The Thomist 64 (2000): 337-74

ST. THOMAS, JOHN FINNIS, AND THE POLITICAL GOOD

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In our observance of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is worthwhile to recall that the role of the philosopher is to provide, as Jacques Maritain said, the true philosophy of those rights.[1] The present paper is focused upon the nature of political society, with the view that this is the best thing there is, at least in the line of practical life, in human affairs.[2] Not to be allowed to live the full life of political society is to be gravely deprived, and philosophical teachings that tend to diminish our awareness of the nobility of political or civic life should prompt us to work hard toward their refutation. Thus, I see myself here as defending the universal right to live in a true city (using this word to translate the classical *"civitas"* or *"polis").* While many articles in the Universal Declaration relate to this, I would cite especially article 28:

> Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.[3]

[1] Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 80: "With regard to Human Rights, what matters most to a philosopher is the question of their rational foundations" (d. pp. 76-80). The present paper was originally composed for a symposium on human rights sponsored by the Canadian Maritain Association and held in Ottawa, June, 1998.

[2] I limit my consideration to the natural order, as distinguished from the domain altogether proper to revealed religion.

[3] "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (1948), reprinted in *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica:Micropaedia* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1984).

In the early 1940s there was a rather acrimonious dispute among Thomists in North America, involving principally Charles De Koninck and Ignatius Eschmann, 0.P. De Koninck had published a book on the primacy of the common good "against the personalists. "[4] Eschmann regarded it as an attack on Jacques Maritain, and also as a conception of the common good at odds with the Christian tradition. His vitriolic attack on De Koninck[5] provoked a response much longer than the latter's original essay.[6]

It has always seemed to me that De Koninck had by far the better of the argument, and that the important point brought forth by the debate was the idea of an intrinsically common good, a type of object of experience that, even if one were the only creature of God, one would have to encounter as a participable or communicable object. Much of the debate turned on the nature of the object of the beatific vision. Eschmann stressed the "personal" and "private" nature of a contemplative experience. De Koninck insisted that, even if there were only one creature capable of having such an experience, that creature would be encountering God as a common good. For De Koninck, the nobility of the human person lay, not his private goods, but in the fact that he is a being meant to participate in the more universal good.

It was very much in the line of De Koninck's thinking that if a member of a political community has certain rights that lie in a zone untouchable by the leaders of the body politic, the reason is especially that that member is not only a member of the civii or properly political community, but also and even primarily a member of a more universal and noble community. Thus, there was great insistence on the nobility of the common good as such.[7]

[4] Charles De Koninck, *De la primaute du bien commun contre !es personnalistes* (Quebec: Editions de l'Universite Laval, 1943).

[5] l. Th. Eschmann, "In Defense of Jacques Maritain," *The Modern Schoolman* 22 (1945): 183-208.

[6] Charles De Koninck, "In Defense of Saint Thomas: A Reply to Father Eschmann's Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good," *Laval theologique et philosophique* 1 (1945) (my offprint runs to 103 pages).

[7] Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 21, a. 4, corpus and ad 3. The universe and especially rational creatures are seen as a community under God, transcending the political community.

As we come to the end of the twentieth century, it seems that we are better and better advised to seek good reasons to oppose the all-encompassing power of political leaders. Newly invented machines threaten the "privacy" of the whole of human life. "Big Brother" has taken on many faces, some in government and some at the head of "multinational" commercial enterprises. It is not surprising, then, that we reflect on the grounds for resisting the omnipresent imposer of policies.

The present paper questions John Finnis's interpretation of Thomas Aquinas on the specifically political common good.[8] It is evident that Thomas limits the zone of human life subject to direction by the human legislator. Not only is God to be obeyed rather than man (where the two conflict), but man's jurisdiction over man is not all-embracing, and leaves room for personal responsibility in such key areas as marriage. Finnis finds Thomas's justification of the limits not altogether clear (239), and proposes (on the basis of select texts) a clearer conception of specifically political society that he identifies as Thomas's. The said conception seeks to present political society as something less than a "basic human good" (a key element in Finnis's conception of the moral life).[9] The basic good of "society" is found directly instantiated in such situations as family life and religious community. Political society is "instrumental" in maintaining such a basic good. The "natural" status of political society is questioned, as is also the idea that the goal of the human lawmaker is the development of virtue in the citizens. In short, the focus is heavily upon the role of politics as maintaining *external* order, leaving free a space for the inner life and private life of the human being.

I contend that the "society" mentioned by Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* 1-11, q. 94, a. 2 is primarily *political* society (and so, in the language of Finnis, that political society is a "basic human

[8] John Finnis, "The State: Its Elements and Purposes," chapter 7 of his *Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), covering pages 219-54. References to this chapter will usually be in my text, and indicate simply the page number.

[9] For a general criticism of the Finnis conception of our knowledge of the moral principles, see my "St. Thomas, Our Natural Lights, and the Moral Order," *Angelicum* 67 (1990): 285-308.

good"), that we have a natural inclination to life in *political* society, and that the goal of the legislator is the development of *virtue* in the citizen. Thomas gives good reasons for limiting the role of the legislator, and indeed limits the common good of political society (to merely human virtue). Contra Finnis, I would see those limits as due to the wider common good of the whole of reality, not the primacy of the private or personal.

I. THE TEXT ON OBEDIENCE

First, let us note the sort of text of Thomas that provides the basis for discussion. *STh* 11-11, q. 104 deals with the virtue of obedience. Article 5 asks whether subjects are morally obliged to obey their superiors in all matters. The answer is no. Two lines of escape are indicated. If there is a hierarchy of command, one should not obey the inferior commander if his command is at odds with that of the superior commander (thus, one should obey God rather than the emperor commanding something at odds with God's commandments). And if the commander gives a command that does not fall within the domain of his superiority, one need not obey: thus, concludes Thomas, one is not obliged to obey human beings, only God, as regards the inner movement of the will.

One human being should obey another in things that are done exteriorly (as compared to the will) by bodily action. And yet here again there are limits, for all men are equal as regards the very nature of their bodies (i.e., in the domain of bodily nutrition and the production of offspring). Thus, a slave is not required to obey his master, a son is not required to obey his father, as regards such matters as the contracting of marriage, remaining a virgin, etc.

This reference to equality as a reason for escaping the supervision of another person relates directly to the very first presentation Thomas makes of obedience. He asks, is one man obliged to obey another? It is to be noted that in giving an affirmative answer, Thomas uses a comparison between the

natural world and the world of human action. In the natural world superiors move inferiors to their actions by means of superior powers bestowed by God. He continues, "So also it is necessary in human things that superiors move inferiors by their [the superiors'] will, from the power of the divinely ordered authority" *(STh* 11-11, q. 104, a. 1 [1964b5-8]). [10] Thus, where there is no such superiority, there is obviously no requirement of obedience. [11]

Otherwise Thomas insists that obedience is due a human superior in matters of human acts and human affairs, but only in the very line of the superiority: the soldier should obey the military superior in those matters which pertain to the conduct of warfare. More vaguely, Thomas speaks of the slave or servant obeying the master in "servile works," the son obeying the father in those matters pertaining to "the discipline of life and the domestic interest." He ends by saying, "and so on"; in other words, we should be able to work out what is the line of suitable limited authority in particular cases.

Thomas notes that in all matters, external and internal, one is unqualifiedly subject to God. In only some matters is one subject to a human being, and thus in these matters the superior is an intermediary between oneself and God. In all other matters, one is immediately subject to God, and is instructed by Him by the natural or the written (divine) law. [12]

[10] Parenthetical page and line numbers refer to the Ottawa edition (1941).

[11] In *STh* I, q. 96, a. 4, where Thomas discusses the situation of man in the state of innocence, the reasons why there was government are two: (1) man, being a social animal, needs to have one person from among the many to consider the interests of the common good; and (2) since, as pointed out in article 3, some people would be *superior* to others as to both science and justice, it would be unsuitable that such talent not be used to the benefit of all.

[12] A text that seems important to me, as suggesting the need to leave room for a zone of liberty, is *STh* 1-11, q. 91, a. 4 (1212bl3-24), that if one tried to have a human law which prohibited and punished all that was bad, much good would be done away with, and one would impede *utilitas boni communis,* let us say "the convenience of the common good," which is necessary for human society *(conversationem humanam).*

II. THE FINNIS POSITION

Finnis begins his discussion by disagreeing with the claim, made by Germain Grisez,[13] that Thomas held that the general promotion of virtue and suppression of vice should be the main component of the common good of political society. Finnis wishes to make dear the limits of the nature and goal of political society as Thomas conceived it.

The line of argument proposed supposes a certain conception of ethics and of Thomas's ethics that depends heavily on a reading of *STh* I-H, q. 94, a. 2, as to the multiplicity of precepts of natural law. In that text, Thomas presents the first principle of practical reason, namely, "that the good is to be done and pursued, and the bad is to be avoided," and goes on to present an order of derivative precepts, in accordance with the order of natural indinations found in the human being. These inclinations are in a threefold order. The first level is indination as common to all substances. Every substance whatsoever is inclined to maintain its own being in accordance with its own nature; thus, those things by which the life of man is preserved and its contrary repelled pertain to natural law. The second level is inclination towards more special items, in keeping with the nature shared with other animals: sexual intercourse and the raising of children. Third, there is an inclination proper to the rational nature: man has an inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society. Thus, there are natural laws such as "avoid ignorance" and "do not offend those with whom you ought to live."

[13] Germain Grisez, "Patriotism, Politics, and Citizenship," chap. 11 of *The Way of the Lord Jesus: Living a Christian Life* (Quincy, Ill: Franciscan Press, 1993), 835-69, at 850 n. 16. Grisez expresses his disaccord with St. Thomas on this point. He sees Aristotle and Thomas as being out of step with "recent Church teaching regarding the instrumental character of political society's common good, the principle of subsidiarity … and religious liberty." I say that Finnis begins with this because he does so in "Public Good: The Specifically Political Common Good in Aquinas," another redaction of the chapter we are discussing, presented in Robert P. George, ed., *Natural Law and Moral Inquiry* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 174-209, at 174-75. The book is a *Festschrift* for Grisez, published at about the same time as *Finnis'sAquinas;* the Finnis contribution is the same as the chapter we are commenting upon, save for the opening on Grisez.

In Finnis's use of this text, the doctrine of natural inclinations becomes a doctrine of "basic human goods" which control all ethical decision.

> In human affairs which are matters of deliberation and choice, what is natural is settled by asking what is intelligent and reasonable. That in turn is settled by looking to the first principles of practical reason, to the basic human goods. So the *civitas* could be called "natural" if participation in it (a) instantiates in itself a basic human good, or (b) is a rationally required component in, or indispensable means to instantiating, one or more basic human goods. Aquinas's opinion, rather clearly, is that it is the latter. At the relevant point in his lists of basic human goods he mentions nothing more specific than living in fellowship *(in societate* vivere)-something that is done also with parents and children, spouse, friends, and other people in various more or less temporary and specialized groups (of pilgrims, of students, of sailors, of merchants, and so forth). (246-47)

It appears that the criterion for whether something is directly a basic human good is whether it is the object of a natural inclination. Thus, in beginning his concluding judgment of Thomas's doctrine of political society, just prior to the above remarks, Finnis says:

> Contrary to what is often supposed, Aquinas's many statements that we are "naturally political animals" have nothing particularly to do with *political* community. So they cannot be pressed into service as implying that the state or its common good is the object of a natural inclination, is an intrinsic and basic good. Strikingly, they do no more than assert our *social* not solitary nature. (245-46)

He goes on to construct a sort of *aporia* by pointing out the following:

> On the other hand, Aquinas accepts Aristotle's opinion that we are "naturally civil animals" because we are *naturally* parts of a *civitas,* which stands to other natural communities as an end. (246)

Finnis's task then becomes one of explaining this "naturalness." In the passage quoted first above we see his proposal of two possible senses of "natural" in this case, and the

option for the second. Political society is not a basic human good; it is not the object of a natural inclination. It is an "indispensable means," we shall see, for instantiating one or more basic human goods.

He says:

> The thought that we cannot live reasonably and well apart from a *civitas* is consistent with the proposition that the common good specific to the *civitas* as such-the public good-is not basic but, rather, instrumental to securing human goods which are basic (including other forms of community or association, especially domestic and religious associations) and none of which is in itself specifically political, i.e., concerned with the state. If that proposition requires qualification, the qualification concerns the restoration of justice by the irreparable modes of punishment reserved to state government. (247)

This is really the heart of Finnis's position. Is political society a basic good or not? This seems to be the issue. The "qualification" amounts to proposing, after having answered in the negative, a bit of an affirmative. Let us see how this is spelled out.

Finnis points to two areas in which the non-political human groups are insufficient for the good life:

> (1) to secure themselves *well* against violence (including invasion), theft, and fraud, and (2) to maintain a fair and stable system of distributing, exploiting, and exchanging the natural resources which, Aquinas thinks, are in reason and fairness-"naturally" (not merely "initially")-things common to all. (Ibid.)

Finnis calls this "the *public good* of justice and peace" (ibid.). What he calls the "basic goods" are not as well maintained by the family and other such groups as they are by law and political institutions. This is what is meant by saying that the *civitas* is merely "instrumental" and not itself a "basic good." What is to be understood here is the rather "thin" character the "public good" has in this picture. Its limitation to externals is stressed.

However, there is the "qualification." Finnis notes that while Thomas holds that there would be need for government and direction of free people, even if there were no badly disposed people, still Thomas does not say that in that state of "original

innocence" before original sin there was a need for *law* and specifically political government. Thus, Finnis views law as inextricably bound up with the need to punish wrongdoers, and indeed to punish them in ways that do irreparable harm to the punished. He notes that, for Thomas, the family has not the right to impose such punishments. It is precisely the right and duty of the political society or its governors to coerce in that way. Thus, in his approach to his "qualification" of the idea that political society is merely instrumental relative to basic goods that pertain to the individual, the family, or other non-political associations, Finnis asks why there can be no "law, in the focal sense" within such non-political groups. Why is Thomas so "insistent on distinguishing public from private" (249)?

Finnis sees the answer in the need for judgment according to publicly established law in order to impose the irreparable measures that may be needed to restore justice and peace. He sees the need for "the detachment which becomes possible in principle when the *persona publica* is differentiated from the *persona privata"* (250).

It is because of this quality of law that Finnis seemingly sees a need to "qualify" his contention that properly political society is not a basic human good. Having said that "for Aquinas the whole construction of a strictly 'public' realm is *by* law and *for* law" (251) and having stressed that this does not require the subjects of the law to be truly virtuous, but merely that they "uphold justice and peace" (ibid.) in their externals, Finnis maintains a sort of hesitation to the end, as to the political society being a "basic good." Thus we read:

> The human common good-now understanding that phrase without restriction to the state's or political community's good-is promoted, and love of neighbor is intelligently put into practice, when the common good that specifies the *jurisdiction* of state government and law is acknowledged to be, neither all-inclusive nor (with one qualification) basic, but limited and (save *perhaps* in respect of restorative justice) instrumental. (252)

The emphasis on "perhaps" is mine. Finnis is not quite ready, it would seem, to say that there is "basic good" here. That is

perhaps why he calls the introduction of the idea that a basic good is involved only a "qualification."

Thus far I have been using Finnis's conclusion. My challenge to his argument consists of three chief points. The first has to do with whether the lawmaker has the *virtue* of citizens as his goal or end, the good in view. Finnis stresses as much as possible the limitation to "externals" of behavior as the proper domain of politics. Indeed, his position consists in the main in isolating as a sort of "thing in itself" this very behavioral ordering of people.

The second point concerns the "completeness" of the political society.

The third point is the presentation of goods that are not the proper business of political society as "private" goods of the person or family. I am concerned that it will not be seen that these goods are really common goods of even more noble social life. In other words, Finnis's denial that the political is a basic human good tends to undermine the social as such.

HI. VIRTUE AS THE END OF GOVERNMENT

A) The Goal of the Legislator

First, then, the of the governor. We could very weH entitle this part "Thomas's philosopher-king." It is the constant teaching of Thomas that the end or goal or good of political society is virtue, that is, human goodness, and that for this to obtain it is necessary that the governors themselves be truly virtuous. [14]

part:4 of Finnis's chapter, entitled "The Virtue Required for Peace and Just Order," there is a toning-down of Thomas's idea that the end of the law made by civil society is the life of virtue. *STh* I-II, q. 95, a. 1, to which Finnis refers us (232 n. 56) as an item he has to explain, views the entire existence of human law in the light of the desirability of becoming virtuous. This is not presented merely as something that will accomplish some other goal of civil society; it rather is something all agencies have to

[14] Cf., e.g., *STh* I-H, q. 92, a. 1, ad 3.

further, but which they prove inadequate to bring about in certain cases. Here is Finnis's explanation:

> The answer seems to be this. Human law must inculcate virtues because it will only work well as a guarantor of justice and peace if its subjects internalize its norms and requirements and-more important-adopt its purpose of promoting and preserving justice. (232)

This is quite a different approach than the line of argument in *STh* I-II, q. 95, a. 1 would lead one to expect. On the Finnis reading, the prompting towards virtue seems to have become something that happens because of something else more limited ("justice and peace" conceived in terms of mere external behavior).

In *STh* I-II, q. 96, a. 2, ad 2, to which Finnis refers us (n. 59) so that we may see virtue as merely *"a* legitimate hope and important aim *[finis]* of government and law" (232, emphasis added), Thomas deals with an objection that the acts of the virtues cannot be commanded by law, because the acts of the virtues presuppose the existence of the virtues (i.e., are *ex virtute),* whereas virtue is the goal, end, *finis,* of law. Thomas replies that we must distinguish between the two ways of performing the act: as coming from the virtue, and as merely the material act which the virtue requires. All the law can oblige is the latter, but the former is the *end* of the law. This hardly gives a picture of law having virtuous acts as merely *"an* important aim."

The next reference in note 59 (i.e., *STh* I-II, q. 100, a. 9, ad 2) is even more telling. The article asks whether the "mode of virtue" falls under the precept of the law. By the "mode of virtue" Thomas means that the act would be performed as by someone really having and using the virtue (i.e., knowingly, willingly, and in a firm or decided way).[15] The article teaches that what is required by a law is that concerning which the lawmaker can adequately judge (and so inflict punishment for transgression). Thus, human law requires that an act be done knowingly, and so it takes ignorance into consideration when meting out

[15] Thomas makes this explicit at 1270a34-b10.

punishment. However, it does not require the inner act of the will to be in conformity with virtue. Human law does not punish the one who merely wishes to kill but refrains from doing so. God's judgment, however, does bear upon this and require good will. Neither divine nor human law requires that the act be done as by one having the virtue, as regards the firmness or steadiness which is the proper fruit of the established habit.

The objector argues as follows:

> That most of all falls under the precept which belongs to the intention of the legislator. But the intention of the legislator primarily bears upon this, viz. that it make men virtuous, as is said in *Ethics* 2 [1103b3]. But it pertains to the virtuous person to act virtuously. Therefore, the mode of virtue falls under the precept. [16]

And Thomas replies:

> the intention of the legislator bears upon two items. One of them is that unto which he intends to lead through the precepts of the law, and this is the virtue. The other is that upon which he intends the precept to bear, and this is that which leads or disposes towards the virtue, viz. the act of the virtue. For the end of the precept is not identical with that about which the precept is given, just as neither in other matters is there identity between the end and that which is for the sake of the end *[ad finem].* [17]

Thomas is very dear. Virtue is not merely *"an* important aim" of the law. It is the end of the law. The limited matter upon which the law is obliged to bear is rather an *ad finem* situation relative to virtue.

The measures in their limited character that can be exacted by just law should not be viewed merely as things in themselves. They are rather to be seen as imbued with the goal of the legislator, that is, as properly *ad finem* behavior. Political life is life on the way to virtue.

STh 1-11, q. 96, a. 2, on the limited prohibitions coming from human law, is important for our purposes. The question asked is whether it pertains to human law to restrain *(cohibere)* all vices.

[16] *ITh* I-II, q. 100, a. 9, obj. 2.

[17] Ibid., ad 2.

The second objection uses the premise that the intention of the legislator is to make citizens virtuous, and argues that this will only happen if *all* vices are eliminated. The *sed contra* cites Augustine, who sees human law as permitting some things for which divine providence will eventually inflict punishment.

Thomas, in his main reply, says:

> the law is established as a rule and measure of human acts. But a measure ought to be homogeneous with the thing measured, as is said in *Metaph.* 10 [1053a24]; for diverse things have diverse measures. Hence, it is necessary, also, that laws be imposed on men in accordance with their own condition, because, as Isidore says, the law ought to be "possible and in accordance with nature, and in accordance with the custom of the country *[patriae]."*
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> Now, the power or capacity for operating proceeds from interior habit or disposition: for the same thing is not possible for someone who does not have the habit of virtue and for the virtuous [person]; just as also the same thing is not possible for the boy and for the mature man. And for that reason the same law is not laid down for children as for adults: many things are permitted for children which in adults are punished by law, or severely criticized. And similarly, many things are permitted to men not perfected by virtue which would not be tolerable in virtuous men.
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> Now, human law is laid down for the multitude of men, in which the greater part consists of men not perfected by virtue. And so, not all vices are prohibited by human law, but only the more grave, from which it is possible for the greater part of the multitude to abstain; and especially those [vices] which are harmful to others, without prohibition of which human society could not be preserved: as, for example, homicides and thefts and such things are prohibited by human law.

We have here a limiting of the action of the lawmaker, who makes laws tailored to the condition of those who are to be guided. Such a limitation pertains, not to the limited character of the lawmaker, whose goal is indeed virtue, but to the limited character of the subjects.

In the replies to objections, the second stresses the need for moderation on the part of lawmakers. Thomas does not deny the premise that making citizens virtuous is the intention. But he says:

> human law intends to lead men to virtue *[lex humana intendit homines inducere ad virtutem*], not suddenly but rather gradually. And so it does not immediately impose upon the multitude of the imperfect those things which already are

[found] in the virtuous, i.e. that they abstain from aU evils. Otherwise, the imperfect, not being able to bear such precepts, would break out into even greater evils.

Thus, Thomas very firmly makes the goal of the legislator the virtuous ddzen. The reason for going slowly is precisely the good order towards such a goal, working on the sort of subjects available. If Finnis were right in stressing a sort of limited "sodal engineering" picture of lawmaking, this would be the place for Thomas to say so. Instead, he affirms the goal to be the development of the virtuous citizen.

In order to bring out this "development of virtue" dimension of political society as conceived by St. Thomas, thus present its unquestionable character as a fundamental human good, one must take into account what he says about two virtues: *legal justice,* primarily to be found in the governor, and the *prudence* proper to the governoL Indeed, this relates to the view that, while the good citizen and the good man are not necessarily identical, the good ruler and the good man are necessarily identical: to be a governor requires the possession of virtue.

B) LegalJustice

In Finnis's view, the political society and its common good are "natural/' in the sense that they are instrumental relative to certain basic human goods. Political society, conceived as the establishment of legal order, the order brought about by law, is necessary because of sin, which requires coercion. Thus, political society is essentially a remedy for evil, rather than something having its own proper goodness. (I leave aside for the moment Finnis's "one qualification.") Against this, I would argue that a virtue corresponds to a natural inclination, and that legal justice is a virtue, and a very primary or basic virtue.

Thus, at *STh* II-II, q. 108, a. 2, asking whether *vindicatio* (say: "the disposition one has to punish the wrongdoer") is a distinctive or "special" virtue, Thomas replies in the affirmative:

as the Philosopher says in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2 [1103a23], the aptitude towards virtue is present in us by nature, though the completeness of the virtue is through habituation or through some other cause. Hence it is clear that virtues perfect us for following through, in due measure, on our natural inclinations, which pertain to what is naturally just *[ad prosequendum debito modo inclinationes naturales, quae pertinent ad ius naturale].* And therefore some special virtue is ordered towards each determinate natural inclination. [18]

Now, there is a virtue of legal justice. I have noticed (in discussions with him) that this was not something Finnis seemed to wish to admit, or at any rate not in the way that I wished to present it.[19] We should underline the way Thomas presents it. In *STh* 11-11, q. 58, a. 3, he teaches that justice is virtue. Justice rectifies human action, and so renders human acts good. He quotes with approval Cicero saying that men are called good especially because of justice. Next (a. 4), he locates this virtuousness in the will, as distinguished not only from the intellect but also from the sense appetites. Article 5 asks whether justice is "all-inclusive virtue" *(virtus genera/is).* The line of thinking Thomas pursues here is as follows. Justice has to do with our treatment of another:

Now this can be in [either of] two ways. In one way, towards the other considered in his singularity. In the other way, towards the other communally *[ad alium in communi],* inasmuch as someone who serves some community serves all the humans who are contained within that community. Thus, justice, according to its very own notion, can relate to both [ways of taking the other]. Now, it is evident that all those who are contained within a community stand related *[comparantur]* to the community as parts to a whole. And the part, as to its very substance [id *quod est],* belongs to the whole *[totius est];* hence, also, any good of the part is orderable to the good of the whole. Therefore, in accordance with this, the good of *any* virtue, whether ordering some human being towards himself or ordering him to other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice is ordered *[ad bonum commune, ad quod ordinatur iustitia].* And in accordance with this, the acts of all the virtues can pertain to justice, according as it orders a man to the com1J1on good. And to this extent, justice is called all-inclusive virtue. And because it pertains to the *law* to order to the common good, as was said earlier, thus it is that such justice, all-inclusive in the explained way, is called *legal* justice, because, i.e.,

[18] Ottawa ed., 1984b5-15.

[19] He wanted it to pertain to any community, not just political.

through it a man is in accord with the law ordering the acts of all the virtues to the common good.[20]

HI understand him, Finnis wants to insist on *"some* community/" and so see nothing necessarily political here. I want to insist on *"legal,"* and underline that it is through the item (the virtue) Thomas has presented that one is in accord with the ordering towards the common good. Of course, if law is *per accidens* to the whole picture of goodness, then Finnis is right.

Finnis holds that the doctrine of legal justice contrasts any community with the individual as an individual. One could have this sort of general justice inasmuch as one is a member of a commercial enterprise, such as IBM. This seems to me quite wrong. Doubtless, there are dispositions one must have if one is to work well in a common enterprise. However, here we are speaking of human virtue, and just as we contrast perfect and imperfect prudence, inasmuch as perfect prudence concerns the whole of human life, so also with such a virtue as justice. The imperfect justice needed for business enterprises even a bad man can have.[21]

A more significant point is the interpretation of article 6: whether aH-indusive justice is identical as to its very essence with every virtue. The idea here is that legal justice is going to be presented as one virtue among many, essentially or substantially distinct from the others.

As we read Thomas in *STh* H-U, q. 58, a. 6, we see that the generality we are here considering is not the generality of predication.Hit were, all the virtues would be justice essentially. It is rather the generality as pertaining to a universal cause relative to its effects. Thus, even though all the virtues fall under general justice, they need not be identified with it, because such effects are not identifiable with the universal cause.

[20] Ottawa ed., 1722a36-b13.

[21] Cf. *STh* H-II, q. 47, a. 13 (1675a7-32): true but imperfect prudence, the sort of thing which pertains to business dealings (IBM), is found in the good and the bad. True and perfect prudence alone rates the title "prudence," speaking unqualifiedly.

General or all-encompassing justice, legal justice, *orders* the acts of a:ll the virtues to its own proper end (the common good): this is to "move" by commanding *(per imperium).* Thomas accordingly compares the role of legal justice to that of Christian charity:

> For just as charity can be called an all-encompassing virtue inasmuch as it orders the acts of all the virtues towards the divine good, so also legal justice [can be called an all-encompassing virtue] inasmuch as it orders the acts of all the virtues to the common good.[22] Therefore, just as charity, which relates to the divine good as to its proper object, is a certain particular virtue, as to its own essence, so also legal justice is a particular *[specialis]* virtue, as to its own essence, inasmuch as it relates to the common good as to its proper object. And thus it is in the governmental leader *[in* principe)[23]principally and, as it were, architectonically, but in the subjects *[in subditis]* secondarily and, so to say, administratively.[24]

The very comparison with charity argues for the view that the common good being envisaged as regards legal justice is the common good of a complete community. It is certainly a natural inclination to life in a complete community that we are seeing perfected by the virtue of legal justice.

C) Governmental Prudence

Let us now look at another virtue that seems to be proper to the ruler of the political community, namely, the primary sort of prudence. It too would be the development of a definite natural inclination, or so one would think.

If we look at *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 10, which asks whether prudence extends to the ruling of a multitude *(ad regimen multitudinis),* we are told, of course, that it does. But of what "multitude" is Thomas speaking, and about what "common good"? Consider the first objection and reply. The objector says:

[22] Here, Finnis (I assume) would like to translate by an expression such as *a* common good as distinct from *the* common good. I doubt that he is right.

[23] Here again, I suppose that Finnis would translate in a way which would make *princeps* apply even to the president of IBM.

[24] 0ttawaed., 1723b17-31.

"the Philosopher says in *Ethics 5* [1129b17] that the virtue related to the common good is justice. But prudence differs from justice. prudence is not related to the common good." Thomas replies:

h is to be said that the Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. But just as every moral virtue related to the common good is called "legal justice," so also prudence related to the common good is called "political prudence"; for the political [prudence] stands related to legal justice, the way prudence unqualifiedly so called stands to moral virtue.

We are using the word "political" here just as we used the word "legal" when speaking of justice. Finnis has told us that we are not to take "legal" seriously in expression "legal justice": general justice has to do with the good of just any group (e.g., IBM). To say the same about "political" this passage, so that Thomas does not mean a virtue having to do specifically with the ruling of the properly "political" multitude, would be to take words out of Thomas's mouth.

Article 11 of the same question asks whether the prudence with respect to one's own good is identical with the prudence with respect to the common good. Interestingly, the *sed contra* argument distinguishes carefuHy between the "common good" of the household or family and that of the state or city. It argues for diverse virtues of prudence for the individual, the householder, and the citizen. In the body of the artide, we have a most important line of argument as regards our present interest, since the properly political common good seems to have the status of a quite distinct and important end or good.

the species of habits *[habituum]* are diversified in accordance with the diversity of object, which is caught sight of as regards its [the object's] formal character. Now, the formal character-of aH those [items] which are "towards an end" *[ad finem]* is caught sight of on the side of the end *[ex pane finis]*.... And so it is necessary that from the relation to diverse ends the species of habit are diversified. But the good proper to one, and the good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom *[bonum civitatis et regni]* are diverse ends. Hence it is necessary that prudences differ as to species in accordance with the differences of these ends; in such fashion that one [prudence] is prudence

simply so called, which is ordered to one's own good; another is domestic *[oeconomica],* which is ordered to the common good of the household or the family; and the third is political, which is ordered to the common good of the city or kingdom.[25]

Finnis is right in thinking that sometimes the expression "common good" refers to something less than the common good of the city. However, Thomas definitely identifies a species of virtue, a species of the virtue of prudence, that has to do properly with the common good of the city, and he calls this "political." And it is this that he related, seemingly, to "legal" justice, in making his earlier comparisons. If specific virtues relate to their proper natural inclinations, the human being must have, in Thomas's eyes, a natural inclination to political society.

We should note as well the reply to the third objection, which not only considers the hierarchy of goals or ends, but gives us a rule of primacy. Indeed, where we, in arguing with Finnis, are trying to make room for the distinctively political virtue, lest we be forced to say that the really primary sort of virtue is that which (for example) rules in family life, the problem for Thomas and his objector is more one of making room for the lower, more particular, which is tending to get eaten up by the more all-inclusive. Thus, Thomas says:

even diverse ends one of which is ordered to another diversify the species of habit; for example, horsemanship and the art of war and politics differ specifically, even though the end of one is ordered to the end of the other. And similarly, though the good of one [person] is ordered towards the good of the multitude, nevertheless this does not prevent such diversity from bringing it about that a habit differ specifically. But from this [situation] it does follow that the habit which is ordered to the ultimate end is more primary *[principalior],* and commands the other habits.[26]

This whole line of thinking clearly means that the political prudence, properly having to do with the common good of the city or kingdom, has primacy over the other types of prudence, such as that which pertains to family life.

[25] *STh* 11-11, q. 47, a. 12 (Ottawa ed., 1673a41-b8}.

[26] *STh* 11-11, q. 47, a. 11, ad 3.

Lastly, in this reading of *STh* 11-11, q. 47, let us look as a. 12, asking whether prudence is only in governors or also in the governed. The answer here (that it is in both) ties the discussion very much to reason, and our ability rationally and freely to follow the commands of the governor or ruler.

Even more significant than question 47 is *STh* 11-11, q. 50, aa. 1 and 2. In providing a question on the subjective parts of prudence, that is, the species which fall under the genus, Thomas begins by asking whether there is a prudence properly called *regnativa.* This should translated as something like "kingly," since he explicitly relates it to the king.[27] It might be called monarchical, but the monarch (elected on considerations of virtue) would be much more like our prime minister or president than like what we mean in English by a king. However, the surprising thing is that the second article asks whether there is a prudence called political, and by this is meant something distinct from the kingly prudence.

The first article seems to make an iron-dad case against Finnis. This is especially so if one accepts the view that Thomas presents in the article on *vindicatio,* namely, that virtues perfect natural inclinations. I take Finnis to be saying that such virtues as legal justice or general justice pertain to just any multitude; and it seems to me he should be saying the same thing about the prudence which relates to a multitude. The interesting thing about the *corpus* of *STh* 11-11, q. 50, a. 1 is that it is so explicit as to what multitude it is considering.

It is to be said that, as is clear from things already said [q. 47, a. 8], to prudence it pertains to rule and command *[regereet praecipere]*. And therefore, where one finds a special type *[ratio]* of rule and command in human acts, there also one finds a special type of prudence. But it is evident that in him who has not only himself to rule but also the perfect community which is the

[27] "King" suggests to us an hereditary office, but this is not included in Thomas's meaning. Thus, in his presentation of the best form of human government, at *STh* I-II, q. 105, a. 1, he treats of *Teg1'1Um* as pertaining to having one top ruler in a society, but quite explicitly ruling *"secundum virtutem,"* an elected ruler, elected from the people and by the people. The best form also includes a group of governors, under the top ruler, also elected from and by all the citizens, and ruling in accordance with virtue.

city or the kingdom *[communitatem perfectam civitatis vel regni],* one find a special and [indeed] the perfect type of rule *[perfecta ratio regiminis];* for, just to that extent a rule is more perfect, viz. to the extent that it is more universal, extending itself to a greater number and attaining a more ultimate end. And so, to the king *[regi],* to whom it pertains to rule a city or kingdom, prudence is due [or befitting: *competit]* as having a special and [indeed] its most perfect type *[perfectissimam sui rationem].* And for that reason the kingly is proposed as a species of prudence.

Obviously, here we are at that highest in the genus, which is the cause of all the others in the genus.[28] If there is a natural inclination to be reasonable in matters social, it is here that it finds its proper perfection.

It seems to me that these texts present well enough the sort of primacy we have always associated with the political common good and political society. The move of Finnis, to make it more instrumental as regards such things as family common good, is to be rejected, if the goal is to interpret Thomas Aquinas.

IV. COMPLETE SOCIE1Y

The part of Finnis's argument we have considered so far concerns the possibility of understanding Thomas's doctrine as a coherent one. Section 6 (pp. 239-45) of his chapter, entitled "The State's Elements, Private and Public," shifts the argument to "the challenge of principle" (239): "Are there good grounds for judging that the state's specific common good is this limited public good of justice and peace?"

Finnis does not want the reason for limitation to be merely what I would call "prudence" -that is, making laws in this matter would cause more trouble than it would eliminate. He wants the fact that law does not seek to bear upon complete virtue to flow from a principle, a goal presumably: "But why judge the effort wrong in principle, an abuse of public power, *ultra vires* because directed to an end which state government and law do not truly have?" (ibid.).

[28] I refer to an oft-used doctrine of Thomas's; cf., e.g., *II Metaphys.,* lect. 2 (Cathala ed., #292-294); *SI'h* I, q. 77, a. 6 (469a34).

I will here consider only what Finnis calls "a second argument" (242):

> [it] asks the questioner to go behind the proposition that states are complete communities, and to consider the grounds for it, on the tacit assumption that the institutions which give this community its completeness-law and government-need justification in the face of the natural equality and freedom of persons, and need to show just why and when their authority overrides the responsibility of parents and the self-possession of free persons above the age of puberty.

Finnis begins by stressing the independence and necessity and even adequacy of individuals and families. He quotes a text to the effect that the human being is more naturally conjugal than political (243 n. 118, quoting *Eth.*, lect. 12 [1720]). In fact, this passage presents the human being at its most "animaL" It is hardly related to the human being as a person exercising liberty, at least as the primary angle. Even paragraph 1721, where Thomas goes on to argue that man is naturaHy conjugal in a special, human way, the presentation is that the husband is suited for outside work, while the wife is suited for inside work. What keeps them together is the common good which is children. What constitutes justice in their treatment of each other is a subject that pertains more to domestic morality or even to political morality, and so is set aside for later (1725). Indeed, Finnis limits his discussion to 1721-24, thus ignoring the move back to the political in 1725.

Finnis exaggerates the completeness of the *totum bene vivere* of the household. He daims that Thomas comes to the conception of the "completeness" of the city community only by attending to the deficiencies of such a community's elements or "parts" (244-45). Of course, it is true that we only appreciate the whole body when we see what the eye can and cannot do, what the ear can and cannot do, etc.

