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WHAT IS NATURAL LAW? HUMAN PURPOSES AND NATURAL ENDS

ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI

The Catholic University of America
Washington, DC

ETHICS IN GENERAL, and medical ethics in particular, are obviously related to human self-understanding, to what we could call philosophical and theological anthropology. Our understanding of what is ethical and unethical is connected to what we take ourselves to be. The relationship, however, is not one-sided. It is not the case that we could work out a comprehensive description or definition of human nature as a purely theoretic enterprise and then apply this knowledge to practical issues, the way we might work out some ideas in mathematics and then apply them to problems in engineering and physics.[1] Rather, the working out of the definition and description of human nature is at the same time the formulation of what we *ought* to be as human beings, because the good or perfected state of man, which is the issue for ethics, is what defines human being. The normative is also the definitional. We cannot describe what man is without specifying the human good, without showing what it is to be a good (and consequently "happy") man. To want one of these dimensions without the other would be like wanting to study physiology, whether human or simply animal, without mentioning health and its various contraries, such as illness, injury, and impairment.

[1] Even in mathematics, the relationship of theory and practice is not one-sided. Many innovations in mathematics arise from real problems of computation, not from abstract mathematics. The stimulus to mathematical thinking often lies in real-world questions.

But human nature is more complicated than physiology. There are few disagreements about what constitutes health and sickness, but there are many opinions about what constitutes human excellence. *As* Aristotle says, we all agree on a *name* for human happiness, but we disagree very much on what makes it up.[2] Still, the fact that we have at least a name in common is important; it shows that we start with some common ground in this domain. We may differ about the *what* of happiness, but not about the *that,* nor do we differ on the fact that we want and need to be happy. The reason we can argue about these differences is that they all pertain to one and the same quest and target. The just man and the hedonist might act very differently, but in some sense they are aiming at the same thing. We are all concerned not just about living but about living well, not just about life but about the good life, and this little difference, between living and living well, greatly complicates the human condition. In fact, it makes it to be the *human* condition. When we say that man is a rational animal, we do not just mean that he is an animal that calculates and draws inferences; we mean, more substantially, that he is an animal that is concerned about living well and not just living.

I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEENENDS AND PuRPOSES

To explore this complexity of human beings, I wish to discuss the difference between ends and purposes. The distinction has been formulated by Francis Slade, in a striking modern recapitulation of classical philosophical ideas.[3]

An end, a *telos,* belongs to a thing in itself, while a purpose arises only when there are human beings. Purposes are intentions, something we wish for and are deliberating about or acting to achieve. Ends, in contrast, are there apart from any human wishes

[2] Aristode, *NicomacbeanEthics* 1.4.

[3] See Francis Slade, "On the Ontological Priority of Ends and Its Relevance to the Narrative Arts," in *Beauty, Art, and the Polis,* ed. Alice Ramos (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 58-69; and "Ends and Purposes," in *Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs,* ed. Richard Hassing (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 83-85.

and deliberations. They are what the thing is when it has reached its best state, its perfection and completion in and for itself. Ends and purposes are both goods, but goods of different ontological orders.

Purposes come into existence when human beings set out thoughtfully to do something. Purposes are wished-for satisfactions in view of which an agent deliberates and acts. A man might set various purposes for himself, such as becoming a lawyer, supporting his family, going on vacation, or giving someone a gift, and he will do various things toward achieving this purpose: he will apply to law schools, get a job, buy tickets, or go shopping. Once a man has a purpose, he articulates the various ways in which the purpose can be achieved (this "shaking out" of means toward the goal is called deliberation); he then performs the action that, as far as he can see, is the best option in the present circumstances (this selection is called choice).[4] Thus, purposes exist "in the mind" and not in things, and they exist only because there are human beings. It would be correct but somewhat misleading to say that purposes are psychological entities, because they are more conceptual and logical than, say, moods or emotions, but it would be true to say that they are part of *our* thinking and that they are different from the ends found in things, which are there independently of our wishes and actions.

Ends, in contrast, do not spring into being through human foresight. They do not spring into being at all; they come about concomitantly with the things they belong to. Things might spring into being when they are generated or made or occur by accident, but ends do not arise without the thing. An end is the finished, perfected state of a thing, the thing when it is acting well as what it is. To clarify this point, we must distinguish three kinds of ends.

First , some ends are, in principle, entirely unrelated to human beings. The end of a tree is to grow, sprout leaves, nourish itself, and reproduce: to be active and successful as a tree, as an entity of this kind. The end of a zebra is to grow to maturity, nourish

[4] Aristotle's analysis of wishing, deliberation, choice, and purposes is found in *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1-5.

itself, reproduce, and live with other zebras. Trees and zebras function well *as* trees and zebras when they act this way, and we know what a tree and a zebra are when we can say what it means to act well as a thing of this kind. A zebra might break its leg or be eaten by a lion, but possibilities like these do not define what a zebra is. They are not part of what it is, its essence, which is displayed most fully not when the zebra merely exists but when the zebra is acting well.

Second, some ends belong to things that have come into being through human agency. Artifacts and institutions, things brought about by human making and agreements, have essences and ends. It is not the case that only natural substances have a *telos.* Consider an institution such as an art museum. Its *telos* is to make works of art available for public viewing, and part of this activity will be the acquisition and preservation of such works. The end of a bicycle is the transportation of individuals, and the end of a ballpoint pen is to be used in writing or drawing. In each case, the end defines what the thing is. It is interesting and important to note that even though artifacts and institutions are brought about by human beings to serve our purposes and our ends, we cannot change what they are. We might suppose that because we have made them, we could turn them into anything we wish, but they resist such manipulation; even as instrumental beings, they have their own nature or essence and ends. They inhabit a niche in the possibilities laid open in the world. We may have brought them into being, but they do not become our purposes. They retain their own ends and we have to subordinate ourselves to them.

To claim that institutions and artifacts have no definition, and that they could be changed by us at will, would mean that they could not be ruined or destroyed by us. Any change would just be a redefinition, carried out by us, who would have freely defined the thing in question in the first place. We could not really "spoil" anything, but experience shows that we can and often do.

I would like to illustrate this understanding of ends by quoting from a book review. The reviewer, Josie Appleton, describes a book based on a series of lectures given by five directors of major

museums in the United States and Great Britain.[5] The lectures were given at Harvard in 2001-2002. Many of the speakers complained about the tendency of museums to engage in all sorts of activities unrelated to what we could call their proper end, such as "inviting you to try on period costumes or make your own ceramic pots." In describing the "key insight" of the book, the reviewer says, "Each public institution has an essence, a reason for its existence, be it making sick people well, improving general welfare, or, in the case of museums, collecting and exhibiting art."[6] She adds that an institution will keep the public's trust only if "it remains true to its essence." These remarks are an excellent expression of what ends are and the obligations they impose on people who deal with the things in question.

We have listed two kinds of things that have ends: first, nonhuman things like zebras, trees, and spiders; and, second, human institutions and artifacts, such as museums and ballpoint pens. There is a third kind that must be added to the list. Human beings themselves have ends. They have an overall end, which we could call happiness, and which is easy to name but difficult to define; but there also are ends for the various powers that human beings enjoy. There is a *telos* for human sociability, for example, for human thinking, for human sexuality, for bodily nourishment, for dealing with dangerous and painful things. There is also a *telos* for human bodily and psychological health. It is especially this third category, the ends of human nature, that gives rise to moral problems. In this category it is most difficult for us to discover what the ends truly are, because here our purposes and our ends become most entangled with one another. Our inclinations and desires give rise to purposes, and sooner or later a conflict arises between what we want and what we truly are. It is quite easy to see what the ends of nonhuman things are; it is more difficult to unravel ends and purposes in regard to institutions and artifacts;

[5] Josie Appleton, "One at a Time," review of *Whose Muse? Art Museums and the Public Trust* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), in the *Times Literary Supplement*, 26 March 2004.

[6] I particularly like the remark that a thing's "essence" is a "reason for its existence." A classical metaphysician could not have said it better.

but it is extremely hard to distinguish ends and purposes in regard to our own nature and its powers. To explore this problem, we must examine more carefully how ends and purposes come to light. This essay will essentially be a study of the kind of truth associated with ends.

II. How ENDS ARE DIFFERENTIATED FROM PuRPOSES

It is not the case that ends are presented to us all by themselves, separate from purposes. It is not the case that we first get a clear, vivid idea of the ends of things, and then only subsequently attach our purposes to them. Moral issues would be much simpler if this were so; indeed, if it were so, there would be no moral problems. Our moral measures would be easily accessible. The human problem arises precisely because we have to *distinguish* ends and purposes in our activity, and it is often difficult to do so. Ends and purposes come to light in contrast with one another. For example, the end of medicine is the restoration and preservation of health, but a man might have many different purposes in practicing medicine. He may intend to heal people and keep them healthy, he may intend to earn money, he may intend to become famous, he may intend to become a politician, or, if he is a vicious agent, he may want to become adept at torturing people. At first, medicine comes to us soaked through with such purposes, often with many of them, and it takes moral intelligence to make the distinction between what belongs to medicine as such and what purposes we have in practicing it. Obviously, the people who teach the medical student will talk about the distinction, but ultimately the student and later the doctor has to make the distinction for himself; the teacher cannot make it for him. No one can make a distinction for anyone else; a distinction is someone's mind at work. The *telos* and the essence of the thing come to light for us precisely in contrast with our purposes, and our purposes also come to light in contrast with what belongs to the things themselves.

It is even misleading to say that ends and purposes come to us entangled with one another. This way of putting it suggests that

we already have differentiated the two but that they have at this moment become enmeshed. Rather, what occurs is that the very contrast between ends and purposes has not yet arisen, that the very categories are not yet available. What we begin with precedes the distinction, and the distinction needs to be made. It has to be made, furthermore, not in placid contemplation of a neutral scene, but in the tumult of desires, emotions, and interests, in the thick of things.

Many of our purposes are compatible with the ends of the things we are involved with. Earning income by being a doctor is not incongruent with the end of medicine, but it can become so, just as it can enter into collision with being a lawyer or a statesman. This conflict happens when the purpose overrides the end and works against it, when, for example, an estate lawyer delays the execution of a will in order to increase his fee, or when a doctor performs unneeded surgeries in order to be able to charge the insurance company. Using a ballpoint pen as a bookmark does not conflict with the end of the writing instrument, but using it to pry things open may well do so. Distinguishing the ends of things against the pressure of our own purposes is analogous to distinguishing the just against the pressure of our own interests. In both cases, we let the objectivity of things come into our consciousness, but the objectivity enters there not as a solitary visitor, all by itself; it enters by being differentiated from what we want.

Is it possible that someone's purpose can coincide with the end of the thing? Certainly, it can; a doctor can have as his purpose here and now the restoration of this sick person's health. The end of the medical art is in this case the purpose the physician has in mind as he practices his art, and one hopes that a physician would in general have as one of his purposes the end of the art of medicine, that he would respect the end of his art and not let his other purposes override it. But even when purpose and end overlap, there remains a difference between them, and the distinction still comes into play. One and the same good presents itself under two guises, as the end of the art and as the purpose of the agent. A formal distinction arises in the way the good appears

even though the good, healing this sick person, remains materially the same; the end does not turn into a purpose, and the purpose does not become an end. The fact that the material good remains the same might conceal from us the fact that there are two ways in which it can appear, two faces that it can present.

Let us suppose that a given doctor does have healing as his purpose in practicing medicine; his purpose is the same as the end of the art. Even this would not be enough. Such a doctor would still not think clearly if he assumed that healing is *only* his purpose, or that it is only the purpose of his associates in the art, and that no defining constraints came into play from the art itself, apart from the purposes of the practitioners. If he thought this way, he would not see or admit that healing, besides being his purpose, is also the end of the art, and that he and his colleagues could not define it in any other way; he would not see that he and his colleagues *should* have as their central and non-negotiable purpose the restoration and preservation of health. Medicine is so defined not because society wants to determine it this way, but because that is what it is.

III. BARRIERS TO THE DISTINCTION

Not everyone is able to distinguish the end from the purpose. There are at least four types of people who are impeded from distinguishing them: the impulsive, the obtuse, the immature, and the vicious.

First of all, it takes a certain development just to be able to have *purposes.* Children and childish people do not yet have purposes. They want things, and they might want things in the future, but they do not distinguish between what they want and what they are doing now, that is, they do not "shake out" the difference between purposes and the steps to attain them. Children are, quite naturally, impulsive. They have not yet developed the ability to think dearly about what they wish for, nor can they distinguish between what they wish for and what they can do now, nor can they discover optional ways of getting

to what they want, nor can they determine which is the best and most feasible way to get what they wish, nor can they, finally, take the first step, as well as all the succeeding steps, to get what they want. To articulate a situation and a desire in this way involves practical thinking. It is the introduction of moral syntax into our consciousness. Impulsive people have not developed this power of reason, this power of practical categoriality. Their future collapses into their present. Children are naturally impulsive, but some people remain childish even as they get older. Thus, Aristotle says that a young man, because of his impulsiveness and lack of experience, is not an appropriate hearer of lectures on political matters, and then he adds, "It makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs."[7]

Second, we may have become adult enough to establish distinct purposes and to determine the steps that lead to them, but we may still be unable to appreciate the presence of other people with their purposes. We permit entry into our awareness only of what *we* want. We remain unable to see that other people have their viewpoints and needs, that we are not the only agents involved in our situations. To fail to be "objective" in this way is to be what I would like to call "morally obtuse" as opposed to being vicious. Someone who double-parks his car and blocks traffic may not be malicious-he doesn't *want* to injure other people-but he is morally obtuse. He is simply and happily oblivious to the fact that there are other people in the situation who are being seriously inconvenienced. His consciousness does not expand enough to include the perspectives of others, even though he is able to distinguish means and purposes in his own case. A patient in a hospital room may keep the television playing all night long "so that he can sleep," oblivious to the other patients in the room. Such obtuseness is a failure in practical thinking, but it is different from vice and also different from the

[7] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.3.

childishness in which one cannot distinguish a purpose from the means of attaining it.

Third, immaturity is the state of mind in which we are unable to distinguish what we (and others) want from the demands and obligations of the world itself; that is, we fail to distinguish our purposes from the ends of things. ·To be able to make this distinction is to be "objective" in a new way, one different from simply recognizing the presence of other agents. If we merely recognize other people and acknowledge that they too have purposes, all we would have is a world of cross-purposes and ultimate violence, which would amount to a war of all against all.[8] This is where the apotheosis of autonomy and choice leads. Recognizing the ends of things and the ends of our own nature, however, would help pacify this conflict. The only alternative to such peace through the truth of things is the establishment of a will that is overwhelmingly powerful, the sovereign or Leviathan, who pacifies by decree and not by evidence, and for whom there are no ends or natures in things. Let us use the term "moral

[8] See Slade, "On the Ontological Priority of Ends," 67-68: "What happens when end is reduced to purpose and consequence becomes visible in the films of Quentin Tarentino, which picture a 'world' in which there are only purposes of human beings, a 'world without ends.' In such a world there cannot be any congruity or incongruity of purposes with ends. There being no ends by which purposes can be measured, all purposes are in themselves incommensurate and incongruous with one another. This is a world in which everything is violent, because there is no natural way for anything to move. But a world in which everything is violent means that violence becomes ordinary, the usual, the way things are. The violent displaces and becomes 'the natural.' ..• The violence shocks [us] because we are not nihilists, because we are still measuring what people do in these films by a world in which there are ends, not just human purposes •••• A world of purposes only is a world of cross-purposes, the definition of fiasco."

Slade goes on to say that if the world had nothing but purposes the narrative arts could not exhibit the forms of things and the forms of human life; it could only show off the style of the artist who composes the work of art. Every life then becomes "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing," with the difference that Shakespeare knows the distinction between an idiot's tale and a human life, while Tarentino does not. Slade compares Tarentino with Kafka, who also describes a world without ends, but who knows how terrifying it is; Tarentino, in contrast, finds it funny. Slade says, "A world of fiasco is a world in which guilt is impossible, because guilt requires responsibility for actions, and there are actions only if purposes are measured by ends." One should notice the idea that true human action, true *praxis,* can occur only when the distinction between ends and purposes is at least glimpsed by the agent.

maturity" to name the ability to see that things themselves have their own excellences that need to be respected if the things are not to be destroyed. This virtue enables us to take up a viewpoint that goes beyond our own desires and the desires of others.

Fourth and last, there is vice. We may acknowledge the ends of things and the viewpoints of other persons, but we deliberately and maliciously let our purposes override them. We fail in regard to justice not because we are impulsive, obtuse, or immature, but because we are unjust. We *want* to destroy the thing in question-the educational institution, the work of art, the church-and we want to injure others. We don't simply do unjust things; we are unjust; we do not, say, simply commit a murder; we are murderers. We have gotten to be this way because of the choices we have made in the past. The inclination to destroy the thing is always associated with some malice toward others; we destroy the thing because it could be a good for others.[9]

These, then, are four ways in which the truth of ends can be occluded: impulsiveness, moral obtuseness, immaturity, and vice. In any given case, the lack of moral insight into the ends of things might be explained by some combination of these four, just as an agent's deficiency might be caused by something intermediate between weakness and malice. What we are discussing is the way that the difference between ends and purposes comes to light, which amounts to the way in which the truth of things is disclosed. If we are to show how truth occurs, it is necessary to show what impedes such an occurrence, what hides the truth. We can appreciate a disclosure only in contrast with the forms of concealment that are proper to the thing in question.

IV. How ENDS ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM CONVENTIONS

There is one more distinction that needs to be made in discussing how the ends of things come to light. We have examined how they are played off against purposes, but they should also be

[9] On the role of malice and friendship in morals, see Roben Sokolowski, "Phenomenology of Friendship," *Review of Metaplrysics 55* (2002): 451-70.

contrasted with conventions, which are different from the institutions and artifacts that we discussed earlier. Institutions and artifacts exist independently once they are made, but conventions-manners and morals-are ways in which we act as human beings. They are more proximately related to our human nature and its ends, because they indicate how we should conduct ourselves, how we should become actualized.

We normally encounter the good and the bad, the noble and the ugly, the obligatory and the prohibited, in our society's laws, customs, manners, and morals. The challenge we initially encounter in life is to make our inclinations, purposes, and choices conform to the injunctions of our community. In most cases it is right and good to conform to social norms, because they are usually reasonable expressions of the natural good. Social conventions and moral traditions, based on long and localized human experience, are normally an embodiment of what is good or bad in itself, the good or bad by nature. Our initial moral challenge is to become "law-abiding citizens," people whose purposes are in harmony with the laws and moral traditions of their community. [10]

Still, conventions cannot be the final word, just as our purposes cannot be the final word. Sometimes conflicts arise in regard to the moral traditions themselves and criticism is necessary. The way things are done needs to be more adequately adjusted; but adjusted to what? What else, but to the way things are? When this sort of "crisis" occurs, we appeal at least implicitly to the ends of the things in question; this appeal is made even by people who may deny that things have ends. What else could one invoke?

Suppose, for example, that in a given community the art of medicine routinely involved abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia, and that it trained its apprentices in these procedures. P. D. James's novel *The Children of Men* presents a !=hillingfictional picture of a situation in which the sick and elderly are granted a "quietus" (which they are not pleased to undergo). It is, first of all, questionable whether under these conditions the medical art

[10] Thus, for Aristotle, the first meaning of justice is the lawful *(NicomacheanEthics* 5.1).

could survive, because people would hesitate to go to doctors and hospitals if killing were to be one of the available "treatments." [11] Acting against the end of the art will tend to destroy the art. But suppose the art were being practiced in this manner; some people would argue against using medicine to kill, and their argument would be based both on human dignity and on the fact that this aspect of "medicine" is opposed to medicine; it is opposed to the essence and the end of the art. Their argument would be based on the nature of the art as well as on the dignity of human nature, that is, on the *telos* of each of the entities involved in the practice.

As another example, suppose that polygamy were accepted in a certain community. [12] To argue that the practice should be changed, one would appeal to one of the ends of marriage, and the argument would be specific and concrete, showing that this way of being married conflicts with the kind of friendship and commitment that marriage "in itself" implies. Such conflicts between an established convention and the way things ought to be show that conventions do not cage people. Conventions can be questioned and changed, and they are questioned when one thinks that they do not properly express the reality they deal with (in these instances, with the art of medicine and the institution of marriage). The ancient practice of suttee in India would be another example; the British abolished the practice not because

[11] At one point in the novel, the protagonist, Theo, is in a museum in Oxford and passes by the custodian, whom he recognizes as "a retired classics don from Merton." He asks him how he is, and the custodian replies nervously, "Oh, very well, yes, very well, thank you ... I'm managing all right. I do for myself, you know. I live in lodgings off the Iffley Road but I manage very well. I do everything for myself. The landlady isn't an easy woman ••• but I'm no trouble to her. I'm no trouble to anyone." Theo wonders what he is afraid of: "The whispered call to the SSP that here was another citizen who had become a burden on others?" (P. D. James, *The Children of Men* [New York: Warner Books, 1992], 120-21. The passage is a fine expression of the radical individualism in the modern state: "I do everything for myself."

[12] Here is an interesting passage in which a writer fails to distinguish between customs and the ends of things: "Monogamy, albeit in various different forms, was the norm in classical antiquity, and it is still the norm in most Western civilizations (except in Utah). It is all too tempting to see those features of our culture which we have retained since antiquity as somehow natural for any human society, but of course there is no reason to make this assumption" (Emily Wilson, "Why Exactly Do We Look Back?" *Times Literary Supplement*, 25 June 2004 [review of Simon Goldhill, *Love, Sex and Tragedy*]).

they simply preferred other customs, but because it was contrary to human nature and the nature of marriage.

This does not mean that the critic of a law or a practice has a full, independent vision of the nature and end of the thing in question and that he compares the convention with it; rather, faced with the law or custom, he knows and says that "this is not the right way to do things" (an observation that might well put him into some tension with his fellows). He knows the end at first more by negation than by positive insight. It is a contrastive knowledge, not an independent vision, but it is still a grasp of the thing itself over against its distortion. The true comes to light against the established delusion. Thus, one of the ways that ends are manifest is in contrast with custom and convention. [13]

It is not the case, however, that we get a view of the thing's *telos* only when there is a conflict between the convention and the end. It is also possible for someone to have the insight that this convention or this practice, this way of doing things, does indeed reflect the end of the thing in question. It takes intellectual strength to make this distinction, because we have to see one and the same thing in two guises, as good by convention and also as good in itself. Most of the time we simply accept the conventional good on its face; it is the way everybody does things, and so it must be right; it is the way things ought to be. To be able to give arguments based not just on convention but on the way things are is a more sophisticated achievement. It involves the recognition, not attainable by everyone, that there are two kinds of "ought." It is analogous to the physician's ability to see healing as both his purpose and the end of his art.

In either case, whether we are distinguishing the ends of things from conventions or from our purposes, we need to have a certain intellectual flexibility. It is more than the power to distinguish one thing from another. We need the ability to distinguish two dimensions, two ways in which something can be good: as an end or a convention, or as an end or a purpose. Distinguishing

[13] I have developed this theme in an earlier essay; see "Knowing Natural Law," in Robert Sokolowski, *Pictures, Quotations, and Distinctions: Fourteen Essays in Phenomenology* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 277-91.

dimensions is more difficult than distinguishing things. When people deny that there are natural ends to things, they do not merely fail to distinguish one thing from another; they fail to appreciate that there are two ways in which goods can present themselves to us. The ability to make this distinction belongs to practical as well as theoretic reason.

In the previous two sections we showed how ends are differentiated from purposes, and we examined four obstacles to that differentiation. In this section we have spoken about the distinction between ends and convention. I now wish to make what might seem to be a rather sudden leap in my argument; I wish to introduce the notion of natural law. This topic might seem different from what we have been discussing, but it really is not.

V. NATURAL LAW

I wish to use an important and illuminating observation by Francis Slade, a way of defining natural law that has, I think, considerable intuitive force. To the question, "What is natural law?", one can answer very simply: "Natural law is the ontological priority of ends over purposes."[14] Natural law is shown to us when we recognize that there are ends in things and that our purposes and choices must respect their priority. This understanding of natural law would imply that our discussion of ends and purposes in this essay has all along been a treatment of natural law and the way it is manifested to us. The precedence of ends over purposes occurs especially in regard to the ends that are proper to human nature and its various powers. For example, the ends built into human nourishment must be seen to govern the way we eat, and the ends built into human sexuality must be seen to govern the way we live with our sexuality. In both of these powers, we ought not to be governed by what we simply want and the purposes we set for ourselves; we must differentiate between what we want and the reality and the *telos* of the thing we are

[14] Slade formulated this concept of natural law in conversation. I am grateful for his permission to use it in this essay. The formulation is implied in the title of his essay, "On the Ontological Priority of Ends and Its Relevance to the Narrative Arts," cited above in note 3.

dealing with. We must have a sense that our purposes must be measured by the way things are, which means that they must be measured by the way things should be. The distinction between purpose and end has to dawn on us, and when it does dawn on us we experience the pressure and the attraction of the way things have to be. We encounter "the natural law."

We might be tempted to think of natural law as a kind of codex, a set of imperatives that could be formulated in a purely theoretic, systematic exercise, identifiable and arguable apart from any particular moral tradition. [15] The use of the term *law* to name what is good by nature reinforces this tendency. But if we think of natural law in this way, we could easily be led into skepticism: If the precepts of natural law are so lucid and rational, why is there so much disagreement and so much obscurity about them? The fact of moral controversy would, in this viewpoint, show that natural law cannot be a codex, and if that is the only concept we have of it, we might conclude that there is no such thing. If, on the other hand, we recognize that not everyone will have a good sense of the true ends of things (the impulsive, obtuse, immature, and vicious are far less able to recognize them), and if we see such ends not as grasped beforehand but as differentiating themselves from our purposes and our conventions, we will be the more ready to admit that *this* kind of natural law does play a role in our moral thinking, in the way we evaluate situations arid agents. This picture of natural law is more realistic and more persuasive precisely because it accounts for the obscurities associated with moral judgments.

It would also be obvious, furthermore, that we are obliged by the ends that come to light in this way. The very fact that they arise formally in contrast with our purposes shows that our purposes have to be adjusted in view of them; that is what an obligation means. The ends become manifest as what we should respect. Only ends can make us accountable; our purposes have nothing obligatory about them. Ends are not just an aesthetic

[15] Writers trained as lawyers may be more prone to understand natural law as such a system of imperatives or values.

alternative to our purposes but a "law" in the nature of things. If we are dealing with the thing in question (with medicine and health, with nourishment or sexuality, with goods that we have to share with other people), we dare not let our desires and purposes be the only measure. The thing we are dealing with makes its own demands on us, and it would be unworthy of us not to recognize the excellence that belongs to it. If we genuinely are agents of truth, we cannot let our wishes be the last word. There is a kind of ontological, cosmic justice in being in harmony with the way things are. This sense of obligation may not appear to the impulsive, the obtuse, the immature, and the vicious, but would we want to be the kind of agent that does not acknowledge it? An end should show up for us first and foremost as that which it would be unworthy of us to violate.

This sense of the noble should be the primary and the core sense of moral "obligation." It is not that a law is imposed on us, that we are fettered by an imperative, but that we would be ashamed to act otherwise. Nobility obliges us in a way different from commands. The nobility of what is good by nature shows up most forcefully to the virtuous agent, who experiences it not as an imposed duty but as the way he wants to be. It shows up also to what Aristotle has described as the self-controlled person and to the weak person, the enkratic and the akratic agents, but they experience it more as an imperative and a command arising, to some extent, from "outside" themselves, because their passions are not in harmony with right reason.[16] But the paradigm, the case that provides the focus for orientation, is found in the way the virtuous agent encounters the noble: not as an imperative but as the way he would want to be. In dealing with eating and drinking, for example, a self-controlled or a weak person might find it burdensome to eat and drink moderately, but a temperate person would find it not a burden but the way things should be. It would not be a matter of natural "law" as much as a matter of natural decency.

[16] Aristotle develops these important moral distinctions, between virtue, self-control, weakness, and vice, in *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.1-10.

The sense of obligation that ends bring with them is reinforced by the Christian doctrine of creation, and it is easier to think of the ends of things as being part of a natural law when we understand the world to exist through God's creative wisdom. We then discover not only a law in the nature of things but also a Lawgiver who is responsible for the way things are. This reinforcement of natural ends, however, also introduces a considerable danger. It may tempt us to think of ends as really being the purposes of the divine intelligence and will. This in turn might tempt us to delete or dilute the notion of ends in themselves; we might think that what look to us like natural ends are really, at their core, purposes and not ends, because they are willed by God, and hence the distinction between ends and purposes might be dissolved when we move into the final and ultimately true context. We might also tend to look to revelation for the more definitive communication of the true ends of things; we might, for example, think that the wrongness of certain practices is shown by their being condemned by the Law of Moses and by St. Paul, not by their showing up to human reason as incongruent with the ends of the things in question. Such an appeal to creation and revelation might make us more inclined to think of natural law as a codex rather than as an experienced obligation. It is true, of course, that revelation will often declare certain natural human practices to be good and others to be bad, but these things also have their natural visibility, and one can argue more persuasively about them if one brings out their intrinsic nobility or unworthiness, their intrinsic rightness or wrongness, as well as the confirmation they receive from revelation.

Saint Thomas says that the natural law is promulgated by being written in the human heart. As he writes, "The law written in the hearts of men is the natural law *[lex scripta in cordibus hominum est lex naturalis]*."[17] Aquinas also quotes a passage from St. Augustine's *Confessions,* where Augustine also speaks about God's law as written in the hearts of men, and of course both authors harken back to St. Paul who, in his Letter to the Romans (2: 14-

[17] *STb* 1-11, q. 94, a. 6, sed contra.

15), says, "For when the Gentiles who do not have the law observe the prescriptions of the law, they are a law for themselves even though they do not have the law. They show that the demands of the law are written in their hearts." We should understand the full meaning of the words used for the heart in such passages, *cor* and *kardia.* They do not connote the separation of heart and head that we take for granted in a world shaped by Descartes. We tend to think that the head or the brain is the seat of cognitive processes and the heart is the seat of emotion and feeling, but when Aquinas appeals to the heart, he is not saying that the natural law is somehow given to our feelings or impulses instead of our minds. Rather, he claims that we are able to acknowledge, rationally, what the good is.

Premodern thought had not undergone the dissociation of sensibility and rational thinking. In Greek poetry the heart, the chest, and even the lungs were generally taken as the place where thinking occurred. [18] There is something wholesome in this ancient understanding; it is really the entire man, the person, who thinks and knows, not the brain. The carpenter thinks with his hands, the quarterback thinks with his legs and arms, and the speaker thinks with the lungs, mouth, and tongue. We do have to distinguish thinking from other human activities, but we should not take thinking to be only isolated cogitation, only sheer consciousness. Furthermore, Robert Spaemann claims that in the New Testament the word *heart* takes on an especially important meaning. [19] He says the heart is taken to be a deeper recipient of truth than the mind or intellect in Greek philosophy; it deals with our willingness to accept the truth. It is an expression of our veracity, our openness to the truth of things. Spaemann says that the concept of "heart" in the New Testament "means something

[18] See the classic study of Richard Broxton Onians, *The Origins of Euro-pean Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate: New Interpretations of Greek, Roman and Kindred Evidence, also of Some Basic Jewish and Christian Beliefs,* 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), chap. 2, "The Organs of Consciousness."

[19] Robert Spaemann, *Personen: Versuche uber den Unterschied zwischen "Etwas" und '1emand"* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996), 29-30.

like the discovery of the person."[20] Still more specifically, in the New Testament it is related to people's willingness to hear and accept the Word of God in Christ.

I would suggest that when Aquinas says that the natural law is written in the hearts of men, he is referring to the capacity for truth that we described when we said that the natural ends of things must be distinguished from our own purposes and from convention. This elementary differentiation, this recognition that my purposes are not all there is, and that the way we do things is not all there is, is a way of being truthful that is achieved by the heart, which if it is sound can cut through the impediments of being impulsive, obtuse, immature, and vicious. I hope that my study can serve as a phenomenological complement to Aquinas's ontological analysis, in which he distinguishes between the various kinds of law and shows that natural law is a participation in eternal law. My descriptions have tried to shed light on how natural law is "promulgated" in human experience.[21]

[20] Ibid., 30.

[21] Aquinas's treatise on law is found in *STh* I-II, qq. 90-108. I have tried to show how the ends of things come to light. My analysis does not claim that we intuit ends; they are disclosed through a distinction, which is more rationally articulated than an intuition. We do not have something simply present by itself to the mind; rather, we have something presented over against something else, and one can discuss such a presentation in a way that one could not argue about an intuition. A distinction, however, is not the conclusion of a syllogism. It can be argued about and clarified, but it cannot be proved. Any attempt to prove a distinction begs the question.

But making a distinction is not the only rational procedure associated with ends. It is also possible to confirm something as naturally good. This is done by showing that the opponent really cannot deny that the thing in question is good; he has to affirm it either in his actions or in other things that he admits to be true, or at least in the way he presents himself and tries to justify his actions in public. This procedure "proves" by refutation, and it is analogous to the way Aristotle argues against those who deny the principle of noncontradiction and other fundamental principles in logic and metaphysics *(Metaphysics* 4.3-8). The argument by refutation is very important in philosophy generally and in ethics in particular; it is tied to the making of distinctions and to the principle of noncontradiction, that is, to the establishment of a rational speaker. It does not, however, bring out the first and original manifestation of moral goods.

VI. PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

I would now like to pull together some conclusions concerning the relationship between ethics and philosophical and theological anthropology. Our understanding of ourselves as human beings is related to our understanding of the good and virtuous human life. This end or *telos* of human being is disclosed by virtuous action, by human beings existing and acting well as human beings. The primary manifestation of such being and acting is carried out by good agents. It is revealed by reason, but by the practical reason of good agents, who show what is possible, not primarily by the theoretical reason of philosophers, theologians, or scientists. Once the good life is manifested in action, philosophy can clarify and consolidate what has been accomplished. It can distinguish the various human lives, the various ways in which people seek happiness, and it can bring out which of these is intrinsically better than the others.[22] For example, one of the forms of happiness that decent people seek is that of honor, of being recognized by others as being good. People are motivated to good actions by the promise of being honored for what they have done. But, as Aristotle points out, honor cannot be the final *telos,* because it is dependent in two ways: first, it depends on other people, on those who bestow it; and, second, it depends on that for which we are being honored (we want to be honored because we are good, and so the goodness is more excellent than the honor).[23] The "logic" of honor implies dependency; it is at best penultimate. This philosophical clarification points us beyond honor to virtue, and even virtue is not ultimate, because it is only a disposition; it has to be exercised in order to make us truly excellent and happy.

This little philosophical critique is an example of what philosophy can do, but it presupposes that there have been good agents and that people have sought happiness. Practical reason has already been at work; honor and virtue have already come into

[22] Philosophy also introduces its own perfection, but it is theoretic and not practical.

[23] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.5.

play. Philosophy does not install the search for or even the achievement of the ethical life. Philosophy can show the intricacies of human action and choice, the relations among the virtues of courage and temperance, and justice and friendship, and other dimensions of the moral life, but it always assumes that these things have been achieved by practical reasoning, which is where human excellence and human failure first come to light, where we first come to see what it is to be human. These achievements are then capsulated, polished, and trimmed in moral traditions, in poetry and narratives, in exemplars, maxims, and customs, where practical and theoretic reason join forces with literary skill to present a picture of how we can be. We measure our lives and actions, we understand ourselves and our human situations, in the light and the frame of such paradigms, and occasionally we may need to distinguish between the way things are and the way they are said to be.

