ANNOUNCEMENT

Brian J. Shanley, O.P., Editor of *The Thomist* since 2002, became President of Providence College on July 1, 2005. Because of these new responsibilities, Fr. Shanley has stepped down as Editor. We are pleased to announce that he will remain on the editorial board as an Associate Editor. In addition, Fr. Lawrence Donohoo, O.P., has been named an Associate Editor. The new Editor is Joseph Torchia, O.P., Associate Professor of Philosophy at Providence College. Father Torchia holds doctorates in Philosophy (Fordham University) and Early Christian Studies (The Catholic University of America), and an S.T.L. from the Dominican House of Studies in Washington.

EDITOR'S NOTE

JOSEPH TORCHIA, O.P.

I consider it a great honor to be named editor of a review which has defined itself as "Steward of the Thomistic tradition." As I begin my tenure in this capacity, I wish to comment briefly about my own sense of our mission, not in the language of some pronouncement, but merely as one man's opinion about the task implicit in our somewhat lofty motto. In my reckoning, this task encompasses two complementary roles. On the one hand, we seek serious scholarly investigations into the sources and development of Christian wisdom that focus primarily (but not exclusively) upon the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. But good stewardship involves more than a custodial role. Reflection on the riches of the past must also inspire and sustain a response to contemporary problems. This publication has consistently proceeded from the premise that Thomism is a *living tradition* that can speak to those issues that run to the core of our being as rational creatures made in the image and likeness of God.

Shortly after assuming the editorship, I examined *The Thomist's* 1939 "Announcement of Publication." I was immediately struck by the enthusiasm for a new venture "launched on the postulate that Dominicans have something very special to offer this twentieth century of ours."[1] As I consider these words some sixty-six years later, I propose the following question: what can a distinctively Dominican speculative review of theology and philosophy offer at the beginning of this new millennium? Indeed, the vision that inspired and guided our founders must be ours as well-nothing less than a contribution "to originality of thought, to solutions rather than compromises with immediately pressing questions."[2] These goals, in fact, are wholly consistent with the Dominican charism and its commitment to learned preaching

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[1] Excerpt from *The Thomist's* "Announcement of Publication," 1.

[2] Ibid., 15.

according to the ideal of *contemplare et contemplata aliis tradere,* that is, "to contemplate and bring what is contemplated to others." This ideal rests on the conviction that the life of the mind must translate into a passion to share its fruits in a concrete context.

Our model in this endeavor is St. Thomas Aquinas himself. Aquinas fixed his contemplative gaze on truth. But ever the teacher, he sought to communicate truth in conversance with all the intellectual currents of his time. In the process, he forged a bold new synthesis of faith and reason versatile enough to speak to a wide range of outlooks and horizons of inquiry. This is why he could adapt and harmonize traditions that his contemporaries perceived as wholly incommensurable with such creativity and imagination. If Aquinas is the "perennial philosopher," it is because his thought affirms an openness to truth wherever it can be discerned. By the same token, he shows us that any search for truth must be guided by that Divine Wisdom whose ultimate source is in God, the ground of meaning and intelligibility. This is the Light that guided him throughout his inquiries, and it must be the Light that guides us in our own, as we confront the unique moral dilemmas that the present century opens to Catholic thinkers. This Light never undermines human reasoning; it only perfects it, and thereby raises the bar of our rational efforts to new heights.

We live in an age that presents great challenges to those committed to the intellectual enterprise of the Catholic Church. And for those who endorse the Thomistic vision of reality, the need for "originality of thought" and "solutions rather than compromises" is more compelling than ever before in the history of this review. At a time when pluralism is widely valued above objectivity, it is all too easy to take refuge in one's own conceptual framework or ideological perspective, and thereby to exclude the possibility of genuine dialogue with one's opponents at the outset. But in the spirit of Aquinas, we do not perceive disagreement as an insurmountable obstacle. Rather, we welcome it as the occasion to advance the debate, and in the process to explore the possibility of consensus and a resolution of problems, even while

upholding those absolute principles that must be presupposed in any rational discussion.

In his encyclical *Fides et Ratio,* John Paul II spoke of a hermeneutical crisis in which "many people wonder whether it still makes sense to ask about meaning."[3] By way of a response, he encouraged a recovery of philosophy's sapiential dimension in the search for the ultimate meaning of human existence. From this standpoint, the medieval understanding of theology as *{ides quaerens intellectum* provides a contemporary incentive to challenge the uncritical presuppositions of a postmodernist culture and its nihilist bent with the considerable dialectical resources at our disposal. In my estimation, *The Thomist* offers an excellent forum for engaging such issues and their wide-ranging implications with cogency, incisiveness, and depth. It is incumbent upon us to assume an active and even confrontational role in this endeavor, not necessarily in an adversarial manner, but in the best sense of Dominican *disputatio.*

This year, the Eastern Dominican Province of St. Joseph celebrates the Bicentennial of its founding in the United States. *The Thomist* stands as one of the most salient legacies of its intellectual apostolate. As we move toward our seventieth year of publication, we seek to maintain this legacy, and in the words of our founders, to furnish material "fitting the dignity of human nature and . . . the joyous work of Wisdom."[4] But the ongoing excellence of this review depends, as always, on the input of our contributors, including that of my fellow Dominicans. As sons of St. Dominic, our common commitment lies in the pursuit of *Veritas,* with all its intriguing textures and nuances, wherever that pursuit may lead us and whatever the cost, "of one heart and mind in God."

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[3] Encyclical Letter *Fides et Ratio* of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Relationship Between Faith and Reason (September 15, 1998), para. 81.

[4] Excerpt from *The Thomist's* "Announcement of Publication," 15.

AQUINAS ON DEFENSIVE KILLING:
A CASE OF DOUBLE EFFECT?

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THE NOW-STANDARD READING of Aquinas's account of private self-defense in *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7 holds that it precludes any kind of deliberate killing. Defensive action that causes the death of an assailant will be morally permissible only when this lethal outcome has the character of a pure side effect. Hence, when Aquinas asserts that in self-defense "the killing of the attacker" is "beyond the intention" *(praeter intentionem)* of the defender, he is taken to be formally denying that a private defender can justifiably *choose* (however reluctantly) to kill his assailant in order to protect himself from grave harm. Article 7 is thus said to exemplify what has since come to be called 'the principle of double effect' (PDE).

'Double effect' is the heading under which the ethical quandaries surrounding side-effect harm have traditionally been discussed in philosophy. This term is shorthand for the two different kinds of effects that can emerge from our actions. On the one hand, there is the very state of affairs that our actions are meant to produce. This goal we **will** succeed at achieving more or less well, depending on our skill. On the other hand, there are the side effects that result from this deliberate intervention in the world. The idea that we are answerable for these side effects, yet in a manner *different from* the way we are accountable for our intentional projects, has been dubbed the 'principle of double effect' (PDE). This principle holds that while we can never be justified in deliberately willing a wrong, we may sometimes have

moral warrant for allowing harmful side effects to eventuate from our otherwise good actions. [1]

My argument here is that Aquinas did not in fact appeal to a version of PDE in formulating his theory of justifiable defensive killing in *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7. The broader context of his other statements on the morality of participation in violence, as well as the twelfth- and thirteenth-century canon-law teaching on this topic, indicate that he did not take self-defense to be an *act* from which harmful side effects (including the death of the assailant) might flow. He viewed self-defense instead as an *aim* that might justify the application of proportionate force against an assailant, even to the point of deliberately causing his death, if this were the only effective measure available at the time. Aquinas recognized that lethal force could also be applied with a very different purpose in mind, namely, to avenge a wrong. It was precisely by way of contrast with this latter aim that Aquinas described defensive killing as "praeter intentionem."

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It is undeniable that the *name* PDE was originally taken from a sentence in the *responsio* to *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7 ("from the act of self-defense there follows a double effect"). Yet whether a *doctrine* of double effect may be found therein is a matter of some dispute. When Aquinas states that a private individual who engages in lethal self-defense must aim solely at preserving his own life, such that the death of his assailant would lie outside of his intention *(praeter intentionem),* does he mean to assert that an agent of this kind may never deliberately inflict death upon another as a means of saving himself? In other words, does this article restrict the scope of private self-defense to actions which, although they may foreseeably result in the attacker's death, can never be chosen precisely with that outcome in mind?

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[1] For further elucidations on PDE, see Gregory Reichberg and Henrik Syse, "The Idea of Double Effect-In War and Business," in L. Bomann Larsen and O. Wiggen, eds., *Responsibility in World Business: Managing Harmful Side-effects of Corporate Activity* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004), 17-38.

Drawing on Cajetan's *Summa* commentary, Joseph Boyle has argued for an affirmative answer to this question. [2] His argument is built around an analysis of the term *praeter intentionem* (as it is used in various works of Aquinas), which, he maintains, must be taken to exclude any deliberate selection of an item, either as end or as means. This leads Boyle to conclude that lethal self-defense will be allowable only under condition that

the assailant's death is not what ends the threat, but is rather a consequence of what stops the attack. In such a case one is not saved because the assailant is dead but the assailant dies because one has stopped the attack. [3]

In a more recent treatment, [4] Boyle, with co-authors John Finnis and Germain Grisez, argues that this theory of lethal self-defense not only holds for private individuals, but, more broadly, should also apply to the killing of enemy combatants in war. [5] For even there

military action must be directed toward stopping the enemy's unjust use of military force, not toward killing those who are bringing that force to bear. By requiring that the death of an enemy soldier be brought about only as a side-effect of a military act having a different appropriate object, our moral theory would limit warfare as stringently as possible to the pursuit of the good purposes which can justify it. [6]

Underlying this reasoning appears to be a twofold assumption: first, that punishment is no longer an acceptable war-aim under current international law; and second, that any deliberate killing in war will necessarily be punitive in character. The exclusion of the first (punitive war) thus entails the exclusion of the latter (the

[2] Joseph Boyle, *"Praeter intentionem* in Aquinas," *The Thomist* 42 (1978): 649-65.

[3] Ibid., 661.

[4] John Finnis, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., and Germain Grisez, *Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

[5] In this regard, the authors note (ibid., 315) that their "just-war theory is more restrictive than traditional versions, even that of Thomas Aquinas." In a more recent text *(Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998]) Finnis clarifies that this application of PDE to the targeting of enemy combatants in war is within the logic, but not the letter, of Aquinas's teaching, since the latter judges "acceptable some intentional killing in capital punishment and war" (287).

[6] Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez, *Nuclear Deterrence,* 315

deliberate killing of active enemy combatants on the battlefield).
Recognizing the continued moral viability of defensive killing in
war, the authors are compelled to justify it by an appeal to PDE.
The scope of this article does not allow for more detailed
discussion of this issue in military ethics. For our present purpose,
it should be noted nonetheless that it is the second of the two
assumptions which stands out as most problematic. Must one
assume that deliberate killing (whether public or private) must
always have a punitive purpose? Or, on the contrary, is it possible
for killing to be deliberate yet purely defensive?

Taking up this last point, Gareth Matthews [7] argues that neither
the textual evidence nor sound reasoning warrants a reading of
STh 11-11,q. 64, a. 7 in which deliberate killing is wholly excluded
as a means of private self-defense. It is with respect to the second
aspect-the philosophical plausibility of applying double-effect
reasoning to licit self-defense-that Matthews's analysis is most
trenchant. Unlike the standard examples of double effect (as, for
instance, in medical ethics, when it is argued that causing the
death of a fetus can be allowed as a side effect which results from
the removal of a pregnant woman's cancerous uterus), where
harm is certainly foreseen but is in no way intended, self-defense,
by its nature, involves the deliberate infliction of some harm on
the opponent (striking him with one's hands or a weapon). Thus,
in his rebuttal of Boyle's thesis, Mathews notes that

even in a case in which the assailant was hit and knocked unconscious, but not
killed, there would again be a bad effect-hitting him and knocking him
unconscious-as well as the good effect of defending my life against an attack.
And in this case, too, the bad effect would be the means by which the good effect
was achieved [8].

Indeed, the very notion of side-effect harm presupposes the exis-
tence of some prior act which is not itself a side effect (otherwise
an infinite regress would result) but which is itself something
deliberately posited in the world. In the case of lethal self-defense

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[7] Gareth Matthews, "Saint Thomas and the Principle of Double Effect," in Scott
MacDonald and Eleonore Snunp, *Aquinas's Moral Theory* (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1995}, 63-78.

[8] Ibid., 69.

this prior act will be nothing other than the application of force against an assailant, an application which is chosen precisely as a means of "stopping the attack."

PDE teaches that agents will be absolved from the liability which ordinarily attaches to the production of harmful side effects only if (at a minimum) the deliberate activity which gave rise to the said side effects was itself not blameworthy. By contrast, the negative side effects that follow from the commission of a crime (or, more generally, from any morally wrongful deed) are ascribable to the agent as an aggravating condition for which he will be held accountable, regardless of the fact that these were wholly undesired by the agent and in no way contributed to the commission of his crime or the enjoyment of its illicit gains. [9]

Thus, in line with Matthews, when we apply this reasoning to Boyle's analysis of lethal self-defense in *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, a manifest problem emerges. *As* an instantiation of PDE, defensive killing will be allowable only when it has the character of a pure side effect which flows from an ostensively good act. Therein lies the rub. The deliberate application of force by persons   in a position of authority (private individuals) is, on Aquinas's account, prima facie wrong: "It is not permitted for a man to strike another," he writes in the subsequent question *(STh* II-II, q. 65, a. 2), "unless he have some authority over the one whom he strikes."[10] On such an act (private violence) he confers the name *rixa* (strife) which, like the kindred acts *helium* (war) and *seditio* (sedition) denote kinds of sin. [11]

My point is not that, for Aquinas, the application of force by private individuals can never be justified. On the contrary, in *STh* II-II, q. 41, a. 1 ("De rixa"), he distinguishes sinful striking from the repelling of injury by force that is proper to the individual who engages in sinless self-defense. It is essential to note, however, that defensive striking requires justification no less than

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[9] See *STh* I-II, q. 73, a. 8.

[10] "Et ideo verberare aliquem non licet nisi habenti potestatem aliquam super ilium qui verberatur."

[11] For an account of Aquinas's conception of "sins against peace," see Gregory M. Reichberg, "Is There a 'Presumption Against War' in Aquinas's Ethics?" *The Thomist* 66 (July 2002): 337-67.

the parallel case of defensive killing. Indeed, Aquinas employs
nearly the same argumentation in his treatment of these two types
of defensive reaction (see section III, below). Hence, if his aim in
STh II-II, q. 64, a. 7 was to show that defensive *killing* will only
be justified when it issues as the pure side effect of an otherwise
good act, he would need to mount much the same argument in
favor of defensive *striking,* thereby denying that it too could ever
be the legitimate target of deliberate action by private individuals.
But if defensive striking will thus be justified only when it has the
character of a pure side effect, we cannot by the same token
appeal to it in our justification of the defensive killing without
giving rise to an infinite regress and hence a vicious circularity in
our reasonmg.

     One could of course attempt to get around this objection by
limiting private self-defense to some sort of mere blocking
motion, yet it would be hard to find support for this minimalist
construal of self-defense in Aquinas, or in the canon-law writings
of his day, which provided the intellectual background for his
comments on this topic (see section II, below). It also cuts against
widespread contemporary moral and legal intuitions about
justifiable self-defense, which generally allow for using hands or
weapons to strike at an aggressor, as long as the response is
proportionate to the scale of the attack.

     Another strategy would consist in arguing that lethal self-
defense is allowable only in cases where the repelling motion can
reasonably be thought to succeed without killing the attacker, yet
where the defender acts with some margin of incertitude with
respect to the lethality of his response.

Not having a great deal of practice at stopping attackers by hitting them with
rocks, I might not have been able to judge accurately how much force would be
needed to stun but not kill my assailant. [12]

Here killing would have the character of an accidental outcome.
It would be akin to the risky adventure of a mountaineer, who,
despite all precautions to the contrary, is nevertheless killed by an
avalanche: he thereby succumbs to an eventuality that he knew to

[12] Matthews, "Saint Thomas and the Principle of Double Effect," 68.

be a distinct possibility from the outset, but which he had hoped to avoid. It is questionable, however, whether Aquinas ever intended to limit defensive killing *praeter intentionem* to the sort of case just envisioned. Indeed, the fact that Aquinas made accidental killing the express topic of the next article *(STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 8)[13] suggests that this kind of occurrence was not his particular concern in article 7.

Another twist on this argument would hold that defensive killing by private individuals is allowable only when it occurs under conditions of strict urgency, such as when a defender has little or no time to consider whether his actions will result in the death of the attacker. In this instance, the press of danger, hence the necessity to take immediate action in the interests of self-preservation, will render void any meaningful attempt to foresee the lethality of one's defensive response. The death of the attacker could thus be described as beyond the defender's intention, for the good reason that the latter never had sufficient time to deliberate about the likelihood of a lethal outcome. While not a wholly implausible interpretation of Aquinas's use of *praeter intentionem* in *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, it remains that this (much like the argument based on uncertainty of outcome) would be a less-than-suitable illustration of the principle of double effect, since this principle is meant to explain, most paradigmatically, situations where an agent foresees, with clarity, that a deadly effect will flow from his otherwise good action. Moreover, those like Boyle who read *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7 as an illustration of PDE do in fact construe this article as teaching that "the death of the attacker is *praeter intentionem* even though it can be foreseen with certainty to follow."[14] Thus, when Boyle asserts that "the death of the attacker is not a means in those cases where Aquinas regards it as *praeter intentionem,* "[15] this proposition is clearly meant to cover a situation in which the defender is fully aware that the lethal effect will inevitably flow from his action, as for example, when a man spears an assailant's heart in self-defense

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[13] "Whether one is guilty of homicide through killing someone by chance *[causaliter]."*

[14] Boyle, *"Praeter intentionem* in Aquinas," 660.

[15] Ibid., 661.

without intending to kill him (to borrow Finnis's provocative example). [16] And it is precisely the conjunction of these two propositions ("death of the attacker is ... foreseen with certainty to follow" and ". . . is not a means") that Matthews and others like him [17] consider highly dubious when applied to the special case of self-defense. Is the Boyle/Finnis reading of Aquinas accurate? Can one *deliberately* spear the heart of an assailant without *intending* to kill him?

The difficulty in question does not arise because PDE is thought to be incompatible with a condition of definite foresight regarding the negative side effect, or because causing another's death with such foresight would, given its special gravity, not be covered by the principle. In military ethics, for instance, it is generally recognized that some missions will be justified, on grounds of PDE, in spite of a recognition that civilian casualties will ineluctably follow. Thus, during the Second World War, Norwegian resistance fighters sabotaged a ferry that was carrying their countrymen across a lake. Their goal was to sink the ship, in order to prevent the occupying German force from transporting a cargo of heavy water from the Vemork plant to the railway lines

[16] "If, as Aquinas seems to assert and never denies, one can spear an assailant's heart in self-defense without intending to kill, it is possible to wage war, too-lethally and often successfully-without that intent" (Finnis, *Aquinas,* 287).

[17] For a similar position, see Steven A. Long, "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas," *The Thomist* 67 (2003): 45-71, see especially 51-53, 56-68. A number of Aquinas's commentators (e.g., Vitoria, Vasquez, De Soto, Lessius) have likewise interpreted *Sth* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7 as teaching that a defender can lawfully will the death of his attacker as a *means* of self-preservation. Hence they have (implicitly) rejected the double-effect reading of this text. For an historical survey in support of this position, see Vincentius M. Alonso, S.J., *El principio del doble efecto en los comentados de Santo Tomas de Aquino* (diss., Rome, 1937). For the opposing position, see Joseph T. Mangan, S.J., "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect," *Theological Studies* 10 (1949): 41-61. This author erroneously attributes to Vitoria the idea that *Sth* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7 represents a teaching on double effect. In the text alleged *(Commentarios a la Secunda Secundae de Santo Tomas,* q. 64, a. 7 [Latin text and English translation in J. P. Doyle, ed., Francisco de Vitoria, O.P., *On Homicide* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1997)]) , after distinguishing between intention (intentio) and choice *(e/ectio),* Vitoria states that while it is not licit (for a private individual) to intend as an end the death of the attacker ("non licet propter se intendere mortem alterius"), this can nevertheless be willed (i.e., be *chosen as a means)* when it is necessary for self-defense (§2, *Sed quia* [Doyle, ed., 194-95]).

on the other side of the lake. Heavy water was an ingredient then vital to the construction of an atomic bomb. The resistance fighters knew in advance that many of the civilians on board would die, yet there was no way to warn them of the danger, as the mission would thereby have been endangered.

As illustrated by this example, it is neither the *ex ante* certitude of a negative result, nor the special gravity of human death, that raises a doubt about whether defensive killing belongs within the category of side-effect harm. Rather, the problem arises because in this particular case the person against whom the defender deliberately directs his blows and the one who suffers death (purportedly as a side-effect harm) are the self-same subject. Moreover and most importantly, the defender clearly stands to benefit from the harm that he has done to the assailant, since this is precisely what stops the latter's wrongful attack. Thus it is disingenuous to speak of this harm, and the resulting death, as though they were pure externalities that were of no benefit whatsoever to the defender. The blow that stops the attack has the character of a means which, at least when self-defense is virtuously carried out, will be reluctantly chosen (the defender takes no pleasure in the harm done), but is a means nonetheless. By contrast, when PDE is used to justify collateral damage in wartime, as in the Vemork example given above, there is a clear differentiation between the target of the intentional action (the German military personnel and their cargo of heavy water) and the innocent passengers on board who died as a consequence of the attack. No harm whatsoever was intended against the latter. Their death was in no way beneficial to the military operation; the Norwegian saboteurs would have much preferred to adopt an alternative course of action had one been available.

One could still argue that defensive killing will be legitimate only under condition that, counterfactually and on the level of intention, the agent would have chosen a nonlethal means of response, had one been available at the precise moment when the aggression took place. Under such a supposition, it would be correct to say that the defender did not actually set out to kill the attacker. He did not choose this particular means precisely

because of its lethal qualities, but simply because at the time it was "the only available effective defensive measure." [18] Imagine a man being pursued up a steep mountain path by an armed assailant. The former spots a loose boulder, and, seeing that this represents his only chance of survival, nudges it downwards in the direction of his pursuer, who will undoubtedly be killed by the impact. Lethality was not the motivating factor in this defender's choice of means; he acted *despite* this factor, rather than *because* of it. On this basis,[19] Boyle concludes that the death of the assailant, although a direct consequence of the defender's forcible response, should nevertheless be described as *praeter intentionem.*

Boyle recognizes, however, that on at least one occasion the term *praeter intentionem* is used by Aquinas to signify an agent's choice of an unwanted means. This occurs in the *Summa contra Gentiles,* book III, chapter 6, where, reflecting on Aristotle's example of the sailors who cast their cargo overboard so as to avoid capsizing *(Nie, Ethics* 1110a8-10), Aquinas comments that although this act is not willed or intended *per se,* it is nevertheless willed for the sake of something else ("vult propter aliud"), namely, protection from drowning, and in this sense it must be described as a regrettable expedient or means. [20] This sense of *praeter intentionem* he most often discusses under the heading of the "mixed voluntary"; according to this concept, an act that one ordinarily finds repulsive, hence 'nonvoluntary' in the sense of being antithetical to the will, can nevertheless be rationally desired (chosen) under circumstances of immanent danger. The similarity with the case of lethal self-defense is indeed striking, [21]

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[18] Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez, *Nuclear Deterrence,* 312.

[19] At this juncture, Boyle quotes Cajetan, who (in his commentary on *Sl'h* II-II, q. 64, a. 7), distinguished between killing an assailant as a means ("ut medium ad finem") of self-protection and killing him as a consequence which follows from the necessity of the end ("ut consequens ex necessitate finis"). The second would be *praeter intentionem,* and the first not. For an analysis (with a translation of the key passage) of this text, see Long,, "Object of the Moral Act," 53-56.

[20] *Summa contra Gentiles* ill, c. 6 (Marietti edition, S 1907).

[21] Interestingly, in one of his treatments of the mixed voluntary, *Quodl.* 5, q. 5, a. 3 ("Utrum ea quae per timorem fiunt, sint voluntaria"), Aquinas mentions killing as an example of an act that can become desirable in particular circumstances, even though *in universali consideratum* it is an unqualified evil. The special case of self-defense is not mentioned.

yet Boyle resists the comparison on grounds that in later texts Aquinas utilizes *praeter intentionem* solely to designate the will's relationship to side-effect harm. Thus, according to Boyle, in his more mature writings Aquinas appears to have avoided any identification of this term with the related category of the mixed voluntary. This analysis is plausible, yet it is not quite compelling, since it is always possible that Aquinas, for reasons left unstated, simply reverted in *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7 to the usage he had earlier established in *ScG* III, c. 6.

In any event, whether described as a side effect or as a repugnant means, the mode of defensive killing just described (in which a nonlethal method of resistance would have been chosen had it only been available at the time) must be distinguished from a defensive situation in which someone puts his assailant to death precisely to ensure that he will never be able to attack again. Under this scenario, less than lethal means of defense, although available, would not be chosen, since these would provide only ineffective protection against attacks that the aggressor would likely renew in the future. Imagine a woman trapped on a boat with a serial killer. Escape being impossible (the boat is on the high seas, and its radio connection with the outside world has been severed), she decides that her safety can be assured only by killing the assailant. No other means will protect her during the time (conceivably quite long) that they will live together on the boat, since, even if she manages to incapacitate him temporarily, he will likely recover to threaten her anew. She finds a gun, and shoots him dead. In this case, the defender directed her choice precisely at the death of her assailant; this tactic she consciously adopts in order to secure herself from the threat of ongoing and future harm. If this were the sort of defensive killing that Aquinas sought to exclude in *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7, it would indeed make good sense for him to describe, by way of contrast, the other sort of defensive killing as *praeter intentionem,* even if, at the limit, he did not consider it a pure and simple side effect, but rather a regrettable means that one might adopt in the heat of the moment.

Thus far, we have considered four different ways in which someone, acting in self-defense, might *praeter intentionem* cause the death of his assailant: (1) mere blocking motions where no harm is directly intended, (2) actions where some harm is intended (e.g., striking an assailant with one's fists) but where a lethal outcome is unforeseen or uncertain, (3) actions chosen under conditions of urgency with little or no time for reflection on the lethal consequences, and (4) actions in which the assailant's death was foreseen with certainty, yet not chosen with that precise end in view, as the defender would have adopted other, nonlethal means, had they only been available at the time. In this last case, the defender may thus seek to disable but not kill his assailant; should he intentionally move beyond this limit, his defense will be illicit.[22]

In a brief discussion of *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, Hugo Grotius, the Dutch theorist of just war, proposed an additional way in which defensive killing might be described as *praeter intentionem.*

It has been well said by Thomas [Aquinas]–if he is rightly understood–that if a man in true self-defense kills his assailant the slaying is not intentional *[ex intentione];* not that, if reason supplies no other means of saving oneself, it is not sometimes permissible to do with set purpose *[destinato]* that which will result in the death of the assailant; rather it is that in such a case his death is not chosen as something primarily intended *[quiddam primario intentum],* as in a judicial punishment, but is the only resource available at the time. Even under such circumstances the person who is attacked ought to prefer to do anything possible to frighten away or weaken the assailant, rather than cause his death.[23]

On this interpretation, when Aquinas distinguished two sorts of killing, intentional and nonintentional,[24] his aim was not exactly

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[22] Boyle makes it amply clear that, on his reading, Aquinas's theory of private self-defense does not allow for this sort of intentional killing: "So Aquinas admits that the killing of another may be within the intention (presumably as a means) but contrasts it with the kind of deadly self-defense which can be morally justified" *("Praeter intentionem* in Aquinas," 661).

[23] *De iure belli ac pacis,* II, I, IV. English translation in G. M. Reichberg, H. Syse, and E. Begby, *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming 2006). I am grateful to Blackwell Publishing for allowing me to quote from this volume in advance of its publication.

[24] In *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, speaking of private citizens, Aquinas initially refers only to killing *praeter intentionem.* Later, in the next to last sentence of the *responsio,* he mentions the case of soldiers and "ministers of a judge" (policemen), who have moral license to kill

to set up a contrast between harm deliberately inflicted, on the one hand, and side-effect harm, on the other. The contrast was meant instead to differentiate between inflicting harm instrumentally, as a *means* of self-preservation, versus causing harm as the very *goal* of one's action. In the latter instance, the agent's *primary* intention is to visit harm on another, either to avenge a past wrong (i.e., retributive punishment, as in Grotius's example), as an expression of hatred, or because of the pleasure it procures (cruelty). Grotius's *primario intentum* would then correspond to Aquinas's *intentio,* an act of the will that is directed to some end.[25] Thus, within the context of *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7, the killing that s designated as *praeter intentionem* would formally exclude all noninstrumental rationales for terminating another's life, retribution in particular, which, by the logic of this article, will legitimately be exercised only by public officials acting on behalf of the common good. Killing by private individuals would be restricted strictly to defensive actions, in the sense that all forms of revenge killing would be emphatically ruled out. Yet, so construed, the scope of legitimate defense would be quite broad, since, at the extreme, it would allow for even a deliberate act of killing, if, under the circumstances, this is reasonably viewed as the only effective (and proportionate) response to an attack that is underway or imminent. The limit set by (4) above would be breached, since here (on Grotius's reading), the lethal outcome could itself be chosen, if the attack could not otherwise be repelled.

   Does Grotius offer a plausible reading of *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7? His proposal is worth considering, as it sums up a view which (as we have seen)[26] a number of Aquinas's Scholastic commentators had already entertained. My assessment of this reading will be two-pronged. First, I will review several key texts from medieval canon law, as these texts would likely have served to frame Aquinas's own treatment of legitimate defense. Grotius himself was well versed in this literature, and it is possible that his

intentionally *(intendens hominem occidere).*

   [25] See *SI'h* 1-11, q.12, a. 2.
   [26] See note 17 above.

interpretation   of Aquinas was informed by a reading of the
standard canon-law texts on self-defense. Then, against this
backdrop, I will scrutinize the logic of *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7, as
well as some related texts (in particular *STh* 11-11, q. 41, on strife
["De rixa"]) to see whether any support can be found in them for
the view of self-defense that Grotius attributes to Aquinas.

II

    If the writings of St. Augustine were Aquinas's sole point of
reference in elaborating his teaching in the *Summa Theologiae* on
defensive killing, it could easily be assumed that this teaching was
intended by him to be as restrictive as possible, in line with the
very strong reserves formulated by his eminent predecessor on the
permissibility of killing in self-defense. Augustine, it will be
recalled, argued that while it could be virtuous to use lethal force
as a means of protecting others from assault, it would be best to
abstain from such a measure-and   thereby suffer death if
necessary-when   faced with an attack upon one's own self.[27]
However, beginning with the Decretist commentaries that
appeared in the second half of the twelfth century (the most
significant of which was the gloss *Qui repellere possunt)* the moral
standing   of forcible   self-defense   underwent   a significant
reappraisal in the law schools of the Latin West. The high-water
mark in this development may be found in the commentary (ca.
1241) of the Dominican William of Rennes on Raymond of
Pefiafort's *Summa de casibus poenitentiae* (ca. 1235). Given the
importance of these texts, and their wide distribution, it is
unlikely that Aquinas's treatment of moral questions in the
Secunda Secundae (written ca. 1270) would not have been
informed by the new and very robust conception of self-defense
that had emerged in the canon-law teaching of the preceding
decades. [28]

[27] See Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*

[28] Very little has been written on Aquinas's relationship to medieval canon law, despite the
fact that he makes ample reference to Gratian's *Decretum,* the *Decretals of Gregory IX,* etc.,
in his various writings (see, for example, the long list of his references to canon-law sources
in vol. 16 of the Leonine edition of the *Summa Theologiae: Auctorum et operum index primus,*

In the *Decretum,* part 2, *causa* 23 (which is devoted to the theme of war and violence), [29] Gratian opens the first *quaestio* with an objection that he seeks to refute in what follows:

It would seem that it is contrary to the teaching of the Gospel to serve as a soldier, since the point of all soldiering is either to resist injury or to carry out vengeance; but injury is either warded off from one's own person or from one's associates, both of which are prohibited by the law of the Gospel. [30]

The contrast here enunciated between the two chief aims for which Christians might wage war, defense and punishment, became a staple in subsequent canon-law discussions of this topic.

The first of these aims (resistance to injury) was taken as the express topic of the gloss *Qui repel/erepossunt,* [31] which articulates one of the first explicit theories of legitimate defense. The gloss follows ancient Roman law in emphasizing the limits that apply to self-defense: it is legitimate only when exercised in the heat of the moment *(incontinenti)* against an attack that is imminent or in progress. Moreover, the defender must show due moderation or proportionality: he is entitled to use only so much force as is

"ius canonicum," pp. 220-22). He would, in particular, have had an especially close knowledge of Raymond of Pefiafort's *Summa de casibus* (from which he quoted extensively in book 4 of the *Sentences* commentary; for documentation, see Jean-Marie Aubert, *Le droit romain dans !'oeuvre de saint Thomas* [Paris: Vrin, 1955], 32 n. 6), which, as noted by Leonard Boyle ("The Setting of the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas-Revisited," in S. Pope, ed., *The Ethics of Thomas Aquinas* [Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002], 3), "Thomas would have used ... as his springboard for occasional *casus* and for the regular conventual 'Collationes de moralibus" [at the Dominican studium in Orvieto, during his stay there in 1261-1265]. "By 1261," Boyle adds, "and indeed long before that date, the *Summa* of the former General of the Dominicans (1238-40) had become an integral part *of* Dominican training. William of Rennes, Lector of the house of Orleans, had written a valuable *Apparatus* to it about 1241. ... " See the remainder of the discussion, where, after speculating that "Thomas had a healthy respect for Raymund as both a fine legist and an able moralist," Boyle indicates at least one question in the *Summa Theologiae* that contains "large and unsuspected borrowings from the *Summa de casibus"* (ibid.).

[29] The work appeared ca. 1140.

[30] *Decretum Magistri Gratiani,* in E. Friedberg, ed, *Corpus Juris Canonici,* pars prior (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1879); translation by Robert Andrews and Peter Haggenmacher in Reichberg, et al., eds., *The Ethics of War.*

[31] The text may be found in *Decretum Divi Gratiani una cum glossis & thematibus prudentum, & doctorum suffragio combrobatis* (Lyon, 1554), p. 840a-b; this gloss has been attributed to Johannes Teutonicus.

necessary to ward off the attack. The gloss further distinguishes between defense of persons and defense of property. The former allows for some forward-looking (preemptive) action, while the latter generally does not. Moreover, the notion of self-defense also serves to characterize a special kind of war, one that is undertaken precisely as a response to actual or imminent attack. The gloss acknowledges that this sort of war could be undertaken not only by private individuals (for whom no appeal to a higher authority is in principle required) but by polities well. It thereby follows Gratian in positing self-defense as one of several possible just causes of war (alongside punishment and recuperation of stolen property). In this respect, *Qui repellere possunt* moved well beyond the conception of legitimate defense that had been articulated in ancient Rome, where the relevant laws applied solely to the actions of private individuals, and not to the public domain of war. [32]

Very significantly, for our purposes, the gloss raises the question whether it is "permissible for anyone to resist violence by hitting back *[repercutiendo]"* or "only by obstructing *[impedi-endo]* the attack?" In response, the author makes clear that Christians, both clerical and lay, who use force to defend themselves are entitled to engage in more than simple blocking motions. They are also permitted to   back, even to the point of killing an assailant, either preemptively (e.g., to ward off an ambush) or, after the attack has already been initiated, to prevent its renewal. This active resistance to injury the author sharply distinguishes from revenge. Defense and revenge are thus construed as two contrasting reasons for the sake of which someone might choose to return violence for violence.

But certain people have contended that no one ought to resist force before it strikes; yet it is permitted to kill *[licitum est occidere]* an ambusher and anyone who tries to kill you.... If, however, someone returns violence *[vim factam repel/at],* this should be done with the assumption that it is for defense *[defendend1],* rather than for revenge *[ulciscend1]•••* and only if the first attacker intends to strike once more *[volebat percutere denuo];* otherwise, if the attacker does not intend to strike once more and the other person still returns

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[32] See Peter Haggenmacher, *Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983), 94-95.

force, this should be seen as revenge rather than resistance to violence. And this is what I understand when it is said that force may be resisted "on the spot" *[incontinenti]*. It is therefore required that a return blow be in defense, not in revenge ... and self-defense must be exercised in moderation. [33]

In the *Summa de casibus poenitentiae,* [34] Raymond of Penafort proposes an expanded version of the main principles outlined in *Qui repellere possunt.* He begins his discussion with the remark that "anyone" may "repel force with force," and thus wage a defensive war "without the special authority of a prince or the Church," under condition that this be done (1) "immediately" *(in continenti)* and (2) with a "moderation of blameless defense" *(moderamine inculpatae tutelae).* [35] The latter expression was at the time the standard legal formula for designating the requirement that the exercise of defensive force should not exceed what is strictly necessary to resist an attack. [36] Such "defense or protection is blameless, that is without fault" comments William of Rennes (who expressly mentions the *deliberateness* of this forcible response), "because ̥ -- [it] does not harm the adversary more (especially [if it is] on purpose) than is required to repel his violence. "[37] Some authors, Raymond notes, restrict this moderation to actions that consist merely in "impeding" *(impediendo)* an

[33] *Decretum Divi Gratiani una cum glossis,* p. 840 (Andrews and Haggenmacher, trans., in Reichberg et al., eds., *The Ethics of War).*

[34] Raymundus de Pennafort, *Summa de poenitentia, et matrimonio, cum glossis Ioannis de Friburgo* [in fact William of Rennes] (Rome, 1603). Below I refer to this work under the abbreviated tide *Summa de* casibus. Page numbers are given in parentheses.

[35] Ibid., II, § 18 (185).

[36] The formula *moderatio* (or *moderamen) inculpatae tutelae* (which seems to have first appeared in the constitution *Recte possidenti,* promulgated around the time of the Emperor Diocletian) originally designated the limits that should be observed by someone who used force in just defense of his *property.* The medieval jurists subsequently applied this formula to the defense of persons (see Haggenmacher, *Grotius,* 278).

[37] Guilielmus Redonensis, *Apparatus,* ad *Summa de casibus,* II, § 18 *(moderamine inculpatae tutelae)* (185): "[N]on excedit modum in defendendo, plus laedendo aduersarium, ex proposito maxime, quarn exigat violentia illata.»William's gloss on the *Summa de casibus* has sometimes been erroneously attributed to John of Freiburg, as for example in the 1603 edition referenced above. This error is explained by the fact that both the *Summa de casibus* and its gloss had long since fallen into disuse when they were first edited in print on the occasion of Raymond's canonization in 1601. This confusion was cleared up by 1715 (on this, see Johann F. von Schulte, *Die Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des Canonischen Rechts von Gratian bis auf die Gegenwart,* 3 vols. [Stuttgart: Enke, 1875-80]).

attack, [38] "for example," adds William, "[by] holding up an arm or
a stick lest one receive an injury to the head or body. "[39] "Others,"
Raymond continues, "say that it is permissible for the laity to
strike back *[repercutere]* but not for clerics," while "a third group
say that it is permitted not only to the laity but also to clerics to
strike back, but draw a distinction between force directed against
persons or against property. "[40] The expansive view articulated by
this third group of authors was, in William's firm opinion, "the
better one." [41] Unlike the first view, which restricts legitimate

[38] *Summa de casibus,* II, § 18 (185). This (as noted in William's *Apparatus* [§18, *Dicunt
quidam])* is undoubtedly a reference to Huguccio, whose very restrictive conception of self-
defense was "a survival of Augustine's view that denied to the private individual the right to
private defense on the grounds that it entailed a loss of love" (Frederick H. Russell, *The Just
War in the Middle Ages* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975], 96 n. 23). Russell
mistakenly attributes this position to Raymond of Pefiafort ("[l]ike Huguccio before him,
Raymond harbored moral suspicions about attempts to justify the right of a private person to
resort to violence on his own behalf, however licit it was in Roman and canon law"), on
grounds that for Raymond "private self-defense justified neither wounding nor killing an
enemy." The tight resttictions on self-defense that Russell refers to in Raymond's *Summa,* the
violation of which merit a sentence of excommunication, bear only on the special case of
persons who exceed the measure in defending themselves against clerics: ("I agree with the
opinion which holds with respect to the sentence of excommunication that if someone
defending himself against a cleric goes too far, if this is intentional, he is subject to excom-
munication" [quantum ad sententiam excommunicationis concordo cum eis, ut, si aliquis
defendendo se contra clericum excessit modum, incidat in excommunicationem]") (§ 18
[186b]). It is true, however, that Raymond did give a nod in the direction of Augustine when
he affirmed that the permissibility of violent self-defense "applies [only] to the imperfect, the
perfect *fpeefect1]* are not allowed to strike back, which the Lord shows in Matthew 5 [:39],
'If anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also' … "(§ 18 [187]). In this
context the *perfecti* signified those individuals who, by their professed state of life, were
committed to living out the gospel counsels of perfection. William, characteristically, defined
the category quite narrowly: "Who are these [perfect]? Does this include regular clergy who
have renounced possessions and even their own will? Response: as perfection has many
shapes, such as perfection in respect of sufficiency, order, empire, religion, and some other
matters distinguished by the theologians, I believe that here only those are meant who are
obliged by vow, precept or law not to retaliate; among these were the apostles and disciples
in the primitive Church who were held to non-retaliation by the teachings of the Lord, since
the Church was to be promulgated and enhanced by blood and martyrdom" *<Apparatus,* §18
[187]).

