel of Jesus Christ; and that evangelization-the active proclamation of the gospel to those who have not yet accepted it-is an unavoidable duty for faithful Christians. Netland further thinks that Christian exclusivism, understood in this way, requires and rests upon a high christology and a strong view of the truth and divine inspiration of the biblical text.

None of these positions is uncontroversial, as Netland recognizes, and the cluster of views that he calls Christian exclusivism has long been out of favor in the mainstream of Christian theological thought, both Catholic and Protestant. It carries conviction, indeed, only among evangelical Protestants and small cadres of unreconstructed pre-Vatican II Roman Catholics. Netland thinks Christian exclusivism deserves a wider hearing, and that it should finally be adopted by all Christians as the proper way to think about religious pluralism. He therefore needs to meet the standard objections to the position, and this book is largely an extended attempt to do so.

In the first five chapters Netland meets objections which, if successful, would make both Christian and other varieties of religious exclusivism untenable. If the arguments in these chapters are successful they establish only the modal claim that Christian exclusivism is possibly true-that the defeaters of it canvassed here do not in fact defeat. To this end Netland argues in chapters 2-3 that there are, as a matter of fact, prima facie incompatibilities among the defining beliefs of the world's major religious communities, and that Christian exclusivism therefore has purchase. In chapter 4 he argues, against W. C. Smith, D. Z. Phillips, and others, that the concept of propositional truth not only has application to religious beliefs, but is also unavoidable in such contexts, and that noncognitivist readings of religion inevitably fail. He needs to argue this since his version of Christian exclusivism is predicated upon a propositional view of truth. And in chapter 5 he argues that at least some criteria for the assessment and adjudication of prima facie oppositions among the doctrines of religious communities do exist and can be applied.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the positions argued for by Netland in these chapters are largely correct, and are badly in need of serious discussion by theologians. But I do not think that his arguments establish the truth of his claims. Indeed, it would be very surprising if they did, for Netland needs to defend among other things a propositionalist theory of truth, an extraordinarily subtle and complex task only the surface of which is scratched here. I suspect that Netland's philosophical training is not adequate to this part of his work; he certainly shows no acquaintance with the debates about propositionalism in contemporary anglophone semantics and philosophy of mind, and makes the astounding claim that propositionalism is " widely accepted in contemporary philosophy " (p. 115). In fact, it is probably more widely rejected than accepted, and is certainly deeply controversial.

In addition, it is not clear that Netland needs to establish that there are tradition-neutral criteria of assessment and adjudication in order to ground the possibility that what is believed by some religious persons may be false while what is believed by other religious persons may be true. Alasdair Mcintyre, among others, has recently set forth powerful arguments that deny the existence of such tradition-neutral criteria while still affirming the possibility of being able to demonstrate the preferability of some religious beliefs to others. This position needs to be engaged if Netland's systematic ambitions are to be realized.

In spite of these weaknesses, Netland's arguments for the possible truth of Christian exclusivism do raise the right questions, and do point to the fact that these questions have not been resolved in the ways that defenders of pluralism so often assume. These first chapters are the strongest part of the book.

In chapters 6-8 Netland offers a detailed analysis and critique of John Hick's position on religious pluralism; a rejection of the (different) pluralistic christologies offered by Hick and Paul Knitter in favor of a broadly Chalcedonian position; and a defense of the need for Christian evangelism and its possible combination with some forms of religious tolerance and interreligious dialogue. The arguments in these chapters address, for the most part, not the conditions of the possibility of the truth of Christian exclusivism, but rather the claim that Christian faith entails commitment to certain strong christological claims, and to the practice of evangelism.

I find Netland's arguments in this section of the book much less convincing. He is perceptive in his analysis of the weaknesses in Hick's position, and possibly correct that the Chalcedonian formulae are consistent with the thrust of the New Testament documents in ways that neither Hick's nor Knitter's christologies are. He is also obviously correct that christological discussion is unavoidable for any Christian who wants to develop a position on religious pluralism. But he apparently

does not see that the christological options are not exhausted by the relatively crude positions taken by Hick and Knitter on the one hand, and a naively literalistic reading of the New Testament on the other. And this, I think, is because his own arguments as to what is required for faithful Christians rest upon a one-dimensional reading of the New Testament, a reading whose basic assumptions are themselves non-biblical. But here too, as with the question of truth, the issues are enormously complex, the literature is vast, and Netland can do no more than gesture at the nature of the problem.

