THE NATURE AND GRACE OF *SACRA DOCTRINA* IN ST. THOMAS'S *SUPER BOETIUM DE TRINITATE*

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I NQUIRIES INTO THE meaning and function of *sacra doctrina* in St. Thomas's thought have long centered on the pregnant yet cryptic opening question of the *Summa Theologiae*. Relatively little attention has been devoted to its treatment in his exposition of Boethius's *De Sancta Trinitate.* [1] Yet this early text, devoted to questions of theological and philosophical method, explores with unusual sophistication the various dimensions and tasks of *sacra doctrina:* a knowledge dependent on revelation and reason; the relationship between faith and reason; the work of reason within and apart from faith; justifications for belief; and the psychological, epistemological, and theological grounds for the complementarity between faith and reason.

This study will explore these various facets of *sacra doctrina* in the *De Trinitate* in order to establish how Thomas, toward the beginning of his career, laid down an intermeshing foundation for philosophy and theology in a work all the more valuable for

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[1] All references to St. Thomas's opusculum on the *De Sancta Trinitate* (hereafter *De Trinitate* or *In Boet. de Trin.)* depend on the critical edition of the Leonine Commission, *SuperBoetium deTrinitate* (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1992). Translations and paraphrases of the first four questions are taken from or based on Armand Maurer, *St. Thomas Aquinas: Faith, Reason, and Theology: Questions I-W of His Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius,* Medieval Sources in Translation (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1987). Translations and paraphrases of the last two questions rely on Armand Maurer, *St. Thomas Aquinas: The Division and Methods of the Sciences. Questions V-VI of His Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius* (3d ed.; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963). The first page reference following citations refers to the Leonine critical edition; the second, to the respective translation of Maurer.

being the sole thirteenth-century commentary on Boethius's text. [2]
What emerges in this daring exposition, which supported the
edifice of his thought to the end, is the construction of an over-
arching science-a wisdom-that embraces a "meta-philosophy"
and a "meta-theology," in which neither component, while
retaining its own identity and its own acts, can be understood
without the other. A study of this text also reveals that much of
the teaching on *sacra doctrina* in the *Summa Theologiae* is simply
a borrowing or rearrangement of ideas already advanced in this
early opusculum. [3]

  In question 1, Thomas examines theology's contribution to
philosophy. [4] How does a thinking steeped in faith know the

[2] Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas,* vol. 1: *The Person and His Work,* trans.
Robert Royal {Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 67-68;
345. For other brief treatments of the setting, history, importance, and bibliography of
Thomas's commentary, see the Leonine Commission's *Super Boetium de Trinitate,*
"Introduction," 5-9; James A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought and
Works* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), 134-38, 381-82; and M.-D. Chenu, *Toward
Understanding Saint Thomas,* trans. A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1964), 276-78. The most painstaking textual analysis is that of Michel Corbin, *Le
chemin de la theologie chez Thomas cfAquin,* Bibliotheque des archives de philosophie,
nouvelle serie (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 291-474. The historical background to Thomas's
text and to the medieval efforts to develop a theology of the Trinity are ably treated in Leo
Elders, *Faith and Science: An Introduction to St. Thomas' Expositio in Boethii de Trinitate*
(Rome: Herder, 1974), esp. 7-24. Ralph Mcinerny provides a helpful assessment of the
influence of Boethius on Thomas in *Boethius and Aquinas* {Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1990), 1-29. Douglas C. Hall's *The Trinity: An Analysis of St.
Thomas Aquinas' Expositio of the De Trinitate of Boethius,* Studien und Texte zur
Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, ed. Albert Zimmermann, no. 33 (Leiden, New York, Koln:
E. J. Brill, 1992), is especially helpful for studying the relationship of the *De Trinitate* to the
Commentary on the Sentences (39-40; 48-49, 55-58). For an extensive list of texts in the
Thomistic corpus treating the question of theological method, see Yves Congar, A *History of
Theology,* trans. Hunter Guthrie (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 91-92.

[3] For an alternative approach that detects a gradual development in Thomas's concept of
sacradoctrina from the *Sentences* through *De Trinitate* and the *Summa contra Gentiles* to the
Summa Theologiae, see Corbin, *Le chemin de la theologie,* 64-107. A textual-systematic
approach is in any case recommended in the presence of the *quaestio* which, shaped by
discrete arguments and responses, lends itself to the interpreter's toil of reworking its parts
into a systematic whole.

[4] The structure of the *Super Boetium de Trinitate* is simple and meticulous, if incomplete.
Following Boethius's text (preface and two chapters), Thomas's opusculum is comprised of
an introduction (pro/ogus), three brief commentaries *(expositio prohemii, expositio capituli
primi,* and *expositio capituli secund1),* and six questions marked off in three groups of two
questions which follow each *expositio.* The literal commentaries closely follow Boethius's

limits and limitations of philosophy in a way hidden from philosophy itself? Furthermore, how does theology clarify the nature of philosophical thinking by situating human knowing in a larger field of knowers? Theology, reaching over to interpret philosophy from a revelatory perspective, finds that its own self-understanding is broadened in the process. In question 2, Thomas examines philosophy's contribution to theology. How does knowledge that arises solely from reason and that is placed before, within, and alongside the knowledge that proceeds from faith contribute to building up a body of knowledge whose content represents a human assimilation of divine truth? More-over, how can this knowledge assist theology even as it retains its own nature and methods? [5] In its task of converting belief into *sacra doctrina,* philosophy both becomes something else and remains itself as theology's companion, counterpart, and competi-tor. Question 3 plumbs yet deeper to uncover the principles and nature of *sacra doctrina* embedded in faith, along with offering a "theology" of philosophy that places both sacred science and secular knowledge within the ambit of the natural desire for God. Finally, question 5, within the context of sorting out the various sciences of natural reason, articulates the basis of faith, itself the basis of *sacra doctrina,* in God's revelation.

The major issues introduced in the prologue are largely raised and resolved in these four interrelated questions. We cannot do better than to trace Thomas's argument textually, for he arranged his work to unfold in accordance with the nature of the subject matter as well as with Boethius's text. [6] However, while Boethius employed a recondite style in order to exclude unworthy readers,

text, while the six questions probe more fully issues raised in the *expositiones,* as the introductory remarks to questions 1, 3, and 5 indicate.

[5] Unless otherwise indicated, "theology," "divine science," and "sacred doctrine" are used interchangeably in this study in both their Latin and English forms to refer to the discipline which, following upon revelation and presupposing faith, investigates God and his creation as it is related to him. "Theology" is to be distinguished particularly from theology as a branch or dimension of metaphysics, and "divine science" is to be contrasted with God's own science or knowledge.

[6] The coincidence of systematic and textual order is helped by Thomas's recognition that Boethius proceeds theologically, that is, he begins with the absolute starting point of the Trinity, which only faith reveals (In *Boet. de Trin.,* prol. [75; 3-4]).

Thomas's work, by its very nature as exposition and commentary, seeks to illuminate and develop Boethius's teachings even to the point of clarifying the character of his veiled and obscure style.[7] The result is an exposition, concise yet comprehensive, that skillfully images its prototype because a master is commenting on a master.[8]

I. THE PROLOGUE: A QUEST FOR THEOLOGICAL METHOD

First statements are usually important in works that treat of first things, and *De Trinitate* is no exception: "The natural gaze of the human mind, burdened by the weight of a perishable body, cannot fix itself in the first light of truth, by which everything can be easily known."[9] Presuming Thomas's Aristotelian psychology of powers and nature, his relatively optimistic assessment of human nature, and above all his fleshly anthropology, one might well be startled by the spiritualist cast of this statement and its propensity to judge human nature by angelic or divine standards. Since an interpretation that finds Thomas succumbing to angelicism or so-called Platonism must be excluded by the most rudimentary familiarity with his epistemology and anthropology, we must look for other explanations.

Textually, the opening statement anticipates Boethius's preface, which expresses disquiet in the face of the awesome mystery being approached. It provides a counterpoise to the optimism, absent in Boethius, which is expressed in the epigraph quoting Wisdom 6:22: "I will seek her out from the beginning of her

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[7] *In Boet. de Trin.* (69; 7); pro!. (75-76; 3-6); exp. proh. (79; 11). For Thomas's discussion of the prudent use of obscure speech in theological writing, see *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 4 (100-102; 51-55).

[8] Thomas's work as exposition and commentary is itself an image of Boethius's text, which Thomas understands as purporting to image God's own knowledge. For he interprets Boethius's opening statement as identifying the efficient cause of the text as principally God's divine light and secondarily the author's mind *(In Boet. de Trin.,* exp. proh. [77; 8]). Thus the *De Trinitate* as text images what it teaches, namely, a sacred teaching rooted in God's revelation and transmitted in a tradition.

[9] "Naturalis mentis humane intuitus, pondere corruptibilis corporis aggrauatus, in prime ueritatis luce, ex qua omnia sunt facile cognoscibilia, defigi non potest" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* pro!. [75; 3]; see also ibid., q. 1, a. 1, ad 4).

birth, and will bring the knowledge of her to light." 1 Further, it responds to Sacred Scripture by paraphrasing the anthropology of Wisdom 9: 15: "For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things. "[11] In this way Boethius's apprehension is both acknowledged and balanced by two scriptural texts respectively concerned with the light of human wisdom and the weight of our corporeal nature. This juxtaposition is reinforced rhetorically through a series of contrasts: *aggrauatus* and *luce, facile* and *non potest, naturalis intuitus* and *corruptibilis corporis.*[12] Systematically, the contrast presents the two poles that govern all six questions of the *De Trinitate:* the lowly human mind and the human nature it illumines, and the transcendence of the Trinity as ultimate object and end of the graced human intellect's desire. The brilliance of Thomas's opening remark appears more clearly when understood as not simply confirming a source of revelation, but also as interpreting the opening state-ment of *Aristotle'sMetaphysics-the* text on first principles which likely represented for Thomas the finest achievement of human reason. As a commentary on Aristotle's bold assertion that all human beings desire to know, the opening statement of the *De Trinitate,* without denying the doctrine of desire, inscribes the believer's experience of epistemological disappointment in the capacity of the human intellect to know the highest truths by its own power.

This initial declaration, then, not only balances the epigraph by tempering Scripture with Scripture, it also mediates between Jerusalem and Athens by moderating the optimism of human thinking with a sobriety that leans on divine wisdom. We know from faith that we do not know from nature the first truths except as through a mirror darkly. In an imbrication of the Socratic mood, God's word gives us knowledge of our ignorance

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[10] "Ab initio natiuitatis inuestigabo et ponam in lucem scientiam illius" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* pro!. [75; 3]).

[11] Douay Rheims version. "[C]orpus enim quod corrumpitur adgravat animam et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem" *(Biblia Sacra: Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem,* vol. 2 [Stuttgart: Wiirttembergische Bibelanstalt, 1969]).

[12] See Thomas's discussion of the necessity of veiling theological discourse as evidence of his rhetorical sensitivities *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 4 [100-102; 51-55]).

in a way and to a depth unknown to philosophy. Hence the *De Trinitate,* as a query into our ignorance, attempts to bridge the gap between the infinite and finite in the realm of knowledge and to set this knowledge against the enlightening matrices of divine and angelic knowledge, human participation in this knowledge, and other kinds of human knowing. In this pursuit of somehow knowing what it cannot know and in ways it cannot know, the human mind is directed both into itself in the reflective analysis that ponders its own act and above itself to the highest Knower for whom we are partly suited in our nature and our knowledge, both by nature and by grace, already now and forever in glory. [13]

The opening statement of the prologue introduces an argument that points to the natural limitations of the human mind ascending to a knowledge of God through knowledge of creatures. God compensates for the human incapacity to know him adequately by providing "another, safe way of knowing ... through faith. "[14] Although this passage does not conclusively establish that *per {idem* means "through the mediation of faith" rather than "through faith itself," a subsequent statement clarifies that this knowledge is based on faith but not identical to it. [15] A basic distinction between philosophical and theological knowing follows: philosophers consider creatures before the Creator, presumably in their ascent to him, while theologians first consider the Creator by virtue of God's revelation. This distinction punctuates the *De Trinitate's* major theme of the limits and possibilities of knowledge variously addressed in the following six

[13] "From the Vlth century text [of Boethius], we pass to the XIIIth century commentary [of Thomas] in which the questions dealt with reveal perhaps the topmost point reached by XIIIth century's critical reflexion upon itself" (Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas,* 278).

[14] "Et ideo Deus humano generi aliam tutam uiam cognitionis prouidit, suam notitiam mentibus hominum per fidem infundens" *(In Boet. ck Trin.,* pro!. [75; 3]). For a similar argument, see ibid., q. 3, a. 1 (107-8; 65-67). The use of *via,* when compared with its pivotal use in the arguments for God's existence *(STh* I, q. 2, a. 3), suggests that Creator and creatures share a common task in bridging the chasm that separates them.

[15] "[C]ognitionis desuper date principium est prime ueritatis notitia per fidem infusa" *(In Boet. ck Trin.,* pro!. [75; 3]). Like the opening article of the *Summa Theologiae,* the *prologus* thus distinguishes, if not sharply, between truths of faith and theological reflection following upon them. However, the emphasis here, in contrast to the *Summa,* is on knowledge of God rather than salvation.

questions.[16] More immediately, it elucidates Boethius's theological method whose point of departure is "the supreme source of things, namely the Trinity of the one God," and so establishes this knowledge as a pursuit of divine knowledge dependent on faith, rather than the knowledge of faith itself.[17] Finally, this archi- tectonic distinction between theology and philosophy introduces a "meta-theology" or wisdom that overarches both knowledge based in faith and natural knowledge by defining each in opposi- tion to the other, but in such a way that their mutual assistance is implied in their passing trajectories between God and creation.[18]

Such in fact appears at once in reflection on the loftiest and most abstruse mystery of the faith. Thomas follows Boethius's example of comparing and contrasting the divine processions with created ones. Is this analogy a divine teaching or a human one? It appears to be both: certain scriptural texts are cited to indicate its revelatory lineage,[19] yet these analogies also serve as concepts for ordering human thinking that Thomas finds at the core of Boethius's own theological vision. In a prefiguration of the *Summa Theologiae's* own structure, Boethius's consideration of uncreated and created processions is seen by his commentator as the key for opening up his entire theological scheme of procession and restoration.[20] The rapid path from reflection on the highest to reflection on the whole in order to understand the highest suggests that both thinkers understand that speech about

[16] Even a question as metaphysically abstruse as whether two bodies can exist in the same place is the locus of a teaching on the limits of reason *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 4, a. 3, ad 1 [129-30; 105-6]).

[17] "Hunc ergo ordinem sequtus Boetius, ea que sunt fidei tractare intendens, in ipsa summa rerum origine principium sue considerationis instituit, scilicet trinitate unius simplicis Dei" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* pro!. [75; 4]).

[18] Thomas may have been prompted here by Aristotle's deployment of a meta-wisdom in the philosophical domain that, by defining the subject matter of first philosophy, is situated both within and beyond it. See Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* 1.9-12; and Aquinas, I *Post. Anal.,* lect. 17-21; Aristotle, *Metaphys.* 1.2; 6.1; and Aquinas, *In Metaphys.,* prooemium.

[19] Thomas cites Ephesians 3:15; Colossians 1:15; and Proverbs 8:22.

[20] *In Boet. de Trin.,* pro!. (76; 5). As presented in the *De Trinitate,* Boethius's tripartite scheme is the Trinitarian God, the procession of good creatures from the good God, and the renewal of creatures through Christ. The *Summa Theologiae* combines Boethius's first two parts in the *Prima Pars,* and then divides his last part into the "renewal of creatures" *(Secunda Pars)* and "through Christ" *(Tertia Pars).* All of this is prefaced by a preliminary treatment of *sacra doctrina (STh* I, q. 1, a. 1) that parallels Boethius's preface.

the Creator presupposes speech about the created. For this reason, the statement that God is treated first in theology must be interpreted with a certain elasticity.

Turning to the question of method, Thomas leans on the unimpeachable authority of St. Augustine to introduce the distinction between leaning on authorities and following reason. Boethius's preference is reason: "The aim of the present treatise is to clarify the mysteries of faith, as far as this is possible in the present life." [21] Thomas emphasizes that this rational quest for understanding the highest things presupposes faith by fortifying Augustine's authority with Scripture: the way of reason is reserved to the wise individual who investigates knowledge of the Trinity "which men of former times accepted on authority alone." [22] Depending on a kind of thinking of which only the few are capable, the method of reason embodies a special kind of knowing conversant with the created order that transposes its insights into understanding of divine matters. [23] The argument clearly implies that those who take the truths of faith further along the path of understanding are to be praised above those who simply believe on the basis of authority.

This suggests that divine revelation not only allows for but actively reveals the truth that the deepening of one's knowledge of revealed truths by enlisting human reason is to be encouraged. Such a conclusion is reinforced by the prologue's closing image of the wise man, borrowed from Job, that makes for a fitting inclusion with the epigraph: "He has searched the depths of rivers, and hidden things he has brought forth to light." [24] It is also braced on the level of human reason by a shrewd observation on Boethius's writing for the understanding few. The difficulties

[21] "Finis uero huius operis est ut occulta fidei manifestentur quantum in uia possibile est" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* pro!. [76; 6]).

[22] "quam antiqui sola actoritate asseruerunt" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* pro!. [76; 6]). Ecdesiasticus 39: 1 is cited.

[23] The following brief commentary on the preface to *De Sancta Trinitate* provides evidence of this by employing the doctrine of fourfold causality, unfolding various forms of argumentation, and acknowledging the limitations of its own human reasoning *(In Boet. de Trin.,* exp. proh. [77-79; 8-12]).

[24] "Profunda fluuiorum scrutatus est et abscondita produxit in lucem" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* pro!. [76; 6]). Job 28:11 is cited.

set before the reader are the locks that either bar him from reading the text, or the occasion for summoning ingenuity and patience so as to release them. [25] In fact, Thomas has made the reader's task less arduous by sounding all the major themes of his text in his sparse introductory remarks. Both in his brevity and in his clarity he continues along the path Boethius marked out in the human quest for understanding the deep 'things of God and his creation. Already Thomas has given the major outlines of what he will soon call *sacra doctrina:* a faith-based inquiry into the highest cause, and the implications of this cause for everything else.

II. QUESTION 1: HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS

In continuity with the theme of the prologue, the first article of the *De Trinitate* shows that the human mind's resources are sufficient for it to know the truth without a new divine illumination. The nature of the human mind is elucidated as the power that is principally engaged with the acts of believing, thinking, and theologizing. In the first part of the *responsio,* reason and revelation, represented by Aristotle and Scripture (Ps 4:7), respectively, join together to establish against Avicenna that the agent intellect is a power of the soul. [26] The conclusion that the active and passive powers working together are adequate for the intellect to perceive the truth leads to the second subargument, which demonstrates that the intellect's power extends to certain intelligible truths that fall within its proper domain. This judgment about natural truths is apparently made by reason. But the companion claim that other truths-among them the truths of faith-lie beyond the capacity of reason and are only known by a divine illumination "supplementing the natural light," obviously depends on premises that arise from

[25] "ut ea que in hoc libro scribuntur tantum sapientibus colloquantur, qui hec intelligere poterunt, sicut est auctor ipse et ille ad quern liber conscribitur, alii uero, qui capere intellectu non possunt, a lectione excludantur: non enim libenter leguntur que non intelliguntur" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* exp. proh. [79; 11)). The argument of ibid., q. 2, a. 4 (100-102; 51-55) is also pertinent to this discussion.

[26] Thomas's awareness of Aristotle's ambiguity on this question, which occasioned Avicenna's position in the first place, is captured in his careful formulation: "uerba Philosophi … magis uidentur sonare" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, a. 1 [82; 16)).

faith. [27] Finally, a concluding subargument, also relying on revealed principles, shows that divine Providence offers ordinary guidance to all created natures by directing their powers to their respective acts, and that the human mind therefore requires this divine activity for its natural functions as well. [28] To varying degrees, then, the various subarguments enlist both revelation and reason to defend the human intellect's capacity to know truth on the strength of its own nature, albeit a nature dependent on God's creative and providential causality.

Clearly, a special divine illumination is assumed here for demonstrating the naturalness of human knowing inasmuch as the argument depends in large part on principles that derive from faith. Revelation offers reason its resources to help it to understand its own nature as well as its limitations as a self-possessed power. For only in a theology of creation that points back to the intentions of the Creator who makes, shapes, and guides it in its acts does human reason find its ultimate articulation. To this end, Thomas intricately weaves an inductive argument of reason, working backward from activities to the nature and functions of the human intellect, with deductive arguments rooted in doctrines concerning the truths of faith and secondary causality. At first glance the argument's dependence on theological premises suggests that reason is inadequate to the task of accounting for itself. To be sure, Thomas joins revelatory principles to principles taken from natural psychology, anthropology, and epistemology in part because of the difficulty of the subject matter, [29] but his intention is also to advance a "theological psychology" that offers far more than reason can provide on its own. No contradiction is involved in the implication that the human mind needs a supernatural illumination to know adequately that it does not need a new illumination to know truth, for a more comprehensive theological approach to the argument does not negate its strictly philosophi-

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[27] "superaddito lumini naturali" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, a. 1 [82; 17]).

[28] For a discussion of the agent intellect as an immediate participation in God's own light, see Jan H. Walgrave, "Die Erkenntnislehre des hi. Thomas von Aquin," in *Aktua/itiit der Scholastik?,* ed. Joseph Ratzinger (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1975), 30.

[29] "multa inquisitione indigeat ad cognoscendum quid est intellectus" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, a. 3 [87; 27]).

cal conclusions. Unable to account thoroughly for its own capacities and limitations, reason transcends itself by merging with faith in order to learn more about its nature than it can gain on its own. Hence the question of whether the human mind is adequate for its own act can be clarified more satisfactorily with the aid of faith, even if reason is taken beyond its own horizon. Paradoxically, reason comes to understand more adequately that it is self-standing by way of a meta-theology which, without calling attention to itself, sheds light on the human intellect by pointing to the radical conditions of its exercise and the limitations of its power. In other words, faith helps reason to see to what extent reason does not need faith-and to what extent it does.

Asking whether the human mind can arrive at a knowledge of God, article 2 addresses the issue of human knowledge of divine matters. It follows the example of the preceding article both methodologically, by engaging faith and reason, and substantively, by clarifying the natural limits of human knowing in its pursuit of the ultimate cause of all things. This clarification is achieved by contrasting the human intellect to the divine intellect and angelic intellects with respect to the way one knows oneself and other beings. The argument centers around knowledge as possession of the form known. Something can be known either through its own form or through the form of something similar to itself. Further, there are two ways that something is known through its own form: either through the form which is the being itself (as God knows himself through his essence) or through a form derived from the reality (as the human intellect knows the stone through its abstracted form). Neither of these ways, however, applies to the human intellect's knowledge of God in our present state. For knowing God through the form that is his essence, which constitutes the beatific vision, is unavailable to an intellect that for now can only know anything by abstracting its form from the senses. As for knowing something through a form that is derived from it, any likeness imprinted by God in the intellect would be created and hence inadequate for reflecting his infinite essence. Finally, knowing God through purely intelligible forms is also ruled out because the human intellect in this world is naturally related to images. Hence God can only be known

through the form of something similar to himself, namely through the form of his effect. Some effects are equal to the power of their causes, and provide knowledge of the cause's essence; other effects are unequal, and can only provide knowledge of the existence of the cause. Since all effects fall short of God, the human intellect is only able to conclude that God exists. However, Thomas turns from Aristotle to Dionysius to widen access to knowledge of God through the three ways of causality, supereminence, and negation.

As with the first article, principles arising from faith are indispensable for this argument's attempt to investigate the power and limits of reason. Even in the terms in which it is framed, the primary question of whether the human mind can know God presupposes knowledge of him not available to human reason. Reason contributes epistemological and psychological principles borrowed from Aristotle;[30] faith provides doctrines which support an intellectual penetration of mysteries concerning the beatific vision and the nature of God and of angels. By situating the human intellect within a larger field of suprahuman and human knowers enjoying the vision of God's essence, Thomas presents a theological epistemology of the human mind that provides knowledge of ways of knowing that do not or do not yet apply to us. The net effect is a complex interpenetration of philosophy, faith, and theology that establishes limits for the operations of reason in this world. [31]

But can the truths of faith provide the human intellect with a knowledge that transcends the capacities of reason? For knowing the limits that are naturally set for human reason is already in some sense to have transcended these limits in order to know them as such. Thomas addresses this question toward the end of the *responsio* in the affirmative, but in a way that accents the *via negativa:*

[30] Maurer directs our attention, among other references, to *De Anima* 3.7; *Post. Anal.* 2.7-10. Here, as throughout the work, he provides an extensive list of sources *(Faith, Reason, and Theology,* 21-22).

[31] This argument is not complete, for Thomas will later show that revelation, in the act of revealing the need for it, instructs natural reason in the limits of its intellectual powers *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1 [106-9; 63-70]). See also *SI'h* I, q. 1, a. 1, and *ScG* I, c. 5.

The human mind receives its greatest help in this advance of knowledge when its natural light is strengthened by a new illumination, like the light of faith and the gifts of wisdom and understanding, through which the mind is said to be raised above itself in contemplation, inasmuch as it knows that God is above everything it naturally comprehends. But because it is not competent to penetrate to a vision of his essence, it is said in a way to be turned back upon itself by a superior light. [32]

As splendid and far-reaching as the teachings derived from faith may be, even they cannot circumvent the human intellect's present inability to attain to a knowledge of God through the divine form or through purely intelligible forms that bear a likeness to him. By means of the illumination of faith, however, the believing mind transcends itself by learning that God in himself remains unknowable to it *in via.* Reason, when elevated by the light of faith, "is raised above itself" insofar as it breaks out of its own boundaries to learn that its natural boundaries are not exceeded by this new illumination. Whereas the first argument presented a theology based in faith showing reason its own limits, here a comparison of various knowers enables theology to know what limits even a supernaturally illumined human intellect encounters-and to know them precisely as limits.

Article 3, investigating whether the intellect knows God before everything else, continues the exercise of applying insights rooted in both reason and faith to understand the nature and limits of the mind. Human unhappiness and disagreement about the nature of God provide initial evidence for a negative answer. The hypothesis that proposes that the human intellect first knows the divine light implanted within it is rejected, but this response requires a more extended analysis of what in fact the intellect first grasps by rneans of an inquiry into the mind's own act of knowing. In contrast to the first two articles, which borrow heavily from insights that depend on faith, article 3 relies largely on premises available to reason to bring the intellect to a

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[32]"In hoc autem profectu cognitionis maxime iuuatur mens humana cum lumen eius naturale noua illustratione confortatur, sicut est lumen fidei et doni sapientie et intellectus, per quod mens in contemplatione supra se eleuari dicitur, in quantum cognoscit Deum esse supra omne id quod naturaliter compreendit. Set quia ad eius essentiam uidendam penetrare non sufficit, dicitur in se ipsam quodarnmodo ab excellenti lumine reflecti" (In *Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2 [85; 22-23]).

heightened self-awareness of what it need not know in order to know. [33] Knowledge begins with the object known; only then does the mind reflect on its act, and by means of the act reflect on its nature. Since reflexive knowledge presupposes simple knowledge of objects, the natural intelligible light which bestows the power of understanding need not itself be first understood. [34] A rather involved epistemology justifies this claim, which not only illuminates human knowledge of God but helps to preserve human knowledge from needless complexity. [35]

Explicitly returning to Boethius's Trinitarian theology, article 4 argues for the impotence of reason in coming to a knowledge of the Trinity. Arguments from divine causality lead back only to the one God, who faith alone knows is the three Persons who mutually share in the work of creation. [36] This conclusion appears as the consummation of the entire question insofar as it directs all of its epistemological efforts toward the most sublime mystery of faith. Though the emphasis is on reason being taught its absolute boundary with respect to knowledge of God's intimate nature, we should observe what is doing the teaching: the faith-infused intellect which alone possesses knowledge of the Trinity. Hence article 4 points in two directions. On the one hand, by showing that natural reason is ignorant of God's innermost nature, it confirms the teaching of article 2 that inquiry based in faith deepens one's knowledge of God's utter transcendence as well as the human incapacity to penetrate to the vision of his essence or even grasp the conditions of its exercise. On the other hand, the intellect infused with faith, informing the natural intellect of what it alone knows of the Trinity, shows to what extent truths of faith

[33] To be sure, theological reasoning also comes into play in accounting for the general knowledge of and desire for God present in everyone from the start, but this is secondary: "non ... oportet quod [Deus] sit primus in cognitione mentis humane, que ordinatur in finem, sed in cognitione ordinantis; sicut et in aliis que naturali appetitu tendunt in finem suum. Cognoscitur tamen a principio, et intenditur in quadam generalitate, prout mens appetit se bene esse et bene uiuere; quod tune solum est ei cum Deum habet" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, a. 3, ad 4 [88; 29]).

[34] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, a. 3, ad 1 (88; 28).

[35] See Walgrave's excellent treatment of theology's contribution to epistemology in "Erkenntnislehre," 23-30.

[36] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, a. 4 (89-90; 31-32).

offer the believer an intimate and exclusive knowledge of God's nature. [37]

Natural reason, however, is not simply on the receiving end. Alongside the double-edged growth in knowledge of God and knowledge of natural and faith-based ignorance of God is the contribution that reason makes to theology. For inquiry based in faith must know what reason can know by itself in order to distinguish such knowledge from what reason can know only through faith as well as what reason cannot know even with it. To begin with, natural knowledge of God varies from person to person relative to the capacity to apprehend adequately the relationship of causes to effects.[38] Since this knowledge pertains to metaphysics, which in turn presupposes familiarity with the other theoretical disciplines, knowledge of God and of the character and limits of human knowledge presumes facility in the human sciences.[39] While these disciplines do not pertain to theology per se, the kind of fundamental theological inquiry undertaken in these articles presupposes considerable knowledge of material logic, anthropology, psychology, physics, and metaphysics insofar as these disciplines help to identify the capacities and limits of the human intellect, especially concerning the highest truths. [40] In this way all human disciplines can assist natural reason in presenting the breadth of its capacities to faith.

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[37] For a discussion of the historical context of the question of the function and limits of reason and revelation in the debate over whether and to what degree human reason can aspire to natural knowledge of the Trinity, see Jarislav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine,* vol. 3, *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300)* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 284-88.

[38] "Et tamen unus cognoscentium quia est, alio perfectius cognoscit: quia causa tanto ex effectu perfectius cognoscitur, quanta per effectum magis appreenditur habitudo cause ad effectum" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2 [84; 22]).

[39] "Human sciences" refers to disciplines dependent on natural reasoning in contrast to sacred science based on faith.

[40] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1 will later confirm this. There the third among five reasons for the necessity of faith is to make certain truths available to all: "propter multa preambula que exiguntur ad habendam cognitionem de Deo secundum uiam rationis: requiritur enim ad hoc fere omnium scientiarum cognitio, cum omnium finis sit cognitio diuinorum, que quidem preambula paucissimi consequntur; unde, ne multitudo hominum a diuina cognitione uacua remaneret, prouisa est ei diuinitus uia fidei" (108; 67). See also ibid., q. 6, a. 1, ad 2 (third part) (163; 65); and *ScG* II, cc. 2-4.

In sum, question 1 offers a balanced assessment of the power
and limits of human reason in general and especially in its
investigation of first principles. Rejecting from the start the need
for a special divine illumination for the functioning of natural
reason, Thomas enlists conclusions of both faith and reason to set
reason on its own two feet by defending its capacity-in one sense
a tautology that supports his case-to accomplish what it has been
empowered to do. But the following articles put a halt to a
natural power that would aspire to an adequate knowledge of
God, whether through his own essence (art. 2), or as the first
truth known (art. 3), or in the form of a rational deduction of the
Trinity (art. 4). At the same time, knowledge that is infused by
faith helps the intellect to come to a deeper self-understanding of
what it can naturally know and what it cannot, what its
limitations are within the larger arena of divine and angelic
knowing, the genesis of its own act of knowing, and its radical
circumscription by faith's exclusive access to God's revelation.
Theology's analytical forays into philosophical psychology, while
remaining eminently theological, serve to clarify both the super-
natural and the natural. Grounded in principles derived from
God's revelation, the reflecting mind, infused by faith, is able to
know what reason cannot know without the benefit of faith, and
even to "know" something of what transcends reason illumined
by faith. By reflection, illumined by revelation, the believer is able
to look at his intellect, as it were, from the outside.

III. QUESTION 2: MANIFESTING THE DMNE KNOWLEDGE

The following sources of knowledge have been introduced in
the first question: natural reason, particularly as it is exercised by
the learned; the light of faith; the gifts of wisdom and under-
standing; and reason illumined by faith. These principles, which
have explored the nature and limits of human reason, are directed
in question 2 to examining the divine science rooted in revelation
and pursued by the reflective human intellect insofar as it is
illumined by faith and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The thematic
sequence from reason to divine science follows the logic that
reason's nature and limitations must be probed before its

resources can be applied to matters of faith. There is, to be sure, the suggestion of circular reasoning in this order of presentation: question 2 formally investigates, with reason's assistance, the nature of a theological science that has already served in question 1 as a source for examining human reason. But circularity is avoided if the arguments of question 1 defining nature and reason are understood as critical moments in divine science's work of distinguishing itself from natural reason in its quest for self-understanding. [41]

A) Article 1: The Divine Permission for Human Inquiry into Divine Matters

The fundamentally different perspective introduced by the second question can be appreciated by contrasting the issues raised in question 1, article 2 ("Whether one can attain to a knowledge of God") and question 2, article 1 ("Whether one should consider divine things by way of investigation"). [42] The earlier question, inquiring into the capacities of human reason to probe the highest cause, bypasses the issue of whether such questioning is permissible. Instead, it concludes that human reason requires the assistance of the new illumination of faith to arrive at an adequate knowledge of God. The second question, framed within the ambit of faith, asks the more basic "moral" question of whether revealed truths should be investigated. At the same time, this argument builds on the conclusions of question 1 insofar as the proposal that the mind should seek knowledge of God in the manner proper to it presupposes philosophical and theological insights into the nature and limits of human knowing. If the earlier question examined the possibilities of human knowing from the human perspective, the present question approaches the issue of limitations from God's viewpoint. More simply, the movement is from what we can know to what we

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[41] Or to paraphrase the teaching of *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, a. 1, the science by which we know is not that which we first know.

[42] "utrum possit ad Dei notitiam peruenire" (80; 13) and "utrum diuina liceat inuestigando tractare" (92; 35) (my translation).

should know. [43] However, by inquiring into God's will with respect to the human aspiration to know him, the question obliquely points to the paradox that its resolution presupposes sufficient knowledge of God's wishes.

Thomas strategically places the moral question before the major epistemological concern of the following article: whether a divine science is possible. [44] This sequence indicates his departure from Aristotelian methodology, in which the first question to be asked would be *an sit-in* this case, whether a science of the particular matter at hand is possible. [45] However, that question can be deferred until article 2, because no matter what an inquiry into the precise nature of divine science yields, the revealed truths which ground any such knowledge cannot be denied. It is this prior faith which bids any investigation to reflect an antecedent reverence for God at the outset. For any inquiry arising from God's revelation is foremost a personal inquiry into the mode of response due him, a "person-to-person" encounter that appreciates the possibility of God's desire for privacy and searches natural wisdom, Christian teachers, and God's word itself for an answer. [46]

[43] Hall, *The Trinity,* 71-72; Elders, *Faith,* 43. In fact, the answer to the question this article poses was already adumbrated in *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2, which favors the human mind's advance in knowledge by the illuminations of faith, wisdom, and understanding. However, reason must also be aware of its limits; see, e.g., ibid., q. 4, a. 3, ad 1 (129-30; 105).

[44] Only the last of seven objections in *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 1 (92; 36) raises an epistemological objection to inquiring into divine matters.

[45] Aristotle, *Post. Anal. 1.1;* Aquinas, I *Post. Anal.,* lect. 2. For a helpful elucidation of the application of Aristotle's and Thomas's teaching to the postulation of a science, see William A. Wallace, *The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology* (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1962), 17-20. Boethius is not cited here in support of Thomas's position, most likely because he was recognized as one of the tradition's strongest proponents of the use of reason in theology. His admonition, "si poterit rationemque coniunge," may be taken as the motto of his thought (Tractate 2, "Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus," in *Theological Tractates,* ed. and trans. H. Stewart, E. Rand, and S. Tester, Loeb Classical Library [Latin], vol. 74 [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973], 36).

[46] Johannes Stohr, "Die Theozentrik der theologischen Wissenschaftslehre des Hl. Thomas von Aquin und ihre Diskussion bei neuzeidichen Kornrnentatoren," in *Thomas van Aquin: Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen,* vol. 19 of *Miscellanea Mediaevalia,* ed. Albert Zimmermann (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 493. See also Stohr, "Theologie als 'Sacra doctrina' bei Thomas von Aquin und in neueren Auffassungen," in *Veritati Catholicae: Festschrift (Ur Leo Scheffczyk zum* 65. *Geburtstag,* ed. Anton Ziegenaus,

The personal encounter between God and human beings implied by the question is in fact the point of departure for the argument: "Because our perfection consists in our union with God, we must have access to the divine to the fullest extent possible, using everything in our power, that our mind might be occupied with contemplation and our reason with the investigation of divine realities."[47] Thomas appeals to divine testimony for his claim by citing Psalm 73.[48] The intellectual pursuit of God, in both contemplative and argumentative modes, is thus enfolded in a more comprehensive quest for human perfection realized in union with God. Moreover, the human yearning for God is positioned within a yet more inclusive theological vision of desire which portrays every creature as naturally drawn to become more and more like God in its own way.[49] In answer, then, to the moral objection that we should humbly refrain from inquiring into divine matters, Thomas responds with the moral imperative to strain after knowledge of the divine on the basis of our natural bent toward the perfection of our human powers-but let human inquiry into divine matters avoid the threefold perils of presumption, rationalism, and overweening pride as it forges ahead to consummate the graced nature's aspiration toward union with God. A theological epistemology appears in the premise that knowing God makes the creature more like him insofar as knowing is a way of being. A theological anthropology appears in the teaching that the human desire to know God represents and

[47] "cum perfectio hominis consistat in coniunctione ad Deum, oportet quod homo ex omnibus que in ipso sunt quantum possibile est ad diuina annitatur, ut intellectus contemplationi et ratio inquisitioni diuinorum uacet" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 1 [93; 37]). It is clear, then, that Thomas is not reducing the Christian faith to a science or the Christian life to a rigid academic pursuit. Its epistemological thrust is rather to be understood as simply one expression of the divine-human encounter, embracing the human desire for a knowledge of God both clear and certain.

[48] "Michi adherere Deo bonum est" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 1 [93; 37]). Elders notes that the *sed contra's* citation of 1 Peter 3:15, which counsels readiness to defend one's faith, was a medieval *locus classicus* for justifying the theological enterprise and inquiring into its nature *(Faith,* 42).

[49] "Set quelibet creatura mouetur ad hoc quod Deo assimiletur plus et plus quantum potest, et sic etiam humana mens semper debet moueri ad cognoscendum de Deo plus et plus secundum modum suum" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 1, ad 7   39)).

expresses the all-embracing desire of the graced human nature for intimate kinship with him. Both together offer a theological *propter quid* argument *ex suppositione finis* that justifies the necessity of seeking understanding of the highest mysteries.[50]

Supporting this argument from revelation is a citation from Aristotle urging us, "so far as we can, [to] make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accord with what is best in us."[51] At first glance, this appeal to philosophical testimony appears surprising since it obscures the distinctively theological turn of the argument. In any case, Aristotle's counsel was intended to animate his readers to aim for suprahuman things, not to defend an inquiry devoutly alert to the sensibilities of a Prime Mover who just might take offense at being the object of mortal inquisitiveness.[52] There is, however, a common logic linking the Christian and Greek teachings: behind Aristotle's assertion lies the doctrine of humankind's affinity with the divine that is both reflected and achieved in the search for divine knowledge.[53] Thomas has raised this insight to the status of its revealed counterpart by marshaling scriptural, theological, and philosophical sources to shape an argument for advancing a quest for knowledge of God that is based in revelation. Indeed, this argument both anticipates and advances an integrated notion of divine science composed of theological and philosophical premises. At the same time, a supplementary instruction safeguards against any confusion concerning the distinctive modes of argumentation by distinguishing theology from philosophy as the discipline that follows upon faith is distinct from the discipline

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[50] In addition to citing Aristotle to support this argument, Thomas reinterprets benignly certain passages from Job and Hilary which endorse a certain reticence in investigating divine questions. See also *In De Qzusis,* lect. 1. *Propterquid* demonstration in theology is discussed in *Quodl.* 4, q. 9, a. 18; see·also James A. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of *Sacra Doctrina* in the *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1," *The Thomist* 38 (1974): 68-69.

[51] "in quantum contingit immortale facere, et omnia facere ad uiuere secundum optimum eorum que in ipso" (Aristotle, *Nie. Eth.* 10.7.1177b31-34; quoted in *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 1 [92; 37]). See also Aristotle, *Metaphys.* 12.7.

[52] Such deference is in fact unnecessary toward a self-contemplating Contemplator who is blissfully unaware of any human inquiries made into his existence or nature.

[53] Aristotle, *Nie. Eth.* 10.7.1177b26-32; *Metaphys.* 12.7.1072b14-30.

that precedes it.[54] When arguments are employed in matters of faith, it is not a question of reason demonstrating truths of faith, but of applying persuasive analogies from reason to the truths of faith.[55]

B) Article 2: The Character of Divine Human Science

The foundation of theological reasoning in faith, which protects inquiry into divine matters from the dangers that arise when it is mistaken for merely another human science, is explicated in article 2. Faith as our human entry into a divine knowledge is made possible solely through God's initiative in revealing himself; in him the thinking believer finds the source, motive, exemplar, and illumination for his own quest for divine knowledge. At the same time, it is faith that creates the major obstacle for granting theology scientific status.[56] In any case, the major issue in article 2 is not faith, but the subject, principles, and ways of knowing divine matters on the part of God, the blessed, and wayfarers. Knowledge of this knowing is due to God's freely sharing his knowledge of both his own knowing and creaturely knowing to us creatures who receive this knowledge according to our own mode of reception. Despite its concern to distinguish God's own science from human participation in it, the argument does not articulate a theology of faith. This is in keeping with Thomas's method of assuming principles that he will later justify-a method that will be justified in his teaching on faith.[57]

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[54] "ubi queritur fides, argumenta tolluntur que fidei aduersantur et earn precedere conantur, non ilia *que* ipsam modo debito sequntur" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 1, ad 3 [93-94; 37-38]; *see* ialso ibid., resp.). *See* J. Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine,* vol. 4, *Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300-1700)* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984),!64.   ,

[55] *In   de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 1, ad *5* (94; 39). The metaphysico-theological justification for this is given in q. 2, a. 3 and is treated below.

