Tbe Tbomist 64 (2000): 161-210

CHRISTIANITY, "INTER CULTURALITY," AND SALVATION: SOME PERSPECTIVES FROM LONERGAN

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The 1998 Synod of Asian Bishops in Rome helped to focus attention in a very concrete way upon theological issues surrounding notions such as "evangelization" and "inculturation," and the interplay between the mission of the Holy Spirit, preparing all humankind in the diversity of cultures and religions to receive the incarnate Word, and the mission of that Word himself, Christ Jesus. One of the participants at the Synod, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, was certainly no stranger ...:0 the complexity of the theological issues being raised. In 1993 he had turned his attention to the issue of Christianity and inculturation in a lecture delivered in Hong Kong entitled "Christ, Faith, and the Challenge of Cultures."[1] Some years earlier he had offered theological reflections on questions concerning "anonymous Christianity" and allied theological issues in a paper that included a discussion of Rahner's approach to these matters.[2]

In his 1993 lecture the cardinal attempts an analysis of the dynamics of evangelization and inculturation that involves a critique of a Western relativist evaluation of what such a process can and should entail. He points out that such relativism was voiced against the Christian claim to uniqueness early in the

[1] Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, "Christ, Faith, and the Challenge of Cultures," *Origins* 24 (March 1995): 679-86.

[2] Joseph Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 161-70.

Church's history by such Roman writers as Symmachus, and remains substantially the same objection today. Against such relativism he argues, firstly, that any human culture if authentic must be open to the discovery of truth-truth that may challenge and revise some of its deep-seated assumptions. Secondly, philosophical relativism is in fact alien to most cultures and religious world-views. And, thirdly, Christianity can be seen to transform and redeem other religious-cultural world-views in the way it preaches a God now brought dose, in the Incarnation-a God, or "Divinity," often implicitly recognized in these world-views as somehow "distant."

A further point Ratzinger makes, and one that I wish to highlight for discussion in this article, is that the Church, the People of God, is itself a "cultural subject." Insofar as there is an intersubjective communion of heart and mind in the body of Christ this must be so. We cannot isolate the incarnate Word from the Jewish world-view and culture which he enters into, transforms, renews, "assumes," and, in doing so, confirms. This culture of the Old Covenant is itself, as Ratzinger points out, a result of what Gadamer might term a "fusion of horizons" with other cultural elements of its neighbors, taking place over centuries. However, such an evolved cultural form receives something of a definitive confirmation from the perspective of Christian faith once and insofar as it is taken into the life and mind of Christ. This process of cultural fusion then enters a new phase, but continues in the history of the Church, in which this Jewish world-view, confirmed and renewed in Christ, encounters and transforms the cultural forces it encounters in the process of evangelization. In this way Christianity, unlike some religions but akin to, for example, Buddhism, creates a universal Christian culture while also allowing (indeed, fostering) what in sociological terms one might call "subcultures"-that is, the varied local cultural forms of Christian societies, nations, cultures. This phenomenon Ratzinger terms "interculturality." [3]

In some ways this analysis appears to move against the current evident in much of the theological reflection on evangelization

[3] Ratzinger, "Christ, Faith and the Challenge of Cultures," 681-83.

and inculturation this century. Pope Pius XI remarked to Fr. M. D. Roland-Gosselin that the object of the Church is not to "civilize" but to evangelize,[4] and since the encyclical *Summi Pontificatus* (1939) the magisterium has often repeated the need to differentiate the two processes. This process of making an increasingly sharp theological distinction between evangelization and inculturation went forward under the impetus of historical developments. A period in which evangelization had gone hand in hand with European colonization and imperial expansion was passing away, and a new appreciation of Catholicism as a world Church was emerging.

In line with such developments Bernard Lonergan insisted that we were moving away from a period of "classical culture" in which Christianity was seen as linked to a view which distinguished bet:ween, on the one hand, a normative classical culture of meanings and values and, on the other, human groupings that were not cultured but barbarian. In the final section of his work *Method in Theology,* entitled "Communications," Lonergan treats of evangelization, the culmination of the Christian message:

> Now a classicist would feel it was perfectly legitimate for him to impose his culture on others. For he conceives culture normatively, and he conceives his own to be the norm. Accordingly for him to preach both the gospel and his own culture, is for him to confer the double benefit of both the true religion and the true culture. In contrast, the pluralist acknowledges a multiplicity of cultural traditions .... Rather he would proceed from within their culture and he would seek ways and means for making it into a vehicle for communicating the Christian message.[5]

Is Ratzinger then proposing a return to what Lonergan would term a classicist model of evangelization? Does his analysis of the People of God as a cultural subject, such that one can indeed speak of a "Christian culture," pit an ideology of normative culture against the pluralist view Lonergan outlines?

[4] Quoted in Walter Abbott, ed., *The Documents of Vatican II* (London: Chapman, 1967), 264 n. 192.

[5] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darron, Longman and Todd, 1972), 363.

One of my aims in this article is to attempt to provide an answer to this question. However, in attempting to answer the question further issues arise regarding the of Lonergan's work for such notions as cultural normativity, Christianity, and inculturation. I wiH also, therefore, examine some of those implications. Finally, I shall extend the discussion to further matters that arise in a consideration of Christianity and mission: the claims to uniqueness on the part of Christianity and the theological cogency and desirability of theories of "anonymous Christianity."

L FROM CLASSICAL CULTURE TO HISTORICAL MINDEDNESS

One phrase of Lonergan's perhaps more than any other appears to have imprinted itself upon the minds of late-twentieth-century theologians in the English-speaking world: the shift from classical culture to historical mindedness. For some it has become part of an arsenal to be deployed against anything which is deemed to be "pre-conciliar," myopic, traditionalist; a slogan with which to hail a "world come of age." For others, who react against the former view, it can appear as yet another modernist mantra which surely fails to do justice to the complexity and diversity of the Catholic ecclesiastical tradition. [6] When one takes into consideration postmodern critiques of the "modern" (appreciating that ecdesiastical modernism was and is but a subspecies of the same), one may wonder whether this

[6] See, for example, Charles Curran's use of the terms in C. Curran and R. Hunt, *Dissent in and for the Church: Theologians and Humanae Vitae* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 155-69. In response, Janet E. Smith objects, quite rightly I believe, both to the imprecision to which Curran's use of the terms "Classicism" and "historical mindedness" leads, and to the way it is a caricature of even Platonic moral theory Ganet E. Smith, *Humanae Vitae: A Generation Later* [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991], 180 and 397). Curran's lack of real understanding of the implications of Lonergan's position is manifested in, among other things, his repeated drawing of a distinction between "classicist" thinking as deductive and modern thinking as inductive. for Lonergan, the discussions of both deduction and induction of the "modem" period fail to make the transposition from "logic to method" (see Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* [New York: Philosophical Library, 1957], 288 and 301). On Lonergan and ethics in general see Andrew Beards, "Moral Conversion and Problems in Proportionalism," *Gregorianum* 78 (1997): 329-57.

Lonerganian phrase is not a celebration of the "modem" which has now had its day.

My first task in this section is, therefore, to clarify somewhat what Lonergan means by this expression. Its open-textured character, including as it does sketches of viewpoints that are actually opposed, make it ill suited to be transformed into a slogan. One should bear in mind Lonergan's own insistence that ideal-types, or models for facilitating historical explanation, should not be imposed on the data in such a way as to become, in H. Marrou's words, "great anti-comprehension machines."[7] One of the principal means I will use to clarify Lonergan's meaning is to raise and examine the question: is Aquinas a classicist for Lonergan?

A) Continuity and Diversity in Cultural Change

Lonergan credited the transition in his thinking from a normative, classical notion of culture to an empirical notion of cultural diversity to the reading of Christopher Dawson's *The Age of the Gods* in the late 1930s, and F. E. Crowe notes the appearance of remarks on the limitations of "Classicism" in Lonergan's writing as early as 1949.[8] In works of the late 1950s and early 1960s such criticisms of classicism increase.[9] Something of the open-textured nature of the term can be seen from these early uses: in the 1959 lectures on education we read that classicism "in its best sense" is to be seen in the Greek discovery of mind, the Greek achievement of theory. This always remains a cultural achievement, despite its limitations, an instance of true progress in Lonergan's view.[10] In the 1962 paper "Time and

[7] Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 226-29.

[8] Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," in *A Second Collection* (Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 264; F. E. Crowe, in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan,* vol 6, *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964* (Univ. of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1996), 154-55, n. 25.

[9] See F. E. Crowe, ed., *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan,* vol. 10, *Topics in Education* (Univ. of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1993), 74-78; and "Time and Meaning," (a 1962 paper), and "The Analogy of Meaning," (a 1963 paper), in Crowe, ed., *Collected Works 6,* 94-121, and 183-212.

[10] Crowe, ed., *Collected Works 10,* 75.

Meaning" we find another attribute of the classicist highlighted, an attribute not so evident in Lonergan's later sketches: he is one who speaks in respectful and deferential tones of the "greats" of the Western intellectual tradition-Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Newton, etc.-but has little if any appreciation of what it actually means to think systematically and creatively as did these cultural giants; the classicist has little real appreciation of what Lonergan calls the theoretical differentiation of consciousness.[11] In a way this echoes a constant theme in Lonergan's work: the authentic human act of understanding has no substitute in a mere parroting of formulae or theory little understood. A tension may be noted here: "classicism" denotes the theoretical differentiation of consciousness, the capacity that emerges in culture for systematic, theoretical reflection, but it is also used to denote cultural deference to such an achievement on the part of those who do not properly participate in it.

The 1968 paper "Belief: Today's Issue," provides a fairly lengthy treatment of the contrast between classical and modem culture, highlighting the limitations of both. Of the limitations of classicism we read:

> Classicist culture was stable. It took its stand on what ought to be, and what ought to be is not refuted by what is. It legislated with an eye to the substance of things, on the unchanging essence of human living and, while it never doubted either that circumstances alter cases or that circumstances change, still it was also quite sure that essences did not change, that change affected the accidental details that were of no great account.[12]

Classicist culture was also essentially "ethnocentric": it contrasted itself not with alternative cultures but with human groups which had simply to be designated "barbarian." "By conceiving itself normatively, [it] also had to think of itself as the one and only culture for all time. But modern culture is culture on the move. It is historicist."[13]

There are other examples of the indefiniteness of Lonergan's historical ideal-type of classicism. For instance, he characterizes

[11] Crowe, ed., *Collected Works* 6, 121.

[12] Lonergan, *Second Collection*, 92-93.

[13] Ibid., 93.

as "classicist" both the metaphysical theorist, who tends to abstract from the particularity of human history and individuals, and the "person for whom the rhetorician or orator of Isocrates or Cicero represents the fine flower of human culture." [14] Yet while one may be both an admirer of theoretical metaphysics and of Cicero, it is dear from a study of such periods of Western cultural history as that of Renaissance humanism that admiration for the latter can entail opposition to the former. Furthermore, Lonergan says that "a classicist would maintain that one should never depart from an accepted terminology," [15] and would therefore be opposed to authentic development of dogma (i.e., development in accord with Vincent of Lerins and Vatican I). But then he demonstrates very ably in his own work on doctrinal history [16] that new terminology was accepted to express further insight into doctrine both in the patristic period, the theology of which is affected by a "tincture" of theory, and in the medieval period, whose theology exhibits a full theoretical and systematic exploration. In other words these periods, characterized in some way as classical by Lonergan, did and could accept new theological terminology, something to which the classicist is, according to the above quotation, opposed.

Finally, it is important to observe that Lonergan on occasions also identifies philosophical and theological deductivism and the quest for certainty as a characteristic of classicism.

> In the second place, the classicist judged modern science in the light of the Aristotelian notion of science and by that standard found it wanting, for modern science does not proceed from self-evident, necessary principles and it does not demonstrate conclusions from such principles. [17]

This more than anything else should make us wary of thinking that Lonergan has given us anything like an "explanatory definition" with the term "classicism." Throughout his career it

[14] Bernard Lonergan, *Philosophy of God and Theology* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973), ix.

[15] Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 123-24.

[16] See, for example, Bernard Lonergan, *The Way to Nicea* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1976).

[17] Lonergan, *Second Collection,* 112.

was such theological deductivism, arising from the fourteenth-century nominalist use of Aristotle, that he strove to contrast with the authentic thought and methodology of St. Thomas Aquinas.

If my indications here of a certain "untidiness" to Lonergan's notion of classicism may appear somewhat disingenuous I would simply reiterate the point that what we have in this notion is not an explanatory concept but something like a Wittgensteinian nominal definition through "family resemblance." Lonergan makes more or less this point himself when he writes:

> But I would like to say that the contrast I have drawn between classicist and modern is not based on some a priori typology or periodization. It is a summary of a whole set of conclusions concerning the defects of our theological inheritance and the remedies that can be brought to bear.

More importantly, he continues,

> If we are not just to throw out what is good in classicism and replace it with contemporary trash, then we need to take the trouble, and it is enormous, to grasp the strength and the weakness, the power and the limitations, the good points and the shortcomings of both classicism and modernity.[18]

If we now address the question "is Aquinas a classicist?" we will gain a better understanding of what Lonergan considers are the strengths of the past that we need to import into the present.

B) Is Aquinas a Classicist?

In *Method in Theology* and elsewhere Lonergan sketches an account of the evolutionary development of the history of meaning in Western culture in terms of three stages or plateaus of achievement.[19] In the first stage we witness ordinary or common-sense meaning (the plateau of "undifferentiated consciousness"). The second stage, growing out of the first, is signaled by the Greek discovery of mind; it is the period of theoretical consciousness, and in terms of Christianity Lonergan sees evidence of

[18] Ibid., 98.

[19] Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 85-99; see also Bernard Lonergan, *A Third Collection* (London: Chapman, 1985), 179-82.

a "tincture" of such theory in the Christological debates of the first millennium, while a full engagement with theory is evident in the Scholastic period. The third stage grows out of the second. It is marked by the growing autonomy of the sciences, both physical and, later, human, from philosophy and the various philosophical responses to these developments, ranging from the "turn to the subject" in Descartes, Kant, and Idealism to the repudiation of such a move in positivism or linguistic analysis. While this is a general sketch of the ongoing differentiations of consciousness in the West, the models available for the cultural interpreter of the process increase as one approximates to concrete examples of historical processes, since one may also take into account some thirty-six possible combinations of these conscious differentiations. [20]

It is clear from this general historical scheme both that the second stage or plateau is, for Lonergan, the stage of classicism and that it is the stage in which, historically, Aquinas is to be located. It would appear to follow, therefore, that Aquinas is a classicist. However, it is clear that Lonergan is reluctant to apply the term to St. Thomas. Rather, it is through a retrieval of Aquinas's thought that one overcomes the limitations of classicism. This is a constant theme throughout Lonergan's work, exemplified by the motto he took for his endeavors from Pope Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patris:* "novae vetere ex augere et perficere." From the beginning of his published work Lonergan's hermeneutic of suspicion is directed against Scotist naive realism in epistemology and its deductivist companion in theology. This conceptualism had entered through Suarezianism into the Jesuit intellectual tradition into which Lonergan was initiated in his youth. It was a breaking free from this background, being enabled to think through the challenges of historically minded modernity for Catholic thought, that characterized Lonergan's years spent "reaching up to the mind of Aquinas."

[20] In addition to the three differentiations of common sense, theory, and interiority (or the turn to the subject, of stage three), there are such differentiations as, for example, the religious, artistic, and scholarly. See Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 272, 275.

In such papers such as the "Future of Thomism," [21] "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation," and the recently published "Fundamental Theology" [22] Lonergan continues to affirm his assessment of Aquinas as the theologian of the tradition, more than any other, whose fundamental theological and philosophical approach is that which we must appropriate in order to move forward. Although Aquinas did not explicitly move from a cognitional theory and an epistemology to ground a metaphysics based upon them, Lonergan believes that both he and Aristotle before him pointed in that direction. For, on Lonergan's view, we find in their work, implicitly and obscurely, some combination of a "phenomenology of the subject" with a "psychology of the soul."[23] It is only through an encounter with Aquinas that Lonergan is able to deconstruct the "knowing as looking" myth that has bedeviled Western philosophy since the late Middle Ages, and in its place outline a critical realism-a realism that holds that reality is not known through sensation but through the deployment of intelligent and reasonable operations.

Further, from Aquinas we learn a totally different approach to theology from that found in fourteenth-century nominalism and deductivism. One understands theology as some attempt at a fruitful understanding of revealed truths, not an exercise in logic that strives for "scientific certainty." The irony here is, of course, that such a notion of "science" itself becomes replaced, after a long historical process, with the very notion of a good theory as that which is the best possible in the circumstances, the attitude to theory which St. Thomas himself had with regard to theology. Thus, one of the characteristics of classicism we noted above, its ideal of logical deductivism in theology and science, is replaced by a return to St. Thomas. As Lonergan writes, contrasting the limitations of "classical Thomism" with the authentic mind of St. Thomas (and suggesting transpositions required to achieve the retrieval of that authentic voice):

[21] Lonergan, *Second Collection*,, 43-53.

[22] Lonergan, *Third Collection*, 35-54; Bernard Lonergan, "Fundamental Theology," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 16 (1998): 5-24, see 22-23.

[23] Bernard Lonergan, "Introduction," in *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. David E. Burrell (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967).

You may ask, however, whether after the introduction of the ... transpositions just outlined there would be anything left of Thomism. And at once I must grant that the five emphases I attributed to classical Thomism would disappear. One may doubt, however, whether such emphases are essential to the thought of St. Thomas or of the great Thomists.[24]

Certainly there are transpositions to be made from Aquinas's thought to a contemporary theology and one must note the limitations of St. Thomas's horizon. One can surely say that Aquinas simply does not have the same sense of historical movement, of the ongoing genesis of methods and cognitive disciplines that we experience in contemporary culture. This is what Lonergan sees as a limitation in his thought. But even here we need to handle the word "limitation" carefully. Naturally, one does not "blame" a thinker of seven hundred years ago for not answering the questions that arise for us today; they simply did not arise for him. However, even here Lonergan's retrieval of Aquinas leads us to qualify this admission. While Aquinas's reflections on doctrinal development or the historicality of human thought are not conspicuous, the indications of an awareness of issues at stake are there. So when Lonergan insists that there is only one eternal truth, in God, and that human truth is both genuine truth but historically conditioned in its formulation (so that one may discern a genuine history of truth), that "concepts have dates," in other words, he is simply exploiting and developing insights he discovered in Aquinas. Thus Lonergan draws attention to St. Thomas's point in the *Summa contra Gentiles* that human insights and judgments, even in metaphysics, have some temporal reference, given the nature of human knowing.[25] Further, he draws attention to St. Thomas's point (following Aristotle) that human knowledge and understanding only occur in an ongoing, historical process of collaboration.[26] On the other hand, Scotist nominalism blocks such attention to

[24] Lonergan, *Second Collection,* 52.

[25] Lonergan, *Verbum,* 63-64 (fhe work originally appeared in article form between 1946 and 1949).

[26] Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on Insight,* ed. E. and M. Morelli, F. E. Crowe, R. Doran, and T. Daly (foronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 383.

the historicity of human thought through its account of "unconscious" concept formation, and diverts attention away from concrete historical process. Unlike St. Thomas, who was concerned to understand something of the mystery of that historical event, the Incarnation, with its implications for the real world of history, the nominalist diverts our attention away from concrete historical process to speculation concerning logical possible worlds.[27] While St. Thomas could not possibly anticipate in a fulsome way the massive development of the *Geisteswissenschaften* in the last three centuries, still Lonergan detects heuristic anticipations of the important issues. Thus the methodological attempt to gather the authoritative texts of the tradition in the mediaeval period anticipates modern efforts in research and interpretation.[28] And the attempts of modern historical scholarship to understand the common sense of other cultures and times are obscurely anticipated in Aquinas's examination of human commonsense understanding in his analysis of *prudentia.*[29]

There are achievements in Aquinas's theology-with respect to grace, the Trinity, and other issues-that Lonergan believes are "classic," in the sense that no theologian working in these areas today or in the future can or should ignore them. But far more important are the avenues for epistemological, metaphysical, and theological research Aquinas opens up: avenues that, Lonergan believes, open up possibilities for developing positions in these areas which admit of permanence and development-allowing for the adumbration of basic philosophical positions fostering development, but restricting radical revision at the cost of self-destructive incoherence. What is really, profoundly important in Aquinas is the discovery of heuristic or methodological indications of what both permanence and authentic development, on the one hand, and inauthentic decline, on the other, could be in human thought and culture.

This retrieval of Aquinas, which is at the core of Lonergan's whole enterprise, implies that for Lonergan there is a history of philosophical truth just as there is a parallel history of dogmatic

[27] Lonergan, *Verbum,* 69.

[28] Lonergan, *Third Collection,* 52.

[29] Ibid., 44.

truth. In this respect Lonergan's work can be fruitfully compared and contrasted with that of Alasdair Maclntyre's retrieval of Thomism (which emphasizes its strengths as a tradition-based form of philosophical enquiry). There are important differences between these two positions,[30] yet much also that is complementary. In fact, reading the former in light of the latter helps to highlight the postmodern moments in Lonergan's thought, particularly with regard to his retrieval of a premodern thinker, Aquinas. In many ways, then, we can see Lonergan's critique of "classicism" as a critique of "modernity." The central role played by the premodern thought of Aquinas in this critique reveals that any understanding of Lonergan's notion of the defects of classicism which reads this as a "modern" or modernist critique could not be more mistaken.

Further, it is interesting to observe some of the striking postmodern themes in Lonergan's work. Even in his magnum opus, *Insight,* a work of "pure philosophy" if ever there was one, such elements are evident. A central theme of the work is an analysis of the way human attempts to reach cognitive and moral self-transcendence in knowing the true and the good, and acting accordingly, are stymied by the mystery of human bias and sin. The only "solution" to this human condition is the divine one of salvation. Thus a philosophical enquiry into human understanding inevitably heads towards a faith perspective. "Objectivity

[30] Michael P. Maxwell, Jr., "A Dialectical Encounter Between Macintyre and Lonergan on the Thomistic Understanding of Rationality," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 33 (1993): 385-99; see Alasdair Macintyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). Maxwell draws attention to Maclntyre's denial of the validity of nineteenth and twentieth-century attempts by Thomists to answer the epistemological questions of modernity; naturally, there is a divergence from Lonergan in this crucial area. Maxwell successfully argues that (as Lonergan points out) we cannot foist such a prejudice against meeting the epistemological challenges of modernity upon Aquinas and that there are many elements of Aquinas's thought that would allow the development of an extremely powerful critique of the deficiencies of the epistemologies of modernity. Finally, Maxwell shows that elements within Maclntyre's version of Thomism as a form of Thomistic fallibilism (akin therefore to views such as those of Popper or Davidson) become involved in incoherence (Maxwell, "Macintyre and Lonergan," 399). I would add to Maxwell's criticisms the point that if some are suspicious about a reading of Aquinas that imports his thought into the epistemological debates of modernity, it is appropriate to wonder, by parity of historical suspicion, about the Thomistic authenticity of an account like Maclntyre's, which provides a metanarrative in terms of such fallibilist criteria.

is the fruit of authentic subjectivity," and that authenticity only comes about through the divine initiative healing the broken human community. This is parallel to Maclntyre's insistence that genealogical and deconstructive critiques have unmasked the pretended impartial objectivity of the Enlightenment as flawed and, in reality, far more scattered and fragmentary in its vision of the world than its propaganda would have us believe. Without a tradition in which the virtues are cultivated truth cannot flourish and, ultimately, that tradition must be based upon resources beyond those which a mere humanism can provide. [31]

More fundamentally, of course, the issue is not one of awarding marks to either Lonergan or Macintyre on the basis of how "postmodern" they appear. The issue is, more fundamentally, one of a possible critique of postmodernity, itself very difficult to delimit, and of possible hermeneutical analyses which might even redefine movements in the Western cultural heritage in a way that challenges those genealogies espoused by some of the more noted representatives of postmodernity. For Lonergan, for example, what is at stake may well have already been played out in some way in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries; the aporias and their resolution may already be present in the dialectical relationships obtaining between Aquinas, Scotus, and Nicholas of Autrecourt. One may remark that, for all its critique of Enlightenment modernity, postmodernity cannot but be its child in the "hubristic pride" it manifests in claiming a total and revolutionary rupture from the past-a past which, in whatever circumlocutory phrases one attempts to express it, is now deemed mistaken and illusory. [32] In contrast Macintyre and Lonergan are

[31] Macintyre, *Three Rival Versions*, 127-31.

[32] Of course Derrida will claim, much to the chagrin of American parmers in debate such as Rorty, that one can never "escape" the Western intellectual tradition. But it is evident that he cannot avoid making the implicit claim that at least he has struggled free enough to achieve the elbow room that allows him to "take" and "re-take" that tradition but no longer to take it "seriously"; see Jacques Derrida, "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism," in *Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Routledge, 1996), 77-88. Derrida brings out in these remarks how fundamental the aporias and problems he encountered in Husserl remain for his thinking. In some ways, Derrida stands to Husserl as Wittgenstein II stands to Wittgenstein I regarding the failure of the "philosophical project." Crucial to any discussion of the relationship between Lonergan and Derrida is precisely a recognition of the way Lonergan retrieves from Aquinas perspectives and approaches that

among those alone capable of a true deconstruction of the pretensions of the enlightenment: for only a viewpoint that sees itself as an ongoing collaboration in the discovery of truth, from past to present, from present to future, can really claim to retrieve in any meaningful way what is valid in the past, or "premodern."

Before we conclude this section, examining what classicism might mean for Lonergan, it may be worth drawing attention to two further points.

First, Lonergan's hermeneutical retrieval of Aquinas, although central to his appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the theological tradition, should not blind us to his positive evaluation of other elements in the theological tradition up to and including those evident in the nineteenth and twentieth-century Catholic tradition. Newman, for example, is a nineteenth-century theological figure who remains very important for Lonergan. Then one finds, in an early essay on the possibility of defining the dogma of the Assumption, positive evaluation of the non-deductivist approach shown to the issue of "implicit revelation" by the theological commission that prepared the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in 1854.[33] Lonergan writes, "Out of the Augustinian, Anselmian, Thomist tradition, despite an imervening heavy overlay of conceptualism, the first Vatican Council retrieved the notion of understanding."[34]

Second, given the variety of characteristics Lonergan brings under the rubric of "classicism" one may note, perhaps with some surprise, the characteristics evident in the thought of some more recent theologians which would render their work classicist. Thus in his critique of Schoonenberg's Christology Lonergan makes the point that the Dutch theologian's failure to understand what Chalcedon taught on the divinity of our Lord has to do, in part, with a "classicist" failure to appreciate the historical context of

were simply not "available" to Husserl. Derrida is more aware than many another thinker of Hegel's dictum "all negation is determinate," but for all that, in even the most tentative or "obvious" judgment concerning a text (and Derrida is insistent on rigor in textual interpretation) one cannot avoid the exigencies of intelligence and reasonableness, nor, therefore, Lonergan would avow, one's commitment to objective reality as the intelligible.

[33] See "The Assumption and Theology," in *Collection* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1967).

[34] Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 336.

that council's use of the term "Person" (although the meaning of the council's teaching, Lonergan insists, is "not obscure").[35] Further, Guy Mansini has argued forcefully for the dramatic differences that exist between Lonergan and Rabner in a number of key areas of theology, one of these being the crucial area of methodology.[36] According to Mansini (we shall return to this issue below), from a Lonerganian perspective Rabner still appears as a theologian captive to the deductivist tradition, which places a premium on philosophical proof in theology rather than nondeductive understanding or insight regarding the divinely revealed truths-the tradition that all too readily conflates intelligibility with necessity. If this is so, then we may observe something quite ironic: Lonergan, normally considered the "philosophers' theologian" may, in effect, place greater emphasis on the transcendence of the mysteries with regard to our understanding, than does the "theologian of mystery," Rahner. If this is so, Rahner's work would still be tied, in some respects, to classicist, conceptualist models from the viewpoint of Lonergan's methodology.

II. CULTURE, CHRISTIANITY, AND CULTURAL NORMATIVITY

Lonergan's contrast between a classicist evangelization, which regards cultures other than the Christian West as "barbaric," and a pluralist evangelization, which attempts to work within the possibilities of another culture recognized as an equal in terms of its communal sharing of values, should not blind us to the fact that there are in the Catholic historical tradition various forms of evangelization which do not work with the "non-barbarian (Christian) versus barbarian (non-Christian)" model. One can think of the evangelization undertaken by the Jesuits in China and India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a fairly obvious example (one which Lonergan himself acknowledged).[37] Beyond

[35] Lonergan, *Second Collection,* 260.

[36] Guy Mansini, O.S.B., "Quasi-Formal Causality and 'Change in the Other': A Note on Karl Rahner's Christology," *The Thomist* 52 (1989): 293-306.

[37] In conversation with Fr Eric O'Connor (I am unable to find the reference to this remark).

this, however, analyses like those of Ratzinger begin to draw our attention to something that requires a good deal of further research and reflection. We are emerging from a period in which Christian evangelization was linked to European colonial expansion. Much of the theological reflection on evangelization in this century, including that found in the magisterium, has been taking stock of this movement beyond European hegemony. But this new phase requires its own forms of reflection: in many ways the emergence of Europe and the West as post-Christian enables us to see anew the distinctions between Christianity and European culture, and between Christian mission linked to European colonial expansion and Christian mission separate from it. In the context of the latter distinction one element required for a proper understanding of evangelization is a retrieval of historical models of Christian mission prior to late medieval and Renaissance colonial expansion on the part of the West. A reflection on these earlier forms may help us move away from too rapid an identification of evangelization with the Western "imperialist" imposition of a world-view. From St. Paul's mission in the diaspora to the Franciscan missions to Beijing in the thirteenth century, one does not witness an "imposition" of Western culture on those to be evangelized, a mission backed by the "big battalions," but nevertheless an unashamed call to accept and adapt to a new truth, a new world-view, and a call to make the sacrifices, sometimes great indeed, which this change of view requires. One can reflect that the Christian mission was established in India certainly by the second century, and when "Thomas Christians" prayed for the world to accept Christ they would have been praying for many a pagan area of Northern Europe. [38]

A further, important issue to draw attention to is the relativization of culture, and in some ways Western "classical"

[38] See, for example, T. Puthiakunnel, "Jewish Colonies of India Paved the Way for St. Thomas," in *The Malabar Church,* ed. J. Vellinan, Orientalia Christiana Analecta 186 (Rome, 1970), 187-91. It is also important to notice the dialectical encounter already under way between Christian and Hindu thought in the writings of the early Fathers, such as Irenaeus and Hippolytus. The background to such exchanges was the Alexandrian school, and the Hindu-Hellenistic cultural encounter which had been underway since Alexander's conquests in Northern India.

culture, through the emergence of Christianity itself. From the New Testament period on through the writings of the Fathers, we witness a dialectical process of reception, rejection, and transformation of that which Christianity encounters as it permeates Greco-Roman culture. Lonergan himself wrote at some length on this process in his analysis of the "Origins of Christian Realism," and to this I shall return below. But what Ratzinger's account of the Church as itself a cultural subject draws attention to (although it is not a feature of his lecture) is the process of relativization of culture which emerges. It emerges with particular clarity in St. Augustine, the cultured man of Western classicism, who had, before his conversion, despised the "barbarity" of mere Christianity, with its coarse and unappealing Hebrew Scriptures.

According to Peter Brown, following H. L Marrou, this relativization of classical culture went forward in Augustine's later period in works like *City of God* and *De Doctrina Christiana.* [39] The rupture with classical ideals was radical, as Augustine began to realize the significance of the fact that God's truth had been communicated through the culture of the Hebrews, a people akin to the tribes that lived on the margins of Augustine's Roman-North African world. Brown writes of Augustine's new approach to culture in *De Doctrina Christiana:*

> He began by remarking that culture was a product of society: it was a natural extension of language. It was so plainly the creation of social habits as to be quite relative. There could be no absolute standards of classical "purism." [40]

Brown concludes: "It is a rare thing to come across a man of sixty, living on the threshold of a great change, who had already come to regard a unique culture and a unique political institution as replaceable." [41] Nor was Augustine's insight, which somehow crystallizes the attitude of the Fathers to pagan classical culture, lost in the Christian West. It is present in the Scholasticisrn of the Victorines in the High Middle Ages, and it reemerges with force in the Renaissance debate over the language of Scripture. So in

[39] Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), chap. 23.
[40] Ibid., 265.
[41] Ibid., 266.

the sixteenth century we find Giles of Viterbo and Cajetan at loggerheads over the question of the value of Greek as opposed to Hebrew: for Cajetan the latter is primitive and defective, whereas for Giles it is perfect, for it is the vehicle of God's revelation. The debate seems to have constituted part of the background to the *querelle des anciens et des modernes,* which Gadamer sees as a feature of the emergence of modernity in the West.[42] Of course, in the period of the Enlightenment Hume and Gibbon would range themselves on the side in the debate opposite to Augustine and Giles.

A) Intersubjectivity and the Christian Cultural Subject

The relativization of culture that emerges with Christianity comes about, therefore, because Christianity realizes itself to be, in Ratzinger's words, a "cultural subject": it itself is a community constituted by common meanings and values, expressed and communicated in common symbols and aesthetic carriers of meaning, allowing and effecting intersubjective communication both between its members and between those members and Christ, the head of the mystical Body. Turning back to Lonergan, we do not find in chapter 14 of *Method in Theology* (on communications), or chapter 12 (on doctrines), which together treat of evangelization, an analysis of the Church as a "cultural subject." So we return to the question asked at the beginning of this article: is Ratzinger's notion of Christianity as a cultural subject, with his allied notion of "interculturality," a classicist approach from Lonergan's perspective? I think not. Rather, I believe there is an important complementarity between their approaches.

The primary focus of Lonergan's attention in these chapters in *Method* is the manner in which Christian dogma develops: the truths of faith revealed in one culture may be understood in a new way (always retaining the same meaning) in another culture. A paradigmatic example Lonergan uses to illustrate this development-with-continuity comes from mathematics: the same

[42] Hans-Georg Gadamar, *Truth and Method,* ed. J. Cummings and G. Barden (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), 20, 242.

truth, that two plus two is four, was understood by the ancient Babylonians, later by the Greeks, and later still in modern mathematics-there is a growth of understanding of the same truth.[43] This notion of development-with-continuity is Lonergan's central concern. However, what Ratzinger's analysis of Christianity as the cultural subject indicates is that when Christianity is preached, what is primarily preached is a person, Jesus Christ. Furthermore, that person, the divine Person in a human nature and consciousness, is a cultural subject: one cannot prescind from encountering and in some way embracing the Word made flesh without at once embracing the culture taken up and transformed in his humanity-"for salvation is from the Jews" Uohn 4:22), or in the words of Pius XI, "we are all Semites spiritually."

All this, however, is implicit in Lonergan's approach. What is distinctive about Christianity is the intersubjective encounter with Christ Jesus, and what Christian evangelization is about is proclaiming Christ Jesus. That communication invites an encounter with the incarnate meaning of the incarnate Word. As Lonergan writes, "The word, then, is personal. *Cor ad cor loquitur:* love speaks to love, and its speech is powerful."[44] And agam:

> We express ourselves, we communicate, through the flesh, through words and gestures, the unnoticed movements of the countenance, pauses, all the manners in which, as Newman says, "cor ad cor loquitur," the heart speaks unto the heart. And the Incarnation and the Redemption are the supreme instance of God communicating to us in this life.[45]

On Lonergan's view, the person is not a monad but comes to be himself through the "mutual self-mediation" of a community or culture (such mutual self-mediation being what is written about by novelists as they trace the intricacies of interpersonal relations in community);[46] this applies equally to the Word made flesh. One

[43] Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 325.

[44] Ibid., 113.

[45] Crowe, ed., *Collected Works* 6, 65-66.

[46] Lonergan, "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer," in ibid., 176. The theme of the *Corad cor loquitur,* intersubjective communion of feeling between Christ and his followers, found in Lonergan's writings could provide a starting point for a theology of the Sacred Heart; such

cannot come close to another without in some ways coming close to his culture. The images and symbols to which the Sacred Heart responded as truly manifesting the truths and values which Jesus had come to communicate must also become the sources of my authentic feelings, my intentional responses to truth and value, if I am truly to enter into an intersubjective communion with him. And those images and symbols, signs and words are, as Ratzinger shows, that which is transformed yet fundamentally confirmed by the Word incarnate. Indeed, as Lonergan argues, our faith affirms that this Jewish culture was prepared as the seed bed of the Incarnation over generations. Following Eric Voegelin, Lonergan points out that the control or integration of symbols and signs in Israel took place not through any philosophical critique but through the purification wrought by the prophetic word which, from the viewpoint of faith, we take to have been a divine work.[47] This particular culture, then, with its world-view, its theology, and its anthropology, is, from the viewpoint of faith, a culture with a normativity no other can claim: it was a people formed by Yahweh for the coming of the Word.

The account of evangelization given by Lonergan in chapters 12 and 14 of *Method* may benefit from an analysis such as Ratzinger's. While Lonergan's examination of the continuity and development of truths about the faith through diverse cultures is essential, still it needs to be complemented by an appreciation of the cultural implications of saying that at the center of evangelization is the intersubjective encounter with the person Jesus Christ. I have indicated already some of the elements in Lonergan's work which might prove helpful in teasing out the theological implications involved in such a reflection. The relativization of cultures which takes place in Christianity, so evident in St. Augustine's relativization of "classical culture," occurs precisely from a realization of the implications of this theological

a theme could be fruitfully reflected upon in the context of what Lonergan has to say about some dogmatic developments as being characterized principally *by* "a refinement of feelings."

[47] Lonergan, *Way to Nicea,* 110. It is perhaps interesting to note, given Lonergan's contention that the anthropological, as opposed to classicist, idea of culture entails study of distinctive forms of common sense, that in *Insight* he enumerates "Catholic" common sense as a distinct type (Lonergan, *Insight,* 416).

fact: the least of aH peoples, the people of Israel, has been chosen as the vehide for God's salvation of the world. Precolonial evangdization was always a realization of this. It is not ethnocentric imperialism that takes a cultural story as in some way normative for all human cultures and therefore prodaims in the name of truth that this cultural story, not the old one (however adaptable the old may be to the new), is now normative. Both Lonergan and Ratzinger argue that the authenticity of any culture is gauged precisely terms of its openness to the true and the good from whatever source this may come. There are many self-destructive inconsistencies in modem Western relativism, but one of the most evident is its own metanarrative of cultural encounter which denies what has in fact occurred through most cultures and historical periods: the permeability of cultures one to another; the abandonment, at times painful, of traditions and religious world-views because new ones have been accepted. It is not for the modern Western relativist to impose (great irony here of course) his metanarrative on the cultures of human history so as to attempt some "anti-ethnocentric" policing protection from the pain of conversion.

However, beyond drawing out the implications of aspects of Lonergan's work that allow a fuller acknowledgement of Ratzinger's point that Christianity is a cultural "subject," one may observe that there is a yet more radical thesis in Lonergan's work that goes beyond Ratzinger's analysis of a certain "cultural normativity" implicit in Christianity: the thesis of "the origins of Christian realism."

B) Christian Realism as a Cultural Catalyst

In the chapter on "Communications" in *Method* Lonergan writes, concerning evangelization and inculturation:

> The pluralist acknowledges a multiplicity of cultural traditions. In any tradition he envisages the possibility of diverse differentiations of consciousness. But he does not consider it his task either to promote the differentiations of consciousness or to ask people to renounce their own culture. [48]

[48] Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 363.

Something of what Lonergan means by "differentiations of consciousness" has been sketched above. However, there is a very significant, and perhaps easily overlooked, modification made by Lonergan of the position he expresses in *Method* in one of his last papers, "Unity and Plurality," dating from 1982. There we read, of communications and evangelization, "There follows a manifold pluralism. It remains that within the realm of undifferentiated consciousness there is no communication of doctrine except through available rituals, narratives, titles parables, metaphors." So far this expresses the same ideas one finds in *Method.* However, Lonergan continues,

> An exception to this last statement must be noted. The educated classes in a society, such as was the Hellenic, normally are instances of undifferentiated consciousness. But their education had among its sources works of genuine philosophers, so that they could be familiar with logical operations and take propositions as objects on which they reflected and from which they inferred. In this fashion the meaning of *homoousion* for Athanasius was contained in a rule concerning propositions about the Father and the Son: What is true of the Father also is true of the Son, except that the Son is not the Father.
>
> Similarly, the meaning of the one person and two natures mentioned in the second paragraph of the decree of Chalcedon stands forth in the repeated affirmation of the first paragraph, namely, it is one and the same Son our Lord Jesus Christ that is perfect in divinity and the same perfect in humanity .... Now the meaning of the first paragraph can be communicated without the addition of any new technical terms. But it can give rise to reflection and to questions. Only after someone asks whether the divinity is the same as the humanity and, if not, then how can the same be both God and man, is it relevant to explain that a distinction can be drawn between person and nature, that divinity and humanity refer to two natures, that it is one and the same person that is both God and man. Such logical clarification is within the meaning of the decree. But if one goes on to raise the metaphysical question whether person and nature can be really distinct or the anthropological question whether there can be any real distinction between subject and subjectivity, then the issue is being transported from the fifth century to the thirteenth on the metaphysical issue, and to the twentieth on the anthropological issue. One not only steps beyond the context of Chalcedon, but also beyond the capacity of undifferentiated consciousness to discover any possible solution.[49]

[49] Lonergan, *Third Collection,* 243-44.

