"INTRINSICALLY EVIL ACTS" AND THE MORAL VIEWPOINT: CLARIFYING A CENTRAL TEACHING OF *VERITATIS SPLENDOR* [1]

MARTIN RHONHEIMER

Roman Athenaeum of the Holy Cross
Rome, Italy

1. *Introduction: Distinguishing choices and their objects from further intention:s and consequences*

MANY CATHOLIC moral theologians have asserted during the last few years that to know what a person really *does* each time he or she is acting and, consequently, to qualify morally this concrete doing, one must take into account all the further goals for the sake of which this person chooses what he concretely does. Equally, so these theologians contend, a balance of all foreseen consequences should be established to make out whether a determinate behavior is the right or the wrong thing to choose. Therefore, according to this view it will always

be impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species-its "object "-the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behavior or specific ads, apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned (VS 79).

The encyclical *Veritatis Splendor* rejects this view of so-called " teleological " ethical theories [2] as incompatible with the exist-

[1] I thank Prof. John M. Haas of Philadelphia for having carefully reviewed my English version of this paper, originally written in German (and not yet published).

[2] The term "teleological " as a characterization of ethical theories became successful through C. D. Broad's essay, " Some of the Main Problems of Ethics," *Philosophy* XXI (1946), reprinted in C. D. Broad, *Broad's Critical*

ence of describable concrete actions which are " intrinsically evil," that is, which are evil " *always and per se,* in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances " (*VS* 80). Consequently, this view finally is judged as incompatible with the

Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. D. R. Cheney (London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Humanities Press, 1971), pp. 223-246. Broad simply identified any "teleological" argumentation with a consequentialist one. So he says (p. 230 of the reprinted essays) : " One characteristic which tends to make an act right is that it will produce at least as good consequences as an alternative open to the agent in the circumstances (...) We can sum this up by saying that the property of being *optimific* is a very important right-tending characteristic. I call it *teleological* because it refers to the goodness of the ends or consequences which the act brings about." Broad, then, goes on to say that a " non-teleological " characteristic of an action would be, for example, the obligation, independent from considering consequences, to perform what one has promised. But already in 1930 Broad had distinguished "teleological" from "deontological" ethical theories; see C. D. Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930), pp. 206 ff. Many, today, call non-teleological ethics (in Broad's sense) "deontological "; cf. William K. Frankena, *Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963). The term "teleological ethics" was thus " imported " by German moral theologians, mainly by Bruno Schuller; see his *Die Begrundung sittlicher Urteile. Typen ethischer Argumentation in der Moraltheologie,* 2nd ed. (Diisseldorf: Patmos, 1980), pp. 282-298 (first published in 1973). According to Schuller, a normative ethic would be "teleological " if it affirms that " the moral character of *all* the actions and the omissions of man is *exclusively* determined by its consequences" (282). So he uses "teleological ethics" as synonymous with "consequentialism" (a term in fact created by G. E. M. Anscombe) and even with " utilitarianism." Its counterpart would be " deontological ethics," which holds that there are *some* actions the moral rightness of which should *not* be judged exclusively on the basis of their consequences; see also Bruno Schiiller, "Various Types of Grounding for Ethical Norms," in *Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,* ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), pp. 184-198. However, as it seems to me, these distinctions are not very clarifying; they rather seem to confuse judgments of prudence ("such and such is the right thing to do") with judgments of conscience ("I must do what I know to be the right thing, whatever the consequences "). Everyone must be a " deontologist" on *this* (second) level, if he does not want to deny that one must follow one's conscience (see for this some of my publications to which I refer further on). For supplementary terminological clarifications, see J. M. Finnis, *Fundamentals of Ethics* (Washington: Georgetown University Press; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 81-86.

existence of absolutely-without exception-binding prohibitive (or : negative) moral norms, that is : with so-called " moral absolutes."

The encyclical clearly distinguishes the object of a concrete choice, and the corresponding action, from *ulterior* intentions with which a choice is made. It seems to me that one of the central problems implied in thus distinguishing choices and their objects from further intentions may be formulated as follows: *What precisely* is qualified when an action or freely chosen behavior is qualified as " morally evil " *by virtue of its very* " *object"* ? This point, I think, must be carefully elucidated if we want to talk reasonably about concrete actions, or choices of determinate behaviors, being morally evil by virtue of their very object, i.e., *independent* of further intentions. If we could not sustain the distinction between the "object" and "ulterior intentions " of a concrete choice, adherents of " consequentialism " or " proportionalism " could successfully deny being implicated in the encyclical's criticism of these positions.

In order to answer the above question, however, another very important assertion of the encyclical must not be overlooked. After having affirmed, in number 78, that " the morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the 'object' rationally chosen by the deliberate will," the text of the encyclical adds the following remark :

> In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself *in the perspective of tho acting person.*

And this is so, the encyclical continues, for the following reason (the emphasis is mine) :

> The object of the act is in fact a *freely chosen* kind of behavior. (...) By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person (*VS* 78).

The above quoted rejection (*VS* 79) which follows in the encyclical in fact is formulated in quite a sophisticated way (e.g., it refers both "object" and the predicate "morally evil" to "*choice* of behavior" and not simply to "behavior").[3] This sentence, repeated in number 82, remains the doctrinal core of the whole encyclical and one of the cornerstones of its argument. And it seems to me that no "teleological" ethical theory-be it "consequentialist" or "proportionalist"-can reasonably deny being affected, indeed, hit in the heart, by this rejection. For it is characteristic for all "teleological" ethical theories that they consider senseless any distinction between "objects" and "further intentions," as well as that they reject the possibility both of judging "wrong" a chosen action independently from all the foreseen consequences, and of speaking on this level *as such* about "moral evil."

During the following exposition I will, without referring much to the text of the encyclical, simply expose how-according to my views which owe so much to the work of many others-the encyclical's teaching should be understood. I not only intend to follow Aquinas's ethical theory but also to render explicit some implicit presuppositions in the field of action theory that are necessary to render fully intelligible both Aquinas's account of "moral objects" as such and its pertinence for our present problem.[4]

[3] Compare this also with No. 1761 of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, quoted in *VS* 78: ". . . there are certain specific kinds of behavior that are always wrong to choose, because choosing them involves a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil."

[4] See a more detailed account in my following books and articles: *Natur als Grund/age der Moral* (Innsbruck-Wien: Tyrolia Verlag, 1987); *La prospettiva della morale. Fondamenti dell'etica filosofica* (forthcoming: Rome: Armando Editore, 1994); "Menschliches Handeln und seine Moralitat. Zur Begriindung sittlicher Normen," in Martin Rhonheimer, Andreas Laun, Tatjana Goritschewa, Walter Mixa, *Ethos und Menschenbild* (St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag, 1989), pp. 45-114; "Zur Begriindung sittlicher Normen aus der Natur," and "Ethik-Handeln-Sittlichkeit," *Der Mensch als Mitte und Massstab der Medizin*, ed. Johannes Bonelli (Wien-New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992), pp. 49-94 and 137-174; finally, my investigations into Aquinas's

I shall first clarify the term " object " as used in practical reasoning (section 2). I then clarify the basic perspective in which we have to consider our problem, the perspective of intentionality, showing how problematic it is when an ethical theory distinguishes " moral " from " non-moral " goods (section 3). This opens the way to speak properly about the " object " of a human act, which of course is fundamental for knowing *what* precisely is qualified when an action is qualified as " evil by virtue of its object " (section 4). In the longest section (5), I will challenge the distinction between " right making properties " and " good making properties " of an action ; I argue for a virtue-orientated rather than norm- or rule-based ethics, showing why only the former is able really to explain why there are in fact some "intrinsically evil acts." In section 6, I shall show how intentionality explains the *rational* structure of what we call the "object" of a human act. Finally, in section 7, I will add some remarks about how to integrate my analysis into the general frame of a natural law theory.

2. *Objects of actions as objects of practical reason*

According to Aquinas, every action intended by the will is a " *bonum apprehensum et ordinatum per rationem,"* a " good understood and ordered by reason." [5] Clearly human acts are specified by different objects; every potency has its own specific object which is its proper end. However, the human act is morally specified only by an "object in so far as it is related to the principle of human acts, that is reason." [6] One must, therefore, guard against identifying the object which provides the moral specifica-

interpretation and completion of Aristotle's action theory are expected to be published under the title *Praktische Vernunft und Verniinftigkeit der Praxis* (Ber !in : Akademie Verlag, 1994).

[5] *ST* I-II, q.20, a.I ad 1. In *ST* I-II, q.18, a.IO, Aquinas affirms that the object which specifies an action morally is a "forma a ratione concepta."

[6] " --- ab obiecto relato ad principium actuum humanorum, quod est ratio" *(ST* I-II, q.18, a.8). The "bonum virtutis" consists "ex quadam commensuratione actus ad circumstantias et finem, *q1wm ratio facit" (In II Sent.,* d.39, q.2, a.l).

tion of an act with " things " or the natural ends of single potencies. As Germain Grisez has put it, "... human acts have their structure from intelligence. Just insofar as an action is considered according to its naturally given structure, it is to that extent not considered as a *human act-i.e.,* as a moral act-but rather as a physiological process or as instinctive behavior. Action with a given structure and acts structured by intelligence differ as totally as nature differs from morality. Nature has an order which reason can consider but cannot make and cannot alter. Morality has an order which reason institutes by guiding the acts of the will." [1]

The object which provides the moral specification is always the object of a human act *just insofar as* it is an act of a *human* being. Without the act of practical reason which relates to any object in a specifically *moral* way, there is neither a human act nor a personal meaning of such acts. To speak of the "object of an action " is to speak of the content of an *intentional* action. That is to say, the morally relevant object of an action is the content of an act *insofar as* it is the object of an *intentio voluntatis* (whether this is on the level of the choice of concrete, particular actions, or on the level of intending *further* ends for the sake of which a concrete action is chosen as a means). With this we see that every object is equally the object of the practical reason which orders and regulates, the fundamental rule or measure of which is the natural law. Only in this way do both the various natural ends of human potencies and the *usus rerum exteriorum* become integrated into the personal *suppositum* in a cognitive-practical way. They thus become objectified in their intelligibility which renders possible the recognition of their morally objective meaning.

3. *The perspective of intentionality and the so-called " non-moral " goods*

The *bona propria,* i.e., the proper goods toward which the individual potencies are ordered as ends-considered in their ontic

[1] Germain Grisez, "A New Formulation of a Natural-Law Argument against Contraception," *The Thomist* 30:4 (1966) : 343.

structure, independently from their being potencies of a human person, that is, considered on the level of their *"genus naturae"* -are not yet moral goods which are as such morally significant (they are no *bona debita* for the acting person as such).[8] But calling them "non-moral" goods seems to be equally erroneous. One simply cannot make moral judgments on the level of *"genus naturae."* However, to call these proper goods of potencies "non-moral goods" is actually a moral qualification since it is possible only from an ethical perspective. To be ethical, a perspective must take account of the acting subject's intentional relation to acts and ends. To affirm that the ends of natural inclinations are non-moral goods or non-moral values is to assert that they do not possess an inherent "*proportio ad rationem."* This would mean that they were exactly *as inclinations "indifferentes ex specie,"* in St. Thomas's language, or that these inclinations, acts, and ends are morally indifferent not only if we consider them "abstractly" in their *"genus naturae,"* but also if we conceive them as forming part of the human *suppositum.* Again, this would mean that only *further* circumstances or intentions of the acting subject *by which* he acts on these inclinations and performs the acts proper to them would have a moral qualification, while the inclinations themselves would not.

To look at natural inclinations and their ends in an abstract-ontic way is, however, neither ethically nor anthropologically an adequate way of considering them. It simply can never lead to a morally qualifying judgment, and this is precisely what the assertion means which states that they are "indifferent" ("*adiaphora*") or non-moral goods.[9] It is not the ends of these inclina-

[8] The distinction between ("*actus"* or *"finis")* *proprium* on the one side, and *debitum* on the other, goes back to *ST* I-II, q.91, a. 2. See for this my *Natur als Grundlage der Moral,* pp. 72 ff.

[9] Cf. *ST* I-II, q.18, a.8: Aquinas arrives at identifying an act as indifferent *"in specie"* by the assertion that the *act as such* has no proportion to the "*ordo rationis"* ; considered in itself the choice of such an act is not yet meaningful for practical reason, "sicut levare festucam de terra, ire ad campum et huiusmodi." It is something quite different to consider an act, which by itself *does* possess such a "proportio ad rationem," *independently* from this relation

tions which are non-moral, but rather the abstract way of considering them which is non-moral. The problem springs from looking at natural inclinations simply as *natural* inclinations, inclinations of the *"genus naturae"* abstracted from the actual human person.[10]

This means that inclinations, their proper acts, and ends are falsely looked at as "data," "facts," and "state of affairs," from the perspective of an outside observer, rather than as inclinations of a intellectually and thus willingly striving person. As such, every human being experiences his inclinations as *his* inclinations, as something that he willingly and intentionally *pursues.* This, precisely, is not recognizable from the viewpoint of an outside observer.

From the viewpoint of the external observer we also say that birds build nests because the outcome of a bird's gathering different materials and executing determinate bodily movement is in fact a nest. But do birds really build nests? That is, do they perform the *action* of "building a nest"? For this they should *intend,* in gathering materiais, the goal of building a nest; they should gather materials, move, and work *for the sake of* building a nest. Moreover, they even should also intend the "why" of building the nest, e.g., "to protect their offspring." With good

to reason, that is, on its merely natural level (e.g., an act of eating or nutrition, an act of sexual copulation). In this case, this will be a biological, physiological or psychological viewpoint which in no way allows a moral judgment. The qualification of an act as "indifferent," however, *is* precisely such a moral judgment.

10 Aquinas also sometimes uses the expression "consideratio *absoluta,"* that is, a consideration of acts detaching them from the wider context in which a moral qualification would be possible. Cf. *In IV Sent.,* d.16, q.3, a.1, qla.2 ad 2: "aliqui actus ex suo genere sunt mali vet boni (...). Hoc autem ex quo actus reperitur in tali genere, quamvis sit de substantia eius inquantum est ex genere moris, tamen est extra substantiam ipsius secundum quod consideratur ipsa substantia actus absolute: unde aliqui actus sunt idem in specie naturae qui differunt in specie moris; sicut fornicatio et actus matrimonialis." Both fornication and a matrimonial act are, as sexual acts considered in their *"genus naturae"* and in their corresponding physiological, biological, and in a sense also in their affective aspects, strictly identical acts. Nevertheless the human sexual act is not an *"actus indifferens"* if considered in its *"genus moris."*

reason we assume that they indeed are not doing this.[11] A human person, however, who strives for self-preservation or for the care of his offspring, and who performs corresponding actions, does not only "arrive at" preserving his life, etc.; rather, he also *intends* it *i'.n* his actions. He does something *for the sake of* preserving himself and caring for his offspring, and this "for the sake of " is a content of his *will.* Self-preservation and care for offspring are, in this case, objects of an intending will, guided by reason. And as such, the corresponding goods (self-preservation, care for offspring) are much more than the resulting *states of affairs* of " self-preservation" or " protection of offspring." It rather is a practical principle which guided a freely chosen act and its intentional content, a content which determines as an intelligible good the agent's will.[12] These contents of intentionality (self-preservation, care for others, and similar things) are *already on the level of natural inclination* a " good " of a striving *human person* and, therefore, " good for man " in the context of the person as a whole. It is precisely this which we call a "moral good." " Moral goods " are the contents of *acts of the will.* And the contents of acts of the will are precisely that which we call, from a moral viewpoint, their *objects.*

We can conclude that to call the ends pursued by natural inclinations " non-moral " goods signifies, in the final analysis, a moral qualification (or " dis-qualification ") based on the *"genus naturae"* of these inclinations and their corresponding acts. This, however, is an illicit *transgressio in aliud genus* and, therefore, results in a conclusion easily recognizable as a sort of "naturalistic fallacy." The naturalistic fallacy is based on a failure to see that the *"genus naturae"* and the *"genus moris"* are not

11 This is not an argument against teleology in nature; just the opposite is the case: this teleology exists because we affirm both (1) that birds do not *intend* the goal of building a nest and (2) that they indeed do what they do *for the sake* of building a nest; so the " intention " is inherent in nature.

12 Compare again *VS* 78 (the emphasis is mine): "The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, *it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally.* . .•"

derivable one from the other.[13] The fallacy occurs when one adopts a morally qualifying predicate on the level of "*genus naturae.*" But "moral indifference" actually *is* such a predicate. Equally, "morally right" is a morally qualifying predicate. It is a predicate which proportionalists adopt for actions on the basis of the resulting balance of non-moral goods which can be foreseen.

In this context the Stoic doctrine of the *adiaphora* is sometimes invoked:[14] Life, health, beauty, property, social status, honor, etc. are not, one says, goods which determine a person's being a *good* person. This depends exclusively on the goodness of the will. I would argue in the following way against this attempt to defend consequentialism by invoking this Stoic teaching: The Stoic doctrine only intends to differentiate the sphere of being from the sphere of acting. Indeed, whether somebody is a good or a wicked person does not depend on the state in which he happens to find himself or the state in which he happens to arrive *independently* from his willing as an acting subject. "Good" and "evil" as objects of practical reason and intentional striving, however, are not at all states of affairs, in which the acting subject happens to find himself. As soon as the agent relates *practically* to goods/bads as life, health, physical integrity, truth, property, it is no longer possible to call those goods or bads *adiaphora,* indifferent things or "extra-moral" goods; for the practical relation itself involves, with regard to them, one willingly taking a position on the basis of a judgment of practical reason; and it is precisely this which determines the quality of the *will* as a good or an evil will. So precisely insofar as a good is a *practical* good (or object of a free will orientated to action) it *cannot* be a non-moral good *because it is impossible that the will relates to "good" in a non-moral way* (not even to a piece of bread practically judged and

[13] This reproach, which I have invoked against adherents of so-called "teleological ethics," is not, it seems to me, sufficiently refuted by W. Wolbert in his critique of my position; cf. Werner Wolbert, "Naturalismus in der Ethik. Zurn Vorwurf des naturalistischen Fehlschlusses," *Theologie und Glaube 79* (1989): 234-267, especially pp. 259 ff.

[14] Bruno Schuller, *Die Begrundung sittlicher Urteile;* Werner Wolbert, *Ethische Argumentation und Pariinese in 1 Kor 7* (Diisseldorf: Patmos, 1981).

chos·en as " to be eaten here and now "). The Stoics only wanted to emphasize that moral goodness consists in an attitude of indifference with regard to any good other than virtue itself. So, they intended to render praxis itself indifferent as far as it relates to these goods called *adiaphora.* The important thing, the Stoics affirmed, is to be virtuous, which means to live in *apathia* with regard to indifferent goods. Consequentialists and proportionalists, however, are not Stoics. For they assert that precisely in the sphere of these " indifferent goods " man has to take responsibility for optimizing these goods (and minimizing the bads), and that this is the basic criterion of the " rightness " of an action. That means that they also consider the *practical* relation to single *adiaphora* as "morally indifferent " (while Stoics want to render insignificant this practical relation) and that only the action, which optimizes them, is morally right. This, however, is a thesis in the field of action theory which is profoundly problematic.

4. *"Object" in the perspective of human actions*

This problematic consists in confusing the viewpoint of the "first person" (the agent's perspective) with the viewpoint of the third person (the observer's viewpoint). To a large extent, these two perspectives correspond to two quite different concepts of human action : the intentional and the causal-eventistic concept.15 The latter looks at actions " from outside " and sees them as *events which cause determinate effects.* Events which cause effects, however, are not yet actions (it could, for example, be an earthquake). From such a perspective, " acting" can only be *reconstructed,* as it were, by interpreting the foreseen connection between act-event and its effect as being the reason for which a rational subject has performed this particular act. An action would be explained precisely when it was possible to indicate

u About the importance of the perspective of the "first person" see J. M. Finnis, *Fundamentals of Ethics,* pp. 114 ff.; Giuseppe Abba, *Felicita, vita buona e virtu* (Rome: LAS, 1989) ; Angel Rodriguez Lufio, *Etica* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1992) and finally my own *La prospettiva della morale.*

those *reasons* which the agent might have had for performing the action. The same applies to its moral qualification: The action itself and its effects are simply events or states of affairs (that is, non-moral realities). Only those reasons which an agent might have for causing through the action-event x the effect y (the state of affairs) are morally qualifiable; this, however, only as " morally right " or " morally wrong." This, I should add, is more a qualification of effects (of y) and their desirability than a qualification of the actions (of x) by which these effects are brought about.

For example, the action-event x brought about by A could consist in causing (in what way does not matter) the death of P. The caused state of affairs will be "death of P." Only the reasons for the desirability of P's death (in the context of a balance of other goods and bads) would determine whether "to do x " is right or wrong. Such a reason may be, e.g., the foreseeable consequences of A's doing x for *all* concerned (i.e., also the effects of doing x with regard to the life of Q, R, S, ..., T as a consequence of A's doing x; e.g., in a case of hostage-taking and blackmail).

What here, however, is entirely put aside is precisely the acting person as a subject which *intends* something *in* doing x; the acting subject, therefore, which performs x *for the sake of* causing P's death (with the *purpose* of killing him). That is: What is put aside is the *choice* of "killing-P " as a setting of A's will against the life of P. This also means: What is put aside is A's taking a position with regard to a specific *person* to which he owes, as to his fellow-man, this and that. This act of choice can adequately be seen only by looking at human actions in the perspective of the first person: From such a viewpoint there are not only two states of affairs (an action-event and its resulting effect), but also the act of *intending* P's death. This intentionality (which here is a choice, the choice of an action) cannot be reduced to "causing the state of affairs of P's death." Otherwise there would be no difference between what an earthquake " does " and what an acting person does: the object and intentional content of "causing P's death" means to set one's will against the

life of P (= against P in the dimension of what fundamentally is "good-for-him") and this positioning of one's will constitutes a specific relation between the acting person and P. The content of this "taking a position" shapes the agent's will and is, as such, the content of a free will, and is " good " or " evil " wholly *independently* of other (foreseeable) resulting states of affairs which might be brought about as a consequence of A's abstaining from killing P (as, for example, saving the lives of Q, R, S, ... , T).

From an observer's viewpoint there is, therefore, no difference between "causing P's death" and "killing P," that is, "doing something *for the sake of* causing P's death." From the observer's viewpoint we may say in the same way" John killed ten persons " and " the earthquake killed ten persons " (as we affirm " The bird built a nest "). What we cannot say in either case from this particular perspective is: Besides the ten killed persons, there is also a *murderer.* In the case of the earthquake this would be simply nonsense; in the case of John, however, it *could* well be the case that he is, in fact, a murderer. But it will never be possible to justify such a differentiation from the observer's viewpoint (otherwise we should equally admit that an earthquake at least *could* be something like a murderer). In reality, however, "to kill P" is not simply "to cause P's being dead," **but** rather it is *to choose, to intend, to want* P's death (for the sake of *whatever* further end). Those practical goods which are objects of our actions (and here P's death is, for the agent, a "practical good," the content of his action) are never such objects simply in their natural, antic value-quality as states of affairs, but rather as objects of an act of the will guided by reason. That is why objects of actions-precisely *because* of their being objects of a human action-are goods in a *moral* sense. As said before: *bonum apprehensum et ordinatum per rationem.*

Therefore, *practical* reason, which is embedded in appetite, and the corresponding moral reflection never relate to the " bona propria "-the particular goods of single natural inclinations-as mere state of affairs on the level of their " *genus naturae* " ; as such they *cannot* be objects or contents of the natural inclination

of a *humaw person* who relates to them appetitively, by will informed by reason. For whom is "self-preservation" ever simply something given, a good only to be " taken into account " or a mere state of affairs, no matter how desirable? For whom is it ever a " non-moral " good, that is, a good which does not concern him *as* a person striving for the fulfilment of his being? As it was said, the ontic-natural aspect of these goods or ends is a *posterior* abstraction which abstracts them from the context of practical self-experience; so, this purely natural aspect is a *reduction* of the proper intelligibility of these goods.

The goods of natural inclinations are never simply a set of given facts, and man is not simply the sum of various inclinations. They rather constitute the proper practical self-experience of persons as *a certain kind* of being. They form a whole, grasped by intelligence as " my" being. So, the practical self-experience of man as naturally striving for goods is precisely what constitutes the *identity* of a person as a *human* person : every inclination and its proper good are experienced as correlated to *my own* striving and not as something alien to me, as, e.g., nature which surrounds me, the world in which I am placed, my environment.16 This "good-for-me" as object of a reason-guided

16 This, it seems to me, is an often overlooked differentiation. An example is provided by Louis Janssens, " Ontic Evil and Moral Evil," *Louvain Studies* 4 (1972) : 121 (note 34) and 135 f. The bodily dimension of man is here conceived simply as "material part of the material world"; it is named "human" only insofar as this " material part of the material world " participates at the same time in the subjectivity of single human individuals. Therefore, Janssens considers the body, in a consequent way, as a " means to action," as an instrument of man's subjectivity for his being able to act in the sphere of the external world. With this, the properly "human" is restricted to a spiritually understood subjectivity (without taking into account that also the body *originally* forms part of man's subjectivity). This, however, is not a personalist view of man, but a view which we could call a " personalistic spiritualism." The consequences of this view are, in the case of Janssens, absolutely clear, e.g. when he says that the exterior act (" *actus exterior")* is an "exterior *event"* (120) which, in itself, does not possess a moral meaning because it does not yet participate in the subjectivity of man, i.e., before it is assumed by the spiritual " ego " as a "means to action." So, bodily acts are, according to this view, a sort of "raw material," determined in their moral meaning exclusively by the spirit. This is obviously true as far as bodily acts need to

will, as intelligible human good, is the content of true self-love which, through the golden rule (a rule of reason and as such a rule of the structural principle of justice based on acknowledgment of others as equal to me), leads to the command " Love your neighbor as you love yourself."

This kind of self-experience reflects the original ontological or anthropological integration of different natural parts of the human *suppositum.* On the basis of a metaphysic of the *suppositum,* such an experience is open for a deeper explanation. So it becomes obvious that each natural inclination by its very nature possesses, in the context of the person as a whole and precisely as an inclination *belonging* to a human person, a meaningfulness which from the beginning transcends the mere *"genus naturae."* This transcendence is destroyed or at least obscured by an abstract view which detaches these inclinations from their original context as inclinations of a human person. In a moral objectivation, the "natural meaning" of each natural inclination is precisely a *personal* meaning which must not be identified with its *"genus naturae."*

The proper work of natural reason-the acts of which are always acts of a person--consists in grasping the transcendence of particular goods, exactly on the basis of the fact that they are integrated into the whole of the human *suppositum* : as *intelligible goods.* As such an experienced intelligible whole of goods they form the "Self." In its natural act, which corresponds to a natural inclination to virtue, i.e., to a life guided by reason, reason comprehends these particular goods as *human* goods and, therefore, as fundamental practical goods of the person. These goods constitute our identity, the consciousness of *who we are* (I and

be "operationally" integrated into the whole of the person. It is not true, however, as an anthropological thesis which reduces " moral meaning" to what proceeds from the spiritual part of the soul or even as a thesis which reduces "human person" to "spirit." Cf. also Martin Rhonheimer, "Contraception, Sexual Behavior, and Natural Law," *The Linacre Quarterly* 56 :2 (1989) : 20-57. Also published in *"Humanae Vitae": 20 anni dopa. Atti del II Congresso lnternazionale di Teologia Morale, Roma 9-12 novembre 1988* (Milano: Edizioni Ares, 1989), pp. 73-113.

the others) and fundamentally shape the will in respect of " the good for man."

5. *The fallacious distinction between "right making properties" and "good making properties" of an action*

Moral philosophers who defend-however divergent be their approaches-a consequentialist position (a " teleological ethic ") usually are much concerned with emphasizing a fundamental difference between the " moral *rightness"* (or the " right-making-properties ") and the " moral *goodness"* (the " good-making-properties ") of an action.[11] The first, they say, concerns the question about the properties which render an action " right " or " wrong " ; the second is related to those properties of an action insofar as it springs from a free *will.* By way of balancing goods and bads, only the question about the " rightness of types of actions " is meant to be resolved. And this, it is asserted, is the question which properly belongs to so-called "normative ethics." The question, however, about what makes the will of the acting subject a "good" will does not, according to their view, depend on whether an action is " right " or " wrong" but rather, e.g., on whether one acts out of benevolence toward other persons, out of love of justice, with a will to fairness or to respecting the other's conscience, with a "Christian intentionality," etc.

Of course in a sense this is rather obvious. It is true in the sense that an involuntary, and thus not imputable, error about what one has to do-in this sense a wrong action-may not hinder the will of somebody who acts in this way from being a good will, even as it does the wrong thing, e.g., a will which, in fact, intends justice even if it does not do the just thing. The corresponding action, then, would be at the same time " morally

[17] The distinction between the "goodness" and the "rightness" of an action was introduced by W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). The terms "right-making" and "good-making characteristics" ("wrong-making" and "bad-making characteristics") of an action was first used in 1946 by C. D. Broad, in his famous, above quoted, essay " Some of the Main Problems of Ethics."

good " and " wrong." The widespread acceptance of this distinction seems to be caused, to a large extent, by the possibility of this state of affairs. It is, however, a case in which the agent in reality does not choose and thus willingly perform the action which he *thinks* he is choosing and performing. It is, therefore, an exceptional case which, for analytical purposes, must be set aside until *after* having determined what basically causes the goodness and the rightness of actions; precisely, because of this, it cannot serve as a paradigm. To be able to justify a distinction between " right " and " good " we must start from the normal condition in which actions are chosen and performed, that is, from the condition that the agent chooses and thus willingly performs exactly the action which he *believes* he is choosing and performing.

Now, the predicates "right" and "wrong" are morally qualifying only insofar as we consider them as predicates for *human acts.* Certainly, a physician may perform an operation " rightly " (correctly, well, efficiently, competently, etc.) ; despite this, his way of acting may be qualified as " wrong " (e.g., if it is-in the first sense-a " well done " abortion). The first type of qualification concerns the technical aspect of the physician's acting, the second concerns the *moral* rightness of the choice of this action. In *both* cases we may, instead of " right " or "wrong," also call the action, respectively, " good" or " evil." The designation derives from the *perspective* in which we consider the action: Either we consider it from the technical perspective (the aspect of surgical techniques) or we consider it from a moral perspective (the aspect of its being the voluntary and deliberate action of a human person; this is the properly moral perspective). The second perspective includes the first (one cannot act in a morally right way without caring about one's technical competence). The distinction, however, between " *morally* right " and " *morally* good " seems to be off the point here. The only relevant distinction is the distinction between " *non-morally* (e.g., technically) right/wrong " and *"morally* right/wrong"; the second, however, is equal to (morally) "good" and (morally) "evil."

The position I am criticizing overlooks the fundamental difference between *praxis* and *poiesis,* taking its orientation from a " poietical " model of action.[18] It is indeed characteristic of technical actions that its (technical) " rightness " is distinguished from the goodness of the will of the person who performs a technical act. Aristotle, however, taught us that the goodness of a praxis (which is *eupraxia)* and the goodness of a moral agent (and this means his wilful striving: *ore.xis)* is a specific kind of "rightness " (*orthotes)* : the rightness of *prohairesis,* of the *choice* of an action. Indeed, we can say that there exist fundamental structures of the " rightness " of desire which reveal themselves precisely through the " *le.r naturalis."* These structures determine-despite the legitimacy of a limited and well defined balancing of goods-that certain actions are always *wrong,* precisely *because the desire or will involved in these kind of actions cannot be "right." Yet a will which is not "right" is an evil will.* In this sense it is " wrong " to *choose* to kill a human person (that is : to set one's will against another man's life), whatever be the *further* intention or end for the sake of which this is chosen. To affirm that such a choice is "not right" (or " wrong ") means precisely to affirm that this is a disorientated choice of the will, that this is a type of action which *as such* (" in itself ") is *evil.* " As such " or " in itself " here signifies : independently from further intentions or foreseen consequences.[19] Such an action springing from a corresponding choice is evil, because it shapes the will, rendering it an evil will, a will directed against "the good for man" (here from the perspective of jus-

[18] See for this also Rudiger Bubner, *Handlung, Sprache und Vernu·nft,* 2nd ed. (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1982), pp. 74-90.

[19] Of course it may be considered as " good " (desirable) that P finally dies (and we may even pray for it) ; in this sense we also say: "It was precisely the 'right' thing for him (and probably also for his relatives) that he finally died." With this, however, we do not qualify an action or the choice of an action, but a state of affairs and its desirability. The goodness, rightness or desirability of such a state of affairs, however, cannot serve as a criterion for qualifying a possible *action* of mercy-killing. Because in such an action a will set against P's life is involved, with the *further* intention of bringing about a desirable state of affairs.

tice). This precisely is what we designate " not right " or " wrong " in a *moral* sense.[20]

Hence, the distinction between " right-making-properties" and " good-making-properties " is in principle questionable. We always have to describe actions and behaviors as objects of *choices* and, therefore, as *intentional* actions. From such a perspective, however, the goodness of the will is regarded as depending on the goodness of freely chosen, *wanted* actions which also includes the agent's willingly referring to the specific goal which constitutes the objective intentionality of this action (I will come back to this below). That is why acts of choice are always describable as forms of *rightness,* that is, of the rightness of desire or of the will. This enables us to indicate specific kinds of actions which are never to be chosen because they are not consistent with a good will, e.g., the choice of killing a person, whatever be the further intention. On the other hand, it is indeed possible to choose what

[20] This affirmation, as is obvious, presupposes that killing as the execution of capital punishment (pronounced by the competent judicial authority) and taking into account the fact that the punished is really *guilty* according to the standards of penal law, cannot be described as a *choice* of the death of a person. Intentionally this action is (as *any* type of punishment is) "restoration of the order of justice," violated by the criminal and in danger of being disrupted without imposition of punishment. However it is precisely *not* the choice of the death of a person as resulting from weighing the good of a person's life against other goods which by this person's death would be brought about (whether capital punishment can be considered as an *adequate, proportionate,* and in this sense just kind of punishment *at all* is another question which still may be answered negatively; but in an objective-intentional sense it is "punishment" and therefore an act intentionally and objectively belonging to the virtue of justice, and not the choice that a person not be, whether as a means or as an end). Cf. the excellent treatment of this question in John Finnis, *Fundamentals of Ethics,* 127 ff.; and my own remarks in *Natur als Grundlage der Moral,* 371-374 and in *La prospettiva della morale* V, 3, d. Secondly, the above affirmation also implies the concept of non-intentional side-effects, e.g., in the case of self-defense which (physically) causes the aggressor's death. This means quite precisely that the aggressor's death was not *chosen for the sake* of defending one's life; cf. *ST* 11-11, q.64, a.7: "illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat." Here, "intendere" means the elective will referring to the concrete action (" occidere hominem "), while the defense of one's life is the *further* intention *with which* the concrete action is chosen.

is morally right with an evil intention; or to choose to do the morally wrong thing with a good will. Moral philosophers and theologians have always known this in the past, and it has traditionally been considered in ethics.[21]

Certainly many decisions, probably even the great majority of them, are legitimately worked out on the basis of weighing goods and consequences. This is particularly true for decisions taken in a wider social context (e.g. social, economical, scientific and research policy). But corresponding possibilities of action are, on the grounds of *moral reasons,* restricted. They are restricted by the condition that they be consistent with the fundamental " rightness of the will " on the level of concrete choices of actions. Here we encounter the kind of responsibilities which we are accustomed to expressing in so-called *absolute prohibitions.* On this level, the " right " and the " good " (or : the " wrong " and the " evil ") basically are identical. Here, balancing goods and calculating possible consequences is *excluded.*[22]

It is one of the most important assertions of classical virtue ethics that there exist conditions for the fundamental rightness of actions which depend on basic structures of the " rightness of desire" and that it is therefore possible to describe particular types of actions, the *choice* of which always involves wrong desire. However, an ethic which understands itself-on the level of "normative ethics "-as providing a rational discourse for the purpose of justifying moral *norms* (or rules) will never be able to acknowledge this. "Norm-ethics" are "objectivistic" in the sense that they *may not,* on the level of the concrete performance of actions, include in their reflection the acting subject and his willingly " taking a position " with regard to " good " and

[21] Compare Peter Geach, "Good and Evil," *Analysis* 17 (1956) : 33-42; republished in *Theories of Ethics,* ed. Philippa Foot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 64-73; see especially p. 72.

[22] This is why *VS 77* rejects in a very specific and restricted way the method of balancing goods and evils : " The weighing of the goods and evils foreseeable as the consequence of an action is not an adequate method for determining whether the choice of that concrete kind of behaviour is 'according to its species,' or ' in itself,' morally good or bad, licit or illicit."

" evil " *in* choosing this or that particular action. Similarly they cannot pose the question about the " rightness of desire," or about the "truth of subjectivity," on the level of concrete choices of particular actions *(independently* from taking into account further intentions regarding the state of affairs or the weighing of consequences which foreseeably will be brought about by these actions or by refraining from them).

I concede it to be true, as has been argued, [23] that the traditional doctrine about the " *fontes moralitatis" as such* does not resolve problems of normative ethics; it rather presupposes these problems to be already resolved. For with respect to this approach, everything depends each time on what one considers to be the "object" of an action. Consequentialists will assert that to determine the object of a concrete action, one has to take into account its foreseeably resulting consequences for all concerned. In this sense, consequentialism does not deny the doctrine about the *"fontes moralitatis,"* it merely puts forward a specific solution about how to work out what the "object" of a particular action IS.

Nevertheless this classical doctrine about " sources of morality" contains an undeniable assertion which, however, is implicitly denied by consequentialism. It is the assertion that, with regard to human action, it is possible each time to *distinguish* between (1) an " object" by which this action (and the agent's will) is already morally specified as " good," " evil," or " indifferent" *independently* from *further* intentions and (2) these further intentions. So the classical viewpoint holds that there are actions which are evil despite the best of intentions or despite the foreseen and intended outcomes precisely because the *choice* of this particular kind of action *through* which these laudable intentions are meant to be fulfilled must already be considered as morally evil. It will, however, never be possible to render intelligible this moral methodology on the grounds of an ethic which from the

[28] Cf. Bruno Schuller, " Die Quellen der Moralitat. Zur systematischen Ortung eines alten Lehrstiickes der Moraltheologie," *Theologie und Philosophie* 59 (1984) : 535-59.

beginning is concerned with justifying "moral norms." This is so because in such an approach the *distinction* between "object" and *further* intentions necessarily drops out of view. The only thing which a norm ethic can produce in the way of an action theory are the particular " occurrences " (" actions "), on the one hand, and the consequences, brought about by them, on the other. If an agent *intends* the best consequences, then it is these which come to be designated the "object" of his "act."

But this does not correspond to our ordinary experience as acting subjects and to the way we arrive at moral decisions; it rather has about it the air of casuistry. From the viewpoint of the acting subject we always encounter at least two intentionalities to be distinguished. If I break the promise of repaying somebody a determinate amount of money, causing by this his economic ruin because I, simultaneously, intend to prevent by this action the ruin of many others, I have *chosen* to break the promise given to my creditor *for the sake of* realizing an intention which is very laudable in itself. But here the object of choice ("breaking the promise") is not less intentionally " taking a position " than the further intention (" benefitting others "). The same applies to killing or lying with good further intentions.

