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THE HUMAN PERSON AND POLITICAL LIFE[1]

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I WISH TO DISCUSS the relationship between the human person and political life. My remarks will be a venture into political philosophy. This branch of philosophy has been shortchanged in Catholic philosophy in the past century, during the Thomistic revival following the encyclical *Aetemi Patris* of Pope Leo XIII in 1879.

In the departmental structure and the philosophical curricula that prevailed in many Catholic colleges and universities during the first two thirds of the twentieth century, political philosophy would usually be located not in philosophy departments but in political science. In seminary programs, there was effectively no political philosophy whatsoever. The philosophy manuals of the early and middle part of the century covered political philosophy, if they treated it at all, as a division of ethics. In the great manual written by Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., for example, entitled *Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae,* [2] one finds extensive treatments of logic, epistemology, philosophy of nature, philosophical psychology, metaphysics, theodicy, and ethics, but in the nearly one thousand pages of the two volumes, there are only some twenty pages, at the very end of the second volume, devoted to "civil society," and this brief section terminates with a two-page treatment *de bello,* on war. This long philosophical work, therefore, does not end peacefully, and it clearly does not offer a solution to the political problem.

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[1] An earlier draft of this paper was presented at a symposium that both honored Pope John Paul II and marked the university career of Jude P. Dougherty, Dean Emeritus of the School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America. The symposium was held on November 17-18, 2000, and was sponsored by the School of Philosophy and the Pope John Paul II Cultural Center.

[2] Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., *Elementa Philosophiae ltristotelico-'Ihomisticae,* 2 vols. (Freiburg: Herder, 1953).

It is true that some of the most important twentieth-century Catholic philosophers devoted much of their work to political philosophy: Jacques Maritain wrote such books as *Man and the State, The Person and the Common Good, Things that are Not Caesar's, Integral Humanism, Freedom in the Modern World* (the French title was *Du regime temporel et de la liberte},* and *Scholasticism and Politics (Principes d'une politique humaniste},* all of which deal with politics, and Yves R. Simon wrote *The Philosophy of Democratic Government* among other titles in political thought, but these two authors were the exception rather than the rule. At Louvain's Higher Institute for Philosophy, for example, there was no representation of political philosophy. Jacques LeClercq wrote in social ethics and social philosophy, but not in political thought as such. What was done in political philosophy added up to a relatively small achievement in this field, compared, say, with the work that was done in metaphysics, philosophy of science, ethics, and the philosophy of man. This lack of interest is rather strange, since political life originally provided the context for philosophy, in the life of Socrates and in the writings of both Plato and Aristotle. The lack of concern with political philosophy should provoke our curiosity and perhaps even our wonder.

At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, a particularly impressive group of Catholic thinkers in Paris has addressed issues in political philosophy. Pierre Manent is the most conspicuous of these, but one must also mention Remi Brague, Alain and Terence Marshall. Their work has been influenced by Raymond Aron and Leo Strauss. We should also call to mind the work, in the United States, of Ernest Fortin, A. A. (Boston College},James Schall, S.J. (Georgetown}, Francis Canavan, S. J. (Fordham}, and Charles N.

R. McCoy (Catholic University), but it is interesting to note that all these persons were or are academically "housed" not in philosophy but in departments of politics, or, in the case of Fortin, in theology. There were other thinkers who approached social and political problems, such as John Courtney Murray, S.J., and John A. Ryan in the United States and Denis Fahey and Edward Cahill in Ireland, but again they tended to discuss these issues in terms of Church-state relations and moral theology, and did so in a somewhat more deductive manner than would be appropriate for political philosophy.[3]

I should add that the Holy Father, in his philosophical writings on the human person, does address the phenomenon of community in his article "The Person: Subject and Community"[4] and in the last chapter of his book *The Acting Person*.[5] That chapter is entitled, "Intersubjectivity by Participation," and is found under the more general heading of "Participation." This general discussion of community, however, does not develop a specifically political philosophy, although it certainly points the way to it. The Holy Father's work in inspiring and promoting the Solidarity movement in Poland, and the great contribution he made in bringing down one of the worst tyrannies in the history of humanity, are further reasons why philosophical and theological reflection on political life should occur in a cultural center dedicated to his name. I would also like to commemorate the work of Jude P. Dougherty, who is being honored by this conference, and to note the keen interest he has had in political life and political thought, an interest that has been expressed in his activities and many of his writings.

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[3] Political philosophy is treated in a more deductive way when it is approached through theology and revelation because it is placed in and derived from a moral context that is more comprehensive than its own. In Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, political philosophy moves toward its first principles from political life itself.

[4] Karol Wojtyla, "The Person: Subject and Community," The *Review of Metaphysics* 33 (1979): 273-308.

[5] Karol Wojtyla, *The Jlaing Person,* trans. Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979).

I. THE PERSON AND POLITICS: ARISTOTLE

The classical and unsurpassable definition of the person was given by Boethius early in the sixth century: a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. This definition highlights rationality as the specifying feature of persons; a person is an individual being that is endowed with reason.[6] According to this definition, there may be persons-divine or angelic-who are not human beings; they too could be individual entities invested with a rational nature, but of course such persons would not enter into politics. Political life requires body and soul as well as personhood.

Persons, in Boethius's definition, are individual entities that possess reason. It is the power of reason, with all that it implies, that makes us to be persons. Even when we use the word *person* in a less technical way, simply to highlight the fact that the individual in question is a human being and should be treated as such, we imply that the dignity he has and the respect he deserves follow from his rationality and not from some other quality. It is because he is rational, an agent of truth, that he must be "treated as a person and not a thing."

Human reason and hence human personality are exercised in speech, in science and the search for wisdom, in ethical conduct, in friendship, and in religion, and they are also exercised in a distinctive manner in political life. Political societies are communities specifically made up of human persons. If we are to speak about the human person, our discussion would be sorely deficient if we did not treat the domain of human political conduct, and if we did not specify how human reason, in thought and in action, is at work in it.

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[6] Boethius's definition does not involve a genus and specific difference, because *individual substance* could not express a genus except in a purely verbal or logical sense. The term expresses a particular right from the start, not something common. Persons are essentially indexical. See Robert Spaemann, *Personen: Versucbe Uber den Unterschied zwischen 'etwas' und 'jemand'* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996), 32-44. Spaemann shows that the term *person* is not a sorta! expression.

It is not just that human beings live together. Men live together in families and the kind of extended families we could call villages or tribes. Such communities come about by natural inclination and do not need founders. They are not the outcome of deliberation, reasoning, and argument, as political societies are. They do not have to be conceived before they come into being. Political societies need to be established by acts of reason, and people who succeed in this enterprise bring about a great good for others: Aristotle says that "the one who first established [such a community] is the cause of the greatest goods,"[7] because founders make possible for man a civilized and virtuous life, a life lived in view of the noble, the good, and the just, a life in which human excellence can be achieved and the worst in man can be controlled: "For man, when perfected, is the best of all animals, but when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all."[8] One thinks of the benefits that millions of people have enjoyed because of the acts of reason that achieved the founding of the United States of America, most conspicuously, the acts of thinking that took place during the Constitutional Convention in 1787, in the debates that followed, in the ratification of the Constitution by individual states from 1787 to 1789, and at the inauguration of George Washington as the first president in 1789. All these events were exercises of reason, and they in turn followed upon the American Revolution itself, as well as the colonial period that preceded it, when the habits of free political life were established among the people.

It is an act of reason, and therefore an eminently personal action, to establish a political society. To underline this point, we may consider the fact that animals also live together, but their association is not the outcome of an exercise of reason on their part. There are no founders in animal societies; Richard Hassing has asked, ironically, "Would Aristotle say that the first founder of chimpanzee society was responsible for the greatest of chimpanzee goods?"[9] The question simply does not apply. There are no founders of animal societies. Also, there are no Washington Monuments or Jefferson Monuments in ape or elephant society, because there are among apes and elephants no founders who exercise their reason to establish a society in which reason flourishes. One of the things that reason does when it prospers in a civilization is to acknowledge, by the building of monuments, the founding acts of reason that established the space within which the monuments could be built. This is not to demean ape or chimpanzee or elephant or dolphin society, but to highlight the human difference and the rational character, hence the specifically personal character, of human political association. Political society is established by a determination of the noble, the good, and the just, which is expressed and then desired by reason.

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[7] Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2.1253a30-31. I have used the Jowett translation of the *Politics,* which is found in McKeon's *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), as well as the translation by Carnes Lord (Aristotle, *The Politics* [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984)), but have made many revisions of my own.

[8] Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2.1253a31-33.

It is important to note, furthermore, that although political life needs to be established by an act of reasoning, it is not therefore purely conventional. It remains part of human nature, but of human nature in its teleological understanding, when human life is seen at its best; it is not part of human nature in the genetic, biological sense.[10] I doubt that researchers in biology will find a gene that programs for political constitutions, or even a cluster of neurons that does so.

Political life is not only founded by an act of reason; it is also sustained and justified by reason. It is carried on by public discussion, in which reason itself is elevated into a higher kind of life than it can reach in familial and tribal community. In the *Politics,* Aristotle describes political society as the culmination of human communities. In cities, he says, there are two irreducible parts, the wealthy and the poor, and the shape that political life takes on results from the perennial struggle between these two groups to rule over the whole.[11] The tension between the richer and the poorer parts of a society makes up the *perpetuum mobile* for politics. When the wealthy rule for their own benefit, the city is an oligarchy; when the poor rule for their own benefit, the city is literally a democracy, a rule by the people or the many, since there normally are more poorer than wealthier members of society. Aristotle says that the best outcome for most people in most places at most times, the practically best form of the city generally, is the republic, the *politeia,* which is intermediate between oligarchy and democracy. In a republic, a large middle class-middle in both an economic and an ethical sense-is established between the rich and the poor, the laws and not men rule, and they do so for the benefit of the whole city, not for any particular part.[12] To live this way is a great human accomplishment. It is a truly exalted exercise of reason for citizens to allow the laws to rule, to have the strength of reason and character to subordinate themselves to the laws, which they allow to rule for the benefit of the whole. Not all people have the civic habits and public vision to let the laws and not their own partisan interests rule over the whole; not all people are immediately capable of being citizens.

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[9] Richard Hassing, "Darwinian Natural Right?" *Interpretation 27* (Winter 1999-2000): 148.

[10] When the causality of the *telos* is denied or abandoned, the mind recoils into simply mechanical and genetic explanations.

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[11] The "political triangle" of oligarchy, democracy, and republic is treated in book 4 of the *Politics.* The determination of the rich and poor as the irreducible segments of the city occurs in chapters 3 and 4. Democracy and oligarchy, the most common forms of political life and the expressions of these two parts of the city, are treated in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 is devoted to the various modifications of oligarchy and democracy. The republic is discussed in chapters 7 and 8. The fact that it is the practically best form of rule is shown in chapter 9. Chapter 11 gives advice on how to strengthen the middle class. One reason why a republic is a good form for political life is the fact that it allows many people to participate in ruling, to be citizens, but without being partisan in their rule. There is more talent, judgment, and virtue in many than in one or a few; see *Politics* 3.11.1281a39-b21. Aristotle also notes that democracies are particularly vulnerable to demagogues, the "leaders of the people"; see *Politics* 4.4.1292a4-38, and 5.5.1304b19-1305a36.

[12] It should be noted that in his discussion of the republic in *Politics* 4.7-9, Aristotle does not claim that the republic as such promotes virtue or nobility; he presents it rather as a resolution of the parallelogram of political forces, in which the interests of both the poor and the rich are best reconciled. The two groups are blended into a middle class that will rule through the laws for the advantage of the whole. Virtue as the overriding end of the republican city will arise through that city's participation in aristocracy; see below, note 15. This "value-free" understanding of the republic is expressed in the brief description given in 4.8.1293b33-34: "For the republic is, to state it simply, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy." See ibid., 1294a22-25: "It is evident that a mixture of the two--of the wealthy and the poor-is to be called a republic, while a mixture of the three [wealthy, poor, and virtuous] should more particularly be called an aristocracy (in addition to the genuine and first form)."

This triad of oligarchy, democracy, and republic is the core of Aristotle's *Politics;* the entire work pivots around this triangle. I would also make the stronger claim that what Aristotle is describing here is the truth of human political life, and not just his opinion or a description proper to his time and place. He is presenting the "mobilities" of political life, and the various solutions and deviations that are proper to it. What he describes goes on even now, so long as we continue to have a political life. Aristotle is describing politics as a human thing, as a human possibility, not just as a historical fact. If we fail to see this, it is because we ourselves have become incapable of recognizing human nature and have fallen into historical storytelling instead.

Aristotle also discusses monarchy and aristocracy, in which one man or a few virtuous men rule for the good of the whole. These two forms serve as a kind of norm for what all cities can be.[13] Because they admit only a few people to rule, however, they may not be possible once societies become very large (Aristotle admits this limitation),[14] but they must be kept in mind as part of how we design and live our politics: when the laws are made to govern, they should rule as virtuous agents would rule. Also, there is an important qualification in Aristotle's definition of aristocracy: aristocracy exists either when the virtuous rule because of their virtue (the virtuous become the establishment, the *politeuma),* or when whoever is ruling exercises his or their rule for the sake of what is best for the city and its members.[15] Because of this second definition of aristocracy, there can be an aristocratic component to every form of constitution, including a republic.

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[13] Kingship is treated and its problems discussed in *Politics* 3.14-17. In chapter 18 Aristotle says that the virtue of a good king and of true aristocrats would be the same as the virtue of a good man. Book 7 in its entirety seems to be a more extended treatment of the best regime, along with remarks wont the material conditions under which it could be realized.

[14] In *Politics* 3.15.1286b8-10, Aristotle says, "And it is probably for this reason that people were originally ruled by kings, because it was rare to find men who were very much distinguished by their virtue, especially since the cities they inhabited then were so small." See also 3.17, where Aristotle says that there may be some populations in which it is best if one individual or one family should rule.

On the margin of all these forms of political life stands tyranny, the catastrophic disaster that is always lurking as the threat to political life. It is the ever-present sinkhole on the margin of politics. It will always be there; nothing we can do can definitively exclude it as a possibility. In tyranny there is no longer any political life, but only servile subjection to a ruler or rulers who rule for their benefit alone, without any virtuous guidance or purpose. To be ruled tyrannically is incompatible with human nature.[16]

In Aristotle's view, the best kind of political community will be made up of elements from all the good regimes: there will be monarchic, aristocratic, and popular elements in the various parts of the government. This variety will provide a kind of tensile strength for the city. Each type of city has its own proper political virtue: even the deviant regimes, such as the oligarchic and the democratic, try to shape the people in the city to fit the constitution, and for this reason every city is concerned not only with economic matters, public safety, and defense, but also with the virtue of its people.[17] This conformity of the upbringing with the constitution will happen as a matter of course in every political society, but all regimes have to be measured by the standard of the virtuous man, and the more closely the virtue of the city approximates that of the good man, the agent of moral truth, the better the city will be as a human achievement.

What is common to all cities in which there is a political life-in opposition, for example, to tyranny, where there is none-is the fact that people do argue about who should rule, that is, they argue about what kind of virtue will set the tone for the city. People who claim that they should rule are trying to do more than just get themselves into the public offices; first and foremost they are also trying to establish a certain way of life, one that they embody, in the community that they want to rule. There always are "culture wars" in political life. Oligarchs, for example, want to live according to the principle that if we are different in one respect (viz., in regard to wealth), we are different absolutely and should be treated as such. The "virtue" in oligarchy is measured by the possession of wealth. Democrats, on the other hand, want to live by the principle that if we are equal in one respect (viz., in regard to liberty), we should be considered equal absolutely. "Virtue" for extreme democrats is the ability to do whatever one wishes, the liberty to satisfy any impulse; that is the kind of life they promote.[18] When people argue that they should rule, they are exercising their reason; this particular exercise of it is higher than the exercise one finds within the family or the village, where such argument about rule does not take place, just as foundings do not take place. Because it is reason that makes us persons, the people engaged in political life are acting more fully as persons than they are able to do in their families and villages. They strive to project and embody a form of human life; they do not just deal with the necessities of life.

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[15] *Politics* 3.7.1279a35-37.

[16] *Politics* 3.17.1287b37-41; Aristotle says there is no people that is *tyrannikon* by nature, nor is any fit for the other deviant regimes.

[17] Each city has to habituate and educate its people to fit the constitution of the city: *Politics* 5.9.1310a12-38. Even oligarchic and democratic cities must do this. If the habits of the people do not fit the laws of the city, Aristotle says, the city will be like the *akratic* man, whose reason and passions are at odds with one another.

It is also the case that there is no one form of the city that is the best absolutely everywhere. Much depends on the population, the circumstances, the lay of the land, the history of the people, and other things. Aristotle distinguishes four senses of the best in politics: first, the best "as we might pray for it," when all the circumstances are favorable (we may not be able to implement this best form, but we must keep it in mind); second, the best in particular circumstances; third, the best that we can achieve when are faced with a city that is already established; and fourth, the best for most people in most circumstances (effectively, this is the republic).[19] Political excellence for Aristotle is therefore flexible, adaptable, and analogous, not univocal. It is the. outcome of prudential, not mathematical, reason.

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[18] For the understanding of justice proper, respectively, to oligarchs and democrats, see *Politics* 3.9 and 5.1.1301a25-b4.

Aristotle's description of political life is not relativized by history. It expresses the political possibilities of human nature, and it is as true now as it always wa-.. Aristotle's *Politics* formulates the substance, the *ousia*, of political life better than any other work that has ever been written.[20]

II. THE MODERN SITUATION

I wish to claim that in our contemporary exercise of political life, in our practice, we *do* conform to Aristotle's analysis, *to the extent that we still have a political life.* For example, in the United States the richer and the poorer are clearly appealed to, respectively, by the Republicans and the Democrats, at least as these parties have been defined for most of the twentieth century, and the problem is to fashion a republic, with an inclusive middle class. There are monarchic and aristocratic elements in our political life, and there is always the danger of tyranny. The major difficulty in our modern situation, of course, is the scale of society and the technology that makes such a scale possible. How can anyone survey the common good? How can any political form be embodied in tens or hundreds of millions of people? This is the great challenge to political prudence in our time.

But although we conform in practice with Aristotle, the *idea* we have of political life in our present day is quite different from what we find in his teachings. In our public discussion of political life, we tend to think that there is one form of government that ought to be installed everywhere. We call it democracy, and we are impatient if we find places in which it has not been realized; we call such places undeveloped countries, implying that they are politically either childish or stunted.

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[19] The four senses of "best" are found in *Politics* 4.1.1288b21-39. It is important to note that the very best form of the city does not signify an "ideal" city, one that would demand preternatural circumstances or a transformation of human nature. Rather, it is the city one could bring about if all the circumstances and conditions were the best one could possibly hope for. Such a city may be practically unrealizable, but not unrealizable in principle. The wonders of modem technology tempt us to think that preternatural circumstances may in fact be attainable, and that a utopia may no longer be as distant as once was thought.

[in] For recent commentaries on the *Politics,* see Mary P. Nichols, *Citizens and Statesmen: A Study ofAristotle's* Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992); Michael Davis, *The Politics ofPhilosophy: A Commentary onAristotle's* Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); Peter Simpson, *A Philosophical Commentary on the* Politics *ofAristotle* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

When we speak this way, our speech is, I think, caught up in an ambiguity. We confuse the republic and the modern state. The republic is the form of government in which laws, not partial, one-sided, self-interested men rule; it is Aristotle's *politeia,* the constitution that is generally the best that can be attained by most people in most places. The modern state, on the other hand, is something that arose through modern political philosophy. It claims to be something radically new and radically different from earlier forms of government. It is meant to be the definitive solution to the human political problem, not a solution for this time and place. It was initially visualized by Machiavelli and baptized by Jean Bodin with the name *sovereignty.*[21] It was comprehensively described by Hobbes, and worked out and adjusted by subsequent thinkers like Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel.[22]

When we speak of democracy, we tend more or less to think that we are speaking of a community in which the laws rule, not men, but usually we are really speaking about a modern state, the one informed by sovereignty, not a society informed by one of the political constitutions described by Aristotle. We also tend to think that the modern state, modern democracy, has arisen as a perfect, culminating development in human history. It is not seen as one of the forms of political life among many, the form that we may be able to achieve if we are lucky and intelligent enough.

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[21] Bodin expressed his concept of sovereignty in his *Les six livres de la republique* (1576). See the selections in *On Sovereignty,* ed. Julian H. Franklin, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Bodin says, "Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth" (1). He models the sovereign after God (46, 50). He also admits that the concept of sovereignty is not present in Aristotle (47, 50). As Julian Franklin observes, for Bodin "citiunship does not necessarily imply political participation as in Aristotle" (1, footnote).

[22] On the concept of sovereignty see Francis X. Slade, "Rule as Sovereignty: The Universal and Homogeneous State," in John J. Drummond and James G. Hart, eds., *The Truthful and the Good: Essays in Honor of Robert Sokolowski* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 159-80.

Let me express my own value judgment at this point: to the extent that the word *democracy* means a republic, it presents a good thing, a form of political life to which one can properly dedicate oneself, one that can be in conformity with human nature and human virtue. The political problem is to determine, by practical wisdom, how the rule of laws ordered toward human excellence can be implemented in our day and age, in whatever part of the world we inhabit. To the extent, however, that the word *democracy* means the modern state, the one described by Hobbes and glorified by Hegel, it presents a great human problem and an ominous threat to the human person. It is a formula for organizing deracinated human beings.

The modern Hobbesian state was nurtured in absolute monarchies in the early modern period, it showed its face in the French Revolution, and it came into full view in the National Socialist and the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century. In this conference, we commemorate the work of Pope John Paul II, a man who experienced both the Nazi and the Stalinist horrors. He reacted to them, in his actions and words, with a courageous defense of the human person in its dignity before God. His defense of the human person, furthermore, is based essentially on truth, on the human person's ability to hear and discover the truth about the world, about himself, and about God. Pope John Paul II reminds us that human beings are individual substances of a rational nature, and that through their reason they can attain the splendor of truth, even in the face of powers that do their best to extinguish the truth and annihilate the human dignity that flows from it. They truly are powers of darkness, for whom will triumphs over intelligence, power over reason, and choice over life. The problem of the modern state, furthermore, was not resolved by victory in the Second World War and the end of the Cold War. It continues in the development of the therapeutic and managerial state, and much of the human drama in regard to the modern state is going on in this very city and its suburbs. What will we have: a genuine republic or a Leviathan masquerading as a republic? The question is still open, and human success, in the short term at least, is by no means assured, but it is possible. As this struggle continues into the future, it is quite appropriate that there be in this city an embodied presence of John Paul II, shepherd and stubborn reminder of the dignity of man.[23]

III. CONTRASTS BETWEEN REPUBLICS AND THE MODERN STATE

Let us speak further about the choice between a republic and Leviathan. I would like to bring out three ways in which these two forms of political life differ. To be more accurate, I should not call them two forms of political life, but the form of political life and the form of mass subjection and individualism.

(1) First of all, in the republic, and in all good political constitutions, reason can be exercised. Men can think and express themselves. The republic is not possible without active human reason. Such reason is exercised in the founding of the city, in the deliberations that go on to determine courses of action, and in specifying the laws of the city and adjudicating the application of the laws. All those who are citizens are able to enter into such exercises of reason; that is what it means to be a citizen, to be able to enter into political reasoning. But besides these political or prudential exercises of reason, there is also in the republic the recognition of the power of theoretical reason, of understanding for its own sake. Besides the ethical and political life of reason, there is a life of simple understanding. Aristotle recognizes this in book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* where he says that the highest human happiness is found in the theoretic life, but he also acknowledges it in a very dramatic way in book 7 of the *Politics,* chapters 2 and 3.[24] He says that the life of thinking is higher than the political, and he implies that if one does not acknowledge the excellence of the life of thinking one will try to satisfy one's thirst for the infinite by ruling over others, and one will therefore try to

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[23] The conference at which this paper was originally given was held, in part, at the John Paul II Cultural Center in Washington, D.C.

[24] Aristotle's argument is developed in *Politics* 7.2-3, especially in 1325a31-h32.

magnify this domination over as many people as possible, at home and abroad, even over one's neighbors and parents and children and friends.[25] In other words, the life of ruling is not the simply highest life; we have to take our bearings from something higher. This also means that there is something in us that transcends political life, and only when political life acknowledges such transcendence can it find its proper place in human affairs. Only then will there be limited government. What this means is that a true republic, a city limited by laws, will have respect for the person as an agent of truth, both in the practical and in the theoretical order. The reason of the human person has its own directedness and its own appetite for truth; it is not just a tool in the service of subrational desires.

The modern state, in contrast, as described by Hobbes and embodied in totalitarian forms of rule, denies the domain of truth. For it, reason is a tool. The modern state is constituted as a new reality, as the sovereign, by an act of sheer will by men in the state of nature, and it exercises its own power simply for its survival and to prevent the state of nature from returning. The sovereign state is separate from the people and it lords over them. For Hobbes, the metaphysical reality of the state is made up of its own power and its own decisions. There is no truth of human nature by which it must be measured and to which it must be subordinated. The state determines even the kind of religion-the grasp of transcendence-that it will tolerate. The citizens or subjects are not agents of truth in any way; when they express their opinions, they are, according to Hobbes, engaged in vain posturing, not true deliberation:

> For there is no reason why every man should not naturally mind his own private, than the public business, but that here he sees a means to declare his eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenious and wise, and returning home to his friends, to his parents, to his wife and children, rejoice and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behavior.[26]

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[25] *Politics* 7.3.1325a34-41.

[26] Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive* 10, §15. See also chapter 1, §2: "All free congress ariseth either from mutual poverty or from vain glory." I have used Hobbes's own translation of this work; see Thomas Hobbes, *Man and Citizen,* ed. Bernard Gert (Garden City, N.Y.:

For Hobbes, the sovereign's will alone should determine public affairs, and even the religious opinions of people have to be segregated into privacy. Such religious beliefs have no public standing as possible truths and cannot be presented as such.[27] George Orwell was not wrong when in *1984* he has the totalitarian O'Brien controlling not only what one should do, but also how and what one should think, even in mathematics.[28] There is nothing to transcend the sovereign; as Hobbes's predecessor and guide, Niccolo Machiavelli, put it, any ideal or best kingdoms, whether Christian or Greek, are figments of the imagination, imaginary kingdoms, that bring about ruin rather than preservation.[29]

In this political viewpoint, intelligence becomes merely calculation and pragmatic coping with the material needs of life. Even the social contract is just the work of calculating reason. Reason is not insight into truth, because there are no natures or forms of things to be understood. There is only the calculation of consequences. The epistemological skepticism of modernity is not unrelated to its metaphysics and political philosophy. Indeed, Hobbes's understanding of men as machines and thinking as mechanical motion, which is presented at the beginning of *Leviathan,*[30] is also not unrelated to his political philosophy: this is how human beings must understand themselves if they are to subject themselves to Leviathan. It is how the philosophical spokesman for Leviathan wants them to understand themselves. The mechanistic interpretation of human beings offered to us by

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Doubleday, 1972).

[27] On the essentially public character of Christian belief, see Francis X. Slade, "Was 1st Aufldllrung? Notes on Maritain, Rorty, and Bloom, With Thanks but No Apologies to Immanuel Kant," in Daniel Mcinerny, ed., *Tbe Common Things: Essays on Thomism and Education* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 48-68.

[28] On Orwell's insight into the reality of the Soviet system, see Alain Besan1ron, *La falsification du bien: Soloviev et Orwell* (Paris: Julliard, 1985). The second part of the book is entitled, "Orwell ou la justification du mal." Besan1ron's work abounds in striking phrases. In describing the radical falsity of modem totalitarian rule, he speaks of "ce mensonge universe!" (176), and he says, "Un homme sans memoire est d'une plasticite absolue. II est recree a chaque instant" (183).

[2'] Machiavelli makes this claim in the famous chapter 15 of The *Prince.*

[30] See the Introduction and first six chapters of *Leviathan.*

reductive forms of cognitive science, in which mind is replaced by brain and human beings are not seen as agents ·of truth, is teleologically ordered toward the modern state in its pure form.

This then is the first contrast I wish to draw between classical and modern political philosophy: modern thought subtracts the issue of truth from the domain of politics, but a republic acknowledges both practical and theoretical truth and the human person's ability to attain it. We might ask ourselves which of these two options is characteristic of our political culture.

(2) The second point I wish to make is that modern political thought considers the state to be an inevitable development in the history of humanity. For Aristotle, the various constitutions come and go as events move along and people respond to them. There is no necessary destiny driving them on and nothing is definitive; circumstances and choices permit now this form, now that to prevail, and sometimes the political society falls into tyranny. Aristotle encourages us to do the best we can in the situations in which we find ourselves. Political life is an exercise of prudence.

In the modern understanding, and especially in the twist that German idealism and Hegel have given it, the modern state is a definitive achievement. No further prudential and philosophical reflection is necessary concerning political society, because the final answer has been reached in the evolution of world history. This is why we take it for granted that what we call democracy should be installed everywhere, and why we call countries in which it does not exist "undeveloped" countries, or, more hopefully, countries "on the way to development." This belief in the historical necessity of the modern state might also explain why political philosophy has been studied in departments of political science, not in departments of philosophy, in Catholic and non-Catholic institutions alike. The political question is not open any longer. The state is a necessary thing-generated by historical if not cosmic necessity-and hence it is an object of social science, not of fundamental philosophical reflection. Nature has been overcome by history, and the unsettled arguments about who should rule and what form of government should prevail, the disputes among parties, can now be put to rest. The declarations of the end of history proposed by Alexandre Kojeve and Francis Fukuyama are related to this understanding of the modern state.