In this passage Lonergan is gesturing in the direction not only of his own contributions in the area of Christology and the Trinity but also towards his thesis concerning an implicit "differentiation of consciousness" that goes forward within the development of dogma: the emergence of "Christian realism"-that is, not only a distinctive Christian metaphysic, as integral to the Christian cultural world-view, but a distinctive Christian epistemology. The passage also places in context the previous passage from *Method.* In the light of the subsequent remarks one can see that in the earlier passage Lonergan has undifferentiated, or "primitive," consciousness in mind as the receiver of the Christian message. But in the later passage he takes cognizance of other stages of consciousness as possible receivers of that same message. In light of this, if one is going to communicate the Christian message effectively to cultures with a more differentiated consciousness (or rather with elements of, for example, philosophical or theoretical differentiation present in the culture), one will have to be on the level of that task. Furthermore, if the truth of Christianity is to be effectively communicated, questions and further questions have to be met. And this will only be achieved by further theoretical differentiation, or (in a "turn to the subject") by the shift to interiority, in the modern context. If this is so then it cannot be true, in an unqualified way, that the pluralist evangelizer avoids promoting differentiations of consciousness. For in order effectively to communicate Christian truth, not error or myth, he may very well have to invite the hearers of the message to move from commonsense meaning to an understanding involving some theoretical elements and, at the limit, metaphysical and psychological elements, if authentic questions are to be met. One may indeed expect such differentiated forms of evangelization to occur in cultures such as those of Asia, where commonsense and religious elements are complemented by metaphysical and psychological traditions of speculation of some sophistication.

We need to understand further something of the significance of this for Lonergan's bold claim concerning a normativity implicit in Christian culture. Foundational in Lonergan's view of method in theology are three conversions: intellectual, moral, and religious. Intellectual conversion is a matter of moving away from

all forms of naive realism, empiricism, idealism, rationalism, and relativism to an adequate cognitional theory and epistemology which can be justified in a self-referential manner; this basic position (which may be indefinitely improved but not radically revised under pain of incoherence) will then provide the basis for the adumbration of a critically grounded metaphysics, ethics, and natural theology. Being intellectually converted is a matter of moving out of the world of the infant, the world of immediacy, into the world mediated by meaning; it is being able to make explicit in knowledge of the self the intellectual and moral operations used since childhood of which, due to the "polymorphism" of consciousness, it is extremely difficult to give an accurate account. Lonergan sees this work of adumbrating a self-consistent basic philosophical position as occurring within an historical tradition and precisely because of that tradition. Not only are Aristotle and Aquinas key figures here, but because it is necessary to reappropriate their basic insights in terms of a philosophy based on the data of one's own consciousness others in the tradition such as Augustine, Descartes, and Newman are also essential contributors. Lonergan's attitude to the Western intellectual tradition, then, is one of acknowledged dependency but at the same time critical retrieval. The metaphysical terms and relations which the theologian may critically justify in terms of the evidence of consciousness are congruent with many of those found in the tradition, primarily as represented by Aquinas. Lonergan's "movement to the third stage of meaning" (focusing on consciousness, interiority) is, then, neither a Wittgensteinian kicking away of the ladder once one has used it to ascend to where one would, nor an Hegelian *Aufhebung* which sees past elements as "blind" in their incompleteness.

Such an appropriation of Western culture, as critical of that culture's shortcomings as it truly is indeed a strong claim concerning a normativity implicit in that culture. But as it stands it is a claim that *de facto* through the mediation of forces within that culture one is able to mount to a critical epistemology and metaphysics. Given this thesis one could argue that since on Lonergan's view the intellectual and moral operations implicit in human acting are transcultural, other cultures could just as well

provide the milieu for the process of self-mediation required for such development" Indeed, while Lonergan did not delve much the intricacies of the religious philosophies of Asia there is plenty of evidence the theoretical differentiation has been operative there, and that the move to interiority, or reflection on consciousness, is present in such religious-philosophical speculation, just as one finds explorations into consciousness (anticipating a philosophical position that would exploit this in a systematic fashion) in Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas"[50]

However, Lonergan's analysis of the "origins of Christian realism" appears to be an even stronger thesis than this: it is a thesis concerning an intellectual normativity implicit Christianity precisely as Christian" The process that witnessed the emergence of Christian dogmas was, Lonergan believes, a dialectical one"[51] The word of God as truth was apprehended in diverse differentiations of consciousness, in commonsense, symbolic, or aesthetic manners, but always as true. Furthermore, as further questions arose this word of God as truth was the subject of questioning, of attempts to understand its implications. Lonergan insists that any attempt to play off the "simple integrity of the gospel" against the "corruption of Hellenized dogma," whether this be espoused by biblical "romantics" or those operating from a philosophical position (e"g",L. Dewart or B0 Welte), does justice neither to what Catholic faith nor to what reason tells us of this process of dogmatic development" The dialectic operative in the process manifests itself in the way various philosophical tendencies resist the emergence of the Trinitarian and Christological dogmas. Lonergan stresses that the very philosophical positions that resisted their emergence are in important respects similar to the philosophies that today continue to deny the

[50] On may observe how even in Anglo-American philosophical circles of late there have appeared works relating philosophical discussions well known in the Western tradition to similar debates in the history of Asian philosophy. For example, see Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad's treatment of the epistemological debate between Vasubandhu and Sankara, "Dreams and the Coherence of Experience," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 32 (1995): 225-39.

[51] See Lonergan, *Way to Nicea;* also "The Origins of Christian Realism" (1961), and "Theology as Christian Phenomenon," in Crowe, ed., *Collected Works 6;* and "The Origins of Christian Realism," in Lonergan, *Second Collection,* 1974.

cogency of the dogmas.[52] In accepting the truths of faith as taught by the magisterium the Christian is a "dogmatic realist." That is, he believes the truths proposed for him to judge as true on the authority of the Word of God. Nor, on Lonergan's view, can one play off "cold propositions" against the "interpersonal encounter" with Christ. This is a large topic, one with which Lonergan was concerned one way or another in much of his work, but a couple of points will suffice to indicate how the issue can be approached. First, in Aristotelian-Thomist terms knowledge is not primarily via correspondence (proposition over against thing with which it is concerned) but by intentional identity between knower and known. Second, propositions are means by which we necessarily express insights into fact and value in our lives, including the vital area of interpersonal relations. Without such insights, which are myriad, and occur in the complexity of relations, these relations could hardly be described as interpersonal at all-for aspects of human intersubjectivity are also shared by the higher animals. Third, affirming truths about what a relationship is can be essential to the flourishing of that relationship (truths about one's marriage, for example). And to affirm as true that God did not get a man to die for us and free us from our sins but that God did this himself makes all the difference to our intersubjective relationship with Christ Jesus.

The Christian as dogmatic realist accepts the truths of faith in judgment in a way cognate with the critical realist's position that truth is known only in judgment: not in sensate experience alone, nor in a combination of that experience with understanding, but through a judgment as to the truth, falsehood, or probability of that understanding of experience. Given natural human tendencies towards various forms of picture thinking (such as empiricism or naive realism, on the one hand, or idealism and rationalism, on the other), there will be a resistance to the view, implicit in the Christian dogmatic affirmation, that truth is known in judgment. Thus Lonergan finds in Tertullian, for example, a type of Trinitarian thinking which must picture reality as the spatially extended: a form of empiricism and materialism. In Origen, on

[52] Lonergan, *Way to Nicea,* section 1, p. 8.

the other hand, one discovers a form of Neoplatonism, caught up in philosophical confusions engendered by talking of God in terms of the Good beyond Being. It is interesting to note that on Lonergan's view the contemporary philosophical parallels to Origen are found in the post-Husserlian thought of J. Trouillard and H. Dumery. The dialectical approach he implies should be taken to their work would, I believe, extend in some way to that of Levinas and Marion. [53]

To argue that Christianity fell captive to Greek thought is, therefore, to understand little of what was happening. Rather,

> The statement that Christ is God, that Jesus of Nazareth is God, created Christian philosophy; working from its presuppositions, you are forced to some sort of ontology. At Nicea, there was not an adequate basis provided by any Greek philosophy. The current philosophies of the time were Stoicism and Platonism and Epicureanism, and none of them would bear the type of thinking represented by the *homoousion*, the *consubstantiale*, of Nicea. A new type of philosophy would have to be developed to enshrine, to be able to include, that notion, a philosophy in terms of existence in the medieval sense. It was not something readymade that the Fathers borrowed from the Greeks; there was no Greek philosophy they could borrow to express what they concluded from revelation. Aristotle never was much esteemed by the Greek Fathers; he was looked upon, at that time, as simply an empiricist-a judgement that has not a little foundation in the Aristotelian writings. [54]

According to the thesis of Christian realism, then, the world-view implicit in Christianity involves not only a distinctive theology,

[53] Crowe, ed., *Collected Works* 6, 125 n. 8. The materials for a detailed "face-to-face" encounter between Lonergan and E. Levinas are certainly there. In his own way Lonergan acknowledges the importance of the phenomenology of the "face" (see ibid., 96-98; *Method in Theology,* 59-60). Like Levinas he rejects an epistemological and ethical solipsism (which Levinas detects in Husserl and Heidegger); knowledge of self or consciousness is a knowledge of an aspect of Being, and, also, it is achieved as ethical endeavor towards, ultimately, the Other of God. Further, such an endeavor can only come about, de facto, within the context of authentic community. However, much divides the two thinkers precisely in terms of the difference in traditions noted in note 33 above. From Lonergan's perspective one would have to bring out the inevitable cognitional and metaphysical consequences implicit in Derrida's critique (of course denied by him) of Levinas in terms of an incoherent attempt to slip free of the language of the "same" (which is, in fact, employed) to refer to the "Other."

[54] Crowe, ed., *Collected Works* 6, 262. See, also, works mentioned in note 52 above, and the celebrated book review, "The Dehellenization of Dogma," in Lonergan, *Second Collection.*

cosmology, and anthropology but also a distinct epistemology-namely, an epistemology that implies that forms of empiricism or idealism are inimical to Christian faith. This philosophical position becomes increasingly explicit in the tradition itself through the lived tradition of faith within which the pronouncements of the magisterium play their role, and as we move from the reflections of Augustine to those of Aquinas to those of twentieth-century Christian thinkers such as Lonergan. That Christian tradition is itself the "way down" (to use a Lonerganian expression): the culture of meanings and values in which Lonergan was able to delineate anew, with a precision and accuracy at the level of our philosophical times, that critical Christian realism from "below upwards" (i.e., from reflection on consciousness to an adumbration of a metaphysics, ethics, theology). This Christian world-view, then, is no product of Hellenized philosophy, nor of any other particular contribution made from a cultural context in which Christianity has grown. On Lonergan's view it is a distinctive Christian philosophical world-view. This thesis, then, is a claim concerning the normative elements in Christian culture even more radical than that outlined by Ratzinger.

Such a thesis is cognate with the views on the origins of the scientific world-view expressed by scholars such as Whitehead and, more recently, Stanley Jaki. On their view the scientific world-view of the West can only be understood within the metaphysical context of the Judaeo-Christian world-view. One might add that, for better or worse, the scientific world-view of the West has enjoyed far more missionary success in all parts of the globe than its supposed Christian parent. Now, however, in a post-Christian Western culture one witnesses a form of tragic battle, a struggle to the death between the Cain of scientism and the Abel of philosophical relativism.

According to Lonergan's notion of the origins of Christian realism, then, there was a certain inevitability about the way in which the preaching of the Christian faith in various cultural contexts during the first millennium would involve a "promotion" of the differentiations of consciousness, as that message was received and its meaning and implications for life were sought. Yet this will also be inevitable in our own day. In preaching the

Word as true in the developed cultures of Asia one will also encounter cultures suffused with elements of the theoretical, and, further, in whatever part of the globe the Christian message is preached Western science is already there proclaiming some kind of world-view which, given the exigencies of human being, will have to be related in a meaningful way to the prior cultural traditions of the region, which may or may not have already elements of the theoretical differentiation of consciousness within them. If the distorted progeny of the Christian world-view, scientism and relativism, are not to gain a foothold that would resist the preaching of the faith, then the readiness to "promote" philosophical differentiation in the culture is all the more urgent.

As we have seen, Lonergan argues vigorously that Christian realism, the philosophical world-view of Christianity, arose in dialectical tension with the existing philosophies of the first millennium. This is not to deny the enormous importance of the "Greek discovery" of mind for this process, but it is to place it in proper perspective. If it is the Christian doctrines that bring about this new world-view, this new philosophy, with its metaphysics and epistemology, then it should be clearly understood that in promoting such a world-view one is not promoting European culture but Christian culture. This is witnessed to not only by the very evolution of that world-view but by the withdrawal of Western culture from this world-view in another dialectical process which has gone on apace since, at least, the Enlightenment. Today in a largely secularized West the theological, anthropological, and cosmological perspectives of Christianity are ignored or challenged in terms of materialism, relativism, and the like.

Ultimately the question of evangelization and inculturation is not a matter of West and East, North and South, but of Christianity and its reception in the world as a whole. The passing of the modern period of "colonial evangelization" should help us gain this perspective ever more clearly. In reality we are in a situation more akin to those of the early centuries of evangelization: a situation in which Christianity does not enjoy cultural hegemony. In terms of the Lonerganian theory of Christian realism what is at issue here is an intellectual conversion which must take place, sooner or later, within the cultures

Christianity encounters. Just as the intellectual and moral operations of the human person are, Lonergan argues, transcultural, so is the "polymorphism" of human consciousness; so also is the difficulty of moving from the world of infant immediacy to an account of how we come to know reality and the good in a world mediated by meaning. Significantly, in this regard, Lonergan draws attention to the family resemblances between (Western) Platonism and (Eastern) Brahminism in their failure to effect just such a philosophical transition: they are unable to express philosophically the criteria for correct knowledge of reality--criteria with which, without explicit reflection, we operate spontaneously from childhood. [55] The philosophical issue, therefore, is not primarily one of East versus West. Lonergan relates the story of a missionary who was able to convert a Japanese bonze only after he had assisted the later to grasp the principle of noncontradiction: that not all paths up Mount Fujiyama were one and the same. [56]

One may reflect that the same problem occurs at present for the evangelizer in the post-Christian West, where relativism and indifferentism are the order of the day for many. Lonergan's principle, enunciated in the final chapter of *Method,* that the evangelist should not ask others to renounce their culture but should rather seek ways to "proceed from within their culture ... making it into a vehicle for communicating the Christian message," [57] is totally laudable as the ideal for which to strive. But once this is situated in the context of other perspectives from his work, namely, the thesis on "Christian realism," one can appreciate that in many situations the new wine will not sit well in old bottles. Thus, a culture that has at its center human sacrifice (e.g., the Aztec) or a culture that feels its metaphysico-political ethic threatened by Christianity (e.g., Japan in the seventeenth century) will experience no little upheaval as the old metaphysical world-view is replaced. This is equally so in the modern West. For a post-Christian culture to accept once more the Christian metaphysic and anthropology, the relativism and

[55] Crowe, ed., *Collected Works* 6, 120-21.

[56] Lonergan, *Understanding and Being,* 301.

[57] Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 363.

materialism in which the only still point in a turning world is some kind of communality based on hedonism must be repudiated and an anthropological view of the sacredness of human life from conception to death accepted, along with the social ethic of human solidarity which this anthropology implies.

One may examine what Lonergan has to say about this Christian realism, as distinctive of, I would say, Christian culture, from the angle of his analysis of the three conversions (intellectual, moral, religious). He distinguishes between a general definition of religious conversion, as a "falling in love in an unrestricted way" with the otherworldly and transcendent, on the one hand, and how this may be judged to be actually achieved, on the other.[58] To be authentic, religious conversion must be ongoing; it must also promote moral and intellectual conversion. This is a methodological, or phenomenological, point concerning religion and conversion in general, without specific reference to any particular religion. But one can note that even from this perspective what Lonergan is suggesting is that a religious conversion or a religion may ultimately be assessed in terms of how well it promotes views congruent with the epistemology and metaphysics that arise, historically, from Christianity. However, there is more to be observed with regard to the analysis of the triple conversions. Later in *Method* Lonergan writes, "Men may or may not be converted intellectually, morally, religiously. If they are not, and the lack of conversion is conscious and thoroughgoing, it heads for loss of faith." And he continues, "while the unconverted may have no real apprehension of what it is to be converted, at least they have in doctrines the evidence both that there is something lacking in themselves and that they need to pray for illumination and seek instruction. "[59]

[58] Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 283-84. The broader and deeper perspectives opened up by Lonergan and Ratzinger for the theme of inculturation and evangelization entail that Rahner's often cited position that Vatican II marked a shift from a European to a world Church has only limited value. It is not so much the case that Christianity is or was a European phenomenon as that Europe is a Christian phenomenon.

[59] Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 298-99. These words of Lonergan are in some way echoed by Cardinal Ratzinger in his address to the 1998 Synod of Asian Bishops in Rome, when he affirmed that experience is not the measure of the truths of faith, rather it is itself judged and transformed by those truths.

When one reflects on this passage from the perspective of the Christian-realism thesis one appreciates that one of the issues being touched upon is that resistance to the rise of Christian dogmas and Christian realism can arise from philosophical positions that in some way still resist their acceptance; and such resistance, one may anticipate, is transcultural.

The passage is also worth pondering with regard to a topic debated among students of Lonergan's work: how does the "phenomenologically" outlined "religious conversion" stand to conversion to a specific religion, to Christianity? One may methodologically describe some features of religious conversion in general (the orientation to other-worldliness), and even have some "religion-independent" criterion in evaluating a religion or a religious conversion in terms of how well it ultimately fosters intellectual and authentic moral conversion. However, the further question arises: above and beyond moral and intellectual criteria how can one evaluate religious conversion? The last passage cited shows that this cannot be done in a "nondenominational" way; it has to be from the viewpoint of some specific religious conversion, such as that to Christianity. Evaluating the authenticity of a religious conversion is evaluating an ongoing process, not just simply noting that religious conversion is "towards the unworldly." One can write, as Lonergan occasionally does, of being an authentic or inauthentic Buddhist, Hindu, etc., but from a religion-neutral or merely phenomenological viewpoint this cannot be consistently pursued, for it implies that when a Buddhist or Hindu rejects such and such a doctrine or typical feature of his religion then the conversion is inauthentic. But it is not for the methodologist to determine whether it is the dissident or the doctrine in question that is inauthentic; that may only be determinable from the viewpoint of the conversion to the specific faith itself. Thus when Lonergan writes that the unconverted need to pray and seek instruction in order to accept doctrine he is presuming a specific faith commitment. Finally, then, the authenticity of religious conversion, when this involves questions over and above what may be examined in terms of intellectual and moral criteria, can only be determined from within a faith context: as a Catholic I see another's rejection of some teaching

of his faith not as inauthentic but, perhaps, as a move along the road of authenticity.

As an evaluation of the contextualization and embeddedness of Western intellectual endeavor Lonergan's analysis of the origins of Christian realism has a peculiarly postmodern ring to it. Where the Enlightenment sought freedom from that context, the postmodern thinker is adept at detecting just where the Christian presuppositions of Enlightenment proclamations of self-evident truths and moral principles appear at the margins. But as was noted above, both Lonergan and Macintyre as Catholic thinkers make common cause with postmodern critiques of modernity only to part company with them in showing that they are parasitic upon what they would oppose. Thus Christian realism, as providing the context for the genius of Aquinas, provides also indications of an epistemological critique of post-modernity. To say that intellectual endeavor is embedded in Christian faith is not thereby to vitiate that endeavor, but rather, just as science has relied on cultural context (Popper's "meta-physical research programmes") for genuine advance, so Christianity fosters the context and the virtues for genuine advance in truth. It was perhaps no accident that one of the most severe critiques of epistemological scepticism issued from the newly converted Augustine in the *Contra Academicos.* And there is deconstructive irony in the way the constitution *Dei Filius* of the First Vatican Council, and the encyclical *Pascendi* of Pope St. Pius X, provided the context in which intellectual endeavor in Catholicism could move confidently on, steering between the Scylla of nineteenth-century fideism and neo-Kantian modernism and the Charybdis of eighteenth and nineteenth-century rational-ism and positivism. For the Enlightenment dream of unfettered rationality had only issued in a nightmarish oscillation between profound Nietzschean scepticism and heady Comtean positivism.

At this point it would be well to sum up the principal points made in the argument of this section. First, it has been argued that Ratzinger's analysis of Christianity as a "cultural subject" is not, from the perspective of Lonergan's thought, an instance of classicism reasserting itself. Lonergan's own analysis of classicism is not to be taken out of context. Indeed Ratzinger's analysis helps

to draw attention to elements in Lonergan's work that may require development. Thus, insofar as for both Lonergan and Ratzinger embracing Christianity is entering into an intersubjective relationship with the Word made flesh, Jesus Christ, just so this intersubjective relationship will involve a participation in the culture that the Word assumed, transformed, but fundamentally confirmed. Second, Lonergan proposes a more radical thesis than that proposed by Ratzinger, but in the direction of Ratzinger's thought. This is Lonergan's notion of "Christian realism": a specifically Christian "philosophy" or world-view, involving theological, metaphysical, and anthropological but also epistemological elements. While this world-view emerges in clarity only over time, and through a process with particular historical and cultural features, still it is intrinsic to Christianity and is, therefore, transcultural. Therefore any culture, be it Western or Eastern, must adapt to the exigencies of this Christian world-view if the faith is authentically to take root in it; this process, ideally, will involve some "fusion of horizons" between the receptor culture and Christianity, for at base all cultures are equally human cultures. But it cannot evade the cross of conversion, which also involves leaving "home and family" to follow the Lord.

III. *EXTRA ECCLES/AM NULLA SALUS*

Towards the end of his 1993 lecture Ratzinger turns his attention to the radical nature of Christian conversion as this is seen by the Fathers. This theme is not new in his theology. It is one upon which he dwelt in the course of a critical reflection on Rahner's approach to the question of the salvation of the non-baptized: the question of the universality yet historical particularity of Christianity, issues which Rahner has discussed under the rubric of "anonymous Christianity." [60] Ratzinger notes what he sees as positive elements in Rahner's *Hearers of the Word* but then goes on to outline what he sees as the heart of Rahner's conceptual solution to the questions which arise in this area, and, in

[60] See Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 161-70.

a series of questions, asks whether this solution really does justice to the problem. He then proceeds to critique some of the more "popular" versions of "humanist Christianity" claiming to derive from Rahner but which, Ratzinger points out, do not do justice to Rahner's analyses.[61]

Rahner attempts to combine the universality of history with the particularity of Christianity without sacrificing the latter's uniqueness. According to Ratzinger, Rahner makes a first attempt at this by describing Christianity as the most successful apprehension of what is always and everywhere implicitly accepted in human consciousness.[62] However, Ratzinger senses that Rahner feels more needs to be said. Rahner does so, first in terms of an analysis of Christ as the one who is apprehended as the "Absolute bringer of Salvation," the One who alone can be said to be God's final word in history since what is achieved in him is the highest that can be achieved in human nature. As the successful instance of human self-transcendence, Christ is in some sense the "concrete universal." Ratzinger continues:

> From what has been said, it follows "that in the meeting with him [Christ] ... the mystery of reality itself ..." is present. Even more clearly: "The relationship to Jesus Christ, in which an individual ... makes Jesus, present within him, the mediator of his direct relationship with God" is such "that man in his existence ... is always already within this relationship whether he is explicitly aware of it or not." From this, Rahner develops his basic formula of Christian existence ...: "He who accepts his existence ... says ... Yes to Christ."[63]

In response to this conceptual scheme, Ratzinger writes:

> This broadly outlined thesis of Rahner's has something dazzling, something stupendous, about it. The particular and the universal, history and being, seem to be reconciled .... But is that really the answer? Is it true that Christianity adds nothing to the universal but merely makes it known? Is the Christian just man as he is? ... Is not man as he is insufficient, that which must be mastered and transcended? Does not the whole dynamism of history stem from the

[61] Ibid., 168-70.

[62] Ibid., 164. The reference is to Karl Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith,* trans. William V. Dych (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1978), 151.

[63] Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology,* 165; Rahner, *Foundations,* 204-6, 225-26.

pressure to rise above man as he is? Is it not the main point of the faith of both Testaments that man is what he ought to be only by conversion, that is, when he ceases to be what he is?[64]

Another way to grasp what is "dazzling" about the Rahnerian thesis of "anonymous Christianity" is to reflect that what was in the tradition a mysterious "marginal" doctrine of the salvation of the unbaptized has become transformed into the norm. Does this not, one may ask, reduce the missions of the Holy Spirit and the Son one to another? Is there any longer a real urgency about hearing the word and accepting the Word, of entering into intersubjective communion with Jesus of Nazareth, whose historical, incarnate presence is mediated, for the most part, through intersubjective encounter with his Body the Church? What appears to have happened in this Rahnerian construction, which makes the mysterious and marginal central, is a buckling and bending of the data of the tradition, the preaching, prayer, and teaching concerning salvation, so that it is now forced to fit in with a thesis which began life precisely as a theological model to assist in gaining insight into the belief of the faith tradition itself. By presenting this thesis of anonymous Christianity Rahner has only made us raise a new question, a question implicit in Ratzinger's questioning: how are we to think through the eschatological urgency of conversion to Christ? This eschatological urgency, which surely cannot be rendered as peripheral to the gospel message, is what the Church in her magisterium has safeguarded through the teaching "no salvation outside the Church," a teaching which received classic formulations at Lateran IV and Florence.

There are perspectives from Lonergan that would throw light on this issue, an issue intimately connected with the themes of the distinctiveness of Christianity, evangelization, and inculturation. To begin with, I think it important to return to Mansini's critique of Rahner. As was noted, Mansini believes that from Lonergan's viewpoint Rahner is still captivated by a scientific ideal in theology which has not yet appreciated the shift from proof to understanding as the ideal of systematics-a shift parallel to that

[64] Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology*, 166.

which has occurred in the development of modern science, but the implications of which were well known to Aquinas.[65]

For example, is the thesis of "anonymous Christianity" framed and expressed as theological argument *ex convenientiae* (a model or hypothesis in the area of a systematic reflection on the doctrines of the tradition) or does it take on the dimensions of a quasi-philosophical anthropology in its own right, a system which appears to bend and buckle the data of the tradition? If Lonergan is right about systematics, then one should perhaps be as suspicious here as one would be of a scientific hypothesis which lacks critical control, or "modesty" with regard to the data it would explain. In other words, is the theory of anonymous Christianity somewhat extravagant, more than is needed for gaining insight into this area of the tradition? And does it actually do justice to all the data, including the eschatological urgency of conversion through intersubjective encounter with Christ and his Body? To add a prescriptive precept to these probings, one might say that for Lonergan, the last thing systematics is about is systems building.

A second, yet allied, issue concerning the uniqueness of Christianity from the perspective of Lonergan's work is the distance he maintained from one of the central positions of the *nouvelle theologie,* as this emerged in the 1940s and 1950s. Lonergan took the view, and argued the case philosophically, that one could not rule out a "state of pure nature," while at the same time he maintained that the "state of pure nature" was itself a rather peripheral theological theorem.[66] If he held the latter, one might

[65] Mansini is not alone in believing there is quite massive disagreement between the positions of these two theologians, once the implications of their positions are worked out dialectically, despite the linking of the two as "transcendental Thomists" in the standard dictionary entries. See Raymond Moloney, "The Mind of Christ in Transcendental Theology: Rabner, Lonergan and Crowe," *The Heythrop Journal* 25 (1984): 299-300; J. Michael Stebbins, "Introduction," in *The Divine Initiative* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); Michael Vertin, "Marechal, Lonergan, and the Phenomenology of Knowing," in M. Lamb, ed., *Creativity and Method: Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981), 411-22; Guy Mansini, "Rabner and Balthasar on the Efficacy of the Cross," *The Irish Theological Quarterly* 63 (1998): 232-49.

[66] See "The Natural Desire to See God," in Bernard Lonergan, *Collection* (2d ed.), ed. F.E. Crowe and R.M. Doran (Toronto Univ. Press: Toronto, 1988); also the ample treatment of this area of Lonergan's theology given in Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative.*

ask, why bother to go to the trouble of defending the former notion? I think it is especially in hindsight that the point of such a defense becomes dear. What Lonergan detected in some of the aspects of the *nouvelle theologie* were elements cognate with a theology modeled on philosophical deduction, or demonstration, which had been manifest before in fourteenth-century nominalism and nineteenth-century semirationalism.

Given this context as background, one can move on to examine some of the points relevant to our question made by Lonergan in chapter 20 of *Insight,* a chapter Lonergan continued to believe important in his late period as can be witnessed from his late essay "Mission and the Spirit."[67] This chapter is a Lonerganian equivalent to Rahner's *Hearers of the Word,* or the philosophical reflections on the "obediential capacity" one finds in, say, BlondeL However, the differences are as significant as the similarities. For one thing, Lonergan's position runs counter to Rahner's central thesis concerning the "deduction" of the Incarnation from the phenomenon of the "final bringer of Salvation." Lonergan argues that one may anticipate a divine solution, communication to humankind, given the problem of evil and the divine goodness. However, he distinguishes between what he calls "natural solutions," "relatively supernatural solutions," and "absolutely supernatural solutions"- among the latter of which, one may infer, would be the Incarnation.[68] If Lonergan's philosophical analysis is correct here, Rahner's attempted transcendental deduction is stymied. For one could not deduce that the word of God claiming to be definitive (and part of the divine solution would be assistance offered to see that this was God's definitive word as far as human history is concerned) entailed the Incarnation of the Word. One can, of course, think of concrete historical examples which would give some idea of what this could mean: for example, the Koran accepted as God's definitive word, and ruling out an idea of Incarnation. One would be hard put to it to show that this Islamic approach was incorrect on purely philosophical grounds, and one would have to contend with Lonergan's argument to the contrary.

[67] In Lonergan, *Third Collection,* 23-34.

[68] Lonergan, *Insight,* 725.

One of the philosophical perspectives Lonergan brings to bear on this theological issue derives from his analysis of the emergently probable course of cosmic evolution. Given the indeterminacy of stages or levels of emergence relative to future developments, the indeterminacy of the potency of a stage of cosmic development implies that one cannot always determine with exactitude what such and such a "nature" will ultimately require or demands (within the wider context of world-order) for its fulfillment. It is therefore again too quick, from a philosophical perspective, to say that human beings require divine sonship for the fulfilment "nature" demands, or that the Incarnation has any kind of cosmogenic or anthropological necessity attached to it. One might suggest that in this way, maintaining a notion of "obediential capacity" which is genuine and yet highlights indeterminacy, Lonergan does more justice to the Barthian insistence on the novelty and sovereign freedom of divine self-communication.

In a number of ways Ratzinger's questions concerning the adequacy of Rahner's analysis are cognate with Lonergan's treatment in chapter 20 of *Insight.* Just as Ratzinger indicates that Christianity and conversion have more to do with "going beyond" being a man than with accepting oneself as such, and that history's own tension manifests this struggle, so Lonergan insists that

> the heightened tension, which would result from a supernatural solution, would not lack its objectification in the dialectical succession of human situations ... when this problem of evil is met by a supernatural solution, human perfection itself becomes a limit to be transcended ... there will be a humanism in revolt against the proffered supernatural solution ... rest[ing] on man's proud content to be just a man, and its tragedy is that, on the present supposition of a supernatural solution, to be just a man is what a man cannot be.[69]

What this analysis of Lonergan's suggests is that every form of "humanism" is some fundamental form of alienating ideology. A constant theme of the present pontificate has been the Holy Father's proclamation of the teaching of *Gaudium et spes:* m

[69] Ibid., 728-29.

God to Man Christ at once reveals man to himself. Perhaps one may say, then, that any form of "humanism," of human religion (and here one can include all religions of humankind to some extent which, unlike Christianity, are not the self-revelation of God, whatever their undoubted God-given goodness may be), has to it the tragic aspect of concealing and alienating man from himself, since none propose precisely that self-revelation of man as son in the Son, to which dignity he is called and compelled. To reverse Rahner's point, that to accept oneself and one's existence is to accept salvation, one may urge that the tragic element in history involves mutually self-mediating meaning and (dis)values in human beliefs which precisely prevent any real discovery of who one is or what one is, most fundamentally, called to be. Thus without the Word I cannot accept my existence, for I know not what that self and that existence are, or are meant to be.

Here we may return to the methodological issue of a systematics which is truly "modest" and which truly strives to do justice, through models and analogies, to the truths of faith. For one can ask whether the Rahnerian scheme of things does justice to the massive theme in revelation of the profound tragedy which marks the history of the human race in its alienation from God, a tragedy which goes hand in hand with the wonder of redemption from the thrall of such alienation. We need, then, models that do justice to the drama of conversion, to the passionate desire for the Word, and intersubjective communion with Him and his Body-models that do justice to the eschatological urgency of conversion, and the redemption of a whole universe in the pangs of giving birth, as the Pauline vision has it.

A key element in Rahner's account is the analogy or model of the move from "anonymous Christianity" to explicit conversion to Christ provided by the philosophical analysis of the way a person may move from implicit, unthematic "knowledge" to explicit, thematic knowledge regarding, for example, his own cognitive capacities. Although Lonergan and Rabner have divergent views of knowledge, consciousness, and this very process of explication, one may grant, from Lonergan's perspective, that something akin to what Rabner describes can occur in

the process of individual self-discovery. No doubt, one can say that such a process is indeed a good both for the individual and for the community, and is vitally important as history progresses: for we have seen how vitally important intellectual conversion is for Lonergan. However, the question remains whether this transition, or conversion from implicit to explicit, provides us with a dramatic enough instance for understanding the drama of conversion to Christ. For myriad are those in human history (saints included), who have lived out authentic lives without such a process of self-discovery. Can we say that for the individual such a growth in self-knowledge is so decisive or totally necessary? For it does not appear that the gospel call to conversion is offered in such an "optional" manner, or to the few who might benefit from it and mediate its benefits to others.

There is, I believe, a more dramatic anthropological model to be found Lonergan's work which provides images for insight into the passionate urgency which the call to conversion has always manifested in Christianity.

Writing of the necessity of the Word for human meaning and being, Lonergan uses the analogy of the couple who are in love but have not yet offered the word, or expression, of love to one another; when they do so the word is not optional, nor empty, but creates a new situation of mutual self-mediation in its expression.[70] However, while Lonergan employs this analogy when writing of the significance of the word for religion, in *Method*, he provides an even more powerful anthropological image of the importance of the word in an earlier section of the work, a section dealing with linguistic meaning in which the discussion has no intended theological import. The story he uses is that of the breakthrough to linguistic meaning of the dumb and mute Helen Keller. Lonergan writes,

> The moment of language in human development is most strikingly illustrated by the story of Helen Keller's discovery that the successive touches made on her hand by her teacher conveyed names of objects. The moment when she first caught on was marked by the expression of profound emotion and, in turn, the emotion bore fruit in so powerful an interest that she signified her desire to

[70] Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 113.

learn and did learn the names of about twenty objects in a very short time. It was the beginning of an incredible career of learning. [71]

He goes on to draw out the existential and ontological significance for the becoming of the person of Helen Keller of this encounter with the liberating word:

In Helen Keller's emotion and interest one can surmise the reason why ancient civilizations prized names so highly .... Prizing names is prizing the human achievement of bringing conscious intentionality into sharp focus and, thereby, setting about the double task of both ordering one's world and orienting oneself within it. Just as the dream at daybreak may be said to be the beginning of the process from impersonal existence to the presence of a person in his world, so listening and speaking are a major part in the achievement of that presence. [72]

While the move from potency to act involved in the shift from adult self-consciousness to explicit self-knowledge, which provides Rahner with an analogy for the shift from unthematic anonymous Christianity to explicit Christian conversion, is no doubt an important good, the far more dramatic instance of Helen Keller's transformation from inchoate, passionately frustrated conscious disorientation to a new life of presence to self and to others through the mediation of the word is a far more appropriate instance of the movement from potency to act through which to appreciate the drama of the moment of Christian conversion. Again, returning to Rahner's point concerning self-acceptance as salvific acceptance of Christ, we can see in poor Helen Keller's example an anthropological image of helplessness such that acceptance of oneself or one's existence is impossible without the coming of the word which, as coming from the outside, both reveals the "other" of the teacher and the world and at once allows Helen's own self-discovery and self-constitution. Sacrament-like, it effects, as effective and constitutive meaning, what it proclaims. To return to a point made above, one can perhaps say that aH "humanisms" (including all non-Christian religions), whatever noble and graced elements

[71] Ibid., 70.

[72] Ibid.

there may be in them, nevertheless contain "words" of obfuscation and alienation within them precisely insofar as they cannot be that incarnate Word of Christianity which reveals to persons, and effects as it reveals, their new nature as sons and daughters in the Son.

A further allied question may be raised at this point. Does the gospel message of salvation and the truths of faith revealed require us to say that Christian nature, the nature of adopted Divine filiation, is always and everywhere found with human nature? In other words, is Rahner's anthropological model of anonymous Christianity a cogent way of understanding the truths of faith concerning the call to conversion? Bearing in mind the methodological point made above concerning the relation between systematics and doctrines in theological method, we can ask whether there are not only rivals to Rahner's account here, but in fact models which do more justice to the eschatological urgency of the gospel call to conversion than does Rahner's view. Keeping in mind the points made so far, then, I will now move on to consider a little more explicitly some questions that arise from the teaching "no salvation outside the Church."[73]

The Church has always held to the teaching "no salvation outside the Church," which received explicit formulation in the magisterium at the councils of Lateran IV and Florence, as expressing the eschatological urgency of Christian conversion found in the gospel. Since 1863, however, there have been a number of explicit statements of the magisterium that guard against false interpretations of the Church's faith; thus it is held that in the mysterious providence of God those not now in visible communion with Christ or his members may become so and thus see the face of God. Understandably, perhaps, these two aspects of the Church's teaching in this area are sometimes felt to be in some tension. But one can point to other areas in the develop-

[73] Still helpful in this area, for texts and commentary, are Joseph Fenton, *The Catholic Church and Salvation* (Glasgow: Sands and Co., 1959); and George J. Dyer, *Limbo: Unsettled Question* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964). A more recent treatment is Francis Sullivan, *Salvation outside the Church?* (London: Chapman, 1992). Sullivan's interpretation of the data in this area of doctrinal development is, however, not without its critics: see Avery Dulles, "The Church as Locus of Salvation," in *The Thought of Pope John Paul II*, ed. John M. McDermott, S.J. (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1993), 169-88.

ment of dogma where non-mutually-exclusive truths are finally discerned as complementing each other within the plan of salvation. One can think of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, opposed by some in the name of the doctrine that all men and women require salvation from the fallen human state by Christ. The doctrine could be readily confessed once it was realized that it was not a negation of this truth: our Lady was truly redeemed by Christ, but in an exceptional and anticipatory manner.

Perhaps the most explicit magisterial statement on the way the Church's doctrine is to be understood is the Holy Office letter "Suprema haec sacra" of 1949. The letter draws an analogy between those not visibly in the Church and those who died as catechumens, or received baptism by desire in some way (e.g., soldiers in the early centuries of persecution who expressed solidarity with their intended Christian victims and thus shared their fate). The "baptism of desire" of these persons, always admitted by tradition as genuine (thus by the fathers of Florence), may be extended so as to include an "implicit desire" for baptism on the part of those not visibly in the Church but who respond to God's grace with upright lives. It is clear, then, that salvation only comes through being incorporated into Christ. However, one should note that the document modestly states that those who live an upright life and thus may been deemed to have an implicit desire for union with Christ can be saved. It does not put flesh on the bones to say more concerning the manner of this salvation. One could go on to ask, therefore, further questions: for example, does an implicit desire need, at some point, to become more explicit if it is to be recognizably a desire for an intersubjective encounter with the incarnate Word? Indeed, other statements of the magisterium may incline one to pursue such further questions. Thus the teaching of Florence that each person must embrace the faith before death points, I believe, in the direction of some account of this "implicit" desire becoming more explicit.

The alternative to Rahner's view that "Christian nature" is always and everywhere found in history which I would suggest is that, firstly, we need not make this affirmation. Rather, I would suggest the anthropological model suggested by the Helen Keller

story: without the encounter with incarnate Word, normally as mediated by the members of his Body, one neither knows the nature to which one is called nor does one yet share that nature. The mission of the Spirit is not collapsed into that of the Son on this account. For the passionate dynamism, the upward struggle towards the fullness of life, so strikingly exemplified in the Helen Keller story, is the unsettling, yet consoling, work of the Holy Spirit calling us towards knowledge of and reception filiation in the Son. Not share this nature grace, but all experience the call to it in an way. Of course, those who have received the priceless gift hear the words that "to those whom much is given much is expected," and part of that expectation is that they share the gift with those who have not yet received it.

Perhaps the Keller story, of someone so heroic and so physically challenged, suggests a broader theological analogy. In the world order God has created many there are who are not destined to grow to maturity in the physical order of creation; numerous are those who have died as infants or before birth. In God's mysterious design these too will grow into maturity, and that through the grace of his life, death, and resurrection. However, one can understand that the created world order is, in some way, primarily for the full growth to maturity of human persons, without denying that these others will, in God's mercy, do so. Analogously, all are called to the fullness of life beginning here and now in encounter with Christ, but in God's providence many wiH not achieve this until an eschatological moment at the end of life; yet they will do so "through the others," through Christ and his members.

What then could one suggest in place of Christian nature always and everywhere being found, if one admits of a general desire for that nature, and also admits the teaching of the magisterium that only the Church can there be salvation? To suggest reflections in this area pertaining to the theology of the moment of death would not be novel. The theologian B. C. Buder, reflecting upon the implications of Lonergan's work for ecclesiology, came to the condusion that a theological model suggesting conversion to Christ and reception into his Body at (before) the moment of death would best do justice to the

theological data to be understood. [74] Interestingly enough the text from Lonergan that suggested such a conclusion to Butler supports the teaching of Florence. For, Lonergan insists, the divine solution must be accepted and assented to in conscious freedom. (One can understand that the Florence assertion of the need of "acceptance before death" is itself not some drawing of an artificial line but an assertion concerning freedom.) Such a theology of the moment of death need not involve itself in the problems associated with such positions as those of L. Boros (successfully criticized by G. Grisez and others). [75] In this area, I believe, there is no reason why, with due caution, theologians should not take as seriously as do a number of philosophers the data which the numerous studies on "near-death experiences" offer for analysis. One of the theologian's doughtiest opponents, A. N. Flew, a philosopher with every reason to wish for a reductive explanation of such data, has in recent work admitted that much of it is extremely difficult to explain away. [76] For our purposes it is interesting to observe that many of the accounts of such near-death experiences concern "conversions" of a moral and cognitive nature: persons have a different view of existence after them, may move from atheism to theism, and so forth. A theological model making sense of the data provided by the tradition could suggest that "before death" as the final separation there is such an encounter with Christ or his members as to constitute an explicit conversion: an acceptance of an intersubjective relationship with Christ.