Of special ethnographic interest is Netland's survey in chapter 7 of the range of current evangelical opinion on the difficult question (difficult, that is, for a Christian exclusivist) of what happens at death to those who have not accepted the gospel of Jesus Christ, either because they are "informationally B.C." (i.e., they have not heard it), or because they were "chronologically B.C." (i.e., they lived before the gospel was proclaimed). Such discussions have a flavor of solemn absurdity to those outside the evangelical fold; their very occurrence should call into question some of the commitments that give rise to them, and they make apparent the severe difficulties inherent in the kind of nonbiblical reading of the biblical materials referred to in the preceding paragraph.

In all, Professor Netland's book deserves wide reading and discussion. It covers too much ground too quickly, hut it has the great virtue of showing both what must he argued if Christian exclusivism is to he held true, and that these arguments are not yet resolved.

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Myeh and Metaphysics in Plato's Phaedo. By DAVID A. WHITE. Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania: Susquehanna Univ. Press, 1989. 316 pp. $45.

David White has written a commentary to the *Phaedo* in order to make clear the purposes its myths serve. There has been a tendency among some interpreters to brush aside this question in their exclusive attention to the arguments of the *Phaedo.* One of the principal virtues of White's book is to demonstrate that a proper philosophical understanding of the *Phaedo* cannot so ignore its myths.

His demonstration gains support from his insight that the *Phaedo* is Socrates' swan song. To those who wonder that he does not regard his imminent death a misfortune, Socrates replies by comparing himself to swans in the following ways:

> *You* probably think that in prophetic skill I am inferior to swans. They, when they perceive that they must die, although having sung their whole life, do then sing mightiest and best *(pleista kai kallista),* rejoicing that they are about to go away into the presence of the god whose servants they are .... Because they belong to Apollo, they have prophetic powers; and foreseeing the good things in Hades they on that day above all others sing and are glad.
>
> But *I* suppose myself to be in the same service as the swans, dedicated to the same god, to have the prophetic skill from our master no less than swans, and to be released from life no less dispirited (84e4-85b7).

The *Phaedo,* then, expresses Socrates' joy, and though he has sung mightily and well his whole life, on this day he sings *pleista kai kallista.*

White draws attention to this feature of swan song, that the death day's is best, and goes on to predict the same feature *within* the death day: " as an agent of Apollo, Socrates will speak longer and better the closer he gets to death" (127). The structure of the *Phaedo* confirms to some extent this prediction. As White notes, " the final proof is the longest of the arguments demonstrating the immortality of soul and . . . the concluding eschatological myth is the longest of the various attempts to depict the afterlife; presumably then both the final proof and the eschatological myth are also the ' best ' of their respective types of discourse" (127).

I find White's application of the swan song convincing, with one qualification. He translates *pleista kai kallista* as " most and best " (126), and understands "most" specifically as a superlative of size: "longest." This reading is too narrow: one established meaning of *pleista* in connection with song is as a superlative of musical volume: " loudest." Indeed I see nothing wrong in imagining Socrates, with growing joy and excitement, talking louder at each new stage of the dialogue. But I think that reading *pleista* exclusively as a superlative of musical volume is also too limited. I suggest that *pleista* here be understood as a superlative of magnitude *in general:* perhaps " greatest " or " mightiest " conveys this sense in English better than " most."

This more general reading allows us to perceive an increase not only in magnitude of size and volume, but also in magnitude of importance. The *Phaedo* comes to the end in, as it were, a mighty crescendo, with the ultimate fortissimo being Socrates' very last words, which are neither myth nor argument but command, and which, though not at all long, are plausibly seen as the mightiest and finest note of the whole piece: "Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius. Be careful; pay the debt."

Before turning to White's account of myth in the *Phaedo,* I must praise his interpretation of these last words of Socrates. One owes a sacrifice to Asclepius on recovering from disease. What disease does Socrates have in mind?

In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche articulated what has come to be a prevailing interpretation: "To live--that means to be a long time sick" ("The Problem of Socrates," tr. Hollingdale). On this reading, death is seen as a release from human suffering. The problem, as White persuasively shows, is that " Socrates could not regard death as producing such a release and remain consistent " with his final myth (277). According to that myth, "those who have just died" are first divided into " those who had praiseworthy and holy lives and those who had not" (113dl;4). As one would expect, the had-nots continue, some forever, in their suffering, if only as purification. The hads, by contrast, move up from their previous dwelling " inside [since under the air of] the earth" to a dwelling "upon the earth" (114b8-c2). This higher life, though " much longer " and " without sickness," is still plainly mortal and bodily (lllb2-3). Only at the end of that higher life will " a part, who have sufficienty purified themselves by philosophy," graduate to an entirely bodiless life which is "finer yet" (114c2-5). But there is no guarantee that these higher-ups will not backslide in their life and return after their eventual death to further suffering, as in the eschatological myths of the *Republic* (619b-d) and *Phaedo* (248a-c). Hence White's assessment of the Nietzschean interpretation seems correct: " Socrates' request to Crito cannot be intended to thank Asclepius for his release from human ills in the sense of a 'final' escape" (277).