Moral virtue is not only, as it is sometimes asserted, the will or the free determination to do " the right thing" each time. Were it like this, there would exist only one single moral virtue. Instead moral virtue is the habitual rightness of *appetite* (of sensual affections, passions, and of the will, the rational appetite) related to the various spheres of human praxis. An act which is *according* to virtue is an act which is suited to cause this habitual rightness of appetite which produces "the good person." To keep one's promise is indeed such an act according to moral virtue.

Certainly, we can describe the action " to promise " from the very beginning in an "eventistic" way, say, as a kind of uttering words (a " speech act ") by which A causes in B the mental state of being certain that A will do x. One may for various reasons consider it very beneficial that in a society there exists a practice of this sort. So one will formulate a rule (or norm) ac-

cording to which one is bound to abstain from any performance which could deprive others from being certain that, whenever A performs the speech act of "promising x," x will be brought about by A. The norm " never break promises " means precisely " always abstain from weakening the practice of promise-keeping." Even if one holds that the rightness of an action has to be determined exclusively on the basis of its foreseeable consequences, one must equally consider that the weakening of the practice of " promise-keeping " will be one of the consequences- probably the most weighty one-to be included in the balance. So, on the basis of such a rule-utilitarianism, one should insist that one is always obliged to keep promises. Or more precisely: one will not insist that promises have to be kept but rather that the *rule* or *norm* "keep your promises " has to be *observed.* This is an important difference (which will become clear immediately). The rule does not express the intrinsic morality of a type of action but rather *constitutes* the reasonableness of a certain behavior on the grounds of the utility of the rule under which this behavior is subsumed and which is to be maintained by this behavior (for the benefit of society, of course). It is obvious that there remains the possibility of conflict with other such rules ("conflicts of obligations ") ; consequently the rule cannot be valid " absolutely." As a result we have to work out which rule has to be followed in such a case: Either on the basis of a "hyperrule," or by arguing in an act-utilitarian way. Utilititarian ethics thus tends to become a complicated attempt to resolve the problems of " norm-utilitarianism." Actually it becomes much more concerned with resolving the problems of utilitarian ethical theory than with resolving ethical problems.

It is quite clear that in all these cases an agent may very well do the " right " thing with an evil will, and sometimes the " wrong" thing with a good will (calculating or subsuming incorrectly or applying the wrong rule, though intending the overall benefit of society or of all concerned). Here, the discourse concerned with grounding norms and resolving cases of conflict of rules and obligations must be sharply distinguished from another discourse, the one concerned with the conditions of good-

ness and wickedness of appetite and will. This distinguishing does not, however, reflect the requirements and the structure of moral action but merely the requirements which arise from the particular characteristics of a "norm-ethic." As said before, with such arguments one does not resolve *ethical* problems, but at most, if at all, the intrinsic problems of a particular ethical theory.

In reality, as acting subjects, we neither observe nor follow norms or rules, nor do we work out our decisions each time exclusively on the basis of foreseeable consequences for all those affected by our actions. Instead, human action realizes itself in the context of definite "moral relationships," the relationships between concrete persons (fellow-men, friends, married persons, parents and children, superiors and subordinates, employer and employee, creditor and debitor, physician and patient, partners in a contract, persons who live in a particular community, etc.).[24] Here, it is always concerned with what we *owe* to others, with the question of right and of good will toward particular fellow-men, with the question of responsibilities toward concrete persons.

Let us consider again the example of promise-keeping. Above we have defined "to promise" ("eventistically") as an utterance by which A causes in B the mental state of being certain that A will do x. However, the bringing about of B's mental state of being convinced that A will do x is not necessarily a promise; it could also be a menace, an announcement or a reassurance (what is really *meant* by a speech act like "You can be sure that tomorrow morning I'll come and see you"?). The above eventistic description of promising contains everything except the

[24] This category of "moral relationship" and its importance for explaining responsibility in moral decision-making was very well emphasized by Robert Spaemann, "Wer hat wofiir Verantwortung? Zurn Streit um deontologische oder teleologische Ethik," *Herder Korrespondenz* 36 (1982) : 345-50 & 403-8. The subsequent criticisms by A. Elsasser, F. Furger and P. Miiller-Goldkuhle (ibid. 509 ff.; 603 ff.; 606 ff.) unfortunately do not enter into the fundamental question posed by Spaemann; Spaemann himself remarks upon this in his concluding reply *(Herder Korrespondenz* 37 [1983]: 79-84).

element which confers on this speech-act the quality of being a promise. This it will be only if A wants to *confer on B a right or a claim* on A's doing x. So B's certitude that A will do x is grounded in a relation of *justice* caused precisely by the promissory act. Exactly this relation between A and B (that is: B's having a claim or a right on A's doing-x, and B's owing to A to do x)-a relation brought about by the speech-act "I promise you "-shows that a norm " keep your promises " is nothing else than a more particular or specific version of the principle of justice to render each one what one owes him. The promissory act indeed creates a relationship between persons in which this general rationale of justice now is valid.

It may happen that a situation changes in such a way that the doing of x (for whatever reason) subsequently turns out to be an unjust action; or even that doing x was unjust from the very beginning, that is, that A had promised B to do something unjust. Is it possible that B has a claim (a right) on A's committing an unjust act? Certainly not. The promise becomes in reality vain (or reveals itself as vain or immoral from the beginning). So the promise, in reality, is not " broken " ; by not keeping it no injustice is committed; rather the very promissory act was unjust, and it now would be according to justice that A in a way indemnifies B, who has been deceived. In order to be able to judge whether a promise keeps binding the person who made it, the consequences of doing x must be considered (an action without *any* consequence is not an action at all). But these will always be the consequences in the sphere of the question whether B continues licitly to *claim* A's keeping the promise, that is: A's doing x. The question can never arise whether such an *eristing* claim may be overridden in favor of other more important or more numerous goods benefitting Q, R, S, ..., T (even if there may be cases in which the benefits for Q, R, S, ..., T precisely will determine whether B continues to have a claim on A's doing x). In any case, the relation between A and B established by making the promise, and the consequences relating to Q, R, S, ..., T, are two different things; one cannot say that we are, *on principle,* responsible for all the foreseen consequences of our

actions or omissions. B's being deceived by a promise which may possibly not be kept certainly cannot be regarded as simply one among many consequences of not keeping the promise. So it *may* be possible that not-keeping a promise is unjust with regard to B even if the state of affairs resulting from not-keeping it were, as such, more desirable than the one brought about by keeping the promise. In this case, not keeping it would be morally *wrong* because the choice of an unjust action involves the wrongness of the will.

Anyhow, this view remains far too abstract. In reality things are resolved in other ways. In reality an agent who intends justice will try, for example, to achieve a delay in repaying the debt. Or he will find (or at least try to find) a way to prevent by other means the ruin of Q, R, S, ..., T. His refusal to commit an injustice against his creditor by breaking the promise will lead him to discover new lines of action, alternatives, and formerly unseen opportunities. To describe this we would need to tell a story. Virtuous actions are, in this sense, rendered intelligible only in a narrative context.[25] But the right thing to do will always be the action which is consistent with the rightness of appetite, with the rightness of our will's relation to concrete persons with whom we live together in defined relationships.

Many details should be added, and there is still much to be specified. But the fundamental difference between virtue- and norm-ethics consists in the fact that for the former the morally right is always determined, *as well* as rightness of appetite, with regard to the " good-for-man " on the level of concrete actions and in relation to particular persons, persons with whom the agent encounters himself living in morally qualified relationships (be they naturally given or be they relationships established by free acts, such as promises, contracts, etc.). That is why a virtue ethic can speak about actions which are " intrinsically," " always and per se," "on account of their very object" evil (cf. *VS* 80). A norm-ethic of utilitarian character, however, that in the last

[25] This is one of the very valuable insights of Alasdair Mcintyre's *After Virtue*, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1984).

analysis is an argumentatively proceeding norm-ethic, cannot do justice to such qualified relationships. Consequently, it is compelled to detach the category of the " rightness of actions " from the category of the "goodness of the will." That is why it simply will not understand that the intentional relation of the will to "justice," i.e., the " just will," is at stake in every concrete choice of a particular action.[26]

6. *The intentional structure of practical objects as " forms conceived by reason"*

So called " teleological ethics " owes a large amount of its plausibility-as far as Catholic moral theology is concerned-not least to the fact that it was directed against a naturalistic (or " physicalist ") misunderstanding of the " *moralitas ab obiecto."*[27] Yet, despite this justified aim, adherents to these "teleological" approaches do not seem to have recognized the real source of this misunderstanding, which consists in overlooking the fact that practical reason is embedded in the intentional process of human acting, being a part of it. That is why, I think, these new approaches remained themselves addicted to a surprising, even extreme, naturalism. Particular actions implicitly are considered by them as analogous to " events " and their outcomes as state of affairs. They implicitly presuppose, on the level of particular actions, a causal-eventistic concept of action (action as causing a state of affairs). I said " implicitly," because adherents of " teleological ethics " do not explicitly defend such a corre-

[26] This, it seems to me, explains why virtue ethics do not require a " personalistic complement." Recent personalism often seems to be an attempt to overcome the one-sided views of modern rule-ethics. Ethics based on the concept of moral virtue are intrinsically " personalistic," but are also probably more open to rational discourse than many forms of actual personalism.

[27] See, e.g., Franz Scholz, *Wege, Umwege und Auswege der Moraltheologie. Ein Pliidoyer fur begrundete Aitsnahmen* (Miinchen: Bonifatius, 1976), 16f.; Joseph Fuchs, " 'Intrinsece malum '. 'Oberlegungen zu einem umstrittenen Begriff," in *Sittliche Normen. Zum Problem ihrer allgemeinen und unwandelbaren Geltung,* ed. Walter Kerber (Diisseldorf: Patmos, 1982), 76£.; Peter Knauer, *S.J.*, "The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect," in *Readings* fo *Moral Theology No. 1,* pp. 1-39.

sponding action theory (they actually deal very little with questions of action theory). [28] That is why they are compelled to reclaim the aspect of intentionality-the aspect of willingly taking a position with regard to " good " and " evil "-on the level of fundamental options and attitudes, on the level of *Gesinnung.* So, consequentialists fail to see that, independently from *further* intentions required to optimize consequences or goods on the level of caused states of affairs, an action may already be qualifiable as *morally evil.* And this means : That a particular type of action, describable in behavioral terms, may be qualified as causing an *evil will* simply because it is *evil* to want (and, therefore, to choose) certain actions as practical objects (= as the " good to be done "). The problem is bypassed, even veiled, by describing chosen actions from the observer's viewpoint, thus leaving out of consideration precisely the act of choice. Probably the most famous example of such an argumentative reductionism is Caiaphas's advice to the Sanhedrin: " It is better for you that a single man dies for the people, than that the whole people perishes." As a judgment about a simple event or a state of affairs and its desirability this obviously is quite true. But it is well known that Jesus did not simply die but was killed.

Precisely because objects of our actions are intentional objects, that is, objects of acts of the will, they can only be " shaped " by reason; for the will is the appetite which follows the judgment of reason. As Aquinas emphasizes: "Species moralium actuum constituuntur ex formis, prout sunt a ratione conceptae." [29] This "form conceived by reason" is nothing other than the object of an action in its *"genus moris."*

This again is closely connected with the fact that every human action is an *intentional* action. And this is why it is something

[28] A more recent attempt to do so by referring to Kant is not very satisfying, and it remains unclear to what extent the author may be called a representative of "teleological ethics." Cf. Gerhard Hover, *Sittlich handeln im Medium der Zeit. Ansiitze zur handlungstheoretischen Neuorientierung der Moraltheologie* (Wiirzburg: Echter Verlag, 1988). However, this book contains some valuable criticisms of positions defended by adherents of " teleological ethics."

[20] *ST* 1-11, q.18, a.10.

that does not simply " happen," but something *willingly pursued* and as such *farmed* or shaped by reason. A concrete practical matter (" *materia circa quam* ")-the same applies to the "matter" of natural inclinations-is *as such,* considered in its pure "materiality," always *less* than the content or object of an action with respect to the natural inclination of a *human person.* If in greeting somebody or giving a starting signal, I raise my arm, then " raising my arm " (the matter of action) is *as such* something which can neither be chosen or performed. The real content of an act of choice and of the describable behavior is exclusively the intentional, i.e., human, action "greeting somebody" *or* "giving a starting signal." In this, however, the practical reason which judges the action as a practical good (something good to do here and now) is already involved. To know *what* a person is doing by raising his arm, one must know *why* (in the sense of " what for") he raises his arm. The " why" here is the formal aspect, the *"forma rationis* " which only renders understandable the event of the raising of an arm as a human *action.* This " why " (or " what for ") confers on the action its *intentional identity* which is able to inform and shape the agent's will.so

In his " Philosophical Investigations," Ludwig Wittgenstein asks "what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm ?" [31] We might answer: What is left over is precisely the *purpose* or *intention* to greet

so Cf. for this G. E. M. Anscombe, *Intention.* Professor Anscombe conceives, in the course of her analysis, the question " Why ?" in a larger sense (any sort of motives, or also unvoluntary causes of actions); it includes the "what for ?," without being reduced to it. But insofar as we are concerned with properly human, voluntary actions, the "why ?" precisely is the "what for? ". It properly concerns " intentions."

31 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* No. 621, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1958), 161e. Wittgenstein thinks that nothing is left over ("Are the kinaesthetic sensations my willing ?"). Wittgenstein refuses (see the next number) to differentiate conceptually, besides the physical fact, an act of willing. Anyhow, Wittgenstein here clearly mixes up the observer's viewpoint ("the fact that my arm goes up") and the acting person's perspective ("I raise my arm"). Nobody ever can really *observe* "I raise my arm"; only

somebody or to give a starting signal. That means that what remains is *"to want* to raise the arm *under the aspect of a specific description* " which is a description of the intentionality involved in the performance. To choose an action "under a description" again involves practical reason which judges "greeting somebody " or " giving a starting signal " as something which is "good" to do here and now. One might object: But you could just simply raise your arm. Well, I would answer, just try to do it! It is true that it might just "happen " (involuntarily, as a reflex, while sleeping); but this is not a human act. If, however, somebody wanted " simply " to raise his arm, he again would do more than simply "raise his arm." If we subtracted from his doing this action the fact that his arm goes up, we would have left over, e.g., "Wanting to show the author of this paper that he is wrong." What would be left over is a " why," the intentional content or the "form" of this act of "raising one's arm."

Therefore, "to greet somebody by raising one's arm" is properly the object of an action, which *in itself* possesses already an intentional structure. In precisely this structure, respectively the " whole " (the " matter " of the action + its " why" or " what for ") is a *"forma a ratione concepta."* Things like " greeting " or affability or gratefulness or justice, that is, corresponding actions to these, do not " exist " in nature. There do not exist corresponding "natural forms." These acts are intentionalities *formed* by practical reason. That is why the *objective* content of human actions can be expressed ·each time only in an intentional description of the corresponding action. " What " we do is always a " why " we do something *on1 purpose.* It is a " material doing " (" *materia circa quam* ") chosen *under a description,* while it is the "description " which actually contains the intentional content of the action. That is why it seems to me correct when Elizabeth Anscombe writes : " We must always remember

" the fact that my arm goes up " is observable. " I raise my arm " can properly be described only as a *choice* by a willing subject. Everybody has personal interior experience of such choices as something different from " kinaesthetic sensations."

that an object is not what what is aimed at *is;* the description *under which* it is aimed at is that under which it is *called* the object." [32]

It is often overlooked (as, for example, by L. Janssens) that an object of the will necessarily is an action-matter *"apprehensum et ordinatum a ratione."* For this reason, it possesses by itself a moral specificity; it never can be wanted or chosen *as* a non-moral good or end.[33] Equally one overlooks that the "end" *("finis")* is not only an object of *further* intentions, but also that the particular choice of an action has its proper " end " : the action as an object.

That is why, each time Aquinas speaks about *"finis,"* an author like L. Janssens reads *"finis operantis,"* overlooking thereby that the object of the exterior act of the will is in itself an end, but not this *further* end for the sake of which the action itself is chosen; instead it is the sort of end which Aquinas sometimes (very few times) calls the " *finis operis."* [34] This *"finis operis,"* however, is the *basic* intentional content of a concrete action (without which it would not be a human action at all), and therefore something like the "formal object" of an action.[35] Such basic contents are not events like " the raising of an arm," but rather " greeting somebody" or " giving a starting signal." They are neither " things " nor " qualified things " as, for example, a *res aliena;* but actions " under a description " as " *mis-*

a2 G. E. M. Anscombe, *Intention,§* 35, 66.

33 Here we may find probably the most decisive misjudgment of Janssens; for he assumed that the will is able to relate to " ontic" goods *as* ontic; so he asserts that it is possible to want " *per se* " an ontic evil on the level of its being only an ontic state of affairs, and that, as such, it can be the object of a choice which, then, would not be subject to moral qualification as a "good" or an " evil " choice. Only if the ontic evil is the end of the further intention with which a choice is performed, if it, therefore, were the proper *reason* of bringing such an evil about, could a corresponding will be called an evil will. Such an objectifying of ontic goods by the elective will, however, is simply impossible; it contradicts the very nature of the will which is *"appetitus in ratione"* or "intellectual appetite"; the will receives its object *through reason.* Janssens' argument is simply naturalistic.

34 Cf. e.g. *In IV Sent.*, d.16, q.3, a.l, qla.2 ad 3.

85 About formal and material objects of actions cf. Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will,* 5th ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1976), pp. 187 ff.

apropriate a res aliena," that is " stealing." The arm itself is not able to greet or to give a starting signal; and an action in which a " *res aliena"* is involved is not necessarily a theft (it may also be the action of seizing something stolen carried out by the police). Equally the so called " *finis operis"* is an *agent's* goal; but it is the goal he pursues independently of the *further* goals he may pursue by choosing this concrete action. It is the goal which specifies the performed action as a determinate *type* of intentional action, the one which Aquinas usually calls the " *finis proximus"* of a human act, i.e., its object.

The " species " of an action is precisely the species " *ab obiecto relato ad principium actuum humanorum, quod est ratio."* [36] The *"finis operis"* is nothing other than the object of *choice* (the choice of the action), which by itself is an act of the will informed by reason.

The so-called " absolute prohibitions," that is, normative propositions which indicate that certain, describable actions may *never* be licitly chosen and willingly performed, therefore relate to actions described *in;tentionally*. It is impossible to do this independently from the content of the acts of choice which relate to such actions. So, for example (although this is not the case with such prohibited actions), a " norm " cannot refer simply to "raising one's arm" but to "greeting somebody by raising one's arm" or "giving a starting signal by a movement of one's arm." Only to actions described in such a way can a moral norm reasonably relate. The norm "never kill" receives, in this way, a clear structure. [37]

7. Natural law: the fundamental rule for the goodness of will

As Aquinas says in one of his most concise phrasings, "natural law is nothing other than the light of the intellect given us

[36] *ST* I-II, q.18, a.6.

[37] Equally does the norm of never lying; see my *Natur als Grimdlage der Moral,* 346 ff.; 367 ff. About both, killing and lying, see also *La prospettiva delta morale,* chapter V, section 3 d. About contraception, see my paper *Contracept,ion, Sc.ma! Behavior, and Natural Law.*

by God by which we recognize what is to be done and what is to be avoided, a light and law which God has bestowed to man in creation." [38] Natural law is not simply an object of human reason, but, like all kinds of law, it consists precisely in judgments of practical reason itself, it is a specific set of *"propositiones universales rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones,"* a set of " universal propositions of practical reason directed to actions." [39]

As I have shown elsewhere, there exists a parallelism between the constitution of objects of actions as moral objects on the one hand, and the constitution of the precepts of natural law on the other. [40] Both objects of human actions and precepts of natural law refer to an " *appetibile apprehensum et ordinatum per rationem."* Both the *praeceptum* of the natural law and the object of a concrete action (which is the object of choice, in itself " prescriptive ") are " *aliquid a ratione constitutum"* [41] and spring from an " *ordinatio rationis."* [42] By natural law, this *objective*- that is, rationally ordered-meaning of natural inclinations is expressed *in universali.* And, therefore, natural law is properly the law by which particular judgments of practical reason are rectified.[43] So in two senses natural law is a " law of reason " : it is a law *constituted by* reason (on the universal level), and a law *referred to* and *regulating* reason (on the level of particular judgments).

as Thomas Aquinas, *In Duo Praecepta Caritatis et in Decem Praecepta, Prologus:* " lex naturae . . . nihil aliud est nisi lumen intellectus insitum nobis a Deo, per quod cognoscimus quid agendum et quid vitandum. Hoc lumen et hanc legem dedit Deus homini in creatione." And further on: ". . . lumen scilicet intellectus, per quad nota sunt nobis agenda."

aa *ST* I-II, q.90, a.l ad 2.

4o See *Naturals Grimdlage der Moral,* mainly part II.

"1 *ST* I-II, q.94, a.l.

42 *ST* I-II, q.90, a.4.

43 " Lex naturalis est secundum quam ratio recta est" *(In II Sent.,* d.42, q.2, a.5). This would be the appropriate place to speak about the constitution of "prudentia" (practical wisdom or "prudence") by the " fines virtutum," and about the twofold (intentional and elective) aspect of moral virtue; finally one must say something about the relation between " synderesis " and prudence. See for this *ST* II-II, q.47, a.6.

In this way the precepts of the natural law are recognizable as properly *practical principles* of the practical intellect determining concrete actions. This intellect possesses its perfection in prudence (practical wisdom). The questions dealt with here were not questions of " normative ethics " ; I did not claim to ground specific moral norms. It concerned a question which first had to be clarified before one could even speak about the grounding of moral norms and normative ethics. I wanted to clarify *how,* from a properly *moral* perspective, we have to speak about moral norms and " normative ethics " and what " moral norms " even refer to. Briefly we now can say: " Moral norms " are, in ethics and in the moral life, a quite specific way of *speaking* about intentional human actions and their practical principles. More precisely, norms are *normative propositions* (propositions in the mode of " ought," " may," " must not," etc.) about intentional actions *based on* practical principles.[44]

Theories like " teleological ethics " (consequentialism and proportionalism) sometimes present themselves as natural-law theories. They on principle rightly do so, because every natural law theory consists of a theory about practical reason and the structure of moral judgment performed by human reason. And teleological ethical theories, defending the cognitive " moral autonomy " of man, in fact *are* theories about what is meant by "to act according to reason ".[45] However, we may now be able to give a critical evaluation of these theories. First, they do not properly have a conception about *principles* of practical reason. This can also be regarded as a consequence of their lack of action-analysis. " Teleological ethics " essentially and exclusively is a decision-making theory: it tries to explain how we work out

[44] About the relation of so-called " moral absolutes " to *intentional* actions, see also the excellent Marquette Lecture by William E. May, *Moral Absolutes. Catholic Tradition, Current Trends, and the Truth,* The Pere Marquette Lecture in Theology 1989 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1989), especially pp. 40 ff.

[45] See Bruno Schuller, "Eine autonome Moral, was ist das ?," *Theologische Revue* 78 (1982), 103-106. See for this my above quoted article "Zur Begriindung sittlicher Normen aus der Natur," especially pp. 67 ff.

decisions about what to do here and now. If adherents of this theory speak of *principles,* they do so only to establish some more general rules for the orientation of decision making. These rules or principles, however, do not have, according to this theory, a *proper* origin, that is, an origin different from the very logic of a particular decision making process. So consequentialism and proportionalism do not really provide a natural-law theory. They provide a theory about reasonable action which basically fails to acknowledge what is most essential for natural law: The existence of real practical *principles* which are not derived from determinate forms of decision-making procedures, but are the real *moral measure* for the decision-making process.

Secondly, by measuring the moral " rightness " of single types of action exclusively on the basis of their foreseeable consequences related to non-moral goods and bads, this theory presupposes a concept of action which simply leaves out of consideration a basic aspect of human actions: The fact that the acting subject, that is, its *will,* takes a position with regard to good and evil already by *choosing* concrete actions which bring about such consequences. This taking a position relates to the agent's own person and to other persons (including God). So it seems that the theory does not acknowledge what actually follows from a more adequate analysis of human action : That *in the will* of the agent the properly moral qualities of " good " and "evil " may also appear *independen:tly* from the whole of foreseeable consequences. Adherents of so-called " teleological ethics " consequently omit in principle an *intentional* description of those particular types of action which afterwards they qualify, on the basis of their decision-making procedure, as "right" or "wrong." To defend their theory, they are *compelled* to describe these actions as mere " events." Then at the same time they indicate the difficulties and aporias which logically derive from such a non-intentional concept of action, difficulties and aporias regarding the concept and the respective determination of the "object" of an action, so that, finally, they are able to offer their theory as the only reasonable solution for these problems, problems, however, created by their

very approach rather than by the subject matter of ethics itself.[46] The solution offered by adherents to " teleological ethics " maintains that "action-events" brought about by acting subjects may be qualified as " right " or " wrong" according to whether they bring about the best overall consequences for all the concerned, an optimum of goods or a minimum of bads.

I have argued, however, that even if the non-moral consequences of an action are optimal and mostly desirable, the action by which they have been brought about may nevertheless be an *evil* action. I would insist that everybody knows that this is possible. Whoever brings about " the best of all worlds" (the world with an optimum of non-moral goods or a minimum of non-moral bads) can, at the same time, be a murderer or a villain, and this not simply because he acted, say, to assure his own glory and, therefore, with a fundamentally evil intentionality, but precisely because we would judge as wicked the *actions* he performed. This obviously shows already that such a world would not be the best of all. The problem with consequentialist ·ethics is not that it does not share this conviction or that its adherents are inclined to plead for amorality, but that consequentialism is not able to *explain* what all of us know. The "secret" of consequentialism does not consist in denying this truth, just as it does not deny the truth of the proposition that a good intention cannot "sanctify " evil means. Instead the " secret " of these methodologies consists in making the *acting* subject disappear which, in its concrete choices of particular actions, takes a position with his will with regard to "good" and "evil." As a result, the verdict about the good intentions which cannot " sanctify " evil means is simply rendered *irrelevant* and *pointless.* For if the "means" (that is: the concrete actions we choose and willingly perform)

[46] This approach, however, is not so different from traditional approaches that can be found in some classical manuals of moral theology. Some of them used to look at actions as physical processes or events, relating them afterwards to the " norma moralitatis," an extrinsic rule determining whether it is licit or illicit to perform such and such an " action." What most classical manuals failed to do was precisely to render intelligible what a human action is and that its moral identity is *included* in it because it is included in the *intentional* structure of an action.

only can be " right" or " wrong," and this depending on their foreseeably resulting consequences in the field of non-moral goods and bads, then *by definition* there cannot exist such a thing as an "evil means." Instead there can be, at most, "wrong means," that is, means chosen on the basis of an error about which means would be the right one in order to achieve a determinate goal. To justify the concept of " intrinsically evil action," an intentional concept of action is required, and a corresponding concept of the intentional basic contents of concrete types of actions. This " intentional basic content " of an action is what we usually call its "moral object." [47]

We all understand a " good person " to be a person whose *will* is a good one, even if, to be good, such a will must often pay a high price: The price of accepting mostly undesirable consequences of its being a good will. But it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it.[48] This proposition precisely means quite specifically that it is *morally better* to abstain from an action the performance of which would be unjust, even if, as a consequence of refraining from it, a much greater injustice committed by others would foreseeably result, an injustice that, however, *I* will suffer. If we set aside the acting subject, the injustice *committed* by me and the injustice *suffered* by me (and committed by another person) appear just as two different states of affairs. The point (long ago expressed by Democritus) is that one cannot and *may* not compare these two consequences, nor may one weigh the action to be avoided against the undesirable consequences of refraining from this action. And this simply for the reason *that the action as such, considered in itself, is an unjust action.* This is precisely what a consequentialist (" teleological ") ethic is unable to justify.

It can be seen that the natural law manifests itself as the totality of principles of practical reasonableness which not only moves us to act and to do the truly good but also compels us to refrain

[47] For a full account of the concept of " intentional basic content " and " intentional basic action" see my *La prospettiva delta morale.*

[48] For the following I am indebted to A. W. Mi.iller, "Radical Subjectivity: Morality versus Utilitarianism," *Ratio* 19 (1977) : 115-32.

from committing injustice. Natural law is the proper "law" of a good will. It orients human persons, as *striving* subjects, to the "good-for-man," on the level of himself and of his fellow-men. It equally makes him refrain from evil, from "poisoning his soul." A life that maintains this orientation to the "food-for-man" in each and every single act of choice may rightly be called a "successful" life. A person who lives such a life therefore deserves praise and we consider him or her as a person who is on the way to sharing in true happiness, of participating in what the Greek Philosophers called *eudaimonia.*

It will always remain difficult to disprove convincingly so called "teleological" ethical theories (consequentialism, proportionalism) as long as one tries to do so in the logic proper to norm or rule ethics. The Church's teaching about "law"-" eternal," "natural," or "positive," "divine" or "human," "old" and "new"-was, in the past centuries, profoundly and not very happily influenced by the logic of norm and rule ethics. For different reasons, moral theologians emphasized the "observers' viewpoint." Unlike the classical and medieval tradition of moral theory, the modern tradition was not interested in exposing a comprehensive conception of the good life as part of the intellectual enterprise involved in coming to an understanding of man and of the sense of his existence. From the 16th century onward, moral theology, intensively permeated with casuistry, was rather concerned with judgments about whether particular acts were compatible, or not, with a conception of the good life already established by revealed positive law and the corresponding moral norms.

This concern, however, falls short of the genuine way we arrive at a proper understanding of the real requisites of morality. For this, also in a Christian context, a virtue-centered moral theory is needed, be it on the level of philosophical ethics or on that of moral theology.[49] So called "teleological ethics" have not yet

[49] See an example of the latter in Romanus Cessario, 0.P., *The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics* (Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991).

escaped from the logic of a legalistic approach; they only now try to "save" freedom from a supposed menace by law. By asserting in number 78 that "to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself *in the perspective of the acting person,"* the encyclical *Veritatis Splendor* opens a new way directed to rediscovering the perspective proper to virtue ethics, which is the genuine perspective of morals.

DID AQUINAS CHANGE HIS MIND ABOUT THE WILL?

DANIEL WESTBERG

University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia

ONE OF THE MOST fundamental and challenging problems in the interpretation of St. Thomas is the proper relationship of intellect and will, on which so much of moral theology (and thus of the *Summa Theologiae)* hinges. As Alasdair Macintyre indicates in both *After Virtue* and *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* the problem involves our understanding of how to appreciate the genius of Aquinas in the monumental task of harmonizing Aristotelian practical reason and the biblical and Augustinian categories of will, sin and the law of God.

When this framework is brought to the reading of St. Thomas, it is very difficult to understand certain texts which can seem to be obscure or inconsistent. In some cases he seems to be following Aristotle's explanations of practical reason and choice, and elsewhere he emphasizes the freedom of the will. One method of dealing with this is to argue for a change in Thomas's thinking: that he shifted from an early emphasis on the intellect (his Aristotelian phase) to an appreciation for the dynamic freedom of the will (which he inherited and developed from the Augustinian tradition). This has the virtue of seeming to deal neatly with inconvenient texts by consigning them to a position which he abandoned; but as we shall see the treatments by Aquinas do not fit the chronology required by this schema of development.

There is very little evidence, actually, to recommend this thesis though it has been advocated by prominent scholars-

and there are strong reasons why we should reject this theory of change. That this explanation has nevertheless been widely held says more about the tradition of voluntarism in our thinking (and our tendency to see Aquinas in that light) than about the merits of the case brought forward to argue for Thomas's shift from reason to will.

Proponents of the Theory of Change

Dom Odon Lattin questioned the dating of *De Malo* 6 to 1263-68 by Mandonnet (and ca. 1268 by Grabmann) on the basis that the work shows advances in the treatment of *liberum arbitrium.* He argued that whereas Thomas had placed the primary motive factor on reason in his earlier works [1] the emphasis was shifted to the will in *De Malo* 6 and *ST* I-II, q.9, a. 4. Therefore we could conclude that *De Malo* is posterior to *ST* I and anterior to *ST* I-II.[2]

Lottin was right about the dating, but not about the reasons given for it. He alleged that the structure of the argument in *De Malo* 6 is entirely different from previous treatments because the distinction between *voluntas* and *liberum arbitrium* has disappeared and been replaced by " liberty of specification " and "liberty of exercise." Lattin admitted, however, that the former belongs to reason and the latter to will implying (without realizing it, perhaps) that we might well interpret this as a change of terminology rather than a change of doctrine.

Lottin softened his claims the following year in an article where he wrote: " *Il ne faudrait pas urger la difference ... qui eziste entre cet expose du* De Malo *et celui du* De Veritate," admitting that the distinction between specification and exercise is also to be found in *De Veritate.* Therefore we should not speak *"d'opposition ni meme de diversite de doctrine."* [3]

[1] E.g. *De Veritate* 22.12; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, 89; *ST* I, q.82, a.4.

[2] " La date de la Question Disputee *De Malo* de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique* 24 (1928) : 373-388.

[3] O. Lottin, "Le libre arbitre chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue thomiste* 12 (1929): 424, n. 1; reprinted in vol. 1 of *Psychologie et morale a=- XIIe et XIIIe siecles* (Gembloux, 1948).

There is still a difference, however, in emphasis, Lottin argued, for two reasons: (1) In the *De Malo* a text from the *Eudemian Ethics* of Aristotle is quoted to indicate that God is the first mover of the will; this apparently undercuts the priority of the intellect over the will; Lottin noted that this text is cited also in *ST* I, so that the "change" in Thomas must now be shown to have occurred before this work; and (2) the connection of the argument of *De Malo* 6 with the controversies and condemnations of 1270.

Thomas Deman, however, had previously pointed to the influence of the *Eudemian Ethics* on Thomas's thinking in the *Summa Contra Gentiles.*[4] This meant that whatever "shift" Lottin saw in Thomas's thinking should have taken place earlier in his career.

A few years later, in an article on human freedom, Lottin argued again for a definite change in doctrine.[5] He was not concerned about the question of dating any longer because Glorieux had clarified the chronology of Aquinas's disputed questions and placed *De Malo* 6 to 1270.[6] He wanted, rather, to argue that the shift in teaching about intellect and will occurred not between *ST* I and *De Malo* but between *De Veritate* and *ST.* In Thomas's early works, Lottin argued, the will always follows reason; and especially in the *De Veritate* there is *"un apparent determinisme psychologique."*[7] This determinism disappears when we come to *ST* I because there the will, although subject to the influence of the object presented by reason, moves itself to action as an efficient cause.[8]

Lattin pointed to the distinction between efficient and final causality with respect to the intellect in action. In *De Veritate,* Thomas had attributed formal and final causality to the intellect:

[4] T. Deman, "Le 'Liber de bona fortuna' dans la theologie de s. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 17 (1928) : 42.

[5] 0. Lottin, " Liberte humaine et motion divine de s. Thomas d'Aquin a la condamnation de 1277," *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 7* (1935) : 52-69, 156-173.

[6] P. Glorieux, " Les Questions Disputees de Saint Thomas et leur suite chronologique," *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale* 4 (1932): 1-33.

[7] Lottin, " Liberte humaine," p. 56.

[8] Ibid., p. 55, referring *to ST* I, q.82, a.4.

ratio illa ostendit quad intellectus movet per modum finis: hoc enim modo se habet bonum apprehen:sum ad voluntatem. [9] In *De Mala* 6, however, final as well as efficient cause now become " *l'apanage exclusif de la volonte elle-meme"* and thus removes from the reason " *toute idee d'infiuence determinante."* [10] Lottin sought to strengthen his case by unfairly stressing the aspect of intellectual determinism in *De Veritate* and by presenting a quite inaccurate emphasis on will in *De Malo.*

Bernard Lonergan made use of Lottin's analysis in his articles concerning grace in St. Thomas. However, he completely polarized the difference supposedly to be found in Thomas. Lonergan alleged that in the *De Veritate, De Potentia,* and *ST* I, Aquinas had equated freedom with non-coercion, but later saw his mistake and retracted. As Lonergan put it:

> This lapse in the teeth of contrary theory was repudiated with extreme vehemence in the later *De Malo* as heretical, destructive of all merit and demerit, subversive of all morality, alien to all scientific and philosophic thought, and the product of either wantonness or incompetence.[11]

The strong opinion is indeed to be found in the words of Aquinas (near the beginning of his response), but we shall see below that the subject for attack was rather different from what Lonergan thought.

The earlier writings on will by St. Thomas, said Lonergan, must be regarded by historians " as a momentary aberration." Along with the false view of freedom Thomas also " overcame the Aristotelian doctrine of passive potency " : in the *De Mala* and *ST* I-II, with passivity "transcended," Lonergan thought he saw that " the freedom of man yields place to the freedom of the will." [12]

This is a misguided reading of Thomas by Lonergan. And how are we to regard his presentation to us of a truncation of

[9] *De Ver.* 22.12, ad 3, cited by Lottin, "Liberte humaine," pp. 54-55, n. 11.
[10] Ibid., p. 163.
[11] " St. Thomas's Thought on *Gratia Operans," Theological Studies* 3 (1942) : 534.
[12] Ibid., p. 536.

freedom-the reduction of the "freedom of man" to the "freedom of the will"-as a more attractive or positive move? This makes sense only if one takes the view of Duns Scotus that, since the intellect being a natural faculty is determined, only the will has free agency. This would support Vernon Bourke's contention that most Catholic understanding of Aquinas on the will has been Scotistic.[18] Such is the weight of authority, however, that several years later G. P. Klubertanz could say that Lottin and Lonergan "have proved that St. Thomas's theory of the will underwent a notable development from the *Commentary on the Sentences* to the *Prima Secundae.*"[14]

Lonergan's interpretation did not go uncriticized. Marianne Childress noted that Lonergan had treated final cause as the same as efficient cause-probably through a misreading of Lottin-thus making it appear as though Thomas had made a shift from the intellect as final and efficient cause to the will as final and efficient cause.[15] A proper reading of *De Veritate,* Childress pointed out, does not sustain this interpretation.[16] In other words, since Thomas never assigned efficient causation to the intellect the change was not nearly as sharp as Lonergan alleged.

R. Z. Lauer, though somewhat deferential to Lottin, questioned his thesis that Bishop Tempier's actions caused Thomas to change his view of will from passive to active. In Thomas's works "the thought that is expressed seems to be consistent throughout his writings"; and Lauer's summary is faithful to Thomas: "the intellect moves the will inasmuch as the intellect apprehends the object of election, apprehends it as having a ratio of good, which is the final cause of the will."[17]

13 V. Bourke, *Will in Western Thought* (New York, 1964), p. 88.

14 G. P. Klubertanz, "The Unity of Human Activity," *The Modern Schoolman 27* (1949-1950) : 94.

15 M. Childress, "Efficient Causality in Human Actions," *Modern Schoolman* 28 (1951) : 191-222.

16 Ibid., p. 201, n. 39. Lottin himself was aware of this: cf. "Liberte humaine," p. 54.

17 R. Z. Lauer, "St. Thomas's Theory of Intellectual Causality in Election," *New Scholasticism* 28 (1954): 318.

Lottin wrote a brief reply, saying that there are two problems involved in the question of final causality: (1) the relation of reason and will; and (2) the influence of the object on the act of the will.[18] Lauer confused these, Lottin said, not realizing that in the commentary on the *Sentences* and in *ST* I only the first problem is treated while the *De Malo* answers the second by showing that reason is not the final cause.

