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SPIRITUAL COGNITION IN THOMAS AQUINAS

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THOMAS AQUINAS is famous for maintaining that all human knowledge in this life, even of God, begins in the senses.[1] Clearly, such a statement oversimplifies his position. Rapture, prophecy, faith, and self-knowledge surpass or stretch the maxim in various ways. Yet they are not outright exceptions to it.

Thomas maintains also that in this life, one knows realities external to the self by means of their likenesses in one's self, such as sensible and intelligible species. But the beatific vision is unmediated, for no likeness in the intellect would be adequate to make known the essence of God.

In this article, I shall try to ascertain what Thomas thought about spiritual cognition. In spiritual cognition, one would "see" a superior, immaterial being (the Deity or an angel) by means of an intelligible form that the object itself has impressed directly on one's intellect; and the function of that form would be the same in relation to the knower and to the known as that of intelligible or sensible species in one's direct cognition of created forms. Just as the eye sees the redness of a red apple by means of a sensible species of redness in the eye, so also would the intellect see God by means of an intelligible species that God has impressed on the intellect.

[1] I presented an early version of this article at a session on supernatural cognition sponsored by the Midwest Seminar on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy at the 38'h International Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, May 2003. I am very grateful to an anonymous reviewer for certain suggestions and criticisms.

Did Thomas believe that spiritual cognition was possible at all in this life? If one knew God in this way, *what* would one know? I raise these questions for two reasons. First, Thomas himself posits a purely spiritual way of seeing God, mediated only by infused species, in two early works.[2] But he posits it there only hypothetically, to be excluded as a possible way of knowing the divine essence. Moreover, in one of these texts, he rules out such cognition as a possible way of contemplating God at all *in via.*[3] Second, Thomas attributes spiritual cognition of some sort to Adam before the Fall and even to contemplatives after it.[4] In prelapsarian cognition, God makes God's self known to the mind by means of an interior, spiritual influence, and that influence functions as a mental species by which one knows God. Just as one sees a stone by means of a sensible species of the stone in one's eye, Thomas argues, so Adam knew God by means of an interior, spiritual influence.

My purpose in this article is threefold: to consider the hypothetical mediated vision of God; to consider Thomas's account of prelapsarian cognition; and to inquire whether the two modes of cognition are fundamentally the same or different. These are rather arcane topics by modern standards, but inquiry into them highlights some salient features of Thomas's cognitive theory. I shall first outline Thomas's account of cognitive mediation, which is crucial for what follows.

[2] IV *Sent.,* d. 49, q. 2, a. l; *De Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2. Editions cited in the notes include the following: *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum,* ed. P. Mandonnet (books I and II) and M. F. Moos (books III and IV, incomplete), 4 vols. (Paris, 1929-56). For the remainder of the *Scriptum* (after Book IV, d. 22), I have used the Parma edition of the *Opera Omnia* (1852-73), repr. New York (1948-50), vol. 7. *Compendium Theologiae,* in *Opuscula,* Leonine edition, vol. 42. *Quaestiones de Quolibet,* Leonine edition, vol. 25. *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate,* Leonine edition, vol. 22. *Summa contra Gentiles,* Marietti edition, 3 vols. (1961). *Summa Theologiae,* Ottawa edition, 5 vols. (1941-45). *Super Boetium De Trinitate,* Leonine edition, vol. 50. *Super Epistolas PauliApostoli lectura,* Marietti edition, ed. R. Cai, 2 vols. (1953). *Super Evangelium s. Ioannis lectura,* Marietti edition, ed. R. Cai, (1952). References to Bonaventure are to the *Opera Omnia* published in Quaracchi (10 vols., 1882-1902).

[3] *De Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2.

[4] II *Sent.,* d. 23, q. 2, a. 1. *De Verit.,* q. 18, a. 1, ad 1.

I. COGNITIVE MEDIATION

According to Thomas, all knowledge of external realities, apart from the unmediated vision of the divine essence, is obtained through formal representations, or "likenesses" *(similitudines)*, in the knower. Thomas posits four kinds of representative likeness: the sensible species (in a sense organ), the phantasm (a sensory representation of a real or imaginary object in the imagination), the intelligible species (the end result of abstraction), and the concept, or word (a mental definition produced by the possible intellect).[5] It is chiefly with reference to species (sensible and intelligible) that Thomas articulates the modes of cognitive mediation. His account presupposes that it makes sense to speak of the intellect's knowing *things*, as well as its knowing that propositions are true. Indeed, that is its primary operation. What the sense organs know are simple accidental forms, such as external colors. And what the intellect knows in the first place are material quiddities, considered in abstraction from their material conditions and thus universally. Such simple apprehension is not a judgment about any subject, but, according to Thomas, it does

[5] For summary accounts of Thomas's theory of cognition, see Georges Van Riet, "Le theorie thomiste de la sensation externe," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 51 (1953): 374-408; idem, "La theorie thomiste de !'abstraction," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 50 (1952): 353-93; and Edward P. Mahoney, "Sense, Intellect, and Imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger," in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, eds., *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 602-22, at pp. 605-11. See also Eleonore Stump, "Aquinas's Account of the Mechanisms of Intellective Cognition," *Revue intemationale de philosophie* 25 (1998): 287-307. For fuller accounts, see Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and idem, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of 'Summa theologiae' Ia 75-89* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chaps. 6, 9, and 10. John F. Peifer, *The Concept in Thomism* (New York: Bookman, 1952), reprinted as *The Mystery of Knowledge* (Albany, N.Y.: Magi, 1984), remains a useful account, albeit one reflecting developments in John of St. Thomas and later Thomism. Peifer focuses on the concept, or mental word. On intelligible species, see Leen Spruit, *"Species intelligibilis": From Perception to Knowledge*, vol. 1, *Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), especially pp. 156-74 (on Thomas); and Katherine H. Tachau, "Some Aspects of the Notion of Intentional Existence at Paris, 1250-1320," in Sten Ebbesen and Russell L. Friedman, eds., *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition* (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Science and Letters, 1999), 331-53 (an important article, notwithstanding some polemics).

have a certain truth value. Indeed, it is infallible.[6] In what sense such quiddities are external to the inteHect is a question that need not detain us here.

In the disputed questions *De Veritate* and the seventh *Quodlibet*, which date from his first Parisian regency (1256-59), Thomas distinguishes three distinct modes of cognitive mediation. As usual, sight is the paradigm and the master metaphor that he uses to analyze cognition.[7] First, there is the means "under which" *(medium sub quo)* one sees. This causes what is potentially knowable to become actually knowable. Physical light is the means under which the eye sees colors, and the light of the agent intellect is the means under which the inteHect knows quiddities. Second, there is the means «by which" *(medium quo)* one sees, such as a sensible or inteHigible species. Third, there may be a means "in which" one knows something, or "from which" one receives knowledge *(medium in quo, medium a quo)*, which Thomas likens to a mirror, or mirror image *(speculum).*[8]

The distinction between the second and third forms of mediation, which one might characterize respectively as "formal" and "objective," is crucial here.[9] Thomas explains the distinction in the *De Veritate* as foHows:

> [I]n corporeal vision ... the medium by which *[quo]* the object is seen is the species itself of the sensible thing present in the eye, which, as the form of the one who sees inasmuch as he sees, is the principle of the visual operation. An example of the medium from which [a *quo]* one receives cognition of the seen object is the mirror from which the species of some visible thing, such as a stone, may sometimes come to the eye, rather than immediately from the stone itself. And these ... are found also in intellectual vision .... The intelligible species,

[6] *STh* I, q. 85, a. 6.

[7] On the philosophical implications of visual paradigms in theology, see Reijo Tyorinoja, *"Fides et visio:* On Visual Metaphysics of Knowledge and Religious Belief in the Middle Ages," in *Archiv fur mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur,* vol. 6, ed. T. Boiadjiev et al. (Sofia: UK, 2000), 115-31.

[8] *Quodl.* 7, q. 1, a. 1. *De Verit.,* q. 18, a. 1, ad 1. Thomas characterizes the medium as that *in quo* in *Quodlibet* 7 and as that *a quo* in the *De Veritate.* The word *speculum* can mean either "mirror" or "mirror image," and it is often impossible to know in a given context which is the appropriate translation.

[9] Thomas says that the intellect uses intelligible species *formaliter* in *Quodl.* 5, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.

by which *[qua]* the possible intellect is caused actually to understand, corresponds to the visible species. And an effect from which *[a quo]* one comes to know a cause is comparable to the medium from which one receives knowledge of a visible object, as from a mirror. In such cases, the likeness of a cause is impressed on our understanding not immediately by the cause, but by the effect, in which the likeness of the cause is reflected. Hence cognition of this sort is said to be specular, because of its similarity to vision that comes through a mirror. [10]

In the seventh *Quodlibet*, Thomas points out that it is only when there is a *medium a* quo-that is, an intermediate object-that cognition is said to be indirect *(mediata).* Someone who is looking at a stone is said to see it directly even though such vision requires not only light as the *medium sub quo* but also the received sensible species of the stone as the *medium quo.* [11] Thomas does not regard the *medium quo* as such as an object of knowledge. Indeed, it is only by reflecting upon the process of cognition that one becomes aware of its existence. [12] When I see the redness of an apple, what I see is the external redness, and not the sensible species by which I see it.

Because no likeness in the intellect would be sufficient to make known the essence of God, Thomas argues, one cannot know that essence unless God joins God's self to the intellect as an intelligible form. [13] In the beatific vision, therefore, there is neither a *medium a quo* nor a *medium quo,* but only a *medium sub quo,*

[10] *De Verit.,* q. 18, a. 1, ad 1: "in visione corporali ... medium vero quo videtur est ipsa species rei sensibilis in oculo existens quae sicut forma videntis in quantum est videns principium est visivae operationis, medium autem a quo accipitur cognitio rei visae est sicut speculum a quo interdum species alicuius visibilis, ut puta lapidis, fit in oculo non immediate ab ipso lapide. Et haec ... etiarn in visione intellectuali inveniuntur .... speciei vero visibili [respondeat] species intelligibilis qua intellectus possibilis fit actu intelligens, rnedio vero a quo accipitur visi cognitio sicut speculo cornparatur effectus a quo in cognitionern causae devenirnus, ita enirn similitudo causae nostro intellectui imprimitur non immediate ex causa sed ex effectu in quo similitudo causae resplendet: uncle huiusmodi cognitio dicitur specularis propter similitudinem quam habet ad visionem quae fit per speculum." I have eliminated treatment of the first mode of mediation.

[11] *Quodl.* 7, q. 1, a. 1.

[12] *STh* I, q. 85, a. 2. See Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis,* 1:159-60 (with the references there given).

[13] *STh* I, q. 12, a. 5. See also *STh* I, q. 12, a. 9; *STh* I-II, q. 3, a. 8; IV *Sent.,* d. 49, q. 2, a. 1; *ScG* III, c. 51.

namely, an infused light that enhances or perhaps takes the place of the agent intellect and enables the soul to be united with God and thereby to see God's essence.[14] According to Thomas, it is precisely because that light, while supernaturally bestowed, is a created form that even the beatific vision is not comprehensive.[15] The blessed do not know God to the extent that God is knowable, and therefore they apprehend rather than comprehend God. Nevertheless, they do see the divine essence. The *medium quo* and the *medium sub quo* limit cognition in different ways.

Rapture, too, according to Thomas, is an unmediated vision of the divine essence. Rapture is not an exception to the rule that one cannot know God's essence in this life because the rapt person is temporarily removed from this life.[16]

Even dimly specular knowledge of God can be construed as vision of a sort: one *sees* God through a mirror and obscurely. And persons who have some special, revelatory insight that is mediated externally or by phantasms may properly be said to see God.[17] Nevertheless, the term "vision" in its strictest sense characterizes direct rather than inferred knowledge. One may infer the presence of a fox in the woods by its signs, such as its footprints, or one may actually *see* the fox. But even vision in the strictest sense is usually mediated by species, for "that thing whose likeness exists in the intellect is known to the intellect by way of vision, just as a likeness of something seen corporeally is in the sense of the one who sees."[18] Knowledge of God achieved simply through infused species would amount to vision precisely inasmuch as the mediation would be formal rather than objective (although, as we shall see, there is a sense in which such vision would be indirect, for what one would see would not be the divine essence).

[14] *STh* I, q. 12, a. 2; I, q. 12, a. 5.

[15] *STh* I, q. 12, a. 7.

[16] See appendix, below.

[17] *In loan.*, c. 1, lect. 11.

[18] *ScG* III, c. 41: "res enirn ilia per intellecturn visionis rnodo cognoscitur, cuius sirnilitudo in intellectu existit, sicut et sirnilitudo rei corporaliter visae est in sensu videntis."

II. COGNITIVE MIRRORS

Thomas characterizes causally inferred, externally mediated knowledge of God as specular.[19] The notion comes from 1 Corinthians 13:12: "Now we see through a mirror obscurely *fper speculum in aenigmate*], but then face to face." The term "specular" usually implies that the cognition is dim ("enigmatic") as well as indirect.

Yet the metaphor of mirrors is ambiguous. Its use in 1 Corinthians suggests cognition that is dim and indirect, while the function of actual mirrors suggests cognition that is virtually immediate, and in which ideally the medium is hardly noticeable.[20]

Thus in the *Summa contra Gentiles,* discussing angelic cognition, Thomas distinguishes between (a) seeing something as if in a mirror and (b) discursively inferring its existence through its effects. In discursive causal inference, there are two acts of understanding *(cognitiones):* that by which one knows the effect, and that by which one knows the cause. A reasoned inference separates the two. But when one sees something in a mirror, there is only a single act of cognition, for one grasps both the intermediate object and the ultimate object at once. It is by simple mirror vision of this sort, Thomas argues, and not through discursive inference, that one angel knows God through another angel.[21]

In simple mirror vision, according to Thomas, one knows yet need not notice the medium. It becomes what one might call an «unnoticed mirror." In the *De Veritate,* discussing how the angels know God, Thomas argues that whenever something is visible in its image, one may consider the image either as a thing in itself or precisely as an image; and in the latter case, the motion of the cognitive power toward the image is the same as its motion

[19] *In loan,,* c. 1, lect. 11. See also *De Verit.,* q. 18, a. 1, ad 1.

[20] Perhaps medieval mirrors were less transparent than modern ones, but cf. Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaemeron* 5.25, where Bonaventure likens the pure mind to a dear, "polished" mirror, and moreover distinguishes between natural mirrors, made by polishing steel, and artificial mirrors, made by precipitating lead on glass.

[21] *ScG* III, c. 49.

toward the object. Likewise, when one knows a cause through an effect, the motion of the cognitive power can proceed to the cause "immediately," so that one does not think about anything else. "And in this way," Thomas concludes, "the intellect of a wayfarer is able to think about God without thinking about any creature."[22] Such considerations may blur but they do not negate the distinction between a *medium quo* and a *medium a quo.*

III. THE AVICENNAN MODEL: KNOWLEDGE THROUGH IMPRESSION

In two early works-his commentaries on book 4 of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and on Boethius's *De Trinitate-Thomas* considers how one might know God not through species abstracted from sense data or by the mediation of external creatures, but through intelligible species that God has impressed directly on the intellect. In both passages, Thomas cites Avicenna.

In his commentary on book 4 of the *Sentences,* Thomas is inquiring as to how the human intellect can know God's essence.[23] His response is largely a rehearsal of discussions and debates among philosophers about knowledge of separate substances.[24] Thomas explains that the problems met by the theologians regarding knowledge of the divine essence are parallel to problems met by the philosophers regarding quidditative knowledge of separate substances (i.e., of intelligences, which Christians call "angels"). Having shown that no species derived from our sensible experience of material things is sufficient as a

[22] *De Verit.,* q. 8, a. 3, ad 18: "Et hoc modo intellectus viatoris potest cogitare de Deo non cogitando de aliqua creatura. »

[23] IV *Sent.,* d. 49, q. 2, a. 1. The *Scriptum* summarizes Thomas's teaching as a sententiary bachelor (1252-56), although he continued to edit it after he became a master of theology in 1256.

[24] Apart from the reference to Avicenna, Thomas's response follows a discussion from Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's *De anima,* book III, regarding knowledge of separate substances, where the Commentator outlines and criticizes the views of Avempace and Alexander of Aphrodisias as well as presenting his own. The point of the discussion is that through such knowledge, the philosopher can attain ultimate happiness. Thomas returns (ca. 1260-64) to Averroes' treatment in *ScG* III, cc. 41-44, where he devotes a lengthy polemical critique to it, refuting the theories of Alexander and Averroes as well as that of Avernpace.

means for quidditative knowledge even of created separate substances, let alone of God, Thomas turns to consider knowledge by impressed species.

He notes that, according to Avicenna in the *Metaphysics*, one can understand separate substances through "the intentions of their quiddities," that is, through likenesses that are not abstracted from them but are rather impressed by them. For one cannot intellectually abstract anything from a being that is already immaterial. But Thomas argues that even if one could know God through impression, such knowledge would still fall short of the vision of the divine essence.[25] His reasoning turns on the principle that "what is received by something is present there according to the manner of the recipient." Since the created intellect falls far short of being perfectly like God, any species received by it will be insufficiently like God for quidditative knowledge.

Thomas uses Avicenna's opinion as the premise of an objection in the same article. According to Thomas, Avicenna argues that when we know a separate substance, what is in our intellect cannot be the very essence of that substance but is rather an impression of it. But one could not know the divine essence in this way, the argument proceeds, for God is more different from us than "any angel or intelligence." Therefore if this were how we knew God, we would not know the divine essence.[26]

Thomas begins his reply by stating that he does not agree with Avicenna, and that other philosophers disagree with him as well. Thomas probably refers here to Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes, whose positions on knowledge of separate substances he has summarized, with qualified approval, in the body of the article. For just as they maintain that one knows separate substances when the (separate) agent intellect is united with the human soul as its form, so also, *mutatis mutandis*, Thomas maintains that in the beatific vision, God will be united to the human intellect as its form. Thomas rejects the position that he attributes here to Avicenna: that the intellect cannot know

[25] IV *Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1.
[26] Ibid., obj. 9.

another essence except by means of some likeness in itself. But Thomas adds, "unless perhaps we wish to say that Avicenna understands the knowledge of separate substances insofar as they are known by the habits of the speculative sciences and of the likenesses of things."[27] On this view, *any* mental representation by which one knew something about God, even if derived from sense data, would be an impression of God, merely because it is less simple and less spiritual than God. Thomas probably has in mind here a position that he attributes to Aristotle: that through abstraction from sense data and syllogistic reasoning, one can arrive at a certain refined (but natural) knowledge of separate substances, the most sublime and felicitous knowledge possible in this life.[28] But that is not how Thomas interprets Avicenna in the body of the article.

Thomas cites Avicenna's opinion also in his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate.* Reviewing the various ways in which one might know something, Thomas notes that one might see something through a form that does not come from the object by abstraction, but rather is impressed by the object on the knower, "as Avicenna says that we know the intelligences through their impressions in us." In that case, "the thing is simpler than the likeness through which it is known."[29] But Thomas argues that no likeness of God impressed on the human intellect would suffice for quidditative knowledge of God, since God "infinitely surpasses every created form."[30]

To what passage in Avicenna does Thomas refer? In both critical editions of the commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*- Bruno Decker's and the Leonine edition-the editors cite here a

[27] Ibid., ad 9: "Ad nonum dicendum, quod dictum Avicennae quantum ad hoc non sustinemus, quia ei etiam ab aliis philosophis in hoc contradicitur; nisi forte velimus dicere, quod Avicenna intelligit de cognitione substantiarum separatarum, secundum quod cognoscuntur per habitus scientiarum speculativarum, et similitudinum rerum."

[28] Cf. *ScG* III, c. 44.

[29] *De Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2: "siue sit impressa intelligenti ab eo, utpote quando res est simplicior quam similitudo per quam cognoscitur, sicut Auicenna dicit quod intelligentias cognoscimus per impressiones earum in nobis." Thomas wrote the commentary 1257-58, during his first Parisian regency.

[30] Ibid.

passage from book 5 of Avicenna's *De anima* regarding the agent intellect.[31] But in the *Scriptum,* Thomas refers to Avicenna's *Metaphysics.* Moreover, he gives no indication that he links the idea of knowledge of separate substances through impression with Avicenna's theory about the agent intellect.[32] The reference is rather to a passage from book 3 of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* regarding the difference between cognition of material forms and cognition of separate substances.[33]

The chapter from which this passage comes concerns the similitude between quiddities in reality and in the mind. Since there are both accidental and substantial forms in reality, must there be both accidental and substantial forms in the intellect to represent them? By insisting on the "intentional" character of mental forms, Avicenna can show that all mental forms, as such, are accidents, and that knowledge itself *(scientia)* is accidental. The agent intellect and other separate substances seem to present a special case. Since they are simple essences, not composites, how can one distinguish a quiddity from the thing itself? Must the mind become united with their very essence to know them? Avicenna argues that the mind understands them not directly, by their essence, but rather by "the intentions of their quiddities." The intellect must abstract material forms from matter to know them, but separate substances impress their own forms upon the intellect, as material forms would do too if they existed separately (which, needless to say, they do not).[34]

What Thomas posits in both of these passages, I submit, is a purely spiritual cognition that would result in a mediated vision of God. But it is important to note that he posits it only

[31] *Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate,* ed. Bruno Decker, editio altera (Leiden: Brill, 1959), 65 n. 1. Leonine edition, p. 84, note to line 61. Cf. Avicenna, *De anima* V, c. 5, in Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus N-V,* ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain: Editions orientalistes; Leiden: Brill, 1968), pp. 126-27).

[32] On that theory, see *STh* I, q. 84, a. 4. See also *ScG* II, c. 76.

[33] As indicated in the *apparatus fontium* to the parallel text in the Ottawa edition of *STh* Suppl., q. 92, a. 1, obj. 9 and resp.

[34] Avicenna, *Metaplrysics* III, c. 8. See Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina I-N,* ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 1977), p. 161, lines 14-16. Ibid., p. 162, lines 26-32.

hypothetically. Moreover, in the passage from his commentary on Boethius, Thomas adds that such knowledge does not occur at all *in via:*

> Nor is God known by us in this life through purely intelligible forms that have some resemblance to him, because of the connaturality of our intellect toward phantasms, as has been said. Hence it remains that God is known only through the form of his effects.[35]

There is another passage in the *Scriptum* in which Thomas refers to knowing God through impression rather than abstraction, and in this case his use of the notion is affirmative. The passage occurs in book 1, distinction *3,* where Thomas asks whether any created intellect can know God.[36] He explains in the body of the article that his question is not whether created intellects can have an unmediated knowledge of the divine essence (which he postpones until book 4), but whether God can be known *in any way.* Thomas's treatment of knowledge in this article is therefore broad and nonspecific. In the remainder of the response, he simply affirms that God is knowable, and goes on to argue that created intellects can never know God to the extent that God is knowable *per se,* and therefore can never comprehend the divine essence, since knowledge of something is always proportionate to the knower rather than to the known.[37]

[35] *De Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2: "Nee etiam in statu huius uie cognoscitur Deus a nobis per formas pure intelligibiles, que sint aliqua similitudo ipsius, propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad phantasmata, ut dictum est. Vnde relinquitur quod solummodo per effectus formam cognoscatur."

[36] I *Sent.,* d. 3, q. 1, a. 1.

[37] Ibid. That statement leaves the beatific vision within the scope of the article, since no created intellect, according Thomas, even in the next life, can ever *comprehend* God: see IV *Sent.,* d. 49, a. 2, q. 3; and *STh* I, q. 12, a. 7; I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 1. Here I disagree with John F. Wippel, in *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 386: "Thomas's answer as he sets it forth here is that God can be known by us, but not in such a fashion that we can grasp or comprehend his essence. *Here we see foreshadowed a position Thomas will often defend in subsequent discussions: we can know that God is, and what God is not, but not what God is"* (emphasis added). But that is how Thomas characterizes our indirect, *a posteriori,* sense-based knowledge of God in *this* life, while even the vision of the divine essence in the next life, in his view, is not comprehensive but only apprehensive.

The five objections are designed to show that God cannot be known in any way. According to the third, no intellect can know God because things are known only through species, by which the intellect is assimilated to its objects. But intelligible species presuppose abstraction. Since God is entirely simple, no species can be abstracted from God; and therefore we cannot know God.[38] In reply, Thomas argues that we can know *both God and the angels* "not through abstraction, but through their impression on our understanding."[39] Since any species exists in the knower in a manner that befits the knower, Thomas explains, abstracted species are simpler than their objects, while the impressed species through which we know immaterial substances are less simple than what they represent.[40]

This reply has puzzled scholars such as Ferdnand Van Steenberghen and John F. Wippel.[41] Its flavor seems uncharacteristic and too reminiscent of Platonic-Augustinian illumination. What does Thomas mean by "impression"? And is he referring here (as he does in reply to the fifth argument) to a supernatural mode of cognition?

Augustinian ideas of illumination are surely in the background. As Wippel points out, Augustine says in the *De libero arbitrio* that "notions" of happiness and of wisdom have been "impressed" by God on our minds.[42] Moreover, Bonaventure refers to knowledge of God by an impressed likeness when commenting, like Thomas,

[38] I *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 3.

[39] Ibid., ad 3: "Unde non dicimur cognoscere ea per abstractionem, sed per impressionem ipsorum in intelligentias nostras."

[40] Species are said to be abstracted from known objects, but perhaps one should interpret this "intentionally," such that *what is known* by means of the species (i.e., the quiddity itself) is abstracted from and simpler than the object itself. But even the reception of a species by a sense organ is a kind of abstraction, inasmuch as the matter of the form is left behind. In any case, the Scholastics sometimes conflate the *quod* of intellectual cognition (the quiddity) with the *quo* (the intelligible species).

[41] Fernand Van Steenberghen, *Le probleme de /'existence de Dieu dans /es ecrits des. Thomas d'Aquin,* Philosophes Medievaux 23 (Louvain-la-Neuve: L'Institut superieur de Philosophie, 1980), 20. Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought,* 386-87 n. 20.

[42] Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 2.9.26.103 (CCL 29:254). Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought,* 387 n. 20. See also Augustine, *De Trinitate* 8.3.4 (CCL 50:272), where Augustine speaks of an impressed notion of the good.

on book 1, distinction 3, of the *Sentences,* and here Bonaventure appeals to the authority of Augustine. Bonaventure concedes that God cannot be known through an abstracted likeness, since such likenesses are more spiritual than the objects from which they are abstracted. But he argues that "the intellect is informed by a certain knowledge [of God] that is a kind of likeness *that is not abstracted but impressed,* being inferior to God because it is in an inferior nature, yet superior to the soul insofar as it makes the soul better." [43] Here Bonaventure cites a text from *De Trinitate* in which Augustine argues that we know God, just as we know material objects, through some likeness in the soul (a position analogous to Avicenna's regarding knowledge of separate substances). [44] It is clear from another passage in Bonaventure's commentary that he has in mind an innate idea of God inscribed on the human intellect. [45] But Thomas says that humans know *angels,* as well as God, through impression, a reference that points rather to Avicenna's influence than to Augustine's.

It is highly unlikely that Thomas is proposing a Platonic doctrine of illumination. He may have in mind a purely spiritual, supernatural knowledge of God that is mediated by infused species. But why go to such lengths to defend the nonspecific position that God is knowable in *some* way? Since the problem posed in the objection is that no species can be abstracted from God because God is entirely simple, it is likely that when Thomas refers to our knowing immaterial things not through abstraction but "through their impression on our understanding," he is referring to *any* knowledge of an object attained by means of a mental species that is less simple than the object. [46] In that case, even quite ordinary, natural, sense-based knowledge of God (if

[43] Bonaventure, I *Sent.,* d. 3, p. 1, a. un., q. 1, obj. 5. Ibid., ad 5: "nihilominus tamen, dum cognoscitur ab intellectu, intellectus informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior Deo, quia in natura inferiori est, superior tamen anima, quia facit ipsam meliorem."

[44] Augustine, *De Trinitate* 9.11.16 (CCL 50:307).

[45] Bonaventure, II *Sent.,* d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, dictum post resp. Bonaventure quotes Augustine here too, but the text is inauthentic. See also *ltinerarium mentis in Deum,* c. 3, n. 4, where Bonaventure states that counsel presupposes "an impressed notion of the supreme good."

[46] I owe this suggestion to an anonymous reviewer.

any such there be) would be attained "through an impression" rather than through abstraction, and *any* species, phantasm, or concept by means of which one understood God or an angel would necessarily be an impression. This is indeed the alternative (and improbable) reading of Avicenna's theory that Thomas proposes in book 4 of the *Scriptum.*[47] If the last interpretation is correct, Thomas must have borrowed the vocabulary and conceptual apparatus of knowledge through "impression" from its Augustinian and Avicennan settings but adapted it to fit his own Aristotelian empiricism (and in so doing, deprived it of most of its explanatory force).

The fifth argument is based on an analogical syllogism whose major premise is from Aristotle: the intellect is to phantasms as vision is to colors. But one cannot see anything without colors. Therefore the intellect cannot know anything without phantasms. But there can be no phantasms of God. For proof of this premise (the minor of a second syllogism), Thomas quotes Isaiah 40:18: "What image will you make of him?"[48] In reply, Thomas begins by saying that Aristotle was talking about such cognition as is connatural to us in this life.[49] It is true that one cannot know God in this way except through phantasms, and phantasms not of God himself but of the effects of God. But this does not preclude a higher, supernatural way of knowing God "through the influence of divine light," for which phantasms are not necessary.[50] Thomas may be referring here to some infused, supernatural knowledge of God that is possible in this life. Or he may be referring to the beatific vision, which is supernatural too but not possible in this life.

IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF MEDIATED VISION

Why should knowledge by impressed species be insufficient for quidditative knowledge of God? And if such cognition were

[47] IV *Sent.,* d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 9.
[48] I *Sent.,* d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 5.
[49] **Ibid.,** ad 5.
[50] Ibid.

possible, what would its content be? What would one see by mediated vision?

The only medium in the beatific vision is the *medium sub quo:* God illumines the intellect, and thus disposes it for union.[51] No created form can adequately represent the divine essence, whether as a *medium a quo* or as a *medium quo.* Thomas uses three kinds of argument to show that one cannot know the divine essence in this life.

First, there is a line of argument pertaining chiefly to specular, externally mediated cognition. Thomas maintains that while God is manifest in creatures as a cause is manifest in its effects, creatures do not reveal the essence of the Creator because they do not "equal the power of their cause" *(non adaequanturvirtuti suae causae).*[52] This idea deserves detailed exposition, but the point is that a form reveals what it is by what it does: the external efficacy of an agent manifests the agent's intrinsic power *(virtus),* which in turn reflects its quiddity.[53] But God does not reveal the divine power in creation to this extent, for as creator, God is an equivocal cause.[54] Therefore causally inferred cognition shows only *that* God is, not *what* God is.

Second, Thomas argues that no species that the mind has abstracted from material things is adequate for quidditative knowledge of any immaterial form, whether uncreated or created. For however mentally separated from its material conditions a material form may be, it is still a material form.[55] In the *De Veritate,* Thomas mentions that the essence of angels, unlike that of God, can be known "through certain intelligible species that differ from their essence," although not through species abstracted

[51] *STh* I, q. 12, a. 2, resp., ad finem; I, q. 12, a. 5.

[52] *De Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2. In *De Trin.,* q. 6, a. 3, Thomas applies this argument to our knowledge of separate substances (angels), since their sensible effects too do not equal the power of the cause.

[53] *De Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2.

[54] That is, a cause that produces a likeness inferior to itself, such that the resemblance involvesno common nature. The standard example of an equivocal cause in Scholasticism is the sun as the source of sublunary generation, light, heat, etc. Thomas points out in *STh* I, q. 13, a. 5, ad 1 that God should really be called an analogical rather than an equivocal cause.

[55] IV *Sent.,* d. 49, q. 2, a. 1. *ScG* III, c. 41.

from phantasms.[56] Clearly, Thomas has in mind here the Avicennan model of vision by impression, but he may be referring to how angels understand other angels, and not to how human beings might understand angels.

Third, Thomas argues that no representative likeness in the intellect, whatever its source, can ever be sufficient (as a *medium quo)* for quidditative knowledge of God. This line of argument, which is the most comprehensive in scope and renders the other two strictly redundant, depends on the principle that the representation or species by which one knows an object must be a good likeness of it.

Thomas assumes that the species and the external essence that it represents are comparable forms, and that one can know the latter only if the former exactly resembles it.[57] He notes that one could not see white by means of a sensible species of yellow. But he argues also that the two things, while formally the same, need not (and usually do not) have the same mode of being.[58] The form by which one sees the redness of a red apple has a quite different mode of being in the eye from that which the external sensible form has in the apple. Hence the alteration *(immutatio)* that a corporeal form engenders when it replicates itself in matter (as when fire makes something hot) is quite different from the alteration whereby the form communicates itself to the senses. Thomas characterizes alteration that produces sensation, whether such alteration occurs in the intervening medium or in the sense organ itself, as intentional or spiritual; and he characterizes the alteration by which material forms replicate themselves in matter as material or natural.[59] A sensible form may affect the sense organ materially as well, but that is accidental to sensory

[56] *De Verit.,* q. 10, a. 11.

[57] This line of argument becomes obscure and perhaps circular if, with some modern Thomistic scholars, one construes the resemblance between interior species and external form in a purely intentional manner, reducing the resemblance to a correspondence of the sort that we expect in DNA or in computer information. (Nothing in the redhead's genes need actually be *like* redness.)

[58] IV *Sent.,* d. 49, q. 2, a. 1.

[59] IV *Sent.,* d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, qcla. 3; ibid., ad 2. *STh* I, q. 78, a. 3; 1-11, q. 22, a. 3; II *De anima,* c. 14 (Leonine edition, vol. 45.1).

cognition and may even obstruct it (as when a bright light dazzles the eye).[60]

Thomas uses several arguments to show that no mental likeness, from whatever source, is adequate for quidditative knowledge of God. The gist of all of them is that a mental likeness is a created form, and that no created form is sufficiently like God. In his commentary on book 4 of the *Sentences,* Thomas distinguishes between the *modus essendi* and *ratio speciei* of the representative species. A species in the knower need not (and usually does not) have the same mode of being as the external form has, but it must have the same *ratio speciei.* Since any created thing is like God neither in species nor in genus but only by analogy,[61] no species in a created intellect can serve as the means by which one knows the divine essence.[62] Thomas uses essentially the same argument in his gloss on 1 Corinthians 13: 12 and in the *Compendium Theologiae.*[63] In his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate,* Thomas observes simply that "any likeness impressed on the human intellect would not suffice to make God's essence known, since that infinitely exceeds every created form. For this reason, God is not accessible to the intellect through any created form, as Augustine says."[64] Thomas has in mind a familiar *auctoritas,* apparently not authentic, in which

[60] *STh* 1-11, q. 22, a. 2, ad 3. See also IV *Sent.,* d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 6, ad 2.

[61] On species, genus, and analogy as progressively remote modes of unity, see Aristotle, *Metaph.* 5.1016b31-1017a3. See also *De partibus animalium* 645b27-28 and 645b3-8. Aristotle's *analogia* is a relational resemblance, such that A is to B as C is to D, and not analogy in the peculiarly Scholastic sense (a *modus loquendi* between equivocity and univocity).

[62] IV *Sent.,* d. 49, q. 2, a. 1. Here Thomas outlines a scale of defectiveness: (1) things in the same species with different intensities, such as two white things with different degrees of whiteness; (2) things in the same genus but in different species; and (3) things in different genera that are analogically akin, such as a likeness of a man and a likeness of his whiteness insofar as both are beings.

[63] *In I Cor.,* c. 13, lect. 4. *Comp. Theo/.* I, c. 105.

[64] *De Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2: "Similitudo etiam quecumque impressa ab ipso in intellectum humanum non sufficeret ad hoc quod faceret eius essentiam cognosci, cum in infinitum excedat quamlibet formam creatam, ratione cuius intellectui per formas creatas peruius non potest esse Deus, ut Augustinus elicit."

Augustine says that God "escapes every form of our understanding. "[65]

In the *Summa Theologiae,* Thomas presents three arguments to prove that one cannot know the divine essence through any mental likenesso[66] The first is an argument from authority. Dionysius says that one cannot know superior things "through likenesses of the inferior order of things" *(per similitudines inferioris ordinis rerum)o*[67] For example, Thomas explains, "the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known through the species of a body!' The *auctoritas* is ambiguous, for one can construe the genitive in two ways (as in "pictures of Picasso"). Notwithstanding Thomas's example (which is reminiscent of his critique of Avempace),[68] he takes the dictum to refer not only to likenesses resembling and representing inferior things, but to any likeness that in itself belongs to the inferior ordero Thus he proceeds with the following argument *a fortiori:* "How much less, therefore, can the essence of God be seen through any created species whatsoevero"

The other two arguments likewise eliminate any mental likeness as an adequate meanso Since God's essence is the same as his being, no created form can match or represent his essenceo Furthermore, the divine essence is boundless, containing in itself "super-eminently" and at once every perfection that a created intellect is able to signify or to understand separately, such as wisdom, power, and being. No created species can represent such an essence because every created form is limited and determinateo Thomas uses similar arguments when commenting on John 1:18.[69]

[65] Cf. ibid., obj. 2: "Set sicut <licit Augustinus, Deus omnem formam nostri intellectus subterfugit." Thomas replies (ad 2) that Augustine is speaking of knowing what God is *(quid est),* not of knowing whether God is *(an sit).* Thomas ascribes the same *auctoritas* to Augustine elsewhere: III *Sent.,* d. 24, a. 2, qdao 1, resp.; *De Verit.,* q. 2, a. 1, obj. 10; and *De Pot.,* q. 7, a. 5, obj. 13.

[66] *STh* I, q. 12, a. 2. Thomas uses similar arguments in *ScG* III, c. 49 to show that angels cannot know the divine essence through knowing their own essence. When he turns to how human beings know the divine essence in c. 51, he merely refers to the earlier discussion of angelic cognition.

[67] Cf. Dionysius *De divinis nominibus* 1 (PG 3:588).

[68] IV *Sent.,* d. 49, q. 2, a. 1. *ScG* III, c. 41.

[69] *In loan.,* c. 1, lect. 11.

The point of these arguments is to show that one can know the divine essence only by an unmediated vision, in which God unites God's self to the intellect as an intelligible form. But suppose, even *per impossibile,* that one could see God in some way by mediated vision, in the manner envisaged in the Avicennan theory: that one could see God through impressed, "purely intelligible" species. Thomas posits species in a knower as the *medium quo* by which an external object is *directly* known, and the direct object of such vision is something that is known quidditatively: in sensory cognition, it is an external accidental form. Impressed species are insufficient for a vision of the divine essence. But what *would* one see? The object would not be the divine essence, but neither would it be a created form (although the intelligible species by which one saw it would be a created form).

Thomas has an answer to this question. Someone who saw God through impressed species would see not the essence of God but some lesser, attenuated vision of God's brilliance: "Hence even some who maintain that one can see the divine essence only in this way [i.e., by an impressed likeness] have said that it is not the essence itself that will be seen [in the beatific vision], but a certain brightness *[fulgor],* which is like its radiance."[70] Thomas gives no clue as to the identity of those against whom he is arguing. Commenting on 1 Corinthians, he describes what would be seen as a "refulgence of [God's] brightness."[71] In the seventh *Quodlibet,* Thomas points out that the received species of a stone allows us to see the stone quidditatively and directly only because it represents the stone completely. Thus if one could see God through an impressed species, one would not see the divine essence directly because the mental representation would be incomplete. Rather, one would see a shadow *(umbra)* of God, for the species would be received according to the mode of the

[70] *N Sent.* d. 49, q. 2, a. l: "Unde etiam quidam ponentes divinam essentiam solum per hunc modum videri, dixerunt, quod ipsa essentia non videbitur, sed quidam fulgor, quasi radius ipsius."

[71] *In I Car.,* c. 13, lect. 4: "per quamdam refulgentiam claritatis suae."

recipient.[72] Just as color, as attenuated light *(lux obumbrata),* represents light in the eye, so the impressed species would represent God in the mind.[73] I take it that the refulgence or shadow would have no existence prior to or independent of its being seen. Itwould be nothing more than a limited way of seeing God's self.