[56] For an examination of the obstacles that sacred doctrine must overcome in order to be recognized as a science, *see* Chenu's appraisal of Thomas's treatment in the *Sentences* and how this is surpassed in the *De Trinitate* and the *Summa Theologiae* ("La theologie *comme* science au XIIIe siecle," in *Bibliotheque Thomiste,* ed. M.-D. Chenu [Paris: J. Vrin, 1957]: 63-92); also Corbin, *Le chemin de la theologie,* 340-43, 380-86.

[57] I treat this issue below in the discussion of *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1.

The *responsio* of question 2, article 2 is comprised of three parts: (1) the human approach to divine knowledge is distinguished from the "natural" approach (that is, for God and the blessed); (2) two distinct sciences are shown to follow from this distinction: one follows our way of knowing, the other we share in imperfectly; and (3) theological reasoning grounded in faith is interpreted as a participation in God's own knowledge. Thomas begins by stating that the nature of science consists in certain conclusions necessarily following from known truths. Since this also holds for the divine things, there can truly be a science of them.

Now the knowledge of divine things can be interpreted in two ways. First, from our standpoint, and then they are knowable to us only through creatures, the knowledge of which we derive from the senses. Second, from the nature of divine realities themselves. In this way they are eminently knowable of themselves, and although we do not know them in their own way, this is how they are known by God and the blessed.[58]

At this point any human accessibility to this "natural" knowledge other than an awareness of its being enjoyed by God and the blessed is only implied. Our way of knowing the divine things is not natural because the human knower is inadequate to the divine objects known.

In the second part of the *responsio,* however, human participation in the knowledge of God and the blessed even in the present life is acknowledged and described:

Accordingly there are two kinds of science concerning the divine. One follows our way of knowing, which uses the principles of sensible things in order to make the divine things known. . . . The other follows the mode of divine realities themselves, so that they are apprehended in themselves *[se ipsa capiantur].*We cannot perfectly possess this way of knowing in the present life, but there arises here and now in us a certain sharing in, and a likeness to the

[58] "Set diuinorum notitia dupliciter potest estimari: uno modo ex parte nostra, et sic nobis cognoscibilia non sunt nisi per res creatas, quarum cognitionem a sensu accipimus; alio modo ex natura ipsorum, et sic ipsa sunt ex se ipsis maxime cognoscibilia, et quamuis secundum modum suum non cognoscantur a nobis, tamen a Deo cognoscuntur et a beatis secundum modum suum" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2 [95; 41)). This argument anticipates the reasoning of *SI'h* I, q. 1, a. 2; I, q. 1, a. 3; and I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.

divine knowledge, to the extent that through the faith implanted in us we firmly grasp the primary Truth itself for its own sake *[propterse ipsam].*[59]

Surprisingly, the point of departure is not the sources of knowledge rooted in reason as distinguished from those rooted in faith, but the difference in epistemological perspective between human knowledge gained through sensible effects and a divine way of knowing taken from the divine realities themselves. Only after the articulation of this sharp distinction is a bridge thrown across the chasm to offer human beings access to the divine perspective. It is faith that enables us wayfarers to participate, if imperfectly, in a kind of knowledge that is not natural for us: God's own intellectual self-possession. Our simple cleaving in faith to the First Truth corresponds analogically to God's immediate self-knowledge,[60] but this can only be a very limited participation in intuitive knowing, as the first part of the *responsio* has already prepared us to conclude.[61] To the degree that we know in a way other than the discursive mode of thought based on sensible effects, we know in a way that the human intellect cannot adequately describe, as the argument presumes. Hence Thomas's elastic and bare language. It is clear from this obscurity that such an imperfect cleaving to the First Truth is not

[59] "Et secundum hoc de diuinis duplex scientia habetur: una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensibilium principia accipit ad notificandum diuina … alia secundum modum ipsorum diuinorum, ut ipsa diuina secundum se ipsa capiantur, que quidem perfecte in statu uie nobis est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu uie quedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem diuinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inhaeremus ipsi prime ueritati propter se ipsam" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2 [95; 41-42]). See *STh* I, q. 79, a. 9 for a similar formulation.

[60] A later statement seems to contradict this: "Vnde quamuis per reuelationem eleuemur ad aliquid cognoscendum quod alias esset nobis ignotum, non tamen ad hoc quod alio modo cognoscamus nisi per sensibilia" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 3 [167; 76]). However, the issue there is the present incapacity of the human intellect to know the essences of immaterial substances. Hence the formulation that "revelation … is fundamentally circumscribed: it alters *what* we know but not *how* we know," while pithy, is too facile (DenisJ. M. Bradley, "Aristotelian Science and the Science of Thomistic Theology," *Heythrop Journal* 22 [1981]: 168).

[61] Later, Thomas will teach that this cleaving through faith rests on the will moving the intellect to the act of belief under the persuasion of grace: "Actus autem fidei est credere … qui actus est intellectus determinati ad unum ex imperio voluntatis" *(STh* II-II, q. 4, a. 1). The Ottawa edition (1941) is used for all quotations from the *Summa Theologiae.*

yet a discursive theologizing. Something more is expected from the argument.

In the third part of the *responsio,* Thomas finally arrives at theology in the sense of a discursive human knowing that is based in faith:

And as God, by the very fact that he knows himself, knows all other things as well in his way, namely, by simple intuition without any reasoning process, so may we, from the things we accept by faith in our firm grasping of the primary Truth, come to know other things in our way, namely by drawing conclusions from principles. Thus the truths we hold on faith are, as it were, our principles in this science, and the others become, as it were, conclusions. [62]

In virtue of our analogical sharing in God's knowledge of all things in himself, we come to divine knowledge in a twofold manner. First, adhering to the primary Truth in faith, we participate in God's self-apprehension in our own way; second, by virtue of this adherence, we come to know other things discursively, just as God's simple intuition of all things follows immediately from his self-knowledge. If the second part of the argument took the human intellect to the extreme limit where it participates in the highest kind of knowledge it can only image but hardly grasp, the third part returns the intellect to its customary horizon. But what are these "other things" that we are to know in our way?[63] That there are other things at all is something new in the argument, for up to this point the exclusive concern has been the "divine things." Not only the mode of knowing but also its content returns us a more familiar world. More basically, the reason for this new kind of knowing is simply that there are other beings besides God that are to be known. Theological epistemology thus presupposes creation and

[62] "Et sicut Deus ex hoc quod cognoscit se cognoscit alia modo suo, id est simplici intuitu, non discurrendo, ita nos ex his que per fidem capimus prime ueritati adherendo, uenimus in cognitionem aliorum secundum modum nostrum, discurrendo de principiis ad conclusiones, ut sic ipsa que fide tenemus sint nobis quasi principia in hac scientia, et alia sint quasi conclusiones" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2 [95; 42]).

[63] The use of *aliorum* here should be compared with *omnium,* the last word of *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3, and *participatio et assimilatio* in the second part of the *responsio* (see note 59) should be compared with *impressio* in ibid. Also, the use of *sigillatio* in *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1, ad 4 (109; 68-69) should be noted in this context.

implicitly directs the created knower back to the very ground he is standing on.

At this point Thomas makes a significant adjustment. The grasping of the First Truth is now identified with holding firmly to the truths of faith, or (to borrow concepts Thomas sharpens later on) the formal and material objects of faith are here fused. But by identifying the primary adherence to the First Truth with adherence to the principles of faith, Thomas is able to reinterpret the more enigmatic language of human participation in divine self-knowing by the analogy of the act of understanding immediately grasping self-evident first principles. Even knowledge of divine realities that is based in faith can begin to assume a human form. [64] The discursive knowing based on understanding principles is properly the work of reason, but now within a properly theological domain. Insofar as it depends on the principles of faith, this analogy "humanizes" our participation in the divine knowing and brings it within the scope of natural discursive human thinking *(secundum modum nostrum discurrendo)*. Taken together, the two kinds of supernatural knowing-the primary grasp of faith and the theological reasoning following from it-image God's own viewpoint first in terms of object and mode of knowing (first kind), and then in the extension of this knowledge to other beings (second kind). Thus Thomas arrives at a knowledge that participates in divine knowing and assumes a form akin to the human sciences. As a cleaving to the First Truth, faith mediates between God's own knowledge and human reflection on this knowledge. It is itself analogous to both human and divine thinking inasmuch as it participates in the perfect, simple divine intuition while imitating reason's assent to the principles presupposed by all of the other sciences.

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[64] Since grace observes "the modes of the operations of nature … the human mind is not illuminated and stilled by forms from another world, but must wrestle with this one, and discover what lies behind and beyond by ranging from point to point: this *discursus* is present even in the activity of divine faith" ("Appendix 5: *Sacra Doctrina*," 59, in Thomas Gilby, ed., *Christian Theology*, vol. 1 of *Saint Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae*, ed. T. Gilby [London: Eyre & Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-81]).

The gap between God's knowledge and human participation in it is further bridged by the analogy of subalternated sciences.[65] Just as lower sciences presuppose and accept on faith principles that are self-evident only in higher sciences, so theology presupposes its principles, the articles of faith, by accepting on faith the word of those witnesses revealing what is self-evident only in the "highest science" of God's self-knowledge. The analogical character of this argument is flushed out in the objection one might make that a musician, for instance, could take the trouble of learning mathematics in order to acquire first-hand knowledge of the principles required for musical composition, whereas no one in this world can see for himself the self-evident principles that remain accessible only through faith.[66] What theologians can do, however, is follow the musician's likelier strategy: go to those who know and trust in their knowledge and integrity. They can go yet further, as Thomas does, by advancing reasonable arguments for the necessity and nature of belief. This is possible because *scientia divina,* like metaphysics, is charged to defend and analogically explain its principles, the articles of faith.[67] It is fitting, then, that Thomas introduces in this teaching on subalternation the concept of revelation, which supports the entire argument, in its relation to faith: "what is self-evident in the knowledge God has of himself is presupposed in our science, and [the articles of belief] are believed on the word of him who reveals them to us through his witnesses."[68] Insofar as *sacra doctrina* only participates in God's own knowledge through faith as a response to his revelation, it is incumbent on Thomas to investigate this ground of faith and revelation. These subjects are respectively treated in question 3, article 1, and question 5, article

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[65] "in scientiis subalternatis supponuntur et creduntur aliqua a scientiis superioribus, et ilia non sunt per se nota nisi superioribus scientibus. Et hoc modo se habent articuli fidei, qui sunt principia huius scientie, ad cognitionem diuinam: quia ea que sunt per se nota in scientia quam Deus habet de se ipso, supponuntur in scientia nostra" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 [96; 44)).

[66] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 7 (96-97; 44).

[67] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 4 (96; 43-44).

[68] "ea que sunt per se nota in scientia quam Deus habet de se ipso, supponuntur in scientia nostra, et creduntur ei nobis hec indicanti per suos nuntios" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 [96; 44]).

4, but the immediate task at hand is to show how divine science is indebted to natural reason to carry on its work. [69]

C) Article 3: The Rational Character of Sacra Doctrina

"Whether philosophical reasoning and authorities may be used in the science of faith which is from God" concretizes the conclusions of the first article of this question. [70] That article asked whether the divine things should be submitted to human rational inquiry; this article asks how divine science is to be practiced. Once again rational method is employed in the very resolution of an exploration of whether it should be permitted. Obviously this gives the argument an ironic character, but the irony makes a point: to argue against a human science of the revealed mysteries requires the deployment of reason to safeguard the revealed mysteries from reason. Similarly, to forbid philosophical arguments or sources in theology is already to demonstrate the capacity for distinguishing theology from philosophy adequately. Hence the gainsayer as well as the patron of scientific theology must think both theologically and philosophically.

Historically, this question responds to the concrete situation of the introduction into thirteenth-century Europe of Aristotelian texts and traditions, and the attendant fear that a scientific theology would profane a canon of teachings personally revealed by God. [71] To grasp the force of this question, we should envision

[69] The argument for subalternation in ad *5* prefigures *STh* I, q. 1, a. 2, where Thomas exploits this analogy to full advantage. Here it is embodied in the fifth response to an objection; there it comprises the pivotal second article of the entire work. A   of Thomas's notion of sacred doctrine with that of his predecessors indicates that the originality of his approach is in large part due to this teaching on subalternation. See Elders, *Faith,* 47.

[70] "utrum in scientia fidei, que est de Deo, liceat rationibus philosophicis et actoritatibus uti" (In *Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, intro. [92; 35]). In fact, q. 2, a. 1 presupposes an affirmative answer to the question this article poses since, as we have seen, Aristotle was cited as a source for supporting the proposition that the divine realities should be investigated.

[71] For the impact of the Aristotelian textual inundation of Western medieval thought, see the classic study of Fernand van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West: The Origins of LAtin Aristotelianism,* trans. Leonard Johnston (2d ed.; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1970), esp. 59-126, 147-97. For the background to the development of theology as science, see Chenu, "La theologie comme science," 9-108; ibid., *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas,* 298-310; Congar, *History of Theology,* 80-91, 95; Elders, *Faith,* 41; Charles Lohr, "Theologie und/als

a science of revealed matters that would not make use of
arguments and sources that do not rely on the truths of faith. But
if only arguments and sources from the Judaeo-Christian tradition
are permitted, one is faced with the difficulty that leading thinkers
of this tradition-indeed,   the Scriptures themselves-have   made
abundant use of pagan sources.[72] The real issue, then, is not
whether Aristotle, Plato, or other pagan philosophers might be
introduced into theology, but whether human learning from any
source other than revelation has a role to play in divine science.[73]
By responding in the affirmative, this argument shows how the
conclusions and methods of human inquiry are necessarily con-
stituent of what is now called for the first time *sacra doctrina.[74]*

The argument begins with the principle upon which Thomas's
entire theology and his concept of divine science are based: "The
gifts of grace are so added to nature that they do not destroy it,
but perfect it.*"[75]* This oft-stated principle can be just as often
misunderstood, for the relationship of perfect grace to imperfect
nature might suggest that nature is somehow merely tolerated,
and that, like St. Paul's faith and hope, it will one day pass away.
The radical formulation that grace perfects nature, only compre-
hensible within the horizon of faith, is actually "unnatural" not
simply because grace surpasses nature, but because the higher
principle here is serving the lower. Grace becomes the servant of

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Wissenschaft im friihen 13. Jahrhundert," *Communio* (German edition) 10 (1981): 316-30;
Otto Pesch, *Thomas von Aquin: Grenze und Gro{Se mittelalterlicher Theologie* (Mainz:
Matthias-Grunewald-Verlag, 1988), 128; Walgrave, "Erkenntnislehre," 27.

[72] For example, Wisdom 8:7 favorably identifies the four major virtues of Plato's *Republic,*
subsequently named the cardinal virtues.

[73] The perspective of the university is implied in the positioning of *sacra doctrina* alongside
the human sciences, apart from which it cannot be adequately grasped. For a discussion of
this perspective within the context of *sacra doctrina,* see Thomas C. O'Brien, "'Sacra
Doctrina' Revisited: The Context of Medieval Education," *The Thomist 41 (1977):475-99.*

[74] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3, obj. 7 (79; 46) and resp. (99; 48). Noting that *scientia divina*
is the preferred term in the *De Trinitate,* Maurer adds that for Thomas, "sacred doctrine is
the teaching revealed by God in sacred Scripture. More generally, it embraces 'whatever
pertains to the Christian religion.' *(Summa,* prol.)" *(Faith,* ix). See also his discussion in
Etienne Gilson, ed., *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1962), vol. 2,
Medieval Philosophy, 164-65.

[75] "dona gratiarum hoc modo nature adduntur, quod earn non tollunt set magis
perficiunt" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3 [98; 48]).

nature. [76] As perfective of nature, created grace presupposes, builds on, and even defers to nature by fitting it for what it is incapable of achieving by itself. As an instance of this principle, *sacra doctrina* presupposes, builds on, and even defers to human reason. [77] Indeed, just as created grace is in the service of nature, so *sacra doctrina* depends on the enduring presence of natural reason. This becomes clearer if Thomas's foundational axiom is read in the context of the two principles that enunciate the purpose of divine science: the pursuit of divine truth advances our quest for perfection as union with God, and belief is for the sake of understanding what is believed. [78] Beginning with the final cause, one can reason backward from human perfection as God actually intends it to the necessity of faith for setting in motion an intentional union with divine realities beyond our natural grasp. [79] If the human good embraces intellectual union with God, and the basis of this union is faith responding to grace, then faith becomes a necessary instrument in the intellectual perfection of the human person in transit toward the graced end of life with God. [80] Like

[76] This is reflected in the teaching that created grace is, as it were, an accident that inheres in the soul *(STh* I-II, q. 110, a. 2). See also *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1, ad 2 (108; 68); q. 6, a. 4, ad 5 (171; 84).

[77] "Only by a correct demarcation of the scope and territory of both nature and grace could the respective functions of reason and of revelation and the use of each of these in theology be defined" (Pelikan, *Growth of Medieval Theology,* 286).

[78] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 1 (93; 37); q. 2, a. 2, ad 7 (96-97; 44).

[79] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 1 offers similar reasoning by establishing the need for *saCTa doctrina* on the basis of the end of human *salus,* a form of argument that also responds to the Aristotelian teaching on teleological argumentation (see Aristotle, *Physics 1.4*). This approach reflects both the practical and the theoretical aspects of *sacra doctrina* inasmuch as human beings are charged with contributing to the attainment of their divinely appointed destiny, which is a contemplative gazing on God. I interpret this article along the lines of interpretation offered by O'Brien, "'Sacra Doctrina' Revisited," 493-99 and J.-H. Nicolas, "Le rapport entre la philosophie et la theologie," *Angelicum* 61 (1984): 5-7. For an alternative interpretation, see Weisheipl, "Sacra Doctrina," 68-69. For short, helpful summaries of classical positions on *sacra doctrina* and how they affect contemporary understanding, see Francisco P. Muniz, *The Work of Theology,* trans. John P. Reid (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1958), 10-13, and Weisheipl, "Sacra Doctrina," 57-63. Three attempts to remove contemporary hindrances to understanding Thomas's doctrine are found in Johannes Stohr, "Theologie," 672-73; Brian Davies, "Is *Sacra Doctrina* Theology?" *Heythrop Journal* 22 (1981): 141-47, *passim.;* and Brian Shanley, *"SaCTa Doctrina* and the Theology of Disclosure," *The Thomist* 61 (1997): 163-87.

[80] III *Sent.,* d. 25, q. 2, a. 1.

the created grace it depends on, faith serves human nature by bringing it to a fulfillment that lies beyond human power. Unlike created grace, it does not perdure, but dissolves into that highest understanding which is the light of glory.

In the present state, however, natural reason endures even in the presence of faith, which illustrates the foundational principle of grace perfecting nature in the realm of knowledge: "The gifts of grace are so added to nature that they do not destroy it, but perfect it. So too the light of faith, which is imparted to us as a gift, does not do away with the light of natural reason given to us by God. "[81] The second statement, which places the teaching of question 1, article 1 within the context of divine science, is not related to the first statement by way of analogy, but rather is a precision or instance of it. Faith is a gift of grace, and natural reason is an expression of nature. Three corollaries follow immediately from this principle. First, the truths of faith exceed the natural light of the human intellect. Second, no contradiction can obtain between the findings of reason and the teachings of faith since both derive from God. Third, with contradiction ruled out, an alternative relationship of similarity obtains between an unequal faith and reason: "since what is imperfect bears a resemblance to what is perfect, what we know by natural reason has some likeness to what is taught to us by faith. "[82]

The major question concerning the use of philosophy in divine science can now be resolved by applying these corollaries to *sacra doctrina:*

[81] "dona gratiarum hoc modo nature adduntur, quod earn non tollunt set magis perficiunt; uncle et lumen fidei, quod nobis gratis infunditur, non destruit lumen naturalis rationis diuinitus nobis inditum" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3 [98; 48]). It is instructive to compare this formulation with the principle of *SI'h* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2 which clearly links the relation of reason to faith with the relation of grace to nature: "Cum igitur gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei, sicut et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis obsequitur caritati."

[82] "Et quamuis lumen naturale mentis humane sit insufficiens ad manifestationem eorum que manifestantur per fidem, tamen impossibile est quod ea que per fidem traduntur nobis diuinitus, sint contraria his que sunt per naturam nobis indita: oporteret enim alterum esse falsum, et cum utrumque sit nobis a Deo, Deus nobis esset auctor falsitatis, quod est impossibile; set magis, cum in imperfectis inueniatur aliqua imitatio perfectorum, in ipsis que per naturalem rationem cognoscuntur sunt quedam similitudines eorum que per fidem sunt tradita" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3 [98-99; 48]).

Just as sacred doctrine is based on the light of faith, so philosophy is based on the natural light of reason. So it is impossible that the contents of philosophy should be contrary to the contents of faith, but they fall short of them. The former, however, bear certain likenesses to the latter and also contain certain preambles to them, just as nature itself is a preamble to grace. [83]

Just as faith is an expression of and response to grace, and natural reason is an expression of and response to nature, so *sacra doctrina* is an expression of and response to faith, and philosophy is an expression of and response to reason. In short, just as grace perfects nature, so *sacra doctrina* perfects reason. For this reason, we can expect the three corollaries of the superiority of grace, the noncontradiction between faith and reason, and the relation of perfect-imperfect likeness to apply to *sacra doctrina* and philo-sophy. Although presented in a different sequence, the three principles in fact are applied. The principle of noncontradiction is explicitly mentioned and assumed in that the specific yet compatible domains of sacred doctrine and philosophy arise from a common divine source; the principle of perfect-imperfect likeness elucidates the hierarchical nature of their complementarity; and the new formulation of nature as preamble to grace adds a striking restatement of the superiority of grace and the contribution of nature. As applied to *sacra doctrina* and philosophy, all three corollaries help to illuminate their separate-but-complementary character and define the indispensable role reason plays in the inquiry into divine matters.

We can link these corollaries, intimated in yet another sequence, to the three ways that *sacra doctrina* uses philosophy: demonstrating preambles, proposing analogies, and building defenses:

First, in order to demonstrate the preambles of faith, which we must necessarily know in [the act of] faith. Such are the truths about God that are proved by natural reason, for example, that God exists, that he is one, and other truths of this sort about God or creatures proved in philosophy and

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[83]"Sicut autem sacra doctrina fundatur supra lumen fidei, ita philosophia fundatur supra lumen naturale rationis; uncle impossibile est quod ea que sunt philosophie sint contraria his que sunt fidei, set deficiunt ab eis, continent tamen aliquas eorum similitudines et quedam ad ea preambula, sicut natura preambula est ad gratiam" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3 [99; 48]). See Stohr, "Theologie," 674.

presupposed by faith. Second, by pointing to the things of faith through certain analogies.... Third, in order to refute assertions contrary to the faith, either by showing them to be false or by showing them to be lacking in necessity.[84]

Demonstrating the preambles of faith manifests the principle of the superiority of grace, employing analogies engages the principle of perfect-imperfect likeness, and refuting spurious reasoning expresses the principle of noncontradiction. The three principles are now given a "chronological" sequence insofar as philosophy's threefold assignment refers respectively to the acts that precede, accompany, and follow upon *sacra doctrina* in its precise act of elucidating the mysteries of faith.

Philosophy's first task of demonstrating the preambles of faith establishes at the outset that natural reason has an indispensable if secondary role to fulfill in the pursuit of understanding revealed matters. However, this function anticipates *sacra doctrina* without contradicting either the teaching that divine science depends on faith or the principle that divine science perfects reason.[85] Moreover, the demonstration of the preambles of faith, while "prior" to *sacra doctrina* and formally lying outside the scope of its principles, is nonetheless caught up in its work. Since divine science participates in God's own intelligibility and "the gifts of grace are added to nature,"[86] the preambles of faith simply profess that faith presupposes intelligibility. Understanding what faith proposes precedes faith in the sense that it gives the potential believer cognizance of the terms of belief and so prepares the way for grace. In this way the preambles of faith offer a matrix for the understanding that depends on faith by situating *sacra doctrina* within the contours of human discourse and preparing it to speak

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[84]"primo ad demonstrandum ea que sunt preambula fidei, que necesse est in fide scire, ut ea que naturalibus rationibus de Deo probantur, ut Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi uel de Deo uel de creaturis in philosophia probata, que fides supponit; secundo ad notificandum per aliquas similitudines ea que sunt fidei, sicut Agustinus in libro De Trinitate utitur multis similitudinibus ex doctrinis philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandum trinitatem; tertio ad resistendum his que contra fidem dicuntur, sive ostendendo ea esse falsa, siue ostendendo ea non esse necessaria" (Jn *Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2,. a. 3 [99; 49]). It should be noted that *sacra doctrina's* dependence on reason to proceed scientifically is not mentioned here, perhaps because this is more properly the concern of logic.

[85]/n *Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 1 and ad 4 (95-96; 42-44).

[86]/n *Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2., a. 2 (98; 48).

a common language with reason by way of analogy. The preambles as presuppositions of faith thus assume a thematic continuity of subject matter between natural reason and reason illumined by faith that is more fundamental than the discontinuity in their sources of knowledge. Because the actualization of faith requires the intellectual recognition of an appropriate object, faith is perfective of reason only by first presupposing reason just as grace perfects nature only by first presupposing nature. Faith, then, has two sources: it is fundamentally rooted in grace by endowing the believer supernaturally with a share in God's self-understanding and perspective, but it is also steeped in nature by enabling the believer to respond to intelligible objects that give content to belief-hence the conclusion that the teachings of philosophy have a secondary role in *sacra doctrina.* [87] When this teaching on sources is joined to the earlier argument that faith terminates in knowledge of the divine things based on faith, it becomes clear that in unique ways faith both begins and ends in understanding. [88]

Philosophy's second function of offering analogies is most intimate to the faith, marvelously exemplified in Augustine's deployment of natural reason to explore the supreme mystery of the Trinity. [89] This function is based on two principles. The first is that grace perfects nature: the analogical structure obtaining between the natural and supernatural orders reflects God's creative fashioning of grace to complement created nature. The second arises from the structure of human divine science: creaturely participation in God's own knowledge enables human beings to take on God's universal intuitive perspective according to a human mode of knowing. Thus the entire argument of the preceding article undergirds Thomas's sparse statement here on the

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[87] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3, ad 1 (99; 49-50).

[88] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2 (95; 41-42) (see text quoted in note 59).

[89] See note 84 for St. Thomas's reference to Augustine's *De Trinitate (In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3 [99; 49]). "Alors que, pour ce qui est de son premier et de son troisieme role la philosophie demeure extrinseque a la theologie, par sa vocation de fournir des 'similitudes,' elle en devient une partie constituante" (Leo Elders, "Les Rapports entre la Philosophie et la Theologie," *Doctor Communis* 42 [1989]: 212).

analogical use of philosophy. [90] Dependent on grace and nature, and situated between divine knowing and natural reason, *sacra doctrina* mediates God's knowing and human knowing in two distinct moments. First it discovers analogues by inquiry into the created order, and then it applies them to the mysteries of faith. [91]

Where can analogues be found? In a supplementary argument building on the concept of subalternated sciences, Thomas enlarges the scope of *sacra doctrina* by substantially widening the contribution human knowledge makes to it. Whereas the principle of subalternation permits lower sciences to presuppose principles proved in a higher science,[92] this argument opens up the possibility of reversing direction by introducing the notion of prior and posterior sciences in the order of study: "posterior

[90] On the basis of a general reading of Thomistic texts which bear on this issue (see, e.g., *ScG* I, c. 8; II, c. 3; *STh* 1, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2; II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2), Congar divides this second use of philosophy into two further applications: (1) a deductive use of philosophy, "whereby an unknown or poorly known truth is brought to light through its connection with a better known truth" (this is its main role in theology); and (2) an "explicative and declarative role ... practiced with regard to the principles themselves," which elucidates them mostly "by offering analogies and congruent reasons." He then examines how Thomas in fact made use of all four applications *(History of Theology,* 97-98; see also ibid., 96-102; and Mark F. Johnson, "The Sapiential Character of the First Article of the *Summa theologiae,"* in *Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl,* ed. James R. Long, 85-99 fforonto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1991], 92-93). Pesch offers a somewhat different inventory of tasks *(Thomas von Aquin,* 138).

A further use of philosophy in *sacra doctrina,* which may be grouped under Congar's first application noted above, is the priority accorded to reason in reinterpreting a scriptural teaching that cannot be accepted at face value (see *STh* 1, q. 68, a. 3; and Swinburne's remarks on this (Richard Swinburne, *Faith and Reason* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981], 181-82). Thomas's interpretation-an accommodation of the scriptural sense to the intellectual capacities of Moses' audience--may be profitably compared to Friedrich Schleiermacher's comments on biblical hermeneutics *(On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers,* trans. Richard Crouter [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988], 100-101). Josef Pieper approves a critical use of philosophy: theology needs "the correction inherent in all things human," the resistance of philosophy to temper it and make it true and strong-"theology must brave 'this savage current'" (quoting Friedrich von Hiigel) *(Guide to St. Thomas,* trans. Richard and Clara Winston [New York: Pantheon Books, 1962], 156-57).

[91] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3, ad 7 (100; 51) and ad 5 (100; 50) respectively treat these moments. With respect to the first, Elders observes that "revealed truth will be a sort of deepening of natural insights, and is not wholly discontinuous with natural thought: natural concepts and principles are submitted to the revelation of God" (Elders, *Faith,* 51).

[92] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 (96; 44).

sciences employ the principles of prior sciences, whether the latter
be higher or lower in dignity" (my translation). [93] Just as meta-
physics borrows principles from lower sciences, so "theology, to
which all the other sciences are so to speak ancillary and propae-
deutic in its coming into being, though they are of lesser dignity,
can use the principles of all the other sciences."[94] Inasmuch as the
content of any science is virtually contained within its principles,
this is tantamount to stating that the entire domain of human
learning stands ready to serve *sacra doctrina.* [95] Not simply scat-
tered arguments pressed into the form of preambles of faith or
shaped into analogies, but the entire scope of secular learning can
be assimilated into *sacra doctrina's* very structure and content. [96]

In scattered texts, Thomas bores increasingly deeper to find
the ultimate ground for such an inclusive subject matter for
theology. First, he clarifies that "divine science is not only about
God. It is concerned with other things as well, which are not
beyond the human intellect even in its present state as regards
knowing *what* they are."[97] With respect to method, then, *sacra
doctrina* and the human sciences share in part a common subject
matter although they employ different modes of argument. [98]
Another text provides a reason for this overlapping subject

[93]"Scientie posteriores utuntur principiis scientiarum priorum, siue sint superiores siue
inferiores" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3, ad 7 [100; 51]).

[94] "similiter theologia, cum omnes alie scientie sint huic quasi famulantes et preambule in
uia generationis quamuis dignitate posteriores, potest uti principiis omnium aliarum
scientiarum" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3, ad 7 [100; 51]).

[95] "Mais la theologie dont il parle, [Thomas] !'envisage selon tout ce qu'elle est. Il
l'etudiera donc tantot dans ce qu'elle a de courant, pour ne pas dire de secondaire; tantot
quant ases sources et tantot quanta ses ruisseaux" (P. Sertillanges, quoted in J.-F. Bonnefoy,
"La theologie comme science et !'explication de la foi selon saint Thomas d'Aquin,"
Ephemeridestheologicaelovanienses 14 [1937]: 426-27). For a study of the all-inclusive
meaning of "philosophy" covering the entire corpus of human learning in Thomas's day, see
O'Brien, "'Sacra Doctrina' Revisited," 479-88).

[96] For the application of this teaching to a philosophy of God, see Benedict Ashley, "The
River Forest School and the Philosophy of Nature Today," in Long, ed., *Philosophy and the
God of Abraham,* 14.

[97] "scientia diuina non est solum de Deo, set et de aliis que intellectum humanum etiam
secundum statum uie non excedunt quantum ad quid est cognoscendum de eis" *(De Trin.,* q.
6, a. 1, ad 2 [third part] [163; 65]). The context of this remark is a justification of the
primacy of the intellectual mode of reasoning in natural theology.

[98] See *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 4 (153-54; 41-45).

matter: sacred doctrine considers "divine beings as they subsist in themselves and *not only* inasmuch as they are the principles of things" (emphasis added). [99] Here there is still a secondary focus on things, although now from the perspective of their principles. Yet another text expands on this teaching by applying an analogy between faith and theology:

Just as faith, which is in a way the habit of the principles of theology, has for its object the First Truth itself, and yet the articles of faith contain certain other things related to creatures insofar as they have some connection with the First Truth, in the same way theology is primarily concerned with God as its subject, but it includes many things about creatures as His effects, or as being in some way related to him. [100]

Creation is now approached from God's perspective insofar as it is related to him. Because God is the principle of everything that exists, *sacra doctrina* in an ancillary scrutiny shares in part a common subject matter with metaphysics, if from a different perspective, by considering God as the principle of all that is. With the subject matter of faith widened in a secondary sense to include creatures, theology now possesses the same subject matter as faith in both primary and secondary senses. In this way faith, already analogical to both divine and human thinking by imitating the divine intuition and grasping first principles in a human way, further enables the *sacra doctrina* based on it to merge the divine perspective with the human. By serving as the paradigm for theology even in terms of subject matter, faith's role as mediator is enhanced. Its contents become more accessible to the human intellect, which is better suited to understanding creatures than the Creator, and the transition from the principles to the conclusions of theology is further smoothed.

[99] "per hunc modum tractanrur res diuinae secundum quod in se ipsis subsisrunt et non solum prout sunt rerum principia" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 4 [154; 44]). This text is discussed below.

[100] "sicut fides, que est quasi habitus principiorum theologie, habet pro objecto ipsam ueritatem primam et tamen quedam alia ad creaturas pertinentia in articulis fidei continenrur in quanrum contingunt aliquo modo ueritatem primam, per eundem modum theologia est principaliter de Deo sicut de subiecto, de crearuris autem multa assumit ut effectus eius uel quomodolibet habentia habirudinem ad ipsum" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 4, ad 8 [156; 49]). This formulation anticipates the pivotal definition of *sacra doctrina* in *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3.

A final text treating divine science's particular focus on creatures places the accent directly on knowing creatures for the sake of knowing God and explicitly expands the subject matter to include all of being: "Although God is neither universal nor individual in himself, he is nonetheless the universal cause and end of all things. So our knowledge of him is in a way universal, extending as it does to everything." [101] How far we have come from the argument of question 2, article 2, which granted *sacra doctrina* a modest knowledge of "other things in our way [of knowing], namely by drawing conclusions from principles"! [102] Now the subject matter of *sacra doctrina* is asserted to be all-embracing: since God in himself and as universal cause and end is its focus, divine science is concerned with everything. For when human beings take on the divine point of view, all of being as created and directed by God, its principle and end, becomes its subject matter. Hence this last text states most profoundly what the companion texts more or less point to: analogues may be found anywhere in creation and brought into the service of divine science.

In sum, these various texts propose that theology shares with philosophy a common subject matter, although it does so from a unified perspective based on God's own viewpoint in contrast to the diversified perspectives of the human sciences based on natural reason. As a result, the relationship between *sacra doctrina* and the human sciences takes on a new complexity. The introductory remark that faith provides a safer way of knowing

[101] "quamuis Deus in se non sit neque uniuersalis neque particularis, est tamen uniuersalis omnium rerum causa et finis; et sic cognitio que de ipso habetur ad omnia quodammodo universalis est" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 3, ad 1 [113; 77]). In fact, this argument is already anticipated in q. 2, a. 2, ad 3 (96; 43) and should be studied with it: "partes subiecti in scientia non solum sunt intelligende partes subiectiue uel integrales, sed partes subiecti dicuntur omnia ilia quorum cognitio requiritur ad cognitionem subiecti, cum omnia huiusmodi non tractentur in scientia nisi in quantum habent ordinem ad subiectum." It should also be compared with a similar statement in *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7: "Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus, vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem," as well as *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, resp. and ad 2. All of these statements represent a considerable advance over the simpler teaching that philosophy and theology share in part a common content *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 1 [95-96; 42-43]). See Pesch, *Thomas von Aquin,* 128.

[102] "uenimus in cognitionem aliorum secundum modum nostrum, discurrendo de principiis ad conclusiones" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2 [95; 42]).

than enfeebled reason can muster is now precised to mean that theology has the right to enter into the realm of reason in order to complete and correct it on matters in which theology has expertise. [103] On the basis of its dependence on God's own vision, divine science not only offers a unique perspective on creation, but compensates for the fragmentary knowledge that natural reason yields. [104] Interventions on the part of *sacra doctrina* in predominantly philosophical domains can now be justified. This requires that the student of theology also be a student of philosophy, conversant in the truths that both disciplines investigate, as well as those truths that exceed yet complement the truths of natural reason. *Sacra doctrina* is thus familiar with such natural inquiries as the search for the ultimate cause of the universe, all the while knowing through faith that this First Cause, in revealing himself, reveals as well his relationship to his world and the basis for this world's yielding itself to natural investigation in the connatural structure of created knower and known. With respect to the inquirer, divine science is aware of the rational creature's infinite longing to know truths that surpass its nature without prejudice to the nobility of its own share in the divine perspective, and the human finitude revealed in the very way God makes himself known. [105] In sum, *sacra doctrina* may confidently gather analogues from any science whatsoever because it understands the analogical relationship between the supernatural and natural orders and, consequently, its own analogical relationship to the human sciences.

But now, in view of *sacra doctrina's* universal compass, the scope and significance of natural reason have become questionable. Thomas adpresses this concern in the last two questions of the *De Trinitate,* on the division and methods of the speculative

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[103] *In Boet. de Trin.,* prol. (75; 3).

[104] J.-F. Bonnefoy, "La theologie," 431. A parallel can be drawn in Thomas's thought between grace and revelation: just as grace takes on the character of *gratia sanans* after the Fall, so revelation corrects natural knowledge of God. See also *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1 (107-8; 66-67) and my treatment of this below.

[105] On the one hand, "set quelibet creatura mouetur ad hoc quod Deo assimiletur plus et plus quantum potest" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 1, ad 7 [94; 39]). On the other, "diuinae reuelationis radius ad nos peruenit secundum modum nostrum, ut Dionisius dicit" (ibid., q. 6, a. 3 [167; 76]).

sciences. Once again the resources of first philosophy and divine science are marshaled, this time for the architectonic assignment of distinguishing the human sciences from one another and from divine science. In doing so, philosophy and theology serve the human sciences by defending the distinctive perspectives of natural reason against the challenge posed by the apparently sweeping claims of theology. [106] Moreover, mapping the domains and methodologies of the various sciences enables the theologian to define precisely the scope of philosophy. This in turn helps to isolate the questions commonly explored by the divine and human sciences as well as those which are exclusively theological. These inquiries thus enrich *sacra doctrina's* self-understanding by distinguishing it from the various perspectives of natural knowledge[107] as well as by providing it with an instrument for self-definition. [108] Divine science further relies on metaphysics to establish immateriality as the basis of intelligibility, and then collaborates with first philosophy to disclose their common subject matter in separate substance while respecting their distinct methods of approach. Even the assistance of natural philosophy is enlisted to settle issues involving matter and motion relevant to *sacra doctrina's* own subject matter. [109] Beyond the services rendered to philosophy, then, these questions enable *sacra doctrina* to know itself by tracing the intimate relationship of

[106] *In Boet. de Trin.,* qq. 5 and 6 (133-71; 3-84). Textually, Thomas is responding to issues raised in Boethius's *De Sancta Trinitate,* chap. 2. See Maurer's helpful introduction in *Division,* vii-xi. For an examination of the impact of these questions on twentieth-century Thomism, see Gerald A. McCool, *Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century: The Quest for a Unitary Method* (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), 249, 254-57. In particular, they provided the basis for Jacques Maritain's seminal work on epistemology, which follows Cajetan and John of St. Thomas in distinguishing the sciences in terms of Thomas's threefold division, but broadened to accommodate modern empirical science *(Distinguish to Unite, or The Degrees of Knowledge,* trans. Gerald B. Phelan [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959], 35-46). See Ashley's critique ("The River Forest School," 1-15).

[107] This work is undertaken especially in *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, and in particular in a. 4 (151-56; 39-49).

[108] What is decisive is not the diversity in things, but diversity as an object of knowledge; not the beings that are known, but rather the beings in terms of the being that knows them *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 1, ad 8 [141; 16]; see also q. 6, a. 1, ad 4 [second part] [162; 62]).

[109] "Theologia uero sacre Scripture tractat de separatis primo modo sicut de subiectis, quamuis in ea tractentur aliqua que sunt in materia et motu, secundum quod requirit rerum diuinarum manifestatio" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 4 [154; 45]).

knower and known back to the connatural structure of an ordered creation shaped by a creating Intellect itself pursued by created intellects. From this vantage point sacred doctrine is able to assist in such tasks as defining the realm and limitations of reason in question 1. Thus does the *De Trinitate* reflexively justify its own method of procedure.11°

With analogues having been shown to be universally available, they must now be applied to the domain of faith in the form of analogies. This second moment is a response to those who would condemn the use of philosophy in theology and compare it to mixing water and wine. Thomas practices what he preaches by converting the image: those who bring philosophy into the service of the faith "do not mix water with wine, but rather change water into wine." [111] The revised metaphor, however, must be interpreted so that philosophy is not understood to be simply absorbed by *sacra doctrina* without in any way changing it. By interpreting this image strictly in terms of the sign at Cana, one can conclude that human knowledge makes a difference to theology insofar as a better wine (not water) emerges from the transformation. [112] The appeal to Cana also suggests that divine grace is at work in the recognition that even if the waters of philosophy potentially contribute to a higher knowledge, they cannot actuate this potentiality themselves. However, even this interpretation cannot account for the fact that at least in their own domain the waters of philosophy remain. Just as different human sciences share common conclusions while retaining their proper means of demonstration, so they remain a human kind of

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[110] See Thomas C. O'Brien, *Metaphysics and the &istence of God* (Washington: The Thomist Press, 1960), 4-15.

m "non miscent aquam uino, set aquam conuertunt in uinum" *(In Boet. de Trin.*, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5 [100; 50]).

