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THEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDED THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970) [1]

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IN THE LAST THREE DECADES there has been much discussion, even heated debate, about the liturgical texts currently in use, or proposed for use, in English-speaking countries. Articles in the popular press and in scholarly journals have centered almost exclusively on the texts produced by the International Commission on English in the Liturgy (ICEL)-that is, on the quality of translations, the linguistic theories undergirding them, the competence of a mixed commission to compose original texts, and the respective roles of the bishops' conferences and the Holy See in approving vernacular translations. [2] These matters are vitally

[1] I am grateful to the Intercultural Forum for Studies in Faith and Culture at the Pope John Paul II Cultural Center, Washington, D.C., for the support that enabled me to complete this article.

[2] See, for examples, Robert Speaight, "Liturgy and Language," *Theology: Monthly Review* 74 (October 1971): 444-56; Ralph A. Kiefer, "The Eucharistic Prayer," *Worship* 50 (1976): 316-23; Richard Toporoski, "The Language of Worship," *Communio* 4 (Fall 1977): 226-60; Ansgar J. Chupungco, "The English Translation of the Latin Liturgy," *Notitiae* 18 (1982): 91-100; Cuthbert Johnson, "Prefaces: Shaping a New Translation," *Pastoral Music* 16 (April-May 1992): 34-37; Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, "The Catechetical Role of the Liturgy and the Quality of Liturgical Texts: The Current ICEL Translation," *Communio* 20 (Spring 1993): 63-83; Eamon Duffy, "Rewriting the Liturgy: The Theological Issues of Translation," *New Blackfriars* 78 (January 1997): 4-27, reprinted in Stratford Caldecott, ed., *Beyond the Prosaic* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 97-126; Donald Trautman, "Rome and ICEL," *America* 182 (March 4, 2000): 7-11; Letter to the Editor written in response to Bishop Trautman's article by the Prefect for the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, entitled "Cardinal Jorge A. Medina on the ICEL Controversy," *America* 182 (April 14, 2000): 17-19; Ad Hoc Committee on the Forum on the Principles of Translation, *The Voice of the Church: A Forum on liturgical Translation* (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 2001).

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[3] Some studies have been For information about the sources themselves, see A. Dumas, uLes sources du nouveau missel mmain," *Notitiae* 7 (1971): 37-42, 74-77, 94-95, 134-36, 276-80, 409-10; Anthony Ward and Cuthbert Johnson, Sources of the Roman Missal (1975)," *Notitiae* 22 (1986): 445-747; 23 (1987): 413-1009; and 32 (1996): 7-179. For works that examine elements of the Latin typical edition of the Missal of Paul VI in relation to their sources see Thomas A. Krosnicki, *Ancient Themes in Modem Prayer* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of A.merica Press, 1973); Anthony Cekada, *The Problems with the Prayers of the Modem Mass* (Rockford, Ill.: Tan Books and Publishers, 1991); Gerard Moore, *Vatican II and the Collects for Ordinary Time: A in the Roman Missal (1975)* (San Francisco: The Scholars Press, 1998); Lorenzo Bianchi, "A Survey of the Theology, Historf, Terminology and Synta'L in the Prayers of the Roman Missal," in *Theological and Historical Aspects of the Roman Missal,* The Proceedings of the Fifth International of Historical, Canonical and ne«i)logica1 Studies on the Roman Catholic Liturgy (Kingston and Surbiton: Centre International Liturgiques, 2000), 127-64.

[4] The alphabetical listing of all the orations in the present Roman Missal in Thaddaus A. Schnitker and Wolfgang A. eds., *Concordantia verbalia missalis romani: Partes euchologicae* (Miinster: Aschendorff, 1983), col. 2865-2910 contains 1,479 orations, exclusive of blessing prayers. Annibale Bugnini, *The Reform of the Liturgy (1948-1975),* trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1990), 396 states that the new missal has "sixteen hundred prayers," which must be a round number that includes all the blessing prayers. Matias Auge, "Le collete del proprio de! tempo nel nuovo messale," *Ephemerides Liturgicae* 84 (1970): 275 states t.hat the new missal has "about *two* thousand prayers" *(duemilla preghiere circa),* a nu..mberthat, based on Schnitker's list, is hard to explain. Both Bugnini and Auge state that the number of orations in the new missal is more than twice the number in the 1962 Missal.

[5] That is, the last edition of the Roman Missal prior to the reforms mandated by Vatican H. The 1962 Missal is the last typical edition of the Missal of Pius V, also called the Tridentine Missal, which was commissioned by the Council of Trent and first appeared in 1570.

sacramentaries or collections of liturgical formularies; still others are new compositions. Many of the orations that were taken from earlier missals or codices were edited. The newly composed texts are woven from threads of two or three ancient orations; constructed of phrases from biblical, patristic, or ecclesiastical texts; or composed in their entirety by those who produced the new missal. Therefore, many of the orations of the Paul Missal are not ancient prayers in the strict sense, but modern redactions of ancient prayers or entirely new compositions.

At the time the new missal appeared, those involved in the work of the reform published articles in v.rhich they set forth the principles that guided selection, arrangement, redaction, and creation of texts, and explained how the principles were concretely applied. [6] Frequently they offered examples. These articles have received little scholarly attention though they are great reservoirs information about the practical decisions made by the reformers. Because these decisions were often subjective, they invite reappraisal by competent of a new generation. More important, however, than scholarly evaluation of the particular judgments, even those with widespread application, is the objective review of the philosophical and theological principles that drove the reform. This has not been undertaken. A thorough evaluation of these principles distinguish those stipulated by the council from those embraced by the *Consilium* [7] the course of the revision process, and evaluate the

[6] See, for example, Henry Ashworth, "The Prayers for the Dead in the Missal of Pope Paul VI," *Ephemerides Liturgicae* 85 (1971): 3-15; Auge, "Le coliete del proprio de! tempo nel nuovo messale," 275-98; Carlo Braga, "II nuovo messale romano," *Ephe<meridesLiturgicae* 84 (1970): 249·74; Carlo Braga, "II 'proprium de sanctis,'" *Ephemerides Liturgicae* 84 (1970): 401-3; Antoine Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," *Questions Liturgiques 25* (1971): *263-70;* Walter Ferretti, "Le orazioni 'post communionem' de tempore nel nuovo messale romano," *Ephemerides Liturgicae* 84 (1970): 321-41; Vincenzo Raffa, "Le orazioni 'post communionem' de tempore nel nuovo rnessale rom:mo," *Ephemerides Liturgicae* 84 (1970): 299-391.

[7] The task of implementing the reform of the liturgy mandated by Vatican II was given to a group named the *Consilium ad exsequendam Constitutionem de Sacra Liturgia* (Consultation to carry out the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy)" The *Consilium* was comprised of members, consuhors, and advisors" AJl but three of the forty members were bishops" Members were not responsible for producing the revised texts themselves, but for deciding matters of policy and approving schemata proposed by the various *coetus* (study groups)" The study

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groups were made up of several consuhors; one consultor, called the *relator,* was in charge. Consultors worked together to review the missal and draw up the various schemata. Drafts of schemata were sent to advisors for review before being presented to the members for approval (Bugnini, *The Reform of the Liturgy,* 65-66).

Each study group was assigned a particular task. *Coetus* 18bis was responsible for the prayers and prefaces. It had seven members. Five of these are listed as consultors and functioned at such. Two are listed as advisors but one of these, Antoine Dumas, seems to have functioned as a consultor for he eventually became *relator* of the group. See Consilium ad exsequendam Constitutionem de Sacra Liturgia, *Elenchus membrorum - consultorum consiliariorum coetuum a studiis* (Vatican: Typis Polyglotris Vaticanis, 1964), passim.

Three of the other authors cited in the preceding footnote are named in the same membership list. Ashworth and Raffa were consul tors; Braga was attached to the office of the *Consilium* secretary, Annibale Bugnini.

" For instance, Auge, "Le co!!ete de! proprio del tempo nel nuovo messale," 275-77, explicitly notes that the Fathers of Vatican II did not envision a reform or enrichment of the orations of the missal. Rather, he explains, the qualities and limitations of the euchologica! texts became more evident in the light of the decision to introduce the use of the vernacular and of the call in *Sacrosanctum Concilium* 21 that the liturgical texts "express more clearly the holy things which they signify, and that the Christian people, as far as possible, be able to understand them with ease and to take part in them fully, actively, and as it befits a community." Bugnini, *The Refoim of the Liturgy,* 398, names certain principles agreed upon by the *Consilium* in October 1966, that is, a year after the council had ended and six months after study group 18bis had begun its work (on the preceding page, Bugnini reports that the group's first task, reviewing and revising all the orations of the temporal cycle, had been undertaken at a meeting in Louvain, April 5-11, 1966).

[9] Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 263-70.

the Sacred Congregation Earlier he had been
charge the study responsible the
orations of the Paul VI Missal, *Coetus* [10] He was, therefore,
intimately involved in the decisions discusses. though his
article is, it offers a more comprehensive introduction
others because it upon nearly every type of oration found
in the new missal. Dumas's is divided into two
The first lays out the principles followed in selecting,
composing the orations Missal, and
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My essay follows

Dumas,
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[10] Bugnini, *The Reform of the Liturgy,* 397 n. 10 lists Dumas as a member of *Coetus* 18bis and states that A. Rose became its *relator* when P. Bruylants died in October, 1966. This appears to be an error. See Bernard Botte, *From Silence to Participation: An Insider's View of Liturgical Renewal,* trans. John Sullivan (Washington, D.C: The Pastoral Press, 1988), 151; and Piero Marini, "Elenco degli *'schemata'* del *'consilium'* e della congregazione peril culto divino (Marzo 1964-Luglio 1975)," *Notitiae* 18 (1982): 668-69.

in presenting this is not to assess character new missal, to demonstrate the importance of studying it specific relation to its sources. The scope of the present investigation is so limited it can identify not revised missal, the examples of revision themselves. Since these tendencies are pronounced, and therefore may characteristic of the as a whole, areas for further scholarly investigation.

L EXAMPLES

We will examine ten the eight numbered examples that Wherever I introduce the example with an English Dumas's comments on the revision or type of revision, and in every case the texts of orations he cites. Dumas's citations identify the source prayers as well as the redaction appears in the Paul These versions are set side-by-side and English so the reader can see exactly was deleted, retained, and changed. A of most noteworthy features of follows. I examine examples cited by of presentation is taken from ancient codices, Latin and have been regu- auuuau'''''' or transcription errors both of Dumas's text and orations, are my own.

A) Revised Orations

Example 1: Accommodation to Modern Mentality

first example is of a change made in order to accommodate modern sensibilities. Dumas writes:

Other texts, having become shocking for the man of today, have been frankly corrected while respecting the structure of the text and the movement of the phrase. For example, the former secret for Saturday of the second week of Lent, which has become the prayer over the offerings for the third Sunday of Lent,[11] changes the expression: *non gravemur externis,* difficult to understand, to: *fraterna dimittere studeamus,* decidedly more evangelical.[12]

1962: SECRET SATIJRDAY OF THE SECOND WEEK OF LENT	PAUL Vl:[13] OVER THE OFFERINGS THIRD SUNDAY OF LENT
His sacrificiis, Domine, concede placatus, ut, qui propriis oramus absolvi delictis, non gravemur externis.	His sacrificiis, Domine, concede placatus, ut, qui propriis oramus absolvi delictis, fraterna dimittere studeamus.
Appeased, 0 Lord, by these sacrifices, grant that we who pray to be set free from our own sins may not be oppressed by the sins of those outside.	Appeased, 0 Lord, by these sacrifices, grant that we who pray to be set free from our own sins may be eager to forgive those of the brethren.

The change from *non gravemur externis* to *fraterna dimittere studeamus* creates an entirely different petition. The 1962 oration asks God to grant, through the efficacy of Christ's sacrifice, which is about to be re-presented liturgically, that the members of the

[11] Before the liturgical reform of Vatican II, the oration prayed by the priest directly before the Preface of the Mass was called the *secreta* (secret) because it was prayed in a soft voice. In the new missal the same oration is prayed aloud and its name has been changed to *super oblata* (over the offerings). In the ICEL sacramentary it is called the "prayer over the gifts."

[12] Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 267-68: "D'autres textes, devenus choquants pour l'homme d'aujourd'hui, ont ete franchement corriges, tout en respectant la structure du texte et le mouvement de la phrase. Par exemple l'ancienne secrete du samedi de la 2me semaine de Careme, devenue la priere sur les offrandes du 3me dimanche de Careme, change !'expression : *non gravemur externis,* difficilement comprehensible, en : *fraterna dimittere studeamus,* decidement plus evangelique." Somewhat puzzling is Dumas's initial presentation of this oration as "shocking to the man of today" and his later description of the shocking bit as only "difficult to understand."

[13] The Missal of Paul VI has appeared in three typical editions dated 1970, 1975, and 2002. All the orations identified as "Paul VI" in this study are identical in all three editions.

Christian community not be oppressed or burdened by the sins of those outside the Church (presumably pagans, heretics, and so forth). The revision asks God to make the members of the Christian community eager to forgive the sins of one another. The original, then, distinguishes the Church community as a whole, with the sins of its own members, from the sum of all those who do not belong to the Church, with their sins, whereas the revision makes mention only of the sins of Christians and distinguishes them according to whether, from the perspective of each individual member of the Christian community, the sins are one's own or those of one's brothers and sisters in Christ.

The 1962 text is not indifferent toward those who are separated from Christ and from us. Rather, it expresses a deep confidence in the power of his saving death and resurrection. Those who pray it acknowledge that no matter what sins are committed by those outside the Church, or how her members may suffer as a result of these sins, those who have been redeemed in Christ are not to be weighed down because faith assures them that God has already granted them victory in his Son.

The 1962 petition expresses both a thoroughly orthodox understanding of the nature of evil and a realistic sense of ironic possibility. Only our own sins necessarily do true harm to us. The sins of others, which we suffer as physical evil, cannot truly harm us unless we permit them to engage our will so that a moral lapse follows. It would be a lamentable irony if those whom Christ has set free from the sins for which they are personally responsible were to be brought low by sins for which they bear no responsibility.

Dumas describes the original oration as "shocking for the man of today" and "difficult to understand." Perhaps it seemed so to him. At first glance many might think the prayer strange. Since September 11, 2001, however, its petition is easily understood by Christians of every stripe who have thought about the attacks on the United States on that date in religious terms. There are two points that flow from this.

First, the relevance of a particular oration for the Church universal is not something that can always be judged by persons of any one time or place. The prudent course is to trust the wisdom of our liturgical tradition to beg for what we need even when we cannot comprehend or imagine it. If changed historical circumstances give fresh relevance to this oration, perhaps no generation should permit itself to reject as unsuitable a petition that has enjoyed long use.[14]

Second, limiting the content of orations to what editors think can be easily understood by the majority of the faithful unduly limits the capacity of the prayers to enlighten and inspire. It seems fitting that the corpus of orations include prayers that present deeper mysteries of faith so that by meditating upon them the faithful may grow in wisdom and love.

Dumas asserts that the revised oration is "decidedly more evangelical" than its source. Certainly the revised text conforms closely to gospel instruction: its petition echoes the fifth petition of the Lord's prayer. But the original oration brings us more deeply into the mystery of Christ and causes us to internalize aspects of it that familiar gospel verses do not make plain. The difference between the two is that the revision petitions that we do something that everyone who has heard the gospel knows we are obliged to do, namely, forgive the sins of the brethren, while the original asks something that only those who have drunk deeply of the mystery of Christ would see for themselves. Neither, in my judgment, is more or less evangelical than the other.

Lastly, the literary artistry of the 1962 text is manifestly superior to that of the revision. *Propriis,* in the original version, forms an overlapping double inclusion with *delictis* and *externis,*

[14] Eugenio Moeller and Ioanne Maria Clement, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* 160, t. 4 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1994), 256-57 lists forty-nine ancient manuscripts in which the 1962 prayer is found. It appears in Masses in times of tribulation *(tempore tribulationis),* for the security of places <*pro stabilitate locorum),* for charity *(pro caritate),* for the concord of the brothers <*pro concordia fratrum),* for rogation days, in Lent and in the time after Pentecost. It seems to have been used both continuously and widely from the eighth century until the reforms following Vatican II. A fiftieth codex has a variant according to which we ask not to be grieved by eternal punishment *(poenis non gravemur aetemis).*

and the result clause, *propriis oramus absolvi delictis, II non gravemur externis,* presents a perfectly balanced chiasm: *propriis/externis* (sins belonging to us/the sins of outsiders) and *oramus absolvi/non gravemur* (we pray to be set free/we may not be burdened). On account of our own sins, we send prayer up to heaven; on account of the sins of those outside the Church, we are in danger of being weighed down. Also, a slight rhyme produced by the unstressed ablative endings runs through the 1962 oration from beginning to end. The new prayer lacks the literary sophistication of the older prayer: there is neither double inclusion nor chiasm, and the rhyme scheme, because it is not picked up in the revised ending, is abandoned midway through the text.

Example 2: Exchanging a Negative for a Positive

Dumas's second example consists of two orations in which positive phrases were substituted for negative ones. Dumas explains:

> Frequently the direction of the phrase has been turned around, going from a negative to a more dynamic positive. Thus in the prayer after communion for the fourth Sunday in Paschal time, the text (Gelasian 272) referring to the Good Shepherd no longer reads: *diabolica non sinas incursione lacerari,*[15] but: *in aeternis pascuis collocare digneris.* In an analogous manner: *nostrae fragilitatis subsidium* (prayer over the offerings for the tenth Sunday *per annum)* moved from the eleventh Sunday after Pentecost, has become *nostrae caritatis augmentum.* [16]

[15] Gelasian 272 actually reads *"lacerare"* (see full text below), but Dumas is clearly correct in presenting the passive, rather than the active, infinitive.

[16] Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 268: "Souvent, le sens de la phrase ete retourne, passant du negatif a un positif plus dynamique. Ainsi, dans la priere apres la communion du 4me dimanche de Paques, le texte (Gelasian 272) relatif au hon Pasteur ne se lit plus : *diabolica non sinas incursione lacerari,* mais : *in aeternis pascuis collocare digneris.* D'une maniere analogue : *nostrae fragilitatis subsidium* (priere sur les offrandes de 10me dimanche *per annum,* venue du 1lme apres la Pentec6te) devient : *nostrae caritatis augumentum."*

GELASIAN[17] 272: ORATION OVER THE PEOPLE
WEDNESDAY, FIFTH WEEK OF LENT

Gregem tuum, pastor bone, placatus intende,
et oves quas praetioso sanguine filii tui redemisti,
diabolica non sinas incursione lacerare.

Appeased, hearken to your flock, 0 Good Shepherd,
and do not allow the sheep that you have redeemed with the precious blood of your Son
to be wounded by diabolical attack.

PAUL VI: POSTCOMMUNION
FOURTH SUNDAY OF PASCHAL TIME

Gregem tuum, pastor bone, placatus intende,
et oves quas praetioso filii tui sanguine redemisti,
in aeternis pascuis collocare digneris.

Appeased, hearken to your flock, 0 Good Shepherd,
and vouchsafe to place the sheep that you have redeemed with the precious blood of your Son
in eternal pastures.

1962:SECRET
ELEVENTH SUNDAY AFTER PENTECOST

Respice, Domine, quaesumus, nostram propitius servitutem,
ut quod offerimus sit tibi munus acceptum,
et sit nostrae fragilitatis subsidium.

Look mercifully upon our service, 0 Lord, we beseech you,
that what we offer may be a gift acceptable to you
and a support to our frailty.

PAUL VI: OVER THE OFFERINGS
TENTH SUNDAY *PER ANNUM*

Respice, Domine, quaesumus, nostram propitius servitutem,
ut quod offerimus sit tibi munus acceptum,
et nostrae caritatis augmentum.

Look mercifully upon our service, 0 Lord, we beseech you,
that what we offer may be a gift acceptable to you
and an increase of our charity.

In the first of the sets presented above, those who pray the original version are aware of danger and ask for God's continual

[17] All orations from the Gelasian Sacramentary are found in Leo Cunibert Mohlberg, *Liber sacramentorum romanae aeclesiae ordinis anni circuli* (Rome: Herder, 1960) where they are arranged in numerical order. The sacramentary that Dumas calls the "Gelasian" is also called the "Old Gelasian." It is a unique Frankish recension of a Roman Mass book whose actual title is that used by Mohlberg. The original manuscript is preserved in the Vatican Library *(Codex Vaticanus Reginensis latinus* 316). The ancient sacramentary was the presider's book. It contained all the texts he personally needed to celebrate Mass, administer the sacraments, preside at the Hours and so forth. See Cyrille Vogel, *Medieval Liturgy: An Introduction to the Sources,* trans. and rev. by William Storey and Niels Rasmussen (Washington, D.C.: The Pastoral Press, 1981) 64-65.

assistance; those who pray the revised version request only the attainment of their final goal. The oration in the Gelasian Sacramentary is a Lenten *super populum*, while the version in the Paul VI missal is a postcommunion in Paschal time. The change in both setting and use gives rise to several questions. What, for example, is the exact nature of the *super populum* prayers in the ancient missals? in other words, what sort of oration has been adapted? [18] Next, would a traditional Paschal postcommunion mention attacks of the devil, ask for protection in more delicately worded terms, or not mention any need at all?[19] Finally, is there an antecedent use for the expression *"aeternis pascuis"* that recommends its adoption here?

In the second set presented above, the revised version requests an increase in charity. Such a gift is a worthy object of petition, for an increase in charity is an increase in our participation in God's own life. It is an increase in grace. However, by their essential nature all the sacraments, and especially the Eucharist,

[18] The Missal of Pius V has prayers *super populum* only for the weekday Masses of Lent. The Gelasian Sacramentary and other ancient Mass books have prayers *super populum* for Masses throughout the entire year. Prayed at the end of Mass, these seem to be blessing prayers that ask that the fruits of the mysteries just celebrated be given to the faithful under an aspect that particularly befits the season or feast. In this setting, they connote far more than would be the case if the same prayer were used as the collect in the same Mass.

However, Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 264, comments concerning the *super populum:* "We note, finally, that certain prayers over the people formerly used in Lent, have retaken their place as collects" ("Notons, enfin que certaines prieres sur le peuple, autrefois utilisees en Careme, ont repris leur place de collectes"). He is thinking, evidently, only of the *super populum* of the 1962 Missal and, on the evidence of the Gelasian Sacramentary, his judgment that these prayers were originally collects appears to be wrong.

Missale Romanum (1970) reintroduces *"orationes super populum."* Under this title the third typical edition presents twenty-four prayers any one of which may be used at the discretion of the priest at the end of any celebration of Mass, or of the liturgy of the Word, or of the Office, or of a sacrament *(Orationes sequentes adhiberi possunt, ad libitum sacerdotis, in fine celebrationis Missae, aut liturgiae verbi, aut Officii, aut Sacramentorum).* The broad range of uses stipulated for these prayers "over the people," and the fact that whether they are used at all lies at the discretion of the celebrant, distinguishes them from the *super populum* of earlier missals wherein specific prayers are assigned to particular celebrations and are not optional.

[19] Certain of the Paschal postcommunions in the Gelasian Sacramentary do ask for protection: no. 477, Tuesday in the octave of Easter, asks for protection in general terms; no. 503, Sunday of the octave of Easter, begs that we be spared entanglement in the traps of error; no. 555, the third Sunday of Easter, asks that we be purged of vice and delivered from every danger.

are rites in which God is worshiped and charity or divine life is either bestowed Penance) or increased (all the rest, including Penance when it is received devotionally). A petition for an increase to be theologically precise, asks for what we believe whenever the mysteries are celebrated or The 1962 version, on the other hand, asks specific assistance: support for our weakness.

Changing the of a phrase from "'negative" to "positive" inevitably entails a change meaning, a that is verified in cited Dumas although he makes no mention of it. does, however, describe positive as "more " The when a positive phrase replaces one is negative varies according to the prayer the particular change made in In general, however, tension in orations excising mention threaten well-being Christ. In sense, the less than the source orations.

More important than however, is fact that texts a tian life that over course of each year. Dumas tells us that negative phrases were "frequently" made positive. If is the liturgical of Christian therefore of Christian spirituality, have been mention those struggle in editorial practice raises questions competencies to pursue: whether revised if so, those)

Example 3: a Restored Text

next is another m editors replaced a negative with a oneo In this case, however, the substitution was made only the prayer was restored to its earliest known form. teHs his readers:

It happened sometimes that beautiful texts, retained after a rigorous selection process or even perfectly restored, and put in the that suits them best, still do not give complete satisfaction. In this case a slight adaptation remained necessary. The most typical case is that of the collect of Easter Sunday that, rescued from the Gregorian deformation in which it passed into the Missal of Pius V and, made to conform to the best witness (Gdasian 463), ended with a regrettable collapse evoking death for the second time in a few words. *Vie* believed it good to put the ending in with paschal by replacing *a morte animae* with *in lumine vitae.*[20]

GELASIAN 463: COLLECT SUNDAY OF THE PASCH	PAUL VI: COLLECT SOLEMNITY OF THE RESURRECTION
1Deus, per Unigenitum tuum	Deus, qui hodierna die, per Unigenitum tuum,
aeternitatis nobis aditum devicta morte reserasti,	aeternitatis nobis devicta morte reserasti,
da nobis, quaesumus,	da quaesumus,
ut, qui resurrectionis sollemnia cohmus,	ut, qui resurrectionis dominicae sollemnia colimus,
per innovationem tui spiritus a morte animae resurgamus,	per innovationem tui Spiritus in lumine vitae resurgamus.
0 God, who unlocked for us the gate of eternity through your Only-begotten Son who conquered death,	0 God, who on this day unlocked for us the gate of eternity through your Only-Begotten Son who conquered death,
grant, we beseech you,	grant, we beseech you,
that we who celebrate the solemnity of resurrection,	that we who celebrate the solemnity of the Lord's resurrection,
may, through renewal of the Holy Spirit, rise from death of soul.	may, renewal of the Holy Spirit, rise in the of life.

[20] Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missd romain," 268: "II est arrive parfois que de beaux textes, retenus apres une selection severe ou meme parfaitement restaures, et mis a la place qui leur convenait le mieux, ne donnent pas encore entiere satisfaction. Dans ce cas, une !egere adaptation demeurait necessaire. Le cas plus typique est celui de la collecte du dimanche de Paqnes qui, degagee de sa deformation gregorienne passee clans le Missel de Pie V et rendue conforme au meilleur temoin (Gelasien 463), se terminait par lli1e chute regrettable evoqmmt la mort pour la deuxieme fois en qudques mots. On a cru bon de mettre la finale en harmonie avec la joie pascale en rempla<;ant *a morte animae* par *in lumine vitae."* The Pius V Easter collect of which Dumas speaks is: "Deus, qui hodierna die per Unigenitum tmnn aetemitatis nobis aditum, devicta morte, reserasti: vota nostra, qnae praeveniendo aspiras, etiam adjuvando prosequere" ("O God, who on this day has unlocked for us the gate of eternity through your Only-begotten Son who conquered death, attend our vows, which you inspire by your grace, also with your assistance").

The poetic parallelism of the Gelasian text is the literary expression of a theological truth: the bodily resurrection of Christ from physical death is the source of our spiritual resurrection from the death of sin. Therefore, what Dumas describes as a "regrettable collapse evoking death for the second time in a few words" is in fact something else entirely. It is an explicit acknowledgment that Christ's victory over physical death makes our escape from spiritual death possible.

One wonders, on this account, whether the criteria for "complete satisfaction" were not a little too subjective or even narrowly ideological. It seems likely that the editors saw the further "slight adjustment" to the Easter collect as nothing more than changing a negative to "a more dynamic positive." In this case, however, the revision is inconsistent with the essence of the celebration itself. The life we celebrate with Paschal joy is available only through the destruction of death and is simply not conceivable otherwise. To shy away from the mention of death's death is to blur the character of the life being celebrated. The good news of the Paschal mystery is definitive victory over death and all that belongs to its realm.

The "slight adjustment" that disrupts the theological parallelism of the oration also disturbs the parallelism of its compositional structure. From a purely poetic perspective, preserving the literary parallelism requires that the change introduced by the editors be accompanied by a like change in the first part of the oration whereby the Only-Begotten Son, instead of conquering death, rises to life. Here, as in example 1 above, the literary form of the original is attenuated in the revision.

Example 4: Changing Perspective

Durnas's next example concerns changes made to the collects of two saints. He writes:

> [I]t is easy to understand why, in certain collects for Christian leaders, the expression: *cu/mine imperii* was changed to *cura regiminis* (Saint Henry), while

terreno regno gave way to *terreni regiminis cura* (Saint Louis): a simple change of perspective for the same reality.[21]

1962: COLLECT FOR ST. HENRY (JULY 15)	PAUL VI: COLLECT FOR ST. HENRY (JULY 13)
Deus, qui hodierna die beatum Henricum confessorem tuum e terreni *cu/mine imperii* ad regnum aeternum transtulisti:	Deus, qui beatum Henricum, gratiae tuae ubertate 12raeventum, e terreni *cura regj_mini*sad su[!erna mirabiliter erexisti,
te su1212licesexoramus;	eius nobis intercessione largire,
ut, sicut illum, gratiae tuae ubertate 12raeventum, illecebras saeculi su12erarefecisti,	ut inter mundanas varietates
ita nos facias eius imitatione,	
mundi huius blandimenta vitare, et ad te 12uris mentibus 12ervenire.	12uris ad te mentibus festinemus.
0 God, who on this day brought blessed Henry, your confessor, *from the summit o(earthly sovereignty* into the eternal kingdom,	0 God, who having gone before blessed Hena with the abundance of your grace wondrously raised him *from care o(earthly government* unto things caelestial,
humbly we im[!lore you,	grant, through his intercession,
that, as you, going before him with the abundance of your grace, granted him to overcome the enticements of the age,	that amid the diverse things of this world
so may you grant us, throuiili imitation of him, to shun the allurements of this world and attain unto you with 12ure minds.	we may hasten towarQLunto you with [!ure minds.

[21] Ibid.: "D'autre part, ii est aise de comprendre pourquoi, clans certains collectes de chefs chretiens, !'expression: *culmine imperii* s'est change en: *cura regiminis* (saint Henri), tandis que *terreno regno* faissait place a *terreni regiminis cura* (saint Louis) : simple changement de perspective pour une meme realite."

1962: COLLECT FOR ST. LOUIS (AUGUST 25)

Deus, qui beatum Ludovicum confessorem tuum de *terreno regno* ad caelestis regni gloriam transtulisti:
eius, quaesumus, meritis et intercessione,
Regis regym Iesu Christi Filii tui facias nos esse consortes.

0 God, who brought blessed Louis, your confessor, from *an earthly kingdom* into the glory of the heavenly kingdom,
we beseech you through his merits and intercession,
grant us to be 12artakersof Iesus Christ, your Son, the King of kings.

PAUL VI: COLLECT FOR ST. LOUIS (AUGUST 25)

Deus, qui beatum Ludovicum, e *terreni regiminis cura* ad caelestis regni gloriam transtulisti,
eius, quaesumus, intercessione concede,
ut, 12er munera tem12oraha quae gerimus,
regnum mum guaeramus aeternum.

0 God, who brought blessed Louis from *care o[earthly government* into the glory of the heavenly kingdom,
we beseech you, grant through his intercession,
that, through the earthly res12onsibilitiesthat we bear,
we may seek your eternal kingdom.

The actual revisions to the two collects were far more extensive than Dumas reports. The revisions as a whole are underscored; those of the kind that Dumas mentions are also italicized. We will begin with the small change in each prayer that Dumas names.

Henry, a German king who became Holy Roman Emperor, died in 1024; Louis, king of France, died in 1297. The original collect for Henry describes his rule as it was understood in his own day. The revised version describes it in terms that reflect modern democratic sensibilities. It is anachronistic. The original collect for Louis does not explicitly mention his rule as king. This is supplied in the revision-but, again, terms more reflective of our historical circumstances than his own. The revision may have been designed to accommodate a modern mentality. Its effect, however, is to obscure the truth that holiness is found in persons of every age and social rank. Henry and Louis were not simply

entrusted with the care of earthly government; they were Christian rulers who became holy as they ruled because of the Christian way in which they ruled.

In order to appreciate the nature of the other changes made to the collect for Henry, we need to know what the editors sought to achieve in their revision of the sanctoral orations. Dumas tells us:

> In the sanctoral prayers we ... put greater emphasis on the personality of the saint, his mission in the Church, the practical lesson that his example gives to men of today. All the corrections or new compositions in the new missal proceed in this direction. [22]

When the editors excised mention of Henry "overcoming the enticements of his age" by the grace of God, they created a prayer that tells us nothing about Henry's personality or his way of holiness. The failure of the corrections to this prayer to proceed in the direction established for all the sanctoral orations suggests that the editors of the new missal did not view Henry's example of freedom from worldly enticements as something suitable for imitation by modern Christians, or that they thought the original collect posits too great an opposition between heaven and earth, or possibly both. Since these themes recur and become more explicit in later examples, we shall consider them as they reappear below.

There are three other differences that a more extensive treatment would examine that can only be identified here. The new text (1) omits the reverential formula "humbly we implore you," (2) asks that Henry intercede for us rather than that we imitate him (a change that flows directly from the decision to omit reference to Henry's particular virtue), and (3) severs the connection between purity of mind and freedom from the attractions of this world established by the original prayer.

[22] Ibid., 264-65: "Dans le sanctoral, on ... mieux mettre en valeur la personnalite du saint, sa mission dans l'Eglise, la le<;;onpratique que donne son exemple aux hommes d'aujourd'hui. C'est dans ce sens que vont toutes !es corrections ou creations qu'il sera facile de relever dans le nouveau Missel."

The change in the petition of the revised collect for Louis is striking and shares common features with the new oration for Henry. The 1962 prayer for Louis begs that we may have partnership with Christ who is the King of kings-here, particularly, the King of King Louis-whereas the revised text asks that we may seek, but does not specify that we also find, "your eternal kingdom." The petition of the revised text, therefore, is stunningly effete in comparison to that of the original collect which seeks nothing less than full incorporation into Christ. Similarly, the old collect for Henry begs that God make us attain unto, or reach *(pervenire),* himself, whereas the new version asks only that we hasten *(festinimus)* unto him. The verb *pervenire* stipulates arrival, *festinare* does not.

A second feature common to both revised collects is a new emphasis on the things of this world which, in addition, are presented in a wholly positive light. In the revised prayer for Henry, we hasten "amid the diverse things of this world," instead of asking, as in the original version, to be able to shun its allurements. In the somewhat convoluted revised collect for Louis, we ask God to grant, through the intercession of the saint, that we may seek his eternal kingdom "through the earthly responsibilities that we bear." In the source text we ask to be granted partnership with Christ "through the merits and intercession" of the saint.

The changes to these prayers, which are much more extensive than Dumas indicates, highlight the methodological importance of returning to the sources. Those who desire to gain a full and accurate understanding of the work of the *Consilium* must examine all the pertinent primary texts, and not rely exclusively upon even those articles, like Dumas's own, that were written by the reformers themselves for the express purpose of describing and explaining their work. The number of changes is too great, and their nature too substantial, for even the most thorough summary to be adequate.

B) Centonized

In the section devoted to the creation of new texts, Dumas describes a practice he "centonization," whereby new prayers are composed by stitching together phrases from *t<No* or more ancient orations. Dumas explains: "This is a method that allowed a revival of the ancient euchological treasury by using best texts so as to present them in a new form in the traditional Roman style."[23] The rest of our examples present the centonized texts cited by Dumas so that the reader can see the process firsthand and judge the success of particular instances.

Example *5*

Dumas us that the truth of the text was the first concern of the redactors,[24] and that care the manifested itself in changes to a great many prayers. Among these were those that were thought to posit too great an opposition between heaven and earth. The following remarks of Dumas are cited to introduce the first centonized prayer because it seems also to illustrate how the editors dealt with texts that they judged to place heaven and earth unfitting opposition:

Concern for the truth required adaptation in the case of numerous orations, as we have said above. For example, many texts, for a long while too well-known, put heaven and earth into radical opposition: from whence the antithetical couplet oft repeated in the old missal: *ter1enadespicereet amare caelestia,* which, though a right understanding is possible, is very easily badly translated. An adaptation was imperative that, without harming the truth, took account of the modern mentality and the directives of Vatican Il. Thus the prayer after communion for the second Sunday of Advent says quite justifiably: *sapienter perpendere* in place of the word *despicere* which is so often poorly understood.[25]

[23] Ibid., 263: "C' est iii1 procede qui a permis de renouveler le tresor euchologique ancien, en utilisant !es meilleurs textes pow- !es presenter sous une forme nouvelle, dans le style romain traditionnel."

[24] Ibid., 263-65.

[25] Ibid., 267: "Le besoin d'adaptation s'est revele necessaire clans le cas de nombreuses oraisons, par souci de verite, comme nous l'avons dit ci---dessus.Par exemple, plusiers textes, depuis longtemps trop comms, mettaient en opposition radicale la terre et le ciel ; d' ou le

VERONESE[26] 173: COLLECT AsCENSION	VERONESE 1053: SECRET MONTH OF SEPTEMBER	PAUL VI: POSTCOMMUNION FIRST SUNDAY OF ADVENT
Da nobis, Domine, non terrena sapere sed amare caelestia et, inter praetereuntia constitutos, iam nunc inhaerere mansuns.	Prosint nobis, Domine, frequentata mysteria, quae nos a cupiditatibus terrenis expediant et instituant amare caelestia.	Prosint nobis, *quaesumus,* Domine, frequentata mysteria, *quibus* nos, inter praetereuntia *ambulant es,* iam nunc *instituis* amare caelestia et inhaerere mansuris.
Grant us, 0 Lord, not to savor of what is earthly, but to love what is heavenly, and, placed in the midst of passing things, already now to cling to what is lasting.	0 Lord, may the mysteries we have celebrated profit us, which free us from earthbound desires and cause us to love the things of heaven.	0 Lord, *we beseech you,* may the mysteries that we have celebrated profit us, *by which you* now already *cause* us, who walk in the midst of passing things, to love heavenly things and to cling to what is lasting.

couple antithetique, souvent repete dans l'ancien Missel : *terrrenedespicereet amarecaelestia* possible de bien comprendre mais tres facile de mal traduire. Une adaptation s'imposait done qui, sans nuire a la verite, tenait compte de la mentalite modeme et des directives de Vatican II. Ainsi, la priere apres la communion du 2me dimanche de)'Avent dit tres justement : *sapienterperpendere,*au lieu du mot : *despicere,*si souvent ma! compris."

[26] All Veronese orations are found in Leo Cunibert Mohlberg, Leo Eizenhiifer, Petrus Siffrin, eds., *SacramentariumVeronense,*Rerum Ecclesasticarum Documentas, Series maior, Fontes 1 (Rome: Casa Editrice Herder, 1956) where they appear in numerical order. The so-called Veronese Sacramentary (or Leonine Sacramentary) is not a true sacramentary, for it was never used in public worship. Rather, it is a private collection of Roman formularies. The manuscript dates from the first quarter of the seventh century but the prayers in it are dated variously from 400-560 AD (Vogel, *Medieval Liturgy,38,* 43). See ibid., 38-45 for a description of the codex (Cod. Bibi. Capit. Veron. LXXXV [80]) and a survey of scholarly opinions concerning it.

