THE EUCHARISTIC THEOLOGIES OF *LAUDA SION* AND THOMAS AQUINAS'S *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE*

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MANY works associated with Thomas Aquinas stand both the Office and Mass for the Feast of Corpus Christi.[1] The earliest witness to this association comes from two of Thomas's Dominican brothers and younger contemporaries, Tolomeo of Lucca and William of Tocco. Around *1317* Tolomeo wrote in his *Historia Ecclesiastica:* " Thomas composed [the Corpus Christi Office] in full, including the lessons and all the parts to be recited by day or night; the Mass, too, and whatever has to be sung on the day."[2] William, in his *Historia beati Thomae* completed around 1320, lists the liturgy of Corpus Christi among Thomas's works and informs us that Thomas wrote the liturgy " at the request of Pope Urban [IV]."[3]

It is known that on August 11, 1264, Urban, in the bull *Transiturus,* declared that the Feast of Corpus Christi was to be celebrated throughout Christendom according to a "new, Roman," liturgy.[4] Thomas had returned from Paris to Italy, his

[1] This does not mean that Thomas created the liturgy for the feast *de nova.* Rather it means that Thomas selected and combined older elements from the Scriptures, the Fathers, and existing liturgies, only venturing to write from scratch those hymns and prayers necessary for expressing the theological and devotional views central to the Feast of Corpus Christi. In other words, Thomas wrote or pieced together texts " proper " to the feast and united them with the " ordinary " texts of the Mass and Office.

[2] James A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works* (Washington, D.C., 1974), p. 177.

[3] Ibid., pp. 132, 177.

[4] Ibid., pp. 179, 183. For a partial translation of the bull *Transiturus* see also Darwell Stone, *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist* (London, 1909), vol. 1, 344-46.

This "new, Roman" liturgy promulgated by Urban IV was, indeed, a new

homeland, five years before the bull was published. Furthermore, by 1264 he had developed a "warm friendship" with Urban, whom we know to have commissioned Thomas to write several works between 1261 and 1265.[5] These facts have led most scholars since the early fourteenth century to conclude that Urban's "new" liturgy was the work of Thomas.[6]

In recent years, however, Cyrille Lambot has questioned whether Thomas wrote or compiled the liturgy promulgated by Urban. He has noted that Reginald of Piperno, Thomas's amanuensis and companion from 1259 to 1274, did not include the liturgy for Corpus Christi in his list of Thomas's works. Moreover, the Dominican Order, like most Orders and dioceses, did not adopt Urban's liturgy for the Feast of Corpus Christi until 1317, when John XXII required its use throughout Western Christendom.[7] If Thomas had written the liturgy, argues

liturgy composed for the celebration of Corpus Christi. Around 1246 a certain John, a religious of Mont-Cornillon, had compiled a liturgy for the " Body of the Lord " that was in place throughout the diocese of Liege. Being so impressed by the solemnities of the Liege eucharistic celebration, Hugh of Saint-Cher, a Dominican and the cardinal legate of Germany, declared in 1252 that the feast of Corpus Christi was to be celebrated throughout the territory under his leadership. Jacques Pantaleon, the future Urban IV, knew the solemnities of Liege from his time as the city's archdeacon. It seems that upon his election as Pope, Urban was urged by many people to establish the Feast throughout Christendom. Eventually he did this with the publication of the bull *Transiturus.* For more details, see Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino,* pp. 178-79.

[5] Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino,* p. 147.

[6] The liturgy for the Feast of Corpus Christi that is associated with Thomas is not identical with the one currently used in both the Roman rite and Dominican rite. The modern texts for the Feast reflect the liturgical reforms that have occurred since Thomas's day. Notwithstanding these reforms, the Mass for the Feast *(Cibavit eos),* which includes *Lauda Sion,* has for the most part remained intact. However, the Office for the Feast has endured several changes, particularly in its night Office of Matins. For more details, see Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino,* pp. 177-78, 180-81.

[7] Because Urban IV died very soon after he promulgated *Transiturus,* his effort to establish a new liturgy for Corpus Christi throughout Western Christendom lost momentum and his bull was disregarded. Clement V (1305-1314) sought to have Urban's bull and all the laws of the Church that had been enacted since Gregory IX, and that had not yet been codified, collected into a

Lambot, certainly the Dominicans would have adopted it imme.. diately instead of waiting fifty-four years after the bull *Transiturus* was promulgated.[8]

Admitting these facts, James A. Weisheipl does not believe that Lambot's arguments against Thomas's authorship are conclusive.[9] Although it is not my purpose to rehearse the debate between these scholars, I would like to consider one piece of evidence that Weisheipl believes suggests Thomas's authorship. In his biography of the Angelic Doctor, Weisheipl writes, "The sequence *Lauda Sion* in the Mass [for Corpus Christi] is remarkable not only for its poetry, but also for its theological content; the individual stanzas can easily be aligned with the Eucharistic teaching of Thomas as found in the third part of his *Summa theologiae."*[10] In this paper I will examine whether the Eucharistic thought in *Lauda Sion* parallels that in the *Summa.*[11]

I

Like all medieval sequences, *Lauda Sion* appears in conjunc-

single *Constitution.* Before the project was completed, death visited Clement. However, his successor, John XXII, completed the project and in 1317 promulgated the *Constitution,* which included Urban's *Transiturus.* See Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino,* p. 183.

·s See Cyrille Lambot, "L'office de la Fete-Dieu. Aperc;us nouveaux sur ses origines," *Revue benedictine* 54 (1942), 61-123. See also Cyrille Lambot and I. Fransen, *L'office de la Fete-Dieii primitive: Textes et melodies restroves* (:M:aredsous,1946).

[9] Ibid., p. 183. For a similar opinion see William R. Bonniwell, *A History of the Dominican Liturgy 1215-1945* (New York, 1945), 241, especially note 44.

[10] Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino,* pp. 180-81.

[11] For discussion of Thomas's theology and other liturgical items in the Office and :M:ass for the Feast of Corpus Christi, see the following works: William R. Crockett, *Eucharist: Symbol of Transformation* (New York, 1989), pp. 115-16; Pierre-:M:arie Gy, "L'office du Corpus Christi et la theologie des accidents eucharistiques," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 66 (1982), 81-86; id., "L'office du Corpus Christi et S. Thomas d'Aquin, Etat d'une recherche," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 64 (1980), 491-507; and W. D. Loring, "Altar and Throne: A Study of Eucharistic Theology and the Vision of God in St. Thomas Aquinas," *Anglican Theological Review* 52 (1970), 97-102.

tion with the Alleluia of the Mass.[12] Unlike the some 4,500 sequences written in the Middle Ages that the Council of Trent (1545-63) banned from the Catholic liturgy, *Lauda Sion* was one of four sequences that survived the liturgical reforms.[13] Perhaps the Council did not abolish *Lauda Sion* because it believed that the revered St. Thomas had written the work. This, plus the fact that *Lauda Sion* is a" sublime didactic poem on the Holy Eucharist," [14] almost certainly kept the Council from casting it aside.

Lauda Sion has twelve stanzas. Stanzas 1 through 9 have six lines each, stanzas 10 and 11 have eight lines each, and the last stanza has ten.[15] (See the sequence with English translation ap-

[12] The sequence is not an easily defined composition. Indeed, musicologists are divided over its origin and early development. By Thomas's time it was basically a hymn-like Latin sacred poem, with regular patterns of both meter and rhyme, set to a preexistent melody. This melody was most often derived from an untexted portion of the Alleluia chant sung at Mass. For more information on the medieval sequence see Richard H. Hoppin, *Medieval Music* (New York, 1978), pp. 154-71 and Willi Apel, *Gregorian Chant (Bloomington,* 1958), pp. 442-64.

[13] Most of the medieval sequences that are extant can be found in vols. 7-10, 24, 37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 53-55 of *Analecta Hymnica Medii Aevi,* 55 vols. (Leipzig, 1886-1922; reprinted, New York and London, 1961).

The three sequences besides *Lauda Sion* not abolished by the Council are: (1) *Victimae paschali laudes* (by Wipo Burgundy, d. c. 1048) for Easter; (2) *Veni sancte Spiritus* (variously ascribed to King Robert the Pious, d. 1031; Innocent III, d. 1216; and to Stephen Langton, archbishop of Canterbury, d. 1228) for Pentecost; and (3) *Dies irae* (attributed to Thomas a Celano, d. c. 1250) for the Mass for the Dead. In 1727 a fifth sequence was adopted for liturgical use, *Stabat Mater* (the text variously ascribed to Jacopone da Todi, d. 1306; Innocent III; St. Bonaventura, d. 1274; et la.) for the Feast of the Seven Dolours; see Apel, *Gregorian Chant,* p. 463.

[14] Joseph A. Jungmann, S. J., *Missarum Sollemnia,* 2 vols. 1948; English translation *The Mass of the Roman Rite: Its Origins and Development,* 2 vols. (New York, 1951-55; repr. Westminster, 1986), vol. 1, p. 438.

[15] *Lauda Sion* is an exact metrical copy of Adam of St. Victor's sequence *Lauda crucis attollamus.* It is clear that whoever wrote *Lauda Sion* used Adam's sequence as a model. For a discussion of the rhyme and meter of *Lauda crucis* and *Lauda Sion* see Joseph Connelly, *Hymns of the Roman Liturgy* (London, 1957), p. 125. With the exception of two lines (which are found elsewhere), *Lauda Sion* also employs the same melody as *Lauda crucis.* This melody is derived from the second alleluia of the Feast for the Finding

pended to this paper.) Viewed broadly, the sequence divides rather unevenly into three parts. In the first five stanzas the Church is invited to join in remembering the first Holy Supper at which Christ gave His living and life-giving substance to His apostles. Stanzas 6 through 11 bring the past into the present. These six stanzas elaborate a rather lengthy and tedious lesson on Christ's presence in the bread and wine. The sequence ends with a one-stanza prayer asking Christ not only to feed His people in the present but also to make them " table-fellows " with Him and all the holy citizens of heaven in the future.

Looking more closely at part one, we can observe that the sequence begins by calling Sion, the Church, to laud its Christ as the new Passover (Stanza 4). "Today," the first Thursday after Trinity Sunday, is Corpus Christi. Upon this solemn festival day the Church commemorates the Lord's institution and gift of the" living and life-giving bread" (stanza 2). Stanza 11, which concludes the middle section's lesson on the manner of Christ's presence in the elements, expands on this notion of Christ the bread. It teaches that Christ is "the bread of angels" who was foreshadowed in Old Testament figures. Isaac was Abraham's offering to God. At Passover the Jews sacrificed a lamb without spot or blemish for their sins. And God nourished His hungry people with heavenly manna. Each of these figures or types point toward Christ, who is the fulfillment of them all. Christ is the new Passover (stanza 4). He displaces the old Passover as " reality puts to flight the shadow " and " light banishes darkness." Here the sequence places the present Eucharistic celebration within the framework of the historical acts of God, affirming that Christ is the center of redemptive history.

Part one of the sequence further reveals that the facts of this redemptive history are commemorated in the holy supper that Christ Himself instituted on the eve of his passion. At this supper the Savior described Himself to the twelve apostles as one who was about to be sacrificed. Thereby he fulfilled Old Testa-

of the Cross; see Apel, *Gregorian Chant,* p. 646. Clearly, it is a mistake to think that Thomas Aquinas wrote both the text and music of *Lauda Sion.* He may have written the poem, but he did not compose the music for *Lauda Sion.*

ment figures : He was the true Isaac, the true Passover lamb without blemish or spot that takes away the sins of the world, and the true manna from heaven that gives nourishment and eternal life to all believers. Christ enjoined His apostles to repeat the supper in His memory until He returns. This the Church does in every Mass, especially the Feast of Corpus Christi.

The sequence is quite dear that the divine victim (*hostiam)* is present in the elements. Therefore, one can rightly speak of a Eucharistic sacrifice. Indeed, the idea of Eucharistic sacrifice that *Lauda Sion* suggests is entirely in accord with Augustine and the patristic tradition as as the late Middle Ages: The Eucharist is a sacrifice in as much as it is a memorial, an *anamnesis,* of the sacrifice of Christ. It is more than a mere remembrance of a past event; and, moreover, it is not a new sacrifice or a repetition of the sacrifice of the cross. The Eucharist " is the sacramental or liturgical celebration of that which took place once for all in the past in order that the present community of believers can participate in its redemptive reality." [16]

It is impossible to glance at *Lauda Sion* without recognizing its preoccupation with Eucharistic presence. Five stanzas (6 through 10) elaborate on the nature of Christ's presence. Stanzas 5 and 6 teach that following the consecration, " the bread is changed *[transit]* into flesh and wine into blood." To the senses the elements remain as they were before the consecration, namely, bread and wine. The bread and wine still feel, taste, and look like bread and wine, but faith knows better. Faith knows that the species are only signs of " hidden extaordinary realities " that lie under the bread and wine (stanzas 6 and 7). " Flesh is bread and blood is drink" (stanza *7).* Thus, in thirteenth-century theological language, upon consecration the "substance "-the reality that underlies the material elements-of the bread and wine miraculously changes into the substance of Christ's risen and glorified body and blood, while all the "accidents "-mate-

[16] William R. Crockett, *Eucharist: Symbol of Transformation* (New York, 1989)' p. 95.

rial qualities and chemical properties-of the bread and wine remain intact. The inner reality of the bread and wine is Christ himself, whereas the elements' outer reality continues to taste, smell, feel, and look as before consecration. *Lauda Sion,* therefore, does not only affirm that Christ himself is present in the elements but explains His presence in terms of the doctrine of transubstantiation.

The notion that the relationship between the elements of bread and wine and Christ's presence in them can be explained in terms of a " change " is not unique to *Lauda Sion* or the Middle Ages. As early as the fourth century Fathers in the East and West articulated this " conversionist " conception of Eucharistic presence. Ambrose was particularly instrumental in introducing the language of change into the Eucharist vocabulary of the western Church. According to his thought, upon consecration the elements are changed so as to mediate Christ's presence to the communicant. Thus, before consecration one reality is signified: bread and wine. However, after consecration, another reality is signified: the body and blood of Christ. The sign (*signum)* and the reality *(res)* have virtually become one.[17]

Existing side by side with this conversionist interpretation is the " symbolic " interpretation. Taught also by Ambrose, this interpretation's most famous exponent was Augustine. Drawing on Platonism, Augustine distinguished between two levels in the sacrament. First, there is the level of the senses, where the communicant perceives the bread and wine. Second, these elements are " symbols " or " signs " that signify another level : the reality of Christ's body and blood. Although not perceived by the senses, this reality is known by the mind and by faith. The second level is the true reality of the Eucharist. The sacramental signs do not only point to this reality; they represent and make it present. Thus to partake of the symbols of bread and wine is to " participate" in the transcendent world that lies behind the world of sense-experience. Augustine means that Christ's body and blood are not merely " represented " by the signs (in the sense

[17] Ibid., pp. 96-97.

of signs as substitutes) : they are mediated by the unity between the sign and the thing signified. This mediation occurs through the dialectic relation of symbol and reality, whereby a symbol essentially *is* that which it represents. In this view there is no need for a change of the elements' nature, for Christ is already present in (behind) the sign.[18]

These two concepts of Eucharistic presence continued well into the Middle Ages, when Ambrose's conversionist notion eventually prevailed over Augustine's symbolic interpretation. By the early thirteenth century the conversionist concept was called *transubstantiatio* and was accepted as the definitive explanation of Christ's presence in the bread and wine. Indeed, in 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council defined it as a dogma of the Church.[19]

With the acceptance of transubstantiation, the medieval church increasingly believed that it must take great care to prevent any profanation of the elements. The church particularly feared that some of the wine would spill as the cup was given to the laity. Gradually, therefore, priests gave only the bread to the laity and they alone received both the br·ead and wine.[20] As seen from the perspective of the communing laity, *Lauda Sion* assures communicants that, though the two elements are consecrated separately, Christ has not been divided. His whole person is equally and " totally under each species " (stanza 7). Thus the communicant can know that he or she is partaking of " the complete Christ-uncut, unbroken, and undivided " (stanza 8).

Furthermore, the sequence teaches that Christ is not spatially extended under the sacramental appearances in such a way that He is divided into as many pieces as the host is broken. He is whole in every part, both before and after fraction. The idea is presented in both stanzas 8 and 10. In the former the communicant is told that " [whether] received by one, [or] received by a

1s Ibid., pp. 78-98.

19 Ibid., p. 118. For an account of the late Medieval history of the doctrine of transubstantiation, see James F. McCue, "The Doctrine of Transubstantiation from Berengar through Trent: The Point at Issue," *Harvard Theological Review* 61 (1968), 385-430.

20 Jungmann, *Missarum SoUemnia,* vol. 2, 385,

thousand, the quantity [of Christ] received by the one is as much as the thousand." Perhaps here the focus is on the number of recipients and the concern that a great number of communicants might diminish Christ and thus diminish the efficacy of the sacrament. Stanza 10 is likewise concerned with the diminution of Christ, but from the perspective of the fractured host. It assures communicants that:

At last, when the sacrament is broken,
have no doubt, but remember that
there is as much [of Christ] in a fragment as
in the whole.
There is no rending of the reality,
only a fracturing of the sign,
which diminishes neither
the state nor stature of the one
signified.

Although *Lauda Sion* insists that the whole living and risen Christ is received under each species, it does not explain *how* all of Christ is present under each of them. Rather, the sequence simply seems intent upon arguing that Christ is really and wholly present under the bread and under the wine. This emphasis. on the " whole " presence is not unique. " Since Anselm of Laon (d. 1117) and William of Champeaux (d. 1121)," writes Jungmann, " theological teaching had become more clear and precise, namely that in the Sacrament not only were the Body or the Blood of Christ present, but the whole Christ, *totus Christus,* was present." [21] However, it was not until the thirteenth century, when Thomas Aquinas articulated his theory of " natural concomitance," that the medieval church arrived at the " classic exposition" of how the whole Christ is present under each species.[22]

Before we look at Thomas's theory, we must complete our analysis of the sequence's teaching about the Eucharist. Stanza 9 argues that Christ's presence is so objective that both good and

21 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 118.

211 See Alan Richardson and John Bowden, *The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology* (Philadelphia, 1983), s.v. "Concomitance," by E. J. Yarnold.

bad communicants receive Him. (The sequence does not describe exactly who the good and bad are.) However, the two do not receive Christ with the same effect. "To the bad it is death, to the good it is life." Undoubtedly, the bad are guilty, as Paul says, "of profaning the body and blood of the Lord" (I Corinthians 11 :27). For late medieval people the seriousness of this evil act was profound, for they did not believe that the bad merely abuse a representation of Christ; the bad also desecrate the literal body and blood of Christ. It was for this reason above all others that bad communicants grew weak, ill, and died. The good, on the other hand, receive the same " living and lifegiving bread " that Christ gave to the twelve apostles. This is the " bread of angels " that has " become the food of the pilgrims [*viatorum]"* (stanza 11).

Whereas stanza 11 speaks of the bread that has come from heaven to the pilgrim, the final stanza shifts the pilgrim's attention toward heaven, the "land of the living." Here *Lauda Sion* brings out the future or eschatological dimension of the Eucharist. The pilgrim prays, " Make us Your table-fellows there in heaven." The sequence suggests that the sacrament prefigures a supper yet to come. It directs the communicant's faith and hope beyond the present to a future day when all of Christ's pilgrims will sit at table together.[23]

Having closely examined the Eucharistic teaching of *Lauda Sion,* we have seen that the Mass, as a commemoration and representation of the Lord's passion, is indeed a sacrifice in as much as it celebrates the *anamniesis* of Christ's words of self-sacrifice at the Last Supper. Moreover, we have seen that *Lauda Sion* is preoccupied with Christ's presence in the Mass, explaining that presence by means of the doctrine of transubstantiation. The Mass, teaches the sequence, is of present significance because Christ communicates His living and life-giving body and blood to all " good " communicants who receive the bread and wine in faith. Thus the Mass has more than just a commemorative and

[23] Geoffrey Wainwright, *Eucharist and Eschatology* (London, Erworth Press, 1971), p. 53.

psychological significance-it communicates grace and spiritual life to the good recipient.

II

In his *Summa theologiae* Thomas Aquinas takes up the topic of the Eucharist in part three, questions 73-83. A brief survey of these questions reveals the breadth of his concern. The Angelic Doctor treats in scholastic fashion the subjects of "The sacramentality of the Eucharist," "The Matter of this Sacrament," "The First Eucharist," "The Minister of This Sacrament," etc. Furthermore, he devotes three questions with eight articles each to the theory of the transubstantiation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ.

Under question *73,* article 4, Thomas asserts that the sacrament points to the past, present, and future and therefore is called by many names. Becaus·e it commemorates the past passion of Christ, it is called a "sacrifice." In regard to the present, the sacrament points to " the unity of the Church " and thus is rightly called " *communio* " and " *syna:ris."* In its future dimension the sacrament" prefigures the enjoyment of God that will be ours in heaven." " Because it keeps us on the way to heaven," says Thomas, the sacrament is correctly called " *viaticum."* Thomas believes that the sacrament is also appropriately called " eucharist " and " *metalepsis* " (" taking to oneself ") .

Thomas says quite clearly that the holy supper is a sacrifice because it commemorates the past passion of Christ. The modern reader may be looking for some explanation as to how the mass is (always) a sacrifice. In other words, he or she may be wondering whether Thomas and *Lauda Sion* teach that Christ's body is literally re-killed on the altar. Thomas treats the subject of sacrifice generally under the virtue of justice in the *secunda secundae,* question 85.[24] Here, Thomas seeks to show that sacri-

[24] See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* vol. 39, *Religion and Worship: 2a2ae. 80-91* (Blackfriars translation), Introduction, Notes, and Glossary by Kevin D. O'Rourke (New York, 1964). In Appendix 4 (p. 262), we are told that "in the *Commentary on the Sentences* there is only a single article (III.

fice is an act of religion. He focuses almost exclusively on the act of offering, giving almost no consideration to either the person making the offering or the thing offered. Essentially Thomas argues that, although sacrifice may be revealed through external acts of religion, such as offering animals or eating bread, it is fundamentally an internal act. Sacrifice is ultimately an internal offering of one's self to God.[25]

In his discussion of Christ's passion Thomas says that the term " sacrifice " is correctly applied to " something done that is properly due to God for His honor to appease Him." He then quotes with approval Augustine's remark that "a true sacrifice is every work which is performed in order that in holy fellowship we may cleave to God, that is, which is related to the end of goodness in which alone we can be truly blessed." Now Christ, Thomas continues, " offered himself in suffering for us, and this very work, that he voluntarily bore suffering, was in the highest degree accepted by God, inasmuch as it proceeded from charity. Hence," concludes Thomas, "it is manifest that the passion of Christ was a true sacrifice."[26] Thus Thomas is quite clear that Christ's passion was a manifestation of His love for God and humanity, and a sacrifice for the sins of human race.

Having established that Christ's passion was a sacrifice, Thomas continues in the third part of the *Summa* to consider the relationship between Christ's passion and the Eucharist. Thomas is quite clear that the sacrament " commemorates the passion of our Lord"[27] and "represents the passion of Christ."[28]

9.I.I), composed of four *quaestiunculae,* devoted to the general concept of '!atria', of which sacrifice is an external act; there sacrifice receives only passing consideration. The *Summa Contra Gentiles* similarly offers no development and sacrifice is only touched on in considering that the human mind must employ things of sense in order to communicate with God (III, 119-121)." Also, Thomas hardly, if at all, mentions the subject of sacrifice in his discussion of the Eucharist in Book 4, chapters 61-69 of *Summa Contra Gentiles.* Here, as in the *Summa theologiae,* the Angelic Doctor's. thought is caught up in the exposition of Christ's real presence in the Eucharist.

25 *Summa Theologiae* (hereafter cited in notes as ST) 11-11 q.83 a.3 and a.4.

2a ST III q.48 a.3.

21 ST III q.73 a.4. See also ST III q.74 a.l.

2s ST III q.73 a.4. See also ST III q.76 a.2; q.3 a.2 and a.4.

It is the "memorial of the passion of our Lord"[29] and "a figure and an example which portrays the Lord's Passion."[30] Therefore, he concludes that "the Eucharist is at once a sacrifice and a sacrament."[31] Undoubtedly, in Thomas's mind the Eucharist is a sacrifice inasmuch as it points to Christ's past passion. Are we therefore to understand that the Eucharist is only a commemoration and not an actualization in the present of the sacrifice of the cross?

Thomas seems to have anticipated our question. In the third part of the *Summa,* question 83, article 1, he asks, "Is Christ sacrificed (*immoletur)* in this sacrament?" Yes, he answers, and for two reasons. Drawing on the authority of Augustine and Ambrose (actually, John Chrysostom), Thomas gives the first reason as follows:

> [This sacrament is called the sacrifice of Christ] because, as Augustine writes, "Images are called by the names of the things of which they are images, thus looking at a picture or fresco we say, That is Cicero, or, That is Sallust." Now, as we have said, the celebration of this sacrament is a definite image representing Christ's Passion, which is his true sacrifice. Hence [,] Ambrose writes on Hebrews, "In Christ was offered once a sacrifice potent for eternal salvation. What do we do? Is it not to offer it everyday, yet for the recalling of his death?"

Clearly Thomas believes that Christ's sacrifice on the cross was offered once for all and cannot be repeated. He nevertheless says that Christ is sacrificed every time the Mass is celebrated. He can affirm both of these beliefs on exactly the same basis as Augustine. Because the sacrament is an *image* of the reality it signifies, it can, according to Platonistic reasoning, be called by the name of the reality it signifies. Therefore, as an image or symbol of Christ's passion, it does not merely point back to His past sufferings, representing something apart from the symbol itself. That is precisely the way modern culture is inclined to

[29] ST III q.73 a.5; See also ST III q.76 a.2.
[30] ST III q.83 a.2.
[31] ST III q.79 a.5 and a.7.

understand a symbol. In ancient culture and in Thomas's understanding, a symbol participates in that which it represents so much that the symbol can almost be said to be that which it represents. In this thought there is little distinction between symbol and reality. " The symbol is the presence of that which it represents and mediates participation in that reality." [82]

Secondly, Thomas quotes the Secret for the Ninth Sunday after Pentecost as an authority for his belief that the sacrament is rightly called the sacrifice of Christ. The prayer affirms that " whenever the commemoration of this sacrifice is celebrated the work of our redemption is carried on." Though Thomas could have easily interpreted this text as an affirmation that each Mass is itself a propitiatory sacrifice, he did not. Rather, he interprets the prayer to mean that the Mass is a sacrifice " in respect of the effect of Christ's passion." And he adds, "By the sacrament we are made sharers of the fruit of the Lord's Passion." The Eucharist mediates the benefits of Christ's passion.

Thomas discusses the effects, or fruits, of Christ's passion at length in question *79.* As we shall see more fully below, the sacrament affords forgiveness of venial sins and unconscious mortal sins.[83] Moreover, the sacrament gives the Christian spiritual strength. Thomas writes, " This sacrament does for the life of the spirit all that material food and drink does for the life of the body by sustaining, building up, restoring, and contenting." [34]

We have noted that *Lauda SionJ,* too, teaches that the Eucharist is a sacrifice. Like Thomas, the sequence does not detail this teaching. This comes as no great surprise because the subject of Eucharistic sacrifice was not a controversial issue before the sixteenth century. Until then, most everyone assumed that the Mass was a sacrifice, and so there was no need to discuss the topic at length.[35] Just as the medieval church accepted the atoning power

a2 Crockett, *Eucharist,* p. 80.
33 ST III q.79 a.3 and a.4.
34 ST III q.79 a.1.
35 Crockett, *Eucharist,* p. 120.

of Christ's death and lacked a fully formulated explanalion of the atonement, so the Church believed the Mass to be a sacrifice.

Though Thomas's teaching on Eucharistic sacrifice is less than what some of his modern readers might expect, his treatment of Eucharistic presence is elaborate and clear. When the priest says, "This is my body," or "This is the chalice of my blood," he is not merely repeating the words of Christ or reporting what Christ said, argues Thomas; [36] he is pointing to the body or the blood of Christ that exists upon consecration under the sacramental species. Like *Lauda Sion,* Thomas is emphatic " that the real body of Christ and his blood are in this sacrament." [37]

Thomas asserts that the substances of bread and wine are not " annihilated " or simply reduced to " a more elementary kind of matter." Rather, upon consecration, he argues, "the complete substance of bread is converted into the complete substance of Christ's body, and the complete substance of the wine ·into the complete substance of Christ's blood." Hence the change is not a "formal change, but a substantial one." Thomas agrees with *Lauda Sion* that such a change " is outside the ordinary course of nature." [38] Therefore, he concludes that "it [the change] can be called by a name proper to itself-' transubstantiation." [39]

Equally like the sequence, Thomas insists that the real presence is known only by faith. Both the *Summa* and *Lauda Sion* teach that, if communicants were to rely only upon their senses, they would never know that the substance of bread has been entirely transubstantiated into the substance of Christ's body, because the appearance or " accidents " of the bread and wine remain as they were befor·e the consecration. Though the bread still tastes, smells, feels, and looks like bread, faith accepts that Christ's substance is under the species.[40]

Thomas also asserts that " our Catholic faith makes it absolutely necessary to profess that the *whole* Christ, *totus Christus,* is in

36 ST III q.78 a.1-6.
81 ST III q.75 a.l.
ss Stanza 6; compare with ST III q.75 a.5.
39 ST III q.75 a.3.
40 See ST III q.75 a.1 and *Lauda Sion* stanza 6.

this sacrament "[41] (my emphasis). By " whole," he means not only Christ's body and blood, but also His soul and Godhead (*divinitatem).* But how is the whole Christ under each of the sacramental species? In the case of the bread, Thomas argues that while it is changed into Christ's body by virtue of consecration, Christ's soul, divinity, and blood are present with the consecrated bread by "a natural concomitance."[42] Essentially Thomas believes that Christ's soul, divinity, and blood are present because they simply cannot be separated from Christ's body. Though at Christ's death the soul and the blood were separated from His body for three days, the two have been forever reunited.[43] As for Christ's divinity, it was never separated from the body; the two were " taken up into hypostatic union " never to be separated.[44] Christ's soul, divinity, and body are also equally present with the consecrated wine by concomitance.

If Thomas did indeed write *Lauda Sion,* one wonders why he did not draw on this notion of concomitance to explain how the whole Christ is equally in each species, and equally in one or a thousand hosts. It is most certain that the author of the sequence believed that anyone partaking only of the bread receives, nonetheless, the *totus Christus.* However, ther·e is no clear evidence in the sequence that he taught the notion of concomitance that we find in Thomas' s *Summa.*

Like *Lauda Sion,* Thomas also teaches that Oirist is not spatially extended under the sacramental appearances in such a way that a portion of Him is in one part of the host and another portion in another. He is equally under each and every part of the host, even before the priest divides it.[45] Furthermore, when fraction takes place, it is not " the actual body of Christ which is

41 ST III q.76 a.1.

42 ST III q.76 a.2.

43 Thomas does argue that if the sacrament could have been celebrated at the time of Christ's death, "under the species of bread would have been the body of Christ without His blood, and under the species of wine would have been His blood without His body"; ST III q.76 a.2.

44 ST III q.76 a.l.

45 ST III q.76 a.3.

broken." This is so for two reasons. " First, it is outside all change and we can do nothing to it. Second, it is present in all its completeness under every part of the quantity [of the sacramental species]." Therefore, Thomas concludes that "the fraction takes place in the dimensive quantity of the bread, where all the other accidents also find their subject." [46] Thus, when the fraction takes place, the sacramental species, not the body of Christ, is divided up. Undoubtedly, Thomas agrees with *Lauda Sion* that when the host is broken, " there is no rending of reality, only a fracturing of the sign." [47]

It is clear that both *Lauda Sion* and Thomas insist that Christ is truly and substantially present in the Eucharistic elements. Further, they both affirm, with the orthodox medieval tradition that culminated at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, that the objective presence of Christ in the Eucharist does not depend on the inner condition of communicants. Such an assumption raised a rather knotty problem for thirteenth-century theologians. In John L. Farthing's words, "Does the real presence of Christ imply that His body and blood may be consumed not only by sinners or unbelievers (*manducatio peccatorum aut infidelium)* but even by a dumb animal who by chance eats bread that has been duly consecrated (*manducatio brutorum)* ?" [48]

Thomas deals with both the problem of the *manducatio brutorum* and the *manducatio peccatorum* in considerable detail. He claims that Christ remains corporeally in the consecrated species for as long as the accidents of bread and wine remain. [49] This opinion makes the question of *manducatio brutorum* particularly pressing. As Farthing has noted,

46 ST III q.77 a.7. Thomas defines dimensive quantity as "the very first accident which affects a material thing." He adds " that all other accidents cling to this first accident"; ST III q.77 a.2.

47 Stanza 10.

48 John L. Farthing, *Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Biel: Interpretations of St. Thomas Aquinas in German Nominalism on the Eve of the Reformation* (Durham, 1988), p. 125.

49 ST III q.76 a.6; q. 77 a.4 and a.5; q.83 a.6.

Proper care or disposition of the consecrated host becomes a matter of great concern if the host is not entirely consumed by the faithful, for the body of Christ will be contained in even a crumb of the consecrated matter so long as it exhibits the species proper to bread. And if that crumb should find its way into the stomach of a church mouse, the true body of Christ will have been eaten by a mouse.[50]

Thomas would most certainly have agreed with Farthing's scenario. He writes, "Even were a mouse or dog to eat the consecrated host, the substance of Christ's body would not cease to be under the species so long as the substance of bread remained." Though in point of fact the body of Christ is consumed, Thomas adds, the animal does not eat Christ's body sacramentally because the mouse or dog "is not of a nature to use it as a sacrament."[51] Even angels lack the nature to receive Christ sacramentally; they receive Him "spiritually by being united to Him in clear vision and enjoyment of perfect charity."[52] Human beings, however, do have the necessary nature; indeed, they alone of God's creatures are capable of receiving Christ's body and blood under sacrament.

Lauda Sion says little or nothing about the *manducatio brutorum.* In passing it declares that the sacrament is for the pilgrim and is therefore "not to be cast to dogs."[53] This is probably an allusion to Jesus' commandment "Do not give dogs what is holy!" (Matthew 7:6). Thomas brings up this verse in discussing whether a priest should deny the body of Christ to a sinner who asks for it. He concludes that the sacrament should not be given to "dogs, that is to notorious sinners."[54] Perhaps the sequence is contrasting pilgrims with both literal dogs (*manducatio brutorum*) and Thomas's metaphorical dogs (*manducatio peccatorum*).

As the body of Christ does not cease to be present when a mouse eats a host, so, argues Thomas, it does not cease to be

50 Farthing, *Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Biel,* p. 125.
51 ST III q.80 a.3.
52 ST III q.80 a.2.
53 Stanza 11.
54 ST III q.80 a.6.

present when a host touches the lips or teeth of a sinner. Rather, the consecrated bread remains in "bad" people as long as it stays in "good"-" until digested by natural heat.... Hence," writes Thomas, "it must be said that sinners, and not merely the just, can receive Christ's body sacramentally."[55] Here the Angelic Doctor is once again driving home his point that the substance of Christ's body is objectively present in the consecrated host for as long as the species of bread would have remained, had it not been transubstantiated. Thus, the unworthiness of a *manducatio peccatorum* cannot sever the union between the sacramental species and the reality of Christ's corporeal presence. If the sinner partakes of the sacrament, he or she receives the body and blood of Christ.

We have seen that *Lauda Sion,* too, will have nothing of the notion that Christ is any less under the species received by the "bad" people than by the "good." It tersely affirms that "the good and the bad receive Him."[56] " Each receives the same [Christ], but," adds stanza 9, "with different results." "To the bad it is death, to the good it is life." The good receive Christ "to life" and the bad "to death."

Thomas agrees that the good and bad partake of Christ with different results. But unlike the sequence, he is much more careful to explain what distinguishes the "good" communicant, who receives life, from the "bad," who receives death. Thomas argues that the "good" includes a lot of people, people who both ignorantly and consciously commit venial sins and even those who ignorantly commit mortal sin.[51] The term also includes people who commit "public" sins as well as those who commit "private" sins.[58] Essentially Thomas argues that nothing prevents one from receiving the grace of the Eucharist except the fully conscious commitment of mortal sin.[59]

55 ST III q.80 a.3.
56 Stanza 9.
51 ST III q.79 a.3.
58 ST III q.80 a.6.
59 ST III q.79 a.3.

Such mortal sin places a further obstacle between the communicant and the grace of the sacrament. That obstacle, argues Thomas, is the sin of unbelief. This heart of unbelief " cuts off at root a person from the unity of the Church [and] makes him utterly unfit to receive this sacrament." [60] Therefore, if a sinner receives the sacrament, he or she " acts a falsehood, and is guilty of sacrilege as a violation of the sacrament, and accordingly sins mortally." [61] Thus, such a communicant appropriately earns the opprobrious epithet "bad." Though forgiveness is available (through penance) to such bad people, they are cut off from the life-giving effects of the supper until the impediments of mortal sin are removed. They are " not spiritually alive," Thomas writes; they are "dead in sin." [62] And if they persist in their sin, they will remain forever cut off from Christ, the fount of life and forgiver of sins.

Though when misused the Eucharist yields death, when used properly it transforms communicants by joining them to Christ in a union of fervent love. Thus he describes consecrated bread and wine as " spiritual nourishment" and " spiritual food and drink." [63] Furthermore, when considered in itself, the sacrament derives from the power of Christ's passion the power to forgive all past sins. However, Thomas is quick to point out that when considered in relation to the recipient, the sacrament's effect may be blocked by an obstacle. As we have seen, this obstacle is an unforgiven mortal sin of which one is aware even while communing.[64]

The *Summa* and *Lauda Sion* agree that the Old Testament manna signified the living and life-giving bread of the sacrament. Both also teach that Christ's body and blood not only sustain the pilgrim (*viatorum)* in the present, they also " keep [him or her] on the way to heaven." [65] Therefore, argues Thomas, the

60 ST III q.80 a.4.
61 ST III q.80 a.4.
62 ST III q.79 a.3.
63 ST III q.79 a.1 and a.2.
64 ST III q.79 a.3. Here Thomas is articulating the distinction between the efficacy of the sacrament *es opere operato* and *ex op-ere operantis.*
65 ST III q.73 a.4.

sacrament is correctly called *viaticum.* This *viaticum* prefigures the enjoyment of God that will be the viator's in heaven.

III

In conclusion, the Eucharistic thought expressed in the sequence *Lauda Sion* is, as James A. Weisheipl argues, very much like that found in Saint Thomas's *Summa theologiae.* As we have seen, the two works have a common emphasis on Christ's presence in the sacrament. They explain this presence in terms of the doctrine of transubstantiation. Both works are clear that the Mass commemorates Christ's passion and mediates His saving presence to all who participate in His passion through the signs of bread and wine. While the Eucharist is understood in both works to have this past dimension, it also has present and future significance. In the present, Christ is in the bread and wine communicating His live-giving substance to the faithful. This substance strengthens the pilgrim as he or she journeys toward heaven. There, in heaven, the pilgrims will sit at table with Christ and the other saints and partake of the ultimate banquet.