This clears the way for White's own interpretation. His insight is to see that Socrates is repaying the god for " provisionally healing a philosophical illness" (281): misology. At 88c-9lc-" a brief section spanning the exact center of the dialogue" (132)-Simmias and Cebes raise devastating objections to Socrates' first argument for the immortality of the soul, which had semed to the company utterly valid. The objections cause a crisis in confidence: how can we trust any argument, now that we have seen how the " absolutely convincing " can become "utterly discredited" (88d2-3)?

Just as with misanthropy, the experience of betrayal can cause hatred. And, Socrates says, " it is impossible that any suffering can be worse than having a hatred of argument" (89d2-3). The reason is that those who suffer from this disease "end *(teleutontes)* by believing that they are wiser than anyone else, because they alone have discovered that there is nothing stable or dependable either in facts or in arguments" (90cl-4, tr. Tredennick). Socrates' verb "to end" is a pun: it also has the meaning *to die.* Though White does not notice the pun, he sees the connection: " the ultimate consequence of misology is a kind of self-destruction in which what is destroyed is that aspect of the self represented by active reason. But if human beings are in fact defined by rationality, then to succumb to misology is to embrace a kind

of death" (134)-one worse than bodily death: Socrates would prefer Phaedo to cut off his hair to mourn not Socrates' death, but the argument's death (89b). Thus a human being can have no greater reason for making a sacrifice to Asclepius than to have been healed of misology.

The proper course of action, when we find ourselves betrayed by arguments, is not to accuse arguments of being incapable of validity, but rather to recognize ourselves as still intellectual invalids (90e); this is the beginning of health. This of course is the familiar Socratic thesis of the *Apology:* that to recognize one's own ignorance is the best way to begin the care of one's soul, and the best that human beings have attained in intellectual health.

Another familiar Socratic feature is that Socrates describes himself as sharing this disease with the company (90e). But Phaedo, looking back at the conversation at the very moment he relays it-and here we are at the very center of the dialogue-states that although " he had often marveled at Socrates before, never more than " at what Socrates then did (88e4-5): note again how Socrates' last song is like a swan's in magnitude, here, of marvelousness) ; he marvelled at " how well Socrates healed" them (89a5). Surely this philosophical healing brings upon the company the obligation of a sacrifice to Asclepius, an obligation which Socrates would want us to take care of above all and not forget.

Let me turn now to White's main concern. Given the principle of the swan song, and that Socrates had throughout his life regarded philosophy as the " greatest kind of music " (6la3-4), it is no surprise that the *Phaedo* is full of philosophical argument. But the longest and best argument in the *Phaedo* is followed by-in the place of highest importance before Socrates' last words- a singularly long and complex myth. Evidently myth has an importance at least as great as argument. What is this importance?

White states or suggests many answers.

(1) "All attempts [by reason] to demonstrate soul's immortality will require reinforcement by some sort of mythic configuration" (18).
(2) Human "philosophical nature may not represent the best that humanity offers with respect to apprehending a partial knowledge of the good; " thus myth serves to " supplement " reason (173) .
(3) Socrates' explanations require him to "explore nondiscursive regions-the language of belief shading into myth. These regions are essential to the problem because the good as such can be expressed only according to their coordinates" (178).
(4) "It is necessary to [use myth] if one wants as complete a perspective on the good as it is humanly possible to secure " (179).

(5) "The mythic details provide what might be called discursive possibilities derived from the arguments preceding it" (238).
(6) Myth makes us "more open to the fundamental character of the metaphysics that grounds it, a metaphysics that becomes indistinct the closer one moves to articulating the principles that animate it" (268).

It is not clear how all of these answers can be right. For example, answers (1) and (4) make reason and myth necessary complements of each other, but in ways that are *prima facie* incompatible, as reinforcers and as alternate perspectives. By contrast, in (6) and (3) reason appears unnecessary, again in ways that are *prima facie* incompatible, as blindness and hypermetropia to the truth. Again, answers (2) and (5) both make myth a supplement, but in (2) to the imperfect, in (5) to the apparently only incomplete.