Christians believe that God has revealed a deeper sense of goodness and virtue (as well as a deeper sense of evil and vice). Faith, hope, and charity, as gifts of God, dispose us to act in a new context, in which we are elevated into God's own life, through the redemptive actions of the incarnate Son of God. In this domain, we do have a kind of "theoretical" priority of knowledge over practical reason; we have to accept certain truths about ourselves before we know we are able and obliged to act in certain ways. However, this new dimension does not override the evidences of natural practical reason. What seemed noble and decent in the natural order remains so, and it is confirmed in its goodness by being involved in this new context of grace. In fact, grace intensifies the appeal of natural virtue, which now shows up as not only as admirable, but also as a reflection of divine goodness. Grace heals and elevates nature. For example, the nobility of human friendship, which is a kind of pinnacle of natural human virtue, is enhanced by becoming involved in charity, which is the friendship that God extends to human

beings.[24] As another example, the excellence of human marriage is enhanced and its meaning deepened when it is understood not only in the natural order, where it has two ends, the procreation and upbringing of children and the mutual devotion of the spouses, but when it is understood theologically to signify the relation between Christ and the Church.[25] From its earliest times, Christianity differentiated itself from its surrounding world by its attitudes toward abortion, infanticide, and matrimonial fidelity. It worked toward the elimination of slavery and gladiatorial combat, it tried to limit warfare, and it changed the meaning of wealth; as Evelyn Waugh has Lady Marchmain say in *Brideshead Revisited*, "Wealth in pagan Rome was necessarily something cruel; it's not any more."[26] In all such instances, what Christianity offers is not a set of new, unheard-of precepts, but a deepening of what is already appreciated as good. The natural visibility remains. Grace elevates and also heals wounded nature, revelation expands and clarifies human reason. I would suggest that one of the strongest arguments in Christian apologetics is the fact that faith refurbishes what is naturally good. Such clarification of goods is not only a moral theology but also a theological anthropology, because it shows more clearly what human beings are and what they can and should be-that is, what their ends truly are.

[24] On friendship as the highest moral virtue, see my essays, "Phenomenology of Friendship," and "Friendship and Moral Action in Aristotle," *Journal of Value Inquiry* 35 (2001): 355-69.

[25] St. Thomas Aquinas discusses bigamy and polygamy in IV *Sent.*, d. 33, a. 1; see also *STh* III (suppl.), q. 65, a. 1. He lists three ends of marriage: procreation and education of children, mutual devotion, and expression of the relation between Christ and the Church. He says that a multiplicity of wives would neither necessarily destroy nor impede the first end, it would not destroy the second but it would seriously impede it, and it would totally destroy the third.

[26] Evelyn Waugh, *Brideshead Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 127.

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SCIENTIFIC REPORTING, IMAGINATION, AND NEO-ARISTOTELIAN REALISM

MICHAEL W. TKACZ

Gonzaga University
Spokane, Washington

IN 1258, ALBERT THE GREAT presided over a formal disputation at the Dominican studium in Cologne devoted to questions arising out of Aristotle's *De animalibus.* Preserved for us in the *reportatio* of friar Conrad of Austria, these *quaestiones* treat a series of zoological problems arranged in the order of Aristotle's books.[1] In the nine questions corresponding to book 1 of the *De partibus animalium,* Albert departs from his strictly zoological observations to consider the proper method to be used by the zoological investigator in his research. The first of these methodological questions is whether scientific research is a twofold process of reporting and explanation.[2] In the course of defending an affirmative answer to this question, Albert makes it clear that the ultimate explanatory goal of scientific research presupposes a "narrative" or descriptive phase of investigation. Without scientific description or reporting, there is nothing to

[1] *Quaestiones super De animalibus* in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia* (Münster im Westphalia: Aschendorff, 1955)(= ed. Colon) 12:281-309. This text should not be confused with Albert's longer paraphrastic commentary on the *De animalibus* edited by Hermann Stadler and published in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Münster im Westphalia: Aschendorff, 1916 and 1920)(= ed. Stadler), Bd. 15-16. On the date and order of these works, see James A. Weisheipl, "Albert's Works on the Natural Sciences *(libri naturales)* in Probable Chronological Order," in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980,* ed. James A. Weis_heipl (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies, 1'980), 572 [no. 11] and 572-74 [no. 13].

[2] *Quaestiones super De animalibus* XI, q. 1 (ed. Colon., 12:218.11-62). Albert uses the terms *narratio* and *causarum assignatio:* "•.• utrum in scientia sit modus processivus duplex: narrativus et causarum assignativus" (ed. Colon., 12:218.14-16).

explain, for there is nothing begging to be understood in terms of its causes.[3]

Albert's remarks draw attention to a crucial issue in the Aristotelian understanding of scientific method: the relationship of scientific reporting and explanation. Explanation, of course, is always in terms of demonstration of the cause, especially *propter quid* demonstration. Demonstration, however, is the ultimate goal of the scientific endeavor and as such must be the satisfaction of something, a response to a need. This is why Aristotelians understand scientific research as a problem-solving activity and maintain that before one can begin to solve the problem, one must know what the problem is and possess a clear articulation of it as a problem calling for solution. Scientific reports provide such an articulation through their description of the subject under study; without them, one cannot even begin the attempt at explanation.

There is, however, more to scientific reporting than this. If such descriptive reports are to be the first step in an explanatory process leading to causal demonstration, then they must treat their subject matter in ways that suggest probable causal explanations. This means that the function of such reports cannot be limited to the setting of puzzles or the raising of questions. They must also, through their dialectical form as measurement, quantitative description, taxonomy, field-studies, systematic observation, or controlled experimentation, bring to light the likely explanatory candidates that can solve the puzzle or answer the question. This is why medieval naturalists, such as Albert, held that the predemonstrative phase of scientific research is so important. It provides the necessary link between the initial encounter of the investigator with the subject matter and his eventual grasp of its cause in demonstration. [4]

[1] *Quaestiones super De animalibus* XI. q. 1 (eel Colon., 12:218.45-50): "Et ideo Philosophus, tanquam sapientissimus et expertissimus in scientiis, in scientia ista procedit primo narrando et secundo narratorum causas inquirendo et assignando, ostendens, quod nos similiter debemus facere, vel annuens."

[4] See *Quaestiones superDe animalibus* XI, q. 2 (ed. Colon., 12:219.11-25) where Albert argues that, while scientific knowledge results from the demonstration of the cause, description is also necessary as it provides the supposition of the effect to be known as caused. Albert provides a fuller treatment in his *De animalibus libri* XXVI, XI, c. 2 (ed. Stadler,

How do measurement data, taxonomic descriptions, observational reports, and other types of scientific reporting suggest answers to the questions they themselves raise? What, precisely, links the report of phenomena requiring explanation to the causal demonstration in a manner that leads the researcher to the explanatory cause? Recent work by Neo-Aristotelian philosophers of science has focused on modeling as the means by which this link is made.[5] Especially important in these treatments has been the role of the imagination in the production of iconic models of the reported phenomena that dialectically indicate how they are to be understood. This has, perhaps, been most clearly instanced by episodes in the history of science involving inferences to unobservable entities. Jude Dougherty, for example, used the Meitner-Frisch liquid-drop model of the atomic nucleus to illustrate Aristotle's account of rational imagination.[6]

The focus of these Neo-Aristotelian studies has been on the structure or formation of the model itself. The present study will, instead, focus on the structure of scientific reports and will explore some of the ways in which it might suggest explanatory models. In particular, the present investigation will have two parts, both having to do with the reporting phase of research. First, I will study the manner in which the problem is stated so as to invite explanation as a solution. Important here will be the way in which scientific reporting functions as a method of selecting relevant phenomena. Second, I will study the manner in which the data being reported suggest iconic representation of the phenomena. Important in this regard is the way in which the researcher's attention is directed to nonaccidental features of the subject under study. As will become apparent, these two functions of reporting are closely related and tend to appear together in

15:764-70).

[5] The best recent Thomistic/Neo-Aristotelian study is William A. Wallace, *The Modeling of Nature: Philosoplry of Science and Philosoplry of Nature in Synthesis* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996). See also the review article on this book by Benedict M. Ashley and Eric A. Reitan, *The Thomist* 61 (1997): 625-40.

[6] Jude P. Dougherty, "Abstraction and Imagination in Human Understanding," in *Nature and Scientific Method,* ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 51-62.

research practice. The modeling of theoretical entities which cannot be directly observed provides an especially provocative example of the power of scientific models and allows both functions of scientific reporting to be studied. Therefore, the Meitner-Frisch model of atomic fission will be used as illustration. Unlike Dougherty's earlier study which concerned the formulation of the model itself, however, attention will here be concentrated on the reports of barium formation from uranium in the Hahn-Strassmann experiments which preceded the work of Meitner and Frisch. The present study, then, seeks to complement earlier Neo-Aristotelian work on modeling with attention to the antecedent conditions for model construction.

I. NEO-ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS OF THE DISCOVERY OF NUCLEAR FISSION

In the early autumn of 1939, Niels Bohr and John Wheeler published the first quantitative analysis of the process of nuclear fission.[7] In the introduction of their paper, they provided a brief history of the research that made possible their account of the mechanism of nuclear disintegration. This history begins with the discovery of the neutron in 1932 and the subsequent determination by Enrico Fermi and his Roman collaborators that neutrons can be captured by heavy nuclei to form new radioactive isotopes. In the case of uranium, the heaviest natural element, this led to the production of nuclei of higher mass and charge number than previously known. Following up on these discoveries, German researchers Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann found that neutron bombardment of uranium isotopes resulted, surprisingly, in the production of elements of much smaller atomic weight and charge, most notably barium. The theoretical account of these striking experimental results was provided by Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch using the liquid-drop model of the nucleus. The splitting of the uranium nucleus is described on the analogy of the

[7] Niels Bohr and John Wheeler, "The Mechanism of Nuclear Fission," *Physical Review* 56 (1939): 426-50.

division of a spherical fluid drop into two smaller droplets because of a deformation caused by an external disturbance. The deformation is resisted by strong nuclear forces that are analogous to surface tension in liquids. The mutual repulsion of electrical charges in the heavy nucleus, however, diminishes the nuclear binding forces, making the nucleus unstable enough that a relatively small amount of energy is required to produce the critical deformation that results in division. At the same time, the nuclear division sets free a large amount of energy, calculated by Meitner to be as much as 200 MeV. These calculations were experimentally confirmed by Frisch and others.[8]

This break-up of the unstable heavy nucleus into intermediate elements was given the name "fission" by Frisch. Clearly, at the heart of the discovery is the application of the liquid-drop model.[9] It was on the basis of this model that Bohr and Wheeler were able to give a more or less complete account of the mechanism of fission, tying together the theoretical account of Meitner and Frisch with its subsequent experimental verification. Building on Bohr's earlier theoretical work on the compound nature of the nucleus,[10] Meitner and Frisch used the analogy with liquids as a way of making theoretical sense of the results of the Hahn-Strassmann experiments. Moreover, their application of the model provided both predictive calculations and a basis for the theoretical description of the mechanism of fission later given by Bohr and Wheeler.[11]

Jude Dougherty provides a Neo-Aristotelian analysis of this moment in the history of physics by focusing on the intellectually

[1] *As* reported by Bohr and Wheeler, "The Mechanism of Nuclear Fission," 426 n. 3. A summary of the experimental history of fission was later given by Orto Frisch and John Wheeler, "The Discovery of Fission," *PbysicsToday* 20 (1967): 43-52.

[9] The term appears in the publication of the liquid-drop theory of Meitner and Frisch in "Disintegration of Uranium by Neutrons: A New Type of Nuclear Reaction," *Nature* 143 (1939): 239-40, but it was first suggested by Frisch in a letter to Bohr in January 1939; see Roger H. Stuewer, "Niels Bohr and Nuclear Physics," in *Niels Bohr: A Centenary Volume,* ed. A. P. French and P. J. Kennedy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 197-220, esp. 214-15.

[10] See below, note 16.

[11] On the origins of the liquid-drop model see Stuewer, "Niels Bohr and Nuclear Physics," 208-10.

productive aspects of the Meitner-Frisch model.[12] He notes that Meitner and Frisch were clearly searching for the causal explanation of phenomena that begged to be understood-namely, the surprising results of the Hahn-Strassmann experiments. That these results were surprising there can be no doubt, for not only did no-one at the time suspect that the atomic nucleus could be divided, but Meitner herself continued to expect for some time that the mysterious substance produced by Hahn and Strassmann was a "transuranic" element.[13] The curiosity of researchers was not satisfied with experimental confirmation, which Hahn and Strassmann quickly provided, but prompted the search for a cause. Thus, Dougherty also notes the implicit realism of researchers: no-one doubted that there was some unknown mechanism behind the production of barium that required articulation in some intelligible form. Finally, Dougherty notes that this articulation understandably took the form of an analogy, an imaginatively pictured source which would be rich enough in its imagery sufficiently and accurately to articulate the causal factors responsible for the known effects.

The reason for the imaginative form of the causal articulation is the truth of the Aristotelian dictum that, in learning, the knower proceeds from what is most familiar, but least known through the precise articulation of its causes, to what is best known through its precise causes, but least familiar.[14] The behavior of liquid drops is quite familiar through sense perception. Moreover, careful observation by more or less direct sensation provides the basis for accurate measurement of the various accidents of fluid drops: relative spherical stability, surface tension, surface disturbances tending to overcome spherical stability resulting in elongation, division into smaller relatively spherically stable masses, etc. The mathematical description of the

[12] Dougherty, "Abstraction and Imagination," *54-56.*

u Ruth Moore, *Niels Bohr: The Man, His Science, and the World They Changed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 220-23. On the origins of the trans-uranium theory and its later abandonment see Ruth Lewin Sime, *Lise Meitner: A Life in Physics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 161-83 and 231-58.

[14] Aristotle, *Physics* 1.1.184a17-21; Dougherty, "Abstraction and Imagination," *54-55.*

experimental results is thus tied to physical causes through the known details of the familiar case serving as an iconic model for the unfamiliar and surprising phenomenon requiring causal explanation.

Aristotle's notion that thinking resembles perceiving underlies this explanative function of iconic models in scientific research.[15] Intellectual capacity is a capacity to think and to judge. Thinking involves imagination consequent upon sensation and, therefore, images always accompany judgments. Unlike sensations, however, images can be either true or false and are within our power to refine and adjust. Given earlier research,[16] the nucleus was imagined as a composite with a delimiting surface providing relative stability. This suggested the liquid-drop image to Meitner and Frisch, who refined and interpreted the image according to the experimental results of Hahn and Strassmann. Moreover, given that images can be taken either in their own right or as likenesses of something else, the liquid-drop model possesses both its own imagined properties and properties associated with the reality being explained. Thus, the spherical stability of the drop is seen in the image as consequent upon its surface tension. When forces overcome this tension, the instability introduced results in the eventual division into two spheres of relative stability. Considered as a likeness of the nucleus, the liquid drop models the strong binding forces of the nucleus in a way analogous to the surface tension of the drop. These forces are overcome by the disturbances introduced by neutron bombardment, resulting in a fission (analogous to the division of the drop) and a large release of energy accompanying transformation into relatively stable lower elements. Each element of the model considered in this way has specific quantitative value. Linking these values to experimentally discovered measurements gives the iconic model its explanative potentiality through its ability to exemplify the

[15] Aristotle, *De anima* 3.3.427a20-22; Dougherty, "Abstraction and Imagination," 56-60.

[16] Notably Bohr's work on the composite nature of the nucleus and his suggestion of its elasticity; see Niels Bohr, "Transmutations of Atomic Nuclei," *Science* 86 (1937): 161-65; and Stuewer, "Niels Bohr and Nuclear Physics," 205-10.

form of what is being explained. *As* Aristotle would put it: "the mind thinks the forms in the images."[17]

Imbedded in the model is the expression of the nature underlying the particular phenomena through which the model is matched to reality in experimental observation. Uranium is known to be a relatively stable element. At least one of its rare isotopes (U^{235}), exhibits a higher excitation energy and lower stability than that of the more abundant uranium isotope, resulting in an instability such that a comparatively small amount of energy will be required for fission, resulting in the loss of one-fifth the mass of the proton. Calculating from the lost one-fifth mass supplies the 200 MeV energy set free by fission. Thus, the model provides the basis of an abstraction to the nature of the nucleus and the forces and modes accounting for its stability and instability. The intellect is thus focused on the common features of mass-energy conversion, atomic number, chemical behavior, and so on, and it is in terms of these that the process of fission is defined and understood. The judgment that fission has taken place is a noetic intuition that apprehends these commonalities and their role in the process under consideration as set out in the iconic model. Through this model, then, the nature of lighter-element production is demonstrated to be a nuclear fission.

II. SCIENTIFIC REPORTING AS RELEVANT PHENOMENA SELECTION

When artificial radioactivity was discovered by Irene Curie and Frederic Joliot in 1934, the existence of unstable nuclei had been known for some time. Nobody, however, had considered that such instability might be due to nuclear disintegration.[18] Nonetheless, this discovery encouraged new research on radioactivity including Fermi's work in Rome involving neutrons. It was not long before the Roman team reported that neutron bombardment of uranium produced some new radioactivity that

[17] Aristotle, *De anima* 3.7.431b2.

[18] Otto R. Frisch, "The Discovery of Fission: How It All Began," *Physics Today* 20 (November 1967): 43-48, esp. 45-46.

they identified as being due to transuranic elements-that is, elements beyond uranium (no. 92). As no such heavy element was known to exist in nature, some researchers suggested that the new substances were not elements number 93 or 94, but isotopes of some known heavy element such as protactinium (no. 91). As a consequence, Lise Meitner and Otto Hahn initiated a series of experiments in Berlin to determine the question. They were able to confirm that Fermi's new element was not protactinium, nor was it an isotope of either thorium (no. 90) or actinium (no. 89). This seem to confirm Fermi's characterization of the substance as transuranic. [19]

These results were already beginning to indicate that the real problem concerned the structure of the nucleus as, in some way, nonrigid. Chemist Ida Noddack suggested that the new substance should not be called "transuranic" until its identity with any other elements had been ruled out. As this suggestion implied the possibility of a fissioning of a heavy nucleus into lighter nuclei, it verged on the requisite focus on nuclear structure as the relevant issue. At that time, however, both theory and experiment did not encourage such an idea and Noddack's suggestion did not receive much attention. [20] Thus, the scientific reporting at this stage of the research did not yet articulate the experimental results in a way allowing a clear selection of the relevant phenomena. [21]

After Meitner's exile to Sweden on account of the Nazi annexation of Austria, her research was carried on in Berlin by Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann. In their studies of the new transuranic elements, they precipitated a new element produced by the Joliot-Curies and found some radioactive residue remained in their test tubes. Attempting to find out what this radioactive substance might be, they precipitated it again using some barium as a carrier. They were surprised to find that the radioactive

[19] Moore, *Niels Bohr*, 220-21. On the Meitner-Hahn "eka" chains of radioactive elements identified in this research, see Sime, *Lise Meitner*, 161-83.

[20] Moore, *Niels Bohr*, 221; see also Otto R. Frisch, "Llse Meimer," in *Dictionary of Scientific Biography* (New York: Scribners, 1980), 9:262a.

[21] An indication of how close the research came at this point is provided by Frisch, "The Discovery of Fission," 46-47.

materials precipitated with the barium. Checking to be certain that no impurities had contaminated the barium distorting the results, they were forced to conclude that the radioactive precipitates must be either barium (no. 56) or the related element radium (no. 88). Further testing showed that there was in fact no isotope of radium and that the residual substance must indeed be barium.[22]

This result was astounding, for barium could only be produced from uranium if the heavy nucleus somehow split. Hahn and Strassmann published their surprising results[23] and now the problem calling for solution was dearly delineated. Through their careful rechecking of their work, Hahn and Strassmann were able to select from among the various characterizations of the phenomena that which was most relevant to the problem of the so-called transuranics, namely, the production of a lighter element. This, in turn, indicated that the problem was not the existence and properties of the transuranics, but the stability of the uranium nucleus itself.

Initially characterizing the new Fermi element as "transuranic" is an example of a universal *ut nunc,* a theoretical characterization of the phenomena that approaches the truth but is thought to be in need of much greater refinement or even replacement before actual explanation is obtained. It is, as some Neo-Aristotelians put it,[24] a kind of verisimilitude that allows research to continue in a certain direction, but with the provision that it may require substantial revision before it can function as an adequate model of the subject under study. This, in turn, allows the researcher to turn his focus here or there as the data become progressively better known and, in the end, reveal the relevant phenomena requiring explanation through an iconic modeling process.

[22] Moore, *Niels Bohr,* 223-25.

[23] Otto Hahn and Fritz Sttassmann, "Uber den Nachweis und das Verhalten der bei der Bestrahlung des Urans mittels Neutronen entstehenden Erdalkalimetalle," *Die Naturwissenschaften* 27 (1939): 11-15. For the correspondence between Hahn and Meitner on these experiments, see Sime, *Lise Meitner,* 231-58, esp.233ff.

[24] John A. Oesterle, "The Significanceof the Universal *Ut Nunc," The Thomist* 24 (1961): 163-74.

III. SCIENTIFIC REPORTING AS ACCIDENT DIFFERENTIATION

As the search for the transuranic elements increasingly focused attention on the structure of the nucleus, researchers were able to differentiate the various accidental characteristics of nuclear structure or function. Before a subject can be iconically modeled, there must be a sufficiently clear distinction between its essential or proper accidents and its merely incidental accidents.[25] In the case of the discovery of fission, the crucial insight into the nature of nuclear stability involved the use of the liquid-drop image as a model for a proper accident of nuclei.

In the wake of Fermi's neutron experiments, Bohr had proposed his compound model of the nucleus.[26] This, in turn, suggested the question of the nature of nuclear stability. Before the Hahn-Strassmann experiments, only fragments of nuclei had been chipped away from heavy elements, but it was thought impossible that a large amount of the nucleus could be split off at one time due to insufficient energy. A nucleus was not something brittle or solid that could be cleaved or broken. Bohr had, in fact, urged a conception of the nucleus as elastic and later, following Gamow, a liquid-drop conception.[27] The Hahn-Strassmann results, then, drew the attention of theoreticians to the liquid-drop model as that most likely able to account for fission into lighter elements. Moreover, it was clear that the model would provide the essential properties of nuclear structure with respect to the relationship of nuclear forces accounting for stability, not simply an incidental feature of neutron absorption or radiation production.

Princeton physicist John A Wheeler has noted[28] that what led researchers to the idea of nuclear fission was not simply

[25] Wallace, *The Modeling of Nature,* 27-28.

[26] See above, note 16.

[27] Niels Bohr and Fritz Kalckar, "On the Transmutation of Atomic Nuclei by Impact of Material Particles, I: General Theoretical Remarks," *Matematisk-Fysiske Meddelelser det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab* 14 (1937): 1-40; see also the discussion by Stuewer, "Niels Bohr and Nuclear Physics," 208-10.

[28] John A. Wheeler, "The Mechanism of Fission," *Physics Today* 20 (November 1967): 49-52.

knowledge of the compound-nucleus and liquid-drop models, but their distinction. It was the insight that the liquid-drop model is a special case of the compound-nucleus model or, as he put it, "a particular way of making [the compound] model of nuclear structure reasonable." This is because the compound-nucleus model accounts for particle arrival in the nucleus, but the liquid-drop model accounts for nuclear excitation. This becomes dear when one recalls that tl;ie_c01cial insight of Meitner and Frisch was that the uranium nucleus was a "wobbly uncertain drop, ready to divide itself at the slightest provocation, such as the impact of a neutron. "[29] It was this that accounted for the relatively little energy required to release the tremendous amount of energy their calculations predicted. This modeled structural instability, then, was the proper accident needed to make sense of the Hahn-Strassmann results. Moreover, it was the reports of the Hahn-Strassmann experiments that focused the attention of Meitner and Frisch on the instability of the nucleus and away from other accidents such as neutron absorption, radiation emission, formation of isotopes, and so on.

CONCLUSION

The work of the imagination in constructing iconic models of little-known physical phenomena and its connection to abstraction is crucial in scientific explanation. Behind such construction, however, lie the reports of researchers who provide the material on which the imagination works. In these predemonstrative reports, the material is not simply presented to the intellect as a puzzle to be solved, but presented as already intellectually sorted out-processed, one might say. This "sorting out" or "processing" takes at least two forms. First, the puzzle is presented with an indication as to which data are relevant to the puzzle's solution. Some sorting through of the data is accomplished in the process of posing the question or discovering the puzzling phenomena. Often such sorting is explicitly taxonomic, as in certain kinds of

[29] Quoted in Dougherty, "Abstraction and Imagination," 53.

biological research, but sometimes it is more closely related to the experimental study of some little-known phenomenon, as in the case of nuclear fission. It is always, however, a selection of the relevant from the irrelevant in a way that suggests lines for further research or theoretical explanation. Second, the puzzle is presented to the intellect with a certain focus on what is essential, and not merely incidental, to the solution demanded by the relevant phenomena. Without such focus, the rational imagination cannot begin the process of iconic imaging, for it has no picture with which to start and no indication as to how the image is to be developed in detail. Whether generated by careful observation or by controlled experiment, scientific reporting always involves the differentiation of accidents allowing researchers to focus on those from which an image with explanatory potential can be formed.

A final point concerning scientific realism. Dougherty notes the implicit realism of the researchers involved in the discovery of nuclear fission. Clearly, Meitner and Frisch did not doubt the existence of a mechanism behind the then truly puzzling experimental results. Hahn and Strassmann also understood that the surprising production of barium from uranium called for the articulation of a then unknown property of the nucleus. Scientific reports provide the link between the encounter of the researcher with the reality calling for explanation and the intellectual act of scientific explanation itself. There is indeed an implicit realism in the activity of scientific reporting, for it presumes the possibility of achieving an explanation not already evident in the phenomena being reported. This indicates the presence of a yet unknown underlying mechanism that can be articulated by means of a model. Reporting is clearly not done for its own sake, but is a stage of scientific inquiry that begs for completion in explanation.

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GRACIA AND AQUINAS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

ANDREW PAYNE

St. Joseph's University
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

IN RECENT YEARS Jorge Gracia has developed a nuanced and sophisticated account of the nature of individuality and of the principle of individuation. He has developed this view in part by criticizing the standard Thomistic account of the principle of individuation as dimensive quantity. The present essay seeks to rehabilitate dimensive quantity by arguing against Gracia that, rightly understood, it does explain the individuation of material substances.

This requires a two-part strategy. First, the meaning of dimensive quantity must be recovered by examining the roots of this concept in Aristotle's *Categories* and *Physics.* The standard Thomistic presentation of dimensive quantity in the writings of Joseph Owens and Joseph Bobik is vulnerable to objections raised by Gracia, and this makes necessary a review of selected passages from Aristotle dealing with quantity. In particular, the notion of position contained in these texts must be elaborated in order to grasp the distinctive content of the concept of dimensive quantity.

Second, Gracia's objections to the Thomistic principle of individuation must be considered in light of this fuller understanding of dimensive quantity. It will be seen that these objections are not compelling, and that dimensive quantity provides a satisfactory principle of individuation for material substances. In particular, Aquinas's discussion of numerical difference in his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate* will be

defended. The upshot of these passages is that matter marked by quantity and position will occupy a determinate place, whereas two distinct material substances cannot occupy the same place simultaneously. As a result, matter modified by dimensive quantity is assigned to some determinate place and time, which suffices to individuate material substances.

To limit the scope of this project, I will defend dimensive quantity only as a principle of individuation for bodies or material substances. In Scholastic usage, these are composite substances, those constituted by the union of form and matter. Gracia rejects dimensive quantity as a principle of individuation in part because it cannot serve as a universal principle of individuation-that is, one that could individuate nonmaterial substances such as angels, God, Cartesian souls, abstract entities, etc.[1] According to Gracia, it is the existence of each thing that is its principle of individuation. For now I wish to put to one side the question of whether we should look for a global principle of individuation, as Gracia does, or attempt instead to find different principles of individuation suited to different kinds of entities, although my strong preference is for the latter option.[2] I will focus instead on whether dimensive quantity provides a satisfactory principle of individuation for material substances.

Furthermore, I will make no attempt to present the full teaching of Aquinas on dimensive quantity based on an historical survey of his writings. As commentators have noted, Aquinas seems to change his mind or at least express his mind differently over

[1] See Jorge Gracia, *Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988), 155. Other works in which Gracia develops his account of individuation are *Suarez on Individuation,* ed. Jorge Gracia (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982); "Individuals as Instances," *Review of Metaphysics* 37 (1983): 39-59; and "Introduction: The Problem of Individuation" in *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation (1150-1650)* ed. Jorge Gracia (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1994), 1-20.

[2] This approach is taken by Lawrence Dewan, who speaks of individuality in Aquinas's thought as a mode of being, where being is said in many ways. He sees in Aquinas a global approach to the individual but not a single global principle of individuation, in light of the fact that "in diverse levels of being there are diverse 'principles' of individuation" (Lawrence Dewan, O. P., "The Individual as a Mode of Being According to Thomas Aquinas," *The Thomist* 63 [1999]: 424).

the course of his career when writing about the principle of individuation. [3] I have focused on the *E.xpositio super librum Boetii De Trinitate,* not because it contains the whole of Aquinas's teaching on the principle of individuation, but because it is here that we can see a fruitful elaboration of ideas drawn from Aristotle's physics. This is what is needed to mount a philosophical defense of dimensive quantity as the principle of individuation.

I. DIMENSIVE QUANTlIY: THE TRADmONAL VIEW AND GRACIA'S OBJECTIONS

Investigation of the principle of individuation was and continues to be one of the most fruitful sources of speculative insight. Clearly the world is full of individual things, but how are we to describe their individuality? What is the source of the distinctness of different individuals? It is well known that Aquinas's principle of individuation for composite substances is quantity of matter or signate matter. These terms signify the view that matter, when modified by the accidents of quantity and dimension-or dimensive quantity-serves to distinguish one particular composite of form and matter from another individual of the same species. With modifications, this view appears in a number of Aquinas's writings and has been accurately described by Joseph Bobik and, more recently, by Joseph Owens. However, it is not yet clear how the accident of dimensive quantity being received in matter actually serves to individuate the different members of one species of material substances. Partly for this reason, Gracia has rejected the view that dimensive quantity is the principle of individuation for material substances.

To gain entry to this debate, we can start with the observation that all attempts to formulate a principle of individuality must

[1] To gain a sense of the range of texts in which Aquinas discusses problems of individuation, see Joseph Owens, "Thomas Aquinas (b. ca 1225; d. 1274)" in Gracia, ed., *Individuation in Scholasticism,* 173-94. Aquinas's earlier writings, in particular his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, are given careful attention in Joseph Owens, "Thomas Aquinas: Dimensive Quantity as Individuating Principle," *Medieval Studies* 50 (1988): 279-310.

bear a common explanatory burden. They must shed light on the principle of individuation and so explain the individuality of, for instance, different human beings. The principle of individuation will be that in virtue of which Peter is (1) indivisible or incommunicable in the technical sense of being noninstantiable, or not such that two or more things could share the property of being Peter; and (2) distinct from all other members of the species to which he belongs and indeed distinct from every other thing. The principle of individuation must give full grounds for (1) and (2), for the indivisibility and distinctness of Peter. If we need to posit more than the principle of individuation to explain Peter's indivisibility and distinctness, then we do not yet have an adequate principle of individuation.

Aquinas describes the principle of individuation for composite substances variously in various texts, but always settles on matter modified by quantity. The standard presentation of this view comes in the commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*. There Aquinas speaks of matter as the source of the individuation of form, resulting in diverse individuals of the same species:

> Things in the genus of substance that differ numerically, differ not only in their accidents, but also by their form and matter. But if it is asked how this form differs from that, there is no other reason than that it Is in other signate matter. Nor can there be found another reason why this matter is divided from that, except on account of its quantity. Hence matter subject to dimension is understood to be the principle of this kind of diversity.[4]

This reply to an objection contains in compressed form the major ideas of Aquinas's description of the principle of individuation: signate or designated matter, the sort of material thing one can point at; the role of quantity in distinguishing signate matter, or dividing this matter from that; and a connection between quantity

• Aquinas, *Super Boet. de Trin.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4: "Ad quartum dicendum quod ilia, quae different nwnero in genere substantiae, non solum different accidentibus, sed etiam fonna et materia. Sed si quaeratur, quare differens est eorwn forma, non erit alia ratio, nisi quia est in alia materia signata. Nee invenitur alia ratio, quare haec materia sit divisa ab ilia, nisi propter quantitatem. Et ideo materia subjecta dimem;ioni intelligitur esse principium huius diversitatis" (Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio super libnun Boethii de Trinitate*, ed. Bruno Decker [Leiden: Brill, 1965], 144-45). All translations from this text are by the author.

and dimension. Neither form nor matter by itself is sufficient to explain individual composites of form and matter; the form is what is shared among the different individuals of the same species, while matter is shared by individuals of different species. Only when quantity enters the picture as modifying matter, and bringing with it dimension, do we have a sufficient explanation of the fact of numerical diversity. As Owens puts it,

> Matter seems to be visualized as a potentiality that gives rise to a three-dimensional expanse yet lacks capacity just in itself to distinguish things in it one from another. It has first to be conceived as divided into parts or units sealed off each in itself by dimensive quantity. Each of them is thereby constituted an individual object in its own right.[5]

So far, this is the traditional presentation of dimensive quantity as the principle of individuation in Aquinas. This provisional answer to the question of how different composite individuals of the same species are differentiated states that it is the parceling out of matter into quantities bearing dimensions that establishes composite individuals. One presentation of Aquinas's thought on the principle of individuation would call a halt to the search for the principle of individuation at this point, resting in matter designated by dimensive quantity. Joseph Bobik summarizes as follows the role of quantity in rendering matter distinct and, via distinction of matter, making substantial form individual:

> Thus, because prime matter is capacity for the accidental form of quantity, due to the fact that matter is divided in distinct parts and situated in different places, it is rendered capable of receiving within itself, being thus divided, *these* substantial forms, *this* form in *this* part, *this other* form in *this other* part .... ff a corporeal substance is in fact an individual, this is precisely because it partakes (due to its partaking in prime matter) in a condition the very nature of which is to render individual, or numerically distinct, that substance which is its subject. This condition is the quantity of a natural body.[6]

[5] *0wens,* "Dimensive Quantity," 280.

[6] 'Ainsi, parce que la matiere premiere est puissance pour la forme accidentelle de quantite, grace a laquelle cette matiere est divisee en parties distinctes et placee en des lieux divers, elle est rendue capable de recevoir en elle, etant ainsi divisee, *tel/es* formes substantielles, *telle* forme dans *telle* partie, *telle autre* forme dans *telle autre* partie •••• Si une substance corporelle est actuellement un individu, c'est precisement parce qu'elle participe (en raison de sa

This approach is helpful as far as it goes in laying out the relations between such concepts as matter, substantial form, and quantity. However, it does not go far enough. It remains obscure why and how quantity is able to render individual the matter in which it is received. Owens recognizes the need to address this issue:

> The whole individuation of a body, both in its substance and in all its other accidents, is made to depend upon quantity. But quantity, as an accident, has to presuppose for its existence the individual substance upon which it depends for its being.[7]

And although he speaks convincingly of the need for material substances to exist in matter subject to dimensions, Owens does not show how this will secure for dimensive quantity, an accident, the role of individuating substances.[8] Having some particular dimension will be true of whatever exists as an individual material substance, but why is this fact given the special role of being responsible for the individuation of that material thing?

This failure to clarify the role of dimensive quantity in individuating material substances has not gone unnoticed. It provides the basis for objections to the Thomistic understanding of the principle of individuation put forward by Suarez in the sixteenth century and more recently by Gracia. Suarez notes that dimensive quantity is typically construed as an accident, and so is capable of being present in more than one subject. To summarize very sketchily Suarez's intricate reasoning, he sets up a dilemma for the Thomistic view of individuation: either the accident of quantity is somehow localized to one individual, in which case its status as an accident prevents it from being the source of that thing's existence as an individual, or it is communicable to distinct individuals, in which case it cannot be the principle of individuation, which must explain why individuals exist as non-

participation a la matiere premiere) a un acte dont la nature meme est de rendre individuee, ou numeriquement distincte, cette substance qui est son sujet. Cet·acte est la quantite corporelle naturelle Uoseph Bobik, "La doctrine de saint Thomas sur !'individuation des substances corporelles," *Revue philosophiquede Louvain* 51 [1953]: 18).

[7] Owens, "Thomas Aquinas," 182.

[8] Ibid., 185.

communicable.[9] To the extent that a given dimensive quantity does inhere in some subject, that subject must be constituted as an individual apart from the accident of dimensive quantity, so that dimensive quantity no longer plays the crucial individuating role.

