CATHOLIC SOCIAL AND SEXUAL ETHICS: INCONSISTENT OR ORGANIC?

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HIS ARTICLE evaluates Charles Curran's proposal that here is an unjustifiable methodological split between recent fficial Catholic social and sexual teaching.[1] Specifically, this study will argue that the dichotomy between recent Catholic social and sexual teaching is not so sharp as Curran and others suppose, and that the real differences which do exist between these two strands are neither arbitrary nor unjustifiable in light of a Thomistic view of the human good. This study will proceed by first providing an overview of Curran's thesis concerning the divergent methodologies employed in Catholic social and sexual teaching as he and other moral theologians have presented it. It

[1] We know of no writing that explicitly challenges this thesis. When this idea is mentioned it is only supported. Among the studies which mention or develop this idea see: Kenneth R. Overberg, *An Inconsistent Ethic? Teachings of the American Catholic Bishops* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1980); Richard Gula, *What Are They Saying aboiit Moral Norms?* (New York: Paulist, 1982), pp. 34-48; *Reason Informed by Faith* (New York: Paulist, 1989), pp. 34-35 and chap. 16; Christopher Mooney, *Public Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), pp. 146-50; Richard McCormick, "The Consistent Life Ethic: Is There An Historical Soft Underbelly?", delivered for the Symposium "A Consistent Ethic of Life" at Loyola University of Chicago, November 7, 1987, pp. 10-13; and *idem,* "Human Sexuality: Toward a Consistent Ethical Method," in *One Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teachings,* ed. John A. Coleman, S.J. (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1991), pp. 189-97; Russell B. Connors, "Justice and Sex: Differing Ethical Methodologies," *Chicago Studies* 27 (1988) : 181-190; Thomas F. Schindler, *Ethics: The Social Dimension* (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1989), pp. 70-75; Patrick T. McCormick, C.M., "Abortion: Retooling for a New Frontier," *New Theology Review* 5 (1992): 48-61.

will then offer a critique of this position by considering the unjustifiable dichotomies it creates between reason and nature, the physical and the personal, and historical consciousness and classicism. We conclude that while tensions exist between these two kinds of teaching, the social and sexual teachings of the church are held together organically rather than juxtaposed incon-

I. CURRAN'S POSITION ON THE CHURCH'S MORAL METHODOLOGY

Two Interpretations of Natural Law

Throughout much of his work, Curran calls attention to two divergent understandings of natural law articulated in the history of Western thought and adopted by the Church.[2] Similar observations have been made by other moral theologians.[8] According to this view, Cicero (43 B.C.) exemplifies one strand of the natural law tradition when he speaks of " true law which is right reason in accord with nature."[4] The focus of this "order of reason " approach to natural law is on the rationality and prudential judgment of the agent in his or her own concrete situation.[5] Ulpian (228 A.D.), who describes natural law as " that which

2 See, for example, Charles Curran, "Absolute Norms in Moral Theology," in *A New Look at Christian Morality* (Notre Dame: Fides, 1968), pp. 74-89; "Dialogue with Social Ethics: Roman Catholic Social Ethics-Past, Present, and Future," in *Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue* (Notre Dame: Fides, 1972), pp. 116-35; " Natural Law," in *Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1985), pp. 119-72; "The Changing Anthropological Bases of Catholic Social Ethics," in *Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1982), pp. 173-208.

s See, for example, Timothy O'Connell, *Principles for a Catholic Morality,* 2nd edition (San Francisco: Harper, 1990), pp. 149-60; John Mahoney, *The Making of Moral Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 110; Gula, *What Are They Saying,* pp. 34-35 and *Reason Informed,* pp. 222-223.

4 *De Republica,* lib. iii, c. xxii: *"Est quidem vera les recta ratio, naturae congriiens."* The citation is from M. Tullii, ed. (Rome, 1852), pp. 405-406.

5 See T. O'Connell, *Principles,* pp. 150-51, and Gula, *What Are They Saying,* p. 35.

nature has taught all animals," exemplifies a very different approach.[6] This strand of natural law, the "order of nature" approach, inclines toward physicalism because of its emphasis on conformity to biological properties or finalities and because it focuses on the commonality between humans and animals.[7]

For Curran and other moral theologians these differing strands of natural law have led, especially in recent thought, to markedly different worldviews, anthropologies, and moral methodologies. The focus on the " order of reason " has proved to be more in harmony with modern understandings of the world, with their awareness of growth, process, and historical consciousness.[8] It likewise has proven receptive to an inductive and experiential approach to moral reasoning, and thereby emphasizes the particular and contextual character of moral choice over deductively derived absolute norms.[9] The result is a greater emphasis on the open-ended character of the moral enterprise. As one's apprehension of reality changes, so should one's understanding of moral norms and reasoning. Echoing Curran in this regard, Gula points out that "insofar as reason's grasp of reality is always partial and limited, moral norms are necessarily tentative."[10] These developments also encourage a greater focus on the person as moral agent. According to Curran, this type of " personalism " is characterized by a relationality-responsibility

s *Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutiomtm,* lib. 1, t. 2. pr: *"!us naturale est, quad natura omnia a11iinilia dornit."* The citation is from the edition by J. B. Moule (Oxford: Clarendon, 1923), p. 100. Ulpian makes this remark with reference to human procreation, but goes on to add that human beings obey this law through the use of reason and out of a sense of duty.

7 Curran, "Natural Law," pp. 127-32, and Gula, *What Are They Saying,* p. 35. For background, see Michael Crowe, "St. Thomas and Ulpian's Natural Law," in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies,* vol. 1, ed. Armand A. Maurer (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), pp. 261-82.

s Curran, "Natural Law," pp. 137-40; Gula, *What Are They Saying,* pp. 18-22, and *Reason Informed,* pp. 30-36.

9 Curran, "Natural Law," pp. 140-41; Gula, *What Are They Saying,* pp. 22-25.

10 Gula, *What Are They Saying,* p. 42.

model that understands "the human person in terms of one's multiple relationships with God, neighbor, world, and self and the call to live responsibly in the midst of these relationships." [11]

In contrast, the " order of nature " strand of natural law sees reality as composed of static and immutable essences, from which one can deduce absolute moral norms. Insofar as it sees the physical qualities of actions or the natural finalities of biological processes as morally determinative, this strand is characterized by a kind of "physicalism." [12] Physicalism, as opposed to "personalism," refers to the tendency in moral discourse to focus on the biological dimensions of the person or of human action in the process of moral judgment.

Application to Church Teaching

Curran and other moral theologians maintain that elements of both the " order of reason " and the " order of nature " approaches can be found in the thought of Aquinas which has proved influential in the formulation of magisterial moral teaching.13 The "order of nature" with its inherently physicalist pre-

[11] Curran, "Official Social and Sexual Teaching," in *Tensions in Moral Theology* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 96. See also his " Methodological Overview of Fundamental Moral Theology," in *Directions*, pp. 3-27. According to Gula, this brand of "personalism " is " characterized by placing emphasis on dimensions of the human person and human actions which extend beyond the physical and biological to include the social, spiritual, and psychological dimensions as well." See Gula, *What Are They Saying*, p. 35. For a more extended consideration of this personalism, see Louis Janssens, " Personalism in Moral Theology," in *Moral Theology: Challenges for the Future*, ed. Charles Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 1990), pp. 94-107.

[12] Curran, "Natural Law," p. 127. Cf. Gula, *What Are They Saying*, pp. 35-36. For a brief historical survey of this emphasis on the physical nature of acts in moral theology, see B. V. Johnstone, "From Physicalism to Personalism," *Studia Moralia* 30 (1992): 76-78.

[13] See Curran, "Absolute Norms," pp. 77-84; "Natural Law," pp. 127-31; Gula, pp. 35-37; Timothy O'Connell, pp. 153-55. Lisa Sowle Cahill also describes Aquinas's understanding of natural law as having physicalist tendencies without citing the influence of Ulpian; see her *Between the Sexes: Foundations for a Christian Ethics of Sexuality* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), pp. 108-9.

occupation with biological finality continues to inform the Church's prohibitions in the matters of sexual ethics, particularly in the encyclicals *Casti Conn>ubii* (1930) and *Humanae Vitae* (1968).[14] This understanding of the " order of nature " with its ahistorical and deductive orientation has also informed social encyclicals such as *Rerum Novarum* (1891), *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), and to a lesser extent *Laborem E.xercens* (1981).[15] The church's social teaching after 1960, however, demonstrates an increasing dependence upon the " order of reason" approach to natural law.[16] The decisive moment of this process is said to have been reached in Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution on the Church *Gaudium et Spes* which repudiated the classicist world view in favor of experience, personalism, induc-

[14] Cf. Gula, *What Are They Saying,* pp. 36-9. For a more extended critique of the teaching of *Humana.e Vitae,* see Curran "Natural Law," pp. 119-72. For a similar critique of the more recent document of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, *Declaratio de quibusdam questionibus ad sesualem ethicam spectantibus* (1976), see Curran, "Sexual Ethics: A Critique," in *Issues in Sesual and Medical Ethics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), pp. 30-52.

[15] For Curran's critique of pre-conciliar Catholic social thought as well as his critique of the teaching of Pope John Paul II, see " Changing Anthropological Bases" and "Dialogue with Social Ethics," in *Contemporary Moral Theology in Dialogue* (Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, 1972), pp. 132ff. See also Peter J. Henriot, et al., *Catholic Social Teaching* (New York: Orbis Books, 1988), pp. 18-19; J. W. O'Malley, "Reform, Historical Consciousness, Aggiornamento," *Theological Studies* 32 (1971) : 573-601; Susan L. Secker, "Human Experience and Women's Experience," *The An:nual of the Society of Christian Ethics* (1991), p. 135; Leslie Griffin, "The Integration of Spiritual and Temporal : Contemporary Roman Catholic Church-State Theory," *Theological Studies* 48 (1987) : 250ff.; and *eadem,* "Moral Criticism as Moral Teaching: Pope John Paul !I's *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis;'* delivered at the Symposium on Recent Catholic Social Teachings at Notre Dame University, April 24-26, 1989.

[16] Curran is dependent here on M. D. Chenu, "The Church's Social Doctrine," *Concilium* 140 (1980): 71-75. Curran himself is somewhat more critical of the earlier social tradition and the discontinuity between it and more recent developments. See Curran, "Changing Anthropological Bases," pp. 173-208; " Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings," pp. 88-100. In this latter work Curran describes the recent social teaching as not only more personalist and historically conscious, but also as adopting a " relational responsibility" approach to ethics. See also Gula, *What Are They Saying,* pp. 42-45.

tion, process, and historical consciousness-a shift evidenced in its appeals to read the "signs of the times!' [11] This new approach has been carried forward in most subsequent social teaching. However, this shift in the social teachings from the " order of nature " to the " order of reason " has not been paralleled in the church's teaching in sexual matters.

Curran recognizes some development in recent official church teaching on sexuality. He points to the replacement of the language about the procreative end of intercourse as primary and the unitive end as secondary by an affirmation of their equal importance in *Gaudium et Spes.* [18] Even though *Humanae Vitae* reaffirmed this position, Curran and many moral theologians uniformly reject its teaching that spouses must preserve the inseparable unity of these ends in each conjugal act. [19] In its continued focus on particular acts, and in its understanding that the conjugal act has a natural finality toward procreation, the encyclical reflects the physicalism of the older " order of nature" strand of natural law. [20] Curran and others argue that the logic of personalism would allow the subordination of the physical end of procreation to the more personal demands of love and relationship. [21] The procreative dimension of a couple's sexual relationship need not be realized in particular acts, but can be spread over the duration of their lives together. [22] Sexuality, and particularly fertility,

[17] See Curran, "Natural Law," pp. 141-43; "Dialogue with Social Ethics," pp. 125-30; and " Changing Anthropological Bases," pp. 183-6.

[18] *Gandium et Spes,* no. 50. Cf. Curran, "Natural Law," pp. 131-32.

[19] Paul VI, *Hnmanae Vitae,* nos. 11-12. Cf. Curran, "Sexuality and Sin: A Current Appraisal" in *Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology* (Notre Dame: Fides, 1970), p. 174.

[20] Cf. Curran, "Natural Law," pp. 156-57; Gula, *What Are They Saying,* pp. 38-9; and Richard McCormick S.J., *N ates on Moral Theology 1965-1980* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1981), pp. 218-21.

[21] Cf. Curran, "Sexuality and Sin," pp. 173-74. This is also a repeated theme in a recent study by Lisa Sowle Cahill, " Catholic Sexual Ethics and the Dignity of the Person: A Double Message," *Theological Stitdies* 50 (1989) : 120-50.

[22] See Curran, "Sexuality and Sin," p. 174; "The Development of Sexual Ethics in Contemporary Roman Catholicism," in *Tensions in Moral Theology,* p. *76;* and McCormick, *N ates 1965-1980,* pp. 218-21.

while important, are neither exhaustive nor determinative of the person.[23] As a result these realities can be subordinated to other goods at stake in relationships.[24] While commending the use of personalist language in recent church teaching, most notably in the thought of Pope John Paul II, some accuse the present pope of inconsistencies in his utilization of personalist ideas. In this view John Paul's advocacy of marital experience and personalism is at odds with a continued focus on particular acts, and hence his emphasis on the " dignity of the person " is in conflict with other aspects of his teaching.[25]

Unlike the sexual teachings, Curran maintains that the church's social teaching has gone through a significant development from the order of nature (1891-1958) to the order of reason (1961-present) with John Paul II vacillating between the two orders.[26]

[23] McCormick, *Notes 1965-1980,* pp. 219-20; Cahill, "Catholic Sexual Ethics," pp. 139-43.

[24] Thus Curran, contrasting his own view with the older and more physicalist approach which saw an inherent teleology in the sexual faculty, states: "A more relational approach sees the sexual faculty related to the human person, and the human person related to others, especially to the marriage partner. For the good of the marriage relationship contraception or sterilization can be justified." See "A Methodological Overview," p. 14.

[25] Cahill in particular objects to John Paul's affirmations of the importance of the vocation of motherhood as a form of gender role stereotyping which results in women bearing the brunt of the procreative end of marital sexuality and also what she sees as the romanticization of sexual commitment in his descriptions of love as a form of self-giving. See "Catholic Sexual Ethics," pp. 145-6. Similar criticisms are made even more sharply by Christine Gudorf, " Encountering the Other: the Modern Papacy on Women," *Social Compass* 36 (1989) : 298-302. Yet other theologians question whether John Paul II's emphasis on the " dignity of the person " is at all relevant to determining the morality of concrete actions. See Bruno Schuller, "Die Personwiirde des Menschen als Beweisgrund in der normativen Ethik," *Theologie und Glaube* 53 (1978) : 538-55 and Richard McCormick, *Notes 1965-1980,* pp. 801-7.

[26] For Curran, John Paul's social teaching is tainted by a return to aspects of a classicist worldview. See "Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings," pp. 92-3. For support of Curran's view, see Joseph A. Selling, "The Theological Presuppositions of *Centesimus Annus," Louvain Studies* 17 (1992) : 35-47, and James O'Connell, " Is There a Catholic Social Doctrine? The Problem of Content and the Ambivalence of History, Analysis <ind Authority," *Heythrop Journal* 32 (1991): 511-538.

For Curran, this development can be seen by contrasting Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931) and Paul VI's apostolic letter *Octogesima Adveniens* (1971). Pius's plan for social reconstruction was a particular plan proposed for all peoples and all times. Curran sees such a plan as flawed from the start since it was Euro-centric and failed to consider its own historical situation. In essence, according to Curran, Pius's corporatist plan was deductive and classicist. This approach, according to Curran, began to be abandoned in Catholic social thought with John XXIII. It was completely dismissed with Paul VI who demonstrated a historically conscious and inductive approach in his social teachings.[27]

Thus in *Octogesima Adveniens,* he writes:

> In the face of such widely varying situations, it is difficult for us to utter a unified message and to put forward a solution which has universal validity. Such is not our ambition nor is it our mission. It is up to the Christian communities to analyze with objectivity the situation which is proper to their own country, to shed on it the light of the gospel's unalterable word, and to draw principles of reflection, norms of judgment, and directives from the social teaching of the church.[28]

Curran goes on to explain that John Paul II fails to continue the sensitivity to the historical particularities of social problems, returning to a more static and classicist approach, by proposing offiical Catholic social "doctrine" for the whole church.[29]

In summary, the thesis advanced by Curran and echoed by others is that there are basic methodological differences between Catholic magisterial teaching on sexual and social morality: " Whereas the official social teaching has evolved so that it now employs historical consciousness, personalism, and a relationality-responsihility ethical model, the sexual teaching still emphasizes classicism, human nature, and faculties, and a law model of

[27] Curran, " Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings," p. 92.

[28] No. 4, as cited in Curran, " Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings," p. 91.

[29] Ibid.; see also Charles Curran, "A Century of Catholic Social Teaching," *Theology Today* 48 (1991/92) : 161, 167-169.

ethics." [30] Additionally, attention is also sometimes drawn to the apparent inconsistency between the highly specific nature of the church's sexual teaching which condemns particular acts and the more general principles and analysis contained in the social tradition. [31]

Are the charges of an unwarranted dichotomy between the church's recent social and sexual teachings accurate? While Curran and others considered thus far are undoubtedly correct in noting a divergence in tone and method between the two forms of teaching, it remains to be seen whether this divergence is as great and as unjustified as they suppose.

IL CRITIQUE OF CURRAN'S ARGUMENT

Our response to Curran is limited to two basic observations : first, the divergence between the social and sexual teachings of the church is not as great as Curran might suppose; and second, Curran overlooks significant differences between sexual and social issues that account for the differences in method which do ·exist. Curran's position arises from three dichotomies that underlie his arguments : reason versus nature, the person versus the physical, and historical consciousness versus classicism. In each, Curran exaggerates the differences and advocates one over the other. Considering those three in turn, we propose instead that an organic unity and interconnectedness exist for each of these pairs, while at the same time we recognize reasons for their difference and utilize them accordingly.

Reason/Nature: An Intrinsic Connection

Curran's separation of human reason from human nature rests upon a misunderstanding of Thomas Aquinas's analysis of human

[30] Curran, "Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings," p. 107. Cf. Gula, *What Are They Saying,* pp. 37-45.

[31] Cf. Richard McCormick, *Notes on Moral Theology 1981 through 1984* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), p. 74; and Curran, "Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings," p, 106. For an application of the same objection to the teaching of the American bishops see Overberg, *An Inconsistent Ethic?*

inclinations within the framework of natural law. Curran attempts to separate "physical" from "rational" inclinations in Aquinas's analysis, assigning the former to the influence of Ulpian and the latter to the influence of Cicero.[32] Such a separation overlooks the fundamental unity and integration of these inclinations already worked out by Aquinas. In his discussion of natural law Aquinas considers how there can be several precepts of natural law and several kinds of human inclinations all of which are known and unified through the exercise of reason.[33] Human beings share with all created things an inclination to self-preservation. With the animals, human beings share an inclination to reproduce and to raise and educate offspring. Finally, insofar as people are rational, they have a peculiarly human inclination to live together in society and to know the truth about God. As expressions of various facets of human nature, these inclinations are designated by Aquinas as "good," and are all unified in the exercise of human reason.[34] As Jean Porter points out, these inclinations are an outline of what a "human life should properly look like, what goods it will incorporate, and what relation those goods should have to one another."[35] An understanding of this properly ordered life requires an understanding of the hierarchical

[32] Curran, "Natural Law," pp. 127-31. See also Gula's interpretation of Aquinas's theory of inclination in *Reason Informed*, p. 225. Influenced by Curran, Gula polarizes Thomas's understanding of the inclinations by maintaining that the inclination to procreate and educate offspring stems from Ulpian's "order of nature" or physicalist approach, while the inclination to know and do the good derives from Cicero's "order of reason" or personalist approach. See also O'Connell, *Principles*, pp. 154-5, for a similar interpretation, although his discussion of Richard Westley's understanding of Aquinas presents an alternative and somewhat more unified view of the interaction of body and spirit in the individual.

[33] Cf. *Summa Theologiae* (ST) I-II, q. 94, a. 2.

[34] *ST* 1-11, q. 94. a. 2, ad 2: *"Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes hujusmodi inclinationes quarumcumque partium naturae humanae, puta concupiscibilis et irascibilis, secundum quod regulantur ratione, pertinent ad legem naturalem, et reducuntur ad unum primum praeceptum, ut dictum est, et secundum hoc sunt multa praecepta legis naturae in seipsis, quae tamen communicant in una radice."* The citation is from the Blackfriars edition, vol. 28 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 82.

[35] Jean Porter, *Recovery of Virtue* (Louisville: Westminster, 1990), p. 90.

order of the inclinations. Porter points out that this hierarchy works in both an ascending order of excellence and a descending order of fundamentality. In the order of excellence, the inclinations are pursued in a way in which the lower inclinations are subordinated to the pursuit of the higher inclinations; namely, the pursuit of self-preservation and procreation is subordinated to the more excellent pursuit of society and God. But at the same time there is an order of fundamentality that prevents the lower inclinations from being destroyed by the higher inclinations, since it is on the basis of the lower inclinations that the higher inclinations are built. Hence, as the goods involved with the inclinations move from first to third in an order of increasing excellence, they also move in the same direction in an order of decreasing fundamentality. The lower levels are the necessary preconditions for the higher levels.[86]

Thus in Aquinas's understanding of human nature, various inclinations (toward being, reproduction, society, and God) are integrated rather than opposed. In this light, the attempt to depict Aquinas as a "physicalist" is based on a fundamental misreading.[87] Both reason and bodiliness (including sexuality) are integral components of human nature. Thus the order of nature and the order of reason are not two conflicting orders as Curran presents them, but two sides of the same coin. In other words, Curran only views the hierarchy of inclinations in one way, namely, in the direction of excellence, and fails to consider adequately

[36] Ibid., pp. 89-90.

[37] William E. May has argued that Curran and O'Connell exaggerate the influence of Ulpian on Aquinas's discussions of natural law. While it is true that human beings share certain inclinations with the animals, they are regulative for human beings only as they are grasped as goods in the light of practical reason. See May, "The Natural Law and Objective Morality: A Thomistic Perspective," in *Principles of Catholic Moral Life* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), pp. 160-5. Cf. D. O'Donoghue, "The Thomist Concept of Natural Law," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 22 (1955): 91. For a further critique of Curran's claim of physicalism in Aquinas and recent official Catholic sexual teachings see William E. May, "The Moral Methodology of Vatican Council II and the Teaching of *Humanae Vitae* and *Persona Humana;' Anthropotes* 511 (1989): 30-45.

the direction of fundamentality which reason also recognizes. This false dichotomy of nature and reason in turn underlies the dichotomies of personalism/physicalism and historical consciousness/ classicism according to which Curran evaluates Catholic social and sexual teachings. While the reading proposed here does not preclude a certain fruitful tension between the various inclinations, it does reject Curran's depiction of them as polar opposites.

Personalism/ Physicalisrn: Unifying the Physical and the Relational

In considering whether the official church's teaching concerning sexuality can rightly be accused of physicalism, a number of observations are in order. To a degree Curran's claim is correct, insofar as the church takes seriously the physical nature of the human body. Sexuality necessarily involves the human body. But like Aquinas the church does not base its teachings merely upon the animal nature of the body. It is noteworthy that the term which church teaching employs in describing marital intercourse is "the conjugal act" or " marital act" which means the marital love that informs sexual intercourse between husband and wife.[38] It is not merely a sex act-that would be physicali11m. The conjugal act is a human act. Animals cannot engage in conjugal acts (which carry out reasoned choices).[39] They are incapable of human love and reason. But should the love and reason expressed in the conjugal act subvert its procreative dimen-

[38] Cf. *Gaudiuin et Spes,* no. 49; *Hivmanae Vitae,* nos. 11-13.

[39] " The sexual characteristics of man and the human faculty of reproduction wonderfully exceed the dispositions of the lower forms of life. Hence the acts themselves which are proper to conjugal love and which are exercised in accord with genuine human dignity must be honored with great reverence." *Gaudium et Spes,* no. 51. The citation is from *The Documents of Vatican II,* Walter Abbott, ed. (Piscataway, NJ: New Century, 1966), p. 256. Cf. Johnstone, "From Physicalism to Personalism," p. 73; see n. 6 on the same page where Johnstone states that " in official documents, such as Pius XI's *Casti Connubii* (1930), that marriage, as a contract by which reason and free will determine the expression of human sexuality cannot be put on the same level as the union of animals."

sion? Can one view the person as free from the constraints of human nature, including its embodied (and hence biological) aspects? Or is not human nature a condition of possibility for all that we do?

While Curran accuses official church teachings of physicalism, his separation of body and spirit forces him to advocate a kind of spiritualism. Curran tends to an ethic for human sexuality which does not account for its concrete embodiedness-in short, its physical character. Can we violate the physical laws of our bodies and still achieve authentic human development? The church's teaching of the inseparability of the unitive and procreative ends of human sexuality recognizes both the dynamic role of sexuality in human relationships *and* the creative and physical dimension of procreation.

Influenced by modern phenomenology in the 1920s and 30s, Catholic moral theologians such as Herbert Doms and Dietrich von Hildebrand began to develop a sexual ethic from the philosophy of personalism. [40] They criticized the exclusive treatment of marriage in terms of ends, specifically the over-emphasis on the procreative end. [41] These theologians maintained that an exclusive

[40] Good discussions of this development can be found in John C. Ford and Gerald Kelly, *Contemporary Moral Theology,* vol. 2: *Marriage Questions* (Westminster, MD: Newman, 1964), pp. 18-35; William Shannon, *The Lively Debate: Response to Huma:nae Vitae* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1970), pp. 12-23; and Theodore Mackin, *What is Marriage?* (New York: Paulist, 1982)' pp. 225-35.

[41] Here Curran and others are correct in their assertion that the tradition has had elements of physicalism. See Johnstone, "From Physicalism to Personalism " on the origins of physicalism. On the legacy of Augustine in the development of the Church's view of sexuality, see the generally excellent historical study of John T. Noonan, *Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by Catholic Theologians and Canonists,* 2nd edition (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1986). Even though there was an over-emphasis on the procreative good, theologians also demonstrated a growing attention to what came to be designated as the unitive good. Hence Augustine will speak of the relationship of husband and wife in terms of friendship (see *De Bono Conjugate,* 1). Aquinas understands marriage as the greatest form of human friendship to which sexual intercourse is not unrelated, even while it does not express its totality (see *Summa Contra Gentiles* III, c. 123, 125; cf. *ST* II-II, q. 26, a. 11). Bonaventure speaks of intercourse as an expression of the unique love which exists betwen husband and wife (see *In IV Sententiarum,* 33, 1).

focus on the "ends" of marital intercourse failed to do justice to the profundity of human relationships. They affirmed the centrality of the couple's love in marriage without denying the integral value of procreation in conjugal love.[42] The work of these theologians prepared for the affirmation of the equal importance of the unitive and procreative dimensions of intercourse at the Second Vatican Council.[43]

When Curran and some other moralists speak of personalism, however, they see the "personal values" of love, freedom, and reason as central to human life and "biological values" such as procreation as secondary and subordinate. In other words the logic of personalism, in this perspective, demands not the elimination of the older language of primary and secondary ends of conjugal love, but its inversion and a corresponding lessening of interest in particular acts.

Such a view is problematic on two counts. First, the argument that personalism necessarily entails a focus on relationships rather than specific acts neglects the existential or reflexive character of human acts. That is, in making particular decisions or choices one shapes one's own character as a moral agent.[44] Even though the person does not summarize or express himself or her-

[42] On the precise relationship of this love to the procreative dimension of marital sexuality, there were important differences between them. While both defended the church's prohibition of artificial contraception, for Doms it was the couple's shared life of "two-in-oneship" that gave marriage its primary meaning. It was this same two-in-oneship that Doms saw as "the one immediate purpose" of intercourse rather than procreation, although this was not excluded since a child constituted the "natural fruit" of a couple's love. See Herbert Doms, *The Meaning of Marriage* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939), pp. 77-78, 84-85, 94-95. Hence his ideas provide something of an anticipation of the personalism presently advocated by Curran and others.

[43] Doms in particular urged the abandonment of the language of "primary" and "secondary" ends, arguing that "it would be better if we just spoke of the procreative and personal purposes immanent in marriage and distinguished them from its meaning" (ibid., p. 88).

[44] Curran is aware of this reflective and self-constituting character of human acts but draws this puzzling conclusion: "Individual acts are not the most fundamental ethical category because they are both expressive of the moral subject and constitutive of the moral being of the subject." See "A Methodological Overview," p. 15.

self completely in particular actions, particular acts are nonetheless integral in shaping one's disposition and character. That one ought not be deeply concerned about whether particular acts express the procreative dimension of human sexuality but only whether this value is expressed over the course of a relationship begs an important question. Does not the failure to respect the value of procreation in particular acts of contraceptive intercourse lessen one's ability to respect this value and live it out in general? If contraceptive intercourse is a bad act, does it not create a disposition toward other bad acts in those who engage in it? [45]

A second problem with this particular version of personalism can be found in its presuppositions concerning human sexuality, nature, and personhood. Central to this account of the person is an interpretation of rationality, freedom, and various relationships that leaves the place of sexuality in this anthropology undeveloped or minimized. [46] The implication is therefore that sex-

[45] A parallel case might be worth considering. Would Curran and others agree that the relation of the unitive dimension of human sexuality to specific sexual acts is equally unimportant? If a particular conjugal act for whatever reason was devoid of love or other personal values, it would not be a good act, but rather an act of sexual manipulation, coercion, or violence. Cf. Cahill, *Between the Sexes,* p. 149. If this is the case, then why should the procreative dimension of human sexuality not also be respected in particular acts?

[46] Hence, when discussing the person as moral agent, Curran will describe the importance of certain dispositions or virtues and also one's fundamental relationships with God, neighbor, world, and self. Little is said about the place of sexuality in such an anthropology except to urge that it be subordinated to the overall context of one's relationships. See, for example, "A Methodological Overview," pp. 14-18. ·when discussing sexuality itself, Curran describes it as a means of personal relationship, but leaves unclear its relation to the person as embodied-except to reject what he believes to be the physicalist preoccupation with procreation characteristic of past Catholic theology and teaching. See " Sexuality and Sin," pp. 168-70. Others will affirm the corporeality of the person as subject, but do not explicitly develop the implications of this with regard to sexuality. See Louis Janssens, "Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations," *Louvain Stitdies* 8 (1980) : 2-29. Still others, such as Cahill, want to affirm the sexual as an " important but not all-encompassing" dimension of human experience, but do not specify how this ought to be understood (see " Catholic Sexual Ethics," p. 143). On the Church's view of the difficulties inherent in the opposition of freedom to human nature and embodiment, see John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, *Veritatis Splendor,* nos. 46-50.

uality is to be equated with " the physical " or with " nature " and both ought to be viewed as extrinsic to the core of the person. Such an approach is beset by problems. This account of personalism reintroduces the false opposition between reason (here equated with the person) and nature (here equated with the body) criticized above. It also creates a further dichotomy between human nature and personhood. Such a dichotomy is unnecesary if nature is understood as a set of organically united inclinations that are possessed by individual persons as the very ground of their humanity. [47] Finally, this account of personalism restricts sexuality to a physical or biological phenomenon. This ignores the growing awareness of the interpenetration of soul and body within the person and the resulting conclusion that sexuality is not merely a biological reality but also one that affects all areas of human personality and relationship. [48] Hence the version of personalism advocated by Curran and others is rooted in an anthropology which appears unworkable.

Curran maintains that, whereas the church's sexual teaching is plagued with the problem of physicalism, the church's social teaching is far more personalistic, escaping this problem. While he

[41] For a good exposition of the meaning of "person" and "nature" in both classical and contemporary thought, see Ambrose McNicholl, " Person, Sex, Marriage and Actual Trends of Thought," in *Human Sexuality and Personhood,* Proceedings of the Workshop for the Hierarchies of the United States and Canada, February 2-6, 1981 (St. Louis: Pope John XXIH Medical Moral Center, 1981), PP. 138-65. It should be noted that the attempt to oppose the categories of person and nature renders unintelligible the Church's classic Christological confession of Christ as one Person in two natures as well as the anthropology of Vatican II with its emphasis on Christ's assumption and revelation of human nature. See *Gaudium et Spes,* nos. 20, 29; *Li1men Gentium,* no. 13.

[48] On this point one can find surprising agreement between moralists who hold otherwise sharply different views. Hence Philip Keane, S.S. states: "the gift of sexuality is a gift that touches persons on all levels of their existence . . . thus becoming a basic ontological determinant of human existence or personality." See *Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective* (New York: Paulist, 1977), p. 4. Ronald Lawler, O.F.M. Cap., Joseph Boyle, and William May will assert in a similar vein that " sexuality is a modality which affects our entire being as persons." See *Catholic Sexual Ethics: A Summary Explanation and Defense* (Huntington, IN; Our Sunday Visitor, 1985), p. 129.

argues that this personalism is achieved through an emphasis on freedom, equality and participation, he does not examine the relationship of the physical nature of the person in the social teachings. This absence points to a failure to understand the importance of the physical in the socio-economic area of morality and thereby appreciate the organic role of the physical in the moral teachings of the church.

There is little disagreement that sexuality is necessarily more physical and bodily than economic concerns. However, economic concerns cannot be understood outside physical and bodily boundaries. In the church's social teachings on wage justice, for example, the popes have emphasized the " necessary " or physical characteristic of wages. Wages are means to one's physical survival, that is, wages have a necessary and physical characteristic. Because work is necessary for the preservation of one's life and the procreation and education of offspring, any wage theory must envisage a wage commensurate with the necessary or physical character of human work. The proper object of justice is not the strict economic exchange of what is "due," but the person. One's due in reference to wages must be a living wage. The wage contract is not merely two parties bargaining for the best price, each attempting to maximize his or her self-interest. The wage contract is a means to further the perfection of the human person, which Leo XIII always sees in terms of providing the necessities of human existence to sustain workers and their families in a relatively comfortable life that includes adequate shelter, medical care, food, pension, etc.

This necessary or physical characteristic of remuneration demands that justice guide the relationship between the worker and the firm as well as the state.[49] Precisely because wages are necessary, they cannot be calculated by economics alone. Since people are physical beings, the physical dimensions of all their activities need to be taken into consideration. All physical or material goods have a "universal destination." The very "nature of creation " is directed toward the common use of all people.

[49] See Leo XIII, *Rerum Novamm* (1891), no. 62.

People do not have absolute control over their property, by the very fact that it is created by God. As John Paul II has pointed out, property has a "social mortgage" and people have the duty of stewardship *to* see that it is distributed to meet the needs of all people.[50] In other words, wages are an important factor in fulfilling the inclinations toward self-preservation, procreation, and education of offspring.

It should be pointed out that, just as Catholic sexual teaching has undergone development in changing its description of conjugal goods from primary and secondary to an affirmation of their mutual importance, so has Catholic social teaching altered its emphasis on wages and ownership from emphasizing the necessary, physical, or need aspect to a more personalistic criterion. This is particularly evident in John Paul's writings concerning worker ownership, although it is also found in John XXIII's *Mater et Magistra.* While worker ownership serves as a good means by which to distribute the goods of the earth for the needs of people, it serves other ends as well. Worker ownership also has a personal rationale which John Paul II refers to as the "personalist argument." The rule of ownership ought to be at the service of " personalistic values." Workers are not only concerned with what they receive from their labor (extrinsic benefits) ; they also want to work for themselves (intrinsic benefits). For John Paul II, it is difficult for workers to have a personal connection to is not their own. He maintains that worker ownership contributes to the personal development of the individual worker-that is, to the formative dimension of work. Another aspect of this personalist component of worker ownership is that it creates stronger social relationships between employees and employers.[51] Worker ownership is advocated by John Paul

[50] See John Paul's talk to the Indians at Oaxaca, Mexico entitled " Importance and Dignity of Farm Workers," *The Pope Speaks* 24 (Fall 1979): 207.

[51] John Paul II, *Laborem Exercens,* nos. 14-15. The "personalist argument " is set in the larger context of private property and more specifically in the ownership of the means of production, although it is also applied to the participation of workers in the production process. See Lothar Roos, " On a Theology and Ethics of "\Vork," *Coimmmio* 17 (1984): 117.

II not only because it distributes wealth and fulfills human needs, but because it serves well as a means to personalization by affecting positively the formative dimension of the person and creating stronger social relationships between worker and employer.[52] In other words, the church has come to a fuller expression of the meaning of remuneration by stressing both the order of funda-

Thus in developments of both the sexual and social teachings of the church, the emphasis has been on uniting and integrating the personal or relational and the physical, not on polarizing them. In the case of John Paul II, this continuity between his teachings in the sexual and social spheres is particularly evident since he employs the language of "the dignity of the person" (drawn from *Gaudium et Spes)* in each. Both contraception and unfair remuneration obscure the dignity of the person because both regard the person as a means rather than as an end in himself or herself. In the case of contraception, the spouses falsify the language of total self-giving which conjugal love is meant to express by withholding an essential aspect of themselves, namely their fertility, from one another. Therefore the person is neither given nor received in the totality which love demands.[53] In the case of unfair remuneration, the person created in God's image

[52] Some may want to accuse Leo and Pius of not developing a more personalistic view of remuneration. One clear reason why Leo XIII did not explicate this area is that if societies were not meeting their basic physical needs, it is hardly possible to speak of meeting more personalistic functions. This reality is similar to Maslow's hierarchy of needs. If a person does not have nutrition and shelter, it is useless to speak of one's self-esteem. See also Porter's chapter on justice where she briefly discusses the relationship between the inclinations. She states " The more basic such an inclination is, the more stringent the claims that it generates, over against both the community as a whole and other members of that community, presumably because one who is frustrated in pursuing one of the more basic inclinations will have much less, or no, opportunity to pursue the more distinctively human inclinations" (p. 136).