[112] An interpretation that invests too heavily in Thomas's borrowed metaphor risks concluding that this "language about the 'utilization' of philosophy by sacred doctrine gives the impression that *sacra doctrina* is somehow constituted as a reflective reality in human consciousness prior to and independently of an engagement with natural knowledge" (Hall, *The Trinity,* 77). For a more satisfactory understanding of Thomas's position, see Wolf-Ulrich Kliinker, introduction to *Uber die Trinitat: Eine Auslegung der Gleichnamigenschrift des Boethius,* trans. Hans Leintz (Stuttgart: Freies Geistesleben, 1988), 18-20.

thinking even when theology absorbs their conclusions into its mode of thoughtful believing.[113]

Finally, philosophy's third assignment of refutation and apology on behalf of *sacra doctrina,* corresponding to the principle of noncontradiction between reason and faith, follows upon faith insofar as attacks upon it presuppose its public articulation. It also follows upon *sacra doctrina* by defending this science predicated on faith and by attempting to render a more adequate account of the divine mysteries in the light of God's word. In contrast to philosophy's two other duties, the apologetic task points outward to a conversation with the detractors of the faith and those who might be impressed by their arguments. Here Thomas's characteristic optimism about reason appears where he turns the argument of those who would exclude pagan philosophy from *sacra doctrina* on its head. Far from polluting sacred truth, the arguments of Aristotle and other pagan thinkers, insofar as they are true, advance the claims of faith against its willing or unwilling detractors, ancient or contemporary, Christian or otherwise. The only operative dividing line is that separating the true from the false, no matter who represents which side. As if to make the point ironically, Thomas compares those who defend the principles of faith against their detractors with Aristotle vindicating the first principles of philosophy against his opponents. [114]

Of the three uses of philosophy in *sacra doctrina,* the disputative is most extrinsic to theology inasmuch as its efficacy requires that it not be confused with strictly theological argumentation. [115] Indeed, it is theological only insofar as *sacra*

[113] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 3, ad 7 (151; 38). Since *sacra doctrina* is partly constituted by its absorption of the human disciplines in any particular epoch, it appears that Thomas's teaching on the nature of theology has a transhistorical character while the content of theology is more subject to development. See Congar, *History of Theology,* 86.

[114] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 4 (96; 43-44).

[115] "et ideo possibile est ex principiis philosophie huiusmodi errorem refellere, uel ostendendo omnino esse impossibile, uel ostendendo non esse necessarium" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3, [99; 49)).

doctrina assigns it problems and reaps its conclusions. [116] More theological are the demonstrations of the preambles of faith, which provide content to principles of faith and form a common discourse between theology and philosophy by linking the mysteries of the Christian faith with human knowledge. Supremely theological is the use of human knowledge to construct analogies in order to shed light on the mysteries of faith. In this last application of philosophy one remains entirely within the domain of *sacra doctrina,* which shapes and uses these arguments for strictly theological ends. In various ways and to varying degrees, then, all three uses of philosophy serve *sacra doctrina* by preparing human knowledge to contribute to the work of pene-trating the revealed mysteries. Having first submitted itself to faith, the human mind now actively serves faith in the pursuit of wisdom. Thomas will soon put this teaching to work literally by training divine science's sights on the mystery of faith itself in question 3. The wisdom of his approach appears in the fact that natural reason, now given clearance to participate in *sacra doctrina,* is solicited to clarify the grounds of faith itself.

IV. QUESTION 3, ARTICLE 1: *SACRA DOCTRINA* AND FAITH

Boethius provides the occasion for questioning the necessity of faith for man by a statement on belief that introduces his discus-sion of the Trinity. [117] What is propaedeutic in Boethius's work, however, is pivotal to Thomas's argument, for the path of the *De Trinitate* has taken us from human knowing, to faith-based human knowing, through reason's contribution to this knowing, and now on to the nature of faith itself. Since natural reason is distinguished from faith and *sacra doctrina* is wholly dependent upon faith, the question on the necessity of faith undergirds the

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[116] Although not a question of defending or proclaiming the faith against or to others, this third use of philosophy can be subordinated to the first use of demonstrating the preambles of faith by using reason to clear away the misuse of reason for the sake of establishing its correct use in *sacra doctrina.* A contemporary example of this is Richard Swinburne's *Faith and Reason,* which apologetically addresses the content of faith to a secular audience by clarifying the preambles of faith through the lens of reasonableness.

[117] Boethius, *De Sancta Trinitate,* chap. 1. This context is closely studied in Thomas's literal commentary (exp. capituli primi [103-5; 58-62]).

arguments that established *sacra doctrina* as a science and eluci-
dated natural reason's contributions to it. The textual progression
has first established the nature of *sacra doctrina* as a science, and
then determined its philosophical foundation before placing it
squarely on the foundation of faith.11⁸ This article, then, by
examining the foundation of *sacra doctrina* and consequently the
function of natural knowledge in articulating it, constitutes one
of the most fundamental inquiries in the entire work. [119] At the
same time, both divine science and natural reason return the favor
by helping to state the case for faith. As to subject matter, *sacra
doctrina,* wholly dependent on faith, secondarily inquires into its
own nature when it conducts an inquiry into its foundations. As
to method, only *sacra doctrina,* not faith, is capable of investigat-
ing the necessity of faith since a mode of argumentation enlisting
natural reason is needed to conduct a reflection on the reasons
for faith. Reason for its part adopts here its hitherto most
assertive stance by appearing to step outside of faith altogether in
order to question its value. Whereas all four articles of question
2 required reason to vindicate its claims in face of a pious
suspicion of man-made scientific theology and curiosity regarding
divine matters, reason here assumes the initiative by conducting
an interrogation into faith and demanding that it justify
itself-from within faith.

What might appear as sovereign rationalism, however, is in
fact *sacra doctrina* adopting the role of mediator between con-
fident reason and ingenuous piety. Appearing to assume the
perspective of natural reason, divine science discloses the intelligi-
bility of faith all the more convincingly from a standpoint seem-
ingly outside of it. This emancipation of natural reason does not
disappoint: reason contributes to an acceptance of faith and
"maintains that we should assent to the words of God." [120] At the
same time, *sacra doctrina* shows that natural reason's indispen-

[118] Respectively, *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2 (95; 41-42); q. 2, a. 3 (98-99; 48-49); q. 3,
a. 1 (107-8).

[119] For a complementary examination of reason's contribution to the understanding of
belief, see Walgrave, "Erkenntnislehre," 32-33.

[120] "Quamuis et ipsa fides non omnibus modis sit preter rationem: hoc enim naturalis ratio
habet, quod assentiendum est his que a Deo dicuntur" (*In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1, ad 5 [109;
69-70]).

sable contribution is limited to pointing to that which surpasses it without the surety of demonstration. This appears even from an analysis of the very form of the argument from necessity, roughly the theological analogue of the *an sit* question in the philosophy of science: if faith can be shown to be necessary, not only can its existence be presumed, but the reason for its existence is knowable. However, the assumption that one can rely on God (here replacing nature) to supply what is necessary for human benefit is itself dependent on faith in Providence. Even when it is given most freedom, then, reason remains firmly within the grasp of *sacra doctrina,* which stands as always within the horizon of faith and is always prepared to show that reason cannot demonstrate faith. But engaging reason to frame the radical question of the necessity of faith is intentional, for divine science is thus able to further its self-understanding as well as an understanding of its roots. In the very act of justifying faith, divine science shows that it and only it is capable of this act of justification, which in turn helps to justify its own derivative existence. Furthermore, its reflection on faith gives *sacra doctrina* a deeper awareness of its own "human" genesis. Like natural knowledge, faith begins nonreflectively in a rudimentary acceptance and contemplation of the truths of revelation; only later is it capable of reflecting on its own act. When formally undertaken, this reflection is exclusively the achievement of *sacra doctrina,* which faith depends on, so to speak, to station itself in a higher intelligibility.

The complexity of the argument for the necessity of faith is partly due to its intricate use of premises both within and without the ambit of faith, and partly due to a masterful application of all three uses of philosophy. Almost immediately, then, we see Thomas putting the teaching of question 2, article 3 to work. First, the argument as a whole takes on the form of a preamble of faith-indeed, *the* preamble of faith inasmuch as it invites belief on the basis of arguments taken from human experience and appealing to faith's reasonableness. Second, this article proceeds analogically by showing likenesses and differences between faith in its natural and supernatural modes, and by analogically applying to faith the principle that what is assumed at the

beginning is proved later.[121] Finally, the argument, already presupposing an articulation of the principles of faith in its exposition of *sacra doctrina,* adopts an apologetic demeanor in its response to the sophisticated objections of unbelievers who prefer the safer course of critical reason.[122]

Thomas begins with a grand analogy. Like science and understanding and unlike opinion, supernatural faith possesses unerring and firm assent; like opinion and unlike science and understanding, it concerns matters not evident to the intellect. Some things are unclear to us due to a shortcoming in the knowable objects themselves, such as individual and contingent objects far from our sensible reach. Other things are unclear to us "because of some deficiency on the part of our mind," or more precisely, due to the nature of human knowing, which is unequipped to grasp the beings that are most knowable by nature, namely, those which are divine and necessary.[123] This distinction taken from Aristotle is then converted by Thomas into a teaching about natural faith and supernatural faith that offers in either case an analogy from human experience.[124] With respect to deficiency on the part of the known, natural faith in other people is necessary to gain access to truths not available through personal encounter. With respect to deficiency on the part of the knower, faith in God is necessary to gain access to truths not available to natural reason. Thus a principle that lies at the basis of Aristotle's division of the sciences

[121] This principle is discussed below.

[122] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1, obj. 1 (106; 63) presages the false piety of Descartes who, like Ahaz of old (Isa. 7:12), dismisses revelation by appealing to its loftiness *(Discourse on Method,* part 1).

[123] "ex defectu ipsarum rerum cognoscibilium, et ex defectu intellectus nostri" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1 [107; 66)). See Thomas's similar formulation in the prologue and my discussion of it above. A restatement of this principle is provided in ibid., q. 4, a. 3, ad 1 (129-30; 105-6), in which the unintelligibility of a principle is traced back to a deficiency either in the knower or in the proposition. In the second case-either a contradiction absolutely speaking or a contradiction for nature considered without divine intervention-Thomas discusses the remarkable capacity of the human mind to speak about what cannot be understood.

[124] Aristotle, *Phys.* 1.1.184a17-22); *Metaphys.* 2.1.993b8-11.

becomes the foundational principle for a theology of faith and the *sacra doctrina* that depends on it. [125]

To explain more fully how faith remedies the lack that attends our knowing, Thomas proposes a principle, based on our epistemological condition, that paraphrases the opening statement of the prologue:

Owing to a deficiency *[defectus]* on our part, divine and necessary realities, which are most knowable by nature, are not apparent to us. We are not adapted to examine them from the outset, because we have to arrive at what is more knowable and prior by nature beginning with what is less knowable and posterior by nature. [126]

Once again human knowers are placed within the field of superior knowers and objects of knowledge. Adopting this universal "extra-human" perspective embracing all intellects gives the human mind leverage by freeing it from the prejudices of taking human knowing as the natural standard of knowing as well as assuming that what is most familiar to us is most knowable simply. By learning how we do not know, we come to understand better how we do know. Within the larger arena of superior knowers, the human intellect approaches the necessity of faith by way of a self-awareness of its limitations and, in particular, its odd trait of knowing "backwards," namely, knowing first what is secondary and second what is primary. Once again the recognition of the limits of human knowing is pushed against the principles that our nature finds its fulfillment only in knowing the

[125] This principle also governs Thomas's own account of the sciences, adapted further to take divine science into account. See especially *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 1, ad 9 (141; 16-18); q. 5, a. 3 (144-51; 25-39); q. 5, a. 4 (153-54; 41-45); q. 6, a. 1 (157-63; 50-65); q. 6, a. 3 (166-68; 72-79).

[126] "Ex defectu uero nostro sunt non apparentia res diuinae et necessarie, que sunt secundum naturam maxime note; uncle ad harum inspectionem non sumus statim a principio ydonei, cum oporteat nos ex minus notis et <ap>parentibus secundum naturam in magis nota et priora naturaliter peruenire" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1 (107; 66)). "Naturalis mentis humane intuitus, pondere corruptibilis corporis aggrauatus, in prime ueritatis luce, ex qua omnia sunt facile cognoscibilia, defigi non potest; uncle oportet ut secundum naturalis cognitionis progressum ratio a posterioribus in priora deueniat, et a creaturis in Deum" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* pro!. [75; 3]). Compare this argument with ibid., q. 1, a. 1, ad 4 (82-83; 18) and q. 1, a. 2 (84-85; 21-23).

highest things and that our graced nature reaches understanding and perfection only by taking on a perspective that is not our own. [127]

Here is where the circle of comprehension enters and justifies the human approach: "But what we first know is known on the strength of what we eventually come to know; so from the very beginning we must have some knowledge of those things which are more knowable in themselves, and this is possible only by faith."[128] It is natural, not supernatural, faith that is at issue here, as is clear from an immediate application to the order of the philosophical disciplines: metaphysics, the last of the sciences, elucidates more fully the principles incipiently assumed by the inferior sciences which precede it pedagogically. [129] Even natural reason, then, must take certain principles on faith: "every science has presuppositions which the learner must believe."[130] Human knowledge, acquired in this tension between the pedagogical and "natural" hierarchies of the human sciences, is ineluctably caught up in this epistemological circle. Even the foundational principles for knowing anything, as well as those of knowing human knowing, including what may be called this "principle of subsequent justification," are first believed and later demonstrated. By justifying a teaching on epistemological justification already introduced in the prologue, *De Trinitate,* question 3, article 1 not only demonstrates what was earlier presumed, but completes a textual imaging of the principle of subsequent justification that spans the text.

[127] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2 (95; 41-42).

[128] "Set quia ex ui illorum, que ultimo cognoscimus sunt nota ilia que primo cognoscimus, oportet etiam a principio aliquam nos habere notitiam de illis que sunt per se magis nota, quod fieri non potest nisi credendo" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1 [107; 66]).

[129] For an argument showing that there is no vicious circle involved in the relationship between metaphysics and the other sciences, see *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 1, ad 9 (141; 16-18); see also I *Post. Anal.,* lect. 17; Maurer, *Division,* 9 n. 21.

[130] "Unde quelibet scientia habet suppositiones quibus oportet addiscentem credere" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1 [107; 66]). Decker traces this statement back to Aristotle's *De sophisticis elenchi* 2.165b3 *(Sancti Thomae de Aquino: Expositio Super Librum Boethii de Trinitate,* ed. Bruno Decker, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, ed. Josef Koch (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), 111. For a pedagogical correlate (and exception) to this principle, see *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1, ad 3 (second part) (161-62; 61-62).

At this point the analogate from the human sciences is applied to faith:

since the goal of human life is perfect happiness, which consists in the full knowledge of divine realities, the direction of human life toward perfect happiness from the very beginning requires faith in the divine, the complete knowledge of which we look forward to in our final state of perfection. [131]

A reasonable basis for divine faith, already suggested by the analogy taken from ordinary experience, is now offered on the strength of a second analogy taken from the human sciences. Just as human beings require natural faith in others to attain knowledge of events not available to their own perception, so they require supernatural faith in God to attain knowledge of divine matters not available to their intellect. And just as those sciences which are posterior in nature (that is, from the viewpoint of the most superior intellect) but prior for us presume principles that are only fully justified in the science that is prior in nature and posterior for us, so we begin our quest for full knowledge of divine matters with the faith which can only be justified in the world to come. [132]

Knowledge is the framework for faith in both its natural and its supernatural senses, but it can also supplant faith, as in the case of individuals who even in this world "arrive by reasoning at

[131] "Cum ergo finis humanae uite sit beatitudo, que consistit in plena cognitione diuinorum, necessarium est ad humanam uitam in beatitudinem dirigendam statim a principio habere fidem diuinorum, que plene cognoscenda expectantur in ultima perfectione humana" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1 [107-8; 66)). This pivotal statement, which so perfectly states the spirit of Thomas's theology as a whole, justifies at least for Thomas the observation of Max Seckler that "Man kann den Geist und das Wesen der mittelalterlichen Theologie vielleicht am besten mit Hilfe der vier Stichworte 'Heil,' 'Wahrheit,' 'Weisheit' and 'Wissenschaft' erfassen" *(Im Spannungsfeld von Wissenschaft und Kirche: Theologie als schopferische Auslegung der Wirklichkeit* [Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1980], 151).

[132] This contrast of the "knowledge of faith" with full knowledge in the vision of God (as opposed to God's own science) indicates that this principle is not simply a restatement of the principle of subalternation *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 [96; 44)). Here it concerns principles insufficiently understood but nevertheless applied, as opposed to principles that, known to be proved in a higher science, are employed in complete trust without any intent to clarify them. It is roughly the difference between the use of metaphysical principles in natural philosophy and, to borrow the example of *STh* I, q. 1, a. 2, the use of mathematical principles in music.

a full knowledge of some divine things." [133] Faith nonetheless is necessary for some regarding many matters and for all regarding certain matters. A brief survey of Moses Maimonides' five reasons for the necessity of faith confirms this: without faith the depth and subtlety of the divine things would be concealed from human minds, the initial feebleness of the human intellect only reaches perfection at the end of its journey, only very few can attain the comprehensive knowledge of things required for knowledge of God, many are impeded by physical dispositions from perfecting their mind by reasoning, and the many occupations of life prevent many from engaging in prolonged contemplation. [134] For these people faith offers a minimum knowledge, including matters which the few are able to grasp through natural reason. [135] It follows from Thomas's teaching that certain truths of faith are grasped by some through reason that only the theologian is able to identify the true objects of faith, for only he is able to evaluate the actual reach of demonstrative argument and to reserve for faith the domain that lies beyond it. [136]

A theology of faith oriented toward its eventual replacement reinforces the position of *sacra doctrina* within the broad movement from rudimentary faith to the ultimate human happiness of beatific knowledge. We now learn that what we earlier learned about divine science was known on the strength of what we now know in this analysis of faith, which undergirds it. Just as philosophy only gains the perspective of what is prior by nature at the end of its path of discovery and so retrieves its original point of departure as provisional and pedagogical, so *sacra doctrina* comes to a more complete understanding by elucidating what it earlier assumed and by reinterpreting its earlier self-understanding on the ground of this analysis of a philosophical principle theologically applied. This explains the reason for the text's being shaped to reflect the principle only now enunciated

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[133] "Ad quorum quedam plene cognoscenda possibile est homini peruenire per uiam rationis etiam in statu huius uite" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1 [108; 66]).

[134] For the limits of understanding with respect to matters of faith, see *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1, ad 4 (third part) (163; 65).

[135] "ut [homo] saltem per fidem diuina cognoscat" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1 [108; 67]).

[136] See *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 4 (153-54; 41-45); *SI'h* I, q. 1, a. 1, resp. and ad 2.

which teaches that what we first know is known on the basis of what we eventually come to know. For the inquiry into natural human knowing in question 1 presupposed *sacra doctrina* and the explication of *sacra doctrina* in question 2 presupposed faith, and now those principles are justified which were mediately presupposed in the first question and immediately presupposed in the second one. We thus needed to come this far to understand the principle in the light of its application to *sacra doctrina* and faith, and to see how the text images its teaching by going back to and behind the beginning in order to justify what necessarily preceded it. The order of knowing and the order of being now merge to explain and teach that the very *nature* of *sacra doctrina* is necessarily pedagogical.

The analysis of faith thus grounds the earlier teachings which set *sacra doctrina* on the footing of faith and faith on the footing of God's own science by accounting for the nature and necessity of belief.[137] However, this teaching on faith not only provides a foundation for *sacra doctrina,* but is itself its achievement since only science possesses the means to develop analogies based on the relationship between divine truths and created realities. Yet the argument for faith, by exploring its very foundation through the principle of subsequent justification, is only the achievement of *sacra doctrina* insofar as this science is grounded in faith. Only because divine science is based in faith, then, can it explore the basis for faith and its own basis in faith. In other words, only reflective faith can ultimately ground faith because the very essence of faith is such that its transcendence circumscribes its reasonableness and not the other way around. [138] More exactly, faith gives us access to *sacra doctrina's* reflection on this transcendence out of which faith itself emerges. In the last· fundamental task of divine science to which we now turn, God's self-knowledge will be linked with its human participation in *sacra doctrina* by revelation, which springs from his self-manifestation and evokes the response of faith.

[137] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2 (95; 41-42).

[138] The comprehensiveness and reasonableness of Thomas's position is anticipated in the three arguments of the *sed contra,* which argue that faith is supernatural, necessary, and natural on the strength of the witness of Scripture, Augustine, and Aristotle respectively.

V. QUESTION 5: *SACRA DOCTRINA* AND REVELATION

The *De Trinitate's* backward trek from the nature of human knowledge, to *sacra doctrina,* to natural reason's contribution to sacred doctrine, to its foundation in faith, is always guided by God's own divine science as the paradigm, cause, and end of human knowing. [139] In the programmatic statement elucidating the notion of subalternation, Thomas links God's own science, *sacra doctrina* as its human counterpart, faith as the ground of theology, and the source of this faith in revelation: "the articles of faith, which are the principles in this science, are related to God's knowledge, because what is self-evident in the knowledge God has of himself is presupposed in our science, and they are believed on the word of him who reveals them to us through his witnesses." [140] God is then both source of the principles that *sacra doctrina* literally assumes on faith and guarantor that these principles may be safely believed. Whereas this earlier statement views the principles of faith analogically with respect to God's self-evident knowledge, the later argument for the necessity of faith approaches faith teleologically as incipient instruction to be superseded by full knowledge of divine realities. In this complementary view, the principles of faith remain fully dependent on God's own knowledge, but his knowledge and complete human participation in it are taken as final cause rather than exemplar formal cause. In this way the argument for the necessity of faith amplifies the first half of the programmatic statement on subalternation by exploring more deeply the relationship of faith to *sacra doctrina* and to God's own science. It also elaborates on the text's rare allusion to revelation by showing how God's providential care for our epistemological needs moves him to grant us the safe and certain knowledge of faith. Yet revelation is introduced here only in terms of faith, that is, on the strength of what is less knowable and posterior by nature. What remains to be shown is

[139] This is most clearly articulated in *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2 (95-97; 41-44).

[140] "Et hoc modo se habent articuli fide, qui sunt principia huius scientie, ad cognitionem diuinam: quia ea que sunt per se nota in scientia quam Deus habet de se ipso, supponuntur in scientia nostra, et creduntur ei nobis hec indicanti per suos nuncios" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 [96; 44]). This statement was discussed above with respect to subalternation.

the derivation of God's revelation from divine knowledge as its source according to what is more knowable and prior by nature.

In keeping with the textual imaging of the principle of subsequent justification, Thomas finally turns to this basis of faith toward the end of the *De Trinitate.* Within the context of defining the various speculative sciences and specifically the subject matter of natural theology, question 5, article 4 elucidates the distinction between this science and a knowledge of divine beings that depends on revelation. The point of departure in natural knowledge marks a contrast to the distinctively theological character of questions 2 and 3, but it is against the background of nature that the extraordinary character of revelation-based knowledge most clearly appears. [141] Thomas highlights this difference by inflecting the epistemological character of the argument with a highly personalist approach to revelation in terms of God's act of self-manifestation.

There is, however, another way of knowing [divine] beings ... not as their effects manifest them, but as they manifest themselves. The Apostle mentions this way ... "So the things also that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may understand." And again, "But to us God has revealed them by his Spirit." In this way are treated divine beings as they subsist in themselves and not only inasmuch as they are the principles of things. [142]

Here Thomas cites Scripture at length in order to let it speak for itself about speech. A revelatory text reveals the ultimate reason for revelation: "that we may understand."

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[141] The perspective of reason as the point of departure for the distinction between natural theology and revelation-based theology in *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 4 is indicated by designating the divine being in the plural form *(res diuine)* which reflects the categories of (Aristotelian) natural theology (153; 43).

[142] "Est autem alius <modus> cognoscendi huiusmodi res non secundum quod per effectus manifestantur, set secundum quod ipse se ipsas manifestant; et hunc modum ponit Apostolus I Cor. II 'Que sunt Dei nemo nouit nisi Spiritus Dei. Nos autem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, set Spiritum qui a Deo est, ut sciamus,' et ibidem 'Nobis autem reuelauit Deus per Spiritum suum.' Et per hunc modum tractantur res diuinae secundum quod in se ipsis subsistunt et non solum prout sunt rerum principia" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 4 [154; 44]). Since it was already quoted in part in the prologue, this citation from 1 Corinthians 2:11-12, 10 provides an inclusion for the entire commentary.

Two kinds of theology, then, are to be distinguished: one treats of divine things as the principles of its subject and is identified with metaphysics; the other "investigates divine things for their own sakes as the subject of the science. This is the theology taught in Sacred Scripture." [143] Metaphysics investigates the same divine beings as divine science, but only to account for the causal structure of the visible world. Though honored as *dea scientiarum,* metaphysics lacks the nobility which arises from a science that is heir to God's own knowledge. For divine science does not simply conclude, but begins with divine beings as its causal principle since it is "non solum de altissimis set ex altissimis est." [144] Because the divine beings have taken the initiative by revealing themselves and inviting a response, they are known not simply from effects that manifest their presence, but from their own revealing word. The principles, in short, are personal. God is approached in this science not primarily to account for lesser beings but above all for his own sake, and not simply by virtue of human inquisitiveness but by virtue of his own self-manifestation. Hence God becomes the subject of a new science, and conversely, a science is established whose subject is personal.

This text further sheds light on the arresting title of question 2, "De manifestatione divinae cognitionis." The primary sense of manifestation proposed in question *S* connotes God's revealing himself, but this expression refers to the manifestation of his mode of knowing. God's revelation is hence the precondition not only for an exclusive knowledge of God, but also for knowing God's own act of knowing and participating in it through faith. [145] The very fact of revelation means that human knowledge of the divine things, as well as all other human knowledge, is ultimately

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[143] "alia uero que ipsas res diuinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientie, et hec est theologia que in sacra Scriptura traditur" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 4 [154; 44-45]). The subsequent argument that distinguishes metaphysics from sacred doctrine does so from the viewpoint of philosophy. Mcinerny notes that a sharp distinction between natural theology and sacred doctrine is not to be found in Boethius *(Boethius,* 130).

[144] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 1 (96; 42-43). See *ScG* II, c. 4. *See* also O'Brien, *Metaphysics,* 172-76.

[145] "The title 'de manifestatione divinae cognitionis' is perhaps best understood as meaning an examination of the way(s) in which God's knowledge appears or manifests itself, but the words also seem to connote that man must make God's truth manifest" (Elders, *Faith,* 41).

dependent not on human knowledge, but on the divine knowledge of God freely shared with his creatures. Therefore, in a way utterly unavailable to natural reason, *sacra doctrina* is able to account radically not only for the humanly knowable, but for human knowing by deriving itself from the First Knower as personal subject. For what God manifests to us is himself as knower in the mystery of his self-understanding for the purpose of our sharing in it: "Now we have received … the Spirit that is of God, that we may understand." A complementary text illumines this ultimate reason for *sacra doctrina* in its relationship to faith and God's science: "Similarly the proximate starting point of this [divine] science is faith, but its primary source is the divine understanding, in which we put our faith. The purpose of our believing, however, is to arrive at an understanding of what we believe." [146] Hence the very reason for human divine science is to return the human intellect to the divine source in a more perfect imitation. God's knowledge is first revealed to us through his word, then responded to in faith, and finally reflected on in theology. *Sacra doctrina* in turn is consummated in a deeper knowledge of what faith teaches, and this belief faithfully reflects God's act of revealing, which discloses first himself and then his knowledge of all things.

When Thomas's teaching on revelation is linked to that on God's self-understanding as the exemplar of theology, *sacra doctrina* appears as a divinely willed participation in God's self-understanding through the revelation of his Spirit. Wishing

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[146] "set finis fidei est nobis ut perueniamus ad intelligendum que credimus" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 7 [97; 44]). Note that this statement is much stronger than the Augustinian formula of *(ides quarens intellectum* and Hilary's admonition quoted in q. 2, a. 1: "'Credendo incipe,' scilicet inquire, 'percurre, persiste'" (ibid. [93; 38]). Rather, one needs to look to St. Anselm for an equally vigorous sentiment, which he places on the lips of Boso: "Sicut rectus ordo exigit ut profunda Christianae fidei prius credamus, quam ea praesumamus ratione discutere, ita negligentia mihi videtur, si, postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere" *(Cur Deus Homo,* 1.1 [ed. Franciscus Schmitt; Munich: Kosel, 1993], 10-12).

"Ainsi le schema meme de la structure de la science est le cadre propose pour analyser le developpement de la foi en *intellectus fidei:* cet epanouissement speculatif, apparement divergent hors de la simplicite contemplative du pur croyant, est, en realite, s'il est bien mene, une remontee de la foi vers la science de Dieu et la premiere etape sur la voie de la vision beatifique, *scientia Dei et beatorum"* (Chenu, "La theologie comme science," 74).

to make himself personally known and to give us partial access to his way of knowing, God graciously reveals himself such that our faith becomes a grace-infused response designed to flower in a knowledge, based in faith, that imitates the divine knowing: "We are endowed with principles by which we can prepare for that perfect knowledge. "[147] By means of a theology that engages our human intellects with the divine truth, we advance our own goal of perfect happiness as well as the work of God's glorification. Human divine science is now seen as an interest in God for his own sake on the basis of his own word that furthers his own act of self-manifestation. Here we are given a far richer response to the question of whether divine matters should be humanly investigated. [148] We are enjoined to pursue divine truth not simply to advance our own perfection as union with God, but to extend God's own self-manifestation by converting belief into human knowledge. By investigating God's nature and his knowledge, *sacra doctrina* continues the act of divine self-manifestation in revealing the revealing God. It shows God's knowing.

VI. CONCLUSION

Having come to the end, we can look back and appreciate the wisdom of the way. *Sacra doctrina,* resting on God's revelation and shaped by human reason, gives us partial access to God's science and situates human knowing within his comprehensive perspective. Only gradually does human knowing come to a heightened understanding of the divine perspective as archetypal and its own perspective as fundamentally backward. This gradual awareness is reflected in a textual approach whereby divine science unfolds itself in a progressive articulation of its own principles. Hence the logic of inquiring at the outset into the

[147] This begins the very last statement of the treatise, which understands faith and the *sacra doctrina* based on it as preparation for that which lies beyond our nature and attained only through grace: "nobis sunt indita principia quibus nos possimus preparare ad illam cognitionem perfectam substantiarum separatarum, non autem quibus ad earn possimus pertingere: quamuis enim homo naturaliter inclinetur in finem ultimum, non tamen potest naturaliter ilium consequi set solum per gratiam; et hoc est proper eminentiam illius finis" *(In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 4, ad 5 [171; 84]).

[148] Thus is the teaching of *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 1 confirmed and surpassed.

human intellect's nature and limitations, especially respecting the divine things. This inquiry presupposes and then shapes the pedagogical entry into the most universal perspective within which God's self-understanding, the "mixed" knowing of *sacra doctrina,* and natural knowing are thematized in terms of their likenesses and differences. A textual approach is particularly warranted for uncovering the systematic teaching concerning divine science because this teaching is suspended between God's understanding and human inquiry, and only gradually does it assume the divine perspective without losing its own. The *De Trinitate,* then, in order to determine the overarching question of what the human intellect can know of God, reflects the mode of human knowing which comes at last to what is first. To this end, it employs from the start its sharpest instrument, *sacra doctrina,* in both its revelation-dependent and reason-punctuated modes, in order to investigate in turn natural and supernatural knowledge. This investigation requires that *sacra doctrina* finally come to an adequate self-understanding, and when it does, it reflects God's own self-understanding in keeping with its nature and destiny.

Theology's first achievement is to give philosophy a deeper understanding of itself by directing divine science's insights to the nature and boundaries of human knowing. [149] Because it enjoys access to God's own science, theology can offer a more comprehensive understanding of nature than philosophy precisely because the divine perspective is needed to interpret the world as created. In this sense reason depends on *sacra doctrina* to come to a knowledge of its ultimate causes. Even before it is established, then, *sacra doctrina* is already at work, illustrating theologically the principle of subsequent justification. Once the nature and limitations of natural knowledge are identified, divine science is free to turn to itself. Its first task is to justify its lofty ambitions. Knowledge of the gift retroactively shapes an awareness of the need for it: the necessity for pursuing a science beyond reason is established through a faith-based awareness of human fulfillment and of the existence of this superior science. *Sacra doctrina*

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[149] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, aa. 1and2 (80-85; 13-24).

encourages the intellect to pursue the divine truths because the perfection of the human person embraces intellectual union, and the desire for divine knowledge is holy. [150] Prepared for an ambitious career, faith-based reason is immediately assigned the task of investigating its nature as a divine science. Reason helps to discover a knowledge that surpasses it, but only with reason's help can the reflecting faith-shaped mind know what reason is unable to know without the benefit of faith. [151]

It is above all faith, however, that gives the human intellect access to God's own knowledge and an awareness of a corresponding relativizing of its own power. Yet faith lends further hope for human participation in a knowledge that transcends human nature. Thus both revelation-based and reason-based knowledge point to each other and acknowledge their mutual, though analogical, dependence mirrored in the shifting perspectives of a text now philosophical, now theological. Reason is explicitly invited to enter into *sacra doctrina* by contributing to the resolution of the very question of whether it should contribute to divine science. It responds by articulating theology's epistemological principles and by undertaking the three distinctive tasks which precede, accompany, and follow upon *sacra doctrina.* [152] Above all, natural reason, presenting the notion of analogy, helps divine science to express the analogical relationship of nature to grace and to appreciate the creative hand of One who fashions grace to complement the natures he formed. Then stepping outside of faith in order to recover it, reason contributes compelling reasons for belief, and derivatively, for the divine science which depends on belief and the revelation on which it depends. Turning from divine science to the faith it is based upon, Thomas offers a reasonable basis for faith and thus a more solid foundation for *sacra doctrina.* [153] The reasons that provide the "reasonableness" of faith, encompassed within a faith-grounded *sacra doctrina,* are hence the basis and context for

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[150] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 1, esp. ad 7 (93-94; 37-39).
[151] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2 (95-97; 41-44).
[152] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3 (98-99; 49).
[153] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 3, a. 1 (106-9; 63-70).

the reasons that establish the need for *sacra doctrina.* [154] Just as created grace ultimately serves nature, so human reflection on the mysteries, having submitted natural knowledge to the service of belief, is now served by a faith that believes in order to understand. [155] Faith, in turn, is grounded in God's revelation, which provides the last critical link back to the overarching divine science of God-a link that is suspended by sheer grace. Now the foundation is complete: just as question 1's inquiry into reason presupposes *sacra doctrina,* and question 2's teaching on *sacra doctrina* requires faith, so now the articulation of faith in question 3 assumes the instruction on revelation in question 5.

All of the fundamental tasks of *sacra doctrina-offering* a "theology of reason"; clarifying the relationship between revelation and reason through arguments based on revelation and shaped by reason; providing a reasonable foundation for faith; and probing the anthropological, epistemological, and theological presuppositions of the complementarity of faith and reason-constitute a "meta-theology" in which divine science reflects on its own act. This expresses and furthers *sacra doctrina's* urge to replace faith with a knowledge that will only fulfill belief when faith is ultimately left behind. The nobility and immensity of this epistemological enterprise leads to the potential inclusion of the principles of all the sciences within the scope of *sacra doctrina,* [156] a conclusion reinforced by an overlapping subject matter for human science and divine science. [157] Just as grace serves nature, so revelation serves reason, now in an elevated state as it seeks to imitate more fully the divine knowing. But patience is necessary: Thomas's textual unfolding of divine revelation rooted in God's own self-manifestation images the gradual character of self-disclosure. [158] Since God reveals divine knowing to us through faith and bids us believe that our provisional

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[154] Similar argumentation is found in *STh* I, q. 1, a. 1. See Bonnefoy, "La theologie," 433.

[155] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 7 (96-97; 44).

[156] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 2, a. 3, ad 7 (100; 51).

[157] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 4 (153-54; 41-45).

[158] In this light Thomas's text once again images his subject matter: since human reflection on human knowledge always remain partial and incomplete, this work, like many other celebrated texts on first things, is left unfinished and fragmentary.

faith-based knowledge will transform into perfect knowledge, human divine science, by coming to understand what it believes, continues the divine act of self-manifestation as a grace-dependent human achievement on the way to consummation. *Sacra doctrina,* in the end, is the time-bound work of glorification, the understanding of the divine self-manifestation within the manifestation of the divine understanding. [159]

THE INDIVIDUAL AS A MODE OF BEING
ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS

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ru CENTLY Timothy Noone [1] and Kevin White [2] have published papers touching in different ways on individuation n Thomas Aquinas. Both express a degree of approval of the position of Joseph Owens, [3] who holds that for St. Thomas the "global" [4] explanation of individuation is to be found in the doctrine of *esse,* the act of being. In the present paper I wish to challenge that Owensian view. To do so, I will first criticize the textual claims of Fr. Owens. Second, I will propose a different approach to the issue, less focused on individuation as something

[1] Timothy B. Noone, "Individuation in Scotus," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 69 (1995): 527-42.

[2] Kevin White, "Individuation in Aquinas's *Super Boethium De Trinitate,* Q. 4," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 69 (1995): 543-56. White sees himself as expanding on Owens's line of thinking (545).

[3] J. Owens, "Thomas Aquinas (b. ca. 1225; d. 1274)," in *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650,* ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1994), 173-94. Parenthetical page numbers in the text refer to this essay.

[4] This word is from Noone. He tells us: "According to Fr. Owens .•. Aquinas is really a global theorist on the issue of individuation. What he actually holds, in Owens' opinion, is that *esse* is the ultimate ontological principle of individuation, just as it is the ultimate source of actuality in all created things. If this is so, Thomas escapes immediately from the charge of failing to develop a general account of individuals as such, whether physical or non-physical, which is one of the methodic objections Scotus marshals against [William Peter] Godinus in their debate" (Noone, "Individuation in Scotus," 540).

In a review of the Gracia book containing the Owens essay, Noone says: "Owens' interpretation of Thomas' many seemingly disparate descriptions of the principle of individuation is unparalleled in its ability to render Aquinas' account of individuation self-consistent without appealing to awkward genetic hypotheses." He obviously approves of this account.

requiring a cause or principle, and more focused on the individual as a mode of being.

I

Father Owens presents us with the role of the act of being, and it is one that seems to make things individual: "[Being] is forging all the various elements of the thing into a unit. It is thereby making them what we understand to be an individual" (174). He is basing himself here on a text from Thomas's youthful *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.* We read: "the being of the thing composed out of matter and form, from which [the human mind] obtains knowledge, consists in some composing of form with matter, or of an accident with a subject *[consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam vel accidentis ad subjectum*]."[5] Is Thomas saying that the *esse* itself is a composite? That is what the reply to the second objection, referred to by Owens, does indeed say: "But our intellect, whose knowledge arises from things, which have *composite being [esse compositum*], does not apprehend that *esse* save by composing and dividing. "[6]

Owens provides his own reflection on and interpretation of what is being said. Taking first the case of a multiplicity of *per accidens* accidents (tallness and musical accomplishment) and the person in whom they inhere (certainly a rather *per accidens* unity), he stresses the "existential" character of the bond uniting them: "they are brought together by real existence in the one person" (174). And he goes on to make the same point as regards the substantial components of the concrete substance.

There is no reason in the essence of a person why his or her form (the soul) should be actuating the particular matter of which the body is constituted at the moment. Different matter keeps coming and going with the anabolism and

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[5] I *Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 (ed. P. Mandonnet [Paris: Letheilleux, 1929], 903), and ad 2 (Mandonnet, 904); quoted in Owens, "Thomas Aquinas," 189 n. 6. While the Latin word *"consistit"* does not always means "is made out of," as English "consists" would suggest, but can mean "is found with" (cf. *STh* I-II, q. 2, a. 7: that in which beatitude *"consistit"* is distinguished from beatitude itself; the former expression refers to that object in which the soul finds beatitude), here it does seem to mean something like the English "consists in."

[6] I *Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2 (Mandonnet, 904). (Owens transl.)

catabolism of nutrition, yet the soul remains the same. There is no essential reason, either in the form or the matter, why this particular form should be in this particular matter at the given instant. The reason is existential. The two are united in the existence they are actually enjoying at the time. The existence *makes* them a unit. (174)

Two points should be made here. One has to do with the doctrine of *esse* found in the texts cited. The other has to do with Owens's conception of the role of *esse* as related to *ens per accidens* and *ens per se.*

While Thomas in the cited text does make the *esse* of composite things a composite, we know that he will subsequently stress the simplicity of *esse.*[7] In commenting on Boethius's *De hebdomadibus* he says that *esse* is not a composite:

just as *esse* and *quod est* differ as to notions, so also they differ really in composites. Which indeed is evident from the foregoing. For it was said above that *esse* itself neither participates in anything such that its intelligibility *[ratio]* be constituted out of many, nor does it have anything extrinsic admixed such that there be in it an accidental composition; and therefore *esse* itself is not composite; therefore, the composite thing is not its own *esse.*[8]

And in the *Summa contra Gentiles* we read: "Nothing is more formal or more simple than *esse.*"[9]

[7] Noone thinks Owens does well to avoid "awkward genetic hypotheses" (see above, n. 4), but Thomas obviously changes his views on some key issues.