How "explicit" this would need to be in order to be a genuine intersubjective encounter freely welcomed before death (welcomed by one prepared through grace-filled upright living) is

[74] Bishop B. C. Butler, "Lonergan and Ecclesiology," in *Foundations of Theology*, ed. Philip McShane (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971), 4-5. Butler refers to Lonergan, *Insight*, 697.

[75] For Grisez's criticism of L. Boros see, G. Grisez, *The Way of the Lord Jesus*, vol. 1 (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), chap. 16. J. H. Wright's article, "Death (Theology of)," in the *New Catholic Encyclopaedia* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 687-95, also critical of "fundamental option" theories of the moment of death, demonstrates, however, the variety of divergent theological theories in this area at the time of the appearance of Boros's book. See also Dyer, *Limbo*, chapters 4 and 5, for examples of Catholic theologies from 1930 to 1960 of "the moment of death."

[76] See, e.g., Anthony Flew, *The Logic of Mortality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).

open to further reflection. But one should recall that there are lessons here in the way the tradition recognized that unbaptized catechumens or even those who died a martyrdom in solidarity with Christians were "in the Church." Their knowledge of Christianity might be very meager, rudimentary; but in such cases there was a genuine intersubjective encounter with Christ or his Body, not simply a transcendental orientation towards the divine or divine salvific acts. Ratzinger worries that the "transcendental orientation" to Christ is precisely that which tends to render the intersubjective encounter in history with Christ otiose. What is the difference between such a "relationship" and the relationship to possible nonincarnate divine salvific acts? What distinguishes our relation to the Son in his mission from that to the Spirit in his? No doubt the objection will be made that postulating some kind of encounter with Christ and his Body at (before) death, however mysterious an encounter it is acknowledged to be, smacks of a *Deus ex machina* solution. However, it appears to me less strained than a theory that would postulate that those who explicitly excoriate and deny Christ and his Body or are indifferent to them, for apparently upright reasons, are still, implicitly, in an intersubjective relationship of love with Him. This appears to strain the notion of intersubjective relationship with another incarnate person beyond any meaningful limit. Besides, there appear to be numerous divine interventions in the New Testament which from a variety of perspectives would be seen by opponents as marked with *ex machina* artificiality.

One further observation concerning the "urgency" of the call to Christian conversion can be made. *As* was noted above, when those who in God's providence are not destined to grow to "full stature" in this life are called by Him to do so in the next, it is through the Other, Christ, and his Body that they do so. The urgency of the call to conversion to Christ is then not just for my own salvation but that I might assist in the salvation of the others. The Christian message is that I am only saved in working for the salvation of others, and this is no less true regarding the mystery of the salvation of those who enter the Church and thereby assume a new Christian nature only at the eschatological point of death. Just as the infant receives baptism through the faith of

others (viz., the parents), so those persons also receive that faith through the mystery of the life and faith of the Church. Through the offering of the sacrifice of the Mass, the worthy celebration and reception of the sacraments, and the living from them into daily life, God's grace flows also to these others. God's victory and victorious presence in this world are assured through his death and resurrection. Yet He genuinely requires our help in continuing this work: the Church can through the lives of its members be more or less effective in being a beacon of salvation to the nations. The urgency of conversion to Christ is an urgency not only for myself but also the concern that others, including those not in communion with the Body during most of the course of their lives, enter the kingdom.

CONCLUSION

This article has taken the form of an extended reflection on issues raised in Cardinal Ratzinger's 1993 lecture "Christ, Faith, and the Challenge of Cultures." I have attempted an exploration of those issues from the perspective of Bernard Lonergan's philosophy and theology. In clarifying what Lonergan means by the shift from "classicism to historical mindedness" I have not only attempted to show that a more careful and nuanced appropriation of his meaning is required than is sometimes evident, but I have attempted to elucidate some quite far-reaching consequences of his position that bear upon discussions of Christianity and culture. In particular I have indicated the quite radical implications that emerge from Lonergan's analysis of the "origins of Christian realism" for discussions of inculturation and mission in a postmodern context. Lonergan's notion of the identity of Christian culture in the ongoing contexts of history is, I suggest, a strong one. It is perhaps worth reflecting on the fact that the very scholar from whom Lonergan learned an anthropological notion of culture, Christopher Dawson, also argued forcefully for a strong version of the thesis of Christian cultural identity, not

from a classicist base, but precisely in terms of anthropological and historical data.[77]

Lonergan's analysis of Christian realism is both a powerful argument in favor of such cultural identity and a brilliant analysis of the way in which the divinely revealed truths of the Catholic faith are the dynamic catalysts of authentic spiritual and cultural evolution. As we now shift from a "modern" ·period, in which theological modernism found its milieu, to a postmodern, the writings of Lonergan, Macintyre, and Ratzinger, among others, point the way to an authentic appropriation of what might be entailed in such a cultural shift, sifting the wheat from the deconstructive and relativist chaff.

[77] On the thought of Christopher Dawson see Stratford Caldecott and John Morrill, eds., *Eternity in Time: Christopher Dawson and the Catholic Idea of History* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark Publications, 1997).

The Thomist 64 (2000): 211-37

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A PURELY NATURAL END FOR MAN

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Denis Bradley's recent *book, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good,*[1] addresses St. Thomas's central and profound teaching regarding the relation of nature to grace. Bradley's interpretation of this doctrine is specially informed by the seeming contradiction between St. Thomas's affirmation of a natural desire to know the essence of God[2] and his insistence that "there is another good of man that exceeds the proportion of human nature because the natural powers are not sufficient for attaining, or thinking, or desiring it."[3]

The passages reflecting these teachings, prominently compared by Bradley,[4] are further complicated by another argument he cites from Thomas:

> Man would have been created frustrated and in vain if he were not able to attain beatitude, as is the case with anything that is not able to attain its ultimate end. Lest man be created frustrated and inane, because he is born with original sin, God proposed from the beginning a remedy for the human race, through which man could be liberated from this inanity-the mediator, himself God and man, Jesus Christ. Through faith in Him the impediment of original sin is able to be taken away.[5]

[1] Denis Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1997), hereinafter cited as *Aquinas.*

[2] *Summa theologiae,* I-II, q. 3, a. 8.

[3] *De veritate,* q. 14, a. 2, quoted from *Aquinas,* 457.

[4] Ibid., 457.

[5] *De malo,* q. 5, a. 1, ad 1, quoted from *Aquinas,* 473.

In a tradition of exegesis that hearkens to the influence of Henri de Lubac in this century, Bradley interprets these teachings as affirming an implicit natural desire for intrinsically supernatural beatitude.[6] He argues further that the imperfection of natural beatitude, and the doctrine that man can be intellectively and volitionally fully perfected only by the vision of God, leaves us with a nature that is "naturally endless."[7] That is, short of supernatural beatitude, not only in this given economy of God's providence but in any possible order of divine providence, human nature would be naturally endless because "radically unfulfilled."[8] Or, as Bradley puts it, *"Natural beatitude in any form does not satisfy man's natural desire for beatitude."*[9] From this proposition he derives the putative fact of human nature's endlessness. This point is further accentuated by his insistence that for St. Thomas obediential potency is merely a creature's susceptibility to miraculous divine action, rather than the passive potency distinctively characterizing a being's susceptibility to God's active agency.[10]

Accordingly, I will here address five principal points, with a view toward showing the coherence of St. Thomas's teaching and thus contextualizing the problematic texts highlighted by Bradley's incisive treatment. To this end I will (1) briefly address St. Thomas's doctrine of human nature's obediential potency for grace; (2) summarize Bradley's account of the natural "endlessness" of nature; (3) present an interpretation of the natural desire for God that does not imply the "endlessness of nature" apart from intrinsically supernatural beatitude; (4) consider the inner symmetry between St. Thomas's teaching that nature would be

[6] *Aquinas,* 445-46: "Aquinas says with unequivocal clarity that the will *as a nature* does have a natural appetite or an innate desire for good in general or happiness. This innate desire for happiness, which is not an elicited desire since it is antecedent to any intellectual act, is certainly an *inclinatio naturae.* The natural desire to see God is *implicitly* contained in the necessary desire for the perfect good or happiness that structures the will, or in the necessary desire, which follows upon the nature of the intellect, to know in general the cause of any known effect." I shall treat this argument of Bradley in detail below.

[7] Ibid., 514.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., 513.

[10] *Aquinas,* 449: "Miracles, then, serve as the Thomistic prototype for understanding the obediential potency of a creature."

vain apart from grace and his teaching that the natural end proportioned to man could, in a different order of providence, have been a genuine (if imperfect) finality; and finally (5) attempt to show how the doctrine of obediential potency, and a correct interpretation of the natural desire for God, enable St. Thomas to affirm an ontological profundity of man which is corevealed to humanity in Christ, and which could not positively be grasped on the basis of pure nature alone.

The substance of these issues-a source of mid-century crisis at the time of *Humani generis*,[11] and of persistent controversy since-is brought to new exigence by Bradley's work, by the contributions of the *Communio* school of theology, [12] and even by certain strands of contemporary Greek theology. [13] Hence to this issue's systematic profundity we may add a note of contemporary significance.

I. OBEDIENTIAL POTENCY

Obediential potency represents the passive potency of a nature in relation to an extrinsic active agency. Hence in *De virtutibus in communi*, a. 10, ad 13, St. Thomas addresses an objection to the effect that acts are of the same genus as their potencies, but that

[11] For an example of an effort during this time favorably to articulate certain aspects of the Dominican commentator tradition on this issue of the desire for God-especially given the prominently contrary teaching of Henri de Lubac, which was gaining widespread influence at the time-see William R. O'Connor, *The Natural Desire for God* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1948). His analysis may be found at greater length in his work *The Eternal Quest* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., Inc., 1947). O'Connor's criticisms of the Scotistic reading of St. Thomas are apt, and his insistence that the natural end is not "terminative" is striking. But in the present author's judgment his excellent analysis falls short in one critical respect: it does not sufficiently articulate the philosophic and theological richness of the conception of obediential potency as safeguarding the most profound elements in Christian anthropology.

[12] Cf. Cf. David Schindler, *Heart of the World, Center of the Church* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996); or his "Christology, Public Theology, and Thomism: De Lubac, Balthasar, and Murray," in *The Future of Thomism*, ed. Deal W. Hudson and Dennis Wm. Moran (Notre Dame: American Maritain Association, 1992), especially 253-54 n. 9, wherein he argues that nature is definitionally unknowable in precision from grace.

[13] E.g., John D. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985).

creatures by definition lack potency for divine acts. Inasmuch as creatures have different passive potencies in relation to different active agencies, a passive obediential potency for acts achievable only with divine aid is intelligible. As St. Thomas writes: "and accordingly we say that the whole creation is in a certain potency of obedience, according as the whole creation obeys God to be able to receive in itself whatever God wills."[14] This "potency of obedience" is readily and initially understood by many interpreters as merely a susceptibility to divine miracle. Such a tendency is understandable, but overgeneric. The specific character of obediential potency is found in the differing passive potencies of natures in relation to different active agencies. As St. Thomas argues, water or earth have diverse passive potencies in respect of the diverse active agencies of fire, the heavenly bodies, and God.[15] And these diverse passive potencies vis-a-vis different active agencies are partially rooted in the characters of the natures involved.

For example, one might say that there is an obediential potency of a stone to be miraculously transformed by God into a human being, but this would be an extremely generic and improper use of the conception of "obediential potency" since obediential potency has to do with what a *nature* can receive from the active agency of God, and in this case the nature of the stone in fact receives nothing, but is simply transformed so as no longer to be a stone. Properly speaking, it is dear that a 'stone does not have an obediential potency to perform specifically human acts, because a rock lacks any passive potency-even with divine aid -either to understand or to will (it naturally lacks these faculties, and hence it cannot even be "helped" to understand and love). By contrast, the human soul does have an obediential potency for the supernatural gift of divine friendship, because-owing to the natural character of intellect and will-it can, with divine aid, be brought to intimate knowledge and love of God. This human obediential potency for intrinsically supernatural friendship is purely passive, for the human intellect and will can reach to

[14] "et secundum hoc dicimus quod in tota creatura est quaedam obedientialis potentia, prout tota creatura obedit Deo ad suscipiendum in se quidquid Deus voluerit."

[11] St. Thomas Aquinas, *De virtutibus in communi,* a. 10, ad 13.

intimate knowledge and love of God solely through divine aid. Yet the passive potency is conditioned by the actual nature God has bestowed-it is only because of man's essentially spiritual nature that he has an obediential potency to the supernatural life.

Bradley argues that whereas obediential potency is spoken of by St. Thomas in relation to Christ's possession of infused miraculous or prophetic knowledge, Thomas expressly fails to mention obediential potency in relation to Christ's knowledge of the beatific vision. Thus, for example, "The term is *not* mentioned at the very juncture where it could be used if Aquinas had thought it should be used."[16] *Sed contra:* if the notion of obediential potency must be deployed to account for our Lord's human possession of lesser instances of supernatural knowledge, a fortiori must it be deployed to account for his possession of the beatific vision. If obediential potency merely referred to susceptibility to transmutative miracle, then this conception could not be used by Thomas regarding Christ's possession of infused miraculous or prophetic knowledge. It is human nature, under the active agency of God, which in a sense is capable of such knowledge-and so this knowledge is not mere extrinsic susceptibility to miracle.

The supernatural vision of God, being starkly supernatural, dearly outstrips the capacity of unaided nature.[17] The phrase actually used by St. Thomas about beatific vision as being "in a certain way above the nature of the rational soul, according as it cannot come to it of its own strength" ("quodammodo supra naturam animae rationalis, inquantum scilicet propria virtute ad earn pervenire non potest"), while yet affirming that "in another way it does accord with its [the soul's] nature according as it is capable of it as made according to the likeness of God" ("Alio vero modo est secundum naturam ipsius, inquantum scilicet

[16] For this whole discussion see *Aquinas,* 453-55. The quotation is taken from p. 455.

[17] CL Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3: "Dicendum quod visio seu scientia beata est quodammodo supra naturam animae rationalis, inquantum scilicet propria virtute ad earn pervenire non potest. Alio vero modo est secundum naturam ipsius, inquantum scilicet per naturam suam est capax eius, prout scilicet ad imaginem Dei facta est, ut supra dictum est. Sed scientia increata est omnibus modis supra naturam animae humanae."

secundum naturam suam est capax eius, prout sdlicet est imaginem Dei facta"), conforms perfectly to the doctrine of an obediential potency to grace and glory. In other words, human nature, with divine aid, is capable of beatitude. Alone it is not capable of attaining it, but even so it does retain the remote capacity to *be so aided* by God-a capacity lacking in any noncognitive being.

Further, it ought be noted that St. Thomas considers the "capacity" of a nature relation to that which God can bring forth from it precisely in addressing the capacity of human nature for "the grace of union, which is the greatest grace." Referring to this grace of union, he writes that

> A double capability may be perceived in human nature: one, according to the order of natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its natural capability; the other according to the order of divine power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of pertains to this. But God does not fulfill all such capabilities, otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is false, as earlier stated. [18]

Surely it is noteworthy that St. Thomas here states that a "duplex capacitas attendi potest in human natura." For this capacity of human nature for the grace of union under the active agency of God (1) *is* a capacity-for only a cognitive being can be so uplifted to the grace of union-and (2) *is* thus a "potency under obedience" or obediential potency-that is, a "capacity" that can be realized only under the active agency of God and is purely

[18] *SI'h* HI, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 3, wherein the objection hinges on human nature's capacity for the greatest grace as not increased by sin; and then ad 3, wherein we are instructed: "Dicendum quod duplex capacitas attendi potest in humana natura. Una quidem secundum ordinem potentiae naturalis. Quae a Deo semper impletur, qui dat unicuique rei secundum suam capacitatem naturalem. Alia vero secundum orclinem divinae potentiae, cui omnis creatura obedit ad nutum. *Et ad hoc pertinet ista capa,citas.* Non autem Deus omnem talem capacitatem naturae implet; alioquin Deus non posset facere in creatura nisi quod facit; quod falsum est, ut in Primo habitum est.-Nihil autem prohibet ad aliquicl maius humanam naturam productam esse post peccatum; Deus enim permittit mala fieri ut incle aliquid melius eliciat. Uncle dicitur *Rom.* V: 'ubi abundavit delictum, superabundavit et gratia'. Uncle et in benedictione cerei paschalis dicitur: 'O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem'" (emphasis added).

passive on the part of the creature, yet founded on the character of the creature's nature as susceptible to a given kind of divine aid. Ergo Bradley's argument that "the term is *not* mentioned at the very juncture where it could be used if Aquinas had thought it should be used" preoccupies itself solely with terminology where the identical principle, however accidentally divergent in terminological expression, ought to be discerned. For in the relevant passage the purely passive capacity of human nature to be aided by God to achieve the grace of divine union is identified, and this capacity is founded on two elements: the spiritual nature of man and the active agency of God.

The nature and role of the doctrine of obediential potency within St. Thomas's doctrine is much controverted, and in this century figures such as LaPorta and de Lubac have argued vigorously against it being a constituent of St. Thomas's teaching of the relation of nature and grace.[19] In another context I have tried to address in depth the anthropological structure upon which the obediential potency for grace is conditioned, and to

[19] See, for example, Henri de Lubac, *Surnaturel: Etude historiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946); *Augustinisme et theologie moderne* (Paris: Aubier, 1965), 242-51; *Le mystere du surnaturel* (Paris: Aubier, 1965), noteworthy for its criticism of the Dominican commentator tradition, 87-88, 142, 179-89; in English, see de Lubac's *The Mystery of the Supernatural,* trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967). See also J. Laporta, *La destinee de la nature humane selon Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1965). Laporta devotes an appendix to arguing that St. Thomas does not use the language of obediential potency in his account of the supernatural destiny of man (133-46).

In a recent article, Brian Shanley approvingly cites Bradley's "challenge to the legitimacy of any allegedly Thomistic ethic based on the fictitious 'natural end' of man," noting that Bradley is in line with Laporta on this point (Brian J. Shanley, O.P., "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," *The Thomist* 63 [1999]: 555). Shanley himself argues that acquired natural virtue as efficacious apart from grace is localized wholly Within political order, apparently because of the realization that after the Fall man is no longer able naturally to love God above himself (see *STh* 1-11, q. 109, a. 4). The point is well taken. However, once acquired natural virtue is defined exclusively within a limited political context, it would seem that *personal* ethical virtues would be subject to moral norms only from the side of grace, and not from nature-yet it is with natural love, even prior to divine charity, that we aboriginally flow forth from creation loving our Creator above ourselves. When this rational inclination is diminished through sin (as St. Thomas teaches that it is: see *STh* 1-11, q. 85, a. 1) the whole ethical life shivers with the tremors of alienation. As it is a natural (as well as a supernatural) ordering that is disrupted by sin, so one can identify the natural acquired virtues that, despite this disruption, are ordered to God.

give summary response to the issues raised by these critics.[20] For the present, it will suffice merely to indicate that the conception of obediential potency outlined here can apply to the relation of nature to supernatural grace (as shown regarding the "grace of union"), and that, while utterly passive, the obediential potency yet is founded upon something positive: namely, upon the intellective and volitional powers of man, which are intrinsically spiritual powers manifesting the ontological profundity of human nature.

Hence the words of Jacques Maritain: "It is necessary that there be in man an 'obediential potency' which, answering to the divine omnipotence, renders him apt to receive a life which surpasses infinitely the capacities of his nature."[21]

II. THE PUTATIVE "ENDLESSNESS" OF NATURE

There has long been a difficulty regarding the status of the arguments brought by St. Thomas to the effect that perfect beatitude is possible only in the next life, and that it requires vision of the divine essence. Working on the force of the conclusion that the perfectly final end is supernatural beatitude, which alone can fully perfect and satisfy intellect and will, Bradley argues that nature taken in itself, and in precision from supernatural completion, is "endless."[22] That is, since only the vision of God can perfectly fulfill human nature-a proposition clearly asserted by Thomas-in an order of providence lacking supernatural fulfillment man's nature would be vain.

In this respect, Bradley can draw heavily from the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas in the *Prima secundae:*

[20] I treat the anthropological structure implicit in St. Thomas's teaching regarding the human obediential potency for the supernatural life in "Obediential Potency, Human Knowledge, and the Natural Desire for God," *International Philosophical Quarterly* (March, 1997).

[21] Jacques Maritain, *Approaches to God,* trans. Peter O'Reilly (New York: Harper, 1954), 112.

[22] For example, Bradley speaks forthrightly of what he describes as "Aquinas's doctrine of man's natural endlessness" *(Aquinas,* 529).

It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.[23]

Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is dear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.[24]

These two passages establish, first, that the natural good cannot be construed as coequal with the supernatural good, as though the natural good in precision from supernatural beatitude were a separate and perfect end. Second, St. Thomas argues that all ends derive their "end-likeness" or very appetibility from being further ordered to the last end. Inasmuch as all Christians admit that in this order of providence the final end for man is the supernatural beatific vision, it seems to follow that the imperfect natural end is an end at all only inasmuch as it is further ordered to supernatural beatitude-of which any natural end is an imperfect similitude and participation.

Moreover, it is dear that for St. Thomas no finite good can quell the will perfectly:

It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which quiets the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e., of man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that nothing can quiet the will of man, save the universal good. This is to be found not in any

[23] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 5.
[24] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 6.

creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man.[25]

While some may argue that this argument is formally theological, one notes that there is no premise in the argument knowable only through revelation; rather, the argument sets forth simply from the character of the formal object of the wm, and from the datum that no finite good so comprises the good-in-general as to render the will incapable of further desire. Hence only if the universal good subsists in one unique instance, and is attained by the creature, can the will be quieted-and God uniquely comprises the universal good.

Now, there is indeed no doubt that for Thomas the end of man is not only *de facto* that of the supernatural vision of God, but that man has some natural appetite to know God from the start. And it is in part the character of this "natural appetite" to know God that raises the question of man's natural "endlessness." If the natural "end" attainable in precision from supernatural beatitude cannot perfectly finalize the will-as we have just seen Thomas argue that it cannot (for he teaches that there is no natural knowledge of God other than that mediated by creaturely effects)-it would appear that apart from supernatural beatitude man is naturaHy "endless" and indeed (as Thomas says above) "vain." In responding to this argument and assessing it-both as it issues from Bradley, and in the roots of his interpretation within St. Thomas's text-we must first address the issue of the natural desire for God. For it is partiaHy in relation to this "natural desire" that it is supposed that man would be specifically unfulfilled and "endless" were God not to have ordained human nature to supernatural completion.

[25] *STh* I-H, q. 2, a. 8: "Dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinern hominis esse in aliquo bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum; alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc restaret aliquid appetendum. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus est universale vemm. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem parricipatam. Uncle solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest."

III. THE NATURAL DESIRE FOR GOD

The natural desire for God is a desire either elicited by prior knowledge -as when Thomas argues to this effect, "When a man knows an effect and knows that it has a cause, there remains in man a natural desire to know about the cause what it is. . . . Consequently, for perfect happiness, the intellect must reach the very essence of the First Cause"[26]-or it is not merely elicited by a particular bit of knowledge, but "natural" *(voluntas ut natura* as opposed to any particular voluntary act elicited by special knowledge). For St. Thomas "each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself."[27] This is distinguished from animal appetite and likened to "sight for seeing or sound for hearing" ("utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum"). But what is suitable to the will by its nature in this sense is intelligible good as such.

So there are two distinct types of natural desire that may be alleged: one elicited by our discovery that finite being has a unitary cause, and the other proceeding from the very nature of the will as ordered toward the universal good. In this second respect (regarding *voluntas ut natura)* Bradley argues that the desire for God-in whom the universal good subsists fully and uniquely-is natural and not elicited, *because it is implicit in that universal good which is the formal object of the will.* Hence he writes:

> Aquinas says with unequivocal clarity that the will *as a nature* does have a natural appetite or an innate desire for good in general or happiness. This innate desire for happiness, which is not an elicited desire since it is antecedent to any intellectual act, is certainly an *inclinatio naturae.* The natural desire to see God is *implicitly* contained in the necessary desire for the perfect good or happiness that structures the will, or in the necessary desire, which follows upon the nature of the intellect, to know in general the cause of any known effect.[28]

[26] *As* cited by Bradley in *Aquinas,* 457; originally from *STh* 1-11, q. 3, a. 8.

[27] *STh* I, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3: "Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu."

[28] *Aquinas,* 445-46.

Cleady he considers the elicited desire to target the vision of God (although Bradley will not designate it as in the strongest sense "natural," howsoever necessary it may be once we know the truth of the proposition that God exists).[29] The passage quoted above also and primarily bears witness that he deems *voluntas ut natura* to constitute a genuinely natural desire for God the strongest sense of "natural!'

Referring first to what Bradley judges the lesser or improperly natural instance of "natural desire"-the elicited desire to know God-it is important to note this desire is proportioned to the creaturely knowledge whence it originates. One may respond with adequacy to the text that the elicited desire is precisely not a *supernatural* desire for God. It is not a desire positively ordered to the inner being of God. Of course, whether the elicited desire to know the essence of the cause of creaturely effects is considered "natural" in the strongest sense or not, it is dearly natural as opposed to being supernatural. But it is a creaturely desire proportioned to the finite evidence whence it proceeds. This is to say that it is a desire to know the essence of the God who is *incognito,* known only through the effects of creatures.

There is an infinite disproportion between God in Himself and God merely as "cause of these created effects," because there is infinitely more perfection in God than in the creature. It is for precisely this reason that no Leibnitzean "best of all possible worlds" is intelligible from a Thomistic point of view, for any possible creation can be indefinitely "improved" by God, owing to God's infinite power: all possible worlds are infinitely remote from the divine perfection. So to desire God merely as "cause of these effects" is to desire God under an improper and disproportionate *ratio.* As such the elicited desire "knows not what it asks." Hence as Maritain writes:

> But this desire to know the *First Cause through its essence* is a desire which does not know what it asks, **like** the sons of Zebedee when they asked to sit on the right and on the left of the Son of Man. *Ye know not what ye ask,* Jesus replied to them. For to know the First Cause in **its** essence, or without the

[29] *Aquinas,* 447: "metaphysical desire to see God cannot, despite what Ferrariensis and Banez suggest, be called, in the precise Thomistic sense, a "natural desire."

intermediary of any other thing, is to know the First cause otherwise than as First Cause; it is to know it by ceasing to attain it by the very means by which we attain it, by ceasing to exercise the very act which bears us up to it.[30]

One recalls the cognate judgment of St. Thomas that philosophic knowledge of God should be compared with beatific knowing more as not-seeing to seeing than as not seeing so well to seeing better.[31] Because the elicited natural desire is *materially* a desire for God, but *formally* a desire for God solely under the *ratio* of "cause of these effects," it is not a desire for intrinsically supernatural beatitude. However, after the fact of revelation and under the light of grace, we do become aware that the object of this natural desire is in fact included within the object of the graced appetite for the beatific vision of the triune God. Yet this second graced appetite for beatific vision proceeds, not from mere natural evidence, but from the active agency of God upon the soul through supernatural grace.

This leaves us to consider *voluntas ut natura,* the desire that Bradley underscores as natural in the strongest sense (i.e., as following upon the native tendency of the volitional power). His argument is that desire for God is actually implicit in the natural ordering of the will to its formal object, which is the universal good. Yet this argument obscures an important proposition which, once understood, makes short shrift of this position. For it is truer to say of the universal good that its full perfection inheres "in" God than to say that the supernaturally beatific good is actually and implicitly "contained" in the universal good.

If it is held that naturally and in precision from grace we implicitly and actually desire God Himself in beatific vision under the *ratio* of the desire for intelligible-good-in-general, then the supereminent divine good is robbed of its utter perfection and transcendence. For the universal good is the-good in-general-it is the intelligible good in general to which the will is ordered by nature.[32] Yet God is no more this intelligible good in general than

[30] Maritain, *Approachesto God,* 109-10.

[31] Aquinas, *De Veritate,* q. 18, a. l.

[32] By "in general" I mean, not that the definition of the good as such includes generality, as in this case no individual good could be desired. Rather I mean to emphasize what St. Thomas emphasizes by referring to the formal object as "universal" (whereas the good as such

he is being-in-general. The error of supposing God to be included *within* universal being (or good) is an error in application of analogous predicates. The full perfection of good resides *in* God. Hence to say that God is implicitly included *in* the-good-in-general collapses creature and creator within a imivocal framework while also defining the object of the will as naturally deific (for only God naturally and properly knows and wills the divine good). It is indeed true that transcendental being and good are more truly predicated of God than of creatures. But we do not know the mode in which these transcendental perfections exist in God, but only the truth of the proposition that they do so. Thus, to affirm that the full perfection of transcendental good resides in God is not tantamount to the confession that the formal object of the will actually and implicitly contains God, because between the good in general and *ipsum bonum subsistens per se* there is an infinite divide.

By way of comparison one should consider the analogous *ratio* of being as contemplated by the metaphysician. Although the universal perfection of being subsists only in God, being is studied by the metaphysician in its created participations, which are not God. The metaphysician does not enjoy beatific knowledge in the contemplation of being, as he does not thereby enjoy direct knowledge of *ipsum esse subsistens per se*. Similarly, the universal truth and good, although subsisting only in God, signify truth and good in general in specifying the intellect and will, not a deific ordering of mind and will directly to the triune God. These observations do not prejudice the truth that all things find their perfection in God, and that intellective agents do so in an intellective manner. But natural knowledge of (and desire for) God remains infinitely distant from supernatural knowledge of (and desire for) God.

The desire for the intelligible good-in-general is not only far from being an actually implicit desire for supernatural beatitude; it is also not simply and absolutely "pre-cognitive" -although doubtless it is, as Bradley argues, "antecedent to any intellectual

in definition is neither universal nor particular)-namely, that the good as such is not any specific good. This sense of the formal object bears comparison with essence absolutely considered as neither individual nor universal by its notion.

act."[33] Volition, howsoever natural, is defined by its relation to the form of reason. This is what will is: appetite following intellective form. Hence will is ordered to the *intelligible* good, and apart from the intellect the will can exhibit no tendency whatsoever, because its being is defined by its relation to intellect.[34] For this reason alone, it becomes apparent that the desire for the intelligible good-in-general bears the natural impress of our knowledge, for the formal object of the will is conveyed thereto by means of the intellect. But in human beings neither the object of knowledge nor of volition may rightly be said to be naturally deific.

Recall Bradley's argument: "The natural desire to see God is *implicitly* contained in the necessary desire for the perfect good or happiness that structures the will, or in the necessary desire, which follows upon the nature of the intellect, to know in general the cause of any known effect." The "necessary desire for the perfect good or happiness that structures the will" is the desire for the intelligible-good-in-general. Under the active agency of God this desire is susceptible of becoming a true desire for divine beatitude. But in and of itself this natural desire is not the desire for supernatural beatitude, for the-good-in-general is neither naturally identical with, nor does it naturally "include," the divine good. The full perfection of the good subsists uniquely and super-eminently in God, and hence under God's active agency we may be brought to graced desire for the divine good. Seen in this light, our ordering to the good-in-general constitutes an obediential potency or natural translucence for the supernatural vision of God. But this natural ordering is not a positive desire for

[33] *Aquinas,* 446.

[34] See, for instance, *STh* I, q. 82, a. 4, ad 3 (Leonine ed.): "quod non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statur in intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praecedat apprehensio: sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit motus voluntatis." See also *Quodlibet* 6, q. 2, a. 2: "motus voluntatis est inclinatio sequens formam intellectam." Likewise *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 26 (Leonine ed.): "Motus voluntatis est inclinatio sequens formam intellectam." See also *STh* 1-11, q. 8, a. 1 (Leonine ed.), where St. Thomas clearly argues that "Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in rationi boni." For the will to tend toward *anything* as good, it must do so by virtue of an apprehension of the mind.

supernatural beatitude apart from its elevation and illumination by grace.

Thus one may not "build into" the desire for indeterminate perfection and the good-in-general an actually implicit desire for knowledge of the triune God without doing violence to Thomas's teaching regarding the very nature of intellect and will. The immateriality of the intellective and volitional faculties constitutes, as it were, a purely passive natural translucence through which the active agency of God may order the human subject to the infinitely higher end of supernatural beatitude. The openness of intellect and will toward the good is simply this-openness. The initiative of God in moving intellect and will to the actual desire of Himself remains essentially supernatural.

IV. CAN THE NATURAL DESIRE BE IN VAIN?

Bradley argues that natural desire for God cannot be vain[35] and that therefore this desire is known, from natural evidence, to be susceptible of fulfillment. Admittedly, to say that natural desire for God must be susceptible of fulfillment neither specifies precisely how this may be so, nor does it involve affirming the natural knowledge of an intrinsically supernatural mystery. It is only through revelation that we know that the object of the natural desire for God is included within the essentially supernatural object of the beatific vision. There is infinitely more in God than "cause of these effects," but the elicited desire to know God seeks to know Him under the *ratio* of "cause of these effects," a *ratio* that is infinitely inadequate to the proper inner truth of God. Hence to say that this limited desire to know God cannot be in vain even if true would still not inform us of the identity of *this* desideratum with that represented by the intrinsically supernatural beatific vision. The very possibility of an

[35] And, it should be noted, on our analysis only the elicited desire is properly a natural desire for God, since the natural tendency of the will toward its object is not deific. This puts one in the interesting position of maintaining that that desire for God which Bradley denies to be natural is a more fit claimant to the title; while that which he affirms to be natural, is here argued not to be a desire for God at all, but merely the ordering of the will to the intelligible good in general.

intrinsically supernatural mystery cannot be proven from natural evidence alone. The natural desire to know the essence of the unitary cause of being is conditioned by the finitude of the evidence whence it derives. In precision from grace this aforesaid desire seeks the essence of God in a manner knowably disproportionate to its object. Like the child's desire to capture the ocean, it is inefficacious. It is a conditional desire, that is, one whose satisfaction is not owed to nature.

As a material prelude to consideration of the relation between natural ends and supernatural finality, it is useful to contemplate the natural desire for God as a *conditional* desire. One may well concur with Jacques Maritain that the natural desire for God is conditional in the sense that its fulfillment is not simply owed to nature, and that this alters when, illumined by faith, this desire is elevated to unconditionality. That whereby the natural desire for God becomes unconditional is the further ordering of nature to the beatific end, and it is only as so uplifted that it is impossible for this desire to be vain. Apart from revelation we know not what we seek by this desire, a desire whose material object wholly transcends the evidence that gives rise to and conditions it, and whose satisfaction is not due to nature. [36]

We naturally seek the highest knowledge of the First Principle of which we are capable, and desire to know the divine essence while nonetheless simultaneously realizing-as a condition of this very desire-that this is a thing impossible to nature simply in its own right. But once revelation teaches us to hope for supernatural beatific vision, we realize the coextension of graced desire for God and natural desire. The natural desire for God then partakes of the supernatural finality without which, in this order of providence, human nature would be vain. Thus from being inefficacious and conditional the natural desire is elevated to become an unconditional aspiration. [37]

[36] On this point, note the long footnote of Maritain, no. 91, in chapter 6 of *The Degrees of Knowledge.* As frequently is the case, in a long note Maritain succeeds in bringing greater clarity to this issue than many another complete book or essay achieves.

[37] Maritain does not much like the language of velleity, which I here avoid in stating his position although I do not share his interpretation of its past use, and consider it apt to articulate the character of a conditional natural aspiration. But he did not think this term appropriate in respect of the natural desire for God. Cf. *Approaches to God,* 112: "It is not

This view of the elevation of the natural desire within grace does not imply the endlessness of human nature apart from grace. In a different economy of providence wherein nature from its inception were not ordered by grace, the failure to fulfill the natural desire to know God quidditatively would not derogate from the felicity of the natural end. Within an economy of providence wherein nature were not ordered by grace, the natural desire for God would be known to be utterly disproportionate with nature, not owed to nature, and indeed impossible for nature by itself.

Neither the negative knowledge that the cannot be quelled by any finite good, nor the natural elicited desire to know the essence of God-which seeks God under the *ratio* of "cause of these effects"-implies the impossibility of a natural end lesser than knowledge of the divine essence. The negative knowledge that no finite good may wholly quell the will, is-absent the promptings of grace-merely as it were the shadow of any natural possession of the good. Apart from the actual ordering of human nature to the supernatural, the incapacity of the will to be fulfilled by any finite good would not be tantamount to Augustinian restlessness, for this incapacity would be marked neither by nostalgia for grace nor by the corresponding normative teleology to the beatific vision. Rather, this mobilism of the wiH-its incapacity to be quelled by finite goods-naturally appears simply as the condition for human achievement of any perfection.

The end proportioned to nature is thus imperfect. But knowledge of this imperfection an economy of providence wherein nature is not ordered to the supernatural) would be merely dialectical and, as it were, shallow. For, in the absence of that active agency of God which coreveals man's profundity in revealing the divine friendship, the possible supernatural object and ontological depth of human nature are not actually brought to light. Hence the supernatural vision of God "exceeds the proportion of human nature because the natural powers are not sufficient for attaining, or thinking, or desiring it."[38] One notes

a simple velleity, a desire of supererogation. It is born in the very depths of the thirst of our intellect for being." It is unclear to me that Banez and others mean to suggest by their use of the term that this is a desire of supererogation.

[38] *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 2, cited in *Aquinas*, 457.

the term "desiring." Neither the elicited desire to know God, nor the natural ordination of the will toward its formal object-intelligible-good-in-general-constitutes an actual desire for supernatural beatific vision apart from grace and revelation.

V. NATURE VAIN APART FROM GRACE?

But what about St. Thomas's distinct argument regarding the need for grace lest man have been created "frustrated and in vain" or "inane"? These last words must be understood as presupposing this actual order of providence in which nature from its first institution is created in grace, and in which it is redeemed from sin and mercifully ordered through the redemption toward the beatific vision.[39] Within *this* order, surely nature if deprived of grace would be vain. This judgment is made all the stronger by the quotation whence these descriptives are drawn: "Lest man be created frustrated and inane, because he is born with original sin."[40]

[39] *STh* I, q. 95, a. 1 (Leonine, Ottawa ed.): "Sed quod fuerit conditus in gratia, ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud *Eccle.* VII: 'Deus fecit hominem rectum'. Erat enim rectitudo secundum hoc quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subiectio erat causa et secundae et tertiae; quandiu enim ratio manebat Deo subiecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus <licit. Manfestum est autem quod ilia subiectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis; alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut Dionysius <licit cap. *N De Div. Nam.* Unde manifestum est quod et ilia prima subiectio, qua ratio Deo subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratiae; non enim potest esse quod effectus sit potior quam causa" ("But the very rectitude of the first state with which man was bequeathed, as is said by others, seemingly requires that he was created in grace, according to *Eccles.* VII, 'God made man right'. For this rectitude consisted in reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul. But the first subjection was the cause of the second and the third; for as Augustine says, while reason was subjected to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason. It is manifest that such a subjection of the body to the soul, and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; elsewise it would have remained after sin, as so in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin as Dionysius stated in *N De Div. Nam.* Wherefore it is clear that the first subjection whereby reason was subject to God was not simply according to nature, but according to the supernatural gift of grace; for it is not possible that the effect be more efficacious than the cause").

[40] *De mala,* q. 5, a. 1, ad 1.

To clarify the matter, it helps to remember the primacy of the principle of act within the theology and philosophy of St. Thomas. His accounts are focalized by *act-for* neither mere potency, nor the distinct, diverse notion of possibility, can by itself account for anything *actual.* As a theologian Thomas is focused upon the given actual providential synthesis of God.

There are indeed, as Bradley notes, places wherein Thomas contemplates a regimen of pure nature, but these are few and atypical,[41] forced upon one's consideration, as it were, as "a corollary of the supernatural character of the beatific vision."[42] Rather, his primary concern is with the given actual providential synthesis. Since every end derives its end-likeness-its appetibility-from its further ordering to the ultimate end,[43] it follows that in this dispensation of providence, wherein God further orders the end proportioned to nature to the end of supernatural felicity, nature would be vain apart from the beatific vision. But this entailment from the actually given providential order does not imply that no other providential order could square with the divine power and wisdom. Indeed, Bradley expressly notes the importance of the hypothesis of pure nature for sustaining the theological truth of the pure gratuity of supernatural grace.[44]

[41] *Aquinas,* 475, nn. 235-37. Bradley rightly cites II *Sent.,* d. 28, q. 1, a. 1; II *Sent.,* d. 29, q. 1, a. 1; *De Verit.,* q. 24, a. 14; *STh* I-II, q. 109, a. 4; *Quodl.* 1, q. 4, a. 3; and finally the lines of *ScG* III, c. 53, wherein Thomas, speaking of the *lumen gloriae,* notes preliminarily that any created intellect can enjoy complete existence in the species proper to its nature without seeing the substance of God.

[42] *Aquinas,* 475.

[43] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 6: "Dicendum quod necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat propter ultimum finem."

[44] *Aquinas,* 429-30: "Aquinas states, very clearly, that the gift of the beatific vision is not a necessary concomitant of the creation of human nature, but rather it is something supernatural that God freely and gratuitously gives to those who love Him. Hence the actuality (i.e., factuality) of this gift (and a fortiori the necessity of man's attaining the vision of the divine essence) cannot be proven philosophically. Men, indeed, could have been created and left to remain in a 'state of pure nature' without benefit of the supernatural gift of the beatific vision."