[53] See Karol Wojtyla, *Love and Responsibility,* trans. H. T. "Willets (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1981), p. 234. The same understanding is reflected in John Paul II's papal teaching. See his Apostolic Exhortation, *Familiaris Consortio,* no. 32, and the partial collection of his general audiences on his "theology of the body" published in book form as *Reflections on Humanae Vitae* (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1984), pp. 33-34.

and called to transform the world through work is subordinated to things or denied basic needs,[54]

While Curran does not deny the physical dimensions of moral teachings outright, his polarization of the physical and the personal prevents an integration that Aquinas's theory of inclinations demands, Curran's approach stands in marked contrast with the effort to integrate the physical and the personal evident in both the sexual and social teachings of the church,

Historical Consciousness/Classicism» Different Structures, Saine Person

Although Curran will remark in passing that there are differences between personal and social ethics, he nonetheless assumes that sexual and social ethics should use the same methodology, [55] The focus of both social and sexual ethics in Catholic teaching concerns two fundamental elements-the structures and the person, Regarding its sexual teachings, the church's primary structural focus is the family with sacramental marriage at its center, The church has regarded sexual activity as limited to marriage between a man and a woman through whose union in the conjugal act a family begins, The church understands the family as a foundational unit of society, with the sacrament of marriage uniting the family as a set institution throughout time,

On the side of Catholic social ethics, the church's primary structural focus has been the state, the market, associations, unions, and productive organizations, Since the Industrial Revolution and Leo XIII's *Rerum N ovarum,* the church has focused upon social structures and the ·effects they have on people, Unlike the familial structure, the church has never ordained one particular social structure as the right one for all times, At times the church has come close to baptizing one economic structure over another (corporatism over capitalism or free market over

[54] See *Laborem E:rercens,* nos, 9 and 12,

[55] Curran, "A Century of Catholic Social Teaching," *Theology Today* (July 1991) : 169,

socialism) , but never as the last word on the issue. The emphasis of the church in the social sphere has been on the principles on which structures of different ideologies can rest.[56]

The structural concerns of Catholic social and sexual ethics are different in many ways. The familial structure of the church's sexual teaching is foundational and consequently unchanging. Imitating the love of Christ and His church, a man and a woman unite in the sacrament of God's love. For this reason the church contends that the family was " from the beginning " and is still today God's original plan for humanity.[57] In contrast, particular social structures are not specified in the church's social teaching; rather, the church condemns or condones socio-economic and political structures from the principles developed in its social tradition. The moral evaluation of social structures is contingent upon such principles and is provisional. Although there are developments in the understanding of the family in church teachings, they are minor in nature (reflecting social shifts such as that from extended to nuclear families) in comparison to developments or shifts in socio-economic structures (agricultural to industrial to informational). With this said, Curran is correct that the church's social teachings are more historically conscious than its sexual teachings. However, to have it any other way, the church would either have to relativize the family or baptize a particular social structure or system.

The point here is not to separate the family from the socio-economic concerns of society. On the contrary, the family serves as the fundamental structure of any society. But it is precisely in this fundamental role that the family has a more permanent posi-

[56] While Curran is not unaware of these ideas, he draws different conclusions. See his discussion of John C. Murray and the Church/State question in *American Catholic Social Ethics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1982)' pp. 225-32.

[51] Thus John Paul II writes that, " polygamy . . . in fact, directly negates the plan of God which was revealed from the beginning, because it is contrary to the equal personal dignity of men and women who in matrimony give themselves with a love that is total and therefore unique and exclusive" *(Familiaris Consortia,* no. 19. The citation is from *The Pope Speaks* 27 (1982): 15-16.

tion than other institutions in society. In other words, the social area has a flexibility that the sexual area cannot provide, because to procreate and educate offspring is more fundamental than the social (although not more excellent), and issues concerning life and death are even more fundamental and therefore provide even more permanence. This is not to say that the only role of the family is to procreate and educate offspring. This was treated above in discussing the importance of the unitive end of conjugal love. But to procreate and educate offspring is certainly *a* fundamental purpose for the family which demands more permanency in any given situation than social institutions such as the state, productive organizations, and other intermediary groups.

On the personal level, one can also notice reasons for the different approaches in these two forms of teachings. In the realm of social ethics, the church focused on general issues such as whether the person could participate within the structure and whether his or her dignity is respected. Thus, while recognizing a moral dimension to the problem of underdevelopment, for example, the church does not attempt to offer technical solutions to it.[58] As Pius XI noted, the church's moral authority does not reside " in technical matters, for which she has neither the equipment nor the mission, but in all those [matters] that have a bearing on moral conduct." [59] While the social teachings of the popes are ultimately aimed at people, they are also aimed at structures. An organization is subject to political, economic, social, and technological changes which needs room for development. Because of the complexity of these variables, the popes have been reluctant to recommend specific programs, unlike the more determinate nature of sexual and familial teachings. What the church attempts, as a part of its mission of evangelization, is to exercise a prophetic role by speaking out on behalf of the person in defense of human rights and condemning evils and injustices embedded within so-

[58] Cf. John Paul II, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis,* nos. 34 and 41.

[59] Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), no. 41. The citation is from the N.CW.C. translation (Boston; Daul:l"hters of St, Paul, n.d.).

cial structures as well as facilitating particular projects that promote the dignity of peoples.[60]

In regard to the personal component of sexual ethics, the church is much more specific in proscribing certain acts as morally evil. The primary reason for this difference in tone and specificity has already been alluded to above. That is, the church sees a fundamental integration of the person with his or her concrete sexual specificity and human nature. Because the church holds that this nature and its meaning have been revealed by Christ, the individual person and his or her sexuality also stand illumined.[61] As the one to whom this revelation is entrusted, the Church regards herself as an " expert in humanity " and is qualified to speak accordingly.[62]

This is not to imply that the social nature of the person is secondary or peripheral to what it means to be a person. Indeed, John Paul II frequently quotes the teaching of *Gaudium et Spes* in this regard: " man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a

[60] See John Paul II, *Sollicitudo Rei Socia/is,* no. 41. The popes, however, do not stay away from particular programs altogether. As John XXIII writes: " It is not enough merely to formulate a social doctrine. It must be translated into reality" (see John XXIII, *Mater et Magistra* (1961), no. 224; the citation is from *The Pope Spea.ks 7* (1961): 337). Otherwise, the social doctrine becomes meaningless, and the role of faith is restricted to the realm of one's private life. This is why, for example, Pius XI, Pius XII, John XXIII and John Paul II have encouraged proposals such as worker ownership, profit sharing, and worker participation, which they see as logical, although not necessary in all cases, outcomes of the church's social principies. See John Paul II, *Laborem E.rercens,* no. 14. For a critique of John Paul's specificity, see James O'Connell, 527. Many people including Curran have been critical of Pius's proposal on vocational groups. See Curran, " Changing Anthropological Bases," pp. 187-88. For a different interpretation of the importance of these groups, see John Cort, "If Not Communism or Capitalism, What?," *New Oxford Review* (September 1990), pp. 18-25 and Jonathan Boswell, *Community and the Economy: A Theory of Public Co-operation* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

[61] Cf. *Gaudium et Spes,* nos. 22 and 29; *Ltmien Gentiitm,* no. 18; John Paul II, *Redemptor Hominis,* no. 8. Perhaps the clearest effort to understand the person and sexuality in the light of revelation can be found in Pope John Paul II's " theology of the body" alluded to above which derives especially from his analysis of the first three chapters of Genesis.

[62] Cf. John Paul II, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis,* no. 41.

sincere gift of himself." [63] We are only fulfilled in communion and community with others. However, as noted above, with the exception of the sexual community of man and woman in the family, this social dimension of human nature does not demand one specific form and the church has seen no reason to impose one.[64]

III. CONCLUSION

This study has sought to examine critically the proposal of Charles Curran and others that the Catholic church has arbitrarily applied two differing moral methodologies in its recent sexual and social teachings. While the point concerning the differing approaches is well taken and undoubtedly correct in certain respects, the idea that this difference is unjustifiable or arbitrary is open to question. We have argued that the differences between the two forms of church teaching are not as great as these thinkers suppose and that the attempt to portray them as such betrays questionable presuppos1t10ns concerning moral methodology, natural law, and personalism. We have also argued that there are reasons for the difference in tone and specificity between these two forms of teaching which have not been adequately considered by those offering this critique. For these reasons, this proposal is in need of further examination and perhaps revision.

[63] *Gaudium et Spes,* no. 24, Abbott, ed., p. 223. Cf. John Paul II, Apostolic Letter, *Mulieris Dignitatem,* no. 7.

[64] Another point of critique that can be explored is the observation that the supposedly radically different worldviews which the historically conscious and the classicist approaches embody in fact share a number of the same presuppositions in their individualistic and reason-centered orientation toward facts and information. The markedly "left-brain" approach betrayed by both worldviews shows a definite inability to integrate more holistic, participatory, and communal forms of knowing yielded by story, symbol, and grace. See the discussion of these matters in David Bohr, *Catholic Moral Tradition: In Christ, a New Creation* (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor Press, 1990), pp. 67-74. See also Joseph Pieper's distinction between *ratio* and *intellectus* in *Leisure as the Basis of C1!fl11re* (New York: New American Library, 1952), pp. 26ff.

HOMO FABER RECONSIDERED: TWO THOMISTIC REFLECTIONS ON WORK

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ALTHOUGH WE APPEAR to be poised at the beginning of yet another chapter in the accelerating drama of the industrial revolution-or as some would have it, a post-industrial climax to that revolution-it is far from evident that *homo faber* and his distinctive activity have found for themselves either a philosophy or a philosopher. The work activity may have become respectable as a philosophical subject only in the nineteenth century, but it has hardly been the object of extended or systematic inquiry, then or now.

That is well illustrated by Marx and the Marxian legacy. Marx is arguably to be considered the preeminent philosopher of work, having elevated work and the worker to the center of his activist program. Yet that same orientation to instigating action leads Marx intentionally to neglect elaborating the philosophical foundations of his thought. To be counted among the consequences of that neglect is a treatment of the work activity which appears to be inconsistent, or at best, incomplete.[1] One measure of the inadequacy of Marx's treatment of the subject is to be found in a significant tendency among some twentieth-century Marxists or Marxist-inspired thinkers to abandon the centrality

[1] On the unresolved tensions in Marx's concept of work, see, for example: G. A. Cohen, "Marx's Dialectic of Labor," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 3 (Spring 1974): 260-261; Peter Fuss, "Theory and Practice in Hegel and Marx: An Unfinished Dialogue," in Terence Ball, ed., *Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), pp. 113-114; and R. N. Berki, "On the Nature and Origins of Marx's Concept of Labor," *Political Theory 7* (February 1979) : 35-37.

of work and the worker altogether. Andre Gorz bids a dramatic and final " farewell to the working class." Work has become so de-skilled and fragmented that the Marxian working class has been decisively replaced by a " non-class of non-workers." Work, now thoroughly absorbed and shaped by technocratic industry, is beyond hope of humanization. The radical program he recommends for the " non-class" is to maximize leisure which is already a realizable possibility within the technocratic economy. With that pronouncement, whatever dignity *homo faber* may have possessed is lost as he vanishes into the depths of a self-reproducing technocratic order. [2]

In this paper I wish to examine an alternative to Marxism for approaching work as a subject worthy of philosophical attention. \Vhile classical and scholastic thought may not appear at first to be promising grounds on which to consider the topic, the work of two contemporary Thomists- Jacques Maritain and Joseph Pieper-offers a significant and unique contribution in this area. However, I hesitate to say that either of these thinkers has accomplished the construction of a full-scale philosophy of work. [3] In all fairness, that is not the intent of either one of them. At the same time, what they have accomplished in their reflections on work in some respects is more extensive and systematic than the results of speculation by Marxist thinkers. [4]

[2] Andre Gorz, *Farewell to the Working Class* (Boston: South End Press, 1982). Gorz's program for labor is built largely on conclusions about the evolution of capitalism since Marx associated with the thinkers of the Frankfurt School and their contemporary disciples. The notable claim is that the contribution of technology has come to dwarf labor as a factor of production to such an extent that Marx's labor theory of value is no longer operative. This dominant role for technology is also at the root of the deradicalization of the workers' movement. See Jurgen Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'," in his *Toward a Rational Society*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).

[3] M. D. Chenu, in his *Theology of W or\0* (Chicago: Regenery, 1963), judges that presently we lack not only a theology, but a philosophy, psychology or sociology of work as well (p. 5). There is little reason to conclude that the situation has been altered since Chem1 rendered that judgment.

[4] Having said that, I by no means wish to diminish Marx's own signal contribution to the subject. Marx is rightfully considered to be the pioneer in

By no means do Maritain and Pieper speak with one voice. Indeed, in examining their respective approaches to work, it will become evident that they have produced, within the boundaries of a shared tradition, distinctive and even conflicting assessments of the concept of work and the problems surrounding it. At least provisionally, I shall argue, it is useful to understand them as presenting two different *models* of the work activity. After having presented those models, however, I shall take a closer look at the nature of the differences between them and make some assessment of the extent to which they may also complement one another. But at least as important as that examination are the insights yielded about the nature of the enterprise of philosophizing about work.

1. Work and Leisure

Pieper's assessment of work in the modern age rests upon one critical assumption: both practically and philosophically, work has escaped its legitimate boundaries of action and effect. The nature of those boundaries was clearly perceived by Aristotle and Aquinas although they could not possibly have foreseen the expansiveness of work in the modern era. Living in this age, Pieper's self-appointed task is to bring to our attention how far work has, in fact, penetrated human thought and action, and he does so by mobilizing standards of judgment which he believes to inhere in the classical and scholastic traditions. That, however, involves a *creative* application of those standards in light of the radically altered circumstances of the modern era. I believe that as a consequence Pieper also substantially extends the discussion of work and leisure to be found in the classical tradition and uncovers implications which had long remained latent.

In Aristotle, both work and economic activity generally remained submerged within the precincts of the household. That is

this field, and, as often the case with pioneers, he traverses an enormous territory without always pausing to survey it in detail. For a remarkable appreciation of Marx as a philosopher of labor, and from a thinker hostile to Marxism, see Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution* (Duke University Press, 1975), p. 300.

to say several things. First of all, economic enterprise had yet to emerge as an autonomous activity, understood to operate according to its own laws and independently of conventional moral standards. Secondly, economic autonomy in such terms was virtually inconceivable for Aristotle; given the ends of the household, economics would remain subordinate to those ends and remain, literally, the " art of household management." [5] This is to underscore the fact that for Aristotle the household is not first an economic unit but a moral community. Such productive activity as takes place within it is a matter of necessity, at best a *precondition* for the moral life.[6]

Even the status of the slave as producer is problematic for Aristotle. The natural slave is one who of necessity requires a master to complete his own nature; his deficiencies are compensated for by the master who acts as his fiduciary. The moral community established between them is to their mutual benefit, being also an occasion for the exercise of justice by both master and slave.[7] So, although the slave may also be a productive agent within the household, that function is seen as an incidental one. Aristotle, somewhat confusingly, amplifies that point when he observes that the one conceivable condition under which the household could dispense with slaves would be " if the shuttle should weave for itself, and a plectrum should do its own harp-playing." [8] Immediately, however, he qualifies this claim, for as it stands, it would suggest that the slave *is* exclusively an instrument of production. In fact, the slave is not primarily a producer at all but a "servant in the sphere of action," and "[L]ife," as Aristotle insists, " is action and not production." [9] He is undoubtedly emphasizing here the personal character of that service and the intimacy it engenders between master and servant. And that in-

[5] On the emergence of economics from the household, see Karl Polanyi, " Aristotle Discovers the Economy " in Karl Polanyi et al., ed., *Trade and Market in the Early Empire* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957).

[6] Aristotle, *Politics,* 1323b.

[7] Aristotle, *Politics,* 1255b; *Ethics,* ch. VIII.

[8] Aristotle, *Politics,* 1253b.

[9] Aristotle, *Politics,* 1254a.

timacy is characteristic of a moral community, not a productive enterprise.

Limitation and *subordination* appear to be the key concepts which apply to work in the Aristotelian household. There is no intrinsic merit to productive toil, not even for slaves, who happen to be best suited to it physically and mentally. The substantive content of work is the provision of use values for the household and work comprises a concrete set of skills and knowledge directed toward these ends. The art of household management embraces the practical knowledge of horticulture and husbandry, crafts and tool-making required to direct those activities. Aristotle distinguishes clearly between this art and the art of acquiring property, the chrematistic.[10] The latter is not concerned with use and disposition of property and wealth for the needs of the household, but simply with the act of acquiring them. It is true that the household must make limited use of that art to the extent that it is not self-sufficient,[11] but the requirement of self-sufficiency also defines the legitimate limits of exercising the chrematistic.[12]

However, when practiced in isolation from the needs of the household, the art of acquisition knows no natural limitations. It is precisely in this state that it becomes a *perversion.*[13] Usury exemplifies the barren nature of unnatural acquisition generally, with money, having no inherent use value, generating more money. But trade itself is perverse as its sole aim is to generate money wealth rather than use values for the household, which comprise in any event the true content of wealth.[14]

10 Aristotle, *Politics,* 1256a.

11 Aristotle, *Politics,* 1257a.

12 Aristotle, *Politics,* 1256a. From the manner in which Aristotle presents his argument, it would be just as plausible, and perhaps less confusing, to include this form of acquisition along with the production of use values. Acquiring those goods calls for a specialist's knowledge of them, as in trading for a horse. Here the expertise lies not in trading skills *per se,* but in knowledge of the excellence which pertains to the object in question. Such knowledge is only incidental to the trader-for-profit.

1s Aristotle, *Politics,* 1256b-1257a.

14 Aristotle, *Politics,* 1257b-1258b.

Both work and trade for Aristotle have this much in common: occupation with them excludes leisure, and leisure embraces the exercise of the distinctively human activities of politics and philosophy.[15] Leisure is activity at its fullest while even play, in contrast, is only the necessary period of rest and recreation embedded in the cycle of work rather than a genuine leisure activity.16 The message is clear: to occupy oneself willingly with unleisurely pursuits where the demands of subsistence are satisfied already is a perversion indeed.

But Aristotle's critique of work and money-making are also to be distinguished from one another. Part of the perverse character of trade is that it distorts the natural ends toward which the arts and crafts are directed, subordinating those ends to the one purpose of money-making.[11] Also, implicit in the attack on usury and the profits of trade is the' claim that such activities are not productive of use-values as is work. Unlike trade, then, work cannot be dismissed as intrinsically harmful to leisure. It, at least, is a *preconditionJ*for leisure when properly subordinated to the needs of the household.

In practice, the problem of work, as distinct from trade, would appear to have been solved for Aristotle. Work in a slave society was largely confined to the household, freeing those who were capable of leisurely pursuits. And yet, even in this setting, Aristotle intimates that work itself can take a perverse form. Specifically, Aristotle observes that the liberal arts are sometimes practiced in an unfitting manner that, in effect, brings them within the ambit of work. One can strive with too much concentration and effort in those arts to attain perfection, robbing them of their liberal character. It is the toilsome and mechanical application of energy that renders such activity work-like.[18] In the ser-

15 Aristotle, *Politics,* 1324b34-1325a23.

16 Aristotle, *Politics,* 1337a39-1335b.

17 Aristotle, *Politics,* 1258a.

18 Aristotle, *Politics,* 1337b. See, also, Ernest Barker's comments at this place in his edition of the *Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958)' pp. 334-35fn.

vile arts-which are directed to producing use-values-such effort is appropriate, but not in the leisure activities. Clearly work cannot be condemned when operating within its proper boundaries; only when it invades the realm of leisure is it subject to disapproval.

Interestingly, Pieper does not offer the conventional condemnation of materialism and its preoccupation with material consumption. He does not, of course, approve, but I am convinced that he understands hedonistic materialism to be more a symptom than a cause. Such a critique could easily follow the lines laid down in Aristotle's reflections on the chrematistic. Instead, Pieper appears to me to pick up the critique of *work* which is only slightly developed in Aristotle himself. No doubt, Aristotle could not have imagined that work could have escaped its boundaries on such a massive scale and produced the effects which Pieper must confront. But, in the process of examining these effects, Pieper is also led to reflect on the very nature of work in a way which Aristotle is not.

Pieper would accept that work entails effort and toil and that it is directed toward the production of utilities or use-values. Yet, as I read Pieper, that does not get to the essence of work as it has exposed itself in the modern age. Far more significant is that work embodies a particular standing to creation, a particular way of knowing or *mode of cognition.* Work is_knowing that can never be content with itself, but is always broadly *instrumental.* That includes, prominently, the utilitarian ends of the work activity but is not confined to them. Man as maker does seek to know the world's physical properties and laws in order to alter it, to make it amenable to his needs and desires. The mode of knowing and reasoning appropriate to those ends is that of *ratio,* the scholastic label for the exercise of the discursive or analytical reason.[19] It is reason linked to understanding causation, to breaking down reality into its constituent parts to render it transparent to manipulation and artifice. This kind of reason-

[19] Josef Pieper, *Leisure, the Basis of Culture* (New York: New American Library, 1963), pp. 26-27.

ing calls for great effort in order to penetrate nature and to make it less mysterious as well as to reconstitute the new understanding of nature into a comprehensible system of knowledge. Even where such knowledge stops short of generating world-transformative projects, it is already an instrument of the human mind which transforms our view of nature. At the very least, nature becomes an object of mental manipulation.

I would suggest that the very ·essence of work for Pieper is this mode of perception and all that it entails. Neither physical effort and effect nor utilitarian motives are enough to explain the penetrative power of work into areas beyond the production of use values. This conclusion is buttressed by Pieper's account of the condition of modern philosophy. For although philosophy is not strictly utilitarian, and certainly does not call for physical effort, Pieper is convinced that the work-like mode of activity has captured even philosophy in the modern era. On this reading, Kant is the philosopher *par ezcellence* of work, for he understands philosophy itself to be a work-like activity.[20] Kant insists that all knowledge is discursive and can only be won by great effort. Philosophy itself is held to be genuine only when engaged in as "'herculean labor.' "[21] The end of that labor is not the creation of use-values but it is nonetheless a reduction of reality to categories which make it amenable (or appear to make it so) to mental manipulation and control.

Proletarianism is the term which for Pieper describes a society dominated by work. Yet, as Pieper insists, it is not the mere existence of the industrial working class that defines this condition and it cannot be resolved by transforming everyone into a proletarian. " What then is proletarianism? If the numerous sociological definitions are reduced to a common denominator, the result might be expressed in the following terms : the proletarian is the man who is fettered to the process of work."[22] In this case, Peiper says that that process "means useful work in the sense

[20] Pieper, *Leisure*, pp. 25-27.
[21] Pieper, *Leisure*, p. 29.
[22] Pieper, *Leisure*, pp. 49-50.

already defined, of contributing to the general need, to the *bonum utile."* [28] More accurately, the peculiar process of work that utility calls into play is production guided by the discursive mode of reasoning. As already indicated, that cognitive process need not be tied directly to the production of use values in order to be characterized as work. It is precisely the ability of discursive reason to penetrate activities beyond producing utilities and transform them into work-like activities. The case of the " intellectual worker "-the scientist, the administrator-is not in question here. They, too, are part of the system of production even if their contribution is not so direct as that of the worker. More to the point, the paradigmatic case of the process of work escaping the production of use values is, as we have already seen, the modern philosopher.

I believe that identifying *ratio* as work's defining characteristic apart from the ends to which it is directed-utilitarian or non-utilitarian-is of significance, for it yields in Pieper's work a two-fold critique of the modern work culture. There are actually two such cultures or at least two variations of that culture. One is the overtly totalitarian work society, exemplified by the regimes of Hitler and Stalin. They do indeed subordinate all activity to the demands of social utility, turning each member of society into a functional unit. This social order, however, is almost a caricature of the work culture, and it is obviously dangerous. But the total work culture can take another more insidious form that is not accompanied by the impositions of the totalitarian state. The industrial democracies are themselves ruled by the demands of work without fully recognizing how totally work and its characteristic mode of cognition monopolizes thought and action in all occupations and at all social levels, even those beyond the narrowly utilitarian. In these circumstances, Pieper reflects, " it might be asked whether we are not all of us proletarians and all of us, consequently, ripe and ready to fall into the hands of some collective labor State and be at its disposal as functionaries-even

[28] Pieper, *Leisure,* p. 50.

though explicitly of the contrary political opinion." [24]

Lost to the total work culture is a distinctive way of knowing, *intellectus* as opposed to *ratio. Intellectus* is the kind of knowledge by way of intuition which Kant refused to recognize as knowledge at all. For Pieper, however, it constitutes knowing in its purest sense, knowing that is content with itself. Such knowledge is the product of contemplation. To acknowledge creation on its own terms-without the desire to alter it or adapt it to human needs-and to sense its divine provenance brings one out of mundane reality into the realm of the transcendent and infinite. From such extra-mundane experiences do human beings maintain contact with the ground of existence and their nature as spiritual beings.

Of course, human contemplation can only imperfectly comprehend being. The promise of the afterlife is that the soul will be able to gaze upon the divine source of creation even as the angels do.[25] What remains significant in the contemplative act is the purity of the desire to experience creation simply as it is, and to do so means putting aside the distractions and busyness of day-to-day existence. Further, Pieper insists that the insight into the being of creation which is the fruit of contemplation arrives effortlessly, without the toil which produces mundane accomplishments. The contemplative insight comes unexpectedly and almost as a gift; like the gift of grace it is incapable of being produced by the recipient of the gift, and the gift itself is incommensurate with any effort expended by the recipient toward securing it.[26]

In one sense, contemplation is simply receptivity or openness to experience.[21] Yet Pieper also makes clear that it must be more than that. This introduces a paradox which Pieper does not appear to have resolved. He insists that leisure ought not to be construed as either passivity or laziness. In fact, such an inter-

24 Pieper, *Leisure,* p. 51.
25 Pieper, *Leisure,* p. 27.
26 Pieper, *Leisure,* p. 52.
21 Pieper, *Leisure,* pp. 40-42.

pretation of leisure is a false understanding imposed by the work culture itself. From the standpoint of work, leisure can only be inactivity as rest from work, or idleness. Pieper insists, on the contrary, that leisure is not to be defined in terms of the cycle of work. Following Aquinas, Pieper understands leisure, as the opportunity for contemplation, to be itself an activity :

> The provision of an external opportunity for leisure is not enough; it can only be fruitful if the man himself is capable of leisure and can, as we say, " occupy his leisure "; or (as the Greeks still more clearly say) *skolen agein,* " work his leisure " (this usage brings out very clearly the by no means " leisurely " character of leisure). [28]

Perhaps Pieper misses the irony of the Greek phrase; he certainly does not pause to consider its implications for his own position. Elsewhere, and more consistently, he seeks to expunge any hint of work or effort from the characteristic leisure activities. Yet Pieper' s efforts in this direction can themselves appear to be somewhat labored:

> the highest form of knowledge comes to man like a gift-the sudden illumination, a stroke of genius, true 1contemplation; it comes effortlessly and without trouble .... The highest forms of knowledge, on the other hand, may well be preceded by a great effort of thought, and perhaps this must be so . . ., but in any case the effort is not the cause; it is the condition. It is equally true that the effects so effortlessly produced by love presuppose no doubt an heroic moral struggle of the will. But the decisive thing is that virtue means the realization of the good; it may imply a previous moral effort, but it cannot be equated with moral effort. [29]

That effort in the absence of genius or moral greatness cannot produce inspired results is true enough. But there are plenty of instances, too, of talent that goes unrealized for lack of effort and discipline. To say that effort is a mere condition for inspiration is to avoid the real issues : *how* do effort and inspiration interact and *what kind* of effort is involved. Since all effort falls into the undifferentiated category of work for Pieper, it is in-

28 Pieper, *Leisure,* pp. 54-55.
29 Pieper, *Leisure,* pp. 31-32.

conceivable to him that it could make any contribution to the activities of leisure. Still, there is the disquieting evidence, which Pieper cannot entirely ignore, that the great accomplishments in art and philosophy and moral life do not come without effort. Ivforeover Pieper himself recognizes that such accomplishments can in turn inspire contemplation; [30] surely this is evidence that contemplation is neither entirely self-sufficient nor spontaneous. This is a problem I will return to later. I introduce it here only to illustrate the lengths to which Pieper will go, under the inspiration of the classical tradition, in segregating work from leisure.

2. Another Model: Work and Creation

In her essay, " Why Work?," Dorothy Sayers refuses to accept that work must, of necessity, be drudgery in order to serve the divine purpose. On the contrary, she draws a nexus between human work and the act of divine creation: "[work] should be looked upon ... as a way of life in which the nature of man finds its proper exercise and delight and so fulfils itself to the glory of God. That it should, in fact, be thought of as a creative activity undertaken for the love of the work itself; and that man, made in God's image, should make things, as God makes them, for the sake of doing well a thing that is well worth doing." [31] Not only does Sayers elevate man to the status of creator, but his work is portrayed in some manner as participation in the original creation by virtue of that status. As creative activity, work acquires a new dignity that makes it a proper subject of inquiry in its own right. Therein lies the distinctiveness of Sayer's position: work is an *autonomoits* activity. Human formative capabilities have a divine provenance but the appropriate standards for judging good work lie within the nature of the work itself and the demands which it imposes upon the maker. "No piety in the worker will compensate for work that is not true to itself; for any work that

[30] Josef Pieper, *The Philosophical Act,* cited in Pieper, *LeisHre,* p. 73.

[31] Dorothy Sayers, *"\Nhy* Work?," in *Creed or Chaos?* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), p. 46.

is untrue to its own technique is a living lie." [82] In the matter of work, attending first to the demands of work is the guarantee that divine ends will also be served and served well.

Sayer's reflections on work are animated mainly by a concern with the actual status of work in the industrial world and the mass consumption society it has spawned. Work in the industrial society has largely lost its autonomy, being regarded as little more than a means to make money. The products of the industrial workplace are ill-designed and shoddily produced precisely because that is the guiding principle. In establishing the linkage of work and creation, Sayers provides a standard by which the prevalent modes of work may be judged and judged deficient. This is at least the basis for establishing a *hierarchy* of work activities that renders work something other than a homogeneous category.

These brief reflections hardly amount to a full-scale philosophy of work but they do expose the two elements that appear to be essential to the alternative Thomistic work philosophy: the autonomy of work and the differentiation and valuation of the various formative activities. Each of those elements is given more extended treatment by Jacques Maritain and along explicitly Thomistic lines. And while he does not provide the critique of industrial work that Sayers does, he develops a philosophical framework in which such a critique naturally emerges and which Sayers herself understands to form the basis for her own reflections. [33] Strictly speaking, it is not Maritain's intent to offer a philosophy of work at all. His philosophical reflections on work are contained in a philosophy of art and artistic creation. But, as he also notes, "[t]he sphere of Making is the sphere of Art in the most universal sense of this word." [34] Artistic making is the model of work at its fullest.

[82] Sayers," Why Work?," p. 57.

[33] Sayers herself understands her reflections to be guided by Maritain's framework; "Why Work?," pp. 61-62.

[34] Jacques Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism* (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), p. 12.

Consistent with the assertion of the autonomy of making, good art is not necessarily sacred art for Maritain. The proper ends of art may be perverted when artistic making is too consciously directed toward glorifying God; in the course of attempting to offer divine praise, artistic activity may fail as both art and worship. However, by probing the depths of the human creative act, Maritain looks to discover the sources of its autonomy and the standards that are appropriate to judging creative activity and human making generally. By virtue of that exploration, what begins as a philosophy of art becomes, by extension, a sketch for a philosophy of work.

Maritain draws upon the broad Aristotelian categories to distinguish the kinds of human activity. Art-like morality and politics-belongs to the *practical* order of *doing* and *making* rather than the *speculative* order. In both realms, intelligence is brought to bear but with a different set of ends in view. Speculative knowledge is knowledge content with itself, knowledge without effect in the material world.[35] In contrast, practical knowledge produces effects in this world; doing consists in the exercise of freedom and will while making produces a tangible product. Doing falls into the sphere of morality and is directed toward the perfection of the will. Making, however, lies outside of the moral sphere. The rules of making are not those of man-of moral doing-but those which belong to the object to be made. Work as an end dictates its own standards which in their turn guide making. It is, then, intellectual, rather than moral, virtues which direct the activity of making. Virtues attend to the perfecting of an activity, and because making lies outside the moral sphere, its attendant virtues are also of a non-moral nature. At the same time, art does not escape human character. The intellectual virtues are necessary to artistic production : " as a man is, so are his works."[36] But moral character need not have any di-

35 Maritian, *Scholasticism,* pp. 5, *7.*

36 Maritain, *Scholasticism,* p. 12. For an alternative treatment of the relationship between work and the intellectual virtues, see Yves R. Simon, *Work, Society, and Culture,* ed. Vukan Kuic (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971), pp. 167-182.

rect effect on artistic virtuosity except where vices such as laziness or indiscipline detract from realizing talent.[37]

Maritain does more than establish the autonomy of making. What moves his speculation closer to a genuine philosophy of work are the refinements he recognizes within the category of making itself. While Maritain will recover the distinction between craft and art, the useful arts and the fine arts,[38] the more fundamental distinction is between creative activity and activity which represents a perversion or falling short of the creative. In fact, when artistic making is spoken of as an autonomous activity, it is meant precisely that it is being performed in the creative mode. Creativity is the touchstone of making at its fullest and most complete, at its most god-like.[39]

As Maritain has it, to create is first to *know* the world in a special way. Maritain begins just here, with the act of cognition, although perception itself does not fully encompass the activity of creation. Creative knowing is summarized as an act of *creative* or *poetic intuition.* Such intuition, however, is not outside of the intellect, but constitutes a distinctive form of knowing. It is knowing-the action of the senses-guided by the intellect and infused with emotion. All of the human capacities participate in this act articulated by the illuminating intelligence.[40] Maritain acknowledges that such *connatural knowledge* or knowledge by inclination is unfamiliar to the modern mind. Yet that penetrating intelligence that senses the essence of Being lies at the core of both practical moral knowledge and mystical experience. And it may penetrate the realm of making through artistic creation: " Poetic knowledge, as I see it, is a specific kind of knowledge through inclination or connaturality ... which essentially relates to the creativity of the spirit and tends to express itself in a work."[41]

[31] Jacques Maritain, *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* (Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 48-49.
[38] Maritain, *Intuition,* pp. 53-64.
[39] Maritain, *Intuition,* pp. 65, 112, 137-138.
[40] Maritain, *Intuition,* pp. 96-97, 118.
[41] Maritain, *Intuition,* p. 118. Cf. p. 55.

Why should the external world become a focus of such intense knowing? It is worth knowing, on Maritain's account, because it is potentially full of meaning for human beings. However, this amounts to more than a claim about the complexity of man and the world. The merely complex is properly the subject of analysis, of dissolution into constituent parts, of simplification or reduction. That much is accomplished by the discursive intellect. Poetic intuition aims at *unreconstructed* complexity, at grasping not simply the whole and its parts, but unveiling the meaning it contains which is beyond analysis. Indeed, such meaning is forever beyond complete grasp. Man and nature possess for man as observer an *amplitude* of meaning, meaning that can never be exhausted.[42] Rather than simplifying reality, poetic intuition is instrumental in uncovering yet deeper layers of meaning and complexity.[43]

Moreover, poetic intuition necessarily brings an encounter in the realm of practical knowledge; the irttellect makes itself consonant with the object of knowledge. The problem arises when the object itself has yet to come into existence. Under that condition, knowledge can only be consonant with the *appetite* which sparks the creative endeavor; truth amounts to conformity of knowledge with that appetite.[44] The creative act, then, must come back to the creator and his nature. That is no less true for the divine creator himself. Maritain portrays God the creator as the first poet, the model for the human creator. He cannot work on matter as a craftsman because matter does not yet exist. He must turn to his own essence to provide the material of the creative act. But the aim for the divine, as for the human, creator is not to know himself, but, knowing himself, to create. The poetic act, then, is intellective but also creative. Such an act can only express the being of its author. It follows that the works of art that come closest to the poetic source reveal most clearly the subjectivity of the author. The act of creative intuition fuses self

Maritain, *Intuition,* pp. 126-127; *Scholasticism,* p. 44.

43 Maritain, *Intitition,* pp. 140-141.

44 Maritain, *Intuition,* pp. 46-47.

and object in an unique fashion; the perceiver-creator is wedded to the object in a way which ceases to be external. Poetic intuition becomes an experience that is at once cognitive and emotional. [45]

Why does the natural world have such meaning? Maritain's answer, in effect, is that it is a reflex of the infinite.[46] Proceeding from its divine origins what else could it be? The *pathos* of human life lies in the fact that it represents the *finite striving toward the infinite,* and in the finite forms of material reality that goal must always escape human grasp. Yet within the finite forms the infinite can be detected although it requires the extraordinary effort of creative perception. The tension induced by the enormity of the object of perception and the resources which can be mobilized to perceive it is an unavoidable accompaniment of creative intuition. All of this may seem far removed from the concerns of the sphere of making, but Maritain comes to see poetic intuition and artistic production as indissolubly linked.

Maritain's use of "poetic" and "creative" synonymously with respect to intuition calls for clarification. Poetic intuition is effectively poetry without words. The poetic impulse is to capture all of the reality of an object within the perceptive act. Poetry proper-in word or song-may or may not come as a later result of that perception. Yet this account can also be misleading insofar as it suggests that poetic intuition can stop short of poetry. That certainly may at times happen, but on Maritain's account, the very fullness and amplitude of Being experienced by way of creative intuition typically spills over the boundaries of individual consciousness.[47] It positively demands communication to others, translation into tangible and communicable form. In entering the realm of expression, however, one is immediately thrust also into the realm of making, whether so slight as crafting words on paper or so earthy as molding clay.

[45] Maritain, *Intuition,* pp. 121-122.
[46] Maritain, *Intuition,* pp. 126-127.
[47] Maritain, *Intuition,* pp. 113-114, 128.