Another way to see the force of this objection is to observe that dimensive quantity as so far described will not serve as an adequate principle of individuation. It meets condition (2) described above, in that it explains how an individual will be distinct from other members of the same species. Peter will have or be partially constituted by one parcel of matter, and Paul will be partially constituted by a different parcel of matter. But the notion of dimensive quantity does not so far meet condition (1); there is no way yet to rule out the possibility that two individuals share simultaneously the same dimensive quantity. A quantity is an answer to the question "How much?" or "How many?", so that "2 quarts" or "3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet" are terms that refer to quantities. These quantities may be instantiated in distinct individuals: in 2 quarts of milk and in 2 quarts of coffee, or in a cube of wood 3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet and in a cube of iron of the same dimensions, or in a second cube of wood of the same dimensions and quantity. In light of these considerations, dimensive quantity may be communicable; the same dimensive

[9] A sampling of Suarez's argumentation in *Metaphysical Disputation* V, section 3, ch. 11 as he sets up and attacks each horn of the dilemma in turn: "First, assuming ... that quantity is not in prime matter but in the whole composite, and that it is destroyed when the substance is corrupted, and that it is newly acquired for the generation of substance. From which it is concluded that, absolutely speaking, numerically this substantial form is first introduced in this matter and [then] quantity follows. Whence the argument is completed, because this form, when it is understood to be received in this matter, is also understood to be received in a matter distinct from the other. Therefore, that [i. e. the substantial individual] as such is one, not with conceptual unity, but with real, singular and transcendental unity. Therefore, just as it is undivided in itself in virtue of its substantial entity, so also it is substantially and entitatively distinct from all others. Therefore, it does not have distinction through quantity • • • • Second, we can proceed to the other view, that quantity is in prime matter and remains the same in what is generated and corrupted. And then an argument no less effective is taken from another place, because not only this matter in itself, but also [matter] as affected by this quantity, can be under diverse forms and, consequently, in numerically distinct individuals. Therefore, [matter designated by quantity] can no more be the principle of individuation than matter alone [can]" (Gracia, ed., *Suarez on Individuation*, 81-83).

quantity may be instantiated by two individuals of the same species. As Gracia puts it,

> [this account] would also be hard pressed to explain the noninstantiability of quantity itself, which is supposed to account for individuation. For, what makes dimensions noninstantiable when we know that in fact they can and are often, separately or together, instantiated elsewhere?[10]

This passage provides the occasion for a more systematic presentation of Gracia's position and his reasons for rejecting dimensive quantity as the principle of individuation. He sees the need to gain a firmer purchase on the question of the principle of individuality by first addressing the nature of individuation and individuality. What is distinctive about individuals is that they are noninstantiable. Where other philosophers place in the foreground the facts that each individual is distinct from other individuals and that each individual in our experience is qualitatively unique in some way, Gracia focuses on a feature of individuals that is rooted deeper in the metaphysics of individuals and less able to be defeated by such possible worlds as a universe containing only one individual or a universe containing only two qualitatively indiscernible objects. Individuals are those entities which instantiate or exemplify universals but are not themselves instantiated and indeed cannot be instantiated. [11] He then takes the task of identifying the principle of individuation to be the task of identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for a noninstantiable individual to exemplify a universal. In his words, "We shall be concerned with what an individual does and must have, that a universal does and must lack, such that the individual is noninstantiable while the universal is instantiable."[12] On this construal, the principle of individuation will be some aspect or component of an individual that renders it particular and noninstantiable, one that makes it the opposite of a universal.

From this perspective, Gracia raises a number of objections to dimensive quantity as the principle of individuation. He classifies

[10] Gracia, *Individuality,* 155.
[11] Ibid., 45-46.
[12] Ibid., 141.

the quantitative theory of individuation as one among other accidental theories, those that make some accident of an individual the principle of individuation. [13] All such accidental theories are subject to the objection that they use an extrinsic feature of a thing, an accident, to account for an intrinsic feature. According to Gracia, "[A] particular quantity [e.g., a person's weight at a given time] is something accidental to a thing, and therefore cannot account for one of its basic ontological characteristics," namely, its individuality. [14] Also, as already noted, Gracia argues that quantity cannot explain individuality in the sense of noninstantiability because quantity is a repeatable and instantiable feature. The quantities signified by such terms as "2 gallons" or "3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet" can be shared by and exemplified by different individuals, so they cannot be the necessary and sufficient conditions for an individual's noninstantiability.

II. ARISTOTLE ON QUANTITY AND POSMON

To answer Gracia's objections and to lay out the full resources of the notion of dimensive quantity, it is necessary to investigate the Aristotelian background of the category of quantity. Aristotle begins his discussion of quantity in chapter 6 of the *Categories* by announcing two different divisions within the category. The first is the division of quantity into those quantities which are continuous and those which are discrete. Aristotle gives as examples of continuous quantities lines, surfaces, and bodies, as well as time and place. These are all quantities that consist of parts in direct contact with one or more part of the same quantity. A line is a continuous quantity because it is made up of segments each of which is contiguous to another segment on the same line. Discrete quantities come with parts that are not in contact with any other part of the same quantity. Examples of discrete quantities are number and spoken speech. Each of these comes with parts that can stand apart from every other part, as syllables

[13] Another accidental theory of individuation is the spatio-temporal theory, according to which individuation arises from a thing's location in space and time.

[14] Gracia, *Individual11y*,155.

of spoken speech are distinct from each other and as the parts of a number lack a common boundary which both parts touch.[15]

The second division of quantity is that between quantities having parts with position relative to each other and those having parts with no position relative to each other. A body which is a continuous quantity will have parts with position relative to each other: my body can be considered as made up of the parts at or below my waist and the parts above my waist. It is in the nature of these parts so considered that they will have a determinate spatial relation to each other. On the other hand, number will not have parts with position relative to each other. Five and five are parts of ten, but it is not in the nature of these parts that they have spatial relations to each other. Three and four are parts of seven, but the nature of three is not defined by its position in space relative to four.

As these examples show, continuous quantities in general are those which consist of parts having position relative to each other, and discrete quantities are those whose parts do not have position relative to each other. The only exception to this coincidence of the two differentia of quantity is time. Time has parts (past, present, and future) of which the present touches both the past and the future, but since only one part of time exists, the present, it cannot be said to have position in relation to the other parts.[16]

One important point resulting from the discussion of quantity in *Categories* 6 is that quantity involves more than simply measure. Previously we said that a quantity is the answer to the question "How much?", an answer that might take the form of "2 quarts" or "3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet." Such answers give the measure or dimensions of a thing but tell us nothing about what the thing is made of or how its parts relate to each other. Indeed, quantity as measure could be applied to an empty expanse of space occupied by no matter at all, though such an empty expanse occurs in our experience only under abnormal circumstances. Although it is certainly legitimate to understand quantity in this

[15] Aristotle, *Categories* 4b2{}-5a14. References to the *Categories* are to the Minio-Paluello edition from the Clarendon Press.

[16] Aristotle, *Categories* 5a15-37.

way, Aristotle's two divisions of quantity imply also a different way of understanding quantity: namely, not as measure, but as quantity of the thing measured. For this type of quantity, the dimensions measured are dimensions of matter, and that matter consists of parts standing in spatial relations to each other. In this second way of understanding quantity, 2 quarts of milk is a different thing from 2 quarts of coffee, even though the dimensions of each are the same. The fact that quantity can involve a thing being constituted by parts will become important when Gracia's objections to taking dimensive quantity as the principle of individuation are considered.

Another important point that results from *Categories* 6 is the mapping of bodies and their parts on to place.

> Place, again, is one of the continuous quantities. For the parts of a body occupy some place, and they join together at a common boundary. So the parts of the place occupied by the various parts of the body themselves join together at the same boundary at which the parts of the body do.[17]

So each body, and each part of a body, is associated with a place, th-:mgh of course this may be only temporary as a body's place may change through motion. The same reasoning holds for lines and surfaces. Thus, all continuous quantities except for time will occupy some place.

One concept Aristotle deploys in *Categories* 6 is that of position. Since this concept will play a crucial role in describing dimensive quantity, it will be helpful to offer a provisional outline of it as it emerges from the *Categories*. As one of the differentia of quantity, position is an attribute of one type of body, namely, continuous bodies. Position consists in the configuration or arrangement of the parts of these bodies relative to each other. So when Aquinas speaks of matter or quantity as having position, this should be understood as treating the body in question as made of parts having position relative to each other. This raises the

[17] Aristotle, *Categories* 5a8-10. Translations of the *Categories* are by J. L Ackrill, taken from *The Complete Worlis of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

question of the relation between this technical sense of position and the ordinary sense of the word in everyday language. The term 'position' in English is synonymous or nearly so with 'place', but it is important to keep separate the concept indicated by Aristotle's word for position, *thesis*, and the concept indicated by his word for place, *topos*, and also to keep both separate from our concept of space. Position, as described so far, concerns the spatial relations of the parts of a body relative to each other and within the limits of that body. The place of a thing, on the other hand, is defined at *Physics* 212a 6-7 by Aristotle as "the boundary of the containing body at which it is in contact with the contained body." Place is understood here as coinciding with the outside surface of a body, on the model of the container of that body. In addition, a place is always the place of a thing, that which occupies or fills it. As such it is different from our notion of space, the expanse or void within which physical objects move but which can conceivably be empty either momentarily or for any amount of time.

Another aspect of position in the sense considered so far is the requirement that when parts of a body have position relative to each other, those parts are joined, directly or indirectly, to each other as parts of the same continuous body. Otherwise, the notion under consideration would not be the concept of the position of the parts of a body relative to each other but the concept of the position of the parts of a body relative to something outside the body. Unlike discrete quantities, the parts of which are not or need not be physically joined to each other, continuous quantities have parts each of which must be physically joined to at least one other part of the same body. When one part is joined to another part, the two not only touch each other but their respective limits unite or overlap to form another part of the whole body in question. Although each part of a continuous body need not touch every other particular part of that body and so need not be in direct contact with every other part of that body, each part of a continuous quantity will be joined to another part which is joined to another part, and so on, until each part of a continuous

quantity is in direct or indirect contact with every other part of that quantity.[18]

A third aspect of the notion of position may be mentioned, although it will not be pursued in any detail here. This is the idea that for the parts of a body to have position relative to each other, the parts must have some permanent duration, however limited, within the body they constitute. This suggestion comes from Albertus Magnus, who claims that position involves three individually necessary and jointly sufficient elements. Besides situation or spatial relation within a body and being joined to each other, for the parts of a body to have position "one part should remain constant with another part in the same continuous thing, so that it should hold together with the other part."[19] Presumably Albert's reasoning is that for parts of a body to have position relative to each other they must remain together in existence as parts of that body at least for some minimal amount of time. This line of thought draws partly on the etymology of the terms for position, which connect position with things being put or set in some region *(thesis* in Aristotle's Greek, *positio* in Latin). If a part of a body existed as a part for only an instant or never remained in the same spatial relations to other parts of that body but constantly altered its position relative to other parts, it would be just as well to deny that that thing was even a part of that body. It could with better reason be called a body in its own right or a part of a different body and not a part of the original body. So for parts of a body to have position relative to each other, they must

[18] Perhaps anachronistically, this account of what it is for the parts of a continuous quantity to have position relative to each other in the *Categories* is intended to reflect Aristotle's description of the relations of contiguity and continuity in the *Physics.* Continuity is one special case of contiguity. If two things are contiguous, then the limits of the two touch each other, but in the case of continuity the limits also form a unity and so constitute one thing; see *Physics* 227a6-17.

[19] Albert speaks of the different aspects of position as follows: "Positionem autem habere tria concernit, scilicet ut assignetur ubi in continuo sita sit particula, et ut una pars permaneat stans in eodem continuo cum altera, et ut teneatur cum altera copulatione. Et quodcumque horum trium deficiat, non habebit in partibus positionem ...• Positio autem in continuo dicit permanentiam, quia positum est fixum immobile secundum esse., et ideo oportet ut dicat permanentiam" (Albertus Magnus, *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis,* lib. 2, tract. 3, cap. 6, in ed. Vives [Paris, 1890], 81; translation by the author).

have some minimal permanence as parts bearing spatial relations to at least some other parts of that body. This third aspect of position is intriguing because it forges a link between the notion of position and the identity of material substances over time. Precisely for this reason it stands outside of the focus of the present paper, which is not the identity of material substances over time but their individuation. However, this third aspect of the concept of position allows us to understand why Aquinas thought that dimensive quantity, his principle of individuation, might also have served as a source for the identity of material substances over time.[20]

Previously it was noted that position concerns the configuration or spatial orientation of the parts of a body relative to each other. Considered in this way, the position of the parts of a body may be distinguished from their place and from the various spatial relations they and the whole body they constitute bear to

[20] One puzzling aspect of the discussion of dimensive quantity in the *Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate* is that Aquinas expects his principle of individuation to do double duty as the source of the identity of material substances over time. He says it is indeterminate and not determinate dimensions that are the principle of individuation, because the latter would not ensure that individuals remain the same in number over time: "Dimensiones autem istae possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum earum terminationem; et dico eas terminari secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram, et sic ut entia perfecta collocantur in genere quantitatis. Et sic non possunt esse principium individuationis; quia cum talis terminatio dimensionwn varietur frequenter circa individuum, sequeretur quod individuum non remaneret semper idem numero. Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura dimensionis tantum, quarilvis numquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint, sicut nee natura coloris sine determinatione albi et nigri; et sic collocantur in genere quantitatis ut imperfectum. Et ex his dimensionibus interminatis material efficitur haec materia signata, et sic individuat fonnam, et sic ex materia causatur diversitas secundwn numerum in eadem specie" (*Super Boet. de Trin.*, q. 4, a. 2 [Decker, ed., 143]). On one reading of this passage, Aquinas has simply failed to see that the issues of individuation and identity over time are distinct, and so assumes without warrant that the principle of individuation can be expected to function also as the source of identity over time. However, on a more charitable reading, if dimensive quantity is defined by the position of the parts of a body relative to each other, and if Aquinas is employing his teacher Albert's analysis of position as requiring permanence of parts of a body over time, then he can allow that the issues of individuation and identity over time are distinct and still claim to have found in position both a principle of individuation and a criterion of identity over time for material substances. Spelling out this claim and its full grounds would take us beyond the scope of the present essay, but the possibility of using position both as principle of individuation and as criterion of identity over time shows the richness of the concept.

the outside world. That annoying novelty of years gone by, the Rubik's cube, is based on the fact that the parts of an object can be rearranged even as the object as a whole remains in roughly the same place and intact. So the position of the parts of the cube relative to each other can change even as the place of the cube remains constant. To distinguish further the concepts of position and place, consider a man sleeping soundly in his seat aboard an airliner as it wings its way from Philadelphia to Chicago. The man is changing place quite rapidly, as the airplane carrying him travels at the rate of several hundred miles per hour. However, his position does not change at all; as long as he retains the same posture, the parts of his body do not alter their configuration relative to each other. Then when the plane lands in Chicago, suppose further that it halts on the runway and waits for a gate to become available for unloading. The man awakes and stretches his arms and legs while remaining in his seat. The man now remains in approximately the same place, but the position of the parts of his body alters when he stretches. Based on these examples, we can say that position and place are different attributes of a material substance. Both properties depend in some way on a material substance's being extended in space and having the capacity to move and change, but they are independent of each other in the sense that they must be defined differently and in the sense that each can vary while the other remains constant. This has the consequence that neither place nor position can be reduced to the other. Nor can the weaker relation of supervenience hold between them; if position supervened on place or vice versa, then it would not be possible for position to change while place remained constant.

At this point it is surely natural to look to Aristotle's *Physics* and its discussion of place for further insight into the relation between position and place. One commonality between position and place in this text is that both are connected with dimensionality. Aristotle speaks of six dimensions in the physical world and groups the six into three pairs of contraries: up and down, before and behind, and right and left. In different passages

he speaks of these dimensions as characterizing both position and place. While observing that all natural philosophers have used contraries as principles, he treats position as a genus spanning contrary dimensions:

> The same is true of Democritus also, with his plenum and void, both of which exist, he says, the one as being and the other as not being. Again he speaks of differences in position, shape, and order, and these are genera of which the species are contraries, namely, of position, above and below, before and behind. (188a 22-25)[21]

Within his discussion of the infinite in book 3, chapter 5, Aristotle speaks similarly of place as a genus containing the dimensions: "Further, every sensible body is in place, and the kinds or differences of place are up-down, before-behind, and right-left" (205b31-33).

The message of these passages is that both a body whose parts have position relative to each other and the place that the body occupies are to be described as having different areas or regions, where these regions bear the relations of being above or below each other, before or behind each other, or to the right or left of each other.[22]

Given the fact that dimensions apply both to places and to positions, we can observe that a material body being in a place is a sufficient condition for it to be constituted by parts having position relative to each other. If a body is in a place, that place will be characterized ·by the six dimensions. As Aristotle says, "Each [of the four elements] is carried to its own place, if it is not hindered, the one up, the other down. Now these are regions [or parts, *mere]* or kinds of place-up and down and the rest of the six directions" (208b11-14). If the place occupied by a body has an up and a down, or an upper part and a lower part, then the body occupying that place will also have an upper and a lower part. These parts will be configured in space in relation to each

[21] Unless otherwise noted, all translation &om the *Physics* are by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye and are drawn &om Barnes, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle.*

[22] For a fuller discussion of the six dimensions and their role in Aristotle's account of place, see Benjamin Morison, *On Location* {New York: Clarendon Press, 2002), 35-47.

other in a determinate way, with one part being above the other, and so will have position in relation to each other.

If a material body being in a place is sufficient for that material body to be made of parts having position relative to each other, then the natural question to ask is whether the converse also holds. Is being a body made of parts having position relative to each other also a sufficient condition for that body being in a place? Intuitively this seems to be true; if a body has parts which have position relative to each other, then those parts need to be somewhere, and the body as a whole will be wherever its parts taken together are, and so will be in a place. The key idea here is that any body is somewhere and so occupies some place. A body is what it is *qua* body, having a determinate extension and shape, in part because of the way that its parts have position in relation to each other. So being a body made of parts having position relative to each other will be sufficient for that body being in a place.[23]

One qualification is in order when speaking of the relation between position and place. Strictly speaking, it is parts of a body that have position in relation to each other; that is why Aristotle speaks of position in the *Categories* as something relative *(pros ti* [6b2-14]). Yet place for Aristotle is a nonrelative property of whole bodies. There is a nonrelative up and down in the universe, as can be seen in the fact that the simple elements of fire, air, water, and earth go to definite regions of the universe when unimpeded, regions whose place is not defined relative to an observer or some arbitrary point in the universe. Also, place is a property of whole bodies and not, strictly speaking, of their parts. It would be strange to deny that the parts of a body are somewhere and occupy some place, but they are not in their own

[23] There is one exception to the general rule that whatever has parts having position relative to each other is in a place. On the Aristotelian view of mathematical entities, lines and plane figures are abstracted from material objects so that the mind represents them to itself apart from matter. In this condition, they have position but not place. So Aquinas says *(Super Boet. de Trin.,* q. 4, a. 3, resp.) that mathematical objects are in place only by similitude and not properly. Due to this special case, I say only that any body or material substance having position will be in a place.

place by virtue of being parts. They are in the place of the whole of which they are parts, and they have place by virtue of their relation to something else, namely, the whole to which they belong. This is the idea behind Aristotle's cryptic comment in book 4, chapter 5: "Nor is it without reason that each should remain naturally in its proper place. For parts do, and that which is in a place has the same relation to its place as a separable part to its whole" (212b33-35). As a result of these qualifications, some care must be taken in comparing position to place. This is the source of such inelegant locutions as "a body being constituted by parts having position in relation to each other" as the correlate to "a body being in a place."

Other passages of the *Physics* show a further use of this relative notion of position. This use goes beyond the parts of a body having position in relation to each other and takes in the idea of bodies having position in relation to each other. As Aristotle develops his grounds for taking place to be something absolute, he contrasts the place of a thing with its position, something that is relative. Looking again at book 3, chapter 5, which speaks of the six dimensions as regions or parts or kinds of places, we find the following: "[l]he kinds or differences of place are up-down, before-behind, right-left; and these distinctions hold not only in relation to us and by position *[pros hemas kai thesei]*, but also in the whole itself" (205b31-34).[24] So there is an up and a down, and a right and a left in the universe; as a result each body is in some determinate place in the whole cosmos. But the passage also suggests that the dimensions have application in a relative sense, by position. Presumably this means that a body is also in front of another in a line for movie tickets, or to the right of the car in the left-hand lane on the highway. The distinction between relative position of this sort and absolute place arises again in book 4,

[24] Here I alter Hardie and Gaye's translation; they render *thesei* as "by convention" rather than as "by position." But there is a clear sense in saying that things are up or down, right or left in relation to us and our position; the same object, without moving at all, will be up and down in relation to me if I move from below it to a point above it and so change my position relative to it. This is the point that Aristotle makes at 208b15-19, discussed in the following footnote.

chapter 1 as Aristotle works toward associating place with the dimensions understood absolutely:

> Now these are regions [or parts, or kinds of place--up and down and the rest of the six directions; nor do such distinctions (up and down and right and left) hold only in relation to us. To *us* they are not always the same but change as we change our position; that is why the same thing is often both right *and* left, up *and* down, before *and* behind. But in *nature* each is distinct, taken apart by itself.[25] (208b11-19)

As we move relative to the chimney rising out of the roof of a house, that chimney may be first up and then down, to the right and to the left. This does not mean that the chimney has changed its place, only that its position relative to us (and ours relative to it) has changed.

III. AQUINAS ON DIMENSIVE QUANTITY

So far, we have seen that a material body being in a place is a sufficient condition for it having position, and we have seen that a body having position is a sufficient condition for a body being in place. This means that a body having position is a necessary and sufficient condition for a body being in place. At the same time, as we have seen in the examples of the man seated on the airplane, position and place are different attributes of a material substance and can vary independently of each other. Also, in addition to the parts of a material substance having position in relation to each other, a material substance can have position relative to another substance. It remains, then, to see how Aquinas would be able to use the notions of quantity, position, and place to argue that dimensive quantity, understood as a quantity of matter having position, is the principle of individuation for substances. To use Gracia's terminology, we can argue

[25] Again altering Hardie and Gaye's translation to capture the sense of *al/a kata tifn thesin, hop6& an straph6men, gigneta*i and its mention of position. The force of the whole passage is that up and down and so forth are constant in nature, but that the same thing can become up and then down relative to us and in relation to our position, as we move or turn ourselves.

that dimensive quantity provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for a material substance to be noninstantiable.

The main source for this response to Gracia is Aquinas's commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate.* In laying out his view on the source of diversity among members of the same species, or numerical diversity, Aquinas focuses on quantity of matter. Such an individual is this form in this matter, but neither form nor matter as such is able to account for the 'thisness' of the individual. Matter individuates form by receiving form as this matter, and it is this matter only insofar as it is divisible, as Aquinas tells us:

> For form is not individuated through the fact that it is received in matter, except insofar as it is received in this matter which is distinct and determined to here and now. Matter however is not divisible unless through quantity. Due to this the Philosopher says in the first book of the *Physics* that once quantity *is* removed an indivisible substance remains. And in light of this, matter is made this and determined according as it is under dimensions.[26]

So the dividing or distinguishing of matter that we find in distinct material beings of the same species requires quantity and proceeds by assigning some dimension to these distinct quantities of matter. At the same time, we should keep in mind that dimensive quantity need not be quantity in the sense of measure, that which is signified by "2 quarts" or "3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet," but also can be the quantity of the thing measured, a quantity which is made of parts having position relative to each other.

This becomes clear if we look closer at how Aquinas understands division of matter in the first article of question 4 of his commentary. This question addresses the cause of plurality, and the first article of the question begins by linking a plurality of things to their divisibility or their being divided. In light of this, the cause of division will also be taken as the cause of plurality.

[26] See Aquinas. *Super Boet. tk Trin.,* q. 4, a. 2: "Non enim forma individuatur per hoc quod recipitur in materia, nisi quatenus recipitur in hac materia distincta et determinata ad hie et nunc. Materia autem non est divisibilis nisi per quantitatem. Unde Philosophus dicit in I Physicorum quod subtracta quantitate remanebit substantia indivisibilis. Et ideo materia haec et signata, secundum quod subest dimensionibus" (Decker; ed., 143)

To illustrate the division of composite things, Aquinas takes up the division of quantity, and in particular a line. As Kevin White remarks, the fact that this example comes at the beginning of Aquinas's discussion of plurality and individuation and its textbook quality indicate that it was devised expressly to guide our understanding of the question as a whole.[27] "For one part of a line is divided from the other through the fact that they have differing situation [*diversum situm],* which is as it were the formal difference of quantity having position."[28] This example is put forward to illustrate the idea that the formal cause of division in composite and posterior things is diversity of simple and first things.

If we step back from the larger aims of the article and focus on this sentence, two important points arise which will help illuminate Aquinas's approach to individuation. First, the division which leads to diverse individuals is not crucially a matter of parceling out quantities of matter in the sense of measuring something 3 feet long. Individuality depends rather on the fact that a quantity of matter is the sort of thing that can have different parts with different positions relative to each other. The formal cause of division in quantity, in the sense of the nature by which the cause occurs, is diversity of "simple and first things." The example which follows, a line divided into two parts, is described as resulting in parts with diverse situation, where situation is the formal nature of quantity having position. So situation and position are the first and simple things, diversity in which explains division in posterior and composite things, such as material substances.

A second point is terminological. Here and in later passages in the *De Trinitate* commentary, Aquinas will use the term *situs* in explaining the individuality of material substances. I have used 'situation' to translate this, in the sense of a thing's being located

[27] Kevin White, "Individuation in Aquinas's *Super Boetium De Trinitate,* Q. 4," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 69 (1995): 547.

[28] Aquinas, *Super Boet. de Trin.,* q. 4, a. 1: "Dividitur enim una pars lineae ab alia per hoc quod habet diversum situm, qui est quasi fonnalis differentia quantitatis continuae positionem habentis" (Decker, ed., 134).

or situated in space, but it is important to keep the term and its associated concept apart from place and terms for place. *Situs* or 'situation' is said to be the formal difference of continuous quantity, so it is the particular nature shared by those continuous quantities composed of parts having position relative to each other. The different parts of a line have diverse situation because they are situated differently within the whole line. *As* such, *situs* or situation cannot be place, which is conceived on the model of a container fit for being filled with quantities of matter. Light is shed on the relation between *situs* and place by Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's *Physics: situs* adds to the category of "where" the idea of an order of parts in a place.[29] *As* a result, *situs* is concerned with the spatial relations of parts of material substances, as is position. This is not *merely* a terminological point, since getting clear on the meaning of *situs* helps clarify Aquinas's view on individuation and present it in its strongest version. According to White, when Aquinas says that division of quantity occurs in a line by the parts of the line having diverse *sitits,* this means that "the different parts of a line are divided because they have different places, place being, as it were, the formal difference of positioned continuous quantity." Here White takes *situs* as synonymous with place and as a result presents Aquinas's doctrine of individuation by dimensive quantity as ultimately a theory of individuation by place.[30] This is not a satisfactory exposition of the meaning of *situs;* an object could retain the same order of its parts even as it changes its place, and so be unchanged in its *situs* while its place changes. And in light of Gracia's criticisms of the spatio-temporal theory of individuation, we should be alert to differences between situation and position on the one hand and place on the other, so as to interpret

[29] See chapter 322 of Thomas Aquinas, *In Octo Libras Physicorum Aristotelis F.xpositio,* (Rome: Marietti, 1954), 159.

[30] "Aquinas states that place enters into the very ratio of dimension, apparently suggesting that it is simpler than dimension, and hence that, according to the argument of Article One, division of place somehow causes diversity of dimension. From the point of view of human knowledge, at least, place seems to vie with quantity as the ultimate root of the discernment of individuals and of the very notion of individuation" (White, "Individuation in Aquinas," 555).

Aquinas's theory of individuation by dimensive quantity as something other than the spatio-temporal theory.

Drawing on our review of Aristotle's discussion of quantity in the *Categories,* we can observe that matter is a continuous quantity and one that is constituted by parts having position in relation to each other. That Aquinas views matter in this Aristotelian light is shown by his reply to the third objection in the crucial second article of the fourth question. That third objection anticipates Gracia by proposing that all accidents are of themselves communicable and so cannot serve as the principle of individuation. Aquinas's reply to this objection points to a special quality of the accident of dimensive quantity. "No accident has in itself the proper nature of division, except quantity. From thence dimensions have of themselves a certain nature of individuation according to a determinate situation, insofar as situation is a difference of quantity."[31] *Situs* here is the nature or property of quantity having position, one of the differentia of quantity. So it is not simply the fact of having dimensions that makes for individuation in material substances, but in addition the having of determinate position, which dimensions carry in their train. Working still with the set of conceptual connections laid out in the *Categories* and the *Physics,* we can say that matter having some quantity will be characterized by some dimensions. Dimensive quantity involves matter having position, or more precisely being made of parts bearing position in relation to each other. A material substance which is made of parts having determinate position relative to each other will also be in some determinate place. This is why matter considered under dimensions is determined to be this matter by being tied to some determinate here and now.

Looking further afield in Aquinas's work, we can also understand why he speaks of dimensive quantity as the source of individuation and explains this using the notion of position. While

[31] See Aquinas, *SuperBoet. de Trin.,* q. 4, a. 2, ad 3: "Nullum autem accidens habet ex se propriam rationem divisionis nisi quantitas. Unde dimensiones ex se ipsis habent quondam rationem individuationis secundum detenninatum situm, proutsitus est differentiaquantitatis" (Decker, ed., 144)

discussing the presence of accidents in the Eucharist in the third part of the *Summa Theologiae,* he states that dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents remaining in the sacrament. Dimensive quantity is able to play this individuating role because of its connection to position.

> So it is that dimensive quantity in itself has a certain individuation; we can imagine many lines of the same kind, but all different because of their position; and this position is part of the very idea of this quantity. For it is of the very definition of a dimension to be *quantity having position.*[32]

This passage shows how Aquinas might reply to Gracia. A plurality of lines of the same length will all have the same quantity, in the sense that measuring each will produce the same answer to the question "How long is that line?" They are individuated not merely by quantity as measure, but by their difference in position relative to each other which puts them in different places. Yet it is still fitting to speak of dimensive quantity as the source or principle of individuation, since position is the specific difference that distinguishes dimensive quantity from other species of quantity. This points to a statement of the nature that is dimensive quantity. Following the idea that a nature is defined by a genus and a specific difference, the nature of dimensive quantity is quantity having position. Rightly understood, the nature of dimensive quantity includes position, so that whatever has dimensive quantity will also be made of parts having position in relation to each other and will therefore occupy a determinate place. Division and incommunicability result from dimensive quantity, since matter under the accident of dimensive quantity will occupy a determinate location.

One sign that these reflections on individuation follow Aquinas's own thought on the topic comes in the third article of the fourth question of the commentary on Boethius. As I have constructed the argument, quantity of matter involves dimensive quantity, which implies that the matter is made of parts bearing position relative to each other, which puts a given quantity of

[32] Aquinas, *STh* ill, q. 77, a. 2. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Tbeologiae* 3a (London: Blackfriars, 1965), vol. 57, p. 134. Translation by William Barden, O. P. Emphasis in original.

matter in a determinate place. For this result to individuate material substances successfully, it must be the case that no two material substances can occupy the same place at the same time. If two material substances could occupy the same place at the same time, they both could have the same quantity of matter and be assigned to the same determinate place. In that event, quantity of matter would not serve to explain the individuation of the two substances. And in fact, Aquinas devotes the third article of the fourth question to ruling out this possibility. Barring divine intervention, he says, two bodies cannot simultaneously be in the same place and cannot be understood so to be. This is due to the very nature of bodies and not to some superficial characteristic, such as their density or impurity or corruptibility. Rather, we have distinct bodies through division of matter, and this division of matter can occur only when two bodies are distinct according to situation *[situs]:*

> [S}incethe division of matter occurs only through dimensions, from the nature of which there is situation, it is impossible that this matter be distinct from that unless they are distinct according to situation, which is not the case whenever two bodies are put in the same place; from which those two bodies would be one body, which is impossible.[33]

It supports my interpretation of Aquinas's thought that he asks in the same article whether two bodies can be in the same place simultaneously and rules this out by drawing on the ideas of situation and position.

IV. IN DEFENSE OF DIMENSIVE QUANITIY

Having attempted to formulate in more depth the notion of dimensive quantity, we can turn now to reconsider Gracia's objections to taking this property as the principle of individuation

[33]Aquinas, *Super Boet. de Trin.,* q. 4, a. 3: "Oportet enim esse plura corpora, in quibus forma corporeitatis invenitur divisa, quae quidem non dividitur nisi secundum divisionem materiae, cuius divisio cum sit solum per dimensiones, de quarum ratione est situs, impossibile est esse bane materiam distinctam ab ilia, nisi quando distincta secundum situm, quod non est quando duo corpora ponuntur esse in eodem loco. Unde sequitur ilia duo corpora esse unum corpus, quod est impossibile" (Decker, ed., 150-51).

for material substances. *As* we have seen, these objections are two. First, relying on dimensive quantity as a principle of individuation involves using an extrinsic feature of a thing to explain one of its intrinsic features, namely, its individuality. Second, dimensive quantity is itself something instantiable and so cannot explain the individuality or noninstantiability of a thing.

The first objection treats dimensive quantity as on a par with any other accident, as something extrinsic to its subject. This relies on the understanding of dimensive quantity as a measure, that which is indicated by "2 quarts" or "3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet." In reply, I would argue that dimensive quantity rightly understood is different from other accidents like color or shape which are indeed extrinsic to a material substance. Dimensive quantity implies position, which is the configuration of the parts of a material substance in three-dimensional space relative to each other. Because of the particular configuration of these parts a material substance will be measured as 2 quarts or will have the dimensions of 3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet, but the position of these parts is the source of these measurements and should not be identified with them. Rather, the position of a body is an integral part of that material substance's constitution. *As* such, a material substance is extended in the six dimensions and constituted by parts configured in some way relative to each other. A body's position helps constitute it as the body it is, as an extended thing located in some place. The matter of a material substance does not have these features of being extended in dimensions and being made of parts merely from an extrinsic source; rather, its position or the configuration of its parts help make it the body that it is. So for the same reason that matter is an intrinsic principle of a material substance, the position of the parts of a material substance and the resulting dimensive quantity of that material substance are intrinsic features of that substance.

Gracia might argue that in fact position is more like such extrinsic features of a thing as its color than it is like a genuinely intrinsic feature. Socrates might have been paler in color if he had spent less time in the agora *of* Athens under the hot sun of

Greece, but even so he still would have been Socrates, only paler. Similarly, Socrates might have been a bit shorter, leading to a slightly different determinate position of the parts of his body relative to each other, but he still would have been Socrates, only shorter. If this is so, or so goes the possible reply, position is not intrinsic to the individuals it characterizes. But this reply rests on a misconstrual of what sort of intrinsic feature is required in a principle of individuation. To be intrinsic in the way envisioned by this reply, a feature would have to be a necessary property of the individual it modifies, and necessarily present in a determinate way in order to individuate this particular individual. Any change in that individuating feature would lead to a different individual. But this is not Gracia's understanding of how the principle of individuation operates. He thinks of the principle of individuation as ensuring the noninstantiability of the individual, not its uniqueness or its having one determinate set of features. The proposed reply makes the individuality of Socrates consist in his exemplifying whatever features are intrinsic to his being Socrates, his Socrateity, while it leaves obscure exactly how Socrates exemplifies those features and is noninstantiable. As such, this approach to individuation collapses into the bundle theory of individuation, according to which each individual is constituted as an individual by bearing a set of features or some suitably complex feature. Gracia is well aware of the drawbacks of such an approach to the problems of individuation and disavows it.[34]

Gracia's second objection to dimensive quantity comes closer to the heart of the matter. The quantities indicated by terms such as "2 quarts" or "3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet" seem to be instantiable or communicable features capable of being shared by many individuals, and so they do not seem suited to explain the noninstantiability of individuals. Even if we construe dimensive quantity as involving position, the configuration of the parts of a material substance relative to each other, this does not alter the essential fact that position itself is an instantiable and communicable feature. Two material substances with the same

[34] Gracia, *Individuality,* 92-94, 144-50.

external dimensions of 3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet could share the same internal configuration of parts relative to each other, though the two substances would be located in different places. In this imagined example it is the different locations of the two substances that does the individuating, so that in fact we are dealing with the spatio-temporal theory of individuation, the flaws of which Gracia has already detailed. So dimensive quantity understood as involving position does not provide us with an adequate principle of individuation.