Our study has not revealed anything that seriously undermines the tradition that Thomas wrote *Lauda Sion.* Notwithstanding the absence of the notion of concomitance in *Lauda Sion,* there is indeed a remarkable parallel between the Eucharistic thought expressed in the sequence and the *Summa.* This parallel in and of itself does not necessarily establish that Thomas wrote the sequence, but it does add more credibility to the testimony of Thomas's contemporaries Tolomeo and William, who both bore witness to Thomas writing the liturgy for the Feast of Corpus Christi.[66]

Looda Sion

Lauda Sion salvatorem,	Praise, Sion, the Savior,
Lauda ducem et pastorem	Praise the Leader and the Shepherd
In hymnis et canticis.	In hymns and canticles I
Quantum potes, tantum aude,	Dare to praise Him as much as you can,
Quia major omni laude	for He is beyond all praising and you will
Nee laudare sufficis.	never be able to praise Him sufficiently.

[66] I wish to thank Professors David C. Steinmetz, Susan A. Keefe, and Geoffrey Wainwright, as well as Byron D. Stuhlman, for their invaluable suggestions and comments on several drafts of this essay.

Landis thema specialis,
Panis vivus et vitalis,
Hodie proponitur :
Quern in sacrae mensa cenae
Turbae fratrum duodenae
Datum non ambigitur.

A theme of special praise,
the living and lifegiving bread,
is put before us today :
The one who at the table of the holy supper
was given to the twelve apostles,
without any doubt.

Sit laus plena, sit sonora,
Sit jucunda, sit decora
Mentis jubilatio.
Dies enim solemnis agitur
In qua mensae prima
recolitur
Hujus institutio.

Let praise be a full, let it be a resounding.
let it be a delightful, let it be a beautiful
shout of joy.
For the solemn day is being observed
upon which the first of the tables of this
institution is remembered.

In hac mensa novi regis
Novum pascha novae legis
Phase vetus terminat.
Vetustatem novitas,
Umbram fugat veritas,
Noctem lux eliminat.

On this table of the new King
the new passover of the new law
put an end to the old passover.
The new displaces the old,
reality the shadow,
light banishes night.

Quod in cena Christus gessit
Faciendum hoc expressit
In sui memoriam.
Docti sacris institutis
Panem, vinum in salutis
Consecramus hostiam.

What Christ did at the supper
this He said should (must) be done
in memory of Him.
Taught by His holy words of instructions,
we consecrate bread and wine in a sacrifice
of salvation.

Dogma datur Christianis
Quod in carnem transit panis
Et vinum in sanguinem.
Quod non capis, quod non
vides,
Animosa firmat fides,
Praeter rerum ordinem.

The dogma is given to Christians that the
bread is changed into flesh
and the wine into blood.
That which you cannot understand, that
which you do not see,
living faith affirms,
it is beyond the ordinary course of things.

Sub diversis speciebus,
Signis tantum et non rebus,
Latent res eximiae.
Caro cibus, sanguis potus,
Manet tamen Christus totus
Sub utraque specie.

Under the different species,
in the signs only and not the things,
there lie hidden extraordinary things.
Flesh is food, blood is drink ;
And nevertheless the whole Christ remains
under each species.

A sumente non concisus,
Non confractus, non divisus,
Integer accipitur.
Sumit unus, sumunt mille,
Quantum isti, tantum ille,
Nee sumptus consumitur.

The communicant receives the complete
Christ-uncut, unbroken, and undivided.
[Whether] one consumes, [or] a
thousand consume,
the quantity of this one is as much as
that one,
Nor is it diminished by being consumed.

Sumunt bani, sumunt mali,	The good consume and the bad consume,
Sorte tamen inaequali	but with different lots:
Vitae vel interitus.	life or death.
Mors est malis, vita bonis,	To the bad it is death, to the good it is life,
Vide paris sumptionis	See these equally taking [yet]
Quam sit dispar exitus.	how disparate is their dying.
Fracto demun sacramento	At last, when the sacrament is broken,
Ne vacilles, sed memento	have no doubt, but remember
Tantum esse sub fragmento	that there is as much [of Christ] in a fragment
Quantum toto tegitur.	as in the whole.
Nulla rei fit scissura,	There is no rending of the thing (signified),
Signi tantum fit fractura,	only a fracturing of the sign, which
Qua nee status nee statura	diminishes neither the state nor stature of
Signati minuitur.	the one signified.
Ecce panis angelorum	Look! Behold! The bread of angels has
Factus cibus viatorum,	become the food of travelers,
Vere panis filiorum,	the true bread of sons,
Non mittendus canibus.	not for casting to dogs.
In figuris praesignatur,	It is foreshadowed in figures,
Cum Isaac immolatur,	when Isaac is sacrificed,
Agnus Paschae deputatur,	when a lamb is appointed for the Passover,
Datur manna patribus.	when manna is given to the fathers.
Bone pastor, panis vere,	Good shepherd, true bread,
Jesu, nostri miserere ;	Jesus, have mercy on us;
Tu nos pasce, nos tuere,	You feed us and You protect us.
Tu nos bona fac videre	You let see the good
In terra viventium.	in the land of the living.
Tu qui cuncta scis et vales,	You who know and can do all things,
Qui nos pascis hie mortales,	who feed us here as mortals,
Tuos ibi commensales,	make us Your table-fellows there,
Cohaeredes et sodales	co-heirs and companions of the
Fae sanctorum civium.	holy citizens [of heaven].

LIGHT AND METAPHOR IN PLOTINUS AND ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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I HAVE TWO CONCERNS in this paper. The first is a broad concern, related to the nature of metaphor, which stems from the destructionist or deconstructionist tendencies in some contemporary phenomenology or phenomenological existentialism. According to these views, the logocentric emphasis of the Western tradition must be shown for what it really is: an attempt to erect a cover upon a fundamental absence. In Nietzsche's well known view, "truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they *are* illusions; worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses, coins which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account as coins but merely as metal." [1] For Jacques Derrida all metaphoricity is caught up in an endless circle, which precludes any privileged vantage-point from which one might determine order, hierarchy and center-point. In particular, the unique heliotropic metaphor which, in Derrida's polemic, determines the whole course of Western philosophy "from the Platonic *eidos* to the Hegelian idea" [2] rests only upon the infinite absence of circularity, for the movement of transference "which turns the sun into metaphor" also inevitably "turns philosophical metaphor towards the sun." [3]

[1] Nietzsche, "On Truth and Falsity in their Ultramoral Sense (1873)," *Works* 2 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), p. 180.

[2] J. Derrida, "White Mythology", trans. F. C. T. Moore, *New Literary History* 6 (1974), 1: 5-74 ["La mythologie blanche" in *Rhetorique et philosophie, Poetique* 5 (Paris: Editions du Seliu, 1971)], p. 55.

[3] Ibid., p. 51.

In this paper I shall examine the thought of Plotinus and Aquinas, broadly described as idealist and realist respectively, with a view to determining whether or not this transference from the physical to the metaphysical is only an illicit, covert erasure of the material sense and a forgetting that all metaphor is self-implicating, that there is no non-metaphorical standpoint from which to grasp the order and structure of the metaphorical.

My second concern is much more specific. It is, first, to compare Plotinus and Aquinas on light and metaphor-two thinkers who might be considered to be poles apart on these questions: on the one hand, Plotinus, the father of Neoplatonic emanationism with its insistence upon the primacy of divine light and the father, surely too, of the tradition of light-metaphysics in the later, mediaeval period; on the other hand, St. Thomas, staunchly realist in the Aristotelian tradition. Second, I will seek to show that this first impression of the gulf between the two thinkers is not borne out by a close textual analysis, and that their respective theories, despite the admitted significant difference in viewpoint, are in some respects very close indeed.

Let us look briefly at the light-metaphysics tradition first. For Robert Grosseteste light is the source of all activity and its diffusion is not a material change or a change in place, but rather an instantaneous and substantial multiplication of itself in three dimensions.[4] Thus, for the author of the *De Intelligentiis* light is the fundamental principle of motion and life: "Est autem prima lucis operatio in sensibilibus quad motum et vitam operatur in viventibus."[5] Since light is the noblest of corporeal things, it therefore has an intermediate place between pure form and matter, and for Grosseteste and also Bonaventure it is consequently named the *forma corporeitatis,* the fundamental form of body as

[4] *De philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste,* ed. Ludwig Baur, in Clemens Baeumker, *Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters,* vol. IX (Munster, 1912), *De Luce,* p. 51.

[5] Clemens Baeumker, *Witelo: Ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII Jahrhunderts,* Band III, Heft 2 of *Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Munster, 1908), *Liber de intelligentiis* IX, p. 11.

such, since light introduces dimension into matter. Light then is the substantial form of the physical universe.[6]

But how is physical light related to spiritual light? For the light-metaphysics tradition, spiritual light (whether the Uncreated Light which is God himself or the created spiritual light by which our intellects understand)[7] is the true primal light. Corporeal light is either derived from the primal light by emanation (or, in some unspecified sense, by virtue of its incorporeal, substantial character), or else related to it only by analogy.[8] Some explanations combine these two views. For St. Bonaventure, for instance, as also for Augustine, light is predicated *proprie* of spiritual things, only metaphorically of physical things (cf. *II sent.* d. 13, a. 1, q. 1, obj. 3, p. 311 b). Implicitly, then, there is a community of being between the two lights : " Lux inter omnia corporalia maxime assimilatur luci aeternae, sicut ostendit Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus, et maxime in virtute et efficacia" (ibid. q. 1, f. 2, p. 319 A). On the other hand, this community is only by analogy: " Lux spiritualis est communis creatori et creaturae s·ecundum analogiam" (ibid. ad 4, p. 318 A). Bonaventure's analysis, then, is subtle and finely nuanced, but even here one can glimpse an important characteristic of the light-metaphysics tradition, namely, that corporeal light draws its essence from intelligible light in such a way that there is a fundamental identity between the two (if this is not to overstate the case) and thus metaphoricity ultimately disappears in so far as light brings about a true and literal designation of the intelligible object.

When we come to look at Plotinus's views we find modern commentators themselves divided on the issue. For Werner Beierwaltes,[9] Plotinus is a precursor of the light-metaphysics

s Grosseteste, *De Luce,* ed. Baur, p. 51. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.* d.12, a2, q.1, p. 318A.

[7] St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* XX, *7; PL,* 42, col. 372. *De Gen. ad Litt. liber imperfectus* 5, 20; *PL,* 34, col. 288.

[8] On this see Joseph Anthony Mazzeo, *Mediaeval Cultural Tradition in Dante's Comedy* (New York: Greenwood, 1968), p. *76.*

[9] Werner Beierwaltes, " Die Metaphysik des Lichtes in der Philosophie Plotins ", in *Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung,* XV (1961), 334-362.

tradition, since there is a *Wesensgleichheit* between corporeal and intelligible light and thus intelligible light must not be taken to be a metaphor, but must be understood literally. Rein Ferwerda,[10] on the other hand, rebuts Beierwaltes's view on the grounds that the latter does not take sufficient notice of Plotinus's own awareness that he is using figurative language (e.g. the ubiquitous *oiov,* or *'ITWS)* and thus concludes that light is used as a metaphor by Plotinus and that it does not designate the true nature of the three hypostases. While the evidence clearly seems to incline in Ferwerda's favor, the issue is complicated further, in my view, by the following two considerations. First, Plotinus may well use light of the intelligible in a metaphorical sense, but there is nonetheless the conviction that light so used is being addressed in its most pure and proper sense, and that, therefore, all derivative light must find its purest reference in the intelligible universe.[11] Is it possible for Plotinus to maintain these two positions simultaneously? Second, Plotinus, like Grosseteste and Bonaventure at a later date, speaks of light very much as though it were a *forma corporeitatis.* In *En!neads* IV, 5[29], *7,* 36, for example, he states that the light from bodies is an external activity of the luminous body, while the light in such bodies, that is, bodies which are primarily luminous, is substance in accordance with the form (*ovCTfo. .;,* KaTa To e!Oos)[12] of the primarily luminous body. Further, if light is incorporeal in the sense that it is "closely parallel to the life which is the incorporeal activity of soul, and is ... formative principle and form,"[13] then surely the light of the sun must be the substantial form of its corporeity. And if this is so, then is there not a sense in which solar light has its prime and proper reference in the intelligible? And again

[10] Rein Ferwerda, *La Signification des images et des mitaphores dans la pensee de Plotin* (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1965), pp. 46-61.

[11] Cf. Ferwerda (note 10), p. 47 re *Phaedo* llOA. See also Plotinus, I, 6[1], 9, 15-25; V.3[49], 8, 35-42.

[12] Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1035 B 15-16, 1Q44 A 10.

[13] A. H. Armstrong in *Plotinus* IV, Enneads IV 1-9, with an English translation by A. H. Armstrong (Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass.-London, 1984) pp. 308-9, note 1.

if this be granted, then Ferwerda's position, that light is employed figuratively by Plotinus, should be rejected.

The solution to this problem, if any, lies, I believe, in the acceptance of *both* of these seemingly incompatible points of view-those of Beierwaltes and Ferwerda-and I shall try to give a sketch of how this is possible as simply as I can. In Plotinus there are at least two important facets of the theory of light. Physical light, as such, is necessarily to be distinguished from intelligible light. Thus, Plotinus invariably speaks metaphorically of intelligible light, and in this he would agree with St. Thomas for whom the corporeal can be attributed to something spiritual only in a metaphorical manner. This facet of Plotinus's theory is also reflected in his insistence that there is no community of being between intelligible and sensible substance.[14] However, from another point of view, when one examines the meanings of light in relation to natural objects and in relation to the principle which makes them what they are, no simple arbitrary line between the physical and the spiritual can be drawn, and the necessity that both frames of reference overlap, or rather, stand together in the same logical space (while being quite different) becomes evident. At the root of this second point of view is an insistence, similar to that of St. Thomas (on which see below), that what is *sensible as such* cannot be· substance in the proper sense. If I interpret Plotinus correctly, this is one of the points I understand him to make in IV,5 [29] chapter 7, where he speaks of the incorporeal nature of light against the implicit background of the Aristotelian doctrine.

First, for Aristotle light is the actualisation of the diaphanous

[14] On this see particularly Kevin Corrigan and Padraig O'Cleirigh, "The Course of Plotinian Scholarship from 1971 to 1986", *Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt,* Tei! II, Band 36.1, pp. 571-623, espec. pp. 579-581. Cf. also P. Aubenque, "Neoplatonisme et analogie de l'etre" in *Neoplatonisme, Melanges offers a Jean Trouillard (Cahiers de Fontenay* 1981), pp. 63-76. P. Hadot, "L'harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d'Aristote selon Porphyre" in *Atti del Convegno internazionale sul tema: Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Roma: 5-9 Ottobre 1970), Problemi attuali di sc. e di cultura,* Quad. 198 (Roma 1974), pp, 31-47.

qua diaphanous.[15] Light is neither fire, nor body, nor efflux from body, but a presence.[16] It does not travel. It is present in the diaphanous not by local, but by qualitative, change. And since the diaphanous permeates bodies, and since light subsists in the diaphanous, when the diaphanous is actualized, light is incidentally the color of the diaphanous.[17]

Plotinus, by contrast, extends Aristotle's theory. For him light is a physical process, within the analysis of whose *meaning* movement, quality, form, activity and power are all involved. Light is defined as the incorporeal *energeia* of the luminous body.[18] What does this mean? In one sense it means simply that it is not a body, even though it is dependent upon a body. However, it does travel to us and to the earth.[19] In another sense Plotinus speaks of " the light mingled in bodies." What he means is the light subsisting in the diaphanous, which is, incidentally, the colour of the diaphanous. Here light is a quality in a substrate, an accident to the substance of the object. But, to go further, the quality in the substrate also manifests, or proceeds from, a dynamic activity. And in this sense light is not just a qualitative actualisation, but, more fundamentally, a substantial activity. The visible activity or quality, the external activity, is what is strictly perceptible. Of the substantial form of the luminous body on its own Plotinus will only speak metaphorically: " it only, so to speak, tints the surface " (*oiov Emx_pwvvvaw,* line 39). Nonetheless, the source is present there where the perceptible activity is manifested. Hence, light is not simply the actualisation of the diaphanous, but the activity of the source, not as a body alone, but as an acting body by virtue of a productive, incorporeal power manifested in it Thus, in VI,4[22],7,31-32 Plotinus argues (in an extended critique of the emanation metaphor) that the physical source does not have light "*qua* body, but *qua* luminous body, by virtue of another power which is incorporeal."

15 *De Anima* 418 B 9, 419 A 11.
16 *De An.* 418 B 14-17.
17 *De An.* 418 B 11. *De Sensn,* 439 A 18 ff.
18 IV, 5[29], *7,* 33-34. II, 1[40] *7,* 20-30.
19 V.3[49], 9, 10-13.

And in VI,3[44],23,5-12 he even goes so far as to speak of the invisible power being *perceived together* with the visible activity, so intimate is the substantial presence of the source. We can now, therefore, give a more precise answer to the meaning of Plotinus's statement that " it is necessary to posit light as altogether incorporeal, even if it is of body " (*acrwµarov* 8€ *l/Tavrwr;* 8et: *riOevai K<f,v crwµaror;* -ll, lines 41-42). The statement is similar to other major pronouncements Plotinus makes about corporeity: for example, *II,7* [31] ,3 : "the productive form must be contemplated without matter, even if it is inseparable." [20] Or VI,7 [38] ,4,23-28: "... it is necessary ... especially in the case of *enula eide* and *logoi* with matter ... to grasp the productive *logos."* [21] We can sketch Plotinus' s view as follows : physical light as such is not substantial. It is only when we grasp the productive power present to it that we can grasp its substantial meaning. And substantial meaning *(logos)* is intelligible, though not in any way cut off from the material object. If light or sight, then, is the highest of physical activities, and if the activity is an expression of intelligible power, then intelligible light is a natural and philosophically necessary completion of, and source for the understanding of, physical light. Thus, we are forced to the conclusion that, while there is no *Wesensgleichheit* between the two and while intelligible light can only be spoken of metaphorically, there is a necessary sense in which a true grasp of the meaning of light requires the primacy of incorporeal power from which the corporeal radiance does indeed spring as an image of the truth. For Plotinus, then, the application of the physical to the metaphysical in metaphor could only depend upon trans£erence in a purely external and accidental manner, for the bigger question is that of meaning, and the acts of meaning and of mere transference are two different acts.

It is my thesis that Aquinas's view, while entirely different in its context and texture (and this would require extended treatment elsewhere), is not without important points of similarity.

[20] II, *7[37],* 3, 12-14.
[21] VI, 7[38], 4, 23-28.

In Book 2, *lectio* XIV of his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* St. Thomas rejects three major views in turn, namely, that light is either a corporeal substance or a spiritual substance, and that it is a substantial form. It cannot, for instance, be the substantial form of the sun, because no substantial form is " in and of itself an object of s·ense-perception; it can only be intellectually apprehended" (section 420). As we have seen, Plotinus adopts a similar position, except that for him the incorporeality of light is very much connected with the manifestation of spiritual significance. What then is light for St. Thomas? It is a quality of the first among bodies which effect change, a quality which has no contrary (Section 421 : qualitas primi corporis alterantis, quod non habet contrarium: unde nee lux contrarium habet) ; in other words, a celestial body.

Why then, we may ask, should light and seeing-related terms be used in reference to intellectual matters, if light is an accident of body? And here we enter upon the problem of the nature and reference of metaphor. For St. Thomas the corporeal can be attributed to something spiritual only in a metaphorical manner, since the ultimate referent of the metaphor is the thing, the sense-object; [22] and in poetry, for instance, metaphor really seduces the mind by offering mere likenesses.[23] But we might press the question and ask whether or not the metaphorical transference from corporeal to intelligible is merely accidental. In my view, three considerations militate against this assessment, indeed also against the very notion of the " merely metaphorical " in this case. First, light is applied to the intelligible because of the special dignity of the sense of sight, which takes place without material alteration, but merely spiritual alteration (Sections 417-418). Second, light as a quality of corporeal, celestial substance represents the highest expression of actualization, possession of form and luminosity in the physical universe. Light is not the essence or substance of those bodies, but it is a manifesta-

[22] *In II Sent.* d.13, q.1, aa2, 3. *Summa Theologiae* I,q. 1, a.9.

2ssr. I, q.l, a.9; *In I Sent.* prol. q.l, a.5, obj. 3 and ad 3; *Commentarium in II libros Arist. posteriorum analyticorum,* I, lectio 1.

tion of the greater fullness of their form, being and act (Section 422). Hence, St. Thomas effectively argues that, while there is no community of being or analogy between spiritual and sensible light (cf. Sections 415-416), this does not mean that the transference from one to another is merely contingent. Third, we can ask how this lack of contingency might be expressed in positive terms. And, if I understand St. Thomas correctly, we can find an answer to this in the substantial power of the luminous body, an answer similar to that of Plotinus. In the *Summa Theologiae* la,67,4, Aquinas argues that it is right to assign the production of light to the first day because it is a quality of a primary body and a common feature (communitatem) which the lower bodies share with the higher. But how can we maintain this, objection 2 asks, if the sun is only created on the fourth day? In reply, St. Thomas cites Dionysius with approval:

All in all then, as Denis says [24] *(De Div. Nom. IV,* 4; *PG* 3,700), the light mentioned was the light of the sun, but the sun had not yet been formed, in the sense that the substance of the sun already existed, having the power of illuminating in a general way, and then later wcquired a special and determinate power to produce particular effects.[25]

This power of light, St. Thomas goes on to relate to the substance of the sun " quantum ad causam." Here then we seem to have a way of signifying substantial light which is in between the literal and the intelligible. But is this so? The central question must be as follows: does this power of light escape the sphere of the metaphorical? And I think the answer has to be in the negative, for the simple reasons that the word " power" (*virtus, dynamis)* stands as a metaphor, when applied to something that it does not immediately signify. Yet at the same time this does not mean that the thing signified is not real. To illustrate this, we may take up the question which St. Thomas poses in *ST* la, q. 13, (aa 3-6) a.6 : " Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?" Thomas's answer distinguishes two orders of priority: a priority according to the thing

[24] *De Div. Nom.* IV, 4; *PG* 3, 700.
[25] *ST.* I, q.67, a.4, obj. 2 and ad 2.

itself, which starts with what is first in itself, that is, God; and a priority according to signification, which starts with what is best known to us, that is, creatures. In article 2 St. Thomas has established that words like " good " and " wise " are predicated of God in the category of substance (substantialiter), and though they fail to represent adequately, " they do signify the divine substance." These are analogical terms. Hence (art. 3), so far as the perfections signified are concerned, they are used properly (proprie) of God, " at magis proprie quam ipsis creaturis," while as to the mode of signifying these perfections, they are used inappropriately, "for they have a mode of signifying which is appropriate to creatures."

What bearing does this have on the case of light? Clearly, "light," unlike goodness, beauty etc., cannot be applied literally to God, nor even to the intelligence for that matter. No, the case of light is different, and yet there does seem to be a predication in the order of substance to be taken into account here as we have indicated above. An answer might be suggested from Thomas's commentary on the *De Interpretatione.* Following Thomas asks : what do names signify? And he answers that they primarily signify neither things nor Platonic separated entities, but rather the *pathemata tes psuches,* i.e. conceptions or essences :

" passions in the soul " must be understood here as conceptions of the intellect, and names, verbs, and speech, signify these conceptions of the intellect immediately according to the teaching of Aristotle. . . . But because in Aristotle's teaching man in the abstract does not really subsist, but is only in the mind, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the conceptions of the intellect immediately and things by means of them." [26]

Hence, we might suggest that according to the mode of signification light is metaphorically applied to the intelligible, whereas according to the mode of essential predication it first signifies the essence by means of which the thing itself is illuminated.

[26] Trans. by Jean T. Oesterle in *Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan* (Milwaukee: Marquette, 1962), Lesson II, 16a, 3, p.25.

And, of course, this does not commit us to assuming, as Ricoeur does [27] for example, that there is a second reference, a reference of the intension, for the essence and thing are mutually self-revealing, and in knowing the essence we are even closer to the thing, so to speak, than in the identity of sense and sense-object in perception.[28] The essence is indwelling, not a separate Platonic sub-: stance. Therefore, while intelligible light is a metaphor, it is simultaneously in the order of substance, as it is also for Plotinus, a natural and philosophically necessary completion of, and even ground for, physical light. What I want to point out, then, is that for both the idealism of Plotinus and the realism of Aquinas an important metaphor such as that of light can never be " merely metaphorical," but instead requires two intersecting structures, two forms of thought, the metaphorical transference and the analogical line of substantial signification. And this means that for these two thinkers metaphors cannot be mere substitution or comparison or even a forgetting of the illusion upon which they are built, for the physical trace is not erased or transformed but remains a fundamental part of the intersecting but sharply differentiated structures. [29]

My argument, then, is this: that in the entirely different philosophies of Plotinus and St. Thomas Aquinas (and I cannot emphasize this sufficiently) there is nonetheless an important

[27] Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language,* trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, S.J. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 216-217.

[28] On knowing in Aquinas see A. C. Pegis, " St. Thomas Aquinas and Husserl on Intentionality", in *Thomistic Papers* I, ed. Victor B. Brezik, (Center for Thomistic Studies, Houston, 1984).

[29] Cf. Paul Ricoeur (see note 27), pp. 279-280: "If, however, this effect of meaning (sc. this splintering of the name and its signification which corresponds to the extension of meaning) really originates in the predicative operation itself, it is at the level of predication that analogy and metaphor separate and intersect. One rests on the predication of transcendental terms, the other on the predication of meanings that carry their material content with them. Such is the magnificent exercise of thought which preserved the difference between speculative discourse and poetic discourse at the very point of their greatest proximity".

point of convergence in the metaphorical application of light to the intelligible and in the substantial signification of light in the intelligible which renders light a proper signification, albeit inadequate and simultaneously retentive of its material origin-a proper signification for intelligible reality. And in my view this means for St. Thomas that it is not only in theological but indeed also in philosophical discourse, where the symbolic method leads the mind to the supra-rational, that metaphor comes into its own and may properly be employed to lead the mind to deeper understanding. And this is why, it seems to me, both Plotinus (in an implicit, undeveloped manner) and Aquinas (in a much more developed way) can speak *literally* [30] of a natural light *(lu.x* or *lumen)* of the created intellect by which, and in conjunction with the properly termed *lu.x gloriae* ("Illa dispositio qua intellectus creatus ad intellectualem divinae substantiae visionem extollitur *congrue* lux gloriae dicitur . . . per hoc quod facit intellectum patientem actu intelligere " *CG,* LIII) the intellect understands and is also lifted up *ad divinam substantiam videndam* (ibid.). There is no space here to show how Plotinus attempts to bring out the natural character of internal light [31] or to contrast Plotinian and Augustinian illumination. Here, in conclusion, we can only indicate two further important characteristics of the successful philosophical metaphor of light in St. Thomas and Plotinus. For St. Thomas illumination is the natural activity of the agent intellect which lights up the essence of the sensible thing so that it becomes intelligible by the possible intellect. For Thomas this means that the natural light of the mind in the process of knowing is " a productive process in which receptivity and activity unite *to produce something new"* [82] and that it is also

80 For Plotinus (among other examples) see VI, 7[38], 17, 37-38. For Aquinas see *De Veritate,* Q.X. a.6, Respondeo, passim for the two lines which intersect in the rational soul. *Summa Contra Gentiles* 53, passim.

31 On this see my "El simbolismo natural de la Luz en Plotino" (trans. J. O. Velasquez), *Revista de Filosofia* (Univ. Chile), 25-26 (1985), pp. 51-56.

s2 This assessment (by Hans Meyer, *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* trans. by Rev. Frederic Eckhof [St. Louis-London: Herder, 1945], p. 332) cannot be sufficiently emphasized.

simultaneously *informed by the world.*[88] In other words, knowing is a self-transcending reality in which the genuinely new is produced. I would suggest that, despite all major differences, this is also true for Plotinus, first, in that the light and sight of intelligible knowing is pre-eminently creative (cf. VI,7 [38] ,35,30-33), and second, insofar as in the highest reaches of thought (and indeed also of mystical experience) we are not furthest from the world, but most united with its real meaning and all its possibilities.[84] Indeed I would go further and say that in the intelligible both forms of signification, the metaphorical and the substantial, are finally united. Now if this is true of the heliotrope for these two eminent forms of idealism and realism, then Nietzsche's myth/substitution metaphor, Heidegger's *destruktion* [s3] and Derrida's endless circle of self-implication do not really apply, for they cannot in any way explain how successful philosophical metaphor continues not only to delight the soul of man and raise it to new heights, but also to tell us something genuinely *new* about the world in which we live.

ss Cf. A. C. Pegis (see note 28).

114 The assessment of Werner Beierwaltes, for example (in *Denken des Eine-n* [Frankfurt, 1985], p. 147), is that the ascent to mystical union not only perfects the human self, but is also the precondition of an intelligible turning to the world.

85 To be fair to Heidegger these two characteristics I am here proposing are not unlike the *Lichtung* of his late work and especially *die Welt weltet,* which is part of the unique disclosure of *Aletheia* in the artwork in his "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes ".

MIND FORMING AND MANUDUCTIO IN AQUINAS*

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QUINAS'S CONCERN for pedagogy is plain from his explicit discussions of the subject, the most noteworthy of which is found in the preface to the *Summa Theologiae.* His qualities as a teacher of beginning students have been brought out by numerous modern authors, among whom are Josef Pieper,[1] who underlines both Thomas's ability to arouse wonder and his use of ordinary language intelligible to all, and James Weisheipl,[2] who points out that Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle reveal a concern for the neophyte who is trying to comprehend the relation between faith and reason.

One important aspect of Aquinas's teaching on pedagogy generally does not get the attention it merits, however, and this is the need for 'manuductio.'[3] 'Manuductio', or '*xeipaywv£a*' (literally, 'leading by the hand') is an expression which Aquinas

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[1] Cf. Josef Pieper, *Guide to Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1962)' c. 8.

[2] Cf. James Weisheipl, O.P., *Friar Thomas d'Aquino* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), 281.

[3] This article drew much of its inspiration from the works of Msgr. Maurice Dionne, a thinker who both elaborated upon and consciously implemented Aquinas's teachings on this subject. Cf. especially: *Initation a la logique,* ed. Yvan Pelletier (Ste-Foy, Quebec: L'Institut Apostolique Renaissance inc., 1976), and *La Necessite de la logique en regard de chacune des vertus intellectuelles,* ed. Louis Brunet, vol. 1 (Quebec: Societe d'Etudes Aristoteliciennes 1980), hereafter cited as *La Nec.*

adopts from Dionysius.[4] It is a word that has different but related meanings in the moral, intellectual, and spiritual orders. Our intention is to elucidate the thomistic doctrine of ' leading-by-the-hand ' in the context of intellectual education, or ' mind forming,' discussing its nature, its necessity, and its place in the global picture of human knowing as outlined by Aquinas.

We will begin by delineating in general what manuductio is by comparing two key passages, the first of which is to be found in the *Summa Theologiae:*

> The teacher leads the students from what is already known to knowledge of things unknown in two ways. First, by putting before him certain aids or instruments which his intellect uses in order to acquire science; for example, when he presents him with some less universal proposition which nevertheless the student is able to judge from things already known; or when he proposes to him some sensible examples, or similitudes, or opposites, or some other things of this sort, from which the intellect of the learner is ' led by the hand ' (manuducitur) to the knowledge of a truth previously unknown to him. The other way [the teacher leads the student] is when he strengthens the intellect of the learner ... inasmuch as he proposes the order of principles to conclusions to the student, who perhaps by himself would not have so much ability to put things together (virtutem collativam) that from the principles he could deduce the conclusions. And therefore it is said in *Posterior Analytics.* Bk. I, that 'demonstration is a syllogism making one know '. And through this mode the one who demonstrates makes the listener know.[5]

[4] Cf. *In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Ezpositio* (Turin: Marietti, 1950), where St. Thomas comments on the following phrase from Dionysius (p. 14) : *"E1r ailT7]11 a11a"Yoµe110J11 a11aTaTtX7/ xe1pa"YOJ1lla"* ("ad ipsam sursum actorum suscitative manuductio "). The commentary reads (p. 17, # 48) : "Further, it is necessary that man progress to better things; and as to this, he says fifthly ' suscitative manuductio sursum actorum ' i.e., those things which go up, that is, make progre"ss, 'ad Ipsam ', namely to the Divinity. [The expression] 'suscitative' manuductio, however, is used because not only can one give a helping hand to those wanting to make progress, but one can even stimulate or urge [people] to progress." All translations are my own. Cf. also *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate,* q. 27, art. 4, ad 8: " Unde Dionysius dicit [cap. II *Cael. Hierarch.],* quod naturale est nobis ut per sensibilia in Deum manuducamur," hereafter cited as *DV.*

[5] *Summa Theologiae* la, q. 117, art. 1. Hereafter cited as *ST.*

This latter way of teaching, namely, presenting the student with the appropriate premises in their proper order, is the only one mentioned in our other text, taken from the " De Magistro " :

In discovery, the process of reason arriving at knowledge previously unknown is when it applies common self-evident principles to determinate matters, and from there proceeds to some particular conclusions, and from these to still others; whence, correspondingly, one is said to teach another because one exhibits this discourse of reason, which one performs in oneself by natural reason, to another through signs, and thus the natural reason of the student through things of this sort proposed to him, as through certain instruments, arrives at the knowledge of things previously unknown. . . . [A] person is said to cause science in another by the operation of the natural reason of that other.... And according to this the Philosopher says ... that demonstration is a syllogism making one know.[6]

These passages show us, then, that teaching involves two different kinds of activities : presenting the order of the appropriate premises in a demonstrative argument, and presenting things other than the argument itself which aid the student to grasp the premises, or their relation to the conclusion.

Another passage in which Aquinas speaks about manuductio is also to be found in the *Summa Theologiae:*

[T]he listener who is able to grasp the intelligible truth when it is presented baldly (nude prolatam) by the teacher shows :himself to be of superior intellect to the one who needs to be led to this by sensible examples (indiget sensibilibus exemplis ad hoc manuduci). [7]

Here the intelligible truth *nude prolatam* corresponds to demonstration in the text cited earlier, and the sensible examples to one of the forms of manuductio explicitly named in that other text.

There is, however, a passage where Aquinas surprisingly uses the expression 'to lead by the hand' in reference to presenting the learner the order of the premises in an argument :

When some causes are known, some effects are readily known in them; others, indeed, may be more hidden, as is manifested by the

s *DV,* q. 11, art. 1.

1 *ST,* IIa-IIae, q. 174, art. 2c.

fact that from some principles of demonstration some conclusions are drawn immediately, certain others, indeed, not except through many intermediary steps; and not just anyone by himself is capable of knowing the latter, but it is necessary that he be led by another (oportet quod ab alio manuducatur).[8]

Here we must simply recognize a more extended meaning of the term, still in keeping with its etymological sense. A comparison may be helpful here: while this expression is most often used in reference to a young child who is taken by the hand in order to insure safe arrival, it may also be employed of a child grown to a certain autonomy who, though no longer requiring such direct help, may still need verbal guidance. So, too, a teacher may be faced with a learner who needs to have everything spelled out in simpler and more concrete terms, or he may be dealing with a learner who is already thinking at the appropriate level of universality, but who needs instruction as to how to order universal propositions known to him so as to arrive at the truth he is seeking. In both these latter cases the teacher leads the student, and thus manuductio may refer in a general way to any help given to a student to lead him to see a particular truth, or it may be taken in the more specific sense of the help given to a learner who is little knowledgeable about the matter discussed and little experienced in thinking things out for himself.[9] The learner who is already able to follow the steps of an argument manifests a significant degree of autonomy in his pursuit of truth. Indeed he is immediately disposed to discovering the truth for himself; whence Aquinas says that he is not necessarily in need of a teacher, but may *perhaps* be in need of one.[10] The more specific sense of manuductio does not apply to such a learner, but rather

[8] *DV,* q. 8, art. 4, ad 12.

[9] 'I'm not following' and 'you lost me' are both expressions indicating that the other should slow down and use a little manuductio.

[10] Note how the case referred to in *DV,* q. 8, art. 4, ad 12 is not just any demonstration, but a demonstration where the steps are numerous. In such a situation it is easy for the student to get lost; in which case assistance from a teacher comes closer to being leading by the hand, rather than simply leading.

to one who can make no progress unless the teacher provide examples, similitudes, etc.

Up to this point our understanding of manuductio has been through contrast with another part of teaching, namely, demonstration. Moreover, we have seen that manuductio is in fact ordered to the latter: it ' boosts ' the student into a position from which he is more able to appreciate a demonstration. We must now go on to determine more specifically what performs this function. Although there is no explicit definition of manuductio in Aquinas, one is easily adduced from what he says. In view of establishing a basis for answering the question as to precisely what sort of thing manuductio is, we shall first examine some of its particular forms.

Aquinas lists four things which lead the learner ' by the hand' to new knowledge: (1) less universal propositions which the student can judge from what he knows already; (2) sensible examples; (3) likenesses or comparisons; (4) opposites. After first presenting examples of each form, we will proceed to discern what characterizes an instrument of manuductio. Since sensible examples constitute the simplest of its forms, these will be considered first.[11]

When explaining the different grades of life, Aquinas notes that the second is made up of immobile animals, and he adds by way of example: " *as are oysters.*" [12] And when speaking about necessity, he says: " Even present things, insofar as they are present, have a certain necessity; *for it is necessary that S aerates sit when he sits.*" [13] In the context of ethics, he furnishes the following example: " The fact that something is so is known through experience and habituation, *for e%ample (put a), that concupiscence is overcome through abstinence.*" [14] The use of the

[11] Nowadays ' sensible' examples are commonly called ' concrete' examples; although perhaps not every sensible example is a concrete example. Note also that the *ST* is replete with examples of manuductio; which is not surprising given that it is a work addressed specially to beginners.

[12] *ST* la, q. 18, art. 2, ad 1.

[13] *ST* Ila-Hae, q. 49, art. 6c.

[14] *In Decem Libras Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum* (Turin: Marietti, 1934), # 53. Hereafter cited as *In Ethicorum.*

word 'puta,' which means 'think [of],' is appropriate because one thinks of something which one already knows, and the example is a means of leading the learner to new knowledge in virtue of its being something which the learner already knows.

Turning now to the use of those less universal propositions which the student can judge, which constitute the first-named form of manuductio, Aquinas furnishes this example:

> If it is manifest to someone that a thing is so it is little necessary that that person know why it is so in order to act. *Just as (sicut) it suffices for a doctor to know that this herb cures this sickne>ss in order to heal someone.*[15]

The student may not at first grasp the more universal statement, while being readily enough able to judge the less universal statement, which thus provides a basis from which the more universal principle can be grasped.[16]

Passing now to similitudes, we find a good example of how they are to be employed in the following text, where Aquinas ex-

[15] *Ibid.,* # 54. Another example of the same would be: "It is illicit for one man to intend to kill another in order to defend himself, except for the one having public authority, who, intending to kill the man for the sake of his own defense, refers this to the public good, *as is manifest in the soldier fighting aga.inst the enemy, and in the policeman fighting robbers."* *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 64, art. 7c.

