

A POSTSCRIPT TO THE  
*"REEDIUM CONCUPISCENTIAE"*

CORMAC BURKE

*Strathmore University  
Nairobi, Kenya*

**T**HE *TERM* *remedium concupiscentiae*, proposed up to 1983 as a "secondary" end of marriage, has been seriously misapplied over the centuries. In practice it was taken to imply that marriage gives a lawful outlet to sexual concupiscence (or lust), and hence married couples can legitimately yield to it. The consequences went further. If concupiscence is "remedied" by the fact of being married, then it is either automatically purified of whatever self-centered (and hence anti-love) elements it entails; or, if these elements remain, they pose no problem to the living and growth of married love. As regards the conjugal act itself, the only moral proviso was that its procreative orientation be respected; given this proviso, the suggestion was that spouses can give concupiscence free rein, without this posing any moral or ascetical difficulties for the development of a full Christian life in their marriage.

While some traces of the term *"remedium concupiscentiae"* can be found in Augustine or Thomas Aquinas, those authors did not use it in the sense that it later acquired. Saint Thomas especially speaks of marriage as a "remedy *against* concupiscence" inasmuch as it offers graces to overcome the self-seeking concupiscence involves. The subsequent reduction of the term to "remedy *of* concupiscence" led to the loss of this understanding.

My purpose in this article is to show that sexual desire and sexual love are, or should be, good things-not to be confused

with sexual concupiscence or lust in which self-seeking operates to the detriment of love.

If the acceptance in ecclesiastical thinking of marriage as a "remedy" or legitimation of concupiscence has for centuries impeded the development of a positive and dynamic notion of marital chastity, John Paul II's "Theology of the Body," if assimilated in depth, leads into a new way of thinking and presents this chastity as the safeguard to conjugal love and a means to its growth.

*Preliminary Note: Human Nature and Concupiscence*

Christianity is the religion of God's greatness and love, and of man's potential, as well as of his frailty, misery, redemption, and elevation. In the Christian view, man is a fallen masterpiece of creation, capable indeed of sinking lower but actually ransomed and strengthened to rise higher. As a result of original sin, says the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*,

human nature has not been totally corrupted: it is wounded in the natural powers proper to it, subject to ignorance, suffering and the dominion of death, and inclined to sin—an inclination to evil that is called "concupiscence." Baptism, by imparting the life of Christ's grace, erases original sin and turns a man back towards God, but the consequences for nature, weakened and inclined to evil, persist in man and summon him to spiritual battle. (CCC 405)

Called to surpass ourselves and to attain divine heights, we are still drawn down by that tendency to lower things which goes by the name of concupiscence.

*Concupiscence*, in biblical and theological usage, covers the unregulated tendency to pursue or adhere to created goods.

Etymologically, "concupiscence" can refer to any intense form of human desire. Christian theology has given it a particular meaning: the movement of the sensitive appetite contrary to the operation of the human reason. The apostle St. Paul identifies it with the rebellion of the "flesh" against the "spirit" (Gal 5:16ff.). (CCC 2515)

Drawing from the First Letter of St. John, Christian tradition has seen three forms of concupiscence arising from self-enclosing attachment to created things. Two of these come from the sensitive appetite, the third from the intellect "All that is in the world, the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of life, is not of the Father but is of the world. And the world passes away, and the lust of it; but he who does the will of God abides for ever" (1 John 2:16-17). The pride of life consists in taking self-centered satisfaction in one's own talents and excellence, and springs from intellectual appetition. Thus the spirit too has its lusts, for not all its desires are upright, many being vain, mean, vengeful, egotistic: thereby tending to distort the truth. Hence man is threatened not only by the rebellion of the flesh, but also by that of the spirit.

These brief introductory remarks lead us to the more limited scope of our present study: the theological and human evaluation of [carnal] concupiscence in marriage, and the history-and also the utility and indeed the validity-of the notion that marriage is, and is intended to be, a "remedy for concupiscence."

## I. CONCUPIŒENCE AND MARRIAGE: THEOLOGICAL POSITIONS

### A) *The "Remedium Concupiscentiae" as an End of Marriage*

Prior to Vatican II, the phrase *remedium concupiscentiae*- "remedy for concupiscence" -was customarily used in ecclesial writing to describe one of the ends of matrimony. The *Code of Canon Law* of 1917, crystallizing this view, distinguished between a single primary end of marriage and a twofold secondary end: "The primary end of matrimony is the procreation and education of offspring; the secondary end is mutual help and the remedy of concupiscence."<sup>1</sup> It is worth bearing in mind that the 1917 *Code* was the first magisterial document to use the terms "primary" and

<sup>1</sup> "I/[atrimonii finis primarius est procreatio atque educatio prolis; secundarius rnutuurn adiutoriurn et rernedium concupiscentiae" (c. 1013).