Finnis wants to present the priority of the parts in the following way:

> These parts [fundamentally, individuals and families] are prior to the complete community not historically but in a more important way: in their immediate

and irreplaceable instantiation of basic human goods. The need which individuals have for the political community is not that it instantiates an otherwise unavailable basic good. By contrast, the lives of individuals and families directly instantiate basic goods, and can even provide means and context for instantiating all the other basic goods: education, friends, marriage, virtue. (245)

This is really the heart of his contention.

The main objection to it is in terms of the interpretation of the *STh* 1-11, q. 94, a. 2 inclination to life in "society." I conceive of it as a rational communion beyond what we get in the family: a perfect society is a city. Even if they "instantiate basic human goods," individuals and families can still have a *material* role, the role of parts, relative to the complete society. What one needs is a consideration of hierarchy in basic goods. Which ends are more ultimate than others? Which goods are more common than others, in the same order? For St. Thomas, the political governor gives direction to the lives of his subjects, direction pertaining to the promotion of virtue. His work gives that unity of order towards goodness of human life which families as such cannot provide. This is quite clear in Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's *Politics*.[29]

Earlier Finnis says of Thomas:

he has stipulated that a state is a complete community, and given *complete community* a purely formal description: a community so organized that its government and law give *all* the direction that properly can be given by human government and coercive *law* to promote and protect the common good, that is, the good of the community and thus of all its members and other proper elements. (221-22)

Is Thomas's description of the completeness of the community as purely formal as Finnis contends? The stipulation that the state is a complete community we do find in the texts to which Finnis refers. However, just how "purely formal" is the description? That the state gives all the direction that can be given is formal

[29] The critical edition is *Sententia libri Politicorum,* in *Opera omnia,* t. 48 (Rome: Ad sanctae Sabinae, 1971). The commonly accepted time of composition is Thomas's second Parisian professorship (1269-72), thus the very mature Thomas.

enough. That this direction is given for the common good, and that that means the good of the community, is also formal enough. But there is material relevant to the description that Finnis does not mention. When Thomas presents the city in I *Pol.*, c. 1/b, commenting on Aristotle at 1252b27-31, he tells us *qualis* concerning the city: what sort of thing is it? The condition of the city is presented as regards three features. It is "out of several" neighborhoods or quarters *(ex pluribus uicis).* It is a perfect community, having whatever is necessary for life. It is *orderedto virtue:*

Thirdly, he [Aristotle] shows to what the city is ordered. For it is originally made *[primitus facta]* for the sake of living, i.e. so that men find sufficient of those things by virtue of which they can live; but from its actually being *[ex eius esse]* it comes about that men not only live, but that they live *well,* inasmuch as through the laws of the city the life of men is ordered to *virtue.* (Leonine lines 26-32; emphasis added)

This is proper to the nature of the city, as Thomas sees it. Thus, in the same chapter, a little later, Thomas clearly conceives of the establishing of the city by linking city and virtue:

Then, when he [Aristotle] says: "Therefore, nature indeed ... " [1253a29], he deals with the establishing *[institutione]* of the city, concluding from the preceding that within all human beings there is present a natural impetus towards the community of the city, just as also towards virtues; and nevertheless, just as virtues are acquired through human exercise, as is said in *Ethics* 2, so cities are established by human endeavor. But he who first established a city was the cause for humans of the greatest of goods *[maximorum bonorum*].

Man is the best of the animals, if the virtue to which he has a natural inclination is perfected in him; but if he is without law and justice, man is the worst of all the animals. Aquinas proves the point thus:

injustice to that extent is crueler the more arms it has, that is, aids for wrongdoing; now, to man according to his own nature belong prudence and virtue which in themselves are ordered to the good; but when a man is bad, he uses them as arms for wrongdoing, as when through astuteness he thinks up

fraudulent schemes, and through abstinence he is rendered able to tolerate hunger and thirst in order to persevere in wickedness, and similarly with other such things. And thus it is that man without virtue as regards the corruption of the irascible is maximally abominable and wild, as being cruel and without affection; and as regards the corruption of the concupiscible he is worst concerning sexual matters and concerning voraciousness as regards food.

But man is led back to justice by the political order: which is shown from this, that among the Greeks the order of the political community is called by the same name as the judgment of justice, that is, *"diki."* Hence, it is evident that he who establishes a city takes away from them that they be worst, and leads them to this, that they be best as regards justice and virtues. (lines 200-235)

Thus, Thomas conceives the completeness of the community as a completeness that leads to virtue. This takes us beyond the formalism which Finnis spoke of. The common good of the city, so considered, seems very close to the ultimate end of human life. The imperfect "felicity" or "beatitude" possible in this life is seen by Thomas as primarily in contemplation of the divine, but secondarily in the operation of the practical intellect ordering human actions and passions.[30]

A state (Finnis's term for Thomas's *civitas* or *gens)* may only be able to give a limited "type of direction" if it is prudently to aim at the goal which is the ultimate end of human life. Thus, we considered earlier *STh* 1-11, q. 100, a. 9, ad 2: virtue is the goal, and the act of the virtue is the means. Still, city living imbues the whole community with order towards virtue.[31]

[30] Cf. *STh* 1-11, q. 3, a. 5 (731b18-24), referring to Aristotle, *Eth. Nie.* 10 (1177a12 and 1178a9). Thomas even uses expressions such as "active felicity" in contrast to "contemplative felicity": cf. *STh* 1-11, q. 4, a. 7 (742a32-37). The general doctrine is, of course, that the happiness possible in this life consists in virtuous operation: Aristotle, *Eth. Nie.* 1 (1102a5). At *STh* I, q. 26, a. 4, speaking of God's own happiness as including whatever is desirable in any happiness, and itemizing the various forms of happiness, Thomas, after "contemplative felicity," lists "active [felicity]," regarding which God possesses "the governing of the entire universe."

[31] The text to which Finnis refers which gives most support to the sort of thing he has in mind is, I would say, *STh* 1-11, q. 98, a. 1 (1246a44-49): "the goal of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the city, to which goal it comes by restricting external actions as regards those evils which can trouble the peaceful state of the city."I do not believe that it expresses the deepest level of Thomas's position.

V. PRIVATE GOOD?

The third point I wish to mention is Finnis's tendency to promote the good that falls outside the properly political as a "private" good. There is no doubt that for Thomas the terrestrial political society is a limited good. We see this in the discussion of obedience, where it is taught that one must obey God in all matters whatsoever, both as to external actions and as to internal operations (i.e., of the will), but that subjection to human superiors is as regards determinate issues.[32] Finnis does indicate that Thomas regards the Church as "also" (i.e., besides the *civitas)* a perfect community, and thus there is another "common good" besides that of the *civitas.*[33] However, he goes on to claim:

> the common good of the political community does not, as such, include certain important human goods which essentially pertain to individuals in themselves, such as the good of religious faith and worship; the fact that such individual goods are goods for many people, or for everyone, does not convert them into the good of the community. (226)

Here, in order to show that he is echoing Thomas, he quotes a passage from *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 80:

> In human affairs there is a certain [type of] common good, the good of the *civitas* or people (gentis)- - - - There is also a [type of] human good which-[though it] benefits not merely one person alone but many people--does not consist in community but pertains to one [as an individual] in oneself (humanum bonum quod non in communitate consistit sed ad unum aliquem pertinet secundum seipsum), e.g. the things which everyone ought to believe and practice, such as matters of faith and divine worship, and other things of that sort. (226)

The translation is Finnis's own; he carefully quotes the Latin in his endnote c (253-54).

[32] *STh* II-II, q. 104, a. 5 in its entirety, and especially ad 2. Cf. also *STh* Il-11, q. 152, a. 4, ad3.

[33] An interesting text in this regard is *STh* 1-Il, q. 63, a. 4 (1041b29-43): the infused moral virtues differ specifically from the acquired, in that they pertain to a different political reality; Thomas refers to *Ephesians* 2: 19, that believers are "fellow citizens of the saints and members of the household of God."

The text bears upon the angelic hierarchy and their assigned tasks. It deals with the lowest part of the hierarchy, which part, according to the Dionysian schema, is to be divided into three levels, the Principalities *(principatus),* the Archangels, and the Angels. This lowest hierarchy is responsible for the *execution* of divine providence in the merely human order (as contrasted with the whole cosmic order). Thomas tells us that by "human things" here he means "all inferior natures and particular causes which are ordered to man and fall into human use." He then explains the three levels of angel in terms of three levels of human good, moving from the more universal to the less universal. Thus we are told:

> Among these [human things] there is an order. For in human things there is a common good, which is the good of the city or people, which seems to pertain to the order of Principalities. . . . And thus, the disposition of the kingdoms, and the change of domination from people to people, necessarily pertains to the ministry of this order. Also, the instruction of those who have the role among men of governors, concerning those things which pertain to the administration of their regime, seems to look to this order.

Next, we move to a middle position, between the common good and the individual good. Thomas continues:

> There is also another human good, which does not find its place *[consistit]* in the community, but pertains to some one [person] in himself, but [a good] not merely of service *[utilia]* to one alone, but to many: for example, those things which are to be believed and observed by all, such as the things of faith and of divine worship and the like. And this pertains to Archangels, concerning whom Gregory says that they announce the highest things; for example, we call Gabriel an "archangel," who announced to the Virgin the incarnation of the Word, to be believed by all.

Thus, one sees what is meant by the limitation to the one individual: it is the Virgin Mary to whom the message is announced, yet the message is one for all the people. The idea is not that faith in general pertains to the people on a sort of individual basis outside the community of the Church. The "pertaining to one person" is the *dimension* of the angelic *task,* a

message to one person. The *nature* of the message keeps us in a middle position, pertaining somewhat to the more universal or common good.

We then move to the lowest level, that of the individual believer. Thomas says:

> There is a human good pertaining to each one singly. And such [good] pertains to the order of Angels, concerning whom Gregory says that they announce the lowest things.

Thomas goes on to say that the middle group have something in common with the highest and with the lowest. Concerning the relation to the highest, he says:

> having something in common ... with the Principalities, inasmuch as they confer authority to the lower angels, and not unworthily, because the things which are individual *[propria]* in human affairs should be dealt out in keeping with what are common *[communia].*

One sees then that what Finnis singled out is rather misleading. The faith and worship is the general thing, and the individual concerned is the Virgin Mary, not just any individual believer. Moreover, there is the usual insistence thatthe particular must be ordered towards the common.

In fact, Thomas considers religious practice as pertaining to the natural law. Thus, to offer sacrifice is presented by him explicitly as a duty decreed by natural law. And he then sees it as altogether appropriate that the human political community enact positive laws in this regard. These laws are distinct, of course, from the divine positive laws.[34] That such enactment of laws is possible only "somewhat" in any give group of people is, of course, the point of the need to limit the enforcement of virtue.

[34] *STh* 11-11, q. 85, a. 1 in its entirety, and especially ad 1. In *STh* I-II, q. 99, a. 3 (1254b4-14), Thomas speaks of the different points of view of human and divine law in directing in matters of divine worship.

VI. THE BASIC GOODS APPROACH

Finnis's main contention is that the common good proper to political society, for Thomas Aquinas, is not a "basic human good," but is rather "instrumental" as regards those goods. As we have already noted, he adds the "qualification" that it may perhaps be a basic good as concerns retributive justice.

I see this as an important issue, quite simply because any diminution in nobility which the political as such suffers relative to the eye of our mind cannot fail to affect the way politics is lived, and especially as to what we expect from our leaders. Finnis's focus on the limitation of political jurisdiction moves us from a definitely *moral* conception of political life to something much less obviously so. Saint Thomas's view by contrast stresses that the goal of the political society and its leaders is authentic human virtue, that accordingly the leaders must be virtuous, and that the limitations in lawmaking relate properly to the licit means of moving the multitude of the people towards that goal.

As I have said, Finnis sees *STh* 1-11, q. 94, a. 2, on the unity and multiplicity of the precepts of natural law, as locating certain "basic human goods" on the basis of some natural inclinations present in the human being.[35] Thus, he can challenge the status of political society as a "basic human good" by questioning the existence of a natural inclination towards it.

First of all, I would like to shake up the vocabulary of "basic human goods." Thomas, in the text in question, speaks of our naturally apprehending the notion of the good. Beyond that, he also speaks of our naturally apprehending certain *bona humana,* human goods. These naturally apprehended human goods are then pointed out to be *ends (bonum habet rationem finis).* And so the naturally apprehended goods are seen as the ends towards which we have natural *inclinations.*

Obviously, Thomas does no more in the article than provide a sketch of the multiplicity and order of these natural inclinations. The extent to which the doctrine of *order* in this article has been

[35] See above, pp. 342-43.

obscured is remarkable. Thus, interpreters such as Grisez, May, and Finnis have denied the moral significance of the presented order.[36] Even Benedict Ashley, while insisting on an order, has, I believe, missed the true interpretation. He speaks of four basic goods, and this in the teeth of the three levels of inclination presented. He sees the first level as exclusively concerned with the preservation of the individual.[37]

The first level of inclination spoken of by Thomas should rather be considered in terms of the great universality it has. It pertains to all substances as such. Thus, it has not to do merely with the individual as an individual, but rather with the being and well-being of being as such. It is the inclination of the creature as a creature. This is the inclination present in each thing, but present according to the proper mode of being of the thing. Thus we read:

> For there is present firstly in man an inclination towards the good according to the nature which he has in common with all substances, inasmuch as all substances have appetite for the conservation of their own being according to their own nature. And according to this inclination those things through which the life of man is preserved and the contrary impeded pertain to natural law. (1225b41-49)

[36] John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 95: "In ethical reflection the threefold order should be set aside as an irrelevant schematization." Most recently, see William E. May, "Germain Grisez on Moral Principles and Moral Norms: Natural and Christian," in George, ed., *Natural Law and Moral Inquiry*, 3-35, at 8: "Thomas has provided an illustrative, not taxative list of such goods in Summa Theologiae 1-2.94.2." See also my paper, "Jacques Maritain and the Philosophy of Cooperation," in Michel Gourgues and G.-D. Mailhiot eds., *Alterite: Vivre ensemble differents* (Montreal and Paris: Bellarmin and Cerf, 1986), 109-17, at 115-16.

[37] Benedict M. Ashley, O.P., "What is the End of the Human Person? The Vision of God and Integral Human Fulfillment," in Luke Gormally, ed., *Moral Truth and Moral Tradition* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1994), 68-96, at 83: "Aquinas .•. enumerated at least four basic goods of life, family, society, and truth." He refers to *STh* HI, q. 94, a. 2 (and also mentions *ScG* III, c. 129). He also says, "But I prefer Aquinas's separation of the physical and the reproductive good, since the reproductive good pertains to the species and not just the individual" (ibid., 86). My complaint is merely that the threefold order, which is carefully proposed by Thomas, is somewhat buried, and that the first level is not understood adequately. I contend that it is not limited to the individual merely as an individual.

This should not be read, for example, as though it did not include the tendency to reproduction, by which the species is preserved. The second level of inclination to which St. Thomas refers, the more special one, concerns what man has in common with the other animals, such as male-female relations and the upbringing of offspring. This is not just reproduction, but a special setting for reproduction.

Each thing has inclination for its own preservation, not only as to the individual, but as to the species. Here the best interpretation comes from Thomas himself in *STh* I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 3. The objector argues against a natural love for God more than for oneself, precisely because nature tends to self-preservation, and tending to favor another over oneself would be against nature. Thomas replies:

> nature turns back towards itself not only as regards that in it which is singular, but much more as regards the common: for each thing is inclined to preserve not only its own individual self, but also its own species. And much more has it a natural inclination towards that which is the unqualifiedly universal good.

We are talking about the inclinations that pertain to what Thomas calls, in *STh* I, q. 45, a. 5, ad 1 (288b36-38), "if I may so put it, the nature of being" *(ut ita dixerim, naturam essendi)*, which is participated in by all creatures. This is part of the view of all reality as the divine effect, and so as naturally "turned towards God": cf. *STh* II-II, q. 106, a. 3, on the philosophy of gratitude, with its quotation from Pseudo-Dionysius: "God turns all things back towards himself, as the cause of all."[38]

Thus, the best commentary on the *first* level of inclination in STh I-II, q. 94, a. 2 is *S1h* I, q. 60, aa. 1-5, which is a detailed discussion of the natural love found in angels and human beings. We see that the inclination common to all substances is a natural love for

[38] Notice that the inclination to perpetuity is had by species in a measured way; thus, Thomas views the species of plants and animals as inclined to perpetuity only for a particular phase of cosmic existence: *De Pot.* q. 5, a. 9, ad 3. This inclination is towards maximal association with the divine: cl. Thomas Aquinas, II *De anima,* c. 7 (Leonine lines 69-157, concerning Aristotle at 415a26-b6).

itself as an individual, and even more for its species, and even more for the author of being, God himself.

In this respect, one should notice that in *STh* I-II, q. 94, a. 2 the third level of inclination, concerning what is proper to the human species, has to do, not with *love* of God, but with *knowledge* concerning God. It mentions our desire to know the truth concerning God. It is the desire to *know* that is being considered, an inclination not found in all substances. The precept Thomas formulates in its connection is: "avoid ignorance." Love of God, on the other hand, is presented everywhere in Thomas's writings as present in every substance as such, and indeed such that every being loves God naturally more than it loves itself.[39] It is this domain of what might be called *"transcendental* inclination" that is being referred to in the first place in *STh* I-11, q. 94, a. 2. The other two particularizing sorts of inclination are dearly relative to the genus and the species.[40]

As regards the third level of inclination, Finnis holds that the "society" referred to, where we read

> there is in man inclination to the good in function of the nature of reason *[secundum naturam rationis]*, which is proper to him; for example *[sicut],* man has natural inclination to this, that he know the truth about God, and to this, that he live in society *[in societatevivat]. (STh* I-II. q. 94, a. 2 [1226a3-8])

is merely the "basic good" of friendship (243; cf. 246) However, just as the inclination to know was focused by Thomas on knowing about *God,* so one would do well to consider that the society he has in mind is the most perfect form of society, the complete society. And that, as Thomas teaches, is the *civitas,* not just the friendship found within the limits of domesticity.

[39] See, e.g., *STh* II-II, q. 26, a. 3: "upon the communication of natural goods to us, [goods] made by God, is founded natural love, in function of which not only man in the wholeness of his nature loves God above all and more than himself, but even every creature whatsoever at its own level [so loves God], i.e. either by intellectual or rational or animal or at least natural love, as for example the stones or other things which lack knowledge; because each part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own particular good." (1555b21-32).

[40] In *N Sent.,* d 33, q. 1, a. 1, where Thomas asks whether polygamy is against the natural law, he simply presents a division in tem:iS of genus and species, with no mention of the first level at all.

It is worth noting that, while Finnis seems to doubt that there is a natural inclination towards life in the political society, he does note in a footnote (n. 137) that Thomas, paraphrasing Aristotle, speaks of a natural *impetus* to political community.[41] The word *"impetus"* Thomas finds in his translation of Aristotle at 1253a30. In explaining this and the following few lines, Thomas himself, as we have already seen, says, "Man is the best of animals if virtue, to which he has *naturalinclination,*is perfected; but if he is without law and justice, man is the worst of all the animals."[42] The natural inclination to legal justice, which is found in all (otherwise it could not be in the governed even as *"secondtzriæt administrative'*[STh II-II, q. 58, a. 6 (1723b30-31)]) is identical with the natural inclination to live in a political society or *civitas.*

If we look at some of the other places where Thomas expresses what is essentially the same doctrine on the natural inclinations as in *STh* I-II, q. 94, a. 2, we see even more clearly that the object of legal justice, the end or good sought by legal justice, has a certain *primacy* among naturally apprehended human goods. Thus, in the discussion of prudence in the *Secundtzsecundtze,*it is asked whether prudence presents the end to the moral virtues. The general answer is that it does not.[43] Rather, prudence has to do with those things which are ordered *towards*the attainment of the end. The virtues prescribe the end to prudence, but the virtues themselves presuppose the natural ability of reason to apprehend the primary ends.

> The end of moral virtues is the human good. But the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with reason.... Hence, it is necessary that the ends of the moral virtues preexist in reason. . . . in practical reason there preexist some items as naturally known principles, and of this sort are the ends of the moral virtues, because the end has the same standing in [the domain of] things to be done as has

[41] See I *Pol.,* c. 1/b (103), concerning Aristotle at 1253a29.

[42] "Homo enim est optimum animalium, si perficiatur in eo uirtus ad quam habet *inclinationem naturalem;* set si sit sine lege et iustitia, homo est pessimum omnium animalium" (Leonine lines 209-12).

[43] In *STh* 1-11, q. 66, a. 3 Thomas says that prudence does present the ends to the moral virtues; this seems to be because in the *Prima secundae* he is ready to use the term "prudence" even concerning the understanding of the first practical principles: cf. the reasoning in *STh* I-II, q. 58, a. 4.

the principle in [the domain of] things observed. (STh II-II, q. 47, a. 6 [1669a50-b14])[44]

In the same line, at the end of the treatment of prudence, speaking of the Ten Commandments, Thomas makes the point that the Decalogue itself is not about the objects of prudence, precisely as such, but about the ends of human life:

the precepts of the decalogue, just as they are given to all the people, so also they fall under the grasp of all, as pertaining to natural reason. But paramount among things commanded by natural reason are the ends of human life *lfines humanae vitae].* (STh II-II, q. 56, a. 1 [1712b5-10])

Of course, all the precepts of the Decalogue in a way pertain to prudence: "Nevertheless all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to [prudence] inasmuch as it is directive of all virtuous acts" (1712b17-20).

We see what should be thought about the ends of human life when we look at what Thomas says about the suitability of the first three commandments of the Decalogue:

it pertains to law to *make* men good. And therefore it is necessary that the precepts of the law be ordered in accordance with the order of *coming-to-be,* i.e. by which a man *becomes* good. But in the order of coming-to-be two things are to be noted. The first of which is that the first part is constituted first, for example in the generation of the animal firstly the heart is generated, and in the [case of] the house firstly the foundation is laid. And in the goodness of the soul the first part is the goodness of the will, [starting] from which the particular man makes good use of every other goodness whatsoever. But the goodness of the will is seen [by looking] towards its object, which is the end. And therefore in him who was to be set on the road to virtue through law, firstly it was necessary to, as it were, lay down a foundation of religion *[iacere quoddam fundamentum religionis],* through which man is duly ordered to God, *who is the ultimate end of the human will.* (Sib II-II, q. 122, a. 2 [2034b42-2035al ſſ

[44] Notice *SI'h* I-II, q. 63, a. 2, ad 3: "the natural rectitude of reason is more noble than the rectification of the appetite which is effected through participation in reason, which latter rectification pertains to the moral virtue."

Thomas goes on to discuss a second need for the order of coming-to-be, explaining the order among themselves of the first three commandments. But we need only note the above. If the "basic" in "basic human good" is that *foundation,* compared to the foundation of the house, of which Thomas speaks, then we see that the basic human good is the ultimate end of man, and that goods will be more basic to the extent that they pertain more closely to that end.

If we consider the moral virtues and the goodness that pertains to them, we see the preeminent goodness of justice. In fact, the text is so decisive that one wonders that it is not cited more frequently. The question asked is: whether justice is pre-eminent among the moral virtues?

> If we are speaking about *legal* justice, it is evident that it is more splendid among all moral virtues, inasmuch as the common good has pre-eminence over the singular good of one person. And in that regard the Philosopher says in *EN* 5 [1129b27] that "justice seems to be the most splendid of the virtues, and neither is Hesperus nor Lucifer so admirable." *(Sib* 11-11, q. 58, a. 12 [1728b19-27])

Thomas goes on to show how even the particular justice of one person to another singular person is a reality more noble than other moral virtues, but that need not concern us. It is precisely the common good with which the *la.w* has to do that makes legal justice so unquestionably noble.

It is, of course, true that Thomas presents prudence as even more noble than legal justice. This is inasmuch as prudence is not merely a moral virtue but is an intellectual virtue.

> The good of *reason* is the good of man. . . . But prudence, which is the perfection of reason, has this good *essentially.* Justice, however, is *-productive* of this good, inasmuch as it pertains to Oustice]to put the order of reason into all human affairs. But the other virtues have *aconservational* ole regarding this good, inasmuch as the passions are given measure lest they remove a man from the good of reason.... Hence, among the cardinal virtues, prudence is better; secondly, justice; thirdly, fortitude; fourthly, temperance. *(Sib* 11-11, q. 124, a. 12)

However, we have seen that Thomas sees the supreme instance of prudence in the person of the ruler.

VII. "INSTRUMENTAL"

Finnis presents the good of political society as "instrumental" regarding the basic human goods found in the friendship of marriage, etc. One supposes that this makes of such a good, not an end in itself, but an *ad finem* item having in itself nothing to recommend it. Thomas sometimes uses the example of a bad-tasting medicine to portray such a "good."[45]

Of course, nothing prevents something from being both a primary goal of human life and an instrument in the service of still more final goods. In fact, this is how Thomas does present political society. The political order is not the best thing in man. The political is "instrumental" relative to the contemplative order, and the intellectual virtues are more noble than the moral, wisdom than political prudence. In *STh* I-II, q. 66, a. 5, ad 1 he concludes:

> For it does not belong to prudence to inject itself into [consideration of] the highest things, which wisdom considers; but it gives orders concerning those things which are ordered towards wisdom, viz. how men ought to arrive *[pervenire]* at wisdom. Hence, in this, prudence, or politics, *[prudentia, seu JJOlitica]* is the servant *[ministra]* of wisdom; it introduces to it, preparing the way for it, like the door-keeper for the king *[sicut ostiarius ad regem]*. (1058a12-20)

Thomas is quite explicit. Politics is the servant, and so the instrument, of wisdom.[46]

Thus, what we object to in Finnis's conception is not that the political order is considered as "instrumental" towards human good.

[45] Cf. *STh* I, q. 5, a. 6, ad 2.

[46] There are admirable texts in the *Summa contra Gentiles* where the whole of human life is presented as ordered towards such wisdom. Take for example *ScG* III, c. 37 (para. 7: *Ad bane etiam omnes ...):* "To this [operation, viz. the contemplation of truth], all other human operations are seen to be ordered, as to an end. For bodily well-being *[incolumitas]* is required for the perfection of contemplation, towards which [well-being] are ordered all the artificial things which are necessary for life. Quiet from the disturbances of the passions is also required, to which one comes through the moral virtues and through prudence; and quiet from external disturbances, to which the whole rule of civil life is ordered [ad *quam ordinatur totum regimen vitae civilis].* So that, if they are rightly considered, all human undertakings are seen to serve those contemplating truth." Again, the little said of civil society in a text like this might foster the Finnis conception, but I do not think Thomas is here aiming to express the whole truth about the end of political society.

It is rather that, with his system of "basic human goods," he sees such things as family life as absolute, and so as an unqualified human good in contrast to the instrumentality of political life. He sees the "basic good" of "living in *society"* as fulfilled primarily in such things as family life and other relatively private associations.

As an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas on the status of political society, this seems to me quite off the mark. One should consider the family as a family. What is proper to this mode of human socializing as such? Thomas does not see it as more noble than the city. He sees it as a part of the city, an element, we might say. Like other ways of human association, it can and should be ordered towards the higher life, the contemplation of truth and the life of religion. However, precisely as family life, it is ordered towards the life of the city. Thus, in I *Pol.*, c. 11 (Thomas commenting on Aristotle, 1260b8 and following), we see that the discussion of the virtue involved in the relationships of husband and wife, father and children, is postponed. It cannot be determined until one gets into "politics," that is, into the discussion of "cities." Two reasons are given.

> First, one must discuss the disposition of the part by making a comparison to the whole, as one determines concerning the foundation by considering what pertains to the house as a whole. Now, the household is a part of the city; and these two relationships or conjunctions, i.e. father and son, man and wife, pertain primarily to the household; hence, one must consider the formation *[qualitersint erudiendt]* of the child and the wife in the light of what is said of the city. (Leonine ed., 95-103)

A second reason is as follows:

> Those things whose disposition makes a difference as to the goodness of the city are to be considered in politics *[in politiis];* but of this sort are the instructions *[instructiones]* of children and women as to how the two are good, since women are half the free human beings who are in the city, while from the children grow the men who must be those who dispense in the city: therefore, it is in politics that one must determine concerning the instruction of children and women. (Leonine ed., 105-13)

This suggests a different relation of the household or family to the political society than one finds in Finnis. It need not at all violate any

"principle of subsidiarity,"[47] which means simply authentic causal hierarchy: there really is a role proper to the lower thing, and it belongs to the higher thing to foster, not destroy the lower thing.[48]

CONCLUSION

In the present paper I have had a limited purpose. I have not attempted to go into detail as to what are the good reasons for the limitations on law and government. I have rather focused on what I see as an unhappy effect of Finnis's interpretation, namely, to diminish the goodness proper to law and government, as understood by Thomas. My aim has been mainly to argue for a *(Jrimary* "basic (or foundational) human good" in the *civitas* as such. While Thomas certainly uses the need to provide coercion to approach the need for the political order, seen as the source oflaw,[49] the actual portrait of that order, especially as found in the suitable governor, is of the richest of goods that practical reason provides.

[47] The violation of "the principle of subsidiarity" was one of the charges brought by Grisez against Thomas Aquinas in the aforementioned critique.

[48] For the role of part and whole, a text to consult is *STh* I, q. 65, a. 2 (397a55-bl3), where we see the ends which are assigned to the different parts and to the whole. Each part is for its own act; the less noble part is for the more noble; the parts are for the sake of the whole; and the whole is for an extrinsic end.

[49] Cf. especially *STh* I-TI, q. 95, a. 1.

The Thomist 64 (2000}: 375-99

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND HUMAN FINALITY: PARADOX OR *MYSTERIUM FIDEI?*

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"Then who can be saved?" Jesus ... said, "For man it is impossible; but for God all things are possible." (Mt 19:25-26)

I. NATURALLAWTHEORY: METAPHYSICAL OR PuRELY DEONTOLOGICAL?

As Heinrich Rommen and Yves Simon have observed, the tradition of natural law is far from monolithic. Within this tradition one can distinguish between "thin" (deontological) and "thick" (metaphysically robust) types of natural law theory. "Thin" theories emphasize the primacy of the notions of right and duty, whereas "thick" theories stress the priority of the notions of good and human finality. Thomas Aquinas is among the best-known proponents of a "thick" natural law theory embedded within a properly theological framework. One may ask, however, whether a "thick" natural law theory is accessible to unaided reason. Stated differently, must a "thick" natural law theory presuppose divine revelation? The answer to this question depends on whether reason left to itself could know that there is a transcendent, unparticipated good in which alone man could find his ultimate completion-perfect happiness. On this issue scholars are divided.

Some Thomistic commentators hold that rational creatures are absolutely incapable of perfect natural happiness, and that this view is strictly consonant with Aquinas's own teaching. From an

Aristotelian-Thomistic standpoint happiness is an act of the speculative intellect engaged in the contemplation of God. This act is strictly natural insofar as it does not exceed the connatural limits of the spiritual creature's intellective power. And the act is perfect insofar as the intellective power is fully actualized. So perfect natural happiness, if it is not absolutely impossible, would consist in a contemplative grasp of the divine nature that fully actualizes the spiritual creature's intellect in accordance with its connatural noetic limits. Aquinas argues in more than one place, however, that the final end of spiritual creatures must be the immediate vision of God. Moreover, Aquinas holds that this vision surpasses the natural powers of finite intellectual natures. Consequently, it would seem that from a Thomistic standpoint spiritual creatures are strictly incapable of a happiness that is both perfect and purely natural simultaneously.

The opinion that perfect natural happiness is intrinsically impossible is reflected in the view that man is endless by nature, a view endorsed recently by Denis Bradley.[1] This view is not new. And the contrary view, that man could have been ordered to a natural final end equivalent to perfect natural happiness, has become increasingly controversial, particularly since the publication of Henri de Lubac's influential *Surnaturel.*[2] The point at issue surfaces when considering the following question: Within their own proper order of being and operation, could rational creatures have been fully perfected had they not been foreordained to a supernatural final end? Thomists would acknowledge that without grace finite intellectual natures in the present historical order cannot reach their concrete final end. But Catholic thinkers are divided as to whether unaided reason could know that human nature in the present historical order cannot be fully perfected within the proper limits of its own order of being and operation.

[1] Denis Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997). Hereafter abbreviated *asATG.*

[2] Henri de Lubac, *Surnaturel: Etudes historiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946).

An affirmative answer to this epistemological query would appear to suggest that an inherently supernatural finality, at least as a theoretically achievable possibility, is within the purview of unaided reason if a natural desire, in this case the desire for perfect fulfillment, cannot be in vain. One could not easily avoid the semi-rationalistic overtones of the foregoing affirmative answer without sacrificing the tenet that a natural desire cannot be in vain, that is, without granting that man is endless by nature. But can the claim that man is endless by nature withstand sustained metaphysical scrutiny? And if not, what are the theoretical implications from the perspective of a Catholic philosopher?

In this paper I will examine whether the claim that man is endless by nature is in any sense problematic. For instance, would a purely philosophical natural law theory based on a teleologically sensitive philosophical theology be precluded in principle if man is endless by nature?[3]

Bradley's position on this question is particularly noteworthy. He opens his recent book with a significant observation:

> There has been a long history, rooted in the late medieval and early modern disjunction of faith and reason, of misconstruing the integrally theological character of Aquinas's rational argumentation. *(ATG,* xi)

I think Bradley is correct regarding the nature of Aquinas's mode of discourse. Almost immediately thereafter he declares:

> I reject ... the conceptual possibility and coherence of an autonomous or, equivalently, systematic Thomistic moral philosophy .... Of course, Aquinas's moral science incorporates rational doctrines, congruent with but not logically dependent upon revealed beliefs. But it does so . . . without thereby . . . licensing Thomist epigones to extract a systematic Thomistic moral philosophy from its native theological setting. (ibid.)

[3] By "teleologically sensitive natural theology" I mean a theology that in the state of pure nature would be fully equipped to address man's final end without reference to divine revelation. By "pure nature" I mean nature in precision from grace, as contradistinguished from elevated nature ordered to an intrinsically supernatural final end.

H Bradley is saying only that Aquinas would deny that a purely natural moral philosophy is practically sufficient in the present historical order, one could hardly differ. But Bradley's line of argumentation goes far beyond that modest daim. His position at least implies the claim that a purely natural and complete moral philosophy is intrinsically impossible. For such a philosophy would necessarily rely on a purely natural final end, and, in Bradley's view, such an end is absolutely impossible in itself. If Bradley's position is correct, then the very notion of a complete philosophy independent from *sacra doctrina* involves not simply a paradox but an internal contradiction. [4] that case the triumph of (some form of) fideism or traditionalism (or nihilism) would seem unavoidable. More concretely, the possibility of the state of pure theory intended to preserve the gratuity of the supernatural order and the integrity of reason within its own proportionate sphere of operation-would be left without any ultimate justification.

H. GRATUHY COMPROMISED OR METAPHYSICALLY UNINTELLIGIBLE POTENCIES?

Let us suppose that man is endless by nature. What are the implications and why? Either the principle of finality understood as a universal and necessary philosophical tenet must be abandoned, or nature possesses a natural exigency for an intrinsically supernatural act, namely, the immediate vision of God. The admission of such an exigency would, from Aquinas's standpoint, compromise the gratuity of the supernatural order, for the immediate vision of God is humanly impossible without grace, and it would seem contrary to the divine goodness that God would create man with an ontological exigency for a final end without intending that it should ever be fulfilled under any circumstances.

In response, one might object that the order of divine justice would not have been compromised had God chosen to create

[4] Cf. *ATG,* xiii, 530.

rational agents without intending that their natural desire for perfect completion should ever be fulfilled, because their one and only possible final end is intrinsically supernatural and, as such, it is not owed to created nature. This objection is an important one from a juridical perspective. From a metaphysical standpoint, however, it is beside the point. Had God chosen to create rational beings in the state of pure nature, and had they all failed to attain any truly final end through no voluntary fault of their own, surely they would have been aware of their unenviable predicament, namely, the everlasting frustration of their inalienable desire for ultimate and perfect completion. And, from a classical Thomistic standpoint, the proposition that an intelligent secondary cause could not be created without simultaneously being divinely ordained and summoned to the beatific vision is strictly incompatible with the gratuity of the supernatural order.[5] The *metaphysical* problem, then, consists in justifying the assertion that in the state of pure nature the divine Wisdom might have permitted the everlasting frustration of natural desire even apart from any spiritual creature's moral failure. A purely juridical solution ignores the deeper metaphysical issue at stake. In the order of intention the final end cannot be everlasting frustration of natural desire, for such frustration is not good in itself, and the good is that at which all things aim.

Furthermore, if the perfect completion sought through a strictly natural desire could not be anything but the immediate divine vision, it would appear that the intrinsic principles of nature alone would suffice to establish the absolute possibility of an intrinsically supernatural final end. But it is not obvious that this possibility could be positively established without reference to intrinsically supernatural principles-grace and the theological virtues. For, if Aquinas is correct, man's *de facto* final end, the immediate vision of God, depends unconditionally on these supernatural principles, inasmuch as this supernatural end wholly transcends the noetic capacities of unaided nature.

[5] Cf. Pope Pius XII, *Humani generis,* no. 26.