Yet one is hard pressed to hold both the "endlessness" of nature and the gratuity of grace. It does not accord with the wisdom of an agent to ordain something to an end and yet provide no means by which the end can be attained. Therefore it does not accord with the wisdom of God to ordain man to an end beyond his unaided natural capacity (the

The issue then is, in what does the putative "endlessness" of nature consist? Does it consist merely in the truth that, in this order of providence, nature is further ordered to grace? But even so, there is an imperfect natural beatitude, as acknowledged by Bradley. Does this endlessness consist in the proposition that, lacking supernatural fulfillment, man could have no end? In this order of providence, it is true that no natural end could finalize man. Does the putative endlessness of nature consist in the proposition that, in a *different* economy of providence, wherein nature were not from its institution ordered in and by grace, there could still be no final natural end? It is this last hypothesis that we must consider.

Specifically, it must be realized that the actual further-ordering of nature to grace-which from the beginning characterizes this economy of providence, as man is created in the state of sanctifying grace-implies of necessity that, absent an end in grace, nature is vain. But in a state wherein nature is not further ordered, the end proportioned to human nature remains a true felicity, a genuine end. One grants that this felicity would be imperfect because mobile. No finite good can perfectly quell the will, and apart from revelation all knowledge of God is causal knowledge proceeding from creaturely effects. Still, natural felicity is imperfect only relative to an end utterly disproportionate to human nature that we cannot even rise to desire apart from grace.

Jacques Maritain has perceptively described imperfect natural happiness as a "felicity in motion."[45] It is the life of obedient servitors of the unseen God, contemplating and serving Him from

"endlessness" of nature) if it is possible that he would never provide the means by which it could be attained (the gratuity of grace}.

[45] Jacques Maritain, *An Introduction to the Basic Problems of Moral Philosophy,* trans. Cornelia N. Borgerhoff (New York: Magi Press, 1990), 111. Maritain draws the distinctions as follows: "l)that the *ultimate End* of the human being is God; 2}that, in the natural order, this ultimate End can only be achieved imperfectly and at a remove, by means of a *natural quasi-final state* or a *felicity in motion* which consists in the operative perfection of the human subject, and principally in a natural contemplation and natural love of God through and in His creatures that falls short of perfectly actuating the intellective and volitional powers; 3)that, in the supernatural order, the ultimate End is reached perfectly and directly, by means of a *supernatural final state* or a *beatitude* which consists in the vision of God known by us as He knows us."

afar through the veil of His created effects and in the integrity of moral rectitude. This order of ends proportionate to human nature does not disappear with the bestowal of elevating grace, but is assumed and further ordered toward the felicity of the supernatural end. But within a radically different providential economy, in which nature were not created in grace, this proportionate natural felicity-surmounted by the natural contemplation of God-would indeed constitute a genuine end.

Only grace and the light of revelation show us that the very object of the natural desire for God is included within the object of intrinsically supernatural beatitude. The natural desire for God does not reveal to the mind how such knowledge might be possible, nor does it in itself manifest the real possibility of supernatural beatific vision. It is only owing to grace and revelation that the attainability of the natural desire and the inclusion of its object within beatific vision is known. As the "end-likeness" of any end is derived from its ordering to finality, and the finality in this order of providence is supernatural beatific vision, natural ends are ends at all by virtue of their further ordering in grace and toward the supernatural vision of God. Ergo, within this providential economy the natural desire for God-realized to be possible of fulfillment owing to revelation-receives its "end-likeness" and unconditionality from the supernatural finality.

So, the question arises: in a regime of pure nature would humanity be unfulfilled apart from the knowledge of God in His essence-a knowledge which revelation alone indicates to be truly possible in the supernatural vision of God? Nature would indeed be lacking a fulfillment, but one that is utterly disproportionate to, and outside the unaided agency of, man. More importantly, the actual *contactus* with God within such an economy of providence would be wholly canalized through the contemplation of God via creation. Within such an order of providence, it would be, as it were, to "interrupt God when He is speaking" should one turn from what He actually is providing for our perfection to an inefficacious desire whose object is desired in a manner that is utterly disproportionate.

While reading a good novel, do we stop enjoying it because of the discursive imperfection and potency entailed by reading and

page-turning-do we chiefly lament the lack of angelic intuition?-or do we enjoy the book? When the author of the terrestrial "book" is knowably God, who directs us toward avid reading, does this cease to constitute a licit end merely because it lacks the perfection of an order of being infinitely beyond it? One grants, again, that such a purely natural "end" is imperfect vis-a-vis the beatific vision. But the very possibility of the beatific vision, as an intrinsically supernatural mystery, is indemonstrable from natural evidence. One also grants that the element of imperfection in such a purely natural end constituted by the *mobilism* in which such an end would be enjoyed would be knowable. But this imperfection, like the silence between words in a spoken sentence, would be felt as merely the condition for the perfection enjoyed, and not as a debilitating utter frustration of nature. Lacking any positive apprehension of the real possibility of perfect finality, and existentially focused upon God's actual providential articulation, the human person within the regime of pure nature would discern the good as framed rather than obscured by the limits of human nature.

Bradley argues that *"Natural beatitude in any form does not satisfy man's natural desire for beatitude."*[46] Arguably one ought to respond that natural beatitude does not satisfy the desire for beatitude of which man is naturally capable with divine aid; yet this capability, while rooted partially in human nature, is only actually realizable under the causality of grace, such that man himself would be positively ignorant of this capability as such in the absence of supernatural revelation. Ergo: natural felicity or imperfect beatitude would indeed constitute true ends within a different economy of providence, proportionately perfecting those aspects of the human person whose perfection is naturally knowable (in precision from grace), and which are due to nature.

Our present sense of the deficiency of unaided nature is conditioned by the drama in which we are ourselves immersed: that of fallen and redeemed nature. It is unavoidable that our reason instruct us as to the vanity of nature apart from grace, for in this order of providence this is so. Indeed, we know the

[46] *Aquinas,* 513.

intimate connections obtaining between the impossibility of the will's being quelled by any finite good and our divine call to the beatific end, just as we now undergo the natural desire for God as an unconditional desire, owing to the inclusion of its object within the supernatural finality to which we are called. But-ex *hypothesi-if* God did not actually further order the end proportionate to nature to supernatural beatitude, it would truly not be so ordered. Apart from such further ordering, human nature would not then, by itself, be in vain-although a specific profundity of that nature in relation to God's active agency would never be existentially discovered by man. It is to this theme that I shall now briefly turn.

VI. THE PROFUNDilY OF THE HUMAN PERSON AS COREVEALED IN CHRIST

I have argued that although the end proportioned to human nature is imperfect vis-a-vis supernatural beatitude it does not follow-were God to have ordered human nature no further than to this end-that this imperfection would vitiate enjoyment of the natural end or render it vain. There is a further implication of this line of consideration which harmonizes well with the teaching that in Christ God reveals man to himself. Clearly the revelation of God in Christ manifests the truth of human destiny. In so doing, it also coreveals the ontological profundity of the human person. The purely passive potency of human nature to receive divine aid and friendship is partially founded upon the character of human nature. Human nature cannot take the first step to this exalted end apart from a first initiative which is wholly and absolutely God's.

As earlier argued, obediential potency is not mere susceptibility to transmutative miracle, but a specific range of actuation to which a given nature is susceptible given divine aid. Obediential potency is the potency of a specific nature to actuations possible only with the help of God and through receiving that which God alone distinctively can give. In this light, the profundity of the spiritual powers of the human creature may be fully fathomed only in the realization that the human creature is, indeed, *capax dei*. Yet this realization-so penetrative of the ontological depth

of the creature-while it pertains *to* human nature, is not merely a realization *of* nature.

Indeed, were we to say that humanity realizes itself as *capax dei* altogether apart from divine revelation, we would imply that God does not reveal man to himself in Christ, for the simple reason that man already would know by nature and, as it were, in advance that human nature is in trajectory to the inner being of God. Thus in the incarnation we would learn of our beatific perfection in the concrete. Grace would on such an analysis constitute merely a means for the perfection of a tendency already generically familiar and antecedent to revelation.Yet surely grace is more than the perfection of the natural desire for God (although it does so perfect the natural desire). Grace brings with it the incipience of supernatural life, and in the present economy of providence this life is teleologically ordered to beatific vision. In short, grace orders human nature to an end that infinitely transcends the most profound philosophic contemplation of human finality. The original truth of nature is reinstated by grace; but it is elevated to a plane higher than that of any finite nature whatsoever, the plane of supernaturally beatific friendship. [47] Far from being merely the projection of a natural line of tendency by "other" means, supernatural grace directs us toward God in a radically new way, and in so doing manifests the created dignity and profundity of human nature whereby the person may be elevated to divine friendship, aided to receive God, and finally be joined with God in beatific knowledge and love. As St. Thomas writes:

> But eternal life is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature, as likewise it exceeds its knowledge and desire, according to 1 Cor. ii. 9: "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the heart of man." [48]

[47] This is not to imply that there is no such thing as a "natural" friendship with God; but such a friendship is of inferior dignity-because the distance between creator and creature is not overcome by a divine revelation, such a natural friendship is a lesser type of friendship. Yet this notion can analogically be affirmed, inasmuch as natural gratitude for God, and love of God more than self-which St. Thomas affirms as pertaining to integral nature *(STh* I, q. 65, a. 5)-obtain.

[48] *STh* I-II, q. 114, a. 2: "Vitaautem aeterna est quoddam bonum excedens proportionem naturae creatae, quia etiam excedit cognitionem et desiderium eius, secundum illud I *ad Car.* II: "Nee oculus vidit, nee auris audivit, nee in eor hominis ascendit."

The idea that the profundity of man as a fit recipient of divine friendship is naturally "self-fathomed" apart from grace and revelation appears insufficiently cognizant of the sublimity of the beatific end as well as of man's need for these divine gifts in order to know the extent and character of human dignity. The specifically Christian sense of the dignity of the human person proceeds from a knowledge accessible through divine faith, whereby we realize the truly infinite "potential" of the soul in relation to God's merciful love.

The similitude of the stained-glass window illumined by the sun's rays well bespeaks the character of the doctrine of obediential potency as applied to the relation of nature and grace. The stained-glass window, were it cognizant, could not "know what it was missing" were it never to irradiate its bright colors under the influence of the sun. It would be a window, still, and function as part of the structure-though it would, in a given respect, not be fulfilled. It would be what it is, not fail to be part of the whole structure of which it would form an integral part, nor lack its own participation in the good of the whole as a specific perfection. Yet its nature stands properly revealed only under the extrinsic causality of the sun's illumination: seeing it so illumined, we know what stained glass truly is for.

Similarly, from the vantage of the doctrine of obediential potency, man only fathoms the true profundity of his spiritual powers when these are sounded and illumined by the active agency of God ordering them to Himself. This ordering is indeed possible owing to the character of human nature as passively susceptible of a definite and distinct range of actuation under the active agency of God. Human nature cannot, simply of itself, attain to grace, desire for supernaturally beatific union, or supernaturally beatific finality. But human nature is such that it may be aided by God and elevated in divine friendship so as to desire the vision of God and be moved to intrinsically supernatural bliss. It is as so aided that we begin truly to know God in the life of supernatural grace and the theological virtues and gifts. It is also as so aided that we properly discover the true spiritual profundity of the human person, a profundity that is significantly but faintly presaged in our natural knowledge of the

spiritual nature and powers of the soul. Hence it is the doctrine of obediential potency which, par excellence, articulates the theological truth that the inner profundity of human nature is manifested to us through the revelation of God in Christ.

Everything articulated within this essay is, as it were, contained within St. Thomas's teaching, and the teaching of his great commentators, especially John of St. Thomas and Banez, and such luminaries of the twentieth century as Jacques Maritain. [49] But at a time when the dignity of the human person is, perhaps more than ever before, a watchword of theological and philosophic discourse, it is perhaps well to accent the sublimity, coherence, and analytic rigor of St. Thomas's teaching regarding the relation of nature to grace, and of the human obediential potency for divine revelation, friendship, and beatitude.

[49] For John of St. Thomas (Poinsot), see *Cursus theol.,* t. II, <lisp. 12, a. 3, n. 23; for Banez, note his commentary on *STh* 1-11, q. 3, a. 8, his "solutio dubii" to the issue "An speculatio Dei, qua per essentiam ipse videtur, sit finis naturalis hominis." Banez provides an elegant argument, flowing from St. Thomas's distinction of the order of nature from the order of grace. Maritain we have cited above.

The Thomist 64 (2000): 239-69

THE GOODNESS OF CREATION, EVIL, AND CHRISTIAN TEACHING [1]

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It is at least a very venerable doctrine in Catholic circles that evil as such is a privation. That is, while there are evil things, what makes them evil (evil as such) is a lack of being that is due the thing. The simple example of blindness, a favorite in metaphysics and theology texts, illustrates the doctrine. Blindness is real, but it is not a nature or actuality; it is the lack of sight. Moreover, it is the lack of sight in a thing which is due sight-the lack of sight in a rock or a tree, for example, is not a privation but a mere negation and is not evil. As there are various types of beings, so there are various types of privations. There are privations in the physical domain (sickness, death, etc.), in the intellectual domain (ignorance and error), in the technological domain (inefficiency, malfunctions), and in the moral domain (omissions, commissions, vices, etc.).

In this article I first argue that the position that every entity, accidents as well as substances, actions as well as other types of beings, is good to the extent that it is actual, and that therefore evil as such is negative, is immediately entailed by Catholic teaching. That is, although the thesis that evil as such is a privation is not defined, [2] it can be inferred by a simple argument from defined teaching. No other position on evil is compatible with what the Church has defined. Second, I present philosophical and

[1] I am grateful to John Crosby, Norris Clarke, S.J., Kevin Flannery, S.J., James T. O'Connor, and Germain Grisez, for reading and criticizing earlier drafts of this article.

[2] Yet the proposition that evil is not a nature *is* defined (see below, p. 4).

theological arguments to support and explain the position that evil as such is a privation. Third, I examine objections to this position, and, finally, I indicate in some detail its practical import for theology-for this doctrine has a profound impact on how one views sin, salvation, and God himself.

I

Few people hold all of the doctrines that the ancient or mediaeval Gnostics or Manichaeans held. Everyone is aware that it is incompatible with Christian doctrine to hold that all matter is evil, or that there is a supreme, independent, evil god, a "god of darkness."[3] However, in reply to these heresies the Church not only rejected Manichaeism as a whole system but also made it clear that it is part of revealed doctrine that all being other than God, to the extent that it is actual, is from God, and is therefore good.

The Manichaeans held that there was an evil god and a good god, that matter was the creation of the evil god and was evil, and that procreation was evil insofar as it subjected another spirit to matter and the god of evil. Salvation involved liberation from matter. The Church was concerned, almost from the beginning of her existence, to distinguish the Christian doctrine on creation from such views.

Scripture seems quite clearly to teach that all of creation is good. Everything other than God is, for as long as it exists, held in being by God: "Yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom all things are and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom all things are and through whom we exist" (1 Cor 8:6). "For from him and through him and for him are all things" (Rom 11:36).[4]

The ancient professions of faith proclaim belief in God, who is Creator, "of all things visible and invisible." Some of these professions make explicit the teaching that all creatures are good,

[3] However, perhaps some people's notions of Satan approach this, inadvertently. See the Sacred Congregation on Divine Worship's decree in 1975, "Les formes multiples des superstitions," translated in Austin Flannery, O.P., *Vatican Collection,* vol. 2, *More Post-Conciliar Documents* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1982), 456ff.

[4] Cf. John 1:3; Acts 4:24; 14:14; 17:24; 1Tim4:4.

and that evil is not a nature. A major proclamation on the goodness of being was made in 1215 in reaction to the Albigensians and Catharists, the mediaeval Manichaeans:

> We firmly believe and confess without reservation that there is only one true God, eternal, infinite and unchangeable .... [The three divine persons] are the one principle of the universe, the creator of all things, visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who by His almighty power from the beginning of time made at once out of nothing both orders of creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, that is, the angelic and the earthly, and then the human creature. (DS 428)

The Manichaeans had asserted that there is an evil creator as well as the good creator, and that the evil creator creates evil beings. Matter, the Manichaeans held, was in its essence or nature evil. In response, the Lateran Council clarified revelation, and proclaimed that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the one "Creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium." Then the council made explicit what is contained or implied by this truth of revelation. It asserted: "For the devil and all other demons are created by God naturally good, and they made themselves bad" (DS 428).

Thus, the council asserted that: (1) God is the only creator (i.e., all creatures are created by God), and (2) even the demons are naturally good. Now, if one claims that evil is a positive entity, then he must say either that it is not created by God, which contradicts (1), or that God creates evil. And yet the council assumes that God does not create evil, for that is the basis of its explanation that the demons are naturally good ("natura creati sunt bani"). The demons are by nature good because everything created by God is good.

The Council of Florence added another point. It proposed several professions of faith for the reunion of various Christians of the East with those in communion with Rome. The Coptic Christians had separated in the fifth century during the Monophysite controversy; their bishops were at the Council of Florence and agreed to what was called the "Decree for the Jacobites." [5] The Coptic Christians had been bothered by

[5] The Coptic Christians were called "Jacobites" after the Orthodox] acob Baradai, bishop of Edessa in the sixth century.

Manichaean sects, and so the decree reiterates the Church's belief on creation, with a special concern to exclude Manichaeism. The profession reads, in part:

> [The Holy Roman Church] firmly believes, professes and proclaims that the one true God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is the creator of all things, visible and invisible *[esse omnium visibilium et invisibilium creatorem*], who, when he so willed, out of his goodness made all creatures, spiritual as well as corporeal *[universas, tam spiritales quam corpora/es, condidit creaturas.]* They are good since they were made by Him who is the highest good, but they are mutable because they were made out of nothing. She also asserts that there is no nature of evil, since every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good *[nul/amque mali asserit esse naturam, quia omnis natura, in quantum natura est, bona est].* (DS 1333)[6]

Several things are asserted here. First, every creature is made by God. That is, every being other than God is a creature of God. The mediaeval Manichaeans held that there was another creator, and that it was a purely spiritual, powerful being, independent in its substance from God. However, the council does not limit itself to excluding this particular position; it excludes any position in which a being exists which is not a creature of the one God. Indeed, the council is simply reaffirming here part of what is asserted in the prologue to the Gospel of John: "All things came to be through him, and without him nothing came to be" Oohn 1:3).

Suppose one held that evil is a positive thing-for example, an actual quality produced in a morally evil act. In other words, suppose one held that moral evil, in some cases, is an actual quality, an actual stain, so to speak.[7] Would this evil quality be a creature? Clearly, it would have to be: .it would be produced by a moral agent, at least; it would not be a self-sufficient being, and

[6] Cf. Vatican I, the decree on creation: OS, 1782/3001; 1801/3021-1805/3025. When the council says that every being is good "secundum totam substantiam," this does not mean that only the substance is good, and not the accident. This expression frequently occurs in both St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and its meaning is that every aspect of the thing, the materials from which it is formed, as well as the resulting entity, is good.

[7] Phenomenologists following Dietrich von Hildebrand hold this position, although it is not clear whether von Hildebrand himself held it. For von Hildebrand's notion of value, see his *Ethics* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald, 1953), 23-63.

it would not be a mere brute fact. Then, would this creature be made by God or not? To say it would not contradicts the ancient professions of faith, which proclaim that every creature is made by God. It would be a creature which is not made by God. However, if one says that it *is* made by God, then one is holding that God directly creates evil. Aside from the obvious incongruity, this position contradicts the Council of Trent:

> If anyone says that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that God performs the evil works just as He performs the good, not only by allowing them but properly and directly, so that Judas's betrayal no less than Paul's vocation was God's own work, *anathema sit.* (DS 1956)

The declaration asserts, in response to Calvinism, that evil works are not related to God's causality in the same way good works are. On the one hand, it is Catholic doctrine that every creature is made by God. On the other hand, it is also Catholic doctrine that evil is not made by God. That is, everything actual other than God is from God; evil is not from God. Evil cannot be an actuality; it must, then, be a negation or lack.

This argument is not new; it is the logic behind the constant teaching of the Church. The Greek Father St. Methodius (d. 311), bishop of Olympus in Lycia, expressed concisely the dilemma for any theist holding that evil is positive, as Charles Journet recounts: "Either God is the author of all being, and consequently of evil, or it is necessary to say with the Gnostics that evil comes from eternal matter for which God is not responsible; in the one case God is not good, in the other he is not absolute." [8]

Moreover, the Council of Florence added, as we saw above, the following point: "There is no nature of evil, since every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good." At first, this may sound like strange language. But it could have been borrowed from St. Thomas, who asked, "Whether evil is a nature," to which he of course responds negatively. [9] Or it could have been borrowed

[8] Cited by Charles Journet, *The Meaning of Evil,* trans. Michael Barry (New York: P.J. Kennedy, 1962), 31.

[9] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 48, a. 1.

from an earlier pronouncement by Pope Leo I,[10] who perhaps borrowed the language from St. Augustine. Pope Leo declared, against the Priscillianists, that

> the true faith professes the substance *[substantiam=being* or *ousia]* of all creatures, spiritual and corporeal, to be good, and that there is no nature of evil *[et mali nullam esse naturam]:* because God, who is the creator of all things, makes nothing that is not good. (DS 286)[11]

To deny that evil is a nature is to say that it is not a something; it is to say that the word does not denote a positive aspect of reality. The word clearly does not denote a fiction or relation of reason. So, it must denote a negation or lack.

Again, suppose evil were a positive something, a positive quality. As a quality it would be a nature, or have a nature. But this contradicts the teaching of the council. Someone might think that *natura* here refers only to substance, as distinguished from accidents, so that one could say that evil is a certain type of accident as a positive entity. But this cannot be the council's meaning, since its reasoning is that every nature is good because every nature is created by God, and his creation is not restricted to substances: he creates all things, visible and invisible, and these surely include accidents as well as substances.

The general point can be seen in a slightly different way. The Church teaches, first, that a human being's good free actions are not from him acting without God's present, active causality. "As often as we do good, God operates in us and with us, so that we may operate," says the Second Council of Orange.[12] If a human being makes a good choice, his act is caused to be by God; and God's causality in no way destroys this human being's freedom.

[10] DS 286.

[11] And of course by this time the council could have been influenced by St. Thomas's terminology. In *STh* I, q. 48, a. 1, he asks: "Utrum malum sit natura quaedam?" (Whether evil is a certain nature?).

[12] The Second Council of Orange, DS 182. Cf.: "For God is the one who, for his good purpose, works in you both to desire and to work" (Phil 2:13); "Not that of ourselves we are qualified to take credit for anything as coming from us; rather, our qualification comes from God" (2 Cor 3:5); "What do you possess that you have not received? But if you have received it, why are you boasting as if you did not receive it?" (1 Cor 4:7).

The Church leaves open how to conceive this causality. Dominican, Jesuit, Augustinian, and other theologians had various theories of how the divine causality is related to free choice. But they all agreed, because it is Church teaching, that God does in some way cause free choices. The Church teaches only that, in some way, God directly causes the act of choice, and in such a way that it remains our act as well, and it remains free. Since the act of the will is a being, a creature, it must be caused to be or held in being by God.

On the other hand, the Church also teaches that if a human being makes a *bad* choice, God does not cause the evil of the act, but only permits it. In short, the good free choice is from God, as well as from the human being; the evil in the morally bad choice is not from God but is only from the human being and is permitted (i.e., not prevented) by God. Now, suppose one says that moral evil is something positive, a quality: how then can one give a different account of the evil act than of the good act? If a human being has sufficient power to do evil (as a positive something) by himself (supposing, of course, that God is holding this person, as a substance, in being), how could he not also have the power to do good by himself?

Once one sees that evil as such is a privation, however, the answer is clear: a human being can do evil by himself, since evil is a privation; he cannot do good by himself, but only as a secondary cause, cooperating with God's primary causality, since all being other than God is immediately caused by God. Without the doctrine that evil is a privation, there is nothing different about the free evil action as an event or being to make sense of the asymmetry between the good action's relation to God and the evil action's relation to God. One will then be moved to say that the freedom of an action means that it is from the human being and not immediately from God also. But this contradicts the teaching of the Church, which clearly gives a different account of the goodness of our good free actions than of the evil of our sinful free actions.

Recent papal teaching reaffirms the doctrine. Pope Leo XIII affirms it.[13] Pope John Paul II affirms it also. In *SalvificiDoloris* he writes:

> Christianity proclaims the essential good of existence and the good of that which exists, acknowledges the goodness of the Creator and proclaims the good of creatures. Man suffers on account of evil, which is a certain lack, limitation or distortion of good *[quod est quaedam privatio, depravatio boni]*. We could say that man suffers because of a good in which he does not share, from which in a certain sense he is cut off or of which he has deprived *[privavit]* himself. He particularly suffers when he "ought"-in the normal order of things-to have a share in this good and does not have it.[14]

This difference between suffering and evil which Pope John Paul explains here is central to the whole teaching in this document. It is not a mere *obiterdictum.* I conclude that the position that all being is good, and that evil is negative, is entailed by teachings of the Church, and is reaffirmed by recent papal teaching.

II

The first argument that evil is a privation is based on the notion of goodness. Goodness is not a nature or property. It is not like the color red, for example. The feature that makes a sweater red is specifically the same as the feature that makes a fire truck red. When we say that a sweater is "red" and that a fire truck is "red," the word has the same meaning in the two cases; it denotes a quality shared in common by various objects.

[13] Pope Leo XIII, *Libertas Praestantissimum,* 33: "But if, in such circumstances, for the sake of the common good (and this is the only legitimate reason), human law may or even should tolerate evil, it may not and should not approve or desire evil for its own sake; for evil of itself, being a privation of good, is opposed to the common welfare which every legislator is bound to desire and defend to the best of his ability."

[14] Popejohn Paul II, *Salvifici Doloris,* 7, *inActaApostolicae Sedis* 76 (1984): 201-50, at 207. Also see his apostolic letter in 1986 on St. Augustine. There the Pope makes his own the teaching of St. Augustine that evil is a privation: "[St. Augustine] understood that the first question to be asked about the serious question of evil, which was his great torment, was not its origin, but what it was; and he saw that evil is not a substance, but the lack of good: 'All that exists is good. The evil about the origin of which I asked questions is not a substance'" (Pope John Paul II, *Augustinum Hipponensum,* August 28, 1986 [Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1986), p. 6).

Goodness is quite different. There is no distinct quality possessed in common by a book, a washing machine, and a person, in virtue of which we say they are "good."[15] The word "good" does not have the same meaning when said of various things-it is not said *univocally*. But it does not have totally different meanings when said of various things either-it is not used *equivocally*. Rather, it is used *analogically*: the meanings are different but related, partly the same and partly different.

The argument can now be formulated.[16] If goodness or value were a nature, substantial or accidental, then, most likely, the word "good" (as well as the words "value" and "valuable") would be predicated univocally of various types of things-the word "good" would be used in the same way "red" is used. However, that is not the case.

As Peter Geach argues, "good" is an attributive expression. That is, it shifts its meaning according to what it is applied to.[17] It makes sense to argue as follows: "Tweetie is yellow; Tweetie is a bird; therefore, Tweetie is a yellow bird." However, one cannot argue: "Joe is good; Joe is a baseball player; therefore, Joe is a good baseball player." The reason is that, while "yellow" and "bird" signify directly properties or natures held in common by various things, "good" is an attributive expression. It signifies, not directly a nature or property, but a way or extent of having other properties, different properties in different cases.

The primary meaning of "good" can perhaps best be understood by looking first to artificial objects. A good washing machine is one that achieves its purpose, that has all of the features and achievements that one expects of a washing machine. "Good" here means fulfillment or completion of purpose; "bad" means falling short of purpose. "Good," as applied to artificial objects, does not refer to any feature or nature shared in common by several objects, but rather to the fulfillment of purpose. And

[15] Cf. John Campbell and Robert Pargetter, "Goodness and Fragility," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 23 (1986): 155-65.

[16] Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.6; Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate,* q. 21, a. 1.

[17] P. T. Geach, "Good and Evil," in *Theories of Ethics,* ed. Philipa Foot (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 64-74; cf. Bernard Williams, *Introduction to Morality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 40-50.

since the purposes of different artificial objects are different, the goodness of one be quite distinct from the goodness of another. Goodness in natural objects is similar. Not an natural objects have conscious purposes, but they do have inherent tendencies or orientations, or, at least, potentialities. And of course different natural things have different inherent potentialities. "Good" as said of natural objects expresses the fulfillment or achievement of their inherent potentialities. Thus a good heart (literaHy) is one that functions according to the inherent tendencies or potentialities of a heart. A good tree (in the natural sense, as a botanist might express it, instead of the sense it which it is good for us) is a tree that its potentialities: namely, it grows taH, sturdy, performs its living functions smoothly, and so on. Moreover, "good" said of either artificial or natural objects expresses desirability: what is good is desirable and preferable to the non-good or bad.

Thus, to say that something is "good" in the primary sense is to say, first, that it fulfills the potentialities or standards for the sort of thing it is,[18] and, second, that as a consequence it is desirable.[19] The standards for the sort of thing one is talking

[18] If it is an artifact, this standard is the purpose for which it was made or is now being used; if it is a natural thing, the standard is the actuation of its inherent potentialities.

[19] So the word "good" is usually used in such a way as to have more than descriptive force. The statements in which it occurs often guide choices rather than just describe. Still, it seems to me that the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive force primarily concerns propositions and statements rather than concepts or words.

Aristotle and Aquinas say that good expresses desirability and perfection (see *STh* I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 1). The "-able" in "desirable" is important: to call something "good" is to say that the thing (or state) has what it takes to be the object of a desire or tendency, or to elicit a desire or tendency. Now, that which can elicit tendency or desire, or which is apt to do so, is the same as a thing's fulfillment or perfection (and so is not, in the central case, *another* thing but the full actuality of the thing in question). So, the two notes are interconnected. On the notion of goodness, cf. William Marshner, "Aquinas on the Evaluation of Human Actions," *The Thomist* 59 (1995): 347-70, esp. 348-53.

Note also that a thing is desired because it is good, not vice versa. Although we cannot *conceive* of goodness without the comparison of it to tendency or desire, in reality what is perfect or perfective does not depend on desire or tendency, but vice versa. This means that goodness, in its primary instance, is inherent or intrinsic to a thing. The *concept* involves a comparison (hence a relation in one's thought) of the thing in its actuality to what the thing could or should be, but what is conceived, that is, the reality apprehended by the concept, is not a relational entity.

about may come from extrinsic ordering (in the case of an artificial object) or from the inherent potentialities of the thing (in the case of a natural entity). In either case, these standards differ for different sorts of things. Thus, an inherently good tree need not have all of the perfections or features we expect of an inherently good horse or human being. A good book is one that one would select in relevant circumstances (it is desirable), because it has those characteristics which make it fulfill the standards for a book (or a specific kind of book). The book's goodness is not some quality over and above its character development, vivid description, and intricate plot; those characteristics *are* its goodness (although conceived as desirable and meeting the relevant standards). Likewise with a good human action: it is one that fulfills the standards for human actions.

One could say that the meaning of the word "good" has a constant schema and a varying content.[20] Its primary meaning always includes desirability and fulfillment (the constant schema), but this will mean different things in different cases, since the characteristics that constitute a thing's fulfillment differ for different sorts of things (varying content).[21] In a secondary sense,

[20] The vocabulary is Germain Grisez's: *Beyond the New Theism* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1975), 248-55. Thomas Aquinas spoke of a *ratio communis* and a *ratio propria;* see *STh* I, q. 13, a. 5. This is close to the distinction R. M. Hare draws between "meaning" and "criteria" for the use of the word "good." See R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 94-110.

[21] Perhaps what is said here about goodness might be clarified by comparing it with beauty, for they are very similar. What does it mean to say that something is beautiful? Take a simple example, say, a beautiful color. I believe we say it is beautiful simply because, as Aquinas put it, it "pleases when seen." This does not mean that beauty is subjective. On the contrary, it means that the color has in it what it takes for the perception of it to be pleasing. Clearly, though, the beauty is not a quality in the color over and above its other features. Rather, what makes it the color it is and what makes it such that it is pleasing when seen are one and the same. The word functions in the same way when used of more complicated instances of beauty, say, a photograph of a beautiful face. The beauty in the photograph is not some quality over and above its other qualities. To say that the photograph is beautiful is to say that its components--the colors, the lines, the light, and so on-are arranged in such a way that it is pleasing when seen. This explains how a piece of music, a book, and a face can all be beautiful, although they clearly have no nature or property in common: each has what it takes to be pleasing or delightful when experienced. Beauty and goodness are similar: neither is a distinct characteristic, but each is a certain way of possessing various other characteristics.

a thing is "good" if it would fulfill another or help another fulfill itself, as water or food is good for a tree.[22]

To this one might object that goodness or value is something like a quality when one speaks of persons or actions, but has the meaning it has as set out above in all other cases, say, when one speaks of books and washing machines. On this view, goodness or value is something like a quality in persons. But in other things, such as books, washing machines, and so on, goodness is nothing over and above the thing's full-being or degree of full-being. However, if this were the situation, then the word "good" (and "value," etc.) would be predicated equivocally. In one type of case the word "good" would denote something like a quality, while in all other cases it would express a complex concept as explained above. But surely this is not true. "Good" said of a person is not totally equivocal with "good" said of a washing machine. It is surely not coincidence that the same word is used of those various objects.

Finally, one might grant that the word is used analogically but still try to maintain that it denotes a distinct quality in the case of persons and actions. The words "good" and "value," one might say, always mean "fulfills" (or "fulfilling"), but in the case of persons this involves a quality over and above their other features, while in the case of a washing machine or book it does not. But this view is incoherent. It concedes that being a good person means, at least in part, having all of the features or qualities which are due a person, all of the features and qualities that constitute the fulfillment of the standards for a person. It adds that one of the features due a person is simply the feature of goodness or value itself. However, if a person lacked this quality, proponents of this view would have to say, on the one hand, that he was good to a certain extent, since he had almost all of the perfections due a person, but at the same time, that he was not good at all, since he simply lacked this property. I conclude that

[22] Aquinas says that the intelligibility *(ratio)* of "good" is "fullness of being," but the subject of which this *ratio* is predicated may be related to it in various way-as possessing it simply, as possessing it to a certain extent, as causing it, and so on. Cf. *STh* I, q. 5, aa. 1-3; I-II, q. 18, a. 2.

goodness is not a distinct nature or property. Rather, it is the full-being, or degree of full-being, in a thing, and this involves various features in various things.[23]

Therefore, "good" and "evil" do not signify contrary properties. Rather, since goodness is the full-being of a thing, its meeting the standard for the sort of thing it is, it follows that evil as such is not a nature, either substantial or accidental, but is the lack of, or deviation from, what is due a thing. If goodness is the fullness of being due a thing, evil must be the negation of what is due a thing, a privation.

A second argument to show that evil as such is a privation runs as follows. In the world are various types of *agents.*[24] Things differ from each other precisely in that they are different types of agents. And agents differ from each other in that each type of agent has a tendency to act and react in a certain way (or a set of tendencies to act and react in certain ways). If two things have the same type of tendencies to act and react, then they have the same nature.

So, beings are agents, and each being has within it a natural tendency or a set of natural tendencies. These tendencies must be toward the actualization of the potentialities of that thing. If A naturally tends toward X, then A must have the potentiality for X, and X must actualize some potentiality in A. A thing could not naturally tend toward an object which did not actualize its potentialities. To say that "A tends to do X, but X is not proportionate to A's nature" would be incoherent. We know what A is only in and through its actions. The actions of a thing

[23] It is worth noting that the concept of "dignity" is distinct from the concept of "good." "Dignity" refers to a specific type of goodness. The "dignity of persons" refers to that in them, whatever it is, which makes it such that one ought not to kill them, one ought not to use them for food, and one ought to take account of their well-being for its own sake when one acts. The concept of dignity is distinct from the concepts of person, or of rational being, and so on. But it does not follow that what one refers to by "dignity" is really distinct from being a person, or being a rational being. Rather, that in a person which makes it such that he deserves respect is just his being a person, not some other quality or aspect.

[24] On this point see Patrick Lee, "Human BeingsAre Animals," *InternationalPhilosophical Quarterly* 37 (1997): 292-94, 301-2.

are just the unfolding of what it is. If A tends to do X, then that just shows that A is the sort of thing that does X.[25]

Now, the actualization of a thing's potentialities, as such-that is, just insofar as it is the actualization of a thing's potentialities-perfects that thing, makes it a more perfect or more complete instance of the type of thing it is. And in fact the actualization of a thing's potentialities, its completion, is called its "good." The more fully X a thing is, the more it realizes the potentialities of an X, the better an X it is. That to which a thing naturally tends is its perfection and its good.

What, then, is evil? Evil cannot be a substance. If it were a substance, then it would be an agent. If it were an agent, its fulfillment would be its good, and its continued being would be good for it; its substantial being would be, at least in some sense, good. Nor can evil be an accident. Every accident must actualize the potentiality of some substance; otherwise, it could not inhere in anything. Therefore, evil cannot be either a substance or an accident. Since it cannot be a fiction or a relation of reason (that is, a being conceived as having a relation it does not have in reality), evil must be negative, in fact a privation-the lack of what is due a thing.

The distinction between a mere negation and a privation must be maintained. Not every negation is evil, but only the negation of what is *due* a thing. A favorite example of the Scholastics was blindness in a human being, as opposed to the lack of wings in a human being. The second is not evil, because human beings are not due wings, are not naturally apt to have wings.[26] The first, however, is obviously evil (not a moral evil, but a "physical evil"), because sight is due a human being. Clearly, blindness is real, but it is not a positive something. It is the not-having-sight in something which is naturally apt to see. The arguments show that

[25] Note, however, that the various tendencies in a complex being must be properly ordered to the good of the whole being, else their actuation may result in privation for the whole being. That is, the actuation of one tendency in a being or agent, while good insofar as it perfects the agent, could be bad, overall, because it also brings about defects in other aspects of the agent.

[26] Cf. Aristotle's definition of privation in *Categories* 10.

what is true of blindness must be true of every instance of evil, in some way or other.

Even this simple example shows that to say that evil is a privation is in no way to deny its importance or reality. It is important and real, although it is not a nature, either substantial or accidental.

Moreover, the position that evil is a privation does not mean that there are no evil things.[27] There are evil things, but what makes them evil is privation. One can speak of a virus or of certain bacteria as evil things, but what makes them evil is the privation they cause.[28] Morally evil acts are actual entities, but what makes them evil is the privation of order in them in relation to the standard of morality-the lack of agreement between judgment and choice.

Similarly, there can be evil persons. The Church teaches, of course, that Satan is an evil, spiritual person. But what makes a person evil is, first, the disorder or privation in his will, and, second, the privation he causes. To the extent that such persons have being or actuality they are good.

To say that a thing is good, then, is to say that it has everything one can expect from that type of thing, or, at least, that it is good in certain respects because it has a considerable degree of the being due the sort of thing it is. This is why the same property or behavior in one case might be called good while in another case bad. Licking the bowl clean, for example, is good if done by one's dog, but bad if done by one's twelve-year-old child. If "good" denoted a property, it is hard to see how the very same property could be good in one case but not good in another case. "Good" expresses the fulfillment of the relevant standard.

If a being is good just insofar as it fulfills the potentialities proper to it, it follows that evil cannot be something positive. It

[27] See the first article of St. Thomas's disputed question on evil. The question he raises is "Whether evil is something *[aliquid]?"* His answer is that that which is evil is something, although evilness itself is a privation *(De Malo,* q. 1, a. 1).

[28] Of course, viewed in itself, the bacterium (and perhaps the virus also) is a distinct organism, with its own nature and a tendency to its own fulfillment; only, its growth involves the privation in its host organism (in certain bacteria). Another example is cancer. What makes it evil is the privation of order in its growth-the lack of regulation of the growth of those cells which would keep them from interfering with various functions in the organism.

cannot be a nature, either substantial or accidental. Therefore, evil must be the falling-short, or diverting from what one can and ought to be.

A third argument for the proposition that evil as such is privation was decisive for many of the Fathers of the Church. If evil were something positive, then one would have to say either that this evil is caused by God, in which case God is in some way evil (which is incoherent, for several reasons), or that there is some being in the universe which is not caused by God, in which case there is some creator other than the one God (which can also be shown incoherent in various ways).[29]

Could one say, perhaps, that some positive evil is caused by creatures, human beings and other free agents, so that God does not directly cause evil, but he does cause the beings that cause evil? The idea would be that God causes A and A causes B (something positive and evil), but that God does not directly cause B. One might suppose that God causes the person and then the person causes evil. In this way one would avoid having to attribute the doing of evil to God: God does not do it; the person does it, and God causes it only indirectly insofar as he causes the person.

If this were true, then God would cause A to exist and then A would cause B to exist, and B would depend on God only indirectly, that is, only insofar as B was caused by A which was caused by God. This would mean that, although A had first to exist in order to cause B, still, A was adequate of itself to cause B to exist.

But this cannot be the case. A can be an adequate cause, and thus provide an adequate explanation, only of what belongs to it by its nature, either formally or virtually. That is, the cause can be greater than the effect, so that the effect does not measure up to the cause, and the cause and the effect do not have the same nature. But there cannot be less perfection in the cause than there is in the effect. The reason is that the cause *explains;* if the cause lacks a perfection equivalent to or greater than that in the effect, then it cannot provide an explanation. For example, the heat in

[29] For example: St. Thomas, *STh* I, q. 11, a. 3; Grisez, *Beyond the New Theism,* 248-55.

the coil on the electrical stove is explained by the electrical energy coming from the electrical outlet and ultimately from the electro-magnetic generator in the city's electrical power plant. The electro-magnet is not formally hot but it is virtually hot: there is not less, but more perfection, more energy, in the electro-magnet than in the electrical coil on the stove. The cause must pre-contain the perfection of the effect, either formally or virtually. If the adequate explanation is found in A, then *what A is* must provide the intelligibility one is seeking. But if the feature one is trying to explain is a feature which A also lacks just of itself (does not have, according to its nature) either formally or virtually, then A cannot provide the adequate explanation and cannot be the adequate cause. *(Cause* is just the real counterpart to the explanation, which is a logical entity.) For example, a saxophone cannot be the adequate cause of the melodious patterns in its sounds; a word processor cannot be the adequate cause or explanation of the meaningfulness of the marks it produces. These aspects of their effects require some immediate cause other than the saxophone or word processor.