[39] *Apparatus,* §18 *(Impediendo)* (185).

[40] In other words, "striking back" will be allowed especially for the protection of *persons,*
in contrast to the protection of *property,* which warrants a lesser use of force, particularly
when applied by and against clergy.

[41] *Apparatus,* §18 *(Tertii dicunt)* (186).

defense to a narrow range of actions (blocking motions), the
second and third views place no special limit on the *kind of action*
that might be engaged in, as long as it is proportionate to the end
of saving oneself from unjust attack. The limits mentioned refer
only to the range of *subjects* who might take part in such activity
(on the second view clerics are excluded) or the *ends* for the sake
of which active resistance (striking the assailant) might
legitimately be carried out (for the protection of self rather than
the protection of property).

As to the question whether a "moderate defense" allows for the
use of weapons in fending off an assailant, Raymond argues that
"if force is inflicted with weapons, it may be repelled with
weapons; otherwise without weapons. "[42] To this last assertion he
is however quick to qualify that, in so judging, we must "take into
consideration the abilities of persons, so that sometimes the small
and weak may defend themselves with weapons against the big
and strong attacking with raised fist. "[43]

Immediacy-the first of the two requirements of a lawful
defense-serves to distinguish the force used in countering an
attack ("repulsio iniurie") from any resort to force that had
punishment ("vindicta") as its primary goal. The basic supposition
is that punishment seeks rectification for offenses that are past and
done, while self-defense is exercised "on the spot" *(in continenti)*
against threats that are ongoing.

[I]f someone after [suffering] an act of violence strikes back, and does it
immediately *[in continentil,* that is, when he sees the other ready to strike again,
he is in no way liable, but **if** he strikes back while the other does not want to hit
him again, this is impermissible, because this is not to fend off injury *[repulsio
iniurie]*but is for revenge *[vindicta*J, which is prohibited for everyone, and most
of all for the dergy. [44]

The problem, of course, is how exactly to define the immediacy
in question. On this point, Raymond adheres closely to the
teaching of *Qui repel/ere possunt.* Upon observing how some
people say restrictively "that no one ought to repel force unless it

[42] sis (186).
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.

has [first] been applied [*nisi illatam*]," he makes clear on the contrary that such force may also justifiably be repelled in anticipation of the actual attack *(priusquam sit illata),* stating that the defender is even permitted "to kill an ambusher and one who intends to kill ... if there is no other way *[si aliter non potest]* to counter the threat of the ambusher."[45] To lift all doubt that the necessity in question would indeed allow for defensive killing, William jots down the words *qua eum occidendo* ("than killing him," i.e., the assailant),[46] as a marginal notation to the *si aliter non potest* (condition of necessity) cited just above.

If "necessity" allows the defender some degree of anticipatory action, it also, on Raymond's account, permits him a reasonable delay in undertaking his response to an unjust attack.

If force is directed against property, then one is permitted to repel it, whether it has already occurred *[illatam]* or is planned *[inferendam],* but rather that is, most of all, when it has already occurred; provided this happens immediately *[in continentt],* that is, as soon as one knows that the attack has occurred, and before one turns to a contrary action *[contrarium actum].* [47]

In other words, far from signifying a necessity so overwhelming that it could leave no time for deliberation, the requirement of immediate response is construed to be fairly elastic. Strictly speaking, the defender is not obliged to mount his counterattack contemporaneously with the assault. He is allowed to set aside time to prepare an adequate defense, under condition, however that, in the interim, he does not engage in a "contrary action." "It is not considered to be a 'contrary action,' William clarifies,

if one in the meantime eats, drinks, or sleeps, or prepares to drive the enemy out of an unjustly occupied possession or recover booty brought away by him, even if this preparation demands a period of delay ... but if one disregards the injury and gives up the intention to pursue one's goods, turning to other occupations, then this is "a contrary action.[48]

[45] Ibid.
[46] *Apparatus,* §18 *(Si aliter),* p. 186.
[47] §18, pp. 186-187.
[48] *Apparatus,* §18 *(Contrarium actum),* p. 187.

It remains unclear whether this allowance of a reasonable delay in defense was intended by Raymond and William to apply solely to the recovery of one's property (the immediate context for their elaborations on this point) or whether it might also be construed to apply to the defense of one's person. Could a private defender be justified in killing his attacker, not immediately in the heat of the fray, but with careful deliberation, after adequate preparations had been made? Since what they have to say on defense of property is, in general, more restrictive than their parallel teaching on defense of persons, it would seem that if a delay were allowable with respect to the former, so too would this hold with respect to the latter. Naturally, however, this broadened concept of immediacy would obtain only under the supposition that (1) the aggressor is seen to be readying himself to renew the attack, and (2) it is impossible to counter this threat (say, by seeking protection from one's superior-prince or judge-who would ordinarily be entrusted with protecting the innocent from violations of the law) by any measure short of killing the assailant.

Should either of these two conditions be lacking, the killing would then have the character of punishment, an aim that was strictly proscribed to anyone not in a position of public authority. Consequently, it was conformity with these two conditions, and not the (putative) exclusion of deliberateness, that defined the legal boundaries of killing in self-defense.

III

Returning now to Aquinas's treatment of defensive killing at *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7, it is easy to detect traces of the earlier canon-law discussions of this topic. The principle of proportionality is duly mentioned ("if indeed one repels violence with moderation, the defense will be licit"), [49] as is the prohibition of any defense that is carried out in a spirit of revenge (ibid., ad 5). [50] However, it is surprising just how little Aquinas says about the exact

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[49] "Si vero moderate violentiam repellat, erit licita defensio: nam secundum iura, *vim vi repellere licet cum moder-amine inculpatae tutelae."*

[50] "The defense forbidden in this passage (Rom. 12:19] is that which comes from a vengeful spite *[livore vindicate]."*

contours of the said moderation. While telling us that "if someone
uses more than necessary violence in defending his own life, [his
act] will be unlawful," [51] he remains silent on the specifics. No
special mention is made of any act that would in principle be
excluded; nor does he allude to the issue of immediacy, which
figured so prominently in the earlier account of the canonists. [52]
The point about moderation is however expressed in a dis-
tinctively philosophical way, since it is linked to the general
principle, already articulated in the *Prima Secundae,* that an act
that proceeds from a good intention can be rendered illicit when
it is not proportionate   to its end. [53] In the case under examination,
the aim of protecting oneself from the harm caused by an attack
is the *intention* (or end), while the *act* is constituted by whatever
specific means (e.g., blocking, hitting, striking with a weapon) are
employed by the defender to secure this goal.[54] In the absence of
any definite indications about the latter (the means),[5⁵] the main
burden of article 7 is to elucidate the nature of the former, that is,
self-defense construed as a special sort of aim or intention.

[51] "Et ideo si aliquis ad defendendum propriam vitam utatur maiori violentia quam
oporteat, erit illicitum."

[52] However, in *srb* 11-11, q.108, a. 2, the idea of defense *incontinenti* is implicitly
mentioned, since here defense and punishment are contrasted precisely by their temporal
dimension {prospective or retrospective): the first is exercised against harms that are still
emergent, while the second against harms that are past and done: "Man resists harm by
defending himself *[defendit se]* against injuries, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges
those that have already been inflicted on him *[vel iam illatas iniurias ulciscitur]* with the
intention not of harming, but of removing the harm done *[non intentione nocendi, sed
intentione removendi nocumenta*]. And this belongs to vengeance."

[53] See, for instance, *srb* 1-11, q.18, a. 4, especially ad 2 and 3.

[54] To use the vocabulary earlier articulated in the *Summa theologiae,* whatever means are
employed to resist aggression would constitute the object of the exterior act of the will, while
the end aimed at {self-preservation) would constitute the object of the will's inner act {see *STh*
1-11, q. 18, a. 6, in corp.).

[55] However in the *sed contra* to art. 7, Aquinas remarks that "it is much more permissible
to defend one's life than one's house" *(multo magis licitum est defendere propriam vitam quam
propriam domum).* This could be an allusion to the third opinion mentioned by Raymond of
Peiiafort in *Summa de casibus,* II, § 18, p. 185 (cited above, p. xxx), according to which active
resistance (striking back), as distinct from mere passive blocking, may be justified particularly
for the defense of one's life, and to a lesser extent (or perhaps not at all) for the defense of
one's property. From this we can tentatively deduce that *"the act* of one defending himself,"
which is referred to in art. 7, is understood by Aquinas to consist in active and not merely
passive resistance to attack.

Aquinas's approach is to define this aim by way of contrast: it is directed not precisely at killing the attacker *(occisio invadentis)* but rather at the preservation of one's own life *(conservatio propriae vitae).* It bears repeating that this is not a comment about the act or means employed; indeed, the sentence where the contrast first appears opens with the famous assertion that "from the act of one defending himself there can follow a double effect"[56]-self-prese:rvarion, on the one hand, and killing the attacker, on the other. The first of these effects is what is aimed at as an end *(intenditur),* the latter, he suggests (implicitly alluding to the first sentence in the body of the article), lies outside of the agent's intention *(praeter intentionem).* Taken as an aim, the first *effectus,* he argues (seemingly with an appeal to natural law), is in no way illicit, since "it is natural for each thing to conserve itself in existence insofar as it can."[57] Reinforcing the same point several lines down, now seemingly with an appeal to the order of grace (the self-love of charity), he states that "nor is it necessary for salvation that a man should omit [performing] an act of moderate defense so as to avoid killing another, since one is more bound to look after one's own life than [to care for] the life of another. "[58]

Nowhere in the above does Aquinas say that the *act* of repelling an attack cannot involve deliberately taking the life of another; the only restriction placed on such an act is that it be moderate, that is, strictly proportionate to the *end* of saving oneself. Yet the claim that a private defender might, under conditions of grave necessity, be entitled to kill his assailant deliberately would nevertheless seem to be inconsistent with Aquinas's main point in *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, namely, that self-defense will be Heit only when the lethal outcome stands outside of the agent's intention. It can be said, however, that this

[56] "Ex actu igitur alicuius seipsurn defendentis duplex effectus sequi potest: rums quidem conservatio propriae vitae; alius autem occisio invadentis."

[57] "Actus igitur huiusmodi ex hoc quod intenditur conservatio propriae vitae, non habet rationem illiciti: cum hoc sit cuilibet narurale quod se conservet in esse quantum potest."

[58] "Nee est necessarium ad salutem ut homo actum moderatae tutelage praetermittat ad evitandum occisionem alterius, quia plus tenetur homo vitae suae providere quae vitae alienate."

inconsistency would arise only if Aquinas were using *intentio* (along with its cognates *intendere* and *intendens)* in a manner akin to the English word *intention,* which broadly designates "a determination to act in a certain way," and hence as applicable to both ends and means.[59] But, in light of the fact that article 7 clearly distinguishes between the act of self-defense and the end for the sake of which this act is done,[60] there is little doubt that *intentio* must here be taken in the more narrow, technical sense of 'aiming at an end'. Thus understood, Aquinas's purpose in the article was to distinguish between two different *goals* for the sake of which killing might be carried out by private individuals: strict necessity (protection from ongoing or imminent harm), on the one hand, and the desire to impose a penalty, on the other. Only in the second case would harming have the character of an end; defensive harming, by contrast, would solely have the character of a means. Read in this way, *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7 amounts to a reiteration of the canonists' basic distinction between licit defensive killing and illicit revenge, albeit dressed up in the philosophical vocabulary of the author's Aristotelianism.

Reference to noninstrumental harming is most apparent in Aquinas's description of illicit private vengeance in *STh* 11-11, q. 108, a. 1, where, as he puts it, the avenger's very aim is to take satisfaction in the harm done to the other.[61] The situation is somewhat more complicated with respect to the public vengeance that is carried out by duly authorized members of the common-wealth, since this will be licit only when it is ordered to something beyond the infliction of pain, loss, or death, namely, to some good that is achieved by the punishment.[62] Here and in other

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[59] The *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary* (at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=intention), accessed 14 April 2005.

[60] "Such an act by which one tends to protect one's life … " ("Actus igitur huiusmodi ex hoc quod intenditur conservatio propriae vitae .•. ").

[61] "If one's intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom one takes vengeance, and rests there, then this (vengeance] is altogether illicit ••. " ("Si enim eius intentio feratur principaliter in malum illius de quo vindictam sumit, et ibi quiescat, est omnino illicitum .•. ").

[62] "If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good, which is obtained by the punishment of the person who has sinned … then vengeance may be licit, provided other due circumstances be observed" ("Si vero intentio vindicantis feratur principaliter ad

passages Aquinas mentions several goods that can be achieved through the imposition of punishment: restraining evil, deterring wrongdoing, the amendment of sinners, etc. Yet, although punishment can indeed be viewed as a means for procuring such goods, it remains true that, at a most basic level, punishment is first and foremost about rectifying the violated fabric of justice: "through punishment the equality of justice is restored" *(per poenam reparatur aequalitas iustitae [STh* 11-11, q. 108, a. 4]). It should be emphasized that this good-the reestablishment of justice-is an end that is realized *in* the punishment itself, for, as Aquinas explains, this justice arises when "he who by sinning has exceeded in following his own will, suffers something that is contrary to his will."[63] In this sense, the punishments in question (striking, maiming, incarceration, or death) represent more than pure means to a distinct end; rather, they are integral to the end itself, and may be intended as such, for it is in them that the balance of justice is restored.

This reading is borne out by the concluding sentence in the body of article 7, where Aquinas asserts that the intentional infliction of death *(intendens hominem occidere)* may licitly be carried out only by persons (soldiers or ministers of a judge) who have the public authority to exercise this action for the sake of the common good. This assertion is made by reference to article 3, where he had explained that political authorities alone, and not private individuals, are entitled to inflict death on evildoers *(occidere malefactorem),* just as "it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the whole body." Although the notion of punishment is not explicitly mentioned, his specification that this killing is to be wrought specifically upon evildoers makes clear that capital punishment is indeed the problem under discussion in article 3.[64] This suggests that when the very same concept of public killing is again mentioned in article 7, it likewise bears a relation to the

aliquod bonurn, ad quod pervenitur per poenam peccantis •.. potest esse vindicatio licita, aliis debitis circumstantiis servatis") (ibid.).

[63] "[I]lle qui peccando nimis secutus est suam voluntatem, aliquid contra suam voluntatem patitur" (ibid.); cf. *Summa contra gentiles,* bk. ill, chaps. 140 and 146.

[64] *SI'h* II-II, q. 64, a. 3.

idea of punishment. Soldiers or enforcers of the law may 'intentionally' kill in self-defense (a. 7), just as judges may rightly order the execution of evildoers (a. 3), because in each case they possess the requisite authority. And such authority is needful for the precise reason that oniy persons entrusted with care of the common good have the right to administer punitive sanctions. This requirement holds not only for the death penalty, but, as we have seen, for any corporeal sanction whatsoever. [65]

The interpretation that I have been arguing for-namely, that in *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7 the reference to 'intentional' killing signifies not merely the deliberateness of this act, but more specifically the fact that it is carried out as an execution of justice-is somewhat obscured by the formulation Aquinas himself uses in the dosing sentence of article 7. There the contrast between private individuals and public authorities appears to be framed, not in terms of self-defense and punishment, but rather as a subset within the first of these two categories: "It is not licit for one man to intend killing another in self-defense, except in the case of those who have public authority, who, though intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the puMic good: for instance a soldier fighting against the enemy and a minister of the judge fighting with robbers. "[66] This formulation can easily lead one to think that the discussion in artide 7 had prescinded

[65] The principle that only someone (a legitimate authority) who is enttusted with the care of a community (preserving its common good) may rightly impose a physical penalty, is succinctly stated in *Sfh* ll-II, q. 65, a. 2: "Now it is illicit to do someone harm, except by way of punishment for the sake of justice *[nisi per modum poenae propter iustitiam].* Again, mo man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Thus it is not licit for a man to strike another *[verberare aliquem],* unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes." The remainder of the article discusses the application of this principle to the special case of paternal authority over children and servants. Having diflferentiated three types of physical harming in *STh* ll-U, q. 65, a. 1, namely, striking, maiming, and killing, Aquinas made dear in *STh* H-H, q. 65, a. 2, ad 2, that only a person holding "perfect coercive power" (i.e., a prince ruling over a city or "perfect community") might be entitled to administer death or maiming, while the "imperfect coercive power" of a father (mling over the "imperfect   or family) is limited to striking onlyo

[66] IIJliicirum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat, nisi ei qui habet publicam auctoritatem, qui, intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem, refert hoc ad publicum bornum: ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis pugnante contra latrones.

entirely from the notion of punishment; [67] in substance the analysis would then have been about two forms of strictly defensive killing, private and public, and only the latter could justifiably be deemed deliberate.

There are however at least two reasons which militate against reading article 7 in the manner just described. First, in his earlier discussion of soldiers fighting against an enemy (i.e., combat in a just war), Aquinas had made clear that such action would necessarily have a punitive dimension: "those who are attacked," he wrote in *STh* 11-11, q. 40, a. 1, "should be attacked, because they deserve it on account of some fault." The same presupposition of guilt would likewise hold, *mutatis mutandis,* with respect to ministers of the judge who use coercive means to enforce the law against criminals.

Second, Aquinas's statements about justifiable resort to force should not be read anachronistically in light of the modern attempt to separate the question of the lawful behavior of combatants in war *(jus in hello)* from the substantive reasons that states may have for going to war *(jus ad helium).* On the modern conception (articulated in the eighteenth century by authors such as Wolff and Vattel), the laws of war apply simultaneously to the opposing belligerents, regardless of which side is truly possessed of the just cause. Hence the determination of right and wrong behavior on the battlefield will be measured solely by military necessity. Soldiers will thus face each others as "defenders," and not as agents of justice or executioners of a sanction. On Aquinas's more traditional understanding, by contrast, just war is a "unilateral act of enforcement," which "implies by definition the legal inequality of the defenders, who confront each other in quite distinct capacities, one as an offender, the other as a dispenser of

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[67] After observing that killing "is only possible in the context of punishment (the preservation of justice) or of a just war," Martin Rhonheimer {"Sins Against Justice [Ila IIae, qq. 59-78], in Pope, ed., *The Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,* 296) correctly notes that, for this reason the concluding sentence of *SI'h* II-II, q. 64, a. 7 must not be taken to be "dealing with mere actions in self-defense, as Thomas's formulation misleadingly suggests." The same author adds (ibid), in line with what I have argued below, that for Aquinas "a just war presupposes some guilt," such that, by the imposition of a penalty "an injustice has to be redeemed."

justice. "[68] In line with this conception, an individual soldier would
view his enemy, not as someone entitled to fight in a manner
identical to himself, but rather as "the rebellious object of armed
coercion. "[69] It would accordingly be a mistake to read the state-
ment in article 7 about soldiers and policemen "defending them-
selves" as though this were meant to signify a form of justifiable
killing that would prescind from all considerations of culpability
and punishment.

   This reading is confirmed by a text in the *Summa Theologiae*
which in fact constitutes a dose parallel to *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7,
namely, the earlier question 41 on strife, "De rixa." One of the
sins against peace, strife designates "a kind of private war, which
is conducted between private persons, not [from the initiative] of
some public authority, but instead from an inordinate will."[70] The
sin consists first and foremost [71] in the illicit use of force by one
private person against another. On the part of the individual who
initiates the attack (goes to the offensive), the sin will be especially
grievous: "it is," Aquinas states in very strong terms, "always
sinful," "for it is not without mortal sin that one inflicts harm on
another even if the deed be done with the hands. "[72] Aquinas
points out, by contrast, that using counter force to protect oneself

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[68] Peter Haggenmacher, "Just War and Regular War in Sixteenth Century Spanish
Doctrine," *International Review of the Red Cross,* no. 290 (September-October 1992): 434-
45, at 435; cf. Aquinas, *STh* II-II, q. 41, a. 1, ad 3.

[69] Ibid.

[70] *STh* II-II, q. 1: "[R]ixa videtur esse quoddam privatum helium, quod inter privatas
personas agitur non ex aliqua publica auctoritate, sed magis ex inordinata voluntate."

[71] Aquinas mentions two other sorts of actors that might be subject to the sin of strife: (1)
individuals who use force defensively to resist a just attack mounted by ministers of a
legitimate prince or judge; in this sense, criminals who resist apprehension, and soldiers who
prosecute an unjust war, would be guilty of strife *(STh* II-II, q. 41, a. 1, ad 3); and (2), soldiers
or policemen who give vent to private animosity when carrying out their official duties *(STh*
II-II, q. 64, a. 7 [in corp., last line]).

[72] "[R]ixa semper importat peccatum. Et in eo quidem qui alterum invadit iniuste est
peccatum mortale: inferre enim nocumentum proximo etiam opere manuali non est absque
mortali peccato." As Aquinas indicates in the reply to the third objection, it is in this respect
that private violence differs essentially from public war. While it may be lawful for the
legitimate authority (a prince or a judge) to go on the attack (i.e., initiate war) against wrong-
doers, the use of offensive force will *never* be permitted on the part of private individuals. This
is the reason why *rixa* is purely and simply the name of a sin, while *bellum* may be either
sinful or just, depending on the three conditions outlined in *STh* II-II, q. 40, a. 1.

from this sort of unjust attack need not always be sinful. On the contrary, some acts of self-defense will be fully justified and thus without sin. It remains true, nevertheless, that agents can indeed fall into sin when defending themselves, not just venially, but mortally as well. To explain the difference between these three modes of self-defense (blameless, venially sinful, and mortally sinful) Aquinas appeals to *intentionality* and *proportionality,* the same two principles that would figure so prominently in *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7.

The explanation in *STh* 11-11, q. 41, a. 1 opens with the statement that if someone's "sole intention be to resist *[solo animo repellendtl* the injury done to him, and he defends himself with due moderation, there is no sin, and one cannot say that there is strife on his part. "[73] Inversely, however, "should a person defend himself out of vengeance or hatred, or in excess to what moderation requires, there will always be sin."[74] Significantly, Aquinas here makes explicit what was left merely implicit in his later treatment *(STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7), namely, that self-defense will become illicit if it is pursued, not merely to repel an attack, but with the added aim of exacting revenge. Should the sentiment of revenge be slight, and the act's disproportionality minimal, the sin will be venial; but should a man go at his attacker with "the firm resolve to kill or cause him serious harm, "[75] the sin will then be mortal. By its placement in the argument, we are led to understand that this 'firm resolve' is sinful precisely because the violence it exercises is bound up with a project of revenge. In other words, Aquinas should not here be understood as making a general statement about the unlawfulness of deliberate private killing (or severe harming) under any conditions whatsoever, such that even strictly defensive killing would be prohibited; rather, his statement bears on the special case of homicidal revenge.

[73] "Nam si solo animo repellendi iniuriam illatam, et cum debita moderatione se defendat, non est peccatum: nee proprie potest dici rixa ex parte eius."

[74] "Si vero cum animo vindictae vel odii, vel cum excessu debitae moderationis se defendat, semper est peccatum."

[75] "[Q]uando obfirmato animo in impugnantem insurgit ad eum occidendum vel graviter laedendum."

SUMMARY

In the preceding, I have offered an interpretation of *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7 that cuts against the standard reading of this text in terms of PDE. In so doing, my aim has been twofold. First, I have attempted to show how this reading misconstrues the basic logic of Aquinas's analysis of self-defense. This analysis is not about deliberate versus nondeliberate killing; its focus rather is on the difference between two quite different aims for the sake of which such killing may be carried out: self-preservation and punishment. While Aquinas unequivocally condemns intentional killing in private revenge, by the same token he never denies that private defenders may justifiably resort to lethal force in situations of extreme necessity. Second, and by extension, I have argued that the PDE interpretation foists onto Aquinas an overly narrow view of the sort of acts that may justifiably be done in self-defense, a view that is out of keeping with the legal conceptions prevalent in Aquinas's own time. My intent has not been to deny that PDE may be found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. To the contrary, I would argue that Aquinas does indeed advocate such a principle, not just once, but repeatedly. [76] However, the contexts in question have little in common with the moral problem of self-defense. [77]

AN ABSOLUTELY SIMPLE GOD?
FRAMEWORKS FOR READING PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS
AREOPAGITE [1]

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ALTHOUGH LARGELY NEGLECTED in the West during recent centuries as formative for philosophy and theology, the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, the *Corpus Dionysiacum* (CD), exercised substantial influence during the Western Christian medieval and Renaissance periods. John Scotus Eriugena, John Sarracen, Robert Grosseteste, and Marsilio Ficino produced some of the major Latin translations of the corpus. Albert the Great wrote commentaries on all the major works of Dionysius; Robert Grosseteste wrote commentaries on several of them. Aquinas wrote a commentary on the *Divine Names* and in addition refers directly to Dionysius in nearly 2200 texts-more references than to any other authors except Aristotle and Augustine. Dionysius's influence continued to be felt through the Renaissance period among thinkers such as Marsilio Ficino, Nicholas of Cusa, Meister Eckhart, and Dante.

The writings of Dionysius have enjoyed an enduring formative status in the Eastern Orthodox Church. Dionysius's writings are central to the Byzantine tradition that runs through the Cappadocian fathers, Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene, Gregory Palamas, and into the twentieth century among thinkers such as

Vladimir Lossky and Christoph Yannaras. A stichera or verse for vespers for the feast day of St. Dionysius Areopagite (Oct. 3) reflects the honor still accorded these writings and their author. [2]

As a friend of wisdom to the point of coming to resemble God as closely as possible, 0 blessed Dionysius, you mystically explained the divine names. Initiated as you were by union with God in the mysteries that surpass all understanding, you taught them to the ends of the earth.

Moreover, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the dependence of the CD on Neoplatonic authors such as Proclus was firmly established, a number of scholars came to view the CD as fundamentally Neoplatonic in spirit: in some cases compatible with the Christian teachings it contained, while in other cases using the Christian teachings as a "front" to promulgate a Neoplatonic view of the world. [3]

In this paper I will sketch three frameworks for reading the texts of Dionysius: Neoplatonic, Scholastic,[4] and Byzantine. Of course, each of the historical traditions associated with these frameworks is complex, diverse, and multifaceted. It would be historically naïve and inaccurate to reduce any of these traditions to specific thinkers such as Plato, Plotinus, Damascius Diadochus, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Palamas, Aristotle, or Aquinas. However, in the context of this paper I shall in fact focus on these

[2] This is the feast day for the St. Dionysius who is believed to have been the actual disciple of Paul. But it is the anonymous author of the *Corpus Dionysiacum* that is celebrated in this verse. A kontakian for the same feast reads: "As a disciple of the apostle caught up to the third heaven, you spiritually entered the gate of heaven, Dionysius. You were enriched with understanding of ineffable mysteries and enlightened those who sat in the darkness of ignorance."

[3] Alexander Golitzin, *Et introibo ad altare dei: The Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagita* (Thessalonika, 1994), 29-37 gives a very good summary of modem interpretations of Dionysius along these lines. Of course, the view that Dionysius is more Platonist than Christian has a long history going back, for example, to Luther: "Dionysius is most pernicious; he platonizes more than he Christianizes" (Martin Luther, "Babylonian Captivity of the Church" [in D. *Martin Luther's Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Weimar: H. Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1912-), 6:562)).

[4] While 'Scholastic' narrowly signifies the type of thought found among Latin thinkers such as Aquinas and Albert the Great, the Scholastic framework has a long lineage extending back at least to Augustine and Boethius and includes thinkers in the Islamic ana Jewish traditions.

thinkers as representative of their traditions as I try to sharpen what seem to be three rather distinctive approaches relative to one another and relative to reading Dionysius.[5] My aim in elaborating these frameworks is more systematic than strictly historical.

I am particularly interested in the problem of whether there is a distinction between the divine essence[6] and energies,[7] an issue that characteristically divides Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic thinkers. [8] This problem is closely related to a host of other problems including the character of God's incomprehensibility and simplicity; the relation between the persons or

[5] Certainly none of these traditions can be strictly identified with any of these thinkers. After all, various propositions of Aquinas were condemned in 1277. Duns Scotus and Aquinas have differing views of the relation of divine attributes to the divine essence. But all of the thinkers I will discuss in this paper are representative of their respective traditions in terms of a general method of doing philosophy, metaphysical framework, etc-at least sufficiently so for the purposes of this paper.

"Essence' is often used to translate *ousia.* However, both Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951), 137-54; and Christopher Stead, *Divine Substance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 1-25 provide general discussions about translating *ousia* in light of its multivalent meanings as well as about problems with translating *ousia* by 'essence'. Stead makes this point particularly in reference to Greek Patristic authors. But given the widespread practice of translating *ousia* as 'essence' in translations of Greek texts and in secondary works that discuss the *ousia-energeia* distinction, I will use the term. For Dionysius, however, I prefer rendering *ousia* simply as 'being' especially since, when applied to God, *ousia* properly names the divine power of 'being-producing' *(ousiopoios)* and not the 'whatness' or 'quiddity' of God.

[7] In the Byzantine framework, the divine energy *(energeia)* is the natural going forth *(exodos)* of the divine essence directed toward creation. As Damascene observes, it is the persons of the Trinity who employ the divine energy *(On the Orthodox Faith* 3.15 [59], in *Die Schriften des Johannes van Damaskos,* vol. 2, ed. the Byzantinischen Institut der Abeti Scheyern [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1973]; citations to this work are by book, chapter, and the paragraph number from the critical edition). The energy can be understood in the singular as the activity common to the persons of the Trinity; yet it is distinguished in various ways: divine knowledge, will, glory, light, etc. We know of and participate in God only in terms to his energies. See, e.g., Vladimir Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the &stern Church* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1976), 67-89; and Gregory Palamas, *Capita physica, theologica, moralia et practica,* in R. E. Sinkewicz, trans. and ed., *Saint Gregory Palamas, The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters,* Studies and Texts 83 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1988), 82-256. References to the *Capita* are by chapter numbers: in this case, 72.

[8] And often divides them in rather sharply polemical fashion. See A. N. Williams, *The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3-27 for a good discussion of the controversy on this matter.

hypostases [9] of the Trinity, the divine essence, and divine energy; [10] the relation between God and finite beings; and the nature of our ultimate union with God. In the first part of the paper, I will lay out the three frameworks with attention to these problems. In the second, I will consider the interpretation of Dionysius in terms of these frameworks and with reference to two general topics: first, how to interpret Dionysius's characterization of God as *hyperousiosousia* (beyond-being being) and, second, whether and in what sense Dionysius makes a distinction between the divine being (essence) and energy. In relation to these issues, I do not think Dionysius fits neatly or completely into any of these frameworks. On balance, though, his writings are best read in terms of the Byzantine framework and they are at odds in fundamental ways with the Neoplatonic and, especially, the Scholastic frameworks.

   As the reader will note, I have spent considerably more time laying out and providing secondary references to Byzantine authors than either Neoplatonic or Scholastic authors. [11] The latter

   [9] Properly, *hypostasis* is translated by 'individual subsistence' rather than 'person', which translates *proposon.* But I will follow convention and use 'person'. It should be noted, however, that authors in the Byzantine tradition typically do not understand the inner life of the Trinity in terms of 'psychological' categories as is done in the West, especially since Augustine. For a good discussion of the differences between Eastern and Western ways of thinking about the Trinity, see Michael Fahey and John Meyendorff, *Trinitarian Theology East and West: St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Gregory Palamas* (Brookline, Mass.: Holy Cross Press, 1977).

   [10] 'Energy' is not the most facile translation of *energeia;* 'activity' is clearly a superior translation. Nevertheless, I will use 'energy/energies' since this is the standard English translation of *energeia* as it appears in Byzantine texts and in the debate concerning the *ousia-energeia* distinction with reference to God.

   [11] In addition to the secondary works cited elsewhere in this article regarding Byzantine authors, the interested reader will find the following helpful: Georges Barrois, "Palamism Revisited," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 19 (1975): 211-31; David Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David Coffey, "The Palamite Doctrine of God: A New Perspective," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 32 (1988): 329-58; George Habra, "The Source of the Doctrine of Gregory Palamas on the Divine Energies," *Eastern Churches Quarterly* 22 (1957): 244-52; Andrew Louth, *St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); George Maloney, *A Theology of Uncreated Energies* (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1976); John Meyendorff, *A Study of Gregory Palamas* (Wing Road, Bedfordshire: The Faith Press, 1974 [1964]), translated from the French *Introduction a l'etude de Gregoire Palama* (Editions du Seuil, 1959); Kallistos Ware, "God

frameworks, so far as I develop them for this paper, are rather well known among philosophers in general. However, while the essence-energy distinction that it at the heart of the Byzantine framework has received a good deal of discussion among professional theologians, it has been virtually ignored by professional philosophers. This is because most philosophers are less likely than theologians to be familiar with authors in the Byzantine tradition.

I

A) The Neoplatonic Framework [12]

For Plato and Aristotle, things are what they are in virtue of their form. Knowledge of a being's form provides our most fundamental knowledge of it-'what it is'. Subsistent forms are what really are for Plato, or the prime instances of being as being *(on he* on) for Aristotle. However, they are definite beings that, as such, are limited or finite. Despite his insistence on the onto-logical primacy of form, Plato posits an unlimited principle that in some sense transcends form: for example, the good beyond being *(epeikena tes ousias).* In light of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides,* the Neoplatonists understand this unlimited first principle as the One. As is well known, in the first hypothesis of that dialogue, Parmenides posits a one in no way many. After showing that nothing can be predicated of such a one without making it many, Parmenides concludes:

There is no manner in which the one has being *[ousia].* Therefore, the one in no manner is *[on].* It cannot then be even to the extent of being one. Rather if we can trust such an argument as this, it appears that the one neither is one nor is at all ... you cannot say that it has anything or that there is anything of it.

Hidden and Revealed: The Apophatic Way and the Essence-Energies Distinction," *Eastern Churches Review* 7 (1975): 125-36; Kallistos Ware, "The Debate about Palamism," *Eastern Churches Review* 9 (1977): 45-63; and Ronald D. Zimany, "The Divine Energies in Orthodox Theology," *Diakonia* 11 (1976): 281-85.

    [12] An expanded and more detailed version of this section is included in my article "Mystical Union and Beatific Vision," *Proceedings of the 11th International Congress on Medieval Philosophy,* held in Porto, Portugal, August, 2002, forthcoming.

Consequently, it cannot have a name or be spoken of, nor can there be any
knowledge or perception or opinion of it. It is not named or spoken of, nor a
matter of opinion or knowledge or perception for any being. [13]

    For the Neoplatonists, accordingly, the One as the unlimited
first principle is radically simple: it is in no way many and admits
of no distinction or differentiation. More properly, it is neither
one nor many, neither united nor differentiated. Hence, to refer
to the One as absolutely simple is to assert nothing positive about
it at all, as if it were the most simple being among the totality of
all beings. Rather, the One is beyond all beings and all entitative
determinations. [14] Although properly ineffable, the One is the
ultimate productive power *(dynamis)* or cause of all things.
Hence, it can be named 'good' and 'one'. Of course, these names,
or any other names we might give to the One, do not imply
differentiation or distinction in it. They are causal designations
that 'name' the One in relation to what comes forth from it.
Conversely, otherness and differentiation, as well as sameness and
union, emerge in the overflow or superabundance of the One. For
Plotinus, otherness is the first "moment" of the procession of
thinking *(nous)* and being since otherness is the condition for any
thing to exist at all, while sameness is established in the reversion
of being and thinking to the One. [15] Hence, for Plotinus, thinking
and being do not pertain to the One since both thinking and being
essentially involve multiplicity and, thus, differentiation. [16]
Consequently, when Plotinus describes the radical reversion of the
soul to the One, in which the soul goes beyond *nous,* closes the
eye of *nous* as one might say, there is no longer a basis for
sameness and difference between the soul qua *nous* and the One. [17]
So, Plotinus writes:

   [13] Plato, *Parmenides* 141D-142E.
   [14] Cf. *Enneads* 5.3.13 and 6.9.3.
   [15] *Enneads* 2.4.5.
   [16] Cf. *Enneads* 5.1.4.
   [17] The limitations of this paper and the complexity of the topic do not allow me to
examine Dionysius's view on the nature of our ultimate union with God relative to the
Neoplatonic, Scholastic and Byzantine frameworks. But I want to mention this matter in
setting forth each of these frameworks as a way of highlighting the differences among them.

So then the seer does not see and does not distinguish and does not imagine two. But it is as if he had become someone else and he is not himself and does not count as his own there, but has come to belong to that and so is one, having joined, as it were center to center. For, there too, when the centers have come together they are one, but there is duality when they are separate. This is also how we now speak of another. [18]

This view of the One ultimately denies the primacy of an 'analogy of being' between the One and beings since the One is utterly inexpressible and incomprehensible. To be sure, an analogy arises in our attempt to understand the one as cause of beings, but in that connection Plotinus writes: "To say that it is the cause is not to predicate something incidental of it but of us, because we have something from it while that One is in itself. But speaking precisely neither 'that' nor 'is' should be said."[19] Plotinus himself, however, seems somewhat ambiguous and ambivalent on this matter. There are texts (most notably the last part of *Enneads* 6.8) in which Plotinus develops what various scholars have suggested is at bottom a kind 'theistic' understanding of the One.[20] That ambiguity and ambivalence, however, seems decisively resolved by Damascius Diadochus, the last head· of the Academy and, probably, one of the most neglected of the great Neoplatonists.

Damascius begins his work *Concerning the First Principle* with the question: "Whether what is called the one principle of all is beyond the all [to *pan]* or something of the all as the summit of all those that proceed from it. Do we say that the all is with it, or after it and from it?"[21] Since for Damascius, "the all" is properly

[18] *Enneads* 6.9.10.

[19] *Enneads* 6.9.4.

[20] John Rist, *Plotinus: The Road To Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 25-26, claims that in some sense Plotinus ultimately attributes (infinite) bein!Yactuality and thinking to the one. This theistic version tempers the more radical strand of Neoplatonism that I am describing. To that extent, this tempered version is, in the long run, basically congruent with the Scholastic framework-at least insofar as the One is understood ultimately as the first being that is the rational and good cause of all other beings.

[21] Damascius, *Aporiai kai luseis perit6n prot6n arcb6n (Doubts and Solutions Concerning the First Principle),* trans. J. Combes (text by L. G. Westernink), 3 vols. (Paris, 1986-91), 1.1.4-7. All references to Damascius are to this edition, and include volume, page, and line numbers. For this paper, I have found most useful the excellent discussion of Damascius by

that from which nothing is absent[22] and not just "those things that subsist in multiplicity and differentiation," [23] the One as the ultimately simple cause is connected even in its transcendence with what it is to transcend. Accordingly, the One is known through the negation of an eminent denial: the One beyond the all-as the undifferentiated, transcendent first principle of all-is superior to the all and unknowable to all intellect and sensation just as the intelligible itself is unknown to sensation. [24]

Damascius, however, writes that "Our soul conjectures a principle of all, however conceived, to be beyond the all, unconnected with the all. Therefore, it must be named neither principle, nor cause, nor first, nor before the all, nor beyond the all. Therefore, much less is it to be hymned as the all. Nor in general [is it] to be hymned, conceived or conjectured. "[25] In this case, we have a more radical negation that neither affirms nor denies the One since it neither has a nature and is utterly unknown. Indeed, "we do not know it either as known or unknown. "[26]

Elsewhere, Damascius writes: "We do not affirm anything of [the ineffable] at all. Therefore, these are not the nature of it: nothing, beyond all, beyond cause, and the uncoordinated with

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Sara Rappe, *Reading Neoplatonism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 197-214. There are good historical reasons for considering Damascius relative to interpreting Dionysius. In the introduction to his translation of Dionysius's letters, Ronald Hathaway concluded a long introductory discussion of the authorship of the *Corpus Dionysiacum* with a conjecture that the writings were influenced not just by Proclus (which was well known) but also by Damascius Diadochus, the last head of the Platonic Academy *(Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite* [The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969], 25-29). Subsequently, Salvatore Lilla, in his article "Pseudo-Dionysius l'Areopagite, Prophyre et Damascius," convincingly showed the influence of Damascius on the *Corpus Dionysiacum* (in *Denys fAreopagite et sa posterite en orient et en occident: Actes du colloque international, Paris, 21-24 septembre 1994,* ed. Ysabel de Andia [Paris: Institut d'etudes augustiniennes, 1997], 135-52).