III. THREE OPTIONS

Two possible responses to the problem offer themselves immediately: (1) to deny the principle of finality as a universal and necessary philosophical tenet, and (2) to affirm the possibility of perfect natural happiness as a truly *final* end. Should we elect to deny the principle of finality, other difficulties would surface. First, the very debate over man's ultimate end would be rendered problematic from a Thomistic standpoint. Apart from the principle of finality it is not clear how one could justify in non-fideistic terms the claim that man has a final end, natural or supernatural. And no Catholic thinker involved in this debate[6] is prepared to endorse a fideistic solution or to deny the metaphysical truth that man must have a final end. The philosophical principle of finality is absolutely indispensable to rational theological discourse on the objective and universal meaning of human existence. Second, the denial of the principle of finality would entail that there could be a real potency that is not for the sake of act. But if the principle of a thing's intelligibility is to be found not in potency as such but in act, then a potency not ordered to act would be wholly devoid of intelligible meaning. A potency is intelligible only to the extent that it partakes of the intelligibility of its associated act. In other words, a potency not ordered to act would be indistinguishable from nothingness or the total negation of being.

So much for the denial of the philosophical principle of finality. We are left, then, with the second option, namely, the affirmation of the possibility of perfect natural happiness as a truly *final* end. But this option would appear to be no less problematic from a Thomistic standpoint. For Aquinas maintains that

> our natural desire for knowledge cannot come to rest within us until we know the first cause, and that not in any way, but in its very essence. This first cause

[6] For instance, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Maurice Blonde!, Henri Bouillard, Etienne Gilson, Bernard Lonergan, Henri de Lubac,Joseph Marechal,Jacques Maritain, William O'Connor, Joseph Owens, Anton Pegis, and Karl Rahner.

is God .... Consequently the ultimate end of an intellectual creature is the vision of God in His essence.[7]

It seems, then, that natural happiness cannot be perfect as long as the immediate vision of God is lacking. In other words, it appears that a purely natural end consisting in a strictly natural knowledge of God cannot be a truly *final* end, for truly perfect rest requires more than a strictly natural knowledge of God. Another argument cited by Bradley *(ATG,* 473) in support of the putatively Thomistic view that man could not have a strictly natural *final* end is the argument found in *De malo,* q. 5, a. 1, ad 1:

> Man would have been created frustrated and in vain if he were not able to attain beatitude, as is the case with anything that is not able to attain its ultimate end. Lest man be created frustrated and inane, because he is born with original sin, God proposed from the beginning a remedy for the human race, through which man could be liberated from this inanity-the mediator, himself God and man, Jesus Christ. Through faith in Him the impediment of original sin is able to be taken away.

I will comment briefly on this argument later.

A third option might be to object that human nature's obediential potency for the supernatural is sufficient to establish the theoretical possibility of the immediate divine vision as man's last end, so that the possibility of this supernatural good could be positively known without presupposing on our part any knowledge of grace. This appears to be the approach of Steven Long. In a recent article, Long pursues the obediential potency option vis-a-vis man's final end,[8] Contrary to Long, however, Bradley argues that Aquinas's teaching on man's final end neither employs nor mentions the notion of obediential potency *(ATG,* 448-55), Bradley argues that

> Miracles . . . serve as the Thomistic prototype for understanding the obediential potency of a creature. Aquinas, however, never calls the beatific vision ... a "miracle." ... [For] a miracle precisely does not realize or perfect

[7] *Compendium theologiae* I, c. 104; cited by Bradley *inATG,* 525.

[8] Steven A. Long, "Obediential Potency, Human Knowledge, and the Natural Desire for God," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 37 (1997): 45-63.

the natural tendency of a being but goes contrary to it. But while the beatific vision is supernaturally attained, it is, according to Aquinas, profoundly in accordance with the intellect's natural tendency: "Every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance." *(ATG,* 449-50)

In support of the view that man's immediate vision of God does not, according to Aquinas, involve any obediential potency for the same, Bradley notes that Aquinas distinguishes the beatific vision from miraculous forms of knowledge, such as prophetic knowledge *(ATG,* 450), and that the notion of obediential potency is properly applicable to infused miraculous knowledge, precisely because such knowledge is entirely beyond the natural capacity of created intellects. In contrast, the immediate vision of God is an act for which created intellects have in some sense a natural capacity, Bradley argues, inasmuch as the natural desire to know God cannot be thoroughly actualized without this immediate vision *(ATG,* 455). In addition, he observes that Aquinas does not use the term "obediential potency" when attempting to establish that man's final end is the beatific vision. He suggests, however, that if the divine ordination of spiritual creatures to the beatific vision could not properly be understood without reference to an obediential potency, it would seem reasonable to expect that Aquinas would mention this potency when attempting to show that a spiritual creature's final end is the immediate vision of God (ibid.).[9]

As a possible reading of Aquinas's teaching, the restriction of the notion of obediential potency to the realm of the miraculous seems plausible enough, since there are Thomistic texts that appear to support Bradley's interpretation. [10] Nevertheless, his treatment of Aquinas's understanding of obediential potency is not compelling. If the act of prophetic knowledge requires an obediential potency, and if the immediate divine vision as participated act is more excellent than the act of prophetic knowledge, then how can this intrinsically supernatural vision not

[9] This line of argumentation is not new. See, for instance, William O'Connor, *The Eternal Quest: The Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Natural Desire for God* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1947), 37.

[10] *See ATG,* 450 n. 130.

require an obediential potency? If an inferior act wholly exceeds the natural capacity of spiritual creatures, surely the same must be true of a superior act. Thus, although Aquinas may not explicitly employ the term "obediential potency" in arguments intended to show that man's last end consists in the immediate vision of God, these Thomistic arguments necessarily presuppose the notion of obediential potency. For no efficient cause other than God can raise a spiritual creature's intellect to the immediate vision of God, and an obediential potency in one sense is a remote passive potency that can be reduced to act by no efficient cause other than God. As Long recognizes, Bradley's interpretation is questionable insofar as it completely reduces the notion of obediential potency to the notion of extrinsic susceptibility to miraculous transmutation. It is true that for Aquinas this susceptibility is an obediential potency. Bradley has not shown, however, that *every* obediential potency must be a susceptibility to miraculous transmutation. [11]

Unless God reduces an obediential potency to an act that completely transcends a spiritual creature's natural capacities, no finite intellect could be raised to the supernatural vision of God. But, if Aquinas is correct, the obediential potency in question cannot be a susceptibility to miraculous transmutation. Consider an example. A horse, say, "Mr. Ed," is obedientially capable of philosophical dialogue. But notice that the horse would cease to be a horse at the precise moment when this obediential potency is divinely actualized. By divine omnipotence the horse would be essentially transformed into a rational creature, for the activity of philosophical dialogue presupposes reason, and a horse as such lacks reason. In this case the obediential potency of the horse is a susceptibility to miraculous transmutation. In contrast, when the

[11] In his *Disputed Questions on the Virtues in General*, a. 10, ad 13, Aquinas argues that man's potency for infused virtues is generically other than his natural potency for acquired virtues. And the potency for infused virtues, which are ordered to an end that completely transcends the end to which the acquired virtues are ordered, is an obediential potency. Moreover, Aquinas does not think the reduction of this obediential potency to act implies any corruption of human nature. In other words, this obediential potency for infused virtues is not an extrinsic susceptibility to miraculous transmutation, at least not according to Aquinas.

human mind is elevated supernaturally to the immediate vision of God, there is no question of a miraculous transmutation of human nature within the framework of Aquinas's theology of grace. Aquinas would deny that human beings cease being human the moment they receive the beatific vision. Bradley has not, therefore, succeeded in justifying the assertion that the notion of obediential potency serves no essential function in Aquinas's arguments concerning man's *de facto* final end.

IV. OBEDIENTIAL POTENCIES DISTINGUISHED

In emphasizing the notion of obediential potency, Long offers a more faithful interpretation of Aquinas's teaching on man's last end. In this regard Long seems less prone to elide the orders of nature and grace. By relying on the notion of obediential potency, he believes he can demonstrate on strictly philosophical grounds that the immediate divine vision as participated act is absolutely possible, not that we are in fact called to the beatific vision. Given that important qualification, his position seems more modest but not insignificant. Nevertheless, at this juncture I think Long, who relies heavily on Maritain, overstates his otherwise excellent case. My reservation is chiefly epistemological in nature. Insofar as it is defined as a remote passive capacity that can be reduced to act by none but the first efficient cause, obediential potency is accessible to philosophical reason left to its own resources. Unaided reason can know in principle that an omnipotent Creator exists and that He created finite beings *ex nihilo.* Truths of this sort fall within the broad ambit of natural theology. If unaided reason can know that there is an omnipotent God who creates finite beings *ex nihilo,* one can also know without the infused light of faith that an ass is obedientially capable of philosophical acts by means of a miraculous transmutation of substance. As no logical contradiction is implied, such transmutation could occur if God willed it. But it is metaphysically impossible that the individual engaged in philosophical activity be an ass simultaneously.

Now, in saying that man is obedientially capable of the immediate divine vision, Long would affirm that a man who is transformed and raised to this supernatural vision does not thereby cease to be a man, that the obediential potency in question is not an extrinsic susceptibility to miraculous transmutation. But if one is not cognizant of the availability of intrinsically supernatural principles such as grace, how can one know that this same obediential potency is not in fact a mere susceptibility to miraculous transmutation? Of course one way to skirt the problem is suggested by Duns Scotus. He denies that the immediate vision of God is an intrinsically supernatural act in the Thomistic sense. From a Scotistic perspective, the obediential potency in question is indistinguishable from a susceptibility to miraculous transmutation. This view is defended in a recent study by Peter Ryan, S.J.:

> De Lubac, *MS,* 78, n. 16, rightly points out that the nature lacking innate desire for supernatural beatitude could be fulfilled by it only by being so profoundly altered that it would become a completely different nature. As we have noted, the same is suggested by Scotus: "if knowledge of the divine essence were above the nature of our intellect, the blessed will never see God; for no potency can be elevated above its specifying object, as [corporeal] vision cannot be elevated to understanding. Otherwise this potency would transgress the limits of its essence, and would not remain specifically the same."[12]

Long, however, would not endorse the Scotistic solution, which appears to be supported by the Scotistic doctrine of the univocity of being. But if one follows Aquinas's doctrine of the analogy of being, it seems reasonable to hold that the ontological divide between the sense power of sight and an angel is relatively insignificant in comparison with the ontological chasm between human reason and God's suprageneric existence.[13] Moreover, the intuitive vision of an angel's essence absolutely transcends the perceptual capacities of nonrational animals apart from a

[12] Peter F. Ryan, S.j., *Moral Action and the Ultimate End of Man: The Significance of the Debate between Henri de Lubac and His Critics* (Th.D. diss., Gregorian University, 1996), 278 n. 10.

[13] See Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 54.

miraculous transmutation of substance. So it does not seem unreasonable to hold that the immediate vision of God absolutely transcends man's noetic faculties apart from a similar miraculous transmutation. And even then it is not clear that a miraculous transmutation of substance would suffice to produce the intrinsically supernatural act in question. [14]

Aquinas, however, maintains that man's elevation to the immediate vision of God is not accomplished without intrinsically supernatural principles, and that these principles (including the entitative *habitus* of grace, the theological virtue of charity, and the *lumen gloriae)* are strictly indispensable conditions of the immediate divine vision as participated act. Furthermore, he teaches that these principles are inaccessible to unaided reason. Now, unless one is relying on the absolutely impeccable testimony of God Himself, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, one could hardly know that an intrinsically supernatural end is attainable without also knowing the availability of the intrinsically supernatural means without which this end could not be attained. If the strictly indispensable means are removed, so is the end. Objectively speaking, there is no obediential potency for the immediate divine vision as participated act apart from the requisite supernatural principles. Stated differently, the purely philosophical notion of obediential potency falls short of the properly theological notion of the same, and the latter is required to establish the absolute possibility of the immediate divine vision as participated act. Thus the philosophical notion of obediential potency available to unaided reason will not suffice by itself to demonstrate what Long thinks he can demonstrate on strictly philosophical grounds.

[14] One might, of course, assert_that the ontological chasm between sense powers and separate substances is fundamentally unlike the ontological chasm between human reason and God's suprageneric existence (cf. ibid.). For instance, one might argue that the ontological divide between sense powers and separate substances involves a difference in kind, whereas the ontological divide between human reason and God's supra-generic existence involves a difference not in kind but in degree or something along those lines. Therefore, the human intellect can be elevated to the immediate divine vision. It is not evident philosophically, however, that an argument of this sort can succeed without prejudice to the divine nature's absolute transcendence.

If Aquinas is correct as regards his theology of grace, no sound demonstration of the absolute possibility of the immediate vision of God can avoid referring to the strictly indispensable means, including grace. With the aid of divine faith, however, a believer can grasp a *mysterium fidei* that a first-rate philosopher such as Aristotle could not possibly anticipate without benefit of divine revelation. [15] Concerning this divine mystery, human reason left to itself is able to posit nothing more than an inherently fallible "judgment of credibility," an act of acquired opinion based on miraculous evidence. Such a judgment is not to be confused with an act of theological faith, an intrinsically infallible supernatural act of intellectual assent to a revealed mystery based on the supreme authority of Self-subsistent Truth. [16] Apart from theological faith and divine revelation, then, the absolute possibility, let alone the historical actuality, of the immediate divine vision as participated act is beyond both proof and disproof.

V. THE ANALOGY OF NATURAL DESIRE

One might still object that my perspective does not seem entirely consistent with the Thomistic texts, because Aquinas offers various rational arguments to support the claim that the last end of spiritual creatures must consist in the immediate vision of God. In response, one may readily concede that such arguments are scattered throughout the Thomistic corpus, like the argument

[15] Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 5; q. 64, a. 1, resp. and ad 4; I-II, q. 62, a. 1; q. 109, a. 1. Also see Joseph Owens, *Towards a Christian Philosophy* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990), 91: "The potentiality for elevation through grace escapes the philosopher's investigation ... and is known only to the theologian. The philosopher discovers no contradiction in the elevation of a created intellect to the beatific vision, as he could in the case of a non-cognitive faculty, yet he cannot show positively that it is possible. He does not know that there is a Trinity to be contemplated, nor that there are supernatural powers to equip the soul for that destiny. As with other revealed truths, the possibility cannot be positively demonstrated even though the arguments that aim to show a contradiction in it tum out to be inapplicable."

[16] On the distinction between the judgment of credibility and the judgment of faith see Romanus Cessario, O.P., *Christian Faith and the Theological Eife* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 59-60.

cited earlier from Aquinas's *De malo.* These arguments can easily be misunderstood apart from their proper context, however. One must recall that Aquinas, unlike Duns Scotus and others, held that spiritual creatures were in fact created in the state of grace, not in the state of pure nature.[17] Given this presupposition, the Thomistic arguments at issue cannot properly be viewed as complete without reference to the intrinsically supernatural principles possessed by spiritual creatures in the original state of nature. Contrary to Scotistic interpretations, the Thomistic arguments are meant to show that nature as originally constituted, not pure nature, is ordered to the immediate vision of God.

For example, in the *De malo* argument cited earlier Aquinas is obviously arguing on the basis of the notion of fallen nature, not that of pure nature, and the theological notion of fallen nature presupposes the theological notion of grace. Consider, also, the famous argument found in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 50. Aquinas argues that the natural desire of separate substances cannot attain perfect rest short of the immediate vision of God. If, as Aquinas believes, separate substances were created in the state of grace, it would be a mistake to infer that the natural desire in question is a desire that does not presuppose grace and the theological virtues. Furthermore, if he thought that the natural-desire argument contained in *ScG* III, c. 50 was entirely conclusive, it is not easy to grasp why he went on to argue in *ScG* III, c. 54 that the immediate vision of God does not in every sense transcend the noetic limits of separate substances. To show that this supernatural vision is not absolutely impossible, he refers explicitly to intrinsically supernatural principles in *ScG* III, cc. 52-54. This significant theological development of the natural-desire argument set forth in *ScG* III, c. 50 is commonly overlooked. Indeed, Scotistic interpretations of Aquinas's argument concerning man's last end are not rare. One is tempted to speculate that the Scotistic reading of the natural-desire argument offered in *ScG* Ill, c. 50 stems partly from the debate between Thomists and Scotists over the necessity of the *lumen gloriae* (treated in *ScG* III,

[17] See Henri Rondet, S.J., *The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the Theology of Grace,* trans. Tad W. Guzie (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1967), 205.

c. 53) in relation to the immediate vision of God.[18] In any event, in view of the foregoing considerations, the claim that unaided reason can neither prove nor disprove the absolute possibility of the immediate divine vision as participated act seems wholly consistent with Aquinas's (theological) arguments concerning the *de facto* final end of spiritual creatures.[19]

Must we infer, then, that unaided reason cannot but conclude that man is endless by nature, as Bradley believes? I think not. Earlier I mentioned the objection that the affirmation of the absolute possibility of perfect natural happiness as a truly *final* end could not be reconciled with Aquinas's teaching that man's "natural desire for knowledge cannot come to rest within us until we know the first cause ... in its very essence." The force of this objection rests on what appears to be a Scotistic rather than a Thomistic interpretation of the natural desire to know God.[20] From a Scotistic viewpoint man has a natural desire for the immediate divine vision, and this natural desire is understood univocally. That is to say, whether the desire issues from graced nature or pure nature is irrelevant in the present case. From a Thomistic standpoint, however, natural desire is understood analogically. Although not completely unrelated, the natural desire of graced nature and that of pure nature are not of the same order; they have different formal objects. The former is directed to God recognized as triune Godhead and as knowable

[18] In this connection see Thomas J. Clarke, *The Background and Implications of Duns Scotus' Theory of Knowing in the Beatific Vision* (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 1971).

[19] My reading of natural desire on this question can be classified as an example of the kind of interpretation inspired by Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534). On Cajetan's position see O'Connor, *The Eternal Quest*, 33-38.

[20] Concerning the widely varying interpretations of natural desire, see O'Connor, *The Eternal Quest;* idem, *The Natural Desire for God* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1948); idem, "The Natural Desire for God in St. Thomas," *New Scholasticism* 14 (1940): 213-67; idem, "The Natural Desire for Happiness," *The Modern Schoolman* 26 (1949): 91-112; idem, "Natural Appetite," *The Thomist* 16 (1953): 361-409. Here one might note in passing that Long disowns quasi-Scotistic interpretations of the natural desire to know God insofar as these deny that this desire is an elicited act of the rational appetite, a volitional act based on a prior act of intellectual cognition. It seems dear to me that Long is quite correct on this key point. See my unpublished dissertation, *A Thomistic Defense of Perfect Natural Beatitude* (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1998), secs. 3.8-3.9.

through intrinsicaHy supernatural principles, whereas the latter is directed to God recognized as first efficient cause and as knowable through means other than intrinsically supernatural principles. It would appear, then, that the natural desire for knowledge in the state of pure nature could come to complete natural rest within human nature by attaining an exalted analogical knowledge of the divine nature through the relatively supernatural instrumentality of divinely infused species. Such knowledge would faH infinitely short of the immediate vision of God, but the absence of the latter would not necessarily entail an objective frustration of natural desire in the state of pure nature. For in the state of pure nature the desire to know the divine essence directly would be nothing more than a pure velleity.[21] Thus, one could maintain consistently that in the state of pure nature the natural desire to know God could come to complete natural rest in spiritual creatures lacking the immediate divine vision. As Aquinas observes: "It is ... necessary for the last end so to man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire. It cannot be his last end if something more be required for his perfection."[22] But in the state of pure nature man would require for his commensurate perfection not a supernatural but a strictly natural end, namely, an exalted analogical knowledge of God's nature means of divinely infused spedes. And to unaided reason the present historical order is indistinguishable from the order of pure nature.[23]

[21] On Aquinas's use of the notion of velleity see, for example, *STh* I-H, q. 13, a. *5*, ad 1; Supplement, appendix 1, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

[22] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. *5*.

[23] The state of fallen nature *qua* fallen is not strictly demonstrable without reference to the state of elevated nature *qua* elevated, and Aquinas considers the latter a divine mystery. Moreover, as intrinsically supernatural principles completely transcend the commensurate limits of nature and its intrinsic powers in the state of pure nature, one cannot prove solely by means of truths accessible to unaided reason that intrinsically supernatural principles are "natural" to nature in its present *(de facto* fallen) state. For, as far as unaided reason is capable of discerning, the present historical order is philosophically indistinguishable from the state of pure nature. The contrary view would seem to imply, in opposition to Aquinas's theological vision, a suppression of "the difference between fallen md restored human nature" (Romanus Cessario, O.lP., *The Godly Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from St. Anselm to Aquinas* [Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1990], 186).

This interpretation, however, would not completely satisfy either Long or Maritain. According to the latter,

> Nothing is more human than for man to desire naturally things impossible to his nature .... Such desires . . . are natural, but one may also call them transnatural. It is thus that we desire to see God . . . it is thus that we desire beatitude.
>
> To say that our intellect naturally desires to see God is to say that it naturally desires a knowledge of which nature itself is incapable. This desire is transnatural, it moves toward an end which is beyond the end for which the nature of man is constituted. According as it reaches thus for an end which transcends every end proportioned to nature, the desire to see God is an "inefficacious" desire-a desire which it is not in the power of nature to satisfy, and it is a "conditional" desire-a desire whose satisfaction is not due to nature.
>
> Yet, according as it emanates from nature, it is a natural and necessary desire. It is not a simple velleity, a superadded desire, a desire of

In other words, since the theological mystery of original sin is inaccessible to unaided reason, unaided reason cannot know in any demonstrative sense that historical nature is actually fallen and internally wounded. Divine revelation and not human experience alone is needed to grasp positively the existential difference between elevated nature and nature outside the state of grace. A purely philosophical analysis of human nature cannot prove anything about nature's original state other than what unaided reason could establish on the basis of nature *qua* nature, nature within its own proportionate order of being and operation.

Here one might object that a world that includes Christ and his Church is radically different from a world that does not include Christ and his Church. But the state of pure nature, unlike the present historical order, would not have included Christ and his Church. Consequently, unaided reason can distinguish between the present historical order and the state of pure nature. This argument is plausible but inconclusive, since the truth of the second premise exceeds the grasp of unaided reason. It is (obviously) the case that this created order includes Christ and his Church, but it also includes numerous other religions and religious icons. Moreover, contrary to the doctrine of religious indifferentism, Aquinas would deny the claim that each and every religion is supernatural in origin or sufficient from a soteriological standpoint. This diversity of religious worldviews is hardly surprising if, as Aquinas maintains (*STh* 11-11, q. 81, a. 5), religion is a natural virtue and if unaided reason is prone to error in matters of religion. Without the infused light of faith, the natural light of reason is not equipped to distinguish infallibly between natural religion ancl revealed religion *qua* revealed. The argument presupposes the truth of the proposition that Christ and his Church are of supernatural origin. The proposition is accessible to unaided reason, of course, but its inherent truth is not; the proposition is credible, but its truth is not positively demonstrable without the aid of divine faith. Cf. Cessario, *Christian Faith and the Theological Life*, 59-60.

supererogation. It is born in the very depths of the thirst of our intellect for being....

And because this desire which asks for what is impossible to nature is a desire of nature in its profoundest depths, St. Thomas Aquinas asserts that it cannot issue in an absolute impossibility.[24]

Maritain cites *STh* I, q. 12, a. 1 in support of his contention. He proceeds to argue thus:

It is in no wise necessary that [this natural desire] *be* satisfied, since it asks for what is impossible for nature. But it is necessary that by some means (which is not nature) it *be able* to be satisfied, since it necessarily emanates from nature. In other words it is necessary that an order superior to nature be possible in which man is capable of that of which nature is incapable but which it necessarily desires. It is necessary that there be in man an "obediential potency" which, answering to the divine omnipotence, renders him apt to receive a life which surpasses infinitely the capacities of his nature. It is necessary that we be able to know God in His essence through a gift which transcends all the possibilities of our natural forces. It is necessary that this knowledge, impossible to nature alone, to which nature inevitably aspires, be possible through a gratuitous gift.

He adds in a footnote:

Thus the argumentation of St. Thomas in the question 12, a. 1, of the *Prima Pars,* establishes rationally the *possibility,* I do not say of *the supernatural order* such as the faith presents it to us and as it implies the specifically Christian notion of grace, but of *an order superior to nature,* the notion of which remains still indeterminate, except in this, that through the divine generosity man can therein be rendered capable of knowing God in His essence.[25]

[24] Jacques Maritain, *Approaches to God,* trans. Peter O'Reilly (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), 98-99.

[25] Ibid., 99. It could be argued that Maritain's thought was slowly moving in this direction based on what he wrote in an earlier work:

> Thus, the desire of nature to see the First Cause [in Himself] is conditional in that it is simply natural. That is why, if man had been placed in the order of pure nature, wherein the means of reaching a vision of the Divine Essence would have been lacking to him, that natural desire would have been frustrated (or only satisfied by lesser substitutes procuring a relative and changing beatitude) without any violation of the principle of finality which protests against the possibility of an unconditional desire of nature being in vain.... We believe this manner of considering the

Maritain's qualification suggests that he is keenly aware of the risk of eliding the natural and supernatural orders. But one may question whether his interpretation of Aquinas on the natural desire for God is strictly correct. He seems driven to argue as he does because he is not sufficiently attentive to the distinction between the "natural" desire that issues from graced nature and the natural desire that would emanate from nature in the state of pure nature. Hence, despite his apparent intentions, his reasoning actually exceeds the proper scope of natural theology. Maritain rightly affirms man's obediential potency for the immediate divine vision. Without reference to intrinsically supernatural principles such as the theological virtue of charity, however, it is not evident that this potency is other than a mere susceptibility to miraculous transmutation, involving a substantial corruption of nature. [26]

In addition, Maritain's distinction between "the supernatural order" apprehended through divine faith and "an order superior to nature" can hardly justify the claim that unaided reason could know positively that the supernatural vision in question is absolutely possible, at least not according to Aquinas's theology of grace. For if the relevant "order superior to nature" is actually the supernatural order of nature elevated by grace, then it would elude the grasp of unaided reason. And if the "order superior to nature" did not include intrinsically supernatural principles such

> question is quite in harmony with St. Thomas' argument *(Sum. Theo/.,* I-II, 3, 8, and I, 12, 1). St. Thomas only demonstrates the possibility of man's seeing the Divine *Essence-because without it a desire of nature would be vain-by* proceeding as a theologian and not as a mere philosopher, by presupposing the possibility of man's attaining perfect or absolute beatitude (faith alone assures us of that, for that kind of beatitude is beyond nature ..• and, consequently, reason all by itself can only bring arguments of suitability to bear on it) and, thus, only by envisaging a desire of nature made unconditional by the supernatural desire that perfects it and proceeds from the knowledge of faith. *(The Degrees of Knowledge,* trans. Gerald B. Phelan [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995], 303 n. 91; emphasis added)

This condensed footnote, which is more than a page in length, is open to diverse interpretations, insofar as the complex line of thought expressed therein appears to be following different trajectories simultaneously.

[26] Nor is it clear that a miraculous transmutation of substance would suffice.

as grace and the *lumen gloriae,* then from Aquinas's standpoint the immediate vision of God would be no more within the reach of nature situated within this superior order than it would be within the reach of nature in the state of pure nature. Unlike Duns Scotus, who thought that the theological virtue of charity is contingently necessary for the human performance of meritorious acts,[27] Aquinas taught that intrinsically supernatural principles are absolutely indispensable to the human performance of intrinsically supernatural acts.[28] For Aquinas, then, the absolute possibility of man's elevation to the immediate vision of God cannot be dissociated from intrinsically supernatural principles of being and operation, because this vision is an intrinsically supernatural act. From Aquinas's standpoint what is involved here is a sublime mystery of faith. Ever since the original sin (another theological mystery), human persons must be transformed radically-regenerated-without *being corrupted in nature.* For Aquinas there is no other option if we are to attain the immediate vision of God. And, following Aquinas's principles, a Catholic philosopher can infer that any positive knowledge of the theoretical possibility of this intrinsically supernatural vision presupposes positive knowledge of the absolutely indispensable conditions of this same act. In other words, the absolute possibility of the immediate divine vision as participated act is itself a theological datum unaided reason can neither prove nor disprove.

[27] Scotus's thought here is influenced largely by his own understanding of both God's *potentia absoluta et pote-atia ordinata* and the relationship be1:weenfreedom and nature. See Mary Elizabeth Ingham, *Ethics and Freedom: An Historical-Critical Investigation of Scotist Ethical Thought* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989), 198-200, 219-21, 223-28, 237 nn. 24-25. See also Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace* (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1952), 124-26, 368, 382.

[28] It appears that Scorns thought that the difference belWeen acquired love of God and infused charity is one of degree, whereas Aquinas held that the difference is one in kind. "As for ... the need for a habit of charity, I reply ... that this habit adds to the substantial intensity of the act a further intensity, which the will alone could also have given to the act by exerting an equal effort" (Allan B. Wolter, trans., *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality* [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986], 443). See also Cessario, *Christian Faith and the Theological Life,* 4 n. 6.

Contrary to the position espoused by Maritain, a purely natural desire, unlike a simple velleity, for what is conceived as strictly impossible to unaided nature is questionable philosophically. Within a Thomistic framework, if a purely natural creaturely desire for the immediate vision of God were possible, and if this desire emanated necessarily from nature in precision from grace, then this desire would certainly have obtained in a state of pure nature in which God did not intend *under any circumstances* to bestow the immediate vision of Himself upon His creatures. Therefore, in that possible world this desire would have been frustrated necessarily, contrary to the philosophical principle that a natural desire is not inane. Moreover, from the perspective of unaided reason it will not suffice to say: "This principle would not have been violated in that possible world, because God could have fulfilled this desire had He chosen to do so." Obviously God can fulfill any ordinate creaturely desire for the good if He so wills, assuming that the fulfillment of the given creaturely desire is absolutely possible in itself. The metaphysical issue is whether the fulfillment of the desire in question is not absolutely impossible, whether this desire is more than a simple velleity. And, according to Aquinas's theology of grace, it seems that one cannot positively demonstrate that the fulfillment of this desire is not absolutely impossible without recourse to intrinsically supernatural principles. [29]

[29] That is not to say that God's power is limited by reason of the fact that He must have recourse to these supernatural principles so that human nature may be raised to the immediate divine vision. On the contrary, the limitation is proper to human nature in precision from grace, a limitation overcome by divine omnipotence through intrinsically supernatural principles. Unlike the nature of an ass, human nature has an obedientia! potency to be regenerated and elevated to participate in a supernatural order of existence and operation without being essentially corrupted. And the obediential potency for intrinsically supernatural acts is not the same obediential potency that is accessible to unaided reason. Grace does not destroy human nature, according to Aquinas. Instead, he affirms that human nature is raised through grace to a transnatural realm of divine being. The interior reformation accomplished is truly radical, but it does not involve a miraculous transmutation of substance, according to Aquinas, who held that the justification of sinners is not a miracle in the strict sense (*STh* I, q. 105, a. 7, ad 1). By means of grace finite persons are truly "born again" in spirit and become genuine likenesses of God, creatures fit to participate in the immediate divine vision. Therein lies the mystery, impenetrable to unaided reason.

VI. INTRINSICIST OBJECTIONS

At this point defenders of what could be denominated "theological intrinsicism" might object that my reading of the natural desire to know God stems from an exaggerated conception of the gratuity of the supernatural order, from an "extrinsicist" theology of grace foreign to the mind of Aquinas. Critics maintain that an extrinsicist theology of grace entails that the divinely impressed inclination to the supernatural final end must be external to human nature. Accordingly, it is thought that extrinsicism implies that man's supernatural final end is nothing but a superfluous bonus, an optional good that one could turn down without *experiencing* a profound frustration of natural desire. One critic articulates the objection in this way:

> Rabner pointed out the religious dangers of extrinsicism.... The supernatural may be very beautiful and very desirable, but in what sense is it obligatory? How could it be shown, in such a case, that man *must* seek a beatitude to which he is not proportioned by nature, under pain of absolute frustration of nature? There could be no serious argument again[st] naturalism.[30]

Illtyd Trethowan expresses a similar reservation:

> If one is not allowed to say that nature requires completion by grace in any sense, if nature is an entirely closed system, then we are faced with the apparent *irrelevance* of the supernatural which was the starting-point for [Maurice] Blondel's thought. It was the need to show his contemporaries that the supernatural is not simply imposed as an alien element but means something for man which remained the motive force [underlying Blondel's speculations] for some sixty years.[31]

Maritain seems to have in mind a similar objection when he writes that the natural desire for the divine vision must be more than a simple velleity, a desire of supererogation.

[30] Vincent Potter, S.j., typescript.

[31] Illtyd Trethowan, "Introduction" to Maurice Blonde!, *"The Letter on Apologetics" and "History and Dogma,"* trans. Alexander Dru and Illtyd Trethowan (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1994), 102.

This objection cannot be taken lightly. Here I cannot elaborate at length on the intricate debate between intrinsicists and extrinsicists,[32] but I can offer a brief response to the preceding objection. The supernatural is far from irrelevant in the actual historical order. In this order we are not free to dismiss our supernatural vocation without the most tragic of consequences. On the contrary, we are obliged to affirm that without Christ's grace human nature cannot attain its *de facto* final end, the immediate divine vision. From the supraphilosophical perspective of infused faith one can affirm, through an infallible act of intellectual assent, that a purely philosophical ethics is incomplete not *de jure* but *de facto*. But the practical inadequacy of a purely philosophical ethics in the present divine economy is cognitively inaccessible to unaided reason. Likewise, one must acknowledge that the absolute possibility of the immediate vision of God, unlike the reality of moral failure, is not strictly demonstrable to unaided reason. In *this* (fallen) world human wisdom without faith will not ultimately suffice vis-a-vis the natural human quest for supreme Truth. Similarly, one will be ill-prepared to defend the *depositum fidei* without a firm commitment to metaphysical realism and objective truth. As the recent encyclical letter *Fides et ratio* makes abundantly clear, the extremes of rationalism (including immanentism) and fideism must be eschewed. An extrinsicist theology of grace properly understood is wholly consistent with *Fides et ratio*, and in my judgment this theology is the very one developed so admirably by the Angelic Doctor.

Regarding the disputed question of natural desire, it is not dear how the desire for the divine vision, insofar as this desire emanates from nature left to itself, can be anything more than a simple velleity, unless one is prepared to sacrifice either the

[32] This important controversy is examined in greater detail in my doctoral dissertation, *A Thomistic Defense of Perfect Natural Beatitude*, chaps. 3-4. There I argue, based on a distinction between nominalist and existential extrinsicisrn, that the various objections of intrinsicist critics apply to the former but not the latter type of extrinsicism. For one intrinsicist's perspective on this disputed question see Stephen}. Duffy, *The Graced Horizon: Nature and Grace in Modern Catholic Thought* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 55-59.

gratuity of the supernatural order (reason without faith) or the natural integrity of reason (voluntarist faith without reason). And this wish is not, *pace* Maritain, a desire of supererogation. A desire of supererogation aims at a good in excess of what is strictly required. In the present context, however, the moral grammar of obligation is quite foreign to the relevant notion of velleity. In the state of pure nature the velleity in question would focus on a supernatural perfection that, barring sin, would be actively sought with the greatest volitional intensity were it known that the immediate divine vision could be attained by nature with the aid of intrinsically supernatural principles. Once such knowledge is gained through properly supernatural means, the velleity is instantaneously and irrevocably transformed into an act of complete willing in the strict sense. Only when the latter act is present can one rightly begin to speak of a genuine frustration of natural desire insofar as this desire remains unfulfilled. But an unfulfilled velleity does not by itself entail a frustration of the relevant natural desire. In the state of pure nature an intelligent creature's natural desire could come to complete natural rest if it possessed every authentic good of which it were capable by nature in precision from grace. In this way it seems that *both* the principle of finality (Aristotle) *and* the radical gratuity of grace (SS. Paul and Augustine) can be preserved widiout compromise, granted that the notion of natural desire is employed analogically (Aquinas) rather than univocally (Scotus). One need not elide the really distinct orders of nature and grace, then, and one can thereby minimize to some extent the risk of falling into the errors of rationalism and semi-rationalism (e.g., Frohschammer, Gunther, Hermes), on the one hand, and those of fideism and traditionalism (e.g., Barth, Bautain, Bonnetty), on the other.

VII. CONCLUSION

The long-standing debate over the relationship between nature and grace is relevant to numerous fundamental questions, including the relationship between reason and faith, the radical distinction between Christian and non-Christian ethics, and the

possibility of a metaphysically robust natural law theory. Clearly these related questions cannot be treated adequately in a brief presentation. I chose to focus on one particular aspect of a much broader set of issues. In particular, my chief objective here has been simply to raise a few basic questions concerning the natural scope of human reason in connection with the possibility and nature of man's last end, questions intimately related to the recent work of Bradley and Long. These two thinkers have relied in different ways on Maritain's keen speculations on the perennial topic of human finality, and, despite my reservations, I believe they have made an important contribution to the scholarly literature on this key anthropological issue. This paper is not intended to offer a final solution to a long-standing and complex controversy, a solution that would satisfy all parties involved. My hope, rather, is to encourage further scholarly discussion of an issue that merits far more attention than it has received in recent years.[33]

[33] I wish to thank Richard Cain, David Hammond, and Thomas Michaud for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper. Regarding the central issue examined above, Steven Long's recent article, "On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man," *The 1homist* 64 (2000): 211-37, merits serious consideration. Although the present paper was completed before that article was published, several of the views expressed therein reflect views discussed in our e-mail correspondence and conversations that began in July 1998 after I read his remarkable 1997 article (see above, n. 8).