In contrast with this view of modern politics, I would claim that human nature has not changed, that political life is the same now as it always has been, and that what is truly civic and political in modern states is precisely what is still functioning as a republic, as a rule of laws, in which people are citizens and not subjects, in which it is still possible to deliberate and voice opinions about how we should live, where we can still express ourselves about the noble and the just, and can ask whether the laws we live under are or are not in conformity with the ends of human nature and the truth about man.

In order to foster true political life, it is necessary for us to change our understanding of the history of philosophy. It is necessary for us to overcome the segmentation of philosophy into ancient, medieval, and modern. We must avoid thinking that we can only understand philosophers as the products of their historical circumstances, the products of their epoch. We must recover the idea that philosophy is a perennial thing, that there are philosophical truths that persist throughout all periods and ages, and that there is a truth about human nature and about political life that has been there all along. Human nature does not change, and the nature of political life does not change either. The thing we have to relativize historically is the modern state, not the political life that we find described in Aristotle. The modern state can be explained by its historical circumstances and it can be transcended. Aristotle has brought to light the nature of political life, while Machiavelli, Hobbes, and their followers have described and fabricated a construct, one that is not in keeping with human nature, human reason, or the human person, one that can be explained by the historical circumstances of its emergence.

(3) We have contrasted the republic and the modern state in regard to the issue of truth and in regard to the issue of historical inevitability. The third contrast I wish to draw between the republic and the modern state concerns the relationship each of

these forms of rule have toward other social authorities and other communities, such as the family, the Church, private associations, unions, businesses, educational institutions, and the like. The republic presupposes prepolitical societies. It does not claim to fabricate men or to make men human. It assumes that families and neighborhoods, churches and private associations, can all do their irreplaceable work in forming human beings, and it facilitates and crowns their work by its own, by establishing the city under laws, the city that both presupposes such prepolitical societies and brings them to their own perfection. This assumption of prepolitical societies is expressed in Aristotle's *Politics* by the fact that the household is treated in book 1 as a presupposition of political life, and in that book Aristotle says, "For the political art does not make men."[31] The city makes citizens, but it does not make human beings.

The sovereign state, in contrast, the Leviathan, levels all prepolitical communities and authorities. It makes a clean sweep. The only private societies that it tolerates are those that it permits to exist for its own purposes. Instead of assuming prepolitical societies and bringing them to a higher perfection, the modern state is related to individuals, which it takes out of the state of nature and transforms into a human condition. This change is vividly expressed by Rousseau, who in *On The Social Contract,* describes the legislator or the founder as follows:

> The man who makes bold to undertake the founding of a people should feel within himself the capacity to-if I may put it so-change human nature: to transform each individual ... into a part of a larger whole, from which he in a sense draws his life and being.[32]

We have seen attempts in twentieth-century regimes to displace and replace the family itself, as well as neighborhoods, educational institutions, and charitable entities such as hospitals by massive governmental bureaucracies and mobilizations. The

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[31] Politics1.10.1258a21-22.

[32] Jean Jacques Rousseau, The *Social Contract,* trans. Willmoore Kendall (New York: Henry Regnery Co., 1954), book 2, chap. 7, pp. 57-58.

homo sovieticus was only the most extreme form of this titanic totalitarian effort, and we can see what it did to people who lived under it and were its targets. Human cloning and the artificial conception of human life may be a Western scientific version of the same thing. But a coherent society is not possible in a Hobbesian state, because such a state is not in keeping with the nature of man.

IV. CONCLUDING PRACTICAL REMARKS

I have discussed both classical political philosophy-which I would characterize not as classical but as perennial-and the modern state, and I have tried to draw some contrasts between them. We have discussed them in regard to three issues; first, whether or not they acknowledge truth and human reason; second, whether they are the outcome of prudential achievement or historical inevitability; and third, whether or not they acknowledge prepolitical human beings, societies, and authorities. It should be obvious that the issues we are discussing are of great human importance. Human life can be terribly tortured by forms of association that destroy political life, and political life can be destroyed by rampant individualism no less than by totalitarian regimes. Modern individualism-what is called liberal individualism-harms the person slowly and silently through a notion of freedom as absence of any and all constraints on the individual's choice; liberal individualism thus undermines its own moral preconditions of self-control, self-governance, and internal, moral freedom. At the other extreme, the collectivism of communism and fascism harms the person suddenly and directly and loudly, through a violent abuse of power that destroys freedom, both external and internal. Thus the two seemingly different modern regimes both destroy the person, although in different ways.

The central question of the last part of my paper is, in what way can the human person be protected, preserved, and enhanced in our modern political context? Can we draw up some agenda items, as tasks for academic life, for the Catholic Church, and for ourselves?

The practical task is for the Church to continue to be active in her defense of the human person. She has in fact done so in things like the Solidarity movement, pro-life causes both in particular countries and internationally, in her educational system, and in her health-care institutions. In other words, the Church herself should continue to act in the public domain. Precisely by defending and exercising her own right to be independent, she creates a wider space for political life for others as well. Political liberty can be preserved only by being exercised.

In a more theoretical domain, the Church can pay greater attention to issues of political philosophy in her academic institutions and even in her seminaries and centers that train people for ministry. It is important to educate people for citizenship, and this does not just mean informing them about the procedures of voting and the mechanisms of government. If men and women are to be citizens, they must be educated about what is at stake in political life, and they must be made better aware of how civic life can be lost. They need a vocabulary for political matters, and the Church can help them acquire it. The clergy and religious should also be helped to understand the nature of political life, lest they become unwitting collaborators in the triumph of the modern sovereign state.[33]

In particular, the Church should insist on the role of truth in human life and the relevance of truth to political society. In this domain there are a whole cluster of issues of great personal and political significance. It is important to teach both students and parishioners about them, but it is also important to deepen our theoretical understanding of these concepts, and to make room for them in the contemporary cultural and theological conversation. To be more specific about these theoretical issues, it would be important, first, to validate the fact that truth is obtainable, to show that the human mind is able to discover truth, and to spell out the various kinds of truth and the force and extent of each. To do this is not a mere exercise in epistemology, but a defense of the human person as an agent of truth. To defend the possibility of truth is to defend human dignity. The encyclicals *Fides et ratio* and *Veritatis splendor,* as well as the apostolic constitution *F,x corde &clesiae,* are a marvelous charter for this effort. Second, it would be essential to clarify what is meant by human nature and to show how we can speak about human nature. One of the central concepts that needs to be clarified and defended in this respect is the concept of teleology, not only in regard to human nature but in regard to things like life, politics, and religion. Things have ends built into them, and natural ends, the natural perfections of things, are not overridden by the purposes we might have, purposes that we might impose on things. We cannot understand anything unless we know what its end is, that is, unless we know what it is when it is acting at its best.[34]

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[33] See Alain Besan1;on, *La confusion des lang1,1e5: La crise ideologique de l'Eglise* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1978). An earlier, less forceful version of this work appeared as an essay, "The Confusion of Tongues," *Daedalus* 108 (Spring 1979): 21-44.

These issues of truth, human nature, and teleology lie very deeply hidden within contemporary political life. They are at the heart of many current controversies. If the Church were able to formulate them well, and use her educational institutions to develop and teach them, she would be engaged in politics in the best and most appropriate way: not in particular, partisan political activity, but in what we could call the "higher politics," the understanding of human life in its principles and in its excellence. The Church in her teaching and in her educational institutions should not measure herself simply by the norms set by the secular world. She should set her own agenda, drawing on her own tradition and inspiration. Through her tradition of natural law, the Church has the resources to redefine the contemporary political conversation in terms of the ends of human nature. By witnessing to the truth the Church would be defending the human person, and would thus make a unique contribution to our contemporary culture and civic life. She would also continue the spirit and teaching of one of her greatest figures, Pope John Paul II.[35]

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[34] For an excellent philosophical treatment of teleology, see two papers by Francis X. Slade: "On the Ontological Priority of Ends and Its Relevance to the Narrative Arts," in Alice Ramos, ed., *Beauty, Art, and the Polis* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 58-69; and "Ends and Purposes," in Richard Hassing, ed., *Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 83-85.

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[35] I am grateful to Richard Hassing, V. Bradley Lewis, and Francis X. Slade for comments made on earlier drafts of this paper.

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ST THOMAS AND THE EUCHARISTIC CONVERSION

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IT IS HARDLY POSSIBLE to read the encyclical *Fides et ratio* without being struck by its insistence upon the need for philosophy, and especially metaphysics, in Christian theology. Among the many reasons cited for this need, one stands out as fundamental.

> The word of God refers constantly to things which transcend human experience and even human thought; but this "mystery" could not be revealed, nor could theology render it in some way intelligible, were human knowledge limited strictly to the world of sense experience. Metaphysics thus plays an essential role of mediation in theological research. Gohn Paul II, *F«Jes et ratio,* §83)

The following study concerns a particular case of this sort of mediating role of metaphysics in theology. It is a small but dominant element in St Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of the Eucharist: his account of the nature of the sacramental conversion, or what is traditionally called transubstantiation.

What has suggested this study to me is a recent article by Germain Grisez on Jesus' substantial presence in the Eucharist.[1] Grisez takes issue with St. Thomas's doctrine. Not only his theme, but also his attacks on Thomas, have much to do with "metaphysical mediation."

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[1] Germain Grisez, "An Alternative Theology of Jesus' Substantial Presence in the Eucharist," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 65 no. 2 (2000): 111-31; cited hereafter by page number alone.

Grisez is not accusing Thomas of teaching things contrary to the faith (113). Rather, he is delivering judgment from the standpoint proper to the theologian, that of "faith seeking understanding." His charge is that a number of Thomas's central positions on Christ's presence in the Eucharist are simply unintelligible.

Of these positions, all but one have to do with the accidents found in the sacrament (either those of the bread and wine, or Jesus' own) and their relation to the substance of Jesus' body and blood. The other position concerns transubstantiation.

Grisez's objections are all serious and worth pondering, even if none is actually fatal to Thomas's account.[2] The strongest, I think, is the one about transubstantiation.[3] With a view to better understanding Thomas, I also find it the most fruitful to engage. As I hope we shall see, not least among the results is an appreciation of the truly theological nature of the account.

I. THE OBJECTION

The purpose of the doctrine of transubstantiation is to specify the kind of change that takes place when the sacrament of the Eucharist is performed. Before the priest utters the words of the consecration-"This is my body," "This is the cup of my blood"-the host and the contents of the chalice are bread and wine. Afterwards, they are the body and blood of Christ. As Thomas sees it, this change must consist in the conversion of the substance of the bread into the substance of Christ's body, and the conversion of the substance of the wine into the substance of his blood *(STh* III, q. 75, a. 4). Grisez recognizes that this is in accordance with conciliar teaching both before and after Thomas (111-12), and so far he has no objection.

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[2] Considering them fatal, Grisez goes on to propose a vastly different account of Jesus' presence in the sacrament. I shall not discuss Grisez's own proposal in any detail. He presents it only as a hypothesis, and he assures us that if he thought that one could reasonably accept Aquinas's account, he would not question it (113).

[3] This may not be Grisez's view. What he seems to find most problematic is Thomas's view that the accidents of the bread and wine subsist without a subject. In general this does appear to be the most controversial aspect of the doctrine. But I find Grisez's particular objection to it less difficult to resolve than the one concerning transubstantiation. In any case, it seems to me that the transubstantiation issue should be addressed first. In all of Thomas's systematic treatments of the sacrament, the discussion of transubstantiation precedes and determines his positions on the other matters. See IV *Sent.*, dd. 8-12; *ScG* IV, cc. 63-68; *STh* III, qq. 75-80.

In Thomas's account, however, the sacramental conversion has something unique about it. In contrast with all other types of conversion, this one has no "subject," in the proper sense of the term. There is no underlying substrate that undergoes it, no material component that belongs first to one term of the conversion and then to the other. This means that nothing in the substance of the bread, not even its matter, is carried over to the body of Christ.[4] The whole substance of the bread passes away, leaving the substance of Christ's body in its stead. According to Thomas, it is in view of this unique feature that the sacramental conversion is given the special name "transubstantiation" *(STh* III, q. 75, a. 4). He judges that such a change exceeds the capacity of any created agency. It can happen only through the power of God.

Of course this is in God's power only if it is something possible in itself, something conceivable or intelligible. What Grisez finds unintelligible is a conversion in which the first term contributes nothing of itself to the reality of the second. "The very idea of converting A into B seems to me to imply that something of A contributes to the reality of B" (119).

Grisez assures us that he is not simply rejecting the notion of a conversion of a "whole" substance into another substance. He thinks it can be meaningful to speak of such a conversion. But he has his own way of understanding it. He takes it to mean a "substantial change without residue" (123). In such a change, nothing having the nature of the first substance remains. The matter of the first substance, however, does remain. It takes on the nature of the second substance. The change is a transformation (ibid.). Yet the "whole" first substance is changed, in the sense that no portion of it stays untransformed. All of its material is integrated into the second substance. None of the first substance is left. On this account, the Eucharist is not the only real example of such a conversion. For instance, when the corpse of Lazarus was brought back to life, Grisez says, "it is surely meaningful, and it seems correct, to say that the corpse's whole substance became Lazarus's again-living self. All the corpse's material was reconstituted into Lazarus's living body, leaving nothing behind" (118).

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[4] The bread is turned into a body that exists even before the change, with its own matter, distinct from the matter of the bread. Thomas provides an imaginary illustration: the conversion of "this finger" into "that finger" (ScG IV, c. 63, §7, *Nunc autem).*

In Thomas's conception, the matter of the first substance is not incorporated into the second substance. It is simply eliminated. The conversion is not a mere transformation. It is a sheer succession from one whole substance to another. Grisez does not think that such a succession can deserve to be called a conversion. The terms of a conversion must have a common element. Thomas is emptying the word "conversion" of its meaning.

> Aquinas holds that one can rightly say that the body of Christ comes from the bread and that the substance of the bread is converted into Christ's body. But in saying these things, one can only mean, on his view, that the bread was the antecedent for Jesus' coming to be in the sacrament by a process in which the antecedent contributes nothing whatever to what follows from it. (118-19)

One might wonder why Thomas even employs such language.

> Of course, even on Aquinas's view, the bread and wine are necessary antecedents both because Jesus used them when he instituted the sacrament and because they leave behind accidents that serve as the sacramental sign under which Jesus is present and in which he is contained. But those requirements could have been met by saying that the bread and the wine are annihilated and replaced by Jesus' body and blood. And this way of putting matters might seem a more accurate account of what Aquinas thinks is happening: first one reality is there and then it no longer exists, its place being taken by a second reality that has nothing whatever in common with the first. (119)

Grisez explains why Thomas insists on speaking of a conversion.

> Aquinas, however, rejects any account involving annihilation. He think such an account would require that Jesus replace the bread and wine by moving from

> heaven into the elements, with the result that he would be in as many different places as there are consecrated species-something Aquinas considers impossible. (119)

This is the decisive point for Thomas: the body of Christ cannot begin to exist in the sacrament by any change in the body itself (*STh* III, q. 75, a. 2). It must do so by a change undergone by something else. The bread must be changed into it. So he adopts the language of conversion. The bread is converted into the body of Christ, by the power of God.

Grisez's charge is that if the bread and the body of Christ have nothing in common, this language is meaningless. Evidently he judges that if the bread does not contribute anything, then as far as bringing about the body of Christ is concerned, it is superfluous. It is no better than nothing. It may as well be annihilated.

Grisez notes that Thomas himself perceives a need to identify some sort of subject for the sacramental conversion. Thomas observes that the bread and the body of Christ are not things that exist in a subject. Hence there can be no subject underlying the change from one to the other. "So," he says, "since this substantial conversion implies a certain order of the substances, one of which is converted into the other, it exists as in a subject in both substances, in the way that order and number do."[5] Grisez sees this as a rather desperate attempt to avoid the kind of problem that he is raising. He counters:

> That explanation confuses logic with reality. Logically, the concepts of bread and of Jesus' body can serve together as the subject of *conversion,* functioning as a two-term relational predicate (just as those concepts can serve together as the subjects of ordering and numbering predicates). But if, as Aquinas maintains, there is no real continuity between the bread and Jesus' body, the two substances share nothing that could make them be together the subject of anything real. Yet transubstantiation is a real conversion. (120)

The issue, then, is whether the very notion of "a conversion" can be saved in Thomas's conception of transubstantiation. If not, then the conception must be judged unintelligible. "And since the unintelligible is impossible, not even God can do it" (119).

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[5] *STh* III, q. 75, a. 4, ad 1. (Throughout this paper, translations of passages from St Thomas are mine.)

II. THE CONVERSION OF A WHOLE SUBSTANCE

Before examining Thomas's conception, we should say something about Grisez's own way of understanding a conversion of one whole substance into another. As he reminds us (112), the Council of Trent's Decree on the Eucharist uses this language.[6] But I find it quite implausible that the council could have meant it in his way, or even in a way compatible with his.[7]

Grisez gives the term "whole" a quantitative sense. It refers to "every bit" of the substance. A whole substance is converted when no portion of it is left behind or nothing with its nature remains. All of its matter takes on the nature of another substance. The "whole" corpse of Lazarus was converted into living Lazarus in this sense: no part of the corpse stayed dead.

This way of distinguishing between the conversion of a "whole" substance and the conversion of only a part or portion of a substance is certainly intelligible. It can also have useful applications. For instance, we might point out that in digestion, normally only a portion of the food is converted into a living body. Another portion is left over and expelled as residue.

But can this possibly be what Trent means in speaking of the conversion of the "whole" substance of the bread and wine into the substance of Christ's body and blood? What would its point be? It would serve to prevent us from thinking that only a portion of the bread in the consecrated host has been converted into the body of Christ, while another portion has remained bread. But who would think that? Some of the bread is converted, and some is not? This is not at all the doctrine of "impanation," according to which the body of Christ comes to exist in the host together with the bread. On that doctrine, none of the bread is converted. The Council of Trent was certainly concerned to rule out impanation. But if someone grants that the consecration does convert at least a part of the bread into the body of Christ, why would he or she think that another part has to remain unconverted? Has anyone ever held such a view?

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[6] "Quoniam autem Christus redemptor noster corpus suum id, quod sub specie panis offerebat, vere esse dixit, ideo persuasum semper in Ecclesia Dei fuit, idque nunc denuo sancta haec Synodus declarat: per consecrationem panis et vini conversionem fieri *totius substantiae panis* in substantiam corporis Christi Domini nostri, et *totius substantiae vini* in substantiam sanguinis eius. Quae conversio convenienter et proprie a sancta catholica Ecclesia transsubstantiatio est appellata" (DS 1642, emphasis added). "Si quis dixerit, in sacrosancto Eucharisiae sacramento remanere substantiam panis et vini una cum corpore et sanguine Domini nostri Iesu Christi, negaveritque mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem *totius substantiae panis* in corpus et *totius substantiae vini* in sanguinem, manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini, quam quidem conversionem catholica Ecclesia aptissime transsubstantiationem appellat: anathema sit" (DS 1652, emphasis added).

[7] I am not addressing Grisez's suggestion thatTrent might be open to the possibility that the immediate terminus ad quern of the sacramental conversion not be the whole substance of Christ's body and blood (124). The issue here is what is meant by "the whole substance of the bread" and "the whole substance of the wine."

On the other hand, at least one theologian prior to Trent did hold a view remarkably similar to Grisez's. Early in the 14th century, the Dominican theologian Durand of Saint objected strongly to Aquinas's account of transubstantiation.[8] He held that a conversion in which no component of the first term remains "is not intelligible."[9] On his view, one thing is convertible into another only if they have matter in common. The very notion of a conversion implies an underlying subject. The subject would be what makes the difference between the conversion of the bread and its annihilation.[10] Durand also proposed an alternative much like Grisez's. He suggested that the sacramental conversion resembles the conversion of food into that which is fed. It would be a kind of transformation. The matter of the bread would lose the nature of bread and take on a share in the nature of the body of Christ.[11]

Of course Durand did not think that any portion of the bread was left unconverted. Yet he did not at all seek to describe transubstantiation as a "conversion of a whole substance." On the contrary, taking that expression in Thomas's sense, he argued directly against its application to the Eucharist. He simply did not feel bound to speak of transubstantiation as a conversion of a whole substance. While acknowledging that this was what was commonly said and taught, he insisted that it was licit to take an opposing view, because the teaching of the Church left the question open.[12] When Durand was writing, in fact, the Church had not yet defined transubstantiation as a conversion of a "whole" substance.

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[8] Durandi a Sancto Porciano, *In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IV*, vol. 2 (Venetiis: Ex typographia Guerra, 1621; republished by The Gregg Press Incorporated, Ridgewood N.J., 1964), IV, d. 11, qq. 2-3, pp. 318vb-320ra.

[9] Ibid., q. 3, §5 (near the end), p. 319vb; cf. q. 2, §11, p. 319rb.

[10] Ibid., q. 2, §6, p. 319ra; q. 3, §4, p. 319va.

[11] Ibid., q. 3, §5, p. 319vb.

Durand's position did not go unnoticed. Two centuries later, Cardinal Cajetan, in his commentary on the *Summa Theologiae* (at III, q. 75, a. 4), spent a good deal of effort on its refutation.[13] Cajetan's commentary was written thirty or forty years before the Tridentine Decree on the Eucharist.

In the background of the decree, then, we find that the description of transubstantiation as a "conversion of a whole substance" was a matter of some dispute. We also find that both sides understood the description as Thomas did. No one took it to refer merely to "all of the bread in the host." It referred to the whole substance *of* all of the bread, that is, to everything entering into the constitution of the bread's substance. The decree's intended meaning must therefore be at least very close to Thomas's. It would then have a clear point: to exclude a position like Durand's (or Grisez's). It would mark the difference between transubstantiation and mere substantial transformations. It would mean a substantial conversion that completely eliminates one substance, leaving a wholly distinct substance in its stead.[14]

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[12] Ibid., q. 3, §5 (near the end) & §6, p. 319vb.

[13] Cajetan's whole discussion of *SI'h* III, q. 75, a.4 merits study (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia,* lussu impensaque Leonis XIII P.M. edita, vol. XIII: *Tertia pars summae theologiae,* a Q. 60 ad Q. 90, cum commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani [Roma: ex typographia polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1906], pp. 168-72). Sections X-XVI concern Durand. Cajetan's analysis of the conversion is quite technical; I shall not attempt a summary of it. But in what follows I draw a good deal from it, especially as regards the analogy between the sacramental conversion and a transformation. There is only one point on which I would take issue with it (see below, n. 35).

[14] Grisez argues that the Fathers of Trent "meant to allow for theological differences among themselves and their advisers," so that even if in fact most or all of them understood the canons on the Eucharist in light of Thomas's theology, there would still be room for dogmatic development (124). I do not wish to quarrel with this. But as Grisez says, "what the

III. THE "SUBJECT" OF THE CONVERSION

I now turn to the main issue: whether such a succession of substances can be understood to consist in a conversion of one into the other. The lack of an underlying subject does raise a serious question about the possibility of such a conversion. Before attempting to formulate the question with precision, it is necessary to correct two points in Grisez's report of Thomas's account of the conversion.

The first point concerns the subject of the sacramental conversion. As we saw, Thomas says that the two substances themselves somehow serve as the conversion's subject. Grisez thinks he is confusing logic with reality. I see no such confusion.

The text in question is a reply to an objection against the possibility of the conversion of bread into the body of Christ. The objection and reply are as follows.

> [Objection] Every conversion is a certain change. But in every change there must be a subject that is first in potency and then in act. For as it says in *Physics* III, motion is the act of something existing in potency. But no subject of the substance of the bread and the body of Christ can be assigned, because, as it says in the *Categories,* it pertains to the notion *[ratio]* of a substance not to exist in a subject. So it cannot be that the whole substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ....
>
> [Reply] The objection concerns formal change, because it is proper to form to exist in matter or in a subject. But the objection does not apply to the conversion of a whole substance. So, since this substantial conversion implies an order of substances, of which one is converted into another, it exists as in a subject in both substances, in the way that order and number do. *(STh* III, q. 75, a. 4, obj. 1 & ad 1)

It is dear that Thomas is not first simply denying that the conversion has a subject and then simply positing one. He is denying that it has a subject in the proper sense: a material substrate, something that is in potency to it. What he goes on to posit is only something that the conversion exists in "as" in a

Council asserts by those canons should be determined by interpreting them in a way that accounts reasonably for their text considered in its historical context" (ibid.). I do not think that he offers a reasonable interpretation of *totius substantiae.*

subject *(sicut in subiecto).* The conversion has a subject only in some qualified sense. In the next article, in fact, Thomas refers back to this one and says explicitly that the conversion does not properly have a subject *(STh* III, q. 75, a. 5, ad 4).

However, Thomas's procedure does raise a question. Excluding a material substrate, and so answering the objection, only seems to require invoking the distinction (drawn in the body of the same article) between a "formal" change, or a transformation, and a conversion of a whole substance, a transubstantiation. Having invoked this distinction, why does he go on, seemingly out of his way or even at cross-purposes, to argue in favor of some sort of subject?

I do not think he is trying desperately to answer an objection like Grisez's. Nor is he even really going out of his way. Instead, he is simply attending to something else mentioned in the objection. This is that it pertains to the notion of a substance not to exist in a subject. To have no subject at all is proper to substances. If the sacramental conversion's nature were such that it could not have a subject in *any* sense, then the conversion itself would be a substance![15] It must have some sort of subject, even if not in the unqualified or proper sense.

How then should we understand the conversion's subject? Thomas seems to follow the rule given at the start of the reply: "it is proper to form to exist in matter or in a subject." He treats the conversion as a sort of form. One thing is converted into another. We analyze the concrete fact in abstract terms and speak of "the conversion." We treat it in the manner of a form. The conversion is "of one thing into another." It involves order ("into") and number (the two things). These are kinds of form. Their subject is constituted by the terms of the order and the units of the number. So the conversion's terms, the two substances, are a sort of subject for it.

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[15] Cf. IV *Sent.,* d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1, obj. 3: "a conversion is in some way *[quodammodo]* an accident." Presumably Thomas does not mean by this that conversions are only with respect to accidental genera of being. He is talking precisely about a certain type of substantial conversion. But although it regards the genus of substance, it is not itself a kind of substance. It does not subsist, and neither does it belong to the very essence of any subsistent thing.

Thomas denies that this is a subject in the unqualified or proper sense. I would suggest that his reason is that it is not even an unqualifiedly "real" subject. In a way it is only a logical one.[16]

The conversion is a kind of succession, which is a type of relation.[17] The two substances are the subject of this relation. Now, insofar as things are in succession, they are not simultaneous. When one is, the other is not.[18] They do not exist together. Nor then can they form a real unity. Of course, each of them, in itself, is something real. But their unity, as a subject of this relation, exists only in the apprehension of reason. Hence they only constitute a logical subject, a subject of predication. They are not a subject in the proper sense, because they do not provide real matter or potency for some form or act.[19]

Thomas is not confusing logic and reality; in fact, he is being especially careful to distinguish them. At the same time, it should be observed that what I am calling the merely "logical" status of the subject of the conversion has nothing at all to do with the absence of material continuity. It is simply a result of the nonsimultaneity of the terms of the conversion. Even in an ordinary change, where there is material continuity; the *terms* of the change do not exist simultaneously. There is a relation of succession between them, and they are a "subject" of this relation only in a qualified sense. To be sure, such a change does have a proper subject, a real substrate. But that subject is only a component of the terms, not the terms themselves.

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[16] I do not mean by this what Grisez means. He says that Thomas has only shown that *conversion* can function as a predicate, with the concepts of bread and of Jesus' body as its subject. Taken at face value, this is hard to understand. To predicate conversion of the concepts would be to say that the concept of bread is converted into the concept of Jesus' body! What Grisez must mean is that on Thomas's account, even if "the bread is converted into the body of Christ" respects the logic of its terms-it is a well-formed sentence-it cannot possibly be true. What I mean is that although the real bread and the real body of Christ are what constitute the subject, they do so only in the apprehension of reason, not in themselves.

[17] See IV *Sent.,* d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 3.

[18] Of course, prior to the conversion, the bread and the body of Christ do exist simultaneously, somewhere; the nonsimultaneity and the succession between them is with respect to their existence in the sacrament.

[19] Is the relation of succession itself a "real" relation? In IV *Sent.,* d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 3, Thomas says that it is something real "in the bread, which is changed" (whereas the body of Christ remains unchanged). Yet previously in the same work he says that "a real relation requires that both of the extremes be in act" (I *Sent.,* d. 26, q. 2, a. 1). In the later *De Potentia,* q. 7, a. 11, one of his examples of a mere relation of reason is that of something present to something future. (Cf. III *Phys.,* lect. 5, §324. On relations between a being and a non-being as relations of reason, see *Sfh* I, q. 13, a. 7.) At any rate it seems clear that the succession cannot be a real "form" or "act." It is not even the sort of "incomplete form" or "imperfect act" that is called "motion" (In IV *Sent.,* d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1, ad3). That would require a material substrate.