[22] Combes, trans., 1.1.9.
[23] Ibid., 1.30.19-20.
u Ibid., 1.17.24-18.2
[25] Ibid., 1.4.13-18.
[26] Ibid., 1.18.4-10.

all, but only the denial of those after it. "[27] In this connection, Sara Rappe correctly observes:

The "Ineffable" is a term that does not possess a meaning in the ordinary sense, since it has no semantic function. It is not a term so that its deployment in language conveys nothing at all to the reader or listener. That this word forms the basis of Damascius' philosophical activity inevitably leads to a self-conscious meditation on the status of his own language, which Damascius often refers to as a radical reversal, or peritrope of language.[28]

B) The Scholastic Framework

For Aristotle, form, *ousia,* and actuality *(energeia)* are the primary, and ultimately equivalent, expressions of being as being; it is with reference to them that everything else is and is said to be. Subsistent forms (viz., the unmoved movers) are the first among beings, which as pure actualities, are finite or determinate. For Aristotle, however, there is no actually infinite being since anything infinite is as such always potential. Given this, how is it that later Christian thinkers can use an Aristotelian framework to claim that God is a purely actual infinite being? Aquinas provides a typical yet elegant solution to this problem in the *Summa Theologiae* I, questions 2-4. In the third argument for the existence of God (q. 2, a. 3), Aquinas argues that subsistent forms-in this case the angels-do not account for themselves since their essence does not involve be-ing *(esse).* They are relatively necessary but not necessary without qualification. To account for their existence, they require a being that is necessary without qualification and whose essence is identical to its be-ing *(esse).* Indeed, it must be identical to its essence and be-ing (q. 3, a. 4). This being, God, is be-ing itself subsisting in itself *(ipsum esse per se subsistens)* (q. 4, a. 2). This being is completely simple without any potentiality or composition. This entails that nothing is predicated *of* God; rather, God is whatever is said of him.

[27] Ibid., 1.13.16-24.

[28] Rappe, *Reading Neoplatonism,* 209.

In the Neoplatonic and Scholastic frameworks, the first cause
is absolutely simple. In the former framework, as is evidenced by
Plotinus and Damascius, the One is radically beyond essence/being
(hyperousios) such that nothing is properly predicated of it,
including 'simple' and 'one'. In the latter framework, however,
God is understood to be an infinite, rational, subsisting being
identical to his essence, existence, goodness, will, knowledge,
love, etc. Whatever is said of God is identical to the divine
essence; whatever is not identical with the divine essence is
created--otherwise   God would be subject to accidents and, thus,
divine simplicity would be compromised.

Despite the radical difference between God and all finite
beings, that difference in the Scholastic framework is still
entitative in character as a difference between two orders of
beings: God as the uncreated being and all other beings as
created. [29] That is, God is understood with reference to the same

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[29] Some scholars have argued that Aquinas, at least in some texts, does not understand God
as a being. Gerald Phelan provides the classic statement of this view in light of a distinction
between *ens* as *id quod est* and *ens* as *habens esse:* "There is a sense, however, in which *ens*
means *habens esse. Ens dicitur quasi esse habens* (De *potentia* VII, 2.res). In this sense, God
cannot be called *ens.* God does not 'have' *esse.* God 'is' *Esse.* However, when *ens* is taken to
mean *'quod est,'* God is *'maxime ens,'* since 'what' He is is lpsum Esse.... But when *ens*
means *habens esse,* it cannot be said of God" ("The Being of Creatures" in *G.B. Phelan:*
Selected Papers, ed. Arthur Kirn [Toronto: Pontifical Instituted of Mediaeval Studies Press,
1967], 90). As Phelan notes, this means that "essence is not … some positive thing but simply
that 'by which' *(quo),* or the mode … in which the act, *esse,* is exercised" (ibid., 91). Essence,
then, as William Carlo argued, is a negative or limiting principle that is reducible to *esse (The*
Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to &istence in fucistential Metaphysics [fhe Hague: Martin us
Nijoff, 1966]). This understanding of the relation between *esse* and *essentia* has a great many
merits on strictly philosophical grounds. Certainly, it would bring Aquinas into closer
proximity with the Neoplatonic nonentitative understanding of the One. Without gainsaying
texts that support this reading of Aquinas (see Phelan, "The Being of Creatures," 89-91, for
some relevant texts from Aquinas), it is not clear to me that it is Aquinas's own, or at least his
predominant, position. The limitations of this paper preclude any detailed investigation of this
matter. But if Aquinas held to a nonentitative/nonessentialistic understanding of God one
would, for example, expect him to draw on Dionysius's use of *hyperousios (supersubstantiale*
in Sarracen's translation) to support it. But Aquinas's implicit understanding of Dionysius's
use of this language, as far as I can tell, is not that Dionysius denies that God has an essence
but that his essence transcends any finite essence (see Aquinas, *In De Divinis nominibus* 1.1,
1.3, 3.6, 5.1, etc. See below, p. 393, for further discussion of this matter). Moreover, in *STh*
I, q. 3, a. 4, Aquinas distinguishes God, who is his *esse,* from things that have *esse* as the first
being *(primum ens)* from all other beings *(entia).* For a detailed investigation of this theory

metaphysical categories that apply to beings. To be sure, some of these categories do not apply (e.g., materiality, potentiality, etc.). But there is a metaphysical and epistemological continuity between God and beings that is rooted in the analogy of being *(ens)* and extends to essence. Indeed, in the absence of such an analogical continuity, there would be no possibility of a science about God and, thus, no possibility of providing a rational grounding of beings in God as the first cause. Accordingly, the human quest for happiness that is rooted in our nature as rational beings would be frustrated. As Aquinas says:

There resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void. Hence, it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God. [30]

I wish to note two obvious points of contrast between the Neoplatonic and Scholastic frameworks. First, despite the strictly rational requirement that God be utterly simple, the Christian God is the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. While Aquinas identifies the persons of the Trinity with the divine essence, nevertheless, the persons are different from and thus in some sense other than one another. [31] The Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Holy Spirit, etc. The Neoplatonic framework obviously rejects the Trinity since all otherness and differentiation is extrinsic to the One. [32] Second, in the Neoplatonic framework, radical union with the One involves a transnoetic experience that transcends sameness and difference between the individual and the One. According to the Scholastic framework, there is an intellectual vision of God's essence for the blessed in the next life which, although it never comprehends God as God does since the

and it:scritical reception by other Thomistic scholars, see Chris Curry, *Reconnoitering the Role of Essence in Light of &se: The Existential Thesis of Phelan, Clarke, and Carlo* (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 1992).

[30] *SI'h* I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 1.

[31] *SI'h* I, q. 39, a. 1.

[32] See Lilla, "Pseudo-Dionysius L'Areopagite, Prophyre et Damascius," 121-22.

created intellect never loses its created status, nevertheless in some way directly intuits the divine essence.

C) The Byzantine Framework

"His divine power has granted to us all things that pertain to life and godliness . . . that through them [we] may become partakers of the divine nature."[33] Commenting on this text, Gregory Palamas writes, "the divine nature must be called at the same time incommunicable and, in a sense, communicable; we attain participation in the nature of God and yet he remains totally inaccessible. We must affirm both things at one and must preserve the antinomy as the criterion of piety."[34] Elsewhere, Palamas elaborates on this matter as follows:

Further, that which participates in something according to essence *[ousia]* must possess a common essence with that in which it participates and be identical with it in some respect. Who then has even heard of there being one essence shared by God and us in any respect? Basil the Great says: "The energies of God come down to us but his essence remains inaccessible." And the divine Maximus affirms, "The man divinized by grace will be everything that God is, apart from identity of essence." Thus it is not possible to participate in the divine essence, not even for those divinized by grace, but it is possible to participate in the divine energy.[35]

It is worth noting that a primary motivation for the distinction between the divine essence and the divine energy is existentially based in deification; as Maximus the Confessor says, we become so united to God that "all that God is, save for an identity in essence, we become when deified by grace."[36] In deification, we

[33] 2 Pet 1:4.

[34] *Theophanes PG* 150:932D.

[35] *Capita* 111. See *Triads* 3.2.5-10 for a discussion of the distinction between the divine essence and energy as well as the distinctions among the energies: *Pro hesychastis.* J. Meyendorff, ed., *Gregoire Palamas: Defense des saints besychastes,* Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense. Etudes et documents 30 (Louvain, 1973), 5-727; selections in Nicholas Gendele, trans., *The Triads* (New York: Paulist Press, 1983).

[36] Maximus the Confessor, *De ambigua* PG91:1380B. See also Leonidas Contos, "The promise of the Secunda Petri ... is realized as that mystical encounter which the whole Palamite theology purposes to explain: In its uncreated energies the divine nature, without loss

are transformed, drawn into a personal communion with the Trinity in its light and glory, in which we experience God "face to *face"-proposon ad proposon* or person to person-and, thus, as he is while the 'essence' of God remains utterly inaccessible to us.[37] Indeed, while for Aquinas we never see God face to face in this life, Byzantine authors assert the possibility of this as evidenced by, for example, the apostles' vision of the uncreated glory of God on Mount Tabor at the transfiguration. [38]

The following text from John Damascene well represents the impossibility of knowing the divine essence:

"No one has seen God at any time; the Only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him" (John 1:18). The deity, therefore, is ineffable and incomprehensible .... Moreover, after the first and blessed nature no one, not of men only, but even of supramundane powers, and the Cherubim, I say, and Seraphim themselves, has ever known God, save him to whom He revealed Himself ... we neither know, nor can we tell, what the essence of God is, or how it is at all.[39]

The incomprehensibility of the divine essence is not just a function of our limitations in this life that are overcome in the next life. As Palamas writes: "there is no name for the divine essence either in this life or in the next-for any created beings."[40] Moreover, the apophatism underlying Damascene's text is not the *via negativa* as this is traditionally understood in the West, which primarily serves to correct the true affirmations said of God: essence is truly said of God but we must deny that the divine essence is anything like a created essence to which our term

or compromise of its divinity, and the nature of man, without change from its creaturlieness, come together in a union of grace" ("Essence-Energies Structure of St. Gregory Palamas," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 12 [1967]: 294).

[37] Cf. Maximus the Confessor, *Questions to Thalassius* 60 *(PG* 90:621C-D).

[38] *Capita* 146-50. Archbishop Basil Krivocheine, "The Ascetic and Theological Teaching of Gregory Palamas," *Eastern Churches Quarterly* 3 (1938): 193-214 has a very good discussion about this. See also, Gregory Palamas, *Triads* 3.1.9-12ff.

[39] John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* 1.1 and 2 (1 and 2). One finds variants on this text throughout this entire Byzantine tradition: from the Cappadocian fathers, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory Palamas to contemporary Orthodox thinkers such as Christoph Yannaras and Vladimir Lossky.

[40] *Capita* 106.

'essence' refers. In contrast, the more radical apophatism in the Eastern tradition means that in a proper sense neither essence or nature are said of God. So, in commenting on *Divine Names* 5.1 "we do not intend to hymn *[hymneo]* the *hyperousios ousia,* "[41] the *scholia* on this text notes that "Dionysius does not present what the essence of God is for 'essence' is not properly predicated of God insofar as he is beyond being."[42] Gregory Palamas puts the matter directly as follows: "Every nature is utterly removed and absolutely estranged from the divine nature *[physis]*. For if God is nature, other things are not nature, but if each of the other things is nature, he is not nature; just as he is not a being [on], if the other are beings *[onta]*. And if he is a being, the others are not beings."[43]

Properly, then, there is no name for "whatever God is"; the name most befitting God's incomprehensibility is that God is beyond all names. Yet, God reveals himself to us as the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit who are present to us in their knowledge, will, light, glory, etc. Indeed, the affirmative names given to God are not said of the essence of God but what is around the essence or nature of God *(peri ten ousian* or *physin)*. As Damascene says: "God then is infinite and incomprehensible and all that is comprehensible about him is his infinity and incomprehensibility. But all that we can affirm concerning God does not show forth God's nature, but only those that are around his nature, "[44] that is, his "energy." The energy is the natural going forth *(exodos)* of the divine essence as directed toward creation. While this energy can be referred to in the singular, one also observes the distinctions between various energies: for example, God's will is distinct from God's knowledge.

Hence, the Byzantine framework recognizes a set of distinctions in God that are not simply nominal or a function of the deficient signification of our language: between the divine essence

[41] See below, the beginning of part II, for a further discussion of this text.

[42] *PG* 4 308D. See also 229C. The *Scholia* are traditionally attributed to Maximus the Confessor but many at least were written by John of Scythopolis. See also Fran O'Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), 77.

[43] *Capita* 78.

[44] *On the Orthodox Faith* 1.4 (4).

(nature) and the hypostases or persons of the Trinity, between the divine essence and the divine energy, between the persons of the Trinity and the energy, and between the various energies that 'comprise' the divine energy. [45] Yet the persons of the Trinity are "one in essence and undivided" [46] from each other and from the essence. The same is true for the energy/energies. All of them are fully and completely God. None is a 'part' of God, nor do any of these distinctions introduce any confusion or division in God.

The distinction between *ousia, hypostasis,* and *energeia* is foundational to the Byzantine framework. Damascene offers this concise exposition of the difference between them:

But observe that energy [enetgeia] and capacity for energy *[energtikon],* and the product of energy *[energtema],* and the agent of energy *[enetg6n]* are all different. Energy is the efficient and essential activity of nature. The capacity for energy is the nature from which the energy proceeds. The product of energy is that which is effected by energy. And the agent of energy is the person or subsistence *[hypostasis]*that employs the energy. [47]

While the earliest writers in the Greek Patristic tradition tend to use *ousia* and *hypostasis* interchangeably, the Cappadocian Fathers tend to distinguish them in terms of the distinction between the universal or common and the particular/individual. [48]

[45] This distinction is perhaps analogous to Scotus's view that there is a formal distinction among the persons of the Trinity, among the divine attributes, between the persons of the Trinity, and between the attributes and the essence. Soctus does acknowledge that formal distinctions have an ontological foundation. I expect that some Orthodox would view the above distinctions as 'real' whereas Scotus does not (e.g., see John Romanidies, "Notes on the Palamite Controversy and Related Topics, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 6 [1960-61]: 2: 190.). But this is likely a verbal difference given Scotus's rather specialized sense of 'real' distinction' as pertaining to things that are separable from one another. It is also worth noting that the text of Palamas quoted above--if God is nature, then beings are not nature, etc.--seems analogous to the univocal notion of being. Richard Cross makes the observation that Scotus's view of formal distinctions in God is bound up with his view of the univocal notion of being *(Duns Scotus* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999], 43-35 as well as 69-71). But I do not want to push the possible similarity too far since Scotus and Byzantine writers seem to be working in rather different ontological frameworks.

[46] From the *Divine Liturgy* of St. John Chrysostom.

[47] John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* 3.15 (59).

[48] Lucian Turcescu, "The Concept of Divine Persons in Gregory of Nyssa's To His Brother Peter, on the Difference Between Ousia and Hypostasis," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 42 (1997): 64-66. Cf. Henry A. Wilson, "[Gregory of Nyssa's] Teaching on the Holy Trinity"

So, Peter, Paul, and Barnabas all exist and are all *homoousios* (of one essence/substance) with one another so far as they share the common *ousia* of humanity. In like manner, the Father, Son, and Spirit are *homoousios* since they share the same *ousia* or nature. It is the individual *(hypostasis)* that gives existence to-that is, manifests-the *ousia.* [49] In this framework, the *hypostasis* receives the ontological weight for it is the *hypostasis* that subsists in the proper sense and not the *ousia.* [50] Although the hypostases of the Trinity are one in essence, they are nevertheless distinct not only from one another but from the essence.

This framework also distinguishes the essence or nature from the energy/energies that naturally flow from it. The energy is around the nature but is not the nature. God's energies are fully and completely divine, fully and completely eternal, uncreated, etc. While they are distinct from the persons and the divine essence, they are inseparable from both. They manifest the divine essence in creation and are that in which we participate and to which we are united in deification. Moreover, the energies that flow from the essence are used by the *hypostasis* (person or subsistent individual) that gives existence to or manifests the essence. Hence, the distinction between essence and energy goes hand in hand with the distinction between essence and person. So Palamas notes it is not man in general--0r the essence common to all humans-that thinks, wills, loves, makes decisions, etc. If it is said that "God does not have a natural energy distinct from his essence" one says that "God does not possess individual subsis-

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in *Select Writings and Letters of Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa,* A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers *of* the Christian Church 5, ed. William Moore and H. A. Wilson (Eerdmans, 1890), 24-25; Basil, *Ep* 38.1, 214-4; Gregory of Nyssa, "On *Not* Three Gods."

  ••Duncan Reid, *Energies of the Spirit: Trinitarian Models in Eastern Orthodox and Western Theology* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 86; and Palamas, *Capita* 136. See also John Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church* (Crestwood N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 40-41.

  [50] This is important in the Byzantine framework since our relation *to* and experience of God is fundamentally personal in nature. This primacy is accentuated, it seems to me, when one recalls the strong apophatism in this tradition-that properly *ousia* does not apply to God except in the causal sense of being-producing *(ousiopoios).*

tence and [this] completely deprives the trihypostatic Lord of real subsistence. "[51]

Palamas notes two problems if these distinctions are not observed. First, the distinction between human persons and the persons of the Trinity would collapse if there is no distinction between the divine *ousia* and energy since if any created beings participated in the *ousia* of God they would be *homousios* with the persons of the Trinity. God would be multihypostatic and not trihypostatic. [52]

Second, this first problem is part of a more generalized problem that the distinction between creation and generation would be abolished since what flows from the essence does so naturally, yet creation is a free act of God's will. Palamas quotes Cyril of Alexandria for support of this criticism: "begetting belongs to the divine nature but creating to his divine energy.... Nature and energy are not identical. "[53] So, if we were to grant with Aquinas that God is called good not simply as cause of goodness but as goodness itself, then God's goodness would be identical to the divine essence and necessary to God. But it is difficult to see how God can be called creator or cause in the same sense, since while God is necessarily good, God need not be a creator or cause.[54]

In the Scholastic framework, whatever is said of God is identical to his essence; whatever is not identical to the essence must be created since otherwise there would be accidents in God. Palamas presents a striking contrast to this view which seems to undergird the Byzantine framework.

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[51] However, the energies do not subsist on their own; they are enhypostatic rather than hypostatic *(Capita* 136). See M. Edmund Hussey, "The Persons-Energy Structure in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 18 (1974): 25-29 for a general discussion of the divine energies as enhypostatic and dependent upon person or hypostasis for their existence. Palamas *Triads* 3.1.9-10 offers this definition of *enhypostaton:* "This, then, is properly an *enhypostaton:* something that is contemplated, not in itself, not in an essence, but in a person *(hypostasis)."*

[52] *Capita* 99 and 109.

[53] Cyril of Alexandria, *Thesaurus* 18 (PG 75:312C). Cf. Reid, *Energies of the Spirit,* 36-38. *Capita* 96-103.

[54] See, Aquinas *STh* I, q. 19, a. 3.

God also has what is not essence. Yet this does not mean that it is an accident. For that which not only does not pass away but also admits or effects no increase or diminution whatever could not possibly be numbered among accidents. Neither is it true that, because this is neither an accident or essence, it belongs among totally nonexistent things: rather, it exists and exists truly. Since the hypostatic properties and the hypostases are neither an essence or an accident in God, are they each on this account ranked among nonexistent things? Certainly not. Thus, in the same way, the divine energy of God is neither an essence nor an accident nor is it classed among nonexistent things.ss

Accordingly, one must note a significant difference between these two frameworks. Both stress God's infinity: that God can in no manner be properly encompassed by the categories employed to understand finite beings. In the Scholastic framework, however, despite the manner in which all the intelligible names that apply to God must be corrected, still, these names truly apply to God. In particular, whatever the divine essence might be, we truly say that there is a divine essence and existence even if we do not know what it is. So too, the simplicity of God requires that we correct the distinctions implied in our use of terms regarding finite beings. While the difference in meaning between knowledge and will corresponds to a 'real' [56] distinction in finite rational beings, when these terms are applied to God, they must be viewed as referring to an entity in whom knowledge and will are identical with each other since they are identical with the divine essence. In other words, with reference to God (the Trinity), we have these sorts of simultaneously true propositions: God is God's essence; God is God's knowledge; God is God's will; God is the Father; God is the Son, etc.; God's essence is God's knowledge; God's knowledge is God's will; God the Father is God's knowledge. The only nonidentity statements are of this sort: God the Father is not God the Son, God the Holy Spirit is not God the Son. Moreover, the nonidentity statements between Father, Son, and Spirit do not

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[55] *Capita* 135. Cf. *Capita 75* and 134.

[56] 'Real' distinction here means a distinction that has an ontological foundation apart from our reason. I am not using 'real' to refer only to distinctions among things that are separable from one another.

imply that Father, Son, and Spirit are not identical to the divine essence.

In the Byzantine framework, the situation is quite different. God (the Trinity) is not just his essence, yet there are no accidents in God. While we may use the term 'essence' of God, properly it does not apply except as a causal designation. Moreover, while God is completely simple as undivided or noncomposite, there are nevertheless distinctions or differentiations in God. These eternal distinctions are eternally united without division. So we have a set of simultaneously true propositions such as: God is God's essence; God is the Father, God is the Son, God is the Spirit; God is God's energies. That is, God is fully and completely his essence, each of the persons of the Trinity, and his energy/energies. But God's energies are not God's essence; God the Father is not God's essence; God the Father is not God's energies. Among the energies: God is God's knowledge; God is God's will; God's knowledge is not God's will. However, the Father, Son, and Spirit are one in essence, knowledge, will, etc. The Father's knowledge is the Son's knowledge, etc. Hence, while the logic of identity, that if A = B and A = C, B = C, is maintained regarding God in the Scholastic framework and in the Western tradition generally,[57] it breaks down in the Byzantine framework. It is not surprising, then, that the Byzantine framework is described in terms of paradoxical or antinomical thinking.[58] Moreover, if the logic of identity governs and is governed by thinking about beings, then in the Byzantine framework we can say that God properly is not regarded as a being.[59]

[57] But see Dale Tuggy, "The Triniarian Dilemma" in *The Trinity: East/West Dialogue,* ed. Melville Stewart (Dordecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 29. He uses the principle of identity precisely to show that it is inconsistent to maintain that if the Father, Son and Spirit are God, then they are somehow distinct from one another.

[58] See, e.g., Krivocheine, "The Ascetic and Theological Teaching of Gregory Palamas," 151; Lossky, *Mystical Thology,* 43; A. de. Halleux, "Palamisme et Scolastique," *Revue tbeologique de Louvain* 4 (1973): 418-22.

[59] Although the Neoplatonic understanding of the One differs significantly from the Byzantine understanding of God, since the former does not admit any distinction in the One while the latter affirms multiple distinctions in God, nevertheless both move beyond an entitative understanding of the One or of God. See, e.g., John D. Jones, "The Ontological Difference for St. Thomas and Pseudo-Dionysius," *Dionysius* 4 (1980): 119-32.

II

A) The Sense of "hyperousios ousia" for Dionysius

In this section of the paper, I will consider two fundamental and related matters in Dionysius relative to these frameworks: the incomprehensibility of God and the distinction between *ousia* and energies.

It is not the intention of our discourse to manifest the beyond-being being *[hyperousiosousia]* as beyond-being, for this is ineffable, and unknown and completely unable to be manifest and surpasses unity itself, but to hymn the being-producing *[ousiopoios]*procession of the divine source of being into all beings.[60]

Aquinas's only comment on this text is found in his *Commentary on the Divine Names.*

It is not Dionysius's present intention that the essence of God be manifest through which all things are given essence insofar as it is in itself, but that the procession of beings from the divine principle into all existents might be praised. For some procession of some perfection from God in existents is manifested by each divine name.

While Dionysius refers the divine names to the processions of God, Aquinas makes it clear elsewhere that when we call God being, life, or good, we are not merely naming some procession of being or life from God but we are naming the source of the procession, which, given divine simplicity, is identical to the divine essence.[61] Aquinas certainly thinks that Dionysius holds this view.[62]

Albert the Great interprets the above text to say that Dionysius does not intend to say that we cannot know the divine essence, but only that we cannot know it perfectly. While we do not know what God is "still the divine essence is known insofar as we come

[60] *DN* 5.1.8168.

[61] *SI'h* I, q. 13, a. 2, ad 2, which is a direct response to the objection that according to Dionysius the intelligible divine names only refer to processions and not the essence of God.

[62] IV *Sent.,* d. 50, q. 2, a. 4, qcla. 3, expos.; *SI'h* III, q. 20, a. 1; III, q. 13, a. 1.

to it after all effects and after all the simplicity of creatures . . . namely, we know the divine essence through the removal from all effects" and accordingly we are able to name it. [63]

Gregory Palamas offers a strikingly different analysis based upon this text:

The nature beyond being, and beyond life and beyond god, and beyond good as beyond good, etc, is neither conceived nor contemplated in any way at all because it is apart from all things and more than unknowable and established beyond the super-celestial minds by an incomprehensible power and is always utterly unable to be grasped and ineffable to all. For it has no name in the present age nor does it receive one in the age to come. . . . Anyone who has knowledge of the truth beyond all truth, if he is to name it correctly cannot legitimately name it *ousia* or nature. But on the other hand, since it is cause of all ... its name must be drawn from things but not in a proper sense. Thus, it must be called *ousia* and nature, but properly the ousia-bestowing procession and energy of God. [64]

How, then, should we understand the phrase *hyperousios ousia?* Grammatically, of course, *ousia* is a noun modified by *hyperousious.* The *ousia* in this case is the divine *ousia* which, when considered as *hyperousios,* is considered in itself and, thus, as ineffable to all created beings. This is the way in which Aquinas and Albert understand the text. But Palamas draws on Dionysius to support a view that properly neither *ousia* nor nature are said of God except in the sense that God is productive of *ousia* and nature in things. On this view, despite the grammatical form of *hyperousios ousia, ousia* is not a noun referring to a divine 'essence' characterized as *hyperousios* in one sense and as *ousiopoios* (being producing) in another. Rather, *hyperousios* "indicates" the Godhead as uncoordinated with all and, thus,

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[63] *Superde divinisnominibus5,* ed. P. Simon (Aschendorff, 1972), 304. It should be noted that Sarracen translates the Greek text *pantel-Os anekphanton* ('completely unable to be manifest') as *per{ecte non manifestabile.* However, in noting that we cannot know God through an interpretation that arises through definitions or divisions or demonstrations, Albert remarks that Dionysius says that God is *non perfectemanifestabile* ("not perfectly able to be manifest"). It is worth noting that Grosseteste translates the phrase as *omnino immanifestabile* while Eriugena translates it as *uniuersaliterinexplanabile.* Albert did not have access to Grossetestes's translation.

[64] *Capita* 106.

beyond all names whatsoever; *ousia,* however, refers to God as
manifested, as we shall see, in the divine energy. [65]

It is striking how like the texts of Damascius quoted above is
this text of Palamas: all names referring to the ultimate cause of
all name it in reference to beings, while 'the principle unco-
ordinated with all' 'is' beyond nature, beyond essence, etc. [66] Both
the Byzantine and the Neoplatonic frameworks, then, note a
double sense of *hyperousios:* the transcendent cause of all is
hyperousios as beyond all finite *ousiai. As* being-producing prin-
ciple of all things, it can be regarded as *hyperousios* or
'superessential'. That is, *ousia* can be said of this being-producing
principle but in a manner that transcends all finite *ousiai.* But, as
in Dionysius's text above, *hyperousios* stands in contrast not to
finite *ousiai,* but God as the being-producing cause of all
beings-that is, in the Byzantine framework, God as the divine
energy.

It is unfortunate that translations of Byzantine and Neoplatonic
texts often tend to follow the Latin rendering of *hyperousios* as
supersubstantiale or *superessentiale* For while *super* can carry the
same ambiguity in Latin as is found in *hyper,* the predominance in
the West of a broadly entitative understanding of God that is
grounded in an analogy of being inevitably flattens the double
sense of *hyper* that we have noted. [67] That is, the reference to the
divine *ousia* as *hyperousios* is ultimately unnecessary and serves at
best a kind of heuristic value. For, since the noun *ousia* refers to

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[65] A similar point is made by John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* I.12b, although in
the critical edition this section is regarded as a later addition.

[66] Of course, in the Byzantine framework, God's manifestation to us is strictly due to
God's, the Trinity's, own self-revelation to us.

[67] So, G. Kapriev argues that Dionysius should be understood in terms of the Eastern view
that the divine essence is unknowable and inaccessible while we participate in the divine
energies ("Bemerkungen iiber den Kommentar des Thomas von Aquin zu *'De divinis
nominibus'* des Dionysius Areopagita, Liber *N,* lectio 1," *Archiv {Ur mittelalterliche
Philosophie und Kultur* 3 (1966): 20-32). He notes that this Eastern way of understanding
Dionysius is completely lost in the Scholastic interpretation of Dionysius (ibid., 32 n. 91). See
Andreas Speer for a critique of Kapriev on this point ("Lichtlcausalitlit: Zurn Verhiiltnis von
dionysischer Licht-theologies und Metaphysick bei Albertus Magnus and Thomas vonAquin,"
in *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter,* ed. Tzotcho Boiadjiev, G. Kapriev, and A. Speer
(Brepols, 2000), 368-72.

the divine *ousia* and the adjective *ousios* in *hyperousios* refers to the finite essence beyond which *(hyper-)* the divine essence is supereminently founded, then *hyperousios ousia* can be recast as divine "essence beyond essence" *(ousia hyper ten ousian).* Hence, *hyperousios ousia* can be rendered either as "essence beyond essence" or "supersessential essence." But given what is involved in predicating "essence" of God, the phrase "divine essence" implicitly contains "superessential" within it as a preeminent denial that the divine essence is like any finite essence. Hence, one can equivalently say "divine essence" or "divine superessential essence." On this view, one can see why Aquinas observes that Dionysius often uses many words in a manner that seems to be superfluous. [68] It is not at all surprising, then, that terms like *super-subtantiale, superessentiale, superesse, superdeus, superbonum,* which are so prominent in the Latin translation of Pseudo-Dionysius, are virtually absent from Aquinas's own vocabulary. Rather, such terms appear for the most part in Aquinas's works in the context of quoting or interpreting Dionysius.

On this matter, I believe that Dionysius is fundamentally misread within the Scholastic framework and more broadly within the philosophical theology that is predominant in the West. Still one must note a significant difference-at least in emphasis-between Dionysius and the Byzantine framework. For despite the text quoted above by Palamas and similar texts in other writers in the Eastern tradition, one finds that these authors regularly use the terms *ousia* (essence) and *physis* (nature) in reference to God. After all, Christian thinkers, both Eastern and Western, confess the Father, Son and Spirit as of one essence *(homoousios).* In this case, *ousia* refers not to the being-producing energies of God, but to the divine essence or transcendent nature of the Trinity 'in itself'.

In contrast, however, Dionysius rarely uses either *ousia* or *physis* to refer to the divinity. Three texts refer to a divine nature *(physis)* twice referring to an ineffable nature; [69] four refer to the

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[68] *In De Divinis nominibus,* proemium.
[69] DN13.3.981A; *FR* l.4.376B; *MT* 3.10320.

divine *hyperousiotes* ('beyond beingness' or 'superessentiality' in the Latin translation). [70] Dionysius never refers to a consideration of the divinity *kat' ousian* (according to essence). So far as I can tell, Dionysius never explicitly employs the standard distinction between knowing what God is *(ti estin - quod est)* and knowing that he is *(hoti estin - quia est).* To be sure, one finds the phrase *ho ti pote estin* used in several places.[71] Given the Latin translation of this phrase as *quodcumque est,* Albert takes Dionysius to refer to what God is *per essentiam* or *definitionem.* [72] But the Greek phrase probably has the much looser meaning of "whatever in the world it is." That is, the phrase is an expression of 'throwing-up-one's-hands" in the face of what is simply unutterable. Similarly, Dionysius never refers to the Godhead in its separation as 'existing *kath auto (per se)'.* Hence, even if we grant that in some sense Dionysius concedes that there is a divine 'essence' or 'nature', one finds a real inversion in his very infrequent use of this language compared with its very frequent use by authors in both East and West.

It should be noted that in referring to the utter separation of God from beings, Dionysius uses the term *kryphiotes* ('hiddenness', 'secrecy', or 'mystery'). While one finds frequent use of the term *kryphios* ('hidden') by both Christian and Neoplatonic authors prior to Dionysius, Dionysius seems to be the first to use the substantive *kryphiotes* with reference to divine 'transcendence'. [73] There are two key texts that are worth quoting:

If we name the thearchic hiddenness God, or life, or being, or light, or logos, we understand nothing other than the power brought forth from it into *us,* whether deifying, being producing, life-giving, or wisdom-producing. [74]

The second, and perhaps more radical, text is:

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[70] DN1.l.588A; 1.5.593C; 2.4.641A; *EP* 4.1072B. The term *hyperousiotes* more likely has the sense of 'what is beyond all beingness' rather than 'supreme beingness'.

[71] *DN* 1.2.588C; 1.5.593C; 2.1.636C.

[72] Albert, *Super de divinis nominibus* 11 (Simon, ed., 414), Aquinas, *In De Divinis nominibus* 2.1 notes the phrase one time and seems to catch the meaning Dionysius intends.

[73] Based upon a search using the online *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.*

[74] DN 2.7.645A.

Neither monad, nor trinity, nor number, nor unity, nor fecundity nor something else among being nor something of what is known about beings bring down the hiddenness, beyond all and logos and intellect, of the beyond-deity beyond be-ing beyond every manner of being beyond all *[tes hyper panta hyperousios hyperouses hypertheotetos]*.[75]

It immediately follows this text as its couplet:

Wherefore, naming the deity beyond all as monad and trinity, it is neither monad or trinity that is discerned by us or something else among beings; but so that we might truly name that of it beyond name and its god-genesis, we name the beyond-name by the triadic and unitary divine name, and we name the beyond-being by beings.[76]

The 'tension' here is between a hiddenness or mystery at the core of 'reality' which 'is' utterly unmanifest, unknowable, and unutterable at least to any finite being, and a procession out of the hiddenness of the 'deity' which involves manifestation in some sense. Does this include the Trinity itself-the three-person manifestation of the fecundity beyond-being[77]–as well as, of course, the divine powers to which the intelligible divine names refer?

The limitations of this article do not allow for a detailed treatment of Dionysius's understanding of the Trinity. [78] In brief, the Father is the sole source of deity; the Son and Holy Spirit are

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[75] *DN* 13.3.981A.

[76] *DN* 13.3.980D-981A. I am writing 'trinity' in lower case letters throughout these two texts. It is not uncommon in various translations and in *Dionysiaca* to see the term placed in capital letters when affirmed and in lower case letters when denied. But that editing decision seems to beg, or at least already make a determination about, the issue I am about to discuss.

[77] *DN* 1.4.589D.

[78] For some representative discussions of Dionysius's understanding of the Trinity, see Golitzin, *Et introibo,* 51-54; Ysabel de Andia, *L "Union Dieu chez Denys l'Areopagite* (Leiden: Brill, 1966), 29-64; Werner Beierwaltes, "Unity and Trinity in East and West" in *Eriugena: East and West,* ed. Bernard McGinn and Willemien Otten (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 209-32; Bernhard Brons, *Gott und dei Seienden: Untersuchungen zum Verhiiltnis von neuplatonischer Metaphysik und christlicher Tradition bei Dionysius Areopagita* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1976), 98-129; and Salvatore Lilla, "Terminologia trinitaria nello Pseudo-Dionigi l'Areopagita. Suoi antecedenti e sua influenza sugli scritorri successive," *Augustinianum* 13 (1973): 609-23.

uncaused [79] differentiations within the deity. Each person of the Trinity is differentiated from the others: as ungenerated, the Father is the sole source of deity; the Son is generated from the Father, while the Holy Spirit proceeds *(ekporeuetai)* from the Father. [80] Although Dionysius notes that affirmative theology shows how the 'divine and good nature' [81] is one and three, he never employs any language that refers to the unity of the Trinity as a unity in *ousia.* [82] It seems to me that there is a real ambiguity in Dionysius in terms of the 'ultimacy' of the Trinity in God. The first issue has to do with whether unity and Trinity are ultimately primary for Dionysius or whether there is a primacy of unity over Trinity. Writers in the Byzantine tradition take the former view: God is essentially one-in-three. So, Gregory of Nazianzen writes: "As soon as I begin to contemplate the Unity, the Trinity bathes me in its splendor. As soon as I begin to think of the Trinity, I am seized by the Unity."[83] But Andrew Louth rightly argues that Dionysius is ambiguous on this point. [84]

   The more fundamental issue, however, is whether for Dionysius the divine hiddenness is beyond both unity and Trinity.

   [79] Dionysius restricts the notion of cause to God's production of finite beings. Many other Byzantine authors speak of the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit from the Father in terms of 'causality' although they note that the Son and Spirit are not 'effects' of the Father in the sense of inferior or subordinate realities.

   [8]°Cf. *DN* 2.4-5.640Dff.

   [81] *MT* 3.10320.

   [82] This might be expected given that the author is trying to establish the work as written by a disciple of Paul. On the other hand, he regularly and self-consciously uses much language that derives from the Cappadocian Fathers and from Neoplatonists such as Proclus. However, at *DN* 1.5.593B he does refer to the Triadic henad *(triadiken henad)* as *homotheos* and *homoagathos.*

   [83] *Oratio 41, In santto baptisma* 41 (PG 36:417C). By way of contrast, writers in the Byzantine tradition often view the Scholastic tradition as one that gives primacy to unity over Trinity in light of a distinction between "on the one hand, *De Deo Uno,* 'On the One God' (including the divine essence and attributes or energies), and, on the other hand, *De Deo Trino,* which concerns the mystery of the Trinity as such. This approach is basically philosophical or 'essentialist.' It assumes the right to speak of the divine essence itself, prior to or apart from the Hypostases or Persons of the Trinity. Thereby, it juxtaposes and implicitly separates these two aspects of the divine mystery" (Boris Bobrinsky, *The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian &perience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic Tradition* [Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir Seminary Press, 1999], 1).

   [84] Andrew Louth, *Denys theAreopagite* (Wilton, Conn.: Morehouse-Barlow, 1989), 88-90.

The texts we have already considered from *Divine Names* 5.1 and 13.3 both suggest this. In *Divine Names* 5.1, Dionysius notes that 'as' *hyperousios,* the divinity surpasses unity itself *(hyperairon auten ten henosin).* Albert takes this unity to refer to the unity of the created intellect, while Aquinas refers it to the unity of the intellects of the blessed.[85] But it is just as, indeed far more, likely that Dionysius has in mind *Divine Names* 1.5, where the affirmations of God include monad (unity) and Trinity, etc. Moreover, it seems incorrect to me to argue that in *Divine Names* 13.3 Dionysius is simply referring to the sort of unity, trinity, etc. that are found among beings. In other words, I suggest that the phrase "something else among beings" is meant to add "what is found or known among beings" to what does not bring down the hiddenness beyond being. It does not extend that 'class' as if unity, trinity, etc. were its first members. If so, as Louth notes, it is not inconsistent to read these texts in light of Eckhart's conception of the God beyond God.[86] Certainly, this sort of reading is ruled out within the Byzantine framework as well as the Scholastic framework.

Louth observes that one of Dionysius's impacts upon the Byzantine tradition is to deepen "the apophatic stress of Cappadocian theology."[87] The texts from *Divine Names* 2.7 and 13.3 express what might be called Dionysius's deep apophatism that, I believe, can profitably be understood in terms of Damascius's notion of a peritrope of speech. That is, neither hiddenessor beyond-being 'signify' 'something'. Rather, discourse

[85] Albert, *Super de divinis nominihlls* 5 (Simon, ed., 304), Aquinas, *In De Divinis nominibus* 5.1.

[86] Louth, *Denys the Areopagite,* 90. See Eckhart, "Sermon 48," in *Die Deutschen Werke,* vol. 2, ed. Josef Quintand George Steer (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1971), p. 420, II. 1-10.

[87] Louth, *Denys the Areopagite,* 115. Georgi Kapriev has a very interesting essay on apophatic theology in Dionysius and the Eastern tradition. In particular, he notes that Palamas does not view apophatic theology, understood in a solely negative manner as the silencing of reason in unknowing, to be ultimate ("Die antiapophatische Deutung des Dionyius bei Gregorios Palamas" in *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter,* 123-55). If apophatic theology in this sense is taken as ultimate, as Barlaam took it, then Palamas argues for an 'antiapophatic' "spiritual vision of the eternal energies of God that is realized beyond intellectual activity" (ibid., 155).

and thinking!intellection   cancel itself m the cessation of
intellection *(noesis).*[88]

B) *The Distinction between Essence and Energies for Dionysius*

The next question is whether Dionysius distinguishes between
the divine energy/energies [89] and *ousia.* The intelligible names we
apply to God refer to the being-producing processions of the
Godhead into beings. Dionysius elaborates on this matter in three
key texts in *Divine Names* 2:

The beneficent procession is a divine differentiation of the divine unity which,
in a super-unitary manner, multiplies and makes itself many through goodness. [90]

We call the divine differentiation the beneficent processions of the Thearchy. For
in being given to beings and abundantly pouring forth the participations of all
good things, it is differentiated in it a unitary manner, multiplied in a singular
manner, and made many without wandering from one. [91]

These common and united differentiations-or   rather, these beneficent
processions-of   the whole Godhead we will try to praise to the best of our
abilities. [92]

But what proceeds? Aquinas notes two senses of 'procession':
The first is that "in terms of which one person proceeds from

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[88] A similar consideration would apply to be-ing (esse or *to* eimu) when said of God.
Dionysius cites Exod 3:14 twice in the *Divine Names:* 1.6.596 and 2.1.637A. In both cases,
it is included among the affirmative names that designate a divine power. So too, Dionysius
refers to the Godhead as *on hyperousios* ('be-ing beyond every manner of being' or
'superessentially be-ing') (DN 2.11.649B). But this phrase also occurs in the context of an
affirmative name of God that again refers to causality.

[89] Dionysius more often says that the divine names refer to the divine powers *(dunameis).*

[90] *DN* 2.5.641D-644A.