The relationship between creative intuition and making also calls for further explanation" Certainly not all making is creative, Le., under the inspiration and guidance of creative intuition" But it would be mistaken to assume that making-even when led by creative intuition-is just an *imperfect* attempt to express the creative insight. That explains why *contemplation* and *creative in:tuition* are to be distinguished from one anotheL [48] The contemplative possesses connatural or intuitive knowledge as experience of the divine and is, moreover, content with that experience. It is sufficient in itself and does not spark the desire to communicate that experience to others. That desire is not excluded as a possibility, but does not arise as an essential part of the experience" In the case of creative intuition, though, the relationship between intuition and expression is of a different charactero

Maritain appears to say that creative intuition-by its nature-demands tangible expression. [49] Because of the fullness of reality contained in the intuitive experience, it is impossible to contain that experience within the boundaries of the perceptive act. It demands a worldly notation, and the experience *is not complete* until it attains it. That calls into play a second order of creation-beyond the creative perception-which is the construction of that notation. And it embraces the problematic we have already encountered: how to suggest within the limitations of materials the non-material meanings that flow from creative intuition. Note that much more than a matter of technique is involved here. Indeed, material technique is only a minimal concern at this point. Even crude technique can serve the expression of poetic intuition, but no amount of technique, however sophisticated, can substitute for creative intuition" [50] Great artists can be distinguished from lesser ones because they unite highly developed technique with creative insighL

Technique itself, after creative perception and formative effort, could be thought of as a *third order* of making and the one which

[48] Maritain, *Int11ition,* pp" 113-114"
[49] :Maritain , *Intuition,* pp. 113-114, 124.
[50] Maritain, *Scholastidsm,* p. 49.

is purely instrumental. But even technique receives a definitive inflection from creative intuition. For if the artist begins only with technique he may never move beyond it.[51] Maritain is entirely consistent in praising the modern age because it has freed the artist from slavish acceptance of prevailing techniques, although that freedom has sometimes been abused and degenerated into a fascination with mere novelty in technique.[52] When, however, technique is hitched to poetic intuition, it becomes something that the artist is also discovering or remaking : there are rules of making, but the rules themselves are subject to creative construction.[53] When art permeates making, man as poet and man as maker are both present, and the line between them becomes artificial :

> Art must never forget its origins. Man is *homo faber* and *homo poeta* together. But in the historical evolution of mankind the *homo faber* carries on his shoulders the *homo poeta.* Thus I shall point, first of all, to the art of the craftsman; and, secondarily, compare the universe of the art of those for whom . . . we reserve the name of artists.[54]

Making is a highly differentiated activity and .one whose complexity Maritain makes some effort to examine. His exploration reveals a hierarchical ordering of activities under the category of making which finally can generate an evaluation of work and working. Art is the highest form of making and the *model* of all making. Artistic making has as its object the representation of beauty and the meaning that lies within it. That is the realm of the *fine arts:* making for the sake of beauty. In contrast, the *crafts* or *useful arts* make in beauty as well, but the beauty is secondary to the concern of *utility.*[55] At the margin, however, it may be difficult to distinguish the two ; much of human artifice

51 Maritain, *Scholasticism,* p. 49.

52 Maritain, *Intuition,* p. 131.

53 Maritain, *Scholasticism,* pp. 38-39; *Intuition,* pp. 56, 64. Maritain claims that it can even be true of craft and technique in *Intuition,* pp. 53-54.

54 Maritain, *Intuition,* p. 45.

55 Maritain, pp. 59-60.

may be of great beauty even apart from the intention of its creators. [56]

On reflection, however, Maritain goes even further, concluding eventually that the traditional distinction between the fine arts and the crafts itself requires significant revision. A more meaningful distinction, says Maritain, is to be drawn between what he terms the *free* or *self-sufficient* arts and the *subservient* arts, a distinction which transcends that based upon distinguishing producing for utility from producing for beauty. Beauty can be engendered in architecture as in poetry. What makes an art self-sufficient is the degree of freedom it has in pursuing beauty, whether or not there are also utilitarian ends involved. Architecture can approach the freedom of poetry in this respect when it is free to produce work for the good of the work itself. " I would say that the good of the work, which is the aim of every art, depends *more,* in certain arts, on its relations to the needs of human life, and on the fact of the work being *good for something else;* and that, in certain arts, the good of the work succeeds *more* in being a *good in itself and for itself. . . .* When the good of the work reaches such self-interiority, the art involved is not subservient but free, as is the case with architecture and still more with painting and sculpture, ... and still more in music and poetry." [57]

3. The Two Problems of Work

I am convinced that how to conceive of work as a philosophical problem has long been obscured by the entanglement of that

[56] Maritain, *Scholasticism,* n. 40; *Intuition,* pp. 61-62.

[57] Maritain, *Intuition,* p. 175. For different reasons, Hannah Arendt transcends the distinction between art and craft in her concept of work Work, on her definition, is the activity which produces the durable world of cultural artifacts which provides the setting for, and sustains, human action; d. *The Human Condition* (University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 168-174. Labor, in contrast, produces the narrowly utilitarian goods and consumables which are drawn into the metabolic cycle and the labor activity itself reflects this cycle in its toilsome repetitiveness (pp. 93-96). However, this distinction allows her to recognize, as does Maritain, the complexity and diversity of the making activities.

problem with the *social problem* of work or labor. Historically, the conflation of the two is not difficult to account for; that work could even be of philosophical interest hardly occurred until the condition of the working class or classes became a matter of public attention. The social problem resolved itself early on into that of the proletariat and its future. That is the case not only for Marxism but for Catholic social philosophy as well.[58] The philosophical task facing Pieper and Maritain is to separate out the two issues, but, after having done so, to show nonetheless how they are related to one another. Maritain, I shall argue, goes furthest in treating work independently, and this apart from the claim of autonomy. Yet Pieper sees clearly as well that a philosophical treatment of work has to establish its independence from the condition of workers or the working class. That is most evident in Pieper's evolving analysis of the proletariat's situation. In an early formulation, Pieper finds the antidote to the condition of the proletariat to lie in " deproletarianization." Drawing upon the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno,* he favors a corporatist reconstruction of society that would allow workers to escape the dependence and degradation associated with wage Small property ownership is a foundation for both the security and dignity of the worker. That independence would also put an end to the class conflict that revolves around the content of the wage contract. By the time of *Leisure,* however, Pieper's understanding of the proletariat has been transformed. In fact, it is no longer, properly speaking, the problem of the proletariat with which he is occupied. Or, to put it another way, the problem of proletarianization is now seen by Pieper to encompass more than the social class called the proletariat. As we have already seen, it is the content of the work activity itself, and its penetration to

[58] For the most extensive treatment of the social problem of labor within Catholic social thought, see Goetz A. Briefs, *The Proletariat* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937).

[59] Josef Pieper, *Thesen Zur Sozialen Politilc* (Frankfurt/Main, 1947). This work first appeared in Germany in 1933, and as Pieper notes in his introduction, was quickly banned.

all kinds of work regardless of social class, that defines the problem of work for Pieper. His continued employment of the term "proletarianization" may, therefore, be somewhat misleading. While wage labor may characterize the work at many levels in society, intellectual workers and managers, as he notes, may be well-paid and otherwise removed from the exigencies facing the industrial proletariat. It is the manner in which they work, rather than any common material condition associated with the way they work, which allows for this classification.

Pieper could only arrive at this conclusion by pursuing the essence of the work activity apart from the social condition of workers. Granting work an independent treatment does not, however, amount to support for the claim of autonomy of work as Maritain or Sayers conceives it. As in the classical treatment of work, Pieper remains no less convinced that work must remain subordinate to ends outside of it-the production of subsistence goods-but that does not prevent him from examining the intrinsic content of work apart from its ends. By having a grasp of that content, Pieper can assess the consequences of the work activity escaping the boundaries set by its legitimate ends. Indeed, as I have shown, only on accepting a particular content of work is it possible for Pieper to account for the penetration of work-like activity into philosophy and art. Granting work independent treatment, then, by no means need be identical with acknowledging the claim of autonomy.

What Pieper has accomplished is to show how the philosophical problem might produce *social consequences* which are profound in their effect but far from obvious. The traditional social problem remains, but is now presented as being a reflection of a more fundamental philosophical ailment. In the event, it itself would appear to be a consequence of the total domination of work; perhaps in a society where work approaches duty (or, as in the totalitarian states, where it has become a legal duty), it is more difficult to focus attention on what must appear as mere sideefiects of the work activity, seen itself as a form of necessity. And the situation is compounded by the vulnerable dependency of wage labor.

I am not accusing Pieper of bad faith or somehow abandoning the industrial worker. His concern with their basic physical needs as well as spiritual well-being is manifest. However, it becomes apparent that the philosophical analysis goes some way towards disarming practical efforts regardless of Pieper's intent. As I hope to make clear, that is not a defect that follows from focusing on the philosophical problem of work, but rather the specific content of Pieper's analysis. Pieper can conceive of work as no more than utilitarian in purpose and, consequently, seeks to narrow the sphere of utility and contract the work activity to match it. But that poses a dilemma for those who work (no matter how work is socially distributed), for however much actual work time is reduced, work itself always remains tied to the utilitarian. Moreover, the discursive mode of reason which accompanies work always threatens to penetrate beyond it. Pieper is himself aware of the consequence and expands upon them at some length. The reduction of work time within the work culture does not provide a spiritual opening at all. Instead, it generates a false leisure which mirrors the work activity itself.[60] The alternative, for Pieper, is to restore the ground for true leisure. At the mass level that means a spiritually based festivity that is genuine punctuation to the rhythm of work, offering a period of escape from the mundane.[61] At the personal level, the experiences of love and intimacy may provide the "existential shock" that disrupts the day-to-day pattern of existence.[62] And to those who are so gifted, artistic creativity and contemplation feed on the insight and inspiration that arrive, as it were, effortlessly.

Given Pieper's measure of the work culture, it is not likely that such occasions will present themselves frequently or spontaneously. That lends an air of pessimism to *Leisure* which may be at odds with Pieper's deep conviction that humans are spiritual

60 Pieper, *Leisure,* pp. 38-41.

61 Josef Pieper, *In Tune With The World* (New York: Franciscan Herald Press, 1973), chs. I-IV.

62 Pieper, *Philosophical Act,* p. 73.

beings to their core. In short, his hopefulness is difficult to sustain in the face of his analysis of the situation. In earlier reflections, when he yet construed the problem of the proletariat in narrow social terms, Pieper could be both more dearsighted and optimistic about a solution and its prospects for implementation.

The program he derived from *Quadragesimo Anno* was simple and direct, and could be summarized in two mutually supporting principles : the deproletarianization (*Entproletarisierung)* of the proletariat and the establishment of an occupational-corporatist order (*berufstandische Ordnung).* The former was the first step in a two stage process ; the :first order of business was to free the workers from the insecurity and dependency that accompany wage-labor by appropriate social legislation. Yet the condition of the proletariat could not be fully resolved until its position as an antagonist in a class struggle was eliminated. The corporatist order was to be the completion of the process of deproletarianization. Workers and employers were to be united in interest and welfare through economic organizations defined by their economic function, a function which cut across dass lines.[63]

By the time of *Leisure,* Pieper concludes that a political solution-as he labels his earlier approach-was not wholly adequate, and that he, like others of his generation, " expected too much in general from unadulterated politics." [64] One can only conclude that this observation is made in light of the philosophical analysis of labor and its detachment from the social problem. He does not, however, wholly abandon faith in the earlier solution, although it will have to be adjusted to take account of the expanded problem of proletarianism, now no longer confined to the industrial working class but present there, nonetheless, in its most acute and manifest form. Now there may clearly be multiple manifestations, or proximate causes, acting alone or in concert, of this condition: " lack of property, State compulsion, or inner impoverishment." Absent, apparently, is hope that a corporatist reconstruction can be effected. In the event, in these altered circumstances,

[63] Pieper, *Thesen, passim.*
[64] Pieper, *Leisure,* p. 67, n. 5.

'deproletarianization ' would mean " enlarging the scope of life beyond the confines of merely useful servile work, and widening the sphere of servile work to the advantage of the liberal arts; and this process, once again, can only be carried out by combining three things : by giving the wage-earner the opportunity to save and acquire property, by limiting the power of the state, and by overcoming the inner impoverishment of the individual." [65]

The component of the revised program which appears to be utterly novel is " widening the sphere of servile work to the advantage of the liberal arts." Not only is it novel; there is no precedent for it in anything Pieper has said thus far. Indeed his meaning is only clarified in another of his works : " The counterpart [of servile work] is not inactivity or nonwork, but free activity, *ars liberalis:* work that does not have a purpose outside of itself, that is meaningful in itself, and for that very reason is neither useful in the strict sense, nor servile or serviceable." [66]

There are a number of problems that suggest themselves. In *Leisure,* too, Pieper notes the classical Greek formulation that leisure is not simply respite but itself must be " worked." Yet Pieper's conception of work-tied as it is to a particular mode of cognition-is also portrayed as inimical to the liberal arts. As we have seen, it is *not* the presence or absence of utilitarian ends which alone distinguishes the liberal from the servile arts, although Pieper sometimes confusingly reverts to that formulation. It is, rather, the mode in which they are conducted; the very *homogeneity* of work renders it harmful to the liberal arts. It is inconceivable, then, that the sphere of the liberal arts could overlap to any extent with the sphere of work.

The point is underlined by Pieper's treatment of creative activity. We know that he goes out of his way to segregate effort and the exercise of analytical reason from the fruits of creative insight; that insight is not produced by any amount of effort, but arrives when the artist or philosopher or mystic has freed himself from toil and become receptive to experience. Although

[65] Pieper, *Leisure,* p. 51.
[66] Pieper, *In Tune,* p. 7.

he must admit that artistry and philosophy entail practical activity, he does all that he can to minimize the contribution of practical effort to the artistic process or philosophical act.

> Certainly a work of art has no utilitarian end, and certainly it is not a means to accomplish something else. But may we not ascribe its power to the fact that the process which takes place in the artist takes place also in his audience-who in seeing, hearing, absorbing the work are kindled to contemplation of Creation? [67]

This is, mistakenly I believe, to conflate the experience of the artist with that of the audience. No doubt, the artist can step back and observe his own work as an audience of one. But he is also the *creator* of that work, and the process of creation is inaccessible to those who simply behold the finished product, or even to an audience who were to watch the artist paint. The artist does not only " see " ; he attempts to distill some of that vision into communicable form. And to whom do we bestow the greatest honors-to museum-goers and connoisseurs or to creators? In short, Pieper could not possibly hope to move servile work toward the practice of the liberal arts, given his own understanding of work. For on that understanding, work excludes contemplation, and the essence of the liberal arts is contemplation. And his portrayal of any creative activity consistently excludes work and effort.

Why then does Pieper even suggest expanding the scope of the servile arts? Surely it betrays an uneasiness with his understanding of work and the work culture. If they cannot be transformed because of their intrinsic nature, it is also the case that work can never be eliminated. Even if it is contained, then, to proportions which satisfy Pieper, that does not discount the possibility-perhaps strong probability-that the imperatives of the work culture will reassert themselves. After all, they are always there, latent, in the very nature of the work activity. Pieper himself claims to be living in an age when just that has happened in both the totalitarian and democratic states. By defining work as he does,

[67] Josef Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation* (New York: Pantheon, 1958), p. 96.

Pieper leaves no prospect for resolving the condition which has become endemic. At best, he can hope for a slight remission but no cure.

Beyond that, there is the positive danger that by denigrating work it loses all prospect of carrying spiritual significance. Pieper, recall, grants a narrow dignity to work; it serves contemplation by freeing time for it but it bears no intrinsic value, and no one who is without need to support himself is obligated to work. If work is irredeemable there is no prospect for transforming the work culture from within or hoping that it will evolve naturally in a more promising direction.

Maritain supplies at least the prospect of escaping these dangers. He does so by constructing the scaffolding upon which Pieper's proposed expansion of the servile arts could more plausibly rest. The main support of that structure is Maritain's conception of making. As we know, it is far from the homogeneous activity which Pieper makes work out to be. Making casts a wider net for Maritain, containing within it making activities of a qualitatively different character which range from the toilsome and degrading to the creative. Pieper simply will not admit that such differences exist. Maritain is able to discern those differences because he is also willing to treat contemplation itself as divided into two types.[68] As a consequence, Maritain does not perceive the deep and unbridgeable gulf which Pieper sees between work and contemplation.

Artistic making and kinds of work or crafting interpenetrate with contemplation of the natural world. On Maritain's account, poetic insight demands material expression and, moreover, participates actively in various orders of creation which accompany the formative activity. And all involves considerable effort. As Maritain insists, the true artist, operating under the guidance of poetic insight, discovers that sustaining creativity calls for *ever greater effort.* Whatever the satisfactions that accompany crea-

[68] Pieper momentarily admits the distinction, only to find that it does not hold up under examination. See *Happiness,* pp. 76-82.

tive work, they must be won by taking on an ever greater burden. But such effort is also of a different character from toil which is merely mechanical and wearying. That, however, Pieper seems unwilling to admit. It is evident in his summary of philosophy in the "philosophical act"-the moment of insight-rather than the exploration and elaboration of that initial germ. That making and contemplation are moments of the same process is something Pieper is unwilling to grant, but it is the basis of the dignity and stature which Maritain accords to human making. Yet if Pieper desires to enhance the status of servile work-work serving utilitarian ends-it can only be by moving closer to Maritain's position in this respect. But that also entails abandoning the conventional distinction between the servile and liberal arts, a distinction which Maritain has already superseded.

Note that establishing the dignity of work in principle does not amount to the claim that all human making actually has this status. Rather, Maritain has set up a standard for judging the multiplicity of formative, productive activities. In doing so, he can be-and is-no less critical of work in industrial society than Pieper himself :

> Artistic work is ... the properly 'human work, in contradistinction to the work of a beast or the work of a machine. . . . When work becomes *inhuman* or *subhuman,* because its artistic charaicter is effaced and matter gains the upper hand over man, it is natural that civilization tend toward communism and to a productivism forgetful of the true ends of the human being (and which *in the end* will therefore jeopardize production itself) .[69]

On this account, it is not work that is a corrupting cultural influence, but work itself which has been corrupted. When work is not all that it could be, severe social consequences follow. The questions Maritain leaves unanswered concern the extent to which work in the industrial setting must follow this pattern and whether it is amenable to change. There is no evidence that he favors a return *to* craft production or that he would consider it possible. In passing, he observes that something of poetic in-

69 Maritain, *Scholastirism,* p. 15411.

tuition may be involved in occupations as varied as those of the businessman, scientist, and general, but provides no elaboration.[70]

4. *Conclusions*

Pieper, in his brief essay, manages to sketch the outline of a work philosophy. It is admirable in its attempt to link what is, in effect, an ontology of work, an assessment of work and its culture, and a program of reform. But it amounts to no more than a sketch, and its defects are all too apparent. It is a project that is flawed from the outset; the analysis of the nature of work on which that project rests does justice to the complexity and variety neither of the productive activity nor of creative endeavor. It is just here that Maritain is most convincing because he takes work seriously as a philosophical subject. Yet his treatment of work does not extend much beyond exploring its ontology, rooted in the creative act. What he accomplishes in that respect is, I believe, considerable and suggestive. But because he stopped short, aside from the few intimations we have noted, of bringing this impressive beginning to bear upon the actual condition of work and the social problem, he cannot be said to have fulfilled the project of a philosophy of work as Pieper outlines it. Had he attempted to do so, it might well have led him to consider further the status of the autonomy of work in the industrial world, the psychology of the worker, and the effect of work on human development. As it is, there is the implication that work, while formally outside the sphere of doing-of moral activity-nonetheless carries a certain moral weight and spiritual significance beyond the narrow utilitarian dignity which Pieper grants to it. In that light, the question of how far work may satisfy the standards of autonomy in practice becomes imperative.

[70] Maritain, *Intuition,* p. 237. See also, Jacques Maritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," in Morris Philipson, ed., *Aesthetics Today* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1961), p. 249.

ULTIMATE END AND COMMON GOOD

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IN HUMAN ACTION what is last in execution is first in intention. For just this reason Thomas Aquinas begins the *secunda jmrs* of the *Summa Theologiae* with a consideration of man's ultimate end. It is the end and the end alone that renders intelligible all those choices and activities that human life comprises. " Finis enim <lat speciem in moralibus " *(ST* 2-2, 43.3; see 1-2, 1.3, 18.6). Both the intellect in its practical activity and the will in its inclination share the same starting point. " The point of departure," Thomas says, "in the activity of rational appetite is the ultimate end" *(ST* 1-2, 1.5). And: "The first principle in human deeds-the subject matter of practical reason -is the ultimate end" *(ST* 1-2, 90.2); accordingly, "what first falls into the apprehension of practical reason is the good" *(ST* 1-2, 94.2). Clarity on this point must be had at the outset of moral discourse (whether philosophical or theological) to ensure success and avoid disastrous confusion. Hence Thomas devotes the first questions of the *secunda pars* to a consideration of the ultimate end. Only then does he proceed to consider human actions in themselves and their intrinsic and extrinsic principles.

In this paper I wish to consider a specific feature of Thomas's discussion of extrinsic principles. For beginning with question 90 of the *prima secundae,* the first question in the so-called Treatise on Law, an explicit consideration of the ultimate end arises once again but with a precision that is, I think, sometimes misunderstood within the Thomistic tradition.

Thomas's discussion of the definition of law in *ST* 1-2, 90 takes its cue from the familiar sense of the term, that is, human

positive law. This is perhaps most obvious in the second article where Thomas argues that aU law (eternal, divine, natural, and human) is ordered to the common good. As the rational rule and measure of all human action, so the argument goes, law must first take into consideration the ultimate end; but since human perfection at every level is achieved only in society (human and divine), the ultimate end is in fact nothing other than the common good. In an effort to confirm this Thomas refers to the fifth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle speaks of legal justice as procuring and preserving the happiness of a political community. He then reminds us that in the *Politics* Aristotle calls the perfect community the city (*civitas).* Strange references for a theologian, unless we realize that Thomas is not restricting his discussion here to divine law and in fact is focussing on its better known secular counterpart in order to shed light on divine and other forms of law. When Thomas identifies the ultimate end with the common good, therefore, he has chiefly in mind the human ultimate end attainable in this life and the political common good, that is, political community.

This identification is precisely what a Thomist such as Henry Veatch denies.[1] As he sees it, the common good or political community is considered good just so far as it is an expedient means to the welfare and happiness of each and every individual citizen. It is not a good worth choosing for its own sake, let alone an ultimate end.

> [T]he common good of any social whole is never an ultimate end or end in itself; instead, any such common good needs to be conceived as a social system or social organization or social order designed and disposed so as to make various of the goods of life available to the individuals who make up the community.[2]

> Rather than an ultimate end, the common good, rightly conceived, can be only an intermediate end, or a means to the perfection or well-being of each and all members of the community.[3]

1 Henry Veatch, *Human Rights: Fact or Fancy?* (Baton Rouge, 1985), pp. 124-134.

2 Ibid., p. 127.

3 Ibid., p. 129.

Veatch's own description of the common good resembles the *bona communia* that Thomas refers to in his discussion of distributive justice (*ST* 2-2, 61.1) which treats such goods as money, honors, water, land (natural resources in general) and " anything else in the class of exterior goods ". The sum of these, according to Veatch, together with the roles, offices, responsibilities, and " institutional arrangements " [4] that ensure their maintenance and usefulness, is the common good.

For Thomas, this is indeed a common and indispensable good, but nevertheless a common good on the level of utility and not choiceworthy in itself. For it falls within an order toward an even more indispensable common good-a good that is in the class of *bonum honestum,* as Jacques Maritain argued repeatedly [5]- a good that is noble, choiceworthy for its own sake, and perfective of the human agent. Thomas identifies this more perfect common good as the life of political community itself, for as a member of this communion of persons, just as within a friendship, the individual finds an essential element of his or her flourishing. In other words, for Thomas (and Aristotle), political community is a basic human good (*ST* 1-2, 94.2). In fact, insofar as it is perfect, the life of the community contains all other natural human goods and for this reason can be considered an ultimate end (though, of course, not the absolute ultimate end).

It is of interest to note that while Veatch denies that the political common good could possibly have the character of an ultimate end, he nonetheless argues that " the love and association of others" [6] is an integral part of an individual's flourishing. But is not political community a form of love and association, of *philia, amicitia,* or friendship? Aristotle, Thomas, and Maritain thought so and for that reason considered the city to be an intrinsic good and an ultimate end. Veatch not only neglects this

[4] Ibid., p. 122.

[5] Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good* (Notre Dame, 1966), p. 53; *The Range of Reason* (New York, 1952), p. 142; *Man and the State* (Chicago, 1963), p. 149.

[6] Veatch, *Human Ri'.ghts,* p. 129.

constant and evident teaching of the tradition he claims his own, but he also (perhaps unwittingly) contradicts it. His confusion on this point, I suggest, stems both from his attempt to reconcile two fundamentally disparate political schools (Aristotle's and Locke's) and from his failure to distinguish objective beatitude *(finis cuius)* and formal beatitude *(finis quo,* see *ST* 1-2, 1.8). Without this distinction, all common goods (e.g., truth, offspring, friendship, creation, God) are quickly reduced to " intermediate ends " or means ordered to the individual's incommunicable state of well-being. With this distinction in hand, however, one can avoid such a dilemma and adopt the scholastic tag, " Amo deum mihi, sed non propter me." I love God (and other intrinsically choiceworthy common goods) for myself, but not for my sake.

John Finnis's interpretation of the common good in *Natural Law and Natural Rights* [1] surpasses Veatch's in clarity and fidelity to the tradition but, it seems to me, is not completely immune from criticism. In fact, his working definition of the common good seems strikingly similar to that of Veatch :

> A set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in a community.[8]

The resemblance lies in the claim that the common good is 1) extrinsic to the " values " of individuals, and 2) a means, as conditions are means, to those "values". I say " seems similar," however, because of other remarks Finnis makes in *Natural Law and Natural Rights* that run counter to such an interpretation. For example, he also calls the common good a " value" and " objective", the" flourishing of all members of the community" and the "object of all justice." [9] In this last sense, the common good

[7] John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 160.

[8] Ibid., p. 155.

[9] Ibid., pp. 154, 174, 168, 194; cf. pp. 303, *372.*

" is not to be confused with the common stock, or the common enterprises, that are among the means of realizing the common good." [10] Finnis advances a threefold division of the common good:

1) the seven basic values (life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, religion, and freedom in practical reasonableness) taken together;
2) each basic value taken separately; and
3) a set of conditions, which is the definition "commonly *[but, note well, by no means exclusively]* intended throughout this book." [11]

Although Finnis does not state explicitly whether an order exists within this division, his argument suggests that the third is ordered to bringing about the first and second. [12]

Thomas himself admits that "common good" is used in a variety of ways, but never exactly in the ways Finnis mentions. [13] Among Finnis's seven basic values or goods, Thomas would admit only one that is truly common in the way a good is properly common, that is, as a common end or goal (" communitate causae finalis," *ST* 1-2, 90.2, ad 2). That good is friendship. [14] Life, knowledge, and the others, since realized (or instantiated) in the individual as such, are common only in definition ("communitate generis vel speciei "). Although we both may be knowing one and the same truth, my act of knowing is not yours. Knowledge in general, as something predicably common, enjoys logical existence only. But a common end or goal must exist as some one particular and real thing, for since actions toward an

[10] Ibid., p. 168.

[11] Ibid., p. 155. See aiso Germain Grisez, *Christian Moral Principles* (Chicago, 1983), pp. 272-273.

[12] Finnis, *Natural Law and N ativral Rights,* p. 156.

[13] See G. Froelich, "The Equivocal Status of *bommi commune," The New S cholasticism* (Winter 1989), pp. 38-57.

[14] So far as play can be considered a good common in the way of a final cause, it is a type of friendship. Religion might also be considered a good common in causality, if by "religion" we mean to signify the object of religion *(finis rnius),* in which case " religion " does not mean an interior state of the soul but the union of man to God, and therefore is also reduced to the good of friendship.

end belong to the realm of individual reality, so too must the end. We have here two types of being-in-common that are opposed with respect to existence. Hence knowledge taken as predicably common cannot serve as a common goal. It is helpful to recall that Aristotle in J?ook 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* reluctantly takes Plato to task precisely on this point.

Friendship, on the other hand, is in its very particularity as common to the friends as the room they may be sharing. By friendship here I do not simply mean benevolence, for that is an interior and therefore incommunicable state of the soul; benevolence can be common only in predication. Rather I am referring to the fulfillment of mutual benevolence in cooperative action and a common life, which Aristotle argues is the most distinctive mark of friendship *(Nicomachean Ethics,* 1157b6-24, 1171b33). Each of the typical actions that friends do together (e.g., eating, drinking, working, playing, exercising, conversing) is so united in any one friendship as to be a single though complex action and not just a single *kind* of action. Even sworn enemies can be said to act together by merely existing and going about their work in the same place. But the kind of unity in the actions of friends must be greater than a unity of predication only. A philosophical discussion among friends, for example, involves two or more interlocutors engaged by a particular topic. If it is a true discussion then there is a true unity, and not a mere passage of words, as when two or more simply ventilate their thoughts. This is like a pile, having no real unity. But a discussion involves an order: give-and-take, response, objection, comment-a coordination of speech in a common pursuit of a particular question. Therefore, like any other order, a discussion is something really one *(realis unio, ST* 1-2, 28.1) and yet common to all the participants. The same holds true for the other activities in which friends typically share. Each is a complex activity whereby one friend coordinates his actions with those of the other.

Now when Aristotle and Thomas argue that shared activity is the proper act of a habit of mutual benevolence, they are saying

not only that this kind of collaboration must arise from a settled state of the soul, but more importantly that it is the perfection and fulfillment of that state. The act of a habit is much more the cause of the habit than the habit is a cause of it. For the act, or more precisely, the good execution of the act, is a cause in the sense of that for the sake of which. It is the ultimate reason why the habit exists in the first place. In the case of friendship, leading a good and pleasant life in common is the final cause of the mutual benevolence between friends. Thus Thomas describes *convivere* as the most choiceworthy part of friendship: " eligibilissimum in amicitia" *(In IX Ethicorum,* lect. 14). At least then in the case of friendship, living together, that is, community, is an ultimate reason for action.

But since friendship is based upon a variety of goods, in fact upon the entire range of goods, can it be the ultimate goal of the pursuit of those goods? Obviously, in friendships based upon utility, like business partnerships, the common action is sought only as a means. But in friendships based upon pleasure or upon excellence *(areten, Eudemian Ethics* 1236a32) or "the good" *(agathon, Nicomachean Ethics* 1155b20), which is equivalent I think to "basic human good," the common action is sought as the perfect mode of participating in the good. It therefore has the character of an ultimate reason for action.

Take, for example, the good of human life. Marriage is a community of human action in which that good is more perfectly realized by and for each member precisely as a part of the community. Indeed, marriage receives its particular character as friendship from its ordination to the propagation and, more importantly, to the education (moral and intellectual) of individual human lives. But as members of this community, the married couple not only prolong their own lives through the perpetuity (in principle) of the line of their descendants but, moreover, they enrich the good *in themselves* by causing the form of the species *in others.* For whatever good one has from nature is held, as it were, in lease, and thus should, and indeed, could, find no determination in oneself. "Nature's bequest gives nothing, but doth

lend; /And, being frank, she lends to those are free " (Shakespeare, *Sonnet* 4). The good of human existence is no doubt one such good that Dante's Virgil had in mind when he says " For the more there are who say ' ours,' /so much the more good does each possess, /and the more love burns in that cloister" *(Purgatorio,* Canto 15, 11.55-57). By the inclination set in the human person, nature directs the couple to propagate the species and so participate in a good greater than any natural good that belongs exclusively to either of them.[15] The natural apprehension of this good is in fact one of the first laws of nature, a form of obligation that St. Thomas calls the duty of nature (*officium naturae, Summa Contra Gen:.tiles* IV.78). Such is the duty to increase and multiply, which the Author of nature has implanted in every living thing, but principally in humans, wishing them not merely to continue the species but, even more, to fill up the number of the elect *(ST* 1, 98.1). Thus the community of marriage is one mode of fulfilling the good of human life.

In general, I am arguing that the full realization of the basic human goods, those self-evident goods, for example, that Thomas lists in *ST* 1-2, 94.2 (life, the union of male and female, children, truth, etc.), depends upon their incorporation in communities of action. All law, including natural law, directs action to the common good, which according to Thomas primarily means friendship.

One of these goods, however, seems to pose an insurmountable difficulty to my interpretation, namely, the good of truth. How does friendship fulfill one's pursuit and possession of truth? Does the common good of friendship rank first even among contemplatives (taking this term broadly) ? At first blush it seems not, for, as Thomas himself says, progress in the contemplation

[15] See Finnis's argument in "Natural Law and Unnatural Acts", *The Heythrop Journal* 11/4 (1970), pp. 365-387, that the couple are "to find their mutually fulfilling communion and friendship not in an inexplicably exclusive cultivation of each other, but in a common pursuit, the pursuit of a good that *de facto* cannot be adequately realized otherwise than by a single-minded devotion to that good, by the *only* two people who can be *the* mother and *the* father of *that* child" (p. 383).

of wisdom depends largely on how much one is cut off from others *(In De Hebdomadibus,* prologue). And ·even though it seems highly unlikely that there can be progress without teachers and a tradition, nevertheless such a community of action is merely useful. In the end, truth and its personal acquisition by the contemplative constitute the ultimate reason for action. Is not a sign of this radical separation of the contemplative from society found in the longstanding custom among most people to disparage those devoted to the philosophical life? Even the great Socrates did not escape this rather common scourge. Aristophanes depicts him in *The Clouds* as a social misfit who contemplates such things as the sun and how far a flea can hop. On the other hand, there have been those who, while extolling the life devoted to wisdom, claim that a fundamental disproportion and even an inevitable hostility exist between philosophy and the city.[16]

In striking contrast to this, Thomas insists that the contemplative adds to the beauty and health of the community.[17] Indeed, during the Middle Ages, Christian, Jewish, Moslem, and Oriental cultures not only tolerated contemplatives but even respected and supported them. They were seen as embodying the peak of human excellence and not as mere accretions that were generally useless for the community. It could in fact be said that their value to the community consisted precisely in their uselessness. For the flourishing of human nature consists primarily (although not exclusively) in the perfection of what is best in human nature, namely, intellect. And the perfection of intellect consists primarily in knowledge of things better than human nature, which man cannot change or shape to his own purposes and hence are essentially useless. This quest for perfection, moreover, is not the domain of a chosen few. The contemplative and the ordinary person immersed in the business of the world both share the same desire of knowledge for its own sake and the same sort of de-

[16] A notable and recent example is Leo Strauss in, for example, "On a Forgotten Kind of Writing," in *What is Political Philosophy?* (Chicago, 1988).

[17] *ST* 2-2, 152.2, adl; *IV Sent.,* d.26, q.1, a.2; *Contra Gentiles* III, 131-136; *In X Ethic.,* lect. 11.

light in learning. Humans are curious by nature. Even the simple desire to go and gaze upon the Sequoias because they are the largest living things on earth discloses this natural bent of the mind. The great delight universally taken in skillfully crafted peripeteia is also, as Aristotle argues in the *Poetics,* a sign that to learn something is a pleasure in itself In sum, contemplation is nothing other than the resolute attempt to do well that which we can scarcely help doing at all if we are human.

No matter how solitary, therefore, a contemplative' s life remains an essential and integral part of human society.[18] While contemplation is the pinnacle of human excellence, it is not its totality. Indeed, since a single individual could never fulfill every human potential (physical, moral, artistic, and intellectual), nor even a small portion of one human potential (Mozart, for example, did not even begin to exhaust the possibilities of the sonata), the contemplative necessarily finds himself or herself united in the human endeavor to overcome the limitations inherent in the individual. That endeavor is human community. "Human communities are the highest attainments of nature, for they are virtually unlimited with regard to diversity of perfection, and virtually immortal." [19] They are unlimited with regard to diversity because they are the union of many variously talented men and women. They are virtually immortal because they are continuously open to all who can participate in the manifold human activities they comprise. Thus, even in the solitary activity

[18] The same holds true on the supernatural level. See *Instruction on the contemplative life and on the enclosure of nuns* (*Vmite seorsuni),* from the Sacred Congregation for Religious, 15 August 1969, section 3: "From Scripture, moreover, it is evident that it was in the desert or in a mountain solitude that God revealed hidden truths to man.... There in fact are places in which heaven and earth seem to merge, where the world, in virtue of Christ's presence, rises from its condition of arid earth and becomes paradise anew.... How then can contemplatives be considered alien to mankind, if in them mankind achieves its fulfillment? This, in a word, is the prayer which is like an apex toward which converges the universal activity of the Church. In this way contemplative religious, bearing witness to the intimate life of the Church, are indispensable to the fullness of its presence."

[19] Yves Simon, *A General Theory of Authority* (Notre Dame, 1962), p. 29.

of the contemplative, the common good of friendship ranks first, so much so that if its existence is threatened the contemplative is obligated to come to its defense. For much more compelling than the debt owed to the community for the opportunity for leisure is the goodness of the community itself.

In conclusion, if friendship as a common good best fits the description of an ultimate reason for human action, then it is precisely what law respects above all. And so it should not come as a surprise to find Aristotle insisting that the principal intent of human law is to produce friendship among the people *(Nicomachean Ethics,* 1155a25). Thomas adds that even divine law has friendship chiefly in view-the friendship, of course, between man and God (ST 1-2, 99.2).

Yves Simon once warned that "an inquiry into the common good must involve constant awareness that its object may, at any time, be displaced by deadly counterfeit". [20] For it is a highly equivocal term. But equivocity does not always preclude one of the many senses from ranking first. I have tried to indicate the status of the common good in an authentic Thomistic moral theory: the common good is ultimate end. In this view, an individual citizen chooses to participate in the common good of his community as an integral component of his flourishing and not as a mere means. Fortunately, this is not a uniquely Thomistic view. The authors, for example, of *Habits of the Heart* (New York, 1985; see also *The Good Society,* New York, 1991) seem to accept it, and in fact have argued that everybody seems in one way or another to assent to it, even though the prevailing language at the moment is that of individualism. For, as I noted, even natural law, the set of first and immediate principles of practical reason present to everyone, has as its principal object the common good.

[20] Ibid., p. 27.