Moreover, the fact that the substances are only a logical subject of the succession does not at all prevent it from being a real succession. On the contrary, if the terms were functioning together as a real subject, then they would not be in real succession. They would be existing simultaneously.[20]

So when Thomas posits a sort of subject for the conversion, he is not trying to make up somehow for the lack of material continuity, and he is not confused. And whether or not he is justified in calling the substantial succession a conversion, there are hardly grounds for saying that on his account, the bread and the body of Christ cannot be "the subject of anything real."

IV. A REAL CHANGE UNDER THE ACCIDENTS

The second point that needs to be corrected in Grisez's report of Thomas's account of the sacramental conversion is a lacuna. Grisez makes no mention of the role of the sacramental species, the accidents of the bread and wine. He does note that for Thomas the species serve as the sacramental sign under which Jesus is present and in which he is contained (119). But he is silent about the fact that the species are also indispensable to the conversion itself. They function, so to speak, as the hinge upon which it turns.

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[20] Even if the succession is not a real relation (see previous note), it can still be a real succession. This is not absurd. Consider, for instance, that God's action of creation is not a real relation of God to creature, and yet it is certainly a real *action* (*STh* I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 1; cf. *STh* I, q. 13, a. 7). What it means for an instance of something to be "real" depends on what sort of thing it is. There is real evil, even though evil is not a positive act or a real "being." A real succession would be one that is neither fictitious nor merely metaphorical (e.g., the atemporal "succession" of numbers in a series).

It is not sufficient, in order to understand the succession of substances as a conversion, to consider the accidents. But for Thomas, it is certainly necessary. A conversion is a certain kind of change. The accidents are needed in order make it possible to speak of any genuine sort of change .in the succession from the bread to the body of Christ,[21] for they are the only thing that remains intact throughout the succession.

Thomas insists that there can be a real change *(mutatio)* only where something remains the same throughout. "It pertains to the very notion of a change that something one and the same be now disposed otherwise than before" *(STh* I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2). If one thing ceases and another begins, that might suffice to speak of some sort of order of succession between them; but there is not a genuine change unless there is a constant third item that is diversified through the succession. This is why the creation of the world was not a change (ibid.). There was no third thing that first had non-being and then being. In contrast with creation, Thomas says, transubstantiation agrees with natural change *(transmutatio)* in this, that "in both, something one and the same remains.... But in different ways; for in a natural change the same matter or subject remains, while in this sacrament the same accidents remain" *(STh* Ill, q. 75, a. 8).

Thomas is very clear about the fact that the accidents of the bread are not a real subject or matter for the sacramental change. Still, he grants that insofar as they remain throughout, they do bear a resemblance to a subject of change *(STh* Ill, q. 75, a. 5, ad 4). They are like a subject precisely in their being "disposed now otherwise than before." Before the consecration, the sacramental species contained bread; now they contain the body of Christ. We can even say that they "undergo" a change, a change in "contents."

The term "undergo" here does not signify the role of a true and proper subject of change. The species's relation to the

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[21] Further on we shall see that the accidents also play a role in making the change intelligible precisely as a conversion, insofar as they mediate the reference of the pronoun "this" in the sacramental formula.

"contents" is not that of matter to form or potency to act. But it would be a mistake, I believe, to think that the Eucharistic change is the only one in which what is said to "undergo" the change is not a subject of it in the proper sense. Consider these examples: a house undergoes a change in occupants; a car changes owners; a dancer changes partners. In each case, that which is spoken of as the change's subject-the room, the car, the dancer-is not a proper subject of the change. It is not related to the objects defining the change-the occupants, the owners, the partners-as matter to form or potency to act. It is only something that is "disposed now otherwise than before." Yet these are all real changes.[22]

This consideration indicates that just as the lack of material continuity does not exclude a real succession from the bread to the body of Christ, neither does it exclude a real change. The continuity of the accidents suffices to display the succession as some sort of real change, whether or not it is a "conversion." The question of the conversion concerns the nature of the relation between the two substances. But even if the accidents were simply "emptied" of contents-even if the substance of the bread were annihilated, and nothing at all took its place-one would surely have to regard that as a real change.

If anything, the lack of material continuity seems to make for an especially "real" change. Even where there is material continuity, there is change only if there is also discontinuity. Continuity is the very opposite of change. There is real change only if there is real diversity between the terms. And a change would seem to be more "real," just insofar as the discontinuity or diversity between its terms is greater.

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[22] This is not to dispute Thomas's remark that "in a natural change the same matter or subject remains." If we analyze these examples, we find that they are only what we might call "supervenient" changes, mere results of more fundamental ones. Underlying them are changes that do have proper subjects. For instance, the dancer's change in partners is the result of the first partner's stepping aside and the second partner's stepping in. By contrast, there is no more fundamental change or set of changes underlying the shift in the contents of the sacramental species.

It is not nonsense to speak of changes as more or less real. The term "change" is not univocal. Change is found in various categories or genera of being, which are not univocally beings. Aristotle distinguishes four basic kinds of real change: in place, in size, in quality, and in substance. These are all true and proper changes. They all yield some real diversity in the thing changed. But the diversities are not on an equal level, because a thing's place, size, quality, and substance do not pertain equally to its identity or sameness. All changes yield some diversity in a thing, but the result may be more or less truly a diverse thing.

Thus, a change in place diversifies the thing changed only according to an extrinsic condition, that of its surroundings. In itself the thing is just the same. By contrast, a change in size or quality diversifies something intrinsic to it. The diversity is in something that is more truly its own. And in a substantial change-a generation or a corruption-the very nature of the thing is changed. This means that the result is without qualification a diverse thing. When an animal grows, what results is still the same individual. But when the animal dies, the individual that was the animal no longer exists. What remains is only a part or component, the matter. Substantial change is called a change in a much more absolute sense than the others are.[23]

In transubstantiation, as Thomas conceives it, the substantial diversity is both in kind and in matter.[24] The substance of one thing yields entirely to that of another. Only its accidents remain. This is not a physical kind of change, as Aristotle's kinds are. But if Thomas's conception is true, then transubstantiation would seem to be in a way the most real change of all.

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[23] The subject of substantial change is itself very difficult to grasp. Substantial change has a proper subject, but the subject is only a very qualified sort of being. It does not have a complete nature of its own. There is nothing definite that it is *per se.* Only the terms of the change--what it is from and unqualified beings. It is not perfectly proper to say that one substance "becomes" or comes to be the other, e.g., that Lazarus's corpse "became" Lazarus (118). See below, n. 53.

[24] For the sequence "change in place, change in quantity or quality, generation or corruption, transubstantiation," see IV *Sent.,* d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1.

So there is a real succession and a real change here. But is there a conversion?

V. THE TRUE PROBLEM ABOUT THE CONVERSION

Grisez never pinpoints what it is about the notion of a conversion that makes an enduring material component appear necessary. I think that there is indeed something, though in the final analysis the necessity is only apparent.

Even granting the foregoing corrections to his report of Thomas, Grisez could still argue that if material continuity is denied, then the only way to conceive the sacramental change is as the annihilation of the bread and its replacement by Jesus' body. A conversion would be out of the question. On the annihilation account, the change in the contents of the sacramental species would only be a result. Underlying it would be two changes, simultaneous but distinct: a change in the bread-its ceasing to exist-and some change in the body of Christ through which it begins to exist there where the bread was.[25] By contrast, on the conversion account, there is only one change, the change in the bread. The body of Christ would be the term of that very change. As Thomas puts it, this succession can be called a conversion because it agrees with natural change not only in the fact that something one and the same remains, but also in the fact that one term "passes away into the other" *(transit in alterum).*[26] The bread passes away, not into nothing, but into

[25] See above, n. 22. The annihilation of the bread, of course, would not have a proper subject, any more than creation does.

[26] *SI'h* III, q. 75, a. 8. Creation cannot be called a conversion, because one term does not upass away into" the other, as it does in a natural change and in the Eucharist. Presumably annihilation would not be a conversion either; there is nothing that the annihilated thing passes into. Thomas often employs the verb *transire* to signify a conversion: see, e.g., *SI'h* I, q. 119, a. 1, where he uses it in several places to speak of the conversion of food into the nature of what is fed. *Transire* literally means uto go across" or uto pass over," or even uto pass away." When it is used to refer to a conversion, it does not mean a change in place. The passage is from what is distinctive about one terrn to what is distinctive about the other, across what they have in common. In this sense the first term also upasses away." It loses what distinguishes it from the second, ceasing to be what its name signifies. (fhe passing away may of course be only a qualified sort, as when an unbeliever is converted into a believer. He or

the body of Christ. The coming to be of Christ's body in the host starts from the bread.

This is what the lack of material continuity seems to exclude. To say that one thing is converted into another is to say that the one is a principle of the other's coming to be. Nor is it merely an indirect principle. It is not just something that must be gotten out of the way, like the first dance-partner. On the contrary, if it were not there first, then the second term could not come to be, since the second's coming to be starts precisely "from" it. Thus, Thomas says that God uses bread "in order to make thence" *(ut faciat inde)* the body of Christ *(STh* III, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1). Yet this seems to imply that the first term provides some potency for the second, something that "can be" the second and "becomes" it. This in turn would mean that there is continuity between the terms, since the potency would survive the change. It would be carried over in the passage from one term to the other. But as Grisez notes (118), Thomas denies that bread properly "becomes" the body of Christ *(STh* III, q. 75, a. 8). In the same place, he also denies that bread properly "can be" or "will be" the body of Christ.[27]

Hence the question is, in what sense does bread serve as that from which the bringing about of the body of Christ begins, if it does not contribute anything to Christ's body? If nothing in the bread functions as matter or potency for the body of Christ, what can it mean to say that the coming to be of the body of Christ in the sacrament starts from the bread? How can the change by which Jesus' body exists in the host be a change in the bread alone?

VI. THE CONVERTIBILITY OF THE BREAD (A): A COMMON NATURE OF BEING

The key text in Thomas is one that Grisez does not consider. It is a brief and difficult text, and its bearing on the problem, as

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she does not absolutely pass away, but only ceases to be an unbeliever.)

[27] However, Grisez overlooks an important qualification to this denial; see below, at n. 52.

I have understood it, is in some respects only implicit. But when taken together with other parts of Thomas's doctrine of the Eucharist, I believe it provides the answer.

The text is a reply to another objection against the possibility of the conversion (*STh* Ill, q. 75, a. 4, ad 3). The body of the article concerns the question "whether bread can be converted into the body of Christ." Thomas of course answers affirmatively. At the same time, he makes it clear from the start that he does not mean to ascribe to bread any natural capacity or potential by which it "can be" converted into the body of Christ.[28] Instead, citing Ambrose, Thomas insists that this conversion is "not like natural conversions." It is "altogether supernatural," effected by the sole power of God. A "natural" conversion, one that occurs "according to the laws of nature" and by the natural power of a created agent, is always a "formal" conversion. It always consists in a succession of forms in one and the same subject. This is because an agent acts only insofar as it exists in act, and every created agent is in act according to a determinate genus and species. What its action can bear upon is therefore only some determinate act. The determination of a thing in its actual being is through its form. So a created agent can only effect a variation of form (in a presupposed subject).[29] But God is an infinite actuality. His action extends to the "whole nature of being." Hence he can effect a "conversion of a whole being." By this Thomas evidently means a variation not only in form but also in the indeterminate subject, the matter or potency, that a being's form presupposes and reduces to a determinate act.[30] This is a conversion of the whole substance of a thing into that of another, a transubstantiation.

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[28] See *SI'h* III, q. 75, a. 8, ad 4: this conversion does not come about through a passive power of the creature, but solely through the active power of the creator.

[29] Thomas is giving a reason why all conversions effected by the natural power of created agents involve an underlying subject. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (I *Phys.,* lect. 12, §107), he remarks that whereas the natural philosopher only proves by induction that all natural productions have a subject, the metaphysician proves it by a reason. For this he cites book 7 of the *Metaphysics.* He seems to be thinking of *Metaphysics* 7.7.1032a20-22, where Aristotle argues that things produced by nature or by art must have matter, because there must be a potentiality for them to be and also not to be. (Aristotle is in fact resolving the notion of matter into the more universal, "metaphysical" notions of potency, being and not-being. In the *Summa* passage, Thomas is showing precisely what it is about created agencies that makes such indeterminate potency-potency to be and not to be-a necessary presupposition.) This is interesting, because it indicates that even from the standpoint of "natural reason" the need for an underlying subject is not something that is simply taken for granted, as though it were a universal and self-evident feature of change, just as such. Instead, the need is reasoned to, as a condition of the types of changes effected by particular types of agency ("nature or art"). Still, the reasoning is so "elementary" -the conclusion is so close to "first principles"-that the need for a subject can easily look axiomatic (as it does to

All of the article's objections have to do with what is special or not "natural" about this conversion, namely, its lack of an underlying subject. The first objection is the one we examined earlier. It simply assumes that every change has a subject. The second objection proceeds as though the sacramental conversion did have a subject, the matter of the bread. But the third objection is more interesting for us. It goes deeper, offering a reason why a conversion of one thing into another seems to need an underlying subject.

The reason is laid down at the very start of the objection: "of things that are divided *secundumse,* one never becomes another." This principle is explained through the example of two colors. The color white never becomes the color black. Instead, as Aristotle says in the first book of the *Physics,* a subject of white becomes a subject of black. A white body becomes a black body. The reason why white does not become black is that they are contraries. They are principles of a formal difference (the difference between a white body and a black body). Difference is a kind of division; and as the very principles of a division, the objection says, contrary forms must be divided from each other *secundum se,* just on account of themselves. The objection then reminds us that there is also such a thing as material division or division in subject. The principles of a material division between two bodies, their "principles of individuation," are their diverse

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Grisez); cf. IV *Sent.,* d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 3, ad 1.

[30] Cf. *ITh* I, q. 65, a. 3: "quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit in causando. Semper autem id quod substernitur in rebus invenitur communius quam id quod informat et restringit ipsum; sicut esse quam vivere, et vivere quam intelligere, et materia quam forma. Quanto ergo aliquid est magis substratum, tanto a superiori causa directe procedit. Id ergo quod est primo substratum in omnibus, proprie pertinet ad causalitatem supremae causae."

signate matters. (Signate matter is matter singled out as "this" matter by way of quantitative dimensions.) So two signate matters, as principles of a division, are also divided from each other *secundumse.* Hence one signate matter cannot become another. Consequently, the signate matter of the bread, this matter of bread, cannot become this matter by which the body of Christ is individuated. And whereas forms have a subject, making it possible for the subject of one form to become the subject of another, matter has no subject. Therefore, the conversion of the substance of this bread into the substance of the body of Christ is impossible.

Clearly we should be interested in this objection. The issue is precisely the "lack of continuity." The claim is that even though the terms of any conversion are divided from each other and exist only in succession, the terms themselves cannot be the very principles of the division. They cannot be divided *secundumse* or just by reason of themselves. Although they are mutually exclusive, they cannot be so in every respect. There must be something in one that is compatible with what distinguishes the other from it. In addition to the principles in them by which they are divided from each other, there must also be some principle common to them. The division can only be by reason of their forms. There must also be an undivided subject.

Thomas's reply is difficult. Here is the Latin, followed by my translation.

> Dicendum quod virtute agentis finiti non potest forma in formam mutari, nee materia in materiam. Sed virtute agentis infiniti, quod habet actionem in totum ens, potest talis conversio fieri, quia utrique formae et utrique materiae est communis natura entis; et id quod entitatis est in una potest auctor entis convertere ad id quod est entitatis in altera, sublato eo per quod ab ilia distinguebatur.

> By the power of a finite agent, form cannot be changed into form, nor matter into matter. But by the power of an infinite agent, which has action bearing on all being, such a conversion can come about, because there is a nature of being common to the two forms and to the two matters; and the author of being can convert what there is of entity in one to what there is of entity in the other, with the elimination of that by which the one was distinguished from the other.

My object in the rest of this section and the next will be to interpret this reply. (In section 8, I shall try to show how it leads to a satisfactory resolution of the Grisez issue.)

The first sentence of the reply reminds us that we are not dealing with a natural conversion. A finite or created agent cannot change form into form, or matter into matter, for the same reason that it cannot produce a whole being out of nothing (see *STh* I, q. 45, a. 5). It can produce a new substance only out of pre-existing matter, that is, by transforming a pre-existing substance. It cannot produce new matter at all. Nor is it the immediate source from which a new substantial form proceeds (see *STh* I, q. 65, a. 4). Instead, under its influence, a new form is educed from the potency of the matter. The emergence of the new form eliminates the previous one. The created agent does cause a change in form, but since it is not the immediate source of the form, its action does not consist in a direct conversion of one form into another.

The rest of the reply is our main concern. Its interpretation is not easy. On first reading, it might seem to boil down to the mere claim that God, as "author of being," can convert any created being into any other.[31] The passage could even be rendered in a way more favorable to such a reading. Instead of "there is a nature of being common to the two forms and to the two matters," one might read "the nature of being is common to the two forms and to the two matters." In my opinion, however, Thomas is not speaking here about a *single* nature common to all created beings (i.e., about what is called *ens commune).* Instead, he is speaking about a certain nature of being common to the two forms, and a somewhat distinct nature common to the two signate matters. I say this in view of the role that he is assigning to the common nature. He is making it account for the possibility of God's converting one form into another and one signate matter into another. *Ens commune* would not immediately account for this possibility, because, for Thomas, the terms of a conversion must be in the same genus. That is, they must have something univocal in common.[32]

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[31] Of course there could not be a conversion if the terms were not both beings; see above, n. 26.

There is at least one text in which Thomas asserts this requirement explicitly. It is found in his earliest treatment of the Eucharist, that of the commentary on the *Sentences.* He is addressing the question whether the substantial form of the bread remains after the conversion.

> In any conversion whatsoever, the terminus *a quo* is in the same genus as the terminus *ad quem.* But that in which this conversion terminates is neither form alone nor matter alone, but a substance existing in act. . . . Hence . . . that which is converted into the body of Christ must also be a composite substance, not just the matter of the bread. And so the form of the bread does not remain. (IV *Sent.,* d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3)[33]

Note that he is using the term "genus" here very strictly, to mean something that is common in a univocal way. Matter, form, and composite all pertain somehow to the category of substance, but they do not do so univocally. Matter is substantial potency; form, substantial act; and both are substantial parts, whereas the composite is the substantial whole.

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[32] I do not mean to deny that there is such a thing as the "universal nature of being" or *ens commune* in Thomas's thought. There obviously is, and God is its agent, the universal cause of "being *qua* being." *As* he says in the body of the article, God has action that extends to the "whole nature of being," *totam naturam entis.* But it is well known that for Thomas *ens commune* is not univocal. Being is not a single genus. This is so even if we restrict our focus to "real" being, which is what *entitas* seems to refer to. Earlier in the *Summa,* in the course of distinguishing between being as convertible with "the real" and being as signifying the truth of a proposition, Thomas says that the former "signifies the entity of what is real *[entitatem rez],* according as it is divided into the ten categories" *(STh* I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2). The categories are ultimate genera. They do not divide being by adding specific differences to something whose signification remains constant throughout; they divide it by constituting diverse significations of being itself ft/ *Metaphys.,* lect. 9, §889-90). Their unity is only analogical. It consists in the fact that there is one chief signification to which all of the others refer, one primary nature to which the others are somehow proportioned. Moreover, within each category, being is also divided analogically according to act and potency (ibid., §897).

[33] At IV *Sent.,* d. 10, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3, Thomas also says that the substance of the bread cannot be converted into the accidents of Christ, because it has no "proportion of similitude" to them. I take it that he means that even if accidents are in some way proportioned and assimilated to substance, as effect to cause, the proportion and likeness is not mutual (cf. *STh* I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 4). There is nothing in which substance and accident are simply equal. Conversion requires that the terms be in some respect equal or equivalent. This entails their being in a common genus. (Cf. ibid., obj. 2: there is no *comparison* between things of diverse genera.)

As far as I know, the principle that the terms of any conversion are in the same genus is not made explicit in the *Summa Theologiae.* But its presence there can hardly be denied. For instance, it evidently figures again in the argument against the continuation of the bread's form.

> If the substantial form of the bread remained, nothing of the bread would be converted into the body of Christ except the matter alone. And so it would follow that it would not be converted into the whole body of Christ, but only into its matter. But this is contrary to the form of the sacrament, which says, "This is my body." *(STh* III, q. 75, a. 6)

Why can the matter of the bread be converted only into the matter of the body of Christ, and not also into its form? Surely it is because matter and form share in nothing univocal. What is converted into the form of the body of Christ must be a form.

An objection in the same article involves a similar point. It says that not even the form of the bread can be converted into that of the body of Christ, because the form of Christ's body is a soul. The objection is evidently that the two forms are not univocal. Thomas replies:

> A soul is a form of a body giving to it its whole order of perfect existence, i.e., corporeal existence, and animated existence, and so forth. Therefore the form of the bread is converted into the form of the body of Christ insofar as the latter gives corporeal existence, not insofar as it gives existence animated by such a soul. *(STh* III, q. 75, a. 6, ad 2)[34]

The form of the bread is convertible into the form of the body of Christ precisely insofar as a common univocal feature can be considered in them, that of a "giver of corporeal existence."

So it seems clear that in *STh* q. 75, a. 4, ad 3, Thomas is not claiming that God can convert any given being into any other whatsoever.[35] Of course God can perform any possible conversion. But matter is only convertible into matter, and form into form.[36] The terms of a conversion must be beings in the same sense.

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[34] Cf. IV *Sent.,* d. 10, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 1.

VII. THE CONVERTIBILITY OF THE BREAD (B): AN ANALOGY WITH TRANSFORMATION

Thomas does not say why there must be something univocal in the terms of a conversion. Yet it is not difficult to suggest a reason: namely, the very way in which the terms must be distinguished from each other, *as* terms of a conversion, that is, extremes of a change. The extremes of a change do not and cannot exist together. They are opposed, incompatible.[37] There is contrast between them.[38] The contrast explains why the presence of one entails the absence of the other. But if there is contrast between them, and if, as is the case in any true conversion, one term is not simply the negation or the privation of the other but rather something positive, then there is also something univocal in them.[39] Contrary natures belong to the same genus.[40]

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[35] It is here that I part from Cajetan. In his commentary on *STh* III, q. 75, a.4, he says that Thomas is speaking of the nature of being that is common to all created beings (section VIII). This leads him to say that it is possible for any created being to be converted into any other-an angel into a stone, for example. Evidently he would even have to say that an angel can be converted into a color! If Thomas meant this, why would he say that the matter of the bread cannot be converted into the substantial form of the body of Christ, nor the substance of the bread into the accidents?

[36] So Thomas might have said that the nature of *matter* is common to the two matters, and the nature of *form* is common to the two forms. The reason why he chooses to designate each as a nature of "being," I would suggest, is that he is constructing a very synthetic presentation of the convertibility as a function of two factors: the presence of some common nature in each pair, and the universal scope of the action of the author of being. Neither factor alone is sufficient to display the convertibility.

[37] V *Metaphys.*, lect. 12, §923: "in quolibet motu vel mutatione, terminus a quo opponitur termino ad quem."

[38] Not all distinctions involve contrast or incompatibility. Things in diverse genera of being are not directly contrary. One and the same subject can have potentiality and actuality, substance and accidents, etc. It is even possible for one and the same subject to have both humanity and divinity.

If this is what Thomas has in mind, then in observing that the terms have a common nature of being he would be taking his cue precisely from the objection. The objection starts with an analysis of the relation between contrary forms. It then applies this analysis to the relation between diverse signate matters, justifying the application by the fact that signate matters resemble contrary forms in functioning as principles of a division.

Thomas is not denying that they are principles of a division. But he wants us to notice that the division between them in fact goes hand in hand with their sharing in a common nature. This amounts to a refutation of the objection's analysis of the division. Contrary forms, such as white and black, are indeed opposed to and divided from each other; and they are principles of the difference between the things containing them (a white body and a black body). But they are not quite divided *secundum se.* That is, they are not *immediately* opposed to each other, as though they agreed only in subject and not in anything in their own natures. They are both colors. They are divided by reason of that which distinguishes one from the other in the common genus of color, that is, by reason of their differentiae.[41] In the same way, the forms and the matters of the bread and the body of Christ are divided by reason of what distinguishes one from the other in the nature of being that they have in common.[42] There is, after all, something in the first term of the conversion that is compatible with what is proper to the second term.

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[39] The two forms cannot be forms of one and the same body, because they are principles of species with contrary differentiae. The bread is inorganic, whereas the body of Christ is organic. (Thus, in line with *STh* III, q. 75, a. 6, ad 2, it is precisely when the form of the bread and the form of the body of Christ are both considered as forms giving corporeal existence that they are seen as contraries. The latter gives organic corporeity, the former inorganic.) As for the two signate matters, we are speaking of each as the matter of a whole body. It makes no sense for a whole body to have two distinct signate matters. That would mean that one and the same body could be located in separate places, and thereby subject to contrary dispositions, at the same time.

[40] See Aristotle, *On Generationand Co77Uption,* I.7.324a1; Aquinas, V *Metaphys.,* lect. 12, S926. There is contrariety even between diverse signate matters, not according to their "essence" (which is sheer potentiality), but according to the contrasting accidental differences by which they are designated (cf. ibid., S927).

[41] These in turn are divided because one somehow includes in its *ratio* the negation of the other. Ultimately at the root of any division there must lie a contradiction; see *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 4, a. 1. Cf. IV *Metaphys.,* lect. 15, §719: contraries cannot belong simultaneously to the same subject, *even though* each of them is a positive nature, because one of them has

So whereas Grisez at one point says that on Thomas's account, the bread and the body of Christ have "nothing whatever in common" (119), Thomas is making a special effort to show us that they do have something. He is granting, or even insisting, that the terms of a conversion always have something in common. What he is denying is that they must always have a common subject. A subject is needed when the agent of the conversion is one whose action extends only to a determinate form of being. But when the agent has action extending to all being, it can perform a conversion between any two things that share a common nature of being--even two signate matters, which have no common subject.

The common nature of being, which Thomas goes on to designate abstractly as *entitas,* is not some sort of "metaphysical substrate." Thomas is not trying to insinuate a proper subject for the conversion here, any more than he was in the reply to the first objection. *Entitas* is only a common *ratio.*[43] The terms of the

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attached to it a privation of something in the other. Privation is a kind of negation or contradiction (see X *Metaphys.,* lect. 6, §2044). The contradictories are what are divided *secundum se.* This of course means, as we have already seen, that there can be no conversion of a being to a non-being or vice-versa.

[42] Thus Thomas's very purpose in adverting to a common nature of being would seem to exclude the *ens commune* interpretation. He is looking for something that does not divide or distinguish one term of the conversion from the other. He cannot be seeing the *entitas* itself as something by which one term is distinguished from the other. Merely analogical unity would not suffice for this purpose, since items that are one by analogy are distinguished precisely in what they have in common.

[43] In calling it a *ratio,* I do not mean that it is a mere "concept," something existing only "in the mind." Unity under a common *ratio* is unity in *relation* to the mind; it is a function of the mind's capacity to consider the *ratio* in abstraction from the subjects by which it is divided and multiplied. But the principle of the unity is in the things themselves. In other words, the common *ratio* does not exist in reality as an "individual"; but it does exist in reality, as something predicated of real individuals. This is because it is an *essential* predicate. The nature of form is predicated *per se* of the real form of the bread and the real form of the body of Christ, and the nature of matter is predicated *per se* of their respective matters.

conversion are separate beings, and the *entitas* in one is divided, in subject, from the *entitas* in the other. The *entitas* in them is the same in *ratio,* but it is not numerically the same. If it were, then the terms would be the very same being, a single individual. The point is simply that they are not separated or divided according to the very *ratio entis* in them. They are divided only according to their distinguishing *rationes.*

Yet Thomas does see the community in *entitas* as setting up something *like* a common subject. The resemblance enables him to construct a kind of analogy or parallel between the sacramental conversion and natural conversions.[44] It is displayed in the rather labored formulation, "the author of being can convert what there is of entity in one to what there is of entity in the other, removing that by which the one was distinguished from the other." As Cajetan says, Thomas is here seeking to "lead us by the hand" from our understanding of natural conversions toward some way of conceiving this supernatural conversion.[45]

The objection had said that the subject of white (which is a body) becomes the subject of black. In Thomas's formulation, "what there is of entity" corresponds to "the subject" (we might say "what there is of corporeity"), and "that by which the one was distinguished from the other" corresponds to "white." The basis of the parallel is the indefiniteness or indeterminacy of "what there is of entity" vis-a-vis the distinguishing item. A subject is related to the forms existing successively in it as something indeterminate to determinants that diversify it.[46]

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[44] Thomas seems to have changed his mind about the way to handle the issue raised in the objection. A very similar objection is raised at IV *Sent.,* d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1, obj. 4: "whatever becomes something takes on that which it is said to become. But every singular is incommunicable, and so one singular cannot become another." The reply: "communication implies some sort of conferral, and so it requires something that receives what is conferred or given; hence it is found only in formal conversions, in which the change is only with respect to form; and so, given that in this conversion nothing remains to which something can be conferred, there is no communication in it." By contrast, in the *Summa* reply he is presenting something *analagous* to a recipient that remains throughout.