In reply, I wish to concede that dimensive quantity is an instantiable or general feature, but to challenge the assumption that no instantiable feature can serve as an adequate principle of individuation. Within Gracia's framework, the principle of individuation, whatever it is, is either itself an individual or it is a universal, an instantiable feature. Gracia claims that it cannot be a universal, because the principle of individuation has the task of explaining how individuals are unlike universals by being noninstantiable. I would argue that this is true of most universals, but that position is a special case. It is an instantiable feature, or a universal, but it is responsible for matter being assigned to determinate places.

To explain how an instantiable feature like position can individuate material substances it is necessary first to enrich the conceptual apparatus used to describe position and place. Gracia approaches the problem of individuation using the distinction between universals and instances: universals are instantiable features, while individuals are noninstantiable instances of universals. But consider also the distinction between a determinable and a determinate thing or quality. Color, for instance, is a determinable feature; to say that a thing is colored leaves open whether the thing is black, white, gray, blue, orange, and so on. Any particular thing will have some particular shade(s) of color, though, and will not be simply colored. Similarly, position and place are determinables. Every material substance has some position, in the sense that it is made up of parts extended dimensionally which bear spatial relations to each other, and every material substance is in place. But every material substance

will not simply have position or simply occupy place in general; every material substance will be made up of parts bearing particular, determinate spatial relations to each other and will be in some determinate place.

I have introduced the contrast between determinables and determinates using the example of color, a universal or instantiable feature. A determinate color is also a universal. There might be thousands of individuals which exemplify a particular, determinate shade of green, and all of these individuals would be exactly alike, considered as colored things. The same goes for such universals as being human, being made of lead, and having dimensions of 3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet, all of which are determinate and instantiable features. However, it is important to notice that not every determinate feature is a universal or instantiable feature. In particular, the determinate feature 'place' is different. A determinate place is not a universal; it is simply where a material substance is or can be. A determinate place is not something that an individual exemplifies or that many individuals exemplify. Of course, many different material substances can occupy one and the same place at different times and so in a sense can share a place. But this does not make that determinate place a universal any more than the fact that two individuals can own a particular automobile, with first one person owning the automobile and then selling it to a second, makes that automobile a universal. When first water and then air fills a jar, the two bodies occupy the same place in turn. But this does.not mean that they exemplify the same place; if they exemplify a universal, it would be something like "being in this particular place at some time." But that place is not identical with the universal mentioned here; the place is what surrounds or limits first the one and then the other body, and what those bodies fill with their parts. So a place is not something exemplified by an individual or by many individuals; it is simply the particular region where a material substance is or can be.

A determinate place, then, is an individual. In addition, whatever occupies a determinate place is itself an individual. A universal is an instantiable feature, while an individual is what is

capable of exemplifying a universal. On this way of conceiving universals and individuals, it is an individual that will exemplify the instantiable feature of occupying this determinate place at some time. We can formulate a universal "occupying this place at some time" and this universal could be exemplified by many individuals at different times, but this fact is based on the prior fact that one and only one material individual occupies a determinate place at a determinate time.

If a determinate place is an individual and is occupied by one or more individuals, we can explain how a universal, instantiable feature can be responsible for individuals being noninstantiable. A determinate position is a universal or instantiable feature, but one that is the source of things having or occupying determinate places. A material substance has a determinate position if it is made up of parts having determinate relations to each other. This configuration of parts within a material substance is an instantiable feature, in the sense that different material substances can be configured internally in exactly the same way; this would be the case in the example of the two wooden cubes with equal dimensions. But one such cube, in having its parts configured in this particular way, will be extended in the six dimensions and will occupy a determinate place. Although the two wooden cubes may have the same internal configuration of parts, they cannot occupy the same place simultaneously, thanks to the fact that two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time. So by having a determinate place, each material substance will be incommunicable and noninstantiable; whatever has determinate position will have a determinate place, and only one individual can occupy that determinate place at a given time. This ensures that dimensive quantity or quantity having position will meet the first condition for a satisfactory principle of individuation, namely that it must explain the incommunicability of individuals.

From the previous paragraph it might seem that it is the difference in place that secures the individuation of our two cubes of equal size. This is part of Gracia's second objection as elaborated above; it might seem that position as the principle of individuation is indistinguishable from the spatio-temporal theory

of individuation. But this is not so, since position is distinct from and the source of a thing being such as to occupy place and have spatio-temporal location. The position of a material substance, in the sense of its parts being in spatial relations to each other, is intrinsic to that substance. It is this configuration of parts in space that is responsible for the material substance taking up or occupying a place, something extrinsic to that substance. For a material substance to be individuated involves, among other things, being in a determinate place. But this is compatible with holding that what individuates that substance, that which explains its being an individual, is that material substance having quantity and position, or dimensive quantity. So it is the dimensive quantity of a body that is responsible for the place of that body. We typically discern the individuality of material substances by their distinct places, and in holding to dimensive quantity as the principle of individuation we can happily affirm this. Yet still it is the position of a body that is responsible for its place. *As* a result, relying on dimensive quantity as the principle of individuation does not reduce to the spatio-temporal theory of individuation.

By investigating the Aristotelian background of several of the key terms in Aquinas's discussion of individuation in the *Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate,* I hope that I have provided further support for the claim that dimensive quantity, although it is an accident, carries with it "a certain individuation." Gracia bases his position on what seems to be unassailable logic: if to be an individual is to be noninstantiable, and if dimensive quantity is an instantiable feature by virtue of being an accident, then it cannot explain the individuality of anything. Yet things are not so simple; the special nature of dimensive quantity, that which is composed of parts having position relative to each other, is such that it is responsible for material objects having determinate places. In doing so, dimensive quantity individuates material objects.[35]

[35] I wish to thank Daniel Novotny and Jorge Gracia for their helpful comments on this piece and for their insightful criticism of my approach to issues of individuation.

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GUITMUND OF AVERSA AND THE EUCHARISTIC THEOLOGY OF ST. THOMAS

MARK G. VAILLANCOURT

Staten Island, New York

ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL treatises written to defend the doctrine of the real presence in the Eucharistic crisis of the eleventh century, *De corporis et sanguinis Christi veritate in eucharistia libri tres*,[1] by Guitmund of Aversa, contains a fascinating vision of the Eucharist as a *species domini*, or another postresurrection apparition of Christ, that calls for further examination by theologians of our own day. Guitmund's doctrine of the real presence, characterized by some authors as "ultra-realist,"[2] is actually far more faithful to the received tradition and indeed anticipatory of the Eucharistic theology of St. Thomas than was once thought. In fact, when compared to that of Thomas, Guitmund's teaching on the real presence furnishes much insight into just what the Angelic Doctor actually taught about the Eucharist.

In order for the reader to appreciate this portrait of the Eucharistic Christ, and to understand not only how it anticipates the Thomistic synthesis, but indeed even lays the theological foundations for it, I shall rehearse briefly the historical background of Guitmund's *De corporis et sanguinis Christi* and its immediate context, the Berengarian crisis of the eleventh century.

[1] See Mark G. Vaillancourt, "The Role of Guitmund of Aversa in the Developing Theology of the Eucharist" (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 2004).

[2] See J. Montclos, *1. Anfranc et Berenger: LA controverse Eucharistique du Xie siecle* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1971), 462; F. Vernet, "Eucharistic du IX a la fin du XI siecle," *Dictionnaire de thiologie catholique* 5 (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1913), 1228; J. Geiselmann, *Die Eucharistielehre der Vorscholastik* (Paderborn: F. Schonigh, 1926), 375.

I will then discuss Guitmund's Eucharistic doctrine as it can be found in *De corporis et sanguinis Christi*, and compare his theology with that of St. Thomas Aquinas. Such an exposition should illustrate not only the importance of Guitmund's insights into the doctrine of the real presence, but also the extent to which Thomas's Eucharistic doctrine was predicated upon them.

I. GUITMUND OF AVERSA AND THE BERENGARIAN CRISIS OF THE ELEVENTH CENTURY

Guitmund of Aversa was born sometime during the first quarter of the eleventh century in Normandy, and joined the Order of St. Benedict at the Abbey of the Cross in St. Leufroy.[3] Around the year 1060, he began his theological studies at the monastery of Bec, where he fell under the influence, and became the faithful disciple, of Lanfranc, Berengarius's principal antagonist and chief proponent of Eucharistic realism. We know from his own correspondence that around 1070 William the Conqueror ordered him to leave France and travel to England. As an enticement to remain in England, William offered him a diocese, but Guitmund rejected the offer because of William's brutality and the Norman hegemony over the British people.[4] He then left England and returned to France. After his return to Normandy, there was a movement to have Guitmund fill the see of Rouen, but the attempt was blocked by his enemies.[5] Subsequent to his episcopal rejection, Guitmund sought permission from his abbot to leave Normandy, and reside at a monastery in Rome, where he assumed the name of "Christian."[6] Upon his arrival, one chronicler of the period wrote that "Pope Gregory VII received

[3] See *Notitia historica et litteraria* (PL 149:1425A-1426B).

[4] See Guitmund. *Oratio ad Guillelmum I Anglorum regem cum recusaret episcopatum* (PL 149:1509A-1512A).

[5] According to Oderic Vitalis, Guitmund's enemies used the fact that he was the son of a priest to block his election (see excerpt from *Historia ecclesiastica* 5.17, appended to the end of Guitmund's *Oratio* [PL 149:1512C]).

[6] See the anonymous *De Berengarii haeresiarchae damnatione multiplici* (PL 145:8B). See also Theodoric Ruinart, *Vita beati Urbani II papae* (PL 151:78A).

him with joy and made him a cardinal."[7] We know also that in February 1077, Gregory appointed him to a papal legation north of the Alps.[8] It appears that Guitmund continued to reside in Rome after the death of Gregory VII, and was elevated to the see of Aversa in southern Italy by Pope Urban II at the council of Melfi in 1089,[9] where he remained until his death around 1095.

Guitmund is known to have authored four works: (1) *Confessio de sancta trinitate, Christi humanitate, corporisque et sanguinis Domini nostri veritate;* (2) *Oratio ad Guile/mum I;* (3) *Epistola ad Erfastum;* and (4) *De corporis et sanguinis veritate Christi in eucharistia libri tres.*[10] It is the last work that constitutes the main focus of this article. It is apparent from internal evidence that it could not have been written before Hildebrand became pope,[11] or after the Roman council of 1079. It was probably written, therefore, while Guitmund was still in Normandy, before he left for Rome, and very possibly before the council of Poitiers in 1075. Consequently, the publication of *De corporis et sanguinis Christi* should be dated around the end of the Berengarian controversy, that is, between 1073 and 1075.

Berengarius was born in Tours sometime between 999 and 1005. As a young Scholastic, he studied liberal arts and theology in the cathedral school of Chartres under the bishop, Fulbert (952-1028). In 1039 he was elected archdeacon of Angers, and took up a teaching post at the cathedral school of St. Maurice, but continued to reside in Tours. Sometime around 1048 his interest in sacred Scripture[12] led him to study the biblical commentaries of Ratramnus of Corbie, wrongly attributed to the ninth-century

[7] *Historia ecclesiastica* 5.17 (PL 149:15120).

[8] See Paul Bernrieden, *Vita S. Gregorii VII* (PL 148:810).

[9] Robert Somerville, *Pope Urban II: The "Collectio Britannica" and the Council of Melfi (1089)* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 53-57.

[10] See also Jean Leclerq's "Passage authentique inedit de Guitmund D'Aversa," *Revue Benedictine 57* (1947): 213-14.

[11] See Guitmund, *De corporis et sanguinis Christi* 3.42. The latest known edition of the work was published by H. Hurter, in the collection *Sanctorum patrum opuscula selecta* 38 (Innsbruck: Libreria Academica Wagneriana, 1879). In my translation, I have used Hurter's text and paragraph notation.

[12] See Montdos, *Lanfranc et Berenger*, 48.

theologian John Scotus Eriugena. Berengarius also read *De corpore et sanguine domini* by Paschasius Radbertus, the Carolingian author of the first monograph ever written on the Eucharist.[13] Berengarius embraced the Ratramnian view of Eucharistic symbolism, and rejected Radbertus's earlier treatise, which he regarded as the Eucharistic realism adopted by the "common crowd." Berengarius considered Eriugena's doctrine, or rather that of Ratramnus, as the faithful exposition of the authentic tradition, expressed most notably by Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine.[14] His ideas, however, soon provoked a public scandal, and through the agency of Guitmund's mentor, Lanfranc, then prior of the abbey of Bee, they found their way to Rome and the council over which Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida presided in 1050. Both at Rome and later that year in Vercelli Berengarius was condemned *in absentia;* Lanfranc was present at both sessions. At the Easter Council of 1059, Pope Nicholas II presided over 113 bishops assembled for the general business of the Church. Cardinal Humbert drafted the profession of faith that Berengarius, this time in attendance, was forced to sign:

I, Berengarius, unworthy deacon of the Church of St. Maurice at Angers, knowing the true, Catholic, and apostolic Faith, condemn all heresy, especially that of which I have hitherto been guilty, and attempts to assert that the bread and wine that are placed on the altar are, after the Consecration, only a sacrament *[solomodo sacramentum]* and not the true Body and Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and that they are not able to be touched or broken by the hands of the priests or chewed by the teeth of the faithful *[dentibus atten]* sensibly, but rather only sacramentally *[sensualiter nisi solo in sacramento]*. Moreover, I assent to the holy Roman and apostolic See and, concerning the sacraments of the Lord's table, I profess with mouth and heart that I hold that Faith that the lord and venerable Pope Nicholas and this holy Synod, resting on the authority of the Gospels and the Apostles, have handed on to be held and have confirmed for me: namely, that the bread and wine that are placed on the

[13] Paschasius Radbertus was a monk of the Abby of Corbie; he was elected abbot in 844, resigned his office in 851 and died in 865. His tteatise *De corporeet sanguinedomini* was written sometime between the years 831 and 833, and the first edition was produced exclusively for the insttucrion of his fellow monks. The second edition, which would receive a far wider circulation, appeared over a decade later in response to a request by the Emperor Charles the Bald, between the years 843 and 844.

[14] Montclos, *Lanfrancet Berenger*,48-49.

altar are, after the Consecration, not only the Sacrament but the true Body and Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and that they are in truth *[in veritate]* sensibly and not only sacramentally touched by the hands of the priests and are broken and chewed by the teeth of the faithful. I swear this by the holy and consubstantial Trinity and by these holy Gospels. I pronounce that those who will come forward against this Faith with their own doctrines and followers are worthy of eternal damnation. But if I myself should at some point presume to think, or preach, anything against these things, I submit myself to the severity of canon law. I have read, and reread this, and sign it willingly.[15]

This statement on the real presence was ratified by the pope with the unanimous assent of the bishops in attendance. It was, as we shall see, the starting point for Guitmund's understanding of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

II. THE EUCHARISTIC DOCTRINE OF GUITMUND OF AVERSA

A) Guitmund and the Real Presence

De corporis et sangu.inis vertitate Christi in eucharistia is first and foremost a defense of the 1059 definition, and its author was undoubtedly justifying the Eucharistic doctrine of his teacher and mentor, Lanfranc, whom he mentions often in the text with great admiration. Guitmund's own Eucharistic theology, as it can be found in *De corporis et sangu.inis Christi,* appears primitive in its graphic portrayal of Christ's physical presence in the Eucharist. This undoubtedly arises from the "shock value" already contained in the language of the 1059 oath, for which his work is an apology. A close study of the work, however, reveals profound subtleties of thought that reflect sound theological principles. These subtleties are at times truly innovative, and argue for a Eucharistic realism that cannot easily be dismissed. They are most notable in the distinctions that Guitmund makes, which in themselves are important to his understanding of the substantial change and sacramental character of the Eucharist, but are most crucial in his explanation of the nature of the real presence.

[15] Translation in J. T. O'Connor, *The Hidden Manna: A Theology of the Eucharist* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 177. See also Denziger-Schonmetzer (DS) 690.

Upon careful examination of the text, one finds that Guitmund uses two words to express the vision of the real presence of Christ on the altar as the same body born of the Virgin. They are both verbs that appear as passive infinitives in the Latin text, one taken from the Berengarian oath, the other from the lexicon of post-1059 Berengarian objections to the oath, and both are terms that serve as points of departure for Guitmund's doctrinal exposition: *atteri* and *dissipari*.[16] An analysis of both will effectively unearth those theological principles, and make clear his profound vision of the real presence of Jesus in the Eucharist as none other than the true presence of the risen Christ himself.

1. The Body of Christ Is Chewed by the Teeth: *Atteri*

One of the first objections raised against the oath of 1059 is that it contained language "grossly material"[17] or "carnalist,"[18] that is, that the body of Christ is chewed by the teeth in holy communion, not just sacramentally *(sacramentaliter)* but sensibly *(sensualiter)*.[19] Most theologians choose to shy away from the language, or excuse it as an overreaction to Berengarius's Eucharistic symbolism. Guitmund, however, embraces this term with a certain sense of "Augustinian boldness," for he asks: "Why is it not right for Christ to be chewed by the teeth?"[20] The objection itself can be understood in only two ways: either it is

[16] Thomas in his commentary on the 1059 oath *(STh* III, q. 77, a. 7, ad 3) , uses the word *masticari* instead of *atteri* and *dissipari,* but the sense is the same, that is, these two words taken together mean the one process of mastication during holy communion.

[17] A. J. Macdonald, *Berengar and the Reform of Sacramental Doctrine* (Merrick, N.Y.: Richwood Publishing Company, 1977), 131.

[18] Montclos, *Lanfranc et Berenger,* 25.

[19] In explaining the phrase *non solummodo sacramentaliter,* Lanfranc makes it clear that: "the Church of Christ believes thus, that the bread is changed into flesh and the wine into blood, and also believes unto salvation and rightly acknowledges it to be a sacrament of the passion of the Lord, of divine propitiation, concordance and unity; the flesh and blood once assumed from the Vtrgin, [is a sacrament] of each one of these things, each in its own way" (Lanfranc, *De corpore et sanguine domini adversus Berengarium Turonensem* [PL 150:415A]). Thus Lanfranc recognized that the 1059 assertion of the real presence did not vacate the sacramental character of the Eucharist.

[20] Guitmund, *De corporis et sanguinis Christi* 1.10.

not possible for God to will such a thing, or, even if he could, it would be beneath his dignity to do so.

To address the first objection, namely, that it is not possible for Christ to be chewed by the teeth, Guitmund adduces the all-powerful will of God. This was Paschasius's first principle in the *De corpore,* and, true to that tradition, Guitmund makes it his own. If God has willed it, there is nothing on the part of created reality that can resist it,[21] for, to quote the Psalmist, "whatever God wills to do, he does, both in heaven and on earth" (Ps 134:6). As one reviews the literature of the period, it becomes clear that, for the defenders of orthodoxy, this principle trumps all arguments. As author of creation, God can will a relationship between Christ's body in heaven and the faithful on earth that allows it to be touched by them in a physical way today, just as it was when Jesus was still in this world.

Guitrnund's first subtle distinction then follows upon the response to the first objection when he asks: "Just what do they mean by *atteri?*"[22] If by *atteri,* he says, they mean "to touch more forcefully," then why cannot Christ be touched? Was not Christ touched by Thomas and the holy women after his resurrection?

> For if the body of the Lord could be touched by the hands of Thomas the Apostle and the holy women after the resurrection, why can it not be touched by the teeth of the faithful today, either lightly or more forcefully (that is atten)-there seems to be no reason to prevent it.[23]

Once this distinction is made, namely, that *atteri* is no more than an extension of the sense of touch, which is proper to physical bodies, then it must be possible to touch Christ in the Eucharist, with the teeth or the hand, or with any other part of the body. For Guitrnund, the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is really and physically the presence of the same body that was encountered by the disciples in the postresurrection experiences. There is no difference-in fact there is an identity between the

[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.

two. In Guitmund's view, the body of Christ seen on the altar is the same body that has risen and ascended into glory, hence to encounter one is to experience the other.

If, however, there is no question of impossibility, then what of unsuitability? If this real presence were possible, since for God all things are possible, would it not be unseemly for Christ to be chewed by teeth? Guitmund responds to this objection with another doctrinal principle, reminiscent of Philippians 2:6-11: the humility of Christ. For would he who "was crushed *[atten]* by the rods of the infidel, the crown of thorns, the cross, the nails, the lance, by all the extreme irreligiosity that was within them"[24] refuse, for the sake of the same faithful, to endure that which was less worthy, namely, to be crushed by their teeth? Guitmund replies in the negative, for if Christ subjected himself to the extreme humiliation of the passion, which meant that he permitted his body to be crushed by sinful men, then it stands to reason that he would also allow it to be touched by his faithful for their salvation.

The next important, yet subtle, distinction on the *atteri* discourse arises from the question as to whether or not "to press more forcefully" means the same thing as "to wound." The former pertains to the sense of touch which is natural to human flesh, but the latter, Guitmund claims, belongs to the infirm character of our mortal human nature, and since "the flesh of the resurrected Lord retained what was of its nature, and lost what belonged to that flesh in its infirmity," Christ can be pressed by the teeth of the faithful with all the strength that is in them, and they can never harm or wound him, for the flesh of the glorified Christ, characterized by impassibility, is now impervious to any form of injury or suffering.[25]

Guitmund's conclusion, which expresses his final word on the defense of the language of 1059, is a typical refrain found throughout the work:

[24] Ibid. 1.11.
[25] Ibid. 1.13.

Consequently, since no impossibility prevents it, nor does the humility of Christ abhor it {if in fact it is necessary for our salvation), and since there is no possibility of defiling the Savior, or of wounding him bodily, and no other reason why it would be unlawful to chew *[atten]* Christ with teeth-if in fact *atteri* is understood as equivalent to "touch more forcefully"-then the argument they advance against us is false and lacking force, saying as they do that: "It is not right for Christ to be chewed *[attert]* by teeth."[26]

But if the body of Christ can be chewed by teeth in a way that is both doctrinally defensible and reasonably understandable, one could also ask about the logical consequence, specifically, is that same body also "broken into pieces *[dissipan],* just like those things that teeth chew and break into pieces?"[27] As in the case with *atteri,* so it is with *dissipari:* a close examination soon reveals a great deal about Guitmund's understanding of the real presence.

2. The Body of Christ is Undivided: *Dissipari*

Guitmund emphaticly denies that a physical encounter with the glorified body of Christ in holy communion implies in any sense carnalism, or worse, cannibalism. No sooner does he affirm the appropriateness of *atteri* than he qualifies its logical consequence, *dissipari:* "Indeed, this too we also confess, that it is certainly not right that by any form of violence-either by teeth or any other means-for Christ to be broken up into pieces *[dissipan].*"[28] It is this notion of *dissipari,* construed in the context of "bodily division" and applied to the Eucharist, that at first glance seems to be a wild contradiction with the experience of the senses. Nevertheless, when the subtle distinctions are again made known, they bring to light Guitmund's most salient theological principles.

First, one must always remember that the principal object under Guitmund's consideration is the Eucharist, which for him *is* the body of Christ. On the level of *presence,* therefore, there is no distinction between the body of Christ in heaven and the body of Christ on the altar; the only difference is the manner of

[26] Ibid. 1.14.
[27] Ibid. 1.7.
[28] Ibid. 1.15.

appearance. There is, nonetheless, a paradox presented to the understanding, for the Eucharistic body of Christ on the altar is seen to be broken in the *fractio* at Mass, but it must in fact be unbroken, as the celestial and glorified body is unbroken in heaven. The question, then, is "how can this be?" For Guitmund, the answer to this mystery lies in the divine motive that makes such a thing possible, for bodily division should not be regarded as dividing up the whole, but rather, the feeding of the many by the one:

> For although the reason for the apparent division by the priest seems to be a great mystery, nevertheless we should believe that when the venerable body of Our Lord and Savior is distributed to the faithful, he has not divided himself among the individual recipients, but rather we believe that he comes into different members of the faithful by way of a participation in himself.[29]

Here one encounters another one of Guitmund's important theological principles, which, although drawn from the tradition, has been articulated by him in a way that has become standard in Eucharistic theology ever since:

> We can also say that there is as much of him in a little portion of the host as in the whole host. Just as one reads about the manna, that neither those who gathered more had more, nor those who gathered less had less. The whole host is the body of Christ, therefore, each and every separate particle is the whole body of Christ. Furthermore, three separate particles are not three bodies, but only the one body. Nor do the particles even differ among themselves as if they were a plurality, since one particle contains the entire body, just as the other particles do. And so they should not now be called many particles, but rather, one integral and undivided host, even though it seems to be divided because of the priestly office.[30]

For Guitmund, then, the whole Christ is present entirely in each part of the host, whether the host remains whole or is broken during Mass, and the whole Christ is entirely present in the whole host as he is in each portion of it. None of the different portions of the fractured host in fact differ among themselves, for they are

[29] Ibid. 1.16.
[30] Ibid.

the one and the same Christ. The same would be true of a thousand Masses offered at the same time, for in each Mass the whole Christ would be present. Christ himself would not be divided by either the different places or the individual priests, for "at one and the same time in a thousand places the one and the same body of Christ can be whole and undivided."[31]

In order to illustrate the reasonable possibility of this doctrine, Guitmund points to an analogy with the voice and the soul. Just as the human voice can make known the thoughts of the human heart to many ears at once without being divided in any way, thereby allowing many ears that are touched by its sound to receive the one and the same message, so in the same way the body of Christ, which is one in heaven, can come to the many by way of the sacrament without suffering any division in himself.[32] In a similar way, just as the soul is not divided among the many members of the body, but is wholly present entirely to each, so the flesh of Christ is present to his body, which is the Church, without being divided up in any way:

> He then who has bestowed such power upon our soul, so that at the same time it exists as one and the same and indivisible in each and every portion of its body, why would he not give that dignity to his own flesh if he wished to? Is his flesh not powerful enough to be whole and entire in the diverse portions of his body the Church? And just as the soul would be the life of our body, would not in a similar way the flesh of the Savior (by all means many times better than our soul because of the grace of God) be the life of the Church?[33]

In *dissipari*, then, just as in *atteri*, one finds another of Guitmund's important theological principles, namely, the ability of Christ to be whole and entire in every portion of the host as well as to each of the faithful at one and the same time. Because that body cannot be divided, it cannot be harmed. Nor is a breaking of the host a cause of division in Christ's body. However many times it undergoes division, it is not diminished, but instead remains a means of multiplying the one for the sake of the many,

[31] Ibid. 1.18.
[32] Ibid. 1.19.
[33] Ibid.

and at the same time renders a richly symbolic commemoration of the Lord's passion.

To the objection that the testimony of the eyes is contrary to all that he has asserted, Guitmund replies that the senses can be deceived, often in little things, and always in this one.[34] For Guitmund, what is absolutely essential on the part of the believer, so as to pierce this great mystery, is faith, for the testimony of the inner eye of the soul is to be believed over that of the carnal and deceived eye.[35] On this point, Guitmund offers a most interesting query: "Is there any difference in the way that the eyes of the faithful are deceived today, from the way that the disciples were betrayed by their eyes with the different appearances of Our Lord while he was still upon this earth?" And it is just this consideration that leads us to perceive the bread and wine of the Eucharist as just another appearance of the Lord, or a *species domini.*

B) Guitmund's "Species Domini"

One of the most fascinating aspects of Guitmund's Eucharistic theology is his understanding of the sacraments of the altar as another postresurrection appearance of the Lord, that is, of the same type as those various appearances of Christ recorded in Scripture where he went unrecognized by his disciples. The notion of the *species domini* has as its origin the theology of Paschasius, but it has been expanded in its scope by Guitmund. In Guitmund's theology, the real presence is simply a sacramental continuation of Christ's earthly presence. According to Guitmund, Christ "is wholly in heaven while his whole body is truly eaten upon earth."[36] What one sees on the altar, therefore, is merely another of the many appearances that Christ assumed while he was upon the earth, when the disciples, although looking at him, did not recognize him:

[34] Ibid. 1.22.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid. 2.51.

For when Mary Magdalene, weeping at the tomb of the Lord, saw the Lord himself-was it not Jesus? But because she was deceived by the eyes, instead [of seeing him] did she not think instead that she was seeing the gardener? Or, when on the day of his own resurrection, he explained the Scriptures to two of his disciples while they were walking along the way-was it anything other than Jesus himself, acting as if he were a pilgrim? For it is written: "Their eyes were held that they might not recognize him." Or, while the disciples were laboring upon the sea, and they saw him walking upon the waters-who would dare to say that it was not he, even though, because they had been deceived by the eyes, they thought that he was a ghost?[37]

Consequently, if the eyes could view the true reality of the sacrament, one would see the Lord Jesus in his own proper form in the glory of heaven. Since, however, our fleshly senses fail us in this matter, faith must substitute for vision.

In the tradition articulated by Paschasius, then, after the consecration, the appearances of bread and wine cease to have their own proper reality, but instead, owing to the miracle of transubstantiation, they derive their new reality directly from Christ himself. Viewed in this way, the "sacraments of the Lord's Body and Blood" have lost all of their natural nutritive capacity.

in addressing the issue of stercorianism,[38] Guitmund emphatically denies that "these sacraments" are subject to the same laws of bodily digestion as normal bread and wine.[39] In fact, so direct is the relationship between Christ and the "sacraments of the altar" that Guitmund absolutely rejects any notion that they can corrupt or decay. Christ can never know corruption, and the Eucharist is Christ, the food of eternal life:

For to us, that Eucharist, that divine manna, is the heavenly bread from God. For truly we receive from the sacred altars the flesh of the immaculate Lamb rendered incapable of suffering, through which we both live and are healed from corruption. This flesh can never be corrupted, nor perish, because although from day to day it renews us, it never grows old.[40]

[37] Ibid. 1.23.

[31] The tenn, that derives its name from the Latin tenn *stercus,* or "dung," denotes a doctrine that applies to the objective nature of the Eucharistic species themselves, and their subjection to the usual laws of bodily digestion.

[39] Guitmund, *De corporis et sanguinis Christi* 2.13.

[40] Ibid. 2.2.

This notion of the absolute impossibility of these "divine sacraments" undergoing any form of corruption, either from being reserved too long or from any other natural process, is a decidedly Ambrosian thought, and one that will eventually draw criticism upon Guitmund, but it is something that he emphatically defends nonetheless. In Guitmund's theology, the species of the sacrament derive their existence directly from Christ, and hence are completely subject to his will, just as he manifested his glory in the Transfiguration, or disguised his identity in the postresurrection appearances:

> [For] the Lord himself is reported to have shown himself to his disciples in different manifestations *[species].* At one time he showed himself to them in the customary appearance, at another in the transfigured splendor of the sun and snow; at one time he showed himself as a pilgrim, another time he looked like a gardener.[41]

The sacraments of the altar, therefore, are a species, or appearance, of Christ (although not his proper, or natural appearance), and as such are a manifestation of Christ's presence-a presence that is brought about by transubstantiation.

C) Guitmund and Transubstantiation

It is admittedly anachronistic to use a thirteenth-century word to describe Guitmund's eleventh-century theology, but, as we shall see, the manner in which this tradition of the Eucharistic change was received and understood in the Fourth Lateran Council was precisely how Guitmund described it in *De corporis et sanguinis Christi.* I contend, in fact, that Guitmund's overall contribution to the elucidation of this doctrine was his theological lexicon on the subject, which stood as a verbal backdrop to the doctrine's final formulation. This fact can be readily shown by a discussion of the substance-accident distinction in the sacrament. First employed by Guitrnund, and then taken up by thirteenth-century Scholastics, it became the centerpiece of their substantial change theory.

[41] Ibid. 3.29.

Towards the end of the first book of *De corporis et sanguinis Christi,* Guitmund admits that the notion of this type of substantial change poses a certain difficulty for some. In the normal course of events, "when something is substantially changed into something else *[substantialiter transmutatur],* it is usually changed into that which did not exist before."[42] Nevertheless, in the Eucharist the change involves one reality being transferred into another *(in unum aliud transferatur),*[43] or, to be more specific, "bread and wine change into *[transire]* the flesh and blood of the Lord."[44] And since such a change is beyond our daily experience, Guitmund is tasked with explaining just how such a thing is possible. According to him, there are four types of change in nature that can be found in sacred Scripture.[45] The first is creation from nothing; the second is its reasoned opposite, annihilation. The third is the change of one substance into something other than what it was beforehand, and the fourth is a substantial change of one previously existing thing into something that already exists. And this last type, "where that which exists passes *[transit]* into that which already exists," is the one whereby "bread and wine by a unique divine power are changed *[commutan]* into Christ's own body."[46] Guitmund makes it clear that "when we say the bread is changed, it is not changed into flesh that was not yet flesh, but rather, into that flesh which was already the flesh of Christ, a change which we confess occurs without any increase in the flesh of the Lord himself."[47] Such a change can be known only by faith;[48] it is reserved by God himself for his own body,[49] and has no equal in the created order.[50] It is singular and unique, open only to the eyes of faith, yet it can be understood from other types of change experienced in nature, and

[42] Ibid. 1.31.
[43] Ibid. 1.9•
.. Ibid. 2.18.
[45] Ibid. 1.38.
[46] Ibid. 1.39.
[47] Ibid. 1.31.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid. 1.37•
.so Ibid. 1.34.

is very similar to that which occurs in accidents inhering in a substance.

Guitmund's understanding of the nature of the substantial change in the Eucharist, as "one thing coming to be in another," is made clearest if one looks at his study of the relationship of accidents to a substance. After treating creation, and its opposite, annihilation, Guitmund points out what accidents themselves seem to experience during an accidental change:

> Concerning singular accidents which depart when others supervene, it would appear that one cannot simply say that they become absolutely nothing. Certainly, if they were something, they would be in a subject. But with contrary ones supervening, they cannot remain in their subject, nor pass over *[transmeare]* into another one. Therefore they become completely nothing, unless perchance someone could say that they are changed *[transmutan]* into that which supervenes. *H* this is so, then innumerable examples occur to us of those things which are essentially changed *[essentialiter transmutantur]* into those things which simultaneously exist. [51]

In Guitmund's mind, this understanding of accidental change offers an insight into the change that the substances of bread and wine undergo at the consecration,

> for as the accidents recede, just as we have said, either they are annihilated, or, if they are changed *fpermutantur],* then they are changed into the arriving ones, which in no small way would approach the matter we are investigating. [52]

Based on this analogy, the Eucharistic change is one wherein the substance of the bread, by means of a change in the order of substance, becomes the preexisting reality of the body of Christ.

Articulated in this way, the substantial change in the Eucharist parallels that of an accidental change observed in nature, that is, the change whereby accidents that inhere in a substance are changed into those supervening accidents that "arrive" in the subject, the substance itself remaining the same. So for Guitmund, as for Thomas, transubstantiation involves accidental change in reverse; in other words, substances change while the accidents

[51] Ibid. 1.38.

[52] Ibid.

remain. Thus in Guitmund's doctrine, as in later Scholastic theology, the substantial change in the Eucharist is a change that takes place in the order of reality. In this case, the reality of the bread gives way to the higher reality of Christ's body, and the reality of the wine gives way to the higher reality of Christ's blood. What remains are only the "appearances" of bread and wine, which have retained their "likeness" to the former reality that they once were, for "the substances *[substantiae]* of things are changed, but, on account of horror, the prior taste, color and the rest of certain accidents *[accidentia],* in so far as they pertain to the senses, are retained."[53]

III. GUITMUND AND THOMAS

A) Comparison

Two later developments in Eucharistic theology, namely, the notion that the Eucharistic accidents exist without a subject[54] and the use of the word "transubstantiation" to describe the substantial change that occurs at the consecration,[55] coupled with the Aristotelian revival of the twelfth century, set the stage for the comprehensive and systematic approach to Eucharistic theology taken by St. Thomas, most notably his *Summa theologiae.* Written towards the end of his life while residing in Naples, just a short distance from Aversa, Thomas's theological exposition of the Eucharist in the third part of the *Summa* embraces many of the key elements already expressed in Guitmund's *De corporis et sanguinis Christi.*[56] This suggests that Thomas may well have been acquainted with Guitmund's text. Although Thomas never mentions Guitmund by name, the Thomistic synthesis itself, as we

[53] Ibid. 3.28.

[54] First taught by Algier of Liege (ct 1132) in *De sacramentis corporis et sanguinis dominici,* and later defined at Constance in 1415 (DS 1152).

[55] Found in the creed of Lateran Council IV in 1215 (DS 802).