It is a defect of White's work that these answers are left undeveloped to such a degree that it is difficult even to assess their mutual consistency. But there is a graver defect: common to all his answers is the diagnosis that rational argument in one way or another lacks the character to reveal all truth; such answers tend in these ways to mistrust rational argument; in these ways they are kinds of misology. It is far better, and far better in particular as an interpretation of Plato, to diagnose our need for myth as a condition of the human soul rather than of rational argument.

To find the point of myth in the condition of the human soul rather than argument itself is hardly new; it is the essence of Hegel's reading:

> However much ... Plato's mythical presentation of Philosophy is praised, and however attractive it is in his Dialogues, it yet proves a source of misapprehensions; and it is one of these misapprehensions, if Plato's myths are held to be what is most excellent in his philosophy. Many propositions, it is true, are made more easily intelligible by being presented in mythical form; nevertheless, that is not the true way of presenting them .... The myth belongs to the pedagogic stage of the human race .... When the notion attains its full development, it has no more need of the myth *(Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* sec. I, ch. III, tr. Haldane and Simpson).

For Hegel, the particular condition of the human soul necessitating myth is the less than full development of the rational element, which as such needs something more user-friendly than pure argument. Unfortunately, how unargued myth can educate, can indeed even be directed at, the *rational* element of the soul is left unexplained.

A much more recent representative of the non-misologic reading is Kenneth Dorter:

> Even Socrates' comparatively sophisticated audience shows itself, like Cebes, not in command of its emotions (59a-b), and Plato would hardly have expected his dialogue's audience to be generally more sophisticated than this one. Such people might not find the philosopher's beliefs incomprehensible, but it is questionable how strong a hold they could have on them if their irrational emotions were not made allies of these beliefs. Where the subject matter is not an emotionally charged one such considerations might be irrelevant, but a subject could hardly be more emotionally charged than that of the *Phaedo*, as the spectator's reactions witness *(Plato's Phaedo: An Interpretation* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982], p. 8).

For Dorter, the particular condition of the human soul necessitating myth is found in the insubordination of its " irrational emotions " to the ruling, rational element of the soul. On this reading, argument is needed to address the rational part, and myth the irrational emotions of the soul. White does not directly consider this interpretation by Dorter. But he is sensitive to the crucial problem with Dorter's reading (cf. White, 20). If the soul were bifurcated into rational and irrational parts, to which argument and myth were separately addressed, there could be no explanation why the myth shares as it does a conceptual content with the argument. Indeed there could be no explanation why the myth has a conceptual content at all. More than just an enchanting tune, a myth requires meaningful lyrics.

Dorter was right to seek an explanation of the point of myth in a divided soul. He was wrong not to divide the soul according to Plato. In the *Republic*, with its elaborate model of the soul as state, Plato divides the rational part of the soul, corresponding to the Guardian class, into two further parts, corresponding to the Rulers and Auxiliaries. Both further parts are therefore rational, hut with the following distinction. In the ruling element is " understanding, which leads and governs " (428e8) , while the auxiliary part has " the power which preserves belief through all circumstances," the beliefs given to it by the ruling element (429b9-c2). Incidentally, Aristotle observes this same subdistinction of the rational element, into " that which trusts in reason, and that which has reason i.e. thinks things through" *(Eth. Nie.* 1.7, 1098a4-5).

Accordingly, in the *Republic* Socrates does not recommend that the auxiliary part of the state (and by analogy that part of the soul) be given the argumentative training which leads to understanding. Rather, it should be treated as wool is with color-fast dye: we ought "to contrive ... how best they might accept and trust in the dictates " of the ruling element (430a2-3) . A primary way to achieve this effect recommended in the *Republic* is the telling of myth: children not yet able to follow arguments can comprehend and be molded by myth (377a-c); presumably the auxiliary part of the soul, which has the function of

preserving belief, not understanding truth, will he effectively molded by the same technique.

This bipartite view of the rational element of the soul, therefore, provides an explanation of the importance of myth as well as argument in Plato *in those dialogues in which Plato subscribes to such a bipartite theory of soul.* It is an important confirmation of this interpretation, then, that the middle dialogues of Plato make extensive use of myth, while the early, 'Socratic' dialogues do not. There is no question that the middle dialogues do accept this bipartite theory. The early dialogues, to he sure, nowhere argue explicitly against a bipartite theory of rational soul, hut to see that the Socratic dialogues cannot accept such a theory, recall that, on a standard interpretation of those dialogues, Socrates denies that knowledge can he rendered helpless in the grip of strong passion, i.e. that one's knowledge can suffer " impotence" *(akrasia,* cf. *Prt.* 352b-357e). On the bipartite theory, however, it is obvious that *akrasia* is possible (cf. *Rep.* 442c-d).