[45] Cajetan, commentary on *STh* III, q. 75, a. 4 (sect. IX, 115).

[46] A genus is related to its differentiae as matter to diverse forms. See VII *Metaphys.,* lect. 12, §1549-50; X *Metaphys.,* lect. 10, §2116.

The reply does not spell out the analogy with natural conversions any further. The identification of a common nature suffices to overcome the division and so to resolve the objection. However, there is a later text in the treatise on the Eucharist where Thomas again draws attention to a common *ratio* belonging to the terms of the conversion. The focus is slightly shifted; this time it is on the nature of being common to the whole terms, that is, the nature of substance and the common set of accidents that they are successively under. But we see here how far the analogy between transubstantiation and natural conversions extends. There is even something resembling a numerically identical subject in the terms of the sacramental conversion.

The text is a discussion of the truth of the sacramental formula by which the conversion is effected, the words "This is my body" *(STh* III, q. 78, a. 5). Thomas says that the formula expresses a conception having practical force, effecting what it signifies. He then asks what the pronoun "this" is supposed to stand for. It cannot stand precisely for Jesus' body, since then the words would mean simply, "This my body is my body." That is true even before the utterance of the words, and so they would not effect what they signify. Nor can "this" stand precisely for the bread, since then the words would not be true; the bread is not Christ's body. So instead, he says, what the pronoun stands for is "that which is contained under these species, in general"; or more precisely, "'the substance contained under the accidents,' which previously was bread, and afterwards is the body of Christ" (ibid., ad 2).

In this last passage, Thomas is presenting the referent of the singular pronoun "this" in the sacramental formula as somewhat like a single subject that is first one term and then the other.[47] We have seen that he regards the accidents of the bread as in some way like a subject of change, insofar as they are something that is one and the same, disposed now otherwise than before. But "this" does not signify the accidents. Its signification is mediated by the accidents, but what it signifies is what the accidents contain-*whatever* it is under the accidents that has the nature of a substance. In a way this is even more like a subject of change than the accidents are, because it is substantial.[48] In another way, of course, it is less like a subject than the accidents are, because the substance under the accidents is now one, now another. It is not unqualifiedly "one and the same" throughout. Yet it still resembles a subject, because there is a qualified sense in which it is one and the same: it is under the same accidents. The association with the accidents makes it a singular object of signification, the referent of "this."[49]

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[47] This is another reason for insisting that what the terms of the conversion have in common, the common *entitas,* must be something univocal. If there were no common name belonging univocally to them, then there would be no unambiguous "this" that changes from one of them into the other. The very meaning of "this" would change too. Although the pronoun gets its singularity from the accidents, it does not signify the accidents; there must be something constant not only in that by which it signifies, but also in what it signifies.

Thomas holds that the conversion takes place in an instant, at the end of the pronouncement of the words of the consecration (*STh* III, q. 75, a. 7). But the pronoun "this," which is uttered at the beginning, retains the very same meaning throughout. What it signifies is like an enduring subject. Relative to it, what is proper to the bread and what is proper to the body of Christ are like contrary forms. The substance under the accidents cannot be both bread and Christ's body at once.[50] Being the bread and being the body of Christ are, to use Thomas's language, opposed "qualities" or "determinate forms."[51] Each is a "determination of a proper nature" (ibid, ad 1), applied successively to the "substance in general" signified by "this."

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[48] However, it is only a *general* substantial item. Its nature is such as to be predicated of something else, something that subsists *per se*-a determinate individual. This would explain why Thomas does not appeal to it in *STh* III, q. 75, a. 4, ad 1. There he is looking for an ultimate subject of predication, one that is not said *per se* of something else. He is treating the conversion as a quasi-form and identifying the subsistent item that serves as its quasi-subject: both substances together. "This" cannot stand for both substances together ("these"), but only for one or the other, indeterminately. What it signifies functions as a quasi-subject of the conversion insofar as the conversion is considered, not as a quasi-form, but as a quasi-transformation.

[49] Readers of Grisez's article will be aware that this "association with the accidents" is another point in Thomas's account that Grisez finds objectionable. Thomas holds that the body of Christ is not subject to the accidents of the bread. The accidents do not inhere in it as they did in the bread. Grisez argues that this excludes any one type of relation to the accidents that is common to the bread and the body of Christ; that is, he cannot find any clear sense in which both the bread and the body of Christ are "under" the accidents (see below, n. 60). I cannot address this objection fully here, but I think it can be shown that Thomas does have a valid sense for the expression. It is presented at *STh* 11-11, q. 8, a. 1. It refers simply to the intelligible existence of the substance of the body there, wherever the accidents are. This association of the substance with the accidents is something other than their inherence in the substance and ontologically prior to it. Hence it can obtain even when the accidents do not inhere.

Thomas is actually rather explicit about the resemblance between "the substance under the accidents" and a subject. As we have seen, he denies that the bread can properly be said to "become" the body of Christ (*STh* III, q. 75, a. 8).[52] This would mean that at the end of the conversion, the bread (or at least a part of it) *is* the body of Christ (or at least a part of it).[53] Verbs such as "becomes," "is," "will be," and so forth are not properly used here. But he also adds an important qualification to this denial. Because a singular item does remain throughout the conversion-the accidents-such expressions can be admitted "according to a certain likeness." They are acceptable if the term

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[50] Thomas observes that if the substance of the bread remained together with the body of Christ in the host, then the formula would have to be "Here is my body" rather than "This is my body" (*SI'h* III, q. 75, a. 2).

[51] *SI'h* Ill, q. 78, a. 5. The treatment of the pronoun in terms of "substance and quality" stems from Priscian's definition of a noun: *proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare* (Priscian, *Institutiones grammaticae,* 2.4.18, in *Grammatici LAtini,* vol. 2, ed. H. Keil [Leipzig: Teubner, 1855), 55.6). Elsewhere Thomas explains that in this definition of a noun, "substance" and "quality" are not to be taken properly, as referring to distinct categories (I *Sent.,* d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3). They refer only to modes of signifying. A noun signifies a thing in the manner of a substance, as though subsisting; and it signifies the thing according to some item by which the thing is known or defined, i.e., some item functioning as a quality or a form. (On "that by which something is named" as playing the role of a form, even if it is not truly a form, see *SI'h* I, q. 37, a. 2.)

[52] The objection had said that the subject of one color *becomes* the subject of the other. In his reply, Thomas is careful not to say that what there is of entity in one term becomes what there is of entity in the other. He only says that one is converted to the other. But there is something *like* a "becoming" here.

[53] In the same article, Thomas notes that even in ordinary substantial changes, it is not perfectly proper to say that one term "can be" or "becomes" the other. One and the same body is first this white thing, then this black thing; but there is nothing one and the same that is first this animal, then this carcass. There is only something that is first a part of this animal and then a part of this carcass, namely the matter. So in a substantial change, "the substance subsisting in this matter" is not unqualifiedly the same before and after the change. It is only the same in matter and in genus.

"bread" is taken to signify, not the substance of the bread, but "in a general way, that which is contained under the species of bread, under which is first contained the substance of the bread, and afterwards the body of Christ." In the parallel *Sentences* text, Thomas uses this analysis to account for a passage from St Ambrose: "that which was bread before the consecration is now the body of Christ after the consecration, because the utterance of Christ changes the creature."[54] In this passage, "that which" functions like a subject.

VIII. THE CONVERTIBILITY OF THE BREAD (C): MATIER FOR THE SACRAMENTAL ACTION

What we must now ask is whether the common nature of being, or the "substance under the accidents," can provide a resolution of the issue raised by Grisez. As I have understood it, this issue is not quite the same as the problem that Thomas resolves by appeal to common *entitas.* The latter problem was whether there is anything in the bread that is even compatible with the body of Christ. Our question is whether the bread can be understood to be, or at least to contain, a genuine principle from which the body of Christ comes to be in the sacrament. Can "the substance under the accidents" be considered such a principle? There are reasons to doubt it.

We must not lose sight of the fact that "the substance under these accidents" does not designate a true and proper subject of change. It only resembles a subject. For one thing, as we have seen, the *entitas* or the substantiality of the bread is not numerically one with that of the body of Christ. They are diverse instances of a common *ratio.* The singularity of "this" is entirely a function of the accidents, and the accidents are not constituents of the substances.

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[54] "Quod erat panis ante consecrationem iam corpus Christi est post consecrationem, quia sermo Christi creaturam mutat" (St Ambrose, *De sacramentis,* 4.4; Aquinas, *N Sent.,* d. 11, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 1, sol. & ad 1). Cajetan makes much of this text. It is cited in the *sed contra* of *STh* lll, q. 78, a. 4.

Moreover, the distinction between a being's common *entitas* and its proper *ratio* does not answer to a real distinction of components in it. Every being is immediately both its own proper self and a being.[55] "What there is of entity" in a thing is not a genuine "recipient" of what distinguishes that thing from others. It is whatever there is in the thing that has the nature of a being. It is the thing itself, considered in a merely indeterminate way.[56] This is especially clear if the thing in question is one of the ultimate components of a substance, its matter or its form. Neither of these is in turn composed of yet another matter and another form. There are only distinct *rationes* in them, the common *ratio* of matter or form and the *ratio* proper to *this* matter or *such* form. The distinction between the matter considered indeterminately, as matter, and the same matter considered determinately, as *this* matter, is a merely logical distinction. So is the distinction between a substance considered merely as "whatever substance is under these accidents" and the same substance considered in its proper nature. The distinction between "this substance" and bread, or between "this substance" and Christ's body, does not reflect a real distinction between a substrate and its form. It is only a distinction in meaning. "This substance" is not functioning as a proper subject of change.

Now, the logical distinction does suffice to show that there is no contradiction in saying the following: "the substance under these accidents, which was bread, is now the body of Christ." The transition from "the substance under these accidents is bread" to "the substance under these accidents is the body of Christ" is not logically or absolutely impossible.[57] God can bring about whatever involves no contradiction. So he can make "this substance" be the body of Christ. And in fact what "this substance" signifies is not annihilated in the transition, but preserved.

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[55] Cf. Cajetan, commentary on *STh* III, q. 75, a. 4 (sect. VIII, "being" does not add any further nature to the specific and generic natures of things. This is not to deny the real distinction between a being *(ens)* and its act of being *(esse).* "A being" means a subject of *esse,* or at least something that somehow shares in *esse.* But there is not one nature in a thing by which it shares in *esse,* and another nature by which its proper identity is constituted. That by which its identity is constituted *is* that by which it shares in *esse;* it is that by which it is disposed to *be itself. Entitas* and *esse* are not ·synonyms. *Entitas* is an abstract noun corresponding to the concrete *ens; esse* is an infinitive verb corresponding to the finite *est.*

[56] *As* Cajetan says, to convert what there is of entity in a thing is to diversify the whole thing (commentary on *STh* III, q. 75, a. 4 [sect. IX,

But assuming that there is no temporal gap between the existence of the bread and the existence of Christ's body under the accidents, "this substance" would be preserved even if the bread were annihilated. Nothing from the bread is needed in order for Christ's body to be "this substance." The possibility that "this substance" be now bread, now the body of Christ, is *only* a logical or absolute possibility, not a natural one. It does not rest on any underlying potency or matter. It rests on a mere indeterminacy of signification or *ratio.* The bread contains an indeterminate *ratio* that is compatible with the determinate *ratio* signified by "the body of Christ." So why can we not say that, by sheer divine fiat, the bread ceases to exist, and the body of Christ simultaneously takes on the role of the substance under the accidents?[58] Why must we say that the existence of the body of Christ in the sacrament is the very term of the change in the bread, or in other words, that the bread is converted into the body of Christ? How does a logical distinction make possible a real conversion?

We can see the answer, I believe, if we pay closer attention to an obvious feature of the sacramental conversion: the very fact that it is sacramental. Although it is an event that only the power of God is adequate to effect, it is not effected by God alone. Unlike creation, it is effected through created instruments. Hence it is in some way conditioned by those instruments and proportioned to their mode of operating. And the sacramental mode is rather special.

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[57] In the sentence, "This substance is bread," the predicate is not contained in the definition of the subject. It is a *per accidens* type of predication (cl. VII *Metapbys.,* lect. 2, §1273). On the legitimacy of "the substance contained under the accidents" as a subject of predication, see Cajetan, commentary on *Sfb* III; q. *75,* a. 4 (sect. VII).

[58] Cf. Durandi a Sancto Porciano, IV *Sent.,* d. 11, q. 1, §14, p. 318vb, II. 2-13. This would not be a real change in the body of Christ, since it would not involve the loss of any previous disposition, as, e.g., in the case of a local movement.

The created instruments in the sacraments function as signs. But they are special signs: they effect what they signify, and they effect it through signifying it. The Eucharistic action is performed by the utterance of Christ's human words, "This is my body." The utterance of these words, in the due circumstances, *is* the action. The consecration makes the host to be the body of Christ through signifying it to be the body of Christ. "The power to convert that exists in the formulae of these sacraments follows upon their signification" (*STh* III, q. 78, a. 4, ad 3).

This power is of course only instrumental. The principal power behind the conversion is God's own. But the action is truly sacramental, and it has its own mode. Thomas contrasts it with creation (*STh* III, q. 78, a. 2, ad 2). Creation is in the mode of a command, a sheer fiat. The consecration is in the indicative mood and the present tense. This, Thomas says, is precisely because it is sacramental. It simply signifies or declares the existence of its effect.

Normally, the truth of a declarative sentence in the present tense depends upon the reality of what it is about. But with the truth of the Word of God, it is the other way round. Whatever the eternal Word of God says to be the case is the case, just because he says so. Divine truth is the cause of the reality, the *entitas,* expressed in it (*STh* I, q. 16, a. 6). In the sacraments, human enunciations share in this power of the Word of God. The consecration effects what it signifies because its signification is true, and because its truth is that of the Word of God (*STh* III, q. 78, a. 5).

Since its power follows upon its signification, the consecration's mode of action also corresponds to the mode of its signification. Although it shares in the power of the truth of the Word of God, it is still an utterance in the human mode: a composite, discursive statement. Hence, even though the effect takes place in an instant, there is a process in the action by which it is brought about.[59] The process begins with the utterance of the word "this." At that moment, what underlies the object signified by "this" is bread. If the substance of the bread were not there, "this" would be meaningless. There would be no substance under the accidents. The action would not get off the ground. "This" would be a false start. The action starts from the bread, *qua* "this," and terminates in the body of Christ, "my body."

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[59] What the words effect is a simple event, and what they signify is also something simple-the host's being the body of Christ. Hence, Thomas says, they obtain the power for the effect only in the simple, final instant of their pronouncement. But he also insists that they

This is how we can make sense of saying that even though the bread provides no material for the body of Christ, the bringing about of the body of Christ in the host starts from the bread. It means that the action by which the existence of the body of Christ in the host is brought about is an action upon the bread. The bread is not just gotten out of the way. Although it provides no potency for the body of Christ, it does provide something needed for the sacramental action that effects the body of Christ. It is a direct principle of the coming to be of Christ's body under the accidents.[60] By sharing in the nature of corporeal substance, the bread contains something in terms of which the body of Christ can be understood and signified; and the sacramental action effects the body of Christ through signifying it. The bread is required in order for there to be what the action presupposes: a substance under the accidents, signifiable by "this." It does not provide matter out of which Christ's body is formed, but it does provide *materiacirca quam,* an object of action. It provides that to which the *ratio* of Christ's body is applied. This application is a predication, but it is also an action. Its result is the very existence of the body of Christ under the accidents of the bread.

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do so *in ordine ad praecendentia-in* relation to the preceding instants *(STh* III, q. 78, a. 4, ad3).

[60] Obviously Thomas does not mean that the substance that is the body of Christ does not exist at all prior to the sacramental conversion. In itself it exists already. Through the conversion it is only "communicated" or "applied" to the host. It talceson a new relation to the accidents of the bread; it begins to "exist under" the accidents. See *STh* III, q. 76, a. 6: "it is not the same for Christ to exist in himself, and to exist under this sacrament; for when we say this, that he exists under this sacrament, a certain relation of him to the sacrament is signified." In line with these considerations, Cajetan argues that strictly speaking, the substance of the bread and the substance of the body of Christ, taken absolutely, are not the terms of the conversion (commentary on *STh* III, q. *75,* a. 4 [sect. V-VI]). Rather, the first term is the substance under the accidents that is bread, and the second is the substance under the accidents that is the body of Christ.

IX. UNDERSTANDING TRANSUBSTANTIATION

The foregoing discussion makes no pretense of fully explaining transubstantiation. It does not display the nature of the power by which the change is accomplished. It only shows that it can make sense to speak of the conversion of one whole substance into another. The analogy between "the substance under the accidents" and the subject of a transformation saves the language of conversion. But fully explaining the event would require understanding the form and power of the truth of the Word of God. It would be like fully explaining creation.

Thomas in fact judges that the sacramental conversion is in some ways even harder to understand than creation *(STh* III, q. 75, a. 8, ad 3). Part of what makes it so hard is that does not reflect any agent's "common" way of acting. This does not just mean that it lies outside our ordinary experience; so does creation. It means that there is no agent that "normally" acts in this way. Grasping the coming to be of something out of nothing, Thomas says, is certainly not easy; but we can at least see that this pertains to the mode of producing that is appropriate for an absolutely "first" cause, a cause that presupposes nothing other than itself. By contrast, a production in which something is presupposed, and yet nothing of it remains, does not pertain to the mode of producing that generally responds to *any* cause, created or divine.

In transubstantiation, something is presupposed to the production. The event is a change and a conversion. This pertains to the creaturely mode of acting.[61] Yet nothing presupposed is a constituent of what is produced. This pertains to the mode of acting proper to God.

So transubstantiation belongs to an order which is in some way between the order proper to the nature of created causes and the order proper to the uncreated first cause. The difficulty seems to be precisely in grasping that there *could* be anything between them. Creatures are involved in the event, but their own natures are insufficient to explain what goes on; judged in their light, the event seems impossible. God is using them to produce an effect for which his nature alone is adequate. But his nature, all by itself, is perfectly sufficient for producing the effect. Judged in relation to him, the result certainly seems possible; but the creatures seem merely superfluous. Our particular problem was that the substance of the bread seemed superfluous. It seemed to have no true role to play as the *terminus a quo* of a conversion.

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[61] Thus the very involvement of a creature in the sacramental action suffices to explain why Thomas takes it for granted that the existence of Christ's body in the sacrament must be the term of a real change in something. (See above, at n. 58.) On the fact that a creature's action always consists in applying some nature to a presupposed object, see *Sfh* l, q. 45, a. 5, ad 1; d. *Sfb* Ill, q. 78, a. 4, ad 2.

What lies between the natural order and the strictly divine order is a created supernatural order, the order of grace.[62] The creature's involvement in it is not superfluous, but it is "gratuitous." It is not impossible; the "nature of being," as gathered from creatures and studied in metaphysics, does somehow allow for the possibility of a supernatural order. But its existence and its true shape are known only by revelation (and then only imperfectly).

If the foregoing interpretation is correct, Thomas's conception of transubstantiation is formed strictly in light of its supernatural proximate cause: a human utterance of the Word incarnate. If we prescinded from the cause, the metaphysical analysis would be idle. The analogy between "the substance under the accidents" and a subject of transformation would seem merely irrelevant. We would indeed find it unintelligible to speak of transubstantiation as a conversion. But of course this is hardly an objection. It only means that for all the philosophy involved, Thomas's doctrine of the Eucharistic conversion is quite formally theological.[63]

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[62] Cf. *STh* III, q. 77, a. 1, ad 1: the subsistence of the accidents of the bread without a subject is against "the common order of nature;" but there is a "special reason" for it "according to the order of grace."

[63] My thanks to Kevin Flannery, S.J., Lawrence Feingold, and David Twetten for their very helpful comments on drafts of this paper.

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BALTHASAR ON CHRIST'S CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE CROSS

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POPE JOHN PAUL II's recent apostolic letter, *Novo millennia ineunte,* contains the following passage:

> Jesus' cry on the cross, dear brothers and sisters, is not the cry of anguish of a man without hope, but the prayer of the Son who offers his life to the Father in love, for the salvation of all. At the very moment when he identifies with our sin, "abandoned" by the Father, he "abandons" himself into the hands of the Father. His eyes remain fixed on the Father. Precisely because of the knowledge and experience of the Father which he alone has, even at this moment of darkness he sees clearly the gravity of sin and suffers because of it. He alone, who sees the Father and rejoices fully in him, can understand completely what it means to resist the Father's love by sin. More than an experience of physical pain, his passion is an agonizing suffering of the soul. Theological tradition has not failed to ask how Jesus could possibly experience at one and the same time his profound unity with the Father, by its very nature a source of joy and happiness, and an agony that goes all the way to his final cry of abandonment. The simultaneous presence of these two seemingly irreconcilable aspects is rooted in the fathomless depths of the hypostatic union. (No. 26)

Why does the Pope direct special attention at the turn of the millennium to the question of Christ's consciousness on the Cross? While the Pope's intentions surely reflect his pastoral mission, theologians will recognize that this question is of systematic import in the work of one of the twentieth century's most acclaimed theologians, Hans Urs von Balthasar. Read this way, the apostolic letter serves as an opportune point of entry into the task of understanding and assessing Balthasar's theology of the Cross.

In volume 4 of his *Theo-Drama,* Balthasar states,

> It is all the more terrifying for the Son, therefore, in the darkness of his anguish, to see that this whole work, which has begun to be realized in Mary, is pointless (because of his gratuitous suffering) and doomed to failure. The Son is not simply alone with sinners in that absolute exchange envisaged by Luther: he is accompanied by a witness to God's activity {which always operates *sola gratia),* and this robs the Man of Sorrows of all hope of completing his mission.[1]

Does this mean that Jesus is hopeless on the Cross? Compare a second text, this time from volume 2 of Balthasar's *Theologik* (published five years later): "Jesus must have had before his eyes the impossibility of accomplishing his earthly mission ... from the very beginning and, as resistance to him grew, with increasing clarity."[2] In his experience, therefore,

> two things can and must occur together: forsakenness by the Father as the final radicalness of frustration and failure (Mk 15:34, Mt 27:46) and the knowledge (which at the moment is perhaps no longer tangible) that "the hour is coming, indeed it has come, when you will be scattered, every man to his home, and will leave me alone; yet I am not alone, for the Father is with me" (Jn 16:32). Ultimate failure and sure knowledge of ultimate fulfillment are not, as in the Old Testament, juxtaposed, but contain one another here.[3]

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[1] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama,* vol. 4, The *Action,* trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 357.

[2] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Ibeologik,* vol. 2: *Wahrheit Gottes* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag,, 1985), 222. "Die Unvollendbarkeit seiner irdischen Sendung-Sammlung der zerstreuten Schafe Israels, gar Wiederherstellung des Zwolfstiimmevolkes, ja als der erwahlte Gesandte das 'Licht der V<>lkerbis zu den Grenzen der Erde' zu sein (Is 49:6; Lk 2:32)-mu« Jesus von Anfang an und bein dem wachsenden Widerstand immer klarer vor Augen gestanden haben." Cf. ibid., 305ff.

[3] Ibid., 223. "Das hindert nicht, vielmehr, daB im Enderlebnis beides beisammen sein kann und muB: das Verlassensein vom Yater als letzte Radikalitiit des Scheiterns (Mk 15:34; Mt 27:46) und das (vielleicht im Augenblick nicht mehr fa«bare Wissen): 'Es kommt die Stunde und sie ist schon da, wo ihr euch verstreut, jeder an seinen Ort, und mich allein lli«t. Und doch bin ich nicht allein, denn der Yater is mit mir' (Jn 16:32). Letztes Scheitem und letztes Erfllllungswissen liegen hier nicht, wie im Alten Bund, neben-, sondem ineinander."

In this second text, Balthasar holds that Jesus would have known that his earthly mission of gathering Israel was doomed, and yet would have known (even if not in a "tangible," conscious way) that the Father would accomplish the mission.

How are we to understand this insistence that the incarnate Son is both robbed of all hope for his mission and yet still knows that the Father will triumph? Balthasar's answer is that this experience of the incarnate Son reveals the unity, in the Spirit, of

> removal into the uttermost distance from the Father and the final step towards and into the Father. The paradox of every Christian mission, that is, movement away from God as movement towards God, is brought here to a unique, because most profoundly Trinitarian, fulfillment.[4]

From this it is clear that Balthasar's theology of Christ's consciousness on the Cross is intimately tied to all aspects of his theology. To grasp what is at stake, one must identify the connections in Balthasar's work between Trinitarian theology, metaphysics, and the theology of Christ.

Challenging both the psychological analogy (Augustine and Aquinas) and the intrasubjective analogy (Richard of St. Victor), Balthasar seeks a new path for Trinitarian theology. His critique of Augustine's psychological analogy is standard-he suggests that it tends towards monism[5]-but his critique of Richard is more significant, since most theologians who criticize Augustine's model seek to embrace Richard's. Balthasar notes that

> it is mistaken to take a naive construction of the divine mystery after the pattern of human relationships (as Richard of St. Victor attempted by way of

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[4] Ibid. "Damit auch ein Zweites: auGerste Entfemung vom Yater und, in der Erfiillung der Sendung, letztes Schreiten auf ihn zu, in ihn hinein. Das Paradox jeder christlichen Sendung: von Gott weg als auf Gott zu, erfiillt sich hier auf einmalige, weil im tiefsten trinitarische Weise."

[5] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama,* vol. 3: *The Dramatis Personae: The Person in Christ,* trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992): 526. He explains that Augustine's analogy for the Trinity from the *imago dei* or the rational soul's memory, understanding, and will "takes place within the same spiritual being, thus yielding an image of the inner life of the one divine Spirit; but, at the same time, the sequence closes the created spirit in on itself and is unable to show how genuine objectification and genuine love-which is always directed toward the other--can come about."

a counterblast to Augustine) and make it absolute; for it fails to take into account the crude anthropomorphism involved in a plurality of beings.[6]

For Balthasar, however, Richard's mistake is not tritheism-he remarks that four of the six books of Richard's *De Trinitate* are devoted to the one divine essence, in order "to exclude all suspicion of tritheism"[7]-but rather lies in Richard's grounding of his analogy upon three human persons rather than upon the trinitarian event of the incarnate Son's Passion, death, and Resurrection. Indeed, Balthasar argues that in order to gain more than "the faintest glimmer of an elucidation of the superabundant triune life resident within the divine unity,"[8] one must look beyond all creaturely analogies and focus upon the revealed archetype, Jesus Christ.[9]

On these grounds, Balthasar identifies the incarnate Son of God's Paschal mystery (itself the ultimate expression of the entire kenotic existence of the incarnate Son) as an economic Trinitarian analogy for the immanent Trinity.[10] Because of the "identity of unity and difference" in Jesus (whose divine and human natures are united in the Person of the Son), his metaphysical constitution already points to the unity and distinction of the divine Trinity.[11] The suffering, death, and resurrection of the incarnate Son reveal analogously the eternal mutual kenosis of the Father and the Son in the *ecstasis* of love.[12] The Father's kenotic begetting of the Son is imaged by the Son's kenotic handing-himself-over to the Father; the intradivine kenosis means that every intradivine relation involves mutual kenosis. Balthasar posits (working "backwards" from the atemporal order of the processions) "the Son's antecedent consent to be begotten and the Spirit's antecedent consent to proceed from Father and Son."[13] In this mutuality he finds "the way in which the Persons of the Trinity 'make room' ('space') for one another, granting each other freedom of being and action."[14] Since the kenotic "distance" between the Father and the Son spans (as mediated by the Spirit) the greatest separation, no matter how "bitter," the incarnate Son receives (out of love) the Father's wrath against sinners without thereby causing the Godhead to break apart.[15]

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[6] Ibid., 526-27.

[7] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama,* vol. 5: The *Last Act,* trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998): 82; cf. *Theologik* 2:39.

[8] Balthasar, *Theologik* 2:39. "Natnrlich hat kein Vertreter des Modells vor allem von Alexander von Hales und von Bonaventura iibernommen und weitergefiihrt wird--daran gedacht, in Gott drei Personen im modemen Sinn, das bei8t drei Bewu8tseinszentren anzunehmen; Richard hat selber vier von seinen sechs Biichem iiber die Dreieinigkeit dem Problem der Einheit Gottes gewidmet. Flir ihn und seine Nachfolger hat einzig die Logik der Caritas Bedeutung, die den 'Andern', Geliebten und den 'Drinen', gemeinsam Geliebten in Gott fordert, unbeschadet der gottlichen Wesenseinheit. Aber das Augustin erglinunde Gegenbild bleibt ebenso unfabig wie das augustiniscbe Bild, die der Einbeit innewohnende dreieinige Liebesfiille mehr als ahnungshaft zu verdeudichen. Durch die unvereinbare Polaritit beider innerweldicher Bilder hindurch haben wir zum unbegreiflichen Urhild emporzublicken."