Like a dog which will not surrender its bone, Lottin took his position even further in order to explain Thomas's doctrine of human freedom. To strengthen his case for change from *De Veritate* to *De Malo*, Lottin exaggerated (in the manner of Lonergan) the intellectual determinism of the earlier work : " *le vouloir suit necessairement le jugement* "; " *le desaccord est impossible entre le choix et le jugement pratique qui l'a determine."*[19]

Other scholars expressed their disagreement with Lottin and Lonergan. Lebacqz distanced himself from Lottin's thesis, saying that it was based on *"une meconnaissance fonciere."*[20] The " determinism " supposedly characteristic of the earlier works is present in all his writings, and Lebacqz pointed to the fact that Thomas uses the supposedly deterministic teaching of the operative syllogism in *ST* I-II, q.13, a. 1.,[21] showing that Thomas did *not* change his position between the *prima pars* and the *prima secundae.* It is significant that Klubertanz in 1961 revised his earlier position of agreement with Lottin and Lonergan on the matter of evolution in Thomas's thought and asserted that the " changes " were more apparent than real. If the teaching in the later works was expressed in the categories of the early works " the really significant differences could well disappear from view."[22]

[18] O. Lottin, *Bulletin de theologie ancienne et medievale 7* (1954-7) : 579-580.

[19] O. Lottin, "La preuve de la liberte chez S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale* 23 (1956) : 326.

[20] J. Lebacqz, *Libre arbitre et jugement* (Paris, 1960), p. 35.

[21] Ibid., p. 36.

[22] G. P. Klubertanz, "The Root of Freedom in St. Thomas's Later Works," *Gregorianum* 42 (1961): 707.

These notes of caution have been outweighed, however, by further repetitions of the thesis of change. In 1971 Bernard Lonergan's earlier studies on grace were re-edited and published as *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas* and expounded Lottin's theory of a marked change between *De Veritate* and *De Malo.* The wide circulation of this book has undoubtedly given fresh currency, in an exaggerated form, to the erroneous view of a massive shift from intellect to will in Thomas's thought without any qualification. The same year marked the publication of Riesenhuber's attempt to provide a metaphysical grounding for the superiority of the will, which was followed up by articles in which he argued for a shift in Thomas's later works to a doctrine of the autonomy of the will.[23]

If the proper way to understand individual passages and the process of development in the *Summa Theologiae* has not been very clear to critics, there seems to be much less doubt about the *De Malo.* As we saw above, the teaching on the will in this question has always been the cornerstone of the thesis of change for Lottin and Lonergan and the point of comparison with the emphasis on the intellect in the commentary on the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate.* When we read *De Malo,* said Lottin, *"nous sommes loin du determinisme qui, dans le De Veritate, reliait le vouloir au jugement pratique prealable."*[24] Because emphasis in *De Malo* 6 on the will has been more congenial, and because it is among Thomas's later writings, scholars have urged us to consider it, whatever Aquinas may have said elsewhere, the final word on the subject of free choice.

Some more recent criticism of Aquinas has tended to give up entirely on the *Summa Theologiae* and make the *De Malo* the

[23] K. Riesenhuber, *Die Transzendenz der Freiheit zum Guten: Der Wille in der Anthropologie und Metaphysik des Thomas van Aquin* (Munich, 1971); "The Bases and Meaning of Freedom in Thomas Aquinas," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 48 (1974): 99-111 and "Der Wandel des Freiheitsverstandnisses von Thomas von Aquin zur friihen Neuzeit," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica* 66 (1974): 946-74.

[24] Ibid., p. 328.

only genuine presentation of Thomas's new understanding of the nature of the will's freedom. This is based on seeing the survival of some of the intellectualist elements in the discussions of human action in *ST* I-II, qq. 1-21 and on finding a new basis of discussion in *De Malo* 6.[25]

Problems with the Theory

The major difficulty in the theory of change is to indicate where the major shift in Thomas's thinking occurred. We have seen that various places have been proposed: after the *prima pars* of the *ST*, then before the *Summa contra Gentiles*, and then after the opening section of the *secunda pars* of the *ST*. The problem for advocates of the theory of a shift has always been that in all these works there are citations which seem to indicate that Thomas had not overcome his " intellectualist " view. Even after *ST* I-II, qq. 1-21 we may point to these elements: in *ST* I-II, q. 76, for example, in the section on sin, the relation of sin to ignorance is given an intellectualist base, using the practical syllogism as the basis for decision, and not giving the will the weight that one would expect if he had made the " shift " by this point. When we come to *ST* III, q. 18, a. 4, in the question whether there was *liberum arbitrium* in Christ, the discussion picks up the framework used in *ST* I, q. 83 without any indication that Thomas had a new way of looking at the will's role in decision.

There is, further, quite a problem in dating implied by this revisionist program, especially by the enthusiasts for *De Malo* 6. There is little disagreement with Glorieux's or Lottin's date of

[25] 0. M. Pesch, in "Philosophie und Theologie der Freiheit bei Thomas von Aquin in *quaest. disp.* VI *De Malo:* ein Diskussionsbeitung," *Miinchener Theologische Zeitung* 13 (1962) : 1-25, sees the intellectualist links between the Ia-IIae and the *pars* Ia. More extreme is H.-M. Manteau-Bonamy, "La liberte de l'homme selon Thomas d'Aquin : la datation de la question disputee *De Malo," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age* 46 (1979), who finds in *ST* I-II the same doctrine as in *De Veritate*, but in *De Malo* "la volonte de !'homme est une puissance radicalement active" (p. 22). The dating problems which this view involves will be considered below.

late 1270, in Paris, for this disputed question; but this of course causes trouble for our treatment of the *secunda pars* of the *Summa Theologiae* which was being composed also during this period. If Thomas had had the breakthrough in his view of the freedom of the will which is alleged, then this should have shown up in the remainder of his work; but the evidence for the unity of treatment in the *ST* is far stronger than the evidence for a change in doctrine, as Pesch and Manteau-Bonamy admit.

One way to deal with this is to say that Thomas simply carried on in the *Summa* with the old intellectualist way of looking at things, and did not bother to integrate his new insights on the will's freedom. At least one scholar is prepared to draw this conclusion and argues that for various reasons Aquinas decided not to modify *ST* I-II, qq. 9-10 along the lines of his thinking represented in *De Malo* 6.[26]

No Thomist could be happy with the idea that the answer to a question as important as the role of the will in human action is answered adequately only in a short disputed question (and a single article at that). This would imply that whole tracts of the *Summa Theologiae* must be ignored (remember that Lonergan included *ST* I as part of Thomas' s " aberration ") or at best read with cautious qualification. There can be very little satisfaction to know that St. Thomas finally got the problem of free will right in the *De Malo* if this means that the centerpiece of the *Summa,* the treatment of human action, morality and virtue, is basically fl.awed. The value of Thomas as a theologian is immensely diminished if this theory is correct because it means not only that his *Summa* is immature in some important ways, but that by the end of 1270 he had the insights to improve his moral theology but failed to integrate these new principles into his work.

There is a lesson to be drawn from J. B. Korolec's summary article on free choice in the *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy.* Following Korolec the reader would think that

[26] The only suggestion given by Manteau-Bonamy, in "La liberte de l'homme," p. 33, is " que la Somme s'adressait a des novices qu'il fallait introduire progressivement a la verite pleniere."

Thomas emphasized the will in the commentary on the *Sentences,* that *liberum arbitrium* can be identified with the will which is the source of freedom in the *De Veritate,* and that it is in the *ST* that Aquinas stresses that the intellect and not the will " has the major role in the moral activity of human beings"; further, Korolec sees in the *ST* that final causality is attributed to the intellect.[27] The fact that Korolec could offer the opposite thesis to Lottin and Lonergan (without apparently realizing its implications) is not to be scorned so much as regarded as evidence for the dynamic interdependence of reason and will for which we would argue.

The thesis of a major shift in Thomas's thought can be strongly challenged by considering texts from the *De Veritate* which emphasize the will, and from *De Malo* 6 which describe the role of the intellect. vVe saw above that in order to make his case Lottin ascribed to the *De Veritate* an intellectual determinism against which the *De Malo* 6 can appear voluntarist. Thomas, however, nowhere states that the will must accept the judgment of reason. In fact, even in *De Veritate,* he emphasizes their mutual interdependence : " the act of choice proceeds from each potency in relation to the other."[28] Completely counter to Lottin's interpretation of intellectual determinism, Thomas says that the "will moves the reason by ordering its action."[29] There is also full emphasis put on the will as early as the commentary on the *Sentences:* "Choosing is principally an act of the will."[30]

Similarly in *De i11alo* 6 Thomas speaks of the way in which the intellect understands the interior act of the will in that through the act of the intellect the will is somehow moved.[31]

[27] J. B. Korolec, "Free Will and Free Choice," *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,* ed. A. Kenny, N. Kretzmann, and J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), p. 635.

[28] *De Veritate* 24.4. " Sic enim actus electionis progreditur, ab una scilicet earum per ordinem ad aliam."

[29] "Voluntas movet rationem imperando actum eius" *(De Ver.* 24.6, ad 5).

[30] "Eligere erit principaliter actus voluntatis" (II *Sent* d. 24, q. 1, a. 3).

[31] *De lvfalo* 6, ad 18: "similiter etiam et interiorem actum voluntatis intelligit, in quantum per actum intellectus quodammodo movetur voluntas."

Since there is evidence in all stages of Thomas's thought of a strong emphasis on both reason and will, the most reasonable and faithful explanation is not that of development or change from one to the other, but that of a constant doctrine of the intimate combination of the two forces.

The Authentic Teaching of Aquinas

The most essential point to grasp is that reason and will do not work in sequence but in harmony, *at the same time.* The intellectualist account pictures the will having to follow what the intellect concludes; the voluntarist account says that the will is free to decide on an action no matter what the intellect comes up with. Thomas's teaching is neither of these, but that both operate together: that when a decision is made it expresses the agent's understanding as well as his desires. This is definitely not the standard, "received" view of traditional scholastic commentators, but it has been noticed by several scholars including G. Verbeke who realized the importance of both cognition and volition in dynamic relationship. Verbeke correctly maintained that the emphasis on both reason and will is present in Thomas's doctrine throughout his writings. [32]

This emphasis is characteristic not merely of Thomas's early stage, but also of *ST* I-II and *De Malo.* In the very first question which opens the discussion of human action Thomas writes that "humans have dominion over their actions through both their reason and will, which is why *liberum arbitrium* is called a fac-

[32] " Les deux facultes superieures de l'homme se penetrent reciproquement," in G. Verbeke, "Le developpement de la vie volitive d'apres s. Thomas," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 56 (1958) : 17. Servais Pinckaers made the relation of reason and will a major theme in a series of polemical articles in *Nova et Vetera* studying the decline of medieval moral theology, reprinted as *Les sources de la morale chretienne: sa methode, son contenu, son histoire* (Fribourg and Paris, 1985).

Mention should be made of two earlier perceptive works: Joseph Glanz, *Die Einheit des menschlichen Handelns bei Thomas von Aquin* (Inaugural-dissertation at F. Wilhelms Univ., Bonn, 1932) ; and U. Serafini, "La liberta umana secondo Aristotele e le interpretazioni averroistica et tomista," *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 34 (1955): 167-185.

ulty of the will and of reason." [33] Confusion is embedded in us right from the start when we translate *liberum arbitrium* as "free will." [34]

There are different approaches and emphases in the various treatments by Thomas, and it is indeed possible to point to changes and improvements. One would *expect* to find, after all, a different emphasis on the will in a work devoted to the subject of truth from one dealing with the nature and causes of evil. With this said, the unity of conception and treatment of the question of the function of the will throughout the works is also remarkable.

In the *De Malo* Thomas tells us that if we consider the activation of the potencies of the soul from the aspect of the specifying object, then the first principle of motion is from the intellect; for in this way the "understood good" moves even the will itself; if however we consider the movements of the soul's potencies from the aspect of the exercise of the act, then the principle of motion is from the will.[35]

This teaching of Thomas is not very different from the position established in *De Veritate* where he taught that man does necessarily desire the good in general, [36] but that there is no necessity with respect to this or that particular good. [37] This is the same teaching as that found in the various treatments. What is stressed in *De Malo* 6 is that only the absolute good, beatitude, is desired by necessity, and thus every good actually apprehended by the intellect in this life is deficient in some respect and thus free from necessity.

[33] *ST* I-II, q.1, a.1. "Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem, uncle et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur ' facultas voluntatis et rationis '."

[34] As Timothy Suttor does at *ST* I, q. 84 in his volume (no. xi) of the new Blackfriars edition (London and New York, 1970).

[35] *De !Ylalo* 6. " Si ergo consideremus motum potentiarium animae ex parte objecti specificantis actum, primum principium motionis est ex intellectu: hoc enim modo bonum intellectum movet etiam ipsam voluntatem. Si autem consideremus motus potentiarum animae ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motionis est ex voluntate."

[36] *De Veritate* 22.5, ad 12, "et sic eti::m voluntas de necessitate vult bonum."

[37] *De Veritate* 22.6, ad 5 " sed non determinate hoc bonum vel illnd."

Lottin's account of the liberty accorded to the will in *De Malo* is very different from Thomas's explanation. Lottin misunderstood completely Thomas's explanation of *bonum quad non inveniatur esse bonum secundum omnia particularis.* Instead of seeing the profound proof for the non-necessity of any *bonum intellectum* (other than *beatitudo)* Lottin says " *Mais si ce bien presente quelque deficience, la volonte peut choisir un autre."* [38] Instead of seeing the indeterminacy inherent in every decision to act, Lottin still continued to see reason and will in opposition, with will making the final choice after all, thinking all the while that this was Thomas's "new" teaching in *De Malo.*

The mistake almost always made in understanding this is to impose a sequential model on the language of Thomas and have the will follow the intellect or make its own decision, when he wants us to see each guiding the other. The key to realizing this is the fact that intellect and will are not two similar but distinct faculties of the mind, one doing one job and one another (in which case they would operate sequentially), but are actually two different *kinds* of potencies according to Thomas. [39] Using his metaphysical basis, the intellect is the term for a person's ability to recognize reality and truth, while the will is a person's ability to be attracted toward good specified in this way. In practical reasoning, both intellect and will need to be active *at the same time.* Apprehension and inclination are simultaneously necessary for action just as pitch and rhythm are both essential for music (which must involve sound frequencies as well as motion forward in time).

The teaching of Thomas on intellect and will cannot be completely clear or convincing until its proper metaphysical foundations are presented, the relationships with Aristotle and Augustine are described, and the actual process of practical reasoning is explained. That will need to be done elsewhere.[40] But we can

[38] Lottin, " La preuve de la liberte," p. 328.

[39] *De Veritate* 22.4, ad 4. Helpful on this point is Lawrence Dewan, "The Real Distinction between Intellect and Will," *Angelicum* 57 (1980) : 557-593.

[40] My attempt at this appears in: *Right Practical Reason: Aquinas on Prudence and Human Action* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

get some help by considering the two points which Lottin and Lonergan raised as the problems which they thought indicated change in Aquinas, namely the notion of the will as a *potentia passiva* and the attribution of final causality to the will.

We saw that one of the key issues to which Lonergan objected was the notion of "passive potency." This is what he thought was "transcended" by Aquinas in *De Malo* 6, and others have thought that this work marks the place where he shifted to an " active " rather than a " passive " view of the will. This is interpreted to mean that the will is now self-activated, rather than being dependent on the determination of the intellect.

This term *potentia passiva* should be interpreted in the framework of Aristotelian physics and metaphysics as Thomas developed it, and not given a psychological connotation which seems to make the agent " passive " with respect to his choices and actions. As Thomas develops the operations of the intellect and will as " passive potencies " he employs a technical expression indicating their relation to external reality. A passive potency, as he described it in his commentary on the *Metaphysics,* is " a principle by which something is moved by something else inasmuch as it is something else." [41] Both intellect and will are passive potencies with respect to an object (anything in the universe which it is possible to think or be attracted to), and therefore are in potency to change-to be "moved" by the object-but as potencies reduced to act they become active and enable a person to be an agent, that is to be free to think, desire, and do things. We expect this explanation of the function of intellect and will on this very Aristotelian basis to be difficult for the modern mind to accept; but it met with considerable opposition in Aquinas's time as well.[42]

If we consider the texts involved-the *De Veritate,* the condemned proposition, and its version in the *De Mala-we* will see

[41] *Metaphys.* 9, lectio 1, no. 1777.

[42] See Z. Kuksewicz, " Criticisms of Aristotelian Psychology and the Augustinian-Aristotelian Synthesis," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,* p. 623.

that there was no abandonment of the prior Aristotelian metaphysics. In the earlier work Thomas, quoting Aristotle's *De Anima,* says that "the appetite is a passive potency, because it is moved by what is desirable." [43] Lattin has described for us the hostility to this on the part of Franciscans like Gauthier de Bruges, [44] and the general reaction that understood Thomas to be denying the freedom of the will. It is clear that they simply did not understand that Thomas was describing appetite in general, the metaphysics of teleology including the "natural appetite" of all creation as well as sensitive and rational appetite.

In December of 1270 a number of philosophical errors were condemned by the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier. The ninth seems to be directed at Thomas Aquinas : " That free choice is a passive potency, not active; and that it is necessarily moved by what is desirable," [45] but the substitution of *liberum arbitrium* for *appetitus* makes a considerable difference. For Thomas free choice is the principle of action, the product of both intellect and will in act. [46]

Thomas is supposed (by those who follow the theory of change) to have been convinced by the pressure of opposition against him into changing his position in *De Malo* 6, disputed at about the same time the list of errors was published. In argument 7, one against free choice, Thomas expresses it this way: " it seems that the will is moved by necessity by what is desirable. Therefore there is no human free willing or not willing." [47] Thomas seems to be distancing himself from his former statement about the determination of the will, but notice that in the

[43] *De Veritate* 25.1, " appetitus autem potentia passiva est, quia movetur ab appetibili."

[44] Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* I, p. 243 ff.

[45] " Quod liberum arbitrium est potentia passiva, non activa; et quod necessitate movetur ab appetibili." *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis,* ed. H. Denifle, vol. I, (Paris, 1899), p. 48.

[46] *ST* I, q.83, a.1, ad 3: " Dicendum quod liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus; quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum." Cf. *ST* 1-11, q.l, a.l, 2.

[47] *De Malo* 6, arg. *7.* "Ergo videtur quod voluntas de necessitate moveatur ab appetibili. Non ergo est liberum homini velle vel non velle."

De Veritate he spoke of *appetitus,* while here it is *voluntas* itself. Appetite is moved by what is desirable; the rational appetite is moved by (the good) in general. The metaphysical basis is the same, but in practice, the will is not moved by any particular good, because of the freedom we have to see things from different points of view.

This is of course the heart of the argument of *De Malo* 6 and one that appears as well in his previous treatments. [48] In his reply to the seventh argument Thomas does not deny the doctrine of *voluntas* as a *potentia passiva* (in the technical sense) ; in fact he reaffirms the teaching, for since the will is related in potency with respect to universal good, no good can overcome the power of the will, as though moving it by necessity, unless it is something good in every respect. [49] Thus the will would still be necessarily moved by completely perfect good.

There has also been misunderstanding of Thomas on the question of final causality on which Lottin based his theory of change. Thomas had always maintained that the intellect was the formal cause and the will the efficient cause (we saw that Lonergan was mistaken in thinking that Thomas had ever associated efficient causality with the intellect). The element of final causality seems to be shifted from intellect to will but this is because of understanding more precisely the connection of *voluntas* with *bonum,* and *bonum* with *finis.* As Verbeke puts it, the overall teaching remains the same, but in the *De Malo* it is " *plus exacte"* than in the *De Veritate* because of the clarification of final causality. [50]

Free choice is a matter of choosing, on the part of both reason and will, the *bonum intellectum.* This never changes in Thomas. But he came to express more precisely that final causality had to do with the *bonum* aspect, and formal causality with *intellectum.* There can be no question, however, of the separation of final causality from intellect in order to show emphasis on the role of

48 *De Veritate* 22.5; *ST* I, q.82, a.l ; I-II, q.9, a.1.

49 *De Malo* 6, ad 7: " Cum autem voluntas se habeat in potentia respectu boni universalis, nullum bonum superat virtutem voluntatis quasi ex necessitate ipsam movens, nisi id quod secundum omnem considerationem est bonum."

50 G. Verbeke, " Le developpement de la vie volitive," p. 13.

the will because of the inherent connection between intelligence and finality. The essence of finality is the understanding of something done for a purpose or for a definite goal, which can be properly true only for rational agents, though analogically of all agents. [51]

Far from shifting to an active notion of will, the intimate combination of intellect and will and of formal and final causality is strengthened in the teaching of *De Mala* 6. Good itself, with respect to its being a certain apprehensible form, is contained under the category of truth as a certain truth; and truth itself, to the extent that it is the goal of intellectual operation, is contained under the category of good as a certain particular good. [52]

The introduction by Thomas of the Aristotelian text on God as mover of intellect and will demonstrates not a shift in his thinking as Lottin thought, but the difference in Aquinas from the emphasis of other theologians on the spontaneous action of the will. It actually underscores the need Thomas felt to provide a metaphysical explanation for the ultimate activation of intellect and will, and shows that he did not change his understanding of passive potency (the need for intellect and will to be moved *to* act by an exterior object) to a notion of radically free agency. When we come to later thinkers there *is* a real difference. There is no need in Scotus, for example, for God to be the first act, because he denies the principle "whatever is in motion is moved by another." [53] It is this Aristotelian principle, still clearly maintained by Thomas in *De Mala* 6, which sets him clearly apart from Henry of Ghent and the Franciscan voluntarists.

We may thus approach the texts and affirm the basic unity

[51] " Since finality is a participated perfection, it must be reduced to its most perfect source and cause, intelligence." L. Figurski, *Final Cause and its Relation to Intelligence in St. Thomas Aquinas,* Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham Univ. (New York, 1977), p. 192.

[52] " Unde et ipsum bonum, in quantum est quaedam forma apprehensibilis, continetur sub vero quasi quoddam verum ; et ipsum verum, in quantum est finis intellectualis operationis, continetur sub bono ut quoddam particulare bonum."

[53] Patrick Lee, " The Relation between Intellect and Will in Free Choice according to Aquinas and Scotus," *Thomist* 49 (1985) : 341.

and consistency of teaching from the commentary on the *Sentences* to the *ST* II, and also explain the differing emphases. Throughout his works, Aquinas wanted to emphasize how reason and will both share in human action as the cognitive and appetitive aspects of an essentially united act.

There may be other factors besides a change in the definition of the will to account for the apparent shifts. For example, if the certainty attaching to moral knowledge is reduced, this gives the effect of greater freedom. Intellectual determinism can also be reduced by giving more weight to the role of emotions and dispositions. A case can be made for these kinds of shifts in the thought of Aquinas, which then make the need to account for a change in his position on the will less compelling.[54]

The Occasion and Purpose of De Malo 6

In some ways it is surprising that there is not a greater difference in the early and late works of Thomas on human action. One of Thomas's purposes in the commentary on the *Sentences* and in the *De Veritate* was to establish the proper role of intellect against the voluntarist emphasis common in the tradition of Philip the Chancellor and especially amongst the Franciscans. In the later part of the 1260s, with nearly everyone misunderstanding his doctrine of passive potency-despite his emphasis on the will's role in his treatment of *liberum arbitrium* in *ST* I, q. 83-he came under increasing suspicion and attack by the traditionalist theologians. Being associated with the group of Siger of Brabant on other points of doctrine, Thomas had to take pains, especially in view of official action taken in 1270, to distance himself as much as possible from a deterministic position.

Thomas thus had several items on his agenda in writing the *De Malo* 6:

[54] Giuseppe Abba suggests that Aquinas moved from a conception of legalist morality *to* one governed by virtue in *Lex et virtus: Studi sull'evoluzione della dottrina morale di san Tommaso d'Aquino* (Rome, 1983). This book has exaggerated the shift, but it does indicate that an explanation of change need not involve a move towards " free will."

(1) To confute Siger and those influenced by radical Aristotelian and Arabic determinism, using arguments from Aristotle (to which they would be open) in order to show why determinism was wrong. [55]

(2) To convince his conservative opponents such as John Peckham that his own position was not determinist. The "extreme vehemence" noted by Lonergan was directed at the radical Aristotelians (not his own previous position!) and was to impress upon the theologians that he shared their convictions about the deep and important connection between freedom and moral responsibility.

(3) To maintain and defend his own position on reason and will. Without substantially changing the teaching of choice by reason and will he stressed the indeterminacy of the will and refined his understanding of formal and efficient cause and his doctrine of the relationship between reason and will and *verum* and *bonum.*

We should judge Thomas's treatment of the problem of reason and will in human action in *De Malo* and *ST* I-II a brilliant solution, and under the circumstances a *tour de force.* At the time, however, Thomas appears to have succeeded publicly only in his first objective, since it seems that Siger of Brabant may have been convinced by Thomas's logic and then modified his views. [56] John Peckham and the conservative theologians were not convinced, however, by Thomas's defense of the will's freedom. Aquinas was subject to deliberate misunderstanding and condemnation by the Franciscan school (if Thomas in fact had shifted to emphasizing the will his conversion to the Franciscan view would surely have not gone unacknowledged).

It is probably fair also to add that, given the hostile situation around the year *1270,* Thomas had to be careful in his descrip-

[55] R. Hissette, *Enquete sur les 219 articles condamnes a Paris le 7 Mars 1277* (Louvain and Paris, 1977), p. 230 ff., has a discussion of the condemned articles dealing with the will in relation to the teaching of Alkindi, Averroes, Siger of Brabant and others.

[56] See F. van Steenberghen, *Maitre Siger de Brabant* (Louvain, 1977), pp. 401-403.

tion of the role of intellect in human action. Thus the cognitive aspects of practical reason, such as the intellectual apprehension connected with intention and the important element of judgment and the syllogism connected with choice, are somewhat disguised in *ST* I-II, qq. 12 and 13. The difficult climate Thomas faced may well explain why the properly balanced roles of reason and will could not be described quite as clearly as Thomas would have liked, which in turn may be a factor in the tendency to misunderstand Aquinas still current in our day.

GOD, EMOTION, AND CORPOREALITY: A THOMIST PERSPECTIVE [1]

MARCEL SAROT

University of Utrecht
Utrecht, The Netherlands

I. *Introduction*

WHEN WE TAKE" impassibility" to mean" immutbility with regard to one's feelings or the quality of ne's inner life," [2] the number of adherents to the doctrine of divine impassibility has continuously decreased during the present century. Slowly but surely the concept of an immutable and impassible God has given way to the concept of a sensitive, emotional, passionate God. Before the Second World War this tendency was restricted to British theology,[3] but since then it has spread to the rest of Europe, notably to France and Ger-

1 A first draft of this paper was presented at a meeting of the Aquinas Research Group of the Catholic Theological University of Utrecht (The Netherlands) in May, 1990. I would like to thank the other participants for their useful comments. The paper also profited from the valuable comments of Prof. Dr. Vincent Brummer and Dr. Christoph Schwi:ibel. The writing of this paper forms part of a research project on divine passibility, supported by the Dutch Research Foundation for Theology and Religious Studies (STEGON), and funded by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Research (NWO).

2 I have argued for this definition in my article " Patripassianism, Theopaschitism and the Suffering of God: Some Historical and Systematic Considerations," *Religious Studies* 26 (1990) : 363-375.

a See A. van Egmond, *De Lijdende God in de Britse Theologie van de Negentiende Eeuw: De Bijdrage van Newman, Maurice, McLeod Campbell en Gore aan de Christelijke Theopaschitische Traditie* (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1986); J. Kenneth Mozley, *The Impassibility of God: A Survey of Christian Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), pp. 127-166; *Doctrine in the Church of England: The Report of the Commission o·n Christian Doctrine Appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in 1922* (London: SPCK, 1938), pp. 55-56.

many, to the United States and to Asia.[4] By now most of the theologians who explicitly state their views on divine impassibility hold that this doctrine is to a greater or lesser degree false, and Ronald Goetz rightly asserts "that the rejection of the ancient doctrine of divine impassibility has become a theological commonplace."[5]

Nevertheless the debate on this issue is not yet closed. Recently Richard Creel published a thorough study in defense of divine impassibility,[6] which, I expect, will prove quite influential. Other theologians who defend the doctrine can be cited as well.[7] To a large extent, the arguments which these theologians put forward in favor of divine impassibility are taken from the classic Christian theological texts. Among these, the writings of Aquinas are not the least important and no one will be surprised to hear that he is frequently cited in this connection. However, what has surprised me in my study of the debate on the issue of divine impassibility is that one of the most important arguments Aquinas

[4] On passibilist tendencies in modern theology, see Richard Bauckham, "'Only the Suffering God Can Help': Divine Passibility in Modern Theology," *Themelios* 9 (1984) : 6-12; Warren McWilliams, *The Passio1i of God: Divine Swffering in Contemporary Protestant Theology* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1985); Van Egmond, *De Lijdende God*, pp. 28-31, and "Theopaschitische Tendenzen in de Na-Oorlogse Protestantse Theologie," *Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift* 79 (1979): 161-177; Marcel Sarot, "De Passibilitas Dei in de Hedendaagse Westerse Theologie: Een Literatuuroverzicht," *Kerk en Theologie* 40-3 (1989) : 196-206.

[5] Ronald Goetz, "The Suffering God: The Rise of a New Orthodoxy," *The Christian Century* 103 (1986): 385. Also see the literature cited in the preceding note.

[6] Richard E. Creel, *Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[7] See, for instance, Brian Davies, *Thinking about God* (London: Chapman, 1985), pp. 155-158; William J. Hill, "Does Divine Love Entail Suffering in God?," in: B. L. Clarke & E. T. Long, eds., *God and Temporality* (New York: Paragon House, 1984), pp. 55-71; id., "The Doctrine of God after Vatican II," *The Thomist* 51 (1987); pp. 412-414; Herbert McCabe, "The Involvement of God," *New Blackfriars* 66 (1985) : 464-476, reprinted in Herbert McCabe, *God Matters* (London: Chapman, 1987), pp. 39-51; Jean-Herve Nicolas, "Aimante et Bienheureuse Trinite," *Revue Thomiste* 78 (1978): 271-292; John M. Quinn, "Triune Self-Giving: One Key to the Problem of Suffering," *The Thomist* 44 (1980): 173-218.

provides in favour of divine impassibility-the argument that bodily changes are necessarily involved in emotion-is almost completely neglected in the contemporary literature on this issue.[8] In my opinion one cannot come to definitive conclusions with respect to the issue of divine impassibility without paying attention to this argument.

The present article should be read as a plea for the inclusion of this argument of Aquinas in the contemporary debate. I will proceed in the following way. The major part of this article will be devoted to an analysis of Aquinas's theory of human and divine emotion. This analysis should not be mistaken for a neutral and balanced introduction to Aquinas's theory of emotion in

s I know of only four exceptions : Janine Marie Idziak, " God and Emotions" (Diss., Michigan, 1975); Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Suffering Love," in Thomas V. Morris, *Philosophy and the Christian Faith* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 196-237; Charles Taliaferro," The Passibility of God," *Religious Studies* 25 (1989): 217-224; Robert Oakes, "The Wrath of God," *Philosophy of Religion* 27 (1990): 129-140. Idziak is of the opinion that an incorporeal God can have emotions, since physiological changes are, in her opinion, not necessary to emotion. Moreover, God "can experience something that at least bears *some resemblance* to our 'bodily' sensations," and this can be considered as " an appropriate *substitute* for the ' bodily ' sensations that are involved in human emotional experience." Wolterstorff thinks that God cannot have emotions, "for a person can have an emotion only if that person is capable of being physiologically upset. And God, having no physiology, is not so capable " (p. 214). Nevertheless, Wolterstorff thinks this leaves open the question whether God suffers, since suffering is a phenomenon distinct from emotion. Taliaferro (pp. 220-221) argues that attributing sorrow to God does not necessarily involve attributing bodily sensations to Him as well, since (1) "a non-physical being can have sensory experiences such as pain and pleasure" and (2) "sorrow is an emotion and there is no apparent absurdity in imagining someone to be in sorrow who is not thereby having any of the accompanying *bodily associations* of pain, her stomach ' turning over,' shedding tears and the like." Oakes argues that " while there appears to be an *empirically invariant association* between the possession of affective capacity and the possession of a neurophysiology . . . this clearly fails to entail that possessing a neurophysiology is *conceptually necessary* for possessing affective capacity" (p. 134). Moreover, he asserts that emotions are mental states and that, since traditional theism holds that an incorporeal God can have intellectual mental states, it would be arbitrary for a traditional theist to deny that God can have affective mental states (p. 134).

general. On every page it shows the author's pre-occupation with the questions whether emotions presuppose corporeality and whether God could have emotions. I will show that for Aquinas bodily changes are essential to emotions and that this is one of the reasons why he holds that God cannot have emotions. In the last part of this article I will show that Aquinas's argument is still highly relevant for contemporary theology. In the present theological discussion on divine impassibility, however, this argument must be presented in a different, more concrete way.

II. *Thomas Aquinas on emotion human and divine* [9]

1. Aquinas on human emotion

Aquinas's theological discussions on whether God could have emotions are profoundly influenced by the fact that he also made a serious study of human emotions in their own right. Therefore, for a proper understanding of Aquinas's views on the possibility of divine emotion, it seems necessary first to have a look at his theory of human emotions.

[9] My rendering of Aquinas's views is based principally on the following texts: *De Veritate* XXV-XXVI, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, ch. 89-91, *Summa Theologiae* Ia, qq. 75-82, laliae, qq. 22-48. All quotations from the Latin text of the works of Aquinas are taken from S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera Omnia*, Vols. 1-7 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980). The English translation of texts from the *Summa Theologiae* is taken from the Blackfriars edition, the translation of texts from the *Summa contra Gentiles* is taken from that by Anton C. Pegis entitled *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*, and the English translation of texts from *De Veritate* is taken from that by Robert W. Schmidt entitled *Truth*. With a view to the uniformity of the rendering of certain terms I have in some instances changed these translations.

Beside these texts of Aquinas I consulted some of the most important studies on his theory of emotions: Eric d'Arey, "Introduction," in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* [Blackfriars Edition] Vol. 19, "The Emotions" (London/New York: Blackfriars, 1967), pp. xix-xxxii; Richard R. Baker, "The Thomistic Theory of the Passions and their Influence upon the Will" (Diss., Notre Dame, 1941); Robert E. Brennan, *Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophic Analysis of the Nature of Man* (New York: MacMillan, 1960), pp. 147-168; H. M. Gardiner, Ruth Clark Metcalf, John G. Beebe-Center, *Feeling and Emotion: A History of Theories* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 106-118; J. M. Idziak, *"God,"* pp. 9-10, 66-68, 86-88; Journet D. Kahn, "A Thomistic Theory of Emotion" (Diss. Notre Dame,

Dijferent kinds of passion

Aquinas uses the term *passiones animae* where we use the term "emotions." The term "passions *of the soul"* suggests correctly that there are other passions besides those of the soul. Aquinas distinguishes between three kinds of passions : passions in a general sense, passions in a (most) proper sense, and passions in a transferred sense.[10] In the first and most common sense, *passio*

is used whenever any quality is received, even if the recipient loses nothing in the process: for instance, one might say that the air ' suffers ' or ' undergoes ' illumination. However, this would be more properly styled 'acquiring' a new quality than 'suffering' something.[11]

In this sense anything that passes from potentiality to act may be said to undergo a passion. Therefore, passion in the first sense " is found in the soul and in every creature, because every creature has some potentiality in its composition . . . " [12] Only

1957); Matthias Meier, "Die Lehre des hi. Thomas von Aquin de passionibus animae in quellenanalytischer Darstellung," *Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* XI/2 (1912); H.-D. Noble, "La Nature de]'Emotion selon les Modernes et selon Saint Thomas," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques* 2 (1908) : 225-245, 466-483; id., "Passions," in A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, E. Amann eds., *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique* XI/2 (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ane, 1932), pp. 2211-2241; Remi Tittley, "La Douleur Sensible Est-Elle une Passion Corporelle ou une Passion Animale Selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin?" (Diss., Montreal, 1967); Howard Gil Weil, " The Dynamic Aspect of Emotions in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas" (Diss., Rome, 1966); Bernhard Ziermann, "Kommentar," in Thomas von Aquin, *Die Menschlichen Leidenschaften* [Die Deutsche Thomas-Ausgabe 10) (Heidelberg/Graz: Kerle/Styria, 1955), pp. 463-618.

1o On this distinction, see *STh* Ia, *79,* 2; *97,* 2; Iallae, 22.l ; 41, 1; *De Veritate* 26, 1; 26, 3. More references are provided by Tittley, " Douleur Sensible," p. 5, n.10, and by Kahn, "Thomistic Theory," pp. 8-20. See also Meier, "Lehre des hi. Thomas," pp. 14-28, and Weil, "Dynamic Aspect," pp. 52-56.

11 *STh* Iallae, 22, 1 c.: " uno modo, communiter, secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abiiciatur a re, sicut si dicatur aerem pati, quando illuminatur. Hoc autem magis proprie est perfici, quam pati." See also *STh* Ia, *97,* 2 c.

12 *De Veritate* 26, 1 c.: " passio igitur prime modo accepta invenitur in anima, et in qualibet creatura, eo quod omnis creatura habet aliquid potentialitatis admixtum, ratione cuius omnis creatura subsistens est alicuius receptiva."

the Supreme Being is impassible in this sense of passion, since only in the Supreme Being is there no potentiality. [18] In the second and more strict sense,

the word *pati* is used when a thing acquires one quality by losing another; and this may happen in two ways. Sometimes the quality lost is one whose presence was inappropriate in the subject: for example, when an animal is healed, it may be said to ' undergo ' healing, for it recovers its health by shedding its illness. At other times, the opposite happens: for example, a sick man is called a patient because he contracts some illness by losing his health.[a]

This last kind of case is called passion in its most proper sense. Thus passion *propriissime sumpta* is an alteration in the subject that removes what is suitable to it, whereas passion *proprie sumpta* includes both alterations that are suitable to the subject and alterations that are harmful. In both cases one quality is lost and a contrary quality is gained. For Aquinas this means that this sort of passion is a kind of motion : motion with respect to quality. [15] Thus passion in its second sense

is found only where there is motion and contrariety. Now motion is found only in bodies, and the contrariety of forms or qualities only in beings subject to generation and corruption. Hence only such beings can properly suffer in this sense. Consequently the soul, being incorporeal, cannot suffer in this sense; for even though it receives something, this does not happen by an exchange of contraries but simply by a communication from the agent, as air is lighted by the sun.[16]

1a See *Sent* II, 19, 1, 3 c.; cf. *STh* Iallae, 22, 2 ad 1.