AQUINAS AS A COMMENTATOR ON *DE ANIMA* 3.5

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DOES ST. THOMAS AQUINAS in his commentary on *De Anima* 3.5 provide an acceptable gloss on Aristotle's cryptic remarks about active mind? That is, can one accept .that what Aquinas says about active mind is what Aristotle meant but for some reason did not say? Many modern commentators, among them Franz Brentano, Marcel de Corte, Paul Siwek, and Francisco Peccorino, appear to think so and present an interpretation of active mind which agrees substantially with what Aquinas says in his *Sententia Libri De Anima (Sent.).* [1]

[1] *Senteiitia Libri De Anima,* opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita (Paris: Vrin, for the Leonine Commission, 1984). While he does criticize St. Thomas Aquinas for some statements which " seem to betray a certain lack of clarity concerning the nature of active intellect," Franz Brentano awards the first place among earlier commentators on Aristotle's doctrine of active mind to Aquinas : " Indeed, I am not sure whether I should not say that he correctly grasped Aristotle's entire doctrine" *(The Psychology of Aristotle: In Particular His Doctrine of Active Intellect,* ed. and trans. Rolf George [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977], p. 155). De Corte holds that the originality of his study consists entirely in combining " all the technical means refined by modern criticism and which the thirteenth century did not have at its disposition " with the " Thomist interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of intelligence," an interpretation with which de Corte agrees, and which he presents as a necessary correction of the errors of modern commentators, who are "more or less instilled with an unconscious Averroism which radically vitiates their power of understanding" *(La doctrine de l'intelligence chez Aristote* [Paris: Vrin, 1934], p. 2). Siwek notes that "many of St. Thomas's explanations of Aristotelian psychology are altogether consonant with our own explanations," and warns his readers against undervaluing Aquinas's views *(Aristotelis Tractatus de Anima Graece et Latine,* editit, versione latina auxit, commentario illustravit [Rome: Desclee & C.i, 1965], p. 30). Peccorini com-

Aristotle's text is concerned with two minds, "a mind which is such as matter by becoming all things, and another which is such as an active principle by making all things" (430a14-15). What are these minds, and what do they do? The central elements of Aquinas's exegesis of *De Anima* 3.5 consist in his answers to these questions. He holds that these two minds are " parts or potencies of the soul " *(Sent.* 3.4. 126). The role of passive mind, the "mind which is such as matter," is to apprehend the intelligible object *(Sent.* 3.4. 101-2), while that of active mind, the mind " which is such as an active principle by making all things," is to abstract the intelligibles *(Sent.* 3.4. 103-4), a role which he explains in this way:

> Active mind makes those things intelligible in act which previously were intelligible in potency. It does this by abstracting them from matter, for in this way they are intelligible in act, as has been said.
>
> Aristotle was led to posit an active mind to exclude the opinion of Plato, who held that the natures of sensible things are separated from matter and actually intelligible. Thus for Plato it was not necessary to posit an active mind. But because Aristotle holds that the natures of sensible things are in matter and not actually intelligible, it was necessary that he posit a certain intellect to abstract them from matter and so make them actually intelligible. *(Sent.* 3.4 50-63)

Active mind on Aquinas's reading makes the potentially intelligible forms of sensible things actually intelligible, and in this way these sensible things become objects of thought. If one accepts this role for active mind, one is forced to accept as well, I think, that active mind is part of the soul rather than something separate from the knowing human subject. Aquinas argues this point at length in his commentary on *De Anima* 3.5. If thinking, the action of the passive mind, is in fact an operation per-

ments on *De Anima* 3.5 by glossing it with excerpts from Aquinas's commentary and expresses the greatest confidence in the Angelic Doctor's interpretation: "Aquinas's understanding, of course, can be relied upon" ("Aristotle's Agent Intellect: Myth or Literal Account," *The Thomist* 40 [October 1976] : 505-34). All of these modern commentators agree with Thomas Aquinas that the active mind is something in the human soul, and the above remarks show that this agreement is hardly accidental; each is aware of his agreement with Aquinas and has been influenced by him to an important extent.

formed by the human knower, the human knower must have what is necessary for him to perform that operation, or, as Aquinas puts it, there must be" in man himself the principles by which he can execute his operation, which is the act of understanding, which, indeed, he could not accomplish except through the passive mind and the active mind. Thus the perfection of human nature requires that both of them be something in man" *(Sent.* 3.4. 95-100). Given the role that Aquinas assigns to active mind, to make the active mind something outside the human knower would imply that man did not have what he needed in order to perform an activity that is natural to him; accordingly, he would be naturally imperfect *(Sent.* 3.4. 93-94). The falsity of this conclusion indicates that active mind, like passive mind, must be " something in man."

The focus of our attention, accordingly, should be the correctness of Aquinas's position that active mind abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form. One cannot justify this interpretation by pointing to Aristotle's text. There is in Aristotle's text the simile of light to describe active mind: " There is a mind which is ... such as an active principle by making all things, like a kind of disposition, as light is; for in a way light makes potential colors, colors in actuality" *(de An.* 3.5. 430a14-17). Aquinas *interprets* this simile as referring to an activity of abstraction performed by active mind; as light makes potential colors actual colors, so active mind makes " those things intelligible in act which previously were intelligible in potency by abstracting them from matter" *(Sent.* 3.4. 51-52). But Aristotle says nothing about an act of abstraction being required for all human intellectual cognition, either in the *De Anima* or anywhere else.

An Aristotelian-Sounding Argument

Aquinas, however, has more than the simile of light to justify his interpretation. In his explanation of abstraction quoted above, he provides an argument whose necessary conclusion is that there must be something that separates the forms of sensible things from matter so that human thinking can take place; such is the

role which Aquinas assigns to the active mind (*intellectus agens).* And, as has been shown, if there is an active mind in this sense, it must be a part of the human soul.

Aquinas's argument for an active mind which performs the work of abstraction is the following:

1. Intelligibility requires separation from matter ("for in this way they are intelligible in act").

2. The forms of sensible things are not themselves separate from matter, but rather are " in matter and not actually intelligible."

Therefore,

3. The cognition of sensible things requires that there be something that makes the forms of sensible things actually intelligible, i.e., fit to specify an act of intellectual cognition ("it was necessary that he posit a certain intellect to abstract them from matter and so make them actually intelligible ").

The conclusion of this argument is certainly not found in Aristotle. Nevertheless, those who accept Aquinas's interpretation as correct take the conclusion to indicate what Aristotle meant but did not say. One reason for this is that the premises of the argument that Aquinas presents for active mind sound Aristotelian. Are both these premises not only Aristotelian-sounding but actually found in Aristotle? If they are, there is at least a probable argument in support of the conclusion that active mind is for Aristotle a faculty of the human soul that abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form.

That intelligibility requires separation from matter is clearly indicated by Aristotle's answer in *De Anima* 3.4 to the following aporia about the intelligibility of mind:

> Is the mind not itself an object of thought? For either everything else will have mind in it, if it is not in virtue of something else that mind is intelligible and if what is intelligible is one in form, or mind will have something mixed with it which makes it, as well as other things, intelligible. (42%26-29)

If being an object of thought means the same thing in the case of mind and other things (" if what is intelligible is one in

form "), mind, as intelligible, should possess whatever it is that makes other things objects of thought. Either mind will possess nothing outside itself and be intelligible in virtue of itself, in which case " everything else will have mind in it "; or mind will possess something other than itself-" something mixed with it" -and this will be what makes both it and other things intelligible. The first possibility is absurd, for if everything is intelligible through the actual possession of mind, even stones will possess mind by the fact that they are intelligible. And the second possibility-that there is something mixed with mind-is incompatible with the simplicity which Aristotle attributes to mind in *De Anima* 3.4: " It must, then, since it thinks all things, be unmixed, as Anaxagoras says, in order that it may rule, that is, in order that it may know" (429al8-20). Since mind is "unmixed" *(amige)* (429a18), there is nothing "mixed with it" (*memigmenon)* (492b28).

Here is Aristotle's answer to this aporia:

> And it is itself an object of thought, just as its objects are. For, in the case of those things which have no matter, that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for speculative knowledge and that which is known in that way are the same. The reason why thinking is not always taking place we must consider. In those things which have matter each of the objects of thought is present potentially. Hence, they will not have mind in them (for mind is a potentiality for being such things without the matter), while it will have what can be thought in it. (430a2-9)

To be known is to be separated from matter ("mind is a potentiality for being such things without the matter "). Whatever is an object of mind is separated from matter in the mind of the knower. Thus, it is not the stone that is in the mind of the knower, but its form *(de An.* 3.8. 431b29-432al). [2] Here, then,

[2] Immateriality is a requirement even of sensible cognition. Thus, in the tradition of the Greek commentators, Aristotle's statement that "sense is receptive of the forms of sensible things without the matter" *(de An.* 2.12. 424a17-19) came to be understood to mean that sense receives the forms of sensible things immaterially, i.e., in a way that, in so far as sensation is an awareness, is not constituted by a physical change (although it might involve a physical

Aristotle argues that intelligibility requires separation from matter. The first premise of Aquinas's argument for an active mind that performs the work of abstraction is, accordingly, in Aristotle's *De Aninia* in the lines immediately preceding 3.5.

Aquinas explicitly attributes his second premise to Aristotle: " Aristotle holds that the natures of sensible things are in matter and not actually intelligible." The reference Aquinas makes to Aristotle's differences with Plato in this same passage might suggest that the Aristotelian text Thomas has in mind is *Metaphysics* Alpha where the Stagirite criticizes the doctrine of the Forms, arguing that the form which gives a thing its intelligibility and existence as a definite kind of thing cannot be something outside the thing itself *(Metaph.* 1.9. 991a8-b9). *Metaphysics* Alpha, however, does not hold that forms which are in matter are thereby " not actually intelligible," nor does Aquinas in his commentary on *Metaphysics* Alpha find this point in Aristotle. One could defend it as genuinely Aristotelian by arguing that, if intelligibility requires separation from matter and the forms of sensible things are not separate from matter, there must be something that separates them. But let us examine this argument for this second premise, which presents it as the conclusion of the first premise and the position of *Metaphysics* Alpha that the forms of sensible things are not separate from matter:

1. Intelligibility requires separation from matter.

4. The forms of sensible things are not separate from matter.

Therefore,

2. The forms of sensible things are not themselves separate from matter, but rather are " in matter and not actually intelligible."

The flaw in this argument is that the sense of "separation from matter " in (1) does not agree with the sense of " separate

change) or a physical being. See Joseph Owens, " Aristotelian Soul As Cognitive of Sensibles, Intelligibles and Self," in *Aristotle: The Collected Papers of Joseph Owens,* ed. John R. Catan (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1981), pp. 81-98.

from matter " in the phrase " not separate from matter " in (4). The requirement of cognition in (1) is not that the forms of sensible things must be encountered outside those things. This absurd interpretation of (1) is required, however, if the notion of separation in (1) is the same as that in (4), since (4), if its sense is determined by what Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* Alpha, means that the form that gives sensible things their existence and intelligibility is not anything apart from the sensible things (i.e., the form in question cannot be a Platonic Form, which is separate). Reading this sense of separation into (1) makes this first premise hold that something separate, such as a Platonic Form, is necessary for intelligibility. Clearly, then, different notions of separation are implied in (1) and (4), and this equivocation in the sense of separation makes the argument invalid. Therefore, since the second premise is neither in Aristotle nor defensible by an argument that would read the text from *Metaphysics* Alpha in the light of the first premise, Thomas's Aristotelian-sounding argument is not a plausible basis for accepting his interpretation of *De Anima* 3.5 as correct.

0 *ther Difficulties*

Other reasons to question the correctness of Aquinas's interpretation of *De Anima* 3.5 are provided by the fact that important elements in Aquinas's interpretation are simply not found in Aristotle, while others strain the sense of *De Ani11ia* 3.5. As already mentioned, for example, there is in Aristotle no doctrine of abstraction such as Aquinas attributes to him in holding that the Stagirite's active mind abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form. The philosopher uses *aphairesis* (" abstraction ") only to refer to the operation of the mind in which, in considering mathematical objects, it disregards everything but the quantity of these objects. Accordingly, abstraction is limited to the mathematicals and there seems to be no textual basis for holding that it is necessary for thinking generally.[3]

[3] On the sense of "abstraction" (*aphairesis)* in Aristotle, see Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics,* 3d ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), pp. 381-85.

Secondly, there is in the *De Anima* no distinction between sensible and intelligible forms. Aquinas's position that the active mind abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form implies that there is a form which is fit to specify an act of sensation (the sensible and intelligible forms. Aquinas's position that the active lection (the intelligible form). If Aquinas's interpretation of *De Anima* 3.5 is correct, one might expect Aristotle to talk about these two forms in the *De Anima.* In *De Anima* 2.12 Aristotle says that sense is "what has the power of r:eceiving into itself the sensible forms of things *[ton aistheton eidon]* without the matter" (424a17-19; trans. Smith [the old Oxford]), and in *De* 3.8 he says that" the objects of thought are in the sensible forms " *(en tois eidesi tois aisthetois)* (432a4-5; trans. Smith). The sensible forms that Aristotle considers in these texts are sensible because they are the forms of things apprehended, at least originally, through sensation. As the second text suggests, these forms remain sensible in this sense even when we think the things of which they are the forms. Neither text indicates that for Aristotle a sensible form must be made intelligible before thinking can occur, and in the *De Anima* Aristotle does not call a form intelligible.

Thirdly, if Aquinas is correct, twice in *De Anima* 3.5 Aristotle uses " mind " of what does not think. First, Aristotle calls the " active principle " of human thinking a mind, although it does not think but only prepares the way for human thinking. If, however, Aristotle's "active principle" is not a mind, why does he call it a mind? Brentano, who agrees with Aquinas on this point, tries to defend this use of the term "mind." He argues that it is the " deficiency of language " that makes Aristotle refer to the principle of thinking as *nous,* even though it does no actual thinking. [4] Similarly, he maintains, Aristotle sometimes uses *nous* to refer to the faculty of desire. Since desire follows on thinking, this use of *nous,* in which the word refers to the consequence of thought, is not very different from the use of *nous* to refer to the principle of thought. [5]

[4] Franz Brentano, *The Ps3•chology of Aristotle,* p. 114.
[5] Ibid., p. 113.

While it is certainly true that Aristotle often finds it useful to exploit the equivocity of key philosophical terms, Brentano's case is not convincing, since all he does is point to a *possible* equivocal use of *nous.* The possibility, moreover, seems remote when we consider that Aristotle can apply *nous* to the faculty of desire not only because desire is an effect of mind, but, more importantly, because the faculty of desire is materially identical to mind *(de An.* 3.9. 432b3-7). In calling what desires *'nous,'* therefore, Aristotle is applying the term to mind itself. Brentano, accordingly, fails to find an instance in which *nous* is applied to something which does not think.

The second instance, according to Thomas, where Aristotle uses "mind" of what does not think occurs at 430a24-25 where Aristotle says that "passive mind is destructible." Not wanting to hold that the thinking part of the soul is destructible, Thomas holds that "passive mind" refers to the part of the soul which is the subject of "passions ... such as love, hate, and remembering, and of such things as take place together with some bodily affection" *(Sent.* 3.4. 233-35). But here, too, the interpretation requires that one accept that Aristotle is using " mind " to refer to something which does not think. Thomas says, "This part of the soul is called mind just as it is called rational in the first book of the *Ethics* in so far as to a certain extent it participates reason, obeying it and following its motion" *(Sent.* 3.4. 239-42). Nevertheless, while one can accept calling rational what is not mind but does have some relation to it, one cannot easily accept calling a mind what is not essentially a mind but only has some relation to it.

Fourthly, Aquinas's view that at 430a19 Aristotle stops discussing active mind and takes up the consideration of what he calls " the intellect in act " is open to question. In the second part of *De Anima* 3.5, Aristotle says, " It is not the case that *it* sometimes thinks and sometimes does not" (430a22). Most commentators hold that the subject of "thinks " and " does not" is active mind. The trouble for Aquinas is that, if these words are understood of active mind, they imply that it is engaged in an eternal act of thinking. But such an eternal act of thinking

is incompatible with Aquinas's position that active mind is a faculty of the human soul, a faculty which itself does not think and whose only connection with thinking is that it facilitates human thinking, which of course is intermittent. [6] Aquinas meets this objection by arguing that Aristotle is not talking about active mind here but rather about "the intellect in act, which consists in the very act of understanding " *(qui consistit in ipso intelligere) (Sent.* 3.4. 196-97). The act of understanding, of courne, is as such always actual. The difficulty with Aquinas's interpretation of these words is that there is no indication that Aristotle has stopped discussing active mind and has taken up a new topic. [7]

Aristotle's Essentially Actual Min:d

The most serious objection to Aquinas's position, however, is based on Aristotle's description of active mind:

> And mind in this sense is separate, unaffected, and unmixed, being essentially an actuality. For the active principle is always more honorable than the passive, and the principle than the matter *(De An.* 3. 5. 430a17-19).

[6] Strictly speaking, the human active mind does have for Aquinas a connection with an eternal act of thinking, since it is a participation in a separate agent intellect *(S.T.* I, q. *79,* a. 4 c.), but this participation does not endow the human active mind with any thinking, far less with any eternal act of thinking.

[7] Siwek provides interesting evidence of the appropriateness of taking the words in question of active mind. Although he agrees with Aquinas that active mind is a faculty of the human soul, he does not avoid the problem as Aquinas does by taking these words as applying to something other than active mind; rather he follows a manuscript reading which omits the *OVX* in the phrase aAA' *OVX* or€ *µ,€v V0<i or€* o' *0V voei.* This gives " it is the case that *it* sometimes thinks and sometimes does not," instead of " it is not the case that *it* sometimes thinks and sometimes does not." In Siwek's altered version the human knower can be taken as the referent for the pronoun subject of "thinks" and "does not," as Siwek's interpretation requires. In omitting the otlx, however, he seems to be influenced by his assumption that active mind is part of the human soul. At least, his argument that the omission of *OVX* produces a more coherent text seems not to have any force unless one accepts this assumption. Not accepting it, one would retain °'*ix,* following the reading of 48 of the 65 codices used by Siwek in his edition of the *De Anima* and that of the commentators Alexander of Aphrodisias *(Peri nou,* in *De Anima Liber Cum Mantissa,* ed. Ivo Bruns [Berlin: Reimer, 1887], pp. 109, 27-28) and Themistius (fo *Libras De Anima Paraphrasis,* ed. Ricardus Heinze [Berlin: Reimer 1899]' pp. 99, 34-36).

The most important element in the description of active mind is its " being essentially an actuality" (*Tfj ova-ii/: wv evf.pyaa)* (430al8). [8] The mind considered in *De Anima* 3.4 is not essentially an actuality. It is in actuality when it has received the form of the object of thought, but in itself this mind is " in actuality no existing thing before it thinks " (429a24). In itself this mind is a potentiality.

The above passage asserts that active mind is separate, unaffected, and unmixed, qualities which were attributed to passive mind in *De Anima* 3.4. The participial phrase "being essentially an actuality " gives the reason that active mind possesses these qualities, and indicates that it possesses them in a way that is superior to the way in which passive mind possesses them: " For the active principle is always more honorable than the passive, and the principle than the matter."

If we consider what " separate, unaffected, and unmixed " must mean in the case of active mind, we must be guided by indications in the *Metaphysics,* which considers both the question of actuality and the case of the unmoved mover of *Metaphysics* Lambda, which is also described as essentially an actuality *(Metaph.* 12.6. 1071b19-20). The guiding principle and justification of the application of *Metaphysics* Lambda to *De Anima* 3.5 is that, since the unmoved mover of the *Metaphysics* and the active mind of the *De Anima* are both essentially actualities, the meaning of " separate, unaffected, and unmixed " as applied to active mind must agree with what these terms mean when predicated of the unmoved mover. The unmoved mover, in fact, is described as separate (*Metaph.* 12.7. 1073a3-5) and unaffected (1073a11-12), and, although it is not described as unmixed, in *De Anima* 3.4 'simple' is used as a synonym for unmixed, and

[8] Siwek notes that *ivlP"feUJ,* is the reading in only 12 of the 65 manuscripts he consulted; nevertheless, he prefers it on the grounds that, according to Priscian, Theophrastus read *€vop"feia* (*Tractatus,* n. 670 [p. 332]). The reading found in the majority of the manuscripts, *&veP"felq,,* would give "being essentially in actuality " instead of " being essentially an actuality." Since what is essentially *in actuality* must be essentially *an actuality,* there does not seem to be any important doctrinal difference here.

the unmoved mover *is* described as simple (*Metaph.* 1072a30-34).[9] Reading *De Anima* 3.5, then, in the light of the *Metaphysics,* one must conclude that, as essentially an actuality, active mind is separate in the sense of not depending on matter for its existence in the way that the form of an enmattered thing depends on matter; unaffected in the sense of not needing anything outside itself for its operation in the way that the human mind depends on its object; and unmixed in the sense of being a pure form which exists without any admixture of potency.

A reader of Thomas's *Sententia* may suspect that this interpretation of Aristotle's text is precisely the one which he criticizes most vigorously in his commentary. Thomas holds that if active mind is a separate substance different from passive mind *(substantiam separatam et quod differt secundum substantiam ab intellectu possibili) (Sent.* 3.4. 90-92), the human knower is not properly equipped for knowing, since he would lack something necessary for knowing. But, as noted in the consideration of this argument above, it assumes that the role of active mind is to make the potentially intelligible forms of sensible things actually intelligible. If this is the role of active mind, a knower who did not possess an active mind would not be able to abstract intelligibles. Although he considers the point at length elsewhere, in the *Sententia* Thomas either takes it for granted that it is the knower that abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form or alludes to a proof of this proposition based on the perfection of human nature.[10] But in any case, since for Thomas we abstract

[9] The first aporia about mind in *De Anima* 3.4 implies that the mind has already been shown to be "simple and unaffected," and to have "nothing in common with anything else" (42%23-24), but what we find in his investigation of the attributes of mind is that Aristotle proved it to be "unmixed" (3.4. 429a18), "unaffected" (429a15) and to "have no nature other than this, that it is potential" (429a21-22). These two lists of attributes correspond if one identifies simple and unmixed, on the one hand, and having nothing in common with anything else and being a pure potentiality, on the other.

[10] In the *Sententia* Thomas says simply that "the perfection of human nature requires that both of these [active and passive mind] be something in man" (98-100). A possible argument for this point in the *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima* is that besides the universal active causes of human thinking that are "the divine power and the powers of other secondary substances,

the intelligible from the sensible form, the active mind which does the abstraction must be part of us *(Sent.* 3.4. 105-6). Obviously however, if the active mind of *De Anima* 3.5 is not something which abstracts an intelligible from a sensible form, but rather a divine mind which is an ultimate source of the actuality of human thinking just as the unmoved mover of *Metaphysics* Lambda is the ultimate source of actuality in the universe generally, Aquinas's argument certainly does not establish that the perfection of human nature requires that active mind in this sense be part of the soul of the human knower.

The interpretation of active mind presented here is not arbitrary. Rather, it is the reading required by the fact that Aristotle says that active mind is essentially an actuality, and, as pointed out above, attributes to it an act of uninterrupted thinking, which would be impossible for anything that depended on matter for its existence or activity. And, if this reading of active mind is correct, Aquinas's reading cannot be right. For Aquinas active mind is a power of the human soul *(Sent.* 3.4. 122-27), which is the form of the body *(Sent.* 2.1. 216-223). Thus, as part of the soul, active mind for Aquinas has a necessary connection with matter that is incompatible with its being essentially an actuality.

if they have any influence on us," there must be particular active causes, i.e., something in particular !mowers that brings about the intelligible form. In the case of certain imperfect animals, such as those that come about through putrifaction, one does find instances of production that owe nothing to particular active causes ; it is the celestial bodies that are the sole active causes of what comes about in such a way. " But for the generation of perfect animals there is also needed, besides the celestial power, the particular power which is in the semen. Therefore, since what is most perfect among inferior corporeal things is the intellectual operation, besides the universal active causes which are the power of God's illumination or the illumination of any other separate substance, there must be a proper active principle in us through which we make the intelligibles in act, and this is active mind" (q. 5, resp.; see also, *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* art. 10, resp.). Perhaps, however, Thomas does not intend this as a proof, since in the same place he says, " But we experience *(ezperimur)* both of these operations [that of the passive mind and that of the active mind] in ourselves, for we receive intelligibles and abstract them." If Thomas thinks that the operation of the active mind is *experienced* as an activity of the knower, there is clearly no need to *prove* that it is an activity of the knower.

Furthermore, it can hardly be unaffected in Aristotle's sense if it has to receive a sensible form before it can perform its proper operation of turning sensible forms into intelligible forms.

What does Aquinas make of Aristotle's calling active mind essentially an actuality, the element in the text of *De Antima* 3.5 which provides grounds for the most serious objection to his interpretation? In his commentary Aquinas says that active mind is " in act according to its substance " *(in actu secundum suam substantiam) (Sent.* 3.4. 71) and explains this sense of being in act by saying that active mind "is compared to an act in respect to the intelligibles in so far as it is a certain immaterial active power able to make other things like unto itself, viz., immaterial. ... An active power of this sort is a certain participation of the intellectual light from the separate substances" *(Sent.* 3.4. 155-58, 162-64). These remarks do not indicate that Aquinas appreciates the full import of " being essentially an actuality." In the *Summa Theologiae,* on the other hand, Thomas seems to be fully aware of the meaning of " being essentially an actuality," and explicitly denies that active mind can be essentially an actuality in Aristotle's sense.[11]

In considering whether the angel's act of understanding can be the substance of the angel, Thomas raises the following objection:

> It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect [*intellectus agens]* of a soul. But the substance of the agent intellect [*inte.Uectus agentis]* is its own action, as is evident from Aristotle and from his Commentator. Therefore much more is the angel's substance his action, that is, his act of understanding. (S.T. I, q. 54, a.l, obj. 1; trans. Pegis) [12]

[11] The justification for clarifying what Thomas says in the *Sententia* in the light of what he says in the *Summa Theologiae* is that the *Sententia* was composed simultaneously with at least part of the *Summa Theologiae,* according to Rene-A. Gauthier in his introduction to the Leonine text of the *Sententia* used in this study (p. 288).

[12] Pegis's translation of the *prima pars* of the *Summa,* a revision of the English Dominican Translation, appears in his *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas,* vol. 2, edited and annotated, with an introduction (New York: Random House, 1945).

Aquinas's answer to this objection is very instructive:

> When the agent intellect is said to be its own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since its very nature consists in act *[cum sit in actu eius siibstantia],* instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it; which cannot be said of the possible intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act (S.T. I, q. 54, a.1, ad 1; trans. Pegis).

Here, in the words *cum sit in actu eius substantia,* Thomas clearly alludes to the Aristotelian formula "being essentially an actuality." [13] The objection indicates that Thomas is aware of the sense in which these words can be taken: they can he taken to mean that active mind *is* what it does. In the body of the article, Thomas makes clear that this identity of substance and act, the thing and what it does, is found only in God: " It is impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality, because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His being and His action " (trans. Pegis). Accordingly, Thomas denies that " being essentially an actuality " means that active mind has no admixture of potency, and proposes another sense for these words. He suggests that they mean that active mind does not need to be brought into actuality before it can do what it does. Thus, whereas the possible intellect needs to be brought into actuality by the reception of an intelligible form before it can think, active mind is by its very nature immaterial and always ready to make a sensible form immaterial.

On the basis of our investigation of the sense of what "being essentially an actuality" means in the context of Aristotle's philosophy, Aquinas's interpretation of these words appears incorrect. To accept it as what Aristotle really meant but for some reason did not say is unreasonable when we see *De Anima* 3.5 in the context of Aristotle's understanding of the kind of sepa-

[13] The laconic rendering of Aristotle's phrase found in the Leonine text of the S*ententia* is *siibstantia actit ens,* which is verbally quite close to *sit in actit eius substantia.*

rateness that characterizes pure actuality. The sense that must be given to these words is precisely that sense which Aquinas denies to them.

ConclusionJ

For a long time the generally accepted view of active mind coincided rather well with what Aquinas says about active mind in the *Sententia Libri De Anima*. The majority of commentators held that active mind was a part of the human soul and the view that Aristotle's active mind is a divine mind was "almost universally rejected." [14] Recent studies, however, have begun to rehabilitate the view that active mind is in fact a divine mind.[15] If, as I have argued in this study, this new view, which, of course, is in large part a reappreciation of an ancient interpretation, is the correct interpretation of *De Anima* 3.5, then Thomas's commentary on this chapter cannot be accepted as a faithful exegesis of Aristotle's text.

In Thomas's defense, however, one must consider that his interest in writing the *Sententia* was perhaps not to reveal the sense that the text of the *De Anima* had for Aristotle. If Thomas's intention in the *Sententia* is the same as his intention

[14] W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 2, *Aristotle: An Encounter* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 322.

[15] Ibid., pp. 322-26; Victor Kai, *On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle*, Philosophia Antiqua, no. *46* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), pp. 84-113; and Jonathan Lear, *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 135-41. My *Active Mind in Aristotle's Psychology* (New York: Peter Lang, forthcoming) argues that active mind must be a separate divine mind which exercises final rather than efficient causality, since for Aristotle efficient causality cannot be exercised by an agent which is essentially an actuality. See also L. A. Kosman, "What Does the Maker Mind Make?" in *Essays on Aristotle's" De Anima,"* ed. Amelie Rorty and Martha Nussbaum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992): "In a sense, Chapter 5 may be thought of as turning to that function of mind, mind as the principle of cosmic ordering and apprehending, that is, of intelligibility and intelligizing *en hapasei tei physei*, to redirect the words Aristotle uses at the beginning of the chapter. In this sense, *nous poietikos* is, as the intrepid half of the tradition has always understood, divine, a fact to which we should be alerted by its description, with clear echoes of *Metaphysics* [Lambda], as a being 'whose *ousia* is *energeia*'" (p. 355).

in the commentary on the *Metaphysics,* his purpose is certainly not to do a commentary on the *De Anima* of the sort one would expect from an historian of philosophy today. Let us consider briefly some indications of Thomas's intention in commenting on the *Metaphysics.*

Aristotle holds that " God is thought by all to be one of the causes and a principle" *(NIetaph.* 1.2. 983a8-9; trans. Apostle). Thomas, on the other hand, while he acknowledges that metaphysics treats of God, denies that anything other than common being *(ens commune)* is the subject matter of metaphysics.[16] Thus, in commenting on Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* Thomas accommodates the words of Aristotle to the truth of Christian revelation: for him it is unacceptable that God should be the subject matter of metaphysics, since " sacred theology has already appropriated God as its specifying subject."[17] Similarly, Thomas's use of " separate," when he says that the subject of metaphysics is what is " in the highest degree separate from matter " (*ma:i:ime a materia separata) (In M etaj;h.,* Proem), is not Aristotelian, since for Aristotle no common notion such as common being could be described as separate from matter *secundum esse et rationiem (In M etaph.,* Proem). For Aristotle, what is separate in being is a substance, but " nothing common or universal can be a substance in the setting of the *Metaphysics* (Z 13, 1038b8-35) ."[18] Again, Thomas uses the infinitive " to be " in the expression *separata a materia secundum esse et rationem* to mean existence, whereas Aristotle uses the corresponding Greek word *einai* to refer to the formal aspect of a thing (e.g., *de An.* 3.2. 426a15-

[16] " Quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret [(1) God and intellectual substances, (2) being and what follows on it, and (3) the first causes of things], non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune" *(In M etaph.,* Proem; ed. Marietti).

[17] Joseph Owens, "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," in *St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: Collected Papers of Joseph Owens,* ed. John R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), p. 5. "If God as he exists in himself is allowed to function as the subject of metaphysics, no room will be left for a further science about God arising from divine revelation" (ibid., p. 7).

[18] Ibid., p. 6.

17).[19] Such differences of philosophical position and reworking of philosophical vocabulary indicate that Thomas's commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle is something other than a work of historical scholarship.

On this and other such evidence, Joseph Owens concludes that "the kind of philosophical truth being propounded in the commentary on the *Metaphysics* should be the truth developed and expressed in the metaphysical thinking of Aquinas himself, to the extent that the text of the *Metaphysics* gives occasion to do so."[20] Furthermore, Thomas does not hesitate to make the words of Aristotle express what Thomas sees as the truth even when he knows that this is not what the Stagirite had in mind. But, in doing this, Aquinas can consider that he is faithful to Aristotle and that he is not doing violence to his thought. Just as Aristotle could justify his interpretation of Anaxagoras as uncovering that truth "towards which his intellect tended, although he was unable to express it" *(bv I Metaph.*, lect. 12, no. 196), Thomas could defend his interpretation of Aristotle as faithful because it presents the truth which the Stagirite had intended to discover.[21]

Thomas's appropriation of Aristotle in the commentary on the *Metaphysics* would suggest, then, that in commenting on the *De Anima* Thomas is expounding his own philosophy rather than presenting the sort of exegesis that one would expect from a modem commentator.[22] And indeed, this is what we find in the case of the treatment of active mind in the *Sententia:* although its position that there must be a power of the soul to abstract an intelligible from a sensible form may be accepted on the philosophical merits of Thomas's arguments, there are important reasons

19 Ibid., p. *'l.*

20 Ibid., p. 9.

21 Ibid., p. 10.

22 Owens's study bears on Thomas's Aristotelian commentaries general!y-including the commentary on the *De Anima,* which he considers briefly-in aU of which "Aquinas continues his dedication to theological wisdom" (p. 17). This dedication prompts him both to seek "philosophical guidance from Aristotle for his own theological work" (p. 19) and to correct Aristotle in those cases in which his philosophy is in conflict with revealed tiruth.

for refusing to accept this commentary on *De Anima* 3.5 as articulating what Aristotle meant but did not say.

On the other hand, even if one accepts that Thomas is not writing the sort of exegesis that one would expect from a modern commentator, one may nevertheless ask why Thomas could not in commenting on *De Anima* 3.5 have agreed with Aristotle that active mind is something separate from the human knower.

The most generally known aspect of Thomas's teaching on active mind is his position that it is a part of the soul which abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form. But this is not all that Thomas says about active mind. In the *Sententia,* as we have seen, Thomas calls active mind "a certain participation of the intellectual light of separate substances" (163-64), and in *De Spiritualibus Creaturis* he argues for the existence of an intellect "above the human soul ... on which the human soul's act of understanding depends (*suum intelligere)"* (art. 10, resp.; ed. Keeler). This mind is a pure intellect (*intellectus secundum totam suam naturam),* and is without discursive movement or potency. This mind, accordingly, is always in act (*intellectum semper in actu e.:ristentem).* And, after recognizing its existence, Thomas identifies it as God *(De Spirit. Creat.,* art. 10). Why, then, did Thomas not interpret *De Anima* 3.5 as referring to a totally actual mind on which minds that are not totally actual must depend? It is curious that, being in philosophical agreement with Aristotle on this point, he nevertheless interprets in another sense the text in which Aristotle argues for the existence of such a divine mind as a cause of human thinking.

The explanation, I think, is that Thomas approached *De Anima* 3.5 in a context established by other commentators who had sought in Aristotle's text an answer to a question that the Stagirite was not asking. The question for Aquinas, as is clear from the above consideration of the *Sententia,* is 'How does a sensible form become an intelligible form?' In the light of this question it is reasonable to hold that there must be something which abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form and to attribute this role to an active mind which is part of the human knower. Aristotle, on the other hand, is not trying to explain how a sensible form becomes an intelligible form but rather to

account for the activity of human thinking by identifying an essentially actual mind on which it depends. Thomas's different perspective is quite understandable when one considers that so authoritative a commentator as Themistius speaks of active mind as making enmattered forms intelligible "by abstracting them from matter." [23] It is thus no accident that Aquinas read Aristotle's text with the wrong question in mind; his question was given to him by other commentators.

In another sense, however, Aquinas's question was not wrong; it was the right question, because it raised the philosophical problems he needed to address. Earlier commentators had interpreted *De* 3.5 in the light of this question and their position that active mind was separate had what Thomas considered unfortunate implications for the integrity of the human knower. Accordingly, in his desire to defend the integrity of the human knower by insisting that what does the abstracting must be part of this knower, Thomas quite appropriately chose to do this in commenting on *De Anima* 3S

[2s] *Jn Libros De Anima Paraphrasis,* p. 98, 1-2,

THE VIRTUES OF MAN THE *ANIMAL SOCIALE: AFFABILITAS* AND *VERITAS* IN AQUINAS [1]

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ARISTOTLE'S definition of man as the *'qlov '1ToAmKov*[2]- the city-dwelling animal-undergoes an interesting transformation in the scholastic Latin of St. Thomas Aquinas : while the epithet of the definition occasionally appears in Aquinas's writings as transliterated, in *animal politicum,* or as thoroughly domesticated, in William of Moerbeke's translation *animal civile,* his preferred version of the Aristotelian formula is *animal sociale,* though he sometimes says *politicum et sociale, politicum vel sociale* and *sociale et politicum.*[3] For these uses of the term *sociale,* Aquinas is indebted not only to earlier writers of Latin but also to the genius of the language itself, whose words *sociale* and *societas* seem to have no equivalent in Aristotle's Greek. Less formal and explicit than the *polis* or *civitas,* what is meant by *societas* is rather the pervasive and mostly unacknowledged element within which cities are founded and continue, and which consists in the specifically human way of being together or, as Heidegger says, *Mitsein.* It is easy to discern in Aquinas's opposition between *politicum* and *sociale* the ancestor of our own commonplace and sharp contrast between " politics " and " so-

[1] This paper was read in Buenos Aires on September 14, 1991, as a contribution to the sixteenth annual Semana Tomista of the Sociedad Tomista Argentina.

[2] *Politics* I, 1, 1153a2-3.

[3] For a survey of texts, see Edgar Scully, "The Place of the State in Society According to St. Thomas Aquinas," *The Thomist* 45 (1981): 407-429. The present discussion may be regarded as a gloss on the theme of this article that the social is prior to the political.

ciety," though we should be careful not to identify our way of speaking with his: whereas we view " society " as a historical product, and so distinguish among different societies, *societas* for him, as for the ancient Romans, primarily connotes the universally human activity of coming together in association or alliance: it names that essential feature of human combination which is prior to institutions and to recognitions of special friendship, but which, just because it is a good of our nature, prevents human togetherness from being reduced to a bare co-presence.

An illustration of the way in which Aristotle's reflections on human nature are both complicated and enriched, in Aquinas's appropriation of them, by the Roman notion of *societas* may be seen by comparing the differing treatments which the latter gives of the " social " virtues of truthfulness and friendliness in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and in the *Summa Theologiae*. In both texts, to be sure, these virtues pale in significance beside such impressive qualities as courage and moderation; nevertheless, a notable increase in their importance seems to occur between the commentary, where, in keeping with the order of Aristotle's text, they appear as members of a series of virtues related to merely secondary matters, and the *Summa*, where they are elevated to a status among the " potential parts " of the virtue of justice and are distinguished by their relevance to the needs of man the *animal sociale.* Let us consider this difference in presentation, bearing in mind that the two texts were composed approximately simultaneously and fairly late in Aquinas's career, that is, during his second Parisian sojourn in 1269-72."