[9] Cf. Balthasar, *Tbeologik* 2:35-42. Balthasar describes Augustine's analogy as "dialectical," beginning from knowing, and Richard's as "dialogical," beginning from loving. Regarding both analogies, he concludes, "Augustine and Richard, and thus Scheeben as well, were fully conscious of the fragility of their undertakings .... The images remained as such unconnected and juxtaposed in the created realm-those most clearly of all which consciously presented themselves as *imagines Trinitatis:* the point of intersection where the lines projected by Augustine, Richard and Scheeben would have to meet was infinitely beyond construction. They are-and here Hegel's method can be included as well-images which look upwards from below and (what might be surprising at first glance) which Christ does not utili;rewhen he undertakes to exposit the divine aspect of his person into the language of his humanity" *(Theologik* 2:61).

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[10] For further analysis, from various perspectives, see Thomas Krenski, *Passio Caritatis: Trinitarische Passiologie im Werk Hans Urs vonBaltbasars* (Freiburg, 1990); Anne Hunt, *The Trinity and the Paschal Mystery: A Development in Recent Catholic Theology* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1997); idem, "Psychological Analogy and Paschal Mystery in Trinitarian Theology," *Theological Studies* 59 (1998): 197-218; Margaret Turek, "Dare We Hope 'That All Men Be Saved' (1 Tim 2:4)?: On von Balthasar's Trinitarian Grounds for Christian Hope," *Logos* 1 (1997): 92-121; idem, "'Asthe Father Has Loved Me' On 15:9): Balthasar's Theodramatic Approach to a Theology of God the Father," *Communio* 26 (1999): 295-318; Gilles Emery, O.P., "L'immutabilire du Dieu d'amour et les problemes du discours sur la 'souffrance de Dieu,'" *Nova et Vetem* 74 (1999): 5-37; J.B. Quash, "'Between the Brutely Given, and the Brutally, Banally Free': Von Balthasar's Theology of Drama in Dialogue with Hegel," *Modern Theology* 13 (1997): 293-318; Steffen Lose!, "Murder in the Cathedral: Hans Urs von Balthasar's New Dramatization of the Doctrine of the Trinity," *Pro Ecdesia* 5 (1996): 427-39; John Milbank, "The Name of Jesus: Incarnation, Atonement, Ecclesiology," *Modern Theology* 7 (1991): 332-33; David B. Burrell, C.S.C., "Incarnation and Creation: The Hidden Dimension," *Modern Theology* 12 (1996): 216-17; Brian J. Spence, "The Hegelian Element in Von Balthasar's and Moltmann's Understanding of the Suffering of God," *Toronto Journal of Theology* 14 (1998): 45-60; Bertrand de Margerie, S.J., "Note on Balthasar's Trinitarian Theology," trans. Gregory F. LaNave, *1be1bomist64* (2000): 127-30; Edward Oakes, S.J., *Pattern of Redemption: The Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar* (New York: Continuum, 1994): 242££.

[11] Balthasar, *Theologik* 2:117-18.

[12] Balthasar acknowledges his debt to the Trinitarian metaphysics of Gustav Siewerth, Clemens Kaliba, Wilhelm Moock, and Klaus Hemmerle. See *Theo-Drama* 5:66-76.

[13] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 5:93; cf. *Theologik* 2:126-28.

[14] Ibid.

Quoting the mystical theology of Adrienne von Speyr, Balthasar further holds that the intradivine kenosis means that the Father in a certain sense "conceals" knowledge in order to make room for the freedom of love.[16] He states,

> "The Father shows the Son less his total knowledge than his total love, which conceals something whose concealment lets love radiate even more brightly." In God there are things that exist "only to provide love with every opportunity for development, to give it the room which it would lack if everything were stale foreknowledge-room which it needs, for it cannot exist without self-surrender, movement and flight."[17]

Again following von Speyr, Balthasar speaks of faith, analogously understood, as a "divine virtue." He explains that

> faith as it exists in God ... is in harmony with "irrefragable knowledge" but is not swallowed up by it, because the love that grants freedom to the other [divine person] always offers him something "that transcends his capacities of knowing," something that has an utterly unique origin, springing from the "hidden depths of the one and communicated to the hidden depths of the other."[18]

Divine knowledge is muted in order to allow for the fuller expression of the ecstatic interplay of love.

The metaphysical suppositions of this kenotic theology of the Trinity deserve notice. Drawing upon the work of Gustav Siewerth, Balthasar argues that love-as self-surrender--encompasses the other transcendental categories.[19] The self-emptying or self-surrender that distinguishes (and unites) the Persons in God accounts for all real distinctions, including that of the multiplicity of creatures and that of the creature and God: "Without this personal distance in the *circumincessio* of the Persons it would be impossible to understand either the creature's distance from God or the Son's 'economic' distance from the Father-a distance that goes to the limit of forsakenness."[20] All creatures bear the Trinitarian mark of kenotic distinction, that is, self-surrendering love (simultaneously letting the other "be" to the point of complete self-surrender and full *communio*),[21] and this Trinitarian mark is most profoundly realized in the incarnate Son, Jesus Christ. The metaphysical priority of love is demonstrated experientially by the example of the child, who is awakened to the fullness of its (human) *being* through "being received into the space of the parent's love."[22] Balthasar adds that "though it remains true that fully realized love also presupposes a fully realized knowledge ..... the unpreconceivability of the self-surrender or self-expropriation which first makes the Father Father cannot be ascribed to knowledge but only to groundless love, which fact proves the identity of love as the 'transcendental par excellence,'" more fundamental than being or knowing.[23]

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[15] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 4:325; *Theo-Drama* 5:98.

[16] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 5:96. Cf. Guy Mansini, O.S.B., "Balthasar and the Theodramatic Enrichment of the Trinity," *The 1bomist* 64 (2000): 499-519; Thomas G. Dahell,*The Dramatic Encounter ofDivine and Human Freedom in the Theology ofHans Urs von Baltbasar* (New York: Peter Lang, 1997).

[17] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 5:96.

[18] Ibid., 5:97.

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[19] Balthasar, *Theologik* 2:127; cf. *Theo-Drama* 5:68ff. For discussions of kenotic love in Balthasar's metaphysics, see, e.g., John O'Donnell, S.J., *Hans UTs von BaltbQSllT* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 7; Aidan Nichols, *No Bloodless Myth: A Guide through Baltbasar's Dramatics* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), especially 197; Angela Franz, "Trinitarian *Analogia Entis* in Hans Urs von Balthasar," The *Thomist* 62 (1998): 533-59; M. Lochbrunner, *Analogia Caritatis: Darstellung und Deutung der Theologie Hans UTs von Baltbasars* (Freiburg, 1981); Mark Mcintosh, *Mystical Theology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998), 107.

[20] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 5:98.

[21] Referring to the poetry of Paul Claude}, Balthasar speaks of the "communion of all particularized things in being" (*Theologik* 2:34)

[22] Balthasar, *Theologik* 2:162.

[23] Ibid., 2:162-63: "Wenn die Transzendentalien jedes, auch das untergeistige Sein durchwalten, so erlangen sie ihre Flllle doch erst, wo das Sein sich innerlich zum Geistsein lichtet, und wenn es wahr bleibt, daB vollendete Liebe auch eine vollendete Erkenntnis voraussetzt (und in diesern Sinn die augustinische Ordnung der Prozessionen nicht aufgegeben zu werden braucht), dennoch die unvordenkliche Selbstmtiu8erung des Vaters zum Sohn hin selbst einer Liebe sich verdankt, die gedanklich iiber das Sein and seine Selbsterkenntnis

Balthasar's theology of the Trinity and his corresponding Trinitarian metaphysics lead him, when he focuses his attention specifically upon the Cross, to develop the substitutionary aspects of Luther's theology.[24] In the economy of salvation, the forsakenness of the incarnate Son involves the pouring-out of the Father's "wrath" upon Jesus Christ. As Balthasar states, "Can we seriously say that God unloaded his wrath upon the Man who wrestled with his destiny on the Mount of Olives and was subsequently crucified? Indeed we must."[25] Yet, he argues that the "exchange of places" in Luther is rendered in overly formal categories. According to Balthasar, Luther

> wants nothing to do with the one, unifying hypostasis in Christ, or with the humanity as an imago Dei (the humanity touches the divinity only at a mathematical point, as it were), or, finally, with a theandric operation of the united natures and therefore with an obedience to mission which accompanies the suffering Christ into his Godforsakenness.[26]

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hinausgeht. . . . Deshalb kann die Unvordenklichkeit der Selbsthingabe oder SelbstentiiuRerung, die den Vater allererst zum Vater macht, nicht der Erkenntnis, sondem nor der grundlosen Liebe zugeschrieben werden, was diese als das 'Transzendentale schlechthin' ausweist." This theme is a central argument of *Tbeologik* 2.

[24] For further analysis, see Roch Kereszty, "Response to Professor Scola," *Communio* 18 (1991): 227-36; Michele M. Schumacher, "The Concept of Representation in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar," *Theological Studies* 60 (1999): 53-71; Gerard Remy, "La substitution: Pertinence ou non-pertinence d'un concept theologique," *Revue Tbomiste* 94 (1994): 559-600; idem, "La dereliction du Christ: Terme d'une contradiction ou mystere de communion?" *Revue Tbomiste* 98 (1998): 39-94; Michel Beaudin, *Obeissanceet solidarite: Essai sur la christologie de Hans Urs von Baltbasar* (Montreal: Fides, 1989); Karl-Heinz Menke, *Stellvertretung*(Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1991); M. Imperatori, S.J., "Heidegger dans la 'Dramatique divine' de Hans Urs von Balthasar," *Nouvelle revue tbeologique* 122 (2000): 191-210; David Coffey, *Deus Trinitas: Tbe Doctrine of the Triune God* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 105-50; Gilbert Narcisse, O.P., "Participer a la vie trinitaire," *Revue Tbomiste* 96 (1996): 107-28; Guy Mausini,O.S.B., "Rahner and Balthasar on the Efficacy of the Cross," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 63 (1998): 232-49.

zs Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 4:345; cf. 4:348.

[26] Balthasar, *Tbeologik* 2:310. "Aber Luther beharrt-freilich nicht immer bis zum Ende konsequent-auf der grundsatzlichen Trennung der Spharen: im Menschen von gratia und donum (fauschereignis und nachtraglichem kampfendem Wirken), in Christos von jeder inneren Verbindung der Naturen; weder will er von der einen und einigenden Hypostase in Christos etwas wissen, noch von der Menschheit als Imago Dei (die Menschheit berfihrt die Gottheit gleichsam nor in einem mathematischen Punkt), noch schlieffiich von einem theandrischen Wirken der vereinigten Naturen und deshalb auch nicht von einem den

Luther did not recognize that the substitutionary act of Christ on the Cross expresses a reality in the Trinitarian life. Simply put, the kenosis by which the Father begets the Son implies "such an incomprehensible and unique 'separation' of God from himself that it *includes* and grounds every other separation-be it never so dark and bitter." [27]

Man's (and Christ's) separation from God is experienced within human consciousness. For this reason, Balthasar's Christology, which he identifies as a "Christology of consciousness," focuses upon "the individual human consciousness of Jesus."[28] He argues that Jesus' human consciousness coincides with his consciousness of mission. Jesus' mission-consciousness is always *absolute:* as his human consciousness develops over time, his mission-consciousness likewise increases in clarity, and so there is never a distinction between his (non-static) human consciousness and his mission-consciousness.[29] His human "I" is identical with his mission. His mission-consciousness is his "fundamental intuition concerning his identity" as the one sent from the Father.[30] In this way, Jesus' consciousness is more than merely human, since his mission-consciousness is of his being sent *from the Father* to accomplish *salvation* (his mission is thus both particular and universal, and expresses in a human way his divine Sonship). Balthasar explains that "Jesus is aware of an element of the divine in his innermost, indivisible self-consciousness; it is intuitive insofar as it is inseparable from the intuition of his mission-consciousness, but it is defined and limited by this same mission-consciousness."[31]

Christ's human consciousness is entirely delimited by his consciousness of mission. This perfect accord differentiates Christ from other human beings, and indicates his divinity. Balthasar

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leidenden Christus bis in die Gottverlassenheit begleitenden Sendungsgehorsam."

[27] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 4:325.

[28] Balthasar, Theo-Drama 3:166. Balthasar explicitly rejects, as impossible, the quest to uncover a "psychology of Jesus." Yet, his purpose is to show that Jesus' human consciousness, insofar as we can know of it from the biblical data, is identical with his mission-consciousness.

[29] Balthasar's debt to Schleiermacher is clear, although he radically re-works Schleiermacher's theory.

[30] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 3:166.

[31] Ibid.

states, "The qualitative difference between his faith and ours is this: we only receive our mission on the basis of our coming to faith, whereas Jesus always has and *is* his mission; in his mission, he has utterly abandoned himself to the Father who guides him and in whom he has complete trust."[32] Jesus' will perfectly accords with the Father's from the beginning; over the course of time, Jesus learns what his mission entails. His absolute obedience (as Son) to the Father, in the Holy Spirit, allows the Holy Spirit to teach him what he has to learn (beyond the fact that he is "the one sent"), when he has to learn it.[33]

What Jesus learns is described by Balthasar in terms of intuitive "initiation," "opening up," and "becoming explicit," rather than as new knowledge. He learns that his mission, as the one sent to reveal the Father, requires him to descend to the uttermost point of not-knowing, of abandonment by the Father: the Word is revealed precisely in its opposite, the silence (non-Word) and death of the Cross.[34] Balthasar explains that

> the outcome is that he is forsaken by God on the Cross. Yet this "infinite distance," which recapitulates the sinner's mode of alienation from God, will remain forever the highest revelation known to the world of the "diastasis" (within the eternal being of God) between Father and Son in the Holy Spirit.[35]

Jesus' "knowing" of divine realities, for Balthasar, is a more and more explicit intuitive grasp of the divine "diastasis," or separation, that Jesus (as the incarnate Son revealing the Father) is called to enact, ultimately, upon the Cross.

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[32] Ibid., 3:170-71. The question of how Christ's human knowledge corresponds with his divine knowledge is thus placed to the side. Rephrasing the question in terms of consciousness, rather than of knowledge, enables Balthasar simply to affirm that Christ's mission-consciousness "totally occupies his self-consciousness and fills it to the very brim. He sees himself so totally as 'coming from the Father' to men, as 'making known' the Father, as the 'Word from the Father', that there is neither room nor time for any detached reflection of the 'Who am I?' kind" (ibid., 3:172)

[33] Ibid., 3:179-80; cf. 182-83; 227.

[34] For further discussion of this point, see especially Hans Urs von Balthasar, The *Glory of the Lord,* vol. 7: *Theology:* The *New Covenant,* trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 130-61.

[35] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 3:228.

In the last volume of his *Theo-Drama,* Balthasar takes pains to affirm that "it is an indispensable axiom that the Son, even in his human form, must know that he is the eternal Son of the Father."[36] Jesus must, Balthasar says, enjoy "the immediate vision of the Father."[37] He explains that Jesus' knowing "that he is the eternal Son of the Father" means that Jesus "must be aware of the unbreakable continuity of his *processio* and his *missio,* or, in other words, he must know of his transcendental obedience, which upholds his entire earthly existence *(Theo-Drama* III, 165ff., 515ff.)."[38] In other words, Jesus' "knowing" of his eternal Sonship is in fact his absolute mission-consciousness, his knowledge of his "transcendental *obedience."* Balthasar's insistence that Jesus must enjoy the immediate vision of the Father is likewise qualified. He emphasizes that "in the Lord's Passion his sight is veiled, whereas his obedience remains intact."[39] This veiling holds for Jesus' entire life, if not to the same degree as the ultimate not-knowing Jesus experiences on the Cross: his mission "presupposes {right from the Incarnation) a certain veiling of his sight of the Father: he must leave it in abeyance, refrain from using it; this is possible because of the distance between Father and Son in the Trinity."[40]

We are now able to interpret more precisely Balthasar's position on whether Jesus possessed "hope" on the Cross. By following the path of absolute obedience to the Father, Jesus {the Son) is infinitely separated from the Father. This separation is not that of will {as if he joined sinners in hating the Father), but is constituted by lack of conscious knowledge that makes his obedience to the Father blind, without thereby becoming disobedience. In obedience to his mission of "being sent," Jesus

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[36] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 5:124. It is worth noting that volume 5 was published five years after volume 3. In the later volume, Balthasar is taking the opportunity to clarify some of the positions adopted in the earlier volume, and he goes over much of the same terrain again in volume 2 of the *Theologik.*

[37] Ibid., 5:123.

[38] Ibid., 5:124.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., 5:125; cf. Balthasar, *Theologik* 2:261-65, 322ff., where Balthasar, generally following Adrienne von Speyr, describes the incarnate Son's "super-obedience" *("Ubergehorsams").*

"distances" himself to such a degree that he has absolutely no knowledge of the Father's love. Balthasar states,

> The Son bears sinners within himself, together with the hopeless impenetrability of their sin, which prevents the divine light of love from registering in them. In himself, therefore, he experiences, not their sin, but the hopelessness of their resistance to God and the graceless No of divine grace to this resistance. The Son who has depended [sich *verlas.sen]* entirely on the Father, even to becoming identified with his brothers in their lostness, must now be forsaken *[verlas.sen]* by the Father. He who consented to be given *[vergeben]* everything from the Father's hand must now feel that it was all "for nothing" *[vergebens]*.[41]

Thus Jesus' lack of hope, his conscious not-knowing, is total. Yet his will is still perfectly in accord with the divine will; his mission-consciousness remains intact, and in this there resides an implicit "hope." His union with sinners means not a perversion of will, but rather that at the moment when his mission is most fully "opened up" and made explicit to him, he *knows* absolutely nothing. His depth of not-knowing (as the not-knowing of the Son, the Word) goes infinitely beyond any mere human separation from truth. Balthasar affirms, "In his dereliction [on the Cross], the Father gives no word of answer to the Son; and his Word, that is, the Son himself, sinks into the silence of death."[42]

This death is enormously fruitful because it is located within the Trinitarian life. Balthasar holds that "the Son's eternal, holy distance from the Father, in the Spirit, forms the basis on which the unholy distance of the world's sin can be transposed into it, can be transcended and overcome by it."[43] The Son's holy distance is intellectual, whereas the unholy distance of the world's sin is moral. As Balthasar states, "This [the free rejection of God's

[41] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 4:349; cf. Balthasar, *Theologik* 2:294££. Balthasar indicates that Jesus' experience on the Cross is what John of the Cross describes as the "dark night of the soul." In *Novo millenio ineunte,* the Pope takes up the same theme, but the Pope, drawing upon Catherine of Siena and Therese of Lisieux, insists upon "the paradoxical blending of bliss and pain," without suggesting that the bliss is no longer experienced (no. 27).

[42] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 4:359; cf. Balthasar, *Theologik* 2:294££.

[43] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 4:362; cf. Balthasar, *Theologik* 2:314ff., where Balthasar summarii.es Adrienne von Speyr's theology of Holy Saturday.

will] *cannot* be said to be an element that is present as a possibility in the Son's relationship with the Father."[44] Yet the Son's holy distance, in the divine plan, encompasses the unholy distance: "These two forms of timelessness-the God-forsakenness of the damned and the God-forsakenness of the Son on the Cross-are not simply unrelated. The latter is because of the former."[45] Father and Son mutually surrender themselves and are abandoned by the other, and this abandonment goes infinitely beyond the condition of finite sin.[46] Moreover, "because of the energy that man has invested in it, sin is a reality, it is not 'nothing.'"[47] Sin is the "refuse" or "chaff" that is consigned by Jesus to hell.[48] It follows that the incarnate Son can truly bear all

[44] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 5:502.

[45] Ibid., 5:311; cf. 257 and elsewhere. For further elucidation of this point, see Nichols, *No Bloodless Myth,* 216.

[46] The problem nonetheless remains: how does a fundamentally "intEllectual" distance-it has to be such, since the divine Persons never hate each other-encompass a willful distance constituted by *hatred* of God? Balthasar affirms that Adrienne von Speyr solves this problem: "The mention of the Father here opens up a new and significant dimension of Adrienne von Speyr's theology which supplies what is lacking in Luther's theology. For here Hell is a trinitarian event. She portrays at length *the trinitarian form of sin,* a matter which cannot be presented here. However, a fundamental statement is that on Holy Saturday the Son (as man and redeemer) is initiated into the dark mystery of the Father, something which itself can happen only in secret and in silence. This presupposes a motion (not potentiality) in the eternal life of the Trinity. This is already true of the Cross: 'The Father is never more present than in this absence on the Cross.' Hell is described as a 'preserve' of the Father, in the sense that, as creator (indeed, already as generator of the Son, in whom every possible universe is always already co-projected) he foresaw and took responsibility for the possibility of the creature's freedom and, on the basis of the abuse of its freedom, the possibility of its eternal perishing: 'a chaos of sin ... like a mirror image of the chaos at the beginning of creation.' And now there is something like a 'retraction' of the Father, in order to admit the incarnate Son into this ultimate darkness, which the Father discloses to him, as the redeemer of sinners, only here at the end of the way of redemption" (Balthasar, *Theologik* 2:321-22, emphasis added).

[47] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 5:314.

[48] Cf. Balthasar, *Ibeologik* 2:324: "In his passage through hell, Christ encounters not only sin, which has now become an amorphous mass, but also figures which Adrienne has called 'effigies' [Effigien). These effigies consist of what of his own substance a man has lent to the sin he has committed: 'This lost piece of man goes into hell with sin.' The Son replaces what has been lost by his personal grace: 'So the erstwhile sinner is indeed now closer to the Lord, but at the same time, as sinner, he is copied, in negative, in hell. An effigy of him ... lies buried and rejected in hell.' The effigies are like a hollow impression, as when a body has lain in the sand." The quotations are from Adrienne von Speyr's *Kreuz und Holle,* vol. 1.

sin-in its hypostasized form, stripped of its association with particular disobedient persons-without perverting his own will. Quoting Adrienne von Speyr, Balthasar notes, "'The Son presents to the Father, in his own person, the sin of the world that he has taken away', at the same time presenting to him 'in his Body, his Bride, the living sinner now stripped of sin.'"[49]

For Balthasar, then, the Son's obedience on the Cross, in order to bear sin fully, must be characterized by two elements: absolute faithfulness, and absolute lack of grounding in knowledge. Jesus only moves to the pinnacle of obedience (the pinnacle of union with the Father's will) by simultaneously entering the abyss of not-knowing. The highest obedience-the highest charity-is that which obeys without (conscious) knowledge or hope. This highest charity expresses the self-abandoning that characterizes absolute Love, namely, the Trinity: "This obedience alone exegetes God as Trinitarian love, and that precisely by the Father's exposing his Son out of love for the world to the contradiction of the contradivine. "[50]

In light of Balthasar's theology, the Pope's affirmation that "Jesus' cry on the cross ... is not the cry of anguish of a man without hope" takes on particular significance. Balthasar's ideas about Trinitarian *diastasis,* inner-Trinitarian faith, and Trinitarian metaphysics depend largely upon his interpretation of Christ's consciousness on the Cross. Were this thread withdrawn from his theology, much else would have to be revised. For Balthasar the Son's abandonment, his supreme not-knowing, is the pinnacle of love, the revelation of the infinite inner-Trinitarian "spaces" of divine kenosis. If, on the contrary, the incarnate Son experienced his abandonment as perfect knowing-supreme awareness of man's sin in the midst of conscious "[seeing] the Father and [rejoicing] fully in him," to quote the Pope again-then the Cross, the divine being, and the Trinitarian processions of wisdom and love (along with the creaturely being that flows from these processions), would not be adequately characterized by Balthasar's dialectic. In affirming that "not even the drama of his passion and death will be able to shake his serene certainty of being the Son of the heavenly Father" (no. 24), Pope John Paul II has thus brought to our attention-whether intentionally or not-a theological debate fundamental to how the Church will understand its most profound mysteries in the new millennium.

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[49] Balthasar, *Theo-Drama* 5:314-15.

[50] Balthasar, *Theologik* 2:331. "Dieser Wahnsinn offenbart sich nicht im Wesen Gottes-er wiirde es, falls Gott der Welt bediirfte, um Gott zu sein--, sondem in Dem, der in einem einzigen Akt das absolut G<>ttliche und das absolut Widergottliche zu einen vermocht hat, nicht im Wahnsinn einer titanisch-iibermenschlichen Gebarde, sondem in der Schlichtheit seines Gehonams. Dieser Gehonam allein legt Gott als die trinitarische Liebe aus, und zwar gerade dadurch, daB der Vater ·seinen Sohn aus Liebe zur Welt dem Widenpruch des Widergottlichen ausliefert. Krenz und Trinitat beweisen sich gegenseitig, wobei Krenz in all seinen oben angedeuteten und menschlicher Logik unventandlichen Dimensionen genommen wird."

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TRUTH AND DIVINE IDEAS

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TRUTH IS IN MIND either as conformed to something or as conformed to by something. As conformed to something, truth is passive knowledge. It is knowledge that is measured or caused by something else. This source of passive or received truth might be an individual, a property or universal, or a fact. In sense knowledge, my image of a half-submerged oar is false because it fails to conform to the oar's real shape. My subsequent image of the uplifted oar is true because it does conform to the oar's shape. In intellectual knowledge, my concept of a triangle as a three-sided plane figure is true because it conforms to the definition of a triangle. And my knowledge that the angles of a triangle total one hundred eighty degrees, expressed in the true judgment to that effect, conforms to and is measured by the corresponding fact.

These three types of measured truth are not on a par. Philosophers rightly say that only judgment is strictly speaking true. This is because only judgments, and not either concepts or percepts, make claims about existence. And those claims either correspond to the facts (are true) or not. When they do and they are subject-predicate judgments, the judger not only knows reality but also knows his judgment's own conformity to reality.[1] In judging that S is P, I compare the subject to my idea of it in the predicate, affirming that the former conforms to the latter. So when my judgment is true, I know both reality itself and my mind's conformity to reality. Thus, the truth of judgment is always more comprehensive knowledge than the truth of either concepts or percepts.

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[1] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 2.

By contrast, as conformed to by something, truth is measure and not measured, active and not passive. This is ontological as opposed to logical truth. It is knowledge that measures or causes something else. Here, truth is a model. Jefferson's plan for Monticello is what measures and is conformed to by the actual Monticello. The ideal Monticello as archetype is said to be the truth of the artifact, the real Monticello. The latter is called true because it measures up to its truth. Thus, in the mind that conforms, what is known is true and what is true is known. But in mind that is conformed to, what is known is truth and what is truth is known. Thus, knowledge and truth are equivalent notions. Not only is something true (or truth) when it is known but something is also known when it is true (or truth).

But is truth in the first instance primarily speaking in mind? And if it is, is it primarily in mind that conforms or in mind that is conformed to? Does it strictly speaking characterize passive mind or active mind? Is it in mind as modeled or in mind as model? In the first section I argue that truth is primarily something conformed to and not something that conforms. It is primarily a measure and only secondarily something measured. That means that propositional truth is truth only in a secondary sense. For here statements or propositions conform to facts and not vice versa. In the second section I argue that truth is in mind and not in things and that it is primarily in God's mind.[2]

I

Consider the relation between 'true' and 'truth' on the one hand and 'good' and 'goodness' on the other. One can say that the predicates 'true' and 'good' always have a sense that includes and hence depends on the sense of 'truth' and 'goodness' respectively. Things are called true after truth and things are called good after goodness. When they are, they are always so called in a secondary sense. The same goes for all abstract nouns and their corresponding adjectives. Recall Plato's idea that things are called F after F-ness. The sense of the adjective feeds off the sense of the noun. It does so, with some difference, the way in which, in Aristotle's celebrated example, 'healthy' feeds off 'health'.[3] The sense of 'healthy' as predicated of food, complexion, exercise, etc., includes and hence depends on the sense of 'health'. Where 'health' means "physical well-being," food is called healthy only because it is conducive to physical well-being in an animal. Complexion is called healthy only because it is a sign of physical well-being in a person, and so on. Similarly, suppose that by the truth of anything x is meant its ground or measure (as the fact that snow is white is the ground or measure of the true statement "Snow is white"). And suppose that by the goodness of anything y is meant the end of y. Then if xis called true because it conforms to some ground or measure and y is called good because it tends to its end, then x and y are called true and good respectively in derived senses of those terms. For here, the concept of a ground or measure enters into the derived sense "conforms to some ground or measure" and the concept of an end enters into the derived sense "tends to its end." This parallels the case of health. The concept of physical well-being enters into the concept of "being conducive to physical well-being" and not vice versa. Thus, "conforming to a ground or measure" and "tending to its end" are derived senses of 'truth' and 'goodness', respectively. That is why, when it is just these senses that are meant, 'truth' is reduced to 'true' and 'goodness' to 'good'. Reflecting these derived senses, 'true' and 'good' are in all cases predicated of things in which truth and goodness are secondarily found.

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[2] St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate,* q. I, a. 2.

All this assumes that truth has the sense of a ground or measure and that goodness has the sense of an end. Both notions are relational. Anything that is a measure is necessarily the measure of something, and anything that is end is necessarily the end of something. But why say in the first instance that truth is a measure and that goodness is an end? Why not say instead that truth is correspondence to a measure and that goodness is tendency to an end?

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[3] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*K.3.1060b36-1061a7.