14 *STh* IaIIae, 22, 1 c.: "alio modo dicitur pati proprie, quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abjectione. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abiicitur id quod non est conveniens rei, sicut cum corpus animalis sanatur, dicitur pati, quia recipit sanitatem, aegritudine abiecta. Alio modo, quando e converso contingit, sicut aegrotare dicitur pati, quia recipitur infirmitas, sanitate abiecta. Et hie est propriissimus modus passionis."

15 For an illuminating discussion of Aquinas's views on motion and the connection between motion and passion in its proper sense, see Tittley, "Douleur Sensible," pp. 7-29.

16 *De Veritate* 26, 1 c.: "passio vero secundo modo accepta non invenitur nisi ubi est motus et contrarietas. Motus autem non invenitur nisi in corporibus, et contrarietas formarum vel qualitatum in solis generabilibus et corruptibilibus.

With respect to passion in its third or transferred sense Aquinas writes:

> Because passion in its proper sense involves a certain loss, inasmuch as the patient is changed from its former quality to a contrary one, the term *passion* is broadened in usage, so that whatever is in any-way kept from what belongs to it is said to suffer. Thus we should say that something heavy suffers when prevented from moving downward, or that a man suffers if prevented from doing his own will.17

In this sense of passion, the soul can suffer a passion "... in the sense that its operation can be hampered." [18]

The distinction between passio animalis *and* passio corporalis

In short, we have seen that Aquinas distinguishes between three senses of " passion," only the first and third of which can be suffered by the soul. This leads us to expect that the emotions or "passions of the soul " are passions in the common or in the transferred sense of the word. However, the contrary is true: the passions of the soul are passions in a proper sense. How can this be? How can the soul suffer a passion properly so called, a passion that can only be suffered by *corpora?* Aquinas answers that it is by the soul's union with a *corpus.* The soul can experience passions *proprie dicta* by virtue of its union with the body. This means that in such a passion the body suffers directly and

Unde sola huiusmodi proprie hoc modo pati possunt. Unde anima, cum sit incorporea, hoc modo pati non potest: et si etiam aliquid recipiat, non tamen hoc fit per transmutationem a contrario in contrarium, sed per simplicem agentis influxum, sicut aer illuminatur a sole." On the fact that it is impossible for anything incorporeal to suffer a passion *proprie sumpta,* see also *De Veritate* 26, 2 c., and *STh* Ia!Iae, 22, 1 c.; 22, 3 c.

11 *De Veritate* 26, 1 c.: "quia ergo actio proprie accepta, est cum quadam abiectione, prout patiens a pristina qualitate transmutatur in contrarium; ampliatur nomen passionis secundum usum loquentium, ut qualitercumque aliquid impediatur ab eo quod sibi competebat, pati dicatur; sicut si dicamus grave pati ex hoc quod prohibetur ne deorsum moveatur; et hominem pati si prohibeatur suam facere voluntatem."

18 *De Veritate* 26, 1 c.: "tertio vero modo quo nomen passionis transumptive sumitur, anima potest pati eo modo quo eius operatio potest impediri."

the soul suffers only inasmuch as it is united to the body, and therefore indirectly.

Now the soul is united to the body in two respects: (1) as a form, inasmuch as it gives existence to the body, vivifying it; (2) as a mover, inasmuch as it exercises its operations through the body. And in both respects the soul suffers indirectly, but differently .... A passion of the body is therefore attributed to the soul indirectly in two ways: (1) In such a way that the passion begins with the body and ends in the soul inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form. This is a bodily passion. Thus, when the body is injured, the union of the body with the soul is weakened and so the soul, which is united to the body in its act of existing, suffers indirectly. (2) In such a way that the passion begins with the soul inasmuch as it is the mover of the body, and ends in the body. This is called a passion of the soul. An example is seen in anger and fear and the like: for passions of this kind are aroused by the apprehension and appetite of the soul, and a bodily transformation follows upon them.[19]

However paradoxical it may seem, Aquinas's "passions of the soul" belong only *per accidens* to the soul. The soul suffers through its union with the body and "passion strictly so called cannot ... be experienced by the soul except in the sense that the whole person, the matter-soul composite, undergoes it."[20] Now

[19] *De Veritate* 26, 2 c.: "unitur autem corpori dupliciter: uno modo ut forma, in quantum <lat esse corpori, vivificans ipsum; alio modo ut motor, in quantum per corpus suas operationes exercet. Et utroque modo anima patitur per accidens, sed diversimode . . . dupliciter ergo passio corporis attribuitur animae per accidens. Uno modo ita quod passio incipiat a corpore et terminetur in anima, secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma; et haec est quaedam passio corporalis : sicut cum laeditur corpus, debilitatur unio corporis cum anima, et sic per accidens ipsa anima patitur, quae secundum suum esse corpori unitur. Alio modo ita quod incipiat ab anima, in quantum est corporis motor, et terminetur in corpus; et haec dicitur passio animalis; sicut patet in ira et timore, et aliis huiusmodi: nam huiusmodi per apprehensionem et appetitum animae peraguntur, ad quae sequitur corporis transmutatio." On the bodily transformation as part of a passion of the soul, see, for instance: *STh* la, 20, 1; 75, 3, ad 3; IaIIae 22, 1 c.; 22, 2, ad 3; 22, 3 c.; 24, 2, ad 2; 28, 5 c.; 31, 4; 31, 5; 37, 4; 41, 1 c.; 44, 1; 45, 3 c.; 48, 2 c.; 48, 3; 48, 4; *ScG* I, 89, 3; 90, 2; *De Veritate* 26, 2, ad 5; 26, 3 c.; 26, 7 c.; 26, 8 c.; 26, 9 c.; *Sent* IV, 49, 3, 2 c.; Kahn, "Thomistic Theory," pp. 58-181; Baker, "Thomistic Theory," pp. 81-84; and Noble, "Nature de !'Emotion," pp. 471-476.

[20] *STh* IaIIae, 22, 1 c.: "passio autem cum abiectione non est nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem, unde passio proprie dicta non potest competere animae nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet compositum patitur."

the soul can indirectly experience a passion in two ways: in the way of a *passio corporalis* [21] and in the way of a *passio aninialis.* As Aquinas's examples show, the first kind of *passio* roughly corresponds to what we call a feeling,[22] while the second kind of *passio* roughly corresponds to what we call an emotion. In a bodily passion there first is an alteration in the body of the subject, which immediately thereafter is apprehended by the sense of touch.[28] The alteration may be suitable or harmful to the subject; in the first case it is apprehended as sensible pleasure, in the second case as sensible pain.[24] In the terms we use nowadays, both of these would be classified as *feelings.* The passions of the soul, however, correspond roughly to what we would call emotions. In their case, the soul apprehends something suitable or harmful and is drawn towards the suitable or repelled by the harmful.

[21] This is not the place to go into what has been called "the *'passio corpora/is'* difficulty." This difficulty consists of two closely connected problems: (1) Aquinas makes the distinction between *passio corporalis* and *passio animalis* both in his *De Veritate* and in his *Scriptum Super Libras Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi,* but he never mentions *passio corpora/is* in his tract on the passions in the *Summa Theologiae.* Why not? Did he change his opinion, and did he at the time of the *Summa* reject his earlier distinction between *passio corpora/is* and *passio animalis?* (2) In the *Scriptum Super Libras Sententiarum* and in *De Veritate* Aquinas explicitly includes *dolor* not among the passions of the soul, but rather among the bodily passions, whereas in the *Summa* he classifies it as a passion of the soul. Here again one might ask whether Aquinas changed his mind, and whether at the time of the *Summa* he rejected his earlier *passio corpora/is* teaching. For a detailed and clear discussion of these questions I refer to Tittley, "Douleur Sensible"; cf. Kahn, "Thomistic Theory," pp. 28-57. I decided to retain the distinction between bodily passion and passion of the soul because it also figures in *ScG* I, 89-91, the chapters in which Aquinas most extensively discusses the question whether God could have emotions.

[22] William P. Alston, "Emotion and Feeling," in Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* II, (New York/London: MacMillan, 1967), p. 481, draws attention to the fact that "... feeling was not recognized as a distinctive category before the eighteenth century ..."

[23] *De Veritate* 26, 3 c.: "tertio modo pertinet ad aliquam potentiam ut apprehendentem ipsam: et sic proprie pertinet ad sensum tactus; nam tactus est sensus eorum ex quibus componitur animal, et similiter eorum per quae animal corrumpitur."

[24] Cf. *De Veritate* 26, 4, ad 5.

Upon this a bodily transmutation follows,[25] by which the soul is in turn indirectly affected.[26] The bodily transmutation, therefore, originates with the soul, and this must be the reason why Aquinas calls this sort of passion *passio animalis:* it is the only kind of passion that is (efficiently) caused by the soul. This is the kind of passion that we would call an *emotion.*

Passions and the soul

Aquinas distinguishes several different powers within the soul. I want to introduce some of his distinctions because they can shed some light on the way in which, according to Aquinas, the soul is involved in the emotions. Moreover, these distinctions will help us later on to explain the way in which one can and cannot talk about divine emotions according to Aquinas. For our purpose, it suffices to distinguish between four powers of the soul: the sensitive apprehension, the sensitive appetite, the intellective apprehension and the intellective appetite. The sensitive powers are distinguished from the intellective powers by their object: every sensible body can be the object of the sensitive powers, whereas the intellective powers regard " a still more extensive object, not just the sense-world but all being, universally." [27] A further difference between the intellective and the sensitive powers is that the sensitive powers need corporeal organs for their operations, whereas the intellective powers do not.[28] In the

[25] *De Veritate* 26, 2 c.: "... nam huiusmodi per apprehensionem et appetitum animae peraguntur, ad quae sequitur corporis transmutatio." Cf. 26, 9 c.: "... passio animalis ... causatur ex hoc quod anima aliquid apprehendit ex quo appetitus movetur, cuius motum sequitur quaedam transmutatio corporalis."

[26] Cf. Tittley, " Douleur Sensible," p. 69; Kahn, " Thomistic Theory," p. 33.

[27] *STh* Ia, 78, 1 c.: " est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae quod respicit adhuc universalius objectum, scilicet non solum corpus sensibile, sed universaliter omne ens." See also *STh* Ia, 80, 2 c.

[28] *STh* Ia, 78, 1 c. A seriously flawed account of the distinction between intellective and sensitive appetite is provided by Mark Jordan, " Aquinas's Construction of a Moral Account of the Passions," *Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie* 33 (1986) : 88, who confuses this distinction with that between sensitive *apprehension* and sensitive appetite; it is this last distinction that Aquinas discusses in *STh* Ia, 81, 1.

case of both the sensitive and the intellective powers, the distinction between the apprehensive and the appetitive power lies herein, that the apprehensive power apprehends its object, while the appetitive power seeks it. This implies that the objects of apprehension and appetite are " one subject but taken under two aspects. It is apprehended as a being that is sensed or understood. It is desired as something desirable or good." [29] A further distinction between sensitive apprehension and sensitive appetite can be made on the basis of the different ways in which bodily organs are involved in the functioning of both. [30] In the functioning of the sensitive apprehension, the sense organs, like the tongue, the eyes, and the ears, are changed " spiritually," that is to say, nonphysically, " the way the form of a color is in the eye, which does not become the color it sees." [31] In the functioning of the sensitive appetite, however, the organs involved-of which the heart is the most important [32]-change naturally, that is to say, physically. [33] Thus the appetite of revenge is accompanied by a kindling

[29] *STh* Ia, 80, 1 ad 2: ". . . id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem subiecto, sed differt ratione, apprehenditur enim ut est ens sensibile vel intelligibile; appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut bonum."

[30] For a critique of this distinction from the viewpoint of contemporary psychology and a reformulation of it that meets this critique, see Kahn, " Thomistic Theory," pp. 99-104.

[31] *STh* Ia, 78, 3 c.: " est autem duplex immutatio, una naturalis, et alia spiritualis . . . ; spiritualis . . . secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale, ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata."

[32] *STh* Ia, 20, 1, ad 1: ". . . proximum motivum corporis in nobis est appetitus sensitivus. Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivi concomitatur aliqua transmutatio corporis, et maxime circa cor, quod est primum principium motus in animali." That the heart is the most important organ of the sensitive appetite can also be seen from *STh* Ia, 20, 1, ad 2; Ia!Iae, 17, 9; 22, 2, ad 3; 24, 2, ad 2; 44, l; 45, 3 c.; 48, 2; 48, 3 c.; 48, 4; *ScG* I, 89, 3; *De Veritate* 24, 8 c.; 26, 3 c; *Sent* IV, 49, 3, 2 c., etc. See also Noble, " Nature de !'Emotion," pp. 472-473; Kahn, " Thomistic Theory," pp, 75-80.

[33] *STh* IaIIae, 22, 2, ad 3: " est autem alia naturalis transmutatio organi, prout organum transmutatur quantum ad suam naturalem dispositionem, puta quod calefit aut infrigidatur, vel alio simili modo transmutatur . . . ad actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur huiusmodi transmutatio, unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis, materialiter ponitur aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi; sicut dicitur quod ira est accensio sanguinis circa cor."

of the blood about the heart and this is a real physical change.[1']

Having made these distinctions we can inquire which powers of the soul are involved in the passions. In the case of a *bodily passion* the essence of the soul is affected by the passion since it is the soul in its essence that is the form of the body.[85] This implies that all the powers of the soul are affected: " Since all powers are rooted in the soul's essence the passion in question pertains to all powers."[36] On the other hand, since by a *passion of the soul*

the body is altered because of an operation of the soul, this kind of passion has to be in a power which is joined to a bodily organ and whose business it is to alter the body. As a consequence, such a passion is not in the intellective part, which is not the actuality of any bodily organ. · Nor again is it in the power of sensitive apprehension, because from sense apprehension no movement in the body follows except through the mediation of the appetitive power, which is the immediate mover. According to its manner of operating, then, a bodily organ (e.g., the heart) from which motion takes its beginning is at once given a disposition suitable for carrying out that to whkh the sensitive appetite inclines. In anger the heart accordingly heats up, and in fear it in a way cools off and tightens up. Thus passion of the soul is properly found only in the sensitive appetite.[11]

[84] *STh* Ia, 20, 1, ad 2: "... in ira .•. materiale est ascensio sanguinis circa cor, vel aliquid huiusmodi; formate vero, appetitus vindictae."

[BG] *De Veritate* 26, 3 c.: " passio igitur corporalis praedicta pertingit ad potentias, secundum quad in essentia animae radicantur, eo quod anima secundum essentiam suam est forma corporis, et sic ad essentiam animae pertinet • • ."

[86] *De Veritate* 26, 3 c.: "... potest tamen haec passio attribui alicui potentiae tripliciter. Uno modo secundum quod in essentia animae radicatur: et sic, cum omnes potentiae radicentur in essentia animae, ad omnes potentias pertinet praedicta passio."

[87] *De Veritate* 26, 3 c.: " passio vero animalis, cum per earn ex operatione animae transmutetur corpus, in illa potentia esse debet quae organo corporali adiungitur, et cuius est corpus transmutare. Et ideo huiusmodi passio non est in parte intellectiva, quae non est alicuius organi corporalis actus; nee iterum est in apprehensiva sensitiva, quia ex apprehensione sensus non sequitur motus in corpore nisi mediante appetitiva, quae est immediatum mavens. Unde secundum modum operationis eius statim disponitur organum corporate, scilicet car, unde est principium motus, tali dispositione quae competat ad exequendum hoc in quod appetitus sensibilis inclinatur. Unde in ira fervet, et in timore quodammodo frigescit et constringitur. Et sic in appetitiva sensitiva sola, animalis passio proprie invenitur." Cf. *STh* Ia, 20, 1, ad 1; *75*, 3; IaIIae, 22, 3.

In sum, bodily passions pertain to the essence and to all the powers of the soul, whereas passions of the soul pertain to the sensitive appetite.

The classification of the individual passions

In the above we have only considered Aquinas's theory of the passions in general. Now I want to introduce his classification of the distinct passions.

We have seen that the objects of the sensitive appetite are sensible objects, regarded as suitable or harmful. Now sometimes there are circumstances in which the satisfaction of the sensitive appetite is difficult, since the stimulus or situation is not merely suitable or good, but arduously so, not merely harmful or evil, but strenuously so. Since Aquinas differentiates powers by their formal objects,[38] he distinguishes between two appetitive powers, one for seeking the simple good and avoiding the simple evil, and one for pursuing the difficult good and fleeing from the difficult evil:

> There must ... be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers. By one of them the soul is simply attracted to what pleases the senses and avoids what hurts them, and this is called *concupiscible.* By the other an animal resists whatever threatens its pleasures and brings danger, and this we call *irascible.* We say that its object is the difficult, for it tends to overcome and rise above threats.[39]

[38] See, for instance, *STh* Ia, 77, 3.

[39] *STh* Ia, 81, 2 c.: "... in parte sensitiva sint duae appetitivae potentiae. Una, per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quae sunt convenientia secundum sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva, et haec dicitur concupiscibilis. Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus quae convenientia impugnant et nocumenta inferunt, et haec vis vocatur irascibilis. Uncle dicitur quod eius obiectum est arduum, quia scilicet tendit ad hoc quod superet contraria, et superemineat eis" (Italics in English text mine). In the same article Aquinas explains that the concupiscible and the irascible powers cannot be reduced to the same source, since sometimes they oppose one another: "... interdum anima tristibus se ingerit, contra inclinationem concupiscuibilis, ut secundum inclinationem irascibilis impugnet contraria." On the distinction between the concupiscible and the irascible appetite, see also *STh* IaIIae, 23, 1; *De Veritate* 25, 2; Daker. "Thomistic Theory," pp. 43-48, and Brennan, *Thomistic Psychology,* pp. 155-157.

Accordingly, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of passions of the soul, concupiscible and irascible passions.[40] He includes six basic passions within the concupiscible appetite and five within the irascible appetite.[41] There are three basic passions of the concupiscible appetite which have the good as their object: love *(amor,* the psychical union of the lover with the beloved), desire (*desiderium,* the movement of the lover towards the beloved) and joy *(gaudium,* the rest in the beloved when it has been obtained). Correspondingly, there are three concupiscible passions with the bad as their object: hate *(odium),* aversion *(fuga)* and sadness (*tristitia).* There are three basic irascible passions relating to evil: fear (*timor,* when the object is an impending evil, so difficult to avoid that it exceeds one's capacity), courage (*audacia,* when the object is an impending evil, difficult to avoid but not exceeding one's capacity) and anger *(ira,* when the object is present, difficult to avoid but not exceeding one's capacity[42]). There are only two basic irascible passions regarding the good. The reason for this is that when the good is possessed, it does not cause any difficulty. And when there is no difficulty, there is no irascible passion. Thus the two irascible passions are: despair (*desperatio,* if one judges that the good is so difficult to obtain that it exceeds one's capacity) and hope (*spes,* if the good is difficult to obtain, but is judged not to exceed one's capacity). These are the basic passions according to Aquinas. He acknowledges that in reality there are many more passions than these eleven, and he accounts for them by referring to the greater or lesser intensity of passions (rage is more intense than anger) and to the different ways in which the objects of the passions can be good and evil (both envy and pity are species of sadness, but in the first case the object is " the prosperity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as an evil for

[40] See, for instance, *STh* IaIIae, 23, 1; *De Veritate* 26, 4.

[41] On the following, see *De Veritate* 26, 4; cf. *STh* IaIIae, 23, 4.

[42] If the evil is present and is regarded as exceeding one's capacity, "... sic nullam passionem facit in irascibili, sed in sola concupiscibili manet passio tristitiae" *(De Veritate* 26.4 c.) Also see *STh* Iallae, 23, 3 c.

oneself," whereas in the second case the object is "the adversity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as one's own evil " [43].

Finally, there is a certain order among the passions, and the primary passion, from which all the other passions spring, is love:

All other motions of appetite and will presuppose love; it is like their very root. No one desires an object or rejoices in it unless it be a good that is loved. Nor is there any hatred except for what is contrary to a thing loved, and the same applies to grief and the rest: they all come back to love as to their primordial source.[44]

Thus love is the primary passion and the principle of all the other passions.

Contrary to this, it could be argued that joy is the first of the passions, because joy is the final end of all passion. Aquinas responds to this argument by making a distinction between the order of execution and the order of intention: " In the line of execution and attainment love is the first passion, but in the line of intention joy is prior to love and is the reason for loving." [45]

Passions of the intellective appetite! [46]

It sees to be clear from the above that anger, fear, love, and

[43] *De Veritate* 26, 4 c.: "tertia vero differentia passionum animae est quasi accidentalis: quae quidem dupliciter accidit. Uno modo secundum intensionem et remissionem; sicut zelus importat intensionem amoris, et furor intensionem irae; alio modo secundum materiales differentias boni vel mali, sicut differunt misericordia et invidia, quae sunt species tristitiae: nam invidia est tristitia de prosperitate aliena, in quantum aestimatur malum proprium; misericordia vero est tristitia de adversitate aliena, in quantum aestimatur ut proprium malum. Et sic est in aliis quibusdam considerare."

[44] *STh* Ia, 20, 1 c.: "... omnes alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem, quasi primam radicem; nullus enim desiderat aliquid, nisi bonum amatum, neque aliquis gaudet, nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amatae. Et similiter tristitiam, et caetera huiusmodi, manifestum est in amorem referri, sicut in primum principium." Cf. *STh* IaIIae, 25, 2; 29, 2, *De Veritate* 26, 5, ad 5.

[45] *De Veritate* 26, 5, ad 5: "Ad quintum dicendum, quod in via exequendi vel consequendi, amor est prima passio; sed in via intentionis gaudium est prius amore, et est ratio amandi ... "

[46] On this question, see *De Veritate* 25, 3; *STh* Ia, 20, 1, ad 1; 59, 4, ad 2; 77, 8, ad 5; 82, 5, ad 1; IaIIae, 31, 4; 35, 1 c.; IIaIIae, 30, 3 c.; *Sent* III, 15, 2, 2b c.; 26, 1, 5 c.; IV, 17, 2, lb, ad 1; Kahn, " Thomistic Theory," pp. 70-71; Ziermann, " Kommentar," pp. 493-495.

the like can be located in the *sensitive* appetite only. This is correct: the *passions* of anger, fear, love, etc., can be located in the sensitive appetite only. But, on the other hand, the terms "anger," " fear," " love," etc., can also denote *acts* of the *intellective* appetite. Thus, for instance, the will for revenge, an act of the intellective appetite, is sometimes called "anger." In the same way the repose of the will in an object of spiritual affection can be called " love" and the fleeing of the will from a future evil can be called "fear." [47] Sometimes the term "passion" is also extended to these acts of the intellective appetite, although they are not passions properly so called.

As we have said above, the object of the intellective part of the soul is more universal than the object of the sensitive part. This does not mean that the object of a sensitive passion must in reality be other than the object of an intellective act: both can have the same object, but a sensitive passion seeks the object as containing in itself the reason for its appetibility, whereas an intellective act tends to it as sharing in goodness or utility itself.[48] In sum, when Aquinas writes about passions of the intellective appetite he means operations of the intellective appetite similar to those of the sensitive appetite, yet unaccompanied by passions properly so called.

2. Aquinas on the possibility of divine emotion

Aquinas is quite conscious of the fact that on a literal interpretation many biblical texts seem to imply that God is capable of experiencing emotions. In this connection he provides the following examples :[49]

" I regret having made them " (Gen. 6:7).
" Yahweh is tenderness and pity, slow to anger and rich in faithful love " (Ps. 103:8).
" Yahweh's anger blazed out at his people " (Ps. 106:40).

[41] See, for instance, *De Veritate* 25, 3 c. and *ScG* I, 90, 2.
[48] *De Veritate* 25, 1 c.; cf. *ScG* I, 90, 2.
[49] See *ScG* I, 91, 12; *STh* IaIIae, 47, 1, obj. 1; *ScG* I, 91, 10; *STh* Ia, 20, 1 sed contra. The translation quoted is taken from *The New Jerusalem Bible* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1985).

"There is rejoicing among the angels of God over one repentant sinner" (Lk. 15:10).
"God is love" (1Jn.4:16).

In view of texts like these, Aquinas cannot simply deny that God can experience emotions like repentance, mercy, anger, wrath, joy and love. On the other hand, it is also impossible for him to admit that God can experience emotions since God, being incorporeal, cannot experience the bodily changes connected with them. [50]

> Every passion of the [sensitive] appetite takes place through some bodily change, for example, the contraction or distension of the heart, or something of the sort. Now, none of this can take place in God, since He is not a body or a power in a body.... There is, therefore, no passion of the [sensitive] appetite in Him.[51]

Thus Aquinas is presented with a dilemma: the denial of emotion in God seems to go against the witness of Scripture, whereas the affirmation of emotion in God seems to be incompatible with the divine incorporeality.

Emotions the object of which is unbefitting to God [32]

For some kinds of emotion, it seems to be out of the question that God could have them, since there is a twofold reason why He cannot have them. This is the case with those emotions the object of which is unbefitting to God. Even if the more general reasons why God cannot have emotions were not there, God still could not have these emotions. The object of an emotion can be unbefitting to God in two ways. It can be unbefitting by being evil as well as by being not yet possessed, but rather as something to be possessed. These objects cannot befit God because

Aquinas provides further reasons why God cannot experience emotions: they are incompatible with His absolute immutability, with His being pure act, etc.

H *ScG* I, 89, 2-3: "Secundum enim intellectivam affectionem non est aliqua passio, sed solum secundum sensitivam . . . Praeterea omnis affectiva passio secundum aliquam transmutationem corporalem fit: puta secundum constrictionem vel dilationem cordis, aut secundum aliquid huiusmodi. Quorum nullum in deo possibile est accidere: eo quod non sit corpus nee virtus in corpore . . . non est igitur in ipso affectiva passio."

This topic is discussed in more detail in *ScG* I, 89, 8-14.

of His perfection,[53] which is so great that it cannot become greater by the avoidance or annihilation of some evil or by the addition of some good.

When we consider the list of basic emotions provided above, it is clear that most of the emotions are in this way doubly unbefitting to God. The objects of hate, aversion, sadness, fear, courage and anger are evil; the objects of desire, aversion, fear, courage, despair and hope are not yet present. All these emotions, then, are doubly unbefitting to God. Therefore it seems clear beyond doubt that God cannot have these emotions.

The love, joy and pleasure of God u

There are some other passions which, though they do not befit God as passions, do not have an object that is incompatible with the divine perfection. In this connection Aquinas mentions love, joy and pleasure. Love, as we have seen above, is the psychical union of the lover with the beloved. It might be objected that the object of love is only psychically and not really possessed,[55] and that this is incompatible with the divine perfection. To this objection Aquinas replies that love is not incompatible with real possession of the good object:

For we love something, not less, but more when we have it, because a good is closer to us when we have it. So, too, a motion to an end among natural things becomes intensified from the nearness of the end.[56]

[5]s On the notion of perfection that is operative here, see Idziak, " God," pp. 86-88.

H On the following, see especially *ScG* I, 90-91.

[55] Cf. *De Veritate* 26, 4 c.: ". . . amor dicitur esse quaedam unio amantis et amati. Id autem quod sic aliqualiter coniunctum est, quaeritur ulterius ut realiter coniungatur : ut amans scilicet perfruatur amato; et sic nascitur passio desiderii : quod quidem cum adeptum fuerit in re, generat gaudium."

[56] *ScG* I, 91, 5: "nam amor est alicuius rei non minus cum habetur, sed magis, quia bonum aliquod fit nobis affinius cum habetur; uncle et motus ad finem in rebus naturalibus ex propinquitate finis intenditur . . ." It is difficult not to see a contradiction between the text quoted and *STh* Iallae, 25, 2, ad 1: "ut autem Augustinus <licit, ... amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia." Also see *STh* Ia,20, 1 c.: " amor autem respicit bonum in communi, sive sit habitum, sive non habitum."

Pleasure is a bodily passion which on the part of the body involves a real union with something agreeable and on the part of the soul the feeling of this agreeableness. Joy, as we have seen above, is also a passion of the soul, wherein the sensitive appetite rests in something agreeable, upon which a bodily transformation follows. Thus the object of both pleasure and joy is the present good, which does not give reason to deny these passions to God.[57]

Moreover, in addition to the Biblical witness there seem to be further reasons to hold that God should have these passions. As we have seen above, "wherever there is appetite or will there must be love," [58] for no one desires an object or wills it unless it be a good that is loved. Now Aquinas holds that there is will in God, and therefore he must affirm that there is love in Him as well. And as to joy and pleasure, Aquinas provides several reasons why God should have them, two of which I quote:

> Joy and pleasure are a certain resting of the will in its object. But God, Who is His own principal object willed, is supremely at rest in Himself, as containing all abundance in himself. God, therefore, through His will supremely rejoices in Himself.
>
> Moreover, each thing takes joy in its like as in something agreeable. . . . Now, every good is a likeness of the divine good, as was said above, nor does God lose any good because of some good. It remains, then, that God takes joy in every good.[59]

[57] For the difference between joy *(gaudium)* and pleasure *(delectatio)* as explained in the text, see *ScG* I, 90, 6 and *De Veritate* 26, 4, ad 5. Elsewhere Aquinas gives a different account of the distinction between joy and pleasure. See, for instance, *STh* IaIIae, 23, 4 c.; 31, 3. For the relevant references to the *Scriptum Super Libras Sententiarum* and the difficulties regarding the distinction between joy and pleasure there, see Tittley, "Douleur Sensible," pp. 76-87.

[58] *STh* Ia, 20, 1 c.: "... in quocumque est voluntas vel appetitus, oportet esse amorem ..."

[59] *ScG* I, 90, 3, 5: "gaudium et delectatio est quaedam quietatio volu.itatis in suo volitio. Deus autem in seipso, qui est suum principale volitum, maxime quietatur, utpote in se omnem sufficientiam habens. Ipse igitur per suam voluntatem in se maxime gaudet et delectatur . . . unumquodque naturaliter in suo simili gaudet, quasi in convenienti . . . omne autem bonum est divinae bonitatis similitudo, ut ex supra dictis patet : nee ex aliquo bona sibi aliquid deperit. Relinquitur igitur quod deus de omni bona gaudet." Also see *ScG* I, 90, 2, 4.

God, therefore, has joy and pleasure as well as love. He cannot have them as passions of the sensitive appetite, however, since every passion of the sensitive appetite takes place through a bodily change. Thus God must have love, joy, and pleasure as " passions " of the intellective appetite, as acts of the will which are not accompanied by bodily changes. In Aquinas's own words:

> Loving, enjoying and having pleasure are emotions when they signify activities of the sensitive appetite; not so, however, when they signify activities of the intellective appetite. It is in this last sense that they are attributed to God.[60]

One question remains: Is there any difference between joy and pleasure when both are acts of the intellective appetite instead of passions of the sensitive appetite? To this question Aquinas answers that for pleasure a really conjoined good is needed, whereas for joy a non-conjoined good suffices. "From this it is apparent that God properly has pleasure in Himself, but He takes joy both in Himself and in other things." [61]

In this way Aquinas has explained how God can have love, joy, and pleasure, "passions" the object of which is not unbefitting to God.

The anger and repentance of God

Until now one tension has remained unresolved. We have seen that the object of most emotions is unbefitting to God. This means that God cannot have these emotions, not even as operations of the intellective appetite. But we have also seen that Aquinas was well aware of the fact that the Bible seems to ascribe some of these emotions, e.g., anger and repentance, to God. How

[60] *STh* Ia, 20, 1, ad 1: "amor igitur et gaudium et delectatio, secundum quod significant actus appetitus sensitivi, passiones sunt, non autem secundum quod significant actus appetitus intellectivi et sic ponuntur in deo." On the ascription of " passions " of the intellective appetite to God, also see *STh* la, 20, 1; Iailae, 22, 3, ad 3; 31, 4, ad 2; *De Veritate* 25, 3; 26, 9, ad 5; *Sent* IV 15, 2, la, ad 4.

[61] *ScG* I, 90, 6: " ex quo patet quod deus proprie in seipso delectatur, gaudet autem et in se et in aliis."

then does Aquinas think that the Bible has to be interpreted m these instances? [62] His answer to this question is

> that the other affections which in their species are repugnant to the divine perfection, are also said of God ... not indeed properly, . but metaphorically,[63] because of a likeness either in effects or in some preceding affection.[64]

When Aquinas writes that affections are sometimes ascribed to God " because of a likeness in effects," this means that sometimes certain emotions are metaphorically ascribed to God when He acts in the same way in which human beings act when they have these emotions. Thus it is not uncommon for human beings to punish those with whom they are angry. For this reason punish-

[62] On this question, see *STh* Ia, 3, 2, ad 2; 19, 11 c.; 20, 1, ad 2.

[63] They are said *metaphorically* of God because, unlike passions the object of which is not unbefitting to God, they necessarily imply imperfection. According to Aquinas, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from God to his creation. These perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in His creatures. Now all words which we apply to God are taken from creatures, and therefore it would seem that they all signify a less eminent perfection than the divine perfection. This, however, is not true, because there are some words the signification of which adjusts itself to the demands of the context in which they are used in such a way that they can be used literally of God as well as of His creatures. One of these words is " good " : God is good in a more eminent way than His creatures, but still the word " good " can be literally applied both to Him and His creatures because the word " good " gives no information about the degree of goodness that is signified. The same goes for "joy": when applied to human beings, this term mostly signifies a passion properly so called, and, when applied to God, it always signifies an act of His will. Most words, however, have a signification that necessarily implies imperfection. " Materiality" is part of the very signification of the word "stone," and "having an object that is evaluated as evil " is part of the very signification of "anger." Therefore these words can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. See *STh* Ia, 13, 3 and the comments of Herwi W. M. Rikhof, *Over God Spreken: Een Tekst van Thomas van Aquino uit de Summa Theologiae* (Delft: Meinema, 1988), pp. 60-63.

ScG I, 91, 12: " Sciendum tamen etiam alias affectiones, quae secundum speciem suam divinae perfectioni repugnant, in sacra scriptura de deo dici, non quidem proprie, ut probatum est, sed metaphorice, propter similitudinem vel effectuum, vel alicuius affectionis praecedentis." On the metaphorical ascription of emotions to God, also see *STh* Ia, 3, 2, ad 2; 19, 11; 20, 1, ad 2; 59, 4, ad 1; lallae, 47, 1, ad 1; *Sent* IV, 46, 2, la.

ment is closely associated with anger, and when God punishes us the Bible sometimes has it that He is angry with us.[65]

The second reason why affections the object of which is repugnant to God are ascribed to God is " because of a likeness in some preceding affection." Here Aquinas refers to the fact noted above, namely, that love, the principle of all passion, and joy, the final end of all passion, may be properly said to be in God. Thus God is said to be saddened by something insofar as it is injurious to something or someone He loves or enjoys.[66] In such a case we say that God is saddened because when something happens that is injurious to an object we love or enjoy we experience the emotion of sadness. In God's case, however, there really is no such emotion.

3. Summary of Aquinas on emotion human and divine

Above we have given an outline of Aquinas's theory of emotions with a view to the connection between emotions and corporeality. We have seen that there is a very close connection between emotion and corporeality: without corporeality, no emotion. We have also seen that Aquinas poses the question whether God can have emotions, and that the corporeality needed for emotions is an important reason for him to answer this question negatively. When Aquinas tries to account for the usage of the Bible, which seems to ascribe emotions to God, he explains this language either as metaphorical or as denoting divine will-acts which are unaccompanied by emotions. Thus one of the reasons Aquinas provides for rejecting divine passibility[67] is the fact that passibility is incompatible with incorporeality.

[65] *STh* Ia, 19, 11 c. In his earlier *Sent* III, 15, 2, 2b c., Aquinas argued that the divine anger, like the divine love, joy and pleasure, could be interpreted as an operation of the intellective appetite. Cf. *De Veritate 25,* 3 c.

[66] Cf. *ScG* I, 91, 12: "dico autem propter similitudinem affectionis praecendentis. Nam amor et gaudium, quae in deo proprie sunt, principia sunt omnia affectionum : amor quidem per modum principii moventis : gaudium vero per modum finis; unde etiam irati punientes gaudent, quasi finem assecuti, dicitur igitur deus tristari, inquantum accidunt aliqua contraria his quae ipse amat et approbat : sicut et in nobis est tristitia de his quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt."

[67] It might be argued that the rejection of emotion in God does not imply

III. *The relevance of Aquinas's view on the connection between emotion and corporeality for contemporary theology*

Two of the most important points for which I have argued above are the following. First, one of the arguments Aquinas provides for rejecting the idea that God is passible is that passibility implies corporeality. Second, this argument is widely neglected in contemporary theology. I want to conclude this article by arguing that Aquinas's position points to a weakness in those contemporary theological positions in which divine passibility is asserted without any attention to the question whether divine corporeality is a necessary concomitant of it. Though I cannot do more than give some indications of the way in which contemporary theology might take up Aquinas's argument, I hope it will become clear from what follows that this argument remains central to the question of divine impassibility. It might well be that the consequence of paying due attention to it will be that the contemporary discussion on divine passibility will take a different course.

1. The theological relevance of arguments based on general theories of emotion

Since I will argue that Aquinas's argument should receive more attention, it seems a good procedure in the first place to ask why this argument is so widely neglected in the present. It is not easy to give an answer to this question, because the fact that it is so widely neglected does not bring with it reasons for

divine impassibility, because God might be passible by being capable of having other, non-emotional experiences of a kind that suffices to make Him passible. Against this objection I would like to point out that the concepts that are in fact used by contemporary passibilist theologians to denote the experiences that make God passible, concepts like sensitivity, feeling, pain, suffering, (com) passion, sympathy, empathy and pathos, all point in the direction of Aquinas's passions properly so called.

such neglect. Nevertheless, I want to make a suggestion. Through discussions about my own research on the connection between passibility and corporeality, it has become clear to me that many contemporary philosophers of religion and systematic theologians consider Aquinas's view that there cannot be passibility without corporeality to be highly implausible. Several of them have sincerely tried to convince me that Aquinas was mistaken in thinking that emotion and corporeality are so closely connected and that my own research on this topic would prove a dead end. Therefore my suggestion is that for many contemporary theologians the claim that emotions involve corporeality is implausible and that this is at least one of the reasons for neglecting Aquinas's argument. [68]

In reply to this intuition of contemporary theologians I want to point out that the idea that physiological changes play an important role in emotion is still defended in the majority of the contemporary psychological theories of emotion. In this connection, let us look briefly at the two theories of emotion that have been most influential during present century. The first of these is the *James-Lange* theory of emotion, developed by William James (1884) and Carl Georg Lange (1885). [69] William James summarizes this theory in the following words :

es Another possible reason for the neglect of Aquinas's argument could be the acceptance that in some sense God has a body. This is the position of passibilist theologians like Charles Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism* (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1941), pp. 174-211, and *A Natural Theology for Our Time* (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1967), pp. 97-102; Grace M. Jantzen, *God's World, God's Body* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984), and Luco J. van den Brom, *God Alomtegenwoordig* (Kampen: Kok, 1982). Since this position is still quite exceptional, there is no need for me to go into it further.