The Thomist 64 (2000): 401-22

NON-ARISTOTELIAN PRUDENCE IN THE *PRIMA SECUNDAE*

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It is often assumed that Thomas Aquinas teaches an Aristotelian doctrine of prudence in the *Summa Theologiae.* Impressed both by the richness of Aristotle's conception of *phronesis* and by the extent to which Thomas seems to rely on Aristotelian authority for his own notion of *prudentia,* some commentators have held that Aquinas's doctrine is essentially Aristotelian. [1] The non-Aristotelian authorities that do appear in the inquiry can be regarded as marginal figures to be reconciled to the dominant Aristotelian teaching, accidents incapable of changing the Aristotelian essence. However eclectic Thomas might be in his metaphysics or in his theology as a whole, at least the doctrine on prudence is straightforwardly Aristotelian. Against this view, R.-A. Gauthier has argued that while Thomas uses Aristotelian formulae to articulate his notion of prudence, he does so by systematically misreading Aristotle and doing violence to the spirit of his texts. [2] Both views of the relation between Thomas

[1] This is implicit, for example, in Yves Simon's writing on the virtues. Simon dissents from Gilson's view that Aquinas is not best regarded as an "Aristotelian" on the ground that "to say . . . that Thomas Aquinas is not an Aristotelian obscures rather than clarifies our understanding of historical developments in philosophy" (Yves Simon, *The Definition of Moral Virtue* [New York: Fordham University Press, 1986], 125). For a nuanced defense and expansion of Gilson's view, see Mark Jordan, *The Alleged Aristotelianism of Aquinas* (Toronto: PIMS, 1990).

[2] R.-A. Gauthier, "Introduction," in Aristote, *L'Ethique a Nicomaque,* introduction, translation, commentary by Rene Antoine Gauthier and Jean Yves Jolif, 2d ed., with a new introduction, 3 vols. (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1970), 1:276. A spirited reply to

and Aristotle have exerted significant influence beyond the narrow circles of academic Thomism. References to "Aristotelian-Thomistic" virtue are commonplace.[3] Almost as plentiful are versions of the sentiment, recently expressed by Allan Bloom, that the medieval use of Aristotelian authority "was, of course, an abuse of Aristotle."[4]

The goal of the present essay is to reject both extremes by paying close attention to what Thomas says about prudence, and how he says it, in a cluster of questions within the *Prima secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae.*

The reading will be set out in a series of steps. First, I will consider the presentation of prudence as an intellectual virtue in questions 56-57 of the *Prima secundae.* Here the central elements of the Aristotelian doctrine of prudence with which Thomas seems to identify his own teaching will emerge. The second section of the paper will examine the handling of prudence among the moral virtues. Close reading of questions 58-61 will show that, while the recognition of the circle between prudence and the moral virtues is indeed similar to that of Aristotle, the consideration of prudence as one of the four cardinal virtues affords Thomas the opportunity to qualify and enrich the teaching with doctrines taken from other authorities, including the Augustinian linkage of *prudentia* and *ars.* The third part of the paper will focus on article 4 of question 61. In attending to this absolutely vital text, I will show that Aquinas situates Aristotelian *phronesis* on the lowest rung of a hierarchy consisting of various levels of prudence. The highest prudence attainable by human beings turns out to be essentially contemplative. Here the preferred authority is Neoplatonic rather than Aristotelian. The fourth and final section will take up the issue of infused prudence

Gauthier can be found in Ralph Mcinerny, *Aquinas and Human Action* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 161-77.

[3] One author even speaks of the "Aristotelian and Aquinian [sic] systems" (Anthony J. Lisska, *Aquinas' Theory of Natural Law* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996], 99).

[4] Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 252. Later in his book, Bloom is somewhat more generous to Aquinas (see, e.g., 376).

and its relation to acquired prudence, analyzing the dependence of both on the un-Aristotelian virtue of *caritas.*

Two comments about what my interpretation aims to reject, and what it does not intend to reject, might be useful. First, I want to reject the claim that Aquinas's conception of prudence as a whole is Aristotelian; Some might regard the rejection of this claim as trite, since one may simply point to passages in which Aquinas says things about prudence that lack any parallel in Aristotle. However, one could argue that Aquinas's intent in these passages is to reconcile non-Aristotelian authorities to what remains a fundamentally Aristotelian doctrine. The rejection of this argument demands more than a set of mere gestures toward particular non-Aristotelian texts. The issue turns on precisely how these texts are to be read.

Second, my view that Aquinas's conception of prudence as a whole is not well-described as Aristotelian does not require me to deny that something like an Aristotelian account of prudence may be abstracted from Aquinas's texts. Aquinas may well hold an Aristotelian account of prudence, in the sense that none of the statements he makes about prudence are logically inconsistent with an Aristotelian account. However, the pressing issue for Aquinas is not whether Aristotle's doctrine can or cannot be exhibited as logically consistent with that of, for example, Augustine. His concern, rather, is to compose a text that sets the multiplicity of known doctrines in their proper pedagogical relation-the relation that proves most instructive and useful for the Christian believer en route to a supernatural end. Whether Aquinas's Ambrosian or Augustinian lines of thought are "consistent" or "inconsistent" with Aristotelian theses is an essentially modern question. It betrays presuppositions and preoccupations that are antithetical to the teaching of St. Thomas.

I. PRUDENCE AS INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE

Questions 55-67 of the *Prima secundae* form an exceptionally compact, tightly organized treatment of the topic of virtue, under

five aspects: essence, subject, inherited divisions, cause, and particular attributes.

The first mention of prudence comes when Thomas takes up the *subjectum* of virtue. In article 2 of question 56, an objector contends that one virtue can be in several powers of the soul by arguing that prudence is in both the intellect and the will. The objector uses the Aristotelian definition of prudence as *recta ratio agibilium* to maintain that it is in the reason; he appeals to the incompatibility of prudence with a bad will to show that it is in the will. Thomas responds that while the real subject of prudence is indeed reason, it presupposes the rectitude of the will. How this is possible is clarified in article 3, which distinguishes between "facility" and "right use," and divides habits into those which produce *(facere)* only facility in action *(facultas ad bonum actum; facultas bene agendi)* and those which produce both facility and right use of something *(aliquis recte facultate utatur).* The intellectual virtues are instances of the former, while the moral virtues are instances of the latter, as illustrated by the contrast between the habits of grammar and justice.

Prudence, however, appears to disturb the dichotomy. It confers both facility and right use, and yet is seated in the reason. Prudence may be an intellectual virtue, but its intimate relation to the will makes it unlike any other intellectual virtue. Without rectitude of the will, which ensures right disposition toward ends, prudence can hardly operate, just as genuine *scientia* of conclusions cannot be had without the correct grasp of starting points by *intellectus.*

The analogy between moral virtue/prudence and noetic grasp/demonstration suggests a particular division of labor. Moral virtues dispose the agent to the end, which is the principle in moral things, and prudence chooses the means. But, an Aristotelian objector wonders in article 4 of question 56, how can this division be taken seriously, since the principal act of moral virtue itself is choice? Thomas answers Aristotle with Aristotle, arguing from book 6 of the *Ethics* that any act of *electio* contains two things: the intention of the end *(intentio finis)* and the right

disposition regarding things directed to the end *(praeacceptio eius quod est ad finem).* The former is the function of moral virtue; the latter is the task of prudence. Thus Thomas affirms the division of labor, while adding the point that the *dispositio* of moral virtue is to be understood as *intentio.* This recalls question 12 of the *Prima secundae,* where intention is located as an act of will that concerns the end.

Thomas, then, has been principally concerned to argue that the intellect can be the subject of particular virtues, even as the principal subject of virtue, in the most proper sense of the term, is the will. As a virtue that seems to occupy both territories, prudence affords a unique opportunity for Thomas to clarify his teaching on the subject.

The next question (57), begins the sequence of questions on the first great division of virtue-the Aristotelian distinction between the intellectual and moral virtues. Thomas begins with the intellectual virtues; the issue of prudence as an intellectual virtue arises in article 4. Here Thomas has an opportunity to address the nature of prudence more squarely than in the previous question. We learn that *prudentia* and *ars* are both forms of *recta ratio,* that their distinction is grounded in a difference between their objects, and that the relevant difference is between things to be made and things to be done. The distinction between *factibilia* and *agibilia* restates and clarifies from the side of the object the distinction that has already been approached from the side of the subject-that is, the distinction between habits that produce only facility and habits that produce both facility and right use.

A new element of the teaching comes in the response to an objector who denies any generic difference between prudence and other arts. Since the duty of prudence is to give good counsel, claims the objector, it is a member of the class to which other arts belong (e.g., warfare, seamanship, medicine). Thomas answers by asserting that prudence as such is not reducible to good counsel within particular contexts of action. It is the excellence of counsel "concerning things that pertain to the entire life of man, and to

the ultimate end of human life."[5] We may allow a sort of prudence in particular areas, for example, warfare or seamanship, and hence speak of prudent officers or prudent pilots. But in its most proper sense prudence embraces as its end the whole of human life-the ultimate end that includes all particular ends.

The final two articles of question 57 complete the teaching. Article 5 reaffirms the distinction between prudence and art and underscores the sense in which prudence is said to be in the reason. While prudence is necessary for both the production of good actions and the living of a good life, art is necessary only for the production of good works, not for good living as such. The location of prudence in the reason is emphasized by recalling the dual concern of *electio* with end and means. Since choice essentially concerns things directed to an end, and not the end itself, right choice requires good counsel, which is an act of reason. The virtue that perfects reason in this capacity is prudence. The last article of the question adds that, while counsel is the function of prudence, it does not exhaust the function of prudence, the other two acts of which are judgment and command. Command, in fact, is the most proper act of prudence. The acts of counsel and judgment are subordinated to command, because they exist only for the sake of command. They are, therefore, more properly assigned to a set of virtues annexed to prudence (counsel to *eubulia,* judgment to *sunesis* and *gnome).*

Questions 56 and 57 seem to produce a complete, self-contained teaching on prudence. In order to establish the sense in which prudence is seated in the reason, Thomas has been required to say much about other properties of the virtue. But has he told us what is essential about prudence as such? He has yet to discuss prudence within the other great division of virtue, the cardinal virtues. As a good teacher, Thomas never says everything he thinks about a topic all at once. The full teaching must be allowed to emerge *poco a poco,* in accordance with the dialectical progress of the inquiry. As the questions about the cardinal virtues and their relations to the theological virtues unfold, so we may expect

[5] *STh* 1-11, q. 57, a. 4, ad 3: "de his quae pertinent ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem vitae humanae."

the teaching on prudence to receive addition and qualification as it is considered under non-Aristotelian rubrics.

II. PRUDENCE AMONG THE MORAL VIRTUES

Thomas holds that prudence is an intellectual virtue, but not without positing its dependence on moral virtue. His favorite device for illustrating the dependence is the analogy between primary understanding of first principles and subsequent demonstration in the speculative realm, and primary intention of the end and subsequent action in the practical realm. Near the end of question 58, on the differences between moral and intellectual virtues, however, Thomas indicates a radical disanalogy. In the speculative realm, there is no sense in which principles depend upon conclusions. With prudence and the moral virtues, things are different. If the moral virtues are to intend the end rightly, they must be directed by prudence. The earlier division of labor between moral virtue and prudence that seemed so straightforward is now subverted, because moral virtue itself is an *habitus electivus* that depends on prudence. This means that not only does prudence require the moral virtues, but also that the moral virtues require prudence. Hence Thomas concludes that while "moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding and prudence."[6]

The reciprocal dependence of prudence and the moral virtues echoes rather than opposes Aristotle. Some commentators have located a contrast at a slightly different point. While Aristotle associates prudence with knowledge of both means and end, these interpreters claim, Thomas unambiguously restricts prudence to the selection of means. The end is grasped by synderesis rather than prudence, as Gauthier emphasizes, citing article 6 of question 47 of the *Secunda secundae.*[7] The text of the *Prima secundae,* however, complicates this simple contrast between Thomas and Aristotle-and it is not self-evident that the *Secunda*

[6] *STh* I-II, q. 58, a. 4.

[7] Gauthier, "Introduction," 1:277-78.

secundae is to be preferred to the *Prima secundae* on this point. The third objector of article 3 in question 66 asks whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues. Presupposing the division of labor between intention of end and choice of means, the objector argues that the moral virtues are better than prudence, just as the end is better than the means. Thomas rejects the argument outright by holding that "prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing *[praestituendo]* the end."[8] The analogy between the dependence of *scientia* on *intellectus* and the dependence of *prudentia* on *intentio* is useful, insofar as it indicates that prudence requires the rectitude of the will, and hence the moral virtues. But it cannot be taken as ultimate, since prudence concerns both the end and the means, even if its knowledge of the end consists principally in determining and specifying for the purposes of human action an end that is inchoately given by the *intentio* of the rightly disposed will, as perfected by the moral virtues.[9]

Thomas, then, preserves in a highly Aristotelian fashion both the reciprocity between prudence and the moral virtues and the ambiguous relations of prudence to knowledge of the human end. He also seems to follow Aristotle in regarding prudence as an intellectual virtue rather than a moral virtue. Responding to an objector in article 2 of question 58, Thomas says that prudence is "essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above. It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues."[10] This alone does not take Thomas far from Aristotle.

That Thomas in fact regards the fourfold classification of the cardinal virtues as not merely different from, but somehow superior to, the Aristotelian division is evident from the ascending character of the ordering of the questions on the division of

[8] *SJ'h* 1-11, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3.

[9] See Daniel Westberg, *Right Practical Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 29ff.

[10] *SJ'h* 1-11, q. 58, a. 3, ad 1.

virtue.[11] The text begins with the Aristotelian dichotomy (questions 57-60), moves to the cardinal virtues (question 61), and culminates in the theological virtues (question 62). While Thomas may regard the Aristotelian division as adequate on its own terms, he gives it only the first word. The final word must be reserved for higher authorities. The first of these higher authorities is Ambrose. The *sed contra* of article 1 of question 61 uses Ambrosian authority to name temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude as the four cardinal virtues, identifying each of them as precisely moral virtues. In the clarifying response, Thomas associates the most complete idea of virtue with moral virtue, because moral virtue essentially concerns the rectitude of the appetite. But prudence also concerns the appetite essentially. This means that prudence is not only an intellectual virtue, "but is also something of a moral virtue."[12] In the next article, the first objector assumes the legitimacy of regarding prudence as "the directing principle of the other moral virtues" and argues that it is the only principal virtue. Thomas responds to the objection by distinguishing between two senses of "principal," but does not question the objector's inclusion of prudence within the set of moral virtues.[13]

Thomas continues to regard prudence as if it were a moral virtue in the closing article of question 61. Affirming the sense in which the cardinal virtues are distinct from one another, Thomas cites Augustine in the *sed contra,* quoting a passage that identifies four parts of virtue. The parts of virtue are plural, because they are individuated by distinct "affections of love" *(affectus amoris).*[14] While prudence may be an intellectual virtue in the Aristotelian lexicon, Thomas does not hesitate to cite an Augustinian textual authority in which it is understood by reference to the affections. To be sure, the Augustinian authority is qualified in the *respondeo,* where prudence is once again

[11] Its superiority is confirmed by its structural role in the treatment of virtues in the *Secunda secundae.*

[12] *SI'h* 1-11, q. 61, a. 1.

[13] *SI'h* 1-11, q. 61, a. 2, ad 1.

[14] *SI'h* 1-11, q. 61, a. 4, SC.

connected with reason on the ground that it has *discretio,* a general property that belongs essentially to reason. But Thomas adds that distinguishing the cardinal virtues by their general properties is less satisfactory than distinguishing them according to their proper matter. (And as we have seen, it is precisely respect to its matter that prudence is a moral virtue.) He also proceeds to amplify Gregory's connection of the cardinal virtues in terms from the Dionysian vocabulary. "It may also be said that these four virtues qualify one another by a kind of overflow. "[15]

A subde but important and potentially far-reaching modification of the Aristotelian teaching on prudence is to be found in artide 2 of question 58. Here the first objector questions the distinction between *prudentia* and *ars,* arguing from Augustine's *De civitate Dei* (4.21) that "'virtue is the art of living righdy:' [16] Thomas responds not by denying the appropriateness of regarding virtue as an *ars,* but rather by endorsing it himself. He adds that the Augustinian dictum applies *essentially* to prudence, and to other virtues by participation, insofar as they are directed by prudence. The implication is that however justified the distinction between *prudentia* and *ars* may be, higher authority allows us to go beyond the strict limits of the Aristotelian distinction. We may indeed think of prudence in art-like as long as we understand that prudence is the art of human living as such, and therefore infinitely more important than any particular art whose object is something less than the final end.

But what positive reasons might we have for connecting prudence to *ars?* In what senses does the practice of living well significantly resemble an *ars?* One may first ask the question with reference to human *artes,* perhaps expecting to find structural features common to all *operatio.* Or one may pose the issue as a question about the relation of *prudentia* to the divine *ars,* especially its participatory relation to *providentia,* as indicated by question 22 of the *Prima pars"* Both of these strategies might

[15] *STh* I-ll, q. 61, a. 4, ad 1.

[16] *STh* I-II, q. 58, a. 2, obj. L

be pursued in the interest of constructing a fuller reading of Aquinas on moral matters.[17] Here I will simply suggest that the membrane that separates *prudentia* and *ars* may be more permeable than supposed by commentators who want Thomas to make adamantine distinctions.[18]

Thomas departs, ·then, from a strict Aristotelian view of prudence in at least two respects. First, he weakens the distinction between *prudentia* and *ars* by subsuming it within a theology of creation and providence unavailable to the Philosopher. Second, he assumes the fittingness of speaking of prudence as a moral virtue in senses not recognized, at least explicitly, by Aristotle himself. As long as we are careful not to derationalize it, or otherwise eliminate its directorial capacity, we may regard prudence as if it were a moral virtue. Doing so, in fact, manifests some of its properties and relations that are concealed by the Aristotelian division. Thus does Thomas honor the precedent of placing all of the cardinal virtues, including prudence, among the moral virtues.

III. PRUDENCE AND CONTEMPLATIVE WISDOM

We have a traced a sequence that begins with an Aristotelian doctrine of prudence and gradually complicates it through the use of other authorities: Cicero, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory. A more striking transformation of prudence occurs in article 5 of question 61. In this article, which serves as both the climax of the treatment of the cardinal virtues and the point of transition to the question on the theological virtues, Thomas adds to the catalogue

[17] For some suggestions as to how to begin, see Mark Jordan, "The *Pars moralis* of the *Summa theologiae* as *Scientia* and *asArs,"* in *Scientia und ars im Hoch- und Spiitmittelalter,* ed. Ingrid Cramer-Ruegenberg .andAndreas Speer (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1994), 468-81.

[18] An example may be found in Jacques Maritain: "the practical order itself is divided into two entirely distinct spheres which the Ancients termed Action *(agibile, prakton)* and Making *(factibile, poieton)"* (seeJacques Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism and the Frontiers ofPoetry,* trans. Joseph W. Evans [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962], 7). On the tendency of Maritain to make "adarnantine" distinctions, see Yves Congar, *Fifty Years of Catholic Theology,* ed. Bernard Lauret (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 73.

of inherited classifications by asking whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into the quartet of political virtues, purgative virtues, virtues of the purified soul, and exemplary virtues. [19] The quartet is taken from Plotinus as read by Macrobius in the first book of the *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio*.[20]

Thomas begins a positive answer to the question speaking of each extreme. The exemplary virtues exist in the divine mind. In God, Aquinas says, implicitly recalling the questions early the *Prima pars* about divine practical knowledge and its human participations, the divine mind itself may be caHed prudence. [21] Without exemplars in the divine intellect, no other virtues would exist. Moving from the most exalted to the most lowly, Thomas speaks of the political virtues, the virtues that enable human beings to conduct themselves rightly in the city. These are the virtues that exist in human beings according to the condition of their nature. In a sentence that dramaticaHy qualifies the whole of the previous discourse, Thomas declares, "It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now." [22]

Up to this point, everything the reader has learned about prudence has been about prudence as a political virtue. He has not learned, as it turns out, what is most essential about the virtue of the person moving toward his supernatural end-the person to whom the entire moral discourse of the *Summa* is directed, as the beginning of the *Prima secundae* has already established. Since man must strive for divine things, as even Aristode *(etiam Philosophus)* realizes, there must be some virtues that exist "between" the political virtues and the exemplary virtues. These are the second and third members of the Plotinian quartet, the

[19] *STh* I-H, q. 61, a. 5: "utrum virtutes cardinales convenienter dividantur in virtutes poliricas, purgatoaia, purgati animi, et exemplares."

[20] See Macrobius, *Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis* 1.8, trans. W. H. Stahl, *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952). As Mark Jordan observes, the passage was familiar to Thomas from many texts, including Albert's *Lectura* on the *Ethics.* See Jordan, "Theology of Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas,* ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 238 and 250 n. 37 with references.

[21] Cf. *STh* I, qq. 14,15, and 22.

[22] *STh* I-H, q. 61, a. 5.

purgative virtues and the virtues of the purified soul. The purgative virtues belong to men *in via* to the divine similitude; the virtues of the purified soul are possessed by those who have already attained it.

Aquinas redescribes all four cardinal virtues in accordance with each category. We learn that prudence, as a purgative virtue, has qualities that have scarcely been revealed until now: "Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone."[23] The difference from this-worldly Aristotelian *phronesis* is striking. It may still be that the principal act of prudence is command, involving the subordinate acts of counsel and judgment. Each of these acts, however, must be informed by contemplation, if they are directed to the ultimate end. Only thus will prudence be able to do its purgative work, after which it will assume its next form as a virtue of the purified soul, which "sees nothing else but the things of God."[24]

The form of prudence most appropriate to the creature on the way to God turns out to be contemplative. Thomas regards it as a virtue that directs its possessor to a world beyond this one. Prudence thus conceived may include aspects of political prudence, but it does so by transforming and ordering it to a larger end. Thomas does not deny the utility of political prudence, since civic goods are to be reordered rather than destroyed. The reordering is potentially radical, however, insofar as it implies that civic goods are to be counted "as nothing" in relation to the infinite good.

We can now see that the initial discussion, conducted under the auspices of Aristotelian authorities, is not meant to offer a complete, self-contained doctrine of prudence. It is, rather, a starting point from which the learner might rise with the help of non-Aristotelian philosophy.

[23] Ibid.: "prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae cogitationem in divina sola dirigat."

[24] *SI'h* 1-11, q. 61, a. 5.

IV. INFUSED PRUDENCE

If Thomas does not regard Aristotle as the final word on prudence, he equally denies it to Plotinus. The article that invokes Neoplatonic authority is the hinge that opens into the wider expanses of Christian theology. Thus immediately after analyzing the cardinal virtues under the Plotinian rubric, Aquinas takes up the theological virtues in question 62. This question never explicitly mentions prudence. It is, nevertheless, crucial for apprehending the full teaching on the subject. After discussing the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, Aquinas declares in the question's final article that "charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all."[25] Here Thomas is speaking of both the theological and the cardinal virtues. No exception is made for prudence. Prudence is not self-sufficient, but depends on charity as its formal cause. The type of prudence in question is not infused prudence-a category yet to be introduced-but *acquired* prudence. The requirement of charity as its formal cause differentiates this prµclence decisively from Aristotelian *phronesis*.[26]

In postulating the formal causality of charity, Thomas once again concludes the final article of a question in a way that serves as the point of transition to the next question-in this case, question 63 on the "cause of virtues." Here Aquinas is entering into a problematic bequeathed to him by the rich tradition of

[25] *STh* I-II, q. 62, a. 4. Thomas tells us that the matter will be taken up later *(STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 8). Against those who would like to find an autonomous ethics in the *Prima* secundae-amoral philosophy that is detachable from the "theological" *Secundasecundae-it* merits emphasis that the teaching on charity as form of the virtues first appears in the *Prima secundae,* in its central part.

[26] Daniel Mark Nelson notices that prudence depends upon charity, but tries to relativize the dependence to the "theological perspective"; see *The Priority of Prudence* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 71. There may be yet a "level of prudence" that, according to Nelson, we can "strive to attain on our own and which leads to the kind of natural happiness that is possible in this life" (72). But in the absence of charity, is this type of prudence a *virtue?* Is the "happiness" to which it leads anything more than a false relation to the last end? Such "Augustinian" questions seem to make some Thomists nervous, but Aquinas himself was content to raise the questions, and to answer them, in a very Augustinian fashion.

speculation on grace and nature.[27] He will return to the topic more fully in the final questions of the *Prima secundae.* We must confine ourselves to observing how the first two articles of this question serve to introduce the category of "infused moral virtues."

Article 1 takes up two antithetical views on the cause of virtue. One is the view that Aquinas associates with the Platonists, namely, the doctrine that full-fledged virtues naturally preexist in the soul, being inhibited only by the body. The other view is the Avicennian teaching that virtues are imposed upon human beings by the single agent intellect, as if from without. Aquinas holds for an Aristotelian mean between these views. The virtues are natural to human beings, but only by aptitude and inchoation. The exception, of course, is the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.

Article 2 continues to assert the "Aristotelian" position, holding that the virtues natural to human beings are formed by habituation. Note, however, that the authorities in this article are entirely non-Aristotelian. Against the appearance that grace precludes the acquisition of virtues by natural habituation, the *sed contra* invokes Dionysius. If evil acts are able to cause vicious habits, as they manifestly are, then so are good acts able to cause virtuous habits. Thomas presents this as a consequence of the Dionysian principle that good is more powerful than evil. The *respondeo* is more subtle. Thomas begins by distinguishing two sets of virtues: those that direct us to the good as defined by the rule of human reason, and those that direct us to the good as defined by divine law. Only the former set of virtues are caused by habituation. The latter set, by contrast, comprise the virtues that God works in us without us *(Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur).* Here Thomas reinvokes the Augustinian definition of virtue that was defended at the closing of question 55.[28]

One might suppose that Thomas has in mind a simple distinction between natural virtues caused by habituation and

[27] See Bernard]. F. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 1-19.

[28] Cf. *SI'h* 1-11, q. 55, a. 4; 1-11, q. 63, a. 2.

theological virtues caused by grace. Prudence, it would appear, is entirely on the side of the former. The question, however, is precisely which virtues direct us to the good as defined by divine law. Article 3 raises this question, asking whether the moral virtues, including prudence, are also in us by infusion. The objectors argue on various grounds that only the theological virtues are infused. The *sed contra* is a verse from the Book of Wisdom: "She teaches temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude."[29] Thomas illuminates the sense of the scriptural teaching in the *respondeo,* arguing that the creature on the way to his supernatural end requires not two but three kinds of virtue. The need for the natural acquired virtues and the infused theological virtues has already been established. What needs to be shown now is the necessity for a third class-the infused counterparts of the acquired cardinal virtues.

Thomas argues the need for infused moral virtues by constructing an analogy in a passage that requires some explication.

> Effects must be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, whether intellectual or moral, that are acquired by our own actions proceed from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as was said above in article 1 of this question and in article 1 of question 51. In place of these natural principles, the theological virtues are bestowed upon us by God. By these virtues we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated above in article 3 of question 62. Therefore it is necessary that other habits caused by God in us correspond in proportion to the theological virtues. These habits are to the theological virtues what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.[30]

[29] *SI'h* 1-11, q. 63, a. 3, sc.

[30] *SI'h* I-II, q. 63, a. 3: "respondeo dicendum quod oportet effectus esse suis causis et principiis proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales -taam morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedeunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis praeexistentibus, ut supra dictum est, art. 1 huius quaest., et quaest. 51, art. 1. Loco quorum naturalium principiorum conferuntur nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem supernaturalem, sicut supra dictum est, quaest. 62, art. 3. Unde oportet quod his etiam virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habent ad virtutes theologicas, sicut se habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad principia naturalia virtutum."

To understand this analogy, we must review, if only briefly, the relationship Thomas has already located between the natural beginnings of virtues and the moral and intellectual virtues. Article 1 of question 51 on the generation of habits identified the natural *principia* of virtues with the *seminalia virtutum*, the seeds of virtue that are the principles of common law.[31] They are the potencies that are multiply actualized in the moral and intellectual virtues. In one sense, then, it is legitimate to regard the virtues as the ends of the *seminalia*. Thomas qualifies this, however, by suggesting that just as principles are superior to conclusions, so are the *seminalia* superior to their outgrowths.[32] If the analogy is to hold between (1) the seeds of virtue and their actualizations in the acquired virtues and (2) the theological virtues and the infused moral virtues, then we would expect to find both that the infused moral virtues grow out of the soil of the theological virtues, and that the theological virtues set the ends at which the infused moral virtues aim.

The first aspect of the analogy demands immediate qualification. Infused moral virtues cannot properly be said to "grow" out of theological virtues, because there is no temporal process that generates one from the other. On the contrary, all the infused virtues are given simultaneously by grace. There is, nevertheless, a sense in which the theological virtues are prior to the infused moral virtues. The work of the former is to show us the supernatural end; the function of the latter is to enable human beings to take particular steps in attaining the end.[33] Hence the questions on the theological virtues come before the questions on the cardinal virtues in the ordering of the *Secunda secundae*. But with respect to the bestowal of infused virtues, there is no "before" or "after." The language of habituation does not apply; the virtues are given all at once. Thus in the final article of the question on the cause of virtue, Thomas holds that the acquired virtues and their infused counterparts remain different in kind. The acquired virtues are formed from seeds that exist in us

[31] *SI'h* 1-11, q. 51, a. 1. Cf. *SI'h* 1-11, q. 27, a. 3; 1-11, q. 67, a. 1, ad 3.

[32] *SI'h* 1-11, q. 63, a. 2, ad 3.

[33] This is the analysis given at *SI'h* 1-11, q. 65, a. 3.

naturally, developed by habituation, and at the mean as discerned by natural reason. Infused virtues, contrast, are given directly by grace, do not develop by habituation, and aim at the end as known by faith, aspired to by hope, and willed by charity.

How does this add to teaching on prudence? At the very least, Thomas has located a species of prudence that cannot be conflated with the Aristotelian virtue, since the origin, development, and end of the former differ radically from the latter. This might be taken, however, as merely asserting the banality that Aquinas is supplementing an essentially Aristotelian teaching with another type of prudence not recognized by Aristotle, since Aristotle was not a Christian and lacked the concept of grace. Against this view, at least two things need to be said. The first is that infused prudence is not simply another, supplemental species of prudence. It is prudence in its proper sense, because it corresponds most dosdy to the proper notion of virrue as expressed by the Augustinian of virrue as a quality of that God works *nobis sine* [34] It is at least a necessary prerequisite of the prudence that will be possessed by the creature *via* to his ultimate end. However complex the relations to acquired prudence may be, it cannot be said that Thomas's teaching on infused prudence is merely an addendum to a more fundamental doctrine of acquired prudence. The second point is that even character of acquired prudence has taken on subtle but important changes, because it has now been situated a new conceptual economy. It is now «informed" by charity operates the horizon now set by infused prudence. This is dearly a decisive difference from Aristotelian *phronesis.*

Thomas says relatively little in the *Prima secundae* about the relationship between acquired and infused moral virtue. We have seen that the final artide of question 63 on the cause of virtue teaches that they are specifically different. The specific difference, Thomas us, is twofold; it involves formal object and end. He uses the example of temperance to illustrate" The common matter

[34] The definition is invoked once more in the *sed contra* of *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4.

of each is the set of tactile pleasures. The formal object of acquired temperance is the mean as determined by purely human reason: "food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason."[35] The mean as determined by the divine rule, by contrast, is more stringent, enjoining man to castigate his own body and reduce himself to servitude before the Lord by abstinence in food, drink, and other sensual pleasures.[36]

With respect to the difference in end, Thomas does not give an example of a particular virtue. He simply distinguishes between virtues that enable one to live well in human affairs, and virtues that enable one to live well in the community that includes the saints and domestics of God. It is plausible that Thomas is alluding, *inter alia,* to the difference between the worldly prudence of the city and the three higher levels of prudence mentioned in article 5 of question 61 on the cardinal virtues. If this is correct, then he would not have to give a specific example, because he has already provided one in the earlier question.

Does the specific difference between acquired and infused prudence, as construed by Thomas, imply their basic independence from one another? Are we to regard each class of virtue as existing in a separate compartment? The remaining questions on the particular attributes of virtue, which constitute the final section of the sequence of questions on virtue in the *Prima secundae,* show that any strong idea of the autonomy of acquired prudence cannot be ascribed to Thomas. Not only do nature and grace cooperate, but all the virtues in a well-ordered soul are unified in charity. Question 65 on the connection of virtues begins with a distinction between virtues in their complete state and virtues in their incomplete state. Some of the moral virtues can exist without the others, but they will not exist *as* moral virtues except in an improper sense. From this alone it would seem to follow that acquired prudence will not exist in its most perfect state *as a virtue* unless it is accompanied by the other virtues, including the infused moral virtues. Thomas confirms this impression in article 2 of question 65, which asks whether the

[35] *STh* I-II, q. 63, a.4.

[36] Ibid.

moral virtues can exist in the absence of charity. An objector juxtaposes the teaching of book 2 of the *Ethics,* which argues that moral virtues can be acquired through human acts, and the scriptural teaching on the infusion of charity by the Holy Spirit. He draws the conclusion that the moral virtues are not connected with charity and can exist without it. Thomas answers the objector by acknowledging that his suggestion holds true of acquired virtue.[37] But acquired virtues without charity, Thomas adds in the *respondeo,* are virtues only *secundum quid.* They "direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end *simpliciter.*"[38] And the proper function of prudence, as Thomas has argued from Aristotle's own principles, is direction "concerning things that pertain to the entire life of man, and to the ultimate end of human life."[39] Unless it is informed by charity and, concomitantly, infused prudence, acquired prudence is not a virtue in the full sense.

Acquired prudence is not sufficient to direct the creature in respect of the ultimate end because it requires that prior disposition toward the ultimate end which is given by charity. A corollary is that acquired prudence *also* requires infused prudence, since infused prudence is included within charity, along with the other cardinal virtues, as Thomas reminds us in article 3 of question 65. Without charity and the infused cardinal virtues, acquired prudence may still exist, but it will not exist as a virtue. Thomas does not hesitate to quote the Augustinian gloss on Romans 14:13, "He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good."[40] Acquired prudence may enable individuals to lead "good lives." But unless the acts governed by acquired prudence are themselves ordered to the supernatural end, the virtue that directs these acts will count as a virtue only in an analogous, derivative fashion. If charity is the

[37] *STh* 1-11, q. 63, a. 4, ad 2.
[38] *STh* 1-11, q. 65, a. 2.
[39] *STh* 1-11, q. 57, a. 4, ad 3.
[40] Quoted in *STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 2.

mother of all the virtues, as Thomas has said, then the virtues without charity are simulacra.[41]

If the infused virtues are virtues in the proper sense, then where is the need for acquired virtues? Does the prudence infused by grace obviate the need for acquired prudence? It is true that infused prudence *can* operate without acquired prudence; the operation of grace can never be said to *require* nature. For Thomas, if not for Aristotle, it is possible for a person to act, and act repeatedly, in accord with prudence despite a settled disposition to the contrary.[42] Nonetheless, grace ordinarily involves the cooperation of nature. The creature on the way toward his ultimate end will hope to possess both types of virtue, and integrate them into a unified habit of prudence.[43] The concept of acquired prudence, then, survives the introduction of infused prudence. Yet it does so only after being placed within a new teleology that is foreign to Aristotle. Aquinas preserves what he can of Aristotelian thinking and observation about acquired prudence, but he does not pretend that acquired prudence, having been brought into the service of charity, can remain exactly what it was for Aristotle. Both the similarities and the differences are crucial.

Thomas says little more about the relations of acquired and infused prudence, not only because the *Prima secundae* treats of

[41] This view has repelled many interpreters. Bonnie Kent, for example, has sought to distinguish Aquinas's view from the "moral particularism" of Augustine, citing passages where Thomas describes virtues without charity as "imperfect" and even "true" in a sense (e.g., cases in which the intended good is something as vital as preservation of the *civitas).* But this does not warrant the ascription of anything like a "moral cosmopolitanism" to Aquinas. It is revealing that in the course of reading Aquinas as an anti-Augustinian, Kent neither mentions his approval of the Augustinian gloss nor attends in general to the play of Aristotelian and Augustinian authorities. See Bonnie Kent, "Moral Provincialism," *Religious Studies* 30 (1994): 269-85.

[42] Alasdair Macintyre, in informal conversation, has compared this aspect of the relation between Aristotle and Aquinas to the pessimism of Freud and comparative optimism of Melanie Klein.

[43] Rejecting the absolute priority of either infused or acquired prudence, Josef Pieper stresses the "pre-eminence of that 'fuller' prudence in which the natural *and* the supernatural, the acquired *and* the given, are combined in a felicitous, in a literally 'graced' unity" (Pieper, *Prudence* [Pantheon Books: New York, 1959], 31).

moral matters in general, but also because it would be difficult to say more without entering directly into the wider problematic of nature and grace. This he takes up in the final sections of the *Prima secunda.e,* before returning to the theological and cardinal virtues in the *Secunda. secunda.e.*

The interpretation of prudence as presented in the *Secunda. secunda.e* poses special challenges of its own. These cannot be confronted here. Doing so would require not only dose attention to the (non-Aristotelian) ordering of questions 47-56 and the complex dialectical movement within those questions, but also the exposition and defense of a view on the logical relation of the *Prima secunda.e* to the *Secunda.secunda.e.* I suspect, however, that such an effort would confirm the conclusion proposed by my reading. While the teaching of Thomas Aquinas on prudence makes crucial use of Aristotle, and does so in a way that does not unscrupulously distort the Philosopher, as Gauthier thinks, the doctrine itself must on the whole be judged as non-Aristotelian. [44] When taken up in the human creature's ascent to God and transformed by charity, prudence becomes something more than Aristotelian *phronesis.* It becomes a participation in divine Providence. [45]

[44] In *Whose justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), Alasdair Macintyre points to the link between human prudence and divine providence, ascribes to Aquinas the view that Aristotle's teleology is "radically defective," and observes that for Thomas even the natural virtues require charity (205). Yet he weakly holds that "there is a dimension to Aquinas' discussion of *prudentia* which is not Aristotelian" (196). His own evidence seems to point to a stronger formulation: that there is an Aristotelian dimension of a Thomist teaching that is not itself Aristotelian.