Things in this material universe are real causes. They cause heat, light, life, meaning, and so on. But their causal powers, dearly, are limited. Their causal powers or natures explain why things exist in this manner or that manner, why they have these features or those features.[30] But the things in this material universe-their causal powers or natures-do not provide an explanation for why things exist as such, for none of them has existence as belonging to its nature, either formally or virtually. Since none of them exists of itself, none of them can be an adequate explanation of the very existing of their effects.

Expressed more formally: the adequate explanation of a thing's having F must be something which has F of itself, either formally or virtually. This point applies to existence. Hence the

[30] Rather than causing something simply to be rather than not be, a natural cause always operates upon something pre-existing and gives it a new form. Fire acts on water or air, parents act on genes, a human artist acts on a canvas. Even our thinking operates upon images or premises. Thus, the causality performed by things in the material universe is a *transforming* causality. The causal powers of things are not proportioned to the very existing of those things. Cf. Herbert McCabe, O.P., "The Logic of Mysticism," in *Religion and Philosophy,* ed. Martin Warner (New York: Cambridge University, 1992), 45-59.

only thing whose causal power is proportionate to existence, as opposed to this or that form or essence, is something which has existence of itself. Only a necessary being, a fully self-sufficient being-God-has existence of itself.[31]

It follows that God, who alone has existence of himself, is causally operative in each new effect, in each coming to be. While the natural cause can explain the nature or manner of existing of the effect, only God can explain, or be a proportionate cause of, the very existing of the effect. Thus, in every effect produced by a creature, both God and the creature are immediately at work.

When a teacher writes a sentence on the chalkboard with chalk, the teacher is the principal cause and the chalk is the instrumental cause. Both the chalk and the teacher produce the whole effect, but in different ways. The chalk produces the whole effect, but there is that in the effect which exceeds its power, namely, the intelligible design of the deposited dust so that it forms words. Another aspect of the effect, its whiteness, is proportionate to the power of the instrumental cause. So, the chalk acts in virtue of its own power, but it also acts in virtue of the power of the principal cause acting in it (the teacher). Hence both causes act immediately on the effect, but in different ways.

Similarly, when a creature produces an effect, it does so only as cooperating with God's primary causality. There is an aspect of the effect which is proportionate to its nature, so it is a real cause: its nature explains why the effect exists in this manner rather than that. But there also is an aspect of the effect which exceeds its power, and that is the existence of the effect, which is proportionate only to the principal cause, which is God. Each produces the whole effect, rather than one producing one part and the other producing the other part, but different aspects of the effect are proportionate to the different causes. Thus, as the chalk produces the writing on the board, but only insofar as it is caused by the writer, so natural causes really produce effects, but only as secondary causes cooperating-freely, in the case of rational beings-with the primary cause, God. One cannot say, therefore, that God causes only the human person and then the

[31] For arguments to support this point, see Grisez, *Beyond the New Theism,* 36-94; and McCabe, "The Logic of Mysticism."

human person causes an evil nature. If a thing is actual, then it must be directly caused by God. If it is directly caused by God, then to the extent that it is actual it is good. Therefore, evil as such must be negative or, more precisely, privative.

m

There are three important objections to the thesis that evil as such is a privation: two alleged counterexamples, and an objection concerning God's causality of created free choices.

The first objection is that pain is certainly a positive something, and yet it is dearly evil. If, then, in this case evil as such is something positive why not in other cases?[32]

Let us first consider physical pain, for example, a toothache or the excruciating pain experienced by a cancer sufferer. The first point to notice is that any animal (including ourselves, since we are animals of a particular type) who cannot feel pain is in grave danger. Pain sensations have a real function in the organic life of an animal. Their function is to signal to the animal that there is a real harm occurring and to press it to correct the problem. Thus, as the sense of smell has a real function to play in the organic life of animals, and in that consists its goodness, so pain has a real and necessary function in the animal's life, and therefore is good.

Of course, pain can perform its function only by being repugnant.[33] If by "evil" or "bad" one simply means "unpleasant," then, of course, pains are "evil." It is in this sense that we might call a piece of candy "good" (pleasant-tasting) but a tart apple "bad" (repugnant to taste). Yet we would add that, while the apple is "bad" in that sense, it is genuinely good, and it is that sense we are discussing here. Precisely the same feature which in digestion or reparative cell division makes us recognize that they

[32] This objection is pressed by G. Stanley Kane, "Evil and Privation," *International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion* 11(1980):43-58; for a reply, see Bill Anglin and Stewart Goetz, "Evil Is Privation," *International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion* 13 (1982): 3-12.

[33] This is an important point. One might argue that another warning device could have been designed. But only something intensely repugnant would serve to press the animal to do something about the cause of the pain.

are genuinely good (instead of just sensibly "good" or "bad") is also present in sensations of pain-namely, their functional place in the life and flourishing of the whole animal. Pain-sensations are a certain sort of sensation, exactly like all other sensations in their role of specifying the animal's adaptation to its environment.

Yet other features of pain prevent one from saying that it is *simply* good. Pain is the sensation which accompanies and signals a real privation. Every painful situation will therefore also involve a real evil, a privation (or at least the threat of harm). Moreover, excruciating pain disrupts the rest of the functioning of an animal, and especially of a human being; thus there is a kind of disintegrity caused by pain. This is one reason why it is frequently morally right to take measures, such as pain-relieving psychoactive substances, to remove or lessen pain. Still, the sensation of pain itself is not a real evil, and so it does not constitute a counterexample to the position defended here.

It might be objected that these points only show that pain can have good effects. Utility does not show that an entity is good; what is evil can be useful.[34] But this objection would misconstrue the argument. The argument is not simply that pain-sensations lead to good effects, but that having pain-sensations in certain circumstances is part of the healthy functioning of an organism. It is useful here to compare pain-sensations to a genuine evil, for example, blindness. Of course, good things can sometimes result from someone's blindness; it might cause him to reexamine the meaning of life, grow in patience, and so on. But the good that might result from blindness would be a distinct effect. The blindness would function only as an occasion for a good quite extrinsic to the blindness. It is otherwise with pain. Of course, pain is not a whole or basic human perfection, and so pain.is not intrinsically good in the way that life, knowledge, friendship, and so on are. Also, one feels pain only when (or usually only when) there is some injury, that is, a real physical privation. However, having pain-sensations when one's flesh burns, for example, is

[34] Jorge Gracia, "Evil and the Transcendality of Goodness: Suarez's Solution to the Problem of Positive Evils," in Scott MacDonald, ed., *Being and Goodness* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell U., 1991), 157f.

part of the functioning of a healthy organism, not just an extrinsic condition for some other good. This is why not having such sensations when flesh is burnt would be bad (a privation) and one would visit a physician to see if that condition could be remedied.[35] That is, the inability to have pain-sensations in appropriate circumstances, or even the absence of pain-sensations in appropriate circumstances, is a malfunction of the organism. This shows that the ability to have pain, and the actual having of pain, in the appropriate circumstances, are parts of being a healthy organism.

One might object, however, that this shows only that most pains are good, not that all are. What about useless pains, or those that continue after they have served their function, for example, in a patient whose cancer is incurable? In reply, there surely is evil here, but the evil is not precisely in the nervous system and in its functioning. Since the injury the pain alerts one to and presses one to alleviate cannot be alleviated, the pain is in one sense useless. However, the nervous system is functioning the way it should, or according to its design. It is analogous to the heart's continuing its pumping action even when it has dogged arteries. The defect, the evil, once again, is in a lack of proper order of its actions-actions in themselves healthy-toward the functioning of the organism as a whole. In this respect pain is not unlike other organic functions. Functioning that is in itself healthy is bad if it is not properly ordered to the survival and well-being of the organism as a whole. What makes it evil, once again, is privation.[36]

We must also consider the case of emotional pain. Sorrow, for example, is an emotion, and thus not evil but simply a reaction to what is evil, or at least what is perceived as evil. Sorrow is indeed

[35] Roger Trigg discusses the case of a woman who lacked pain-sensations. Her condition was far from enviable; she constantly suffered injury because of her indifference to it. Roger Trigg, *Pain and Emotion* (London: Oxford University, 1970), 163-68.

[36] One also should note that pain is one type of a broader class of sensations that we find repugnant or, at least, undesirable. Pain-sensations are in the same class as itches, sweltering heat, cramps, electric shocks, and vile smells. Cf. R. M. Hare, "Pain and Evil," in Joel Feinberg, ed., *Moral Concepts* (London: Oxford University, 1970), 29-42. Clearly, such sensations are not evil: in their various ways they too are aspects of the animal organism's adaptation to his environment. But pain-sensations are not qualitatively different from them.

unpleasant or repugnant, but one *should* feel sorrow over a real harm to onesdf or one's friend, There would be something wrong if one did not, Sorrow is analogous to physical pain: as pain is the physical reaction to injury, sorrow is the emotional reaction to injury, The case is the same for an enduring or intense sorrow, Emotional pain is therefore not a counterexample, and the evils to which emotions are reactions will, in the end, be privations-sickness, death, broken relationships, lost opportunities, and so on.

The second objection to the privation thesis is that morally evil acts are not mere privations, The morally evil act of adultery and the morally evil act of hatred of God, for example, are obviously more than just absences good, They are positive acts. Moreover, the objection continues, that which makes them evil seems to be something positive; for there is in each of these acts an *opposition* to what is good, rather than just a failure to do or pursue the good. "Is it not obvious," someone might ask, "that Hider was a positive evil force, and that what made him evil was something positive, namely, his hatred?"

Aquinas considered this objection, [37] as have others in the Scholastic tradition, [38] Consider intellectual acts first. One might think that the privation thesis is committed to saying that all error is basically of one sort. Error would be just the lack of truth. But, surely, one might object, there is a difference between ignorance and error-between not knowing something, even something one ought to know, and holding an opinion that is *opposed* to the truth, Error is more than just lack of truth, one may object, it is something opposed to the truth,

The mistake here is to that the privation constituting the evil must always be located the same place. What makes a false opinion bad is indeed a privation, but the privation is not in the same place, so to speak, as it is in ignoranceo In ignorance there

[37] St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, cc. 8-9.

[38] For example: Francisco Suarez, *The Metaphysics of Good and Evil according to Suarez,* trans. and ed. Jorge Gracia and Douglas Davis (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1989), 168f. Bill Anglin and Stewart Goetz are correct when they observe that, "Indeed, given the fact that the philosophers, such as Augustine and Aquinas, who held the privation theory gave very careful thought to moral evil, it would be quite surprising if moral evil constituted a counterexample to the privation theory" (Anglin and Goetz, "Evil is Privation," 8).

is an absence of the act of knowing. In error there is a positive act of belief, but the belief lacks conformity with reality. In error one holds a proposition to be true, that is, to conform with the facts (supposing here a realist view and a theoretical rather than a practical proposition). An intellectual act of this sort is good, as far as it goes, but the problem lies in the lack of conformity between the proposition one believes and what is the case. In other words, there is first of all a lack in the proposition. [39] The act of holding that a proposition with that sort of lack in it is true has a privation in it, since one ought to affirm only true propositions. Ignorance is a privation of an intellectual act; error is an intellectual act with a privation in it.

There is a similar distinction in the moral order. Omissions are clearly distinct from commissions, and not every moral evil is an omission. Still, the moral evil consists in a privation, the privation in the choice. That is, there are privations of choices (omissions) and choices with privations (evil commissions).

The morally bad choice is not done for the sake of the moral evil in it. Rather, it is done for the sake of something that at least seems in some way good. The choice of adultery, for example, is made for the sake of the experience involved. A murder might be committed for the sake of money or power. But there is joined to the object chosen, or there is found in the object chosen, the privation of due order to the objective moral standard. [40] Aquinas expresses this point as follows:

> Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of senses without the

[39] Although a false proposition *lacks* conformity with reality, there is no reason to hold that every proposition should be a true one. Every *believed* proposition should be true, but one might do various things with propositions-consider them, compare them to others, and so on. So, the lack in question here is not yet a defect or privation. The privation occurs when a false proposition is believed.

[40] One can disagree about what that standard is and still accept this point.

order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed. [41]

In other words, the sinner chooses some object that has, or seems to have, some good in it-otherwise there would be no point in choosing it-but the object chosen has a privation in it as well, of which the sinner is quite aware, though he makes the choice anyway. One rightly says that the whole act is evil; still, that which makes the act evil is a privation. [42]

The same is true in other morally bad choices. In the doctrine of the seven capital sins the tradition explains how sins arise. These basic sins are not the most serious, but they are the roots or heads (from *capita,* "heads") from which other sins flow. Pride, avarice, gluttony, and lust are the inordinate desires for status, wealth, food and drink, or sexual satisfaction. These are the first capital sins, based on the desire for some good. Notice that all of them are desires for things that are in themselves good. Excellence or status, wealth, pleasure in food, drink, and sex are good things; it is only the *inordinate* desire for them that is a sin.

A similar point is true for aversions. We naturally have aversions to what is harmful or in some way repugnant to us. But a disorder-a privation-can arise, in that something that is actually good can seem harmful to us. This happens in the other three capital sins. Thus, sloth is aversion to one's own moral or spiritual good, because of the difficulties in its pursuit. Envy is sorrow at another's good, because his good is perceived as threatening one's own excellence. And anger is an inordinate desire for vindication or vengeance. In sinners, Aquinas points out, an actual hatred for the good can arise-not a hatred of the good precisely because it is good, but a hatred of it because it threatens status, comfort, or some other true or apparent good. Such hatred, though, as he points out, is not a capital sin; it

[41] *STh* I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2.

[42] This is not a specifically Thomistic doctrine. It is shared by other doctors of the Church. For example, St. Bonaventure writes: "Sin is the corruption of mode, species, and order. Because it is a defect, it does not have an *efficient* cause but a *deficient_cause,* namely, the defect in the created will" ("Et hoc est peccatum, quod est modi, speciei et ordinis corruptivum; quod quia defectus est, non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem, videlicet defectum voluntatis creatae" *[Breviloquium* 3.1.3]).

emerges only somewhat later in the deterioration of the sinner (one does not usually become morally bad all at once). The hatred is a disorder founded on a prior love, actually a love that already has gone awry. So, in sinning one wills something that is in itself good, but wills it in an inordinate way. The sin is choosing some good in such a way as to turn away from a full respect for all other goods, and thus in such a way as to turn away from God's plan.[43]

The doctrine of the capital sins makes clear some basic truths about the moral life. First, sin involves an inordinate choice of a good. All of the things pursued in the capital sins are objects which if pursued appropriately and wisely, and in accord with the other goods of the kingdom (the fulfillment of God's plan for creation and redemption), would be quite reasonable and morally good. A status fitting my vocation, pleasure in healthy food and drink, pleasure in sexual acts which truly embody and actualize my marital communion, and so on-these are goods which it is fitting to pursue. It is the pursuit of status, pleasure, comfort, and so on as independent from the kingdom planned by God that is the source of sin. Sin is the narrowing of one's concern to what one wants, no matter what its relation to the kingdom.[44]

But hatred of God, one may object, is a positive opposition to the good and God, and not just the absence of a good. Precisely what makes it evil (the objection continues) is something positive, its opposition to God.

However, not every hatred, whether it be emotional or volitional, is evil. It is natural and healthy for animals and

[43] Thus, one of the traditional definitions of a sin is "the willing of a changeable good in an inordinate way, so that it involves a turning away from the unchangeable God" (*STh* 1-11, q. 84, a. 1).

[44] Since evil is a privation it follows that we do not have, strictly speaking, tendencies toward evil. One treats evil as if it were a positive nature if one views our concrete nature as having distinct tendencies toward evil, perhaps as a result of original sin. Instead of having simply evil tendencies, or tendencies simply toward evil, we have disorders, privations, in our tendencies. For example, there is no such thing as a tendency toward selfishness, literally speaking. Rather, selfishness is a disorder in other tendencies: a privation in our basic tendencies toward food, sexual acts, and so on. A so-called tendency toward cruelty is a disorder in one's disposition or capacity to have aggressive emotions. Our basic tendencies and our basic emotional constitution are good; but they are more or less disordered, from original sin, personal sins, defects in our culture, and so on.

rational creatures to have an aversion for what threatens them. Hatred is a type of act which in some circumstances is appropriate. We should hate whatever is really harmful to us-but that, of course, does not in.dude either God, our neighbor, or ourselves. What makes hatred of God or of a human person evil is that such acts are directed toward objects to which they should not be directed. In other words, what makes such acts evil is their departure from the due order. Hatred should be directed only toward certain nonpersons that are actually or potentiaHy harmful. The evil is the departure from that due order. There is a strict analogy here with the intellectual order. One may assent or one may dissent (hold that something is false). Neither assent nor dissent is in itsdf inteHectuaUy bad; the bad consists in the disorder arising from assenting to what is false or dissenting from what is true. Likewise, there is an act of love and there is an act of hate. Neither is of itself an evil; the evil consists their disorder.

Moreover, it is worth noting that one cannot hate God precisely because he is good or because he is who he is: goodness is not hated for its own sake. It is nonsense to imagine that someone can acquire a nature such that he hates good because it is good and loves evil because it is evil. However, one can hate God if God is perceived as getting in the way of something else one wants, something which is good, or seems to be good, on some level or other.

A third objection concerns God's causality of free choices. I have argued that God causes every being other than himself, including free choices, but that he does not cause the evil, the privation, in free choices. One might object, however, that this position cannot be maintained. I also argued that human beings do not directly intend the evil, but are responsible for it insofar as they knowingly will to pursue something else to which this privation is attached. It might be objected, however, that the creature's choice seems to be related to God in precisely the same way, and so the reason for saying that the human person is responsible for moral evil would also apply to God.

However, evil is related to the sinner quite differently than it is related to God. Aquinas uses the following analogy. When an

animal limps, two causes are to be considered: the motive power of the animal, and a defect in the animal's leg, namely, a curvature of the bone. Clearly, the motive power of the animal causes the act, but the limp insofar as it is a privation is not due to that motive power; rather, it is due to the defect in the leg, the bone's curvature. Or suppose an expert saxophone-player is playing a defective saxophone. The music will be defective, but the defect will be due solely to the saxophone and not due to the saxophone-player. Indeed, whatever there is of good in the music will be due to both the saxophone and the saxophone-player, while the defects in the music will be due solely to the saxophone.

The analogies apply to the morally evil act and its relation to God and the human being. Good free choices by human beings are both from God and from the human beings. In an evil free choice, the actuality and degree of goodness that is in it is from both the human being and God. But the defect, the evil, is solely from the human being, and is not traced back to God at all. God moves the human being only toward good. As a defect in the bone prevents the animal's motive power from producing a perfectly good walk, or as a defect in the saxophone prevents the expert saxophone-player from producing beautiful music, so a defect in the human secondary cause prevents God's causality-which is only toward good-from resulting in a morally good act. God causes actuality in the morally evil act (and the human being is also a cause of the act in this respect, but as a secondary cause), but the evil, the privation, is traced back to a (voluntary) defect in the human being and in no way traced back to God.

IV

There are several ways in which this doctrine has a profound practical impact on faith. First, the basic Christian attitude toward sin involves a balance. On the one hand, Christian teaching insists that sin really is unreasonable, foolish. On the other hand, Christian teaching equally insists that we all are sinners and are subject to temptation. So, on the one hand, there must be an objective standard by which one can see, even from within the

perspective of sinning, that sin is unreasonable. Those who sin are not merdy choosing the side opposite the side "we" have chosen. On the other hand, there must be some point to the sin, lest we imagine we are beyond temptation.

This balance can be maintained by recognizing that the evH in the sinful act is a privation. As an inordinate act, sin has two aspects. As an act, it has an inteHigible purpose, a purpose that, as far as it goes, is good. Thus, one can understand why someone might sin. As inordinate, however, sin is unreasonable, with an unreasonableness that is is, an unreasonableness that can be seen by all, not just by those who have already opted for one "side" rather than the other.

However, if one thinks that evil as such is positive, then one is likely to think that evil as such is attractive, that sin is the choice of evil (as such) versus good. But if evil is thought of as a kind of quality some people are sometimes attracted to, then this penchant for evil will be either natural or not. If it is natural, then there must already be some evil in us substantially. [45] If it is not natural, then it is hard to see how we could be tempted to it without already having been somehow corrupted-but then that corruption would require explanation.

H one does find evil attractive, then how can one see its irrationality while sinning? That is, within the perspective of this tendency one could not see its irrationality. H evil is some positive quality and doing evil is choosing the evil itself, then, to the extent that one is inclined toward good, doing evil will be sheerly irrational; but to the extent that one is inclined to this evil quality, this inclination wiH remain unexplained, and there will be no absolute standard by which one can then see the unreasonableness of doing evil.

Moreover, if evil is viewed as a nature, even accidental, keeping to the good will begin to seem restrictive, for it will appear to be a pursuit of some positive reality and a turning away

[45] The idea that there are positive evils, but only among accidents, and not also somehow internal to substances, is inconsistent. Positive accidents must stem from the internal natures of things; their positive being must be explained by reference to a substance or substances. Hence those who conceive evil, or some evil, as a quality will tend to trace it back to an inherently evil substance.

from another positive reality. The morally right thing will seem to be defined by the boundaries of moral rules. The tendency will be toward a negative and legalistic frame of mind. There is also the strong likelihood that the commission of evil will seem quite unlike anything one is regularly tempted to do, for acts which even seem to be motivated by love of evil for its own sake are quite rare. This would lead to the comforting but illusory thought that one never sins.

If one recognizes, however, that evil as such is a privation, one sees that doing evil is the pursuit of some type of good in such a way as to suppress in oneself an appreciation of the goodness of other things, and thus in such a way as to turn away from God's plan, his orienting us to love of all good. Thus, the very orientation by which one is inclined to the particular good one seeks in a sinful act provides a standard by which one can see the unreasonableness, the wrongness, of this act. Even if one is doing evil, there is a standard within that perspective that can show its unreasonableness.

Once one sees that evil as such is a privation one sees that departing from God and his plan is not really going in a separate direction. We sometimes think of cooperating with God on analogy with going in a certain direction, say, going upward, or going north. Then we may think of doing evil as going in the opposite direction, going down or south. However, this is misleading. The full unreasonableness and objective wrong of doing evil is revealed when we see that doing evil is not going in any opposite direction-there isn't a positive something apart from God, there isn't another "team" independent of God, really offering something not offered by God. There is no positive point which is a term of departures from God. To depart from God is to diminish, to shrivel, to move toward non-being-without making "non-being" a something.

Second, believing that evil as such is a nature is likely to make evil seem more powerful than it is. But to see that evil as such is a privation is to see that however powerful evil persons can be (e.g., Satan, or other evil powers), they still exist only insofar as they are preserved in being by the Creator, and they act only insofar as their actions, to the extent that they have actuality in

them, are held in being by the Creator. There is a battle between the forces of good and the forces of evil, as St. Paul and the tradition of the Church assure us; yet the battle is very unlike other battles with which we are familiar. The forces of evil have no chance of ultimately winning, and the very weapons at their disposal are permitted them by the head of the opposite force.

Third, the idea that evil is something positive could prevent one from seeing that God does not directly do evil of any kind, that, as Jacques Maritain emphatically expressed it, God is absolutely innocent of evil.[46] If evil as such is a nature, then it is hard to see any reason one could have for saying that God would not do non-moral evil, here and there, for a good reason. If evil as such has a positive nature, then on what grounds could one say that (non-moral) evil is alien to God's nature or essence?[47] It is incoherent to think of God as bound by some moral rules distinct from himself; therefore, if it is not simply incoherent to think of God as doing (non-moral) evil, then there will be no reason at all to think he does not.

Finally, God is a God of love and forgiveness-which does not mean that he does not hate sin or insist on our repentance and reformation. It does mean, however, that he has a definite strategy for dealing with evil in his creation, especially with moral evil, that is, sin. His strategy, revealed in the gospel, at first seems paradoxical. He responds to evil and hatred with love and the offer of forgiveness. This strategy is actually the most realistic possible, since evil is a privation.[48] The most realistic way of dealing with evil is by overcoming, with healing love, to the extent free creatures will cooperate, the wound, the privation, which is the problem.

[46] Jacques Maritain, *God and the Permission of Evil* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966), ch. 1.

[47] Our thinking about God is analogical. We reason that creatures, the effects of God's creation, are to some degree like God. So, whatever positive perfections there are in the world must be reflections--vague and inadequate perhaps---of a more eminent perfection in God. If evil were a nature, then, it is hard to see how one could consistently think of God as all good. Would not this nature have to be conceived as also a reflection of some aspect of the Creator's being?

[48] Cf. Germain Grisez, *The Way of the Lord Jesus*, vol. 1, *Christian Moral Principles* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), 120-25, 332-36.

However, if evil as such is thought of as a nature, then God's real strategy for dealing with evil will seem incoherent. Consistency will push one toward different strategies. Perhaps one will wish to destroy the things infected with evil, as did the zealots. Or perhaps one will incline toward dissociating oneself from evil, as did the Pharisees. To the extent that one does incline toward a different strategy one has compromised the Cross, which is God's utterly realistic, but scandalous, strategy for dealing with evil. Saint Paul says he preaches nothing but Christ, and Christ crucified. God's response to evil in the Cross is neither to destroy, nor to dissociate himself from, evil things and evil persons. His response is to offer love and forgiveness, a strategy that makes sense only if evil is a privation, a wound that needs to be healed.

The Thomist 64 (2000): 271-300

ELEMENTAL VIRTUAL PRESENCE IN ST. THOMAS

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Perhaps the best-known example of how Aristotle's philosophy of nature is thought to have been superseded by the scientific revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is the establishment of the atomic theory. The Stagirite's thoroughgoing opposition to the reduction of substances to aggregates of atoms is evident throughout his physical works and to the modern reader it seems that if there is any point on which Aristotle has been proved wrong it is this. It is therefore natural to think that, because they adopted Aristotle's mistake, the medieval philosophers-most notably St. Thomas Aquinas-are similarly outmoded. However, given the considerable revision of our understanding of the existence of atoms underway in contemporary science (particularly in quantum theory) since the beginning of the twentieth century, one is tempted to reassess the degree to which the Aristotelian abhorrence of atomism is truly obsolete. [1]

[1] See Edward MacKinnon, S.J., "Thomism andAtomism," *Modern Schoolman* 38 (1961): 121-41; William A. Wallace, O.P., "Are the Elementary Particles Real?" in *From A Realist Point of View: Essays on the Philosophy of Science* (2d ed.; Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983), 171-83. More recently, see Wolfgang Smith, "From Schrodinger's Cat to Thomistic Ontology," *The Thomist* 63 (1999): 49-63; and *The Quantum Enigma: Finding the Hidden Key* (Peru, Ill.: Sherwood Sugden and Company, 1995), especially chapters 3 and 4. For another recent but more careful exposition of St. Thomas's doctrine, focused on virtual presence and less concerned with the implications of quantum theory than the others are, see Joseph Bobik, *Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the De Principiis Naturae and the De Mixtione Elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).

While this paper will not offer such a reassessment, it will provide at least part of what must serve as a necessary foundation for it. In the following I will present a critical exposition of St. Thomas's account of the manner in which elemental substances are present in non-elemental substances, referred to as "mixtures."[2] If this mode of existence, usually referred to as "virtual presence,"[3] is not articulated very carefully, it will be not only an obstacle to any attempt at showing the present-day relevance of Aristotelian natural philosophy, but in fact an enigmatic and obscure account of the workings of nature.

Virtual presence has received surprisingly little space in the already sparse literature on Thomas's natural philosophy. One

[2] The words in Aristotle and St. Thomas are μ(1;1i;; and *mixtum* (or *mixtio),* respectively. I hesitate in deciding how to translate these words, the main reason being that what modern chemistry refers to as a mixture is something more precise, and probably less substantially united, than that to which Thomas and Aristotle refer.

In chemistry mixtures are divided into two categories: heterogeneous and homogeneous. However, the definition of each is primarily operational. A mixture is heterogeneous if it is an aggregate in which the particles are merely juxtaposed and can be mechanically separated, whether by filtration, distillation, or simply by using a pair of tweezers. It is homogeneous (or a solution) if there is such a thorough blending among the parts that the one dissolves in the other and they cannot be mechanically separated. Such mixtures are opposed to chemical compounds, in which there is a much stronger bond between the parts, one that involves the sharing or transferring of electrons on the atomic level (and such are subdivided into ionic and covalent bonds, each of which can also be further subdivided), and which possess properties radically different from those of their constituents. An example of a heterogeneous mixture would be salt and pepper shaken together in a jar; an example of a homogeneous mixture, salt water; and an example of a chemical compound, table salt (sodium chloride). While it is clear that Thomas would not consider a heterogeneous mixture to be a *mixtum* (in *De Mixtione Elementorum,* In. 34, he calls such a *confusio* or a *mixtio ad sensum,* as opposed to a *vera mixtio),* the question is more difficult in the case of solutions and compounds.

Hence, while many stand by the cognate (Williams, Fine, Code, and Crombie), other suggested translations vary from "mixed body" (Bobik), to "gel" (Fine), to "compound" (Wallace, Hoenen, and Van Melsen), to "chemical compound" (Phillips, Bittle, and Bogen), to "chemical combination" Uoachim and Gill), while some vacillate between "compound," "mixture," and "combination" (Cohen). Some use the old chemical terminology from the nineteenth century, calling this a "mixt" (Duhem and Needham), while others (Maier) have simply refused to translate the expression at all. While noting that each of these ways of translating has its benefits, rather than choose among them I will simply stand by the traditional cognate "mixture" or "mixed substance."

[3] Thomas never uses this actual expression. I will say more on the significance of this below.

can only speculate as to the reason for this, as the doctrine itself is not exactly transparent.[4] However, insofar as Thomas's doctrine is really just an interpretation of Aristotle's words in *De Generatione et Corruptione*, 1.10, it is noteworthy that Aristotle himself, at least in recent years, has not been similarly neglected.[5] Indeed, the recent deluge in Aristotelian studies being made by those who are principally of the analytic tradition has made Thomas's work all the more relevant. To put it simply, these neo-Aristotelians are in some respects reinventing the wheel with their careful studies of Aristotle on mixtures; many of them, after detailed analysis of Aristotle's works, are reaching conclusions that Thomas reached over seven hundred years before them. Because few of them seem to notice that they might have saved time by reading Thomas's commentaries and related opuscula,[6]

[4] The only study produced in almost a generation is Bobik, *Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements.* This work goes a long way both toward explaining Thomas's doctrine and toward showing its congeniality to contemporary particle physics. Indeed, aside from Bobik the most recent work done on virtual presence is acerbically critical of it, namely that of Marius G. Schneider, O.F.M., "The Anachronism of Certain Neothomistic Physical Doctrines," *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy,* vol.. 4, ed. John K. Ryan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1969), 142-73.

[5] For example, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* devoted its September and December issues to "Form, Matter, and Mixture in Aristotle" (vol .76 [1995]). Other recent work includes Mary Louise Gill, "Matter Against Substance," *Synthese* 96 (1993): 379-97; Paul Needham, "Aristotelian Chemistry: A Prelude to Duhemian Metaphysics," *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 27 (1996): 251-69; Sheldon M. Cohen, *Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55-100. Strangely, Anneliese Maier thinks that this matter is really a non-issue in Aristotle; see her *On the Threshold of Exact Science,* ed. and trans. Steven D. Sargent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 131-32.

[6] The only exception to this that I have seen is Cohen, who makes some reference to St. Thomas's account, comparing it to that of Gill (see Cohen, *Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance,* 90 and 98 n. 69). Cohen thinks St. Thomas's doctrine and arguments directed against Averroes are also opposed to his own position; however, I am not sure that Cohen's position is really that similar to Averroes's, so I suspect that he did not give Thomas a careful reading. It should also be noted that Kit Fine gives a nod to the medieval commentaries on *De Generatione et Corruptione,* 1.10. In an endnote he admits that there are "many points of contact" between his discussion and the medieval debates on the subject (Kit Fine, "The Problem of Mixture," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 76 [1995]: 366 n. 12). This is not to say, of course, that these fresh studies have nothing to add to what Thomas says. Indeed, their additions often can serve to make Thomas's interpretation of Aristotle more precise.

this may be something of which both disciples of St. Thomas and these neo-Aristotelians should take note.[7]

I. THE AMBIGUITY OF THE DOCTRINE

St. Thomas presents the notion of virtual presence in response to a question: "in what manner are elements in a mixture?"[8] The dilemma that provokes his answer can be formulated in the two ways one can stress this question. On the one hand, in what manner do the elements exist in *a mixture,* a being that is substantially one, possessing its own nature? On the other hand, in what manner do the elements exist *in* a mixture, that is, how are they constituents of and present within the mix? Even before Thomas offers his account-which is merely his interpretation of Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione,* 1.10[9]-one expects a

[7] There is a slight difference in motivation and spirit behind the study of the Aristotelian-Thomistic account. Many of the neo-Aristotelians seem to take it for granted that Aristotle is wholly and manifestly obsolete in this matter, and hence are interested in Aristotle simply for the sake of giving an historically accurate exegesis; see, for example, Fine, "The Problem of Mixture," 266-67, and 309; and Harold H. Joachim," Aristotle's Conception of Chemical Combination," *Journal of Philology* 29 (1904): 77 n. 1. The majority of Thomists, however, are interested in whether or not the doctrine is *true.* Some even wish not only to understand but also to defend the doctrine (e.g., Hoenen, Philips, Bobik, Duhem, and Wallace). Even those neo-Scholastics that think that Thomas's account is no longer viable still feel the need to argue their position; see, for example, Schneider, "The Anachronism of Certain Neothomistic Physical Doctrines"; Virgil G. Michel, O.S.B., "On the Theory of Matter and Form," *&clesiastical Review* 73 (1925); and Celestine N. Bittle, 0.F.M., *From Aether to Cosmos* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing, 1941), 334-40.

[8] St. Thomas's opusculum *De Mixtione Elementorum ad Magistrum Phippum de Castro Caeli* begins with this question: "Dubium apud multos esse solet quomodo elementa sint in mixto." I will translate from the Leonine edition, *Opera Omnia,* vol. 43 (Rome: Santa Sabina, 1976). For the sake of giving special care to accuracy, all translations of St. Thomas and Aristotle will be my own except when otherwise noted.

[9] I say that the idea of virtual presence is merely Thomas's reading of *De Generatione et Corruptione,* 1.10, because whenever he discusses virtual presence he references it. It is unfortunate that Thomas never completed his commentary on *De Generatione et Corruptione;* he commented only on 1.1-5, while one of his disciples, probably Thomas of Sutton, finished the commentary. It is clear that St. Thomas was intent upon finishing the document but was interrupted by his fateful call to Lyons (seeJean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work,* vol..1, trans. Robert Royal [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996], 235). In any case, a few years earlier Thomas wrote *DeMixtione Elementorum,* and this is certainly his most articulate explanation of virtual presence. A comparison of texts makes it clear that Thomas of Sutton made

distinction: in a way they *are* in a mixture, and in a way they *are not*. Indeed, following Aristotle, Thomas says that the elements are present potentially, but not actually.[10] However, he is still more specific.

Thomas summarizes his doctrine by saying that the substantial forms of the elements are present in a mixed substance *virtute*, that is, "by power." However, the exact meaning of this idea of presence "by power" is ambiguous not only because Thomas applies it in various ways among radically diverse beings (from putrefying matter to God),[11] but even more so because it seems to suggest a modality of existence that is in some sense "between" potency and actuality.[12]

The rather natural English translation of the ablative noun *virtute* by the adverb "virtually" only exacerbates the difficulty.[13] In modern English the word "virtually" means "more or less," or "practically," or "pretty much but not quite." If we were to stand by this translation of *virtute*, then Thomas's answer to the question of how the elements are present in a mixture would be equivalent to saying that they are "pretty much there but not

extensive use of it while completing the commentary for *De Generatione et Corruptione,* 1.10, often simply transcribing whole paragraphs, but the commentary on this chapter is also based heavily upon tract. 6 of St. Albert's commentary on *De Generatione et Corruptione.*

[10] Whether one is commenting on Aristotle or on St. Thomas, it is generally agreed that they do not think the elements are actual in a mixture. The only exception that I have seen is Sharvy, who is focused on Aristotle, not Thomas (R. Sharvy, "Aristotle on Mixtures," *Journal of Philosophy* 80 (1983): 439-57; see especially 445-56). For a straightforward refutation of Sharvy, see Fine, "The Problem of Mixture," 279-85.

[11] Thomas says both that maggots exist "by power" in putrefying matter *(Summa Theologiae* l, q. 73, a. 1, ad 3), and that all things created by God are in Him inasmuch as "the effect preexists by power in the cause" *(STh* I, q. 84, a. 2; see also *STh* l, q. 4, a. 2). This of course suggests the analogical character of virtual presence.

[12] This expression will be severely qualified below.

[13] Schneider himself employs this word in his translation of *De Mixt. Elem.,* In. 149; for one so critical of those who obfuscate the doctrine, he is surprisingly lax about being literal here (see Schneider, "The Anachronism of Certain Neothomistic Physical Doctrines," 164). Bobik is the only translator to use the expression "by power" (he includes "virtually" as an alternative in parentheses) for this same passage (see Bobik, *Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements,* 122). Note that while no explicit reference to St. Thomas or Aristotle is being made in this context, Wallace's account of "powers models" in inorganic substances implies the doctrine of virtual presence, or presence by power (see William A. Wallace, O.P., *The Modeling of Nature: Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis* [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996], 70-73).

quite," which is hardly a philosophically precise manner of speaking.

It is clear, then, that if we insist upon saying that the elements are present virtually we are under an obligation to distinguish explicitly this use of "virtually" from its common use. However, many who purport to be explaining Thomas's account simply say that the elements are "virtually" in the mixed substance and leave it at that, as though the matter is thereby made clear.[14] This shows the superiority of translating *virtute* as "by power," because it not only avoids the misapprehensions that almost inevitably arise with "virtually," but its somewhat awkward sound suggests that a technical distinction is being made.[15] Indeed, as I will show below, by directing the reader's attention to the powers of the elements and mixtures the fittingness of this technical expression becomes clear. Nonetheless, very few Thomistic commentators seem to recognize that this translation is preferable, and have often offered expositions of the doctrine that lend themselves to confusion.

[14] Although he does much to defend and articulate the Aristotelian-Thomistic position, William Kane does not seem to think it necessary to explain why we should use the word "virtually" at all: "Let us say that the elements are virtually present in the compound, that is, by virtue of the substantial form of the compound" (William Kane, O.P., "Hylemorphism [sic] and the Recent Views of the Constitution of Matter," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 11 [1935], 73). Bittle, in a lengthy treatment of the Aristotelian "hylomorphic theory," is no more clear: "every compound must have a single form, while the elemental forms themselves have passed out of existence; the latter are contained 'virtually' in the form of the compound" (Bittle, *From Aether to Cosmos,* 311). In an historical analysis of the debate about the unicity of form among the medievals Daniel Callus simply states that according *to* Thomas and his disciples the elemental forms are in a mixture "only virtually as implied, synthesized, and comprised in the higher form" (Daniel A. Callus, O.P., "The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form," in *The Dignity of Science: Studies in the Philosophy of Science presented to William Humbert Kane, O.P.,* ed. James A. Weisheipl, O.P. [Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1961], 123). Finally, one of the worst culprits in this matter is R. Phillips, using "virtually" and "virtual" almost a dozen times in explaining substantial change, without explaining the meaning of the term until pages later. Even then he does not quite say why the word is an appropriate technical term (see R. P. Phillips, *Modern Thomistic Philosophy,* vol. 1: *The Philosophy of Nature* [Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1948], 137-39, 143-46).

[15] Indeed, it may be no coincidence that Thomas never uses the adverb *virtualiter* or the adjective *virtualis* in the present context; he is always more concrete, using the noun *virtus* (in its nominative and ablative forms).

Because of this confusion, it is worthwhile first to note some of the criticism that has been made of Thomas's doctrine and of contemporary Thomistic expositions of this doctrine. More than half a century ago Virgil Michel criticized Thomists who attempted to reconcile contemporary science and Aristotelian-Thomistic natural philosophy concerning substantial change, saying that these neo-Thomists are forced to have

> recourse to the obscure *virtual permanence* of the forms [of the elements] ... [But] in the explanation of this phenomenon there is no common understanding among the authors. The attempts at an explanation of this virtual presence in general do not contribute to the honor of Scholastic clarity of thought, and are to some intelligible only when taken to be a vaguer way of merely saying that the old elements do as a fact reappear upon the corruption of the compound.[16]

More recently, Marius Schneider has made similar criticisms, beginning with the thesis that "Neothomistic views of the constitution of corporeal being conflict not only with one another, but-in spite of their intended faithfulness to Aquinas' philosophy-also with the teaching of St. Thomas itself,"[17] a criticism with which I will agree to an extent. However, he then goes on to make the further, and ultimately more important, claim that virtual presence "not only sounds but most certainly is naive and medieval,"[18] and that the accounts of Thomas and the interpretations of his present-day disciples are inherently

[16] Michel, "On the Theory of Matter and Form," 252. Michel's own view is that any attempt at explaining the presence of the elements in a mixture in terms of potency or virtual presence is utterly contrary to experimental data: "It seems difficult to-day [sic] not to accept the conclusion that the elements retain their individual substance in compounds. The whole mass of scientific evidence in fact, for the building up of the elements out of common particles, when taken together, is overwhelming ... It can therefore hardly seem unphilosophical to subscribe to the *actual* permanence of chemical atoms in a compound" (ibid., 251-52 [emphasis added]).