69 William James, "What is an Emotion ?," *Mind* 9 (1884) : 188-205, reprinted in Magda B. Arnold (ed.), *The Nature of Emotion: Selected Readings* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), pp. 17-36 and (partly) in: Cheshire Calhoun & Robert C. Solomon, *What is an Emotion! Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 127-141. In the following all references will be to the reprint in *The Nature of Emotion.* See also William James, *The Principles of Psychology,* Vol. II (Reprint: New York: Dover Publications, 1950), pp. 442-485.

Our natural way of thinking about ... standard emotions [70] is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is that *the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.* Common sense says ... we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, ... and that the more rational statement is that we feel . . . angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble.... Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. [71]

According to K. T. Strongman, who in the second chapter of his *The Psychology of Emotion*\ reviews twenty modern theories of emotion, the James-Lange theory is "probably the most famous of all." [72] And William Lyons asserts that this theory " has been one of the reasons why many psychologists fasten almost exclusively upon physiological changes, and the feelings resulting from them, as the essence of emotion." [73]

The second theory of emotion which I would like briefly to summarize is the *Schachter-Singer* theory of emotion, which has also been called the "two-component," "cognitive/physiological," and " cognition-arousal " theory of emotion. [74] Stanley Schachter

[10] Beside these standard emotions James admits the existence of "feelings of pleasure and displeasure, of interest and excitement, bound up with mental operations, but having no obvious bodily expression for their consequence ... " (James, "What is an Emotion?," p. 18). It is not this idea that has made James's theory of emotion famous, however, but the idea that emotion is the feeling of bodily changes. Hugo Miinsterberg extended James's theory of emotions to include pleasantness and unpleasantness. See his " Lust und Unlust: Eine vorlaufige Mitteilung," in *Beitriige zur experimentellen Psychologie* Heft 4 (Freiburg: J. C. B. Mohr, 1892), pp. 216-238.

71James, "What is an Emotion?," p.19.

[12] K. T. Strongman, *The Psychology of Emotion* (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 13.

[7a] William Lyons, *Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 13.

[74] Stanley Schachter & Jerome E. Singer, " Cognitive, Social and Physiological Determinants of Emotional States," *Psychological Review* 69 (1962): 379-399, partly reprinted in: Calhoun/Solomon, *What is cm Emotion?,* pp. 173-183. In the following all references are to this reprint.

and Jerome E. Singer agree with the James-Lange theory that " the individual will react emotionally . . . only to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological arousal." [75] They disagree with the James-Lange theory, however, by holding that

> Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation, he will label his state and describe his feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him. . . . Precisely the same state of physiological arousal could be labeled ' joy ' or 'fury' or ' jealousy ' or any of a great diversity of emotional labels depending on the cognitive aspects of the situation.[76]

As Howard Leventhal and Andrew J. Tomarken remark, this theory " has dominated social-psychological research for the past 20 years." [77]

Above I have highlighted only the two theories of emotion that have been most influential during the present century. That the close connection between emotion and corporeality is corroborated by the *majority* of contemporary psychological emotion theories can be seen from a review article of Paul R. and Anne M. Kleinginna. [78] They found 92 definitions of "emotion" in a variety of sources in the literature on emotion. Of these definitions 32 were written before 1970, 3 of which had their primary emphasis on physiological changes and 20 of which had a secondary emphasis on physiological changes. Sixty definitions were published between 1970 and 1980, 4 of which had their primary emphasis on physiological changes and 39 of which had a secondary emphasis on physiological changes. In sum, the ma-

[75] Schachter/Singer, "Determinants of Emotional States," p. 183.

[76] Ibid., p. 183.

[77] Howard Leventhal & Andrew J. Tomarken, "Emotion: Today's Problems," *Annual Review of Psychology* 37 (1986) : 565-610 (quotation from p. 567). See also Rainer Reisenzein, " The Schachter Theory of Emotion: Two Decades Later," *Psychological Bulletin* 94 (1983) : 239-264, who provides a very interesting discussion of the research that has been generated by the Schachter-Singer theory of emotion.

[78] Paul R. Kleinginna & Anne M. Kleinginna, " A Categorized List of Emotion Definitions, with Suggestions for a Consensual Definition," *Motivation and Emotion* 5-4 (1981): 345-379. To my knowledge there is no similar review of definitions published during the last decade, but it is not my impression that much has changed since 1981 in this respect.

jority of contemporary psychological definitions of emotion include a reference to physiological changes.

Though this at least gives some *prinia facie* support to Aquinas's idea that emotions and corporeality are closely connected, it could be objected that the connection between emotion and bodily change that is made in many contemporary psychological theories of emotion is of another nature than the connection Aquinas uses in his argument against divine passibility.[79] The latter connection is a conceptual or logical connection: the concept of an emotion includes bodily changes and therefore it is conceptually or logically impossible that anyone can have an emotion without undergoing bodily changes. Even God could not have an emotion without bodily changes, because it would not be an emotion. Now contemporary psychology is not concerned with conceptual or logical possibilities or impossibilities, but with facts. Therefore physiological changes should be included in psychological definitions of emotions when it is in fact the case that human emotions do always involve corporeality. But even when human emotions in fact always involve physiological changes, this does not necessarily imply that it is (conceptually) inconceivable that incorporeal emotions could exist, and thus that an incorporeal being could have emotions.

This objection strikes home: while psychological theories of emotion may conclusively argue that there is a factual connection between emotion and corporeality, they never can prove that there is a conceptual connection between the two. For arguments in favor of a conceptual connection between emotions and corporeality we should turn to philosophical theories of emotion, because conceptual inquiry is part of the philosophical approach to emotion. And when we turn to philosophical theories of emotion, it soon becomes clear that, though most of the attention of philosophers concerned with emotion is devoted to cognitive aspects, some of the most important contemporary philosophers of emotion indeed do hold that there is a conceptual connection between emotion and corporeality. In this connection I want to refer to

[79] On the following, cf. Oakes, "The Wrath of God," p. 134.

the important and in my opinion most balanced of contemporary philosophical theories of emotion, William Lyons's "causal-evaluative theory." This theory resembles the Schachter-Singer theory in being a two-component theory, but it differs from it in making the cognitive component the cause of the physiological changes. William Lyons asserts that

> The concept of something is the list of necessary and sufficient conditions ... for something's being that sort of thing. Now the causal-evaluative theory gets its name from advocating that *X* is to be deemed an emotional state if and only if it is a physiologically abnormal state caused by the subject of that state's evaluation of his or her situation.[80]

This is a very clear example of a philosophical theory that defends a conceptual connection between emotion and physiology, and it might be argued that if this theory is correct, an incorporeal God cannot have emotions.

This argument, however, though logically unimpeachable, would not convince many passibilist theologians. As Nico Frijda has remarked: "It is no use quarreling with definitions."[81] In other words, it is always possible to define "emotion" in such a way that physiological changes are or are not included. The philosopher can decree any definition of emotion and he can include whatever features he wants.[82] Such definitions, however, only prescribe a certain use of words, and therefore their relevance for the theological question whether God can have emotions can be doubted. Let us, for the sake of the argument, suppose that all philosophical theories of emotion agree that emotions necessarily involve physiological changes. Even then a theologian who is convinced that God is passible is not compelled to give up this conviction. It is always open to him to

[80] Lyons, *Emotion,* pp. 57-58. A similar definition of emotion is provided by Robert Brown, *Analyzing Love* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)' p. 14.

[81] Nico H. Frijda, *The Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)' p. 125.

[82] Naturally it is possible to criticize philosophical theories of emotion when they define "emotion" in such a way that this word comes to mean something quite other than we usually mean by it. When conceptual inquiry loses the contact with the common usage of words, something has gone wrong.

argue that the experiences he wants to ascribe to God do not fall under the "philosophical" concept of emotion; he means other, " emotion-like " experiences, which do not involve any physiological changes. In fact, this is the strategy of Nicholas Wolterstorff in his article on " Suffering Love " which I quoted above. On the one hand, accepting Lyon's causal-evaluative theory, he admits that God cannot have emotions, but on the other hand he asserts that this leaves open the question whether God suffers, since suffering is a phenomenon different from emotion.[83]

It seems, therefore, that arguments against divine passibility that conclude from a general theory of emotion to the impossibility of ascribing emotions or passibility to God have only a limited theological value. This limited value lies in that they can help us to show that Aquinas's contention that emotion necessarily involves corporeality is not so implausible and that the passibilists' implicit contention that it is possible to experience emotions without having a body is not so plausible as these may seem at first sight. While it is already noteworthy that, according to most psychological theories of emotion, emotions always in fact involve physiological changes, it is even more significant that at least some philosophical theories of emotion go so far as to assert that it is inconceivable that anyone has an emotion without physiological changes. This suggests that there is a very strong connection between the phenomena we commonly designate as emotions and physiological changes, and thus that passibilist theologians cannot without argument take it for granted that incorporeal passibility is possible.

2. The theological relevance of the analysis of specific emotions ascribed to God

In the present theological situation the best way to pursue the intention of Aquinas's argument seems to be not by arguing against the possibility of divine emotions in general but by arguing against the possibility of specific divine emotions. Arguments concerning the connection between divine passibility and

[83] See Wolterstorff, "Suffering Love," pp. 214-215.

corporeality should ask whether the specific experiences passibilist theologians ascribe to God necessarily entail corporeality. If this necessity can be shown by an analysis of these experiences, then it will no longer be open to passibilist theologians to argue that the criticism is misdirected insofar as it concerns experiences other than those they want to ascribe to God.

Though it would exceed the scope of the present article to work out this suggestion in detail, I want to give a rough sketch of the approach I favor. In contemporary theology the doctrine that God is passible has some clearly defined functions. By analyzing the arguments that are given in favor of divine passibility, it is possible to find out what these functions are. Let me give an example. One of the most central arguments for divine passibility is based on the statement that God is love. Richard Creel summarizes this argument as follows:

> *Love* requires emotional passibility. To love someone is to care about him, and to care about him is to care about what happens to him, and to care about what happens to him is to be affected by what happens to him; it is to be happy when things go well for him and to be distressed when things go badly for him.... If God, the greatest conceivable lover, is emotionally unaffected by our ecstasies and our agonies then it only shows that he is no lover at all. But God is love. Therefore God must be thought of as emotionally passible.[84]

[84] Creel, *Divine Impassibility,* pp. 113-114, (italics his). Creel himself disagrees with this argument, which is given by Anton Bodem, "'Leiden Gottes ': Erwagungen zu einem Zug im Gottesbild der gegenwartigen Theologie," in Anton Ziegenaus, Franz Courth, and Philip Schafer, eds., *Veritati Catholici: Festschrift Leo Sche-ffzky zum 65. Geburtstag* (Aschaffenburg: Paul Pattloch Verlag, 1985), pp. 596-597; Paul Fiddes, *The Creative Suffering of God* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 16-25; Jean Galot, *Dieu Souffre-t-Il?* (Paris: Editions P. Lethielleux, 1976), pp. 50, 172-173; Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God,* pp. 163ff.; Jung Young Lee, *God Suffers for Us: A Systematic Inquiry into a Concept of Divine Passibility* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 6ff, 17ff; Geddes MacGregor, *He Who Lets Us Be: A Theology of Love* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 3-22; John Macquarrie, *In Search of Deity: An Essay in Dialectical Theism* (London: SCM Press, 1984), p, 180; Jurgen Moltmann, *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology* (London: SCM Press, 1977), pp. 222, 230; Huw P. Owen, *Concepts of Deity* (London: MacMillan, 1971), p. 24; Arthur R. Peacocke, *Intimations of Reality: Critical*

This quotation makes clear what for many theologians is one of the theological functions of divine passibility: divine passibility is a necessary condition for divine love. When God loves people, according to these theologians, this means that He is distressed when things go badly for them. And since on the analysis these theologians give of love the measure of suffering of which one is capable is an indication of the measure of one's love, they will without hesitation assert that God has a capacity for great distress and for intense suffering.

My suggestion is that it would be worthwhile to inquire whether the kind of suffering-out-of-love these theologians ascribe to God necessarily entails physiological changes. Similar inquiries should be made into other concrete experiences of passibility that are ascribed to God for other theological reasons. The methods for these inquiries will have to be borrowed from the philosophy of emotion, but the subject-matter will be provided by theology.

For two reasons I suspect that this kind of approach will prove much more successful than the general approach rejected above. First, in this way one's analysis directly regards the specific experiences passibilist theologians ascribe to God, so the discussion will not be on the question whether the analysis applies or not, but on whether it is correct or not. Secondly, in this way there is no need to establish that emotions in general necessarily involve physiological changes, but only that those kinds of emotional experiences which passibilist theologians ascribe to God necessarily involve these changes. Now in the example given above of a con-

Realism in Science and Religion (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 77-78; S. Paul Schilling, *God and Human Anguish* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1977), pp. 253-254; Jon Sobrino, *Christology at the Crossroads: A Latin American Approach* (New York: Orbis Books, 1978), pp. 197-198, 217, 225-226; John R. W. Stott, *The Cross of Christ* (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1987), p. 332; Kenneth Surin, "The Impassibility of God and the Problem of Evil," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 35 (1982): 98, 100-102; Gerald Vann, *The Pain of Christ and the Sorrow of God* (Oxford: Blackfriars Publications, 1947), p. 60; Frarn;ois Varillon, *La Souffrance de Dieu* (Paris: Le Centurion, 1975), pp. 65-71; Keith Ward, *Rational Theology and the Creativity of God* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982),

crete emotional experience ascribed to God (suffering out of love), the emotional experience is of a rather vehement, excited, and profound kind. This is exactly the kind of emotional experience in which it is most likely that physiological change is necessarily involved. Though I have no space to prove this here, the most important other arguments for divine passibility also suggest vehement divine emotions. Hence it seems relatively easy to show that for the kinds of emotion that are in fact ascribed to God by passibilist theologians, God has to be corporeal.

IV. *Conclusion*

I have argued the following points: (1) On the basis of his general theory of ·emotion Aquinas argued that emotion necessarily involves corporeality, and that God, being incorporeal, cannot have emotions; (2) In contemporary theology it is often argued that God can be passible and have emotions, while this argument of Aquinas is almost completely neglected; (3) Since contemporary theories of emotion generally agree with Aquinas in asserting a strong connection between emotion and corporeality, one cannot without argument assume that it is possible for an incorporeal being to have emotions; (4) Passibilist theologians will hardly be convinced by the argument of Aquinas and other arguments for the thesis that physiological changes are part of the concept of emotion and that God therefore cannot have emotions, for it is always open to them to argue that the particular "emotional" experiences they ascribe to God do not fall under this concept of emotion; (5) This does not imply that the point Aquinas wanted to make-that God, being incorporeal, cannot have emotions and thus cannot be passible-cannot be defended. It seems, however, that the best way to defend it is to proceed from an analysis of the specific emotional experiences passibilist theologians ascribe to God.

p. 199; Daniel Day Williams, *The Spirit and the Forms of Love* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 127-128, and many others. In my 1989 lecture "Auschwitz, Morality and the Suffering of God," now published in *Modern Theology* 7-2 (1991): 135-152, I myself whole-heartedly accepted this **argu**ment, which I now consider to be very questionable.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HOMOGENEOUS OR HETEROGENEOUS DEVELOPMENT?

BRIAN T. MULLADY, O.P.

Holy Apostles College and Seminary
Cromwell, Connecticut

ONE OF THE most difficult questions to confront those who hold for a natural-law conception of Catholic moral teaching which does not change with the development of the times is the area of the freedom of religion in the political order. The traditional teaching on this subject is expressed in many places. The most difficult *locus* for anyone who wants to defend the traditional opinion is found in *The Syllabus of Errors* of Pius IX. In this document, the following canons are explicitly enumerated :

77. In this age of ours it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be the only religion of the state, to the exclusion of all other cults whatsoever.
78. Hence in certain regions of Catholic name, it has been laudably sanctioned by law that men immigrating there be allowed to have public exercises of any form of worship of their own.
79. For it is false that the civil liberty of every cult, and likewise, the full power granted to all of manifesting openly and publicly any kind of opinions and ideas, more easily leads to the corruption of the morals and minds of the people, and to the spread of the evil of indifferentism.[1]

[1] " *77.* Aestate hac nostra non amplius expedit, religionem catholicam haberi tamquam unicam status religionem, ceteris quibuscumque cultibus exclusus. *78.* Hine laudabiliter in quibusdam catholici nominis regionibus lege cautum est, ut hominibus illuc immigrantibus liceat publicum proprii cuiusque cultus exercitium habere. *79.* Enimvero falsum est, civilem cuiusque cultus libertatem, itemque plenam potestatem omnibus attributam quaslibet opiniones cogitationesque palam publiceque manifestandi conducere ad populorum mores animosque facilius corrumpendos ac indifferentismi pestem propagandam." Denizinger-Schonmetzer, *Enchiridion Symbolorum,* n. *1777-1779* (2977-2979), hereafter refered to as *DS.*

In this text, freedom of religion is clearly condemned. Yet one finds about one hundred years later the issue of religious freedom discussed by Vatican II. Here the conclusion reached seems quite different.

The Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. Freedom of this kind means that all men should be immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups and every human power so that, within due limits, nobody is forced to act against his convictions in religious matters in private or in public, alone or in associations with others. The Council further declares that the right to religious freedom is based on the very dignity of the human person as known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself. This right of the human person to religious freedom must be given such recognition in the constitutional order of society as will make it a civil right.[2]

These two documents seem to represent a significant change in the teaching of the church. Beyond the obvious change in attitude towards religious freedom, many moral theologians also see another change : the very language of the decree signals a departure from the traditional basis of the law of nature by a reference to the dignity of the human person. One example will suffice:

It may also be a growing dissatisfaction with the traditional concept of ' nature ' which has contributed in recent years to the focus of moral attention moving from ' human nature ' to ' human person '

[2] " Haec Vaticana Synodus declarat personam humanam ius habere ad libertatem religiosam. Huiusmodi libertas in eo consistit, quod omnes homines debent immunes esse a coercitione ex parte sive singulorum sive coetuum socialium et cuiusvis potestatis humanae, et ita quidem ut in re religiosa neque aliquis cogatur ad agendum contra suam conscientiam neque impediatur, quominus iuxta suam conscientiam agat privatim et publice, vel solus vel aliis consociatus, intra debitos limites. Insuper declarat ius ad libertatem religiosam esse revera fundatum in ipsa dignitate personae humanae, qualis et verbo Dei revelato et ipsa ratione congnoscitur. Hoc ius personae humanae ad libertatem religiosam in iuridica societatis ordinatione ita est agnoscendum, ut ius civile evadat." Vatican II, *Declaratio de Libertate Religiosa: Dignitatis Humanae,* n. 2. Translations are taken from *Vatican Council II, The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Dornments,* Austin Flannery, O.P., ed. (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1975).

or ' human dignity.' Thus, the Second Vatican Council was certainly not unaware of the whole moral tradition centered on the law of nature when it nevertheless considered basing objective moral standards on ' the dignity of the human person,' and finally decided to propose the need for such standards as based on the ' nature of the [human] person and his acts.' [3]

Modern moralists think that the emphasis on the human person is completely new. They think that the old natural-law ethics has been replaced by a personalistic ethics. For them, norms which expressed the law of nature and were exceptionless have given way to norms which demand that exceptions be made. There are too many factors and difficulties at work in this sort of thinking " to be fully examined in a short article like this. Suffice it to say at the beginning that the issue of religious freedom is often invoked as an example of such a change. Not only is this offered as a change in the basis for the teaching on religious freedom, but this issue has been used to support a more general proposition that the church can and has changed her teaching completely on other matters.

Some say that this claim of a change in church teaching is used as a justification for not taking the papal teachings on sexual ethics and birth control seriously: If one just waits long enough, the teaching of the church will be changed on these matters as it has already been changed on the issue of religious freedom. Still others say that the document of the Second Vatican Council on religious freedom is so startling a change that it falsifies the council and shows that at least this document is not the work of the Holy Spirit. The teaching contained in this document is so compromising to the traditional teaching of the church that they even call into question the authority of the Pope to teach it and suggest that perhaps Pope Paul was not a true Pope. This is a radical opinion, it is true, but it is one point of

a John Mahoney, *The Making of Moral Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 113-114.

4'Cf. Brian Mullady, *The Meaning of the Term Moral in St. Thomas Aquinas* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1986).

view, exacerbated perhaps by the fact that Pope Paul called this "one of the major texts of the Council." [5]

The apologists for the document make their case more on juridical rather than on theoretical grounds. As the issue is not merely juridical, this seems to weaken their argument. One of the principal apologists for the document is the great American Jesuit, John Courtney Murray. Though his explanation is somewhat limited from the theoretical point of view, it contains a great deal of merit as to the practical and juridical parameters of the problem.[6] However, although John Courtney Murray was sure that this document represented a development in doctrine, he was not certain what this development might be. In the original translation of the document of the Second Vatican Council into English he states, " The course of the development between the *Syllabus of Errors* (1864) and ... [this decree] ... still remains to be explained by theologians. But the Council formally sanctioned the validity of the development itself; and this was a doctrinal event of high importance for theological thought in many areas." [7]

Many moralists today see in this development a place where the church has entirely changed her teaching on a subject of importance. They argue that there is really no magisterial teaching which is forever fixed. This applies to many areas of interest but has been used in a particularly effective way by those who have opposed the teaching of the church on birth control in *Humanae Vitae*. There are numerous examples of theologians who think this way. For example,

> Even this brief look at the history of our moral teaching should prompt us to describe our teaching icompetence in more modest terms. Either we must admit a drastic relativism which would allege that all of that teaching was right in its day or we must admit

[5] W. M. Abbott, *The Documents of Vatican II* (London: 1966), p. 674; cited in Mahoney, *Moral Theology,* n. 150.

[6] I shall not go into the juridical history of this problem in this paper. For those who are interested in this, they can profitably read John Courtney Murray, *The Problem of Religious Freedom* (Westminster, Maryland: 1965).

[1] Abbott, *Vatican* II, pp. 673, 672. Quoted in Mahoney, *Moral Theology,* pp. 114-115.

the presence of error in the history of the pilgrim church . . . To stress this point: . . . the teaching of Gregory XVI and Pius IX that it was ' madness ' to allege religious freedom as a right of man and a necessity in society, and the proclamation of Vatican II that such freedom is a right and necessity in society-such teachings are not consistent or mutually irreconcilable. Even full recognition of the historical context that spawned these statements does not establish doctrinal continuity.[8]

In this article, Daniel Maguire applies this conclusion of a lack of any sure doctrinal continuity in magisterial statements to many other moral teachings of the Magisterium, including those on usury and on contraception. Obviously, this presents a very real challenge to the continuity of any doctrinal statement. One is tempted to say that no doctrinal or moral statement is universally true through time. This would compromise the very nature of the truth and the ability of the church to define doctrines. Maguire expresses the implications very well: "Still, to assert that in all this there is no change but simply development is to play semantic games." [9]

In this article, then, I would like to examine the question of whether the teaching of the church has really changed or not. Is this development truly homogeneous or heterogeneous (change) ? If the former is true, then the teaching of the Second Vatican Council should be viewed not as a conformity to the spirit of this age, but rather as an application of the same traditional teaching of the church looked at from a different point of view to correspond to new problems found in the signs of our times. In other words, we may have always taught the same teaching as Vatican II about religious freedom, but may not have emphasized this part of the truth because of other moral problems in other times. I would like to suggest that the religious freedom condemned in the *Syllabus of Errors* refers to religious freedom looked at from the point of view of the action of the intellect, or freedom respecting the truth; whereas the freedom of religion

[8] Daniel C. Maguire, "Morality and Magisterium," in *Readings in Moral Theology: No. 3,* eds. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), p. 45.

[9] Ibid., p. 46.

guaranteed and encouraged by *Dignitatis Humanae* refers to religious freedom looked at from the point of view of the action of the will in morals. In other words, those who see in these different expressions a change in teaching are committing the fallacy of univocity of terms in logic. The terms "freedom" refer to two very different acts of the soul.

One of the difficulties in discerning this truth comes from the historical problem of the confessional state. John Courtney Murray makes a good examination of this problem from the point of view of jurisdiction in law. I believe that this is the only basis on which the problem of the confessional state need be discussed. In other words, the union of throne and altar is a practical problem truly limited to one particular epoch in history and really has little to do with the problem discussed in this paper. Regardless of whether there is a state religion or not, both the *Syllabus of Errors* and *Dignitatis Humanae* present their teachings as universally and necessarily true.

Another difficulty which must be addressed in this article is the issue of the natural law as the ba,sis for morals. Many moral authorities have used the supposed change in doctrine in Magisterial teaching as a sign that the church has changed the basis upon which the church decides the reasonability of her teaching.[10] As a result, I would also like to show that the personalistic norm is itself just another way of expressing what has always been meant by the natural law, and that this in turn is truly the basis for the different meanings of religious freedom in the documents of the Magisterium.

The tradition of the church before Vatican II had already be-

[10] For example, "But the founding of the right to religious freedom on the dignity of the individual human person can be seen as a further indication of the move from human nature to the human person and his dignity as the basis for moral reasoning. In the circumstances it is significant that the criterion of person rather than nature can be seen as flourishing in the thought of John Paul II, ... in which, with reference to the subject of contraception, he invites theologians to shed more light on 'the biblical foundations, ethical grounds and the personalistic reasons behind this doctrine.'" Mahoney, *Moral Theology,* p. 114.

gun to invoke a distinction with respect to the term " freedom of religion." For example, Leo XIII says,

Another liberty is widely advocated, namely, *liberty of conscience.* If by this is meant that everyone may, as he chooses, worship God or not, it is sufficiently refuted by the arguments adduced. But it may also be taken to mean that every man in the State may follow the will of God and, from a consciousness of duty and free from every obstacle, obey his commands. This indeed, is true liberty, a liberty worthy of the sons of God.[11]

In this text, one can see that the Pope himself long before Vatican II makes a distinction between a freedom of conscience which suggests " everyone may, as he chooses, worship God or not" and that every man " in the State may follow the will of God and, from a consciousness of duty and free from every obstacle obey his commands."

Vatican II explains this distinction very clearly:

The Council further declares that the right to religious freedom is based on ... [the] dignity of all men because they are persons, that is, beings endowed with reason and free will and ... are both impelled by their nature and bound by moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth.[12]

This clearly refers to the religious obligation of the truth which is invoked in the encyclical of Leo XIII. There is no freedom of religion regarding this because the truth about God is one. Religious freedom regarding the content of religious truth is also obviously what is condemned in the *Syllabus of Errors.* This freedom is always condemned in the context of nineteenth century liberalism, which viewed the supernatural as something basically unable to be defined. Real dogma was not possible, because one could really express nothing about God, or alternately, any expression about God could be true. Because God acted in

[11] Leo XIII, *Libertas Praestissimum,* 30.

[12] " Secundum dignitatem suam homines cuncti, quia personae sunt, ratione scilicet et Iibera voluntate praedicti ideoque personali responsabilitate aucti, sua ipsorum natura impelluntur necnon morali tenentur obligatione ad veritatem quaerendam, illam imprimis quae religionem spectat." *Dignitatis Humanae,* n. 2.

the world only through human reason, the laws of the State should be the ultimate criteria for the truth of religion; the State would establish the fact that all religions were the same.

Vatican II goes on to explain another aspect of the truth of religion:

> But men cannot satisfy their obligation in a way in keeping *with their own nature·* unless they enjoy both psychological freedom and immunity from external coercion. Therefore the right to religious freedom has its foundation not in the subjective attitude of the individual, but in his very nature.[13]

This clearly refers to the liberty of conscience which Leo XIII expressed as the freedom to pursue one's duty free from every obstacle. The teaching of the Council on this expresses the right of a person to embrace any truth from the interior movement of his will. One should notice in these texts-" *with their own nature"* and *"in his very nature"* -that the basis for the judgment about the differences in which the civil law relates to freedom of will and freedom of intellect is human nature itself. This is a clue to the fact that the Council in no way changed the criteria for judgment concerning the basis for religious freedom. What forms the basis for the seeming contradiction in the statements of the texts of the Magisterium? Far from being a change in doctrine as to morals, these different judgments simply respect a classic distinction in St. Thomas Aquinas between the functions of reason and will in the moral order. The word "freedom" may express the necessary freedom from external coercion in any moral act of the will for it to truly be an act of the will; it may also express a judgment as to whether the objective truth of God binds all men to seek it. The word refers to different powers with different objects, and this situation demands that one examine the nature of those powers respecting truths about God.

13 " Tenentur quoque veritati cognitae adhaerere atque totam vitam suam iuxta exigentias veritatis ordinare. Huie autem obligationi satisfacere homines, modo suae propriae naturae consentaneo, non possunt nisi libertate psychologica simul atque immunitate a coercitione externa fruantur. Non ergo in subiectiva personae dispositione, sed in ipsa eius natura ius ad libertatem religiosam fundatur." *Dignitatis Humanae,* n. 2.

This examination should lead to some insight not only into the place of the civil order in coercion about these truths, but into the place of coercion in general as well. A corollary would include the possibility of any religious truth leading to true human freedom. All of this is based, of course, on the difference between how the conscience relates to the will and how the conscience relates to the intellect.

Accordingly, I will examine the different ways in which the conscience relates to the will and to the intellect, *based on the nature of each in man.* Please note that although various actual situations may call for different emphases in this discussion (one may emphasize the relation to the will at one point, the intellect at another), such a change in emphasis in no sense falsifies the previous teaching. Rather, the various emphases in the teaching complement each other and help to give a complete picture of the various foundations of the human act in general, an action which follows nature. The references to the human person in *Dignitatis Humanae* clearly refer not to a new historically-determined condition, but rather to a transhistorical nature which is found in all men. The teaching of the whole Magisterium about religious freedom is in no way an attempt to change the teaching of the church to correspond to the spirit of the age. Just the opposite is the case. The universal is not an impoverished sense experience which must be continuously reformed according to the culture. The way in which the intellect acts as it binds the conscience in truth and the way in which the will acts as it freely embraces the truth are based on those very powers of the soul.

The term " freedom of religion " cannot be used in a univocal sense. In the *Syllabus of Errors* and in *Dignitatis Humanae* this term refers to freedom looked upon from two very different objects in two very different powers of the soul. The term " freedom " can become very confusing unless it is delineated as to precisely what it means. Normally it is used to translate free will in human acts. At the outset of the section in the *Summa Theologiae* on morals, St. Thomas makes the point that free choice by which man is lord of his acts is expressed by the term

"liberum arbitrium." There he explicitly states that free (*liberum)* choice *(arbitrium)* means a faculty which includes *both the intellect and* will.[14] For an act to be truly human, it must be immanent. It must issue from both intellect and will. Acts which do not issue from both do not befit rational beings and are not placed in the genus of morals.[15]

However, there are not two acts with two objects present in an act of free choice. The act of free choice must be essentially one. This act may be two in power, but only one actual act.[16] So, in free choice, both the intellect and the will concur, but in different ways. Free choice is primarily an act of the will but guided always by the act of the intellect.[17] Still, the intellect and the will contribute to the act of free choice each according to its own manner of being as a power. One must then examine the contribution of each to the one act of free choice.

The same object can be desired by the will and known by the intellect. This object forms the basis for the distinction of powers. For example, the same object may be seen, tasted, smelled, heard, and touched, and this same object would form the basis for all of the experiences of the senses as to their objects. In the case of the movement of our souls, all objects may be looked upon in their relation to the soul. This includes God as an object of religion. There is a twofold relationship of things to the soul. A being outside the soul, whether an apple or God, has the possibility of being in the soul as it exists in itself, but experienced in

14 " Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem : unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur *facultas voluntatis et rationis."* Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 1, a. 1, c.

15 " Illa ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa movent ad finem: quia habent dominum suorum actuum per liberum arbitrium, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis . . . Illa ratione carent, tendunt in finem per naturalem inclinationem, quasi ab alia mota, non autem a seipsis." Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 1, a. 2, c.

16 " Liberum arbitrium est tantum una potentia formaliter, sed duae virtualitcr." Aquinas, *In Commentaria Super Sententias* II, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2; *De Veritate,* 24, 5.

11 Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. 13, a. 1, c.

the spiritual way the soul exists. This makes something knowable.[18]

A thing may also be related to the soul in that the soul is inclined to desire the thing as it exists in itself. I may desire or love God or an apple in my will as this being exists in its own right. In fact, until I actually experience the being in its mode of existence love is not satisfied.[19] There is a certain circularity in knowing and loving. The circle begins with the act of knowledge which is drawn to experience an object in the manner of the intellect and the act of the will which is drawn to experience the object as it exists.

Basically, it is the contribution of each of these powers to the act of free choice which divides morals into genus and species. This is even the basis for the division of the treatment of morals in the *Summa Theologiae.* St. Thomas treats of the contribution of the will to morals in *ST* I-II, qq. 6-17. An act is placed in the genus of morals insofar as it is free, that is, voluntary. In his treatment of this, St. Thomas examines the various conditions under which an act done by a man could not be voluntary. Common to all those conditions is the presence of a certain violence which compels a person to act against his will. Violence cannot be done to the act of the will itself (elicited). However, a person can be compelled by exterior forces to do acts of his other powers which he can command (imperated or commanded acts).

As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, insofar as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will . . . In like manner a man may be dragged by force, but it is contrary to the very notion of violence, that he be thus dragged of his own will.[20]

[18] "Res autem ad animam invenitur duplicem habitudinem habere: unam secundum quad ipsa res est in anima per modum animae, et non per modum sui." Aquinas, *De Veritate,* 22, 10.

[19] "Aliam secundum quad anima comparatur ad rem in suo esse existentem." Aquinas, *De Veritate,* 22, 10.

[20] "Quantum igitur ad actus a voluntate imperatos, voluntas violentiam pati potest, inquantum per violentiam exteriora membra impediri possunt ne im-

This violence introduces a condition into any human act which compromises the existence of the genus of morals in it. This violence may be the result of some compelling force. Someone takes my hand and stabs someone else using it. He overpowers me in doing so. It may also take the form of a kind of interior violence. My emotions are incited to such great anger that I am blinded by rage through no fault of my own. I commit murder as a result. I have committed an objective sin, but I am not responsible for the sin because my will was compelled by some force outside of it. The more these exterior forces bind the judgment of reason and move the will without this consultation, the less freedom there is in such an act.[21] An act of any kind, especially an act of faith, cannot be truly human and responsible unless it is in the genus of morals. The more outside factors compel such an act, the less free it is and the less it is in the genus of morals.

An act becomes human because it is voluntary and results from the will. It becomes good or evil according to the judgment of reason. No human act can be good unless this act is according to the truth. For this reason, Pope John Paul II says often that freedom does not mean freedom from the truth but freedom for the truth. Truth is not judged by the same standards as the freedom of will in an act. In fact, it is the compelling nature of the truth which is the basis for the freedom in any act of will.

The truth of a moral act must be judged not on the basis of the lack of violence done to the will, but on the basis of reason. This reason forms the foundation of the judgment of any moral act as good or evil. " Thus good and evil in human acts are considered insofar as the act is in accord with reason informed by

perium voluntatis exequantur. Sed quantum ad ipsum proprium actum voluntatis, non potest ei violentia inferri . . . Similiter etiam potest homo per violentiam trahi : sed quod hoc sit ex eius voluntate, repugnat rationi violentiae." Aquinas, *ST* I-II q.6, a. 4, c.

21 " Aliae vero causae sunt quae inclinant voluntatem ad peccandum, praeter naturam et ordinem ipsius voluntatis, quae nata est moveri libere ex seipsa secundum iudicium rationis." Aquinas, *ST* I-II, q. *73,* a. 6, c.

the divine law, either naturally, by instruction, or by infusion ... [and] it is evil for the soul to be outside reason as for the body to be outside of nature." [22]

The conclusion naturally follows from this that the moral goodness or evil of a human act is judged by a different criterion from the human freedom of the act. For an act to be in the genus of morals it must not suffer exterior violence. For the will to be drawn to a good, all kinds of exterior influences may be brought to bear on it, but until the individual accepts a given act as good in his intellect and so moves his will, any good movement he makes will not be completely under his lordship and so it will not be a deep act of love. The union which such an act produces with the being to which it is united will be weak. Though the truth is the primary criterion for what is good and should be willed, one cannot really be compelled to embrace the truth by violence. This is true of any human assent. It is even more true of the assent of faith. This is based on the very nature of the will and the object of faith who is God Himself.

Among the unbelievers there are some who have never received the faith, such as heathens and Jews: and these are by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they might believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder the faith.[23]

It seems obvious to me that this text is clear about the fact that the act of religion must be an act of freedom of will at least for those who are not Christians. Though it is true that St. Thomas later in the same article says that Christians may be compelled by corporal punishment to return to a faith which they

[22] "Unde bonum et malum in actibus humanis consideratur secundum quod actus concordat rationi informatae lege divina, vel naturaliter, vel per doctrinam, vel per infusionem . . . quod animae malum est praeter rationem esse, corpori praeter naturam." Aquinas, *De JY!alo*, 2, 4.

[23] "Infidelium quidam sunt qui numquam susceperunt fidem, sicut gentiles et ludaei. Et tales nullo modo sunt ad fidem compellendi, ut ipsi credant : quia credere voluntatis est. Sunt tamen compellendi a fidelibus, si facultas adsit, ut fidem non impediant." Aquinas, *ST* II-II, q. 10, a. 8, c.

have already freely professed, the point that the primary act of faith must be an act of will seems clear enough. St. Thomas makes no distinctions in this article about the tolerance of unbelief in a state, though he does speak about it later. This shows that the teaching of Vatican II in this matter was present in germ many centuries before Vatican II. It also demonstrates that the basis for this teaching does not have its origins in twentieth century personalist philosophy. The expression of the teaching in Vatican II may use terms like " personalist norm "; but these terms are founded on all the rich tradition of the natural law about the kind of moral acts which befit someone with a reasoning soul. The teaching is based on the *nature* of the freedom of the will in the act of morals.

It seems equally clear to me that the teaching in the *Syllabus of Errors* is based on the common teaching of St. Thomas about truth in the intellect. The human intellect comes to experience all beings in its manner. The being of the thing it experiences as to its essential constitution is one. Each being expresses truth which corresponds to it. "Truths which are in things are many, as are the entities of things." [24] These truths are in some ways accidental to the human intellect. They would still be things in their essence if no human intellect existed. But they are not inseparable in any sense from the truth which God's intellect communicates to them. They are formed by his one idea in the Word. His Providence governs them. God is the cause of all these things and so their truth is one in Him. The truth is primarily seen as He sees it. His truth is one and there cannot be many conflicting ideas about Him which are all true. His truth is one and every human intellect is bound to know this truth to be moral and to be good insofar as it is able. The measure or standard for any truth is one if that truth is compared to the mind of God which thinks it.[25]

[24] " Veritates autem quae sunt in rebus, sunt plures, sicut et rerum entitates." Aquinas, *De Veritate,* 1, 4.

[25] " Si ergo accipiatur veritas proprie dicta secundum quam omnia principaliter vera sunt, sic omnia sunt vera una veritate, id est veritate intellectus divini." Aquinas, *De Veritate,* 1, 4.