Because the English cognate is "despise" we are disposed to find the Latin expression *terrena et amare caelestia* rather harsh" fact *terrena* is better away or refuse to earthly things'" than despise the things vocabulary of the two orations coHection the prayers transcribed above, like collect for Saint Henry already examined, is not so even though three texts do present earthly and heavenly things as potentially or actually competition for our affections" they go so far as to suggest an opposition that is inconsistent with orthodox Christianity is a subject a more extensive treatment can be provided here" What is dear, however, is the reformers made the antithetical of the Veronese texts synthetic omitting tvvo phrases: *non terrena sapere*, "not to take on smell/flavor of the things of earth"; [27] *cupiditatibus terrenis* "they may set [us] free from disordered desires for things of "

The in the Paul postcornmunion are those supplied by the revisers" The words and *instituis* are itaHdzed even though different grammatical forms of the same appear Veronese because the change in significantly the theological contours of prayero The new theology must be credited to the revisers.

In Veronese the mysteries cause us to love the heaven. In the Paul text, the mysteries become instruments which God causes us to heavenly things. The new wording to do justice to the belief sacraments actually cause what signify" The new oration is ambiguous, permitting not requiring a purely symbolic view of sacrament. composing this postcommunion prayer, the revisers began with an oration that unambiguously expresses the Catholic understanding of sacramental efficacy and changed it to an oration which few Reformation Christians disagree. [23]

[27] Meaning that we are not to take our inspiration or character from them.

[28] The issue here is not whether sacraments are insllrumental causes, but whether the oration affirms their efficacy. Aquinas's understanding of the instrumental causality of sacraments does not preclude their having power to sacramental effect-indeed, just

The modern editors also substituted *ambulantes,* a present participle active, for *constitutos,* a perfect participle passive. This exchanges explicit acknowledgment of a divinely willed condition (placed) for a self-description (walking, living). Like the new collects for Saints Henry and Louis, this new postcommunion calls greater attention to our situation in this world. Here, however, an infelicity is introduced. Those who pray the new prayer inform God about his actions and their own: "by which you cause us, who walk in the midst of passing things, to love heavenly things."

Example 6

Dumas tells us that the present prayer over the offerings for December 22 was centonized from three different orations, all found in the Veronese collection.

VERONESE 666: COLLECT MONTH OF JULY	VERONESE 1261: SECRET BIRTH OF THE LORD	VERONESE 146: SECRET MONTH OF APRIL
Auxiliare, Domine, supplicibus tuis, ut opem tuae gratiae consequantur, qui in tua pietate confidunt.	Exsultantes, Domine, cum muneribus ad altaria ueneranda concurrimus: quia et omnium nobis hodie summa votorum et causa nostrae redemptionis exorta est.	Tribue nos, domine, quaesumus, donis tuis libera mente servire, ut purificante nos gratia tua, iisdem, quibus famulamur, mysteriis emundemur.
Aide, 0 Lord, your suppliants that they may obtain the help of your grace who trust in your mercy.	Rejoicing, we hasten with gifts to your holy altar, 0 Lord, for today, the highest of all desires and the cause of our redemption has appeared.	Grant us, 0 Lord, we beseech you, to wait upon your gifts with a free mind, that, through your grace purifying us, we may be cleansed by the same mysteries which we serve.

the opposite: "if we hold that a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace, we must needs allow that there is in the sacraments a certain instrumental power of bringing about the sacramental effects" (*STh* III, q. 62, a. 4).

PAUL VI: PRAYER OVER THE OFFERINGS
DECEMBER 22

In tua pietate confidentes, Domine,	Trusting in your mercy, 0 Lord,
cum muneribus ad altaria veneranda concurrimus	we hasten with gifts to your holy altar,
ut, tua purficante nos gratia,	that, through your grace purifying us,
iisdem quibus famulamur mysteriis emundemur.	we may be cleansed by the same mysteries which we serve.

Phrases from each of the Veronese orations were cut and pasted to form the new prayer over the offerings. Only one word underwent a change of form *(confidunt* to *confidentes)* and not a single new word was introduced.

Veronese 1261 contains no petition. Those who pray it state their motive for running to the altar with gifts: the highest of all desires and the cause of redemption has appeared. Still, they ask for nothing. Nor is there an *ut* clause: there is nothing that the faithful expect as they bring their gifts. The Savior's birth and the joy of it have left them both breathless and wanting for nothing; the oration is a burst of pure delight. The Paul VI oration is also without a petition, though the presence of the *ut* clause gives it a somewhat different character. Those who pray the new oration seem more to be informing God of their purpose than to be carried away by sentiments proper to the liturgical moment.

Example 7

The new prayer over the offerings for Ash Wednesday was centonized from two ancient sources, a Gelasian secret and a Bergamese preface.[29] The Gelasian oration appears at the beginning of Lent, the Bergamese preface in the Mass immediately before Palm Sunday.

[29] The Bergamese Sacramentary is a ninth- or tenth-century Ambrosian or Milanese rite text-that is, it is a Western, non-Roman sacramentary. The manuscript is cited as Bergamo, S. Alessandro in Colonna, *Codex* 242 (Vogel, *Medieval Liturgy,* 109, 437).

GE1ASIAN106: SECRET SUNDAY AT BEGINNING OF LENT	BERGAMESE 454: [30] PREFACE	PAUL VI: PRAYER OVER THE OFFERINGS ASH WEDNESDAY
Sacrificium, Domine, quadragesimalis initii sollemniter immolamus te, Domine, deprecantes, ut cum epularum restrictione carnalium a noxiis quoque voluptatibus temperemur.	Vere dignus ... aeterne Deus, cuius nos misericordia praevenit ut bene agamus subsequitur ne frustra agamus, accendit intentionem qua ad bona opera peragenda inardescamus tribuit efficaciam qua haec ad perfectum perducere valeamus. Tuam ergo clementiam indefessis vocibus obsecramus, ut nos ieiunii victimis, a peccatis mundatos, ad celebrandam unigeniti filii tui domini nostri passionem facias esse devotos, per quern maiestatem.	Sacrificium quadragesimalis initii sollemniter immolamus, te, Domine, deprecantes, ut per paenitentiae caritatisque labores a noxiis voluptatibus temperemus, et a peccatis mundati, ad celebrandam Filii tui passionem mereamur esse devoti.
0 Lord, we solemnly offer unto you this sacrifice at the beginning of Lent, imploring, 0 Lord, that with the restriction of carnal feasting we may also abstain from sinful pleasures.	Truly ... eternal God, whose mercy goes before us that we may act well, follows after lest we act in vain, sets afire intention, by which we may be roused unto the performance of good works, grants power by which we are able bring these to completion. We, therefore, implore your clemency with unwearied voices, that cleansed from sins through the sacrifices of fasting, you may cause us to be faithful in celebrating the passion of your Only-begotten Son our Lord through whom ...	We solemnly offer this sacrifice at the beginning of Lent, imploring you, Lord, that through the labors of penitence and charity we may abstain from sinful pleasures, and, cleansed from sin, we may be able to be faithful in celebrating the passion of your Son.

[30] Angelo Paredi, *Sacramentarium Bergomense: Manoscritto de/ secolo IX de/la bib/ioteca di S. Alessandro in Colonna in Bergamo,* VI (Bergamo: Edizioni "Monurnenta Bergomense, 1962), 146. The text is from the Mass entitled *"Sabb. in tradit. symbol"* (Saturday for handing on the Creed).

The Gelasian secret begs God that the fast from food may be accompanied by a like fast from sin. The first half the Bergamese preface is a to God's mercy provides the motive for the petition God cause us, by the fast his mercy inspires and makes possible, to cleansed from sin faithful celebrating the passion of Son. If we look at what the Paul prayer omits or adapts, as weH as what it adopts from the Gelasian Sacramentary, we see that restraint in the matter of food is replaced by the of penitence and charity, the preposition *"cum"* by the preposition *"per."* In the Gelasian prayer, it is God who gives the grace of abstaining from pleasures; in the Paul VI text, this comes about through our ascetical labors. Similarly, the word *"facias"* has been omitted from the portion of text adapted from the Bergamese prefaceo In the preface, God causes us, cleansed of sin, to be faithful in the celebration of his Son's passion; the Paul VI oration, again it is our ascetical efforts that produce these effectso

The crucial question is whether the Bergamese preface and the Paul VI prayer express the same understanding agency, or to put it another way, whether the efficacy accorded our labors the new prayer is the same as that which is to sacrifices of fasting in the older text. The tvvo statements are grammatically equivalent, but do not carry the same weight in their respective contextso The first part of the Bergamese preface unequivocally affirms that God's grace precedes and accompanies every meritorious deed. The text as a whole acknowledges that salutary acts are both from God and their human agents. Paul oration, which makes no mention of our need for God's grace, is vague about the graced origins of our striving and its every result Compared to the source prayers, the Paul text has a much weaker and less precise theology of grace.

Example 8

Dumas's last example of a centonized prayer is the new postcommunion for Sunday. Its sources are a collect and

postcommunion from the Mass for Palm Sunday in the Gelasian Sacramentary.

GELASIAN332: POSTCOMMUNION PALM SUNDAY	GELASIAN330: COLLECT PALM SUNDAY	PAUL VI: POSTCOMMUNION PALM SUNDAY
Sacro munere satiati supplices te, Domine, deprecamur,	Deus, quern diligere et amare iustitia est, ineffabilis gratiae tuae in nobis dona multiplica;	Sacro munere satiati supplices te, Domine, deprecamur,
ut qui debitae servitutis celebramus officio, salutationis tuae suscipiamus augmentum.	ut qui fecisti nos morte Filii tui sperare quod credimus, fac nos eodem resurgente pervenire quod ten dimus.	ut qui fecisti nos morte Filii tui sperare quod credimus, facias nos eodem resurgente pervenire quo ten dimus.
Sated with sacred gift, humbly we beseech you, Lord, that we who celebrate in the duty of bounden service may receive an increase of your salvation.	0 God, whom to love and esteem is justice, increase in us the gifts of your ineffable grace, that you who have made us, by the death of your Son, to hope for what we believe, make us, by the rising of the same, to reach that toward which we aim.	Sated with sacred gift, humbly we beseech you, Lord, that you who have made us, by the death of your Son, to hope for what we believe, may make us, by the rising of the same, to reach whither we aim.

The verb "aim" is an acceptable but weak rendering of the Latin verb *tendere* which means "to direct oneself" or "to direct the course of one's life," as well as to "to stretch" or "to bend." *As* such the new and old orations do not simply ask that we reach our goal, but assume that we are applying ourselves to reaching it

consciously consistently. The new text is a demonstrates centonization, risky itself, can impressive results when the theology, not simply the words, of the texts is into new composition.

The revisers also composed new orations transposing biblical, patristic, and texts, and, instances, wrote entirely new orations themselves. Dumas's article cites examples of these also, it be too great an undertaking to examine them here.

PRINCIPLES UNDERGIRDING THE DECISIONS OF THE REDACTORS

Mentality

correctly identifying the primary that directed the decisions the reformers, then accurately assessing the principles and their application, is a matter of the highest importance. Dumas never explicitly foremost principle guided the redactors. He however, repeatedly speak of the reforms accommodating the modem person, contemporary sensibilities, or current historical drcumstances. [31]

[31] See for examples in Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missd romain," "… of a Missal that, while it must remain faithful to the Roman style characterized by the complementary qualities of clarity, density, and sobriety, had to open itself to contemporary aspirations-according to the very fruitful directives of Vatican H" (263); "At a more profound level, liturgical texts, no longer failing to recognize the horizontal dimension, have opened themselves to the human preoccupations which constitute the major concern of the Church today" (264); "Without doubt, because of the complexity of our life dominated as it is industrial technology, these values exert a greater attraction upon our contemporaries for whom the sober hannony of Roman art is prized above the artificial elegance of the Baroque" (265); "In the litm'gical renewal, in particular, concern for the truth and simplicity was, for the revisers, imperative from the outset that the texts and the rites may be perfectly--or at least much better-accommodated to the modern mentality to which it must give expression while neglecting nothing of the traditional treasury to which it remains the conduit" (266); "In the oration after the third lesson of the Paschal vigil, slavery 'in Egypt' has become 'slavery under Pharaoh' for reasons one can imagine" (268). Also, statements presented eadie1 in the essay pertain in the present context: "Other texts, having become shocking for the man of today, have been frankly (267); "On the other hand, it is

His remarks suggest that the revisers labored under the conviction that changes us and our world had rendered forms and words of our liturgical rites somewhat obsolete and that these, therefore, needed to be changed. Further, examination of the examples he cites seems to verify this: phrases that were thought to be difficult or shocking for modem persons were corrected or adjusted. Dumas's constantly reiterated concern that the liturgy be "'accommodated to the modem mentality" raises the question of whether the primary referent governing the work of the reformers was, in fact, the modern person, or, to express the same possibility in a somewhat different way, whether the reformers understood the task of reform to consist reshaping the liturgy according to the suppositions the modem age as they ,.,,,,,.,.,."""""""" them . .

To be dear, the issue is not whether liturgy is historically and conditioned; inevitably it is.[32] Nor is issue whether the liturgy must the human beings who celebrate surely it must. The liturgy communicates divine realities, the saving fruits of the Paschal Mystery, to beings in S3.cramental celebrations are, like Christ, fully and fully Liturgical or sacramental rites, therefore, must both the divine mysteries their recipients. This requires fidelity to the truth Christ and to what he himself has revealed to us about our nature. That is, liturgy must embrace express a view of the human person that accords with gospel revelation.

If the reformers gave to the of age rather than to the justification and sanctification that is accomplished through liturgical incorporation into Christ, or if uncritical acceptance of modern philosophy's view of the person led them to set modes of ritual expr-ession

easy to understand why, in certain collects for Christian leaders, the expression: *culmine imperii* [at the summit of sovereignty] was changed to *cura regiminis* [care of government] (St. Henry), while *terreno regno* [earthly kingdom] gave way to *terreni regiminis wra* [care of earthly government] (Saint Louis): a simple change of perspective for the same reality" (268).

[32] Indeed, certain prayers and even whole celebrations, for example the Feast of the Most Holy Rosary, had their origins in historical events.

The

[33] Timothy Vaverek, "Cardinal Newman and Liturgical 3, no. *2* (1998): H-17, at 14. Vaverek's article discusses Newrliii2n's seven notes for a1!;t1r1glusit1u1g development from corruption and applies them to liturgical development.

[34] See, for examples, in Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missd romain," under the su bh•ea<1mg "historical truth": "[the revisers] of the missal discarded without appeal the recollections of hagiographical legends: the dove of Saint Scholastica, the maritime exploit of Saint the mirncuious of Saint Peter (264); under me subheading "truth of inspiration and style": "It suffices to dedare that we no longer find in the orations mention of fasts that are no longer observed, nor of torrents of tears that were never shed. Many superlatives and excessive adverbs, even if tolerable in Latin, have been pitilessly eliminated (ibid.); under the subheading "simp!iciry": "It suffices, therefore, that each prayer express the main point of its content without repetition or detours, submissive to the principles for a homily: to have something to say, to know how to say it, and to stop after it has been said" and "the elimination of ... types of prayers which in other respects are inclined to be obscure or tedious when accurately rendered into modern languages" (265); under the subheading "adaptation," something we quoted above: "from whence the antithetical couplet oft repeated in the old missal: *terrena et amare caelestia,* which, though a understanding is possible, is very easily badly t-ranslated" (267); and "changes the expression: *non gravernur extemis,* difficult to understand, to:

unrelated to, the matter addressed in the preceding section. Indeed, some of the same sentences could be cited in both connections. Here, however, we are interested not in why texts were changed but how they were changed-that is, what kinds of things were included and excluded, and what modes of expression were accepted and rejected.

After remarking that the list of things emended out of concern for the "truth of inspiration and style" is too long for him to itemize, Dumas gives two examples: "we no longer find in the orations mention of fasts that are no longer observed, nor of torrents of tears that were never shed."[35] The two, evidently, are representative types of a great number of different changes. In presenting them together under a single heading Dumas, I believe, conflates two issues. The first is whether the truth of an oration depends upon its reflecting the actual situation of those who pray. The second is whether truth requires that language always be used literally.

Paul VI changed the laws on fasting so that those between the ages of 21 and 59 ceased to be bound under pain of mortal sin to fast on all the weekdays of Lent.[36] Only two days of obligatory fast remain: Ash Wednesday and Good Friday, though according to the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* fasting itself remains one of the principal forms of penance in Christian life.[37] The word "fast," whether appearing as a noun or a verb *(ieiunium* and *ieiunare),* is found three times in orations of the Paul VI Missal; two of these are in texts used exclusively on Ash Wednesday.[38] The new missal uses the word solely in reference to fasting from

fraterna dimittere studeamus" (268).

[35] Ibid., 264: "Qu'il suffice d'assurer que !'on ne trouve plus, dans Jes oraisons, mention des jefines qui ne sont plus observes ni des torrents de larmes qui ne furent verses."

[36] *"Paenitemini"* (Apostolic Constitution on Penance, *17February1966),ActaApostolicae Sedis* 58, no. 3 (31March1966): 184.

[37] *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* 2d ed. (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2000), para. 1434. The other two are almsgiving and prayer.

[38] Schnitker and Slaby, eds., *Concordantia verbalia missalis romani,* col. 1138. *"Ieiunium"* appears in the collect and postcommunion for Ash Wednesday; it also appears in the collect for the third Sunday of Lent. In addition, *"ieiunium"* is found in two prefaces: the proper preface for the first Sunday of Lent and the fourth Lenten preface.

food. The word "fast" appears thirty-six times in the orations of the 1962 Missal, where it is used in reference to both fasting from food and fasting from vice.[39]

Dumas sees the change as required by "concern for the truth."[40] He evidently assumes that truth requires orations to reflect the circumstances of the praying community. It is not the nature of liturgical prayer, however, simply to reflect the congregation's situation. Rather, the prayers of the liturgy place appropriate sentiments on our lips and in our hearts and minds, and present us with ideals to which we are meant to aspire, and which we are called by God to attain, even as they give us words to plead from God the grace of attaining them.

Therefore, to omit mention of fasting in our liturgical texts simply because we are no longer obliged to rigorous fasting under pain of serious sin seems not to be a matter of truth, but of excessive literalism. The twofold effect is that liturgical prayer fails to present us with a full picture of how we ought to be living and permits us to forget that a supererogatory fast is a great good.

According to Dumas, "concern for the truth" manifested itself in changes to a great many texts besides those that contained references to fasting. His declaration invites further examination of the missal so that we may become aware of all the ways in which the orations have been adjusted to fit the circumstances of the faithful and of how these adjustments, in turn, have changed the liturgical depiction of Christian life and practice.

Dumas also tells us that the editors excised the mention of "torrents of tears that were never shed." Weeping is a physical act, but it also describes a spiritual state-namely, that of contrition and repentance. "Torrents of tears" is a figurative way of naming that state. Similarly, Dumas tells us that "In the oration

[39] Andre Pflieger, *Liturgicae orationis concordantia verbalia, prima pars: Missale romanum* (Rome: Herder, 1964), 293-94. The actual number of prayers is thirty-four, but two of them are used twice. A prayer that speaks of fasting from vice follows the lesson from Micah on Ember Saturday in September: "Grant us, we beseech you, 0 Lord, so to abstain from bodily feasting that we may likewise fast from (our) besetting vices" ("Praesta quaesumus, Domine, sic nos ab epulis abstinere camalibus: ut a vitiis irruentibus pariter jejunemus").

[40] For another explanation see Auge, "Le collete de! proprio de! tempo nel nuovo messale," 288-89.

after the third lesson of the Paschal vigil, slavery 'in Egypt' has become slavery 'under Pharoah' for reasons that one can imagine."[41] This prayer is the eleventh and last that we shall examine. It reads:

1962 MISSAL: ORATION AFTER THE FOURTH PROPHECY OF THE PASCHAL VIGIL[42]

Deus, cuius antiqua miracula	0 God, whose miracles of old
etiam nostris temporibus coruscare sentimus,	we perceive to shine forth even in our own times,
dum, guod uni populo a persecutione Aegyptiaq liberando dexterae tuae potentia contulisti,	since what you granted to people in freeing them from Egyptian persecution with the power of your right arm,
id in salutem gentium per aquam regenerationis operaris,	that you worked unto the salvation of the nations through the water of regeneration;
praesta, ut in Abrahae filios et in Israeliticam dignitatem totius mundi transeat plenitudo.	grant that the fullness of the whole world may pass into the sons of Abraham and the honor of Israel [literally Israelite worthiness].

The actual phrase the 1962 Missal, then, is *persecutione Aegyptiaca,"* that is, Egyptian persecution, not "slavery in Egypt." In the Paul VI Missal, it becomes *"a persecutione Pharaonis,"* from the persecution of Pharaoh. The images of the original oration are national and are played off against one another couplets: one people/the nations // Egyptian/Israelite. God's act that sets one people free from another people is repeated, in a greatly heightened sense, for aH nations in the waters of baptism. The prayer recalls that salvation passed from one nation to the whole world, and begs that the fullness of salvation granted in Christ may now pass, as it were, back into the people who were the to experience God's saving acts: the

[41] Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 268: "Dans les oraisons de la Vigile pascale, apres la 3me lecture, la servitude 'en Egypte' est devenue la servitude 'sous Pharaon' pour !es raisons que l'on devine."

[42] The third lesson of the Paschal Vigil in the Paul VI iectionary and the fourth lesson in the 1962 Missal are both from Exodus 14-15. Both are followed, except for the differences noted in the body of the essay, by the same oration.

people of Israel. To change "Egyptian" to "of Pharaoh" not only disturbs the parallelism and poetry of the prayer, it betrays a literalism that expects very little of the faithful by way of knowledge of salvation history, spiritual imagination, or capacity for nonliteral modes of expression. If the faithful are so poorly prepared for full, active, and conscious participation in liturgical celebrations, the appropriate remedy is sound catechesis. Lowering the level of a liturgical text only lowers the level of participation that it makes possible because it correspondingly diminishes the capacity of the text to engage us.

Dumas's remarks about both tears and Pharaoh, as well as the fact that the new missal restricts its use of the word "fast" to the physical fast from bodily nourishment,[43] raise the question of whether the reformers shied away from symbolic forms of expression to a significant degree.[44] If so, a great number of questions arise in consequence. Fully exploring the ramifications would require the help of scholars with diverse areas of expertise: anthropology, liturgy, philosophy, theology, art, and literature, to name the most obvious.

CONCLUSION

Our examination of the revisions to the Roman Missal has been confined to the orations that Antoine Dumas, an advisor to the *Consilium* and member of the Sacred Congregation for Divine Worship, presented to us for study. In examining only eleven of approximately fifteen hundred orations, and these somewhat

[43] Use of the word "fast" in reference to vice has a long history; it is prominent already in the writings of the fifth-century monk John Cassian (e.g., *De institutis* V.10-11and21-22).

[44] The likelihood of this seems confirmed by two other examples, although they are of a different order because they do not involve orations and are not mentioned by Dumas. One pertains to the lectionary and the other to the psalter. In the 1962 Missal, the first Scripture lesson in the Masses for the evangelists Matthew and Mark is Ezekiel 1:10-14, the text that names the four living creatures, man, lion, ox, and eagle, that became the symbols of the four evangelists. In the new lectionary, Ezekiel 1:10-14 is not used at all-even though the lectionary was specifically designed to broaden the faithful's liturgical exposure to the Word of God, and the passage itself continues to exert noteworthy iconographic influence in our churches. The second example is the decision to remove the "cursing psalms" from the psalm cycle of the Liturgy of the Hours.

rapidly, we have not, obviously, established anything at all about the character or quality of the orations in the new missal. These eleven orations, however, were put forward by Dumas as illustrative of the principles of revision, and for this reason merit close attention.

Common to all eleven is a presentation of Christian life in which nothing threatens well-being in Christ or casts a shadow of any sort. Only two words in the revised orations suggest that things are sometimes difficult. The first is *"studeamus"* of *"fraterna dimittere studeamus"* in the prayer over the offerings for the third Sunday of Lent (example 1, above). The verb *studere* has a range of meanings extending from "try" and "strive" to "be eager to" and "be zealous for." The second is the word *"labores"* in the prayer over the offerings for Ash Wednesday (example 7, above). *Labor* in Latin is a strong word which the English cognate "labor" does not quite equal, for the Latin generally describes work that brings forth sweat. Apart from these two examples, about which it could be argued that functional equivalents are supplied in the revisions, all the actual or potential difficulties of Christian life named in the source texts have been excised from the new ones. For the prayers we have examined these are: spiritual dangers posed by the sins of non-Christians, attacks from diabolic incursions, human frailty, worldly enticements, and disordered desires.

Authentic Christian life is never without its hardships in this world. We have promised in Baptism to die with Christ, and dying is not easy. The tendency to exclude mention of difficulties that we all experience in the nature of things seems especially ill-advised because the matter at issue is not polite conversation, in which it is sometimes wiser not to mention unpleasant things, but prayer to our Lord. If we fail to speak of such things to him, we also fail to seek his help with them.

Excising mention of things that pose dangers to spiritual well-being includes the practice of editing orations so that they present the things of this world in a neutral or wholly positive light. Dumas, in his discussion of *"terrena despicere et amare caelestia,"*

identifies "the modem mentality and the directives of Vatican II" as the two reasons for revisions of this kind. Nowhere in his essay, however, does he explicitly name either the directives of the council or the aspects of the modem mentality that he judges to have required such revisions. This raises an important question for further study: whether the Fathers of Vatican II actually modified Church teaching about the Christian's relationship to the things of this world in a way that required amendment to our liturgical texts, and, if so, whether the actual changes made to the prayers implemented the revised teaching with appropriate nuance.

An important doctrinal issue presents itself in the new postcommunion for the first Sunday of Advent. Comparison with its source (Veronese 1053) reveals that the Paul VI oration forsakes a clearly worded Catholic sacramental theology for something that, in its vagueness, is utterly consistent with much Protestant sacramental thought. This raises a question that has significant pastoral implications and, therefore, merits further investigation: whether the fullness of Catholic truth expressed in the original orations was preserved in the revisions. Orations which are found to have suffered losses in this respect need to be restored, and their deficiencies supplied by sound catechesis in the meantime.

The centonized prayer over the offerings for Ash Wednesday is a second example in which the fullness of Catholic truth is not preserved in the new oration. The theological issue here is the Catholic doctrine of grace. In his essay, Dumas writes: "We are able to say that henceforth liturgical prayer helps us better to understand that the kingdom of God is constructed here below out of humble human realities."[45] This statement, while amenable to orthodox interpretation, does not tell the whole story. Humble human realities cannot attain to, never mind be the raw material for, the kingdom of God unless God's grace, as the Bergamese preface puts it, "goes before us that we may act well, follows after lest we act in vain, sets afire intention, by which we may be

[45] Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau rnissel rornain," 264: "On peut dire que, desorrnais, la priere liturgique aide rnieux a cornprendre que le royaurne de Dieu se construit ici-bas, a partir des humbles realites hurnaines."

roused unto the performance of good works, and grants power by which we are able bring these to completion." Christian faith tells us that humble human nature is called to an end infinitely beyond the scope of its natural powers, nothing less than everlasting interpersonal communion with the Blessed Trinity, and that it is made capable of reaching this end solely by divine grace. Dumas's failure to mention God's grace is the more grave in the context we cite precisely because he is stipulating a principle that guided the reform. Furthermore, this principle, with its theological defect uncorrected, seems to have guided the centonization process that excised mention of God's work as the new prayer over the offerings for Ash Wednesday was stitched together from the older texts. The very important question that arises in this connection is to what extent the failure to give due acknowledgment to the need for God's grace permeates the new missal, for the faithful are ill-served by prayers of a Pelagian hue.

In three of the examples we saw that the literary devices that give depth, beauty, and polish to the original orations-indeed, that draw us into their abundance-do not appear in the revised texts. Nor were we able to discover comparable compositional sophistication in the new orations. This is no small matter. Form and content are intrinsically united in all literary composition; together they are the text and, because we are incarnate spirits, together they engage us. On this account, it seems likely that redactions which lower the literary quality of liturgical texts correspondingly diminish their capacity to draw the faithful into full, active, and conscious participation. [46] This, together with the editorial practice of excising phrases or concepts that are "difficult to understand," raises several questions for scholars to pursue: whether the faithful are drawn to fuller participation by prayers of unexceptional literary quality or by those of greater sophistication and beauty; whether the faithful are more actively engaged by prayers whose full meaning is immediately comprehensible or by those whose depths continue to unfold as they are heard again and again; whether the prayers of the new

[46] Cf. *Sacrosanctum Concilium* 14.

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[47] Edmond Bishop, "The Genius of the Roman F.ite," in *Liturgica Historica: Papers on the Liturgy and Religious Life of the Western Church* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1918), 3. I am grateful to NeilJ. Roy of The Catholic University of America for suggesting that I quote Bishop in this context.

[48] Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 265: "obeiss::mtaux principes requis pour une bmme homelie: avoir quelque chose adire, "'1voirle dire, s'an:eter apres l'avoir dit."

[49] For example, "the revisers ... of the missal discarded without appeal the recollections of hagiographical legends: the dove of Saint Scholastica, the maritime of Saint Raymond, the miraculous designation of Saint Peter Chrysologus" ("les reviseurs ... ont

tendencies, clearly evident in such a small sampling of texts, reflect Enlightenment preoccupations and presuppositions. They raise the question of whether Enlightenment presuppositions have shaped our new liturgical books and rites, and, if so, in what ways, to what extent, and with what effect-all issues that merit exploration by scholars with the requisite philosophical and theological competencies.

It is likely that, for those who have the eyes to see such things, every liturgical text manifests the grace and glory, and bears the smudge and smell, of the age that produced it. The Paul VI Missal presents an anomaly for, as we have seen, the reformers revised the texts of every age. In consequence, and this needs to be confirmed or contradicted by careful objective examination, it may be the case that nearly all the texts of our missal reflect the strengths and weaknesses, the insights and biases, the achievements and the limitations of but one age, our own-as the anachronistic collects for Saints Henry and Louis certainly do. If this is indeed so, then Catholics of today, in spite of the access made possible by vernacular celebrations, have far less liturgical exposure to the wisdom of our past and the wondrous diversity of Catholic experience and tradition than did the Catholics of earlier generations.

The work of the liturgical reform, as Dumas reminds us, was enormous beyond imagining and accomplished in a very short period of time. We owe those who labored to produce the new texts a debt of gratitude. One way to express that gratitude is to study their work well-not only the final product of their labors, but the work itself-so it might be better understood and appreciated, as well as refined, corrected, and perfected.

ecarte sans appel !es reminiscences de legendes hagiographiques : colombe de saint Scholastique, exploit maritime de saint Raymond, designation miraculeuse de saint Pierre Chrysologue") (ibid., 264); and "In the sanctoral prayers we have avoided all excessive justification, all recalling of famous feats which are common to many (foundations, miracles, etc)" ("Dans le sanctoral, on a evite toute apologie excessive, tout rappel de faits notiores et communs a plusieurs [fondations, miracles, etc]") (ibid.).

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TRUTH OR TRANSCENDENTALS: WHAT *WAS* ST. THOMAS'S INTENTION AT *DE VERITATE* 1.1?

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SCHOLARS HAVE LONG BEEN interested in the first article of Thomas Aquinas's *Disputed Questions on Truth (De Veritate).* Most of this interest has been focused on Thomas's discussion of the general modes of being (*entis genera/es consequentes omne ens),* which later thinkers have come to refer to as "the transcendentals." Indeed, influential commentators like Umberto Eco,[1] Armand Maurer,[2] and Francis Kovach[3] have turned to this text primarily-and sometimes only-for its insights about the transcendentals.

The most important recent contribution to this exegetical tradition was made by Jan Aertsen in his *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas.* While Aertsen admits that Thomas "never wrote a separate treatise on the transcendentals,"[4] he also claims that Thomas left «three texts [I *Sent.,* d. 8, q. 1, a. 3; *De Veritate,* q. 1, a. 1; and *De Veritate,* q. 21, a. 1] ... that have a more general character and present the

[1] See Umberto Eco, *The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 20, 22.

[2] See Armand Maurer, *About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation* (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1983), ch. 1, n. 26.

[3] See Francis Kovach, *Philosophy of Beauty* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), 240-42.

[4] Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thotnas Aquinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 71.

doctrine the its entirety." [5] these texts, Aertsen takes the article of *De Veritate* to "Thomas's most complete account and afford insight into the interests motiving transcendental thought. "[6] It is therefore unsurpnsmg that Aertsen reads *De* q. 1, a, 1 as a and epistemological discourse privileges transcendental modes of being. [7]

There are, of course, scholars resist reading the first article of *De* as though it were primarily a discussion the transcendentals. In 1989, Adrian Reimers published an entitled "St. Thomas's Intentions at *Veritate* 1," in argued that "St. Thomas's a..nalysis these transcendentals is logical in nature, rather than ontological. . . . The ultimate purpose of *De Veritate* 1, 1 is to define a word, namely, 'truth'." [8]

Even stated in these broad terms, Reimers's claim has met objection from leading contemporary expositor of Thomas's doctrine of the transcendentalso Aertsen writes:

> This approach yields too limited a picture of Thoma.s's intentions. The question is "What is truth?", and Thomas looks into the conditions for every investigation into what something is. *As* we observed earlier, it is evident from the arguments pro and contra that the question actually disputed in 1.1 is whether truth is altogether the same as being. *If Thomas were interested in a logical definition of truth, we are left with no explanation as to why he unfolds the doctrine of the transcendentals in precisely this text.* [9]

The argument between these exegetes is complicated, part because their dispute is over Thomas' s mode of discourse as well as the question he intended to investigateo Thus, one aspect of the controversy derives from that Reimers believes that

[5] Ibid., 72.

[6] Ibid., 73. See i!so ibid., 261, 336.

[7] Indeed, Aertsen finds such a rich source of Thomas's ontology and epistemology there that he attempts to construct the entire edifice of medieval philosophy upon his reading of the transcendentals as the *prima* of human conception in *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1.

[3] Adrian Reimers, ast. Thomas's Intentions at *De Veritate* 1, *Doctor Communis* 42, no. 2 (1989): 175-83. The tide of the present article, of course, refern to Reimers's suggestive piece.

[9] Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals,* 106-7 (emphasis added).

Thomas's aims in this text are logical, whereas Aertsen maintains that they are more ontological and epistemological. The other aspect of the dispute arises from differing assessments of Thomas's central intention in the text. Reimers thinks Thomas intended primarily to discern a definition of truth, but Aertsen holds that Reimers's interpretation of the text does not have the resources to explain one of the most striking features of the text, namely, Thomas's discussion of the general modes of being.

In this paper, I wish to address the latter, more fundamental aspect of this controversy: what was Thomas's intention at *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 1? I contend that his primary intention was to define truth. [10] This thesis can be supported both by close reading of the first article itself and by analysis of the larger organizational structure of the *De Veritate.* Thus, I will first examine the text of *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 1 in order to explain how the discussion of the transcendentals fits into Thomas's attempt to define truth (section I). I will then pause to consider two objections against my reading of this text. The first is the objection raised by Aertsen: why would Thomas discuss the transcendentals in a text where his primary aim was to define truth (section II)? The second objection is a more powerful modification of the first: even if one can account for Thomas's discussing the transcendentals as part of his attempt to define truth, how are we to explain the striking detail of this discussion-detail that does not seem to be demanded by the task of defining truth (section Ill)? After addressing these two objections, I will sketch the structure of the entire *De Veritate* in order to show how this larger structure emphasizes the primacy of truth, not the transcendentals, in the first question (section IV). Thus, I will attempt to produce both "microscopic" and "macroscopic" textual evidence for construing question 1, article 1 primarily as an attempt to define truth. Finally, to defray any concerns that this dispute might be just a minor exegetical

[10] This contention is obviously more consonant with Reimers's reading than Aertsen's. I do not mean, however, to imply complete agreement with all aspects of Reimers's interpretation nor complete disagreement with all aspects of Aertsen's interpretation. I only mean to defend the claim that Thomas's primary purpose in the article was to define truth, against Aertsen's objection to the contrary.

a few words about the significance of Aquinas's indeed, medieval thought in general (section V).

L THIE SCHEMA OF *DE VERITATE*

Since the question of Thomas's central intention here is primarily a matter of textual interpretation, it must be resolved by turning to the text. To save time, I focus my consideration of the artide on the corpus, examining it schematicaHy rather line line. However, we should at least note the question, objections, and objections *sed contra* that set the context for Thomas's response.

Thomas begins the first article of the *De Veritate* with a simple announcement: "The question concerns truth. And first it is 'what is truth?' ["quid est veritas?"]. "[11] The question speaks directly to the exegetical dispute at hand, it seems dear Thomas means to investigate the nature of truth. Indeed, the *"quid est"* formulation suggests the investigation wiH culminate in a of

However, the is no sooner undenway Thomas seems to shift In the first objection, he writes: seems that true is altogether the same as being. In book *The Soliloquies,* Augustine says true is which is'; but that which is is other than being. Therefore, 'true' signifies altogether same thing as 'being.'" [12] Thomas's first argument *sed contra* clarifies the at issue the objections: "On the 'useless repetition of the same thing is meaningless' H, therefore, true were the same as being, it would be meaningless when a being is called 'true,' which is false;

[11] "Quaestio est de veritate. Et primo quaeritur quid est veritas?" Latin quotations from the *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate* are taken from the Leonine Edition (in *Opera Omnia* 22 [Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1970-76]). English translations of the *De Veritate* text are my own.

[12] "Videtur autem quod vemm sit omnino idem quod ens: Augustinus in librn Soliloquiorum dicit quod «verum est id quod est"; sed id quod est nihil est nisi ens; ergo verum significat omnino idem quod ens."

therefore they are not the same." [13] Notice that the question disputed in these arguments is not precisely "what is truth?" but rather "whether truth is altogether the same as being?" At first blush, it is not dear how the dispute about the relationship between being and truth is relevant to the announced question regarding the quiddity of truth. On the other hand, if Thomas were primarily interested in truth as a transcendental property of being, the question of the relationship between truth and being would be more obviously germane.

Since the announced question and the objections provide ambivalent testimony, we must turn to the corpus of the article for clarification ofThomas's purpose. Thomas begins his response in a remarkable way: "Just as it is necessary to make a reduction to *per se nota* principles in matters of demonstration, so too when investigating the definition of any thing, lest there be an infinite regress, and science and cognition perish altogether. " [14] The claim that demonstrations must be reduced (or at least reducible) to first principles is commonplace, but Thomas's application of this demand to definitions is more striking. One would normally expect a definition to be reduced only to a genus and a specific difference. Nevertheless, Thomas begins his response by suggesting that all quiddities must in fact be reducible to that which the intellect first conceives. Following Avicenna, he states that this first concept is being *(ens).* Thus, other concepts must be taken from some addition to being.

Therein lies the rub. For, as Thomas points out, "nothing can be added to being as though it were extrinsic to it, in the manner in which a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a

[13] "Sed contra, 'nugario est eiusdem inutilis repetitio'; si ergo verum esset idem quod ens, esset nugatio dum dicitur ens verum, quod falsum est; ergo non sunt idem."

[14] "Dicendum quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se inteilectui nota ita investigando *quid est unumquodque,* alias utrnbique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio remm; illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit est ens, ut Avicenna <licit in principio suae Metaphysicae; uncle oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex addirione ad ens" *(De Verit.,* q. 1, a. 1; emphasis added).

subject, since every nature is essentially a being *[ens]*."[15] When defining a thing, we usually distinguish the species by adding a specific difference to the genus. But when the term to be defined transcends all genera-as truth does-there is no genus to which the species can be reduced; the only "category" sufficiently broad to contain it is being, and (as Aristotle noted) nothing can be added to being in the manner of a genus because there is no difference outside of being to specify it.[16]

Fortunately, as Thomas points out, there are other ways of adding to being. For while nothing can add to being in the manner of something extrinsic to it, a term can express a "mode of being" that is not made explicit by the term "being" itself, thereby adding to being *in ratione* if not *in re.*[17] This logical addition to being can happen in two ways, as Thomas explains.[18] The first type of addition results in the "special modes" of being, namely, the categories of substance and the nine accidents. But

[15] "Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur generi vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens, unde probat etiam Philosophus in III Metaphysicae quod ens non potest esse genus; sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super ens in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur" (De *Verit.,* q. 1, a. 1).