[8] *Expositio libri Boetii De hebdomadibus* 2 (Paris: Cerf; Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1992), lines 204-15 (ed. Calcaterra, no. 32): "sicut esse et quod est differunt secundum intentiones, ita in compositis differunt realiter. Quod quidem manifestum est ex premissis. Dictum est enim supra quod ipsum esse neque participat aliud ut eius ratio constituatur ex multis, neque habet aliquid extrinsecum admixtum ut sit in eo compositio accidentalis; et ideo IPSUM ESSE NON EST COMPOS/TUM; res ergo composita non est suum esse; et ideo dicit quod in *omni composito aliud est* esse ens et *aliud* ipsum compositum quod est participando *ipsum esse"* (small caps added).

The Boethius text has, at line 17: "Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est." The Leonine editors (Louis J. Bataillon and Carlo A. Grassi) have attempted to italicize this in Thomas's exposition. The *"ens"* is awkward. Without it, one would think one could under-line "et ideo <licit quod in *omni composito aliud est esse* [ens] et *aliud ipsum* compositum quod *est* participando ipsum esse." See also lines 140-45, *onesse* as abstract and thus p:itre as to its "essence."

[9] *ScG* I, c. 23 (ed. Pera, no. 214; Pegis, no. 2): "Ipsum enim esse non potest participare aliquid quod non sit de essentia sua: quamvis id quod est possit aliquid aliud participare. *Nihil enim est formalius aut simplicius quam esse.* Et sic ipsum esse nihil participare potest. Divina

And what about the causal role Owens attributes to *esse* with the word "makes"? This has much to do with his view of *esse* as a "cause of individuation." In the *Sentences,* it is true, Thomas seems to affirm that the *esse* of a caused thing is itself the *formal* cause of being of that thing. At least, to an objector who says that the *esse* of creatures must be "through itself' and thus not be caused (and consequently is God himself), Thomas has occasion to say, "created *esse* is not *through* something else, if the word 'through' expresses the intrinsic formal cause; on the contrary *[immo],* through it *[ipso],* formally, the creature is."[10] In this passage, it is clear that *esse* is being regarded as the intrinsic formal cause. However, towards the end of the *De Veritate* we read: "God causes in us natural *esse* by creation, without the mediation of any efficient cause, but nevertheless through the mediation of a formal cause: because natural form is the principle of natural *esse."*[11] And it is this doctrine that will prevail.[12]

A first point, then, is that Owens is starting us out with a conception of *esse* that, with respect to its nature and its causal role, Thomas does not seem to have retained.

Second, Owens seems to be using the *per accidens* itself as a sort of "scope" in which to see actual existence at work. This is

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autem substantia est ipsum esse. Ergo nihil habet quod non sit de sua substantia. Nullum ergo accidens ei inesse potest" (italics added).

Cf. also *De Pot.,* q. 1, a. 1: "Verbi gratia 'esse' significat aliquid completum *[Lege:* completivum] et *simplex* sed non subsistens; 'substantia' autem aliquid subsistens significat sed alii subjectum. Ponimus ergo in Deo substantiam et esse, sed substantiam ratione subsistentiae, non ratione substandi; esse vero *ratione simplicitatis* et complementi, non ratione inhaerentiae quae *[lege:* qua] alteri inhaeret" (italics added).

[10] I *Sent.,* d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2 (Mandonnet, 198). For a text which goes very much along the lines of Owens's idea, cf. *Quodl.* 9, q. 2, a. 2 [3], ad 2: "sed *esse* est id in quo fundatur unitas suppositi: uncle*esse*multiplex praeiudicat unitati essendi" ("but being is that on which is founded the unity of the subsisting thing: hence, multiple being precludes unity of being").

[11] *De Verit.,* q. 27, a. 1, ad3 (Leonine ed. [Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976), t. 22/3, lines 182-86).

[12] Cf. e.g., IV *Metaphys.,* lect. 2 (ed. M.-R. Cathala [Turin: Marietti, 1935], no. 558), the criticism of Avicenna on *esse.* See my papers "St. Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause," in *The NewScholasticism* 63 (1989): 173-82; and "Saint Thomas, Form, and Incorruptibility," in Jean-Louis Allard, ed., *Etre et Savoir,* Philosophica 37 (Ottawa: Les Presses de l'Universite d'Ottawa, 1989), 77-90.

surprising for many reasons. [13] The one reason I will mention here is that Thomas himself takes quite a different line in a particularly prominent text in the *Summa contra Gentiles.*

Even in those things whose *esse* is not subsistent, that which is present within the existent besides its *esse* is indeed united to the existent, but it is not one with its *esse,* save by attachment *[per accidens],* inasmuch as there is one subject which has *esse* and that which is besides *esse:* as is dear [in this case, viz.] that in Socrates, besides his own substantial *esse,* there is present the white, which is diverse from his substantial *esse,* for being Socrates and being white are not the same thing, save by attachment. If, therefore, *esse* is not in some subject [the autograph has "substance"], there will not remain any way in which that which is besides *esse* can be united to it [viz to *esse*]. [14]

Obviously, in such a doctrine, *esse* is no bond uniting or "forging . . . into a unit" all the items. This role rather belongs to the subject, that is, the subsisting substance as such. This is also the doctrine one finds in the *Tertia pars,* written in Thomas's later years. [15]

It might be noted, furthermore, that Owens, in his presentation of the unity of the concrete substance, composed of

[13] This is far from a late development in Owens's metaphysics. He already has it in his *Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian "Metaphysics"* (2d. ed.; Toronto: PIMS, 1963), 209. See my paper, "Being *per se,* Being *per accidens,* and St. Thomas' Metaphysics," *Science et Esprit* 30 (1978): 169-84, for a criticism of this view.

The *per accidens* certainly relates in a special way to the individual, as distinct from the universal: cf. V *Metaphys.,* lect. 7 (845) and lect. 11 (910), but that does not mean that *esse* is the "tie that binds."

[14] *ScG* II, c. 52 (ed. Pera, no. 1274). Pera notes the reading of Thomas's autograph.

[15] *STh* III, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1. This article asks whether there is only one *esse* in Christ. The first objector makes his case on the basis of form as that upon which *esse* follows: "Damascene says in bk. 3 that those things which follow upon the nature in Christ are duplicated. But *esse* follows upon the nature; for *esse* is from form *[esse consequitur naturam; esse enim est a forma].* Therefore, in Christ there are two *esses."* And Thomas replies: *"esse* follows upon the nature not as [something] HAVING *esse [habente m esse],* but as that *by which* something is *[QUA aliquid est];* but it *[esse] follows* upon the person or hypostasis as [something] HAVING *esse.* And so it rather retains unity in accordance with the unity of the hypostasis, than that it have duality according to the duality of nature" (italics and small caps added).

The idea is obviously that when one has to do with something that has all that it takes to be a complete thing, then *esse* is on the scene in its proper setting. Rather than simply saying that *esse* is what gives unity or individuation to the thing, Thomas sees the unity of *esse* as *resulting* (it "follows") from the unity of subject or hypostasis.

this matter and this form, complicates matters slightly by taking the case of the human person, whose soul of course subsists in its own being. In fact, even in the case of nutrition in general, as applying to all living things, there is need for a special doctrine of individuation. In his commentary on Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione,* Thomas, taking the case of any substance that changes its matter, and raising the question of its enduring identity, sees the need to provide a special mode of substantial form, somewhat immaterial, and thus somewhat akin to the subsisting form which is the human soul. It is the *form,* in such a case, that guarantees the substantial unity.[16] Thomas does not appeal to *esse* as Owens does. I submit that the reason is that he has a different conception of the being of things from that of Owens.

What we must emphasize is that Owens uses this conception of the role of *esse* in order to introduce his reader to the whole issue. *Esse* is presented as "forging ... a unit," that is, bringing about unity. While such words can signify formal causality[17] (and even that, as I have said, is not Thomas's mature conception of the role of *esse),* Owens's conception of the "accidentality" [18] of *esse* seems to make the causality verge on the efficient, a sort of intrinsic efficient cause binding things together. [19]

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[16] *lDe gen. et corr.,* lect. 17 (ed. Spiazzi [Rome and Turin: Marietti, 1952], no. 118). This work of Thomas is incomplete, ending at *De gen.* 1.5.322a33. Aristotle is discussing growth and diminution, and the nutrition involved with them. The general picture is of a being that maintains its identity through its form, while its matter changes. The translation of Aristotle that Thomas is using seems to speak of the form as "immaterial" though in matter. Thomas thus provides the following explanation: "the power of the form, in living things, does not determine for itself any designated matter *[aliquam materiam designatam],* since one part flows forth and another arrives, as was said above. Nevertheless the power of the form cannot be without all matter, but [is] indeterminately in this or that: because, as is proved in *Metaphysics* 7, the power of the generator is the form which is in this flesh and these bones. . . . Therefore, in this way, the power of the form of flesh or other such things, inasmuch as it does not determine for itself any designated matter, but at one moment is preserved in this, at another moment in that, is like an immaterial form *[est sicut species immaterialis]."*

He also speaks of the form of the living thing as *"quodammodo immaterialis."*

[17] Cf. *STh* I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 4.

[18] See my paper "St. Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause" (see note 12, above)

[19] Etienne Gilson, in *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: PIMS, 1949), 172, explicitly makes *esse* an intrinsic *efficient* cause: "Actual existence, then, is the *efficient cause* by which essence in its turn is the formal cause which makes an actual existence to be 'such an existence'" (italics added). This hardly corresponds to Thomas's conception. If one insists on

Owens immediately introduces us to the case of God, in whom *esse* is itself subsisting. He speaks of the "unifying" feature of existence as even more striking in the case of God: [20] "It [existence regarded as a nature] necessarily individualizes itself. Subsistent existence is its own individuation" (175). We notice that he maintains the causal conception here. Obviously this is not true causality, nor does Owens mean it to be taken as such. Nevertheless it is important to specify just which intelligibility is assigned which role, even in the case of the divine simplicity. Thus, for example, Thomas specifies that beatitude belongs to God precisely in function of his intellect, not in function of his essence or his will.[21] Here, as Owens sees it, it is of the very nature of existence that it have the task of individuation attributed to it.

The texts he cites to support his doctrine here merely say that God has the characteristics that constitute the individual. The first, taken from the *Sentences,* does say that the divine *esse* is determinate in itself and divided from all others; but it does not attribute that to *esse* precisely as *esse.* It is the case rather because God is subsistent *esse,* thus perfect, and so cannot receive any addition, which pertains to its being an individual. [22]

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making the *esse* of the creature a cause, Thomas rather regards it more as a *final* cause, and the effect of all the other sorts of causality: cf. *De Pot.,* q. 7, a. 2, ad 10.

In affirming what he does, Gilson refers (172 n. 23; cf. 169) to the doctrine that causes are causes of each other, but in diverse genera of causality: V *Metaphys.,* lect. 2 (no. 755). However, in that text, Thomas carefully explains that doctrine in terms of (1) the relation between efficient and final causality, and (2) the relation between form and matter. Nowhere does he say anything about efficient and formal causality as reciprocal.

[20] Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, sees *substance* (in the sense of essence) as playing the unifying role. Thus, at *STh* I, q. 11, a. 4, on whether God is maximally one, an objector holds that since each thing is one through its own essence, and what is by its own essence such is maximally such, every being is maximally one. Thomas replies (ad 3): "though admittedly every being is one through its own substance, nevertheless it is not the case that the substance of each thing relates equally to causing unity; because the substance of some is composed out of many, but the substance of others [is] not [thus composite]."

[21] *STh* I, q. 26, a. 2.

[22] I *Sent.,* d. 8, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1 (Mandonnet, 219). The second text he refers to says that God, through his *essence,* is something undivided in himself and distinct from all those things which are not God *(De Pot.,* q. 8, a. 3). This is "essence" used in a sense which does not necessarily distinguish between "essence" and "substance"; Thomas is merely contrasting the essence with the Trinity of Persons, about which he is speaking in the context.

There is nothing, as far as I can see, to justify giving the role of "individuation" to the divine *esse* as such. I think rather of a text from the *Summa contra Gentiles* that shows something of the variety of intelligible roles of the various items in the meta-physical analysis:

> It has been shown in the First Book (ch. 31) that those things which in creatures are divided are unqualifiedly one in God: thus, for example, in the creature essence and being *[esse]* are other; and in some [creatures] that which subsists in its own essence is also other than its essence or nature: for this man is neither his own humanity nor his being *[esse];* but God is his essence and his being.
>
> And though these in God are one in the truest way, nevertheless in God there is whatever pertains to the intelligible role *[ratio]* of the subsisting thing, or of the essence, or of the being *[esse]; for it belongs to him not to be in another, inasmuch as he is subsisting;* to be a what *[esse quid],* inasmuch as he is essence; and being in act *[esse in actu],* by reason of being itself *[ratione ipsius esse].*[23]

"Not to be in another," as we shall see, pertains precisely to the individual. Accordingly, I am not at all ready to say that, for Thomas, God is an individual precisely because of his *esse* as *esse*.

However, that is Owens's definite meaning, in pointing to the divine *esse* as self-individualizing. He says: "This unifying and individuating feature follows upon existence wherever it is shared" (175).[24] And again we read: "This individuating function

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[23] *ScG* IV, c. 11 (ed. Pera, nos. 3472-73; italics added).

[24] Notice that Owens has practically identified the issues of individuation and unity. This in itself is highly questionable, since "one" is said in as many ways as "being" is. Owens himself wants to see the *esse* of a thing as the cause of its unity. He points to a problem text *(De Verit.,* q. 21, a. 5, ad 8: whether the created good is good through essence) which seems to allow essence, just in itself, a unity, and in this respect contrasts calling a thing "one" and calling it "a good" or "a being," the latter two names being said of created essence only by participation. In the context, Thomas rules out an argument that rejects participation in being and goodness, an argument claiming that this gets one into an infinite regress (an argument originally used by Averroes to reject unity by participation). Owens explains the unity involved as something along the lines of the negative unity attributed to primary matter. This is odd, to say the least. In fact, Thomas later in his career changes his approach in this matter, himself using the argument of Averroes even to apply to the case of being; that is, Thomas eventually (IV *Metaphys.,* lect. 2 [555]) treats of both "one" and "a being" as signifying the essence as such, though he continues to reject the argument as regards the case of "a good" *(STh* I, q. 6, a. 3, obj. 3 and ad 3). Notice that, in obj. 2 and ad 2, he allows that "anything whatsoever is a being *[ens]* through its essence." The thing is good through its *esse,* not merely

of existence may be expressed tersely: 'For everything in accordance with the way it has existence has unity and individuation"' (175). All that the phrase Owens cites from Thomas [25] need (or does) mean is that *esse,* unity, and individuation all have the same causes or principles. But Owens continues: "Whether as subsistent in God or as accidental in creatures, existence is, in the order of being, the basic 'cause of individuation"' (175) This sentence from Owens includes the item in quotation marks, "cause of individuation." This is because in the footnote to the previous citation (190 n. 11), he said concerning the statement that existence, unity, and individuation go together: "The context is the 'causa individuationis animarum.' The point is that bodies are only in a way *(aliqualiter)* the cause of individuation of souls."[26] The implication he is leaving with the reader is that Thomas is referring to *esse* as the "cause of individuation."

Actually, in the text Owens is using, namely the response to Johannes de Vercellis,[27] the real argument is that "cause of

through the essence. Moreover, in *STh* I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 1, he uses the argument of Averroes for "one," and that in a way that can hardly be reduced to the sort of unity of matter Owens tried to exploit. In fact, it is a "one" that is explicitly identified with "a being."

[25] *Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de 108 articulis* (Leonine ed., *Opera omnia,* tome 42) a. 108 (lines 1185-87): "unumquodque enim secundum quod habet esse, habet unitatem et individuationem."

[26] Owens here throws in another text, from *Com. Theo/.* I, c. 71, but it shows neither more nor less than the other text.

[27] The passage is as follows:

> The 1lS'h item proposed: "Souls are individuated by the matters of bodies, though [when] separated from them they retain individuation, like wax [retaining] the impression of the seal", can be understood in a good way or a bad way. For if it is understood that souls are individuated by bodies, in such a way that the bodies are the total cause of the individuation of souls, it is false. But if it is understood that bodies are in some way the cause of the individuation of souls, it is true; for each thing according as it has being, has unity and individuation. Therefore, just as the body is not the total cause of the soul, but the soul as to its own nature *[rationem* J has some order to the body, since it belongs to the nature of the soul that it be unitable to a body: so also, the body is not the total cause of the individuation of *this* soul, but it is of the nature of *this* soul that it be unitable to *this* body, and this remains in the soul even after the body has been destroyed. (Lines 1177-94)

individuation" and "cause of being" go together. Is matter cause of being? To the extent that it is, it has some claim to be cause of individuation. Since the former claim is quite limited, so is the latter. There is no suggestion that the *esse* is the cause of individuation of the soul. That would require, as per the argument, that it be a cause of *esse* of the soul. God, not *esse,* is the cause of the *esse* of the soul (and the soul itself, by virtue of its own nature, is formal cause of its having *esse).* [28]

Owens continues by claiming that Thomas says that existence is what "makes one thing differ from another." And he quotes in proof the example: "As existents, however, they differ, for a horse's existence is not a man's, and this man's existence is not that man's" (175; the example is taken from *STh* I, q. 3, a. 5). Once more, all it shows is that existence and individuation stand and fall together. It does not show that existence is a cause of individuation. The text occurs in an article showing that God is not in a genus. It says that things in a genus have their generic essence in common, but differ *secundum esse,* that is, taken in function of their existence. This is shown by stating the fact that the being of man and the being of horse are not the same. And it is added that the being of this man and that man are not the same. What this shows is that when a thing has *esse,* it must have in it something other than the quiddity itself (and particularly the quiddity of the genus). That is, there must be a *subject* which has *esse* and the essential nature. The idea is certainly not that *esse* as such is intrinsically individual and the cause of individuation. But that is what Owens's position involves. [29]

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[28] On the subsisting form as formal cause of its being, see my paper "St. Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause," esp. 178-80.

[29] I am reminded of *STh* I, q. 12, a. 4, where it is said of material things that their natures do not have *esse* save in "this individual matter." There can hardly be any doubt that in this part of the *Summa esse* is presented as what is most common of all, and as having the nature of the received and formal: cf. *STh* I, q. 4, a. 3: all things are like God in function of *esse,* which is analogically common to all; and *STh* I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3: "when I say 'the *esse* of a man, or of a horse, or of anything else,' *esse* itself is considered as formal and received; not as that item to which *esse* belongs." It is true that the text used by Owens (viz., *STh* I, q. 3, a. 5, main argument 3) is one of the more Avicennian texts in the *Prima pars,* and requires very careful handling. Notice that it is the third of three arguments given.

Hence, as regards this first section of Owens's paper, so crucial for his entire outlook, I do not agree that *esse* is a "synthesis," or that "it *makes* each a unit in itself and renders it distinct from all others" (italics added). He has not shown (nor is it true) that existence is the basic "cause of individuality" in Thomas's philosophical thinking (175). However, it is certainly true that individuation and *esse* stand and fall together. They have the same causes.

Owens concludes the first part of his paper, the part that concerns us, with a reference to a text wherein Thomas cites the *Liber de causis* on God's individuation. This we will reserve for the second part of our paper. 30

II

I propose to present Thomas's doctrine of "the individual," calling attention to a few rather all-encompassing ("global") texts. But first I wish to introduce the idea that "the individual" names a mode of being. We will even say that there are modes of being an individual, that is, that "individual" is said of many which are so called only by analogy. 31

First, there are texts that present the contrast between the universal and the individual (or singular) as pertaining to beings as beings. Thus, in the *Summa contra Gentiles* we are told:

The nature of a genus cannot be perfectly known unless its primary differences and essential accidents *[differentiae primae et per se passiones]* are known: for one cannot perfectly know *the nature of number if the even and the odd* remain unknown. But THE UNNERSAL AND THE SINGULAR ARE DIFFERENCES OR ESSENTIAL ACCIDENTS OF BEING [ENIIS]. If, therefore, God knowing his own essence knows

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3 °Continuing to prove his point, Owens says: "In the language of the *Liber de causis,* God's individuation is his own pure goodness" (175). Here we are referred to two texts, II *Sent.,* d. 3, q. 1, a. 2 (Mandonnet, 90-91) and *De ente,* c. 5, Jl. 23-24. However, I would urge the reader to see how Thomas handles God's being an individual in his *In De causis.* For this, see below.

31 I *Sent.,* d. 22, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2 (Mandonnet, 538-39): "an analogue is divided in virtue of diverse modes. Hence, since 'a being' is predicated analogically of the ten genera, it is divided among them in virtue of diverse modes. Hence, to each genus there is owing a proper mode of predicating." Thomas is here contrasting the analogical, divided by diverse modes, with the univocal, divided by differences, and the equivocal, divided by signified things.

perfectly the common nature of being *[naturam communem entis]*, it is necessary that he perfectly know the univeral and the singular. [32]

Thus, in discussing the individual, we may expect to be m a deeply ontological discussion. [33]

If we pursue this view of the individual as related to the nature of *ens* or "that which is," we find the *Summa Theologiae* discussion of Boethius's definition of the person (viz., an individual substance of a rational nature), most helpful. Thomas's main reply, explaining this definition with thoroughgoing approval, takes the form of a lesson on the individual *(individuum).* We begin:

though admittedly the universal and the particular *[particulare]* are to be found in all the genera, nevertheless the individual is to be found in a special mode *[speciali quodam modo]* in the genus of substance. For substance is individuated through itself *[per seipsam]*, whereas accidents are individuated through the subject, which is substance; for one speaks of "this" whiteness inasmuch as it is in "this subject." And so also, suitably, the individuals of substance have a special name, apart from the others: for they are called "hypostases" or "primary substances." [34]

This is certainly a controlling text. Notice that "universal" and "particular" (interchangeable with "individual") are found in all the Aristotelian categories of being. This is to say again that this is a difference which pertains to beings as beings.[35]

[32] *ScG* I, c. 65 (ed. Pera, no. 532; Pegis, para. 4; italics and small caps added). Avicenna, *Uber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* (ed. S. Van Riet [Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 1997], I-IV) 1.2 (p. 13, lines 42-44), speaking of the subject of the science, "ens inquantum est ens," and the items which follow upon it (line 37), says: "Et ex his quaedam sunt ei quasi accidentalia propria, sicut unum et multa, potentia et effectus, *universale et particulare,* possibile et necesse" (italics added).

[33] Cf. Jorge J. E. Gracia, *Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988): "My suggestion, then, is that individuality may be interpreted as one of the two fundamental ontological modes, the other being universality" (136). Whether or not they are "the two" fundamental modes, they are surely fundamental ontological targets of attention.

[34] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1.

[35] The fact that "the individual" is found in all the categories itself entails that it is an analogous term: no predicate is predicated univocally of substance and accident, as St. Thomas says in *De Pot.,* q. 7, a. 7.

Moreover, we will be primarily considering what takes place within the genus of substance. Accidents are already excluded from the issue. As is well known, the accident which is quantity regularly has attributed to it some sort of individuality and some role as "principle of individuation." [36] It should be clear from the above text that such a role must be secondary, at best.

Thomas continues his lesson on the individual, as follows:

But in a still more special and more perfect mode *[quodam specialioriet perfectiorimodo]*, the particular and the individual *[particulareæt individuum]* is to be found in *rational*substances, which have mastery over their own action, and are not merely acted upon, but rather act by virtue of themselves *[per se agunt].* Now, actions are in *singulars.*[37]

And therefore, also, in contrast to other substances, the singulars *[singularia]*of rational nature have a special name. And this name is "person."

And therefore in the aforementioned definition of the person is placed "individual substance," inasmuch as it [the person] signifies the singular in the genus of substance; but "of rational nature" is added, inasmuch as it signifies the singular among rational substances.[38]

[36] See especially *STh* III, q. 77, a. 2.

[37] Italics added. From the point of view of the building up of human metaphysical experience, the association of individuals (or subsisting things) and operations should be related to the experience of composite things as the proper subjects (the "vehicles," one might say) of both (1) actual existence and (2) motion or change. Thus, in *Metaphys.* 9.3.1047a31-b2, Aristotle points out that while we attribute "being thought about" to things which do not exist, nevertheless we attribute *motion* only to the *existent.* Cf. Thomas's IX *Metaphys.,* lect. 3 (1805-6). Cf. also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a12-24.

Aristotle's doctrine that the question of the separability of soul turns on its having an operation of its own derives from the foregoing considerations: cf. *De anima* 1.1.403a10-12.

[38] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1. The same points are made in *De Pot.,* q. 9, a. 1, ad 3 and ad 8. However, in the reply to objection 3, Thomas is more complete on the relation of the individual to action.

just as individual substance has it as proper that it exist through itself *[per se existat],*so also it has it as proper that it act through itself *[per se agat]:* for nothing acts save a being in act [ens *actu;* and because of this, heat, just as it is not through itself, so also neither does it act through itself; but rather the hot heats through heat. But that which is *to act through itself [per se agere]* belongs in a more excellent degree to substances of rational nature than to others. For only rational substances have mastery over their own act, such that there is in them to act and not to act; but other substances are more acted upon than acting. And therefore it was suitable that the individual substance of a rational nature have a special name.

We see from the key consideration in the above, namely, the
citation of the dictum "actions are in singulars" that we are on the
trail of what essentially constitutes singularity or individuality. It
is something that is seen in modes or levels, but that is realized
most fully in the extent to which a substance is an agent, a source
of events.

To an objector who claims that the individual cannot be
defined, and thus Boethius cannot be correct, Thomas responds
that "the general character of singularity" *[communem rationem*
singularitatis] can be defined, and points to the definition of
primary substance given by Aristotle. [39]

However, the most important objection and reply for our
present interest come in third place. The objector, criticizing the
Boethian definition, points out that "individual" is not the name
of a thing outside the mind, but is rather a logician's considera-
tion; not the name of a *"res,"* but merely of an *"intentio";* and yet
the person is a real thing. Boethius's definitional procedure is
thus, he claims, unsuitable.

Thomas   replies,   explaining   carefully   the   meamng   of
"individual" in the definition.

because substantial differences are not known to us, or else are not named, it
is necessary sometimes to use accidental differences in place of substantial
[differences], for example, if someone were to say: "fire is a simple, hot, and
dry body"; for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms, and reveal
them. And similarly the names of *logicalnotions [intentiones]*can be accepted
in order to define *real things [res],* inasmuch as they are accepted in the role of
some names of real things which [names] have not been invented. And thus this
name "individual" *[individuum]*is inserted in the definition of the person in
order to signify the mode of subsisting, which belongs to particular substances
[*modum subsistendiqui competit substantiisparticularibus*].[40]

[39] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 1. The reference is to Aristotle, *Categories*3.2al 1: "Substance, in
the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable
of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse" (trans. E. M.
Edghill).

[40] Ibid., ad 3. In *De Pot.,* q. 9, a. 2, ad 5, on the same point, we have: "'individual' is
inserted into the definition of the person in order to signifythe individual mode of being" *[ad
designandumindividualemmodum essend1].*

At I *Sent.,* d. 25, q. 1, a. 1 (Mandonnet, 601), the discussion of Boethius's definition of
"person," note how different isThomas's handling of "individual" from that in *STh* I, q. 29,

In another objection in the same article, the meaning of the term "substance," as used in the definition of person, is questioned. The preferred reply of Thomas is as follows: "'substance' is taken universally *[communiter],* inasmuch as it is divided into primary and secondary; and by the addition of 'individual,' it is narrowed down to stand for primary substance."[41] Thomas's only slightly earlier *De Potentia* discussion (q. 9, a. 2) explains more fully:

> when "substance" is divided into primary and secondary, this is not a division of a genus into species-since nothing is contained under "secondary substance" that is not contained under "primary [substance]"-but rather it is a division of the genus in function of diverse modes of being *[secundum diversos modos essendi].* For "secondary substance" signifies the absolute nature of the genus, just by itself; but "primary substance" signifies it [the nature] as individually subsisting *[ut individualiter subsistentem].* Hence, it is more of a division of an analogue than of a genus *[magis est divisio analogi quam generis].* Thus, therefore, "the person" is indeed contained in the genus of substance, though admittedly not as a species, but as determining a special mode of existing *[ut specialem modum existendi determinans].*[42]

Thus, we see the extent to which the entire discussion is one of dividing being into modes, relative to what subsists, as having its own *esse.*

It is not easy to see just what is meant by this division of "that which is" into the universal and the individual. Can we say that universals are beings? Certainly, an argument from the *Summa contra Gentiles* maintains that they have less right to this title than does the individual. Arguing that God's providence extends to contingent singulars, Thomas says:

> Since God is the cause of that-which-is inasmuch as it is that-which-is *[entis inquantum est ens],* as was shown above, it is necessary that he be the provider *[provisor]* for that-which-is inasmuch as it is that-which-is: for he provides for things inasmuch as he is their cause. Therefore, whatever *is* in any degree *[quocumque modo est]* falls under his providence. But singulars are beings *[entia],* and more so *[magis]* than universals; because universals do not subsist

a. 1 and *De Pot.,* q. 9, a. 2; in the *Sentences* commentary it is still merely the name of an intention.

[41] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 2.
[42] *De Pot.,* q. 9, a. 2, ad 6.

by themselves, but *are* [viz: have being, *sunt]* only in singulars. Therefore, there
is divine providence even as to singulars. [43]

Thus, we see that the universal is viewed as the inherent, in
contrast to the individual which precisely subsists, that is,
properly *has its own esse.* Inherents are found even in the genus
of substance, as in the case of the substantial forms lower than the
human soul. [44]

   Having located our topic as the mode of being proper to the
subsisting thing, [45] let us note how Thomas provides a tableau or
panorama of being, viewed as to the different modes of the
subsistent or individual. In terms of subsistence or *"having* being,"
we get the following:

[43] III *ScG,* c. 75 (Pera, no. 2513; Pegis, no. 13). Cf. also I *Post.,* lect. 37 (Leonine ed.
[Paris: J. Vrin; Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1989], lines 173-87, commenting on Aristotle,
85b15; Spiazzi, no. 330):

> And he [Aristotle] says that if the universal is said of many in function
> of one intelligibility *[rationem]* and not equivocally, the universal as
> regards what pertains to reason *[quantum ad id quod rationis est],* that
> is, as regards science and demonstration, will not be less of a being than
> the particulars, but rather more, because the incorruptible is more of
> a being *[magis ens]* than the corruptible, and the universal intelligibility
> *[ratio universalis]* is incorruptible whereas the particulars are
> corruptible, corruptibility happening to them in function of the
> individual principles, not in function of the intelligibility of the species,
> which is common to all and preserved by generation; thus, therefore,
> as regards what pertains to reason, the universals *are* more than the
> particulars, but as regards natural subsistence *[quantum uero ad
> naturalem subsistenciam],* the particulars are more *[magis sunt],* [and
> thus] are called "primary and principle substances."

[44] See *STh* I, q. 45, a. 4. In referring to the substantial forms lower than the human soul
(which subsists), I am trying to be as "realistic" as possible regarding the universal. The sub-
stantial form is not the universal, but is its principle. The essence or quiddity of the material
thing is distinct from the material thing itself, and has the role of "formal part": cf. *STh* I, q.
3, a. 3. For an indication of the problems in discussing quiddity, substantial form, and thing,
see my paper "St. Thomas, Metaphysics, and Formal Causality," *Laval theologique et
philosophique* 36 (1980): 285-316.

[45] "Mode of being" itself deserves prolonged study. The general notion of "mode" here
is one of *measure* of a formal feature: cf. *STh* I, q. 5, a. 5. Thus, we are regularly considering
a "receiver" which *has* some perfection. In the case of God, the simplicity of the divine
essence requires that God *be* whatever he *has;* cf. *ScG* I, c. 23 (no. 218).

Now, there are many modes of being of things *[modus essendi rerum].*

For some things are, whose nature does not *have* being *[habet esse]* save in this individual matter; and of this mode *[huiusmodi]* are all corporeal [things].

But some things are, whose natures are subsistent by themselves, not in any matter, which nevertheless are not their own being *[esse],* but rather they are [things] *having* being *[esse habentes];* and of this mode are incorporeal substances, which we call "angels."

Of God alone the proper mode of being *[proprius modus essendi]* is that he be his own subsistent being *[suum esse subsistens]*.[46]

We should note the use of the word "have" as in "have being," which St. Thomas sometimes stresses in order to present the subsisting thing as such. Thus, for example, in presenting the sort of thing which is truly "made," he tells us that "being made" is ordered to "being," and so that is properly made which properly *is.* And what is that? "That is properly said to 'be' which itself *has* being *[quod ipsum habet esse]*, as subsisting in its *own* being *[quasi in suo esse subsistens]:* hence, only substances are properly and truly called 'beings' *[entia].*"[47]

However, we can find the above tableau set out expressly as regards the individual. Let us consider a text from *In De causis,* prop. 9. This is one of the most important lessons in the work, since it concerns the causality of the highest cause and how it stands as to being, relative to all the rest. Thomas is presenting the author's conception of God as pure *esse,* and the created separate substance as a composite of form and *esse.* At the very end of the discussion, there comes a possible objection. If God is pure *esse,* he will not be an *individual* being; he will rather be that *"esse commune"* predicated of all; and since only individuals act or are acted upon, he will not be a cause. The contention is that the divine *esse,* in order to be individuated, must be *received in something.* The obvious point is that it does not suffice to posit *esse* as such, in order to have something individuated. [48]

[46] *STh* I, q. 12, a. 4, in part.

[47] *STh* I, q. 90, a. 2.

[48] *Super Librum de causis expositio,* prop. 9, ed. H. D. Saffrey, O.P. (Fribourg: Societe philosophique; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1954), p. 64, line 28-p. 65, line 7; italics in the edition, indicating words from the commented text:

> Posset enim aliquis dicere quod, si causa prima est esse tantum, videtur
> quod sit esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur et quod non sit

Does Thomas answer that *esse* as such everywhere provides individuation? Not at all. He rather relates individuation in the first cause to its *not being received in anything.*

But to this [the author of the *De causis]* responds that the very infinity of the divine *esse,* inasmuch as it is not limited to some receiver, has in the first cause the role of the *yliatim* which is in other things. And this because, as in other things the individuation of a received common thing is brought about by the receiver, so the divine goodness and being *[esse]* is individuated from its very own purity, i.e. through the fact that it is not received in anything; and from the fact that it is thus individuated by its own purity, it has it that it can issue forth in goodnesses [bestowed] upon the intelligence and the other things.[49]

One sees that it is very much the receiver that accounts for individuation in all the common things; one should remember that *esse,* in everything other than God, is as something received

> aliquid individualiter ens ab aliis distinctum; id enim quod est commune non individuatur nisi per hoc quod in aliquo recipitur. Causa autem prima est aliquid individualiter distinctum ab omnibus aliis, alioquin non haberet operationem aliquam; universalium enim non est neque agere neque pati. Ergo videtur quod *necesse* sit dicere causam primam habere *yliatim,* id est aliquid recipiens esse.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Book of Causes,* trans. Vincent A. Guagliardo, O.P., Charles R. Hess, O.P., and Richard C. Taylor (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 72.

Cf. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., "Le principe de l'individualite," in *Le "De ente et essentia" de s. Thomas dAquin* (Le Saulchoir: Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 1926), 49-134. The very first theologian he presents, William of Auvergne, in his *De universo* (ca. 1231-36), refers to the *Liber de causis* without mentioning that name, in connection with divine individuality. Roland-Gosselin (73 n. 3) cites Guillaume d'Auvergne, *Opera omnia* (Orleans, 1674), t. I, *De universo* I, 2, c. 9 (p. 852 a D): "et posuerunt ei individuum dicentes quia individuum ejus est bonitas pura."

[49] P. 65, lines 7-15: "Sed ad hoc respondet quod ipsa *infinitas* divini *esse,* scilicet non est terminatum ad aliquod recipiens, habet in causa prima vicem *yliatim* quod est in aliis rebus. Et hoc ideo quia, sicut in aliis rebus fit individuatio rei communis receptae per id quod est recipiens, ita divina *bonitas* et esse individuatur ex ipsa sui puritate per hoc scilicet quod ipsa non est recepta in aliquo; et ex hoc quod est sic individuata sui puritate, habet quod possit *influere bonitates super intelligentiam et alias res."* Cf. Guagliardo, p. 72. The translation is my own, but this is no reflection on the fine translation of Guagliardo, Hess, and Taylor. I might note, however, that for "per id quod est recipiens," they have "through what the recipient is." I think it might be rendered: "by the receiving that-which-is"; that is, the receiver has always the role of *"quod est,"* or the subsisting thing.

in a receiver.[50] It could hardly serve, in the doctrine of St.
Thomas, as something giving individuation to all else.

Since Thomas has been obliged to work with the text of
someone else, which as he reads it seems to require something
material (or quasi-material) for individuation, he goes on to
provide his own proper account of individuation.

So that this may be evident, it is to be considered that something is called an
"individual" from this fact, that it is not of its nature to be in many: for the
universal is that whose nature it is to be in many.

But that something is not of a nature to be in many can occur in two ways.
In one way, by the fact that it is limited to some one thing in which it is
[present], for example whiteness by the character of its species is of a nature
to be in many, but this whiteness which is received in this subject cannot be
save in this.

But this way [of not being of a nature to be in many] cannot proceed to
infinity, because in formal and material causes one cannot proceed to infinity,
as is proved in *Metaphysics* 2; hence it is necessary to arrive at something which
is not of a nature to be received in something, and from this it has
individuation, as for example primary matter in corporeal things, which is the
principle of singularity.

Hence, it is necessary that everything which is not of a nature to be in
something, by that very fact is individual; and this is the second way in which
something is not of a nature to be in many, i.e. because it is not of its nature
to be in something, as for example if whiteness were existing separately
without a subject, it would be an individual in that way. [51]

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[50] *STh* I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3. I am reminded of the way Johannes Capreolus expresses the
doctrine of St. Thomas concerning *esse,* as that item in the metaphysical analysis of the
creature most remote from the nature of that which subsists as such. He says: "since the *esse*
of the creature least of all subsists, it is not properly created or annihilated, nor is, nor is not,
nor begins [to be], nor ceases [to be]; but all those things are said of that which is through
that *esse,* and not of *esse* itself" ("Cum ergo esse creaturae minime subsistat, non proprie
creatur, aut annihilatur, aut est, aut non est, aut incipit, aut desinit; sed omnia talia dicuntur
de illo quod est per illud esse, et non de ipso esse") Oohannis Capreoli, *Defensiones theologiae
divi Thomae Aquinatis,* ed. C. Paban et T. Pegues [furonibus: Alfred Cattier, 1900], 1:327a).

See my paper, "Capreolus, saint Thomas et l'Etre," in *Jean Capreolus et son temps
1380-1444 Colloque de Rodez* [special number, no. 1 of *Memoire dominicaine],* ed. Guy
Bedouelle, Romanus Cessario, and Kevin White (Paris: Cerf, 1997), 77-86.

[51] There is a most interesting text in *Quodl.* 7, q. 4, a. 3 [10] (Leonine ed.; Rome:
Commissio Leonina; Paris: Cerf, 1996), t. 25/1, pp. 22-24. Thomas is asked whether God can
bring it about that whiteness or any other corporeal quality exist without quantity. He
answers that God could do it. One must distinguish, in any quality, between the nature
through which it obtains a specific character and the individuation by which it is this *sensible*

And in this way there is individuation in separate substances, which are forms having *esse,* and in the first cause itself, which is *esse* subsisting.[52]

What could be clearer? Thomas has ample opportunity to bring in *"esse* as such"; he does not do so at all.

There is, then, a "global" theory of the individual in St. Thomas's doctrine, namely, that something does not have a nature such as to be received in something. In corporeal things, this derives from the matter. In subsisting forms, the form itself

whiteness distinct from that other sensible whiteness. God could, by a miracle, bring it about that the nature subsist without any quantity, but that whiteness would not be this *sensible* whiteness; it would be an intelligible form, something like the separate forms which Plato posited. However, that this individuated *sensible* whiteness be without quantity is something that cannot be brought about. In the reply to objection 1, he describes the hypothetical miraculously separate whiteness as "a spiritual, not a corporeal, quality."

In this relatively early text, Thomas reserves the word "individuation" for the sensible whiteness, as found in dimensive quantity, whereas our present text presents as individual the hypothetical whiteness itself subsisting, and speaks of "individuation" regarding subsistent form.

[52] Ed. Saffrey, p. 65, line 16-p. 66, line 7:

> Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod aliquid dicitur esse individuum ex hoc quod non est natum esse in multis; nam universale est quod est natum esse in multis.
>
> Quod autem aliquid non sit natum esse in multis hoc potest contingere dupliciter.
>
> Uno modo per hoc quod est determinatum ad aliquid unum in quo est, sicut albedo per rationem suae speciei nata est esse in multis, sed haec albedo quae est recepta in hoc subiecto, non potest esse nisi in hoc. Iste autem modus non potest procedere in infinitum, quia non est procedere in causis formalibus et materialibus in infinitum, ut probatur in II *Metaphysicae;*
>
> unde oportet devenire ad aliquid quod non est natum recipi in aliquo et ex hoc habet individuationem, sicut materia prima in rebus corporalibus quae est principium singularitatis. Unde oportet quod omne illud quod [p. 66] non est natum esse in aliquo, ex hoc ipso sit individuum; et hic est secundus modus quo aliquid non est natum esse in multis, quia scilicet non est natum esse in aliquo, sicut, si albedo esset separata sine subiecto existens, esset per hunc modum individua.
>
> Et hoc modo est individuatio in substantiis separatis quae sunt formae habentes esse, et in ipsa causa prima quae est ipsum esse subsistens.

Cf. Guagliardo, pp. 72-73.

(not the *esse)* has the requisite nature. In God, the *esse*-itselfis of such a nature as to subsist. "The individual" is *analogically* common, or is divided into modes.