I

The commentary on the *Ethics* introduces the fourth book of the work as a sequel to the third : after discussing courage and moderation, which concern those things by which the very life of man is preserved, Aquinas says, here, in Book IV, the Philos-

4 For the chronology, see James A. Weisheipl, O.P., *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and -YVorks, with Corrigenda and Addenda* (Washington, pp. 361, 380.

opher treats of other "intermedaries," namely seven virtues and the feeling of shame, which are related to "certain secondary goods or evils." [5] Among the seven virtues, the first four have to do with external things, whether the external goods of wealth and honor or the external evils which provoke anger. [6] The other three virtues, however, concern human actions themselves, which in serious matters requires the virtues of *affabilitas* and *veritas* and in playful ones are perfected by the virtue of *eutrapeleia* or "wit." [1] Aquinas assigns *affabilitas* and *veritas* to the "serious" part of human action in order to distinguish these virtues from *eutrapeleia;* Aristotle himself, while agreeing that the area of influence of *affabilitas* roughly coincides with that of *veritas,* describes this area more particularly as "conversations, living together and the sharing of words and things." [8]

Aquinas divides the chapters on *affabilitas* and *veritas* with his usual minute care, making clear Aristotle's intention to demonstrate that these virtues, in conformity with the definition of virtue set forth in Book II, are each intermediary states between two extremes: friendliness is a mid-point between fawning and quarrelsomeness, as truthfulness is between boastfulness and

[5] Postquam Philosophus determinavit de fortitudine et temperantia, quae respiciunt ea quibus conservantur ipsa hominis vita, hie incipit agere de aliis medietatibus, quae respiciunt quaedam secundaria bona vel mala. Et primo determinat de medietatibus laudabilibus quae sunt virtutes; secundo de his quae non sunt virtutes, sed passiones, ibi: *De verecundia autem* etc. *Sententia libri Ethicorum* (Rome, 1969), 4.1.1-9. Both the Moerbeke translation of the *Ethics* and Aquinas's commentary on it will be quoted from the Leonine edition of the commentary, in which the standard division into ten books is observed, but the chapter divisions of both the Aristotelian and the Thomistic texts follow the divisions of Aquinas; references to the Moerbeke translation will include the usual indications of the Bekker edition, and references to the commentary will follow the lineation of the Leonine text.

[a] Ibid., 9-22; 4.13.1-5.

[1] Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtutibus quae respiciunt res exteriores, hie determinat de virtutibus quae respiciunt actus humanos. Et primo in seriis; secundo in ludicris . . . (ibid., 14.1-5).

[8] In colloquiis autem et convivere et sermonibus et rebus communicare . . . (ibid., 14.1126bll-12) ; Circa eadem autem fere est et iactantiae medietas . . . (ibid., 15.1127a13).

irony.[9] For the most part the commentary stays quite close to the letter of the Moerbeke translation, briefly clarifying the significance of each point in sequence, though occasionally Aquinas pauses to explain the meaning of a Graecism or to add a supplementary consideration to what the text says.

One such consideration is introduced when the commentary reaches Aristotle's remark that the friendly person's effort to give pleasure and avoid giving pain is directed to what is good and useful because this virtue concerns the pleasures and pains which occur in conversations. Aquinas takes this occasion to add that human living together (*convictus) principally* and *properly* consists in conversations : for being together in conversation is a property-a *proprium-of* human beings among the animals which share (*sibi communicant)* in food and other such things.[10]

[9] Fawning may be done for its own sake, by the *placidus,* or for the sake of gain, by the *blanditor sive adulator;* the quarrelsome person is called *litigiosus et discolus* (ibid., 14.142-154). The boaster or *iactator* is opposed to the ironic man or *eyron* (ibid., 15.52-60).

[10] Referens autem ad bonum et conferens, coniciet non contristare vel condelectare; videtur quidem enim circa delectationes et tristitias esse in colloquiis factas (ibid., 14.1126b29-31). Et <licit quod tendit ad hoc quod sine tristitias vel etiam cum delectatione aliis convivat, et hoc refert ad bonum honestum et ad conferens, id est utile, quia est circa delectationes et tristitias quae fiunt in colloquiis, in quibus principaliter et proprie consistit convictus humanus ; hoc enim est proprium hominum respectu aliorum animalium quae sibi in cibis vel in aliis huiusmodi communicant (ibid., 14.99-107). Cf. ibid., 17-21: ... colloquia humana per quae maxime homines ad invicem convivunt secundum proprietatem suae naturae et universaliter circa totum convictum hominum qui fit per hoc quod homines sibi invicem communicant in sermonibus et in rebus.... Elsewhere *[Sententia libri Politicorum* (Rome, 1971), 1.1/ b.112-126] Aquinas argues that the use of speech *(locutio)* among men constitutes a *proprium* which, like the need which men have of one another for survival, is a sign of man's social and political nature. The use of the term *propriitm* in these texts is, of course, technical. It names the fourth of the "predicables" or "universals" distinguished by Porphyry *(genus, differentia, species, propriitm, accidens),* a feature which is intermediary between substance and accident : a *proprium* does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles of a species (cf. *Summa Theologiae* (ST) I, Q.77, a.l, ad 1). If speech is a *Propriitm* of human nature, it is also, in Aquinas's view, both a consequence and a purpose of the human body, whose distinctive upright posture permits man not only to gather knowledge by looking around and upwards, to use a more perfect brain, and to develop the nimble

A rather obvious fact, perhaps; nevertheless, this comment, by its use of the logical term *proprium*, momentarily develops a passing observation on the aim of the virtue of friendliness into a reflection on human nature, thereby disclosing an important dimension of the virtue itself which Aristotle at most leaves implicit. In the question on friendliness in the *Summa Theologiae*, where Aquinas is freed from the constraint of expounding a text, this root connection between *affabilitas* and human nature becomes much more pronounced.

Towards the end of the chapter on friendliness, the commentary makes another kind of contribution to the discussion by providing a name for the intermediary between the fawning and the quarrelsome dispositions, an intermediary for which Aristotle's Greek has no term, but which "among us," Aquinas says, can be called *affabilitas.*[11] Earlier, in the second book of the commentary, where Aristotle had called the virtue <*fn"Aia,* Aquinas proposed the corresponding Latin term *amicitia*, which he there took to be synonymous with *affabilitas.*[12] Clearly, however, the definite "friendship " specified by *cfn"Aia* and *amicitia* fits the virtue in question less exactly than does the more diffuse " friendliness " or " approachability " which *affabilitas* suggests. Like the word *societas*, then, the choice Latin term *affabilitas,* which appears to have reached Aquinas both from a verse of the Vulgate Bible and through a tradition of discussions of duties *(de officiis)* composed by Cicero, Ambrose and Cassian,[18] is an instance of the

human hand, but also to free the mouth to become an instrument of speech (*locutio)* which is a "work of reason;" cf. *ST* I, Q.91, a.3, ad 3. Both the *Ethics* and Aquinas's commentary suggest that the *proprium* of speech is especially evident at meal-times. Human eating-together seems to be emblematic of domestic life (cf. *Politics* I, 2, 1252bl3-14). Accordingly, the "other such things " which involve speech and thus call for *affabilitas* might include sexual union, the care of children and perhaps manual labor. The theme of the table as the site of *affabilitas* recalls the titles of Plato's *Symposium* and Dante's *Convivio.* Cf. the root meaning of *convictus.*

11 Ibid., 2.91108a28 and 135-136.

12 Ibid., 2.9.1108a28 and 135-136.

13 Ibid., 2.9.135-136, *adnotationes.* The scriptural verse is *Ecclesiasticus* 4.7, which the Leonine editor R.-A. Gauthier mentions with a reference to *ST* II-II, Q.114, a.1, *sed contra.* It is remarkable that the *Summa* refers to

superior range and precision of Aquinas's resources for describing moral phenomena in comparison with those of Aristotle,

Proceeding to the subsequent and rather longer chapter on truthfulness, we find the commentary still closely hugging the letter and the *intentio* of Aristotle's texL Here again, however, Aquinas at one point momentarily enlarges the scope of the discussion with a few supplementary remarks, About a third of the way through the chapter, Aristotle, summing up a preliminary distinction between the virtue of truthfulness and the opposing vices of boastfulness and irony, states that falsity is of itself " base" and " to be avoided," while truth is " good" and " praiseworthy," [14] Aquinas begins his explanation of this remark with the observation that " signs have been instituted in order that they might represent things according as they are!' [15] This brief sketch of a theory of signs, with its opposition between *res* and *signa* and its technical notion of " representation," is drawn from Augustine's *De doctrina christiana,* which thus furnishes a most unaristotelian and indeed ungreek vocabulary for the purpose of expanding Aristotle's consideration of certain human qualities to include a more fundamental reflection on the process of signification which grounds the activities of both the truth-teller and the liar, Aquinas adds that one who represents things as other than they are by lying acts in a disordered way *(inordinate)* and viciously, while one who speaks the truth acts in an orderly way *(ordinate)* and virtuously,[16] the " ordering" in question being that of signs to things, However briefly, he thus expands the limits of Aristotle's discussion in two ways:

Ecclesiasticus no fewer than five times in this article of the *Summa,* and three times again in the following article, thus suggesting that it is the book of the Bible which is eminently concerned with the sphere of *affabilitas,*

[14] Per se autem mendacium pravum et fugiendum, verum autem et bonum et laudabile *(Sententia libri Ethicorum,* 4J5Jl27a28-30),

[15] Ad hoc enim signa sunt instituta quod repraesentent res secundum quod sunt , , , (ibid,, 85-86), The Leonine editor refers to Augustine, *De doctrina christiana,* I, II, 2,

[18] • , , et ideo, si aliquis repraesentat rem aliter quam sit mentiendo, inordinate agit et vitiose, qui autem verum <licit, ordinate agit et virtuose (ibid,, 86-89),

as already suggested, he gives Aristotle's character sketches a more theoretical cast by reducing the remarks on truth-telling and lying to a basic consideration of the origin and purpose of signs; by the same token, he extends Aristotle's relatively narrow concern with questions of truthfulness and falsehood about oneself to a more general consideration of truth and lies as such. These enlargements of Aristotelian themes, which are merely hinted at in the commentary, are more fully developed by the account of truthfulness in the *Summa.*

In commenting on Aristotle's presentation of friendliness and truthfulness, then, Aquinas supplies the text with a more emphatically theoretical perspective both by bringing a more explicit organization to the ordering of these virtues and by occasionally deepening the discussion through the introduction of fundamental principles. A comparison of these chapters of the commentary with the questions on truthfulness and friendliness in the *Summa,* however, shows what Thomas the commentator is *not* able to do. One important difference between the texts is that the words *sociale* and *societas,* which do not occur at all in the two chapters of the commentary, become, in the corresponding section of the *Summa,* basic terms for clarifying the nature of these " social" virtues as potential parts of justice.

II

Turning to QQ. 109-116 of the *secunda secundae,* we note first of all that the virtue of truthfulness acquires a preeminence over friendliness which it did not have in the commentary both by being placed before the latter in the order of topics and by being treated at much greater length.[17] We also remark that the Aristotelian definition of virtue as an intermediary not only is acknowledged in these questions, but is their basic ordering prin-

[17] Between the question on *veritas* (Q.109) and the questions on the opposing vices mentioned by Aristotle (Q.112 on *iactantia* and Q.113 on *ironia),* Aquinas inserts two questions which go beyond Aristotle's concerns: Q.111, Aquinas's classical treatment of lying (in which Augustine's *De mendacio* is the chief authority), and Q.112, on the biblical theme of hypocrisy.

ciple, since Aquinas in each case begins with a question on the virtue and then goes on to consider the corresponding vices.[18] Finally, we observe that the discussions of friendliness and truthfulness in the *Ethics* are frequently quoted or referred to in this part of the *Summa*.[19] Mixed with these Aristotelian components, however, are two quite unaristotelian ones which are more important. The first, of course, is a theological interest, which appears not only in the many scriptural and patristic quotations, but also in the regular series of articles which treat the particular vices as sins, thereby reminding us that we are reading a summary of theology composed in a tradition of manuals for confessors.[20] The other unaristotelian element is the presentation of truthfulness and friendliness as "potential parts" of justice and as taking their place accordingly within the great organizing scheme of this part of the *Summa*, a scheme which Aquinas owes to Roman developments of the Platonic-Stoic doctrine of four cardinal virtues.

Before the way in which truthfulness and friendliness are parts of justice is explained, there is, according to Aquinas, another point to be clarified in the case of each, namely the fact that recognition of them as "special" virtues depends on the Augustinian principle that the good consists in order. We have seen how the commentary briefly refers to the "orderly" and "disorderly" actions of truth-telling and lying; in the *Summa* this concern with order becomes systematic in the consideration of what is distinctive of both virtues. The argument with respect to both is that since the good does consist in order, wherever

18 See the preceding note on *veritas*. The treatment of *affabilitas* remains closer to the Aristotelian pattern, with a question on the virtue (Q.114), and then one question each on the opposing vices of *aditlatio* (Q.115) and *litigium* (Q.116).

19 In the case of each of the two virtues, approximately one quarter of the corresponding chapter in the *Ethics* is quoted or closely paraphrased in the corresponding section of the *Summa*.

20 *ST* II-II, Q.110, aa.3-4; Q.111, a.4; Q.112, a.2; Q.113, aa.1-2; Q.115, aa.1-2; Q.116, a.2. Cf. Leonard E. Boyle, "The Setting of the *Summa Theologiae* of Saint Thomas," *The Etienne Gilson Series* 5 (Toronto, 1982).

there is in human action a special aspect *(ratio)* of order, there must correspondingly be a special good, and so a special virtue. One such order is established according as man's external words or deeds are duly ordered to something as signs to what is signified; and to this end he is perfected by the virtue of truthfulness.[21] Another order in human actions is required in that each man ought himself to be appropriately ordered, through his words and deeds, to other men in his being together and with them, so as to comport himself towards them in a becoming way: and thus there must be a special virtue which preserves what befits this order, namely, friendliness or affability.[22] The theme of order, more particularly that of the ordering of words and deeds, which Aquinas uses to distinguish the matter of truthfulness and friendliness here is evidently more precise than the rather vague class of " serious matters " by which he somewhat mechanically sets these virtues apart in the commentary on the *Ethics.*

We come now to the most striking novelty of the *Summa's* treatment of these virtues, namely the identification of them as "potential" or "adjunct" parts of justice.[23] Let us first note that Aquinas's authorities for this identification are both Roman:

21 Dicendum quod ad rationem virtutis humanae pertinet quod opus hominis bonum reddat. Unde ubi in actu hominis invenitur specialis ratio bonitatis, necesse est quod ad hoc disponatur homo per specialem virtutem. Cum autem bonum, secundum Augustinum in libro *De natura boni,* consistat in ordine, necesse est specialem rationem boni considerari ex determinato ordine. Est autem quidam specialis ordo secundum quod exteriora nostra vel verba vel facta debite ordinantur ad aliquid sicut ad signatum. Et ad hoc perficitur homo per virtutem veritatis. Unde manifestum est quod veritas est specialis virtus *(ST* II-II, Q.109, a.2, c).

22 Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, cum virtus ordinetur ad bonum, ubi occurrit specialis ratio boni, ibi oportet esse specialem rationem virtutis. Bonum autem in ordine consistit, sicut supra dictum est. Oportet autem hominem convenienter ad alios homines ordinari in communi conversatione, tam in factis quam in dictis, ut scilicet ad unumquemque se habeat secundum quod decet. Et ideo oportet esse quandam specialem virtutem quae hanc convenientiam ordinis observet. Et haec vocatur amicitia sive affabilitas (ibid., Q. 114, a.I, c.).

2s Cf. *ST* II-II, Q.48, a.I, c.: Partes autem potentiales alicuius virtutis dicuntur virtutes adiunctae quae ordinantur ad aliquos secundarios actus vel materias, quasi non habentes totam potentiam principalis virtutis.

Cicero in the case of truthfulness and Macrobius in that of friendliness.[24] His own understanding of the subordination of these virtues to justice is best approached way of objections which arise at the beginnings of the two respective articles on this point, arguing that neither truth-telling, on the one hand, nor friendliness, on the other, seems to involve the payment of a debt, so that each virtue appears to faJl outside the definition of justice.[25] In both instances, reply at once transforms the discussion of a rather small virtue into a reflection on human nature by stating the definition of man as the *animal sociale.* The article on truthfulness argues as follows: because man is the social animal, one man naturally owes to another that without which human society could not be preserved; but men could not live together if they were not able to believe one another, which depends upon each making manifest the truth to the other; therefore, the virtue of truthfulness does include the aspect of paying a debt.[26] The argument concerning friendliness not only follows the syllogistic pattern of this demonstration, but builds upon it: as has already been said, Aquinas begins, because man is by nature the social animal, he owes, from a certain decency, that manifestation of the truth to others without which the society of men could not endure; but just as man cannot live in society without truth, so neither can he do so without pleasure, for, as Aristotle says, no one can spend all the day with one who is sad or unpleasant; and therefore man is bound a certain natural debt of

[24] *ST* II-II, Q.109, a.3, *sed contra* and Q.114, a.2, *sed contra.*

[25] Iustitiae enim proprium esse videtur quod reddat alteri debitum. Sed ex hoc quod aliquis <licit verurn, non videtur alteri debitum reddere, sicut fit in omnibus praemissis iustitiae partibus. Ergo veritas non est pars iustitiae *(ST* II-II, Q.109, a.3, obj. 1). Ad iustitiam pertinet reddere debitum alteri. Sed hoc 11011 pertinet ad hanc virtutem *(sc.* amicitiam), sed solum delectabiliter aliis convivere. Ergo huiusmodi virtus non est pars iustitiae *(ST* II-II, Q.114, a.2, obj. 1) .

[26] Dice11dum quod quia homo est animal sociale, naturaliter unus homo debet altcri id sine quo societas humana serviri non posset. Non autem possent homines ad invicem convivere nisi sibi invicem crederent, tanquam sibi invicem veritatem manifestantibus. Et ideo virtus veritatis aliquo rnodo attendit rationem debiti *(ST* II-II, Q.109, a.3, ad 1).

decency to live with others in a way which is pleasant, except, occasionally, when it is necessary to sadden others for some useful purpose.[27] These articles do concede that truthfulness and friendliness, while resembling justice in their orientation "to another," do not fulfill the definition of justice completely, because the debts which they pay are not "legal" but rather "moral" ones, contracted from a sense of decency.[28] That these virtues thus lie beyond the scope of law appears to diminish their significance, relegating them to the sphere of the private and of a kind of moral good taste which cannot be legislated, but only taught by exhortation and example. Their vital connection with our nature, however, which cannot satisfy its need to be with others without the trust and the pleasure provided by these virtues, suggests that they are conditions of, and in this respect more important than, the legal and political situation within which justice properly so-called becomes a requirement. The intriguing contrast between the secondary and the necessary in these virtues seems to reflect the distinction between the political and social aspects of human nature. To man as the *animal sociale*, at any rate, it would seem that no perfections are more important than the modest habits of truth-telling and

21 Dicendum quad, sicut supra dictum est, quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, debet ex quadam honestate veritatis manifestationem aliis hominibus, sine qua societas hominum durare non posset. Sicut autem non posset homo vivere in societate sine veritate, ita nee sine delectatione, quia sicut Philosophus <licit in VIII *Eth.*, "nullus potest per diem morari cum tristi, nee cum non delectabili." Et idea homo tenetur ex quodam naturali debito honestatis ut aliis delectabiliter convivat, nisi propter aliquam causam necesse sit aliquando alias utiliter contristare (ST II-II, Q.114, a.2, ad 1).

28 Deficit autem (*sc.* veritas) a propria ratione iustitiae quantum ad rationem debiti. Non enim haec virtus attendit debitum legale, quad attendit iustitia: sed potius debitum morale, inquantum scilicet ex honestate unus homo alteri debet veritatis manifestationem. Unde veritas est pars iustitiae, inquantum annectitur ei sicut virtus secundaria principali (ST II-II, Q.109, a.3, c.). Deficit autem (*sc.* amicitia) a ratione iustitiae, quia non habet plenam debiti rationem, prout aliquis alteri ob!igatur vel debito legali, ad cuius solutionem lex cogit, vel etiam aliquo debito proveniente ex aliquo beneficio suscepto: sed solum attendit quoddam debitum honestatis, quad magis est ex parte alterius, ut scilicet faciat alteri quad decet eum facere (ST II-II, Q.114, a.2, c.).

affability, since without these, as Aquinas points out, the very being of men as social animals cannot last. Such virtues, one may say, are compatible with very great vices, while lack of friendliness, at least, does not preclude the possession of more heroic other virtues. Nevertheless, although the question of their presence or absence is not the final test of human goodness, it is the first such test : first in the raising of children, first in the meeting of strangers, first, too, in the society of acquaintances, which in a sense is always beginning anew.

III

I close with a few observations provoked by the foregoing remarks. First of all, it is clear that the necessity of truthfulness and friendliness is obvious, so much so that their inculcation is nearly universally a central feature in the education of the young. Certainly, the importance attached to these virtues varies according to circumstance, and modern urban life in particular has greatly obscured their direct reference to human nature; on the other hand, the immediacy and intimacy of electronic communication dramatically remind us of their perennial indispensability. A second observation concerns the regular conjunction of the two virtues which we find in human life, and which is no doubt owing to their common subservience to the needs of our social nature: despite the fact that truthfulness seems a degree more necessary than friendliness, and despite the grain of truth in the cynical view that the two virtues are incompatible, they nevertheless call out for and complete one another, so that there is something incongruous, as well as corrosive of society, in malicious honesty or deceitful affability. Perhaps the two virtues unite most closely in the attractive quality we call frankness. A further noteworthy point is that the goods secured by these virtues are found again in the highest human activity, the pursuit of wisdom, which provides not only knowledge of truth, but also, as Aquinas, echoing the Book of Wisdom, affirms, a companionship--a *conversatio* or *convictits-which* contains no bitterness

or weariness, but only joy.[29] It would appear to be a measure of the consistency of human nature that its most pressing needs should thus anticipate its deepest satisfactions. Finally, it seems relevant to consider that Aquinas opens his question on Christ's way of life with an article in which he argues that it was fitting for Christ to live among men, rather than as a solitary, because He came into the world in order to manifest the truth *(ad manifestandum veritatem),* to free men from sin and to give men, by living in familiarity with *them-familiariter cum hominibus conversando-the* confidence to approach God.[30] Although Aquinas does not in this argument mention the virtues we have been discussing, his descriptions of the first and last of the three purposes of the Incarnation are reminiscent of his accounts of truthfulness and friendliness respectively. Might not the full worth of these virtues have derived, in his view, from their exemplification by the truthful and affable Redeemer of the world?

[20] See *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, c.2: Inter omnia vero hominum studia sapientiae studium est perfectius, sublimius, utilius et iucundius. . . . Iucundius autem est quia " non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius nee taedium convictus illius, sed laetitiam et gau<iium *(Sap.* VII, 16).

[30] *ST* III, Q.40, a.l, c.

THE IMMANENT AND THE ECONOMIC TRINITY

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IN HER MAJOR study on the Trinity, *God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life*, Catherine Mowry LaCugna contends that theology should abandon the distinction between the immanent and the economic Trinity as it has been understood within contemporary theology. She believes that such a distinction segregates " God in himself " from " God for us " and thereby fixes an unbridgeable gap between them. This divorce renders the Trinitarian God irrelevant to the Christian life. In contrast, LaCugna proposes-and this is the theme of her entire book-that the whole trinitarian enterprise must be executed within a soteriological context. [1]

Since the Council of Nicea, however, the history of the development of the doctrine of the Trinity has focused, both in the East and in the West, on the immanent Trinity and the intradivine relationships between the persons. This is especially true of Latin trinitarian theology where Augustine and Aquinas founded their trinitarian conception on substance and articulated a trinity of persons who are enclosed upon one another. [2] The more theology developed the doctrine of the immanent Trinity,

[1] Catherine Mowry LaCugna, *God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life* (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991). See pp. 15, 211.

[2] With reference to the Western conception of the Trinity in contrast to the East, LaCugna comments: " However, the economy of salvation *a Patre ad Patrem* becomes all the harder to see once the consubstantiality of persons is situated in the intradivine domain, or beyond, in a permanently unknowable and imparticipable divine essence" (ibid., p. *73).* For comments on how Augustine's trinitarian thought brought about a rupture between God in himself and God for us see pp. 80, 91, *97,* 101-02, 104. For a similar criticism of Aquinas see pp. 157, 167-68.

the more the doctrine of the Trinity became irrelevant. LaCugna completes her lengthy, and often insightful, study of the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity by concluding: " The history of doctrine and theology tells the story of the emergence and defeat of the doctrine of the Trinity." [3]

Even if one argues, as Rahner and many others do, that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity, the very distinction still places a gulf between God as he exists in himself and the God who exists for us.[4] There remains, according to LaCugna, a separation between *theologia,* that is, knowledge and speculation about God *qua* God, and *oikonomia,* that is, knowledge and speculation about God-for-us. For LaCugna, if *theologia* is to be relevant it must be inherently and thoroughly soteriological. Hence it follows that *theologia* can only be *theologia* of the *oikonomia,* that is, a theology of God's action within the world. A *theologia* of the Trinity must then be a *theologia* of the trinitarian pattern of God's self-revelation within the economy. Her governing principle is: " *theologia* is fully revealed and bestowed in *oikonomia,* and *oikonomia* truly expresses the ineffable mystery of *theologia."* [5]

> [The economy is not] a mirror dimly reflecting a hidden realm of intradivine relations; the economy is God's concrete existence in Christ and as Spirit. The economy is the 'distribution' of God's life lived with and for the creature. Economy and theology are two aspects of *one* reality: the mystery of divine-human communion.[6]

Thus the Trinity that is revealed is not a Trinity apart or distinct from the economy, but a Trinity of the economy. " The referent for the immanent Trinity is not 'God *in se,'* or 'God's essence as it is in itself.' Theories about what God is apart from

[3] Ibid., p. 198. Also, pp. 209-10, 392.

[4] LaCugna gives a clear exposition of Rahner's position on the distinction and relationship between the immanent and economic Trinity (cf. ibid., pp. 211-21). She concludes: "Finally, according to Rahner at least, distinctions in the economy originate in and are grounded in distinctions 'in' God. It is on the last point that we part ways with Rahner" (p. 221).

[5] Ibid., p. 221.

[6] Ibid., p. 222.

God's self-communication in salvation history remain unverifiable and ultimately untheological, since *theologia* is given only through *oikonomia."* [1]

LaCugna therefore argues :

There is neither an economic nor an immanent Trinity; there is only the *oikonomia* that is the concrete realization of the mystery of *theologia* in time, space, history, and personality. In this framework, the doctrine of the Trinity encompasses much more than the immanent Trinity, envisioned in static ahistorical and transeconomic terms; the subject matter of the Christian theology of God is the one dynamic movement of God, *a Patre ad Patrem*. ... The existence of such an intradivine realm is precisely what cannot be established on the basis of the economy, despite the fact that it has functioned within speculative theology ever since the late fourth century.

This vision of the basic trinitarian framework obviates the need to adhere to the language of economic and immanent Trinity. These terms are bound inextricably to the framework that operates with a gap between *oikonomia* and *theologia.* The revision-more accurately, the return to the biblical and pre-Nicene pattern of thought-suggests not only that we abandon the misleading terms, economic and immanent Trinity, but that we also clarify the meaning of *oikonomia* and *theologia. Oikonomia* is not the Trinity *ad eztra* but the com-

[7] Ibid., p. 231. Cf. pp. 224-28. For LaCugna theology fell to the temptation to seek to articulate the inner life of God: " to find reasons for the coequality of persons in an independent metaphysics rather than in the record of the economy, and, to confuse the immanent structure of salvation history with the 'inner life' of God. As we have seen, the notion of God's 'inner life' simply cannot stand up to scrutiny " (p. 229). LaCugna is in basic agreement with Schoonenberg that we are incapable of moving from the Trinity revealed in the economy to speculation about the Trinity as it may exist in itself. We do not know whether God actually exists as a Trinity apart from God's trinitarian expression in the economy. All we know is the economic expression. " This is the import of Schoonenberg's point that the question of whether God would be trinitarian apart from salvation history is purely speculative and cannot be answered on the basis of revelation" (p. 227; also pp. 217-20, and p. 236, n. 21). For Schoonenberg's own article see "Trinity-the Consummated Covenant. Theses on the Doctrine of the Trinitarian God," *Studies in Religion* 5 (1975-1976): 111-16. Commenting on Schoonenberg's position that to say the immanent Trinity is dissolved in the economic Trinity, as though the eternal Trinity first came into existence in and through history, Kasper states: " In eternity the distinctions between the three persons would then at best be modal, and would become real only in history" *(Thi? God of I?SUS Christ,* p. 276).

prehensive plan of God reaching from creation to consummation, in which God and all creatures are destined to exist together in the mystery of love and communion. Similarly, *theologia* is not the Trinity *in se,* but, much more modestly and simply, the mystery of God.[8]

Within the economy of salvation, then, God manifests himself within a trinitarian pattern. God expresses himself in the form of a descending and ascending parabola through Christ in the Spirit and so sweeps us up into himself though Christ in Spirit. " This chiastic model of emanation and return, *ezitus* and *reditus,* expresses the one ecstatic movement of God outward by which all things originate from God through Christ in the power of the Holy Spirit, and all things are brought into union with God and return to God." [9]

The heart of LaCugna's trinitarian theology is the notion that "to be" is "to be relational." The whole history of trinitarian thought is founded upon this principle.[10] However, the Trinity does not exist as an intradivine set of persons who subsist in relation to one another. That would once more divide *theologia* and *oikonomia.*[11] Rather God, within the economy, is inherently relational in that through Christ and in the Spirit he relates to us and so unites us to himself in communion.[12] For God to be is

s Ibid., p. 223.

9 Ibid., p. 223.

io Ibid., pp. 288-92. LaCugna wishes, following Zizioulas, to lay claim to the Cappadocian insight that personhood is constitutive of substance and not vice versa (cf. ibid., pp. 244-50, 260-66).

11 LaCugna writes : " The goal of theology is not knowledge of God ' as God is in Godself' disjoined from God's manifestations in the economy; the goal of *theologia* is knowledge of God, which is inseparable from who God is in God's concrete existence in Christ and the Spirit" (ibid., p. 233, cf. 334).

12 LaCugna does not see the *perichoresis* as designating the intercommunion between intradivine persons. " The starting point in the economy of redemption, in contrast to the intradivine starting point, locates *perichoresis* not in God's inner life but in the mystery of the one communion of all persons, divine as well as human. From this standpoint ' the divine dance ' is indeed an apt image of persons in communion : not from an intradivine communion but for divine life as all creatures partake and literally exist in it " (ibid., p. 274; see pp. 270-78).

for God to be relational.[13] Unlike the limited relatedness of human beings, " to God belongs the sphere of infinite relatedness, infinite capacity for relationship, infinite actuality of relationship, both to past, present, and future reality." [14]

Quoting again at length, LaCugna writes:

> The relational ontology in which all of reality is referred to its origin in personhood-if it were carried forward through the whole of dogmatic theology-would avert the separation of *theologia* and *oikonomia.* The trinitarian *oikonomia is* the personal self-expressing and concrete *existence* of God. The ontology proper to this understands being as being-in-relation, not being-in-itself. The economy is 'proof' that God is not being-by-itself but being-with-us. The sphere of God's being-in-relation is the economy of creation and redemption in which the totality of God's life is given. We have no direct or immediate access to God's being in-itself or by-itself . . . . The heart of *theologia,* as also of *oikonomia,* is therefore relationship, personhood, communion. The mysteries of human personhood and communion have their origin and destiny in God's personal existence. The histories of divine and human personhood intersect in the economy that proceeds *a Patre ad Patrem,* through Christ in the unity of the Holy Spirit.[15]

LaCugna maintains then that " In God alone is there a full correspondence between personhood and being, between *hypostasis* and *ousia.* God for us is who God is as God." [16] Ultimately then it does not matter whether one uses the term "person" for God in the singular or plural, for " we are not giving a description of the essence of God as it is in itself, but using a term that points beyond itself to the ineffability of God."

> [This is so because] the proper focus of theology is the concrete manifestation of God's personal reality revealed in the face of Jesus Christ and the activity of the Holy Spirit. It does not so much matter whether we say God is one person in three modalities, or one nature in three persons, since these two assertions can be understood

[13] For LaCugna, "This relational ontology follows from the fundamental unity of *oikonomia* and *theologia:* God's To-Be is To-Be-in-relationship, and God's being-in-relationship-to-us *is* what God is" (ibid., p. 250).

[14] Ibid., p. 292.

[15] Ibid., p. 246.

[16] Ibid., p. 305.

in approximately the same way. What matters is that we hold on to the assertion that God is *personal,* and that therefore the proper subject matter of the doctrine of the Trinity is the encounter between divine and human persons in the economy of redemption.17

The reason I have outlined LaCugna's position at some length, predominately using her own words, is that, as a Christian view of God and his relation to us, it is, I believe, fatally and disastrously flawed.

LaCugna is absolutely correct in saying that the God who is must be God-for-us. There is no other. There is then no ontological difference between what God is in himself and what God is for us. However, in order for there to be a God-for-us there must be " a " God.[18] In order for there to be a Trinity-for-us there must be *a* Trinity. While there is no ontological distinction between the immanent and the economic Trinity-the Trinity which expresses itself in the economy must be one and the same Trinity that exists in itself-yet there is an ontological distinction between God and all else that exists. The *oikonomia* is the realm where God, in all his wholly otherness as God in ontological distinction from the *oikonomia,* is present and acts, and in the Incarnation actually abides, in the fullness of his wholly divine otherness, as man. For LaCugna, God, in his wholly ontologically distinct otherness as God, is actually never present to nor active within the *oikonomia.* Rather, God is reduced to the *oikonomia* itself so that we no longer live with God in his wholly otherness, but only experience a God who has receded into and subsides wholly within the ontological level of the *oikonomia* itself.[19]

17 Ibid., p. 305; cf. pp. 300-304.

18 By speaking of " a " God I do not want to imply that God is one of many beings, but precisely the opposite. God must exist ontologically distinct from all that is not God. As Aquinas states : God is not contained in any genus *(Summa Theol.* I, q.3, a.6).

19 LaCugna does speak of the ineffable mystery of God, but this apophatic knowledge of God is an apophasis of the *aikonomia-those* aspects of God which remain mysterious to us within the economy. " There is no hidden God *(deus absconditus)* behind the God of revelation history, no possibility that God is in God's eternal mystery other than what God reveals Godsclf to be ... It must be emphasized that divine immanence is not equivalent to the 'eco-

LaCugna, while wanting to eliminate the gap between God and us, has actually constructed a chasm between God and us that is now unbreachable. We only come to experience and know the phenomenal God of the *oikonomia* and never the noumenal God who actually exists in his wholly ontological distinct otherness as God.[20]

Thus LaCugna so collapses, fuses, and merges the Trinity into the economy that the economy is no longer the realm in which the Trinity acts, but the only realm in which the " Trinity " *is.* The *oikonomia* is no longer the realm in which the trinity of persons as they exist, in all their otherness, act, and so relate to us in all their otherness as distinct divine subjects, but the only realm in which the Trinity of " persons " actually exist. The Trinity does not exist ontologically distinct from the economy. " The Trinity" ontologically is the economy. Thus the Trinity is not the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit acting in time and relating to us in history as they are in themselves, but merely an impersonal theological principle grounding, sustaining and articulating our relation to "God" and with one another. God is no longer a trinity of persons or subjects. The term "trinity " now merely expresses the trinitarian pattern or mode of God's revelation as manifested through Christ and in the Spirit by which human persons (including Christ) are related to God.

Equally, one can question, although I do not believe she wants to hold this position, whether God, for LaCugna, is ultimately

nomic' Trinity, nor is divine transcendence equivalent to the ' immanent ' Trinity. God's transcendence is not God out of relationship to us. God is transcendent because God's nearness to us in history does not exhaust the ineffable mystery of God. *Both* immanence and transcendence must be predicated not just of *theologia* but also of *oikonomia:* God's mystery is grasped as transcendent precisely *in* the economy of salvation. Vice versa, the economic self-revelation of God in Christ is grasped, albeit obliquely, as the mystery of *theologia* itself. If we adhere to the principle that economy and theology belong together as two aspects of one mystery, then *the economy of salvation is as ineffable as is the eternal mystery of God (theologia)"* (p. 322; cf. pp. 322-35).

[20] If God is not ontologically distinct and other than the *oikonomia,* one ends up with either a finite God or a " Christian " expression of atheism, both of which, in the end, may be the same.

nothing more than the philosophical principle, inherent within reality, which gives rise to human relations and expresses "the more" contained within them.[21] God does not exist " outside " the economy. He is the economy.

While LaCugna consistently speaks in personal and relational terms and wishes to found her trinitarian theology upon them, in Part Two of her book, where she presents her own theology of the Trinity, she assiduously avoids using the terms " Father," " Son," and " Holy Spirit." Instead she speaks of "God," " Christ," and " Spirit." [22] She does this, I believe, for two interconnected reasons. First, the terms " God," " Christ," and " Spirit " are more compatible with her reductionist view of the Trinity as existing only in the economy. God (as relational, and not necessarily as Father) expresses himself through Jesus as the Christ in the Spirit. Secondly, I believe that she avoids the term "Father" not only because she believes that God could be equally well called "Mother," but more, in light of the above, because the term "Father" (or "Mother" for that matter) implies a " Son." [23] She wants to avoid the term " Son" because that immediately presupposes a subject, and one that might be construed as ontologically divine apart from the economy. She normally drops " Holy " from Spirit because that traditionally implies a subject as well. By speaking of " God," " Christ," and "Spirit," LaCugna can speak of the relationality of God without speaking of divine subjects. Christ and the Spirit are not divine subjects, *homoousios* with the Father; rather they embody and so express how God relates to and acts within the world. Human beings are the only real persons or subjects within LaCugna's relational ontology. The human subject of Jesus supremely embodies God's relatedness to us in the Spirit and so is the Christ. The Spirit

[21] In this case LaCugna's notion of God would be similar to Hegel's "Spirit," or Heidegger's and Tillich's "Ground of Being," or Process Theology's " Di-polar" God.