[16] Aristotle argues that being cannot be a genus (and thus that nothing can add to being as a specific difference adds to a genus) because the difference must be outside the nature of the genus. Since every difference is a being, if being were a genus, it could never be differentiated into species. See Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 3.3 (998b14-17); cf. Thomas's *IIIMetaphys.,* lect. 8, par. 433. See also Aristotle's *Topics* 4 (122b20). Strictly speaking, the facts that truth is reducible only to being and that being cannot be a genus make it impossible to define truth; one must be content with a description of its *ratio.* I use the locution "defining" truth throughout this essay because it is handier than "describing the *ratio";* the simpler phrase should not, however, be allowed to obscure the facts of the matter.

[17] Another way to express this distinction would be to state that one can add to 'being' even though one cannot add to being. In this paper, I have eschewed the convention of setting off concepts with single quotation marks because there are no equivalent markings in the Latin text. This occasionally leaves ambiguity about whether Thomas means to discuss an extramental reality, a concept, or a word, but the ambiguity ultimately derives from Thomas's own text.

[18] " **---** quod dupliciter contingit. Uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis; sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera; substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam differentiam quae designet aliquam naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se ens, et ita est in aliis generibus" *(De Verit.,* q. 1, a. 1).

each of these categories has a more restricted scope than being, so this manner of addition cannot produce a term (or concept) that is coextensive with being. The second manner of addition, however, results in concepts that are coextensive with being, or as Thomas states: "such that the expressed mode be a general mode consequent upon all being" ("ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens").[19] Now, something can be said of every being either in itself *(in se)* or in relation to another *(in ordine ad aliud),* and one can speak in each of these ways either affirmatively or negatively. Thus, the terms "being" *(ens)* and "thing" *(res)* are said affirmatively of every being in itself with respect to its act of being and its essence, respectively. The term "one" *(unum)* is said negatively of every being in itself inasmuch as it is not divided from itself. Thomas then turns to the modes of being taken in relation to another, stating that we call every being "something" *(aliquid)* inasmuch as it is divided from other beings. It is noteworthy that Thomas seems to have reversed his previous order here, mentioning what might be construed as the negative relational mode of being before the positive. Of course, in order for there to be a positive relational mode of being, there must be some thing capable of being related to every being ("quod natum

[19] The full quotation reads: "Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens, et hie modus dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in se, alio modo secundum quod consequitur unum ens in ordine ad aliud. Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter quia vel exprimitur in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative; non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente nisi essentia eius secundum quam esse dicitur, et sic imponitur hoc nomen res, quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaphysicae, quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem vel essentiam entis; negatio autem consequens omne ens absolute est indivisio, et hanc exprimit hoc nomen unum: nihil aliud enim est unum quam ens indivisum. Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid: dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid, unde sicut ens dicitur unum in quantum est indivisum in se ita dicitur aliquid in quantum est ab aliis divisum. Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud, et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente; hoc autem est anima, quae «quodamrnodo est ornnia», ut dicitur in m De anima: in anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva; convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum, uncle in principio Ethicorum dicitur quod «bonum est quod omnia appetunt», convenientiarn vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum" *(De Verit.,* q. 1, a. 1).

sit convenire rum omni ente"). This according to Aristotle, has two faculties through it relates to the and appetite *(vis cognitiva et* [21] The relation between being appetite is expressed the term "good" The relation between being intellect is expressed

For the most of the so-called «transcendentals" is now complete. yet (following the line numbering the Leonine nearly forty percent of the corpus remains out of 105 These remaining lines should be of great interest m assessing the role of the transcendentals the as well as Thoma.s's intention the text.

Thomas's next step is rather explained that term "true" bespeaks a between being and intellect, Thomas goes some detail the cognitive and it relates to the of [22] He notes that rn perfected through the assimilation of the thing known, such a way that this assimilation rn "cause of cognition." Thomas this of intellect and thing the

pointed fashion,
conformity as its

relation

[20] See .Aristotle, *De Anima* 3.!l (431b20); cf. m *De Anima,* lect. 13, par. 787-88.

[21] Notice that Thomas does not actually say there are two faculties: he says that "in the soul there is *a force cog-11.itiva and appetitive"* ("in anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva"). This might suggest that Thomas was thinking in terms of *one* soul relating to the world in two differem ways rather than *two* faculties relating to the world separately. The differences need not ttouble us here, though.

[22] "Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitarn, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis, sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur secundum speciem coloris cognoscit colorem: prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens inteliectui concordet, quae quidern concordia adaequatio intdlectus et rei dicitur, et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit vernm super ens, scilicet conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et intellectus, ad quam conformitatern, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei: sic ergo entitas rei praecedit rationem veritatis sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus" (De *Verit.,* q. 1, a. 1).

conformity does not actually exist until cognition occurs; nevertheless, Thomas insists on it. He is also careful to point out that the *entitas rei* (the "real existence") of the known object precedes the *ratio* of the true.

The purpose of this foray into the metaphysics of cognition becomes dear when we reach the culmination of Thomas's response. Thomas states that ..according to this ... truth or the 'true' is found to be defined in three ways." [23] In the first way, it is described according to that which precedes the formal perfection of truth, namely, the extramentai existent. (Thus, Thomas notes, the definitions of Augustine and Avicenna speak of truth as though it were equivalent to being.) In the second way, truth is defined according to that which formally completes the *ratio* of truth, namely, the *adaequatio intellectus et rei.* (Thus, the definitions Thomas attributes to Isaac Israeli, Anselm, and Aristotle posit a of understanding and thing. FinaHy, truth has been defined according to that which is, properly

[23] "Secundum hoc ergo veritas sive verum tripliciter invenitur diffiniri" (De *Verit.,* q. 1, a. 1). The quotation continues: uuno modo secundum illud quod praecedit rationem veritatis et in quo verum fundatur, et sic Augustinus diffinit in libro Soliloquiorum «Verum est id quod est», et Avicenna in sua Metaphysica «Veritas cuiusque rei est propries:as sui esse quod stabilitum est ei», et quidam sic «Verum est indivisio esse et quod est>>. Alio modo diffinitur secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur, et sic dicit Ysaac quod <Neritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus», etAnselmus in libro De veritate «Veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis», - rectitudo enim ista secundum adaequationem quandam dicitur -; et Philosophus dicit IV Metaphysicae quod diffinientes vemm dicimus 'cum dicitur esse quod est aut non esse quod non est'. Terrio modo diffinitur vemm secundum effectum consequentem, et sic <licit Hilarius quod «Verum est dedarativum et manifestativum esse», et Augustinus in libro Devera religione «Veritas est qua ostenditur id quod est», et in eodem !ibro «Veritas est secundum quam de inferioribus iudicamus»."

[24] Scholars dispute Thomas's attribution of the *adaequatio rei et intellectus* formula to Isaac. See, for example, J. T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age* 7 (1933): 5-8. Some take this definition to be "magisterial," that is, to have been me opinion of the masters in the Parisian schools (see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals,* 244, esp. n. 3). The definition is found, among other places, in the writings of Alexander of Hales *(Summa Theologica* pars I, inq. 1, tract. 3, quaest. 2 [in *Summa Theologica* (Florence, 1924-48), vol. 1, p. 142, n. 89]), Albert the Great (De *bono K,* q. 1, a.8 [in *Opera Omnia* (Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff, 1951), vol. 28, sect. 28, l. 62]), and Bonaventure (I *Sent.,* d. 40, a. 2, q. 1 [in *Opera Omnia* (Quaracchi, 1882), vol. 1, p. 707, esp. n. 5]). The editors of these works also point to the Islamic Aristotelians, especially Avicenna, as possible sources of the definition.

consequent upon the of presumably, Thomas means that group of definitions speaks to cognition as the effect of truth, following analysis he provided in his discussion of cognition. locates the definitions attributed to Hilary and Augustine's *De vera religione* this third category.)

The is, then, roughly as follows. First, Thomas states that all concepts must be reducible to lest knowledge be unfounded. reduction concepts to being actually constructing concepts, he notes the which one cannot to being and gestures toward a general way in which one can add to being. Third, he mentions first precise way in one can acrnaHy add to being, a procedure produces the special modes being" Fourth, he explores the second precise way in which one can add to being, a procedure that produces general modes of being; this exploration culminates the description truth as a general mode of being said in relation to intellect. Fifth, he offers a tripartite analysis of the metaphysics of situates truth more precisely as a between extramental being (the cause of truth) and cognition (the effect of Sixth, Thomas reconciles preferred definition of as a conformity and thing with other authoritative statements using a taxonomy of analogous senses derived from the tripartite of cognition he just spite of the fact objections emphasize the adds to being, the corpus concludes precisely where opening question would seem to lead, namely, a consideration of the of truth. Indeed, the rather elaborate structure of the corpus appears to be ordered articulating Thomas's definition of truth as a general mode being said relation to intellect and harmonizing this definition with others Thomas has inherited authoritative thinkers. Thomas's comments about the transcendental modes of being occur *en route* to accomplishing these more primary tasks,

II. OBJECTION 1: WHY DISCUSS THE TRANSCENDENTALS HERE?

With the schema of the entire corpus in view, we are now positioned to see whether the presence of the transcendentals in question 1, article 1 is consistent with the notion that Thomas's central intention there was to define truth. It has been shown that the article begins in search of the quiddity of truth and ends with a discussion of the same topic. But how are we to meet Aertsen's objection concerning the middle of the article: Why does Thomas discuss the transcendentals here if his purpose was merely to define truth? [25]

It seems to me that the unity of this text is best appreciated from the vantage point of its final lines. The corpus of the article culminates in a discussion of the proper and received definitions of truth. Looking backward from this discussion, we can see that there are perfectly natural connections among Thomas's treatment of the problem of adding to being, his survey of the transcendental modes of being, his sketch of the metaphysics of cognition, and his ultimate concern to discern the quiddity of truth. Truth is, after all, transcendental; it transcends all genera. Thus, it cannot be defined according to the normal formula of "genus+ specific difference," but must be reduced to something more general than the categories themselves. Since the most fundamental concept we possess is being, Thomas reasonably begins his attempt to define truth by making a resolution to being as that which the intellect first conceives. But there is a problem with trying to form definitions by adding to being-at least if one expects to proceed in the manner according to which a species is formed by adding to a genus-for there can be no difference that lies outside the nature of being, and thus no species can be formed from being as a genus. To distinguish truth from being, then, Thomas must explain the ways in which we can in fact add to being, namely, by constructing terms that express modes of being

[25] One might also address the related question: How do we account for the fact that the objections (and the *sed contra)* focus on the problem of how truth adds to being? I take it that by explaining how the problem of adding to being is an integral part of Thomas's attempt to define truth, my interpretation of the corpus also addresses this concern.

not made explicit by the term "being" itself. This can happen in two ways, and Thomas examines both. The first way results in the formation of the categories; but since each category has a more restricted scope than being itself, Thomas must eschew this manner of addition as a means for generating a transcendental term. The second way, however, can produce general modes of being. Thomas explores certain possibilities for forming such modes *en route* to articulating the one that is said of being in relation to intellect, namely, truth.

It is worth noting that even while sketching these transcendentals Thomas seems to have the definition of truth in sight: for, when discussing the relational transcendentals, he reverses both his initial order of treating "positive" modes before "negative" ones and (perhaps more importantly) the proper ontological order whereby true precedes good. One might assume he does this so that his discussion will culminate with the *ratio* of truth as a gen-eral mode of being consisting in the *adaequatio intellectus et rei.*

This hypothesis is borne out in the lines that follow the discussion of general modes of being, where Thomas sketches the tripartite metaphysics of cognition in order to establish a taxonomy for the received definitions of truth. This taxonomy is, of course, arranged according to the logic of analogy. Properly speaking, truth consists in the *adaequatio intellectus et rei;* but "true" can also be said *per posterius* of both the cause of truth (extramental being) and the effect of truth (cognition). While Thomas uses this logic to reconcile his description of truth as *adaequatio intellectus et rei* with others he inherits from philosophical and theological authorities, we should not lose sight of the fact that the focal point of the taxonomy is still the *ratio* of truth. Thus, taken in one glimpse, the various parts of the article do cohere. And if Thomas devotes a fair amount of consideration both to the problem of adding to being and to transcendental modes of being, it is because these topics are integral to his attempt to answer the question *"quid est veritas?"*

III. OBJECTION 2: WHY DISCUSS THE TRANSCENDENTALS IN SUCH DETAIL?

Even if one allows that the task of defining truth calls for a discussion of how general modes of being can be formed by adding to being, it is not immediately clear that the detail with which Thomas carries out this discussion is demanded by the goal of defining truth. Would it not have sufficed for Thomas simply to have noted that truth adds to being a relation to intellect? Or perhaps that there are two ways in which one can add to being, and that one of these ways produces general modes of being such as truth, which is a general mode of being in relation to intellect? But Thomas goes to the trouble of listing and characterizing as many as six transcendentals. One might use this fact to formulate a second, more powerful objection against my reading of Thomas's intention in *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 1: Why would Thomas describe the general modes of being *in such detail* unless he were interested in them for their own sake?

In response to this objection, one might note that Thomas' s description of truth as a relation between being and intellect *(convenientia entis ad intellectum)* seems to have embedded within it certain alternative (onto)logical possibilities that Thomas considers in an orderly manner as he approaches the description of truth. [26] His description of truth, taken in its context, can be glossed as 'a mode of being generally consequent on every being in relation to intellect' *(modus entis genera/is consequens omne ens in ordine ad intellectum).* We can parse this description into the following parts: *modus entis - genera/is consequens omne ens - in ordine -ad - intellectum.* I suggest that each of these components is one of at least two (onto)logical options from which Thomas chooses in order to form his description of truth.

To begin with, every concept is either definable within the genera of the ten categories or it is not. If not, then the concept can only be described as a *modus entis* and not by a

[26] I use the term "(onto)logical" in order to highlight the fact that the options Thomas is here navigating do not seem merely to be logical categories, although the passage has a fairly disjunctive structure; rather, Thomas seems to see these options as real metaphysical niches.

rnln'i!P'I·nu'<;:: *omne ens,*
consequent on
something can
There can be

it is
(HA2). It has
distinguished by relations
something else These
speaking,
affirmatively 1C>e1A/1-J'Hu1tnt
Latin pr•ep:os1ncms

appetite,
betv.reen being the intellect,
formalization induded in these
description of truth as a general mode
convenientia en.tis ad znz:eti:er:tu1n
mo.aus entis [(!I) coi<tse.01u1ms
[(2) *ad]*

In retrospect, Thomas's list of transcendental properties looks strikingly like a sketch of the options through which Thomas must navigate in order to formulate "IIB2b." If this is in fact how the list emerges, then the transcendental terms included in this discussion are by and large nothing more than the names of the options Thomas faces as he attempts to describe truth in this way. Moreover, the "list" of transcendentals Thomas offers in this article would have to be regarded as being deeply influenced by his goal of articulating the formulation "IIB2b."[27]

One benefit of this interpretation is that it nicely highlights how the middle of the article is in fact *the middle* and not the goal. By looking backward from Thomas's definition of truth, we can see how deftly he navigates *modi entis genera/es consequentes omne ens* to move from the foundational concept of being to the mode of being *genera/is consequens omne ens in ordine ad intellectum.* It is precisely *en route* to describing this latter mode of being (truth) that Thomas elaborates other (onto)logical possibilities for *modi entis genera/es consequentes omne ens.*

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the preceding explanation of the options implicit in Thomas's description of truth is not entirely sufficient to account for the detail of Thomas's discussion of general modes of being. Thomas could have generated the classification of truth as a *modus entis genera/is consequens omne ens in ordine ad intellectum* simply by noting that modes of being can be distinguished by relations, or certainly by noting that they can be distinguished either according to being *in se* or by relation to something else. Why, then, does Thomas mention the negative possibilities, *unum* and *aliquid?* Moreover, what leads him to draw the apparently ultrafine distinction between *ens* and *res?*

The transcendentals were obviously on Thomas's mind when he penned this article. This is understandable, since he clearly assumes truth to be transcendental in this text. What is more, one would be hard pressed to find thirteenth-century discussions of the transcendentals that did not acknowledge *unum* as a property

[27] The significance of this fact will be made explicit in the last section of this essay.

roots of run as deeply as Aristotle's fact, *unum* was the model transcendental for some of the earliest thirteenth-century treatises on the subject.[28] Thomas's milieu, it been customary, even expected, to dental properties.

explained by two factors.

'-'"""""""""·'v••Thomas maintains practice transcendentals negatively. This practice, placed alongside the of relational transcendentals, suggests the possibility of a negatively defined relational transcendental (that a defined division rather correspondence). Thus, might have in his discussion merely to articulate logical option of a relational analogue to *unum.* In Avicenna describes *aliquid* and *ens* as two names for the same concept.[29] Since Thomas cites Avicenna's the one might reasonably suspect this text has informed Thomas' *s* thought on various modes being and that *aliquid's* presence in artide is a manifestation

Finally, presence might be explained three ways. Avicenna lists *res* as one of the three first impressions.[30] Thus, as with Thomas might included *res* way of articulating a thought he gleaned from of Avicenna. A second possibility emerges Thomas's response to the objection *sed contra.*[31] The depends on an of

[28] first among these was the Chancellor's *Summa de bono.* See Henri Pouillon, "Le premier ttaite des proprietes transcendentales: La «Summa de bono» du cham:elier *Revue Neoscolastique de* 42 (1939): 40-77.

[29] See Avicenna's *Metaphysics* I. 5: vero et a!iquid sunt nomina multivoca unius intentionis." See also Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals,* 102.

[30] See Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals,* 81-82.

[31] The third objection *sed contra* reads: "Praeteria, secundum Boetium in libro de Hebdomadibus in omnibus creaturis «diversum est esse et qnod est»; sed verum significat esse rei; ergo verum est diversum a quod est in crearis. Sed quod est est idem quod ens; ergo vemm in creatw:is est diversnm ab ente." Thomas's response states: "Ad tertium dicendnm quod cum dicitur 'diversum est esse et quod est' distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui ille actus convenit; nomen autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi, et ideo ratio

"quod est" and *"ens."* Thomas refutes the argument by noting that *"ens"* is taken with respect to a thing's *esse,* not its essence *(quod est);* as we learn in the corpus, *"res"* is said with reference to a thing's essence. Thus, Thomas's response to this argument depends on the distinction between *"ens"* and *"res."*[32] It is entirely plausible that he draws this distinction in the corpus in anticipation of invoking it in his responses to the objections. The third explanation is more philosophically loaded. If all *modi entis generates consequentes omne ens* are concepts that can and must be resolved into *ens,* then *ens* itself might not be a *modus entis genera/is consequens omne ens.* In other words, *ens* might not be a *mode* of being so much as it is *being itself.* If this is right, another term must be found to hold the place of something said affirmatively of every *ens in se. "Res"* is precisely such a term, and it is therefore possible that Thomas included *"res"* not as a second *modus entis genera/is consequens omne ens in se dicitur affirmative,* but as the only one.

To admit that Thomas fills out his sketch of *modi entis generates consequentes omne ens* a bit more fully than his task of defining truth might demand is not, however, to yield that the article aims *primarily* at discussing the transcendentals, much less that it is a treatise on the transcendentals. Consider an example. If I were to give someone directions for driving from Sioux Falls, South Dakota to South Bend, Indiana, I might say: "Take Interstate 90 east through Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Illinois. *As* you come into Chicago, you will pass O'Hare International Airport; soon you'll be able to see the Sears' Tower, which some say is the world's tallest building; then you'll pass Comiskey Park, home of the Chicago White Sox. About 90 miles past Chicago, you'll see the exits for South Bend." Now, even though my long-winded directions say things about the windy city, it would be peculiar to call them a description of Chicago, and even more peculiar to say that the whole thing is a treatise on Chicago. These

non sequitur."

[32] Thomas does not invoke the term *"res"* in his reply to the objection, but the conceptual distinction between *"res"* (which is taken from *quod est)* and *"ens"* (which is taken from *esse)* is at work.

directions unquestionably information Chicago than essential one's way to South Bend; they also omit many matters one would want to include when discussing Chicago in its own right. Thus, the whole discussion is construed as a set Sioux Falls to Bend. The directions elaborate on a few points interest along the way; even these elaborations are influenced by the goal of getting to South Bend.[33] Similarly, best way to describe the corpus of *Veritate,* q. a. including every mention it makes of transcendental is as an attempt to define truth. To be sure, the artide contains interesting sometimes nonessential comments about modes being that we recognize as transcendentals. Indeed, the transcendentals to set the context from which Thomas's definition of truth emerges. The significance of that context not be underestimated; but it should also not obscure the fact that the entire discussion is ordered toward defining truth.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE *DE VERITATE*

While attention to the first artide is essential for understanding Thomas's intentions there, it is not the only textual evidence that bears on the issue. For just as a thorough understanding of the first article provides a foundation for interpreting the rest of the *De Veritate,* so too analysis of the structure of the entire reveals those features of the first artide that Thomas meant to bear most weight As we shall soon see, the larger structure provides additional evidence that Thomas's purpose in the was primarily to investigate the of [34]

[33] For example, we might note that the only Chicago landmarks described in the directions are visible from interstate 90. But there are many other Chicago landmarks one would want to see if one were not constrained by the task of driving to South Bend *via* interstate 90.

[34] Before examining the structure of the *De Veritate,* I should offer a caveat. The genre of the disputed question is nnusual by modern standards. On the one hand, as a record of what were originally oral disputation sessions, the text is neither so polished nor so well organized as a work like the *Summa Theologiae.* On the other hand, there are indications that the text Thomas left to us comprises a revision of the actual oral sessions. (!am thinking, for example,

In order to discern the structure of the work, let us survey the twenty-nine questions that comprise the *Disputed Questions on Truth.*[35] The first question is entitled *"De veritate,"* and the larger work takes its name from here. Questions 2 through 20 aH deal, in one way or another, with matters of inteHect (divine, angelic, human, speculative, practical, before the fall, heaven, etc.).[36] Question 21 is concerned with the good. And questions 22 through 29 all deal with the appetites (e.g., divine and human wills, passions, etc.). The pivotal questions in the structure of the disputation are questions 1 and 21. As it happens, these texts also speak most directly to the transcendentals, so they have shared the fate of being isolated in order to examine that doctrine.
within the context of the entire set of disputations, questions 1 and 21 mark the beginnings of more extended and more prominent discussions in questions 2 through 20 and questions 22 through 29, respectively. The discussion of question 1 is

of *De Veritate,* q. 1, a. 1, obj. 2, where the objector seems to have knowledge of the replies that will be given and, in fact, anticipates them. Of course, this phenomenon could also be explained by actual give-and-take during the initial session of the disputation or by the fact that some of these solutions were already common knowledge at the time of the disputation.) In addition, the fact that Thomas had control over the topics to be disputed means that he could also have shaped the broad contours of the disputations according to a larger organizational plan for the work. Thus, it would be foolish to expect the organization of a set of disputed questions to be as fine-grained as, say, the *Summa contra Gentiles;* but it is reasonable to expect more organization than one would find in a set of quodlibetal questions.

[35] The twenty-nine questions disputed in the *De Veritate* are: 1. Truth; 2. God's Knowledge; 3. Ideas; 4. The Divine Word; *5.* Providence; 6. Predestination; 7. The Book of Life; 8. The Knowledge of Angels; 9. The Communication of Angelic Knowledge; 10. The Mind; 11. The Teacher; 12. Prophecy; 13. Rapture; 14. Faith; 15. Higher and Lower Reason; 16. Synderesis; 17. Conscience; 18. The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence; 19. Knowledge of the Soul After Death; 20. The Knowledge of Christ; 21. Good; 22. The Tendency to Good and the Will; 23. God's Will; 24. Free Choice; 25. Sensuality; 26. The Passions of the Soul; 27. Grace; 28. The Justification of Sinners; 29. The Grace of Christ.

[36] Questions 2-7 are straightforwardly related to the divine intellect; questions 8-9 concern angelic knowledge; question 10 discusses the (human) mind, especially in relation to the Trinity; question 11 investigates the acquisition of knowledge; questions 12-14 examine various modes of supernatural (human) knowledge; question 15 explains how the higher and lower reason are really one and the same power considered in relation to different objects (perhaps bridging Thomas's discussions of speculative and practical inteliect); questions 16-17 deal with matters of practical intellect; and questions 18-20 all deal with human knowledge in unusual states (viz., before the fall, after death, and in the person of Christ).

to the consideration intellect in nineteen follow, the discussion of goodness prepares for Thomas's treatment of appetite in the eight questions that foHow it.

The model for this structure is the Aristotelian account of the relationships between of soul and their objects. As the Philosopher notes we must consider object before we can investigate act and the faculty that are actualized by k [37] Accordingly, Thomas must discuss (the object of the intellect) turning to the intellect itself, must discuss goodness object of the appetite) before turning to appetite itself. Indeed, when the metaphysical psychological backdrop of the work is appreciated, it becomes dear the entire structure the disputed questions rests on the account of as object Thomas proposes question 1. It is interesting to note that Thomas brought the underpinnings structure to our attention in the artide, where the interaction among powers of extramental beings is the *sine qua non* of his attempt to distinguish as a relational transcendental Thus, the first artide provides an key to the rest of the work by calling to mind the Aristotelian metaphysics cognition and that shapes the entire disputation; at the same time, the larger structure of the *De Veritate* lays stress on investigation of truth as the 1. Ultimately, the same condusion seems to emerge dose reading the article analysis the larger structure the disputed questions: Thoma.s's primary intention q. 1, a. 1 was to examme not the transcendentals.

[37] Aristotle, *De Anirrui,* 2.4 (415a14-22). A similar principle can be drawn from Plato's *Timaeus* (61c). This dialogue was, of course, one of the few Platonic texts known to the Latin-speaking world in the High Wtiddle Ages and was enormously influential. It is not dear, however, that the relevant section of the *Timaeus* would have been known to Thomas: Chakidius's commentary on the Timaeus-the primary means thrnngh which the *Timaeus* was conveyed in the Middle Ages--stops around section 52c.

V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISPUTE

There is, then, both microscopic and macroscopic textual evidence that Thomas's primary intention at *De Veritate,* q. 1, a. 1 was to investigate the nature of truth. Aertsen's question about this interpretation must be taken seriously, for the transcendentals are prominent in the article. But the discussion of general modes of being is not at odds with the endeavor to define truth; it is part of it. Lest the reader think this dispute has no significance beyond the exegetical debate, though, I shall conclude by mentioning three ways in which a proper understanding of Thomas's intentions at *De Veritate,* q. 1, a. 1 is important for larger issues.

First, for Thomas, metaphysics is the science that studies *ens inquantum ens* and its attributes.[38] Inasmuch as the transcendentals are attributes of being, they are of obvious importance for metaphysics. Now, *De Veritate,* q. 1, a. 1 has often been treated as a kind of systematic treatise on the transcendentals, leading scholars to take the article's "list" of general modes of being as canonical. Thus, if a term does not appear on this "list" (and especially if it does not appear on similar "lists"), that term is often assumed not to be a transcendental. However, if Thomas's purpose in this article was not to exposit the transcendentals systematically but rather to define truth, merely sketching some of the possibilities for constructing transcendental modes of being along the way, then it would be imprudent to deny that a mode of being is transcendental simply because it does not appear here. I am thinking, of course, of beauty in particular. Misconstruing

[38] See IV *Metaphys.,* lect. 1, par. 529: "Now because a science should investigate not only its subject but also the proper accidents of its subject, he therefore says, first, that there is a science which studies being as being, as its subject, and studies also 'the attributes which necessarily belong to being,' i.e., its proper accidents" *(Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics,* trans. John Rowan [Notre Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1995]). Strictly speaking, the transcendentals cannot be "proper accidents" of being because proper accidents are outside the essence of their subject. See also *Metaphys.,* prologue ("It is called *metaphysics* inasmuch as it considers being and the attributes which naturally accompany being"), and *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1. Cf. Jorge Gracia, "Critical Study: Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: Aertsen's Characterization of Medieval Thought and Thomistic Metaphysics," *Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Medievales* 64 (1997): 455-63 (esp. 459).

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[39] Jan Aertsen raises this objection in v.Beauty in the Middle Ages: A Forgotten Transcendental?", *Medieval Philosopby* 1 (1991): 68-97, esp. *75* (see also 73). It is also acknowledged as a difficulty by Francis Kovach, *Die Aesthetik des Thornas von Aquin* (Berlin: De Gmyter, 1961) 75-76, 183; and Eco, *Aesthetics,* 30, 34.

[40] Imporrant works like me *Summa contra Gentiles,* each of the Aristotelian commentaries, and the Scriptme commentaries are all less expansive than the *De Veritate.* Indeed, the *De Veatate* is almost as large as all of the other questions combined.

[41] It is even somewhat overstated to suggest that this work treats the entire *De Veritate.* See Wilhelm Schneider, *Die Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate des Thomas von Aquin in lhrer Philosophiegeschichtlichen Beziehung zu Augt'.stinus* (Miiru;ter: A.<chendorff, 1930).

[42] Because Thomas's commentary on the *Sentences* was consttained both the order of Lombard's work and the expectations of the schools, the *De Veritate* represents his first large-scale, independent work. As such, it is interesting to read alongside Thomas's *Summae* as an early attempt to organize large amounts of doctrine according to his own mind.

good first step toward understanding and evaluating the *Disputed Questions on Truth* as an integrated work.

Finally, two recent books have made rather sweeping claims about St. Thomas's thought-and indeed medieval thought in general-based largely on their authors' readings of the *Disputed Questions on Truth.* In *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas,* Jan Aertsen suggests that the transcendentals are the hallmark of medieval philosophy (which, incidentally, he means to distinguish quite sharply from medieval theology). Moreover, Aertsen's appropriation of Thomas's doctrine of the transcendentals, and thus of medieval philosophy more generally, is grounded firmly in his interpretation of *De Veritate,* q. 1, a. 1. More recently, in their book *Truth in Aquinas,*[43] John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock have attempted to appropriate Thomas's teaching on truth as an antidote to modern rejections of correspondence theories and realism; interestingly, they claim that Thomas's doctrine of truth is theological through and through, and they too ground their claims (at least in part) in a reading of *De Veritate.*[44] It seems, then, that contemporary appropriations of Thomas' s thought and even medieval thought are being forged against *De Veritate.* We should make our best effort to appropriate these texts according to Thomas's own intentions.

Thus, for the sake of metaphysical speculation, for the sake of an historical appreciation of Thomas's various attempts to organize large bodies of doctrine, and for the sake of producing accurate appropriations of Thomas's thought, it is important to understand Thomas's intention in *De Veritate,* q. 1, a. 1. From beginning to end, his intention was to answer the question *"quid est veritas?"*[45]

[43] See John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, *Truth in Aquinas* (London: Routledge, 2001).

[44] I examine the question of whether or not Thomas's doctrine of truth is theological in «Natural Theology in St. Thomas's Early Doctrine of Truth," in *Restoring Nature: &says in Thomistic Philosophy and Theology* (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, forthcoming). The article includes detailed discussion of the positions of Aertsen, Pickstock, and Milbank.

[45] I would like to thank Peter Adamson for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The research for this project was supported by an ARAF grant from Augustana College.

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CHRIST IN AQUINAS'S *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE:* PERIPHERAL OR PERYASIVE?

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Born THOMASAQUINAS and Bonaventure, having completed their doctoral *cursus* in the 1250s, could leave the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard behind and apply their own theological acumen to the organization of *sacra doctrina.* Since Bonaventure was elected Minister General of his order in the same year he was recognized as a master by the University of Paris, his academic career was curtailed. He did manage in that same year, in response to the request of many students, to compose his *Breviloquium,* universally recognized as an attractive, accessible, and profound work of doctrinal synthesis.[1] Aquinas had the opportunity to teach for many years before he began around 1265-66 to write his *Summa Theologiae,* his crowning achievement. Though unfinished, this work, far more extensive than the *Breviloquium,* made available to students of his era and to us the fruit of his mature thought in a carefully devised pedagogical order.[2]

In this essay we are principally concerned with the *Summa* and its ordering of topics, but to help us highlight its distinctive features we will contrast it with the *Breviloquium.* As our title

[1] In the general prologue to his *Breviloquium* (hereafter *Brev.),* Bonaventure gives the following title to the chapter that surveys the plan of his work: "De illis septem, de quibus est theologia in summa" *(Brev.* 1.1.1) This shows that he is conscious of at least schematically covering the entirety of theology.

[2] Aquinas's *Compendium Theologiae* corresponds more closely *to* the *Breviloquium* in length and purpose. We will refer to it when we examine the creedal roots of the *Summa.*

suggests, the place given to Christ in these two syntheses offers a locus of significant comparison. first reading, Christ is dearly at the center of appears not to be at the center of the does Christ the organization of the *Summa?* That is question our investigation.

To begin, us evoke the *Breviloquium.* That work stays much doser to structure Lombard's four books than does Aquinas's *Summa.* Nonetheless the changes Bonaventure makes to Lombard's appear slight on the surface, result in major improvements. The of his work companson to that of is presented in the following diagram:

	Bonaventure		Lombard
Prologue	On Scripture and theology		Book 1: Introduction; God as One arid God as Triune
Parr 1	The of God, followed by appropriated attributes: efficiency and power to the Father, exernplarity and wisdom to the Son; finality and will to the Spirit *(Brev.* L6.9).		
Part 2	The World Crearure of God	God as Origin (appropriated to Father: *Brev.* 2.5.5)	Book 2: Creation; Original Justice; Grace
Part 3	The Coirrnptio1.1 of Sin	God as Restorer (preceded by an account of the need for restoration); Sending of the Word as Exemplar	
Part 4	Incru.uation of ilie Word		Book 3: Incarnation; Redemption; Virtues, Gifts, Precepts
Part *5*	The Grace of the Holy Spirit	God as End; Sending of the Spirit to achieve the return of human creatures to God.	
Part 6	S2cramental Medicine		Book4: Sacraments; Last Things
Part 7	Fina! judgment		

Two major differences need to be brought out. First, the *Breviloquium* brings out the tacit Trinitarian structure of Lombard's work. In part 1, after a brief conspectus of the whole work, Bonaventure immediately goes to the heart of the matter which is God as triune, whereas Lombard begins his treatment with the existence of God. Bonaventure also tightens up Lombard's subsequent consideration of attributes of God by selecting those that can be seen in a dear relationship of appropriation to the persons of the Trinity and in their role in the Trinitarian unfolding of the rest of his treatise. [3]

Second, Bonaventure aligns his Trinitarian structure more closely to the Trinitarian structure of the creeds. The rteatment of grace and the virtues is somewhat scattered in Lombard (partly in book II and partly book HI). Bonaventure goes back to the order of his own teacher, Alexander of Hales, and deals with both together after his treatment of the incarnate Christ, presenting them as the gift of the Spirit flowing from the risen Christ and poured out in Pentecost. [4] This sequence is pedagogically simpler, more attractive, and, most importantly, doser to the basic pattern of salvation history articulated in the creeds, in which forgiving grace is affirmed after the artide that prodaims belief in the Holy Spirit. Thus Bonaventure's Trinitarian pattern is not a speculative whim but his way of articulating the profoundly imbedded economic pattern according to which the Father sends the Son and the risen Christ imparts the grace of the Holy Spirit *(Brev.* 4. 10.4). In this sequence the second person occupies the middle position. Christ was already in a middle position within

[3] This unfolding is depicted in the third coillilfln, beginning with part 2. It is recapimlated in *Brev.* 7.1.2: first principle produces according to the sublimity of his power, governs according to the rectitude of truth (the Incarnate Word as teacher and exemplar), brings to completion according to the fullness of goodness." Aquinas demonstrates a simiiar approach in his *Commentary:* "tria opera tribus personis appropriantur: creatio, quasi prima, Patri, qui est principium non de principio; glorificatio, quae est ultimus finis, Spiritui Sancto, ratione bonitatis; recreatio, quae media est, Filio, qui est media in Trinitate persona" (K *Sent.,* d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3). Cf. G. Emery, "Le Pere et !'oeuvre de creation selon le Commentaire des Sentences de S. Thomas d'Aquin" in *Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris,* ed. C.-J. Pinto de Oliveira (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1993), 85-117, esp. 106.

[4] Cf. *Brev.* 4.10.4-8.

Lombard's *Sentences,* the gives this centrality a firmer and more systematic basis.

Before moving on to Aquinas's *Summa* and its structure, let us clarify certain hermeneutical assumptions. In various passages of the *Summa,* notably the prologues to its three parts, Aquinas left us an account how he conceived its Though these passages are of capital importance, they not set a limit to our efforts to understa."1d this Like other dassic theological works, the *Summa* is singularly able to evoke the mystery of God for human minds in their present pilgrim state, and thus has attracted an ongoing community interpretation around itself. While this community seeks to unearth signs of Aquinas's intent in devising a plan for his it also, as instanced by many recent scholarly attempts, considers text as it stands on its own, looks for other fruitful patterns and correlations not dearly intended by Aquinas that may have been part of the habitual texture of his mind. We no intention of reviewing different attempts at grasping the structures the *Summa* and pronouncing all of them, or all of them but one, to be wrong. Our keynote is complementarity and muh:ivalence rather than exdusion and univocity. is to single out helpful interpretative dues that are more explicit and stimulate further re-reading of the text its community of interpretation. Our responsibility is to be as respectful of the Mystery as are Bonaventure and Aquinas themselves.

We wiH begin with the sequence proposed by Albert Patfoort, which emerges from a straightforward narrative reading of the *Summa's* text, similar to our reading of the *Brevilo-quium.* We wiH then attempt to probe the text with the help of Michel Corbin, Yves Congar, P. E. Persson, and Jean-Pierre Tonrdl, then relate their efforts, which yield sets of concen-tric sequences, to the earlier *exitus-reditus* pattern proposed by M.-D. Chenu. We will then assess the role played by the creeds in shaping the *Summa,* and finaHy seek a context for the *Summa's* plan in Aquinas's view of the way in which the theological endeavor of the *Summa* constitutes a science. At we will

have moved from what is explicitly evoked by Thomas to what unobtrusively but powerfully animates the *Summa* from within.

L THE *SUMMA'S* PLAN AS TRINITARIAN: THE FATHER/SPIRIT/SON SEQUENCE

The *Breviloquium* is faithful in its broad systematic lines to the sequence of Father-Son-Spirit suggested by the creeds. The classical salvation-historical approach of the creeds which Bonaventure follows is narrative and linear: it presents in succession the events of creation, fall, incarnation, redemption, effusion of the spirit, grace, sacraments, and final beatitude. This narrative is subsumed into a Father-Son-Spirit sequence, in accord with the Johannine pattern of the Father sending the Son, and the Son in turn promising us an Advocate, his Spirit.