[91] *DN* 2.11.649B. See Istvan Perczel, "Denys et !es Henades de Proclus," *Diotima* 23
(1995): 71-76 for a concise discussion of Dionysius's distinction between the divine
union-God as 'transcendent'-and   the divine differentiation-God's   activity in the world.
The divine names refer to powers that are united in the divine differentiation since they are
common ro the persons of the Trinity. Perczel notes that Dionysius follows the Cappadocian
distinction between essence and energies (ibid., 72). He also shows how Dionysius's
terminology for 'union' and 'differentiation' was influenced by Proclus.

[92] *DN* 2.11.652A.

another and by this the divine persons are multiplied and distinguished." The other sense, though, is that of procession "in terms of which creatures proceed from God according to which the multitude and distinction of creatures comes to be from God. "[93] Accordingly, when Dionysius talks about the processions *of* God *into* creatures, he is referring to the processions *of* creatures *from* God. [94] Aquinas and Albert the Great [95] allow for a procession of God into creatures only in the sense of exemplary causality: the divine essence, which is the likeness of all creatures, is communicated to creatures through a created likeness So Aquinas writes that:

The divine essence is not communicated to the creatures that proceed, but it remains uncommunicated and unparticipated; but his likeness, by which he gives to creatures, is propagated and multiplied. In a certain way, the divinity through its likeness and not through essence proceeds into creatures and is in a certain way multiplied in them. In this way, the procession of creatures can be called a divine differentiation. [96]

On this view, Dionysius does not refer to a differentiation or procession of God in the strict sense, that is, a procession in God that is fully God since that sort of procession only refers to the procession *(proodos)*[97] of the Son and the Spirit from the Father. For Palamas, however, this differentiation or procession is the

[93] Aquinas, *In De Divinis nominibus* 2.3 See also I *Sent.,* d. 13, q. 1, a. 1.

[94] See also O'Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius,* 13.

[95] Aquinas, *In De Divinis nominibus* 2.3; Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Super de diviniis nominibus* 2 (Simon, ed., 74).

[96] Aquinas, *In De Divinis nominibus* 2.3, Albert, *Super de divinis nominibus,* 2 (Simon, ed., 72).

[97] This is a broader sense of 'procession' *(proodos)* in the sense of any forward movement. It is narrower than the specialized sense of 'procession' *(ekporeusis)* which, in the Orthodox Church, refers only to the 'coming forth' of the Holy Sprit from the Father in contrast to the generation of the Son from the Father. In the Catholic and Protestant Churches, 'procession' *(prodoos/processio)* is applied equally to the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit from the Father and from the Son. Of course, in both East and West, 'procession' *(proodos)* is used in a variety of non-Trinitarian senses. See "The Filioque: A Church-Dividing Issue: An Agreed Statement of the North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation," Saint Paul's College, Washington, DC October 25, 2003 (http://www.usccb.org/seia/filiogue.htm). Section 3.1, "Terminology," gives a good discussion of the terminological issues that divide Eastern and Western thought about the Trinity.

divine energy that is distinct both from the hypostases of the Trinity as well as from the divine essence. It is by this energy, and its differentiation into many energies, that the divinity-the Trinity--creates and is present to creation. [98] So for Palamas, there are two processions in God: the processions of the hypostases of the Trinity and the procession of the divine energies around God. The divine energy can be named and known from created beings but is itself beyond being. [99] That is, the divine energy is not some created being or effect of God, but rather God as present to beings.

The Scholastic framework for reading these texts inevitably refers the differentiations or processions of God to created effects: that is, to processions *of* creatures *from* God while the source of the processions-the likeness of creatures in God-is identical to the divine essence. The Neoplatonic framework likewise reduces the differentiations to finite processions. Of course, Dionysius allows for the existence of created powers that proceed from God: so there is a difference between the divine power of being and life that is creative of beings and the finite powers of being and life in which beings participate in order to exist, live, etc. [100]

Both of these frameworks misread Dionysius on this score. They both rest on an a priori assumption of unqualified or absolute simplicity that requires that any differentiation or otherness be extrinsic to the One or to God. Yet if the above texts of Dionysius are read in a 'straightforward' manner-that is, to mean what they say-then the differentiations to which the divine names refer are differentiations *of* the divinity which are the divinity. [101] It is precisely these differentiations that are said of the

[98] *Capita* 85.

[99] *Capita* 87-88.

[100] See *DN* 11.6 and *EP* 2 where Dionysius distinguishes between the source of the processions, the uncreated processions, and the finite effects of those processions.

[161] See Golitzin, *Et introibo,* 49-60 who argues for the essence-energy distinction in Dionysius. However, Adolph Ritter maintains that while Dionysius belongs to the tradition in which essence and energy are distinguished in God, this distinction is not directly derived from his theology ("Gregor Palamas als Leser des Dionysius Ps.-Areopagita," *Denys l'Areopagite et sa posterite en orient et en occident: Actes du colloque international, Paris,*

persons of the Trinity in a unitary manner. Accordingly, there is a threefold sense of procession *(proodos)* for Dionysius: the procession of the Son and Spirit from the Father, the procession of the divine energy of the Trinity in its production of and presence to beings, and the processions of beings from the divinity. This is exactly the manner in which these texts are read in the Byzantine framework. However, Dionysius's teaching on this matter is, or at least seems to be, somewhat different from and possibly at odds with this framework in certain respects.

In the Byzantine framework, one of the frequent considerations used to distinguish essence from energy is that every essence naturally gives forth energies by which it is expressed but which are different from it.[102] But Dionysius never uses this sort of argument to support the distinction between the being-producing divine powers and the divine hiddenness or *ousia.* Given Dionysius's extreme reluctance even to talk about a divine *ousia,* this is not too surprising. This principle seems to require a certain ontological continuity between God and beings that Dionysius does not appear to accept. The reason is that the principle that every essence naturally gives forth energies, which express it but

21-24 septembre 1994, ed. Ysabel de Andia [Paris: Instirut d'erudes augustiniennes, 1997], 574). Otto Semmelroth argued that the powers *(dunameis)* "were not a relationship between God and the world, but a reality in God, in some way different from the essence" ("Gottes ausstrahlendes Licht: Zur Schopfungs-und Offenbarungslehre des Pseudo-Dionyius Areopagita," *Scholastik* 28 [1953]: 482). See also, Semmelroth, "Gones geeinte Vielheit: Zur Gotteslehre des Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita," *Scholastik* 25 (1950): 394 for a similar claim. Golitzin, *Et introibo,* 55 favorably cites the latter text. But see Walter Neid!, *Thearchia: Die Frage nach dem Sinn von Gott bei Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita und Thomas von Aquin* (Regensburg: Habbel, 1976), 456-57; and Walther Volker, *Kontemplation und Ekstase bei Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1958), 153-54 for critical assessments of this claim. For some scholars who reject the essence-energy distinction in Dionysius see E. Corsine, *II tratto DE DNINIBUS NOMINIBUS dell Pseudo-Dionigi e i commenit Neo-Platonici al Parmenide* (Turin, 1962), 101; Brons, *Gott und dei Seienden,* 176-83; Stephen Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 156-66; and Ysabel de Andia, "Transfiguration et theologie negative chez MaJcimele Confessur et Denys l'Aerfopagite," in de Andia, ed., *Denys fAreopagite et sa posteritæn orient et en occident,* 313-15, 325. See also Ysabel de Andia, *L'union Dieu chez Denys l'Areopagite* (Leiden: Brill, 1966), 65-75.

[102] Cf. Gregory Nazianaen, *Oratio* 31.16; John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith,* 3.15 (59); Palamas, *Capita* 129.

are different from it, must view this relation between essence and energy as a formal characteristic or property of essence and energy so that it applies to all essences. But then it seems that there must be enough similarity between the divine essence and all other essences that this formal characteristic applies to the divine essence. Christoph Yannaras claims that the radical incomprehensibility and transcendence of the divine 'essence' means that there is no analogy between beings and the divine *'ousia'* but only between the beings and the divine energies.[103] In the same vein, as we have seen, Palamas claims that if God is or has essence, then beings do not and vice versa.

It is hard to see how the above principle, which is invoked to distinguish the divine essence from the divine energies, does not run afoul of these claims. It seems to require that there be at least some analogy between divine and finite essences. Indeed, Dionysius never really offers a 'justification' for the difference between the divine powers and the hiddenness except that the divine hiddenness is beyond all names whatever and that, as we saw above in the texts from *Divine Names* 2.7 and 13.3, any name said of the divinity must refer to a manifestation, and thus a differentiated and united procession of the divine hiddenness: 'within' *(ad intra)* God in the manifestation of the Trinity and divine powers, 'outside' *(ad extra)* God in finite beings.

Another principal reason for distinguishing essence and energies in God is that there without it would be no creation understood as God's free production of beings. The reason is that whatever 'flows' from the essence of God does so naturally. In the Byzantine framework, will is differentiated but not inseparable from the divine essence precisely to account for the freedom with which God creates.[104]

[103] Christoph Yannaras, *De fabscence et de Nnconnaissance de Dieu <fa-pres /es ecrits areopagitiques et Martin Heidegger* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1971), 82.

[104] Moreover, in virtue of the free character of creation, Lossky denies that the energies can be viewed merely in causal terms as the divine presence *to* creation: "The energy is not a divine function which exists *on account of* creatures•... Even if creatures did not exist, God would none the less manifest Himself beyond His essence; just as the rays of the sun would shine out from the solar disk whether or not there were any beings capable of receiving their light" *(Mystical Theology,* 74).

Thinkers in both the Scholastic and Byzantine traditions affirm that that God freely creates beings by an act of will and not by emanation or a simple 'necessary' overflowing of God into beings. Of course, for Plotinus the production of beings by the One is not necessary or compelled since the One is in no sense constrained by anything external to itself.[105] Conversely, if we take creation simply in the sense of unconditioned causality-creation *ex nihilo-then* there is no incompatibility between creation and emanation. Hence, the key issue here is not whether the production of beings is *ex nihilo-the* Neoplatonic and Christian traditions both agree on this-but whether the production of beings is free in the sense that God need not have willed the, production of beings.[106] But it is not dear to me that Dionysius holds to a theory of creation as a free production of beings by God.[107] To be sure, Dionysius refers to the divine paradigms or exemplars as the divine wills *(thelemata);* he also asserts that the production of beings is guided by divine providence.[108] But such texts in and of themselves do not require a theory of creation. In the latter part of the sixth *Enneads* (6.8), Plotinus attributes will to the One; elsewhere he writes about the providential ordering of things.[109] Yet it is dear that Plotinus does not hold to a theory of creation in the sense that the One need not have willed to produce beings.

There are at least two keys texts that seem to argue against the view that for Dionysius God creates beings in the sense that he need not have willed them:

[165] This is a major conclusion of *Enneads* 6.9.4.

[106] See Aquinas *STh* I, q. 19, a. 3. "Since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change."

[107] Golitzin, *Et introibo,* 77-86 argues that Dionysius holds to a theory of creation, yet notes that "Dionysius' creationism represents perhaps the most ambiguous features of this thought" (78). Golitzin's interpretation seems to depend on viewing the divine logos as the divine will (86ff.).

[108] Cf. *DN* 4.33.733A-C; and 5.2.693A-696B.

[109] *Enneads* 3.1 and 2.

For by be-ing, the good (as 'essential' good) extends goodness into all beings. Now just as our sun-neither by choosing nor by calculating but by its being-illuminates each of those that partake of its light according to the capacity of each logos, just so the good-beyond the sun as the elevated archetype is beyond its obscure image-by its existence *[hyparxis]* analogically sends forth the rays of its whole goodness to all beings.[110]

For since as the existence *[hyparxis]* of goodness, it is the cause of all beings by its be-ing, it is suitable to hymn the good-source providence of the thearchy from all its effects.11[1]

The first text, from *Divine Names* 4.1, regularly appears in objections Aquinas raises to the view that God freely creates the world. [112] Over the course of his career, Aquinas always gave a similar response. By likening the flowing forth of beings from the good by its being to the production of the rays of the sun by its being, Aquinas argues that Dionysius did not intend to deny creation but to affirm that the good (God) produces by its nature as does the sun. But since the good by nature is rational and a rational being produces freely by will, then the good (God) produces by its will. Albert gives a similar analysis of the same text. [113] But these texts are just as easily read in light of the Neoplatonic principle that what is complete produces things by its nature so that 'providence' does not imply a volitional concern by an agent for its effects.11[4]

If we take these texts and the reference to 'divine wills' as evidence that Dionysius holds to a theory of creation, then it must be noted that Dionysius never discusses a divine name of will *(thelema).* Indeed, in his writings, *thelema* explicitly occurs in reference to God only in the text cited above from *Divine Names* 5.8. The term *boulesis* does not occur in Dionysius's writings. Dionysius uses *ktesis* (creation) and its related verb only four

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[110] *DN* 4.1.6938. Sarracen translates *hypancis* as *essentia.*

[111] *DN* 1.5.593D. Sarracen translates *hypancis* as *essentia.*

[112] This text is discussed twenty-four times in Aquinas's writings ranging from I *Sent.,* d. 34, q. 2, a. 1 to *SI'h* III, q. 117, a. 6.

[113] Albert, *Super de divinis nominibus* 4 (Simon, ed., 118).

[114] Proclus, *Elements of Theology* 23.

times, and then only in citations from Scripture. [115] In other words, the reference to a divine will in terms of which Eastern and Western authors constantly stress the free character of the production of beings is virtually absent from Dionysius. If this is so and we grant that Dionysius holds to a version of the essence-energy distinction in relation to God, then not only does he not defend a distinction between the divine energy and *ousia* to account for creation as a free production of beings by God, it is also not clear that he holds to a theory of creation in this sense.

CONCLUSION

Simplicity, understood as unity without distinction, fundamentally regulates the Scholastic understanding of God.[116] Yet even in the West, this notion of simplicity is not unchallenged. Richard Cross notes that Scotus's position about the formal distinction of the persons of the Trinity and of the divine attributes from the divine essence and from one another means that Scotus develops a "weak concept of simplicity": God, for Scotus, "is far less simple than Aquinas's God." [117] This is also the case, it seems, in the Byzantine framework, although the notion of 'complex unity' is perhaps a better characterization of God's simplicity. Basil Krivocheine notes that Gregory of Nyssa regularly speaks of the simplicity of the divine nature or essence rather than the simplicity of God, [118] while God, the Trinity, 'names' the essence, the persons of the Trinity, and the divine energies. [119] God's simplicity, or perhaps better 'unity', does not mean that God is without distinction or differentiation but that he

[115] *DN* 2.1.637B (twice); 4.4.700C; 9.3.912A.

[116] Simplicity also fundamentally regulates Neoplatonic thinking about the One, although it must be remembered that, for the Neoplatonists, the One is properly neither one nor many.

[117] Cross, *Duns Scotus,* 43, 45 respectively. This weak simplicity, according to Cross, stems from Scotus's notion of univocity.

[118] Basil Krivocheine, "Simplicity of the Divine Nature and the Distinctions in God, according to St. Gregory of Nyssa," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 21 (1977): 76.

[119] More precisely even the names 'God' and 'divinity' are names for divine processions and energy since there is no name for the divine 'essence' (ibid., 86, 89).

is without division and contradiction. [120] So, as is chanted in Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, we worship "the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit: the Trinity, one in essence and undivided."

And for Dionysius? The great refrain in his writings is: "The divinity is all things as cause of all, but nothing apart from all." So, the divinity 'is' beyond-being being: radically hidden and utterly unknown, yet manifest in the Triadic unity of Father, Son, and Sprit, and present to created beings in the uncreated powers or energies that belong to the Father, Son, and Spirit in a unitary manner. Put another way: The divinity is beyond-being *(hyperousios)-utterly* beyond unity and differentiation-yet being *(ousia),* hence, differentiated in its unity while united in its differentiations. [121]

[120] Ibid., 103-4.

[121] Cf. Jens Halfwassen, "Sur la limitation du principe de contradiction chez Denys," *Diotima* 23 (1995): 46-50.

ECCLESIAL EXEGESIS AND ECCLESIAL AUTHORI1Y: CHILDS, FOWL, AND AQUINAS

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WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP between biblical interpretation and the various understandings of the kind of reality that the Church is? In exploring this question, this article will examine three exegetical models: Brevard Childs's *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological Reflection on the Christian Bible,* Stephen Fowl's *Engaging Scripture: A Model for Theological Interpretation,* and Thomas Aquinas's *Commentary on the Gospel of St. John* (on John 21). I will inquire into how the three authors' various understandings of the Church shape their biblical interpretation, and how their understanding of exegesis in turn shapes their view of the Church and ecclesial authority. In order to place these three approaches in dialogue, a significant portion of the article will be devoted to sketching their views in detail.

Childs and Fowl are among the preeminent contemporary thinkers on the topic of the theological exegesis of Scripture, and comparing them with Aquinas finds justification in their own writings. Childs says of Aquinas, "one could hardly wish for a more serious and brilliant model for Biblical Theology on which a new generation can test its mettle. "[1] Similarly Fowl, concerned

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[1] Brevard S. Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological Reflection on the Christian Bible* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 42; for a survey of the fate of Childs's guiding theme of "canon" in biblical studies (German- and English-speaking) over the past half-century, with attention to Jewish-Christian dialogue, see Childs, "Critique of Recent lntertextual Canonical Interpretations," *Zeitscbrift {Ur die alttestamentliche*

about the institutionalized theological fragmentation that one
finds in the contemporary academy, suggests that Aquinas's under-
standing of exegesis is in some respects an exemplar for his own:

Thomas Aquinas, as well as his contemporaries, would have recognized that in
writing his commentary on John's gospel he was engaged in a different sort of
task than in writing his *Summa Theologiae.* Thomas, and his contemporaries,
however, would have been puzzled by the notion that in writing one he was
acting like a biblical scholar and in writing the other he was working as a
systematic theologian. These tasks were all seen as parts of a more or less unified
theological program of articulating, shaping, and embodying convictions about
God, humanity, and the world. [2]

Wissenschaft 115 (2003): 173-84; and "The Canon in Recent Biblical Studies: Reflections on
an Era," *Pro &clesia* 14 (2005): 26-45, which are especially valuable for their critique of
James A. Sanders's approach to "canonical" biblical interpretation (e.g., Sanders, *Canon and
Community: A Guide to Canonical Criticism* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984)); see also the
essays in *The Canon Debate,* ed. L. M. McDonald and J. A. Sanders (Peabody, Mass.:
Hendrickson, 2002), especially the essay by   Bovon, "The Canonical Structure of the
Gospel and Apostle," 516-27. In response to James Barr's thoroughgoing critique (found
throughout Barr's corpus) of "biblical theology," see the pointed comments of Francis Watson
in his *Text and Truth: Redefining Biblical Theology* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997),
18-26; cf. Jon D. Levenson's critical review of Barr's *The Concept of Biblical Theology: An
Old Testament Perspective* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999) in *First Things* 100 (February
2000): 59-63. As Watson points out, "The Christian Bible is the object of study for three
distinct communities of interpreters. Each community has its own relatively autonomous
disciplinary structures. Each has developed an extensive and ever-expanding secondary
literature, with its great names of past and present, its monograph series and its journals. Each
offers programmes of graduate training and career possibilities, thereby securing its own
future. . • • [I]t therefore requires a conscious effort of the imagination to perceive the
coexistence of three distinct communities of biblical interpreters as the anomaly that it actually
is" (2). Watson goes on to observe (rightly) that while biblical scholars freely work in other
fields (sociology, literary theory), they are discouraged from working with systematic
theology: "at this point the disciplinary boundary has normative force. It does not merely
represent a convenient division of labour; it claims the right to exercise a veto.
Interdisciplinary work involving biblical studies and systematic theology is therefore a perilous
and vulnerable activity whose legitimacy is open to serious doubt" (3).
   [2] Stephen E. Fowl, *Engaging Scripture: A Model for Theological Interpretation* (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1998): 16; cf. Fowl, "The Conceptual Structure of New Testament Theology," in
Biblical Theology: Retrospect and Prospect, ed. Scott J. Hafemann (Downers Grove, III.:
InterVarsity, 2002), 225-36, at 228. Like Watson, Fowl is concerned about the separation
between biblical studies and theology. Fowl blames the "institutional fragmentation" brought
about by increasing specialization and the fact that "(t]o be counted as a professional within
each of these disciplines, one has to master such a detailed body of knowledge particular to
each field that it is rare to find a scholar in one field whose work is read and used by those in
another" ("The Conceptual Structure of New Testament Theology," 229). He argues that the

Indeed, Aquinas's practice of theological exegesis, which flows from his understanding of the Church and (inseparably) ecclesial authority, illumines both strengths and weaknesses in the exegetical approaches of both Childs and Fowl, and thereby offers ways of further developing a mode of contemporary ecclesial biblical interpretation.

I. BREVARD CHILDS

A) Childs's Project

Brevard Childs begins his "Prolegomena" to his magisterial *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments* by remarking,

There is general agreement that Biblical Theology as a discrete discipline within the field of biblical studies is a post-Reformation development. Although the Bible was much studied earlier, it is argued that during the period of the early and mediaeval church the Bible functioned within a dogmatic ecclesiastical framework in a subservient role in order to support various traditional theological systems. The Reformation signalled a change in emphasis by its appeal to the Bible as the sole authority in matters of faith, nevertheless the Reformers provided only the necessary context for the subsequent developments without themselves making the decisive move toward complete independence from ecclesial tradition. Only in the post-Reformation period did the true beginnings of a new approach emerge.[3]

Childs locates this narrative of the nature and aims of "biblical theology" in the writings of the eighteenth-century scholar J. P. Gabler, who distinguished carefully between "biblical theology," whose method was historical, and "dogmatic theology," whose

way forward is the ecdesial "rule of faith" as developed *by* Irenaeus, with its circularity between the New Testament and Church doctrine. See also the work of the Methodist exegete Robert W. Wall, "Reading the Bible from within Our Traditions: The 'Rule of Faith' in Theological Hermeneutics," in *Between Two Horizons: Spanning New Testament Studies and Systematic Theology,* ed. Joel B. Green and Max Turner (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 88-107; as well as Paul M. Blowers, "The *regula fidei* and the Narrative Character of Early Christian Faith," *Pro &clesia* 6 (1997): 199-228; for Wall's canonical perspective, dose to Childs's, see Wall's "The Significance of a Canonical Perspective of the Church's Scripture," in *The Canon Debate,* 528-40.

[3] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 3-4.

method was speculative. [4] For Gabler, the historical method characteristic of "biblical theology" could avoid the complexities and ever-changing lenses characteristic of "dogmatic theology," and thereby reveal in simple and dear fashion the religion of the Bible. Gabler proposes therefore that "biblical theology" should examine the biblical texts in three stages: first, seeking their historical origins (authorship, context, genre); second, comparing the various texts in the Bible in order to gauge objectively their areas of agreement and disagreement; and third, distinguishing the universally true daims made by the biblical text from those claims that appear dearly to be merely a product of and for their time and cultural climate. Having identified the key biblical truth claims, such "biblical theology" could then provide worthy theses for the speculative and pastoral connections drawn by "dogmatic theology."

As Childs tells the history, two problems arose in the working out of Gabler's project by the scholars who followed him. First, in actual practice, philosophical judgments could not be kept out of the method. [5] Second, the unity of "Biblical Theology" gave way in practice to a split between Old Testament theology and New

[4] Cf. Ben Ollenburger, "Biblical Theology: Situating the Discipline," in *Understanding the Word: Essays in Honor of Bernhard W. Anderson,* ed. James T. Butler, Edgar W. Conrad, and Ben C. Ollenburger (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985), 37-62; Robert Morgan, "Introduction: The Nature of New Testament Theology," in Robert Morgan, ed., *The Nature of New Testament Theology: The Contribution of William Wrede and Adolf Schlatter* (London: SCM Press, 1973), 1-67. For Morgan's efforts to develop a contemporary New Testament theology in the academy, proposing that "Christian scripture does not yield a normative theology but suggests a doctrinal [Christological] norm," see his "Can the Critical Study of Scripture Provide a Doctrinal Norm?," *Journal of Religion* 76 (1996): 206-32. For an example of development in biblical theology see Craig A. Evans, "Life-of-Jesus Research and the Eclipse of Mythology," *Theological Studies* 54 (1993): 3-36.

[5] *As* Stephen Fowl remarks, following Ben Ollenburger, "Gabler's position was very quickly abandoned in favor of positions more clearly influenced by Kantian concerns culminating in Wrede's essay, 'The Tasks and Methods of "New Testament Theology"'" (Fowl, *Engaging Scripture,* 14). Fowl provides a valuable discussion of Wrede's approach, which adopted the methodology of the history of religions and thereby caused an internal division within the discipline of "biblical theology." See Robert Morgan's English translation of Wrede's essay in Morgan, ed., *The Nature of New Testament Theology,* 68-116. For a positive overview of New Testament theology, surveying it historically with special attention to works published in the 1990s, see Frank Matera, "New Testament Theology: History, Method, and Identity," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 67 (2005): 1-21.

Testament theology, and then to a rejection of anything "theological" at all (ultimately including the very notion of a "canon" identifiable as "Old Testament" and "New Testament"). The historical method could not bridge the differences between the two Testaments, nor could it account for why certain texts, rather than others, were included in the Testaments.

Childs points to Gerhard Ebeling, writing in the 1950s, as the scholar who recognized this situation and proposed an important methodological shift by way of rescuing "Biblical Theology." Ebeling's new definition of Biblical Theology's task, quoted by Childs, is the following: "In 'biblical theology' the theologian who devotes himself specially to studying the connection between the Old and New Testaments has to give an account of his understanding of the Bible as a whole, i.e. above all of the theological problems that come of inquiring into the inner unity of the manifold testimony of the Bible."[6] Childs understands his own work as following in this line, even if not fully in accord with the way in which Ebeling would have undertaken the task. For Childs, Biblical Theology is premised upon the assumption of the unity of the historical and the theological; without this assumption, it makes no sense to speak of canonical, revelatory texts.

Yet, Childs holds that one cannot too quickly sublate the historical into the theological. In this respect Biblical Theology, he thinks, represents a significant advance over the patristic-medieval tradition of exegesis. As he puts it, "The task of Biblical Theology does contain an essential, descriptive component in which Old and New Testament specialists continue to make clear 'the manifold testimony of the Bible'. Any new approach to the discipline must extend and indeed develop the Enlightenment's discovery that the task of the responsible exegete is to hear each testament's own voice, and both to recognize and pursue the nature of the Bible's diversity."[7] Childs emphasizes, however, that

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[6] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 7.

[7] Ibid., 8. Francis Watson challenges this aspect of Childs's approach. For the Christian, Watson suggests, the Old Testament always points beyond itself to Christ and thus does not possess an autonomous or semi-autonomous "voice." Childs's attempt to separate off such a voice, before attending to the "canonical context," strikes Watson as a removal of the "single,

recognition of and appreciation for the Bible's diversity need not
be opposed to theology; on the contrary, a proper theology of
God's working in history will welcome the task of hearing "each
testament's own voice." Such theology will insist simply upon the
canonical unity of the Bible, as the fundamental principle from
within which to hear the diverse voices within each Testament.
This theological principle, at the center of Childs's version of
Biblical Theology, flows from faith in Jesus Christ, which cannot
and need not be bracketed. This unifying principle-Christ-
enables us to hear the diverse voices "as a testimony pointing
beyond itself to a divine reality to which it bears witness. "[8] The
biblical voices testify to Christ, and thus enable, "as a vehicle of
God's will," the Church to hear Christ's saving word for human
beings.[9]

christological centre as the object of this discrete witness" *(Text and Truth,* 216). Christopher
Seitz responds to Watson on this score in "Christological Interpretation of Texts and
Trinitarian Claims to Truth: An Engagement with Francis Watson's *Text and Truth," Scottish
Journal of Theology* 52 (1999): 209-26. Seitz holds that the distinct "voice" sought by Childs
is simply the theology of Israel (e.g., faith in the one God) that remains true in Christ Jesus,
and that instructs Christian theology when Christian theology is willing to begin with the Old
Testament (seeing there truths of faith) rather than beginning with the New and then facing
the problem of what to make of the Old; as Seitz says, "The Old Testament is not a relative
with a gas problem, as a former colleague once said, that we must accept and try politely to
work around" (226). In a short response to Seitz, Watson suggests that "the differences
between us are more apparent than real" (Francis Watson, "The Old Testament as Christian
Scripture: A Response to Professor Seitz," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 52 [1999]: 227-32,
at 232). The difficulty comes, according to Watson, because Seitz has not fully seen the basis
for Watson's critique of Childs. Watson states, "My position is based on a phenomenological
description of the structure of the Christian canon, according to which the 'discrete voice' of
each of its two major parts can only properly be heard on the assumption of their
interdependence. ... To speak of the 'discrete witness' of the Old and New Testaments
respectively is to make an important point about the twofoldness, but it tells us nothing about
the dialectical unity. If we regard each of the two collections of texts as basically autonomous
in relation to the other, it will be difficult to *substantiate* the claim that the God of Israel is
the God of Jesus--however emphatically we assert it. The *necessity* of this identification will
only be apparent if, without losing their distinctiveness, the Old and New Testaments are seen
to be constituted as old and new only in relation to the other and to the definitve disclosure
in Jesus of the triune God that both separates and unites them" (227-28). I concur with
Watson, and in so doing concur largely also with the points made by Seitz.

    [8] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 9.
    [9] Ibid.

It is far from the case, then, that Childs uncritically accepts the premises behind Gabler's effort to expand and develop the Reformers' liberation of the Bible from its patristic-medieval subservience to dogma, a liberation almost equally dosed off by Protestant Scholasticism. Childs fully recognizes that "'some sort of conceptual framework" is necessary for reading a text, and also that there is no necessity for dogmatic formulations to be *ipso facto* opposed to historical research. [10] The need is to achieve an integration of the historical and the theological where dogmatic formulations do not squeeze the Bible's diverse voices into one mold. While he grants that "[i]t is undoubtedly true that in the history of the discipline traditional dogmatic rubrics have often stifled the dose hearing of the biblical text," he holds that this does not mean that dogmatic categories necessarily distort Biblical Theology. [11] Childs seeks to map a middle way. He disagrees with Hans Frei's and George Lindbeck's attempts to argue that the Bible, in itself, creates a world whose claims are solely verifiable from the inside of that text-constituted world. [12] Instead, he argues that the dogmatic claims speak about the transformation, ultimately in Christ, of a world that is recognizable even to those who have not read or heard the Bible. Historical research remains important because it makes manifest the fact that the texts of the Bible refer not simply intratextually, but also extratextuaHy.

B) *History of Theological Exegesis*

In briefly reviewing the history of theological exegesis from the patristic period through the Reformers, Childs treats Irenaeus, Origen, Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin. With his characteristic ability to read other authors sympathetically, Childs identifies a number of valuable points for contemporary Biblical Theology in their approach to Scripture and theology. [13] In

[10] Ibid., 12.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., 19-22; here Watson agrees with Childs.

[13] Cf. Childs's more extensive development of this historical approach in his *The Struggle to Understand Isaiah as Christian Scripture* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2004), which includes chapters on Irenaeus, Origen, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin, among others. One might

Irenaeus Childs finds the biblical pattern of creation and
redemption in Christ (making dear that the New Testament forms
a integral unity with the Old, rather than being simply tacked on
to it), as well as the "'rule of faith," the realities to which Scripture
points, which continues to be upheld by the Church's bishops
down the centuries. [14] Origen provides an emphasis on Scripture
and the reading of Scripture as belonging to "the process of divine
pedagogy, "[15] the movement from the historical to the divine, by
which God raises the human mind to God in Christ. Augustine
similarly frames the reading of Scripture in (Neoplatonic) terms
of healing and elevating the mind, in a Christological movement
from the historical to the divine. To this point Augustine adds "'a
holistic rendering of the theological intention of scripture" as
ordered to charity, which requires also of the teacher of Scripture
an ability to move hearts as well as minds. [16]

   While these brief summaries of patristic exegesis are generally
laudatory, Childs's equally brief treatment of Aquinas begins to set

also see Luke Timothy Johnson's chapters on Origen's and Augustine's exegesis in Luke
Timothy Johnson and William S. Kurz, S.J., *The Future of Catholic Biblical Scholarship: A
Constructive Conversation* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002): 64-118.

   [14] Denis Farkasfalvy, O.Cist., makes an interesting proposal with regard to the exegetical
and canonical development in the second and third centuries: "It is most important to realize
that the canon of the New Testament itself-the   very fact that we have a distinctively
Christian corpus of sacred writings--grew   out of a hermeneutical crisis," in which anti-
Gnostic Fathers such as Irenaeus and Origen "found themselves in a dilemma. From one side
they saw the threat of an uncontrollable syncretism, while from the other they feared the loss
of history and universalism. They embraced a canon of two Testaments which guarded against
Marcion by the wide range of prophetic and apostolic writings included in the canon and
against Gnosticism by the wide range of apocryphal literature omitted from it" (Farkasfalvy,
"The Case for Spiritual Exegesis," *Communio* 10 [1983]: 336-37); cf. Denis Farkasfalvy and
William Fanner, *The Formation of the New Testament Canon: An Ecumenical Approach* (New
York: Paulist, 1983); Denis Farkasfalvy, "'Prophets and Apostles': The Conjunction of the
Two Terms before Irenaeus," in *Texts and Testaments,* ed. W. E. March (San Antonio, Tex.:
Trinity University, 1980): 109-34. For a Protestant perspective on the formation of the canon,
with a valuable critique of Rahner's understanding of the Old Testament, see Stephen B.
Chapman, "The Old Testament Canon and Its Authority for the Christian Church," *ExAuditu*
19 (2003): 125-48.

   '-' Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 35. For a critical reading of
Origen (for his allegorical interpretation), see Thomas F. Torrance, *Divine Meaning: Studies
in Patristic Hermeneutics* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995).

   [16] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 38.

forth some of the tensions that his constructive project of Biblical Theology seeks to resolve. I will thus pause a bit longer on his ambiguous account of Aquinas's theological exegesis.

As quoted above, Childs describes Aquinas as offering a "serious and brilliant model for Biblical Theology on which a new generation can test its mettle." [17] On the other hand, Childs charges Aquinas with falling at times into an "inability to rightly hear because of a false starting point" -although Childs here points out that this problem is endemic to the task of biblical exegesis-and remarks that "it is obvious that Thomas' contribution to Biblical Theology does not lie in a direct appropriation of his commentaries," due to his lack of knowledge of the biblical languages and his "'scholastic categories and endless subdivision of phrases. "[18] For Childs, it is dear that Aristotle's philosophy is "alien" and even "antagonistic" to the biblical texts, and he remarks that no contemporary biblical scholar is likely to attempt, as Aquinas did, to adopt Aristotelian philosophy. [19] As Childs is weH aware, these are the negative reasons why Aquinas has often "served ... as a prime example of dogmatic theology's imposing of an alien philosophical structure on the biblical text which obscured the Bible's own categories and which rendered it largely mute." Childs agrees in general with the philosophical critique. [20]

Yet, despite these negative points, he also acknowledges the depth of Aquinas's engagement with the realities of Scripture. The Aristotelian framework, outdated though it may be, does not prevent Aquinas from penetrating the biblical text, albeit perhaps in spite of his philosophy: "A study of Thomas is invaluable in seeing to what extent the author was able to adjust his philosophical perspective to the uniquely biblical message and, in the process, cause his own alien categories actually to serve toward the illumination of the biblical text. "[21] After all, as Childs has noted earlier and here repeats, every biblical theologian,

[17] Ibid., 42.
[18] Ibid., 41-42.
[19] Ibid., 40.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., 42.

whether patnst1c, medieval, or modern, must possess some
"conceptual framework," and the deficiencies of these "time-
conditioned human categories" can be overcome, to varying
degrees, by theologians whose ears are sufficiently attuned to
Scripture's own voices.[22] In Childs's view, Aquinas is able often,
if not always, to overcome the deficiencies of his Aristotelian and
Scholastic lenses by means of his keen sense for the realities at
stake in Scripture. [23] Childs finds that Aquinas's "enduring
contribution" is that his theological gifts enabled him to engage
profoundly "with most of the major problems which still confront
a serious theological reflection on the Bible. He pursued in depth
the relationship between the testaments in respect to law,
covenant, grace, and faith," among other themes. His complex
efforts to integrate Athens and Jerusalem-for   example, Greco-
Roman virtue theory with Old Testament law, Aristotelian "final
cause" with biblical *telos-as* well as his nuanced insight into such
perennial problems as the Pauline theology of justification, make
Aquinas's theology, despite its often inhibiting Aristotelian frame,
of significant value to those who seek to understand the meaning
of the biblical texts, even if his efforts to integrate disparate
streams of thought do not always work.

   It remains the case, however, that in Childs's survey it is
Aquinas's Aristotelian engagement with the biblical texts, far more
than Irenaeus's sense for history and the rule of faith or even than
the broadly Neoplatonic models of Origen and Augustine, that
marks the point at which the relationship of dogmatic theology
(now conveyed in an Aristotelian frame) and biblical theology
begins truly to show some strain. The implicit suggestion is that
the Scholastic approach leads to the necessity of reawakening to
the actual voices of the texts by means of breaking through
dogmatic formulations, now formulated in an Aristotelian key.
While Childs does not explicitly discuss the difference between
Aquinas and his patristic predecessors on the one hand and the

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Wayne Hankey criticizes Childs for not noticing the Neoplatonic aspects of Aquinas's
approach: see Hankey, "Aquinas, Pseudo-Denys, Proclus and IsaiahVI.6," *Archivesd'histoire
doctrinaleet littbaire du Moyen Age* 64 (1997): 59-93.

difference between Aquinas and Luther on the other, in Childs's survey it becomes apparent that Aquinas occupies a profoundly ambiguous transitional position. The philosophically layered exegesis of Aquinas remains keen enough to attain biblical insight,, but the veil set in place by the insistence upon inserting "alien", and "antagonistic" Aristotelian conceptual frameworks will render necessary, once minds less biblically and patristicaHy formed than Aquinas's come to predominate, a recovery of the historical exigencies of the biblical texts. [24]

For Childs, Luther accomplishes this breakthrough. He does so in the midst of the theological ruins of the Church, two and a half centuries after Aquinas. On one side we find "the uncritical, easy piety of the mediaeval church which had domesticated the Bible: with its ritual and office," and on the other "the urbane, secular, and non-theological reading of the Bible by the new humanists, who were tone-deaf to the real message of scripture and knew

[24] Childs later remarks (within a broader response to David Kelsey's functionalist understanding of biblical authority), "Yet to speak of a reality in some form not identical with the biblical text as the grounds for theological reflection raises for many the spectre of a return to static dogmatic categories of the past. Thomas Aquinas assumed an analogy of being between divine and human reality which could be discerned to some degree by means of reason. Both the Reformers and the philosophers of the Enlightenment resisted strongly any direct move from general being to a sure lmowledge of God, and such a move finds few modem defenders. A repristinarion of any form of traditional ontology seems out of the question for multiple reasons .... I would rather argue that the reality of God cannot be defined within any kind of foundationalist categories and then transferred to God. Rather it is crucial that the reality of God be understood as primary. Moreover, according to the Bible the reality of God has no true being apart from communion, first within God's self, and secondly with his creation" (82). Childs thus follows his rejection of "traditional ontology" with a metaphysical claim, drawn from the Bible, about God-a metaphysical claim that in fact needs the nuancing that "traditional ontology" could provide. Despite the effort to move from metaphysics to "hermeneutics" or to "anti-foundationalism," one finds oneself back at metaphysics! I have tried to suggest a model of biblically adequate metaphysics in my *Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). See also Francis Martin, "Revelation as Disclosure: Creation," unpublished article. See also the interpretations of biblical texts that possess clear metaphysical implications in L. Roger Owens, "Free, Present, and Faithful: A Theological Reading of the Character of God in Exodus," *New Blackfriars* 85 (2004): 614-27; and J. C. O'Neill, "How Early Is the Doctrine of *Creattioex Nihilo?," Journal of Theological Studi.es* 53 (2002): 449-65; as well as Lawrence Boadt's appreciative comparison of Aquinas's theology with that of the biblical wisdom literature in his "St. Thomas Aquinas and the Biblical Wisdom Tradition," *The Thomist* 49 (1985): 575-611.

little of the wager of faith. "[25] It seems dear that Childs has in
mind, in contemporary terms, Christians who have never read or
truly heard Scripture and secularized scholars whose reading of
Scripture is so threadbare as to be suited solely for the acaderny.[26]
In this situation, Luther penetrated the meaning of the Bible with
a fiery intellectual zeal that was capable of removing the
accretions that prevented the true Christological face of Scripture
from being seen. This zeal was not rnerdy intellectual; rather, it
was fundamentally Christological and existential, the result of
encountering Christ in the Word of Scripture. As Childs puts

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[25] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 46.