[56] A fact that lends some credence to O'Connor's insight that Guitmund's contribution to the development of Eucharistic theology "anticipated some of the great synthesis of St. Thomas" (O'Connor, *Manna,* 106.)

shall see, exhibits many points of convergence between the two. This, I contend, makes the case for Thomas's use of *De corporis et sanguinis Christi* in the development of his own Eucharistic theology.

One obvious point of agreement between the two is the acceptance of transubstantiation as a substantial conversion of the elements of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ,[57] while the "accidents" of bread and wine remain after the consecration. These appearances persist, according to Thomas, in agreement with Guitmund, so as to "avoid the horror" of eating human flesh and drinking blood.[58] For Thomas, as for Guitmund, this change arises out of the substance of the bread, such that the substance of the bread itself is converted into the substance of the body of Christ, and in a way that the former becomes the latter through a complete and total substantial conversion that excludes any possibility of annihilation.[59] In agreement with Guitmund, Thomas teaches that the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist is also a physical one.[60] With Guitmund, Thomas likewise explains that the "whole Christ is under every part of the species of the bread."[61] Finally, in a way strikingly similar to Guitmund, Thomas asserts that when the "sacramental species" are broken or divided, Christ's "true body" is not so divided because, first, that glorified body is incapable of harm, and second, it is whole and entire under each and every part, and this is "contrary to a thing broken."[62]

There are, it must be admitted, a number of radical differences between Guitmund and Thomas. In a marked difference from Guitmund, who seems to hold that the subject of the Eucharistic species is the actual body of Christ itself, Thomas himself adopts a later theological development that the accidents exist without a

[57] *SI'h* m, q. 75, a. 4.

[58] *SI'h* III, q. 75, a. 5. Cf. Guitmund, *De corporiset sanguinis Christi* B.29.

[59] *SI'h* m, q. 75, aa. 3 and 8. Cf. Guitimond, *De corporiset sanguinisChristi* 1.38.

[60] *SI'h* m, q. 76, a. 1, ad 2. Thomas says "By the power of the sacrament there is contained under it, as to the species of the bread, not only the flesh, but the entire body of Christ, that is the bones, the nerves, and the like."

[61] *SI'h* m, q. 76, a. 3.

[62] *SI'h* m, q. 77, a. 7. Cf. Guitmund, *De corporiset sanguinisChristi* 1.13 and 16.

subject.[63] Thomas further states not only that these accidents exist without a subject, but that neither can the body of Christ be affected by such accidents, nor even altered in any way so as to receive them.[64] Moreover, Thomas holds that all the other accidents inhere in the one primordial accident of "dimensive quantity," such that it is the medium whereby all the other accidents are related to it, as though it were their subject.[65] In the Eucharist, according toThomas, God makes this accident exist in itself, so that it can in turn be the subject of the others.[66] The "accidental complex" that makes up the Eucharistic species in the Thomistic schema retains its natural properties because of this metaphysical structure, such that these elements can corrupt,[67] be burned,[68] and even nourish.[69]

It is precisely on this very issue of the species and the physical presence of Christ in the Eucharist that the critical difference between the Eucharistic systems of Thomas and Guitmund become clear. According to Thomas, in consonance with Guitmund, it requires faith to discern the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, both for the merit of the faithful, and in order to protect the mystery from the derision of the unfaithful.[70] Likewise, Thomas asserts that there is no deception in the sacrament, since the accidents that are discerned by the senses are truly present.[71] Guitmund, however, finds a certain level of deception, which, although not in the sacrament, remains nonetheless in the bodily eye. According to Guitmund's theology, then, one can perceive Christ's presence only by faith: the species are real, for there is a change in the substance, such that what was once bread

[63] *SI'h* m, q. 77, a. 1. Cf. Guitmund, *De corporis et sanguinis Christi* 3.28.

[64] *srh* m, q. 77, a. t.

[65] *SI'h* m, q. 77, a. 2.

[66] *SI'h* m, q. 77, a. 1, ad 1. It would appear from this that, in the theology of St. Thomas, the tactile experience of the communicant (i.e., that which is felt when the Eucharist is chewed by the teeth) is the physical encounter with this accident.

[67] *SI'h* m, q. 77, a. 4.

[68] *SI'h* III, q. 77, a. 5.

[69] *SI'h* m, q. 77, a. 6.

[70] *SI'h* III, q. 75, a. 5.

[71] Ibid., ad. 2.

still retains the likeness to bread, but is bread only in "appearance." The "accidents" themselves, however, are always the "prior accidents" of the bread, which God wills that they should "manifest their own qualities." The reality for Guitmund, then, is not bread, but the body of Christ. Thomas, on the other hand, makes an all-important distinction, namely, that the proper object of the bodily eyes are the external species, whereas the proper object of the intellect, or the eye of the mind, is the substance. Therefore, although what the mind intuits by faith is really present, what the eye sees is likewise really there.[72]

The above comparison reveals the following: for Guitmund, the species are real, but they belong to the glorified body of Christ and have been evacuated by the change in substance of their natural properties, so that they can neither corrode nor give nutrition. This fact comes from the very action of the substantial change at the consecration itself, wherein Christ changes the bread and wine into his own body and blood in a way that he completely takes over their former reality and makes it his own. Bread is no longer bread, but the body of Christ, and, in a similar way, wine becomes the blood of Christ. Understood in this way, it is not correct to speak of the "accidents of bread and wine" since their former reality has passed away. Instead, Guitmund refers to the "accidents of the *prior essence* of bread and wine," that is, the "accidents" of the former reality, for their new reality is the *speciesdomini*. Thus, the glorified body, as it relates to the species themselves, imparts existence to them and is contacted in an "unmediated way" in them, and the accidents of the "prior essence" of bread and wine, rather than inhering in nothing, instead inhere in the *species domini* itself-the hallmark of

n Ibid. Cf. Guitmund, *De corporis et sanguinis Christi* 1.22, where he says (speaking about the apparent division in the host), "Therefore, although the host is thought to be broken by violence, nevertheless what Christ himself wills must be believed, and not what the carnal senses judge. Therefore, just as after the fraction of the host, single pieces seem less than the whole host, so also in all those Masses the body of the Lord appears to be less than he is in heaven. But this whole perception is only according to the senses, which just as they are often deceived in many other things, are always deceived in this one. But if the eye of flesh cannot perceive this, is this any reason to extinguish the eye of the mind?"

Guitmund's realism.[73] For Thomas, however, the accidents are real, but there is a "quasi-separation," since they inhere in nothing, that is, in no proper subject. Hence in Thomas's system, the accidents share the natural properties of bread and wine, with the result that they can corrode and give nutrition. Because of this quasi-separation, the accidents also lack the immediate "influence" of the glorified body that Guitmund's understanding of the real presence yields, namely, the body of Christ being chewed by the teeth, and the inability to undergo corruption.

By contrast with Guitmund, Thomas is a metaphysical realist who upholds Eucharistic realism. Thomas is a realist because, unlike Guitmund, he believes that these things which seem to happen to the accidents (e.g., corruption, consumption by mice or by fire), really do happen, and they can be explained satisfactorily by the substance-accident relationship, begun with Guitmund but developed only in later theology. Guitmund, on the other hand, presents a Eucharistic realism that seems to denude the species of bread and wine of their former natural properties, and this is owing in large part to the perspective that he adopts. Guitmund, unlike Thomas, takes as his point of departure an understanding of the real presence that makes the body of Christ on the altar identical with the glorified body of Christ in heaven, and then reconciles that view with the apparent contradictions that have been observed in the species. Thomas, on the other hand, accepts changes to the accidents as actual changes, and then, by a process of metaphysical reasoning, works his way inward to that same understanding of the real presence that calls for an identity between the body of Christ on the altar and the body born of the Virgin.

B) Conclusions

The fundamental difference between the Eucharistic theologies of Guitmund and Thomas, therefore, is that Guitmund's realism

[73] This is my own interpretation of Guitmund's doctrine of the substance-accident distinction, which allows the "accidents of the prior essence of bread and wine" to manifest their own proper qualities in a way that is acceptable to the testimony of the senses.

extends to the Eucharistic species themselves, which makes them what I have described as the *species domini.* This theological perspective has been characterized by some as "ultra-realist,"[74] and constitutes a position that seems to undermine the sacramental character of the Eucharist. This article has shown that this characterization of Guitmund's theology is inaccurate, and that the difference between Thomas and Guitmund on this point is more a matter of theological perspective than of doctrinal faith. Guitmund, as mentioned above, begins his theological investigation with the truth of the real presence, and works his way outward to the objective nature of the sacramental species. Thomas, on the other hand, begins his theological study with the objective nature of the Eucharistic species. Combining the substance-accident distinction with an Aristotelian philosophy of nature, Thomas reaches a conclusion that does not reject that realism, but instead only moderates it, as the following illustration will demonstrate.

For Guitmund, the body of Christ is chewed *(attert)* by the faithful in the reception of holy communion, and that same body is broken *<frangi.)* by the hands of the priest at Mass; yet that same body is whole, entire, and unharmed, in such a way that the same body can be divided up *(dissipart)* for the salvation of the people. This happens because the food of the Lord's altar is the Lord himself, and the sacramental elements, by divine power operating through the ministry of the priest at the consecration, are substantially changed *(substantialitercommutan)* into the body and blood of the Lord, so that the Lord himself is substantially present in them. What remains is just another postresurrection appearance of the Lord, like that of the pilgrim to Emmaus, or the gardener at the tomb. The accidents of what were bread and wine, therefore, are no longer accidents of bread and wine *per se;* instead, they have become a new "appearance of the Lord" *(speciesdomini).* To chew the *speciesdomini,* therefore, is to eat the body of Christ, for, according to Guitmund's theology, the reception of holy communion involves a physical contact

[74] See above, note 2.

(sensualiter) with the risen Lord, just as Thomas the Apostle touched the wounds of Jesus, or, as the holy women clung to his feet.

Thomas, however, adopts a consistently realist perspective. For him, the mind works by abstraction, so that what the intellect perceives as happening truly happens. Yet the Eucharist is a sacrament, and sacraments call for faith, and faith demands the acceptance of the real presence as the same body born of Mary, although present under sacramental forms. Thomas first resolves the problem on an intellectual plane, for he makes it clear that the object of the senses is the sacramental species, and the object of the intellect is the substance. The former communicates truth by abstraction, the latter by faith. By furnishing the quality of substance to the Eucharistic species, the elements of bread and wine themselves form the physical sensation that the mind experiences, but faith says that it is the body of Christ that is eaten nonetheless.

In the Thomistic schema, then, one eats the body of Christ in the act of chewing the species because Christ is present under them, whereas for Guitmund to chew the species is to eat the body of Christ because the species are Christ. One may safely conclude, then, that Thomas concurred with Guitmund regarding the Church's immemorial teaching about the real presence of Christ in the sacrament of the Eucharist, but Thomas built upon this foundation a metaphysical construct of the accidents that is acceptable to the senses. It is precisely here that St. Thomas departs from the Eucharistic theology of Guitmund. Although Thomas shared for the most part the doctrine of the real presence as expressed in Guitmund's *De corporis et sanguinis Christi*, he nevertheless diverged from it in his articulation of the substance-accident distinction. By introducing a philosophy of nature into his Eucharistic theology, Thomas was able to account for the actual decomposition of the Eucharistic elements without resorting either to a fideist conceit or to a denigration of the real presence.

Thomas's revision, therefore, from the perspective of theological development, has departed from Guitmund's earlier view of the Eucharist as a *species domini.* The purpose of this article has been to reintroduce Guitmund's vision for the consideration of contemporary theology. This revisiting of the theology of Guitmund of Aversa, and its comparison with that of St. Thomas Aquinas, not only may afford new insights into the Angelic Doctor's understanding of the Eucharist, but may likewise serve to guide the further development of Eucharistic theology in the twenty-first century.

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THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF JEAN CAPREOLUS, O.P.

EDWARDP. MAHONEY

Duke University
Durham, North Carolina

ON SEPTEMBER2-4, 1994, a conference was held at Rodez, France, honoring the Dominican Jean Capreolus, the *princeps thomistarum,* on the 550th anniversary of his *death.jean Capreolus en son temps (1380-1444)* is a collection of studies originally presented at that conference.[1] The editors present the volume with the hope that it will lead researchers to return to Capreolus's own text. Two of the three editors have since published an English translation of Capreolus's *On the Virtues.*[1]

Special attention is paid in these studies to the context of Capreolus' s life and labors, particularly his *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis,* during the fifteenth century. The editors have wisely divided the volume into three parts. Part 1 presents the historical context in which Capreolus lived, part 2 sets forth his thought and intellectual activities, and part 3 studies the questions of the early editions of his writings and his influence on such Dominican thinkers as Cardinal Cajetan and Silvestro da Prierio.

In an extremely helpful introductory essay, Reudi Imbach takes up the intellectual context of Capreolus's work ("Le contexte

[1] *Jean Capreolus en son temps 1380-1444: Colloque de Rodez,* ed. Guy Bedouelle, 0.P, Romanus Cessario, O.P., and Kevin White (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1997).

[2] John Capreolus, *On the Virtues,* trans. Romanus Cessario, O.P., and Kevin White, with introduction by Servais Pinckaers, O.P. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001). The editors of *Jean Capreolus en son temps* express their admiration as well for the 1900-1908 edition of Paban and Pegues.

intellectuel," 13-22). Capreolus labored as a Bachelor at Paris from 1407 to 1411, was then at Toulouse, and thereafter pursued the editing of his work at Rodez (from 1426 to 1432). Imbach observes that if one wants to know the intellectual climate in which the *Defensiones* was written, one should turn to the intellectual life of the last decade of the fourteenth century and the beginning of the fifteenth century. He himself presents just such an informative sketch of the intellectual scene at Paris during that period. One approach would be to situate Capreolus in the history of Thomism. Imbach himself appears to approve a different approach, that is, to examine attentively the milieu in which the project of the *Defensiones* was born. He is convinced that it is possible to interpret the *Defensiones* as a reply to the intellectual problems of the period. Imbach identifies some marks of the boiling intellectual world in which Capreolus lived and certain of his preoccupations. He notes the anti-Thomist stance of various theologians and suggests that Capreolus represents one of the attempts to return to past viewpoints. In this case, the return is to the thought of Thomas Aquinas.

The picture that Imbach sketches emphasizes humanism, which he takes to involve philosophical thought and to have reached its zenith in the fifteenth century. He mentions its most celebrated proponents and practitioners, namely, Petrarch, Coluccio Salutati, Leonardo Bruni, and Poggio Bracciolini. He alludes to the discussions and debates regarding the superiority of medicine over law and the superiority of the practical life over the theoretical. He points to the connection between Italian humanism and Parisian humanism in figures like Nicolas de Clamanges and Jean de Montreuil. However, during the period when Capreolus was at Paris the two thinkers who dominated the scene were Pierre d'Ailly and Jean Gerson. Both men served at different times as chancellor of the University of Paris and both played major roles at the Council of Constance from 1414 to 1418 (15).

Three debates at Paris during this period enable us to form some idea of the intellectual life at Paris during Capreolus's youthful years. The first was the debate regarding the *Roman de*

la Rose. Jean Montreuil wrote a short treatise in praise of it, which provoked various sharp replies, two of which were authored by Christine de Pisan and Jean Gerson (ibid.). The second debate followed upon the assassination of the Duke of Orleans by messengers of the Duke of Burgundy on 23 November 1407. The murder was defended by Jean Petit on the grounds that it was a matter of tyrannicide. It is striking that in his *Defensiones* Capreolus does not cite or discuss the passages from St. Thomas that the defenders and adversaries of Jean Petit had cited.

The third debate involved a Dominican, Juan de Montson, who presented himself to be examined for the doctorate in theology and defended some ideas that disturbed some of those listening to him. Subsequently a convocation of the faculty condemned fourteen propositions. Montson appealed to the pope. D'Ailly headed a delegation to the pope, who condemned the propositions in 1389. However, the Dominicans refused to accept this outcome and were barred from the university until 1403. It is noteworthy that several of the propositions in question concern the topic of the Immaculate Conception of Mary. Montson was simply defending the Dominican position against the Franciscan and Scotist position prevailing at Paris at the end of the fourteenth century. He claimed that his statements were Thomistic, and he defended himself by invoking St. Thomas. Imbach cites D'Ailly's remarks about Aquinas to show that what had been a conflict regarding a professor had now been turned into a debate regarding St. Thomas himself. D'Ailly questioned what it meant to say that Aquinas's doctrine had been approved by the Church. In his view, it meant merely that Aquinas's doctrine is useful and can be diffused in the schools. While D'Ailly judges that this doctrine does not contain errors against the faith, he does think that it contains many incoherencies and contradictions. It is particularly telling that D'Ailly accuses Aquinas of limiting divine power and denying that there could be other worlds. He calls heretical Thomas's view-condemned in 1277-that there cannot be a plurality of angels in one and the same species. Finally, he

considers to be scandalous Thomas's thesis of the unity of substantial form.

From these facts regarding D'Ailly's intervention to defend the action of the faculty at Paris against Montson, Imbach draws three conclusions which lead us to the very threshold of Capreolus's *Defensiones.* The first is the observation that the entire critique that D'Ailly directs against the thought of Aquinas is focused on divine omnipotence, that is, the claim that Thomas has minimized God's omnipotence. D'Ailly himself thus synthesizes the Scotistic and nominalistic critique of Thomistic thought. The second conclusion is that the anti-Thomist animosity that reigned in the theology faculty at Paris around 1400 explains at least partially how it is that a young Thomist who began his studies at Paris at this moment could conceive the project of a *defensio theologiae Sancti Thomae.* The atmosphere of sharp critiques directed against Thomist thought enables us to understand better Capreolus's remarks at the beginning of the *Defensiones* that the one thing he wished to do was to recite the opinions that seemed to him to be from the mind of St. Thomas (20). But Imbach is careful to add that while Capreolus's project can be described as a return to the authentic thought of St. Thomas, it is completed by a concern to refute the various fourteenth-century adversaries of St. Thomas by means of a metacritique. The goal of that metacritique is to render fourteenth-century thought inoperative. Imbach sees a like approach to the "novelties" of fourteenth-century thinking and a like desire to return to the thirteenth century exhibited in Jean Gerson's *Contra curiositatem studentium.* However, Imbach observes (correctly) that Gerson wanted the return to be .to Bonaventure (ibid.).

In the first part of the book, which is entitled "Capreolus en son temps," key events in the political, cultural, and ecclesiastical history of Rodez and environs are set forth by Jean Delmas ("Le Rouergue au temps de Capreolus," 25-34) and Nicole Lemai"t:re ("La vie religieuse en Rouergue au temps de Jean Cabrol," 35-48). The last two essays of part 1, which were written by Bernard Montagnes, O.P. (49-55), and Pierre (57-73), trace the

history of the Dominicans in the Midi and the place of Capreolus in the Dominican convent at Rodez in the fifteenth century. Capreolus finished *hisDefensiones*there on 14 September 1426. But the work was not published until 1483 and then at Venice in four volumes by the Sons of Octavianus Scotus. In her rich study, Lemaitre has gathered references to Capreolus from various archival and other scholarly sources.

The second part of the book, which presents the lines of Capreolus's thought and his intellectual destiny ("Les lignes de pensee et destin intellectuel "), contains eight key studies regarding different aspects of Capreolus's philosophical and theological thought. His honoric title as *princeps thomistarum* clearly indicates his place as one of the most important commentators on St. Thomas Aquinas. Nonetheless the question that naturally rises is whether he is always an accurate commentator. It is faced by the authors of the eight studies.

Lawrence Dewan, O.P., raises the issue of Capreolus's accuracy in regard to his explication of the relation between essence and existence. In a fairly terse essay ("Capreolus, Saint Thomas et l'etre," 77-86), he declares Capreolus to be a faithful interpreter of St. Thomas. Apparently he takes Capreolus' s reference to a real distinction between the subsisting creature and its *esse existentiae* to be genuinely Thomistic. Moreover, he considers Capreolus's presentation in book 1, distinction 8 of the *Defensiones* to be a veritable treatise on the act of being, the *esse* of creatures. Accordingly, he proposes to sketch the systematic presentation of the *esse* of creatures as found in that part of the *Defensiones.*

Dewan points out (79) that Pierre Auriol understood *esse* as the very existence of the existing thing such that *esse* is identical with the essence or the thing itself. Essence and *esse* cannot be two beings or two things. Regrettably, Dewan does not address himself to the question of how Capreolus handles the doctrine of metaphysical participation and how he relates that doctrine ·to the distinction of essence and existence. It would have been helpful if Dewan had cited relevant studies of Joseph Owens and John Wippel.

Jean-Luc Solere contributes to the volume a study on Capreolus and the theory of the divine ideas ("Capreolus et la theorie des idees divines,"' 87-108). He points out that that theory and other topics such as human psychology and the problem of the universals were revived toward the end of the thirteenth century and discussed by Wyclif, Francis Meyronnes, John of Ripa, William of Alnwick, Peter Auriol, and Durandus of Saint among others. Capreolus, coming along a century later, endeavors to erase all the traces that these attacks had left on St. Thomas's theory. Solere singles out as the key notion in the theory of the divine ideas that God is pure act from which there unfold the divine attributes of divine simplicity, perfection, infinity, immobility, and eternity. From this it follows that God's very essence is his knowing, that he knows by means of his essence, that God knows his own essence perfectly, and that God knows more than his own essence, since he knows his essence as imitable. Solere goes on to discuss the nature and role of the divine ideas and thereafter to combat the views of Auriol and Durandus.

Henry Donneaud, O.P., examines Capreolus's handling of another fundamental doctrine of St. Thomas, namely, theology considered as a science ("La theologie comme science chez Capreolus,"' 109-29). He recounts that Andre Hayen wanted to show that while St. Thomas himself considered theology to be a science in the strict sense of the word his medieval disciples refrained from doing so. Neither Hayen nor Jean Leclerq recognized the contribution of Capreolus. Donneaud insists that the sole intention of Capreolus in the prologue of the *Defensiones,* in contrast to others in the Thomist school, was to show that theology is fully a science. His own aim is to examine the way in which Capreolus conceived theology as a science in order to ascertain on the one hand his more or less exact fidelity to the thought of St. Thomas and on the other hand the pertinence of his replies to the objections that such a position arouses. Donneaud goes on to review St. Thomas's notion of the subalternation of sciences and to focus on the key problem of the role of evidence

for critics of such a position. He cites Pierre Auriol, Gregory of Rimini, William of Ockham, and Hervaeus Natalis. Capreolus himself also refers in the prologue to John Duns Scotus and Durandus of Saint Pourc;ain. Donneaud sees Capreolus as being in a direct line from St. Thomas, insisting that there is no difference between sacred theology and the natural sciences as regards subalternation. He goes on to characterize Capreolus's position as an indisputable archaism *(incontestable archafsme),* since it displays a faithful adherence to the philosophical principles and the intellectual world of St. Thomas, his master, and an indifference to the teachings of fourteenth-century Scholasticism. Donneaud sees Capreolus as correctly establishing the meaning of theology as a science for St. Thomas since he was free of the deference to Aristotelian imperialism *(imperialisme aristotelicien)* that marked other interpreters of that doctrine.

Gilbert Narcisse, O.P., writes a brief but interesting study on the use by St. Thomas and Capreolus of arguments based on the fitting or the seemly ("Rationalite theologique et argument de convenance," 131-38). He discerns two very different approaches in the theology of St. Thomas. On the one hand, there are the methodological expositions regarding theological science along with critical reflections on human knowledge of God. On the other hand, there is the practice of theology *in situ,* the very exercise of intelligence in a search for an understanding of the mysteries of the faith and finally expounding them doctrinally. In the judgment of Narcisse, the coming together of these two perspectives-namely, critical reflections and practical exercises-ought to allow us to grasp better the entire conception of theology according to St. Thomas.

In regard to this subject, the journey of M.-D. Chenu is interesting in that it exposes this conception of theological science according to St. Thomas. Recent years have seen an oscillation, no doubt significant in the history of Thomism, between the investigation of a truly scientific rationality, which presumes a certain ideal of science, and the maintenance of the theologal foundation of *sacra doctrina.* Taking into account historical vicissitudes,

notably those of Thomism and Augustinianism, what remains at stake is a specifically theological rationality. Pere Chenu wound up by discovering an equilibrium. This he accomplished by extricating the Aristotelian theory of subalternation in its singular application to theological science.

Narcisse states his desire to carry out one test of this oscillation by comparing the respective place that St. Thomas and Capreolus accord to the argument from the fitting *(convenance)* in the question of the Incarnation. There are three major positions that Narcisse sets forth: (1) Scotus's view that the Incarnation has no connection to sin; (2) the view of the Thomists that Christ would not have come if man had not sinned; and (3) Thomas's view which stresses the hypothetical, namely, that it is more fitting *(convenientius)* to say that the work of the Incarnation had been ordered by God as a remedy against sin in such fashion that if there had not been sin there would not have been the Incarnation. Narcisse judges St. Thomas's usage of the argument from the fitting to be quite nuanced in comparison to that of Capreolus.

One of the most interesting essays in the volume, at least for philosophers, is that by Serge-Thomas Bonino concerning Pierre Auriol's conception of cognition and Capreolus's critique ("Capreolus contra Pierre Auriol: Une certaine idee de la connaissance," 139-58). The issue centers around Auriol's notion of *esse apparens,* which he set forth in the first quarter of the fourteenth century. At the very start of his *Defensiones,* when he states that he intends to refute those who attack St. Thomas, Capreolus names Auriol first before John Duns Scotus and Durandus of Saint That is to say, Auriol is more generally Capreolus's particular adversary, and this is the case regarding the nature of cognition. Bonino takes special care to emphasize that it is an error to try to explain the intellectual movement of the fourteenth century solely by reference to William of Ockham, just as in the recent past it was an error to try to explain the intellectual movement of the thirteenth century by reference to Thomas Aquinas alone. Bonino points out that Auriol's views are not an Ockamist miscarriage, that contempor-

aries paid at least as much attention to Auriol's theory of knowledge as they did to Ockham's, and that Capreolus himself never mentions Ockham.

Bonino divides his discussion into two parts. In the first he sketches the fundamental theses of Auriol's theory of cognition, stressing those most frequently referred to in the *Declarationes.* Bonino honestly admits the methodological difficulties involved in such a reconstruction. For Auriol knowledge is that whereby the object known appears to consciousness. Knowledge, phenomenality, and representation are all interconnected. The *esse apparens* is a pure being of reason and is not to be identified either with extramental real being or the intramental real being of an accidental form. It is rather a purely intentional being *(esse intentionale).* And while it is certainly in the soul, it is there by virtue of the object known and not by virtue of a reality inhering in the soul. That is to say, it is present objectively and not subjectively. Auriol attempts to show the absolute necessity of postulating *esse apparens* by appealing to *experientiae* or illusions (141-42).

Bonino goes on to summarize Auriol's attack on the cognitive psychology of Aquinas. He recounts that Capreolus himself points out the framework of St. Thomas's theory of cognition by noting the fundamental roles played by the intelligible species and the concept. Auriol on the other hand identifies the impressed intelligible species with the act of cognition itself, denies all activity to the possible intellect in the cognitive act, and rejects the *Verbum* or concept as an immanent form terminating the act of cognition. And yet while Auriol considers the intelligible species and the act of cognition to be identical, he does see a distinction of reason between the intelligible species and the act of cognition. Bonino correctly reports that Capreolus refers to some of Auriol's arguments as "echappatoires prolixes" *(prolixae evasiones).* According to Capreolus, Auriol attacks the Thomist notion of the *Verbum* head on as postulating an accidental form inhering in the intellect. But then it can only be a singular reality, when in fact the terminus of the act of cognition is the universal essence of the

known object. Worse yet, Auriol characterizes the Thomistic notion of the *Verbum* or concept as an image *(idolum)* which is the terminus of the gaze *(aspectus)* of the intellect. But if the intellect rested in this image there would then result the absurdity that the sciences would be about such images and not about extramental things.

Kevin White's essay works in tandem with that of Romanus Cessario, for which it serves as an introduction (although the editors chose to place it after Cessario's). White's study concerns the views of St. Thomas and Durandus of Saint on faith, but with an emphasis on the question of certitude ("Saint Thomas et Durand de La question de la certitude de la foi," 165-75). White notes that Durandus composed three versions of his commentary on the *Sentences.* Although he attenuated the anti-Thomistic nature of some of his ideas in the later versions, there still remain vestiges of the original version. White therefore proposes to treat in particular a question that is such a vestige, namely, whether faith is more certain than scientific knowledge. Both in his early commentary on the *Sentences* and in later works St. Thomas holds that faith is more certain than science in regard to some fundamental points. Durandus sharply disagrees, for he maintains that faith is not at all more certain in any regard. The issue is one that could be called a problem of the "psychological" order, namely, faith itself rather than the object of faith. Durandus does not question the truth of the articles of faith to which faith adheres but more precisely the manner in which faith adheres to the articles. White judges Durandus's point of view to involve an implicit rationalism. He confines himself in this essay to presenting the position of Durandus.

Durandus raises the question in the context of the seventh question of distinction 23 in book III of the *Sentences* and there seeks to clarify two relevant points.[3] The first is to explain that the three phrases found in Augustine-namely, *credere Deum,*

[3] See Durandus of Saint Pour9lln, *In Petri Lombardi sententias theo/ogicas commentariorum libri N* (Venice: Guerraea, 1571; repr. Ridgewood, N.J.: Gregg Press, 1964), bk. m, d. 23, q. 7, fol. 255rb-255va.

credere Deo, and *credere in Deum,* respectively-consider God as the object of faith, the reason or moving cause for faith, and the goal of the believer. The third phrase refers simultaneously to the act of faith and the act of charity while the first and second phrases designate the acts that correspond to the unique act of faith.

The other point to be clarified involves a distinction Aquinas often makes between two different certitudes, namely, the "certitude of evidence" *(certitudo evidentiae)* and the "certitude of adhesion" *(certitudo adhaesionis).* According to the former certitude, knowing is more certain than believing, since what is known is evident while what is believed is not. According to the latter certitude believing is more certain than knowing, since whoever believes adheres more firmly to what is believed than does the person who knows adhere to what is known.

Durandus straightaway rejects this Thomistic distinction. He argues first of all that certitude and falsity cannot coexist. But he then observes that in fact firmness of adhesion can be found in false beliefs. This is the case with heretics and all who obstinately adhere to their false opinions. Accordingly, firmness of adhesion cannot be of the essence of certitude. Durandus adds that simple firmness of adhesion seems to be greater in scientific knowledge than in faith, since we adhere more firmly to that from which we can separate ourselves only with great difficulty. He therefore considers false the Thomist view that a greater firmness of adhesion renders faith more certain than scientific knowledge. What is noteworthy is that Durandus omits reference to Aquinas's explanation that it is the First Truth, namely, God, who transforms the will in faith, providing a firmness greater than the firmness achieved by human reason. White points out that by concentrating wholly on faith and its object and abstracting from the will and God's influence on it, Durandus presents faith in purely intellectual terms.

Durandus next links together the two kinds of certitude with Aristotle's distinction between *secundum se* and *quoad nos.* Believing "in itself" is considered to be more certain than

knowing, since that which is believed is in itself more certain than that which we know scientifically. However, from the perspective of "by relation to us" *(quoad nos)* the opposite is the case, since knowing scientifically is by relation to us more certain than believing. This is a distinction made by Aquinas himself that Durandus does not hesitate to reject, just as he had rejected the first distinction. He justifies his rejection by three arguments, the first two of which are based on passages from *De anima* and *Metaphysics.*

The first argument is based on remarks of Aristotle, who points out that the separate substances are more knowable in themselves than are the sensible substances, although in regard to us they are not more knowable but rather less known. Durandus denies that such a distinction is relevant in the case of *habitus* and acts, since they are more certain only insofar as they render their objects more certain for us. If they are called "more noble" it is only because of the nobility of their objects. Durandus then takes Aristotle's remarks regarding nobility and certitude at the beginning of *De anima* to mean that Aristotle divides nobility of science into a nobility according to certitude and a nobility derived from the nobility of the object. He goes on to reject making a distinction between things that are better known *simpliciter* and of themselves *(secundum se)* and things that are better known to us if this is not correctly understood. He adds that something is called knowable only from the knowledge of the one knowing, since knowledge is a condition of the knower and not of the thing known.

At this point White is careful to note that Durandus goes on to appeal to the hierarchical nature of grades or levels of knowing. Man holds the lowest grade or level among the intellectual creatures *(infimus gradus inter creaturas intellectuales).* Accordingly not everything that is better known to man is better known *simpliciter.* Rather is it least known. On the other hand, what is better known to God is better known *simpliciter,* because it is better known according to the highest knowledge *(suprema notitia).* Moreover, what is better known to an angel is better

known on a second level or grade *(secundus gradus)* insofar as the knowledge of an angel is midway between God's knowledge and man's knowledge. With these distinctions established, Durandus explains that those things that are more sublime in their very being *(entitas)* are known first by God and an angel, both of whom possess an intellectual power that is itself more sublime *(sublimiorvirtus in cognoscendo)*. Indeed Durandus speaks of God and the angel as the highest knowers *(supremi cognoscentes).*

Durandus is now ready to turn back to the topic under investigation, namely, whether the act of faith is more certain than an act of science or vice versa. Although something that is believed, for example that God is triune and one, is of itself more certain and more known than many things known about creatures in the manner already set forth, many *habitus* and acts of science that are within us are more certain and more known extensively and intensively than are faith and its acts. This is so because that which has many modes of certitude is more certain extensively and intensively. But such is the case extensively regarding science with respect to faith, since science and its acts possess both the certitude of evidence and the certitude of adhesion, if the latter should indeed be called certitude. In contrast, faith possesses only the certitude of adhesion. But this is also the case intensively, since what contains the least doubt is the most certain. Scientific knowledge cannot in any case contain any doubt, while faith can and yet at the same time is itself preserved.

In his essay on the differing conceptions of faith held by St. Thomas and Durandus of Saint and commented on by Capreolus, Romanus Cessario situates Capreolus in the Dominican tradition ("Saint Thomas, Durand de et Capreolus: Le debat sur la foi," 159-75). He makes much of the distinction set forth by French-speaking theologians between the "theologique" and the "theologal" so that they might make more precise the manner in which the spirit and heart operate in Christian life. The former designates the more speculative and scientific while the latter describes the lived practice of the Christian faith. Cessario acknowledges that the term "theologal"

has until now been rarely found in English but he notes that it had been used by John Donne in the seventeenth century to refer to the infused virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Cessario argues that the nuance gained by the terminology of "theologal" is important for taking account of the Thomist doctrine of faith. Indeed he maintains that the very notion of a "theologal way" is to be found in Capreolus's discussion of the virtue of faith and he expresses his satisfaction that the English translation of *The Catechism of the Catholic Church* has reintroduced this distinction. He suggests that the idea of "the theologal way" makes reference to a Christian existence that is lived more precisely as experience. We possess once again the possibility of distinguishing in the terminology itself between someone who has a "theological" knowledge of the Christian religion and someone who lives these Christian mysteries in a theologal manner. Cessario considers the distinction of the theologal and the theological to enable us to distinguish someone who knows about the Christian religion from the believer who truly lives the Christian mysteries. Moreover, he evidently thinks that Aquinas would have accepted speaking of the experience of the Christian life. Indeed he notes that Aquinas describes wisdom as.a "tasting" *(gustus)* of divine goodness and speaks of the gifts of the Holy Spirit as producing a sort of experiential knowledge of God *(quasi experimentalis).*

Saint Thomas presents as an argument for the theologal virtues the fact that each person pursues a twofold goal in his life, one proportioned to human nature and the other a happiness that surpasses that nature. Accordingly the virtues of faith, hope, and charity are special gifts from God to his creatures. These theologal virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues since they enable the human person to attain God directly. The moral virtues only allow the believer to behave in a proper manner, whereas the virtues of faith, hope, and charity allow the justified soul to enter into a personal communion with the Trinity.

Cessario points out that Durandus effectively interprets the phrase *"credere in Deum"* ("to believe unto God"), which issues from a definition of Augustinian provenance, not as an act of faith

but rather as the working together of faith and charity. Thomas himself would argue that, while the movement toward God is only perfect when charity is present, even a Christian lacking charity-that is, someone whose faith is dead-can be described as experiencing the beginnings of this movement toward God precisely because believing implies the intellect and the will together.