By contrast, Aquinas's *Summa* seems to take a significantly different tack: what in these earlier syntheses is found under the aegis of the Son is found in the *Summa's Tertia Pars,* and what is under the aegis of the Spirit is found in the *Secunda Pars.* Thus the sequence appears to be changed to Father-Spirit-Son, with Christ losing his central position. Albert Patfoort is a dear interpreter of Thomas on this sequence:

> The rest of the *la Pars* (qq. 44-119) naturally comes under the aegis of the Father, from whom all "proceeds," including the Son and the Holy Spirit, whose processions, Aquinas states in an almost untranslatable formula, are *ratio* and *causa* of the procession of creatures (cf. *Ia,* q. 45, aa. 6-7). We can further state that, aU things considered, the *Ila Pars* in tum presents the dynamism of what St. Thomas, after St. Augustine, likes to call the *gratia Spiritus Sancti* (cf *Ia llae,* q. 106, *passim;* q. 109, a. 9, ad 2; q. 114, a. 3, etc.), whose role is to give life to our free disposition of ourselves and of things, and, finally, the *Illa Pars* is manifestly the domain of the Son.[5]

The *Secunda Pars* contains Thomas' s moral theology, and in his view that moral theology is intrinsically pneumatological.[6] Christ

[5] Albert Patfoort, *Thomas d'Aquin: Les cles d'une theologie* (Paris: FAC-editions, 1983), 66 {translation mine).

[6] Ibid., 71-102.

his redemption comes later, in the
core God's salvific is the Spirit than the
earthly Christ, who is more contingent, more up with
space and It is that the *Summa* does not ...nn
more usual narrative structure m
facets need to be explored.

U. THE *SUJViMA'S*PLA..1\fAS CONCENTRIC

As we continue our scmtiny, there emerges a complex pattern of narrowing concentric cirdes with Christ and his in the center. will explore three related sequences. The first, taken the prologues to the three parts the *Summa,* may well express some Aquinas's intention organizing his materials. The two are based on textual correlations that have emerged among later interpreters.

The first sequence has been thoroughly by Michel Corbin. In sum, studies and his work (creation) the *Prima Pars;* in the *Secunda Pars* he singles out among the creatures of God human beings their work, is to those acts that to beatitude in God; in the *Tertia* he singles out among human beings Jesus Christ, the God-Man, and his work, is to human beings to their beatitude. Corbin is careful to highlight this dynamic perspective. [8] Aquinas does not deal with essences seeks faithfully to reflect God's initiating freedom and our responsive freedom, which are at the heart of salvation history.

The prologue texts manifest this dynamic perspective. The

[7] This sequence easily dovetails with a contemporary approach in which one discerns the Spirit invisibly at work in the world, in the lives of men and women before the coming of Christ, and the earthly Christ as the supreme visible manifestation in the fullness of time of God's reaching out to his creation" In this sequence ilie Spirit is the one who, prior to the Word, prepares the way for the Word to be recognized in his human manifestation. In Rahner's terms God constitutes us as hearers of the word before speaking to us. Similarly Lonergan attributes centrality to the gift of love flooding our hearts (Rom 5:5) and sees in Christ the supreme articulator of a Spirit-suffused relation with God that otherwise remains tacit. See F. E. Crowe, of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions: The Contribution of Bemard Lonergan to the Wider Ecumenism," Chancellor's Address, Regis College, 1984.

[8] Michel Corbin, *Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974), 782-806, esp. 785.

Prima Pars considers not just God but creation as the work of God, the *Secunda Pars* not just human beings but also the human actions that lead them to or away from beatitude, the *Tertia Pars* not just Christ but also his benefits, that is, his redemptive work on our behalf.

The second sequence is found in the work of P. E. Persson. He builds on an insight of Yves Congar into the relevance of III *Sent.*, d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 2 for the plan of the *Summa.* [9] This sequence begins with the most general presence of God in creation *per essentiam, potentiam, et praesentiam (Prima Pars),* through a more special presence in those sanctified through grace (though the *Secunda Pars* deals with man and his work, what makes that work possible is grace, the consideration of which constitutes the climax of the *Prima Secundae),* and ending with God's unique presence to Jesus Christ through hypostatic union (dealt with in the opening of the *Tertia Pars).*

The third sequence, which is similar to the second, is evoked by Jean-Pierre Torrell when he presents *STh* I, question 93, article 4 on the various ways in which human beings image God and relates these ways to the *exitus-reditus* theme. In the broadest sense all humans are the image of God in their aptitude to know and love God: this the *Prima Pars* deals with. This image is enhanced in the just who actually love and know God through the new creation of grace *(Prima Secundae),* and comes to its fulfillment in the glorified who know and love God perfectly. We find here again a similar pattern of narrowing concentric circles, with a narrower beginning (all human beings as created by God, rather than all creation) and a broader ending (all the glorified,

[9] P. E. Persson, *Sacra Doctrina: Reason and Revelation in Aquinas* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970), esp. 259. Here is the III *Sent.,* d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 2 text to which he refers: "ad id quod ulterius quaeritur, dicendum quod plenitudo divinitatis dicitur corporaliter habitare in christo tripliciter: •.. secundo per similitudinem ad tres dimensiones corporis, quia divinitas est tribus modis in christo: uno modo generali, sicut est in omnibus creaturis, per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiarn, et in hoc consistit quasi longitudo; alio modo speciali, prout est in sanctis per gratiam, per quam est latitudo caritatis; tertio modo in proprio filio, scilicet per unionem, in quo est sublimitas et profundum." Aquinas evokes this sequence in the *STh* III, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2.

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	First Seguem:e: The prologues to the *Prima,* and *Tertia Partes* (Corbin)	The presence of God (Persson & Congar)	Third Sequence: I, q. 93, a. 4: The image of God (Torrell)	Trinitarian am2ro1:1riation · (Patfoort)
Ia	God and his work, which is creation"	God's presence to creation *per essentiam, potentiam,*	The image of God in all humans as created by God *(exitus)*	Father
Ha	*(within creation):* Man and his work, which is acts leading toward beatitude [12]	God's presence to the just *per gratiam*	The im.age of God in those who are sanctified through grace (beginning of the	Spirit
ma	·*(among humans):* Christ and his redemptive work, leads to tI1e glory of the blessed	God's presence to Christ *per unione'rtl*	The image of God come to its perfection in the glorified (end of the *reditus).*	Son

[10] Torrell analyses this text in his *Saint Thomas maltre* (Paris and Fribourg: Cerf, 1996), 115 ff. He does not explicitly relate it to the structure of the *Summa* but he connects the image of creation vvith the *exitY.S,* the image of new creation (grace) with the beginning of !:he *reditus,* and the image of glory with the *reditus* accomplishect

[11] "primo namque considerabimus ea quae ad essemiam divinam pertinent; secum:io, ea quae pertinent ad disrincrionem personamm; terrio, ea quae pertinent ad processum creaturarnm ab ipso" *(STh* I, q. 2, prol.). The work is that of creation, of which God is efficient cause. That creation is seen as a procession, an *exitus.*

[12] "postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi libemm airbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem" *(STh* I-II, Note the parallelism between God as voluntary principle of his work of creation and human beings who are voluntary principles of their works. Note also the role played by the doctrine that human beings are created in the image and likeness of God. God is exemplar, and human beings are image, inasmuch as God shares with them the power of free self-disposition.

Let us comment on each of the parts of the *Summa,* focusing on differences in the way each of the sequences treats them.

Prima Pars. The third sequence differs from the other two, in that it begins not with creation in general with the creation of human beings and their powers. The offers a basis for this: the *Pars* describes creatures and their powers in great detail as a prolegomenon on activity *(Secunda Pars),* whereas the rest of creation is given a somewhat briefer treatment.

Secunda Pars. Here the sequence appears to be out harmony with the others: rather stressing God's work of grace, it stresses the human work of free acts leading to beatitude. Let us address apparent the context a more detailed comment on *Secunda Pars,* which is longer more complex than the other two parts of the *Summa.*

Given purpose the as a manual for beginners preparing for sacerdotal ministry as Dominicans, the large place given to what Aquinas himself refers to as *res moralis* is not surprising. The outline of *Secunda Pars* leads up to and away from the treatise on the *gratia sancti,* which empowers us on our journey toward the for we are created.

(1) The *Prima Secundae* begins with beatitude and with the basic structures and intrinsic principles of the human activity by which we journey toward

(2) Under the heading intrinsic principles i.t turns to sin and its effects on the human race, above moral impotence. This sets the stage for the organization of the rest of the *Prima Secundae* in terms alluding to Augustine's *De Spiritu et Littera* [13] *(STh* q. 90, proL): God is the extrinsic principle of our good acts, teaching us by the law *(STh* I-II, qq. 90-108), and enabling us through grace *(STh* qq. 109-14).

(3) The treatise on grace which brings *Prima Secundae* to a dose is the high point *Secunda Pars* as a What becomes dear in this treatise is the beings toward beatitude featured in prologue to the *Secunda* m

[13] Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera,* c. 5.

empowered permeated operates
the human and cooperates acts I-II, q. 111, a. 2). Thus we can say without contradiction that the *Secunda Pars* deals with God's work grace and the beings toward their beatitude.

on the *Secunda Secundae* develops in great detail specific features of grace: theological and states of

we move to consider these offices and states, the focus begins to narrow and the stage is set for consideration in the *Tertia* a particular his particular salvific mission and the graces that pertain to

Tertia Pars. The sequence features Christ himself a.'1d the glorified him, the first sequence contains both of these aspects, thus suggesting that there is no contradiction here" Indeed particularity of Jesus Christ is to be found the greatest universality. More specifically, grace that endows nature of Christ is at once the grace of a singular being q. and the grace of the one because of his identity, is head of absolutely every human *(STh* q. esp. aa. 3 as the *Tertia* the being to the of Jesus, it leads the earthly Christ to the aH-indusive mystical risen Christ, of he is head in which he dispenses the sacraments, preparing us for glory, thus continuing presence among us.[14] This part of the is Aquinas intended to take, executed the compilers was toward risen glory to which humans

To sum up foray beyond the narrative Father/Spiirit/Son reading suggested by Patfoort invites us to consider an alternative way viewing the structure of the

[14] Cf. Torell, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin, mattre spirituel,* 195. For him the *Summa* ends with Christ, but with Christ seen in his fullness as body including its members and the means of salvation, forming with them one mystical person (see *STh* m, q. 48, a. 2, ad 1).

Summa. Patfoort's narrative reading is linear and diachronic, considering the first part, then the second, and finally the third. The alternative reading is retrospective and synchronic: having come to the end of the *Summa* we look back at the parts and how they relate to each other. In this perspective the *Summa* can be depicted as a cone with three slices. The bottom and foundational one depicts the creation-wide scope of the *Prima Pars,* the middle one the human scope of the *Secunda Pars,* and the narrowest one the Christ-related scope of the *Tertia Pars.* Looking at the cone from the top down suggests to us a concentric articulation of the themes of the *Summa.* In this view Christ, while treated last, is within the narrowest drde, and in this sense a point of convergence, a center, rather than an appendix awkwardly tacked on to the *Summa.*

III. THE *SUl!IIMA'S* PLAN AS CYCLIC: *EXITUS* AND *REDITUS*

Since 1940, Chenu's application to the *Summa* of the cydic *exitus-reditus* pattern explicitly Aquinas in his *Commentary on the Sentences*[15] has been a quasi-obligatory point of reference in scholarly discourse on this topic. It has been accepted by most, albeit with modifications, and rejected by some others.[16] The main evidence for the application of this cyclic

[15] M.-D. Chemi, *Introdv.ction a l'etude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1950), esp. ch. 11. An earlier sketch of this material is found in "Le plan de la Somme theologique de S. Thomas,» *Revue Thomiste* 45 (1939): 93-207.

[16] Two early critics, A. Hayen and H. Schiliebeedcx, are featured in Max Sedder's review of the plan of the *Summa* in *Le salut et l'histoire* (Paris: Cerf, 1967), 28ff. (a translation of *Das Heil in der Geschichte: Geschichtstheologisches Denken bei Thomas von Aquin* [Munich: Kosel, 1964]). Corbin is another critic of Chenu. However while there is clear textual evidence for his own view, set forth earlier, there is also dear textual evidence for Chenu's. We should keep both views in tension rather than eliminate one. Wilhelm Metz, *Die Architektonik der Summa Theologiae des Thomas von Aquin* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998), is a more recent critic of Chenu. In this book, his *Habilitationschrift,* he claims that Chenu's scheme is merely material and misses the formal basis for distinguishing the parts of the *Summa.* Really its three parts correspond to *theoria, praxis,* and *poiesis* respectively (89-96, 200-204). Theory and praxis can help explain the difference between the *Prima* and *Secunda Partes,* but H. O. Pesch (in a critical review in *Theologische Revue)* correctly rejects the application of *poiesis* to the *Tertia Pars* as unfounded and confusing. Any attempt such as

Pars:
deals with God's governance
which is Godsdf *STh* I, q.
m this prologue, Aquinas is "'V"""""""
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Sentences (I
Does
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the *Prima*
abstract and necessary structures
that govern creatures' egress from the
Tertia is scarcely an reflecting the
a salvation history which
thought would at best have
In response we must note that in
passage in the *on the*

Metz's to come np with a grand explanatory scheme that excludes all others deeply underestimates the richness and multiva!ence of this text.

[17] G. Lafont, *Structures et miithode dans ia Somme theologique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1961), 150-71.

Sentences Aquinas makes a dear link with a scriptural text: "I am the alpha and the omega" (Rev 2:2). In addition, rather than speak of *exitus,* the *Prima Pars* uses the scriptural language of *processio-the* processions internal to the Trinity and their prolongation in the procession of creatures from their maker *(STh* I, q. 2, prol.; and I, q. 44, prol.). These scriptural references are crucial. They suggest that in the end *exitus-reditus* is not a neo-Platonic structure imposed on Christian revelation but one that facilitates the clearer expression of a fundamental scriptural pattern.

For Aquinas the use of philosophy is ancillary, and ultimately philosophical categories of whatever provenance are judged and· reshaped by revealed doctrine *(STh* I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2). How are the categories of *exitus* and *reditus* reshaped by their use within this theological context? Rather than being imbued with a necessitarian world view, they are, as we have seen, permeated through and through by freedom. This is clear from the fact that God's work is not necessary emanation but free creation *(Prima Pars);* the work of human beings is not necessary return but the intersection of divine and human freedom in graced acts *(Secunda Pars);* and the work of Jesus Christ is not an unavoidable incarnation and redemption but the expression of God's supreme freedom *(Tertia Pars).* In sum, the application of *exitus-reditus* to the *Summa* offers a broader context for the concentric patterns articulated earlier, and in turn these patterns help to validate *exitus-reditus* as part of the theological patrimony rather than as a philosophical intrusion. Interrelated with these concentric patterns, it remains a valuable contribution to the conversation.

IV. THE *SUMMA'S* PLAN AS CREEDAL

We saw earlier how in key respects the *Breviloquium* adheres more closely to the flow of the creeds than does Lombard's *Sentences.* In our effort to probe the rationale for the *Summa's* plan, we need to explore more closely how this plan relates to the creedal articulation of faith, foundational in any Christian

the
pertains to God
pertains to (T*ertia*

Pars): [20]

[18] The term Thomas uses is *s-ymbolum,* of 'Nhich there are *Il:"No,* the Symbol of the Apostles and the Symbol of the Fathers, in me Mass (SI'h ll-Il, q. 1, a. 9, ad 4-6). ·we would refer to these as the Apostles's Creed and the Nicene-Constantinople Creed. For a succinct presentation *of* the arrides of faith as understood by the Dominicans of Aquinas's time, see J. Goering, "Christ in Dominican Catechesis: The Artides of Faith," in Kent Emery, Jr., and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans* (0-TotreDame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 127-38.

[19] Cf. *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7. These theological principles have their conclusions, and *De Verit.,* q. 14, a. 11 clarifies the reiationship between principle§ and conclusions: **If** I affirm a principle from which other truths derive, in affirming that principle explicitly (e.g., God is provident toward human I also accept the conclusions that are drawn from it (e.g., God sends His Son into the world).

[20] This distinction occurs elsewhere, for instance in I *Comp. Theo/.,* c. 2: bearificantem cognitionem circa duo cognita dominus consistere docillt, scilicet circa divinitatem trinitatis et humanitatem (based on the words of Christ as reported in Jn 17:3); see *alsoDeArticulis Fidei* 1 (based on john 14:1).

	The Divinity of God	The Humanitv of Christ	Comments
1	He that comes to God must believe that He exists	and rewards those who seek Him	This the text of Heb 11:6, quoted in *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 7
2	God's existence	God's providence over the salvation of human beings	These are the primary matters of faith in which all articles of faith are implicitly found
3	that they may know Thee	and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent	John's description of eternal life in John 17:3, quoted in *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 8
4	the secret of the Godhead, to see which is beatitude	the mystery of Christ's humanity, by which we have access to beatitude	Both of these mysteries are objects of the beatific vision
5	unity of the Godhead; trinity of the persons (3); works proper to the Godhead: -of nature (creation); -of grace (sanctification); -of glory (resurrection and life everlasting);	incarnation or conception; virginal birth; passion, death, burial; descent into hell; resurrection; ascension; corning for the judgement	Aquinas puts the 7 articles referring to the majesty of the Godhead before the 7 on the humanity of Christ. Aquinas also provides for an alternate configuration that would give 6+6 rather than 7 + 7 articles

Rows 1-2 pertain to *STh* II-II, question 1, article 7, and rows 3-5 to *STh* II-II, question 1, article 8. Article 7 deals with the increase in the articles of faith from Old Testament times to the coming of Christ. The scriptural base for this article is provided by the Hebrew text (row 1), which includes Christ implicitly under the rubric of God's providential care for humanity. Article 8 deals with the explicitation of the articles of faith after the coming of Christ. Here Aquinas brings in the text from John (row 3), which in its second member alludes specifically to the mystery of Christ rather than generally to providence. [21] The beginning of the corpus

[21] In other cases where Thomas sets out Christian doctrine according to the order of the creeds, this is the text he uses rather than the one from Hebrews. It leads more directly into the articles of the creed, whereas the Hebrews text is more generic and allows one to move

article 8 recapitulates
row which shows
Row here 5 shows how the articles
the t".vo members of John 17:3

back further in the quest of foundational principles for a scientific theology.

22 We find the sarne systematic order in ill *Sent.,* d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, 1, but with more detail, suggesting that the first work is to the Father, the other two *w* the Spirit (Aquinas is silent on this in the *Summa).* The same is found in Bonaventure's m *Sent.,* d. 25, a. 1, q. 1 and in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri,* pars m, inq. 2, tract. 2, quaest. 2, tit. 1, cap. 1 (in *Summa Fratrisillexandri* [Florence: Quarrachi, 1948], 4: 1122). (In the latter text one finds this reordering.) An earlier and less developed form of !this order is found in Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de Bono,* ed. N. Vicki (Bern: Francke, 1985), 2:627. Aquinas was not breaking new groun.d in this systematic exposition of the creeds, but following a received tradition.

23 The 1954 Marietti edition *(Opuscuia Theologica,* vol. 1) is being used here. Generally occurring as recapitulations rather than as prologues, the structure markers in the *Compendium* are looser than those of the *Summa.* This tends to favor the view of Lafont and Torrell that the first book of the written around 1265-67, may have been a sketch on which the *Summa* builds. I suggested such a relatively early dating on other grounds in my *Structures dynamiques de la grace: Grace medicinale et griice elevante selon Thomas d'Aquin* (fom-nai: Desdee, 1973), 163 n. 132.

Comp. Theo/., c. 147). The work of glory in the *Compendium* begins in chapter 148 when Aquinas moves on to the consummation of human beings, and through them of the whole creation, and then deals with resurrection, eternal life, and the remuneration of both good and evil.[24] Having fully dealt with the topics under the rubric of God's divinity, Aquinas then goes on to Christ's humanity in chapters 185-246.

The *Summa* contains the same elements and follows the same basic pattern as the *Compendium,* but with some differences.

First, the *Prima Pars,* like the beginning of the *Compendium,* covers the unity of God, the trinity of Persons, and the work of creation, in that order. [25]

Second, the *Secunda Pars,* the focus of which is anthropological and moral, begins with an extensive development on human activity and its principles, comes to a climax in its consideration of the work of grace, and is followed in the *Secunda Secundae* by a thorough study of virtues, states, and offices. Some of this anthropological material (e.g., on human beatitude) is subsumed in the *Compendium* under the work of creation. Some of it is missing from the *Compendium,* but may have been intended for the unfinished book 2 on hope (and good intention) and the projected book 3 on charity (and good behavior). It is clear that humanity's graced journey to God offers a clear thematic focus in the *Summa* which it does not in the *Compendium.* [26]

[24] At the very end of the first book of the *Compendium* (c. 246) Aquinas looks back and offers an explicit account of the structure of this book in slightly variant terms: the three effects of God are creation, pertaining to nature; justification, to grace; and remuneration, to glory.

[25] Unity of God: *STh* l, qq. 2-26; I *Comp. Theo/.,* cc. 2-36; Trinity: *STh* I, qq. 27-43; I *Comp. Theo/.,* cc. 37-67; Work of creation: *STh* I, qq. 44-102; I *Comp. Theo!.,* cc. 68-143, including governance *(gubernatio* or *providentia)* of creatures in general terms. In the *Compendium* a special providence (I *Comp. Theo!.,* c. 143) or government (I *Comp. Theo!.,* c. 147) extended to rational creatures, who receive grace and the forgiveness of sins, is considered to be the second effect of God.

[26] This appreciation of the role played by human beings created in God's image and free agents of their own return to God was present already in the *Compendium.* A revealing text is found in I *Comp. Theo/.,* c. 201, where Aquinas argues for the appropriateness of the incarnation: "[through the incarnation] the universality of the entire divine work is perfected, since man, the last to be created, returns in a certain cycle to his origin, united to the very

Third, unlike the *Breviloquium,* both the *Compendium* and the *Summa* put the humanity of Christ in their final part. However, in one vital respect the *Summa* follows the order of the creeds whereas the *Compendium* follows the systematic ordering we have described: the humanity of Christ precedes the work of glory in the *Summa* (and in the creeds) but follows it in the *Compendium.* The work of glory, together with the sacraments not dealt with in the *Compendium,* is seen in the *Summa* as a benefit conferred by Christ, the *via ad beatitudinem:*

Breviloquium: closest to the creedal narrative	*Compendium:* closest to the systematic reordering of the articles of the creed	*Summa:* a further reordering by Thomas
God, triune and one	God, one and triune	God, one and triune
work of creation	work of creation	work of creation
Christ	work of grace	work of grace /humans
work of grace	work of glory (sacraments omitted)	Christ
work of glory (preceded by sacraments)	Christ	work of glory (preceded by sacraments)

The treatment of the humanity of Christ comes across more as an appendix in the *Compendium* than it does in the *Summa.* The *Summa* maintains the humanity of Christ as a block to be dealt with in its final part, but subsumes it into the overall *exitus-reditus* pattern identified by Chenu by making it precede the treatise on the consummation of all things. The *Summa* also maintains a clear parallelism between its three parts, each developing one of the three works of God featured in the creeds: creation *(Prima Pars),*

origin of things through the work of the incarnation" (my translation). See also I *Comp. Theol.,* c. 149: "the consummation of the entire physical universe depends on the consummation of human beings." What the *Summa* adds to the *Compendium* is the embodiment of this heightened appreciation of the theological role played by the human journey to God in its very structure, and a close linking of that journey with G<ld's work of grace which empowers it. These new insights may have been triggered by Thomas's intention to provide a complete treatment of *res moralis* in the *Summa.*

grace *(Secunda.Pars),* and glory *(Tertia Pars).* At the same time it provides a process of concentration in which Christ is clearly the consummation of the work of theology *(Tertia Pars,* prol.) through the sequence that leads from God and creation to humans and grace and finally to Christ and glory. The themes of the *Summa* are deeply rooted in the creeds, but their ordering represents a significant step by Aquinas toward greater clarity and harmony.

V. THE STRUCTIJREOF THE *SUMMA:* METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

We have developed a variety of perspectives on how Aquinas organized the themes of Christian doctrine in his *Summa* and how this organization is rooted in the creeds. We have discovered a rich network of meanings and have opted for multivalence rather than seeking one absolutely clear and all-sufficient interpretation. Does the theological methodology Aquinas uses in the *Summa,* articulated in *STh* I, question 1, help us understand more deeply his use and reconfiguration of the creedal articles in that work?

Sacred doctrine is to be scientific *(STh* I, q. 1, a. 2) and argumentative *(STh* I, q. 1, a. 8). Scientific argumentation in the Aristotelian sense moves deductively from causes to effects, from principles to conclusions, but argumentation can be taken more widely to mean any *discursus* of the mind moving from one truth to another *(De Verit.,* q. 2, a. 4, ad 5), including the opposite movement of induction, from effects to causes *(STh* I, q. 1, a. 7, ad 1). Aquinas does not want to lock *sacra doctrina* into the category of strict deductive science. There is room for movement not only from causes to effects but also from effects to causes, as well as for the use of metaphor and image to lead one into the mystery which rational categories cannot exhaust *(STh* I, q. 1, a. 9).

Unlike the sciences known to Aristotle, *sacra doctrina* proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, that of God and the blessed *(STh* I, q. 1, a. 2), transmitted to us through revelation. That revelation is expressed in the canonical

I, q. 1, a.
summarize what
H-H, q. 1, a.

i:ne:ce1ne:a1fashion
God reveals to us.[28] way they us
imperfectly approximate the and comprehensiveness of
vision of which faith is a A key
task is the identification of appropriate for a
netvvork of intelligible as all-encompassing as possible.
What are more and generative
doctrines that can other how can
process of derivation take Building on a tradition
concemmg way the articles of the creed can
summed up, recapitulated, and structured, Aquinas developed his
answer to these questions adapting
patterns of Aristotelian science as
with his endeavor both

Science in the elucidation-Aquinas
uses the term *(STh* I, q. 1, a0 *5,* ad 2)--of the
articles of other as tool to be used purpose
to be achieved. Like other J\Jistotelian tools categories used
by this tool is even transformed, the process
being used. Indeed philosophical texts, even those of Aristotle,
are the least of the authorities used in I, q0 1, a. 8,
2). Moreover, sacred doctrine sits in judgment on the
principles, condusions, methods of philosophical science.

[27] This argument, from I Cor 15:12, recurs a number of times in his works, and is found in *Sfh* I, q. 1, a. ll. It occurs in Scripture, not in a subsequent theologiail elaboration.

[28] *Sfh* I, q. 1, a. *5,* ad 1 and 2; I, q. 1, a. 9.

Thus we ought not to expect Aquinas univocally to apply the principles of Aristotelian science to his theological enterprise.

The ideal of Aristotelian science is to know not just what is in fact the case but also why it is the case: one seeks to grasp the necessary and universally connection of facts with the causal principles from which they are derived and which are better known. [29] The more powerful and probative the principles, the more scientific the knowledge. Because the principles of *sacra doctrina* derive from more certain and more comprehensive knowledge, that of God, this science differs from the sciences known to Aristotle not as a deficient instance but as a higher realization. The more scriptural and creedal principles play a role theology, more scientific it is.[30]

A problem, however, arises from the fact that some articles of faith are contingent and/or singular rather than necessary and/or universal as to as Aristotdian principles. Creation and depend upon the freedom of the stories recounted testaments are shot through freedom both human and divine. [31] In his scientific search Aquinas singles out the most necessary articles faith, which, including the other articles implicidy, can serve as

[29] Chapter 1 of John Jenkins's *Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), offers a good summary oft.he Aristotelian approach to science. Jenkins argues that sacred doctrine has features which distinguish it from other human *scientiae,* it is nevertheless fully a PA [Posterior Analytics] *scientia* and it shares with other human *uienti<W* centtal featuresn (51). He upholds this against Chenu and many other interpreters of Thomas.

[30] I intend here to be restating part of the argument made by Eugene Rogers in his *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth* (Notte Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995) 17-70. He rightly stresses the role of Scripture, which permeates the entire *Summa,* but because of my concern ·Nith the structures of the *Summa,* I stress the complementary role of the creeds, which encapsulate scriptural revelation into the dear principles needed for pedagogical organization.

[31] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 2 raises this issue in terms of the particular deeds of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and offers a response that appears somewhat perfunctory. Why would Aquinas not have raised what for us would seem a much more significant objection in terms of the particular and contingent deeds of Jesus Christ? This suggests that for Aquinas and schoiars of his day Christ's deeds, for a!! their particularity and contingency, play a privileged and essential role in theology, but one that somewhat remained in the penumbra. It is that role that we are trying to articulate.

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emerge. to the harrn.olllty
faith, and the
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dimension of this scientific approach is that the *"u:wuna*
consistently treats complex topics after it has considered
"""""!-""""principles they can be readily seen to For
the study nature in the *Pars* is preceded
by a study angelic creation, we might better
comprehend the composite of spiritual and the corporeal
is the Likewise the of Christ is the
God-Man *(TertiaPars)* is preceded by a study God
and of man Christ comes at the end not because
he is relatively unimportant because key blocks
to place the
undertaken. [33]

Godself, as efficient
considering human beings m

[32] The srudy of Gilbert Narcisse, *Les raisons de Dieu: Argument de co11111Hmance et esthetiqv1e theologique sek,n saint Thomas J:Aquin et Hans Urs von Balthasav* (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1997), brings out both the centrality of *convenientia* in the argumentation of Thomas Aquinas and the role the tmnscendenral beauty plays in his thought-secondary to transcendental truth, but still of crucial import. In addition to making room for finely honed argument, sacred science must deal with metaphor and images, which through their attractiveness drnw people into the unfathomable mystery: see *SYh* I, q. 1, a. 9; and I *Sent.*, d. 1, a. *5,* ad 3.

[33] CL Seckler, *Le salut dans l'histoire,* 35, where he presents Schillebeeckx's views on the organization of the *Summa"*

their free, graced actions are in the image of God; having dealt with God and God's human image, we can study Christ. Just as in the Trinity the Son proceeds from the Father, and the Spirit from the Father and the Son, so too in the *Summa* the study of the human image in the *Secunda Pars* flows from the study of the divine exemplar in the *Prima Pars* and the study of Christ in the *Tertia Pars* flows from the study of both divine exemplar and human image.

(2) The *Prima Pars* does not present God abstractly, but God in his desire to share his life with creatures, and the *Secunda Pars* does not present man abstractly, but man in his orientation toward God.[34] Thus the Christology of the *Tertia Pars* yokes together a God already wanting to share in human nature, and a human nature already in its depths oriented to God. Just as the Spirit is the bond of unity of Father and Son, so too Christ is the bond of unity between God and man.

These two points allow yet another pattern to emerge out of the text of the *Summa.* This pattern mirrors the processions of the Trinity and in it the humanity of Christ plays the bonding role the Spirit plays within the Trinity.

B) The Summa's Plan as Scientific: Background

The scientific order of presentation, which begins with the broadest and most generative principles and deductively moves toward detailed exposition, presupposes that one has discovered what those principles are. Thus prior to a pedagogically ordered scientific exposition *(ordo disciplinae),* there is a process of discovery *(ordo inventionis).* To discover the principles of *sacra doctrina,* accessible in their clarity only to God and to the blessed, but revealed to us in Scripture and summarized for us in the articles of faith, a sure guide is needed. As Aquinas tells us in the *Tertia Pars,* this sure guide is Christ, the *via veritatis,* the teacher *par excellence.*

[34] A. N. Williams, "Mystical Theology Redux: The Pattern of Aquinas's Summa Theologiae," *Modem Theology* 13 (1997): 67.

Let us not, however, unduly limit the scope of Christ's teaching activity. The *Tertia Pars* deals not just with the Jesus who ministered in Galilee and Judea but also with the *totus Christus*, head and members, who through the Church continues to teach to this day. During his earthly ministry Jesus himself taught the Jews of his day, but he entrusts the task of teaching the Gentiles to his apostles *(STh* III, q. 42, a. 1, c and ad 2); he himself teaches in such a way as to imprint his teaching in the hearts of his hearers rather than on paper *(STh* III, q. 42, a. 4), and he follows a certain order, teaching his disciples that they in turn might teach others (ibid.),[35] orally and in writing. Thus we have a process of doctrinal communication beginning with Christ who teaches orally and empowers his disciples to preach and to write, and so on down through the ages. There accumulates a body of materials accessible to the theologian, beginning with Scripture, followed by the articles of faith which summarize the Scriptures, followed by the councils, followed by approved patristic sources, followed by theologians, followed by philosophical sources whose authority is least (cf. *STh* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2). The theologian uses them all within the Church, which has the power to regulate them.

These sources stimulate a lengthy process of discovery in which various elements of the truth, communicated to us in the narrative sequence of the Scriptures, are collected, analyzed, and brought to a point where they can cohere in a suitable pedagogical order. In the *Summa* that order begins with God, continues with man, and culminates in the God-man incarnate, who leads humankind through the vicissitudes of history toward God. As Aquinas tells us, God is at the beginning of the theological project and animates it throughout: all theological topics are such because of their relationship to God. But if we look at the *Summa* not just in its content but also in its performance, not only does it end with the total Christ in whom we have access to eternal life, but it also

[35] A key text: "Christ is constituted by God as the head of the Church, indeed of all human beings, as was said above, such that all should not only accept grace through him, but also receive from him the teaching of truth. As he himself said (Jn 18:37): 'I was born for this, and came into the world for this, that I might give testimony to the truth'" *(STh* Ill, q. 12, a. 3; translation mine). See also *STh* Ill, q. 3, a. 8; and *ScG* IV, c. 54.

begins with the same total Christ who teaches us down through the centuries, giving to us the principles we need for the systematic elaboration of *sacra doctrina.* The order of scientific pedagogy leads from God to Christ; the order of discovery leads from Christ to God.

This links up with two related articles that deal with the formal object *(STh* I, q. 1, a. 3) and with the subject matter *(STh* I, q. 1, a. 7) of *sacra doctrina.*[36] More foundational and pertinent to the order of discovery, *STh* I, question 1, article 3 tells us that the science which is *sacra doctrina* deals with particular topics inasmuch as they are revealable, just as the eye sees things inasmuch as they are colored. This unifies a multitude of topics under the formal object of revealability. But is there a more immediate and concretely discernible way in which they can be seen to constitute one subject matter? Derivative and more pertinent to the order of pedagogy, *STh* I, question 1, article 7 tells us that these topics are all treated under the aspect of God: they either are God or refer to God as beginning and end.[37] This last phrase summarizes the pedagogical order of the *Summa.*

The formal object and the subject matter of *sacra doctrina* are intimately related: revealable truths are precisely those that relate to God and to our journey to God *(STh* I, q. 1, a. 1). In a variant formulation, God reveals to us what we cannot know by ourselves, namely, God's own self-knowledge, and all else known in the unifying perspective of that self-knowledge *(STh* I, q. 1, a. 6).38

Where does Christ fit into this? It is clear that the total Christ is not the unifying subject matter *of sacra doctrina (STh* I, q. 1, a. 7). Yet, as we have seen, that science unfolds from God in the direction of the total Christ in which all humans find their way to God. Moreover, if we return to the perspective of *STh* I, question

[36] Two helpful articles: J.-P. Torrell, "Le savoir theologique chez saint Thomas," *Revue Thomiste* 96 (1996): 355-96, esp. 381-82; and T. C. O'Brien, *"Sacra Doctrina* Revisited: The Context of Medieval Education," *The Thomist* 41 (1977): 475-509.

[37] See also *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.

[38] This is amply developed by Corbin, *Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin,* 767ff.

article 3, us to have a science whose subject matter is God .. to God is as we revelation Christ. Again we Rogers: the more more Christoform it is.[39]

sum, sequence of pedagogy) we have analyzed in different facets throughout this paper can expanded. As we just seen, in order discovery Christ revelation is prior to doctrine God. That doctrine is both the of the order of discovery and the beginning the of scientific exposition. This gives us a sequence of Christ-God-Christ. A further expansion is possible as well, if we go back to the broadest context set by *STh* I, question article 1 and articulated Chenu's *exitus-reditus* pattern. Christ's revelation us grounded God's salvific choice from all eternit"/ to offer men a destiny beyond their ken. destiny God, through the way which is Jesus """""""""""""""""is now expanded to God-Christ-God-Christ- begins ends

This sequence can be expressed in the following diagram:

Order of Discovery: God / total Christ / God

1 God who chooses to reveal Godself as the destiny of human beings	2 The total Christ as the vehicle for this revelation	3 Doctrine of God as providing the principles and *ratio formalis* of sacred doctrine as science	4 Christ the revealer as the goal toward which sacred doctrine is headed	5 God as the one toward whom Christ leads human beings

Order of Discipline: God / total Christ

[39] See note 30. O'Brien makes a similar point: uBy origin it [i.e., *stJCra doct:rina]* rests on the ro!llti.ngelllfact of God's revealing at :i.11,;md on the contingently chosen, historical events of salvation, the divinely intended meanings of both the words describing those events and of the events themselves. That gives *sacra doctrina* its paradoxical character: it is a science of the contingent. The *de facto* divine economy must always be the final me21Sureof the loftiest of theological speculations. Concretely the mystery of Christ is decisive as criterion of every intelligible construct» (O'Brien, *"Sacra Doctrina* Revisited," 499-500).

Thus Christ plays a twofold role in sacred doctrine. In the order of discovery his role is that of actually revealing God to us. He taught us during his earthly ministry but also continues to teach us as the total Chris4 body and members, through the Church down through the ages (column 2). In the order of scientific exposition he is the summit and culmination of the whole theological enterprise as Aquinas conceives it in the *Summa* (column 4). But then in the broadest sense, before Christ the revealer there is God's project of inviting us into intimacy with himself (column 1), and after Christ the culmination there is the God to whom Christ leads us (column 5), completing the circle. In this approach, Christ continues to be a culmination, as Corbin claims, but within an *exitus-reditus* context, as Chenu reminds us.

VI. CONCLUSION

If nothing else, our exploration of the *Summa* has established that it is indeed a classic text, multidimensional, with many facets and perspectives, worth returning to over and over again because each time one struggles with it one is blessed with new insight. A number of organizing patterns for the *Summa* have emerged in the course of this essay. Priority must be ascribed to those which stem directly from the prologues in which Aquinas expresses his own intentions, but clustering around them are others that emerge from a scrutiny of the text, which at most were part of the habitual texture of Aquinas's mind. The point of this exercise is not to single out the one pattern that excludes all others but to disclose the richness of thought available to us when they are all held together.

There is an obvious sense, from the narrative ordering by Patfoort of the three parts in their diachronic sequence, that the Spirit occupies the middle position in the sequence of the *Summa* that Christ occupies in the *Breviloquium.* But as we continued to probe how the themes of the *Summa* are related to one another synchronically, especially through a study of the prologues, we found a variety of concentric schemes, which show us how

gets to the final part of whose is Christ benefits, after he has developed the broader themes that contextualize and prepare it. The converges on and culminates in The doctrine Christ occupies a central position in the This position may be less conspicuous it is the but nonetheless it is powerfully operative.

This is in the sections of the essay in we Aquinas proceeded as he did in organizing into the creedal roots of the *Summa* unearthed another pattern, on a systematic exposition of the creeds that goes back to Philip Chancellor, which the treatment of the incarnate Christ is found in a second part parallel to the first part which deals God and God's works. This precludes notion that Christ was treated as an afterthought the *Summa.* We then probed the method of the *;:;uinmia* discovered in the foreground role Christ plays in binding together pairts. A further scrutiny disclosed the background role by Christ as the revealer of the principles required for the proper scientific unfolding of *sacra doctrina.*

The Spirit, and as beginning and end, play a key m the structuring of the so does Christ. His role is pervasive and does not itself to be encapsulated a simple formula.