[26] Childs elsewhere cautions that Catholic exegetes, uncritical prior to the twentieth
century, are now in danger of shifting too far in the other direction: "ill modem Catholicism
since the encyclical of 1943, the historical critical approach to biblical studies has been folly
embraced. I judge this move to have been correct, especially when viewed in the historical
context of the Catholic Church's earlier dogmatic position. However, I think that this
hermeneutical relationship [between historical-critical and canonical bibliral interpretation]
must be viewed in a far more subtle, indeed dialectical manner, because of the unique
character of the biblical subject matter. The Bible in its human, folly time-conditioned form,
functions theologically for the church as a wimess to God's divine revelation in Jesus Christ.
The church confesses that in this human form, the Holy Spirit unlocks its truthful message to
its hearers in the mystery of faith. This theological reading cannot be simply fused with a
historical critical reconstruction of the biblical text, nor converrsdy, neither can it be separated.
This is to say, the Bible's witness to the creative and salvific activity of God in time and space
cannot be encompassed within the categories of historical criticism whose approach filters out
this very kerygmatic dimension of God's activity. In a word, the divine and human dimension
remains inseparably intertwined, but in a highly profound, theological manner. Its ontological
relation finds its closest analogy in the incarnation of Jesus Christ, truly man and truly God.
The present danger of Catholic biblical scholarship is that in its genuine sense of lteedom from
rigid dogmatic restraints, it has moved! imo the pitfalls of liberal Protestantism in its embrace
of modernity along with all of its critical methodologies" (Childs, "The Canon in Recent
Biblical Studies: Reflections on an Era," 44-45). While I agree with much of what Childs says
here, he distinguishes too cleanly between a purely historical realm (the realm accessible to
"historical critical reconstruction") from a purely theological realm known, like Jesus' divine
nature, in faith. I rake this point to be the central critique posed against the Pontifical Biblical
Commission's "The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church" in Lewis Ayres and Stephen E.
Fowl, "(Mis)reading the Face of God: *The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church,"
Theological Studies* 60 (1999): 513-28, although Ayres and Fowl direct this critique largely
toward the document's affirmation that the "historical-critical method" is *necessary* for the
Church's biblical interpretation. I would say that historical-critical reconstruction has value
when normed by a broader participatory understanding of "history," beyond the narrow
nominalist sense accepted by most historical critical reconstruction, that allows for theological
retrieval of the history taught by the Bible.

"Solus Christus provides the key to all his exposition .... Luther used his christological understanding of the whole Christian Bible, not as a formal principle, but as an authority which he derived from the living presence of God who was present in the text. The Bible was not a story about Jesus, but the very source of Christ's actual presence. "[27] Whereas Aquinas probes the biblical texts with an Aristotelian apparatus, seeking to set forth the biblical world view in a way that attempts simultaneously to engage the insights of Greek philosophy, Luther is bedazzled by the Christ whose face shines through the biblical texts.

Luther permits nothing-so/us *Christus-to* come between him and that living and active face, no matter what the value of Greek philosophy may or may not otherwise be. Yet Luther does not allow his Christological principle, by which he tests every passage of Scripture, to flatten the diversity of Scripture. Instead, the multiplicity of ways in which Christ is present brings into focus "the differing voices of scripture both in judgment and salvation, through law and gospel. "[28] Childs thus finds that Luther, breaking through philosophical and even dogmatic veils by sheer focus on Christ, reclaims the "element of direct encounter" with Christ in Scripture that was present, even if perhaps not quite as strongly, in the Neoplatonic exegetical models of spiritual healing taught by the Fathers, but that had begun to be lost in the still-valuable Aristotelian biblical engagement of Aquinas.[29] Identifying Luther

[27] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 44.

[28] Ibid.

[29] See also Childs's "Toward Recovering Theological Exegesis," *Pro Ecclesia* 6 (1997): 16-26, in which he points out, "There is, in addition, another aspect of the Scripture's pressure which needs further exploration beyond Yeago's description. The coercion of Scripture also functions critically in relation to Christian dogmatics to fragment and shatter traditional dogmatic structures. Especially in the Reformers' attack on the scholastics one sees how Scripture exerted not only a centripetal, but also a centrifugal force in subjecting all human traditions to radical criticism in light of the gospel. Right at this juncture one senses a decisive difference between Aquinas and Luther in the use of the Bible" (17). Childs envisions Scripture as a self-standing entity that radically calls to account non-scriptural entities; but what if the Church, as sacramentally and dogmatically constituted, cannot be separated in this way from Scripture? This is the problem identified by, for example, Richard Popkin in "The Intellectual Crisis of the Reformation" in idem, *The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle,* rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3-16.

as a model of his own project in Biblical Theology, Childs concludes, "In sum, a great majority of the major theological issues involved in the modern enterprise of Biblical Theology were already adumbrated   Luther in a profound sense."[30]

   Once Luther achieved the breakthrough, Calvin-the fast figure   Childs's survey of pre-historical-critical theological exegesis-returns   to patterns more similar to those of the Fathers, although with the Lutheran principle of *sola scriptura* now firmly in place. For Calvin, Scripture is "self-authenticating" because God speaks through it and the Spirit illumines the reader to understand the truth of this speech. The task of dogmatic theology, then, is to se:rve the reader's entrance into Scripture by clearing away paths that might obscure or distort God's active Word. Thus Childs contrasts Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae,* written (Childs mistakenly suggests) "to encompass the whole of Christian teaching into which structure the Bible provided the building blocks," with Calvin's *Institutes,* in which it is theology that prepares for the Bible and not the other way around. Calvin, Childs affirms, does not in writing the *Institutes* move back

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   [30] Childs, *BiblicalTheology of the Old and New Testaments,* 45. Thi.ISXca1rm.otfolly agree with Francis Watson's view that Childs, like Hans Frei, neglects "the hermeneulical significance of the location of the church within the world," that is to say, "a realistic socio-politicai orientation" (Watson, *Text, Church and World* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1994], 46). I think that Childs's approach takes a conscientiously Lutheran approach to "the location of the church within the world"; the question is whether this Lutheran account 1M0rks. For Watson, Childs's daim that the am.on functions harmoniously, rather th::m conflicrualiy, indicates that Childs's "ideal 'community of faith and practice' is oblivious to the function of the canonical text as a site of ideological conflict. It is alone with the text, free from and untrammelled by historical realities" (44), Watson largely agrees with Childs's description of "the formal outlines of the canonical object, over against an interpretative tradition which has rendered it invisible," but Watson rejects Childs's claims regarding "the *adequacy* and the *sufficiency* of the canon for guidance of the community into the 1mth" (ibid., 44). Childs's understanding of "canon" possesses a keen historical sense of rootedness in Luther's (certainly conflictual) Christological reading of the Bible: the canon suffices to guide the community precisely in revealing *Christ,* and this encounter with Christ forms and guides the community in ways that both sanctify the world and bring the community into conflict with the world. This Lutheran position neither precludes the ecumenical value of canonical biblical interpretation nor implies, as Wall'lon suggest>, that the canon's "ttuthful witness" is not "given and discovered in the midst and in the depths of the conflict-ridden situations in which it is inevitably entangled" (45), but it does call into question whether Childs's account of the Church is adequate.

toward the medieval temptation: "It is a fundamental misunderstanding of Calvin's purpose to suggest that he sought to impose a dogmatic system on the Bible."[31] In contrast to Luther, Calvin develops through a theology of "covenant" a more positive account of the history of Israel, thereby adding another element useful for contemporary Biblical Theology. Similarly Calvin is not so worried as Luther about the use of philosophical language in theology, since he recognizes that such language, as in the case of the "Trinity," can prove helpful in leading the reader or hearer deeper into the reality described in Scripture. Whereas Luther had struggled for some time with the patristic-medieval multiple senses of Scripture, Calvin, as a second-generation member of the Reformation, easily rejects all but the literal. Childs implies, in short, that thanks to Luther's breakthrough Calvin is able to advance an exegesis that draws together many of the best contributions of Luther and the Fathers. [32]

C) The Canonical Approach and Ecclesial Authority

Having sketched both current and classical approaches to "biblical theology," Childs turns to setting forth his approach. *As* is well known, he focuses on the integration of the two Testaments through a theology of the biblical "canon," although he cautions that his theology of "canon" does not intend to propose an ecclesial norm over and above Scripture itself. *As* he puts it in response to Walter Brueggemann, "The whole point in focusing on scripture as canon in opposition to the anthropocentric tradition of liberal Protestantism is to emphasize that the biblical text and its theological function as authoritative form belong inextricably together. "[33] Both liberal Protestantism and

[31] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 49.*

[32] It is perhaps worth noting that Childs is a Presbyterian.

[33] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 72. Childs's critique of Brueggemann as ultimately falling into the liberal Protestant exegetical mode described by Hans Frei strikes me as correct. In response to Brueggernann's approach to canonical exegesis in "Canonization and Contextualization" (in Walter Brueggemann, *Interpretation and Obedience* [Philadelphia: Augsburg Fortress, 1991]), Childs observes that Brueggemann-drawing upon David Tracy's terminology-relies upon the voices of the

"traditional Catholic discussion of canon," Childs notes, tend to view the Bible's form (canon) as extrinsic to the biblical text itself, thereby devaluing the Bible's status as God's Word by supposing the text to be normed by a human authority rather than as norming all human authority. [34]

On the basis of his theology of canon, Childs argues that the task of Biblical Theology is "to understand the various voices within the whole Christian Bible, New and Old Testament alike, as a witness to the one Lord Jesus Christ, the selfsame divine reality." [35] Employing the tools of both history and theology, Biblical Theology should both appreciate the diversity of the voices and draw the connections that unify the voices in Christ. Furthermore, Biblical Theology should appreciate that this same divine reality (Christ) is known through the Holy Spirit in the community of faith. While the faith community's Spirit-enabled appropriation of Christ is not the same as the biblical Word,

oppressed, mediated by the interpreter, to actualize the "classic" text and thereby instantiate the Church's "canonical interpretation" today. This procedure, in which "[t]he inert text of the classic receives its meaning when it is correlated with some other external cultural force, ideology, or mode of existence," is as Childs says Mexactlythe hermeneutic.al typology which H. Frei so brilliantly described in his book, *The &lipse of Biblical Narrative.* It makes little difference whether the needed component for correctly interpreting the Bible is the Enlightenment's appeal to reason, consciousness, and pure spirit, or to Karl Marx's anti-Enlightenment ideology of a classless society and the voice of the proletariat. The hermeneutical move is identical. … The theological appeal to an authoritative canonical text which has been shaped by Israel's witness ro a history of divine, redemptive intervention has been replaced by a radically different construal" (Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 73). As Childs makes dear, both modem and postmodern biblical interpretation imagine the text as fundamentally "inert" rather than as bespeaking ecclesially identifiable realities of faith. Like the nonteleological "nature" and "will" of nominalism that are neutral vis-a-vis the good (thereby making volition an arbitrary exercise of power that controls and shapes premoral "nature"), the nominalist text does not have meaning in mediating participation in realities but instead awaits an actualization to make the text meaningful.

[34] Ibid., 72. Childs's position indicates the influence upon his thought of a nominalist account of the Church and of biblical interpretation. Granting the Church's role in shaping the biblical canon need not involve supposing the Church to be "over against" the biblical canon. Rather, *participating* in the mediation of God's Word belongs to the very nature of the Church as the Body of Christ, In this participation, the Church makes no claim to be superior to the reality participated.

[35] Ibid., 85.

neither can the two be separated, since the biblical Word is intended, as Calvin among others showed, to edify the Church. Biblical Theology is therefore not a mere academic or abstract enterprise, but is intended to be normative in the present and to be "responsive to the imperatives of the present and not just of the past." In serving the faith community's ongoing "struggling to understand the nature and will of the One who has already been revealed as Lord," Biblical Theology's practitioners will be aware that they are not so much interpreters of the biblical text as they are primarily and powerfully interpreted by the biblical text, the Word of God, Jesus Christ. [36] As for the possibility of dialogue between Biblical Theology and dogmatic theology, Childs suggests that the task of systematic theologians, given their training, is to "bring a variety of philosophical, theological, and analytical tools to bear which are usually informed by the history of theology and which are invaluable in relating the study of the Bible to the subject matter of the Christian life in the modern world." [37] The systematic theologian, in this view, is trained in contemporary modes of thought, as well as the history of theology, so as to be able to lead contemporary persons (the modern world) more deeply into the Christological ambit illumined by the normative task of Biblical Theology.

How does this approach illumine the question of authority in the Christian life? Childs explores this question in two chapters. The second of these chapters, entitled "God's Kingdom and Rule," engages Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God. As Childs points out, "it would seem that few subjects are in greater need of the contribution of Biblical Theology in seeking to overcome the present fragmentation in the understanding of God's kingship over the world." [38] Childs first examines the concept of "the kingdom of God" in the history of the Church. In the early Church, the "kingdom" was held to be the millennium, after the Second Coming, during which Christ would reign on earth. Beginning in the third century, however, the "kingdom" and the

[36] Ibid., 86.
[37] Ibid., 89.
[38] Ibid., 624.

"millennium" began to be both spiritualized (with respect to the
period after the Second Coming) and made more concrete in the
pilgrim Church. In Childs's view, Augustine bears much of the
responsibility for this problematic shift:

> clearly it was he [Augustine] who first developed a major theological alternative
> for reinterpreting the kingdom of God in his great book *De civitate Dei.* It has
> often been stated that Augustine simply identified the kingdom of God with the
> visible church, but his interpretation is certainly far more subtle. The
> institutional church, even in its imperfect state, may indeed be called the
> kingdom of God, but only in so far as it is determined by that perfect heavenly
> kingdom. Still in spite of Augustine's theological nuances, the effect of his
> interpretation was to transform the early church's eschatological perspective into
> an era of church history through which God's rule was realized. Moreover,
> Augustine provided the legacy from which the mediaeval church expanded its
> claim to be the kingdom of Christ on earth. God's rule was so embedded in the
> earthly structures of the church that it could be read off its institutional life. Still
> it should be noted that eschatology was far from dead as evidenced by the
> continuing eruption among the followers of Joachim of Fiore, in the radical
> Franciscans, and in the Hussites of Bohemia.[39]

The "kingdom of God" shifted from signifying Christ's this-
worldly reign after the Second Coming to signifying the Church,
even the Church on earthly pilgrimage. For Childs, Augustine's
account of the "kingdom" as already, in a participatory sense,
present in the Church as the Body of Christ is insufficiently
dialectical. In contrast, Childs notes that Luther upholds the
proper tension through his doctrine of two kingdoms, the
incomprehensible heavenly kingdom of God and the earthly
regn.um Christi, dialectically lived out by the believer as "simul
iustus et peccator. "[40] Later Protestant biblical scholarship, as
Childs shows, separated radically the Church (unknown to and
unintended by Jesus) from Jesus' apocalyptic preaching of the
"kingdom."

Given the alternatives between what he views as the
Augustinian and Catholic conflation of the Church and the
kingdom, and the liberal Protestant rejection of any relationship,

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[39] Ibid., 625.

[40] Watson does not give sufficient attention to this aspect of Childs's thought.

Childs applies his method of Biblical Theology in hopes of a better outcome. His historical-critical study of the Old Testament and rabbinic Judaism establishes that "[i]t remains a difficult and controversial issue to establish the origins, dating, and development of the concept of Yahweh's kingly sovereignty because of the nature of the Old Testament evidence," [41] and the same holds for messianic concepts.

If the Old Testament and rabbinic Judaism do not offer a dear interpretation, does the New Testament offer more insight into the meaning of the "kingdom of God"? Reading historical-critically, Childs notes that in the New Testament "the immediate problem arises as to the exact content of Jesus' preaching since each of the evangelists has tended to reflect a stage of the tradition which not only shares the sharpening effect of its oral transmission, but also bears the signs of compositional ordering as well." [42] Childs then sifts through the various passages in which the "kingdom" is mentioned. He shows that the New Testament passages do not concur with the liberal Protestant idea of believers themselves bringing about the establishment' of the kingdom. He notes the apocalyptic urgency of Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom, an urgency that is not however marked by "extra-vagant" apocalyptic speculations. While at times it seems that for Jesus the kingdom is already present in his proclamation (e.g., Luke 17:21), at other times it seems that the kingdom is in the future. The kingdom stands as the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy and messianic hopes, but not thereby as simply "read off" from the Old Testament; rather, Jesus' words and deeds are evaluated in light of the Old Testament scriptures. Finally, comparing the various evangelists along with St. Paul, Childs observes a development from implicit to explicit Christology that influences the portrait of Jesus' gift of salvation and thus of the "kingdom."

At this point, in accord with his method, Childs moves from the historical-critical effort to hear the distinct voices of the

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[41] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 634.
[42] Ibid., 636.

scriptural texts to canonical Biblical Theology. In light of a
lengthy critique of the biblical-theological approach to the "king-
dom" offered by H.-J. Kraus, Childs argues that recognizing the
dialectical relationship between the discussion of God's sover-
eignty in the Old and New Testaments enables the interpreter to
avoid the pitfalls of both the Catholic and the liberal Protestant
views. In the Psalms, for example, he finds "a theological check
against all attempts to interpret Christ's kingdom as an internal-
ized moral force directed to the service of human advancement,"
while "the New Testament's profile of the kingdom as the reign
of love and justice revealed in Jesus Christ corrects any Old
Testament tendencies toward understanding the kingdom as the
national domain of one chosen people. "[43] The kingdom should
neither be historicized and spiritualized, nor made overly
concrete. Thus in the concluding section to this chapter, in which
he brings his Biblical Theology into dialogue with dogmatic
theology, Childs takes issue especially with the thought of Jurgen
Moltmann. As this section makes dear, Luther's critique of the
Catholic monastery remains the core of Childs's viewpoint. Childs
agrees with Luther that the spirituality of the monastery defines
the key misunderstanding of the "kingdom" as an entity that
human beings bring about. He writes, "Certainly one fails to
comprehend Luther's passionate insistence on justification by faith
alone unless his teaching is seen against the background of his
relentless attack on traditional Catholic spirituality institutional-
ized in the monastery, which even in its highest expressions of
concern for the poor was unable to grasp the nature of God's
freely offered grace apart from all human moral strivings. "[44] The
Church, Childs condudes, must "bear witness to the kingdom of
God" as a sheer gift to be received in faith, without undialectically
claiming to be or to bring about the kingdom of God, since the
reality of salvation is sheer gift and therefore cannot be
instantiated or reified in historical human beings.[45] Witnessing to
the gift of the kingdom is the Church's way of proclaiming God's

[43] Ibid., 651.
[44] Ibid., 656.
[45] Ibid., 657.

rule without claiming to have instantiated it, or to be progressively instantiating it, on earth.

D) *Metaphysics, Dialectics, and the Church*

It does seem that Childs's approach contains not Biblical Theology pure and simple, if there ever could be such, but Biblical Theology mixed with metaphysical presuppositions. If we recall Childs's depiction of the "alien" Aristotelian lens employed by Aquinas, in contrast with Luther's direct encounter with Christ in Scripture, we might wonder whether Greek philosophy did not in fact come to Aquinas's aid in interpreting the fundamental patterns in Scripture. As Charles Morerod has shown, Luther's theology was marked, in his account of causality, by a nominalist lack of the doctrine of participation, forcing Luther to rely upon dialectical tension to describe the relationship of divine and human action.[46] Childs's account of the Church suffers from the same lack. In attempting to understand the scriptural teaching that the Church both is and is not the kingdom, Childs falls back upon the Church as "bearing witness" to the kingdom in order to combat the Pelagianism he thinks he finds in both Catholic monasticism and liberal Protestantism. In so doing he cannot give a full account of how the witnessing Church really *is* the kingdom, although he recognizes that scriptural texts make this claim.[47] A metaphysical account of participation would free him from this inability. Insofar as the Church participates fully in Christ by Christ's grace and mediates this grace to the world, the Church is the kingdom; insofar as the Church fails, as made up of sinners, to participate fully in Christ, the Church still falls short of the kingdom. The Church both is, and is not, the kingdom. The two senses can be reconciled and integrated through understanding participation.

In contrast, the nominalist rejection of participation-a metaphysical move-leads both Luther and Childs to see no other

..; See Charles Morerod, O.P., *Oecumenisme et philosophie: Questions philosophiques pour renouveler le dialogue* (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2004): 55-97, 135-148.

[47] This is, I think, the germ of truth in Watson's criticisms.

way than at best to hold in dialectical tension the two scriptural
affirmations, unable to affirm that the Church, composed of
sinners, can really be the kingdom in a way that would not detract
from the uniqueness of God's holiness and agency. A fully human
mediation of salvation, in which the Church truly is the kingdom,
cannot for Luther and Childs be squared with the reality that God
alone is holy and God's agency alone makes holy. Lacking this
understanding of participation and mediation, human agency can
do no more than "bear witness" to God's salvation, rather than
embodying God's salvation as his kingdom. Seeing that Christ
seems to promise more for the Church on earth, liberal Protes-
tantism then goes to the opposite extreme, in which human
agency takes over for God's agency. A richer metaphysical
account of the reality depicted in Scripture would avoid this clash
of competing agents and do justice to how the Church both is and
is not the kingdom, and thus how the visible Church does, and
does not, embody and mediate Christ's authority in the world.

In this light we should also look briefly at Childs's chapter on
the Church, entitled "Covenant, Election, People of God." After
discussing historical-critically the themes of "covenant" and
"people of God" in the Old Testament, Childs remarks, "The
problem of understanding the people of God as a present reality
and as an eschatological hope is handled differently by
Deuteronomy from that of the prophets. Yet both witnesses firmly
resist identifying God's people either with merely a political
entity, or a timeless community of believers." [48] Reflecting his
recognition of the complexity of the theology of the Church, he
dryly remarks: "It is thus not surprising that this issue will again
erupt in the New Testament with a vengeance. "[49] As regards the
Old Testament presentation of the theme of "election," which he
also engages historical-critically, Childs points out that scholars
consider it to be a development of the late monarchical period
that, theologically speaking, makes clear God's completely
gratuitous love for Israel.

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[48] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 414.*
[49] Ibid.

Turning to the New Testament, Childs summarizes historical-critical research indicating that Jesus, while taking as a given that Israel was the "people of God" as expressed in the particulars of the covenantai relationship, added to this conviction a strong "apocalyptic vision of a completely theocentric ushering in of a new age which overturned all ideas of who was first and last within the kingdom, and which gave preference to the outcast and to the disenfranchised of the world" "[50] Here Childs canvasses Jesus' preaching of the kingdom, with an emphasis on its eschatological aspects and the element of judgment, as well as Jesus' messianic claims (differentiated from some traditional messianic expectations)" Childs holds that Jesus' calling of the twelve disciples indicates primarily the coming kingdom of God, organized around the twelve as the new Israel, which will include all nations. For Childs "there can be no doubt from the larger picture of the Synoptics that Jesus did evoke the claim of establishing an eschatological community within the coming kingdom of God. "[51] This community would be "concrete, yet eschatological" and would embody "the emerging kingdom of God," emerging now in the faith of believerso[52] Childs recognizes further that John's Gospel, which he contrasts in this regard with the Synoptics, affirms the kingdom "as a present eschatological event "[53] From this Childs draws a portrait of the Gospel of John's ecclesiology as radically otherworldly: "Clearly for the Fourth Gospel national, cultural, and ecdesiastical parameters have been transcended, and the nature and qualifications of those chosen by God have been formulated alone in terms of the confrontation with Jesus Christo"[54]

As regards Paul, Childs emphasizes his dialectical reflection upon Israel "'according to the flesh" and the Israel into which the Gentiles have been grafted" Christ has fulfilled the covenantal promise to Abraham. The Church is Israel insofar as the true

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[50] Ibid., 430.

[51] Ibid., 4320

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid,, 433.

[54] Ibid., 434.

Israel always was a people "of faith who share in the promises and live in the Spirit. "[55] Yet, God will turn the disobedience of Israel "according to the flesh" into favor by means of the obedience of the Gentiles. Childs finds that the concept of "the body of Christ," although of limited importance in Paul's letters, takes on much greater significance in the deutero-Pauline letters and in Catholic theology. The point of Paul's usage of this phrase is to show that the community depends entirely upon Christ. Whereas Paul focuses on Israel, however, the deutero-Pauline letters (e.g., Ephesians and Colossians) develop an entire ecclesiology around the image of the body of Christ. The First Letter of Peter and the pastoral Epistles likewise articulate a much greater sense of the Church's new structure and self-understanding, now significantly differentiated from that of Israel. The Letter to the Hebrews, Childs suggests, is closer to Paul in this regard.

Analyzing these Old and New Testament voices (as retrieved historical-critically) from the perspective of canonically governed Biblical Theology, Childs focuses upon the "dialectical pattern" of the particular or this-worldly and the transcendent. The Old Testament presents Israel as God's particular people, but also suggests a transcendent eschatological fulfillment, in which the Gentiles would be included, as well as the significance of a righteous remnant. The New Testament presents the Church both as Israel and in discontinuity with Israel; likewise "[t]he people of God can be portrayed according to the social structures of an empirical nation, but again as a transcendent universal fellowship. "[56] The New Testament moves in the transcendent, universalizing direction by its rejection of a particular tie to the land and its inclusion of the Gentiles; and yet the New Testament retains the particularity of Jesus as the Christ who fulfills God's promises to Israel (as well as the prophecies) and the New Testament employs the central Old Testament themes of covenant, election, and people of God. With the Old Testament, the New recognizes that the people of God "depends solely upon the divine mercy

[55] Ibid., 435.
[56] Ibid., 442.

and initiative," that this election is a vocation that demands holiness, and that the Psalms give voice to a faithful response to God's election. [57]

Having made these points, Childs concludes the "Biblical Theological Reflection" section of his analysis of the Church by suggesting that the central difference between Old and New Testaments is also the center of ecclesiology, namely, Jesus Christ. For Childs-and here his perspective is close to Aquinas's, although Childs does not include the Church's crucial sacramental-mediational dimension-there is little point in examining the Church per se, because the Church points always toward Christ. A proper ecclesiology will be, in its focus, a Christology. The Church is the community of those who bear witness. Thus the Church, while "its ecclesiastical structures can be analysed sociologically like any other social institution," possesses a transcendent life, a life of witnessing "to the source of its life, 'to preach the unsearchable riches of Christ' that through the church the manifold wisdom of God might be known (Eph.3.9ff.), 'from whom every family in heaven and earth is named' (v.15). "[58] This transcendent life belongs to the Church, and yet belongs to the Church solely as a vocation or mission of witnessing; the life is Christ's, and the Church points to him without fully embodying his life (this embodiment of the kingdom, as we have seen, is reserved for eternal glory). Nothing on earth, not even the Church, may take away the focus on Christ, in whom alone there is life.[59]

[57] Ibid., 445.

[58] Ibid., 446.

[59] In the roundtable discussion summarized by Paul Stallsworth in *Biblical Interpretation in Crisis,* ed. Richard John Neuhaus (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1989), David Wells points out that "'of course the autonomy of the individual interpreter opens the door to great abuse. But I think you should hear the other side of the argument: The autonomy of the church also opens itself to great abuse. If it is true that the interpreter can be overcome by vested interests in his or her reading of the text, it is equally true that an interpreting church can be overcome by vested interests in its reading of the text" (161). Similarly, speaking on the basis of notes prepared by John Rodgers, Wells later cautions that "where you have this very neat conjunction between Scripture, tradition, and the church, what you are really looking at is a kind of translation theology. In principle, it does the same thing that radical feminists and liberationists do. Only here the Word of God is faded out into a kind of

Despite the many strong points of this section, again we see a
"competitive" or "dialectical," rather than participatory, relation-
ship between the Church and Christ, requiring that the Church
possess Christ's life solely by the mission of bearing witness, not
in a fuller participatory sense. On the basis of the results of his
"Biblical Theological Reflection" section, Childs in his final
section ("Dogmatic Theological Reflection on the People of
God") applies his results to the present situation and praxis of the
Church in relation to the world, in accord with his understanding
of the task of dogmatic theology. He offers here an excellent
critique of the "two covenant" model (one for the Jews, the other
for the Gentiles). Turning to the identity and mission of the
Church, he points to the movements of renewal in the Church's
form, movements that express the "creative role of the Spirit," as
indicative of "a growing awareness that the future life of the
church cannot be any longer identified with its dominant Western
shape," in light of other cultural forms with which the gospel is
coming into increasing contact. [60] Biblical Theology can provide a
norm by indicating the diversity of the biblical witness regarding
the Church's self-understanding: "Clearly no one form of polity
has the sole daim to biblical warrants. "[61] Building upon Biblical
Theology, dogmatic theology must insist upon the centrality of
Christ (rather than, e.g., Karl Marx) in all acceptable forms of
Christian polity. Childs also cautions against uncritically accepting
the claims of liberation theology to have understood the direction
of God's providential work as regards political platforms. The
Church proclaims the kingdom of God, but only Christ, risen and
glorified, is the fullness of the kingdom. God's people are

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ecclesiastical vernacular. John Rodgers's concern is that the Word of God must be unfettered.
If the church attempts to fetter or control the Scriptures, then Christ is no longer free to speak
through it" (173). Childs is struggling with the same problem: Will not a robust account of
the Church's participation in/mediation of the Word of God result in the Church controlling
and eventually muting Christ, in a profound distortion of what should be? Catholics, aware
that all, including bishops, fall short of the glory of Christ, nonetheless trust in faith that
Christ, through the gift of the Holy Spirit, will sustain his Bride in faithfully witnessing to his
cruciform image by mediating his wisdom and love to the world.

   [60] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 448.

   [61] Ibid., 449.

journeying to the fulfillment in Christ to which, as the Church, they witness by proclamation of Christ's victory.

II. STEPHEN FOWL

A) *Fowl on Childs*

In the introduction to his *Engaging Scripture,* Stephen Fowl provides a brief appreciation and assessment of Childs's approach. Appreciatively, Fowl remarks that without Childs's work, very little scholarly space would presently be open for theological exegesis by biblical scholars, and he agrees with Childs's canonical principle for Christian biblical interpretation. [62] Fowl disagrees, however, with Childs's methodological distinguishing of historical-critical sections on the Old and New Testament from Biblical Theology. In Childs's approach, a survey of the results of historical-critical research allows the particular voices of each Testament to be heard before the more synthetic, canonical evaluation of the Bible's meaning under the rubric of "Biblical Theology" begins. Fowl questions why the "voices" of the Old and New Testament should be the "voices" set forth by historical-critical research. Why should one assume that historical-critical methodology gives a privileged access to the "voices" of the two Testaments? What if, for instance, historical-critical research leaves out, methodologically, certain aspects of what might otherwise belong to both Testaments' "voices"? What defines a scriptural "voice"? (Indeed, Fowl would prefer to avoid speaking of the human agency of scriptural texts, because such language tends to blur the reality that texts, including scriptural texts, require interpreters.)

In this light, Fowl finds especially troubling Childs's rejection of allegory. He notes that the practice of allegorical reading in fact belongs to what Childs might call the "voice" of the New

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[62] Fowl, *Engaging Scripture,* 3, 25.

Testament, at least the letters of Paul.[63] Moreover, Fowl denies
that historical-critical research, the quest for the original voices of
the Testaments, can act as a "control" over allegorical reading that
otherwise could become more and more eisegetically distant from
the meanings in the biblical texts themselves. [64] Historical-critical
reading, just as much as allegorical reading, methodologically
involves practices that lead it further and further from the actual
biblical texts, as anyone familiar with the hypothetical recon-
structions proposed by historical-critical scholarship recognizes.
Historical-critical reading is in the same boat, as it were, as
allegorical reading, but the allegiances of the latter are ecclesial,
whereas the former professes a neutrality that already, in a
nonneutral fashion, distances it from ecclesial reading. On this
ground Fowl also questions whether the historical-critical effort
to locate the particular "voices" of the Old Testament on its own,
without any reference to the New Testament, does not result in
a distortion (from a Christian perspective) of the voices of the Old
Testament, which Christians understand to be profoilndly caught
up already in God's Christological and pneumatological action
made manifest in the New Testament. [65]

[63] Ibid., 26. See also ibid., 134, where Fowl, drawing on the work of Richard Hays, argues
that "Paul's reading of Abraham's story is not only ecclesiocentric in the sense Hays claims,
but that the internal coherence of Paul's reading presupposes and requires that Abraham's
story be read within the context of an ecclesia that has experienced the Spirit in the way the
Galatians have. Moreover, while Paul insists on the hermeneutical priority of the Galatians'
experience of the Spirit, it is an experience interpreted   by Paul. The Galatians' Spirit
experience is not self-interpreting."

[64] On the truth sought by allegorical reading, see, e.g., J. Patout Burns, "Delighting the
Spirit: Augustine's Practice of Figurative Interpretation," in De *Doctrina Christiana: A Classic
of Western Culture,* ed. Duane W. H. Arnold and Pamela Bright (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1995), 182-94. On the "controls" to allegorical reading, see Bryan M.
Litfin, "The Rule of Faith in Augustine," *Pro Ecclesia* 14 (2005): 85-101.

[65] Fowl, *Engaging Scripture,* 27. Fowl remarks later, "given that the notion of texts having
voices is a way of talking about the communities in which these texts are read, then Christians
must hold some form of the view that the proper voice of the Old Testament is heard within
those communities that read the scriptures under the guidance of the Spirit in the light of the
life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. It is not the case that the guild of professional Old
Testament scholars establishes something like the autonomous voice of the Old Testament,
which is then related in a complex way to the autonomous voice of the New Testament
(established by professional New Testament scholars)" (131). He points out in a footnote to
this passage, "I take it that Jews would hold to similar views. That is, the Old Testament is not

Problematically for Fowl, Childs's use of his historical-critical summaries indicates the view that ecclesial reading must be at a fundamental level normed by historical-critical reading, so that ecclesial reading does not become eisegetical. Put another way, Childs grants that historical-critical reading, as relatively neutral, should provide the norm for theological (or canonical and ecclesial) reading, although he also obviously considers historical-critical reading insufficient. Fowl pinpoints the problem: "Childs seems suspicious of any interpretive claims which finally rest on the judgments of actual living Christians. "[66] Because Childs does not want nonbiblical realities read back into the biblical texts, historical-critical analysis plays for him the role of curtailing the Christian tendency to read contemporary realities and concerns back into Scripture. Whereas Childs's concern about such bad reading leads him to set in place historical-critical reconstructions as the rock upon which Christian canonical readings must be tested, Fowl suggests that historical-critical reconstructions, while potentially valuable and informative, cannot play that role for Christians, because historical-critical readings are incapable of engaging the *realities* at play in Scripture.

If I understand Fowl correctly, he is saying that historical-critical readings can apprehend competing concepts and warring factions within the biblical texts, but cannot apprehend historically the theologically known realities that, Christians believe, inform the texts *qua* Scripture. These theologically known realities are God revealing divine realities, as well as human beings, within the community gathered by God, appropriating and participating in these divine realities of faith. [67] It follows that only

really seen as an 'autonomous' voice. Rather it is read in the light of its subsequent commentaries by those committed to living faithfully (as they see it} before the God of Israel. As Jon Levenson notes, discussions between Jews and Christians over the Bible that demand that both Jews and Christians abandon these particular commitments in favor of the commitments of professional biblical studies are not an exercise in ecumenism. Rather, they result in the distortion of both traditions" (ibid.}. Fowl's distinction between "supersessionist" and "Marcionite" approaches is helpful in this discussion (see 129).

"Ibid., 26.

[67] Fowl later points out, in response to the charge that he is advocating an ahistorical reading by rejecting the *necessity* of historical-critical interpretation for the Church, "What is interesting about the argument against ahistorical readings, however, is not so much the

by learning within the gathered community both the Triune God and the practices of sapientially appropriating and participating in God's saving *doctrina* can one adequately read the Scriptures that describe these very realities. Well-formed readers will be able to recognize the interpretations,   including of course historical-critical ones, that adequately illumine the reality described in Scripture. [68]

B) Exegesis, Eisegesis, and Ecclesial Reading

In short, Fowl holds that the norm for what counts as a good reading of scriptural texts must be "communal judgments about whether such interpretations will issue forth in faithful life and worship that both retain Christians' continuity with the faith and practice of previous generations and extend that faith into the very specific contexts in which contemporary Christians find themselves. "[69] Given this position that formation of ecclesial readers (whom I would describe as participants in *sacra doctrina)* rather than historical-critical judgments should be the ultimate test of adequacy in biblical exegesis, Fowl affirms that "Christians need to be more intentional about forming their members to be certain types of readers, readers who, by virtue of their single-

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chimera it attacks (i.e. historicality), but what it implicitly assumes: When historical critics argue against ahistorical readings they seem to assume that the only alternative is to be a historical critic" (184). To those who hold that historical-critical interpretation is necessary for the Church because God became man in *history,* Fowl, following Andrew K. M. Adam, responds that historical-critical scholarship's value is weakened both by the inability to demonstrate much about the historical Jesus, and more importantly by the fact that the mystery of Christ's humanity and divinity, and his theandric acts, exceeds the capacity of historical methodology (185-86).

[68] Comparing the community of academic biblical scholarship with the community of the Church, Fowl observes how much formation the academic community requires of its participants. He draws the conclusion that Christian communities should emulate the academic community not by seeking,, in general, to become proficient in its methods, but by forming ecclesial readers: "Rather than seeking to become well-versed in the skills, habits, convictions, and practices of professional biblical scholarship so that they can make useful *ad hoc* judgments about this work, Christians need to become much more well-versed in the skills, habits, convictions, and practices attendant upon Christian interpretation of scripture" (187).

[69] Ibid., 26.

minded attention to God, are well versed in the practices of forgiveness, repentance, and reconciliation. "[70] Otherwise, the interpretation of Scripture will miss the point, being unable to apprehend the very realities about which God teaches in Scripture. This inability produces the worst kind of "eisegesis" by importing into the interpretation of the texts precisely the blindness and deafness to God's active Presence that the divine and human authors of the scriptural texts warn against.

It should be emphasized that Fowl is well aware of the distinction between Scripture and theology that Childs, by his use of historical-critical exegetical summaries, is attempting to uphold as regards eisegesis. Fowl too wishes to avoid eisegesis. *As* he remarks in comparing theological texts and scriptural texts, "Christians theoretically could ignore or diverge sharply from the views of texts from the tradition," while "Christians could not ignore or diverge sharply from scriptural texts in this way."[71] The key question of course is how to read Scripture so as to avoid diverging sharply from its texts. For Fowl, the answer is found in grounding ecclesial reading not upon the historical-critical method's efforts to retrieve the original meanings of the texts, valuable though this may be, but upon the formation of readers attuned to the realities in the texts, and thus remaining open to possible multiple meanings (given the interweaving realities) within one text. This decision identifies the authority of Scripture as a canonical reality operative within the community of the Church: "The authority of scripture, then, is not so much an invariant property of the biblical texts, as a way of ordering a set of textual relationships. To call scripture authoritative also establishes a particular relationship between that text and those people and communities who treat it as authoritative. "[72] Scripture's authority does not subsist apart from the community of readers formed authoritatively by God teaching, among other ways, through Scripture. Fowl affirms that the saints are the true interpreters of Scripture because their lives and teachings conform

[70] Ibid., 26-27.
[71] Ibid., 5.
[72] Ibid., 6.

to the pattern of salvation that Scripture, as divine *doctrina,* teaches.[73] On this view, ecclesial interpretation of Scripture need not follow one particular method, but may apply different methods at different times in order to illumine the realities at stake in a given interpretive decision. Fowl describes this practice as "underdetermined interpretation," which he defines as recognizing "a plurality of interpretive practices and results without necessarily granting epistemological priority to any one of these."[74]

Eisegesis in the interpretation of Scripture, therefore, is for Fowl something different from what others have made of it. Interpretations of Christian Scripture that are not formed pneumatologically and Christologically by the practices of the community, itself shaped by the divine *doctrina* that is Scripture, will necessarily be eisegetical. As I would put it, such interpretations will lack connection with the realities active in the *doctrina* that Scripture is. Fowl states it this way: "Christians will find that interpretations of scripture have already shaped

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[73] Ibid., 7.

[74] lbid., 10; cf. Fowl's chapter 2. This "underdetermined" mode is governed by attention to theological realities. It is not "underdetermined" in the sense that the Christian could read Scripture any way with equal fruitfulness, but it is "underdetermined" in the sense that it leaves open various ways of understanding biblical texts. *As* Fowl explains, "Christians, by virtue of their identity, are required to read scripture theologically. Others may wish to do so, and Christians can certainly benefit from the insights of outsiders who engage scripture theologically. Most obviously, these readings would come from Jews who are reading their scripture theologically, but are not necessarily limited to them. My claims here neither limit the extent of the universal claims Christians want to make, nor seek to eliminate the interpretive practices of others. Christian biblical scholars can in principle engage in the whole panoply of diverse, and irreducibly distinct, interpretive practices characteristic of the profession of biblical scholarship. Neither the profession nor the 'semantic potential' of the Bible requires all critical interpreters to read theologically" (30). In a similar vein, Fowl states in his conclusion that "the ends towards which the church interprets and embodies scripture are simply not those of the profession. *As* a result, the work of professional biblical scholars must always be appropriated in an *ad hoc* way, on a case-by-case basis" (183). I largely agree with Fowl's approach, but l think that his claims might be moderated by Child's point that, as David Yeago has shown, "traditional Christian exegesis understood its theological reflection to be responding to the coercion or pressure of the biblical text itself. It was not merely an exercise in seeking self-identity, or in bending an inherited authority to support a sectarian theological agenda" (Childs, "Toward Recovering Theological Exegesis," *Pro &clesia* 6 [1997]: 16-26, at 17).

convictions, practices, and dispositions which have, in turn, shaped the ways in which scripture is interpreted. Not only is it impossible to undo this process, it is not clear how one would ever know that one had done so."[75] He points to the "rule of faith," advanced by Irenaeus, as an example of this necessarily ecclesial interpretation. The task of not diverging from Scripture thus cannot be accomplished by historical reconstructions of original meanings. Rather, not diverging from Scripture is an ecclesial task that requires the "practical reasoning" of believers formed by the Church's ongoing sapiential (receptive) practice of *doctrina,* and that may include, but need not include, historical-critical analysis.[76]

Fowl's effort to identify a mode of theological exegesis thus concentrates on identifying "the ways in which scriptural interpretation might shape and be shaped by specific Christian convictions, practices, and concerns."[77] Given this goal, he names his effort "theological interpretation" rather than "biblical theology," because the latter's largely historical retrieval of the Bible's meanings does not give sufficient weight to the ongoing (theological) ecclesial mediation of divine *doctrina* by pathic and poietic participation (to use Reinhard Hiitter's terms).[78] Theological interpretation involves readers in a circular movement of receiving God's *doctrina,* as Fowl shows by means of the example of the claim that Scripture is a unity. Fowl points out that this claim, which accords with God's unity of will, "presumes a doctrine of God (which is itself shaped by scripture) and God's providence.*"[79]* Furthermore, interpreting Scripture as a unity not only requires doctrinal presuppositions, but also, as Fowl immediately adds, ecclesial presuppositions about the unity of

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[75] Ibid., 10.