Thomas's account of the mediated vision of God is similar to Gregory the Great's account of contemplation, with which Thomas was familiar.[74] Working within a framework of ideas taken from Augustine, Gregory expounds a notion of contemplation as an interior mental ascent to the Godhead. Such contemplation is possible only for someone who has suppressed the data of the senses and returned within the mind.[75] Gregory uses metaphors of light to characterize what is seen, although he casts his account of contemplation in theologically negative and morally heroic terms. He interprets Jacob's wrestling with an angel as an allegory of contemplation.[76] Purified by tears of compunction, the mind reaches up to the heights of contemplation, but it is dragged down again and falls back into its mundane condition, providentially learning a vital lesson in humility. Like Jacob, contemplatives must limp through their mundane life.

Yet even at the height of its ascent, according to Gregory, what the mind contemplates is not God "in his brightness" or "what he himself is," but rather something "under" that brightness or "under" God.[77] Commenting on Ezekiel 2:1-"a vision of the likeness of the glory of the Lord"-Gregory points out that what is seen is not God's glory itself but rather a *likeness* of that glory.[78]

[72] *Quodl.* 7, q. 1, a. 1.

[73] Ibid. On the theory that color is *lux obumbrata* (attenuated light), see III *Sent.,* d. 14, a. 1, qcla. 3.

[74] Cf. *De Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2; *In loan.,* c. 1, lect. 11; *STh* II-II, q. 180, a. 5, ·obj.2.

[75] For a summary of Gregory's theory, see Cuthbert Butler, *Western Mysticism* (2d ed.; London: Constable, 1927), 91-133.

[76] Gregory, *In Hiezech. II, Homilia* 2.12-13 (CCL 142:232-34).

n Ibid. 2.14 (CCL 142:235; see also 142:234).

[78] Gregory, *In Hiezech. I, Hom.* 8.30 (CCL 142:120).

Although "holy men raise themselves up in lofty contemplation," they "cannot see God as he is." [79]

V. KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BEFORE THE FALL

his commentary on the book 2 of the *Sentences,* and again in his *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate,* Thomas attributes to Adam before the FaH a way of knowing God that fits the definition of spiritual cognition outlined above. The aim in such discussions is to show that Adam's way of knowing God was in some sense a middle way between our present, fallen manner of knowing and the beatific vision. [80]

In the *Scriptum,* responding to the question whether Adam in Paradise saw the divine essence, Thomas argues that one may see something in three ways: (1) through its own essence, as the eye sees light; (2) through some effect that it engenders in the mind of the seer, as when the eye sees a stone through the stone's likeness in itself; or (3) through some external object of vision, as one sees someone else's face a mirror. [81]

God sees own self in the first way. The light of glory supernaturally raises both angels and human beings to this way of seeing God in the beatific vision.

The angels are naturaUy able to see God in the second way (i.e., through an likeness), for the light of their own intellect is a likeness of the uncreated light. "By knowing the light of their own nature, which is a likeness of the uncreated light, they see God."

After the Fall, human beings know God in the third way. Here one knows God through some effect outside the intellect, whether the effect is natural or spiritual. Thus the philosophers achieve some knowledge of God by natural cognition, through understanding created things. And through faith, one believes in things that have been revealed to others "through the influence of

[79] Gregory, *Moralia* 31.51.101(CCL143B:1619).

[80] II *Sent.,* d. 23, q. 2, a. 1. *De Verit.,* q. 18, a. 1, ad 1. Cf. Bonaventure, I *Sent.,* d. 3, p. 1, a. un., q. 3.

[31] II *Sent.,* d. 23, q. 2, a. 1.

spiritual light." In both cases, Thomas adds, one sees God as if through a mirror, as Paul says.

Yet before the Fall, Adam was so elevated by grace that, like the angels, he knew God in the second way, that is, through "some effect flowing into the intellect of the seer" rather than "through some effect outside the mind of the seer, in which a divine likeness is produced." Such knowledge of God is natural for the angels but supernatural among human beings. Here Thomas uses an argument *a fortiori:* even after the Fall, some contemplatives who are worthy of "divine revelations" know God in this way; how much more so did Adam in the state of original justice.[82]

Thomas presents a similar account of Adam's prelapsarian knowledge of God in the disputed questions *De Veritate*, again in an article on whether before sin Adam knew the essence of God. Peter Lombard says that before sin Adam saw God "without a medium" *(sine medio).* But according to Thomas, that does not imply that Adam saw the divine essence, for (as we have seen) there are different kinds of cognitive medium.[83] After sin, human beings need a *medium a quo* to know God: they can know God only through creatures, by indirect, specular cognition, as St. Paul explains in Romans 1:20. But human beings did not need a medium of this sort before the first sin, although they did need something analogous to sensible species in vision, that is, a *medium quo.* It is only as a result of sin that one needs an intermediate object *(medium a quo)* to know God:

> Man did not need this medium [i.e., a *medium a quo]* in the state of innocence, but he did require the medium that is like a species [i.e., a *medium quo]* of what is seen. This is because he saw God through some spiritual light divinely infused into the human mind, which was a kind of expressed likeness of the uncreated light.[84]

[82] Ibid.

[83] *De Verit.,* q. 18, a. 1, ad 1.

[84] Ibid.: "Hoc autem medio non indigebat homo in statu innocentiae; indigebat autem medio quod est quasi species rei visae quia per aliquod spirituale lumen menti hominis influxum divinitus, quod erat quasi similitudo expressa lucis increatae, Deum videbat."

What Thomas characterizes as light in this passage is not, as usual, a *medium sub quo* (the mind's power to make things intelligible) but a *medium quo,* which functions as a mental species. While fallen human beings need all three media, Thomas argues, Adam needed only a *medium sub quo* and a *medium quo* to know God before he sinned, while the blessed need only a *medium sub quo.*[85]

Although Thomas says here that before sin human beings did not *need* specular cognition to know God, he believes that they knew God in this way as well. Thus in the following article, he asks whether Adam in the condition of innocence also knew God through creatures. He answers yes. Adam knew God "through an internal inspiration from the irradiation of divine wisdom," and thus through a "spiritual likeness impressed on his mind" rather than "from visible creatures." But Adam also knew God through the senses and phantasms. Hence his knowledge of God was twofold, being like that of the angels in one way (for they know God through an "internal inspiration"), and like our own, fallen knowledge in another way. Because Adam already knew from within what he found without, specular cognition then was not the same as it is now. In us, specular cognition is like the inquiry of someone who discovers the truth, by proceeding from the known to the unknown. In Adam, it was like the process of remembering, whereby someone who already knows the truth habitually (as a science) proceeds from things actually known to things that have been known.[86]

VI. PRELAPSARIAN COGNITION AND PHANTASMS

In spiritual cognition of God, one would know God by means of an intelligible form that God himself has impressed directly on one's intellect, and the function of that form would be the same in relation to the knower and to the known as that of intelligible or sensible species in one's direct cognition of created forms and

[85] Ibid.

[86] *De Verit.,* q. 18, a. 2.

substances. Prelapsarian contemplation of God, as described in the *Scriptum* and the *De Veritate,* is dearly spiritual cognition as defined above. Thomas himself compares the infused influence by which Adam would have known God to sensible species in sight.

Yet in the Boethian commentary, having hypothetically considered cognition through impressed species, Thomas argues that in this life one cannot know God "through purely intelligible forms that have some resemblance to him, because of the connaturality of our intellect toward phantasms." Therefore, he concludes, "God is known only through the form of his effects" (i.e., through inference from external, corporeal creatures). [87]

In speaking of knowing God through "purely intelligible forms," Thomas may be referring to intellectual cognition that occurs without recourse to phantasms, or he may be distinguishing immaterial forms from material forms considered in abstraction from their material conditions. Elsewhere he argues against the theory (which he attributes to Avempace) that one can arrive at knowledge of immaterial quiddities (and thus of separate substances) merely by taking abstraction of material quiddities to its ultimate extent (i.e., to the point at which a quiddity is no longer a quiddity *of* something). [88]

If one assumes that in referring to the life of wayfarers *(status huius viae)* in this passage from the Boethian commentary Thomas includes the state of "original justice," [89] there is some inconsistency between what he says here and what he says about prelapsarian cognition. Yet one can resolve most of the dissonance if one assumes that even in prelapsarian cognition of God, according to Thomas, the intellect depends on phantasms, at least as mental symbols if not as sources of information. Three pieces of circumstantial evidence support this interpretation.

First, in the *De Veritate,* discussing whether Adam knew the essence of angels before he sinned, Thomas argues that, even then, the human intellect could know only by "inspecting"

[87] *De Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2.

[88] See IV *Sent.,* d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 (critique of Avempace).

[89] Cf. *De Verit.,* q. 18, a. 5, where Thomas argues that even before the Fall, Adam's mode of cognition was essentially that of one *in via.*

phantasms.[90] He concedes that the intellect might be made supernaturally capable of receiving knowledge in another way, as the body can be modified by a miracle. But even before sin, he argues, Adam's condition was that of someone *in via.* In this life, grace may make one capable of knowing some intelligible object (such as the Trinity} that one could not know by reason alone, but one's *manner* of knowing remains essentially the same. Adam's proper manner of knowing, like ours, was to know through phantasms, and such cognition would not have sufficed for quidditative knowledge of angels. If Adam knew the essence of angels, therefore, he must have done so in a rapture. Thomas mentions in the same article that Adam enjoyed infused knowledge of God.[91]

Second, Thomas argues in the *Summa Theologiae* that even the most sublime, purely "intellectual" forms of prophecy involve the use the phantasms, because it is "connatural to man according to the state of the present life" that he cannot understand without them.[92] To analyze the means and modes of prophecy, Thomas considers two aspects of cognition: the intrinsic powers of the human intellect, characterized here as intellectual light; and the basic data with which the intellect works, namely, phantasms.[93] God may supernaturally supplement human knowledge by enhancing either the intellectual light or the phantasms that the light illumines; and God may supernaturally enhance phantasms either by presenting real external objects that are outside the normal course of nature or by introducing nonveridical phantasms directly into the imagination. Thomas regards that mode of prophecy in which there is only a new light of understanding, applied to the common data of the senses, as the most excellent and sublime, for he construes it (notwithstanding its dependence on phantasms) as purely "intellectual."[94]

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid., ad 10.

[92] *STh* 11-11,q. 174, a. 2, ad 4: "connaturale est homini secundum statum praesentis vitae, ut non intelligat sine phantasmate."

[93] *STh* I, q. 12, a. 13; 11-11,q. 173, a. 2.

[94] *STh* 11-11,q. 174, a. 2.

In an unusual passage, Thomas mentions that God may cause prophetic revelation "by impressing intelligible species on the mind itself, as is evident regarding those who receive knowledge or wisdom, such as Solomon and the Apostles."[95] But we must presume that even in that case, according to Thomas, supernatural understanding depends upon phantasms.

The third piece of evidence pertains to contemplation, to which Thomas himself compares prelapsarian cognition. Commenting on John 1:18 ("No one has ever seen God"), he seems to imply that contemplative cognition is purely spiritual. He explains that there are four ways in which one may be said to see God in this life. First, God may reveal himself in a special way through some created, external object, as when Abraham saw the three men (Gen 18:4). Second, one may see God through an imaginary representation (a nonveridical phantasm), as in prophetic visions. Third, one may see God through an intelligible species abstracted from sense data, as when someone gains an insight into the magnitude of God through considering the magnitude of creatures (Wis 13:5; Rom 1:20). Fourth, God may be seen "through some spiritual light infused into spiritual minds in contemplation." Such was the vision, Thomas explains, whereby Jacob saw God "face to face" (Gen 32:30), and which according to Gregory occurs to those engaged in "lofty contemplation."[96]

Yet in the *Summa Theologiae,* responding to a text from the *Moralia* in which Gregory speaks of contemplatives withdrawing within themselves and leaving behind the "shadows of corporeal things," Thomas argues that even such contemplation depends on phantasms. According to Thomas, Gregory does not mean that contemplation is entirely free from the shadows of corporeal things, but that it should not remain in them (i.e., it should treat them as unnoticed mirrors). While knowing them, it should reach

[95] Ibid.

[96] *In loan.,* c. 1, lect. 11. This commentary (an unedited *reportatio)* probably dates from the second Parisian regency. On "lofty contemplation" *(alta contemplatio),* cf. Gregory, *Moralia* 31.51.101 (CCL 143B:1619).

beyond them toward intelligible truth.[97] Thomas is not really the sensualist that he has become in popular theological imagination. The less one is aware of sensible things and images, in his view, the better. But he maintains that all knowledge in this life depends in some way on phantasms, and that phantasms properly represent sensible creatures, and represent God only very deficiently, as mental symbols that are more unlike than like God.

It seems that, in Thomas's view, the "connaturality" of one's cognitive dependence on phantasms rules out the possibility of any *purely* spiritual cognition in this life, grace notwithstanding. In natural knowledge, that dependence is congruent with a mode of cognition based on sensory information. Although the intellect, by means of intelligible species, knows quiddities in abstraction from their material conditions, what it sees are material forms, and it cannot actually think of them except as instantiated in phantasms (much as a geometer cannot reason without diagrams).[98] In spiritual cognition, on the contrary, the mind is informed by an interior, spiritual influence, and the object of such cognition is not a material form but God. But even then, the mind needs phantasms, at least to think about what it knows. In short, Adam achieved spiritual cognition, according to Thomas, but not *purely* spiritual cognition.

VII. PRELAPSARIAN COGNITION AND INFERENCE

Thomas distinguishes categorically between the indirect, inferential knowledge of a cause through its effects, and the direct knowledge of something by means of a mental likeness. That is why, in two early works, he introduces the notion of knowledge through impressed species as well as arguing that one cannot reach quidditative knowledge of God by inference from created effects. In the *Summa Theologiae,* he argues that the intelligible species is a *quo* and not a *quad* of understanding: a means, not an object. Needless to say, one can know the species, in his view, or

[97] *SI'h* 11-11, q. 180, a. 5, obj. 2 and ad 2.
[98] *STh* I, q. 84, a. 7.

he would not be discussing it. But Thomas argues that one knows about the species only through a secondary, reflexive act of cognition. [99] If one knows an object, X, by means of an intelligible species, Y, one's knowledge of X is prior to one's knowledge of Y, and the latter is not necessary for the former. The opposite is the case in objectively mediated knowledge: one knows the medium first, and thereby knows the ultimate object. Even in cases of simple specular cognition (where one knows the image and its object at once) or of cognition through unnoticed mirrors, the priorities are essentially the same. Here there is no direct knowledge of the object in relation to which knowledge of the medium would be secondary and reflexive.

Prelapsarian cognition, on Thomas's analysis, was vision-like inasmuch as the mediating likeness of God was spiritual, not corporeal, and above all inasmuch as it was inside, not outside, the seer's intellect. But does that likeness function as a *medium quo,* as if it were a mental species, *in every respect?* There is some evidence that Thomas considers such cognition to involve a special kind of inference, in which self-knowledge precedes knowledge of the source. And if he is being consistent, that should distinguish the interior medium in prelapsarian cognition from the intelligible species in one's direct cognition of external things.

First, Thomas says that the prelapsarian cognition that Adam enjoyed by grace belongs naturally to the angels, and he sometimes construes the angels' natural knowledge of God as based on self-knowledge. Second, his account of prelapsarian cognition in the *Summa Theologiae* is subtly different from that in earlier works and seems to presuppose that Adam's distinctive manner of knowing God was introspective but specular.

According to Thomas's analysis, the angel knows God through the natural illumination of its own intellect, and Thomas construes this innate form as a *medium quo.* Thus he explains in the *Summa contra Gentiles* that the angel knows God through itself insofar as a likeness of the cause in the effect is itself a form by which <*forma qua)* the effect knows the cause. Likewise, a box or

[99] *STh* l, q. 85, a. 2.

chest, if it were intelligent, might know through its own form the art by which it was made, for its form resembles the art.[100] Thomas does not regard such mediation as mirror-like. In the same passage, by contrast, he argues that one angel knows God through another angel simply by seeing both the effect itself and the cause in the effect with a single act of cognition, *as one sees someone else in a mirror,* rather than by reasoning from effect to cause, as happens when one uses *a posteriori* demonstration.

Yet even in his earliest treatment of prelapsarian cognition, Thomas says that the angels see God introspectively "by knowing the light of their own nature, which is a likeness of the uncreated light."[101] And in the *Summa contra Gentiles,* discussing whether one could know the divine essence by knowing angels, Thomas explains that the angel knows God by knowing itself, although in the same passage he construes the interior likeness as a *medium quo* of vision:

> The separate intellectual substance, by knowing its own essence, knows·also that which is above itself.... This must be so especially when that which is above itself is its cause, since a likeness of a cause must be found in its effects. Hence, since God is the cause of all created intellectual substances ... it is necessary that separate intellectual substances, by knowing their own essence, also know God himself by way of a certain vision. For that thing whose likeness exists in the intellect is known to the intellect by way of vision, just as a likeness of something seen corporeally is in the sense of the one who sees.[102]

It makes no difference to Thomas, it seems, whether one construes the angel's innate illumination as a *medium quo* of vision or as an intermediate object of knowledge (as if it were an interior *medium in quo).*

[100] *ScG* Ill, c. 49.

[101] II *Sent.,* d. 23, q. 2, a. 1.

[102] *ScG* III, c. 41: "Dictum est enim in secundo libro quod intellectualis substantia separata, cognoscendo essentiam suam, cognoscit et quod est supra se.... Quod praecipue necesse est si illud quod est supra ipsam, sit causa eius: cum oporteat in effectibus similitudinem invenire causae. Unde, cum Deus sit causa omnium substantiarum intellectualium creatarum . . . necesse estquod intellectuales substantiae separatae, cognoscendo suam essentiam, cognoscant per modum visionis cuiusdam ipsum Deum: res enim ilia per intellectum visionis modo cognoscitur, cuius similitudo in intellectu existit, sicut et similitudo rei corporaliter visae est in sensu videntis."

In the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae,* Thomas seems to construe Adam's prelapsarian cognition as specular and inferential, albeit introspective. He seems no longer to distinguish, as he did in earlier works, between Adam's knowing God *in* a created form, as in a mirror, and Adam's knowing God *by* a form, as by a *medium quo.* Thomas's guiding thought is still that prelapsarian knowledge of God was akin to that of the angels, but he now construes it as based on contemplation of certain "intelligible effects":

> Hence the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and firm contemplation of intelligible effects, which he perceived by an irradiation of first truth, whether by natural or by graced cognition. Hence Augustine says in Book XI of the *De Genesiad litteram* that "perhaps God used formerly to speak to the first human beings as he speaks to the angels, by illumining their minds with unchangeable truth, albeit not by so great a participation in the divine essence as that of which angels are capable." [103]

The contrast made in the first sentence between exterior things and intelligible effects implies that the latter were within Adam's mind. The "irradiation of first truth" seems to be the *medium sub quo* under which Thomas understood these interior effects. It is interesting that Thomas now allows that Adam may have enjoyed such insight even naturally.

In the same article, again responding to Peter Lombard's assertion that Adam knew God *sine medio,* Thomas argues that Adam did not need to reach knowledge of God by reasoned inference from effects, as one would use a middle term in a syllogism to reach an unknown conclusion. Rather, Adam saw God at once *in* God's effects, and especially in the "intelligible effects," *as one might see a man's image in a mirror.* [104] If these intelligible effects were within Adam's mind, Thomas is now construing even prelapsarian cognition as essentially mirror-like.

[103] *STh* I, q. 94, a. l: "Unde homo primus non impediebatur per res exteriores a dara et firma contemplatione intelligibilium effectuum, quos ex irradiatione primae veritatis percipiebat sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita. Unde dicit Augustinus in XI Super Genesim ad litt. [c. 33], quod 'fortassis Deus primis hominibus antea loquebatur, sicut cum angelis loquitur, ipsa incommutabili veritate illustrans mentes eorum; … etsi non tanta participatione divinae essentiae, quantam capiunt angeli'."

[104] *STh* I, q. 94, a. 1, ad 3.

These differences from his earlier treatments of prelapsarian cognition may reflect some development in his thought (for he composed the *Prima Pars* in Rome, 1265-68). But Thomas does not seem to recognize any distinction between (a) the mind's knowing God via reflection on spiritual influences within itself (a knowledge perhaps mediated by phantasms) and (b) the mind's knowing God in a vision-like manner, such that the interior spiritual influence functions as a *medium quo.*

VIII. CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that Thomas attributed spiritual cognition to Adam before the Fall (and presumably to Eve too, but she usually gets left out of these discussions). In such cognition, as in the higher levels of contemplation, God represents God's self to the mind rather by means of an infused, spiritual influence than by means of external objects or phantasms; and the function of the interior influence is the same as (or at least closely analogous to) that of cognitive species in one's natural knowledge of created, material forms.

Thus far, prelapsarian or contemplative cognition seems to be the same as the mediated vision of God that Thomas posits hypothetically (citing Avicenna) in the *Scriptum* and the *Super Boetium De Trinitate.* But further scrutiny suggests two possible differences.

First, it seems that in Thomas's view prelapsarian cognition (unlike the hypothetical mediated vision) was inferential, such that Adam's cognition of the infused, interior influence was prior to his knowledge of its source. On this view, the function of the infused influence in prelapsarian cognition is like but not exactly the same as that of a *medium quo* in sensory vision or in the intellection of simple quiddities. But this difference is tenuous, for one might argue that the distinction between formal and objective mediation is less clear than I have assumed here.[105]

[105] Cf. Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 200-219: Pasnau argues that Thomas's position on cognitive species presupposes an "act-object doctrine," such that the species is in some sense an object of the mind.

Second, there is some fairly strong (if not quite conclusive) evidence that Thomas assumed that prelapsarian cognition, unlike the hypothetical mediated vision, was dependent on phantasms. Thus one may reasonably conclude that Thomas construed prelapsarian cognition as spiritual but not as *purely* spiritual.

Both of these conclusions would raise further questions. Why did Thomas construe the infused spiritual influence in prelapsarian cognition, like the sensible species in sight, as a *medium quo?* What was the point of the equation? In what sense, according to Thomas, was prelapsarian or contemplative cognition a *vision* of God? Did he believe that Adam, like the hypothetical subject of the mediated vision of God, had witnessed God's radiance or shadow? Did he believe that contemplatives enjoyed vision of this sort? That is not improbable, for in his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate,* Thomas quotes Pope Gregory's gloss on Genesis 32:30 ("I have seen the Lord face to face") when describing the most sublime, grace-assisted heights of the *via negativa:* "The vision of the soul, when it reaches out toward God, is beaten back by the dazzling brilliance of his immensity." [106]

APPENDIX: RAPTURE

Rapture, according to Thomas, is an extraordinary, premortem vision of the divine essence attained while the subject is in a trance. The term "rapture" comes from 2 Corinthians 12:2-4, where St. Paul recounts how he was "caught up" *(raptus)* into the third heaven. Thomas believes that Moses as well as Paul experienced rapture. [107] He concedes that Adam may have seen the divine essence in a rapture too, during his "deep sleep" *(sopor),* [108]

[106] *De Trin.,* q. 1, a. 2: "... in Glosa Gregorii 'Visus anime cum in Deum intenditur, immensitatis coruscatione reuerberatur'." Cf. Glossa ordinaria, Gen. 32:30 (Strassburg edition [1480-81, repr. Tumhout, 1992], vol. 1, p. 83); and Gregory, *Moralia* 24.6.12 (CCL 143B:1196).

[107] *De Verit.,* q. 18, a. 1, ad 13; *STh* I, q. 12, a. 11, ad 2.

[108] *STh* I, q. 94, a. 1. See also *De Verit.,* q. 18, a. 1, ad 13 and 14. The suggestion that Adam's deep sleep was a rapture springs from the patristic theory that his sleep must have been a prophetic trance, because of St. Paul's interpretation of Gen 2:23-24 as a reference to

although he says that one cannot be certain about this: perhaps Adam was elevated only so far as to grasp the divine mysteries at a more profound level.[109]

Any person in a higher state of contemplation may be loosely described as rapt, and St. Paul's rapture, Thomas says, can be construed as the "supreme degree of contemplation in the present life."[110] But even contemplation is normally mediated by phantasms, at least of imaginary objects.[111]

Rapture is not an exception to the rule that one cannot know God's essence in this life, according to Thomas, for the rapt person is temporarily absent.[112] He or she is insensible, with vital signs reduced to a minimum.[113] More precisely, the rapt person is still "potentially" in this life, inasmuch as the soul is still united to the body as its form, but he or she is not "actually" in this life, inasmuch as the mind is no longer using the body's senses or even the imagination.[114]

An anonymous fourteenth-century novella tells how a Beguine experienced rapture as she sat in a corner of a church. So caught up was she that the people carried her away and wanted to bury her. Her confessor insisted that she was alive, but they could find no signs of life in her. When she returned to normal, she said, "Oh, poor me, I am here again."[115] It may have been the prevalence at a popular level of such stories and experiences that led Thomas to discuss rapture at length in the *Summa Theologiae*.[116]

Christ and the Church (Eph 5:32): see Philip L. Reynolds, *Marriage in the Western Church* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 284-87.

[109] *De Verit.*, q. 18, a. 1, ad 14.

[110] *STh* II-II, q. 180, a. 5.

[111] Ibid., ad 2.

[112] *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 11.

[113] *STh* II-II, q. 175, a. 4.

[114] *STh* II-II, q. 180, a. 5.

[115] *Sister Catherine Treatise*, trans. Elvira Borgstiidt, in Bernard McGinn, *Meister &khart, Teacher and Preacher* (New York: Paulist Press, 1986), 358-59.

[116] *STh* II-II, q. 175.

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SACERDOTAL CHARACTER AT THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL

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THE TEACHING OF **THE** Second Vatican Council on the sacramentality of the episcopate, together with its insistence that all three *munera* of teaching, sanctifying, and ruling are imparted by episcopal ordination, seems to lead naturally to the idea that the character imparted by the sacrament is the locus of the *munera* of teaching and ruling in the same way as it has always been thought to be the seat of the power of sanctifying. Moreover, certain conciliar passages seem practically to suggest this. So, *Lumen gentium* 21b, just after stating that all three *munera* are conferred by consecration, adds the following:

> it is very clear that by the imposition of hands and the words of consecration the grace of the Holy Spirit is conferred in such a way and a sacred character is imprinted in such a way that, in an outstanding and visible way, bishops discharge the functions of Christ himself as Teacher, Pastor and Priest, and act in his person [perspicuum est manuum impositione et verbis consecrationis gratiam Spiritus Sancti ita conferri et sacrum characterem ita imprimi, ut Episcopi eminenti ac adspectabili modo, ipsius Christi Magistri, Pastoris et Pontificis partes sustineant et in Eius persona agant].

Presbyterorum ordinis 2c also says:

> the priesthood of presbyters is conferred by that special sacrament in which presbyters, by the anointing of the Holy Spirit, are signed with a special character and thus configured to Christ the Priest, in such a way that they can act in the person of Christ the Head [Sacerdotium Presbyterorum … peculiari … illo Sacramento confertur, quo Presbyteri, unctione Spiritus Sancti, speciali

charactere signantur et sic Christo Sacerdoti configurantur, ita ut in persona Christi Capitis agere valeant].

Acting the person of Christ the Head, moreover, is a matter of instructing, sanctifying, and ruling the Church his body-all three-as is dear from the first part of *Presbyterorum ordinis le.*

It is not surprising, therefore, to certain scholars, among them the most asserting that the character is, or is the locus of, all three *munera,* and without making any distinctions. Thus Jean Galot comments on the passage from *Presbyterorum ordinis:* "The character provides the foundation for the empowerment to speak in the name of Christ, to proclaim the Word of God, and to expound with authority the gospel message.... Note that the power conferred by the character is not just cultic and sacramentaL" If the character has the past been understood to be limited in that way, that is a mistake that we need not repeat, according to Galot.[1] For Ghislain Lafont, the council "expands the meaning of the [character]: it cannot be reduced to an instrumental power over the Eucharist." The character makes the bishop pastor, and "confirms and consecrates a Christian's charism of presiding over a particular Church." It "habituates" him generaHy and across the board "to act responsibly the name with the authority of Christ ... in the acts of his ministry."[2] And Sara Buder has this to say apropos of *Lumen gentium* 21:

> According to the Council ... the sacrament itself confers a new share in Christ's threefold office of priest, prophet (or teacher), and pastor. The character imposed by episcopal ordination is explicitly linked to the sacramental role of bishops, who "take the part of Christ himself, teacher, shepherd and priest, and act as his representatives" or *"in eius persona."*[3]

[1] Jean Galot, S.J., *Theology of the Priesthood* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1984), 208-9.

[2] Ghislain Lafont, *Imagining the Catholic Church,* trans. John Burkhard (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 2000), 159. However, Lafont continues, we need not think of a power that is "'physically' permanent," but only of a permanent "configuration to Christ the Pastor" (ibid., 160).

[3] Sara Butler, "Official Teaching on the Ministerial Priesthood," unpublished paper of October 12, 1995, p. 8; but for the same idea see her "Priestly Identity: 'Sacrament' of Christ the Head," *Worship* 70 (1996): 303.

The first statement is unassailable; it is the second I wish to contest. For thinkers such as Butler and Galot, presumably, just as the character has been understood (especially by Thomists) to be or at least to include the stable and inamissable power of sanctifying, so also it is or at least includes similarly indelible powers of teaching and ruling.

Lumen gentium21b conduces to this view, however, only if it is read in such a way that the character alone enables the bishop to act in the person of Christ the teacher, pastor, and priest. But this is certainly contrary to the literal sense of the text, which mentions grace in addition to the character. Both grace and the character enable the bishop to function in the said way. The English translation in the Flannery edition indeed reads: "the grace of the Holy Spirit is given, and a sacred character is impressed in such wise that bishops ... take the place of Christ himself, teacher, shepherd and priest." Here, grace and the character are separated by a comma, and no comma separates the character from episcopal action in the person of Christ. This suggests that all three *munera* are founded in the character. But the Latin text joins grace and the character in one breath, and separates off acting in the person of Christ from both with a comma, more easily supporting the reading that both grace and the character conspire to produce that effect.[4] Moreover, the English omits the first *ita,* the one that says "grace is conferred *in such a way,"* and keeps only the second, "a character is imprinted *in such wise."* But the double use of the Latin *ita* makes it perfectly plain that the result clause *(ut Episcopi ... sustineant et ...agant)* is a function of both grace and the character.

Neither the commentary of G. Philips on *Lumen gentium* as a whole nor that of J. Lecuyer on paragraph 21 supports viewing the character as the locus of the *munera;* they do not announce any such thing as an intended development concerning the nature of the character in the theology of orders.[5] On the contrary, Lecuyer notes that the council leaves to theologians the task of

[4] Nor does the "ontological participation" in the *munera* of the *Nota praevia explicativa,* 2, further the problematic reading, since grace is as much a reality as is the character.

[5] G. Philips, *L'Eglise et son mystere au deuxieme concile du Vatican: Histoire, text et commentaire de la constitution "Lumen Gentium"* (Paris: Desclee, 1967), 1:246-76.

grace character conferred the relation between [6] Lecuyer he served on of the doctrinal commission charged assembling *De ecclesia.*[7]

2c seems more favorable to the view of The character itself is presented as a function of of Holy and without break, it is the character alone is to be imprinted that "thus" they are configured to Christ "in such a way" that they are able to act the person of Christ head. Configuration to Christ has long been -associated with the theology the character.[8] The last clause seems to draw from the of configuration the ability to represent Christ. This text, then, looks as if it makes the character itself the factor in virtue of which the priest acts the person of Christ the teacher, pastor, the priesto

The trouble such a view can be briefly stated. it is certainly part of the received tradition of the Church that sacramental acts of consecrated bishops are themselves valid, so have the effect intended, it is by no means part of the of Church that magisterial and acts are never other than successfoL That is, bishops can heresy; also, bishops can so govern as to tear and not up the Churcho The teaching functions of bishops priests can misfire in a way their sanctifying function cannot.[9]

article, I examme whether the council in fact view character is a power teaching same way it has been thought to the power of sanctifying, that is, *potestas* the council fathers intend to teach that character imparted by episcopal ordination is

[6] J. Lecuyer, "L'Episcopato come Sacramento," in *La Chiesa del Vaticano II,* ed. Guilherme Barauna (Florence: Valiecchi Editore, 1965), 729-30. Further, it is in virtue *of* both grace and character that the bishop is said to discharge the three *munera* in the place of Christ.

Komonchak in *History ofVatican II,* ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph A. Komonchak, vol. 1(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1995), 286.

[8] From Philip the Chancellor, followed in this by Albert, Bonaventure, and Thomas.

[9] Saving that teaching function of the Holy Father or of the college as a whole when they teach definitively.

substantially the same as the powers or *munera* of teaching and ruling? The *Acta Synodalia* will answer this question directly and in fairly short order. The answer is no, and this is perfectly clear from the *relationes* accompanying the final versions of the documents. It will be necessary, however, to canvass all the speeches and observations of the fathers to see whether and to what extent and with what approval they entertained the view of Galot and Butler. The meager results of this canvass show the council was hardly aware of the possibility of reading things as do Galot and Butler. But the speeches and observations of the fathers also contain some resources for thinking about the *munera* in their difference and distinction. In a concluding section, I will suggest a more comprehensive view of the matter on the basis of these resources.

I. THE *ACTA SYNODAL/A* FOR *LUMEN GENTIUM* 21. [10]

A survey of the *Acta* reveals that there is nothing to support reading *Lumen gentium* 21 as conducing to the problematic view. Neither Philips nor Lecuyer alerts us to any development concerning the idea of the sacramental character of bishops because there is nothing to alert us to.

We can begin with the *relatio* of Cardinal Konig (21 September 1964) presenting the next-to-final version of *Lumen gentium* 18-21. This version of *LG* 21, Konig explains, rearranges the paragraphs so as to start with the priesthood of Christ. [11] The text prefers to speak of the episcopacy as the fullness rather than as the highest grade of orders, so as to indicate a whole in which priests participate. More nearly touching our concern, it states positively and unambiguously that consecration confers all three episcopal *munera*. [12] Very nearly touching our concern, it states the

[10] For much of what follows, one can consult Francisco Gil Hellfn, *Lumen Gentium: Constitutio Dogmatica de Ecclesia Concilii Vaticani II Synopsis in ordinem redigens schemata cum relationibus necnon patrum orationes atque animadversiones* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1995).

[11] *Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti ConciliiVaticaniII* (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1970-), vol. 3, pars 2, 202.

[12] Ibid., 203.

sacramentaHty of the episcopate more positively than the previous text: instead of saying that a bishop cannot be returned to the state of a laymen or simple priest, it speaks of his acting in the person of Christ Since it was on the basis of the character that it was said that a bishop could not become again a simple priest or layman, is it on the same basis that a bishop acts in the person of Christ discharging all three *munera?* This would be a reasonable inference. It sets up the view of Galot and Buder. It is also, as we shaH see, what one prominent father thinks the text implies. Directly touching our question, however, Konig explains that in affirming that consecration imparts a character, "the words were chosen in such a way as to abstract from disputed questions: namdy, whether it be a new character or only a broadening of presbyteral character, and so on." [13] Evidently, there is no innovation or development intended with respect to the understanding of the character of orders. Konig notes that the text intends also to avoid the *question--0bscura quaestio-of* presbyteral ordinations (Le., ordinations to the priesthood and diaconate by priests), and says merely that, through the sacrament of orders, only bishops assume new members into the episcopal body. [14]

In the *relatio* with which the final text was presented (17 November 1964), the Doctrinal Commission declares that consecration imparts not just an aptitude or disposition for the *munera* ruling and teaching, but the *munera* themselves. [15] For the commission's understanding of *"munus,"* we can appeal to the *Nota praevia explicativa* 2, which says that "the word *munus* is used, not power *[potestas],* because that could be understood as a power *ad actum expedita."* However, to the request that the text say that the powers of ruling and teaching derive from the power of sanctifying, the commission thinks it good that the text do no more than state the fact of the conferral of the powers, "and not enter into the question of their connection with one another." [16] To the request to add text stating explicitly that the

H Ibid., 204.

[14] Ibid. For the question of presbyteral ordinations, see, for example, DS 1145, 1435.

[15] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 3, pars 8, 62 (modus 39).

[16] Ibid., 61 (modus 38).

council intends to settle no disputed questions as to the origin of jurisdiction and the power of teaching or any question concerning character, it is answered, not that the council is here settling such questions, but that the theological qualification of the text has already been sufficiently declared. [17] Finally, to the request that the character imparted by orders be described as dispositive, once again the commission responds that it thinks it good not to enter into disputed questions. [18]

These two *relationes* make it impossible to see *Lumen gentium* 21 as positively teaching and intending to teach that the character consists of the three powers together. On the other hand, there was evidently some sentiment for expressing things differently, or more fully relative to the character. In turning to the speeches and written comments of the fathers, I canvass widely for remarks on or relative to episcopal character.

A) Speeches and Comments, First Session, on the First Schema "De ecclesia"

The schema *De ecclesia* was distributed to the council fathers on 23 November 1962. [19] The composition of chapter 3, on the sacramentality of the episcopate, had been left to Joseph Lecuyer. Number 11 of this chapter states (1) that episcopal consecration confers the power of sanctifying, (2) that the powers of teaching and governing, instituted by Christ, are closely united *(arcto vinculo coniungeretur)* with the power of sanctifying, (3) that consecration confers grace, and so (4) the episcopacy is the highest grade of the sacrament of orders. Further, (5) a consecrated bishop also receives a sacramental character, such that (6) he can never become a simple priest or a layman again (7), nor

[17] Ibid., 63 (modus 45), which refers to ibid., 56 (modus 10), where the Doctrinal Commission's declaration of 6 March 1964 is repeated to the effect that no definition should be understood to be made except where such is openly declared as being made.

[18] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 3, pars 8, 63-64 (modus 49).

[19] For the history of this schema, see J. Komonchak, in Alberigo and Komonchak, eds., *History of Vatican II,* 1:285-300, 311-13.

lose the power of validly confirming of validly ordaining ministers. [20]

The fourth chapter of the schema, on residential bishops, was entrusted to H. Schauf. It tackled the difficult question of jurisdiction at number 14, and took the Hne that jurisdiction is not conferred by ordination, but results, directly or indirectly, from papal mission. [21] This did not survive the consideration of the Central Preparatory Commission, however, and the text was altered to read that ordination confers together with the *munus* of sanctifying the *munera* of teaching and ruHng as welL The *exercise* of jurisdiction, nevertheless, is said to be received not from ordination but from the pope. [22]

Discussion of the schema lasted seven days and began on 1 December 1962. [23] There was considerable focus on the origin of jurisdiction, no discussion of character. The written observations are more interesting for our topic. There are many observations to the effect that consecration imparts three *munera,* due care taken often enough to distinguish this from particular jurisdiction or its exercise. Bishop says that "the power to teach exists ontologically in every consecrated bishop. "[24] There is also considerable concern that episcopal power be said to be radicaHy coHegial, so that the *munera* are exercfaed in virtue of consecration *and* location in college. In this, the focus is on the simple affirmation that consecration imparts a responsibility for the whole Church, exercised by the college of bishops as such. A few observations contain some more thoughtful view of the *munera.*

[20] *Acta et documenta Concilio oecumenico Vaticano II apparando; Series secunda (praeparatoria)* (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1969), vol. 2, pars 3, 1038 (hereafter ADP). Or *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 1, pars 4, 23.

[21] ADP, vol. 2, pars 3, 1040. See Alberigo and Komonchak, eds., *History of Vatican II,* 1:294.

[22] Cardinals Frings, Richaud, Konig, Dopfoer, and Bea, and Patriarch Saigh all spoke in some way for some such change; ADP vol. 2, pars 3, 1048, 1051-53, 1054, 1056, 1058, 1062-65.

[23] See Giuseppe Ruggieri in *History of Vatican II,* ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph A. Komonchak, vol. 2 (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1997), 328-40.

[24] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 1, pars 4, 437. The focus is rather on consecration as giving responsibility for the whole Church.

Cardinal Richaud wants to say that the basic or radical power of a bishop, including titular bishops, for ruling the whole Church in association with the other members of the college comes from consecration, not from a share in papal jurisdiction, although consecration does not of course of itself give particular jurisdiction for a diocese. Richaud makes episcopal jurisdiction for the whole Church depend on the principle of St. Thomas that distinction of orders depends on relation to the Eucharist: "the power of jurisdiction in regard to the Mystical Body belongs to bishops from its connection with the fuller and more complete power which they enjoy for the Eucharistic .Body, the permanence of which bishops alone can guarantee through the ordination of priests." [25] In this way a principle that previously had been used to deny the sacramentality of episcopal orders-since bishops and priests were said to be the same in that they had equal power to consecrate the Eucharist-is made to ground their distinction. [26] Here, the capacities to teach and rule might be said to flow from the power of sanctifying, and all three *munera* would be rooted in the character.