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APPLYING ARISTOTLE IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

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IN HIS BOOK *When did I begin?,* Norman M. Ford argues that, because up until about the fourteenth day a single human embryo can split in such a way that twins (or other sibling groups) result, the embryo during this period cannot be considered a human individual.[1] In historical support of this thesis, he cites Aristotle, who, according to Ford, holds that the sensitive soul-which is a prerequisite for the presence of the rational or properly human soul--enters the embryo some forty days after conception for males, ninety days for females.[2] Ford has been challenged on his interpretation of Aristotle by the prominent Aristotelian Enrico Berti, who argues that, if we bear in mind especially Aristotle's application of the doctrine of first act to the beginnings of human life, we must acknowledge that for him the human soul is present from conception.[3]

[1] See N. M. Ford, *When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1989), 19-52. Ford has now another book on this topic *(The Prenatal Person: Ethics from Conception to Birth* [Oxford: Blackwell, 2002]), to which I did not have access as I was writing this essay. Henceforward, when I speak of twinning, I mean the production of monozygotic sibling groups-cleaving aside, that is, polyzygotic twins and ignoring the possibility that more than two fetuses might be the result of a single embryo's splitting.

[2] Ford, *When Did I Begin?,* 27-28, 32. At *Pol.* 7.15 (1335b19-26), Aristotle suggests that, once the sensitive soul is present, abortion is not permissible. He seems, however, in the same passage to countenance the exposure of infants.

[3] E. Berti, "Quando esiste l'uomo in potenza? La tesi di Aristotele," in *Nascita e morte dell'uomo: Problemi filosofici e scientifici,* ed. S. Biolo (Genoa: Marietti, 1993), 115-23. The same essay appears in *Quale statuto per l'embrione umano? Problemi e prospettive,* ed. M.

Molfi {Milan: Blib!iotech_ne.,1992)., 52-5ft I wiH however? the former. l:n. an Italian translation of *Wlhen Did I* Ford has published a reply to sor:ae of }tis critics'.' in.eluding Berti Ivt Ford *cornincio io? conce[Ji:vnentoneUa storia, nella e nella scienza* [IVU!an: Baldini & Castoldi, 1997], 310-22).

9.7 (1048b37-Hl49a18).

I discuss first act bdow"

4! use ;J1e text of *GA* edited by 1-L J. Dmssaart Lulofa and published in 1965 mnong the Oxford Classical Texts.

For would put down the (736a32)] as soulless or in every sense bereft of life both the semen and the [Ta TE OTIEppcna of animals *live* no less than those of and up to a certain That then they possess the nutritive soul is is it from the discussions elsewhere about soul *[De an.* 2.4 this soul must be As develop they also acquire the sensitive soul in virtue of which an animal is an animal ... [5] For, e.g., an animal does not become at the same time an animal and a man or a horse or any other and the peculiar character of the in each individual. of the greatest which we must strive to and as far as possible. When and how and whence is a share in reason those animals that in this ..,,..,,,,r·u-.11,,1 It is that the semen and the not yet separate, must be assumed to but not until those 1)] se1pairnteafrom the it absorbs nourishment and performs the function of the nutritive soul. For at first all such seem to live the life of a plant. [6]

And it is dear that we must be the rational soul. For all three kinds of must be before are it is necessary should all come into without existing outside it, or that should aH exist or that some should so exist and others not.

in the material 0u1vP""""

or come from the male and be to the material in the female. then either all of or none, or some must come into m the male from

Now that is dear from this IS cannot exist

cannot enter from outside. For neither is it IJ'-""m·""for them to enter from a for the semen is for the

[5] Drossaart Lu!ofs marks a lacuna in the text here, suggesting that it should be filled by the words KC!t Ka()'

[6] The Platt translation {also as given in]. Bame&,.ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Translation* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1934], 1143) renders this as, "For at first all such *embryos* seem to iive the life of a added). But the Greek is, rrpliiTOV l.lEv yap *cmcwr'* EO!KE (_;ijv Ta TOWOm <!>!JTOO pfov (GA *23* [736b12-13]); amxvr' clearly refers to Ta crm'°pµcnaKai Ta at *GA 23* (736b8-9). !3erti's translation (taken from D. Li.nza) gives the correct understanding' *In un primo tempo sembra che tutti silfatti esseri vivano la vita del!e piaute.*

reason alone so to enter and alone to be divine, for no activity has any connection with the activity of reason, [7]

Berti understands asserting that the embryo ",,,.,,,,.1-,-u·,,,it cannot have received the

[7] *GA* 2.3 (736a32-b29); Berti leaves out (with the apprnpriate indications) what I give in brackets, that is, 736b16-22. Like other Aristotelian translations ᗰthis essay, this one is &om the Revised Oxford Translation (Barnes, ed.), occasionally (as here) slightly revised, The translation of *GA* has as its base an earlier translation by A. Platt, who translated Tο icu11µain line 736a32 (and ;a Kutjµam at 736b9 and '736b11) as "unfertilized embryo." Berti takes exception to this translation (Berti "Quando esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 117); it does not appear in the Barnes version.

[8] Berti, "Qoondo esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 117.

[9] Ibid., 118.

[10] Ibid.

Satisfied that Aristotle is saying in *GA* 2.3 that right from the beginning the embryo is possessed of a nutritive soul in act and the other two souls in potency, Berti introduces the passage from *De an.* 2.3. His intention in doing so is to show that the type of potency attaching to the rational soul is such that we can say that the rational soul is present in the embryo right from the beginning.

> The cases of figure and soul are exactly parallel; for the particulars subsumed under the common name in both cases-figures and living beings--constirute a series, each successive term of which potentially contains its predecessor, e.g., the square the triangle, the sensory power the self-nutritive. Hence we must ask in the case of each order of living things, What is its soul, i.e., What is the soul of plant, man, beast? ... For the power of perception is never found apart from the power of self-nutrition .... Again, among living things that possess sense some have the power of locomotion, some not. Lastly, certain living beings-a smaH minority-possess calculation and thought, for (among mortal beings) those which possess calculation have all the other powers above mentioned, while the converse does not hold .... Reflective thought [Si:wp11n1<(x_; presents a different problem. [11]

It is dear, notes Berti, that Aristotle holds that in any living being there is just one souL[12] In human beings, that soul is rational; thus, when Aristotle says *GA* 2.3 that the rational (and the sensitive) souls are in the embryo in potency, even at that point we must assume that the *real* soul is the rational, that it contains the other two (or, at least, the corresponding faculties). To quote Berti, "Here, as one sees, Aristotle affirms that the superior soul contains in itself the inferior, and not vice-versa. Thus, in the human embryo, one must suppose that there is already contained the soul superior to all, i.e., the rational, which however possesses in act only the nutritive faculty, and in potency the sensitive and rational. "[13] Berti also acknowledges that, for the rational fac..dty to be to operate, there is required *intelletto teoretico* flE<J.1Pl1TlKO<;voGi;), an issue that Aristode remands to another forum.

[11] *De an.* 2.3 (414b28-415a12). The ellipses correspond to the pieces left out by Berti.
[11] Berti, esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 118.
[13] Ibid., 119.

How is this possible? How can a soul that is only in potency in the embryo *contain* the soul (or the faculty) that is already there in act? This is possible by means of the Aristotelian conception that the soul is "first act of a body which has life in potency."[14] When a person knows a language but is asleep, the language is both in act (first act) and in potency. Before he learned the language, it was (in another sense) in potency; now that it is learned, it is in act. But it can, so to speak, be put in act in a more perfect sense: the person can wake up and use the language. This is sometimes called second act. Thus, right from the beginning, the embryo can be said to have a rational soul in act (i.e., in first act), although this will only be put in act fully (i.e., in second act) once the necessary organs develop, etc.

Berti's third passage, from *Metaph.* 9.7, is offered in confirmation of the former argument. In it Aristotle is explaining what it means to be in potency for something. That which is potentially a house is not such until all the material is gathered and there is present someone who wants to build a house. Similarly, a doctor cannot cure just any material-he cannot, for instance, cure a dead body; he needs a body that is disposed to be healed. Aristotle discusses here also semen (or seed, cmtpµa). "But we must distinguish when a thing exists potentially and when it does not; for it is not at any and every time. E.g., is *earth* potentially a man? No-but rather when it has already become *seed*, and perhaps not even then, as not everything can be healed by the medical art or by chance, but there is a certain kind of thing which is capable of it, and only this is potentially healthy."[15] This is not the passage quoted by Berti in support of his thesis that the embryo contains the rational soul in (first) act; that passage is the following, which comes a few lines later:

> E.g., the seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must be deposited in something other than itself and undergo a change. But when through its own motive principle it has already got such and such attributes, in this state it is already

[14] 010 ii ljluxTf lonv EVTEAEXEtaii npuin1 <JWµaTO<; cpuatKoOSuv<lµEtl,;wl]v exovTO<; *(De an.* 2.1 [412a27-28]; Berti, "Quando esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 119).

[15] *Metaph.* 9.7 (1048b37-1049a5).

potentially a man; while in the former state it needs another motive principle, just as earth is not yet potentially a statue (for it must first change in order to become brass).[16]

This passage demonstrates, according to Berti, the difference between the semen and the embryo. The former is not yet a man, the latter is: a man in potency, by which is to be understood a man in first act. The difference between the former and the latter is that the latter has its own "motive principle" (apxtj). Like the material for the house in the presence of the builder and the properly disposed body in the presence of the doctor, from the man in potency a full-grown man will result if no impediment presents itself. Berti condudes, "if the embryo is already in potency, it must already possess act, as *first act*, the soul that is proper to the species, even if it is not capable of exercising immediately aH the faculties-that is, it possesses in act only nutritive faculty and in potency the others."[17]

n

In order to deal with Berti's general understanding of Aristotle's embryology, we need now to go back to the first passage, that is, the passage from *GA* 2.3. We have seen that Berti interprets the remark that, before they are separate, "the semen and the embryo [Ta mrtpµcna 1<al Ta (736b8-9)]" have the nutritive soul potentially as saying that the relevant change occurs "after the union of the seed furnished by the father with the material furnished by the mother." Berti rather slides over the fact that in *GA* 2.3 Aristotle speaks of two types of embryo-or, perhaps better, two stages of same embryo. The first stage he associates closely with the semen, not only in the piece just

[16] o'l:ovTO cm£pµa oonw (8£1 *yap* EV @J.·(ι <nrndv> Kai µna!'kXAA£1v),ØTCTV r';; i\811 l'i1a Tfj<; athoO apxfi<; UTOIOUTOV, ijori TOUTO 8uvciµn. EK£1vo 8£ h£pm; apxij<; odrn1, WITT!Ep ii yfj ourrw iiuvciµE1 (µna!3a71o0cra yap £mm XaAKo<;) *(Metaph.* 9.7 [1049a14-18]). The word nEcrElv is inserted by Ross; in the Jaeger text it does not appear (nor is it tnnslated in the Barnes volume [p. 1656]). Since Berti's translation presupposes n£crdv, for the moment I use Ross's older translation of *Metaph.* rather than the Barnes revision.

[17] Berri, "Quando esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 121.

referred to (where he speaks of both the semen and the embryo as "not yet separate") but also at the beginning of the passage: "since both the semen and the embryo [Ta TE 01TEpµaTa Kai Ta KutjµaTa (736a33-34)] of animals *live* no less than those of plants." It is only at the second stage, with respect to which Aristotle mentions the embryo and not the semen, that we have that which "absorbs nourishment and performs the function of the nutritive soul." This is the embryo that has become "separate" from the mother, in the sense that it has bodily integrity and movement of its own.[18] This is consistent with what he says elsewhere in *GA*, where the embryo requires some time in the presence of the semen--or, more precisely, in the presence of that which it brings: its *pneuma-before* it launches out on its own. During this time the *pneuma* is working upon the embryo, but in an external way-that is, in such a way that the embryo cannot be said to have its own "motive principle" or dpxtj and therefore cannot be a man in first act.

In *GA* 1.21and22, Aristotle insists that in the life of the early embryo the action of the *pneuma* is external. At the beginning of *GA* 1.21, he asks a number of crucial questions about the relationship between the semen and the menses (the female contribution to animal generation).[19] He wants to know "how it is that the male contributes to generation and how it is that the semen from the male is the cause of the offspring"; and he asks: "Does it exist *in* the body of the embryo as a part of it from the first [trOTEpovw<; EVUTTclpXOVKai µ6ptov ov Eu0u<;],mingling with the material which comes from the female? Or does the semen communicate nothing to the material body of the embryo but only to the power and movement in it?" (*GA* 1.21 [729b2-6]; emphasis added). His answer is quite emphatic: "the latter alternative appears to be the right one both *a priori* and in view of the facts. For, if we consider the question on general grounds, we find that, whenever one thing is made from two of which one is active and

[18] See *GA* 2.1 (735a20-22); 2.4 (740a37-b2); 2.6 (742a2-3); 2.7 (746a22-28).

[19] At *GA* 2.4 (739a7-8), Aristotle notes that there is a part of the menses that is less fluid; see also 2.4 (739b26). So the female contribution is not just *any* part of the menses.

the other passive, the active agent does not exist *in* that which is made" *(GA* 1.21 [729b8-11];emphasisadded). He acknowledges, of course, that the formation of the embryo does take place within the female, not the male *(GA* 1.22 [730a32-bl]); but even this, he says, can be accounted for in terms of his standard examples of crafts: "the carpenter must keep in close connection with his timber and the potter with his clay, and generally all workmanship and the ultimate movement imparted to matter must be connected with the material concerned, as, for instance, architecture is *in* the buildings it makes" *(GA* 1.22 [730b6-8]). A craftsman nonetheless always remains external to his artifact (see *Metaph.* 9.7 [1049a11-12]).

In *GA* 2.1 Aristotle comes back to this issue, suggesting at first that the operation of the semen must be internal to the embryo: "Now it would appear irrational to suppose that any of either the internal organs [O'lTliayxvwv(734a2)] or the other parts is made by something external, since one thing cannot set up a motion in another without touching it, nor can a thing be affected in any way by anything that does not set up a motion in it" *(GA* 2.1 [734a2-4]). (The parts of the body mentioned here would include the so-called homoeomerous parts such as blood, flesh, and the material of bones.)[20] After mentioning some possible objections, he says that it is necessary to make some distinctions; in particular, we must determine in what sense it is impossible that the parts might be generated by something external (GA 2.1 [734b4-7]): "For if in a certain sense they cannot, yet in another sense they can."

It is possible, then, that A should move B, and B move C; that, in fact, the case should be the same as with the automatic toys. For the parts of such toys while at rest have a sort of potentiality of motion in them, and when any external force puts the first of them in motion, immediately the next is moved in actuality. As,

20 See *GA* 1.1 (715a9-l 1): mwrl. µ£v T«jl OAfp Ta dvoµotoµEpfj, 0' dvoµotoµEpfot Ta 6µo1oµepfj, of: Ta Ka>.oUµeva0T01xda Tuiv owµ<l-ruiv.This passage depicts a sort of hierarchy of parts: whole animals contain nonhomoeomerous parts, such as hearts and brains; the homoeomerous (such as flesh and blood, but also including gold, wood, stone, etc.) contribute to the nonhomoeomerous parts; the elements (earth, air, fire, and water) contribute to the homoeomerous parts. See also *GA* 1.18 (722a16-18, 28-33); and *Mete.* 4.12.

in these automatic toys the external force moves the parts in a certain sense by any part at the moment, but touched one in like manner also that from which the semen comes, or in other words that which made the semen, sets up the movement in the and makes the parts of it first touched to touch it. a way it is the innate motion that does *(GA* 2.1

[21] See *GA* 1.21 (730b19-22).

[22] See *Aristotle's*

from II. 1-3), trans. D. M. Balme, Clarendon Aristotle series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 157; and D. M. Balme, Av&pu.rlTo;;avSpwnov Hui:nan is Generated by Human," in *The Human Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions,* ed. G. R, Dunstan (Exeter, Devon: Exeter University Press, 1990}, 23; see also G.4 2.5 (741b7-9); and *MA* 7 (701b2-3). Kn his translation, Balme uses uthe automata in the 'mar;els"'; but in his 1990 essay he suggests that 'automatic toys' would be the best translation, even better than the 'automatic puppets' often found (in, for instance, the Barnes volume). uHe [Aristotle] dearly refers not to puppets worked external strings but to automatic toys like t.lie modern ones whleh, af<.er a simple pVJSh, will walk along by moving legs waggle head, tail, ears, etc., while containing no motive power (other than gravity}" (Bahne, uHuman ls Generated by 23). I have altered the Barnes translation accordingly.

(741b12)] (such as softness, hardness, color, and the other differences of the homoeomerous parts)" (*GA* 2.5 [741b9-14]). It is not at all clear why Aristotle is conceding anything here to "the natural philosophers" (he has just earlier rejected the utility of the principle "like is brought to like" (*GA* 2.4 [740b12-14]); but it is clear that he does not understand the action of the semen as *sheerly* mechanical. It is external but it does bring about a real alteration (dA/io(wcrt<;;) in the material provided by the mother, not just a shifting of parts. The alteration of which he speaks is again, and significantly, alteration of the characteristics of the homoeomerous parts. These are, of course, to be distinguished from the nonhomoeomerous parts such as the heart, brain, eyes, etc., which are, according to *GA* 2.3, required for the presence of certain faculties of the soul: "Plainly those principles whose activity is bodily cannot exist without a body, e.g. w:alking cannot exist without feet" (736b22-24). Nothing that Aristotle says excludes, however, the possibility that the semen's work upon the maternal material might result in the formation of organs (cm/iayxvwv; see *GA* 2.1 [734a2]).

But the most important piece of evidence for the present interpretation comes in *GA* 2.4. Having explained that the action of the semen upon the female material is like the way that rennet acts upon milk in order to curdle (or "set": ouvtOTT]crt[739b24]) it, Aristotle again makes the point that, at the beginning, the embryo has the life of a plant (*GA* 2.4 [739b34]). The plant, which contains a "motive principle" (apxr)), only eventually produces the analogues of organs: the shoot, the root, etc. In an animal, it is with one of these organs that come along eventually that one is to associate the motive principle of the organism itself: the heart.

> So also in the embryo all the parts exist potentially in a way, but the first principle is furthest on the road to realization. Therefore the heart is first differentiated in actuality. This is clear not only to the senses (for it is so) but also on theoretical grounds. For whenever the young animal has been separated from both parents *it* must be able to manage itself, like a son who has set up house away from his father. Hence it must have a first motive principle [15£1

cipxl\v EXEIV (740a7-8)] from which comes the ordering of the body at a later stage also, for if it is to come in from outside at a later period to dwell in it, not only may the question be asked at what time it is to do so, but also we may object that, when each of the parts is separating from the rest, it is necessary that this principle should exist first from which comes growth and movement to the other parts. (*GA* 2.4 [740a1-13])

Notable in this passage are the words "whenever the young animal has been separated"; they correspond to the remark in *GA* 2.3 about the semen and the embryo which, "while not yet separate, must be assumed to have the nutritive soul potentially, but not actually, until (like those embryos that are separated from the mother) it absorbs nourishment and performs the function of the nutritive soul" (GA 2.3 [736b8-12]). Aristotle says in the passage we are now examining that only once this separation, which coincides with the formation of the heart, has occurred do we have the all-important motive principle. A couple of chapters later, Aristotle says that it is the heart that organizes the whole subsequent life of the organism: "if there is anything of this sort which must exist in animals, containing the principle and end of all their nature [To TTacrri<; £xov Tij<; <j>ucrt::w<; dpxfiv Kal TEl.o<; (742b1)], this must be the first to come into being-first, that is, considered as the moving power, but simultaneous with the whole embryo if considered as a part of the end" (*GA* 2.6 [742a37-b3]).

Putting all these ideas together, the scheme that forces itself upon us is one in which the animal embryo has initially the life of a plant, although with this difference: a plant has an internal motive principle, whereas an embryo is moved along by the continued action of the semen, which is only internal in the way that the motion of automatic toys is internal. Eventually, however, the principle of the animal's *own* nutritive life is constructed out of the material provided by the mother. This principle is the heart. Aristotle very clearly associates it with the animal's nutritive life in lines coming shortly after the longer passage just quoted:

Therefore it is that the heart appears first distinctly marked off in all the sanguinea, for this is the first principle [cipxiil of both homoeomerous and nonhomoeomerous parts, since from the moment that the animal or organism

needs nourishment, from that moment does this deserve to be called its principle [dpxtjv (740a19)]. For that which exists grows, and the nutriment, in its final stage, of an animal is the blood or its analogue, and of this the blood-vessels are the receptade, and that is why the heart is the principle of these also. (GA 2.4 [740a17-23])

We are not therefore to associate the nutnt1ve life of the animal with the nutritive life one sees in the early developing embryo. The former is related more to plant life, and the nutritive faculty in animals is quite different. *As* Aristotle says in *De an.* 2.3, "It is ... evident that a single definition can be given of soul only in the same sense as one can be given of figure .... Hence we must ask in the case of each order of living things, What is its soul, i.e. What is the soul of plant, animal, man?" *(De an.* 2.3 [414b20-33]). It is true that the nutritive faculty of a plant can be said to fall under the same definition as the nutritive faculty of man, but this would only be a logical definition: the nutritive life of a plant is radically different from that of a man (similar to the way that a triangle is radically different from a square). [23] fact, it is difficult even to say that the early embryo *has* a nutritive soul, although it does, as we have seen, *"seem* to live the life of a plant" *(GA* 2.3 [736b12-13]). Immediate after the passage about the automatic toys in *GA* 2.1, Aristotle says of the *pneuma,* "Plainly, then, while there is something [i.e., the *pneuma]* which makes the parts, this does not exist as a definite object [TobE Tl], nor does it exist in the semen at the first as a complete part. "[24] If the early embryo had a soul, it would inform its body and together they would constitute a TObE n in such a way that also the form could be said to be a TOSE n (see *Metaph.* 7.3 [1029a27-30]). As things are, according to Aristotle, the *pneuma* never really enters into the material presented by the mother. genuine Toa£ n-and a

[23] See Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de spiritalibus creaturis,* a.1 ad 24: "Anima autem alterius animalis dat ei solum esse animal; unde animal commune non est unum numero, sed ratione t:anturn; quia non ab una et eadem forma homo est animal et asinus." See also *ScG* H, c. 90.

[24] *GA* 2.1 (734b17-19): YOTI µEv o()v fon Tl 0 nmd, OOX OOOW<; 1)£ W<; TOOE Tl 00()' EVU1TclpXOV WS TflEAEaµtvov TO llflWTOV, ofjAov.

soul-arrives on scene the appearance of the heart.

When happen? In *Historia animalium,* children the first movement side of about be a female then on left-hand side about the [583b3-5]). "About

warns us not to look precise answers to questions, is, answers that apply acrnss board *(HA 73* [583b5-9]). here in *Historia* u."""""""·""" he that, in these first days of the quickened limbs are plain to see, in.duding the penis, and the eyes also, whichas other areofgreatsize" 73[583b18-20]), we have also seen him say that, although "all the exist potentially a way at the same time ... the first principle is furthest on the road to realization. Therefore the heart is first differentiated in *2A* [740a2-4]; see also [666a20-23]), Two chapters he says that the followed immediately by head: "that part which first principle comes into being next to this the This is the parts about the head, particularly the eyes, appear largest the at an early stage, while the the umbilicus, as legs, are small; for the parts are the sake upper, are neither parts of the end nor able to 2.6 [742b12-17]).

So, the organs necessary for various functions of the animal appear more-or-less at the same time: the heart first, but head and the eyes follow thereupon. have already seen that the is associated with nutrition, but it is also up with sensation: ..the motions of pain pleasure, and generally of all sensation, their source in the heart, and find in it their ultimate termination" *3A* [666a11-13]; see also *GA* 2.6 [742a32-33], regarding locomotion). Indeed, as we have already

seen, the heart is in animals the "principle and end of *all* their nature" *(GA* 2.6 [742b1]; emphasis added). And the organ corresponding to the sense of touch is the body itself *(GA* 2.6 [743b37-744a1]), which would seem to have its human beginning simultaneously with the heart.

This is all evidence in support of Berti's thesis that the various faculties arrive at one time. Even if the primary sense organs appear after the heart, the heart is involved not just in nutrition but also in sensation. *As* for the rational part, since it requires no physical organ (although in men it presupposes the sensitive functions), there is no difficulty locating its inception also at this beginning, that is, when the heart is first formed. This would be consistent with Aristotle's remark in *De an.* 2.3, comparing the functions of the soul to geometrical figures: "for the particulars subsumed under the common name in both cases-figures and living beings--constitute a series, each successive term of which potentially contains its predecessor" (414b29-30). [25]

The present interpretation also partially supports Berti's use of *Metaph.* 9.7, regarding the embryo as first act. This becomes more apparent, however, if we make a slight revision to the text that Berti gives us. In his translation, the seed is said not to become

[25] It has been suggested to me that Aristotle's remark at *GA* 2.3 (736b2-3), where he says that the embryo does not become at the same rime animal and man nor animal and horse counts against the thesis that all the faculties arrive at one rime. But it seems to me that that passage is talking about the eventual development of things already contained in potency (i.e., first act) within the embryo once the heart has developed. Aristotle says just after the remark about being animal then man, animal then horse, "For the end [To TiAcx;] is developed last, and the peculiar character of the species is the end of the generation in each individual" *(GA* 2.3 [736b3-5]). But surely the end is the natural consequence of that which the animal already is. Later on in *GA,* Aristotle makes clear what he means by saying that the fully specified animal arrives only later. He has in mind monstrosities that develop only up to the point of what is most general since the material of the embryo is not fully mastered by the movements that continue the development of the various organs *(GA* 4.3 [769b11-13]). "Then people say that the child has the head of a ram or a bull, and so on with other animals, as that a calf has the head of a child or a sheep that of an ox" *(GA* 4.3 [769b13-16]). But Aristotle will have none of this---clearly because he knows that the human monstrosity is still human: as he notes, the misshapen heads are just similarities such as happen naturally also when there is no deformity. That the complete development of the embryo regarding sexual differentiation and other characteristics, including possible monstrosity, depends on the heart can be gathered from *GA* 4.1 (766a30-b4); and 4.3 (769b3-10).

a man in first it is first "deposited [undergoes] a change." The in something other than itself"-which suggest that man is there first act (in Berti's words) "after the union of the seed fumished by the father the furnished the mother" [26]-corresponds to the Greek m::adv inserted by Ross at It appears in no manuscript, although pseudo-Alexander includes it in a paraphrase passage. [27] Read the word nic:adv, the

[f]he seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must further undergo a change in a foreign medium. But when through its own motive principle it has already got such and such attributes, in this state it is already potentially a man; while in the former state it needs another motive principle. 9.7 [1049a14-17])

Ross argues that here "is not account own view the an£pµa forms no part of the matter the offspring is its formal cause"; [28] another explanation that Aristotle is using the '"seed" *Metaph.* the generic sense does not exclude the female contribution or embryo itself. [29] any case, the passage the nEcrr1v no longer suggests that the cmdal moment the seed fails onto the menses says it more must "undergo a change" -sometime or anothero This moment is to associated the first presence this latter is to be associated which becomes

[26] Berti, "Quando esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 118.

[27] Alexander of Aphrodisias (and pseudo-PJexander), *Commentaria inAristotelem Graeca*, vol. 1, *In Aristotelis Metapbysica Commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck {Berlin: Reimer, 1891), 582..33.

[28] See W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics: A JRwised Text with Introduction and Commentary*, 2d ed (Oxford: Clarendon, 1953), 2:255.

[29] Balme notes that m[s]eed' (crntpµa) may refer to (i) seed of a plant; (ii) the male semen (strictly (iii) the female conttil:mtion to generation; (iv) the first stage of the foetus (strictly, Kul'jµa, foetus or conception)" (Baime, trans., *Aristotle's 'De partibus animalium' I and 'De generatione animaiium' I {with passages from n. 1-3}*, 131). For (iv), see *GA* 1.18 (724b14-15).

sometime around the fortieth day in males, the ninetieth in females *(HA 73; GA 2A,* 6). Berti is correct to apply the Aristotelian idea of first act and *Metaph.* 9.7 in particular to the question of the onset of the human soul; he errs, in my opinion, regarding the timing of this onseL

m

Does aH this play into Norman Ford's hand? Can Ford call Aristotle support of thesis that the human individual is not present at conception? In a way yes, a way no. In order to understand the impact of Aristotle's embryology (both biological and metaphysical) on Ford's theory, we need to understand why Aristotle puts the onset of the motive principle at forty days (or so) rather than earlier.

Let us go back to Aristotle's "crucial questions" asked at the beginning of *GA* 1.21 about the relationship between semen and menses. As we have seen, he says there that we must ask

> how it is that the male contributes to generation and how it is that the semen from the male is the cause of the offspring. Does it exist in the body of the embryo as a part of it from the first, mingling with the material which comes from the female? Or does the semen communicate nothing to the material body of the embryo but only to the power and movement in it? *(GA* 1.21 [729b1-6])

It may not be immediately apparent, but in this passage Aristotle is peering down the aHey where eventually genetic theory was to be discovered, and turning away for lack of light. He is asking whether there is something *physical* in the male semen that combines with the female element to form the embryo. He has in mind theories of his day, collectively known as "pangenesis," according to which the semen contained something drawn from every part of body that would, after copulation, grow into a full-sized animal.[30] Its advocates sometimes spoke a small

[30] Aristotle offers a succint definition of 'pangenesis' at *GA* 1.18 (724a12-13): O:rro TiavTwv arroKpivnm To cmipµa Twv µopiwv. He tells us at *GA* 1.18 how his own approach differs from this: "For whereas *they* said that semen is that which comes *from* all the body, *we* shall say it is that whose nature is to go *to* all of it" (oi µ[v yap TO arro rravToc; amov, i'jµdc; 0E TO

animal (l;4>ov µtKp6v [722b4-5]) (or, in humans, the so-called homunculus) passed along in the semen.[31] Aristotle had no evidence that there was any such object in the semen, nor any such resulting articulation in the embryo itself, up until at least the fortieth day. Until that point, he says, the embryo is "fleshlike" (KpEWOE<;, *HA* 7.3 [583b10-11]), which puts it among the homoeomerous parts *(Mete.* 4.10 [388a16]; *PA* 1.1 [640b18-20]). It is "without distinction of parts" (avap0pov, *HA* 7.3 [583b9]). Aristotle does say that within the female element are found all the parts of the animal in potency *(GA* 2.4 [740b18-21]), even those that distinguish the sexes (GA 2.3 [737a24-25]); but this must mean that they are found in potency the way that a bed is found in potency in the wood that stands before the carpenter, for Aristotle denies elsewhere that sex is determined at conception *(GA* 1.18 [723a23-b3]; 4.1 [763b26-27]). For him, sex differentiation depends upon the strength of heat in the semen *(GA* 4.1 [766a16-22]), which goes to work on the menses, only eventually producing organs, as we have seen.

Most interestingly, there were theories available in the intellectual culture within which Aristotle worked that, at least in

npOi; ruravr' ifvm 1TE$UK0i; arrepµa (po()µEv)(725a21-23). In fact, Aristotle propounds his own version of pangenism in *GA* 1.19. He says that semen is "a residue of the nutriment when reduced to blood, being that which is finally distributed to the parts of the body" (726b9-11); then he says, "for this reason also it is natural that the offspring should resemble the parents, for that which goes to all the parts of the body resembles that which is left over" (726b 13-15). But he immediately places these ideas within the context of his own theory, speaking of potency and indeterminacy (726b15-19). One finds a version of pangenesis also in Darwin: see A. L. Peck, trans., *Aristotle, Generation of Animals* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1953), 50 n. a.

[31] That such theories of "pangenism" are on his mind in *GA* 1.21 is apparent from his use of the same (spurious) example to refute both pangenesis and this later idea that the semen contributes something physical to generation. I mean the example of certain insects whose females, during copulation, supposedly extend part of themselves into the male rather than vice-versa; this allows them to extract the ouvaµt<; from the male without any matter. According to Aristotle, this shows that also in cases where the male injects semen into the female the important thing is that he transfers Mvaµt<;. The example occurs both at *GA* 1.18 (723b19-27) (as an anti-pangenism argument); and at *GA* 1.21 (729b22-25) (as an anti-physical-contribution argument). Indeed, in the former argument (at 723b27}, he makes a forward reference to the general argument in favor of the notion that the male contributes nothing physical. See also *GA* 1.18 (724b4-6 and 724b23-30).

certain respects, come closer than his own to modern genetic theory. Aristotle himself is our best source regarding these theories. He recounts, as we have seen, that "some say that [the semen] comes from the whole of the body" *(GA* 1.17 [721bll-12]). (Since some such thinkers were open to the idea that semen was produced by both parents *[GA* 1.17 (721b6-8)], "semen" here need not mean male semen.) One of their reasons for believing this was that children resemble their parents: "for the young are born like them part for part as well as in the whole body; if then the coming of the semen from the whole body is cause of the resemblance of the whole, so the parts would be like because it comes from each of the parts" *(GA* 1.17 [721b20-24]). Since the semen comes from all parts of the body, it would contain somehow all the traits that are passed on to the children. Empedocles even had a theory that exploited the idea of a part corresponding to a companion part, the two contributing to the whole progeny; he held, that is, that "there is a sort of tally in the male and female, and that the whole offspring does not come from either, 'but sundered is the fashion of limbs, some in the man's, <some in the woman's seed hidden>'" *(GA* 1.18 [722b10-12])[32] This is not a bad way of representing the way in which the male and female gametes both contribute to the genetic material of the zygote.

There is much that is correct in such theories. As we now know, there does exist right from the beginning in the embryo that which determines individual traits of the eventual progeny: DNA. It is not drawn from the whole body, originating rather in the appropriate organs of the parents' bodies, but it does contain information and "instructions" corresponding to every part of the

[32] The quotation is Empedocles's fragment 63 (H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds. and trans., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,* 6th ed. [Dublin and Zurich: Weidmann, 1951], 31 B 63): .Prial yap f.v Tlji appEVI Kai Tlji 0tjAEI ofov cruµf:!ol.ovEVElVat, OAOV o' dn' OUOETEpOU cimevat, "fila 01foTiacrm1 µEl.ewv<j>1km;·ii µf:v f.v civop&; ... *"(GA* 1.18 [722b10-12]). It isnot clear how it is to be completed, but the continuation must certainly speak about the female contribution. Diels and Kranz, in their translation, complete the phrase in this fashion: *der eine liegt in dem miinnlichen, <der andere in dem weiblichen Samen verborgen>;* I have followed them.

parents' bodies. Moreover-and this is important-DNA is *physically* present in the gametes and then in the embryo from the moment of conception. Thus, when Aristotle asks his "crucial question" about how the male contributes to generation-"Does it exist in the body of the embryo as a part of it from the first [we; ἐνυπάρχον καὶ μόριον], mingling with the material which comes from the female?" (GA 1.21 [729b2-4])-and subsequently answers no, the semen "communicates nothing to the material body of the embryo but only to the power and movement in it" (GA 1.21 [729b4-6; see also 729b8-9]), he is wrong, at least regarding the existence of something of the semen in the body of the embryo.

But Aristotle also had good reasons for rejecting the pangenesis of his day. It was often quite crudely physicalist. Anaxagoras, an exponent of the theory, asks, "How can hair come from not-hair?";[33] so he evidently thought that hair somehow found its way into the semen. Moreover, Aristotle, displaying not a little genetic sophistication, argues that the proponents of pangenesis had no way of explaining how a child can resemble a *remote* ancestor: "for the resemblances recur at an interval of many generations, as in the case of the woman in Elis who had intercourse with a negro; her daughter was not negroid but the son of that daughter was" (*GA* 1.18 [722a8-11]).[34] They have no way of explaining either, says Aristotle, how a full plant can grow from just a cutting (ibid. [722a11-14]).

Aristotle offers many other such arguments, some stronger than others, but his basic one is this: the proponents of pangenesis had no concrete evidence for their theory (see *GA* 2.1 [734a20-25]). When one takes a look at the early (aborted) embryo, one sees no differentiation (HA 7.3 [583b20-21]). Nor did Aristotle see such articulation in the semen or in the menses (GA 1.20

[33] Diels and Kranz, eds. and trans., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 59 B 10; see also *GA* 1.18 (723a6-7); and Peck, trans., *Aristotle, Generation of Animals*, 62.

[34] Aristotle mentions also that Herodotus held that the semen of Ethiopians was black: "as if everything must needs be black in those who have a black skin, and that too when he saw their teeth were white" (*GA* 2.2 [736a10-13]).

[729a20-33]; 2.1 [734a33-b3]). Therefore, he sought a theory that would explain how from unarticulated matter a fully articulated fetus and human person could grow. The theory involved, naturally enough, a number of his favorite concepts: potency and act, passion and motion, matter and form. The semen contributes nothing physical to the embryo but only form and movement, in the transmission of which it serves (along with *pneuma)* as tool of the father. To use a standard Aristotelian example (see, for instance, *GA* 1.18 [722a30-b1]), think of a word. It can be broken down into syllables and ultimately letters (which we can assume are purely physical). That which the semen passes on is the *arrangement* (cruv0£aa1'<;[722a35]) of the letters, not the letters. In the passage where he asks his "crucial questions," he speaks of the semen's bringing shape or form (µop<j>r)v) to the menses, as well as "power and movement" (&uvaµtc; Kal Ktvrimc;, *GA* 1.21 [729b4-8]). In the succeeding chapter, comparing the action of the semen to the work of a carpenter, he says that it transfers to the material "the shape and the form" (ft µop<j>r) Kai TO d&oc;, *GA* 1.22 [730b14]).

We now know that DNA also involves a certain arrangement of its various constituent elements (the nucleotide pairs, adenine-thymine and guanine-cytosine), which play the primary role in relaying genetic information. Neither an arrangement nor information is, strictly speaking, physical. Aristotle had this right. What he did not know was that, in actual fact, the genetic information that enters into the embryo from the father is attached to physical objects: nucleotides and amino acids. According to Aristotle, the father's contribution is just form, combined somehow with propulsion; the female contribution, as we have already noted, is (relatively) undifferentiated matter. The organs of the embryo arrive-but only eventually-because the power and movement passed along by the semen (and *pneuma)* impose form-human form-upon this matter.

But *had* Aristotle known what modern scientists know, what would he have said? He would certainly have had no trouble with the idea that genetic information is attached to matter; if

,H See *animalh-tnz and generatione animalium' I (with passagesfrom II. 1-3),* 161.

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self-nutrition, ""'·"""""n"
whether such

In the case of certain of these povJers, the answers to these are easy, in the case of others we are what to say. as in the case of which when divided are observed to comirme to live from one another was

one, so notice a sim.Har in other varieties of

i.e. in insect..swhich have been cut in tvm; each of the segn1ents possesses both sensation and local movement; and also and for, where there is sensation, there is also p!1ea<;u1·e where these, also desire.

[36] Some ofthe relevant passages: *De cm.* 1.4 (409a6-1 O; *5* (467a18-22).

stands

a part;
part" too is rejected by Parmenides.

Aristotle's *an.* 2.2 is, effect, a response to this *apona.* Whereas on account of is forever inclined to forms "'Ideas") into a separate suprasensible realm, Aristotle insists that in material substances, in any case, although form is distinct from matter, it is nonetheless tied to it in such a way that it follows its appropriate matter in its entirety. h: can do this since form is not subject to the same causal processes as matter. It is neither generated nor does it corrupt *(Metaph.* 7.9 8.3 12.3 [1069b35]); it is indivisible *(I\Aetaph.* 7.8 in short, it is not potentially something and then that something act. It is rather *composites* of matter and form that are generated corrupt are subject to other changes.