[76] For Fowl's account of this "practical reasoning" of Christian scriptural exegetes (i.e., ideally all Christians), see ibid., 194ff., as well as Fowl's *The Story of Christ in the Ethics of Paul* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991).

[77] Fowl, *Engaging Scripture,* 10.

[78] See ibid., 21. Cf. Reinhard Hutter, *Suffering Divine Things: Theofugy as Church Practice* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), originally published in German in 1997. Naturally Fowl, whose book was published in 1998, does not refer to Hutter.

[79] Fowl, *Engaging Scripture,* 20.

God's action in forming a peopk The daim that Scripture is a
unity "is confirmed by the presence of a contemporary community
which both testifies to God's continuing action in its midst and
presents itself as the continuation of God's actions beginning with
Adam and Eve through Abraham and Sarah, Moses and Miriam,
and the prophets, reaching its climax in Jesus, moving on through
Paul and Priscilla, down to the present, and looking expectantly
towards the new Jerusalem. "³ ° Fowl also makes dear that this
ongoing circular activity of ecdesial interpretation, guided by the
Holy Spirit as receptive participation in God's *doctrina,* pro-
foundly challenges the Church because of the difficulty of living
in ways that make true interpretation possible. [81] Opposed to weH-
formed ecdesial interpretation is the distortion that is eisegetical
imposition of our sinful practices upon God's *doctrina.*

C) *Whose Authority? Which Practices?*

It is at this point-the question of distinguishing well-formed
ecdesial interpretation from eisegetical imposition-that Fowl's
project, with which in general I am profoundly in agreement,
encounters difficulties. To his credit he recognizes these
difficulties without seeking to resolve them in a facile manner. I
wiH first summarize the points that he makes with regard to
ecdesial authority in the conclusion to his   and then
examine these points in light of his account earlier in the book of
the ecdesial embodiment of Paul's interpretive practices.

In the condusion, he specifies four questions about the
relationship of biblical exegesis and ecdesial authority that his
book has necessarily raised, without answering, in its effort "'to
show the integral connections between Christian scriptural
interpretation, Christian doctrine and practices, and Christians'
abilities to form and sustain a certain type of common life.'"[32]
First, given the value of figural or allegorical exegesis aiming at
providing Christ-focused readings, who decides what figural

[so] Ibid"
[81] Ibid", 11; cf. Fowl's chapter 3.
[&z] lbiclo, 2060

readings are appropriate and helpful? Second, assuming that there could be "occasions when attempts to extend a tradition into the present actually break the tradition," who would make such determinations? Third, assuming that the Spirit-filled Church comes to surprising judgments that extend without breaking the tradition, how are such judgments to be instantiated as normative for Christians? Fourth, if as Fowl proposes the formation or character of Christian readers is central for exegetical judgments that Christians make, how can the Church ensure that those who hold office and authority possess such well-formed character?

Instead of offering a direct answer to each of these questions, which would require addressing a set of issues that lie outside the scope of his book, Fowl proposes some basic rules (my word, not his) for testing possible answers. First, he affirms that biblical authority depends upon some notion of ecclesial authority: "authority is not something that has been inserted into the Bible which can then later be found, abstracted, analyzed, and either followed or ignored. Rather, scriptural authority must be spoken of in connection with the ecclesial communities who struggle to interpret scripture and embody their interpretations in the specific contexts in which they find themselves."[83] The first rule thus indicates that the question of ecdesial authority's relationship to biblical interpretation cannot be simply bypassed, as it largely is even by Childs. The second and third rules then set in place basic norms, drawn from Scripture, for ecclesial authority: such authority must recognize the Holy Spirit's ongoing work, and must bear the cruciform mark of the body of Christ.

In light of these rules, Fowl rejects certain accounts of ecdesial authority. First, ecdesial decision making must not follow a consumerist model, in which the goal would be pleasing with efficiency and flexibility the customer (the person in the pew). This would be to deny the divine guidance of the Holy Spirit and would ignore Christ's command that his followers take up their cross and follow him. Second, ecclesial authority cannot be authoritarian in regard to theological and interpretive discussion

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[83] Ibid., 203.

and debate, because such authority would not be cruciform and
would stifle the freedom of the Holy Spirit's work. Third, ecde-
sial authority must operate with the goal of speaking to all
Christians (the one and "catholic" Church) rather than in a purely
congregationalist fashion. Fourth, ecdesial authority, and theories
of ecdesial authority, must be ecumenically responsive to the
divisions among Christians and assist in their healing.

Clearly, some tensions arise in these four negative positions, as
regards how to attain aH the goals desired and how one would
recognize when the goals were attained. If ecdesial decision
making is not geared toward the religious "consumer" in the pew,
then ecdesial authority will necessarily challenge, make uncom-
fortable, and provoke disagreement among the persons in the
pew. Only in this way will sinners be confronted with their
crosses, and be configured, in graced repentance and prayerful
following of Christ, to his cruciform *imago.* But ecdesial authority
that challenges believers, thus provoking public disagreement and
debate (fueled also by the media with their own narrative of
ecdesial authority), will be seen as authoritarian if it attempts to
govern theological (interpretive) discussion in such a way as to
make dear to all believers the difference between paths that
constitute true following of Christ and paths that do not. [84]

[34] This situation is nothing new, although the consumption-driven communications media
ru:e largely new. Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, in his lengthy dispute with the semi-Arians,
was seen by Arius and some of the emperors as rigidly ruling out a path chosen by the majority
of Christians in many areas. I disagree, therefore, with Francis Watson's application to biblical
interpretation of his comparison between monologic and dialogic discourse, the latter
representing the eschatological inbreaking of undistorted communication or true interpersonal
communion. Watson writes that "the revelation of the eschatological horizon of universally
undistorted communication must itself be communicated in a dialogical fonn rather than
imposing itself unilaterally in the form of a monological demand for credence and submission"
(Watson, *Text, Church and World,* 123). Ironically, Watson himself issues what might seem
to be, in biblical interpretation, a "monological demand for credence and submission" when
he rejects 1 Corinthians 14:33-35. He states, "No amount of special pleading can conceal the
fact that what occurs here is the violent suppression of dialogue in the name of a truth that is
now to be experienced by women in a hereronomous and monological form which
undermines their starus as persons (for to be a person is to be a dialogue-partner)" (116).
Persons or churches (one thinks of Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox) who defend 1
Corinthians 14:33-35 are engaging in "special pleading" at best and their arguments constitute
cooperation in the violent suppression of women's status as persons. This rhetoric is not

Moreover, an ecclesial authority that seeks to uphold the Church's unity and catholicity will almost inevitably speak in ways that, by claiming to speak for all Christians, do not seem fully to appreciate ecclesial divisions. This situation-the perception of the ecclesial authority as authoritarian and unecumenical-will be exacerbated if the ecclesial authority teaches as normative for all Christian an interpretive position that conflicts directly with what many other Christians communities, as well as with what Christians within the ecclesial authority's own communion, believe and practice. In short, there is a question as to whether the points proposed by Fowl can hold together, or whether they cancel each other out.

Perhaps the key question, however, is from where, for Fowl, the ecclesial authority derives its authority. An ecclesial authority may-both in proclaiming as normative for all following of Christ certain interpretive positions not adhered to by all Christian communities and not popular within its own communion and in insisting for the good of believers that this position is theologically definitive (thereby seeming to "stifle" theological discussion and debate)-be seen as authoritarian and unecumenical. Yet, as Fowl is well aware, such an ecclesial authority may in reality be embodying, guided by the Holy Spirit, the cruciformity that is marked by the experience of popular opposition. How are we to know when an ecclesial authority is interpreting Scripture in a

exactly an invitation to dialogic engagement. This fact suggests that (even for Watson) ecclesial biblical interpretation cannot always be "dialogic" but sometimes must indeed demand a form of "credence and submission" rather than-as Watson defines the "dialogical" vis-a-vis the "monological"-actively promoting further dialogue with "an oppressed or dissident minority" (112). Watson's rejection of 1Corinthians14:33-35 also points to further problems with his account of "dialogical" and "monological." Person-constituting "dialogue" with Christ requires, for Watson, liturgical "speaking in Church," and those who deny this liturgical role to women are supreme instances of the "monological." First, this claim simply ignores the dynamic of sacramental participation, despite Watson's agreement with Jiirgen Habermas's critique of "modern philosophy as proceeding from a subjectivity construed in terms of the self-constituting ego" (113). Second, the claim appears to presume that "dialogical" discussion would be ended by the Church's teaching that a doctrine was definitive and unchangeable. The characteristics of fruitful ecclesial dialogue, including what Chesterton calls the "democracy of the dead" who as saints alive in heaven belong even more fully to the Church, are elided.

scripturally well-formed way, and when an ecclesial authority has
authority to do so for all Christians?

Fowl proposes an answer, but before sketching it I should
make clear my concerns. Fowl's proposal-whose   tentative char-
acter should be emphasized-is   deficient, I think, in two areas.
First, he may not give sufficient weight to the embeddedness of
Scripture historically within particular sacramental modes of
ecclesial authority. Can Scripture be separated from these modes,
which developed historically within a clearly demarcated ecclesial
community, without becoming entirely different in the
lives of Christians? Indeed, it could be suggested that Fowl's own
approach is an effort to reinsert Scripture and scriptural inter-
pretation into these ecclesial, communal modes from which it was
extracted when the sacramental understanding of the Church's
authority was, during the Reformation, severely challenged.
Second, I think that Fowl's proposal may not fully account for the
cruciformity, and thus obedient receptivity, required for the
Christian freedom of believers, a particular cruciform freedom
that should characterize all Christian biblical interpretation.

Fowl addresses the issue of ecclesial authority most directly in
the context of exegeting certain passages of St. Paul. On the basis
of his reading of Galatians 3-4, he finds that "[t]he authority
which generates and underwrites the counter-conventional
interpretation on which Christians will need to rely arises out of
friendships. "[85] This position, he notes, is similar to that of Stanley
Hauerwas, who "reads *Watership Down* to display the relation-
ships between an authority that arises out of friendships and
authority based on a coercive use of power. "[86] Fowl summarizes
and agrees with Hauerwas's view that "if the church is to maintain
its peaceable identity then it will have to base its authority on such
friendships. "[87] Ecclesial authority that arises out of friendship,
Fowl argues, need not deny that all Christians, not only a
privileged few such as the apostles (or their successors), are
enabled by the Holy Spirit to interpret Scripture proficiently.

[85] Fowl, *EngagingScripture,* 155.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.

Paul's creative exegesis (of, in his case, the Scriptures of Israel) is a model for all Christians; the apostle does not have a special claim to interpretive proficiency. [88] The task for each Christian is to learn how to follow Paul's example and interpret Scripture in a well-formed fashion. [89] Fowl points out, however, that the fact that each Christian is called like Paul to interpret Scripture does not mean that Christians can interpret Scripture adequately outside a well-formed interpretive community. Paul's own example suggests the contrary.

As Paul's exegesis makes clear, "certain communal habits and practices" belong to and sustain Christian reading. With Richard Hays, Fowl affirms, "To learn to read scripture like Paul means learning to read ecclesiocentrically. "[90] It follows that precisely in attaining their dignity as Spirit-inspired interpreters of Scripture Christians will learn that such interpretation is ecclesial and communal, and is made possible and sustained by ecclesial and communal practices. Christian interpretive practice thus must balance each Christian's interpretive freedom and authority with the fact that this freedom and authority flows from the Christian's ecclesial practices. In other words, in order to read in community and thereby instantiate Christian reading, Christians must in friendship (friendships formed *in Christ)* learn how "to grant one another interpretive authority. "[91] Fowl recognizes that because the very venture of following Christ is at stake, it will be difficult for persons to know *how* and *when* to take the risk of granting such authority to others. He states, "There is no risk-free way of doing this. The only real way for Christians to proceed in this regard is

[88] Ibid., 150-51.

[89] Ibid., 152-53. In this regard, Fowl agrees with Richard Hays's proposal of three "constraints" (admittedly rather broad and vague) upon "interpretive freedom" that characterize well-formed Christian interpreters, Paul and his communities included: "First, no reading can be true if it 'denies the faithfulness of Israel's God to his covenant promises.' Secondly, 'No reading of Scripture can be legitimate if it fails to acknowledge the death and resurrection of Jesus as the climactic manifestation of God's righteousness.' Finally, and most importantly, 'No reading of Scripture can be legitimate, then, if it fails to shape the readers into a community that embodies the love of God as shown forth in Christ'" (153).

[90] Ibid., 152.

[91] Ibid., 157.

to begin the process of forming and maintaining friendships with
each other so that they will know each other sufficiently well to
be able to grant one another a measure of authority to interpret
in counter-conventional   ways on occasions. "[92] In relationships of
friendship, this position implies, there will be sufficient inter-
personal trust to allow for both the limitation of personal freedom
and the risks that others might lead one astray that are involved
in granting (even only to a degree) to others interpretive authority
for oneself and for the community.

    Yet, does the concept of freedom at work here privilege a
neutral "freedom from" over a deifying and participatory
"freedom for"? Fowl indicates that only in relationships of
friendship can the Christian trust another so much as to grant him
real interpretive authority. No doubt Fowl principally has in view
the "hard cases," where some members of the community dissent
from the established communal teaching and thereby, if granted
"authority,"   shift the community's perspective on a point of
dogmatic or moral interpretation.   But the two "alternatives,"
other than sheer edectic individualism, that he gives to the
friendship-constituted   granting of authority are "Christians either
credulously handing themselves over to anyone claiming to speak
with the voice of God or reducing interpretive authority to a form
of coercion exercised by powerful individuals or groups. "[93] If the
granting   of interpretive   authority   is not friendship-based,
grounded upon personal (individual) "judgments about char-
acter, "[94] Fowl seems to suggest that interpretive authority reduces
simply to power of various kinds, whether that of a cult persona
or that of an authoritarian   group.

    There is another alternative, which itself finds support in
Fowl's account of exegesis. Why should interpretive "freedom" be
primarily understood in terms of an individual who then "grants,"
in the context of friendship, others the exercise of authority over
his or her interpretation?   Am I, as a Christian, in a position to
"grant" interpretive authority? Or rather am I not the one to

    [92] Ibid.
    [93] Ibid.
    [94] Ibid.

whom things are granted, in other words a person defined by receiving all from Christ my Lord and friend? Is this profound receptivity not, in fact, precisely also my Christian "freedom," the freedom for which Christ has set me free? Would it not be an usurpation, a falling away from the communion that is Christ's friendship, for me to "grant" someone else the authority that Christ grants sacramentaUy in his mystical Body's interpretation of his Word in the Holy Spirit?

Not surprisingly, given the insights that we have summarized above, Fowl understands and agrees with this point. He writes, "By claiming that it is no longer he that lives, but Christ who lives in him, Paul has not obliterated a previously autonomous self. Rather, he has re-situated his life in a different story, the story of Christ. Paul's account of his character testifies to the power of God's grace to reconstitute a self under the lordship of Christ."[95] Autonomy was never a possibility for Paul; the issue was solely in what way he was to serve God. Fowl could not be dearer in rejecting the "modem self" which he recognizes to be mis-leadingly characterized "by presumptions of autonomy, individu-alism, unencumbered rationality, essential stability, and an absence of historical and social contingency."[96] Yet if the Christian self is ultimately a "grantor" of authority, within friendships that the self chooses and evaluates, then I do not see how this is different from the "modern self" that Fowl rejects.

Indeed, in rejecting "autonomy" Fowl ca.Us into doubt the idea that the Christian can "grant" interpretive authority over the Word of God. In rejecting "unencumbered rationality" Fowl might, then, ask more rigorously whether Christian interpretation is not already constituted within a friendship-based community that Christians have not chosen but that is entirely the result of God's love, God's friendship in Christ. In rejecting "an absence of historical and social contingency," similarly, Fowl might explore more fully what it means to say that the Christian friendship-

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[95] Ibid., 159.
[96] Ibid., 158.

based community, and its interpretative practices, are inextricable
from the historical and social matrix.

D) Cruciform Freedom and Authoritative   Exegesis

Three   points follow from Fowl's own principles. First,
interpretive authority in the Christian community is not based on
our granting or on our love or on our friendships; rather it is
based on Christ's granting and Christ's love and Christ's
friendship, as befits Fowl's Christological principle. Second, in
accord with Fowl's principle of cruciformity, we are "free," and
exercise Christian "interpretive freedom, "[97] not *before* we grant
others interpretive authority, but rather when we, by God's grace,
receive and thereby grant Christ's interpretive authority over
ourselves. We are free when we receive the cruciform imprint of
obedient receptivity that reverses our enslavement in pride in
which we imagine ourselves to be the "grantors." Third, this
cruciformity, in the history of the Holy Spirit's work, means that
the Church cannot be an idea or a chosen set of friendships.
Rather, the Church is Christ's gift. This gift, as Fowl would not
deny, is sacramental. It comes through baptism and through the
Eucharist. These sacramental ministries are inseparable from the
historical ministry of orders, and from the historical Church as a
received reality that is constituted by Christ. Far from it being the
state or the community of believers (in an Enlightenment social
compact) who grants the Church interpretive authority, it is
Christ who establishes the Church in human history as a reality of
inseparably related word and sacrament. For the Church's
ordained ministers to exercise ultimate interpretive authority is
not to exercise authoritarian power. Their ministry of ultimate
interpretive authority, a historical reality to which Ignatius of
Antioch and indeed Paul himself already bear witness, derives not
from arbitrary power but from the wisdom of the living Christ. In
his wisdom Christ thereby ensures the cruciform and receptive
character of interpretation   in the Church. The Church's sacra-

[97] Ibid., 152.

mental (received, historical, contingent upon Christ and the Holy Spirit's ongoing gift) authority frees each Christian to exercise, in liberative and creative obedience, a lived-out interpretive authority that remains united with Christ's interpreting of the entire *humanum* in the Holy Spirit. *As* Reinhard Hutter has evocatively put it, we are "bound to be free."[98]

In view of my admiration for his overall project, I expect that Fowl would be sympathetic with much, if not all, of this. It is clear that his emphasis on "grant[ing] one another interpretive authority" [99] stems largely from his concern over "ways in which Christians (and clergy in particular) abuse those entrusted to their care," which leads him to combine his rejection of Enlightenment theories of human autonomy with sympathy for a posture of "suspicion of anyone who might seek to have us view their voice as converging with God's voice." [100] The issue is whether ecclesial mediation of Christ's word has proven trustworthy. While affirming that "God's providential care often operates through human agents," and thereby affirming mediation in general, Fowl also states that in discerning claims to authoritative interpretation Christians must exercise "great wisdom and even suspicion."[101] He has particularly in view areas such as slavery and the moral status of homosexual acts. *As* regards the former, he is well aware of justifications of racial slavery arising from the interpretation of the figure of Ham in Genesis 9:18-27. *As* regards the latter, he suggests that there is a need for "counter-conventional inter-pretations,"[102] to which he devotes a chapter arguing that "Spirit-inspired interpretation" indicates the need for reinterpreting, at least in a preliminary fashion, same-sex sexual contact in light of the experience of homosexual friendships in the Church. [103]

[98] Reinhard Hutter, *Bound to Be Free: Evangelical Catholic Engagements in Ecclesiology, Ethics, and Ecumenism* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2004).

[99] Fowl, *Engaging Scripture,* 157.

[100] Ibid., 156.

[101] Ibid., 157.

[162] Ibid., 154 and elsewhere.

[103] Ibid., chapter 4. I think Fowl is mistaken here. For arguments against such a re-interpretation, see, e.g., Richard B. Hays, *The Moral Vision of the New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco,

In light of such issues, Fowl suggests that the alternatives are
either "grant[ing] one another a measure of authority to interpret
in counter-conventional   ways on occasions," or "credulously
handing [ourselves] over to anyone claiming to speak with the
voice of God," or "reducing interpretive authority to a form of
coercion exercised by powerful individuals or groups," or eclectic
individualism. If so, then the alternatives are inevitably rooted in
power, and nominalism's account of the centrality of the arbitrary
will is correct, after all.

   Such a conclusion, which goes against Fowl's own concern for
communal interpretation,   suggests a twofold problem in Fowl's
account of how Christians participate in God's *doctrina.* First,
Fowl cannot identify any actual Christian communion   that
possesses, without believers granting it (more or less temporary)
authority, the ability to read Scripture authoritatively as a Church.
Second, Fowl so emphasizes the meaning-generating role of the
interpretive community that he risks disjoining "meaning" from
the biblical texts. On both counts, Fowl seems to me to require a
more full account of the mediation of God's *doctrina.* Regarding
the latter count, the biblical texts possess in themselves salvific

1996), 379-406; Robert A. J. Gagnon, *The Bible and Homosexual Practice: Texts and
Hermeneutics* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2001); Christopher R. Seitz, "Scripture and a
Three-Legged Stool: Is There a Coherent Account of the Authority of Scripture for Anglicans
after Lambeth 1998 ?" and "Dispirited: Scripture as Rule of Faith and Recent Misuse of the
Council of Jerusalem: Text, Spirit, and Word to Culture," in his *Figured Out: Typology and
Providence in Christian Scripture* (Louisville: Westtninster John Knox, 2001), 49-68 and 117-
29; idem, "Human Sexuality Viewed from the Bible's Understanding of the Human
Condition" and "Sexuality and Scripture's Plain Sense: The Christian Community and the Law
of God," in his *Word without End: The Old Testament as Abiding Theological Witness* (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998), 263-7 5 and 319-39; *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* nos.
2357-59 in the context of the *Catechism's* treattnent of the sixth commandment. Fowl
defends, against Christopher Seitz's "Sexuality and Scripture's Plain Sense," Jeffrey Siker's
"How to Decide? Homosexual Christians, the Bible, and Gentile Inclusion," *Theology Today*
51 (1994): 219-34, where Siker argues that the debate over homosexual acts is analogous to
the Council of Jerusalem's debate over Gentile inclusion. Fowl's key move is to question "how
compatible a static notion of the 'plain sense' of scripture, a plain sense located in the text
rather than the believing community, is with Christian theological approaches to the Old
Testament" (Fowl, *Engaging Scripture,* 126). This contrast between "in the text" and "in the
believing community" invokes a false dichotomy by separating the text from the meaning, just
as it would be equally crippling to separate the community from the meaning. Cf. Fowl's
"Texts Don't Have Ideologies," *Biblical Interpretation* 3 (1995): 15-34.

meaning because God gives them such meaning. As Fowl rightly affirms, they do not stand autonomously; on the contrary, they participate in or mediate God's *doctrina.* In so mediating, however, they actually possess (in participatory fashion) what they mediate. [104] Put another way, God's revelatory *doctrina* succeeds in expressing itself in and through the texts of Scripture, composed by the inspired authors in the Holy Spirit. These texts possess that meaning in themselves, but not on their own, since they always participate in and mediate God the Trinity's teaching.

As regards the former, Fowl rightly emphasizes the meaning-generating role of the community. The true meaning of the biblical texts cannot be fully discerned outside of the community (shaped by moral, liturgical, and intellectual "practices") that is nourished by the biblical texts, and interpreters from different religious communions will disagree to varying degrees. This is so, however, not because the texts are merely awaiting a meaning that the community gives (or imposes upon) them, but because the community itself participates in and mediates God's *sacra doctrina.* The meaning is found both in the biblical texts and in the community of biblical interpreters, because God's revelatory *doctrina* expresses itself in and through both. The opposition between ecclesial interpreters and scriptural texts is a false one, because both are shaped by God to participate in and mediate God's salvific *doctrina.* The key, however, is that the source of their authority is not granted by mere human beings. Rather, Christ the Teacher gives, in the Holy Spirit, his authority to the mediations (Church and Bible) by which he is efficaciously embodied and proclaimed in the world. Christ has won historically the victory over the principalities and powers; through his *doctrina,* he frees human beings from the principalities and powers. This community of freedom, which takes ecclesial and sacramental form through his commissioning of his apostles, is based not on power but on cruciform obedience, the heart of

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[104] On this point see John Webster, *Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). The nominalist occlusion of participation leads to dichotomies such as the one advanced by Fowl between "text" and "meaning," because it seems that, in order for the community's role to be secured, the text cannot have its role.

Christ's victorious *doctrina.* [105] Within the Church as formed eucharistically by this cruciform practice of obedience, the wisdom of God's Word, appropriated in the history of the Church, frees human beings for Christian freedom. In this context, the moral difference between the sexual union of male and female persons and sexual unions between persons of the same sex belongs to the divine wisdom inscribed teleologically in human persons and taught consistently in *sacra doctrina,* as practical wisdom for the good of human persons struggling to find and follow "the way, the truth, and the life" Gohn 14:6, cf. John 8:32).

E) The Mediation of Divine "Doctrina": Preliminary Evaluation

As I hope to have shown, Fowl's approach, somewhat more than Childs's, recognizes Scripture's place within the context of divine *doctrina* and thus fosters the recovery of a more adequate understanding of the "historical." Nevertheless, Fowl's account of ecclesial authority, like Childs's, runs into ecclesiological problems. Both Childs and Fowl have concerns about ecclesial mediation of divine *doctrina,* Childs largely because (lacking an account of participation) he fears that it limits God's freedom and Fowl because he thinks that (given the potential for abuse) it limits human freedom. [106] As I have suggested, both Childs and Fowl thereby manifest, in varying degrees and with different results, nominalist inheritances that have shaped contemporary biblical exegesis.

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[165] Cf. my *Christ's Fulfillment of Torah* and *Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), whose basic argument is summarized in Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering, *Knowing the Love of Christ* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002): chapter 6. On the Eucharist as a community-forming sharing in Christ's sacrificial Cross, see my *Sacrifice and Community: Jewish Offering and Christian Eucharist* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).

[106] Fowl's position is representative of a danger that, as John Webster points out, afflicts some "accounts of Scripture as the Church's book": "such accounts can sometimes take the form of a highly sophisticated herrneneutical reworking of a Ritschlian social moralism, in which the centre of gravity of a theology of Scripture has shifted away from God's activity toward the uses of the church" (Webster, *Holy Scripture.* 43).

Behind the question of ecclesial mediation of divine *doctrina,* of course, lies the related question of the ability of human concepts to mediate divine realities. Does Scripture, with its multiple human perspectives, mediate divine realities in a coherent fashion? Outside the framework of divine *doctrina,* realities such as the God-man, the Trinity, the Church as the body of Christ, creation, the Paschal mystery, life in Christ, the sacraments, eternal life, and so forth become in Scripture mere conceptual shells at best, whose content is elaborated in a Catholic fashion only as a second step on the part of the later community. Such realities are seen as eisegetical intrusions into texts that are innocent of such theological depth as regards teaching the divine realities of salvation. Childs faces this difficulty with his reconstruction of the "voices" of the Old and New Testaments, which are then dialectically engaged by Biblical Theology done from the perspective of faith. Fowl faces the same difficulty with his "underdetermined" sense of Scripture that makes problematic the claim that Scripture's words shape interpretation. Neither Childs's project nor Fowl's is crippled by these difficulties, because of their deep sense both for Scripture and for the tradition of faith-based exegesis that seeks in Scripture the realities of Christ's *doctrina.* Nevertheless, both projects are weakened.

By way of augmenting the accounts of theological exegesis that Childs and Fowl provide-and thereby attempting to develop further their laudable efforts to deepen contemporary Christian exegetical teaching-I will turn to Aquinas's exegesis of John 21, a chapter that takes us into the heart of Aquinas's theological exegesis of ecclesial authority in the mediation of *sacra doctrina.*

III. AQUINAS ON JOHN 21:
ECCLESIAL EXEGESIS AND ECCLESIAL AUTHORITY

A) *Aquinas in Light of Childs and Fowl*

Aquinas thinks that John 21 teaches about the Petrine ministry in the Church, and also about the role, in general, of bishops. How does this viewpoint shape-and how is this viewpoint

shaped by-his understanding of theological exegesis of Scripture? Recall the fundamental concerns of Childs and FowL For Childs, granting that "no modern biblical theologian can function without some ᵢ ₋₋ conceptual framework," Christians need to seek ways to encounter the gospel through the least possible refraction of "alien categories," whether from ancient philosophy, from Marxist liberationist standpoints, or from other similar distortive lenses.[107] *As* Childs presents it, the way through such difficulties is carefully (historical-critically) to sift Scripture itself before proceeding to the synthetic task of "Biblical Theology" and the applicative task of" dogmatic theology," thereby ensuring that one has as direct an engagement with Scripture's own perspective as possible. Childs's account of ecdesial authority (the Church) indicates this concern that ecdesial mediation not stand in the way of Christ, but rather simply bear witness to a reality (the gospel) that is outside itself but that guides its mission of prodamationo For Fowl, Christians need to build up in Christ-centered friendships the reading practices (such as forgiveness, repentance, hospitality, and so forth) that will make it possible for Christians "to be able grant one another a measure of authority to interpret in counter-conventional ways on occasions," and thus by implication granting interpretive authority in friendship not only in hard caseso[108] The alternatives that Fowl sees are sheer individualism, the credulity of cults, or "reducing interpretive authority to a form of coercion exercised by powerful individuals or groups. "[109] Fowl notes that when Christian communities are well formed, those in authority will exercise "Christian practical reasoning" in interpreting Scripture, but he is acutely aware that such conditions, requiring disciplined and well-formed communities choosing well-formed leaders, will not hold in all times and places (to say the least).

In short, both Childs and Fowl are wary of ecdesial mediation of divine *doctrina* given the likelihood that ill-formed Church leaders and theologians will read Scripture through distortive

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[107] Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments,* 42.

[108] Fowl, *Engaging Scripture,* 157.

[109] Ibid.

lenses that prevent the Christo logical and pneumatological power of the gospel from engaging the Church. In examining Aquinas's reading of John 21, therefore, I want first to explore his understanding of ecdesial authority, and in this light to comment upon his exegetical practice. [110]

B) Why Peter?

We might begin with John 21:7: "That disciple whom Jesus loved said to Peter, 'It is the Lord!' When Simon Peter heard that it was the Lord, he put on his clothes, for he was stripped for work, and sprang into the sea." Why did the beloved disciple, whom Aquinas identifies earlier as John, say this to Peter rather than to the other disciples who were also in the boat? In the context of the Gospels, as well as the context of John 21, Aquinas supposes that in part it was "because Peter was above the others in rank." [111] Similarly, when in verse 10 Jesus says to the gathered disciples, "Bring some of the fish that you have caught," it is Peter who undertakes the task: "So Simon Peter went aboard and hauled the net ashore, full of large fish, a hundred fifty-three of them; and although there were so many, the net was not torn" (21:11). Aquinas interprets this as another indication of Peter's task in the Church, "because the holy Church has been entrusted to him, and it was said to him in particular, 'Feed my lambs' (21: 15). "[112]

Likewise, reading verse 15 itself-"When they had finished breakfast, Jesus said to Simon Peter, 'Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?' He said to him, 'Yes, Lord; you know that I love you.' He said to him, 'Feed my lambs'"-Aquinas states that this command to feed the lambs of the Lamb of God suggests

[110] Cf. for a generally similar approach to Aquinas's exegesis and theology of the Church Walter H. Principe, C.S.B., "'Tradition' in Thomas Aquinas' Scriptural Commentaries," in Kenneth Hagen, ed., *The Quadrilog* (New York: Health Policy Advisory Center, 1994), 43-60.

[111] St. Thomas Aquinas, *In loan.,* c. 21, lect. 2 [2592], in Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of St. John,* trans. James A. Weisheipl, O.P. and Fabian R. Larcher, O.P., part 2 (Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1999), 631. Bracketed numbers refer to paragraphs in the Marietti edition.

m Ibid. [2603] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 635).

that "one should not be called a Christian who says he is not
under the care of that shepherd, that is, Peter."[113] Aquinas also
later notes, as a good possible reading, John Chrysostom's inter-
pretation of John 21:19b, "And after this he Uesus] said to him
[Peter], 'Follow me.'" For Chrysostom, "in saying 'Follow me,'
Christ means in your [Peter's] office as prelate, leader *[in
praelationisofficio].* He was saying in effect: As I have the care of
the Church, received from my Father-'Ask of me, and I will
make the nations your heritage' (Ps 2:8)-so will you be, in my
place, over the whole Church."[114] Aquinas agrees with Chrysos-
tom's reading, but notes a question that arises from the book of
Acts: why does James appear to govern the Church in Jerusalem?
He answers: "We can say that James had a special jurisdiction
over that place, but Peter had the universal authority over the
whole Church of believers."[115]

We have not reached the heart of Aquinas's teaching on Peter's
authority, but it will be helpful before proceeding to raise briefly
the question of eisegesis. It is clear that Aquinas's exegesis, as
Fowl proposes for contemporary exegesis, belongs within a
historically embodied community of exegetes, united by
friendship with Christ. Aquinas sees Chrysostom, for example, as
a preeminent "friend of Christ," a saint filled with the
enlightening power of the Holy Spirit, and therefore as an
authoritative reader of Scripture. Among the practices that shape
the Church to which Aquinas belongs is the practice of the Pettine
ministry, which forms the Church in the (perhaps painful)
practices of unity and obedience, and which thus assists in the
configuration of Christ's members to his cruciform obedience. It
would be impossible for Aquinas to interpret John 21 outside of
this context of the Church's reading. Is this eisegesis?

On Fowl's terms, I think that the answer would be no-
although some of Fowl's potential concerns have yet to be
addressed. Certainly, Aquinas is reading as a Christian in the
context of an ecclesial community of readers who, in charity, are

[113] *In loan.,* c. 21, lect. 3 [2623] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 643).
[114] *In loan.,* c. 21, lect. 5 [2636] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 649).
[115] Ibid. [2637] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 649).

formed by the cruciform practices of the Church that flow from and witness to the meaning of Scripture.

On Childs's terms, however, I think that the answer would be yes. In particular, Aquinas's claim that "James had a special jurisdiction over that place, but Peter had the universal authority over the whole Church of believers" sounds suspiciously like imposing the medieval Church's understanding of primacy and collegiality upon the text of the Gospel of John. It only helps a little that it is in fact Chrysostom (unattributed by Aquinas) who says, "And if any should say, 'How then did James receive the chair at Jerusalem?' I would make this reply, that He Uesus] appointed Peter teacher, not of the chair, but of the world. "[116] Aquinas follows Chrysostom while adjusting Chrysostom's language now to describe James's ministry as a "special jurisdiction" *(habuit quidem specialem loci illius)* and Peter's as "universal authority over the whole Church of believers" *(universale dominium totius Ecclesiae fidelium).*

C) *History and Spirit*

For Aquinas (and this is my view as well), scriptural exegesis must be ecclesial in a pneumatological sense-namely, in dependence upon the Holy Spirit to guide the historically embodied form taken by the special Petrine ministry taught in John 21, and in dependence upon the Holy Spirit to guide that historically embodied community's affirmation of the truth of the evangelist's testimony (the reception of the gospel as Scripture). Thus in exegetingJohn 21:24, "This is the disciple who is bearing witness to these things, and who have written these things; and we know that his testimony is true," Aquinas remarks that here the evangelist John "speaks in the person of the entire Church which received it. "[117] This pneumatological and ecclesial sense is the realm of *doctrina.* What God is teaching in Scripture cannot be

[116] St. John Chrysostom, *Homily* 88, no. 1, in *Chrysostom: Homilies on the Gospel ofJohn and the Epistle to the Hebrews,* the Oxford translation edited by Philip Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 14 (1889; reprint, Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1995), 332.

[117] *In Joan.,* c. 21, lect. 6 [2656] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 655).

separated from the historically embodied pneumatological practices that, as themselves God's pedagogical *doctrina,* teach us how to interpret what God is teaching in Scripture.

Historical-critical exegesis might suspect that Jesus never said anything of the sort. As Fowl reminds us, though, such suspicion misses the very point of Scripture as God's *doctrina.* To enter into the reading of Scripture as God's teaching means to be assured in faith that Jesus Christ, in his historical teaching, knew and loved the realities of salvation. Calling his disciples belongs to Jesus' teaching; dying on the Cross belongs to his teaching; the risen Jesus teaches the apostolic Church. In faith we see that this pattern of *doctrina* cannot be separated from the body of believers that the Teacher commissions and sends out in history. The Church herself, as a pneumatological participation in Christ's saving work, is God's pedagogical *doctrina,* in which the Trinity teaches and trains human beings in Christ's cruciformity. The realities of Trinity, Incarnation, and Church are not extrinsic, as the suspicions of historical criticism might suggest, to divine *doctrina.* Rather penetrating to the heart of Scripture means encountering these realities, and joining the community of "friends" of Christ Gohn 15: 15), those who have heard Christ's teaching and who embody divine *doctrina* in a set of practices that flow from Scripture and enable believers to interpret Scripture. In other words, Jesus' command to Peter in the Gospel of John to "Feed my lambs" belongs to the historical embodiment of divine *doctrina* and efforts (impossible ones) to determine whether Jesus taught it indicate a failure to grasp the scope of divine *doctrina.* Given the historical embodiment of the realities of salvation taught in Scripture, Aquinas's interpretation of John 21:17 as teaching the Petrine ministry, as practiced in the Church, is not eisegesis but rather engages the reality of salvation taught in Scripture from the exegetical perspective of the historically embodied pneumatological practices that enable us to interpret Scripture's teaching and to live it out in a cruciform mode. Imagine if there were no historical embodiment of the Petrine office. Would that make readers "exegetical" rather than

"eisegetical"? On the contrary. It would instead impose eise-getically the reader's lack of comprehension on the text, rather than enabling the reader, as the existence of the Petrine ministry does, to participate exegetically in the reality taught in Scripture. "Exegesis" in this sense is nothing less than a participation in God's salvific *doctrina,* a participation that the Church performs in history and that manifests and proclaims these saving realities to the world.

D) Triumphalism, Cruciformity, and Ecclesial Reading

Yet, is not this understanding of "exegesis" triumphalist, in the sense of presuming that the Church (of Aquinas) truly is the Church that God intends in his *doctrina* and thereby forgetting about the possibility of ongoing and systemic, or near-systemic, interpretive and pedagogical failure on the part of the leaders of this Church? Aquinas's exegesis is sensitive to this point. Interpreting John 21, he grounds the Petrine ministry, and all ecclesial authority, upon cruciform repentance. Thus he agrees with Augustine in according significance to Peter's martyrdom as expressive of the kind of "following" that Jesus commanded Peter to undertake Gohn 21:19): "Peter not only suffered death for Christ, but also followed Christ even in the kind of death, that is, death by the cross."[118] Aquinas, following Augustine, reads Peter as an exemplar of charity and therefore as the leader chosen by Jesus. John is preeminent in understanding, whereas Peter is preeminent in devotion and love.[119] Discussing John 21: 15, where Jesus asks Peter, "Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?," he argues in Aristotelian fashion, drawing also upon Gregory the Great, that Peter should have more charity than the other disciples (as "more than these" implies is necessary), since "the one who cares for and governs others should be better."[120]

us *In loan.,* c. 21, lect. 5 [2636] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 648-49).

[119] See *In loan.,* C. 21, lect. 2 [2592-93] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 631-32); c. 21, lect. 5 [2639-41] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 649-50).

[120] *In loan.,* c. 21, lect. 3 [2619] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 641).

The "better" person is the one who loves more and thereby can be
counted upon to be a faithful shepherd for others.

   Much care therefore needs to be taken, as Augustine in his
commentary on John 21:12-19 emphasizes, to avoid installing
bishops in the Church who are self-lovers rather than lovers of
Christ. Aquinas notes in this regard that Christ "imposes the
pastoral office on Peter only after an examination. Thus, those
who are to be raised to this office are first examined, 'Do not be
hasty in the laying on of hands' (1 Tim 5:22)."[121] The risen
Christ's questioning of Peter occurs after they had finished break-
fast, which prompts Aquinas to suggest a mystical interpretation:
"This signifies the spiritual meal by which the soul is refreshed
with spiritual gifts, even when it is united to the body: 'I will
come in to him and eat with him' (Rev 3:20)."[122] Only men who
have experienced fully this "meal" are fit for the bishop's task,
which consists in mediating the "meal" to others, as Aquinas
explains with references to the fulfillment of Jeremiah 31 and
Psalm 63:5. The bishop should be obedient, wise, and filled with
grace. Above all, the bishop must possess radiant charity. Citing
1 Timothy 3:1, Aquinas remarks that unavoidably, given the
brokenness of the times, "many who assume a pastoral office use
it as self-lovers."[123] But this outrage, no matter how frequent and
inevitable, cannot be accepted: "One who does not love the Lord
is not a fit prelate. A fit prelate is one who does not seek his own
advantage, but that of Christ's; and he does this through love:
'The love of Christ controls us' (2 Cor 5:14)."[124] When a bishop
lacks charity, he lacks the very thing that makes his ministry
purposeful, since the bishop's task is to give himself for the good
of his flock.