To sum up: I have praised White for his eye-opening revelations that the structure of the *Phaedo* is like a swan song, and that the illness of which Socrates and company are healed is misology. And I have found it ironic that White does not see that his misologic inter· pretation of the point of the *Phaedo's* myths is inconsistent with the second revelation. Finally, I have suggested that a non-misologic interpretation is satisfactory.

It is a misfortune that the Platonic-Aristotelian distinction of the rational element into a part which can understand argument and a part which can comprehend unargued assertion and command has not been well marked in the history of philosophy, which has substituted cruder counterparts to reason: irrational emotions or non-rational will. It is relatively unimportant that when we work with the cruder distinctions we stumble in interpreting the *Phaedo.* The real trouble comes when, with a cruder distinction in hand, we observe, as we must, that there is more at the heart of human life than rational argument. If everything but argument is outside rational discourse, rational discourse begins to look an insignificant part of human expression. If nothing but argument is the concern of the rational self, the rational self begins to look an insignificant part of the human being. But, as modern and contemporary philosophical exploration has shown, to look outside the rational for the truth about the human being is to risk the destruction of philosophy.

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The Giving and Taking of Life: Essays Ethical. By JAMES TUNSTEAD BURTCHAELL. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989. xiv + 304 pp. $29.95.

One looks forward to the writings of James Burtchaell not only because his judgments are almost always on the side of the angels hut also because his mastery of the English language often enables him to say in a few words what writers of lesser skill say in volumes.

This is a collection of previously-published essays on a wide range of topics including contraception, abortion, the use of biotechnology in human reproduction, the use of fetal tissue in medical therapy, law in a pluralist society, liberation theology, the morality of terrorism and the relationship of religion to politics. In its own way, this hook poses well the moral questions of how we and " nature " are to relate to the newly emerging generation of technology. Because the articles are so diverse, it is not possible to give a detailed account or critique of each of them, and rather than doing that I will focus attention only on the issue of ethics and the newly emerging technology which will have a profound impact on not only our personal lives, hut also our society and politics. And to an even greater extent, newly emerging technological developments will have an enormous impact on the way in which our race regenerates and orients itself in the future.

On a case-by-case basis, Burtchaell raises these issues with great force and clarity, even though his understanding of nature and technology is not entirely clear. He suggests that nature is far more subtle and vital than we commonly assume and that it has its own ways of fighting hack against our technological assaults against it. Our attempts to control and manipulate nature through technological means provide nature with an opportunity to protect itself hy striking hack at us in ways previously unimagined. Using technology to bend nature to our will is much like the Australian Aborigine who vainly tried to throw away his boomerang!

What is most striking about this hook is the contradictory way in which Burtchaell employs the concept of nature to determine the morality of certain enterprises. This contradiction is seen most clearly hy comparing his assessments of artificial contraception and technological transmission of human life. The contrast is so sharp that the issue of the foundations of his thought can he called into question. When one compares his favorable assessment of artificial contraception to his critical evaluation of technological reproduction of human life, one wonders if there is an underlying principle guiding his moral deliberations or whether it is merely his intuitions, likes and dislikes (strongly

colored and shaped by his cultural setting) that determine his evaluations.

In "'Human Life' and Human Love", Burtchaell vigorously criticizes the substance, form and arguments of the encyclical *Humanae Vitae.* For him, the great flaw in this encyclical was the weight it gave to the distinction between natural and artificial contraception and the absolute condemnation visited upon the latter. Seeing little difference between more natural methods of contraception like natural family planning and the use of the pill, Burtchaell argues that artificial contraception should have been given some kind of moral permissibility by Pope Paul VI (P. 99). But it is not clear why he gives limited support to artificial birth control after one reads his harsh criticisms of it:

> But the venture of technology overshot its original goals in several unforeseen ways. America now has the highest rate of teenage pregnancy in what we like to call the developed world. The incidence of sexual promiscuity, venereal disease, abortion, marital collapse, fatherless children, child abuse and abandonment, wanton breeding by the thriftless (and dusky) poor is probably higher than at any time in our national history.
>
> The founders [Margaret Sanger and Marie Stopes] did concede that their program might not immediately achieve its desired results. But that was because of the lack, in their time, of an 'ideal' contraceptive. Its development was to be expected from further assiduous scientific research. Seventy years and much assiduous research later, the same message is still bravely recited. With more technology-more instruction in contraception, more availability of contraceptives, and more abortion as a failsafe backstop-all of these problems can be licked (P. 127).

Even further he writes:

> The naivete of the technicians seems never to have been jolted by any suspicion that their massive scheme of helpful contrivances might itself have been one of the surest stimulants of irresponsible sexual activity (P. 129).