[45] An earlier version of this paper was read at the 33rd International Congress of Medieval Studies in Kalamazoo, Michigan. I thank Mark Jordan, Rebecca DeYoung, and Michael Dauphinais for their suggestions and comments.

The Thomist 64 (2000): 423-48

THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT AND THE DOMAINS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

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The most common version of the doctrine of double effect maintains that a distinction should be drawn between two domains of moral responsibility. In the one domain are those effects that an agent brings about as ends or as means to his ends. In the other are those effects that an agent only foresees he will bring about, even if he is certain he will bring them about. The distinction made between these two domains is such that there are certain kinds of effects that could never be justified if they were brought about as means or ends, but that could be justified if they were brought about as foreseen side effects, even if the agent were certain that his action would bring them about.

There is another, much weaker version of double effect, which creates a different line of demarcation between the two domains of moral responsibility. In this version there are kinds of effects that could never be justified if they were brought about as ends or means, and that could be justified if brought about as foreseen side effects, but only if the agent was less than certain that his action would bring them about. Here the agent is only justified in taking the risk that he will bring these side effects about. If he is certain that his action will bring such effects about, then they belong in the same moral domain as means.

Saint Thomas Aquinas has often been identified as at least the implicit source of the strong version of the doctrine of double

effect.[1] It is argued that, for Aquinas, intention defines a special domain of moral responsibility. While we are responsible for everything we knowingly bring about, we are responsible in a special way for what we knowingly and intentionally bring about. And it is argued that, for Aquinas, what we intentionally bring about are the ends we pursue and the means we employ-hence the strong version of double effect.

Recently, however, Thomas Cavanaugh has argued that Aquinas only accepts the weak version.[2] I believe that Cavanaugh is correct, but his argument is less than convincing because he relies on the same use of the concept of intention employed by those who defend the strong version. I shall argue that this use of the concept of intention is mistaken both as an interpretation of Aquinas and as a philosophical position.

For Aquinas, I will argue, we intend only the end, not some complex of end and means. Once this is recognized, it will become clear that Aquinas subscribes only to the weak version of double effect, and this in turn will show that, in his thought, intention does not define a special domain of moral responsibility in any way that is relevant to the doctrine of double effect. Finally, I will argue that in his analysis of the moral act Aquinas provides us with strong grounds for justifying the position he takes.

I

In describing Aquinas's position Anthony Kenny writes: "The end is wanted, the means are chosen; what is intended is neither the end itself, nor the means in themselves, but the end through

[1] See Joseph Boyle, "*Praeter Intentionem* in Aquinas," *The Thomist* 42 650. In this paper I will concentrate mainly on the arguments of Boyle since he has done most to defend the strong version of double effect.

[2] Thomas Cavanaugh, "Aquinas's Account of Double Effect," *The Thomist* 61 (1997): 107-21. In a more recent article Cavanaugh has himself rejected the position he ascribes to Aquinas and has argued in favor of the strong version of double effect. See Thomas Cavanaugh, "Double Effect and the Ethical Significance of Distinct Volitional States," *Christian Bioethics* 3, no. 2 (1997): 134. We shall consider this argument later.

the means."[3] Cavanaugh tells us that, for Aquinas, "we will the end, we choose the means, we intend the complex end-through-means."[4] Joseph Boyle is the most cautious. He admits that, for Aquinas, the agent does not intend the means as such. But still he goes on to say that the means as means are "within intention. "[5] I believe that all these comments reflect an inaccurate interpretation of the position of Aquinas; intention is not for some complex of means and end, but only for the end.

To be sure, in the language of Aquinas the kinds of actions we would usually identify as means, such as calling for a doctor or taking medicine, are intended-but intended as an end, not as a means. Means as means are not intended or included within the object of intention. This point might seem to be a slight one, but if it is acknowledged it then becomes easier to understand the role that, for Aquinas, a consideration of intention is supposed to play in moral assessment.

One can see why it is so easy to believe that, for Aquinas, one intends not only the end but also the means as means. In contemporary philosophical circles there is virtual unanimity that one intends both the end and the means, and this unanimity probably accurately reflects contemporary usage. This makes it all too easy to assume that Aquinas holds the same. But a careful look at the text reveals that Aquinas used the term "intention" in a different way.

At first glance, it does seem that the text of Aquinas supports the inclusion of the means as means within the object of intention. This apparent support is found in Aquinas's discussion of the distinction between simple volition and intention. [6] Aquinas tells us that while volition is simply *(absolute)* for the end, intention is for an end as a term towards which something *(aliquis)* or something else *(aliquidaliud)* is ordered. But what is this 'something else'? The characteristic examples of this

[3] Anthony Kenny, *The Anatomy of the Soul: Historical Essays in the Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), 138.

[4] Cavanaugh," Aquinas's Account of Double Effect," 113.

[5] Boyle, *"Praeter Intentionem* in Aquinas," 653 and 657.

[6] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4.

'something else' that Aquinas gives are examples of what we would ordinarily call means. Thus one intends to attain health (the end) by taking medicine,[7] or by calling for a doctor.[8] This has led commentators and translators to assume that this 'something else' must always be something we would call a means. Consequently it is concluded that the concept of intention involves an essential reference to means and that thus the means as means must somehow be within the scope of intention.[9] But I believe that it is inaccurate to say that this 'something else' that is ordered to the end must always be a means. Consequently it is inaccurate to say that, for Aquinas, the means as means are part of the object, or are within the scope of the object of intention.

In the body of the article in which Aquinas makes the distinction between volition and intention, he states that intention involves a movement towards an end, and that this movement involves a mover and a moved. It is obvious that the mover is the will. But the moved, he tells us, is the *other* powers of the soul, that is, the ability to reason, imagine, see, hear, move from place to place, and so on.[10] It is dear then, that what distinguishes volition and intention is the fact that while volition consists simply in actually desiring an end, intention involves using the other powers of the soul in *doing something* to achieve a desired end. Thus the essential difference between volition and intention is the fact that intention implies action in a way in which simple volition does not. And the 'something other' to which the concept of intention must refer is the other powers of the soul.

When we act to realize an end, very often we employ means. But sometimes we do not. There are some actions, such as speaking, that I might intend to do and do straight off. In such an action I must employ some of the other powers of my soul, the ability I have, for example, to control my lungs, larynx, mouth. But I do not use anything we would ordinarily call means. Thus while intention must always refer to 'something other' which is

[7] *STh* I-II, q. 14, a. 4.

[8] *STh* I-II, q. 8, a. 3.

[9] Boyle, *"Praeter Intentionem* in Aquinas," 653.

[10] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 1.

ordered to the end, and while this 'something other' must always consist, at least in part, of some of the powers of my soul which are to be employed by my will in attaining the end, it need not necessarily involve what we would ordinarily call means. Thus it cannot be claimed that the means as means are within intention because the concept of intention necessarily involves a reference to means. It simply does not necessarily involve such a reference.

It might be objected that the term 'means' can be interpreted to include any use I make of the other powers of the soul. Thus one might say that even in just speaking I must make use of various muscles and the use I make of these muscles could be called the means by which I speak But it would be misleading to treat this use of muscles as the same kind of thing as picking up a pen in order to write. Picking up a pen is something one can simply do, and consequently it is something one can do for any number of reasons. But how can one use the various muscles one uses in order to speak? Clearly, only by speaking. It would be more accurate to say not that I speak by moving these muscles, but that in speaking I move these muscles (although in the context of some kind of medical test it could be accurate to say that I speak in order to move these muscles). Thus it would be misleading to stretch the notion of means so that it includes both what we would ordinarily call means and any use we make of the various powers of the soul.

Perhaps this point needs belaboring. I am not claiming that for an act to count as what we would ordinarily call a means it must be temporally distinct from the act that is the end for which it is the means. As we shall discuss later, the very same act can be identified, under one description, as an end, and, under a different description, as a means to that end. For example, I might be waving my arm and when asked, "Why are you waving your arm?" I might answer that I am waving my arm in order to get my friend's attention. Thus my action under the description "waving my arm" would be identified as a means by which I achieve the end of attracting my friend's attention. But in answer to the same question, I might simply say: "I am attracting my friend's attention." In this second case I would be describing this

act as an end" But what we ordinarily call means-for example, calling for a doctor, taking medicine, waving my arm-can aU be picked out with a description that could also be used to identify some other act than the act by which some particular end is achieved. Thus I can "wave my arm" not just to get attention, but also to exercise, to signal approval, and so on, In contrast, "using my muscles such a way as to speak" can only be used to identify the act of speaking. for this reason it is significantly different from what we usually call a means.

But if the 'something other' to which intentions refer is not necessarily a means, why, when Aquinas gives us examples of this something other, does he give us examples of means? And why, when he exp Heidy discusses this 'something other', does he discuss only what we would ordinarily call means? There is one obvious reason: a means is a dear and legitimate example of this 'something other'. There are further reasons as well why it is natural that Aquinas should choose *only* this kind of example. First of all, foHowing Aristotle, Aquinas wants to discuss desiring ends and then deliberating about and choosing means. This makes something that is a means the obvious choice of example. But a much more important reason is that Aquinas formulates his whole theory of human action not as part of an abstract debate in action theory, but solely as part of a discussion of moral assessment. Now the only kind of evaluation we make of the movements of our musdes and limbs is in terms of the actions that these movements are involved in. Thus such movements, in themselves, would be of no interest to Aquinas. Consequently it should not be surprising that when Aquinas discusses this 'something other', he discusses only what we ordinarily call means. In other words, it is not his concept of intention that leads Aquinas to using only means in his examples of this 'something other', but rather an extraneous commitment to a discussion of moral assessment. Unfortunately this choice of examples seems to have misled many of his interpreters.

One cannot argue, then, that for Aquinas the means as means must somehow be within the scope of the object of intention on the grounds that the concept of intention involves an essential

reference to means: it does not. But Boyle also offers two other grounds for claiming that the means as means must be within the scope of the object of intention.

Boyle cites two texts in which Aquinas seems to say that what is outside intention lacks an order to the end.[11] These texts would seem to provide grounds for claiming that the means as means must be within intention, for since the means just as means do have an order to the end, these texts would seem to imply that they could not be outside intention. However, the texts that Boyle cites do not necessarily support his position. The first text, which is from the *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,* seems to be irrelevant because it has nothing to do with human action.[12] The second text is about human action, but here Aquinas doesn't say that what is outside intention lacks an order to the end.[13] Rather he says that what is both outside intention and by chance *(casu)* lacks an order to the end. Thus neither of these texts provides a compelling reason to claim that the means as means are within intention.

Boyle also takes Aquinas's claim that in what is numerically one act the agent can will both the end and the means to be evidence that the means as means can be within the scope of the object of intention.[14] But the article he refers to can be plausibly interpreted to lend more support to the position of this paper than to the position of Boyle. Aquinas explains his point by referring to Aristotle's remark that the same slope could be identified differently depending on whether it was described as a steep ascent or a steep descent.[15] Aquinas's position, then, would

[11] Boyle, *"Praeter Intentionem* in Aquinas," 654.

[12] See IV *Sent.,* d. 4, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4 (Boyle incorrectly cites this text as a. 1, ad 2). In this text we are told that even the damned retain on their souls the character which they have received in baptism. But this is "praeter intentionem imprimentis characterem." He goes on to say: "Et ideo non est ibi ordinatus ad aliquem finem, quia quae praeter intentionem accidunt, carent ordine ad finem." In this text it would seem that "praeter intentionem accidunt" would be best translated as "what happens outside an end or purpose." And obviously what happens outside an end or purpose lacks an order to an end.

[13] *STh* I-II, q. 102, a. 1.

[14] Boyle, *"Praeter Intenionem* in Aquinas," 654. The text he refers to is *STh* I-11, q. 12, a. 4.

[15] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3. Aquinas cites Aristotle's *Physics,* 3.3.

seem to be that the same action could be identified as a means under one description and as an end under a different description. Thus I might take medicine in order to maintain my health. This action, under the description "taking medicine," could be identified as a means. But if when asked what I was doing I were to reply, "I am taking care of my health," I would be describing it as an end.[16] Thus the action, *described not as a means but as an end,* could be an object of intention.

II

So far I have argued that, for Aquinas, one intends only the end. This point is significant for understanding his position on the role that a consideration of intention should play in moral assessment. But before turning to this position, it is necessary to consider in more detail the relationship of intention and end to action.

In a familiar text Aquinas argues that intention need not be for a last end:

> Intention regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole movement. Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the other. Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be of both.[17]

What Aquinas seems to have in mind in this text is a process in which there are a number of steps leading to a conclusion. Thus I might want to consume medicine in order to restore my health. But I might first have to buy the ingredients and then mix them in order to make the medicine. Each of these steps would have to have its own end even though it was just one step in the overall

[16] *As* we shall see, it is also the case that one and the same action, under the same description, can be described in one context as a means, and in another context as an end.

[17] *STh* 1-11, q. 12, a. 2 (translation in Aquinas, *Summa theologica,* trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province [New York: Benziger, 1947]).

process. In this kind of situation we can see another way in which what is a means in one context can be identified as an end in another context Thus while my mixing of the medicine is a means which will enable me to take it, the successful mixing is the intended end of this particular act Thus the means is intended, but again only as an end.

There is an apparent problem involved in Aquinas's position. In his analysis the overall movement toward the end is broken up into temporal segments. But what is to keep this process from being arbitrary and open ended? This would seem to remain a question even if one insists that the temporal segments have to be actions, for what can be accurately described as an action can often be resolved into temporally discrete, more precisely defined actions. Thus in the act of mixing the medicine I might first add so much of one ingredient to a second ingredient and then mix for several seconds before adding a third ingredient and so on. And each of these steps might constitute a different act. What is to place a limit on this process of resolution?

Aquinas's use of the word *terminus* supplies an answer to this question. *Terminus* literally means the point in time at which an action stops, and the point at which an action stops need not be some goal or objective. I might stop mixing the medicine because I am knocked over or because I faint. But it is dear, given the way in which Aquinas uses *tenninus* as interchangeable with *finis* (goal or objective), that this is not what he means. In this text the action ceases because the goal has been reached and the action has been successfully completed. This is what places a limit on the process of segmentation. Each segment must be an action. And for a segment to count as an action there must be some description that an agent would recognize as a description that could be used to identify that point in time at which that action had been successfully completed. This is a description of the term of the action, that is, the end that the agent was trying to achieve in (as opposed to by) the very performance of the action. Thus with respect to tying my shoelaces someone might say "First you moved your right finger into opposition to your right thumb." But I might not recognize that as a description of the successful

completion of anything I tried to do. And, if that is the case, while it would be part of the behavior involved in tying my shoelaces, it would not be one of the actions that was part of what went on when I tied shoelaces. In fact it is possible that the only description I could recognize as a description of what I was trying to achieve in tying my shoelaces was "tying my shoelaces."" If this were the case, this action would not be subject to any process of resolution into more elementary actions.

In his discussion of moral assessment, and elsewhere, Aquinas makes a distinction between the object of the act and the end of the act. This terminology might seem misleading because what he caHs the object of the act is also an end of the act, a proximate as opposed to a more remote end of the act.[18] However, what he caHs the object of the act is not just an end that happens to be more temporally proximate to the act than any other end. It is the end that constitutes the terminus of the action, the point at which the action has been successfully completed, and as such it provides the grounds for identifying the segment of behavior referred to as an action. Thus what Aquinas calls the object of the act is not just something that, as end, explains why the agent performed an action; it also enables us to say that it was an action that he performed.

Since intention is only for the end, whether in terms of the object or in terms of the end of the action, the role intention WHl play in determining moral responsibility will be based on some consideration of the end. We shall eventually see that intention plays two different roles in determining moral responsibility, but only one of these roles is relevant to the issue of double effect: namely, the role intention plays in determining the kind of action to be moraHy assessed.

Intention, as we have seen, determines the end of the action. But, Aquinas tells us, it is the end of the action, whether in terms of the object of the act,[19] or in terms of some further end of the action,[20] that determines, for the purposes of moral assessment,

[18] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.

[19] *STh* I-H, q. 18, a. 2.

[20] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 6.

the species of the act.[21] So it is intention through its determination of the end of the action that determines whether the kind of action we are morally assessing is one of shoelace tying, or vainglory, or homicide, and so on. This has an obvious relevance to double effect. If an effect results from the agent's action, and the agent intends this effect, then the effect enters into the very description of the kind of act to be morally assessed. Thus if the death of a human being results from the action of the agent, and the agent intends this effect as an end, the act is a homicide. If the agent does not intend this effect as an end, then the act is not one of homicide.

The fact that intention determines in this way the kind of action performed might lead one to conclude that, for Aquinas, intention defines a special domain of moral responsibility and consequently that he accepts the strong version of double effect. In other words, one might be tempted to conclude that, for Aquinas, the agent has a special responsibility for all and only those aspects (including effects) of his action that enter into a description of the kind of act performed. But this is not the position he takes. He holds that the agent has the *same responsibility* for those effects which are the particular concern of the strong version of double effect, *whether he intends them or not.* We can see this in his discussion of killing in self-defense.

III

Aquinas begins his discussion of killing in self-defense by noting that an action can have two effects, one of which is intended and the other of which is outside intention, *praeter intentionem.* [22] This distinction is often seen as the basic point of the article.[23] But it is not. For Aquinas, it is only the starting point for moral analysis.

[21] An act could have several ends and thus be classified in several ways. Thus one might give alms for the sake of vainglory. This would be an act of both almsgiving and vainglory. See *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3.

[22] *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7.

[23] Cf. Boyle, *"Praeter Intentionem* in Aquinas," 657.

In the text Aquinas actually says is that an action receives its species from the object of the agent's intention. As we have just seen, this means that the intention of the agent enables us to identify, for the purpose of moral assessment, the kind of action we are dealing Thus if the end of the action is the killing of a human being the act is a homicide or an attempted homicide. [24] If, on the other hand, the effect is not intended by the agent, if it is outside the agent's intention, then, as Aquinas teUs us, it is *per accidens*, that is, it is not involved in essence of the act; it is not a factor in determining the kind of action that occurred. [25]

The point, then, and the only point of Aquinas's reference to intention and to what is outside has to do with determining the kind of action with which we are dealing. This is the obvious place to start the process of moral assessment-but it is only a start, and only sometimes does it give us conclusive results. [26] If the end of an act is adultery, then it is an adulterous act, and on that basis alone it would be judged to be wrong. But often just identifying an act as a kind of act is not enough to ground any moral condusion. Thus in the text we are dealing with, if we discover that the end of the action is the death of the assailant, then we would know that we could classify this action as a homicide. But this, in itsdf, unlike the case of the adulterous

[24] Following Aquinas, I am using the term "homicide" as a morally neutral term indicating the taking of a human life.

[25] In *STh* HK, q. 72, a. 1, Aquinas says, "Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from what is essential and not from what is accidental." Thus since intention determines the end, and the end determines the species of the act, what is outside intention would have to be accidental, that is, not involved in determining the kind of action performed.

[16] Cavanaugh suggests a different interpretation. He translates Aquinas as saying "moral acts receive their character according to what is intended, not according to what is *praeter intentionem"* (Cavanaugh, "Aquinas's Account of Double Effect," 113). from this he concludes that "what is *praeter intentionem* is not essential to establishing the agent's action as good or bad"(ibid.). Here he seems to be assuming that intention simply and directly determines the moral character of the act. This enables him to conclude that a consideration of what is *praeter intentioneni* is not necessary in determining the act as good or bad. But such an interpretation is dearly untenable. As Cavanaugh himself notes (ibid.), Aquinas states that in morally assessing "1ll action one must consider the object of the act, the end of the act, and the circumstances of the act *(STh* I-H, q. 18, a. 1). And while the object of the act and the end of the act are determined by the intentions of the agent, such circumstances as who performs the act are not. Thus some consideration of what is *praeter intentionem* is essential in establishing the act as good or bad.

act, would still not give us enough to ground a moral judgement. We would have to look into the circumstances. Who was the agent? If we discover that the person who performed the action was not an agent of the state, acting as such, then we would know that the act was wrong. If this person was an agent of the state acting as such, then the action, so far considered, would not be wrong. Even here we would have to be careful, because if this agent was "moved by private animosity" [27] once again the action would be wrong. Thus while determining the intention and thus the end of the act gives us a classification of the act, this sometimes provides not the conclusion but only the start of the process of moral assessment.

In the case where the agent intended only to protect his own life and did not intend to kill the assailant we would not have an act of homicide even if the assailant were killed, but rather an act of self-defense. Self-defense, like homicide, can be either right or wrong. Again, we would have to look at the circumstances; in this case we would have to consider, not whether the person acting was an agent of the state, but whether the force used in self-defense was moderate, that is, no more than what was necessary to get the job done. If it was more than necessary, then the act was wrong.

But there is more to consider here in the way of circumstances. One of the circumstances of the act under consideration is the fact that the assailant dies as a result of the action of the agent. So just as we had to consider the way in which force is used, we would also have to consider the way in which the action results in the death of the assailant. On this issue Aquinas is clear. In an answer to an objection, he remarks that the kind of action he is referring to is one from which the death of the assailant follows sometimes *(quandoque).* In other words, if it is necessary, one can legitimately use in self-defense a kind of action from which the death of the assailant will sometimes follow. If it is necessary, one can risk the life of the assailant.

[27] *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7.

This same position is also found in the body of the article, although there it is stated in an admittedly oblique fashion. We can see it in the use of the verbs *evitare* and *providere.* Aquinas tells us that the agent need not omit the use of moderate force in order to avoid *(evitare)* the death of the assailant. Now *evitare,* "to avoid" or "to shun," implies taking steps to see to it that something doesn't happen. Thus Aquinas is telling us that in confronting the assailant, the agent is not obliged to take steps to see to it that the assailant doesn't die. In other words, he is not obliged to see to it that the assailant survives. All this seems to imply is that he can risk the life of the assailant.

Furthermore, Aquinas justifies the position he takes by saying that one is bound to take more precautions, *plus providere,* for one's own life than for the life of another. In the context of the article this means that when faced with the choice of taking precautions for my own life or taking precautions for the life of another I can legitimately take precautions for my own life. Thus I need not take precautions to see to it that the assailant survives. Here again it would seem that the most natural reading of this text is that the agent can risk the life of the assailant.

Cavanaugh correctly recognizes the significance of Aquinas's comment that the death follows only sometimes, and uses it to argue that, in this text, Aquinas accepts only the weak version of double effect. But he interprets Aquinas, in this comment, to be referring to the conditions under which the death would not be intentional. On his interpretation killing in self-defense can be justified if two conditions are met: the death is not intended and moderate force is used. He argues that for the death to be not intended it is necessary that it follow only sometimes from the kind of action employed by the agent.[28] This, however, is a difficult interpretation to defend. As Boyle points out,[29] and as Cavanaugh admits,[30] there are texts in which Aquinas identifies as being outside intention properties that are necessarily and always associated with the kind of action performed. Why, then,

[28] Cavanaugh, "Aquinas's Account of Double Effect," 110-12.

[29] Boyle, *"Praeter Intentionem* in Aquinas," 660-63.

[30] Cavanaugh, "Aquinas's Account of Double Effect," 118.

in this case would Aquinas hold that for the death to be not intended it is necessary that it follow only sometimes? My position, on the other hand, is that the use of the term "sometimes" does not relate to the question of whether the death is intended or not. The death of the assailant is not intended, for Aquinas, simply because it is not the end of the act. The use of the term "sometimes" is meant to clarify not the content of the intentions of the agent, but rather one of the circumstances required for a legitimate act of self-defense.

If we can generalize from Aquinas's discussion of self-defense, it would seem that even if it would be wrong for an agent to bring about a kind of effect as an intended effect, it might still be possible to justify bringing about that kind of effect as an unintended or circumstantial effect, but only if the effect followed with less than certainty from the agent's action. If the agent were certain that such an effect would follow from his action, then it would be wrong for him to bring about this effect as an intended *or unintended* effect. This is obviously equivalent to a rejection of the strong version of double effect along with its underlying assumption that intention always defines a special domain of moral responsibility. For on this underlying assumption the kind of responsibility that an agent has for those effects he intends he has only for those effects he intends. On the contrary, my reading of Aquinas's account is that, in the situation we have described, the agent would have the same responsibility for the effect whether it was intended or not. One could see why some would resist this interpretation. It does seem strange that there are situations in which there is no moral significance in whether or not an agent intends an effect. But this position does have a clear justification in the thought of Aquinas.

IV

Before turning to the justification of Aquinas's position, it is necessary to define more sharply the issue under debate. As we have seen, the doctrine of double effect is traditionally formulated in terms of a distinction between ends and means on one side and

side effects on the other. But this formulation m less than adequate because it fails to take explicitly into account the distinction between those ends that are wanted in themselves, and thus final, and those intermediate ends that are of merely instrumental value. Furthermore, it should be dear that virtually everything we ordinarily identify as means could also be identified as such intermediate ends. Thus, discussing double effect it would be more precise and useful to distinguish between effects that are brought about as final ends, effects that are brought about as intermediate ends, and side effects. And once one adopts this three-part distinction, it becomes dear that there are not two but rather three correlated domains of moral responsibility. There are effects that could never be permissible if brought about as final ends, but that might be justified if brought about as intermediate ends, that is, as means" For example, whHe it would never be permissible to inflict physical or psychological pain on another just for the sake of inflicting the pain, it could be permissible to inflict such pain as an instrumental end. In military training one can deliberately inflict physical and psychological pain on recruits in order to test and to enhance their endurance. [31] This implies that there is one domain of moral responsibility that consists of those effects the agent brings about as final ends, a second domain that consists (roughly) of those effects the agent brings about as intermediate ends, and a third domain that consists (roughly) of side effects.

These three domains a:re correlated in such a way that the domain of effects that are final ends is most restrictive and the domain of (roughly) side effects is least restrictive" Thus if a kind of effect is permissible as a final end, obviously it would be permissible as an intermediate end or as a side effect. But even if

[31] The notion that there are kinds of effects that could be justified as means but never as ends does seem to be present in the thought of Aquinas. As we have seen in his discussion of homicide, Aquinas claims that the death of a human being can be a legitimate end of human action, but only if it is done by an agent of the state and only as a means to preserving the common good. Thus if an agent of the state acts out of private animosity-that is, if the person's death is something he also wants for its own sake-the act is wrong. Thus, for Aquinas homicide is something that even a public official can never pursue as a final end, but it is something that he can pursue as an intermediate end. See *STh* H-Il, q. 64, a. 2.

a kind of effect is not permissible as a final end, it might be justified as an intermediate end. On the other hand, if a kind of effect is never permissible as an intermediate end, it could never be permissible as a final end. In the same way, if a kind of effect is permissible as an intermediate end, then obviously it could be justified as a side effect. But even if a kind of effect is never permissible as an intermediate end, it might be justified if brought about as (roughly) a side effect.

We are now in a position to define more precisely the point of the doctrine of double effect, and the point of disagreement between the strong and weak versions of this doctrine. The first point to be noted is that the tradition.al doctrine of double effect has nothing to do with final ends. We have found two distinctions with regard to moral responsibility. The first is the distinction between effects brought about as final ends and effects brought about as intermediate ends. The second is the distinction between effects that are brought about as intermediate ends and (roughly) side effects. The traditional doctrine of double effect deals only with this second distinction. The only point of the doctrine of double effect is that effects that could never be justified as intermediate ends might be justified if brought about as (roughly) side effects.[32] And the point of contention between the strong version and the weak version of this doctrine has to do with where to draw the line of moral demarcation between intermediate ends and side effects. According to Boyle, even if it were never permissible to bring about a kind of effect as an intermediate end, it might still be possible for an agent to justify bringing about this effect as a side effect even if he were certain this effect would follow from his action. In Aquinas's account,

[32] This formulation of double effect is more precise than, but not inconsistent with, the traditional formulation. Traditionally the doctrine of double effect is said to deal with the justification of effects that it would never be permissible to bring about as either ends or means. This of course implies that it has to do with the possibility of justifying effects that could not be justified as ends and could not be justified as means. And of course this implies that it has to deal with the justification of effects that could not be justified as means, which is equivalent to my suggested formulation. My point is that the reference to final ends in the traditional formulation is otiose. If it were impermissible to bring about a kind of effect as a means, then surely it would be impermissible to bring such an effect about as a final end. Furthermore, as we shall see, the reference to final ends has tended to generate confusion.

even if it is never permissible to bring about a kind of effect as an intermediate end, it might still be possible for an agent to justify bringing it about as a side effect, but only if he was less than certain that it would follow from his action. If he was certain, then this effect would belong in the same domain as instrumental ends and he could not be justified in bringing it about.

The failure to recognize that there are not two, but rather three correlated domains of moral responsibility has led to confusion in some discussions of double effect. Thus Anthony Kenny gives the following as an example of double effect.

> It is an unfriendly act for a hostess deliberately to seat one of her guests at table next to another guest whom she knows he dislikes. The act is not unfriendly if she assigns the place to the guests not deliberately, but because such is the unintended outcome of a placement which takes account of the conventions about alternating between sexes, separating husbands and wives, and so on.[33]

Again, the point of the doctrine of double effect is that there are effects that cannot be legitimately brought about as intermediate ends (means), but that might legitimately be brought about as side effects. But this is not the kind of situation that Kenny is describing. Certainly it would be wrong to seat a guest next to someone he disliked as an end in itself, as a final end. This would be unfriendly. But one could imagine drcumstarn::es in which one might justifiably seat a guest next to someone he disliked in order to strengthen his character or to enhance his social graces. Thus because seating a guest next to someone he disliked could be justified as an intermediate end (a means), no spedal argument from double effect is required to show that one could be justified in doing this as a foreseen side effect. Thus Kenny's example is not relevant to the traditional doctrine of double effect.[34]

[33] Anthony Kenny, "PhilippaFoote on Double Effect," *Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie,* ed. Ted Honderich (New York: Rutledge, 1985), 84.

[34] I have distinguished between a strong and a weak version of double effect. There is another possible version that might well be called the weakest. In this version the point of the doctrine of double effect is to help people deal with irrational guilt. Thus it is wrong to get others upset thoughtlessly or maliciously. But in such cases it is not the effect that is wrong, but rather the fact that the effect is brought about thoughtlessly or maliciously. There is nothing wrong with producing such an effect if one is engaged in a proper activity, for

I bring this point up because I will argue that Aquinas is justified in holding that it is only those side effects that are less than certain that can be justified by the doctrine of double effect. There are many side effects that come to mind, like the pain that accompanies dental work or the discomfort one produces in returning a paper with a poor grade, that can be certain and still be justified as side effects. But such examples are of effects, which, while they could not be justified as final ends, could be justified as intermediate ends. Hence they are irrelevant to the discussion of double effect.

The distinction between the three domains of moral responsibility also reveals a confusion in one of the arguments that Boyle uses in support of the doctrine of double effect.[35] Boyle says that the agent is most responsible for what he freely chooses to bring about in his action. He claims that "what one chooses is not an indeterminate set of foreseeable results of one's performance, but the bringing about of a definite state of affairs regarded as worthwhile and valuable."[36] And this set of affairs has a special moral significance because it is the state of affairs that the agent "sets his or her heart on. It is the commitment to these states of affairs which is the basis upon which a person forms his character and makes himself a certain kind of person."[37]

What Boyle says in this argument is, I believe, correct. But it is relevant only to the ends that the agent pursues as valuable in themselves, the ends that he pursues as final ends. I said earlier

example returning a poor paper with a poor grade. Perhaps this is what Kenny has in mind. But this principle is more therapeutic than moral.

[35] Joseph Boyle, "Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect," *Ethics* 90 (1980): 533-37. It should be noted that, in addition to the argument that we are about to consider, Boyle also argues that the doctrine of double effect can be justified as a necessary condition for any morality that involves absolute moral prohibitions. See Joseph Boyle, "Who is Entitled to Double Effect?" *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 16 (1991): 475-94. While I believe his claim is correct, l also believe that the weak version of double effect will suffice for the role that he describes. This response becomes more plausible if we consider that in the performance of actions true certainty with respect to effects is rare. But my reply would also require a defense of the moral significance of the distinction between actions and omissions and a discussion of the difficulty involved in formulating exceptionless prohibitions.

[36] Boyle, "Toward an Understanding of Double Effect," 536.

[37] Ibid., 537.

that in addition to providing the grounds for identifying the of act under moral assessment, there is also a second role intention can play in connection with moral assessment. We see here what this second role is. The intentions that an agent has for final ends do define a special domain of moral responsibility. The agent does have a special responsibi!ity for all and those effects that he brings about as final ends. But is not relevant to the doctrine of double effect. The doctrine of double effect, if I am correct, has to do only with the distinction between intermediate ends (means) and side effects. But this is not what Boyle is talking about, for the agent "sets his heart" on unwanted intermediate ends (means) as little as he "sets his heart" on unwanted side effects.

Of course Boyle does intend his argument to cover more than just final ends. Thus in one place in this argument (and only in one place) he mentions states of affairs the agent sees as "instrumentally valuable""[38] He seems to be assuming that what is instrumentally valuable somehow shares in the value that the agent sees in the final end. But if this is his assumption, it seems to apply also to those side effects that define the strong version of double effect. For to the extent that unwanted means are instrumentally valuable, those side effects, which the agent is sure his action will bring about, are concomitantly valuable. The agent brings about undesirable means because *by* them he achieves an end he desires. He brings about undesirable side effects because *with* them he achieves an end he desires. I see little reason why we should attribute an ethical significance to the preposition "by" and refuse to attribute this significance to the preposition "with." So if an agent has a special responsibility for what he finds instrumentally valuable, he has that same responsibility for what he finds concomitandy valuable.

I suspect that the reason that Boyle is willing to attribute to "by" a special significance is his implicit acceptance of the metaphor of the inner eye. Intention is thought of as an inner eye that the agent can direct at wiH to certain aspects of what he

[38] Ibid., 535.

brings about and not to others. Thus Boyle remarks that the doctrine of double effect implies that a person can "direct his intention to the good effects of his action and withhold it from the bad."[39] It then seems natural that the agent should be more responsible for what is in focus than for what is peripheral. And what is in focus is supposed to be the end and the means by which the end is to be attained. But the concept of the inner eye is just a misleading metaphor that provides no real logical support for the doctrine of double effect.[40]

V

The place to look for the basic justification of Aquinas's position on moral responsibility is not in his use of the concept of intention, but in his identification of moral acts as voluntary acts, that is, as acts that arise from the agent's reason.[41] In other words, the degree of moral responsibility an agent has for an effect that he brings about is determined by the extent to which that effect is integrated into his life as a rational agent.[42] The role intention plays in determining moral responsibility is to be explained and justified in terms of the proposition that the moral act is the act of a rational agent.

[39] Boyle, *"Praeter Intentionem* in Aquinas," 649.

[40] The metaphor of the inner eye may even be present in certain translations of Aquinas. Thus in Vernon Bourke's translation of the *Summa contra Gentiles* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), he translates Aquinas as writing "In the case of voluntary agents, the intention is directed to some particular goal" (46). But the word "directed" is not found in the Latin. "In agentibus autem voluntariis intentio est ad bonun aliquod particulare." And again he translates, "For the intention is directed to an ultimate end a person wills for its own sake"(47), while Aquinas writes, "lntentio enim est ultimi finis quern quis propter se vult." It could be that the only thing behind these translations is a desire for felicitous English. But in this same passage Bourke also translates Aquinas as writing "That a person may frequently direct his intention to goods of this kind"(46), when the text could be more simply and accurately translated, "That a person frequently intends goods of this kind" ("Quod autem hujusmodi bona aliquis intendat in pluribus").

[41] Aquinas tells us that the study of morality treats of human actions *(STh* 1-11, q. 6) and that human actions are those actions which proceed from reason *(SJ'h* 1-11, q. 1, a. 2). Following Aristotle, he also says that praise and blame pertain only to voluntary acts, that is, acts which proceed from reason *(STh* 1-11, q. 6, a. 1).

[42] "Dicuntur autem aliqui actis humani vel morales secundum quod sunt a ratione" *(STh* 1-11, q. 18, a. 5).

I will argue that the notion of the moral act as the act of a rational agent provides a justification for the distinction between the three domains of moral responsibility, and it provides this justification in such a way that it implies a rejection of the strong version of double effect. But before turning to this argument I will briefly consider a somewhat similar argument that Cavanaugh uses to support the strong version of double effect.[43] Cavanaugh also recognizes a distinction between the responsibility an agent has for those effects he brings about as final ends and the responsibility he has for the effects he brings about as means. But he formulates this distinction in a different way. He states, with respect to an effect that should be avoided, that the worst thing that one could do is to bring about such an effect as a final end, and that it is not as bad to bring it about as a means. He then states that this distinction requires an explanation, and this explanation is to be found in "the intensity and depth" of willing.[44] What the agent wills as a final end, he wills most intensely and deeply and that is why, if an agent brings about an effect which should be avoided as a final end, his action is *"most intensely* and *most deeply wrong.,,*[45]

Cavanaugh's distinction provides an argument for the strong version of double effect. Just as one wills the means less intensely than one wills the end, so one wills the concomitant side effects less intensely than one wills the means. And since the difference in the intensity of the willing establishes a difference in responsibility between end and means, so a difference in intensity of willing must establish a difference in responsibility between means and side effect, whether this side effect is probable or certain. Hence the strong version of double effect.