One of the advantages of this theory is that, using it, Aristotle can explain what is whens; for instance, an is split in two and suddenly becomes two earthworms-two different substances. This is not a problem him since form is not the sort can split. In order for splitting to occur, obviously, there have to be something that cm first one and later two; a form, form, is always one: form of man recognized in Socrates is the same form recognized in Parmenides. Now, Socrates and Parmenides are thus one in species, they are two in number, as Aristotle never tires of saying (e.g., *Metaph. 5.6* [1016b32-33]; [1034a7-8]). Number, however, pertains to their matter, not to their form as such. Thus, Aristode can say the above passage) in the case of plants and certain divisible animals, each individual fa "actually one, potentially many."' After a split occurs-which splits can only occur on material level-the whole of the (Le., the "whole nature" of the form) is found in both pieces, now

spatially separated. This is no more mysterious than when we divide a lump of gold in two and notice that the resulting pieces are entirely gold. When we divide a material substance, we divide material, not form. We effect two composites sharing fully in the same form; we do not split a form.

Our second passage is taken *fromMetaph.* 7.16. In it Aristotle is explaining that the actuality-the act-of a substance excludes there being other acts within it. His examples have mostly to do with parts that, because of the complexity of their governing substance, can never have independent existence; but he also mentions divisible animals.

> Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only potentialities,-e.g. the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and when they *are* separated, then too they exist, all of them, merely as matter) and earth and fire and air; for none of them is one, but they are like a heap before it is fused by heat [m:<j>9ij(1040b9)] and some one thing is made out of the bits.[37] One might suppose especially that the parts of living things and the corresponding parts of the soul are both, i.e. exist both actually and potentially, because they have sources of movement in something in their joints; for which reason some animals live when divided. Yet all the parts must exist only potentially, when they are one and continuous by nature-not by force or even by growing together, for such a phenomenon is an abnormality. (1040b5-16)

Obviously, in this passage unity is a key concept. Something can only be in act as a substance if it is a unity of its parts. This unity prevents the parts from being substances in their own right-that is, from being substances in act; they must remain in potency. Most such parts do not in fact become substances in act when the unity of the original substance is lost. When a man dies, his disparate parts become not individual men but "a heap." But in some cases the potentiality in the part does become act. What is it that allows this to happen? There are present in the parts, such as the parts of earthworms, sources of movement (TQ apxa<; EXEtv Ktvtjcri::w<;[1040b12-13]), that can survive a division. While still within the body of the original earthworm, they are in potency;

[37] The word TTETTf!V (m:<j>0ij[1040b9]) plays a role in *GA*. It is one of the words Aristotle uses to describe the action of semen upon the menses. It "cooks" the menses: see *GA* 1.19 (726b5-6); 1.20 (729al8); see also 2.4 (738al3); 5.1 (780b9-12).

after a division, the ancillary sources of movement become central sources and we have new substances.

We have now a number of Aristotelian doctrines before us; we must see whether they can be applied in the analysis of the early embryo. There is a *prima facie* case against such an application: Aristotle himself does not speak of twinning as occurring in this fashion. This is easily dealt with. Knowing little about the true nature and functioning of the early embryo, he had no idea that embryos might split in the early days of gestation. For him, in other animals, twins resulted from large amounts of menses; in man, "because of the moisture or heat of his body" (GA 4.4 [772a18-22, b3-4]). Taking into account what we now know about monozygotic twinning, we can do what Aristotle did not know how to do: apply his account of how some animals can be divided to the early human embryo.

In *De ;uventute et senectute* 2, Aristotle remarks: "Divisible animals are like a number of animals grown together, but animals of superior construction behave differently because their constitution is a unity of the highest possible kind" *(Juv.* 2 [468b9-12]). Among "animals of superior construction" Aristotle no doubt includes man, but we now know that the clause excluding them from division and survival applies only once the embryo gets passed its first fourteen days or so (past the "primitive streak stage").[38] Before that period we can indeed say that men are "like a number of men grown together."[39] As we

[38] W. J. Larsen, *Human Embryology,* ed. L S. Sherman, S. S. Potter, and W. J. Scott (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 2001), 69-74.

[39] In II *Sent.,* d. 18, q. 2, a. 3, Thomas actually says that after the semen goes off separately to work upon the menses, it is like the piece of the worm divided from another part, but with this difference: the worm part is a worm in act and similar to the whole; the sperm has only the potency to becomes this: "Ante vero quam resolvatur per actum virtutis generativae separatum a reliquo sui generis, est in eo potentia ilia indistincta sicut forma totius non est in parte nisi in potentia: quando autem separatur, efficitur actu habens talem potentiam vel formam: sicut etiam videmus in animalibus annulosis, in quibus, secundum Philosophum, una est anima in actu, et plures in potentia; unde quando dividuntur, efficitur quaelibet pars animata habens animam distinctam: in hoc tamen differunt, quia propter parvam differentiam organorum in illis animalibus pars est fere tori consimilis; et ideo in parte remanet anima perfecta, sicut erat in toto: semen autem decisum nondum est actu simile tori, sed in potentia propinqua: et ideo non remanet post divisionem animae in actu, sed in potentia: propter quod

have seen, in saying this of dividing animals, Aristotle does not mean that there are many actual animals in the original; he is referring rather to potential animals. All the elements required to produce a fully grown animal out of a part are present in that part. Once a split occurs, that part is an animal in first act. So also with the early human embryo. Before the split, it is one, but potentially two (or more) since at least certain of its parts have within them that which is required to become unities with motive principles of their own. In response to Ford, therefore, we can say that there are no Aristotelian reasons independent of his primitive biology to say that the earliest human embryo is not a human being. If an earthworm is split, resulting in two earthworms, we do not deny that the original earthworm was an earthworm.

V

This still leaves a large number of difficulties to be dealt with. I will address just one of them, an important one, which is partially theological in character. Does not this approach constitute traducianism, that is, the belief that the soul is passed on from one human individual to another rather than created by God? Traducianism has long been an issue associated with Aristotelian embryology due to statements in Aristotle suggesting that the soul of the embryo comes from the father (see, for instance, *GA* 2.4 [738b25-26]). For those who wish to combine Aristotle's properly philosophical ideas with modern biology, however, traducianism with respect to progenitor and *conceptus* is no longer an issue. It is now clear that the male and female gametes are involved equally in conception-that is, in the production of the genetically structured entity to which, on Aristotelian grounds, one can assign a human soul in first act. Even if someone should still want to say that both male and female contribute somehow to the embryo's soul, the latter is, at the moment of conception, undoubtedly a "new thing," coming into existence, to a significant extent by chance, when the oocyte

dicitur ii de Anima, quod semen in potentia vivit et non actu."

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embryo "by transmission" -that
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traducianism. these souls enter the "'"'"'"'"'·.,.,,"'"
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reasonable, for begins or comes about or is generated
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[40] J. Hal! and et al., Cloning *of* Hmnan Embryos Using an Artificial Zona Pellucida, Ahe;i:ractsof the Scientific Oral and Poster Sessions, Abstract 0-001, Sl in *The American Fertility Society Conjointly with the Canadian Fertility and Amirology Society, Program supplement* (1993).

[41] *STh* I, q. 118, a. 2, ad 2.

[42] Tl *Se-flt.,* d. 18, q. 2, a. 3: "Sed positio Aristotelis muho rationabilior est: quia nihil incipit vel fit vd generatm nisi se<.-undum rnodum quo esse habet: et ideo concedimru; animam sensibilem et vegeubilem ex traduce esse.n Perhaps *ex traduce* cocld even be translated "by graft."

animalibus anulosis) that live after being divided. [43] Exploiting these ideas, a philosopher intent on avoiding traducianism could acknowledge that, when ernbryo-1 splits, it transmits nutritive and sensitive souls to embryo-2 and embryo-3. He could then employ another type of explanation the rational soul, perhaps arguing that the operations of the rational soul "do not come about by means of any corporeal organ" *(ScG* c. 68) and that, therefore, the rational soul's generation must be of a different, nonphysical order. [44] Since the the rational soul is independent of the physical development the embryo, except that the rational cannot be present before sensitive, such a philosopher could say that, when the creates two new souls. These new souls are, course, souls; and, since a man is possessed of just one soul, the nutritive and the sensitive souls are present these souls as faculties (we recall *De an.* *23* [414b28-415a12], second passage). the nutritive and sensitive faculties were transmitted by embryo·-1.

As I have said, there remain a number of difficulties to be dealt with, having to do especially with the relationship of the rational soul of embcyo-1 to of its two "progeny" and with the threat of an unacceptable type of dualism, given that we are suggesting that a new soul (for instance, the soul of ernbryo-3) comes to inhabit a body--or at least part of a occupied by soul (that embryo-1). But I must leave these issues to another occasion. For the present, however, I believe we can say that, with a number adjustments made necessary by

[43] *ScG* II, c. 86: :mima nuttitiva et sensitiva esse incipiunt per seminis traductionem, non autem intdlectiva. Ad!mc. Si :mima !mman3 per traducrionem seminis esse inciperet, hoc non posse< esse nisi dupliciter.--Uno modo, ut ime!iigeretur esse in semine acru, quasi per accidens &visa ab :mima generantis, sicut semen dividitur a corpore: ut videmus in animalibus anulosis, quae decisa vinmt, in quibus est anima una in acru et mukae in potentia; diviso autem corpore animalis praedicti, in quaiibet parte vivente incipit anima esse actu. ◦ See also *STh* I, q. 118, a. 1.

[44] The idea, of course, is of Aristotelian origins: see, for instance, *De an.* 2.2 (413b24-27); 2.3 (415a11-12); and *GA* 2.3 (736b27-29).

scientific advances, Aristotle can be applied fruitfully m contemporary embryology. [45]

[45] I am grateful to Stephen L Brock and Paul W. McNellis, S.J., for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay. All errors are, of course, my own responsibility.

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THE AUGUSTINIANISM OF THOMAS AQUINAS'S MORAL THEORY

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IN RECENT YEARS two scholars have attacked the thesis that Thomas Aquinas has an Augustinian view of pagan virtue. Bonnie Kent argues that according to Thomas an individual can fully possess acquired moral virtues even without the virtue of charity.[1] These natural virtues are directed towards purely natural happiness. According to her interpretation, even though there are moral virtues that cannot be acquired without grace, such as charity and religion, these virtues are supernatural and not natural. Consequently, a naturally virtuous agent need not be correctly ordered to God through charity. Similarly, Brian Shanley stresses the difference between Thomas and Augustine, but from the standpoint of political virtue.[2] According to Shanley, Thomas thinks that the pagans were able completely to possess the

[1] Bonnie Kent, "Moral Provincialism," *Religious Studies* 30 (1994): 269-85; *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 27-33. Kent attacks the interpretation of Alasdair Macintyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).

[2] Brian J. Shanley, O.P., "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," *The Thomist* 63 (1999): 553-77. Shanley contrasts his position primarily with that of Jacques Maritain, *Science and Wisdom,* trans. Bernard Wall (London: Lowe and Brydone, 1940), 138-61, and also that of John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus,* d. 17, a. 2, in *De Virtutibus,* ed. Armand Mathieu and Herve Gagne (Quebec: Laval, 1952), 419-81. The position of Maritain and John of St. Thomas is held by many Thomists and Commentators. See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *The Three Ages of the Interior Life: Prelude of Eternal Life,* trans. M. Timothea Doyle (St. Louis: Herder, 1951), 1:58-59; idem, "L'instabilite dans l'etat de peche mortel des vertus morales acquises," *Revue Thomiste* 42 (1937): 255-62.

political virtues grace even not a right to

Kent Shanley disagree over the of grace in Thomas's moral theory. Kent's thinks ends of moral action. [3] The to that imperfect happiness nature. In the happiness exceeds our natural Christians may possess supernatural virtues, anyone can acquire the virtues. rn more Augustinian. [4] He understands Thomas to there is only one end for humans, namely, of God. Being ordered to was first through original sin. Nevertheless, Shanley does interpret as saying through their powers alone pre-Christian pagans were able completely to acquire the virtues, ordered to the political common good. Consequently, interpretation resembles of insofar as thinks that some humans were

of God over self are conditions acquisition of the virtues. general, they both cont.TastAugustine's assessment of pagan virtue with Thomas [5]

In artide I argue although understanding of virtue is more developed Augustine, they agree on *tiNo* central humans without grace are to even their obligations, someone without grace cannot possess the same type of perfect acquired moral that can be possessed someone grace, article is three parts" the first, I will show are

[3] Kent, 281; *Virtues of the Will,* 30-31.

[4] Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 554-55, 567-72.

[5] Kent, "Provim:ialism," 277-79; *Virtues of the Will,* 25-28; Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 563-64.

similar to the above two theses. In the second, I will show that according to Thomas there are obligations based on human nature that cannot be fulfilled by the unassisted abilities of fallen humans. In the third, I will argue that Thomas's political virtue is simply acquired moral virtue, which indirectly depends on grace for its full possession.

I

Augustine's remarks about pagan virtue are scattered throughout his writings, and there is no scholarly agreement on how the various passages can be reconciled. Nevertheless, Augustine consistently distinguishes between Christian virtue, vice, and an intermediate state that can be identified with pagan virtue.[6] It seems that the moral habits of bad Christians would also fall into this intermediate state. Although Augustine does not describe pagans as truly virtuous, neither does he think that they are all equally vicious.

Augustine's most famous treatment of pagan virtue is in *De civitate dei*, in which he argues that those qualities which we identify as virtues are in fact vices if they are not directed toward God. The purpose of the *De civitate dei* is to defend Christianity against the criticisms of pagans. Consequently, it seems plausible that Augustine would disparage pagan virtue in this work. Nevertheless, he distinguishes sharply between the moral status of the good Romans and that of the wicked. Although some Romans, such as Nero, acted out of a desire for domination, other Romans restrained their lower appetites so that they might win the praise of men.[7] Moreover, Augustine praises Cato because he did not seek glory to the extent that Julius Caesar did. Cato received

[6] My interpretation of Augustine in large part follows John M. Rist, *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 168-73. This interpretation may conflict with that of Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 563. Domingo Banez lists Augustine's relevant texts in his *Commentaria in Secundam Secundae*, q. 10, a. 4 (Salamanca, 1583), 587.

[7] Augustine, *De civitate dei* 5.19, ed. Bernard Dombart and Alphonus Kalb, *CCSL* 47 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), 154-55.

[8] Ibid., 5.12 (CCSL 47:142-46).

[9] **"Sed per quosdam qW pro suo modo bnni e!Lant, n-nagna adrniillst--rabantu¤t-que** cre:sc<,lx1t'(ibid., 5.12 [CCSL 47:146]).

[10] For Augustine's famous disparagement of pagan virtue, see ibid., 19,25 (CCSL 48:696).

"Augustine, *Contra Julianum* 4.3.21, *PL* 44 (Paris: Migne, 1841), 749.

[12] Ibid., 4.3.22. (PL 44:749).

[13] Ibid,, 4.3.25 (PL 44:751). CL Augustine, *De spiritu et littera* 28, in Charles Urba and Joseph Zycha, eds., *CSEL* 60 (Vienna: Leipzig: Freytag, 1913), 203.

[14] Augustine, 138, in Al Goldbacher, ed., *CSEL* 44:144. This is listed as *5* by Banez (see above, note 6).

because they are directed towards the final end, which is God. Although this distinction does not exactly correspond to the threefold distinction in *De civitate dei,* it does show that Augustine does not merely dismiss pagan virtue.

In his refutation of Pelagianism, Augustine is concerned not just with pagan virtues, but also with the claim that someone can fulfill moral obligations without the assistance of grace. One of the effects of original sin is to limit the range of free choice. Although Augustine seems to think that the obligation to love God can be known apart from divine revelation, he also thinks that pagans are unable properly to love God. [15] In *De gratia et libero arbitrio,* he discusses the command to love God "with the whole heart, the whole soul, and the whole mind." [16] He agrees with the Pelagians that it is possible to fulfill this commandment at least partially. The dispute is over how this commandment can be fulfilled. Augustine writes, "from where is this love *[caritas]* of God and neighbor in men, unless from God himself? For if it is not from God, but from men, the Pelagians prevail; if however from God, we prevail over the Pelagians." [17] He dearly thinks that there are moral precepts that cannot be fulfilled without the assistance of grace.

There is a connection between Augustine's position that loving God requires grace and his cautiousness about pagan virtue. If the obligation to love God is not at least partially fulfilled, then there can be no right order to God. There can be no true virtue without this order. Therefore, grace is a necessary condition for virtue. It will be shown that Thomas remains basically faithful to this Augustinian position.

[15] For the love of God over self in Augustine's moral thought, see especially John Burnaby, *Amor Dei: A Study in the Religion of St. Augustine* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938); Oliver O'Donovan, *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980).

[16] Matt 22:37-41; see also Deut 6:5; Lev 19:18.

[17] "unde est in hominibus charitatis Dei et proximi nisi ex ipso Deo? nam si non ex Deo, sed ex hominibus, vicerunt Pelagiani : si autem ex Deo, vicimus Pelagianos" (Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio liber unus* 18.37 [PL 44:903]). Cf. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* 2.5.5 (CSEL 60:75); *De natura et gratia* 59.69 (CSEL 60:285).

II

Although Thomas Aquinas emphasizes even sinners and infidels can perform many good actions, he agrees with it is impossible someone to a natural powers are unassisted grace. understand Thomas' s position on this question, it is helpful to make some distinctions about understanding of human nature. I wiH this by showing that there is at least one (and perhaps more) that can never because of the weakness of human nature. Last, I will show to Thomas, someone without grace will commit bad actions which order him away from his last end.

In Thomas's time there was a discussion whether Adam Eve were originally created with grace, or whether there was a time which they lived only according to their natural abiliries.[18] Thomas relies on the authority of the Fathers and the original rectitude of the soul to argue Adam and Eve were created with grace in the state of justice,[19] Nevertheless, God could have created humans a purely state. Thomas that it is worthwhile to discuss what humans can do out of their abilities alone *(ex*[20] Since Thomas makes this remark in context of humans were created without grace, it seems a about natural abilities is a discussion about the state of pure nature. Even though not create man without grace, he have, and by about such a state we can fruitfully discuss

[18] For a discussion of these issues, see jean-Pierre Torrd!, "Nature et grace chez saint Thomas *Revue Thomiste* 102 (2001): 167-202, See also Steven A. Long, "On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man," *The Thomist* 64 (2000): 211-37.

[19] *Quodl.* I, a. 8, in *Opera Omnia* (Rome: Leonine Commission, 1882-), 25.2:187-88; *STh* I, q. *95,* a, 1. For the *Summa Theologiae* I have used the Leonine edition as reprinted in *Summa Theologiae,* 4 vols. (Turin: Marietti, 1948). For the background to this debate, see Artur Michael Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Fiuhscholastik* (Regensburg: Pustet, 1952), 1.1, 43-50,

[20] "Set, quia possibile fuit Deo ut hominem faceret in puris naturalibus, utile est considerare ad qwnrum se dilectio naturalis extendere possitv *(Quodl.* l., a. 8 [Leonine 25.2:188]).

our natural abilities. However, one could also follow the sixteenth-century commentators Thomas de Vio Cajetan and Domingo Banez in holding that the phrase *"ex puris naturalibus"* refers to the state of original justice, but abstracting the influence of grace.[21] The important doctrine here is that according to either interpretation Thomas is discussing a human nature that is unharmed by the Fall. He describes human nature in this state as integral human nature, which is to be contrasted with the fallen human nature which is transmitted after the sin of Adam. This fallen human nature can be healed through the influence of grace.[22]

Although in his earlier writings Thomas does not emphasize the influence of original sin on free choice, in his later writings he clearly states that after the Fall it is impossible for man to fulfill certain precepts of the law. In his early *Scriptum super libros sententiarum* (1252-56), he discusses whether God's precepts can be fulfilled in the context of a distinction between the act that falls under the precept and the intention of the lawgiver.[23] Without grace someone can perform the substance of a required act, but he cannot perform the act in the way in which God wants it to be performed, namely, through charity. In the *Quaestiones disputatae De Veritate* (1250), Thomas again distinguishes between the substance and the mode of an act, although in this discussion he focuses not on the lawgiver but on the different goods tl:iatare involved, namely, that good which is proportionate to human nature and that good which exceeds it.[24] The difference

[21] Thomas de Vio Cajetan, *Commentaria in Primam Secundae*, q. 109, a. 2 (Leonine 7:293); Domingo Banez, *Commentaria in Primam Secundae*, q. 109, a. 2 (Madrid, 1948), 3:34.

[22] For the development of Thomas's understanding of *gratia sanans*, see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. J. Patout Burns (London: Darton, Longman and Todd; New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 46-55.

[23] Thomas Aquinas, II *Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 3, in *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, ed. R. P. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), 724-26. For the dating of Thomas's works, I follow Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, *The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996).

[24] *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 14 (Leonine 22:722-24).

between the goods is not connected to the substance of an act, but to the way it is performed. Without grace someone can perform a required act, but not according to the way in which God wants to elevate it to a supernatural good. In both of these early passages, Thomas emphasizes that grace is necessary for merit, but he does not mention that it is needed to heal the effects of original sin and to make possible the very performance of some actions.

These early treatments contrast with the clearer and more mature discussion of the *Prima Secundae* (1271), in which Thomas asks, "Whether a man without grace through his natural abilities is able to fulfill the precepts of the law."[25] In his response to the question he again makes the distinction between the substance of the work and the mode of acting, but he also sharply distinguishes between integral human nature and corrupt human nature. In a state of integral nature it is possible for someone to fulfill the law according to the substance of the work commanded, but not according to the mode, since this requires charity. In contrast, in the state of corrupted nature it is impossible to fulfill even the substance of the divine command without healing grace. Here Thomas's conclusion in the earlier works is applied only to a state of integral nature and not to actually existing human nature. This emphasis on fallen nature's weakness is reflected in the *In Epistolam ad Romanos* (1271-73).[26] In this commentary on St. Paul he explicitly adverts to Pelagius's error, that is, the belief that someone can obey the law through natural powers. Although the Gentiles could naturally know the law, they could fulfill it only if they converted to the faith. In his discussion of Thomas's doctrine of justification, Henri Bouillard argued that whereas earlier in his teaching Thomas shared his contemporaries's ignorance of Augustine's anti-Pelagian polemics, he later shows a deep knowledge of them.[27] As a result of his reading, Thomas

[25] "Utrum homo sine gratia per sua naturalia legis praecepta implere possit" *(Sl'h* I-II, q. 109, a. 4).

[26] *In Epistolam ad Romanos,* c. 2, lect. 3, n. 216, in *Super Epistolas* S. *Pauli Lectura,* ed. Raphael Cai (Marietti, 1953), 1:39.

[27] Henri Bouillard, *Conversion et grdce chez* S. *Thomas d'Aquin,* Theologie 1 (Aubier: Monatigne, 1944), 92-122.

adopted an Augustinian anti-Pelagian stance was unusual for his time. It is at any rate dear that years he that on account of original sin humans are unable to fulfill the unless they are healed by God's grace.

Thomas thinks the to love is an example a fallen

[1]. *STh* I-H, q. 109, a. 3. For the importance of this issue, see M-R. Gagnebet, "L'amour nature! de Dieu chez saint Thomas et ses contemperains," *Revue Thamiste* 48 (1948): 294-446; 49 (1949): 31-102; David M. "The Role of God in the Philosophical Ethics of Thomas Aquinas," in *Was im Mittelalter?,* ed. Jan. A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1998), 1028-31. For a discussion of Thomas's various texts, see especially Gregory Stevens, "The Disinterested Love of God according to St. Thomas and Some of l:-lis Modem Interpreters,» *The Thomist* 16 (1953): 307-33, 497-541.

[29] *STh* H-H, q. 2.6, a. 3.

[30] "Nam qu"'1edam sunt certissima, et adeo manifosi:a quod editione non indigent; sicut mandata de dilectione Dei et proximi" (STh I-II, q. 100, a. 11). CL *STh* I-U, q. 100, a. 3, ad 1; I-H, q. 94, a. 4. For more on God and the natural law, see Gallagher, Role of God," 1031-33.

reason, it cannot fallen humans unless receive assistance.

Thomas does not separate religious obligations the moral Hfe.[31] Religion is a and not a theological Its basis is not in revelation, rather in the honor that humans naturally owe to God.[32] the object is not the end directly, is God, means to such as sacrifices devotions. Nevertheless, since it is about those things which are ordered to God, it is more the other moral virtues.[33] Thomas is dear that are required to offer sacrifice to God because natural law.[34] This obligation is based not: on a special divine """""""""""""""""""" the natural inclination all ,.....'"..."'. about the necessity of grace for to love God, he does not explicitly state grace is necessary performing such as sacrifices.[35] like Augustine, and indeed most ancient medieval moralists, Thomas that virtue of religion is a necessary condition for a good

Thomas's early discussion of difference between Christian and pagan contemplation the specifically Christian religion is necessary for the Contemplation is a cause of devotion, which is a religious act.[36] Even his early *Scriptum super sententiarum*, Thomas dearly distinguishes between the contemplation philosophers and the saints"[37] The

[31] For the natw"al virtue of religion, see especially Gallagher, Role of God," 1025-28. Kent, «Moral Provincialism," 282; *Virtues of the Will,* 32, states t.'1at the virtue of religion is a supernatural and not a natural virtue. In this she partially follows Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,* trans. L K. Shook (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 333-50. For the possibility that Gilson might have been deceived by the word "political," see below, note 44.

[32] *STh* ll-H, q. 81, a. 5.

[33] *STh* H-H, q. 81, a. 6.

[34] *STh* H-H, q. 85, a. 1.

[35] *STh* H-H, q. 85, a. 4.

[36] *STh* ll-ll, q. 82, a. 3"

[37] m*Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, qda. 3, sol. 1, in *Scriptum super Sententiis,* vol. 3, ed. Maria Fabianus Moos (Paris: Lethidleux, 1933), 1177. See R-A. Gauthier, "Tmis Commentaires 'Averroistes' sur l'Ethique aNicomaque, *"Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littbaire du mayen age* 22-23 (1947-48): 268-69; G. Mansini, *"Similit&'.do, Communicatio,* and the Friendship

philosophers love God as their own perfection, and consequently their act proceeds from self-love. In contrast, through contemplation the saints are able to love God more than themselves. Whereas Aristotle makes philosophical contemplation the highest act, Thomas argues that the philosopher's contemplation is inferior to that of a Christian. Both Augustine and Thomas argue that even the philosophers were unable to order properly their activities towards God. [38]

Although the love of God may be the only natural duty that can never be fulfilled without healing grace, Thomas does argue that without grace someone will eventually fail even with respect to other obligations. The Fall has affected the entire moral life. In the *Prima Secundae,* Thomas states that in the state of integral nature someone could avoid all sin with merely the natural help of God. [39] However, one result of original sin is that reason is submissive not to God but rather to the lower appetites. Although a fallen human without grace can avoid a particular mortal sin, he will eventually commit one. In his parallel discussion in the *Summa contra Gentiles,* Thomas states that Pelagianism errs in its rejection of this point.

Like Augustine, Thomas thinks that grace is a necessary condition for the complete fulfillment of moral duties. This necessity can be understood in two ways. First, there is at least one natural moral obligation that cannot be fulfilled unless the agent has been healed by grace. Since it is necessary for the agent to love God more than himself in order to have a proper order to his own last end, without grace someone cannot be directed to either his supernatural or his natural end. Second, an agent without grace will eventually commit seriously bad acts. According to Thomas, grace is necessary for the moral life because of the harmful effect of original sin on human nature.

of Charity in Aquinas," in *Thomistica, Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale,* Supplementa, 1 (Leuven: Peeters, 1995), 11.

[38] For the importance of this position in Augustine's thought, see Rist, *Augustine,* 173.

[39] *STh* I-II, q. 109, a. 8. See also *ScG* III, c. 160 (Leonine 14:466).

[40] Odon Lott-in, *el: morale au xii" et Jciil siecles,* vol. 3 (lLouvaim Abbaye du Mont Cesar; Gembloux: Drn::u!ot,1949), 105-9.

[41] William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* 3.11.1, ed. Jean Ribai!lier, Spicilegimn Bonavenrurianum 16-19 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Rechen;he Scienrifique; Rome: Collegium Bonaventurae, 1980-85), 3:172; *Summa Aurea* 2.13.1 (2:470-75). See Lottin, *et morale,* 142-46.

[42] WiHiam of Auxeme, *Summa Aurea* 3.11.3.1 (3:185).

[43] William appearn to think that the obligation to perform an act implies a corresponding ability to it. Nevermeless, it is not dear to me whether William could agree with Thomas that "ought" implies "can" only before the FalL See for his example his to the objections in *Summa Aurea* 2.2.1 (2:34-35). But see also *Summa Aurea* 2.10.5.1 (2:286-91).

As Shanley observes, Thomas does describe acquired moral virtue as political virtue, and he states that this virtue is concerned with the political common good. This language can be misleading if two facts are not kept in mind. First, as I have stated, the identification of moral virtues as political virtues is standard for medieval thinkers. Thomas is merely repeating common usage.[44] Thomas at no point claims that the acquired virtues are political in the sense that their full possession is possible even without a proper ordering to God. Second, for ancient and medieval thinkers, and perhaps especially for Thomas, the common good encompasses much more than it does in later politics and political philosophy.[45] According to Thomas, each individual is a part of the political community and as such becomes good only in the context of the community.[46] An individual's private good cannot exist apart from the family and the political unit. Many of the acts that Thomas attributes to the acquired moral virtues would not seem political to us. For example, a pagan can exercise the virtues of temperance and justice by rendering his marriage debt.[47] Moreover, we have seen that religion is an acquired moral virtue. Thomas does not oppose the religious to the political. Secularism is a contemporary phenomenon that Thomas would find not only irreligious, but also unnatural and politically harmful. Furthermore, although religion and politics are distinct, there is an important sense in which the political community can enact laws for religious acts insofar as they are related to the political common good.[48] Consequently, although Thomas distinguishes

[44] For the danger of reading too much into the word "political," see Gauthier, "Trois Commentaires 'Averroistes' sur l'Ethique a Nicomaque," 312 n. 2.

[45] For Thomas's theory in context, see M. S. Kempshall, *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For Thomas himself, see especially Charles de Koninck, *De la primaute du bien commun contre !es personalistes* (Quebec: Laval; Montreal: Editions Fides, 1943); idem, "In Defence of St. Thomas: A Reply to Father Eschmann's Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good," *Laval theologique et philosophique* 1.2 (1945): 9-109; Lawrence Dewan, O.P., "St. Thomas, John Finnis and the Political Good," *The Thomist* 64 (2000): 337-74.

[46] *Sfh* II-II, q. 47, a. 10, ad 2.

[47] IV *Sent.*, d. 39, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5, in *Opera Omnia* (Paris: Vives, 1871-1872), 11:226.

[48] *Sfh* I-II, q. 99, a. 3, ad 2. See Dewan, "St. Thomas, John Finnis and the Political Good," 364 n. 34.

between end of man ....
good, he does not The pagans
were able The issue is
whether " .... that
are

and the

states some virtues are
imperfect because are merely to good actions,
whereas perfect virtues are indinations to performing
actions in a good manner. perfect virtues
morales perfectae) are connected to each One reason for
this connection is exercise of perfect moral virtues
requires prudence chokes for the sake the
The virtues are inclinations an prudence
chooses means to the end.[50] can be no perfect virtue
prudence.

In artide 2, Thomas discusses the moral virtues can
exist without charity. ""[51] artide distinguishes between
acquired and infused virtues. Since the moral virtues are
to an end does not
even pagans can possess
virtues. are perfectly virtues
which are actions directed the last

[49] Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," *565;* Maritain, *Science and Wisdom,* 147-54; For John of St. Thomas, see especially *Cursus Theologicus,* d. 17, a. 2, 53-71 (De *Virtutibus,* 463-81).

[50] "ad rectam autem e!ectionem non solum sufficit im:linario in debirum finem, quod est directe per habirum virmris moralis; sed etiam quod aiiqllis directe eligat ea quae sunt ad finem, quod fit per prudenriam" (Sfh I-ll, q. *65,* a. 1).

[51] "Utmm virtutes morales possint esse sine caritate" *(STh* HI, q. *65,* a. 2).

supernatural end of man.[52] This ordering to the end shows that there must be a connection between the virtue of prudence and charity.

Shanley's interpretation of Thomas does not give proper emphasis to this connection. Prudence is more concerned with the correct order to the last end, which comes through charity, than with those particular ends which are brought about through the exercise of the other virtues.[53] Since the last end is supernatural, the infused moral virtues are more perfect than the merely acquired virtues. Consequently, Thomas states that only the infused virtues are perfect virtues *simpliciter*, since they order a man towards the final end *simpliciter*. contrast, the acquired moral virtues are virtues *secundum quid*, since they order a man only to the last end in some genus *(respectu finis ultimi aliquo generi)*, and not to the last end *simpliciter*. Shanley understands the perfect/imperfect distinction in this second article to be very different from the perfect/imperfect distinction in the firsto According to Shanley, the moral virtues that are acquired by the pagans are imperfect in the sense that they do not direct someone towards the last end *simpliciter* (ao 2), but perfect in the sense that they are connected through prudence (ao 1). Consequently, when in the beginning of article 2 Thomas says that the acquired moral virtues existed in many pagans *(in multis gentilibus)*, Shanley understands him to say that many pagans possessed moral virtues that were connected with each other. In contrast, Maritain and John of St. Thomas argue that in the state of fallen nature there can be no ordering to the natural end without an ordering to the supernatural end. Consequently, although acquired and infused prudence are distinct, there cannot even be perfect acquired

[51] For the historical context of the question of whether acquired moral virtues are "tme" virtues, see Odon Lottin, "Les vertus morales acquis sont-elles de vraies vertus? La reponse des theoiogiens de Pierre Abelard asaint Thomas d'Aquin," *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale* 20 (1953): 13-39; idem, "Les vertus morales acquis sont-elles de vraies vertus? La reponse des theologiens de saint Thomas aPierre Auriol," *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale* 21(1954):101-29.

[53] "Ad rectam autem rationem prudenriae multo magis requiritur quod homo bene se habet circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios fines, quod fit per virtutes morales" *(STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 2).

prudence an who does not virtues and actions are not ordered to his supernatural end. without perfect prudence it is impossible fully to possess the Therefore, without there is no virtues are not connected.

unqualifiedly
'l!Jif:rt(::ct:" is used to describe acquired virtues other through prudence, this to describe the infused virtues which Shanley makes an been discussed in the to condude from new perfect/imperfect charity there can be acquired virtues are imperfect that they are not infused and yet perfect in the sense that are connected each other through prudence. contrast, John of St Thomas deny that there can even be connected acquired virtues someone who lacks their interpretation can found the *Secunda Secund,.ae,* question 23, article which Thomas asks, without chariry there can be some true virtue." [54] This contains a more complete description of ways in which different order someone to different goods. Thomas distinguishes last end and a proximate end. There are goods, namely, the last is the enjoyment of and the proximate good. A new distinction is then between proximate end is a true good that is a false A habit orders someone to a is not a rather a false similitude of virtue. A orders someone to the final end of man is true virtue in an unqualified sense *(virtus vera simpliciter).* The remaining kind of virtue is that which orders someone to a proximate good which is orderable to the finai good,

[54] "Utmm sine caritate possit esse aliqua vera virtute" *(STh* H-H, q. 23, a. 7)

for example the conservation of the political community.[55] Thomas argues that this virtue is true because it orders someone to at true good. Nevertheless, it is imperfect if these true goods are not referred to the last supernatural end.

The point in this discussion is not just that acquired virtues are imperfect because they do not directly order the agent to the supernatural end. It seems that Shanley overlooks Thomas's distinction between true goods that are referred to God and those that are not. In the response to the objection that those without charity can produce good acts, Thomas distinguishes between those acts which are incompatible with charity and those which are compatible with charity but performed by someone who lacks charity.[56] Someone can make an act of faith or of hope without charity, just as in this condition someone can perform certain naturally good acts. These acts will be good in their genus, but they will not be perfectly good. Even though they are capable of being ordered to God, they are not in fact so ordered.[57] A disordered agent can have a habit or disposition to perform good actions;[58] nevertheless, this disposition or habit does not make the agent good.[59] Both Kent and Shanley seem to conflate the following two positions: (1) that agents without charity can perform good acts, and (2) that there can be good agents who lack charity. But Thomas denies this latter position. Someone who does not care much for God may do good by giving alms to the

[55] "Si vero illud bonum particulare sit verum bonum, puta conservatio civitatis vel aliquid huiusmodi, erit quidem vera virtus, sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum bonum. Et secundum hoc simpliciter vera virtus sine caritate esse non potest" (ibid.).

[56] "Unus quidem secundum hoc quod caritate caret: utpote cum facit aliquid in ordine ad id per quod caret caritate. Et talis actus semper est malus: sicut Augustinus <licit,in *N Contra Julianum* ... Alius autem potest esse actus carentis caritate non secundum id quod caritate caret, sed secundum quod habet aliquod aliud donum Dei, vel fidem vel spem, vel etiam naturae bonum ... Et secundum hoc sine caritate potest quidem esse aliquis actus bonus ex suo genere: non tamen perfecte bonum quia deest debita ordinatio ad ultimum finem" (ibid., ad 1).

[57] For the different ways in which an act can be referred to God, see Banez, *In II-II,* q. 10, a. 4 (Salamanca, 589-90).

[58] For the difficult question of whether without grace such a virtue would be a habit or merely a disposition, see especially Garrigou-Lagrange, "L'instabilite," 260-62.

[59] *STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 2, ad 2.

poor. His frequent almsgiving may even become a sort of habit. Nevertheless, despite his good actions, such a person will never be good. His very imperfect true virtues will be disconnected and not ordered to his proper last end, which is God.

The distinction between being capable of being ordered and actually being ordered is also invoked in a discussion of whether some infidels are able to be chaste and just. Thomas emphasizes that they can never possess true justice or chastity because they lack the correct order to God.[60] Shanley thinks that Thomas is stating that certain infidels who have not deliberately rejected God and Christian belief are able to perform good acts. But Thomas seems to be making a completely different point, which is that those who are turned away from God can perform good actions even while they are turned away from him. Thomas is not thinking about a neutral state in which an individual has not yet decided for or against God.

Thomas emphasizes the distinction between an infidel's good acts and the good acts of a Christian in *Secunda Secundae,* question 10, article 4, which asks, "whether every action of an infidel is a sin."[61] The disagreement over whether there can be a neutral state affects the interpretation of this discussion. According to Shanley, Thomas is discussing only a *secundum quid* infidel, who would seem to be a person who has not yet believed and is not guilty of unbelief.[62] Such persons can perform good acts because they occupy a middle state in which they are not ordered to or away from God, but rather to or away from a more proximate good. But the statement that an infidel can perform good acts is meant to show that even a disordered agent can perform good actions. So long as an infidel is not referring the act to the end of disbelief, he is able to perform a good act. It seems to me that Thomas would classify pre-Christian pagans as either

[60] "ita non potest esse simpliciter vera iustitia aut vera castitas si desit ordinatio debita ad finem; quae est per caritatem, quantumcumque aliquis se recte circa alia habeat" (*STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 7, ad 3).

[61] "Utrum omnis actio infidelis sit peccatum" (*STh* II-II, q. 10, a. 4).

[62] Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 564.

those who have implicit faith and are ordered to God or as those who have turned away from him.