Cessario goes on to relate that the virtues that Saint Paul lists in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (13:13) show how the intellect and the will can attain God. While charity must be ranked first according to a hierarchical ordering of these virtues, since it is the mother of virtues, faith comes first in the order of coming-to-be. Saint Thomas states that there must be an object of sense knowledge or intellectual cognition for every human appetite. This means that in the case of the appetites of love and hope their objects must be grasped by the senses or the intellect-and thus faith must precede them. It is this intellectual nature of faith demanded by Capreolus that provokes the controversy between him and Durandus regarding the certitude of faith. Cessario judges the basic error of Durandus to be his failure to recognize that faith involves both the intellect and the will together. His related error is to think that cognition produces greater certitude than does faith. On the other hand, Capreolus is better able to set forth the nature of the certitude enjoyed by faith since he recognizes the role of the will and God's influence on the will in faith. He considers the assent of faith to be much more sure than the assent of scientific knowledge. Durandus failed to understand that faith demands at the same time that the intellect know the truth and that the will adhere to the truth. In a word, faith puts love at the service of knowledge.

Durandus's view that empirical knowledge produces a greater certitude reflects his error in regard to the role assigned to the will in faith. On the other hand, since Capreolus does not distance himself from considerations regarding the will and the influence that God has on the will, he is able to identify the kind of certitude enjoyed by faith. He takes the assent of faith to be much

more sure than the assent of scientific knowledge. Indeed the firmness of adherence possessed by faith has its cause in the will. This means that the understanding of the believer will sometimes give assent to some proposition by reason of a command by the will. As a result it will assent more firmly and more intensely than does the understanding of someone who knows in a scientific manner. The ultimate cause of faith being so powerful a virtue is simply the believer's "firm and intense" adhesion to the Word of God.

This observation Cessario develops further. Since the virtue of faith is perfected by the intellect in conjunction with the will, certitude of faith rests on a person's adhesion to God as First Truth, as the Word. But this is exactly what Durandus refuses to accept in his rejection of Thomas's account of faith as an intellectual virtue.

In the last study of part 1, Servais Pinckaers concerns himself with Capreolus's defense of St. Thomas' teaching on the virtues (..La defense, par Capreolus, de la doctrine de saint Thomas sur les vertus," 177-92).[4] Pointing out that Capreolus defended Thomas's moral doctrine as based on the virtues and the gifts, Pinckaers characterizes that doctrine as presented by Capreolus to have much to tell us as we face contemporary moral problems and issues. He also considers Capreolus's disciplined and precise manner of procedure to have much to teach contemporary students. Both his thinking and his reasoning are concise and precise. Although Capreolus is not a commentator on St. Thomas, he is in fact a defender of his thought against such critics as John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, Durandus of Saint and others. His mode of defense is basically to present excerpts from St. Thomas's writings that serve as replies to his critics. As a result, Capreolus has Thomas speak for himself while he, in a self-effacing manner, adds little of his own. In Pinckaers's judgment, Capreolus reveals a penetrating theological mind and is "a good representative of the Thomist school at war."

[4] It should be noted that his study is all but identical with his foreword in the Cessario-White translation of Capreolus, *On the Virtues* (xi-xxvi; see above, note 2).

The key topics to which Pinckaers limits himself are four in number: (1) whether virtuous *habitus,* either acquired or infused, are necessary; (2) their location in the sensible appetite; (3) the connection of these virtues; and (4) how the virtues and gifts are distinguished. In regard to (1), the necessity of virtuous habits, Pinckaers points to the sharp divide that developed at the beginning of the fourteenth century between a morality based on virtue, which Thomas derived from the Fathers, and a morality based on individual actions. That latter morality, which would triumph in the modern period, involved a basic freedom, a supposed freedom of "indifference" that would be limited externally by law with its obligations and prohibitions. This morality rejected the notion of *habitus.*

Not surprisingly, Pinckaers emphasizes that the very meaning of *habitus* is in no way captured by our modern word "habit," which stresses the mechanical and diminishes human involvement. On the contrary, a *habitus* involves a capacity to acquire and exercise our craft *(metier)* as humans in accord with the true and the good, and thereby brings about excellence in our actions and progress in living. It must be carefully noted that the morality built on good virtues, that is, the theological and cardinal virtues, perfected by the gifts, presumes both the notion of natural inclinations to the good and also an excellence of action that is ordered to an ultimate end, namely, complete human perfection and happiness. The *habitus* of the intellect and will provide them with a needed stable disposition, a determination oriented toward the perfection of their activities. The freedom of the morality of *habitus* is a freedom for the good.

One of the major opponents of the morality of *habitus,* that is, the morality set forth by St. Thomas, was Durandus of Saint who makes a key distinction between the act in its natural being *(esse naturae)* and the act in its moral being *(esse morale).* According to the former, we can perform an action independently of any consideration of its kind and its moral quality, even that of being good or bad. The good or bad *habitus* does not determine the *esse naturae* of the action. Rather it is the

conformity or lack of conformity to right reason that determines the moral character of the action. For Durandus what is of basic importance is the act in its singularity taken independently of reference to *habitus.* A similar stance is found in the development of casuistry and in contemporary consequentialism. All that is left to *habitus* is a very secondary role of providing some continuity by way of long-range motivation. Obviously such an approach to moral thought is radically opposed to the viewpoint of St. Thomas, for whom the human act is by its very nature moral and involves the human will.

Pinckaers faults Capreolus for presenting a "defense" of St. Thomas that accepts Durandus's way of setting up the problem by way of the distinction between *esse naturae* and *esse moris.* He clearly thinks that Aquinas would not have done so. Not surprisingly, he approves Capreolus maintaining that the morality of an action is based not on the action itself but on the knowing subject as well as on the object, the circumstances, and the end. Nonetheless Pinckaers does fault Capreolus for failing to see *habitus* as rooted in natural inclinations of the intellect and the will. Pinckaers thus takes Capreolus both to hold that the determination of actions is derived entirely from *habitus* and also to fail to realize the role played by the natural inclinations. He even suggests that Capreolus may be here under the influence of the notion of freedom of indifference.

Other arguments against *habitus* that Pinckaers considers are taken from Durandus and Auriol respectively. The arguments taken from Durandus are that the facility to perform certain actions is due not to a *habitus* but to the acting subject itself and that the *habitus* does not contribute to the intensity of the act. One argument taken from Auriol is that virtue is a pure relation of fittingness which can change as a person changes. Although Capreolus rejects this point of view, Pinckaers observes that Capreolus has conceded too much to the opponents of Thomas, who fail to recognize the dynamic nature of virtue that brings humans to realize the finality geared toward divine beatitude. He then considers briefly an objection of the Franciscan, Peter Auriol,

who is a favorite target for Capreolus. Auriol downgrades the importance of *virtus* by construing it as an accidental being *(ens per accidens)*, a composite of a quality and a relation of fittingness. In contrast, Capreolus holds that for St. Thomas virtue is not a pure relation but contains a relationship to the subject and the operation which is its goal.

A second key topic (2) is the locus of the moral virtues. In opposition to John Duns Scotus, who held that the virtues are located in the will, St. Thomas attributes virtues both to the will and to sensible appetite. What is summarily rejected by Durandus in Thomas's system is the notion of the infused moral virtues which involve in turn the gifts that the Spirit bestows on the Christian. As Pinckaers explains, for Thomas a moral theology based on virtues leads ultimately to the doctrine of the gifts of the Spirit. While Scotus rejects the need to involve the gifts, Capreolus reaffirms the distinction between virtues and gifts drawn by St. Thomas and replies in detail to the arguments of Scotus.

A third key topic (3) pursued by Capreolus is St. Thomas's teaching regarding the interconnection of the virtues. Their unity is achieved through prudence (as regards the moral virtues) and through charity (as regards all the virtues taken together). Saint Thomas stresses that the moral virtues need prudence just as prudence needs the moral virtues. All this rests on the close cooperation of the spiritual faculties of the intellect and the will underscored in Thomas's moral psychology and most evident in his analysis of freedom and choice. In John Duns Scotus dissolves the link between these spiritual faculties and the virtues. That is to say, for him a right prudential judgment could be related to a bad choice. In like fashion, Scotus considers it to be possible that one could acquire perfection in regard to one virtue while being imperfect in regard to other virtues.

Pinckaers sets out with approval the replies of Capreolus. One is that the virtue of prudence is not limited to the steps of judgment and counsel but is also involved in the step of *imperium* or command that provides the impetus to act from within the

acting subject. Another point made by Capreolus is that the *habitus* of prudence is developed from experience over time and cannot be the result of a single act. A morality that is based on individual acts cannot explain all that is involved in prudence. Pinckaers adds on his own that in a morality based on virtues prudence presupposes deeply based intentions and a long-range view. These order action to its ultimate end and also gain for prudence higher criteria of judgment. It is in this way, according to Pinckaers, that prudence is linked to charity.

In his conclusion, Pinckaers reviews what he has established both about Capreolus and also about the significance of the latter's contributions. He notes that he has not set forth all that could be said about Capreolus's discussion of virtue. What is important for Pinckaers is the noteworthy role that Capreolus has played in the history of the rivalry between a morality that is based on virtues and gifts and a morality that stresses individual acts, downplays *habitus* and finality, and opens the way to casuistry. Pinckaers praises Capreolus not for being an original thinker-which he was not-but as a worthy defender of earlier views, namely, those of St. Thomas Aquinas. He ends his essay by expressing his gratitude to Capreolus "for having contributed from afar to the current renewal of virtue-based morality."

The third part of the book has to do with the later history of Capreolus's *Defensiones* and his subsequent influence ("La posterite de Capreolus," 193-273). Guy Bedouelle presents a brief sketch of the influence of Renaissance humanism on Dominicans of the fifteenth century, that is, the period of Capreolus's own life and work, along with some general remarks about the history of Thomism among Dominicans of the period. He then treats of the various printed editions of the *Defensiones* ("Les editions 'humanistes' de Capreolus," 195-207). He notes that there exist at least forty five exemplars of the 1483-84 edition that was published by Octavianus Scotus at Venice. The next edition was also published at Venice but in 1515 by Georgius Arrivabenus, a nephew of Octavianus Scotus. The subsequent edition was published in 1587-88 at Venice by the heirs of Hieronymus Scotus

and was dedicated to Pope Sixtus V, a Franciscan. Another edition was proposed for publication in the late seventeenth century by Pierre Chastaignac, a member of the Dominican community of Limoges, but it was never published. Brief notice is taken of it by Bernard Montagnes ("Une edition de Capreolus projetee en 1686," 209-11).

Some note must be taken of Capreolus's influence on two important Dominicans, namely Tommasso da Vio, known better as Cardinal Cajetan, and Sylvestro da Prierio. In his study on Cajetan and Capreolus ("Cajetan et Capreolus," 213-38), Andre F. Von Gunten raises the issue of precisely how much influence the *Defensiones* had on Cajetan's commentary on the *Summa theologiae.* Martin Grabmann had claimed that most of Cajetan's knowledge of the late Scholastics who were adversaries of St. Thomas was drawn from Capreolus. Von Gunten raises several questions: Why did Cajetan make use of the *Defensiones?* Was Capreolus the sole source of such information for Cajetan? Did Capreolus help Cajetan to penetrate the doctrine of St. Thomas? And why did Cajetan mention Capreolus so often in his commentary on the *Summa theologiae?*

After Cajetan was made Procurator General of the Dominican Order in 1501, he was urged by his patron, Cardinal Olivier Caraffa, to complete his commentary on St. Thomas's *Summa theologiae.* Cajetan indicates both that repeated readings of Thomas increase rather than decrease the difficulty of grasping his sense and that outstanding Thomists, who frequently return to the *Prima pars* again and again, affirm that they always perceive something new. Cajetan even suggests that many theologians think that they will gain a great name for themselves, both for their genius and for their teaching, if they attack the *Prima pars* by their contrivances. Indeed he considers John Duns Scotus to have labored beyond others in this matter with illustrious subtlety and power. He describes Scotus as almost striving to destroy individual words of the *Prima pars* (215). When the matter seemed to demand it, Cajetan himself solved difficulties, especially those raised by Scotus. The purposes of Capreolus and

Cajetan are so alike that Von Gunten suggests that both wrote *Defensiones.* It is therefore significant that in his commentary Cajetan both regularly makes reference to Capreolus and also mentions by name those who were opponents of Thomas's teaching, including Duns Scotus, Pierre Auriol, Durandus of Saint Pour\:ain, Peter Paulude, and Gerard of Carmel. But Von Gunten indicates that there are occasions on which Cajetan reaches an interpretation independently of Capreolus. He gives examples of texts from John Duns Scotus that Cajetan knew on his own.

Von Gunten declares that Grabmann was right to hold that Capreolus was the link providing Cajetan with knowledge of the medieval philosophers and opponents of St. Thomas, whose works had not come down to him. Without the collaboration of Capreolus Cajetan would never have had contact with a great part of these various opinions. However, Von Gunten adds that Grabmann erred in restricting Cajetan's sources to Capreolus, since Cajetan apparently had other sources, including texts, whereby he had contact with the thought of such figures as John Duns Scotus, Durandus of Saint and Gregory of Rimini. Some of their arguments as found in Cajetan are not to be read in Capreolus. Nonetheless Cajetan does on occasion tell his reader to read more on a particular issue in Capreolus.

Von Gunten raises two key issues. One is whether Cajetan accepted some of the interpretations of St. Thomas put forth by Capreolus and the other is whether the way of understanding the thought of St. Thomas is uniform in Capreolus, Cajetan, and subsequent Thomism. By necessity Von Gunten can only give brief attention to these challenging points. He does so by comparing the views and discussion of Capreolus and Cajetan on particular topics. The first of these is whether man in the present state of fallen nature can through his natural abilities and without grace do a morally good act. Capreolus follows Gregory of Rimini rather than St. Thomas on the need for such a special aid *(auxilium},* though he does attribute this position to St. Thomas. Some later Thomists followed Capreolus on this question. Von Gunten also examines the views of Capreolus and Cajetan on the

principle of individuation, concluding that Prierio, Javelli, and Sylvester of Ferrara follow Capreolus. Another topic raised regards the formal constituent of created personality *(personalitas),* that is, the *suppositum.*

In the conclusion to his study, Von Gunten declares that there is a continuity but not an identity between Capreolus and Cajetan. In his determination to defend St. Thomas, Cajetan made abundant use of Capreolus's work.

The activity of those who were opposed to St. Thomas's doctrine must be situated at the mid-point of the fourteenth century, though there had already been opposition at the end of the thirteenth century. His thought generated strong reactions which led his disciples to defend it. But it was Capreolus who was the first to set forth a global defense of St. Thomas. By the end of the fifteenth century the Thomists-at least in Italy-held Capreolus in high regard for the service rendered by his *Defensiones.* But while Capreolus provided the basis for an exposition of St. Thomas's doctrine, Cajetan stressed the arguments that justified that doctrine and that therefore weakened the point of view of St. Thomas's critics. Even today there are in the Thomist school defenders and opponents of Cajetan.

Another important Dominican who made use of Capreolus during the Renaissance period was Silvestro da Prierio. Michael Tavuzzi ("Capreolus dans les ecrits de Silvestro da Prierio, O.P., 1456-1527," 239-58) reviews the history of the early, very limited diffusion of the *Defensiones* in manuscript form. Only rarely did any Thomist writer of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century make reference to it. One example is Petrus Negri in his *Clipeus Thomistarum,* published at Venice in 1481. Earlier in 1477 Lorenzo de Medici had given a handsome manuscript copy of book 1 of the *Defensiones* to the library of the Dominican convent of Saint Mark's at Florence. Dominic of Flanders, whose *Quaestiones in XII Metaphysicorum* was published only in 1499, apparently had knowledge of book 1 of the *Defensiones* much earlier. Dominic's work was one of defense of St. Thomas and involved providing passages from Thomas's writings in a manner

very similar to the procedure of Capreolus himself. Indeed in the Thomist tradition Capreolus was viewed as the Prince of Thomist Theologians and Dominic as the Prince of Thomist Philosophers. But by reason of its great length even after its publication in 1483-84 Capreolus's *Defensiones* seemed to demand shorter versions, that is, summaries of different sorts. Those who authored such summaries included Paolo Barbo da Soncino, Isidore degli Isolani, and Bartolomeo Spina. The largest and the most influential was that written by Silvestro da Prierio.

Silvestro da Prierio joined the Dominicans of strict observance in 1471. He studied with Peter of Bergamo and Dominic of Flanders at the Dominican *studium generale* in Bologna. His fellow students included Girolamo Savonarola and Paulus Barbus da Soncino. Later in 1489-90 he was himself the master of studies at the same *studium generale.* After receiving his doctorate in theology from the University of Bologna in 1498 he served as regent of studies at the *studium generale* in 1499-1502 and again in 1510-11. In 1515 Pope Leo X named him a professor of theology at the University of Rome, the *Sapienza,* and Master of the Sacred Palace, a post he held until 1527. He was much involved in papal dealings with Luther, Erasmus, Reuchlin, and Eck. But he showed interest in Capreolus throughout his ecclesiastical career.

Prierio wrote an enormous work on Capreolus that was composed of two parts, both published in 1497. The first part, which was known as the *Compendium Capreoli,* is a summary of the *Defensiones.* The second part is known as *Additiones in Capreolum.* Tavuzzi notes that it gained some attention in Germ'any, and he cites references to it in Karlstadt and Eck. He also underscores that while the *Compendium* lacks originality as a theological work the *Additiones* are far more interesting since Prierio extends the discussion beyond what Capreolus sets forth in regard to some topics. He mentions and discusses an extraordinary number of Scholastic writers, both those who are well known and others who are less well known. He even disagrees with Capreolus on some topics, of which Tavuzzi

provides examples. One is the claim by Prierio against Capreolus that Aquinas never maintained a real distinction between the act of intellectual cognition *(intelligere)* and the concept *(conceptus mentis; verbum).*

Prierio also planned an ambitious comprehensive work on Aquinas entitled *Conflatum ex S. Thoma.* In Tavuzzi's judgment, had it been completed it would have rivaled Cajetan's commentary on the *Summa theologiae* and Silvester of Ferrara's commentary on the *Summa contra Gentiles.* It contains a very large number of passages from St. Thomas's works, and it serves as a summary of St. Thomas's whole thought. The structure of the *Confl.atum* follows the order of the *Summa theologiae.* The original plan was for it to consist of four volumes divided according to the *Prima pars,* the *Prima secundae,* the *Secunda secundae,* and the *Tertia pars.* Although Prierio finished different sections, all that was published in a first volume at Perugia in 1519 was that part of the work that corresponded to the first forty-five questions of the *Prima pars.* Tavuzzi argues that other parts that Prierio had finished were circulated in manuscript form; he provides a list of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writers who referred to a second volume.

There is one striking policy that Prierio adopts in the *Conflatum* that is clearly held in opposition to Cajetan: namely, to deny that there were any real changes in doctrine between St. Thomas's commentary on the *Sentences* and his *Summa theologiae.* Prierio explains such seeming changes and developments by maintaining that the *Sentences* commentary does not contain St. Thomas's own views. Since he was at the time of its composition merely a Bachelor, he was often merely reporting commonly held positions. On the other hand, when he composed his *Summa theologiae* he was a Master of theology and so exercised the right to present his own views.

The *Additiones* had as their purpose to defend St. Thomas against rival medieval traditions, representatives of Scotism and Nominalism and others such as John Duns Scotus, Durandus of Saint Henry of Ghent, Pierre Auriol, and Gregory of

Rimini. All are mentioned many times in the *Conflatum.* However, their positions are quickly dismissed by borrowings from the objections raised by Capreolus and summarized by Prierio in the *Compendium.* On the other hand, the polemic in the *Conflatum* is basically a defense of that which Prierio believes to be the authentic doctrine of St. Thomas over against erroneous interpretations set forth in the Thomist tradition by Cajetan in particular. Tavuzzi is quick to point out that Cajetan had already attacked Prierio in his *De cambiis* (1499) and commentary on the *Prima pars* (1507), though not by name.

In Tavuzzi's judgment the prime significance of the use that Prierio makes of Capreolus in the *Conflatum* is not so much to achieve a true interpretation of the thought of St. Thomas as it is to engage in a polemic against Cajetan's very personal interpretations of St. Thomas. The *Defensiones* of Capreolus simply provided Prierio with arguments that he could use against Cajetan. In fact Tavuzzi points out that there are references to Capreolus on almost every page of the *Conflatum.* But he is also careful to add that at times Prierio sets forth discussions that rise above the narrow preoccupations of his dispute with Cajetan. One such discussion regards the difference of opinion within the Thomist school regarding God's knowledge of future contingents. Prierio presents Capreolus as the author of one of the three opinions on this topic. And while he considers Capreolus to be the "father of all theologians of our time" *(pater omnium theologorum nostri temporis),* from whom all Thomists have derived something good, he shares with Capreolus a harsh evaluation of the worth of Pierre Auriol, a stand no doubt inspired by the *Defensiones.*

The last study in the volume, that of Norman J. Wells, concerns Capreolus and other late medieval theologians on the subject of eternal truths ("Capreolus et ses successeurs sur les verites eternelles," 259-73). To appreciate Capreolus' s position on the question of the *aeternae veritates* and its influence on other thinkers Wells proposes first to give both background and foreground material on the issue. By establishing the influences on

Capreolus we will be better prepared to assess the significance of his position. In doing so we will be enabled to evaluate the impact of his point of view on such later *Thomistae* as Cajetan, Soncinas, Sylvester of Ferrara, Javelli, Banez, and Soto.

Wells begins by sketching the historical context dating back as far as 1241 and a condemnation issued by William of Auvergne at Paris. The bishop condemned as erroneous the claim that there are many eternal truths other than God. Both in 1243 and 1256 General Chapters of the Dominican Order instructed that this error be deleted from all copy books. Toward the end of the thirteenth century, Richard of Middleton expressed his misgivings regarding the position of Henry of Ghent both with regard to eternal essences endowed with their own essential being *(esse essentiae)* and also with regard to many essential and necessary *aeternae veritates.* Later in the fifteenth century, Dionysius the Carthusian had similar fears and expressed them by citing the very text in which Middleton criticizes the position of Henry on *aeternae veritates* in the light of the condemnation of 1241. But Wells then points out that Capreolus, the *princeps thomistarum*, was actually influenced by Henry of Ghent's position regarding the eternal essences, their essential being, and their eternal truths.

Capreolus treats the question of the eternal essential truths in his defense of St. Thomas's position on the question whether a subsisting creature is to be identified with its own existential being ("Utrum creatura subsistens sit suum esse existentiae"). Wells points out that Capreolus himself presents five conclusions, but he judges it sufficient to examine only the first, which affirms that no subsisting creature is its own *esse.* He defends St. Thomas's response by citing only four texts from his works. However, Wells is careful to note that in fact Capreolus appears to put greater emphasis on *auctoritates* such as Aristotle, Augustine, Robert Grosseteste, Albert the Great, and Averroes than on St. Thomas himself.[5]

[5] For further relevant discussion, see Norman J. Wells, "Capreolus on Essence and Existence," *The Modern Schoolman* 37 (1960): 1-24.

In the first argument, in order to establish the *per se et non per aliud* character of the essences of creatures, in opposition to the *per aliud et non per se* status of the *esse* or existence of creatures, Capreolus accordingly gives due consideration to the first mode of predicating *per se.* In the case of *Rosa est rosa,* the quiddity of the rose does not belong to the rose by virtue of some extrinsic active cause *(aliqua causa agens extrinsica).* The proposition itself is eternally true whether or not there are roses. This means of course that both the essence of the rose and also its eternal truth are uncreated.

Against an unnamed opponent who maintains that the essence and the eternal truth are necessary only on the supposition of a creative efficient cause, Capreolus carefully distinguishes two usages of the copula *est.* In the one usage, the copula signifies the actual e:xtramental existence of the subject of the proposition whereas in the other usage the copula indicates the truth of the proposition, which is signified by the link between the subject and the predicate. Wells remarks appropriately that in Capreolus's eagerness to establish the eternal validity of nonexistential and nontemporal propositions he goes so far as to say that what is nothing at all can be said to exist and that *ens* can be predicated of that which does not really exist. Both Aristotle and Averroes are used as authorities for this remark.

Another authority to whom Capreolus makes appeal is Augustine in the *De libero arbitrio.* When Augustine says that seven and three are ten not only now but always, Capreolus takes him to be talking about an uncreated and necessary essential eternal truth. Capreolus insists that the eternal and uncaused truths and essences maintained by Augustine, Albert, and Thomas are eternally true in the divine intellect and are identified with the divine ideas. What is rejected by Capreolus is that the essences and existences of creatures come forth from a creative efficient cause, since that would mean that the divine ideas are creatures.

Nonetheless, Wells finds Capreolus raising doubts regarding the views of Augustine, Albert, and Thomas. In particular, Capreolus attributes to St. Thomas the view that both the

existence and also the essences of creatures are forthcoming from a creative efficient cause. Wells sees Capreolus taking over the position of Henry of Ghent, who maintained a twofold sort of divine causality, namely, divine efficient causality and divine exemplary causality. The essences and their eternal and necessary *esse essentiae* are forthcoming from God in terms of an eternal exemplary type of causality by which God's knowing endows each essence with an intelligible and quidditative *esse (esse intelligibile et quidditativum).* The contingent existence of creatures is forthcoming from God acting as an efficient creative cause. However, the causally dependent essence, in the first instance, is not properly speaking created. Creation relates to contingent existence and to an efficient cause and not to necessary essences and a formal, extrinsic, and exemplar cause.

Having set forth Capreolus's position in a general fashion, Wells raises a number of critical points. He notes first of all that Capreolus grants a primacy and priority to essence over existence and to necessary essential truths over contingent existential truths. He notes secondly the importance given to essential eternal uncreated truths which are not uncaused. Wells also points out problems that arise in regard to the subject of the uncreated eternal truths. Given the uncreated status of the essences of creatures in Capreolus' *s* position, those essences are not creatures. Nor are they God. One can then ask whether or not this is tantamount to a multiplicity of eternal truths that are not God, since they are caused-the very position that was condemned in 1241. And does not the identification of the uncreated eternal essences and eternal truths with the divine ideas result in the ideas being multiple in such fashion that the simplicity of the divine essence is compromised?

Another set of criticisms set forth by Wells regards predication and the truth of propositions. He chides Capreolus for coming dose to confusing *esse essentiae* with the use of *esse* that treats of *esse veritatis propositionis.* The latter concerns *entia rationis,* that is, intramental beings of reason, and also privations like blindness, negations, and chimeras. Wells therefore asks what could

differentiate nonexistential essential proposmons from nonexistential propositions that deal with beings of reason? He proposes as one possible answer that the truth of essential propositions would be based on an eternal *esse essentiae* while the truth of propositions dealing with privations, negations, and chimeras would be based on a being of reason *(esse rationis).*

Wells turns in the last part of his article to a consideration of the stance that some later Thomists took in regard to Capreolus's views on essence and existence. He begins by characterizing the *Defensiones* as providing a model of a defensive style and of a defensive interpretation of St. Thomas's views on essence and existence. Both Soncinas and Cajetan used Capreolus in their comments on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard in order to defend Aquinas. Soncinas uses the same argumentation that Capreolus derived from Albert and others to show that the essences of creatures are *per se et non per aliud,* in contrast to their existence which is *per aliud et non per se.* However, while Capreolus was wary about attributing to St. Thomas this position regarding the essences of creatures as uncreated, Soncinas shows no such reserve. And while he accepts Henry of Ghent's teaching on the twofold character of divine causality, namely, *causa exemplaris* and *causa efficiens,* he never mentions Henry. His position is like that of Capreolus for he takes both essence and existence to be causally dependent on God. Yet though the essences of creatures are caused they remain uncreated. Soncinas eventually changed his position in his *Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissimae.* He there rejects the twofold relationship of the essences of creatures to the divine causality. Instead he accepts that *humanitas* and *lapideitas* are produced by God as from the first cause, that is, an efficient cause. According to Wells this move by Soncinas is a major event in the history of Thomism for he has purged from the position of Capreolus any dependence on Henry of Ghent's celebrated teaching on the eternal and necessary exemplary causality of the *esse essentiae* of the essences of creatures. But what is remarkable is that Soncinas goes on to maintain that even if God did not exist the proposition "Man is an animal" would still be true. Wells rightly asks if Soncinas is not thereby

maintaining that there are eternal truths which are neither simply God nor creatures, the very position condemned in 1241.

In the remaining pages of his article, Wells discusses Soncinas on essential propositions as well as his critique of Hervaeus Natalis and the defense of the latter by Javelli. He ends his article by emphasizing that while there is disagreement between Soncinas, Hervaeus, andjavelli, all three are opposed to Henry of Ghent and Capreolus on the noncreative exemplary causality of the essence of creatures. For them essences before their creation have an existence that is identical with the existence of their cause. Later *Thomistae* would have to address the question whether there can be many created eternal truths.

A short conclusion completes the volume. In terms of the traditional periodization, the editors see Capreolus's century as a time of "transition" between the medieval Scholasticism of the thirteenth century and the rise of humanism.

The editors note that a superficial view of the situation would lead us to believe that Capreolus did not break new ground but only repeated the theology of St. Thomas and did so defensively as the title of his work, *Defensiones,* indicates. Such an impression is mistaken. The editors consider the very title of Capreolus's work to connote at the same time both a conservative spirit as regards doctrine and also a positive atmosphere in theological debate. These traits reappear in the later posterity of Capreolus's thought, beginning at the end of the fifteenth century, most notably among the authors of the *Compendia.* Examination of the printing of his work during the humanist period and the role that his thought played in theological controversies within the Church at the time of the confrontation with the Reformation indicate that his posterity and its relevance are greater than had been thought.

The editors go on to ask what the figure of Capreolus represents in the debates of his time, debates which have in fact recurred throughout the course of Christian thought from its very beginnings. One could characterize that figure by the refusal to put up with a rupture of theological thought that might otherwise seem inevitable and indeed intrinsic. Rather does Capreolus aim

to bring things back toward a center, that is, toward a unity to be regained. That unity, which is evidently God Himself, explains why theologians and philosophers continue to speak of divine ideas and eternal truths. However, they differ as regards the manner in which they discover the center of theology. In the case of Capreolus, he does this by way of a defense of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, since he is convinced of the danger of advancing the role of philosophy in man's approach to God. The editors rightly note that this is not a new question in Christian thought. Indeed the tension between Athens and Jerusalem already occupied the very first centuries of Christianity.

As regards this issue the editors explain that it is a profound Thomistic conviction that the believer is in fact a "philosopher" in the first sense of the term, namely, one committed to the love for and study of wisdom. They take St. Thomas to have addressed the concern of the Church Fathers by giving a Christological form to his response regarding the eternal truths. Indeed St. Thomas's *Summa theologiae* would have been inconceivable without the revelation of Christ, the *Verbum,* who transmits to us that which St. Thomas and Capreolus calls *sacra doctrina,* which is simply that which God knows regarding himself and which he shares with the blessed.

Regarding this statement about *sacra doctrina,* the editors emphasize that it is based on an experience of God. This fact explains why the respective positions of St. Thomas and Capreolus are not completely acceptable or even simply communicable in the context of a modern conception of academic or scientific life. We are at a great distance from the original conception of the medieval university.

The thought of Capreolus, even if it was principally developed at Paris, shines forth from a provincial convent of the Midi in France, in a town that did not even possess a university. This miracle of a unity of life and thought which made Capreolus a *princeps* is the placing in operation of the Dominican intuition uniting prayer, study, and contemplation.

BOOK REVIEWS

Spea/Ungthe IncomprehensibleGod: ThomasAquinason the Interplayof Positive and Negative Theology. By GREGORYP. ROCCA, 0.P. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004. Pp. xxv + 412. $64.95 (cloth). ISBN-0-8132-1367-3.

Gregory Rocca's book is a uniquely valuable contribution to the literature of Thomism. It is at present the most complete and careful coverage we have of St. Thomas's position on how we can speak intelligibly, philosophically, about God. We must be able to speak positively about God, yet he remains a mystery that exceeds the power of our finite minds to grasp comprehensively. *Speaking the Incomprehensible God* is about Aquinas's remarkable balancing act between positive and negative theology, as they are called technically. All competent Thomists admit the presence of both strands of theology (philosophy of God) in St. Thomas. But they differ, sometimes significantly, on how they interpret the relation between the two paths, the relative importance of each and the relation of priority between them.

The author has the balance between positive and negative theology in St. Thomas exactly right, and expresses this central message of the book beautifully in two early paragraphs:

> The Dionysian path to God is fundamentally twofold: the way of negation and the way of affirmation, or more precisely, the way of negation based on God as the transcendent Beyond and affirmation based on God as Cause of all things.
>
> As we shall see, Aquinas will often interpret the Dionysian maxim about God's absolute unknowability to mean something quite different than what Dionysius originally intended. Aquinas will also elicit a threefold path from the statements of Dionysius, and he will tend to emphasize a domesticated version of the Dionysian *via negativa*, inasmuch as in his hands it becomes a "way" comfortably at ease within the contours of the positive theology. (25)

The author goes on to develop each point in detail-first of all negative theology, then analogy, and finally positive theology. (I would have preferred if he had handled first the positive bond of similitude deriving from creation, then the negative as a qualification of this. But he has preferred to move from

negative to positive theology.) First he develops the incomprehensibility of God, then the *via negativa* as a part of the threefold path of affirmation through causal similitude, negation of any attributes containing imperfection or finitude in their meaning, and reaffirmation of the perfection in its preeminent transcendent state in God. Both these points he handles well, taking us carefully through all the relevant texts in St. Thomas.

The author next deals with analogy as the tool for speaking positively about God. He does this first in Aristotle, then follows all the windings of Thomas's successive attempts to develop a general theory of analogy to meet the needs of his own much richer metaphysical vision. Aquinas tries persistently-and unsuccessfully-to fit these constructs into the framework of Aristotle, but he ends up dropping them, one by one, as inadequate to handle the intrinsic proportional similitude between God and creatures that is required by his own metaphysical vision, which goes far beyond Aristotle. The Aristotelian theory, as shown by the examples adduced by the author, is radically inadequate to explain any really intrinsic proportional similitude between its analogates, let alone between substances, and least of all between God and other beings. The author admits that the one general theory St. Thomas tries to defend most explicitly-namely, that analogy holds when a given positive attribute is predicated of one primary analogate intrinsically and properly, and of all the other analogates only by some relation to the primary one, as food as cause of health in an animal and clear urine as an effect of health-in fact prescinds from, is "neutral" toward, whether the relation in the secondary analogates indicates an intrinsic similitude or not with the primary one.

This may be a helpful general *linguistic* theory of analogy, and is always present in some way in all the Thomistic uses of analogy. But by itself it is not enough to express Thomas's own rich metaphysical theory of the bond of intrinsic proportional similitude between God and his creatures based on his creative act of sharing his own perfections with them in diverse positive, though limited, ways. Aquinas finally comes around, in his later works from the *Summa contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologiae* on, to stating simply and clearly his own version of the special analogy required to speak meaningfully of the relation between God and creatures that flows from creation. Thomas describes this in terms of analogy based on the ontological structure of participation between creatures and God, "predication by participation," as he calls it. When a higher cause, especially a universal and transcendent one like God, shares his goodness and perfections in various finite modes of participation with lower beings caused by it, this generates a shared bond of intrinsic though limited similitude between all the effects and their source, which can only be described in analogous language (*ScG* I, c. 32; *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 2; *STh* I, q. 13, a. 5; etc.) And since "participation" denotes an intrinsic similitude between effects and their cause, the analogous language expressing it must also signify intrinsic similitude between all its analogates. This theory of analogy and its metaphysical foundation go far beyond Aristotle and any of his theories or practice of analogy. I wish the author had explained ·and emphasized a little more strongly and

clearly at the end of his study of analogy this notion of analogous predication by participation as Aquinas's principal tool in explaining how we can speak positively about God. He does, however, later on in chapter 9, speak beautifully of "Participation: Aquinas's Christian View of the Universe." He is clearly aware of the central importance of participation in the metaphysics of Aquinas, but in his long patient examination of the detail of the texts the clear vision of the forest sometimes gets submerged in that of the trees. Lastly, one of the most important points the author makes in his treatment of analogy is that for Thomas analogous terms do not become analogous as isolated concepts, but only when linked to judgment, that is, as actually predicated of diverse subjects-contrary to some other Thomistic traditions, such as seems to be the case with Cajetan and his school of commentators, on whom the author has an illuminating commentary in chapter 5.