As for good, no end is called good because the tendency toward it is good. On the contrary, the tendency is called good because what it tends to is good. A seedling is called good because it shows promise of reaching its natural end as a healthy, mature plant. Otherwise we should not choose it over others. Recall Aquinas's point that desires are called good only because the ends to which they tend are good.[4] My desire for peace is good because peace is good. Thus, since good passes over from end to tendency or desire and not vice versa, goodness is primarily end and only derivatively tendency toward end.

As for truth, take the correspondence view that "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. Under this view, iron pyrite is called false gold only in a derivative sense-that is, only because it elicits the false belief or statement, "That is gold." Under both this view and the view that truth is a measure, the derived sense of 'true' includes its primary sense, as was previously seen in the case of 'health'. When 'truth' means "being a measure" something is called true gold only because it conforms to the measure of gold. The derived sense of 'true' here (i.e., "conforms to some ground or measure") includes its primary sense (i.e., the concept of a ground or measure). And when 'truth' means "the conformity of statement to fact" the derived sense of 'true' in 'true gold' (i.e., "elicits the statement, 'That is gold' which corresponds to the fact") once again includes the primary sense of 'true' (i.e., the concept of correspondence to fact).

With this in mind, recall our question. Why not say that truth consists in the correspondence-relation between measured and measure (hereafter, C) and not in being the measure itself (hereafter, M) by conformity to which the measured is called true?

To answer, compare two secondary senses of M and C, respectively. Call them *m* and *c*. If *m* is logically prior to *c* then it follows that M is logically prior to C. M therefore wins out over C so far as being the primary sense of truth is concerned. This strategy turns on the following principle, P.

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[4] *STh* I, q. 16, a. 1.

> P
> No actual primary sense of a term r has a derived sense that includes a derived sense of some alleged primary sense of r.

Thus, suppose that Y is the primary sense of r while Z is alleged to be the primary sense of r. P states that if y is a derived sense of Y then y does not include z, a derived sense of Z. Otherwise Y has a derived sense y that comes not from Y but from Z. And then, as against the supposition, y comes from Z and not from Y. For if y depends on z and z depends on Z then y depends on Z.

An example will make this clear. Suppose Smith and Jones hold rival definitions of 'goodness'. Smith says that goodness consists in being an end while Jones claims that goodness consists in tending to an end. Call these definitions E and T, respectively. From Smith's standpoint, when something is called good because it tends to its end, 'good' is used in a derived sense. For "tending to its end" (hereafter, e) includes the idea of an end, which for Smith is the primary sense of 'goodness'. Thus, when a seedling that overall looks promising is called good, it is so called, according to Smith, in sense *e*. By the same token and from Jones's standpoint, when something is called good because it is a sign of something's tending to its end, 'good' is also used in a derived sense. For "being a sign of something's tending to its end" (hereafter, t) includes "tends to its end," what for Jones is the primary sense of 'goodness'. Thus, suppose that our seedling's sprouting buds overnight is called good. Since that event is called good because it is a sign of the seedling's tending to its end, it is so called, according to Jones, in sense *t*. Now *t* here evidently depends on *e* since *t* includes *e*. But since, under P, no actual primary sense of a term r has a derived sense that depends on a derived sense of some alleged primary sense of r, it follows that E and not T is the primary sense of 'goodness'.

As it is with goodness so is it with truth. Suppose that Smith adopts M and says that truth consists in being a measure while Jones favors C and says that truth is the conformity to a measure. From Smith's perspective, when x is called true because x conforms to a measure, 'true' is used in a derived sense. For "x conforms to a measure" (hereafter, m) includes the idea of a measure, which for Smith is the primary sense of 'truth'. Thus, when a nugget is called true gold because it conforms to goldness, it is so called, according to Smith, in sense *m.* By the same token and fromJones's perspective, when the same nugget is called true gold because it elicits a belief that conforms to a ground or measure (in this case the fact behind the belief), 'truth' is also used in a derived sense. For *c,* "x elicits a belief that conforms to some ground or measure" includes C, the idea of conforming to a ground or measure (i.e., a fact) which for Jones is the primary sense of 'truth'.

Now it is evident here that *c* includes and hence depends on *m.* "Eliciting a belief that conforms to some measure" includes and hence depends on the idea of conforming to a measure. Once again, then, let us apply P. If *c* which hangs on C includes *m* which in turn hangs on M, then C is not the primary sense or definition of 'truth'. Otherwise, by P, *c* does not include *m.*

The same goes, *pari passu,* for falsity. If for Smith truth is a measure and for Jones it is conformity to a measure, then for the former falsity is absence of a measure (not-M), while for the latter it is lack of conformity to a measure (not-C). From Smith's standpoint, then, when something is called false because it fails to conform to a measure, 'false' is used in a derived sense. For the idea of x's failing to conform to a measure (hereafter, not-m) includes the idea of the absence of a measure, which for Smith is the primary sense of 'falsity'. To say that x lacks conformity to R is to say that, so far as x is concerned, R *is not* its measure. Thus, when for Smith a nugget of iron pyrite n is called false gold because it lacks conformity to goldness, it is so called in sense not-*m.* To say that n lacks conformity to goldness is to say that goldness *is not* n's measure or definition. That shows how the idea of the absence of a measure enters into the idea of the lack of conformity to a measure.

The same goes for false beliefs. False beliefs are those that lack a corresponding fact as their ground or measure. But that is to say that the facts that would make those beliefs true are absent or missing. Again, sprinters say that they made a false start just because the way they left the starting line lacks conformity to some mental model for race-starting. In these as well as in all other cases of falsity, the lack of conformity of x to some measure R means that, so far as x is concerned, R is missing or absent.

By the same token and from Jones's standpoint, when n is called false gold because it elicits a belief that lacks conformity to a measure (i.e., the supposed fact that n is gold), 'false' is also used in a derived sense. For *not-c,* "x elicits a belief that lacks conformity to a measure," includes not-C, "lacks conformity to a measure," which for Jones is the primary sense of 'false'.

Now it is evident that *not-c* includes and hence depends on not-m. "x elicits a belief that lacks conformity to a measure" includes and hence depends on the idea of lacking conformity to a measure. To apply P once more, then, if *not-c* which hangs on not-C includes *m* which in turn hangs on not-M, then not-C is not the primary sense or definition of 'falsity'. Otherwise, going by P, *not-c* would not include not-m.

From this it follows that 'truth' no more means the conformity of something to a ground or measure than 'goodness' means the tendency of a thing to its end. These are senses of 'true' and 'good' and not the senses of 'truth' and 'goodness'. But then no one correctly defines 'truth' as the conformity of a belief or statement to a fact. For if the conformity of a belief or statement to a fact is not a case of the conformity of something to its ground or measure then nothing is. It follows that M wins out over C as the primary sense or definition of 'truth'. Truth is primarily measure or ground and only derivatively the conformity of measured to measure or grounded to ground. When we mean the latter, the appropriate word to use is 'true' and not 'truth'. And falsity is primarily the absence of measure or ground and only derivatively the lack of conformity to some measure or ground.

Here again, when it concerns the latter, the correct word to use is 'false' and not 'falsity'.

II

It remains to determine whether truth is in minds. If it is, the question is whether the mind is human, suprahuman, or both. Since truth has the nature of a measure, this comes down to asking whether the measures or standards by comparison to which things are called true are in minds or not.

In at least some cases the measure is doubtless mental and the mind is ours. The measuring source of a work of art is some model in the mind of an artist. Having abandoned several false starts, a sculptor calls his latest cut "the true one" only because it conforms to his ideal model. It is true because it conforms to what, for it, is its truth. Here, truth is evidently ideal measure. The ideal exemplar is the truth of its *exemplatum.* So too is it ideal standard in the crafts when products such as boats, houses, furniture, etc., are by craftsmen called true when they conform to their ideal models. This is productive as opposed to artistic truth. Here, the model is again the truth of the product.

Truth, however, is not just in these but in all cases mental model. For suppose that truth is the end of the intellect and that the end of anything is its full realization or good. Suppose further that the function of any intellect is to know. Then it follows that truth is both the good of the intellect and the end or good of knowing. Moreover, since what measures is prior to what is measured, then, other things being equal, knowledge that measures is prior to knowledge that is measured. Therefore the good or full realization of the intellect is knowing that measures things as opposed to knowing that is measured by things. From all this it follows that truth is primarily in intellect as a priori model and measure of things. Thus,

1 Truth is the end of intellect.
2 The end of anything is its full realization or good.
3 So truth is the full realization or good of intellect.

4. But the function of intellect is to know.
5. So truth is the end, good, or full realization of knowing.
6. But knowledge is fully realized when it measures as opposed to being measured by things. Otherwise the measured is prior to the measure.
7. So the end and good of intellect is knowing that is the model and measure *of* things as opposed to knowing that is measured *by* things.
8. Therefore, truth is primarily knowledge in intellect that is the a priori model and measure of things.

What applies to the definition applies to any instance. Hence, truth is ideal model and measure in propositional truth no less than it is in artistic and productive truth. In the truth of propositions, the thing measured is some statement, proposition, or judgment (the difference here makes no difference) and the measure is some fact to which the latter corresponds. The statement "Snow is white" is true because in fact snow is white. The former is patterned after the latter which is its ideal model and measure. Like artifacts, then, statements are called true because they conform to their ideal measures. A fact is the truth of a true statement no less than the plan of Monticello in Jefferson's mind is the truth of Monticello. In propositional truth these standards are objective facts and not subjective models. But in both cases, truth is the model and measure of the true. As artists work for the sake of copying their ideal models, so too do persons judge and make statements for the sake of mirroring the facts. Artists look to their mental models as a guide for what they make with a view to copying those models. Just so do honest persons look to facts as a guide for what they say in order to mirror those facts in language. In both, then, the model or measure functions as final cause.

The difference is that the facts that serve as final causes of statements in propositional truth are not found in our minds. Otherwise in making true statements our intellect always conforms to itself. It is difficult to see in that case how true judgments are distinguished from false ones. For false statements too, when sincerely made, conform to the minds of those who make them. One's false statement that whales are fish conforms to one's belief that whales are fish. It is also difficult, if propositional truth is housed in our minds, to see how solipsism is skirted. For all knowledge of fact is in that case knowledge of self. It follows, therefore, that the fact which is the ground, measure, and model of a true statement exists a priori or *ante rem* in God's mind.

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PLANTINGA ON BELIEF

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ALVIN PLANTINGA'S *Warranted Christian Belief* is an important book about an important subject.[1] During most of the history of analytic philosophy of religion, discussion about the rational grounds for religious belief, or lack thereof, has been understood as discussion of the grounds for belief in the existence of God. It has been pointed out that most believers, philosophers included, do not hold a simple theism independent of any other religious commitment, but rather accept belief in the existence of God as part of belief in a specific religion like Judaism or Christianity. But analytic philosophers have not concentrated on the nature of rational justification for belief in a religion that claims to be revealed.[2] When one of the most eminent analytic philosophers of religion produces a major work on the rational grounding of Christian belief, it is therefore a significant event.

Part of the significance comes from the fact that Plantinga is the Christian philosopher who is best known and respected by the secular philosophical world, at least in English-speaking countries. His views are thus liable to be taken as the best rational defense that Christians can offer for their belief. It is therefore important that Christians evaluate whether or not he succeeds in his aim of showing that Christian belief is reasonable.

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[1] Alvin Plantings, *Warranted Christian Belief* (Oxford: Oxofrd University Press, 2000). Pp. xx + 508. ISBN 0-19-513192-4 (cloth), 0-19-513193-2 (paper). Page numbers in the text refer to this book.

[2] This is not an exceptionless generalization; the principal exception to it is Richard Swinburne, whose work has had the object of giving good reasons for accepting Christian belief. Nonetheless it is broadly true.

I

Plantinga's book builds on his previous two books, *Warrant: The Current Debate* and *Warrant and Proper Function,* which examined and criticized current views on knowledge and justification and argued for his own position on these subjects. His object in *Warranted Christian Belief* is to use the conclusions of these books to address the question of whether Christian belief is rationally acceptable.[3]

He distinguishes between two kinds of objections that can be raised to the rationality of Christian belief. The first kind are *de facto* objections, which assert that some or all Christian beliefs are false. The second are *de jure* objections, which claim that Christian belief lacks rationality in some way (i.e., that it is unjustified, irrational, or unwarranted). His object in the book is to argue that there are no good *de jure* objections to the rationality of Christian belief that do not depend on *de facto* objections.

Before embarking on this task he addresses objections to the view that Christian belief is possible. He argues convincingly against the positions of Gordon Kaufman, John Hick, and (on some interpretations) Immanuel Kant, who have claimed that it is impossible to refer to God or make affirmative predications about him, and hence that Christians cannot hold the beliefs that they purport to hold.

Having dealt with this preliminary issue, Plantinga asks how the *de jure* question is to be understood. He first considers the evidentialist view, as found in John Locke. Evidentialism embodies classical foundationalism and deontologism. Classical foundationalism holds that a belief is acceptable for a person if and only if it is either self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses, or else is believed on the evidential basis of propositions that are acceptable and support it deductively, inductively, or abductively. Classical deontologism holds that we have a moral duty to regulate our beliefs in this way. A belief is justified if the believer has followed this duty in forming it. The *de jure* question for the evidentialist will be whether Christian believers follow their duty by proportioning their belief to the evidence available to them. Plantinga rejects this view of the *de jure* question, because he holds that classical foundationalism can be seen to be false. It is self-refuting, because it is not itself either self-evident, incorrigible, evident to the senses, or based on propositions that are; and it does not fit most of the beliefs that we quite reasonably hold, as for example that the world is round. When classical foundationalism is rejected, it becomes clear that deontologism is inadequate as a basis for posing the *de jure* question. We do have a duty to be responsible in forming our beliefs, but it is clear that an average Christian believer lives up to this duty if he has made reasonable efforts to inform himself about the objections to Christianity and still finds himself sincerely convinced of its truth. If we understand justification in a deontological sense, as meaning satisfaction of our duties towards the truth, it is obvious that Christian belief can be justified. The *de jure* question ought not therefore to be understood as asking whether belief is justified in this sense, because the answer is too easy.

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[3] By Christian belief he means what is common to the great creeds of the main branches of the Christian church.

We approach a right formulation of the question when we look at the objections to belief given by Freud and Marx. Freud sees religious belief as resulting from wish-fulfilment, and Marx sees it as resulting from a perverted world view that is produced by a perverted social order. Both these objections, in Plantinga's view, amount to the complaint that belief lacks warrant. Warrant is the property that distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief, if it is present in sufficient amounts. The right *de jure* question to ask about Christian belief is whether it lacks warrant. Plantinga here makes use of the account of warrant he has developed in his two previous books. A belief is warranted, in his view, when it is produced by cognitive faculties that are aimed at truth, and that are functioning properly according to a good design plan in an environment for which they have been designed. A design plan specifies a way of working that subserves the purpose of a thing; it is a good plan if a thing achieves its purpose when working according to that plan.

In attempting to answer this *de jure* question, Plantinga distinguishes between belief in God's existence and belief in the teachings of the gospel. He offers a model of how we might come to have warranted belief in God's existence, which he calls the Aquinas/Calvin (A/C) model because of its supposed resemblance to the views of those thinkers. He then extends this model to give an account of belief in the gospel. He explains how these models satisfy the conditions for warrant that he has set out, and considers arguments against their providing warrant. The proposal of these models is not intended to show that Christian belief actually is fully warranted, since that would mean establishing that it is true and hence going beyond the *de jure* question; it is only meant to show how such belief could be warranted, and to establish that if Christian belief is true then it probably is warranted.

Plantinga claims that Aquinas and Calvin agree that there is a natural knowledge of God. He cites *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 38, and *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 2, a.1, ad 2 for Aquinas's position, but bases his model on Calvin's account. He uses Calvin's term *sensus divinitatis* to name the cognitive faculty that, on this model, produces belief in God in humans. The *sensus divinitatis* is a faculty that belongs to humans by nature. The belief in God that it produces is basic; it is not inferred from other beliefs.[4] Certain circumstances trigger the operation of the *sensus divinitatis.* It takes these circumstances as input, and produces as output belief in God. An example of such a circumstance would be an experience of the glories in nature, which would produce in us the belief that there is a God who has created them. These circumstances are not reasons for the belief in God produced by the *sensus divinitatis;* they are occasions of its formation. Belief produced by the *sensus divinitatis* is properly basic with respect to justification, in that a person is not behaving irresponsibly in

[4] Plantinga thinks that it is possible to establish that God exists using inference from other beliefs that are known, but this is not, he says, how the *sensus divinitatis* works.

believing in God in this way. Most importantly, belief produced by the *sensus divinitatis* is warranted. The purpose of the *sensus divinitatis* is to enable us to have true beliefs about God-that is why he created us with it. When it functions properly, it produces true beliefs about God. So, the belief it produces is warranted.

One is naturally inclined to ask why not everyone holds true beliefs about God, if we all possess the *sensus divinitatis* by nature. Plantinga holds that its operation is impeded by sin, which interferes with or even suppresses its functioning, and makes us unwilling to accept its deliverances. This sin is original as well as personal. God's remedy for human sin and its effects is given in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. He needed to inform us about this plan of salvation, which he did through a three-part process. The first part is the production of the Bible, which informs us about this plan, and has God himself as principal author. The second is the sending of the Holy Spirit, which repairs the ravages of sin in our hearts. The chief effect of this sending is the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit, which produces the third part, faith. Faith involves both mind and will. Its intellectual aspect is knowledge of God's plan of salvation. The part of the will in faith is both affective (loving and being grateful to God) and executive (accepting the offered gift of salvation and committing one's self to the Lord).

The internal instigation of the Holy Spirit, unlike the *sensus divinitatis,* does not belong to humans by nature. Rather, it is the result of a supernatural divine intervention, which is made necessary by sin.[5] The belief in the gospel produced by the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit is basic, not the result of inference. It is properly basic, and thus warranted, because the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit has the function of producing true beliefs, operates in an appropriate cognitive environment, and succeeds in carrying out its function.

Plantinga does not think that ordinary human faculties can produce warranted belief in the gospel, because the historical

[5] Plantinga differs here from Aquinas, who thinks that faith is an essentially supernatural grace that surpasses the power of any created being, and hence that grace would have been necessary for faith even in unfallen man.

evidence for the Bible's being divinely inspired is too weak. He considers the claim that there are defeaters for the beliefs produced by the *sensus divinitatis* and the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit. The principal candidates for such defeaters are the findings of contemporary biblical scholarship, the positions of postmodernism and pluralism, and the existence of suffering and evil in the world. He argues that none of these candidates can succeed in defeating Christian belief, and concludes that there are no good *de jure* objections to such belief. The question of whether such belief is in fact true is beyond the scope of philosophy, whose role is merely to clear away obstacles to faith.

II

Plantinga's substantial book contains many valuable discussions that cannot be considered here. But his main positions, which are sketched out above, must be judged wanting, for both philosophical and theological reasons.

A) Sensus divinitatis

Two problems arise for his account of the *sensus divinitatis*. The first is whether such a thing really exists; the second is whether, if it exists, it can be said to provide knowledge.

The idea of an intuitive, non-inferential knowledge of the existence of God or gods is originally a pagan one. In Cicero's *De natura deorum,* the Epicurean Velleius asserts that

> [Epicurus] alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom, or law, but rests on the unanimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them [intelligi necesse est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatus cognitionis habemus].[6]

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[6] Cicero, *De natura deorum,* tr. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb, 1933), 45-47. Epicurus describes these innate notions by the Greek term npOATJIJllt;.

One may speculate that Calvin was influenced by Greek sources in devising his notion of the *sensus divinitatis.* [7] Aquinas, unlike Calvin (and in spite of Plantinga's talk of an "Aquinas/Calvin model"), did not accept the idea of a basic knowledge of God of the kind that Plantinga postulates. This was probably a conscious rejection, since he had read the *De natura deorum.* He did think that we have a confused innate knowledge of God through having an innate grasp of the concepts of being, truth, and goodness, but this is not a knowledge that Plantinga-who denies that God is identical with being, truth, or goodness-could accept. The natural knowledge of God to which Aquinas refers in *ScG* III, c. 38, is not a basic belief, but the result of inference from the order observable in nature.

The trouble with the claim that there is such a thing as the *sensus divinitatis,* which is a part of human nature and gives us a correct understanding of God, is that such a correct understanding is not to be found among humans generally. The only people who have held a conception of God that Plantinga would accept as more or less accurate have been those who belonged to religions that were based on or influenced by God's revelation to the Jews, and (questionably) a few who have arrived at a right view of God through lengthy philosophical investigation. If the *sensus divinitatis* really exists, why is it that every instance of a correct understanding of God can be explained as due to a cause other than its operation? Why are there no examples of its undoubtedly working on its own? This fact makes the idea of the *sensus divinitatis* doubtful.

Plantinga might reply that those people who are not Christians, Muslims, Jews, or philosophers do not have an adequate knowledge of God because in them the operations of the *sensus divinitatis* are corrupted by sin. But a large proportion of people who have correct beliefs about God live lives that are devoted to serious sin. It thus cannot be the case that sin invariably distorts or silences the *sensus divinitatis.* It can only be said to do so for the majority of sinners, while the sense is able to operate for a substantial minority. Why is it then that outside the group of philosophers and believers in theistic religions, there is no such minority?

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[7] Probably Stoic rather than Epicurean; he was interested in Stoicism, and translated some of Seneca's works. For a discussion of Seneca's views on innate knowledge of God, see Myrto Dragona-Monachou, The *StoicArgt4ments for the Existence and the Providence of the Gods* (Athens, 1976), 185££.; and Seneca, *Letters* 41, 90, 120.

The sorts of innate knowledge of God postulated by Aquinas and Epicurus would not suffice for Plantinga's *sensus divinitatis,* because the knowledge of God given by the *sensus divinitatis* is supposed to be a religiously sufficient one, which provides us with the information we need to enter into a proper relationship with God. A necessary component of such knowledge would be that it enables us to distinguish between God and created things, thus making it possible for us to keep the second commandment.[8] Epicurus's conception, which says that there are many gods, obviously will not do this.

Moreover, the account of God that Plantinga provides, and that he would presumably hold to be furnished by the *sensus divinitatis,* is not religiously adequate. Plantinga's own account of God fails to distinguish adequately between God and creation, because he rejects the doctrine of divine impassibility. His characterization of this doctrine is partly mistaken, because he thinks that it excludes God's feeling joy or delight, but he sees rightly that it excludes God's suffering, longing, or desire. He insists by contrast that God can and does suffer, and experiences longing and desire. In doing so, he attributes to God properties that are incompatible with the divine nature, and that can only exist in creatures.[9] He defends his rejection of this doctrine by claiming that it is incompatible with the Scriptures, which attribute these properties to God (319). This scriptural argument is insufficient. There are a few passages in the Scriptures that could be said to ascribe suffering to God if taken literally, but there are also many more passages that describe him as feeling hatred, fury, and vengeance. We do not and cannot take the latter passages at face value, so Plantinga cannot demand that we take the former ones at face value without further consideration. Such consideration shows that we ought not to think that God literally suffers. God is infinitely good, and enjoys infinite happiness and bliss. The evils on account of which Plantinga claims that God suffers are evils that occur in the world, and hence finite, although enormous. God can feel either a finite or an infinite suffering on account of these evils. An infinite suffering over finite evils would be infinitely disproportionate, so God would not feel it. But finite suffering would make no difference to a being already enjoying infinite bliss, and thus would not matter to God; it would be pointless and unimportant. But suffering that is unimportant will not do for Plantinga, because the whole point of divine suffering, for him, is that it *is* of account to God. The attribution of suffering to God results from a certain anthropomorphism on Plantinga's part, from neglecting to think of God as the infinite and perfect being that he is. It is deeply perverse to insist that suffering must be found in the source of all joy, goodness, beauty, and love.

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[8] Here I am following Peter Geach in his "On Worshipping the Right God," in *God and the Soul* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).

' This point could also be made about his *Does God Have a Nature?* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), where he maintains that there is composition in God, but I will confine myself to discussing the assertions about God that he makes in the book under review.

There is however a more serious argument against divine impassibility that could be extracted from Plantinga's remarks on faith (319ff.). He rightly says that the love of God involved in faith resembles God's own love. He might argue thus: possession of saving faith involves a certain participation in the divine nature; the love involved in faith includes an element of longing and desire; therefore, the divine nature includes an element of longing and desire. But this argument is invalid, because it does not include the premise that the longing and desire involved in faith is part of what makes this faith a participation in the divine nature. This premise will not be accepted by those who hold a traditional view of the divine nature. They will point out that although some kinds of love involve longing for an absent good, other kinds involve enjoyment of a good possessed, and it is the presence of a love of God of the latter sort that makes faith a participation in the divine nature. This love is brought about by the fact that in saving faith we possess the good of God's friendship through charity. The longing for God felt by those who have faith reflects the fact that their participation in the divine nature has not been brought to fulfilment. In Heaven, where it is brought to fulfilment, this participation is greater, but all longing is replaced by enjoyment. We cannot therefore say that participation in the divine nature includes longing and desire.

The existence of the *sensus divinitatis* is thus doubtful. But even if it were to exist, it would not provide us with knowledge of God's existence. The difficulty with claiming that the *sensus divinitatis* provides knowledge can be seen from the following example. Suppose God creates a person S with a mental constitution that causes S to come noninferentially to believe, whenever he meets a man with blue eyes, that that man is an used-car salesman. God arranges that all the blue-eyed men in S's vicinity are used-car salesmen, and whenever S meets a blue-eyed man, he forms his belief accordingly. (To avoid confusing the issue, suppose that he never gets independent evidence of these men being used-car salesmen.) God forms S's mental constitution and arranges S's environment in this way in order to bring it about that S forms a true belief about the used-car-salesman status of the particular blue-eyed men that he meets. S's belief would be exactly parallel to the belief in God produced by the *sensus divinitatis,* and it would be warranted and constitute knowledge in Plantinga's view, because it is true, results from the operation of a design plan aimed at true belief that is operating in the environment for which it is designed, and its design plan is a good design plan for the environment in which it is designed, indeed a perfect one since it can never produce false belief. But obviously S's belief would not in fact be knowledge, and would not even be reasonable.

Connected with this counterexample is a flaw in Plantinga's general view of knowledge and warrant. He confuses the purpose a thing has with the motivation for bringing it into existence that prompted the person who made it. If we allow that things have functions or purposes by their nature, we cannot identify these two. Suppose, for example, that an orange-growing company uses genetic engineering to create a species of insects that will destroy all orange trees except the strain of tree that they have specially developed. The company's motivation for creating the species will be to make money, but the natural purpose of the insects will not be to make money for the company; it will be to live and reproduce, as with all breeds of animal. It is thus illegitimate to infer, as Plantinga does, that because the *sensus divinitatis* and the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit were supposedly created by God so that they could provide us with true beliefs, they therefore have this function by nature.

B) Internal Instigation of the Holy Spirit

Evaluating Plantinga's conception of the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit is less straightforward than evaluating his conception of the *sensus divinitatis.* This is because he does not really have a single consistent position on the nature of the former. Rather, he expresses two different positions, which are of different merit.

The difference lies in whether or not Christian faith is belief in God's testimony. On the one hand, Plantinga frequently asserts that it is. He states,

> On the model, there is both scripture and the divine activity leading to human belief. God himself (on the model) is the principal author of Scripture. Scripture is most importantly a message, a communication from God to humankind: scripture is a word from the Lord. But then this just is a special case of the pervasive process of testimony, by which, as a matter of fact, we learn most of what we know.[10]

Elsewhere Plantinga says something different about the way in which we come to believe. He describes an encounter with the Scriptures, or with a report of what is said by the Scriptures, as an *occasion* for belief, rather than as furnishing reason for belief. He asserts that when we read Scripture or are told of it, or in some other way encounter a scriptural teaching,

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[10] Plantinga, *Warranted Christian Belief,* 251.

> What is said simply seems right; it seems compelling; one finds oneself saying 'Yes, that's right, that's the truth of the matter; this is indeed the word of the Lord.' I read 'God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself'; I come to think: 'Right; that's true; God really was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself!' And I may also think something a bit different, something *about* that proposition: that it is a divine teaching or revelation, that in Calvin's words it is 'from God'. What one hears or reads seems clearly and obviously true and (at any rate in paradigm cases) seems also to be something the Lord is intending to teach.[11]

Here, faith is described as being produced by something other than belief in God's testimony. It is simply an immediate conviction of the truth of the Christian message. Plantinga does not clearly say whether or not this immediate conviction and the recognition that the message is from God can both be said to give rise to belief in the Christian message, but he implies in some passages that it is the immediate conviction that produces belief, not the recognition of its divine origin, and that this recognition is a concomitant of belief in the message rather than a ground for it. He says,

> [Calvin] does not mean to say, I think (at any rate this is not how the model goes), that the Holy Spirit induces belief in the proposition *the Bible* (or the book of Job, or Paul's epistles, or the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians) *comes to us from the very mouth of God.* Rather, upon reading or hearing a given teaching-a given item from the great things of the gospel-the Holy Spirit teaches us, causes us to believe that *that* teaching is both true and comes from God. So the structure here is not: what is taught in Scripture is true; *this* (e.g., that in Christ, God was reconciling the world to himself) is taught in Scripture; therefore, this is true. It is rather that, on reading or hearing a certain teaching *t*, one forms the belief that *t*, that very teaching, is true and from God.[12]

It is quite right to deny that belief arising from accepting someone's testimony is produced by inference,[13] and thus it is true that belief in God's testimony will be a basic belief (and a properly basic belief, since it will be believing someone who is knowledgeable and truthful). But Plantinga, in asserting in the above passage that the belief involved in faith is properly basic, does not seem to have in mind the proper basicality that belongs to belief in the testimony of a truthful knowledgeable person. Rather, this proper basicality attaches to the immediate conviction that believers possess of the truth of the great things of the gospel. Since in this immediate conviction the Holy Spirit causes us to believe that the teachings of the gospel are true, the conviction that God teaches these things cannot form part of our grounds for believing in their truth, because this belief has already been produced by the immediate conviction.