There are two interventions on the nature of teaching that nicely balance each other. First, Bishop Bergonzini holds that as when a minister sanctifies, Christ sanctifies, so when a bishop teaches, Christ teaches (recalling Augustine: "It is Christ who preaches Christ"). [27] This puts the exercises of the *munera,* and perhaps the *munera* themselves, all on the same footing. If the power to sanctify is identified with the character, then so also might be the power to teach. On the other hand, Bishop Darmander criticizes the schema where it says (chapter 7, *De ecclesiaemagisterio):* "whoever hears this magisterium hears, not men, but Christ himself teaching." He agrees that "he who hears you hears me" but not that "he who hears you does not hear you"" For men who preach the gospel are free, and have minds already much informed. "A human instrument must mix something of himself with the teaching of Christ, since in all instrumental

[25] Ibid., 409.

[26] See *STh* suppl., q. 37, a. 2; and suppl., q. 40, a. 5. See Joseph Lecuyer, "Les etapes de l'enseignement thomiste sur l'episcopat," *Revue thomiste 57* (1957): 33, 51.

[27] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 1, pars 4, 423.

operations, the nature and quality of the instrument cannot be changed without the effect being changed. The same writer using two different typewriters will produce two different pages; and the more living and conscious the instrument, the more he will impress his own character on the work."[28] And this, in turn, argues for a difference in the standing of the two *munera.*

The 300 pages of the second series of written observations submitted between the first and second periods rarely touch on the relation of the *munera* either to one another or to character.[29] I report three observations of more interest.

Archbishop Joseph Lefebvre quotes Lecuyer to the effect that by ordination bishops enjoy the power of ruling, and are strengthened with the grace and charisms for their pastoral mission.[30] This is important since it puts more in play than simply "power" and "grace."

Bishop Elchinger wants to say that episcopal consecration inserts a man into the college of bishops; as well, he wants an affirmation of character. Indeed, a man is modified by the sacrament in his being, in his position relative to God and men. He becomes the voice of God and the hand of God, and Elchinger speaks of these two things seemingly as both functions of the character.[31] This is reminiscent of Bergonzini.

Father Prou, Superior General of the French Benedictine Congregation, takes a Trinitarian line: the *missio* of Christ confers authority, jurisdiction, on those sent; the *missio* of the Holy Spirit confers the instrumental power of orders and as well the gifts *(dotes)* for assistance in teaching in order that the *missio* from Christ be fulfilled. As the mission of the Son is the mission of the Son breathing the Spirit, and as the Spirit is not from the Father alone, so the mission from the Son cannot be fruitfully fulfilled without the *virtus* of the Spirit, nor can the *virtus* of the Spirit be legitimately exercised except by an inheritor of the mission of

[28] Ibid., 452.

[29] The Polish Episcopate criticizes the text for not indicating the exact connection between ordination and the powers to rule and teach *(Acta Synodalia,* vol. 2, pars 1, 599).

[30] Ibid., 469.

[31] Ibid., 505.

Christ.[32] Accordingly, one is constituted a member of the college by consecration and *missio* together: consecration gives instrumental power to sanctify and the assistance of the Holy Spirit for teaching; the canonical mission is a continuation of the mission of the Son, and is a *potestas auctoritativa* (St. Albert).[33] Again, there is an awareness that there is more in question than sanctifying grace and character understood as inamissable power. Also, there is a distinction between a power or capacity to do something and the proximate authority to do it.

B) The New Draft Schema: The Text of G. *Philips*

As has been many times told, the mass of the criticism the first schema *De ecclesia* encountered in the opening session of the council urged its abandonment. In place of that text (the production of Ottaviani, S. Tromp, and R. Gagnebet), the Doctrinal Commission's subcommission on the Church adopted a text prepared by G. Philips.[34]

The Philips text is a step backward in that it repeats the first schema's number 11, saying only that the powers of teaching and ruling are aptly united with the power of orders. The statement of the first schema at number 14, that consecration gives these powers, is dropped. The new schema also drops the idea that a bishop can never lose the power to confirm and ordain, and so elides the question of the distinction of bishop and priest at this point. On the other hand, it keeps the idea that the bishop cannot be reduced to the state of a simple priest or laymen, and this as a function of the character. The chief focus of the council's considerations of the episcopate, however, was collegiality. This topic the Philip's text brings forward as it makes the college of bishops, the successor of the college of apostles, the subject of supreme teaching and governing power in the Church. From this strategic move, all else will follow.

[32] Ibid., 555.

[33] Ibid., 557-58.

[34] For the genesis and adoption of the Philips text, see Jan Grootaers, Alberigo and Komonchak, eds., *History of Vatican II,* 2:400ff.

1. First Comments on the Philips Text

The Philips text was sent to the fathers on 22 April and 19 July 1963. Extensive written observations were submitted during the intersession between the second and third periods of the council. Again, there are calls for a statement of the sacramental origin of the threefold *munera.* Practically equivalently, there are assertions that consecration inserts a man into the college of bishops. Bishop Carli wants a declaration that consecration imparts a proper character to the bishop. He does not say but probably understands that it is the *potestas ordinis* in virtue of which a bishop cannot lose the power to confirm or ordain, since he wants that phrase restored.[35] Bishop Elchinger observes that all three *munera* are exercised in the celebration of the Eucharist.[36] Prior General Healy, O. Carm., notes that while *potestas ordinis* inheres perpetually, the assistance of the Holy Spirit that confers indefectibility is capable of more or less and is not inhering.[37] Elchinger's view conduces to identifying the character with the three powers; Healy's does not, since the assistance of the Holy Spirit enabling teaching at the highest level is not a stable power. Evidently, however, these are not necessary implications.

2. Speeches and Written Observation on the Philips Text

Bishop Cirarda Lachiondo's speech indicates there was no common mind of the fathers on our topic. He wants to say nothing about the character except that it exists, since there is no agreement on its nature or distinction from presbyteral character.[38] As to the substance of the issue, Bishop Hoffner, speaking for many German-speaking bishops, distinguishes the

[35] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 2, pars 1, 635. Carli was a member of the theological commission of the Italian Bishops' Conference and member of the Conciliar Commission on Bishops (Andrea Riccaud, in Alberigo and Komonchak, eds., *History of Vatican II,* 2:17, 23). He resolutely opposed the understanding of collegiality finally adopted (Gerald P. Fogarty, in Alberigo and Komonchak, eds., *History o(Vatican II,* 2:105).

[36] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 2, pars 1, 661.

[37] Ibid., 670.

[38] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 2, pars 2, 458; in the same vein, Bishop Enciso Viana, ibid., 593

three *munera* and two *potestates:* the former are offices or ministries in which power is to be concretized. [39]

Material from the written observations can be put into four batches. First, there is more expression of the view that consecration gives all three *munera* and locates a man in the *collegium.* Second, there is the question of the distinction of bishop and priest.

Third, a considerable number of observations distinguish and relate the *munera.* In line with Hoffner, for whom *potestas sanctificandi* is given with consecration while the other two functions are given only as *munera* not yet proximate to act, Archbishop Calabria takes the text correctly to mean that ordination indeed gives three *munera,* and the graces to discharge them, but only one power, *potestas ordinis.*[40] This sort of remark indicates an apprehension that the *munera* do not all have the same footing, but it is concerned more with preserving order in the Church than with anything else. Some think of the *munus* of teaching in such a way that the sacrament can be seen to give more than can be described in the ordinary categories of power and grace. Bishop Lamont distinguishes the *virtus sacramentalis* given by consecration, the same for all bishops, and the charism of divine assistance for, for example, teaching infallibly. [41] Again, Bishop Cantero Cuadrado and three others say that bishops have the capacity so to teach "from the constant power anc! help of the Holy Spirit who was promised and given by the Lord." [42] Bishop Topel for his part orders the *munera* and holds that the *munera* of teaching and ruling are praeambula to the *munus sanctificandi.* [43] Similarly, Archbishop Olaechae Loizaga thinks the ministry of word and rule is founded in the sacrificial ministry of making the Eucharist, and not in a simple canonical mission. [44] This could be developed in such a way as to locate all three

[39] Ibid., 522.
[40] Ibid., 689-90.
[41] Ibid., 794.
[42] Ibid., 694.
[43] Ibid., 890.
[44] Ibid., 833.

powers in the character. For his part, Bishop Graziano thinks the text already ascribes all episcopal power to character, and wrongly, to the detriment of the monarchical nature of church. [45] Last, Bishop d'Almeida Trindade importantly distinguishes the function of sanctifying from the other two in relation to Christ, who is not present in the same way in the three functions: as priest, the bishop is an instrument of Christ; but he is not an instrument of Christ in teaching and ruling, strictly speaking. Rather, he teaches and rules in his own name or in the name of the Church. [46]

Fourth, there is the observation of Bishop Paul Yoshigoro Taguchi, which deserves a place by itself for the interest it has and the speculative satisfaction it gives.[47] Commenting on number 19 (the bishop as teacher), he notes that the *munus docendi*, the episcopal capacity to teach, is a gift of the intellectual order, like the light of faith or the light of glory. It is not a mere right to teach-which belongs to the *potestas regiminis-but* an internal power, leading to infallibility, an *augmentum intellectuale*, bespeaking the assistance of the Holy Spirit. The capacity to teach is a gift for declaring the *magnalia Dei* with power to convert men, or, as he has it, it is an illumination for writing, or the power of a two-edged sword for debate and rendering testimony before tribunals, or spiritual unction for writing in the saints and doctors of the Church. Again, it is the assistance of the Spirit for infallible definition, a gift in the way of prophecy. And the *munus regendi-a* ius-includes but is not exhausted by the other two. This is part of the solution: the *munera* of teaching and ruling are rights, although not merely rights. The distinction between a *right* to teach and rule (given at least fundamentally to whoever has the episcopal power to sanctify and given by the act that gives the power to sanctify), from a *capacity* to teach and rule is to be remembered.

[45] Ibid., 762: "episcopal power is ascribed almost exclusively to the sacramental character."

[46] Ibid., 714.

[47] Ibid., 897-98.

C) Closing on the Final Text

An emended text was distributed to the fathers in the third session of the council, on 15 September 1964. In this version, chapter 2 is devoted to the People of God and chapter 3 to the hierarchy. This is the next-to-last draft before the final version of *Lumen gentium.* It is where we started our review of the *Acta.*

The teaching on the episcopacy as a sacrament, as we have seen, now comprises the following assertions. (1) Episcopal consecration transmits the same spiritual gift as the apostles gave to their helpers by the imposition of hands. (2) This consecration is the fullness of the sacrament of orders (and no longer the "highest grade"). (3) With the *munus* of sanctifying, consecration confers the *munera* of teaching and ruling, which "of their nature" cannot be exercised except in communion with the episcopal college and its head. This is a return to the original schema *De ecclesia,* number 14. (4) Imposition of hands and the words of consecration so impart grace and so impart a sacred character that bishops take the part of Christ the Teacher, Shepherd, and Priest, and act in his name. This evocation of the bishop as acting in the person of Christ according to all three *munera* is new. (5) Wherefore, only bishops can assume new members into the episcopal body through the sacrament of orders. The Philips text had dropped the statement that, from the character, bishops have an inamissable power to confirm and ordain; the new text drops as well the statement that, because of the character, a bishop cannot be reduced to a simple priest or laymen again.[48]

The accompanying *relatio* for number 21 anticipates what Cardinal Konig will say on 21 September. It adverts to the desire to conceive presbyters as participating in the powers of the bishop, hence the change from "highest grade" to "fullness" of orders. It explains that it wishes to avoid the question of whether priests can ordain priests-hence the simple assertion that bishops can be made only by bishops. It explains also that the inability of a bishop to become a layman again is dropped and that the dignity

[48] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 3, pars 1, 214-15.

of the bishop is expressed more positively. This more positive expression is the statement that bishops act in the person of Christ. "Bishops are said to act in the person of Christ, and not only as Priest, but also as Teacher and Pastor: for the whole *munus* of bishops ought to find expression."[49]

It is here, it will be recalled, that the text opens up to the reading of Butler and Galot. Since it was on the basis of the character that it was said a bishop could not become again a simple priest or a layman, it seems reasonable to infer that it is on the same basis that a bishop acts in the person of Christ in all three *munera.* In fact, as we observed at the very beginning of this essay, the text does not exactly say that, and as to the nature of the character itself, the *relatio* says only that "the words prescind from the disputed questions which some of the fathers touched on."[50]

Written observations on this emended text, as touching our question, were brief. There is continued minority resistance to the sacrament as conferring all three *munera,* sometimes on the ground that the positions remain disputed questions. On the other hand, Bishop Groblicki wants the text to go further than it does, and state that priests and deacons do not have the power to ordain; because of the power to ordain, the *munus dirigendi pascendique gregis* belongs to bishops connaturally, as it does not to priests.[51] There is here the idea of consecration conferring some sort of basic right to rule and teach.

Relative to conferral of the *munera* of teaching and ruling, Cardinal Browne says that "if the word *munera* is taken for the gifts of grace *(dona gratiae)* by which the one consecrated is rendered apt to exercise the office of teaching and ruling, the text, as is evident, can be admitted." If it is taken to mean that consecration confers the very *potestas* of teaching and ruling *ex auctoritate,* however, it is not to be admitted.[52] Here, we might say, ordination gives a capacity in the form of gifts and graces, but

[49] *Relatio,* in ibid., 241.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid., 581-82.
[52] Ibid., 630.

it does not give power *ad actum expedita,* as the *Nota praevia explicativa* will have it.

Cardinal J. Lefebvre speaks for many when he distinguishes the *munus regendi* and jurisdiction, the first a sacred power given by God with consecration, the second a *temperatio* of the power, received by law; the question of the origin of jurisdiction remains open. [53]

Bishop Carli's remarks bear more explicitly on our question. He stands with those for whom the distinction between the substance and exercise of jurisdiction, its immediate derivation from God, and episcopal character as a new impression are all disputed questions. [54] Nor for him does the liturgy settle the issue of jurisdiction. [55] Especially important for us, he wants to drop the statement that bishops act *in persona Christi magistri et pastoris,* for, he explains, the character configures the bishop to Christ the priest, and not necessarily to Christ as teacher and shepherd. [56] Notice, then, that he understands the text to affirm the interpretation of Butler and Galot.

D) Conclusions

Four conclusions can be drawn from a survey of this conciliar material. First, although the question of the identity of the *munera* with the character is quite beyond the intention of the text of *Lumen gentium,* it seems to be suggested if not strictly entailed by some views of some fathers. Second, Ekhinger and perhaps Richaud seem dose to conceiving this very idea of the identity of the *munera* with the character, and seem to favor it. Third, it is only Carli and Graziano of whom we can say with certainty that they dearly and expressly entertain the idea of the identity, only to disapprove of it. Fourth, there are some fathers who are concerned, variously, to trace the differences among the *munera,* or to conceive of an effect of the sacrament in addition

[53] Ibid., 631; he appeals to Lecuyer on St. Thomas for same view (ibid., 635).
[54] Ibid., 655.
[55] Ibid., 660.
[56] Ibid., 661-62.

to grace and power, or to make a distinction between a power and a right.

II. *THEACTA SYNODAL/A FORPRESBYTERORUM ORDINIS* 2C.[57]

We noted that the relevant text from *Presbyterorum ordinis* seemed to support the problematic view that, in the same way that the character is the power of sanctifying it is also the power of teaching and ruling. Once again, we can begin with the last *relationes* and then review the constitution of the text from the beginning.

The final text was distributed on 2 December 1965. The accompanying *relatio* reports a change from saying presbyters are given a character *(speciali charactere donantur)* to saying they are marked with a character *(speciali charactere signantur).* But to the suggestion that the *sic* of *sic Christo Sacerdoti configurantur* should be suppressed, lest one conclude that it is in virtue only of the character alone and by itself that the priest is configured to Christ the priest, the commission observed that although the text indeed says by what reason the priest is configured to Christ, namely, the character, "it is by no means suggested that the character is the only thing by which priests are configured to Christ."[58] Nor therefore can it be concluded that it is in virtue only of the character that the priest acts in the person of Christ for the triplex *munera.*

Substantially, this answers the question about what the council intends to teach with these lines, but as with *Lumen gentium,* so here we will canvas the background of this text to see what thought was given to this matter by the fathers.

[57] See for much of what follows Francisco Gil Hellfn, *Presbyterorum Ordinis: Decretum de Presbyterorum Ministerio et Vita Concilii Vaticani II Synopsis in ordinem redigens schemata cum relationibus necnon patrum orationes atque animadversiones* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1996).

[58] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars 7, 121 (response to modus 24).

A) De clericis, Schema propositionum de sacerdotibus, De vita et ministerio sacerdotali

Jean Frisque very justly remarks that "the history of the Decree is as long as that of the council itself."[59] He includes here the *De clericis,* distributed 21 April 1963, the *Schema propositionum de sacerdotibus* (May 1964), and the *Schema propositionum de vita et ministerio sacerdotali* (October 1964).[60] In fact, the prehistory of the text of *Presbyterorum ordinis* that concerns us begins with paragraph 2 of the schema of 20 November 1965. There are only a few things of note to report before that from a discussion that rarely bears on the character as an important theme.

De clericis 2 speaks of the priest as made an instrument of Christ by the sacrament of orders and the character it imparts; by this consecration, moreover, priests represent the priesthood of Christ and act in his name. For his part, Archbishop Menager called for precision on the notion of an instrument: the priest is an instrument of Christ in the strict sense only in things like consecrating the elements at Mass; he is not an instrument, but only a minister, in nonsacramental acts, for "he acts from himself (e.g. in speaking and preaching) even if he is expounding the teaching of Christ and preaching in the name of Christ and the Church."[61] This kind of observation is important in thinking about the difference of the *munera.*

Second, a very high theology of priesthood finds expression at this moment of the council. So, Bishop Theas laments the loss in *De vita a ministerio* of a statement that the priest acts *in persona Christi.* The priest's whole ministry is so to be characterized, and therefore the priest is rightly styled an *alter Christus.*[62] Again,

[59] Jean Frisque, "Le decret "Presbyterorurn Ordinis": Histoire et commentaire," in *Les Pretres: Decrets "Presbyterorum Ordinis" et "Optatam totius,"* ed. Jean Frisque et Yves Congar (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1968), 133.

[60] For comment on this material, see R. Wasselnyk, *Les Pr€tres: Elaboration du decret de Vatican II. Histoire et genese des textes conciliares. Commentaire* (Paris: Desclee, 1968).

[61] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 3, pars 4, 907.

[62] Ibid., 247. Cardinal De Barros C:lmara agrees (ibid., 403).

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mission of Christ. [67]

[63] Ibid., 476.

[64] Ibid., 471-72. See Wasselynck, *Les Pretres,* 43-45.

[65] Ibid., 547.

[66] Ibid., 611. See also Bishop Philippe (ibid., 624) and Bishop Parker *(Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars 4, 945).

[67] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 3, pars 4, 577. The canonical mission determines the mode and scope of the mission received in consecration (ibid., 578). And see the Bishops of Oceania (ibid., 663).

Last, for Archbishop Shehan, the foundation of the priest's call to holiness is not only that by the sacrament and the character he is made an instrument of Christ and can act in his person, but also that by the sacrament and character he is configured to Christ and given a special role in his priesthood, his mediatorship. [68] By sacrament and the character-but what if one just says "character," and makes that the basis of acting in the person of Christ for all three *munera?* Again, for Bishop Philippe, it is by force of the character that the priest is *alter Christus:* "since it is by force of the character of orders that he is the minister and instrument by which Christ continues his saving work, especially in the Eucharistic sacrifice."[69] "Especially," but not exclusively.

To this point, the character is not connected in any explicit way to the teaching and shepherding functions of the priest. There are, however, suggestions of this connection. First, configuration to Christ is traditionally imputed to character, and Ferrari speaks of configuration to Christ in the threefold office. Second, character is associated with acting in the person of Christ, and "acting in the person of Christ" is expanding its range.

B) To "Presbyterorum ordinis"

The schema *De clericis* and its subsequent transfigurations could not easily support the heavy demands of the fathers. There was a desire to speak of the priest in his relation to the laity, to bishops, to other priests, and to Christ. There was a desire to relate the priest's holiness more closely to his ministry. There was a need to balance the priest as one consecrated with the priest as one sent. A new point of departure in a new draft was ready by 20 November 1964. [70]

[68] Ibid., 639.

[69] Ibid., 624.

[70] Wasselynck, *Les Pretres,* 23, 37-38; the old material was not abandoned but recontextualized.

1. Text of 20 November 1964 (First Draft of *Presbyterorum ordinis)*

Following the *prooemium,* this text addresses the nature of the priesthood in its first paragraph. The point of departure is the mission of the Church, in which aU the faithful exercise a royal priesthood, offering spiritual sacrifices to God through Christ. Everyone has a part in the mission of the Church, but only some are consecrated to represent the priesthood of Christ the Head and act in his person. It is through these priests that the Church offers a visible sacrifice, the sacrifice Christ offered of himself on the cross. These priests share the authority by which Christ instructs, sanctifies, and rules his body, and it is by a special sacrament that they are incorporated into the mission of the bishops, which insertion is a share in the priesthood of Christ. Just as bishops are configured to the person of Christ the Head by force of their consecration, in the same way, although subordinately, priests are consecrated to Christ the Head. [71]

aU this, there is no mention of priestly character at all. The concern is not to up any loose threads of the customary theology of orders and its appreciation of the effects of orders, but firmly to reinsert the entire of theology of orders within an ecclesiological framework hammered out in the production of *Lumen gentium,*

Written comments on this text prior to the next conciliar session were extensive, but not much concerned with the theology of the character. [72] Archbishop Philippe understands that it is character that configures to Christ, which configuration grounds the priest's share the bishop's mission, [73] But does this mission in which the priest shares by his character include teaching and ruling?

For Cardinal Dopfner, this would seem so. He wants the character to be mentioned at number 1 in the following wise:

[71] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars 4, 834-35,

[72] See Wasselynck's analyis in *Les Pretres,* 30-31: concern with the "nature" of the presbyterate finishes dead last, much after such things as celibacy or the priest's relation to the bishop.

[73] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars 4, 948.

"adorned with the sacerdotal character, priests are able to exercise the special power of Christ the Head in his body which is the Church. "[74] This suggests a conception of character that includes more than *potestas ordinis,* power in regard to the Real Body of Christ. Dopfner maintains that the priest represents the priesthood of Christ "especially" in offering Mass, but that he acts in the person of Christ in exercising all three *munera.* His explanation of that proposed text, however, does not declare his mind on this.

Bishop Ekhinger's observations are characteristically noteworthy. He wants the priest to be seen in the context of the mission of Christ, of the Church, of the bishop. He wants the priest's spirituality to be seen as rooted in the discharge of a threefold *munus,* as with St. Thomas, for whom the priest must live in the acts of his ministry. Further, "priestly ordination does not in the first place confer the power to celebrate the Eucharist or to preach the Word of God. By the presbyterate, the bishop sacramentally gathers helpers to himself who, even if they are dispersed in order to accomplish their ministry, must exercise it at the interior of a collective pastorate that is referred to the Episcopal College. "[75] This suggests that the character is to be the locus of all three *munera.*

2. Revised Schema Sent 12 June 1965 (Text of the Debate of October 1965)

The changes can be briefly summarized. The priest is defined no longer first in relation to the baptized-his priesthood in relation to priesthood of the faithful-but in relation to the apostles and the bishops. *Lumen gentium* 28 is repeated, according to which, through the apostles, Christ made their successors, the bishops, share in his own consecration and mission. Bishops in turn pass on their ministry in a subordinate mode to priests. The priest is fashioned after the image of Christ the High Priest to discharge the threefold *munera* and shares in

[74] Ibid., 874.
[75] Ibid., 924.

the authority of Christ the Head to do so. By ordination he is configured in a special way to Christ the Priest, and so, sharing the mission of the bishop, he can act in the person of Christ the Head, Teacher, Priest, Rector. Rather than being incorporated into the mission of the bishop, he is now said to share it; and together share the priesthood of Christ.[76]

This is the text debated in October 1965, and there is still no mention of character at number 2. There will be calls for its insertion into the text, the center of the debate is rather over how fundamentally to think of the priest: should he be seen first of all as one consecrated to God or as one sent?[77] Archbishop Marty called attention to this fact his *relatio* of 16 October 1965. There are, he said, two conceptions of the priest in the requests the fathers, and both find a place in the new schema: first, there is an emphasis on consecration, by the sacrament, and on personal union with Christ, the source of holiness; second, there is a focus on mission, received in the sacrament from Christ, and by which the priest becomes a member of the presbyterium and so becomes a helper of the bishops and acts in the person of Christ.[78]

The forces brought to bear in shaping the final text are very evident the speeches of October. There is much support for a statement of the "ontological"' consecration of the priest, his "ontological" participation the priesthood Christ. This is quite traditionally allied with a caH to mention the character imparted by the sacrament orders. There is also great support for describing the priest as one sent, one sharing the mission of Christ, and so exercising aH three *munera* of sanctifying, teaching, ruling. And then there is a mediating position, which identifies the ontological consecration of the priest with his being given a share in the mission of Christ. At that point, one is near to seeing the character, traditionally understood as the very ground of the ontological consecration, as giving also the *munera,* the powers, to teach and to rule, and not only to sanctify. Some

[76] Ibid., 337; Wasselynck, *Les Pretres,* 47.

[77] Wasselynck, *Les Pretres,* 48.

[78] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars 5, 70-71.

fathers-Dopfner, Henriquez Jimenez-come very dose to saying this very thing, and Weber will in fact say The text will not say it, although that is its drik By a sort of accident of composition, as we shall see, that is the drift-not the intention-of the texto

Cardinal Richaud speaks strongly for the priest as one consecratedo He wants a statement that is less exclusively oriented to the activity (ministry) of the priest, and one that takes in the life of the priest as founded in his consecration, beginning with the priest's donation of himself in love to God. Moreover, "the excellence of the sacramental character is not to be forgotten, because it seals in the intimate heart of presbyters the bond of love between God and the priest and effects a true and special consecration in the soul of the priest, just as in baptism and in confirmation the sacramental character places in the depths of the Christian soul something sacred, under the action of the Holy Spirit."[79] Others speak in the same vein in favor of a greater stress on the ontological condition of the priest, but without always mentioning character.[80] These bishops speak of mission, but it is subordinate to consecration. The priest shares the mission of the bishop because he shares in the priesthood of Christ, and not vice versa, as in text[81]

Following the other line of thought, Bishop de Roo and 133 others take the mission of the Church to the world as the controlling point of departure. Within this mission, the hierarchy is a "sacrament of Christ, Shepherd and Head," and the priest is one "in whom Christ the Shepherd prosecutes his call sacramentaHy!' The priest is therefore leader of the flock "By priestly ordination, God gives the priest the mandate and the specific grace for this task [*munus]* and sends himo"' And de Roo speaks of *varia munera,* both traditional and newly come to light, that are united in the priest's ministry.[82] By force of the sacrament and in all three of the standard *munera,* "priests become a

[79] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars 4, 732.

[8°] For example, Bishop Charue (ibid., 808). And see Bishop Soares de Resende, for whom sacerdotal character is a reality analogous to the incarnation of Christ *(Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars 5, 65).

[81] Cardinal Shehan (ibid., 28). And this is fixed in the next draft.

[82] Ibid., 163-64.

sacrament of Christ, a visible and effective sign of his mission in the Church. "[83]

It is the emphasis on ordination as effecting a share in the apostolic mission that swings us into the comprehensive, mediating position. Cardinal Rugambwa has it that the priest's mission is from ordination. Broadly, he seems to be thinking of the mission in threefold terms. He does not mention character, but speaks the idea: the priest is "'incorporated with Christ in an ineffable and indelible way. "[84]

Bishop Henriquez Jimenez wants the point of departure in number 1 to be in the priest's "ontological configuration to Christ the priest, as wen as in his real participation in Christ's unique and eternal priesthood." Priests are signed by the character of Christ's priesthood and so offer the unbloody sacrifice; and their participation in his priesthood is not a mere "external deputation," but is an ontological consecration, a real configuration to Christ the priest, a true and indelible and permanent power "by which the power the priesthood of Christ is rendered visibly present in the Church and world. "[85] It is only from this point that we should proceed to existential questions. Therefore, the character should be mentioned in number 1: "the teaching about character should be brought to Hght," and "sacerdotal being placed once again in the ontological configuration to Christ the priest, and in a real, though ministerial, participation in His priesthood." Further, this ontological share in the priesthood of Christ is also a share in his mission.[86] It is a true sharing in the ministry and *munera* of bishops, and ordination confers the *munera* of sanctifying, teaching, and ruling in a mode subordinate to that of the bishops (and not to be exercised apart from hierarchical communion). Therefore, number 1 is to be emended: by ordination priests are "in a new way ontologically configured to Christ the Priest. "[87] For this, the bishop does not identify aH

[83] Ibid., 165.
[84] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars 5, 15.
[85] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars 4, 747.
[86] Ibid., 749.
[87] Ibid., 749-750.

the *munera* with character and seems rather to take the character for *potestas ordinis* as ordinarily understood. [88] The implication of saying that the character is an ontological share in the mission of Christ as a whole is not seen.

Last in this development, let us consider Cardinal Dopfner, speaking for another 65 German-speaking bishops. They think it good that the schema takes in the threefold *munera.* [89] Arguing that we should speak of participation not in the mission of the bishop but rather in the mission of Christ, they say: "The reason why the priest can act in the person of Christ consists in his participation (sacramental) in the mission of Christ. "[90] There is a "sacramental" share in Christ's mission; it is threefold, and we are very dose to thinking that character, which had more narrowly been understood as a sacramental share in priesthood of Christ, founds all three *munera.*

The same things can be noted in the written observations. First, there is again expression of the view in which the priest's ontological consecration is fundamental. [91] There are also many expressions in line with seeing the priest as one sent. [92] And there are observations that keep both emphases. Archbishop Mordllo Gonzalez says that presbyters were immediately instituted by the apostles or their successors, and that this priesthood is a configuration to the priesthood of Christ and a participation of the priesthood of Christ; priests are subordinate to bishops, but their *munera* and ministry are given by ordination itself. [93] And according to Bishop Weber: "By the imposition of our hands an inamissable grace is given to them which they call up daily .... This grace consists in the special sacramental character of orders,

[88] Ibid., 747.

[89] Ibid., 464.

[90] Ibid., 468.

[91] For example,, Bishop Cecchi *(Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars 5, 265); Bishop Muldoon (ibid., 415).

[92] See, for example, Bishop Hervas y Benet (ibid., 353). Bishop Plourde (ibid., 443-44), appeals to *STh* I-II, q. 102, a. 4, ad 3: if in the Old Testament the ministries of priest and prophet were divided, they are not divided in Christ; temple and synagogue come together in a church whose sacrifice is spiritual.

[93] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars *5,* 412-13. He does not mention character.

whence there flows a share in the *munera*
Christ himself." This seems to include *munera* with respect to the body of Christ is the Church. It seems to be position of Galot and Buder. [94]

3. Text Distributed 12 November 1965

This is the next-to-final text, approved paragraph paragraph, 12-13 November. In this text, the mission of the priest, the evangelization, is styled, after St. as itself a cultic act and one ends in the celebration of the Eucharist. The glory of God which is the end of priestly ministry consists in the free and conscious acceptance of the of God in Christ. So have been balanced the missionary and cultic-consecratory lines of thought [95] This text is the first to ordination gives the priest a character; however, there is no observation on or explanation this in the *relatioo*[96] As in the case of *gentium,* the concern was not the intricacies of the ontology of the effect of orderso The focus was on the priest's to the mrnsmn the Church, to the their priesthood, and to the bishops, and on holiness, life, and ministry.

The same conclusions can be drawn from this survey material as were drawn for the material surrounding *gentium"* First, although the question of identity the *munera* with the character is quite beyond the the text of *Presbyterorum ordinis,* it is suggested if not strictly entailed by some views of some fathers" Second, Ekhinger, Henriquez Jimenez, and perhaps Philippe seem dose to conceiving this very idea of the identity of the *munera* with the character, and seem to favor it. Weber does conceive it. Third, there are some few fathers are concerned to trace the differences of the *munera* and their exercise"

[94] Ibid., 514.
[95] Frisque, decret," 140-43.
[96] *Acta Synodalia,* vol. 4, pars 6, 347, 390.

III. CONCLUDING SYNTHETIC PROPOSAL

What is to be salvaged from the mountain of conciliar material touching on or at least coming dose to the idea of sacerdotal and episcopal character? Not very much. Still, there are some hints, some few thoughtful distinctions that emerge from the vast ocean of words of the *orationes* and *animadversiones* so faithfully preserved in the *Acta.* If we put them together, we cannot say that we have the teaching of the council; on the point at issue, the council is silent, as the final *relationes* accompanying the texts make plain. But we may be able to outline some more satisfying view of the nature of the effect of episcopal and priestly ordination than Galot and Butler give us.

My proposal undertakes three necessary tasks. First, we need to say something about the differences of the *munera.* Second, we need to think in a more capacious way about the effects of the sacrament, and find some effect of the sacrament in addition to a sort of generally conceived "grace" and an indelible «power!' Third, we need to distinguish the *munera* as rights and as powers.

A) Differences of the "munera"

The differences of the *munera* are to be told off from the differences of their exercises.[97] We need first simply to think about sanctifying, teaching, and ruling as actions. is the *priora quoad nos,* after alL Whatever we say about what enables these things must have its point of departure in the things enabled. For this we have to look at the experience of Christians and to the judgment of the Church as to when and under what circumstances teaching, ruling, and sanctifying are successful and when they are not. Looked at this way, there are very great and important differences between sanctifying, on the one hand, and ruling and teaching, on the other.

Our experience as Catholic Christians, and the judgment of the Church, is that a validly ordained priest's sacramental actions are

[97] In what follows, I try to develop my previous "Episcopal *Munera* and the Character of Episcopal Orders," *The Thomist* 66 (2002): 389-91.

themselves always valid, as long as the priest (or bishop) "intends to do what the Church intends." The priest or bishop may be foolish, badly instructed, or even wicked. But if the priest intends to consecrate the elements at Mass, the elements are consecrated, the action successful. And if the bishop intends to ordain a man, the man is ordained, the action of ordination successful.

Why does the success of the action demand (as a minimum, not as an ideal) so little on the priest's or bishop's part? The answer is that the only indispensable thing the priest or bishop contributes is the constitution of the sign of the sacrament. For this he must have enough of his wits about him to mean the sign. But he need not believe the sign truly signifies what it does, much less that it truly effects what it does. In the first place, the sign is presented to the faith of the recipient, not his faith. In the second place, the priest is not the principal agent of the sacramental action, the sanctifying action. He is a tool to provide a tool, namely, the sign, to the principal agent, namely Christ.

Why then, it will be asked, cannot anyone with enough wit to make the sign be the instrument of the sacramental action? Once again, the answer is that the minister is an instrument. To be such, however, he must be made to be such. That is, the priest or bishop must be rendered apt to be the instruments they are. Not all consecrate or ordain in the Church. If this is not a brute, but an intelligible, fact, then we shall say as well that not all can consecrate or ordain. In the "can" is contained the idea of capacity or power. Nor is the power merely an ecclesially juridically constituted power. For Christian experience and Church judgment recognize that even outside and against the law, validly ordained priests validly consecrate, and validly ordained bishops validly ordain.

Why this is a good and saving arrangement of the economy of sign and rite in which the power of the Lord's cross is extended to touch the believing Christian gathered into the assembly of the Church, we cannot go into here. But this arrangement is the arrangement recognized by the Church as fact.

For all that the essential action of the minister of sacrament is to provide a sign, we must not mistake the sacraments as teachings

merely. They teach and instruct, surely; but first of all they are doings. The sacraments change things. If one says in reply that a teaching can change things, too, we must observe that it does so first by changing the mind: that is, the display of reality a teaching is serves in the first place merely to show something to someone who may choose to exercise his agency on the basis of that display, but who is first of all simply a beholder of the display. Teaching addresses the mind, and if it changes things, it does so through the agency of the one who beholds the display. But sanctifying touches the heart and does so through the display of the sacramental sign apprehended in faith. This sign is in the last place the instrument, not of the minister, but of the one who by his word makes all things, and by this sacramental word changes the Christian heart. To be sure, the sign "works" through its apprehension in faith on the part of the recipient. But there is no subsequent choice on his part to act; apprehending and believing what the sign says, he is rather acted upon.

The action of priestly sanctifying is therefore something inserted into Christ's sanctifying; it is an instrumental piece of the Lord's activity of baptizing or forgiving sins. All that is required is that one is made a suitable instrument, and one must intend to do what the Church does.

If sanctifying is a doing, the Lord's doing using the action of the priest, teaching and ruling are by contrast both displays. Teaching shows us what is. Ruling is a teaching that shows us what is to be done: it is the display of some action as good, and therefore to be embraced by the one ruled. In neither case is the priest an instrument in the way he is in sanctifying.

Let us speak first of teaching. We can say that sanctifying and teaching both are ministerial, but unlike sanctifying, teaching is not itself a piece of the Lord's preaching. We could perhaps rather say that it is a repetition of it. The Lord's preaching, his very own discourse, is of course like the minister's a display and not a doing. It so displays the world that it evokes a doing, an action, on the part of the hearers. But first, it is an articulation of how things are: "the kingdom of God is at hand." Second, it evokes

response- "Repent!" -but it is not itself the response; it is not an action.

Now, because it is a display, it is quotable. When I quote someone, we can say, if we want and as Bergonzoni and Eichinger said at the council, that the one quoted speaks.[98] Certainly, what was first made present in his speech is made present in the speech of another. Although it accomplishes the display of what first was displayed by the original speaker, however, quotation is nonetheless not the very speaking of the original speaker. This is the point of Menager.[99] If speaking were a doing, and changed some piece of the world, we should say that it is imitable rather than quotable. For in a doing, the very particularity of what is acted on prevents it from being transportable in the way speech is. Just because display does not change, but lights up, it is moveable in a way it could not otherwise be. Crossing the Rubicon as Caesar did, in his time and place, could happen but once. Just because it is not a doing, but a displaying, however, saying "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is infinitely reproducible. Its display of what Caesar did but once can be rearticulated again and again. Because things once displayed can be redisplayed across space and time, the message of the Lord can be made present in many places and times. That is sufficient description of the teaching of the Church, the teaching of priest or hierarch. We need not say as well that the Lord is the very one speaking as we must for baptism say that he is the very one baptizing. The baptizing of this one is not repeatable. It is a doing. Telling of this baptism, or of baptism as such, is repeatable. Teaching is display; baptizing or consecrating is a doing.[100]

What the apostle or bishop or priest does subsequently to the teaching of the Lord, therefore, is to repeat the news he first delivered, redisplay his original display of how God's eschaton is now available in time. Better, in Robert Sokolowski's sense, the preaching of apostle or priest is a quotation of the Lord's

[98] See above, notes 27 and 31.

[99] See above, note 61.

[100] See Darmancier above, note 28, who is trying to articulate this distinction.

teaching.[101] This is the difference. In quoting, I display something *as displayed* by a previous speaker. In repeating, I let slip away the display as previously displayed; I say the words and make the articulation, as it were, on my own. Evidently, the preacher is to quote believingly, but it is altogether formal to the discharge of his function that he "quote"-that is, that he not let slip the fact that the news in question is not delivered on his authority, but on another's. Moreover, in ordinary quotation, the one who quotes can in principle check things out for himself. "Mary said the car was out of gas." I can myself verify this, and then I no longer need to take Mary's word for it. But if I take it as true that the kingdom is at hand, on the ground that the Lord said so, I am not in a position to check this out on my own. If I pass on this message, I must not give the impression that I say it on my own authority. I must always quote. I must always display the presence of the kingdom *as* first displayed by Christ.

Now, in this way, there is an important difference between the ways in which sanctifying and preaching or teaching can fail. Sanctifying fails if I do not intend to do what the Church does in the sacrament. The essential thing I contribute is the constitution of a sign-the pouring of the water and the words of baptism, for instance. I can constitute this sign even if I do not believe that baptism cleanses consciences, even if I do not believe there is a God. What I "intend" is not the action of cleansing consciences; if I do not believe baptism does that, there is no such action for me to approve or "intend." Even if I do believe, my priestly intention is not that consciences be cleansed, for the very good reason that I do not think myself the principal agent so cleansing consciences. What I am intending is the liturgical action, the bare *sacramentum tantum,* the sign of the sacrament, which, if I have faith, I am confident the principal agent uses to cleanse consciences. Failing that-failing the making of the sign-moreover, the principal agent has no instrument to use to cleanse consciences sacramentally, and there is no sacramental cleansing.