Contraception has also brought us "[A]n entire generation of adults poisoning their capacity to parent" (P. 142). With all of this, it is hard to understand why he criticizes the Vatican for condemning artificial contraception as an "intrinsically denatured act" (P. 140).

But while strongly favoring "artificial" contraception, Burtchaell is a strong critic of the use of artificial methods to generate life. Are we to conclude from this that artificiality is permissible in efforts to curb generation but abhorrent when used to generate life? In his article "The Child as Chattel", he rightly argues that the "artificial" generation of children through IVF and other contemporary biotechnology causes serious harm to children, parents and society. The fundamental problem with our technologists is that they believe our actions (or technologies) derive their meaning not from their inherent direction

or force, but from the wishes we have for them (P. 147). Yet he will not accept the notion that the contraceptive action has an inherent meaning or message which is contrary to what he claims is the proper relationship between science and nature.

He argues that the Catholic Church should approve artificial contraception as have other Christians Churches such as the Anglican Church at Lambeth (Pp. 106-8). However, he says little of the fact that these Churches have shown little concern for the Christian tradition on this issue and have carried that lack of concern to other areas: ordination and ministry, sexual ethics and abortion. And he does not seem to see that the Churches which have approved artificial contraception do not stand as a credible model for a Church which takes its heritage seriously and which envisions itself as having been charged with an authoritative teaching ministry. Even further, he omits any mention of the ban the Orthodox Churches have maintained against contraception in recent years.

He compares the heavy-handed manner in which the teachings of *Humanae Vitae* have been imposed on the Church to the way in which the papacy in the middle ages and early modern era vainly attempted to assert its authority over secular rulers. But a more apt comparison could be drawn between the way in which the Church vainly taught against the practice of jousting, duelling and gunfighting right up to the First World War and its teachings against contraception. Both of these teachings were propounded consistently for centuries and yet both were in large part ignored by major segments of the laity. This suggests that a future post-technological society with more perceptive awareness of the intricacies of nature might well look on the practices of contraception as having been similarly misguided.

Burtchaell strongly opposes technological intervention to promote generation through IVF, but he raises few questions about allowing it to inhibit or prohibit generation through contraception. He sees quite clearly the divisive and harmful effects of allowing technologists to be the creators of children, but he appears somewhat blind to the harm that allowing technology to determine conception can do to couples. Burtchaell is fond of criticizing official Church pronouncements for their stylistic and rhetorical inadequacy, and one gets the impression he would like to see them all written in his own breezy style. Because of these criticisms and because of the absence of any systematic character to his own work, one suspects he does not fully understand the philosophical rigor in these official statements.

While he is undoubtedly an extremely competent writer and in possession of an engaging literary style, one wonders how qualified he is as a rigorous and systematic moralist. This question needs to be raised because of his apparent allergy to the major moral and philosophical

debates now raging in contemporary Catholic morality. For example, one searches this volume for an essay on the debate between Grisez and Finnis and their opponents but nothing is found. This silence leads one to suspect that his judgments do not flow from a foundation of moral principles hut rather from his own vaguely articulated intuitions.

Burtchaell rightly criticizes the use of human fetal tissue in transplantation for therapeutic purposes because these procedures violate the canons of informed consent. It is more accurate to say that these tissues are " harvested " from the fetus rather than donated because no legitimate informed consent was given to their removal. His moral criticisms of these procedures are correct, but I fear they may not have much impact on contemporary advanced technologists who usually subordinate ethical concerns to scientific and technological advances. Few of these researchers would forsake what appears to be a promising scientific or technological advancement for the sake of an ethical scruple.

Rather than raising only ethical objections to their research and proposals, a more effective approach would be to show that more ethically tolerable technological and scientific areas of research are also more advanced and sophisticated in their technological and scientific character. Many scientists would not curb or redirect their research solely for ethical reasons, but they would modify it if shown that their research is not only ethically tainted but is also scientifically and technologically backwards. This implies that, to gain credibility in the scientific community, bioethicists in coming decades will have to show that morally flawed technology and scientific research is also unsophisticated and retarded science. They will have to be aware of not only the ethical deficiencies in research protocols, but also of their scientific deficiencies as well.