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[11] Ibid., 250.

[12] Ibid., 260.

[13] For argument supporting this position, see C. A. J. Coady, *Testimony: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

We may call these two different accounts of how Christian faith is produced the testimony account and the immediate-conviction account. The immediate-conviction account is not a tenable one; it is open to a number of insuperable objections.

First, it does not explain why faith should constitute knowledge or reasonable belief. Why should the fact that believers have immediate conviction of the truth of their beliefs make this conviction reasonable? Many people have firm unshakable convictions that are completely unwarranted. Plantinga would presumably reply that this immediate conviction is rational and provides knowledge because it is produced by the inner inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and a conviction so produced satisfies the conditions he has laid down for a belief to be warranted. It is brought about by God, our designer, with the purpose of getting us to believe truths, and operates in the environment-hearing the truths of the gospel announced to us-in which it is designed to operate; and since it is brought about by God it cannot fail in achieving its purpose.

But the counterexample to Plantinga's account of the *sensus divinitatis* that is given above also shows that the immediate conviction that he describes as giving rise to faith would produce irrational belief. The production of S's belief about the blue-eyed man being an used car salesman happens in the same way as the production of belief in Christian teaching does on the immediate-conviction account. Since S's belief is irrational, Christian belief would be irrational as well if it was formed in the way the immediate-conviction account describes.

Second, most Christians have as a matter of faith held that Christian faith rests on belief in God's testimony. Why would God produce or allow this conviction, if-as the immediate-conviction account implies-it is mistaken?

Third, Christians disagree over important matters of faith. Why would such disagreements exist, if God immediately produces belief in the truths of the gospel in the minds of Christian believers? And how, on the immediate-conviction view, can these disagreements be resolved, if the basis for faith is simply a feeling of conviction that is held by believers on all sides of such disputes?

One reply to this objection might be that most Christians do not disagree over important matters of faith; they agree on the essentials of faith, and only disagree over nonessentials. But this is not so. One example among very many would be over the permissibility of divorce for Christians. Roman Catholics hold that Christ's teaching absolutely forbids divorce between baptized Christians, and that a Christian who divorces his or her Christian spouse and marries someone else commits adultery. Other Christians hold that it is indeed permissible for Christians to divorce. Another example is the doctrine of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. If Christ is really physically present in the Eucharist, it is obligatory to worship the Eucharistic elements as divine; but if he is not, such worship will be idolatry.

Another reply would be that disagreement is due to sin on the part of people who hold wrong beliefs about the faith, and that the way to make sure that one's convictions about faith are the right ones is to refrain from sinning. I do not want to deny that disagreements over the content of the faith are sometimes, even often, the result of mistaken beliefs about faith, when the existence of these beliefs is due to the sin of the believer. But it is unreasonable to say that this is always the case. It is dangerous as well, because it tends to give rise to the following line of thought. If sin is the only explanation for mistaken belief, it must be that everyone who holds a mistaken belief does so out of sin. Since sin deserves punishment, it follows that those who hold mistaken beliefs deserve to be punished. On the contrary, history teaches us that people can hold mistaken views about the teachings of the Christian faith in complete innocence.

Plantinga could (and I suspect would) hold that the way to settle doubts or disputes about the faith is by appealing to the Scriptures, whose content believers accept as being spoken by God. But any answer that will emerge from such an appeal will be accepted because it is spoken by God, and therefore not because of immediate conviction, which is incompatible with his immediate-conviction understanding of faith.

For these reasons the immediate-conviction account should be rejected. Such a rejection would actually improve Plantinga's view of faith, because he would then be left with his testimony account, according to which God speaks in the Scriptures and the inner action of the Holy Spirit leads us to recognize and believe this speech. This account is simply the position of Christian tradition on this subject. It is not affected by the problems with his theory of warrant and knowledge, because he does not need this theory in order to say that testimony provides us with knowledge; we know that testimony can be a source of knowledge, independently of any philosophical theorizing about what knowledge is.[14]

Plantinga's testimony account suffers nevertheless from both a negative and a positive flaw. The negative flaw is that he does not explain how the Holy Spirit enables us to recognize and believe God's speech in the Scriptures. He may have intended the immediate-conviction account to serve that purpose, but it does not do so.

The positive flaw is that for him believing God when he speaks is a component of the virtue of Christian faith, rather than the whole of the virtue. (We should distinguish between believing God when he speaks, and believing what God says.[15] One can believe a proposition that is asserted by God, without believing it because we are trusting God's testimony; the latter is the sort of belief involved in Christian faith.) The full virtue, on Plantinga's view, the virtue possession of which means that the person who possesses it is justified (in the religious rather than the epistemic sense), consists in belief plus something else. The something else is an act of the will that is different from the act of believing God when he speaks (e.g., love of God, a feeling of trusting confidence in Christ's redemptory work, living a good life, or a combination of all of these).

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[14] See ibid.

ts On this see Elizabeth Anscombe, "What It Is to Believe Someone," in C.F. Delaney, ed., *Rationality and Religious Belief* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979).

The trouble with such a conception is that the aspects of faith that redeem us and make us acceptable to God turn out all to be concentrated in the something else. Someone who loves God and lives a good life is by that very fact saved and acceptable to God. Since the redeeming aspects of faith are separate from belief in God's testimony, whence comes the use or necessity of such belief for our redemption?[16] The only function that belief can have in our salvation, on this view, is an instrumental one, that of being helpful or necessary for the achievement of the plus-component-as, for example, by providing us with information that we require in order to perform the actions that will bring about our salvation. This is how Plantinga seems to think of it.

But this view of the function of belief is not consonant with the Scriptures. The Scriptures praise belief *itself,* not just actions that we perform as a result of believing God or concomitantly with believing God. Not only is belief itself praised, it is described as bringing about our salvation. The noun 'faith' (tnOTl<;) and the verb 'to believe' (tnOTEUW) have more than one sense in the New Testament. In some cases, 'faith' refers to something other than the act of believing someone's testimony (as for example Rom 3:3, where tno-n<; describes God's trustworthiness rather than the act of believing); and there are many cases where it could be disputed whether mun c; should be understood as the act of believing testimony. There are, however, many passages where it clearly means trusting someone's testimony.[17] The absence of belief of the latter kind is blamed, while its presence is praised. Clear instances of blame are found in Mark and 1 John. In Luke 24:25, Christ rebukes the disciples for not having believed what the prophets had spoken. 1John5:10 states "He who does not believe in God has made him a liar, because he has not believed in the testimony that God has borne to his Son."

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[16] Luther made this criticism in rejecting the possibility of a formless infused faith. Commenting on Galatians 5:6, he said that "the sophists [sc. the scholastic theologians) ... say that even when faith has been divinely infused-and I am not even speaking of faith that is merely acquired-it does not justify unless it has been formed by love.... They even declare that an infused faith can coexist with mortal sin. In this manner they completely transfer justificationfrom faith and attribute it solely to love as thus defined" (Luther, *Works,* vol. 27 [Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1964), 28). Luther's criticism should not he confused with his rejection of formless faith on the grounds that all infused faith must justify; the two criticisms of formless faith are distinct.

Belief in God's testimony is described by St. Paul in his letter to the Romans as a worthy act that brings God's favor. Paul says that Abraham was justified on account of his believing God when God promised that Sarah would bear a child in her old age, and that he would have many descendants: "In hope he believed against hope, that he should become the father of many nations; as he had been told, 'So shall your descendants be'. . . . No distrust made him waver concerning the promise of God, but he grew strong in his faith as he gave glory to God, fully convinced that God was able to do as he had promised. That was why his faith was 'reckoned to him as righteousness'" (Rom 4:18, 20-22 [RSV]). Paul makes the same point in Galatians: "Let me ask you only this: Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law, or by hearing with faith? ... Does he who supplies the Spirit to you and works miracles among you do so by works of law, or by hearing with faith? Thus Abraham 'believed God, and it was reckoned to him as righteousness'" (Gal 3:2, 5-6.)

Advocates of a 'belief-plus' conception of the Christian virtue of faith have sometimes tried to square their views with the Pauline texts cited above by interpreting the faith referred to in them as being something more than simply believing God when he speaks. But this interpretation does unacceptable violence to these texts. It is clear in the passage from Romans cited above, for example, that Paul is saying that Abraham was justified by the simple act of believing God's promise to him. Texts like those in James 2:27, which state that "faith without works is dead," do not provide support for a 'belief-plus' conception. The fact that committing sin deprives faith of its salvific value does not mean that faith is not the sole cause of salvation when sin is absent.

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[17] Examples include Matt 9:28-29; Mark 13:21, 16:11-13; Luke 22:67; John 2:22, 3:12, 4:21, 4:50, 5:24, 5:46, 8:46-47, 10:24-25; Acts 8:12, 27:25; Rom 10:16-17; 2Thess1:10; 2 Tim 1:12; 1John5:10.

The claim that faith on its own justifies us might be met with the objection that charity on its own justifies us, and that charity is distinct from faith. The answer to this objection is that charity is a love, and love is exercised in acts. As Aquinas conceived it, formed faith, the faith that justifies, does not consist in choosing to believe God when he speaks and also in a separate act of choosing to love God in himself above all created things. Rather, in formed faith there is only one act, the act of choosing to believe God; and the love of God is what motivates this act. That is how Aquinas's view of faith avoids a 'belief-plus' view. For him, formed faith is an act of charity. It is moreover a privileged act of charity, because it is the act that opens the door to all other acts of charity. For Christians, faith is the first act of charity, upon which all other acts of charity are built, and without which no charity is possible.[18]

These criticisms of Plantinga should not be taken to mean that his book fails in its stated goal of showing that there is no *de jure* objection to Christian belief that is independent of *de facto* objections. He succeeds in this simply by pointing out that if Christian belief is true, it probably is warranted. (This is not hard to establish, since on most construals of faith it is part of Christian faith that faith is warranted.) But his ambitious attempt to show *how* it could be warranted does not work out. His failure to show that belief in God's existence is properly basic is not of much consequence from a believer's point of view, since, as he remarks, there are lots of sound arguments available to justify such belief. His failure to show how the Holy Spirit can enable us to recognize that God is speaking is a more serious theological and apologetic shortcoming. It is but justice, however, to recognize that he fails where previous Christian thinkers have generally not succeeded.

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[18] Although Aquinas avoids the positive flaw in Plantiuga's account of faith, he shares the negative flaw. He does not explain how the Holy Spirit brings us to recognize and believe God's speaking.

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FOR THE CHURCH AND WITHIN THE CHURCH: PRIESTLY REPRESENTATION

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SOME RECENT ARTICLES that have summarized the state of current research on the subject of priestly representation have come to the conclusion that the priest is capable of acting in the person of Christ the Head because he first represents the Church.[1] These articles have drawn from David Coffey's 1997 essay on the common and the ordained priesthood.[2] The work of Coffey has proved to be an important one for theologians interested in the theology of priestly representation. What has been lacking until now is any study of whether his central claims are well founded.

Coffey's article aimed at developing a pneumatological understanding of the priesthood of Christ, and what Coffey calls the "priesthood of the Church" as a "distinct category," in the interest of reaching a new clarity with regard to the relation of the ordained and the common priesthood.[3] In the course of his article, one of the conclusions that Coffey reaches is that there is a priority of the ecclesial to the Christological in the priestly representation of Christ's Headship. To represent Christ as Head is primarily the ability to represent the *totus Christus,* the Head and members.[4] This conclusion is undergirded, it seems to me, by two claims Coffey makes in his 1997 essay. These amount to the following: (1) Vatican II wrongly assumed the ordained priesthood could be understood directly in Christological terms and thus gave the mistaken impression that the common priesthood was understandable first in ecclesiological terms,[5] and (2) if the ordained priesthood is understood immediately in terms of the Headship of Christ, then the priest appears as above the Church or apart from the Church.[6] In other words, if the ordained priesthood is understood first in terms of a new configuration to Christ, then the priest is elevated to some position outside of the rest of the Church. As a consequence, the rest of the baptized, though called priestly and regarded as "members" of Christ, are effectively envisioned as "other" than Christ, that is, "simply" the Church.

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[1] Most notably Thomas Rausch, "Priestly Identity: Priority of Representation and the Iconic Argument," *Worship* 73 (March 1999): 169-79; see also Paul Philibert, "Issues for a Theology of Priesthood: A Status Report," in *The Theology of Priesthood,* ed. Donald Goergen and Ann Garrido (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 2000): 30-31. Both Rausch and Philibert draw on an earlier essay by David Coffey, "PriesdyRepresentation and Women's Ordination," in *Priesthood: The Hard Questions,* ed. Gerald P. Gleeson (Newtown, New South Wales, Australia: E.J. Dwyer, 1992): 79-99.

[2] David Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," *Theological Studies* 58 Uune 1997): 209-36.

[3] Ibid., 213.

I will limit my criticism to these two central claims and the conclusions that Coffey deduces from them. I maintain that these claims cannot be reconciled with the council documents and the intentions of the council fathers as evidenced in the official *Acta.* Furthermore they are not congruent with how recent Church teaching has interpreted Vatican II. Sara Butler[7] and Samuel Aquila[8] have shown how crucial it is to consult the *Acta* in order to interpret Vatican II's teaching on the ordained priesthood and priestly representation. The *Acta* of a council is of prime importance in determining what a council intended to teach and why it intended to teach what it did.[9] A careful reading shows that Vatican II affirmed a Christological priority for both the common and the ordained priesthoods while strongly asserting the ecclesiological dimensions of both priesthoods. Far from separating the ordained priesthood from the Church, the council envisioned it as something for the Church but within the Church-a visible sign of Christ the Head who fills up his Church with life.

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[4] Ibid. He also comes to this conclusion in his earlier essay "Priestly Representation and Women's Ordination," 88.

[5] Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 211.

[6] Ibid., 235.

[7] Sara Butler, "Priestly Identity: 'Sacrament' of Christ the Head," *Worship* 70 (July 1996): 290-306.

[8] Samuel Aquila, *The Teaching of Vatican II on "In Persona Christi" and "In Nomine Ecclesiae" in Relation to the Ministerial Priesthood in the Light of the Historical Development of the Formulae* (Licentiate tessina, Pontificium Athenaeum Anselmianum, Rome, 1990).

Lay persons are presented in the documents of Vatican II not as passive recipients of Christ's activity but as active participants in his threefold office. It is through this participation that the baptized mediate Christ's gift in their own way. The baptized, united with Christ and made sharers in his priesthood in their own condition, must carry out his threefold office in the Church and in the world. The priesthood of the baptized is not a matter of simple union with Christ or simple belonging to Christ because the common priesthood is ordered to mission.

This essay will unfold in five parts. First, I will compare the idea that the priest acts *in persona Christi capitis* because he first acts in the name of the Church with recent Church teaching after Vatican II, especially *Pastores dabo vobis,* Pope John Paul II's 1992 postsynodal apostolic exhortation.[10] Second, I will give a brief description of Coffey's position. Third, in the longest part, I will show how Coffey's interpretation of Vatican II's teaching on the ordained priesthood and the common priesthood cannot be sustained. Fourth, I will show that what Vatican II teaches concerning the priest representing the Headship of Christ does not somehow place the priest apart from or above the Church.

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[9] Francis A. Sullivan, S.J., *Creative Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of the Magisterium* (New York and Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1996), 170. Sullivan observes "One of 'the norms of theological interpretation' is that very often considerable light can be shed on the intentions of a Council from the study of its *acta.* In the case of Vatican II, the interpreter has available the thirty volumes of the *Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Conciliii Oecumenici Vaticani Secundi,* in which to follow the progress of any text through the Council."

[10] This exhortation was issued after the Eighth Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops (1990), which treated the topic of the formation of priests.

Last, I will conclude with a summary of my argument and a suggestion for the direction of further research.

I. PRIESTLY REPRESENTATION AND RECENT CHURCH TEACHING

A number of theologians hold that there is a priority of the ecclesial over the Christological in priestly representation.[11] These theologians contend that a priest can act *in persona Christi* because he first acts *in persona ecclesiae.*

It should be pointed out that recent magisterial teachings-by both the ordinary universal magisterium[12] and the papal magisterium[13]-have taught the opposite. The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* teaches that "It is because the ministerial priesthood represents Christ that it can represent the Church."[14] While strongly affirming that reference to the Church is necessary in defining priestly identity, *Pastores dabo vobis* teaches that there is a Christological priority in the ordained priesthood. It explains, in its second chapter, that

> The priest's relation to the Church is inscribed in the very relation which the priest has to Christ, such that the "sacramental representation" to Christ serves as the basis and inspiration for the relation of the priest to the Church.... And so the priest, on account of his very nature and sacramental mission, appears in the structure of the Church as a sign of the absolute priority and gratuity of that grace which is conferred by the risen Christ on the Church.[15]

At the same time, one of the strengths of *Pastores dabo vobis* is its statement that the nature and the mission of the ministerial priesthood must be defined in light of the "multiple and rich interconnection of relationships which arise from the Blessed Trinity and are prolonged in the communion of the Church, a sign and instrument of Christ, of communion with God and of the unity of all humanity."[16] In the light of this, it must be admitted that those theologians who are not convinced by the Church's teaching on the priority of the Christological dimension for priestly representation nevertheless share an important concern with recent magisterial teaching: that the ordained priest is not be understood or seen as existing apart from the Church.[17]

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[11] For example, Susan Wood, "Priestly Identity: Sacrament of the Ecclesial Community," *Worship* 69 (March 1995): 109-27; Rausch "Priestly Identity"; Paul Philibert, "Issues for a Theology of Priesthood"; David Power, "Representing Christ in Community and Sacrament," in *Being a Priest Today* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 97-123.

[12] For example, *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* 1553.

[13] Most recently, *Pastores dabo vobis;* Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Declaration on the Question of the Admission of Women to the Ministerial Priesthood" *(Inter insignores)* (1976) promulgated during the pontificate of Paul VI; and Pope Pius XII's encyclical *Mediator Dei* (1947).

[14] *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* 1553.

[15] *Pastores dabo vobis* 16 (translation mine). For the Latin text see *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 84 (1992): 682.

Pastores dabo vobis also states that the synod's summary of the nature and mission of the ordained priesthood-which the second chapter of *Pastores dabo vobis* itself claims to summarize-is a faithful presentation of the council's teaching.[18] If this is true, it is hard to see how the idea that the priest can act *in persona Christi* because he can first act *in persona ecclesiae* can be reconciled with the teaching of Vatican II.

II. COFFEY ON THE PRIORITY OF PRIESTLY REPRESENTATION

Coffey is of the opinion that Vatican II left us with the mistaken impression that the ordained priesthood is Christological, while the common priesthood, rooted in baptism and communicating an orientation to worship, is ecclesiological.[19] He makes this claim on the basis of what he thinks are the pneumatological and ecclesiological dimensions of the common and ordained priesthood. He argues that *Presbyterorum ordinis* 2, which speaks of the priest as acting in the person of Christ the Head, "assumes" that the ordained priesthood should be understood immediately in Christological terms. Subsequent magisterial documents, he says, make the same assumption.[20] However, according to Coffey deeper reflection shows that this. assumption is mistaken. The Headship of Christ is an ecclesial function and can only be exercised in the Church. In Coffey's words: "therefore statements about it, even one invoking Christ the priest, whether they be magisterial or simply theological are directly ecclesiological and only indirectly Christological."[21] Similarly, Coffey says that the common priesthood is directly ecclesiological and indirectly Christological because the common priesthood "is that of the members of the Mystical Body" and the Mystical Body is the Church.[22] Each priesthood "possesses properly an ecclesiological nature"[23] because "they exist and operate as God's gifts to the Church,"[24] albeit as different and distinct gifts. Both forms of priesthood, however, do have "Christ's priesthood as their ontological ground."[25]

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[16] *Pastores dabo vobis* 12 (Eng. trans. from *Origins* 21 (16 April 1992]).

[17] *Pastores dabo vobis* 16 also states that the ordained priesthood "arises with the Church" and that "Consequently, the ordained priesthood ought not to be thought of as existing prior to the Church, because it is totally at the service of the Church. Nor should it be considered as posterior to the ecclesial community, as if the Church could be imagined as already established without this priesthood" (Eng. trans. from *Origins).*

[18] The Pope refers here to the summary of the work of the synod collected in the "propositions" that were forwarded to him at the conclusion of the synod.

[19] Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 211-12 and 235.

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[20] Ibid., 211.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid. Coffey tries to correct Vatican II with *Mediator Dei.* He cites the following English translation by the Catholic Truth Society of *Mediator Dei,* no. 88: "by reason of their baptism Christians are in the Mystical Body and become by a common title members of Christ the Priest; by the character that is graven upon their souls they are appointed to the worship of God, and therefore, according to their condition, share in the priesthood of Christ himself." Coffey interprets this to mean that the encyclical makes an ecclesiological statement about the faithful-by baptism they are members of the Body of Christ-and infers from it the Christological statement that the faithful are members of Christ the Priest. This passage of the encyclical, in the eyes of Coffey, gives an unambiguous ecclesiological reference for the common priesthood--one that Vatican II did not embrace as a conclusion. The serious problem with this claim is that Coffey relies on a faulty English translation. It only partially translates the phrase "generali titulo christiani in Mystico Corpore mernbra effi.ciuntur Christi sacerdotis." The original Latin text does not allow a disjunction between the Mystical Body and Christ the Priest. Rather according to *Mediator Dei* baptism makes the faithful members of the Mystical Body *of Christ the Priest.* The American English translation in the Vatican Library translation series released by the National Catholic Welfare Office (Washington D.C., 1947) is more faithful to the Latin: "By the waters of Baptism, as by common right, Christians are made members of the Mystical Body of Christ the Priest, and by the 'character' which is imprinted on their souls, they are appointed to give worship to God. Thus they participate, according to their condition, in the priesthood of Christ." For a similar translation see Gerald Ellard, *Encyclical Letter Mediator Dei of Pius XII* (New York: America Press, 1948), 44. See also, Gerald Treacy, *Mediator Dei on the Sacred Liturgy* (New York: Paulist Press, 1948), 41. There is nothing in the encyclical that somehow places the Mystical Body in an antecedent position to Christ the Priest. Furthermore, Coffey's interpretation seems to require us to think that the encyclical supposes the sacramental character of baptism to be ecclesial rather than Christological. On the contrary, there is no reason to believe that *Mediator Dei* conceived of the character as having an ecclesial priority over the Christological.

Coffey urges us to understand the common priesthood as "a dynamism of faith, of divine sonship or daughterhood," and the ordained priesthood as "a charism, of official witness, which the common priesthood is not."[26] Vatican II was not able to reconcile the two priesthoods in the person of Christ owing to what Coffey believes was an incomplete pneumatological understanding of the priesthood of Christ. The upshot is that the council clung to the understanding that the ordained priesthood refers immediately to the Headship of Christ and this did "nothing to correct the popular perception of the priest as above the Church rather than as part of it."[27] For Coffey, only on the foundation of a sound pneumatology is it possible to reconcile the common priesthood and ordained priesthood and describe their intrinsic relation. Thus, on the basis of the anointing of the Spirit of Sonship, the common priesthood is said to be a "dynamism of incorporation into the Church" and the ordained priesthood is a particular charism.[28] Coffey describes the intrinsic relation between the ordained priesthood and common priesthood as "the relation of sharing in Christ's Headship over against simple union with him through faith, or the relation of official witness (apostolic leadership) in the Church over against simple belonging to it through faith and baptism."[29] The Headship of Christ is a gift for the Church. It is not exercised above the Church, and must be seen as directly ecclesiological.

[23] Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 225.

[24] Ibid, 212.

[25] Ibid.

[16] Ibid, 235.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

III. PRIORITY OF PRIESTLY REPRESENTATION: THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II

Having described Coffey's interpretation of Vatican II, I will now examine two of his primary claims: (1) that Vatican II assumed that the ordained priesthood should be understood directly in Christological terms, and (2) that it thus gave the impression that the common priesthood was directly ecclesiological.

A) The Common Priesthood

The conciliar texts and the *Acta* show that the fathers regarded the common priesthood and the ordained priesthood both as directly Christological. Both priesthoods participate in Christ's priesthood, mission, and triple office. The problem that faced the fathers at Vatican II was how to specify and identify the difference between the priesthoods, given the fact that both were presented as directly Christological. They did so by specifying the differentiation of roles and functions between the two priesthoods. The diverse roles and functions are rooted in a particular sharing in Christ's life, or, to put it differently, in a particular ontological participation in Christ's life. The distinction that is made between the two priesthoods in *Lumen gentium* 10-that they differ essentially and not only in degree-should not be isolated from the explanation of it that is given in chapters 3 and 4.

Careful observation of chapter 4 of *Lumen gentium* will show that the council fathers clearly taught that the common priesthood was directly Christological. *Lumen gentium* 34 teaches that "since the supreme and eternal Priest, Christ Jesus, wills to continue his witness and service through the laity too, He vivifies them in His Spirit and unceasingly urges them on to every good and perfect work."[30] Thanks to the outpouring of the Spirit, in baptism, the laity share in the mission of Christ as priest, prophet, and king. The lay faithful's activity in this threefold office is possible because of their profound union with Christ. It is telling that paragraphs 34, 35, 36 affirm that Christ continues his priestly, prophetic, and royal witness and service through the laity. Thus Christ himself continues his priesthood through the spiritual sacrifices of the laity who consecrate the world to God. Christ is said to "fulfill" *(adimplet)* his prophetic office not only through the hierarchy who teach in his name but also through the laity who witness and proclaim the Gospel in word and action (LG 36). The Lord desires to spread his kingdom through the laity who must "learn the deepest meaning and the value of all creation and how to relate it to the praise of God" (ibid.). The laity are said to be charged with the responsibility to permeate the world with the Spirit of Christ and to conform the conditions and institutions of the world to the norms of justice. There can be no doubt here that Vatican II understood that the laity, anointed by the power of the Spirit, act because of their union with Christ, the priest. He alone is the origin of the lay faithful's priestly activity.[31]

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[30] All quotations from *Lumen gentium* and *Presbyterorum ordinis* are taken from *The Documents of Vatican* II, ed. Walter M. Abbott (New York: America Press, 1966).

Coffey objects that even if we can conclude that through their common priesthood the lay faithful act because of their union with Christ, "this would still not be readily recognized as a Christological reference, since in the body-metaphor that it implies only the Head was identified as Christ, and therefore the members almost by definition would be other than him."[32] He also contends that even if *Lumen gentium* did teach that the common priesthood is a participation in the priesthood of Christ, this is not sufficient to place the common priesthood into a Christological framework. According to Coffey this was due to a failure to put forth a model for the common priesthood comparable to that of the ordained priest who acts in the person of Christ the Head.

In reply, it should be pointed out that the head-body symbol must read in its context and should not be abstracted from the careful presentation in chapters 3 and 4 about the differentiation of the two forms of priesthood. It does not do justice to the text of *Lumen gentium* simply to assert that it taught that the common priesthood is a participation in the priesthood of Christ. The council clearly spells out in chapter 4 that Christ acts through the lay members of his Body because he continues his life, his mission, and his threefold office through them. It is true that the laity do not share in the Headship of Christ, but this does not mean that they are almost by definition other than Christ. It is because the lay members, by the power of the Spirit, are conformed and likened to Christ in baptism that they can be the mystical and historical extension of his Body. The conception of the Church as the Body of Christ, Head and members must be understood in light of *Lumen gentium's* repeated affirmation that there is a differentiation of roles in the building up of Christ's body and in the continuation of his mission.

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[31] The apostolic exhortation *Christifideles laici* calls attention to this very point. Commenting on *Lumen gentium's* affirmation of the laity's participation in the triple office of Christ, *Christifideles laici* 14 states: "Clearly we are the Body of Christ *because* we are all 'anointed' and in him are 'christs,' that is, 'anointed ones,' as well as Christ himself, 'the anointed one.' In a certain way, then, it happens that with the head and body the whole Christ is formed" (emphasis added; Eng. trans. in *Origins* 18 [9 Feb. 1989]: 562-95).

[32] Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 225.

A careful reading of the texts of *Lumen gentium* cannot sustain the interpretation that Vatican II presented the common priesthood as directly ecclesiological and only indirectly Christological. The council fathers taught that the common priesthood is directly Christological, having its origin in Christ, in its own distinct way. The baptized are active participants in Christ's threefold office. United with Christ and made partakers of his priesthood, the baptized actively carry out his threefold office in the Church and especially in the world where they mediate Christ's gifts. It is not sufficient to describe the common priesthood as a matter of simple union with Christ or simple belonging to him because the priesthood of the baptized is ordered to Christ's mission.