[101] See his "Quotation," in *Pictures, Quotations, and Distinctions: Fourteen Essays in Phenomenology* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 27-51.

Evidently, for the teaching of the priest and bishop to be successful, it must at least accurately repeat the teaching of the Lord. It has the most audacious because most humble aim-audacious as reporting the words of the Lord of hosts; humble as a mere messenger who presents himself always only as such. Because teaching is a repetition of a display originally not the speaker's own, however, the priest or bishop can get it wrong, even when he intends to get it right. He can forget parts; he can add on parts that were not originally there but that he thinks are restatement or statement of implication. When he does this, he fails in his audacious/humble task of being a messenger. Christian experience and the judgment of the Church are quite certain of the fact that priest and bishop sometimes teach as the gospel what is not the gospel. For all that they are validly ordained, their teaching is not universally and unfailingly successful as is their sanctifying activity. This several of the fathers pointed out.[102] That meansthat, if ordination gives the power to teach, it does not give a power like the power to consecrate or ordain. The power to teach is quite fully "delible."

In fact, preaching and teaching can fail far more easily than sanctifying. A lack of faith will seriously erode successful teaching. Let us recall Gadamer's discussion of teaching in *Truth and Method.* Teaching, or preaching, is an act of interpretation. All interpretation depends on the foreunderstanding with which one approaches the text. The relevant foreunderstanding with which to approach and understand the Scriptures is faith.[103] So, if there is no faith, there is no understanding of the message, and therefore no successful quotation of the message.

Of course, there can be literal quotation in the very words of the Gospels-reading the text-just as there can be literal quotation (and there had better be) of the liturgical texts for the sacraments. But if teaching the text is interpreting the text, then interpreting the text is also applying the text.[104] This usually takes more than only saying once again the very words. So, apart from

[102] Healy, above at note 37; d'Almeida Trindade, at note 46.

[103] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), 295-96.

[104] Ibid., 275.

faith, teaching the gospel, whether evangelically, catechetically, or theologically, really cannot go forward.

The same is true for ruling. Let us think of the ruling in question as the application of a kind of law. This law is not simply a collection of administrative rules ensuring administrative efficiency and valid for any bureaucracy. Such is part of ecclesiastical governance, but it is not the most important part. The most important part is ordering the life of the community according to the law of the gospel. This is the law of the cross, as when Paul urges us to have the mind of Christ, who although he was divine, emptied himself. It is the law whereby he who was rich became poor for our sake. It is the double law of love, love of God with our whole heart, love of neighbor as ourselves. The intelligibility of these laws, the fact that they really do conduce to the common good of the community, is not obvious. It, too, is beheld in faith, or not at all. Therefore, one's ability to rule by these laws is strictly dependent on faith.

Preaching in the first place aims to say what is; ruling aims as well to say what should be. Arguably, it is more difficult, and is more easily corrupted. It requires an exercise of prudence, of political prudence, as teaching does not, or not to the same extent. This prudence will be the marshaling of means unto the common good, where the common good of the Church is an order not just of justice but of charity. Therefore it will not happen without charity. Ruling seems more dependent, requires more. If teaching depends especially on faith, ruling depends on both faith and charity. Ruling can therefore fail in more ways than teaching. The priest can fail to remember the gospel law, or he can change it, add to it. The priest or bishop can also fail in charity and so render himself incapable of applying the law of charity.

Ordination is not the basic grant of faith to a Christian, just as it is not the basic grant of charity. But the things that it does give for the discharge of teaching and ruling are parasitic on faith and charity and can be lost if they are lost, the way the power to sanctify cannot be so lost. What are these things?

B) The Effects of the Sacrament

The things given in ordination are the things prayed for in the ordination prayers. Some of these things, once received, are more stable than others-a fact that is generally recognized.[105] Most stable, as implied by Christian sacramental experience and the Church's judgment of the validity of sacramental acts, is the power to sanctify in celebrating the sacraments. It is this power St. Thomas identifies with a character that cannot be lost.

What of other endowments? Lefebvre spoke of charisms, Prou of *dotes* for teaching and the fulfillment of a bishop's mission.[106] For teaching infallibly, there are *dona* (Browne), or the charism of divine assistance (Lamont), or the *virtus et auxilium* of the Spirit (Cantero Cuadrado).[107] Taguchi speaks variously of an illumination or an *augmentum intellectuale* or of something like the gift of prophecy for teaching.[108]

For infallible teaching, supposing more is wanted than an *assistentia per se negativa,* we could very well imagine a transitory assistance like that which St. Thomas supposes for prophecy.[109] But on the supposition that the endowment in question is something for the teaching of the bishop in general, something therefore more stable, we shall have to reach for the category of habit-a relatively permanent but by no means indelible determination of a power.[110] So, St. Thomas knows of a gratuitous grace, "the word of wisdom and knowledge," a grace that is ordered to the public teaching of prelates.[111] This grace, moreover, is really identical with the gifts of wisdom and knowledge, gifts of the Holy Spirit, and differs from them only according as it bespeaks an especial fullness of the gifts.[112] *As* to

[105] For example, Yves Congar, "Le sacerdoce du nouveau testament: Mission et culte," in Frisque and Congar, eds., *Les Pretres,* 246.

[106] See above, notes 30 and 32.

[107] See above, notes 52, 41, and 42, and Calabria at note 40.

[108] See above, note 47.

[109] *STh* 11-11, q. 171, a. 2.

[110] It would be no less "ontological" for being a habit but not a power; see above, Charue, note 31.

[111] *STh* 11-11, q. 177, a. 2.

[112] STh1-11, q. 68, a. 5, ad 1; 1-11, q. 111, a. 4, ad 4; 11-11, q. 45, a. 5, corp. and ad 2.

ruling, the gift of counsel also can be a gratuitous grace.[113] It is the gift associated with practical wisdom, with prudence, and so with governing.[114] The gifts of the Holy Spirit, we recall, render a man especially receptive to actual grace, to the promptings of the Holy Spirit,[115] including the inspirations relative to teaching and instructing and being practically wise, the very things a bishop needs every day. Such gifts are better understood as habits rather than as powers, and this in contrast to the character imprinted by orders.[116] These gifts, moreover, can be lost, and are lost with the loss of charity.[117]

C) The "Munera" as Rights and as Powers

As a final step, we need to distinguish between the right to teach and rule on the one hand and a capacity to teach and rule (to discern the true, to behold what is to be done) on the other. If by the first we mean a legally constituted and recognized right, then the second is more a "natural right" so to teach and rule.

In giving a certain fullness of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, ordination gives the capacity to teach and rule, the capacity to interpret Scripture for these people now and the capacity to see how the law of Christ is to be fulfilled here and now. Is this also the right to teach and rule? Taguchi said that what is given for teaching by the sacrament, an *augmentum intellectuale,* is not a "mere right" to teach. It is not a merely juridical reality, because it is a real capacity.[118] It is, we might say, a natural right to teach, in the sense that any such capacity bespeaks a sort of native rightness of its exercise. Moreover, the right to teach is included in the bishop's *potestas regiminis,* a right to rule that includes the right to exercise the *munus* of sanctifying, too. We might, then, delineate the matter as follows.

[113] *STh* IHI, q. 52, a. 1, ad 2.

[114] With wisdom, *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 4; with prudence, II-II, q. 52, a. 2.

[115] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

[116] Gifts as habits, *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 3; character as power, III, q. 63, a. 2.

[117] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 5.

[118] See above, note 47.

First, it should be mentioned that just in giving the power to sanctify, ordination gives a call, an aptitude for the other *munera*, in the sense that it is fitting that the one who sanctifies teach and rule. Groblicki seemed to have a sense of this: who has the power to ordain connaturally rules and teaches.[119]

Second, as the Doctrinal Commission insisted, ordination is not a mere deputation to rule and teach; it gives real capacities so to do.[120] If we think of these capacities as a kind of abundance of the relevant gifts of the Holy Spirit, then we can recognize them as by nature giving title to be exercised. The capacity just is a sort of natural right to be used. But if the capacities can be lost, then this kind of right can be lost too.

Third, there is juridical right, with the canonical mission and exercised only in hierarchical communion. This may be given to and not withdrawn from one who has not the real capacities to rule and teach as grounded in the gifts. It may be given to one who once had but who lost the capacities. Also, given by law, it is revocable by law, and is revoked when someone shows himself manifestly incompetent to teach and rule.[121]

D) Conclusion

In this way, we recover the older and entirely sane sense of the relatively less stable capacities, in comparison to the power to sanctify, possessed by prelates and priests. Not recovering this sense conduces to bad consequences. We may be tempted to inflate episcopal (and, in their order, presbyteral) acts of teaching and ruling. When such inflation becomes unbearable because of heresy or malfeasance, we will be tempted to reject the whole idea of a sacred hierarchy. We must distinguish. What is true is that we

[119] See above, note 51; also Olaechae Loizaga, for whom the ministry of word and rule are rooted in the sacrificial ministry (above, note 44); Eichinger, for whom the bishop exercises all three *munera* in the celebration of the Eucharist (above, note 36); and Plourde (above, note 92).

[120] See above, at note 15.

[121] Cf. Browne (above, note 52): consecration does not give the power to teach and rule with authority; and Prou (above, note 33): the mission given by consecration is not *potestas auctoritativa.*

are given a sacred hierarchy permanently sacred in its sanctifying function, sacred in its teaching function when discharged by men of faith, and sacred in its ruling function when discharged by men of charity.

The idea that the powers of ruling and teaching are as stable as that of sanctifying and for the same reason is suggested by the wording of texts, and Galot, Lafont, and Butler cannot be faulted for seeing it there. It is suggested because the council associates the three *munera* with the ideas of configuration to Christ and acting in the person of Christ, and these ideas themselves once upon a time were more narrowly associated with the power of sanctifying, itself identified with character. But the idea that the powers of ruling and teaching are as stable as that of sanctifying and for the same reason is not stated by the texts. To the few, very few persons who saw this possible implication of the texts, the final *relationes* replied that it is not a legitimate inference from the texts. Indeed, it is evident from the *Acta* that there is really not much concern at all with the nature of the character, presbyteral or episcopal. The association of themes that leads to the idea of founding all the *munera* in the character is, in fact, quite accidental. The text of *Presbyterorum ordinis* is imitating the text of *Lumen gentium*, and the crucial wording of the text of *Lumen gentium* is an accident of the desire to state positively what had been stated negatively in a previous draft, namely the dignity of episcopal office, and to express it with respect to all the *munera* in words formerly restricted to expressing it with respect to just one.

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INCLUSIVE LANGUAGE AND THE EQUAL DIGNITY OF WOMEN AND MEN IN CHRIST

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PARTICIPANTS IN THE ongoing debate over inclusive language translations of the Bible may find themselves with strange bedfellows. Those who oppose these translations include not only traditional orthodox believers but also not a few feminists. The latter group fears that inclusive language tends to soften "the harsh and intransigent message of a truly patriarchal document. "[1] Sherry Simon summarizes this position as follows:

> Inclusive language translations do not go far enough in either of the (contradictory) directions favored by feminist translators. They do not reveal the potentially woman-friendly aspects of the Bible, nor do they expose its unflinching patriarchy. They stand in ideologically ambiguous territory, seemingly provoking more confusion than they resolve.[2]

On the other side of the battle lines we find not only the remaining feminists and their sympathizers but surprisingly also some evangelical Protestant scholars. For example, Mark L. Strauss and D. A. Carson, who identify themselves as "complementarians" opposed to a feminist agenda, have each devoted

[1] Sherry Simon, *Gender in Translation: Cultural Identity and the Politics of Transmission* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 125.

[2] Ibid., 129. Simon seems sympathetic with this view (which she associates with Phyllis Bird and Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza among others), but in the end she hedges her bets: "There is no single feminist approach to Bible translation" (133).

an entire volume to a vigorous defense of "moderate" inclusive-language translations.[3]

I. INCLUSIVE LANGUAGE AND REVELATION

This confused situation will come into clearer focus if we consider where the various participants in the debate stand with regard to the doctrines of revelation and inspiration. More radical feminists have either dispensed with such notions entirely or significantly redefined them. Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, for example, proposes that the Bible is no longer to be regarded as an authoritative "source" of revelation but as a "resource" for feminism. "Women's experience in their struggle for liberation" replaces the Bible as the "normative authority" and starting point for theology. Indeed the very notion that the Bible is the word of God is "an archetypal oppressive myth that must be rejected."[4]

Nicholas King, a Catholic who favors inclusive-language translations of Scripture, represents a slightly less radical position: the Bible is "androcentric and patriarchal beyond our power of remedy" but should not be abandoned altogether since, amid all the hurtful patriarchy, it contains "whispers of liberation ... for all who are oppressed."[5] Presumably this is where King would locate "the revelation of God," to which he often refers. But it is not clear how such "revelation" could ever function normatively or be accessed objectively since King concludes that "the Bible is already geared to making us relativize all speech about God and

[3] D. A. Carson, *The Inclusive-Language Debate: A Plea for Realism* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker; Leicester: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 11; Mark L. Strauss, *Distorting Scripture? The Challenge of Bible Translation & Gender Accuracy* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 25. Complementarians (as opposed to egalitarians) "believe Scripture sets out distinct roles for men and women in the church and in the home" (ibid.).

[4] Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza, *Bread Not Stone: The Challenge of Feminist Biblical Interpretation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), quotations from pp. 14, 13, and 10 respectively.

[5] Nicholas King, *Whispers of Liberation: Feminist Perspectives on the New Testament* (New York and Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1998), 35.

about Jesus; and that is what I suggest that the feminist critique of the Bible should teach us to do."[6]

Certainly neither Strauss nor Carson would accept King's view, to say nothing of Schussler Fiorenza's. In fact, their entire argument in favor of inclusive language is based on the belief that the Bible is the word of God and ought for that very reason to be translated as accurately as possible. They maintain that because of alleged recent changes in English usage the goal of accuracy in translation not only permits but actually requires the use of inclusive language. Strauss summarizes his position as follows:

> [f]hough I am a complementarian, from a linguistic and hermeneutical perspective I see validity in the introduction of inclusive language-when that language demonstrably represents the biblical author's intended meaning. This perspective is not based on a social or political feminist agenda (I oppose such an agenda) but on the nature of language and translation. [7]

It is precisely on the basis of "the nature of language and translation" that I wish to take issue with the conclusions of Strauss and Carson. This article will demonstrate that inclusive-language translation fails because it runs counter to the nature of linguistic innovation and communication and rests on a faulty notion of what is involved in translation. It may be possible to translate this or that passage into inclusive language without distortion, but ultimately there will be a conflict of interests. Inclusive language and accuracy of translation are on a collision course.

I have chosen Strauss and Carson as dialogue partners because I share their belief in the divine inspiration of Sacred Scripture and their commitment to fidelity in translation. Furthermore, I appreciate the irenic tone of their books and their sincere attempt to be even handed. I find little basis for dialogue with those feminists who regard the Bible as inherently oppressive, though I

[6] Ibid., 38.

[7] Strauss, *Distorting Scripture*, 25. According to Strauss, "The inclusive language debate is not about altering the original texts of Scripture (the Hebrew or Greek texts) but about *how best to translate those texts into clear, accurate and contemporary English*" (28).

happen to agree with those hold indusive-language translations "do not reveal potentially woman-friendly aspects of the Bible" and cause "more confusion than they resolve."

II. A NON-RANDOM TEST CASE

As a test case I wiH examine Galatians 3:23-4:7 its translation in the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) of 1989. This passage was chosen not randomly but because it contains some of the central affirmations of the New Testament. H the dear transmission of revealed truth is impeded by the NRSV translators' attempt to avoid "the danger of linguistic sexism, "[8] we might have reason to doubt the daim that inclusive language is a matter of "preferences that have nothing to do with faith or dogma. "[9] Furthermore, among the truths at stake in the translation of this passage is Paul's striking expression the equal dignity of women and men Christ (Gal 3:28). Now, if it can be shown that indusive-language translations actually obscure this pro-feminine dimension of divine revelation, we have not only a situation of considerable irony but also cause to suspect that there might be something inherently problematic the very attempt to translate the biblicaltext "inclusively." For if inclusive language fails to convey the dignity of women even when 1s the author's point, how it succeed elsewhere?

No two indusive-language translations are quite alike. But the NRSV, which is widely used throughout the English-speaking world by both Protestants and Catholics, is representative of a whole wave of moderate indusive-language revisions produced during the 1980s and 1990s, an intended to replace popular translations made earlier the century, These revisions are classified as "moderate" because the most part inclusive language they employ is restricted to references to human beings.

[8] See Bruce Mo Metzger, "To the Reader," in *The Holy Bible, Containing the Old and New Testaments with theApocryphal/Deuterocanonical Books, New Revised Standard Version* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), xiv.

[9] Joseph Jensen, "Inclusive Language and the Bible," *America* 172 (5 November 1994): 18.

Unlike the more radical inclusive translations, they retain traditional terminology when referring to God or Christ. In other words, they use "anthropological"-but not "theological" or "christological"-inclusive language.[10] Even among these moderate inclusive-language translations there are significant differences, both in principles and in procedure,[11] but in the case of Galatians 3:23-4:7, our critique of the NRSV would apply *mutatis mutandis* to all other attempts to translate this text "inclusively." For this is one of those passages where push comes to shove and one must simply choose between inclusive language and fidelity to the original.

For sake of comparison, the NRSV text of Gal 3:23-4:7 is placed alongside that of the version it replaced, the RSV (NT first published in 1946). Words and phrases directly affected by the adoption of inclusive language are set in italics.

[10] This terminology is intended to be more precise and comprehensive than the usual distinction between "horizontal" and "vertical," but it is certainly not meant to disguise the fact that even anthropological inclusive language can have theological ramifications. In any case, even some moderate inclusive-language translations, including the NRSV, show a tendency to "thin out" masculine pronouns for God, without resorting to feminine or inanimate pronouns (Carson, *The Inclusive-1.Anguage Debate,* 24). The NRSV also occasionally refers to Christ as a "human being" rather than a "man" (translating c'ivepwu0<;) "when the translators felt that Christ's humanity, not his maleness, was being stressed" (Strauss, *Distorting Scripture,* 45). Neither of these tendencies is mentioned in the NRSV preface, which speaks only of a mandate to avoid masculine language "in references to men and women" (Metzger, "To the Reader," xiv).

[11] As a striking example, inclusive language is employed much more cautiously and under the guidance of a more coherent set of principles in the Revised NT of the New American Bible (1986) than in the Revised Psalms (1991) found under the same cover. Joseph Jensen's attempts to defend the latter revision against its many critics appear disingenuous. Jensen (a member of the translation team and chair of the board of editors) claims that the Revised Psalms "is merely gender-inclusive where the meaning [of the original Hebrew] clearly calls for such inclusiveness" ("Watch Your Language! Of Princes and Music Directors," *America* 174 [8 June 1996]: 9). But this is manifestly not the case. For example, the translators resort to all manner of circumlocution to avoid the word "man" when translating Hebrew *geber* ("man"), a lexeme that always refers to a male and is thus always rendered *vir* in Jerome's *Psalterium iuxta Hebreos* (Pss 18:26; 34:9; 37:23; 40:5; 52:9; 94:12; 127:5). They do this even when the immediate context refers to the "wife" of the *geber* in question (128:3-4)!

Galatians 3:23-4:7

RSV (1946)

[3:23] Now before faith came, we were confined under the law, kept under restraint until faith should be revealed. [24] So that the law was our custodian until Christ c;:1me, that we might be justified by faith. [25] But now that faith has come, we are no longer under a custodian; [26] for in Christ Jesus you are all *sons* of God, through faith. [27] For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ. [28] There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. [29] And if you are Christ's, then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to promise. [4: 1] I mean that *the heir, as long as he is a child, is no better than a slave, though he is the owner* of all the estate; [2] but *he is* under guardians and trustees until the date set by the father. [3] So with us; when we were *children,* we were slaves to the elemental spirits of the universe. [4] But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, [5] to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as *sons.* [6] And because you are *sons,* God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, "Abba! Father!" [7] So through God you are no longer a slave but a *son,* and if a *son* then an heir.

NRSV (1989)

[3:23] Now before faith came, we were imprisoned and guarded under the law until faith would be revealed. [24] Therefore the law was our disciplinarian until Christ came, so that we might be justified by faith. [25] But now that faith has come, we are no longer subject to a disciplinarian, [26] for in Christ Jesus you are all *children* of God through faith. [27] As many of you as were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. [28] There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus. [29] And if you belong to Christ, then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to the promise. [4: 1] My point is this: *heirs, as long as they are minors, are no better than slaves, though they are the owners* of all the property; [2] but *they remain* under guardians and trustees until the date set by the father. [3] So with us; while we were *minors,* we were enslaved to the elemental spirits of the world. [4] But when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, [5] in order to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as *children.* [6] And because you are *children,* God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, "Abba! Father!" [7] So you are no longer a slave but a *child,* and if a *child* then also an heir, through God.

III. THE LITERAL SENSE OF "SONS"

The primary difficulty that this passage posed for the NRSV translators, as they attempted to carry out their mandate to eliminate "masculine-oriented language,"[12] was how to render the six occurrences of uloc; (traditionally "son[s]") and the single occurrence of the compound ulo0t::crfa(traditionally "adoption as sons"). In four of the six occurrences of uloc; they have opted for the gender-neutral "child(ren)" (3:26; 4:6-7), while in the remaining two cases, where uloc; refers to Christ, they have retained the traditional "Son" (4:4, 6). The one occurrence of ulo0t::cr(ahas been translated "adoption as children" (4:5).

At the outset of our assessment of these translation choices, it is important to note that, while many proponents of inclusive language appeal to alleged recent changes in English usage,[13] such an argument does not seem to be relevant when it comes to the word "son(s)." It is not the case that "son(s)" was once used generically and only recently has been perceived to exclude females. Apart from "Bible English" (i.e., biblical translations and biblically derived theological and spiritual discourse), the word "son(s)" has rarely if ever been understood to include females. Thus when the translators of the RSV and other pre-inclusive-language versions used "son(s)" to render uloc; in Gal 3:23-4:7, they were not translating in accord with standard English usage but were relying on the reader's ability to gather from the context that Paul was referring to females as well as males. But since Paul first states emphatically that "in Christ Jesus you are *all* sons of God," then explicitly notes that he is referring to "as many of you as were baptized," and even adds that in Christ "there is not male and female" (3:26-28),[14] only a rather incompetent reader would

[12] Metzger, "To the Reader," xiv.

[13] Carson, *The Inclusive-Language Debate,* 183-92; Strauss, *Distorting Scripture,* 140-46; Jensen, "Inclusive Language," 14.

[14] Unless otherwise indicated, biblical translations are my own.

get hung up on the unusual usage "son(s)" and condude that this word refer only to [15]

Another argument in favor of inclusive language points out that in some cases a Greek (or Hebrew) word that is gender-neutral has been traditionally rendered by an English word that normally refers to males. The parade example is Greek d&cllcpo(, which can refer to a mixed group of male and female siblings, [16] while English "brothers" is not normally so used. Thus, in the many places where the NT uses d:8cll<f>o{ figuratively to refer to members of the Christian community, the NRSV employs a variety of paraphrases: "brothers and sisters" (Gal 1:11; 3:15; 5:13; 6:18; PhH 1:14; 3:1, 17; 4:1), "friends" (Gal 4:12, 28, 31; 5:11; 6:1; Phil 4:21), "beloved" 1:12; 3:13; 4:8), or even "members of God's family" (Gal 1:2; d. Rom 8:29). [17] Some proponents of indusive language claim that, far from distorting

[15] By contrast, even a very competent reader could be confused by the translation "children" in the NRSV and the NAB Revised NL. Note that the translators of the latter revision find it necessary to include a marginal note (on 3:26) explaining that the Greek term literally means "sons" and that this is in contrast to the young child under a disciplinarian. It is also interesting to note mat both the King James Version (1611) and the Rheims NT (1582) use "children" to translate uioi (or Latin *filii)* in 3:26. But they are constrained by the force of Paul's argument to use "son(s)" throughout the rest of the passage.

[16] W. Bauer, F. W. Danker, W. F. Arndt, and F. W. Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature* (3'd ed.; Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 18.

[17] Such variety is itself curious. Did the translators fear that using "brothers and sisters" for every figurative use of ali£A<jlol would make inclusive language too conspicuous or tedious? If not, why did earlier translators (cf. RSV) not feel the same need to employ a variety of renderings for ali£1i<jloi? Generally speaking, the NRSV tends toward "formal equivalence" and "concordance of terminology," and yet the freedom with which it handles terms such as aoi:?i<jlol (or uiol) suggests a degree of concern with "receptor response" reminiscent of the "dynamic-equivalence" translations in vogue during the 1960s and 1970s. (For an explanation of these terms, see Eugene A. Nida, *Toward a Science of Translating* [Leiden: Brill, 1964], 159-60, 165-67.) The more cautious translators of the NAB Revised NT, who refer to the translation of ao£A<j>oi as "an especially delicate problem," chose to retain the traditional rendering "brothers," noting that "[t]here has never been any doubt that this designation includes *all* members of the Christian community, both male and female" ("Preface to the Revised Edition," in *Saint Joseph Edition of the New American Bible* [New York: Catholic Book Publishing, 1986], 7).

the meaning of the original, such renderings are actually "more accurate" than the traditional "brothers" or "brethren. "[18]

But whatever one thinks of this argument, it does not apply to the case of Greek uloc; and English "son." While lexemes in different languages rarely have identical semantic ranges, these two actually come pretty close. In the nonbiblical Koine Greek of Paul's day, uloc; had a range of senses similar to English "son. "[19] Thus, the singular uloc; referred to a male offspring, not to a daughter (0uych11p). And to refer to a mixed group of male and female offspring, one normally used a gender-neutral term such as TEKVa ("children") or rrmo(a ("[young] children"), not the plural ulo(("sons").[20] Or one could specify that both sons (ulol) and daughters (0uyaTfpEc;)were involved.[21]

[18] Strauss, *Distorting Scripture,* 15; cf. Carson, *The Inclusive-Language Debate,* 130-31. It is amusing *to* note, however, that in a literal context where there is almost no doubt that both males and females are meant, and where it is a question of those who will betray Christ's disciples to death (Luke 21:16), the NRSV renders aoe;\(j>olsimply "brothers"! Apparently accuracy is less a concern in such cases.

[19] The claims made in this paragraph are based on my examination of hundreds of non-literary Koine papyri (mostly from the period 200 B.C. to A.D. 200) including searches run via the Perseus Digital Library (www.perseus.tufts.edu). For a convenient overview of the use of uiCx;, see James Hope Moulton and George Milligan, *The Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament: Illustrated from the Papyri and Other Non-Literary Sources* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1930; repr. 1972), 649.

[20] The one clear exception of which I am aware is in a "deed of disownment" from the Byzantine period, approximately 500 years after the time of Paul (P. Cairo Maspero 67353, as found in A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar, *Select Papyri I,* Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932], 262-67). The author refers to his "parricidal children" (rnic; umpo;\q)oic; µou uioic;) and then gives their four names, two male and two female.

[21] Thus, for example, in P. Oxyrhynchus 1464 (A.D. 250), we read: "I have sacrificed and made libation and tasted the offering along with Taos my wife and Arnmonius and Arnmonianus my sons [uioic;] and Theda my daughter [0uymp(]" (A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar, *Select Papyri II,* Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934], 352-53). Other clear examples accessible through the Perseus Digital Library include (with my translation of the pertinent passages): P. Michigan 5.322a (A.D. 46), line 38 ("my aforementioned sons and my four daughters"); BGU 5.1210 (circa A.D. 150), line 67 (the property of the deceased is to be given "to their sons and daughters and [other] heirs"); and P. Oxyrhynchus 3.533 (second or third century A.D.), lines 26-27 ("greet Statia my daughter and Heraclides and Apion my sons"). Even in biblically influenced discourse and in a context where the terms are used to refer to spiritual offspring, uioi Kai 0uym(pec; ("sons and

Generally speaking, this usage is reflected even in the translation-Greek of the Septuagint (LXX), provided it is a question of the proper or literal sense of terms.[20] Thus when Hebrew *banim* means "children" of both sexes,[21] it is typically rendered TEKVa (e.g., Gen 3:16; 30:1; 31:16; 32:12); but when it refers specifically to males, ulo(is used (e.g., Gen 5:4; 6:10; 9:19; 10:25; 11:11; 19:12; 29:34; 34:25; 35:29; 37:35; 46:15). In the NT, similarly, the plural ulo(may refer to two or more male offspring (e.g., Matt 20:20-21; Luke 15:11; Acts 7:29; 19:14; Gal 4:22; Heb 11:21) but never to a mixed group of (literal) sons and daughters.[22] In the latter case one finds Tiat&ia (e.g., Matt 11:16; 14:21; Luke 11:7) or more commonly TEKva (e.g., Matt 7:11; 27:25; Mark 10:29; Luke 14:26 [cf. Matt 10:37]; Luke 23:28; Acts 21:5; 1 Cor 7:14; 2 Cor 12:14; Col 3:20-21; Titus 1:6).

The point of all this is that the Greek lexeme ul6c; is every bit as much a "masculine-oriented" term as is English "son." According to its literal or proper sense it refers to males. This literal usage forms the foundation upon which any figurative use will be built. Or, to change the image, the proper sense is the sounding board off which the various figurative senses of ul6c; will

daughters") is a natural enough expression (Epistle of Barnabas 1:1).

[20] When uio(refers beyond the first generation of offspring and means "descendents," it does include females. But here it is a question of Semitic idioms such as "the sons of Israel" (="the Israelites" [e.g., Judg 1:1]). Other more figurative idioms involving uio(and inclusive of both genders are frequent in the LXX (e.g., "sons of unrighteousness" = "unrighteous persons" [2 Sam 3:34]) and in the NT (e.g., "sons of light" = "persons who live in the light" [1 Thess 5:5]). But such expressions do not touch upon our argument concerning the translation of Gal 3:23-4:7.

[21] Because the Hebrew words for "son" *(ben)* and "daughter" *(bat)* are cognates (from Proto-Semitic *binu** and *bintu** respectively), the *grammatically* masculine plural form *banim* serves as the "unmarked" term with respect to *sexual* gender and can thus mean either "sons" or "children." When a Hebrew author wishes to specify that females are involved, the "marked" form *banot* ("daughters") is employed, as in the common phrase *banim u-banot* ("sons and daughters"). In this respect, Hebrew is like Latin (cf. filius, filia, filii, filiae) and unlike Greek or English or German (where the words for "son" and "daughter" are not cognates).

[22] In John 4:12 the reference is probably to Jacob's twelve male children (thus even the NRSV renders uio("sons" here); it is less likely that the author wishes us to think also of Dinah (cf. NAB: "children").

be heard. Thus the usage by which Paul refers to human beings of both sexes as "sons of God" (ulol 0rnu) represents an extension of the "masculine-oriented" term u\6c; to include females. Of course, Paul did not originate this usage, and so we must briefly consider its somewhat complex background.

IV. THE INCLUSIVEUSE OF "SONS"

In the Old Testament, Yahweh refers to Israel corporately as his "son" (Hebrew *ben* = Greek u16c; [Exod 4:22; Jer 31:20; Hos 11:1]),[25] or in the plural as his "sons" *(banim).* In the latter case, because *banim* is unmarked for sexual gender (see note 23 above) and because the various contexts do not indicate otherwise, it is quite natural to assume that Israelite females are included. And in at least one passage (Isa 43:6), this is made explicit by Yahweh's reference to "my sons . . . and my daughters" *(banay . . . u-benotay),* which the LXX, naturally, renders Touc; ulouc; µou ... Kai Tac; OuyaT[pac; µou. But in the remaining instances of this usage, the LXX translators must choose between rendering *banim* as ulo((Deut 14:1; Isa 1:2; Jer 3:14; Hos 2:1) or as TEKva (Deut 32:5; Isa 63:8). The former has the advantage of preserving the theologically important correlation to Israel's corporate identity as Yahweh's "son" *(ben* = uloc;), but the latter more readily suggests that females are included.

Thus, while uloi 0rnu and TEKva 0rnu may both refer to the Israelites as chosen for a filial relationship with Yahweh, these phrases are not completely interchangeable. Nor is it simply the case that u1o{ represents a wooden rendering of *banim* and TEKVa a more idiomatic one. These assertions are confirmed by a brief examination of the Book of Wisdom, which was composed in idiomatic Greek just before the turn of the era (probably in Alexandria) and which seems to have played a formative role in

[25] LXX Hos 11:1 refers to the "children" (Tfrva) of Israel, not to God's "son." This may reflect a Hebrew *Vorlage* that differed slightly from the Masoretic Text.

Paul's thinking.[26] The Book of Wisdom contains about as many references to Israel's sonship as do all other OT books combined and represents in this regard (as in so many other ways) something of a synthesis of OT theology and a bridge to the NT. In light of these observations, it is striking to note how the author of Wisdom favors ulo((Wis 9:7; 12:19, 21; 16:10, 26; 18:4} over TEKVa (only 16:21). That we should not ascribe this tendency to sexism is dear from the fact that in the first of these passages the author explicitly refers to Israel as God's "sons and daughters" (ulwv ... Kal 0uyaT€pwv [9:7]}, echoing Isaiah 43:6 and anticipating 2 Corinthians 6:18.

Why, then, does the author of Wisdom favor ulo(over TEKva? Clearly he wants his readers to perceive the connection between his motif of seven references to "the sons/children of God" (plural) and the two references to "the son [ul6<;] of God" (singular) found near the beginning and end of the book (2:18; 18:13). The first part of the book (chaps. 1-5) is dominated by the figure of the righteous sufferer who is both "servant of the Lord" (2:13) and "son of God" (2:18). Because he "boasts that God is his father" (2:16), this man is mocked, tortured, and put to death by those who do not understand that man was made in God's "image" precisely in order to enjoy the incorruptible life of divine filiation (2:23). But God grants imperishable life to the righteous sufferer and raises him up to the glorious status of "the sons of God" or "holy ones" (5:5 [probably a reference to the angels]).

Writing just a decade or two prior to the Incarnation, and drawing upon the riches of Torah, prophecy, and wisdom, this inspired author seems to have thus glimpsed the manner by which Israel would realize its true identity and vocation as "servant of the Lord" and "son of God": not through a return to the glorious wealth and political power of Solomon but in the person of a

[26] Wisdom is probably the only OT book to be composed entirely in Greek (even 2 Maccabees contains a lengthy passage [1:1-2:18] that seems to be translated from a Semitic original), and it is almost certainly the last book of the OT to be written (circa 20 B.C.). Its influence on Paul's Epistle to the Romans is generally recognized, but one finds echoes also in Galatians. For example, Paul's use of the verb ("send forth") in Gal 4:4-6 draws upon Wis 9:10 ("Send her [Wisdom] forth from the holy heavens").

poor, humble, and righteous sufferer imbued with divine wisdom.[27] In the central portion of the book (chaps. 6-9) the author adopts, with no little irony, the persona of Solomon (sans the greed, lust, oppressiveness, and idolatry of the historical figure) and humbly prays to receive the wisdom necessary to be a just king over God's "sons and daughters" (9:7). Finally, through his midrash (interpretive retelling) of Israel's early history (chaps. 10-19) the author constantly reminds his contemporary Jews (who, like the Hebrews of old, live in Egypt) that as God's "sons" they are called to be holy and righteous in the midst of a pagan world and that they will be sustained in persecution and nourished by revelation. The motif of sonship concludes when the Egyptians, chastised by plagues, are compelled to acknowledge Israel to be "God's son" (0rnu u16v; 18:13). This collective use of uloc; brings us full circle, recalling not only Wisdom 2:18 but Exodus 4:22, the OT's first reference to God's fatherhood and Israel's sonship.

The Book of Wisdom's theology of sonship thus sets the stage for the NT, where, of course, we find further developments. Under the title "Son of God" (6 uloc; Tou 0cou), Jesus is revealed to be the definitive embodiment and representative of Israel, the Messiah, the righteous sufferer, and the eternal Son of the Father. Israel's prerogative of sonship is fully realized in him and is the heritage of his followers, who are called "sons" (ulo() or "children" (TEKva) of God. The former usage is found in the Synoptic Gospels (Matt 5:9, 45; Luke 6:35; 20:36), the latter in the Johannine Literature Uohn 1:12; 11:52; 1 John 3:1-2, 10; 5:2). In the Pauline epistles we find an even split, each term used (with this sense) six times. But the distribution is uneven, with Tfrva used more broadly (Rom 8:16-17, 21; 9:8; Eph 5:1; Phil 2:15). In fact, aside from OT quotations (Rom 9:26; 2 Cor 6:18), ulo(is confined to our passage in Galatians (3:26; 4:6) and the parallel passage in Romans (8:14, 19). But it is striking that

[27] "Now the further off a thing is, the less distinctly it is seen; and so those who were near Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good things to be hoped for" (STh II-II, q. 1, a. 7, ad. l; trans. Anton C. Pegis, *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas,* vol. 2 [New York: Random House, 1945], 1066).

whereas in Romans 8 Paul alternates between ulo(and TEKva, in Galatians he uses only ulo(, apparently avoiding Tfrva. The reasons for this will be discussed below.

We may now summarize this part of the argument. The Greek lexeme uloc;, according to its literal or proper sense, refers to males (both in the singular and the plural). Like its English counterpart "son," it is a "masculine-oriented" term. The biblical expression by which Israelites or Christians are referred to as God's ulo(thus represents an extension of the term to include females (precisely the sort of usage that the NRSV translators have set out to eliminate). The author of the Book of Wisdom strongly favors ulo((which he clearly intends in a gender-inclusive sense [cf. 9:7]) over TEKva, apparently in order to underscore the correlations among: (1) Israel's corporate covenantal identity as uloc; 0rnu, (2) the plurality of righteous Israelites as ulol 0rnu, and (3) the individual righteous sufferer as uloc; 0rnu. Paul, for his part, refers to Christians both as ulol 0rnu and Tfrva 0rnu but in Galatians 3:23-4:7 has restricted himself to the former expression. In other words, like the author of Wisdom, Paul has chosen to use a "masculine-oriented" term "inclusively." *As* will become clear below, our capacity to understand his meaning and to receive revelation through his words depends in large part on our appreciation of this fact.

V.THESTATUSOFSONS

Next, we must attend to the distinction between inclusive language that is "anthropological" (referring to human beings) and that which is "theological" or "christological" (referring to God or Christ). Moderate inclusive-language translations such as language and have for the most part retained traditional masculine language when referring to God or Christ.[28] Thus, in our passage the NRSV renders uloc; with "child(ren)" when the reference is to mere human beings but retains the traditional "Son" when the

[28] See note 10 above.

reference is to Christ. By contrast, Burton H. Throckmorton's more radical translation employs inclusive language that is anthropological, theological, and christological, as exemplified by his rendering of Gal 4:6. "And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of God's Child into our hearts, crying, 'God! Mother and Father!'" [29] While such a rendering leaps across the hermeneutical gap and transforms Paul's richly evocative biblical diction into the banal jargon of political correctness, [30] it does, almost in spite of itself, preserve one important dimension of Paul's argument that has nearly vanished in the NRSV. By maintaining a certain consistency in his rendering of ul6<; ("Child" when the reference is to Christ, "children" when it is to Christians), Throckmorton enables us to glimpse the correlation Paul wishes us to see between Christ's eternal Sonship and our filial adoption. The latter is a participation in the former.

This point is, moreover, hardly peripheral to Paul's argument. His tight Trinitarian formula ("God has sent forth the Spirit of his Son") indicates that the Holy Spirit is precisely the Spirit of eternal filiation, whose action in our hearts and minds is required if we are to enter into Jesus' relationship to the Father. This is further underscored by Paul's coupling of the Aramaic *abba* of Jesus' prayer with Greek 6 naTtjp (cf. Mark 14:36). The reader of the NRSV could easily overlook all of this, since the first due is obscured. Apparently Jesus is "Son," but we are mere "children. "[31] In a passage in which Paul draws a sharp contrast between the "child" (vtjmo<;)who is still in his minority and the

[29] Burton H. Throckmorton, Jr., *The Gospels and the Letters of Paul: An Inclusive-Language Edition* (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1992), 212. Throckmorton even employs what might be termed "ancestral inclusive language." For example, he has Paul say that Christians are "offspring of Abraham *and Sarah*, heirs according to promise" (Gal 3:29; emphasis added).