It seems that Michel opts for what was traditionally the other position popular among the medievals: the doctrine of the plurality of forms in a substance (see ibid., 255-56). Note also that it is probably not a coincidence that Michel's article was written just before the birth of quantum theory (in the 1930s), in which the character of the "scientific evidence" changed considerably, and consequently so did our understanding of the atom.

[17] Schneider, "The Anachronism of Certain Neothomistic Physical Doctrines," 142; see also 152-53.

[18] Ibid., 151.

bankrupt, given the scientific evidence. Hence, Schneider reveals an underlying attitude that

> neoscholastic philosophy cannot fulfill its task of offering a much desired realistic philosophy of nature as it is known in our age.... [For] whoever is faintly acquainted with modern physics ... is aware that ... scarcely any of the corresponding doctrines of the scholastic physics is true .... and whatever the truth value of modern science may turn out to be, the necessary scientific presupposition of Aristotelian hylomorphism most certainly does not represent a true conception of physical being.[19]

Hence, Schneider concludes his paper by asking rhetorically,

> Is it too much to expect that contemporary Thomists who subscribe to the modern scientific views of the constitution of physical being ... seriously reflect upon this insight of their master,[20] finally give up the attempt to defend obsolete physical doctrines, and offer their help for the realization of a truly neoscholastic philosophy of nature?[21]

Schneider seems to be making three points: (1) contemporary disciples of St. Thomas give neither plausible nor consistent accounts of the presence of elements in mixed substances; (2) these accounts are deformations of that offered by St. Thomas, and are motivated by a wrongheaded desire to reshape virtual presence in the image of modern scientific data; and (3) Thomas's own account cannot be salvaged and must be discarded. The first and second criticisms are true to a certain degree, while the last seems a bold but false assertion. However, since in this article I am concerned only with explaining Thomas's position, not with its truth or falsity as such, I must set aside the third criticism altogether; the first and second are more immediately pertinent to the present inquiry. That is, what is Thomas saying about how the elements are preserved in a mixed substance, and how does contemporary scholarship interpret this?

[19] Ibid., 153, 160-61, 168.

[20] The insight to which Schneider refers is Thomas's admission that if light were atomic, then Aristotelian natural philosophy would be based on faulty principles. See II *Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3.

[21] Schneider, "The Anachronism of Certain Neothomistic Physical Doctrines," 173.

II. THE ALTERNATIVES TO ST. THOMAS'S DOCTRINE

The natural way to present the answer to this is to look at St. Thomas's explanations of the subject, focusing in particular on his only extended treatment of the matter, *De Mixtione Elementorum.* Thomas begins with a *via negativa,* telling us how the elements are *not* present in a mixed substance. The two explanations which Thomas opposes are particularly noteworthy insofar as some Thomists seem to be close to attributing one or both of them to Thomas.

The first position Thomas addresses, and then criticizes, is that of Avicenna,[22] namely that "while the active and passive qualities of the elements are reduced in some way to a mean [quality] through alteration, the substantial forms of the elements remain [in the mixed substance]."[23] Avicenna is saying that the elemental substantial forms retain their actuality even after the generation of the mixture, and the only real change seems to be an accidental one. Hence, Thomas summarizes Avicenna's account elsewhere by saying that the elemental forms "remain integral," "in act," and "in the mixture in act with respect to essence."[24]

One might notice that this is essentially the doctrine of the plurality of forms about which there was much controversy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[25] Indeed, if the description is

[22] "Elements are not corrupted into their species in the complexion *[complexione],* but are converted *[convertuntur]"* (Avicenna, *Metaphysica,* tract. 8, cap. 2, fol. 97vb-98ra; see also *Sufficientia,* tract. 1, cap. 10, fol. 19rb). Callus notes that Avicenna is inconsistent in this matter inasmuch as he gives a very different account of how the forms of lower organisms are in those of higher ones (see Callus, "The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form," 127-29, esp. n. 10).

Thomas does not specifically attribute this position to Avicenna here, although he does elsewhere *(STh* I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4; and *De Anima,* a. 9, ad 10). Algazel seems to agree with Avicenna in this (see his *Metaphysica* II, tract. 3).

[23] "qualitatibus activis et passivis elementorum ad medium aliqualiter reductis per alterationem, formae substantiales elementorum manent" *(De Mixt. Elem.,* II. 3-6).

[24] "integras remanere" *(STh* I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4); "actu remanere" *(Quaestiones Quodlibetales* I, q. 4, a. 6, ad 3); "actu sunt in mixto secundum essentiam" *(De Anima,* a. 9, ad 10).

[25] Callus notes this as well (Callus, "The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form," 128 n. 10). If this is correct, one might also include Avicebron and Gundissalinus as targets of Thomas's criticism here, although there is no explicit reference made to the raging debate on the plurality of forms in this opusculum.

taken strictly, it is congenial to an atomic theory of matter. I should qualify this claim, however, because most atomists would say that there is no substantial form of the whole aggregate of elements, and hence no true mixture, while pluralists admit that there is a primary substantial form of the mixture to which the elementary forms are subordinated and by which they are directed.

Thomas begins to probe the second position-that of Averroes[26]-by pointing out that some recognized the problematic character of Avicenna's position, and so posited a more complicated alternative to avoid its absurdities: [27]

> the substantial forms of the elements in a way remain in the mixture. But ... the forms of the elements do not remain in the mixture according to their completeness, but are reduced to a certain mean. For they [Averroes and his followers] say that the forms of the elements admit of more and less, and have contrariety with respect to one another. [28]

No language of actuality or potentiality is used in this account, so the position is somewhat vague. It is like Avicenna's insofar as the elemental substantial forms are present in the mixture (in actuality?); it is unlike it insofar as they seem to be blended in some way, perhaps analogous to the way Avicenna describes the blending of the active and passive qualities of the elements.

Now, because Averroes knows that substance does not admit of degree,[29] his position must be more subtle. According to Averroes,

[26] See Averroes, *De Caelo et Mundo,* bk. 3, corns. 67 and 68. Again Thomas does not refer to his opponent by name in this context here, but he does elsewhere (see *De Anima,* a. 9, ad 10; *STh* I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4; and *Expositio Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate,* q. 4, a. 3, ad 6). On the Averroist doctrine, see Andrew G. Van Melsen, *From Atomos to Atom: The History of the Concept Atom,* trans. Henry J. Koren (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1952), 66-73; Robert P. Multhauf, "The Science of Matter," in *Science in the Middle Ages,* ed. David C. Lindberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 384-86.

[27] *De Mixt. Elem.,* II. 53-54.

[28] "formas substantiales elementorum aliqualiter remanere in mixto. Sed . . . formae elementorum non manent in mixto secundum suum complementum sed in quoddam medium reducuntur; dicunt enim quod formae elementorum suscipiunt magis et minus et habent contrarietatem ad invicem" *(De Mixt. Elem.,* II. 56-57, 59-64).

[29] "Each substance as such is not said to admit of variation of degree. For example, if that substance is a man, he cannot be more of a man or less of a man, whether he is compared to himself [at different times] or with another man" (Aristotle, *Categories,* 5.3b36-37).

the forms of the elements are the least perfect [forms] inasmuch as they are closest to prime matter. Whence they are means between substantial and accidental forms, and thus inasmuch as they approach the nature of accidental forms, they can admit of more and less.[30]

Hence, because of the grades of perfection found in various natural forms, Averroes in effect says that elemental substances do not fit into one of the ten categories of beings. Rather, he attributes to the elements in a mixture[31] a sort of intermediate position between accidents and substances. While the elemental forms do seem to be actual,[32] they are not quite substantial and yet are more than accidental.[33]

Thomas takes issue with both of these positions.[34] So we know that whatever he means by virtual presence or presence "by power," he cannot mean that the elements exist in actuality; nor can he mean that, because of the ontologically impoverished nature of the elements, they are able to straddle the distinction between substance and accident. That describes how the elements

[30] "Formae elementorum sunt imperfectissimae, utpote materiae primae propinquores; uncle sunt mediae inter formas substantiales et accidentales, et sic, in quantum accedunt ad naturam formarum accidentalium, magis et minus suscipere possunt" *(De Mixt. Elem.,* II. 68-73). See also *De Anima,* a. 9. ad 10; *STh* I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 3; and *Quodl.* I, a. 6, ad 4.

[31] Thomas does not specify whether, according to Averroes, the elements as such-i.e., both in and outside of a mixture-have forms that are intermediates between accidental and substantial forms. The language seems to suggest it, but one can answer the question with certainty only by a careful study of Averroes's cosmology.

[32] This seems the more natural reading of the text, although some have held that the imperfect existence that Averroes is attributing to the substance of the elements is a form of potential existence. See, for example, Wallace," Are the Elementary Particles Real?", 179; and Anneliese Maier,An *der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft,* (2d ed.; Rome: 1952), 29.

[33] If the reader finds it difficult to understand Averroes's position, he should note that Thomas describes this odd doctrine as being "improbable for a number of reasons," and as "even less plausible" than that of Avicenna (Ins. 74 and 54). Elsewhere he puts it more strongly: "this is even more impossible" than Avicenna's account *(STh* I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4), and is "ridiculous" *(De Anima,* a. 9, ad 10). If the fundamental notion of substance is "being in itself" and of accident "being in another," how can something be neither a substance nor accident? How can it be *in between?* This seems to deny the law of the excluded middle.

[34] The arguments he offers against them are in *De Mixt. Elem.,* II. 18-52, 74-118, for Avicenna and Averroes respectively. Note that if Averroes's account is interpreted loosely or charitably, Thomas agrees with it (see *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 4, a. 3, ad 6). But it is fairly obvious that this is not the meaning that Averroes intends.

are not in a mixture. The question remains, how *are* they in a mixture?

III. ST. THOMAS'S GENERAL SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION

Saint Thomas then makes the transition to his own account, noting the parameters required for any answer to be plausible, saying that "one must discover another mode by which both the veracity [genuine character] of the mixture is preserved, and yet the elements are not totally corrupted but remain in the mixture in some way."[35] After explaining the manner in which elemental qualities affect each other he offers the following solution:

> Therefore, the powers of the substantial forms of the simple bodies are preserved in mixed bodies. The forms of the elements, therefore, are in the mixed bodies not in act but by power. And this is what Aristotle says in the first book of *De Generatione et Corruptione:* "Therefore they," that is, the elements in the mixture, "do not remain in act, like 'body' and 'white' [remain in act], and neither are they corrupted, either one or both of them. For their power is preserved."[36]

This summary is the core of the doctrine referred to as "virtual presence." It is both an explanation and an interpretation of a notoriously ambiguous passage from the Aristotelian corpus that has plagued commentators for over two millennia. We will unpack this account by focusing on different aspects of it.

The first and most obvious point that Thomas (and of course Aristotle) is making is that, *contra* Avicenna and Averroes, the elemental substances are not *actually* preserved in the generation of the mixed substance. To use Aristotle's example, "white" and

[35] "Oportet igitur alium modum invenire, quo et veritas mixtionis salvetur, et tamen elementa non totaliter corrumpantur, sed aliqualiter in mixto remaneant" *(De Mixt. Elem.,* II. 119-22).

[36] "Sic igitur virtutes formarum substantialium simplicium corporum in corporibus mixtis salvantur. Sunt igitur formae elementorum in corporibus mixtis, non quidem.actu sed virtute. Et hoc est quod Aristotelis dicit in I De generatione, 'Non manent igitur--elementa sclilicet in mixto--actu ut corpus et album, nee corrumpuntur nee alterum nee ambo: salvatur enim virtus eorum'" *(DeMixt. Elem.,,* II. 145-53; see also *Quodl.* I, a. 6, ad 3; *SI'h* III, q. 77, a. 8; *Summa contra Gentiles,* IV, ch. 35; II, ch. 56). The passage from Aristotle is *De Generatione et Corruptione,* l.10.327b29-3 l, with Thomas using the Moerbeke translation.

"body" can each be predicated of a man that has undergone an alteration of skin tone, and this is because these predicates signify his actual qualities or attributes.[37] However, when (according to the medieval theory of elements) a metal is generated out of a certain proportion of earth and water, we cannot predicate earth or water of this metal because they are not its actual qualities or substance-unless we say that the metal is not a substantial unit. At best we can say only that the metal is earthen or aqueous, meaning that it is *made from* such, and that such are *in* the metal. Simply put, whiteness and corporeity are in act in a mixed substance, while the forms of the elements are not. The substantial forms of the elements, according to St. Thomas, have corrupted in some fundamental way.

The natural question, then, concerns this denial of the actual preservation of the elements: is virtual presence, then, nothing more than potential presence? For dearly one does not want to say simply that virtual presence is a third mode of being *between* potency and actuality. To do so would be to deny that the distinction between the actual and the potential is exhaustive of what in any way exists. This interpretation would not only be contrary to the convictions of Thomas, a good disciple of Aristotle, but it might also be unintelligible; what *is* either *is in actuality,* or *is able to be* (and this ability exists in things that are in actuality). Indeed, to read Thomas to mean that virtual being is literally and unequivocally a mode of being *between* actual being and potential being would be to claim that Thomas is making a mistake similar to that of Averroes when he posited the being of the elements in a mixture to be *between* accidental and substantial being. In both cases the distinction would be *ad hoc* and probably a contradiction in terms, so if one insists on describing presence by power as a third mode of existence between potency and act, he may do so only by making severe

[37] "White" signifies an affective quality or a disposition, while "body" signifies a secondary substance.

qualifications of this expression.[38] Properly speaking, this description is inaccurate, and so one should avoid it.

The only logical possibilities, then, are that the elements in mixtures exist either in act or in potency-and, because Thomas explicitly rules out the former, the latter is the only option. Hence, virtual presence must at its root be a kind of potential existence. Indeed, the word *virtus* itself suggests this inasmuch as it is the translation of *dunamis* in the *De Generatione et Corruptione* passage Thomas quotes above. *Dunamis* itself may be translated as "potentiality," "possibility," "capability," and of course "power," and the shades of difference in meaning found among each of these alternatives makes translation difficult.[39] However, we can rule out at least one very restricted use of the word *dunamis* in the present context: the word is not intended to refer to the technical name of the second species of quality in Aristotle's *Categories,*[40] for at least some of the "powers" or "capabilities" of the elements include heat and frigidity, which fall into the third species of quality.[41] Hence, the use of *dunamis* (and *virtus)* Thomas understands to be implied here is broader in its scope.

[38] Although it is clear from his numerous works on related matters that Wallace has a very penetrating understanding of St. Thomas on virtual presence, he chooses this infelicitous expression on at least one occasion, saying that Thomas "took a middle position [between those of Avicenna and Averroes], that the elements were present in compounds neither actually nor potentially, but virtually.... Although real, however, [an elementary particle] is not fully actual, nor is it merely potential; rather it has a virtual existence" (Wallace, "Are the Elementary Particles Real?", 179). Peter Hoenen likes to say that "the forms of the elements are not present in *pure* potency nor in act, but virtually" (Peter Hoenen, S.J., *The Philosophical Nature of Physical Bodies* [the first and second parts of book 4 of the *Cosmologia],* trans. David J. Hassel, S.J. [West Baden Springs, Ind.: West Baden College Press, 1955], 39 [emphasis added]). The modifier "pure" helps to ameliorate the ambiguity insofar as it specifies that the kind of potency we are ruling out is that proper to prime matter, as Hoenen goes on to say (see ibid., 40-45).

[39] Note that because *virtus* is a translation of ouvaμtc;;,not of OpETTj, it is less fitting to translate *virtus* as "virtue," a word which in English suggests moral excellence and would be inappropriate in a discussion about inorganic substances. However, the notion of excellence will be relevant in our discussion of the blending of the elemental qualities. Indeed, there is an etymological connection between *virtus* in the sense of power and *virtus* in the sense of moral virtue inasmuch as *virtus* comes from *vir,* "man"; *virtus* implies "manliness," "courage," and "strength."

[40] *Categories* 8.9al4-28.

[41] Ibid., 8.9a29-10a10.

However, the fact that *dunamis* can be translated as potentiality and possibility suggests another question: does saying that an element is virtually present in a mixed substance mean nothing more than that it is within the pure potentiality of the mixture to corrupt into that element again? Is Thomas saying simply that it is physically possible-that is, nothing more than "not impossible"-for the mixed substance to perish at some time and thereby to produce the elements from which it originally came to be? This would appear to say little more than that the mixed substance, having prime matter as a constituent principle in it, can in principle corrupt into any physical substance. What is virtually present, then, would be simply what is within the *pure potentiality of the primary matter* of a physical substance.

This is obviously *not* what Thomas has in mind. If it were, then there would be no need to give a new name-presence "by power"-for such a kind of potential being, and this sort of potentiality would not be peculiar to the relationship of a mixture with its constituent elements. If by calling something virtually present in something else we mean simply that the former "has the power" to be generated from the latter, then not only are the elements virtually present in the mixture, but also one element is virtually present *in another element,* since the elements can transform into each other. In fact, on this account a mixture would be virtually present in an element, since the latter can become the former (e.g., water can become wine). However, as Thomas never speaks in such a way, it is clear that he restricts the doctrine of virtual presence to the presence of elements (or simpler substances) in mixtures (or more complex substances).[42] Earth is said to be present by power in metal, the plant soul in the animal soul,[43] and the lesser number in the greater,[44] but not vice

[42] Aristotle himself is clear about this when he discusses elemental presence in mixtures, when he brings up presence ouv<iµe1, "by power" or "by potency," for the sake of distinguishing mixtures from elemental change. See *De Generatione et Corruptione,* 2.7.334b8-30.

[43] See *Quodl.* I, a. 6; *De Unitate Intellectus,* par. 49; *STh* I, q. 76, a. 4, corpus and ad 5. I will say more about what one might call "psychic virtual presence" in the concluding section.

[44] See *Quodl.* I, a. 6, corpus and ad 1; *STh* I, q. 76, a. 3. See also Aristotle, *De Anima,* 2.3.414b19-32.

versa. So it is clear that he does not mean that the elements are present in a manner of *pure* potentiality-the way we say prime matter is potential, and indifferent, with respect to every material form-when he says the elements remain *virtute*.

If virtual presence does not mean that the elemental substantial forms are actually in the mixed substance and if it does not mean simply that they are within the pure potentiality of the prime matter of the mixture, then Thomas means something in between these two extremes of actual being and purely potential being. On these things, I should note, there is little disagreement in the literature interpreting St. Thomas. However, there *are* shades of disagreement concerning the further specification of the doctrine, which I will discuss as I expound Thomas's account.

IV. PRESENCE BY POWER

Let us return, then, to the discussion of Thomas's and Aristotle's respective choices of the words *virtus* and *dunamis*. According to Thomas, if an element is virtually present-present "by power"-in a mixture, while its substance is not actually present, its powers are preserved. When he says the "powers" or "abilities" are preserved, this word may signify any number of attributes or properties of the element; in fact, the very opposition Thomas draws between the elemental powers (preserved) and the elemental substantial forms (not preserved) suggests both that these powers are actualities and that the word is being used to refer to accidental forms indiscriminately. [45] This interpretation seems to be supported, and somewhat specified, by Thomas's description of how the qualities of the elements exist in the mixture, for as he lays the foundation for his doctrine of virtual presence he notes that

[45] I use the word "accident" in a broad sense to include not only attributes that are purely incidental and transient-as when one says that "in the Agora" or "blushing" are accidents of Socrates-but also those that are peculiar and predicable only of one species-as when one says that "risible" is an accident of Socrates. Simply put, by "accident" I mean anything that is not a primary substance or its substantial form. See the distinction between kinds of accidents in *De PrincipiisNaturae,* c. 2, par. 343; and *De Ente et Essentia,* c. 7.

It should be considered, then, that the active and passive qualities of the elements are contrary to each other and admit of more and less. Moreover, from contrary qualities that admit of more or less can be constituted a mean [intermediate] quality that savors of the nature of each extreme, such as grey between white and black and tepid between hot and cold [do]. Therefore, with the excellences of the elementary qualities having been so remitted, a certain mean quality is constituted from these which is a proper quality of the mixed body.[46]

The powers referred to as being preserved in the mixture appear, then, to be the active and passive qualities that differentiate the elements and allow them to act upon each other. Thomas seems to be using "power" in a way that coincides with the fundamental notion of *dunamis* Aristotle offers in the *Metaphysics*, namely, a "principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself as other." [47]

However, it would be premature to conclude from this that virtual presence is simply a combination of the potential presence of the substantial forms of the elements and an actual presence of the elemental qualities. As Thomas says, the active and passive elemental qualities, being contraries, can be present in the mixture only in the way that extremes are present in a mean; whatever this latter expression means exactly, we must at least say that these qualities are not *actually* present, lest we deny the principle of non-contradiction. Thomas would then be saying that a substance composed of fire and earth would be both actually dry

[46] "Considerandum est igitur quod qualitates activae et passivae elementorum contrariae sunt ad invicem, et magis et minus recipiunt. Ex contrariis autem qualitatibus quae recipiunt magis et minus, constitui potest media qualitas quae sapiat utriusque extremi naturam, sicut pallidum inter album et nigrum, et tepidum inter calidum et frigidum. Sic igitur remissis excellentiis qualitatum elementarum, constituitur ex his quaedam qualitas media quae est propria qualitas corporis mixti" *(De Mixt. Elem.,* ll. 123-32). See also *STh* I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4; and *ScG* IV, c. 81. Note that he also says that the elements "remain in power, as Aristotle says. This is inasmuch as the proper *accidents* of the elements remain with respect to a certain mode [i.e., moderation], in which the power of the elements remains" *(De Anima,* a. 9, ad 10 [emphasis added]).

[47] fonv dpxl] µETaf3oAi'jr;f.v W.J.41 UW.J.o" (Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* 9.1.1046a10). Wallace's interpretation of the plural of *dunamis* and *virtus* as "powers of action" (Wallace, "Are the Elementary Particles Real?", 179) is then fairly accurate. Schneider's "accidental forces" (Schneider, "The Anachronism of Certain Neothomistic Physical Doctrines," 164) interpretation of *virtutes* in *De Mixt. Elem.,* l. 146, conveys the sense to a certain degree but it certainly is not a good translation.

and actually moist, one composed of water and air both actually hot and actually cold.[48]

Nor can we, to avoid this incoherence, say that one part of the mixture is actually hot and another actually cold, for Thomas and Aristotle understand inanimate mixtures to be perfect blends, homogeneous substances. Each of the parts of such mixtures, then, must be like the others; this means that each part shares not only in specifically and numerically one substantial form, but also in specifically and numerically one active or passive qualitative form-the mixture properly speaking has one temperature and one degree of moisture. It is true that Thomas sometimes classifies organisms among mixtures, and that these are obviously heterogeneous (for example, some parts of an organism are more moist than others).[49] However, the primary concern in the doctrine of the virtual presence of the elements is their preservation in a homogeneous mixture, what Aristotle calls a "homoeomer" (oμotoμt::ptjc).[50] For the elements are only indirectly components of organisms-the matter from which a man is produced is seed and menses, not earth, air, fire and water-but are directly the components of homogeneous mixtures, which can thereby be disposed to serve as the matter of organisms. Hence, we are again forced back to some manner of potential existence, this time for the elemental *qualities*.[51]

[48] For "contraries ... cannot belong at the same time to the same thing" (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 4.6.1011b17; seealso4.4.1005b36-32; and5.10.1018a25-38). Schneider voices a similar warning, or rather a complaint (Schneider, "The Anachronism of Certain Neothomistic Physical Doctrines," 164). In the medieval account (adopted from Aristotle) of the four fundamental elemental qualities corresponding to the four terrestrial elements, fire is hot and dry, air is moist and hot, water is cold and moist, and earth is dry and cold. The order of the predicates is not arbitrary; fire and air are both hot, but fire is hotter and heat distinguishes it more than air. See *Bobik,Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements*, 144-82 and 252-83.

[49] For example, see *De Caelo et Mundo* III, lect. 8.

[50] See Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione*, 1.5.321b17-22; 1.10.328a3-14; and 2.7-8.

[51] Aristotle is explicit in calling this a mode of potential presence: "When one [contrary quality] exists simply in act, the other exists in potency [liuvciμEL];when, however, it is not wholly so, but [relatively] hot-cold or cold-hot, because in being mixed things destroy each other's excesses, then ... *neither of the contraries will exist simply in act*, but something intermediate which, inasmuch as it is in potency more hot than cold (or vice versa), is proportionately twice (or three times or such) as hot in potentiality as cold" (Aristotle, *De*

However, again we must distinguish: the elemental qualities are not potentially present in the intermediate quality in an unqualified potentiality. The elemental qualities do not survive the mixing, but neither are they wholly corrupted. As Thomas puts it, the quality proper to the mixture "savors" or "has the flavor of"[52] the qualities of the elements. Just as the taste of something bitter is apparent in the flavor of something bitter-sweet, and sweetness in sweet-and-sour pork, so are the qualities of elements readily apparent in the intermediate or mean quality proper to the mixed substance.

Thomas's analogy with mixed colors[53] illustrates the same point: one can almost *see* the presence of black and white in the color grey, and if *(per impossibile)* someone had never seen the color grey or a particular shade of grey he could immediately identify the extremes blended in this mixture.[54] This is why grey

Generatione et Corruptione, 2.7.334b9-16 [emphasis added]). Similarly, Thomas says that "the mixture itself does not have in actuality something of those things which came together in its mixing [i.e., the elemental forms and qualities], but in potency only *fpotentia tantum*]" *(Metaphys.* I, lect. 12).

[52] "sapiat" *(De Mixt. Elem.,* l. 127). Phillips likes to say that the elemental powers are themselves virtually present in the mixed substance (Phillips, *Philosophy of Nature,* 134 and 144-45). Although the reason for wanting to speak this way is understandable, this is an unfortunate way of describing the matter because it amounts to saying that the *powers* of the elements are present in the mixture *by their powers being present.* Since there is little illumination in this manner of speaking, we should restrict the designation of "virtual presence" to the elements themselves, not to their powers themselves.

[53] See *De Mixt. Elem.,* II. 128-29, quoted above. This is drawn from Aristotle, *De Sensu et Sensato,* 3.439b18-440b25.

[54] This is very similar to the lone exception to absolute empiricism that Hume makes: "Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colors of all kinds, except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that color, except that single one be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colors than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up himself the idea of that particular shade though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can" (David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* [2d ed.; Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993], sect. 2, pp. 12-13). Though Hume is suggesting that we can almost see the mean in the extremes, while Thomas is saying that we can almost see the extremes in the mean, nonetheless the parallel is obvious. Even the staunch empiricist admits an exception to the basis of his philosophy because of the manifest nature of this case.

is sometimes defined as light-black or darkened-white, depending on the shade. Hence, in commenting on Aristotle's discussion of the mixture of sensible qualities, Thomas says that "those things which are mixed together obscure each other."[55] Notice that Thomas says that colors obscure *(obscurant)* each other, not that they are hidden by *(latent)* or completely eclipse *(occultant)* each other.[56] Hence, black and white are known to be present in grey not only from the experience of grey yielded from mixing the two together, but from a simple observation of the color itself.

Similarly, Thomas is suggesting, the presence of each of the elemental qualities in the intermediate seems to be readily apparent to the discerning eye. This is clear again with the case of hot and cold in tepid,[57] which-unlike black and white in grey-is not just an analogy but *is* a real example of the blending of elemental qualities. Lukewarm water is sometimes described as cold and at other times as warm, depending on what use one is going to make of it-cold when one wants a bath, warm if one wants to fill a vase of roses. So Thomas means nothing vague or mystical (and certainly nothing dubious) in suggesting that we can discern the elemental qualities in their intermediate; rather, he is appealing to a manifest matter of experience. We can recognize the intermediate quality *as intermediate,* that is, as an actual quality in its own right that is at the same time a sort of balance or equilibrium[58] between two extreme qualities. The extreme

[55] "ea quae comrniscentur obscurant se invicem" *(De Sensu et Sensato,* c. 7). This is a summary of Aristotle at *De Sensu et Sensato,* 7.447a14-33.

[56] *Obscurant* is also Moerbeke's translation of a<j>avtl;EtV(at 447a22) which could mean either "to conceal" or "to obscure."

[57] See *De Mixt. Elem.,* ll. 129-130, quoted above.

[58] One is tempted to say "tension," but this choice of words seems a little too Empedoclean and violent sounding for what is really a natural unity, or synthesis. Today we might call it a bipartisan compromise or resolution.

One might go even further and draw an analogy between the extreme elemental qualities' presence in the mean quality of the mixture and the relationship between contrary extreme habits, called "vices," and the mean habit between them, called "virtue," The virtue of courage is not a combination of being alternately rash and cowardly, or in feeling an inner struggle in which one desires both to run away and to dash into the fray. The courageous man is not in inner turmoil because his intellect and his passions are harmonized; he recognizes the danger of performing an action but also knows that the common good must be served in protecting the city. Similarly, a mean quality in a mixed substance is one quality that is a perfection and union of two opposed qualities that nonetheless coexist (in potency)

degree of the quality of the element is not preserved but the quality itself is inasmuch as the mean quality has a "share of the natures of each" extreme.[59]

To make the nature of this sort of tempering of the extremes a little more concrete, Thomas continues, saying that the intermediate quality proper to a mixed substance

differs in diverse [mixtures] according to the diverse proportions of [elements in] the mixture. And this quality is indeed the proper disposition to the form of the mixed body just as the simple quality is to the form of the simple body. Therefore, just as the extremes are found in the mean which shares in the nature of each, so the qualities of the simple bodies are found in the proper quality of the mixed body.[60]

Naturally, there is a ratio among the parts or respective concentrations of the elements in the mixture and this ratio is proper to each species of mixture.[61] Thus, the more one element

harmoniously in the mixture. On a virtue as a disposition or quality that is the perfection of an imbalanced or extreme power, see *STh* I-II, q. 49, a. 1; *STh* I-II, q. 55, aa. 1 and 3. On Aristotle's general doctrine on the composition of intermediates from their contraries, see *Metaphysics,* 10.7.1057a18-29.

[59] "participat naturam utriusque" *(De Mixt. Elem.,* I. 138). Bobik says cryptically that "it is not at all necessary for this mean quality to be anything at all like either of the extreme qualities; it may turn out to be a surprise of some sort, even a complete surprise" (Bobik, *Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements,* 123-24). How a quality can be intermediate between two extreme qualities and yet be nothing like them is mystifying to me. How could we discern the extremes in the mean *at all* if this is possible? Looking at the color grey we would not be certain that it isn't a mean between purple and green.

[60] "differens tamen in diversis secundum diversam mixtionis proportionem; et haec quidem qualitas est propria dispositio ad formam corporis mixti, sicut qualitas simplex ad formam corporis simplicis. Sicut igitur extrema inveniuntur in medio quod participat naturam utriusque, sic qualitates simplicium corporuminveniuntur in propria qualitate corporis mixti" *(De Mixt. Elem.,* II. 133-40). See also *ScG* III, c. 22, pars. 7 and 8; IV *Sent.,* d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 4; and *Quodl.* 10, a. 3, ad 2.

[61] The difference in quality, then, is in a sense due to a difference in quantity (see Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* 10.7). This fact is of prime importance to anyone trying to articulate how the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of elemental combination fits with contemporary science and atomic theory. Many have recognized this and done just that (see, for example, *Bobik,Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements,* 121-26, Hoenen, *Philosophical Nature of Physical Bodies,* 65-74, Kane, "Recent Views of the Constitution of Matter," 72-74, and Phillips, *Philosophy of Nature,* 144-50). One might call this the ancient "law of fixed proportions." In any case, it should be noted this is not necessarily an atomistic account of the mixing of the elements. One can speak of two quantities having a ratio but not thereby corresponding to a number of discrete particles. Indeed, two continuous quantities could be

predominates in a mixture, the more the qualities of the mixture will resemble those of that element.[62] While the substantial forms of the elements corrupt in their own proper and actual existence, the ratio of these parts that go into the production of this mixing bowl, as it were, is fixed and is the proper disposition of the new substance.

Before completing his explanation of virtual presence in *De Mixtione Elementorum*, Thomas makes a further point about how the elements are present in the mixed substance by their powers somehow being preserved. This is worth adding if we are to give a full account of virtual presence. He notes that

> while the quality of a simple body is indeed other than its substantial form, it nonetheless acts in virtue [i.e., in the power] of its substantial form; otherwise heat would only be able to make things hot, and by its action a substantial form would not be educed into actuality (since nothing acts beyond its species). Thus, therefore, the powers of the substantial forms of the simple bodies are preserved in mixed bodies.[63]

incommensurable (and therefore necessarily non-atomistic) and still bear a ratio to one another.

[62] Indeed, if the ratio of one component to another is exceedingly high, Thomas (following Aristotle) thinks that not only is the mixture simply referred to by the name of the predominant component, but in fact (if a certain threshold ratio is breached) the substantial form of this component consumes that of the more diffuse component form. For example, a mixture of water and a drop of wine is really just water (although the water now acquires some of the qualities of the wine to some extremely mild, usually indiscernible, degree). The opposite occurs if the wine predominates by far and the water is diffuse. See Aristotle, *De GenerationeetCorruptione*,l.5.321a33-b3; l.10.328a23-32,andThomas'scommentaryDe *Generationeet Corruptione*,lect. 14.

[63] "Qualitas autem simplicis corporis est quidem aliud a forma substantiali ipsius, agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis; alioquin calor calefaceret tantum, non autem per eius actionem forma substantialis educeretur in actum, cum nihil agat ultra suam speciem. Sic igitur virtutes formarum substantialium simplicium corporum in corporibus mixtis salvantur" *(De Mixt. Elem.,* ll. 140-47). Elsewhere he makes a similar comment about the meaning of presence "by power": "the power of the substantial form [of the element] remains in the elementary quality, allowing that it has been remitted and as it were reduced *[redacta]* to a mean. For the elementary quality acts in the power *[in virtute]* of the substantial form, and otherwise the action which is done through the heat of fire would not terminate at the substantial form [of fire being educed]" *(Quodl.* I, q. 4, a. 6, ad 3). On the manner in which mixtures or elements bring about substantial changes through alteration, see *Sfh* III, q. 7, a. 12; IV *Sent.,* d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 4; *Quodl.* I, a. 6, ad 2; X, a. 3, ad 2.

Thomas, perhaps having in mind the fact that certain rubbing motions of sticks or the scraping of flint and steel can produce fire, draws the conclusion of the final sentence by means of an implied minor premise. The syllogism is as follows: fire is able to induce another body to combust only by virtue (i.e., by the power) [64] of its substantial form in it; certain mixed substances can induce other bodies to combust; therefore, these mixed substances do this only by virtue (i.e., by the power) of the substantial form of fire in them. Somehow the virtue or power of the fire to cause combustion is present in substances that have fire as one of their elemental constituents. And, like other qualities, this power or virtue exists in the mixed substance to a remitted or tempered degree. Thus, the most distinctive and most significant activity that a fire can perform can also be performed, albeit less readily and to a lesser degree, by what has fire in it. Hence, the virtue or power of the element fire that is preserved in the mixture is not only the active quality heat (tempered by its contrary, cold), but also fire's ability to induce combustion which derives from its substantial form.

Thus, Thomas's answer to the question of how the elements exist in a mixed substance is that they exist by their powers existing, and this means that their substantial forms in and of themselves do not exist in actuality, and in fact neither do their active and passive qualities, at least not to their full "excellence."[65] Speaking most properly, both are preserved only *in potentia*, although I add that the preservation of the elemental powers is both more evident and less potential than that of the elemental substantial forms.[66] For (as I argued above) not only is

[64] Alternately, "under the influence" or "guidance," as Bobik puts it (Bobik, *Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements,* 124-25).

[65] See *De Mixt. Elem.,* l. 130.

[66] Emphasizing that virtual presence is a kind of potential presence, Bobik summarizes St. Thomas's account by taking an example from modern chemistry, saying that "hydrogen and oxygen are not there actually, though they are there potentially-and in two senses of 'potentially': 1) virtually (by their power), and 2) retrievably" (Bobik, *Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements,* 125). I have not focused as much on the retrievability of the elements because St. Thomas does not focus on it in his explanation of virtual presence (although it is certainly implied). The second difficulty I will point out in the concluding section, revolves, at least in part, around the significance of elemental retrievability.

the presence of the elemental qualities evident to sense-unlike that of the elemental substantial forms in the mixture-but the substantial forms are there only *virtute,* that is, only *by means of their powers.* We know the former are preserved because we know that the latter are preserved, although technically both are preserved only potentially, the elemental substantial form because there can be only one actual substantial form of one substance, and the elemental powers because opposed qualities cannot exist in one (homogeneous) subject at the same time.[67]

I will add one more comment to make a little dearer how the power of the dement can be preserved potentially (in an intermediate) but preserved nonetheless with a higher grade of actuality-and therefore a greater degree of evidence-than the elemental substantial form. It can be said that in some mixtures the presence of elements is more evident than in others-one might say that the virtual presence is stronger in them. For, if one element predominates a mixture (providing it does not consume the other element[s]),[68] the proper quality of the mixture wiH be very dose to that of the element. For example, the medievals readily inferred that water predominates in glass because of its transparency, its coolness to the touch, and its

However, it seems to me that Bobik is not dear enough that the qualities or powers of the elements exist themselves in a sort of potentiality. He frequently (see ibid,, 124-25) refers to the elemental forms as corrupted and the elemental qualities as preserved, and while this is true in the sense explained above, it is not true without qualification because this language sounds as if the elemental qualities are preserved *in act.* However, this is to a certain degree a matter of emphasis.

It is interesting to note that the interpretation of Aristotle offered by at least one non-Thornist concerning elemental presence in a mixture seems almost identical to that of St. Thomas: "(a) Fire, Earth, Air, and Water are present in a chemical compound only by ability (dynamei) *[virtute],* i.e., in virtue of the possession by the compound of intermediate abilities of the same kinds of [sic, as?] the maximal abilities which are peculiar to the heat of Fire and Air, the cold of Earth and Water, the dryness of Fire and Earth, and the wetness of Air and Water; (b) The presence by ability of an element in a compound consists of (nothing more than) the possession by the compound of the relevant non-maximal abilities" Games Bogen, "Fire in the Belly: Aristotelian Elements, Organisms, and Chemical Compounds," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 76 [1995]: 379).

[67] On how the elements mix inasmuch as their qualities mix, see *De Partibus Animalium,* 2.1.646a12-24; also see Fine, "The Problem of Mixture," 304-5.

[68] See note 62 above.

smoothness (reducible in part to moisture).[69] Although it possesses none of these to the degree that water does (water is a better medium of sight, is cooler, and is obviously more moist), it is not unreasonable to say that glass is, for example, transparent, without making any further qualification. This quality of the element seems to be preserved almost wholly intact; it is more actual than, say, the slight grade of opacity the glass has from the earth that is in it.[70] While we can say of the water's substantial form *as such* that it exists in the glass simply in potency, nevertheless its powers are stronger, more actual in the glass, and so *by these powers-virtute-water's* presence is stronger.[71]

V. REMAINING QUESTIONS

Despite my elucidation of Thomas's account of virtual presence, most of which has been said before by others, there remain points about which there has been much debate in making sense of both St. Thomas and Aristotle on this matter.[72] Hence, what I have offered is at best only the foundation of an interpretation of Thomas's account of virtual presence. However, to point the way wherein more work needs to be done, I will conclude by noting two disputes on the nature of the preservation of the elements in mixtures according to Thomas and Aristotle.

[69] Glass even takes its name from *glacies*, "ice" (contrary to myth, Aristotle did not take ice to be substantially different from water; see *Meteorology*, 1.11.347b15, where he says that snow, frost, and rain-water are all the same substance, "differing only in degree and amount"). Note that even contemporary science classifies glass as a liquid because of its lack of integrity over time-that is, its ability to flow (albeit, very slowly). This amorphous character is observable in old windows (e.g., stained glass in old churches) that appear warped and "runny."

[70] On the intrinsic opacity of earth, see Aquinas, *De Sensu et Sensato*, c. 5.

[71] On the grades of potentiality in a mixed substance according to St. Thomas, see *ScG* III, c. 22; *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 4, ad 14 and 16; and *XIIMetaphys.*, lect. 2. Hoenen uses language similar to mine in describing virtual presence: "In the compound the forms of determined elements are not in pure potency, but in potency which approaches the act of elements" (Hoenen, *Philosophical Nature of Physical Bodies*, 42; see also 48-49).

[72] It is unfortunate that neo-Scholastics-focused as they are on making sense of St. Thomas, sometimes forgetting his self-identification as a disciple of Aristotle-and analysts-who long ago set aside the medievals as less-than-critical interpreters of the Philosopher-do not pool their resources and compare notes in this discussion. Much could be gained on both sides, and perhaps many exegetical matters could be resolved.

First of all, can one say that an element existing potentially or virtually in a mixture is the same in number with the element that went into the change? Or-since this is somewhat misleading, and since one wonders what it would mean for something to have potential numerical unity--can the very same piece of earth that went into the mixture be yielded out of it upon the corruption of the mixture? On Aristotelian-Thomistic principles, one's inclination should be to answer in the negative,[73] but the fact that there has been some dispute about this should give one pause.[74]

This question obviously owes part of its motivation to the contemporary atomistic viewpoint, for therein one tends to think of atoms as particles that move from one molecular composition to another: as it is sometimes put poetically, "we are each made of stardust." The atomist, and even a Thomist trying to overcome modern atomistic prejudices, will imagine and speak of the atoms as though they retained their numerical identity throughout their existence.[75] However, one should recall that, if properly understood, [76] the idea of atomic building blocks is not opposed to Aristotle's or St. Thomas's understanding of elemental

[73] Aristotle is fairly clear on this: "This again is where the investigation begins: do all things return on themselves in the same way, or not, but rather some in number and some in form only? It is evident that those whose substance ... is imperishable will be the same in number ... but those whose substance, on the contrary, is perishable must necessarily return on themselves in form, not in number. That is why water from air and air from water is the same in form, but not in number, and if these too are the same in number, still they are not things whose substance comes to be, the sort, namely, that is capable of not being" *(De Generatione et Corruptione,* 2.11.338b12-19). This translation is taken from *Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione,* trans. C. J. F. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 59. On numerical unity in general, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* 3.4.999b28-1000a4; 5.6.1016b32-1017a3.