It is certainly true that there is a difference in responsibility between the effects one brings about as ends and the effects one brings about as means. But what does it mean to will more or less intensely? Cavanaugh seems to have a muscular conception of

[43] Cavanaugh, "Double Effect and the Ethical Significance of Distinct Volitional States," 136-39.

[44] Ibid., 138.

[45] Ibid.

will. Just as one can push with all one's strength, or push with less than all one's strength, or push just a little, so one can will with all one's might, or less than all one's might, or just a little bit. I find this conception of will far less clear than the distinction it is meant to explain. Therefore I see no reason why we should use it to explain the difference in responsibility between what is brought about as an end and what is brought about as a means, especially when a far clearer alternative is available.

Let me start by considering first the distinction made in the weak version of double effect, the distinction between means and probable side effects. If an agent brings about an effect as a means, then he brings it about for a specific reason, and consequently this effect is essentially related to his life as a rational agent. But take the case of a surgeon who undertakes a very high-risk operation and the patient dies as a result. The surgeon knew that his action might very well result in the death of the patient. But if he were to be asked, "Why did you kill the patient?" he would obviously reply that he was hoping that the patient would survive. And this reply would not just be a denial that he had a reason for bringing about the death of the patient; it would be an assertion that the very request for a reason was out of place.[46] Thus the death of the patient would be clearly removed from his life as a rational agent.

If an agent is to be thought of as rational, however, it is not enough that, on the occasions when he acts, he is generally able to specify a reason why he acts. It is even more essential that reason be found in the agent's life as a whole; in other words, it is even more important that the reasons he cites for his actions have to fit into some sort of coherent pattern. In order for this to be the case, his life, on the whole, has to be governed by a generally coherent set of final ends that are, more or less, consistently pursued. Thus the final ends an agent pursues are of fundamental ethical importance, because they determine what

[46] This use of the "Why?" question was introduced by Elizabeth Anscombe. See G. E. M. Anscombe, *Intention* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 9-28.

kind of rational agent he is.[47] This is why it not unreasonable to hold that a rational agent is to be judged good or bad, not just for the acts he performs, but even more for the final goals he pursues. Consequently the demands of morality should be greatest with respect to the agent's goals and this would justify our belief that kinds of effects that might never be permissible as final ends could, under certain conditions, be justified as means. It would also, to refer to Cavanaugh's approach, explain why, if it were wrong to bring about an effect as a means, it would be even worse to bring about such an effect as an end.

The distinction, then, between effects that are pursued as final ends and effects that are pursued as intermediate ends or means, and the distinction made in the weak version of double effect can both be justified in terms of Aquinas's notion of the moral agent as the rational agent. But what of the distinction made by the strong version of double effect? What of the distinction between means and those side effects that the agent is certain will result from his action?

There is, to be sure, one kind of side effect that might be foreseen with certainty and yet would not be integrated into the rational life of the agent. These are the effects that the agent foresees, but with respect to which he has no interest whatsoever. I go into a room and turn on a light in order to look for a book. I realized that when I turned on the light I would illuminate a bush outside the window. But if asked, "Why did you illuminate that bush?" I could answer that I didn't care about that, I was just looking for a book. In this kind of response I would be rejecting the relevance of the question "Why?" Thus illuminating the bush was not something I did as a rational agent, or at least it was not integrated into my life in the same way as are those effects which

[47] The intimate relationship between morality and rationality does lead to a question about whether an agent could be thoroughly rational and thoroughly bad. Thus we have the possibility of an agent who consistently pursues a coherent set of goals, many of which are bad. But, at least according a version of the natural law tradition, for an agent to be rational the goals that he pursues must not only be consistent with each other, but also with the nature of the agent as a human being. In fact it is suggested that what would make goals evil would be their inconsistency with the nature of the agent as a human being. Thus, in this tradition, the ideal of the rational agent and the ideal of the morally good agent tend to coincide.

I brought about as means or ends. Such effects, however, are not relevant to the doctrine of double effect. The agent does have an interest in those effects that are relevant to double effect because he has some reason not to bring them about.

The agent would obviously have an interest in those kinds of side effects that he finds completely attractive. But one can have a reason for doing something, and do it, but not for that reason. So here it might be possible that the agent would bring about a side effect that he found completely attractive, and yet not bring it about for any reason. Paradoxically such effects do not demand reasons precisely because the agent has nothing but reasons to bring them about. Such side effects, if they occur, could also be foreseen with certainty and not integrated into the life of the agent as a rational agent. But again such side effects are not relevant to double effect.

Finally we turn to the kind of side effects that are relevant to double effect. These are effects that the agent must have an interest in because he has good reason not to bring such effects about. These are side effects that, *prima facie,* should be avoided. Thus if the agent is certain that he will bring about such an effect, he cannot reject the question "Why?" as irrelevant. A *contravening reason* is required. Furthermore, in the kind of situation that is considered in double effect, the agent would have a reason for bringing about the side effect. He would bring about the side effect because with the side effect comes another effect which he desires. Thus it would seem that such side effects are virtually just as much a part of his life as a rational agent as those effects which he brings about as means. For in both cases the question "Why?" is relevant, and in both cases this question has an answer. Consequently there would seem to be little or no ground for any distinction in moral responsibility between the two. Therefore, since it would be wrong to bring such effects about as means, then it would also be wrong to bring them about as side effects. And so the strong version of double effect should be rejected. [48]

[48] Since I have been using Anscombe's "Why?" question, I should note that in her book, *Intention,* she apparently takes a position which is contrary to the one I am taking here. See *Intention,* 89-90. I would add, however, that this book was originally published in 1957. In

The doctrine of double effect is supposed to establish the grounds for a distinction between the kind of responsibility an agent has for those effects he brings about as means and the kind of responsibility he has for those effects he brings about as side effects. I am arguing that there are such grounds when one is dealing with effects that are probable, but that these grounds disappear when one is dealing with those effects that are certain. Probable effects are brought into the life of the agent as a rational agent in a special way if they are pursued as means, because then they are brought about for a specific reason. If they are not pursued as means, then they are not brought about for any reason, and so they are not integrated into his life as a rational agent in the same way.[49] Consequently the responsibility an agent has for those probable effects which he brings about as means is different in kind from the responsibility which he has for those he brings about as side effects. But if these effects are certain, and they are the kind of effects that are relevant to double effect, then he brings them about for a specific reason whether he brings them about as means or not, and so the grounds for a significant distinction in responsibility are not to be found.

We have seen that the most plausible reading of what Aquinas says about killing in self-defense supports the weak but not the strong version of double effect. We can now see that Aquinas's identification of the moral act with the act of a rational agent provides a justification for this position. My overall conclusion, then, is that Aquinas rejects the strong version of double effect, accepts the weak, and leaves us with good reason to do the same.

a later discussion, specifically about double effect, she seems to indicate that for double effect to apply we must be able to talk about "taking the risk that that (the effect) will happen" "Action, Intention, and Double Effect," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 56 (1982): 23. Also in the introduction for one of the volumes of her collected papers, she wrote that her prior papers "represent a struggle to treat all deliberate action as a matter of acting on a calculation how to attain one's ends. I have now become rather doubtful of this" (G. E. M. Anscombe, *Ethics, Religion and Politics, Collected Philosophical Papers*, vol.3 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981): viii.

[49] I am here putting aside effects that are pursued as final ends. As we have seen, that is a different issue.

The Thomist 64 (2000): 449-72

AQUINAS'S METAPHYSICS AND DESCARTES'S METHODIC DOUBT

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I

Aquinas variously expresses the subject of metaphysics. It is *ens inquantum ens*, *ens qua ens*, *ens commune*. These expressions stand for an intelligibility, an *abstractum*, that spans the sensible and non-sensible orders.[1] But this immateriality is not what is distinctive of the *ratio entis*, for Aquinas assigns the same immateriality to the notions of substance, act, and potency.[2] Rather, Aquinas characterizes the *ratio entis* in terms of *esse*, or *actus essendi*. Just as a runner, a *currens*, is a man plus his running, his *currere*, so too a being, an *ens*, is a thing plus its act of existing, its *esse*.[3] *Ens* is a *"quasi habens esse."*[4] In sum, the

[1] "We say that being [ens] and substance are separate from matter and motion not because it is of their nature to be without them, as it is of the nature of an ass to be without reason, but because it is not of their nature to be in matter and motion, although sometimes they are in matter and motion, as animal abstracts from reason, although some animals are rational" (Aquinas, *In Boet. de Trin.* q. 5, a. 4, ad 5; translation in Armand Maurer, trans., *The Division and Methods of the Sciences* [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), 48-49).

[2] "In this [second] way being *[ens]*, substance, potency, and act are separate from matter and motion because they do not depend on them for their existence . . . Thus philosophical theology [also called "metaphysics"] investigates beings separate in the second sense as its subject" *(In Boet. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4 [Maurer, trans., *Division and Methods of the Sciences*, 45)). See Aquinas, I *Metaphys.*, proem.

[3] "Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod dicimus esse, et aliud per hoc quod dicimus id quod est; sicut et aliud significamus cum dicimus currere, et aliud per hoc quod dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse significantur in abstracto, sicut et albedo; sed quod est, id est

en.tis is a composite notion whose parts are some thing or nature plus its *esse.*

The key to unlocking the philosophical door to Thomistic metaphysics appears to He in discovering the account how this composition characteristic of the *ratio entis* is revealed to the mind's eye. Since the composition is that of a commonality and for Aquinas human knowers abstract commonalities from data, it should foHow that the philosopher abstracts the *ratio entis* understood as *habens esse* from data comprised of individual things plus their *esses.* such data the commonality is *ens* in the *habens esse* sense.

But whence the data? Is it obviouuhat an existent, a being, is a thing plus its *actus essendi?* Aristotle did not think so. He said that "'one man' and 'man' are the same thing, and so are 'existent man' and 'man; and the doubling of the words in 'one man and one existent man' does not express anything different. "[5] Echoing

ens et currens, significantur in concreto, velut album" *(In de Hebd.* C. *11).* Also, "Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum esse, veritas fundatm in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponirur" (I *Sent.*, d. 19, q. *5*, a. 1); "Sicut autem morns est actus ipsius mobilis inquanturn mobile est; ita esse est actus existentis, inquanrum ens est" (I *Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2); "Ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi" (De *Verit.* I, 1, ad contra 3); "esse dicirur actus entis inquantum est ens, idest quo denominamr aliquid ens actu in rerum natura" *(Quodl.* IX, q. 2, a. 3); "et ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatm ens" (ScG H, c. 54). For further texts on the composite nature of *ens,* see Gerald B. Phelan, "A Note on the Formal Object of Metaphysics," in Arthur G. Kirn, ed., G. *B. Phelan Selected Papers* (foronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), 64-66; "The Existentialism of St. Thomas," in ibid., 74-75, 80-81. Also Joseph Owens, "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," in *St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: Collected Papers of Joseph Owens,* ed. John R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 78-81.

[4] "Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens" (XH *Metaphys.,* lect. 1, no. 2419 (Cathala ed.). The qualification indicated by the "quasi" refers to the fact that unlike the thing's other "possessions" that are all posterior and subsequent to the thing, the *esse* "had" by the thing is prior and fundamental to the thing. Hence, "esse est accidens, non quasi per accidens se habens, sed quasi actualitas cuiuslibet substantiae" *(Quodl.* H, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2). And at *Quodl.* XH, q. *5,* a. 1, the priority of angelic *esse* to the angel itself is used to deny that *esse* is an ordinary accident: "quia accidens intelligitur inesse alicui praeexistenri. Angelus autem non praeexistit ipsi esse." For Aquinas's texts on the priority of *esse,* see *STh* I, q. 8, a. 1; I, q. 44, a. 2.

[5] Aristode, *Metaphysics* 4.2.1003b25-30. On Aristode's non-existential sense of the question "An est?," see Owens, "Accidental and Essential Character," *59.*

Aristotle while criticizing Avicenna, Averroes argued that a substance was essentially a being and not a being by reason of an addition. [6] Kant would observe that there is no difference between one hundred possible thalers and one hundred actual ones. [7] Also, contemporary logicians treat existence as a second-order predicate that in the first order disappears into just the fact of individuals of a certain nature. [8] Even the Thomistic tradition lacks unanimity. In *The Elements of Christian Philosophy*, Etienne Gilson, describes the situation this way:

> Existence may mean either a state or an act. In the first sense, it means the state in which a thing is posited by the efficacy of an efficient or of a creative cause, and this is the meaning the word receives in practically all the Christian theologies outside Thomism, particularly those of Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, Scotus, and Suarez. In a second sense, existence *(esse,* to be) points out the interior act, included in the composition of substance, in virtue of which the essence is a "being," and this is the properly Thomistic meaning of the word. The problem under discussion now is: how did Thomas Aquinas achieve the awareness of the very possibility of this notion? . . . The majority of philosophers will concede that it is a far cry from a possible thing to an actual thing.... This will be conceded by all, but if an actually existing being has been produced by its cause, why should one attribute to it an "existence" distinct from the fact that it exists? ... What has divided the Thomist school from other schools of theology, ever since the thirteenth century, is a general reluctance to conceive the act of being *(esse)* as a distinct object of

[6] Averroes, *Destructio Destructionum,* disp. 5, Juntas ed. (1574), 78A. Aquinas repeats Averroes' argument at IV *Metaphys.*, lect. 2, no. 555. For an Averroistic criticism of Aquinas's position, see the text of Siger of Brabant as edited by Armand Maurer in "*Esse* and *Essentia* in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant," *Mediaeval Studies* 1 (1946): 71. Siger points out that if existence results from the principles of the thing, yet is not an accident, it must be the thing itself.

[7] "The content of both [viz., the object and the concept of the object] must be one and the same; nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses merely what is possible, by my thinking its object (through the expression 'it is') as given absolutely. Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers" (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* A 599/B 627, trans. Norman Kemp Smith [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965], 505).

[8] See Patrick Lee, "Existential Propositions in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas," *The Thomist* 52 (1988): 605-26.

understanding. To tell the whole truth, even the so-called "Thomists" have been and still are divided on this point. [9]

Aquinas recognizes that the data are not obvious. Usually we make a distinction between a subject and its act by catching the subject apart from the act. For example, we draw a distinction between me and my tan by finding me later without it. But do we ever find me apart from my existence as I am found apart from my tan? It seems not. Without my existence, I am not found at alt In a previously published article on Aquinas's metaphysical employment of the *duplex operatio intellectus,* [10] I presented Aquinas as taking another approach. Instead of trying to find the thing existing without its real existence, Aquinas finds the real thing itself with another existence. He calls this further existence *"esse spirituale"* and *"esse immateriale"* and ascribes it even to sense cognition. [11] Speaking in general about the nature of cognition, and so also of sense cognition, Aquinas says knowledge is the existence of the known in the knower, that the perfection of the knower is that the known is in some way in the knower, and that cognition is the existing perfection of one thing brought to be in another. [12] But for Aquinas actual sensation attains individual things existing externally. For example, sight attains the color in the body. [13] Hence, the known that comes to

[9] Etienne Gilson, *The Elements of Christian Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), 142-43.

[10] "The Fundamental Nature of Aquinas' *Secunda Operatio Intellectus," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 64 (1990): 196-202.

[11] "In the [object sensed, the form] has a material mode of being *[esse naturale],* but in the sense, a cognitional and spiritual mode *[esse intentionale et spiritualer* (Il *De Anima,* lect. 24, no. 553 [Foster and Humphries, ttans., *Aristotle's De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 340). "Color habet duplex esse, unum naturale in re sensibili, aliud spirituale in sensu" (Ill *De Anima,* lect. 2, no. 589 [Pirotta ed.]).

[12] Respectively: *De Verit.,* q. 2, a, 5, ad 15; q. 2, a. 2; and ibid.

[13] "The §ell§e-objects which acruate sensitive activities-the visible, the audible, etc.--exist outside the soul; the reason being that actual sensation attains to the individual things which exist externally" (H *De Anima,* lect. 12, no. 375; Foster and Humphries, ttans., 249; "what is seen is color which exists in an exterior body" (HI *De Anima,* lect. 8, no. 718; Foster and Humphries, trans., 419).

exist in the knower is a real existent. Sensation is the real thing itself genuinely existing in a different way. Joseph Owens remarks that "Aquinas writes as though this notion of cognition is apparent to immediate reflexive observation. He offers no demonstration of it, nor does he illustrate it by any comparison or analogy."[14]

Metaphysically speaking, the fact that the real thing also exists cognitionally implies that no type of existence belongs to the thing of itself. To be able to have various types, the thing must possess none. An intrinsic reality for the thing would make it impervious to taking on genuinely another way of existing. But the thing does also truly cognitionally exist. On the other hand, if the thing is of itself a cognitional existent, then it exists only cognitionally. Its real existence would be bogus, or illusory. Again, if the real is also cognitional, then the real must not be real of itself. This conclusion alerts the mind to the presence of an act, distinct from the thing, in and through which the thing is real.

Therefore, a crucial claim in Aquinas's approach to understanding a really existing thing in terms of a thing with its real existence is that in sense cognition the real thing also exists cognitionally. Neo-Thomists have called this Aquinas's direct or immediate realism. Especially since Descartes, most philosophers have disparaged direct realism. Since direct realism seems to be oblivious to many factors that go into sensation, thus rendering suspect the objectivity of what is sensed, philosophers label direct realism "naive realism." And since in the face of objections direct realism simply insists that sensation "sees" or "knows" something real, philosophers also label it "dogmatic realism."

For purposes of defending the direct realist component in the basis of Aquinas's metaphysics of *actus essendi*, I want to take on that paradigm of critical philosophers, Rene Descartes. In the exercise of "methodic doubt," Descartes argues that we must remain skeptical about the realism of the senses. He offers a series of supposedly legitimate hypotheses concerning the character of

[14] Joseph Owens, "Aquinas on Cognition as Existence," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 48 (1974): 76.

sensation, all of which are designed to loosen any claimed cognitive grasp of things other than ourselves. I will cover the series, beginning with the dream possibility.

II

In the beginning of *Meditation* I, Descartes remarks:

> I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself the same things or sometimes even less probable things, than do those who are insane in their waking moments. How often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself in this particular place, that I was dressed and seated near the fire, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed! At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; what happens in sleep does not appear so clear nor so distinct as does all this. But in thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream. [15]

In sum, I have dreamed that I was composing a philosophy article. How do I know that I am not dreaming right now? A standard answer to the dream possibility is that I know that I am not dreaming right now because right now I am directly aware of something real, which never happens in a dream. And to a reader of the above quotation it might seem that Descartes shares this answer because Descartes insists that he only "almost" convinces himself that he is dreaming. [16]

[15] Rene Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy,* in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes,*trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 1:145-46.

[16] "ut obstupescam, & fere hie ipse stupor mihi opinionem somni confirmet" (2d Latin ed., in Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds., *Oeuvres de Descartes*[Paris: J. Vrin, 1964], 7:19); "mon estonnement est tel, qu'il est presque capable de me persuader que je dors" (ibid., 9/1: 15). Descartes begins the next paragraph by "supposing" that he is dreaming: "age ergo somniemus … " and "Supposons done maintenant que nous sommes endormis."

But Descartes's remark could be taken another way. That Descartes "almost" convinces himself could mean that he is "on the fence" about knowing whether he is awake or dreaming. The reprise in *Meditation* VI of the methodic-doubt exercise shows the correctness of the "on the fence" interpretation. The reprise indicates that Descartes's methodic doubt has an assumed context. In setting the stage for the reprise, Descartes describes what he believes the senses present. Besides his own body with its appendages, his senses present outside of himself other bodies with extension, shape, motion, tactile qualities, and qualities like color, taste, sound, all of which serve to distinguish the sky, the earth, and the sea. And then comes the revealing comment:

> And certainly, considering the ideas of all these qualities, which presented themselves to my mind and which alone I perceived properly or immediately, it was not without reason that I believed myself to perceive objects quite different from my thought, to wit, bodies from which those ideas proceeded; for I found by experience that these ideas presented themselves to me without my consent being requisite. [17]

"Ideas" here seems to refer to mental existents, for Descartes describes them as presented to his mind as objects of perception and he distinguishes them from the bodies from which they proceed. Even before methodic doubt is initiated, Descartes is of the mind that sense awareness has only ideas for its proper and immediate objects. Since, obviously, dreaming also would have only ideas as its objects, the difference between sensation and dreaming could only be extrinsic. Hence, I would know that I am sensing only because I would somehow know that my ideas derive from other bodies; I would know that I am dreaming only because I would somehow know that my ideas derive from me. This ideative understanding of the of sensation makes sensation an easy target for methodic doubt. Since I am

[17] Haldane and Ross, trans., 187-88. The second and third editions are respectively: "Nee sane absque ratione, ob ideas istarum omnium qualitatem quae cogitarioni meae se offerebant, & quas solas proprie & immediate sentiebam" (Adam and Tannery, eds., 7:75); "Et certes, considerant !es idees de toutes ces qualitez qui se presentoient a ma pensee, & lesquelles seules ii sentois proprement immediatement" (ibid., 9/1:59).

immediately aware only of ideas and, as Descartes remarked back in *Meditation* I, "no certain marks" exist to distinguish the waking from the sleeping state, then on the available intrinsic evidence one must doubt whether one is sensing or dreaming. Descartes is a fence sitter. [18]

Sometimes this assumed context is taken to mean that we are always aware of subjective existents only, of items existing in our awareness only. This understanding of ideas as the proper objects of awareness belongs more to the empiricist tradition. It fails to do justice to Descartes. the course of giving his proof for God in *Meditation* III, Descartes distinguishes two facets to our ideas: their objective reality and their formal reality. The idea's "formal reality"' expresses that the idea is a mode of consciousness, a subjective existent; the idea's "objective reality" expresses what the idea is of. [19] Descartes is quite serious that the idea effects a

[18] In reply to Objections V (Gassendi), Descartes insists that he is not feigning doubt as Gassendi presents him: "for you pretend that I speak in jest when I am quite serious and take as serious, and as uttered and asserted as true, what I propounded only as a question and as arising out of common opinion for the purpose of enquiring further into it. My statement that *the entire testimony of the sense must be considered to be uncertain, nay, even false,* is quite serious and so necessary for the comprehension of my meditations, that he who v.ill not or cannot admit that, is unfit to urge any objection to them that merits a reply" (Haldane and Ross, trans., 2:206). For a contemporary discussion, *see* Nicholas Wolterstorff, "What is Cartesian Doubt?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (1993): 467-95.

[19] Haldane and Ross, trans., 1:161-63. In his reply to Objections IV and in going along with Arnauld's use of terms, Descartes employs the phrase "formal aspect of ideas" for ideas as they represent something; see ibid,, 2: 105. At the start of the first set of Objections to the *Meditations* (ibid., 2:9-10), Catems objects to what Descartes calls the objective reality of ideas by denying ideas simply. Asking what is meant by "an idea," Cateirus answers his own question by repeating the thesis of his teachers: an idea is "a direction of an act of mind." Hence, "being thought" or "being perceived" is only an extrinsic attribute for the thing thought or seen. Neither involve new or further actual existence. In his reply, Descartes insists that "being thought" involves more than an extrinsic attribution and that the "idea of the sun," for example, does not signify the mind's operation *(operatio)* determined in the mode due to an object. Rather, the idea of the sun is an intramental existent described as the sun existing in the mind in the way in which objects are wont *to* exist in the mind. This characterization seems to make sense in terms of the objective reality existing in the formal reality of some inttamental object of awrureness.Yet in a *tour de force* article, "Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, and Suarez," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 28 (1990): 33-39, Norman Wells argues that the idea that is representative is no object of a mental activity but the mental activity itself. Wells quotes Descrurtesthat the word "idea" is

transportation to something else. At least we seem to go to something else. The idea is more than a formal reality; it is also enlivened by an objective side. In virtue of this objective facet, even Cartesian ideas seem to get us out of ourselves and enable us to forget ourselves. Hence, Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* construal of Descartes' *cogito* as intentionally impoverished, as lacking a *cogitatum,* misses the objective facet of the ideas in the *cogito.*[20]

Of course, a problem remains. The transporting produced by the idea is no guarantee of the veracity of the transporting. And this fact is what methodic doubt fastens upon. We have no way of telling whether the formal reality has been formed in the correct way to enable a truthful transportation to occur. Somewhat similarly, police witnesses in the O. J Simpson trial swore under oath that when they called up their memories, they recalled placing the glove in a protective bag. The memory transported them to that event. Nevertheless, videotape showing handling of the glove without the bag dramatically illustrates the lack of veracity. Only by checking out the idea with reality could a Cartesian be confident about the truth of the idea's objective reality. But if ideas are always the immediate objects of our

equivocal between the representing operation of the intellect and the thing represented. For Wells Descartes acknowledges no representative object sense of idea. Wells also notes that Descartes says that some of my thoughts *(cogitationes,* operations of thinking, not *cogitata,* objects of thought) are images of things and that to these the name "idea" properly belongs. The difficulties with Wells's thesis are: (1) in his reply to Caterus Descartes explicitly sets aside thinking of the idea as an *operatio intellectus;* (2) it is odd to understand an activity as such to be an "image," "a picture," or "similar" to a body, for example; yet these are all terms Descartes uses to describe an idea; (3) as noted, *Meditations* VI seems to present ideas as immediate objects of perception and as perceived by the senses and not as the activity of perceiving. What then does Descartes mean when he says that "idea" properly belongs to *cogitationes* and that these are images? I think that he should be understood to mean the *cogitatio* as inclusive of the merely mental object that represents the thing. Ideas as representative objects would also be presupposed in his "Praefatio ad Lectorem" description of ideas as "pro operatione intellectus."

[20] "The transcendental heading, *ego cogito,* must therefore be broadened by adding one more member. Each *cogito,* each conscious process, we may also say, 'means' something or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular *cogitatum"* (Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations* [fhe Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 33).

awareness, the checking out becomes impossible. On this interpretation methodic doubt is a deadly serious game whose result is to impale us on the fence between knowledge that we are sensing and knowledge that we are dreaming.

III

At this point it is instructive to consider a standard neo-Thomist reply. Thomists like Yves R. Simon and Jacques Maritain concede Descartes's point that awareness is always in terms of two-sided ideas.[21] For them memory images are paradigmatic for both external sensation and intellection. These Thomists agree with Aristotle and Aquinas, who compare the memory image to a painting. A painting is something in itself and so one can contemplate it. But a painting is also a likeness of something else. Like the painting, one can consider the memory image as an existent in the act of memory or as the likeness of something else. While agreeing with Descartes on the two-sided nature of all of our ideas, these Thomists do not concede the skepticism that

[21] See Yves R. Simon, *An Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge,* trans. Vukan Kuic and Richard J. Thompson (New York: Fordham University Press, 1990), 14-22. See also idem, "Essay on Sensation," in *Philosophy of Knowledge,* ed. Roland Houde and Joseph P. Mullally (Chicago: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1960), 74-76; idem, "To Be and to Know," *Chicago Review* 14, no. 4 (Spring 1961): 94-96. For Simon's expressed liaison of his notion of "two-sided" ideas with Jacques Maritain, see *Metaphysics of Knowledge,* 22 n. 32. Even though I believe that in the last analysis Simon correctly allies his position with Maritain's, some precisions should be noted in fairness to Maritain. The two-sided ideas which Simon says are present in all cognition and which he paradigmatically identifies with memories, Maritain calls formal signs. But Maritain does not want the impressed species, both on the sense and on the intellectual levels, called formal signs. He reserves "formal sign" for *species expressae,* or elaborated presentative forms, that are present at the *end* of the act of knowing, not at its *beginning.* See also Jacques Maritain, *Distinguish to Unite, or, The Degrees of Knowledge,* trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), 120. If we concede Maritain all of that, his temporal division between impressed species, that is, received presentative forms, and expressed species, that is, elalmrated presentative forms, does not mean to exclude an essential similarity. Like the expressed species, the impressed species are still regarded as two-sided entities, for both are called "a pure means of knowing [quo]" in the sense of bringing our attention to something else first rather than to the species first. As I will explain, this two-sided view to all cognitive species is problematic for maintaining a direct realism.

Descartes insisted must follow.[22] Skepticism is avoided because an epistemological primacy belongs to the intentional facet. One first knows things, then one knows the ideas, not vice versa. This correction solves any doubts about the realist nature of knowledge.

But does skepticism disappear? I will not dispute with these Thomists the epistemological primacy of the intentional in our ideas. My problem is that I find this primacy congruent with the need for validation. If the Simpson trial has taught us anything, it has taught us that memory images, for all their intentionality and ability to transport us to something else, are not self-validating. If they were, we would never bother to check them out against the historical record. With memory images, anyway, intentional primacy does not render validation otiose. Finally, if the play of intentionality in memory images is considered paradigmatic for even sensation, then the validation issue is quite legitimately extended to sensation.

Maritain appears to sense this weak spot. In his "Critical Realism" chapter from *The Degrees of Knowledge,* he adopts a different defense of sensation. He expresses his critical realism in terms of an undeniable unity of the real "thing" and the "object" of thought. But for purposes of critique, it is crucial to realize that the starting point is the unity of the real as possible and the object of thought. Here are some expressions of this:

> In fact, the intellect, in virtue of its own proper activity, perceives that necessary law of all possible being [viz., the principle of identity] in an actual (and contingent) existent grasped by it through the sense .... But for critical reflection it is well to give distinct consideration to the primary datum (revealed by psychological and logical analysis) of the intellectual perception as such. And that is why we say ... with R. Garrigou-Lagrange, that awareness

[22] Simon, "To Be and to Know," 99. Also, "In the whole theory of knowledge, there may not be any problem more significant, doctrinally and historically, than this: are ideas representative things, like photographs, paintings, and sculptures, or are they a distinct kind of entities, defined by the primacy of representing, defined by the primacy of objectivity, defined by the primary function of bringing about objective rather than matter-form unions, defined in short, by the primacy of objective over natural existence?" (ibid., 95). The point is reiterated in "Essay on Sensation," 71-72. On Simon's view that Descartes is a proponent of two-sided ideas, though according primacy to the non-intentional facet, see ibid., 97-98.

of the irrefutable certitude of the principle of identity as the law of all possible being is part of the first conscious (philosophical) grasp that constitutes the starting point of critique. [23]

And also:

Starting from that certainty [that the intellect's first apodictic and absolutely irrefragable ceaitude has to do with possible extramental being of which it knows in an entirely and eternally certain and necessary way that insofar as it is, it is not nothing] [the intellect] reflexively confirms for it itself ("justifies" to itself) the veracity of sense and its own certitude of the existence of the sensible world. Thus, it is nonsense to posit (as is constantly done) the problem of the import of intellectual knowledge by bringing into question, as real being other than the ego, not, first of aH, possible extramental being, but only the existence or non-existence (in act) of the sensible world. [24]

If I understand him, Maritain's position is astonishing. As noted the first quotation, Maritain admits that the intellect draws the principle of identity (and the notion of being that it expresses) from actually existing things given in sensation. short, the intellect abstracts the principle. However, for purposes of initiating a critique of knowledge, this abstractive origin can be put aside. The critique should begin just with the "intellectual perception as such." For simply at that point we already know that we are in possession of an object that holds at least for the possibly reaL This undeniable feature of the inteUigible object illustrates the unbreakable unity between thing (as at least possible) and object. The principle of identity is more than subjectively necessary; it expresses what anything must be if it is to be an actual being.

How does Maritain's thinking defend the truthfulness of the ideas of sensation? To see the connection, one must turn to the second quotation. Maritain says that from our certitude about the real as possible, we can reflexively confirm the veracity of sense. He leaves unelaborated the reflexive justification, but what he may have had in mind is this. The veracity of our ideas of sensation is no difficult matter because we already know that our

[23] Maritain, *Distinguish to Unite*, 92 n. 1.

[2]. Ibid., 102 n. 2.

idea of being is true for all possible real being. But we can grasp something true of all possible real being only by taking it from some actual real being. Now being is taken from the object of sensation. Hence, the object of sensation is an actual. In sum, the unity of thing and object on the intellectual level is used reflexively to confirm the unity of thing and object on the sense level.

My problem with Maritain's exercise of critical realism concerns its first part, namely, the unity of thing and object on the intellectual level. In the absence of a perceived abstractive derivation of the notion of being from some actual existent-that is, just with the intellectual perception as such-how do I know that I am dealing with anything objective at all, even the real as simply possible? Might the notion be expressing simply an ineluctable way of thinking? Maritain fastens on this ineluctability to justify the principles of metaphysical wisdom and to show that idealism is an absolute impossibility. [25] But ineluctability is also true for the merely a priori. It is no sure-fire sign of realism.

Maritain's move is strikingly reminiscent of the retorsion or performative self-contradiction defense of the Transcendental Thomists Joseph Marechal, Karl Rahner, and Bernard Lonergan. Consider Lonergan's remarks on objectivity. For Lonergan, at the fundamental level of consciousness we do not have true objective knowledge by seeing that our judgments are confirmed by the facts. Such a view is identified with Etienne Gilson's perceptualism and with a naive realism. [26] The view is dogmatic and arbitrary because the facts as facts are all congruent with phenomenalism and idealism. [27] Lonergan insists that there is no

[25] Ibid., 74.

[26] On Gilson, see Bernard Lonergan, "Metaphysics as Horizon," in F. E. Crowe, ed., *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J.* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 208-10. On nai've realism see Bernard Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," in ibid., 231-33.

[27] "Still, you will ask, just where did existence come in? Was it some one of the data, or was it their totality: no, any and all the data are quite compatible with phenomenalism, pragmatism, existentialism; but none of these philosophies include Aquinas's *actus essendi.* Did then existence come in with the insight, or with the concept, or with the particularized concept? No, idealists and relativists know all about insights, concepts, and their particularization" (Bernard Lonergan, "Insight: Preface to a Discussion," in Crowe,

intuition of existing singulars. Such an idea he associates with the illegitimate extrapolation of the ocular version of objectivity to the intellect's grasp of the objective.[28]

How do we know that we have an objective knowledge of real things? Lonergan describes objective knowledge as grasping the virtually unconditioned. He describes the grasping in these terms: a reflective judgment bearing upon the knower reveals the knower to be asking no more questions about the data.[29] A quieting of the intellect is the tell-tale sign of objectivity. The quieting indicates that somehow the data fit into being, the object of the intellect's pure disinterested desire to know. In a summary text with clear echoes of Marechal and Rahner, Lonergan says,

> It is not true that it is from sense that our cognitional activities derive their immediate relationship to real objects; that relationship is immediate in the intention of being; it is mediate in the data of sense ... inasmuch as the intention of being makes use of data in promoting cognitional process to knowledge of being.[30]

Collection, 162). In "Cognitional Structure" (233-35), Lonergan insists that the nafve realist has no way to stop the idealist from describing the data in terms of appearances only.

[28] "Is it a fact that our intellectual knowledge includes an apprehension, inspection, intuition, of concrete, actual existence? Or is it a fact that our intellectual knowledge does not include an apprehension, inspection, intuition, of concrete, actual existence?" (Lonergan, "Insight: Preface," 162-63). Lonergan's subsequent elaboration of the second alternative clearly shows that he favors it. On the nai'.verealist's illegitimate extrapolation of the ocular vision model of objectivity, see "Cognitional Structure," 232-33.

[29] "But when there are no further questions, the insight is invulnerable ...• Such an insight is correct, if there are no further, pertinent questions" (Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* [New York: Longmans, 1965], 284). Likewise, Gerald McCool comments: "And when the knower saw in the act of reflective insight that no further relevant questions remained unanswered, he could safely give the answer, 'yes, it is'" (Gerald McCool, "History, Insight and Judgment in Thomism," *Proceedings of the Jesuit Philosophical Association* [Chicago: Loyola University of Chicago 1985]: 44). Lonergan is aware of the subjectivism here and insists that it is insufficient to say that objectivity is achieved when no further questions occur to me (Lonergan, *Insight,* 284). Yet his attempt to clarify himself by introducing the self-correcting process of learning (ibid., 286) does not return, as far as I can tell, to any trappings of the ocular vision model. Rather, the process is subjectively described as reaching its limit in "familiarity" with the concrete situation and in "easy" mastery of it.

[30] Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," 235-36; *d.* Marechal: "Considered as a moment in the intellect's ascent towards the final possession of the absolute 'truth,' which is the spirit's 'good,' [affirmation] implicitly *(exercite}*projects the particular data in the perspective of this ultimate End, and by so doing objectivates them before the subject" CTosephDonceel,

In sum, just as a savage would not know whether something is nutritious simply by looking at it but only by noticing if its ingestion quiets the growling of his stomach, so too the knower understands that something is real not by looking at it but by seeing how it fares in his intellectual dynamism. If the datum quiets the dynamism, we know the datum is truly objective. Obviously, objectivity rests upon confidence in the objectivity of the dynamism itself. That confidence is based upon the fact that the dynamism is ineluctable and so is affirmed even in the doubt of it. But again, is ineluctability in thinking a sure-fire sign of contact with reality? Could not the ineluctability indicate that one is trying to buck merely mental machinery ?[31]

There is no substitute for abstraction. Unless the notion is intellectually seen in the real as given by sensation, a division between thing and thought will be thinkable. In his *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge* Gilson speaks more correctly than the previous Thomists. In the last two chapters, he repeatedly defends realism by portraying the intellectual apprehension of being as an abstraction, the apprehension of the universal in the particular given by sense. Speaking of classical realism, he asks:

> Is it so difficult, then, to understand that the concept of being is presented to knowledge as an intuitive perception since the being conceived is that of a sensible intuitively perceived? The existential acts which affect and impregnate the intellect through the senses are raised to the level of consciousness, and realist knowledge flows forth from this immediate contact between object and knowing subject.[32]

ed., *A Marechal Reader* [New York: Herder and Herder, 1970], 77); and Rahner: "Because it is apprehended in this dynamic tendency of the intellect ... the particular sensible thing is known as finite, i.e., as incapable in its limitation of filling up the space of this dynamism. Because of this comparing of the particular thing to the absolute and ideal term of knowledge, the particular thing appears as existent (concrete being) in relation to being" (Karl Rahner, "Aquinas: The Nature of Truth," *Continuum* 2 [1964]: 67).