[30] To Throckmorton's credit, he has at least preserved a modicum of intimacy in his rendering of af3fla6 ucrrtjp. The same cannot be said for the translators of the NTILB, who render the phrase, "O, My dear Parent!" *(The New Testament of the Inclusive Language Bible* [Notre Dame, Ind.: Cross Cultural Publications, 1994], 215).

[31] According to Strauss, "To argue that this connection is 'obscured' in the NRSV is probably nitpicking" *(Distorting Scripture,* 162). Given the importance of the truths of revelation that are at stake, I am willing to run that risk.

"son" (uloi:;) who has come of age, the text as translated in the NRSV seems to qualify our relationship with God a way that runs counter to Paul's intention.

There is, of course, a huge difference between Christ's Sonship and ours, as Paul indicates by using the word ulo0i::cr(a *("adoptive* sonship") in reference to the latter. One might even be tempted to defend the NRSV as safeguarding this distinction, especially in light of the fact that elsewhere in the NT the Johannine Literature consistently refers to Christ as uloc;; but studiously avoids this term when speaking of Christians, using TEKVa ("children") instead. But that is exactly the point. The various formulations of Paul, John, and the other sacred authors play complementary roles within t:he NT's overall witness t:o the mystery of Christ. A translation that fails to aHow each of these authors to speak in his own voice risks upsetting this delicate canonical balance and to that degree does not serve revelationo

Next we should note that the NRSV committee's decision to use the gender-inclusive "child(ren)" to translate the anthropological occurrences of uhk; in Galatians 3:23-4:7 has caused a ripple effect. For in the RSV (and most other EngHsh translations) "chHd(ren)" already been employed in this passage to render the word vtjmoc; (4:1, 3)0 Since Paul's argument, as just noted, hinges on a sharp distinction between vtjmoc; ("babe, child" [here: the heir during his minority]) and uloc; ("son" [here: the heir having come of ageՈ, there was no question of using the same English word to translate both Greek terms. Such a procedure would have made nonsense of the passage.[32]

Instead, the NRSV translators use the word "minor(s)" to render vtjmoc;. In and of itself, this is an excellent choice and arguably an improvement over the RSV, since "minor" pinpoints the precise sense of vtjmoi:; that Paul intends in this context But only serves to highlight a further problem with using "child(ren)" for uloc;. For English "child" by no means connotes

[32] This does not stop Throdanorton or the NTILB translators, however. In blatant disregard for Paul's train of thought, they employ "child(ren)" to render both and The resulting translation is not only inaccurate but unintelligible.

that one so called has come of age, is no longer in need of guardians, and is ready to take possession of the inheritance. If anything, the word is suggestive of just the opposite. Although the NRSV translators attempt to establish a semantic opposition between "minor" and "child," the two words sound more like synonyms. Thus, despite considerable ingenuity, the NRSV translators are not able both to eliminate "masculine-oriented language" and to give the reader the best possible opportunity to follow Paul's dense and subtle line of argumentation. As Bruce Metzger confesses in his preface to the NRSV, "more than once the Committee found that [its] several mandates stood in tension and even in conflict." [33] In the case of Galatians 3:23-4:7 the tension between inclusive language and accuracy of translation has been resolved in favor of the former,

Making explicit reference to Galatians 4:7, Carson attempts to forestall this sort of criticism and to defend the procedure of rendering ulOi:; with "child(ren)." He argues that since Greek Tfavov ("child") refers to an heir elsewhere in the NT (Mark 12:19; Luke 1:7; Acts 7:5), there is no reason why English "child(ren)" cannot refer to the heir(s) in the Galatians passage, even if it happens to be translating uloi:; (rather than Tfavov). His examination of Romans 8:14-21 seems to clinch the mattero In this passage, which contains a very dose parallel to Galatians 4:4-7, Paul freely alternates between uloc; and Tf'Kvov, so that "it is difficult in the flow of this context to detect [any] significant semantic distinction between the two terms." [34] Carson thus implies that while Paul in fact uses u'l6c; in Galatians, he could just as easily have used Tfl<vov (or oscillated between the two terms as he has in Romans) with no real difference in meaning.

The lexemes ul6<; and TEKvov overlap semantically, to be sure, but there are important differences between them (beyond those discussed above), both paradigmatically and in the specific circumstances of NT usage. For example, TfKvov can suggest a certain tenderness, affection, or intimacy, especially in direct address.

[33] Metzger, "To the Reader," xiv.

[34] Carson, *The Inclusive-Language Debate,* 132-33 (quotation from p. 133).

This is true both in the Greek papyri, where the term is sometimes "used as a form of kindly address, even in the case of grown-up persons," [35] and the NT, where it often refers figu:ratively to fellow Christians, as when a pastor addresses the members of his flock (eogo, 1Cor4:14, 17; 2 Cor 6:13; 1Tim1:2; 2 Tim 2:1; Titus 1:4; 3 John [36] Thus Paul addresses the Galatians as "my children" (TEKVa µou) when he wishes to adopt a maternal tone (Gal 4:19; cfo the reference to Paul's "labor pains").

On the other hand, when NT authors choose ulo(to refer figuratively to Christians, the accent is usually on the great dignity and free status of these "sons [i.e., citizens] of the kingdom" (Matt 13:38)0 Note for example this brief parableo

> Jesus said: "What do you think, Simon? From whom do the kings of the earth collect taxes and tribute? From their sons [ul.o!] or from foreigners?" When he said, "From foreigners," Jesus said to him: "So then, the sons are free" (Matt 17:25b-26; cf. 8:36).

Moreover, even without a modifier such as *yvtjawc;* ("legitimate"), uloc; can connote legitimacy of sonship, in semantic opposition to v60oc; ("bastard").

> Persevere in discipline; God is treating you as sons [ulo!]. For what son is there whom the father does not discipline? But if you are without discipline, in which all have become partakers, you are bastards [v6901] and not [true] sons (Heb 12:7-8).

These nuances and others still must be taken into consideration when assessing Paul's usageo Why does he restrict himself to ulcii:; in Galatians 3:23-4: 7 but alternate between this term and TEKvov in the parallel passage in Romans 8? The Achilles heel Carson's argument is his failure to note several significant differences between the two textso Paul's consistent use of u\Oc; (and avoidance of TEKvov) in Galatians is by no means inconsequential, as Carson seems to suggest, but is carefuHy cakulated and crucial to his argument, as I shall demonstrate presentlyo Even in Romans 8, the

[35] Moulton and Milligan, *Vocabulary,* 628.

[36] The diminutive TEKVfov may also carry this connotation (e.g., 1John2:1, 28).

alternation between u16c:; and TEKvov is not entirely random. For example, the dose conjunction between the expression ulol 0rnu ("sons of God") in Romans 8:14 and the phrase nw:uμa ulo0rn·(ac:;("Spirit of adoptive sonship") in 8:15 serves to indicate the important correlation between Christ's filial relationship with the Father and ours. Only after having established this connection is Paul free to switch from ulol ernu to TEKVa 0rnu in 8:16-17.

VI. PAUL'S TEACHING IN GALATIANS

In order better to grasp Paul's teaching, let us turn now to those features of Galatians 3:23-4:7 that find no dose parallel in Romans 8:14-17. To begin with, the salvation-historical dimension of Paul's argument is more to the fore in this part of Galatians than in Romans 8. In the former passage Paul is explicitly concerned with the role of the Law within the divine pedagogy.[37] The OT Israelite is a vtjmoc; under the law, but the Christian (whether Jew or gentile), justified by faith, is a uloc:; come of age and thus has taken possession of the inheritance.[38] The full irony of this claim appears only against the backdrop of the OT's teaching about Israel's sonship. Israel is identified as Yahweh's "firstborn son" at the moment when they are delivered from Egyptian slavery and given the Law at Sinai (Exod 4:22; cf. Hos 11:1). But according to Paul, it is precisely at this point that Israel passes into a different sort of bondage. Israel under the Law is like the heir during his minority and thus "no different from a slave" (Gal 4:1).

The promised inheritance belongs to the seed of Abraham, "who is Christ" (3:16), and Christians become this seed by being incorporated into Christ through baptism (3:27-29). Paradoxically, even those Christians who have the status of slaves within Greco-Roman society enjoy this sonship (3:28). And while ul.o{ka(a is the prerogative of Israel (Rom 9:4), Gentiles too may

[37] In Romans Paul has already dealt with this matter in 2:17-3:20 and 7:1-25. After a concise summary in 8:1-4, he can move on to devote the remainder of the chapter to the spiritual dynamics of the Christian life.

[38] Once Paul moves beyond this stage of the argument and no longer needs the semantic opposition between minority and majority, he is free to use the word Tfrvov (cf. Gal 4:28).

now be incorporated into "the Israel of God"-apart from circumcision-and thereby become "sons" (Gal 3:26-28; 6:16)0 Thus, while circumcision, the sign of the old covenant, serves as a boundary marker between Jew and Gentile and is administered to males over against females, baptism initiates an into a single dignity, that of Christ the heir.

Next we must attend to Paul's assertion that in Christ "there is not male and female" (3:28), which at first glance seems out of place in this context, [39] but upon doser inspection proves to be integral to Paul's vision of life in Christ. The phrase "male and female" (apac:v Kai 0fj/\u) alludes to Genesis 1:27[40] and thus adumbrates Paul's teaching that life in Christ amounts to new creation" (Gal 6:15; 2 Cor 5:17). The point is not that baptism somehow restores human beings to a pristine androgynous state, [41] nor that it confers equal societal rights upon them as autonomous individuals, [42] that it brings them into "the Kmvwv{a of [God's] Son" 1 Cor 1:9)o

[39] Note that it finds no parallel in 1 Cor 12: 13 or Col 3: 11.

[40] Here we must credit the NRSV with an improvement over the RSV, which obscures the allusion by translating Gal 3:28 too freely ("there is neither male nor female").

[41] Citing apocryphal and gnostic parallels, Hans Dieter Betz *(Galatians,* Hermeneia [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979]) finds in Gal 3:28 a reference to "the metaphysical removal of the *biological* sex distinction" (196), coupled with a pre-Pauline "doctrine of an androgynous Christ-redeemer" (199). "Being 'one in Christ Jesus' (Gal 3:28d) would then be a form of 'imitation of Christ' and would follow from the inclusion of the Christian into the 'body of Christ.' Since Christ is androgynous, his 'body' would be also, and so would the Christians who are the members of that 'body'" (ibid.). Betz grants that "definite proof' for this hypothesis is lacking, since all of the pertinent parallels are later than Galatians (ibid.), and that Paul "has obviously changed his position in 1 Corinthians" (200). Betz's lengthy and learned discussion is marred by his failure to account for either the allusion to Gen 1:27 or Paul's use of the masculine pronoun de; (not the neuter £v) in the phrase "one in Christ" (see note 47 below).

[42] Betz rightly rejects overspiritualized interpretations that would reduce the threefold egalitarianism of Gal 3:28 to the spirirual realm, as if Paul's words had no concrete social, political, or even ecclesiastical ramifications whatsoever (Betz, *Galatians,* 189 n. 68). At the same time, an overpoliticized interpretation that misses the spiritual and sacramental root of ecclesia§tical and social transformation would be equally reductionistic. As Betz notes, "Paul makes these statements not as utopian ideals or as ethical demands, but as accomplished facts" (189). The discussion below aims to get at the heart of the matter without entering into broader questions such as the precise relationship between the Church and the world. For a balanced exegesis of Gal 3:28, see James D. G. Dunn, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* (London: A & C Black, 1993), 205-8.

Genesis 1 presents "man" *(adam)* as a creature uniquely endowed with a capacity to receive the gift of existence, and all of creation, from the hand of the Creator in a free act of reciprocal knowledge and love. We call this endowment "personhood."" The careful formulation of 1:27 ("in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them") indicates that sexual differentiation and the interhuman relationality that it symbolizes are integral to human personhood. Even after the primal disobedience, sexual intercourse in humans is not merely a matter of animal instinct but an occasion for interpersonal "knowledge" and for free cooperation with the Creator (cf. 4: 1). But the power of sin prevents man from a full realization of personhood and in a particular way subjects the man-woman relationship to dynamics of disordered desire and male domination (3: 16).

To what extent such dynamics of sin might be enshrined within the Torah itself is a complex and controversial subject.[43] Suffice it to say that while the Torah offers glimpses into the true dignity and personhood of women (beginning with Gen 1:27 itself), the Mosaic covenant does not provide an antidote to the fundamental problem of sin. And for Paul that is the bottom line. The Law does not "impart life" (Gal 3:21) and thus bring about the reconciliation with God necessary for human persons to realize fully their personhood. This only happens when partmpate in the eternal act of love of the Son, now made available by the Holy Spirit through the transformed humanity of Christ. This is what it means to say 'Abba."'[44]

Jews living under the Law and Gentiles living in ignorance of God are both alike "enslaved" under the "weak and beggarly elements" of "the world" (4:3, 9). They are trapped within roles and ways of relating that are dictated by norms of "the world" (i.e., human society insofar as it is a manifestation of our

[43] Contrast, for example, the respective interpretations of Num 5:11-31 (the suspected adultress) in Jacob Milgrom, *Numbers,* JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia and New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1990), 346-54; and Dennis T. Olson, *Numbers,* Interpretation (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1996), 35-39.

[44] Francis Martin, *The Feminist Question: Ferninist Theology in the Light of Christian Tradition* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1994), 324.

collective attempt to assert and maintain our autonomy over against the Creator) and thus capable of, at best, only a very imperfect realization of their human (male and female) personhood. Galatians is all about emancipation from this predicament. "For freedom Christ has set us free" (5:1). "You are no longer a slave but a son" (4:7). Christ's self-donation rescues us "from the present evil age" (1:4). As Francis Martin formulates it, "the *persona* accorded by this world has been superseded by the personhood conferred by faith and baptism."[45]

But this freedom comes about only through the cross, "through which the world is crucified" to us, and we "to the world" (6:14). This "co-crucifixion" with Christ (2:19) is necessary because the Son's eternal act of love for the Father enters into our history through the Incarnation and is most perfectly available to faith through Jesus' death on the cross. The "Kotvwv(a of the Son" into which we are called (1 Cor 1:9) is precisely a "Kotvwv(a in his sufferings" (Phil 3:10; cf. 1 Pet 4:13), and as these are re-presented to us in the Eucharist, it is a Kotvwv(a in his body and blood (1 Cor 10:16). Inasmuch as this brings us into the eternal filiation, it is "Kotvwv(a with the Father" (1 John 1:3); and insofar as it heals our interhuman relationality, it gives us "Kotvwv(a with each other" (1:7). Finally, since all of this is possible only through a healing grace that touches our hearts and minds, it is "Kotvwv(a in the Holy Spirit" (2 Cor 13:13).[46]

Thus Paul's surprising allusion to Genesis 1:27 in Galatians 3:28 ("there is *not* male and female") does not, as a superficial reading might conclude, subvert the biblical vision of the human person, as if to suggest that sexual differentiation is unimportant to Christians or that God's original intention for human beings is unrealizable. On the contrary, within the broad context of his argument, which pivots on a sharp contrast-but not a radical discontinuity-between "two covenants" (4:24), Paul wishes to

[45] Ibid., 326.

[46] According to Thomas Aquinas, the grace of the Holy Spirit is a "spiritual seed transmitted to the place of spiritual generation, i.e., man's mind or heart, because they are born sons of God through a renewal of the mind" *(Commentary on Galatians* [4.3]; trans. F. R. Larcher [Albany: Magi Books, 1966], 119).

indicate that male-female relationality as marred by sin and as lived out in "the world" and under the Law has been replaced by a Kotvwvfa that makes women and men "one in Christ" (3:28).[47] Sexual distinction is not obliterated but is taken up into a new mode of relating and a new complementarity in Christ, who is "the last Adam" (1 Cor 15:45).

The Church, and each of its members, is both filial and maternal. It is filial by virtue of its union with Christ in his self-donation of crucified love (Gal 1:4; 2:19-20; 6:14) and in his prayer to the Father (4:6}. It is maternal in the apostolic "labor" and moral transformation by which Christ is formed within each member (4:19) and in the glorious eschatological freedom by which it is even now "the Jerusalem above ... our mother" (4:26). The Church as mother is prefigured by Israel's matriarch Sarah, the "free woman" who conceives and gives birth "through a promise" and "according to the Spirit" (4:23, 29). And at the definitive turning point in salvation history we find another "woman," who provides the organic link between OT Israel and the Church: she gives birth "under the law," but this birth leads to redemption from the law and the reception of ui.o0i:crfa(4:4-5).

VII. THE FATAL FLAW OF INCLUSIVE LANGUAGE

Now that we have clarified Paul's teaching in Galatians 3:23-4:7, we may resolve the issue of his use of the word ui.6c; and its translation. Let us pose the question as starkly as possible. If Paul is concerned with the equal status and dignity of Jew and Greek, of slave and free, of male and female, why on earth does

[47] F. F. Bruce is right to compare the "one body" statements of Rom 12:5and1Cor10:17 *(Commentary on Galatians,NIGTC* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1982], 190; cf. Dunn, *Galatians,* 207). But in Gal 3:28, as noted above, Paul uses the masculine singular form of "one" (i:i<;)rather than the neuter singular (Ev). Presumably he would have used the latter had he intended an ellipsis for "one body," or even if he had meant "one" in a more general sense (cf. John 11:52). Instead he seems to be thinking more in terms of incorporation into the one *person* of the Incarnate Son of God. Cf. Eph 2:14-16, where we find first the general sense of "one" (neuter Ev), then the notion of incorporation into the person of Christ (masculine Eva κatvov livepwnov), and finally the image of the body of Christ (neuter tvl awμan).

he choose a word that evokes Israel's unique prerogative of sonship, seems to exclude slaves, and is "masculine-oriented" (i.e., does not normally refer to women)? Why does he not employ a more obviously inclusive expression such as TEKVa (as in Rom 8:16-17) or uiol Kai (as in 2 Cor 6:18)? The answer is simple. It is precisely the "exclusive" sense of that serves as the backdrop for Paul's "inclusive" use of the term. The contrast between the two enables him to indicate the true status of the Christian, which derives from the sonship promised to Israel and is analogous to the privileged status that the world accords to men over women and to free persons over slaves. He thus intends a certain irony in his own "inclusive" use of the "masculine-oriented" term In Christ, Gentiles are as much "sons" as are Jews; slaves are as much "sons" as are freemen; and females are as much "sons" as are males.

When considering the semantics of a word such as it is helpful to distinguish between the paradigmatic axis of meaning and the syntagmatic axis. The former is an abstraction from the multitudinous concrete uses of a word by a given community of speakers or in a given group of texts, as when the various senses of that word are listed in a dictionary or lexicon. The syntagmatic axis refers to the use of a word in a specific speech act or text.[48] The interaction between these two axes can be quite subtle. Thus Paul's use of in Galatians (the syntagmatic axis) certainly respects and builds upon the ways this term was used in the Septuagint and in Greco-Roman society (the paradigmatic axis), but it also bends the term a bit, to ironic effect. As Paul Mankowski notes: "In linguistic terms, there is no such thing as inclusive or exclusive *language.* Language is a vehicle of thought, capable of being steered in any direction by any speaker."[49]

In fact, what is sometimes labeled "exclusive language" is actually the *inclusive use* of terms that in other contexts can refer

[48] The terminology is that of Ferdinand de Saussure and corresponds to Roman Jakobson's polarity between "selection" and "combination" (see Linda R. Waugh, *Roman Jakobson's Science of Language* [Lisse: Peter de Ridder, 1976], 32-36).

[49] Paul Mankowski, S.J., "The Necessary Failure of Inclusive-Language Translations: A Linguistic Elucidation," *The Thomist* 62 (1998): 456.

specifically to males, while the expression "inclusive language" is applied, misleadingly, to the avoidance of the inclusive use of such terms. If in polite company I say, "Man does not live by bread alone," offense might be taken, not because anyone seriously misunderstands me to be referring only to males but precisely because I am using the "masculine-oriented" word "man" *inclusively.* Insofar as there is an external societal pressure upon the speaker to avoid such usage, Mankowski suggests, so-called inclusive language amounts to a sort of "etiquette." [50] We adhere to this etiquette, not out of fear of being misunderstood but so as not to appear boorish.

Does Paul want his female readers in Galatia to "feel included" among his addressees and as members of the Body of Christ? Clearly he does. Better still, he wishes them to *know* that they are included. But it is the overall tenor of his argument (and the truth to which it bears witness) that accomplishes this, not the systematic avoidance of certain words or uses of words. Ironically, the NRSV's imposition of the etiquette of "inclusive language" upon Paul's discourse actually obscures what he is saying about the equal dignity of women and men in Christ! Because Paul's "woman-friendly" message depends largely on the *inclusive use* of a «masculine-oriented" term (uloc;), it simply cannot be translated accurately into "inclusive language."

We are dealing here not with an isolated case of poor translation but with a fatal flaw inherent in the inclusive-language project. Insofar as the NRSV imposes the terms of discourse upon the sacred author, it is doomed to failure. For it is of the very nature of language that a speaker or author-and not least a theologian-must be free to adopt and adapt a vocabulary that is suitable to what he or she wishes to communicate. The role of the reader (or translator) is not to tell the author what words (or senses of words) he or she can or cannot use; rather the reader must attempt to understand what is written *on its own terms.*[51]

[50] Ibid.

[51] In other words, inclusive-language translation fails because it does not respect the distinction between "encoder" and "aecoder." "[F]or the encoder, selection is the antecedent (analytic) operation, while contexture is the subsequent (synthetic) operation, whereas the

Naturally, the author who wishes to be understood may not flout convention (the paradigmatic axis) entirely. But this still leaves plenty of room for innovation (along the syntagmatic axis). The beauty of language is that speakers and writers tend to be highly creative, while listeners and readers have an amazing ability to adjust to that originality. That is why we are often able to understand a new word, a new sense of a word, or a new idiom the first time we hear it. This is the genius of human language, apart from which double entendre, innuendo, metaphor, and poetry would all be impossible.

A simple illustration from everyday spoken language may help. Some years ago I moved to New Orleans, and being a Yankee, encountered many new word uses and idioms. I recall vividly the first time a Louisiana native told me to "have a good evening" at 12:30 in the afternoon. In the interval of perhaps 1.5 seconds between her words and my response ("Thanks-you too!") my mind rapidly processed a series of possibilities, which if spelled out discursively might look like this: "Perhaps she has lost track of time and thinks that it is late afternoon. No, not likely. Could it be some kind of joke-that I should have a good evening but perhaps a miserable afternoon? No, we just met, and she seems serious. Eureka, I have it! In the local dialect 'evening' can refer to anytime after noon!" This sort of intuitive process goes on constantly, every time we encounter a new linguistic innovation. But it operates so rapidly that we are rarely even conscious of it.

Linguistic communication depends on thousands of extremely subtle contextual clues, and our highly agile minds enable us to adjust to them spontaneously. To take another example, imagine that you are sitting in a restaurant and catch just a fragment of the conversation at the next table, in which someone says, "She lost the second set." In a microsecond the incomparable "search engine" with which you are endowed sorts through the dozens of distinct senses-verbal, adjectival, and nominal-that the word

decoder is confronted with the synthesis and proceeds to the analysis" (Waugh, *Roman Jakobson's Science of Language,* 34). Granted that translators fill both roles, they are first and foremost decoders, and even as encoders their primary responsibility is to facilitate, insofar as possible, the reader's decoding of the original communication.

"set" has in Modern English and does the same for the other words in the sentence. You conclude that the conversation is about tennis. And you are almost certainly correct. Of course, it is just possible that it concerns someone's having mislaid a set of china, but this is far less likely.

The problem with inclusive language-especially when it is imposed on a text through translation-is that it works against the normal process of linguistic communication and innovation. It throws a monkey wrench into an extremely sophisticated and delicate mechanism. Inclusive-language translators and their defenders operate under the erroneous assumption that certain "words or phrases" in and of themselves "deny the common dignity of all the baptized."[52] They have adjudged "sons" to be one such term and forbidden Paul to use it inclusively. This is a remarkably naive approach to "the nature of language and translation."

Naturally, a study of fourteen verses in one translation can hardly claim to settle the issue of inclusive language once and for all. Much remains to be said. Strauss complains that critics of inclusive language "have tended to find a few examples of poor translation in a particular version and then draw sweeping conclusions about the inaccuracy of inclusive language." This is unfair, he points out, because all translations contain inaccuracies. "There is no such thing as a perfect translation."[53] That is true, of course. Therefore I have attempted to indicate not only where the NRSV is inaccurate but precisely how and why it has gone astray. If a translation contains an inaccuracy and this is pointed out, we should be able to correct the mistake. But how could the inaccuracies in the NRSV rendering of Galatians 3:23-4:7 be remedied-unless we are willing to forego inclusive language itself and abandon the goal of eliminating "masculine oriented

[52] This expression is taken from *Criteria for the Evaluation of Inclusive Language Translations of Scripture Texts Proposed for Liturgical Use* (no. 17), a document produced by the Joint Committee on Inclusive Language and approved by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in November 1990 (cited favorably in Jensen, "Inclusive Language and the Bible," 14).

[53] Strauss, *Distorting Scripture,* 28.

language" from the biblical text?[54] For it is precisely by means of the "masculine oriented" term uloc; that Paul teaches us about the equal dignity of women and men in Christ.[55]

[54] One might, of course, attempt to employ inclusive language only where it does not obscure the original and leave passages such as Gal 3:23-4:7 in traditional biblical English. There are, however, at least two problems with such a procedure. First, it would require translators to do a thorough exegesis of every single passage with an eye toward identifying those passages that cannot be accurately rendered into inclusive language-a virtually impossible task. (Note that even the translators of the NAB Revised NT, who are rather discriminating in their use of inclusive language and attempt to subordinate it to "fidelity to what the text says" ["Preface to the Revised Edition," 6], have botched Gal 3:23-4:7 in much the same way as have the NRSV translators. See note 15 above.) Second, this procedure would amount to the adoption of two distinct sets of translation principles, introducing a certain unevenness into the discourse and obscuring any number of intertextual connections both within Galatians and between Galatians and other books of Scripture.

[55] My colleagues Andrew Minto, Stephen Hildebrand, and Michael Sicilia read an earlier draft of this article and offered valuable suggestions for its revision. I gratefully acknowledge their contributions without holding them responsible for any remaining deficiencies.

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AUGUSTINE, ARISTOTLE, AND THE *CONFESSIONS*

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THOUGH AUGUSTINE'S FAMILIARITY with Aristotle has in general been well documented, its deeper implications remain unclear.[1] On the one hand, Augustine knew enough about Peripatetic thought to appeal to it when he needed to-so much so, in fact, that in their bitter correspondence Julian of Eclanum mockingly calls *Augustine Aristoteles poenorum.*[2] Unlike several other Church Fathers, Augustine held no disparaging views of Aristotle and generally referred to him with respect. Augustine calls the books of Aristotle "recondite and obscure" *(reconditos et obscuros),* a statement not intended as a criticism, for the point of the passage in which the remark occurs is how to understand the books of the Old Testament, which are also laudably recondite and obscure.[3] Augustine does say at one point that Aristotle is not Plato's equal, but the inferiority in question concerns eloquence-et *eloquio Platoni quidem impar-not* philosophical merit.[4] Indeed, the very idea of starkly contrasting Plato and Aristotle, so natural to us who live in the luminous shadow of Raphael's "School of Athens," would seem exaggerated

[1] Cf. G. Christopher Stead, "Aristoteles," in *Augustinus-Lexicon,* ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe & Co, 1994), 445-48; Michael W. Tkacz, "Aristotle, Augustine's Knowledge of," in *Augustine through the Ages,* ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1999), 58, 59.

[2] Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* 3.199. Citations of Augustine in the footnotes, unless otherwise noted, are to the *Confessions.*

[3] Augustine, *De utilitate credendi* 6.13. It is for this reason that I would disagree with Stead's characterization of this remark as a "complaint" about Aristotle's obscurity (Stead, "Aristoteles," 445).

[4] Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 8.12.

and almost vulgar to Augustine, who writes in his first work as a Christian believer:

> Regarding the education, teaching, and mores by which the soul is taken care of: because there was no lack of the most astute and discerning men to teach in their discussions that Aristotle and Plato harmonize with each other in such a way that [only] to the unlearned and inattentive do they seem to conflict, there has crystallized over many centuries and through many arguments, in my opinion, a single discipline of philosophy most true.[5]

Such a cautious yet sanguine view of the compatibility of Plato and Aristotle does not stray far from the opinion of say, Cicero, who expresses similar sentiments in his dialogues[6] and who even addresses both Plato and Aristotle as friends.[7] What bears noting for our present considerations is that Augustine is hereby appropriating the opinion as his own, an appropriation that may suggest something more than mere trust in his philosophically eclectic predecessors.

On the other hand, however, it is generally agreed that Augustine's knowledge of Aristotelian thought was, as Michael W. Tkacz puts it, "limited and indirect."[8] Latin Christians in the fourth and fifth centuries had hardly any first-hand exposure to Aristotle's original writings except for a few treatises on logic, a paucity that forced thinkers like Augustine to rely on Cicero, Varro, and various Neoplatonists for an avenue into Peripatetic philosophy as a whole.[9] Needless to say, these mediators did not

[5] "Quod autem ad eruditionem doctrinarnque attinet et mores quibus consulitur animae, quia non defuerunt acutissirni et solertissimi viri, qui docerent disputationibus suis Aristotelem ac Platonem ita sibi concinere, ut imperitis minusque attentis dissentire videantur, multis quidem saeculis multisque contentionibus, sed eliquata est, ut opinor, una verissimae philosophiae disciplina" {Augustine, *Contra Academicos* 3.19.42). Except where noted, all translations in this essay are mine.

[6] See Cicero, *Academica* 1.4.17ff., 2.5.15. Cicero's view was also common in Neoplatonism (cf. Stead, "Aristoteles," 445; Tkacz, "Aristotle, Augustine's Knowledge of," 58).

[7] Cicero, *Pro Murena* 31.64.

[8] Tkacz, "Aristotle, Augustine's Knowledge of," 58.

[9] Augustine, of course, also had little direct contact with Plato's dialogues and thus had to rely on the same mediators, but the difference here is that, at least in the case of Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, the mediators primarily saw themselves as disciples in the Platonic tradition. Whether that *ipso facto* makes Neoplatonists a more faithful conduit of Plato's

expound every facet of Aristotle's thought, but only those parts germane to their own objectives. Further, how faithful their teachings about Aristotle were remains an open question. All of this renders Augustine's use of Aristotle-to say nothing of our ability to make accurate judgments of that use-problematic.

There is, however, one Aristotelian work that we know with relative certainty Augustine did read on his own, alone and unaided: the *Categories.* Augustine's interaction with the *Categories,* carefully recounted in the *Confessions,* is more complicated than initially appears, extending as it does far beyond the passage in which it is explicitly discussed. Nevertheless, it is an interaction worth tracing, for the way in which Augustine engages Aristotle's thought in the *Confessions* reveals much about the extent to which and the manner in which he was capable of benefitting from non-Platonic sources. The goal of this essay is to scrutinize that engagement as closely as possible in an effort to better surmise Augustine's relationship to the non-Platonic veins of classical philosophy.

I. THE ABUSE OF THE CATEGORIES

In *Confessions* 4.16.28, Augustine mentions the *Categories* of Aristotle for the first-and nominally the only-time:

> And what did it profit me that, when I was just twenty years old and there came into my hands a certain Aristotelian work called the *Ten Categories,* I read it and understood it, alone? [10]

Such a mastery of the text was no small feat. The *Categories,* which deals with the mental grasp of simple or incomplex things, is itself anything but simple or uncomplicatedo [11] Augustine mentions others who admitted that they barely understood the work even after being helped by the "most learned masters" *(magistris eruditissimis),* masters who not only lectured on it, but

thought is another question.

[10] "et quid mihi proderat quod annos natus ferme viginti, cum in manus meas venissent aristotelica quaedam, quas appellant decem categories ... legi eas solus et intellexi?"

[11] Cf. Aquinas, *In Post. Anal.,* proem., n. 4.

who "drew many [diagrams] in the dust" *(sed mu/ta in pulvere depingentibus)* in an effort to explain it (4.16.28). Yet these privileged students could not tell Augustine anything that he had not already discovered on his own. "What the book was saying," Augustine writes, "seemed clear enough to me" *(satis aperte mihi videbantur loquentes* (ibid.).

For the young Augustine, comprehending a difficult subject matter without any assistance was thus a cause of glee, especially since several of his instructors and their pupils were eager but unable to make a similar boast. Yet by the time he writes the *Confessions,* Augustine realizes that his easy grasp of the *Categories* was an occasion for downfall, puffing up his pride and hindering his return to God.

> What did this profit me, seeing that it harmed me when, imagining that whatever had being was included within these ten categories, I tried in this way to understand even you, my God, wonderfully simple and immutable?[12]

The *Categories,* it appears, led Augustine down the erroneous path of trying to fit God into one of the *praedicamenta* of substance, quality, quantity, etc. There thus seems to be ample reason to concur with James D. O'Donnell's conclusion that for Augustine, the "theoretical instruments" of Aristotle were "defective" by virtue of Aristotle's "ignorance of the truth about God."[13]

Nevertheless, on the basis of the testimony of the *Confessions,* it is perhaps safer to conclude that the defects in question belong more to the young Augustine than to Aristotle. Augustine does not offer a direct critique of the *Categories,* stressing instead his own culpability in whatever errors they may have occasioned. He was the one, not Aristotle, who persisted in imagining that whatever had being was to be placed in one of the categories. And he was the one who did so out of the impression that God was someone or something "subject to His own greatness or beauty, so that they

[12] "quid hoc mihi proderat, quando et oberat, cum etiam te, deus meus, mirabiliter simplicem atque incommutabilem, illis decem praedicamentis putans quidquid esset omnino comprehensum, sic intellegere conarer?" (4.16.29).

[13] James O'Donnell, *Augustine Confessions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 2:266. O'Donnell posits that the *Categories* are mentioned here to account for the bad thinking that will culminate in Augustine's book *de pulchro et apto* (ibid.).

were in Him as in a subject, as in bodies" *(quasi et tu subiectus esses magnitudini tuae aut pulchritudini, ut illa essent in te quasi in subiecto sicut in corpore)* (4.16.29). Such a carnal conception of God can hardly be associated with the *Categories,* which does not treat of being *qua* being or intelligible realities *per se,* let alone deity.[14] But it is much associated with the young Augustine, who continually struggled with metaphysical materialism until he read the books of the Platonists.[15] Augustine's conclusion to book 4 sums up nicely the thrust of his point here: none of the ostensibly good things to which he had been exposed, whether Aristotle or the liberal arts, could be of any use to as long as he held that God was a sort of luminous body (4.16.31).

If this is the case, Augustine's discussion of the *Categories* is not a condemnation of Peripatetic thought but an illustration of his own depravity at that time in his life. For though Augustine understood (or should have understood) that the *Categories* was not about God, he nevertheless, out of pride and vanity, used the work to misconceive God. This ties into one of the cardinal themes of the *Confessions-that* only the humble truly reach God-but it also explains why the reading of the *Categories* is brought up in book 4, despite the fact that the incident took place six or seven years earlier than the events recounted in that book. For the central theme of book 4 is what Augustine refers to as the "pride of life" *(ambitio saeculi)* (10.30.41). Book 4 begins with Augustine's pride in the liberal arts and ends on the same point. And it is in this same book that Augustine mentions that he was being rebuffed by God because God "resists the proud" *(superbis resistis)* (4.16.26). Augustine's treatment of the *Categories* is, in

[14] The *Categories,* it should be remembered, is concerned with the various ways to predicate the presence of concrete things, especially with respect to human beings and animals. Harold P. Cooke notes as much in introducing his English translation of the work: "Hence we may infer that when Aristotle lays down the Ten Categories ... the Subject which he has wholly, or at least principally, in his mind is an individual Man" (Aristotle, *The Organon,* trans. Harold P. Cooke [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938], 3, 4).

[15] Cf. Roland J. Teske, "Heresy and Imagination in St. Augustine," *Studia Patristica* 27 (1991): 400-405; Joseph Torchia, O.P., *Creatio ex nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine: The Anti-Manichean Polemic and Beyond* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), esp. chapters 2 and 3.

fact, primarily in terms of pride, first as an occasion of pride in others, and then in himself (4.16.28, 29). [16]

IL THE *CONFESSIONS'* PATTERN OF ABUSE AND REUSE

The theme of *Confessions* 4.16.28 and 29, then, is not the demerits of Aristotle's *Categories,* but Augustine's misuse of those *Categories,* a misuse precipitated on the one hand by his lack inteUectual would have enabled to differentiate material and spiritual substances-and on the other by his lack of moral conversion, which would have granted him the humility to approach God in a more fertile manner. Such a depiction is significant, for it not only betokens Augustine's lack of animus against Aristotle, but it forms part of a broader pattern in the *Confessions* that discloses precisely how Augustine is using his literary sources. That pattern, to which we now must turn, is encoded in the structure of books 1through9.

As several scholars have noted, the first nine books of the *Confessions* (the narration of Augustine's past) are arranged chiasticaHy, with the middle of the middle book serving as the pivot of its two wings. [17] In the first half of the chiasm (1.1.1-5.7.13) Augustine is spiraling downward away from God, while in the second half (5.8.14-9.13.37) he gradually returns to God. The "'direction"' in which Augustine is going has an enormous bearing on how weH he is able to relate to what is around him. For example, Frederick Crosson speculates that one

[16] Interestingly enough, the same point emerges in Augustine's arguments against Julian in the *Contra Iulianum.* Julian, a talented but rather arrogant young man, proudly cites the *Categories* several times to justify his positions (see C. *Jul.* L4.12; 2.10.37; 3.2.7). Augustine replies that while his understanding of the *Categories* is correct, Julian is misusing it (ibid., 5.14.51; 6.20.64).

[17] Cf. Frederick Crosson, "Structure and Meaning in St. Augustine's *Confessions,"* in *The Ethics of Having Children,* Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 63, ed. Lawrence P. Schrenk (Washington, D.C.: ACPA, 1990), 86-97; David J. Leigh, "Augustine's *Confessions* as a Circular Journey," *Thought* 60 (March 1985): 73-88; and William A. Stephany, "Thematic Structure in Augustine's *Confessions," Augustinian Studies* 20 (1989): 129-42. Stephany's findings are also summarized by Robert McMahon in *Augustine's Prayerful Ascent: An Essay on the Literary Form of the Confessions* (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 136-40.

of the reasons there are hardly any proper names of acquaintances in the first half of the historical narrative and an abundance of names in the second half is that it dramatizes how Augustine's flight from God is also a flight from authentic friendship, while his return to God also marks a return to community. [18] Augustine is capable of relating well to the people around him only when his right relation to God is restored.

What is true for people in Augustine's life is also true for external goods: things that are dismissed in the earlier part of the *Confessions* as occasions or instruments of sin have a strange tendency of reemerging later in the work in a more positive light. The things in question can be places, such as bathhouses (in book 2 they are the scene of Patricius's vulgar boasts about his son's pubescence but in book 9 they enable a bereaved Augustine to weep for his deceased mother). [19] They can be objects, such as a fig tree (Augustine foolishly believes that Manichean elders have power over theophorous weeping figs in book 3, while in book 8 Augustine, before reading the theocentric passages of St. Paul, wisely sheds real tears under a fig tree). [20] They can also be activities: in book 4 Augustine rejects the bibliomancy of randomly reading a verse for personal guidance, yet this is precisely what he does in response to the voice admonishing him to "take and read" in book 8.[21] And they can even be languages: in book 1 Augustine says he had little use for Greek as a boy, while in book 9 is found the only Greek word used in the *Confessions*[22] (a delightfully subtle confirmation of the chiastic thesis as well as an answer to Augustine's prayer-made,

[18] Crosson, "Structure and Meaning in St. Augustine's *Confessions*," 88ff. Monica, for instance, is not named until *Conf.* 9.12.32, nor are Augustine's mistress and the dear friend who died in book 4 ever named. Beginning in book 6, however, the names of numerous friends begin to appear-Alypius, Simplicianus, Victorinus, et al.

[19] 2.3.6; 9.12.32.

[20] 3.10.16; 8.12.28.

[21] 4.3.5; 8.12.29. Augustine even goes out of his way to say that he took St. Paul's epistle off of a "gaming table" (/usoria)(8.6.14).