[22] See, for example, pp. 320, 356, 365, 378.

[23] For LaCugna's view that God could equally well be called "Mother," see ibid., pp. 267-70, 280, 303.

specifies the manner in which God acts in Christ and m each of us, and so is called Spirit. [24]

Thus, while LaCugna maintains the dynamism and even beauty of relational language, the notion of personhood, at least the personhood and subjectivity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is abandoned. They are not divine subjects and therefore all that LaCugna says about our unity and communion with " them " is vacuous. [25]

This becomes exceedingly evident when LaCugna states that all speech about God as personal or relational is mere metaphor. " The systematic theologian needs to keep in mind that every concept, whether it be 'substance' or 'relation,' is fundamentally metaphorical, not a literal description of what is." [26] Such a view substantiates the previous criticism that the use of trinitarian language merely expresses an impersonal theological or philosophical principle which governs and underlies reality.

Moreover, while LaCugna wishes her trinitarian theology to be thoroughly soteriological, Jesus as the Christ does not relate to God in a different kind of way than we do, but only in degree. [27] Therefore, Christ exemplifies and embodies, and so reveals, how all of us relate to God in the Spirit. The actions of Christ and the Spirit do not change our relationship with God in kind but

[24] Ibid., pp. 296-98.

[25] LaCugna's Cqapter 9, "Trinity, Theology, and Doxology," is spiritually and aesthetically moving. However, because the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are no longer divine subjects in themselves, the praises that we sing are devoid of theological content and meaning. We end up singing our own praises as persons rather than glorying in the majesty and splendor of the triune God.

[26] Ibid., p. 359; cf. p. 354. LaCugna refers the reader to her other articles at this point: C. M. LaCugna and K. McDonnell, " Returning from 'The Far Country': Theses For a Contemporary Trinitarian Theology," *The Scottish Journal of Theology* 41 (1988) : 191-215, esp. 204-5, and C. LaCugna, "Re-Conceiving the Trinity as the Mystery of Salvation," *The Scottish Journal of Theology* 38(1985): 1-23.

[27] LaCugna denies both that the Sonship of Jesus differs in kind from our own sonship and that Jesus the Son is an eternal divine person (ibid., pp. 309, n. 67 and 317, n. 143).

only in degree through the manifestation of the trinitarian pattern of divine and human existence to consciousness.[28]

LaCugna believes that her understanding of the Trinity is biblical and follows the pre-Nicene pattern, that is, that the Son and the Holy Spirit are conceived primarily as the manner in which God acts within the economy.[29] The Son and Spirit emanate from God only in relation to the economy of salvation-the orders of creation and redemption. As the above shows, she believes such a notion sustains her premise that *theologia* and *oikonomia* are one and the same.

Now the pre-Nicene Fathers, as witnessed primarily in the Apologists, did stress the economic expression of the Trinity. The Son and the Spirit became distinct subjects emanating from the Father only at creation and in redemption. This conception was due to their heavy reliance on Middle Platonic thought. However, the whole trajectory of the pre-Nicene development was directed away from such a conception in light of the biblical data and the Christian faith that grew out of it. We see this development already in Irenaeus, who pushed the economic expression of the Trinity well into the immanent nature of God. More and more, as witnessed in such theologians as Tertullian in the West and especially Origen in the East, the question of concern was how to conceive of God in such a manner as to uphold the oneness of God and yet allow that the Son and the Holy Spirit are eternal subjects within that oneness. The subordinationism and the emanationism contained in the early Fathers were neither expressions of their disbelief in the eternal divinity of the Son and the Spirit, nor of their conviction that the Son and Spirit were only "God" within the economy; rather, these were conceptual struggles and attempts to articulate the belief that the Son

[28] On how Jesus, through his death and resurrection, changes our relationship with God not only in degree but in kind, see T. Weinandy, *In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity of Christ* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993).

[29] *God For Us*, pp. 221-23.

and Spirit are God both within the being of God and within the economy of salvation. In a way, the pre-Nicene Fathers did not really want to say what they said, but they could not come up with any better way to say it. LaCugna, on the contrary, does want to say what they said because she believes this is the best way to say it.

Actually, LaCugna's pre-Nicene version of the Trinity is not pre-Nicene at all. The pre-Nicene Fathers, including the Apologists, conceived the Son and the Spirit to be distinct divine subjects in themselves, at least within the economy, whereas LaCugna deprives them of their divine subjectivity even within the economy. The Son and Spirit are only impersonal expressions of God's relatedness which becomes personified in human persons, including Christ. Thus, LaCugna's trinitarian theology is thoroughly Platonic and emanationist in character.

LaCugna believes that trinitarian theology took the wrong turn at the Council of Nicea. Nicea created " the gap between *oikonomia* and *theologia."* [30] By proclaiming the Son to be *homoousios* with the Father, Nicea compelled theology to speculate about the intradivine trinity of persons separate from the economy, rather than grasp that "the Trinity" is entirely God's expression of himself within the economy. While she recognizes that Nicea is a stumbling block to her trinitarian thought, LaCugna does not perceive its radical significance. It is Nicea that guarantees that the God we have come to know is truly the God who is *for us.*[31] Nicea forges the unbreakable ontological link between the economic and the immanent Trinity and it does so by declaring that the one who is *wholly within* the economy is the same one who is *wholly other than* the economy. The Son, who is *homoousios* with the Father, and thus wholly God as the

[30] Ibid., p. 35; cf. pp. 209, 231.

[31] The title of LaCugna's book is not without significance. While the book is on the Trinity, it is entitled *God For Us.* The reason is that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit do not truly exist as divine subjects, only God exists, and thus it is he who is for us. He is "for us " by expressing himself in a trinitarian pattern,

Father is God in all his wholly ontologically distinct otherness, is the same Son who became man, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, and was buried. LaCugna's venture ultimately runs aground on the rock of *homoousios.* [32]

[32] Kasper is entirely correct when he states : " There is at least one case in which this identity of economic and immanent Trinity is a defined truth of faith: the incarnation of the Logos, or hypostatic union. . . . In the case of the incarnation, then, the temporal sending of the Logos into the world and his eternal procession from the Father cannot be completely distinguished; here immanent Trinity and economic Trinity form a unity" *(The God of Jesus Christ,* pp. 274-75).

HERMENEUTIC OF AQUINAS'S TEXTS: NOTES ON THE *INDEX THOMISTICUS*

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I. *Introduction: First Impressions of the* Index Thomisticus

UPON ENTERING an excellent library of philosophy, one cannot help but notice the 56 volumes of the *Inde:c Thomisticus.* [1] Anyone with a scholarly interest in Saint

1 *Index Thomisticus: Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Operum omnium Indices et concordantiae* . .. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974-1980). Reference to this work in notes takes the form: *IT* [section]-[vol.], [p.]. References to Aquinas's works will follow the conventions established by Busa in the *Index Thomisticus* (e.g., *STI=Summa theologiae,* prima pars) and unless otherwise indicated are from the same texts processed in the *Index Thomisticus.* References to Roberto Busa's works will have the following abbreviations: *Clavis Indicis Thomistici: Clavis Indicis Thomistici* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holtzboog, 1979). *Fond. informatica linguistica: Fondamenti di informatica linguistica* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1987), (contains a bibliography of Busa's works through 1987). *Per San Tommaso 'ratio seminalis':* "Per San Tommaso 'ratio seminalis' significa 'codice genetico '. Problemi e metodi di lessicologia e lessicografia tomistiche," in *Atti dell'VIII congresso tomistico internazionale* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1981), vol. 1. *L'Index Thomisticus:* "L'Index Thomisticus," in *Stitdi medievali,* III serie, XXI, I, 1980. *Informatica e filologia:* " Informatica e nuova filologia," in G. Savoca ed., *Lessicologia, filologia e critica* (Florence: Olschki, 1986), pp. 17-25. *L'originalite linguistique:* "L'originalite linguistique de S. Thomas d'Aquin," in *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi (Bulletin du Cange),* Tome XLIV-XLV, fascicule double, 1985, pp. 65-90. *ORDO dans les ouevres:* "ORDO dans les ouevres de St. Thomas d'Aquin," in M. Fattori and M. Bianchi, eds., *ORDO II Colloquia internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo* (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo e Bizzarri, 1979), pp. 59-184. *Voces REALIS-REALITER:* "Voces REALIS-REALITER in S. Thoma Aq. Cum appendice de voce 'res-rei," in M. Fattori and M. Bianchi eds., *RES. III Colloquia internazionale del Lessico intellettuale Europea* (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1982), pp. 104-

Thomas Aquinas will be drawn to employ the *Index Thomisticus* as a powerful concordance. But any reasonable scholar can recognize the disproportion between a desirable concordance and this hyperbolic system of about 70,000 pages. The *Index Thomisticus* is the second largest written work of this century, surpassed only by the *Enrcyclopedia Britannica.* The *Index Thomisticus* is a mountain of pages that classifies with a precision never before realized everything that came from Aquinas's pen in twenty-five years.[2] Is it not awkwardly disproportionate and too pedantically analytical for scholarly research?

Moreover, what would Aquinas think if, in a return to this life, he could see the electronic digestion of his work? A neoscholastic Jesuit who devoted thirty-four years of his life to chopping and classifying even the most insignificant things, like " et " and " est," could seem to St. Thomas a modern computernut, i.e., a person who has lost his good sense in front of a screen.[3] Everyone understands the usefulness of a concordance; even St. Thomas wanted and used concordances.[4] But the *Index Thomis-*

136. *De voce SPIRITUS:* "De voce SPIRITUS in operibus S. Thomae Aquinatis," in M. Fattori and M. Bianchi, eds., *SPIRITUS. IV Colloquia lnternazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo* (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1983), pp. 191-222. *Thomistische Hermeneutik:* " Das Problem der thomistischen Hermeneutik nach der Veroeffentlichung des Index Thomisticus," in A. Zimmermann, ed., *Medievalia,* Bd 19: *Thomas von Aquin* (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 359-364. *L'Indez Thomisticus per la filosofia:* " L'Index Thomisticus per la filosofia e la teologia," in *Teologia* 5, 1980, pp. 258-265. *Il logos Principia di dialogo:* "Il logos principio di ogni dialogo tra persone secondo San Tommaso," in *Portare Cristo all'Uomo. Congresso del Ventennio dal Concilio Vaticano II* (Vatican City: Urbaniana University Press, 1985), pp. 577-584.

2 I. e., 8,767,854 words. The *lnde:i: Thomisticus* classifies everything St. Thomas has probably written, everything St. Thomas erased *(Autographi deleta: Inde:i: Thomisticus:* 006 ADL) and even works of other chosen authors for comparison with St. Thomas.

a Roberto Busa, S.J., was born in Vicenza, Italy in 1913. He began to "play" with the computer in 1949. His major work in neoscholasticism is: *La terminologia tomistica dell'interiorita. Saggi di metodo per un'interpretazione della metafisica della presenza* (Milan: Bocca, 1949).

4 See St. Thomas, *Tabula libri Ethicorum* in " Opera Omnia, Iussu Leonis XIII edita" (Leonine edition), tomus 48 (Rome, Ad. Sanctae Sabinae 1971), pp. B 63-B 158.

ticus is excessive. What is the purpose of this expenditure of human energy and time? Is it only for the satisfaction of completeness, of perfection? The *Inde% Thomisticus* is an *unicum* and a *monstrum* (in both the senses of a wonder and something deformed). We may not lament the *unicum.* But what would a library become if every author had an *Indn* such as Aquinas has now?

The question " for what? " is a disoriented yet common and understandable reaction to this new instrument on which Roberto Busa has spent half of his life. Moreover, there are other characteristics which strike the common approacher of this *monstritm.* The *IndeJC Thomisticus* looks both extremely advanced and primitive. The formal symbolization is so new that everyone is disoriented by it. But in spite of this aspect of novelty, the language used in the *Inde% Thomisticus* is a dead language, Latin, which once was the language of culture, but today is the language of nostalgia. As a result of these two characteristics, the *IndeJC Thomisticus* seems to come from other periods than the present: the future, the time in which the computer will make available every text with this kind of mathematical and electronic precision, and the past, the time in which scholars were able to communicate in Latin.

Furthermore, the *Index Thomisticus* is the most pedantic work ever written. The *Inde% Thomisticus* surpasses in precision and erudition any classification of human speech attempted before. It can spot every "et" or "ad" of St. Thomas. Busa avoided asking the question whether or not a word was relevant before classifying it.[5] In fact, Busa purposely did not ask the question " what is important? "[6] The original structure of every human

[5] The most common words like " et " are not excluded simply because they are judged unimportant. See the *tabulae* 33 and 34 in *IT* I-9, pp. 1205-1206 for a view of the frequency of these words in St. Thomas's work.

[6] "Ho giudicato che fosse importante rilevare e sistematizzare tutto quello che c'e, cosi com'e. In scienza pura tutto e per principio importante: si tratta di conoscere fatti e cose per quel che sono e per quel che contengono di categorie. All'opposto, un giudizio d'importanza non puo non essere relativo a finalita specificate.[- - -] E la prima volta che un indice o concordanza documenta tutti gli *et,* i *non,* i *quam,* gli *est,* di un corpus di queste dimensioni" *(L'lndex Thomisticiis,* pp. 414-415).

language is present in the most common words. To choose *to* overlook these words is to choose to overlook the simplest yet deepest categories of thought and language. Busa explains why the outcome of this complete analysis is so complex: "The *Index Thomisticus* is a complex research documentation, which may prove at the outset *to* be laborious *to* use. There are two reasons for this. The first is the enormous quantity of data to be documented: *179* writings, 1,500,000 lines and 10,600,000 words. The second reason for the complexity of the *Index Thomisticus* is the complexity inherent in speech and language. In all verbal expressions there emerges a multitude of distinct, diverse, opposite, and complementary structures. Speech can be viewed as the merging of body and soul, where matter and spirit come together. In fact, reality consists of more than only tangible objects. Physical objects react only to present stimuli. Measurements of these interactions can be formulated in mathematical terms. On the contrary, human words show that : a) human thought also deals with non-present stimuli : unseen, possible, universal, formal objects ... ; b) the human mind also has instantaneous flashes and intuitions which are a simple mental operation, by which it masters a multitude of different objects in a system which derives its unity from its goal ... ; c) the mind has the power of creative freedom to select among the many beautiful and appealing possibilities which it is able to imagine." [7]

After these remarks, we can consider the position of someone who for whatever reason wants to read Aquinas. This reader could ignore the *Index Thomisticus* altogether. Since the dimensions are so enormous, he could avoid it with the justification that it is important for linguistics and research in medieval language, but not for understanding Aquinas. He could use it at most as an oversized concordance. However, the general opinion would be that to understand St. Thomas one must read St. Thomas directly, not an electronic pulverization of what he has written, just as to understand a man you must look at the whole, and not at his atomic composition: 65% Oxygen, 20% Hydrogen, 12% Carbon, etc.

[7] *Clavis Indicis ThomistiC'i,* p. 7.

Nevertheless, if one's curiosity is provoked by this huge expenditure of energy, one should try to understand whether the electronic precision of Busa can have any use in the hermeneutics of Aquinas. The *Index Thomisticus* is a linguistic instrument. Really to understand any instrument one must be able to use it, and in order to be able to use the instrument, one must use it. *Ab esse ad posse datur illatio.* The best way to understand the *Index Thomisticus* is to examine carefully its hermeneutical use, looking at someone who has used it (besides reading the instructions, of course).[8] It is not hard to imagine that in the next decades instruments like the *Index Thoniisticus* will be made available for many philosophers. An interest in the *Index Thomisticus,* therefore, goes beyond an interest in St. Thomas. It is an interest in what will succeed the birth and childhood of the computer in the humanities: a jump in the techniques of the academy.

II. *An Overview of the Structitre of the* Index Thomisticus

A synthetic view of the *Index Thomisticus* is the first thing required. The *Index Thomisticus* consists of 56 volumes of more than 1000 pages each.[9] Properly, the *Index Thomisticus* comprises 49 volumes, with 7 supplemental volumes which reproduce the electronic texts used in the *Index Thomisticus.*[10] The *Index Thomisticus* is divided into three sections:

SECTIO PRIMA (10 vols.):
Indices
Prospectus distributionis[11]
Singillata distributio[12]
Systemata lexici[13]

[8] *Clavis Indicis Thomistici.* A volume of introduction is forthcoming. For the moment, *Clavis Indicis Thomistici* may be considered an introduction to the *Index Thomistiws.*

[9] The *Index Thomisticus* is available on 300 magnetic tapes (density 800 bpi). Soon it will be available on optic disk.

[10] See below.

[11] Published in 1976.

[12] Published in 1976.

[13] Published in 1980.

SECTIO SECUNDA (23 + 8 vols.):

Concordantiae operum thomisticorum:

Concordantia prima [14]

Concordantia altera [15]

SECTIO TERTIA (6 + 2 vols.):

Concordantiae operum aliarum auctorum [16]

Concordantia prima

Concordantia altera

The first section is the strangest and apparently most useless section of the *Index Thomisticus.* It consists of tables of symbols and numbers not immediately decipherable. This is a work of pure linguistics, and one must understand its usefulness within this horizon. A cardinal distinction for understanding the system of the *Indices* (and the concordances, too) is the linguistic distinction between *lemma* and *form.* Everyone makes use of this linguistic distinction in speaking and writing, yet few can say what it is. Busa explains it in this way: " We call a lemma a lexical unit, i.e., the words which in a dictionary represent all their possible flections and signify that basic meaning which is common to all. For instance, ' am, are, was, being' are forms of the verb ' to be.' " [17] The four largest *Indices,* tables of distribution, are organized upon two distinctions : a) *lemma-form* and b) general *prospectus* and one-by-one view.[18] The first eight

[14] Published in 1974-75.

[15] Published in 1980.

[16] Published in 1980.

[17] R. Busa, *CAEL Newsletter,* Dec. 1988 (trans. M. Dunne). Also: " Lemma: titulus paradigmatis, exprimens unitatem lexicalem vocabuli quod flexiones habet; v.g. *sum* est lemma cuis formae sunt *sum ... est ... fui ... fuisti ... ens ...*, etc. Forma: typus vocabuli prout scriptum iacet ..." *(IT* II-1, p. IX. Microglossarium). "The difference and distinction between lemma and form belongs to those structures of our speaking ability which everyone exercises, i.e. knows *in actu exercito,* but to which only a few people give conscious and deliberate attention *in actu signato," Clwr;is Indicfr Thomistici,* p. 19. See also *Informatica e filologia,* p. 19,

[18] The

volumes of the *Index Thomisticus* contain tables arising from this fourfold distinction. The tables of the last two volumes of the first section are based upon other concepts and oriented towards different problems. For instance, there are tables of graphical variations, of homography,1° of the forms printed in alphabetical order of the inverted word, and of quantity.[20] This appears to be the most maniacal part of the *Index Thomisticus.* Busa's fantasy and the computer seem to be out of control. The question " what for? ", however, is misplaced: the usefulness of these tables becomes apparent in working with the *Index Thomisticus.* Asking " what for? " beforehand is like judging all the Chinese material in a library to be useless simply because one is not able to read it.

The second section consists of 31 volumes. This is the best known and most used section of the *Index Thomisticus* (at least the 23 volumes of C*oncordantia prima).* They were the first to be published, and they can be used as a simple concordance of all St. Thomas's works. This is the best system of concordance ever produced. A rapid glance shows its logical completeness and pleasing aesthetic presentation. The difference between *Concordantia prima* and C*oncordantia altera* lies in the way in which the words are presented. In the former, every word is given in its whole context, while in the latter, every entry consists of only three words. All except 1654 of St. Thomas's words are present in C*oncordantia prima.*[21] The remaining words are to be found in the *concordantia altera.*[22]

The third section consists of only 8 volumes. This section is a classification of 61 texts of other medieval Latin works. The primary purpose of this section is to make possible a comparison

19 " I call the forms which are spelled identically but belong to different lemmas, homographs." *Clavis Indicis Thomistici,* p. 23.

20 A panoramic structure of these ten volumes is given in the insert to volumes 9 and 10: *Indes Indicum.*

21 *IT* II-1, p. X.

22 The reason for this is either the excessive frequency of certain words or their presence in quotations or citations. The table of Indices shows where the word is to be found.. For a complete and detailed explanation of the distribution in *Concordantia altera* (2nd to 5th concordances), see IT II-1, p. IX.

with St. Thomas's language. Section III is structured exactly like section II. Many of the indexed works are works which St. Thomas left incomplete and which were finished by other "Thomists." However, other words indexed also include texts by Albert the Great, Giles of Rome, Cajetan, Thomas Sutton, etc.[23]

The supplement consists of 7 volumes with all the texts processed in the *Index Thomisticus.* They are the most rapid way to check a reference in St. Thomas's text.[24] This edition of St. Thomas's *Opera Omnia* is the most compact available: all works are compressed in to 4500 pages. St. Thomas's text is offered in a form which is not very easy to read but is extremely useful for reference. Lastly, the texts used are from the most recent (and, when available, the critical) edition of St. Thomas's works.[25] The list of them can be found at the beginning of any of the 49 volumes of the *Index Thomisticus.*

The *Index Thomisticus* is primarily a work in computational linguistics.[26] It is the most daring use of the computer in the Humanities to date, if for no other reason than the amount of paper consumed by the work. The *Index Thomisticus* is a tool for studying not only the language of St. Thomas, but also-in levels of ascending generality-scholastic Latin and medieval Latin.[27] This linguistic instrument is useful in philosophy for two reasons. First, because the texts processed have philosophical-theological value, the material analyzed so minutely becomes available for dealing with many problems in St. Thomas. It is a powerful lens which allows one to discover things too small to be seen in an

[23] For the complete list see *IT* I-1, p. XV-XVI. See also *L'Index Thomisticus.* pp. 412-414.

[24] The last volume is for *Alii Auctores.*

[25] Considering how hard it is to obtain certain editions of St. Thomas's works, these 6 + 1 volumes of supplement render another great service.

[26] " L'Index Thomisticus per i suoi risultati, finaliti e materiali e anzitutto un'opera di linguistica generale" *(L'Index Thomisticus,* p. 418).

[27] For the distinction of these three different levels and an introduction to each of them see M. D. Chenu, *Introduction a l'etude de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Medievales, 1950), pp. 84-105.

ordinary reading or too numerous to be considered systematically. Thus, it offers the raw material to deal with hermeneutical problems in reading St. Thomas. Secondly, the *Index Thomisticus* provides a large amount of material for elaborating a philosophy of language, i.e., for understanding language as such.[28]

III. *The Novelty of the* Index Thomisticus

In the *Inde% Thoniisticus* texts are treated in a novel analytical way. Roberto Busa is not the first to discover that language is a compound of atoms which can he examined with electronic machines. Neither is he the first to analyze the laws of composition of these atomic-words. But he is the first and, until now, the only one who has taken a system, a product of human thought, and has produced a disintegration of such scientific precision.

Just as a chemist gives the formula of a compound, elements in percentage, and the spectrographic analysis, so the *Inde% Thomisticus* gives elements and percentages of that peculiar compound of ink or bits which is St. Thomas's *Opera Omnia.* Busa, who is aware of his position as a pioneer, writes: " This manual is the outcome of 40 years of computational linguistics, like the geographical map of a new region which an explorer has measured first."[29] The most striking aspect of this work is the fact that Busa discovered a new method. This method is not confined to an analysis of St. Thomas. Soon we may hope to have similar instruments for Aristotle, Plato, Augustine, Kant, etc. without having to multiply space in libraries. These indexes can use a different " support": not heavy and cumbersome paper, but optic disks.

Continuing the analogy with physics and chemistry, the

[28] Many drafts of such a philosophy of language are offered *passim* by Busa: "Je point de depart de la philosophie est !'analyse reflexive du language Commun a tout l'homme, au fond duquel on trnuve la logique de l'etre" *(L'originalite linguistique,* p. 78) ; Cf. *L'Index Thomisticus Per la filosofia.* pp. 258-265.

[29] *Fond. informatica linguistica,* p. 13 (my translation).

strange-looking first volumes of the *Index Thomisticus* can be compared to Mendeleev's table of elements. Computational linguistics is to language what the atomic theory is to physics. The lemmas and the forms are the analogues of atoms in the field of linguistic expression. Lemmas and forms are the smallest parts of speech with meaning. Mendeleev's table of elements is not comparable to the alphabet because letters are not *per se* parts with meanings. For the written text of St. Thomas, the *Singillata distributio lemmatum,* the distribution of the lemmas one by one, constitutes the analogous reduction. The *Index Thomisticus* is the *ana-tomization* of St. Thomas's text just as *atomic* Physics is the *ana-tomization* of nature.

The language in the first part of the *Index Thomisticus* is reduced to its elementary morphology just as physics renders the elementary morphology of experienced reality.[80] To reduce St. Thomas's text to the *Index Thomisticus* is to understand nothing, just as to reduce nature to atoms is to understand nothing. Things arise from the infinite numbers of possibilities of combinations of elements, but they are not reducible to the elements. Moreover, what really exists are the compounds, while the elements are a scientific abstraction depending on existing reality. If the compound is not reducible to the elements, neither is the composition. The composition-including the law of composition, the architectonic, and the relationships among the elements-is irreducible to the elements of the sentence.[81]

In the introduction to the *lexicological system* in *Index Thom-*

so The isotopes and the ionized form of atoms are the analogues of the form in *Index Thomisticus,* while the basic form of atoms corresponds to the lemmas.

si "As regards that which is compounded out of something so that the whole is one-not like a heap, however, but like a syllable is not its elements, *ba* is not the same as *b* and *a,* nor is flesh fire and earth ; for when they are dissolved the wholes, i.e. the flesh and the syllable, no longer exist, but the elements of the syllable exist, and so do fire and earth. The syllable, then is something-not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else." Aristotle, *Met.,* VII, 17, 1041 b, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle,* ed. by J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), vol. 2, p. 1644. See *Informatica e Filologia,* p. 20.

isticus, Busa writes: " Our system is integral, exhaustive, and complete, meaning that it offers all words without any exception, numbered as far as the last units and classified in such a way that no index or concordance has ever done before. However, one who would affirm that nothing is to be systematically defined would be mistaken : I think that researches on human speech are more inexhaustible, so to speak, than physical or biological researches." [32] The complexity and the simplicity of language (even the small fragment of all spoken and written words that is the entire Thomistic corpus) is the complexity and simplicity of reality. Millions of words can be classified by a computer, but their order is beyond the complexity of any software: it exhibits the simplicity of intelligence. What exists is not words or elements, but simple units, sentences and subsentences, which are yet extremely complicated when anatomized.

IV. *Working on Aquinas with the* Index Thomisticus

There are many possible ways to exploit this linguistic instrument. Before sketching the hermeneutical use of the *Index Thomisticus* as elaborated by Busa, some examples of different possible uses are noted. All these uses exploit primarily the fact that the *Index Thomisticus* is a complete concordance of St. Thomas's corpus. Inos Biffi uses the *Index Thomisticus* to locate and examine all the occurrences of the lemma *metaphysicus.* [83] William Wallace ·examines the lemma *suppositio* and particularly the syntagma *ex suppositione,* proving a linguistic and a conceptual continuity between medieval science, represented by St. Thomas's use of this language and concept, and empirical-modern science, represented by Galileo's use of the same language and

[s2] *IT* I-9, p. XIV, n.2 (my translation).

[a3] I. Biffo, "Il lemma *metaphysicus* in san Tommaso d'Aquino," in *Teologia,* pp. 85-107 (English summary p. 107). In another article-" Per un'analisi semantica dei lemmi ' theologia,' 'theologus,' ' theologizo ' in san Tommaso: un saggio metodologico nell'uso del "Index Thomisticus," in *Teologia,* 3, 1978, pp. 148-163-Biffi follows the pattern of a hermeneutical research to a greater degree.

concept.[34] Laura Landen, recensing all the occurrences of terms like *complexio* and *elementum,* sheds new light-from St. Thomas's biological language-on the well known Thomistic thesis of the unicity of the substantial form.[35] Enzo Portalupi documents the influence of Gregory the Great on the young St. Thomas, collecting all the quotations of Gregory the Great in the *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate.*[36] With a more lexicographical intention and method, Riccardo Quinto[37] analyzes the words *timor* and *timiditas,* exemplifying also the lexicographic process invented by Busa.[38]

Before sketching the moments of a hermeneutical analysis with the *Index* it is necessary to counteract the widespread idea that the use of a computer shortens the time involved in developing an interpretation. The computer, rather, makes this process longer, but much more precise and complete. The *Index Thomisticus* creates the need for a greater amount of time for hermeneutical research. The time necessary for research is " by its nature and without possible remedies the true remarkable defect of the *Index Thomisticus* (defect ... by ·excess!) : The *Index Thomisticus* is neither a lexicon nor a florilegium ready to hand for rapid consultation, but a document for systematic researches."[39]

[34] Unpublished paper presented at the XIX International Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, MI, 1984. See W. Wallace, "Galileo and Reasoning *Ex Suppositione:* The Methodology of The Two New Sciences " in *Proceedings of the 1974 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,* ed. by R. S. Cohen et al. (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1976), pp. 79-104.

[35] Idem. See L. Landen, " Thomas Aquinas and the Dynamism of Natural Substances" (Dissertation, Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1985).

[36] E. Portalupi, " Gregorio Magno nelle Quaestiones Disputates De Veritate di Tommaso d'Aquino, in *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 78, 1985, pp. 556-598.

[37] R. Quinto, " ' Timer ' e ' Timiditas.' Note di lessicografia tomista," in *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 78, 1985, pp. 387-410.

[38] For more examples of use of *Index Thomisticus* see *Thomistische Hermeneutik,* p. 364.

[39] *Per* S. *Toinmaso 'ratio seminalis'* p. 448. "When someone has an immediate need to know what St. Thomas wrote about a specific point of doctrine and does not have the time to research scientifically into which words are

The first moment of the analysis is the *le.xicological analysis.* Once the lemma corresponding to the concept to be studied has been determined, i.e., the key-word, the "family" of the lemma has to be measured and classified. The family of a lemma is composed of all those lemmas which share the same radical stem, or which are lexicologically related. In this way one can begin to identify the *notional area* of the key-word. The notional area or semantic field does not necessarily have the same verbal root. This notional field, however, has to be measured in lexicological terms: classified by numbers, occurrences, etc., either in proper texts or in quotations. Before the second step, one must notice that the problem of a Thomistic lexicology in general can be stated in this way: " How many and what sort of words did St. Thomas use? How does one describe the system, both by typology and by quantity? " [40]

The second moment consists in the proximate preparation to *lexicographic analysis.* All the contexts selected are read one by one.[41] It goes without saying that certain contexts are extremely prominent: those, for instance, where the key-word is not just used but also *defined.*[42] This lexicographic moment of the analysis, however, still deals with the word itself in its *use,* with the word *in actu exercito.* The most elaborate part of the hermeneutical work consists in this analysis. First, it is very important to identify the other words with which the key-word is associated: as

used by St. Thomas in expressing it, he is advised not to apply to the *Index Thomisticus* but to an *inde.r realis,* i.e., subject index of St. Thomas, like the *Tabula Aurea* of Petrus of Bergamo, the *Indices Leonini* vol. XVI and L. Schuetz's *Thomas Lexi/con" (Clavis Indicis Thomistici,* p. 10).

[40] *Per S. Tommaso 'ratio seminalis* ', p. 445. L. Bataillon, in a short paper with the title " The *Index Thomisticus* and Leonine Editions " for the XIX International Congress on Medieval Studies (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1984) gives examples of the lexicological usefulness of the *Inde.r Thomist,irns,* limited to the ongoing production of critical editions of St. Thomas.

[41] Criteria of selection, of limitation, differ according to the goal and the available time for research. One can restrict a search to the context of the key-word, avoiding the contexts of words of the lexicological family and of the notional field. Other possible restrictions : only to certain works, only uses outside of quotations, etc. See for this *Clai1is Indicis Thomistici,* pp. 16-18.

[42] See the example for *metaphora,* in *Clavis Indicis Thomistici,* p. 18.

synonyms, antonyms, comparisons, etc. Then, exammmg the grammatical correlations, one determines which words are associated with it as adjectives (predicative or attributive), which words are associated as specifications (genitive), or which words the key-word specifies, etc. Finally, one determines for which verbs the word is the subject or the object of action. This process is the very anatomy of the key-word. It shows a myriad of different links and connections. It is like the examination of a cell under a microscope.[43]

" Writing the lexicographic voice is the last step. It is a spiritual work of intuitive and synthetical interpretation. It would be science fiction thinking that a computer would be able to accomplish it."[44] All the analytical work here finds its synthesis. In this process thought and word, in-tuition and ex-pression, find their identity again. To write the lexicographic voice is to reach the *mens auctoris* and its *Aus-legung,* ex-position. For example, one sees that when St. Thomas wrote *ratio ordinis,* he was not thinking of what we think when we say " the reason of order," but of something closer to what we think in saying " rational plan, program."[45] Likewise with *ratio boni:* not (only) "the reason of good," but "value."

The lexicographic analysis has as its final goal the compilation of a new Thomistic lexicon.[46] This lexicon will make possible the passage between signs belonging to two different systems. The lexicon will be a bridge, moreover, not just for signs, but for thoughts. This hermeneutical project is very ambitious and requires the *sacrifice* of confidence in an acquired jargon, or better, requires that the jargon, in this case the medievalist jargon, be presented as such, which may not be related essentially to what

43 Examples of this patient analysis are presented in the quoted articles : *ORDO dans les oeuvres, De voce SPIRITUS,* and *Voces REALIS- Realiter.*

44 *Per S. Tommaso 'ratio seminalis'*, p. 450.

45 *Per S. Tommaso 'ratio seminalis'*, p. 447.

46 "This was mainly the reason why I wanted to prepare the *Inde.x Thomisticus.* I maintained that St. Thomas's vocabulary should be translated prior to his texts. In fact, linguistic evolution progresses at a far greater speed than the evolution of species " (*Clm:is Jndicis Thornistici,* p. 14).

is said and often proves misleading. Thought cannot be mummified in words: because it is act, thought is dynamic and living. The project of a new Thomistic lexicon is not just an invitation to a linguistic party. It is an invitation to thinking: an invitation to discover philosophy and not just history in the *history of philosophy.* It is an invitation to depart from the safe ghetto of two kinds of repetitions : that of the historicist and that of the paleo-scholastic. For the former, time is *everything,* while for the latter, time is *nothing.* For Busa's hermeneutical project, time is *something.* [47] Therefore, the *Inde:c Thomisticus* is a philosophical project of the "consciousness of the work of time." [48]

V. *Anti-Historicism 'Without Forgetting Time and History: The E:cample of* Ratio Seminalis

In reading St. Thomas, like reading anyone else, there is a communication between two intelligences, remote in time, space, environment, and language. This communication is made possible by signs, written words, and sentences which convey a meaning It is practically impossible that the same signs could have the same meanings after seven centuries of human speech and of human history. This is the hermeneutical problem: the reader's mind and the writer's mind are not reading the same thing, al-

[47] There is another hermeneutical process altogether different from the patient analysis of the *Index Thomisticus.* This method is a synthetic one (see *Thomistische Hermeneutik,* p. 360). In order to understand only one word, one has to read the entire corpus. This synthetical approach is certainly more fundamental. But even if *the method looks to the whole,* it does not mean that studying the fragment is worthless. To inquire into the fragments as if the whole were just the mere sum of the fragments is to have lost sense of reality. Inquiry into the fragments *qua* fragments manifests again the primacy of the whole. As anatomy can be extremely useful to physiology, so the anatomy of the text in its words can be useful for understanding the text.

[48] So J. Grondin proposes to translate Gadamer's syntagm "Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein" *(Wahrheit und Methode,* II, II, 3). See J. Grondin, " La conscience du travail de l'histoire et le probleme de la verite en hermeneutique," in *Archives de Philosophie* 44, 1981, pp. 435-453. In any case, the finest merit of historiographical hermeneutic is the *disclosure of time,* i.e., the time which separates reader and writer. It is an *ex-position* and thereby discloses consciousness of the work of history.

though the sign is the same sign. The same sign, for instance, *ratio seminalis,* does not have the same meaning in the two minds.[49]

The first, but still rudimentary, solution of this hermeneutical problem regarding St. Thomas is the literal translation. The text is simply given in a modern language. *Ratio seminalis* is thus translated by ' seminal reason ' or ' seminal virtue.'

Et ideo convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas et passivas quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium seminales rationes vocat.[50]	Thus Augustine aptly termed seminal virtues all those active and passive powers that are the originative sources of the coming into being of natural things and of their changings.[51]

" Seminal virtues " (reasons) has practically no meaning for any modern mind. This reflects a weakness of the translator, but neither the text by itself nor such a translation of it can overcome this difference.[52] Another way to make the differ·ence less puzzling is an historiographical approach. In this way, *ratio semin'alis* is understood in its historical settings, as a Stoic concept inherited by St. Thomas through the influence of St. Augustine, and so on: quotations and citations of Marcus Aurelius, Plutarch, Philo, and Plotinus, as origins of the concept for St. Augustine and St. Thomas, can be multiplied. While bringing the historical meaning of the concept closer, this approach makes the philosophical meaning more remote.

The *Index Thomisticus* makes available the horizon of the same word every time it has been used, i.e., written. The effort of

[49] *Per San Tommaso 'ratio seminalis',* p. 448.

[50] *ST* 1, q. 115, a. 2 c.

[51] Ibid. Quoted in Blackfriars edition. One should consult the essay on 'Seminal Reason' by W. A. Wallace, in Vol. 10, appendix 6, pp. 197-198 of the Blackfriars edition of the *Summa Theologiae* as well.

[52] " On perdra par la, heureusement, la facilite macaronique de traduire les discours de St. Thomas, tout simplement en manipulant les desinences, la graphie et parfois l'ordre de ses mots. Traduire un texte d'autrui implique de remonter de son discours a ses concepts et de reexprimer ces memes concepts avec nos mots d'aujourd'hui, meme s'ils son differents: en effet dans un auteur ancien, plusieurs mots peuvent avoir des contenus semantique que nous ne leur attribuons plus aujourd'hui" in *L'originalite linguistique,* p. 88.

comprehension is to try to understand in one's own *conceptual system* a different *conceptual system,* and to do so through a *verbal system* that is not coincident with the way its expression appears to us. The common system of signs, the written words, is neither common nor immediately communicative. The *hermeneutical* process can be represented with a triangle. [53]



This triangle avoids the possible reduction of concepts to words (verbal system to conceptual system), and expresses the necessity of a passage through the reader's conceptual and verbal system in order to understand a simple text.