Support for my view may be seen in the fact that Thomas's argument for the possibility of an infidel's good actions is similar to his argument for the possibility of a sinner's good actions. Thomas is considering a real infidel and not a basically good pagan who as yet does not know the Christian God. Thomas's concern with real infidelity can be especially seen in his discussion of Cornelius.[63] When it is argued that Cornelius was an infidel and yet able to perform good acts, Thomas states that Cornelius was not an infidel since he had implicit faith. Here Thomas is clearly describing an infidel as someone who is turned against God. Nevertheless, even though an infidel is turned against God, it does not follow that all of his acts are referred to his infidelity. Although the infidel is not acting for the sake of the last end, his action could be performed by someone who so acts. The infidel acts well by performing a good action that is not referred to his final end, which is himself; inversely, the Christian sins by performing an action that is not referred to the end of faith.[64] A basically bad person can perform some good actions, and a basically good person can perform some bad actions. In the *De Malo,* Thomas similarly discusses how a good act can be performed by someone who lacks charity.[65] Every human action is either good or bad. For someone who has charity, a good action is meritorious and a bad action is demeritorious. Someone who lacks charity can commit bad and therefore demeritorious acts. Nevertheless, he can also perform some good acts. These good acts will not be demeritorious, but neither will they be meritorious, since the agent lacks charity. Consequently, there are

[63] "De Cornelio tarnen sciendum est quod infidelis non erat: alioquin eius operatio accepta non fuisset Deo, cui sine fide nullus potest placere. Habeat autem fidem implicitam, nondum manifestata Evangelii veritate" (*STh* II-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3).

[64] "Sicut enim habens fidem potest aliquod peccatum commitere in actu quern non refert ad fidei finem, vel venialiter vel etiam mortaliter peccando; ita etiam infidelis potest aliquem actum bonum facere in eo quod non refert ad finem infidelitatis" (*STh* II-II, q. 10, a. 4).

[65] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 5, ad 7 (Leonine 23:45).

some human acts that are neither meritorious nor demeritorious: namely, good but not meritorious acts.

These passages show that when Thomas mentions the good actions of an infidel or a sinner, he is discussing acts that can be referred to God even though they in fact are not. Consequentiy, there is a problem only with ordering such an act to its last end. But this disorder means that the relevant moral habit will be imperfect, since the agent does not have a unified moral life. Unlike Augustine, Thomas carefully distinguishes between the goodness of an act, which comes from the act's object, and the end of an act.[66] Thomas at times is much more concerned with the goodness or badness of an isolated act. Augustine is almost always concerned with the fundamental orientation of the agent towards God or towards his own self. Nevertheless, as both John of St. Thomas and Maritain note, Thomas never repudiates the basically Augustinian position that a correct ordering to God through charity is a necessary condition for perfect acquired virtue.

Part of the contrast between Shanley's view and the traditional one may lie in his view of the relationship of the acquired virtues to the last end.[67] He seems to reject the notion of a natural end of man and states that acquired natural virtue is concerned with the best good that can be obtained apart from grace. But, as we have shown, because of the Fall it is impossible without grace even to

[66] "Ubi Augustinus uidetur reiicere communem scholasticorum sententiam, qui asserunt, opus bonum morale ex obiecto cui non opponitur mala circumstantia finis, simpliciter esse bonum opus" (Bafiez,In II-II, q. 10, a. 4 (Salamanca, 587)). Banez (Salamanca, 587-92) makes a good attempt at harmonizing Thomas and Augustine. For Thomas's position, see Ralph Mcinerny ,*Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory ofPractice* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 80-83.

Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 554-55, seems influenced by Denis J. M. Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997). Bradley seems to argue that since the natural end of humans cannot be completely obtained through natural powers, humans are naturally endless. For criticisms of Bradley, see Long, "A Purely Natural End for Man," passim; Peter A. Pagan-Aguiar, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Finality: Paradox or *Mysterium Fidei*,"*The Thomist* 64 (2000): 211-37. I follow Jean-Herve Nicolas, *Les profondeurs de la grace* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969), 375-99, who argues that the supernatural end is a further determination *(surdetermination)* of the natural end of man, continuous although not identical with it.

obtain many connatural goods, including the most important one, which is God. Thomas does emphasize that God is the natural last end. When the acquired moral virtues are connected with each other through prudence they are ordered to this last end. Without this ordering to God they can be habits or dispositions to good actions, but they will not be the perfect acquired virtues which make the agent good. [68]

Shanley finds support for his position that those without charity can have connected acquired virtues in Thomas's *De virtutibus cardinalibus,* article 2, in which Thomas asks, "Whether the virtues are connected; so that he who has one, has all?" [69] In this passage Thomas distinguishes between three grades of virtue. According to the first grade, the virtues are natural inclinations to the good and are not connected by prudence. Thomas states that these virtues are altogether imperfect. According to the second grade, virtues order someone to the good properly speaking *(bonum simpliciter),* but insofar as it is found in those things which pertain to the rule of human actions and is known through prudence. These virtues are connected through prudence. According to the third grade, the virtues order someone to the good properly speaking *(bonum simpliciter)* and as it is obtained through charity. These virtues are connected through charity. According to Shanley, this threefold distinction shows that pagans can have those virtues which belong to the second grade even though they cannot have charity and the infused moral virtues. He seems to infer the position that the acquired virtues can fully exist without charity from the fact that the acquired virtues are connected through acquired prudence. To the best of my knowledge, neither John of St. Thomas nor Maritain denies that the acquired moral virtues are connected through prudence. [70] The

[68] Garrigou-Lagrange, "L'instabilite," 260.

[69] "Utrum virtutes sint connexae; ut qui habet unam, habeat omnes." *(De virtutibus cardinalibus,* q. un., a. 2, in *Quaestiones disputatae,* ed. P. Bazzi et al. [furin: Marietti, 1965), 1:817).

[70] "The natural virtues are indeed connected in prudence but prudence concerns the order of means to the end, and presupposes rectitude in willing the end" (Maritain, *Science and Wisdom,* 148).

real issue is whether the prudence can exist someone who lacks charity. Thomas not address the issue in this article, which is not surprising since the is about the ways the are connected and not about whether the moral virtues can exist For Shanley's interpretation to be correct, Thomas have to be arguing not that the virtues are through prudence, but also that someone who does not have can prudence. There are no hints the text that Thomas so argues. as we have seen, Thomas's discussion *Prima Secundae,* question 65, article 2, would contradict that conclusion.

According to Shanley, pagans were to possess acquired virtues without being to God as their last end. But Thomas thinks that each person must make a choice being ordered to and being ordered to [71] This choice has been much discussed in the literature on whether non-Christians can be saved.[72] argues upon the age of reason everyone must be ordered either to the due end or away from Those are ordered to have grace, and those who lack this order lack grace. Shanley argues that at pre-Christian pagans this due end can be any sort of genuine [73] Since passage is about whether someone has grace or not, his interpretation appears to entail the condusion that someone orders himself towards a genuine good must be in a state grace. But according to

[71] *Sfh* HI, q. 89, a. 6.

[72] See Louis Caperan, *Le probleme du salut des infideles,* vol.1, (Toulouse, 1934), 186-99.

[73] Shanley, on Pagan Virtue," 573. Shanley (ibid., 573-75), seems to give a semi-l:'eiagian interpretation to the phrase *faciens quad in se est.* He does explicitly state that he is trying to avoid semi-Pelagianism, but it is not dear to me how he does it. His assmnption here is that pagan virtue is a preparation for grace. If he is assuming that grace is a necessary condition for the pre-Christian development of political virtue, then it is not dear to me how this belief is consistent with the earlier sections of his paper. If he is assuming that such virtue can be acquired without grace, then he is stating that through his unaided natural efforts a pre-Chrisrian pagan can perform acts which are acceptable to God. For Thomas's rejection of this latter position, see Bouillard, *Conversion et grace.* For the passage under discussion, see also Joseph P. Wawrykow, *God's Grace and Human Action: "Merit" in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 38 n. 84.

Thomas, even someone who lacks grace and is turned away from God can be ordered to some genuine goods. Consequently, the due end in this passage requires an ordering of goods to God. Whereas Shanley suggests that the infidel may have never made a choice for or against God, Thomas thinks that this choice must be made. Anyone who makes the wrong choice is not ordered to God. Consequently, although disordered agents may have habits that direct them to goods that are referred to God, these acts in fact are not so referred. These habits or dispositions are not connected virtues. The infidel cannot have perfect acquired prudence because he does not direct his activities towards the last end.

What is Thomas's view of "pagan" virtue? A moral habit or disposition is possessed by an agent who either is or is not ordered to God, his natural and supernatural last end. A non-Christian may be so directed only if he has implicit faith and the theological virtue of charity. Only when an agent has grace can he can possess acquired virtues that are directed to God in different ways by both acquired and infused prudence, and unified by charity. Someone without charity can consistently perform good actions and it is in this sense that he can be said to have true virtue. Nevertheless, this true virtue will be very imperfect even on only a natural level.

On my reading of them, both Kent and Shanley think that at least some agents can develop the same virtues as Christians and in the same manner. By "same virtues" I mean "virtues with the same formal object." By "in the same manner" I mean "connected through prudence." The acquired virtues differ from the infused virtues on account of their formal object and rule.[74] On the views of Kent and Shanley, it seems that a Christian and a pagan could perform the same brave action and develop the same habit of bravery. According to Kent, this habit of bravery orders the non-Christian to his natural end; according to Shanley, it orders the

[74] *STb* -1-11, q. 63, a. 4. See Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 558-59. Shanley's understanding of the relationship between the acquired and infused virtues is unclear to me. He may think that Christians can posses only the infused moral virtues, whereas the pre-Christian pagans possessed the acquired ones. But it is not clear how one would support such an interpretation of Thomas.

agent to the poHticai good. Since, as Thomas states, virtues are distinguished by their own objects not only the last end of the agent, it follows that Christians pagans could have the same moral virtue. Moreover, if pagans have other acquired moral virtues, including prudence, they will possess the same that are possessed by Christians. Both Christians and pagans have moral virtues are connected through prudence. According to my interpretation, no agent can be ordered to the natural end without at the same time being ordered to the supernatural end through charity. Moreover, this ordering to the natural end is a necessary condition for acquired prudence unity' of acquired moral virtues. Consequently, if a pagan possesses acquired moral virtues that are connected with each other prudence, it follows that he must be ordered to even the supernatural end, requires charity. In short, such a pagan must have implicit faith"

Thomas agrees with Augustine on two First, those who are not ordered to God can have a sort of virtue that is distinct from vice. Second, those who are so disordered cannot fully possess the acquired virtues. Thomas differs from Augustine in emphasizing even these agents can perform good acts and have corresponding habits or dispositions. this difference is deeper agreement. Thomas and because of the different contexts which they wrote and developed their thought. Augu§tine never developed a §ystematic moral theory which he discussed the goodness of an act as opposed to the goodness of the agent. His concerns were more doctrinal and polemicaL He was fighting Pelagians and pagans. In contrast, Thomas was concerned with incorporating Aristotle's theory into a Scholastic for him increasingly Augustinian framework. Nevertheless, Thomas Augustine agree on the central that an agent can never be good without being ordered to God through grace. As we the first part, Thomas's position on pagan virtue seems to have developed in the same direction as his views on justification" Unlike many medieval theologians, Thomas

thoroughly adopted Augustine's anti-Pelagian stance. Both Augustine and Thomas emphasize not only the weakness but also the insufficiency of fallen human nature.

IV

Both Kent and Shanley seem to contrast an Augustinian position in which pagan virtues are really vices and a Thomistic position in which at least some persons can lead a morally virtuous life without the assistance of grace. I think that neither Augustine nor Thomas holds the views that are attributed to them. Although Augustine does say that pagan virtues are only similar to true virtues, he does distinguish carefully between pagans who perform good actions and those who are vicious. Thomas's position is especially complex. The dispute between the non-Augustinian reading of Thomas and the more traditional version is not over whether Thomas says that pagans can have "true" virtues. Everyone admits that he does. The question is whether without grace someone can be good by the fact that he has acquired virtues that are perfect-that is, connected with the other virtues through prudence. Although Thomas thinks that pagans without charity can have true virtues, he does not think that they can lead morally virtuous lives. By "true virtues" he means only habits or dispositions for performing good actions. Without charity someone can perform good actions, but he can never be good.

One advantage of rejecting the Augustinian interpretation of Thomas is that it would make possible the existence of a Thomistic moral philosophy that is completely independent of revelation. By emphasizing the weakness of fallen human nature Thomas makes it difficult for moral philosophy to be entirely independent of moral theology.[75] Kent follows Cajetan in thinking that moral philosophy is about nature and has no need of

[75] For a criticism of Maritain on similar grounds, see Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good*, 495-506.

revelation.[76] Moreover, she argues for the further point that a naturally moral life is possible without the virtue of religion. Shanley's claim is much narrower and more in tune with Thomas's Augustinian heritage. Although Shanley seems to think that Thomas's moral philosophy cannot be separated from moral theology, he does think that for pre-Christian pagans all the acquired virtues, even the virtue of prudence, can be possessed without charity and the infused moral virtues. But, as John of St. Thomas observed, there is a difficulty in this position.[77] In a state of pure nature it would be possible to be ordered to a purely natural last end. However, since we do not live in a state of pure nature, it is impossible for us to be ordered to the last natural end and away from the last supernatural end. Consequently, anyone who lacks the supernatural virtue of charity is ordered away from the last natural end. Although someone in this state can perform good acts, he cannot possess even the acquired moral virtues in the same way that they are possessed by someone who is ordered to God through charity.

Both Kent and Shanley neglect Thomas's position that original sin has destroyed our ability to acquire fully even the natural virtues without grace. The Augustinianism of Thomas's moral theory is not just in his belief that all men are called to an end whose attainment exceeds the natural abilities of human nature, but also in his position that these natural abilities have themselves been corrupted. Both Augustine and Thomas can explain why most humans fail to attain their last end. Many animals flourish; few humans do. Aristotle recognized that few are virtuous but he did not give a complete explanation of why this is so.[78] According

[76] Kent, "Moral Provincialism," 279; *Virtues of the Will,* 28. Cajetan, *Commentaria in Secundam Secundae,* q. 23, a. 7 (Leonine 8:172).

[77] "Difficultas ergo est in hoc statu presenti, in quo non potest quis carere gratia et charitate nisi propter peccatum, et consequenter cum aversione ab ultimo fine, quae aversio non potest esse ab ultimo fine supernaturali quin sit etiam a fine ultimo naturali, siquidem omne peccatum est contra naturam rationalem, quod non esset, si maneret peccator conversus et conjunctus Deo fini naturali, qui est finis rationalis naturae, ex cujus recto amore maneret rectificatus in ordine naturali" Uohn of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus,* d. 17, a. 2, 55 [De *Virtutibus,* 465-66]).

[78] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.7 (1150a1015).

to Thomas, few of us attain our last end because we need God's grace to heal our corrupted natural powers and to raise us to our supernatural end.[79]

Thomas's moral theory is more nuanced and consistent than that of Augustine. Nevertheless, Thomas agrees with Augustine that the virtuous life is impossible without the assistance of grace. Some duties are impossible to fulfill on account of the corruption of human nature through sin. Consequently, grace is needed to heal human nature. Moreover, the virtue of charity is necessary for a correct ordering to God. Someone who does not have charity can only have imperfect acquired moral virtues which are not directed to either the natural or supernatural last end of man. Although such a person may perform good actions, he will never possess the perfect acquired moral virtues.[80]

[79] *STh* l, q. 23, a. 7, ad 3.

[80] I would like to thank the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies for granting me a Gilson Fellowship, which made it possible for me to write this article. Brian J. O'Donnell and an anonymous reader made helpful criticisms. Fr. Brian Shanley gave gracious advice and assistance.

Heidegger's Atheism: The a Voice. L\URENCE PAUL HEMMING. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002. Pp. 344. $45.00 ISBN 0-268-03058-8.

Readers of Laurence Paul recent book on should not neglect to recall the extent to which Heidegger himself radically transformed our understanding of what it means to give an "interpretation." Hemming's discussion displays a constant awareness of our indebtedness to Heidegger in this regard. His book is best conceived as a careful to and thinking with Heidegger rather than as a more traditional exegesis of the

This is not to imply that Hemming is unconcerned about Heidegger's meaning. But from a Heideggerian itself has an event-like character, so that it can never be "fixed" or determined once and for all. Moreover, it is revealed as much in what Heidegger suggested but left unsaid as in what he actually wrote had to say.

Readers of *The Thomist* wi!l be familiar with Hemming's essay on "Heidegger's God," in 1998; this new hook on *Atheism* represents an amplification and a of the argument sketched in that article. Here the juxtaposition of titles is itself informative about the author's original Heidegger's atheism is the portal which any interpreter must peiss in order to have the opportunity even for a glimpse of Heidegger's God.

Regeirded separately, neither title would seem to represent a that is particularly startling or A number of have insisted that Heidegger is best understood as an atheist even as a and that he said so for anyone who has ears to hear. been those commentaries with Heidegger's God; Heidegger as a thinker of great significance, eJnd few ,,.,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,,..exercised as powerful an influence over developments in twentieth-century Christian theology. Hemming, however, wants to mainteiin both perspectives at once. It is to describe Heidegger as an atheist, while also regarding him eis a deeply religious thinker, albeit as one whose God does not appear in those places where his have been inclined to look.

Heiddegger's writings embody a lifelong meditation on the history of the concept of being. Hemming notes that the Heideggerian corpus "reeks of God" without actually saying very much about the Deity. Some scholars-most notably Karl Lowith-have tried to account for this peculiar fact by suggesting that Heidegger "supplanted God with being" (2); and many readers who discern in Heidegger's works a perspective friendlier to theology than the one that LOwith delineated are nevertheless inclined to conflate Heidegger's idea of God with his concept of being. Hemming emphatically rejects all such readings. Being, for Heidegger, is always finite and can never be spoken of God. Moreover, Hemming's account "decidedly overlooks the understanding of the holy that Heidegger develops, particularly in relation to Holderlin" (17). Consequently, his discussion either rebuts or circumvents the two most common strategies for explaining Heidegger's religious significance.

Hemming's own strategy is to argue that "Heidegger's atheism ... is an explicitly Christian affair"; moreover, that his atheism consists precisely in his refusal of "the way the Christian God has been woven into human thinking" (18). Atthe same time, Heidegger's refusal is conceived as a "vibrant pedagogy," one that brings the reader to address the question of God in the very process of exposing "the extent to which so much which claims to speak of God does not do so" (50). This is a clearing away of the God of metaphysics in order to make room for the God of faith, but not at all in the sense that Kant proposed. It is not essentially an epistemological move, exposing a gap in the order of knowledge that only faith can fill. The atheistic refusal of God as being (highest being, ground of being, first cause, etc.) is simultaneously the coming to myself as this being, *my* being, grounded in nothing; and "this groundlessness is the ontological grounding possibility of discovering (in faith) myself to have been created by God" (59). The rejection of a "God already known to me as what grounds me" (162) is the preparing of a space within *Dasein* to meet the God who speaks to me, the God revealed in faith, not as pure presence but as an "event in being" (73).

This strategy is enacted in Hemming's own prolonged meditation on the full range of Heidegger's writing, from the earliest pronouncement of his atheism in 1921 to his most mature reflections. After an extended introduction that supplies a useful summary of the book's structure and basic argument, Hemming proceeds to explore the early work, Heidegger's youthful theological inquiries and the original development of his philosophical atheism against that theological background. This discussion culminates in a consideration of Heidegger's *Phanomeno/ogie und Theo/ogie*, the publication of a lecture originally delivered at Tiibingen in 1927. There theology is identified explicitly as the "science of faith," as Hemming explains, "in no sense concerned with a disclosure of the essence of God or of God's being as such, but only *my* being in its comported faithfulness to God" (65).

Already in this second chapter, Hemming eschews the standard account (again, originating with Lowith) of an "early Heidegger" who stands in opposition to the "later Heidegger," the contrast being marked in terms of an

of *Dasein* to the as such" In the next three Hemming presents his own understanding of the meaning of the "turn" *(Kehre)* in Heidegger's philosophy, as well as its relation to the "event" *(Ereignis)*. These pages are laced with insight; while the detailed analysis there resists neat summary, the upshot of this discussion is Hemming's insistence on the basic of Heidegger's thought. On Hemming's account, the "turn" does not refer to something representing a basic in Heidegger's thinking; rather, it refers to Heidegger's own about time and That ui""'rn"' is the event of Nietzsche's pronouncement of the death of God, so that the turn is manifested in the of Western as a turning away from from God *as* o:r highest being. With Nietzsche, the "ground becomes and weightless,,, so that an being, everything, is now "secured in terms of *v""""'·"i'i*

With these Hemming sets the stage for the analysis in the second half of the where he more articulates his understanding of Heidegger's God. This negatively, in 6, with a review of Heidegger's of traditional Christian theology, but condudes more in chapter 9, with a brilliant and enormously stimulating set of deliberations on the challenge that Heidegger's atheism represents for contemporary theologians. Hemming has already begun to respond to that challenge In between, there is important material dealing with Heidegger's consideration of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, the relationship between Heidegger and medieval Aquinas), aI1d own sharply critical evaluation of Jean-Luc Marion's theological appropriation of certain Heideggerian insights. These last two topics are linked since, in Hemming's Marion's somewhat ambivalent interpretation of Aquinas is related to his of Heidegger's difference. It is his failure to situate the experience of faith within the finite structures of *Dasein* that leads Marion l:o attempt to think God without the "I," that is, without "the very self that Heidegger's atheism has painst21kingly light and elaborated so as a While trying to think of "God without " Hemming contends, Marion remains within a notion of that is "resolutely

""-"1Ul"'01" avoids such a trap to the extent that his doctrine of analogy is regarded as playing a and is not construed as a metaphysical claim Hemming explains that this was Heidegger's understanding of how n""""""' both conceived and the concept of analogy. Hemming's of Heidegger on this issue is persuasive; it is another matter to persuade the reader that Heidegger's understanding of Aquinas is the correct one, that Aquinas himself was *not* involved in the very sort of metaphysical project that makes Marion so nervous. This is a complex issue, certainly not to be resolved in a few brief remarks-perhaps not likely to be resolved even in a series of lengthy discussions. I raise the issue only because some readers (including myself) will not be so disturbed the prospect of Aquinas (or anyone

else) engaging in the sort of traditional metaphysical inquiry that tends to be labeled as "ontotheology." The claim that "being and God are the same" (167) is a worrisome claim only to the extent that one has a very precise sense of what extraordinarily vague terms like "God" and "being" are supposed to mean. I am not attempting here to echo Carnap's famous/infamous critique of Heidegger's philosophy, a critique that I regard as being massively insensitive to Heidegger's most valuable insights. But I do think that some of Heidegger's talk about metaphysics as "ontotheology" results in a kind of unfortunate caricature, that he (and so perhaps Hemming) has paid insufficient attention to the logic of vagueness and to how it needs to be applied to such considerations.

I raise the issue, also, because Hemming has established (now in this book, but also in numerous other publications) a highJy original and fiercely independent viewpoint, but one that obviously bears a discernible resemblance to the theological perspective of Radical Orthodoxy. Yet Hemming's remarks here about Heidegger and nihilism display a distinctive tone of voice that dearly sets him apart not only from Marion but also from the Radical Orthodox theologians. Nevertheless, like the latter, he seems invested in the project of demonstrating the extent to which Aquinas got things right, no matter how confused Aquinas's contemporaries, successors, and most prominent interpreters may have been. Moreover, he appears to share the perspective defended by these theologians that things began to go especially and disastrously wrong when Duns Scotus appeared upon the scene, with the promulgation of his doctrine of the univocity of being. It is only a short step from Scorns through Suarez to Descartes. Nominalism rears its ugly head and the truth of being is forgotten, obscured in a cloud of ontotheological dust.

This evaluation of Scorns and Scotism is inferred from what Hemming writes in the book, not a careful summary of what he actually has to say. (Hemming addresses Scotus more directly in the 1998 *Thomist* essay that forms the precis for this extended argument.) But even the relative silence about Scorns is curious here, not just because Heidegger began his career by thinking/writing about (albeit spurious) Scotistic texts, but because Scotus's historically prominent theory of univocity, his idea of God as "infinite being," have him lurking everywhere in the shadows of Hemming's (and Heidegger's) argument as it unfolds.

The fact that Hemming evaluates the claims that Heidegger refused to voice, organizing his interpretation around what Heidegger left unsaid, makes me feel a bit more comfortable about observing Hemming's silence on certain issues. He is also silent about the potential influence of non-Christian, specifically East Asian religious ideas on the development of Heidegger's "atheistic" theology. In what sense would Hemming want to insist that Heidegger's atheism is an "explicitly Christian affair"? In terms of its origin? Or in terms also of its philosophical development and enduring religious significance?

The most important things that Hemming leaves unsaid, of course, are those things that go beyond saying, sometimes shattering language like a fragile vase, sometimes hidden in the "babble" of our metaphysical saying. I was moved by

he articulates a
of care, one that reveals lo,re as a "mode of kn.O,iV!!1>r----a£:am.
"""""""m" of finite creatures
thing, out for but never
thinking v11ith ri<:Wegger, wants to turn our attention back to the self as "the
horizon vvhere God is " the finite space where this God who
This God can be named in prayer

for (soci.

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Natural Law and Practical1was1mi1nf!. lVlARKC. MURl'iHY. Cambridge Studies in University 2001. 284. $54.95. ISBN 0-521-80229-6.

Recent moral seen a great interest m
'rn""""""· There is a sense among many that the basic
have led to interminable disagreement,
formulations of and
Put another way, the achievements of
have tended to show vvith the snortc•Jrr11r1gs
ethics (I but also the various forms of
whHe better models. This has led many
trained in methods to reexamine ancient and medieval
accounts, among them the tradition of natural law most but not
associated with the Much of this work has been
more suggestive than but there are several large-scale constructive
the most prominent The
recovery of natural. law in analytical terms is dms an obvious and
necessary of contemporary moral There are,
obstacles. The best-known obstacle is the thesis associated with Hume and
Moore that one cannot derive morally
statements. There is also the first
most modem moral
associated with premodern But natural law has often aimed to

do precisely that. There are also well-known problems concerning the role in natural law theory of the sort of teleology largely rejected by modern science. All of this suggests that perhaps there is simply too much disagreement at too basic a level between anything like traditional natural law and modern analytical philosophy. Finnis's work has aimed to meet these challenges, but has remained controversial among more traditional Thomists on account of its own peculiarities. Mark C. Murphy's *Natural Law and PracticalReasoning* thus enters a controversy already in progress. The book aims to do what others have either merely gestured at or attempted to do without garnering great acceptance, that is, to present a natural law theory that is expounded largely in the language and techniques of analytical philosophy, but that is grounded in the main theoretical commitments of the tradition.

Murphy offers a natural law account that aims to be a theory of practical reason, that is, one that explains the intelligibility and reasonableness of action. He begins by specifying the necessary elements in any plausible natural law theory: it must offer a catalogue of basic goods grounded in human nature and it must offer standards of practical rationality justified by reference to those goods (1-3). Accordingly, Murphy first offers an account of the basic goods that constitute reasons for action connected to human nature and then proposes standards of practical reasonableness. In approaching the first task Murphy confronts a disagreement internal to recent natural law theory: namely, the disagreement between those who see the principles of practical reason as derived from an account of human nature ("derivationists") and those who see them as indemonstrable and not derived from speculative judgments ("indinationists"). The first view, common among more traditional Thomists and Aristotelians, is represented by Anthony Lisska in his 1996 book, *Aquinas's Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction;* the latter mainly by John Finnis. Murphy argues for what one might call a modified inclinationism. He quickly rejects derivationism for, first, violating Hume's law and, second, for making it difficult to see how ordinary persons could have access to basic moral knowledge. He criticizes Finnis's inclinationism, however, for failing to reconcile the claim that basic moral principles are self-evident with the claim that the goodness of such goods is explained by human nature (14-17). Murphy's own inclinationism aims to solve this problem by defending an account of practical reasoning that relates moral principles to human nature without committing the naturalistic fallacy. He pursues this task by proposing two large arguments upon which the rest of the account-which mainly consists of defensive arguments for his own approach and a more detailed spelling out of actual principles of practical reasoning-rests.

The first of these two arguments is called the "real identity thesis" and is intended to provide the epistemic basis of a natural law theory that does not run afoul of Hume's law. The thesis proposes an understanding of the relationship between speculative and practical judgments based on an analogy between different types of indexical statements. Just as one cannot derive statements like "Murphy is in his office" from statements (made by Murphy) like "I am in my office" or vice versa, so one cannot derive judgments about how one should act

from statements about the human as such. Nevertheless, there can be a "tight correspondence" between the content of the two statements. So the content of judgments of what one should do is logically independent and underivable from speculative judgments about the human good, but also identical. working dialectically between the t\1\\lo, one can recognize their logical difference, but stiU find them mutually illuminating

The second argument, called the "functional composition thesis," concerns daims about the human good itself. Murphy defends the notion that there is a (CC)mpou111aor inclusive) function that can be ascribed to human beings as such and that such a function can be related to goodness. The thesis itself is explained by way of an interpretation of Aristotle's function argument in *Nicomachean Ethics* L 7, the function of parts in a whole to the notion that the whole itself has a function. Function is then related to flourishing with the help of Mark Bedau's defense of a teleological account of functioning and his classification of teleology into three groups, one of which is the sort of full-blooded teleology advocated Aristotle. This describes human flourishing; a lesser grade of teleology describes other nonhuman parts of nature.

Having proposed these two theses, sets about formulating and defending an account like Finnis's theory, is grounded in a set of basic goods that constitute reasons for action. Murphy's list is, however, somewhat different from Finnis's. He proposes the following basic goods: life, knowledge, aesthetic experience, excellence in play and work, exceUence in agency, inner peace, friendship and community, religion, and happiness. This last concerns the formation agents of rational Hfe through which to realize the good. The goods are analyzed dialectically by means of both speculative judgments about flourishing and practical With respect to practical reason, however, the goods are, as the real thesis states, fundamental reasons for action. From them derives principles of practical reason that govern both plans of action and agems. The of these preclude dismissing or devaluing basic goods or persons the context of goods). Like Finnis, also holds that the basic goods are incommensurable, unlike Finnis, he thinks it may be possible to order them hierarchically. A defensible hierarchy among goods, however, would not add much to the formulation of practical principles (198). Murphy's theory then is one based on the notion that the human good is objective, concerned with human welfare, and anti-consequentialist.

Finally, Murphy argues that specifically morni imperative force is added to the principles of reason when it is impossible to decide on some opposed course of action without a practical error. Generalizing from this leads to specifically moral principles that preclude *inter alia* discrimination, lying, and callousness.

There is a great deal to chew overr·in Murphy's account and no one can accuse him of being too stingy with arguments. He responds in great detail to a dizzying number and variety of to his various proposals and formulations relating to his claims about the objectivity of well-being and alternative

contemporary views. This book should and will be a focus of debate among those who advocate various versions of natural right in moral, political, and legal philosophy. What I want to offer is not so much criticism as observations and questions of the sort that seem to me natural from an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective. They all are related to what seem to me the distinctly modern elements in Murphy's natural law theory.

First, Murphy's dismissal of what he calls "derivationism" is based on what seems a rather casual acceptance of Hume's and Moore's views about the naturalistic fallacy. There have been a number of proposals advanced, even within analytical philosophy, to explain away the so-called fallacy of deriving values from facts: one thinks of Geach, Searle, and Prior, not to mention Macintyre. So why does Murphy adopt Lisska as the only representative of derivationism worth refuting? One reason is perhaps that Lisska, unlike most of those mentioned above, argues against Hume's law as an explicit proponent of natural law theory, but the question is broader than just natural law and Murphy chooses his opponents more broadly elsewhere in the book. Moreover, it does not seem to me that Lisska makes the strongest case.

From a more explicitly Thomistic perspective there are questions about the "functional composition thesis" and about the catalogue of and relationship between the basic goods. On the first point, Murphy is clearly concerned that a defense of a naturalistic account of flourishing looks too teleological for modern natural science. His adoption of Bedau's grades of teleology manages only to put this question off by proposing a kind of modified dualism: human flourishing manifests full teleology, while other parts of nature manifest lower grades of it. Perhaps that is the best we can do, but it seems unlikely that many proponents of anti-teleological science will be persuaded by it. On the second point, Murphy, like Finnis, holds that the basic goods are incommensurable. He does allow that there may be room for the notion of hierarchy among the goods (190-98); however, he evinces considerably more caution about this than either Aristotle or Aquinas, both of whom clearly defend the superiority of contemplation.

There are two other issues concerning the character of Murphy's account vis-a-vis traditional natural law theory that bear a somewhat paradoxical relationship to one another. Murphy criticizes derivationism for making it unclear how plain persons have access to basic moral knowledge. On finishing *Natural Law and Practical Rationality*, however, one wonders just how much easier plain persons have it on the basis of Murphy's account. At the same time, the actual cache of specific moral knowledge one carries away from the book may appear rather small. Murphy writes that he arrives at "thinner conclusions than those reached by a number of writers in the natural law tradition" on the basis of the principles of practical reason his theory generates (216), and a bit later confesses that those principles are "highly abstract," but that this is not so worrisome since working through the "more interesting moral requirements that can be generated from these fundamental principles would be extremely tedious," adding that his study is not primarily concerned with "the more

casuistical questions that arise within natural law theory" (230). It is fair enough that one cannot do everything in one book; however, a very large part of the controversy over natural law theory surely concerns the specific moral judgments about controversial questions that the tradition has proposed and the modern rejection of them. Murphy confines himself to brief discussions of discrimination, lying, and callousness. In the first of these discussions he actually mentions the controversy over discrimination against homosexuals by the military (231). The question of same-sex marriage, however, is of far greater moment and involves (in part, at least) the same principle. One may wonder if the thinness of these conclusions is related to Murphy's acceptance of Hume's law at the start.

These questions notwithstanding, *Natural Law and Practical Rationality* is an important book and one that should be studied by all contemporary students of the issues it treats. The book succeeds in advancing the project of an analytical natural law theory where others have failed, and contains many illuminating discussions of various related and subsidiary questions. The writing is clear and the quality of philosophical argument is very high. There has been a virtual rebirth of interest in and contribution to moral, political, and legal philosophy in the natural law tradition in recent years. Murphy's contribution to this increasingly lively and important conversation is among the most noteworthy and valuable.

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An Essay on Divine Authority. By MARK C. MURPHY. Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002. Pp. x +198. $39.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-8014-4030-0.

In this book, Mark C. Murphy explores the question of God's rule over created beings. He challenges the view-widely held by theists and non-theists alike-that, if G<Jd exists, human beings must be bound by obligations of obedience to Him. He argues that this view-what he calls the 'authority thesis'-is not sustained by any of the arguments usually made in its behalf, including those drawn from Scripture and tradition. In fact, he goes so far as to maintain that the authority thesis in all of its forms is not merely rationally unsupported but false (150).

What disturbs Murphy is the claim that divine commands are 'constitutive': "When authority *A* issues a dictate that *B 0, B* typically cites the reason that *A* told *B* to *Oas* at least part of the reason to do Othat *B* has" (12). In other words,

the authority's command provides a reason for action as knowledge of the consequences and of other features of the action, and his power to alter the practical situation (e.g., by attaching good or bad consequences to our choices. One concern that seems to underlie rejection of universal divine in this sense is the 'Wicked Bible' could God have commanded without at the same time altering the or social. dimensions of sex and Another concern is respect for the autonomy of rational which in his view supports a presumption against belief in relations (sec.

The apparent radicalism of conclusion is an iHusion. He supports 'the thesis': "it is a necessary truth that if God commands a rational creature to do *O,* then this creature has decisive reasons to do *O'* (21). As he sums up the practical of this view, "orthodox theism holds that if one holds that a command really is from the to do is to adhere to it, to have absolute trust that following the command is the to do"

Murphy not defends the thesis, he also defends divine auth•or;rty in the strict sense, as a contingent matter. Rational beings have decisive reasons themselves to divine to the extent that have chosen to let God's decrees take the of their own

law and conventional sometimes force to broad and •re·mPnt.: Thus a man to drink to excess may when your wife teHs you to do so'" will allow God to specify the transformation of the

but with little argument, that natural reason demands of Christian love as he Finnis think otherwise n. 11). A touchier annro21ch works concerns homosexual practices. on Thomas Nagel's account of and. sexual differences he criticizes the natural nracnc:es '-"""u""·"""•' by Germain Grisez and

view, rnther like playing a or rather engaging in a friendly wrestling match, with no referee to intervene if the parties to anger and do one another permanent damage; in any case, it is not a manifestation of mere hedonism. (That there is nothing to some form of activity but pleasure seems unprovable anyv,ray.)

Murphy holds that Christians can accept this view of sexuality while their traditional condemnation of homosexual sodomy. For homosexual behavior is problematic even on natural law grounds (182), and God specifies the relevant moral principles so as to forbid it. In other words, "homosexual sodomy is wrong because it is contrary to the divine command, not because it is contrary to the principles of natural practical reasonableness" (ibid.). "On this account, the sin of those [if culpable] who engage in homosexual sodomy outside the range of divine authority is not unchastity, but pride" d. n. This is not as liberal a doctrine as some readers might think, since Christian ethics regards pride as a far more serious matter than sins of the flesh. Its implications for the policies of the secular state be a different matter, however (cf. 177 n. 5).

The whole book is argued with admirable courage, rigor, and thoroughness. refusal to strain natural law reasoning to reach theologically correct conclusions is and his solution to the question of homosexual practices is worthy of serious attention. Following his difficult argument is, however, impeded by his insistence on "politically correct" pronouns-in one case *she* for Moses, though in the context of a And his argument concerning homosexuality concedes too much, on the strictly philosophical to the contemporary prejudice against taking sexual difference seriously, even w·hen dealing with sexual behavior, in which the distinctively male or female features of the human body are most prominent.

Moreover, in my judgment, he has not confronted the case for divine authority in its most radical and most credible form, aH of whose elements can be found in his The ethics of divine authority at its best is a metaethical thesis chap. Like most such theses, it forms a part of a larger metaphysical perspective-in this case, theism. Like all such theses, it works from, and tries to make sense a 'gut' morality resting on the mutual understandings and convergent emotional responses of the members of society. Hence adherents of the ethics of divine authority can agree with naturalists about the immorality of terrorism and child abuse, and debate them about sexual morality or assisted suicide, even while disagreeing with them about questions of moral theory (see 79). Naturalists do not necessarily fail to be "masterful users of deontic concepts" (ibid.): they merely hoid a metaphysics, and consequently a metaethics, that theists regard as in error, and this may distort their use of deontic concepts at least upon occasion.

Doubts about whether we, in fact, to obey God ran be taken as showing "that one's relationship with God has somehow gone awry" (82). For such a person is on the way to abandoning theism, and with it the most natural theistic metaethical doctrine. And, like metaethical doctrines generally, a

metaethics of divine authority makes some forms of moral argument easier and others more difficult, but does not uniquely determine the resulting moral code.

The ethics of divine authority has two pillars. First, God is a perfect being, so there will be no incoherencies or other flaws in His decrees (see chap. 3). Second, God is "creator of all things visible and invisible," and this includes both the requirements of morality and the human beings to which these requirements apply. This conjunction disposes of the 'Wicked Bible' problem: some moral requirements flow from the divine nature in the, admittedly obscure, way both necessary truths and lesser necessary beings do. (This consideration means that 'divine command ethics' is not the most accurate expression for the view in question, but does not militate against the term 'divine authority'.)