[31] For an elaboration of the problem, see John F. X. Knasas, "Intellectual Dynamism in Transcendental Thomism: A Metaphysical Assessment," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 69 (1995): 23-25.

[32] Etienne Gilson, *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge,* trans. Mark A. Wauck (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 206.

Also, "'The apprehension of being by the intellect consists of directly seeing the concept of being in some sensible datum. "[33] Again, "When the concept of being is abstracted from a concrete existence perceived with the senses, the judgment which predicates being of this existent attributes being to it ... as 'seen' in the sensible datum from which [the concept of being] was abstracted. "[34] In sum, Gilson identifies the grasp of a notion's objectivity with the grasp of its abstraction from the sensible real. For Maritain and the Transcendental Thomists the objectivity the notion of being is independently recognizable. The intellectual perception as such suffices. No reference to being's abstraction from sensible things need be considered. Hence, according to Gilson,

> H you feel that abstraction should not presuppose its object, it would be far better to stop treating it as an abstraction, since there is no longer anything from which it could be abstracted. Make it the idea of some Cartesian thought, but do not try to play nvo tables at one time.[35]

IV

These difficulties spotlight the need for realists to reassess Descartes's noted assumption that consciousness is always terms of two-sided ideas. Does the assumption withstand scrutiny? Such ideas certainly are involved in memory and imagination. lin both cases reflection uncovers a cognitional entity, a device, in and through which one remembers or imagines this or that. one sense, the terms "a memory" and "an image" refer to this entity. As mentioned, because of their ability to transport us to remember or imagine this or that, memory images are fascinating items. In fact, Descartes's two-sided ideas make dreams and hallucinations perfectly understandable. Absent the reflection necessary to apprehend the formal reality of the idea,

[33] Ibid., 197.

[34] Ibid., 205.

[35] Ibid., 193. For another excellent presentation of abstraction as the validation of our concepts, see Robert J. Henle, *Method in Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980).

the dreamer or hallucinator is lost in the idea's objective reality. It is no wonder that both think that the object of awareness is real. Neither can escape the dream or the hallucination because neither can remove himself from the idea. And neither individual can get out of the idea because neither can reflect and objectify the idea in its formal reality. Such is how we get out of a dream. Awareness transits back through the intentionality of the idea's objective reality and then beyond the idea itself so that we are now aware of the idea in and through which we were dreaming. Upon waking we can still vividly be aware of these ideas so that we can plunge back into them and begin dreaming again. The same is true with imagination. We can use the images of imagination to frighten ourselves. For example, let us imagine tarantulas crawling up our backs. We are frightened because for a second we are lost in the intentionality of the images. We regain our composure, we "come out of it," by our awareness obtaining some distance from the image. We see that we were just "imagining" it. But consider someone who would be locked into the intentionality here because of an inability to reflect. His fright would become a torture for him. Such happens with victims of delirium tremens and schizophrenia.

Despite the legitimate doubts about their objectivity, the intentional power of two-sided ideas is an intriguing hint of the realism of human consciousness. Can these ideas do what they do, namely, so vividly transport us to something else, and belie on the part of consciousness the possibility of becoming the really other in order to be aware of it? Whether that becoming of the really other ever actually takes place is, of course, the crucial question. But what Descartes called the "objective reality" of ideas is a sign of a strong surge of intentionality that must always be troubling to the idealist. In other words, as Descartes practices methodic doubt in terms of two-sided ideas, not only is realism neutralized but so too is idealism. If a realist has to wonder about the objectivity of our ideas, so too the idealist has to wonder about their subjectivity. We may have strongly intentional ideas because consciousness at another point involves a direct and immediate awareness of something real.

I want to argue that we do find a level of awareness whose intentionality does not involve two-sided ideas. At this level, reflection confirms that my object of awareness is simply something real; it simply makes me aware of my awareness of something real. The reflection does not objectify a two-sided Cartesian idea in and through which I am aware of something. The level of awareness of which I am speaking is my present one in which I am at least looking this way and listening. In the Aristotelian tradition, it was called sensation. In Aquinas's taking up of the point, the absence of any two-sided ideas was strictly and scrupulously respected. Sensation did not proceed in and through the generation of any such entities. Sensation came about by the sensor taking on the form of the thing sensed "without the matter." The excluded matter encompassed not only the matter of the external thing but also the matter of the sensor. At its penultimate stage sensation involved reception of form by form. Formal reception of form assures that the received form remains numerically identical with the form of the real thing.[36] Formal reception engenders no Cartesian "formal" reality for which the received form would be the "objective facet"; any way one turns it, the received form remains the form of the thing. The received form manifests none of the two-sidedness characteristic of Cartesian ideas. So impressed, the sensor was in sufficient actuation to cause an operation of sensation with a real thing as object.

Thanks to these doctrines of Aristotle and Aquinas one can construct in the vein of direct realism an understanding of the sensor. There is nothing about material things, hylomorphically understood, that makes immediate realism impossible. But guiding the entire construction is the fact that our reflection

[36] "The form into which the percipient or knower is brought by the efficient causality is the same individual form that actuates the child in real life. It is not just specifically the same, as is human form in child and parents. It is individually the same form, actuating both child and percipient in two different ways of existing. It makes the percipient be the individual that exists in reality" Uoseph Owens, *Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry* [Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies: 1992], 41-42). "From this viewpoint there is reception of form into form instead of form into matter. The result is that the one and the same form makes the sensible particular thing exist both in the real world and in the percipient" (ibid., 42-43).

outstrips the two-sided ideas of memory and imagination and confronts us with a mode of awareness whose intentionality is of real things in a direct and immediate way. Because of a physical or chemical lesion between the organs of imagination and sense, it may be true that someone cannot perform this reflection and so is unable to come out of an hallucination. A persistent and even incurable hallucination is a possibility. But this admission fails to entail that presently I might be hallucinating. I confidently exclude that scenario in and through the reflection that I perform right now. While this reflection notices ideas for memory and imagination, it sees none for sensation. Hence, in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 84, a. 8, ad 2, Aquinas remarks that if one ingests a sleep-inducing volume of food or drink and if the vapors' movements are slight, "not only does the imagination retain its freedom, but even the common sense is partly freed; so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things and their images *[similitudines discernata a rebus]*." Notice that as the more external senses are freed, one's attention is taken away from the similitudes to the things. Is this not Aquinas acknowledging my described reflexion to sensation and its realistic findings? The presence of this reflection and its results are distinguishing marks of human sensation as opposed to dreaming or hallucinating. [37] This articulation of the direct and immediate presence of the real shows that realism need not be dogmatic.

[37] Using Wells's thesis (see supra, n. 19), a Cartesian might try to regroup and to insist that sensation includes a two-sided item. The double item is the composite of object sensed and sensing activity. And just as the activities of dreaming or imagining immediately bring nonexistent objects before us, who is to say that sensing does not do the same? But are activities like dreaming, imagining, and sensing on a par phenomenologically? When I reflect on a present act of sensing and aware of the act itself, the object continues to be more distinctly present than is the case when I reflect upon my imagining or dreaming. In the latter cases, I can almost consider the activities just in themselves with the attention to objects significantly dumbed down. The reflective grasp of my act of sensing shows the sensing to be much more "transparent" than the acts of imagining and dreaming. Perhaps as activities, imagining and dreaming are more "opaque" because there is more going on within them than just their objects. In any case, this difference of opacity versus transparency makes any extrapolations from imagining and dreaming to sensing illegitimate. Even on Wells's thesis a discernible difference exists.

V

Other experiences could constrain one to reintroduce a formal reality into our objects of sensation. In the reprise of methodic doubt in *Meditation* VI, Descartes mentions observing square towers that at a distance look round and colossal figures perched on these towers that from below appear smalL He also reports of amputees who experience feelings removed arms or legs.[38] The point of these cases is to confirm that the obvious reality of the object of sensation is not obvious. If the tower is square but we are seeing something round, then we are not seeing the tower; if the statue is colossal but we are seeing something small, we are not seeing the statue; if the amputee is feeling something "in his then he is not doing so.

The cases of the tower and the statue and others Hke them, (e.g., the blackboard looking rectangular to those in front and trapezoidal to those on the sides), were the stock in trade for the empiricist philosophers in the eighteenth century and for sense-data theorists[39] and phenomenologists in the twentieth. Among the latter, Edmund Husserl, in his *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,* employs the perspectival character of our perception of physical objects to conclude that the physical object is not immanent to the act of perception; it is not a real "constituent part of consciousness" but necessarily "transcendent to perception. "[40] This necessary transcendence of the thing over against the perception of it is Husserl's basis for bracketing our

[38] Haldane and Ross, trans., 1:189.

[39] For a summation of arguments for sense data, see R. J. Hirst, *The Problems of Perception* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1978), ch. 2.

[40] "The studies we have completed lefr us with the transcem:lence of the thing over against the perception of it, and ru; a further consequence, over against every consciousness generally which refers to the thing; not merely in the sense that the thing as a real constituent part of consciousness is as a matter of fact not to be found-the whole situation rather concerns eidetic insight: in absolutely unconditioned generality or necessity, a thing cannot be given as really immanent in any possible perception or, generally, in any possible consciousness. Thus a basic ruid essential difference arises between Being as Experience and Being as (Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* [New York: Collier Books, 1972], 120).

judgments of real existence that we make m the "natural attitude."

Is the direct realist understanding of sensation confounded by these cases? Their common assumption is that immediacy means exactitude. Hence, where the perceptual object is inexact in relation to the real thing, the real thing cannot be understood as immediately present. I maintain that the assumption holds only for physical immediacy or presence. Physical presence demands exactitude. For example, to be physically present a one-armed man cannot be two-armed. Physical presence brooks no exception to exactitude. For Aquinas, cognitional presence is different. As long as the thing's causality is formally received, then the thing presents itself in cognition. Yet, real things are formally received and so are cognitionally present only at the ends of long chains of physical causality. Before landing in the formal amplitude of the sense power, the thing's physical causality can be understood as running a gauntlet of other physical causes. These other causes can impact the thing's causality so that the thing becomes present in cognition inexactly. In fairness, one should acknowledge that physical causality could also achieve exactitude. Our experience with TV cameras shows that sometimes physical causality gets it right. The pink shade of the dress of the woman in the studio is captured by the image on the screen. However, I will concede that perception does present reality inexactly. Hence, we may never know the exact configuration of the real shape that we see or the exact shade or hue of the real color that we see. But this concession is a small price to pay for the realistic component in the basis of Thomistic metaphysics. The fundamental point remains that perception presents something real-a real color, a real shape, etc., even granting inexactitude in the perception.

What of the amputee? That he must confirm or disconfirm his feeling by looking down at his absent leg indicates that his feeling alone and his reflection upon it cannot detect the illusion. Does this phenomenon indicate that sensation itself could present us with something not real? No. No more difficulty exists here than in the case of seeing a long-ago-extinguished star. Provided that the star's causality continues and eventually impinges upon the

formal amplitude of the power of sight, the causality makes the real star present. There is no need to assume that if sense presents reality, then sense presents reality as it is right now. That judgment or its opposite can be left to those who study the physical causality involved in vision and the presence of any time lag.

What the amputee may be feeling is analogous to what the astronomer may be seeing. Just as the astronomer may be seeing the real star in its lingering causality on the sense power, so too the amputee is feeling his leg as formally presented through the lingering neural activity excited by the leg before amputation. Both sense something real but falsely assume that it is right now. Evidently the right-nowness of reality is not an original factor in sensation. Again this acknowledgment is a small concession in the wake of the admission that sense directly presents reality. In sum, the Thomist realist, at least, shows a sophisticated knowledge of the mechanics of sensation and so is not naive.

At the end of *Meditation* I, Descartes mentions a final scenario. He says,

> I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity.[41]

The same assumed context of two-sided ideas that gave cogency to the dream possibility does the same here. As reflection traces the idea's objective reality back into its formal reality, we become aware of an object for which a *spiritus malignus* could quite possibly be a source. But where the same reflection succeeds in outstripping two-sided ideas and lands on a level of consciousness in which the object is through and through something real, this hallucination scenario appears impossible. In other words, just as I know that I am not dreaming now because now I am aware of something real, so too I know that I am not hallucinating now

[41] Haldane and Ross, trans., 1:148.

because I now am aware of something real. Awareness of something real occurs neither in a dream nor in a hallucination. The object of my present awareness resists reflective reduction into the objective reality of an idea. Rather, my object steadfastly remains the direct and immediate presence of something real.

I would be remiss to fail to note that within the context of his own already formulated epistemology Aquinas largely concedes the *spiritus malignus* possibility. He discusses how demons can act on the exterior senses.[42] One way is from without by forming things that will in turn impact the senses. This activity obviously poses no problem to the realism of the senses. But another way of demonic activity is from within. Demons can stir up an indisposition in the organ so that a false perception results, somewhat in the same manner as a choleric tongue will cause everything to taste bitter. This demonic activity somewhat affects the realism of the senses-but not fundamentally. Just as those to my side still see the penny's real shape though inexactly, so too those with a choleric tongue still taste the orange's real flavor though very inexactly.

Aquinas describes a second manner in which demons can affect the exterior senses from within. In the *Commentary on the Sentences* he says:

> species that are conserved in the imagination flow into the organs of sense by the operation of demons, just as happens in sleep. And so when these species reach the organs of the exterior sense, they are united as if they were things present outside and sensed in act.[43]

Aquinas admits as a possibility a demonic backloading of the exterior senses from species conserved in the imagination. Does this possibility eliminate the direct realism of our presently exercised act of sensation? I do not think so. This backloading cannot occur without coincident stimulation of the imagination,

[42] *STh* I, q. 111, a. 4.

[43] II *Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4: "Species quae sunt in imaginarione servatae operatione daemonum ad organa sensuum fluant, sicut contingit in somno; et ideo, quando illae species contingunt organa sensus exterioris, uniuntur ac si essent res presentes extra et actu sentirentur" (Mandonnet ed. [Paris: Lethielleux, 1929], 215-16).

for it proceeds the demon bringing about motions in the organ of the imagination that impact on the organ of the exterior serrne. But by reflection I know that what I am imagining now is not what I am perceiving now. Likewise, I can know that now I am not imagining at all but nevertheless am perceiving. So reflection that I can exercise right now confirms the current absence of baddoading from the imagination. [44]

In condusion, the type of reflection that Descartes employs to uncover two-sided ideas ,as direct and immediate objects of consciousness need not stop with that accomplishment. Given that same reflection can validate real things themselves as the direct and immediate objects of our current act of perceptual awareness. The content of consciousness is far richer than Descartes imagined. Our consciousness indudes not only ideas but the direct presence of the real. At a fundamental level, human consciousness is "the existence of the known in the knower"; it is "the existing perfection of one thing brought to be in another." As mentioned earlier, these facts of sense perception lead the inteHect straight into Aquinas's metaphysics. For a real thing also to exist cognitionally, the real thing cannot be real of itsdt The thing's reality must be owing to another act.

If in its Hmited Cartesian use reflection produces certitude at least of the *cogito,* why cannot this same reflection produce the certitude of perceptual realism?

[44] .In *The Mystery of the Mind: A Critical Study of Consciousness and the Human Brain* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), 21-27, noted neurophysiologist Wilder Penfield describes cases of electrical stimulation of the cortex that are very similar to Aquinas on the possible backloading of the exterior senses by imagination. In these experiments patients describe "hearing" and "seeing" and "watching" sounds and sights. The patients knew, however, that the experiences were of past events, or "flashbacks." H the Wilder experiments are cases of backloading of the senses from imagination, it is noteworthy that the patient can tell that the voices rure of the past only by checking them with his memory. The patient cannot see what is going on in his imagination. Hence, one should concede that in the middle of the hallucination, one cannot reflect to imagination. Nevertheless, the realist should go on to insist that right now I can reflect to imagination and that shows that I am not in a hallucination. In *Cognition,* Owens admits that the claim of some neurophysiologists that electrical stimulation of the cochlea, retina, or cortex suffices for impressed sensible species contradicts immediate realism (251-52). But in the present state of research this claim is far from verified.

BOOK REVIEWS

Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. By ALAsDAIRMACINTYRE.The Paul Cams Lectures. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 1999. Pp. 186. $26.95 (doth). ISBN 0-8126-9397-3.

I read this book under very appropriate conditions, during a sojourn in the hospital that provided me with a hands-on experience of its main themes: human vulnerability in sickness and old age-the result of our sharing in animality through our bodies-and our consequent dependence on others within family, social, and political contexts.

Comprising a series of conferences, this book is the fruit of profound reflection on a topic too much neglected by philosophers: human weakness as related to our bodily condition. The author critiques the rationalist concept, Cartesian in inspiration, which posits a break between human beings and animals particularly for this reason, that the latter, not having language, therefore possess neither thought nor reasoning power. In the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas, Alasdair Macintyre mailltains that there is a similitude, a continuity, and a gradation from the animal to the human being. This is apparent in the behavior of animals such as dolphins with their hunting strategies. We have to attribute a certain form of reasoning activity to them because of the way in which they proceed in view of an end and communicate among themselves with a kind of prelinguistic understanding. Thus, as St. Thomas says, animals possess something similar to reason and free will. In the same way Macintyre believes, contrary to Heidegger, that the bodily behavior of human beings vis-a-vis the world was originally animal behavior, that this heritage subsists, and that it is only partially transformed by culture.

Macintyre characterizes the human being as "an independent practical reasoner," possessing the ability to reflect on reasons for and means to ends, based on desires and pleasures evaluated according to criteria of what is good in itself for human beings and their full development. The independence envisioned here, however, in no way signifies personal isolation, as is the case with individualism, but includes a recognition of the need to depend on others. This starts in childhood, to which philosophers have paid scant attention. Education given by parents plays a capital formative role and should ultimately teach the child to act freely and to do what he thinks is right, even though eventually this may not please his teachers. Nevertheless, to attain this

maturity, the progressive acquisition of the moral virtues is indispensable: self-control and, when necessary, detachment from desires through tempernnce; courage in the face of conflicts and difficuhies; justice, which ensures respect for others and collaboration with them; and prudence, which guarantees the quality of practical judgment and caHs for the interplay of the other virtues. External rules are helpful for this kind of formation, but do not suffice by themselves. Rules and the virtues work together to produce growth and the formation of self-awareness in cooperation with others

The author's research seems to me to culminate in the complementarity that he establishes between giving and receiving in human action. This creates relationships of generous and true friendship, associating the virtues of dependency with those of independence and transcending the opposition between egoism and altruism. Here we come to the virtues as analyzed by St. Thomas. With justice go liberality, decency, mercy, and works of charity. In this connection, the author does not hesitate to criticize a treatise of Aristotle in which the "megalopsychos" or magnanimous man, in his grandeur, prefers not to recognize benefits received because they reveal his dependence on others. In this context, self-awareness and self-confidence develop in relation to the identity others attribute to us. Seeking excellence as an end that has value in itself combines with the sharing of others' points of view in friendly dialogue.

The author is finally led to discuss political and social structures ordered to the common good, precisely in their reciprocal integration of the common and individual good. He enumerates three conditions required in every society: the right to affect political decision-making, norms of justice conformed to generosity (granting to each according to his capacity and needs), and representation of the weakest by proxy in common deliberations. He insists on the recognition of every person in society, and particularly on the ofren-forgotten contribution of defenseless persons, such as children and the sick, who teach us responsible charity. He frankly believes that such principles can never be realized in the modern State determined by considerations of money and power; they are more applicable to families, which although not self-sufficient exercise a key role for aH institutions, and to local communities, where activities and evaluations can be better shared in the sense of responsible good will.

The author doses with an interesting contrast: the radicalism of Nietzsche. Nietzsche, in order to promote the will to power, repudiates all virtue that implies dependence, and declares that it is in our friend that we find our most perfect enemy, never being so dose to him as when we oppose him.

The thirteen conferences presented in this book are remarkable for their content and rigor. The volume is like a prolongation of *After Virtue*, which it completes. On several important points it sparks a kind of revolution in regard to the prevailing rationalism regarding human thought and action. In touching on the separation between humanity and animality, it affirms a continuity

between body and reason in human action, in conformity, among other things, with the role that St. Thomas assigns to the passions in moral action, when he makes the study of them (love, desire, hope, etc.) a preparation for the analysis of the corresponding virtues (charity, hope, etc.). Thus morality receives the mission of contributing to the union and active harmony between body and soul, between animality and spirituality, between passions and virtues. Obviously, this can only be done in the context of a morality of virtues that will insure interior formation and growth, rather than in a morality of imperatives or prohibitions imposed from without.

An important contribution of the author is his demonstration that virtue, which perfects our self-awareness, far from being purely individual, includes at the same time the recognition of other people in their otherness and the acceptance of our dependence on each other, as well as on our bodies. This twofold dimension, paradoxical at first sight but necessary and vital, is actively at work in the relationships of giving and receiving inspired by generosity and characteristic of friendship, which Aristotle links directly to the virtues, devoting two books of the *Nichomachean Ethics* to the subject, and which Thomas makes bold use of in defining charity. I should also like to stress the author's insistence on the moral contribution of weakness, at the bodily as well as social level, in relation to generosity, justice, and love. It thus confers on morality a new dynamism which harmonizes well with the primacy of charity established by John and Paul and the best of Christian tradition. It shows us how to overcome individualism and abstract morality with the action of reason joined to virtue, and leads to the positive acceptance of bodiliness, in the person of the other, in society and in the world at large.

In closing I should like to offer a suggestion. The affirmation that "our whole initial bodily comportment towards the world is originally an animal comportment" and that "we never make ourselves independent of our animal nature and inheritance" (49), could lead one to believe that animality is the primary source of human action, according to an evolution from the imperfect to the perfect, as Darwin understood it. This view, which rightly gives an essential place to the body, needs to be completed with the aid of Aquinas's teaching on natural inclinations (*STh* I-II, q. 94, a. 2), which sees as the source of our action the inclinations to the good, to being, truth, and social life, which are in the spiritual order. We need, however, to avoid separating these inclinations from each other and should consider rather that they act together and are interwoven. Thus, while being wholly spiritual, they do, as universal experience demonstrates, form connections with and are intimately implicated in our bodily condition. Moreover, it would be interesting to show how the inclination toward sexual union, of which St. Thomas remarks precisely that it associates us with animals, is, in the human person, related to other inclinations which engage the man and woman as persons and thus acquire a spiritual dimension.

All this recalls the Pauline definition of spiritual worship, literally "rational" worship *(logikos),* in the Letter to the Romans: "Present *your bodies [vos corps]* as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is a spiritual worship" (Rom 12:1). It is significant that the two most widely used French translations should avoid using the word *corps* to translate *siima.* The Jerusalem Bible translates it as *"vos personnes"* and the Ecumenical Bible as *"vous-memes."* The studies of Alasdair Madntyre can help us to avoid modern categories and prejudices that create an obstacle to an exact and enriching reading of the Bible. (Translated by Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, 0.P.)

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The Catholic University as Promise and Project: Reflections in a Jesuit Idiom. By MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY, S.J. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998. Pp. 224. $55.00 (doth), $22.95 (paper). ISBN 0-87840-711-1(doth),0-87840-710-3 (paper).

As Buckley (a chaired professor of theology and director of the Jesuit Institute at Boston College) explains in the preface, "this book is more a collection of essays, each bearing upon a cognate question, than a steady and single argument. Its unity is thematic rather than systematic" (xx). The central theme is captured in the first essay with an evocative image: hundreds of faculty and administrators at Boston College gathered on the steps of the library to celebrate a Mass to mark the start of the 1992-93 academic year while students make their way indifferently through the congregation and into the library. Buckley notes that the majority of thirteen thousand people of the university community apparently had something else to do that day, which during the liturgy spurred him to wonder, "What is this upon which we invoke the unspeakable mystery of God? What is this 'we' who are at prayer?" (4). These questions go to the issue of identity, and in Buckley's opinion, many Catholic colleges and universities, induding the Jesuit ones with which he is most familiar, are not facing this issue squarely. He offers several explanations-for example, a refusal to return to precondliar parochial narrowness, pluralism among faculty, and concern over the conditions attached to receiving state and federal money-but the one he focuses on is the assumption that religious and academic life pertain to two spheres of reality that relate to each other only extrinsically rather than intrinsically. Thus the

first essay advances the argument that "the academic and the religious are intrinsically related, that they form an inherent unity, that one is incomplete without the other"; "each term of this dyad and the realities to which they refer . . . do not simply exist juxtaposed to each other in influential contiguity"; rather, "one dynamically involves the other" (15).

The intrinsic relation of religion and academia is a leading emphasis in the other essays as well. In chapter 2, Buckley maintains that the Church must foster scientific inquiry for two reasons: because scientific inquiry raises questions of ultimate meaning and mystery which bear on the self-understanding and mission of the Church, and because it instills an unswerving commitment to the truth which can only benefit the Christian faith. In chapter 3, he defends the position advanced in chapter 1 against the criticisms of David J. O'Brien, by pointing out, among other things, that the distinctively religious character of Catholic universities does not remove them from the wider pluralistic culture, as O'Brien implies, but actually enables them to contribute to it. Chapters 4 and 5 provide expositions on the Jesuit vision of the Catholic university: chapter 4, on Ignatius of Loyola's understanding of higher education, which integrated humanistic, philosophical, and theological studies; and chapter 5, on the early Jesuit humanistic vision, which ascribes to created things the capacity to serve as instruments of divine purpose. In chapter 6, Buckley explains how the new Jesuit humanism entails a concern for justice and thus obliges Jesuit schools to produce students who are not only humanistic but humane. In chapter 7, he affirms the move of Catholic colleges and universities from a custodial understanding of forming students to an understanding that challenges students to deal with the problems facing the Christian faith in a pluralistic society and world. The last two chapters, 8 and 9, attend to "the two architectonic wisdoms whose pursuit has been emphasized in the history of Jesuit higher education," respectively, "philosophical and theological studies" (xxi). In spite of the variety of themes, taken together these chapters form a complex elaboration of the central point of the initial essay: that the promise and project of the Catholic university is to create a setting in which Christian faith and intellectual inquiry work together for the mutual advantage of each.

It is worth noting that these nine essays were written over a considerable period of time: two were written in 1971, one in 1978, one in 1982, four between 1991 and 1993, and one (the only one previously unpublished) some time after 1995. As a result, the book as a whole addresses issues surrounding the controversy over *Ex corde&clesiae* and its application in the United States, but without becoming totally absorbed by it, and without the author "weighing in" on the issue of a *mandatum* for theology faculty at Catholic colleges and universities. Never strident or alarmist, these essays are the measured reflections of an accomplished Jesuit priest and scholar, marked by an expertise and freshness that comes only with years of research, writing, and teaching about the nature of Catholic higher education.

Not surprisingly, then, this book has several strengths. For one thing, Buckley identifies and reveals the shortcomings in the flawed but all-too-familiar thinking that we encounter today in the discussions about Catholic higher education. For example, he insightfully observes that Timothy Healy's (former president of Georgetown) notion that the Church and the university constitute separate and distinct institutions, religious and secular, could just as equally be said of the Church and the City of San Francisco (12). Or to take another example, he shows that David J. O'Brien's rejection of any talk of distinctiveness is generated by a framework that allows only for two alternatives for Catholic higher education, "either secularization or sectarianism" (49); in so doing, it fails to appreciate how a Catholic university can be motivated to address a pluralistic society, not in spite of, but because of its distinctively Catholic view of human life and culture (48-51). Or again, he makes it clear that the definition of a Jesuit university as simply a place where Jesuits teach, or where students receive "value-centered education (the same could be said of those in mainland China)," or where there is a strong campus ministry office, or where teachers take an interest in students-he makes it dear that these watered-down definitions of a Catholic university do not come from Ignatius of Loyola and are inadequate to a genuinely lgnatian vision of Catholic higher education. Buckley's attempt to dispel at least some such familiar misconceptions should be regarded as a welcome service.

Another strength of this book is that it provides an illuminating account of the origins and significance of the Jesuit vision of higher education. Drawing on the writings of Ignatius and on the early history of the society, Buckley explains how the standard, three-tiered curriculum of the Jesuit universities (the *ratio studiorum)* was designed to integrate humanistic studies with both philosophy and theology, and thus to form students in a Christian humanism that would enable them to serve both Church and society. The central claim of the theology informing this Christian humanism is that of "instrumental causality," which sees "God as workman and God's work in and through all things" and sees "the human as the instrument of the divine, as the means through which the divine enters human history" (85). Buckley uses this Ignatian notion of instrumental causality to rebut the charge of anthropocentrism that was leveled by Maritain against Molina and, by association, against the Jesuit educational enterprise as a whole. He contends that Maritain's attack on the "Ignatian" conception of human freedom and divine causality is an unfair distortion, for it ignores the fact that Ignatius, in the *Constitutions* and in the *Spiritual Exercises,* never allowed the importance of natural virtues and gifts to obscure the decisive role of the divine initiative in and through all events and actions. On this score, Buckley cogently shows that the Ignatian commitment to higher education flows out of a theologically charged vision of "human beings united with God; humane intellectual disciplines and

achievements united within the reflection of God: everything was to be united without being identified" (102).

This brings up the most important strength of this book, namely, its emphasis on theology as the shaping intellectual force, as the architectonic knowledge and wisdom, in Catholic higher education. The chief obstacle in such a restoration, as Buckley explains in the first essay, is "extrinsicism," a habit of mind that traces back to "the neoscholastic misunderstanding and miscasting of the relationship between nature and grace," whereby "'nature' was treated as a unit, entire unto itself, with 'grace' taken as an addition to nature for which nature had no intrinsic orientation. Grace was, in that sense, 'extrinsic' to nature'" (12). From this misconception, it follows that intellectual inquiry can progress without reference to religion. Thus in preconciliar Catholic universities, religion was catechetical and apologetic in character, not a genuine mode of intellectual inquiry; and this same pattern is reproduced today whenever theology is pushed to the margin of a curriculum and functions as "one more course among others" (15). The alternative that Buckley proposes is a relation between religion and academics that is "intrinsicist" in that it holds that "any academic movement towards meaning or coherence or truth, whether in the humanities, the sciences, or the professions, is inchoatively religious"; that is to say, it moves "towards an ultimacy, i.e., towards a completion or a whole, in which it can obtain comprehensive sense" (ibid.). But in this intrinsicist view, there is a movement in the other direction as well. As Buckley puts it, "the commitments and the instincts of faith are inescapably towards the academic .... the dynamism inherent in the experience of faith ... is towards the understanding both of itself and of its relationship to every other dimension of human life" (15-16). Thus there is a symbiosis between faith and academic inquiry: "if allowed their full development . . . the religious intrinsically engages the academic, and the academic intrinsically engages the religious ... . One leads to the other." This insight lies at the heart of "the character and promise of a Catholic university," which is uniquely "dedicated to the organic fulfillment of these two desires for knowledge. The inherent integrity ... of the full faith-experience moving towards its satisfaction in transcendent completion ... is what a Catholic university must affirm and embody, however halting and imperfect its attempts" (16). The theological grounding for this vision is found, according to Buckley, in the doctrine of the two natures of Christ. "Jesus is the union of God and humanity. So also ... the Catholic university is a union of faith and all human culture. God becomes incarnate in humanity; faith becomes incarnate in human culture .... The reality of Christ lies in the union of divinity and humanity; the reality of the Catholic university lies in the union of faith and human culture" (17). Drawing a parallel with the doctrine of the hypostatic union, in which Christ's divinity and humanity are united yet still distinct, Buckley maintains that in a Catholic university religion and all other disciplines-the arts, humanities, social sciences, natural sciences,

and professions-are likewise united yet distinct. Thus united, "human culture and faith are brought to a new depth and a reflective enhancement" (20). Indeed, "the Catholic university exists to deepen the unity between Christian faith and all the forms of knowledge" (ibid.).

Buckley's argument here is to be commended for proffering a clear, coherent, *theological* account of the place of theology within the overall curriculum. Still, it is presented only in general terms and thus does not explain how, specifically, theology relates to other disciplines. Working within a Rahnerian paradigm, Buckley tends to cast "religion" largely in terms of an unthematized, transcendental mode of knowing that serves as a background to knowledge pertaining to the categorical realm of time and space; hence the frequent appearance in these essays of such notions as "religious dimension," "religious consciousness," "ultimacy," "absolute," and "meaning," in expounding on the relation of the Christian faith and academic inquiry. When employed in this way, "the religious" does not interact directly with and impinge upon other areas of intellectual inquiry; rather, it is located on an ever-receding horizon that provides proportion and perspective to other forms of knowledge but does not actually transform them. The advantage here is that the potential harmony between theology and the other disciplines is brought to light, particularly as regards theology and the natural sciences, an area in which both Rabner and Buckley have shown keen interest and commitment. But the disadvantage is that it does not register the important tensions and conflict that can often arise. For example, if, as Buckley argues in chapter 6, justice is a central concern in Jesuit higher education, then the theology that grounds the Catholic notion of the common good should shape the way the institution of private property is presented in economics classes. Moreover, if, as Buckley rightly insists, the Catholic curriculum must be integrated fully, then such concerns cannot be met simply by courses in business ethics; rather, they must inform the very way in which the market is described and analyzed, and here a host of issues emerges as to how production, consumption, and distribution should be viewed in light of the gospel and the Church's social teachings.

But these issues can be broached only when we move from "religion" cast in terms of implicit, transcendental knowing to a theology cast in categorical terms and grounded explicitly in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Buckley would not disagree with this, it seems to me, but his book does not delve into these specific issues, and thus does not take up several crucial questions, for example: What criteria should be used in determining whether or not a proper understanding of economics is being imparted to students? What specific curricular structures are needed to facilitate such interaction between theology and economics? And, what specific institutional arrangements are needed to foster interaction between theology and the other disciplines as a whole?

Most Catholic educators, like their non-Catholic counterparts, would respond to these questions by immediately insisting that the autonomy of academic disciplines must be preserved, and they would back this up by appealing to Aquinas; on this score, they would find support from Buckley. But here it must be noted that Aquinas's affirmation of the integrity of the liberal arts cannot automatically be translated into an affirmation of all modern academic disciplines, for the liberal arts of the medieval period can be integrated into a theological framework in a way that some modern fields of inquiry cannot. This is especially true of history and the social sciences, which are designed to provide explanations of actions and events that exclude formal and final causes and thus by design tend to subvert, rather than support, a comprehensive theological framework. This is not to say that history or the social sciences can in no way be integrated into an Ignatian framework of divine instrumental causality; but it is to say that genuine integration will involve more tension and conflict than Buckley implies. The same can be said of the humanities as well, as would be clear from a close reading of the work of Derrida or Foucault.

The importance of attending to the tension between theology and other disciplines can be stated in Christological terms. While it is true that Christ embodies divine and human natures in one person, it is also true that this hypostatic union leads to conflict between the human Jesus and the world around him. After all, the Word became flesh, dwelt among us, and was crucified, and it is only through the power unleashed in the cross and resurrection that our fallen human nature can now be transformed. If, then, a parallel can be drawn between the hypostatic union and the relation of religion and academics, we can say that a similarly disruptive transformation must occur in the realm of the intellectual life: knowledge gained in the secular disciplines must be purified by a kind of crucifixion of the intellect in order to achieve genuine unity with theology. There are indications that this view would be too Bonaventurian for Buckley's Thomistic sensibilities, but it remains exactly how inquiry in history and the social sciences can be ordered to theological ends.

Of course it is not possible to do everything in one book. And to his credit what Buckley has done in this book is demonstrate the urgency of generating a theological conversation that can address these issues. In this sense, these essays represent the kind of scholarship needed to forge a genuinely theological vision of Catholic higher education.

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El don de sabiduria sequin santo Tomas: Divinizacion, filiacion y connaturalidad. By CRUZ GONZALEZ AYJESTA. Pamplona, Eunsa, 1999. Pp. 216. $26.50. ISBN A8431316020.

A doctoral thesis in theology done at the University of Navarre, this is an interesting work on the gift of wisdom according to St. Thomas. The author develops his subject in five chapters of unequal length. The first two, historical, are followed by a three-part essay that is analytical and speculative in thrust.

The author first outlines in detail some controversies among twentieth-century theologians on the subject of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which were touched off by the challenge to the universal call to mysticism. Even though the universality of the Christian vocation to holiness was generally accepted, there were important differences of opinion as to the meaning of the word *mystical,* depending on whether one referred simply to baptismal grace or to extraordinary ways of union with God.

The necessity of the gifts for salvation, affirmed by St. Thomas, was the occasion of a debate at the beginning of the twentieth century between the Dominican Froget and Perriot, a collaborator on the review *"l'Ami du Clerge,"* who wrote the work, "The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Souls of the Just." Froget held that the gifts are necessary in order to go beyond the organism of the virtues, but that they are not necessary for the production of each supernatural action. Perriot, on the contrary, thought that such action proceeds simultaneously from two different moving principles, in such wise that the gifts extend their influence to the entire Christian life.