A word like *ratio seminalis,* therefore, has two different meanings, one in St. Thomas's mind and one in the reader's mind. Translating *ratio seminalis* by ' seminal virtue' or 'reason' gives the text an oldness and an inadequacy which originally it did not have. To read *ratio seminalis* by giving the word a historical meaning, i.e., furnishing it with a set of historical sources and influences, is to *meta-interpret* the text. Furthermore, when the historical apparatus obstructs the comprehension, this leads the reader to *mis-interpret* the text.

[53] *Thomistische Hermeneutik,* pp. 359-360; *Per* S. *Tommaso 'ratio seminalis'*, p. 444; *L'lndex Thomisticus,* p. 414.

A rigorous lexicographic analysis [54] of the word shows that St. Thomas uses the word *ratio seminalis* to mean something similar to what we mean by ' genetic code,' or the original set of information. The word *ratio* has the meaning of program, plan, or organized set of information. The word *seminalis,* the adjectival form of *semen,* has to be understood as 'genetic.' *Rationes seminales* should be understood as those programmed codes which are at work in the ordered development of a living being. The repetition of these programs, from living being to living being, is reproduction. According to St. Thomas, there are four different modes in which these biological routines or genetic programs work: first, in the beginning phases of every living being; second, in the mature living being insofar as it is able to reproduce this information; third, in the beginning of all processes of reproduction, *genesis,* as a condition of possibility of an order; fourth, but fundamentally, in the mind of the programmer of life.[55] This does not mean that St. Thomas had our notion of *genetic code* or that he is the father of genetics, but that in using this expression to explain the living world he means something similar to what we mean when speaking of genetic codes.

One may criticize this approach by saying that it lacks historical sense. ' Genetic code ' is not *ratio seminalis,* one might argue, for there are seven centuries of history of scientific effort in between. This goes without saying. The problem is instead: how can we judge the *past* from a point of time that is itself going to be the *past* in a few years? Why should the truth be ' genetic code ' and not *ratio seminalis* if in one hundred years another expression, ' x ', will replace ' genetic code ' as inadequate? In reading an author of the past we have to remember that we ourselves are going to be what he is : *past.* With the measure by which we measure, we are to be measured. What is more, we are already measuring ourselves and the value of our opinions. If scientific-philosophical paradigms were without any continuity,

[54] Analysis of *seminalis* made by I. Sztrilich. See *Per* S. *Tommaso 'ratio seminalis',* p. 442.

[55] *ST* 1, q. 115, a. 2; *Per* S. *Tommaso 'ratio seminalis',* p. 442-443.

then any paradigm would have as justification only the fact of being the most recent.

Another objection rises from certain fields of specialization in medieval philosophy. The effort to overcome the difficulties in the comprehension of a text (cultural settings, chronologies, styles, influences) leads to forgetfulness of the value of the text itself. One can spend a lifetime on these texts and be incapable of remembering why they are still so interesting. This fear of thinking is a mortal disease in philosophy. It is comparable to the fear of Cremonini, who used to say " De Aristotele dicimus, non de re ipsa." [56] The "archeological" effort to disclose certain texts, an effort worthy of a great reconnaissance, must remember that those texts and words coming from centuries past have meanings. And the worth of archeological efforts depends upon this : the more current these texts are the more valuable it is to " discover " them. This is assuming, of course, that someone from the past can say something that we do not know, i.e., that it is not true that the last to speak is the one who is right.

Busa remarks that he has not yet found a word in St. Thomas which has not undergone a process of modification in its meaning. Indeed, history docs nothing in vain. The meaning of the word *ordo,* for instance, a word used very often by St. Thomas, has been specified by many other words, and simply translating *ordo* by ' order ' loses the semanticity of the word in St. Thomas. Therefore, *ordo* can mean in St. Thomas (according to the different contexts in which it is used) what we mean by ' organization ', ' system ', ' classification ', ' hierarchy ', ' taxonomy ', etc.[57] Likewise, the word *virtus* has a notional value much more extensive than the word 'virtue'. Moreover, in English the word ' virtue ' has almost completely lost its dynamical connotation. For St. Thomas, *virtus* means force, energy, power, dynamism, capacity, ability, efficacy, etc. An expression like *virtus fidei,* for instance, would be better translated " power of faith." [58]

[56] As quoted by F. Olgiati, *L'anima dell'umanesimo e del Rinascimento* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1924), p. 576.

[57] *ORDO dans /es oeuvres,* p. 60.

[58] *L'originalite linguistique,* p. 75. See also *Voces REALIS-REALITER; De voce SPIRITUS.*

This effort to go beyond a thoughtless reading to understand signs truly is the hermeneutical attitude. And this hermeneutical attitude is what philosophy and theology are all about: " One of my teachers, Father Carlo Giacon, S.J., attributed to St. Thomas the originality of having made the distinction between theology and philosophy. I want to add to this a paradox: while for St. Thomas theology is the hermeneutic of the human and historical discourses by which God disclosed the mystery of salvation, philosophy is the hermeneutic of that exclusive language of God of which things are the words (*solus Deus potest creare),* i.e., philosophy is the hermeneutic of being and of the beings. St. Thomas realized that, for all of us, all discourse is but a fragment of a hermeneutic of being." [59]

[59] " Un des mes maitres, le R. P. Carlo Giacon, S.J. attribuait a St. Thomas l'originalite d'avoir distingue philosophie et theologie. Moi j'y ajoute un paradoxe : la theologie etant l'hermeneutique des discours humains et historiques avec lesquels Dieu a revele !es mysteres du salut, pour St. Thomas la philosophie est l'hermeneutique de cette langue exclusive de Dieu, dont !es mots sont !es choses *(solits Deus potest ereare),* c'est-a-dire l'hermeneutique de l'etre et des etres. St. Thomas s'est rendu compte que, pour nous tous, tout discours n'est qu'un fragment d'une hermeneutique de l'etre" *[L'orighialite linguistique,* p. 78 (my translation)].

BOOK REVIEWS

Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. By IRIS MURDOCH. Harmondsworth: Allen Lane; New York: Viking, 1992. $35.00.

Dame Iris Murdoch is familiar to most people as a witty and engaging novelist whose twenty-four books of fiction can be read on a variety of levels. They are wonderful stories, but the philosophically acute reader will also enjoy Murdoch's judgments, polemics, and in-house jokes about philosophers and philosophical views.

Comparatively few people are aware of Murdoch's previous scholarly studies: *Sartre, Romantic Rationalist, The Sovereignty of the Good, The Fire and the Sun; and Acastos.* Even so, those familiar with these books will recognize the profound impact she has had on debates within moral philosophy. She has been at the forefront of the movement that has rehabilitated the central importance of such notions as goodness, the Good, virtue, and the moral life as a journey.

So it is not surprising that Murdoch has returned to the genre of philosophical argument to advance her views on the relationship between metaphysics and morals. But it *is* surprising that her argument exhibits neither the clarity of thought characteristic of the analytic philosophy in which she was trained nor the dramatic narrative of her novels.

Indeed the book reads like a collage of lecture notes, complete with extensive quotations from other people's thoughts with minimal commentary. Further, the chapter titles (e.g., " Fact and Value," " Schopenhauer," " Consciousness and Thought-I," " Derrida and Structuralism," " Consciousness and Thought-II," "Notes on Will and Duty," " Axioms, Duties, Eros," " Void ") shed little light on the overall structure or argument of the book. One cannot help but have the impression that Murdoch spent less time crafting the argument of this book than she does in crafting the story line and characters of her novels.

This is not to say, of course, that there is not much to be learned from Murdoch's perspective. She is remarkably erudite, and her discussion of various themes, figures, and issues often yields fascinating insights. But the whole is considerably less than the sum of its often interesting parts. I have already suggested that this is partly because of the structure and style in which the book is written. But the book

is also disappointing, and perhaps more determinatively, because of the overall perspective she seeks to deploy and defend.

Readers of Murdoch's work have heretofore often wondered about the relationship between her avowed Platonism and her interest in Christianity. *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals* has the virtue of clarifying that relationship, hut the result is unpersuasive.

At the heart of Murdoch's Platonism is her recasting of the allegory of the cave from *The Republic.* The moral life is an arduous struggle to ascend from the cave (represented, as in her earlier works, by " the fat, relentless ego ") by a dispossession of the self so that we can apprehend a little less imperfectly the perfect form of the Good. As Murdoch puts it,

> Plato assumes the internal relation of value, truth, cogmtion. Virtue (as compassion, humility, courage) involves a desire for and achievement of truth instead of falsehood, reality instead of appearance. Goodness involves truth.seeking knowledge and *ipso facto* a discipline of desire. ' Getting things right ', as in meticulous grammar or mathematics, is truth-seeking as virtue. Learning anything properly demands (virtuous) attention. Here the idea of *truth* plays a crucial role (as it does also in Kant) and reality emerges as the object of truthful vision, and virtuous action as the product of such vision. This is a picture of the omnipresence of morality and evaluation in human life (p. 39).

Such a depiction ought to resonate quite deeply with Christians, something not lost on Murdoch when she writes a few pages earlier: "There are innumerable points at which we have to detach ourselves, to change our orientation, to redirect our desire and refresh and purify our energy, to keep on looking in the right direction: to attend upon the grace that comes through faith " (p. 25) .

But Murdoch's "grace" and her "truth-seeking as virtue," among other themes, involve something quite different from what Christians have typically meant by such notions. Murdoch does not simply wish to say that God is Good; she wants to *replace* talk of God with talk of the Good. Metaphysics, according to Murdoch, is a gifted thinker's engagement with the Good which, while independent of the self, is also not transcendent in any sense similar to what Christians say of God. Talk of this " immanent " Good is indispensable to an adequate account of morality, but we can and more importantly *should* dispense with talk of God.

Moralists, she suggests, can give an adequate and coherent account of morality by developing metaphysical metaphors about the Good and ignoring or abandoning references to God. Indeed Murdoch follows Schopenhauer in being attracted to Buddhism as a tradition that talks about the Good without reference to a personal God.

In addition, Murdoch thinks we in the West can dispense with talk

of God because traditional Christianity is fading, and along with it, belief in a " supernatural " God. It is to be replaced by a " demythologized " Christianity which " takes leave of God." Setting aside the empirical dubiousness of her claim that Christianity is " fading," Murdoch's theological perspective here seems most influenced by a rather peculiar and provincial British intellectual tradition identified with such figures as A. J. Ayer and John A. T. Robinson. One has to wonder about the theological sophistication of a book on " metaphysics and morals " and on issues of " God " and " Good " which devotes more space to Don Cupitt than to Thomas Aquinas.

Indeed the omission of any discussion of St. Thomas (he is mentioned twice, and only in passing) is a major lacuna of the book. One would think that, at the very least, his work represents a worthy rival whose position is sufficiently similar to require a sustained engagement by Murdoch. But while she provides a thorough discussion of Anselm's ontological argument (which she thinks provides only the necessity of Good-not a proof of divine existence) , Murdoch attends neither to Thomas's critique of the ontological argument nor to Thomas's complex synthesis of the Platonic-Augustinian and the Aristotelian traditions.

Why this is so is unclear. It would seem that, despite Murdoch's recurrent desire to bring theology and philosophy together (as well as her judgment that current intellectual trends are already bringing them together), -0nly a " demythologized " Christian theology is invited to the table.

Perhaps Murdoch's philosophical perspective on the relationship between metaphysics and morals would be more persuasive if it was defended more explicitly in relation to rival viewpoints such as St. Thomas's, *or* if her own judgments about Christianity's contemporary significance did not hang by rather tenuous threads, *or* if she developed a more powerful argument about why belief in a transcendent-yet-immanent Triune God *should* be abandoned as morally dangerous. But in the absence of such accounts, her perspective seems rather arbitrary -and ultimately unsatisfying.

Perhaps the saddest feature of reading this book is that it now becomes more difficult to read Murdoch's wonderful novels and even to re-read her engaging *The Sovereignty of the Good.* Once one has seen the full development of her philosophical perspective in *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals,* it will not be easy to be enchanted once again by Murdoch's storytelling power. That is the unfortunate legacy of a problematic book written by a most provocative author.

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Galileo, Bellarmine and the Bible. By RICHARD J. BLACKWELL. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1991. Pp. 272. $29.95 {cloth).

Although this well-hound, manageable volume, complete with an artistic seventeenth-century dust jacket, has not received an official ecclesiastical "imprimatur," nevertheless, it is (according to this Dominican reviewer) both free from doctrinal error and filled with true and useful historical, philosophical, and theological information. Seemingly no other case in the history of our western intellectual tradition has generated more controversy, more ill feeling, and more mutual misunderstanding across more lines of intellectual, political, and religious division than the "Galileo affair." Few people today are equipped historically, scientifically, philosophically, and theologically to discuss accurately the wide range of issues surrounding this unfortunate incident. A seasoned veteran of the strong historical, philosophical tradition of the Jesuit-run St. Louis University, and himself an active member of the Roman Catholic Church, Richard J. Blackwell, historian of philosophy and philosopher of science, has done a marvelous service to the academic community hy presenting us with this volume.

In this well-researched, well-argued, and very readable manuscript, Blackwell helps to place Galileo's intellectual and ecclesiastical struggle within the broader historical, philosophical, religious, and theological context of rthe late 16th and early 17th centuries. Quoting the words of Olaf Pedersen, Blackwell considers the Galileo affair " not only as an episode in the history of science, but also as an important event in the history of theology" {p. 3). His principal purpose in writing this book is " to study the Galileo affair from this perspective " and, in particular, to understand "the role played by the Bible in the Galileo affair" (p. 3). Without attempting to praise, to blame, or to excuse, Blackwell sets out to understand precisely how it was that the historical, religious, and theological factors came to have such a profound effect on the scientific and philosophical questions of Galileo's time. He argues convincingly that the Roman insistence on upholding the traditional interpretation of certain key biblical passages can he understood adequately only within the historical and religious climate of post-Tridentine theology, Jesuit obedience, and strict adherence to the Thomistic synthesis of philosophy and theology. Toward this end, Blackwell brings together for the first time certain important texts, concepts, and historical arguments that help to alleviate some of the " murkiness " blurring our view of the Galileo affair, and help to make that incident more intelligible to our modern minds.

Blackwell argues that the Roman hierarchy was not so much concerned with the content of the new astronomy as it was determined to reassert itself as the authentic interpreter of Scripture and tradition. According to Blackwell, the new astronomy challenged not only the philosophy of Aristotle and the theology of Thomas Aquinas, but, perhaps more importantly, it challenged the ecclesiastical authority of the Roman hierarchy in its role as interpreter and teacher of the Apostolic faith. How could the new astronomy be anything but a hypothetical model, when it so clearly contradicted the words of Scripture as interpreted by the Church Fathers? How could mere mathematicians and astronomers insist on philosophical propositions that seemed to make the Bible false? No single individual was invested with the authority to interpret the Bible for the whole body of believers, as the Church had so painfully learned from the lessons of the Protestant Reformers. That authority lay solely with the "Church," that is, with the Roman hierarchy, the Pope in union with a council, as was clear from the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent. Moreover, strict obedience was the order of the day as many Jesuit thinkers so agonizingly came to realize.

Blackwell divides his own text into seven chapters: (1) Trent and Beyond; (2) Bellarmine's Views Before the Galileo Affair; (3) Galileo's Detour into Biblical Exegesis; (4) Foscarini's Bombshell; (5) The Bible at Galileo's Trial (6) The Jesuit Dilemma: Truth or Obedience; and (7) Reflections on Truth in Science and in Religion. In the first two chapters, he establishes a context for the Galileo affair by discussing :the theological interpretation and importance of the Council of Trent, especially as concerns ecclesiastical authority, the interpretation of Scripture, and the tradition of the Church Fathers. He singles out for discussion the biblical and cosmological views of Robert Bellarmine, a cardinal, a Jesuit, and perhaps the leading theologian and Churchman of his day. As Blackwell reminds us, Bellarmine was involved in the condemnation of Giordano Bruno, in the controversies over grace and free-will among the Jesuits and Dominicans, and he played a signal role in the " first trial " of Galileo. Moreover, had Bellarmine lived longer, perhaps his personal respect and admiration for Galileo could have prevented the seemingly inevitable show-down between Galileo and the Roman authorities. However, Blackwell points out that it was Bellarmine's own theology, including his strict interpretation of Trent, his emphasis on the importance of authority, and his understanding of " blind obedience " that helped to shape the forces that eventually brought down Galileo and temporarily slowed the advance of scientific and philosophical discourse in the Catholic world.

In chapters three, four, and five, Blackwell discusses the writings,

decrees, and events surrounding the condemnation of Copernican astronomy and the silencing of Galileo in 1616, as well as the disciplining of Galileo in 1633. Blackwell shows that the significant scientific, philosophical, and theological issues were all decided during the " first phase" of the trial in 1615-16. In the second phase of the trial, in 1633, the Church merely reasserted " with both force and frequency " its earlier condemnation of Copernican astronomy and focused its attention instead on " the person of Galileo "–" Was he loyal or was he disobedient? " {p. 131).

In the final two chapters, Blackwell discusses these ecclesiastical decisions concerning Galileo and the new astronomy within the context of the Jesuit notion of obedience and an increasing desire within Roman Catholicism in the 17th century to curtail the divisive effects of the Protestant Reformation. He shows, too, how this emphasis on authority and obedience adversely affected the Jesuit thinkers of the day, who seemed eager to make a place for the new evidence of the senses in the world of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy and theology. Finally, Blackwell considers some contemporary questions concerning the relationships among science, philosophy, and theology, and draws certain parallels between the thoughts, actions, and events of the 17th-century and those of our present age. Indeed, what is the relationship between authority and truth?

Besides his original discussion concerning the role of the Bible in the Galileo affair, Blackwell brings together for us in a relatively extensive series of appendices and in English translation {some for the first time) key documents surrounding the incident. These include a selection from the Decrees of the Council of Trent, Diego .de Zuniga's theologically suspect *Commentary on Job,* a section of Bellarmine's theological masterpiece, *De controversiis de verbo Dei,* Galileo's *Letter to Castelli,* Galileo's correspondence with Pietro Dini, as well as some of Galileo's unpublished notes on science and scripture (written in 1615), along with Foscarini's *Letter* on Copernican astronomy and his *Defense* of that letter, together with an anonymous censor's report on the original letter and Bellarmine's own *Letter to Foscarini.* These texts present us with a convenient opportunity to peruse the documents for ourselves and to see the important role that ecclesiastical authority and biblical interpretation played in the Galileo affair. Galileo and Foscarini tried desperately to convince the Roman authorities that they were making a grave mistake in condemning Copernican astronomy in order to uphold the traditional interpretation of scripture. "Too had," says Blackwell, " that they apparently were unable to see the devastating impact of their actions beyond their Roman world and beyond their own small place in time" (p. 124). And yet was it not precisely he-

cause they perceived the importance of this event and the devastating effects of privatized religion that they in fact insisted on their own authority? Indeed, they were mistaken in this instance, and they have paid dearly for it over the ages, hut it was a sincere concern for truth and for Church unity that guided them on their path. Galileo himself was committed to the same ideals of theological, philosophical, and scientific truth as were the Jesuits, as were the Roman authorities, as were most thinkers of the time. It was this concern for truth that led to this individual conflict, which has had disastrous effects within and without the Catholic world for the last four centuries.

All in all, I think that Blackwell has made a significant contribution to the ongoing discussion of the relationships among science, philosophy, and theology. This is a first-rate treatment of an immensely important historical incident that sheds light on the issues of today. However, I should like to raise several questions about the hook and suggest areas that need clarification and further study. First, I think that Blackwell does not state strongly enough the historical conclusion for which he has presented convincing evidence. He jumps too quickly at the end of the hook from the 17th century to the present day. Had he stayed principally with his understanding of the Galileo case and the surrounding theological climate of the time he could have made his point more forcefully and tied together more clearly several lines of intellectual and historical importance. Secondly, Blackwell's treatment of some of the methodological issues of the 17th century strikes me as somewhat anachronistic. He seems at times to take for granted the contemporary distinctions between science, philosophy, and theology, distinctions which would not have crossed the minds of even the greatest thinkers of that time. Though 17th-century thinkers most assuredly distinguished the realm of faith from the realm of reason, they certainly did not consider the study of nature to he " hypothetical," in the contemporary sense, as Blackwell sometimes hints that Galileo and Foscarini did. In fact, it was their commitment to the human mind's ability to grasp clearly and certainly the secrets of nature that got them into so much trouble in the first place. Galileo hoped to discover the true constitution of the physical universe based on sense experience and necessary reasons or demonstrations. William Wallace's recent work on Galileo's early physical and logical questions is especially helpful in supplementing our understanding of Galileo's use of *suppositiones*, that is, " suppositions " or "hypotheses," in his scientific writings. Bellarmine, Galileo, and most thinkers of the time shared common Aristotelian principles of methodological procedure, whether in natural philosophy, metaphysics, or Christian theology. Thirdly, a fuller discussion of the appendices could have helped to make them more useful for the

reader. Indeed, Blackwell does discuss the context and importance of the documents within his own text However, I think that a short introduction to each selection, including time and context of its authorship, as well as some of its historical or intellectual connections with other writings would have proved helpful. Finally, I perceived a few minor inconsistencies in Blackwell's discussion of the relationship he· tween tradition and Scripture, and his discussion of the " literal " interpretation of Scripture. He argues that the problem with the new astronomy is that it contradicts the Scriptures and not the unwritten Catholic tradition. Yet he spends a considerable time discussing the Patristic interpretation of Scripture, which he seems to say is part of the " unwritten " Catholic tradition. Also, at times he seems not to keep in mind clearly enough the precise meaning of " literal " interpretation of the Bible. Indeed, as Blackwell points out, the literal sense can be figurative, that is, metaphorical, e.g., " God's wrath " or " God's right hand." However, when he detects an increasing literalism in the Church's interpretation of Scripture, Blackwell seems to forget this point. The more " literal " interpretation of passages dealing with the motion of the sun seems to me a mistake about the true literal meaning of the text, rather than an increasing emphasis on the literal sense, as distinct from the metaphorical or figurative sense. However, these are only minor points and do not detract from the meaning and importance of Blackwell's text.

In some ways, we have only recently begun to face the facts of the Galileo affair in an honest and scientific manner. Much more work needs to be done on the scientific, methodological, philosophical, and theological context of this history-shaping event. Blackwell's discussion of the role of the Bible in the Galileo affair is a significant contribution towards our further understanding of why this incident happened in the way that it did-indeed, why it happened at all. This book is accesible to theologians, philosophers, historians, and interested scientists. It could be used in graduate courses, as well as in upper-level undergraduate courses, dealing with issues of the historical relation· ships among science, philosophy, and theology. For all who are interested in coming to a true understanding of the Galileo affair within its 16th- and 17-century context, this hook is a must read.

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Salvation Outside the Church? Tracing the History of the Catholic Response. By FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN. New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1992. Pp. i + 224. $12.95 (paper).

The subtitle of the volume describes well its purpose and content. The author surveys in chronological order, beginning with the earliest ecclesiastical writers and ending with John Paul II, the various interpretations of the axiom *extra ecclesiam nulla salus.* What prompted Sullivan to undertake a historical rather than systematic approach in his volume is the conviction that without taking into account the historical and cultural factors that conditioned the formulation of this axiom it is impossible to make sense of the shift from the exclusivism of the pre-Vatican II Church to the inclusiveness of Vatican II and post-Vatican II theology with regard to the salvation of those who are not members of ,the Roman Catholic Church.

The principle that guides Sullivan's attempt to disclose the *meaning* embodied in the manifold formulations of the axiom " there is no salvation outside the Church" is Pope John XXHI's distinction between " the substance of the ancient doctrine of the deposit of faith " and " the way in which it is presented," and the more recent emphasis of the Declaration *Mysterium Ecclesiae* (1973) on the historical condition affecting the expression of divine revelation.

As a historical study, *Salvation Outside the Church?* is an excellent continuation of Louis Caperan's two-volume work *Le probleme du salut des infideles,* which is still unavailable in English. Obviously an overview of almost two thousand years of theological discussion of this problem has to be highly selective if one is not to miss the forest for the trees, and Sullivan's choice of authors as well as of historical periods for discussion is judiciously made. If a complaint is to be made in this regard, it is that he has focused too much attention on magisterial documents, and Roman documents at that, and not enough on contemporary theology. True, he devotes a chapter to the theory of " anonymous Christians," espoused mainly by Karl Rahner (chapter 10), and defends it against criticisms by Henri de Lubac, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Hans Kiing, and Max Seckler. He is well aware that Rahner's theory has become the position of mainstream Catholic theology and cites authors who support it in one way or another (p. 181). However, a book that claims to present " the Catholic response " to the problem posed by the axiom *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* should, one would expect, have discussed in greater detail the various positions of contemporary Catholic theologians on this issue. It is to be fervently hoped that Sullivan will take up this task in his next book.

Sullivan's basic thesis is that the substance underlying the various negative formulations of the axiom *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* is the positive belief ithat " God has assigned to the church a necessary role in the accomplishment of his plan for the salvation of humanity " (p. 12). Such a thesis is, of course, neither new nor startling. Hans Kling had already said that much in his 1967 *Die Kirche* (English translation, p. 318).

What is helpful in Sullivan's account is his explanation of both the intent of those who affirmed this axiom with its apparent exclusiveness and the limitations that prevented them from perceiving the universality of God's saving grace. With regard to intent, Sullivan shows con· vincingly that the patristic usage of the axiom is intended as a warning for those Christians who had separated themselves from the *catholica* either by schism or by heresy that they must remain within it in order to be saved, whereas ithe medieval usage is intended to warn pagans and Jews that they should accept the message of the Gospel now that it had been announced to them. With regard to limitations, Sullivan singles out two: the geographical and the psychological. On the one hand, there was before the discovery of America the conviction that the world was identical with Christian Europe. This belief led theologians to postulate that the Gospel had been spread throughout the world. On the other hand, their ignorance of the dynamics of human choice caused rthem to impute bad faith and guilt to all those who re· fused to accept the Gospel.

The shift from the pessimism of the pre-Vatican II Church to the optimism espoused by Vatican II and post-Vatican II theologians regarding the possibility of salvation for non-Roman Catholics is credited by Sullivan to two factors: Vatican H's teaching on the hierarchy of truths (the primacy being granted to God's universal will to save rather than to the necessity of baptism and the Church as means of salvation) and the broadening of theological horizons brought about by ecumeni· cal and interreligious dialogues.

As a historical study, *Salvation OutsUle the Church?* is a helpful survey of a vexed issue in ecclesiology and the theology of grace. It accomplishes what it sets out to do, wiith clarity of exposition, economy of expression, and fairness of judgment, qualities that grace Sullivan's other works such as *Magisterium* and *The Church We Believe In.* As has been pointed out above, Sullivan's basic thesis is neither startling nor new, but theological merit often does not lie in radicality and novelty. One is grateful to Sullivan for having shown that the nega· tive-sounding formula " No salvation outside the Church" is " only one way, and a very imperfect way at that, in which Christians have expressed their belief that God has given to his church a necessary part to play in his plan to save the world " (p. 204).

Excellent as Sullivan's book is, it has raised a host of questions which, though it cannot be fairly expected to discuss them at length, much less to resolve, are at the heart of ongoing reflections about the possibility of salvation outside the visible Church. Such questions concern the concrete ways in which God works in the lives of peoples of different religions, the unique and normative role of Christ in the history of salvation, the function of non-Christian religions as mediations of salvation, and so on. And the debate on these issues rages on among Catholic as well as non-Catholic theologians! One wishes that Sullivan had given a fuller account of this debate which is central in interreligious dialogue.

More directly connected with the method and approach of the book itself are the questions of dogmatic development and the hermeneutics of doctrines. To put it more concretely, was Leonard Feeney, with whose ironic fate the book opens and ends, simply expressing the ancient doctrine of the deposit of the faith concerning salvation in the Church in a negative and imperfect fashion? Or was he (and more importantly, popes and official teachers of the faith) wrong in affirming the exclusiveness implicit in the formula *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* (which apparently they did) ? H the latter, then the issues of infallible magisterium and dogmatic ' development ' raise their ugly heads, and one has to come to terms with them.

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Character. By JOEL KUPPERMAN. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp. vi + 193.

The two theses of J. Kupperman's *Character* are "that character is of central importance to ethics and that ethical philosophy will have to be restructured once this is understood " (p. 3). The argument has three stages: the first three chapters explicate the notion of character and its relationship to the notions of the self and of responsibility; the next two consider the dominant, rival theories in contemporary ethics; the last two address the topics of value and the place of character in ethics. In two appendices, Kupperman applies the substantive conclusions of the work to the issues of moral psychology and the education of character. A brief review cannot communicate the many nuances of argument and the precise and lucid style that distinguish the book. While certain parts of the argument seem problematic, or at least in

need of further development, the work deserves the attention of professional ethicists and of inquisitive non-professionals.

The opening chapter offers the following definition of character: "X's character is X's normal pattern of thought and action, especially with respect to concerns and commitments in matter affecting the happiness of others or of X, and most especially in relation to moral choices" (p. 17). In the second chapter, Kupperman considers three views: Enduring Self (ES), No Self (NS), and Constructed Self (CS). The ES appears *to* be seH-evidently true. But what exactly is the self and where is it to he found? It is difficult to fix the abiding " I " amid or behind the flux of our self-experience. On the other hand, even Hume's skepticism concerning the self presumes that " we know where to look " for it. The " I " is simultaneously obvious and elusive, stable and unstable (p. 40). Thus, both the ES and the NS are problematic, The third option is the Constructive Self, Kupperman holds that, as children, we begin with a "protoseH." The full-fledged self is often the result of orientations, habits, and traits of character developed before one has even begun deliberating about the kind of character one would like to have. Like the self, character is constructed mostly through unreflective choices. But this raises questions about responsibility, which is the focus of the third chapter. If we have not willed to be the sorts of persons we now are, how can we be held responsible for who we are or what we do? Actions do not " flow from character like water from a pipe " (p, 59) . Over long periods of time and through a reorganization of large portions of our life, we can change our character; short of that, we are capable in particular circumstances of altering characteristic ways of behaving,

The subsequent two chapters provide criticisms of alternative ethical theories: Kantian and utilitarian theories, as well as those of Rawls and virtue ethicists. The former pair share the same weaknesses, Their decision procedures presume an inherited morality that educates agents to identify certain features of experience as salient; in spite of claims to scientific rigor, the procedures yield " indeterminate . . , results." The theories also emphasize single decisions to the exclusion of continuity of commitment. Instead, priority must he given, as it is in character ethics, to a person's sensitivity, to her or his awareness that a case is morally problematic and to the " agent's conscientiousness, as reflected in the willingness to reflect seriously on what seems morally problematic." Rawls's theory is also reductionistic. It fosters a lowest common denominator view of values and dogmatically excludes " the promotion of character and various virtues-intellectual, aesthetic, and moral " from the supposedly value free original position. While Rawls's view is clearly antithetical to the concerns of char-

acter ethics, it might seem that virtue ethics would be congenial. Indeed, " character " and " virtue " are often used interchangeably in contemporary ethics. Virtue ethics is indeed noteworthy for its " implicit reference to what agents are like." It provides criteria for the identification and appraisal of certain classes of actions, but it " breaks down in cases in which a number of factors of different sorts are relevant" (p. 107). In spite of its focus upon agency, virtue ethics tends towards impersonal universalization, since virtues are identical from one person to another. Character, on the contrary, underscores the particularities and distinctiveness of the life of *this* person, with his or her specific "concerns and commitments" (p. 9).

Much of contemporary ethics is preoccupied with questions of value. Kupperman argues that value should be linked to character. The vacuity of much contemporary discussion of value can be traced to a reluctance to impose values. The good life is thereby equated with happiness and happiness with pleasure or subjective satisfaction. Kupperman counters that happiness is not the same as pleasure and that the good life includes more than happiness (he notes that Aristotelian *eudaimonia* is inadequately translated as happiness) . The possession of excellences of character, for example, perception, experience, and refined judgment, makes a person a more authoritative judge concerning value. Thus, " strength and goodness of character matter to the values available to a person " (p. 115) . The flourishing of character is personal; one should welcome an "antiphony of values" (p. 143). Character traits such as sensitivity and perceptiveness enable one to appreciate rival visions of the good life and prepare one to deal with unanticipated circumstances and "hard cases." Strong character is needed for confidence in, continuity of, and satisfaction with one's self. While a social setting may be necessary for the development of character, " more creative forms of character are more likely to develop in a pluralistic society than in a tight-knit community" (p. 111).

Although numerous issues in the book invite exploration, the differences between Kupperman's character theory and virtue ethics is perhaps the most promising. A proponent of virtue ethics could embrace the basic criticisms of neo-Kantian and utilitarian theories. Most virtue ethicists, for example, Macintyre, and Hauerwas, have overcome the compartmentalization of the virtues through the narrative unity of human life. What, then, distinguishes Kupperman's view? Kupperman's view seems in some cases too close to virtue ethics and in others too far from it. The universalist critique of virtue ethics, for instance, seems equally applicable to character theory. While Kupperman holds that justice is for the most part an artificial virtue, he also thinks that a " social order can reasonahly be judged from the outside " and that

certain violations of justice can be appreciated without " any back· ground of social conventions" (p. 95). The cases he cites-racial and gender bias and the failure to return kindness-may he unproblematic for us, hut is this not because we have been tutored by the institutions of modern liberalism? A strong case can be made, moreover, that our general agreement vanishes when it comes to particular cases. This raises a larger question: can character ethics-with its repudiation of impersonal decision procedures-provide a basis for even limited universalism? A less impersonal route would be that of Thomistic natural law, but Kupperman's meager attention to personhood and his emphasis upon the self as a " metaphysical term of art" makes this an unlikely route.

Kupperman seems intent on securing limited universalism as a nee· essary framework for pluralism; the view is central to his thesis that moral education cannot substitute values clarification for absolutism, at least not in its initial stage (pp. 174-78). It is not clear, however, that the primacy of the language of " values " is compatible with an emphasis on strength of character. Kupperman concedes that an "anti- phony of values " may make the achievement of strong character more difficult. He fails, however, to entertain seriously the possibility that the pluralism of post-modern liberalism might well generate a society of Nietzsche's last men, with no more than a " qualified loyalty to any- thing " (p. 137) . While the argument of *Character* may not he fully persuasive, it nonetheless marks an important contribution to recent Hterature attempting to show that liberalism need not be indifferent to questions of the good and of human excellence.

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The Magic of Ritual: Our Need for Liberating Rites that Transform Our Lives and Our Communities. By TOM F. DRIVER. San Francisco: Harper, 1991. Pp. 270. $19.95.

Tom Driver, former theater critic and author of hooks about theater and religion, is Paul Tillich Professor of Theology and Culture at Union Theological Seminary, New York. He is also an active leader in the Ritual Studies section of the American Academy of Religion. This engagingly written book reflects all of these vocations and interests. When he writes compellingly that we suffer from a void of ritual that could give shape and meaning to human life he critiques the view that

Christianity is primarily about theology and doctrine as well as the shape and content of the liturgy as presently celebrated in many Christian churches. On the one hand, this book is an apologia for the role of ritual in Christian life; on the other, it is a trenchant critique of what and how liturgical churches ritualize their faith. In the Introduction he states that by design this work is about the " deep human longing for ritual; to interpret it in the light of our physical, social, polemical, sexual, moral, aesthetic, and religious existence; and to urge a reform of our ritual life, especially in religion, so that our longing for ritual and our longing for freedom may come together " (4). He poignantly observes that the book is a response to "ritual boredom" (7) and that much Christian liturgical practice " has become moribund " (11).

The book's fairly evenly distributed three parts concern "ritual pathways," a cursory survey of animal, human and church ritual behavior (chapters 1 to 3), " modalities of performance," relating ritual to theater and reflecting on ritual's relationship to confession and ethics (chapters 5 and 6), and" ritual's social gifts," reflecting on the results of ritual: order, community and transformation of participants (chapters 7 to 9). In many ways the book's Conclusion and two Appendices betray Driver's slant on the state of contemporary Christian liturgy and ritual studies by offering critiques of the celebration of some Christian liturgies (Conclusion and Appendix A) and of the work of the ritual theorist Victor Turner (Appendix B). While there is nothing really new in this last part of the book, these sections offer a particularly clear view of where Driver stands, what his prejudices are, and how current his scholarship really is. Reading these last sections first would offer theologians not trained in ritual studies a bridge from their disciplines and experience of liturgy to the " purer " treatment of ritual in general in the book's first nine chapters.

At the same time, these last sections are highly problematic, polemical, and debatable. The concluding chapter " Christian Sacraments as the Performance of Freedom" exemplifies Driver's concern throughout the book that rituals are open to ongoing change, that they are less about communal cohesion than liberation from institutions that are too tightly knit, and that the poignant critique from the contemporary women's movement should serve to critique the oppressive structures of much Christian liturgy. That he relies so fully on Juan Luis Segundo's dated book *The Sacraments Today,* written from a Latin American perspective before the envisioned postconciliar liturgical inculturation even began to take place, raises certain cautions about the method and sources used in the rest of his research. That he includes "Fifteen Maxims for the Planning of Christian Rituals" (212) as

part of this chapter would seem to mitigate the argument of his opening three chapters about the givenness of rituals in human and church life. The fact that these " maxims " ignore what is foundational to Christian liturgy and sacramcnts-Christology, Pneumatology, and ecclesiology-makes them less compelling as guides for Christian ritual construction and celebration.

In many ways the book's first three chapters are the most important. They introduce the problematic of modern religionists' longing for and search for " liberating rituals " and their not finding them in church liturgy (chapter 1), they show that both animals and humans use rituals to structure life (chapter 2), and that part of humanity's "loss of balance " at the end of the millennium is that it has lost its way in appreciating and performing rituals (chapter 3). The book begins to lose cogency from a Christian Hturgical perspective when the contrast between " priest " and " shaman " (chapter 4) ignores an equally central discussion about the role of the Christian liturgical community which has been initiated into and which is gathered for its covenant renewal through liturgy, whoever leads the service and whatever his or her primary job description.