[16] It is not always easy to distinguish between a concrete example and a proposition which is less universal. For instance, in the passage from *In Ethicorum* (# 53), one might say that "it suffices for a doctor to know that this herb cures this sickness in order to heal someone," is an example of the general principle. Even an apparently concrete example, such as: "It is necessary that Socrates sit when he sits" is actually a universal statement, rather than a concrete example, since the 'when' here means whenever. Strictly speaking a concrete example would regard some particular thing or event situated at a particular time and place, e.g., remember how Aunt Mabel cured her cold last summer with that herb when she didn't even know its name. The mind has a tendency to universalize, often doing so even without an adequate basis in experience. Note also that Aquinas speaks about sensible examples, and not concrete examples, and thus he does not necessarily intend to divide example against less universal statement, and there may in fact be overlapping of these two forms. Also to be taken into account is the fact that some less universal statements express truths about sensible reality, and some do not. This point is in need of further investigation.

plains why good and bad fortune seem so haphazardly distributed among just and unjust alike:

> [B]ecause we are ignorant [of the right rule of providence] things seem to us to come about in a disorderly and irrational way; *just as if someono entered an artisan's shop, the artisan's tools would seem to him to be uselessly multiple, if he did not know the reason for using each; which multiplicity appears to have a reasonable cause to the one who has insight into the virtue of the· art.*[17]

Such comparisons do not prove the points in question, but do make them more intelligible to the beginner.

Aquinas uses that instrument of manuductio which proceeds through opposites in resolving the question of whether *honestas* is a part of temperance :

> We have already said that *honestas* is a certain spiritual beauty. The beautiful, however, is opposed to the ugly. And opposites are what most manifest each other. *Honestas* seems then to especially belong to temperance which repels the things which are ugliest and most indecent for man, namely, bestial pleasures.[18]

The reader familiar with Aristotle's *Topics* cannot help but note that the instruments of manuductio seem to correspond to those of the dialectician.[19] This might lead one to suppose that manuductio is nothing other than dialectic, or that dialectic is nothing but manuductio. After all, dialectic is an art which aids discovery, teaching one to do more perfectly and systematically what one does naturally when one seeks to discover something. And since teaching is an art which imitates nature, ideally the teacher retraces the process of discovery he went through, minus the fruitless steps.

[17] *DV,* q. 5, art. 5, ad 6. Other well-known comparisons which Aquinas makes include those between art and nature, and between *intellectus* and synderesis.

[18] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 145, art. 4c. Another example of the use of opposites is found in the discussion of what it means to live : " We say that an animal lives when it begins to have motion from itself; and we judge the animal to live so long as such a motion appears in it; *when indeed it no longer has some motion from itself, but is moved only by another, then we say that the animal is dead,* through the extinction of life in it." *ST* la, q. 18, art. le.

[19] Cf. Aristotle, *Topics,* especially, Bk. 1, c. 13.

However, there is reason to think that manuductio is better defined in terms of something other than dialectic. For there is a passage where Aquinas maintains that the teacher can lead the student by the hand presenting arguments which are to be accepted simply on the authority of the teacher. In this he follows Aristotle who says that " it is necessary for the learner to take things on trust" [20] A teacher can assist the beginner by presenting him a difficult argument with instructions to : ' learn it by heart, and then we will get into some of the subleties.' Trust in a teacher is not proposed as a substitute for the learner's understanding things for himself, but rather as an aid to his doing so. For to be presented with the correct explanation, even before one is able to understand it, is an advantage insofar as one has definite words to keep in mind, and to reflect upon, until that time when, in the light of experience, one comes to see for oneself the truth of what one has been told.

The reason that trust in a teacher's words provides a kind of manuductio stems from the human mind's limited capabilities: " Perfectae cognitionis homo in sui principio capax non est " [21]. our mind does not instantly seize the natures of things, and the necessary connections existing between them, but arrives at them only gradually, starting from sense experience. Since this process is lengthy and far from automatic, help from other individuals

[20] Cf. *DV,* q. 14, art. 10c: "[I]n the beginning ... the instructor does not immediately present the one he is instructing the notions (rationes) of the subtleties about which he intends to instruct him: because then immediately in the beginning the one who is instructed would have perfect science; rather the teacher presents him certain things the reasons of which the student does not know at the time when he is first instructed; however, afterwards he is to know them when he has been perfected in science. And therefore [Aristotle] says, that it is necessary for the learner to believe *[Sophistical Refutations,* 165b3] : and he could not arrive at perfect science in another manner than by holding as true those things handed to him in the beginning, whose notions at that time he was not able to seize.... [M]an in the beginning is not capable of perfect knowledge; whence it is necessary that he accept some things through the way of belief (per viam credendi), through which he is led (manuducatur) to arriving at perfect knowledge,"

[21] *Ibid.*

who have traced the path before us is necessary if we are to make any significant progress.

We can see now that the instruments of manuductio are not only the fruits of the instruments of dialectic used to lead the learner, but are anything which helps the learner to see a given truth because of being adapted to the natural weakness and imperfection of the mind.[22] For, while arguments of authority have their place in a dialectical discussion,[28] faith or firm conviction in what another says does not.

Further confirmation of our thesis is readily drawn by reviewing the four instruments which Aquinas names; for they all can be seen to minister to the weakness of a mind which is not ready at first to handle things of any great universality or intelligibility. For Aquinas, the most fundamental facts about the way in which our mind operates are that its starting point is sense experience and its goal is wisdom, i.e., scientific knowledge of the causes of all that is, and especially of the things which have the most being. There is a great distance between what we first know, namely, sensible things, which are less intelligible in themselves,[24] and what we ultimately seek to know. A demonstration explains things in terms of what is most intelligible in itself, i.e., in terms of causes, and thus while it constitutes the substance of science, it is nourishment too tough for the mind to digest in the beginning. A teacher who provides the student with nothing but abstract arguments, in the manner of certain scholastic manuals, strains the student's mind. To avoid deforming the mind, one

22 Msgr. Maurice Dionne remarks that: "[X] is not a good master for a young person because of his ignorance of *the mode of the soul in knowing, which is marvelously described in question 117* [of the *ST]."* Emphasis mine. *Les refutations sophistiques,* Vol. 1, Ed. Yvan Pelletier (Ste-Foy, Quebec: L'Institut Apostolique Renaissance, 1976), 196.

28 Arguments from authority are " the weakest form of argument ". Cf. *ST* Ia, q. 1, art. 8 ad 2.

24 Cf. *In Duodecim Libras Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio* # 285 (Turin: Marietti, 1964) : "The human soul ... by nature is the act of an organic body; it has a natural aptitude for knowing truth about bodies and sensible things, which are less knowable by their nature, on account of their materiality, but nevertheless are able to be known through abstraction from the phantasms of sensible things." Cf. also # 282. Hereafter cited as *Meta.*

must first nourish it with things which are more proportioned to it, i.e., things which are closer to sense. "The mode of knowing connatural to man is to be led (manuducatur) to invisible things through visible things." [25] Our natural knowledge has its beginning in sense; whence our natural knowledge can extend only so far as it can be led through sensible things." [26] This explains why almost every text on manuductio mentions sensible things.[27]

The use of less universal propositions makes provision for the weakness of our minds,[28] inasmuch as being closer to sense, they are naturally more known to us than what is more universal and intelligible in itself.[29]

Similitudes and differences are helpful because we do not see directly into the nature of things, but have to compare them and contrast them with things extraneous to them.[30] For, since "our knowledge begins from sense which bears on exterior accidents,

[25] *ST* Ia, q. 43, art. 7c.

[26] *ST* Ia, q. 12, art. 12c.

[27] Cf. *La Nec.,* 18: "Sense is a necessity for the intellect. If one removed all the examples in the treatises of Aristotle so as to keep only the discourse which is strictly speaking intelligible, we could no longer understand them, and this would be especially the case in those treatises which are most intelligible by nature, as are to the highest degree the *Metaphysics* and the logical treatises. The more a discipline is abstract and difficult, the more it needs to be taught using manuductio. And this, once again, is what is being said in the *Divine Names:* 'Reason nourishes itself from the senses'. Senses which are well nourished contribute greatly to the intellect's growth."

[28] Cf. *ST* Ia, q. 106, art. le: "[D]octores, quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter distinguunt providentes capacitati aliorum."

[29] Cf. *Meta.* # 45: "Those things which are most removed from what is sensible are difficult for man to know; for sense knowledge is common to all, since from it all human knowledge takes its beginning. But those things which are most universal are most removed from what is sensible, because sense is of singulars; therefore universals are most difficult to man to know." Cf. also *Meta.#* 46.

[30] Cf. *In Ethicorum,* # 131, 132: "It is necessary that something which was formerly said in outline (figuraliter), i.e., according to some likeness and description which is in some manner extrinsic to the thing . . . thereafter be more fully described.... [T]he reason for this is that it belongs to human nature to use reason to know the truth. It is not however proper to reason to immediately apprehend the truth; and therefore it belongs to man to perfect himself little by little in the knowledge of the truth."

our intellect from this exterior knowledge is barely able to arrive at interior knowledge of things."[31] Thus when we first try to define things, we generally start off by saying something in the line of: 'it is like this' or 'it is like this, but it is not quite the same.' Moreover, lacking immediate insight into the natures of things, we are more sure that a thing is such when we see in contrast that its opposite is not that way.[32]

Is everyone, then, in need of manuductio? We must recall that teaching is an art which ministers to nature, and that man is naturally endowed with the ability to discover. While no one can dispense with sensible examples,[33] comparison with sensible things, and such like, since the need for these stems from the very nature of the mind, it is possible, nonetheless, for one to come up with them by oneself. However, while what is most proportioned to the human mind are the natures of sensible things, the mind is very weak even in regard to these; as Aquinas so bluntly puts it: "no philosopher could ever completely investigate the nature of a fly."[34] And the mind is plainly even less well off when it comes to understanding non-sensible things. The disproportion between what is first known to us and what we seek to know is the initial situation of every human individual.[35] While it is

[31] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Bk. IV, c. 1.

[32] Aquinas says that "opposites are what most manifest each other" *(ST* IIa-IIae, q. 145, art. 4c). Cf. also *In Ethicorum,* # 679: "Et quia opposita ex invicem manifestantur . . . ." The ability to grasp differences makes more demands on the intellect. It is relatively easy to note similitudes; indeed we are often deceived by similitudes due to the comparative difficulty of discerning differences. Msgr. Dionne takes up the very interesting question of whether any of the instruments of manuductio allow the learner to come to a definitive conclusion. He argues that this can happen only in the case of one instrument alone: differences. Cf. *La Nec.,* 15-27.

[33] Cf. Paul Valery, *Varietes,* Vol. I, quoted in *La Nec.,* 83: "One has to resign oneself to wallowing in examples. Wallowing sometimes results in splashing up a few drops of light."

[34] *In Symbolum Apostolorum Expositio,* # 864, Mar.ietti edition.

[35] One is in need of manuductio in some disciplines more than others, according as that discipline is more or less proportioned to the mind. For example, a great deal of manuductio is required in logic, whereas next to none is required in mathematics.

true that certain individuals are more able to be led by the things themselves [36] than are others, virtually everyone at some time is in need of being led by the hand or, at very least, would have progressed better with such help, and most of us are in need of it most of the time.

It is easy enough to identify other forms of manuductio now that we see that an instrument of manuductio is anything which helps the learner to see a given truth because of being proportioned to the natural weakness and imperfection of the mind.[37] To name a few: a student should first be presented with the more general issues, before having to face very particular problems. In approaching a given issue, a student should be given a general idea of what is at stake, before getting into the details of rigorous argumentation. One particularly good way of doing the latter is to take up the opposed views of other thinkers.[38] When explaining a concept one ought to start, where possible, from the etymology of the word used to express it, since the etymological meaning is more concrete and closer to sense.[39] Also, since we naturally wonder more readily about sensible and imaginable things than about intellectual problems hidden beneath the surface, the teacher ought to find suitable comparisons with tangible things so as to provoke wonder in students about intellectual matters which otherwise would appear to them to be of remote

[36] Long before Aquinas, Aristotle spoke of people 'being led by things '; cf. *Metaphysics* 984a18.

[37] I add "in seeing a given truth", because there are other things which the good teacher will present to the learner, but which are not ordered to seeing any specific truth, being rather general in application. These are logic and also the proper methods of the different particular disciplines. A good teacher will teach a student the method of a discipline before the discipline (Cf. *Meta.* # 335), but Aquinas never calls such teaching manuductio. Rather, manuductio is used to bring the student to understand particular truths, including truths about method.

[38] As Aquinas does, for instance, when he addresses the question of whether we have intellectual knowledge about sensible reality. Instead of simply stating the answer, he first takes up the opposing views of Heraclitus and Plato.

[89] Aquinas's actual practice, as well as what he says in *ST* Ia, q. 18, art. *Zc,* shows that he sees examination of a word's etymology to be useful as manuductio.

interest. Many more forms of manuductio could be named, but those we have given should suffice.

Let us then sum up what we have seen: Teaching is to imitate discovery. The process of discovery starts from what is best known to us but least knowable in itself, namely, sensible things, and ends when universal principles are correctly applied to the matter at hand. Since there is a great distance between these two points, the mind must be provided with a variety of aids or instruments which it can both grasp and use to progress toward *scientia perfecta.* These instruments, when presented to the student by a teacher, are forms of manuductio. The teacher who neglects using these aids, in favor of arguments which are more cogent in themselves, overtaxes the student's mind, and thus conduces to its deformation.

Plainly, a general study such as ours leaves many interesting questions concerning manuductio unanswered. Our central purpose, however, has been to provide the basis for, and hopefully kindle an interest in, further study of a thomistic doctrine of singular value to anyone concerned with effective teaching.

ON LEO STRAUSS'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURAL LAW THEORY OF THOMAS AQUINAS *

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IN COMPOSING the introduction to *Natural Right and History* in the early 1950's, Leo Strauss described the situation in American social science as a division between two parties : the modern liberals of one persuasion or another, who had largely abandoned natural right altogether, and the students of Thomas Aquinas.[1] Since the fundamental goal of that book was a recovery of the classical or pre-modern theory of natural right, one might have anticipated that Strauss's work would have been received enthusiastically by the latter group. If nothing else, Strauss and the Thomists were natural allies because they shared the same modern enemies: namely, historicism (the view that all human thought is confined to the immediate historical horizon of the thinker) and positivism (the view that human thought cannot make value judgments, but only judgments about observable matters of fact). Beyond that, Strauss explored very seriously the issues of reason and revelation .and of religion and politics-both of which are crucial for Thomistic political thought.

Yet, despite such favorable auguries, a congenial affiliation of

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[1] Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 2, 7.

Straussians and Thomists was never formed.[2] Many factors probably contributed to the losing of the opportunity,[3] but presumably chief among them was the fact that, even though Strauss's view of Thomas was genuinely respectful, it was not unequivocally sympathetic. Strauss preferred classical natural right theory to modern natural right theory, and he came to the conclusion that Thomas's teaching on natural right—while certainly 'pre-modern'[4]—introduced novelties into the classical position which weakened it rather than improved it. The goal of this essay is *to* analyze Strauss's reservations about Thomas's statement of the problem of natural right. Such an analysis will, I hope, contribute to a more fruitful exchange between the students of Leo Strauss and those of Thomas Aquinas.

I

Perhaps the best way to initiate an explanation of Strauss's view of the differences between classical and Thomistic natural right is to contrast the starting points of the two theories. The classical approach begins with what is said about right, with the everyday opinions that are held about what is just. From such an immediate starting point the classical approach ascends toward true knowledge through the process of dialectics. Although all people have views about what is just, in fact such opinions, when examined through friendly disputation with a philosopher, are almost always found to be self-contradictory; however, the

[2] This is not to suggest that Strauss was completely ignored and rejected by the Thomists. For an overview of the Thomistic literature which has considered Strauss, see James V. Schall, "Revelation, Reason and Politics: Catholic Reflexions on Strauss," *Gregorianum* 62 (1981), 349-365, 467-497.

[3] See Ernest L. Fortin, "Rational Theologians and Irrational Philosophers: A Straussian Perspective," *Interpretation* 12 (1984), 349-350.

[4] For Strauss, the fundamental division within the history of political philosophy was between the ancients and the moderns. He understood Thomas to be in the former camp and was critical of contemporary Thomists who, under pressure from the success of modern physics, had attempted to 'modernize' Thomas by jettisoning his teleological view of nature. See *Natural Right and History,* pp. 7-8; *What is Political Philosophy?* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1959), pp. 285-6.

very fact that one comes to realize that contradiction and seeks to rectify it points to the fact that human beings realize that a more comprehensive, non-contradictory view might be possible. The contradictions thus force one to ascend beyond the opinions that are at best only partially true toward an ever more consistent view, a view based on nature; if such a process could reach culmination, the culmination would constitute a statement of what is right by nature.[5]

The starting point in Thomas's theory of natural right is not what is said about justice; rather, as can be seen in the structure of the questions on law in the *Summa theologiae,* Thomas begins at the extreme opposite of the spectrum of truth, with God. God's wisdom rules the entire universe in accord with God's eternal law or providence. Human beings, however, are not subject to providence in the same way as irrational natures, which pursue their appropriate ends without understanding. Through the capacities of conscience, human beings have an immediate intellectual grasp of the end of human nature and so move toward that end voluntarily. They are therefore not mindlessly subject to providence, but actually participate in it, in the sense that they apply God's natural law, known to the human conscience, to themselves.[6]

The difference in the two approaches is striking. For the classical natural right theorists, one ascends to the knowledge of natural right through dialectics; for Thomas, _the knowledge about what is according to nature is a descent, from God, through providence, to the law known by the human conscience, to deduced conclusions about natural law. As Strauss puts it, the Socratic method begins not with what is first in itself or first by nature, but with what is first for us, with the opinions.[7] The implication is that Thomas, on the other hand, begins with what is first in itself or first by nature, i.e. God. For Socrates, then, knowledge of natural right is always accessible but never imme-

[5] *Natural Right and History,* pp. 123-6.
[6] *Summa theologiae,* Ia-Hae, q. 91, aa. 1-2; q. 93, aa. q. 94, a. 1.
[7] *Natural Right and History,* pp. 123-4.

diate; the laborious endeavor of dialectics is always the pre-condition, and only philosophers master dialectics. For Thomas, though, we do have immediate access to natural right through the conscience or, more precisely, *synderesis*-an intellectual *habitus* which contains the first precepts of the law of nature.[8]

Strauss emphasizes the importance and uniqueness of *synderesis* to Thomistic natural right theory. He insists that the origins of the term are to be found in Christian patristic authors rather than in classical antiquity and that the intellectual *habitus* which the term names is something quite foreign to classical natural right theory. He is willing to admit that human beings experience "a kind of divination that not everything is permitted," but suggests that such a divination is as apt to result in absurd taboos as it is in an understanding of natural right.[9]

Strauss's concerns about Thomas's suggestion that natural right is known through *synderesis* as opposed to Socratic dialectics may at first seem tangential. Why does Strauss think that the issue is so crucial for the fate of natural right? The argument repeatedly raised against natural right is that knowledge of what is just varies from one society to another, from one historical epoch to another, whereas natural right must be unchange-

8 *Summa theologiae,* Ia, q. *79,* aa. 11-12; Ia-Hae, q. 94, a. 1; *De veritate,* q. 16, a. 1.

9 *Natural Right and History,* pp. 129-130, 157-8. The origin of Thomas's concept of *synderesis* is a matter of dispute among scholars. Harry V. Jaffa [*Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 173], a student of Strauss, follows the lead of his teacher, pointing out that Thomas himself mentions Basil and Jerome as authorities for the existence of *synderesis.* Oscar J. Brown [*Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas* (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1981), pp. 175-7] says that most authorities agree that the term itself entered the milieu of scholasticism through the commentary of Jerome on Ezekiel. Michael Bertram Crowe ["The Natural Law Before St. Thomas," *Irish Ecclesiastical Record 76* (1951), 193-204] suggests that William of Auxerre is a more immediate source of the idea of a *habitus* of practical first principles parallel to the *habitus* of speculative first principles. John J. Schrems ["A Reexamination of Harry V. Jaffa's *Thomism and Aristotelianism," Political Science Reviewer* 18 (1988), 179-181] insists that the basic idea of *synderesis* may be found in Aristotle's *Ethics* (1151a15).

able; the variety of opinions concerning justice supposedly proves that there is nothing which is just by nature. Strauss, however, is merciless in attacking this argument, insisting upon its irrelevance repeatedly in *Natural Right and History.*[10] Indeed, he initiates the very first chapter of the book with an assault upon this argument, claiming instead that unanimity of opinion concerning natural right is in no way "a necessary condition" of the existence of natural right :

> Some of the greatest natural right teachers have argued that, precisely if natural right is rational, its discovery presupposes the cultivation of reason, and therefore natural right will not be known universally: one ought not even to expect any real knowledge of natural right among savages. In other words, by proving that there is no principle of justice that has not been denied somewhere or at some time, one has not yet proved that any given denial was justified or reasonable.[11]

According to Strauss, the argument that lack of consent disproves natural right is the very same argument used by the conventionalists against natural right teaching in antiquity. As he puts it, the argument "has shown an amazing vitality throughout the ages, a vitality which seems to contrast with its intrinsic worth."[12]

It would seem that Strauss's concern about Thomas's doctrine of *synderesis* is connected to this conventionalist criticism. The classical expression of the natural right teaching is immune to the objection which points to a lack of common consent about justice because the classical view does not claim that there should be common consent about justice. Indeed, for the dialectical approach the various and competing opinions about justice are precisely the pre-condition necessary in order for the question about natural right to arise. That most people do not know natural right is a given for the ancient authors.[13] It is not, however, so obvious that the Thomistic expression of natural right

[10] *Natural Right and History,* pp. 9-10, 97-8, 124-5.
[11] Ibid., p. 9.
[12] Ibid., p. 97.
[13] Ibid., pp. 10, 124-6.

theory, which attempts to erect its foundations on the *habitus* of *synderesis,* can adequately answer the conventionalist objection, If *synderesis* is common to all human beings, should not all human beings have knowledge of natural right? Consequently, should there not be common consent about what is right by nature? This problem is compounded by Thomas's view that what is right by nature is actually natural *law,* The term "law," as Thomas himself notes, implies promulgation, [14] The law must be known or else it is not law, If one does not know a law, one cannot be held fully responsible for failing to abide by iL In other words, once Thomas has asserted that what is right by nature is actually natural law, does he not have to say that everyone knows that law? [15]

Thomas, of course, clearly saw the problem himself and attempted to solve it by means of the distinction between primary and secondary precepts of the natural law, The primary precepts of the natural law are what *synderesis* knows immediately, and human knowledge of these precepts is immutable, These unchanging first precepts need to be applied to contingent matters, however, and this gives rise to the secondary precepts, These secondary precepts follow very closely from the primary precepts, and so consequently in the vast majority of cases such precepts are known, Nevertheless, it is possible that, due to the required descent from the unchanging first principles into the realm of contingent human events, in a few instances a person or even a whole group might be ignorant of one of these secondary precepts, The thieving Germans, Thomas says, were a case in point, for they were ignorant of the secondary natural law precept forbidding stealing, [16]

Thomas thus anticipates the conventionalist criticism concerning universal knowledge or consent, Still, while perhaps his theory does not require universal consent concerning natural right, does it not require at least majority consent? Surely it

[14] *Summa theolog£ae,* Ia-Hae, q, 90, a. 4, ad L
[15] Jaffa, *Thomism and Aristotelianism,* p, 172.
[16] *Summa theologiae,* Ia-Hae, q, 94, a, 4,

must at least be said that the knowledge of natural right cannot be limited to the wise as in the Socratic view, for that would clearly violate the meaning of promulgation. Furthermore, one wonders what happens as one applies the natural law to ever more contingent circumstances. In such cases, will natural law still be known to all, or at least to most? In discussing the Mosaic law, Thomas mentions a tertiary group of moral precepts which, unlike the charity commandments or the decalogue, would have been accessible only to the wise if God had not revealed them.[17] However, Thomas is silent about a corresponding tertiary group of natural law precepts not immediately accessible to everyone; perhaps this is because it is difficult to see how such precepts, which lack promulgation if they are known only to the wise, could constitute a law.

Perhaps in the end Thomas does have an answer to the conventionalist objection about consent. However, the very least that can be said is that this problem of the knowledge of what is right by nature raises all sorts of problems for Thomas which were simply not obstacles for the ancient theory of natural right. According to Thomas, those who do not know natural right are in the extreme minority; according to Plato, those who do know natural right-the philosophers-are in the extreme minority. Consequently, those who object to natural right teaching on the basis of human ignorance of natural right are clearly going to find Thomas an easier target than the classical authors.

II

According to Strauss, Thomas's doctrine of *synderesis* as the divine promulgation of the natural law has the effect of obfuscating the classical link between natural right and the question concerning the best regime. In classical natural right thinking, natural right is based upon human nature, but human nature is political, for human beings cannot be perfected, cannot live well, except by living with others. This means that what is right by na-

[17] Ibid., q. 100, aa. 1, 3, and 11.

ture for man will necessarily include an understanding of what is right by nature for man's political life, i.e. an understanding of justice.[18] But what is right by nature for man's political life is a question that is answered by a determination of the question concerning the best regime. The ancients did not spin stories about the best regime just because they had nothing better to do; the best regime is natural right 'writ large':

> The classic natural right doctrine in its original form, if fully developed, is identical with the doctrine of the best regime. For the question as to what is by nature right or as to what is justice finds its complete answer only through the construction, in speech, of the best regime.[19]

Thomas, of course, accepted the Aristotelian teaching that man is by nature political, and he does treat the question of the best regime. However, that question is not an issue of paramount importance to his theory; certainly the doctrine of the best regime is not the fullest or most complete expression of the natural law. In a footnote, Strauss directs the reader to Thomas's teaching that the regime of ancient Israel constituted the best regime.[20] According to Thomas, however, that regime was founded not by the moral precepts of the Mosaic law, which are basically correlates of the natural law precepts, but by the judicial precepts of Moses, which are only derivations from the moral precepts-derivations that do not have the full intelligibility and moral force of the natural law. Most significantly, after the coming of Christ those judicial precepts prescribing the best regime are abrogated.[21] Thus, the teaching about the best regime, which is paramount to the teaching of the *Republic* and of the *Laws,* plays only a minor and dispensable role in Thomas's natural law teaching. What constitutes the fullest expression of natural right for the former is for the latter a relatively unimportant topic.

Strauss argues that the reason why Thomas was able to dis-

[18] *Natural Right and History,* p. 129.
[19] Ibid., p. 144.
[20] Ibid., p. 144, n. 20.
[21] *Summa theologiae,* Ia-Hae, q. 99, aa. 2, 4; q. 104, aa. 1, 3; q. 105, a. 1.

engage natural right from the question about the best regime was that he linked natural right, or, to speak more precisely, natural law, to the notion of a divine lawgiver. In Thomas's theory, the natural law is higher than a discussion of the best regime, for it has been promulgated by God through *synderesis* and is therefore in effect always and everywhere-even in a bad regime, or even among those who do not live in a city. The natural law requires the observance of the decalogue and the moral precepts it embodies; such a code must be followed in a democracy, an aristocracy, an oligarchy, a monarchy, a tyranny, or a mixed regime. The natural law does not require a particular form of regime; instead, it requires that a particular set of precepts be observed in all regimes.[22]

These observations bring us to one of Strauss's central concerns about Thomas's view of natural right. According to Strauss, classical natural right thinking was a very flexible theory that took into account the legitimate demands of expediency and urgency. One might come to know natural right through answering the question about the best regime, but no one claimed that this regime could exist always and everywhere. Indeed, the chances that such a regime should ever come into existence are exceedingly small. Philosophers, who know natural right, probably do not want to rule because they prefer to devote themselves to higher pursuits, and even if they for some reason were persuaded to rule, the non-philosophical majority probably would not want them, preferring their own opinions to the naturally just. Therefore, while the existence of the best regime is always theoretically possible, the best regime is in fact always constructed in speech. Moreover, the best regime is only best in optimal conditions. Most peoples, not being sufficiently perfected, could not have such a political regime. A regime less than the best regime is thus best for most cities.

The exigencies of the present situation are consequently accorded great status in ancient natural right thinking. It was understood that natural right will frequently, nay, almost always,

22 *Natural Right and History,* p. 144.

have to be suspended by political rulers. In other words, natural right requires what Strauss calls "dilution." Without such dilution, natural right is not beneficial to the city and instead becomes only a tremendous threat to stability, for virtually no regimes can truly be said to be by nature just:

> In descending into the cave, the philosopher admits that what is intrinsically or by nature the highest is not the most urgent for man. . . . When attempting to guide the city, he knows then in advance that, in order to be useful or good for the city, the requirements of wisdom must be qualified or diluted.[23]

Strauss explains that this position of the .ancients must not be confused with "relativism." [24] Indeed, he says, there is "a universally valid hierarchy of ends," but the demands of urgency are also legitimate, and the most urgent end may be a lower end than other, less urgent but more noble ends. In such a situation, the classical theorists felt that it was a sign of nobility to seek, as much as possible, the higher end over the urgent end, to make the higher end the most urgent end; still, one could not say that the demands of urgency ought never to be preferred to a higher, less urgent end.[25]

In Thomas's view, of course, it is possible that in extreme instances certain precepts of the natural law can legitimately be suspended. The fundamental primary precepts of the natural law do not admit of dispensation at all, but the more concrete conclusions of those precepts, the secondary precepts, may admit of dispensation. The example that Thomas gives of such a dispensable precept is the case of returning a pledge to a man who intends to use it to attack one's own country.[26]

Be this as it may, says Strauss, Thomas's dispensable natural laws are still secondary precepts of a law promulgated and en-

2a Ibid., p. 152.

24 Even less must it be confused with an unconscious "dance with Machiavelli " as Schall [" A Latitude for Statesmanship? Strauss on St. Thomas," *Review of Politics* 53 (1991), 128] suggests.

25 *Natural Right and History,* pp. 162-3.

20 *Summa theologiae,* Ia-Hae, q. 94, a. 4.

forced by God. Perhaps on the rarest of occasions they may be suspended, but *only* on the rarest of occasions. Whereas Plato's doctrine of dilution recognized that natural right existed virtually nowhere except in a city constructed in speech, Thomas's doctrine of dispensations implies that the natural law must be practiced virtually always and everywhere. By standing over and immediately judging all positive law, Thomas's natural law theory has the effect of drastically restricting the latitude required by political leaders to confront the urgencies of the present situation.[21] In Strauss's mind, then, the ubiquitous presence of the divine lawgiver has the effect of rendering the natural law teaching inflexible, and it was partially against this inflexible teaching that the modem political thinkers rebelled.[28]

III

In analyzing Strauss's understanding of these Thomistic innovations in natural right theory, it becomes clear that all paths of questioning lead to Thomas's divine, provident lawgiver. It is because of this provident deity that Thomas can assert the doctrine of *synderesis,* that he can demote the question of the best regime, and that he can make his theory of what is right by nature ' inflexible.'

Ancient natural right teaching, Strauss claims, does not ground itself in a divine lawgiver who promulgates and enforces through providence, for the ancient teaching does not appeal to the author of nature but to nature itself: " The example of Aristotle alone would suffice to show that it is possible to admit natural right without believing in particular providence or in divine justice proper." [29] Strauss even finds the connection between providence and natural right to be foreign to the thought of Cicero, who is sometimes interpreted as arguing for such a view. The problem with such an interpretation of Cicero, says Strauss, is that in the key text of the *Republic* in which this teaching is

21 Jaffa, *Thomism and Aristotelianism,* pp. 179, 182-3.
2s *Natural Right and History,* p. 164.
2o Ibid., p. 94.

found, the speaker is not Scipio, who speaks for Cicero, but Laelius.[80] Since the ancients did not ground their understanding of natural right in the notion of a divine lawgiver, Strauss has very real doubts about the existence of a natural *law* theory, properly speaking, in the ancient world at all; the exception would be Stoicism, which, like Thomas, accepted the doctrine of divine providence.[81] In fact, Strauss argues instead that since the fundamental distinction at the heart of classical natural right thinking is the distinction between nature on the one hand and law or convention on the other, the idea of "natural law" would virtually be a contradiction in terms to that tradition.[82] Without a divine lawgiver, the most that can be said is that some things are in accord with the hierarchical structure of human nature; that what is in accord with nature in this way can be said actually to constitute a law is only possible if one has recourse to a provident, legislating God.

Strauss does not attempt to disprove the Thomistic doctrine of particular providence; neither does he attempt to disprove the teachings of *synderesis* or 'inflexibility' which are based upon Thomas's provident lawgiver. Indeed, it is important to understand that Strauss's criticisms of Thomas's theory of natural law are not immediately directed against the truth of the position. Rather, Strauss is concerned about the prudence of the position; he is concerned that Thomas, by erecting natural right on the unstable foundation of theology, has left natural right theory on shaky and uncertain ground. Thomas attempted to establish what is more evident (natural right) upon what is less evident (God); the result may not have been in the best interests of natural right, for Thomas thereby left natural right vulnerable to the attacks of the moderns:

> The modern efforts were partly based on the premise, which would have been acceptable to the classics, that moral principles have a

80 Ibid., pp. 154-6.

81 Leo Strauss, *Platonic Political Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 141.

82 Ibid., p. 138.

greater evidence than the teachings even of natural theology and, therefore, that natural law or natural right should be kept independent of theology and its controversies.[33]

In objecting to the linkage between natural right and natural theology and the many conclusions that flow from such a linkage, the moderns in fact attacked not the ancients, but the medieval version of the ancients. If the ancients are examined only through Thomistic-colored glasses, it is not completely clear to ungraced human philosophy, Strauss implies, that they are in all ways superior to the moderns. In this sense, then, Thomas actually represents an obstacle to Strauss's project of resuscitating classical natural right theory.

Though he does not actually attempt to establish the point, Strauss suggests that quite possibly the impetus for Thomas's innovations in the realm of natural right, for his overstating the claims of natural right, was his Christian faith :

> It is reasonable to assume that these profound changes [introduced by Thomas into natural right teaching] were due to the influence of the belief in biblical revelation. If this assumption should prove to be correct, one would be forced to wonder, however, whether the natural law as Thomas Aquinas understands it is natural law strictly speaking, i.e., a law knowable to the unassisted human mind, to the human mind which is not illumined by divine revelation.[34]

This remark is uncharacteristic of Strauss, since he frequently argued that the interpreter ought not necessarily to confine a great thinker's views to the historical horizon in which he wrote; given the context, Strauss's remark almost seems *ad hominem,* i.e., Thomas reached the conclusions he did not on the basis of argumentation but on the basis of his Christian background.[35]

However, it should be pointed out that Strauss's view of Thomas's innovations in natural right theory is not logically dependent upon his assessment of the impetus for those innovations. In other words, it would seem to be logically possible to disagree

33 *Natural Right and History,* p. 164.

84 Ibid., p. 163.

a5 See Schall, " A Latitude for Statesmanship? " esp. p. 133.

with Strauss's view of the motives for Thomas's innovations and still agree with Strauss's critique of those innovations. Strauss himself admits his view of the motives which incited Thomas's innovations is only an unproven assumption. He presumably understood, then, that even if this assumption turned out to be wrong, his criticisms of Thomas's innovations would. remam.

Nevertheless, Strauss's reservations about the naturalness of Thomas's natural law theory point to a profound disagreement with Thomas concerning the relationship between faith and philosophy, and one is thereby inclined to conclude that perhaps Strauss not only finds Thomas's innovations in natural right theory imprudent but also non-philosophic. It is neither possible nor necessary to explain completely Strauss's view of the tionship between reason and revelation at this juncture, but the key to understanding his concern with Thomas's position has to do with Strauss's understanding of what it means to be a ophe:r, an understanding which Thomas Pangle has explained as follows:

> We will never grasp adequately what Strauss, following Plato and Xenophon, means by " philosophy " so long as we try to conceive of philosophy as merely a method of thought, or an assemblage of intellectual tools, or even as the most comprehensive sort of reflection which culminates in a "total world-view": *philosophy is, above all, a unique· way of life; and the authentic philosophers are human beings of a different kind from all other human beings.*[36]

H one understands philosophy as such a unique way of life,[37] then the conflict between religious faith and philosophy becomes very sharp indeed. The believer's act of faith, to use Thomas's

[36] Thomas L. Pangle, "Introduction" to Leo Strauss, *Platonic Political Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 9; see also Leo Strauss, "The Mutual Influence of Theology and Philosophy," *Independent Journal of Philosophy/Unabhi:ingige Zeitschift* fur *Philosophie* 3 (1979), 113.

[31] h would seem that Schall ["A Latitude for Statesmanship?" pp. 127-8] does not consider philosophy in such a fashion and is therefore puzzled at Strauss's view of the problem of faith and reason.

own analysis, is an assent by the will to things that are not understood and, by definition, are not understandable, for they are supernaturally revealed. The philosopher, however, places understanding above all else; the philosopher lives according to understanding. To ask someone who lives according to reason to assent to something other than reason would be to ask the impossible.

For Strauss, the doctrine of natural right emerged as a result of philosophy's struggle against religion. Pre-philosophic life is characterized by the identification of the good with the ancestral, with the customary way of living. Questions about the good in pre-philosophic life are answered by authority, by appealing to the authority of the ancestors or the authority of the gods. Philosophy instead seeks the answers about the beginnings, about the first things, from nature, and indeed philosophy can be said to have emerged simultaneously with the discovery of nature. By identifying the good with nature, philosophy uproots the identification of the good with the ancestral. Consequently, philosophy presupposes the doubt of the authority which identifies the good with the ancestral.[88] Philosophy thus becomes a whole different way of experiencing the world :

> ... the relation of reason or understanding to its objects is fundamentally different from that obedience without reasoning why that corresponds to authority proper. . . . By submitting to authority, philosophy, in partkular political philosophy, would lose its character; it would degenerate into ideology, i.e., apologetics for a given or emerging social order, or it would undergo a transformation into theology or legal learning.[89]

It would seem, however, that Thomas might freely admit this 'non-philosophic' (in the Straussian sense) character of his thought. Consider, for example, the work in which Thomas's supreme expression of his natural law theory is found, the *Summa theologiae.* That work begins with an article entitled with the question of "whether, besides philosophy, any further teaching

as *Natural Right and History,* pp. 81-93.

39 Ibid., p. 92; see also "On the Interpretation of Genesis," *L'Homme: Revue francaise d'anthropologie* 21 (1981), 19.

is required?" The question does not sound very auspicious for a work devoted to theology, but Thomas explains that in fact the science of sacred doctrine is required in addition to philosophy, and for two reasons : first, because human nature is directed to an end that exceeds the grasp of human reason; second, because even those truths about God which reason might come to know are only grasped by the reasoning powers of a few, and that after a long time and with the admixure of many errors. In other words, Thomas is suggesting that the philosophic quest is radically inadequate, for it is simply exiled from the highest things and all but exiled from other important but not supreme things. Whereas the initial article of the *Summa* begins by asking whether a teaching besides philosophy is necessary, by the time one finishes reading the article one wonders whether philosophy has any use at all, given the vast superiority of the science of sacred doctrine. Thomas says that in fact it does have a use-but only as a handmaid to theology. This ancillary status of philosophy is evident also in Thomas's treatise on law, a treatise which does not culminate in but begins with a discussion of the natural law and ascends from that discussion to treatments of the Mosaic law and the law of Christ.