If this unity of truth is applied to things in general it is even more applicable to faith. Faith has as its object the first truth which makes all things one. In faith, one begins to look at the world from God's point of view, wherein the unity of creation, the order of divine Providence, and the actions of human persons become more evident. If there cannot be many truths about things looked at from God's point of view, there certainly cannot be many different conflicting ideas of God which are all true.[26] The truth of religion is such a truth. As to which religion is true, then, there is no question. There is only one.

Further, the teaching of Vatican II has often been used to justify dissent within the church as a sign of "healthy pluralism." This seems strange as the council expressly states the following:

> So while the religious freedom which men demand in fulfilling their obligation to worship God has to do with freedom from coerdon in in civil society, it leaves intact the traditional Catholic teaching on the moral duty of individuals and societies towards the true religion and the one Church of Christ.[27]

Clearly Vatican II did not have any changes in mind regarding the traditional teaching of the church that all are bound in conscience to form a right conscience. The right conscience must pay an obligation to the order of reality. The human person does not create the truth in the order of reality with respect to any moral good, let alone religion. As to the order of truth, the presence of the thing in the mind as the mind assents to the thing in a spiritual way, the equation of the idea and the thing are necessary for truth to be present. Though there can be no such equation with God, God has revealed his inner character both in nature and in revelation. This revelation can only be one. The reflection of the human mind on it can only be of a piece and all human beings are bound in conscience to seek this insofar as they are capable.

26 " Per se obiectum fidei veritas prima est . . . Veritas autem divinae cognitionis hoc modo se habet, quad primo et principaliter est ipsius rei increatae; creaturarum verum quodammodo consequenter, in quantum quidem cognoscendo seipsum omnia alia cognoscit." Aquinas, *De Veritate,* 14, 8.

21 Vatican II, *Dignitatis Humanae,* 1.

As to the freedom of the will in coming to assent to such a thing, the more outside pressures (outside not in the sense of instruction and teaching, but in the sense of violence done to the body or the emotions), the less the act of the will becomes involved in the truth to which the person is assenting. In this sense, the act of faith, or any other act, is more and more removed from the realm of morals. The potential for virtue is reduced in direct proportion to the freedom of the inner act of the will.

After this examination, it is possible to arrive at several conclusions. First, Vatican II made reference to a traditional argument found at least in Thomas Aquinas on the difference between the binding character of the truth and the freedom of the will in morals. Second, this distinction in no way calls into question the traditional basis of the natural law for deciding on human goods. Personalist terms may be used sometimes, but these perfectly reflect the constant philosophical tradition of the church. Third, the *Syllabus of Errors* and *Dignitatis Humanae* are in perfect theoretical accord on the nature of religious freedom. The former emphasizes the intellect as bound to seek the truth, the latter the will in its freedom from every exterior coercion in order to be a natural, human act. The fact that they represent different jurisdictional ideas about the state religion is due only to the application of these principles in various times. Fourth, both teachings have to do with freedom of conscience in the civil order and cannot be used to found the right of Catholics to dissent from the teaching of the church. The only intelligent conclusion is that there is a homogeneous and not a heterogeneous development of doctrine exhibited by the two documents.

RECLAIMING LIBERALISM *

DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN

St. John's University
Jamaica, New York

Through the shift of emphasis from natural duties or obligations to natural rights, the individual, the ego, had become the center and origin of the moral world, since man-as distinguished from man's end-had become that center or origin.

-Leo Strauss

THE CONCEPTION of individuality that lies at the foundation of natural rights classical liberalism has been a target of criticism for some time. This is not news. What is news and what is becoming more apparent to those who examine the issue is that the alternatives Strauss presents in the above quotation are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, as I and my colleague, Douglas J. Den Uyl, have recently observed:

Making the individual the moral center of the universe does not require that one accept nominalism, mechanism, or hedonism, nor does accepting essentialism, teleology, and eudaimonism . . . require rejecting individualism. It is possible for the fulfillment of the individual to be interpreted in terms of the requirements for human well-being. There can be a view of the ego or self that is neither otherwordly nor Hobbesian, but Aristotelian. Further, the achievement of man's natural end need not be interpreted along Platonic lines. There is no such thing as the flourishing of "man." There is only the flourishing of individual men. The human good neither exists apart from the chokes and actions of individual human beings nor independent of the particular " mix " of goods that the individual human being must determine as appropriate for his circumstances.

*This essay is based on a paper presented at a meeting of the American Association for the Philosophic Study of Society, American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division) convention, December 29, 1991 in New York City. This meeting was devoted to David L. Norton's book *Democracy and Moral Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

Strauss's dichotomy betrays a disturbing tendency, often found among proponents of natural right and natural law, to reify the concept " natural end " and make it some good that competes with the good of individual human beings.[1]

David L. Norton in his recent work, *Democracy and Moral Development,* has also noted the nonexclusivity of Strauss's alternatives.

> Conditioned as we are by modernity's conception of the individual, the question of replacing avarice as the thematic motivation in lives of persons is likely to leave us at a loss. What else could possibly serve? The purpose of this book is to propose the eudaimonistic answer, and that answer is love in the meaning of Eros. Thus understood, love is not exclusively or primarily interpersonal; it is first of all the right relationship of each person with himself or herself. The self to which love is in the first instance directed is the ideal self that is aspired to and by which random change is transformed into the directed development we term growth. When the ideal of the individual is rightly chosen, it realizes objective values that subsisted within the individual as innate potentialities, thereby achieving in the individual the self-identity that is termed "integrity" and that constitutes the foundation of other virtues.[2]

Norton desires to reconceptualize the individualism historically associated with classical liberalism so as both to retain the gains of classical liberalism and to overcome its moral minimalism.

According to Norton, the crucial problem with the conception of individuality historically associated with classical liberalism is that it is "non-developmental," or rather, there is only development within a single stage, namely, for self-preservation. There is nothing more. There is no standard of self-perfection by which to distinguish satisfaction of desire from satisfaction of right desire-no way to distinguish Socrates's satisfaction from that of a fool's. Norton thus seeks to replace classical liberalism's non-developmental conception of individuality with a eudaimonistic conception of the individual.

[1] Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, *Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991), pp. 92-93.

[2] *Democracy and Moral Development,* p. 40.

By replacing classical liberalism's conception of individuality with a eudaimonistic one Norton seeks both to overcome modernity's divorce of politics from virtue and to provide classical liberalism with what, according to Norton, it most notably lacks-a normative grounding for individual rights. The primary object of analysis for these comments will be Norton's attempt to justify individual rights by appealing to eudaimonistic individualism.

According to Norton, eudaimonistic moral and political theory holds responsibilities to be logically primitive, and so he conceives of his argument for individual rights as requiring an exchange of a " rights-primitive " conception of the individual for a " responsibilities-primitive " conception. In other words, rights are to be derived from responsibilities. Norton's fundamental argument is as follows: If every person has the basic moral responsibility to discover and progressively actualize his or her innate potential worth, then, by the logic of " ought implies can," persons have a right (a moral entitlement) to what is needed to fulfill their basic moral responsibility.[3] Norton contends that this argument will generate rights that are (1) not inherently adversarial or competitive, (2) both positive and negative, and (3) circumscribed by responsibilities.

Norton holds that in order for the "ought" of self-actualization to be attributable to individuals, it must be the case that they can actualize their potential worth. Yet " can " has both a conditional and unconditional sense. The unconditional " can " refers to what is possible for a person *qua* person, the conditional " can " refers to what is possible for a person in certain circumstances. Norton argues that the effect of this distinction is that, even though a person may be blocked by circumstances from doing what self-actualization requires, there remains an abstract moral obligation for a person to struggle against these obstacles. A person's liability for failing to fulfill his basic moral responsibility

[3] This argument is in some respects similar to Henry Veatch's in *Human Rights: Fact or Fancy?* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), pp. 160-167. Also, see Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Patrick Steinbauer's critical review, "A New Defense of Natural Rights," *Humane Studies Review 413* (Summer 1987), pp. 3-6.

may be proportionally diminished by circumstances, but his basic moral responsibility is not absolved. Thus, when it comes to the things that are needed for self-actualization, but which cannot be self-provided and can come from others, the moral responsibility on the part of others to provide these necessary conditions also remains. Norton states : " By the ubiquity of the abstract and unconditional 'ought' ... , it is the first responsibility of any society to provide such conditions for all persons." [4]

Norton divides basic rights into two classes: (1) rights that can be self-provided, which are essentially to things and not against persons, and require only a protective perimeter of " negative rights"; and (2) rights that cannot be self-provided, which are essentially claims to the positive performances of others, and thus are " positive " rights. According to Norton, one has a right to what one needs and can use in one's primary moral work of actualizing one's innate potential worth.

What are we to make of Norton's argument? His argument seems to have the following structure. Suppose that in order for Smith to actualize his innate potential worth he must perform action M. This yields the premise :

(1) Smith ought to do M.

This is an obligation that Smith owes to himself. According to the " ought implies can " principle,

(2) If Smith ought to do M, then Smith can do M.

Therefore, it follows that

(3) Smith can do M.

Now, suppose that Jones (who has the ability to do otherwise) coercively interferes with Smith's attempt to self-actualize and prevents Smith from doing M, or suppose that Jones (who has the means) fails to provide Smith with the means by which Smith might overcome obstacles that prevent him from doing M in a particular situation, then

(4) Jones brings it about that it is not the case that Smith can do M.

Ignoring how it could be correct to say that Jones can, by failing

[4] *Democracy and Moral Development,* p. 111.

to do something, cause Smith's inability to do something, it is clear that even if Norton's argument has established (4), it has yet to establish that

(5) Nobody ought to bring it about that another person cannot perform his self-actualizing actions.

It is certainly true that Smith has the obligation either to do M or take actions to overcome any obstacles that prevent him from doing M, but this is a far cry from establishing any obligation on the part of others not to prevent Smith from doing M, let alone provide Smith with the means by which he might do M. What other premises are there to Norton's argument that might provide (5) with a justification?

Norton claims that (6) eudaimonia is an objective value. It is not imputed, but recognized. In response to Socrates's question to Euthyphro, it is something which is desired because it *is* good. Norton claims that since eudaimonia is of objective worth, it is valuable not only to the individual who actualizes it but to everyone else who can recognize it. Thus, it is "on the premise of innate potential worth in all persons, which is at the same time responsibility for actualizing this worth " [5] that we impute responsibilities to persons unknown to us and affirm the basic dignity of all persons. An individual's rights are derived from responsibilities. Norton seems, then, to be claiming that since eudaimonia is of objective worth, then Smith's actualization of his innate potential worth is of value to Jones and vice versa. And if this is so, then everyone has a responsibility for actualizing this worth, regardless of whose worth it is.

There are three problems with this reasoning, however. First, it may be true that eudaimonia is an objective value, but it does not follow from this that its worth is the same for all individuals. Eudaimonia could be an agent-relative [6] value such that the

s Ibid., p. 110.

6 We may say that the eudaimouia of any person, P_1, is agent-relative if that state of affairs S_1 which constitutes the fulfillment of P_1 is relative to P_1; and this is the case if and only if S_1's distinctive presence in world W_1 is a basis for P_1 ranking W_1 over W_2 even though S_1 may not be a basis for any other 2gent ranking W_1 over \V".

weighting that is given by person P1 to his achievement of eudaimonia, Ei, is greater than what P1 gives to Pz's achievement of eudaimonia, *Ez.* In other words, it is perfectly consistent for eudaimonia to be an objective value and yet so essentially related to persons that Ei gives P1 the primary moral responsibility of achieving Ei without implying any such responsibility for P1 achieving E2.

Second, for everyone to recognize the objective worth of eudaimonia does not mean that one person's achievement of eudaimonia is the same as another's. As Henry Veatch has observed:

> If the good of X is indeed but the actuality of X's potentialities, then this is a fact that not just X needs to recognize, but anyone and everyone else as well. And yet given the mere fact that a certain good needs to be recognized, and recognized universally, to be the good of X, it by no means follows that X's good must be taken to be Y's good as well, any more than the actuality or perfection or fulfillment of X needs to be recognized as being the actuality or perfection or fulfillment of Y as well.[7]

Eudaimonia is not something abstract any more than our humanity is some amorphous, undifferentiated universal. Eudaimonia is to be found in the completion of our individual potentials.

Third, universalization of the claim "One ought to actualize his innate potential worth" does not justify (5). It can be true that if actualizing P1's innate potential worth is a basis or reason for P1 taking a certain action, then P2 actualizing his innate potential worth is also a reason for P2 taking a certain action, but this does not show either that P1's innate potential worth is P2's or that P1 has any reason to assist, or even not interfere with, P2's attaining his innate potential worth. Thus, it does not seem that

[1] Henry B. Veatch, "Ethical Egoism, New Style: Should Its Trademark Be Libertarian Or Aristotelian ?," *Swimming Against the Current in Contemporary Philosophy* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990), p. 194.

Norton can find a justification for (5) by simply appealing to the objective character of eudaimonia. [8]

Is there any other premise to which Norton appeals? Norton also holds that eudaimonism rejects the idea that a human being is an isolated atom and holds *(7)* that human beings are inherently social beings. Maybe this premise will allow Norton to justify (5). It depends on the plausibility of what Norton takes the inherent sociality of human beings to mean or imply. To say that we as human beings are inherently social certainly means that our natural origin is within society, not some state of nature, and that each of us needs to associate and cooperate with others in order to fulfill our individual innate potential worth, but to say this is neither to affirm nor to imply (S). The fact that human beings are naturally social does not establish that there are individual rights or even interpersonal duties; rather, it creates the necessity for attempting to determine what the basic principles of human social, political, and legal life should be. How can the individual innate potential worth of each and every person be achieved in a manner consistent with the inherent sociality of persons? Something stronger than *(7)* is needed to answer this question.

Norton links *(7)* with a claim about the "common good" of a society. Eudaimonism holds (8) that "the common good is no more and no less than the particular goods of individuals *in complementary interrelationship."* [9] Norton claims that the complementary interrelationship of goods

> is implicit in the fact that the good that is to be actualized, conserved, and defended-the good that represents the individual's achieved identity-is an objective good, that is, it is of value to others no less than to the individual who actualizes it. Because this is so, no life can be said to be fulfilled whose worth is not recognized and utilized by (some) other persons in their own self-actualizing enterprises. Correspondingly every well-lived life must utilize values produced by

s It is not true that unless X or X-ing is good for everyone, then it cannot be good for anyone.

e *Democracy and Moral Development,* p. 124.

(some) other well-lived lives. And this is to say that within a society, every person has a legitimate interest in the essential personhood of every other.[10]

The move from " some other " to " every other " in the above quotation is legitimated, Norton claims, by the fact that those who produce the values upon which you or I rely have need of values which are produced by others, who in turn have need of values produced by others, and so on. This forms the basis for a community of true individuals.

While it is certainly true that the actualization of a person's innate potential worth is caught up in various kinds of relationships with other persons, there are still some problems with this argument. The fact that a significant number of a person's potentialities are other-oriented in nature does not show either (a) that the actualization of P2's potential is or should be of the same worth to P1 as the actualization of his own potential or (b) that the fulfillment of P1's potential cannot be achieved without the fulfillment of every other person's potential. Surely, there are *some* other persons whose well-being is intimately tied up in my own, and maybe an empirical case can be made that shows how in certain circumstances my well-being and that of every other person amount to the same thing. Yet this is not something that flows from the very nature of eudaimonia. It is not something known a priori. To use Norton's very words, "a duty to self *can* be at the same time a duty to others," [11] but this does not suffice to establish that every person's well-being requires an interest and concern in the well-being of every other person. Nor does it establish (5).

Before ending these comments I cannot help but observe that Norton's argument-though certainly powerful and moving in many ways-seems disconnected. Norton states very early in *Democracy and Moral Development* that eudaimonia is an inclusive end and that according to this interpretation it is open-ended, that is, it allows for "a multiplicity of kinds of self-actual-

[10] Ibid., p. 124.
[11] Ibid., p. 119 (my emphasis).

izing lives directed toward a multiplicity of ends." [12] But if this is true, then eudaimonism, though an objective good, is also an individualized and agent-relative good, and it is only in terms of abstract principles that we can speak of e.udaimonia being the same thing for different people.[18] It is not concretely the same thing for any Smith and Jones.[14] However, it does not seem that Norton recognizes the implications of this position for his evaluation of the economic decisions of people in the classical liberal society. Norton speaks of people being distracted from actualizing their innate potential worth by possessions that possess them and holds that no one has a right to more of a good than he or she can utilize. He speaks, for example, of people owning sports cars they cannot utilize or whose utilization takes them away from their life course. But, given Norton's view of eudaimonism, can such criticism be made from his philosophical armchair?

While misuse of goods by an individual is certainly a real possibility, this is not something that can be determined from a mere abstract consideration of eudaimonia. If eudaimonia is truly individualized, then it achieves determinate from, i.e., becomes something real, only in light of needs and circumstances that are unique to the individual. In other words, there are individuative features which are neither included nor implied by an abstract

12 Ibid., p. 6.

18 Consider the following statement by J. L. AckriU: "Aristotle may be criticized for assuming that there is an answer to the question 'what is the best life for man?'-as opposed to the question 'what is the best life for *this* man or *that* man?' He certainly does think that the nature of man-the powers and needs all men have--<letermines the character that any satisfying human life must have. But since his account of the nature of man is in general terms, the corresponding specification of the best life for man is also general. So while his assumption puts some limits on the possible answer to the question 'how shall I live?,' it leaves considerable scope for a discussion which takes account of my individual tastes, capacities, and circumstances." *Aristotle's Ethics* (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), pp. 19-20.

14 Showing that eudaimonia is not some kind of Platonic *eidos* or Aristotelian generic form was one of the central points of Norton's earlier book, *Personal Destinies: The Philosophy of Ethical Individualism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

account of human well-being that determine the proper weighting, valuation, pattern or balance of basic human goods for a person. There is no preset weight or pattern that everyone should have in order to self-actualize. Thus, when it comes to determining just what eudaimonia concretely amounts to for a person in certain circumstances, there is a central role for practical reason. The intellectual virtue of prudence [15] is absolutely crucial. But practical reason only occurs when the individual himself confronts the contingent and particular facts of his concrete situation and determines at the time of action what is in that situation truly good for him. It is not something that Platonic Rulers or Norton can divine by some *inspectio mentis* procedure.

The individualized character of eudaimonia also has important implications for how the relationship between ethics and politics is conceptualized. Thus, when it comes to rejecting modernity's divorce of politics from virtue, Norton should be more cautious. Eudaimonism demands that severing *any* connection between politics and ethics be rejected, but this does not require that ethics and politics be identified or have the same function. Neither does it require that " rights " be reducible without remainder to other moral concepts such as " responsibility," "duty," or even "justice." [16] Rather, "rights" may be an ethical concept that is not directly concerned with achieving self-perfection of individuals but instead with providing moral guidance in the creation and interpretation of a political/legal context for social life.

Indeed, given Norton's acceptance of an inclusive end interpretation of eudaimonia and dismissal of the idea that eudaimonia requires a convergence toward a single form of life as objectively the best, there is an important point to modernity's refusal to collapse politics into ethics and its emphasis upon "rights." Since pluralism and diversity necessarily characterize the actualization by individuals of their innate potential worth and since an indi-

[15] See Douglas J. Den Uyl, *The Virtite of Prudence* (New York: Peter Lang, 1991).

[16] Nor does eudaimonia require that we assume that the goods of all individuals ideally exist in some complementary interrelationship.

vidual's worth can only be achieved with and among others, the ethical principles employed to establish a political/legal context for social life need to have a different function from those ethical principles (e.g., the virtues) which guide individuals in seeking self-perfection. The ethical principles [17] employed by politics need to provide a standard for interpersonal conduct that favors no particular form of self-perfection and at the same time provides a context for diverse forms of self-perfection to be achieved. They must allow for the compossible pursuit of self-perfection by each and every individual in society. Hence, politics should employ only those principles which, despite the diversity, deal with that which is common to all acts of self-perfection and peculiar to each.[18]

It is at this point that the profound moral significance of a liberal polity whose aim is not the creation of virtuous citizenry but the protection of their equal negative liberty suggests itself. The ethical principles a liberal polity employs (such as the natural right to equal negative liberty) in creating a political/legal context for social life in which a citizen's self-direction or autonomy is protected may indeed be the proper political expression of an ·eudaimonistic reclamation of liberalism. Though such a polity would not guarantee that its citizens will be self-directed, much less conduct their lives in self-perfecting ways, it would, through a legal system dedicated to the protection of equal negative liberty, protect the possibility of their self-direction, and **in** this way provide a connection [19] between ethics and politics. Examining this suggestion is, of course, a complicated task.

11 Since the ethical principles employed by politics are used to create a political/legal context in which people might go about the task of using normative principles (e.g., the virtues) to achieve self-perfection, the ethical principles employed by politics could be called "metanormative " principles. See *Liberty and Nature,* pp. 96-115.

18 These principles must, in other words, be based on something in which each and every person, in the concrete situation, has a necessary stake.

19 Norton does discuss the concept of " self-direction," but he seems *to* confuse it with "self-perfection." For an account of the crucial importance and centrality of self-direction *to* an inclusivist conception of eudaimonia, see *Liberty and Nature,* pp. 70-75 and pp. 92-96. Also, see *The Virtue of Prudence,* pp. 181-186.

THE START OF METAPHYSICS*

THEODORE J. KONDOLEON

Villanova University
Villanova, Pennsylvania

IN HIS RECENTLY published book, John F. X. Knasas seeks to answer this twofold inter-related question: What, according to Saint Thomas's expressed teaching, is the subject of metaphysics and how does the human mind proceed to attain it for the purpose of study? While he acknowledges a debt to Joseph Owens for certain of his basic positions, Knasas will claim that the book's argument is original in the way in which it opposes what he takes as realistically the subject of metaphysics at its initial stage (or with the only understanding of being-ens-metaphysics requires to begin) to what will become this science's subject at its later, more mature stage. Moreover, although he *may* contradict himself on this point, he will reject, as Saint Thomas's view, the position that a *physical* demonstration can establish the existence of immaterial being, be it God or angels. He will also argue at some length what he evidently considers a crucial epistemic procedure for the start of metaphysics, viz., that a series of judgments relating individuals back to their acts of existence (from whence they were originally abstracted) is required for the "judgmentally constituted multitude" from which the mind attains common being. Finally, since he will insist that abstraction must be controlled by the data, he will allow no room in Thomistic metaphysics for a beginning *metaphysical intuition* in which being is seen as not necessarily linked to matter and motion, nor for an *a priori* approach to its subject which would start

*John F. X. Knasas, *The Preface to Metaphysics: A Contribution to the Neo-Thomist Debate on the Start of Metaphysics.* New York: Peter Lang, 1990. Pp. 193.

from the nature of the knowing subject, viz., the human intellect, as open *to and* directed toward infinite being and intelligibility. In what follows I will discuss (and critically assess) each of these features of this book as well as address myself briefly *to* certain things the author has *to* say about the Thomistic " five ways."

In the first three chapters Knasas is primarily concerned with showing that metaphysics cannot begin with a notion of being understood in the sense of *ens commune.* This sense of the notion traditionally includes both material *and* immaterial being. However, he argues, since (according to his reading of Aquinas) only metaphysics can demonstrate the existence of immaterial being, its subject cannot, at least at its outset, encompass such being, not even as something *conceivable.* He therefore opposes the view of Neo-Thomists who, basing themselve? on the now famous and frequently cited text from Saint Thomas's *Expositio* on Boethius's *De Trinitate* (Question 5, article 3), insist that metaphysics begins with the recognition that being is something *separate* from matter and motion (and not merely so in the mind's consideration by abstraction). This separation is understood in the so-called negative judgment of separation: " it is not of the nature of being to be in matter and motion (even though it is sometimes found therein)."

On this point Knasas finds fault with " Natural Philosophy" Thomists, among whom he includes the Dominicans L.-B. Geiger (although this writer is barely mentioned and only in a footnote discussion) and James Weisheipl, both of whom have argued that the subject of metaphysics presupposes a demonstration from *natural philosophy* that immaterial, unchanging being exists (otherwise, they maintain, the separation of which Saint Thomas speaks in the *De Trinitate* Commentary would have no *fundamentum in re).* Again, his main argument with these Thomists is that no textual justification can be found for their view-indeed there is counter-textual evidence against it-that physical philosophy proves the existence of immaterial being *and* that, in the eyes of Aquinas, metaphysics awaits such a demonstration in order to begin. He equally rejects the position, one which he at-

tributes above all to Maritain, that, prior to any argument that would establish the actual existence of God, being can be understood-and this thanks to an existential judgment in which existence is restored to the essence (for, in the act of simple apprehension, the essence has been considered in *abstraction* from existence) and the mind's focal point becomes the very act of to be of things-as something not necessarily in matter and motion. In this view, *being* is recognized from the outset as a *transcendental* notion applicable, in an analogous manner, to all that *is* or *can* be and as conceivably transcending the material and changing order. Knasas disavows such a beginning for Thomistic metaphysics since he thinks it unwarranted by anything given to the intellect in direct and immediate human experience.

Finally, and in a similar empirical vein, he opposes Transcendental Thomism (here he singles out particular texts from Marechal's *Cahier* V but also cites a few from Rahner's works) and argues, not without textual support, that Thomistic metaphysics acknowledges no form of innate knowledge nor any initial *subjective* approach to philosophical knowledge of God based on the immateriality of the human intellect and its consequent natural tendency to infinite being and intelligibility. Knasas, it should be noted, is fully aware that all these Thomists claim some textual support for their views and see them to be in some way *secundum mentem Thomae;* thus his dispute with them is, in part, on textual grounds, he either interpreting the texts differently or else arguing that they are insufficiently conclusive to establish his adversaries' positions.

For his part, Knasas would substitute for *ens commun:e* (understood as including immaterial as well as material being) *habens esse* (a "haver of existence") as the initial subject of Thomistic metaphysics. Clearly one has ready access to this subject from the beings of his direct and immediate experience, without having to wait upon a prior demonstration of the existence of immaterial being. Moreover, this position, Knasas also points out, avoids the circularity involved in offering a metaphysical argument for the existence of separate (i.e., immaterial) being and/ or the textually unwarranted (if not questionable) view that

a physical argument can establish its existence. Knasas finds textual support for his view in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 44, a. 2, where Saint Thomas, tracing the development of ancient Greek philosophy, notes its final arrival at a consideration of being simply as being *(ens inquantum est ens)* and the subsequent inquiry into the cause of universal being. From this text, Knasas argues, it can be inferred that metaphysics need only begin with material beings *qua* being as its subject or with the general notion of *habens esse* (where the haver of existence is material substance) and then proceed from there to the First Cause of being (viz., God). (In light of the importance of this text to Knasas' s argument as to what constitutes the starting subject of Thomistic metaphysics, it is somewhat surprising that he fails to quote it, either in Latin or in English, but seems content merely to paraphrase it.) Knasas also contends that the notion of *habens esse*, as the initial subject of metaphysics, implies existential judgments which regard two components in material beings, viz., essence and existence. Incidentally, he does credit Maritain with drawing attention to the *existence* element in the notion of being and in insisting that it is something given in a judgment of existence.

In Chapter Five (" *Ens Commune")* Knasas argues that once the existence of immaterial being is established, *habens esse* then becomes recognized as a commonality which need not be confined to bodies. In other words, it becomes equated with the traditional subject of metaphysics, *ens commune.* Yet he also maintains here, as well as earlier in Chapter One, that *ens commune* is a commonality whose notion includes the (presumably real) composition of essence and existence in the beings encompassed within its range. Consequently, as he had noted in Chapter Four (p. 53), " God cannot fall under *ens"* and therefore, by implication, cannot be part of the subject of metaphysics: indeed, according to Knasas, He stands outside this subject as its cause. Yet, it should be noted, earlier in the same chapter, on page 48, in expositing Thomas's teaching on naming God, Knasas had also observed that names free of materiality, e.g. *ens,* are properly said of God. (Whether his later statement in this

chapter represents a contradiction on his part or simply reflects what, for him, is an ambiguity in Saint Thomas's teaching on this matter, this reviewer has no way of knowing, but it is seemingly the latter.) In any event, he goes on to say that the notion of *ens* must be subtracted so that the subject (or haver) of existence is removed and only *esse* remains; it is this notion, viz., *esse commune,* which analogously applies to God. (Whether this is a textually justified position or not is a question to which I shall return later.)

But to come to what this reviewer found to be the most perplexing part of the book's entire discussion, it is Knasas's account (in Chapters Four and Six) of how the mind is to attain the commonality *habens esse* as the initial subject of Thomistic metaphysics. Again, it should be noted that, for Knasas, this notion takes cognizance of the (presumably real) composition of essence and existence in material beings. Let me attempt to summarize here, accurately I hope, the series of steps he sees to be involved in this procedure. Perhaps the first that should be noted is the consideration of the class essence in abstraction from existence, the consideration of which Aquinas speaks in several places in his early work *On Being and Essence.* However, to be assured that this abstraction is distinct from the abstraction of the essence from designated matter and thereby avoid a " redundancy problem," one must first abstract the *individual* from its real existence. Now in order to do *this* one must also recognize that the individual has two existences : one a *real* existence and the other a *cognitional* one (the reader is only told, in the later account in Chapter Six, that this cognitional existence is in the order of *sense* knowledge). What is common here, viz., the individual, can now be considered apart from both modes of existence and thus be regarded as "existentially neutral." After a number of such considerations (i.e., of individuals apart from their real and cognitional existences), one can proceed to abstract the specific essence from existence with the understanding that this abstraction is not the same as its abstraction from designated matter. Then, in the " fly-back activity " of judgment, one's intellect composes the specific essence with some individual and ultimate-

ly composes the individual with its real *esse* (of which the intellect now attains a " distinct perception "). Thus the object of the judgment act is ultimately " a particular *habens esse."* Finally, from "a judgmentally constituted multiplicity" one's intellect again abstracts to attain the commonality, and the analogous notion, *ens,* in the *habens esse* sense.

In Chapter Six, Knasas also develops an argument for God's existence which claims to follow Aquinas's thought in Chapter Four of On: *Being and Essence.* The argument is presented in seven steps, one of which acknowledges that *esse* is something " accidental " to the haver of existence, which, in this case, is the essence or substance of a material being. One would think that the distinction in question must be recognized as a *real,* not merely as a conceptual distinction, if it is to support an argument for God's existence which entails the premise that if existence is something extrinsic to the essence of a being then it must be something caused either by the intrinsic principles of the essence or by an extrinsic cause. Yet Knasas argues in a footnote discussion (p. 51, n. 41) that" it is not clear whether the distinction is just conceptual or also real" and concludes " In my opinion, the *De ente* text does not presuppose the real distinction." (It is obvious that in this matter Knasas is following Owens; it is just as obvious, at least to this reviewer, that if *esse* is regarded, as it is in this text, as something extrinsic to the essence and as something caused either by the essential principles or by an extrinsic cause, then *esse* is being understood here as something really distinct from the essence.) From the fact that *esse* is recognized as something accidental to the essence and as something that cannot be caused by its intrinsic principles, Knasas argues (following the text), then it can be inferred that it must be extrinsically caused, ultimately by the being whose essence is to exist, viz., God.

Finally, in Chapter Seven Knasas offers his own rendition of Aquinas's *quinque viae.* Here he is concerned to bring out the " existential " dimension of these arguments, something he says Aquinas neglects to do. However, that he sees the Fourth Way as giving evidence of this neglect is certainly not indicated by his

own presentation of it (indeed, it bespeaks just the opposite). Yet the most "eccentric" part of this discussion concerns Knasas's interpretation of the argument from motion (in the words of Aquinas, "the most obvious way" viz., the *prima via).* Evidently following Gilson and Owens, he interprets it not as a *physical* argument, i.e., as an argument from *motion,* but as a *metaphysical* one, i.e., as an argument from the *existence* of motion. Indeed, in Knasas' s interpretation, the argument becomes an argument from *participation.* In his own words, "it seems clear that the cause of the motion's existence can only be a thing whose nature is existence . . . The unmoved mover causes motion by causing the *esse* of the particular nature that is motion" (p. 158). Thus motion is given a particular nature and an *esse* befitting that nature, thereby seemingly becoming a participated being. This interpretation would appear to be in opposition to Saint Thomas's view that motion is something incomplete and, consequently, not something that participates *esse* (since what has existence is in some way something complete or actual).

There are numerous other things which this reviewer finds objectionable in this book; however, it would be impossible as well as inappropriate to consider them all here. But to mention briefly just some of them, there would seem to be no textual justification for Knasas's assertion (on pp. 105 and 109) that Aquinas represents God by the analogous notion of *esse commune.* "Being," as a name said of God, is usually expressed by Aquinas by the Latin noun *ens.* (In other words, names said of God must signify something subsisting.) There is also the perplexing, if not unduly complicated, procedure that Knasas would have us engage in to attain the metaphysical notion of being. Furthermore, that it involves judgment acts in which the mind attains a "distinct perception" of particular individuals' acts of to be reflects, I believe, a misunderstanding of Saint Thomas's epistemology. Knowledge that our intellectual notion of being represents the individual being is only reflex and indirect via a conversion to the phantasm. It should also be noted in this connection that the analogous character of the notion of being is best seen when the notion is predicated of the various *classes* of

being, and of finite and infinite being. (This observation similarly applies to the gradation or hierarchy in being, where the gradation, on the finite level, is considered in terms of the degree of limitation the class essence places upon the existing beings in the class.) Knasas, perhaps following Gilson and Owens here, neglects to bring out this noetic point due to his emphasis on individual being as the ultimate form of reality. Moreover, his phraseology (a phraseology which he repeats several times) " a judgmentally constituted multiplicity" suggests a subjectivistic idealistic epistemology that he would doubtlessly wish to avoid in any form. Perhaps what he intends to say here is "a judgmentally known constituted multiplicity."

Two final objections, if I may. In the context of his argument with "Natural Philosophy" Thomists, Knasas (p. 36) that he finds no textual evidence that Aquinas gives natural philosophy an ability to prove separate substance. This statement seems, at least to this reviewer, to be contradicted by the thoroughly Aristotelian character of Aquinas's argument in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, Chapter 13, for an Unmoved Mover (whom he will identify as God). According to Knasas' s interpretation of this text (p. 53) the "natural philosophy" part of the argument only argues for an immobile part of an immobile (sic.) self-movement. However, he goes on to say that Aquinas "by a posterior argument at *Summa Theologiae* I, 70, 3, ... argues that this soul is best construed as a separate substance." (But perhaps this latter argument is also "metaphysical" since its conclusion is an *intellectual substance* as mover!) Again, it seems incorrect to say that separate substances are " metaphysically reached " insofar as they are (actually or *possibly)* the causes of the *esse* of generable things by causing (as universal causes) their substantial forms through their motion of the heavenly spheres (see p. 112). For Saint Thomas, angelic beings are not " metaphysically reached " by any *a posteriori* argument having to do with motion or change; the arguments he presents for their existence are *truly* metaphysical in character and involve the notion of the completion of the finite hierarchy and/or the notion of perfection. (On this matter see his Disputed Question

De Spiritualibus Creaturis, article 5; see also *Summa contra Gentiles,* Book II, ch. 46.)

My last objection concerns Knasas's representation of the position espoused by Transcendental Thomists. I find it less than fair and accurate. For example, his observation " Echoing *separatio* Thomists, Transcendental Thomists grasp *esse* in judgment. Yet *esse* is now divine *esse* and judgment is an *a priori* dynamism to that term" (p. 47). This statement *could* leave one with the impression that Transcendental Thomists are ontologists. Again, Knasas seems to pass over, conveniently for his purpose here, a text in which Aquinas acknowledges the active, causal role of the agent intellect, i.e., of its dematerializing *and* unifying function so far as its product, the intelligible object, is concerned. I refer to *Summa Theologiae I,* Question 84, article 1. In this text, one widely known to Thomists, Thomas, partly in sympathy with Plato, points out that the intellect knows in an absolute (i.e., simple or unified), immaterial, and unchanging way what exists in reality in a manifold, material and changing way (for what exists in the knower exists there according to the mode of the knower). Thus Knasas's statement on page 64 "In contrast Aquinas presents the intellect simply as a condition for knowledge ... the intellect never has a constitutive function ... the nature of a cognitive power merely determines the range of what is known, not how it is known," is mistaken on two scores. As we have seen, the intellect, according to Thomas's teaching, does determine how a thing is known, viz., in an absolute, or immaterial and unchanging way. Moreover, the intellect is not simply a *condition* of knowledge, or a necessary condition of knowledge (p. 61). The agent intellect is also a *cause* of knowledge, as Knasas implicitly acknowledges elsewhere in this discuss10n.

In conclusion let me say that Knasas's book is bound to be a controversial one (as this reviewer's discussion of it has already shown). While his effort to show that Thomistic metaphysics emphasizes existence is indeed commendable, I believe it misfires because of certain excesses in his interpretation of this most important aspect of Saint Thomas's thought. This may be seen in

his " existential " reading of the *prima via* and in the epistemic claim about direct intellectual knowledge of a particular **indi-**vidual's act of to be. And, on the other side of the coin, even though this book at its outset and in its middle chapters does acknowledge that the commonality *habens esse* takes cognizance of two components in material beings, viz., essence and existence, one is not quite certain, in light of his interpretation of Aquinas's argument in *De ente,* Chapter Four, whether this composition is acknowledged, all along, to be a composition of two really distinct principles. Finally, to close on a non-controversial point, I noted just two typographical errors: on page 98 " substracting" appears for the word "subtracting"; and on page 138 "cogition" appears instead of "cognition."

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE FATHER: A COMMENT

PETER C. PHAN

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

ROBERT WARNER, in his article" Rahner on the Unoriginate Father," * critically investigates Karl Rahner's interpretation of the New Testament usage of *ho theos* as God the Father and his proposal to identify God the Father as the unoriginate. In this brief note I would like to respond to his criticisms and propose some further issues for reflection on Rahner's trinitarian theology.

I. *Rahner's Thesis*

Rahner's position can be summarized as follows:

(**1**) The New Testament uses the word *ho theos* not only to indicate (" stand for " or " refer to " = *supponere)* but also to signify or mean (*significare)* God the Father. In other words, "God" in the New Testament does not mean "divine nature" (*divinitas* or *deitas)* but the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the concrete person who possesses unoriginately the divine nature and communicates it to the Son by eternal generation and to the Spirit by active spiration. According to Christian revelation, then, " God " is the *fons trinitatis.* The Son and the Spirit are " God " only insofar as they receive their " nature " from the act of self-communication of the Father.

(2) God the Father, insofar as he is God not by receiving the divine nature from anyone but is himself the source of divinity, is properly called the unoriginate.

**The Thomist,* 55, 4, October, 1991, pp. 569-593.

(3) This unoriginateness of the Father is known only by revelation (" concrete unoriginateness "). Philosophy can know only divine uncreatedness or aseity (God as *agenetos,* not as *agennetos).* However, since there is only one God and since this one God is the Father, *what* philosophers know, in *Christian* perpective, is this God the unoriginate, even though they do not know God *as* the unoriginate, that is, as the Father of Jesus Christ and Spirator of the Spirit. Philosophers know, in Rahner's terminology, "total unoriginateness."