By way of example, human fetal tissue transplantation to cure diabetes should be shown to be not only unethical, but also in violation of the canons of advanced scientific research. Burtchaell seems to agree with claims that human fetal tissue transplants have exceptional therapeutic potential, but this has not been proven in the human domain. And he seems to be unaware of the extraordinarily difficult problem of controlling their release of therapeutic substances. To effectively criticize these protocols bioethicists should also recommend more sophisticated research to replace them, such as procedures now being developed to genetically bind insulin-producing islet cells to " immortalized " cancer cells. These cells would be placed in controlled release devices that would protect the cells from the immune system of the patient and in turn would protect the patient from the cancer cells. Because these cells are " immortal ", they could produce insulin for an indefinite period of time and would not need to he replaced at regular intervals. This is the elegant and sophisticated technology that fulfills the canons

of sound scientific research that bioethicists should espouse to drive out the rather crude and barbaric practices of transplanting " baby brains " into the heads of the elderly and senile. The persuasive bioethicist of the future will have to be more discriminating in his or her judgments of the scientific and therapeutic efficacy of procedures.

One would hope that this volume on the giving and taking of human life would have included reflections on the contemporary human genome mapping project, for the success of this project will profoundly influence how life is transmitted in the twenty.first century. This project aims at identifying each and every gene in the human genome along with its specific function in order to identify and treat genetically-related diseases such as sickle-cell anemia, diabetes and Trisomy 13. However, a less well-advertised agenda aims at using this information for little less than positively eugenic purposes. Whether contemporary high technology should be allowed to assume this role will be the great biomedical debate of the twenty-first century, dwarfing both the abortion and euthanasia debates, and it is unfortunate that Burtchaell does not begin to address that issue in this volume.

Burtchaell's essay "Moral Response to Terrorism" is an insightful piece, for it suggests that contemporary technology is partly responsible for the rise of present-day terrorism. The development of mass armies equipped with the weaponry made available by modern high-technology has destroyed the effectiveness of traditional conventional warfare. The only means of warfare that hold out any promise of success today are nuclear war, high-technology warfare, guerilla warfare and terrorism, and it is terrorism which is now the preferred choice of the dispossessed and militarily weak, even though its rise has again put the common man in jeopardy. Democratic processes and the mass army were supposed to protect the security of the common man, but they have failed in this mission by giving the politically disenfranchised no other means to strike at oppressors than through terrorist attacks.

Burtchaell argues well ,that the response of organized political societies to terrorism is crucial, but fashioning a properly ethical response to a terrorist act is extremely difficult. The terrorist acts to provoke not a juridical but a political response from authorities. But usually societies respond to terrorist acts by denying moral legitimacy to the terrorist's claims, and they criminalize the action in an attempt to gain moral superiority over the terrorist. The difficulty with most of these " juridical " responses to terrorism is that they latch onto the unethical demands or acts of terrorists and use these to deny all moral legitimacy to their demands. The ethically and politically effective response to terrorists would be one which takes into account their morally legitimate claims and tailors responses to those claims. Burtchaell rightly suggests that the standard one·sided response is unwise, and can only bring poli-

tical ruin, for what is required is a proper legal response to their illegal acts and a properly political response to their political acts.

Burtchaell is usually close to the truth in his ethical judgments, hut one is often uneasy with these judgments either because of some glaring inconsistencies or because they do not seem grounded on a solid theoretical basis. He is possessed of some remarkably clear insights and a powerful rhetorical style, hut these suffer from his inability to string these insights into a consistent outlook on these critical biomedical issues.

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Image and Spirit in Sacred and Secular Art. By JANE DILLENBERGER. New York: Crossroad, 1990. Pp. 217. $29.95.

In the quarter century since the close of Vatican II, it is surprising how few Catholic seminaries in this country have followed the Council mandate that called for the study of sacred art by candidates preparing for ordination. On the contrary, the preconciliar ambivalence toward the arts in general, and the visual arts in particular, has been superseded by an incipient iconoclasm that has flourished hand in hand with the liturgical renewal. In the exuberance of throwing out the vestiges of preconciliar culture, hasty reformers have unwittingly embraced new art forms that are all too often lacking in aesthetic or spiritual value. Their untrained eyes predictably gravitate toward the insipid, the garish, and the gaudy. Much of what has been lauded as Catholic art in the past two decades finds itself as hopelessly outdated as the burlap banner. Catholic culture has devolved into Catholic kitsch.

It is ironic that the most eloquent voice for the study of art in American seminaries today belongs not to any priest or prelate, hut to a Protestant woman, Jane Dillenherger, who has established a long and distinguished career teaching in theological seminaries. These include: Drew Theological Seminary, San Francisco Theological Seminary, the Pacific School of Religion, and the Jesuit School of Theology in Berkeley. The Harvard-educated Dillenherger is the author of numerous hooks and articles dealing with art and religion. That she foresaw a career dedicated to rebuilding bridges between these two long-estranged fields of study was evidenced early on when she sought an inter-disciplinary doctoral degree with a dissertation committee that would include the theologian Paul Tillich alongside the eminent art historian Erwin Panofsky. The innovative proposal was denied. Undaunted, Dillen·

berger later went on to establish at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley a doctoral program of studies in the Arts and Religion, the only one of its kind in the United States, where theologians, artists, and art historians collaborate in the education of future church leaders.