[22] The word is f3al.avEiov-a bath (9.12.32). Augustine mentions it in order to explain its etymological meaning as something that drives out (f3a
3.4.8 Augustine also discusses the meaning of another Greek term, "philosophy," but most manuscripts have this word in its Latinized form.

significantly, when he discusses his boyhood aversion to Greek-that he may use well whatever he has learned) (1.15.24).

Though it might be tempting to read in all this an inconsistency, what this chiastically grounded tandem reveals is a dynamic pattern of godless "misuse" and godly "reuse," where the good use of things is contingent on the degree to which the user has been morally, intellectually, and religiously converted. When Augustine, unconverted and unrepentant, is spiraling away from God in the first half of the narrative, he abuses all of the things around him because, with his own desires in a state of turmoil, he is incapable of using anything properly. Conversely, when he begins his ascent back to God in the second half through a multiform and ongoing conversion, the very things that were once "deadly" to him may now serve as occasions of grace rather than sin since his soul has now gained the wherewithal to make good use of them. Augustine's narrative, in other words, is driven at least in part by a poetics of use and abuse that in many cases has more to do with the agent than with the object, with the condition of the user than with the qualities of what is being used.

Augustine's use and abuse of books--one of the most salient and constituent themes of the *Confessions-is* no exception to this rule. Just as the very items or activities that led Augustine down a path of misery are the same ones that, when reordered, help him in his return to God, so too are the same authors who initially seem so harmful or useless to him "redeemed" in his eyes once his eyes have been healed and strengthened to see things properly. In book 1 Terence is a blight for introducing the rapist who follows Jove as a "model of fornication" *(exemplum stupri),* yet the same playwright proves quite useful in framing the question that Augustine answers so eloquently in book 10: "Why does truth engender hatred?" *(cur autem veritas parit odium).*[23] Vergil is castigated in book 1 for his romantic tale of Dido and Aeneas, yet the *Aeneid* makes several reappearances in the *Confessions,* the scene in book 5 of Augustine leaving Monica weeping at the shores (Augustine's imitation of the dramatic climax of Dido and

[23] 1.16.26; 10.23.34.

Aeneas's affair) being only the most prominent.[24] In book 3 Cicero's *Hortensius,* through no fault of its own, sets the stage for Augustine's initial misreading of Scripture and for his entering into the Manichean sect, but its reuse at Cassiciacum helps him and his friends prepare for their baptism in book 9.[25]

III. THE REUSE OF THE *CATEGORIES*

The same is true for Aristotle's appearance in the *Confessions.* Though the *Categories* initially serves as a stumbling-block for an intellectually and morally proud Augustine, it silently reemerges several times later in the *Confessions* to be better utilized by an older and wiser Augustine. First, several of Augustine's own conjectures about time in book 11 resonate with the Aristotelian teaching found in the *Categories-for* example, that time is a continuous quantity *(Categ.* 4b25; cf. *Con{.* 11.26.33), that no part of it continues to exist *(Categ.* 5a27; cf. *Con{.* 11.27.34, 35), and that it is therefore similar in its nature to speech *(Categ.* 5a35; cf. *Con{.* 11.27.34).[26] Second, the driving question of the

[24] 1.13.20-22; 5.8.15 (cf. Virgil, *Aeneid,* 4.576ff.). Other scenes include, but are not limited to, Augustine's journey to Carthage (3.1.1; cf. *Aeneid* 4), Augustine's rejection of marriage as incompatible with his mission (6.12.21; cf. *Aeneid* 4.440, 449), and Monica as Euryalus's mother (6.1.1; cf. *Aeneid* 9.491-96). Cf. Camille Bennett, "The Conversion of Vergil: The *Aeneid* in Augustine's *Confessions," Revue des etudes augustiniennes* 34 (1988): 65ff.; and J. J. O'Meara, "Augustine the Artist and the *Aeneid,"* in *Melanges offerts a Mademoiselle Christine Mohrmann* (Utrecht: Spectrum Editeurs, 1963), 259, 260.

[25] 3.4.7-6.10; 9.4.7. Though it is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the question further, it is at least noteworthy that these incidents of proper reuse are almost always "silent." Terence is named in book 1 but not in book 10, Cicero in book 3 but not in book 9. Indeed, the *Confessions* has a palinodic quality, where the first word is not the last and the last word is not always pronounced.

[26] Augustine could have taken these notions from other sources-Porphyry explains them in his *Commentary on the Categories* (see 103.19-33; 104.34-105.10)-but such conjecture may be unnecessary given the fact that we know Augustine read the *Categories* himself. It should also be added that using several tenets of Aristotle's teaching on time by no means implies complete agreement with the whole of that teaching.

On a related note, there are echoes of Aristotelian thought in book 11 of the *Confessions* in addition to that which comes from the *Categories.* Cf. C. G. Niarchos, "Aristotelian and PlotinianlnfluencesonSt.Augustine's Views of Time," *Philosophia* 15-16 (1985-1986): 332-51; Robert C. Trundle, "St. Augustine's Epistemology: An Ignored Aristotelian Theme and its Intriguing Anticipations," *Laval theologiqueet philosophique* 50 (February 1994): 187-205.

Categories-how to predicate the presence of things-forms part of the backdrop against which Augustine answers one of the driving questions of the *Confessions:* how to understand the presence of God, be it in the events of one's life, in one's memory, in time/eternity, in nature, in history, or itself. Augustine's condusions about divine presence are manifold, but one thread that runs throughout is the understanding that God's presence is, in the strict sense of the word, unique. The *Confessions,* then, can be seen as a sustained illustration of Augustine's insight at the end of book 4 that God does not fit into any the categories of human reasoning (God is not an individuated substance; he has no quantity, quality, etc.). This insight does not deny validity of the categories; indeed there is a way in which one must rely on them in order to show how God utterly transcends them. But what it does do is set into sharp relief, by way of *apophasis,* the ineffable presence of God. In this respect the placement of Aristotle's *Categories* at the end of book 4 not only crystallizes the problem of encountering and thematizing God's presence (thus setting the stage for its eventual resolution in books 7 through 10), but functions as an important foil for demonstrating what we do not mean when we say, "God is present."

The dearest and most significant reuse of Aristotle, however, occurs in *Confessions* 12.29.40, where Augustine lifts Aristotle's discussion of the four kinds of priority from *Categories* 14a25-

In that section of the *Categories,* Aristotle examines what it means to say that one thing is prior to another. Initially, he posits that there are four possibilities: (1) priority of time (KaTa xpovov), where A is said to be to B if it is older than or came before B *(Categ.* 14a27); (2) priority of existence or being (Kma Tilv Tou dvm), where A is prior to B if A's existence foHows from B's, but B's does not follow from A's *(Categ.* 14a30-3 (3) priority of arrangement (KaTa where one thing is said to prior to another according to some order, such as letters being prior to syHables *(Categ.* 14b1); and (4) priority of nature (tjluau;), where one thing is said to be prior to another if it is honored more *(Categ.* 14b5). Aristotle, however, does not seem entirely happy with the fourth priority, remarking this is how

"the many" (ol rroi\i\ol) tend to speak. (Perhaps this is why he goes on to describe it as the most different from, or "alien to" (di\i\OTptuhaTOc;), the others *[Categ.* 14b7].) Aristotle's ambivalence is compounded by his unexpectedly adding a fifth priority, one in which "of two things whose existence follows from each other ... one which is in any way the cause of the other is prior by nature to it" *(Categ.* 14b 10).[27] The example Aristotle gives is the *fact* that a man exists and the *statement* "A man exists." Both follow from each other but do not reciprocally cause each other, for the fact causes the statement to be true, not vice versa. Significantly, Aristotle also refers to the fifth kind as a priority by nature (cpumc;).

The odd way in which Aristotle lists the priorities serves two purposes. First, his ambivalence about the fourth priority underscores its dubious status as a natural priority. To honor one thing more than another is indeed a kind of priority, but it is a priority of human convention or whim, not nature. By stating that priority of honor is what is *thought* to be prior by nature by ordinary men and women, Aristotle is implicitly drawing our attention to the difficulty that the vast majority of human beings have in properly differentiating personal or conventional opinions about reality from reality itself. What the many consider natural is, upon deeper reflection, often revealed to be nothing more than personal or cultural bias" On the other hand, the kind of priority, the kind that is grasped by someone capable of differentiating different modes of being (i.e., a philosopher), is truly "natural." Further, by listing the fifth priority separately as he does, Aristotle underscores its differences from the first four. Unlike the other kinds of priority, which compare simple things to each other, the fifth is a comparison of things with different modes, of a thing existing in reality and a truth existing in the mind.[28]

[27] The full statement is, "Twv yap avnOTpE<j>OVTWVKaTa TOU d vm OKOAOU0T]av TO a(nov cmwaouv 0mEp<fl TOU dvm npOTEpov £iKOTW<; Tfj <j>uan *t.f:yolT'* av" (Aristotle, *Categories and Propositions,* trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle [Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1980]).

[28] See John J. Cleary, *Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority* (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2002), 29.

In book 12 of the *Confessions* Augustine also lists four kinds of priority: eternity *(aeternitas),* time *(tempus),* choice *(electio),* and origin *(origo)* (12.29.40). He describes them in the following way:

> [Something is said to be prior by] eternity, as God [is prior all things; by time, as the flower [is prior to] the fruit; choice, as the fruit [is prior to] the flower; by origin, as the sound [is prior to] the song.[29]

these chapters Augustine has been canvassing a number of different orthodox interpretations of Genesis 1:1 and 1:2, an endeavor which yidds no definitive condusions about the meaning of the text but which at least demonstrates the legitimacy of interpretative pluraHty.[30] The priorities are introduced in an attempt to clarify one such valid interpretation, the opinion that the verse "In the beginning God made" means "First God made" (12.28.38). In order to avoid a possible contradiction with the rest of the Genesis passage, the subscriber to this view would need to understand "first" in a non-temporal sense-hence the need to explore different notions of priority.

Despite differences in nomenclature, a comparison of Aristotle's and Augustine's lists reveals striking similarities. Augustine, for example, keeps Aristotle's initial topography of four priorities[31] but readily accepts Aristode's unstated demotion of the fourth, the so-called priority by nature, to a priority of human whim. Thus in his own list Augustine will refer to the "priority of choice" *(electio)* and give as an example the fact that most men and women will choose the delicious and nutritious fruit over the pretty but useless flower. There is also a strong affinity, if not identity, between Augustine's "priority of origin" and Aristotle's "priority of order." Not only is Augustine's example of sound and song comparable to Aristotle's example of

[29] "aeternitate, sicut deus omnia; tempore, sicut flos fructum; electione, sicut fructus florem; origine, sicut sonus cantum" (12.29.40).

[30] Augustine here does not seem to have any particular set of "opponents" or even interlocutors in mind, as none of the various positions he mentions were commonly associated with any recognizable Christian or even Manichean authorities (cf. O'Donnell, *Augustine Confessions,* 3:316-17, 328, 329).

[31] Augustine most likely does not mention the fifth priority because its subject matter is not relevant to his present concerns.

letter and syllable, but his renaming of it in terms of ongm conforms to Aristotle's treatment of this priority as a logical ordering of first principles and propositions, the former of which constitutes the starting point for the latter.[32] Even the priorities most distinct from each other, Aristotle's "priority of existence" and Augustine's "priority of eternity," betray an intriguing compatibility. For Aristotle, the priority of existence means that A's existence follows from B's, but B's does not follow from A's. Were one to substitute "God" and "all things" (the two referents Augustine uses to exemplify the priority of eternity) for A and B, one would arrive at the following statement:

> God is prior to all things as God's existence follows from the existence of all things, but the existence of all things does not follow from God's existence.

Such a compatibility by no means suggests that the two priorities are the same; on the contrary, as A Solignac, S.J., notes in his explication of 12.29.40, the priority of eternity is the only one of Augustine's priorities that requires a uniquely Christian view of God "immutably creating mutable beings."[33] But if this is the case, then Augustine's priority of eternity would mark a development of Aristotle's priority of existence in light of divine revelation. Thanks to the proficiency wrought by his ongoing conversions, Augustine has indeed learned to make good use of the *Categories.*

IV. POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES

Before proceeding any further, however, I should point out that there are two possible difficulties with my contention that *Confessions* 12.29AO includes a silent but salient use of chapter 12 of Aristotle's *Categories.* First, given Augustine's liberal use of Neoplatonic sources, it may be more likely that he took the

[32] Augustine's development of this priority in terms of matter and form ("sonus eius materies eius est ... formatur ... ut cantus sit [12.29.40]) most likely accounts for his changing the name.

[33] "La priorite selon l'eternite comporte en effet que !'on saisisse le paradoxe d'un Dieu creant immuablement des etres muables; c'est une priorite *de transcendance" (CEuvresde Saint Augustin,* vol. 14 [Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1962], 612 n. 26).

foundation for his theories on priority from some work other than the *Categories*. This would explain, for instance, his alteration of the Aristotelian order of the categories listed in book 4 from "substance, quantity, and quality" to "substance, quality, and quantity," the latter order being the one transmitted by one or more veins of the Neoplatonic tradition.[34] It is certainly true that Augustine could have culled the different meanings of "first" from such sources, although concrete evidence is wanting. Porphyry's *Commentary on the Categories* and *Isagoge,* both of which are dedicated to an analysis of Aristotle's *Categories,* make no mention of the priorities, and neither does Plotinus' s *Enneads;* for that matter, none of the great investigators of Augustine's sources-namely, Pierre Courcelle, Harold Hagendahl, John J. O'Meara, Robert O'Connell, and James D. O'Donnell-have ever drawn a connection between 12.29.40 and a Platonic text. Yet even if a Neoplatonic derivation is possible, it is still not unreasonable to turn first to the *Categories* as a likely source for Augustine's views on priority, as this is the only relevant book that we know Augustine read. (Which Neoplatonic works he read, on the other hand, remains a hotly contested point.[35]) Nor would our hypothesis preclude a Neoplatonic influence. For if Augustine's list of the categories in 4.16.28 betrays a Neoplatonic hermeneutic (which to some scholars, incidentally, is a big "if"), then this merely establishes that Augustine's memory or appropriation of Aristotle was affected to some degree by his interaction with Neoplatonism. The same dynamic could be operative in his knowledge of the priorities without in any way denying that Aristotle is his primary, albeit quasi-mediated, interlocutor.

The second difficulty concerns the consensus among modern scholars that the last five chapters of the *Categories* (which include

[34] Cf. O'Donnell, *Augustine Confessions,* 2:265.

[35] Cf. Pier Franco Beatrice, *"Quosdam Platonicorum Libras:* The Platonic Readings of Augustine in Milan," *Vigiliae Christianae* 43 (1989): 248-81; Frederick Van Fleteren, "Plato, Platonism," in *Augustine through the Ages,* 651-54; R. H. Nash, "Some Philosophic Sources of Augustine's Illumination Theory," *Augustinian Studies* 2 (1971): 47-66; O'Donnell, *Augustine Confessions,* 2:416-17.

the discussion on the priorities) are spurious. [36] This may indeed be the case, but what is essential for our purposes is not whether Aristotle wrote 11b15-15b32 of the *Categories* (dubbed the *postpraedicamenta),* but whether Augustine *thought* that Aristotle wrote them. Based on the evidence we have of late-fourth-century views on the Aristotelian corpus, it seems relatively safe to conclude that Augustine did indeed consider the *post-praedicamenta* genuine. It is generally acknowledged that Andronicus, a Peripatetic editor from the first century B.C., knew of the last five chapters [37] and that subsequent commentators on the *Categories-for* example, Dexippus (early 4th century A.D.), Arnmonius (5th century), Philoponus (mid-5th century), and Simplicius (early 6th century)-either wrote on these sections or alluded to them. [38] Porphyry also knew of the *postpraedicamenta* and considered them authentic. [39] This being the case, when the *Ten Categories* came into Augustine's hands, the work almost certainly included 11b15-15b3 2, all of it dutifully ascribed to Aristotle.

V. CONCLUSION

Augustine's use of Aristotle in the *Confessions* is not only consistent with his qualified appreciation of the philosopher in the rest of his writings, but it also suggests an engagement with Aristotelian philosophy that extends more deeply than has generally been recognized. Through a dexterous return to the *Categories,* Augustine was able to overcome the pitfalls of his adolescent arrogance by taking Aristotle's teachings on time and priority and weaving them into his own mature reflections on these topics in books 11 and 12 of the *Confessions.* This, of course, does not render Augustine an "Aristotelian" any more than Thomas Aquinas's frequent appeal to the writings of pseudo-

[36] Cf. L. Minio-Paluello, *Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione* (Oxford, 1949) v, vi.

[37] Cf. Simplicius, *Commentarius in Aristotelis Categoriae,* 379.8.

[38] Cf. 17.7-9; 93.9-12; 167.21-168.3; 379.8ff, respectively, of each author's *Commentary on the Categories.*

[39] Cf. Simplicius, *Comm. in Aris. Categ.,* 379.13.

Dionysius him a "Neoplatonist." But it does attest to a certain resourcefulness and independence of mind on Augustine's part, to say nothing of a bold willingness to fuse together diverse schools of thought. For that matter, Augustine's "synthesis" of different philosophical traditions may even suggest a greater compatibility between Aristotle and Plato than our own stereotypes currently allow. than disregarding Augustine's conclusions about the recondite harmony of classical philosophy's twin giants as the aping of a Ciceronian or Plotinian tenet (both of these authors being themselves often unjustly dismissed as "edectic"), [40] Augustine's position on the Academy and the Lyceum may be one that merits our serious consideration"

[40] The very term "eclectic," in fact, does not fully deserve its disparaging connotations. Cf. Pierlugi Donini, "The History of the Concept of Eclecticism," in *The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy,* ed. John M. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 15-33.

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A LONG DISCUSSION REGARDING STEVEN A. LONG'S INTERPRETATION OF THE MORAL SPECIES

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LIKE STEVEN LONG[1] I am disturbed by the view maintaining that crushing a baby's skull is not necessarily an act of killing the baby; yet I am unconvinced by his counter analysis of Aquinas. The difficulty concerns the nature-or the moral species-of a doctor's act when she performs a craniotomy in order to save the life of the mother. Is the doctor's action a resizing of the head or a killing of the baby? Aquinas, of course, does not discuss craniotomies, but Long thinks he may find an answer to the difficulty in Aquinas's discussion of self-defense. After all, the problem is more general than craniotomies, encompassing the nature of all moral actions. What is, for example, the moral nature of the act of killing in self-defense? Is it a killing in order to save one's life or is it a repelling of the attack, with the side-effect of the assailant's death?

In what follows, I do not dispute many of Long's criticisms of the view he opposes, but I do dispute his own interpretation of Aquinas. He has attempted to construct a theory from a few difficult passages, while he has failed to address the many passages that might call his view into question. I propose, therefore, to do three things. First, I will lay out Long's view; second, I will show that his view cannot be reconciled with Aquinas's; and finally, I

[1] See Steven A. Long, "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas," *The Thomist* 67 (2003): 45-71.

will tentatively suggest the direction to go for a better interpretation. [2]

I. LONG'S VIEW

The dispute focuses on the text of *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7, in which Aquinas discusses self-defense. Aquinas claims that the defender can intend to preserve her own life, but she cannot intend to kill the assailant. The relevant passages are worth quoting:

> Nothing hinders one action from having two effects, one of which is within intention and the other of which is outside intention. But moral actions receive their species according to that which is intended, and not from that which is outside intention, since this is *per accidens,* as is plain from what has been said. From an act of self-defense, then, two effects can follow: the preservation of one's own life and the killing of the assailant. Acts of this sort, if what is intended is the preservation of one's own life, do not have the formality of being unlawful, since it is natural to anything to preserve its own existence insofar as it can....
>
> It is unlawful for a man to intend to kill a man in order to defend himself, except for those who have public authority, who while intending to kill a man for self-defense, refer this act to the public good, as is plain for soldiers fighting the enemy, or for a minister of the judge fighting against robbers, although even these sin if they are moved by private desires.[3]

[2] Many, of course, have written extensively on the nature of moral actions in Aquinas, including Servais Pinckaers, "La role de la fin dans !'action morale selon Saint Thomas," in *Le renouveau de la morale* (Paris-Tournai, 1964); Stephen L. Brock, *Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998); Eric D'Arcy, *Human Acts: An Essay in their Moral Evaluation* (Oxford: Clarenden Press. 1963); and (at least in a Thomistic vein) G. E. M. Anscombe, *Intention (Id* ed.; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1963).

[3] *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7: "Nihil prohibet unius actus esse duos effectus, quorum alter solum sit in intentione, alius vero sit praeter intentionem. Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter intentionem, cum sit per accidens, ut ex supradictis patet. Ex actu igitur alicuius seipsum defendentis duplex effectus sequi potest, unus quidem conservatio propriae vitae; alius autem occisio invadentis. Actus igitur huiusmodi ex hoc quod intenditur conservatio propriae vitae, non habet rationem illiciti, cum hoc sit cuilibet naturale quod se conservet in esse quantum potest. ... Illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat, nisi ei qui habet publicam auctoritatem, qui, intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem, refert hoc ad publicum bonum, ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis pugnante contra

The uncontroversial first claim, that it is legitimate to intend to preserve one's own life, poses no difficulty, but the second claim, that the defender cannot intend to kill the assailant, has generated much controversy, largely over the meaning of the word 'intend'. Some say that intention includes the means aimed at, and therefore in self-defense one can in no way legitimately aim to kill, either as an end or as a means, but Long claims that in this text 'intention' refers only to intention of the end, which is Aquinas's primary meaning of intention. On Long's reading, then, Aquinas is saying that one cannot intend to kill as an end, but it might be permissible to kill as a means to the goal of saving one's life. In favor of his interpretation Long cites many passages in which Aquinas says that intention concerns the end while choice is of the means. "Just as intention concerns the end, so choice concerns those that are ordered to the end."[4]

The act of self-defense, then, may have two effects, the preservation of one's life and the death of the assailant. While one can intend (as an end) to preserve one's life, it is impermissible to intend to kill (as an end) in order to save oneself. It is permissible, according to Long's interpretation, to choose to kill as a means. The proscription applies only to intention, not to choice, and therefore only to the end and not to the means. Long's idea seems to be something like the following: killing is legitimate if one chooses it as a necessary but unwelcome means to achieve the good goal of preserving one's life, but one cannot begin to want the assailant's death as something desirable in itself, apart from its utility in saving. As long as one desires the killing simply as a means, it does not give moral species to the action, for it is not intended, and so the action falls under the species of self-preservation. But when one begins to desire the killing as an end, as something desirable apart from its utility, then it is intended and the action falls under the unlawful species of killing.

latrones. Quamvis et isti etiarn peccent si privata libidine moveantur."

[4] *STh* I-II, q. 13, a. 4: "Sicut intentio est finis, ita electio est eorum quae sunt ad finem.'" Also see *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3. In *STh* I-II, q. 8, intro., Aquinas lists intention as an action that concerns the end, and in *STh* I-II, q. 13, intro.; *ITh* I-II, q. 13, a. 3; and *ScG* III, c. 6, he states that intention does not concern the means.

This interpretation seems to imply the unacceptable conclusion that the means never give moral species to an action, and that many wrong actions can be justified on the basis of good intentions. Robin Hood, for example, does not intend to steal, for he desires it only as a means to give to the poor; his action, therefore, is not specified as theft, as almsgiving. Similar arguments can be made for just about any action, from adultery to murder. Long's position, it seems, reduces to a morality of intention, an Abdardianism in which only a person's goals determine the good or evil of her actions, the actions themselves never playing a role in morality.

Long is ready with a reply to this difficulty. He says that the means chosen do in fact give species to human actions, for the action chosen as a means has its own object its own natural order to some end, from which it receives its species. There are two sources of the species of human actions, namely, the object of the action and the end intended by the agent. The action of theft has its own object and gives species to the action, no matter the intentions of Robin Hoodo

At this point, it seems that Long is getting himself into deeper water, for he is trying to interpret a text that states that what is outside intention does not give species. Long claims that the means is outside intention, but then he goes on to daim that the means does in fact give species. In other words, he says that what is outside intention gives species, when the very text he is trying to understand explicitly states the opposite. Long's attempt to extricate himself from this perplexity is rather convoluted. Nevertheless, he reaches a coherent position, however much he must stretch the text of *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7 to do so.

Without ever referring us to any text or passage of Aquinas, Long relies upon a teaching that undoubtedly arises from *STh* I-H, q. 18, aa. 6 and 7. As Long puts it, "When the object [of an action] is naturally ordered to the end, then the moral species derived from the end is the defining species."[5] Or as Aquinas says,

[5] Long, "Object of the Moral Act," 58.

When the object is not *per se* ordered to the end, then the specific difference from the object is not *per se* determinative of the species from the end, and vice versa. It follows that one of these species is not under the other, but the moral act is under two disparate species, for example, we say that he who steals in order to commit adultery, commits two evils in one act. On the other hand, if the object is *per se* ordered to the end, one of the differences is *per se* determinative of the other, and one of the species will be contained under the other. [6]

Aquinas goes on to say that the species from the object is contained under the species from the end.

We have, then, Long's two sources of moral species, the object and the end; we have the idea of the object being naturally (or *per se)* ordered to the end; and we have the idea of the species from the end being the defining species. Unfortunately, it is still far from evident how this teaching is supposed to get Long out of his dilemma. Add one further teaching-that killing is sometimes naturally ordered to self-preservation-and we are still left in the fog. Long derives this last teaching, plausibly enough, from the fourth reply of *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7. The objection says that no one is allowed to commit adultery or to fornicate in order that he may save his own life. Since killing is worse than either of these sins, then neither can someone kill to save his own life. Aquinas responds that, "The act of fornication or of adultery is not ordered of necessity to preserving one's own life, as is the act from which killing sometimes follows." [7]

We have yet to see how these ideas are supposed to reconcile the claims that what is outside intention does not give species, yet the means, which is outside intention, does give species. Let us

[6] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 7: "Sic igitur quando obiectum non est per se ordinatum ad finem, differentia specifica quae est ex obiecto, non est per se determinativa eius quae est ex fine, nee e converso. Uncleuna istarum specierum non est sub alia, sed tune actus moralis est sub duabus speciebus quasi disparatis. Unde dicimus quod ille qui furatur ut moechetur, committit duas malitias in uno actu. Si vero obiectum per se ordinetur ad finem, una dictarum differentiarum est per se determinativa alterius. Uncleuna istarum specierum continebitur sub altera." Aquinas does not use Long's wording of "naturally ordered to an end"; rather, he speaks of something being *"per se* ordered to an end."

[7] *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, ad 4: "Dicendum quod actus fornicationis vel adulterii non ordinatur ad conservationem propriae vitae ex necessitate, sicut actus ex quo quandoque sequitur homicidium."

begin by considering the ideal case in which the act of killing is naturally ordered to the end of self-preservation, and in which the defender chooses to only as a means, without intending to kiH as an end (which is precisely the case that Long thinks is justified by *STh* II-H, qo 64, ao 7)o The means gives us the species of killing, the end intended gives us the species of self-preservation, but since the object of killing is naturally ordered to the end, it follows that its species is not entirely disparate; rather, it falls under the species of self-preservationo The species from the object serves merely to narrow the defining species of self-defense, which is derived from the end, into something like 'lethal self-defense' o[8] What matters is that it remains, in species, an act of self-defense, which Aquinas explicitly states is legitimate.

Now suppose that the defender wants to kill not simply as a means but as an end. No longer can his act of killing fall under the species of self-defenseo Rather, killing is intended and so becomes an independent species of its own, which Aquinas states is unlawfuL

Finally, consider the act of fornication as used to preserve one's own life (eog., one is threatened with death if one does not fornicate)o Suppose that the person chooses to fornicate only as a means, and no way intends it as an end. Can we then say that fornication is legitimate because it falls under the broader species of self-defense, so that it becomes 'fornicating self-defense'? No, we cannot, for fornication is not naturally ordered to preserving one's life, so it, like the instance of stealing in order to commit adultery, must give rise to an entirely separate specieso Similarly, if some act of killing were not properly proportioned to self-preservation, it would not simply narrow the defining species of self-defense, but would generate its own species, which again would be unlawful.

We have, then, three cases. The act of kiHing is naturally ordered to self-defense and it is not intended as an end; then we have a single species of lethal self-defenseo (2) The act of killing is naturaHy ordered to self-defense, it is intended as a good in

[8] Long, "Object of the Moral Act," 64.

itself; then we have killing as an independent species of its own, not falling under self-defense. (3) The act of killing (or fornicating) is not naturally ordered to self-defense, so that even if it were chosen merely as a means it would nevertheless give rise to an independent species of its own. Because self-defense is an acceptable act, the first case, which falls under the species of self-defense, is morally good. Since a private individual cannot kill (as an action with its own independent species), it follows that the second two cases are evil. Long, by the way, fits the craniotomy case, in which the doctor crushes the head of the baby (and so kills the baby) in the third case; killing the baby is not naturally ordered to saving the mother, he says, for the baby is in no way engaged in an action of endangering the mother. [9]

The position so far laid out is internally consistent, even if it leaves gaping holes, such as the problem of determining when an action is naturally ordered to an end, but it still has not got Long out of the woods. It is a fine account of self-defense, but it is no account of Aquinas's statement that what is outside intention, being *per accidens*, does not give species. Why would Aquinas make such a statement so dearly contrary to his teaching that the means do give species?

First of all, by *praeter intentionem* Aquinas means what is outside the general intention. [10] Suppose I intend to take a trip to Chicago. Such a general intention is as yet indeterminate as to whether I will take a plane, a train, or an automobile. In other words, the means to get to Chicago is outside the scope of the general intention to go to Chicago. Similarly, the means of defense is outside the general intention to defend myself. Now since, in the ideal case (1) above, the species of the action ultimately falls under the end of self-defense, it is, says Long, quite appropriate to say that the object (or means) does not give species; [11] it merely determines the species, rather than gives an independent species of its own. For the first case, then, Aquinas's statement is true: what is *praeter intentionem* (the means) does

[9] Ibid., 68.
[10] Ibid., 60.
[11] Ibid.

not give species. Aquinas's statement does not apply to the second case, of course, since killing is intended as an end. But the third case, in which the means is outside intention yet gives its own independent species, remains a difficulty for Long. The third case simply does not fit under Aquinas's general principle that what is outside intention does not give species. Why, on Long's reading, does Aquinas ignore this third case when he gives the general statement about species? Quite naturally, thinks Long, because by knowing that the action is lethal, we do not yet know whether it fits the third case; we must further determine whether the action is naturally ordered to the end, which is why Aquinas goes on to say that even with a good intention, the act of self-defense can be unlawful, if it is not proportioned to the end.[12]

All of this may seem quite natural to Steven Long, but I will not, even at this point, hide my skepticism. Aquinas seems to be giving a general principle, that what falls outside intention does not give species, but in his actual theory, the principle turns out not to be general at all. It is, in fact, only a principle for the ideal case, the situation in which the means chosen is naturally ordered to the end intended. Even then the principle holds only in an attenuated way, since the chosen means, which is outside intention, further determines the species (e.g., making it defense *by killing* or *lethal* defense). Rather than tell us that his principle is not general, Aquinas gives it a quasi-general application because, says Long, we don't know just from the intention whether we have a case in which it applies. All the more reason, it seems to me, for Aquinas to clarify the scope of this principle when he lays it out at the beginning of *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7.

With that note, let us turn to our second task, criticizing Long's account.

II. PROBLEMS WITH LONG'S ACCOUNT

I will cover the following four difficulties with Long's account: (1) According to Aquinas, intention does indeed concern the

[12] Ibid.

means as well as the end; (2) Long ignores the fact that the proximate end is most important in determining the species; (3) Long's use of *praeter intentionem* does not correspond with Aquinas's; and (4) even the public official cannot do what Long says he can, namely, intend to kill as an end.

As I criticize Long's view, I will invariably make points that tell in favor of the view opposed by Long, what he calls the Cajetanian interpretation, but my arguments should not be taken as a defense of the Cajetanian interpretation, a view with which I have my differences, at least as it is usually applied to self-defense in current discussions.[13]

A) Intention of the Means

According to Cajetan's reading of *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, Aquinas prohibits not only intending killing as an end but also intending killing as a means; the death must be a result, a side-effect, of the action that is intended, which is simply an action of repelling the attack. Long, on the other hand, says that the means chosen does not fall under intention, so that one may legitimately choose to kill in order to save one's life.

As we have seen, on this point Long actually provides textual evidence corroborating his claim, leaving no doubt that for Aquinas intention concerns the end while choice concerns the means. Unfortunately, Long ignores crucial passages that throw his interpretation into doubt.[14] In particular he ignores *STh* I-II, q. 12, aa. 2 and 3, *tvvo* articles that directly address the question of whether intention could ever concern the means, or what is ordered to the end *(ad finem).* The first of these articles asks whether intention concerns only the ultimate end. In response, Aquinas says,

[13] I do not doubt Cajetan's interpretation of *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7 so much as I doubt its application to most instances of self-defense.

[14] For a fuller account of intention in Aquinas see Joseph Boyle, *"Praeter intentionem* in Aquinas," *The Thomist* 42 (1978): 649-65. See also John Finnis, "Object and Intention in Moral Judgments according to Aquinas," *The Thomist* 55 (1991): 10-14.

As was said, intention refers to the end insofar as it is the term of the movement of the will. In a movement, however, a term may be taken in two ways, either as the ultimate term, which is rested in and which is the term of the whole movement, or as some mediate term, which is the beginning of one part of the movement and the end or term of another part. For example, in the movement which goes from A to C by way of B, C is the ultimate term, while B is a term but not ultimate. Intention may bear upon both of these sorts of terms, so that while it is always of the end, it need not always concern the ultimate end. [15]

The next article gives us an application of this teaching.

Intention is not only of the ultimate end, as was said, but also of the mediate end. Someone may, however, intend both the proximate end and the ultimate end at the same time. For example, at the same time someone may intend both to prepare medicine and to regain his health. [16]

Clearly, as Cajetan recognized when he cited this example while commenting on *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, preparing medicine is a means to the end of attaining health, yet it is intended as a mediate end, which may also be called *ad finem* {as in *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 4), usually translated as 'means'. In other words, it is certainly true that intention concerns the end, both ultimate and mediate, and not the means. The problem is that the means is also an end, albeit a mediate end. Preparing medicine, when viewed in relation to the goal of health, is a means; at the same time it is an end of the agent or an end of other actions, such as moving one's hands. When Aquinas says, then, that intention concerns the end and choice concerns the means, he does not exclude the possibility that they both concern the same object, which may itself be *ad finem;* one may both choose to prepare the medicine

[15] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 2: "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, intentio respicit finem secundum quod est terminus motus voluntatis. In motu autem potest accipi terminus dupliciter, uno modo, ipse terminus ultimus, in quo quiescitur, qui est terminus totius motus; alio modo, aliquod medium, quod est principium unius partis motus, et finis vel terminus alterius. Sicut in motu quo itur de a in c per b, c est terminus ultimus, b autem est terminus, sed non ultimus. Et utriusque potest esse intentio. Unde etsi semper sit finis, non tamen oportet quod semper sit ultimi finis."

[16] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 3: "Est enim intentio non solum finis ultimi, ut dictum est, sed etiam finis medii. Simul autem intendit aliquis et finem proximum, et ultimum; sicut confectionem medicinae, et sanitatem."

and intend to prepare the medicine. Both these can concern the means; they differ in the formality under which they move toward that means. Intention moves toward the means as a mediate end, while choice moves toward it precisely as something ordered toward a more ultimate end.[17]

Long claims that 'intention', when applied to the means, is being used analogously. Unfortunately, he cites no passages of Aquinas indicating such. Article 12 of the *Prima Secundae,* of which we have quoted articles 2 and 3 above, directly addresses the topic of intention. Therefore, if Aquinas were using intention in an extended sense of the term, we should expect him to tell us so. Yet he does no such thing. He has a single meaning of intention in mind that applies both to the ultimate end and to the mediate end, both to health and to the preparation of medicine. In contrast, when Aquinas asks whether the act of willing *(voluntas)* concerns the means, he says that *properly speaking* it does not, leaving open an improper or analogous sense in which it does.[18] Or again, when he asks whether enjoyment *ifruitio)* concerns only the ultimate end, he says that a mediate end that has its own pleasure may be enjoyed *in some way of speaking.*[19] Aquinas uses no such terminology when he speaks of someone intending the mediate end of preparing medicine. Intention is intention, whether it concerns the ultimate end or the mediate end.

If one kills in order to save oneself, then the ultimate end is the preservation of one's own life, but a more mediate end is the means of killing. Intention applies to both of these ends, even though the second one may also be called a means. To read *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, then, in a Cajetanian fashion, as prohibiting intention of the means of killing is not, as Long suggests, using 'intention' in an extended sense, apart from Aquinas's usual meanmg.

[17] See *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3.
[18] *STh* I-II, q. 8, a. 2.
[19] *STh* I-II, q. 11, a. 3.

B) The Proximate End Gives Species

Long might very well reply that while intention can refer to the mediate end, and hence the means, nevertheless, the intention that determines the species of actions, which is the concern of *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, is the further end rather than the mediate end, for, as we have seen, the end gives the defining or formal species while the means merely provides a further determination. So it would seem, if we read merely *STh* I-II, q. 18, aa. 6 and 7. Unfortunately, once again, Long ignores some crucial texts suggesting that the intention that specifies is precisely the intention of the mediate end or means. Aquinas repeatedly affirms that the species of human actions come from the proximate end rather than the remote end. For example, he says,

> Profit or glory is the remote end of the dissembler, as it is of the liar, but the species is not taken from this end, but from the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one is.[20]

In order to avoid possible confusion, I have chosen a text in which it is clear that Aquinas is referring to the proximate end of the will, and not the end of the exterior action. Another such text is *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 3, the very text in which Aquinas establishes that human actions are specified by the end. The corpus leaves no doubt that Aquinas is speaking of the end of the will, yet in the reply to the third objection, he says,

> One and the same action, insofar as it arises from the agent, is ordered to only one proximate end, from which the act has its species, but it may be ordered to many remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. [21]

In another place he says that, "Those things that are ordered to an end may be diversified by the end in two ways. In one way

[20] *SI'h* II-II, q. 111, a. 3, ad 3: "Dicendum quod lucrum vel gloria est finis remotus simulatoris, sicut et mendacis. Unde ex hoc fine speciem non sortitur, sed ex fine proximo, qui est ostendere se alium quam sit."

[21] *SI'h* I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3: "Dicendum quod idem actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab agente, non ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet speciem, sed potest ordinari ad plures fines remotos, quorum unus est finis alterius."

because they are ordered to diverse ends, and this makes for a diversity of species, most of all if the end is proximate."[22] Elsewhere, he identifies the proximate end with the object: "Moral actions do not have their species from the remote end but from the proximate end, which is the object."[23] It is not clear whether this object is the same as the object that Long considers to be the specifying element of the means or exterior action, the *materia circa quam* that is mentioned in *STh* I-II, q. 18, aa. 6 and 7, but there is good reason to suppose it is. In *STh* I-II, q. 73, a. 3, ad 1, Aquinas says, "The object, even if it is the *materia circa quam* in which the act terminates, has the formality of an end, insofar as the intention of the agent is led into it."[24] The *materia circa quam*, then, specifies insofar as it is an intended end of the agent. When one kills in order to save oneself, the object of the act of killing serves as an object only insofar as it is an end intended by the agent.

How are these texts concerning the proximate end to be reconciled with *STh* I-II, q. 18, aa. 6 and 7, which say that the remote end intended[25] is formal with regard to the species of actions? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is far from clear, and I will not attempt it here. The only point that I need to make is that the proximate end intended, which is the same as the means, does indeed give species. It is simply false to say that the

[22] *STh* I-II, q. 107, a. 1: "Ea autem quae ordinantur ad finem, secundum rationem finis dupliciter diversificari possunt. Uno modo, quia ordinantur ad diversos fines, et haec est diversitas speciei, maxime si sit finis proximus." Aquinas is here concerned with species of law, but he makes a general statement about things that are ordered to an end, which include actions. I quote the text because of the strong emphasis upon the proximate end.

[23] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6, ad 9 "Ad nonum dicendum, quad actus moralis non habet speciem a fine remoto, sed a fine proximo, qui est obiecturn." Again, it is clear that Aquinas is speaking of the end intended, for the objection reads, "The end gives species in morals, for moral actions are judged good and evil from intention" ("Finis dat speciem in moralibus, quia ex intentione judicatur actus moralis bonus vel malus"). See also *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4, ad 9; *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 7, ad 8; *STh* I-II, q. 60, a. 1, ad 3; *STh* II-II, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2; *STh* II-II, q. 66, a. 4, ad 2.