Thus far I have said nothing about the role of quantity in individuation. I have focused rather on the mode of being of the subsisting thing, which obviously cannot stem from quantity or any accident. In earlier texts Thomas treats individuation as a kind of package, focusing on the multiplication of beings in the same species.[53] How are the instances of human nature distinct one from the other? The answer lies neither in form just in itself nor in matter just in itself, but in matter as subject to dimensive quantity. Dimensive quantity is presented as following upon the substantial form, corporeity, a substantial form which is present in all matter. This general doctrine is never abandoned by Thomas, but in later presentations it is more carefully distinguished from the primary metaphysical issue, the mode of being of the subsisting thing. [54] Dimension serves to limit a form which can be in many, so that it still has "being in," but has being in one only. Primary matter serves to remove altogether the aspect of "being in." This distinction of the two issues is clearest in *STh* III, q. 77, a. 2, on whether the dimensive quantity of the bread or the wine is the subject of the other accidents in the

[53] The fundamental work here is that of Roland-Gosselin mentioned   earlier. Roland-Gosselin (105 n. 2), hunting for discussions of individuation in the first book of the *Sentences* commentary, tells us that we have the doctrine of the multiplication of individuals in a species by "division of matter" in I *Sent.,* d. 9, q. 1, a. 2 (Mandonnet, 248-49). Notice that we are talking here about the problem of multiplication, and not merely of "not being in something."

[54] I notice that *De Pot.,* q. 9, a. 5, ad 13 gives us the two aspects that I think Thomas eventually sees have to be carefully distinguished. Notice that in this text the individating principles are called the *"principium subsistendi."* This seems right to me, and not the somewhat Boethian doctrine in *STh* I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 5. But I cannot deal with that here.

I notice that in *Quodl.* 2, q. 2, a. 2 [4], on the distinction between nature and supposit in angels, supposedly a later text, Thomas holds that the angel's nature is not individuated by matter, but by itself: because such a form is not of a nature to be received in some matter. However, there is a distinction between nature and supposit, since things are predicated of the supposit which cannot be predicated of the nature as such. This line of thinking strikes me as more akin to the earlier approach to individuation, tending to distinguish between individuation and subsistence. The later view makes subsistence the primary individuation.

sacrament of the Eucharist. [55] We have seen it above, also, in the text from the *In De causis.* I believe that this distinction of issues is crucial for understanding Thomas on the individual and individuation.

In the present paper my main objectives have been (1) to criticize the association of individuation with the act of being, taken precisely as such; and (2) to show a truly global approach, on Thomas's part, to the individual as such, the individual conceived as a mode of being. Enough has been said to alert the reader of Thomas to the fact that in diverse levels of being there are diverse "principles" of individuation.

[55] The doctrine in *STh* III, q. 77, a. 2 is the same as in the *In De causis.* I have used the latter only because I have actually encountered readers who object to the "theological" character of the former.

THE SPIRIT AND THE LIMITS OF PRUDENTIAL REASONING [1]

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HUMAN FULFILLMENT finds its fullest expression in an eternal friendship with God; such a relationship of friendship, while only completely achieved in the next life, nonetheless plays a constitutive role in moral reasoning in this one.

While one might regard what is asserted in the previous paragraph as a simple truism among Thomists, it has nonetheless recently come under fire in Thomistic scholarship. The aim of this paper is to address that challenge. The thesis I develop here is simple and twofold: first, that our friendship with God, as spoken of under the general notion of "beatitude," is a constitutive component of the moral life; second, that it is St. Thomas's doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the specific indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the baptized individual, that completes his portrait of moral decision making. The two aspects of the thesis are related in that Aquinas's reflections on the gifts of the Holy Spirit supply a much-needed answer to those interpreters of Aquinas who wish to minimize the significance of beatitude, or friendship with Christ, in moral discernment. In sum, the central questions to be addressed here concern the nature and extent of beatitude ill Christian moral reflection.

It would seem that beatitude does not play a central role in the Christian moral life, for a number of reasons. In a recent work,

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[1] A draft of this paper was delivered at the Missouri Valley Association of Catholic Theologians, St. Louis, Missouri (Fall, 1998).

Pamela Hall notes that within her broader account of St. Thomas's discussion of Christian morality she hopes to argue that "human prudence cannot steer itself by referring to God as ultimate end, since this is an end of which we do not have sufficient apprehension here and now." [2] Citing a Thomistic truism regarding the ineffability of the divine essence, Hall suggests that such an essence cannot function in any useful way in matters of moral reflection, for one cannot have as one's normative end something that is utterly incomprehensible.

The claim that divine friendship cannot serve as an end upon which prudential reasoning might rely seems, despite its initial plausibility, to fly in the face of all of those well-known passages in which charity, as precisely that virtue of friendship with God, is the central virtue, indeed the root virtue of the Christian moral life. Hall recognizes the primacy of charity in St. Thomas's account, yet reminds her readers that charity is a virtue principally related to the will, not the intellect. [3] Since charity is related to the will, and prudence is a virtue of the practical intellect, charity is unable to illuminate in any constitutive way moral decision making. As Hall says, "Thus an important problem arises: in practical reasoning we cannot use as a guide an end which we do not-and cannot-apprehend. "[4]

And yet this thesis seems again to fly in the face of St. Thomas's insistence on the total interior transformation of the baptized person who now participates in the new law of grace-a new law that is precisely characterized as one that facilitates a reformation of the interior life.

Hall recognizes this importance of the new law of grace when she says, "what the New Law [of grace] contributes uniquely to morality is a new characterization of morality's end: intimate union with God, "[5] but tempers the function of this intimate union by noting that the life of infused virtue does not "require a

[2] Pamela Hall, *Narrative and the Natural Law* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 20.

[3] Ibid., 75.

[4] Ibid., 79.

[5] Ibid., 88.

cognitive grasp of an end higher than natural reason can provide. "[6]

It is not readily clear, however, how infused prudence, animated by a newly discovered intimate union with God, does not require any further grasp than that supplied by natural reason. Surely the mortal sinner, though he may enjoy a natural knowledge of God's existence, is at a disadvantage in the exercise of infused prudence. Hall herself indicates some problems in her reading of St. Thomas along such lines and in a footnote admits some difficulties in her analysis.[7]

Hall's conundrums about the place of God in the Christian moral life emerge from premises that seem initially true: God is incomprehensible; an incomprehensible end cannot serve as a practical end (even for prudence which may be infused); and charity, while essential in the Christian moral life, is nonetheless noncognitive in thrust. The question remains: what good is God in living the moral life?

Followers of Hall's work may rightly note that her reflections are not limited to the ineffability of God or the noncognitive status of charity; rather, Hall's overall efforts are an attempt to defend the enduring significance of the natural law, and especially the natural *inclinationes,* even as these are subsumed into, and indeed help fill in our understanding of, the new law of grace. But an appeal to natural law is not without its problems. For the natural law, as is well known by all students of St. Thomas, lends itself to greater frequency of defect as one descends into the particulars. Hence, "With respect to particular conclusions come to by the practical reason there is no general unanimity about what is true or right, and even when there is agreement there is not the same degree of recognition" *(STh* I-II, q. 94, a. 4).[8]

Here, it seems, one finds yet another reason that beatitude or friendship with Christ is essentially impotent in matters of practical reasoning, since even infused prudence, taken up as it is with

6 Ibid., 83.

7 Ibid., 140 n. 108.

8 All Latin citations as well as the English translations of the *Summa Theologiae* will be taken from the Blackfriars translation, Thomas Gilby, O.P., and T. C. O'Brien, O.P., eds. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966).

the task of application and implementation of the natural law, not only lacks a sufficient grasp of God as friend, but lacks a sufficient precision concerning the matters of particulars. In other words, it is not only its dependence upon an ineffable God that makes the exercise of infused prudence problematic in matters of living the Christian life. Rather it is the very nature of prudential reasoning itself as functioning among the vicissitudes of the human condition that makes it fundamentally limited. While one could solve the problems of the noncognitive character of charity by noting that one receives in addition to charity the infused intellectual virtue of prudence, prudence itself seems especially limited in its ability to secure certain judgments regarding particulars.

This notion about the limits of prudential reasoning extends beyond Hall's efforts specifically, bringing us closer to another influential interpreter of Aquinas, Jean Porter. Porter is the principal source for many of Hall's reflections and extends the critique of St. Thomas even further.

In *The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics,* Porter supplies one of the clearest examples of this kind of reading of Aquinas with the following remark.

The supernatural end of human life as such cannot be the subject of direct knowledge for creatures such as ourselves, since it consists in direct union with the God who is utterly inaccessible to our conceptual knowledge. For this reason, it cannot directly serve as the goal by which we evaluate our actions, since we cannot orient our practical reason by a goal that we cannot conceive. We can know something about the moral content, so to speak, of the life of grace. Otherwise, Aquinas could not have detailed the moral qualities associated with the theological virtues as he does. But that knowledge is based on our observation of graced lives, interpreted in the light of doctrine and natural moral wisdom, and does not-could not-derive from our knowledge of the qualities of the beatific vision toward which the graced life is directed.[9]

As is evident, Porter supplies the essential thrust of Hall's observations concerning the impotence of beatitude in prudential reasoning. How might one begin to respond?

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[9] Jean Porter, *The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 66.

One can begin with the claim in the opening sentence, that "it [our supernatural end] consists in direct union with the God who is utterly inaccessible to our conceptual knowledge." This "inaccessible" nature of God, as Porter states, or the lack of a "sufficient apprehension" or "cognitive grasp," as Hall says, is the lynchpin for much of their reflections, and deserves special attention.

It is not clear what Porter and Hall mean by such terms, but lacking sufficient clarity one might still begin to formulate a response. If "cognitive grasp" or "conceptual knowledge" is taken to mean a kind of comprehensive knowledge of God, then God indeed does escape that kind of knowledge, even in the next life. But it in no way follows that such knowledge is essential for illuminating prudential reasoning. "Eudaimonia," as is well known, supplies a sufficient end for guiding one's prudential reasoning in the Aristotelian tradition, yet it is not at all clear that one must require a complete knowledge of its conditions in order for it to supply a sufficient end for prudential reasoning.

Moreover, while it may be true that by grace we are united to God as "one who is unknown" *(STh* I, q. 12, a. 13, ad 1), this unknowability pertains to the divine essence in its fullness, and in no way suggests that this notion of the unknowability of God severs its effective relationship to the living of the Christian moral life. St. Thomas's apophaticism is not agnosticism. Thus while it is true that no one can fully comprehend the divine essence, even in the next life in the full state of beatitude, it is not at all accurate to say that God is an end which is completely uncognized. Later on, when we discuss the significance of the infused virtues and especially the gifts of the Holy Spirit, we will see that St. Thomas speaks of a kind of connatural knowledge, and will speak of our fellowship with God as *afamiliaris conversatio (STh* 1-11, q. 65, a. 5). The incomprehensibility of the divine essence does not banish God to the regions of moral irrelevance. Rather, St. Thomas insists that the blessed "see" the essence of God *(STh* I, q. 12, a. 1), in an intellectual manner *(STh* I, q. 12, a. 3), through a supernatural disposition added to the created intellect-the *lumen gloriae (STh* I, q. 12, a. 5)-though in a limited fashion.

Hall and Porter might respond that such a relationship exists only in beatitude, not in this life, and thus the objection still remains. But it should be noted that while the beatific vision is the reward of the blessed, as *comprehensores,* in the next   we nonetheless enjoy an intimate relationship with God as friend along the way, as *viatores.* Moreover, Aquinas makes explicit exceptions to the general rule concerning the limitations of our knowledge of God and argues elsewhere that St. Paul as well as contemplatives in a heightened state indeed "see" the divine essence (cf. *STh* I, q. 12, a. 11, ad 2; 11-11, q. 175, a. 3; 11-11, q. 180, a. 5). In this heightened state of contemplation, St. Thomas argues, the person occupies a kind of middle state between the present life and the life to come. As such it would be wrong to overstate, as Hall and Porter seem to have done, the distinctions between our knowledge of God in the state of perfect beatitude in the next life and our imperfect knowledge of that same God, however darkened, in this one. God is not so unknowable as some would contend.

Another mode of response to this apparent deconstruction of St. Thomas would focus on the account of his doctrine of charity. What can one say about the noncognitive status of charity and its relationship to the living of the Christian moral life? If Hall and Porter are right to recognize that charity is a virtue whose subject is the will, then how precisely as an essentially nonintellectual virtue can it be said to illuminate the moral life, especially in that the essential virtue of prudence is fundamentally intellectual in character? While the gap may have been closed in our earlier conversation between our limited selves and the unknowable character of God, a fissure nonethdess remains within the person between one's love for God as a matter of the will and the demands of the moral life as a matter of practical reasoning. A relationship with the "unknown God" of Christ, though now no longer an impossibility, remains nonetheless impotent in matters of morality. As Porter states in a different context, "Thomas' moral theology presupposes that the content of morality [of the moral life] can be derived from independent, non-theological grounds ... [and] that the moral life exists quite well without special doctrinal underpinnings ... and is intelligible in its own

terms." [10] Beatitude remains essentially irrelevant in moral reasoning.

One may respond by noting that while charity is properly related to the will, it is nonetheless part of a trilogy of theological virtues, one of which (the theological virtue of faith) is precisely intellectual in thrust. Saint Thomas asks explicitly whether charity can be had without faith or hope (*STh* 1-11, q. 65, a. 5) and answers in the negative, arguing that the essential character of charity, namely friendship, would be absurd without the attending virtues of believing and hoping in that friend. It should be noted, too, that the reverse is possible; one can have a kind of faith and hope, though imperfect, without charity. And thus while the grasp of love surpasses the reach of knowledge, love does not abandon all knowing, but indeed points the way-as charity alone remains in beatitude while faith and hope pass away.

Still, one may counter this observation by recognizing that while the virtue of faith indeed may accompany all instances of authentic charity, faith is principally concerned with the higher truths about God, and thus is essentially speculative in nature. Thus while it appears that the impassable gulf between charity and the practical life has been bridged, the impasse is not yet resolved in that beatitude must penetrate further into the recesses of the person's life, down from the lofty heights of speculation and into the more sordid details of the practical life. Friendship with Christ may indeed be more encompassing than a mere affective movement of the soul, as St. Thomas's understanding of faith as an intellectual virtue may suggest, but the moral life is lived in the details; the light of beatitude does not seem to penetrate that darkness.

Yet, if grace perfects nature, it would seem that the grace of the theological virtues can effect an even more radical transformation of the human person. Friendship with Christ not only can embolden the will and illuminate one's speculative understanding, but can, indeed should, penetrate the practical intellect, shedding light on one's obligations here and now, in this particular moment. Saint Thomas is determined to illustrate this very point.

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[10] Jean Porter, "Desire for God: Ground of the Moral Life in Aquinas," *Theological Studies* 47 (1986): 65.

Indeed I would argue that the development of St. Thomas's
thought in the *Secunda Pars* illuminates this very claim: that
Christ transforms every aspect of ourselves not simply in a kind
of generic, noncognitive way but in practical matters as well. In
an effort to account for this total transformation of the Christian,
St. Thomas argues that along with the theological virtues of faith,
hope, and charity, one is given all of the infused moral virtues as
well. To live only the theological virtues without the full
complement of the other infused moral virtues would be to live
the life of the stunted child, innocent from the perspective of the
end, yet immature from the perspective of the way.

   The nature and function of the infused virtues are not always
dear; yet one must not underestimate their significance in St.
Thomas's account of the moral life. The infused virtues are or-
dered toward an end that is distinct from that of their natural,
acquired counterparts, and so are considered to be of a different
species from the latter *(STh* 1-11, q. 63, a. 4). Moreover, they do
not stand in the same manner of the natural virtues in regard to
the mean *(STh* 1-11, q. 64, a. 4), nor do they mimic the natural
virtues in their development or diminution; they can be gained or
destroyed in a single act *(STh* 1-11, q. 63, a. 2). St. Thomas's
insistence on the place of the infused virtues within the moral life
is enough to give one pause when scholars are found to be
claiming that God does not function as the goal by which we
orient our practical lives. What are the infused virtues if not those
qualities of one who is capable of ordering his practical life
toward God as friend?

   A steadfast interlocutor might continue to argue that St.
Thomas's account of faith, though coupled with charity and the
attending infused virtues, remains nonetheless speculative, in that
it pertains to higher things. Hence while infused virtue seems to
offer some kind of penetration into the practical affairs (in that it
entails prudence), not even infused prudence can be sufficiently
bolstered in practical matters by an insight which remains
speculative. Nor can the natural law be of assistance to infused
prudence, since even an infused sense of the natural law seems
unable to span the seemingly infinite void of particularity.

For example, in an altogether different context and yet with the similar aim of circumscribing the scope of prudential reasoning, Jean Porter cites *STh* 11-11, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3, which concerns why there is no such thing as a "speculative" prudence and says the following:

> In order to fully appreciate the significance of this passage, it is necessary to realize that prudence, for Aquinas, is an intellectual virtue, grounded in the practical intellect by which the agent is enabled to choose and act in accordance with the rational principles of human action (ST I-II 57.5; II-II 47.2). *The upshot of this passage is that there is no determinate way to move from the rational principles of human action to a specific choice of a concrete action.* We find a similar sense of the limitations of practical reasoning in Aquinas' discussion of the precepts of the natural law.[11]

As an aside it should be noted that the discussion under question pertains to the indeterminate, open-textured character of *consilium,* not the *electio* or the *imperium,* an oversight that is relevant to Porter's account. Nonetheless, for this discussion it is enough to note that her point about the nonscientific character of prudential reasoning holds. As Aristotle reminds us, *phronesis* is not *episteme;* there remains an open-textured character to one's moral discernment concerning the variety of options for prudent action.

Does this flexible character of prudence lend itself to the kind of readings we have found here? I would suggest that it does not; moreover, Aquinas seems aware of this very element of prudential reasoning and seeks specific ways to address these concerns. More precisely, his account of the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit seem especially tailored to closing any such gaps in the Christian moral life.

First, St. Thomas says that faith, while it is principally speculative in that it is directed toward God as the First Truth, is nonetheless practical in its extension in that the First Truth is also our last end of all our actions and desires. It is, St. Thomas says, invoking the words of St. Paul (in Galatians), a faith that is not merely speculative, but one that works through love *(STh* 11-11, q.

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[11] Jean Porter, *Moral Action and Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 98; emphasis added.

4, a. 2, ad 3). As Romanus Cessario, O. P., says, "The theological
virtue of faith, then, unites the believer to everything which God
discloses about Christian life. In short, there exist no purely
speculative truths of revelation. Every truth … contributes to the
perfection of the moral life."[12]

Second, the theological virtues are accompanied by still
another mode of divine relationship: namely, the gifts of the Holy
Spirit.[13] As necessary for salvation and accompanying all of the
theological virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are those activities
of the divine life whereby the human person is made amenable to
the prompting of the Holy Spirit. Like his discussion of the
infused theological virtues, this dimension of St. Thomas's analy-
sis is one more component of his attempt to demonstrate the radi-
cal transformation of the person as the new creature in Christ
precisely in this life. Far from being a mere regulative, though
inert, ideal of moral reasoning, the "vision" or knowledge of God
as friend expresses not merely the promise of future possession,
but the actual, though imperfect, union of the believer with God
in this life. Friendship with the incomprehensible God has begun
in the ordinary, practical life of the believer, though it is
completed in the life to come; despite being "under construction"
it nonetheless plays a constitutive role for us, the *viatores* of the
Christian life. God moves the believer directly not merely as a
remote final cause but cooperatively in his specific actions.

In the *Secunda Secundae,* St. Thomas allies the gifts to the
particular infused virtues.[14] The theological virtue of faith is

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[12] Romanus Cessario, 0.P., *The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics* (Notre Dame:
University of Notfe Dame Press, 1991), 69.

[13] St. Thomas addresses the nature and function of the gifts specifically in *STh* I-II, q. 68.
In the *Secunda Secundae,* he treats each of the seven gifts in its relationship to the infused
moral and theological virtues. Recent treatments of St. Thomas's account of the gifts include
Romanus Cessario, O. P., *Christian Faith and the Theological Life* (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1996), especially chap. 5; Benedict M. Ashley, O.P.,
Thomas Aquinas: The Gifts of the Spirit (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1995); Paul
Wadell, *Friends of God: Virtues and Gifts in Aquinas* (New York: Peter Lang, 1991); Jordan
Aumann, 0.P., *Spiritual Theology* (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor Press, 1979);
Antonio Royo, O.P., and Jordan Aumann, O.P., *The Theology of Christian Perfection*
(Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1962).

[14] For a discussion of St. Thomas's treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Summa
Theologiae,* see Edward D. O'Connor, C.S.C., "Appendix 4: The Gifts of the Spirit," pp.
110-30, in vol. 24 of the Blackfriars translation of the *Summa.*

wedded both to the gift of knowledge and to the gift of under-
standing. In both instances St. Thomas explicitly indicates that the
gift is understood to have practical import *(STh* II-II, q. 8, a. 3;
II-II, q. 9, a. 3). It is as if St. Thomas is determined to demon-
strate the total transformation of the Christian's life; Christ will
not abandon the believer in his moment of Christian witness.

Moreover, it should be noted that St. Thomas yokes the gift of
wisdom to charity. With this decision, he seems to advance two
issues related to our project here. First, he recognizes in the
fullness of charity a distinctly intellectual component. Thus while
charity as a theological virtue may be said to reside in the will, in
the fullness of the Christian life it finds its complement in wisdom
(STh II-II, q. 45, a. 2). Second, St. Thomas explicitly affirms that
this gift, unlike its more secular counterpart, has practical import
especially. Since the gift is derived from a union with God that is
especially intimate, "by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it
is able to direct us not only in contemplation but also in action"
(STh II-II, q. 45, a. 3).

Finally, some attention needs to be given to prudential
reasoning. Prudence entails three aspects or moments in its
operation, all pertaining to issues concerning the means of
obtaining the ends already established. In its infused mode, it is
concerned with means that pertain to our supernatural end, life
with God as friend. In this case, the theological virtues of faith,
hope, and charity as well as their attendant gifts are especially
relevant as they supply a kind of connaturality or affinity with the
ends of prudential reasoning (as well as indirectly illuminating the
particulars surrounding the means of our perfection, as indicated
earlier). Technically speaking, prudential reasoning is an oppor-
tunity for the *viatores,* not the *comprehensores,* who have
achieved the end to which all decision is directed. [15]

Counsel, or *consilium,* is that gift of the Holy Spirit particu-
larly allied to prudence and identifies the activity of discerning
the proper means available to the agent who desires to achieve a
particular end. Aquinas's account of counsel in its supernatural
mode seems especially tailored to address any objection that

[15] Cf. Thomas Gilby, O. P., "Appendix 5: The Subordination of Morals," pp. 142-46 in
vol. 18 of the Blackfriars translation of the *Summa.*

would suggest a kind of inherent impotence in matters of particulars. One may recall the notion that natural law, as it extends to particular cases, loses some of its explanatory force in supplying a rationale for particular actions. When such reasoning is then guided by an end of which there seems to be no sufficient apprehension (as Porter and Hall have suggested) a Christian inspired prudential reasoning seems especially vague in practical affairs.

And yet I have already identified the ways in which the ends or principles of Christian moral reasoning may be sufficiently grasped. Now in dosing it is important to note that Aquinas fills in the gap in matters concerning the means to various ends and the particulars as well. Citing counsel as a necessary gift of the Holy Spirit which aids in the exercise of infused prudential reasoning, he specifically notes,

Prudence or well-advisedness, whether acquired by practice or shed on us by grace, directs us in our searchings into matters that our minds can grasp, and enables us to be of good counsel for ourselves or for others. Yet the outcome of our mind's inability to grasp all individual and contingent events that can possibly happen is that the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain. (Wisdom 9.14) Consequently we need in our searchings the guidance of God, who knows all things. This comes through the gift of counsel, whereby we are guided by the advice, as it were, of God. [16]

The human mind may not be able to grasp all of the particulars or the contingents, even in the exercise of infused prudence. But God is able to grasp the particulars and communicates through the gift of counsel the appropriate means (available here and now) to the agent's supernatural end.

It is clear that what might plague the open-ended character of Aristotelian prudential reasoning, namely, its apparent impotence

[16] *STh* II-II, q. 52, a. 1, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo. Dicendum quod prudentia vel eubulia, sive sit acquisita sive sit infusa, diriget hominem in inquisitione consilii secundum ea quae ratio comprehendere potest; unde homo per prudentiam vel eubuliam fit bene consilians vel sibi vel alii. Sed quia humana ratio non potest comprehendere singularia et contingentia quae occurrere possunt, fit quod 'cogitationes mortalium sunt timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae,' ut dicitur Sap. IX. Ideo indiget homo in inquisitione consilii dirigi a Deo, qui omnia comprehendit. Quod fit per donum consilii, per quod homo dirigitur quasi consilio a Deo accepto."

in matters of grasping the singular instance, is not problematic for the Christian conscience. The baptized, free from mortal sin and alive in the Holy Spirit, have an ally the non-Christian Aristotelian does not. God enters the life of the Christian in its minutest details, shaping it for the achievement of beatitude down to the finest of particulars. Beatitude is neither inaccessible in its essential outlines nor does that friend, the divine Person, from whom such friendship finds its origins, abandon us at the critical moments of decision making. Friendship with Christ is not some generic concept formulating only the vaguest of simple volitions or unthematic intentions; it is that personal resource the Christian agent draws upon in the interiority of his heart, where he draws upon the Lord for counsel in matters of particular actions. We can know the moral content of the life of grace not, *pace* Porter, through the mere "observation of graced lives," but through our own participation-full, vigorous, and intimate-in the life of Christ. This evangelical character of Thomistic prudential reasoning is an essential feature of St. Thomas's portrait of the moral life and resolves many of the ambiguities of contemporary interpretations.

In conclusion, one sees that only a fuller treatment of St. Thomas's account, a treatment that recognizes the nature and importance of the trilogy of theological virtues, the role of the infused moral virtues, and especially the gifts of the Holy Spirit, provides a complete account of the one taken up with the mandate to live the Christian moral life. By the Spirit we are led to see, if only darkly, that practical form of everyday life whereby we are drawn closer to our ultimate perfection in beatitude.

LYING AND SPEAKING YOUR INTERLOCUTOR'S LANGUAGE[1]

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INTRODUCTION

GIVEN ITS CONSTANT preoccupation with the Church's stance on sexual issues, it is not surprising that the media have missed a controversy over *lying* in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church.* In the first English version *[CCC1],* the *Catechism* stated:

Lying is the most direct offense against the truth. To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead into error someone who has the right to know the truth. (U483)

This formulation of the moral prohibition to lie is exactly the same one as Kant roundly criticized in his 1799 essay "On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns." Kant gave two criticisms. First, he denied that there was a possibility of a right to truth: for Kant it appears that rights are things that can be achieved through the will of the person possessing the right, and it is not always possible to come to true conclusions. Second, Kant claimed that

an intentionally untruthful declaration to another man ... always harms another; if not some other human being, then it nevertheless does harm to humanity in general, inasmuch as it vitiates the very source of right *[Rechtsquelle].*(426)

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[1] I am most grateful to Abigail Tardiff for fascinating discussions on this topic. In particular, I am indebted to her for so aptly characterizing the basic idea from which this paper evolved as: "speaking [your interlocutor's] language." Without her contribution, the paper might have never been written.

The very source of right is rationality, and an untruthful declaration is directed against rationality.

But one can also make another criticism of the *CCC1's* principle against lying. To say that it is wrong "to speak or act against the truth in order to lead into error someone who has the right to know the truth" is a merely analytic truth, a tautology, since its validity follows from the very meaning of the word "right" in "right to know the truth." Evidently one may not act against someone's right-this is what the word "right" *means.* Thus the *CCC1* formulation, while not false, is trivial. Moreover, it does not accurately reflect the full strength of the traditional prohibitions against lying in the Catholic Church. Perhaps for these as well as other reasons, the recently released second English version of the *Catechism* [CCC2] states instead:

Lying is the most direct offense against the truth. To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error.

This formulation is free of our and Kant's criticisms of the *CCC1* principle, but now it becomes open to criticisms to the effect that it is too strong. After all, if one is hiding Jews in one's basement and the Gestapo asks whether one has Jews in one's basement, then one might think that to fail to deny the presence of Jews in one's basement is wrong. Obviously, remaining silent is not an option since in this case dearly *silentium affirmatio est.²* Nor is any kind of equivocation (equivocation, an assertion of a true claim that one expects to be misunderstood by the interlocutor, might be compatible with CCC2's   though it is not dear if it agrees with Kant's views) a reasonable option (one might well imagine that the Gestapo insists on an unambiguous yes or no answer). Kant appears committed to biting the bullet and saying that there are Jews in his basement. We will argue that in this case, and perhaps in a few similar cases, both on Kantian grounds and on the grounds of the *CCC2,* it is acceptable to say to the Gestapo, in a dear voice, "No, there are no Jews in my house." Indeed, we will argue the further claim that to say, "Yes, there are

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² Or at least, *silentium* has the same end result as *affinnatio.*

Jews in my house," would be to *lie*. We will use this particular example throughout the argument.

Before we come to the solution, we shall have to examine an important issue of language. Our general approach will be inspired by the method of examples and counterexamples so popular in analytic philosophy, a method ultimately tracing itself back to the Socratic method of what Aristotle calls "induction *[epagoge]*" and which proceeds by proferring a number of cases, allowing the listener to grasp the general principle.

I. SPEAKING YOUR INTERLOCUfOR'S   LANGUAGE

First, consider a rather straightforward case.

Dietrich, a German, is visiting John, an American, in New York. They are sitting in a cafe. Dietrich knows very well that John is expecting to be spoken to in English, and Dietrich also knows English quite well. He puts an attractive unlabelled bottle of poison on the table before John, and says: "Gift." John takes the bottle with gratitude, and later at home drinks it and dies. What John did not know is that Dietrich uttered the word "Gift" in German, in which it means "poison."

Dietrich has not only murdered John, he has *lied* to him. That "Gift" means poison in German in no way excuses Dietrich from the charge of lying, because Dietrich knew that John would inter- pret the utterance as an English word rather than as a German word. To speak one language deceitfully when your interlocutor is expecting another is to lie, because a basic principle of human language is that one speak in ways that one expects the inter- locutor to understand.

In fact, one could say that all human discourse happens in a single superlanguage, which has a grammar that subsumes the grammars of all the individual languages. The superlanguage's grammar and syntax in particular governs discourse in multiple languages, and describes the normative universal human practice of linguistic communication. It is a grammatico-syntactic feature of the superlanguage that in the context of the Dietrich-John story the meaning of the utterance "Gift" is the English one, because the context determines that syntactically (in super- language syntax) the word is to be understood in English. Thus,

Dietrich has lied in the superlanguage. He has made the utterance "Gift" in a context in which it does not truly apply.

Now consider a case that is a little more complicated. This case trades on the interesting linguistic fact that the Polish word *zapomniec* (to forget) has the exact opposite meaning to its Russian cognate *zapomnyet'* (to commit to memory).[3]

Natasha, a Russian, is visiting her friend Artur, a Pole, in Warsaw. Natasha knows Polish pretty well. On the last day of the visit, she asks Artur to give her best regards to some Poles that she knows but whom she did not have time to meet. She tells Artur their names. However, Artur forgets all the names. An hour later, she asks Artur in Polish: "Do you know the names of all the people to whom I asked you to give my kind regards?" Artur does not wish to admit that he has forgotten the names, and he knows that not remembering the names is a good excuse for him not to have to talk to certain people to whom he does not wish to talk. He answers, also in Polish: "Zapomnialem wszystkie nazwiska." This is perfectly good Polish, and it means, "I have forgotten all the names." Natasha knows, and Artur knows that she knows, that this is spoken in Polish. However, Artur also knows that Natasha will misunderstand "Zapomnialem" to mean "I have committed to memory," because the Russian cognate of the Polish verb used here means "To commit to memory." Thus, Artur knows that Natasha will understand him to have said, "I have committed all the names to memory."

Here, Artur has lied to Natasha. Yet unlike Dietrich's interlocutor, Natasha knows in what language she is being spoken to. We propose the following analysis of why we can say that Artur has lied to Natasha. In addition to the broader dividing lines between individual languages such as Polish, Russian, German, and English, there are finer dialectal divisions within the individual languages. But even in addition to these dialectal divisions, there are cases where small groups might adopt a variant linguistic form. Thus, one can imagine a pair of English speakers who have decided, for fun, that whenever they are speaking to each other, they will interchange the meanings of the words "cat" and "dog." These two people are speaking a somewhat different language from standard English. Now, what Natasha is speaking is in fact not Polish, but what we might call "Ruspolish," namely, that dia-

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[3] And, even more curiously, the Polish opposite to *zapomnieC,* namely *zapami(tac* (to commit to memory), has as *its* Russian cognate the archaic/colloquial word *zapamyatovat'* which means "to forget."

lect of Polish which is spoken by a Russian who has not studied the dangers of Polish-Russian falsely friendly cognates. Given that Artur knows that Natasha expects to be spoken to in Ruspolish (though she herself would call it "Polish"), Artur's utterance is a *lie.* Superlanguage rules require that you speak in a language that your interlocutor will understand. In the superlanguage context, given Artur's knowledge of Natasha's expectation to be spoken to in Ruspolish, Artur's statement, "Zapomnialem wszystkie nazwiska," must be taken to be a Ruspolish statement, meaning, "I have committed all the names to memory," and hence is false and, indeed, a lie.

Thus, the present case is in fact exactly the same as the Dietrich-John case, with the exception that Natasha does not know that her language (Ruspolish) deviates from standard Polish. But this exception does not make Artur's deceit any less of a lie.

The strong anti-lying principle is that making a false assertion in order to lead someone into error is wrong. The question then arises in the above cases of how utterances are to be understood as assertions; the right answer appears to be that assertions in multilinguistic contexts are governed by certain partly contextual superlanguage rules. The anti-lying principle in multilinguistic contexts then says that *you may not utter an assertion which you believe to be false when understood in your interlocutor's language (i.e., the language in which your interlocutor will take your assertion to have been made), with intent to deceive.*[4] One must speak one's interlocutor's language.

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[4] The "with intent to deceive" qualification is, of course, intended to rule out cases like those of jokes mutually understood as such. Alternately, such jokes can be analyzed as not being *assertions,* and hence as not falling under the head of the anti-lying principle. Saint Thomas criticizes the jocose lie which "is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the way it is told" as being "of a nature to deceive" on account of "the very genus of the action" *(STh* II-II, q. 110, a. 3). This criticism, however, misses the mark if one can analyze apparently false sentences not intended to deceive as not being *assertions.* A proper understanding of language takes into account contextual and nonverbal factors, including whether the speaker and listener are taking a given utterance to be literally assertoric. To call jokes that are not intended to deceive and that do not deceive "lies" is as much a misunderstanding of language as to say that the Psalmist's quoting the fool's "There is no God" (Ps 10:4; 14:1) is a lie or to say that Dostoevskii was a liar when he penned the *Brothers Karamazov* because there never was such a person as Ivan Karamazov. Saint Thomas's mistake here is not so much a philosophical one as one of linguistic theory.

II. THE GESTAPO AND THE JEWS

Helga is hiding Jews in her basement. The Gestapo comes to her door. The Gestapo officer knows that Helga is an upright and very honest person, and Helga knows that he knows this. The officer asks, "Are there any Jews in your house?" Helga knows that the officer knows that she knows that if she answers in the affirmative or is ambiguous or remains silent then her house will be searched and all Jews found therein will be killed. Helga thinks for a moment. Then she looks the officer straight in the eye and answers clearly, distinctly and with an air of sincerity: "No, there are no Jews in my house."

At first sight, Helga has lied, transgressing against the *CCC2* anti-lying principle (though not against the *CCC1* principle, since presumably the Gestapo officer has no right to know whether there are Jews in Helga's house), and against Kant's anti-lying principle.

However, let us analyze carefully what Helga has asserted. She said that in her house "there are no Jews." Let us assume that it is clear to all that her basement is a part of the house. The grammar of Helga's utterance is clear. What about the meanings of the words? In ordinary language there is no problem with words like "no," "are," "in," "my," and "house". But there is one word that is rather fluid: "Jews." It has religious, ethnic, and perhaps other meanings. What are "Jews"? Let us assume for the sake of the argument that all of the Jews in Helga's are both fully ethnically Jewish (recognizing that ethnic designations are inherently ambiguous, we need to mean by this something like that they consider themselves ethnically Jewish and are considered as such by just about everybody else) and fully religiously Jewish. They are definitely Jews by *our* standards.

So it seems that Helga has lied, that she said there were no Jews in her basement while there were. But actually, Helga did not say that there were no Jews in her basement. She said that there were no "Jews" in her basement.[5] To understand this

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[5] There is a crucial linguistic difference (mention versus use) between a quoted and an unquoted word. An unquoted (and nonitalicized) word is to be understood as meant in the language of the surrounding text. A quoted word can be understood in the language of the original communicative context. (In fact, in the above sentence what one would really like are not ordinary quotation marks but Robert Brandom's "scare quotes"; see his *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment* [Cambridge: Harvard

apparent paradox, let us recall the multilinguistic form of the principle prohibiting lying formulated in the previous section. To lie is to deceitfully utter something which in one's interlocutor's language is false. One's utterances are to be interpreted in that language which one expects one's interlocutor to understand them as being made in. But language is not defined by dictionaries (as already seen in the case of Artur and Natasha), but by *usage.* The crucial question to ask now is this: What does the utterance "Jew" mean to the Gestapo officer? Assuming that Helga knows the Gestapo officer's language, she has lied if and only if within her house there are entities in the extension of the term "Jew" as understood in the Gestapo officer's language. Moreover, if there are no such entities in her house, then it would have been a lie for Helga to say, "Yes, there are Jews in my house"-it would have been exactly the kind of lie that Artur uttered to Natasha.

But now the way to a possible solution is clear. If language is defined by usage, then the primary meaning of the word "Jew" must be taken from the linguistic utterances of the community to which the Gestapo officer belongs-utterances such as the following one from Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf:*

When thus for the first time I recognized the Jew as the cold-hearted, shameless, and calculating director of this revolting vice traffic in the scum of the big city, a cold shudder ran down my back.

The language of the Gestapo officer's social milieu was defined by works such as *Mein Kampf* and by Goebbels's propaganda. For the Gestapo officer, the primary meaning of the word "Jew" was something like "a sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating trafficker in vices." Thus, when the Gestapo officer asked Helga, "Are there any Jews in your house?" what his question really meant in *ordinary* English was: "Are there any sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating traffickers in vices in your house?"

But of course Helga, as an upstanding citizen, would not have any such sub-humans in her house, and so after a moment of thought during which she translated from Gestapo-speak to her own language and back, she answered with something that when

University Press, 1994], 545.)

translated from Gestapo-speak to ordinary English would mean: "No, there are no sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating traffickers in vices in my house." She could say this with perfect sincerity while looking the Gestapo officer in the eyes.

In fact, had Helga said, "Yes, there are Jews in my house," this would have meant, in the Gestapo-speak in which she was speaking to the Gestapo officer in accordance to the principle of speaking your interlocutor's language: "Yes, there are some sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating traffickers in vices in my house." This not only would have condemned the Jews in her house to death, but would also have slandered her house's occupants.

Thus, by uttering the words, "No, there are no Jews in my house," Helga spoke truly, and by uttering the words, "Yes, there are Jews in my house," she would have been lying, even though there were Jews in her house. The key point is that "Jews" in Gestapo-speak does not signify Jews, but a semi-mythical entity.[6]

It may be objected that our defense of Helga's action neglects a Kripkean account of a distinction between essential and non-essential properties. The essential properties of a Jew, from the Nazi point of view, would have been some genetic qualities. Let us leave aside the fact that these genetic qualities cannot be fully defined, and involve an inescapable confusion between ethnic and religious senses of Jewishness.[7] Call the conjunction of the essential genetic properties G. In addition to G, the Nazi would, according to this objection, believe there are some nonessential properties, such as *being a sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating trafficker in vice* (for conciseness call this composite property S) that are coextensive with the class of all Jews. Then, when the Nazi asks Helga, "Are there any Jews in your house?" the objection to be made is that what he is asking Helga is, "Are there any entities satisfying G in your house?" It is true that the

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[6] We write semi-mythical, because there probably do exist cold-hearted, shameless, calculating traffickers in vices. Such traffickers in vices might not be sub-human, but at least one might find some who *act* sub-humanly. And of course, since every ethnic group has its bad apples, there are likely even some *Jews* (in an ethnic, not religious, sense) who are like that.

[7] Many religious Jews might have been descendants of converts to Judaism in ages past, though the Nazis would still have counted them as Jews.

Nazi *believes* that G is coextensive with *S,* but nonetheless, had Helga answered, "No, there are no Jews in my house," the Nazi would have understood this to mean, "No, there are no entities satisfying G in my house," which would be a lie, even though, "No, there are no entities satisfying S in my house," would be true.

Even if we grant the Aristotelian-Kripkean distinction at the heart of this objection, the objection neglects the fact that when analyzing the meaning of an actual utterance it is not an essential vs. nonessential property distinction that matters, but rather a salient vs. nonsalient property distinction which we must take account of. Consider the following story:

Margaret lands on the famous Twin Earth that analytic philosophers like to imagine. Suppose also that XYZ (a liquid that has a different composition-and hence difference essence-from H_2O despite having the same gross qualities) has exactly the same qualitative properties with regard to the preservation of Margaret's life as H_2O does. Unfortunately, Margaret's water supply has run out a few days ago, and Margaret is dying of thirst. After Margaret lands on Twin Earth, not knowing that on this planet there is no H_2O but only XYZ, she gets thirsty and asks a native standing by a body of XYZ, "Is this water?" Now, the native, let us suppose, knows all about the H_2O vs. XYZ distinction, and he knows all about the fact that XYZ has the same effects on Margaret's body as H_2O. He also knows that Margaret is not much of a scientist (so she won't understand that XYZ is harmless) and that unless she is told that there is water there, she will very soon die of thirst. He also knows that Margaret doesn't know that what is present on Twin Earth is XYZ and not H_2O. He answers, "Yes, this is water."

Did the native lie? If it is the essential vs. nonessential property distinction that is important to understanding language, then he did, since he knew that Margaret would understand "Yes, this is water," in Earth-English rather than in Twin-Earth-English, and what is present on Twin Earth does not have the essential properties of water (i.e., of H_2O). However, Margaret really does not care about the chemical composition of the liquid in front of her. What she cares about is that it will satisfy her thirst and save her life. The *salient* property of water in her discursive context is not the essential property that water is H_2O (assuming that Kripke's account is correct) but rather the nonessential property that it

satisfies thirst and is beneficial to her. Were Margaret to have full information and the capacity to understand it, she would not consider it relevant whether what is present before her is *XYZ* or H_2O. (In fact, she then might not ask whether it is water, but merely whether it has the thirst-satisfying properties of water.) The chemical composition is not salient for the analysis of the meaning of her question and of the answer as understood by her. The native spoke truly.