[74] Cohen, for example, promotes the idea of numerical unity. See Cohen, *Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance,* 91-93, and 99.

[75] One should be careful about identifying the atomistic view with the reality of the situation. Quantum theory seems to demand that this intuitive inclination to tag atoms with numerical identity throughout their various alterations and interactions be resisted and even discarded. Scientists are finding themselves hesitant to say anything about atoms when they aren't actually being measured. There is a sea of literature on this topic; from a Thomistic viewpoint, see Wallace, "Are the Elementary Particles Real?", 171-83; idem, "Elementarity and Reality in Particle Physics," in *From a Realist Point of View,* 185-212; Edward Mac.Kinnon, S.J., "Atomic Physics and Reality," *Modern Schoolman* 38 (1960): 37-59.

[76] That is, if and only if atoms are understood *not* to have actually distinct substantial forms while in the mixed substance; they can possess only virtual existence.

combination; their doctrine of natural minima should settle that question.[77]

This leads us to the second difficulty. If an element does not maintain its numerical identity after becoming a part of a mixture, one starts to wonder in what way virtual presence preserves the elements in any significant sense. On this matter one finds two main camps in the secondary literature: on the one hand, those who interpret Thomas (and Aristotle) to be promoting a watered-down and almost metaphorical sense in which the elements exist in the mixture, and, on the other, those who find a more tangible and "full-blooded" account of the same.

The controversy revolves around a distinction between whether virtual presence means that the elements are "constitutionally" or merely "genetically" present in the mixture.[78] While there are sometimes significant nuances that distinguish their particular positions, Wallace, Cohen, and Fine fall into the former camp,[79] while Maier, Schneider, Gill, Bogen,

n See Aristotle, *Physics,* 1.4.187b13-22 and b30-37; *De Caelo,* l.9.278bl-3. Also see Thomas's commentary, I *Phys.,* lect. 9. For discussions of natural minima in Thomas and the other medievals, see Wallace," Are the Elementary Particles Real?", 177-79, especially nn. 14 and 15; and Anneliese Maier, *Die Vorlaufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert* (Rome: Edixioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1949), 179-90. Oddly, Maier seems to think that the ideas of atoms and of natural minima are unconnected, at least among the medievals; see Maier, *On the Threshold of Exact Science,* 130 n. 5.

[78] I draw these terms from Schneider, "The Anachronism of Certain Neothomistic Physical Doctrines," 164-68. Among the Aristotle scholars, Bogen refers to the former as "component realism" (Bogen, "Fire in the Belly," 388-89). Fine holds for the elements as "concurrent ingredients" in the mixture (Fine, "The Problem of Mixture," 276).

[79] See Wallace, "Are the Elementary Particles Real?", 177-79; Cohen, *Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance,* 90-98; and Fine, "The Problem of Mixture," 266-370, esp. 273-85. Cohen's position is a bit difficult to categorize, especially his notion of "ontological sabbatical"; he sometimes says that "on my view, the compound ["mixture" in our language] ... consists of elements bereft of their natural dispositions" (98 n. 69), which sounds a lot like *actual* presence. Nonetheless, I think Cohen is more in line with the constitutional account than the genetic one; in any case, he thinks that his interpretation differs from that of St. Thomas, which he thinks is equivalent to Gill's, a genetic interpretation (see ibid., 90, 98 n. 69). He also believes that the genetic interpretation of Aristotle is "probably the most plausible one" (ibid., 90), despite his own inclinations and speculations.

As regards other members of this division, some (e.g., Hoenen and Phillips) are difficult to categorize because they do not address the problem explicitly. However, I suspect that both lean more in the direction of the constitutional account (see Hoenen, *Philosophical Nature of Physical Bodies,* 70-72, and Phillips, *Philosophy of Nature,* 144-46).

and Needham fall into the latter.[80] The question depends on whether it is accurate to say that the elements are component or integral parts; those who say the elements are constitutive of the mixture say yes, while those on the genetic side say no. To use the words of a member of the former camp, "one can say that an elementary particle is a part of a physical body.... Part is to be taken to be correlative with whole . . . [and hydrogen and oxygen] are fully real as its [water's] parts.... [an element is] a real part of such a body, as an integral component."[81] On the bther side, the claim is that the elements are not components; they are ingredients in the mixture only in the sense that it came to be out of these elements and they will corrupt back into these elements. Thus, virtual presence merely defines where the mixture came from and what it will later on become. A mixture is simply a substance that is disposed to corrupt into certain things rather than just anything, and thus the elements are in it simply in the sense that they are that into which the mixture will break down.[82]

I suspect that a definitive determination of what Thomas would say in this matter will require a careful study of how he uses the words "in," "part," and "whole," and so the natural places to focus would be his commentaries on *Physics* 4.3 and *Metaphysics* 5.23-26.[83] Depending on how this question is

[80] See Maier, *On the Threshold of Exact Science,* 138-39; Schneider, "The Anachronism of Certain Neothomistic Physical Doctrines," 164-66; Gill, "Matter against Substance," 393; Bogen, "Fire in the Belly," 384-86, 389-90; and Needham," Aristotelian Chemistry," 262-69. Each of these has a slightly different position. Many of the analytic philosophers believe that Aristotle's elemental forms are nothing more than the combined active and passive qualities-that is, they have no *substantial* forms. Nonetheless, this position, which is obviously opposed to that of Thomas, will not affect the essence of the controversy.

[81] Wallace, "Are the Elementary Particles Real?", 177, 179.

[82] Cohen summarizes the genetic position by saying that the elements' "potential existence amounts to nothing more than their recoverability" (Cohen, *Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance,* 91); this presence is a "genetic property," merely a "remark about its [a mixture's] origins and ancestry" (ibid., 97). *As* Needham puts it, "Earth is, however, totally absent from an Aristotelian mixt [sic].... Although there may be a sense in which a mixt might be considered to be derived from, or decomposable into, elements *they* are not present in the mixt, not even potentially" (Needham," Aristotelian Chemistry," 266, 269). Note that Needham's final claim, that the elements are *not even potentially* present in the mixture, is saying more than the others who stand by the genetic interpretation; there is a tendency for this position to reduce to saying that the elements are not really preserved at all.

[83] IV *Phys.,* lect. 4; lect. 5; V *Metaphys.,* lect. 20; lect. 21. See also *STh* II-II, q. 48, a. 1.

resolved, there is still the further question of whether or not Thomas's position will be viable as an accurate description of the physical world. For if the genetic account of virtual presence is correct-and this is the more conservative reading, I think-and this account follows from the Aristotelian-Thomistic conviction that mixtures are homoeomers (i.e., every part is like every part),[84] then Thomas's position may need modification. For, as Hoenen puts it,

> today no one can hold that tenet generally accepted because of defective experimentation from the time of St. Thomas up to modern times, namely, the tenet that for the most part inorganic compounds ... are homogeneous. Today the heterogeneity of microstructure is established without a doubt.[85]

However, Thomas frequently describes heterogeneous substances-that is, the higher living things (which he even calls mixtures on occasion)[86]-as having not only inferior kinds of souls, but even the elements in them *virtute.*[87] Hence, heterogeneity is an impediment neither to substantial unity nor to the virtual presence of the elements.[88]

In any case, it is difficult to determine the truth of the matter even with the measuring instruments we possess today, and one should not be surprised at such difficulty in understanding something that comes so close to prime matter in its nature (or lack thereof).[89] At least we can say that we have made a good

[84] This is held by both Bogen ("Fire in the Belly," 384-86) and Needham ("Aristotelian Chemistry," 264-69).

[85] Hoenen, *Philosophical Nature of Physical Bodies,* 49; see also ibid., 70-73.

[86] See above, note 49.

[87] See *Quodl.* I, q. 4, a. 6, corpus and ad 1; *STh* I, q. 76, aa. 3 and 4.

[88] Hoenen agrees; Thomas and Aristotle "proposed no theoretical objections to it [i.e., the heterogeneity of a substance]-this is impossible even on peripatetic principles .... Jn fact, St. Thomas ... had some difficulty in trying to explain why specific heterogeneity was present only in living beings and not in the inorganic" (Hoenen, *Philosophical Nature of Physical Bodies,* 71). Phillips makes similar points (see Phillips, *Philosophy of Nature,* 148-50).

[89] As we delve into more and more fundamental material levels, we approach what is closer and closer to primary matter, which has no actual properties in and of itself; it is pure potentiality and essentially indeterminate. See *ScG* II, c. 90; *STh* III, q. 57, a. 4; *Compendium Theo/ogiae,* c. 74. No doubt this is part of the reason for the so-called "quantum strangeness" that permeates the data of particle physics nowadays. On this matter, see citations in notes 1and75.

beginning toward articulating St. Thomas's account of elemental presence *virtute*, "by power," his resolution of a debate that is as old as the Presocratics, and therefore as old as philosophy itself.

The Thomist 64 (2000): 301-8

REDUCTIONISM IN METAPHYSICS: A MISTAKE IN LOGIC?

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Some philosophers say that all is G where G stands for either matter, mind, or some neutral being. They thus make G the highest or widest genus. These are materialists, idealists, and neutral monists, respectively. Despite their differences, these metaphysical reductionists succumb to the same dilemma. They must either forego all difference in their worlds or else abandon their worlds altogether.

In the first section of this paper I explain the dilemma and show how it is solved. Then I raise and answer four objections to the solution in the second section.

I

Materialists say that all is matter, idealists say that all is mind, and neutral monists say that matter and mind are appearances of some more basic stuff into the definition of which neither matter nor mind enters. But any philosopher who says that all is G, regardless of what G stands for, identifies G with the highest genus. Otherwise he says that G falls under a wider genus, H. And then he countenances the possibility that H has some species besides G. When Thales says that all is water he makes water the highest genus. Otherwise he says that water is a species of a higher genus, H. And then he implies that possibly not all is water.

Put generally, if it is true that all is G then all difference within G must be due to something besides G. No genus explains its own differences, because difference is outside the definition of genus and anything that is implied by genus. No sooner, then, do philosophers who say that all is G recognize difference in their worlds than they admit features about the world that fall outside of G. Hegel once complained that Schelling's philosophy was a night in which all cows were black.[1] Schelling might have replied that that is the price all must pay who say with consistency that all is G.

Materialists, then, make matter the highest genus. Otherwise they countenance the possibility that what in fact *is* the highest genus includes nonmatter as one of its species. But that is just what they wish to exclude. In any case, if they recognize difference in the world, materialists then swallow the contradiction that all difference in matter is due to nonmatter. They must therefore choose between denying all difference in their world and abandoning their world entirely. Seeing this fork, Descartes placed motion, the proximate cause of all difference in the world, outside the definition of matter. And for him motion, in turn, is introduced into the world by God. It might be going too far to say that Descartes used God only to serve physics. But that the father of modern philosophy left himself open to that charge explains Pascal's quip that Descartes only needed God to cause motion in the world.

Materialists cannot say that mind explains the differences among material things without admitting something besides matter-for example, mind. And then they are dualists and not materialists. Nor can they say that a type (or types) of matter explains those differences. Otherwise difference in matter explains difference in matter. By definition, any type or species includes a difference. If, then, a type (or types) of matter explains difference in matter and that same type (or types) of matter includes a difference, then we come to the circular argument that difference in matter explains difference in matter.

[1] G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind,* trans. J. B. Baillie (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), 79.

Similarly, idealists cannot say that matter explains differences among mental things without admitting something besides mind, (i.e., matter). They then abandon idealism in favor of dualism. But for the same reason as we saw before, they cannot say that a type (or types) of mind explains difference within mind either. Otherwise difference in mind explains difference in mind. If a type (or types) of mind or mental activity explains difference in the domain of mind and that same type (or types) of mind includes a difference (since any type or species includes a difference) then difference in the domain of mind explains difference in the domain of mind. Thus, a perfect circle once again accrues.

What holds for materialists and idealists also holds for neutral monists. The latter hold that matter and mind are two features we add on to reality which in itself is neither physical nor mental. Recall James's paint which in a pot in a paint-shop is saleable matter but on canvas represents a spiritual function. [2] Yet neutral monists are still philosophers who say that all is G; it is just that for them G refers to being that is neutral as between matter and mind. They must therefore ascribe all difference we foist onto G either to something besides G or to a type or species of G. But suppose they do the former and say that all difference in G is introduced by something besides G, say, mind. Then they recognize mind as something distinct from G or neutral being. Thus, they end up both affirming and denying that all is G. But suppose they do the former and ascribe all difference that is foisted on G to a type or species of G. Then there are two species of G, namely, the type of G on which differences are foisted and the type of G called mind that foists differences onto the first type. But once again, since difference is outside genus, this difference between the two types of G, neutral being, must be due to something besides G. And then, since something else besides neutral being is admitted, neutral monism collapses.

Neutral monists like James (and the early Russell) might protest that this distorts their program. The diverse appearances that neutral being gives off are grounded in neutral being. They

[2] William James, "Does Consciousness Exist?" in Barbara MacKinnon, ed., *American Philosophy: A Historical Anthology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 245.

are not just foisted onto it by us. But the counterreply is that the difference makes no difference. If the various appearances have a foundation in reality then neutral being is no bare identity but itself contains differences, quite apart from any differences that are introduced by us. But since difference is not due to genus, it follows that some real thing *besides* neutral being causes these differences within neutral being. And then neutral monism falls again.

II

Joining forces, materialists, idealists, and neutral monists might proffer four objections to our critique. First, suppose that something outside matter, mind, or neutral being must be brought in to explain the differences within matter, mind, and neutral being, respectively. Then by parity of reasoning something outside the genus animal must be invoked to explain the fact that some animals are warm-blooded and others are not. But to hold this is senseless. For an animal's being warm-blooded is due to its being a mammal, yet being a mammal is evidently not something that falls outside the genus animal. It follows that the objection to monism is also senseless and our argument fails.

This objection confuses the intension of a genus with its extension. Being a mammal does not fall outside the extension of the genus animal any more than does being human. Otherwise it would be false to say that mammals are animals. But mammality as well as warm-bloodedness do fall outside the intension of the genus animal. Otherwise all animals would be both mammals and warm-blooded. It is the intension and not the extension of the putatively ultimate genera of matter, mind, and the neutral stuff that is concerned when it is claimed that, to explain difference within those supposed ultimate genera, something outside those genera must be invoked. What is meant is that something outside the *intension* of those genera must be brought in to cover difference within those genera.

Nevertheless, materialists, idealists and neutral monists, have a second objection. Difference within matter, mind, or neutral being, they might counter, is ultimate and irreducible. But since

what is ultimate and irreducible is insusceptible of explanation, then to try to account for difference in matter, mind, and neutral being is from the start futile. So too is any attempt to explain difference in those supposed ultimate genera. Since, then, the argument falsely assumes that materialists, idealists and neutral monists are obliged to cover difference in their respective worlds when in point of fact they are not, it does not hold.

The evident reply to this is that nothing accidental is ultimate and irreducible. Since bending is accidental to a bough, a bough's bending is not ultimate and irreducible. It is due to something external to the bough (viz., the wind). But difference, though essential to species, is accidental to genus. And it is in its relation to genus and not to species that difference is here taken. Therefore, so far from being insusceptible of explanation, any difference in the supposed ultimate genera of matter, mind, or neutral being requires explanation. Therefore the dilemma still stands. Either those differences in G are explained by a type of G or by some substance besides G. Once again either circularity or contradiction is incurred. It follows, therefore, that materialists, idealists, and neutral monists are all caught between eliminating all difference in their worlds and relinquishing their worlds altogether.

A third objection is that our argument faces a dilemma of its own. *Without* the idea of a highest genus it cannot prove anything but *with* that idea it proves too much. The argument contends that the highest genus cannot be identified with either material substance, mental substance, or neutral substance, because when *differentiae* are admitted either circularity or contradiction accrues. But if that is so, then the highest genus cannot be identified with any kind of substance without inviting the same dilemma. Yet the irony is that the idea of a highest genus *does* imply some all-embracing substance in which all things participate. So either what is necessary for the argument (i.e., the idea of a highest genus) is denied from the start or else the argument proves too much.

' This third objection turns on an ambiguity in the word 'substance'. True, when the highest genus is identified with some all-embracing *kind* of substance, the fork in which our argument

was just placed is ineluctable; either a condition of the argument (the idea of a highest genus) is denied or the argument proves too much. But this dilemma fades as soon as 'substance' refers not to a certain kind of thing but to *substratum* or substrate. For substance in this sense is not a thing but a relation, the relation of what is potential to what is actual. It is not a complete thing in its own right but the potentiality in a thing to be the kind of thing it is. Since substance in this Aristotelian sense of substrate belongs to all things, substance is the highest genus. All things are said to be substantial. To be sure, the differences among these things are not due to a specific type (or types) of substance. Otherwise specific difference is explained by specific difference and circularity once again results. Instead, those differences are due to something distinct from substance or potentiality altogether, namely, to form or actuality.

Nor does saying that the difference comes from nonsubstance this time contradict the claim that all things are substantial. It is not at all like saying that all is matter, all is mind, or all is neutral being. That is because neither substance nor nonsubstance is a certain complete thing, as we saw matter, mind, and neutral being are complete kinds of thing. For here substance is the potential and nonsubstance is the actual. And so far from being complete kinds of things in their own right, the potential and its actuation are but two sides of a complete thing-in fact of every thing. That being the case, one can consistently say both that all things are G and that difference within G is due to non-G. For the actual is distinct from the potential. If things are assayed into the potential (G) and the actual (non-G) as distinct but incomplete aspects of those things, then one consistently says both that all things are G and that all differences in G are due to non-G.

The fourth and final objection is that our argument is self-defeating. Having rejected materialism because it fails to cover difference without either circularity or contradiction, our proposed alternative only *installs* materialism. To say that things are comprised of the potential and the actual is to say that they are comprised of matter and form in Aristotle's sense of those terms. But everyone knows that all such composites in Aristotle are and must be quantified or spatial things. Thus we end up

saying with the materialist that all things are spatiaL Then, if we once recognize difference in the world, we are placed on the horns of that same dilemma of circularity or contradiction in which we implicate all materialists. So our argument only boomerangs on itself.

The reply to this final objection is that it fails to distinguish saying that all *things* are spatial and saying that all there is is spatial. One consistently believes that all things are spatial and disbelieves that all there is is spatial just in case to be is not to be a thing. But saying that things are composed of matter and form makes only the narrower claim that all *things* are spatial and not the wider claim that all there is is spatial. Thus, it is compatible with saying that some being is nonspatial, just so long as the latter is not being in the sense of a thing. But materialism is defined as the broader view that all there is is spatial, be it a thing or a nonthing. Since, therefore, our alternative is not wide enough to be materialism, it is insusceptible of the dilemma of circularity or contradiction in which all materialists who recognize difference in the world are caught.

To sum up, reductionist metaphysicians cannot consistently hold that all is G and cover differences in G. For to say that all is G is to make G the highest genus and all difference falls outside of genus. They must therefore choose between eliminating all difference in their worlds and abandoning their worlds altogether, conceding, after all, that not all is G. The only escape from this dilemma is to identify G not with any actual thing but with the potentiality to take on or become some kind of thing. Then it can be consistently said that all things are G and that all differences in Gare due to non-G.

Can it not be said, then, that materialism, idealism, neutral monism, or for that matter any other reductivist metaphysics feeds on a mistake in logic? And does not that error consist in forcing a genus to supply its own *differentiae?* The implications of doing this would be less alarming if the genus in question were relatively proximate. But as is evidenced by the daim that all is G, the genus that is here forced to deliver its own *differentiae* is nothing less than the highest genus. But no genus, proximate or remote, can be called upon to do what it cannot possibly do-that

is, explain its own differences. Since difference is accidental to any genus, reductionists must either deny that all is G or concede that their G is bare unity without difference.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles II. By Norman Kretzmann. Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. 483. $65.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-19-823787-1.

The Metaphysics of Creation is the sequel to *The Metaphysics of Theism* and the second in a projected three-volume investigation of the "natural theology," or what Kretzmann calls "generic theism," contained in the first three books of Aquinas's *Summa contra Gentiles.* Kretzmann claims that his book is not a commentary but rather a "selective, critical analysis of Aquinas's natural theology" (2). Given Kretzmann's intention to show the relevance of Aquinas's natural theology to contemporary debates in analytic philosophy of religion, one would expect his selection to be governed in a significant way by contemporary currency. That is the case, for example, in a chapter entitled "Origin of Species," which is devoted to showing that certain purported oppositions between creation and evolution are wrongheaded (183-227). Yet even here Kretzmann's approach (which makes very interesting use of Aquinas's distinction between creating, distinguishing, and furnishing) has a strong textual basis. More so than the book on *ScG* I, this book attends to the intricate structure of *ScG* and especially to the prominence of dialectical skirmishes with rival, inherited philosophical positions and interpretations of Aristotle. Whereas Kretzmann had insisted on the demonstrative order of the *ScG* in his exposition of book I, he now speaks repeatedly of the dialectical structure and mode of inquiry of book IL His philosophical commitments and his manner of reading *ScG* II come to the fore in his analysis of three issues: the necessity of creation, the union of soul and body, and the incorruptibility of the human soul.

In the discussion of divine creation, he follows Aquinas's line of argument fairly closely. He denies, for example, that God's perfection unduly circumscribes his creative options. He rejects the notion that God must create the best possible world if what we mean by "best possible world" is a world none better than which can be conceived (224-26). While he agrees that God is not necessitated concerning what He creates, he departs from Aquinas on the question of whether God must create. The latter necessity is not a requirement of justice, but is instead a requirement of God's goodness, following from the principle of the diffusiveness of the good. Kretzmann's position is not reducible to the necessitarian view of Avicenna, whom Aquinas is at pains to combat in

this section of *ScG.* Avicenna's necessitarianism is that of natural necessity wherein the cause is determined to one effect; it is what Kretzmann calls "single-effect causation." Kretzmann's position is that the necessity of creating is compatible with freedom concerning what to create. But what is his argument that God must create? There is an "inconsistency in the notion of goodness that is for ever unmanifested, never shared by the perfectly good, omnipotent agent." This follows from Aquinas's principle that "the sharing of being and goodness proceeds from goodness" as "its defining characteristic." Kretzmann elaborates, "a being that is good ... simply is a being productive of good things external to it" (136). Of course he is adding to Aquinas's position the term "external," since Aquinas holds that God's communication of his own goodness is completely shared only within himself. In fact, it would seem that the Trinity is God's complete self-diffusion. In a footnote, Kretzmann anticipates this line of argument and notes that Aquinas himself argues this way in the *Sentences.* His response is twofold. First, such arguments can have no place in natural theology; second, it is "God, not some one divine Person, whom Aquinas identifies as 'goodness itself.... ' Consequently ... the essential self-diffusiveness of goodness as an aspect of the essence of God remains in force, necessitating external, volitional diffusion" (135). The latter rejoinder is wide of the mark, since the basis of the Trinity is not a single Person, which would create an inappropriate inequality among the divine Persons, but rather the divine essence itself. The crucial question concerns the necessity of external manifestation, but this requirement seems to rely on too strict an analogy between natural and human productivity, on the one hand, and divine artistry, on the other. Kretzmann can of course recur to his claim that such arguments are out of place in natural theology, but then we have to insist, as Aquinas so often does in *ScG,* on the limits to natural reason, which in this case can assert only that God's self-knowledge and self-love are limitless and involve complete self-communication without being able to hazard anything more than feeble guesses as to how this self-communication occurs. Indeed, the attempt of philosophy to do more than this leads to the variety of neo-Platonic emanationist schemes that Aquinas targets in *ScG* II.

After the discussion of creation, Kretzmann turns to a careful exposition of the intricate and in many ways confusing structure of book II, whose study of creatures begins with a common consideration of all intellectual substances, that is, of both human souls and angels, then turns to the union of soul and body and the proper operation and incorruptibility of the human intellect, and ends by underscoring the difference in species between the human soul and the separate substance. The common consideration of souls and separate substances has misled Thomists such as Gilson and Fabro into thinking that the incorruptibility of the soul can be established by immediate, metaphysical arguments. This would be the case if the initial arguments for the incorruptibility of all intellectual substances were equally compelling for separate substances and human souls. But, as Kretzmann rightly notes, the subsequent arguments on behalf of the union of the human soul with the body

render dubious the previous, common argument on behalf of the incorruptibility of all intellectual substances. Aquinas himself concedes this point when in chapter 79 he makes the specific case for the incorruptibility of the human soul. We will turn shortly to Kretzmann's appraisal of the argument of chapter 79, but before we do so we should attend to what he calls "metaphysical hybrids," that is, composites of intellectual souls and bodies. The use of the term "hybrids" might seem warranted by Aquinas's pattern of speaking of intellectual souls prior to his investigation of whether and how an intellectual substance can be united to the body. Yet, as Kretzmann himself shows, Aquinas's own account of that unity defends Aristotle's thesis that the intellectual soul is the substantial form of the body, a thesis that the term "hybrid" fails to capture. As Kretzmann puts it in his careful exposition of Aquinas's dialectical encounters with rival accounts of unity, the "standard is unconditional unity."

As he also notes, the opening of chapter 57, which argues that only Aristotle's account of the unity of soul and body can save the nature of man, is pivotal. In this chapter, after having considered the inherited views on the union of soul and body, Aquinas appeals directly to the phenomena to be explained, namely, the human operations of sensing and knowing. The nature of sensation as a shared operation of body and soul and of the dependence of the intellect on phantasms are "dialectically crucial." What needs especially to be saved and explained is the fact that "this man understands." The problem with certain Arabic claims concerning the separate existence and unity of the intellect is not so much that they are internally incoherent as that they simply eliminate the phenomenon that a theory of knowledge sets out to explain. Kretzmann wonders why Aquinas takes so seriously such a "fantastic theory" (339), especially given that the debate in the universities over the unity of the intellect had not yet arisen. Aquinas certainly thinks the position is false both philosophically and as an interpretation of Aristotle. But he does not think it entirely unfounded. Further reason for his attention to it can be easily adduced. He is worried about the implications of the unity of the intellect not only for the question of personal immortality but also for the question of whether the ultimate end of human life can be achieved by a natural process, which constitutes the central dialectical debate of book III. The attention lavished on the unity of the intellect is consonant with the general practice in the *ScG*, which is to devote the most attention to those views that are directly and most forcefully subversive of the teachings of Catholic theology, even when the position might seem to be easily dismissed. So, for example, in book I, chapter 20, Aquinas devotes seemingly inordinate attention to the topic of whether God is a body, even though potency and matter have already been denied of God. Here he is concerned to eradicate any vestiges of idolatry and to remind his readers that they must not be slaves of the imagination in the investigation of divine things.

Kretzmann is aware that one of the central issues for Thomas's project in *ScG* is personal immortality. So it is not surprising that Aquinas would devote

considerable attention to the question of the incorruptibility of the human soul (see especially *ScG* H, c. 79). Yet Kretzmann finds Aquinas's arguments so unconvincing that he concludes that it would have been better for Aquinas to "consign the whole topic of immortality to Book JIV, where the data of revelation are admitted into the enterprise" (418). The central arguments converge upon the distinctiveness of intellectual activity, which is dependent on the body to provide its object of knowledge, but whose operation is not mixed with the body. It is easy, as Kretzmann seems to do, to lose sight of the key argument for the subsistence of the intellectual soul, which runs thus. Whatever has an operation proper to itself subsists; but the intellectual soul has an operation in which the body does not share; therefore the intellectual soul subsists. The technical term for what subsists and is complete in its nature is *hoc aliquid;* given that the inteHectual soul is naturally the form of the body, it can be said *w* subsist but not to be complete in its own nature. lit is, in fact, just part of a species. The human soul can called a *hoc aliquid* in only a diminished, analogical sense *(ScG* U, c. 91). Nonetheless, the subsistence of the intellectual soul provides the basis for the affirmation of its incorruptibility. The problem, as Kretzmann points out, has to do with the "mode" of intellectual activity of a separated intellect. Even if we grant that the intellectual soul is distinct from the body, given its inherent dependence on phantasms it is not at all dear how such a power could operate apart from the body. Aquinas's response is that it does so by means of a different mode of activity. But Kretzmann objects that "no other mode of intellectual activity has been established" (416). In fact, Aquinas's assertion that the separated intellect will know as the separate substances know runs afoul of his subsequent contention that human souls and angels are entirely distinct species. As Anton Pegis remarked years ago, in the process of answering one problem Aquinas creates another. Kretzmann is certainly right to insist that a dear answer to the question of immortality must await the teaching of revelation, but this does not mean that the entire topic should be consigned to revealed theology. Indeed, the question of immortality is a philosophical one. H we can establish that the intellectual soul is capable of separate existence but not precisely how it would operate in such a state, then we would simultaneously underscore the achievement and the limits to philosophical inquiry and provide a starting point for the dialectical engagement of philosophy by theology.

One of the most impressive features of Kretzmann's interpretation-something that is likely to be more appreciated by exegetically minded Thomists than by the analytic philosophers of religion for whom Kretzmann is the way he links together its various parts, especially the way he insists upon the connections between the first and second books of the *ScG,* both of which have as their object knowledge of God. The turn from God (book I) to creatures (book II) is a "further study of God," a shift from his immanent to his extrinsic activity (8). *ScG* U corrects multiple errors about creatures and thus refines our understanding and increases our appreciation of God's wisdom, power, and goodness. As Kretzmann notes, the philosophical

center of book II consists of a series of dialectical encounters with rival conceptions of creation and creatures. Given what he has already asserted about the intimate link between books I and II, it seems natural to suppose that rival conceptions of creation and creatures reflect differing conceptions of the divinity. If that is so, then we shall have to reject his central thesis about the inquiry of *ScG* I-II: namely, that it teaches generic theism.

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Les principes des choses en ontologie medievale (Thomas d'Aquin, Scot, Occam). By MICHEL BASTIT. Bordeaux: Editions Biere, 1997. Pp. 361 + vii.

In this study, Michel Bastit, a professor of philosophy at the University of Bourgogne, attempts to arrive at a comparative perspective on medieval metaphysics whereby he may render a philosophical judgment upon the thought of the three outstanding Scholatic authors mentioned in the book's subtitle: Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. Professor Bastit is clear that, although he uses historical data and texts to arrive at descriptions of his subjects, he does not intend to trace historical linkages between the authors or to place them in historical context in any detailed manner. To do so, he feels, would be to become a prisoner of historical study and to forego the more challenging and valuable task of making a philosophical judgment about the thought of the authors studied (15).

In order to achieve the comparative perspective required for making his philosophical evaluation, Bastit examines themes treated by each of the authors, themes arising from the authors' common acceptance of Aristotelian doctrines in the areas of metaphysics and natural philosophy. In the first part of the work, subdivided into two chapters, he examines wisdom and the orders of being and discourse; in the second part of the work, subdivided into four chapters, he treats of determination, fulfillment, hylomorphic composition, and ontological composition; and in the final part, subdivided into three chapters, he studies wisdom and prudence, order and will, and the conflict of freedoms. Although the first two parts are genuinely comparative in the sense that each of the authors is discussed immediately in reference to the common theme being treated, the final part breaks with this pattern by devoting its first chapter to Aquinas, its second to Scotus, and its last to Ockham.

In approaching Aquinas on the subject of wisdom or first philosophy, Bastit characterizes the fundamental issues as being: (1) whether, in light of the

conflict between Aristotle and traditional Augustinian teaching, to reduce Aristotelianism to a general ontology above which to place a revealed theology or to think through a natural onto-theology that would subsequently be surpassed by theology but would yield analogical concepts useful to it; and (2) whether or not Aristotelian onto-theology is a competitor to or an ally to faith and *sacra doctrina* (19-20). To Bastit, Aquinas seems to give both philosophy and *sacra doctrina* their due: philosophy follows the order of things and reaches thereby some conclusions about God; it does not need to turn to theology to find solutions to its own problems. Likewise, theology reveals not only truths surpassing altogether what human reason might know, but also truths knowable, in principle, by human reason. (21)

As to the subject-matter of metaphysics proper, Bastit, while recognizing that St. Thomas identifies that subject as *ens in communi,* sees the assurance for the unity of metaphysical knowledge in the causes and principles of *ens in communi,* namely the immaterial substance that is God. Thomas's position on the manner in which God enters into metaphysics as a subject of discourse means for Basitit that Aquinas is actually moving away from the Avicennian position to one similar to that of Averroes. It is the use of causality by Aquinas in showing the existence of God, however, that gives metaphysics its truly transcendental character, and the foundation for discourse about God is the discovery of the Unmoved Mover in the study of physics (25-26).

Turning to Scotus, Bastit focuses his attention initially upon the prologues of the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio.* In these texts, which are attempts by Scotus to justify the legitimacy of theological discourse through arguing that the end of man cannot be rightly discerned by natural reason, Scotus shows, according to Bastit, the extent to which he has undergone Augustinian influence and anticipates similar later efforts by Luther and Kant to delimit reason. Criticizing Gilson's interpretation of Scotus as being too facile and relying on uncertain developmental hypotheses (32), Bastit proposes a synthetic reading of the Subtle Doctor's teaching on the subject-matter of metaphysics, basing himself primarily upon selections from Scotus's *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis. Ens commune* is the subject of metaphysics for Duns Scotus and God enters into metaphysical discourse under the rubric of *primum ens* and not *primum mavens;* to Bastit's mind, Scotus's rejection of the primacy of the Unmoved Mover argument for showing God's existence means that his is an attempt to do metaphysics without physics (35). The only development that Bastit sees from the first questions in Scotus's *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* through the *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* to the *Reportationes Parisienses* is in regard to the doctrine of the univocity of being, a doctrine that was required ultimately, in Bastit's opinion, because of Scotus's position on the subject-matter of metaphysics.

Ockham's position upon the subject-matter of metaphysics is considered an elimination of the problem of identifying the subject of metaphysics more than a solution to it (35-44). Ockham denies any single subject for the science of metaphysics, just as he does for all other sciences. Each syllogistic argument

employed in metaphysics has a distinct subject, the logical subject of its conclusion. *Metaphysics* is a term we use to refer to a certain group of subjects of discourse contained in Aristotle's book of that same title; the unity belonging to metaphysics is that of loose collection, not that of a formally united object.

The evaluative dimension of Bastit's comparative presentation becomes painfully obvious in the second chapter's treatment of the order of being; but once that dimension comes into play it remains throughout the balance of the book. Bastit argues that the heart of Aquinas's understanding of being is analogy and, in particular, the analogy of proportion as opposed to the analogy of attribution. The latter requires formal consideration of the Creator/creature relation, something that is beyond philosophy and pertains rather to theology (63). What philosophy deploys instead of the analogy of attribution is a transcendental analogy of proportion in its own theological discussions. In contrast to Aquinas's teachings, Scotus's account of the order of beings is marred in several respects. By substituting *ens commune* for God as the primary subject of metaphysics, Scotus sends philosophy down the road leading to modern philosophy. Univocity and analogy are, furthermore, strictly opposed: the destruction of Thomistic analogy is the construction of Scotistic univocity (65-67). With his wayward tendencies, Scotus opens up the way for the destructive critique of Ockham which dismantles the problematic of univocity and analogy by allowing *ens* to be univocal logicially speaking, but utterly equivocal when predicated concretely (72-75).

The manifestly hostile stance adopted toward Scotus and Ockham continues in the succeeding chapters. In the third chapter, entitled "Determination" but dealing mainly with the respective thinkers' doctrine of substance, Aquinas's doctine of substance is identified with that of Aristotle. Scotus's Aristotelianism on substance, though supported, Bastit acknowledges, by numerous texts, is more apparent than real (92). Scotus modifies the doctrine of substance to accommodate Eucharistic concerns, thereby revealing his theological preoccupations. On the knowability of substance, Scotus's argument that we know substance by inference since all that the senses perceive are accidents is considered to be a capitulation to the inscrutability of substance, leaving metaphysics as a transcendental ontology stipulating the conditions for phenomena with which we are immediately acquainted but which are unknowable in themselves. This cleavage between substance as known by inference and phenomena known directly evidences, Bastit believes, a return by Scotus to the "dualistic Platonism discarded by Aquinas" (98). Ockham is interpreted as treating the metaphysical doctrine of substance on a linguistic level, while reducing substance to singular, concrete substance in ontology (98-101).

In the fourth chapter, which deals with ontological perfection, Aquinas's appropriation of a genuinely Aristotelian understanding of act and potency, understood as conceiving potency as strictly relative to act, is contrasted with the essentialism of Scotus and the empiricism of Ockham. Bastit interprets

Aquinas as attributing to rational powers the capability of making contrary determinations, but also claims that Aquinas's doctrine of potentiality and possibility involves holding that (1) every possible is limited by a future that will be actual and (2) some possibles are possibles that will never be (111). Although he reviews in some detail the complicated discussion of potency in Scotus's key text on potency and act, *Quaestiones in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis,* book 9, Bastit accuses Scotus of conflating logical with metaphysical senses of possibility, thereby reputedly detaching essences from their ground in actual existence. Scotus's effort at exploring possible essences in his ontology Bastit labels 'logicism' and sees in it a forerunner of Kant and Husserl (114). Though Scotus's distinction between objective and subjective potencies is canvassed, it is thought of as being connected to his doctrine of being as essence, which leads, in turn, to Scotus's attributing to matter a kind of non-formal actuality, providing Ockham with his opportunity to reduce actuality to factuality (119). Ockham's analysis of *esse in potentia* is construed as more logical than properly ontological. Contrary to Aristotle's doctrine of actuality as a qualitative perfection of the subject, Ockham's notion of actuality tends to reduce actuality to a set of successive qualitatively undifferentiated states. The dynamic tendency of things toward fulfillment is lost in Ockham's account of potency and act (115-22).

The final two chapters of the first part treat of hylomorphic composition and ontological composition. Regarding hylomorphic composition, Aquinas is viewed as achieving a balance lacking in the other two philosophical authors since he alone commits to the classical Aristotelian thesis that matter is pure potency, never existing apart from form. Aquinas holds that matter always exists as signate matter; according to Bastit, this means matter determined by the forms of the elements (130). Even Thomas's natural-law doctrine needs to be set in the cosmological framework in which matter and form composites have an essential unity of potency/act. If one attributes to matter and lower forms a greater autonomy than Aquinas does, the union of matter/form composites begins to be placed in question (133). Yet that is exactly what happens, we are told, in the case of St. Thomas's two successors. Both Scotus and Ockham attribute some actuality to matter; in Scotus's case it leads, Bastit asserts, to a quasi-Platonic doctrine of matter having its own entity and intelligibility (137), thereby causing a decomposition of the paradigmatic union of matter and form, whereas in Ockham's case it leads to a devaluation of final and formal causality (152-53).

On the topic of ontological composition, Bastit sets the terms of the discussion against the background of what he admits is a lacuna in the Aristotelian ontology; contingency in the doctrine of the historical Aristotle is found only on the part of the material causes of things and in any event such contingency is not radical enough to express the givenness of creation. Avicenna's effort at coping with the difficulty of finding room in the Aristotelian ontology for the doctrine of creation is his own proposal of the distinction between essence and existence with its emphasis upon the

existential neutrality of essences; yet Avicenna's doctrine needed to be modified to find a place in the Scholastic authors (171-72).

At this point, Bastit turns his attention to twentieth-century interpretations of Aquinas's metaphysics that have made the distinction between *esse* and *essentia* the keystone for their presentations of Aquinas's thought. Focusing upon Etienne Gilson and Cornelio Fabro, Bastit contends that what these proponents of a nontraditional interpretation of Aquinas hope to discover is not only his original teaching as opposed to that handed down by later Thomists, but also a version of his thought that can be more easily brought to bear upon contemporary concerns. Furthermore, he observes that they usually find such an Aquinas, an Aquinas more existential, free of Aristotelian conceptualism, and one not forgetful of being and ontological difference-that is, one capable of escaping from the Heideggerian critique of Western metaphysics (173-75). As opposed to the existential Aquinas of Gilson and Fabro, Bastit proposes what he deems to be a more Aristotelian interpretation. In his view, the chief problem with the existential interpretation is that it misconstrues the distinction between philosophy and theology, failing first to distinguish between ontology and natural theology within philosophy proper and second to distinguish between the reflection upon the relation of things to God in natural theology and the *use* of that reflection within the scope of *sacra doctrina* (176). After reviewing Aquinas's *De ente et essentia,* Bastit makes some rather startling assertions, though ones in keeping with hints he had dropped earlier in the book. First, the *esse/essentia* distinction may not even pertain to philosophy since the distinction relies on the concept of creation that itself may lie beyond the scope of philosophical knowledge (179-80). Second, the fact that Aquinas assigns the role of communicating *esse* to the composite to form in his metaphysics indicates the basic importance of *essentia* in his philosophy and not the act of being (182-83). Finally, texts wherein Aquinas's doctrine of creaturely participation in *esse* is found are better seen as cases presenting a doctrine of natural or revealed theology, albeit one building on an Aristotelian philosophical foundation (186-87).