Interestingly enough, Strauss does not deny that, if natural right once emerges and becomes commonplace, it can be adjusted -with a bit of paring and whittling-to religious belief. In other words, if philosophy is understood not as a way of life but as a set of conclusions or doctrines, then it is perhaps not impossible to make faith and philosophy more or less compatible.[40] One surmises that Strauss felt that this was what Thomas had done.

However, the problem with such a procedure, according to Strauss, is that if faith predominates it " makes the quest for natural right infinitely unimportant: if man knows by divine revelation what the right path is, he does not have to discover that path by his unassisted efforts." [41] Thomas, as the first article of the *Summa theologiae* indicates, would more or less concur in

[40] *Natitral Right and History,* p. 85; "Mutual Influence," p. 113.
[41] *Natural Right and History,* p. 85.

Strauss's description of the situation. While he might not say that philosophy is " infinitely unimportant" for faith, he does say that it is at best only a " handmaiden " who is exiled from the highest truths. Unlike the philosopher Strauss, however, Thomas does not find such a situation objectionable.

IV

As was noted in the introductory paragraph of this essay, at mid-century Strauss could describe the Thomists and the modern liberals as the two major parties in American social science. Indeed, he could plausibly claim that Roman Catholic thought was the most powerful opponent of the entire modern Western political project:

> Anyone who wishes to judge impartially of the legitimacy of the prospects of the great design of modern man to erect the City of Man on what appear to him to be the ruins of the City of God must familiarize himself with the teachings, and especially the political teachings, of the Catholic church, which is certainly the most powerful antagonist of that modern design.[42]

Since that time, of course, Thomism has collapsed, not only as an important party within American social science and a serious opponent to modern liberalism, but even as the dominant school of theology within Roman Catholicism, which has suddenly reconciled itself to life in the City of Man. By criticizing Thomas from the point of view of the ancients, Strauss extended to the Thomists a profound challenge, but such a challenge from the side of the ancients was hardly what the shrinking army of Thomists, then desperately fending off their modern critics, needed most. This may explain in part the relative silence with which Strauss's work was originally greeted within Thomistic circles.[43] However, by indicating in the initial chapters of *Natural Right and History* and in other works how the powerful modern obstacles to the recovery of pre-modern thought might be

[42] *What is Political Philosophy?* p. 281.

[48] See Fortin, " Rational Theologians and Irrational Philosophers," pp. 349-350.

overcome, Strauss has done the Thomists a greater favor than they have heretofore realized.[44] Moreover, even concerning those points at which the Straussian project diverged from Thomism it should be pointed out that there is little assistance so helpful to any group of thinkers as that provided by a truly profound critic. Consequently, even now it is not unreasonable to hope that the Thomists might be able to profit from Strauss's thought.

44 Ibid., p. 356.

THEOLOGY, PRAXIS, AND ETHICS IN THE THOUGHT OF JUAN LUIS SEGUNDO, S.J.

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I. *Introduction*

JESUS OF NAZARETH Yesterday and Today is Juan Luis Segundo's most recent contribution in an on-going effort to forge a distinctive post-conciliar catholic theology.[1] This five-volume work establishes Segundo as one of the most prolific, methodologically sophisticated, and constructive Catholic theologians of this century. In these volumes he moves beyond the task of reframing fundamental theology in political and social terms that he began in earlier works and undertakes a full elaboration of the theological method that he introduced in *The Liberation of Theology.*[2] Better than any previous work, the recent effort witnesses to the author's range of interests and strengths,

[1] Originally published in the Spanish as *El hombre de hoy ante Jesus de Nazaret* (Madrid: Ediciones Christiandad, 1982): Vol. I. *Fe e ideologia;* Vol. II/1 and 2 *Historia y actualidad: Sinopticos y Pablo;* Vol. II/3 *El Cristo de los ejercicios espirituales;* Vol. II/4 *Lineas actuates de interpretacion de Jesus de Nazaret.* English translation *Jesus of Nazareth Yesterday and Today,* tr. John Drury (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books) : vol. 1 *Faith and Ideologies* (1984); vol. 2 *The Historical Jesus of the Synoptics* (1985); vol. 3 *The Humanist Christology of Paul* (1986) ; vol. 4 *The Christ of the Ignatian Exercises* (1987); vol. 5 *An Evolutionary Approach to Jesus of Nazareth* (1988).

[2] *The Liberation of Theology,* tr. John Drury (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976). For earlier efforts at political and social theology, see *A Theology for Artisans of A New Humanity,* tr. John Drury (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books): vol. 1 *The Community Called Church* (1973); vol. 2 *Grace and the Human Condition* (1973) ; vol. 3 *Our Idea of God* (1973) ; vol. 4 *The Sacraments Today* (1974); vol. 5 *Evolution and Guilt* (1974).

including theology and philosophy, hermeneutics and critical social theory, linguistic theory, and biblical studies.

Continuing analysis and assessment of liberation theory, and Segundo's recent effort in particular, is warranted for at least three reasons. First, *Jesus of Nazareth* and particularly its first volume, *Faith and Ideologies,* clarifies Segundo's constructive project. The volume reasserts much that is already familiar to Segundo's past readers : a deconstructive hermeneutic; the elaboration of the concepts of faith and ideology; and an interpretation of the relationship of faith to praxis, efficacy, and liberation. But it also breaks new and creative ground as it begins to construct the foundations of a moral epistemology and teleology, a more fully developed theory of value appropriation, and an anthropology grounded in transcendental-existentialist and process categories. One can only appreciate the scope and implications of Segundo's thought in a critical analysis of this recent work.

Second, Segundo's ·effort calls for further discussion because of its inevitable influence on the development of other constructive and critical Christian theologies. The visions of " geotheology," "world Catholicism," and a "liberating theology" advanced by Latin and North American Catholics are no longer the preoccupations of a peripheral minority but reflect the aspirations of conservative, moderate, and progressive voices in the Christian church. As part of this constructive task, a growing number of contemporary thinkers are addressing concerns or appropriating categories and constructs developed or elaborated by Segundo.[8] His theological breadth and sophistication means

[8] For discussions of this shift, see Alfred Hennelly, "Today's New Task: Geotheology," *America* 18 (January 1975): 27-29; and Penny Lernoux, *People of God: The Struggle for World Catholicism* (New York: Viking/ Penguin, 1989). Those either indebted to or engaged in substantial conversation with Segundo include Matthew Lamb, *Solidarity With Victims: Toward a Theology of Social Transformation* (New York: Crossroads, 1982) ; Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, " Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation," *Origins: N. C. Documentary Service* 15 (17 April 1986): 713-27; Rebecca Chopp, *The Praxis of Suffering: An Interpretation of Liberation and Political Theologies* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986) ; Alfred Hennelly, *Theology for a Liberating Church: The New Praxis of Freedom* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1989).

that he is the Latin American thinker from whom North Americans and Europeans with constructive interests in theological and political ethics have the most to learn.

Finally, Segundo's critics have leveled a range of charges against him and other liberation theologians. Some have criticized the scope of their work or questioned the commensurability of a Christian apologetic to their theological claims. Others have highlighted liberation theology's general lack of substantive ethics or sophisticated analysis concerning political economy. Most of these criticisms should be reevaluated in light of Segundo's most recent work, since it offers important clarifications and constructs that will render some criticisms obsolete while reinforcing others.[4]

[4] The best critical analyses of liberation theology and Segundo in particular include Schubert Ogden, *Faith and Freedom: Toward A Theology of Liberation* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1979); J. Andrew Kirk, *Liberation Theology: An Evangelical View From The Third World* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1979); Dennis McCann, *Christian Realism and Liberation Theology: Practical Theologies in Creative Conflict* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1981); Doug Sturm, "Praxis and Promise: On the Ethics of Political Theology," *Ethics* 92(4) (1982): 733-50; Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Until Justice and Peace Embrace* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1983), 42-68; Michael Novak, *Freedom With Justice* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984), 183-184; Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, *Instruction on Certain Aspects of the "Theology of Liberation,"* Origins 14(13) (September 13, 1984): 193-204, though serious questions remain as to whether this document reflects a serious or accurate understanding of or engagement with Latin American liberation theology; Michael Novak, *Will It Liberate? Questions About Liberation Theology* (New York: Paulist Press, 1986); Bernard T. Adeney, "Political Ethics: A Critical Examination of Liberation Theology's Ethical Methodology," *Quaker Religious Thought* 22 (1/2) (*# 63-64)* (Fall/Winter 1986): 21-36; Richard Rubenstein and John K. Roth, eds., *The Politics of Latin American Liberation Theology* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute Press, 1988); James Tunstead Burtchaell, *The Giving and Taking of Life: Essays Ethical* (Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 188-208; Daniel S. Schipani, ed., *Freedom and Discipleship: Liberation Theology in an Anabaptist Perspective* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1989), particularly the essays by Rutschman, Swartley, and Yoder; Arthur F. McGovern, *Liberation Theology and Its Critics: Toward an Assessment* (Marylmoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1989); and Paul Sigmund, *Liberation Theology at the Crossroads: Democracy or Revolittion?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). The best elaboration of Segundo's method of critical social

In this paper I focus my analysis on Segundo's recent effort to address issues related to fundamental values, moral theology, and political praxis. In Part II, I orient the reader to Segundo's basic critical method and outline his reconstruction and elaboration of the concepts of faith, anthropology, and human valuing. I show how Segundo's concepts of anthropological faith, transcendent valuing, deutero-learning, and critical hermeneutics seek to provide a coherent framework in which social analysis, theology, politics, and praxis can be held together in the elaboration of an efficacious process of humanization. In Part III, I discuss the problems that are resolved by Segundo's effort and indicate others that result from his program. If, for Segundo, efficacious human liberation is the key to an authentic Latin American theology, then I suggest that this goal can be most fully realized if the author deemphasizes his personal-existential grounding of value and focuses his efforts on concerns of practical theology, morality, and ·ethics. Finally, in Part IV, I sketch the formal structure, a range of substantive and procedural moral principles, and a framework for critical ethical reflection that might strengthen Segundo's program while building on and remaining consistent with his commitment to a liberating praxis. Such principles and procedures, I argue, will permit Segundo to explicitly elaborate and publicly justify important moral concepts that he already accepts, center his theological effort on critical praxis and ethics, and permit him to address a range of practical problems that confront Latin America but have until now evaded both analysis and resolution by any Latin American liberation theologian. To the extent that they share his vision of efficacious liberation and human well-being, even those who are suspicious of and unsympathetic or hostile toward Segundo's program at the level of method have a stake in the practical implications of his position and thus in the constructive recommendations that I advance. Additionally, I argue that it will be at the substantive

theory and its role in his ongoing project is Marsha Aileen Hewitt, *From Theology to Social Theory: Juan Luis Segundo and the Theology of Liberation* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990).

level of practical theology and ethical reflection-and not at the formal, foundational, and methodological level-that the distinctiveness and strength of Latin American liberation theology in general and Segundo's project in particular will be realized.

II. *Methodological Issues*

The Importance of Segundo's Task

A substantial portion of Segundo's constructive work has focused on a reconstruction of the concept of faith in the context of a broader commitment to human authenticity and freedom. This reconstruction is important for both theoretical and practical reasons. According to Segundo, a reinterpretation of the meaning and task of faith to human existence is essential if the Gospel message of human liberation is to be fully appreciated and realized. Because of its basic commitments and theological method, Latin American liberation theology-better than most other theologies-embodies the spirit and intent of Vatican II in seeking an end to alienation and to the authoritarian, heteronomous, legalistic, and imputatory construals of grace and salvation that have characterized much Christian thought on both sides of the Enlightenment. Humanization can only be achieved if past interpretations of faith " in " certain persons, beliefs, or doctrines are replaced with a more human-centered, existential construal of this concept that can then serve as the foundation of the moral.

A reinterpretation of faith also provides an opportunity for Segundo to delineate and emphasize humanity's shared vocation in history. By grounding faith in universal-existential and process-oriented presuppositions, Segundo is able to reinforce his move away from a classical conception of " Christian faith " to an appreciation of " anthropological faith " that is constituted by human-centered concerns.[5] Equating authentic Christian faith

[5] For the distinction between Christian and non-christian, see *The Community Called Church,* 13, 17, 93, 117-18; *The Liberation of Theology,* 125. For the distinction between authentic and inauthentic humanity, see *Grace and the Human Condition,* 14-15, 24-38, 51-53, 77-78, 147.

and " anthropological faith " supports Segundo's contention that true faith is not the exclusive claim of those who call themselves Christian. By extension, Christianity lacks distinctiveness with respect both to the authenticity of the faith it embodies and to the transcendent values to which it witnesses. The attractiveness of this move for Segundo is that it establishes a foundation for shared Christian and non-christian discourse on human concerns, but without the problems associated with natural law or various types of divine command theory. However, it requires a radical reassessment of the status of the claims of Christian belief, including the very notion of orthodoxy and Christianity's traditional claims to distinctive and decisive revelation concerning fundamental human concerns.

Finally, this reconstruction of Christian faith is Segundo's response to those critics of liberation theology who have argued that it lacks the theological and methodological depth that is a prerequisite for establishing enduring credibility in theological discussions.

'With these warrants and justifications as a background and rationale for Segundo's effort, let me sketch the content of that project more fully.

Faith and Ideology

Segundo argues that a life of faith is essential to the fulfillment of the Christian-and human-task Understood apophatically, "faith is not a universal atemporal body of content summing up divine revelation" to which the Christian It does not serve as a repository of the " correct " strategies for addressing the problems of concrete human existence. Faith "lacks any precise instrument for measuring the historical life of Christians by pre-established standards." [7] Nor is it constituted by a set of conceptually objective truth claims, even though it empowers the search for value, satisfaction, and truth that is established

e *The Liberation of Theology,* 108-110.

7 *The Liberation of Theology,* 108-110.

on other grounds.[8] Positively, as a basic characteristic of all human beings, the expression of faith embodies a commitment to seek meaning and purpose in human existence through the expression of fundamental openness or trust towards others.[9] Faith thus advances human liberation through its ability to give human life coherence and meaning and to empower humanity to face the challenges of life. As beings of faith, all persons are called to take part in the construction of human-centered reality.[10]

Because faith is for Segundo a *formal* characteristic of the human, it can only inform or influence concrete human existence when it is mediated by concrete, tangible, and practical beliefs. Ideology serves this purpose. Unlike faith, ideologies are simply substantive beliefs or normative programs of existence that concretize the basic values and goals apprehended through the posture of faith. Faith is logically distinct from and prior to ideology and can never be equated with any given ideology. But ideologies are necessary, essential tools that bring faith and values to bear on reality. As a result, faith can never be encountered or experienced independent of its "ideological manifestation." But at the same time faith is the mechanism and the process by which old ideologies are deconstructed and new, "helpful" ideologies are continually reinvented. Faith is thus the means to human liberation in both a negative and a positive sense; negatively, because it empowers and ratifies the dismantling of ideologies that enslave (it is "freedom from ideologies"); positively, because it undergirds a process of ideological creation in the changing contexts of reality.[11]

[8] *The Liberation of Theology,* 11, 134-5.

[9] *The Liberation of Theology,* 179; *Faith and Ideologies,* 15-16, 31-59. Note particularly 34, 37, and 45 where he refers to the necessity of the primacy of "human projects" and of a "sensitive human heart" to the life of faith. It is statements such as this that highlight the characteristics of an affective (rather than rationalistic) theology and a liberation spirituality that are integral to Segundo's theological vision.

[10] *The Liberation of Theology,* 110, 120; *Faith and Ideologies,* 5-20, 24.

[11] "A Conversation with Juan Luis Segundo, S.J.," in *Faith,* ed. Teofilo Cabestrero (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1980), 173; Segundo, *The Liberation of Theology,* 110, 120.

Faith as the Existential Appropriation of Value: Transcenden1t Value, Satisfaction, and Eschatologicat Coherence.

If faith has no content, then where and how does one apprehend the values that should be affirmed and that ought to guide the continuing critique and reconstruction of provisional ideologies? In earlier works, Segundo argued for the normativeness of the values of freedom, humanization, and human well-being.[12] In *Jesus of Nazareth* he attempts, following Bateson, Rahner, and Berdyaev, a transcendental-existential grounding of those values as a first step in establishing a human vision of authentic existence and a complementary morality. Marsha Hewitt notes that Segundo determines the morality of actions as a function of their intented efficacy. As a result, " the moral quality of an act is not derived extrinsically, so that obedience to religious laws offers no basis for determining if an action is moral." [18] If Segundo were thus to argue for the authority of Scripture or a natural law theology as decisive in informing a substantive teleology or duty-based morality, he would undercut the centrality and significance of his interpretation of faith to his entire project.

As a way of maintaining a commitment to faith and the moral, Segundo argues that the existence and continuation of a life of faith must be premised on a person's ability to express to the best of their ability and in full awareness of their lived situation a " scale of absolute or unconditioned " values that constitute the basic meaning structures of human existence.[14] The reconstruction and deduction of these values will be essential to their ultimate justification in the context of "faith-fut" existence. One's choice of values is informed by the search for human well-being. The process of distinguishing and discriminating in one's choices, ordering, or ranking of values is a function of the degree to

12 *The Liberation of Theology,* 155, 178; *The Community Called Church,* 26, 107; *Evolution and Guilt,* 111; *The Sacraments Today,* 58.

13 Marsha Hewitt, " The Search for a Liberating Christology," *Religious Studies Review* 15(1) (January 1989): 49.

u *Faith and Ideologies,* 63, *75,* 78, 140.

which they are perceived as being consistent with the attainment of satisfaction and human happiness. Segundo suggests at points that critical reflection on values presupposes and can only occur in a communal, dialogical, and relational context in which a person can learn from others how to appropriate values in the move toward satisfaction. It is historical communities, individuals, and traditions that temporally express a given set of values through the ideologies they embrace. These communities affirm various values as they commend them over time.

To recognize that certain values have been affirmed by others through a process of concretizing or "ideologizing," however, does not guarantee that those expressions are either normative or essential to the attainment of satisfaction, happiness, or efficacious existence in the present. The act of valuing and the final decision about which particular values to appropriate is ultimately an individual challenge of existence in which self-referential determinations of satisfaction must shape one's choices of which values to appropriate as the basis of one's moral vision.[15] Choosing to embody or witness to certain values is a radical statement of faith, since one can never be sure whether a value can be realized in a particular, concrete setting:

> Just as we cannot enjoy direct experience of the satisfaction a given value can provide once it has been realized to the ultimate limits of human possibilities, so neither can direct experience provide the data required to complete the comparison between [various] values . . . the data are not transcendent solely when and if they have to do with God or the beyond. They are such because they transcend all possibility of empirical verification by the individual human being.[16]

Because persons are thus incapable of empirically testing or fully verifying the authenticity or efficacy of such values before they are chosen or embraced, Segundo suggests that value commitments will need to be undertaken in the context of an "existential wager." Individuals must choose to concretize-ideologize-transcendent values with an ultimate hope, grounded in

[15] Ibid., 72-73, 322.
[16] Ibid.

faith, that they are making the best possible choice concerning personal satisfaction and happiness for both the present and future.[17] Such a wager seeks a state of "eschatological coherence."

> To *some extent,* then, every values-structure is necessarily grounded on the *ultimate* satisfaction one expects to get from the conjunction of reality with the practice of some value or set of values. The judgement which serves as the basis for this " faith " thus transcends everything which can presently be verified empirically. It presupposes a provisional way of acting *as if. . . .* Its verification is not ordinary empirical verification. Its verification is eschatological, hence an object of faith *up to the very end.*[18]

One verifies transcendent values by choosing in faith to concretize and act on them while recognizing that such verification is both incomplete, nonempirical, and imperfect. Still, such appropriation, though tentative and provisional, is essential, since faith can only be realized or exercised in the choice of a scale of substantive values that serve as the basis for an ideology.

Segundo gives little indication of the nature, shape, or substance of these transcendent data and values which serve as the prerequisite, foundation, and impetus to the construction of ideology. To do so would undercut the decisiveness of the existential wager and would collapse the distinction between faith and ideology that he seeks to maintain. These volumes present no substantive discussion of preference satisfaction, though Segundo obliquely suggests that the satisfaction of any authentic preferences will necessarily entail an other-regarding (and therefore human-centered and moral) encounter with other persons.[19] His primary concern at this point in his constructive effort is to argue for the imperative of value-creation rather than for a specific ideological manifestation of faith and values. Still, he notes that authentic faith involves a commitment to the liberation of the poor and oppressed and to historical change based on love. As a result, Segundo seems to have some normative standard in mind with which to judge authentic and inauthentic faith.[20]

[17] Ibid., 152.

[18] Ibid., 154, 165, emphases Segundo's.

[19] *The Liberation of Theology,* 13, 39, 79.

[20] Ibid., 44, 71-74, 81-84, 97.

Deutero-Learning and the Life of Faith

If an essential characteristic of the human task is critically to reflect on transcendent data and values in faith, then theology as a discipline and specific theological formulations or doctrines (ideologies) establish their legitimacy by helping these values "come to terms with historical reality."[21] For Segundo, a theology becomes authentic when it is placed in the service of struggling human beings.[22] If a person's "faith is to persist, it must increasingly be based on the creative ability to solve many problems, in line with the growing complexity of the reality with which he or she must deal."[23]

Value apprehension, appropriation, and application are three distinct tasks in which all persons must be involved.[24] Segundo seems to suggest that value apprehension and the transcendental deduction of value is a task for which human beings, as a function of their humanity, are equally prepared.[25] Still, the appropriation of a scale of values and the application of those values to the construction of ideologies are learned behaviors essential to the flourishing of individuals and communities. Segundo terms this dynamic process "deutero-learning," emphasizing the central role that critical hermeneutics holds in this undertaking. The process of deutero-learning is thus at once a critical deconstruction of dominant ideologies and a creative act of praxis and politics that translates transcendent data and values into concrete

[21] *Faith and Ideologies,* 130.

[22] *Faith and Ideologies,* 64, 76, 80, 87.

[23] Ibid., 75.

[24] William Schweiker indicates the importance of distinguishing these three facets of Segundo's reconstructive effort in "The Liberation of Theology and the Revolution of Love: An Engagement with Juan Luis Segundo's *Faith and Ideologies"* (presented in the Currents in Contemporary Christology Group, Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Chicago, Ill., November, 1988, photocopy).

[25] See his discussion of the place of reason in the transcendental deduction in *The Humanist Christology of Paul,* 133, though it is not clear to me to what degree reason is necessary in order to apprehend or appropriate transcendent values. Its role in the construction and application of provisional ideologies is clearer.

reality.[26] Deutero-learning, as the exercise of authentic faith in the construal of ideologies, thus embraces or is fundamentally guided by the *formal* or *categorical* imperatives *to* attain satisfaction and bring about humanization and efficacy. But its *substantive* formulations are *hypothetical* and context-dependent. Authentic praxis is simply the creative construal-the concrete attainment-of provisional ideologies.

In summary, deutero-learning provides the framework in which Segundo claims to elaborate a formal, phenomenological, existential, and teleological morality. It is formal in its affirmation of the concepts of faith, transcendent data, and transcendent value that seek to provide a " moral " and " human " orientation toward reality.[27] It is existential in its affirmation of the necessity of personal and " subjectively authenticated" concrete reflection on transcendent values prior to their appropriation and application.[28] It is phenomenological in its claim that the construal of concrete values and their appropriation can only take place in the context of concrete existence. And it is moral to the extent to which Segundo claims that relational or other-regarding reality fundamentally informs the choice of which substantive values to affirm.

[26] For a fuller analysis of this interpretation of the Scriptures as a witness to an historical and concrete process of "learning in faith," see Segundo *Que es un Cristiano?: I. Etapas precristianas de la fe: Evolucion de la idea de Dias en el Antigua Testamento* and *II: Concepcion cristiana de hombre* (Montevideo, Uruguay: Mosca, 1971). For a discussion of the parallels between Segundo's concept of deutero-learning and the concept of conscientization, see McCann, *Christian Realism and Liberation Theology,* 164-172, where the author argues that Segundo is indebted to Paulo Freire's notion of conscientization for his own formulations; and a rebuttal to this thesis in Matthew Lamb, " A Distorted Interpretation of Liberation Theology," *Horizons* 8 (Fall 1981) : 352-64. Alfred Hennel!y makes a claim related to McCann's when he argues for an understanding of Freire as liberation theologian with respect to ,stated ends and theological method; cf. Alfred Hennelly, *Theology for a Liberating Church,* 67-80. I believe both McCann's and Hennelly's assessments are substantially correct, though, as I will discuss shortly, I have serious questions about the adequacy of conscientization to the task at hand.

[21] *Faith and Ideologies, 322.*

[2s] Ibid., 46, 157.

Christian Theology in Light of Anthropological Faith and Deutero-Learning.

The implication of Segundo's shift to the language of anthropological faith and the contextual determination of appropriate ideology is that Christianity may not presumptively provide the " best " (most efficacious) construal of human faith in all situations. Segundo still affirms Christianity as a decisive means of change and transformation in some situations.[29] *Jesus of Nazareth* is in part an argument for the relevance of Christian theology to the task of humanization and social construction and praxis. I want to take a closer look at Segundo's discussions of grace and christology in this context, since-as examples of theological reflection-they provide insight into the nuances of his claim for the relevance of Christianity in light of the methodological commitments just outlined.

The task of grace is to overcome alienation and bondage in history; to break the barriers that limit and constrain humanity.[30] While Segundo rejects the distinction of planes of existence that is present in Thomistic thought, he argues that the work of grace irrevocably and comprehensively establishes a new "supernatural " mode of being by transforming humanity fully into the image and likeness of God. This anthropocentric transfiguration is evidenced through the attainment of human achievements, dominion over nature, personalization, and fraternal solidarity.[31]

Segundo is thus committed to the centrality of the language of grace in his developing theological and social vision because it communicates an essential characteristic of human reality not fully captured by other concepts. Its legitimacy, however, is established not as a function of its doctrinal orthodoxy or its historical affirmation by Christians but because it reinforces the

[29] For an argument concerning both Christianity's decisiveness and the Christian's privileged comprehension or understanding of the purposes of God, see *The Community Called Church,* 3, 10, 24, 40, 55, 72-83, 131; *The Liberation of Theology,* 228-31.

[30] *The Humanist Christology of Paul,* 93.

[31] *The Liberation of Theology,* 150; *Grace and the Human Condition,* 7-10, 28, 43-46, 60, 139; *Evolution and Guilt,* 46-7, 66, 83.

notion of anthropological faith that is fundamental to all human experience. Thus, while Segundo is willing to concede that distinctive Christian theology (i.e., the construal of reality and construction of a provisional ideology based on Christian teachings) exists, grace is in reality something experienced by all persons as a function of their humanity.[32]

What characteristics might a functional christology exhibit would be consistent with and reinforce this open, progressive, and universalist vision of grace? *Jesus of Nazareth* certainly contains the foundation for a christology of sorts. But any response to this question is complicated by the fact that Segundo himself refers to his effort of interpreting the life, ministry, and work of Jesus as an 'anti-christology."[33] He uses critical analysis of past christologies (the Synoptics, the first part of Paul's Letter to the Romans, and the *Spiritual E:cercises* of St. Ignatius) as occasions for exploring the implications of his critical method to the construction of contemporary provisional theologies. Based on this analysis, he suggests that three presuppositions ought to guide both one's reflections on the formal concept of christology and the construction of provisional christologies.

First, to understand and/ or appropriate a christology is to appreciate or commit oneself to the concrete construal of the life of faith of that christology's creator. Christologies are products of human creativity refl.ecting concrete anthropological visions. For Segundo, the essential " truth " of a christology is not doctrinal-

82 Segundo is more that just a universalist when it comes to the experience and appropriation of salvation. He further argues that the experiences of grace and salvation are central to the human experiences of love, justice, and life; of overcoming the law, sin, and death; *The Humanist Christology of Paul,* 86, 97.

as *The Historical Jesus of the Synoptics,* 13-21. It should be emphasized that this is not Segundo's first foray into christology. Indeed, most of the significant methodological presuppositions and substantive elements of christology found in *Jesus of Nazareth* were developed in earlier works. See, for example, *Grace and the Human Condition,* 34, 42, 85, 95, 118-119, 132; *The Community Called Church,* 10, 11, 13, 18, 26. The implications of Segundo's social theory on christology is deftly discussed by McCann, *Christian Realism and Liberation Theology,* 221-227.

ly established or objectively affirmed, but is a function of whether or not it affirms the primacy of the process of critical faith (i.e. deutero-leaming) in the life of its creator. Because of this proviso, the critique-the critical deconstruction-of historical or contemporary christologies (including those of the New Testament) can never be interpreted as an act of idolatry or heresy. Rather, in keeping with the task of the life of authentic faith, such deconstruction seeks to uncover the limitations of particular ideologies as a propaedeutic to constructive undertakings. [84]

Second, such christologies must be developed in the context of an existential, historically grounded, contextual, concrete, and process-oriented appreciation of the life of faith if they are to be experientially coherent. Such a construal of the Christian life is reaffirmed by the existential coherence of appr·eciating Christ as one who reveals the possibility of open, progressive human growth and perfection.

Third, Segundo's appreciation of theology rules out the construction of metaphysical and dogmatic christologies and the attribution to Jesus Christ of the substantive embodiment of the necessary and sufficient revelation of God.[35] In fact, as Marsha Hewitt has observed, Segundo's fundamental commitment to human liberation means that

> It is Jesus' life, words and deeds, which interest Segundo much more than his substantive revelation to God. Segundo's preoccupation with social change leads him to focus much more on Jesus the man, than Jesus as Christ.... [T]he real point of faith in Jesus is that Jesus stands as a paradigmatic referential witness . . . of those values which promote the interests and welfare of humanity.[36]

[84] It is this interpretation of the task of theology that distinguishes Segundo's position most clearly from that of The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, elaborated in "Instruction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of Liberation," 193-204; Segundo's response to this attack is developed in *Theology and the Church: A Response to Cardinal Ratzinger and a Warning to the Whole Church,* tr. John W. Diercksmeier (Minneapolis: Seabury/Winston, 1985).

[35] *Faith and Ideologies,* 50, 75-77.

[36] Hewitt, *From Theology to Social Theory,* 11, 57, 163-165.

McCann's observations and assessment of Segundo's earlier Christological reflections reinforce Hewitt's arguments concerning Segundo's most recent work. McCann observes that, for Segundo, Jesus is appreciated most as a model of what it means for humans *to* appropriate a critical approach to existence, This appreciation of faith empowers individuals to authentic life and the appropriation of experientially-based " coherent" truth. The salvific meaning of the Christian life is not substantive (though certainly there are substantive values that Christians may affirm) but the embodiment-the occasion-of the deideologizing task.[31] Segundo's construal of faith is an apologetic for a specific anthropologically-centered christology rather than, as with Barth and others, a christologically-based general anthropology.

McCann's observations notwithstanding, Segundo's "anti-christology " does not rule out confession of Jes us as Christ by the believer. *Jesus of Nazareth* attempts to ground this theology not in subjectivism or emotivism, but rather in a shared vision of a human faith. Segundo's vision is a witness to the primacy of critical reflection over substantive doctrinal affirmations and to the primacy of human faith over the provisional construal of dogma and ideology. It thus raises a range of challenges to tional theology, at the level of both content and method.

HI. *Critical Analysis*

Segundo's methodological and constructive efforts are not without their problems. Here, I detail a number of limitations with Segundo's project and introduce some options for resolving these conundrums in a way that might still permit Segundo to remain consistent with his fundamental presuppositions.

First, Segundo needs to further justify why his recognition of the formal concept of anthropological faith and a commitment to personal authenticity and humanization requires a concurrent commitment to concrete, efficacious, and other-regarding con-

[37] McCann, *Christian Realism and Liberation Theology,* 224; "A Conversation with Juan Luis Segundo, S.J.," in *Faith,* ed. Teofilo Cabestrero, 173; *The Liberation of Theolog:;i,* 108-110, 134-5.

cerns. There are striking similarities here between Rahner's attempt to interpret and mediate the experience of salvation through the affirmation of the self and Segundo's notion of humanization-as-salvation mediated by transcendental-existentialist categories.[88] For both authors, the tension between an individualist, self-referential normative vision and a position that affirms other-regarding, interpersonal, and communally-based value claims is resolved in favor of the latter.

In Segundo's work this move is never justified. Human expressions of faith, Segundo argues at points, are self-authenticating, and are not open to external judgments or critiques. They are neither externally verifiable nor falsifiable because there exist no evaluative criteria other than "subjectively authenticated" feelings for judging the authenticity and/ or efficacy of faith claims. In other words, there is no reason in Segundo's constructive vision why the attainment of personal-existential coherence must necessarily or universally result in a commitment to other-regarding concerns or communal efficacy. If, as I believe is the case, Segundo's understanding of faith as a fundamental but formal reality does not allow for any judgments or assessments concerning its substance, then there is no way for Segundo to judge or justify his preference for one manifestation of faith over another. In principle a person's expression of anthropological faith can affirm goals that oppose moral, humanistic, and liberative considerations. But of course, this is not the claim that Segundo ultimately makes. Rather, he argues that all authentic faith must be committed to, and all deutero-learning and conscientizing actions can be tested with respect to, certain humanistic values. Suddenly, it is substantive ideology which is judging, indeed shaping, authentic faith. The problem with this move is that it is precisely what the distinction between faith and ideology and the concepts of faith and eschatological coherence were developed to avoid.

A second and related problem with Segundo's position centers on his claim that since transcendent values are apprehended in

[88] Cf. Rebecca Chopp, *The Praxis of Suffering,* 19.

relational and communal contexts, the values thus apprehended will necessarily be other-regarding. Segundo seems to argue here that all human beings will affirm similar if not identical values as a result of the shared participation in a process of transcendental deduction, and that the appropriation of authentic moral values will provide universally binding standards of authentication.[89] Again, this is a less than self-evident claim. Segundo never fully elaborates why the transcendental deduction in the context of faith needs to be *relationally* grounded. In fact, the language he employs to discuss anthropological faith and the attainment of eschatological coherence is surprisingly absent of interpersonal markers, metaphors, and language. And to claim that knowledge or values are imparted interpersonally is not a justification that such values must be moral. His failure to distinguish moral from non-moral value, and to develop an accessible and sustained justification of the primacy of the moral over the non-moral ultimately undercuts his later attempts to elaborate a moral teleology and a justification of the primacy of deutero-learning and praxis. At most, such a claim supports a formal epistemology, not any normative moral claim. His transcendental existentialism thus fails to carry the weight of establishing the political and practical theology and social agenda that are his aspiration.

As a way of overcoming these types of criticisms, Segundo posits the existence and usefulness of interpretive 'keys" (political, anthropological, existential) that may be used to decipher the meaning and imperatives of life and that can provide insight for both critically evaluating and structuring provisional ideologies. Some keys are relevant universally or are more adequate to the task of understanding, in specific situations, what expression our faith ought to take.[40] At other points Segundo suggests that *any* key can-at any time-potentially or practically assist in the construction of an authentic ideology.[41]

39 *The Historical Jesus of the Synoptics,* 173.

40 *The Humanist Christology of Paul,* 161-2; *The Historical Jesus of the Synoptics,* 34.

41 *The Humanist Christology of Paul,* 163.

Here we run into a third limitation with Segundo's argument. The claim for the usefulness of interpretive keys assumes a positive relationship between the interpersonal disclosure of value and substantive other-regarding concerns. These values, it is implied, empower the discrimination and selection of one's "keys." But justifying the criteria that permit one to select the appropriate keys for the task at hand is precisely the problem with which one must deal and which justification in ideology, faith, and transcendent data and values all fail to provide.

A fourth problem with Segundo's program derives from the inconsistency between his methodological claims and his commitment to the primacy of historical and contextual existence. Surprisingly, Segundo's transcendental-existential deduction is methodologically formulated and executed fairly independently of contextual considerations. Not only is it unclear what, for example, a distinctively Latin American context might provide to this social theory; it is obvious that lived history and the concrete reality of political community is important only as a secondary consideration at the level of defining, establishing, and appropriating particular ideologies. In Segundo's scheme, one commits to the fundamental values that inform ideologies independent of one's context. Political, communal, and contextual considerations provide only the necessary occasion for testing and elaborating a substantive agenda whose formal and existential coherence must be tested with respect to other criteria. The difference between Segundo's effort and the methodological aproach taken by other liberation theologians-for example Ernesto Cardenal in *The Gospel in Solentiname-is* profound, suggesting Segundo's dependence on a rather Kantian approach to resolving both moral and psychological conundrums. This recourse to transcendental language at the expense of a phenomenological starting point is ironic, since Segundo appeared to argue against such formalism in most of his earlier works. For a person committed to the emancipation of humanity, to humanity's substantive and efficacious liberation, his constructive effort remains theoretical and foundational. It never ventures into reflection on

or discussion of concrete, practical problems or the establishment of essential though provisional ideologies" There are in *Jesus of Nazareth* references to but a total lack of substantive discussions of nuclear weapons; [42] economic structures and systems; [43] issues relating to the approval and/or use of force in the quest for liberation; [44] concerns of ecological ethics ; and the social and moral status of women in Latin America"[45] It is clear that Segundo rejects the ideological constructions developed in other contexts (particularly Europe and North America)" But throughout his work of the past 22 years he fails to develop even the rudimentary contours of an ideology consistent with his fundamental theological vision"

A fifth and final limitation of Segundo's program is that it fails to discuss the necessary or sufficient conditions essential to the exercise of deutero-leaming, conscientization, and praxis; or to provide insight into precisely how these tasks follow from or relate to the knowledge gained through the experience of faith and the attainment of eschatological coherence" Sometimes Segundo suggests that the apprehension of transcendent values is empowered by a commitment to deutero-leaming and conscientization" At other times he argues that the exercise of faith and the

42 *An Evolutionary Approach to Jesus of Nazareth,* 4, 127 n29"

43 " Social Justice and Revolution," *America* 118(17) (April 27, 1968): 574-77; and " Capitalism versus Socialism: *Crl<.r Theologica,"* in *Frontiers of Theology in Latin America,* ed" Rosina Gibellini, tr. John Drury (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1979), 240-259, where Segundo takes the inconsistent position of absolutizing a temporally determined ideological manifestation-socialism" His most recent work addresses these issues only to the extent of affirming the biblical preferential option for the poor in the teaching of some Gospel writings, ct *The Historical l esus of the Synoptics,* 65, 76, 87, 9L However, the implications of this for further moral deliberation and the formulation of ideologies and public policy are not explored"

44 *The Liberation of Theology,* 156-166; *Our Idea of God,* 166-169; "Christianity and Violence in Latin America," *Christianity and Crisis* 28 (March 4, 1968), 31-34; and McCann's discussion of the limited nature of Segundo's discussion of these issues in Dennis McCann and Charles Strain, *Polity and Praxis: A Program for American Practical Theo log;'* (Minneapolis: Winston/Seabury, 1985), 148-9"

45 *An Ei,olittionary Approach to Jesus of N a::areth,*24, 135 n155.

appropriation of values is pre-critical and thus an activity independent of deutero-learning and conscientization.