Just as the native spoke truly, so did Helga. For the salient property in the context of the Gestapo seeing Jews for slaughter is not G, but *S*. It is not because of Jews possessing G that the Gestapo wishes to kill Jews, but because of the Jews allegedly possessing *S*. It is *S* that is the salient property in the context of the Gestapo search, just as from Margaret's point of view it is the life-preservingness that is the salient property. In fact, the Gestapo officer might not even understand G very well. He might not be a geneticist. The reason for seeking Jews to kill was not the true[8] belief that they possess G, but the false belief that they possess *S* (or, at most, the false belief that G entails S).

Another science-fictional example might help to clarify the point in a different way.

In the year 2600, it becomes possible to enumerate the essential properties of an individual human being and this has been done for all people by a central authority. Morton is sought for a brutal murder of which he was convicted, but after which conviction he escaped. He is so dangerous that he must be killed on sight. Now, Donna's husband Frank looks exactly like Morton. What is worse, the police computer has erroneously substituted Frank's data for Morton's. The policeman comes to Donna's door, reads to her the list of what he thinks are Morton's essential properties (in suitably abbreviated form, one presumes, and perhaps reduced to a single number), but which in fact are Frank's properties, and asks, "Is the person with these properties in the house?" Donna knows the policeman won't listen to any explanations, because Morton is too dangerous and too well-armed for the police to have patience for anything but a quick answer. Donna knows that she has just been handed a list of Frank's properties, and she knows that if she answers affirmatively or hesitates, the police will come in, see Frank, and shoot him. She answers: "No."

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[8] For simplicity we are assuming the Nazis' genetic criteria made sense. If they did not, then the whole Kripkean objection falls apart.

Let F be the list of properties of Frank that the policeman has read to Donna. When the policeman asks, "Is the person satisfying F in the house?" it is still not F-ness that is salient, even though F-ness is an essence, but rather the unstated property of being a brutal murderer. When the policeman asks, "Is the person satisfying F in the house?" he does not really care about F-ness, any more than Margaret cares whether what is on the planet is H_2O or XYZ (indeed, on this account, Margaret could have just as well asked, "Is this $H_2O?$" and if the native knew the motivations behind the question, then he could answer, "Yes, this is H_2O"). For the policeman the salient meaning of "person satisfying F" is a compound noun meaning "brutal murderer named Morton." This person is not present in Donna's house, and she is truthful in answering in the negative.

In the same way, the salient meaning of "Jew" from the Gestapo's point of view in the context of capturing "Jews" for slaughter is not G but S. Since nobody in Helga's household satisfies S, she is right to deny there are any "Jews" in her house.

Three more objections may occur rather immediately. First, supposing that it is true, as the above account alleges, that the Gestapo is seeking instances of S and not instances of G, are we able to condemn the Gestapo for being racist murderers? After all, a person seeking to destroy instances of S, that is, seeking to eliminate sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating traffickers in vices, cannot be said to be a racist murderer. That is in part correct. And indeed, one might argue that *out of charity* Helga *should* assume the Gestapo officer is seeking instances of S rather than instances of G, since one should assume the best about people. However, it is also the case that the Gestapo officer might well be culpably guilty of believing that instances of G are instances of S. It may be *hatred* that is inspiring him to paint G's as $S's$, or to accept the propaganda that paints them thus. He may be culpably guilty in not questioning the propaganda. He may be culpably guilty in self-inducing in himself the belief that G's are S's. After all, we can reasonably say that he *should* know that at least most G's are not $S's$, and so his error is probably a culpable one, and we can have at least sufficient certainty of the culpability of his error that a human court might be able to convict him of

his crimes, unless he were to bring in sufficient evidence to show that the propaganda brainwashed him in such a way as to make him invincibly ignorant of most G's not being *S's.* In the desire to condemn Nazism, one has to be careful to understand that some individual Nazis *might* not have been culpable.

There is a second objection that is more worrying. Suppose that we have a Gestapo officer who does not believe that G's are *S's.* In fact, he knows very well that Jews are ordinary people, no more and no less prone to vice than others. He does not believe any of the Nazi propaganda, and thinks that the slander of the Jews in *Mein Kampf* is just that-slander. However, out of a sheer malicious desire to cause pain to others, this officer decides to murder Jews. When he asks, "Are there any Jews in your house?" he really means "Are there any instances of G in your house?" Now, as the story is described, Helga can still answer, "No, there are no Jews in my house," because she will naturally *assume* that a Gestapo officer at her door is of the more usual propaganda-believing kind, rather than of the clear-thinking but demonically malicious kind that is now under consideration. Indeed, the principle of charity would lead her to assume that the officer is of the first kind.

But what if Helga knows this Gestapo officer, and knows the above facts about him? One could deny this possibility by saying that no amount of evidence could possibly make it *completely* certain that a person is the demonically malicious kind of Gestapo officer described in the previous paragraph, and that the principle of charity would still force one to assume (except in circumstances where prudence requires that one go by the mere *no reasonable doubt* standard of the courts, this not being such a circumstance) that the officer is the propaganda-believer. Alternately, it could be · said that malice *necessarily* distorts one's point of view. Thus, the Gestapo officer through his malice *necessarily* comes to believe that G's have false properties (such as *hatefulness* or *fittingness for torture),* and it is under the description of these false properties that he seeks "Jews," so that in his linguistic practice, "Jew," despite his explicit avowals to the contrary, necessarily takes on a meaning charged with false properties. This second answer appears plausible. It is probable enough, we suggest, that in

practice Helga could act on it and say, "No, there are no Jews in my house," expecting that the Gestapo officer would take this to mean that there are no hateful persons or persons worthy of torture in the house (for cases of practical action, one only needs probabilities, not certainties). Note that this second reply also may work in other cases of a murderer (other than a Nazi) who hates a certain person and who comes to the door asking whether this person is within when in fact he is.

However, if neither of the two replies works, then one must admit that this is a case of lying, and that Helga has no choice but to remain silent, equivocate (if equivocation is acceptable when lying is not, which is very much open to question),[9] or die in a physical attack on the Gestapo officer. To abstain from lying under these circumstances might strike some as an overvaluing of the value of truth, but there appears to be no escape from it, given either the CCC2 principle or Kant's condemnation of lying.

A third objection might be offered to the effect that our account of why it is acceptable for Helga to say, "No, there are no Jews here," fails to do justice to the actual motivations that any particular historical Helga might have had, and so although it excuses a theoretical Helga from guilt, the historical Helgas in such situations were all guilty by virtue of not having the correct motivations, since they did not think in terms of the "speak your interlocutor's language" principle. But in fact, quite possibly, something like the principle was in the back of the historical Helgas' minds. They might have reasoned, "The only reason this Gestapo officer wants to know whether there are Jews is to kill them. There's nobody in my house deserving of death." Or else they might have simply acted on a moral intuition [10] that correctly states that in such cases one can say, "No, there are no Jews here."

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[9] The principle of speaking your interlocutor's language does appear to rule out equivocation, though the matter is perhaps not completely certain, since the equivocation might be within one's interlocutor's language. The detailed examination of this question is outside the scope of the present paper.

[10] And as Christians, we certainly do admit that such a moral intuition might have been implanted by an inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

Finally, one might try to formulate an alternate, perhaps preferable, account. One such account that respects the value of truth as found in the *CCC2* principle and in Kantianism would be to say that we should maximize the truth-content of our interlocutor's minds. Now, saying, "Yes, there are Jews here," will have many false implications that the Gestapo officer will make. The Gestapo officer will, for example, come to accept the false proposition, "There are people worthy of death in the house," and maybe even the false normative proposition, "I ought to arrest some people in this house." Thus, while the statement implants one truth in the Gestapo officer's mind, it leads him to believe many falsehoods. However, a principle of maximizing the truth-content of our interlocutor's minds leads to a breakdown of the structures of trust in society (and thus is not generalizable in accordance with the categorical imperative). After all, religious persons following such a principle might manufacture false miracles, on the ground that a person's belief in the small falsehood of some miracle having taken place is far less significant and outweighed by the value of the true beliefs in the rest of the religion. It is clear that if the truth-content maximizing principle were generally followed, then people would trust each other less, and would become less able to come to true conclusions, and in fact the principle would be self-defeating when generalized.

CONCLUSION

It has been argued that the principle *to speak your interlocutor's language* together with a distinction between the properties salient and nonsalient in a given communicative context allows one to say that a person who, having Jews in her basement, answers to the Gestapo, "No, there are no Jews in my house," is saying the truth, and would be lying if she said, "Yes, there are Jews in my house."

The correct principle against lying, compatible with the *CCC2* and with Kantianism, then should be read as stating:

(L)   Never say what is false in your interlocutor's language (i.e., in the language you expect him to understand your statement within) with the intention of deceiving him.

Here, "language" must take into account the salient vs. nonsalient contextual distinction with regard to meaning. Such a distinction is generally necessary, since persons rarely have a full understanding of all the facts. If a man on the street asks me, "What time is it?" I, despite being a philosopher, do not need to correct his doubtless many incorrect understandings of the nature of time before telling him that the current time is 4:19 P.M. He may draw some false inferences from this. He might, for instance, contrary to relativity theory, conclude that there is an absolute "now" throughout space that is labeled "4:19 P.M." The philosophical facts about the nature of time are *not* salient in this situation, unless I know the man to be a philosopher interested in the present context not in the ordinary practical sense of "what time it is" but in the nature of time. Almost every time we are asked a question and give an answer, it is likely that our interlocutor misunderstands, in some small way, one or more properties pertaining to the terms in our answer; we must, in order to satisfy (L), take care to ensure that in the *salient* sense our reply is true, where salience is measured from the point of view of our interlocutor's language and his present circumstantial context. [11]

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[11] Kantians, and maybe even some others, will also be pleased to note that (L) is fully generalizable and hence satisfies Kant's categorical imperative.

PREDICATES: A THOMIST ANALYSIS

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APREDICATEis not just another name for a set. Some predicates are species and some are genera. Any species is predicable of an individual that belongs to that species but no set is predicable of an individual member of that set. One can say that Socrates is human but not that Socrates is the set of humans. Further, any genus is predicable of its included species but no set is predicable of any one of its subsets. One can say that humans are animals but not that the set of humans is the set of animals.

Beyond saying that some predicates are not sets, we may say that no predicate of any subject is a set. Take any predicate F that is truly said of a subject *a.* If F is a set then it follows that *a* is a set. But *a* is evidently not a set but a member of a set. Otherwise any member of a set is itself a set and the division of set and set-member collapses. Suppose the set of tigers comprises two members, Josh and Jake. If Josh dies, then it is truly said that the set is reduced by one member, that it goes from having two members to having just one. But this makes sense only if it is the *same* set that once had a pair of members and now has one. If it is one set that has two members and another that has one then *no* set is reduced by one member. But a set *is* reduced by one member and it is evidently not Jake who is so reduced. So the difference of set and set-member remains even in a set of one.

But what are predicates if they are not sets? Since it is by definition 'of' or 'about' a subject, a predicate is a relational concept. As a genus is the genus of a species and a species is the species of a genus, so too, a predicate is the predicate of a subject.

By the same token, a subject is by definition the subject of a predicate. With respect to such relational concepts, one cannot say what they are apart from bringing in their respective correlatives. To try to do so substitutes the abstract for the concrete and confuses relations with things.

With this as our cue, we consider two puzzles about predication. The puzzles as well as their solutions we owe to Aquinas.[1] The answers to both flesh out the subject-predicate tie. They also illumine what figures in that relation, including the idea of a predicate. Aquinas frames the first puzzle as a dilemma; call it the dilemma of predication. The *tiger* that is predicated of Jake is either particular or universal. But in either case predication is pre-empted. No particular is predicated of a subject. And if it is the universal tiger that is predicated of Jake, then the particular thing Jake is said to be a universal. If Jake is a tiger and tiger is a universal then the absurdity follows that Jake is a universal.[2] Yet we do truly say that Jake is a tiger. How is that possible?

Aquinas's solution is that the *tiger* that is here predicated of Jake is neither particular nor universal.[3] Any *thing* is either particular or universal, but what the predicate *tiger* signifies is not a thing. It is tiger taken in abstraction from the manner in which it is either in particular things like Jake or in universal things like concepts. By analogy, suppose that Jones is a teacher by day and a salesman by night. By day he teaches American history; by night he sells furniture. Yet it is the same Jones who takes on both modes. Just as we say that the teacher-mode and the salesman-mode are accidental to Jones so are the particular and universal modes accidental to the *tiger* that is said of Jake. That *tiger* is something neutral between the two modes just as Jones is something neutral between *his* two modes. This neutral core is full of possibility of which Jake and the concept *tiger* are two expressions. It is what Aquinas calls essence.

The second problem is conveniently prefaced by noting the formality of mathematical concepts. Concepts like twoness and

[1] St. Thomas Aquinas, *On Being and Essence,* trans. and ed. A. Maurer (Toronto, 1949), chaps. 2 and 3.

[2] Ibid., chap. 3, p. 42

[3] Ibid., ch. 3, pp. 40-41.

circularity signify those properties to the exclusion of anything that *is* two or circular. That is why they are closed concepts, signifying form alone apart from matter. And just because they are closed (formal) and not open (material) concepts (i.e., taken as cut off from any things that exemplify them), these mathematical concepts denote but do not connote. Circularity denotes that by which something is a circle to the exclusion of anything that happens to be circular. Moreover, they are not just formal but purely formal concepts, because matter is not included in their definitions.

Suppose, then, that 'tiger', by means of which *tiger* is predicated of Jake, signifies *tiger* to the exclusion of those things that *are* tigers. Then, like 'twoness' and 'circularity', 'tiger' signifies form alone apart from matter. It signifies the property of being a tiger as severed from individual tigers. To keep the parallelism with twoness and circularity, call it the concept *tigerness.* Because it is taken in precision from the things that exemplify it, tigerness denotes without connoting, just as in the case of 'twoness' and 'circularity'. The difference is that, unlike 'twoness' and 'circularity', 'tigerness' is not a purely formal concept. Matter evidently enters into its definition.

What follows from this is that all formal concepts, mathematical or other, are impredicable. They are decent enough concepts, but they are closed and not open concepts. And just for that reason do they fail to be logical concepts. One can no more say that this number is twoness or that that shape is circularity than one can say that Jake is tigerness. The reason is that, having denotation only, 'tigerness' signifies a part and not the whole of the subject Jake. That is because it signifies the form of the subject cut off from its matter. So predicating *tigerness* of Jake is nonsensical because it says that a whole is one of its parts.

The solution is predictable. It is to identify predicates with open and not with closed concepts. Open concepts are the five predicables of classical logic: genus, species, difference, property, and accident. We can say "Jake is a tiger" but not "Jake is tigerness" because 'tiger' is a predicable, in this case a species. Like 'tigerness', 'tiger' signifies the form tiger. But it does so as a

whole and not as a part.[4] Taken in this way 'tiger' is not cut off from the things that exemplify it. Rather does it inchoately include those things. That is what is meant by saying that it has connotation. Even as it denotes the form tiger, the concept 'tiger' connotes Jake, Josh, Jerry, and every other tiger. They are included in the extension of 'tiger'. Therefore, 'tiger' is predicated of Jake without predicating a part of a whole. Because 'tiger' includes the whole of what Jake is and 'tigerness' does not, 'tiger' but not 'tigerness' is predicable of Jake.

How do these solutions help to explain the subject-predicate relation? The answer to the first problem shows that true subject-predicate judgments are tools of analysis. Since the P that is pulled out of S is some concept or essence, the copula signifies conceptual analysis-the 'is' of essence. Under the first solution, a predicate is some form that is extracted from matter. Here, the neutral form tiger is predicated of Jake. It is said to be Jake's form. But to be a neutral form (i.e. the form of tiger taken as such), it must have in the first instance been abstracted from the individual matter of Jake. It follows that all true subject-predicate judgments mirror the relation of a property to that of which it is the property. Aquinas calls it the form-matter tie in any material thing. Predicate is to subject as form is to matter. Predicates, says he, are taken formally and subjects materially.[5]

The answer to the second problem shows that true subject-predicate judgments are simultaneously tools of synthesis. Since it synthesizes being and essence the copula in 'S is P' is opposed to conceptual analysis. Instead of separating P from S, it joins P with S. This is the 'is' of being. Recall Locke's account of what he called the second act of the mind (judgment). It not only keeps two ideas apart, says Locke, but it also brings them together.[6] Here, Locke evidently reflects the Scholastic logic he learned at Oxford, according to which judgments are simultaneously both tools of analysis and tools of synthesis. In any case, it is because predicates connote the whole subject that they are said to *be* what

[4] Ibid., ch. 2, pp. 37-38.

[5] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 13, a. 12.

[6] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* ed. A. S. Pringle-Pattison (Oxford: 1960), 93.

their subjects are. In Fregean words, one can say that subject and predicate have the same reference even though they have a different sense. Recall that this synthesis is blocked when concepts are not predicates, that is, when they do not connote the whole but only denote the part. We cannot say that Jake is tigerness because 'tigerness' is a closed and not an open concept.

The copula in subject-predicate judgments like "Jake is a tiger" is therefore systematically ambiguous. As the 'is' of essence, it signifies the relation between Jake and the property he has of being a tiger. This relation of property to subject is one of form to matter. Jake is something that is specified by the property of being a tiger. But as the 'is' of being, the copula runs in the opposite direction. Subjects are taken formally and predicates materially. [7] Taken as connoting the individuals by whose existence the possible thing, tiger, is actualized, 'tiger' expresses something possible with respect to the actual, in this case the subject Jake.

To bring this out, compare the 'is' of predication and the 'is' of identity. "Washington is our first president" exemplifies the latter and "Washington is a president who came from Virginia" exemplifies the former. These statements are evidently of a different type. Yet they are alike in that in each one subject and predicate are the same in reference but different in sense. How, then, do they differ?

The answer is that the predicate in the latter implicitly includes presidents besides Washington while the predicate in the former does not. That is why the latter is convertible *simpliciter* and the former is not. But to say that the predicate 'a president who came from Virginia' includes in its extension other presidents besides Washington is to say that it is an open concept. It stands to those subjects as something possible or potential stands to its actuation. To echo Frege again, it is unsaturated with respect to what saturates and completes it. [8] Thus, when it concerns the 'is' of being as opposed to the 'is' of essence, predicate stands to subject not as form to matter (act to potency) but as matter to form (potency to act).

[7] Aquinas, *STh* I, q. 13, a. 12.

[8] G. Frege, "Function and Concept," in Geach and Black, eds., *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (Oxford, 1960), 31-32.

To sum up, this double meaning of the copula implies that true subject-predicate statements simultaneously signify both identity and difference. They are a logical identity-in-difference. As the 'is' of essence, the copula signifies the difference of subject and predicate, while as the 'is' of being it signifies their identity. As the 'is' of essence, the copula signifies the matter-form relation between Jake and the property he has of being a tiger. Here, it is the difference of subject and predicate *within* the concept that is featured. Since a predicate unfolds some character of the subject, it is the sense and not the reference of the predicate that is concerned. The question of existence is thus bracketed.

But as the 'is' of being, it is the other way around. Since a predicate is now a possible which the subject, as existence, actualizes, a predicate is no longer seen as conceptually unpacking the subject. Instead, subjects are viewed as realizing and completing their predicates. Unlike the first case in which the predicate signifies some abstracted part of the concept, the predicate now signifies the whole concept. It signifies it as something potential and incomplete with respect to the subject which actualizes and completes it as existence completes essence. So under the 'is' of being existence is featured and essence bracketed. That is why it is the reference and not the sense of a predicate that is here concerned. To the extent that it refers to the same individual that is named by the subject, a predicate is united with its subject in being even as it is distinguished from it in concept.

HAS THE MESSAGE OF *EVANGELIUM VITAE* BEEN MISSED? AN ANALYSIS AND A FUTURE DIRECTION FOR CATHOLIC BIOMEDICAL ETHICS

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O
N MARCH 3, 1999, on the eve of the fourth anniversary of the promulgation of Pope John Paul H's encyclical *Evangelium vitae* ("The Gospel of Life"), John Cardinal O'Connor and Bernard Cardinal Law convened a conference entitled "In God's Image: Called to Build a Culture of Life." In honor of the occasion, the Holy Father sent his greetings and a four-page letter. Included in the letter was the following:

At the end of the twentieth century we are witnessing a strange paradox: the sanctity of human life is being denied by an appeal to freedom, democracy, pluralism, even reason and compassion. As the Bishops' Statement points out, words have become unmoored from their meaning (e.g., *Living the Gospel of Life,* 11), and we are left with a rhetoric in which the language of life is used to promote a culture of death .... The language of human rights is constantly invoked while the most basic of them-the right to life-is repeatedly disregarded .... So great is the confusion at times that for many people the difference between good and evil is determined by the opinion of the majority, and even the time-honored havens of human life-the family, the law and medicine-are sometimes made to serve the culture of death.

At such a time, Christians must act.

Your action needs to be both educational and political. There must be a thorough catechesis on the Gospel of Life at all levels of the Catholic community. Catholics imbibe much of their surrounding culture, and therefore this catechesis needs to challenge the prevailing culture at those points where

human dignity and rights are threatened. Such a catechesis has as its goal that shift of perception and change of heart which accompany true conversion (cf. Eph 4:23). The call to conversion must ring out in your homes, in your parishes and in your schools, with complete confidence that the Church's teaching about the inviolability of life is deeply in tune with both right reason and the deepest longings of the human heart. This educational effort will increasingly open the way for Catholics to exercise a positive influence as citizens of their country, without false appeals to the separation of Church and State in a way that consigns the Christian vision of human dignity to the realm of private belief. The choice in favor of life is not a private option but a basic demand of a just and moral society.[1]

Drawing on the United States Catholic Conference's recently released *Living the Gospel of Life: A Challenge to American Catholics,* the Holy Father here emphasizes that for the Gospel of Life to be truly gospel, to be truly 'good news', it must be lived in its fullness by American Catholics. It is not an easy time to do so. For it is a time when that most basic moral imperative-innocent human lives are to be considered inviolable-is being undermined by what the Pope calls a "culture of death." In this time of Orwellian politics, the Pope notes that appeals to freedom and rights are increasingly reinterpreted through the lenses of utility and cost-effectiveness, so that the defenseless and the marginal-ized can be ignored or dispatched, and traditional virtues of love and compassion are being reconfigured to justify death-dealing.

It is in this context that the Pope wrote *Evangelium vitae,* urging a new catechesis of our culture in which Catholics and all people of good will work together to "ensure that justice and soli-darity will increase and that a new culture of human life will be affirmed, for the building of an authentic civilization of truth and love."[2] He also specifically urged Catholic intellectuals to "place themselves at the service of a new culture of life by offering serious and well documented contributions, capable of command-

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[1] This letter, dated February 20, 1999, was addressed to "My Venerable Brother, Cardinal William Henry Keeler, Archbishop of Baltimore, Chairman of the Bishops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities", and "sent with the assurance of my prayers for the success of this important meeting jointly organized by the Bishops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities and the Pontifical Council for the Family." All underlined passages are underlined in the original.

[2] Pope John Paul II, *The Gospel of Life ("Evangelium vitae")* (Washington, D.C.: United State Catholic Conference, 1995), §6. Henceforth cited as EV.

ing general respect and interest by reason of their merit. "[3] Of course, in order to do so, these intellectuals must understand the encyclical and recognize its authority. Yet despite the glut of perfunctory reviews in a large number of periodicals shortly after its release, there has been little sustained reflection on the meaning or significance of this encyclical, at least in English.

There have been two collections of essays published in English that engage *Evangelium vitae.* These are *Choosing Life: A Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae,* edited by Kevin Wildes, S.J., and Alan Mitchell,[4] and *Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics: Protestants Engage Pope john Paul II's Moral Encyclicals,* edited by Reinhard Hutter and Theodor Dieter.[5] Unfortunately, neither volume as a whole captures and responds to the central theme of *Evangelium vitae.* Neither volume as a whole highlights the urgent crisis in contemporary Western society, nor how Catholics are called to respond to it.

Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics bills itself as "the first sustained Protestant engagement of *Veritatis splendor* and *Evangelium vitae* in the English-speaking world." [6] It is in fact a significantly narrower project, being largely a Lutheran response, both to core moral notions of "law," "nature," and "freedom;' in these encyclicals, and to issues like abortion, euthanasia, and capital punishment. It hopes to instruct Lutherans as to what they can learn from the Holy Father (and vice versa) in theological ethics in the 1990s. It is an attempt at ecumenical dialogue in theology at a high level and for the most part it succeeds. Reinhard Hutter notes that the appropriate *telos* of such dialogue is to "learn how to speak 'with one voice' in matters of morals and ethics, particularly in a society that is increasingly alienated from the moral orientation that the biblical wimess and the churches' traditions provide. "[7] However, since *Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics* devotes

[3] EV, §98.

[4] Kevin Wm. Wildes, S.J., and Alan C. Mitchell, *eds.,Choosing life: A Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997). Henceforth CL.

[5] Reinhard Hiitter and Theodor Dieter, eds., *Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics: Protestants Engage John Paul II's Moral Encyclicals* (Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998). Henceforth EVE.

[6] EVE, 2.

[7] EVE, 3.

the majority of its attention to *Veritatis splendor,* its focus tends more towards metamoral questions and less towards the broader cultural issues that I take to be the heart of *Evangelium vitae.*

Choosing Life: A Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae, a conference-generated collection of nine essays and seventeen responses, is the first (and so far only) collection of essays in English devoted entirely to *Evangelium vitae.* However, while twenty-five of its twenty-six contributors are faculty members at a Catholic university or have some other clear Catholic affiliation, the essays do not provide a straightforward analysis of what is new, note-worthy, significant, and extraordinary in this encyclical, nor how its message on the "value and inviolability of human life" might be communicated appropriately and effectively to the Church and to all people of good will. Surprisingly, none of the essayists seems to have been asked to give an overview of the encyclical, and while some of the essays refer to the broad vision of *Evangelium vitae,* it is not central to any of them. It would have been helpful if the editors had provided such an overview.

The essay in these two volumes that best captures the central thrust of *Evangelium vitae* is Edmund Pellegrino's essay on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Pellegrino notes that *"Evangelium vitae* implicitly and explicitly sets out a particular way of 'doing' medical ethics in the domain of human-life issues, much in the same way *Veritatis splendor* did in a more formal manner for ethics generally." [8] Pellegrino here refers in compact form to what I take to be the two central themes of the encyclical.

First, *Evangelium vitae* does indeed offer a distinctive meth-odological approach to moral theology; that is, the very form and structure of the encyclical constitutes a recommendation of an approach to moral matters from a Catholic theological perspec-tive. This methodological approach, which a number of the essays touch on briefly, is thoroughly theological, thoroughly Christo-logical. While it might appear paradoxical or even contradictory, John Paul II insists that *"from the Cross, the source of life, the "people of life" is born and increases."* [9] An adequate response to

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[8] CL, 241.

[9] EV, §51; italics in original.

Evangelium vitae must address and illuminate this theological vision which undergirds and drives this encyclical.

Second, *Evangelium vitae* offers a critique of particular practices of medicine, particularly abortion and euthanasia, situating these objections in the context of its theological vision of the goodness and inviolability of human life.

While these are not the only two themes of *Evangelium vitae,* and parts of *Choosing Life* and *Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics* address other issues of significance, my analysis of these two volumes will concentrate on those essays which address these two themes.

I. *EVANGEUUM VITAE* AND METHODOLOGY IN MORAL THEOLOGY

Referring to *Evangelium vitae,* Leslie Griffin notes that "the author prefers a distinctively Catholic, theological argument to a natural law style of reasoning. The analysis is predominantly scriptural and theological, not philosophical or scientific."[10] Now, while one might assume that a Pope would make "Catholic" arguments and do "scriptural and theological" analysis, Griffin's point is not entirely without significance. For Griffin is correct to see in encyclicals like *Evangelium vitae* (and for that matter *Veritatis splendor)* a departure from a particular kind of natural-law reasoning for moral matters prevalent in papal documents in much of the last century, and a recovery of a more explicitly theological point of departure for reflection on Catholic morals.

John Conley makes this contrast somewhat starker, arguing that a significant methodological shift has taken place within the corpus of John Paul H's encyclicals. In contrast to earlier social encyclicals, *Evangelium vitae* and *Veritatis splendor* "employ a biblical logic of argumentation and an apocalyptic tone that diverge sensibly from the rhetoric of the earlier social treatises."[11] In methodological terms, Conley is arguing that in *Veritatis splendor* and *Evangelium vitae* the Pope "establishes scriptural

[10] CL, 160.

[11] CL,4. While one might argue that Conley's point-that John Paul H's earlier encyclicals also have a significantly more developed theological sensibility than many earlier papal encyclicals-is somewhat overdrawn, it is significant and important.

narrative as the point of departure of Christian moral interrogation. . . . Such narrative dialogue, which becomes mimetically the dialogue between God and every attentive disciple, provides the framework of moral discernment concerning particular acts and political applications. "[12] In his response to Conley, David Hollenbach reiterates this point, noting that the Holy Father is "unabashed" in locating this vision of the human good, including the sacredness of human life, in God's love, which is revealed in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and that overcoming the "sullen disengagement" of our contemporary society will take a far greater vision of the human good than can be gleaned from moral principles.

Conley's and Hollenbach's emphasis on the centrality of narrative for understanding the Pope's moral methodology in *Evangelium vitae* is not shared by all of the contributors to *Choosing Life.* James Keenan claims that the Pope's "new" defense of the sanctity of life appeals only to the doctrine of creation. Contrary to past "positivistic" formulations, where the sanctity of life is found in the brute fact that God wills it, because our lives are "divine possessions,"[13] John Paul H's new approach finds the sanctity of life lies in our status as created in God's image. Whereas the former "traditional" view is "extrinsic" and "voluntaristic," the new view, where the sanctity of life is "within the human, the image of God," is presumably "intrinsic." Although Keenan argues that the "created status" view here actually constitutes "reasoned argumentation,"[14] and that this is a major breakthrough, it is not clear that the view that God has somehow "built" the sanctity of life into created human nature is more profound than the view that is content to say that God wills it, since our very created nature is indeed the will of God as well. Perhaps Keenan would emphasize that God's will in creation has a particular "covenantal" character, but that is also arguably true of God's will in all situations. However, claims about the character of God's will are based on and can only be fully understood

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[12] CL, 18.

[13] This positivistic "divine possession view" is attributed *to Humanae vitae.* See CL, 52-53.

[14] I infer from this that the lack of "reasoned argumentation" is what Keenan considers to have been the problem with the "traditional" view. See CL, 55.

in the light of the narrative of God's faithful relationship with the world from creation through to the eschaton.

A difficulty of Keenan's approach-that is, not locating his understanding of creation and redemption in the context of the biblical narrative-is highlighted near the end of his essay when he says "I confess a certain confusion ... Does the 'life' that we have as a sharing in the divine life come from God's act of Creation ... or from Redemption?" [15] Keenan notes that while Antonio Autiero roots the sanctity of life in the *imago Dei* (i.e., a "creation" argument), Cardinal Ratzinger insists that the Pope roots the sanctity of life soteriologically (i.e., a "redemption" argument). [16] But Keenan's puzzle is resolved once one locates these doctrines in the divine drama of fulfillment, where our dignity as humans, given to us in creation, is renewed and restored in our redemption, and moves toward its true fulfillment in an eschatological perspective. Any attempt to understand our status as creatures independently of our status as redeemed by Christ or as creatures pursuing fulfillment in the kingdom of God cannot help but remain a puzzle.

The philosopher Joseph Boyle adverts to this point in his response to Keenan. After noting that "sanctity of life" is developed in *Evangelium vitae* from a number of different scriptural sources, he says,

but if part of the story about the inherent dignity of humans and their bodily lives emerges in the creation accounts and the image-of-God statements and if a further part emerges in what John and Paul say about the destiny each person has because of Jesus' redemptive activity and God's response to it, perhaps the full story needs to depend on all of what Scripture teaches and all of what the Church believes about these matters. [17]

While certainly not a wholesale endorsement of a narrative approach to theological ethics, these comments from one of the foremost contemporary natural-law ethicists shows that even "ahistorically minded" Catholic ethicists seek some basis for unity in the scriptural accounts.

[15] CL, 55.
[16] CL, 55.
[17] CL, 72.

While John Conley is appreciative of the exegetical starting point of the Pope's moral methodology, he too is less confident that the narrative of the person of Christ, to which the scriptural narrative bears witness, can function as the starting point for Christian reflection on the moral life. Thus, Conley argues that *Evangelium vitae's* "exegetical focus remains fixed upon the universal truth regarding the divine nature, human nature, and moral values that may be gleaned by a careful meditation of the narrative and its subacts."[18] But is the Pope's scriptural exegesis-the encounter of Christ with the rich young man, or the narrative of the affirmation of life in *Evangelium vitae-merely* an entryway towards "universal truths" and "moral values" that are supra-narrative?

The Pope's emphasis on the *temporal* character of human life would seem to indicate not. At the beginning of *Evangelium vitae,* in the section describing the basis for the fundamental worth of the human person, the Pope emphasizes the temporality of all human life on earth, that "life in time, in fact, is the fundamental condition" of earthly life. Although it is sacred, earthly life is not an "ultimate" but a "penultimate" reality. The penultimate character of earthly life is fully understood only in the light of our supernatural calling, and it is this calling that "highlights the *relative character* of each individual's earthly life."[19]

To what, then, is human life relative? To atemporal "universal truths" and "human values"? To some transhistorical or transnarratival earthly reality? Not according to *Evangelium vitae.* Human life is relative, according to the encyclical, to the gospel of Jesus Christ, which is the transhistorical and yet fully historical "source of invincible hope and true joy for every period of history."[20]

The meaning and significance of every human life, and of all that is, is to be discovered in a realization of God's narration of the world-its creation, redemption, sanctification, and final consummation in Christ. All of earthly reality exists in time: at one time it came to be; at another time it was transformed by its

[18] CL, 5.

[19] EV, §2; italics in original.

[20] EV, §2.

fallenness; still again at another time redeemed; and one day shall be no more. That the dignity of human life is to be located in a timeful narrative of our relationship to God is illustrated in the following:

Here the Christian truth about life becomes most sublime. The dignity of this life is linked not only to its beginning, to the fact that it comes from God, but also to its final end, to its destiny of fellowship with God in knowledge and love of him. [21]

The Pope continues by noting that this narrative truth about our lives conditions how we are to think about our earthly state. Although we may instinctively see life as a good, life's goodness and loveliness is only adequately appropriated when we understand our earthly life as the place where

God manifests himself, where we meet him and enter into communion with him. The life which Jesus gives in no way lessens the value of our existence in time; it takes it and directs it to its final destiny: "I am the resurrection and the life ... whoever lives and believes in me shall never die (Jn 11: 25-26)." [22]

Even the apparently transhistorical notion of "eternal life" is located historically, as the adjective "eternal" "does more than evoke a perspective which is beyond time." [23] Eternal life is with all who believe in Jesus and enter into communion with him. The mystery of how eternal life can be both transhistorical and historical at the same time is also discussed in the same section: "Eternal life is therefore the life of God himself and at the same time the life of the children of God." [24]

The most notable way in which Christians have witnessed to the "relative character" of earthly life, a witness that has immortalized them in the Christian community, has been to accept martyrdom rather than compromise something more important than earthly life. Thus, in the context of pointing out that earthly life is not an absolute good for the Christian, *Evangelium vitae*

[21] EV, §38.
[22] EV, §38.
[23] EV, §37.
[24] EV, §38.

evokes the witness of the martyrs John the Baptist and Stephen. What is more important than earthly life? Fidelity to Christ is more important, "remaining faithful to the word of the Lord even at the risk of one's life."[25]

The best articulation of the Pope's narratological understanding of human life and how this shapes Christian discipleship is provided by the Lutheran Lois Malcolm in her article in *Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics* on the Pope's understanding of theonomy. In discussing the Pope's existential starting place in *Veritatis splendor-that* he begins with the encounter between the young man and Christ, which is a type for how the "beginning" point for each of us is where our life narratives meet Christ-Malcolm speaks of this "exegetical context as a kind of 'fundamental ontology' for the pope's ethics ... Christian morality finds its center and criterion in the person of Jesus."[26] Malcolm goes on to note that what is called for is a total commitment to the person of Jesus, and the renunciation of anything that gets in the way of such discipleship. This scheme collapses any sharp distinction between justification and sanctification. As she puts it most helpfully:

On the one hand, it is about gift-the call to encounter with Christ, who is the origin and goal of human life, the source and saving power of Christian morality. On the other hand, it is also a call to obedience, a command to live life in a certain way. If it offers a vision of life that inspires and empowers-that responds in a profound way to the aspirations of the human heart-then it also presents a mandate and an imperative. [27]

Living in response to the call of Christ is what Malcolm calls "theonomous freedom," and Malcolm takes this to be the "first principle" or "root conceptual pattern" for the Pope's moral methodology. This approach to the moral life rejects the dichot-

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[25] EV, §47. Lois Malcolm elaborates insightfully on this point when discussing *Veritatis splendor's* understanding of freedom: "This personalist conception of freedom is situated within the broader context of a meditation on Christian martyrdom. Such martyrdom is rooted neither in human heroism nor the constancy of good intentions, but in the crucified Christ. We might say that the crucified Christ is the nature and locus of the good of this personalist conception of freedom" (EVE, 174).

[26] EVE, 164.

[27] EVE, 164-65.

omy between autonomy and heteronomy which presupposes that
the will follows either its own law or one fundamentally strange
and external to the self, but rather proposes a "participated
theonomy," where the self-in the light of the natural law and
revelation which are fundamentally harmonious-"participate[s]
in [its] own finite way in the wisdom and providence of divine
law, the divine pattern or exemplar that governs the ordering of
existence."[28]

In the light of the Church's identity as those who cling to the
very person of Christ, who see freedom as participated theonomy,
an identity based in an irreducibly theological narrative which
fully embraces the natural law and the pursuit of the true Good,
the Church looks at its surrounding culture, discerns the particular
ways it fails to embrace the Good, and witnesses to the true Good.
This connection between the Church's fundamental theological
identity and the moral lives of the members of its body as
signifying their identity is part of the very structure of *Evangelium
vitae,* as it is for *Veritatis splendor.*

The significance of the structure of *Evangelium vitae* and
Veritatis splendor for moral methodology is worth highlighting,
since little attention has been paid to the deeper methodological
structure they both share. The three chapters of *Veritatis splendor*
suggest a threefold movement of reflection on how the Christian
faith is to be thought and lived which I take to be a model for
methodology in Catholic moral theology.

The first movement is *existential.* It is reflection upon the
fundamental questions of human life, the encounter with Christ,
and how Christ answers the fundamental existential questions
concerning the good and end of human life. We have this
presented in the first chapter of *Veritatis splendor,* where the
young man's encounter with Christ is located in the context of the
narrative of his life, and the narrative of the young man's life is in
turn determined by his response to his encounter with Christ.
Similarly, the second chapter of *Evangelium vitae*[29] presents the

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[28] EVE, 168.

The first chapter of *Evangelium vitae* serves as an extended introduction to the
particular issue being addressed by the encyclical, namely, our culture's increasingly
threatening posture towards innocent human life.

gospel of life in narrative form, as both a proclamation of the very person of Jesus, and as a drama of fulfillment from its roots in Genesis and Exodus through to its fulfillment in Christ, highlighting the Cross, which "is revealed as the centre, meaning and goal of all history and of every human life."[30]

The second movement is *engagement.* Moral theology takes its roots in the gospel of Jesus Christ and engages in a critique of culture. Thus the second chapter of *Veritatis splendor* engages "some trends of theological thinking and certain philosophical affirmations [that] are incompatible with revealed truth." [31] Similarly, the corresponding third chapter of *Evangelium vitae* engages in a critique of the view that "permit[s] the killing of an innocent human being, whether a fetus or an embryo, an infant or an adult, an old person, or one suffering from an incurable disease, or a person who is dying."[32]

The third movement is *evangelical* or catechetical. Here moral theology instructs believers on how to live out their faith wisely in the light of the gospel as applied to their particular cultural issues and problems. Thus the third chapter of *Veritatis splendor* calls the Church to go beyond its task of cultural criticism and to catechize, to educate. It tells us that the "secret power" of the Church's education is not in improved doctrinal or moral formulations, but "in *constantly looking to the Lord Jesus."[33]* In this movement, attending to the saints and martyrs and adhering to absolute moral norms are not seen primarily as ends in themselves, but as signs of faithfulness to Christ. Similarly, the corresponding fourth chapter of *Evangelium vitae* teaches Catholics how to evangelize: to proclaim, celebrate, and serve the gospel of life.[34]

II. *EVANGELIUM VITAE* AND CATHOLIC BIOMEDICAL ETHICS

Having built on the existential identity of Christians as those who see their discipleship to Christ as a narrative of fulfillment,

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[30] EV, §50.

[31] *Veritatis splendor,* §29.

[32] EV, §57.

[33] *Veritatis splendor,* §85; italics in original.

[34] EV, §80-91.

of eternal life in Christ, [35] *Evangelium vitae* moves on to an engagement with specific bioethical questions that challenge this fundamental Christian identity. John Paul II's favorite way of expressing the fact that human existence is given its ultimate significance in being part of a type of what Christ has done in time[36] is to quote *Gaudium et spes* §22: "By his incarnation the Son of God has united himself in some fashion with every human being."[37] This passage is quoted at both the beginning and the end of *Evangelium vitae,* its purpose being to describe where the ultimate significance and dignity of human life is to be found. [38] When the Pope quotes from *Gaudium et spes* at the end of *Evangelium vitae,* the connection to medical ethics is made explicit. The Christ child himself was caught up in the great struggle between life and death, at the time when Mary, along with Joseph and the child, had to flee to save the life of her Son. In terms of how we are to struggle against the forces of evil and darkness "that child is a figure of every person, every child, every helpless baby whose life is threatened. "[39]

As noted earlier, Pellegrino's essay in *Choosing Life* captures the spirit of *Evangelium vitae* particularly well, conveying the Pope's sense of urgency and emphasizing the encyclical's importance for society generally and medical ethics specifically. Unlike many of the other essays, Pellegrino has a clear sense of the big picture: *Evangelium vitae* is fundamentally a Christian response to a world that, as it becomes increasingly post-Christian, sees less and less difficulty with intentionally killing innocent persons in a variety of situations and contexts. Pellegrino also notes that

[35] EV, §37.