Nonetheless the failure of Aquinas's successors to appreciate the value of his teaching on *esse* is another sign, to Bastit's mind, of their lack of philosophical acuity. Scotus's attribution of a kind of being to essences combined with his emphasis on the contingency of actual existence and his own peculiar rendering of the act/potency distinction means that he is incapable of appropriating the doctrine of Thomistic *esse* (189). In what must be one of the most vituperative attacks ever made upon the Subtle Doctor, Bastit proceeds in short order to list what he considers to be the defects of Scotus's metaphysics: (1) Scotus has to locate indeterminacy in God; (2) instead of making creation something outside the realm of philosophy and an ordered relation that could be eternal, Scotus opts for a transcendental science removed from primary substances, whether sensible or eternal; (3) metaphysics becomes a science of intelligibles; (4) as such, it becomes a science of sciences but not a science of subsistent beings; (5) in abandoning physics, Scotus's thought

opens the road to a physics that becomes mechanics and a metaphysics that becomes a logic or general ontology; (6) Scotus's distinction between created/Uncreated being as a transcendental division of being shows that he takes this division as evident while the distinction is unavailable to the philosopher who neither knows, at the outset of his inquiry, of God's existence nor, at any point, of the creation of the world; and (7) Scotus's so-called demonstration of God's existence cannot actually succeed at its ultimate stage and thus drifts into rhetorical *suasiones* to accomplish its aim (189-90). Ockham fares little better, though he does manage to escape the invective directed at Scotus. The Venerable Inceptor is simply dismissed with the observation that he reduces the distinction between essence and existence to a conceptual or verbal one by sharply distinguishing between the copula and the sense of existence as a nominal feature (198-200).

In the third and final part of the book, Bastit undertakes to show how the differing metaphysical theses of the authors lead ineluctably to their varying conceptions of the realm of human action and governance. Much of the seventh chapter, which deals mainly with Aquinas, is given over to a fairly straightforward presentation of the key points in St. Thomas's philosophical psychology. After summarizing Aquinas's account of the sensible and intellectual powers, Bastit characterizes the Thomistic doctrine of will as embracing the thesis that the will is neither essentially autonomous nor essentially self-determining. The will is free to the extent that it is not in the presence of the complete good that would render it perfectly happy; since the conditions of the present life are such that no such good is presented to it, a person may will or not the particular goods presented. The Thomistic explanation of individuation through matter in combination with the claim that all individuals within a species are identical through their specific form is appealed to as providing the basis for community life and the flourishing of the individual within the polis; since Aquinas holds that the whole being of the individual is determined by its specific form which nonetheless is individuated by matter, there is within the individual a bond with everything else of its species and yet an irreducible difference between a given individual and another, owing to the material conditions of each individual and the particularity attaching thereto, the object for prudential judgment (233).

In the final two chapters, Bastit finds hardly any philosophical value in the outlook of either Scotus or Ockham regarding the human person and the community. Curiously enough, though little of the seventh chapter focused on Aquinas's account of the interrelationship between the divine will and the divine intellect, much of the final two chapters consists of treating the Scotistic and Ockhamistic teaching on the divine will. Scotus is faulted, thanks to his formal distinction between the divine will and the divine intellect, for attempting to find a radical separation in God between knowledge and existence and thus between the speculative and the practical (258). This separation leads to the distinction, characteristic of Scotus's thought, between the necessary and the contingent precepts of the natural law, while his doctrine

of divine ideas, in its comparison of God to a creative artist, is guilty, in Bastit's eyes, of anthropomorphism (260). Furthermore, Scotus opens up the way for a teaching more fully evident in Ockham: a picture of God as capricious and arbitrary (344-46). Ockham's doctrine of individuals as the only elements in his ontology, with universals being found exclusively in the mind and meaning reduced to the referential dimension of mental language, entails for Bastit that the world is now constituted by, and manipulable by, the knowing subject (308-9). In the end, in Bastit's judgment, Ockham's ontology leaves us with brutal states of affairs that are both expressions of a blind divine power and sources of human power and self-aggrandizement (327).

Unsurprisingly, Bastit concludes by reiterating his negative philosophical judgment on the value of the thought of Scotus and Ockham as compared to that of Aquinas. Only Aquinas's principles are capable of reconciling reason and revelation, properly treating philosophy and theology, and allowing us to avoid the manifest errors of modern and contemporary philosophy, to which the dialectic of conflicting claims advanced by Scotus and Ockham inevitably leads (346-48).

In reviewing such a work, one finds oneself unsure of what canon of evaluation to use in judging it. On the one hand, much of the work is historical in nature and makes claims about the meaning of philosophers' doctrines found in the history of philosophy; on the other, many of the claims are speculative in nature and would need their own independent forum to be presented and defended. To the extent that Bastit's book has as a preliminary task understanding and presenting the thought of those authors which it intends to compare and evaluate, I feel justified in pointing out at least of few of the more egregious mistakes and aberrant interpretations. Bastit's effort to contrast St. Thomas's view of the subject-matter of metaphysics with that of seems to miss the point; Thomas does have a different position precisely because his position is a third alternative to the positions taken by Averroes and Avicenna, not because his is a slightly adapted version of the Commentator's, as Bastit's interpretation implies. On this score, Scotus's position is much more in keeping with the majority of the Latin commentators and does not deserve to be singled out for its oddity, but rather for the ingenious manner in which Scotus refines the more common opinion. Furthermore, Scotus is not suggesting that metaphysics should be done without physics; rather, following the lead of Aquinas's teacher Albert the Great, he is pointing out that natural philosophy can only arrive incidentally at the cause of being since it does not consider being as such. If to hold the opinion that *ens commune* is the subject of metaphysics is to start down the road of modern philosophy, then Scotus has plenty of predecessors, companions, and fellow travelers on that journey. Much the same could be said of Bastit's criticisms of Scotus's doctrine of substance. Scotus is not the first to raise questions about how substance is knowable; after all, things cannot give what they do not have-if accidents are not substances they cannot provide species of substances. To accuse Scotus of Platonism because he restricts our knowledge of sensible substances to what we can arrive

at through careful observation of their accidental properties strikes me as a strange way to describe what seems to be sound, scientific methodology. The accuracy of Bastit's interpretation of Scotus in general is questionable. Indeed, whether he has a firm command of which works are authentic and which spurious is uncertain; on pages 202-8, notes 108-9, for example, he appeals, as to a genuine work of Scotus, to the Pseudo-Scotus's (probably John of Cornwall's) *Questions on the Posterior Analytics* printed by Wadding. Finally, Bastit's remarks on Ockham are riddled with misreadings. To give an obvious instance, Ockham does not hold that virtue of any sort is impossible without knowing by revelation the will of God, as Bastit thinks (324-26); what he does hold is that the highest virtue is impossible without loving God for his own sake, but this is just a rather commonplace position on the privileged status of Christian virtue.

In conclusion, I do not recommend this book, since it depicts poorly the historical figures it seeks to compare. The idea of a comparative study of these authors' metaphysics and ontology is one worthy of pursuit, but I fear that it will take the learning of a Gilson or a Boehner to be able to put that idea into practice. Until such a great scholar should once again arise, the goal of this book will remain unfulfilled.

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Saint Thomas d'Aquin et le sacerdoce. Actes du colloque organise par l'Institut Saint-Thomas-Aquin les 5 et 6 juin 1998 aToulouse. *Revue Thomiste* 99 (1999). Pp. 295 (paper).

As the editor of this volume, S. Bonino, formulates it, the premise of the colloquy whence this collection of papers proceeds is as descriptive of the United States as of France: the high academic study of St. Thomas has moved from the care of theologians to philosophers, from clerics to lay men and women in secular institutions. While there are aspects of this movement to rejoice in, there are also dangers to avoid, since St. Thomas is not understood well in abstraction from the explicit theological intention of his work, an intention most easily assimilable in institutions of ecclesiastical character. Hence the gathering of mostly clerics, mainly Dominican, preponderantly associated with the teaching of theology in an ecclesiastical institution, that has produced this collection of papers. And a very nice collection it is indeed, illustrating, as Bonino says, the sapiential and contemplative character of contemporary Thomist studies, as well as their historical-critical maturity.

Whether it also demonstrates the abiding capacity the mind of St. Thomas to respond to contemporary concerns is more difficult to judge, and depends in part on the place the reader accords St. Thomas in the tradition.

The collection is ably introduced by Msgr. E. Marcus, archbishop of Toulouse. He articulates the challenges to any attempt to make St. Thomas speak to contemporary concerns about the priesthood, challenges that range from the relative dearth of extended treatments of priesthood by St. Thomas, to the absence in St. Thomas of an ecclesiology in which to situate the concept of priestly mediation, to the greater role contemporary discourse on ministry accords to the *triplex munera.* The American reader may find just as interesting the archbishop's insightful summary of the theological questioning of the priesthood in France from 1943 *(La France pays de mission)* to the present.

The contributor most easily recognized by English speakers will doubtless be J.-P. Torrell, and indeed, his article on the priesthood of Christ in question 22 of the *Tertia pars* can claim a certain pride of place in the collection, since Christ is the cause and exemplar of the entire Christian priesthood and cult (a. 4). Torrell's commentary shows how question 22 is a crossroads of tradition and Christo logical principle: both Augustine and Cyril of Alexandria, both the instrumentality of the humanity of Christ and the personal dignity of the One who uses the instrument, are in play in understanding the priesthood of Christ. A sort of nerve-center of the *Tertia pars,* question 22 looks back to question 8 (on the headship of Christ) and forward to the theology of the cross in questions 48 and 49.

Since Christ is priest because he is mediator (a. 1), teaching God's law to men and offering man's sacrifice to God, Torrell wonders at the placement of question 26, on Christ as mediator, after question 22. G. Remy takes up just this issue of the relation of the notions of priesthood and mediation in St. Thomas. In this study, the cross appears as the supreme mediation between God and sinful man, requiring Christ to engage the charity by which he exceeds the angels and the capacity to suffer by which he is beneath them. At the same time, the satisfaction of the cross is the sacrifice of Christ the priest. Like Torrell, Remy is puzzled by the placement of the questions on mediation and priesthood in the *Summa.*

The mediation of the cross is made present in the double mediation of the Mass, which is both God's sanctification of the worshipers and cult rendered to God; the role of the eternity of the priesthood of Christ in explaining the eschatological effect of the Eucharist is developed in a last article on the priesthood of Christ by D. Chardonnens, a development of article 5 of question 22. Since the victim of the cross is eternal, the offering can be represented daily. More particularly, the priesthood of Christ is eternal because, though the oblation has occurred once and for all, both the internal attitude of Christ whence the oblation proceeded and as well the effect of the oblation are everlasting. The Eucharist proceeds, therefore, from the eternal Christ; moreover, the goal of the Eucharist is to bring us to eschatological glory. Chardonnens develops this teaching of St. Thomas with attention to the

instrumentality of the humanity of Christ and the influence of St. Cyril of Alexandria, for whom the influence of the Eucharist depends on the instrumentality of the life-giving flesh of the Word.

The foregoing considerations of the priesthood of Christ are doubtless fundamental, but the most exciting articles in this collection deal with the spiritual priesthood of Christians. I include here the important articles on St. Thomas's treatment of priesthood in two scriptural commentaries, that on Hebrews and that on the Psalms. Admittedly, C. Berceville is on the track of the priesthood of Christ in the commentary on Hebrews. But see what beautiful things emerge: exterior is related to interior cult as is the body to the soul, and so Christ's priestly death is the instrument and realization of his own interior, spiritual sacrifice of prayer and devotion. The definitive sacrifice of Christ's blood, moreover, is ordered to our interior sacrifice-the spiritual sacrifice of every baptized Christian-and it enables our interior sacrifice by provoking the act of faith. In this way, the fruit of his priesthood is the Church herself in her entirety.

The companion piece to the foregoing is M. Morard's article on the sacrifice of Christ and of Christians in the *Super Psalmos.* The special value of this article should be noted, given the confused state of the text of *Super Psalmos,* and the fact that Morard is the editor of that text. His appreciation of this commentary is thus very complete, and I think this article is worth the price of the whole collection. The *Super Psalmos* is late, and according to Morard has less to do with dogmatic exploration than with the reception of Scripture on the part of the dogmatically, systematically mature mind of Aquinas. It is a reception at once traditional and alive to the unity of the canon. Moreover, receiving the Psalms, Thomas receives the Scriptures as a whole, for he shares with the Areopagite the view that the Psalms express the whole of Scripture under the formality of praise. If the Psalms do not speak often of priesthood, moreover, David the anointed King is for St. Thomas a figure of Christ the anointed Priest and King. The Psalms are the prayers of Christ; they are the prayers of Christ the Priest; they are the interior sacrifice of Christ the Priest. For here, as in the commentary on Hebrews, the finality of exterior sacrifice is once again the interior act. The sacrifice of the cross, its representation in the Mass, all are ordered to enabling the interior cult of the Christian. With St. Augustine, sacrifice is any good work aiming at union with God. It is the interior act of the soul, the act of charity, that unites, and this means that Christ's sacrifice is most perfect. On the other hand, words are the signs par excellence of the interior acts of man. Christ's sacrifice is thus especially ordered to our sacrifice of praise-to *our* praying of *his* prayers, the Psalms.

The words of teaching and preaching also manifest interior acts, and moreover do so in such a way as to lead others to make the same act. The Christian teacher is therefore also priest. This last kind of spiritual sacrifice is discussed by both Morard and by G. Emery, who develops its connection with the Dominican mission, and inserts it into a treatment of the sacrifice of

religious life as a prolongation of the spiritual sacrifice that is an exercise of baptismal grace. Emery's study of the spiritual priesthood of the faithful is a discourse both comprehensive and, like Morard's, edifying. Together with B.-D. de La Soujeole, who writes on the three *munera* in St. Thomas, Emery makes the point that the priesthood of the baptized faithful means a participation in sanctifying grace. Again, the exterior is for the interior cult, as both eliciting it and signifying it. This spiritual priesthood of the baptized, which St. Thomas calls a "mystic" priesthood, is not an unreal priesthood, and "priesthood" is not said metaphorically here, as Cajetan will have it later. De La Soujeole, for his part, provides a thoughtful rendering of St. Thomas's comparisons of the three *munera.* Most important, I think, he points out that when teaching and ruling are picked out as "secondary" relative to the "principal" function of sanctifying, "secondary" does not mean "accidental." The *munera* have the same relations to one another as do faith, hope, and charity. Faith's priority to charity, like that of teaching to sanctifying, is a priority in the order of generation. And as hope is an effect of charity, so is the possibility of ruling an effect of sanctifying. This discussion is very useful for thinking about the *munera* in the documents of the Second Vatican Council.

Between the priesthood of Christ and the spiritual priesthood of the baptized, there is the priesthood conferred by the sacrament of orders. Readers will appreciate P.-M. Gy's magisterial summary of the development of St. Thomas's thought on this sacrament from the *Sentences* commentary, to the *Contra Gentiles,* to whatever can be gleaned of the late Thomas from question 22 of the *Tertia pars* and the treatment of character in question 63. Three things especially are to be noted from the article. First, Gy observes that the distinction of sacraments ordered to one's personal good and sacraments ordered to the common good is to be found neither in St. Albert nor in St. Bonaventure. Second, the clearest point of doctrinal evolution is the shift from locating the primary instance of character in baptismal character *(Sentences* commentary) to locating it in priestly character *(Summa).* And this seems to be an inference that follows from maintaining that character is a participation in the priesthood of Christ. For Christ's priesthood is a priesthood for others *(STh* III, q. 22, art. 4), and the ministerial priest participates in Christ's priesthood under just that formality, since this is a sacrament ordered to the common good. Third, and in express contradiction *to].* Lecuyer's study of some forty years ago, Gy gives us his opinion that the episcopate is not sacramental for St. Thomas. Unfortunately for those of us who have been faithfully recounting Lecuyer over the years, Pere Gy does not defend this opinion in any detail.

In a second article on the sacrament, G. Narcisse reports his doctoral dissertation on how the argument *ex convenientia* functions for St. Thomas, and how it functions specifically to exclude women from orders. If we no longer consider that women are in a state of subjection and so for that reason unable to signify hierarchical superiority, the principle of Christological exemplarity still plays a role in understanding orders. The humanity of Christ, and so, necessarily, a sexually determined *humanity-this* humanity-is the

instrument of grace. Orders are fittingly given to a person who evokes that humanity, a male humanity. And as to "fittingness" itself, Narcisse reminds us that all St. Thomas claims for the priesthood of Christ is that it is "fitting" for Christ to be a priest. To find the fittingness of one of the arrangements of the economy is to find an intelligibility determined by the divine mind. Narcisse closes his article with a reminder of the fittingness of finding new roles for women in the Church today.

Finally, C. Morerod and M.-B. Borde contribute studies on the reception of St. Thomas's teaching, the first in Cajetan and the second in the Salmanticenses. S. Bonino's contribution considers priesthood as a natural religious institution.

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Mystical Theology. By MARK A. MCINTOSH. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998. Pp. 246. $26.95 (paper). ISBN 1-55786-907-3.

In a previous book *(Christology from Within: Spirituality and the Incarnation in Hans Urs von Balthasar* [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996]), Mark Mcintosh probed the integral relationship between spirituality and theology in the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar and suggested its paradigmatic necessity for theology as a whole. In the present book he undertakes a full-scale treatment of the thesis and leaves the reader with a well-considered charge for anybody undertaking the task of theology. By an explicit turn to mysticism and mystical theology (as the title suggests) Mcintosh achieves a retrieval of that discipline so often marginalized by systematicians. As is clear from his weighty first chapter much needs to be negotiated along the way with pitfalls to be avoided by practitioners of each discipline. In doing so he sets up a standard for both spirituality and theology which he himself must meet. Suffice to say that Mcintosh is clearly successful in his endeavor.

Spirituality is a minefield in and of itself-mysticism as well! Much passes under this bridge which has little to do with established religious traditions, not to mention theology. A significant strain of modern Protestant dogmatics from Albrecht Ritschl to Karl Barth considered mysticism as almost inimical to evangelical faith while Catholic dogmatics has (certainly with less hostility) simply sidelined it to specific subordinated disciplines (ascetical, mystical, or spiritual theology) with little consequence for systematic theology. Mcintosh does not simply accuse theology for the regrettable divorce between the two

disciplines (with ill effects for both). Spirituality bears its responsibility as well, beginning with no less a figure as Bernard of Clairvaux.

Bernard's opening to his third sermon on the Song of Songs as in part quoted by Mclntosh-"Today the text we are to study is the book of our own experience *[in libro experientiae]"-is* the linchpin for the misreading of mystical texts within the spiritual tradition and for the distortion of spirituality which separates it from theology. Needless to say this distortion, which Mcintosh identifies as "experientialism" with the help of Denys Turner (see *The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995]) is endorsed by a good number of moderns, only adding to the problem which the book is seeking to overcome. Mcintosh's strategy, both critical and constructive, is threefold.

First, he must identify methodologically his manner of proceeding. Early on in the book Mcintosh critically reviews various takes on the academic discipline of spirituality studies. To the extent that an anthropological approach dominates in this field, whether based on psychological states or even a self-transcendence oriented to ultimacy, it tends "to render God peripheral" (21). For Mcintosh this is no light matter. His definition of spirituality, which situates "the discovery of the true 'self' precisely in encountering the divine and human other" (5), demands attention to the reality of God revealed and communicated, the active presence of God which engenders and empowers spirituality. The real question concerns the interpretation of mystical and spiritual texts in this regard. This baseline cannot be forfeited if the theological connection is to be affirmed.

Second, theology as the expression of encounter with God in speech and understanding is also integral to Christian mystical experience. To establish his case Mcintosh devotes two chapters to a query of historical and twentieth-century theologies. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, and Bernard of Clairvaux are the three focal figures for his tracking of developments from the Fathers through the medieval era. The first is clearly decisive for any study of Christian spirituality but serves in this work as a measure along with Meister Eckhart for that strand of Christian spirituality which is grounded in the apophatic. If theology is to have a integral purchase on mystical experience it must be demonstrated here as well as in the more cataphatic traditions of Bernard, Bonaventure, and Ignatius Loyola (whom he also references). While attending to these others Mcintosh's burden is to adjudicate the distinctly Christian element in the former. Again, for him, the stakes are rather high. As he states in it in sum, "the mystical is not simply the ineffable incomprehensibility of God ... but precisely the infinite self-giving of God which is the fundamental characteristic of the divine Trinity and is enacted in history in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus" (44). If one captures this for Dionysius and Eckhart then one is well on the way to affirming that it is the very content of the Christian gospel that deepens our perception of the divine mystery-theology surely is not left behind even in mystical silence.

This also explains Mcintosh's turn to Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar for his probing of twentieth-century theology on this score. If theology and spirituality meet in contemplation then Rahner and Balthasar stand out as the two Catholic alternatives on the matter. While the Trinitarian and Christological credentials of both are not in question Mcintosh's sympathies are with Balthasar when it comes to the integration between the mystical and theological. He prefers to situate the divine mystery in the latter's well-known emphasis on the paschal transitus with its inner-Trinitarian and Christological explicitness rather than in the former's transcendental orientation to apophatic silence.

Mcintosh concludes the first part of his book on "Issues of History and Method" by specifically taking up the theological hermeneutics of spiritual texts. One must be mindful that he is arguing not as a purveyor of religious mysticism in general but as a Christian theologian who is mining the revelation of the triune God in specifically Christian mystical texts. Again Mcintosh insists on the particularity of both mystical texts and Christian gospel. Hence (borrowing from his insightful description of the role of Christ in Maximus's account of mystical knowledge) mystical texts convey not some primordial inner experience to be duplicated but rather "the perceptivity of our bodies . . . the linguisticality of our minds and the sensitivity of our feelings" (61). Here he returns to his critique of experientialism, which substitutes experiences-even negative contentless "dark night" experiences-for the activity of God in the believer's life. The intentionality of mystical texts is to point to the divine Other in the "hidden reality of God's encounter with humanity" (142). Therefore, it is proper to interpret the "apophatic momentum of Christian mystical texts ... [as] bear[ing] the marks of that ultimate apophasis enacted by Jesus" (127) even where the Incarnation and the Cross are not named.

The second part of the book follows through by illustrating mystical theology in practice. If Christian mystical experience is to be read in a Trinitarian and Christological register Mcintosh fruitfully addresses both areas of dogmatic inquiry. For the former he takes an interesting and original pneumatological turn. Consonant with other recent theological attention to the Holy Spirit Mcintosh explores the Spirit as the *affectus* of Trinitarian yearning between the Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit is *"the love which arouses us to full personhood* by inciting in us a response to (and a participation in) *the personhood of Jesus the Word incarnate"* (158). This "pneumatological grammar" is essential for the overall project (how else to integrate spirituality and theology!) and also for the theological rendering of self and personhood which mystical experience and postmodern discourse are both so occupied with.

Before arriving at his own intervention in the discussion over anthropology (his final chapter) Mcintosh first addresses a series of Christological issues now illuminated by this integrated theological perspective. He answers several objections to an incarnational Christology voiced primarily by John Hick in order to affirm an incarnational maximalism over against "Left Incarnational

Minimalism" and "Right Incarnational Minimalism," respectively diminishing the divinity or humanity of Christ. Questions about the mutual exclusivity of Christ's humanity and divinity and the limits of Jesus' self-knowledge are deftly dealt with. In his defense against charges of docetism in traditionally orthodox incarnational Christology Mcintosh invokes the language of mystical paradox to say that Jesus is most fully divine and the incarnation most fully consummated on Golgotha. This buttresses the attempt to argue that "that which distinguishes Jesus from other human beings is not anything at the level of nature" (204). His intent is to affirm with Chalcedon and from a Cappadocian perspective that the nature of the union in Christ is hypostatic and not essential. Yet while he also affirms that Jesus' identity is that of the eternal Word of God (a personal identity by which he is distinct from others), how Jesus does not also differ in his divinity (not humanity) from us is not sufficiently acknowledged. He means to say that "who Jesus is" is different from us but not "what he is." True enough for his humanity but how is it true for his divinity? At least some more discussion remains for this issue.

Although Mcintosh did not want to begin his study with an anthropological hermeneutic of mystical experience, he ends with the fruits of an anthropology that emerges from his Trinitarian theological hermeneutic. Engaging among others such postmodern thinkers as Emmanuel Levinas and Edith Wyschogrod, his richest writing is reserved for his use of the saintly testimony of Edith Stein and Simone Weil. The relationality and otherness of the postmodern self are addressed within the perspective of a Trinitarian radicalism in which the "openness of the Trinity to the other sustains not only the infinite othering of the divine persons but also the *finite* other of human persons" (237). The stuff of the human self is not just relation via otherness but self-bestowal and self-giving within the matrix of participation in the Trinitarian life of God.

I have little to quibble with in this book apart from further development of the Christological point mentioned above. But there is an interesting matter to pursue which gets us back to the quotation from Bernard of Clairvaux. Mclintosh does attempt to defend Bernard from misreadings, although in the end he seems to allow the charge of experientialism to stick. My point does not so much concern Bernard as it does Mcintosh's comments about Madame Guyon, whom I suppose one could consider the epitome of experientialism. Mcintosh comments that her utter resignation of the self was an elaborate *rhetoric* of the self and turned out to be an ever more baroque *technology* of the self (8). Considering that she was the quintessential Quietist it only furthers the case against experientialism. But does this dispose of experience even if we maintain that experience in and of itself is never the measure of spirituality? Consider Ignatius Loyola whom Mcintosh invokes (especially in regard to Balthasar). Certainly attention to the motions of one's heart and the movement of God in one's prayer and life inform the *Spiritual Exercises.* Mcintosh comments that for Balthasar these are subordinated to "the believer's growing obedience to the will of God" (107) while in general the *Spiritual Exercises* serve "not as a prescription for working up a series of particular experiences,

but as a matrix of symbols which serves to re-contextualize one's experiences entirely" (135). Certainly. But without denying that Christian spirituality is not simply an inventory of the self (even the spiritual self!), and that it is inherently communal and generative of "concrete, historical meaning" (62)-thus Mcintosh's acknowledgment of the contributions of liberation and feminist theologies-might not we attend more to the pneumatological texture of Christian experience? In fact I believe that is where Mcintosh is directing us. If there is a caveat here, it is simply that out of gratitude for his work we might also experience the Spirit anew where theology and spirituality blend together again.

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The Virgin and the Dynamo: Use and Abuse of Religion in Environmental Debates. By ROBERT ROYAL. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999. Pp. xi + 271. $25.00 (paper). ISBN 0-8028-4468-5.

When assessing this book it is important to bear in mind that Robert Royal is vice president for research and a senior fellow in religion and society at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C., was assisted by George Weigel and Elliott Abrams in shaping its contents, and that a major part of the work derived from the author's delivering the Bradley lectures in 1997 at the American Enterprise Institute. As such it is less an integral whole than a series of essays edited with recurring themes. The author lays no claim to being a theologian. In the introduction he states "I am no theologian, and I do not think it would be wise to spend much time reading modern theology for enlightenment on environmental or other human problems" (9). Thus is the tone set for a wide ranging tour de force about the "use and abuse" of religion in environmental debates today.

The book's title derives from Henry James's assertion that our age is torn between "the Virgin and the Dynamo." For James "the Virgin" is an image of the fullness of religious belief and human meaning as well as beauty and nature itself, representing a spirituality that James could no longer accept. James judged that "the Dynamo" was the efficient and powerful achievement of modern science and technology which had forever destroyed the plausibility of truths associated with the Virgin. The Dynamo had in effect become an alternative religion, unrecognized as such by most people, but dominant in its power and effects all the same. Royal uses this framework to characterize the

polarities evident in the stance of many authors on the role of religion and theology in environmental debates today. He rightly cautions that all too frequently some "environmentalists" assert a romantic opposition of nature to civilization. He asserts that his approach in this book does not fit easily in the usual dichotomy of environmentalism or developmentalism. This assertion rings true throughout the book's introduction (containing a most useful overview of the work) and seven chapters.

More often than not Royal juxtaposes biblical insight with descriptions of evidences of today's ecological crises which concern, among other things, global warming, gas emissions, endangered species, wetland preservation, and the ozone layer. (These are summarized in the introduction and rather fully developed in the first part of chapter 3.) While affirming the command of Genesis that humans are to be stewards of creation Royal asserts that such an admonition "does not give us much concrete guidance" (2) in what to do about environmental crises today. True as far as it goes, this is the kind of assertion (which recurs throughout the book) by which Royal asserts that theology and religion ought to limit what is said and argued about what human stewards ought to do about the environment. Obviously those from a rich theological tradition such as Catholicism need to avoid any kind of "prooftexting" and fundamentalism of the biblical or any other sort. But is it not precisely the contribution of a living, teaching, theological tradition to face contemporary issues on the basis of the scriptural and magisterial tradition it represents? Royal often opts for the simplistic, dismissive comment and tone about theology and religion. As such his work is as fundamentalist and simplistic as some of the authors and positions he quite accurately and (most often) carefully critiques. Very early on he evidences a "sleight of hand" and rhetorical flair that unfortunately conceals rather than reveals issues for legitimate debate and theological insight. For example, he asserts that he will avoid the term "sustainable development" because of the many dubious assumptions people have attached to it of late. This ignores the fact that the phrase can well be used to argue in favor of both *development,* as opposed to a romantic notion of creation, nature, and the environment, and the equitable distribution of the world's resources, insuring that what is "developed" can also be life giving and preserving for the world's inhabitants-in effect be ecologically and humanly *sustainable.* But because of overgeneralizations and possible misunderstandings Royal (boldly) writes "sustainable development generally makes the socialist mistake of thinking that a central bureaucracy can plan for the operation of a whole economic order better than the innovators and entrepreneurs within it" (17). The assumption that sustainability and central bureaucracies go together is at least unnuanced rhetoric if not in fact unproven. Regrettably this kind of rhetorical flair overgeneralizes a host of issues throughout the book. What would have been welcomed is more theological precision and the making of careful distinctions (the very craft of the theologian).

The first chapter ends with a helpful summary of issues about the environment and ecology today and the challenges which these offer to the religiously grounded, thoughtful person, which issues derive from a rather brief but overall very insightful summary of reflections from the Bible, St. Augustine, and Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger. These sources are used to defend a balanced approach to issues about preserving creation for all creatures, especially since some extremists in environmental circles can be legitimately criticized for almost divinizing nature. The author's comments about a certain hierarchy in the cosmos and different claims which creatures can make on the world's resources are quite accurate. But again, even here, a certain caricaturish rhetoric is evident.

Despite the fact that Royal claims no real competence in modern science, in the second chapter he offers an admirable summary of contemporary science as it relates to ecology. Quantum physics and the theories of Stephen Hawking, among other things, are clearly presented and offer helpful insight for the theologian of the demands which science can and should place on any theologian working on ecology today. Again, a chief contribution here is to insure that nature and creation and their preservation are not romantically idealized.

This theme is helpfully reiterated in chapters 3 to 7, whose main focus is to evaluate the writings of some contemporary thinkers (many Catholic theologians among them) with respect to fallacies in their approaches to ecology, more often than not because they have (at least in Royal's estimation) so overemphasized creation and the environment that the role of humanity is eclipsed and the uniqueness of the human person as created in God's image and likeness is diminished. Not surprisingly the names Thomas Berry and Matthew Fox recur (chapter 5 is entitled "The Gospel according to Matthew," meaning the contemporary author not the evangelist) and "ecofeminists" are grouped together as though theirs was a univocal stance or that they proffered a single argument in favor of ecology. But even with this drawback Royal is to be commended for indicating some of their extreme views and theologically thin assertions. To be welcomed are his pleas for depth and nuance in contemporary religious thinking about ecology and the environment. One would have expected such from those claiming to be theologians. Unfortunately in "environmental theology" today such cannot be presumed; theology itself is thus diminished because of such overly generalized statements and theological thinness.

Royal unfortunately gives scant or no attention to sources for legitimate theological development in Catholic thought as it relates to issues of the environment today. It would seem obvious that among the contributions which Catholic theology and the magisterium have made to the credibility of the faith is the fact that traditionally they evaluated contemporary issues in light of the sources of the faith and articulated credible, contemporary insights derived from that age-old faith. Contemporary crises in the world today resulting from the misuse of the environment can (and should) be taken seriously as an

opportunity for Catholicism to articulate its beliefs in a new way. Most surprisingly and glaringly Royal skirts some of the more useful avenues explored by the contemporary magisterium, by some newer voices in theology, and by some ecumenical parties.

Hence, it is unfortunate that the contemporary magisterium on the environment and ecology is given slight attention, if not short shrift. Although Pope John Paul II has frequently noted the problems of ecological degradation in a variety of talks and messages (for example to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in 1991and1993), his World Day of Peace Message (1January1990) "Peace with God the Creator, Peace with All the World," which contains his most complete treatment of these issues, is noted only in passing. The encyclicals *Centesimus Annus* (specifically nos. 37, 53) and *Evangelium Vitae* (specifically nos. 22, 27, 34, 42) stand out as building blocks in a contemporary magisterium on the interrelationship among concern for the earth, the needs of people, and overconsumption of resources in the developed world, inviting people to adjust agrarian policies and economic structures so as to ensure the well-being of all citizens of this earth. More popular applications of these teachings appear in the Holy Father's Lenten messages for 1992, 1993, and 1996, none of which are even noted here. That the editors of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* deliberately took pains to emphasize the integration between belief in the God of creation and belief in the God of redemption is also conspicuously absent as a fruitful avenue for Catholic theology to pursue.

In addition, among the more useful contemporary approaches to ecology from a Catholic perspective is the collection of essays published by the U. S. Catholic Conference *And God Saw That It Was Good: Catholic Theology and the Environment* (noted in chapter 5, n. 1) or Stephen Bede Scharper's *Redeeming the Time: A Political Theology of the Environment* (summarily dismissed in the introduction and n. 3). That the Orthodox have taken up environmental issues as key to their contemporary teaching is clear from official statements such as *Orthodoxy and the Ecological Crisis* from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, co-published by the World Wide Fund for Nature International, and the writings of theologians such as Kallistos Ware (noted in n. 24 of the introduction but nowhere developed as one way of integrating sacramentality and the ecology). The almost decade-old American ecumenical initiative cosponsored by the U.S. bishops' conference, the National Religious Partnership on the Environment, is regrettably not even mentioned.

These writings share a vision of Catholic theology that is integral, specifically one that emphasizes both creation and redemption, sacramentality as a broad concept and the celebration of liturgy and sacraments as the chief way we articulate our beliefs, contemplation and action, and orthodox teaching and deeds in service of God's justice for the world and all who dwell in it. Unfortunately Royal's book on the "use and abuse of religion in environmental debates" is a one-sided debate against religious bodies and theologians legitimately raising their collective and individual voices about the environment because of some extremist views and approaches, legitimately exposed. There

are a number of quite orthodox, centrist, and mainline theological voices that are worth hearing, supporting, and even expanding on. While Royal legitimately notes where the theological minefields are located, he most often remains content to indicate danger rather than the contribution which (especially Catholic) theology can make to developing a theology that is ecologically aware. Gratefully, (admittedly) tentative first steps have been taken on a number of thoroughly orthodox Catholic fronts to face the issue of how Catholic theology responds today to the environmental crisis theologically, spiritually, and pastorally. A greater appreciation of these approaches might have helped to fill out the book's subtitle by at least noting the very significant usefulness of these voices in today's environmental debates. That the religious voice is scarcely heard among environmentalists is to our collective chagrin. Royal is on target when he notes this absence. He misfires when he ignores insightful and reasonable challenges that Catholicism can and should offer to the whole field of environmental studies and environmental science today.

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The Ethics of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Two Courses. By IGNATIUS THEODORE ESCHMANN, O.P. Edited by EDWARD A. SYNAN Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1997. Pp xxx + 242. $49.50. ISBN 0-88844-720-5.

In the era after World War II many students came from Canada and the United States to Toronto to take courses at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, leading to a licentiate in mediaeval studies and/or an M.A. or Ph.D. in Philosophy granted by the University of Toronto. Most of these students took an introductory course on the life and writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas in the fall semester and "The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas" in the spring semester. These courses were taught by the Reverend Ignatius (for Ignatius of Antioch) Theodore Eschmann, O.P., who had come to the institute in 1942 and remained as a professor of philosophy until his death in 1968. While recognized as a leading authority on the works of Aquinas as well as his moral philosophy and theology, Eschmann's writings were not copious. Now some years after his death Msgr. Edward A. Synan has edited for publication the

lectures Eschmann wrote for his ethics courses. Synan himself, a professor and former president of the institute, died in 1997, the year of publication.

This work includes a short, interesting biography of Eschmann. He was born in Diisseldorf, Germany, in 1898; he received a classical education at the Royal Prussian Hohenzollern-Gymnasium in Diisseldorf, graduating in 1916; from there he went into the German army in which he served as a machine-gunner until the end of the war. It is of interest to students of the revival of Thomism that Etienne Gilson, Eschmann's colleague as founder and director of the institute, served in the French army as a machine-gun officer until taken prisoner at the battle of Verdun in 1916. Eschmann's "A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works" is an appendix to Laurence K. Shook's translation of the fifth edition of Gilson'sLe *Thomisme.* This catalogue was also an appendix to James A. Weisheipl, O.P., *Friar Thomas D'Aquino.*

Eschmann entered the Cologne province of the Dominicans after the war and was sent to Rome for his philosophical and theological training in the 1920s and early 1930s at the Angelicum. He began his writing here, mainly reviews, usually in the language of whatever book he was reviewing. In 1936 he returned to what had become the National Socialist Germany of Hitler; an early assignment was to preach and explain from the pulpit the 1937 *Mit Brennender Sorge* letter of Pius XI, written under the direction of Eugenio Pacelli, Vatican secretary of state and the future Pius XU. For this he was imprisoned by the civil authorities of Cologne for a year, during which time he suffered some brutality. After his release he was able to get to Canada where he was part of the project of the Dominicans under Fr. Louis-Marie Regis, O.P., to edit and publish what came to be known as the Ottawa *Summa.* He had a short period at Laval University, where he had an unhappy controversy with Charles De Koninck over the political thought of Jacques Maritain, before he went to Toronto in 1942 to teach at the institute. This biography is told by Synan with many more details and anecdotes which make a fascinating introduction to the lectures edited by Synan. It is acknowledged that Professor Mark Jordan made a first effort at organizing Eschmann's lectures and Synan thanks Jordan for suggestions he used in the later preparation for publication. One of the suggestions was to divide the lectures according to the headings "Eschmannus Bellator" ("Eschmann the Warrior") and "Eschmannus Aedificator" ("Eschmann the Builder") to indicate on the one hand his strong criticism of much post-renaissance Thomistic interpretation of the *Prima secundae,* and on the other hand his positive and extensive analysis of St. Thomas's treatment of prudence.

A feature of Eschmann's classes was that he read the Latin text of Aquinas in such a way that students of limited language ability found that text perfectly intelligible. In this edition the texts of Aquinas are in English with the Latin in the footnotes. Another feature of this study is that Synan has enriched the lectures of Eschmann with the fullest information about those quoted added in the footnotes. As a student and later a colleague at the institute Synan has made this edition a work of loving piety toward his teacher.

Eschmann strongly repudiated the post-Trent division of theology into dogmatics and morals. In affirming the unity of the *Summa Theologiae* he stressed the continuity that flowed from the *Prima* to the *Secunda pars* and consequently he emphasized in explaining the prologue to the *Prima secundae* the notion of the human person being in the image of God as an intelligent and free being. His lectures brought out Aquinas's debt to Aristotle's *Ethics* as well as the special Augustinian and Christian context, but the thrust was always in seeing man acting for an end that would fulfill his being as a person. The happiness of the human person comes through acting in a rational way that would perfect his nature. Thus the seventeenth-century theologians who approached morality in a legalistic way, affirming the rules which kept one from sinning, even if they claimed Aquinas as their mentor came in for special criticism in these lectures by Eschmann. His objective was to explain and analyze the first question of the *Prima secundae,* going into the historical background of each objection, showing the parallel passages in the early *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum,* as well as sources in Aristotle and Augustine, but also he wanted to show his students, who one day would be teachers of other students, how to read St. Thomas Aquinas. Again and again he stressed the need to re-read and study the text as part of a larger whole.

In this context he showed how Aquinas developed in his own treatment of an issue; how the answer given to a difficulty some years later in the *Summa* was an improvement over the treatment given in the *Scriptum;* and how this technique of analysis could be used in determining the chronology of some of the writings whose dates are subject to dispute. A further lesson here was to recognize the limitations of some Thomistic textbook writers who used "scissors and paste" to put together texts, ignoring the context of the original quotation. Those who had the privilege of being Eschmann's students will be delighted with Synan's work for it will recall their student days, and those who did not have the opportunity will benefit Eschmann's exposition and come to understand why he downgraded those moral theologians who had what he regarded as a legalistic approach to morality.

The second course Synan presents from Eschmann's notes is headed "Eschmann us Aedificators" and sub-headed "The Ethics of the Image of God." Here he presents St. Thomas on the virtue of prudence; but it is much more than that since it goes beyond the virtue and embraces the wholeness of Eschmann's understanding of what morality meant for Aquinas. It is a positive exposition of morality as the fulfillment of the person as made in God's image, intellectual and free. Crudely put, Eschmann is repudiating the morality of duty and rules and is affirming a morality of personal perfection where to be moral is the realization of being all that one can be. It owes a great deal to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* but grasped in a Christian way wherein the supernatural perfects the natural. And it is great reading because it is so practical: Eschmann is giving his own distillation in a life devoted to the understanding and meditation on Aquinas.

Eschmann reflects on a number of topics as he builds toward his conclusion of the liberty of the Christian as the perfection of prudence: ethics, natural law, conscience, the teleology of human life, and the parts of prudence. Speaking of *solertia* or ingenuity as part of prudence he says,

> this ingenuity, is also a certain quickness of moral wit which grasps human situations, even complicated human situations, in an inkling and accurately, instructively as it were, by connatural perception, unhampered by the temptations of injustice, of cowardice, of immoderation. There is more to this than meets the eye, at bottom it is a spiritual and vital soundness .... The doctrine of prudence calls for vital sanity ... which is the hallmark of classical and Christian ethics of virtue. (207)

One is tempted to go on quoting Eschmann, but there is no substitute for reading the book, which I strongly recommend especially to those who did not have the opportunity of hearing this teacher himself. Synan has done a great service to contemporary Catholic thought in making available the Eschmann lectures and one has to be grateful for their publication now some thirty years after his death by Toronto's Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

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