The preceding observations suggest that Segundo's program may not provide the essential epistemological and moral coherence necessary to justify his methodological moves and his concurrent commitment to efficacious humanization. I suggest, however, that some shifts in strategy at the level of fundamental moral theology might still provide a range of strategies for furthering his goals. Here, I wish to explore three possibilities.

Segundo's first option might be to place morality, other-regard, and efficacious considerations at the center of his program. Such an approach could consistently maintain his fundamental commitment to liberation, humanization, efficacy, and other-regard, and would further strengthen his claim that all authentic values are disclosed contextually and interpersonally. Its major liability would be that it might be too normative and doctrinal an approach to theology and morality for Segundo, emphasizing critical reflection on beliefs, doctrines, and normative constructs rather than encouraging the appropriation of a critical and formal method of interacting with reality. Such an approach might require that the conception of faith and the transcendental deduction of value outlined in *Faith and Ideologies* be abandoned.

If Segundo were to explore this line of argument, there might be at least two plausible ways for him to proceed in establishing a more secure ground for his moral theology. Marsha Hewitt has suggested that Hegel possesses, in his formulation of the concept of Absolute Spirit, a resource that might be employed as a foundation for a normative morality by individuals such as Segundo who are committed to a moral teleology and a dialectical or process-oriented vision of history.[46] Still, much work would need to be done in elaborating such a constructive position. It would require of Segundo a rethinking of the place of Hegelianism in his larger theological project (a commitment that Segundo has, for whatever reason, eschewed since his earliest writings on Berdyaev and Christian existentialism).

[46] Marsha Hewitt, " The Search for a Liberating Christology," 49.

A second way of maintaining the centrality of other-regarding considerations and a commitment to the interpersonal disclosure of value would be for Segundo to appropriate Habermas's theory of communicative competence as a foundation for his value theory.[47] Habermas suggests that it is through interpersonal participation and public communication and discourse that normative decisions concerning the structure and function of specific ideologies and/or patterns of praxis are developed. The normative values of human existence (Segundo's transcendent values) are those that emerge through consensus as a "judgement acknowledged by all participants in discourse" as best able to satisfy the formal and substantive demands of discourse (e.g. coherence, comprehensiveness, consistency, simplicity, fidelity to lived experience and to one's expressed religious and moral authorities).[48] The apprehension of authentic values thus requires, at least in principle, the participation of all persons on whom such values would impinge. It seems to differ from Segundo's construal of value apprehension and appropriation in two ways. First, Habermas's approach does not rely on the s·earch for individual eschatological coherence as the context for value appropriation. Second, the theory seems much more willing to accept a conceptual relativism of sorts than Segundo's position would.

Habermas's approach to grounding and elaborating fundamental values could advance Segundo's program in a number of ways. First, it addresses Segundo's concerns about the determination of normative human values and the process of valuing. Similarly to Segundo, Habermas provides a formal, universalizable, procedural framework for the apprehension and explication of value. Beyond this Habermas's presupposition of "the gen-

[47] Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interest,* tr. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1968); Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society,* tr. with an introduction by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).

[48] Strain and McCann, *Polity and Praxis,* 153. See also the excellent articles on the use of Habermas by Christian theologians in Dennis McCann, "Habermas and the Theologians," *Religious Studies Review* 7(1) (January 1981): 15-21; and Paul Lakeland, "Habermas and the Theologians Again," *Religious Studies Review* 15(2) (April 1989): 104-9.

eralizability of interests," as both a presupposition of the act of valuing and the ground of normative values retains a certain contextual and communitarian primacy. It goes beyond Segundo's own efforts by making the interpersonal disclosure of value more than simply the occasion for the attainment of individual eschatological coherence. Rather, personal eschatological coherence and the determination of fundamental value cannot even be undertaken, nor does it make sense, apart from a posture of interpersonal communication. The phenomenological, political, and contextual nature of valuing is maintained, with moral and discourse an outgrowth of this posture. More clearly than Segundo's existential derivation, Habermas's notion of communicative competence reveals the positive, necessary relationship that exists between a non-emotivist, non-subjectivist procedural framework and the deduction of substantive moral values.

Both Segundo's and Habermas's reconstructions seek to establish a fundamental grounding for values. Segundo's program also seeks a means of reconciling fundamental value considerations with commitments to efficacy and self-authentication. But a different option beyond the Hegelian and Habermasian options that Segundo might explore would be simply to abandon the search for a universalist or transcendental theory of value and praxis and focus his attention instead on the lived, concrete demands of neighbor welfare and efficacy. Indeed, such a philosophical reconstruction may be unnecessary to the task of praxis. As Richard Bernstein has observed, the attempt to reconstruct a foundation for a universal value theory (one distinguishing feature of modern European philosophy and theology and of Segundo's recent work) must necessarily prove futile. It is an approach that fails to address the pragmatic and practical concerns (including morality, ethics, social analysis, and political economy) of concrete contexts.[49] Such an "anti-foundational" approach that emphasizes, as Bernstein suggests, practical knowl-

[49] Richard J. Bernstein, *BeJ1ond Objectivism and Relatiilism: Science, I-Iennene11tics, Gt!d Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985).

edge, might be commended to Segundo for a number of reasons. Most importantly, it might appear to offer a better chance of elaborating and strategically implementing humanization and efficacy through praxis than his present scheme does. Even if Segundo were successful in his aspiration of reconstructing a concept of value (though he acknowledges that even the transcendental deduction of value tells us nothing about a scheme of general, concrete, or specific values), such a process could be read as uncoupling critical hermeneutics and conscientization from any substantive values, in the process retarding the construction of even provisional ideologies. And appropriating Habermas's method and procedural emphasis might force Segundo simply to exchange one type of naturalism for another. If from Segundo's perspective, the ultimate purpose of engaging in a reconstruction of Christian thought is to establish theology as an effective tool for social change, liberation, and praxis, and if deutero-learning is the linchpin of this process of efficacious praxis, then Segundo might constructively shift his efforts away from foundationalism and abandon his search for a universally recognized grounding for value.[50]

Abandoning the task of reconstructing a theory of value based on a transcendental-existential deduction via a Hegelian dialectical teleology, through a theory of communicative competence, or by some other option, Segundo's value theory need not degenerate into radical subjectivism or nihilism. By emphasizing praxis and a more contextually-dependent and historical starting point for reflection on values, the centrality of deutero-learning, the use of critical social theory, and community-centered analysis and decision-making is maintained. Segundo would, however, be forced to explore other ways of construing a conception of value and the moral life.

My task in highlighting these limitations and outlining these alternatives has been twofold. First, I have tried to indicate

Anselm Kyongsuk Min makes a similar observation with respect to Ogden's "liberation christology" in "How Not To Do A Theology of Liberation: A Critique of Schubert Ogden," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 57(1) (Spring 1989): 83-102.

stress points and some weaknesses in the theoretical foundation of Segundo's program. I have sought to reveal the problems that Segundo encounters when he tries to reconcile his emphasis on foundationalism with his commitment to humanism, efficacy, and praxis. My criticisms of his program notwithstanding, I am in enthusiastic agreement with him concerning the centrality of other-regarding and human-centered considerations to the moral -and theological-enterprise. I suggest, however, that his fundamental and methodological constructs fail in their present forms to provide a warrant or justification for the very values that are most central to his program. If Segundo is committed to efficacious praxis as the authentic concretization of faith, then he is compelled-independent of the foundational (or anti-foundational) stance he takes-to renegotiate, and to emphasize with vigor, the place of ethics (defined simply as critical reflection on morality and lived experience) in his program of praxis.

Segundo might be reticent about this proposal, since he has argued consistently that ethics possesses at best marginal status in any program devoted to praxis. At points he suggests that critical reflection on praxis and humanization in the context of deutero-learning eliminates the need to reflect critically on morality. However, if one could demonstrate that Segundo misconstrues the nature and task of ethics, misinterprets the negative relationship of praxis and humanization to ethics, and fails to appreciate the functional and efficacious role that ethics might play in a constructive program such as his, then I suggest that he ought to give serious consideration to renegotiating the place of ethics in his program. [51]

IV. *Constructive Recommendations*

As a means of assuring the success of both the deconstructive and synthetic components of his program-to which "humanization" and "efficacy" are the desired outcomes-Segundo must establish a firm commitment to a liberation ethics: a sub-

[51] This is not a novel observation; cf. Sturm, "Praxis and Promise"; McCann and Strain, *Polity and Praxis,* 149.

stantive, concrete, practical moral theology. Such a commitment seems essential for at least three reasons. First, as Segundo has argued, faith requires an ideological manifestation-premised on an awareness and appreciation of historical existence-as a means to the concretization of that faith in the present. A program of ethics can assist in the construction of such an ideology.

A second argument for the development of a substantive liberation ethic derives from the demands of praxis and efficacy in the lived situation of Latin America. With its growth and development as a significant theological presence, it is incumbent on liberation theology to establish now the contours of an efficacious praxis. The contemporary challenge to theologians like Segundo is to develop a constructive ethical, political, and economic posture that will facilitate the process of establishing just, sustainable, and participatory societies in the hemisphere. The changed political situation in Latin America and the institutional openings that have appeared since 1989 now require of all liberation theologians the development of a comprehensive moral and political theory that addresses some of the issues I will elaborate shortly.

Finally, I believe that liberation theology's own best chance of forging a *distinctively* Latin American theology will be advanced when it undertakes the development of a clear, comprehensive, and substantive Christian political and social ethic. Other liberation theologians are beginning· this task, most notably Miguez-Bonino. [52]

Let me indicate four areas in which I believe the development of a liberation dhic might be used by Segundo to advance his program of ideological construction, praxis, and efficacy.

First, I have already indicated that Segundo might at some point profitably elaborate a conception of moral value. I am *not* suggesting he needs to fill in and expand on the theoretical program he has begun. Rather, he needs to concretize-to ideologize-that value theory in a way that clarifies the *substance*

[52] Jose Miguez-Bonino, *Toward a Christian Political Ethics* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983).

and *concrete expression* of terms such as "human responsibility for history," "praxis," "efficacy," "humanization," "other-regard" "solidarity with" and "preferential option for the poor." There is some confusion among Segundo's interpreters over the moral theory that he advocates as most consistent with his general theology and social theory. Some interpret his position as something close to act-utilitarianism.[53] His recent effort seems to reinforce this assessment by suggesting some sort of teleological theory embracing a commitment to "satisfaction" and efficacy with scant reference to community-based guidelines for moral conduct. The question, of course, is whether Segundo's construal of deutero-learning in light of transcendent data and value provides a foundation for the development of a moral theory that is richer than a vulgar utilitarianism. The essential elements are present in his work of the past 20-25 years to construct a moral theory similar to rule-utilitarianism or a communitarian-based teleology. However, the distinction and priority of some moral over non-moral values in the context of praxis needs to be established. Such a theory need not focus simply on goals and ends, moral principles, or virtues, but might productively begin to reflect on how these facets of moral existence are related, particularly in the present situation of Latin America. For example, what virtues are most conducive to the practice of humanization? What moral defects or vices (in addition to or as a further specification of alienation and sloth) have until now guided the development and structuring of political communities on the continent? How might conscientization as a means of moral education be specified beyond what has already been noted by individuals such as Friere? On this issue, it seems to me,

[53] See McCann, *Christian Realism and Liberation Theology,* 225; and McCann and Strain, *Polity and Praxis,* 148-9. The most compelling passage in support of this interpretation is *The Liberation of Theology,* 171. In addition, references to "the economy of energy," "efficacy," and "satisfaction" at points support this reading, cf. *Our Idea of God,* 114; *Evolittfon and Guilt,* 17, 111-12, 119; *The Sacraments Today,* 33, 58; *The Liberation of Theology,* 122, 155, 165. Segundo's attempt to distinguish his commitment to efficacy from vulgar utilitarianism based on "qualitative" distinctions fails to provide tangible criteria to accomplish that task; cf. *The Sacraments Today,* 55-6.

Alasdair Macintyre might serve as a discussion partner, since his aspiration of a coherent teleology, balanced with a suspicion of ideological and principled immobility is similar to Segundo's. Jeffrey Stout's *Ethics After Babel* seems to grapple with many of the same concerns raised by Segundo, and suggests an alternative reading of ways in which theological resources can be brought to bear on theoretical and practical concerns. Additionally, Stanley Hauerwas has discussed the process and substance of formative Christian character in an ecclesial context in ways reminiscent of Segundo's work of the late 1960's and early 1970's. Indeed, the insights of narrative theologians might be particularly helpful to Segundo, given their attention to context and their shared critique of certain aspects of rule-morality, deontological construals of morality, and aspects of Enlightenment individualism.[54] Additionally, Eduardo Hoornaert has suggested a range of specifications to the general pedagogical task of the Christian community in light of deutero-learning and conscientization that emphasizes the charismatic dimensions of Christian belief reflected in an emphasis on transformation, wonder, miracle, imagination, and a shared community of goods.[55]

Second, Segundo needs to recognize and affirm the importance of moral principles as tools of moral justification. In the past, he has consistently equated all concrete moral imperatives or

[54] Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, In.: Notre Dame University Press, 1981); Jeffrey Stout, *Ethics After Babel* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988); Stanley Hauerwas, *A Community of Character* (Notre Dame, In.: Notre Dame University Press, 1981). For other narrative theological perspectives, see Paul Nelson, *Narrative and Morality: A Theological Inquiry* (Pittsburgh: Pennsylvania State University, 1987), though the narrative and communitarian critiques and constructive alternatives are not without their critics; see Allen Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism" *Ethics* 99(4) (July 1989): 852-82; and Todd Whitmore, "Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism in Christian Ethics : A Critique of Stanley Hauerwas," in Diane Yeager, ed. *The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 1989* (Knoxville, TN: The Society of Christian Ethics, 1989), 207-225.

[55] Eduardo Hoornaert, *The Memory of the Christian People* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1988).

principles legalistically.[56] But his argument seems to be unjustified for at least four reasons. First, such a position is inconsistent with his recognition of the need for ideology. Not all ideologies are legalistic, particularly when constructed in full awareness of the realities of a critical methodology and social theory. And the language of moral principles provides a means to the justification of chosen ideological constructs in a way that the assertions of both transcendent data and deutero-learning are unable to accomplish. Second, moral principles need not be tightly or narrowly formulated as rules or laws. In our everyday language at both the interpersonal and political levels, principles are most consistently construed as broader or more fundamental than laws and rules. Segundo himself recognizes this at points, as when he discusses the "law of love" or the "principle of the economy of energy." Third, moral principles do not need to be interpreted absolutely. There is a difference between a categorical and a hypothetical imperative; between absolute norms, *prima facie* principles, and maxims. This is a distinction that Segundo consistently overlooks but that is absolutely crucial to the task of reconciling the language of enduring values with the importance of contextual demands. Finally, an elaboration of principles and reflection on their relevance, meaning, and weight would necessarily be conducted with respect for context and changing situations. Such principles need not be applied *de facto,* as Segundo suggests, "from above." But a recognition of the dual claims of both eschatological and moral coherence might permit Segundo to argue for the presence of something like *prima facie* moral principles or duties and their relationship to contextually determined *actual* duties.[57]

Alternately, and perhaps more successfully, Segundo might consider appropriating Richard McCormick's "proportional" approach to considering, weighing, and appropriating moral

[56] See, for example, *Evolution and Guilt,* 95; "Capitalism/Socialism: *Crux Theologica,"* 243-6.

[57] See, for example, W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: The Oarendon Press, 1930).

values.[58] McCormick's constructive contributions might be commended to Segundo as a starting point for his own constructive undertaking for a number of reasons. First, McCormick's commitment to contextually grounded critical moral reflection is strong. And he construes reality fundamentally in both other-regarding and relational terms, a position that resonates with much of Segundo's fundamental orientation.[59] Second, McCormick possesses at the foundation of his moral theory a well developed teleological value theory grounded in a notion of "basic human tendencies" that resonates with Segundo's notion of transcendent values and "personal satisfaction."[60] McCormick has centered his notion of morality on the reality of "premoral," "physical" or "antic" goods and evils. Moral goods or evils, construed as such through proportionate judgments exercised contextually but in light of the more fundamental reality of antic goods and evils, serve as a bridge between fundamental value realities and practical or ideological concerns in much the same way that transcendent data and interpretive keys mediate faith and ideology for Segundo.[61] McCormick has also been forced over the years to defend his position against criticisms that it is consequentialist and reductionistic. His successful defense is one that might be commended to Segundo, who suffers similar criticisms.[62]

Segundo appears at points to be able to accommodate these

[58] The best overview of McCormick's moral theory is James B. Tubbs, "Recent Theological Approaches in Medical Ethics: McCormick, Ramsey, Hauerwas, and Gustafson" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1990), 27-120.

[59] Richard McCormick, *How Brave a New World! Dilemmas in Bioethics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1981), 346-349; Tubbs, "Recent Theological Approaches," 32-35, 39-40.

[60] See Tubbs, "Recent Theological Approaches," 41-42.

[61] Tubbs, " Recent Theological Approaches," 45-52. A full discussion of the ontic/moral distinction is presented in Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey, eds., *Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations* (Chicago: Lcyola University Press, 1978).

[62] Tubbs, "Recent Theological Approaches," 77-102.

recommendations. He recognizes a number of moral principles: political liberation grounded in efficacious love;[63] love as seeking the welfare of the neighbor;[64] love construed as mutuality and/or self-sacrifice;[65] love construed as respect for persons and their autonomy, both as a goal and as a regulatory claim;[66] justice as fairness or equity;[67] justice as equality;[68] justice as giving to those in need;[69] justice as demanding the use of effective means (utility and proportionality) to bring about solidarity.[70] Still, further discussion of how such formulations relate to various acts of deutero-learning in different settings is necessary. It is not clear, for instance, how such principles presently relate to each other in Segundo's scheme, or whether there exist for Segundo such things as moral dilemmas in the context of conscientization, deutero-learning, the divine dialectic of history, or evolutionary humanization.

Segundo might further explore the appropriation and justification of certain strands of rights language. For example, how might he justify and specify his claim of a "right to development" or "the undeniable right of the female to be treated on a

63 *Our Idea of God,* 114; *The Liberation of Theology,* 122, 155, 165; *Evolution and Guilt,* 17, 112, 119; *The Sacraments Today,* 33, 58; *The Historical l esus of the Synoptics,* 81.

64 *Evolution and Guilt,* 111; *The Sacraments Today,* 58; *The Historical l esus of the Synoptics,* 35.

65 *The Liberation of Theology,* 155; *The Community Called Church,* 26.

as *Our Idea of God,* 115; "Capitalism Versus Socialism: *Crux Theologica,"* in *Frontiers of Theology in Latin America, 240-59;* "Wealth and Poverty as Obstacles to Development," 21-31 in *Human Rights and the Liberation of Man,* ed. L. Colonnese (South Bend, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, *1970).*

61 *The Sacraments Today,* 22, 70.

68 *Our Idea of God,* 83.

69 *The Community Called Church, 59.*

70 *Grace and the Human Condition, 94; The Liberation of Theology,* 171; and *The Liberation of Theology,* 161, where both utilitarian interpretations of prudence and admission of a general principle of proportionality governing the use of "scarce resources" (the ability of humans to apply love) are discussed.

footing of equality with the male"?[71] Are such rights grounded in individual or communal conceptions of love or justice? Is it a right to a certain level of liberation, well-being, goods and services, freedom, or to a specific process of development? Does it imply a specific form of political economy? And how will such recourse to rights language be held together with communal conceptions of salvation, humanization, and solidarity with the poor through socialism?

Additional principles might be commended to Segundo: a commitment to communal rather than individual eschatological coherence reflected at least in part through a principle of covenant fidelity "story-formed community," or communal solidarity grounded in a history of marginalization. Recent Papal Encyclicals from the 1960's on provide insight into other principled construals of morality that might be commended to Segundo. The procedural principle of subsidiarity (as elaborated by John XXIII in *Pacem in Terris)* might not only support the move toward a praxis of freedom, but might be creatively appropriated to argue for the necessity-even primacy-of the voice of base communities in the shaping of democratic political and economic institutions.[72] And the recent NCCB Pastoral *Economic Justice for All* might serve as a ready source of principled language that would support Segundo's evolving conceptions of justice.[73]

McCann has noted that the development and elaboration of "middle axioms" might further specify the way in which moral

[71] See "Wealth and Poverty as Obstacles to Development," 29; "Christianity and Violence in Latin America," 29, where the request for a "gift of development" to Latin America from the industrialized nations is balanced with a general rejection of the language of imperfect obligations as a ground for morality; *An Evolutionary Approach to Jesus of Nazareth,* 135 n155.

[72] John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris* (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1963), paragraphs 140-141, p. 33.

[73] Though some writers have noted that it is precisely the principled language and anthropological realism resulting in the recognition of the legitimacy of a mixed economy that make it unamenable to, if not incommensurable with, the spirit and methological presuppositions of liberation theology; cf. Dennis McCann, "Liberating Without Being a Liberationist: The U.S. Catholic Bishop's Pastoral Letter on the Economy," in Rubenstein and Roth, eds, *The Politics of Latin American Liberation Theology,* 266-287.

principles and ethical deliberation are related to concerns of public policy and functional efficacy.[74] This approach has been employed by Segundo on at least one occasion, specifically when he advanced the normativeness of socialist economic systems.[75] My suggestion is that more consistent recourse to such mediating constructs might provide support and direction to praxis in other situations. None of this is to say, of course, that such axioms need be taken as "objectively absolute" or universally binding. But they might, along with the idea of *prima facie* duties, ontic goods, and rights provide a helpful bridge between commitments to faith and concrete praxis.

A third direction in which Segundo might develop his ethics would be to elaborate the relationship that holds between procedural and substantive issues in the pursuit of liberation and efficacy. He possesses a basic commitment to a "politics of inclusion" and the imperative of recognizing the voice of the voiceless. While he has made a start in showing how this inclusive approach to communal existence might be grounded methodologically and how it may be advanced in the context of his evolutionary vision of humanization, a number of concerns remain. First, he needs to emphasize negative or autonomy rights-what might be termed "protective praxis"-in this evolutionary scheme. The development of moral limits, side constraints, and boundaries on the action of individuals and social institutions are important to the establishment of a truly authentic political community. Greater recognition of the competing claims of individuals-and of various principled construals of humanization-will support the development of this form of praxis. Segundo's ethical theory needs to justify his critique of certain classes of actions, conventions, and social constructs (developmentalism, capitalism, violence) and his advocacy of the construction of just and participatory intermediary social structures (families, base

[74] Dennis McCann, "A Second Look at Middle Axioms," in *The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 1981,* ed. T. Ogletree (Council for the Study of Religion, 1981), 73-92; McCann and Strain, *Polity and Praxis,* 161-9.

[75] "Capitalism/Socialism: *Crux Theologica."*

communities, and voluntary associations) and programs (land reform, environmental protection, industrial development, representative political institutions, human rights, just health care delivery systems, social security, and voter registration).[76]

Fourth, Segundo needs to elaborate further his understanding of an interpersonal or community-based process of moral reasoning. While he notes that much of his earlier theological reflection took shape in the context of a dialogical community, *Jesus of Nazareth* fails to justify the centrality of such a process to authentic critical reflection. There is little elaboration or justification here of a community-based hermeneutic. And yet such elaboration appears essential to establishing any commitment to authentic praxis. Here, the reflections of individuals such as John Howard Yoder provide ready sources for exploring the theological and praxiological texture of such a position, suggesting the way in which divergent voices might dialectically relate in the uncovering of truth.[77] The authority of "hermeneutic communities" can be reasserted with respect to the establishment, articulation, and justification of values-between certain broad though substantive values and their culturally and context-specific manifestation in light of social analysis, theological reflection, biblical analysis, and a commitment to efficacious praxis. Such a context might provide further practical specification and sharper definition of a number of key concepts in Segundo's theology. It would force a rethinking of the procedural and substantive concepts of justice that are the necessary aim of his theology. And it would oblige theologians and the communities to which they belong to wrestle with the integration of individual and communal per-

[76] "Capitalism/Socialism: *Crux Theologica"* and "Christianity and Violence in Latin America."

[77] John Howard Yoder, "The Hermeneutics of Peoplehood," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 10(1) (Spring 1982): 40-67; and Michael Cartwright "The Practice and Performance of Scripture: Grounding Christian Ethics in a Communal Hermeneutic," in Diane Yeager, ed., *The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 1988* (Knoxville, TN: Society of Christian Ethics, 1988), 31-53.

spectives, reasoning, discourse, and spiritual and practical aspirations.

Segundo might object to such recommendations on a number of grounds. But taking the steps I have suggested may be the price he must pay for facilitating authentic liberation at certain levels of human existence. By exploring such possibilities, he creates an opening for dialogue with a range of interesting perspectives and voices that have not yet been affirmed by liberation theology. Such an initiative offers an opening for the development of a distinctive liberation ethic and provides an opportunity for authentic hemispheric dialogue.[78]

[78] Earlier drafts of this paper were presented in the Currents in Contemporary Christology Group at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Chicago, IL, November 1988; and at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Christian Ethics, South Bend, In., January 1989. My thanks to Dennis McCann, Diane Yeager, and Max Stackhouse for critical comments and suggestions.

RECENT BARTHIANA [1]

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NO ONE CAN responsibly do theology today without reckoning with the prodigious legacy of Karl Barth, the Swiss Reformed theologian who was born in 1886, began theological studies in 1904, entered a full-time pastorate in 1911, taught dogmatics successively at Gottingen, Munster, Bonn, and Basel between 1921 and 1962, and died in 1968. From his electrifying *Commentary on Romans* through his multi-volumed but unfinished *Church Dogmatics* he wrote unceasingly in the areas of exegetical, historical, ethical, practical, and dogmatic theology, and ventured from time to time into the realms of politics and culture. Helper in organizing textile workers while pastor in Safenwil, questioner of major assumptions of neo-Protestant liberal theology, spiritual leader of the German Confessing Church's struggle against Nazism, principal author of the Barmen Confession, participant in the 1948 Amsterdam Assembly of the World Council of Churches, and invited guest of Pope Paul VI in Rome in 1966-these are some of the highlights of Barth's colorful career.

The books under review provide impressive testimony to Barth's ongoing significance for modern theology. One is a work

[1] Karl Barth, *The Gottingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion,* vol. I, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Eerdmans, 1991). 490 pp. $39.95 cloth.

George Hunsinger, *How To Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1991). 298 pp. $32.50 cloth.

John Macken, S.J., *The Autonomy Theme in the Church Dogmatics: Karl Barth and his Critics* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990). 232 pp. $54.50 cloth.

S. W. Sykes, ed., *Karl Barth: Centenary Essays* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989). 171 pp. $39.50 cloth.

by Barth himself, two grew out of doctoral dissertations, and the other contains interpretative essays by five theologians who wished to honor Barth on the occasion of his centenary year in 1986.

To appreciate properly the surprising appearance of Barth's *Gottingen Dogmatics* requires a bit of history. After ten years as a pastor in the village of Safenwil in north-central Switzerland, Barth was called in 1921 to be "Honorary Professor of Reformed Theology" on the theological faculty of the University of Gottingen in Germany. Having neither doctorate nor teaching experience, he was offered the cp_air on the basis of the first edition of *Romans* (1919) with the expectation that he would represent the Reformed tradition in this German Lutheran stronghold. During his first years he presented exegetical lectures on biblical texts as well as historical lectures that would help him learn his own tradition: the Heidelberg Catechism, Calvin, Zwingli, the Reformed Confessions, and Schleiermacher. Not until 1924-25 did he dare attempt to lecture on dogmatics, and even then he was not allowed to use the title "dogmatics," which was reserved strictly for Lutherans, so he chose to name his lecture series " Instruction in the Christian Religion," recalling Calvin's chief work, *Institutio religionis christianae.*

Unlike his second cycle of lectures in Munster in 1926 (published as Prolegomena to *Die Christliche Dogmatik* in 1927) and the magisterial *Church Dogmatics* that began in 1932, these first lectures on dogmatics were never published during Barth's life time. Preserved in his own handwriting, they were edited and finally made public in 1990 in the Swiss edition of his *Collected Works.* The first of two volumes has now appeared in English and comprises four of seven chapters : three on the doctrine of the Word of God (as Revelation, as Holy Scripture, and as Christian Preaching) plus one on the doctrine of God. Three other major *loci* (Anthropology, Reconciliation, and Redemption) will appear in Volume Two. Professor Daniel L. Migliore of Princeton Seminary has written a 48-page Introduction to the whole, which provides brilliant insights into Barth's theology and points

out the particular characteristics and peculiarities of this first (and only completed!) set of lectures on dogmatics.

Why should one read the *Gottingen Dogmatics* rather than, say, the *Church Dogmatics?* First, Barth's basic theology, at least the lineaments thereof, is to be found here in what is perhaps its most accessible form; in relatively short compass he sets forth his methodological approach and an exposition of all the major *loci.* Second, there is a freshness and sense of excitement in these lectures that is engaging; Barth is obviously trying to forge something new, and in doing so he reveals to the students his struggles with his own Reformed tradition, why he departs from the reigning liberal theology of the time, and where he differs from the Lutherans and others. Finally, an impressive humility *coram Deo* pervades the work; Barth begins his lectures by quoting the prayer which Thomas Aquinas put at the head of his *Summa Theologica:* " Merciful God, I ask that thou will grant me, as thou pleasest, to seek earnestly, to investigate carefully, to know truthfully, and to present perfectly, to the glory of thy name, amen."

If it is indeed more rewarding to read Barth himself than to read those who write about Barth, secondary literature nevertheless can provide helpful interpretative guidance into what is admittedly a complex subject, given Barth's long-term and voluminous contributions to theology. This is eminently true of the three books being considered here.

Professor George Hunsinger of Bangor Theological Seminary, who wrote his doctoral dissertation on Barth under the late Hans Frei of Yale, professes to have been reading Barth's *Church Dogmatics* for 15 years before undertaking to write *How To Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology.* The fruit of his labor is a book of exposition rather than criticism, because he wanted above all to provide a way of understanding Barth that would make it possible for criticisms to be more adequate and fair. His exposition, however, is not aimed at the content of the various theological *loci* of the *Church Dogmatics* (he recommends Herbert Hartwell's earlier volume, *The Theology of Karl*

Barth: An Introduction, for that), but rather at helping readers develop a set of skills necessary for understanding Barth's arguments and, in particular, his conception of truth. To this end Hunsinger explicates six different dialectical and often counter-intuitive patterns or motifs which must be recognized if one is to understand how the subject matter of the *Dogmatics* is shaped: actualism, particularism, objectivism, personalism, realism, and rationalism. Hunsinger argues that interpreters err in trying to find *one* key to Barth's theology. Only a multi-patterned approach can exhibit the internal coherence of the *Church Dogmatics,* disclosing the complexity-in-unity and the unity-in-complexity of the whole.

How To Read Karl Barth is not an easy book to read! I found it to be somewhat repetitious and even dense at places. Nevertheless, I consider it to be the best secondary source for aiding the serious scholar to understand Barth's *Church Dogmatics.* Careful reading of *the whole book* is required, but the result will be a new appreciation for Barth's attempt to do justice to the mystery of God's revelation by incorporating dialectical and paradoxical modes of thought into his theological arguments.

John Macken's *The Autonomy Theme in the "Church Dogmatics": Karl Barth and His Critics* grew out of a dissertation on the other side of the Atlantic, specifically at the University of Tiibingen under the guidance of Professor Walter Kasper. Macken is a Jesuit who now teaches at the Milltown Institute of Theology and Philosophy in Dublin. This book, which probes Barth's understanding of human autonomy before God against the background of its long history in Western theology since Augustine and Pelagius and its philosophical expression since Kant and Fichte, is a model of clarity of thought and composition. After each section the author presents a succinct summary of what he has just written, so that no one can miss the train of thought or the nuances of the argument, and at the end of work he formulates his conclusions and critical questions with precision.

Beyond its informed and generally sympathetic treatment of Barth's interpretation of the relationship between human freedom and divine freedom, an added strength of this book is Macken's exposition of the critique of Barth's work by German theologians since 1950, but especially since Barth's death in 1968. The author is thoroughly familiar with the issues that have been hotly debated in a considerable body of German literature that is simply out of the reach of, and thus unknown to, the majority of English-speaking people-writings by Pannenberg, T. Rendtorff, Moltmann, Jiingel, Wagner, Marquardt, Krotke, Freyd, Schellong, Huber, Todt, et al.

As one would expect from a Roman Catholic, Macken pays particular attention to Barth's struggle with questions of natural theology, synergism, and sacramentalism. For me, one of his surprising conclusions was that toward the end of the *Church Dogmatics,* and specifically in the fragment on Baptism in CD IV/4, Barth moved away from his earlier christologicaljparadoxical understanding of the relationship between divine and human action to the affirmation of a relatively independent human sphere of activity, a movement corresponding to his move from a sacramental to an ethical interpretation of Baptism. Such a conclusion, in my view, has to be hedged about with certain reservations, which I think Macken also recognizes.

We turn now to the final volume: *Karl Barth: Centenary Essays,* edited by S. W. Sykes, Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. In addition to the editor's Introduction, the book contains five substantial essays (one by Sykes) on various aspects of Barth's thought with the aim of demonstrating his continuing theological importance. Lutheran, Reformed, Anglican, and Roman Catholic perspectives are represented.

Ingolf U. Dalferth, a tutor in the *Evangelisches Stift* in Tiibingen, writes perceptively of "Karl Barth's Eschatological Realism," arguing that Barth is a realist who holds that theology essentially refers to the eschatological reality of the risen Christ, which is to be explicated to our mundane reality in terms of the Christological model of the " hypostatic union " formulated at

Chalcedon. Professor Colin E. Gunton of King's College, University of London, writing on " The Triune God and the Freedom of the Creature," applauds Barth for grounding human freedom in the freedom of God to be God's own self, but faults Barth for not affirming the humanity of Jesus Christ as strongly as his divinity and for not giving adequate weight to the Spirit in his theology.

Both Professor Sykes and Professor Philip J. Rosato, S.J., who teaches theology at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, are interested in the dialogue between Barth and contemporary ecumenism, particularly the dialogue with Roman Catholicism. In " Authority and Openness in the Church " Sykes points out that early on both Barth and Catholic theologians such as Erich Przywara and Karl Adam worked to restore the authority of revelation to the church in the light of its liberal dilution, but that Barth, mindful of Rome, also sought to assure the sovereignty of Christ *over* the church, the freedom of the Word of God over all human authorities (Pope, dogma, *opus operatum,* etc.). Rosato, in "*Ad Limina Apostolorum* in Retrospect : The Reaction of Karl Barth to Vatican II," tells of Barth's dramatic two-week visit with Pope Paul VI and others in Rome in September 1966, and of the critical questions he raised concerning parts of the documents of Vatican II when he subsequently wrote his booklet, *Ad Limina Apostolorum.* Some examples are these: Is scripture given precedence over church and sacraments? Is the primary function of the church mediation or testimony? Has the inexhaustible task of proclaiming the Gospel been overshadowed by the controllable task of celebrating the Lord's Supper and other sacraments? Is there a fundamental inequality between ordained priests and lay apostles? Without being the least defensive, Rosato gives reasoned answers to these questions from a Roman Catholic understanding of the church and its mission.

In the final essay, " The Reception of the Theology of Karl Barth in the Anglo-Saxon World: History, Typology and Prospect," Richard H. Roberts, lecturer in Theology in the University of Durham, presents the most thorough account of the reception of Barth's theology in Britain and America that I have read.

The author has an amazing knowledge of the literature, from the earliest days before the translation of *Romans* to the present time, and for me this essay was worth the price of the book. What becomes increasingly clear is that there has not yet been a definitive Anglo-Saxon interpretation of Barth's theology which respects its context, content, and consequences, no comprehensive mediation rather than a merely passive reception of his theology. As Roberts indicates, such a work would have to go *through* and not simply *around* Barth.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that all four of these books are well worth reading. But if you have to choose only one, then read Barth himself!

MACINTYRE'S POSTMODERN THOMISM: REFLECTIONS ON *THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY*

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IN A RECENT issue of *The Thomist,* J. A. DiNoia, O.P., argues that certain themes in post-modern thought provide an occasion for the recovery of neglected features of the Catholic tradition.[1] DiNoia focuses on three motifs: first, a "broader conception of rationality," with an emphasis on the "role of tradition and authority," second, attention to the "role of texts and narrative in shaping thought and culture," and, third, the "importance of community in fostering personal identity." These themes have been prominent in the writings of Alasdair Macintyre. In his latest publication, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry,* he brings the Augustinian-Thomistic tradition into conversation with its principal rivals, encyclopaedia and genealogy.[2] The dialogical character of the work, the text of his Gifford Lectures, affords Macintyre the opportunity to sharpen and develop his views of rationality, of the connection between particularism and universalism, and of the Christian contribution to moral inquiry. What emerges from the series of dialectical encounters is a constructive, postmodern Thomism, one which is not susceptible to the genealogical critique of encyclopaedia and which circumvents the self-destructive tendencies of genealogy.

[1] "American Catholic Theology at Century's End: Postconciliar, Postmodern, and Post-Thomistic," *The Thomist* 54 (1990), pp. 499-518.

[2] The seminal text for each of the three rival versions was published in the 1860's: for encyclopaedia, *The Ninth Edition of Encyclopaedia Brittanica,* for genealogy, Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals,* and for tradition or Thomism, *Aeterni Patris.*

According to Macintyre, the terms of the debate over rationality between genealogy and encyclopedia have obscured apprehension of the Thomistic alternative. As they see it, " Either reason is thus impersonal, universal, and disinterested or it is the unwitting representative of particular interests, masking their drive to power by its false pretensions to neutrality and disinterestedness." But the mutually exclusive way of putting the question conceals a

> third possibility, the possibility that reason can only move towards being genuinely universal and impersonal insofar as it is neither neutral nor disinterested, that membership in a particular type of moral community, one from which fundamental dissent has to be excluded, is a condition for genuinely rational inquiry.[3]

The passage introduces the salient features of Macintyre's view of the relationship between particularism and universalism.[4] Macintyre develops his view not only in confrontation with genealogy and encyclopaedia, but also out of the Thomistic tradition. In a chapter entitled, "Too Many Thomisms? ", Macintyre describes the history of the revival of Thomism after *Aeterni Patris.*[5] Macintyre criticizes early neo-Thomism for reading Aquinas as a systematic thinker, whose project was fundamentally epistemological. By beginning with ·epistemology, neo-Thomism distorted Aquinas's texts, cast the terms of the debate between Aquinas and modernity in the distinctively modern language of epistemic justification, and predictably reenacted the futile history of modern philosophy.[6] Macintyre observes that there are simply "too many ways to begin." But even early on

a *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 59-60. Henceforth referred to as *TRV.*

4 Many critics have misunderstood Maclntyre's insistence on the particularist means to universality. For a careful and sympathetic discussion of this question, see John Doody, " Macintyre and Habermas on Practical Reason," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly,* LXV (1991), pp. 143-58.

s *TRV,* pp. 58-81.