A central feature of Driver's book derives from his explicit effort to connect ritual and the theater. But the flaw here is related to the priest/shaman discussion as primary ritual actant in the previous chapter. The parallel between ritual and ,theater is quite inappropriate given the fact that theater (even in its most participatory contemporary exprcssions) is predicated of " actors " or " performers " and an " audience." This simply cannot be the paradigm for evaluating ritual hecause in essence ritual behavior is inclusive of the whole community. Even those who " watch " the acting oui: of the rites of pmisage Driver describes are themselves at least committed to them (they do not critique them as in theater) and they largely join in their enactment. Certainly Christian liturgical ritual is enacted by and with the whole assembly. More particularly, the emphasis in the postconciliar liturgical reforms in the Catholic church, calling for the " full, conscious and active participation " of the whole assembly in liturgy requires that the actor/ spectator dichotomy be overcome in theology and transcended in practice.

In many ways Driver has done his homework. He has researched and cites the most commonly acknowledged contemporary ritual theorists (in English) from Arnold van Gennep to Ronald Grimes. Happily, for Driver's thesis here and for method in liturgy studies today, conversation with ritual theorists has become a constitutive part of liturgical and sacramental studies across denominational lines. What would have helped Driver's argument here would have been more explicit at-

tention to the psychological factors that are part and parcel of ritual celebration and human, as well as Christian, identity. A greater familiarity with foreign language sources, especially on this latter point, would have made the book more cogent and complete.

The academic theological community is still searching for ever more adequate methodologies for ritual studies. The fact that the American Academy of Religion and the North American Academy of Liturgy have ongoing study groups concerned with this topic is a very encouraging sign. Harper is to be thanked for publishing this book as one attempt to articulate how ritual studies are not for the theorist only. As Driver repeatedly asserts, the study of ritual is essential for human survival and Christian vitality.

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Mary For AU Christians. By JOHN MACQUARRIE. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1991. Pp. xiii + 160.

In the preface, John Macquarrie expresses his purpose for writing this collection of papers very clearly and concisely: "... the ecumenical spirit of recent years has been encouraging Christians to try to understand and appreciate one another's traditions better, so this book is ' for all Christians ' and is written in the hope that they may find in Mary resources for reconciliation rather than conflict." Fittingly enough most of the chapters of this book were originally papers given by Macquarrie to members of the Ecumenical Society of the Blessed Virgin Mary (ESBVM) to which he has belonged since 1970, only a few years following its foundation in England. The foreword to this book by Dom Alberic Stacpoole, one of its contemporary leaders, provides a helpful description of the origin, growth, and ecumenical effectiveness of ESBVM which gives the reader the proper context for the spirit and doctrinal contents of the book. Part Two, " An Ecumenical Office of Mary -the Mother of Jesus" and several supplementary appendices for options in reciting this Office, shows that ESBVM is very much motivated by devotional practices as well as doctrinal dialogues.

"God and the Feminine," the initial essay, was originally a paper delivered by Macquarrie at ESBVM's Third International Ecumenical Congress held at Birmingham during Easter Week 1975. It is a masterpiece of theological precision and a balanced interpretation concerning an issue which is all too seldom characterized by either quality.

In the movement toward greater equality of the sexes which would produce more freedom and dignity for women, it seems that the most vociferous pro-feminists and anti-feminists rarely hit the happy medium in this complex and highly emotional issue. Macquarrie, on the other hand, makes superb use of the Judaeo-Christian Tradition to accomplish just that, looking, for example, to the ethical monotheism of the Old Testament in opposition to the pagan fertility cults, to the fact that there were women among the disciples of Jesus, one of whom was the first witness to his resurrection, and to St. Paul's teaching that the differences between male and female do not really count in the new creation of Christ. Macquarrie points out the indispensable role of Mary in the New Testament scheme of salvation as most significant for the authentic liberation of women. It is his thesis that the "... study of the Marian tradition can help Christians reach a fuller and more balanced understanding of the feminine in their religion, from the theological question about the significance of sexuality for our understanding of God to practical questions about the roles of women in the modern Church" (p. 23). According to Macquarrie, it is not linguistic innovation but only sound teaching that will show the triune God revealed in Jesus Christ, Son of God and Son of Mary, as communicating divine recreating love to us ,through the feminine as well as the masculine. This reviewer does feel obliged to raise a question about 'the author's use of theological terminology when he refers to the three divine Persons as "three distinct modes of being" (p. 21) which seems to lend itself to a modalist or Sabellian misinterpretation of the mystery of the real distinction between the three divine Persons within the one divine nature. Perhaps it was done out of sympathy with the Barthian and Rahnerian objections against the use of the notion of "person" as an analogy, hut their quest for other analogical approaches to the Trinitarian mystery probably created more problems than solutions, one of which is a flirtation with some form of "modalism."

The second essay, "Mary in the New Testament," is also refreshing to read, mainly because Macquarrie is able to detect a few traces of the historical Mary as the biblical basis for authentic development of Marian doctrine and devotion in the Tradition. His carefully drawn conclusion is that there is a solid scriptural foundation for reflecting upon Mary's theological significance. Then in the four following essays of Part One in the hook, Macquarrie proceeds to address the critical ecumenical question of just how far such development can travel on the road of post-biblical Tradition.

He begins this difficult journey by reflecting upon the Roman Catholic dogma of the Immaculate Conception defined in 1854 by Pope

Pius IX. Macquarrie clearly asserts: " I do not myself see any irresoluble conflict between the doctrine of an Immaculate Conception (at least as it will be expounded here) and the full humanity and freedom of Mary as of the same race as Eve" (p. 54). And it does appear that his explanation of the dogma is in substantial agreement with its definition in 1854. Macquarrie does have a more positive way of expressing this revealed mystery than " Mary was preserved from the stain of original sin." He prefers putting it, "Mary was preserved in a right relatedness to God " (p. 71), meaning that she was ever completely receptive to her Son's redeeming and recreating grace from the very first instant of her personal conception. Thus there is no conflict between her receptive and redeemed righteousness and his creative, innovative, and redeeming righteousness.

The fourth essay, " Glorious Assumption," is the only one in this collection that did not appear originally as a paper for ESBVM, but was the Assumption Day Lecture delivered at Walsingham Parish Church. Macquarrie is of the opinion that it is the issue of authority rather than any deep division over the person of Mary that makes the dogma of the Assumption ecumenically controversial. Pope Pius XII solemnly defined it as a truth revealed by God and so to be believed by all members of the Roman Catholic Church during the Holy Year 1950. Of course there are other ecumenical problems concerning this dogma such as the lack of any clear and explicit biblical evidence or of early patristic testimony which must be taken into account. But Macquarrie does describe with spiritual fervor and theological acumen his own pilgrimage of faith regarding this dogma, having come to perceive it as significant for the inseparability between our ascended Lord and his body the Church upon earth. Mary is the first moment in the glorious assumption of the whole Church (p. 91).

"Mary Co-redemptrix," the fifth essay, addresses in a special way two terms that have had profound influence upon Marian doctrine and devotion, namely, " co-redemptrix" and "mediatrix." The first term has virtually disappeared from the religious and theological vocabulary of contemporary Catholicism since Vatican II, which did not use it even once in its teaching about Mary. The second, while used once in chapter 8 of the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, was very carefully nuanced so as to prevent the misinterpretation that Mary's mediation is on the same level as the unique mediatorship of her Son. Macquarrie proceeds, however, in a very positive manner to show that such terms, while they have been ahused, admit of a proper meaning that must be preserved. Both " co-redemptrix " and " mediatrix " designate our response to the gift of grace which enables us to cooperate in working out our salvation and in serving as channels or in-

struments of redemption for others. Mary is the primary exemplar of receiving her Son's redeeming love in freedom and of wholeheartedly mediating his graces to all he has redeemed.

The final essay, "Mary and Modernity," is most timely for American Christians and ecumenists. It is a very worthwhile attempt to compare and contrast the secular triad of virtues, liberty, equality, and fraternity with the Christian triad of theological virtues, faith, hope, and love, especially as they are exemplified in Mary. Although this approach perceives Mary more as a " sign of contradiction " to our secularistic culture, she will help us to avoid the extremes of confusing true freedom with licence, genuine equality with egalitarianism, and authentic fraternity with collectivism by helping inspire in us the really liberating values of her Son's Gospel. Everyone can benefit immensely from the intelligent reading of this book.

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Dieu et l'etre d'apres Thomas d'Aquin et Hegel. By EMILIO BRITO. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991. Pp. 422. 245 francs.

Sprung from premature fears of post-modernity or from an ignorant nostalgia for a monoform Catholicism which never existed, universal dismissals of " modernity " still appear occasionally in Catholic journals. They recall ,the neo-scholastic te:xitbooks prior to Vatican II in whose pages the " *moderni* " (among whom were numbered not only *"Kantiani"* but *"Hegeliani* ") were dismissed by authors who, having read a few pages, were incapable of grasping the basic directions of philosophy from Herder to Heidegger. Emilio Brito, S.J., however, follows in the line of the French and German Jesuits: through this century they have sustained a varied dialogue, in philosophy and theology, between Thomas Aquinas and the important figures of modern philosophy. His two works on Hegel's Christology, and a third large study of God and creation in Schelling are now followed by this comparative work.

The theology of Aquinas and the philosophy of Hegel are like two galaxies. Do they move past each other at a distance, or do they move through each other guarding a proper identity with similar forces and shared motifs? Brito has chosen one theme within these two vast realms of thought: his topic (and the book's title can mislead) is God; 'being'

is present as a stimulus to our reflection about God. After an introduction on recent interpretations of Hegel, particularly by Catholics, pages which should be read by all interested in contemporary theology, there are three sections: " the knowledge and naming of God," " the divine substance and the cycle of its attributes," and " the operations of absolute spirit." The chapters in each of the three areas present Aquinas's and then Hegel's thought, and sometimes a section of further comparison. At the end of the work Brito offers a conclusion ("God's Goodness") and a postlude ("God's Beauty"). Finally there is a *"Resume."* According to Brito, Aquinas's thought is clear (his Aristotelian logic is readily understandable) , and his emphasis lies with the divine transcendence. Despite the process-format of the *Summa theologiae* and the traces of history in the headship of Christ, the diversity of sacraments, and the theologies of faith and natural law, his modest description of movement in God and in God's world of beings stands in contrast to the unleashed and unresolved development penetrating Hegel's *Geist.*

The concluding " *Resume* " of nine pages is particularly valuable as it brings together the author's synthetic insights into Aquinas and Hegel (one might hope that at least it would appear in translation) . The following excerpt displays its balance and clarity.

> The God of the *Summa* tends to stay back from mediation, letting itself exist in a certain exteriority, while the Hegelian absolute " raises out" the determinations it posits only by also absorbing them negatively. In the same vein, the Hegelian parousia of the negative abolishes absolutely the distance maintained by the inexpressible in language. In an opposite direction, the originating positivity of the God of Thomas grounds the irreducible presence of a reality represented in discourse. If he is a stranger to this approach and more respectful of mystery, nonetheless, Hegel rejoins Thomas in refusing agnosticism and in (accepting) the speculative vision of absolute truth. Despite the difference in terminology, the Hegelian Idea and the Thomasian Being come together in the measure that they articulate the Self (subject, substance) as a unity of moments in theory and praxis (the True, the Good) (p. 381).

Hegel receives more attention, more commentary, and more employment of secondary literature, for modern philosophy is Brito's area of expertise. The rapid movement from one of Thomas's works to another can imply that his *corpus* is angelic in its lack of development. A theologian might look for more precision and exposition concerning the relation between theology and philosophy, or grace and nature. One would not want to restore a neo-Thomist mentality where philosophy and theology were confused, or a " Christian philosophy " where segments of Aquinas were stripped of references to their polar star, Christ, and to their ground, grace. Brito's hook is far from that. But

it can he noted that God must ultimately be understood within Aquinas's entire thought as the source of Trinitarian missions becoming present to people and not just as a being with a sublime simplicity and immutability who in the past set forth an array of beings. Revelation and salvation in Hegel are mentioned: but they do not quite escape the evolving depth of an incomplete God, nor do they adorn and expand a human being whose particularity and limits are more than tragedy and opposition. From this dialogue admirably advanced by Brito's book, we understand why Aquinas must always be preserved from the mechanics (never more exciting than when applied to God) which neo-scholasticisms compulsively construct, and why Hegel must be studied for the dynamic of his thought-forms but not for his conclusions without resolution.

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Work in the Spirit. By MmosLAvVoLF. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp. xviii+ 252. $32.50 (cloth).

Miroslav Volf initiates his theological inquiry by exammmg the contemporary situation of work, its transformation from a world of agricultural and industrial production into a system of information technologies. He attentively notes that this contemporary technology brings with it both advantages and disadvantages for workers. He also examines crises such as unemployment and discrimination which ac· company employment today. Despite both the ambiguity which accompanies the change in production and the threatening uncertainties caused by the current crises, he nevertheless emphasizes the duality of work: people consistently find their work to be both curse and delight. VoH wishes to emphasize this twin feature so that the theology he fashions WM he realistic and active.

Volf pursues a theology of work which can account for varied developments in quite different economies and for the needs of succeeding generations. Thus Volf describes the activity of work in terms which are invariant with respect to time and place. By a theology which is adequate to this global concept of work, he means one " developed on the basis of a specifically Christian soteriology and eschatology . . .. (79). While Volf maintains an attention to the Christian traditions in recalling soteriology, he downplays a creation-based understanding of work in favor of one which is eschatological. Work is a cooperation with God in the transforming of the world on the way toward the new

creation of the end-time. Volf's laying-out the transformative character of work is insightful. It avoids the recurrent consequences of a theology of work based solely on creation: effort without limit and sullen acceptance of the toil.

How does he accomplish this? First, he explores the lodes of dominant theoretical understandings of work by examining the .thought of A. Smith and K. Marx. Second, he presses for a pneumatological understanding of work. That is, he holds that rthe presence of the Spirit is key to human activity (133). Volf makes use of the theological tradition of the charisms in order to present more completely how human effort and divine activity can cooperate in work. Charisms are personal capacities which achieve development through interaction with the Spirit (112 and 130). He <introduces the variety and suppleness integral to charisms so as to correct the understanding of work as vocation. In his observation of industrial and information societies, Volf recognizes that persons often change :their j ohs or may he engaged in several occupations at one time. He reminds ,theologians that ' vocation,' in contradistinction to its frequent understanding as a single, lifelong assignment to a specific occupation and standing, is a call to a person in a particular place and time (109). The particular assign· ment is not the governing element; rather, the person who works receives a call to which his or her talents make an adequate response feasible.

Volf carefully notes that a charism extends benefits to others even beyond the circle of co-religionists **(Ill).** In addition, Volf's position makes possible an attentiveness to differences among individuals and changes within persons. It remains uncertain, however, whether his global concept of work can encompass the heterogeneity which results from the variation of different structures and systems. For example, unemployment is not a univocal concept across regional and national lines. The heritage expressed in the spiritual and corporal works of mercy could further stimulate both the development of the attention to diversity, which the charisms themselves welcome, and a movement of the pneumatological theology of work away from any self-restriction to believers.

Volf's presentation contributes significantly to the understanding of work activity by situating it within ecological processes. Not only do the activities of persons cooperate with the Spirit who moves the entire world to a new creation, hut also the Spirit imbues and acts within nature itself. Indeed, the reading of Marx has taught Vol£ the perduring naturalness of the power of persons in their working: "... When human beings work on nature, nature, through them, works on itself " (57). Through these two conceptual moves, Volf avoids the conse-

quences of the invidious disjunotion between working persons and their world, namely, ignorant indifference or intentional destruction valued as an achievement. The restoration from past destruction wreaked upon nature, the maintaining of a constant protection of it, and the securing of its future preservation provide both guides and goals for work. In Volf's careful approach to the faith-informed evaluation of the relation between work and nature, there is promise of fruitful dialogue with Pope John Paul's interpretation in *Laborem Exercens* of the book of Genesis's "subduing of nature."

As a way of evaluating work, Volf sketches a moral anthropology by laying out true and false needs (152-154). One critical need is human development. This takes place at the moral level by way of the "fruit of ithe Spirit," and in the practical and intellectual spheres through the "gifts of the Spirit." An attention to the medieval heritage-especially in its examination of the fruits and gifts of the Spirit in relation to the virtues-would offer some power in pressing forward Volf's salient pneumatological account of personal development which results from work.

Such an account is important because what human beings are like becomes problematic when a central element in the theology and ethic which Volf offers is the "new creation." How are anthropology and eschatology related in such a way that both activity and critique still matter? If work profoundly affects workers, it is important to know which sorts of work will correspond to the new creation.

In raising the issue of freedom, one turns to another important area of Volf's moral anthropology. Freedom is that element of the new creation which would secure the individual's integrity; yet it is unclear how freedom is linked to the new creation. The privilege assigned to freedom requires a clear explication of the connection between the freedom ingredient to salvation and the manifestations of freedom in the secular sphere. On the way to this goal, Volf examines bad work, i.e., work in coerced circumstances. In so doing, Volf dedicates much attention to alienation. He is notably clear in avoiding an approach which would analyze the dissatisfaction of the worker as the basis for this range of phenomena (158 ff.). He underscores the critical point that alienation is not the sum of the possible negative effects on the workers' feelings, but rather alienation is what it does to the working person (162). However, his insistence on an objective character for alienation requires a more transparent articulation of the dynamics concerning human freedom.

In examining several aspects of work which center around freedom, certain terms should be distinguished more sharply. Although it appears intuitively correct that the more work resembles leisure the more

it is humane (134), one can also easily recognize the inhumanity of enforced leisure or useless work. Freedom's stronger sense certainly cannot be the ability " to engage in whatever activities one may desire " (186). That is license. While Volf makes use of a Kantian approach which prohibits workers from being treated only as a means and, interestingly, also condemns work which is simply instrumental, one must ask whether an analysis in terms of means and ends suffices. The need for a different basis for critique appears readily, for example, when the issue of management control must be addressed. Is freedom necessarily limited by accepting work? If managers direct workers' activities for the sake of security and control, one cannot on that basis alone censure these purposes. Likewise, the criticism of the situation where workers must follow the orders of managers is appropriate in some circumstances only. Security, control, obedience are all multivalent terms. The discrimination of the meanings is a critical contribution of a theological assessment of the structures and processes which shape the work place. Volf is insightful in distinguishing the subordinations which devolve from the application of particular forms of technology and from managerial control (180). Neither form of subordination, however, necessarily constrains the freedom integral to the person.

Volf attempts to ground the objective character of good work in "certain characteristics of human nature" (160). Economic forces frequently require labor which threaten these features. The abstraction of physical power renders the worker a skillful animal. Yet Taylorism produces, in addition, an abstraction of intellect; managers, planners, and designers are reduced to machine-like analysis and decision. Further, the legal and social environment may generate an abstraction of will, so that it remains merely as a periodic, formalized activity at the time of contract negotiation. This abstraction of the will distorts a significant characteristic of human nature, namely, the incessant desire for some form of participation in the social process.

Human symbolic activity-the capacity to express and to interpret-is a characteristic of human nature in which work can find an objective ground. Persons can then view elements of material creation as a means, an end, or an expression (p. 96)-all deriving from their work. Expressivity is a characteristic of all free activity: productive, practical, or political. Work understood in terms of symbolic activity makes it possible to understand how freedom is integral to such activity if it is to meet basic needs, especially personal and social development.

Security, control, and obedience are inadequate values when the ability to elicit, contribute, and respond to symbolic expression is blocked. Both in its activity and through its status as an emblem, prop-

erly constituted authority exercises and fosters symbolic activity. The force of management is not to he confused with .the question of authority. An investigation of authority within •the corporation and in the work place calls for a more sharply delineated taxonomy of the interaction of all employees: those involved in production, service, and management. Developed out of another tradition of theology, the writings of Oswald von Nell-Breuning provide some of the necessary tools for the analysis of power, force, authority, and participation.

A more systematic understanding of the cooperation of Spirit and person in his or her activity of work can establish a theological approach to this large question of freedom. Volf himself suggests as much when he reflects on the possible ways in which economic alienation and alienation from God influence each other. It is interesting and important to work out how economic alienation can lead to alienation from God, hut still too much to say that economic alienation causes alienation from God (166). When attempting to probe this relation, it is of limited usefulness to say in response to Marx's work that alienation from God is the basic alienation (163). It is, of course, important to assist believers in their exercise of Marxian language; however, Christians must speak of alienation from God in terms which can he grasped by non-believers. Social sin may he the category-devolving from articulations within the Christian heritage-that can elicit some resonant response from those who, although standing outside these traditions, are attempting to respond to the same issues.

Volf's theology of work is constructive and hopeful, for, in addition to his examination of alienation, he presents a study of its contrary. Good work fa directed effort which is humanizing, fosters participation, remains an *actus personae,* and maintains personal development (175-179). In attempting to delineate work which would he humanizing and non-alienating, Volf valorizes "work for work's sake" and " work as an end in itself " so that persons do not value their work solely in terms of what it produces. Yet these terms-Volf's distinction between production and productivity notwithstanding (198)-remain easily confounded with the common, extrinsic measures of work. Although it cannot be analytically identified with the ideal of work, leisure does provide a clue to the character of work because it secures a prerequisite for work's twin-play. Much can he learned about good work from the fascination of people with the game character of their efforts, regardless of its heteronomous purpose or autonomous direction.

Furthermore, a necessary step in delineating the characteristics of good work is to draw upon the distinction between work and labor. Marx holds that toil, production, and service within a constrained context constitute labor. This is not the same as work, which unfolds

within an emancipated framework. Consequently, even work as a means is not a form of forced labor in all situations *(pace* p. 59) .

How persorni exercise their unconstrained freedom offers a model on the basis of which the critique of actual labor within exploitative and alienating systems and structures can take place. One useful element of eschatology for believers is that it provides a point of vantage whereby they can differentiate between work and labor-as well as between leisure and constrained ease. Volf's reflection on "autonomous work " outside the time of employment indicates a perception of this.

Volf describes work as increasingly removed from nature; yet, because there are senses in which this development is by turns commendable, neutral, or damnable, precisely so that a theological attention toward ecological issues is not clouded, the shape and elements of this process must be delineated. The issue of a removal of work activity from nature (in the industrial and information societies) may indicate not simply a change in the way persons work with nature but also a note of possible change in the major image of the work interaction with nature. The image has changed from extraction or production to preservation or shaping. Having acknowledged this new conceptual matrix, one could then articulate what respect for nature (145) and nature's potential (146) might he.

Volf's key move in articulating a theology of work-his use of charism-presents some difficulties. That Christians work not out of duty but out of experience of the Spirit (125) requires a restatement of spiritual experience in terms so broad that it might then approximate duty. Further, the relation between charisms and the gifts and fruits of the Spirit should he made clearer. Are the charisms equivalent to the gifts of the Spirit? If so, then what does the charism vocabulary add? If not, then how are these two deposits of the Spirit's action related? The examination of workers' inventiveness, of the constant origin of the technology emergent from working persons, is critical for developing a pneumatological model of charism as accountable skill for service. Volf's intriguing study of Genesis 4, as manifesting God's blessing on human ingenuity provides the start of such an examination.

A theological approach to work in terms of its expressivity may profit if it were to make use of the work of John of St. Thomas (Poinsot) on sign and signification, perhaps particularly in conjunction with his *The Gifts of the Spirit.* Then, too, the work of Rhineland mysticism might well prove a rich resource for a theology of work, especially in Ruusbroec's refined attention to the action of the Spirit and the work of persons. A step still further back in the Christian tradition would have theologians who probe invention and production, technology and serv·

ice explore the writings of Maximus ·the Confessor. Indeed, conversation with the Orthodox tradition which has reflected upon Maximus's insights might contribute to the further development of an ecumenical theology-well initiated by Miroslav Volf-which is supple and extensive enough to address the global structures and personal experiences of work today.

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Philosophy and Art. Edited by D. 0. DAHLSTROM. Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy Volume 23. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991. Pp. xii + 266. $44.95 (doth).

Daniel Dahlstrom's collection of essays on philosophical aesthetics is by various writers, from differing theoretical perspectives, on diverse themes, in contrasting styles. Containing many good things, the *ensemble* witnesses nonetheless to the Babel that is contemporary Western philosophy and the disorientation of much artistic practice today. This review will attempt to guide the potential reader through this multifarious offering.

The initial group of essays shares a common concern. Thomas Prufer argues, with Aristotle's help, that in tragedy the meaning of human action :is focussed through the conferring of form (*eidos)* so that the dramatic artwork transforms while reproducing, enhancing the elements of intelligibility in the action it portrays. Karsten Harries finds an adequate aesthetic not in the legend of Narcissus-art m; a beauty that invites us to " lose ourselves in its self-sufficient presence," -hut in that of Pygmalion where the artwork's beauty points beyond itself to a beatitude which comes from attention to the other. Joseph Margolis commends a minimum ontology in which artworks (like persons) are " entities ... *embodied* in physical things " and with their "properties *incarnate* in physical properties." The emphasis here is meant to distinguish Margolis's position from that of physicalism. A sculpture, for instance, is not a mere physical object hut " a real, culturally complex object produced in a humanly apt world and embodied in a physical object of some sort": such a conclusion is forced on us, according to Margolis, by the very demands of reference and predication in aH language about art. We begin to see a common thread inter-linking the contributions summarized so far, :namely, *How does the artefact come to be an artwork?*

This is also the question with which Francis Kovach's Neo-Thomist contribution opens, and his answer is that while every artwork, like every artefact, has its material cause in entitatively accidental being, the artwork is distinguished by taking beauty as its formal cause, cognitive delight as its final cause, a ' model or preconceived idea ' as its exemplary cause, and a maker who ' arranges ' an artistic medium as its efficient cause. In this essay, which combines an austere practice of the Scholastic " distinguer pour unir " with a flurry of references to music and painting, Kovach does not hesitate to deny the term ' fine art ' to much twentieth century experimental art which for him is simply "interestingly novel." For Kenneth Schmitz, with his more phenomenological approach, an artefact comes to be an artwork by " gaining a certain density of form, content and meaning." His essay centers on the concept of the *boundary* of the work, which both divides it from and links it to its audience. Schmitz stresses that such boundaries, in their role as providers of " juncture and communion," cannot operate without a circumambient *tradition.* Question: where would the artwork be without the mediating assistance of a community of producers, performers, receivers, and interpreters? Answer: reduced back to the status of an artefact. Somewhat abruptly appended to this discussion is the thought that a religiously inspired artwork may bring us to that supreme boundary where the bounded (the creaturely) is both divided from and linked to the Boundless (the Creator) . A fuller discussion of this issue would certainly be desirable-not least in a volume on philosophical aesthetics emanating from a Catholic University press!

A second group of essays moves in the ambit of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century German philosophical tradition, which was still sufficiently imbued with the ideas and the concerns of the Judaeo-Christian revelation to advance its elucidation. Robert Wood, in an account of Kant's aesthetics firmly contextualized within an overview of his 'project ' as a whole, explains that, for Kant, art is the "prime analogate for all other types of purposiveness." Not only does art serve analogically to draw together all experience, it also provides the most all-encompassing notion for the world that judgment can reach: nature as "divine art." Sensitivity to nature gives birth to art which, in turn, makes us sensitive to the beauties of nature. This point is related to the moral dimension so pronounced in Kant's work: the human being acting under moral law is itself an aesthetic form *par excellence.* Indeed, the artistic presentation of such acting is the fusing of the harmonious operation of our faculties in the experience of beauty of presentation with the experience of the (fortunate) disproportion of our faculties in the discovery of the sublime. Yet this is not, ultimately, a humanism; for Kant, the divine artist is the source of

the inspiration of the genius which affects the community's sensibility, weaning it from the dominance of appetite and aiding it in the l:rnnsi◦ tion to the moral dimension.

Schiller, so Walter Hinderer explains, ascribed a similar :irole to art as a means to self-completion. In *On the Aesthetic Education of Man,* he asserts that it is philosophical truth, and not merely poetic licence, to call beauty our " second creator." Only aesthetic experience is able to " cultivate the totality of our sensuous and intellectual abilities in the greatest possible harmony." Hinderer brings out Schiller's high anthropology: the suprasemmous in man is the divine in him; man's realization of the idea of l:otality makes him the "peer of God." Here a subj acent theological doctrine of man made in the divine image and likeness threatens to turn itself into an untrammelled Prometheanism.

In his treatment of Hegel's aesthetics, William Desmond raises the question, left in shadow hy Schiller, as to whether human originality is not related to a more ultimate power (Sha£teshury had called the artist "a Just Prometheus *under love").* For Hegel, art evinces (along with religion and philosophy) a dimension of absoluteness. In Desmond's words, the great artwork " serves to tell us something significant about the deepest sense of being in relation to the meaning of being as such." In post-Kantian aesthetics the originating role of the Eternal in its transcendent otherness tends to be replaced by that of the creative self in its inwardness, thereby raising a question concerning what sort of *otherness,* if any, remains to stand over against the self in such a philosophical context. Although Hegel does go beyond Romanticism in rejecting the notion that the originating spirit is simply the creative individual (the origin "institutes, mediates, and consolidates itself in different cultural-historical formations " of the power of being or *Geist),* aesthetic origins remain for Hegel a self.mediation, rather than an original otherness that "resists our mastery." For Desmond, however, echoing Schelling, the great artwork " concretizes that otherness in a way that resists complete conceptualization." With the affirmation that thought must think not only itself hut also its other-and not simply its other in a dialectical sense-Desmond appeals to the philo· sophy of art to go beyond Hegel rather than around him. Hegel was too concerned with a wholeness akin to " Greek circularity " to do justice to the (more Jewish, i.e., biblical) "unmastered infinite."

Between these essays-concerned as they are with the metaphysical and anthropological implications of art as an expression of the ultimate origin of the world and a major factor in human flourishing of the most far-reaching kind-and other contributions which are largely deaf to these appeals, we can situate the editor's own reflection on the " end of art/' or, rather, the" end of the idea of art," a concept he takes from

the work of Arthur Danto. Here the stimulus to reflection is those elements in modern art which " make a farce of traditional art and art theories hy giving us artworks indiscernible from objects found on grocery shelves or in lavatories." If, as Danto suggests, whatever is to count as art is simply what an " artworld " decrees, then the distinction between artefact and artwork can disappear completely (except in terms of somebody's bank balance).

The trouble with the remaining essays in this collection is that their authors have not appropriated a truth given lapidary expression in Woods' essay on Kant: "Attention to the works of genius throughout the ages cultivates the *sensus communis* and establishes a community involved in the beautiful." Thus, while Ted Cohen is right to consider television a possible artistic medium, the objects of televisual appreciation he considers usually witness to a *breakdown* of a community involved in the beautiful, while the frequently nugatory objects discussed in John Brough's "Who's Afraid of Marcel Duchamp? " testify to the *disintegration* of the *sensus communis* concerned.

Finally, if Paul Weiss is right in his "Creativity and Beauty" not only to designate beauty " the excellence pertinent to the creation of a work of art," but also to house it together with the quartet of truth, goodness, glory, and justice, then we can get a sense of how wisdom in both philosophy and artistic practice might he restored: through a re·discovery of the interdependence of the transcendentals. But perhaps only the Judaeo-Christian revelation now holds the key to this possibility.

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Through the Tempest: Theological Voyages in a Pluralistic Culture. By LANGDON GILKEY. Ed. Jeff B. Pool. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991. Pp. xx + 252.

Langdon Gilkey: Theologian for a Culture in Decline. By BRIAN J. WALSH. Lanham, MD: University Press of America/Institute for Christian Studies, 1991. Pp. xii + 324. $47.50 (cloth); $22.50 (paper).

With the exception of two mid-1970s papers, *Through the Tempest* is a collection of some of the addresses and essays written in the 1980s hy Langdon Gilkey, Shailer Mathews Professor Emeritus at the University of Chicago Divinity School. Title and subtitle are meant to re·

fleet three elements of Gilkey's temper. First, the *tempest* corresponds to his dramatic vision of the twentieth-century world, with its wars, upheavals, and destructive forces. Second, the preposition *through* expresses the sober hope that for all the darkness that surrounds our century, we are actually moving toward a destination beyond the turmoil. And third, his explorations and assessments of the many facets of contemporary culture are *theological voyages.*

In these pages readers will find many of the themes Gilkey has tackled over the years, such as God, Jesus, Creation, Providence, spirituality, the function of symbols, ethics, suffering and death, Christianity and other religions, faith and science, church and public policy. Among the most original pieces are, to my mind, Ch. 10, on the different attitudes to ethics in Christianity and Buddhism, and Ch. 14, which clarifies many aspects of suffering.

The general readership made up of those interested in religion will probably enjoy these lectures, while specialists in theology or human studies are likely to find them merely impressionistic and too vague both in their cultural analyses and in their conceptual discussions. Further, there is a discrepancy between Gilkey's assessment of the human predicament and :the theological solutions he puts forward.

On the one hand, the mood and the content of his assessment is neo·orthodox (inspired by his master Reinhold Niebuhr). For instance, chapters 11 and 13, on evil and sin, are typical of an acute awareness of the dark side of human conduct. As he follows this vein, Gilkey raises pertinent, profound, and difficult questions.

On :the other hand, his prescriptions do not match the depth of his diagnoses. Despite his efforts at overcoming theological liberalism, he often remains confined within the limits of the Western Enlightenment. For example, like most eighteenth-century thinkers, he rejects "a level of grace beyond nature " (54) . What he repudiates is in all likeliness the *modern separation* between nature and supernature, and he is apparently unaware of a significant alternative, namely, the *medieval distinction* between the natural and the supernatural aspects of Christian life. Consequently, for him grace merely consists in the restoration of human nature: "grace in no way transcends nature but rather makes its realization and fulfillment possible " (61) .

Likewise, Gilkey's treatment of the problem of truth in Christianity and world religions does not take us beyond modernity. In chapter 2, his problematics remain very close to the ones set up by Spinoza and Lessing. Thus Gilkey departs from Calvin's position regarding the precedence of faith over loving one's neighbor and adopts-without naming him-Spinoza's stance which asserts the priority of love over doctrine (22). In this connection, Gilkey fails to offer any precise unraveling of the extrinsicist problem of revelation forcefully voiced by

eighteenth-century thinkers like Lessing. He states that the issue, as we face it today, is deeper: "It is not just our response to revelation that is relative; it is the revelation to which we are responding that is now roughly equal to the others" (31). Gilkey does not explain in what sense we can still talk of " revelation " in this case. All he offers is a "paradox of a relative-absolute " (191; see 181-193), that is to say, an amalgamation of universalism and relativity, in which these two components stand in tension without being intellectually thought out.

Gilkey's theological style is marked by a determination to proceed dialectically in the discussion of issues. Since his thinking purports to he dialeotical, his assertions are generally matched by antithetical assertions. To give hut a few examples: the tension between credibility and rationality, theology and ontology, or universalism and relativity. The acknowledgement of " tensions" is rather popular nowadays in the human sciences and in theology. In a first stage, this recognition is sound, for it amounts to taking full account of the complexity that characterizes important human problems. In a second stage, however, it is not very fruitful, because it gives up the endeavor to fully understand what can and ought to he understood. In other words, the acceptance of "tensions" is a premature submission to the Mystery in an area where *fides quaerens intellectum* could gain some true insights.

As a matter of fact, in a short passage Gilkey goes beyond dialectical thinking, at least to a certain extent. In his reflections on God's transcendence and immanence (91-92), he does not rest content with stating that God is both transcendent and immanent. He defines and qualifies several terms in such a way that the reader can advance, beyond a mere tension, toward an intellectual integration.

Most of the time, unfortunately, Gilkey does not suggest how such an integration could he achieved. Instead, he remains a prisoner of his dialectical oppositions, for example regarding the following polarities in God: being and nonheing, independent and related, absolute and self-limiting, immutable and changing. Like Pannenherg and Moltmann, Gilkey wrestles with the late medieval concept of an arbitrary divine omnipotence and never manages to exorcise it (96; 109). Therefore, instead of seeing through the inadequacy of this concept, he sim· ply balances successive versions of it with successive versions of its opposite, thereby projecting various polarities into God. I suggest readers would find it helpful to contrast Gilkey's position with the one adopted by Michael J. Dodds, O.P., in his penetrating work *The Unchanging God of Love* (Frihourg: Editions Universitaires, 1986), which goes to the very roots of the problem.

Gilkey has been active in three areas of the theological enterprise: prolegomenon, constructive theology, and theology of culture. In his

hook entitled *Langdon Gilkey,* Walsh presents him as a *Theologwn for a Culture in Decline* (this is the subtitle). Walsh thinks Gilkey's lifetime project is best understood when approached from the perspective of his theology of culture. Accordingly, after outlining Gilkey's theological method as a whole (Part I), Walsh proceeds to focus on his theology of culture (Part II), in terms of which he then discusses his prolegomenon (Part III) and his constructive theology (Part IV).

This threefold division is a felicitous organizing principle which facilitates the presentation and evaluation of Gilkey's theological corpus. Walsh's hook aims to he both expository and critical, and by and large it is very successful. I have found Walsh's expose somewhat unclear at times, hut this defect has much to do with Gilkey's idiosyncratic style, whose option for noetic tensions does not lend itself easily to conceptual precision.

Walsh's assessment of various aspects of Gilkey's theology is very helpful. In particular, I would draw attention to the following, quite illuminating topics: Gilkey's eidetic unfaithfulness to Scriptures (37-38, and 260-262); the doubts Walsh raises concerning some aspects of Gilkey's doctrine of God (242-245, and 258-259); the inconsistency he spots in the way Gilkey conceives of a Christian critique of the ambiguous religious character of secular culture (158-167) ; the distinction, introduced by Walsh, between a religious structure and its direction or misdirection, regarding the problem .of the religious substance of a culture (214-217); Gilkey's collapsing of the religious "dimension" into the unifying center of the self (198-200, and 212); the dualism between religious and scientific language (203-205).

Walsh calls Gilkey "a systematic theologian who has not produced a systematic theology" (227). As an explanation for this inadequacy, I have suggested that Gilkey does not manage to integrate the neo-orthodox and the liberal strands in his attempt to correlate cultural issues with Christian doctrine and practice. In his writings there is a continual oscillation between fideism and rationalism. Despite this lack of systematic integration, the reading of *Through the Tempest,* especially if coupled with Walsh's exposition and critique, can trigger much fresh and profound thinking.

Loms RoY,.O.P.

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