Jane Dillenberger's latest book, *Image and Spirit in Sacred and Secular Art,* is fitting testimony to a career that has stretched over five decades. The hook is a compendium of essays and lectures addressed to "the inquiring, intelligent adult who has little or no formal background in the visual arts." The offerings include such diverse subjects as "The Image of Evil in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Art" (what would have been her dissertation topic under Tillich and Panofsky), "Picasso's Transformations of Sacred Art," "The Appearance and Disappearance of God in Western Art,"" Lucas Cranach, Reformation Picture-Maker," and "Images of Women in American Art." Altogether, ten essays have been included in this Crossroad publication which is generously filled with 133 reproductions of works discussed in the text.

The overarching theme of this hook is to look at visual images and analyze how they have changed through successive cultural eras. In doing so the author makes every attempt to connect art and religion with everyday life. In her introductory essay, "Looking for Style and Content in Christian Art," Dillenberger calls on all viewers to discard their private prejudices as they gaze upon artworks: "Nothing less than a kind of self-abdication is demanded of us by a great work of art. It asks us to see it, if only for a few moments, in terms of the vision that it represents and expresses." Only by placing biases in check can the viewer hope to share in the artists's vision, a truly creative interval for the beholder, which the art critic, Bernard Berenson, called "the aesthetic moment," that experience wherein the perceiver and the perceived " become one entity; time and space are abolished and the spectator is possessed by one awareness." When ordinary consciousness is renewed, the viewer feels " as if he had been initiated into illuminating, exalting, formative mysteries. In short, the aesthetic moment is a moment of mystic vision." Truth, both Dillenberger and Berenson would agree, is not imparted by the spoken or written word alone. Truth can he visually perceived when not blinded by prejudice.

The discarding of prejudices in viewing a work of art, Dillenherger points out, is necessary for the educated as well as the uneducated. She attacks feminist theologian Elizabeth Moltmann-Wendel for her declaration that representations of the Magdalen as a sinner are sexist. "What is left of the great male sinner?" Moltmann-Wendel asks, adding " What would our tradition look like if it had made Peter a converted pimp? " Dillenberger rebuts the feminist for her ignorance of art (and its concomitant theology) with the comment, " She is appar·

ently not aware of the tradition in art in regard to Peter's denial and repentance, both repeatedly represented. El Greco at different times did five paintings of *St. Peter in Tears,* many of them with the same posture and general format of his *Penitent Magdalene* paintings. For Protestants of the time, Peter was the apostle who denied Christ whereas for Roman Catholics and El Greco, St. Peter was the first pope and the tears shed after his repentance became a symbol of the sacrament of confession." Putting imagery and hagiography in historical context, Dillenherger points to the popularity of repentant Magdalen themes in the seventeenth century as evidence of Catholicism's post-Tridentine reaffirmation of all seven sacraments, especially penance. Far from being sexist, such imagery is the epitome of art collaborating with dogma, and in the words of Emile Male, " Beauty consuming itself like incense burned before God in solitude, far from the eyes of men, became the most stirring image of penance conceivable."

The hook deals with secular art as well, and it compares the various canons of beauty reflected in the works of artists coming from different geographic and historical backgrounds. But the most provocative issue in Jane Dillenherger's writings comes with her defense of Abstract Expressionism as a mode for conveying the numinous in art. Pointing out that Jackson Pollock, Barnett Newman, and Mark Rothko were each called upon to design chapels, she laments that their religious works were appreciated more by the world of art than by the world of religion, giving credence to Thomas Messer's dictum that " Today the art museum is the Temple."

At the very least, Mrs. Jane Dillenberger is for our own century what Mrs. Anna Jameson was to the nineteenth-century. Jameson, an Anglican Englishwoman, traveled throughout Europe and wrote voluminously on art, reawakening in her contemporaries an appreciation for the signs and symbols found in Christian imagery. On the other hand, Professor Dillenberger has demonstrated, particularly in this book, that it is not enough to merely recapture the past if a living artistic tradition is to survive. Like the French Dominican, Pere Couturier, who stands as a pivotal figure in the *rapprochement* between artists and the church in the middle of this century, Jane Dillenberger makes a convincing argument for the educated eye discovering the spirit in new and ever-expanding forms of visual expression.

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