6 See the quite different understanding of this history in Gerald McCool's *From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989) and "Why St. Thomas Stays Alive," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 30 (1990), pp. 275-288.

there was an acknowledgement by Kleutgen, among others, of the disparity between pre- and post-Cartesian philosophy. Still, early neo-Thomism failed to see that the break came not with Descartes but with Scotus. Hence, the decidedly unThomistic influence of Scotus upon Suarez-whose authority was crucial in the rehabilitation of Aquinas-was unconsciously incorporated into neo-Thomism.[7] The result of early neo-Thomism was an unhappy assimilation, adequate neither to Aquinas nor to modernity.[8]

As Macintyre sees it, the neo-Thomist insight into historical rupture paved the way for a more historically nuanced recovery of Aquinas. Later Thomists sought to revitalize Thomism through historical reconstruction of the sources, literary forms, and pedagogical structure of Thomas's texts. Macintyre himself has moved steadily in the direction of historical reconstruction. In *After Virtue,* Macintyre sought to rehabilitate Aristotle's ethics by substituting social for natural teleology. In *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?,* and even more so in *Three Rival Versions,* Macintyre acknowledges the dependence of ethics upon speculative philosophy and locates particular issues within broader pedagogical structures.

In articulating Aquinas's alternative to encyclopaedia and genealogy, Macintyre subordinates epistemology to pedagogy.

[7] In contrast to Kleutgen, Macintyre argues that the *De Veritate* is a work of " conceptual clarification, analysis, and description, not at all one of epistemological justification." He also takes issue with Kleutgen's depiction of Aquinas "as presenting a finished system whose indebtedness to earlier writers is no more than an accidental feature of it." K!eutgen's Suarezian appropriation of Aquinas is by no means the necessary result of *Aeterni Patris.* As Macintyre notes, the document cites Caietan not Suarez, nowhere adverts to epistemological questions, and describes Aquinas's achievement as "the culmination of a tradition." *TRV,* pp. 74-5.

[8] DiNoia sees a similar weakness in the celebration of aggiornamento in Catholic theology after Vatican II : " When accorded primacy over resourcement, aggiornamento looks to postmodern eyes as if always on the verge of running out of breath. Conceived simply as the updating of theology, aggiornamento is never finished catch;ng up; conceived more grandly as modernization, it is already far behind." "American Catholic Theology at Century's End," p. 518.

In contrast to encyclopaedia's appeal to autonomous reason, Thomism issues an invitation to participation in a community of inquiry. The starting point is not impersonal, self-justifying rationality, but the " authority ... internal to the practice of the craft." [9] As a craft, philosophy does not justify itself in advance; nor does it present in a piecemeal fashion propositions that are immediately and equally accessible to the inspection of all rational beings. Rather, it asserts that the apprehension and pursuit of the goods sought in the craft presuppose at least the rudimentary possession of the very virtues which it is the goal of the craft to inculcate. The resolution of the paradox, which Macintyre identifies as a variant of the Meno paradox, is to assert both that the inquirer has certain potentialities to the relevant virtues and that he needs an authoritive pedagogue to assist in the actualization of these potencies. By attending to the unnoticed and inexpungeable presence of pedagogical authority, Macintyre's Thomism is at odds with genealogy.

Maclntyre's account of philosophy as craft simultaneously highlights temporality and realism. The teacher " links past and present " in light of the goal to be realized in the future. The teacher forms the unformed dispositions of the student and makes explicit inchoate apprehension of first principles. The teacher also initiates the student into a tradition and community of inquiry, wherein the student's own history and pre-philosophic reflection find a place as part of a larger whole. Moreover, crafts " require the minds of those who engage in the craft to come *to* terms with and to make themselves adequate to the existence and properties of some set of objects conceived to exist independently of those minds." The Aristotelian-Thomistic account of human understanding is object-oriented; it treats objects, not consciousness or judgements, as primary. The analogy between philosophy and craft brings embodiment to the fore. Our natural existence among, and interaction with, sensible objects is prior to knowledge of things and of ourselves.

[9] *TRV,* p. *63.*

The understanding of philosophy as craft presupposes that human beings have within themselves the "potentiality for moving towards and achieving the relevant theoretical and practical conclusions."[10] One of the developments in *Three Rival Versions* is the emphasis on philosophical psychology, which Macintyre once rejected as an outmoded "metaphysical biology." He goes so far as to assert that "evaluative judgements are a species of factual judgement concerning final and formal causes of activity of members of a particular species."[11] The "plain person" knows the *principium* of the natural law not in the sense that he can explicitly "formulate" it, but "by showing a potentiality to do just that, in the way in which the truth of the principle is presupposed in a multiplicity of particular practical judgements." Indeed, the Thomist finds evidence of the universal possession of *synderesis* in the historical phenomenon of "recurring resistance to discarding" certain basic moral rules, even when the rules have become "unintelligible residues from a lost past."[12] Again, particularism is the necessary avenue to the fulfillment of universalist aspirations. In order to realize one's telos "as being, as animal, and as rational" one must "engage with others" in such a way that one can be a "teachable learner."[13] Nature gives moral inquiry its impetus and starting point, but the fruition of inquiry is largely dependent on the pedagogy of a virtuous community. Indeed, the fundamental precepts of the natural law, which are mostly negative, are variously described by Thomas as necessary for human happiness, as part of the content of the decalogue, and as necessary for the health and well being of the community.

In the confrontation between tradition and genealogy, Mac-

[10] *TRV,* p. 63.

[11] *TRV,* p. 134.

[12] Macintyre expatiates on this point, "The Thomist . . . discerns in the continuous reappropriation of the rule, and in the recurring resistance to discarding them, evidence of the work of synderesis, of that fundamental initial grasp of the primary precepts of the natural law, to which culturnl degeneration can partially or temporarily blind us but which can never be obiiterated," *TRV,* p. 194.

[13] *TRV,* p. 136.

Intyre contrasts the genealogical vision of the self as multiple with the " complex metaphysical " view of personal identity presupposed by tradition. The latter position supposes that an inquirer has certain natural capacities which are actualized through communal participation in a craft. The compatibility of the natural or rational and the social is central to the writings of Aristotle and Aquinas, yet natural law theorists have overlooked it.

In fact, Macintyre could put the point more forcefully. Thomas inherited from Aristotle a view of the soul as a potency, which is actualized by interaction with the world and which knows itself obliquely by reflection upon its objects and operations. The potential nature of the soul undergirds the discussion of friendship in the *Ethics*. Men are better able "to think and to act" in community : they come to know themselves through knowing their friends.[14] The duality of the term *logos,* which may mean either reason or speech, is operative in the opening of *Politics,* where the ability to reason in common is said to be the mark of human nature.[15] The pedagogy of the *polis* offers a vicarious participation in reason. As Aristotle puts it, one must " learn to rule by being ruled."[16] Even the law, which commands obedience through fear, is a "*logos* proceeding from prudence and intellect."[17]

The connection between the rational and the communal, the natural and the social, permeates the writings of Aristotle and Aquinas. The link between tradition and rationality is of course a leitmotif of Macintyre's writings. A consequence of the link is that, although truth may be the goal of philosophy, the most any tradition can assert is that it is the "best so far." Macintyre reads Aquinas accordingly. There is basis for Macintyre's emphasis on the temporal character of inquiry in Aquinas. Temporality surfaces implicitly in Aquinas's dialectical sorting out of authorities and in his adoption of the genre of the *quaestio dis-*

14 *Ethics,* VIII (1155a16), and IX, 9.
15 *Politics,* I, *2* (1253al-30).
16 *Politics,* III, 4 (1277bl0).
17 *Ethics,* X, 9 (1180a22).

putata, which mirrors the public debates of the universities. These public debates occur before particular audiences and consider only a limited number of objections.[18] Thomas contrasts the intuitive and timeless intellection of angels with human knowing through phantasms, which carry with them a temporal reference.[19]

While Thomas acknowledges the influence of historical conditions and the ineliminable reference to temporality in human knowing, he also thinks that philosophy reaches a certain adequacy with Aristotle. He reads Aristotle's treatises as containing both dialectical *and* demonstrative arguments. His most explicit remarks about limits have to do not with the linear movement of history but with the hierarchical order of knowledge. Macintyre himself adduces the text from the opening of the *Contra Gentiles,* where Thomas depicts *sapientia* " in terms of a hierarchy of crafts."[20] Thomas's understanding of hierarchical incompleteness is heavily indebted to Aristotle. The following Aristotelian theses are germane : Subalternate sciences accept as starting points things that higher sciences demonstrate, speculative sciences take their principles from first philosophy, and the highest science is itself essentially incomplete with respect to what transcends the imagination.

First philosophy stands at the summit of the hierarchy of the sciences both because it studies the highest things and because it supplies what was missing in the practice of the particular sciences, namely, an account of their first principles.[21] Thomas underscores the hierarchical limits to the disciplines that touch upon the highest and best things. In his commentary on the *De Anima,* he states that philosophical psychology can say little or nothing about the conditions and nature of the separated soul. Similarly,

is Thomas even proffers remarks on the historical development of Greek philosophy. He situates Plato's view of knowledge in its historical context, understanding it as a response to the materialism of pre-Socratic thinkers *(Summa Theologiae,* I, 84, 1).

19 *Snmma Contra Gentiles,* II, 94.

20 *TRV,* p. 67.

21 *In De Trinitate,* V, 1, ad 9.

in the *Ethics,* he insists that moral philosophy treats only of imperfect happiness. Finally, in metaphysics, he argues that, given the dependence of the human intellect upon images, first philosophy cannot go beyond proving the existence of God to any adequate knowledge of what God is. In each of these cases, philosophy points to what it cannot adequately explain. As Josef Pieper puts it, Thomas's philosophy is ultimately a *philosophia negativa.*

Thomas's understanding of the hierarchical incompleteness of Aristotelian philosophy is defensible as a reading of Aristotle. When Thomas turns from his exegesis of Aristotle to a consideration of the relation between philosophy and theology, the principle of hierarchical incompleteness takes on wider import. Philosophic discourse culminates with the first and highest causes, the study of which is most desirable and delightful. Following Aristotle, Aquinas holds that a small amount of probable knowledge concerning the most noble things is more desirable than a certain and thorough knowledge of less noble subjects.[22] But philosophy reaches a tragic impasse in its study of the highest things. The authoritative voice of Scripture breaks the silence of philosophy and satisfies, beyond what we could ever demand or even hope, our desire to know and love.

Macintyre's understanding of the role of temporality and historicity in Aquinas raises questions not only about Aquinas's self-understanding but also about the relationship of Macintyre's project to that of Aquinas. Macintyre critizes some neo-Thomists for assimilating Aquinas to modern thinkers and for obscuring the distinctive features of Aquinas's thought. But is not Macintyre open to the same objection? He counts among the influences on his own project Vico, Kuhn, and other contemporary thinkers : his middle ground between genealogy and encyclopaedia is reminiscent of Peirce's conception of historically self-correcting rationality. According to Macintyre, those who do what Thomas did are likely to rearticulate a tradition in unanticipated ways. How then are we to distinguish progress from unintentional betrayal? Macintyre's response has to do,

22 *Jn De Anima,* I, le. 1.

first, with historical reconstruction, with the recovery of the sources and questions that motivate the project, and, second, with reading part in relation to whole. As he puts it,

> It is not in respect of their individual theses, considered item by item, but only in respect of those theses understood in their relationship to each overall specific mode of enquiry, that the true nature of the conflict between Thomism and . . . modern standpoints can be adequately explored.[23]

If our primary task is to understand Thomas as he understood himself, then should we not follow the pedagogical order he prescribes? In order to bring into focus the difference between Thomas's project and the epistemological project of modernity, a detailed analysis of the domains of, and modes of discourse appropriate to, logic, psychology, and metaphysics would be necessary.[24] A more complete account of the structure of philosophic pedagogy in Aquinas would take Macintyre more deeply into the history of the debates among Thomists over the dependence of metaphysics on natural philosophy, the role of Aristotelian logic in philosophic discourse, and the connection between philosophy and theology.[25] For the moment I will speak only about the status of natural philosophy.

As we have already noted, the modern critique of Aristotle's natural philosophy led the Macintyre of *After Virtue* to substitute social for natural teleology. The subsequent works, however, contain numerous references to human nature, to philosophical psychology, and to the dependence of ethics upon speculative philosophy. The shift makes a confrontation with modern and post-modern science inevitable. Yet, aside from a pejorative assessment of its celebration of technique, Macintyre has little to say about modern science in *Three Rival Versions.* He seems to

[23] *TRV,* p. 77.

[24] There has been little attention to these fundamental questions in Thomistic exegesis. A conspicuous and instructive exception is Mark Jordan's *Ordering Wisdom: The Hierarchy of Philosophic Discourses in Aquinas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986).

Macintyre acknowledges the importance of these issues when he refers to the *De Ente* and the *De Veritate* as seminal texts.

subsume modern science under encyclopaedia. Macintyre begins the lectures by questioning the scientific model of rationality, as embodied in the genre of the Gifford lectures.

Gifford's supposition, which reached "canonical expression" in the Ninth Edition of the *Encyclopaedia Brittanica,* was that ethics and theology were scientific disciplines. But, as Macintyre argues, the four elements of the science of nature, namely, "data, unifying conceptions, methods, and a history of continuous progress," are inapplicable to moral and theological investigation.[26] Indeed, Macintyre embraces the genealogical subversion of the encyclopaedic model of objective, progressive, and autonomous rationality. Is Macintyre right to assimilate modern science to encyclopaedia? Might not 19th-century encyclopaedia be a caricature of Cartesian or Newtonian science? Has the genealogical critique of modern science come to terms with the procedures and substantive claims of science from the inside?[27] As MacIntyre notes, the genealogical stance resists the sort of sustained submission to a tradition that is the necessary prelude to mature criticism. The gap in Macintyre's narrative is particularly troublesome given his castigation of the epistemological turn in neo-Thomism. The transcendental Thomism of Lonergan, for instance, claims to have advanced the Thomistic tradition precisely through an encounter with the methods and substantive conclusions of modern science. Until Macintyre addresses more amply the status of natural science in Thomism and the challenge of modern science, his critique of epistemological Thomism will remain tenuous.

There is, I think, an additional reason for Macintyre to address the status of natural philosophy in Aquinas, one that bears upon his understanding of Aquinas's resolution of the conflict between Augustine and Aristotle. In *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?,* Macintyre argued that the conflict "could only be resolved on the basis of a systematic conception of truth which

[26] *TRV,* pp. 20-21.

[27] On this, see David Lachterman, *The Ethics of Geometry: A Genealogy of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 1989).

enabled Aristotelian and Augustinian theses to be reformulated within one and the same framework."[28] Macintyre thinks that Aquinas developed the systematic conception of truth in the *De Ente* and the *De Veritate.* In these texts, Thomas provides an analysis of the causal and analogical relationships between key terms such as "truth" and "true," "being" and "essence." Behind these relationships stands the Christian doctrine of creation. Some have argued that Thomas had explicitly theological motives for embracing Aristotle.[29] Indeed, confusion in Augustine's teachings on divine illumination and the absence of any clear conception of what it would be for the human person to operate in accord with unfallen nature are both corrected in Thomas's Aristotelianism. Yet Thomas finds a mediating principle in the doctrine of creation. As Macintyre notes, "an Aristotelian account of nature ... was not merely harmonized with an Augustinian supernatural theology but shown to require it for its completion, if the universe is to be intelligible in the way in which parts relate to wholes."[30] Thomas's penchant for theological middles in the reconciliation of Aristotle and Augustine can also be seen in his frequent appeal to Dionysius in those places where disagreement between Augustine and Aristotle is most conspicuous.[31] Thus, he mitigates the tension between neo-Platonic Christianity and Aristotle.

2s *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 171.

20 Josef Pieper writes, "Aristotle is for St. Thomas (in the measure in which he follows him) nothing more nor less than a clear mirror of the natural reality of creation." *The Silence of Saint Thomas,* transl. Murray and O'Connor (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1957), p. 32.

ao The classic text on the creation and for the unification of Aristotelian and Augustinian understandings of the human person is the second book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles.*

s1 See, for instance, the first two questions from the treatise on man from the *Summa Theologiae,* I, *75* and 76. In I, *75,* which treats of the nature of the soul, citations of Augustine dominate in the sed contras, while in I, *76* Aristotle is the chief authority. In the final article from *75,* Thomas adduces a passage from Dionysius for the claim that the angel and the soul are not of the same species. Dionysius highlights the poverty of the soul which must gather knowledge from sensible things, a notion that is not far removed from Aris-

The question of the status of natural philosophy in Aquinas leads inevitably to the question of the relationship between philosophy and theology. There remains a certain ambiguity in MacIntyre's understanding of the relationship. He moves between "characterizations of Aquinas as a philosopher," who understood philosophy as a craft and who advanced and integrated two previously separate traditions, and an emphasis on the distinctively theological elements in Aquinas's ethics.[32] But what is the relationship between theology and tradition-constituted inquiry? Macintyre depicts the latter as offering only the " best so far " and as always open to the possibility of radical reversal. Indeed, he describes Thomas's own project in just these terms. Yet he also speaks of the " finality of Scripture and dogmatic tradition." [38]

Concerning the connection between philosophy and theology, Macintyre writes,

> As metaphysics stands to the other disciplines within the Aristotelian scheme, so a theology which has integrated metaphysical commentary into itself is now to stand, but this theology has to argue with and 1cannot merely dictate to the subordinate disciplines in a form of active dialectical encounter.[s4]

Macintyre is correct, I think, to contrast the Thomistic understanding of dialectical encounter with both the " Averroist insistence on the autonomy of philosophy and the conventional Augustinian theology." Yet, as he notes, the content of revealed theology is not indifferent to, or equally well articulated by, various philosophic traditions. By the time of Aquinas, dogmatic theology had already incorporated elements of pagan philosophy

totle's conception of the soul as a potency. The guiding principle, moreover, of Thomas's understanding of the relationship between nature and grace--namely, that grace does not destroy nature but rather perfects it-has a Dionysian origin. See, for instance, I-II, 10, 4, where the following Dionysian passage is cited : " it pertains to divine providence not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things." Precisely such a principle makes possible the inclusion of Aristotle within Christian theology.

s2 *TRV,* pp. 127, 132-33.

83 *TRV,* p. 125.

B4 *TRV,* pp. 132-33.

in order to give public expression to its central teachings. Indeed, as Augustine and Aquinas read it, Scripture itself is fraught with metaphysical implications. While Aquinas counsels the believer to " descend to reason " and engage philosophy on its own terms, precisely the certitude and universal efficacy of revealed truth evince its superiority to philosophic pedagogy.[35] This is not to say that theology cannot develop, or that it has nothing to learn from encounters with rival traditions. It is to say that radical reversal is inconceivable. More importantly, it is to say that Aquinas's success in mediating between and reconciling rival traditions is attributable not just to virtues of empathy, but also to his confidence that whatever truth natural reason can achieve must be compatible with revealed truth. As he puts it in the *Contra Gentiles,*

What is introduced into the soul of the student by the teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher.... The knowledge of the principles that are known to us naturally has been implanted in us by God; for God is the author of our nature. These principles therefore are also contained in the divine wisdom. Hence, whatever is opposed to them is opposed to the divine wisdom and cannot come from God.[36]

The passage expresses Thomas's confidence in the veracity of revelation, even as it implies that the evidence of natural reason cannot be ignored.

The question of the relationship between philosophy and theology is particularly important for Macintyre's reading of the *secunda pars* of the *Summa.* Macintyre argues that the pedagogy of the *Summa* anticipates the contemporary emphasis upon the moral relationships between author and text, text and reader. The text cannot be read intelligently by just any sort of person. Macintyre highlights the location of the treatise on law between those on sin and grace and argues that, according to Aquinas, the achievement of the ultimate end requires an acknowledgement of one's sinfulness and of the need for grace. Macintyre

35 *Summa Contra Gentiles,* I, 2.
aa *Summa Contra Gentiles,* I, 7.

cites Leonard Boyle's essay on the setting of the *Summa,* which argues that the intent was not apologetic or even philosophic but pastoral. Boyle's essay ensconces the text within an explicitly Christian community, intended for a specifically Dominican audience, presupposing particular educational, ecclesiastical, and political institutions. Macintyre is aware of all this, yet he appears to read the text as if it were intended to engage the philosophic tradition directly. Especially problematic is the role of original sin.

> What one discovers in oneself and in all other human beings is something surd and unaccountable in terms of the rational understanding of human nature : a rooted tendency to disobedience in the will and distraction by passion, which causes obscuring of the reason and on occasion systematic cultural deformation.[87]

But what status does the universal experience of disobedience have in Aquinas? As Martha Nussbaum has objected, it is not clear that this ought to be taken as the central feature of our moral experience.[88] Macintyre himself notes that Augustine's depiction of fallen nature lacks an adequate account of what it would be " for the intellect to be rightly ordered according to its own nature." [89] Aquinas supplies what was wanting. Prior to the topic of original sin, the *Summa* treats the being and attributes of God, creation, human nature, the ultimate end, and the virtues. Even if disobedience were seen to be fundamental, the movement from such an experience to the affirmation of original sin would involve no necessity. Christian thinkers from Paul to Kierkegaard have indeed pointed to the phenomenon of sin as something that eludes rational explanation and treatment. But the identification of this phenomenon as sin cannot be made by reason alone; indeed, the doctrine of original sin is but part of the Christian narrative of redemption.[40] As Macintyre notes, Christian the-

37 *TRV,* p. 140.

38 " Recoiling from Reason," *New York Review of Books, 7* December 1989, pp. 36-41.

20 *TRV,* p. 101.

40 In the discussion of original sin in *Summa Contra Gentiles,* IV, 52, Thomas adduces probable arguments on behalf of the doctrine, but the absence

ology subsumes particular philosophic themes within the " larger narrative " of the movement of creatures from and to God and has at its starting point, not apologetics, but the " discovery of the self in Scripture." [41]

Another controversial feature, to which Nussbaum also objects, concerns Macintyre's understanding of the authoritative limits to rational inquiry. The most sustained discussion of authority occurs in the section on Augustine. At times, Macintyre ties the need for authority to the influence of original sin; because the will is " initially perverse" it "needs a kind of redirection." [42] Hence humility and obedience become the crucial auxiliary virtues. It is important to see that these virtues are auxiliaries, even if they are indispensable *in via.* The Augustinian justification of authority, moreover, is not only or primarily the result of original sin. As Macintyre puts it,

> The story of oneself is embedded in the history of the world, an overall narrative within which all other narratives find their place. That history is a movement towards intelligibility. But in the course of discovering the intelligibility of the order of things, we also discover why at different stages greater or lesser degrees of unintelligibility remain. And in learning this we learn that authoritative testimony, to point us forward from where we are now, can never in our present bodily life be dispensed with.[43]

Once again the notion of hierarchy is relevant to the Augustinian-Thomistic conception of authoritative pedagogy. The Christian tradition embraces and extends the ancient view of pedagogy, which required as its starting point submission to a teacher, to a tradition of inquiry, and to the discipline of dialectic. Hence, authority is not an impediment to inquiry; rather it is constitutive of it.

The introduction of theology into the hierarchy of the sciences accentuates the gap between what is presently believed and what

of discussion of original sin prior to the fourth book, which marks the transition from matters accessible to reason to those received only through revelation, severely restricts the probative force of the arguments.

[41] *TRV,* p. 83.

[42] *TRV,* p. 84.

[43] *TRV,* p. 92.

will become intelligible during, or at the completion of, inquiry. But it does not undermine an analogous relationship between philosophy and theology. Macintyre's account of authoritative pedagogy not only brings to the fore the continuity between ancient and medieval thought; it also provides a basis for a more adequate expression of the relationship between philosophy and theology in Aquinas.

The function of authority is to safeguard the good not only of this or that particular argument, but also of the community, intellectual and political. On this view of inquiry, individual intellectual progress is subordinate to, and cannot flourish apart from, the wellbeing of the inquiring community. Against the encyclopaedic view of the self as autonomous and already adequate to the objects of knowledge, the Augustinian-Thomist requires that the student first appropriate the tradition (s) to which he is heir. The appropriation occurs principally through the exegesis of texts, through the reading of texts in such a way that the texts "in turn interpret the reader." Such exegesis demands morally committed modes of inquiry; it involves a willingness to subject oneself, one's interlocutors, and texts to interrogation. Macintyre writes, " Only the self as transformed through and by the reading of the texts . . . will be capable of reading the texts aright." [44] In reading various texts, one becomes attuned to the " different kinds of authority possessed by different types of text." [45] The notion of authority, then, is broad and analogical. Its function, moreover, is not peculiar to theology. The dialogues of Plato and the treatises of Aristotle impose a similar responsibility upon their readers. Philosophic inquiry began under the auspices and authority of the Good.

As we have already noted, Macintyre embraces the genealogical critique of encyclopaedia. The Thomist and the genealogist have more in common with one another than either does with encyclopaedia. Both demythologize the encyclopaedic metaphors of objectivity, autonomy, and progress. They share a concern

[44] *TRV,* p. 82.
[45] *TRV,* p. 233.

with temporality, with the various genres and rhetorical features of philosophic discourse, and with the interpretation of signs that refer not directly to things but to other signs. Both appreciate the dialectical interplay of presence and absence in discourse, historical rupture, and the movement toward an authentic self. Yet fundamental differences persist. Central to tradition is the actualization of a telos over time, which implies that one can impute continuing accountability to agents and that human life has the "continuity and unity of a quest." Although tradition underscores the limits to everything short of beatitude, progress toward beatitude occurs in a number of intelligible stages.[46] Genealogy, on the contrary, repudiates the notion of personal identity and understands the role of hierarchy and authority in tradition as but another form of domination.

In rejecting personal identity and accountability, genealogy poses problems for itself. Macintyre asks: "Is the genealogist not self-indulgently engaged in exempting his or her utterances from the treatment to which everyone else's is subjected?" To this, the genealogist may respond that he merely adopts a series of provisional masks for particular encounters, masks that are taken up and then discarded. Given the genealogist's rejection of categorial thinking, "it is incumbent upon" him "not to provide someone like myself with acceptable answers." To do so, the genealogist would "have to engage in a kind of discourse from whose presuppositions he or she claims *to* have decisively separated him or herself."[47]

To those who stand outside the genealogical project there can be, and ought *to* be, no satisfactory response. Yet the eschewal of continuity and accountability raises an internal difficulty for the genealogist, particularly for the genealogist's goal of emancipation from deception. The process of emancipation "requires the identity and continuity of the self that was deceived and the self that is and is to be." The act of "disowning" presupposes con-

[46] Aquinas holds that theology itself is a science subalternate to the beatific vision *(Summa Theologiae,* I, 1, 2).

[41] *TRV,* pp. 206-10.

tinuity and identity. The genealogist thus risks engaging in the self-indulgence of making of himself the "great exception." The goal of liberation through disowning and deconstructing raises questions not only about personal identity and accountability, but also about the " extent . . . to which it is inherently derivative from and even parasitic upon " the concepts, modes of argument, and theses of those whom it opposes. Genealogy is thus in the odd situation of " drawing its necessary sustenance from that which it claims to have discarded." [48]

Macintyre notes that it remains unclear whether the genealogist has the resources to circumvent these internal objections. From the vantage point of tradition, however, the project of "unmasking" is seen as a "mask for pride." [49] Indeed, the so-called masters of suspicion have unmistakable antecedents in the Augustinian tradition. The Christian conception of rational inquiry includes moments of subversion, which put into question the reliability of the powers of the person and the legitimacy of motives. The recognition of perversion in the will and disorder in the intellect is a necessary prerequisite to progress in inquiry, both practical and theoretical. For the Augustinian, suspicion is but one moment or a series of moments within a larger pedagogical framework, the ends of which become increasingly intelligible to the student over the course of time. The moment of self-accusation is, moreover, unintelligible apart from the Christian doctrines of Incarnation and redemption. If Christian moral inquiry becomes dislocated either from its discursive, pedagogical hierarchy or from the Christian narrative of redemption, it does indeed become, in Nietzsche's terms, a "life-denying, ascetic ideal." [50]

The difference between tragedy and comedy-for instance, between Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* and Dante's *Divine Comedy* -is an instructive way to think about what separates genealogy and tradition. Yet Nietzsche's distortion of the Christian narra-

48 *TRV,* pp. 214-215.
49 *TRV,* p .146.
50 *TRV,* p. 40.

tive, a distortion that he inherited both from secularized Christian philosophy and from the Christian communities of his day, is increasingly an obstacle to the reception of Christian texts. Recent literature on Augustine, for instance, is not only inadequate to the complexity of his thought, but is especially blind to his narrative transformation of pagan philosophy.[51] While MacIntyre asserts that Augustine subscribed to a basically Plotinian epistemology, he also notes the importance of temporality, embodiment, and human language in Augustine's narrative of the good life.[52]

Macintyre makes some suggestive remarks about the parallels between Aquinas's ethics and Dante's *Divine Comedy.*[53] But is there any basis for Maclntyre's narrative rendering of Aquinas's thought? Although Thomas did not write narrative theology, the dominant motifs of Christian comedies are operative in his texts. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* for instance, Thomas describes two ways of knowing God: the first through a gradual ascent from creatures to God and the second by means of God's descent to us. Thomas highlights the limits to the first way, since by our natural powers we can "scarcely reach a perfect knowledge of

[51] In her remarks on Augustine, Martha Nussbaum is given to sweeping generalizations and unsubstantiated theories ("Recoiling from Reason"). Perhaps this is due to her reliance upon Elaine Pagel's *Adam, Eve, and the Serpent* (New York: Random House, 1988) as her sole source of information about Augustine and the early church. Yet Pagel's work offers at best a superficial and selective reading of Augustine. In her discussion of the pre-Augustinian church, she anachronistically associates pristine Christianity with the "American revolutionaries" and the Declaration of Independence (p. 55). As a corrective, see Frederick J. Crosson's "Structure and Meaning in St. Augustine's Confessions," *PACPA* 63 (1989), pp. 84-97. For a balanced assessment of the relationship between Church authority and popular piety in the Middle Ages, see John Van Engen's "Faith as a Concept of Order in Medieval Christendom," in *Belief in History,* ed. Thomas Kselman (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), pp. 19-67.

[52] Compare Paul Ricoeur, " The Aporias of the Experience of Time: Book 11 of Augustine's Confessions," in *Time and Narrative,* vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 5-30.

[58] The dispute between Macintyre and Nussbaum may well reduce to a disagreement over whether tragedy or comedy provides the most comprehensive account of human life.

lower natures." The second way is the way of Incarnation. The "way of ascent," Thomas writes, " is the same as the way of descent." [54] But the latter route is the only efficacious means to the end. Christian revelation thus involves the comic reversal of the perspective of the philosopher. The comic elements can be seen in the accent upon descent as a means to ascent, upon the humble life and abject death of Christ as offering access to the transcendent good, upon the restoration of what appeared irrevocably lost, and upon communion over isolation. The Christian narrative of redemption accentuates Maclntyre's position on the particularist means to universality.

Three Rival Versions has the sort of rhetorical unity that characterized *After Virtue* and that was conspicuously absent from *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?.* [55] The book begins and ends in the present, by analyzing the crisis of rationality in contemporary thought, and by posing questions concerning the moral and intellectual legitimacy of professional philosophy and university curricula. The present curriculum, with its emphasis on the unity of knowledge, rational autonomy, and progress, is a remnant of encyclopaedia. But, as the " stuttering ineptitudes " of the apologists for academe indicate, there remains no whole to be justified or salvaged. Indeed, the structure of the present curriculum is an obstacle to both genealogy and tradition, whose visions of inquiry and ethics must be distorted to be heard. Hence they are never actually heard. Macintyre proposes reconceiving the university as a " place of constrained disagreement, of imposed participation in conflict, in which a central responsibility of higher education would be to initiate students into conflict." [56] In the reconceived university, every teacher would play a " double role," on the one hand, as a " protagonist of a particular point of view," and, on the other, as "someone concerned to uphold and to order ongoing conflicts " with rival standpoints. [57]

H *Summa Contra Gentiles,* IV, 1.

55 For my view of the previous work, see "Macintyre, Tradition, and the Christian Philosopher," *Modern Schoolman* 68 (1991), pp. 211-223.

56 *TRV,* p. 231.

s1 *TRV,* p. 233.

According to Macintyre, Aquinas is a model not just for those interested in restructuring education along Thomistic lines, but for all who play the dual role of protagonist and interlocutor. But, as I have suggested, Aquinas's success in overcoming the conflict between rival traditions should not be attributed solely to his commitment to a certain model of rationality or to his possession of virtues of empathy, but equally, perhaps principally, to his Christian faith. Aquinas writes the *Summa Con:tra Gentiles,* in which he engages, corrects, and extends the views of pagan philosophers, as an unabashed advocate of the truth of the Catholic faith. Given Macintyre's ascetically restrained conception of truth, the infused virtues of faith and hope would provide indirect sustenance to inquiry. Christian confidence about the compatibility of faith and reason, moreover, would find embodiment in a willingness to engage all germane positions. A consequence of this slight modification of Macintyre's position is that Catholic universities would be the best hope for reconceiving the academic institutions of higher education. If this is correct, then the penchant of Catholic universities for conformity to the dullest of secular models is a spectacle more disquieting than the critique of Christian thought by its two principal rivals, encyclopaedia and genealogy.

REJOINDER TO BRUCE MARSHALL

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DISCUSSIONS HAVE *to* end sometime, and the differences in the reading of Aquinas by Bruce Marshall and myself will perhaps have sufficiently come into view if brief comments on several points are made.

1. In his second statement [1] Marshall seems *to* have shifted his argument. Originally he argued that a non-believer (e.g. a pagan philosopher such as Aristotle) *could* not know or even properly refer to God.[2] But in the subsequent statement, he seems to concede that, according *to* Aquinas, " That there is one God was known even by the philosophers, and is not a part of faith " and that " while some of the Gentiles knew God with respect *to* certain things which were knowable by reason, nevertheless they did not know him insofar as he is the Father .... " (501; cf. 512-13). Marshall seems now to hold that although that knowledge was possible at one time, it is not any longer:

> As Thomas reads Paul, then, the error (and specificallythe idolatry) of the Gentiles *overrides* the knowledge of himself which God has given to them " from 1creation through the senses " ; in consequence the *further possibility* of this knowledge . . . is withdrawn by God. With regard to the Gentiles, including their sapientes-the philosophers with demonstrative arguments-the denial of knowledge *overrides the initial ascription of it* (512, my emphasis).

[1] Bruce D. Marshall, " Thomas, Thomisms, and Truth", *The Thomist* 56 (1992) pp. 499-524. His original article was in *ibid.* 53 (1989), pp. 353-402. Page references in the text or footnotes without other citation will be to these articles.

[2] " The person whose discourse does not cohere with the broader norms of Christian belief is not even talking about God, and so cannot *possibly* know or refer to him " (378-379), emphasis mine.

I confess to a certain difficulty in understanding what "overrides" means here: cancels? contradicts? blots out? In any case, it seems that it was, at some time and for some non-Christian thinkers (e.g. Aristotle), possible to come to the knowledge of God's existence by reason, but that Marshall interprets Aquinas as saying that that knowledge is no longer even possible.

2. Marshall's general claim is that Aquinas must be read as holding a coherentist notion of revealed truth, so that a pagan and a Christian cannot mean the same thing the word ' God '. But Aquinas says exactly the opposite:

> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the nature of God as he is in himself, but each knows him by some understanding (*aliquam rationein)* of causality or excellence or remotion . . . Consequently a pagan can take this name God, when he says an idol is God, in the same way that a Catholic does in saying an idol is not God.[3]

3. Again and again, Marshall returns to the claim that, according to Aquinas, " In simple things any failure of knowledge *(defectus cognitionis)* is in fact a total lack of knowledge " (382) ;[4] he cites the *Commentary on John,* in which Thomas declares

> ... while it is possible for composite things to be known in part and to be unknown in part, if simple things are not grasped completely, they are not known (501).

In Marshall's view, these claims about the knowledge of simple forms exclude the possibility of any adequation between the conclusion of a pagan philosopher's demonstration and the Divine *esse:* ". . . the *defectus cognitionis* of which Thomas speaks in II-II, 2, 2, ad 3, entails not a partial, but a total lack of corres:. pondence between the mind and God" (384).

Marshall seems to read such statements as if they made the following objection:

a *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 3, a. 10, ad 5: Dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque catholicus neque paganus cognoscit; sed uterque cognoscit earn secumdum aliquam rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis ... Et secundum hoc in eadem significatione accipere potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum <licit idolum est Deus, in qua accipit ipsum catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus.

4 Quoting Aqu'.nas, *Sun;11w theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3.

It seems that we cannot know God in this life by natural reason, because God is supremely a simple form, and so not to know his nature *comp,letely* (totaliter) is to completely miss knowing him.

What this objection overlooks is that it is possible to know that a simple form exists without knowing that form *totaliter.* Indeed Aquinas proposes this objection, which I have just paraphrased:

It seems that it is not possible to know God in this life by natural reason. For Boethius says that reason does not grasp simple form. But God is supremely a simple form, as has been shown. Therefore natural reason cannot attain *[pervenire]* to knowledge of him.

His response is terse :

. . . reason cannot attain *[pertingere]* to simple form so as to know what it is; but it can know of it and that it is.[5]

And, as he argues here and elsewhere, we can have a proper knowledge of God through coming to know in this way that He is, e.g. by way of remotion, as philosophers have demonstrated. [6] Such knowledge leaves us in ignorance, of course, of the divine nature, and so one having such knowledge can still be justly called ignorant of God.

This explains the several texts which Marshall cites (501, SlOff.) where Aquinas asserts that the knowledge of God *per creaturas* which some Gentiles had does not means that they knew "the singular excellence of God," and so *ignorare dicuntur.* [7]

[5] *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 12, 1 and ad 1: Videtur quod per naturalem rationem Deum in hac vita cognoscere non possimus. Dicit enim Boetius quod ratio non capit simplicem formam. Deus autem maxime est simplex forma, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo ad ejus cognitionem ratio naturalis pervenire non potest . • . ratio ad formam simplicem pertingere non potest, ut sciat de ea quid est; potest tamen de ea cognoscere, ut sciat an est.

[6] *Summa Contra Gentiles* III, 39: Ad propriam autem alicujus rei cognitionem pervenitur, non solum per affirmationes, sed etiam per negationes . . . sed . . . per affirmationes propria cognitione de re habita; scitur quid est et quomodo ab aliis separatur; per negationes autem habita propria cognitione de re, scitur quod est ab aliis discreta, tamen quid sit remanet ignotum. Talis autem est propria cognitio quae de Deo habetur per demonstrationes.

[7] So also the Gentiles are said to be alienated from God: "Modum autein huius a!ienationis tang1t, scilicet per ignorantiam . . . *nat1lrae divinae*" (512n.25), my emphasis.