   If charity is so crucial for a bishop, is ecclesial mediation a
doomed enterprise from the start? How does Aquinas handle the
reality that ecclesial mediation means that sinners, even if
repentant sinners, will lead the Church in Christ's name and as

[121] Ibid. [2614] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 639).
[122] Ibid. [2615] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 639).
[123] Ibid. [2618] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 640).
[124] Ibid. (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 641).

participating his authority as priest, prophet, and king? Aquinas observes in this regard, "And so the final commitment of the Church is given to the humbled Peter." [125] After his fall, Peter has become a better person. Earlier he had thought himself better than the other disciples (Aquinas cites Peter's boasting in Matthew 26:33) and had freely contradicted Jesus (Matt 26:35). Aquinas notices that now, when asked by Jesus whether he (Peter) loves Jesus more than do the other disciples, Peter answers solely that "you know that I love you" (John 21: 15). Peter does not claim to love Jesus more than do the others. In contrast with his past behavior, he thereby "humbles himself in respect to the apostles . . . . This teaches us not to rank ourselves before others, but others before ourselves: 'In humility count others better than yourselves' (Phil 2:3)." [126] Furthermore, Aquinas notices that rather than say "I love you" Peter says to Jesus "you know that I love you." Similarly, in verse 17 Peter responds, after Christ's third query, "Lord, you know everything; you know that I love you"" Aquinas contrasts this with Peter's contradiction in Matthew 26 of Christ's prophesy that Peter would deny him three times. Now Peter recognizes that Christ knows, and relies upon Christ's knowledge. As Aquinas puts it, "'Peter, having been conquered by his own weakness, does not presume to state his love unless it is attested to and confirmed by the Lord . . . . He is saying: I do love you; at least I think I do. But you know all things, and perhaps you know of something else that will happen. "[127] Peter humbles himself before Christ by recognizing that all things depend upon Christ and that he, Peter, needs Christ most of all.

[125] Ibid. [2627] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 644).

[126] Ibid. [2621] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 642). Richard B. Hays describes post-Resurrection reading: "The risen Christ is present [in the gospel accounts] where and when he chooses. Paradoxically, our new understanding depends on an event that we cannot possibly understand. Therefore, we are radically dependent on a God who insists on being known on his terms, not ours: 'For my thoughts are not your thoughts, nor are your ways my ways' (Isa 55 :8). A hermeneutic of resurrection, then, will teach us epistemic humility" (Hays, "Reading Scripture in Light of the Resurrection," in *The Art of Reading Scripture,* 236; cf. Stanley Haueirwas, "The Insufficiency of Scripture: Why Discipleship Is Required," in his *Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing the Bible from Captivity to America* [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1993]: 47-62, at 53-54).

m In Ioan., c. 21, lect. 3 [2621 and 2627] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 642, 644).

Most importantly, then, Peter's office as bishop, and his
universal authority in the Church, is based first and fundamentally
upon being forgiven-and   not only that but upon being forgiven
the most heinous sin of directly denying Christ at the time of
Christ's most urgent need. Precisely in his condition of having
received everything by grace, he is able to serve the Church in his
office, because he experiences in himself his flock's needs, which
can only be met by receiving God's gifts. He can thereby devote
himself to mediating, by Christ's power, God's gifts to a needy
people. Aquinas identifies three ways in which Peter must feed his
flock, corresponding with Christ's thrice-repeated command to
"Feed my sheep." Christ empowers Peter to accomplish this
"feeding," whose three aspects correspond to humankind's three
needs. First, we human beings need wisdom; second, we need
moral exemplars who will inspire us to holy living (charity); third,
we have bodily needs. [128] In the first two ways, the bishop should,
by Christ's grace, be the model teacher. In the third way the
bishop must provide temporal help to those in need. Aquinas sees
this enactment of charity as being the fulfillment of Ezekiel 34:2,
"Woe, shepherds of Israel who have been feeding yourselves!
Should not the shepherds feed the sheep?" It also stands, no
doubt, as a warning to bishops of Aquinas's time. Yet the need for
true teaching by way of wisdom and love has precedence over the
meeting of bodily needs. Here Aquinas cites Jeremiah 3: 15, "And
I will give you shepherds after my own heart, who will feed you
with knowledge and understanding."

One might still ask: Given the knowledge that we have of the
history of the Pettine ministry as it has been exercised in the
Church, does Aquinas's biblical interpretation   not skew the
reality? I have been arguing that Aquinas, by his own ecclesial and
pneumatological participation in the reality of a Petrine office to
which he owed cruciform obedience, is able to penetrate into the
reality taught by God in Scripture. But what if, looking at the
history of the Church, one disagrees that (even as a general claim)
either the episcopal structure or the Petrine ministry has been a

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[128] Ibid. [2624] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 643).

history of wisdom, love, and service? Aquinas is confident, it is true, that the Church has not been led astray, and that the Church that now possesses the Petrine ministry is the same Church as then possessed the Petrine ministry. The nourishing *doctrina,* inclusive of word and sacraments, continues to be given by the Church so that believers might participate in the sanctifying and deifying wisdom of the Word. However, Aquinas is attuned to the reality that Jesus' encounter with Peter possesses some of the mystical aura of the Resurrection, which colors it with a sense of Christ's triumph. Even when, as has frequently happened, the personal charity and wisdom of Peter and his successors, and/or that of his brother bishops, fail, the Church by Christ's power and grace does not fail, and thus neither does Christ's work of the ecdesial mediation of his saving *doctrina* faiL

E) *The Mystical Sense: Confidence   Christ*

Why not? Aquinas offers a set of reflections on this question by way of mystical interpretation of the fishing and the meal in John 21: 1-14. In the mystical sense, Peter's decision to go fishing, in which he is joined by the other disciples, "signifies the work of preaching." [129] Yet, as verse 3 informs us, they caught nothing all night. Lacking "God's help and the interior Preacher," they could not succeed; following Augustine, Aquinas blames this situation on Peter's and the disciples' continuing state of fear, which is opposed to charity. [130] Jesus, however, does not allow their fear and lack of charity to win the day. Although their "ignorance" prevents them from recognizing Jesus' presence, he accomplishes their work for them. [131] He instructs them in verse 6 to cast on the right side of the boat, where they will find fish. Emphasizing God's causal power in salvation, Aquinas suggests that "the right side" indicates predestination, as in Proverbs 4:27 and elsewhere. The eschatological, triumphant aspect of the scene is noted by Aquinas through a comparison with the fishing scene of Luke 5.

[129] *In Joan.,* c. 21, lect. 1 [2577] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 627).

[130] Ibid. [2582] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 628).

[131] Ibid. [2586] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 629).

In both cases a great number of fish are caught. Yet in John 21 the "fishing differs from that mentioned by Luke because there (Lk 5:6) the nets broke; and in a like way the Church is rent by disagreements and heresies. But in the fishing mentioned by John the net does not break because there will be no lack of unity in the future life. Again, in the incident mentioned by Luke, the fish were taken into the boat. But here in John's incident, the fish are brought to the shore, because the saints destined for glory are hidden from us."[132] Aquinas knows that "disagreements and heresies" will rend the Church *(Ecclesia scissuras patitur per dissensiones et haereses),* but these effects of human sin, while deeply serious and heartbreakingly painful, will not keep Christ from accomplishing his eschatological work through the mediation of the Church on earth.

In a similar manner, Aquinas emphasizes the mystical interpretation in his discussion of Peter's response to Jesus' presence once, alerted by the beloved disciple, Peter and the others recognize Jesus. On this reading, Peter jumps into the sea, signifying the troubles of the world, because "[t]hose who desire to come to Christ cast themselves into the sea, and do not refuse the tribulations of this world." [133] The path of the Church is the path of suffering in imitation of Christ. The boat on which the disciples ride is, in accord with 1 Peter 3:20, the Church. This boat signifies that tribulation in the world cannot overcome the holiness and unity of the Church, which will bring its passengers safely and quickly to the heavenly land. The net for the fish (the faithful) caught by the disciples is sound *doctrina,* "by which God draws us by inspiring us from within: 'No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him.'" [134] This *doctrina,* taught us interiorly by the Holy Spirit, is preached by the apostles, and their preaching participates in drawing us to the Trinity. [135] The hot coals are the new commandment of love (John 13:34; see also Luke 12:49); the fish on the hot coals is the nourishing food

132 Ibid. [2590] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 630).

133 *In loan.,* c. 21, lect. 2 [2594] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 632).

134 Ibid. [2596] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 633).

135 Ibid.

of Christ crucified out of love for us; the bread is Eucharistic bread, both as wisdom and as his body and blood Oohn 6).

Returning to the literal sense, Aquinas interprets Jesus' command in verse 10 that the disciples add some of the fish they have caught to the fish already lying on the coals as indicative of our participation in the Eucharistic upbuilding of the Church: "It was like saying: I have given you the gift of charity, I have roasted my body upon the cross and given you the bread of my teaching, which perfects and strengthens the Church. Now it is your task to catch others."[136] The idea that this reading is the literal sense might seem odd to many modern exegetes, but Aquinas offers it as suggestive of the mission that the risen Lord is giving his disciples, as well as congruent with the intended symbolism of the elements of the meal. A further probing of the mystical meaning of the text follows, as befits the eschatological depth of this post-Resurrection scene. Aquinas first interprets the coals, fish, bread, and contribution of the disciples in terms of the moral or typological sense. He then suggests that Peter's entering the boat in verse 11 indicates Peter's ascent (inclusive of his interior transformation) to "the helm of the Church," and that Peter's hauling ashore of the net loaded with 153 "large fish" (verse 11) bespeaks mystically how the Church, governed by the Petrine ministry, brings the faithful to eternal life in accord with predestination. He gives various mystical readings of the number 153, drawing upon Augustine and applying it to life in Christ. He notes that the net remaining whole symbolizes the Church on earth, because of Jesus' promise that "I am with you always, to the close of the age" (Matt 28:20), but symbolizes more perfectly the perfected heavenly Church, "that peace which will be in the saints" where "there will be no schisms."[137] Aquinas is aware, as a Dominican (an order founded to combat spiritually a heretical movement in the Church) and as one called upon personally to help heal the breach between East and West, of the pain and sorrow that the Church, often wounded by her members' sins,

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[136] Ibid. [2601] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 634).
[137] Ibid. [2606] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 636).

encounters in this world. [138] But his confidence in Christ is even
greater.

IV. CONCLUSION

Interpreting John 21:25, "But there are also many other things
which Jesus did; were every one of them to be written, I suppose
that the world itself could not contain the books that would be
written," Aquinas explains that "to write about each and every
word and deed of Christ is to reveal the power of every word and
deed. Now the words and deeds of Christ are also those of God.
Thus, if one tried to write and tell of the nature of every one, he
could not do so; indeed, the entire world could not do this. This
is because an infinite number of human words cannot equal one
word of God. " [139] This passage encapsulates the underlying
presuppositions of the Aquinas's scriptural exegesis. In every word
and deed of Christ, realities of infinite depth, grounded in the
Trinitarian wisdom and love, are revealed. To penetrate Scripture,
whose fulfillment is Christ, one must tap into these divine
realities. Exegesis is this participation in the realities that God
teaches in Scripture. This does not mean that exegesis is detached
from interest in historical information; far from it, because God
teaches in and through human history. But on the other hand,
Scripture cannot be penetrated by those who rely solely upon
..linear" historical methodology. The realities must be ultimately
encountered in faith, as befits the kind of realities they are. The
literal sense itself, not to speak of the mystical interpretation that
may at times be appropriate to stimulating Christian reading, thus

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[133] Cf. Thomas J. McGovern's argument that recovering the patristic-medieval tradition
of exegesis will assist in strengthening relations with the Orthodox Churches: McGovern,
"The Interpretation of Scripture 'in the Spirit': The Edelby Intervention at Vatican II," *Irish
Theological Quarterly* 64 (1999): 245-59, especially *159.* For similar discussion see Georges
Florosky, *Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View* (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland,
1972); M. Ford, "Towards the Restoration of Allegory: Christology, Epistemology and
Narrative Structure," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 34 (1990): 161-95.

[139] *In loan.,* c. 21, lect. 6 [2660] (Weisheipl and Larcher, trans., 656).

bears a tremendous weight of mystery, because "even an infinite number of human words cannot equal one word of God."[140]

Childs and Fowl would agree, as far as I can tell, with much of Aquinas's approach. They differ with it largely as regards ecdesial mediation. In different ways, they suggest, I think, that Aquinas's patristic-medieval approach may not be "critical" enough-Childs because Aquinas employs authorities (theological and philo- sophical) that seem eisegetically to obscure at times the full sense of the gospel and that exaggerate the Church's participation in Christ, and Fowl because Aquinas may not attend sufficiently to alleged failings in interpretation (primarily on moral matters) of the institutional Church as led by the papacy.

In disagreeing with Childs and Fowl in this regard, I am not suggesting that Aquinas's exegesis cannot be deepened: such deepening is the purpose of contemporary appropriation of the tradition of exegesis in which Aquinas is a central participant. [141] Stimulated by Childs's and Fowl's valuable efforts to retrieve a Christian reading of Scripture, my argument here has been that Aquinas's exegetical practice displays, both as an interpretive model and (by a necessary correspondence) in its interpretation of ecdesial authority, what it means to participate in ecdesially mediated divine *doctrina*.

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[140] Cf. Olivier-Thomas Venard, O.P., *La langue de /'ineffable: Essai sur le fondement tbeologique de la metaphysique* (Geneva: Ad Solem, 2004).

[141] For work in this direction, see Matthew Levering, *Participatory Exegesis: A Theology of Biblical Interpretation,* unpublished manuscript.

BOOK REVIEWS

Theoriesde l'intentionnalite au moyen age. By DOMINIKPERLER. Paris: Librairie
Philosophique J. Vrin, 2003. Pp. 157. 15€(paper). ISBN 2-7116-1652-5.

Ever since it was revived by Franz Brentano in the nineteenth century,
intentionality, that is, the capacity of certain mental acts to be 'about' something
or refer to something beyond themselves, has been widely regarded as 'the mark
of the mental'-that by which we can speak of the inner life of the mind as
distinct from the more basic interaction of physical causes and effects outside the
mind. Brentano openly acknowledged the influence of Scholastic authors in
developing his theory, which he called "intentional or mental inexistence *[die
intentionale (wohl auch mentale) lnexistenz],"* as a result of which most
philosophers today are aware of its medieval origins. What is less clear is how
medieval thinkers themselves understood intentionality as part of their own
efforts to develop a philosophical model of human cognition.

This book explores medieval antecedents to Brentano via the contributions
of three late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century philosophers on the topics
of the immediacy, activity, and object of intentional acts (31-35). After an
introductory chapter explaining the significance of the problem in the later
Middle Ages, the author, Dominik Perler, devotes successive chapters to the
theories of Peter John Olivi, Dietrich of Freiburg, and John Duns Scotus.
Thomas Aquinas is mentioned, but only tangentially, as this debate did not come
into full flower until a decade or so after his death, by which time it had also
begun to recapitulate the growing intellectual opposition of Dominicans, who
adopted Thomas's Aristotelianism, and Franciscans, who sided more closely with
the Augustinian tradition.

The book is not exactly a scholarly study. It revises a series of lectures
delivered by Perler at the Sorbonne in March and April 2002, evidence of which
survives in its clear, easygoing prose and occasional repetition of key points. But
the effect is quite deliberate: "preserving the style and structure of the oral
presentation, I have avoided a detailed discussion of the secondary literature,"
the reader is informed (7). Footnotes as well are limited to references to the
primary texts and secondary literature of a general or introductory nature. There
is a short bibliography and a useful index.

The introductory chapter, "Le probleme de l'intentionnalite au XIIIe siecle:
Cadre historique et systematique," is an exemplary study of the difficulty of

determining the medieval antecedents of a modern problem: "if you want to analyze medieval theories," Perler states, "you must proceed like an archaeologist and properly distinguish between the different layers presented by the texts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, in order to see how they have been laid down" (19). A trite metaphor, perhaps, but apt in this case. Intentionality is among the numerous medieval philosophical artifacts that have been brought into modern debates as if dug up with a backhoe, with no sense of their connection to the materials that surround them and give them meaning. The fact is that medieval thinkers were not interested in intentionality because it would help them complete their phenomenological analysis of consciousness (cf. Husserl) or provide further ammunition against the dreaded proponents of AI (cf. Searle). Rather, they wanted to explain human cognition within the broadly Aristotelian and Neoplatonic constraints they inherited from the schools of late antiquity. When they discussed intentionality, it was usually in the context of their explanations of how an immaterial soul could be affected by material processes, how concepts are related to both linguistic expressions and the external world, and how the intellect actively contributes to the cognitive process. It is possible to finesse these discussions into what we now call philosophy of mind, but only with a great deal of dexterity and care as distortion is inevitable.

One key difference, Perler reminds us, is that, unlike Brentano, medieval philosophers regarded intentionality not as a purely internal or mental phenomenon (30), but a natural characteristic of mental acts (36)-an assumption that can look question-begging to modern readers used to distinguishing more sharply between the mental and the physical. By the same token, it would be a mistake to find in the materialist aspects of medieval theories of intentionality a kind of naturalism *avant la lettre* (38). Instead, material and immaterial components both tended to be integrated into medieval theories, an approach that led to its own questions and problems, which must of course be confronted on their own terms.

In the second chapter, the author discusses the views of Peter John Olivi (d. 1298), a Franciscan who emphasized the active nature of all cognition and immediacy of its object as against the passive, species-reception approach favored by Aristotelians such as Thomas Aquinas (45-46). Central to his account is the idea the intellect must have a "virtual presence" in its objects because it is a higher power capable of endowing things that are not intellects with representative function. Intentionality is for Olivi a primitive characteristic of mental acts, paradigmatically exhibited by the act of attention *(conversio)* through which the intellect fixes on or directs itself toward something. The problem with the species approach favored by the Aristotelians is that it has no way to account for this, in addition to being vulnerable to skeptical objections because species stand between the intellect and its ultimate object (60). But Olivi, Perler argues, is not able to offer a viable alternative because his own direct realism is couched in highly metaphorical language (62), with no case explained in enough detail to show how it might work in practice (74). This is surely

correct, but I would venture to suggest that a defender of Olivi might find it beside the point: if intentionality is primitive in the way he believes, then the intentionality of mental acts will simply be given, requiring no more explanation than, say, the materiality of physical substances (we don't need a *theory* of what makes some things material; they just come that way). Furthermore, Olivi's metaphors are often quite telling. In a key passage, Olivi writes: "For the act and cognitive aspect [of the intellect] is fixed on the object, and is intentionally absorbed *[imbibitum]* into it; that is why the cognitive act is called 'apprehension' and 'the apprehensive tension of an object *[apprehensiva tensio obiecti]'-[i.e.,]* in this tension and absorption the act is intimately conformed to and configured by the object" (61-62; Olivi, II *Sent.,* q. 72). The Stoic notes in Olivi's concept of intellectual cognition are unmistakable in this passage. Although Perler is fairer to Olivi than some recent commentators have been, it would have been nice if he had plumbed further into Olivi's unusual ways of thinking and speaking about the intellect. There is definitely more to be said here.

The third chapter takes up the equally fascinating account of Dietrich of Freiberg (d. ca. 1318), a Dominican who studied at Paris in the 1270s and eventually returned there to teach in the 1290s. Dietrich holds that the intellect itself "constitutes its objects in their essential structure," a view that led Kurt Flasch several decades ago to dub this "the Kantian turn of the Middle Ages" (78). Perler thinks that this overstates things, seeing that Dietrich remained a thoroughgoing Aristotelian in the number and kinds of categories he was willing to embrace, and never mentioned the kind of critical project Kant very deliberately took himself to be engaged in (92-94). Dietrich simply wanted to bring Aristotelian psychology more into line with the Neoplatonic tradition, emphasizing the intellect's creativity, perpetual activity, and ability to understand things in their essence (rather than through the senses)-all points on which he departed from the more orthodox Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas. He was led to these conclusions because he conceived of the human intellect Neoplatonically as the "effusion" of the divine intellect, so that it must possess the same capacities, albeit in diminished form (82-83), But this is not without its costs: whereas Aristotelians such as Thomas explained the intentionality of the intellect in relation to that of the senses, Dietrich detaches the intellect from other cognitive capacities in order to emphasize its autonomy, making it really distinct from other powers (103-5). Unfortunately, he does not also draw a sharp distinction between the intentionality of the senses and that of the intellect, which is what we would expect if the two are metaphysically distinct. Perler rightly faults Dietrich for not having these details worked out, but again, one suspects that Neoplatonists would not worry too much about the details where the senses and imagination are concerned, belonging as they do to an inferior mode of being. Top-down theories are rarely good on details. But Perler really hits the nail on the head as far as the deeper dilemma faced by such theories is concerned: "How can [the intellect] have dependence [on the senses] and autonomy at the same time?" (106).

Although the final chapter is nominally addressed to John Duns Scotus (d. 1308), more than half of it discusses the theories of his Franciscan successors Jacob of Ascoli and William of Alnwick, both of whom taught at Paris in the first decade of the fourteenth century. This is because in his surviving writings and especially in those directed against Henry of Ghent Scotus is more interested in the epistemological aspects of intelligible or intentional being than its ontological status. Despite the fact that he was the first to draw a dear metaphysical distinction between the material and immaterial orders, he does not give a precise explanation of the relation between intentional being *(esse intentionale)* in the intellect and the material, extramental thing that is its object (108-9). Ascoli and Alnwick were both interested in ontological matters in their theories of intellectual cognition, however, with AscoH introducing a distinction between intelligible species having real existence and intelligible things having merely intentional existence, and Alnwick taking a more parsimonious line by emphasizing the representative function of intelligible species as distinct from their mode of existence in the intellect (120-38). Perler does a nice job of showing how both authors are part of the Scotist:ic tradition, and of laying out the attractions and drawbacks of their theories for the reader.

This book is a fine introduction to the problem of intentionality in the later Middle Ages; those who consult it will learn much from its pages. Non-Francophone readers may be assured that the fluently multilingual Perler writes French as William of Ockham writes Latin: with prose that is dean, simple, and direct-not at all weighed down by Gallicisms and other continental literary flourishes that might get in the way of presenting the argument (a nice example here is his reduction of Olivi's argument against the intellect's passively receiving intelligible species into six dear steps [55-56]). Think Anthony Kenny translated into French.

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Teo-logia: La Parola di Dio nelle parole dell'uomo. By PIBRO CODA. 2d ed. Rome: Lateran University Press, 2004. Pp. 466. 26,00€ (doth). ISBN 88-465-0493-3.
Il Logos e il nulla: Trinita, religioni, mistica. By PIERO CODA. Rome: Citta Nuova, 2003. Pp. 552. 34,50€ (paper). ISBN 88-311-3346-2.

On visits to Rome, I have been increasingly impressed by the vitality of the Italian ecdesial and theological scene. Ecdesial movements, such as Sant'Egidio, Focolare, and Comunione e Liberazione, seem to be flourishing. Bookstores, on the Via della Conciliazione and elsewhere, burgeon with new theological works,

both by Italian authors and in translation. To the happy surprise of some of us who studied in Rome during the Second Vatican Council, the Pontifical Lateran University has emerged as a theological center, characterized not only by fidelity to the Church's magisterium, but by genuine creativity in exploring issues both traditional and new.

The Lateran has benefited from the leadership of two world-renowned theologians: the former Rector, Angelo Scola, now Cardinal Patriarch of Venice, and the present Rector, Bishop Rino Fisichella. In addition, there are a number of others who are elaborating an approach to theology that is open to the challenges of the new millennium, even as it is firmly rooted in the tradition and most especially in the uniqueness of Christ's paschal mystery. A leading and distinctive voice here is that of Fr. Piero Coda, two of whose works form the basis of this review.

Born in 1955, Piero Coda earned two doctorates, one in philosophy and the other in theology. His specialties include Trinitarian theology and the Christian theology of religions and he has written extensively in both areas. He has also published studies on Hegel and Bulgakov. Coda also serves as President of the Italian Theological Association and is a consultor for the Pontifical Council for lnterreligious Dialogue. Significantly, he has, for a number of years, been the personal theologian of Chiara Lubich, the founder of the Focolare movement.

Coda's *Teo-logia* is the revised and updated version of the introductory course offered to students beginning their theological education at the Lateran. In the second part of the book, devoted to a brief, but discerning, overview of the history of Christian theology, Coda says this of the great medieval theologian St. Bonaventure: "The point of departure and constant reference point of Bonaventure's theology is the charism of Francis of Assisi, who serves as a true 'theological icon.'" I think, *mutatis mutandis,* the same may be said of Coda's theology in regard to the charism of Chiara Lubich.

Lubich's own spiritual journey began in the anguish of the Second World War, when as a young student she took refuge in a bomb shelter. There, meditating on the Gospels, she received illuminations that grew into a twofold realization. First, the culmination of God's revelation is the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. "Gesu abbandonato" paradoxically discloses the very depths of God's love. His cry of dereliction from the cross (Mark 15:34) recapitulates and redeems all innocent human suffering. He is, exclaims, Lubich, "the God for our time" (I/ *Logos,* 49: "il Dio del nostro tempo"). Second, the resurrection, in the power of God's Spirit of love, of the Christ who died forsaken initiates the new creation. The distinguishing mark of the new creation is the reality of Pentecostal unity: many divided individuals becoming one in Jesus Christ. This profound sense of Christ's passion for unity, the "that all may be one" of John's Gospel, animates Lubich's spiritual teaching. Her "charism of unity" serves as the continuing inspiration of the Focolare movement.

I think it true to say that Lubich's spiritual vision and mission constitute "the point of departure and constant reference point" of Coda's theology. His own philosophical background and interests enable him to bring Lubich's rich intuitions into conversation with the Western philosophical tradition, especially

the provocative reflections of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. In addition, through his concrete experience in interreligious dialogue sponsored by the Focolare Movement, as well as through his professional commitment to the academic study of religions, Coda is fashioning a distinctive Christian theology of religions whose hermeneutical key is the paschal mystery of Christ. In the tradition of Bonaventure, Coda presses his reflection beyond the elucidation of "meaning" to the further question of "truth": beyond phenomenology to ontology.

II Logos e ii nu/la represents Coda's most sustained presentation to date of his theological position. Several chapters of the book originate in earlier essays, but they have been revised and extensively supplemented to form a coherent and systematic whole. The work is divided into three major parts. In part 1 Coda examines the new context of Christian theology today: the respectful encounter with the great world religions. While firmly committed to the universality of God's offer of grace, Coda seems less persuaded of the need to correlate grace and revelation in Rahnerian fashion. He may cautiously speak of "revelation" in nonbiblical religions, but there is always an analogous quality to such ascription.

Part 2 then explores the concrete universality of the crucified and risen Christ who is the unique Word of God made flesh. In a manner reminiscent of Balthasar, Coda underscores the *"major dissimilitudo"* of the paschal Savior. He is the Measure, the Logos in person, who assumes, judges, purifies, and recapitulates every authentic religious experience. Clearly, Coda is not offering a neutral examination of religions, nor even a "comparative theology," if this be construed solely as an examination and elucidation of texts and symbols. In effect Coda agrees with Lonergan on the imperative of the move to judgment: insight alone *is* insufficient.

The appeal to judgment is an appeal to the truth of reality itself. Crucial to Coda's theology is that the paschal mystery, the Christ abandoned and raised by the Father to new life in the Spirit, is the unique way to the acknowledgment that all created reality finds its true home in the mystery of Trinitarian love. Hence Coda sketches a Trinitarian ontology, the mystery of gift and reciprocity in whom we live and move and have our being. The impressive Christocentric nature of Coda's theology raises no barrier to interreligious dialogue. Instead it provides the very condition of its authentic possibility. Where the Center holds firm and luminous, the boundaries may be generous and surprise with illuminating discoveries.

This becomes further evident in part 3 of *Il Logos e ii nulla:* "Il Logos che s'annulla e le vie della mistica" ("The Logos Which 'Nullifies' Himself and the Mystical Ways"). Here Coda enters into a close reading of apophatic mystical traditions, both Eastern and Western. He sees them as bearing precious witness to the sheer Otherness of the Divine and the urgent need for expropriation of the empirical and ever-imperial ego if union is to be realized.

The gospel meets this profound mystical sensitivity with the proclamation of the creative and redemptive Word. *Logos* and *nulla* coincide in Jesus' kenosis: his abandonment on the cross. This seeming defeat is, to the eyes of faith, God's supreme victory. In the trenchant words of Chiara Lubich, which Coda makes

his own, the total pouring out of Jesus' life in death reveals the mystery of his own being: "il Nulla Tutto dell'Amore"-that nothingness which is total love.

As this last quotation indicates, the nothingness in question is not empty void, but fulness of new life. The loss of self it entails is not impersonal fusion, but achievement of personhood in communion. It thus opens upon the unending gift of Trinitarian life: "not the darkness of the ineffable, but the Glory of the inexhaustible."

An important consequence of Coda's sensitivity to the need to move toward a Trinitarian ontology is that the soteriology that permeates his work also exhibits ontological substance. In the face of so much impoverished exemplarism in contemporary soteriology, Coda offers a robust theology of salvation. The paschal mystery of Jesus Christ does not merely indicate a way to follow. Christ by his death and resurrection forges the Way. He himself becomes the Way into the new creation. Christians are called not so much to imitate the historical Jesus as to participate in the new life of their crucified and risen Lord, becoming, in the tradition's pregnant sense, *"filii in Filio":* sons and daughters in God's only Son.

As they journey on the Way, confronting the challenges of their unique historical times and cultures, disciples are accompanied and sustained by the Eucharistic Presence of their Lord who is the living bread, the *viaticum* for their *itinerarium in Deum.* Receiving the Lord's body, they *become* his body with all the realism that Paul and Augustine ascribe to Christ's ecdesial body. The "we are" of the new creation, whose sacrament is the Church, is the created image of the "We are" of Trinitarian life, destined to be consummated at the end of time when the Triune God will indeed be "all in all."

A final point worth highlighting in this remarkable theological endeavor, so redolent of Vatican II's dual call to *ressourcement* and *aggiornamento,* is that the focus upon ontological participation is further exemplified in a theological approach characterized by noetic participation. In a way that weds Bonaventure and Aquinas, Coda holds that the "object" of theology is "God in Christ." In the final part of his *Teo-logia,* he writes that "Christology is not simply one theological tract among others, but provides the essential structure of the whole of theology." Further, this knowledge of God in Christ only becomes possible through a sharing in the very faith/vision of the living Jesus, in his original and originating relationship with the Father in the Spirit.

Piero Coda is elaborating a promising approach to theology in which the invidious dichotomies of faith and reason, spirituality and systematic reflection, contemplation and action, proclamation and dialogue are sublated into a more integral and comprehensive understanding of the faith. His work richly deserves wider attention.

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Who Is My Neighbor? Persona/ism and the Foundations of Human Rights. By
   THOMAS D. WILLIAMS. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
   America Press, 2005. Pp. xvi+ 342. $69.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-8132-1391-6.

   Thomas Williams has produced a very well-written and informative book,
successfully bringing ethical personalism to bear upon the issue of the legitimacy
of rights language. He argues against three formidable theorists-Alasdair
Macintyre, Joan Lockwood O'Donovan, and Ernest Fortin-that rights language
is not only legitimate within traditional philosophical and theological ethics but
that it brings to ethical discourse positive emphases not otherwise available. He
then seeks to show how what he calls "Thomistic personalism"-Thomism
"enriched" by means of "a more nuanced and robust vision of the constitutive
elements of personhood: subjectivity, creativity, self-determination, freedom,
and interpersonal activity" (128)-provides the best candidate for grounding
rights. Although Williams's version of personalism is much indebted to John Paul
II, whom he cites often, he also displays a familiarity with a wide selection of
secondary literature, including works in Italian, French, Spanish, and German.
   Against Maclntyre's position in *After Virtue* that belief in rights is "one with
belief in witches and in unicorns," Williams puts forward a simple yet powerful
argument, which in fact constitutes the core idea of the book: that if rights do
not exist one cannot speak of things due in justice. "Suppose for a moment," he
says, "that Macintyre is correct in saying that natural rights do not exist. This is
equivalent to saying that no person can naturally claim to deserve anything from
anyone else" (61). This is what having a right means: deserving something from
someone else or from some group. Perhaps someone will answer that we can
analyze a proposition like 'Joshua has the right to life' in the typical analytic
fashion: 'there is an *x* such that x is a right to life and Joshua has *x'*. Since the
first conjunct is false (there is no such thing as a right), the whole proposition
can be false without implying anything about whether or not it is just to deprive
Joshua of his life. But such an arguer would still have to deal with the common
perception that this is all that Joshua's having a right to life means: that it is
unjust to deprive him of his life. Saying that rights exist is no more problematic
than saying that duties exist--or, for that matter, that there are laws.
   Although Williams's position in this respect is more than tenable, he fails
adequately to address a central aspect of the anti-rights-language argument: the
distinction between talk of rights *(iura)* and talk of right *(ius).* When Macintyre,
for instance, argues that the term 'rights' did not exist before the late Middle
Ages (57), he clearly means particular rights (whose existence he denies) as
opposed to right (whose importance he affirms). In response (63-64), Williams
makes some perfectly valid points about how vocabulary evolves, but he also
castigates Macintyre for denying the existence of rights while praising "the
classical virtue of *phronifsis,* which [in Maclntyre's words] 'characterizes someone
who knows what is due to him, who takes pride in claiming his due'" (63)-as
if speaking of that which is due were already to speak of rights. But this is to

beg--or, at least, to ignore-Madntyre's question: whether *rights* exist, as opposed to right.

It is a shame that Williams has either overlooked or chosen to ignore this issue, for an historical counterargument is and was available to him. Buried in a footnote on Williams's own page 273, for example, is a list of places in Thomas Aquinas (who wrote, of course, weH before the late Middle Ages) where he refers to individual rights. One might also cite Cicero's remark at *De re publica* 1.32: "Si enim pecunias aequari non placet, si ingenia omnium paria esse non possunt, iura certe paria debent esse eorum inter se qui sunt cives in eadem re publica." Or the counterargument could be more analytical and logical, saying that, if right or justice demands a particular type of behavior with respect to any person, such a demand can be referred to in the singular without rendering the system itself incoherent; calling such a thing 'a right' is a perfectly reasonable option for the historian. Williams comes dose to such an argument-"The choice of vocabulary," he says, "does not alter the underlying meaning expressed" (63)-but he does not advert here to the proper target: namely, the supposedly irreducible distinction between rights and right. He does say that it is "misleading to speak of the two terms ['right' and 'rights'] as if they were mutually exclusive, when in fact they are mutually indicative" (73), but this is mere assertion: Williams does not give us an *argument* for their inter-translatability.

The parts of the book on personalism contain a number of problems most of which have to do with personalisrn itself rather than with Williams's exposition, which is always dear and lively. He gives, for instance, the now-familiar personalist argument for the uniqueness of persons. Persons, he says, "cannot, properly speaking, be counted, because a single person is not merely one in a series within which each member is identical to the rest, for all practical purposes, and thus exchangeable for any other. One can count apples, because one apple is as good as another (i.e., what matters is not that it is *this* apple, but simply that it is an apple), but one cannot count *persons* in this way"" (129, emphasis in the original). But this is so much hyperbole, One can count *this* apple and *this* apple and *this* apple: they come to three apples; and one can do the same sort of thing with respect to this person, and this person, and that. It is true that apples are not subjects and persons are; but that is a point of a different order: it has nothing to do with counting, It is surprising, by the way, that Williams never mentions in this section John Crosby; nor does he appear in the bibliography, even though the argument is very much associated with him. (For a criticism of Crosby and the counting argument, see Stephen L Brock, "Is Uniqueness atthe Root of Personal Dignity? John Crosby and Thomas Aquinas," *The Thomist* 69 [2005], 173-201.)

Personalism's emphasis on the uniqueness of persons was doubtless the philosophical cause of John Paul U's development (but not overturning) of traditional Church teaching on capital punishment, just as a more sober Thomism-which was also present in his intellectual makeup-was responsible for this teaching's moderate formulation in the *Catechism of the Catholic*

Church. If the governing precept of one's ethical system says that the person is "of inestimable worth" (118), it becomes very difficult consistently to allow for the deliberate taking of a person's life, even if that person has committed heinous crimes and/or is a threat to society. That is the way such precepts work. If 'Thou shalt not commit adultery' is among one's primary precepts, committing adultery is excluded; and the proposition 'the person is of inestimable worth' comes very close to saying 'Thou shalt not kill any human person'. That the *Catechism,* although restricting the right considerably, allows that public authority can punish malefactors "by means of penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not excluding, in cases of extreme gravity, the death penalty" (§2266) is indication that its governing precept is not the personalistic one.

in this book but elsewhere ("Capital Punishment and the Just Society," *Catholic Dossier* 4, no. 5 [1998]: 28-36)-defends the *Catechism's* teaching in all its intricacy; but here, as is perhaps appropriate for an exposition of personalism, he comes very close to denying the legitimacy of any deliberate killing of a human being. On page 254, he writes: "It would ... seem logical to say that if killing another human being is evil, then such an action constitutes an improper or incorrect way to treat another person"; and then on the following page: "In the case of the fifth commandment, for example, it is good that the other *is,* that the other *lives,* and thus to kill the other would be wrong" (emphasis in original). Although at one point he does slip in the word 'innocent'-"the deliberate destruction of innocent life is recognizably evil" (254)-we find no allusion here to what Williams certainly knows: that is, that the fifth commandment is more properly rendered as 'Thou shalt not murder' than as 'Thou shalt not kill' (human persons). But, more generally, what is required here-and what personalism does not provide-is perspective: a realization that, although, especially in our day, respect for persons is a very important part, it is not the *whole* of ethics. One finds the same sort of imbalance in Williams's census of the universe. Although in an early description of the person, he is careful to mention angels (108), the rest of the book is peppered with remarks like "The rationality of personhood actually opens up a gulf between man and all other creatures" (126), or "in the case of the human person, a thoroughly unique dimension presents itself, a dimension not found in the rest of created reality" (133).

A book, however, should be judged with respect to what it pretends to be; and this one does not pretend to be a thoroughgoing defense of personalism but rather an application of a version of that theory to the issue of the legitimacy of rights language. In this sense, then, it succeeds-and succeeds very well, due primarily to Williams's hard work and powers of exposition.

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Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein. Edited by
JEFFREY STOTJI"and ROBERT MACSWAIN. London: SCM Press, 2004. Pp.
279. $35.00 (paper). ISBN 0-334-02923-6.

There are good reasons to leave the purchase of *Festschriften* to institutional
libraries, while saving one's own manna for works offering greater promise of
lasting significance. Because the individual essays often lack any unity, save that
which coalesces, with mixed consistency, around the scholar honored, they vary
in quality, and, unless the oeuvre of the scholar in question is truly significant,
they often speak more to the variegated interests of the acolytes than to the
vision of the high priest. Those are the standard reasons for avoiding a
Festschrift. One should add that Victor Preller, the *sacerdos* in question of this
book, is known for a single, though influential, monograph, *Divine Science and
the Science of God: A Reformulation of Thomas Aquinas* (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1967), a work that betrays the cleric's cleft fidelity to rival
faiths, Thomism and ordinary language philosophy.

Good reasons to be wary, but in this case one should ignore them and plunge
into the waters flowing from that cleft. These essays are not jejune juxtapositions
of Aquinas and Wittgenstein, producing little of insight and being of interest
only to those whose adherence will suffer any immersion into the arcane. If
Aquinas and Wittgenstein share nothing else, it is now clear that both opened
wide avenues of discourse, which is why subsequent generations will continue
to speak of both men, and in idioms created by the insights of both. This volume
shows how fecund those insights are, and the authors take to their task so aptly
that one never feels that they suffer from a compulsion to draw one thinker into
the orbit of the other. Sometimes the focus is the philosophy of language, at
other times a seminal question in Thomism, and still other times a pressing,
contemporary concern, unrelated to either, at least initially. What unites this
collection is the deep grounding of the authors in both thinkers, allowing them
to speak in an idiom that is coherent and compelling, simply because it is the
language of the world in which we now dwell, a world that cannot be accessed
without the vocabulary of both Aquinas and Wittgenstein.

Jeffrey Stout's introduction surveys the volume's contents, and admirably
meets the rather daunting task of enticing the reader, who might be familiar with
the work of only Aquinas or Wittgenstein and perhaps entirely in the dark
regarding Preller's contribution to the study of theology.