B) The Ordained Priesthood

Coffey's claim that Vatican II "assumed" that the ordained priesthood should be understood directly in Christological terms is focused especially on the texts that deal with Christ's Headship.[33] I contend that these texts should not be read in isolation from what is said about the ordained priesthood being rooted in Christ. It is not the case that the texts on Headship "assume" that the ordained priesthood is directly Christological because these texts, such as *LG* 28 and *PO* 2, are grounded upon what is taught in the entire third chapter of *Lumengentium* (esp. 18-21). In this chapter, the ordained priesthood is presented, step by step, as rooted in a unique participation in the priesthood of Christ or, in other words, as "directly Christological."

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[33] Ibid., 211.

According to *LG* 18, "Jesus Christ, the eternal Shepherd, established His holy Church by sending forth the apostles as He Himself had been sent by the Father (cf. John 20:21). He willed that their successors, namely the bishops, should be shepherds in His Church." *LG* 20 asserts that whoever listens to them listens to Christ. *LG* 21 explains that the bishops possess the fullness of the ordained priesthood and that "In the bishops, therefore, for whom priests are assistants, the Lord Jesus Christ, the supreme High Priest, is present in the midst of those who believe. " Thanks to their ordination, bishops exercise the triple office of Christ in *eius persona.* Morever, *LG* 21 states "it is clear that, by means of the impositions of hands and the words of consecration, the grace of the Holy Spirit is so impressed, that the bishops in an eminent and visibleway undertake Christ's role as Teacher, Shepherd, and High Priest, and that they act in His person." *LG* 25 explains that bishops are "authentic teachers, that is, teachers endowed with the authority of Christ."

In these ways, the bishop, and thus the ordained priesthood, has the unique capacity of representing Christ to the Church. It is Christ who continues his work and service of teaching, sanctifying and shepherding through the ordained priesthood. It is true, of course, that this activity of the ordained priest is a gift of service for the Church, and in the Church, but the council understands that the origin of this activity and service is Christ.

Butler's research is helpful here. She calls attention to the fact that Vatican H's strong statements about the participation of the laity in Christ's priesthood necessitated a further specification of the distinctiveness of the ordained priesthood. This further specification of the ordained priesthood in terms of the formulas *in persona Christi* and *in persona Christi capitis,* served not only to clarify its distinctiveness but also to illuminate "the sacramental ordering of the Church as a body in which diverse functions bring about a vital unity."[34]

The text of *LG* 28 presents the ordained priesthood's participation in the priestly office of Christ as encompassing the three *munera* of teaching, leading, and sanctifying. Furthermore, the *relatio* clarifying the final text explains something of how the council fathers understood the relation between the Head and Body of the Church. The passage from *LG* 28 reads:

> Although priests do not possess the highest degree of the priesthood, and although they are dependent on the bishops in the exercise of their power, they are nevertheless united with the bishops in sacerdotal dignity. By the power of the sacrament of orders, and in the image of Christ the eternal High Priest (Heb 5:1-10; 7:24; 9:11-28), they are consecrated to preach the gospel, shepherd the faithful, and celebrate the divine worship as true priests of the New Testament. Partakers of the function of Christ the sole Mediator (1Tim2:5) on their level of ministry, they announce the divine word to all. They exercise this sacred function of Christ most of all in the Eucharistic liturgy or synaxis. There, acting in the person of Christ, and proclaiming His mystery, they join the offering of the faithful to the sacrifice of their Head. Until the coming of the Lord (cf. 1 Cor 11:26), they re-present and apply in the Sacrifice of the Mass the one sacrifice of the New Testament, namely the sacrifice of Christ offering Himself to His Father as a spotless victim (cf. Heb 9:11-12).

Butler points out that this text is particularly important because, according to the *Acta,* the editing of it forced a clarification of the phrase *in persona Christi.*[35] The first draft of the text did not present priest-presbyters as participating in the *munera* of teaching and leading when they acted *in persona Christi.* The use of the term *in persona Christi* in regard to priest-presbyters was restricted to the *munus* of sanctifying, that is, offering the Eucharistic Sacrifice of the Mass and administering the sacraments. As for the other *munera,* priest-presbyters were said to be under the authority of the bishop and are to cooperate with the bishop in his shepherding of the people.

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[34] Butler, "Priestly Identity," 305.

[35] Ibid., 298.

The second draft, on the other hand, related the *munera* of teaching and guiding the faithful with acting in the person of Christ. This connection was solidified and expanded in the final draft, quoted above, which became the approved text. Acting *in persona Christi* is not restricted to the celebration of the Eucharist. Priest-presbyters are said to be consecrated "to preach the Gospel, to shepherd the faithful and celebrate the divine worship." The sacrament of Orders which gives the priest-presbyter a share in the priestly office of Christ includes the three *munera* of teaching, leading, and sanctifying. Butler writes: "The Council connects Eucharistic presidency and pastoral leadership on the grounds that in both the priest acts in the person of Christ."[36] Still, having made this strong connection, the council fathers teach that it is in the Eucharistic liturgy that priest-presbyters exercise their sacred functions in a preeminent way. The text of *Lumen gentium,* at this point, footnotes the twenty-second session of the Council of Trent (Denzinger 1743) and the encyclical *Mediator Dei,* no.84 (Denzinger 3850).[37] After warning against certain errors[38] the text from *Mediator Dei* states: "But we deem it necessary to recall that the priest acts for the people only because he represents Jesus Christ, Who is Head of all His members and offers Himself in their stead."

The citation of this passage from *Mediator Dei* also discloses something about how the fathers at Vatican II understood the relationship between the ordained priesthood and the common priesthood, as well as the relationship between the Head and body of the Church in the Eucharist. The priest can act for the people, for the common priesthood, only because he represents

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[36] Ibid., 298, citing also *Acta Synoda/ia,* v. 2, pars 2, 213; see Aquila, *The Teaching of Vatican II on "In Persona Christi" and "In Nomine Ecclesiae,"* 91.

[37] The *relatio* on *LG* 28 and 29 explains "the office by which the priest acts 'in persona Christi' especially in Eucharistic worship is shown by the words of Trent and confirmed by the words of the encyclical 'Mediator Dei.'"The Council of Trent taught in its twenty-second session that it is Christ who offers the Eucharistic sacrifice for us. For the text of the *relatio* see *Acta Synodalia,* v. 2, pars 2, 213. I give the translation in Aquila, *The Teaching of Vatican II on "In Persona Christi" and "In Nomine Ecclesiae,"* 91.

[38] *Mediator Dei* 83 warns against the error of thinking that a "priest only acts in virtue of an office committed to him by the community."

Jesus Christ, who is Head of all the members. It is Christ who speaks for us to the Father and draws us by the power of the Spirit into his worship of the Father. The ordained priest in the Eucharist sacramentally represents Christ presenting his Body, the Church, to the Father. He represents Christ doing for us what we cannot do by ourselves alone. Thus, it is because the priest acts in the person of Christ as Head that he can speak *in nomine ecclesiae.*

Aquila notices that there was another addition to the final text of *LG* 28 that contributed to the clarification of the term *in persona Christi:* "Exercising within the limits of their authority the function of Christ as Shepherd and Head, they gather together God's family as a brotherhood all of one mind and lead them in them Spirit, through Christ, to God the Father." Aquila notices, rightly, that this addition is important because it connects the *munus* of the priest to Christ's function as shepherd and Head of the Church.[39] This emphasis is further developed in *Presbyterorum ordinis.*[40]

Summing up thus far: Careful study guided by the *Acta* shows that *LG* 28 clarified the phrase *in persona Christi* by teaching that the priest-presbyter acts in the person of Christ not only in Eucharistic presidency but in pastoral leadership as well. In both instances, the priest-presbyter shares in the function of Christ the sole Mediator. It is in the Eucharist that the priest-presbyter acts in the person of Christ *par excellence.* There, he re-presents the sacrifice of Christ and acts for the faithful joining their sacrifices to the sacrifice of Christ the Head. Priest-presbyters participate in the function of Christ as Head and shepherd, gathering together the faithful into God's family and leading them in the Spirit through Christ to the Father.

In *LG* 28 the essential difference between the ordained priesthood and the priesthood of the baptized cannot simply be distinguished by its "public" character. The ordained priest has a different relationship to Christ. He shares in the mediatorship of Christ in a special way because he represents Christ facing the Church announcing the word of the gospel and joins the sacrifice of the faith to Christ's sacrifice. In this way, *LG* 28 understands the ordained priesthood as directly Christological and as a gift for the Church.

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[39] Aquila, *The Teaching of Vatican II on "In Persona Christi" and "In Nomine Ecclesiae,"* 93.

[40] Understood in this context, the reference to Headship in LG 28 is far more important than Coffey thinks. He dismisses it as "theologically insignificant" (Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 211).

Presbyterorum ordinis builds upon what is taught about the ordained priesthood in *LG* 28. The first paragraphs of *PO* 2 state that all the baptized share in the consecration and mission of Christ and that in Christ all the baptized are made into a holy nation and a royal priesthood. It is recalled that the Lord, in order that the baptized might be joined together into one body, set up certain ministers and gave them the power to offer sacrifice and forgive sins. This priestly office is carried out for the faithful in the name of Christ.

Butler points out that the *Acta* show that the fathers of Vatican II were concerned to clarify further still the theological nature of the distinctiveness of the ordained priesthood. *PO* 2 sets out to do precisely this. It declares that priests share in the authority of Christ to build up his Body, the Church, and act *in persona Christi capitis:*

> Inasmuch as it is connected with the episcopal order, the priestly office shares in the authority by which Christ Himself builds up, sanctifies, and rules His Body. Therefore, while it indeed presupposes the sacraments of Christian initiation, the sacerdotal office of priests is conferred by that sacrament through which priests, by the anointing of the Holy Spirit, are marked with a special character and are so configured to Christ the Priest that they act in the person of Christ as Head. . . . Through the ministry of priests, the spiritual sacrifice of the faithful is made in perfect in union with the sacrifice of Christ, the sole Mediator. Through the hands of priests and in the name of the whole Church, *[nomine totius ecclesiae]* the Lord's sacrifice is offered in the Eucharist in an unbloody manner until he Himself returns.

The council fathers were not satisfied with simply saying that the priest represents Christ; they wanted to specify how the priest represents Christ differently from the rest of the baptized. The specific difference between priesthood of the baptized and the ordained priesthood is that the priest acts in the person of Christ the Head. But the fathers went even further, clearly affirming that the participation in Christ's Headship is given for the purpose of building up the Church and directing its growth.

By the time this text reached its final form, it had undergone several revisions. Butler calls attention to the official *relatio,* which explains that the presbyter "is configured in a special way to Christ the priest, so that, having become a sharer in the episcopal mission, he is able to act in the person of Christ the Head, Teacher, Priest, and Ruler ... in the building up of his Body, which is the Church."[41] The connection between Headship and mission here is clear.

The next revision of the text and the accompanying *relatio* supply further insight into how the council fathers understood *in persona Christi capitis.* The revision-pertinent to the second sentence of the text quoted above-relates and differentiates the sacraments of initiation and the sacrament of Orders. The ordained priesthood is grounded in the sacraments of initiation, but it is bestowed by the distinct sacrament of Orders. Thanks to the anointing of the Holy Spirit, the priest-presbyter is given a unique character which configures him to Christ. It is this special sacramental character, which is Christological, that enables the ordained man to accomplish his mission *in persona Christi capitis.* In other words, if priests are marked with a special configuration to Christ, then this is basis of their action *for* the Church. Understood in this way the ordained priesthood cannot be spoken of as first ecclesial, because the source of priestly action comes not from the Church but from Christ.

The *relatio* notes the addition of the phrase *nomine totius ecclesiae.* The final text asserts that the faithful participate in the Eucharistic sacrifice through the ministry of the ordained priest. This is, of course, affirmed elsewhere in the documents of Vatican

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[41] *Acta Synodalia,* v. 4, pars 6, 390. I give Aquila's translation *(The Teaching of Vatican II on "In Persona Christi" and "In Nomine Ecclesiae,"* 106).

II,[42] but here the spiritual sacrifices of the faithful are said to be consummated in union with Christ's sacrifice which is offered through the hands of priest-presbyters in the name of the whole Church *(nomine totius ecclesiae).* The priest can pray in the name of the Church because he represents Christ, the Head of the Body, who gathers together the prayers and sacrifices of the members, joins it to his prayer and sacrifice, and presents it to the Father. It is this relationship of Christ to the Church that is sacramentalized in the ordained priesthood in which the priest stands *in persona Christi capitis.* Thus, when the priest prays *in nomine eccleisae,* he does so not only in the name of the local church community, but also in the name of the whole Church because he represents Christ, the Head who presents his Body, the Church, to the Father. The *relatio* sheds additional light on how *in persona Christi capitis* was understood because it explains that the mission of the priest-presbyter is distinct from the one given to the laity: the former has its source in the mission Christ gave to the apostles and through the apostles to the bishops.[43]

The understanding of Headship, *in persona Christi capitis,* in the documents of Vatican II is different from the conception that Coffey proposes. He understands Headship to be directly ecclesiological and indirectly Christological because it is an ecclesial function and can only be exercised in the Church. The difference between the ordained and common priesthood for Coffey ultimately rests upon an ecclesiological difference. He thinks of Headship as the ability to represent the members of the Church.

In the documents of Vatican II, on the other hand, the essential difference between the ordained priesthood and the common priesthood is not simply ecclesial but Christo logical. The ordained priesthood and the common priesthood each involve a different participation in the priesthood of Christ and a different participation in Christ's mission. The council fathers could affirm, deliberately, this Christological difference while at the same time asserting that both the common priesthood and the ordained priesthood, each in its own way, are given for the service of the Kingdom of God and the Church. But again, this service issues from a certain participation in Christ's priesthood-something that not even the Church can give by her own power or ability alone.[44]

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[42] See for instance *LG* 10; *Sacrosanctum concilium* 48. Here we can appreciate the logic of the latter document which teaches that since the faithful offer "the immaculate victim, not only through the hands of the priest, but also with him, they should learn to offer themselves too. Through Christ the Mediator, they should be drawn day by day into an ever closer union with God and with each other, so that finally God may be all in all." The point of the text is not to assert some narrow approach to the liturgy that would monopolize it in favor of the priest but rather to affirm the priority and gratuity of Christ who wants to unite the Church to his worship.

[43] *Acta Synodalia,* v. 4, pars 6, 342.

N. THE MEANING OF HEADSHIP

We turn now to Coffey's other claim, that if the ordained priesthood is understood immediately in terms of the Headship of Christ, then the priest appears as above the Church or apart from the Church.

It is certainly true, as we have seen above, that Vatican II understands the source of the ordained priest's action for the Church as a participation in Christ's Headship. However, this does not isolate the priest from the Church or put him in a position above the Church. The share of the ordained priest in the Headship of Christ is given for the Church and is ultimately intelligible only in reference to the Church. In the documents of Vatican II Headship is an inherently relational concept. Recall how *Lumen gentium* and *Presbyterorum ordinis* describe and explain the *munera* of the ordained priesthood in terms of

[44] It is interesting to note that Vatican H's understanding of the common priesthood and the ordained priesthood bears a certain correspondence with what St. Thomas teaches about the sacramental character being the character of Christ in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 63, a.3. After stating that a character marks something as being ordained to a specific end, St. Thomas says: "Secondly, each of the faithful is deputed to receive, or to bestow on others, things pertaining to the worship of God. And this, properly speaking, is the purpose of the sacramental character. Now the whole rite of Christian religion is derived from Christ's priesthood. Consequently, it is clear that the sacramental character is specially the character of Christ, to Whose character the faithful are likened by reason of the sacramental characters, which are nothing else than certain participations of Christ's Priesthood, flowing from Christ himself" (translation taken from the English Dominicans [Chicago: Benziger Bros., 1947]).

sanctifying, shepherding, leading, preaching, and teaching. These things only make sense in relation to the Church-not apart from or outside of it. In other words, the priest understood as *in persona Christi capitis* represents Christ the Head in his relationship to the Church. This relationship-thanks to the indissoluble union between the Head and members of the Body-is not outside of the Church but within the Church. The Church lives in her Head and from her Head who is the source of her life. Christ the Head lives with her and in her.[45] Headship is constitutive of the Church and therefore cannot be other than within it.

It is because Vatican II affirms the Christological priority of Orders-in terms of *in persona Christi capitis-that* it understands the ordained priesthood as "for others." The ordained priesthood is "for others" because it is a special participation in Christ's priesthood which, by its very nature, is ordered to the common good of the Body, the Church.[46] Thus, Vatican II understands that when a man is ordained a priest-presbyter he is given a new relationship to the Church within the one Body because he participates in a new way in the priesthood of Christ. The new relationship, which occurs within the Church, makes visible and effective sacramentally the reality of Christ's priestly office for the baptized.

This presentation of Headship in the documents of Vatican II is consistent with the council's profound sacramental understanding of the Church and Orders. Christ's ongoing love for the Church in which he calls, gathers, sanctifies, builds up, and unifies his Body, the Church-that is, his activity as Head and Shepherd-should be recognizable in a visible sign. This Headship, whereby Christ faces the Church, is visible and identifiable in the ministry of the ordained priesthood. It is a sign

[45] Cf. *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* 708.

[46] Although he did not use the later terminology of *in persona Christi capitis,* Augustine saw something of this relationship of the priesthood to the baptized as one of "with and for" in a sermon marking one of his anniversaries as a bishop: "Where I'm terrified by what I am *for you,* I am given comfort by what I am *with you;* For you I am a bishop, with you after all, I am a Christian" ("Sermon 340," in *The Works of Saint Augustine: Sermons,* tr. Edmund Hill, ed. John E. Rostelle, v. 3/9 [Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1990] 292; emphases added).

of the sheer gratuity and priority of the grace of Christ. It is Christ with the power of the Holy Spirit who unites and fills up the Church with the divine life.[47]

In the concern to present the ordained priesthood as existing within the Church, it is easy to confuse the question of context with that of representation. To be sure, both the common and the ordained priesthoods exist within the Church, not outside of it. To that extent, they are both ecclesial. It is also true, as we have seen, that both priesthoods have Christ the Priest as their origin. To that extent they are both Christological. But only the ordained priesthood, not the common priesthood, requires the sacramental representation of Christ.

A further difficulty is that Coffey fails to apply to his understanding of the ordained ministry the truth that Christ is the source of life in the Church. This failure leads to a faulty understanding of Headship that equates Headship with leadership or "official witness."[48] A fully sacramental understanding of

[47] It is also worth noting that Vatican H's understanding of the Headship of Christ-as the source of growth, order, and life--reflects something of what the Letter to the Ephesians and the Letter to the Colossians proclaim about the Headship of Christ. Heinrich Schlier commenting on the term *kephale* in Eph 1:22f; 4:14; 5:23; Col 1:18; 2:10; 2:19, observes that Christ is presented as Head of the Church "in the sense that from this Head the body grows up to this Head." In this schema, Schlier states, "the Head is not present without or apart from the body, nor the body without or apart from the Head. The Church is the earthly body of the heavenly Head." Moreover: "In this unity of Christ and the Church the Headship of Christ is manifested in the fact that He directs the growth of the body to Himself. The *kephale* determines not merely the being of the body but also the fulfilment of its life.•.. He is the effective "whence" of the activity of the body whereby it edifies itself though gifts given to its members. *As* the *kephale* He is thus the concrete principle of the bodily growth of the Church. He is the *arche,* Col 1:18." See Heinrich Schlier, s.v. "kephale," *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,* v. 3., ed. Gerhard Kittle, trans. Geoffrey W Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1964-76): 680. Schlieralso comments that *"kephale* implies one who stands over another in the sense of being the ground of his being. Paul could have used *arche* if there had not been a closer personal relationship in *kephale"* (ibid., 679). The exegete Markus Barth observes that Paul preferred to employ the verb "to fill" to describe how Christthe Head governed the body. "If Christ is the head then he is the 'greatest power,' the 'source', the 'beginning' or the 'rule' *(arche),* the 'acropolis' of all members. Thus it is impossible to assume that they 'fill' him. He alone fills them" (Markus Barth, *Ephesians: Introduction, Translation and Commentary* [Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974], 190-91).

[48] For example, recall Coffey's description of the relationship between the ordained priesthood and the common priesthood. "Depending on whether christological or ecclesiological terms of reference are chosen, it can be called the relation of sharing in

Headship is of a different kind. It is exercised only by the authority of Christ and in his person. It involves a special participation in the mission and mediatorship of Christ whereby Christ, the source of life, nourishes and builds up the Church. The ordained priesthood is a gift to the Church, instituted by Christ, neither prior or posterior to the Church but within it. The rest of the baptized may designate the one to occupy this office, but they do not confer on him the authority to act in *persona Christi capitis.*

Coffey does, at one point, appear to come close to a sacramental understanding of Headship that represents Christ as the source of the Church's life. After quoting some comments

Christ's Headship over simple union with him through faith, or the relation of official witness (apostolic leadership) in the Church over against simple belonging to it though faith and baptism. While both possibilities are correct, the second is the more appropriate, as it is expressive of the actual context in which the priesthood exists and operates" (Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 235). David Power runs into a similar difficulty when he writes: "Hence his [the priest's] action *in persona Ecclesiae* is a cultic action wherein the Church's devotion and spiritual sacrifice is expressed. This distinguishes the action of the Church in giving homage from its action, through a minister, as instrument of Christ's sanctifying power, though the latter properly occurs in the context of the former ("Representing Christ in Community and Sacrament," 101). Here are contrasted two situations. In the first, the Church through the priest gives homage to the Father, and the priest acts *in persona Ecclesiae.* In the second, Christ acts through the Church and the Church acts through the priest to sanctify. The difficulty with this is that it camouflages an equivocation with respect to "Church." In the first situation, the assembly expresses its devotion through the prayers said by the priest. In the second situation does the assembly moved by Christ express its sanctifying action through the priest? On the contrary, Christ acts for the people through the priest. It is true that the action of the priest is an action of the Church but in a different sense than in the first situation. Sanctifying the elements is not an action of the congregation. To be sure, the Church regulates the exercise of the priest acting as Christ's instrument. Still, the sanctifying action of Christ does not pass as it were from Christ to the assembly and then to the priest. Nor does the liturgy signify anything like this. It is relevant to note that during the discussion of the drafting of *PO* 2 the *relatio* explains that the addition of the words *nomine totius ecclesiae,* in reference to the priest, was made to show forth the nature of the sacrifice of the Mass. A council father proposed that the text should be emended so as to describe presbyters as "ministers of the Church." The theological commission responsible for overseeing revisions to the text rejected the request explaining that the text already spoke of the priest-presbyter speaking *"nomine totius ecclesiae."* Furthermore, the *relatio* replied, "Presbyters act not as ministers of the Church but as ministers of Christ." The *relatio* cited *LG* 10 and 28: in *persona Christi agentes.* See *Acta Synodalia,* v. 4, pars 7, 123-24. Here again we see the council's intention to affirm the Christological priority of the priest representing Christ as Head.

from an essay by Georg Hintze[49] about priestly representation, Coffey argues that the ordained priest sacramentally represents Christ's Headship and that this Headship is drawn not from the members of the Church but from Christ.

> It is necessary to add only that the priest does not represent Christ and the Church in exactly the same way. He represents Christ in that he sacramentally makes visible and active in the Church an invisible reality, Christ in his headship. This is not the case with his representation of the Church, for in a real sense the Church is visible already. But in this case he adds headship, apostleship, or leadership to the action of this group of believers, in order to constitute them as Church in the full sense. Apart from his presence and ministry they are only a group of believers, unable of themselves to represent the Church. But at the same time, the fact that he represents them by no means renders their presence and action superfluous, for just as their faith is positive and active, so too is their priesthood. Thus it can be seen that, even though the priest represents a reality that is already at least partially visible, his is truly a sacramental, and not merely juridical, representation. (If, per impossibile, it were only of the latter kind, his priesthood would differ only in degree, not in kind, from theirs.) But what he adds is drawn not from them, but from Christ. And it is precisely this contribution that, along with theirs, truly constitutes the Church, and therefore the Church at prayer, i.e. the priesthood of the Church.[50]

This affirmation that the ordained priest's sacramental representation of Headship is derived directly from Christ does not seem to be integrated into Coffey's wider analysis of the nature of the ordained priesthood. Throughout his article,[51] except for the passage quoted above, he claims,

> For the headship of Christ as exercised in the only place where it can be exercised, namely the Church, is clearly an ecclesial function, and therefore statements about it, even ones invoking Christ the priest, whether they be

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[49] Georg Hintze, "Das gemeinsame Priestertum aller Glaubigen und das besondere Priestertum des Dienstes in der okumenischen Diskussion," *Catholica* 45 (1991): 44-77.

[50] Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 233-34.

[51] He comes to the same conclusion in his earlier essay "Priestly Representation and Women's Ordination," 96. Here Coffey states: "However, the priest's primary and direct representation is of the earthly church, and it is only insofar as he represents *it* that he is able to represent Christ and the whole Church."

magisterial or simply theological, are directly ecclesiological and only indirectly Christological.[52]

But how can this Headship, which the ordained priesthood sacramentally represents, be only indirectly Christological and directly ecclesiological *if,* as Coffey says, Headship is drawn from Christ and *if* it is precisely this contribution that, together with the common priesthood, constitutes the Church, particularly the Church at prayer? There seems to be a failure, as described above, to grasp Vatican II's point that the sacramental representation of the Headship of Christ has to do with representing Christ as source of the life of the Church evident in the actions of sanctifying, teaching, and shepherding the Church.[53] Or in the words of *Pastoresdabo vobis,* "And so the priest, on account of his very nature and sacramental mission appears in the structure of the Church as a sign of the absolute priority and gratuity of that grace which is conferred by the risen Christ on the Church."[54] A closer reading of the documents of Vatican II together with the *Acta* would have assuaged Coffey's entirely legitimate fear that the sacramental representation of Christ's Headship might be seen as isolating the ordained priest from the Church and placing him in a position apart from the Church or above it. *Lumen gentium* and *Presbyterorumordinis* present the ordained priesthood (and the common priesthood) in a strong relational and Christological framework, understanding the ordained priest as sacramentally representing Headship within the Church and for the Church.

V. CONCLUSION

Vatican II successfully avoided a juridical interpretation of priestly identity as well as a juridical understanding of the term *in*

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[52] Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 211.

[53] Here again, Vatican II's view of Christ's Headship seems to be well-informed by the Pauline understanding. Markus Barth argues that "Paul could ascribe to the head more than a representative and dominating function. He coulq attribute to it the power to perceive, to interpret, to coordinate, and to unify all that went on in the body and its several members. Because the head is the 'greatest power' of the body, causation and coordination can be ascribed to nothing else" (Barth, *Ephesians,* 190).

[54] *Pastoresdabo vobis* 16 (translation mine).

persona Christi that would isolate the priest from the Church. It affirmed a strong Christological priority of priestly identity in terms of a sacramental representation *in persona Christi capitis.* This inherently relational sacramental imaging of Christ in terms of Headship firmly placed the ordained priest within the one body, the Church, and thus made reference to the Church absolutely necessary for defining priestly identity. The ordained priesthood is a gift to the Church, instituted by Christ, neither prior nor posterior to the Church. The concern that scholars such as Coffey have for the ecclesial dimension of a contemporary theology of priestly identity is well-placed. While not denying these concerns, this article has called attention to the priority of the gratuity of the grace of Christ and the gift of communion that Christ gives to the Church.

In persona Christi capitis is understood in the documents of Vatican II as a sacramental representation of the priority of Christ's activity whereby he gathers and builds up his Body, the Church, and draws the Church into his worship and his sacrifice. The ordained priest's ability to represent the Church and to pray in the name of the whole Church is based on his participation in this function of Christ as sole mediator. The priest's representation of the Church and speaking *in nomine ecclesiae* is situated within *in persona Christi capitis.* The former has its foundation and its reason in the latter. It is Christ who first offers himself; the Church is only able to offer herself because of his offering. The Church gives homage and offers its sacrifice of praise through Christ. In this way, Christ, the Head of the Body, acts in the name of the whole Church and represents the whole Church to the Father. It is on this basis that we can distinguish two distinct forms of representation-distinct but always united. On the one hand, the priest represents Christ the Head who sanctifies his body the Church and directs its growth. On the other hand, the priest represents the whole Church by speaking *in nomine ecclesiae,* just as Christ does, representing her faithful response to the Father through the sacrifice of Christ.

The Christological priority of priestly representation is well established in Church teaching. I would suggest that the direction of further research might be well served if it moved beyond the issue of the priority of priestly representation. In *Pastores dabo vobis* 12 we read that priestly identity, "like every Christian identity, has its source in the Blessed Trinity, which is revealed and is communicated to people in Christ, establishing, in him and through the Spirit, the Church." The exhortation goes on to observe that both

> the nature and the mission of the ordained priesthood cannot be defined except through this multiple and rich interconnection of relationships which arise from the Blessed Trinity and are prolonged in the communion of the Church, as a sign and instrument of Christ, of communion with God and of the unity of all humanity.

I believe scholars might find it fruitful to take up the task of probing the interconnection of these relationships that constitute the identity of the ordained priest.

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