4. St. Thomas does indeed say such things as "the person who wants to believe only those things which he knows " and " would it not be foolish to believe about God only those things which a person can know by his own resources " (507 and n.11). But quite apart from the caution which ought to be exercised about comments concerning per impossible and foolish wishes, Aquinas's doctrine is unequivocal: it is impossible that one and the same things should be believed and seen by the same person.[8]

I forbear from commenting on other disputed points, save the unusual claim that

> Thomas does, of course, attribute demonstrative knowledge of God to the philosophers, but this attribution must, I have suggested, be interpreted in the light of its subsequent denial; in this context the attribution is traceable to the formal validity of the arguments, the denial to the diversity of sense (518n.42).

So according to Marshall, when Thomas says philosophers such as Aristotle " demonstrated " the existence of God, he is only speaking of the "formal validity" of their arguments.[9]

To affirm that Aquinas thought it was possible for pagan philosophers-Le. for natural reason-to come to know by demonstration that God exists is not to maintain some kind of rationalist " Thomism "; it is simply to recognize his constant and consistent position. In no way does such an affirmation conflict with his equally constant insistence that we cannot know God, i.e. know God's nature, in this life.[10] Nor does it conflict with

[8] *Siimma theologiae* II-II q. l, a. 4 and 5; *De Veritate q.* 14, a. 9; etc. Hence the'distinction " between propositions about God which cannot be demonstrated and those which can" is *not* "a distinction within the contents of the articles of faith ... " (516). I am grateful to Alasdair Macintyre for drawing my attention to several relevant texts.

[9] Despite the fact that the distinction between demonstration and formal validity is elementary and fundamental for both Aristotle and Aquinas. Cf. *Post. Anal.* 1:2 (7lb20-25) and Aquinas's commentary *ad Zoe.* Marshall begins his second article with a dictum from Hegel. In reading him, I have sometimes felt like Kierkegaard seems to have felt vis-a-vis Hegel : that he wanted to have it both ways, "both/and", while the Danish thinker insisted that it had to be " either / or."

[10] E.g., ... secundum hoc dicimur in fine nostrae cognitionis deum tamquam ignotum cognoscere, quia tune maxime mens in cognitione profecisse invenitur,

his insistence that what we know by faith about the unity of the divine essence cannot be proved.[11] Natural theology, for all its significance, remains in profound ignorance of God, incommensurably distant from what the least of the faithful among us knows.

quando cognoscit *eius essentiam esse supra omne quod apprehendere potest in statu viae,* et sic quamvis maneat ignotum quid est, scitur tamen quia est. *Super librum Boethii De Trinitate,* 1.2 ad 1, my emphasis.

11 *De Ver.* q. 14, a. 9, ad 8.

BOOK REVIEWS

Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives. Edited by FRANCIS SCHUSSLER FIORENZA and JOHN P. GALVIN. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991. Vol. 1: Pp. xv+ 336. Vol. 2: Pp. xv+ 384. $21.95 each; $39.95 set.

Not too long ago a fellow Dominican who wanted to do some personal updating and retooling in theology asked me to recommend to him some hooks in Catholic systematics which would show him the lay of the land in contemporary theology. I was happy to be able to apprise him of the two volumes under review. Most of the essayists do not explore new territory or establish new beachheads (nor was this their task) hut instead skillfully sketch the revised maps of *terra cognita* and graciously occupy already conquered lands, sometimes repeating their own creative work published elsewhere. Without doubt the majority of the Catholic theological guild who belong to the College Theology Society or the Catholic Theological Society of America would recognize in the overall thrust and import of these articles a broad harmony with the main themes and general methodology of contemporary Catholic theology, while they would also acknowledge in the articles' various emphases and organizational techniques the legitimate pluralistic expressions of that theology. In e:ffect, the authors offer, in a balanced and evenhanded way, albeit from their own individual perspectives (hence the subtitle), a rich distillation and compact presentation of the state of contemporary Catholic theology as it is probably taught by the majority of professors in North America.

The editors see the volumes as opening up the diverse theological perspectives within Roman Catholic systematic theology, hut as the list of authors reveals, these perspectives actually cluster within the moderate center-to-left-of-center spectrum of contemporary Catholic theology: Systematic Theology: Tasks and Methods (Fiorenza); Faith and Revelation (Avery Dulles) ; Approaching the Christian Understanding .of God (David Tracy) ; The Trinitarian Mystery of God (Catherine Mowry LaCugna); Creation (Anne M. Clifford); Jesus Christ (Galvin); Church (Michael A. Fahey); Sin and Grace (Roger Haight); Saints and Mary (Elizabeth A. Johnson) ; Sacraments in General, Baptism and Confirmation, Penance, Anointing of the Sick (Regis A. Duffy); Eucharist, Order (David N. Power); Marriage (Fiorenza); Eschatology (Monika K. Hellwig).

The traditional topics in the traditional order reveal that the volumes

are meant to serve as a summary and survey of the major courses of·fered within most Master of Arts and Master of Divinity programs. The intended audience is the beginning student, the student who needs to review the major themes of systematic theology, and the student who needs some updating in contemporary theology. In my opinion, the best articles for the intended audience and purpose are those hy Fior·enza (Systematic Theology) , Dulles, Galvin, Haight and Johnson.

The editors asked the authors to bear in mind five specific goals: to root their work in Roman Catholic theology; to help recover, in Rahner's words, " the forgotten truths " of Catholicism, by displaying how historical studies have uncovered heretofore neglected traditions; to make use of current hermeneutical theories and philosophical reflections; to take into account the ecumenical dimension of theology, while also clarifying the distinctive Roman Catholic position on various topics; and to he attentive to the current stress on praxis. In general, whenever their topic required it, the authors have fulfilled these goals. What has resulted is a combined work deeply grounded in historical understanding which is ecumenically broad while also distinctively Roman Catholic. The articles have tended to retrieve Catholicism's forgotten truths from the church's patristic era, since the dominant tradition until Vatican II was the one defined by the high Middle Ages and Trent. Indicative of this trend is the fact that, among the brief annotated bibliographies appended to each essay, only those by Dulles and Haight contain a work by Thomas Aquinas-and in Dulles's opinion the treatment of faith in the *Summa theologiae* is " stilil the most authoritative and incisive Catholic treatise on faith" (I :128). Never·theless, the authors are fair in giving medieval theology its rightful place within the Catholic tradition.

Instead of offering even the briefest summary of the seventeen individual essays, since the aui:hors' basic introductory treatment of their topics will already be familiar to most readers of this journal, in what remains I will address the issue of what is particularly Roman Catholic about the theology of the two volumes.

Methodologically, these volumes are not specifically Roman Catholic because they are unabashedly historical-minded, pluralistic, and personalistic. Much of contemporary Protestant theology has a similar methodology. They are methodologically Roman Catholic, however, since the writers stand in an interpretive tradition hound to the historical Catholic community which has roots in apostolic times and is presently united under the leadership of the bishop of Rome and the episcopal college. Tlie methodology of thinking theologically within the Roman Catholic interpretive tradition has also produced distinctively Catholic thematic emphases, many of which focus on the great Cath-

olic insight that God's presence is mediated to humanity in various ways: through Christ, church, sacraments, and the natural and human worlds.

In his article which describes theology as " more like a raft bobbing upon the waves of the sea than a pyramid based on solid ground " (1 :5), Fiorenza emphasizes that Catholic theologians live and write their theology within the community of the church, though they are also responsive to the needs of the academic community to which they belong. Dulles's piece is replete with Catholic themes: the unity and continuity between revelation and religion; the unity and cooperation between faith and reason; the necessity of faith for salvation, but not its sufficiency; sacred scripture and tradition as forming one sacred deposit of the word of God; the church formed by the Spirit as the collector, identifier, and interpreter of the scriptural canon.

Tracy takes the antifideist Catholic path of accenting theological analogy, and his method of correlation is actually a Catholic way of relating grace to nature, where God's revelation corresponds to the human quesi for meaning in limit-questions and limit-experiences. LaCugna retrieves the Greek Catholic tradition of trinitarian theology, situates trinitarian thinking within the ambience of liturgical prayer, and emphasizes the relevance of trinitarian doctrine for Christian praxis.

Faithfulness to Chalcedon must be one of the hallmarks of a comprehensive Christology according to Galvin, who also proclaims the unity of the Jesus of history with the Christ of faith, and as regards the delicate issues of the nature of Christ's resurrection and our knowledge of it comes down solidly on the side of the position which mediates between the extremes of Bultmann and Pannenherg. Assessing creation as naturally and ecologically positive in its own right rather than as merely the presupposition for redemptive history, Clifford holds that science and theology need to he in mutual interaction with one another on questions about creation.

For Haight, who maintains the need to integrate both the healing and elevating functions of grace and who reclaims the profound emphases of Trent on the interior and transformative aspects of grace, the doctrine of grace is what defines the anthropology of Catholicism and its exercise as a religion. Both Johnson and Fiorenza lay stress on the Christian community, as the *Lebensraum* where Mary and the saints are honored and imitated, and as the ecclesial locus where marriage is truly consummated as a Christian sacrament. Hellwig sees eschatology in a Catholic key as necessarily communal and personal/individual at the same time and as affirming both the continuity and discontinuity between this world and the eschaton.

lronioally, the retrieval of patristic theology together with the ecumenical emphasis has blunted some of the more "traditional" (i.e., Tridentine) Catholic accents within what used to be the most distinctively Catholic of the systematic treatises-church and sacraments. For example, while Power asserts the Eucharist as a real presence and propitiatory sacrifice (Tridentine themes), he does not stress them, in order to make room for an understanding of the Eucharist as active celebration and sacramental memorial (Catholic themes older than Trent which are ecumenical at the same time) ; he also does not underscore the Tridentine teaching about the sacramental character of Orders and thus does not accentuate the difference between clergy and laity. Again, instead of offering a Tridentine critique of Luther's singular understanding of the *fides sacramenti,* especially as it applies to the sacrament of penance (according to the early Luther's erstwhile debate partner, Cardinal Cajetan, Luther's view of the *fides sacramenti* was the only thesis of his which could not be reconciled with the Catholic faith and in effect amounted to the founding of a new church), Duffy attempts to integrate its positive aspects within a Roman Catholic sacramentology.

Systematic Theology is a work permeated by Catholic themes, even if some of them would have been handled differently by other Catholic authors and though some of them are also shared by Protestant authors. The two volumes are a worthwhile and solid introduction to and summary of the present state of Catholic theology in North America, at least from the centrist-liberal perspective, and will serve their intended audience very well.

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The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics. Vol. V: *The Realm of Metaphysics in the Modern Age.* By HANS URS VoN BALTHASAR. Translated by Oliver Davies, Andrew Louth, Brian McNeil C.R.V., John Saward and Rowan Williams. Edited by Brian McNeil C.R.V. and John Riches. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991. Pp. 666.

This volume of the English translation of Hans Urs von Balthasar's masterpiece comprises the latter half of *Herrlichkeit,* Band III/I, *Im Raum der Metaphysik,* the first half having been published as *The Glory of the Lord,* Volume IV: *The Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquity.* The

reader must remember that von Balthasar intends to denote by " metaphysics " the entire cultural complexus of myth, philosophy and religion, whose theological interest for von Balthasar is that it is seen to be the humanist anticipation of Glory, a grace-driven quest for God. This usage is of course unfamiliar to most students of the subject, and is one which moreover carries with it the anti-systematic presuppositions already noted in reviews of earlier volumes of *The Glory of the Lord:** Von Balthasar looks upon " the realm of metaphysics " as that historical space in which the quest for human transcendence discovers that its goal is actual only in the Form of Christ, the Glory of God. The quest that is metaphysics is of itself a merely human project, and as such, is an illustration of human indigence.

It is worth observing that von Balthasar's discussion of metaphysics, running to a thousand dense pages in the first (1965) edition of Band III/I: *Im Raum der Metaphysik,* has been considered dispensable to the unity of the *Herrlichkeit* by the editors of the French and Italian translations, both of which editions omit Band IH/L The English translation of its second part, here under review, makes that omission understandable, for in the first place its contribution to the whole is largely ancillary, a matter of illustration, and in the second, it is a work extraordinarily demanding of the reader-and if one may judge from the profusion of floating prepositions and consequent ambiguities in the English text, all too demanding of the translators as well. The sheer time required adequately to appreciate the prodigious learning of this massive study, and the patience required to keep its line of argument clear, are such as to defeat its purpose for most prospective readers. It is a work which, even more than the other volumes of *The Glory of The Lord,* requires the labor of re-reading its six hundred and fifty pages of text more than once, and the leisure to ponder what has been read, and then, were it possible, a community of learning to which one might resort, in which the quality of one's assimilation of the author's insight might be discussed. Such time, such energy and such resources are in short supply.

In these circumstances, the reviewer's task must be one of teasing out some of the threads of the author's argument, attempting their interweaving with the argument of the earlier volumes, and offering thereupon some pertinrnt cnt1c1sm. Clearly enough, such an effort must remain personal and provisional. Yet with this volume the shape of von

*Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, I:Seeing the Form, The Thomist* 48/4 (Oct., 1984) 663-667; H: *Theological Styles: Clerical Styles, The Thomist* 51/l (Jan., 1987) 178-186; HI: *Theological Styles: Lay Styles, The Thomist* 51/4 (Oct., 1987) 710-714.

Balthasar's theological aesthetics has become reasonably clear, and something of this kind may attempted.

Von Balthasar discovers in the Cartesian and post-Cartesian metaphysical constructs a continuing attempt to reconstitute the metaphysical project after the Nominalist defeat of the medieval cosmological syntheses. These modern efforts proceed either by a recognition of the ultimately paradoxical " ontological difference " between God and creation, between God's Glory and man's, and consequently an abandonment of the quest for systematic rationality in favor of the construe· tion of an aesthetics, or in the alternative refusal to accept that irre· solvable divine-human dialectic, with a consequent oscillation between the pantheistic reduction of humanity to divinity, and the humanistic reduction of divinity to humanity.

Von Balthasar is very much the Augustinian. His theology is not an inquiry into the intrinsic causes of historical being, which must presuppose the nonparadoxical character of its subject, hut is rather a per· ception of the universal experience of a suffering and alienation whose unity and universality is factual, hut is incapable of coherent metaphysical statement in terms of intrinsic causality. Attempts at the con· struction of a rationally coherent theological metaphysics, such as that of St. Thomas, succeed as aesthetic perceptions of the Glory of God, not as systematic resolutions of its paradoxical Revelation in the Christ.

The paradoxical character of existence is exposed by the Greek poets from Homer and Pindar down to Euripides, by the classic philosophical tradition from the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus, by the early and high medieval development of that tradition, by the writings of the Christian mystics, saints and poets with which this volume begins, by the modern philosophy stemming from Descartes, and by such poets as Goethe, Holderlin, Rilke, Peguy, and Claude!. Von Balthasar places a particular stress upon that radical aspect of the human paradox which has been perceived only in relatively modern times: the fact of human solidarity, whose limiting case is our solidarity with the damned. This solidarity presents the final paradox, clearly incapable .of systematic resolution: hence von Balthasar's fascination with the descent of Christ, the Glory of God, into Hell as its one comprehensive affirmation and the sole adequate response to the paradox of human history.

Thus von Balthasar's interest in theology is wholly phenomenological, an inquiry into the fallen consciousness of man, universally driven to seek a transcendence of suffering and alienation which can come only from God. Von Balthasar is impatient with efforts to provide the in· tellectual resolution of the human dilemma, for these are successful only by the denial of the historical reality of man. Therefore he recognizes as theologians only those who, in their concern for speaking

truly of the human condition, manifest the same impatience as does he with formal reason as the guide to the human *telos.* Theologians, in his view, are those intellectuals and artists who know that it has not pleased God to make his people safe by dialectic.

Von Balthasar's theological aesthetics is thus in full reaction to theological systematization, which he is convinced cannot accommodate the freedom of the Revelation. He takell for granted that the quest for systematic rationality in theology is inescapably the submission of the free and paradoxical truth of the faith-and so of the Glory of God revealed in Christ, to which the faith responds-to the supposedly intrinsically *necessary* reasons underlying Catholic dootrine. The quest for such "necessary reasons" constituted the common project of the twelfth-century theologians, notably Anselm and the Victorines, who lived however in an age of innocence: under the influence of Plotinus by way of Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena, they did not attempt to transcend the human paradox; for them, necessity and freedom were in agreement in the beautiful.

During the early medieval period, these Augustinian theologians developed a dialectical interpretation of the analogy o·f being under the same Neoplatonic influence of Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena. They passed on that cosmological analysis of the interrelation of God and his creation to their thirteenth-century successors, who accepted without demur the cosmological presuppositions of their forehears' systematic interest in theology. Unfortunately, the fascination with Aristotelian logic had begun to dissociate the freedom and rational necessity the early medieval theologians had known to be coincident in beauty.

The full weight of the rationalist implications of the twelfth century's Neoplatonic interpretation of the Augustinian hylemorphism were avoided for as long as the Augustinian illumination doctrine remained in possession, for that illumination was clearly given *ab extra,* as not inherent in the human mind as such and therefore as in some manner a free gift of the truth as free in itself, and so a gift of freedom to the mind. The Augustinian intuition of free truth, of truth as free, was accepted down to the triumph of Aristotelian rationality under St. Thomas. Then Thomas's partial adaptation of Aristotle's novel logical metaphysical act-potency analysis of intrinsically necessary causality proceeded to confuse illumination with the agent intellect, thus relegating it to one of the intrinsically necessary constitutive causes of human knowledge. This mistake prefaced Duns Scotus's dismissal of the " necessity " of Augustinian illumination for the rationalization now identified with theological rationality. The consequent exaltation of autonomous rationality flowered in the Norninalist dismissal of meta-

physics as a theological project. Here von Balthasar's insight is vindicated to this extent: being cannot be rationalized, and those who would rationalize must abandon metaphysics.

Surveying the same historical period as that covered by his third volume, von Balthasar begins with a study of Meister Eckhart, whose life bridged the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and who initiated that "theology of the saints" which extends to Newman. Eckhart attempted a theological adaptation of the pagan virtue termed *apatheia* by the Greeks, in order to underntand that freedom in Christ which the Catholic tradition of calls indifference (*Gelassenheit).* He is the first illustration a Christian thinker who, emerging from the cosmological sacrality von Balthasar thinks characteristic of theology to the close of the High Middle sets Western theology upon the course it will thereafter follow. In his quest for rthe meaning of Christian indifference, Eckhart finds himself treading perilously close, by way of the self-abandonment which he identifies as *Gelassenheit,* to the Neoplatonic pantheism first explored in the West by Eriugena, with the dialectic alternative of a self-affirmation which bars union with God.

One form or another of this dialectic, which von Balthasar considers always to arise out of a rationalist rejection of the paradox of the analogy of being, whether implicit as in Eckhart or explicit as in Hegel, will be the permanent temptation of subsequent theology. Von Balthasar shows it to be represented in the present century by Rilke and Heidegger, but he has traced meticulously the fortunes of the analogy throughout the preceding five hundred yearn in an immensely learned scrutiny of the work of Ruysbroek, Suso, Tauler, Nicholas of Cusa, Ignatius of Loyola, Ficino, Leibniz, Giordano Bruno, Lord Shaftesbury, Goethe, Holderlin, Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and many other scarcely lesser figures. This material must he read: like all of von Balthasar's work, it defies summary or compression. Throughout this formidable demand upon the reader's own learning, intelligence and attention, von Balthasar returns to themes typical of his entire venture: disclose a severely classical grounding in the Western philosophical tradition, a predilection for its Platonic expression, particularly as developed hy Plotinus, and the conviction that this pre-Christian wisdom is available for Christian exploitation, by the analogy Ito " the spoil of the Egyptians " familiar to the Fathers. It is patent that Plotinus particularly was thus levied upon almost from the beginning of Christian theology. The major contribution of Neoplatonism to Christian theology is the analogy of being. This imports the recognition, explicit in Plotinus, of the paradox of the simultaneous transcend· ence and immediacy of God to the world of man.

But when this philosophical tradition is understood to he basic to all Christian theology, it is so as nature to grace, with all the question of their interrelation at once begged and, by von Balthasar, left unresolved a priori, for that way lies system. Still it may be said that for von Balthasar, the relation of grace to nature is quite clearly historical and free, not a matter of an inference of grace from its supposed prior possibility in nature.

Included in this programmatic, not to say systematic, irresolution before the classic theological dilemmas is the temptation to identify fallenness and finitude, with pantheism then inescapable, and finally atheism. The remedy proposed is always the return to the analogy-hut until clarified past the point of Neoplatonism, it is the analogy which suggests the pantheist soteriology. Always, for von Balthasar, such rational contradictions as the nude analogy of being may present are resolved only by the Form of Christ: to seek their resolution elsewhere is to end in one of the dialectical traps which lie in wait for systematists.

Were theological *rationality,* as he regards it, locked in logical necessity insofar as self-consistent, his inference could hardly he faulted. That systematic theology is thus constrained he never establishes, other than by the narration of the continuing failure to find a systematic expression of the freedom of the faith.

Further, the insistence on the discovery, as a pre-Christian datum, of an analogy at the level of being between God and all that is not God makes it difficult, perhaps impossible, to understand the centrality of Christ to Christian theology: the analogy occupies that center beforehand. It then becomes difficult to deal with Christology in a fashion which avoids submitting the Revelation to the prior control of the analogy of being, which is thus in a position to legislate not simply for theology hut for God as well. Something of that percept echoes through the thought of Eckhart, and crops up variously thereafter: behind the Trinity stands the divine Essence. Von Balthasar contributes to this bafflement, at least for this reader: nonsuhsistent "Being," approximately the *esse* of the Thomists, becomes in his thought a medium between God and creation, as an implication of the analogy.

Another echo of Plotinus is heard frequently in the authors surveyed: the dialectic between God and man tends to be understood as between unqualified freedom and power on the part of God, and pure receptivity (indifference, *Gelassenheit,* self-abandonment, letting Being be, etc.) on the part of man. Even the eternal generation of the Son is thus understood by Eckhart, who has the Son proceeding from the Father in a " pure medium of receptivity." Elsewhere I have remarked upon von Balthasar's own dualistic relegation of masculinity to God and

femininity to creation, by reason of the latter's reception of its being from the Creator. This theme is found here in frequent applications of nuptial symbolism to the union of the soul of the Christian to God or to Christ; sometimes the union of divinity and humanity, or "the world," in Christ is thus imaged. This is consistent with another non-historical emphasis, widely shared by the authors he examines, upon the supposed immediacy of the relation between the individual soul and God.

But all of these matters are hut illustration of a more central point, that of the continuing oscillation, among the writers whose intellectual quest for Glory von Balthasar has reviewed, between self-sufficient immanence and self-negating transcendence. All are grist for von Balthasar's mill, whose product is inevitable: only the perception of the Glory of God in the Christ will satisfy this universal ontological hunger. "Our hearts are restless, until they rest in Thee."

In rthe present volume, von Balthasar traces that oscillation up to its latest and German expression, which extends from Meister Eckhart in the late thirteenth century to Heidegger in ,the twentieth. He discovers that each of these efforts, however tempted, either honors the ontological difference upon which the theological appreciation of the analogy of being and the Glory of God is dependent, and turns away from the rationalist elimination of the Glory of God in favor of an ultimately aesthetic response to that Glory, or, succumbing whether to cosmological or titanic blandishments, turns away from the Glory of God in pursuit of autonomous rationality and autonomous existence in a world bereft alike of paradox, of freedom, and of the Glory of God.

In the second and third volumes of *The Glory of the Lord,* we have seen von Balthasar set his face against all of those constructions of formal reason which enclose the Glory of God revealed in Christ within their own immanent logical necessities, thereby to distort rather than receive the Form of Glory that is Christ. He maintains that the " clerical styles" of theology fell generally into this rationalism after St. Thomas, when they began to mistake commentary on the supposedly final Thomist synthesis for the task of theology. Von Balthasar has concluded that from the late thirteenth century, with Dante, theology passed by default into the hands of the laity: it is " lay styles " which thereafter will occupy his attention, so much so that in his discussion of theological "styles" he practically ignored Newman. These "lay styles " are theological insofar as they forego system in favor of aesthetics.

Von Balthasar has found in theological aesthetics the single alternative to the pursuit of the fatally flawed ambition of systematic theology. I have earlier suggested that his discussion of the meaning and role

of *rectitudo* (the coincidence of truth and freedom and necessity) in Anselm's theology clarifies von Balthasar's aesthetics: he identifies the free order, the intrinsic coherence, of the free truth of the Revelation with the beautiful, not with the rational. He finds the appropriate analogue in the integrity of a work of art whose inherent unity is not necessary a priori, but only a posteriori, in the sense that it has reached its own perfection, the beauty which it bears upon its face: it must be as it is. This insight reflects the " Was it not necessary? " of Christ to the disciples at Emmaus.

Consequently it is by reason of the freedom of truth that the passage from system to aesthetics in theology is held to be necessary. As von Balthasar understands the freedom of truth-which is the freedom of the Revelation, the Glory of God-its transcendence requires a faith response whose unity cannot be systematized (i.e., rationalized) without deformation, for the Revelation, whose Form is Christ, can be apprehended only as Glory which carries its own warrant; there is no apologetics of the beautiful. The unity of the faith is not capable of a comprehensive propositional statement, although it is perceived and apprehended in its totality, in its free and necessary unity, by the believer. This, the analogy of faith, has only the unity of beauty, of the Glory of God.

In this emphasis upon the impossibility of a systematic statement of the Catholic faith, von Balthasar is most certainly correct: otherwise doctrine and the theology which would provide such an account would coincide in such wise that any theological mistake would be an infidelity. But since Anselm, it has been the task of theology continually to seek to understand the faith, not to foreclose the seeking by comprehending the faith in a rationale.

Further, within von Balthasar's view of theology as aesthetics, it is difficult to discover the distinction between the theologian's faith and his theological-aesthetic expression of that faith: e.g., Holderlin's poetry is thought to warrant his standing as a theologian; is his poetry to be read as the personal effort that is theology, or as a confession of the public faith, or both at once? Such an identity of faith and theology would not trouble von Balthasar, for all theologies, insofar as aesthetic and therefore valid, are different: their unity is symphonic, perceptible but not capable of rational synthesis. But does this not carry the consequence of a kind of privatization of the faith? If one may reply for von Balthasar, he would say no: the criterion of theology is the Glory of God, than which nothing is more public. Thus we may rely upon a *sensus fidelium* as wiser than the theologians: when theological aesthetics fails, it fails of beauty, and does not reflect the Glory of God nor affirm its Revelation in Christ. Von Balthasar shows how such failures betray themselves throughout this fifth volume.

Throughout *The Glory of the Lord,* von Balthasar presupposes that systematic theology must be a rationalism and so, rejecting rationalism, he rejects systematic theology. Like many others in flight from Thomism, he has turned instead to Augustine's phenomenology. But Augustine also is a systematic theologian. His hylemorphism supports a coherent phenomenology of fallen existence at worship in the Church, not merely an ineffable aesthetics, and this can be shown.

Any complete criticism of von Balthasar's anti-systematic postulate, and thus of his aesthetics, requires a positive development of a systematic theological method or methods which are adequate to the freedom of the truth and so cannot be charged with rationalism. That being beyond the limits of a review, one can only insist that such a rejection of the systematic project as intrinsically self-defeating is without justification: nowhere has von Balthasar established this crucial point. That this is the case only suggests that, in the end, his own work is not beyond the range of the criticism such systematization might offer.

For the rest, few would deny that we live in a world in which the Glory of God, if not imperceptible, is little perceived beneath its veiling. We are at the end of a century drenched with the blood of the innocent but not yet, as it seems, to satiation. The Western culture oscillates now as before between the obsessive quest for those secular negations of man and God which since Marx are politics, not theory, and the fugitive perception of the crucified Glory of God that objectively fills creation with life from the Cross. Ours is an age not unlike the late medieval period, fascinated with death, pervaded as von Balthasar observes with war and plague, presided over by a Church fragmented by schism. For us, as then and as always, the Glory of God is mercifully veiled, imposing itself on no one, freely available to anyone who would see. None of us could bear the unveiling of that Glory; we can approach it only sacramentally.

When theology does not speak to this universal human condition, when it does not reckon with the universality of our darkness, unbelief, and sin, and with the Glory that transcends our misery utterly by assuming it wholly, it is not heard. For sixty years von Balthasar insisted upon our unity in sin and in redemption to those who would listen, who are many and will be many more. His wisdom will continue to illumine the life of the Church, even when, as today, not everyone is receptive to such mastery of the Christian tradition as his writings display. We are not in a position to pass upon the merits of a work of this monumental stature; its brillance and learning judge us.

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On the Nature and Existence of God. By RICHARD M. GALE. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. 422 + viii. $44.50 (hardbound).

Is there a rational justification for believing that God, as understood by traditional Western theism, exists? Richard M. Gale uses the tools of analytic philosophy to address some aspects of this question. He intentionally avoids any discussion of inductive arguments which would try to show that the existence of God is the "only possible explanation" of some observable feature of the universe, and concentrates instead on arguments which more generally discuss whether or not belief in God is rationally justified (pp. 3, 241). His book is in some ways a response ,to philosophers such as William Alston and Alvin Plantinga who have used analytic philosophy in defense of the theistic claim that God exists. Gale offers a more sbptical account of the ability of reason to justify belief in God. He views his work as beneficial to theism, however, in that it may lead believers to adopt a conception of God which is "more adequate" for inspiring worship and obedience than the traditional notion (p. 3).

Before considering "theological arguments" in favor of the existence of God, Gale analyses a number of "atheological" arguments against it. The arguments fall into two categories, epistemological and pragmatic. Epistemological arguments are concerned with justifying any claim to knowledge that God does or does not exist. Pragmatic arguments try to show that belief (or disbelief) in the existence of God is justified by the moral benefits that accrue from it. With the exception of the last chapter, the entire book is devoted to epistemological arguments.

Gale views his atheological arguments as "thought experiments" which test the internal consistency of the traditional understanding of various divine attributes and so lead us to improve the logical consistency of our understanding of God. When the traditional understanding of some divine attribute is shown to involve logical incongruities, the theist is invited to go "back to the drawing board and redesign the particular divine attribute that is the focus of the argument" (p. 3). Atheological arguments are presented first so that the redesigned divine attributes can inform the subsequent analysis of theological arguments in favor of God's existence.

Gale is willing to redesign a good number of divine attributes on the basis of often familiar and sometimes rather shaky atheological arguments. The traditional understanding of divine omnipotence, for instance, is tested in Chapter 1, using Gale's version of the well known

dilemma of whether an omnipotent God could create a stone so heavy that God could not lift it. Since it is necessary that God ls omnipotent and since it is necessary that an omnipotent being can do anything, it is necessary that God can do anything. Thus, " it is necessary that God can create a stone so heavy that God cannot lift it." But if it is necessary that God can create a stone so heavy that God cannot lift it, then it is possible that there is something that God cannot do. So it is not necessary that God can do anything. Thus we come to the contradiction that it is both necessary and not necessary that God can do anything (p. 18).

Gale sees that his premise, " it is necessary that God *can create a stone so heavy* that God *cannot lift it,"* itself involves a self-contradiction and is equivalent to saying that the omnipotent God *can act in such a way* that the omnipotent God *is simultaneously not the omnipotent God* (20). What he fails to see is that attributing to God any action that falls short of perfect activity (e.g., immoral action) involves the same self-contradiction. Nor does he seem to realize that self-contradictory statements of this sort are simply nonsensical. Being devoid of meaning, they can tell us nothing about what God can or cannot do, and so in no way require us to restrict or qualify God's omnipotence.

Not seeing the senselessness of self-contradictory statements, Gale embarks on a program of reforming or qualifying the traditional notion of divine omnipotence to accommodate them. His suggested modifications, in turn, call into question the traditional notions of divine simplicity and perfection. Gale concludes that " the best strategy for the theist is to bite the bullet and take back the requirement that an absolutely perfect being have every perfection to an unlimited or unsurpassable degree." He finds that in " giving up the requirement that the Deity he absolutely simple, . . . not only is no real harm done, but it helps us to escape from a devastating atheological argument " (p. 29).

Similar atheological arguments are put forward regarding God's immutability. In Chapter 2, divine immutability is found to contradict the theistic doctrine of creation, and in Chapter 3 immutability is judged to be incompatible with God's knowledge of temporal things. Only if God's will is changeable can he at one point not will to create and then will to create. Similarly, God cannot truly know changeable things unless his knowledge of them changes as the things themselves change. Gale acknowledges that the notion of divine eternity is of some avail i.n overcoming these dilemmas but argues that it involves us in still more serious problems since it makes God "a nonperson," Gale's argument at this point ignores centuries of theistic reflection on the

eternal, personal God in favor of Sartre's understanding of consciousness as necessarily implying temporality. Gale fails to recognize that in adopting this understanding, he is gratuitously limiting God to a creaturely mode of existence (the very thing he will later direct his readers to avoid since it involves a "radical anthropomorphizing of God" [p. 177]). If (by arbitrary definition) "only a temporal being can qualify as a person" (p. 92), then of course God is either temporal or not a person (and mindless to boot): "[In affirming an eternal God], the theist ... winds up with a God who is a nonperson. A person has a mind and thus endures in time" (p. 53). Gale concludes that, if we are to have a God who is personal and thus religiously available, we must once again redesign the divine attributes and "make do with a temporal God" (p. 56).

Gale feels he can be rather free in redesigning the concept of God so long as the referent of the word "God" remains the sarr..e as it has been in the theistic tradition, especially in the biblical roots of that tradition. He finds that "the basic problem that a theological concept of God faces is that of over metaphysicalizing God so that he no longer is a person and thereby becomes religiously unavailable" (p. 4). While Gale offers an enlightening discussion of how the name "God" refers to God, his account of divine properties suffers from a certain "under metaphysicalizing" in his own philosophy. Divine properties may be "hard-core" (such as God's worshipfulness and supremacy in being) or "soft-core" {such as God's absolute simplicity, identity of essence and existence, and absolute omnipotence). Hard-core divine properties are "essential to our idea of God" while soft-core properties "can alter over time without destroying sameness of reference." The connection between the hard-core and soft-core properties "is very loose, and thereby permits there to be considerable conceptual reform without destroying sameness of reference" (pp. 7-8). He suggests, for instance, that one might give up absolute simplicity as a soft-core property without altering the referent. Thus one might presumably maintain that God is still the one who enjoys supreme greatness in being (hard-core property) even though God is no longer considered absolutely simple.

At this point, one wonders whether we are talking about metaphysical attributes which have an inherent relationship to one another (and presumably some metaphysical ground for being attributed to the supreme being in the first place), or whether we are merely playing with our concepts-shuffiing them around to suit our pleasure. To at least some philosophers it is clear that to deny God's absolute simplicity or to deny that divine essence is identical with divine existence is tantamount to denying that God is the first and highest being.

The second section of the hook examines four sorts of theological arguments. In Chapter 6, four versions of the ontological argument are subjected to painstaking analysis and found wanting. In fact, the conception of God with which the ontological argument begins is found to lead to an ontological disproof of God's existence: "God should not be the sort of entity that necessarily exists; for, if he is so con· ceived, it follows that he does not and cannot exist" (p. 202). In Chapter 7, the cosmological argument is considered. Gale contends that the argument is false since it is impossible for the being affirmed in its conclusion to exist (p. 238).

In Chapter 8, arguments for the existence of God based on religious experience are reviewed. Gale is understandably reluctant to accept such arguments as valid demonstrations of God's existence, given the necessarily subjective character of their starting point. His arguments, however, so emphasize sense experience as the model for all veridical, cognitive experience as to render all religious experience non-veridical and non-cognitive (p. 326-327). While all might agree that religious experience is not the same as sense experience, many would have to disagree that religious experience is neither veridical nor cognitive in the ordinary meaning of those terms. Gale himself strongly insists that we follow the " standards of ordinary language," which he finds embodied in the *OED* (pp. 48, 70). But the *OED* defines "veridicaP' as "truthful" and "cognitive" as "pertaining to cognition," which is defined as " the action or faculty of knowing taken in its widest sense." By these definitions (which do not tie the terms so narrowly to sense perception as Gale does), religious experience might well be both veridical and cognitive.

In Chapter 9, Gale looks at pragmatic arguments for God's existence. Such arguments try to show that belief in God is justified by the desirable consequences that follow from it. Arguments from prudence show that believing in God's existence satisfies the needs of the believer, while arguments from morality contend that such belief fosters our moral betterment either personally or socially. Gale's analysis raises serious questions about .the success of such arguments, but does not attempt to give a decisive conclusion regarding their validity.

Throughout the book, Gale often alludes to " the great medieval theists" (pp. 4, 23, 37, 53, 54, 59, 95, 178, 201, 215). Unfortunately, however, he largely ignores their discussions of the specific questions that he is examining, especially in his treatment of divine attributes. Their profound insights into the nature of God, when mentioned at all, are sometimes dismissed not through responsible philosophical argu· mentation, but by facile allusions to vague and unfounded psychologi· cal or sociological factors that supposedly formed the basis of their

metaphysical conclusions: " It was assumed by the medieval theists •.• that there is something inherently inferior about the temporal compared with the timeless. Being temporal was an infliction, a sort of body odor from which everything of this world reeked. For a complex set of reasons, some psychological having to do with the fear of death and decay, others socioeconomic concerning their disdain for the inferior class of people who were forced to manipulate changing objects, they assumed that true being must he found in what is immutable . . ." (p. 54).

Gale's hook is quite thorough in its review of the relevant literature of contemporary analytical philosophers on the existence of God and affords a rich feast for anyone looking for an almost boundless supply of carefully fashioned logical arguments questioning the conclusions of those who have used analytic philosopy to defend theistic tenets. For philosophers hungering for a truly insightful contemporary approach to the question of God's existence and nature, however, the hook provides hut meager fare.

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Die Gnade vollendeter Endlichkeit: Zur transzendentaltheologischen Auslegung der thomanischen Anthropologie. By RICHARD SCHENK, O.P. Freihurg: Herder, 1989. Pp. 638. 98 DM.

The title of this hook, which could he rendered into English as, roughly, *The Grace of Perfect Imperfection,* could strike one as ironic, and yet it intrigues by promising a new way of looking at a fundamental anthropological problem. The hook delivers on this promise hut, in so doing, creates difficulties for the reviewer. For this new way of looking is so thoroughly grounded in the history of philosophy and theology, its scope is so broad, its implications so profound that it demands a greater arena than a hook review to do it justice. Therefore, I will content myself with introducing its structure and content as well as indicating to whom this hook may appeal.

The work is the doctoral dissertation of Schenk, done at the University of Munich. It is an attempt to develop an historically grounded, yet transcendental interpretation of Thomistic anthropology which avoids the experiential supernaturalism of Karl Rahner's theology. Schenk demonstrates the possibility of an alternative reading by developing the differences between Heidegger and Rahner in their respec·

tive notions of transcendence. These three, Thomas, Heidegger and Rahner, are the chief discussion partners for Schenk, although the foot· notes and bibliography reveal a familiarity with the secondary literature that is breathtaking.