Joseph Incandela's "Similarities and Synergy" opens the essays with the only
sustained comparison of Aquinas and Wittgenstein. Admitting the philosophical
disparity, Incandela probes, "but what, despite the evident divergences in style
and substance between these two thinkers, allows both men sympathetic
treatment by the same authors? Or to put the matter more bluntly--if they seem
so different, why do they tend to get invited to the same parties?" (22). The
answer is that they stand at either end of the Enlightenment, whose canons of
rationality were challenged by the publication of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical
Investigations.* Because Aquinas and Wittgenstein are both profoundly humane

thinkers, for whom questions of existential depth must be raised, both see a truly normative role for tradition, for shared culture and values. Incandela examines four areas of contemporary convergence in his evaluations of both: "the authority of the teacher, the transformation of the student, the type of rational justification offered by and through this enquiry, and the outcome of the process" (26).

Some might take offense at the title of Bruce D. Marshall's essay, "In Search of an Analytic Aquinas: Grammar and the Trinity."' Aquinas, an analytic philosopher! Yet the depth of any thinker is sounded by the ability to speak to subsequent generations. Before resenting the adjective "analytic" being applied to St. Thomas, one should take the time to read Romanus Cessario's apdy named *A Short History of Thomism* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005) and realize at least two things: every generation reads Aquinas through its own filters, and the failure to realize this makes one a fundamentalist, not a "faithful" Thomist. In this useful case study, Marshall suggests that St. Thomas employed "semantic ascent" when confronted with a Trinitarian quandary: why did the tradition accept as correct the assertion that *Deus generat* but reject *essentia divina generat?* Aquinas responded with a distinction he frequently favored, between the *res significata* and the *modo significandi.* Here different grammars, modes of signifying, are in play. Obviously God and the divine essence a.re identical, but *Deus* is a concrete noun, signifying God as personal while *essentia divina* signifies the abstracted form of the possessor. Marshall writes, "Similarly, 'Deus' and 'essentia' refer to the same thing, but the different ways they refer, their different *modi signifu:aridi,* make it impossible to substitute them for one another without changing the truth values of the relevant sentence" (67-68). Just as a person, not human nature, begets, so God, and not the divine essence, generates.

Stanley Hauerwas reveals the "family resemblance," to employ a favorite trope of Wittgenstein, between his own sustained project and that of Aquinas, Preller, Wittgenstein, and G. M. Hopkins in "Connections Created and Contingent." He argues that what each thinker means by the word "God" cannot possibly be proven by natural theology. Rather God is that place where the intelligibility of our conceptual systems exhaust themselves and must await the graced address of revelation. "[T]here can be no coercive argument to compel acknowledgment that God is God"' (78). Is discourse on the divine then futile? Wittgenstein insisted that aU reasoning comes to an end, that it must eventually rest in its own bedrock. Hauerwas suggests that the bedrock itself might adumbrate God's existence. "[A]s Preller suggests, just as Hopkins thinks the world is saying something to our longing for the permanence of beauty, so also Aquinas believes the contingency of the world says something to our desire for the good. 'Our desire' is constitutive of the way things are" (89).

Those feeling that the question of our natural knowledge of God has been dispatched too quickly, at least in this summation of Hauerwas, will be gratified by the contribution of Fergus Kerr, "'Real Knowledge' or 'Enlightened Ignorance': Eric Mascall on the Apophatic Thomisms of Victor Preller and Victor

White." This historical essay, on the twentieth-century debate within Thomism, especially in its response to Barth, on how apophatic Thomas should be read is all the more welcome, coming close upon the publication of Gregory P. Rocca's study of Aquinas on analogical knowledge of God, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God* {Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004). A closing sentence of Kerr aptly summarizes a detailed discussion: "Victor Preller, as well as Victor White, not to mention Pere Sertillanges, insist so strongly on the famous statements by Thomas Aquinas according to which we know what God is *not,* but not what God *is (ST* I, 1.6 ad 3), that they play down his equally plain statements that we can know something about God by reflecting on the world which is God's doing" (120).

In "Religious Life and Understanding: Grammar Exercised as Practice," David B. Burrell traces a thematic line of descent from Preller's work, which presented Thomas as foremost a theologian, to that of Pierre Hadot and Catherine Pickstock. He considers the role of practices, a key Wittgenstein motif, to be an implicit legacy of that earlier work. "Indeed, when we focus on that role of language proper to expressing how things are, it becomes clear how proper discourse already embodies a form of life with taxing demands" (126), Practice, particularly that of worship, grounds the language of the theologian or philosopher in a fundamental relationship between creature and creator, one eclipsed in Enlightenment approaches to knowledge. "So the only way to reclaim one's own reality and that of the universe is to receive it rather than claim it; indeed, to recover oneself by recognizing the creator as the gracious source of one's being, and the One to whom that being longs to return in order fully to be" (129-30).

"'Aquinas is suspicious of mystical experience because it seems to displace grace with glory, and Wittgenstein is suspicious of mystical experience because it seems to displace communal with incommunicable experience. Their concerns largely overlap. I begin with a concrete case" {136). Eugene F. Rogers, Jr. then relates a personal memory of Victor Preller, who spoke to him before his death of being "lifted up on the prayers of his congregation into the prayer of the Spirit that prays for those who on account of weakness do not know how to pray as they ought" (Rom 8:26) (137). Rogers argues that for Aquinas the work of the Spirit should be manifested primarily in the community rather than in mystical experience, which is not so much subject to doubt as simply incapable of producing concepts translatable into communal praxis. He then shows how Aquinas's treatment of grace, which initially seems to limit the rich pneumatological indwelling of Paul, is nonetheless crucial if humanity is not to be collapsed into the divine. "Here, grace serves to mark a distinction between God as primary agent and the soul as secondary agent: 'an agent does not determine an object by means of his own substance'{STl-11.110.1). God does not *replace* our substance with God's own; God does not eliminate or violate human nature: to put the danger in graphic terms, Thomas is worried about a scheme in which God would rub out human beings, or turn a gift into a rape" (143).

The essays turn to ethics with John R. Bowlin's "Nature's Grace: Aquinas and Wittgenstein on Natural Law and Moral Knowledge." Bowlin argues that Aquinas's thought isn't designed to quell the concerns of moral skeptics about any particular moral obligation, but that it rather presupposes that human beings will use the grace that is reason to respond to the God-given demands of their nature. He juxtaposes this with a very helpful clarification of the role of *Lebensformen* in Wittgenstein's thought. Life forms are not simply "equivalent to a culture or a conceptual scheme" (164); they also explain a shared human form of action and concern that transcends the particular. The concurrence he finds in the thought of both thinkers: "the shared linguistic competence that comes packaged with our common humanity depends on our acceptance of a lection of moral and ontological commitments, a collection of judgements about the goodness of certain ends and about the truth of certain propositions" (ibid.).

In "Wittgenstein and the Recovery of Virtue," G. Scott Davis similarly proposes a Wittgenstein-based *via media* between those conservatives who see values as one more object within the world, easily ascertained by anyone who will look, and liberal theorists who find themselves unable to deal with conflict between values because they are presumed to be self-justifying *within* disparate communities. Davis argues that values are learned, like language, as a way of getting-on in the world. This does not make them capricious, but suggests that "to choose something is to recognize in it a good to be pursued now. This means that standards of goodness are built into the learning processes" (187). Concluding, he argues that if "good"' is that which all practice strives for, then the good is prior to the right.

Victor Preller's late-twentieth-century reading of Aquinas had a Kantian slant. "Intelligible experience comes from the mind and its modes of constructing and interpreting reality," is how Douglas Langston characterizes Preller's approach in "The Stoical Aquinas: Stoic Influences on Aquinas's Understanding of Charity" (197). That raises the question of how we can know and love a God who transcends the mind. Langston's solution is "to show that there is a strong Stoic influence (which he traces through Cicero and Augustine) on Aquinas's analysis of the theological virtue of charity, and that this link supports Preller's claim that an intentional relationship to an unknown God is key to understanding Aquinas's thought" (199). Langston understands Preller to assert that we cannot direct our intentions toward a God who remains essentially unknown without an infusion of grace which manifests itself in the virtues. "With infused charity, we do not form full intentions of the ultimate object, God. We can only form a general, vague intention towards the ultimate object and act in accordance with what we think are the manifestations of the love that the unknown being gives us" (210).

Did the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus,* who clearly imbued that work with an ethical intentionality, abandon any possibility of ethical theory with the *Investigations?* M. Jamie Ferreira poses that question in "Vision and Love: A Wittgensteinian Ethic in *Culture and Value."* In a profoundly humanist reading of the thinker, he argues that the philosophical task of the later Wittgenstein was

philosophical clarity, but that perspicuity involves nothing less than self-transformation. "Wittgenstein wants to cause the kind of change that happens when one sees that one was under an illusion and no longer needs to hold on to a particular idea or perspective .... Seeing what is there may require a change in us; it may also initiate a change in us" (227-28).

Correctly rejecting readings of Wittgenstein that would limit theological discourse to the self-referential expression of linguistic communities, Jennifer A. Herdt asks in "Justification's End: Aquinas and Wittgenstein on Creation and Wonder" if one must not find in his thought an ordering similar to that of Aquinas, who understood God to be the highest end. She suggests that justification of language games come to an end for Wittgenstein with the experience of wonder. "'[J]ustification ought to come to an end not simply with the contingency of forms of life, but in wonder at the mystery of the world's existence, including the existence of our form of life.,, (249).

Victor Preller's "Water into Wine" identifies wonder as the transforming miracle that separates Aristotelian philosophy from Aquinas's Christian theology. For the Greek, the finite and the rational were synonymous, but in questioning the radical contingency of existence Aquinas challenges the very identification of intelligibility with finitude. Prell er writes, "It is unthinkable that the *existence* of the universe of finite entities in which I find so much meaning and intelligibility should itself be absurd-an unintelligible fact! Therefore, I surrender. I give up my claim that the *human* intellect is the final judge or percipient of intelligibility, of all that is intelligible" (260).

Mark Larrimore doses the volume with "'Memoir: Living *in media res."* "Prell er had a phrase for the moment when a student 'got' what it was one of his courses was about: 'the penny dropped'" {272} Larrimore insists that learning new material serves little if it is not accompanied by new insights, and the latter often come as one is exposed to new languages, new ways of looking at the world.

This unique volume gives voice to a new generation of interpretation for both Aquinas and Wittgenstein. In drawing deeply from both thinkers, these writers offer us a more Catholic Wittgenstein, by which I mean a more deeply humane thinker who ponders an humanity apt for grace. They also give us an Aquinas who still speaks trenchantly to our concerns. *AB* Larrimore remembers a class of PreHer's, "All at once the Thomistic locutions seemed not cumbersome if gothically elegant redescriptions of things already known but, rather, illuminations of things heretofore unremarked" (273). This unique volume explores Victor Preller's fruitful interests in two historic voices that still call for a response from us.

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Art and Intellect in the Philosophy of Etienne Gilson. By FRANCESCA ARAN
    MURPHY. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2004. Pp. 363.
    $49.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-8262-1536-X.

Francesca Aran Murphy's *Art and Intellect in the Philosopby of Etienne
Gilson* is a provocative, richly documented, and highly original intellectual
biography of a twentieth-century intellectual giant. It substantially captures the
complexity of Gilson the man, historian, and Christian philosopher. Anyone
seriously interested in Gilson studies should read this work.

The book consists of an introduction (entitled "Time and Eternity"), fifteen
chapters, an afterwo•d, bibliography, and index of persons. The tides of the
fifteen chapters are: (1) "Draper's Son," (2) "Beginning with Descartes," (3) "Ad
Fontes: Gilson's Ernsmian Method," (4) "'Under the Ensign of St. Francis and
St. Dominic,'" (5) "Reason and the Supernatural,'" (6) "Christian Philosophy,"
(7) "Newspapers and Utopias," (8) "Humanist Realism," (9) "World War II
History and Eternity," (10) "Gilson's Theological Existentialism: The
Metaphysics of the Exodus," (11) "'Ecdesial Cold War," (12) Between the
Temporal and Eternal Cities,'" (13) "'Facts are for Cretins,'" (14) "A Pictorial
Approach to Philosophy," and (15) "Gilson's Grumpy Years."

Murphy conceives this book to be about "Gilson the living philosopher," not
"Gilson the medieval historian" (6). Quite fittingly for a study of the intellectual
life of a philosopher, Murphy studies Gilson as "a man of many parts" (290).
Her approach to this intellectual. biography is highly original for at least four
reasons. First, before examining different major parts of Gilson's intellectual
history and the intellectual principles he called upon to resolve problems he
faced throughout his life, Murphy attempts to situate him intellectually by
interpreting his thought as the life-long reaction of a loyal French Catholic to the
French modernist crisis, with which he had some sympathy in his youth and
throughout his life. While many thinkers have studied the work of Jacques
Maritain against a similar religious and political background, Murphy, to my
knowledge, is one of the first people to do so regarding Gilson. She maintains
that the modernist crisis was one of the generating forces of four great issues that
concerned Gilson throughout his life: the relation of the Catholic faith to
different political orders, the problem of the relation of faith and reason,
theology as a source of philosophical realism, and time (especially history) and
eternity.

Second, Murphy places special emphasis on the influence of aesthetics,
especially music, on Gilson. Hence, she refers to Gilson's "musical, existential
Thomism" (5). She attributes this interest, partly, to Henri Bergson's life-long
influence on him. She goes so far as to maintain that Bergson was "[t]he
philosopher who most influenced Gilson" and that "Gilson got it into his head
that Bergson was an Aristotelian" (6). Third, she also makes special note of
Gilsonian humanism, which, at times, she refers to as his Erasmian method (48)

and his Pascalian heritage (4). Fourth, Murphy attempts to elevate the extent and status of the Bonaventurean and Franciscan influence on Gilson. Hence, for example, of the many parts that comprised Gilson the philosopher, she says: "There were always two sides to Gilson's mind. Aesthetically, he was a •Franciscan,' vastly preferring non-figurative art to classical realism.... But Gilson was also a *'choisiste,'* dedicated to the fact and the *thing"* (86).

Murphy's novel approach to understanding Gilson is refreshing and enriching. I think it is also a main reason her work is likely to be controversial. By initially contextualizing Gilson's intellectual development against the modernist background, Murphy sees different battles that Gilson waged throughout his life and different approaches he took to resolving them as having deeper, sometimes more long-standing and personal, motives than Gilson scholars often attribute to them. Hence, for example, she sees clerical mistreatment of Alfred Loisy in its poorly orchestrated reaction to the modernist crisis as a contributing reason for Gilson's dislike of manual Thomism and for specific attacks he later launched against proponents of "Roman Thomism" and the Thomistic commentary tradition. Moreover, she maintains that Gilson's "offensive against his Thomist contemporaries took a roundabout turn through Baroque scholasticism" (257). In other words, Gilson veiled his criticism of specific individuals behind attacks against the Thomistic manual and commentary tradition.

Murphy extends this personal and emotional side of Gilson by seeing his affection for Lucien Levy-Brohl as teaching Gilson "to recover philosophers in their individual difference" and Gilson's "Erasmian genius" (143). She also attributes to Levy-Bruhl invention of the type of historical research upon which Gilson built his career. She sees Gilson's attitude toward music and painting influencing his approach to metaphysics. She finds Henri Bergson's "musical" metaphysics and teaching about *elan vital* to be a main source of Gilson's sensitivity to *esse's* dynamism and modernist art. And she maintains that "Gilson's sense of the dependence of Christian philosophy on theology had affective roots in the youthful observation of the anti-modernist campaign" (291). She further maintains that Gilson thought St. Thomas's *esse* was "the 'beyond' that Bergson was seeking" (205).

Murphy's detailed introduction to the Christian-philosophy debate that started with Emile Brehier in France in the 1920s is especially helpful for contemporary scholars. Murphy contextualizes this discussion by first introducing her readers to the cultural and political environment in France following the French Revolution, the birth of Auguste Comte's Positivism, the start of *Action Franf{aise,* encyclicals of Popes Leo XIII and Pius X, the Dreyfus Affair, the 1904 expulsion of Catholic teaching Orders from France, Bergson's work and its impact, and Marc Sangnier and his Sillonists. In so doing, she introduces her readers to the general intellectual atmosphere that had immediately preceded Brehier's salvo that started the debate and throws much

light on understanding the nature and evolution of the discussion during the 1930s and from the 1930s to the present.

Murphy's chapter on Gilson and Rene Descartes shows how Gilson's early conviction that "metaphysics stems from theology" (40) would color his later study of St. Thomas and would, in a way, become deeper as he got older. I think that she is largely correct to see Gilson increasingly relying on "the theological mystery of being" (203).

To highlight the essential difference between Gilson's existential, Thomistic humanism and the Thomism of other leading twentieth-century intellectuals, Murphy judiciously intersperses her historical narrative by contrasting Gilson's approach to that of other Thomists and philosophers regarding major issues like the nature of Christian philosophy; natural desire for God; the relation of theology and philosophy; the nature, and intuition, of being; the case for world government; and aesthetics and metaphysics of art. She goes into many of these conflicting approaches in extensive detail. A glimpse at some of the more significant disagreements shows Gilson dismissing the metaphysical claims of Pere Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and Gaetano Sanseverino by maintaining (259-60) that they confuse the first principle of demonstration ("being is being") with the first principle of knowledge. By so doing, they turn conceptual principles into *causes* of knowledge. "For St. Thomas," in contrast, "the principle of knowledge is being: one has to be within reality, before one has anything to demonstrate; 'if there is no knowledge, there is no matter for demonstrations."'

Against Maurice Blondel's objection to Christian philosophy, Gilson replies with the assertion, "'Philosophy is not just another science,' like mathematics, 'because it cannot be achieved without metaphysics, and metaphysics cannot be achieved without God" (147). Against Maritain's claim that we have an intellectual intuition of being, Gilson interjects that we never initially intellectually apprehend existence detached from something-that-has-existence. He says, "'[W]e only apprehend' *esse* as the being-of-this-entity, which is for us the object of a 'sensible perception.' So 'it will not do to take a sensible intuition of the entity for the intellectual intuition of its being'" (326). In opposition to the excessive Platonism and intellectualism that Gilson found in Maritain's philosophy of art, Gilson complained to Gerald Phelan, "[H]ad St. Thomas ever 'thought about art … he would have connected art to being, to the entire man, and not to some form of knowledge--to take art for knowledge is to engage in the sophism of misplaced intellectualism" (286). And contra Maritain's case for world government, despite the fact that, like Maritain, Gilson opposed the Vichy regime during World War IT and was involved in helping to found the United Nations, Murphy sees Gilson's writings against Dante Alighieri's politics (246-53) as another instance of Gilson targeting "historical characters" as "stand-ins" for living individuals. He detects "flaws" in Maritain's program to "persuade each state to abandon its sovereignty" and "the practical difficulty of ensuring that this world authority will be just." Murphy finds Gilson skeptical of

Maritain's hope that a secular practical faith and one world government will ever be able enough to secure world peace.

Murphy documents Gilson's fierce loyalty to his friends, in spite of all such disagreements. Hence, while he repeatedly defended Maritain against his detractors {294}, he never forgot Maritain's mistreatment of Bergson: Murphy sees Gilson's critique of Maritain's philosophy of art as connected with Maritain's ingratitude toward Bergson, something for which Gilson "could never forgive" him (32). Similarly, Gilson defended Bergson {294} against a "diatribe" launched against his thought in 1959 by Fr. Joseph de Tonquedec and defended (192-95, 228-32) Henri de Lubac, Yves Congar, and Marie-Dominique Chenu against moves by Pere Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and others to impede or condemn their work.

Murphy's book does have some flaws. For example, a work of this caliber merits a subject index in addition to an index of persons. Beyond that, Murphy's tendency to read historical characters (like Erasmus, Pascal), and themes (like cubism, music) into Gilson's mind as analogously regulating his thinking at one time or another might confuse readers not used to thinking in terms of "Wagnerian epistemology," "Erasmian method," and "thingism." In some instances, precisely what she means by these terms needs some clarification that she omits.

In addition, Murphy makes some claims about major philosophical issues that, while perhaps somewhat justified, merit further explanation to avoid misunderstanding. For example, she claims Gilson found {321} that David Hume was right to deny that causality is a principle. She quotes Gilson as saying that Hume "never placed in doubt that effects come from causes, he simply recognized that the relation of causality does not correspond to any dear idea in the mind, which is something different." According to Gilson, Hume recognized that we do not know a priori that "every change has a cause." Consequently, "we obtain that generalization through "spontaneous inference." While parts of what Murphy says are true, we cannot justifiably maintain that Gilson denied causality to be a principle, or that he held, "If causality is not a principle, then one has to retreat from deduction to the more solid ground of 'empirical observation.'" To my knowledge, Gilson never denied the reality of a principle of causality, in the sense that causes are mind-independent principles of being, change, and knowing. And I do not think Murphy wants to claim he denied this, as appears dear from what she says (262-63) about the way Gilson distinguished between causality as "an interpretative intellectual category, or a concept" and a cause as "an active sort of fact." The reason we have to use empirical observation to grasp cause/effect relations is not that causes are not principles. It is the same reason we have to use empirical observation initially to grasp being. The person, not the intellect or the senses, is the knower. And we first grasp being and causes in our sensible apprehension of physical being, not through an immediate intellectual intuition of the concept of being that we deductively unpack.

Despite some such flaws, Murphy's *Art and Intellect in the Philosophy of Etienne Gilson* is a significant intellectual achievement and major contribution to Gilson studies. It is a terrific introduction to Gilson the man at work as a historian and Christian philosopher. It is a superbly written, beautiful, book that manifests a deep penetration of the principles that guided Gilson throughout his personal life and professional career. Moreover, its aesthetic quality matches its intellectual depth. For this reason, it is a work in which, I think, Gilson would take much delight and many others will too.

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One Hundred Years of Philosophy. Edited by BRIAN J. SHANLEY, O.P. Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 36. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001. Pp. 311. $49.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-8132-0997-8.

The fourteen essays contained in this book provide knowledgeable reflection on aspects of a whole century of philosophy. They are papers collected by Brian Shanley, O.P., on selected areas of twentieth-century philosophy and of Catholic thought, aimed also to indicate the breadth of interests of the School of Philosophy at The Catholic University of America, whose centenary (1996) was marked by lectures that included these topics.

Some of the essays are significant contributions toward organizing and orienting scholarship (for instance, Timothy Noone on scholarship on medieval philosophy); some are notable expositions and evaluations (e.g., Robert Sokolowski on phenomenology, and William Wallace on philosophy of science). Some are broad interpretations and controversial appraisals of the significance of various stages (e.g., Thomas Russman on British philosophy, and Frederick Crosson on Catholic social thought). Some are written in a style I find off-putting, with metaphorical personifications like "the person transcends the conditions of finitude of the self and the world in the unthematic pre-conception of absolute being itself" (140, in an essay by Kenneth Schmitz), and editorial adverbs, like "More importantly, precisely in the" at the start of the quoted sentence. Some are oracular about options that seem to me contrived, for instance, Robert Spaemann says, "Christianity needs philosophy in order to assert itself in the modern world," "Christianity must prefer realistic philosophers" (179) and other hypostasizing of abstractions (cf. Sokolowski's criticism of that on p. 214) and the metaphorical use of "must" applied to Christianity.

Some essays have narrower scope but great interest, like Daniel Dahlstrom's account of developments of aesthetic theory both in analytic and continental thought and their application even to social criticism. He correlates the philosophy with phases of art that a nonspecialist might not easily see are connected. Eugene Long recounts tendencies in British-American philosophy of religion that he explains as follows: "the advance of the physical and social sciences, the increasing respectability of materialism and a general turning away from speculative metaphysics prepares the way for a new century of philosophy of religion more focussed on the empirical and the particular than the ideal and the universal"(269). It seems to me that it wasn't all that particular and empirical and that philosophers actually accomplished the restoration of a high standard of philosophical theology (e.g., in the journal, *Faith and Philosophy},* and the renovation of the epistemology of religious commitment, as well as a notably cooperative common discipline among scholars of different strands of Christianity who share a high degree of technical philosophical skill.

Robert George surveys the controversy over moral foundations of law from Holmes, through the legal realists, the legal positivists, H. Hart, the moral realism of J. Raz, Fuller's notion of the "internal morality" of law, and Ronald Dworkin's "right answer" thesis, ending with an endorsement of "the Thomistic proposition that just positive law is derived from natural law"(93). Lastly, A. S. Cua describes the work of three major Chinese scholars writing the history of Chinese philosophy, Hu Shih, Fung Yu-Lan, and Lao Szu-kwang, who write influenced by distinct Western viewpoints on what philosophy is and what competent philosophy involves.

My comments here will be limited to four of the essays. The selection should not be taken to slight the interest of the others.

Timothy Noone's twenty-page exposition of the course and accomplishments of historical scholarship on medieval philosophy, including problems of textual editing, is a genuine *tour de force* with ample references. He focuses on the organizing conceptions, covering the whole period, of Maurice De Wulf, Etienne Gilson, and Ferdinand Van Steenberghen, and on the new perspective on logic and language epitomized by Philotheus Boehner. He gives lively vignettes, too, for instance about how some scholars in the early twentieth century met academic difficulties when their views, inspired by other medieval greats, did not accord with those of St. Thomas (115 n. 11), about the "famous twenty-four theses" Catholic teachers were supposed to propose and approve. There is a fascinating story about the disagreements among text editors about how scientifically to determine the critical texts (124-29), and about Destrez confirming the medieval *peciae* system of multiple copyists working from pieces of an original under supervision (that might vary in attentiveness).

Noone's main discussion is of the historiographical approaches: (i) De WulPs approach, which did not take enough account of the philosophical diversity of the thirteenth century and regarded philosophy as an explanatory inquiry without formal doctrinal dependence, with its history arching up to the thirteenth century and declining after; and (ii) Gilson's related notion of

Christian philosophy as "every philosophy which, though keeping the two orders [of faith and reason] formally distinct, nevertheless considers Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary to reason" (Noone quotes from *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy).*

Noone describes Gilson's idea that by the thirteenth century medieval thought ascended from St. Augustine to its zenith in Aquinas, "a new understanding of reality" (120), to which later alternatives (e.g., Henry of Ghent, Scotus, Ockham, etc.) were, in Gilson's scheme, inferior, though admirable. He contrasts that with the expositions of Gilson's former student, Philotheus Boehner, which presented the accomplishments of medieval philosophy in logic and philosophy of language, and the "blossoming of metaphysical speculations in the writings of late thirteenth-century philosophers and theologians such as Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and John Duns Scotus."(124). Boehner considered those a further and independent flourishing of philosophy. Noone thinks De Wulf, Gilson, and Van Steenberghen all aimed to describe a unity of medieval thought, but encountered " a greater diversity among medieval thinkers than their historical models, admirable as they are, would tolerate" (124).

Noone's concluding reflections include acute worry over the fate of textual studies when there is no longer a Latin-speaking student culture. He also observes that, though the period of the later Middle Ages did not have the unity De Wulf, Gilson, and Van   postulated, it did have a "shared conception of what intellectual inquiry should be like" (131) and "a cultural unity that our own intellectual culture lacks"(ibid.). He also thinks recent metaphysical inquiries in philosophy generally have sharpened the questions medieval .scholars put to their medieval texts (132), and that the study of medieval philosophy has broadened the way contemporary philosophers look at the history of their subject and that "medieval philosophy calls into question the manner in which philosophical problems are approached nowadays." I think he is right on all counts.

Robert Sokolowski's "Phenomenology in the Last Hundred Years", for those who have not already read it as the appendix to his *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), seems to me admirable reading, even for those who know the subject themselves. It is only thirteen pages, but it is packed, clear, concise, fluent and, showing a distinct preference for Husserl's more scientific, realist orientation, as contrasted with Heidegger's initiating and constant "religious impulse" (206) and his preoccupation with the problem of being. Sokolowski says that Husserl stepped out of the Cartesian subjectivity trap with a distinctive notion of intentionality; that he "ridiculed" the Cartesian epistemological problem (ibid.) and held that "we experience and perceive things, not just the appearances, or impacts or impressions that things make on *us";* and that he worked "out detailed descriptive analyses that proved themselves by virtue of their precision and convincingness" (207). "We are told that the things we perceive do immediately present themselves to us." Sokolowski definitely gets across Husserl's perceptual realism that includes the many modes of the absent, "the absent, what is not there, is given to us as such"

(ibid.). He provides an evocative list of the sorts of remote, abstract, and even no longer existing things that can be presented to thought. He depicts Husserl as a notable contrast to and corrective for representationalism and phenomenalism. Yet, Sokowloski remarks, "all too frequently everything in Husserl is reinterpreted according to the very positions he rejected" (215), an illustration being Sartre's claim that Husserl remained a phenomenalist (210). One of the main themes is a contrast between Husserl and Heidegger both in thinking style and in positions and concerns. Sokolowski surveys developments of phenomenology in Germany, France, and among some British and Americans, and sketches the origins and motivations of what he calls two "metamorphic forms" "somewhat on the margins of phenomenology," hermeneutics and deconstruction. He concludes that phenomenology "still continues in a somewhat less spectacular way" as one of "the major traditions in philosophy," hampered, he thinks, by "a total lack of any political philosophy" (214) and with "its established terminology" "a handicap" with words that "tend to become fossilized and provoke artificial problems" (ibid.). He mentions that the abstract terms, like "noema" "life-world," and so on, "substantialize what should be an aspect of being and *of* the activity of philosophy" (ibid}, and concludes that phenomenology, properly understood is a resource for theology and for "an authentic philosophical life." The implied advice is of great merit.

   William Wallace's essay, mainly assembled from his 1996 *The Modeling of Nature,* interprets the coincidence of philosophical speculation and scientific accomplishment (with respectful nod to Kuhn) as a convergence toward a science-based realism of explanation that is self-correcting and incomplete, and yet compatible with the idea that most of what we are certain of about the world is true (52).This is his intended corrective to three criticisms of science that he recounts. He explains the leading ideas from the time of William Whewell, Comte, and Mill, on through Mach, Duhem, and Poincare, then logical positivism (Nuerath, Schlick, Reichenbach, and Popper's critiques of them), the logical empiricism of Nagel and Hempel, the developing disputes about scientific realism and the Kuhnian critique of the notion of scientific progress on the basis of the history of science, and onward through Popper, Lakatos, and Feyerabend. He summarizes those stages as "the critique of science stage, the logical reconstruction stage, and the history of scientific revolutions stage" (46). He then surveys the more recent movement to treat science as a sociological and political construct (Bloor, Shaoin, and Schaffer, Latour and Woolgar, and others), that leads to "the current devaluation of science's claims" (49)

   According to Wallace, the twentieth century began with "a fallible and revisable character" being attributed to science. This was followed by Kuhn's "historical reconstruction" of its stages, and then a "social reconstruction" (Bloor, Latour, et al.). "Each reconstruction has managed to cut into science's epistemic value, into the truth and certitude that were its hallmarks from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century" (49-50). Wallace asks whether that is the best one can hope for. He sketches out a modest realism and concludes, "what we need are

philosophers who know and appreciate scientific knowledge from within, who can defend its claims for truth and certainty" (53).

Thomas Russman offers a readable historical reconstruction of British philosophy starting from the replacement of Bradley's idealism at the turn of the twentieth century by Russell's and Moore's initial realism, which soon became phenomenalism. He explains the logical constructionist impulse, including the proposed, and failed, logical foundations of mathematics and the logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein. He goes on to describe the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, and the more general phenomenalistic verificationism of A. *].* Ayer, the development of confirmation theory, and Popper's proposed falsifiability criterion of meaningfulness.

There is a brief exposition of the turn to ordinary language and Wittgenstein's "meaning- is-use" idea, though I don't think the real point or importance of Wittgenstein's work is presented, particularly not its (beneficial) consequences for mathematical, aesthetic, and religious knowledge, or its consequences for accounts of linguistic meaning generally and its evading skepticism in particular. Russman observes, "British philosophy of the later twentieth century has at times exhibited a crab-like drift in the direction of epistemological realism," but he doesn't illustrate this. The expository device of contrasting the developments as responses to idealism that all eventually fail ("suffered rejection in turn" [30]) while interesting, seems like an imposed plot. The writers were much more concerned, in my opinion, to accommodate science and achieve a new standard of clarity of expression and rigor of thought.

Russman concludes, "Phenomenalism of the traditional British empiricist sort has been at a low ebb in Britain for the last 35 years at least"(ibid.), and observes that it was succeeded by "a wider and wider range of philosophical discussion characterized by careful attention to the uses of language and the problems that arise form its misuses" (ibid.).

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Originally written to be part of a series of introductory works in moral theology, *Christian Anthropology and Sexual Ethics* also works well as a free-standing volume. As the title of the work suggests, its subject matter is the human

person. The aim of the moral life according to Guevin is the divinization of the person through participation in grace.

The book is arranged in a highly symmetrical pattern. The first five chapters focus on the person in light of the mystery of creation, focusing on the body person, sexuality, and moral growth. The remaining five chapters return to these topics from the vantage point of the mystery of the Incarnation and grace.

Part 1 opens with a brief introduction which identifies the origin and end of the human person as the Trinity. The first chapter begins with a reading of the biblical creation accounts. Guevin highlights the fact that the Old Testament creation accounts describe human beings as the result of God's free decision, not as a result of procreation by sexualized gods and goddesses as in other Ancient Near Eastern creation myths. Genesis presents women as the equals of men, seeing them as ordered to one another in a communion of persons. However, this vocation to communion with God and one another was ruptured by sin.

The second chapter continues this biblical focus through a closer look at the body. The Old Testament, Guevin asserts, holds that men and women "do not *have* bodies; they *are* bodies" (15; emphasis in original). Included in the biblical affirmation of the oody is its sexuality, which like the rest of creation is designated by God as "very good" (Gen 1:31). Sexual activity and procreation are blessed by God as reflections of his own creative action. As a dimension of humanity's creation in the image and likeness of God, sexuality is not an extrinsic attribute of the person but is a "constitutive dimension of him or her" (17).

Guevin turns in the third chapter to a close examination of natural law in the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. While everything that exists has a specific nature, human beings apprehend theirs through the use of reason and pursue its flourishing through their free choices. Human flourishing consists not merely in the fulfillment of the inclinations of nature (such as life, the procreation and education of offspring, living in society, or seeking truth) but in the contemplation of God in the beatific vision. Beatitude then is a single reality with a twofold form: imperfect (the fulfillment of nature) and perfect (the enjoyment of God). Those things which enable us to enjoy these forms of beatitude are the virtues-acquired and infused.

This leads Guevin to a focus on the function of virtue in relation to human development in chapter 4. He a.liludesto the work of numerous scientists who have studied various facets of human development. However, he does not really engage their positions, but rather takes from them the general idea that human development unfolds in certain patterns which can be interrupted by sickness or sinful choices. The full flowering of the human person-physically, cognitively, socially, morally, and spiritually-is assured by the formation of the *habitus* of virtue.

In the case of sexuality the relevant operative *habitus* for human maturity is the virtue of chastity, which is the focus of chapter 5. With modern personalistic appropriations of Aquinas, chastity is understood as more than mere continence (refraining from unruly or disordered sexual passions). Rather, chastity involves

the recognition of the value of the other as a person who should be loved rather than used. Guevin correctly emphasizes the social nature of this and other virtues. But both the interpersonal and cultural contexts in which virtue is formed are marred by the continuing presence and effects of original sin and therefore in need of the grace of Christ, which is the focus of the book's second half.

The sixth chapter focuses on Christ as the image of God *par excellence.* Guevin uses a variety of images drawn from both Eastern and Western Christian thought to describe his salvific work: divinization (understood as the perfection of human nature), the imitation of Christ the archetype, and Christification. The pattern of Christ's life, his self-emptying humility, free obedience, and love, are the foundation of the moral lives of his followers.

Chapter 7 reprises the discussion of the body in the book's second chapter, now focusing on the flesh in the mystery of salvation. Guevin is particularly interested in the fact that "Christ's corporeity has important ethical implications for our own bodies" (97). He correctly asserts that Paul's thought betrays a moral not an anthropological dualism in its discussion of the opposition between flesh *(sarx-an* existence dominated by sin) and spirit *(pneuma).* The body, on the other hand, has an eternal and glorious destiny with Christ. For Guevin, this key tenet of Pauline anthropology is foundational to the fact that one cannot dissociate "moral acts from the bodily dimension of their exercise" (107). As Christ lived the unity of body and soul perfectly, his followers are called to do the same in their liturgical celebration and their daily acts of service and love.

Guevin returns to the discussion of law in chapter 8. For Aquinas, the natural law was fully compatible (though not as complete) as the Old Law entrusted to the Jewish people, yet both were incomplete without grace. It was also compatible with the New Law of the Holy Spirit given through Christ. As a participation in the divine nature, the New Law divinizes human beings. It therefore empowers and enables human freedom to function to its fullest and most Christ-like extent.

One way in which this Christified human freedom is actualized in the confines of human existence is in the liturgy. Chapter 9 of the book considers participation in the liturgy as a form of spiritual conversion and faith development. Guevin offers an examination of the thought of Nicholas Cabasilas, an Eastern theologian who was a near contemporary of Aquinas. Cabasilas highlights the ontological transformation of the Christian effected in baptism, chrismation, and Eucharist. These sacraments christify the believer in being, in action, in mind, and in will, at the same time conferring the divine energies (virtues) and gifts of the Holy Spirit. Thus the moral life is the continuation of the liturgical worship at the heart of the Christian life.

Revisiting the discussion of sexual integration in the fifth chapter, chapter 10 examines the infused virtue of chastity. Guevin looks at chastity in relation to the theological virtues. Through faith Christians see their own bodies and the bodies of others as temples of God called to a new life, and in this light sexual sin takes on a far deeper significance. The virtue of hope sustains chastity within the

fidelity of Christian marriage as well as within a life of consecrated celibacy. Interestingly, Guevin uses the discussion of charity to highlight not only the friendship and love that animate marriage but the mutuality of this relationship across the board. Celibates too participate in this nuptial love if their pursuit of holiness is imbued with love rather than "moral narcissism" (165). Returning to the pastoral note on which the book began, Guevin closes with a recognition that true impeccability belonged only to Christ and his Mother in this life. Christians need to recognize the reality of moral failure with which they live and thereby grow in the virtue of humility.

Guevin's book has much to commend it. Among its strengths are its rich and diverse use of sources. While solidly grounded in the thought of St. Thomas, Guevin enriches this approach through engagement with biblical and patristic sources (as did Aquinas}, eastern Christian sources both classical and contemporary, and contemporary phenomenological appropriations of Aquinas's teaching such as Karol Wojtyla's personalist account of the virtue of chastity. His ability to integrate the liturgy as a program for moral and faith development is both rather unique in recent Western moral theology and genuinely refreshing.

In many respects Guevin's book successfully models the renewed moral theology called for by the Second Vatican Council. It is "nourished by scriptural teaching" (cf. *Optatum totius* 16} which is "the soul of sacred theology"(Dei *verbum* 24}. It also demonstrates "livelier contact with the mystery of Christ" (cf. *Optatum totius* 16) in its focus on the human person in the light of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. This also accords well with the Christological anthropology of *Gaudium et spes* 22, which sees Christ as the revelation of what it means to be human. The second half of the book in particular explores some of the foundational moral implications of viewing the person in the light of Christ.

The book also makes important contributions to the renewal of virtue theory of recent decades. It does so by beginning to integrate the council's Christological anthropology with the tradition and language of virtue as others such as Livio Melina have done. It also advances recent discussion of virtue theory by beginning to apply it to the area of sexuality rather than focusing-as have many other studies--only on questions of method, history, or fundamental moral theology as have many other studies. Finally, like virtue theory in general, the book offers a helpful antidote to the casuistry of the modem Catholic tradition in highlighting the vocation to holiness as the center of Christian life.

However, in spite of its many strengths, the book is not without some limitations. It is a bit odd that Guevin mentions numerous scientific studies of human psychological, sexual, and moral development but does not engage them. In fact, he explicitly warns against the determinism of some of these accounts (see 53). Such warnings are well taken, but one is left to wonder why Guevin thought it necessary to mention individuals like Freud, Jung, Piaget, and Kohlberg, without engaging their thought in any substantive way either in regard to their strengths or their weaknesses.

A second problem with the work is that its title is a bit misleading. It most certainly deals with Christian anthropology, as well as with sexuality and with moral virtue in a general sense. However, there is relatively little discussion of sexual ethics *per se*. Aside from some applications to the morality of extramarital sex and a brief and very general treatment of the requirements of chastity in and outside of marriage, there is little treatment of specific questions of sexual ethics. The reader looking for treatments of masturbation, contraception, or homosexual activity or partnerships will therefore be disappointed.

A more substantive problem is posed by the very structure of the book itself. While Guevin is careful to assert that there is no two-story universe and that the two forms of beatitude are not wholly separate (see 28-29,123, 156), the twofold optic of nature and the Incarnation which structures the book seems to push in a direction opposite to these affirmations. The closest Guevin comes to showing successfully the unity and interpenetration of these two orders is in his discussion of the infused virtue of chastity. Yet even here, looking at chastity in light of the theological virtues, he never fully shows where exactly the continuity and discontinuity between and natural and infused virtue lie. However, given that nature and grace is a problem which has vexed the whole of the Western theological tradition, it must be admitted that Guevin is hardly alone in this difficulty. Perhaps if he had better maintained the Trinitarian focus with which the book began, he might have been better able to show the unity of these spheres, as much Eastern anthropology has done.

Aside from a few typos which survived the editorial process, the book is well written and dear. I recommend it for scholars and advanced students interested in the fruitful nexus between theological anthropology and virtue theory. The work is generously indexed.

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