[36] The starkness of this point is put most strongly in §80, when the Pope quotes St. Gregory of Nyssa to emphasize the point that life is "one with Jesus himself': "Man, as a being, is of no account; he is dust, grass, vanity. But once he is adopted by the God of the universe as a son, he becomes part of the family of that Being, whose excellence and greatness no one can see, hear or understand. What words, thoughts or flight of the spirit can praise the superabundance of this grace? Man surpasses his nature: mortal, he becomes immortal; perishable, he becomes imperishable; fleeting, he becomes eternal; human, he becomes divine" (St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Beatitudinibus,* Oratio 7; PG 44:1280).

[37] This quotation may be seen as a "signature" of the present Pope, as he cites it in, I believe, every one of his encyclicals.

[38] EV, §§2 and 104.

[39] EV, §104.

Evangelium vitae's response to attacks on innocent persons begins not with appeals to natural law, but to "Scripture, divine law, and revelation." [40] While Pellegrino himself begins with Scripture to ground the inviolable dignity of innocent human life and draws on *Evangelium vitae's* philosophical engagement with contemporary culture, he spends the lion's share of his essay responding to the arguments of "sincere and conscientious proponents of euthanasia and assisted suicide" that appeal to autonomy, compassion, the evil of suffering, and the loss of dignity. [41]

While only one essay in *Choosing Life* is explicitly concerned with abortion, it is actually a central theme in three essays-one from a historian, Kathryn Olesko, and two by law professors, Leslie Griffin and Cathleen Kaveny. Unfortunately, none of these three authors shows an eagerness to appropriate directly the explicitly theological vision of *Evangelium vitae* that has been outlined in this review; Olesko and Griffin also fail to consider the Pope's appeals to the true human good, and the practices and virtues that tend toward such good. Kaveny's article, by contrast, makes clear the relevance of such an appeal to discussions of the function of the law in contemporary American society.

Olesko criticizes the Pope for being inconsistent in denouncing as part of the culture of efficiency certain forms of the rational control of the natural while supporting natural family planning, the practice of which she believes to presuppose the legitimacy of these forms of rational control. What she fails to see is that the Pope indicts "the culture of efficiency" for failing to consider human practices in the light of the reasoned ends of persons, namely, the true individual good and the common good. Since she makes no distinction between *techne* and *phronesis,* between techniques where one pursues external goods through instrumental reasoning and practices where the goods pursued are "internal, "[42] Olesko has a much broader conception of what kinds

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[40] CL, 241.

[41] CL, 236-37

[42] On the notion of a 'practice', see Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), chap. 15. See also Joseph Dunne, *Back to the Rough Ground: 'Phronesis' and 'Techne' in Modern Philosophy and Aristotle* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993).

of actions are to be understood as 'techniques' than does the Pope. For instance, Olesko notes that the Pope "condemns *techniques* of abortion, contraception, and euthanasia outright (EV, 13-14, 22)."[43] However, abortion (or for that matter natural family planning) are not techniques, but practices.[44] Olesko thinks the Pope condemns various techniques *per se,* but in fact the Pope always critiques techniques in the light of the good pursued, particularly when techniques, which are properly *means,* come to be seen as *ends.*

Since Olesko acknowledges no conception of the human good, she predictably reads the Pope's criticism of the culture of efficiency as one element of his "vilification of democracy" and the liberal ideals of freedom and autonomy. [45] Again, the Pope never criticizes democracy *per se,* but only when it comes to be seen as an end in itself rather than a means to the pursuit of true individual good and the common good.

Democracy cannot be idolized to the point of making it a substitute for morality or a panacea for immorality. Fundamentally, democracy is a "system" and as such is a means and not an end.... in other words, its morality depends on the morality of the ends it pursues and of the means which it employs.... the value of democracy stands or falls with the values it embodies and promotes. [46]

According to the Pope's analysis, in a political system without such ends, efficiency necessarily becomes the default 'virtue' that drives societal decisions.

In her essay on *Evangelium vitae's* analysis of abortion, which cites the document somewhere between seventy-five and a hundred times, Leslie Griffin neither ever agrees with the Pope's substantive criticism of abortion, nor does she ever defend the

[43] CL, 106; italics added.

[44] Contra Olesko's claims about the Pope's affirmation of "technological reasoning" with regard to natural family planning, Karol Wojtyla's *Love and Responsibility* argues that natural family planning is not a technique of birth regulation, but an application of the virtue of continence, which is one dimension of the virtue of chastity (Wojtyla, *Love and Responsibiliity,* trans. H. T. Willetts [London: Farrer, Strauss and Giroux, 1981], 240-42).

[45] CL, 106.

[46] EV, §70. Furthermore, this is not the entire 'story' about democracy in *Evangelium vitae.* In §20, the Pope contrasts the "democratic ideal" with totalitarianism as he does the culture of life with the culture of death.

view that abortion may be good or justified in some instances. She
simply does not *directly* engage abortion as a moral question.
Instead, her main conceptual move is to draw a sharp distinction
between theological arguments and natural-law arguments, and to
argue that only natural-law arguments have potential for being
part of a "public" conversation about the law. Thus she has no
sympathy with *Evangelium vitae's* approach, which, in "accentu-
ating the theological argument ... urges Catholic moral principles
upon all persons, non-Catholic as well as Catholic. It also
recommends that Catholic moral teaching be ascribed into law."[47]

What is Griffin's goal? It seems she is interested in making
Catholic morality safe for American liberal democracy, keeping it
as a private issue, or making it an issue of at best an eviscerated
notion of natural law separate from theology. The Church has no
business putting forward its *theological* vision of the true and the
good in the public square of America, at least not when the issue
is abortion. Why not? Because ecclesially specific beliefs do not
merit the status of "public reason." The final footnote of Griffin's
essay quotes John Rawls's 1993 book *Political Liberalism* as
follows:

Public reason "means that in discussing constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical
doctrines-to   what we as individuals or members of associations see as the
whole truth .... " Instead, public reasoning should "rest on the plain truths now
widely accepted, or available, to citizens generally." [48]

With these Rawlsian commitments, Griffin also misses the Pope's
fundamental *philosophical* point, that the dignity and inviolability
of innocent human life is the precondition and basis for all other
human goods to be rightly pursued and for human laws which aim

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[47] CL, 160. Of course, Griffin's dichotomy between "theological" and "natural-law"
arguments is deeply problematic. For example, Aquinas's understanding of natural law is
theologically rooted, and many contemporary commentators on natural law are stressing its
properly theological character. See, for example, Russell Hittinger, *"Veritatis splendor* and
the Theology of Natural Law" in *Veritatis Splendor and the Renewal of Moral Theology,* ed.
J. A. DiNoia, O.P., and Romanus Cessario, O.P. (Chicago: Midwest Theological Forum,
1999), 97-127.

[48] CL, 173 n. 18. See also Leslie Griffin, "Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian Liberals,"
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law journal 5 (1997).

to protect and promote such goods. As Lois Malcolm rightly notes,

> The pope's argument is that the modern constriction of morality to the rights and freedoms of individuals undercuts the very bases for protecting those rights since it offers no other reference point for making moral choices than the choices-the acts of power-for individuals. [49]

The pope is trying to provide a basis for a morality which precisely cannot be reduced to the imposition, enactment, enforcement, or inscription of some persons' acts of power over and against the lives of other members of a society. The pope does not bring forth a campaign to guard the lives of innocent human beings because he "wants to enforce the Church's moral teaching," but because it is a necessary foundation for any authentic social and political life. As long as Griffin refuses to entertain such notions of the good, I am not sure she can provide what she undoubtedly wants, namely, an adequate basis for a good and just society.

This brings into sharp relief the difference between the articles by Griffin and Cathleen Kaveny in terms of the appropriate functions of the law. Having imbibed a Rawlsian view, Griffin refuses to bring a substantive view of the good into the public realm, and thus appears to understand the function of law to be primarily regulatory. [50] In contrast, drawing on a Thomistic theory of law, Kaveny argues that law should not be limited to punitive and protective functions, but can and should have the purpose of leading potential wrongdoers to virtue, "albeit slowly and haltingly." This is law's pedagogical function.

Kaveny is well aware that to attribute to law a pedagogical function also requires one to acknowledge the necessity of a substantive account of the good, an account of human flourishing. She is also aware that such accounts of the good, while necessary for her "virtue-based" legal theory, are very difficult to defend in our contemporary fragmented society. However, Kaveny argues

[49] EVE, 183.

so Kaveny's citation of Feinberg's view that the function of law is essentially negative is pertinent (CL, 143).

that she is no worse off than typical proponents of the currently dominant rights-based theories of law. For such rights-based theories, if they are sufficiently detailed enough to furnish a concrete legal system, also draw on an account of human flourishing, even if it is a tacit one.[51]

However, Kaveny does not simply want a more "honest" rights-based theory, for rights language simply "does not provide a basis for fruitful moral conversation about controverted moral issues, especially in a pluralistic society."[52] Focusing their attention on the victim rather than the perpetrator, rights-based theories are ill-equipped to address key elements of criminal law, such as the subjective culpability of the perpetrator. Furthermore, Kaveny believes-with good reason-that emphasis on rights language has led to the withering of the fundamental action theory central to the Catholic tradition. While obviously not the whole story, Kaveny's drawing a connection between the rise of rights-based legal theories and the increasing rejection of the distinction between intended and foreseen consequences of an action is well taken.

Further, Kaveny argues that rights-based theories generally fail to make the necessary connection between negative duties (e.g., never make direct attacks on innocent life) and positive duties of care. Kaveny fears that by appealing so strongly to rights in its heroic defence of innocent life, *Evangelium vitae* may be in danger of failing to keep the intimate connection between negative and positive duties clear. Again, Kaveny thinks that a more thoroughgoing appeal to Aquinas would serve *Evangelium vitae* well on this score. The encyclical rightly appeals to Aquinas's point that laws which contravene the moral order are not laws but "acts of violence." However, Aquinas also notes that laws which place burdens unequally on the community, even with a view for the common good, are also acts of violence rather than laws.[53] In Thomistic theory, law functions well when the appropriate negative and positive duties are viewed as complementary and function in tandem.

[51] CL, 142-43.

[52] CL, 136.

[53] CL, 141. Kaveny cites *STh* I-II, q. 93, a. 3, ad 2; and *STh* I-II, q. 96, a. 5.

Kaveny believes the inadequacy of rights-based moral theories is revealed in a particularly profound way on the issues of abortion and euthanasia. With issues like these, one cannot in any meaningful way sharply separate the negative duties regarding direct killing from positive duties of care. Thus Kaveny notes "as the Pope himself recognizes, the persons most tempted to kill the weak and the innocent are those upon whom the positive duties of continuing to care for them rest most heavily."[54] If the law is to address these questions in a more fruitful way than has been the case in the recent past, Kaveny believes that increased attention must be paid to the law's pedagogical function.

While Kaveny is clear about the grave wrong of abortion, she thinks that any legislative initiative to limit abortion must be part of a wider effort to "inculcate virtue" in our society regarding the inviolability of human life, or such efforts are doomed to failure. To her fellow lawyers who wish to develop an account of law that encourages its "pedagogical" function, she warns them that they "need to develop a way of honoring the honest, although mistaken, moral beliefs of others that is not reducible to pluralistic relativism or a callous disregard of the harmful effects of those beliefs when put into practice.*"[55] This is a monumental task; we can hope to hear more about it from Kaveny before too long.

In conclusion, while *Choosing Life* and *Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics* provide many valuable insights into *Evangelium Vitae,* they do not in the end focus our attention on the message at the heart of this encyclical. *Evangelium vitae* calls us to be fully human, and a full and adequate recognition of our human dignity rests in a timeful narrative of our encounter with Christ. Our encounter with Christ "in no way lessens the value of our existence in time; it takes it and directs it to its final destiny."[56] Precisely by embracing the irreducibly theological drama of fulfillment which Christ offers to us, we find it possible to live in harmony with the demands of right reason and the deepest longings of the human heart.

[54] CL, 141.
[55] CL, 146.
[56] EV, §38.

This theological vision can certainly inform more fully the work of moral theologians concerned with medical ethics. In the letter quoted at the beginning of this essay, John Paul II presents moral theologians with a vision of service to their world, part of which involves "challeng[ing] the prevailing culture at those points where human dignity and rights are threatened." This is in no way "anti-" or "against" culture, but a true service to any "just and moral society." While one element of challenging the prevailing culture is "dialogue," it is only one element. The kind of moral formation needed at this time involves catechesis and conversion. This catechesis and conversion begins with ourselves, and must also go on in our Church and in our society. For our society to commit itself to the protection of every innocent life will certainly require more than dialogue, it will require conversion. It will require a reshaping of many of our practices which follow a conversion of heart. Where do we turn to find such practices? *Evangelium vitae* suggests that we turn to the Church's *outstanding history of charity,* a history which has brought into being in the Church and society many forms of service to life which evoke admiration from all unbiased observers. Every Christian community, with a renewed sense of responsibility, must continue to write this history through various kinds of pastoral and social activity.[57]

There is much concrete practical wisdom embodied in these forms of service which continuously needs to be creatively integrated into the life of all of the Church's institutions, especially its hospitals, clinics, and convalescent homes. Discovering, encouraging, and promoting our "history of charity" is perhaps one of the most pressing tasks for the moral theologian at this time.[58]

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[57] EV, §87.

[58] Thanks to M. Baxter,$. Donahue, and J. Grabowski for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis. By
VIVIANBOLAND,0.P. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996. Pp. 353. $128.50 (cloth).
ISBN 90-04-10392-9.

In this remarkably wide-ranging book, Fr. Boland has presented scholars of
medieval philosophy with a compact history of the doctrine of divine ideas in
Western philosophy, as well as a study of the scope of that doctrine in the
thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. To accomplish both of these tasks, Boland
divides his presentation into two parts, the first comprising four chapters and
the second three. In the first part of the book, he is successful in setting forth
the major figures and their key, historically influential theses, though some of
the analyses are more protracted than would be required simply in order to
provide the background to Aquinas. The second part of the book addresses
Aquinas's own theory and outlines its main features by analyzing texts from
various periods of Aquinas's literary career.

The book opens with an introduction laying out the conflicting inter-
pretations of divine ideas given by Thomists in the twentieth century. Such
notable scholars as Gilson and Sertillanges claim that Aquinas's account of the
divine nature, especially that found in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, does not
necessitate any doctrine of divine ideas and that Thomas's emphasis on divine
simplicity militates somewhat against endorsing divine ideas. According to
Thomists of this outlook, Aquinas simply held on to the theory of divine ideas,
historically speaking, out of respect for the theological authority of St.
Augustine and not out of any theoretical commitments of his own. On the
other hand, such a leading authority as Geiger maintains that the doctrine of
divine ideas is integral to Aquinas's theological thinking-indeed, so integral
that Thomas needs to posit divine ideas in order to sustain the divine simplicity
while simultaneously allowing for God's intimate awareness of each aspect of
his creation. Boland's work, through its detailed examination of the sources for
Thomas's doctrine of divine ideas and the texts that present that doctrine
constitutes, in effect, a response in favor of Geiger's position and opposed to
the minimalist approach to divine ideas characteristic of Gilson and
Sertillanges.

Each of the first four chapters focuses on a different group of prominent
figures. The first treats of Plato and the tradition of Academic speculation
leading to and including middle Platonism. Regarding Plato himself, Boland
undertakes an analysis of the *Timaeus* with its characteristic doctrine of the

Demiurge. Although he acknowledges the problematic enterprise of inter-
preting the professedly mythic aspects of the doctrine, Boland nonetheless
presents a fairly straightforward reading of the *Timaeus:* the Demiurge is not
the supreme principle of the Platonic universe, though it is prior to soul and
the physical universe, while the Forms are prior to the Demiurge and are
certainly not the thoughts of a divine mind. Observing that this way of
understanding the Platonic account of creation, though perhaps justified on
textual grounds, leaves Plato subject to many of the criticisms later voiced by
Aristotle, Boland adds that the *Timaeus* so understood is open as well to two
philosophical developments: (1) identifying the Demiurge with the supreme
principle of the universe and (2) placing the Forms within the mind of the
supreme principle as its thoughts. These two developments cannot be precisely
traced historically, but clearly the second can be seen already in the works of
Antiochus of Ascalon, the middle Platonist of the first century B.C., whose
thought was continued and amplified by such notable figures as Albinus. The
first of the developments would seem to be found in Platonic tradition prior to
Antiochus, but is clearly judged to be commonplace Platonic doctrine by
Roman philosophers such as Cicero and Seneca in their summary renderings of
Greek philosophical teachings. A final figure of importance in the transmission
of early- and middle-Platonic doctrine is Philo Judaeus whose discussion of a
divinely spoken Word containing an intelligible world provided much stimu-
lation for later Christian speculation.

The second of the background chapters deals with Plotinus, Augustine, and
Boethius. Plotinus is seen as bringing to fulfillment a certain tendency in
Platonic thinking as an effort to respond to Aristotelian criticisms of the Forms.
By positing Forms as the very thoughts of vouc;;, Plotiims locates the Forms as
intelligibles in the divine mind, borrowing extensively from Aristotle's quite
similar doctrine of divine mind in *Metaphysics* book A. Furthermore, Plotinus's
approach allows the divine mind to function as the measure of the dependent
and subsequent items in the process of cosmological emanation, thereby making
room for a doctrine of providence much richer than that found in the
Aristotelian writings. Yet, as Boland notes, the fact that the Plotinian vouc;;, is
not the ultimate, but penultimate, principle of reality meant that no Christian
philosopher could take over Plotinus's theory in its original form, despite its
many advantages in terms of synthesizing the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts
of supersensible reality. In his interpretation of Augustine, Boland proposes,
interestingly enough, that Augustine's speculation about divine ideas remains
more indebted to the middle Platonist than to the Plotinian account of divine
mind. The classic text in Augustine's corpus, *De 83 quaestionibus* q. 46, speaks
of a plurality of *rationes* that are different for each type of created thing yet
identical to God, the first principle, being the very thoughts of the divine mind.
When such terminology is combined with Augustine's treatment of the divine
Word in the *De Trinitate,* what emerges is something more readily reconcilable
with Philo Judaeus or Seneca than with Plotinus. Boethius, on the other hand,
is believed by Boland to have undergone considerably more Plotinian influence,

something that Boland finds revealed in Boethius's constant concern to safe-guard the divine unity and simplicity.

The third chapter gives detailed overviews of Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus. The importance of Pseudo-Dionysius lies in his identification of the divine ideas with the divine attributes of life-itself, wisdom-itself, and being-itself. These auto-realities are rooted in God's causal activity, his overflowing generosity and perfection. Such a direct linkage to divine attributes provided later Western thinkers with an occasion to consider the relationship between the various attributes and the divine ideas, a framework independent of and differing markedly from the Augustinian tendency to locate the ideas in the attribute of knowledge and the procession of the divine Word. Boland's extensive treatment of Proclus is partially an effort to place into sharper relief the Christian elements in the Pseudo-Dionysian synthesis and partially an attempt to sketch out the pagan speculation underlying the Pseudo-Aristotelian *Liber de causis* so often commented upon by medieval philosopher-theologians.

The final chapter on Aquinas's sources focuses upon Aristotle and his account of divine knowledge. Acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing the account of mind in general in the Aristotelian corpus from that given for divine mind, Boland opts for an interpretation that sees the statements about mind in the *De anima* as being generically true about mind insofar as it is something divine, while holding that the claims advanced in the *Metaphysics* describe the uniquely Divine Mind. Since Aristotle's thought is noncreationist, Boland rightly understands the Stagirite's metaphysical explanations to terminate in supersensible reality as an effort to explain the intelligibility and order of the universe rather than its existence. Yet he portrays Aristotle's God, curiously enough, as "the model rather than its [the world's] goal and the exemplar but not the cause of its being" (173). The present reviewer would think that the Aristotelian God could quite rightly be described as the goal and final cause of the universal cosmic motion, but not in any way its model or exemplar; indeed, the standard interpretation of Aristotelian theology sees it as being distinguished from other theologies by its denial of exemplarity. At the end of this chapter on Aristotle, Boland quickly reviews some key figures in the transmission of Aristotelian learning, including ancient Aristotelians such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Islamic Aristotelians such as Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, and Christian Aristotelians such as John Philoponus and Albert the Great. While characterizing Albert as "the enthusiastic leader of [the] fresh attempt to integrate the philosophy of Aristotle with Christian theology" (187) beginning in the Latin West during the thirteenth century, he seems to overlook entirely the notable efforts of such predecessors to Albert as Alexander of Hales, Jean de la Rochelle, Phillip the Chancellor, and Richard Rufus.

Turning to the main subject of the book, Boland begins his analysis of Aquinas's position on divine ideas with a study of the doctrine of his early *Scriptum* on the *Sentences.* The main lines of Aquinas's teaching are already present in this early work: God's knowledge of creatures is rooted in his knowledge of his own essence as imitable and things are related to their

respective ideas in accord with the manner that they are produced by God. Although the doctrine of the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate* q. 3, a. 2, and *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 15 introduces a clearer distinction between types of divine ideas as objects of quasi-speculative knowledge *(rationes)* and quasi-practical knowledge *(exemplaria),* Thomas is obviously committed to allowing divine ideas for a wide range of objects: species, supervenient accidents, individuals, and possibles, since he emphasizes the importance of God's knowledge of singulars. The most problematic text of Thomas's mature literary activity is, of course, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, cc. 50-54 with its various redactions wherein Thomas deliberately suppresses a draft text that makes extensive use of the doctrine of divine ideas. Boland's efforts to lessen the impact of this piece of evidence which lends apparent support to those who would minimize the significance of divine ideas for Aquinas are hampered on two scores. First, Boland does not make the rather obvious reply that to argue from the doctrine's absence in the *Summa contra Gentiles* to its secondary status is tantamount to an argument from a lack of evidence and that, in any event, Thomas certainly included the divine ideas in his magisterial, and later, *Summa Theologiae.* Second, Boland does not exploit sufficiently the Islamic context of the *Summa contra Gentiles;* Thomas's tendency to be in dialogue with Avicenna and Averroes in that work may help to explain the difference between its approach and that found in his other writings.

In his sixth chapter, Boland outlines Aquinas's account of divine ideas as they relate to the divine Word. Since Aquinas allows two ways in which things may be in the Word, as that which the Word knows and that which is said in the Word, he seems keen to allow a role for the divine will in the speaking of the divine ideas bearing upon *creata* as opposed to *creabilia,* though Boland never fully explicates precisely how this role is to be rendered consistent with the necessity of the procession of the Word.

In his final chapter, Boland attempts a retrospective analysis of precisely how Thomas's overall theory of divine ideas aligns with the various sources that the Angelic Doctor read and utilized. Emphasizing that Thomas does not assign the divine ideas the same epistemological role as that given them by Augustine, Boland contrasts the Thomistic doctrine of agent intellect with its naturally efficacious enlightenment rendering sensible items actually intelligible to what he describes as (284) "the occasionalist type" of enlightenment "associated with medieval Augustinianism." Here Boland does not seem to fathom that the ultimate grounds for Aquinas's rejection of Augustinian epistemology lie in Thomas's revision of the term of human intellectual knowledge to encompass only necessary truths about created things rather than to include awareness of immutable, eternal truths, the view associated with Bonaventure and other illuminationists of the thirteenth century.

On balance, the book is a fine effort at trying to solve a problem within Thomistic secondary scholarship by a careful examination of the sources at Aquinas's disposal for his doctrine of the divine ideas and his appropriation of those sources. The book suffers at times from a tendency to become so bogged

down in fleshing out the precise meaning of the doctrines of earlier figures such as Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius that the main object of study is temporarily lost from view; shorter sketches of the historical background would probably have sufficed, even if at times questionable interpretations would have to be taken on matters controversial among specialists working in ancient philosophy. Furthermore, a strictly chronological order of presentation would probably have improved the clarity of the treatment since Aristotle's views had to be referred to extensively prior to their formal study in the fourth chapter. On the other hand, much more could, and should, have been made of the impact of near-contemporaries and contemporaries on Aquinas's thought; St. Bonaventure, for example, is doubtless one of the contemporary theologians with whom Thomas is in dialogue in the *Sentences* commentary and elsewhere, yet Bonaventure is mentioned only in passing. But, despite its faults, Boland's book remains a solid achievement. It gathers together a wealth of material, both secondary and primary, dealing with divine ideas in Aquinas and the doctrinal tradition leading to him. Any future scholar treating of the topic of divine ideas will, doubtless, benefit enormously from the study of Boland's treatment of the problems involved and his impressive command of the relevant primary literature.

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Living with God: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Life on Earth and 'Life' after Death. By CARLO LEGET. Publications of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht, n.s. 5. Leuven: Peters, 1997. Pp. 304. 1100 BEF (paper). ISBN 90-6831-966-3.

Skipping directly to the author's concluding chapter is an occupational hazard for readers, but what is death for mystery novels can breathe life into academic books, and I found myself moving directly to the last of Leget's five chapters after struggling with his first. The first chapter, called "In Search of an Appropriate Perspective: Aquinas on God and Life," opens with the nature of theology *(STh* I, q. 1). Leget then turns to "life" and "death" as they apply to creatures. The focus of chapter 1, however, is on "life" as a divine name *(STh* I, q. 18), and Leget concludes by considering "life" among the Trinity of Persons in God.

Two points initially made it difficult for me to follow the "search" in chapter 1. First, the presentation of the nature of theology, though clear, is too brief and lacking in argument. Leget's main conclusion is that *sacra doctrina* is

broader than its three distinct "parts": Scripture, the articles of faith, and theology proper, defined as "scientific reflection on the content of faith." This view is intriguing but not without problems. Leget's textual warrant to buttress the claim that theology is only *"part* of the sacred doctrine" is "Unde theologia quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinet differt secundum genus ab illa theologia quae pars philosophiae ponitur." But to say that theology "pertains" to sacred doctrine is not necessarily to make theology merely a *part* of sacred doctrine. While admitting that "Aquinas considers the Articles of Faith as the principles of theology" Leget does not draw what seems to be the logical consequence of this admission, namely, that such principles and the conclusions drawn with their aid are both contained within one Aristotelian science, the science of *sacra doctrina,* for which theology is but another name, not merely a part.

The second stumbling block concerned the "central question" of the book, "the relation between *vita naturae* and *vita aeterna."* Leget explains that he "will use the word 'relationship' for what Aquinas means with [by?] *conversatio,* 'life' in the sense of 'living together with someone'." But he neglects to give a thorough explanation of *conversatio,* neither appealing to Busa nor pursuing its rich relations with its linguistic twin *conversio.* Here is a lost opportunity. And in the explanation he does give (64 n. 151), though he correctly denies that God has a "real relationship" with creatures, he neglects to define this rather arcane Scholastic expression or explain the difference between 'real relations' and 'relations of reason' in a way that would throw light on his central topic.

Such difficulties led me to the brief and illuminating final chapter. Its title- "Living with God as Meaning of Life"-fits the whole work into a *genre* which became popular in the twentieth century and might be called 'meaning of life' literature, most memorably exemplified by the psychologist Viktor Frankl's classic, *Man's Search for Meaning.* Leget points out that while the word 'meaning' traditionally referred to the sense of some specific term, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century it took on a more general intention, referring to "human existence as such," as in the now familiar phrase "the meaning of life." Against the backdrop of two World Wars, the Cold War, existentialism, and its offspring deconstruction and postmodernism, Leget thinks that "the quest for meaning" in the wider sense "has become symptomatic for contemporary North-Atlantic culture" (256). No less a figure than John Paul II has recently agreed, describing philosophy itself as a "dramatic" quest for truth which begins with the "question: 'Does life have a meaning?'" *(Fides et Ratio* 26).

Leget attempts to answer a twentieth-century question by turning for help and advice to a thirteenth-century Dominican friar. Turning to Aquinas sends Leget off in a different direction from Frankl, who focused on his own death-camp experiences and said that for an existentialist "what matters is not the meaning of life *in general* but rather the *specific meaning* of a person's life at a given moment." By contrast, Leget turns to Aquinas to give a *general* account of the meaning of human life as such, one that could undergird any individual

account. For Aquinas, God is not merely a creator; humans have a teleological relation to him. To understand any relation one must look at three things: the subject of the relation, the relation itself, and the term of the relation. Roughly speaking, Leget organizes his book around these three parts of the relation between humans and God. Chapter 2, entitled "Foundations of Life with God," focuses on the subject, the human agent. Chapter 3, called "Dynamism of Life with God," is devoted to the kind of human activity that develops the relationship between humans and God in the present life. Chapter 4 concerns the terminus of that relation: eternal life, and is called "Perfection of Life with God."

The topics that could be treated within this framework are virtually unlimited, but in chapter 2 Leget, like Frankl, concentrates on death, that great evil standing between "the life of nature" and "eternal life." To understand the condition of facing death, Leget takes up three topics: death itself, Christ, and the sacraments. He begins with God, who, though "other" than creatures, is their "final end." The death humans face can be understood in two ways, which leads Leget to an important methodological aside:

> Eventually, I take the *theological* interpretation of death as being the most comprehensive framework in which all other levels and orders fall into their proper place. Before this theological interpretation is studied, the level of natural *philosophy* will be considered, since here, the consequences which follow from Aquinas' doctrine of the unity of the soul are worked out. (77)

When taken philosophically death is "defined" as the separation of soul from body. The fact that Leget does not go into Aquinas's arguments for the existence, spirituality, or immortality of the soul indicates how separate theology and philosophy are for him, and that he thinks the present work theological rather than philosophical. On a second definition, death is "the privation of life," which leads immediately to the question "why death?" and to the properly theological answer that death is punishment for original sin. Hope for a life beyond death comes through Christ, and in particular from the suffering and death of Christ, which is "the heart of the matter" because Christ alone restores the relation of human to God and provides an exemplar for human life. Humans "participate" in the "work of Christ" through the sacraments, which are the "foundation and framework of life with God."

The most important part of the study is chapter 3, concerned with actively living out one's teleological relation to God, or, in Leget's words "the dynamism of life with God." Leget follows the order Aquinas took in the "moral theology" of the second part of the *Summa,* though very selectively. Beginning with God as the ultimate end of human life, this chapter encompasses the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity as the means of attaining that end, then the evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience as "directed at one's own spiritual perfection." After treating such states of character, Leget turns to the act of martyrdom, which requires "a degree of moral perfection which outreaches that of the Evangelical Counsels" in "giving

up corporal life for the sake of spiritual life," and he ends by considering the morality of the act of killing *(STh* 11-11, q. 64). In this chapter both the promise and the problems of Leget's enterprise are clearly on display.

   He correctly points out that even though "eternal life" with God consists in the contemplative act of beatific vision, the "way of life" Aquinas recommends for our journey in the present life is the active life. A sign of the priority of active over contemplative life for humans *in via* is that "Aquinas considers the *vita activa"* of the friars "to be more perfect than the *vita contemplativa* of those [the monks] who are committed solely to prayer." Leget is also correct in stating that the present active life requires the full perfection of the theological virtues; living out the four cardinal virtues is simply not enough.

   The most interesting part of chapter 3 is the treatment of the morality of killing. Older Neoscholastics tended to suppress the religious elements of Aquinas's argument or to call "philosophical" what was actually based on faith. More recently the Grisez 'school' has rejected capital punishment, for instance, on the grounds of an absolute right to life, a conclusion now also embraced by Pope John Paul II. While Leget does not directly take on these contemporary views, his way of approaching the texts of Aquinas is illuminating about what Thomas himself actually meant, and could provide the basis for helpful interventions in contemporary discussions. His fundamental point is to insist on interpreting "Aquinas' discussions about the killing of human beings" in terms of the human journey to God which involves "the proportion between *vita naturalis (vita animae et corporis), vita gratiae* and *vita gloriae."* Consequently, he distinguishes arguments about killing into those set "within the social context of a community," which are purely philosophical, and those set in "relation with life with God *(vita gratiae),"* which involve faith. In the first perspective, Leget finds that Aquinas uses two criteria for exceptions to the general rule that killing humans is forbidden: (1) the person killed must be "a sinner who is a danger to the community" and (2) the killing must be "done by the public authority charged with the care for the common good." He astutely notes that these criteria "are the same as Thomas formulates" for "waging war," and that "a pattern emerges" from comparing homicide and war, namely that they are justified only based on "the well-being of innocent people."

   The fact that well-being involves more than bodily life provides Leget with a point of transition to the perspective of faith. What Aquinas says about killing heretics and killing oneself may be difficult for our contemporaries to accept, but Leget does us a favor by pointing out that Aquinas's arguments in important ways rest on faith. For example, he notes that "killing oneself is a double murder: not only corporal life is destroyed, but spiritual life as well," a conclusion based on seeing human life as *vita gratiae* moving to *vita gloriae.* The magnitude of the evil involved in suicide cannot be seen apart from this perspective. In addition, the perspective of faith gives Leget a solid reading of Aquinas on what is perhaps the most difficult biblical story about killing: "The story of the sacrifice of Isaac confirms the central position of the *life of grace* for dealing with corporal life and death." This case may seem impossible when considered from the perspective of the human "social context" as seen in the

precepts of the second tablet of the Decalogue. But when looked at in light of the first tablet, and seen through faith, "Abraham is no more than the executor of God's death sentence, which is passed on each human being from the moment of birth" because of original sin.

Leget's account in chapter 3, however, could be improved in one important way. It is too narrowly 'theological'. He undervalues the role of rational arguments in the dialectical interplay of faith and philosophy found in Aquinas's theology. Thus, for example, in treating happiness Leget begins where Thomas did, with the fact that human action is teleological. But he simply passes over the many philosophical arguments Aquinas offers, in moving from the end of a given act to all acts having ends to a hierarchy of ends to one ultimate end. Most important is what justifies identifying the one ultimate end with God. Aquinas devotes the whole of question 2 to a series of arguments modeled on Boethius's *Consolation* which are designed to lead the mind rationally to the conclusion that such an ultimate end cannot be something other than God. Such an argument may fall short of demonstrating that God is the source of happiness, but it shows that Aquinas does not think the identification of the highest end with God obvious, as Leget does: "This [ultimate end], *of course,* is none other than God." Perhaps it is obvious because it is a theological assumption. But theological assumptions, if indeed this is one, need not be arbitrary or irrational, and reason can open us to them, a point of capital importance for the contemporary reader.

Another example of this problem is as follows. Virtue is "the central element in Aquinas' consideration of moral action and life of grace." Though St. Thomas himself used seven virtues-the four cardinal as well as the three theological virtues-to structure his presentation of our 'return to God' in the *Secunda Secundae,* Leget limits himself to the theological virtues and devotes but two paragraphs to the cardinal virtues. The reason seems to be a misconception that the cardinal virtues are irrelevant to the journey to eternal life. What little Leget says about them bears out this point. He correctly notes that the term 'cardinal' comes from "the hinge *(cardo)* of the door," but then confuses this metaphor by adding that the door leads "to human life." But if the door leads *to* human life, what is the door itself, metaphorically speaking? Later in the very text Leget quotes Aquinas clarifies the metaphor: *"Moral deeds* are the *door* through which one enters into the contemplation of wisdom" in heaven *(De vir. card.,* q. un., a. 1, ad 4). The reason why getting the metaphor right is important is that on Aquinas's construction the cardinal virtues are called "cardinal" precisely because they lead us to the perfect happiness of eternal life. Leget, by contrast, holds that the four cardinal virtues *only* "contribute to the happiness man can reach by his natural powers *(beatitudo imperfecta)."* In so passing over the cardinal virtues as irrelevant to the topic of "life on earth leading to 'life' after death," Leget neglects to follow his own sage advice: "In Aquinas' account of happiness, imperfect and perfect *beatitudo* should *not* be played off against each other."

After chapter 3 takes the reader through the present life, chapter 4 turns to the heavenly goal. Here the way Leget divides up "eternal life" into consideration of the glorified soul, glorified body, and glorified creation puts what is normally conceived purely personally into a communal context, and sets up a clever treatment of "the 'logic' of hell," where "Aquinas' account of *mors aeterna* is in every respect the reverse of heaven." Certainly Dante understood that while God is the center of heaven, "in hell everything is sought in accordance with one's own profit." Leget points out that there is an analogy between "eternal punishment" and "capital punishment on earth, which is not directed at the emendation of the one sentenced, but to the profit of the community," which perhaps shows why our contemporaries find them equally objectionable.

Leget's work bears the marks of a first effort, and includes some blemishes. Apart from problems of substance such as those mentioned above, it reads too much like a dissertation, though one rather skimpy in the use of secondary sources. The ethical works of Grisez, Finnis, and Mcinerny are not even listed in the bibliography. It also includes minor distractions like using Deferrari's now fifty-year-old *Lexicon* (22 n. 47), even though the author clearly knows Busa, and using Weisheipl's biography (4) rather than Torrell, whose 1993 work is not mentioned. But looking at Aquinas's moral thought by paying close attention to its explicitly religious dimension, especially introducing the now-popular "narrative" approach in a way that is quite faithful to the thought of Aquinas, as Leget does, makes for an intrinsically worthwhile, if less than perfect, book. One hopes that when Dr. Leget turns again to this topic he will look more carefully at the wide variety of fine work now being done in Thomistic ethics by Anglo-American philosophers, and that he will enter into discussion with more of them.

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Person in the World. By MARY CATHARINE BASEHEART. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997. Pp. 204. $99.00 ISBN 0-7923-4490-1.

Almost anyone who has heard of Edith Stein knows that she was a German-Jewish Carmelite nun who was put to death at Auschwitz by the Nazis and recently canonized by Pope John Paul II. Many will also recall that she was an intellectual, a feminist, and a student and associate of the philosopher Edmund Husserl. But few, unless they have a working acquaintance with the phenomenological movement and the German language, are likely to be familiar with her significance as a philosopher in her own right.

Person in the World was written to redress this need. It is the first comprehensive introduction to Stein's philosophy in English. This fact alone makes it a major achievement. Much of it is based on Baseheart's doctoral dissertation, "The Encounter of Husserl's Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas in Selected Writings of Edith Stein," written at Notre Dame almost forty years ago, in 1960. The reason for the delay in publication is that immediately after completing her dissertation, Baseheart was pressed into administrative duties as dean at Spalding University, a position she occupied for nearly twenty years. Tragically, she died in 1994, just before receiving word that the manuscript of *Person in the World,* the culmination of her scholarly life's work, had been accepted for publication. We owe a debt of thanks to John R. Wilcox and the Edith Stein Center for Study and Research, which Baseheart founded at Spalding University in 1990, for seeing her magnum opus through to its final publication.

Despite its comparative brevity, *Person in the World* is a large accomplishment, offering an overview of Stein's entire philosophical development. Starting with a synopsis of her life and thought, it proceeds with a careful analysis of her ideas that progresses through chapters that are divided in a topical and chronological sequence. Beginning with Stein's study *On the Problem of Empathy,* which she wrote as her doctoral dissertation under Edmund Husserl in 1916, it follows her use of the phenomenological method to examine such topics as the foundations of psychology, the nature of the state, the nature of woman, and the philosophy of education. Baseheart's book then follows Stein's later philosophical development, where Stein turns the phenomenological method toward the study of Aquinas, drawing points of comparison with Husserl on such topics as intuition, essence, and finite and eternal being.

As Baseheart herself declares, *Person in the World* is an expository book and does not aim to criticize Stein, either directly or by bringing her into discussion with other philosophers, except for those that she herself is concerned with (Husserl, Scheler, Aquinas, et al.): "My purpose in this book is to remove the wrapping and lid from the gift that Edith Stein has given us and to say: 'Look! See what is inside.'" Baseheart's aim was to provide an accurate summary of Stein's work, which others may use in taking the further steps necessary toward criticism and comparative analysis.

Stein's philosophical vocabulary presents obstacles similar to those of Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) to readers without some background in phenomenology. Even such an able exposition as Baseheart's, perhaps because she was so closely focused upon presenting an accurate representation of Stein's thought, provides very little to help the reader who is unacquainted with the work of phenomenologists such as Husserl or Scheler. Baseheart undoubtedly intended her book as a testament to Stein's highly technical skill, as well as her breadth and profundity, as a phenomenologist.

Person in the World is divided into nine chapters: (1) "Light in Darkness: Edith Stein's Life," (2) "Overview of Her Philosophy," (3) "The Human Person," (4) "Community and State," (5) "Woman and Education," (6)

"Essence and Existence," (7) "Intuition of Essence," (8) "Finite and Eternal Being," and (9) "Concluding Postscript." An appendix contains Baseheart's translation of extended sections of Stein's essay "Husserl's Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas: Attempt at a Comparison," which Stein contributed to a *Festschrift* published in honor of Husserl's seventieth birthday in 1929. Baseheart also presents the reader with extensive explanatory and documentary notes throughout her volume, as well as a thorough bibliography of books and articles by and about Stein.

Stein began her studies at the University of Breslau where she became briefly enamored with empirical psychology, but soon became persuaded that this science was still in its infancy and rested on unclarified methodological principles. It was during that time that she encountered Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901), which led to her decision to go to Gottingen to study with Husserl. She was attracted both by the labor of conceptual clarification she saw in his phenomenological method, and by the promise it offered of surmounting the dominant psychologism of the day by means of the analysis of essences and essential structures of phenomena.

The heyday of the Gottingen school of phenomenology was over by the time Stein arrived, since most of the original members of the philosophical society there (Adolf Reinach, Conrad and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Alexander Koyre, and Jean Hering) were no longer students of Husserl. But Stein became good friends with a number of the members in her time, including Hans Lipps and Fritz Kaufmann. Reinach's character and conversion had a profound effect on her, as did Scheler's lectures, which destroyed her earlier rationalistic prejudices against the philosophical possibility of religious faith. Her own conversion occurred in 1921 after a night of reading St. Teresa of Avila's autobiography.