The first chapter is Schenk's exploration of twelve antitheses. Its purpose seems more negative than positive in that it prevents the reader from simply categorizing Schenk's work and interpretation as either " history " or a " new interpretation," as either " perennial " or " contemporary", to mention just two of the antitheses.

The second chapter is the longest, most difficult and, from a systematic viewpoint, most important of the work. Schenk lays out the alternative views, stemming from Porphyry's and Proclus' schools of Neoplatonism respectively, of the theodicy problematics, which were available to Thomas in constructing his anthropology. Schenk's choice of the theodicy problem as a focus is particularly fruitful, since it allows him to show how all of the fundamental theological anthropological issues, such as nature and grace, death, epistemology and freedom are involved and affected. The fundamental question can he formulated thus: Is the perfection of the human being accomplished in his or her own subjectivity or in its being surmounted?

It is also here that Schenk's work shows its power in areas beyond the merely speculative. His concentration on the theodicy problem brings an almost " pastoral " side to the work, in that it seeks to avoid easy answers to the difficult question of why God allows human suffering. This question is not put aside by the Gospel hut made more pointed. Thomas seeks to follow and enhance what went before him (and here we have moved into the third chapter) by not functionalizing suffering and yet maintaining the call of the individual to salvation. It is precisely in this place, in this antinomy between the pri· mordial hope for perfection and the equally primordial doubt of ever attaining it, that Schenk does his theology. From this viewpoint such things as the gratuity of grace, the unexpected character of revelation and its "non-naturalness" receive their proper context. Human beings experience a " deficit " in their striving for happiness which faith is unable to overcome precisely because this deficit is the transcendental condition of its possibility. It is in this light that Schenk analyses the axiom that grace does not destroy hut rather presupposes nature and perfects it. (The light he sheds on the Przywara-Barth debate over this question is immense.) Nature is such that it lacks; and grace does not do away with this experience of lack hut perfects it–hence perfect imperfection. Not only. does this analysis present an interpretation of the axiom which is more open to an ecumenical understanding, it also reveals a transcendental method for theology. The

usual transcendental theology begins with the fact that grace, salvation and revelation are experienced (albeit implicitly) by everyone everywhere. This risks underestimating the newness and even the " strangeness " of revelation as well as the uniqueness of Christianity. Schenk is able to highlight these aspects without rendering grace " extrinsic " to nature.

Schenk's most attractive work is his treatment of the problem of death in the fourth chapter. He compares and contrasts Rahner's and Heidegger's different conceptions of death and then brings out Thomas's emphasis on the negativity of death as characteristic of his anthropology and as the condition of hope in the resurrection. In this light, the " immortality " of the human soul can be seen as equally blessing and curse, so long as the hoped for, or despaired of, resurrection has not overcome death.

Schenk ends with a discussion of human freedom, finding a position between Rahner's emphasis on pre-elective transcendental freedom. and the early Heidegger's decisionism. The finite spontaneity of human knowing is the boundary and the possibility of human free choice.

Clearly this work will be of interest to medievalists in general and Thomistic scholars in particular. Further, anyone whose theology is influenced by the thought of K. Rahner will want to read this book. Without ever lapsing into polemics, it provides the most profound analysis of, and answer to, some of the limitations inherent in Rahner's thought. Finally, it seems to me that this hook would he of special interest to Jesuit specialists in Rahner's thought. For it does seem to me that Schenk is trying, granted on a completely different level and in a completely different context, to restart the Dominican-Jesuit controversy. For pointing out that there remain serious issues over which we can and perhaps should disagree, we can only he grateful.

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Reading in Communion: Scripture & Ethics in Christian Life. By STEPHEN E. FOWL & L. GREGORY JONES. Series: *Biblical Foundations in Theology.* Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1991. Pp. ix + 166. $13.95 (paper).

This book represents the collaborative attempt of a biblical scholar and an ethicist to determine the precise sense in which scriptural texts can be taken as normative for the Christian moral life. The collaboration is a fruitful one, its results illuminating not only the problem of method in ethics, but issues of biblical hermeneutics as well. This result is not serendipitous; for the authors, the question of how one ought to live the Christian life and the question of how one ought to interpret Scripture are inextricably linked. Indeed, perhaps it would be more accurate to suggest that, on the account that Fowl and Jones supply, these are different formulations of the very same question. There is no rigid demarcation here between the hermeneutical and the ethical realm, no rigorous sorting out of issues appropriate to each field of inquiry. The authors make good on their introductory promise "to write a single text" rather than simply to generate a series of "alternating perspectives" (p. 3).

In the very first chapter of the book, certain typical, even dominant, ways of construing the relationship between Scripture and ethics are briefly reviewed and then rejected. Ethics is commonly perceived as being primarily "concerned with right actions and decisions," the authors contend, while the Bible is viewed as a moral guide for the "particular decisions made by isolated individuals" (p. 5). In contrast, Fowl and Jones argue that "Scripture is primarily addressed not to individuals but to specific communities called into being by God" (p. 8). Moreover, our ethical deliberations ought *not* to be focused on particular decisions and the formulation of moral principles that bear on those decisions, but rather, on "issues of character and the formation of character in and through socially-embodied traditions" (p. 9).

The consequences of such a general position are carefully and sensitively explored in this first and in subsequent chapters. The authors reject the assumption that one such consequence must be the conclusion that moral behavior is not, after all, ruled behavior, that one cannot formulate and articulate the principles that govern much of what we do. Their position entails the conclusion, rather, that such principles cannot be meaningfully detached from the communally embodied traditions that engender them. Indeed, they *have* meaning at all only insofar as the individuals describing, interpreting and employing these

principles possess the peculiar habits and beliefs characteristic of the members of a specific community. In the analysis of any given moral situation, then, the discussion of principles will necessarily presuppose a discussion of character, of the *sorts* of persons involved in the situation, their moral beliefs and capabilities. It is important to note that this discussion will often take a narrative form, precisely because the delineation of character is most readily accomplished by telling stories about persons, about their communities, their politics and practices, their interests and aspirations.

Thus, moral capabilities are formed in " the friendships and practices " that constitute communal life. In asserting this, the authors defend an important but not terribly controversial claim. What is especially intriguing and insightful about their account, however, is the related claim that moral capabilities are also hermeneutical capabilities, that some of the patterns and habits of action acquired by living in a Community also function as habits of interpretation. "Well-formed character," Fowl and Jones explain, is crucial not only to "Christians' ability to live faithfully in the various contexts within which they find themselves," but also to their " ability to read, speak and perform the word of the Lord " (p. 85) . Moral virtue *is,* on their account, a kind of interpretive skill. (If not identical, character and interpretive skill are, at the very least, formed in the same process, inextricably linked together as aspects of "practical wisdom." See page 31.)

This result is especially meaningful once it becomes clear that the authors are employing a usefully broadened concept of " interpretation." To interpret a scriptural text can and often will involve "the disciplined use of words " (p. 33) . But the full articulation of Scripture's meaning requires also a disciplined way of life; Christian practice has an explicitly hermeneutical significance. In the same sense that one's *interpretation* of a dramatic play consists not only in what one says or writes about it, but also in how one actually *performs* it on stage, so too, the authors argue, " Our interpretation of Scripture-and our willingness to have our lives interpreted *by* Scripture-have as their goal a performance of Scripture" (p. 62). So the meanings of Scripture are embodied in Christian practice. Against the background supplied by such a perspective, the last chapter of the book presents an illuminating portrayal of Dietrich Bonhoeffer as an exemplary " performer of Scripture."

Fowl and Jones are sensitive to the sort of critique typically directed at accounts, such as theirs, that stress the primacy of tradition, as displayed in a community's ideals and customs. If interpretation is always a matter of "reading in communion," some critics might argue, how can one account for the prophetic voice, the individual who seeks

to expose traditional interpretations as false, dangerous or oppressive? If "interpretation is confirmed, constrained, and determined by the political constitution of those contexts in which interpretation takes place" (p. 17), then how is it possible to formulate questions that challenge such constraints by addressing the situation of individuals and groups pressed to the margins of society? Moreover, how is conversation possible with those multifarious "outsiders" who live in communities different from one's own?

Fowl and Jones respond to such critical questions by carefully noting that, as in the example provided by Bonhoeffer, wise interpreters are always themselves open to interpretation. This openness is more than simply a willingness to enter into dialogue with other interpreters, both in and outside of one's community, to listen to their challenges and criticisms. It is, in addition, a willingness to be challenged by the scriptural texts themselves, so that our reading of these texts will "involve allowing the texts to provide readings of us" (p. 42). In this respect, Scripture is at once normative for and formative of community while at the same time representing the embodiment of "otherness," prophetically exposing the complacency and self-deception that infect a community's interpretive practices. This general strategy of reading "over-against ourselves" is developed at some length by the authors, and an entire chapter (Chapter 5) is devoted to the problem of "listening to the voices of outsiders."

This type of criticism is an important one and the authors are to be lauded for the care that they take in responding to it. That response, nevertheless, raises some questions that their account leaves unanswered. That account, in effect, seeks to balance an ongoing emphasis on intl'atextual matters (the formation of Christian identity through the wise and faithful interpretation/ performance of the Bible), with a careful attentiveness to intertextual phenomena (the cultivation of dialogue with other persons, communities, scriptures, etc.). The possibility of communication with such others need not rest on some hidden assumption about an "essential universal core" shared by all systems of belief and practice (p. 124). All that is required is that there be *some* continuity of belief and practice, *some* shared habits and assumptions, among diverse communities.

It is at this point that further clarification of the authors' position would be desirable. To talk about reading the Bible as a text is relatively straightforward (even if such talk does generate a myriad of hermeneutical problems). But to talk about opening oneself and one's life to being interpreted *by* Scripture, to talk about providing "readings of the world" even while allowing "the world to provide readings of us" (p. 4), is to treat each of these-self, life, the world-as a

" text " that can and must be interpreted. Here a question arises concerning the extent to which Fowl and Jones intend such talk to be taken literally. There are ample resources, supplied by contemporary hermeneutics and semiotic, available for the purpose of explicating the various senses in which human selves, for example, can be treated and interpreted as complex systems of signs. Within the framework supplied hy such theories, persons *are* texts, and conversation between persons represents a form of living intertextuality. Moreover, it is appropriate to regard the encounter between interpreter and scriptural text as itself constituting a genuine conversation.

This book is not a philosophical treatise and so it is understandable that the authors do not explore such theoretical material in detail (although they certainly do not ignore these considerations; see pages 14:ff.). But even a highly selective appeal to some of these resources might have helped to clarify their argument and to promote their theological objectives. A more detailed theoretical sketch of the dynamics of sign interpretation, for example, might have enabled readers to make better sense of the seemingly circular claim that specific Christian virtues " both are the prerequisite for, and the result of, wise readings of Scripture" (p. 36). It might also have enabled them to grasp more precisely the sense in which interpretation is said to culminate in performance. That is to say, one's 'living the Gospel' is part of rather than merely a consequence of one's interpretation of Scripture precisely because human praxis is itself a form of meaningful semiosis.

A certain vagueness surrounds the authors' repeated claims about the normative status of the Bible in Christian ethics. They clearly reject the simplistic strategy of harvesting from Scripture a collection of unambiguous rules and maxims for guiding human conduct. They energetically resist the temptation to "read into" Scripture one's own established moral beliefs and practices, by insisting on the reader's willingness not only to listen to the voices of outsiders, but also, to be "interrogated *by* Scripture" itself (p. 38). Finally, they are eager to abandon the notion that the Bible is a " relatively stable entity which has a single ' meaning '." With each of these moves, the authors distance themselves from typical but highly problematic methods of describing the normative primacy and authority of Scripture. But the result is that their own account remains problematic until they can explain how the Bible can have many meanings but not just *any* meaning. Moreover, they need to clarify the role of extrabiblical meanings in shaping Christian identity. Just what are the constraints on moving beyond the interpretation of Scripture in order to embrace moral values and practices learned through one's conversation with other persons and cultures? It is, admittedly, a fuzzy matter to decide how

many of a Buddhist's ideas and practices I can adopt before my *identity* as a Christian is threatened. Yet l:he issue of Christian identity W so central to Fowl's and Jones's account, while their encouragement to, ' listen to the voice of others ' is so sincere, !:hat l:he reader deserves a more nuanced discussion of this problem.

To say that Scripture is an important source of religious and moral knowledge is to say a great deal, but also to leave much left unsaid. The authors argue " that Christian communities need to establish spaces in which believers oan have their characters formed and informed by a true knowledge of God" (p. 103). Because I regard that argument as a compelling one, I am curious to learn more about the peculiar shape that the classical problem of religious knowledge might take within the framework that this hook provides. It is a framework in which interpretation is conceived as an essentially communal, dynamic and morally transformative experience. That conception and that framework, it seems to me, have the potential to yield much fruit.,

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Broken Lights and Mended Lives: Theology and Common Life in the Church. By ROWAN A. GREER. University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986. Pp. xiv + 237. $19.50, (cloth).

Scholars in early Christian studies have been paying more attention of late to the social setting of the early Church. Books such as Robert Wilken's *The Christians as the Romans Saw Them* and Peter Brown's, *The Cult of the Saints* reflect a widespread concern with the *Sitz im Leben* of the early age of Christian life. But the pendulum can swing too far in the direction of neglecting theology's influence on the common Hfe of Christian believers. This book is an attempt to see the theological perspectives as explaining and shaping the lives lived by believers in the Christian gospel.

The volume is divided into two parts corresponding to the two terms of the title. The first and shorter part includes three chapters, the ond :five chapters, each bringing out a theological theme and its influence on the social levet The " broken lights " of the title is taken from the poem. of Tennyson, *In Memoriam:* "they are but broken lights of thee." They denote the theological views that genuinely, if

imperfectly, reveal God's glory. They do not exist in splendid isolation hut are meant to heal and mend human lives. In his use of these terms Rowan Greer wants to indicate the mutuality of theology and Christian experience. As indicated by the Catholic Theological Society of America's 1992 convention theme "Theology and Experience," the mutual relationship of both these realities is of first importance and relevance.

Irenaeus, who gives us " the earliest theological synthesis in the history of the Church " (p. 25) , forges his theology in the face of Gnostic cosmological speculations. For him the crucified and risen Lord is the new Adam and his experience is genuinely human. The material creation must not he destroyed, as the Gnostics held, hut fulfilled. This leads Irenaeus to view the incarnation as the culmination of God's economy. For Irenaeus, Greer holds, recapitulation does not mean redoing Adam's work so much as fulfilling" for the first time the promise of Adam's creation" (p. 38).

This view is contrasted with ·those of Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine, thinkers who come from different settings than Irenaeus. While the great apologist had to defend Christian truth against Gnostics who would deny its relation to the created order, the Bishop of Nyssa saw it as justifying the monastic life. As the image of God, man must actualize the likeness to him through a life of virtue. Greer outlines Nyssa's theology with a focus on human freedom, understood as in dialectic with providence within the Neoplatonic scheme of love.

But as Augustine shows, Neoplatonism cannot hear the full weight of Christian revelation. The axiom ' to know the good is to do the good ' can he reversed; instead of freeing Augustine it rather shows him the presence of a depraved will. Knowing and willing simply do not move in easy dialectic. Augustine's personal experience of evil in the world and in his own will led him to a view of the Christian life more as an anticipation of rather than a participation in Truth, says Greer (p. 77) . Nyssa's explanation of the origin of evil strikes Augustine as a compromising of God's sovereignty. His experience with Pelagianism leads to a highlighting of original sin and the corruption it causes. This in turn leads him to read biblical history as God electing the saints by grace from the mass of perdition. One may quarrel with Greer over the details of the schematization hut the contrast does indeed mark Greek and Latin theologies even to the present.

The second half of the hook focuses on " mended lives," i.e., the restorative power of Christianity in human institutions. Under this category Greer considers the family, hospitality, the Christian as citizen in the world, monastic life, and the collapse of the West. Certainly the topics are wide-ranging hut to each of them Greer brings a degree of

balance and insight that is admirable. In the matter of the family, for instance, the church saw itself as the society of mutual love which would transform human relationships. Sometimes this meant emphasizing Roman notions of respect and justice; sometimes it meant departing from current practice, as in St. Paul's revolutionary statement of equal partnership in marriage (1 Cor 7:4) or Callistus's allowing the marriages of slaves. Monasticism itself was a radical departure from Roman family structures. The Church could promote both celibacy and marriage.

Another area of Christianity's social impact was that of hospitality, which includes almsgiving, care of the sick, etc. The author gives many examples from Christian sermons and writings on the need for this virtue to he exercised. It is clear that this concern is based on a new vision of man redeemed by Christ.

An interesting chapter describes the paradox of Christians being in the world hut not of it. Using Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria as opposite poles, Greer sees the Christian stance toward the empire and human culture as expressed in radically different ways. Martyrdom for the first would be a complete rejection of the world while for the second it would be the perfect expression of love, a metaphor for the Christian life. With Eusebius, Greer holds, the paradox seems to dissolve. That the fall of Rome was seen as devastating by Christians is an indication " that the paradox of alien citizenship can never be successfully put into practice on a social scale," Greer writes in a provocative sentence (p. 159). Either rejection or sacralizing seems to be inevitable.

Monasticism provides another stage for the discussion of man's relation to society. Is the phenomenon a protest against society (even Christian society) or the realization of the Christian ideal as in Athanasius' s *Life of Antony?* Greer offers interesting remarks on the vision of Origen and the Cappadocians, Evagrius and John Cassian.

Greer takes the reader over a wide range of different material but his balanced chapters offer insight into a common theme: how the next world is present in this one or is a fulfillment of this one. Generally the author has succeeded in resisting the temptation to over-schematize. Of course the material considered is open to different interpretations, hut the analyses Greer offers here are well-considered and provocative.

The book is very well edited with barely a typographical error to distract the reader, and it is well bound. It is an appropriate presentation for the quality of writing within.

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The Great Dissent: John Henry Newman and the Liberal Heresy. By ROBERT PATTISON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp. xiii + 231. $29.95.

This extremely provocative and elegantly written study of John Henry Newman's struggle with "liberalism" argues that Newman was a genuine rebel whose solitary voice needs to be heard, as much today as then, but whose project was, in the end, eminently unsuccessful. The preface announces that the purpose of the book is to " establish Newman's impeccable credentials as a failure," and the suggestion that " the totality of his failure is the measure of his grandeur as a critic of our culture" leads to the appraisal that Newman's true "intellectual counterparts " were Marx and Nietzsche and Lenin, rather than Arnold or Carlyle (vi-viii, 53). As "the single unwavering but articulate voice raised against liberalism in all its incarnations," Newman indirectly offers an " invaluable " description of the thought against which he battled, but his importance, the author suggests, lies in his utter failure to make a dent in the century of thought following him: " the victory of everything Newman despised makes his defeated and unfashionable view of Western civilization interesting not merely as a consistent critique of what has come to pass, hut as one of the few intelligible alternatives to the ideological monopoly of liberalism " (53) .

That alternative, a " consistent view of the world opposed to liberalism root and branch, sharing none of its premises and despising all of its works is an inestimable benefit, for no one more than the liberal himself," for without an "honest and unforgiving voice" like Newman's, the liberal " would smugly assume that the paradoxical tenets of his creed are ... self-evident truths" (215). On the one hand, Newman's value lies in challenging liberalism's complacency, and treating "the ugliest manifestations of liberalism with the contempt they deserve but rarely provoke" (215). Moreover, Pattison allows that Newman offers an " acute refutation of its [liberalism's] major premises " (53) (if " refutation " is the ' achievement ' word I think it is, this seems inconsistent on Pattison's part). On the other hand, Newman's value lies precisely in failing to undermine liberalism-while he reminds liberalism that it is a heresy, thus provoking its vitality, it is only insofar as liberalism remains vital that " the possibilities of relative decency and tolerant forbearance remain alive" (216). The author argues, in other words, that Newman's attack on liberalism hits the mark with respect to liberalism's "ugliest manifestations," hut it is, unfortunately, tied to a theory of belief which entails an intolerant dogmatism. Newman is, in the end, a peculiar figure, described as

important and valuable (and even possibly correct-189), yet, none·theless, insignificant, "trivial" (8), and even "absurd" (143); like the Oxford Movement with which he is associated, he said to have made an "impression" without making an "impact" (25), and that, according to Pattison, is a blessing for those care about the liberal cause oftoleration (65, 178) .

Pattison begins in earnest his exploration of Newman's response to his age by examining his particular response to one critical, yet typical, opponent: "The combat with Renn Dickson Hampden epitomizes the process by which Newman determined the narrow compass of truth and formed his reply to the heresies of liberalism " (60) . The " almost pathological detestation " of Hampden which the author attributes to Newman (77, n.40) is the response to principles put forth by Hampden which Newman saw as "the social expression of Socinianism," which was itself only a reincarnation of the Ari.an heresy (76). Hampden's heresy, on this view, grew out of Arianism-to understand that "is to see how Newman formed the standards of truth by which he condemned the modern world" (76). For Newman, "the modern world is a realization of Socinian beliefs," " the complex of contemporary civilization originated in the distorted beliefs of Arius" (198-99), and Arianism (Hampden's heresy, liberalism) raised the pressing question "what kind of truth could words express" (107).

Pattison presents Newman's understanding of liberalism from two somewhat different perspectives-HberaHsm is not only anti-dogmatic, it also claims that one can act on principles without believing in them (91). Two issues are thereby raised: one, and this is the issue we meet first, is the relation between belief and action; the other is the character of belief itself. The distinction between the two issues is not always recognized by Pattison, and there is unclarity within the discussion oJ each issue.

The preface hints at Newman's problematical "adherence to the perverse proposition that belief precedes action" (vii), and this criticism is repeated and reformulated. Newman's " indictment of modernity " (and his irrelevance to it) is lbased on his " peculiar ... insistence that action can he explained by reference to dogma "; Newman's is " the most determined defense of the primacy of belief yei devised " (76). Newman is said to distance himself from Whatley's "dissociation of belief and action " (59) . The " divorce " characteristic of liberalism-where " belief is irrevocably separated from action "-is :finally explicated as the liberal claim that " we can act on Christian principles even though we cannot believe in them" (91). Newman's " theory of belief " is finally characterized as the claim that " beliefs drive the world "; Marxist analysis invalidates this claim, the author

suggests, and with it" the whole of Newman's religious position" (117-18). The assertion of the primacy of belief is equated with the assertion of the "preeminence of ideas among the forces that shape human life" (132-33). In the end Newman's "conclusion that belief takes precedence over action" is what separates him from "modern thought," and his thought has "continuing value" precisely because his position cannot be "honestly refuted": the assertion that human life is determined by its belief or lack of belief may be unfashionable, but it is at least a challenging hypothesis" (198-99).

The tales which Pattison tells about Newman's position, however enjoyable the reading, are marked by an unfortunate lack of conceptual clarity. First, the thesis is itself unclear. To say that belief precedes, has primacy over, is among the forces leading to, takes precedence over, and determines, action is to say quite different things: the kind of relation between belief and action with which Newman is saddled needs to be sorted out better. Second, the thesis implies a view of the relation between theory and practice which is quite at odds with what Newman says-it misleadingly suggests that Newman's "primacy of truth" (149) was the primacy of theory. Thirdly, some of the formulations of Newman's "theory of belief" present a picture which seems difficult to argue with-for example, Pattison charges that "for Newman, action unguided by belief was mere expediency, while belief severed from its moral consequences was mere sophistry" (99), but this doesn't seem the sort of claim "few Victorians and even fewer moderns could accept" (189).

The description of the dissociation between belief and action which Newman sees at the heart of liberalism leads to the second issue-that of Newman's views on "belief." Here again the author is not strong on conceptual discrimination; a number of crucial contrasts and correlations are posited, but the contrasts lack conceptual definition and the links of the correlations are not forged with analytical rigor. "Belief" is treated repeatedly as equivalent to "dogma" and "doctrine," and even "idea" (133)-but none of these are identical and the indiscriminate use of such crucial terms makes it difficult to assess the author's argument. Admittedly, he pays a lot of attention to all these concepts, but without ever actually clarifying them very much.

Similar problems arise when the author almost imperceptibly slides within a single paragraph from the phrase "absolute realities" to the phrase "objective realities" (146); he continually treats as equivalent not only terms like "absolute" and "objective" (147, 189, 193, 196, 201), but also conflates "absolute" with "positive" (82). He repeatedly fails to distinguish between claims to "certainty" and claims to "infallibility" (a distinction Newman makes quite clearly

in the *Grammar of Assent),* and treats rejections of "ineffability" as affirmations of "absolutism." The terminological "landmines, unobtrusive but lethal" (146) and "mischievous terminology" (152) which Pattison finds in Newman are only too evident in Pattison's own writing. This imprecision obviously affects his central thesis about Newman's response to Hampden as the paradigmatic anti-absolutist, the arch-relativist. When absolutism is understood as the view that language is more than a "mind-game" (86) and reason is not a "delusion" (83, 90-94), Newman is left holding the bag of absolutism-but it is no longer the absolutism we all agree should be criticized, the absolutism which makes infallible claims to absolute truth. We can, after all, he anti-absolutist without having to pay Hampden's price of giving up " reason and ... a universe of language and interpretation " (94). When, as the harbinger of modern logical positivism and relativism (79), Hampden presents sentiment, action (91-82), and instinct (94) as the only alternative to absolutist claims to truth, he is presenting a false dichotomy. We " moderns " recognize it as false--logical positivism no longer holds pride of place in contemporary philosophy. If liberalism requires " religion without doctrine, language, or reason " (91), it is not at all clear that liberalism has triumphed.

An evaluation of Newman's marginality to modern thought, his "great dissent," is rendered .difficult in the face of the trading on ambiguities found in Pattison's arguments. For example, the " relativism " espoused by Hampden (which is said to presage contemporary relativism) is at times seen by Pattison as grounded in the claim that reason is a " delusion," but at other times it is grounded in the claim that "human ideas are relative to the human mind" (87). Newman could no more avoid being the latter kind of relativist than we can, and it is not clear that " modern thought " is committed to the former kind of scepticism. If " relativism " is premised on the view that reason is a " delusion," it is not at all clear that relativism has triumphed. Moreover, the kind of dualism that Hampden reveals in his account of the relation between doctrines and " facts " (85-6, 93) is precisely the dualism against which much contemporary thought has argued; Pattison's appeal to Wittgenstein is a very selective one, for Hampden's view of " the unbridgeable gulf between .the mind and the facts to which it responds" (86) is clearly foreign to the thought of, at the very least, the later Wittgenstein. It remains to the end unclear precisely what Newman's defense of "dogma" consists in-the meaning of dogma varies between notions of infallible formulation, authoritative formulation, and, finally, any formulation at all (as opposed to ineffability). When Pattison presents Newman's view that "Christianity is faith, faith implies a doctrine; a doctrine propositions; propositions

yes or no, yes or no differences " (173), he is certainly not making a case for Newman's absolutism. (Nor is the case made for Newman's absolutism by the report that Newman thought "truth is absolute" (193)-that does not say anything about whether Newman thought our access to or formulations of truth were infallible or absolute.) In fact, Pattison admits that Newman denied only the liberal view that "language was totally divorced" from reality (159).

The question at issue is that of reference-do words refer to more than themselves, or are we only talking about language? What is most troubling about Pattison's discussion of the question of dogma, language, and reason is the way in which his descriptions and criticisms often have a grain of truth in them, or *could* be interpreted so as to provide a correct picture (of Wittgenstein, Newman, Hampden, etc.), but are, as they stand, very misleading. For example, it is very problematical to attribute to the "moderns," through Wittgenstein, the view that language is a " mind-game," or the view that " language and truth are irreconcilably separate" (160). Although there is *some* sense in which this could be stretched to fit the view that prevails today, without further clarification this either misrepresents ,the "modern" view or, at best, only confuses the issue of Newman's contrast. Similarly, it is confusing to see claims which seem perfectly plausible and non-absolutist (e.g., that " the mind can state truth " or that " belief has an object "-139, 153) lumped together with (and colored by) claims that are extreme and untenable, and to see purportedly alternative formulations of a given tenet really say something else altogether (as when claims to "objective" truth are re-presented as claims to infallible or absolute access to truth).

The attempt to go beyond simply talking about language and to speak of " objective" realities need not imply espousal of a crude correspondence theory of truth. Moreover, the alternative to ineffability is not necessarily either a claim to absolute truth or a crude correspondence theory of truth. Pattison's assumption of such false dichotomies only causes confusions when we attempt to assess Newman's response to liberalism.

It is intriguing that Pattison seems to force Newman into a no-win situation. He charges, on the one hand, that Newman is a dogmatist, or absolutist, who thought words referred in a crude correspondence way and who made uninhibited claims to absolute truth, infallibly known. On the other hand, however, Newman is accused of thinking that "verbal precision insulted truth" (145; see also 161). In other words, whenever Newman is saying something which cannot be faulted for expressing an utterly crude correspondence theory of truth, he is accused of being incredibly sloppy or, worse, slippery in his use of

language. That kind of exegesis seems determined from the outset to find fault.

Whether Newman's attack on ·the kind of relativism he called liberalism failed to make an impact on twentieth-century thought cannot be judged, in the end, without both clarifying the terms of the discussion more than Pattison does and taking into account Newman's views on the subtle, nuanced processes of informal reasoning and his appreciation of the limits of scepticism. Pattison adverts to these obliquely (152, 178), but they should be made more of, because those views constitute an attack on both scepticism and the notions of ' pure ' reason or' pure logic' (as accounting for we believe what we do) which does find significant echoes among " moderns " (whether in the person of James, Wisdom, Polanyi, Toulmin, Harman, Putnam, or Wittgenstein).

This study is no doubt a useful antidote to the work of those pious partisans and canonization-seekers to whom Pattison often refers, who are mired in the quicksand of uncritical admiration of Newman, but while it valiantly attempts unflinching honesty, its own bias is revealed in what I have suggested often appears to be just the kind of "systematic ambiguity" and" willful obscurity" (144) of which he accuses Newman. Nonetheless, "challenging Newman's work to justify its place in intellectual history " (v) , it succeeds in being extremely suggestive (and provocative) and thereby provides a study worth close attention by anyone interested in Newman. What is more, even those only vaguely interested in the Victorians will be rewarded by the remarkably engaging and entertaining prose found here; what one suspects might have been boring in less able hands is offered with an urbanity and wit (occasionally sarcasm) seldom found :in such scholarly studies.

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Quodlibetal Questions. By WILLIAM OF OCKHAM. Vol. 1 trans. Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley; vol. 2 trans. Alfred J. Freddoso; pref. Norman Kretzmann. Vol. 1 of the *Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991. Pp. 391 and 305. $100.00 for both (cloth).

In these handsome volumes, Professor Alfred J. Freddoso and the late Professor Frank E. Kelley have provided the scholarly community with an English translation of William of Ockham's *Quodlibeta septem* (hereafter *QS).* The volumes constitute the first volume in the new *Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy,* and both the new series and this first contribution within it will add generously to the growing num· her of medieval philosophical texts available in English. Using the critical edition of Ockham's Latin text established by the Rev. Joseph C. Wey *(Opera theologica,* vol. 9, Franciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure, NY, 1980) as the basis for their work, the translators offer to readers of English an accurate translation of one of Ockham's mature theological works, treating a wide variety of philosophical and theological topics. Indeed, thanks to their efforts, the broad range of Ockham's thought in natural and revealed theology, ontology, epistemology, and ethics becomes available in English for the first time.

The purpose of the Yale series is to translate into English " complete works of philosophical and historical importance". In deciding which work of Ockham to translate for the series, the translators faced two potential hazards: the danger of translating one of Ockham's earlier works that might contain ideas which he subsequently reconsidered; and the danger of translating a work that focused upon a narrow range of topics, something which would give readers the false impression that Ockham's philosophy was concerned only with those topics. The translators have adroitly managed to avoid both of these potential hazards. The translators certainly steered clear of the first hazard by deciding to translate Ockham's *QS.* These quodlibetal questions are believed to represent the substance of disputations Ockham held at the Franciscan *studium* in London during the years 1322-1324, although the final written form of the work probably was not established until 1325 or shortly thereafter at Avignon. Hence the *QS* represent to a large extent Ockham's final word on the topics discussed, since in the period after 1325 up until the time of his death in 1347 Ockham was too heavily embroiled in ecclesiological and political controversies in Avignon and Munich to give much consideration to more speculative concerns. Yet the translators also avoided the second hazard by choos-

ing to translate the *QS.* True, the *QS* is akin to numerous other medieval quodlibetal questions in that it treats an array of questions; hut, in the case of Ockham's work, the range of topics is so broad and the issues broached therein so fundamental to his personal thought that one has, in effect, a compendium of Ockham's major philosophical and theological ideas.

A brief glance at the table of questions indicates the breadth of the questions and their relevance to perennial philosophical discussions. In the area of philosophical theology, Ockham asks whether it can be proved by natural reason that there is only one God; whether it can be proved by natural reason that God's power is infinite; whether God could have made the world from eternity. In regard to ethical theory, Ockham asks whether the exterior act has its own proper moral goodness, and whether there can be a demonstrative science about morals. In fields of epistemology and the philosophy of mind, Ockham asks whether the human intellect knows its own acts intuitively in this life; whether it knows sensible things intuitively; and whether there can be an intuitive cognition of a non-existent object. Closer to the area of logic and semantics, Ockham raises several questions about the status of propositions and their components: whether a mental proposition is composed of things or concepts; whether mental names are divided into concrete and abstract names in the manner of spoken names; whether the object of a definition is an extra-mental reality or a concept. Finally, readers are given the opportunity to see much of Ockham's program of ontological reduction: in answering the question whether there are ten categories, Ockham argues that there are really only two absolute distinct things, substance and quality, and that all the other categories are oblique ways of referring to these things; and in the Sixth Quodlibet, Ockham devotes the bulk of his questions to paring down the realities required to make sense of the category of relation.

The quality of the translation is quite accurate and readable, if at times more literal than one might wish; at all events, it certainly is faithful to what the translators rightly describe as Ockham's "generally limpid, though rather terse " Latin prose. There are, however, some minor problems connected with the translation's literalness and a small procedural matter for complaint. To illustrate the minor problems attendant upon the literalness of the translation, let the following example suffice. In the First Quodlibet, question 3 (p. 21; critical edition, p. 21) Ockham replies to the question whether paternity is distinct from the Father and explains how to understand the proposition 'paternity constitutes the Father'. He writes 'sed talis propositio debet glossari sic . . .' which is rendered by the literal ' Instead, such

a proposition should he glossed as follows . . .'. The problem, of course, is that we do not speak in English of glossing a proposition, although, to he sure, that is what the Latin ' glossari ' literally means. Perhaps a better, if less literal, translation of 'glossari' in this context would he 'analyzed' or 'interpreted'. The procedural matter of complaint is the practice of employing, albeit occasionally, the variant readings of the critical edition as the basis for the translation. The translators regularly indicate when and where they engage in this practice and usually do so only in places where the manuscript readings reported in the variants fill out arguments left incomplete by Ockham; the practice is innocent enough when employed in this fashion. But by employing this same practice at other times, the translators read a noticeably different text from that established by the critical edition. For example, in the First Quodlihet, question 4 (p. 74; critical edition, p. 86), the Latin text reads "... sed non est causa partialis actus assentiendi sine visione media .. ." which is correctly rendered "But it[a sentient vision] is not a partial cause of an act of assenting unless there is a mediating intellective vision .. ." with an asterisk used to indicate that the word ' intellective ' is borrowed from the variant readings. The problem here is that the variants on the Latin word ' media ' do not quite justify what the translators print as coming from the variants; although the Latin word ' intellectiva ' (=intellective) is a variant on the word ' media,' it is listed as a *substitution* for ' media,' not as an *addition,* yet the English translation would indicate otherwise. In short, the variants justify the alternate translation "unless there is an intellective vision," or, by following a different manuscript tradition, the alternate translation " unless there is vision of the intellective [power]," hut none of the variant readings adequately support the literal translation " unless there is a mediating intellective vision." What is at stake here is not the meaning of the Latin text-as indicated above the translators have done a fine job of conveying that, and 'intellective' ought to he included in this sentence; instead what is at stake is the practice of departing from the text of the critical edition and then attempting to tell the reader which words are derived from the variants. If translation into idiomatic English within a given context requires that the translators supply a few words not found in the original, whether the Latin equivalents of the words are in the variants or not, the translators would he better off, it seems to me, indicating that they are supplying those words by using the traditional method of placing the words in question within brackets. Certainly, such a practice is generally safer in that it allows the English reader to know what is present in the Latin text and what the translators are supplying for the sake of clarity and readability.

Yet these remarks should be taken as expressing very mild and minor criticisms and reservations. Even the practice of reading against the critical edition is sometimes quite useful, as on p. 70 where the trans· lators correct the placement of a comma in the edition which improper· ly separated the Latin phrase ' per se ' from the consequent of the con· ditional sentence with which it belongs. Nor should the remarks in the previous paragraph he taken to .imply that there are not numerous truly excellent and perceptive renderings. On p. 20 the translation of ' rationes ' with ' intentional contents,' on p. 71 of ' legit ' with ' read aloud,' on p. 402 of 'scientia' with 'evident knowledge '-all of these serve to indicate the brilliance of the translators at understanding the intricacies and subtleties of medieval scholastic Latin, their ingenuity at conveying that language into modern English, and their sensitivity to modern readers' needs and problems. Furthermore, it should come as no surprise that the translators have performed their thankless task with such aplomb. The late Frank Kelly was, for most of his academic career, one of the chief editors of the Franciscan Institute's critical edition of Ockham and produced, in addition, numerous articles on medieval philosophy and theology; Professor Freddoso has already shown the quality of his skill at translating medieval Latin with his translation of the second part of Ockham's *Summa logicae* and has authored fine studies of Ockham's logic and ontology.

Apart from the translation proper, the translators have made every effort to ease the reading of Ockham's text by providing informative notes to clarify difficult passages, explanations of technical terms, and references to Ockham's own works and those of his opponents, includ- ing references to English translation of the latter when these are avail- able. They have also tried to facilitate close and careful study of Ockham's treatment of related matters within the *QS* by creating a topical table of contents in addition to the regular table of questions and an index of subjects. Finally, Professor Freddoso has graced the volumes with an introduction in which he neatly summarizes recent scholarship on Ockham and has appended an ample selected bihliog· raphy of titles on Ockham in English.

In sum, the translators have succeeded admirably in producing volumes that should " serve in part or in whole as the basis for grad- uate or advanced undergraduate courses on Ockham's philosophy" (p. xxiii). Unfortunately, something which is, indeed, beyond the control of the translators may impede that happy and desirable result: the prohibitive cost of the volumes. Priced at $100 US, the volumes are likely to exceed the budget of both interested undergraduate and grad- uate students and he purchased only by academic libraries. Perhaps Yale Press will soon bring its new series out in paperback where it

can fulfill the hopes of the translators. I am certain that the late Frank Kelly, himself an active undergraduate teacher, would look forward to the use of the translation in the classroom, and I would like to add my own sentiment to those of the surviving translator and series editors by dedicating this review to his memory: *Requiescat in pace et lux aeterna luceat ei.*

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