After describing this original controversy, the author distinguishes two theories that formed as it were two schools. The first, promoted by Garrigou-Lagrange and in great part by Gardeil, following Froget's line of thought, saw the essential difference between the virtues and the gifts to be their mode of action-human and superhuman respectively, the gifrs being superior to the virtues. This theory was based on St. Thornas's *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* and supposedly found a confirmation of its intuitions in the writings of St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa of Avila. J. de Guibert, for his part, was of the that St. Thomas's thought had evolved, and that in his maturity he saw the gifts as *habitus,* receptive rather than operative, disposing a person to docility to the Holy Spirit. In this perspective Guibert thought, in contrast to Garrigou-Lagrange, that not too much importance should be attached to the division into seven gifts. Later, Congar would adopt this position. As can be seen, the debate turned on the exegesis of St. Thomas's texts.

Regarding question 68 of the *Prima secundae,* some saw in artide *2* a statement by St. Thomas that the gifts surpass the virtues, while others found in artide 8 the superiority of the theological virtues over the gifts. The author devotes twenty pages (37-58) to the question of an evolution in the thought of St. Thomas regarding the gifts: Garrigou-Lagrange saw only a verbal evolution, while Guibert attempted to show that St. Thomas broke with the immediately

preceding tradition in order to return to William of Auvergne's concept of the gifts as passive and receptive. Philipon held a middle position of moderate evolution.

The historical tour ends on a note of astonishment at the fact that since the Second Vatican Council a certain disaffection has emerged in regard to this teaching on the gifts, while at the same time the Holy Spirit Himself has become the object of renewed interest. The paradox may be due to a misinterpretation of the theory. An emphasis on St. Thomas's teaching on the subject of the new law by authors such as Pinckaers, Garcia of Haro, and Mongillo, that throws light on the debated specificity of Christian ethics, may prove fruitful in getting us beyond the impasse.

What is the source of the theory denounced above? The second chapter throws the blame squarely on John of St. Thomas. He is the one who maintained a real distinction between virtues and gifts on the basis of the superhuman mode of the latter. It was he who extended knowledge by connaturality to all the intellectual gifts, while St. Thomas, according to the author, reserved this to the gift of wisdom. Again, John of St. Thomas qualified this knowledge as "experiential" or "mystical"; he had it depend upon a spiritual savor or touch that produced in the soul an affective knowledge of God through His effects. John of St. Thomas made two changes in the teaching of St. Thomas: first, for him *connatural* came to mean *affective* as opposed to *speculative,* and second, he slipped from the realm of the ontological into that of the psychological. It would be an error to say that his marked distinction between affective and speculative knowledge coincided with St. Thomas's expressions in *STh* I-II, q. 45, a. 2: by way of cognition/by way of con-naturality. The author attributes this misunderstanding to a theory of knowledge marked by conceptual rationalism. This influence would have made the views of St. Thomas's eminent disciple seem to flow from the authentic teaching of St. Thomas himself, not only for an author such as Garrigou-Lagrange but also for a Jacques Maritain, both of whom had a habit of projecting the spiritual doctrine of the Carmelite authors onto their reading of Aquinas.

We have to praise the author for his direct study of John of St. Thomas and for his clear recognition of the global influence he exerted over later Thomistic authors. We can also concede to him, in regard to the exegesis of the thought of the Angelic Doctor, his claim that the teachings of the disciple and the Master do not exactly coincide, and that this is an important fact. We would only add that the teaching of John of St. Thomas on the gifts of the Holy Spirit, taken in itself, is doubtless not without value, and would perhaps deserve better treatment than to be relegated to the rank of a faulty interpretation.

The third chapter, which opens the speculative part of the work, points to the doctrine of the divine missions as the key to the understanding of the gift of wisdom. It is related to the themes of the divine indwelling and divinization. The author shows in pertinent texts of St. Thomas this doctrinal link between

the gifts and the indwelling, even where the latter term is missing. The evolution of thought between the *Commentary on the Sentences* and the *Summa Theologiae* shows clearly that in the latter the gifts of the Holy Spirit have their root in the theological virtues and are like derivations; this manifests a deepening of the understanding of the theological virtues, to which the divine indwelling is referred. Most importantly, this doctrine of the divine missions is based on several formulas of St. Augustine that are rich in meaning. Thus, for example, the relationship between the mission of a divine Person and His eternal procession and, on the other hand, its link with the experiential knowledge mentioned above, are contained in the affirmation, "mitti est cognosci quod ab alio sit." In the same way, as to union with God, one notes the passage, between the *Commentary on the Sentences* and the *Summa Theologiae,* from the concept of an assimilation in the literal sense of a person to the qualification of the presence of God in the just as that "of the known in the knower and of the loved in the lover."

The author presents several interesting observations, for example on the vocabulary of the indwelling as referring to the new creation which is divinization (another terminology being used to designate the presence of God in the first creation), or again on the complementarity of the Augustinian formulas used in the different works of St. Thomas. A good statement of the question relative to the understanding of the expression "quasi-experiential knowledge" confronts different positions, such as those of G. Philips and A. Patfoort. The author, in line with his ontological interpretation, sees in experiential knowledge the happy joining of wisdom assimilating to the Son and of charity assimilating to the Holy Spirit, the knowledge obtained by wisdom leading to the experience pertaining to love, in view of the truth that the Word breathes Love.

Clearly, the author draws the best possible material from Augustinian sources and thus confirms the closeness of the Thomistic doctrine of grace and the gifts to the great scriptural and patristic theme of divinization. One can only regret that an overall view of St. Augustine's teaching on this subject was not included.

The fourth chapter studies the connaturality proper to the gift of wisdom. The author overtly challenges the classic division of the gift of wisdom into speculative and practical parts. This division inherited from Aristotle needs to be revised when it is no longer a question of human wisdom but of the gift of the Holy Spirit. In this matter we have to prefer the indications drawn from St. Augustine. In fact, knowledge gained through the gift of wisdom is speculative in its object but practical in its mode. One can wonder whether the recurring affirmation of the inopportuneness of Aristotelianism in this regard is sufficiently established by the author. We know, in fact, that St. Thomas's use of the Stagyrite was far from servile and was never allowed to "paganize" his theology.

Still, the analysis of the connaturality of the gift of wisdom is totally convincing here. The author explains well, and notably, how a right judgment as to the ultimate end is presupposed for the act of the gift of understanding, but does not constitute it-which would deprive of its legitimacy the attribution of connaturality to the gift of understanding, as do John of St. Thomas and Jacques Maritain after him. This chapter shows excellently the twofold relationship between the gift of wisdom and the virtues of faith and charity. The author emphasizes that this is a question of "living faith," that is, faith informed by charity, which alone gives rise to the act of "believing in God." The relationship between the gift of wisdom and the beatitude promised to the peacemakers is also beautifully developed.

The last chapter, more succinct and less coherent than we might wish, touches on other aspects of the gift of wisdom, especially the question of the assimilation to the Son and the relation between the gift of wisdom and divine filiation. This includes two stages: the first, ontological, involves charity, while the second, operative, unfolds through the gift of wisdom. These well-thought-out pages seem too brief in view of the importance of the subject. Some complementary remarks on the different meanings of the word *wisdom,* on the influence of St. Augustine on St. Thomas, and on the links between the gift of wisdom and the theological virtues, lead up to a conclusion that recapitulates admirably the plan and development of the work.

This book is remarkable for its clarity and is written in a style that makes it accessible to beginners in university studies. The content of each section is explained at the outset and summarized at the dose, and the flow from chapter to chapter makes for delightful reading. The information is precise, but not always complete. The treatment of the question of the indwelling could have profited by a consideration of the contrasting theses of those other great representatives of the schools, Suarez and Vasquez. More authors of the twentieth century, too, might have been opportunely considered (one thinks of Terrien, Chambat, and Dockx, who are only mentioned in footnotes). A few errors in Latin quotations are regrettable, and a good number in French. Finally, we deplore the absence of an index of names and places.

We acclaim, on the other hand, this direct study not only of Aquinas but also of John of St. Thomas. The analyses are made with rigorous authenticity. They demonstrate that the teaching of St. Thomas can be contemplated in its own right, the jewel case of commentaries which may alter the sense of what they wish to expose. I recommend this beautiful book without hesitation, in this Jubilee Year, to all who are interested in St. Thomas and in questions about the spiritual life. (Translated by Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P.)

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What Sort of Human Nature? Medieval Philosophy and the Systematics of Christology. By MARILYN McCORD ADAMS. The Aquinas Lecture, 1999. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1999. Pp. 113. $15.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-87462-166-6.

Metaphysical inquiry flourishes in contemporary philosophy, and attention to metaphysical issues in theology is at the heart of a theological tradition that extends back to the very beginnings of Christian reflection. *A priori*, then, one would expect to find contemporary Christologists interested in the metaphysical aspects of Christology, and one would also expect to find them applying themselves vigorously to a study of the works of medieval Scholastic authors, whose contribution to metaphysical theology was of the highest quality. For the most part, however, this is not what is happening. Much (though not all) of contemporary Christology tends to steer clear of inquiry into the metaphysical aspects of Christological doctrines; likewise much (though not all) of contemporary Christology tends not to see itself as part of a tradition of reflection that goes back to medieval Scholastic Christology. These facts are probably related to one another, although the history that has led up to our present situation is complex (it would, for example, *bt* impossible to tell one story that applied to both Roman Catholic and Protestant theology).

This situation is to be lamented, even though the decisions that led to it were not always lamentable themselves-the desire to break away from manualism in Catholic theology, for example, was hardly a bad one. In any case, it seems safe to say that one worthy goal for present-day Christologists is to recapture a metaphysically informed way of reflecting on Christ, which will, in practice, require coming to grips with the medieval contributions to this field. Marilyn McCord Adams's *What Kind of Human Nature? Medieval Philosophy and the Systematics of Christology* will be a valuable aid to those engaged in this task. The text of her 1999 Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University, it examines what several medieval thinkers, and also Martin Luther, had to say about the metaphysical character of Christ's humanity. Adams, the Horace Tracy Pitkin Professor of Historical Theology in the Yale Divinity School, is eminently qualified to comment on such matters, as all students of high Scholastic thought know well.

In her introduction, Adams lays out the patristic-conciliar understanding of Christ as one person subsisting in two natures, each of which is maintained in its full integrity. She then points out that this understanding leaves unanswered many questions about Christ's humanity. Is it a fallen humanity like ours? An unfallen one, like Adam's? A glorified one? "If each of these states is compatible with as well as accidental to human nature, Christ could be fully human in any of them. Patristic authors had already begun to debate the question, what was Christ's human nature like during his *ante-mortem* career?" (9). Her aim in the book is to show how views on the character of Christ's humanity are governed by varying theological and philosophical commitments

in six authors: Anselm, Peter Lombard, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and Martin Luther. (Particularly noteworthy is her attention to Bonaventure's *Sentences* commentary, a text that has been unreasonably neglected.) Her hypothesis is that "conclusions about Christ's human nature are *systematically driven,* and vary principally with a theologian's estimates of the purposes and proprieties of the Incarnation on the one hand and of the multiple and contrasting job-descriptions for Christ's saving work on the other" (ibid.). To be sure. philosophy plavs a role: "Secondarilv. focus of detail and choice of stvle in the oortrait are markedly affected by .•. philosophical tastes and commitments" (9-10). The study of these authors is not only of historical interest but also "constructively suggestive" (10).

In the sections that follow, Adams treats her six authors in the order given above, highlighting certain themes. Due to differences among the thinkers, there are differences in which issues are discussed, but three of the most important are Christ's knowledge, his sinlessness, and his physical and spiritual weaknesses. Christ's human knowledge is exalted by the five medieval authors, although they strive to explain in just what way it was limited, for limited it had to be, if it was to be human knowledge (see esp. 15, 21, 32-36, 53-57, 78-85). The same authors treat Christ's sinlessness not merely as actual sinlessness but as impeccability, the inability to sin at all; they work hard to show how this is compatible with human freedom (see esp. 13, 19-20, 39-40, 62-63, 75-78). Christ's weaknesses, finally, were both physical and spiritual, according to the medievals, although they never led to sin (see esp. 14-15, 22-24, 40-42, 59-67, 85-90).

General principles drive these reflections, according to Adams. There is a philosophical and theological "presumption against incarnation" (95); "taking a finite and temporary 'almost-nothing' human nature into the unity of person is ... something Divine wisdom and good taste would avoid, other things being equal" (11). This presumption is overridden by the need to save humanity and by God's self-giving goodness, but it then "reasserts itself" in the demand that Christ's humanity be as exalted as possible (95). Next, the Savior's job-description requires him to be more than just another carpenter from Nazareth: he has to have superior knowledge and virtue in order to bring us to salvation. At the same time, however, soteriological requirements lead the medievals to hold back from attributing full human perfection to Christ during his earthly career: in order to be a model for us, and in order to suffer and earn merit, he has to have weaknesses of body and soul. Finally, especially in later medieval authors, Christ's human glorification is qualified simply to ensure that he has a normally functioning humanity compatible with the status of a wayfarer. So the general picture seems to be as follows: in order to be joined to God, Christ's humanity has to be as perfect as possible, all other things being equal; furthermore, insofar as Christ is Savior, his humanity has to be pretty impressive. Other things aren't equal, however, for a number of reasons, among them soteriological ones. Where Christ's humanity ends up, in the view

of any particular theologian, depends on the balancing of upward and downward pressures exerted by theological and philosophical forces.

The reader will have noticed that the preceding paragraphs are restricted to the medieval authors that Adams discusses. What about Luther? Although his style and purposes don't allow us to determine his precise views on, say, whether Christ had infinite human knowledge, he "exposes the assumptions behind [the medieval scholastic] family of Christologies as less than self-evident" (97). Steering farther from metaphysical presuppositions and closer to the text of the Bible, Luther was freer from concerns about the metaphysical propriety of the incarnation and therefore able to bring Christ's humanity closer to ours; in his humanity, Christ had our guilt and liability imputed to him and suffered greater penalties, including the feeling of divine abandonment (91-94).

There are, to be sure, issues that Adams does not discuss. For example, she does not ask whether Christ as human receives habitual grace from the very fact of his being divine or, as the rest of us do, from the Holy Spirit. Or, to pick a more technical example, she does not ask whether Christ's human nature is a property-bearer, which is relevant to issues such as Christ's human free will. If Christ's humanity can be a property-bearer, then it might be tempting to say that it is Christ's human nature that has human free will; that would seem to make it an agent in its own right, which at least sounds like a kind of Nestorianism. It is disappointing to find such issues undiscussed, but it was probably wise of Adams not to include them, as they would have made the lecture too unfocussed.

In her concluding remarks, Adams speculates about how else one might approach the question of Christ's humanity. Worries about metaphysical propriety could be taken, not as reasons for demanding that Christ's humanity be deiform, but as reasons for holding that it doesn't much matter what kind of humanity Christ has-after all, all finite creatures fall short of divine perfection, whether they are angels or maggots, sinless or sinful. Further, if the main goal of the incarnation needn't have been the rendering of satisfaction, then the particular issue of sinlessness seems irrelevant, at least in principle. "Which would furnish more hope: the appearance of a God-man Whose human nature represents our lost past and promised future? or Divine identification with our present misery, God's taking human being in all of its uncleanness into hypostatic union with Godself?" (98). It's not clear how much these suggestions represent Adams's own views and how much they are thought-experiments meant to bring out the issues at stake. One could c:'!rtainlyraise some concerns. Although it is true enough that God's perfection means that there is a perspective from which all creatures are on the same footing, it is questionable to bring in sinfulness as just another kind of falling-short. Creatures necessarily fall short of God, but if they subordinate themselves to him, then at least they aren't opposed to him, whereas sin would seem to be not only falling short but also insubordination and opposition. But these are

complicated matters that cannot be fully treated either in the conclusion of a lecture or in a short review.

Adams summarizes and assesses an enormous amount of material in ninety-two short pages and documents it with 346 footnotes, nearly all of them citations of primary sources. She balances attention to historical context with depth of analysis, thus avoiding both anachronistic interpretation and mere unphilosophical paraphrase, using an accurate but vigorous and nontechnical style. Finally, she does a good job of showing how theological and philosophical issues interact. As already noted, medieval Scholastic Christology does not receive as much attention as it should. Anyone wanting to study it could hardly find a better way of starting than reading the texts Adams cites and learning from her analysis.

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Nicolaus Minorita: Chronica. Edited by GEDEON GAL, 0.F.M., AND DAVID FLOOD,0.F.M. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1996. Pp. 30* + 1238 + v. $68.00 (doth). ISBN 1-57659-118-2.

In this volume, two distinguished Franciscan scholars make available in modern, working editions all the important documents pertaining to the Poverty Controversy of the fourteenth century. The chronicle of Nicholas, put together around 1350, documents the sad history of the Poverty Controversy, from its seemingly insignificant origins at Narbonne in 1321 to the appeals of the Michaelists at Munich and their argument against papal *plenitudo potestatis* directed to Benedict XII around 1340. The chronicle itself provides brief sketches of the order of events linking the legal and other documents reproduced and the editors have supplemented these explanations with substantial introductions of their own, providing both a narrative of the relevant context and a summary of the documents' contents. Through such extraordinary efforts, the editors have, as their subtitle indicates, produced a source book for students of Franciscan studies and Church history that should be eagerly received by those working in the fourteenth century.

In the first chapter, we find the papal documents to which reference is continually made in subsequent arguments and appeals. In his bull *Quia nonnunquam* (March 1322), Pope John XXII relieved the prohibition upon discussing apostolic poverty and asked for an open discussion of the issue of whether or not Christ and the apostles owned anything, either in common or

privately. Although such an issue may seem innocent enough to the contemporary reader, apostoHc poverty was considered the haHmark of Franciscan life and practice in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; John XXII's decision to reopen the discussion of poverty after nearly a half century of silence brought about by Nicholas HI's *faciit qui seminat* was revolutionary in its impact and foreboding. The Franciscans themselves rightly perceived that steps might be taken to undermine the system whereby they used but did not own the things they needed to live mid discharge their duties. Hence they immediately prepared a response during their general chapter at Perugia Oune 1322). The response was not deemed convincing by the Pope, who replied in the bull *Ad conditorem canonum* (December 1322) by deciding to make the Franciscans the owners of the things they used. Furthermore, the papal bull *Cum inter nonnullos* (November 1323) declared that it was heretical to assert that Christ and his apostles did not own the things they used, an opinion that was commonplace among the Franciscans. Even the appeal of the Franciscan lawyer Bonagratia of Pergamo was unavailing, producing little more than a revised version of *Ad conditorem canonum.* After the appeal of Bergamo, reproduced here in full, and that of Louis IV, the newly elected Holy Roman Emperor, the Pope responded in the papal bull *Quia quonmdam* (November 1324), justifying his actions by claiming to have the right to revoke the decisions of his predecessors whenever doing so would benefit the advancement of the faith.

The second chapter of the chronicle narrates and gives the documents describing the break between the Michael of Cesena, the Minister General of the Franciscan Order, and the papacy. After a delay owing to illness, Michael of Cesena arrived (December 1327) at Avignon, the seat of the papacy, in response to the summons of John XXII, who caHed upon Michael to conform to the declarations of *Quia quorundam.* After a difficult interview with the Pope in April, 1328, during which Michael contested the papal charges of heresy and appealed for reconsideration, the situation grew steadily worse for the minister general. The papacy became concerned that its decisions regarding the Franciscan Order would become the source of further diminution of its political power after Louis IV took up the cause of the rights of the order and deposed the Pope. As a result, Michael began to fear for his life and took steps to leave Avignon despite the city arrest under which he had been placed until he submitted to the papal declarations. Finally, on May 26, 1328, Michael fled Avignon along with William of Ockham and some other friars to continue the dispute with xxn in a wider forum.

The remaining chapters of the chronicle function within the framework established by an alienated minister general and an intransigent papacy. The third chapter reproduces Michael of Cesena's longer appeal in its entirety, first published in Pisa in September, 1328, presenting the Michaelists' sophisticated argumentation regarding ownership and simple use, while the fourth chapter makes available the companion pieces of Michael's shorter appeal and Louis

IV's condemnation of Pope John XXII. The fifth chapter describes the further deterioration of ecclesiastical unity in thought and action: in the letters reproduced here, Bernard of Turre, the cardinal functioning as effective head of the order at the instigation of John XXII, convoked a general chapter at Paris and there had Michael deposed from the minister generalship in Pentecost, 1329; in the fall of 1329, John XXII responded to Michael's appeal in the form of the papal letter *Quia vir reprobus.* At this point, we find already the situation that would last for almost a century. There were two Popes, one in Rome and the other Avignon, each basing his claims on the Petrine principle and each enjoying considerable recognition by secular, political authorities. Parallel with the papal conflict, there were two Franciscan ministers general, one hiding in Munich at the court of Louis IV of Bavaria and the other officially supported by the Avignon papacy.

The sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters narrate the continual exchanges between Avignon and Munich. John XXII's unusual theological views on the resurrection and the final judgment, including the remarkable claim that no person would enjoy the beatific vision until the general resurrection at the end of time, began to color the discussion and to figure in the controversy. After Michael and his followers were excommunicated at the close of the Parisian general chapter, Gerald Odonis, the papally endorsed minister general, entered into the fray as a new interlocutor, determined to defend the papal position. The exchanges between the two ministers general are bitter and cover a wide range of theological and ecclesiological issues.

Although John XXII renounced many of his theological novelties on his deathbed, his errors remained one of the grounds of disagreement long after his death since they were linked, in the minds of the Michaelists, to the radical innovations proposed by the Pope in the area of Franciscan ecclesiology and rationale. When John XXII's successor, Benedict XII, proceeded to affirm John's decrees and his policies, the group of Michaelists in Munich renewed the controversy by stating their opposition to the new Pope. The ninth chapter of the chronicle presents the appeals of the Michaelists against Benedict XII and the treatise of Louis IV who focused his writing on the manners in which both Popes abused their temporal authority under the rubric of *plenitudo potestatis.* Unsurprisingly, the tenth and final chapter shows the direction in which the thought of the Michaelists was headed: it reproduces a treatise, at least partially authored by William of Ockham, wherein the entire notion of *plentitudo potestatis* was subject to severe scrutiny and the view was advanced that the Pope has no such fullness of power either in temporal or secular matters.

The chronicle has been masterfully edited in this volume. Numerous references are given to historical studies for those interested in pursuing research into various aspects of the Poverty Controversy and its aftermath. Indices referencing the manuscripts used for the chronicle and the materials cited in the notes render access to the wealth of sources found in the volume

easy. Those doing research in the area of fourteenth-century ecclesiastical history and the history of ideas should acquaint themselves with the chronicle and the volume should be purchased by every library attempting to acquire primary-source documentation for medieval history.

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Peter of John Olivi On the Bible: Principia quinque in Sacram Scripturam: Postilla in lsaiam et In lad Corinthios. Edited by GEDEONGAL, O.F.M., and DAVID FLOOD, O.F.M. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1997. Pp. vi+ 431 $68.00 (paper). ISBN 1-57659-128-X.

Far too often, historians of medieval philosophy and theology confine their investigations to commentaries on Peter the Lombard's *Sentences,* systematic treatises on theological topics, commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus, and disputed or quodlibetal questions arising from the teaching of theology within the medieval universities. Rarely do such historians step outside these genres to examine the ideas that the authors they study had on the Bible, despite the fact that teaching the biblical text was what occupied at least half of the time of medieval theologians. Although the failure on the part of modem scholars to study the broader content of medieval theology is regrettable, it does find some excuse in the paucity of medieval commentaries available in modem, critical editions. The present volume admirably seeks to fill part of that lacuna by providing a fine edition of some of Peter John Olivi's comments on the Bible.

The editors review the details of Olivi's life as well as some elementary features of medieval biblical exegesis in the general introduction to the volume. They note that his approach to the Bible is characterized by his concern for the role of the Franciscan movement within the unfolding of salvation history. Indeed, this concern becomes apparent in the texts of Olivi, whose fascination with the seven seals of the Apocalypse is remarkable; nearly every one of commentaries edited in the volume makes some use of apocalyptic figures as a hermeneutic device for understanding the structure of the Bible and the flow of history that the Bible helps uncover.

The first part of the volume consists of five *principia* on the Bible, while the second part contains Olivi's commentary on Isaiah and his unfinished commentary on Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians. In addition, there are

two appendices: one comprising a question on obedience from Olivi's treatise on evangelical perfection and the other two sermons on the life of St. Francis.

Noteworthy among the five inaugural lectures on the Bible or *principia* are the first and second. In the first *principium,* Olivi defends the legitimacy of study against some standard objections advanced against it within the Franciscan order. To the charge that study gives rise to pride and the discussion of pointless questions, Olivi replies that a proper attitude toward study will always bear in mind the relationship between learning and the acquisition of the virtues (25-29). Connected to the right attitude towards study is a sensitivity towards the hierarchy of *auctoritates;* Olivi contends that the proper order should be, in a descending order of priority: the Bible itself, the Fathers, the theologians, and the philosophers. To study the last should be the duty only of the most acute minds, whose function is to purify philosophical texts of their errors and to bring out their underlying truths. The second *principium* illustrates Olivi's ability to adapt his considerable philosophical learning to the task of commenting on the Bible. Taking one of his favorite biblical passages, the seven seals of Apocalypse 5: 1, Olivi aligns the seven seals with the seven transcendental properties of being: unity/plurality; conformity/disconformity; actuality/potentiality; generality/specificity; substance/ accident; absolute/relative; and, most importantly, *esse secundum rem* and *esse secundum apprehensionem.* The last is the mode of being most consonant with the Scriptures themselves since the meaning of Scripture is revealed in the different levels of apprehension and appearance (50-61).

In the second part of the volume, we find Olivi's fascinating commentary on Isaiah. Though much of the text focuses on a thorough explication of the different senses-literal and spiritual-of the various passages, the philosophical side of Olivi again becomes manifest in his extensive discussion of prophetic visions. After reviewing the thesis of divine illumination, commonplace among contemporary Franciscan theologians, Olivi expresses doubts, as he does likewise in his other writings, about its tenability either regarding intellectual knowledge in general or prophetic vision in particular. Olivi proposes that the origin of prophetic vision is not divine illumination, understood as a person seeing the uncreated truth of God, but is rather found in some change within the mind of the prophet, while the summit of the vision consists in the graced contemplation of divine truth. The change effectuated in the mind of the prophet usually provides an inherent certitude whereby his mind is aware that the alteration of consciousness is from God; the contemplation of the truth gives the prophet a certain taste of the divine sweetness accompanied by the realization that the truth so experienced is incapable of being shown to be such through human reasoning (195-96). Yet Olivi finds that both of these features, while found in prophetic visions in their highest manifestations, are not always present in all prophetic visions. Some prophetic visions are not accompanied by the certitude on the part of the prophet that the vision is from God and some are not confirmed by the sweet

contemplation of divine truth. Furthermore, understanding prophetic visions is not something always found in the prophets themselves, as is clear from the case of the prophet Daniel; even in the mind of the prophet, some elements of his vision may be only probable and subject to correction while other elements remain certain-such was the case, according to Olivi, with Joachim of Fiore's vision of world history (197-98). Whatever may be the manner of explaining prophetic visions, however, Olivi thinks that the problem of reconciling the certitude of prophetic visions with the contingency of future events is no greater than the more general problem of reconciling divine foreknowledge and future contingency. Though the contrary of what the prophet sees could come to pass in the sense that the causes involved in a future event are capable of producing the contrary, the contrary of what the prophet foresees cannot come to pass, given the certainty of the divine vision in which the prophet shares through his adherence to divine revelation (199).

Among the texts published in the appendices of the volume, a text that should be studied by both philosophers and historians is the question on the vow of obedience. The question really treats of three issues: whether one should commit to a vow of obedience; whether oppression through the vow of obedience by a lower ecclesiastical authority should be reported to a higher one; and what is the proper rank of obedience among the three traditional vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. Here Olivi shows his devotion to the Franciscan rule and the writings of St. Bernard. Obedience is the highest of the three vows in the sense that it involves the surrender of one's own will to the superior as invested with the authority of the Lord. But there are nonetheless limits to obedience. No one is obligated to obey commands to sin, or commands that involve danger of mortal sin, or commands that would undermine the pursuit of the religious rule to which one is bound. In treating the ranking of the three vows, Olivi's dedication to the Franciscan way of life is once again obvious. Opposing the bold position taken by St. Thomas *(ausus est quidam scribere)*, Olivi argues that poverty is not to be ranked the lowest of the three vows on the grounds that it requires the surrender of the least things, namely, our exterior earthly goods, as opposed to the surrender of sensual pleasure required by chastity and the surrender of one's own will required by obedience. First, chastity also requires the surrender of exterior goods to the extent that it demands the forsaking of one's wife and her affections. Second, poverty demands the foregoing of sensual pleasures, even sexual ones, to the extent that one must, in following poverty, give up a wife if she may be deemed a possession. Finally, the continual demands of poverty upon oneself make it a harder vow to practice than obedience since the demands of obedience are usually less frequent and less severe. Even obedience, Olivi suggests, cannot be put into practice perfectly without the concomitance of poverty since the readiness to go and live anywhere to preach the Gospel presumes the forsaking of temporal goods which poverty involves (403-4).

The present volume dearly deserves the attention of scholars pursuing the study of medieval philosophy and theology. But it also should draw the notice of Church historians and historians of canon law for whom it may give some insight into the tradition of thought and feeling behind those involved in the later Poverty Controversy of the fourteenth century. The editors are to be commended for the remarkable job they have done of assembling such important texts and offering them in such well-documented and readable editions, while the Franciscan Institute is to be applauded for its efforts to make texts of such significance available at prices affordable to impecunious scholars.

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Religious Experience in "Earliest Christianity: A Missing Dimension in New Testament Studies. By LUKE TIMOTHY JOHNSON. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1998. Pp. vii+ 199. $20.00 (paper). ISBN 0-8006-3129-3.

This book can be considered an intermediate step between two other works by Johnson: *The Real Jesus* (1996), a theological apologetics that responds to the "misguided quest for the historical Jesus" by asserting the "the truth of the traditional Gospels," and *Living Jesus* (1999) which "reflects on the person of Jesus as good news." The purpose of this book is to call attention to and legitimate the fact that faith experience forms the matrix and subject of the discourse we find in the literature of earliest Christianity. Johnson rightly points to this "missing dimension in New Testament studies," the result of a mentality that systematically overlooks what is central in the New Testament witness. He sets about legitimating the reality of earliest Christian experience by recourse to a particular application of the phenomenology of religion which is neither history nor theology (vii).

There are five chapters in the book. Chapter 1, "What's Missing from Christian Origins," dearly establishes the fact of a methodological bias which eliminates experience as a category when investigating the beginnings of Christianity. Chapter 2 is an attempt to set up an objective approach that is modeled on work done in the field of the general phenomenology of religion and at the same time respects the reality of early Christian religious experience. This is accomplished by a judicious use of the work of M. Eliade, G. Van der Leeuw, G. Marcel, and especially J. Wach. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 apply the four

components of J. Wach's definition of religious experience to three public areas of early Christian experience, namely, baptism, glossolalia, and sacred meals.

This is a pioneering work which the author hopes will stimulate further research and reflection. The basic challenge that it offers to New Testament scholarship is on the level of epistemology, though this is never discussed as such. It comes at a time when many in the guild are asking philosophical questions about their methods and subject matter, often without the benefit of any serious philosophical training. Johnson's work is a good example of how probity in the use of history and creativity in the search for philosophical insights can render more intelligible the realities mediated by the ancient texts, especially those of the New Testament itself. By setting experience at the center of his study he forces himself and his readers to ask serious questions about the nature of experience and the nature of the communicative acts by which experience is mediated. This is the undoubted strength of the book whose weaknesses are those of an effort to include hitherto untried approaches in New Testament study. It is with respect for what Johnson has accomplished that I would like to enter into dialogue with him about some aspects of his work. I will discuss each chapter in turn.

After establishing the unavoidable fact that the New Testament authors are speaking about realities that have impinged upon their lives and are speaking to others who share this experience, Johnson goes on to analyze the failure of historians to take this dimension into account in their attempts to understand the presence of early Christianity in history. There is, first of all, the intellectualist approach which seeks to find the "essence of Christianity" underneath the ecclesiastical, mythic, and syncretizing overgrowth now present in the text. Pure (read Protestant) Christianity is thus recovered. Then there is, or was, the History of Religions School which, while it respected the "popular" nature of Christianity, could only understand this in terms of individual piety, thus misunderstanding the very phenomenon it sought to explain. In addition, this approach sought to render Christianity intelligible by treating it as an interesting mutant strain in the popular Hellenism of the day and by tracing its development according to the "laws" of the development of religious sects. The ultimate failure of this attempt cleared the way for the historical-critical method to seek intelligibility through the analysis of sources which in turn are used as evidence for various sub-groupings, now vanished, whose various and sometimes eccentric views, it is alleged, have been homogenized by ecclesiastical authorities to serve as part of their agenda. The last part of the chapter is an analysis of the massively erudite work of Jonathac Z. Smith for whom religion is simply a subjective pattern of cognition, one of many equally interesting ways in which human beings strive to "have 'space' in which to meaningfully dwell" (quoted on p. 28).

Johnson rightly points to the post-Kantian epistemology of Smith's whole effort while reserving for the last chapter a more detailed critique of his actual methodology. The first chapter would have profited from a more philosophical

critique of the other approaches discussed, particularly a consideration of the epistemological status of historical knowledge. It is clear that Johnson's strength lies more in the area of the assessment of first-order heuristic structures, the mental framework that constructs a hermeneutical spiral. But the basic problem in most historical work is to be found on the level of second-order heuristic structures, that is, on the basic philosophical stance, often unconscious, of the investigator.

In chapter 2 Johnson elaborates a methodology apt for the study of the Christian phenomenon. This is a daunting task, and one for which he has prepared himself by gaining an acquaintance with various approaches, particularly that of the phenomenology of religion. The problem is that of using general categories that can apply to "religion" as a whole in order to study Christianity, which is not a species within a genus called "religion." No one else has solved the problem which is eminently worth the effort: how does one reconcile the claim to uniqueness while at the same time appreciating the human context and condition of the Christian faith? Johnson, following the scholars mentioned above, opts for the category of "power" as the one most apt to characterize Christian experience. I would suggest that the category that specifies Christian experience is that of "person." Christians were and are in living contact with *someone,* namely, Jesus Christ and God in and through him. Johnson continually asserts this, and rightly so. Is it not possible to see that the experience of this person is a unique experience of power? It is the prime analogate of all religious experience and founds a category in which other religious experiences participate analogically.

With the third chapter we enter into a discussion of the first Christian religious moment generative of experience, namely, baptism. Johnson is respectful of the complexities of an historical reconstruction of this rite in the early Church. His comparison of the Letters to the Galatians and Colossians as examples of a "Phrygian" need for successive initiations is quite valuable. I would not agree, however, that baptism results in a state of "liminality" or "statuslessness." The New Testament texts are clear that baptism marks a transition to a new state, a new identity. This is true not only of the Pauline texts but also of such passages as Mark 16:16. The influence of Jewish thinking on baptism, particularly that in regard to the *miqveh,* is important here: the liminality is in the transition through water, not in the state that results from the transition. This is particularly true if, as some maintain, circumcision did not always follow in the case of the conversion of a Gentile.

Glossolalia forms the topic of chapter 4. Again, Johnson has researched the matter carefully and the result is a classic example of what I have called above the difficulty of trying to find uniqueness in a matter that is widespread in the context of religious experience. It may be that in regard to such phenomena we are sometimes dealing with the psychosomatic manifestations of a certain kind of pressure on the psyche. The pressure can be pathological, divine, or anything in between, thus pointing to the need for the gift of discernment of spirits.

Such discernment is necessary in the context of enthusiastic corporate worship of the type Paul has in mind in 1 Corinthians 12 and 14. However, it is not correct to equate tongues with "ecstatic speech" as Johnson consistently does. Paul himself recommends that, if there is no one to interpret, the person should "keep silent in the church and speak to himself and to God" (1 Cor 14:28). This does not imply "ecstatic speech" but a simple form of God-given prayer that can be "quiet." However, the main object of Johnson's treatment, if I understand it correctly, is not only glossolalia but the more general experience of Christ in the midst of corporate worship. This is again an example of the powerful experience of a person.

The last chapter is explicidy dedicated to the question of communal worship in the context of meals "where the magic is." In some ways this is the strongest of the three chapters in which Johnson's method is applied. Meals are obviously a more accessible common context in which to study what is unique within what is common. Johnson's critique of Jonathan Z. Smith evinces the same capacity for pointing to weaknesses in first-order heuristic structures as we have seen in *The Real Jesus"* The earliest matrices of what is now called "the summit and fount" of all the Church's activity *(Sacrosanctum Concilium* 10) are to be found in the meals Christians took together in memory of Christ, a memory that induded a grateful turning to the past, experience of Christ in the present, and a confident expectation of the future. The six steps Johnson outlines for a reading of ancient meals could well form the topic of a separate study and they could advance the discussion of method considerably. I would hope that such a study would help clarify how to speak of what is unique and what is common, of analogous but not equal manifestations of religion, of Spirit-inspired praise and not only of enthusiasm and ecstasy, of sacrament in the world of ceremony, and finally of mystery rather than magic. Luke Timothy Johnson could bring a particular set of gifts and insights to this task.

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