(4) There are then two central claims: (a) " God " means the Father; (b) the "Father " means the unoriginate-who-communicates-himself-to-the-Son-and-the-Spirit. It is of paramount importance to remember that when Rahner speaks of the Father as the unoriginate, he never separates him from his relationships to the Son and the Spirit. As a matter of fact it is precisely in *these* relationships in the history of salvation that we know the Father as the unoriginate.

II. *Warner's Critique*

Warner's criticisms of Rahner's understanding of the Father as the unoriginate are as follows:

(1) Rahner is guilty of contradiction in maintaining that x (the first Trinitarian hypostasis) is both absolutely and relatively unoriginate.

(2) There is another self-contradiction: unoriginateness means, by definition, incommunicable. How then can the Father who is identified with the unoriginate communicate himself?

(3) A third contradiction: if the act of self-communication of the unoriginate is free, then the unoriginate is free to be Father or not, free to be a trinity or not; if it is necessary, then the unoriginate is rationally deducible and hence philosophically knowable. Either option is liable to the charge of heresy.

(4) Rahner' s notion of the Father as the unoriginate suggests that there is an abyss lying behind the Father. Rahner's identification of the Christian notion of the unoriginate in trinitarian theology with the philosophical notion of the abyss does not allow

him to attach any concrete determination (such as Fatherhood) to his concept of God.

III. *Rejoinder*

I would like to examine each of Warner's objections in turn.

(1) Rahner does not assert that the same x (the first trinitarian person) is both absolutely and relatively unoriginate at the same time. Rather what is affirmed is that Christians know God as the concrete unoriginate and that philosophers know the same God but not *as* the concrete unoriginate but *as* the total unoriginate. There is no contradiction in saying that the same thing is known in two different ways. For Rahner there is no other God than the Father of Jesus Christ and the Spirator of the Spirit, so that if philosophers know God (and Rahner maintains they do), then they know the God whom Christians profess, though not *as* Christians profess him. In reality, then, there is only concrete unoriginateness which is constituted by the Father's self-communication to his Son and his Spirit. Note that total unoriginateness is not aseity but concrete unoriginateness known *implicitly*. Hence total unoriginateness and concrete unoriginateness (or unoriginateness and Fatherhood) do not " move in opposite directions," as Warner alleges (p. 587), rather the former is the implicitly known form of the latter.

(2) It is true that the notion of self-communication plays a pivotal role in Rahner's theology. But it is false to say that " unoriginatedness is, by definition, incommunicable " or that " it represents that in God which cannot be transmitted and the permanent logical bar to the very possibility of a complete self-communication " (pp. 587-588). First of all, it is simply not true that what is unoriginated is ipso facto incommunicable. Not being originated (a passive state) does not of itself preclude communication of oneself (an activity in another respect).

But this is perhaps not what Warner means to say. Rather he takes self-communication of the unoriginate (or Father) to mean communication *of* the unoriginateness (or fatherhood) to another, and hence he sees a logical contradiction in maintaining unoriginateness and self-communication simultaneously. But, of

course, that is not what Rahner (nor Christian theology in general) intends with the notion of the self-communication of God. When we say that the Father gives himself to the Son, we do not mean that the Father gives his fatherhood to the Son. Rather we mean that what the Father gives his Son is not something other than what he is but his very being divine insofar as he is *fans divinitatis.* Similarly, when we say that the Father (or the unoriginate) gives himself to us in history in self-communication, we do not mean that he gives us his fatherhood (or unoriginateness), but that he gives nothing other than himself by giving us his Son and his Spirit in whose model (the Son) and by whose power (the Spirit) we can call God our Father.

That Rahner insists on the " distance and inaccessibility " of the Father who " remains the incomprehensible " in his self-communication, as Warner correctly points out (p. 588), is to be attributed to his conviction that the Father *qua* Father cannot be sent because he is the unoriginate, as Thomas Aquinas himself argues *(ST,* I, q. 43, a. 4). But this does not mean that the Father is somehow not really and truly present to us so that " God's transcendence competes with God's capacity for fellowship," as Warner puts it (p. 588). The Father is *himself* present and given to us " mediately " in and through his Son and his Spirit. In this way grace is always trinitarian in nature.

(3) Warner's third objection claims that Rahner's attempt to make a transition from the economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity in his trinitarian theology suffers from a logical inconsistency insofar as it affirms that the act of God's self-communication is both free and necessary. Or, as Warner puts it, it is a " necessary accident," an obvious oxymoron (p. 590). There is no doubt that for Rahner God's act of self-communication is free, and therefore cannot be deduced from the concept of God as the unoriginate or Father.

But in what sense can it be said to be necessary? Only in the sense that *if* God wants freely to communicate himself to us, he can only communicate himself as triune, because that is what God is if what he communicates is *himself,* in his Word and Spirit, which is the only way humans can receive him. What is neces-

sary is not the act of self-communication (which remains a free, undeducible historical fact), but its structure, which Rahner derives by way of "transcendental deduction," as opposed to *a priori* deduction and a mere *a posteriori* induction from facts.

Does this necessary trinitarian structure of divine revelation mean that philosophy can grasp, as Warner claims (p. 590), the revealed God as triune? Not at all, because it is only in faith that one can grasp the triune God. Warner assumes that everything that is necessary is ipso facto available to reason. But that is not the case. It is quite possible that something necessary becomes clear to reason only after it is revealed, and then not even by *rationes necessariae,* but only by *rationes con'Venientiae.* The necessary trinitarian structure of divine self-communication derives from the *necessary* relations in God, even though such necessary relations are known to us only by God's self-manifestation. Indeed, according to Catholic dogma, these trinitarian relations, though necessary in themselves, will remain forever a mystery to the human mind.

(4) Finally, Warner suggests that behind Rahner's trinitarian concept of the unoriginate lurks the philosophical concept of the abyss with which the unoriginate is identified. In footnote 60, he mentioned Schelling's romantic idealism as a possible source for Rahner's speculation and adds, cryptically, that Rahner's-trinitarian theology amounts to a " trinitarian theogony " that only marginally offers a more appealing alternative to Hegel's notion of Absolute Spirit. It is true that at the University of Freiburg Rahner took two courses on Hegel's *Phanomenologie des Geistes* and one course on Schelling's *Uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* under M. Heidegger. It is also true that Rahner frequently uses the language of abyss in speaking of God.

But is Rahner's notion of the *ursprungslos* the theological equivalent of Schelling's (or Jacob Boehme's) *Ungrund* and vice versa? It does not seem likely. For one thing, Rahner's trinitarian theology is deeply rooted in the New Testament data regarding *ho theos* as Father, Rahner's exegesis of which Warner gives a brief summary (pp. 571-574) but unfortunately does not pronounce whether it is right or wrong. It is not the fruit of

philosophical speculation on the *Ungrund* out of which the Trinity and the spiritual and physical universes come (Jacob Boehme) or on the " eternal contrariety " forever alienating himself from himself (Schelling).

Furthermore, the abyss, as Warner correctly points out, is "formless ontologically" (p. 592), whereas Rahner's notion of the Father as the unoriginate is anything but that. Again Rahner's description of the Father as the unoriginate based on New Testament data in the article *"Theos* in the New Testament " is sufficient rebuttal of the view that the unoriginate is " formless ontologically."

IV. *Further Questions*

Having examined the validity of Warner's criticisms of Rahner's concept of God the Father as the unoriginate, I would like now to offer some alternative proposals.

In rejecting Rahner's view of the Father as the unoriginate, Warner appeals to Thomas Aquinas's treatment of the *notiones* (pp. 581-583). Basically he accepts Thomas's view that innascibility does not constitute personhood in the Trinity, because it is " a negative, affirming nothing" *(ST,* I, q. 40, a. 3, ad 3). There are, in Thomas's opinion, only three person-constituting properties, namely fatherhood, sonship, and passive spiration. Since trinitarian persons are constituted by relations and since innascibility does not indicate relation, except negatively, innascibility is not a person-constituting property.

A few observations should be made in this regard. First of all, even though Thomas holds that relations rather than origins constitute personhood in the Trinity *(ST,* I, q. 40, a. 2), his position is nuanced. He acknowledges that divine persons are distinguished both by relations and origins (*licet enim distinguantur utroque modo),* since relations are brought about by origination, even though he goes on to say that in his opinion it is better to say *(melius dicitur)* that persons are distinguished by relations first and foremost *(prius et principalius).*

However, Thomas's position is not without ambiguity. Since trinitarian relations are rooted in origination, it must be said

that ultimately and ontologically divine persons are distinguished by their origination or their relations of origin. In fact, the first question on the Trinity (q. 27) deals with processions rather than with relations, which can be intelligently discussed only subsequently (q. 28).

Furthermore, is it adequate to say that in the first person of the Trinity innascibility or unoriginateness is merely " negative, affirming nothing " ? Bonaventure's view that *ingenitus* refers to the fruitfulness of the Father *[generat quia innascibilis* (I *Sent.* 28, 1, 2, ad 3) J and that divine persons are constituted prior to their relations cannot be dismissed lightly. In patristic tradition, *agennesia* as applied to the Father indicates more than just lack of relation or origin; it describes the Father as *principiuni sine principio, principiuni fontale, autotheos, ho theos epi panton.*

Likewise, it would seem that Rahner's use of "unoriginate" is much more than a negative assertion that the Father is not originated like the Son and the Spirit. Rather it serves to emphasize the fact that it is only because the Father, as the unoriginate, is the underived infinite richness of being, truth and love that he generates and spirates-generat *quia innascibilis-to* use Bonaventure's expression. Furthermore, for Rahner, the unoriginateness of the Father should never be separated conceptually from his generation of the Son and the spiration of the Spirit, because that is how we experience him in the history of salvation.

But why, one may ask, does Rahner use this negative term (taken in the privative sense, at least since Thomas) to express something infinitely positive? Though Rabner has not explicitly justified the use of this term, several reasons readily come to mind. First, the term recovers an ancient tradition which ascribes a rich connotation to it and which is not done justice to by Thomas. Secondly, by its apparently negative character it serves well to retrieve the mystical tradition which privileges the incomprehensibility of God. Thirdly, it is in accord with his *reductio in niysteriuni* as expounded in his theology of mystery. Lastly, it leaves open the question, at this stage of his trinitarian theology, of whether the term " person " would be appropriate *today* for a theology of the Trinity.

The foregoing defense of Rahner against Warner's strictures should not be construed as an endorsement of Rahner's trinitarian theology in *toto*. Indeed, there are quite a few important questions that beg for answers. In honor of the Trinity let me mention only three. First, how does one apply Rahner's theology of the symbol to the procession of the Spirit? It seems clear enough that the Son can be said to be the symbol of the Father in Rahner's ontology of symbol, but how does the Spirit fit in? Secondly, given Rahner's *Grunda.x-iom* that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa, how does the event of the Cross bear on our understanding of the immanent Trinity? Should one accept von Balthasar's *theologoumenon* of a supratemporal " event " of suffering love in the inner trinitarian life or Moltmann's bolder speculation on the Cross as the breakdown of trinitarian relations? Thirdly, is not Rabner too dependent on the Enlightenment conception of "person" as center of consciousness so that he is overly suspicious of the term in developing his trinitarian theology? Should one not make use of *perichoresis*, as Leonardo Eoff has done, as the central concept for a theology of the Trinity?

These are weighty and obscure enough questions to be addressed to Rabner' s trinitarian theology and I do not pretend to do anything more than raise them here. What I have shown, I hope, is that Warner's criticisms of Rahner's concept of the Father as the unoriginate do not hit the mark, or if they do, they are not fatal.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics. Vol. VI: *Theology: The Old Covenant.* By HANS Uns VoN BALTHASAR. Trans. Brian McNeil, C.R.V. and Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis. Ed. John Riches. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991. Pp. 443.

In this penultimate-volume of *The Glory of the Lord,* von Balthasar sets forth a " biblical aesthetics " in which the manner of the emergence of the Glory of God in the world of man is spelled out. He proceeds by examining the bewildering variety of the manifestations of God's Glory in the Old Testament, but always as unified in their historical convergence upon Jesus, the Christ, the final and definitive presence in history of the divine Glory in whom Word and Image, Messiah and Servant, Son of Man and Son of God, are at one. This manner of proceeding is little consonant with contemporary Catholic exegesis, which prefers to regard the Old Testament as a free-standing hook, and is rather fastidious about reading it as " literally " the prologue and the *Sitz im Leben* of the New. For such exegetes, the literal and the historical senses are entirely distinct, because of their methodological enlistment in the historical pessimism of the Enlightenment. Balthasar, of course, is not of their camp.

Balthasar's mastery of Old Testament exegesis is on a par with the effortless command of the Western philosophical, theological, and literary tradition which he has displayed in the earlier volumes of this work. While he relies heavily upon von Rad, a glance at the index shows that his knowledge of Old Testament scholarship is based upon a wide reading, upon which he levies throughout the book with practiced ease. The exegetical method implicit in his analysis is the one employed by scholars such as de Lubac, Guillet, and Ligier; its classic Augustinian understanding of the free unity of history, and of the consequently free meaning of Old Testament and the New as fulfilled in the Kingdom of God, needs no apology. The currently common supposition that the " literal " sense of Scripture is that which an Enlightened positivism will permit needs only to be recognized to be rejected.

In the opening pages of the Introduction Balthasar sets the theme which will dominate the book: the rationally irresolvable dialectical

tension between God and all that is not God, a tension inherent in the revelation of the Glory of God. In keeping with the emphasis of his earlier volumes, Balthasar is insistent upon the radical gratuity of the revelation of the Glory of God. The revelatory manifestation of God as God, who is beyond all perception, all knowing, all communication, and yet is communicated, perceived the more surely where the more veiled, and definitively revealed on the Cross. The revelation of God's Glory is of God as the Absolutely Other, as formless, and so as in tension with all form which would mediate the revelation. This communication, this mediation, is utterly *ex nihilo;* it relies upon no capacity in man, upon no natural process of spiritual development, and is unrelated to, because absolutely transcendent to, all human projects. Impossible to prepare for, the manifestation is constantly new, arising out of no prior possibility in man or his world, and responding to nothing in him which might make the revelation capable of anticipation. The paradox of God's self communication of his formless Glory is then beyond all utterance, and yet is uttered, given form: the final Form is, of course, the Christ.

This is the basic datum, the ground upon which all theology rests, and is pure grace, a gift beyond all expectation, incapable of being imagined. All the preparatory Old Testament images finally fail. The paradox, the self communication of God who is beyond all utterance, yet is uttered, has its resolution only in the Form, the personal unity, of Christ. The revelation always at once transcends and assimilates the concrete historical forms by which it is mediated. The pagan materials are transformed by their historical deployment in the revelation-e.g., the pagan myths of creation, of divine wars and marriages, the pagan wisdom-and in their deployment, they converge, hut not within the Old Testament. The utterance, the revelation of Glory in the Old Testament, however luminous, remains fragmented, for the sole unity of the Old Testament revelation of Glory is proleptic. Its unity is revealed in the unanticipatable historical Form of Christ, in which all the fragmentary Old Testament revelation is completed and fulfilled, and thereby recognized as anticipatory, and because anticipatory, as unified, as the revelation of Glory.

In an earlier volume, Balthasar has observed that the Old Testament is the path from paganism to Christianity. He will allow the Old Testament no autonomous value, no autonomous " literal sense " possessing revelatory value. This does not prevent, but rather warrants, his discriminating and brilliant exposition of the historical, prophetic and wisdom literature of the Old Testament.

The perception of Glory (Balthasar considers the vision of Glory as light/ darkness to he primary, and thus prior to any other manifestation of Glory as word, image, or covenant) is always radically unprepared

for, and always disconcerting to the point of shock. Its reception requires that the recipient transcend himself in an ecstasis, for he has no powers of his own with which to respond. The perception of God's Glory is inseparably the perception of God's supreme holiness and of one's own uncleanliness. The grace of revelation is at once a judgment upon sin and the purification of the recipient, and the historical confession of faith is always penitential as well as credal (204).

A review of this volume, as of its predecessors, must abandon any pretense of summary. Balthasar's prodigious learning forbids that route as an absurdity. However, systematic critique of the theological unity of Balthasar's aesthetics may be of use to the prospective reader, if only to suggest a provisional route through this formidable work. Little more than suggestion of a *point d'appui* for the reader's own inquiry can be attempted, but that has its importance. Balthasar is too important a theological resource to be read passively, for his work challenges the Christian understanding, and mere docile acceptance neither meets that challenge, nor does it much honor a great theologian.

Balthasar's theological aesthetics has undoubtedly been influenced, pro and con, by the dialectical theology of his great Calvinist counterpart, Karl Barth. For instance, on the negative side, Balthasar rejects Barth's rigorous systematic construct as a deformation, and in rejecting Barth, rejects all system as inevitably trapping the Glory of God in the necessary structures of formal logic, nullifying the freedom essential to the Glory of God. On the positive side, Balthasar accepts the Barthian dialectic between creation and Covenant, which sees in creation the " outer ground " of the Covenant and in the Covenant the "inner ground" of creation (88). But, curiously, Balthasar rejects Barth's placing of the imaging of God in marriage (99). When discussing the image of husband and wife as employed in Hoseah, Balthasar twice insists that the symbolism is non-sexual, although it is admittedly incarnate (23, 244).

While Balthasar is certainly correct in holding that the interpersonality which Barth considers to be the core of the marital imaging of the Trinity is a concept far wider than the marriage relation, it is rather the covenantal specificity of the marital relation, and its strict association with the good creation in Genesis, that is pertinent for a theology of Glory. This association is more than corroborated by the Pauline assimilation to marriage of the Head-Body relation of Christ to the Church, and thus to the New Covenant. Balthasar's objection (99, n. 23) that "the second creation narrative speaks of sexual relationship so obliquely (woman comes from man; in Paradise there are no children) that sexuality cannot be derived from man's original state as image of God " ignores the rather pertinent Pauline teaching that because the Body is from the Head, the Body is the Glory of the Head.

Further, following Augustine in this, he forgets that it is not children which complete the integral good creation of Adam and Eve, but the marriage bond between them, the Covenant. Pope John Paul II has given a repeated emphasis to this precise point. Balthasar's concern for the Glory of God that is given in Christ can hardly ignore that the Church is the Glory of Christ, and that the Christ, in whom Glory and form are personally united, images the Father precisely by having a Glory, which is to say, as the Second Adam, the source of the Second Eve.

Balthasar's profound knowledge of the patristic tradition will have reminded him of the common patristic interpretation of Christ's death on the Cross as the deep sleep of the second Adam, in which the second Eve is taken from his wounded side, the blood symbolizing the Eucharist and the water symbolizing Baptism. Clearly we have in the marital relation between Adam and Eve, and between the second Adam and the second Eve, much more than the interpersonality allowed by Barth and evidently by Balthasar. If one may suppose that Christ's imaging of the Father is fulfilled on the Cross, by which the New Covenant in his blood is instituted, the marital character of that imaging is hard to miss. But Balthasar speaks not of marriage; he refers rather to the " sexual relationship " as a thing neutral or natural, but not inherently sacramental and thus not marital. But the marital symbolism used to state the relation between God and his people, and therefore the marital symbolism of the Covenant itself, becomes more and more explicit as we pass from Hoseah to Trito-lsaiah, where infidelity is routinely assimilated to adultery and fornication. The femininity of the primeval order of the good creation is further underwritten by the Wisdom literature; von Rad has stressed the femininity of the allure of created Wisdom and the masculinity of the response to her (see *Wisdom in Israel* (1972), esp. ch. ix), as in Prov. 8:22, Sir. 14, 24, and Wis. 8. Balthasar acknowledges the femininity of Lady Wisdom (357), but finally for him Wisdom is divine, not created (360). This reduces to mere accommodationist metaphor the liturgical attribution of Wisdom to Mary.

This raises a further difficulty in Balthasar's theology, one that is already present in his acceptance of Barth's dialectic of creation-Covenant. In what context are we to read the creation accounts in Genesis with their representation of the integrally good creation whose goodness is complete with the appearance of Eve? Do these speak prophetically of the Christ in such a manner that the Pauline idiom of " second Adam, second Eve" governs their real meaning? In a number of places, Balthasar refers to the pre-existent Christ, the pre-existent Church, and the pre-existent Covenant in a fashion consonant with the Pauline imputation of primordiality to the Christ, as the second Adam,

and to the Church, as the second Eve, and to the Covenant, as their One Flesh. This imports the identity of the primordial and integral Covenant with the good creation from which we are fallen, and so sets a covenantal criterion for fallenness, which is neither from nor into " nature," but is from the grace of Christ, of the Covenant, and thus a rejection of the marital integrity of the Covenantal good creation. Such a view rules out any consideration of a natural or ungraced creation. And yet, in Barth's view, and Balthasar's as well, such a creation, opposed to the Covenant in the sense of being incapable of an unequivocal statement, is in some fashion its " outer ground."

The problem posed by this notion of the creation-Covenant dialectic is of course that of the nature-grace relation. Barth supposes that creation (nature?) is prepared for and intended for grace. In the analytic use of those terms, e.g., that given them by St. Thomas's act-potency analysis, the statement so read is meaningless: uncovenanted creation is ungraced by definition, without any possible analytic predisposition for or concrete relation to grace and covenant as act to potency or potency to act. In fact, Balthasar insists upon their mutual exclusion when speaking of the perception of the Glory of God. It is in precisely the same sense that Barth was accustomed to speak of grace as " thrown like a stone" before a totally unprepared recipient. The " dialectic" of nature-grace, analytically understood, thus raises logical questions to which, as Balthasar insists, there are no solutions.

Consequently we must drop as irrelevant to Balthasar's aesthetics the analytic sense of the dialectic of nature and grace. Within that formally logical context, the elements of that polarity have in fact never surmounted their logical contradiction. In any event, Balthasar opposes that analytic context absolutely for theology.

There remains then the historical sense of nature and grace, the sense proper to the phenomenological Augustinian tradition common to Barth and to Baltbasar, in which nature is the historical or temporal experiential prius of the grace of conversion or its free (and therefore graced) refusal. From this theological stance, all of historical unity, goodness, truth, and beauty is subject to the Lord of history, and no part of the good creation, even as fallen, is untouched by that dominion, which is neither forensic nor external, but inheres in the very constitution of creation of which Christ is Alpha and the Omega. But this means that creation is " in Christ "; if there is a dialectical opposition between creation and the Covenant instituted by Christ, it is free rather than necessary, unless we take "creation " to be fallen as such, i.e., open to conversion. This cannot be what is meant by Barth, for such a conclusion implies an ontological dualism which he would certainly not accept, as Balthasar would not.

It would appear then that the dialectic upon which Balthasar insists

between God and what is not God is *ex peccato*, although often enough he treats it as though it were an implication of finitude and not of fallenness. More often he simply ignores the distinction, which is understandable, given his phenomenological methodology. Historically, in the concrete, the creation and fallenness are in fact identical, in the sense that all the historical creation is in fact fallen, the second Adam and the second Eve excepted-for, as constituting in their One Flesh the promordial covenantal prius, the good creation of which fallenness is the free rejection, their involvement in our fallenness is redemptive and not an unfree subjection to its necessities. Otherwise put, Christ who is the Glory of God and the Church who is the Glory of the Glory of God are veiled by fallenness hut are not fallen.

The historical sense of nature and grace, then, is that which recognizes the immanence of the Glory of God in the good hut fallen creation. This immanence is indeed dialectical, at once revealed and hidden. The Old Testament and the New speak of it as veiled, and Paul's development of this theme is familiar (2 Cor. 3:4-4:6). This immanence of the Glory of God in history, in the historical creation, emerges irresistibly throughout history into visibility and audibility, and pervades history with its sovereign freedom. In fact, it is the immanence, quite evidently, of the Lord of history, whose Personal entry into our fallenness-Logos *sarx egeneto-is* the final manifestation of the Glory of God in the conception, the life, the death on the Cross, and the Resurrection, of the Christ. Balthasar affirms this with admirable clarity. However, he thinks of this pre-existence in terms of predestination, that is, statically and nonhistorically as a divine decree or a divine idea and not as a concrete event in history (21).

But this immanence of Glory is historical and consequently it must he dynamic, a free historical event. Further, this free immanence-event engages not a fallen freedom, but the integral freedom of the risen Glory of God, a freedom which, however veiled, is of the Lord of history, who as Lord is not subject to recession in time and dissipation in space: only the Lord of history is thus free of history, in history.

His freedom is obviously not that of the earthly Jesus, whose life was lived in the context of our fallenness and mortality which he accepted freely as the free kenotic implication of his historical Mission from his Father. Nor can this freedom be assigned simply to the risen Christ, whose manifestation in our history ceased with the Ascension. Clearly then we are speaking of the Eucharistic immanence of the risen Christ, of the manifest Glory of God. It is this historical immanence that alone provides the possibility of the revelation of the Glory of God upon which Balthasar's theological aesthetics is intent.

Unless that Glory, as Image, as Covenant, and as Word, pervades all of fallen time and space, all of the historical creation, its fragmentary

manifestation-in the beauty of creation, in the patriarchal pre-history, in the Noachic, Sinaitic, and Davidic covenants, in the historical events of the Old Testament, in Old Testament prophecy, in the Temple sacrifices, and in the Wisdom tradition-could never find integration in Christ's Form. Neither, apart from that Eucharistic immanence of the Glory of the Lord of history, could there be that quest, that anticipation of Glory, which Balthasar ascribes to the "realm of metaphysics." The integration of the perception of the Glory of God is historical, not eschatological (204) ; that ongoing integration presupposes that history possesses a prior or primordial free unity which can only be Eucharistic.

But it is curious that, while alluding to the Eucharist not infrequently, Balthasar appears to assign it a secondary role: it is consequence rather than cause (e.g., 24). He affirms Origen's reduction, under Neoplatonizing influences, of the Eucharistic event to " a speech event" (381) while insisting that this event is historical. Nonetheless he manifests here the hesitation before Eucharistic realism *qua* sacrificial which emerges elsewhere in his works (e.g., *Church and World,* 1967, at 114, 125, 167). But only a sacrificial Eucharistic presence of the Christ institutes the New Covenant; only if the Mass is thus the offering of the One Sacrifice does it sign and effect the presence, *per modum substantiae,* of the New Covenant in history, by which history, as fallen, is sacramental through the sacramental immanence of its Lord in One Flesh union with the second Eve.

This raises a final point. Balthasar accepts a Neoplatonizing tradition in the patristic and spiritual literature---i.e., in the West, from Augustine to Bernard, and from a Kempis and the *devotio moderna* through a good deal of Baroque spirituality, reappearing in our own time in C. S. Lewis-which uses marital symbolism to describe the union of the "soul" of the Christian with Christ. This finds no justification in Scripture, nor in the Catholic liturgy; for both, the bride of Christ is the Church, the Body, in One Flesh union with her Head, the Christ. Since Justin Martyr and lrenaeus, Mary has borne the title of second Eve as the antetype of the Church-which title is incidentally an implicit recognition of her unfallen integrity, for in her are integrated the expressions of unfallen femininity which in all other women are fragmented and irreconcilable. Balthasar finds in her the " real symbol " of the second Eve, and the one " who provides the model according to which the believing soul strives to reach her Lord and Bridegroom" (137; see also 359). This may be no more than a rhetorical conclusion to a highly rhetorical passage, but nevertheless it is worth affirming that the Christian's union with the Christ, however mystical it may be, is radically sacramental; it is Eucharistic and

ecclesial, and access to that union is only by way of that sacramental mediation.

This fact simply rules out the Platonic aberration which would assign masculinity to God and femininity to creation, or masculinity to the Christ and femininity to those who in and through the worship of the Church affirm his Lordship. Were it otherwise, marriage would not be a sacrament. The affinity Balthasar displays for this expression of Neoplatonic cosmology is consistent with his emphasis upon the factual contradiction not only between the formless God, as absolutely Other, and the concrete form of the recipient of his revelation, but also between man and woman in the created order. It is as contradictory that the creation is " very good " (353) . We must then suppose that their marital relation, as beautiful, is also conceptually and rationally equivocal: in it their contradiction is transcended, but as beauty, not as truth. Yet marriage is a sign, effective in signing: can Balthasar's theology accommodate its sacramentality?

In this same connection, Balthasar passes on to the topic, perennial in his thought, of the contradiction between human solidarity and final damnation. His attribution of solidarity with the damned to God wh2 is beyond all contradiction (224) makes it understandable that some have found in his theology a doctrine of universal salvation comparable to that illustrated by the Barthian allegory of the sinking ship which cannot sink.

Such criticisms are of course systematic, and anyone accepting Balthasar's view of systematic theology can hardly consider them, much less offer a reply. On the other hand, they do not on that account vanish. If Glory, as beauty, is also one of the transcendentals, at one with unity, goodness, and truth, we may expect its theology, as a *quaerens pulchrum* which is also a *quaerens intellectum,* however aesthetic, to be open to such criticism as set out here. At bottom, the dialectical relation-or tension-which Balthasar has placed between creation and Covenant is in need of more explanation than he has given it-but that explanation may well be methodologically forbidden by his aesthetics.

Such dilemmas, unresolved and perhaps unresolvable, do not detract significantly from the extraordinary achievement of *The Glory of the Lord,* of which this volume is a worthy component. It is a book to return to, one whose reading can never be really finished. A classic, it will outlive any criticism directed at it. No theologian should be without the seven volumes of *The Glory of the Lord,* if only to remind him of his own responsibilities, in the light cast upon the office of theologian by one of the transcendent scholars of our age.

DONALD J. KEEFE, S.J.

Denver, Colorado

The Godly Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from Anselm to Aquinas. By ROMANUS CESSARIO, O.P. Studies in historical theology. v. 6. Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1990. Pp. xxiv + 214. $14.95 (paper).

The Godly Image presents a retouched version of the author's dissertation, first published in 1982 as *Christian Satisfaction in Aquinas: Towards a Personalist Understanding* (Washington, DC: University Press of America). Seeking a broader audience, the author has dropped the dissertation's numerous Latin footnotes, shortened and enlivened the chapter titles, and streamlined some of his arguments (e.g., pp. 93-95). He has as well corrected (e.g., on Pannenberg, p. xxii; on Anselm, p. 157) or toned down (e.g., the description of monastic theology, p. 1) earlier statements. Reference to the possibility that Aquinas suffered a nervous breakdown disappears (p. 18). Still, the work remains substantially the same, reproducing even some typos (e.g., William of St. Armour [sic], p. 3) from the original.

The new subtitle, *Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from Anselm to Aquinas,* is unfortunate. First, it leads one to expect a survey of the major soteriological positions articulated in the period between the two, hut such is not forthcoming. The work remains what the original title indicated, a study in the thought of Aquinas.

Second, in that work Anselm plays hut a perfunctory role, serving as the foil from whose mercantile model (p. 73) or juridical mentality (p. 91) Thomas can advance to a more appropriately interpersonal grasp of the mode of our salvation. This reading of Anselm, however, leaves him in the hands of liberal Protestant historians of doctrine of the nineteenth century, and, as the bibliography indicates, it ignores more recent literature which rightly stresses the metaphysical and religious depth of Anselm's key concept of *iustitia.* For a precise rendering of the relation between Anselm and Aquinas, one may wish to place greater emphasis on *ST* III, q.14, a.I, ad 1. In that text Aquinas accomplishes two things. First, he integrates Anselm's concept of satis· faction with the traditional religious insight that, in some sense, Christ suffered what sinners deserve to suffer. At the same time he deepens the concept by rendering explicit the place of love and obedience as the formal element in satisfaction and thus rejoins Anselm in rejecting any strict notion of penal substitution.

These reservations aside, the author's thorough, comprehensive, and competent investigation into Aquinas fills a lacuna in the history of soteriology, a lacuna, one regrets to say, still left open by the work of his immediate predecessor, B. Catao. At the same time the scope

of the author's work offers a further and important contribution. By researching Thomas's thought on satisfaction in the context of penance as well as soteriology, the author manages to suggest, and explicitly, that the generative matrix for Thomas's theoretic work in both areas lies in the cruciform dynamics of Christian conversion, the life of grace. With this insight he opens a door from historical theology to a contemporary systematics.

WILLIAM P. LOEWE

Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

Free Will and the Christian Faith. By W. S. ANGLIN. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Pp. vii + 218. $55.00 (cloth).

W. S. Anglin, a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in Mathematics at McGill University, has produced a highly compact and compelling volume which attempts in just 218 pages to prove God's existence, to argue for personal immortality, to defend the coherence of theism against the problem of evil, to provide cogent analyses of both omnipotence and omniscience, *and* to examine criteria for distinguishing divine revelation from other forms of communication. The thread holding these rather motley swatches of cloth together is the author's concentration on libertarian freedom which weaves throughout the above issues in one way or another. It shows up in the expected places (e.g., in the so-called 'free will defense' of the problem of evil) but also in places hitherto unexpected (Anglin nicely argues that if humans are truly free in the libertarian sense, then it is appropriate and necessary that the Scriptures take the form they in fact do) .

In light of the impossibility of touching on all of Anglin's concerns, the difficulty in reviewing a work such as this is doing justice to what the author has presented while neither ascending to generalizations blind to nuances in his argument nor descending to cavil about particularities ultimately inconsequential to the book's thesis.

Allow me to propose the following as a way to go on: In his Preface, Anglin explains that the aim of his book is to show " that it is possible to be both a libertarian and a traditional Christian" (p. vii). Here, then, are three elements to guide reflection on Anglin's work: libertarian freedom, the Christian tradition, and the relation between the two. Let us take each one in turn.

Libertarianism: Libertarian views of freedom are a lot like tenure and taxes: much maligned, perhaps necessary, and still around despite the best efforts of intelligent people to defeat them. Indeed, there is

something quite truthful in libertarianism. That is, it seems quite obvious that a situation in which I am not able to do other than I in fact do would be one where I do not aot freely. Anglin does an extremely credible job of showing this in chapter 1, appealing to several aspects of human life where it is necessary that one can do other than one does: loving, moral responsibility, promise-making and keeping etc.

But doing other than what one does is perhaps the least interesting aspect of freedom-just as tenure and taxes are perhaps the least interesting aspects of college teaching and the national debt, respectively. For someone like Iris Murdoch in *The Sovereignty of Good,* libertarianism ignores the moral formation going on behind and between such explicit moments of choosing. She argues that if we ignore all that is within the person, we're quite likely to identify freedom with the outward movement of choice, since there is nothing else with which to identify it. If, on the other hand, we attend to how structures of value are imperceptibly built up within and around us, " we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already over."

For those like Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, libertarianism ignores the role of the community in situating freedom and inculcating those good habits or virtues most conducive to a life of true goodness. Neither identified freedom with unconstrained choice, but rather affirmed that freedom was situated amidst particular surroundings and actualized not by following just any one of all possible options but by acting in accord with the goals or loves one already possesses as a living inheritance of the community of which one is a part. It is clear that for Anglin freedom must extend to the choice of these values themselves. He states, " occasionally we stand back from our various desires and decide which ones we shall renounce and which ones we shall encourage .... To choose values is to ' come out' from one's previous culture, morality, and so on, and, in spite of such influences, embark on a course that is really one's own" (pp. 17-18). Freedom for Aristotle and Aquinas, however, is *not* the ability to begin anew with ends wholly of one's own determination but rather what one does with everything he or she has previously been given. Community becomes crucial here. Not only does a particular kind of influence not eliminate human freedom, but it is in fact *necessary* if people are to be free.

Anglin *also* wants to talk about habits and character (pp. 27, 126, 141); but unlike Aristotle, Aquinas, and Murdoch, he doesn't seem to think that this qualifies his libertarianism in any decisive way. But the fact is that making room for habits and the formation of character in one's presentation of freedom inevitably crowds a libertarian view of freedom. If habits are simply repeated libertarian choices to act in certain directions, then why speak of habits at all? If, on the other

hand, a habit is a decisive qualification of libertarian agency in which the will is gripped by something not entirely of its own choosing, then whither libertarian agency?

Tradition: The index to this book lists 5 references to Augustine, 4 references to Aquinas, 2 references to Anselm, 2 references to Calvin, and no references to Luther or Molina. In light of the relatively few appeals to the theological tradition, I am puzzled, therefore, by what exactly Anglin means when he refers to a traditional Christian and how exactly he considers his case compatible with traditional Christianity. For example, Anglin quotes approvingly from Augustine's *De Libero Arbitrio.* That, however, was an early work where Augustine was indeed much more indebted to something like the libertarianism which, as Anglin admits, he later abandoned. Though the author does quite imaginatively cite a number of Scriptural sources for such things as the free will defense, that too seems a very truncated notion of what the Christian theological tradition is. (One must also note that Anglin's appeal to Scripture is quite selective because, as Robert Merrihew Adams has argued, I Samuel 23:1-14 seems to affirm something Anglin denies in his analysis of omniscience: that God's knowledge extends to counterfactual propositions. Molina himself appeals to I Samuel 23:1-14 to argue for God's middle knowledge-that is, knowledge of what each agent would do if placed in various circumstances, as well as to the story of Chorazin and Bethsaida in Matthew 11:21.)

Interestingly enough, the same error committed in the description of human freedom recurs in the description of tradition. When discussing freedom, Anglin presumes that human beings have the ability to step hack from contingent desires and cultural influences to choose autonomously. This amounts to the ability to escape from the thickets of human historicity to a clearing affording a less impeded, more objective view. If the libertarian agent can do this with her own history, then why cannot the libertarian agent do the same thing with a historical tradition of thought? Anglin explains, "To reason is not just to work out syllogisms hut also to evaluate reasons and, to do that, we must respond to them in an undetermined manner. We must stand apart from our wants, vested interests, and any other possibly determining factors . . . true reasoning does require libertarian free will-so that one can stand hack from the world, free of distorting influences, judging the premisses and their interconnections in a wholly objective manner . . ." (pp. 12-13). But if the individual can step outside of her tradition and historicity in this way and see things aright as Anglin's analysis of human freedom seems to say, then why can't the scholar do the same thing with the Christian tradition? And if one *can* do this, then why even feign allegiance to the Christian tradition or even care what it says since immersing oneself in the " wants, vested interests,

and other possibly determining factors " of *any* tradition would seem merely to impinge upon the libertarian freedom of the Christian scholar to view things " in a wholly objective manner "?

Trying to start over from scratch in life or scholarship is always an invitation to the self-deception of attempting to transcend one's finitude and leap away from the shadow of one's own historicity. So Anglin is surely wrong when he says that the only alternative to the above notion of rationality is " an enfeebling scepticism " (p. 13) . We cannot escape human finitude or the historicity of life and thought which sustains it into an ahistorical realm of acting or thinking. Wishing we could wastes precious time and makes us bad stewards of the conceptual and moral resources that *are* available to us by pining for what we cannot have and neglecting what we do have. Just as "enfeebling scepticism" need not be the only alternative to Anglin's notion of rationality, determinism need not be the only alternative to Anglin's libertarianism.