Nor is the problem of human autonomy serious. We are right to accept a presumption against authority relations among human beings (see sec. 6.5), because other human beings are finite, fallible, and sinful like ourselves; and more fundamentally because they too are created beings. (I pass over the messy problems created by the doctrine of the Incarnation.) But if God is our creator in a radical sense, then these considerations do not apply to His authority. Moreover, we can see inadequate formulations such as that we owe God a debt of gratitude for our very being (sec. 5.4) and that we are His property (sec. 5.3) as partial expressions of the fact that we are wholly His creation. As for the importance of voluntary submission to God's will (see sec. 7.4), there is profound spiritual wisdom in consenting to what one already is.

Though this form of the ethics of divine authority meets Murphy's critique, it is not necessarily problem-free. We have, first, to defend its underlying theism against the charge of meaninglessness or incoherence. Second, that morality issues from God tells us very little about the actual requirements of morality, or how we are to find out what they are. An important issue is one Murphy only mentions in passing, that one might be "imprudent in deciding what sources should be recognized as correctly containing the content of God's commands" (170). The relative roles of Scripture, tradition, contemporary religious leaders, and independent moral reasoning remain to be defined.

I conclude with a discussion of Murphy's account of the (almost) sacrifice of Isaac (41-45). In what must be something like the most hairsplitting argument on record, he maintains "that God intends that Abraham kill Isaac, yet that God does not intend Isaac to be killed by Abraham, but also that God's perfect rationality is thereby left intact" (43). A divorced husband, he argues, might intend that his daughter respect her mother, but not that his former wife, whom he hates, be respected by her daughter (42). But to save the father's rationality in this case, we need to suppose that he wants his daughter to respect her mother for the sake of her own moral character, and not for any benefit his ex-wife might gain from such respect. Such complex intentions could cover all his desires without his having incompatible intentions about logically equivalent states of affairs.

On the view of divine authority suggested here, a smoother if less fundamentalist reading of Genesis 22 is possible. The passage dramatizes two

up your most central moral
you to do so.

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Versions of Thomism. By FERGUS KERR.
Oxford: Blackwell 2002. viii + 254.
ISBN 0631213139.

After Aquinas is a survey of "non-standard"
of topics in the thought of Thomas Aquinas that is ae:s1gneo
subvert the "standard" account derived from a "Leonine Thomism" infected by "arid Aristotelianism." Those conversant with contemporary trends in
wiH perhaps wonder if the "standard account" is still of the name and whether the book's target is not a corpse Perhaps, 1t ;s a :ipecter still alive in some theological cirdes, in which case Kerr's book is a salutary remedy. Even if the "standard" account no longer exists as rhis book an interesting and wur nu·""" ₆ ·
in Thomism; it should prove especially to
carried out as a dialogue with Barth and his followers.

After an overview of life and times, Kerr
basic misreadings that in the Leonine of aoonJrnnaW:J:!!:
as an antidote to """"<i"rc1n,•v
Epistemology" occasioned
Thomas as an ally in an conceived struggle to defeat modernity" Kerr argues that Aquinas does indeed provide a way to subvert the Cartesian problematic, just not in the way envisioned by Transcendental Thomists or Neoscholastic realistso As Kerr describes his own the best way to exorcize Descartes is with a heavy dose of (as he showed in his masterful *Theology* Underlying \Wittgenstein's claim that "the human body is the best of the human soul" is an intuition about human nature very dose to such that "the discipline of being to exposure of the absurdities of assuming that the interior life is radically private us to understand Thomas Aquinas's pre-Cartesian account of the human mind and will" Against the "subjectivist-individualist" that characterizes modernity (including Aquinas operates within a --01-...,rt11vP-n:>rt•
that sees the intelligibility of the world realized in mind-world
function of the collaboration of knower and known. Ultimately Aquinas's

confidence about human knowing derives not from a prophylactic argument against skepticism/solipsism, but rather from a theological conviction that we are created in the image and likeness of an intelligent God and set in a world designed for us to realize that identity.

The second major misreading of Aquinas stems from assimilating his approach to apologetic responses to Enlightenment skepticism. It is precisely this reading of Aquinas that led Barth to denounce natural theology and analogy as the work of the anti-Christ because of the way in which it supposedly subordinates the living Triune God to a monolithic idol. The role and nature of the famous *quinquae viae* in Aquinas lie at the heart of this debate. In a chapter that is a "Prolegomena to Natural Theology," Kerr argues that we cannot begin to understand Aquinas if we see him as operating within modern philosophical categories. Aquinas presupposes a much broader notion of causality that does not map on to the modern tendency to reduce causality to mechanism and matter. Instead, he has a rich notion of agent causation wherein the Creator's omnicausality is not a monocausality wiping out genuine creaturely causality; there is double agency without rivalry. Aquinas's notion of substance is likewise unmodern insofar as it is dynamic and relational (as per Norris Clarke) rather than static and monolithic. Kerr next offers "Ways of Reading the Five Ways" as an exercise in securing divine transcendence against broadly Anselmian claims about God's existence being *per se nota* rather than as an answer to a modern atheisitic evidentialist challenge. God is not available as a natural object of human cognition except obliquely on the basis of a posteriori argumentation that leaves God's transcendence intact. Aquinas himself was well aware of the cognitive and religious gap between the limited conclusions of the five ways and the triune God, but nonetheless he was confident on the basis of the doctrine of creation that the world provides some kind of cognitive purchase on its Maker. Kerr devotes a chapter to "Stories of Being," designed to unpack Aquinas's notion of God as *lpsum esse subsistens.* After noting that Aquinas's doctrine of what we can know about God is fundamentally ordered towards its completion in beatific deification, Kerr explores some of the major attempts to come to terms with the doctrine of God as subsistent existence. As Kerr notes, the "seas of language run high" in any attempt to explore this doctrine, and he ultimately evinces little sympathy for Gilsonian, Heideggerian, and Balthasarian readings of Aquinas's metaphysics. In the end they offer incommensurable and often barely intelligible readings of Aquinas.

· Kerr devotes two chapters to Aquinas's moral thought. The first explores the problems involved in treating Aquinas as a natural law ethicist. Building on the work of Russell Hittinger, Pamela Hall, and Servais Pinckaers, Kerr shows that it is wrong-headed to extract Aquinas's doctrine of natural law from its broader theological context of providence, beatitude, virtue, sin, and grace as if it could stand on its own as a putative ethics. Indeed there is no modern "ethics" to be found in Aquinas because his concern is explicitly theological. In a companion chapter on "Theological Ethics," Kerr argues (obviously influenced by Pinckaers) that Aquinas's moral theology is best characterized as an ethics of divine

beatitude. The *Secunda Pars* is dominated by the idea that we are created in the image and likeness of God for the sake of beatific union. In this life the focus is how human beings become disposed in the right way (virtues, gifts, and beatitudes) so as actively to grow into the kind of persons who find fulfillment in God. This conformity of images to the divine requires the redeeming action of the Image, so that Aquinas's ethics is Christological as well, insofar as the only way to beatitude is through the redeeming work of Christ. In a penultimate chapter on "Christ in the *Summa Theologiae,"* Kerr explores some further themes in Aquinas's Christology, focusing on his personal devotion to the crucified Christ and his discussion of the motive for the Incarnation.

The discussion of ethics leads to a chapter on the "Quarrels about Grace" occasioned by de Lubac's *Surnaturel.* Kerr rightfully notes that the quarrel attempted to find answers to a nature-grace problematic that was foreign to Aquinas because he never worried about a hypothetical "nature" and its relationship to a grace coming to it from outside; for Aquinas, there was only the one divine economy that had never known a nature apart from grace. Aquinas views creation as ordered to its consummation in grace, and the human person as being made for a share in divine life or divinization. Hence his central axiom: grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it. This fit between nature and grace, however it is parsed by the participants in the quarrel, is deeply disquieting to Barthians, who view sinful nature as needing to be destroyed and recreated by grace and so see in Aquinas's doctrine a thinly disguised Pelagian optimism. Kerr argues that Aquinas was faithful to the Augustinian tradition's emphasis on the need for grace, but with a parallel and compatible fidelity to the Greek Patristic tradition of deification. Kerr thus devotes an entire chapter to the theme of "Deified Creaturehood" Aquinas was a realist about grace and took seriously the claim in 2 Peter 1:4 that grace makes us partakers in the divine nature. Kerr relies heavily on the work of A. N. Williams on deification, arguing that Aquinas's theological anthropology is best understood as a mystical theology focused on the condition for the possibility of union with God.

The final chapter considers "God in the *Summa Theologiae."* In response to the standard Reformed complaint, voiced vigorously by Barth, that Aquinas's God is a static monad constrained by Greek essentialism, Kerr explores how Aquinas's doctrine of God is biblical, Trinitarian, relational, and dynamic (it is puzzling why this chapter did not follow the earlier discussion of God's nature). His most novel claim is that Aquinas's God is better conceived as a verb and an event than a noun and an entity, if the former couplet is conceived as connoting activity and the latter is conceptually tied to stasis. At the very heart of the triune God is the procession of persons in knowing and loving; thus the activity of *lpsum esse subsistens* is nothing other than relational knowing and loving. There is no nature of God antecedent to or independent of Trinitarian personal activity, even if that nature is first approached intellectually in abstraction from the Trinity. The very persons of the Trinity are constituted by their activity and relations with each other; borrowing from Thomas Weinandy, Kerr notes that because the names that designate the persons do so on the basis of their

relational activities, they are best seen as verbs rather than nouns. Thus whether we think of God as *Ipsum esse subsistens* or Trinity, as one nature or three-personed, God is defined by activity.

Kerr concludes his survey with this observation: "Thomas's thought, perhaps over a range of issues, contains within itself the Janus-like ambiguities that generate competing interpretations that can never by reconciled .... all along the line Thomas's work, we may surely say, offers readers today little of the 'synthesis' and 'equilibrium' for which it was widely admired 50 years ago, but, on the contrary, reveals a loose-endedness in its constantly repeated discussions of finally unresolvable problems" (210) Herein lies the central problem of this work: Is this unresolved ambiguity really in Aquinas or is it rather more a reflection of the author's inability or unwillingness to adjudicate competing interpretations? It is both the strength and, in my view, the weakness of this book that it leaves the reader with all sorts of unresolved questions. It is a strength of the book that it reviews competing interpretations of Aquinas's theology in an undogmatic, fair-minded, and perspicuous manner; not only beginning theology students but also specialists will learn much from such an approach. Yet the weakness of this approach is that it leaves competing interpretations unresolved in a way that implies that the problem is in Aquinas rather than in his interpreters. Kerr's intuitions are generally on the mark and it is clear that he has more sympathy for some views than others, but he consistently balks at taking an explicit stand in favor of one line of interpretation. Aquinas's thought hangs together much better than Kerr leads the reader to believe, despite the loose-endedness of his interpreters. While it was perhaps a fault of Leonine Thomism to treat Aquinas as having straightforward answers to all the questions, it was right to attribute to him a unified view of the whole. There may be versions of Thomism, as Kerr's book discloses, but that does not mean that there are versions of Thomas.

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Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas. By MATTHEW LEVERING. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002. Pp. 264. $44.00 (cloth), $24.00 (paper). ISBN 0-268-02272-0 (cloth), 0-268-02273-0 {paper).

The Vatican II declaration *Nostra Aetate* placed interreligious dialogue at the center of Catholic theology in our day. In many ways, the most important dimension of that dialogue is with the Jewish people. Carried on in the shadow of the Shoah and yet with the *elan* given to Catholic-Jewish dialogue by the

words and actions of Paul the direction set *Nostra Aetate* has been ""ᵒ""""""n"""" and has enabled a type of honest interaction that would have seemed u""·""""""""-'ᵍbefore its on October 1965. difficulties lie ahead, of course, but some of the means of these have become apparent in recent years.

One of the most '1!'1,,.:.,,,-r'"nJ-means of serious and mutual reflection on the natl.lle of the relation benveen who do not believe in Christ and Christians. How can we understand Paul H's delivered in the synagogue at November the "the people of God of the Old Covenant that has never been revoked God"? ·we are invited to um:lertake a work of retrieval that wiH force us out of famHiar and the energy and we need to look at the of farad in our own and to begin to work toward a of doctrine.

"""""""""""" of the type of research and reflection needed if we are to recover in greater fullness the robust of the past, in this case th21t of Thomas to the mystery of IsraeL As the tide wishes to see how understands Christ's fulfillment of both Torah a.'"1d The first part of the book is dedicated to the first and is followed the second part Christ and the Temple. Each part is made up of three and the book ends with a chapter.

1, Level'ing offers a response to Michael wvs1:h1Jigiro1:n division of the Law into three and uu•u<H--.1u1;:> not respect the of the Torah as understood who see in its every aspect an expression of the one will of God. out that for the Mosaic Law is the rwing'ln"ı

was a means of grace th1:ou1gh ancient sacraments of the were towards Christ through the same faith and love which we are still towards him" q. 8, a. 3, ad 2 disrusses some of the consequences """""·""draws from the fact that Jesus, as the Incarnate Wisdom of God, acts out that Wisdom in his life, his teaching, his observance of the and *va'""".a'* in the events of his life.

In chapter 3, Levering links Christ's threefold office of and especially as these are to their consummation on the cross, as another way of how understands Christ's fulfillment of the whole Law. While it is true that there are two """"u·""""" sentences in the *Tertia Pars* that refer to this threefold office 178 n. 73), this

does not seem to have been an operating organizing principle in Aquinas's treatment of the Incarnation and Redemption. Nevertheless, Levering makes good use of these dimensions of Christ's person and activity to return once again to the notion of fulfillment of the Law according to Aquinas's division of the Law into ceremonial (priest), judicial (king), and moral (prophet). In regard to the first two of these Levering cites *STh* ID, q. 35, a. 7, ad 1: "Christ's priesthood and kingdom were consummated principally in his passion." The last lines of chapter 3 speak of the one reality and activity of Christ in its threefold manifestation: *prophet-the* source of the Inner Teacher, the Spirit who mediates the will of the Father; priest--continuing to be the one who sanctifies believers and brings them into the presence of the Father; king-governing his Church according to the perfection of the Divine law whose principal intention is to "establish man in friendship with God" *(STh* I-II, q. 99, a. 2). While the heavenly state of Christ will be considered in relation to the new Temple, his Body, these lines invite further study regarding the fact that the Law is being fulfilled now by the heavenly action of Christ and the share that believers have in this activity.

In part 2, Levering considers Christ's fulfillment of the Temple. At this point his Jewish dialogue partner is Jon Levenson, who develops a theology of the relation between Sion, the Law, and Zion, the place of David's city and the Temple, utilizing the theme of the "cosmic mountain" as outlined by Mircea Eliade. According to Levenson the Old Testament, and particularly Rabbinic theology, looks upon the Temple as located on the "cosmic mountain," thus manifesting God transcendent "presence." This presence is not dependent upon the existence of the physical Temple; even now it is the mysterious center of Jewish life, that "place" of holiness outlined and effected by observance of the Torah in such a way that it can be said that people become the Temple of YHWH.

Levenson derives much of his thought from the theology of the "name" present in the dedicatory prayer of 1 Kings 8 and elsewhere. So too, in the opinion of Aquinas, "God's 'name' dwelt in Israel's Temple because the Temple was the place where the holy sacrificial liturgy, which God had instructed Israel to perform, manifested God's 'name'" (95). Aquinas, of course, goes on to develop this in terms of the whole Christ, Head and members, the Blessed Virgin Mary, and each individual Christian, each in his own interconnected way being a place of the worship of the Trinity in sacrificial holiness. The consummation of this worship, proleptically manifested at the Transfiguration and realized in the Resurrection of Christ, is seen to be the eternal and glorious liturgy of the whole Body of Christ in heaven.

After acknowledging, at the beginning of chapter 5, that an account of the Christian life that illustrates how it is meant to fulfill the Torah is necessary for a complete presentation of Aquinas's notion of fulfillment, Levering goes on to concentrate on the Mystical Body of Christ and the sacraments as the place where the Temple worship is fulfilled. This fulfillment is not complete, of course, since for Aquinas and the biblical tradition he adheres to both the worship and *sacramenta* of the Old Law and in another way those of the New Law are

consummated in the beatific vision. The perfection of worship and the perfect fulfillment of the covenant are found in the passion of Christ. Thus, relying on Aquinas's teaching, Levering states: "In both Israel and the Church, inclusion in the Body is achieved through the realities of faith and charity, but these spiritual realities cannot be rut off from corresponding 'signs' or sacraments-Israel's Temple and its fulfillment in the Church's sacramental structure and worship"

In the final chapter treats of what he calls "the liturgical consummation of (129): the beatific vision, the ultimate sacrifice of shared and offered by all in the heavenly Jerusalem who make up one Body, one Temple of the Messiah. It is here that, in and through Christ, the Temple worship, which reached its fulfillment in the Passion of Christ prolonged and participated in his finally reaches its consummation. In *STh* q. 103, a. 3, Aquinas sketches out the three stages of worship: "One state was in respect of faith and hope and in the means of obtaining them [the Old Law]. . . . Another state of the interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods, a:; in things present or past New Law]. . . . The third state is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is believed in as lacking, nothing hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the Blessed. In this state of the nothing in regard to the worship of God will be figurative; there will be but *thanksgiving and voice of praise* (Isa 51:3)"

This fine work makes a serious contribution to the kind of retrieval theology that must be done before we Christians can approach Jewish-Christian relations in our own with a genuine spiritual and theological understanding of what the Scriptures and Tradition teach. Terms like "supersessionism" and "evangelization" are used with little understanding of what the New Testament and the great theologians and mystics of our tradition actually teach. The undoubted and manifold sins of the past, to speak only of the Christian side, must be of and never repeated, but there is as well the golden thread of genuine teaching that must be joined to our modern efforts if the dialogue is to be honest and fruitful.

In regard to Aquinas more work is needed to develop his thought regarding what we call now the "unrevoked covenant." His views on the ways in which Christians should relate to Jews, often misunderstood and confused with those of his contemporaries, must be darified; a study in this hne of ;-i-,.-.,,,.,ntis soon to be Aquinas's teaching on the Beatitudes as the Christian activity that fulfills the Torah must be set forth, and indeed lived in a public and widespread way, before our claim to be the heirs of God's revelation to Israel will be credible.

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Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence. By THOMAS J. MCPAR1LAND. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2001. Pp. 303. $37.50 (cloth). ISBN 0-8262-1345-6.

Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence reveals the ongoing maturation of those scholars who continue to appropriate Lonergan's work and explore its ramifications. More specifically McPartland's book participates in a serious discussion on the integration of Lonergan's notions of metaphysics, culture, and history, and his relationship to such modern and contemporary figures as Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Dilthey, Heidegger, Polanyi, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas, and especially Eric Voegelin.

McPartland's objective is to articulate a philosophy of history that is a differentiated form of wisdom and is capable of mediating historical existence. The result is both personal and communal. As personal, it is an authentic subjectivity that is a love of wisdom and a species of religious love that is differentiated by functional specialization and a personal existential attunement to the in-between. As communal, it is a community of lovers of wisdom, collaborating in a functionally specialized community called Cosmopolis.

McPartland develops his view of wisdom by rooting it in a restoration of a metaphysics of historical existence an analysis of the horizon of a subject. As the summary presentation of Lonergan's notion of the person (chap. 1) and of metaphysics expressed as generalized emergent probability (chap. 2) reveals, only the human being who has undergone an adequate development in the great achievements of the past and the present can supply the context for this analysis. This analysis, subsequently, provides a heuristic tool that McPartland uses to reveal both what can be appreciated in various authors on philosophy and history and their limits and distortions. He sets up the heuristic in chapter 1 by identifying two opposed theories of knowledge, the confrontational view and the isomorphic. In Lonergan's *Insight,* the confrontational view of knowledge and reality is based on the senses, and is summarized by Lonergan's phrase "already-out-there-now-real." The isomorphic view is based on the questions for understanding, which seek insights, and questions for reflection, which seek judgments. Thus, reality is not something "out-there." It is what is grasped or mediated in the human person by a compound of experience, understanding, and judging. Experience constitutes the cognitive appropriation of the potency of reality, understanding mediates the intelligibility of reality, and judgment mediates the truth of reality as understood. This is not to say that this compound creates the real. It is not to say that the reality that is known is not distinct from knowing. It is not to say that cognition is not a part of reality. Rather, it is an epistemological articulation of the relationship between cognition and reality, which is precisely what prompted the modern and postmodern questions that resulted in a rejection of metaphysics and, in the end, promoted historicism. McPartland makes the two opposed theories of cognition fundamental in his dialectical analysis, and crucial in his method for the analysis of historical

existence. This which McPartland caHs a "dialectical " is used to engage various modern and authors 3) and to recover a notion of that rejects historicism In 5, it effects an of reason and

of those who live in openness to the "'in-m1terpretilt1•:m match the "basic horizon" of a human existence incarnate with a is necessary for the realization of a of historical existence mediated by a dialectical devoted to that community called must be open to the transcendental norms that caU of and the of counter-7, McPard:md sets foHh the differentiated wisdom that will a wisdom that is more than cognitive and in fact is a form of love. This

further nuances *w* the meaning of authentic subjectivity and authentic historical existence.

It must be noted that this has a significant limit not adequately reveals in the concrete It is rare to find "lovers of wisdom," even rarer to find lovers, even rnrer yet to find persons and communities with tu1aci:io:na1a1 differentiation of and *"'"V'-"'"'"'"'"'"* Cosmopolis that fa effective in as a steward of historical existence. of "philosophies" as illustrations of this On its own, the philosophy will lack effective «nth,r>ir11ru among the

McPartland's att1mement to the Transcendent and the in-berNeen, to this """"V""">'""""" form of needs to be by

cornpJ,emlenitedby a that constitutes a higher form of is expressed Lonergan as a type trnnscendent In *Method in Theology,* it becomes a hope for a Divine "entrance into the world mediated by meao.-;,ing." This is for more than a attunement to the Trnnscendent, a self which then ex-presses in and Rather, it is a hope for the Transcendent to become incarnate, and to enter into a communal mediation of self-transcending """"Ui'-"<·>·

for effective in its mediation of historical transcendent hope already mentioned is fulfillment in an actual Divine entrance into history. The inner-word needs to be mediated a truly effective outer word that is

constituted in some manner by the Beyond, the Transcendent, or the one whom we commonly identify as God. And in becoming a recurring fixture of historical existence, this hope for a Divine entrance combined with the actual Divine entrance itself must also include a further hope and realization: a hope for a permanence of the meaning of that outer-word, carried in particular kinds of roles and tasks that comprise a divinely constituted community in which Cosmopolis can be truly actuated. This would be the step that takes McPartland's impressive and worthwhile integration to the next stage, and beyond the limits ofVoegelin's own rich and insightful project.

McPartland's book reveals the power of authentic subjectivity in healing the cultural and social rifts caused by the intellectual dialectic of the two positions on knowledge, and the historical supremacy of the confrontational view of knowledge in many modern and postmodern versions of life and history. The method of self-appropriation that Lonergan espouses and McPartland utilizes facilitates a restoration of metaphysics and a hermeneutic that grounds a metaphysics of development, which in turn becomes a powerful tool for rejecting historicism while maintaining both historicity and normativity.

McPartland's integration of metaphysics into the philosophy of history is encouraging on its own terms. Metaphysics is one of the topics that has been somewhat neglected in studies of Lonergan's writings over the years, perhaps because its fullest treatment arises in the second half of *Insight*, and many are only beginning to penetrate the significance of that second half. Yet Lonergan apparently wished in his last days that he had spent more time emphasizing metaphysics. In his earlier days, he had been consumed by the formulation of a metaphysics of history. Many outside of Lonergan circles or those who never took any classes with him would probably be surprised to discover that he had said anything extensive on metaphysics. To many, he is a Transcendental Thomist or a neo-Kantian Thomist, and this usually means attention to the subject and ignorance of the object. Yet Lonergan's notion of metaphysics restores the validity of that science in the face of a modern world that has converted it into a treatment of angels and strange phenomena. It is a welcome sign to see that Lonergan's notion of metaphysics is introduced into McPartland's discussion of historical existence.

On a number of minor points and one or two major ones, I would raise questions about McPartland's position on the human subject, on metaphysics, and on Cosmopolis; however, as he repeatedly asserts, the real issue is the project of human life and that project has its roots in the primordial question seeking the ultimate answer. This book and the solutions it offers to a plethora of persistent philosophical and cultural deformations of soul and society merits serious consideration by philosophers and historians. Complement this analysis of the deformations both with the ineptitude of those deformed souls at reversing counter-positions and with a hope for a Divine solution and the result would be a more complete account of historical existence. Then complement it with the actual Divine solution and the result would give Cosmopolis a solid

hope for a real effective participation in the stewardship of historical existence by a wisdom that is both functionally specialized and ordained by the Divine entrance into the world mediated by meaning.

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The Unspoken Word: Negative Theology in Meister Eckhart's German Sermons. By BRUCE MILEM. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002. Pp ix+ 192. $44.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-8132-1019-4.

Meister Eckhart's life and works continue to fascinate scholars, religious people, non-Christians, and even atheists. His texts, both in Latin and in his elegantly expressive Middle High German, have received much academic attention on both sides of the Atlantic and indeed worldwide. The interpretation of his treatises and sermons depends to a great extent upon the interpreter-scholars, Christians, Buddhists, etc. All seem to find some basis for their own beliefs or a connection to their opinions in the writings of the Master. The effort to unearth the riches of his teachings has produced some bizarre conclusions. In this book, Bruce Milem makes an effort to place Eckhart's use of negative theology in a broader context and succeeds in reminding any interpreter of Eckhart's writings of some essential facts which, if ignored, lead to very strange interpretations of the Master's theology and method.

According to the title, Milem is presenting to the scholarly community a study of negative theology in Meister Eckhart's German sermons. However, it seems that he relegates this goal to a place of secondary importance. Instead, he proposes to describe "a new way of reading Meister Eckhart's sermons" (4). Milem argues that "instead of stating doctrine or describing mystical experience, Eckhart ... primarily involves his audience in a complex interpretive exercise by deliberately giving difficult sermons that emphasize their own status as products of language. The sermons' self-referential quality opens the door to thinking about the relation between the sermons and the divine truths they claim to articulate" (ibid.).

As a starting point, Milem considers Eckhart's own agenda, using the famous quotation from German sermon 53 *(Misit Dominus)* and from which the title of this study derives: "God is a word, an unspoken word." He concludes that "any consideration of [Eckhart's] preaching must begin with the problems raised by God's ineffability" (5), and goes on to pose a very important question: "If divine nature is truly unspeakable and ineffable, how can Eckhart even name it, let alone say something about it?" (6). To grapple with this issue he makes use of

Michael A. Sells's *Mystical Language of Unsaying.* In using Sells's theory regarding any possibility of using human language to speak of the utterly transcendent, he returns to Eckhart's sermon and asks: "What does it mean to call God an ineffable, unspoken word? What kind of word is this, and why is it unspoken?" (8). Milem employs this use of interrogative technique throughout his study to do exactly what he claims Eckhart is up to in his sermons. Eckhart wanted to get the hearers of his sermon to think, to be actively engaged in the sermon and to be challenged by its difficulties. He wanted "to transform their understanding of themselves and God" (150). Milem takes his readers along the same path by constantly posing multiple questions in order to engage the reader's mind in the difficulties of Eckhart's thought. He wants the reader to think of Eckhart's teachings according to his own methodology so that they will understand Eckhart, his method, and his message in a new way.

Surprisingly, Milem also uses the drama theory of Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956) to conclude something about Eckhart's preaching method. Both authors, operating within the limits of their creative works, had a primarily didactic purpose in mind. According to Milem, an appreciation of Brecht's use of an .alienation effect *(Verfremdungseffekt)* helps the modern reader understand the sermons in a new way. "Eckhart wanted his audience to remember that they [the sermons] were being given by a human being in time" (12). He continues this comparison: "Strange though it may seem, Eckhart's sermons are like dramatic performances, where one focuses not only on what the actors say, but also on what they do and how they interact with each other" (15). This intrusion of the theatrical into the homiletic moment seems far more Brechtian than Eckhartian. From Eckhart we have nothing but texts, no description of his sermon delivery that would support any comparison to Brecht's carefully crafted stage directions to achieve the desired alienation effect. This may apply, however, in a merely verbal sense as when Eckhart seems almost to shout "Now understand me correctly!" in Sermon 16b or "And now see and pay heed!" in Sermon 2, and as at the conclusion of Sermon 52, where he seems even dismissive. Eckhart delivered highly complex and theological sermons to a congregation of learned individuals-<>therwise they would be pointless, for no ordinary person would have a chance of understanding his message. The ordinary man in the pew would take Eckhart's admonition not to worry about it quite seriously. Brecht addresses all levels of society and by the use of various alienation techniques he keeps his audiences thinking (so the theory goes) and hopes to accomplish his didactic purposes. The other function of the Brechtian alienation technique is to prevent the audience from identifying or sympathizing with the characters precisely to force the members of the audience to concentrate solely on the didactic, propagandistic message. Such a function clearly shows the deficiencies of Marxist anthropology, for it reduced human beings to the status of mere rational creatures without any affective or emotional lives.

Regarding methodology, the author offers reasons why he has chosen German sermons and not Latin: "But I believe the best way to proceed is to treat the Latin and German halves of his work separately and to examine his activity in

each before asking how the two halves fit together. Only in taking them separately at first can one be reasonably sure of discovering their true relationship" (17). That makes sense since this is really about the methodology of four German sermons rather than a study of negative theology that would automatically entail the use of all of Eckhart's writings pertinent to the topic. Even though Milem adamantly limits his study to four German sermons, his analysis and discussion prove to be quite interesting.

Milem devotes a chapter each to four German sermons: 52 *(Beati pauperes spiritu),* 2 *(lntravit Jesus),* 16b *(Quasi vas auri so/idem),* and 6 *(justi vivent in aeternum).* Before he begins consideration of each sermon in turn, he makes a statement about Eckhart's method: "Eckhart speaks as he does to get his listeners started on thinking about themselves in relation to the divine, a process that ideally should arrive at the mystery that God is both one with and distinct from all creatures, including sermons and their interpreters" (21). Sermon 52 "functions as a sort of image of the soul" (19) that is both caught in time and yet has an eternal destiny. Eckhart seeks to explain the paradoxes inherent in human existence by using the image as a way of being able to speak of the soul as both united to and separate from God. Milem continues this consideration of paradoxes in his analysis of Sermon 2, where he discusses the critical use of images as being necessary. In Sermon 16b he writes of the image and claims that an image clearly reveals its dependence on its source rather than accurately reproducing its source (20). Jesus is the image of the invisible God, the Word made flesh who reveals the Father, for whoever sees Jesus sees the Father. The complexity of the proper ways of speaking of Jesus' nature and his relation to the other persons of the blessed Trinity offers a paradigm for speaking about the human person as the image of God. In discussing Sermon 6 Milem asserts "the understanding of the image affects his notion of justice by which he means ideal Christian practice" (20).

Milem devotes his final chapter to Eckhart's preaching and modestly asserts that his conclusions "must be tentative" (143) precisely because he has considered only four of possibly 120 sermons. The four sermons focus on three topics: "the relationship between God and other beings, whether and how humans can know God, and the shape and rationale of Christian practice and action" (144). Here Milem considers the maelstrom of paradoxes produced from the sermons of the Meister-paradoxes that intentionally force the listener to grapple with the sometimes outrageous assertions of the preacher. The goal of Eckhart's methodology had to do with getting the "listeners to transform their understanding of themselves and God" (150).

Milem deftly makes use of all the sources one would expect in a study of Meister Eckhart. Clearly the topic has caused him to become immersed in the scholarship and to think deeply about Eckhart's sermons "that even now make one wonder what was going on when he preached" (160). This results in a careful study that places the varied readings of Eckhart's theology-from incomprehensible Christian mystic to atheistic Zen practitioner-into its true context. One can really wonder at God as the "unspoken word" and pursue a

course of negative theology only after God has spoken the word. The paradoxes that Eckhart preaches come out of the inherent paradoxes of Christian truths. It took the Church centuries to formulate anything accurate, incomplete as the Nicene Creed may be, about the identity of Jesus, who is both tme God and tme Man, born in time and yet eternal, God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, one in being with the Father, etc. The Fathers of the early ecumenical councils produced a creedal statement of tmth expressed, believed, and affirmed while acknowledging that there is much more that cannot be expressed about God. God has revealed himself through his Word, Jesus Christ, and through the inspired texts, and yet remains shrouded in transcendent mystery, unable to be grasped completely by human knowing.

This interesting study could have been improved by the inclusion of complete new translations of the German sermons considered here. The quotations used to illustrate the author's point differ enough from any text available that a complete translation would have been very useful. The conclusion of Sermon 6 illustrates the difference in translation and therefore in interpretation. Eckhart's conclusion, in Middle High German, runs "Daz wir die gerehticheit minnen <lurchsich selben und got ane warumbe." Milem translates this as, "That we love justice through itself and God without why." By contrast, the translation contained in *Meister &khart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense* reads, "That we may love justice for its own sake and for God, without asking return." A complete text of the four sermons also would have allowed the reader to experience Eckhart's style and wonder about the effects the sermon would have had on Eckhart's congregation. It would have permitted the reader to place each sermon in its own context so that the power of Eckhart's words, the flow of his logic, and the impact of his shocking statements may have their full effect. The challenges of the original delivery for a congregation that knows that the Word was spoken at and in creation, that the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and yet hears Eckhart proclaim that God is a word-an unspoken word--can impact the modern reader as well.

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Medieval Masters: Essays in Memory of Msgr. E. A Synan. Edited by R. E. HOUSER. Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1999. Pp. 287. $15.00 (paper). ISBN 0-268-04214-4.

Edward A. Synan (1918-97), while a *praelatus honorarius,* was generally addressed by his students as Father Synan. At the time of his sudden death on 3

August 1997 he was a senior Fellow Emeritus of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Stidies, Toronto and a Professor Emeritus in the Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto. He began his thirty-eight-year career at Toronto in 1959 and he served as President of the Institute from 1973 to 1979, and again as president in 1989 and 1990. A native of New Jersey, and graduate of Seton HaH, he studied at Louvain and then contirmed studies at Toronto under Etienne Gilson and Anton C. Pegis, earning a Ph.D. and a Licentiate in Mediaeval Studies in 1951. Before coming to Toronto he held a chair of philosophy at Seton Hall (1952-59) and became associated there with Msgr. John Oesterreicher in the promotion of Christian-Jewish relations, His first book, in 1965, was *The Popes and the Jews in the Middle Ages*, and he went on to produce a number of other specialized mediaeval studies.

Such details fail to depict the man his :students remember as a person who was a charming conversationalist as well as an exciting preacher, and a friend who supported them through their graduate studies. These eleven essays Synan's former students are an offering of tribute to their beloved teacher. M. Jean Kitchel, in "'Remembering Synan," offers her personal reminiscences of the numerous times Fr. Syn2ln befriended her when she was a beginning student. Her account of his many generosities to her reflects the kind of person he was to his many students. The remaining ten essays are more technical pieces. fo most cases they were probably b21Sed on the specialized doctoral research of their authors, often less-well-known masters of mediaeval thought.

Jorge J. E. Gracia, in his "Metaphysical Epistemological a.'1d Linguistic Approaches to Universals: Porphyry, Borethius, and Abaila1rd,'" studies the treatment of universals. He shows the conventional interpretation of the history of philosophy, according to which it developed over the centuries from an emphasis on the metaphysical to the epistemological to the linguistic in the contemporary times is inaccurate since the early medieval work of the authors he studies involved aU three approaches. For Gracia the mettaphysical is the basic and primary way.

David Twetten examines" Albert the Great's Early Conflations of Philosophy and Theology on the Issue of Universal Causality." He shows how Albert changed his position with respect to the roles of and theology, reflecting the situation in the early thirteenth century as the writings of Aristotle and his Arabian commentators were beoowing better known and having their impact on the work of the Christi.an d1.eologians.

Timothy B. Noone contrasts the thought of Bonaventure and Scorns, both Franciscans, on the theory of knowledge. He shows there was a movement from Bonaventure's use of Augustinian illumination to the moderate realism of Scotus, who had to take into account the work of Henry of Ghent. "One must condude that Scorus's epistemology is in fundamerntal rontirmity with that of Thomas Aquinas, although the focus of ScoW!S's own thought is the doctrine of Henry Ghent."

R, E. Houser, the editor of this volume, contributes a lengthy examination of "Bonaventure's Three-Fold Way to God." He shows that Bonaventure used

different approaches to the demonstration of the existence of God. Well aware of the logical requirements presented by Aristotle, Bonaventure had a certain enthusiasm for the approach of Anselm which Houser prefers to call the "noetilogical" rather than the Kantian "ontological." He shows Bonaventure working to present a more effective version of Augustinian *illumination* as well as a cosmological argument (effect to cause) which Houser calls "aitiological," using transcendental Truth as the starting point. The argument reminds one of Aquinas's fourth way, since it concludes via a theory of participation in a God who is Truth Itself, and consequently Being Itself.

Richard C. Taylor examines" Averroes' Epistemology and Its Critique by Aquinas." Those familiar with the *De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas* will find the essay gives a more sympathetic treatment of Averroes, especially on there being one "material intellect" for all men. Taylor shows an extraordinary command of primary and secondary sources relating to Averroes, and his essay is a challenge to those who believed Aquinas had achieved victory in interpreting Aristotle's *De Anima.*

In "Creation, Numbers, and Nature: On Aquinas's *Quodlibet* 8, 1.1." Kevin :white shows how a challenging question asked at a session of disputed questions can lead to the most profound metaphysical analysis. The question was whether the number six is the Creator or a creature. A perfect number is one that is the sum of all its factors (as, e.g., six is the sum of one, two, and three). Moreover, six was the subject of some reflection since Genesis tells us God created everything in six days. This essay leads us into an investigation of the being of natures, and how they exist in creatures, in God, and in themselves.

Barry F. Brown, in "Act, Potency and the Real Distinction of Essence and Existence in Aquinas," reviews this basic topic of Thomistic metaphysics and how we came to know this distinction-and whether or not it is a first principle. The essay is an interesting examination also of how actuality is limited by the potency it actualizes and how this relates to the metaphysics of participation. It is one of the most readable papers in the series.

In "Love of Friendship and the Perfection of Finite Reasons," Janice L. Schultz undertakes an analysis of Aquinas' *amor amicitae,* "love of friendship," and argues against a paper by David Gallagher that only a moral love is faithful to St. Thomas's understanding of that love. "But essential to true self-love is setting aside self-indulgence as the criterion of behavior, which must be accompanied by the acceptance of a moral standard to which the self is subordinate." Only a morally ordered love of friendship can further our perfection as persons.

R. James Long takes up the topic of" Aquinas and the Cosmic Christ," which leads to an examination of whether Christ, as the Second Person of the Trinity, would have become incarnated as a human if Adam had not sinned. Did Christ come because he chose to redeem mankind for the sin of Adam, or would he have become incarnate had there been no original sin? Long studies the texts of Aquinas relating to this question and finds him responding in the negative.

Mary Catherine Summers examines "Walter Burley: A Student of John Duns Scorns?" and in doing so explores the early fourteenth century, a period so often neglected by those who judge that medieval thought pea.Iced in the thirteenth century. An odd tradition held that Burley had been a student of Scotus, and then later came to oppose him. Summers judges that Burley "'heard" Scorns lecture at Oxford early in his student career, was influenced by him, but when in his own professional career he came to consider the limits of what can be known natural reason (exduding revelation), his conclusion reflected more the influence of Henry of Ghent than that of Scotus.

This coUection of essays does honor to Fr. Synan and is another fine contribution to the series of Thomistic Papers published by the University of St. Thomas Center fo:r Thomistic Studieso

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