[24] *STh* I-II, q. 73, a. 3, ad 1: "Dicendum quad obiectum, etsi sit materia circa quam terminatur actus, habet tamen rationem finis secundum quod intentio agentis fertur in ipsum, ut supra dictum est."

[25] That he is speaking of the remote end in these articles is clear from the examples he gives.

intention of the means does not gives species. When Aquinas says in *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, that actions take their species from what is intended, he could not possibly have meant to exclude intention of the means.

C) "Praeter Intentionem" Does Not Concern General Intention

Long claims that in *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, when Aquinas says that what is *praeter intentionem* is *per accidens* and hence does not give species to an action, he is referring to a general intention, to which the means are outside intention, just as a general intention to go to Chicago need not include any determinate means of getting there. Long provides us with no other texts in which Aquinas uses *praeter intentionem* in this way, especially texts in which he uses it to delineate the species of action. In fact, Aquinas sometimes does use *praeter intentionem* in this way. In the *De Veritate,* when Aquinas is wondering whether God creates with one or many ideas, he says that if someone has a general intention to make a triangle, then it is outside his intention whether it be large or small, and more generally he says that if an agent has only a general intention, then the details (which would include the means of bringing it about) are outside his intention. [26] However, I cannot find anywhere that Aquinas uses this sense of *praeter intentionem* when he is referring to the specification of actions. A cursory examination of examples indicates that Aquinas does not use *praeter intentionem* to exclude the means from giving species. He uses it, rather, to exclude what Cajetan wanted to exclude, namely, a consequence or side-effect of an action. [27]

For example, Aquinas says that active scandal is not a distinct species when the spiritual downfall of one's neighbor is outside intention, "as when someone in his inordinate deeds or words intends only to satisfy his own will and not to give someone the occasion of ruin." [28] Clearly, Aquinas does not mean the occasion

[26] *De Veritate,* q. 3, a. 2.

[27] Again, Boyle *("Praeter Intentionem,* ") provides a fuller account of *praeter intentionem.*

[28] *STh* II-II, q. 43, a. 3: "Ut puta cum aliquis suo facto vel verbo inordinato non intendit alteri dare occasionem ruinae, sed solum suae satisfacere voluntati."

of downfall is chosen as a means, for it is not a means at all. Rather, the occasion for ruin follows from his own sinful behavior as a consequence.

Aquinas says that a sin does not take its species from its punishment, because the punishment is *praeter intentionem.* [29] He cannot mean that the sinner merely chooses the punishment as a means. Plainly, the sinner foresees the punishment as an undesirable consequence of his actions.

Although all virtuous activities reveal the truth of oneself, as an act of courage reveals that one has courage, only in the virtue of truthfulness is this *per se* intended; for the other virtues, this self-revelation is *praeter intentionem* and so it does not give species.[30] Once again, it is clear that the act of revealing one's nature does not serve as a means of accomplishing the brave act; rather, someone does a brave act, and consequently he reveals his nature. [31]

It is not impossible, of course, that in *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7, Aquinas is using *praeter intentionem* to exclude the means from giving species, even though elsewhere he uses it to exclude the consequences of action, but there seems no good reason to suppose that he is, apart from Long's *a priori* assumption that Aquinas must think it is legitimate to choose to kill in order to defend oneself.

Long's use of *praeter intentionem* also forces him into an awkward reading of *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7, ad 4, which we have previously quoted as saying, "The act of fornication or of adultery is not ordered to preserving one's own life from necessity, as is the act from which killing sometimes follows."[32] Long concludes that adultery and fornication are not naturally ordered to saving

[29] *STh* I-II, q. 72, a. 5.

[30] *STh* 11-11, q. 109, a. 2, ad 2

[31] There are many texts in which Aquinas uses *praeter intentionem* to exclude what is done in ignorance from giving species, but clearly these texts concern neither *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7, nor Long's interpretation of it. See, for example, *STh* 11-11, q. 39, a. 1; *STh* 11-11, q. 59, a. 2; *STh* 11-11, q. 110, a. 1; and *STh* 11-11, q. 150, a. 2.

[32] *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7, ad 4: "Dicendum quod actus fornicationis vel adulterii non ordinatur ad conservationem propriae vitae ex necessitate, sicut actus ex quo quandoque sequitur homicidium."

one's life, so they cannot under the species of the end, namely, self-defense. KiHing, on other has a natural order to so it does fall under the species of the end. The difficulty Long's interpretation involves "the act from which sometimes follows." Cajetan, of course, supposes this action has killing as a side-effect. Long cannot read the killing as a side-effect, for he thinks the kiUing is chosen as a means. In sense, then, does killing upon the act? According to Long, it follows upon the act of seH-defense because defense, by itself, does not require homicide, even if *this* defense requires homicide. [33] In other words, Long is relying upon his notion of the general intention to defend oneself, to which the particular means, such as killing, are *praeter intentionem.* The means, in effect, *follow* upon the end, just so long as a variety of means is sometimes employed for the end.

This reading is awkward enough as it stands, but upon scrutiny it becomes almost incoherent. What is act of killing? Is it the act that is naturally ordered to self-preservation, or is it what sometimes follows upon such an act? Long's position demands that killing is the act is naturally ordered to self-preservation, if it were not, then the act of killing would not be contained under the species of defense. The fourth reply, however, says that killing is follows upon the act ordered to self-preservation. It cannot be both. Either kiUing is itself ordered to preservation, or it follows upon the act ordered to preservation. We might also ask what act is naturally ordered to preserving one's life. As we have seen, Long requires that killing itself be naturally ordered to preserving one's life, but that is not how he reads the fourth reply" Rather, he says that killing follows upon the very act of self-preservation. And then the becomes a sort of tautology: act from which killing sometimes follows, which is the act of preserving one's life, is naturally ordered to preserving one's hie. There is simply no satisfying way to read the fourth reply given Long's interpretation.

[33] Long, "Object of d1e Moral 61.

D) The Public Official Does Not Intend to Kill as an End

Long says that it is wrong to intend to kill because one somehow desires the killing as good in itselfo The private individual, he says, can desire killing only as a means; the public official alone can want killing as desirable in itself. Long is wrong on both points. The private individual cannot desire killing even as a means, and the public official does not desire killing as good in itselt Let us quote once again the pertinent text from *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7:

> It is unlawful for a man to intend to kill a man in order to defend himself, except for those who have public authority, who while intending to kill a man for self-defense, refer this act to the public good, as is plain for soldiers fighting the enemy, or for a minister of the judge fighting against robbers, although even these sin if they are moved by private desires.[34]

The opening statement could hardly be better worded to describe intending to kill as a means to save oneself. Aquinas is not talking about killing as desirable in itself; he is talking about killing *in order to* defend oneself. This sort of killing, the sort that is ordered as a means to one's defense, is permissible for the public official but not for the private individual. And the public official must "refer this act to the public good," which does not seem like a description of wanting something as an end, a good in itself.

Long uses this notion of ordering to the common good to suppose that public officials might "shoot to kill even in defense against a merely diversionary or weak delaying tactic by a criminal band-not because of the gravity of the threat to the officers themselves, but because should the band succeed in escaping this would pose a threat to society at large."[35] Long gives no evidence

[34] *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7: "Illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat, nisi ei qui habet publicam auctoritatem, qui, intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem, refert hoc ad publicum bonum, ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis pugnante contra lattones. Quamvis et isti etiam peccent si privata libidine

[35] Long, "Object of the Moral Act," 63.

to indicate that this is the sort of case Aquinas has in mind. While Aquinas is talking about intending to kill in order to defend oneself, Long's case seems more concerned with intending to kill in order to prevent escape, two quite different situations. No doubt public officials are sometimes justified in killing for this reason, but this is not the case Aquinas has in mind.

According to Long, Aquinas allows the private individual to kill as a means (at least for self-defense); what he prohibits is killing as an end. We do not have to go far from *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7, however, to see that Long must be wrong. Just one article earlier Aquinas asks whether it is ever legitimate to kill the innocent. He answers that one may kill sinners by ordering it to the common good, but that the innocent may never be killed.[36] Three articles earlier, Aquinas asks whether the private individual can kill sinners. He answers that he cannot, for only those who have care of the common good may order a killing to the common good.[37] Killing of the innocent is never allowed; killing of evildoers is allowed only to the public officials; it readily follows that private individuals are never allowed to kill.[38] Indeed, Aquinas goes so far as to say,

> Doing something for the benefit of the common good that harms no one is lawful for any private person, but if the benefit involves harm to another person, then it should not be done, except on the basis of the judgement of him to whom it pertains to decide what may be taken from the parts for the safety of the whole.[39]

[36] *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 6.

[37] *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 3.

[38] Long ("Object of the Moral Act," 63) quotes in his favor *STh* 1-11, q. 100, a. 8, ad 3, which says that the Ten Commandments forbid unlawful killing but allow lawful killing. But Long makes an unwarranted jump from the fact that there are lawful killings to the claim that there are lawful killings for the private individual. The passage he quotes gives only two examples of lawful killings, namely, killing evil-doers and killing enemies in war. *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 3, ad 1, which addresses the same sort of objection as *STh* 1-11, q. 100, a. 8, ad 3 (people killing under the command of God), does not say that these killings are legitimate for the private individual, but that these killing are done by God.

[39] *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 3, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod facere aliquid ad utilitatem communem quod nulli nocet, hoc est licitum cuilibet privatae personae. Sed si sit cum nocumento alterius, hoc non debet fieri nisi secundum iudicium eius ad quern pertinet existimare quid sit subtrahendum partibus pro salute totius."

Other texts, as well, confirm our second point, that the public official does not intend to kill as an end in Long's sense. The virtue of vengeance, for instance, aims at someone's evil, but it does not aim at this evil in itself, but rather only insofar as some other good is attained through it.

In the case of vengeance we must consider the mind-set of the one seeking vindication. If his intention is led primarily into the evil of the one upon whom he takes vindication, and rests in it, then vindication is in all ways unlawful, for to take pleasure in another's evil pertains to hatred .... On the other hand, if the intention of the avenger is led principally into some good that is attained through the punishment of the sinner (for example, that the sinner may amend, or at least that he be restrained and not disturb others, and to maintain justice and to honor God), then the vindication may be lawful, supposing that other necessary circumstances are observed. [40]

Even God, when he punishes, does not seek the evil of death itself, but only the justice associated with it.

Death may be considered in two ways. First, it may be considered insofar as it is a certain evil of human nature; as such, it is not from God but is a defect following on human sin. Second, death may be considered insofar as it has a formality of goodness, namely, insofar as it is a just punishment; as such, it is from God. Thus, Augustine says that God is not the author of death, except insofar as it is a punishment. [41]

The public official, says Long, will act until he succeeds in killing the condemned criminal, but the private individual will act to kill only so long as the assailant poses a threat. [42] He concludes

[40] *STh* 11-11, q. 108, a. 1: "Est ergo in vindicatione considerandus vindicantis animus. Si enim eius intentio feratur principaliter in malum illius de quo vindictam sumit, et ibi quiescat, est omnino illicitum, quia delectari in malo alterius pertinet ad odium .... Si vero intentio vindicantis feratur principaliter ad aliquod bonum, ad quod pervenitur per poenam peccantis, puta ad emendationem peccantis, vel saltem ad cohibitionem eius et quietem aliorum, et ad iustitiae conservationem et dei honorem, potest essevindicatio licita, aliis debitis circumstantiis servatis."

[41] STh11-11,q. 164, a. 1, ad 5: "Mors dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est quoddam malum humanae naturae. Et sic non est ex Deo, sed est defectus quidam incidens ex culpa humana. Alio modo potest considerari secundum quod habet quandam rationem boni, prout scilicet est quaedam iusta poena. Et sic est a Deo. Unde Augustinus dicit, in Libro Retractat., quod Deus non est auctor morris, nisi inquantum est poena." See also *STh* I, q. 49, a. 2; *STh* 1-11, q. 19, a. 10, ad 2.

[42] Long, "Object of the Moral Act," 65.

that the former is killing as an end, while the latter is not. He should rather conclude, it seems, that killing remains a means the private individual so long as there is an imminent threat, but that killing remains a means for the executioner independent of any immediate threat.

Interestingly, Long brings lack of innocence into his account of self-defense. He says that the assailant must be performatively non-innocent, that is, he must be engaged in threatening activity.[43] Apparently, this performative guilt is a condition for kHling to be naturally ordered to self-defense, and so to under the species of self-defense. According to Long, the doctor is not allowed to a baby order to save the mother because the baby is not performativdy guilty.[44] None of this appears in *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, in which Aquinas never refers to the guilt or innocence of the assailant.

m. WHAT TO Do WITH *STH* U-H, Q. 64, A. 7

My analysis here has been largely negative, showing that Long's interpretation of *STh* H-H, q. 64, a. 7 is flawed; I have to supply a better interpretation in its place. What can I say positively by way of interpreting intention within this text? Unfortunately, not much. I think it is a mistake to begin with *STh* H-H, q. 64, a. 7, which is a very difficult text. Furthermore, I think that most readers approach the text the wrong presuppositions and intuitions. If one supposes, as Long does (as weH as do those he opposes), that Aquinas is defending contemporary intuitions concerning self-defense, then one has already got off on the wrong Aquinas gives little evidence to indicate exactly situations he thinks meet his conditions for self-defense and which not. I think the conditions are very stringent and few instances of self-defense meet them.[45] But

[43] Ibid., 67.

[44] Ibid., 68.

[45] For two accounts that recognize more stringent restrictions on self-defense see G. E. M. Anscombe, "War and Murder," in R. Wasserstrorn, ed., *War and Morality* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth 1970), 45; and Thomas A. Cavanaugh, "Aquinas'sAccountofDouble Effect," *The*

whether I am correct or not, it is a mistake to begin with this text, and it is a mistake to begin with presuppositions about what it is saying. In my mind, Aquinas's action theory should be examined and understood apart from this text; when this theory is understood well, then we can turn to his article on self-defense. If we begin as Long does (and in this regard he is little different from most others), and suppose that *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7 must justify actions in which we kill as a means to preserve our lives, then we might very well distort the meaning of the text to meet this presupposition. What if, after all, Aquinas thought such actions are not justified? I think such actions are justified, but then I also think that *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7 does not justify them.[46] To make the text justify such acts of self-defense one must stretch and twist the texts too much, as Long himself has done.

STh II-II, q. 64, a. 7 is dear on a few points about intention: (1) the species of human actions are taken from what is intended; (2) what is *praeter intentionem* does not give species; (3) some actions that have two effects can have one effect intended but the other *praeter intentionem;* (4) the public official can intend something the private individual cannot; and given the wording, I think it is hard to get around (5) the public official can intend to kill as a means, while the private individual cannot. These five points are indeed a meager start, but then again, if I am correct, they are not a start at all. They should be the conclusion of an examination of other aspects of Aquinas's thought.

If we wish to find within Aquinas a solution to the problem of the c:raniotomy case, we should look elsewhere than *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7. While intention plays a prominent role in Aquinas's analysis of self-defense, I suspect that it may play only a minor role in an understanding the nature of craniotomy.

Thomist 61 (1997): 107-21.

[46] I hold the view that in a situation of emergency the private individual takes on the role of the public official, and hence he defends himself not as a private individual. This view is not found in Aquinas, but it may be derived from his principles.

BOOK REVIEWS

Thomas Aquinas' Trinitarian Theology: A Study in Theological Method. By TIMOTHY L. SMITH. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003. Pp. 258. $59.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-8132-1097-6.

The Trinitarian theology of Thomas Aquinas is difficult and its interpretation remains a subject of controversy. The majority of twentieth-century theologians have severely criticized it: some have seen it as an attempt to provide a rational demonstration of the Trinity, others have characterized it as speculative reflection detached from the economy of salvation. Going back to Theodore of Regnon, and continuing through Michael Schmaus and Karl Rabner, many theologians have seen in St. Thomas the representative *par excellence* of an essentialist "Latin tradition" as opposed to a personalist "Greek tradition." Even today, manuals of theology continue to reproduce cliches of this sort. For this reason, Timothy Smith's work, which purports to show the inaccuracy of such interpretations, is a welcome contribution. Smith does not concentrate on the doctrinal content of Aquinas's theology but rather on his method, for a proper understanding of this method is required in order to have a correct reading of the treatise on the Trinity. The trajectory of this study is not linear. First of all, Smith provides an exposition of the context and the structure of the questions on the Trinity in the *Summa Theologiae* (chap. 1), then the order observed in the study of essence and of the divine persons (chap. 2), next the coordination of essential and proper terms (chap. 3, with a discussion of Trinitarian appropriations), and then the historical context of theological language (chap. 4). Finally, he underlines St. Thomas's originality in what constitutes the heart of the matter: naming God (chap. 5). This project allows us to lay to rest the methodological criticisms often leveled at Aquinas.

Smith's research has much to recommend it. He aptly demonstrates that history and soteriology occupy a central place in the structure of the *Summa Theologiae* (12-20). He convincingly demonstrates that, for St. Thomas, the doctrine of the Trinity is "the interpretive framework for understanding all other doctrines" (29). In comparing Augustine and Thomas, Smith shows that it is impossible to speak of a single "Latin tradition" in Trinitarian theology (68-70, 119, 231). He also clearly establishes that for St. Thomas, the persons are never conceived of as a derivation of the divine essence. This is a veritable *leitmotif:* it is impossible rationally to demonstrate the Trinitarian processions (70-79,

"""""""""",...,,,<and of appropriations manifests that the originality of Thomas in his theory of the divine names (1 This fundamental point is made explicit by an analysis of the distinction that Aquinas makes between the manner of signifying *(modus significandi)* and what is signified *(res significata;* 140-44). We name God as we know him; we do not know what God is in Himself, but only what God is not; however, we are able to make affirmative statements, with a substantial value, about God. These elements of the doctrine of analogy are indispensable in order to grasp the methodology of the treatise on the Trinity. At this point, Smith enters into a long discussion to show that, thanks to the distinction between the *modus significandi* and the *res significata,* the Thomistic doctrine of analogy respects the incomprehensibility of God without leading to agnosticism: our language signifies the divine reality means of concepts formed by our mind; it depends upon the mode of our knowledge and the reality outside the mind. There is neither an exact correspondence between our language and the known reality nor is there an equivocation of the agnostic type. In a long historical discussion (160-203), Smith shows that, on the one hand, such a denial of "linguistic immediacy" excludes any direct influence of the *modistae* ("speculative grammarians") on St. Thomas. On the other hand, however, Aquinas dearly upholds the affirmative and substantial value of the language that revelation gives us to name and come to know the Triune God. Our naming, although imperfect and incomplete, "does indeed refer to God properly" (233): the aim "is not grammatical but metaphysical" (234). The goal of this study is thus attained: "We showed that Thomas' Trinitarian language is not a rational demonstration but a logical presentation and investigation of doctrine" (231). Such is the project of "faith seeking understanding" which this work serves to illuminate.

In order to demonstrate the unity of the treatise on God in St. Thomas, Smith takes up the solution formerly proposed by Carl Strater, S.J.: when Thomas considers the divine essence *(STh* I, qq. 2-26), the word "essence" means "the total essence," that is to say "the total divine reality" (pp. 24-25). Yet it is debatable whether Strater's solution resolves the problem: as I have previously written elsewhere *(The Thomist* 64 [2000]: 534), the concept of "total essence" is quite embarrassing. If questions 2-26 of the *Prima Pars* refer to such "total divine reality," does this mean that questions 27-43, which are about the distinction of the persons, refer to something "less total," or different from the "total reality of God"? The distinction between what is "common" and what is "proper" to the divine persons, apart from being much more traditional in Christian doctrine, may prove more helpful in explaining the structure of the treatise in the *Summa.* Moreover, along with Strater, Smith attributes to Cajetan responsibility for the modem interpretations that have separated the treatise on the "One God" and that on the "Triune God" (39-46). Granted that Cajetan introduces some new precisions in the reading of St. Thomas, it nevertheless can be shown that there are important similarities with some of Aquinas's own explanations. Thus, for example, Smith reproaches Cajetan for thinking that the

subject of the phrase "God creates" refers to the divine essence as an absolute and concrete subsistence (45). Yet, is this affirmation so far from St. Thomas's position? Aquinas explains: *"creatio est opus essentiae divinae, unde est opus suppositi indistincti"* (I *Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2). The proceedings brought against Cajetan here do not help to resolve the problem of interpreting Thomas.

Smith credits the *Summa* with having clarified the concept of procession and, this is of note, having eliminated the term "natural" from the discussion of processions (84). But he claims that the name "Son" "has virtually no epistemological value except as it is indicative of the mutual distinctions within the Trinity" (105). He therefore distinguishes between "Proper names" (capital P) and "proper names": the former (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) tell us that there are distinctions in God by means of relations of origin, although "they do not, however, tell us about the proper identity of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit" (109), while the latter (Word, Love, Gift) are called proper "simply by reason of being specific to one Person" (107; cf. 105, 108-9). Thus, the term "Love" "has only negligible semantic import" (107). These explanations are very disappointing. Smith does not seem to consider the precise relationship between the name "Son" and the name "Word," and he pays little attention to the function of the study of the name "Love": the analogy of the Word and of Love, which is at the very heart of Thomas's Trinitarian doctrine, is thus obscured. The same malaise might be said to afflict his understanding of the relationship between origins and relations in God. How are we to understand the statement that "For Thomas the origins and relations of the Persons are not distinct at all, not even according to our understanding" (153)? If our mind does not distinguish between origins (procession) and relations, why then does St. Thomas study them in a distinct manner? Smith's work contains other expressions that seem either awkward or unfortunate. Despite the fact that he clearly maintains the affirmative and substantial character of our language about God, his explanations concerning the proper names of the divine persons tend surprisingly toward apophatism, bordering on agnosticism (see for example 154-55).

My final criticism concerns the historical aspect of the question. Smith demonstrates, with great erudition, how St. Thomas distinguishes himself from the *modistae:* on this point, it is by means of the history of doctrine that the originality of Aquinas is brought to light. Yet this historical aspect is hardly appealed to in the study of the treatise on the Trinity itself: missing here is a discussion of Thomas's contemporaries. On one point, at least, Smith does compare Aquinas with St. Albert the Great on their interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius (210-28). He argues that Albert names God first "good" rather than "being," thereby disagreeing with Aquinas. Albert's basis for naming God by way of analogy "is not, as it is for Thomas, the participation of creatures in the divine perfections" (211, cf. 225); Albert also "denies that we can have access to the being of God even in the beatific vision" (ibid.). According to Smith, Albert's reading of the *Divine Names* is guided by the complete negation of knowing and

language, because Albert teaches that we can reach God as cause of creatures and not as He is in himself, so that Albert's understanding of divine names is "fundamentally negative" (218). For Albert, "divine predication remains equivocal" (216). While it is true that Albert strongly emphasizes the negative aspect of analogy, perhaps his thought is more complex. On the one hand, he maintains that the name "being" naturally precedes the name "good": it is solely in respect to the relationship to effects, that is the *"prout sunt in causa,"* that the name "good" has a priority over the name "being" (Albert, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus,* c. 13 [ed. Colon., t. 37/1, p. 449]; cf. Albert, I *Sent.,* d. 2, a. 14). This teaching is in fact identical to that of St. Thomas. In his commentary on Dionysius's *Divine Names,* Albert emphasizes the second point of view, namely the divine attributes as cause of creatures, because such is the subject matter of the *Divine Names* (in Albert's interpretation). On the other hand, Albert does not say that we attain to God solely under the aspect of his activity *ad extra.* Certainly, we come to know God from our knowledge of creatures, but our analogical knowledge is capable of naming that which belongs to God substantially *(secundum substantiam)* and absolutely (and not only causally). This appears dearly in Albert, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus,* c. 1 (ed. Colon., t. 37/1, pp. 2, 25, 35, etc.), as was established by Francis Ruello *(Les "noms divins" et leurs "raisons" selon saint Albert le Grand commentateur du "De divinis nominibus"* [Paris: Vrin, 1963], pp. 43-117). For these reasons, granting that Albert can be interpreted in many different ways, Smith's interpretation seems at least questionable.

Timothy Smith's study is very useful for definitively dismissing certain criticisms leveled against St. Thomas's theology, in particular the charge that sees in Aquinas a rationalist attempt to demonstrate the Trinity. The attention paid to methodology and analogy is also key: Smith is to be commended for dearly calling this to mind. But on some points, it seems to me that this present work remains incomplete and contains debatable interpretations. Perhaps it would be necessary to study the content of Trinitarian doctrine in a more detailed fashion, for in St. Thomas, method is intimately linked with the object of study. A historical approach in this line of research could also be useful were it to be pursued not only in the *Summa* but in Thomas's other works as weH and then comparing them with those of other theologians in the thirteenth century. (Translated by John Langlois, O.P.)

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The Act of Faith: Christian Faith and the Moral Self By ERIC O. SPRINGSTED. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. xiii + 271. $24.00 (paper). ISBN 0-8028-4888-5.

Faith can be a troublesome concept in the contemporary world. From the journals of analytic philosophy to the classrooms of undergraduates, positions begin from doubt, cynicism, and unbelief. In this supposedly neutral, critical tribunal, philosophers and students alike weigh the relative merits of belief versus unbelief. This process suggests that believing in the Christian revelation is a matter of assenting to one among several differing interpretations of quantum physics. Faith cannot survive this initial position of indifference unscathed. Faith must be a personal act in which the person does not merely assent indifferently to a proposition, but submits himself to the God revealed in Jesus Christ through the assent to the propositions that make that revelation intelligible.

Eric Springsted's book presents an extensive intellectual meditation on various issues surrounding his thesis that the act of faith must be a personal act of the moral self. His book offers not a continuous narrative, but rather vignettes, each of which deepen the reader's understanding of the topic. This is not a criticism of the book, for it is surely an accomplishment to have chapters on John and Paul, on Aquinas and Calvin, and on Nussbaum and Weil. Through each of the different chapters, Springsted argues why the only sound justification of religious beliefs must be one that acts from within those beliefs and begins with the first-person viewpoint of the person engaged in the act of believing. The strength of the book lies in its ability to situate historically many of the modern presuppositions for the justification of religious beliefs. Here the book draws upon the rich historicist, philosophical literature of the past several decades as expressed in diverse ways by authors such as Charles Taylor, Diogenes Allen, William Placher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Hilary Putnam. An adequate understanding of the Christian act of faith requires precisely those philosophical commitments that were falsely set aside in modernity. Similar to John Milbank's *Theology and Social Theory,* this book supports the claim that one simply cannot keep asking the Christian faith to make itself intelligible to philosophical standards that were devised from an anti-Christian philosophical standpoint.

The analysis of the will in Augustine sheds helpful light on the metaphysical and anthropological commitments necessary to make the act of faith intelligible. The author shows that David Hume conceived of human free will in nonmetaphysical terms. Free will, for Hume, consists in the ability to do or not to do something, thus not in any status of the moral self as inclined to a particular kind of perfection. Augustine and Aquinas clearly admitted the former while also holding the latter notions of freedom. (Servais Pinckaers, O.P., has shown the nominalist prejudice for focusing on the freedom from interference and excluding the freedom for excellence.) Hume thus incorrectly separated the moral self from the specific acts of the person. The former became an

unnecessary superstition that could be cut away with critical reason; the latter became neutral, episodic acts that must be evaluated no longer as perfective of the human person, but merely as conforming to reason now conceived exclusively as a calculating machine. The author does a splendid job of articulating how the opposing views on the justification of moral beliefs stem from prior disagreements about the nature of the will.

In Augustine's intellectual struggles to overcome Manichaeanism, he discovered that the source of evil was his own will. Yet for him to judge his will as evil, he could not understand his will as a neutral agent capable of doing or not doing something. To root evil in the will meant that the evil will had to be judged defective. The significance of the evil act lies not in itself, but in the fact that it is performed by a particular agent, an agent turning away from its own perfection. As Springsted summarizes, "if evil is a privation of form, it is the will itself that is deficient .... Evil is not simply a matter of choosing bad things, it is also a reason to question the choosers" (112). Against Hume's anti-metaphysical reduction of the will, Augustine's view of the will presents the will as fundamentally ordered toward the good. With a teleological conception of the will, all considerations of actions of the will-and this includes here the willing involved in the assent of faith-must include the first-person perspective. "The moral self is determined not so much by its public action or even potentially for action as it is by the vision of the good to which it assents, with and by which it identifies itself, and to which it is therefore bound" (116). The agent either chooses to assent to the truth of God as the center of the universe or refuses to do so. The "I" in the "I assent" or the "I refuse to assent" must remain for philosophical analysis. The central thesis of Springsted's book is that the issue of the justification of religious beliefs simply cannot be adequately analyzed from a neutral, third-person perspective. It is not a court of impartial, disinterested reason, but a claim that demands an answer from each human being.

The book offers a sustained criticism of an exclusively intellectualistic view of belief. For Springsted, faith is not a matter of getting it right, but becoming good. He argues that Calvin and Aquinas would have agreed that the person cannot assent to the truth of faith while rejecting the good. Here Springsted fights rationalistic accounts of the faith and ends up largely following the voluntarist tradition. A deeper appreciation of intellectualist accounts of faith would have helped. There are surely more options than rationalism and voluntarism; Springsted himself clearly wants to safeguard some intellectual content of faith. He attempts to do so by retrieving from Newman the description of faith as "thinking with assent." Nonetheless, readers who are wary of the specters of voluntarism in faith and desire a more adequate presentation of Aquinas's view on faith should read Romanus Cessario's 1996 book, *Christian Faith and the Theological Life.* Knowing the truth about God means that the mind is achieving its highest purpose. Faith is a personal relationship with God in the assent of the mind, yet the person can still reject the truth it sees. The object of the intellectual assent of faith-namely, God-does not fully determine the will. The mere fact that we can conceive of a rational creature knowing this

truth, yet rejecting it, demonstrates this lack of determination. The intellectualist claim that faith is irreducibly an intellectual assent does not deny that the intellectual assent involves the movement of the will. No divorce of intellect and will has occurred-rather a distinction. Faith assents to God as true, yet the will must choose to love God as good.

Some readers may question the ultimate presentation of religion indicated in the book. The author states at one point that Kant achieved a "genuine insight into the relation between religion and morality" (222). Religion "is a sense that in the face of another the obligation to her is unconditional, that it is mine, that I am claimed by it, that I ought to pay attention to her." The author continues, "God's relation to the soul ... is experienced as a moral relation that makes itself felt, and that is lived out in the obligations we have to the world around us." There is a danger here of delimiting "religion" to the love of neighbor without an explicit subordination to the love of God. Springsted's apparent Kantian commitments appear to lead him to offer an account of religion that is not theocentric. Springsted's work would be improved by going beyond the understanding of obligation to the much deeper notion of justice, the primary duty to worship God. Although the author shows a keen historical sensitivity in exposing the problematic nature of the modern tendency to justify belief from an imaginary third-person perspective, here he seems to accept Kant's reduction of religion to moral obligation. This reviewer wonders whether Springsted could have eschewed more clearly a potential dichotomy between the personal character of faith and the God who is reached through the specific propositions included in revelation.

As already suggested, this failure with respect to the nature of religion highlights another aspect of faith. Although we approach the question of faith, to be sure, from our personal, communal, and historical experience, the theological exposition of the mystery of faith must not limit itself to this experience. The experience of faith, instead, needs to be located within a larger theocentric account. How does God bring the rational creature into union with Himself?. That union ultimately includes the perfection of the image of God in the human person as the believer is joined by faith and charity to the tri-personed God. God elevates the human creature through the gift of faith as the intellect assents to God Himself through all He has revealed. Through the gift of faith, human beings join themselves to God through a friendship borne of God's communication of Himself to them. In this way, the options for considering the act of faith need not be seen exclusively to be first-person versus third-person accounts since a theocentric perspective remains. The second-person account of Augustine in his *Confessions* comes to mind: "'You converted me to yourself."

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Modern Catholic Social Documents & Political Economy. By ALBINO BARRERA, O.P. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001. Pp. 340. $69.95 (doth). ISBN 0-87840-856-8.

The purpose of Albino Barrera's *Modern Catholic Social Documents & Political Economy* is to provide a "small step" towards an interdisciplinary examination of the claims of Catholic social teaching. It is successful in this endeavor, providing an extensive evaluation of Catholic social teaching and contrasting it with secular economics literature. In doing so it makes a helpful contribution towards dialogue between Catholic and secular economic perspectives.

The book is divided into five parts. The first part examines the economics underlying modern Catholic social teaching, the second reviews the evolution of this teaching from the Scholastic to the modern periods, and the third contrasts it with contemporary secular economic thought. Part 4 engages a number of postindustrial economic questions, and provides a sound explication of the principles of the universal destination of goods, private property, and the primacy of labor over capital, showing how all three are "distinct from each other, yet inseparable" (204-5).

The book's attempt at a broad synthesis of modern Catholic social teaching, including both Church documents and secondary material, is found in part 5. The author charges that modern Catholic social documents serve as an "amorphous presentation" of Catholic social teaching that allows "a broad spectrum of political philosophy, from liberation theology to classical liberalism confidently claim selected texts of this tradition as an affirmation of their own position" (viii). He also notes, however, that if "used together as a single analytical framework, the tradition's complex set of principles and norms prevents [the] abuses, misuses or extremes to which such teachings can be carried when used singly," without reference to the rest of the body of teaching (185). Accordingly, he attempts to build two frameworks to summarize this complex set of principles and norms. The first helps to interpret the principles of Catholic social teaching, while the second is a diagnostic framework for examining social dilemmas and possible solutions in terms of the common good.

The first framework lays its foundation in human dignity, based on the human person's creation by God in his image, redemption by Christ, and destiny for union with God (251-52). The actualization of this dignity is then presented as integral human development, seen in terms of our response to the gift of self, of the earth, and of each other (258-61).

The second framework provides a series of questions that are meant to aid in examining particular social dilemmas. These questions are divided into two groups, addressing due order and due proportion of the common good. The former deals with the relationship of the person to God and to others in the community, of the community to the marginalized and to the individual, and of the individual and the community to the goods of the earth. Examining the relationship between the community and the marginalized, for example, the

framework incorporates principles of participation, relative equality, and the preferential option for the poor, and asks of any particular proposal what "does it accomplish with respect to the community's commitment to the marginalized?" The questions about due proportion cover the distribution of benefits flowing from the use of the goods of the earth, equitable distribution of gains and burdens across the community, and service to the whole person and to every person (300-301). These frameworks represent a substantial effort to summarize the Catholic social teachings of the past one hundred years.

The scope and comprehensiveness of these frameworks are impressive. Somewhat problematic is the fact that the author does not make a point of distinguishing between normative magisterial teaching and commentaries on that teaching. For example, in exploring the question of what counts as superfluous income, Barrera considers both Pope John XXHI's teaching on human rights in *Magister et magistra* and the concept of three strategic imperatives developed by David Hollenbach, S.J., giving them apparently equal weight (189). Such an approach is common in literature in this field, but the attentive reader will notice that some of the problems raised with respect to Catholic social teaching turn out to be problems primarily with the commentaries.

For example, the author spends several pages addressing the "deficiencies of the social documents of the past hundred years" with respect to egalitarianism (181-85, 190). Yet the only positions he criticizes in these particular pages as deficient are those of the Yale Task Force on *Pacem in terris;* of Drew Christiansen, S.J.; and of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. The only time he mentions a magisterial document issued with the full authority of the universal Church within this particular discussion is when he admits the contributions that *Laborem exercens* and *Centesimus annus* have made to towards a more balanced egalitarianism.

Another example lies in the book's consideration of China's one-child policy as an example of the difficulty of addressing conflicting rights. This policy is alleged to create a tradeoff by going "against the social right to found a family and procreate . . . but is justified by the state as necessary if it is to provide adequately for the infrastructure to service the social right to food, clothing, shelter, rest, and medical care" (188). Barrera then asks whether this is a real tradeoff, and if it is so, what guidelines are available in Catholic social teaching for making the tradeoff. On the grounds of the right to life, such a policy is dearly and obviously immoral, so there is no tradeoff involved. But even were we able somehow to bracket the life issue, the remaining issue of the apparently conflicting rights between families and the state is quite handily addressed by Catholic teaching, both in general terms by the principle of subsidiarity and also more directly in the Church's teaching on the rights of parents.

Such examples are worth attending to, though they do not invalidate Barrera's approach. The real problem caused by the lack of a dear distinction between magisterial documents and secondary sources is a narrowing down of the potential fruitfulness and even, in a certain sense, a stifling of the creativity of the original teachings. Papal encyclicals on economic and political questions over the

past one hundred years do not contain canons, and-like many other magisterial statements during this period-do not resolve specific questions. Their style is more exhortative: they lay out general principles and extend them to particular issues, and in doing so can be extremely fruitful. Two examples are the principle of subsidiarity, an idea originally defined in the encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, and *Laborem exercens's* distinction between the objective and subjective senses of work, and its claim that "in the first place, work is 'for man,' and not man 'for work.'" These are just two of several creative ideas found in Catholic social teaching, many of which are original to this teaching. These ideas are rich and fecund, and can serve as the source and inspiration for fresh solutions to the economic, political, and social problems of a particular place and time.

While the style of the modern papal social encyclicals is one of a general vision that encourages us to try different approaches and to be imaginative, the of commentaries on these encyclicals is not. Commentaries on Catholic social teaching tend instead to narrow down the ideas presented for the purposes of studying and critiquing them. Many of the commentaries used by Barrera appear to resort almost exdusively to discussion of public-policy alternatives, and this appears to influence his own work. To a point, this is understandable. The book is about political economy, and therefore attention to political decisions about the economy would seem to be appropriately its primary focuso Also, the author himself notes that, since the Middle Ages, Catholic social teaching has evolved away from personal considerations to the consideration of issues of social structures. Nevertheless, the central role of personal initiative and responsibility is affirmed throughout the modern social encydicak But even while citing the microfimmce movement-in most cases a private, not public, initiative-as "one of the most successful projects of recent development economics" Barrera appears to confine himself almost exclusively to a public-policy perspective.

This narrowing down of the range of possible solutions to economic, political, and social problems to include only legal and regulatory actions diminishes the fruitfulness of the original magisterial teachings and risks excluding other, more creative solutions. So, for example, the book seems to accept that "vibrant job creation" and "alternative work arrangements such as co-management, co-ownership and profit sharing" will always be conflicting objectives (see 188). This may perhaps be the case when we consider public-policy options, but others, inspired directly by Catholic social teaching, have found ways to resolve this problem through private initiative. The Antigonish cooperative movement of the 1930s led by Tompkins and Coady; the Distributist movement of Hillaire Belloc, G. K. Chesterton, and Fr. Vincent McNabb, O.P. (and the latter's agrarian colony at Ditchling), also in the 1930s; the Mondragon cooperative movement founded by Arizmendiarrieta (1950s to the present); and the Focolare movement's Economics of Communion, which since the early 1990s has grown to include almost eight hundred firms on five continents, are all examples of original solutions to this problem, animated by Catholic social teaching.

Barrera's project could be furthered by a reading that attempts to develop something simply out of the magisterial documents themselves. In fact, the book is at its best when Barrera does exactly this. In the chapter on the universal destination of goods-the teaching that the goods of the earth are intended for the benefit of all-he is forced to rely on magisterial teaching almost exclusively, because of the dearth of secondary material on this subject. Here he presents an impressive overview of the development of this teaching, and then convincingly shows how it is extended to address the needs of a knowledge-based economy where intellectual property is becoming increasingly more important relative to physical property.

Modern Catholic Social Documents & Political Economy is an ambitious effort to synthesize Catholic social teaching that makes an important contribution to scholarship in this area. A stronger focus on the original Church documents themselves would only enrich the effort.

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The Letters and Diaries of john Henry Newman, vol. 8. Edited by GERARD TRACEY. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. Pp. xxvii + 644. $125 (doth). ISBN 0-19-920403-9.