Libertarianism and the Christian tradition: I hope I have said enough already to argue why there may be a tension in this book between Anglin's dual allegiance to libertarianism and the Christian tradition. Allow me to push him a bit further here. Anglin rightly admits in his preface that " Traditional Christian thinkers such as the later Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot fit it with the dogmas of the Faith" (p. vii). Yet, there is scant mention later in the book of these ' traditional thinkers ' and only one paragraph explaining the changes in Augustine's views, which the author partly attributes to a mistranslation of Romans 5:12. But doesn't Anglin owe his readers some explanation of who else repudiated libertarianism, what *they* were responding to, and why (like Augustine) they could have gotten ,things so wrong?

In addition, Anglin argues that God has libertarian freedom. St. Anselm would have vigorously denied this. According to Anselm, libertarianism in God is a cheaper, less worthy kind of freedom for the deity to have, for it would have implied an ability to sin which Anselm refused to place in God. Anglin argues just the opposite: a being with libertarian free will " is more exalted than persons without libertarian free will " (p. 41). Yet Anglin also denies that God has the ability to sin, but continues to parse that inability in terms of libertarian freedom. Why? He writes," Note that x can be morally good even if it is determined that he never freely choose to do what he believes is evil. ... For it is possible that ... one has freely chosen (in the libertarian sense) to put oneself in a situation where it will be so determined. For example, although the saints in heaven cannot sin, they none the less deserve credit for not sinning since the reason they cannot sin is that they freely chose to let God's grace fix them in goodness" (p. 105).

The beginning of wisdom is always to call things by their proper name. Too many provisos in the definition of freedom (as: libertarian freedom may allow one freely to decide never to have libertarian freedom in the future) only weaken the force of the arguments. Truth be told, it is hard *not* to resort to such provisos when trying to articulate a view of freedom common to creatures on earth, the blessed in paradise, and God in heaven. At the very least, the Christian tradition resists *reductions* to libertarianism. Such a move is both historically inaccurate and blind to the messiness both made and endured by two thousand years of Christian philosophy and theology.

The inspiration behind this book, however, is exactly on target. Much of the history of Christian theology can in no small way be seen as a series of repeated attempts to figure out how the free agency of the human person could possibly accommodate the free agency of the creator. In few issues does this question rise to such prominence as in discussions of divine providence. Anglin defends a notion of providence, though in a roundabout way. He correctly notes that God's foreknowledge is quite closely linked to God's providential care over the world. While he affirms divine foreknowledge of future contingents, he stipulates that it must be derived or " logically subsequent " to the actions of free creatures (pp. 80, ll8). Thus, if God " chooses to create Mary, God is, in a sense, taking a risk" about what Mary would do, the evil she may cause, etc. (p. ll8). But making God's knowledge dependent in this way makes it hard to see how God can exercise provident governance over the world, for " if God's foreknowledge is causally posterior to the event then it cannot help God prevent that event" (p. 128). The problem is that governance seems to presuppose logical *priority*. But logical priority seems somewhat dangerous to libertarian freedom. The language Anglin uses here is quite revealing and rather problematic. He says God "inspires" people (p. 103), can " bring them to repentance " or " can create new persons who will be likely not to do evil" (p. 120). God even " encourage [es] us to use our free will to do what is right. One might even say that [God] woos us as a lover woos his beloved" (p. 181). The defender of libertarian freedom thus faces an unpleasant dilemma: either God's providential inspiration, encouragement, and wooing take away libertarian freedom or they do not. If they do cancel libertarian freedom, Anglin has failed in his attempt to show that " it is possible to he both a libertarian and a traditional Christian." If they do *not* cancel libertarian freedom, then it seems that *God* is not the one ultimately directing all things unto good. If providence reduces without remainder to libertarian freedom, then God is simply taking the chance that things will all work out. And that's not providence--certainly not in any traditional sense.

These objections to one side, one must compliment Anglin on the thoroughness with which he pursues his points. He almost always provides several arguments for the same point. So we get eight arguments for libertarianism, five for how natural evil comports with the existence of a benevolent, all-powerful God, and so on. These arguments carefully avoid the repetitiveness one might expect and rather skillfully succeed in revealing a mind concerned with mapping out all the knolls and hollows on the intellectual terrain of the particular issue under consideration.

Almost inevitably, any one hook's discussions of such disparate topics will vary in both quality and depth. Some parts of this hook (for example, the chapters on the existence of God and the problem of evil) should he generally accessible to the interested beginner in the philosophy of religion. Chapters 5 and 6 on the goodness of God and the problem of evil are especially well done. Anglin honestly and squarely faces the standard objections and manages to produce as complete and compelling a defense as one is likely to find anywhere in the literature. His use of the Principle of Double Effect to exonerate God from blame for creating creatures who may freely do evil was effective and innovative. Other parts of *Free Will and The Christian Faith* (say, the chapter defending God's foreknowledge featuring the rather paradoxical concept of "backwards causation " in which future free choices cause past foreknowledge) seem to require and presuppose a more thorough immersion in the recent scholarly literature. Some readers may find the author's use of logical notation to explicate his arguments distracting or alienating, though he takes great pains to explain the symbols he employs in the prose he uses. In addition, he is quite helpful to the reader at the start of each chapter in providing concise previews of the arguments to come. On the whole, this is a hook with occasional flashes of insight and innovation, hut with tangles and tensions in the arguments in other parts.

JOSEPH M. INCANDELA

Saint Mary's College
Notre Dame, Indiana

Quest for the Absolute: The Philosophical Vision of Joseph Marechal. By ANTHONY MATTEO. De Kalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois Press, 1992. Pp. xi + 173. $30.00 (cloth).

The Belgian Jesuit Joseph Marechal (1373-1944) is little known in North American philosophical circles. Indeed he is simply little known outside the somewhat small circle of scholars interested in the history

of twentieth century Roman Catholic theology. There Marechal's work, in particular his five volume *Le Point de Depart de la Metaphysique (PDM)* has a special place of honor. One need but think of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan among his intellectual heirs to recognize the impact of the thinker and of the volumes. The service of Anthony Matteo's *Quest for the Absolute (QA)* is to provide a clear and concise study of Marechal's thought. It makes a valuable companion to Joseph Donceel's *A Marechal Reader* (1970). To my knowledge, the only other full-length discussion in English is Otto Muck's *The Transcendental Method* (1968), a book which is nearly unreadable in its English translation if not in its German original.

Marechal was a committed and convinced Thomist, but discussing him under the rubric "transcendental method" brings home a critical conjunction between his Thomism and certain strategies more characteristic of Immanuel Kant and his followers. Instead of seeing Kant simply as undermining the objectivity of metaphysics and of natural theology, he came to believe it possible to take the Kantian "turn to the subject" and to show that it had possibilities not dreamed of by Kant himself. One early indication of Marechal's revisionary approach appeared in his notes for a 1914-1915 course on epistemology: "Kant deceives himself in recognizing, in the operations of spirit, only the pure synthesis of an empirical given. The human spirit is at once an empirical faculty and a faculty of the Absolute. This second aspect was only imperfectly grasped by the author of the *Critique of Pure Reason."* Thus Marechal was already on his way to answering his opening question for volume I of *PDM* (1922): "Metaphysics, if it is possible, has necessarily for its point of departure, an absolute objective affirmation: do we find in the contents of our consciousness, a similar affirmation, surrounded with all the guarantees claimed by the most exigent critique?"

The arrangement of *QA* is basically the same as that of *PDM.* Having established the problem in the first few pages, Marechal wound his way through the history of western philosophy from the pre-socratics to William of Ockham in volume I. The movement was one of challenge and response followed by renewed challenge and so on. Thus Aristotle overcame the sophists by a defense of the principle of identity and by an integration of intellection and sensation. But such overcoming is never once and for all. In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas retrieved the Aristotelian balance in his critical realist contribution to the debate about universals. It was a balance disturbed by Duns Scotus and then lost by Ockham. Volume II was a history of modern philosophy with the polarities being Cartesian rationalism and Humean empiricism. The subject-matter of Volume III was the Kantian effort for a new synthesis of subject and object, impression and

concept, sense and understanding through the transcendental method and the theory of the a priori in knowledge. A posthumous volume IV traced the idealist element in Kant and in his successors. This idealism was, in part, the new challenge faced by the nineteenth century philosophers and theologians of the scholastic revival. In moving the *Critique of Pure Reason* towards Aristotle and Thomas, volume V constituted the original contribution of *PDM* to the revival.

Of course, Marechal's contribution was also a critique. Matteo averts to the nervousness with which *PDM* was received by some scholastics and churchmen. But he gives little sense of just how far out on a limb one had to go in the decades after the modernist crisis and *Pascendi Dominici Gregis* (1907) to use Kant as the spring-board for a retrieval of Aristotle and Thomas. It was Kant who often appeared as the principal villain, one whom the Abbe Van Loo could even describe in *Kantianisme et Modernisme* (1917) as 'le plus grand malfaiteur de tous les siecles." Man'ichal never denied the weaknesses or the dangers of the critique, but he preferred to take its strengths and to discover their hidden possibilities. The turn to the subject could be a way to show the a priori basis for the very critical realism and objective theism which seemed shaken by this turn. In appropriating Kant for such a surprising end, Marechal was reinventing not only the critique, but also in some measure scholasticism.

The gist of Marechal's argument was somewhat as follows. Kant was right that the human intellect has sensory data as its proper material and that the concept remains empty without the data and the data chaotic without the concept. Since it is also a faculty of judgment affirming reality through the union of concept and sensation, a properly transcendental method appealing to the a priori of thought should result in epistemological realism, albeit a dynamic realism. Then, since the pursuit of knowledge and understanding has no limit, it moves to the infinite as its a priori condition. *QA* quotes Marechal's conclusion: "we may state in strictest logic, that the possibility of our subjective last end presupposes logically the existence of our objective last end, God. Thus in every intellectual act, we affirm *implicitly* the existence of an absolute being."

Obviously in *QA,* Matteo has gone beyond an historical survey of a neglected philosopher to an advocacy of the ideas of the philosopher. Although he is not uncritical of Marechal's own reading of various philosophers, he does accept the basic outline of his history of philosophy. Aristotle and Thomas become the heroes of the history for Matteo as well as for Marcchal, and he works hard to show the intelligibility of the *PDM* both as an interpretation of Kant and as a way hack to realism and theism. In his " Critique and Conclusion," he takes on Etienne Gilson, who had claimed that the turn to the sub-

ject could never arrive at a viable metaphysics and shows effectively that Marechal's subject was never in isolation from the objects of sensation and thought. On the other side, he presents the *PDM* as an alternative to the soft theism of thinkers like Hans Kiing and as a promising approach in contemporary epistemological debates involving Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, Joseph Margolis, and many others.

The historians of philosophy will have to take up the critique of Matteo and Marechal on the many figures which they survey in *PDM* and *QA.* No one writer can cover so much ground without raising the ire of the specialists in particular thinkers or epochs. I shall simply say that the overview is helpful and that Matteo deserves credit for putting Marechal's readings to the test of his own reading of the works at issue. *QA* presents and evaluates this history with remarkable brevity, a virtue which can have its vicious side. I found the brevity to be a particular problem in the handling of Kant and of Marechal. The *Critique of Pure Reason* and *PDM* are elaborate analyses of thought, and Matteo proceeds in such summary fashion towards the big conclusions that he does less than justice to these analyses. Being so summary turns out to be a problem in showing that *PDM* can escape the accusations of subjectivism and relativism made by its scholastic attackers and that it has a way around those problems in present-day controversies. I myself am a partisan of the epistemology and metaphysics Marechal and Matteo advocate, but I find many of my doubts about the project unresolved by its presentation in *QA.* My particular concerns here center on conceptual relativism and theistic objectivity, hut anyone who can resolve those doubts definitively will have done a monumental service not just for the reviewer but for humankind. Marechal himself had intended a sixth volume more straight-forwardly along the Aristotelian-Thomist line, something which bad health prevented. We should wish Matteo the good health to develop the ideas of *PDM* and *QA* at the greater length required to achieve fully the promise claimed for them in this fine book.

MICHAEL J. KERLIN

La Salle University
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

The Priority of Prudence. By DANIEL MARK NELSON. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. Pp. ix + 164. $26.95 (cloth).

In recent years, we have seen a number of attempts to recapture the natural law doctrines of Thomas Aquinas. This book is another such

attempt, and in it Nelson attempts to do two things. First, he tries to show that prudence is the most important of the virtues and is prior to nature in the process of determining the moral character of actions. Prudence is undoubtedly a highly important virtue because it is the train that carries the agent to the moral good and it must stay on track for the agent to realize fully the aims of morality. But it is not clear that it is prior to other virtues, or to nature itself, as Nelson contends, and a strong case can he made that charity is first among the virtues, and that prudence is determined by charity. Prudence is prior to the other virtues in the sense that they are all weakened by prudential failures, hut prudence wanders aimlessly, not only in the absence of the guidance of the other virtues, hut also without the guidance of nature itself. Cut loose from its secure grounds in nature, prudence and the other virtues collapse, and they need not only the secure standards provided by justice, fortitude, and charity, hut also of nature to he authentic.

Second, he is trying to show that Aquinas is not so much a natural law moralist as he is a rationalist and a virtue theorist. To do this, he argues that nature serves merely an explanatory and foundational function for morality, and provides no information about moral judgments (p. 100). He subordinates nature to reason in order to resolve disputes between modern deontologists and consequentialists, hut in doing this he transforms Aquinas from a natural law moralist to a rationalist. He gives priority to reason at the expense of charity and nature, both of which I think are actually more prominent in the thought of Thomas.

For Nelson, acts receive their moral character from everything hut nature: circumstances, appropriateness to their object, and their fullness of being. He reduces all unnatural activities to violations of reason, implying an identity between the natural and rational, and denies any identity between the natural and the good, believing that this undermines morality (p. 67). Because of his rationalist approach to morality, he regards sin only as an irrational action, hut says little about it being an action contrary to nature, and makes no claims about sin being an act against charity. But if it is true that sin is irrationality, then some of the most important salvific acts of Jesus' life could well have been sinful, because they were irrational. For Aquinas, nature occasionally declares a small number of acts wrong, like homosexuality, hut Nelson regards this more as an aberration from the generally consistent position of Aquinas, and continues to reduce nature to reason.

In spite of what he claims, the traditional opinion that Aquinas really is a natural law moralist is generally valid because the ultimate ground and norm of morality for Aquinas is human nature. In arguing as he does, Nelson stands in a long line of rationalist interpreters who reject any intuitional aspects to moral knowledge. But there are natural

moral concepts in the person, brought to light through experience, for even the most mentally handicapped have a sense, feeling, or intuition of unfairness, injustice, benevolence, and virtue. This is not purely the result of their environment, and it seems to be a dimension of their existence not duplicated among the beasts. For the primary principles of the natural law, known through *synderesis*, explain how and why we make moral judgments, and only the secondary principles guide conduct through the action of prudence (p. 65).

Nelson denies that human nature stands as either the measure or guide of the virtues, and the natural law is essentially dumb and directionless, for it does not give any concrete direction to moral decision making, but merely grounds and explains our moral judgments (p. 92). For Nelson, prudence guides actions, not by syllogistically applying the primary principles to the action under consideration, but more by acting like general rules of thumb (p. 145). This is a rather paradoxical view because of his emphasis on the prominent role he gives to reason at the expense of nature. While he believes we have a natural aptitude for virtue, this aptitude does not inform our moral decisions. *Synderesis* in its operations is thus neutralized because it only apprehends the first principles of nature but cannot derive material content from them with any moral certainty, and does not employ syllogistic reasoning to infer clear and concrete guides for action.

Nelson describes Aquinas's moral system as eudaimonistic and teleological, which is true to an extent, but for Aquinas the moral life is fundamentally theological, oriented through human nature to grace, and it is the concept of nature that holds this all together. Our participation in the eternal law is through reason, virtue, nature and charity, and not merely by reason and charity, and to neutralize the authoritative position of nature puts the whole theological edifice in jeopardy. This is of little concern to the ethicist, but it is of major interest to the moral theologian. A morality based on virtue that does not prepare human nature for the restoring actions of grace is ultimately futile. For Thomas, nature linked the actions of the person to the rejuvenation of their human nature and preparation for grace. Nelson's denigration of the position of nature makes Aquinas a rationalist in practice, which is to mischaracterize him.

Nelson radically suppresses the role of nature in morality because he pays insufficient attention to Thomas's metaphysical doctrines which link his moral teachings to his theological doctrines, and because of this he fails to see the dynamic role of nature in Aquinas's morality. Aquinas believes that nature interacts with reason, grace, virtue, and charity to lead us to the fullness of the moral good. For Aquinas, all of these are required to ascertain moral truth in the situation and to do what is morally right, and to denigrate the position of one of them

severely impairs the operations of all the others. For Thomas, the proximate moral norms that determine the goodness or malice of actions are the virtues, but they do this in conjunction with reason, nature, charity and grace. By abandoning the role of nature in morality, he can dispense with the metaphysical foundations of morality, but doing this undermines Thomas's notion that grace creates a new ontological order. If moral action is not oriented to restoring human nature, the power of grace to elevate our nature to the supernatural would be compromised or negated. It is true in many instances that the immediate standards for determining the morality of actions are the virtues rather than nature, but in other cases, such as murder or theft, nature establishes the immediate standard, which together with proximate material norms makes it possible to evaluate acts.

He admits that prudence requires a sustaining and all-encompassing vision of what constitutes the good life to he a virtue, and it acquires this because it is both a practical and an intellectual virtue (p. 84). But grounding the operations of the virtues solely on practical reasonableness is naive because of the instability and subjectivity of reason. He admits that the will inclines toward the apparent good presented by reason, but does not tell us how the true good standing beyond the apparent good presented by reason can be known (p. 75). Nelson does not seem to take seriously the difficulties involved in ascertaining what is truly virtuous and rational. There is the false courage of the Nazi concentration camp guard that cloaks astonishing cruelty. Abortionists cloak their homicidal acts by claims that they are protectors of abused and vulnerable women. The cruelties of *la'issez faire* capitalism were accepted for decades as necessary for justice, and the license of the sexual revolution parades itself as tolerance, sensitivity, and intelligence. Nelson seems to be unaware that denying nature any role in determining moral right and wrong vastly complicates the process of moral discernment.

To repeat: he admits that the will inclines toward the apparent good presented by reason (p. 75), hut does not tell us how the true good standing beyond the apparent good presented by reason can be known. For Aquinas, the real moral good is found by the joint action of nature, reason, virtue and grace. All are necessary: practical reason, habitual action enlightened by grace, natural concepts and inclinations, and the powers developed as a result of the virtues. He admits that prudence requires a sustaining and all-encompassing vision of what constitutes the good life to be a virtue, and it acquires this by reason of the fact that it is a practical as well as an intellectual virtue (p. 84). But where does that vision required by the virtues come from except from nature, grace and charity? Reason alone presents too cloudy and confused a picture to fulfill this role, just as does nature or virtue if taken

alone, and it is only when all three of these are taken together that one can arrive at an adequate comprehension of the full truth of morality.

To promote his analysis, I think Nelson misrepresents some views. He argues that Aquinas condemns homosexuality as being contrary to our "animal" nature, thus demeaning Aquinas's criticism of these actions. It is more precise to say that Aquinas regards this as contrary not to just the animal dimension of our being, but to our very human nature (p. 122). He agrees with Aquinas that some acts such as murder and theft are known to be wrong by almost immediate apprehension or intuition. But Nelson asserts that prudence determines whether an action is murderous or unjust taking or not (p. 121). I am not sure it is entirely accurate to term this critical and decisive action the result of a prudential judgment. His understanding of McCormick's views of proportionate reasoning is really quite simple (pp. 134-5), for throughout the years proportionate reason has acquired many faces, and many who have studied it closely are not entirely sure that it has the only meaning he attributes to it.

His incomplete separation of virtue and nature may not succeed, for if this link is weakened, one would have to ask what in practice would make the virtues to be virtues if they orient us only to the rational but not the natural? What is it that makes prudence and justice good for persons in their operations? Why are fairness or intelligence good things to have? And even further, will this incomplete separation provide a satisfying answer to the question: "Why be rational and why be virtuous?" I think not. I wanted to believe this book was correct when I first read it, for I was convinced that the prevailing deontological direction of most natural law interpretations was wrong. Before reading this book, I thought the great task before moralists was to recover not only the virtues in general but prudence in particular in order to recover the best of Aquinas. But I now think this book is a serious distortion of Aquinas's thought and the first task is to recover Thomas's concept of nature and relate it harmoniously to reason and virtue. Under the guise of promoting the virtue of prudence as a means of bringing peace to moral debate, Nelson has radically altered the nature of Thomistic moral theology.

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

Program for the Study of Religion
University of Illinois
Champaign-Urbana, Illinois

In Defence of the Church Catholic: The Life of Stephen Gardiner. By GLYN REDWORTH. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. Pp. xii + 354. (cloth).

In a rather lengthy annotated bibliography to his 1977 history of England during the Reformation, Geoffrey Elton wrote, under the heading " Politics and Personalities," " For Gardiner we have only the rather simple book by J. A. Muller, *Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction* (London, 1926); a new book, long overdue, is rendered more urgent by the discovery of his 'Machiavellian treatise'."

It has puzzled me for a number of years that someone who was as well known and influential among his contemporaries as was Stephen Gardiner should be relegated to only occasional references in modern texts about the period. Muller's book was, for almost seventy years, the only work approaching a biography that had ever been published, and while it studied many (though by no means all) of his works, it is sketchy in a number of areas. In 1975, Peter Donaldson published a work under the title of *A MachiavelUan Treatise by Stephen Gardiner:* leaving aside for the moment the question of whether this treatise is, in fact, by Gardiner at all, this work was the sole study of the Bishop of Winchester's life and work since Professor James A. Muller's death in 1941.

It thus comes as a quite pleasant surprise that not one, hut two hooks should be published within a year of each other dealing with this particular era and subject. By far the more scholarly is this work by Glyn Redworth, an expansion of his doctoral thesis done under the direction of Christopher Haigh. It has two great advantages which are immediately evident. The first is that it is an original look at the life of a man who was, by turns, Secretary to Cardinal Wolsey and Henry VIII, Bishop of Winchester (the richest diocese in England at the time), Master of Trinity Hall, Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, and Lord Chancellor under Queen Mary. Far from being a revision of, or even dependent upon, Muller's work, it is a fresh look which is most welcome. The second is the wealth of the notes and the breadth of acquaintance with contemporary scholarship that is evident. One of the most revealing footnotes is the second note of the first chapter, in which the "unsatisfactory" label of "revisionism" is discussed, and the reader is lead to a " sympathetic critique of revisionism" in a 1987 article by the author. At least it is obvious where the author stands from the outset.

The strongest area of this work is the masterful consideration of the period between the fall of Cromwell and the death of Henry VIII.

Muller's biography was weak and distracted in this period, and Redworth not only follows Gardiner's activities quite closely, but places those activities in the larger area of European diplomacy. Primary sources are used in abundance, and the burgeoning secondary literature is used with discretion.

There are, however, two drawbacks to this book. The first is a problem in the methodology. The author at the very beginning states that he will concentrate on the life of Bishop Gardiner, and will not study the man's writings. This is a fair enough statement, but the almost complete absence of any reference to some of Gardiner's works, along with a limited reference to others, makes even the life of the Bishop incomplete. There are occasional references to the *Oration on True Obedience,* Gardiner's defense of the Royal Supremacy and his most famous work, but other than this, the literary side of Gardiner's life is missing. Gardiner was, it is true, noted for his diplomatic and political skill (to hold all of the offices Gardiner did for over thirty years and still to be able to die in his bed is remarkable for this period of the sixteenth century) : nevertheless, his writings often were more important. Archbishop Thomas Cranmer, in prison and awaiting execution in the reign of Queen Mary, was asked what was his greatest regret. The Archbishop replied that it was the fact that he had left one treatise of Gardiner's unanswered, and now he was out of time.

Even sources which shed light on Bishop Gardiner's activities do not show up in this biography. Gardiner's journal (Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, MS. 127), which he kept while imprisoned during the reign of Edward VI, does not show up in the list of manuscripts consulted, or in the footnotes of the text dealing with that period of Gardiner's life. In that same manuscript are a number of records of Gardiner's trial, which also are not mentioned in the biography. Most of Gardiner's journal is spent in his attempts at Latin poetry (including a long and not very spectacular poem on the name "Jesus"), but other information there is valuable to the assessment of the man. The place of Gardiner in the fight over the pronunciation of Greek at Cambridge University, referred to in only one footnote (p. 222, n. 46), is likewise a further area which is neglected to the detriment of the biography. Gardiner's letters on the subject are long, and show a scholarship that is not otherwise evident in his political correspondence. To view this controversy, as Redworth does, as primarily a political one in which Gardiner seeks to repress innovations only seems to catch part of the story.

The author does, however, refer to the *Machiavellian Treatise* in some detail, and rejects Gardiner's authorship. Here he performs the service of righting a number of misconceptions. Both Muller and Pierre Janelle, in an earlier generation of Reformation scholarship, knew of

the treatise and discussed it in their correspondence. Both thought it spurious. Redworth, independent (so far as I know) of Muller and Janelle's correspondence, comes to the same conclusion for the same reasons. Here the author's attention to at least one of Gardiner's attributed writings was of some value, but only by exception.

This lack of reference to Gardiner's writings leads the author to some inaccuracies. When Redworth concludes that Gardiner accepted the 1549 Book of Common Prayer as an act of obedience to the will of the prince, he ignores Gardiner's defence of the Prayer Book both in his interrogations during his trial as well as in his attacks on Archbishop Cranmer regarding the Eucharist. Gardiner cited five points in the Service of the Holy Communion which, he said, " were most consonant with Catholic doctrine." This was a shrewd political point, as well, since Cranmer was the author of the service. Some have suggested that the reason for the rushed revision, in a more radical and Protestant direction, of the Prayer Book in 1552 was that a Catholic interpretation could be put on the Service of Holy Communion by such as Gardiner and his followers.

The second drawback of this biography is the use of the term "Catholic" (with both a capital and lowercase "c"). The very title of the Book, *In Defence of the Church Catholic* (as opposed to the " Catholic Church " ?) raises this question. The author's use of the term " Catholic " is not consistent, even in his own writing. Sometimes it refers to what would now he called the Roman Catholic Church, after the Act of Supremacy had separated the Church of England. Sometimes it refers to that party within the Church in England which sought to retain the usages and doctrine of the pre-Reformation Church, and of which Gardiner was the most famous and visible leader. Sometimes it refers to a " Catholic " tradition or doctrine, used in a way which is familiar to Anglicans of a particular stripe, hut which is not in common use (here, " Catholic " would almost he synonymous with " Patristic ") ; this last usage may be closest to that of Gardiner and his interlocutors. This confusion is not helped by the inconsistent usage of the writers of the period. This whole problem is made worse by the scholarly question of continuity; namely, what, if any, ecclesial body is in continuity with the pre-Reformation Catholic Church in England? Is it the Church of England? Is it the Roman Catholic Church? Is the Catholicism of Pole or More *substantmlly* different from Henrician Catholicism?

The polemic, and the difficulty of solution, of this latter problem is evident in Gardiner's own life. John Foxe records that Gardiner, returning from the Colloquy of Ratisbon, was received at Louvain as a Catholic Bishop and treated to a sumptuous banquet where Gardiner

"was presented with wine in the name of the whole University." That evening, one of the feasters recalled that this was the man who had written the foremost theological defense of the Royal Supremacy: the following morning, when Gardiner asked for vessels and vestments to say Mass before proceeding on his way, they were refused him, as to an excommunicate or a schismatic. This incident is significant for a number of reasons: it shows that, whatever anyone else might have thought, Gardiner certainly thought he was a Catholic. The ambiguity of that label, and how far exactly it extended, is also quite evident. Some explanation of the difficulty and some consistency of usage in the text of the biography would have been welcome.

The text itself appears to have a number of editorial flaws: p. 201 begins in the middle of a paragraph, and the opening lines are omitted. In the second paragraph of p. 176, numbers are transposed so that what is printed as 1534 should read 1543 (in the context, a significant difference) .

The book is, on the whole, a contribution to scholarship that is long overdue. That a man who was so powerful (not to say feared) during his own lifetime should wallow in oblivion is confusing. Redworth's biography, for all its incompleteness, is of great value in piecing together the life of this leader, both political and ecclesiastical, who sought to fashion the emerging English Church and nation into a recognizably Catholic form.

W. BECKET SOULE, 0.P.

Dominican House of Studie$
Washington, D.C.

Art and the Word of God (Arte e la Parola di Dio): A Study of Angelico Rinaldo Zarlenga, O.P. Edited by VINCENT I. ZARLENGA, O.P. (text in English and Italian). River Forest, Illinois: Fra Angelico Art Foundation, 1990. Pp. xiv + 109.

The religious order of the Dominicans (Order of Preachers) was founded in the thirteenth century by St. Dominic with the specific purpose of preaching the Gospel or " ministry of the Word." With the Franciscan Order it shared in the creative, artistic impulse that produced the medieval cathedrals. It is often said that the great *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas, for all its intellectual rigor, is also a work of art comparable to the gothic masterpiece of Chartres cathedral.

Dominicans and Franciscans thought that the Gospel should find expression not only in words, but in poetry, music, architecture, and

the plastic arts. Among the artists who were members of the Dominican Order are the recently beatified Fra Angelico (BL Giovanni da Fiesole), Bartolommeo della Porta, an important influence on Raphael and other High Renaissance painters, Juan Mayno the gifted Spanish contemporary of El Greco, Pere Couturier, the advocate of modern church art and friend of Matisse, and the American sculptor, Thomas McGlynn. Carrying on this Dominican tradition, Angelico Rinaldo Zarlenga (1919-1986), a native of Italy, worked in the United States from 1949 until his death. The present work, edited by his brother Vincent, also a member of the Order, makes available a chronological catalogue of his paintings, sculptures, and designs in glass, with many illustrations in full color, along with a biography and critical appreciations by others, including Cardinals Joseph Bernadin and Mario Luigi Ciappi. It is an important contribution to the history of Catholic religious art in the United States.

The noted German theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar built his whole theology not on the goodness and truth of God, but on His *beauty*, or in biblical terms, God's "glory." According to St. Thomas Aquinas, " beauty " is the " radiance of truth," that is, it is truth as truth is related well to our knowing powers. Like the fit between the key and the lock, beauty is the fit between known and the knower. That is why a landscape on a cloudy day looks dull and uninteresting, but when the sun comes out it appears strikingly beautiful. The sun's illumination has made the dim objects vividly visible, radiant to our eyes.

This is what the artist does for us. He does not clothe the facts of reality with an adventitious beauty, but he illumines those facts so that what before seemed dull every-day reality now appear to us in its profoundly meaningful truth. Unfortunately too many artists today have lost fatih in the meaningfulness of our world. To them it is absurd, empty. Consequently, they find nothing better to do with their genius than to display their originality and skill or their private moods.

Angelico Zarlenga, as a man of faith, found a better way to be an artist. It was not that he saw the truth of the world around him as sweetly ideal. Many of his works, such as the " Crucifix of the Skyscrapers " (page 43) , have as their theme the bitter pain of our world. But this painting does not make protesting evil its ultimate subject, but rather the beauty of God's mercy shining through the suffering, which he himself experienced both in lack of appreciation for his work during his lifetime, and in his last long illness from cancer. Authentic Christian art, therefore, never covers over the Cross, nor the ugly injustices of our world against which it must always protest, but it reveals the beauty of hope which the Gospel truth declares.

Those who read this handsome book and study the paintings and sculptures of Zarlenga in excellent color will be able to follow the phases of his artistic development and find many subjects for meditation and enjoyment.

BENEDICT M. ASHLEY, O.P.

Aquinas Institute of Theology
St. Louis, Missouri

The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. By BRIAN DAVIES, O.P. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992 (cloth); Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993 (paper). Pp. xv + 391.

An establishing circumstance of the 'restoration' of Christian philosophy at the end of the last century, and the turn of this century, was that the medieval authors whom Christian philosophers turned to were, by profession, theologians whose appropriation of philosophy was for explicitly theological ends. By and large, however, the modern authors who set about retrieving medieval thought had an agenda quite different from that of their medieval luminaries. Still reeling from the philosophical fall-out of the Enlightenment, and encountering rationalism, idealism, and empiricism on all sides, committed Christian thinkers sought a source of philosophical reflection and, perhaps more importantly, justification, that could buttress the claims made by Christianity for those who were within the believing community, and defend the faith from the intellectual attacks of those who were not. The enduring philosophical inheritance of the Middle Ages, and particularly the *philosophia perennis* of St. Thomas Aquinas, was that source, wrote Leo XIII in his *Aeterni patris*, and Catholic philosophers soon collected.

But the inheritance was not fully collected. With distinctive philosophical goals in mind, Christian philosophers focused upon the putative philosophy of medieval writers, particularly Aquinas, and largely left theological reflection alone. And, when theological contentions on the part of medieval authors did make their way into the discussion, they were almost inevitably appropriated as a legitimate incorporation of revealed teaching into what somehow remained the philosophical project. The result was 'Christian Philosophy.' Although this resulted in the flurry of Catholic philosophical study during the first half of this century, the picture that emerged of the medieval authors, and of Thomas in particular, was inevitably one-sided, and incomplete. An overly pessimistic assessment of the situation would be to say that, for all the hard work of the Gilsons and Maritains, Van Steenberghens and DeKonincks, we are no nearer to Thomas today than we were in the 1870s.

Brian Davies's endeavor seeks to change that, because it attempts to provide the modern reader with a comprehensive introduction to the great expanse of Thomas's thought according to the manner in which Thomas himself presented it in his mature theological masterpiece, the *Summa theologiae.* Fr. Davies has succeeded magnificently, and his book will become, as it should, a mainstay on the bookshelves of university libraries, students, and teachers alike. Professional philosophers whose work never leads them to Thomas's discussion on Christ, say, can readily get a good working knowledge of how Thomas approaches this center of Christian faith and practice. And the student who is altogether new to Aquinas can grasp something of the ' movement ' of Thomas's thought by reading, and re-reading, Davies judicious renderings of Thomas's doctrine on human acts. This is a book of many uses, all of them instructive and helpful.

Considering this book to be an introduction, as Fr. Davies does (p. viii), does not do justice to the quantity of his achievement in writing it, or of the student's investment in reading it. The work occupies some 391 pages, reading made difficult by the tightly-knit character of Thomas's thought, though Davies' easy writing helps to allay the burden. The physical constitution of the book, in slightly off-white octavo paper and an 11-point base font, makes for comfortable reading. Davies has avoided excessive footnoting, giving references to Thomas's text judiciously, and he also provides a well-tailored and impressively diverse bibliography at the end .of the volume which can be effectively consulted by his reader. The author himself is a foundational theologian at Blackfriars in Oxford, so one might expect him instinctively to address the particular audience he encounters in his work. But, save on a very few occasions, Fr. Davies is mindful that in selecting a broad audience he has cast a very wide net; the book is generally free from various forms of philosophical or theological ' newspeak,' and thus all readers with a willingness to read what is by necessity a long book will find themselves both able to do so, at the outset, and rewarded they when have done so, at the end.

The book begins with a preliminary chapter devoted to sketching Thomas the man to the reader. Basing himself upon standard sources in Thomistic literature, such as Weisheipl, Chenu, Boyle, Pegis, Gilby, and others, Davies provides the reader with the ' Shape of the Saint,' giving him an account of Thomas's life and profession, together with a short explanation of the discipline Thomas called *sacra doctrina.* Following the order of the *Summa theologiae,* Davies next turns to address how we get to God, and then to the divine attributes. Here Davies is in comfortable, and constant, conversation with any number of thinkers who frequent the discipline of the philosophy of religion, a particular forte of Davies (Oxford University Press is presently pub-

lishing his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion).* In fact, Davies' coverage of Thomas's 25-question treatment *de deo uno* in the *prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae* amounts to 163 pages of text, or more than two-fifths of the entire book's length-the discussion of the Trinity, by contrast, is 22 pages long. But this portion of the book is no mere recitation of topics interesting to philosophers of religion, for Davies does the reader the service of unifying the minute considerations of this or that particular topic from the philosophy of religion into a single, compelling presentation of Thomas's doctrine of God, a presentation that in turn serves as a reliable foundation for the rest of the book's topics, even though they receive less attention in terms of the quantity of writing. In short, philosophers of religion will surely want to read Davies's account to get some sense of where the Aquinas they study from the point of view of his doctrine on, say, the divine immutability or eternity, unity or predicability, sees the discussion of God heading; readers with interests in ethics or christology, on the other hand, will be able to obtain a sense of the God that Thomas sees as the unifying dogmatic principle of all of the other topics considered in the *Summa theologiae.*

Davies next turns to a presentation of the human person, considering the constitution of humans, the immortality of the soul, and the nature of voluntary action, in a chapter entitled ' Being Human.' This is followed by a very useful chapter, 'How to Be Happy,' that sketches the outlines of Thomas's foundational moral teaching, and by 'How to Be Holy,' which deals with the Old Law, the New Law, and divine grace. Unfortunately, the selectiveness that Davies must exercise in so large an undertaking as this book results in a treatment of faith, hope, and charity that lasts only 22 pages, with no *ex professo* treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, or even of prudence and the other cardinal virtues. The upshot is something of an inversion of the history of the *Summa theologiae:* the *secunda secundae,* to which Thomas himself devoted the most text, and which medieval scriveners most often copied, gets scant treatment in Davies book. It is true that there are many able accounts of the subject-matter of the *secunda secundae* to be found in Thomistic literature, but Davies has shown himself in this book to be so able a presenter of Thomas's thought that one is sorry not to see him use his gifts on a portion of Thomas's *Summa* that is enjoying increasing popularity and influence today.

The book finally turns to treat of Christ, his saving work, and the sacraments, with particular emphasis placed upon the crowning sacrament of the eucharist. Davies addresses well some objections raised to Thomas's teaching on transubstantiation, and brings the chapter, and, abruptly with it, the book, to a close. The book's ending does mirror that of the *Summa theologiae,* even though it would have been helpful,

I believe, for Davies to provide the reader with a separate summary of the book in which he emphasized three or four of the main ' thrusts ' of the integral teaching of Thomas. Fr. Davies has been, after all, our guide in the book, and someone who has performed the impressive feat of appropriating Thomas's great literary legacy would surely have some insights of enduring use to his reader.

Davies himself admits (p. ix) that his task, because of its size, required him to be selective, and indeed he is in the book, for there are no significant treatments of Thomas's account of creation, the angels (important if only for its account of created intellect and will), the hexameron, human knowledge, the passions, sin, the cardinal virtues, and the contemplative and active states in life. Yet in spite of this Davies delivers to the reader a picture of Aquinas that will allow him, I believe, quickly to appropriate Thomas's teaching on those subjects, should he turn to them. And that, for any book of this type, is the true test. This book is highly recommended for interested undergraduates, graduate students whose work touches upon Aquinas's teaching in whatever way, and philosophers and theologians who seek to have a broad, well-integrated account of the teaching of the ' Common Doctor.'

MARK JOHNSON

Saint Joseph's College
Rensselaer, Indiana

GENERAL INDEX TO *THE THOM/ST*

VOLUME 58 (1994)

ARTICLES

INDEX OF ARTICLES (*Oontinue<l)*

REVIEWS

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWED *(Continued)*