In the third part of the book, "Crucial Truths about God," the author unfolds piece by piece the main contents of what we can say positively about God: the existence of God, creation, the likeness between creatures and God, the real distinction between *esse* and essence in all creatures, the immanence and transcendence of God, the divine infinity, eternity, etc. Then in a final part on "The Divine Names," building on what has gone before, he sums up how we can speak intelligibly of God in positive human language that yet respects and leaves intact the unsoundable depths of the divine mystery. It would take too long to discuss all these points in detail, but the author handles them carefully and well. There is a mine of informative explanation to be explored here. In his many detailed footnotes the author shows an amazingly broad acquaintance with the whole range of relevant scholarly literature on almost all points. Readers can only be most grateful to have available such a rich treasury of well-informed, well-balanced commentary on Aquinas's philosophy of God.

In a very rich and eloquent conclusion the author sums up what he considers the unique contribution of St. Thomas: namely, his carefully balanced interweaving of positive and negative theology that reveals "the tensioned structure of any truth about God" (a beautifully terse and insightful phrase!). He shows the importance for the life of the Church of such a grounding of the intelligibility of its religious and liturgical worship of God, where we must somehow speak meaningfully of God in word and action. And it is a much-needed corrective to the common practice of so many contemporary continental philosophers of religion who routinely, following the lead of Heidegger and the postmodernists, overemphasize the negative-theology path almost to the exclusion of the positive.

Aquinas insists that it is possible, though difficult, to come to know the existence of God, creation, and some of his main attributes by the resources of philosophical reason under its own power; he also believes that he has shown how it can be done. Rocca is nevertheless convinced that Aquinas is primarily guided and motivated, although he is not always aware of it, by an implicit background of the light of faith in his discovery of the nature of God as infinite subsistent pure act of being, and of God as the transcendent, gracious and

absolutely free Creator of a radically contingent universe. This may well be the case historically, although I tend myself to go along with St. Thomas in granting a stronger power to reason. Or can we not say that although the first discovery of one of these truths may well come from the illumination of faith, this very light then clarifies and focuses the natural light of our human reason so that it itself now clearly sees the intrinsic, even the unique, intelligibility of the truth in question? But the author's reflections, based on his immense knowledge of the texts, deserve the most serious critical meditation.

My one regret is that in his summary of the conclusions of the book at the end he did not reaffirm more strongly and explicitly what I consider the central philosophical message of the book, so beautifully stated in chapter 1, on the priority of relation between the positive and negative theology in Aquinas. That is, the foundational relation between God and creatures is that of creation, which generates the basic similitude between creatures and their Source that grounds the positive path of theology, and that only *within this positive foundational relation* does the negative theology fit "comfortably" as a set of purifying qualifications to preserve the unsoundable depths of the divine mystery underlying all.

W. NORRIS CLARKE, S.J.

Fordham University
Bronx, New York

Thomistes ou de l'actualite de saint Thomas d'Aquin. By S.-TH. BONINO ET AL. :Editions Parole et Silence, 2003. Pp. 279. 23 € (paper). ISBN 2-84573-179-5.

This is a somewhat unplaceable book, but-especially to readers of *The Thomist-no* less interesting for that. Its editor, Pere Serge-Thomas Bonino, O. P., who is editor likewise of the *Revue Thomiste,* regards it as the "manifesto" of the "Toulouse School" of Thomism-which is simultaneously a Fribourg (Switzerland) School, as the provenance of the essays contained in this volume suggests. But for reasons underlined by the archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Christoph Schonborn, in his foreword, the term "manifesto" is also felt to be a trifle risky, owing to what might be deemed its inappropriately partisan and polemical connotations. So by a play on words the introduction puts its emphasis, rather, on what the book *makes manifest.* And this-we are informed-is not a "party" at all but rather the continuing intellectual vitality of the tradition of thought stemming from Thomas, above all in its power to contribute to "contemporary doctrinal debates, both in philosophy and theology" (11).

One would like to know (but discretion forbids enquiring) what was the editor's first reaction when he received the Schonborn preface. The cardinal

seems grateful for the renaissance of not merely historical but also doctrinal interest in Thomas's corpus-as shown, for example, by *Veritatissplendor* and *Filiesetratio,* the Pope's "two most doctrinal encyclicals" (5). He appears even more preoccupied, however, by a possible new Thomistic bid for conceptual hegemony in Catholic thought. Accordingly, his preface sounds a somewhat minatory note. A new generation of Thomist writers may well represent a grace for the Church. But this will only be a fruitful grace if they avoid the arrogance of which previous Thomistic revivals were guilty. Thomas is the *doctor communis* not because his distinctive fashion of organizing the intelligible content of revelation imposes itself to the exclusion of all others. He is the common doctor precisely because of the quality of his openness to receive from as many strands as possible of the philosophiCal, biblical, and patristic tradition. We remember that Cardinal Schonborn's own first love was the Greek Fathers, who saved a number of European Dominicans of his generation from Neo-Modernism at a time when Thomism was seen-even in the Dominican Order in, say, France-as politically hardly recuperable, whatever the regrets this aroused. So he fires a warning shot across the bows of these Dominicans, who with one exception are considerably younger than himself. Schonborn is certainly thinking of the conflict in the 1940s and 1950s between Henri de Lubac, S. J., (a lover of the Fathers first if a Thomist a good second) and one of the heroes-if not the principal hero-of the new Toulouse-Fribourg revival, Marie-Michel Labourdette, O. P., (a Thomist as committed to the commentators as to Aquinas himself).

In fact, Labourdette, an extraordinarily intelligent and well-read man, did not deny the need to nourish Thomism from without, which could include a fresh reading of its own sources. He simply affirmed the desirability of maintaining its structural principles. And this fits with Bonino's account of what is distinctive about the Thomism represented by these pages. This will be, Bonino explains, a Thomism that is anxious to study Thomas in his historical context-without, however, incarcerating him there. It will treat Thomas as a sapiential master for whom theology is more primary than philosophy-without, however, denying the diverse epistemological bases of these disciplines in the way sometimes found in the High Anglican interpretation of Thomas in the Radical Orthodoxy movement. It will be seriously interested in the major Thomistic commentators who are unlikely to have got absolutely everything wrong or added nothing whatsoever of value-without, however, excluding the possibility that any given commentator may have missed quite a good deal. The new Thomism will then proceed to deploy the resources thus acquired by putting them at the service of contemporary theology, philosophy, and, more widely, culture-without, however, concealing the fact that these are the resources of a *tradition* which possess, therefore, their own coherence and cannot simply be turned into a quarry for this or that disparate purpose.

The essays that make up the meat of the book-and which, evidently, the editor understands to embody this ethos--are grouped into five constellations. An opening section considers fundamental theology and so corresponds, broadly

speaking, to the initial question of the *Prima pars.* In what manner does Thomas practice theology, exegesis, and philosophy, within the unity of his exploration of *sacra doctrina?* The first of a trio of doctrinal sections considers in turn the theology of God, One and Three, and of the human person not only made in God's image but considered in his or her "integral reality." This is followed by a group of essays on "Christ and the Church," including there a sketchy but suggestive approach to Thomism and ecumenism as well as a more audacious proposal about (Thomism and) interreligious dialogue. The final doctrinal heading provides the rubric for five contributions brought together as "morals and spiritual life." The book ends with two useful chronicles of Thomism after Thomas, some bibliographical advice for French-speaking readers, potted biographies of the authors and a postword from Pere (now Cardinal) Georges Cottier, the erstwhile Theologian of the Pontifical Household.

I began this review by calling this book "unplaceable." The difficulty of identifying its real subject matter arises from the very different approaches of these essayists to the topics assigned. Some are content with a straightforward exposition of St Thomas's thought. Others not only make little or no reference to Thomas's actual writings, they deal with issues he hardly addressed. They do so, however, according to principles imagined, whether credibly or otherwise, to be internal to his thought. Thus the account of Thomas's Christology by Gilbert Narcisse would satisfy the most exigent historical theologian, whereas Charles Morerod's idea that the Thomistic contribution to the official bilateral dialogues in the modem ecumenical movement should consist in investigating the philosophical presuppositions of the high contracting parties is a request for an entirely novel initiative. The most valuable essay for a student of the historical Thomas is almost certainly Garrigues's study of Thomist anthropology which, by a subtle reading of, especially, *De malo* makes a convincing case that the "personalist" element in Thomas's account of human agency has been insufficiently appreciated. This has implications for how Thomas evaluated not only the voluntary, concrete, and singular, but also the dialectic of intellect and will in man's union with God. It should also be said that the level of conceptual demand varies greatly, from the limpid simplicities of Gilles Emery on questions about God in Thomas and today, to the high refinement of Emmanuel Perrier on "sources of law [or possibly 'right', = *droit],"* which is probably more pertinent to British than to American readers since much of it presumes the Continental-type jurisprudence now entering the English legal system through the incorporation of European Union law.

Personally, I found most useful in this collection Henry Donneaud's survey of the French Thomism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which includes material not easily available elsewhere. I found rather alarming Benoit-Dominique de la Soujeole's request to consider what is valid in the truth- and value-systems of the nonbiblical religions "participated ecclesiality" (162): that is a formula which, precisely by trespassing on terrain otherwise allotted to the non-Catholic Christian churches and ecclesial communities, proclaims its own excessiveness. ("Ecclesiality of desire"-De la Soujeole's alternative etiquette-is

less objectionable.) Thierry-Dominique Humbrecht's essay, "God and Being, or the New Covenant," will very likely prove the most useful in Anglophone countries to professional teachers of Catholic philosophy and theology. Since phenomenology's "theocentric tum," the issue of the relation of God and being now has a widely recognised pertinence that only Thomists generally appreciated before. That in itself is a testimony to the perennial value of the tradition of Thomist thought which these (mostly) still young men, or men in young middle-age, are continuing with courage, learning, and that peculiar French combination of spirituality with intellectual flair.

I noticed with pleasure the name of Hans Urs von Balthasar, invoked positively and at a crucial point in Humbrecht's argument-though a Balthasarian connection is subterraneously present likewise in the discussion of the beautiful in Narcisse's article on the realism of St Thomas. This is a book with very few footnotes or perhaps he would have mentioned his own doctoral thesis which compared Balthasar's mind-set as disclosed in *Herrlichkeit* with Thomas's appeal to *convenientia,* or revelatory "fittingness"-itself, he argues, a category of theological aesthetics. Among the "new masters," Balthasar's writing is surely one direction in which Thomists could look in order to amplify the theological resources of their tradition-not, of course, uncritically, or without the necessary adjustments that foundational Thomist principles may suggest. This would only be, after all, to repay the compliment Balthasar himself paid Thomas in treating his Christian metaphysic as the high-point, ontologically speaking, of the West.

AIDAN NICHOLS, O. P.

Blackfriars
Cambridge, England

Act & Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes. By Colin E. Gunton. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003. Pp. ix+ 162. $29.00 (paper). ISBN 0-8028-2658-X.

A reworking of a set of public lectures, this book proved to be the author's last, as Gunton died unexpectedly in 2003 after a prolific thirty years as a Reformed theologian in England. As the preposition in the title indicates, the work is not a systematic exposition of the divine attributes themselves but a critical discussion of the way they have been and ought to be treated. The first four chapters raise the various theological issues at stake in how and what we predicate of God's nature and character, but for the most part they offer a sustained criticism of the classical manner of attribution. The last four chapters are more constructive, although Gunton's own proposals for theological predication and brief discussions of certain attributes are neither fully developed

nor neatly presented. Although one can appreciate a few of his criticisms and even the general trajectory he wishes treatment of the attributes now to take, those of more Catholic theological sensibilities will have difficulty identifying with his general discounting of the tradition's development, based as it is on a Barthian tendency to oppose philosophical reasoning about what God must be against revelation's account of God's historical actions on our behalf.

In the preface Gunton says his original intention to offer a more comprehensive treatment of the attributes gave way to a growing dissatisfaction with how the tradition came to define proper theological predication. In his assessment, the doctrine of the divine attributes was often done by using the wrong method, developing the wrong content, and treating things in the wrong order (8). Early Christian theologians emulated the Neoplatonic approach to characterize God as essentially that which the world is not. In favoring a cosmological method of philosophical abstraction from the imperfections found in the world, the tradition displaced the Old Testament as the proper theological foundation of the doctrine of God and neglected to draw God's character more positively from his saving actions in the economy. While explicitly critical of Origen, Pseudo-Dionysius, John of Damascus, and Aquinas, Gunton especially indicts *The Divine Names* for the tradition's excessively negative approach to and characterization of God, one that conceived the relation of God and the world as opposed to one another, in marked contrast to what the incarnation implies. Gunton criticizes the method for its emphasis upon the unknowability of God because it discounts what divine revelation is meant to provide for us and the manner we are given to know it-not by philosophical deduction but by the mediating work of the Son and Spirit to make the Father known. Insisting that the economy, and the incarnation especially, give us knowledge of God's actual being, he rejects the Thomistic position that theological language is analogical in favor of Scotus's claim that it is univocal. In the end Gunton does not say that the classical attributes of God in the tradition are mistaken; rather, his lament is that "the negative, metaphysical and impersonal attributes so dominate the discussion that the personal and action-based attributes [such as love and holiness] appear to have been marginalized" (51).

To reverse the tradition's shortcomings, Gunton advocates an approach that knows God not by abstracting *from* the world but by attending to how the incarnation makes God known *within* the structures of space and time. His driving question is, what difference does the Trinity, understood both economically and immanently, make in a theological account of the divine attributes? In light of the economic Trinity, the account the divine attributes must be more narrative in form and founded upon divine action as beginning in the Father, put into effect through the Son, and brought to completion or perfection by the Holy Spirit. The Trinitarian acts of creation, salvation, and redemption serve as a better context for treating the divine attributes more positively because divine action occurs within and for the world and entails no dualistic opposition between matter and spirit. Articulating what constitutes God's character in light of the Trinitarian form of divine action serves .to

overcome the tradition's rather monadic conception of the divine attributes that developed on the principle *opera ad extra trinitatis sunt indivisa.*

In regard to the immanent or eternal Trinity, Gunton wonders how the divine attributes differ in light of the truth that God is eternally a communion of three persons in relation. Gunton insists "that treatments of the being or essence of God must be trinitarian from the outset" (98), since our knowledge of God is known in a Trinitarian way by the mediatorial work of the Son and the Spirit. The graced privilege of knowing the hypostases-knowledge in the form of personal relation given us in our *koinonia* with God achieved in the economy-gives us knowledge of the essence of God, since the "three persons *are* the being of God, and if we know the Father through the Son and in the Spirit we know the being of God" (112). Ultimately Gunton seeks a three-subject account of each divine perfection because the attributes refer not to the divine nature but to the persons. However, instead of delivering the goods and articulating what the attributes are in light of the Trinity, Gunton continues his reading of the tradition, referencing a few rather non-Trinitarian treatments of the attributes that he unconvincingly says are closer in spirit to his project. He does, briefly, redefine some attributes in terms of God's historical action-for example, divine omnipotence is not so much pure, unrestricted power but the action of God in the cross of Jesus, while divine immutability is economically the constancy of God from creation through redemption. One of the more constructive contributions in the work is a reworking of Barth's rather voluntarist understanding of divine freedom to one that is ordered by the Spirit towards communion. Yet in the end Gunton does not offer a Trinitarian account of all the divine attributes but a discussion of the proper attribute of each divine person. Following St. Paul's Trinitarian benediction in 2 Corinthians 13:14, he identifies the Father's primary characteristic as love (ay<im]), the Son's as grace or mercy (Xaptc;}, and the Holy Spirit's as fellowship or communion (x0tvwvia). The love that is the Father is the origin and end of all economic acts, grace the form of that love made manifest in the world by the Son's redemptive act, and communion, with knowledge and freedom, the sanctifying and perfecting action of the Holy Spirit.

It is important to note that Gunton does not subscribe to the current fad in contemporary theology that simply rejects many classical attributes like immutability or impassibility. Though he admits that the tradition was "not naive" and "had good reason to say the things that it did about God" (22), he never stops to wonder how a method of predication with all the faults he ascribes to it was able to generate a list of attributes which he does not really find problematic in themselves, only in the priority given to them (109). His reading of that tradition is superficial and unsympathetic, where differences in form, method, and emphasis are taken to imply a fundamental antithesis of content. He maintains that the negative way should be rejected absolutely (154), primarily because it opposes God and his creation. Yet for all of its philosophical borrowings the tradition fundamentally rests upon the biblical doctrine of creation, and thus looks to the cosmos, known in the light of faith to be made

in the Logos and ordered by the Spirit, for evidence of God's power, and goodness. The tradition, which was not wanting for commentaries on Genesis, never set God and the world in a relation of opposition but rather contrasted their respective properties, seeing the characteristics of each as opposite precisely because the Uncreated cannot be identified with the created. Gunton's appeal to the doctrine of the incarnation for a univocal understanding of God's nature does not work because the incarnation presupposes this nonidentity of the divine and human at root in the doctrine of creation. And his claim that "in light of the gospel we must be free to confess that we are granted to know the very being of God" (111) tends to overlook the complementary scriptural teaching that our knowledge is imperfect (e.g., 1 Cor 13:12) or, as Rahner put it, that even in his self-revelation God remains mysterious. In his insistence that the economy privileges us with knowledge of God not otherwise available to us, Gunton obfuscates the distinction between the knowledge of faith where we know *that* God is love, holy, three persons, etc., and the knowledge of understanding pursued in theology where we search for the best way to express *what* is God's love, holiness, etc.

As much as Gunton helps one to see value in a more explicitly Trinitarian account of the divine attributes, his approach gains only by losing. It is one thing to hold that the divine essence should be treated with reference to the divine persons; it something else entirely to hold that nothing ought to be said specifically or directly of the divine essence itself. A "problem that is intrinsic to the tradition, Catholic and Protestant alike, [is] to treat natures as things which have attributes. But natures are not hypostases, and so do not have attributes" (149). What Gunton really attempts is an account of the attributes with no reference to the divine nature; only definitions of divine perfections framed in an hypostatically and economically distinct manner pass muster. Thus his redefinition of divine simplicity rests not on the absolute oneness of the divine essence, but upon the perichoretic communion that cannot be broken (122-23). What this seemingly subtle change excludes is the possibility of predicating the perfections of the nature to each person singly, not just communally. St. Gregory of Nazianzus taught that "each person considered in himself is entirely God" *(Oratio* 40, 41), but this indiscriminate sense of the divine perfections is lost by treating the attributes always in reference to the hypostases in their economic or immanent relations. In the end this approach confounds the difference between the attributes and the personal notions, between what is true of God as God and what is distinctly true of each person in relation to the others. It tends to lose the important benefit (very much needed in many contemporary theologies of God) that comes from discussing the divine nature *qua* nature: theological appreciation of its transcendent disparity over any created nature, including our own.

MICHAEL A. HOONHOUT

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

Will There Be Free Will in Heaven? Freedom, Impeccability, and Beatitude. By SIMON FRANCIS GAINE. London and New York: T & T Clark, 2003. Pp 141. $40.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-567-08950-9.

The beatific vision excludes the possibility of sin. Thus George Wall concludes that the blessed are unfree. John Donnelly, conversely, sacrifices the impeccability of the blessed in favor of their freedom (3-7). According to Simon Francis Gaine, Wall and Donnelly are led to these unorthodox views because of an inadequate conception of freedom. Gaine intends to show not only that the freedom of the blessed is coherent with the beatific vision, but that freedom, correctly understood, has its fullest development when the blessed are in complete possession of God and when they are no longer subject to sin. What leads one to see a tension between freedom and impeccability is the understanding of freedom as "freedom of indifference." The tension is solved, however, when one adopts the patristic and Thomistic conception of freedom, which the author, borrowing an expression from Pinckaers, calls "freedom for excellence."

Gaine investigates the problem of freedom in heaven mostly from the theological perspective. His main interest is seemingly to defend the orthodox view of eschatology according to which freedom is supremely possessed by the blessed. The framework of the problem of freedom in the presence of the universal good is clearly theological, yet it is also of great philosophical relevance: what is at stake is the understanding of the pedect mode of freedom and the definition of freedom. The question of the freedom of the blessed thus bt:comes a litmus test for an author's understanding of freedom and a test case for the coherence of his psychology and moral theory. The historical approach to this question gives rise to an interesting observation: "It seems that the more voluntarist a theologian becomes, the more he must perhaps limit the freedom of the blessed in order to maintain an orthodox position on impeccability" (84).

The main authors Gaine studies are Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez. He first examines Suarez, who is significant as an historian, as it were, of medieval philosophy, and as one of the most influential thinkers to transmit medieval thought to modernity. Suarez provides us with a helpful conceptual tool by distinguishing between an intrinsic cause (i.e., the vision of God) of impeccability and an extrinsic cause (i.e., God's providence or grace}. Suarez attributes the intrinsic view, a position he himself adopts, to Thomas, while he classifies Scotus's and Ockham's views as extrinsic (16-21). Regarding the question of how there is freedom in the blessed, Suarez reviews the classical solutions of Augustine and Anselm of Canterbury for whom freedom, understood as freedom from the slavery of sin (Augustine) and as the power to preserve rectitude (Anselm},is fully realized in heaven. But Suarez considers this an equivocal use of the notion of freedom, since in its core, freedom means for him not freedom from sin, but freedom from obligation and absence of necessity. In this regard, Suarez admits that the blessed are free to a certain extent, but due

to the necessitating character of the divine vision, this freedom is diminished (21-32).

On Scotus's account, the finite will of a creature has essentially the power to do otherwise than it does. This does not change in the vision of God. Though one cannot unwill or "nill" *(nolle)* happiness, one can always turn one's attention away from happiness and thus "not will" it *(non velle)*. The vision of God does not by itself alter the will's capacity to turn away from God. It is God, not as beheld, but as providing a special grace, who prevents the blessed from sinning. God extrinsically determines the will so as to remain steadfast in the free enjoyment of the beatific vision (35-68).

Ockham understands freedom as freedom of indifference: whatever the practical intellect dictates, the will has the power to will its opposite. The will does not necessarily will the good in general and it is capable of willing evil as such. The will is thus equally free to will or to nill beatitude and to will or nill God. Even when God is clearly seen, there is no necessary beatific act of fruition. Precisely because the beatific act is entirely caused by God, the blessed cannot nill God: this is what guarantees the perpetuity of beatitude and the impeccability of the blessed. Freedom of indifference remains in the blessed with regard to those acts which are not sinful. Ockham extends the scope of freedom toward evil under the aspect of evil, and yet limits the self-determination of free acts in heaven: he safeguards the impeccability of the blessed only by assuming that the acts of fruition of the blessed are not caused by them but by God (71-84).

If the conception of freedom as something completely unlimited results in the denial or reduction of freedom in the state of perfection, we may have to rethink what freedom really is. Caine's discussion of an adequate understanding of freedom is dependent on Pinckaers's analysis of the discrepancy between freedom of indifference and freedom for excellence. Freedom of indifference is detached from the natural inclination to the good and to happiness. The desire for happiness as the ultimate end is no longer what gives unity to the moral life; rather, morality is seen as the continual subordination to law, the law being an expression of the will of the lawgiver (God or political authority). Freedom for excellence, conversely, is the development of the natural inclinations to the good, the true, etc., by means of the moral virtues. It is a freedom that grows in proportion to the stable adherence to the true good. The closer ohe comes to God, who is the fulfillment of all desire, the more perfect is one's freedom for excellence (87-102).

The test case of the beatific vision does not jeopardize the freedom for excellence, but rather confirms the adequacy of this understanding of freedom. In the possession of God, freedom is fulfilled. There is no tension between freedom and impeccability. In *its* consummation, freedom is a gift of grace. Grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it (119-28). But if freedom for excellence in its completion is essentially the unfailing adhesion to the good, in which sense do the blessed still enjoy free choice *(liberumarbitrium)*?Aquinas offers an answer to this question. God, though necessarily willing his own

goodness, freely decides to share his goodness with creatures. The blessed angels have no tendency to opposites with regard to God; rather, they freely exercise a role in divine providence with regard to humans. They are no longer free to sin (which constitutes not a perfection but rather a defect of the will), but they are free to choose among opposites, with the order of the end kept in view. In similar fashion, the saints in heaven can still exercise free choice, though they cannot depart from God (128-34).

Gaine offers us an elegant solution to the theological problem of freedom in its eschatological dimension. He does not neglect the philosophical relevance of this question, since he is interested in elaborating an adequate definition of freedom. Yet he does not exhaust the rich philosophical potential implied in the problem: while he examines at length the relation between free choice and impeccability, he could have addressed other important topics in more detail, (e.g., the relation between freedom and necessity and the compatibility of freedom and determination). In order to achieve this goal, a more detailed discussion of each author's notion of freedom or free choice outside of the contexts of eschatology would have been necessary. A closer look at medieval conceptions of free choice and of freedom reveals that the opposition between freedom of indifference and freedom for excellence is inadequate to describe the problems at hand. Medieval authors developed the two notions of freedom in order to solve different difficulties, and these two notions are in fact not incompatible: freedom of indifference focuses on the contingency of the act of free choice, whereas freedom for excellence accounts for the relation between freedom and the attainment of one's end. The real question, which Gaine does indeed to some extent address, is the place of natural inclinations in an author's psychology and ethical theory: are acts of free choice elicited independently from inclinations to happiness or not? A greater philosophical awareness could also have rendered Gaine more attentive regarding his use of the notion of "free will." Does he consistently intend *liberumarbitrium?H*so, then "free choice" or "free decision" would have been a better translation, because whether freedom is rooted in the intellect or in the will or in both is a matter of debate. Perhaps some of these limitations could have been avoided had Gaine made more use of secondary sources, including important non-English literature. These reservations set aside, Gaine offers us an interesting and engaging study that uses a specific theological problem to investigate a problem of general relevance: the correct understanding of freedom.

TOBIAS HOFFMANN

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

Alasdair Macintyre. Edited by MARK C. MURPHY. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 219. $65.00 (cloth), $23.00 (paper). ISBN 0-521-79042-5 (cloth), 0-521-79381-5 (paper).

The unified project of Alasdair Macintyre's later work, beginning with *After Virtue,* constitutes an important contribution to the study of philosophy. Nevertheless, secondary works on Macintyre have until recently been restricted mainly to journal articles and book reviews, many of them critical, with much of that criticism based on misinterpretation. Errant critics have faulted Macintyre for constructing a fairly conventional but entirely unworkable metaethical theory, for trying to advance Thomistic natural law while rejecting the metaphysics presupposed by it, and for allowing religion or ideology to drive his work. The mixed quality of this criticism-some of it produced by respected scholars-may confirm Maclntyre's comment on the ways that audiences hear lectures *(Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry,* 2), but it certainly indicates the need for good secondary literature on Macintyre. *Alasdair Macintyre,* edited by Mark Murphy, will go a long way to help fill this need.

The book focuses on Maclntyre's *"After Virtue* project." The authors of the seven essays provide some measured criticism, but the explication of MaCintyre's position remains the focus of the book from beginning to end, and that end is pursued with considerable clarity. These writers come from a variety of specializations and show a real interest in Maclntyre's ideas; their work places Maclntyre's philosophy in the broader context of contemporary thought, reveals some of the crucial influences on its development, and identifies some of the criticisms of it. Gordon Graham offers a very useful study of Maclntyre's account of the role of history in the work of moral philosophy. Jean Porter explores the meaning and implications of Maclntyre's theory of tradition. Stephen Turner gives an excellent introduction to Maclntyre's work in the philosophy of the social sciences. J. L. A. Garcia offers an interesting reading of MaClntyre's critique of modern moral philosophy. David Solomon provides a exposition of Maclntyre's assessment and critique of contemporary moral philosophy. Mark Murphy's own contribution to the book is a study of Maclntyre's political philosophy. Terry Pinkard completes the volume by examining MaClntyre's critique of modernity.

Solomon's essay, "Macintyre and Contemporary Moral Philosophy," is easily the most important contribution to this book. Writing with the authority of a friend and colleague, Solomon traces the development of Maclntyre's ethical positions, and places his contribution to contemporary moral philosophy within the broader debates over metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Solomon draws on works from all stages of Maclntyre's career, beginning with his unpublished master's thesis, *Tbe Significance of Moral Judgments,* to show that "the continuities in Maclntyre's ethical thought are more important than the changes in it" (114). Solomon demonstrates that "Maclntyre's reputation as an

outsider to mainstream academic moral philosophy is misleading." His philosophy has, in fact, developed in and through his engagement with contemporary ethical thought. Solomon traces Maclntyre's critique of conventional metaethics, from the criticism of Moore's intuitionism and Stevenson's emotivism in his master's thesis, through his criticism of Hare, and of conventional normative theories, both Kantian and consequentialist, to the synthetic achievement of *After Virtue.* Noting that Maclntyre's ethical theories "do not fit neatly" into any of the four standard categories of normative ethics (deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and anti-theory), Solomon shows what Macintyre shares with and rejects in each of them. Solomon ends by addressing two lines of criticism that have been advanced against *After Virtue:* (1) that Maclntyre's assessment of contemporary moral culture is wrong, and (2) that Maclntyre's characterization of the limitations of human inquiry is inconsistent with his claim "to be a moral realist whose central theoretical ambition in ethics is to achieve the truth (not just warranted assertibility) about ethics and to provide rational support for the claim that what is achieved is truth" (145). Solomon's essay should become a standard reference in any future work on Macintyre.

Turner's "Macintyre in the Province of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences" will also prove to be of great value to the study of Maclntyre's work. The theory of rationality that Macintyre develops in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* and *Three IOval Versions of Moral Enquiry* has more in common with the philosophy of science than with conventional epistemology, and this chapter helps to explain how Maclntyre's theory of rationality developed. Turner opens a perspective on Macintyre that situates his later work on rationality within his work in the philosophy of the social sciences. Turner's selection of texts will prove useful to any student of Macintyre who is looking for a starting point to probe these issues.

Murphy's chapter, "Maclntyre's Political Philosophy," provides a clarifying summary of Maclntyre's political views. Readers of *After Virtue* may be familiar with Maclntyre's claims that "Natural or human rights ... are fictions" *(After Virtue,* 70) and that "What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages that are already upon us" *(After Virtue,* 263). Murphy shows how these claims fit into the larger picture of Maclntyre's concern with natural law, the role of common goods in shared deliberation, and the impossibility of engaging in shared deliberation in the political structures of modem states (which Macintyre has compared to "giant utility companies" *[Dependent Rational Animals,* 132]). *As* is the case with Turner's article, the breadth of Murphy's documentation will make this an excellent starting point for further research.

One more especially valuable feature of the book is Graham's summary of Maclntyre's history of the rise of Hume in the Scottish Enlightenment in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* Responding to Robert Wokler's complaint that

Macintyre misrepresented Francis Hutcheson as a "conservative" rather than as a "vigorously critical reformer" of Scottish education (25; citing Robert Wolder, "Projecting the Enlightenment" in *After Macintyre* [Notre Dame: Univesity of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 116), Graham clarifies the issues at play in one of the most difficult parts of *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* Graham's answer vindicates Macintyre against Wokler's complaint and highlights what Macintyre takes to be the crucial break in philosophical history that leads to the emotivist culture described in *After Virtue.*

This book provides an excellent introduction to Maclntyre's philosophy, but the picture that it draws is incomplete because the book lacks any sustained discussion of his metaphysics. Porter considers some of the epistemological implications of Maclntyre's Aquinas Lecture (51-52); Murphy addresses Maclntyre's account of natural law (167-70) and raises a question about Maclntyre's metaphysics (195 n. 7); but neither follows this thread to consider the metaphysics presupposed by *After Virtue,* described to some extent in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry,* and declared quite explicitly in the Aquinas Lecture. Others have written on this topic (see Thomas Hibbs, "Maclntyre's Postmodern Thomism," *The Thomist* 57 [1993): 277-97; Kent Reames, "Metaphysics, History, and Moral Philosophy," *The Thomist* 62 [1998): 419-43); and Christopher Lutz, *Tradition in the Ethics of AlasdairMacintyre: Relativism, Thomism, and Philosophy* [Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2004)). The absence of a study of Maclntyre's Thomism leaves this introduction to his later work incomplete, and ignoring Maclntyre's metaphysics has troublesome implications for at least one of the chapters in the book.

Pinkard's chapter includes an extended, though somewhat implicit, defense against Martha Nussbaum's assertion that Maclntyre's later work indulges in nostalgia for an orderly Catholic past that has never really existed (Martha Nussbaum, "Recoiling from Reason," *New York Review of Books* 36 no. 19 [1989}: 36-42). "Any reasonably close reading of his work ... belies such an interpretation," Pinkard declares (181), and that is certainly the case. But the reading that Pinkard presents does not adequately address Maclntyre's moral realism, his defense of Thomistic natural law, or his embrace of the classical metaphysical tradition presupposed by both of these. One might be left wondering why a highly qualified scholar like Nussbaum would accuse Macintyre of nostalgia in the first place. Pinkard recognizes Maclntyre's realism (186-87, 190) but otherwise ignores the metaphysical thel!le altogether, and draws two conclusions that seem out of place: (1) "In Maclntyre's view •••. moral reality itself changes as conceptions of the good themselves change-there is neither one moral reality out there waiting for us to respond to it, nor a substantive constraint bound up with the formal conditions of constructing such a reality" (184); and (2) "the problem of the existence of a 'natural' standard of practical reasoning-taking 'natural' here in its eighteenth-century sense as embodying those standards that are 'fixed' in contrast with the variable standards

of 'positive' law-appears just as acute for Macintyre, who eschews appeal to pre-Galilean conceptions of nature, as it is for the Kantians who accept the same thing." Pinkard does not draw the important distinction between Maclntyre's philosophical methods and his substantive positions. Maclntyre's philosophical method is entirely contemporary, and this may tend to conceal his metaphysical commitments; but he uses contemporary philosophical resources to mark out the limits of those resources, to identify the questions that those resources cannot address, to mark out an intellectual space that a properly constituted metaphysics could fill, and to suggest that at least one tradition of inquiry is already at peace with the fruitfulness of its own approach to those problems (see Maclntyre's response to Susan Coleman in "A Partial Response to My Critics" in *After Macintyre,* 300). What Pinkard provides, then, is an excellent account of Maclntyre's methods that overlooks a crucial part of the trajectory of Maclntyre's work.

Graham's question about "The Disquieting Suggestion" of *After Virtue* marks a different kind of problem. Graham asks: "What are the moral equivalents of widespread riots, factories being burned down, books destroyed, physicists lynched? What is the counterpart to the Know-Nothing political movement? And when did all this happen? And where?" He answers that "in subsequent pages [Macintyre] records no social and political episodes of the type that mark his imaginary history of science that have hitherto gone unnoticed" (16). This is simply not the case. In chapters 4 and 5 of *After Virtue,* Macintyre identifies the predecessor culture to emotivism as the secularized Protestant culture of certain parts of northern Europe, and identifies the analogous event as the Protestant Reformation (an event that displaced moral philosophy and submitted the monastic centers that studied it to considerable violence) and argues that the scientific revolution only compounded the problem. Solomon explains: "Our ability to know and act in accord with the divine law was denied by the voluntarism of the Protestant reformers and their acceptance of a strong doctrine of original sin, while the teleological conception of nature at the heart of the classical conception of human life was abandoned with the acceptance of the new mechanistic science" (135). Identifying the counterpart to the Know-Nothing movement and the predecessor culture to emotivism in *After Virtue* is crucial to understanding Maclntyre's decision in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* to discuss the history of the enlightenment in Scotland rather than in France (see *After Macintyre,* 299), a decision that some critics found altogether unfathomable (19). This minor oversight takes little away from the value of Graham's chapter, however, *as* his study of Maclntyre's history of the Scottish Enlightenment makes the issues involved very clear.