I had so wanted to begin this review with the following remark: "Gerard Tracey, I am pleased to report, is a worthy successor to the magisterial editing of Cardinal Newman's letters begun by the late Fr. Stephen Dessain, his mentor." Gerard Tracey was such a worthy editor to be sure, but Newman scholars were numbed to learn of Gerard's untimely death on 20 January 2003. More about Gerard Tracey is found *infra.*

Letters and Diaries, vol. 8 *(LD* 8) covers the tumultuous period in Newman's life from January 1841 until May 1842. His own foreboding words in the *Apologia* capture the period's poignancy: "From the end of 1841, I was on my death-bed, as regards my membership with the Anglican Church." During these fifteen months Newman wrote Tract 90, experienced its seismic effects in the English church, saw his Via Media's branch-church conception shredded by the establishment of a bishopric in Jerusalem, and felt the entire Oxford Movement (his and Pusey's and Keble's) put on a sort of trial in the voting for the Poetry Professorship by the entire body of M.A.s of the university. The only other comparable period in Newman's life of such sustained drama and intense correspondence came in 1869-70, when Vatican I defined papal infallibility (see my review of *LD* 25 in *The Thomist,* April 1974). By Lent of 1842 Newman was

by stages "retiring" to Littlemore, the quasi-monastic cottage setting he leased, which lay almost three miles from Oxford. Projected volumes 9 and 10 will cover these remaining months in the Anglican church until Newman's "conforming" to Rome-his customary phrase for it-in October 1845. They are crucial times in Newman's discernment process, during which he worked out a vision of doctrinal development that freed him from the major criticisms leveled against Roman dogmas, but these more hidden months were not nearly as dramatic as *W* S's fifteen months. (For readers unfamiliar with the *Letters and Diaries* publishing strategy: Stephen Dessain began with Newman's Roman Catholic period, 1845-90, volumes 11to31, having first mapped out a printing prospectus for the extant corpus of over twenty thousand Newman letters. The projected ten volumes of Anglican letters then began appearing, following Dessain's own untimely death. Tracey edited volumes 6, 7, and the present 8.)

The careful reconstruction of the critical text, its necessary clarifying footnotes, the thumbnail descriptions of persons mentioned in the text, and the sourcing of Newman's letters are all present in the expected quality of Dessain's legacy. Moreover, given the commotion of these fifteen months, Tracey has given more ample play to the inclusion of letters to Newman (many from Keble and Pusey) and letters between other principal players (e.g., Richard Church's long letter to Frederic Rogers surveying Oxford contretemps [108-11]). He has also provided supplementary material in appendices (e.g., Newman's seven "Catholicus" letters to *The Times* of London, later reproduced in *Discussions and Arguments* of Newman's Uniform Edition [pp. 254-305], and which presaged principles that subsequently appeared in *Idea of a University* and *Grammar of Assent,* as well as Sir Robert Peel's speech at Tamworth that prompted these letters; the episcopal "charges" of six bishops against Tract 90, including that of Bishop Sumner of Chester, which Newman called "flat heresy" [LD 8:320]). The thumbnail sketches of mentioned persons at the volume's end are a real boon in understanding who the chief players of the Oxford Movement were. In assuming editorship at volume 6, Tracey had recast and strengthened all previous sketches, volumes 7 and 8 thus building on volume 6 and sketching only first-time mentioned personalities. I would recommend readers of volume 8 to photocopy the personal sketches of the earlier two volumes, which will then provide a complete *dramatis personae.*

Readers of the *Apologia* have long been struck by Newman's forceful description of the three great "blows" that "finally shattered my faith in the Anglican Church" (139, 143): the history of Monophysitism and Arianism portraying a *Via-Media-type* position as heretical, successive episcopal "charges" condemning the teaching of Tract 90, and parliamentary establishment of a Jerusalem bishopric having intercommunion with Prussian Protestants. Volume 7 presented lively letters about the first blow (cf. my review of *LD7* in *The Thomist,* April 1997). In the present review I would wish to supplement and nuance what *Apologia* readers already know about the latter two blows.

First, a prefatory primer on the *Via Media* and *Branch* doctrines, close yet distinct ideas, and necessary for grasping what follows. The *Via Media* describes

the Church of England as ecclesially positioned between Roman Catholicism and Reformation Protestantism. It recognizes with the Reformers pastoral abuses and doctrinal innovations in the Church of Rome. It recognizes with Rome fundamental heresies in Reformation churches. Anglicanism, accordingly, is essentially Catholic in ecclesiology (e.g., a God-given episcopacy, sacramental efficacy), and with Roman Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy it exists unfortunately in disunity today. All three are branches of the primitive undivided Apostolic Church. But if a living branch, then the doctrines of the Ancient Church should live on in the Anglican formularies, such as the Prayer Book and the Thirty-Nine Articles. Tract 90 was Newman's attempt in early 1841, his *experimentum crucis (Apologia,* 130), to prove this true for the Articles.

Readers of *LD* 8 will be surprised by how quietly the affair begins. Save for the 1/19/41 diary entry, "hard at Number 90 and went [to dinner party] forgetting to shave" (21), there is not a single letter or diary entry about crafting the Tract, save for a few suggestions from John Keble sent on 2/19. Years later Newman updated his 2/27 diary: "This was the first day of the Number 90 row" (45). After the "Letter of the Four Tutors" (Churton, Wilson, Griffiths, and Tait, who later became archbishop of Canterbury) arrived on 3/8/41, letters to and from Newman fly fast, and they fascinate us far more than the less detailed account in the *Apologia* could. We learn from his letter to brother-in-law Tom Mozley (58) that his other aim in writing Ninety was to keep people from "conforming" to Rome who liked Rome uncritically-Newman remained keen about Roman abuses-and were unpersuaded by a *Via Media* view. Newman and the founders of the Movement of 1833 called these younger Tractarians "Ultras" (e.g., W. G. Ward, F. Oakeley). From letters to and from Edward Pusey, we learn that Pusey thought people would not be ready for Ninety, that he thought the Catholic interpretations of the Articles to be the natural ones whereas Newman always thought them allowable ones *(LD* 8:76 n.1), and that it was Pusey who suggested Richard Jelf, that "over-cautions" Fellow of Oriel *(LD* 8:63), as the recipient of Newman's subsequent explanation of Ninety. Pusey reckoned that this clarification would have staved off condemnation by the Hebdomadal Board (i.e., the heads of the constituent Oxford colleges who met weekly), had it come into the Board's hands twelve hours earlier than it did (LD 8:72 n.1).

Apropos the *Letter to Jelf (LD* 8:78-88), completed 3/13/41, a lengthy ellipsis unfortunately occurs at the final sentence on page 88, wherein Newman argued that a narrow, somewhat Protestant reading of the Articles pushes Anglicans out the door and toward Rome. The *Letter* is, of course, fully printed in *Via Media* 2:376-91, along with postscripts reflecting Newman's 3/19/41 letter to W. F. Hook *(LD* 8:98-99, which also gives Hook's letter to him). Gerard Tracey is not at fault for the printing slip, and I would wish the story known for his sake, albeit posthumously. Some years ago Tracey told me that OUP had outsourced the text to India for typesetting, and numerous glitches subsequently surfaced. He scoured the galleys and caught most of them. Readers of *LD* 8 need simply be made aware of the dropped paragraphs.

On 3/15/41 the Heads of Houses censured Ninety for "evading ... and reconciling subscription to [the Articles] with the adoption of errors, which they were designed to counter" (LD 8:77). With his earliest Oxford friend, John Bowden, Newman took solace that their indictment spoke of evasion and not heresy (ibid). To the same friend a fortnight later Newman is encouraging a Declaration from university M.A.s in support of the Catholic principles of the Tracts, but when Bishop Bagot of Oxford chilled the idea, Newman backed off and the Declaration was aborted.

In these letters Pusey emerges as the one who attempted to block episcopal condemnation through back-channel discussions (see **ill** 8:281, reporting a Pusey meeting with Howley), and a number of letters corroborate *Apologia* (90) about an "understanding" that no condemnation would ensue if the Tracts ceased and Tractarian incentives abated (see Howley of Canterbury's letter to Bagot [LD 8:101] and Newman's to M. Giberne [LD 8:189]). Tempers cooled to such an extent that Newman wrote his sister Jemima on 3/30/41 that "our Tract affair is settled" (**ill** 8:145). It was not, as we now know, because the bishops began breaking the deal with their "charges" to their diocesan clergy. Instructive all through the dealing and the deal breaking is Newman's sense of obedience to bishops, especially his own, Richard Bagot of Oxford. Newman's letter to Bagot (LD 8:129ff and in *Via Media* 2:395ff.), which along *with]elf* can be taken as clarifying explanations of Ninety, expresses in the clearest manner his willingness to obey a bishop's wishes. (See also **ill** 8:165 for the same resolve, though on 2/19/42 he writes to Keble [LD 8:466], that should a bishop become heretical, one's obedience to him is absolved; in this case one can appeal over him to Convocation, a structure akin to a national episcopal conference today.)

Were a bishop or bishops to suppress Tract 90 as heretical-a far more serious charge than being evasive-Newman was prepared to resign his clerical office and return to lay communion in the church. He and Keble exchanged letters to this effect because they could not subscribe the Articles in the sense the bishops might mandate (LD 8:120). One might wonder why Newman would not envision simply leaving Anglicanism. Many letters make clear that although the Anglican bishops were unwittingly doing Rome's work in closing down hospitality for Catholic sensibilities, at home as it were in Anglicanism, two considerations slowed Newman from defecting: Rome, admittedly by branch theory a natural home for Catholic principles, still had abuses aplenty and, secondly, all true discernment requires patience, long-endured patience (LD 8:220 captures both issues).

Correspondence begins at this time with Fr. Charles Russell of Maynooth, him whom *Apologia* 194 credits with having "more to do with my conversion than any one else," because in a nonpolemical way this learned Irish priest gently pointed out misconceptions about Tridentine teachings. On the other hand, Newman outlined his faults with Roman Catholicism in letters sent Russell (**ill** 8:174, 177, 182).

All Newman's letters to Mary Holmes, who had been governess for W. M. Thackeray's children and later fraternized with Anthony Trollope, invite perusal of what is involved in a genuine conversion from one church to another. Newman is as much being autobiographical in these letters as he is instructing Ms. Holmes, who would become a Roman Catholic a year before her spiritual director did. The theme of patience is paramount, and a few illustrations of rightful patience at work merit mention. "Never trust a first suggestion," he wrote Ms. Holmes on 8/8/41, "you cannot tell whether the voice is from above or from below. Your rule is, not to attend to it but to go on as usual. At first shrink from it. If it is from God, it will in due time return. And hence to all great changes, a season of thought and preparation is a necessary introduction, if we would know what God's will is" (*LD* 8:239). Concerning reputedly miraculous events happening in devotional Catholicism, Newman urged a particular patience that remains ever timely: "Do not think that I wish to speak lightly, or even skeptically, of the existence of a divine and miraculous system of Providence among us even now. But I think it a kind of evidence as to which one is very likely to deceive oneself, and that if any evidence required time and delay before it was received, it was this" (*LD* 8:318).

Do not be swayed by superficial attractiveness, Newman cautions her further. "You are framing in idea a religion of all joy. No. A sinner's religion must have sorrow .... A true church must have its abasing, its chill, its severe doctrines" (*LD* 8:248). To Robert Wilberforce, former Oriel Fellow during the famous Tutorship scrape of 1830 with Provost Hawkins, he added additional justification for his own deliberateness: "Recollect that I wish to be guided not by controversy [i.e., arguments pro and con] but by *ethos*, so that (please God) nothing would seem to me a reason for so very awful and dreadful a step ... but the quiet growth of a feeling through many years" (*LD* 8:452). Even when the orthodoxy of Anglicanism seemed melted away, Newman remained steadfast in his commitment to the Church, as in these memorable words to a confident Maria Giberne, "I shall never be loath, when necessary, to call heresy heresy, and am never going to retreat before heresy until like mephytic gas it is suffocating outright" (*LD* 8:392). Conversion to Roman Catholicism is still four years off!

Letters in the fail of 1841 describe "this deplorable Jerusalem matter," "this hideous business" to send a bishop to Palestine to shepherd a handful of Anglicans and large numbers of Lutherans and Monophysites (*LD* 8:290, 292). A drafted but unsent letter to the *Times* lays out the problems, concluding "What is the worth of Episcopacy without orthodoxy? What is it but a husk pretending to be what it is not?" (*LD* 8:316). For Newman's theology, this government initiative, which had been promoted by Prussian ambassador Bunsen, undid his branch theory. To Henry Woodgate he confided on 11/12/41, "if we are now to recognize the Protestants as Catholic brethren, the ground is cut from under me. I shall have taught people that there is a Church, *somewhere,* and the Archbishop will teach them it is not to be found at home" (*LD* 8:327). (Branch theory assumed that the English Church served Anglicans on English soil and did not encroach elsewhere save for private chaplains.) Newman was at that moment

preparing four Advent sermons, he told Woodgate resignedly, whose motif was "the duty of our keeping to ourselves" (presumably nos. 21-24 in *Sermons on Subjects of the Day).*

Oxford professorships are voted "in Convocation" by its M.A.s, those in college residence and those in careers elsewhere, and they are customarily low-turnout affairs. The poetry professorship in 1841-42 was not to be customary. Pusey picked up the politics early: "I am sorry to say that the election to the Poetry Professorship is to be made a party question against [Isaac] Williams. People are canvassing against him, because he is a writer in the Tracts" *(LD* 8:260 n. 3). There was an initial sentiment among the Tractarians for Williams to withdraw and thus to avoid another controversy so soon after Tract 90. But two other sentiments came to overrule withdrawal. If enough M.A.s, even if not enough for victory, could line up behind Williams-recall that the bishops chilled the idea of a declaration in favor of Ninety-then a large number of university men would be making a public statement for Tractarian principles. Newman, in addition, wrote Williams himself apropos episcopal pressure on him to step down: "such a termination of the contest is pregnant with evil to the *integrity of* the Church. If the Church by all its acts signifies that it is other than the Church Catholic, Catholic minds will leave it. As to you, the Bishops, like Varney, are seething a kid in its mother's milk" (from Walter Scott's *Kenilworth;* that is, the bishops utilize Williams's known Tractarian value of obedience to them to order him alone, not both contenders, to step down [LD 8:420]). A straw poll of committed votes was subsequently taken-623 Williams vs. 921 Garbett-after which Williams did step down, a strong pro-Tractarian statement having been made.

Apologia (162) mentions the three friends (Henry and Robert Wilberforce, Frederic Rogers) to whom alone Newman confided how thoroughly unsettled he had become in Anglicanism. He lacked his 1/26/42 letter to Robert when writing the *Apologia, butLD* 8:440-42 provides it and Robert's hasty response, "I don't think that I ever was so shocked by any communication." What *Apologia* does not mention, and the letter does, is that the "blows" of 1841 that had tied his theological hands forced him "back upon the *internal or personal Notes* of the Church," such as sanctity, in order to remain in conscience where Providence had placed him by baptism. Wanting to keep Ms. Holmes from abandoning the English Church, Newman wrote her: "I assure you that I conceive myself to have the most certain proofs, though of course I cannot communicate them to another, that the Presence of Christ is still with us. And I shrink from the ingratitude and profaneness of turning *from* that Presence in the hope of finding it elsewhere. Suppose it elsewhere. How do I know I should find it? Is it not enough if I have it now? ... At present the Pillar of the Cloud is with [our church]" *(LD* 8:366; the phrase is the official name, of course, of his "Lead Kindly Light" poem).

Some miscellaneous matters should be noticed in addition to the major "church topics" above. Henry Edward Manning, who as cardinal figures so largely in Newman's Roman Catholic life, is encountered sporadically. One

senses, even this early, a coolness between the two men. Although he has Tractarian leanings, the Archdeacon of Chichester comes through more in league with Gladstone and church politics than with the Oxford men. On 7/25/41 Newman writes him condolingly on the fourth anniversary of his wife's death *(LD* 8:229). William George Ward, who later collaborated with Manning to thwart Newman, comes through very supportively in these letters, and vice versa. Newman chided his brother-in-law for mistreating Ward, noting somewhat curiously to Tom Mozley "that any one else but a person so singularly sweet tempered as he (for this is his strong point, from being fat I suppose) would have taken offense at it" *(LD* 8:438). Newman's greatest friend of his Catholic years, Fr. Ambrose St. John, appears for the first time as a diary entry on 4/21/41, mentioned among the clergy attending the consecration of Keble's chapel at Hursley.

Newman's siblings figure prominently. John, Harriett, Jemima, and Frank collectively fret over shiftless Charles, who would not get a job *(LD* 8:254, 302 n. 3, 463), and first-born John notes to his sisters that "Chas at last turned sharp upon *me" (LD* 8:297). Harriett disowned John lifelong after her brother converted, and even though the sisters and the two Mozley brothers whom they married were quite Tractarian in views, Harriett's coolness and reserve to John's writings can be felt this early *(LD* 8:341, 385). While she never condoned the 1845 conversion, Jemima on the other hand stayed in contact with her brother, and a greater warmth than Harriett's in writing John even in 1841 can be detected *(LD* 8:363).

Thomas Arnold, the epitome of the liberal Oriel Common Room noetic and retaining immense cachet as Master of Rugby after leaving Oxford, groused that "Mr. Newman and his friends appear to hate the nineteenth century" (preferring Antiquity to its values), and to invest the patristic period and the New Testament with equal authority *(LD* 8:103-4). A possible verbal dual with Arnold made Newman feel "dismal" at the prospect of debating this master polemicist, the only instance of controverting that ever seemed to cow Newman, so far as I know.

Newman's letters abound with aphorisms still current, for example, "one man's food is another man's poison" *(LD* 8:228), and with humor seasoned to the occasion, as when he responds to a concerned correspondent on whom a mutual friend had dumped personal woes. "You should consider too that he *rids himself* of his anxiety by sending it to you. Only do not keep it, but ship it off to some penal settlement or destroy it outright" *(LD* 8:404). Whether with humor or understatement or with a nephew's protectiveness, he writes his beloved Aunt Elizabeth when acknowledging her birthday greetings that "it dismays one that life is going on with so little to show for it" *(LD* 8:470). Sure!

I cannot conclude without returning to Mr. Gerard Tracey. He loved bringing Newman's letters into public light, and as time-consuming as a volume's editing was, he was unstinting in his availability to every Newman scholar who came to the Birmingham Oratory to research. His obituary in the *London Times* (30

January 2003) noted his uncommon generosity, and I attest to it, too. The *Letters and Diaries* series will publish over 20,000 Newman letters. I once asked Tracey to guess how many more Newman actually wrote, and he answered "another 20,000." Take, as instance, the diary entry for 1/26/41, where Newman lists eleven letters he wrote on this day, of which we have only two (LD 8:23). Some letters have turned up since Fr. Dessain began this series. Tracey was already planning supplemental volumes to the originally envisioned thirty-one. His masterly hand is missed. (Bro. Francis McGrath, F.M.S., a distinguished Newman scholar, has been appointed his successor.)

Oxford University Press is also to be acknowledged appreciatively. These volumes are meant for libraries, and such books do not make much money for presses. But OUP has stood steadfastly behind the project. There was a time when only Newman's *Uniform &lition* was quoted in Newman scholarship, but as the Newman of the letters has been mainstreamed into scholarly consciousness-and this is relatively recently-one now sees *Letters and Diaries* referenced liberally. Perhaps this is the finest acknowledgment readers can render Oxford University Press.

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john Paul II and the Legacy of "Dignitatis humanae.,, By HERMINIO Rico, S.J. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002. Pp. 228. $59.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-87840-889-4.

Even at a first glance at this book by Portuguese Jesuit Herminio Rico suggests reasons that one should read it carefully. First of all, it deals with the theme of the heritage of the Second Vatican Council, to whose implementation Catholics all over the world are still called. Second, the author takes up the theme of interpretation and adoption of the heritage of the council by John Paul II, which is still the subject of much debate between critics and enthusiasts of the present pontificate. Third, the book promises critical considerations about freedom, or more precisely, about religious freedom, as a key to the understanding of modern culture and the way in which modernity is interpreted by John Paul II.

The book consists of two parts. The first is devoted to an analysis of the declaration *Dignitatis humanae* and to the presentation of theological debates connected with the declaration. The second part is devoted to the place of this document in John Paul II's pontificate. The first chapter presents one of the

author's major theses, which is that the declaration *Dignitatis humanae,* understood in light of the history of the Church, serves three important functions. First, since it grants every human person the right to religious freedom, the declaration has redefined the relations between the state and the Church. In this new formula, in which Rico follows Marie-Dominique Chenu, the Constantinian era ends, and the secular authorities are no longer under an obligation to promote the mission of the Church. In the context of such an interpretation of *Dignitatis humanae,* religious freedom is understood as an inalienable and natural right of every human person.

Second, the declaration condemns the religious persecution committed by the governments of states under the influence of ideologies hostile towards religion, especially communism. In this sense, religious freedom is understood, according to Rico, first of all as the right of the Church to operate and exist freely. It is worth pointing out here a certain lack of ecumenical sensitivity in the book. Rico makes a dangerous and illegitimate distortion of the content of the declaration. He claims that this declaration is about the defense of the Church against state interference, suggesting that first of all it is about the Catholic Church. In fact, the declaration (and this is one of the great achievements of the council's theology) defends the rights of *all* religious communities and churches. The defense of the rights of the Catholic Church is only one of the many applications of this more universal attitude. It is worth noting that John Paul II became involved in the 1980s in the defense of the rights of believers in Central-Eastern Europe against enforced atheism-not only Catholics in Poland, but also Christians of other denominations in the Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, etc.

The third application of the declaration has to do with the cultural relativism and indifferentism of the late twentieth century. The fundamental question, put forward by Rico in the context of John Paul II's pontificate, is whether the declaration, which played so important a role in the first two historical contexts mentioned, may apply equally to present relativistic democracy.

In his considerations concerning the place and meaning of *Dignitatis humanae* in the thought and activities of John Paul II, Rico notices that the pope was personally involved in each of these three contexts. Nevertheless, the author's criticism of the present pontificate is based on the argument that both during the Second Vatican Council and during the first part of his pontificate John Paul II interpreted *Dignitatis humanae* in the light of the Catholic Church's fight in Central-Eastern Europe with atheistic communism. One of Rico's major criticism about the present pontificate is that John Paul II is insensitive to the first application of *Dignitatis humanae,* namely, the identification of the right to religious freedom as a universal right. This is the basis of the Church's presence in modern, liberal Western democracies. The fact that John Paul II is deeply rooted in the Polish Church, according to Rico, has resulted in primacy being given to the defense of the institutional rights of the Catholic Church against pressure from a totalitarian, atheistic state. Because of the great similarity

between the first and the third application of *Dignitatis humanae,* says Rico, the fact that John Paul II has underestimated the first application means that in the second part of his pontificate he has been unable to find the place in his theology and style of work for the right to religious freedom.

Rico's assertion that John Paul II is interested in the conciliar declaration on religious freedom only in the context of the Catholic Church's fight with communism in Central-Eastern Europe contains a misunderstanding as well as a false interpretation of the present pontificate. One can indicate two inconsistent points within such a stance. First, the interest of John Paul II in the situation of believers in Eastern Europe has been a part of his responsibilities as a shepherd of the universal Church, as it has been in his interest in the situation of Catholics in Chile under the government of the right-wing Pinochet regime, or in the Philippines under Marcos. Rico seems not to notice that the declaration on religious freedom has become for the pope an inspiration and an efficient tool of fighting for freedom of conscience and believers' rights not only in Poland, but everywhere where these rights have been abused, in countries as different as Mexico, Nicaragua, the Philippines, or Chile. The declaration on religious freedom is an inspiration for the pope also in a situation in which a lay democratic state forbids believing citizens to express their religious beliefs in the public sphere. John Paul II has many times emphasized this injustice and abuse of the right to religious freedom. Rico does not take into account the fact that in Western, liberal democracies the debate concerning the place of religion in the public sphere is far from complete, and many events following September 11, 2001 indicate that it will start again. For the reader it is difficult not to have the impression that in spite of Rico's intellectually sophisticated analyses his conclusions express a rather stereotypical interpretation of the pontificate, which, especially in the 1980s, one could encounter daily in the popular press: namely, the pope from Eastern Europe does not understand Western, liberal democracy.

Second, a careful reader of the play *Our God's Brother,* by Karol Wojtyla, and John Paul II's social encyclicals, first of all *Laborem exercens,* will see that communism has never been for John Paul II mainly a political phenomenon, as Rico seems to think. The pope's criticism of communism aims at finding the cultural and anthropological sources of the modern European crisis. John Paul II states that this crisis does not limit itself to the works of Marx and Engels, but goes back to the constitutional philosophical currents of the West. Traces of the pope's topography of the sources of modern crisis can be found almost in all his documents, first of all in the encyclicals, from *Redemptor hominis* (1979) to *Fides et ratio* (1998). In view of this extremely ambitious intellectual project of John Paul II, Rico's views seem rather banal. Rico claims that the attitude of dialogue with the world, represented by the declaration *Dignitatis humanae,* has been replaced during the present pontificate by a confrontational attitude tested in the conflict with communism. This attitude refers to the nineteenth-century model of the Church as a besieged fortress. The author's own proposal for building the

relations between the Church and the contemporary world amounts, by contrast, to a general call for renewing the dialogue between the Church and the world, a dialogue which is the only way to reach the truth and in which all sides are allowed a say.

Because the author undertook to consider so difficult a theme as the relation between the theology of John Paul II and the message of the declaration *Dignitatis humanae,* it should come as no surprise that the reader's attention is drawn by problems and questions that have not been considered in the book. Some of them seem to be conditions *sine qua non* of an adequate consideration of the theme. The fundamental question, which is not present in the book, concerns the problem of changes in the situation of Europe and the world that occurred in the second part of the twentieth century, between two events which are reference points in our debate: the announcement of the declaration on religious freedom *Dignitatis humanae* (1965) and the jubilee year 2000, which may be considered as the culmination of the present pontificate. Is the dramatic tone that undoubtedly appears in the recent encyclicals of John Paul II *(Veritatis splendor* [1993], *Evangelium vitae* [1995], and *Fides et ratio* [1998]) in some sense justified by the state of world affairs? Many serious commentators, even outside the Catholic Church, claim that this is so. Rico's suggestion that the pope's attitude, which is confrontational and not dialogical, results from his being burdened by communism cannot be taken seriously in such a context.

The book has much in its favor. Undoubtedly, its first, historical part is the most worthy of recommendation. This part is devoted to the declaration *Dignitatis humanae* as well as the conciliar and postconciliar theological debates related to the declaration. The author shows a great knowledge of rich secondary literature concerning *Dignitatis humanae* and presents it in the book in a precise fashion. Rico's bibliographical references can serve everyone interested in the subject as very helpful material for further studies.

Nevertheless, Rico's reflection concerning the pontificate of John Paul II is disappointing. Stereotypical views concerning the burdening of the pope with communism cannot replace the serious intellectual involvement the book's subject matter requires. Unfortunately, the project undertaken by the author of explaining the relation between the theology of John Paul II and the declaration on religious freedom *Dignitatis humanae* has not been carried out properly. It still awaits a creative approach.

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Christologie im Horizont der Seinsfrage: Uber die epistemologischen und metaphysischen Voraussetzungen des Bekenntnisses zur universalen Heilsmittlerschaft fesu Christi. By MICHAELSTICKELBROECK.Miinchener Theologische Studien, II. Systematische Abteilung, 59. Band. St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag, 2002. Pp. 713. 68 €(cloth). ISBN 3-8306-7133-4.

The ubiquitous phenomenon of globalization poses a heretofore unknown challenge to every world religion: namely, to reconsider more "radically" (in the literal sense of the word: going to the roots) the epistemology upon which it is built. Religious pluralism, the acceptance of which is characteristic of the postmodern mind frame, fails to address the internal way a particular faith tradition arrives at its belief. *Christologieim Horizont der Seinsfrage* takes up this challenge head on and attempts to uncover anew for the twenty-first century the epistemological basis for Christian belief in the divine Logos who became incarnate and redeemed all of humankind.

In this voluminous study, Michael Stickelbroeck discusses from an ontological perspective the basis for Christological dogmas and lucidly examines the epistemological and metaphysical prerequisites for claiming the universal mediation of salvation by Jesus Christ. The study achieves two objectives: (1) preventing Christian faith from falling into the trap of mere myth and (2) evidencing its credibility in confrontation with the decisive philosophical criteria: namely, reality and rationality. The author teaches systematic theology at a Catholic college in Austria and wrote this *Habilitationsschrift* under the direction of the recently appointed bishop of Regensburg Gerhard L. Muller, professor of dogmatics at Munich University and member of the International Theological Commission.

Stickelbroeck observes, in the wake of profound upheavals in philosophy and a subsequent rephrasing of Christology in the second half of the twentieth century, a crisis of plausibility and a lack of acceptance of classical dogmatic Christology. He claims that the inner connection between Christology and a metaphysical view of concrete reality-and thereby between philosophy and theology-fades from view. Without a proper philosophical and more precisely epistemological basis the New Testament and early Church statements, up to Nicaea and Chalcedon, concerning Jesus Christ cannot be understood, let alone retrieved. An antimetaphysical option in favor of a Kantian epistemological skepticism leads in Stickelbroeck's view to a rejection of natural theology (Bultmann) and, as a consequence, to postmodern agnosticism. He probes how Christology could be reconciled to current plausiblities and finds the answer in the appropriation of metaphysics.

Stickelbroeck investigates the conditions requisite for human beings to accept in faith God's "absolute self-revelation" in history. How is "the coincidence of God and humankind in the person of Jesus Christ" accessible to cognition? What are the natural premises one must presuppose for faith to come about? How might a human person become the mediating center for revelation and salvation?

Stickelbroeck considers Descartes's turn to subjective consciousness and Kant's reduction of speculative human reason to the realm of sense objects as major impediments to metaphysics and therefore to understanding Christology. He questions whether indeed human experience is unable to grasp more than what human sense perception allows. Using the difference in German between *Wirklichkeit* (= the realm of cause and effect) and *Realitat* (= all of reality) he offers an epistemology that is not only able to apprehend actual reality but that is also a metaphysical, overarching concept enabling a realistic appreciation of Christological creedal sentences. For this he draws heavily on Thomas Aquinas. The principle *similitude rei intellectae* enables grasping a matter as it is *in se.* This Thomistic formal principle for insight explains the viability of an extrapolation from general sense content to the inner intelligibility of the totality of reality (= *Realitat).*

Stickelbroeck apprehends Thomas's view of the inner intelligibility of being as overcoming skepticism with respect to metaphysical insight. Thomas holds that the human mind is able to abstract from sense experience something like a sweeping and all-encompassing meaning. The *intellectus agens* is capable of investigating sense experience and accessing thereby an intelligible object (= *intelligere in sensibus).* By virtue of the *lumen naturale* the human mind is capable of abstraction, that is, it is able to arrive at insight into essence.

While Kant poses the question of the conditions for possibility of insight, Thomas's point of departure is the incontrovertible fact that insight is already being constantly gained a priori by the human mind. Here Stickelbroeck points to a "certain circle" because insight and the object of insight imply an overarching intelligibility. A priori insight is always insight into the actual reality of a concrete object and not the mere imagination of an object, as Kant thought. The recognized object becomes thus part of the *geistige(s) Leben* (= intellectual life, 516) of the one who gained insight into it. There is a *quodammodo unum fieri* which enables the subject gaining insight to transcend itself in the act of insight.

It is of utmost significance for a propositional communication of Christology that the term accessed in insight represents for philosophy of language as *verbum interius* an actual meaning. The term expresses a certain content based on the fact that the human mind with its indwelling intentionality grasps something that by and of itself is intelligible. The external word receives its meaning from this interior word (term). While the "linguistic turn" (Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap) focuses on cognition's dependency on particular linguistic comexts, Thomas discovers the human mind's capacity for abstraction and its ability to grasp essences. In spite of linguistic and cultural constraints, human cognition leads to the universality of the human intelligence accessing universally valid statements and ultimately the ability to transcend.

It is on this basis that the author is able to present a biblical theological overview of the revealed identity of Jesus with his Father and his preexistence. A survey of Christology Uustin Martyr, Irenaeus, Arius, Athanasius, Nestorius, Leontius of Byzantium, Leontius of Jerusalem, and Maximus the Confessor) up

to and including Chakedon follows. The God acting in the covenant is evidenced in fact as "the God of the philosophers" (Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, and Especially Paul, the Synoptics, and John serve to illustrate that the Christian doctrine of God is closely allied with an ontology and metaphysics asserting the personhood of the God-man.

Having established this, the second part of the book deals with the Christo logical designs of E. Schillebeeckx, E. Jilngel, and J. Hick-interweaving pertinent aspects of their respective indebtedness to previous intellectual history. Here the author demonstrates how theologians professing to make do with no philosophy at all are actually influenced by philosophical presuppositions and/or by preceding ideological decisions. The deficits that arise from defining the personhood of Christ without metaphysics and a sound epistemological basis are uncovered. These three radically different positions are tested against Thomas's thought and are found seriously defective.

Is not Schillebeeckx merely making subjectivity the hermeneutic norm par excellence when he postulates the criterion of "salvific relevance"? The Dutch theologian's epistemology is uncovered as "positivistic empiricism," essentially indebted to Wittgenstein's "language game." As a result the hypothesis of the God-man is tested against human cognitional truth. Human-historic experience becomes the criterion for the profession of faith in the resurrection of Jesus. For human acceptance of the notion of "God," God must enter the categorical world. Schillebeeckx accepts theoretically two variations of the language play: in one Jesus is conveyed in conversational discourse as a human person; in the other Christ is discussed as the divine Logos. No mediation between the two occurs, as to the mind of Schillebeeckx personhood cannot be conceived of outside history. Only in life does an individual gradually become a person. As a consequence hypostatic union is not an ontological reality (preceding incarnation), but merely a psychic consciousness "into" which Jesus lives. Here Stickelbroeck identifies Kant's concept of the "self" as the basis for Schillebeeckx's definition of consciousness. As Stickelbroeck points out, however, such philosophy of consciousness fails to countenance the substantiaHty of any given person. The horizon of creaturely immanence becomes in this matrix the exclusive "proving grounds" for Christology. The pragmatic usefulness of theological statements for an individual to master existence ethically is now the criterion for Christological statements. This "dominance of a functionalistic thinking" makes it impossible to understand the issue in a nonutilitarian way. Jesus' relevance is reduced to that of an ethical exemplar. Revelation as the principle for religious insight is ignored. In Schillebeeckx's perspective salvation and profane history become identical and God no longer impacts the categorical conditions of this world.

While the author welcomes Jiingel's consistent staurocentric and Trinitarian approach, he considers Jilngel's statement that God identifies himself with Jesus much too restrained to affirm the Logos' preexistence. Junge! insists on the identity of Jesus with the Logos, but tears the unity of Jesus' personhood apart when he introduces a difference between anhypostasy and enhypostasy, and so

between the immanent meaning of Jesus' life and his significance in redemption. In Jiingel's view, the Logos remained always superior to the earthly Jesus. Stickelbroeck asks how Jiingel is then able to appreciate the *pro nobis* of crucifixion. He falls short of the creed's "one in Being with the Father." He is unable to state an essential identity of Father and Son. Rejecting the *analogia entis*, he cannot follow the understanding of being as essence's *actus essendi* in the nature of things. However, only jointly do being and essence form an individual. The Thomistic concept of knowing God *lumine naturali intellectus* remains alien to Jiingel.

By surrendering the principle of *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, Hick's theology becomes merely descriptive in character, allowing only for a pragmatic, not a rational, horizon. Jesus loses his identity with the only-begotten Son of God. The Blessed Trinity finds no expression in the Word. Christology is metaphorical. Thus one is able to understand why Hick's Christ ranks on the same level as Hindu gods. This second part of the book illustrates the need for theology to be consciously open for metaphysical questions.

In the third part, Stickelbroeck develops epistemological preconditions for the Christological dogmas. He shows Cartesian dualism to be one of the sources for scientism in modern sciences. He regards the Kantian gnoseological foundational option as tearing faith and reason asunder. While attempting a synthesis of sensationalism (empiricism) and rationalism (idealism), Kant finally must admit that his attempted synthesis failed. He cannot achieve a true access to intelligible reality from sense perception and on the basis of an immanentistic epistemology. Stickelbroeck shows that Thomas's metaphysics is not beholden to a rationalistic metaphysics of terms. The background for Thomas's epistemology is divined in his ontology as an act of being and personhood-as an *actus omnium actuum-which* is not subsumed under the order of the merely created, but refers to God as the *ipsum esse.*

In cognition a true statement is arrived at but is not limited to this fact. The human mind is able to reflect upon this circumstance again and to arrive thereby at an insight into meaning. It grasps intelligible structures and is able to abstract an essential content from these. A special section of the book is devoted to Lonergan's concept of "dynamic intentionality" on actual reality and the discussion of "transcendence of insight." Apart from and independent of psychological, social, or historic conditions, absolute judgments are possible. As the Christologies discussed evidence insight into God as creating difficulties, the author also discusses natural theology's possibilities, necessity, and limits. He pleads for a negative theology, which overcomes agnosticism, affirms divine revelation, and yet does not reduce God to finite history. Only a divine reality of yet greater *transcendence-tamquam ignotum-can* do justice to Jesus as the Christ, that is, as the God-man. With this background Stickelbroeck reflects on God's suffering with and for human beings.

The author is careful not to suggest that faith could be "deduced" from natural reason. Faithful to Thomas, he sustains a marked difference between philosophical insight into matters divine and faith insight grounded in

supernatural grace throughout the study. Highly interesting is his discussion of faith cannot be reduced to a practical coming to terms with reality in the vein of a functionalistic understanding of religion. In his estimation faith means addressing existentially propositional truth head on. Faith widens the cognitional horizon of humankind to participation in God's self-recognition by way of mediation on part of the incarnate divine Logos-per *speculum et in aenigmate.*

Stickelbroeck depicts Locke's departure from an ontological understanding of personhood as causing a reduction of personhood to crude self-consciousness. Reading Thomas closely, in the final section he discusses the ontologically relevant Trinitarian understanding of the term "personhood." Showing the intimate relationship between philosophy and theology, Stickelbroeck highlights the relevance of the term "person" for both Christology and (therefore also) anthropology. Thereby the dependence of ontology on Trinitarian theology becomes apparent. The reader becomes acutely aware that one is only able to reflect properly on divine self-communication if one apprehends in Jesus the eternal Son sent forth from inner-Trinitarian life. Thereby the Blessed Trinity is evidenced not as a superfluous adiaphoron, but as the transcendental-logical precondition for appreciating properly the mystery of incarnation.

Trinitarian personhood in tum is the enablement of a creaturely personhood that is far more than mere self-consciousness. As Jesus is the eternal Son of God, human beings are able to partake in divine Sonship and in divine life. The true and real coincidence of God and humankind in Jesus Christ vouches for inner divine relationality to flow into humankind, thus becoming the basis for a renewal of the latter's relational identity as children of God. Faith does not come about by forming predicated terms, but by cognition judging truth. then is Christian faith in the unique mediation of salvation by Christ more than a tradition and becomes what it indeed claims: universal truth 17:17).

The reader is left with the sense that a central issue confounding some modern-day Christologies is solved. The outlines of the original Christological synthesis are being retraced and its lasting relevance shown: the identity of the eternal Logos with the concrete historic mediator Jesus as the Christ. It would be intriguing to know how Stickelbroeck would evaluate such varied Christological contributions as those of von Balthasar, Roff, Kereszty, O'Collins, or Eastern theology.

The viability of the Stickelbroeck chooses-the *analogia entis* of Thomas-is further confirmed by an unlikely witness: quantum physics. In the nineteenth century empirical sciences provided the basis for naturalism. While classical physics took the place of metaphysics as a major point of reference for some theologies, sciences now apprehend in the immanent world "a knowing world spirit" (Carl Friedrich v. Weizsiicker), "a nature possessing an intellectual component" and even a "world soul" (Hans-Peter Durr). Microscopic matter contains information suggesting reality's overarching purpose and meaning (N.B. not only of palpable reality, but of the totality of reality). In hindsight some later-twentieth-century Christologies must be faulted for being too much influenced

by a mechanical understanding of physics, in vogue already well prior to 1950. With the advent of quantum physics is it not now high time for theology to "demythologize the program of demythologization"? Ontology is by its very "nature" infinitely more than mere facticity. Stickelbroeck's critical appraisal of representative Christologies-by way of reintroducing Thomas's central notion of the *analogia entis* to the current discussion-serves this purpose and, one might add, serves the purposes of ministry as well.

My survey cannot do justice to the wealth of materials, distinctions, and thoughts Stickelbroeck has put into this book. This remarkable scholarly study not only addresses burning Christological issues in an effective manner, it may well also contribute to a revival of a healthy and balanced appreciation for the thought of Thomas Aquinas. In order to treat such difficult material adequately Stickelbroeck employs sophisticated, but always comprehensible, German, discusses a vast array of up-to-date literature and compares it to a multitude of theological sources from Christianity's first centuries.

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