After completing her dissertation in 1916 under Husserl, who called her his "best pupil," Stein served as his assistant, editing the manuscript of his *Ideas* (vol. 2). Her letters to Roman Ingarden reveal her growing frustration with Husserl's work habits and lack of time for her own work, which led her to resign in 1918. In a succession of experiences that undoubtedly helped to solidify her feminist outlook, she unsuccessfully sought university professorships (unheard of for women in her day) at Gottingen, Freiburg, and Breslau, but managed to secure only a modest position as a secondary-school teacher at a convent school for girls, St Magdalena's, in Speyer (1922-32).

Stein's strictly phenomenological work from this period includes, in addition to her dissertation on empathy, a study of the philosophical foundations of psychology and the social sciences (1922) and an investigation concerning the nature of the state (1925). But it was also during this period that, without ceasing to cooperate in the research of the phenomenologists, she began working with a small group of Catholic intellectuals formed around von Hildebrand, Daniel Feuling, and Erich Przywara, who were collaborating on a German edition of Cardinal Newman's works. She translated the volume of Newman's letters and journals written before his conversion to the Catholic Church. Her

most ambitious project during this time was her translation of Aquinas's *Disputed Questions on Truth* (1931).

In 1931, Stein gave up her post at St. Magdalena's with its "piles of essays" to devote her time to lecturing and writing. Already in 1927 she had started lecturing in leading European cities on the subjects of women and education. She had also been working on a massive treatise on potency and act, which she later revised after her entry into the Carmelite order, under the title of *Finite and Eternal Being* (1936). Like Karol Wojtyla, who was also a student of Roman Ingarden and Scheler, and wrote his first work on St. John of the Cross, Stein also wrote a work on St. John of the Cross, *Science of the Cross,* which remained unfinished at the time of her martyrdom in 1942.

Baseheart, recognizing Stein's insistence that philosophy calls for completion by theology *without becoming theology,* confines her study to Stein's philosophy. The unifying thread she finds running throughout Stein's work is the ontic structure of the person-already evident in her interest in psychology at Breslau, as well as in her dissertation on empathy. In fact, Roman Ingarden suggested that she was particularly receptive to the subject of empathy because it offered a way of clarifying the ontical structure not only of the individual but also of the community, as evidenced in her later studies of the philosophical foundations of the social sciences and of the state.

In her study of empathy, Stein focuses on the existential, lived experience of empathy, in contrast to Husserl's narrower epistemological concerns. She distinguishes between what is experienced primordially and what is experienced nonprimordially in order to contrast how one's own self and other selves are constituted in experience. The unity of the self constitutes itself in primordial acts (perceiving, recollecting) that link the present and past self. As the self is constituted in primordially experienced acts, so other selves are constituted in nonprimordially experienced acts of empathic consciousness. Like Husserl (and Merleau-Ponty), Stein holds that our recognition of other selves is founded on perceptual bodily experience. We experience our own bodies from the "inside" and see ourselves from the "outside" as "other" in a world of others. We see others from the "outside" as well, our perceptions generating an empathic cognition transcending those perceptions themselves. Our experience of another's joy is nonprimordial, though it is evoked by the other's primordial experience. Accordingly, Stein rejected Scheler's theory that we perceive other selves from the "inside" as we perceive ourselves. In her view, empathy functions constitutively to reveal not only the inner life of the other, but also the self as other to its others, and thus as a means of self-knowledge amidst one's relations to others.

A few summary observations concerning other dimensions of Stein's philosophy covered by Baseheart will have to suffice. Stein's analysis of woman follows the general structure of her theory of the constitution of the person, but enters into an intricate synthesis of phenomenological and Aristotelian-Thomistic conceptualizations. Each person has not only universal essence but individual essence, embodying human essence through freely chosen individual

acts. In two conceptually dense chapters on "Essence and Existence" and "Intuition of Essence," Baseheart examines Stein's phenomenological conceptions of individual and universal essences and their relation to empirical perception and Husserl's "categorical intuition."

In her later works, such as *Finite and Eternal Being,* Stein increasingly turned her phenomenological approach to focus on issues raised by her intense study of Aristotle, Augustine, Bonaventure, Scotus, and especially Aquinas. Religious concerns become more central. She took issue with Heidegger's emphasis on *Angst,* calling his work the philosophy of bad conscience and suggesting that the experience of "security"-based   on the feeling of being supported in one's received being-rather   than "anxiety" is the more typical human experience.

But as Baseheart notes, it would be a mistake to suppose that Stein ever turned her back on her phenomenological approach in her later work. It is true that even in her dissertation she exhibited a marked independence in the way she appropriated Husserl's ideas. It is also true that she sided with the phenomenological realists (Reinach, Scheler, Conrad-Martius, lngarden, Hering) against Husserl in rejecting both his turn to transcendental idealism and his transcendental reduction (though not his eidetic reduction). Indeed, Stein's abiding commitment to metaphysical realism is apparent throughout Baseheart's book, in Stein's accent on the primacy of natural belief in the reality of the world, as in her theory of truth as conformity of intention to real object and objective being. Yet in all of this, Stein remained a true phenomenologist.

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A Spiritual Theology of the Priesthood: The Mystery of Christ and the Mission of the Priest. By DERMOT POWER. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998. Pp. 178. $19.95 (paper). ISBN 0-8132-0916-1.

Dermot Power's *Spiritual Theology* is very much and in the first place a theology, for he is mindful that priestly life depends on prior conviction about priestly existence. He finds this prior conviction challenged by such writers as E. Schillebeeckx and J. Martos such that, were the challenge to prevail, the result would not be some merely questionable change of priestly spirituality, but its disappearance-there   would no priests in the required sense to need it or have it or practice it. Power therefore thinks to strengthen this prior conviction about the existence and nature of Catholic ministerial priesthood

by gathering a theology of the priesthood from the voluminous work of Hans Urs von Balthasar. By that very fact, moreover, the theology will be a spirituality, since it was one of Balthasar's chief glories to make these two recover their original unity.

The priest is the "transparency" of Christ and his representative (3, 19). This is what is today contested, and this is what Balthasar both holds in common with the theology of the Church (13-15) and yet gives new depth to. And this is why Power begins with Balthasar's Christology in chapters 1 and 2.

The priest is the transparency of Christ. The structure of priestly identity therefore reproduces the structure of the identity of Christ. And the identity of Christ is constituted by a twofold transcendence: a transcending relation to his Father (i.e., a love for, a gift of self to, the Father); and a transcending relation to the world, to sinful humanity, that makes the Church (2, 20). Just so, priestly identity is a matter of a twofold transcendence: first to Christ and with Christ to the Father; second with Christ to Church and world. The purpose of a spiritual theology of the priesthood, in fact, is nothing except to keep these two transcendences alive (5).

But why should doing so constitute a properly priestly spirituality? Jesus is rightly called a priest by the later theology of the New Testament, for his surrender of himself to his Father on the cross, and for our sake, is par excellence sacrificial and so priestly (22, 24). The cross, moreover, is the culmination and manifestation of the incarnation as a whole event, and therefore, it turns out that the fundamental relations of Christ's entire life-transcendence of self toward Father and toward the world-and so that life and that person, are rightly described as priestly, according to Power (32). Christ is Priest because also Victim, and the self-offering is life long.

We encounter here the now-familiar Balthasarian thesis that the person theologically considered is mission. The Person Christ is the mission as incarnate to surrender to the Father who sends him and so to give himself for the world-to sacrifice himself. The mission is priestly, and therefore this Person is through and through and preeminently Priest (35). The sacrifice-obedience of the Son (34-37), as well as the kenosis of the Son in priestly service to us (337-42), provide the context for understanding talk of "substitution" and "expiation" (Power himself defends Balthasar's own defense of this point as abidingly significant [42-45]), and Power repeats the terms of Balthasar's understanding of the atonement: on the cross, the estrangement between God and man due to sin is swallowed up in the separation of Father and Son which is nonetheless their nearness (46).

At this point, Power turns to the ecclesiology of Balthasar and begins to close on the issue posed more narrowly by the title of his book: the idea of a priestly spirituality requires one to relate the personal, as it were, the interior life of a Christian ("spirituality"), to a public office ("priesthood"). He makes this issue the central issue of the book, taking it up in chapters 3 and 4. Just as the identity of Christ cannot be abstracted from the Church, so the identity of the Church cannot be abstracted from the differentiated network of relations,

all centered on Christ, that constitute her. The relations in question are original, originating, ever contemporary, and form the immediate matrix in which the office of the priesthood is to be located. The relations in question are those instantiated by Mary, John, Peter, and Paul.

For Balthasar, the fundamental relation of the Church to Christ is that of Mary, and is nuptial (50, 57-60); the priest is wholly in service to this nuptial relation, showing the love of the Groom for his Bride (50, 63). If both John and Peter figure in their own way the dedication of office to love (Peter by way of humiliation), it is with Paul that Balthasar, and so Power, finds the clearest expression of the solution of the relation of person and ecclesial office (chap. 4). The resolution is to see that office in the Church is personal, and person-making. If priestly "office" requires the transcendence of self unto Christ and the Church, it is precisely these donations of self to and for the sake of others that make the person, and that constitutes the "space" of the priest's spiritual interiority. As for Paul, then, to live was Christ and to die was gain, so also for the contemporary priest: he aspires to live, no longer him, but Christ in him, manifesting the love of God to Church and world. This is to find his soul/self in losing it.

Following the resolution of the central issue, chapter 5 presents what is for Balthasar a spirituality and style of life congruent with and even demanded by priestly office, namely one informed by the evangelical counsels. In poverty and simplicity of life, the priest represents the one who though rich became poor for us. In obedience, the priest imitates the obedience of the Son, and moreover enters into a perfect *disponibilite* relative to the demands of pastoral charity. In celibacy, the priest figures the fruitfulness of the Bridegroom of the Church. This spirituality is applied in chapter 6 under some of the usual headings of priestly identity-preacher, reconciler, etc. It is only here, I think, that Power registers a major reservation about Balthasar. While Power grants the appropriateness of the counsels to priestly life, he thinks Balthasar too closely identifies them with what is necessary for priestly life (155).

The book is to be commended for its fundamentality: Power does not proceed blithely to the question as to what a priestly spirituality might be today, but realizes that he must first show there is such a thing, or better, that he must first show, and against the view of someone like Schillebeeckx (26), that such a thing has a right to exist in the Church. He does this, or rather indicates how this is to be done, by outlining an argument for the dominical institution of the priesthood and for the legitimacy of priestly language to characterize both our Lord and the apostolic ministry. It is this, an historical foundation, that allows him to lay the ontological foundation of a priestly spirituality that he alludes to in his preface, which consists in the identifications reviewed above: of the mission and person of Christ, of the mission and priesthood of Christ, and of the continuing priestly presence and action of Christ in the action and presence of the ordained "official" priest.

In executing his project, Power's good use of *Pastores dabo vobis* will also be welcome to many readers.

Naturally, the book has some of the strengths and weakness of the theology on which it is based (i.e., Balthasar's). The main strength is nothing but the grounding of priestly identity in the theological synthesis of Trinity, Christ, and Church that Balthasar offers us, a strength that Power justly and often points to. But there are weaknesses, as well. For instance, there is the implication that priesthood is in itself a Trinitarian reality: if Christ's priesthood consists in the donation of himself to his Father, and if that donation simply manifests in the created order the eternal donation of the Son to the Father, then priesthood turns into an eternal and Trinitarian reality. The same thing happens when "thanksgiving" and "obedience" turn likewise into Trinitarian realities for Balthasar. At this point, we seem to lose the axiom established by St. Augustine that Christ is a priest in virtue of his humanity. It is not that Power, or Balthasar for that matter, denies this in so many words, but the question does anse.

There is also a weakness that, I think, is Power's alone. In chapter 4, he seems to reverse the traditional functions ascribed on the one hand to the *characterindelibilis*imparted by sacrament of order and on the other to the grace given by this sacrament. The grace of orders is personally sanctifying; it does not ensure the objectivity of the priest's sacramental acts, as Power seems to suggest (84). That is precisely the role of character, which indeed calls for, but does not constitute or even ensure, personal holiness.

The book is also marred by sloppy copy editing and imprecise citations (e.g., of Schillebeeckx [64] and Balthasar [95]).

The major difficulty of *SpiritualTheology,* however, is that it has two books inside it. The first is a monograph on the theology of the priesthood of Hans Urs von Balthasar. The second is a book on the priesthood in Power's own voice. It may be that some readers will think this package a bargain, but my impression is that neither project is fully realized. For a book on the spirituality of the priesthood, there is too much Balthasar. For a book on Balthasar, there is not enough orientation to the various texts Power adduces. It is best to take the book, then, as what Power thinks we should know about the foundations of priestly spirituality, where what he thinks is, as he informs us, largely what he has learned from Balthasar.

Notwithstanding the above criticism, Power's book is important and should be read just because both he and Balthasar are correct about these foundations, and because Power (no fool he) knows both how necessary they are if we are to have a structure that can stand up to the winds of post-Christian culture, and just how difficult they are to lay, given contemporary theological building codes. In view of the current "crisis" of priestly identity and spirituality, Power has a nice sense of the limitations of purely functional and "horizontal," not to say Congregationalist views of priestly ministry. The ramshackle theologies of priesthood built on such lines in the last thirty years give no real shelter to the priest-that is, they make no sense of his identity such that it seems worthwhile to sacrifice anything for it-in the post-Christian, postmodern, end-of-history

winds that are blowing. For any priest feeling left out in that cold, there is some shelter to take in this book.

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Prierias: The Life and Works of Silvestro da Prierio, 1456-1527. By MICHAEL TAVUZZI. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997. Pp 190. $39.95. ISBN 0-8223-1976-4 (cloth).

Michael Tavuzzi, O.P., has previously published studies on Italian Dominican theologians at the beginning of the sixteenth century which bring to light some forgotten contemporaries of Luther and Erasmus: "An unedited Oratio by Tommaso Rodini Tedeschi, OP (1488-1527)," *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 32 (1994): 43-63 (with edited text); "Valentino da Camerino, OP (1438-1515), Teacher and Critic of Cajetan," *Traditio* 49 (1994): 287-316; and "Gaspare di Baldassare da Perugia, OP (1465-1531)," *The Thomist* 60 (1996): 595-615. Tavuzzi has recently presented the work of Prierias from the particular perspective of the interest which Prierias showed in the *princeps Thomistarum:* "Capreolus in the works of Silvestro da Prierio, OP (1456-1527)," in *jean Capreolus en son temps, 1380-1444,* Memoire Dominicaine, special number 1 (Paris: Le Cerf, 1997), 229-58. Though this article was published prior to this latest work, it is not mentioned here.

This new work on Prierias fills a gap and will render a great service to researchers. The analyses are precise but are often put back into the context; the style is sober and concise to the point of being a bit dry; the texts are clearly presented and are largely cited in notes at the end of the volume.

The plan is strictly biographical, tracing the brilliant but laborious career of the Dominican theologian, a career much different from that of the extraordinarily gifted Cajetan (92). Tavuzzi divides the life of Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio into four chapters whose titles correspond to roles he filled: "Friar Preacher, 1456-1487"; "Regent Master, 1487-1502"; "Prior and Vicar General of the Reformed Lombard Congregation, 1503-1515"; "Master of the Sacred Palace, 1515-1527." After examining the contradictory historiography on the circumstances and date of his death, the author concludes: "Nothing is known of the manner of Silvestro's death in mid-1527. Taurisano *(Hierarchia ordinis praedicatorum,* 1916) suggested that Silvestro probably died during the Sack of Rome. This conjecture is extremely plausible, for it is only the chaotic conditions of Rome during that event which can explain why the death of the

Magister Magistrorum passed unnoticed and without leaving any precise record" (130).

A very useful list of Prierias's works published in Latin and Italian between 1496 and 1523 or 1524 is given in an appendix, along with indications of subsequent editions. This list permits the reader to determine the Dominican's best-sellers: *Aurea rosa,* an exposition on the gospel pericopes for all the Sundays of the year and saints' feasts, published in Bologna in 1503 with eighteen later editions, particularly at Bologna, Lyon, and Venice; and the celebrated *Summa summarum,* also known as the *Summa Silvestrina,* similarly published for the first time in Bologna in 1513 with twenty-eight subsequent editions during the sixteenth century, sixteen of which were published in Lyon. The diverse works against Luther also knew a certain success, but Tavuzzi refers us to the work of P. Fabisch and E. Iserloh, who have made an inventory of these editions *(Dokumente zur causa Lutheri (1517-1521)* [Munster, 1988]).

Those who are interested in Dominican history will find this book very useful, especially for its description, its particular perspective on the career of Prierias, and its discussion of the rivalries between the reformed friars and the conventuals. The book also throws light on the theological debates that opposed this theologian to Cajetan, especially with respect to the position the latter adopted on the doctrine of the immortality of the soul put forth by Pomponazzi. This debate is the object of the *Conflatum ex angelica doctore S. Thoma* (Perugia, 1519) from which Tavuzzi has chosen an illustration as the frontispiece of his own work. But it is the Prierias we encounter in the works on the Church in the sixteenth century whom I would like to present briefly here, the adversary of Reuchlin, Luther, and Erasmus.

We know precious little concerning the role Prierias played in the conclusion of the great debate that pitted the humanist Johann Reuchlin against the Jewish convert Pfefferkorn and his Dominican friends at Cologne. Reuchlin had opposed the systematic destruction of Jewish books such as the Talmud which contradicted Christianity. As Master of the Sacred Palace, Prierias had to intervene in the proceedings and was without doubt a member of the commission in Rome that had to render a final judgment. Passions ran so high in the "republic of letters" that it is difficult to discern what comes out of the propaganda, false rumors or solid facts. It is certain that Luther, in his own defense, reproaches Prierias for his unfavorable judgment of Reuchlin.. However, the Dominican theologian responds that his behavior in office has always been that of "a just and merciful man" (91).

Tavuzzi also discusses Prierias's immediate response to the Ninety-Five Theses of the Wittenberg Augustinian, a very sensitive subject because it has been much studied by Luther scholars. Beginning with the four small works Silvestro produced very quickly between 1518 and 1520, the investigation is well carried out. While it is true that he highlighted the ecclesiological dimension of what was relatively implicit in Luther's theses, it must also be said that he became fixated on this issue and condemned what were after all but theses proposed for debate (granted that they were written to be provocative). The provocation certainly hit its mark with the Master of the Sacred Palace.

Tavuzzi sums up his impression this way: "While it would be difficult to argue that [Silvestro's moves] can justify the accusation of theological incompetence in a narrowly technical, professional sense, there can be little doubt that, taken together, they did constitute a serious mishandling of the Luther affair at its very beginning" (112). Tavuzzi provides the ingenious hypothesis that Prierias's decision to denounce Luther's positions so vigorously arose out of his unpleasant experience with Savonarola. "Perhaps Silvestro believed that if his erstwhile confrere had been disciplined more promptly to begin with, his case might not have ended in the tragic way it did" (113).

In 1519, Erasmus is careful to make clear that he does not intend to pass judgment on Luther, for as he says: "nee accusator sum nee patronus nee judex" (Letter 1041). However, he does not agree with the *Dialogus* of Prierias, which he has read and knows well, essentially taking issue with the papalist ecclesiology found therein. Yet, as Tavuzzi clearly points out: "Erasmus stressed on several occasions that his criticisms of Silvestro concerned pragmatics and not Silvestro's theological acumen and erudition" (119).

It is in 1523, when Erasmus has turned against Luther, that he begins to draw closer to Prierias, who writes to the humanist in 1523. A new exchange of letters between the prince of humanists and the Master of the Sacred Palace took place as a result of the criticisms leveled against Erasmus's commentaries on the New Testament by the Spanish theologian Zuniga. Silvestro's letter is no longer extant, but we do possess Erasmus's response, which Tavuzzi dates from the end of January 1524 (120). In speaking to Beda concerning Prierias in June 1525, Erasmus describes him as having an "animus praefractum et intractabilem." I admit that I do not understand the following commentary by Tavuzzi: "Erasmus added a few more words in favor of Silvestro's character" (122), unless it is meant to be ironic. What is more, it is well known that Erasmus's judgments are very subjective and dependent upon what he believes the other person thinks of him. Thus, he would not be an infallible witness to the personality of the Dominican theologian.

It is impossible to broach a discussion in this review on the *Consilium super reformatione ecclesiae,* dated 1522, which historians of the Catholic Reformation consider to be a foundational text for the growing consciousness of the need for a profound reform within the Church. Tavuzzi advances arguments making it "reasonable" to attribute this work to Silvestro and most certainly not to Cajetan as was previously thought (115-19).

Despite some minor errors (for example, at several points "Shinner" in place of "Schiner," and "Obermann" for "Oberman"), this work is on the whole very well presented. In treating the personality of Prierias with clarity and precision, the book is useful for all those who are interested in this decisive period in the history of Christianity. (Translated by John Langlois, 0.P.)

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The Return of Splendor in the World: The Christian Doctrine of Sin and Forgiveness. By CHRISTOF GESTRICH. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997. Pp. xxiv + 344. $40.00 (paper). ISBN 0-8028-4164-3.

At a time when sin is little discussed either among the general public or even within ecclesial and theological circles, Professor Christof Gestrich of Humboldt University in Berlin has set himself the task to write a major study on the topic. He stresses that it is this very absence of discussion and knowledge of sin that closes us off from "the meaning and hope for our future" (xiii). "Invariably the knowledge of sin is no longer pursued by anyone, by any group that could act as a representative of society as a whole: it is this lack of knowledge that seals our doom. This is the main reason I am writing this book" (170).

What is important to grasp already at this juncture is that, for Gestrich, only a proper and comprehensive understanding of sin, in all of its sociological, psychological, philosophical, and theological dimensions, can provide humankind with hope. Unless and until humankind regains a right understanding of sin, there is little, if any, hope for God's response to sin in Jesus Christ to achieve its goal-that is, the return of splendor. Gestrich sees his book then not as a gloomy study narrating humankind's desperate plight in the face of sin, but rather as an attempt to uncover the means whereby, in recognizing the truth of sin, humankind is able to appropriate the salvation offered in Jesus Christ. Here, I believe, Gestrich is absolutely correct. The splendor of the cross and the glory of the resurrection are only thoroughly manifested against the somber backdrop of sin.

According to Gestrich, contemporary men and women tend to think that the evil they are suffering comes from "outside themselves," instead of discovering that their suffering is due to "their own 'sin'" (36). Thus "forgiveness of sins seems to have become an embarrassment for theology and a vague experience among Christians, who desire it in declining numbers" (36-37). But how did such a situation develop? Gestrich is convinced that present-day theology, in its understanding of sin, is "paralyzed" by the Enlightenment's religious agenda (11). Modern theological hamartiologies consider sin only in relationship to "the human pursuit of freedom and identity," and as such are modeled after various eighteenth-century philosophies (75). To confirm this point, as well as to bring new clarity to the truly biblical concept of sin, Gestrich devotes a substantial portion of his book to examining the notion of the Fall and sin within the writings of such men as Herder, Rousseau, Fichte, Holderlin, Schiller, Freud, and especially Kant. While this makes, at times, for some rather dry and heavy reading, Gestrich is quite insightful in his commentary. However, it is his conclusion that is significant. He judges that Kant and Schiller (though similar judgments could be made of many of the above named),

> understood the conquest of evil as a task exclusively for man himself.
> They ignored the key religious event of evil and sin: human separation

from God. They also read the stories in Genesis 2-3 not as explanations
of the relationship between man and God but as coded statements
about man becoming mature that must be judged from a purely
anthropological perspective. Thus they also fail to appreciate God's
essential part in overcoming evil and its consequences. (127-28)

How then does Gestrich himself define sin? His answer to this question,
with its psychological, philosophical, and theological implications, is where he
is most perceptive and creative. Human beings, from the dawn of their exis-
tence, have desperately sought their own justification: to be affirmed and sanc-
tioned in their worthiness to exist. "Man's hunger for his own justification is
that primeval place in human existence where sin first cast its shadow on all
that is human" (173). In order to obtain such justification and approval human
beings demand it of others, and so use and abuse others, including God.
Whenever one demands that others validate the justification of one's existence
and endorse one's present worthiness of affirmation, one "is looking for some-
thing from them that human beings, animals, plants, and things cannot
reasonably do, nor want to do" (176). One has made oneself an idol. Only God
is justified in his own existence. Only God is worthy to be affirmed in his own
righteousness. For Gestrich, only God can then affirm the worthiness of each
individual to exist and bestow righteousness upon each individual. These are
all free gifts that come forth from a loving God. This he did in the act of
creation itself and has done so again through redemption in Christ. However,
sin is precisely that attitude and act which seeks justification and righteousness
within oneself and demands that others, including God, recognize and confirm
the truth of such self-righteousness. "I have elevated myself to inhuman
proportions; indeed I have made myself into an idol to the extent that I strive
to procure my own justification through trickery, cunning, or power" (176).
In so doing sin is primarily against God, and thus the primary consequence of
sin is separation from God.

Gestrich's analysis of the nature of sin should be welcomed both because of
its biblical basis and, because of this, for once more locating sin where it
properly belongs: in the context of humankind's relationship to God. In a sense
God, not man, is at the heart of sin for sin strikes at the very heart of who God
is, that is, simply ... God. Equally, Gestrich clearly perceives how we as
individuals, in our frantic pursuit of self-justification, not only bring evil and
suffering upon others, but also destroy ourselves in the process. Likewise, as
seen from the above, Gestrich believes that sin, as humankind's unbridled self-
centeredness, is the cause of present-day consumerism with its devastating
ecological consequences. The whole of creation, minerals, plants, and animals
alike, are despoiled and abused to advance our self-aggrandizement.

Original sin, for Gestrich, cannot then, as some modern theologians have
proposed, be reduced to "biological evolution" or to the "sinful situation" into
which all are born (231). It is not just our sociological environment that is
sinful. Sin reaches to the very depths of the individual person. Yet, Gestrich
does not wish to portray original sin as merely the past act of a long-deceased

ancestor, which in turn has some contemporary ramifications. Rather, original sin replicates itself in every actual sin. What Gestrich says is true and important, but here I believe he does not see clearly that the reason each sin imitates the original sin is that every human person is born with an inner propensity (concupiscence) for self-justification. Because of Adam and Eve's sin, we are now born without a proper relationship to God, and thus we are born with a mind and heart that are already (de)formed and predisposed to do what they did.

Gestrich argues that "sin is the kind of wrongdoing against our fellow men and fellow creatures and also against God that we can never make up for. Sin can only be atoned for and forgiven, but cannot be cleared up by compensatory works" (216). God, in his love, has sent his Son into the world in order to make vicarious and substitutionary atonement for our sins. Gestrich maintains that substitutionary action is inherent within human relations. Everyone is burdened and sometimes overwhelmed by his or her responsibilities, problems, and concerns. Others must relieve such a person from his or her burdens. Such a person "needs members of the same species who treat him so kindly that they temporally free him from his basic social commitments. The person who lets man have time for his specifically human needs is the one who takes ethical substitutionary action" (299).

Following Bonhoeffer, Gestrich then argues that Jesus performed such a substitutionary action on behalf of the whole of humanity. He did what we could not do. He took upon himself our sinfulness and offered his life to the Father in atonement for our sins, thus freeing us from a burden that we could not carry or overcome. We appropriate the forgiveness that Jesus obtained for us through faith and the sacraments, especially baptism and the Eucharist, for in these we no longer seek self-justification, but obtain it freely from God. Thus God restores to us our splendor.

However, this free gift of God should not be interpreted as "cheap grace." Rather, Gestrich rightly insists that the Christian life places responsibilities upon the Christian, and the Church, as it does not in its present often lax attitude, should insist upon these. For Gestrich, the chief among these mandates is a full participation in the life of Christian community.

Despite its strengths, it is this latter portion of Gestrich's book, where he treats of the salvation offered to us in Christ and so the return of our splendor, that is somewhat disappointing. It is not that I would radically disagree with much of what he says. For the most part I am very sympathetic with the basic outlines of his soteriology. The difficulty is that, after treating the nature of sin in such depth and clarity, he does not follow through with a like treatment of salvation. He does acknowledge at the onset of his study that "at the end of my book I could only allude to why the reality of forgiveness is closely connected to the reality of substitutionary action" (xxii). This is to be pitied, since without a fuller understanding of salvation, we are left with a somewhat unfinished story. I would only hope that Gestrich would follow up this book with a fuller soteriological study, and that, if he does so, he would root it more biblically.

Absent within this present offering is a clear and developed understanding of the biblical notion of sacrifice, as well as the specific role of the Holy Spirit within the work of redemption.

Nonetheless, Gestrich has written a good book and one that deserves a wide reading. He has treated a sensitive and important topic, and he has done so with philosophical and theological precision. Moreover, one cannot help but perceive from reading this book that Gestrich is a theologian of faith. He possesses an authentic concern for the pastoral needs of the Church and a deep desire that God's splendor would return to a world that has been contaminated by sin.

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The Resurrection. Edited by STEPHEN DAVIS, DANIEL KENDALL, S.J., and GERALD O'COLLINS, S.J. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. 367. $35.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-19-815091-1.

Beginning on April 7 (Easter Sunday), 1996, a five-day "Resurrection Summit" organized by the editors of this volume was held at St. Joseph's Seminary, Yonkers, New York. Designed (perhaps dubiously) to attract media attention as a kind of orthodox counterpart to the peripatetic Jesus Seminar, the program nonetheless provided serious presentations by a number of reputable theologians, exegetes, and philosophers of religion. Each of the major papers was followed by a response which initiated more general discussion. Twelve major papers (the preface [p. x] incorrectly speaks of thirteen) and three responses have been incorporated into this volume, which may best be classified as the proceedings of a conference; other responses were excluded due to constraints of space. The papers are rather disparate, for the conference apparently did not envisage comprehensive coverage of issues relating to Jesus' resurrection. As is usual with publications of this genre, the value of the individual contributions varies widely; the three published responses are of uniformly high quality, each superior to the paper to which it is appended.

Prefatory material composed by the three editors provides an account of the summit's planning and procedures, a summary of the papers contained in this volume, and capsule biographies of the summit's participants (including some who did not contribute to this book). A judicious account of the summit's papers and discussions by John Wilkens, editor of the London *Tablet,* is followed by Gerald O'Collins's "The Resurrection: The State of the Questions," which appears to have functioned as a keynote address. Far from

providing the thorough overview its title promises, this paper offers brief remarks in an apologetic tone on the meaning of resurrection language, the appearances, the empty tomb, and the foundations of Easter faith; particular attention is devoted to criticizing the tendency of John Hick and Sallie McFague to reduce the resurrection to the emergence of faith on the part of the early disciples. A concluding section proposes several historical, theoretical, practical, and liturgical questions related to the resurrection as an agenda for future exploration. Archbishop Peter Carnley's response finds O'Collins imprecise in his critique of Hick and inclined to assume what needs to be proved; placing less emphasis on historical knowledge, Carnley advocates greater appeal to the present experience of the Spirit as foundational for faith in Christ's resurrection.

The papers that follow address diverse aspects of the theology of the resurrection from a variety of perspectives. In her well-crafted plea against reduction of the resurrection to more privatized considerations, Janet Martin Soskice links faith in the resurrection to hope for the New Jerusalem. Carey Newman, the author of *Paul's Glory-Christology* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), argues that the resurrection triggered a close association of Jesus with God's glory; in substance, this identification amounted to a profession of his equality with God. The resurrection thus necessitated a redefinition of monotheism and led ineluctably to a rapid rupture between Jews and Christians. Allen Segal, for his part, offers an informative discussion of beliefs concerning life after death in the Hebrew Bible and such later Jewish sources as Josephus, the Mishnah, and the Talmud.

Turning to the resurrection appearances, Stephen Davis distinguishes between normal vision (as in everyday seeing), subjective vision (equivalent to a hallucination), and objective vision (seeing what is really there but visible only to one specially enabled by God to do so). Davis argues at length that the appearances narrated in the Gospels-all conceived (unlike reports of Jesus' predictions of passion and resurrection) as substantially accurate historical reporting-were instances of normal vision, such that they could have been captured in a photograph. William Alston, a distinguished analytic philosopher of religion, provides a detailed critical analysis of Reginald Fuller's *The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives* (New York: Macmillan, 1971). In response, Sarah Coakley draws judiciously on Alston's earlier writings to raise important hermeneutical questions and suggest concerns similar to those of Janet Soskice. Another eminent philosopher of religion, Richard Swinburne, analyzes the evidence regarding the resurrection. After weighing the evidence needed to affirm the occurrence of miracles, he concludes that, while the historical evidence taken in isolation is insufficiently probative for such an unusual event, reflection on the existence and character of God provides a background theory making the modest historical evidence "quite strong enough … to make it considerably more probable than not that Jesus Christ rose from the dead on the first Easter Day" (207). An unusual appendix to this chapter appeals to the early Christian adoption of Sunday worship as a further

argument in favor of the resurrection and as a basis for positing specific instructions on this subject from the risen Lord.

In the most stimulating paper of the collection, Francis Schussler Fiorenza expresses with greater clarity, and develops further, an approach to the theology of the resurrection originally adumbrated in his *Foundational Theology:Jesus and the Church* (New York: Crossroad, 1984). After succinctly summarizing the current state of the question and critiquing the prevailing options for their tendencies toward foundationalism, he advocates an approach that emphasizes the importance of testimony. Fiorenza analyzes the various genres in which New Testament witness to the resurrection is to be found. Arguing that the ground of faith must not be confused with the historical genesis of faith and that the meaning of biblical texts is impoverished when they are adduced solely as sources to be quarried for purposes of historical reconstruction, he concludes that the New Testament testimonies as such, when received in conjunction with the appropriate background theories and with due attention to subsequent Christian praxis as a warrant for their authenticity, provide in their disclosive power the basis for Christian faith. Perusal of this thought-provoking though at times obscure study will repay even readers favorable to the alternatives that Fiorenza criticizes and rejects.

The remaining papers are, on the whole, of less significance. William Craig provides a needed, though sometimes overstated, critique of John Dominic Crossan's denial of the resurrection; Paul Eddy's response reaches a similar conclusion after a more incisive analysis of Crossan's work. A meandering and repetitious essay by Alan Padgett criticizes modern historical research on Jesus for abstracting from faith, but fails to succeed in making his own position clear. Marguerite Shuster examines the preaching of the resurrection in Augustine, Luther, Karl Barth, and Helmut Thielicke. Lastly, Brian Johnstone, in dialogue with Emanuel Levinas and John Milbank, probes the possible implications that orientation on the resurrection could have for Christian consideration of central ethical questions. While perceptive and very informative on the state of moral theology, this chapter seems somewhat out of place in the present volume. The book concludes with an index of names.

A collection of this sort is difficult to assess as a unit, since its chief value lies in the individual contributions, each of which can and will be read by itself. The major gaps in the study of the pertinent New Testament texts (by competent exegetes) and the lack of detailed consideration of the thought of major modern theologians (Hans Urs von Balthasar, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Karl Rabner, Edward Schillebeeckx) make the work unsuitable as a general introduction to its chosen topic. The important discussion of the resurrection in recent German Catholic theological literature (Georg Essen, Hans Kessler, Hansjiirgen Verweyen) is mentioned only tangentially and, to judge from the argumentation, is familiar to only a small minority of the contributors. Even apart from these deficiencies, it may be wondered if it is wise to engage the Jesus Seminar on its own chosen turf, the superficiality of which is in principle inimical to serious discussion of the Christian faith.

Nonetheless, some contributions are of genuine value. Direct critique of Crossan's publications (Craig, Epps) is of unquestionable pastoral importance. The attention drawn (in different ways) to the relevance of background theories (Swinburne, Fiorenza) and of Christian experience and praxis (Carnley, Fiorenza) for faith in the resurrection is of lasting value, for the resurrection cannot be appropriately treated in isolation. So too is the insistence of Soskice and Coakley that faith in the resurrection not be reduced to a minimalistic, reified content. In this regard, the sage observations of the outside observer at the symposium, John Wilkens, provide more food for thought than several of the lengthier presentations.

Some smaller points and printing errors should also be noted. Like many contributions that strongly accent the resurrection, Newman's essay in places sounds adoptionist (80, 82; but see by way of contrast 88). A "not" is missing on page 102 (line 11). The German exegete Oberlinner is named both Lorenz (correctly) and Ludwig on the same page (219). On page 236 (line 6 from below), read "to" for "of." There are five errors in the untranslated German citation of Georg Essen's important critique of an earlier version of Fiorenza's proposal (244). On page 262 (line 18), read "copying" for "coping." On page 312 (line 19), read "avers" for "averts."

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Dominican Gallery: Portrait of a Culture. By AIDAN NICHOLS, O.P. Leominster, Herefordshire, U.K.: Gracewing/Fowler Wright Books, 1997. Pp. 443. £ 30. ISBN 0-85244-3935.

This weighty work is both a delightful surprise (a biographical study of seven English Dominicans active in the period 1930-65) and a major contribution to fundamental theology. The seven figures portrayed are Victor . White, Gerald Vann, Thomas Gilby, Sebastian Bullough, Gervase Mathew, Kenelm Foster, and Conrad Pepler. Photographs of all seven are included, preceded by one of Fr. Bede Jarrett-included because one of the author's theses is that these seven friars were all recruited during Jarrett's long provincialate and/or inspired by his particular vision of English Dominican life. That vision may be described as a sort of historically informed Thomism building bridges to contemporary art and culture, and present in the ancient universities. It is this concern to touch and to transform contemporary culture that makes this book much more than a family album; it is a work of readable, attractive fundamental theology.

There are seven chapters devoted to the seven friars. Each of these chapters begins with a short biography (too short for my taste) of one of these rather original characters, followed by a systematic summary or digest of his main books and articles. The thought of each man, already dense, is made even more so by this process of condensation. This inconvenience is justified, I think, by the useful service the digest renders to the reader, who is free to explore further once the seven doors have been opened. These seven chapters are framed by three others and two appendices. The first framing chapter sketches the English Dominican background in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, its houses, its program of formation, and its quarrels over observance, apostolates, and the relation to the English universities. The second, more original, framing chapter treats the English Catholic setting of this Dominican activity. Here we learn of the London "salon" of Charles Bums, doctor and psychologist, in St. Leonard's Terrace, Chelsea. Here the reigning intellect was the cultural historian Christopher Dawson. Here too met the poet David Jones, the philosopher E. l. Watkin, H. Grisewood of the BBC, and the priests M. D'Arcy, S.J., and Ronald Knox. Among the novelists J. R.R. Tolkien, Graham Greene, and Evelyn Waugh were the best known. Cardinal Hinsley exercised a positive influence, as did T. S. Eliot from outside the Church. The final chapter consists of a brief epilogue in which the author finds the common element in the seven men he examines to consist in "a rational and spiritual intelligence which has come successfully to grips with *the concrete*" through the search for specifically English metaphors and examples. The first appendix treats of the English Dominicans from 1221 to 1850. The second reproduces and comments on two letters of David Jones to Fr. Gilby which, in their difficult language, summarize the message of the entire book.

The seven friars included a Jungian, a calligrapher and printer, a biblical scholar, a Byzantinist, a logician, and a Dante scholar. They were all intensely English, with the result that they are not so well known on the Continent. It might be well therefore to list them again, with their years of birth and death, their academic level (they were often gifted amateurs) and specialization, analogy with a better-known French Dominican or two, and the number of pages the book devotes to them. (1) Victor White (1909-60; 70 pp.; Louvain lectorate), the only full-time systematic theologian in the group. For his efforts at the renewal of Thomism he could be compared to Chenu (but he was more introverted and depressive than Chenu, interested in a dialogue with Jung, not Marx), and for his pioneer ecumenism, with Congar. (2) Gerald Vann (1906-63; 60 pp.; Angelicum lectorate), comparable to the early Louis Bouyer for his work in a secondary school, to Bernadot, Carre, Bouchet, or Bro for his efforts in spirituality. (3) Thomas Gilby (1902-75; 43 pp.; Louvain doctorate), moralist, logician, estheticist, comparable to the Chenu of the *Summa* of the *Revue des Jeunes,* and to Pie and Pohier for the dialogue with Freud. (4) Sebastian Bullough (1910-67; 45 pp.; Cambridge M.A.), somewhat comparable to Benoit as a biblical scholar. (5) Gervase Mathew (1905-76; 36 pp.; Oxford M.A.), lecturer at Oxford University in Byzantine Studies, patrologist and

historian, with elements of Festugiere, de Menasce, and Fiey. (6) Kenelm Foster (1910-86; 38 pp.; Cambridge doctorate), reader in Italian studies. (7) Conrad Pepler (1908-93; 60 pp.; Angelicum lectorate), comparable to Roguet or Gy for liturgy, to Lebret for social thought, to Garrigou-Lagrange in his concern for mysticism and spiritual theology.

Common traits would be an esthetic Thomism; a desire for integration, to offer people a total vision of life (often aided by Jung); and the search for a sane social order in view of the Second World War. Common lacuGae would be an avoidance of Hegel and Johannes Weiss. Thus while they were culturally very rich, there is something rather static and socially conservative about their thought. Their theology was concentrated on the kerygma and the sacraments, not on a future eschatology for this world.

Nichols minimizes certain things: the remoter influence of John Ruskin and William Morris; the harm done to biblical studies by antimodernism (especially from 1907 to 1912), which explains the biblical thinness among the seven; the negative effect of *Humani Generis* (1950) on Victor White's explorations. He does allow the dark shadow of the provincial Hilary Carpenter to be glimpsed. Carpenter blocked White's promotion to regent, closed Blackfriars Press, and almost closed the review of the same name.

Due to the complex, rich subject and perhaps to haste, this ambitious project is marred by many misprints and some minor errors of detail. For example, Denifle was an Austrian, not a German; Van Ackeren was an American, not a Dutchman; the etymology of education (66); the Anglicans at Kelham were not monks; Pourrat was a Sulpician, not a Jesuit. The author misses the role of Fr. Pepler at Wittgenstein's deathbed, now fully told in Ray Monk's biography of the philosopher. The blemishes are understandable given the sweep and range of this wonderful book, for which we can only feel grateful.

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