Another minor difficulty arises in Porter's chapter on Maclntyre's use of the term "tradition." Porter's exposition is excellent, but it includes a critique that seems to be inconsistent with that exposition on at least one point. Porter identifies some of the conditions that are required "for an encounter between two rival traditions to take place" that could allow one tradition to gain insights

from its rival to help overcome an epistemological crisis. These include (1) "genuine contact" which entails "sustained contact" and that adherents of each tradition "remain sufficiently open to consider the claims of the rival tradition seriously," and (2) the ability "to recognize that the alternative presents a genuine rival, that the alternative offers a distinct account of the same realities with which they themselves are concerned" (48-49). This is a good statement of Maclntyre's position. Differing traditions, even traditions that rival each other, can coexist in mutual ignorance or mutual dismissal for an indefinite amount of time. It is only when the adherents of one moral tradition find themselves in an epistemological crisis that they are likely to take a keen interest in the moral and intellectual resources of their rivals (this was a key point in Maclntyre's "Epistemological Crisis, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," *Monist* 60 (1977]: 453-72). Maclntyre's theory of tradition is not a conventional metaethical theory; it is, more humbly yet more profoundly, an account of the ways in which real traditions.may interact when their committed adherents are trying to solve real problems. So when Porter turns to criticism a few pages later, it is surprising that her questions seem to suggest that Macintyre is offering a conventional metaethical theory: "[I]t is not clear how the rival claims of disparate moral traditions could be adjudicated. Indeed, it is not clear that there could be sufficient genuine conflict between moral traditions for them to count as genuinely rival traditions" (54). Consequently, she raises this question: Can unrelated traditions challenge each other? If Porter's preceding description of Maclntyre's position is correct-and I am convinced that it is-then the answer is that it depends on whether and to what extent contingent circumstances bring the adl:erents of such traditions into genuine contact. As Macintyre insists in "Epistemological Crises," such crises cannot be manufactured. The question of how to adjudicate the rival claims of disparate moral traditions seems more at home in the conventional metaethics that Macintyre rejects.

Murphy's book would be worth its price for its bibliography alone, but it would be equally valuable if it contained only the essays by Solomon or Turner. Dependable in its interpretations, well documented, and highly readable, it will help professionals, students, and general readers to understand Maclntyre's thought and its importance, along with some of the more significant criticisms that have been advanced against it. While the lack of a discussion of Maclntyre's Thomism leaves it incomplete, *Alasdair Macintyre* goes a long way to help fill the need for good secondary literature on Macintyre, and it raises the bar in the study of Alasdair Macintyre to a new level.

CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN LUIZ

Saint Meinrad School of Theology
Saint Meinrad, Indiana

Litterature et theologie: Une saison en enfer. By OLMER-THOMAS VENARD, O.P. Geneve: Ad Solem, 2002. Pp. 505. 47 €. ISBN 2884820051.

In the years immediately following Vatican II, Thomists often despaired of Aquinas having any further influence on Catholic thought. In fact, more recent years have seen a remarkable rediscovery of Thomas Aquinas himself, and of his relevance to our intellectual milieu. An integral part of this fresh appropriation has been theological as well as philosophical; indeed, most recently (under Josef Pieper's inspiration) we have put pay to that bifurcation of theology and philosophy which bedeviled neo-Thomism and has been institutionalized in Catholic colleges and universities in North America. We have seen how closely such a reading was tied to a modernist bifurcation between reason and everything else. The merit of postmodern reflection has been to restore Newman's reminder {bolstered by Gadamer) that all inquiry is at root fiduciary, so faith can count as well as a mode of knowing-provided it profits from that critical assessment which each Abrahamic tradition has espoused in its better moments. Olivier-Thomas Venard's amazing work fits into the genre just described, moving it astutely in the direction of literary studies: a second subtitle reads "Thomas Aquinas: Poet Theologian," while the principal subtitle is taken from the masterwork of Rimbaud.

Briefly, the intent of the author-a Dominican teaching at the Ecole Biblique in Jerusalem-is to recover the literary potential of Aquinas's composition of his theological inquiry, notably in the *Summa Theologiae*, and to do so by facing off his mode of expression with the poetic oeuvre of Rimbaud. This requires him initially to show how theological inquiry must be literary through and through. He accomplishes this by deftly deconstructing the conceptualist ethos that dominated neo-Thomism, and doing so from a careful clarification of the sense in which Aquinas himself purposed to establish *theologia* as a *scientia*. We have come to eschew translating those terms precisely to keep readers from importing contemporary notions into a medieval discourse. And it turns out that medieval discourse proves far more congenial to the postmodern sensibility in which we all live, even if it may take a work like this to persuade us of that fact. While Venard's guides are multiple, two especially reflect the dimensions of this work: Marie-Dominique Chenu and George Steiner (notably his *Real Presences)*. Chenu insisted on historical appropriation of Aquinas in the face of ideological retrieval, while Steiner has effectively reminded poststructuralist literary critics how their attempt to erase the author is rooted in their original denial of a creator. In fact, Venard's work is designed to show how Aquinas's literary strategies, especially in the lapidary prose of the *Summa*, can be compared to poetic composition in the way they succeed in manifesting what cannot be expressed directly.

Along the way, Venard shows how Aquinas's analogical use of language employs metaphor effectively and judiciously to make its point, thereby deconstructing the way in which conceptualist Thomists needed to sever analogy from metaphor. In fact, this reminder could encapsulate the entire thesis of Venard's exploration: analogous discourse *in divinis* must always retain a hint of

metaphor, since the primary analogate--God-resists conceptualization, as does the *res significata* of any divine name. That means, of course, there can be no "theory of analogy" short of a set of judiciously assembled reminders: in a postmodern reading of Aquinas sensitive to its medieval setting, Wittgenstein prevails! Philosophers wedded to a conceptualist mode have never been able to make sense of "analogy"; the literary maneuver proposed here (in an astutely philosophical mode) could help enlarge their appreciation of medieval modes of inquiry by showing how attention to literary composition can effectively improve an inquiry of philosophical theology. That will, however, require sustained work-not simply because conceptual univocity offers a handy default mode for philosophers, but also because this study is a demanding one, as a summary of the sections reveals.

The book is unabashedly theological in tone, tracing a sustained attention to verbal composition to the emanation of the Word in God. It is this focus that legitimizes the author's literary scrutiny of the *Summa* in the initial section: "From Theology to Literature." What follows-"From Literature to Theology" -takes its initial steps with Arthur Rimbaud to espouse the literary vocation of a poet, as that call has fascinated poststructuralists in their quest for a transcendence devoid of a disturbing divinity. Venard takes Steiner a step further to show how an explicitly Trinitarian model of Word can effectively (and uniquely?) restore "the lost Word" for which so many continue to search. Then from the "poetic of God in the thirteenth century" we are moved to an effective (yet always proleptic) symbol of presence in the Eucharist. Part 3-"Rhetorical Synthesis and the *Summa* Tbeologiae"-begins with a penetrating analysis of the "burnbg bush" (Exod 3), juxtaposing and interweaving Gilson's insight into its role of privileging *esse* for medieval thought with postmodern aspirations for poetry. Here is where the inquiry reaps philosophical fruit, exalting that mode of inquiry dubbed *convenientia* by medievals, and found wanting by later theologians hoping for more direct articulation, if not proof, of matters divine. Venard makes masterful use of Aquinas's proposal of theology as a "subalternate *scientia,"* likening it to astronomy as it makes use of mathematics, to remind us how theologians must alter the philosophical categories that will prove indispensable to them. (This chapter speaks directly to analytic "philosophers of religion," though without directly addressing them.) So we are treated to a reconstruction of the task of theological composition, with an eye to a *scientia* which must proceed so conscious of its subject as at best to attempt to *display* that subject as an object, since conceptualization will not only fail to be adequate, but when proposed can so mislead as to falsify its object (i.e., since adequacy is what conceptualization seeks and promises).

Finally, we are treated to three "impressions" that might help us to grasp the centrality of the "person of Christ" to this work which proposes to "englobe all the historical actions of Jesus . . . in an original and holistic work of *manifestation:* as the Word, incarnate, never ceases to be the first and supreme sage," and whose composition "'coincides with a vital conception of creation continuing at each instant, as a work common to the triune God, yet whose

master pattern is the Word-Son" (458). These "impressions" derive from Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle, in this case, the *Metapbysics* and *Posterior Analytics.* From the first, we are directed to "Aristotle's inquiry into the most appropriate way to come to know the *nature* of things" (459). Here, it seems, every relevant form of inquiry is demanded, though all need to be sifted; poets have their place as well, though it will be relativized. What counts, of course, is the act of sifting, which Aristotle identified with the *dialectic* of Plato. From the *Posterior Analytics,* we are treated to the vexing issue of foreknowledge needed to come to know anything-the famous "Meno-problem, which leads us into the presumption dear to both Aristotle and Aquinas, of a "profound harmony between the steps of reason and processes of nature" (466)-yet one for which Aquinas's creation-centered scheme can more effectively account. Finally, also from the *Posterior Analytics,* we note how one must recognize "wisdom as a *habitus* for first principles" (468), and we are invited to link this commentary on Aristotle with Aquinas's commentary on John, where "Christ is explicitly designated as the unique principle of science" (479) as, of course, the Word though whom the universe is created. So this work mimics the journey of discovery which is the *Summa,* and does do by detailing for us the manner in which it has explicitly been constructed, and the relevance such construction has to our efforts to understand in these arcane arenas. Such a rediscovery of Aquinas's genius for literary composition can return us to an attentiveness which conceptualist modes of thought had all but obscured, and reawaken our appreciation of the literary challenges that constructing an authentically analogous mode of discourse will pose. *Caveant scriptores,* yet accomplishments like this one can display the fruits of genuine apprenticeship to a literary master of philosophical theology. We are promised two successor volumes, to carry this thesis into more explicitly philosophical and then theological domains. The second has been completed, and the third is in process. *Ad multos annos!*

DAVID B. BURRELL, C.S.C.

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

The Very Rich Hours of Jacques Maritain: A Spiritual Life. By RALPH MCINERNY. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003. Pp. 235. $32.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-268-04359-0.

The Very Rich Hours of Jacques Maritain is a relentless statement of the relationship between philosophy and faith in the man whom Yves Simon called the only genius in Catholic philosophy in three hundred years. It is also Mclnerny's testimony to the sanctity of Maritain and the magnificent

he was for Catholic students of philosophy during the golden years of twentieth-century Thomism, which supported philosophizing in an atmosphere of faith.

The intriguing title shows that the real biography of Maritain is a spiritual biography, which Mcinerny divides according to the liturgical day. Using the hours from Matins to Compline as the frame for the birth-to-death events of Maritain's life and work, Mcinerny begins the book with an "invitatory": an account of the visit of Edith Stein in 1932 to the Thomistic Study Circle at the Maritains' home in the Paris suburb of Meudon. Mcinerny uses her visit to illustrate the spiritual as well as intellectual attraction of the Maritains' lives and thought, in this case an appeal felt by a brilliant young philosopher who would one day become a saint.

For those who have read much of Maritain, this book may disappoint, for it is not a thorough treatment of the Maritainian corpus. Neither is it an intensive examination of Jacques's spiritual life in the typical way of spiritual biography, which would have required more personal details about his life in Paris, Toronto, etc., and included correspondence with spiritual intimates and testimonies from friends. The real audience for the book is persons wanting a provocative account of philosophy as found in a Catholic thinker whose fundamental interest was faith, sanctity, and union with God.

Mcinerny repeats the factual elements of Maritain's life, ones familiar to readers of Maritain and to be found in other works, including Raissa's evocative memoirs, *We Have Been Friends Together* and *Adventures in Grace*. He writes interestingly of the distinguished and rather secular Parisian family into which Jacques was born in 1882; of his youthful friendships with Charles Peguy and Ernest Psichari; of Jacques and Raissa's student days at the Sorbonne, first under the influence of skeptical professors, and then listening to the lectures of Henri Bergson, through whom "their metaphysical gloom began to lift" (17). In 1904, the year of their marriage, they read Leon Bloy's novel *The Woman* Who *Was* Poor and then met Bloy, a man contemptuous of philosophy but heroic in faith, who became their godfather. Bloy answered their question of why one lives. The answer: to be a saint. Jacques and Raissa were convinced that their baptism into the Catholic Church would separate them from family and friends and even the very activity of philosophical thought. But two years later they began to study the writings of St. Thomas after meeting the Dominican theologian Humbert Clerissac, who told Jacques that Christian life is based on knowing that God is Truth. Bloy was the occasion of bringing rest to their hearts and souls, Clerissac and St. Thomas of bringing certitude to their minds.

Mcinerny also writes of well-known public intellectual/spiritual events in Maritain's life, such as Jacques's initial acceptance and eventual rejection of Action Fran9lise; his and Raissa's association with notable French artists like Jean Cocteau and Andre Gide; his friendship with eminent Catholics with whom he sometimes quarreled: George Bernanos, Paul Claudel, and Reginald Garrigou-LaGrange; his North American period in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly at New York and Princeton; his ambassadorship from France to the Vatican following World War II; the death of Raissa in 1960; and his last years at

Toulouse with the Little Brothers of Jesus. He also describes the unusual occurrence early in Jacques's career when a young French soldier, Pierre Villard, who had once taken a course from Jacques and whom he later spiritually counseled, died in combat in 1918 and left Jacques a sizeable inheritance. That bequest supported Jacques and Raissa in their work, including the study circle at Mendon, which became a center of both philosophical study and spiritual life.

Naturally, the association most to be noted in Jacques's life is that with RaYssa. According to Jacques's own avowal she was the greatest influence on his life and work. Some have questioned the merits of her poetry or the depths of her spirituality, but it is dear that Jacques doubted neither. He believed his wife to be a fine poet, but more importantly he believed she was a saint. In 1912, Jacques and Raissa took a vow of chastity, not because of any hesitation about the goodness of sexual love but from a desire to follow one of the counsels of the evangelical life. Jacques and Raissa's life together for sixty years was, in the midst of intellectual combats, personal illnesses, and the tragedies of the great wars, the story of two people in love with each other and God. Raissa died on 4 November 1960 and soon after Jacques read her journals and published them. He saw Raissa as a mystic of high order and felt her spiritual journals were of the rank of Therese of Lisieux and John of the Cross.

Mcinerny is a master teacher of the vast literature Maritain produced as he manages-along with the main theme of the book-to attend to many essential ideas in Maritain's philosophical work and to summarize Thomistic principles that animated Jacques's work. One easily finds in Jacques's writings instances of his contemporaneity, his desire to reach people, including thinkers of his time; 01te also finds a recurrent anti-modernism. Mcinerny reminds us of Maritain's detestation of the modern turn from the transcendent in philosophy and culture and his unremitting campaign against all modern philosophers (whom in other ways he often admired) from Descartes to Kant to Sartre, who denied the intelligibility of being and the primacy of the other in cognition. His anti- and pro- attitudes towards the modern mind were associated not only with his commitment to the perennial philosophy of St. Thomas but also with his ultimate religious motivation and his conviction of the goodness in the heart of the common man, who spontaneously seeks the transcendental dimensions of the true, the good, and the beautiful and whose natural reason achieves a preconceptual outline of metaphysics.

For some persons interested in Maritain's philosophy, it was his work in aesthetics and politics that was most significant. Also dearest in these fields is his application of Thomism to modern life and his trust in the human instinct for the beautiful and the good. Concerning art and poetry, he said that the soul of the artist or poet inevitably inclines to something beautiful to be made. His analysis emphasizes the artist's and writer's awareness of his unique creative intuition, manifesting an attention to the personal in art that has evolved over the millennia and finds its source in understanding God as a Trinity of persons. Such aesthetics in the hands of Maritain guided him in fulfilling his and Raissa's resolve, during their retreat year of 1919, as Benedictine pblates living near

Solesmes, to enter into the world of high culture. Thus, the Thomistic Study Circle involved an apostolate to the artists and poets who came to Meudon. Jacques and Raissa encouraged their artist friends, including famously atheistic and sinful ones, towards Catholicism. They felt that such artists, in their creative intuition, had, in and beyond their personal torments, a light and desire for the Beauty that redeems.

During the 1930s Maritain turned to political questions, publishing his masterful political-philosophical work, *Integral Humanism,* in 1936. Underneath anthropomorphic humanism and its forms of democratic governments there is an authentic inspiration that proscribes partisanship, seeks a just and transcendent balance of political views, and entails an ultimate assent to the divine. The natural-law theory of Aquinas and other classical thinkers has been lost sight of but still can be present-along with its gospel foundations-in practical conclusions, as in an agreement on human rights. Maritain did not seek a sacral polity but, rather, one in which Christian faith is exercised with tolerance throughout pluralistic societies, in which it remains the case that the common man has, by inclination, a grasp of the goodness of the precepts of the natural law.

Was Maritain the quintessential Thomist Mcinerny claims he was? Mcinerny says that Maritain scrupulously analyzed the texts of Aquinas but that when he wrote he sought to show the contemporary relevance of St. Thomas's principles. He had taken to heart Leo XIII's exhortation about applying St. Thomas to the present age. And in Maritain's use those principles had one end in view, the link between reason and faith.

Maritain's book on Christian philosophy appeared in 1933. Wanting to preserve the autonomy of philosophy, he said that certain, significant, and ultimate knowledge can be had through reason alone. Yet he had one exception for faith's influence: while theoretical reason suffices to achieve certainties about God or an angelic order, in the practical historical order of decision about concrete moral acts reason alone is not enough. Since we are ordered to but one end, a supernatural one, an adequate moral philosophy depends on the higher light of faith and theology.

Maritain's life work, and Mclnerny's book, invite us to wonder how a Catholic's faith affects his philosophy without violating the rights of the natural intelligence. Many Catholic philosophers will keep their own spiritual and intellectual lives more separate than Maritain did his, and this constant tying of the two in Mclnerny's book will distract or disturb them. On the other hand, there are Gilsonians who hold that Maritain never appreciated St. Thomas's theological use of philosophy.

The question remains: in what way did Maritain's faith affect his philosophy-apart from his distinctive notion of moral philosophy adequately considered? Mcinerny profusely demonstrates the *fact* of some sort of connection between Maritain's philosophy and his faith. He does not explain the connection, though what he repeats from Maritain about the distinction between the nature and the state of philosophical reason is helpful. Of its nature

philosophical wisdom requires only reason. But the attainment of that wisdom can be helped or harmed by the state, or subjective condition, of the thinker (e.g., living in an environment supportive of faith or one contrary to it). I think analogously of Maritain speaking of the teacher of mathematics or astronomy or engineering, a teacher who does not believe in a Christian mathematics, etc., but who possesses Christian wisdom and whose "teaching overflows from a soul dedicated to contemplation" and which can convey to the student "an unspoken intimation of the immortal value of truth, and of those rational laws and harmony which are at play in things and whose primary roots are in the divine intellect" *(The Education of Man: The Educational Philosophy 9f Jacques Maritain*, edited with an introduction by Donald and Idella Gallagher [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc, 1962], 136).

I add a few comments on this provocative question of the connection between faith and reason. First, is there a proper positive dependence of the Catholic philosopher on the authoritative teachings of the Church? Do, and ought, revelation, Church doctrine, and theology influence our philosophy only negatively? Did the Tridentine Church from 1900 to 1960 play a significant role in Maritain's philosophical thought and commitments? Have some of us who received our higher education in America in the 1940s and 1950s had more trouble than we ought in grounding our personal philosophizing because of an inappropriate dependence on the link made by Leo XIII and other popes of St. Thomas and the intelligibility of Catholic faith? But the greater question is this: are there atemporal certainties of revelation, doctrine, and, yes, theology that support the perennial philosophy of St. Thomas, Jacques Maritain, and potentially all Catholic philosophers?

Second, the ailing Yves Simon, in his last, dramatic lecture at Notre Dame, said he himself preferred not to engage in the religious references or the apostolic concern one finds constantly in Maritain's philosophical writings, because he preferred a way that insured epistemological purity and logical rigor. No doubt Maritain also greatly valued such purity and rigor, yet evidently he did not feel they were threatened by bringing up so regularly, in all of his writings, the religious, the theological, and the mystical. In spite of the rich association of reason and faith in Maritain's work, no Christian philosopher-as Simon himself went on to note in the same lecture-has been more insistent than Maritain in asserting the distinction between philosophy and faith, in arguing for the autonomy of philosophy, in dedicating himself to being, which is intelligible to human reason.

We can suppose in Maritain a great integrality of soul in which he experienced the proportions and linkages between his faith and reason. He had a heroic capacity to relate to both God and world This union without confusion of the things of heaven and the things of earth was Maritain's glory. He had a continuous willingness to allow the higher life and light of faith to absorb and assist him, to find analogies between faith and reason, and even, perhaps, to view mystically the philosophical order itself. Mcinerny says of Maritain: "The ideal of the intellectual life that he embodied inspired generations of laypeople who

decided to devote their lives to philosophy or to theology or to see whatever they did *sub specie aeternitatis"* (80). Perhaps it was this last and sublime factor that Maritain encouraged or helped elicit most from his students and readers. I suspect that Maritain's experience of God, and his seeing things from God's point of view, were the principal causes of the religious references in his philosophical writings. But, no matter how absorbed in God or how divinely inspired is one's understanding of things now, and even in eternity, one ought never to let go of the realm and rights of sense and reason. This conviction of the value of creation, including human intellection, was the source of Maritain's fidelity to the philosophical order.

Third, a given Catholic philosopher could be a saint who never admits the light of faith in any way into his philosophy. Another Catholic philosopher could be avoiding deep faith in and love of God, an openness to holiness, and even a needed renunciation of his philosophical reason. Are we Catholic intellectuals humble when we hesitate on the quest for sanctity? How many of us when we were young and heard and read the words and knew of the way of Jacques Maritain were moved to a kinship of life and thought? How many of us have been open to the same sort of immolation of philosophical thinking as Jacques was early in his adult life and have refused the sacrifice? The natural, and supernatural, cognition of God and all things as related to God is not particularly present in the Catholic college and university today, not just because of a proper and passionate dedication to the relative autonomy of participated being and the rights and demands of reason but also, sometimes, because of our lack of faith and courage: our professional cowardliness, humiliation, and lust, our dalliance caused by an adoration of the earth, and our dilatoriness in looking at the face of God.

In any case, I finished Mclnerny's book with gratitude to the director of the Jacques Maritain Center for writing it as he has and being as he is.

RONALD E. LANE

College of Saint Benedict
Saint Joseph, Minnesota

Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato. By UOYD P. GERSON. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. 291. $55.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-19-925763-9.

In the Neoplatonism of Plotinus, all elements of the world lie between the One, which is fully actual and transcendent, and matter, which is mere potentiality and the sheer deprivation of being. This world view has both epistemological and ethical dimensions. *As* matter is brought into being through its attraction to the One, so too does it gain in intelligibility and form such that

the resultant objects are fit to be comprehended by the soul. Though attached to a body, the soul may purify itself through asceticism and contemplation and rise up toward the source of existence and truth. Down to the present day, the Plotinian outlook has exerted a tremendous influence on the study of Platonism itself, with the result that it has become almost an historical truism that Plato posits supersensible forms or ideas, eternal and transcendent, that condition the material world of sensible objects. Yet it often seems that Plato fails to specify precisely the relationship between forms and particulars-sometimes speaking as if forms were strictly separate and apart from particulars and sometimes as if forms were present in and seen through particulars. Neoplatonism, therefore, presents itself as a clarification of Platonic philosophy, by fixing the ambiguous status of forms vis-a-vis particulars and describing the series of intermediary elements.

I offer the preceding comments to illustrate the sort of Platonism that is assumed in the background of Lloyd *Gerson'sKnowing Persons:A Study in Plato.* Gerson's central thesis is that a distinction between "human being" and "person," or alternatively, between "embodied soul" and "disembodied ideal" underlies Platonic philosophy. He suggests that once this distinction is appreciated, it renders various aspects of the Platonic dialogues more clear and coherent. Broadly speaking, the Platonic philosophy to which Gerson refers is a two-world metaphysics consisting of the priority of the forms and the posteriority of the material, sensible world. The soul's task both intellectually and morally is to free itself as much as possible from the body, to distance itself from sensible things, and to rise up toward the intelligible forms. As Gerson states, "One of my main contentions is that Plato's account of personhood or the self has to be understood from the •top down,' i.e. within the context of his hierarchical metaphysics" (9-10). Once Plato's dualistic metaphysics is stipulated, it serves as a framework for a conceptual resolution of his notion of person: "we shall discover that there are good textual grounds for insisting that Plato distinguishes between the endowment of personhood and the achievement of personhood and that our endowment-the persons we are here below--does stand to an ideal of achievement roughly as images stand to their eternal exemplars. *H* this is so, much of what Plato says about person can be illuminated by bringing the metaphysics to bear on the psychology" (3). Thus, Gerson's thesis could be reformulated as follows: given this fixed metaphysical background, a concept of 'person' can be posited that is in logical harmony with it. The bulk of the book consists in a reading of various passages from the dialogues in light of the "embodied souVdisembodied ideal" distinction. Chapter 2 focuses on the manner in which this distinction plays out in the *Phaedo;* chapter 3 deals with the division of the soul in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus;* chapters 4 and 5 discuss the accounts of knowledge in the *Republic* and *Theaetetus,* respectively, and how these views touch on the concept of 'person'; and chapter 6 rounds out the book with short discussion of the *Timaeus, Philebus,* and the *LAws.*

Gerson holds that the distinction between "embodied soul" and "disembodied ideal" overcomes the simplistic psychological dualism between body and soul often attributed to Plato, and he holds that this misunderstanding arises due to the fact that Greek has only one world for "person" and "human being", namely, *anthropos.* Consequently, "[s]ince he [Plato] does not have a technical or even semi-technical term for 'person' as distinct from the ordinary words for a human being ... it is not an entirely straightforward matter to show exactly how the distinction is operating in a given text" (2). Thus, when Gerson writes that "Plato does indeed wish to distinguish between human beings and persons" or "for Plato, a person is a soul and a human being is a composite of soul and body" (ibid.), he is not referring to Plato's descriptions of persons as we find them in the dialogues, since on the surface no such distinction can be seen; rather, he is referring to the intended meaning discovered in the dialogues and uncovered through his own analysis of them. Hence, his method consists in positing the distinction between "embodied soul" and "disembodied ideal," applying it to the dialogues, and then setting out to find whether this distinction is contained within them. The payoff of this method is that it allows Gerson to discern connections between various Platonic doctrines not previously apparent-for example, to bring Platonic ethics and psychology into more of a logical harmony with its metaphysics and epistemology (see, e.g., comments on 3-4 and 9-10 as well as chapter 4 on the *Republic's* account of knowledge); to show the motivations in Plato's mind from one doctrine to the next, from dialogue to dialogue (see, e.g., 48-49, 97-98, 149, and 157 for comments concerning how Plato deepens his account of personhood in order to buttress moral a:id epistemological doctrines); and to restore certain other teachings to a logical consistency (see, e.g., the discussion of *akrasia* at 40-49).

There is no doubt that Gerson's distinction-the "separation thesis," let us call it-reflects something of the spirit of Socrates' arguments in which the soul is represented as sometimes abiding in, sometimes separate from, a body, but always superior to the body and its proper ruler. Moreover, in certain dialogues the theme of the soul's superiority to the body is sharpened and intensified to a degree that approaches Gerson's distinction-most notably, the discussion of the *Phaedo* where the theme of dying looms large and where philosophy itself is defined as preparation for the separation of body and soul (see *Phaedo* 63e-69d, 81a-84b, and 114c in the concluding myth). Yeti wonder whether the separation thesis sufficiently captures the nuances and complexities of the Platonic treatment of the soul and body across all the dialogues. Consider the account of the soul in the *Republic.* A central concern of the dialogue is the taming of *eros* and *thumos,* passions associated with the body but also amenable to reason and calculation. While there is no doubt that the *Republic* deemphasizes the role of the body and trumpets the rule of reason, are we warranted in concluding that the dialogue's main ethical and educative advice is that the body is bad and contaminating and that the soul needs to escape from its confines and those of the material world generally? After all, a central teaching of the *Republic* does appear to be that an integration of reason and desire is a precondition of political

life and that this integration culminates in the person of the philosopher-king. One could argue that it is the philosopher-king who lives most consciously and fully in the material world precisely because he understands the eternal principles that govern it and therefore achieves the harmonization of body and soul most perfectly.

It is not my aim here to argue for this "harmonization thesis" but only to suggest that Gerson's study could be viewed as a platform from which to begin a broader consideration of Platonic philosophy. Indeed, even in those dialogues where the "ideal of disembodiment" or Plato's "other-worldliness" is at its height, the separation thesis still might be shown to be an aspect of a larger thesis positing a harmony of body and soul. So the *Phaedo,* for example, which places the greatest emphasis on separation of body and soul, also describes a subsequent reunion of the two in a future life. The proofs for the soul's immortality explicitly point to the soul's ongoing return to the body (see 72a-d). Indeed, Socrates' initial arguments in the *Phaedo* use the notion of "recollection" to argue for the soul's existence prior to entering a body and thus concern embodiment rather than disembodiment. Even in the concluding myth, Socrates says that the path to Hades "is neither one nor simple" and that individuals, "having undergone [in Hades] what they must and stayed there for the appointed rime ... are led back here by another guide after long periods of rime" (107e-108a). That separation is a moment in a greater circular motion of the soul through the cosmos is evident in the myths that concern recollection, immortality, and reincarnation in the *Meno* (81b-d), the *Phaedrus* (248a-250c), and the *Republic* (614b-62ld). More generally, all of Plato's eschatological myths-including those where separation predominates over circularity, such as the myths of the *Gorgias* (523a-527e) and the *Phaedo-present* themselves as backdrops for the soul's behavior and self-understanding in its present incarnation.

If such a step is taken to bring the separation thesis into greater harmony with the Platonic myths in which the soul is at the center, it would also help to resolve some tensions in Gerson's assessment of Plato's notion of "person." First, the soul's relation to the body need no longer be exclusively characterized as a kind of schizophrenia or "Stockholm syndrome" (276), since the soul's procession through the cosmos brings it to a better comprehension of the demands of embodied life through its comprehension of the principles that govern the material world. Second, it would obviate the necessary though unstated implication of Gerson's analysis that the philosopher feels this sense of divided personality most acutely and painfully, since he is closest to the "disembodied ideal" and so most conscious of his ineliminable attachment to the body (cf. statements about the philosopher on 277 and 279-80). Rather, the life of the philosopher would best integrate body and soul precisely since he attains the most perspicuous view of the world and sees the body in its proper place. Third, this would substantiate Gerson's claim-a tenuous one in my view-that embodiment is an image of disembodiment and that the life of practical judgment is an image of the theoretical life of pure knowledge (see, e.g., 278).

Indeed, the separation thesis implies that the practical life is in opposition to the theoretical life, since the practical life increases the individual's interest in and dependence upon the material world. By identifying separation as a moment in the greater cycle of harmonization, one could explain the widening vision acquired by the soul as it proceeds through the cosmos as an extension of the perspicuous understanding of concrete circumstances required for practical judgment. In sum, *Knowing Persons* presents a view of the Platonic dialogues whose basic interpretative principle brings to light a central aspect of the Platonic cosmos. The discussions of the dialogues found in the book are worthy of consideration and valuable to scholars, even if one does not hold that separation is the ultimate aim of Platonic philosophy.

JOE MCCOY

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

A Catholic Response in Sixteenth-Century France to Reformation Theology: The Works of Pierre Dore. By JOHN LANGLOIS. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003. Pp. 328. $119.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-7734-6697-5.

The *Dictionnaire de spiritua.lite* entry on Pierre Dore, O.P. (written in 1957), noted that the mid-sixteenth-century works of this spiritual and controversialist writer had not yet been systematically studied. With this monograph, John Langlois, 0.P., has enriched our bibliographical knowledge of Dore's numerous publications and has taken up three areas of his teaching for systematic examination.

After an introduction surveying the perceptions and judgments on Dore advanced by historians, a chapter sketches the setting of his life and work as a friar who entered a priory of the reformed Gallican Dominican Congregation in 1514 and then pursued studies in Paris to the doctorate in 1532. A helpful overview of Dore's publications follows, which is supported by an appendix on the first publication of each, on the known reprints, and on their presence today in forty libraries. Dore published thirty-five works between 1525 and 1569, with an exceptional burst of productivity in vernacular works in 1538-41. The works draw extensively on Scripture, at time straining texts to find in them spiritual nourishment in metaphorical expressions or apologetical support for Catholic doctrine and practice, contrasted with Protestant teaching.

A first systematic chapter treats Dore's vernacular instructions on lived religiosity, in which the Reformation *sola fide* is countered by insistence on faith formed by love, with faith as the root, hope the trunk, and charity the branches of our tree of life. The "ways to paradise" go along paths sketched by the

Matthean beatitudes, each connected with a reward, in accord with with the Catholic doctrine of merit. A narrative such as Jesus' encounter with the woman of Samaria shows that the first grace is granted gratuitously, though it then leads to God asking us to become active in good works on his behalf. Augustine enters with the contrast of creation *sine nobis* and salvation only *cum nobis,* but Aquinas's influence is pervasive even without extensive citation, hardly needed by Dore's lay readers.

A chapter on the Eucharist and priesthood reviews works aiming to counter Calvin, with emphatic teaching on Christ's gift of his body and blood, present by transubstantiation, as the remedy for the deleterious effects of original sin. One should hear, listen attentively, and hold adamantly to the word of Christ, *"This* is my body," where the neuter *hoc* must refer to *corpus,* not to a masculine *panis.* But while Dore was constrained to meet Calvinistic arguments, his works press on to explain the ceremonies of the Mass in a way intended to engender devout attendance. He instructs on the rightful dispositions for receiving Holy Communion and even quietly lifts a passage from Calvin to insist on more frequent reception of this medicine of our weakness and bond of intimacy with God than was heretofore the rule.

The third systematic chapter, on the virtuous life, features Dore's longest work, *L'image de vertu* (1540, with six reprints}, which draws on the whole of Scripture to set before the reader the very perfection of a godly life, as given exemplary concrete form in the Blessed Virgin Mary. One should contemplate the virtues of Mary so as to grow in desire for them and to pray earnestly for her help in gaining them. Dore knows well our daily struggles, and presents God's grace which triumphed in Mary as essential to ordering our divided hearts. Temptations should not lead to morose doubts, for they are signs that the devil wants to upset one's progress in virtue. Strikingly, *L'image* includes a defense of Mary's Immaculate Conception. Dore cites a typical argument then regnant in the Parisian Faculty of Theology, namely, the quasi-definition issued by the Council of Basel (in 1439, when in schism from Pope Eugenius IV), but he goes on to show the presence of immaculist doctrine in the early works of Aquinas (he cites Aquinas here, but with only partial accuracy). For Dore, a foray into doctrinal history is less important than the demonstration in Mary of God's grace fully triumphant, offering us a pledge of our eventual transformation by the same grace.

Langlois devotes space to the immediate French context of Dore's work, especially to his close connection with the House of Guise and other women of the nobility to whom he dedicated some works. I would suggest a larger European context in the "theology-for-piety," which is being recognized as a significant category of religious writing in the fifteenth century. The Parisian Chancellor Jean Gerson is something of a father figure in this development, which has been studied by Bernd Hamm of Erlangen, who coined the term *Frommigkeitstheologie,* and Christoph Burger of Amsterdam. Langlois practically defines the category with regard to Dore's desire to edify, inspire, and inflame the heart on the.basis of a solid theology that nourishes the intellect (83).

Throughout Langlois's study, Dore's question-and-answer catechism, the *Dyalogue instructoire* (1538, six repints to 1545) serves to illustrate his instruction on the fundamentals of Catholic faith and doctrine. The work was the first adult catechism in French, brought out even before the Parisian Faculty of Theology framed its twenty-six Articles of Faith in 1543. Late in the book it is termed a forerunner of Canisius's catechisms (1555 and after) and the *Catechismus Romanus* of 1566. But a more natural connection would be with the work that in fact succeeded it in France, Emond Auger's *Catechisme et sommaire de la religion crestienne* (Lyon, 1563), published during Dore's lifetime, with the same anti-Calvinist concerns of his work. Auger swept the French catechetical field in the late sixteenth century, and the differences with Dore's *Dyalogue* would certainly be instructive.

A final issue to be addressed in integrating the works of Pierre Dore into the history of Catholic spiritual instruction would be to characterize their relation to the popular piety that went before and then followed after. Clearly, as a Doctor of Paris, inventive adapter of scriptural narratives, and close reader of Aquinas, Dore represents a move beyond the hyperactive devotionalism of pilgrimages, shrines, relics, patron saints, and indulgences that flourished in Europe around the year 1500. He inculcates a recentering and refounding in Scripture and central doctrines. But what about the religiosity that followed? Jean Delumeau characterized this in numerous works, based mainly on French materials, as a religiosity of anxious fear over the danger of losing eternal salvation. Dore shows something else, a more holistic piety, being inculcated in works of the mid-sixteenth century, and so raises a question about the Delumeau theses, at least about their applicability to the decades just before the outbreak of the French religious wars.

JARED WICKS, S.J.

John Carroll University
University Heights, Ohio