"secondary" in relation to the ends of marriage, so proposing a notion of these ends as hierarchically structured.<sup>2</sup>

The fifty years following the promulgation of the Pio-Benedictine Code were to witness a growing debate regarding the ends of marriage. The debate concerned the relative importance to be attached to procreation on the one hand, and on the other to a rather (as yet) ill-defined "personalist" end seen as largely or wholly unconnected with procreation. Taking for granted the main lines of this debate, which have been considered elsewhere,<sup>3</sup> we pass on here to the presentation of the ends of marriage in the Second Vatican Council and the postconciliar magisterium.

*Gaudium et spes* is the main document of the council that treats of marriage. The only specific end of matrimony mentioned in the constitution is the procreation-education of children.<sup>4</sup> It indeed says that marriage "has various ends" (GS 48), and adds that the natural ordering of marriage towards procreation should not be taken as "underestimating the other ends of marriage"<sup>5</sup> (GS 50). Surprisingly, however, these other ends are nowhere specified. It may be that the council fathers did not want to foreclose the ongoing debate about the ends of marriage, and they may have also prudently felt that further ecclesial reflection would be necessary before a general consensus might be reached on new ways of expressing the various ends of marriage and their mutual relationship.

Peculiarly, it seems to have been as the result (initially at least) of canonical more than of theological reflection that a new and very precise expression of the ends of marriage finally emerged. This becomes less peculiar when one recalls that Pope John

<sup>2</sup> "However surprising it may seem, the fact is that canon 1013, 1 [CIC 1917] is the first document of the Church to list the ends [of marriage] and to set them out in an hierarchical order. ... This canon is also the first document of the Church to use the terminology of 'primary' and 'secondary'" (U. Navarrete, S.J., *Periodica* 56 [1967]: 368). cf. A. Sarmiento, *El matrimonio cristiano* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2001), 360.

<sup>3</sup> See C. Burke, "Marriage: A Personalist or an Institutional Understanding?" *Communio* 19 (1992): 278-304.

<sup>4</sup> "By their very nature, the institution of matrimony itself and conjugal love are ordered to the procreation and education of children" (GS 48, repeated in GS 50).

<sup>5</sup> "non posthabitis ceteris matrimonii finibus."

XXIII's convocation of the council was accompanied by the decision to elaborate a new code of canon law. Revising the 1917 *Code* so that it would more faithfully reflect conciliar thinking about the life of the Church and of the faithful became a major postconciliar undertaking. This work of revision, done in depth and without haste, lasted more than fifteen years, and resulted in the 1983 *Code of Canon Law*-described by Pope John Paul II at its promulgation as "the last document of the Council."<sup>6</sup>

The revision carried out by the pontifical commission entrusted with the task was guided not merely by the terms of canon law, but also-and very deliberately-by theological considerations. This was in conformity with the directive of the council that canon law should be presented in the light of theology and of the mystery of the Church.<sup>7</sup> One of the novelties of the 1983 *Code* is in fact the inclusion of canons that are simply theological statements of doctrine.<sup>8</sup> Hence, whenever these canons use modified or new terms in presenting the Church's law, one can legitimately look to them for a possible development in theological and magisterial thinking.

With this in mind, let us turn to the opening canon in the section of the *Code* that deals with marriage.<sup>9</sup> Canon 1055 says:

The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a woman establish between themselves a partnership of the whole of life, *is by its nature ordered toward the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring*; this covenant between baptized persons has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament. (§1; emphasis added).

Our attention centers on the italicized words.

We read, without surprise, that one end of matrimony is the procreation and upbringing of children. Surprise can arise, however, when we turn to the other end specified-the "*bonum coniugum*/" or the "good of the spouses"-and is justified by the

<sup>6</sup> Pope John Paul II, Address to the Roman Rota, 26 January 1984, AAS 76 (1984): 644.

<sup>7</sup> See *Optatam totius* 16.

<sup>8</sup> See, e.g., cc. 747ff. in book 3; and cc. 849, 879, 897, 959, 998, 1008 in book 4.

<sup>9</sup> Book 4, "The Sanctifying Office of the Church," part 1, title 7.

fact that an altogether new term is being used in a magisterial document to describe an end of marriage.

This novel way of expressing the ordering or purposes of marriage was accepted and given further authority eleven years later in what may be considered an even more important magisterial document, the 1994 *Catechism of the Catholic Church*. Paragraph 1601 of the *Catechism* repeats the above canon word for word.<sup>10</sup> Paragraph 2363 expresses this specifically in terms of *ends*: "the twofold end of marriage: the good of the spouses themselves and the transmission of life."<sup>11</sup>

Undoubtedly the most important issue brought up by this new formulation of the ends of marriage is the nature of the *bonum coniugum* or the "good of the spouses." This is not an easy question, especially when we bear in mind that the term *bonum coniugum* is of very recent coinage. It is scarcely ever to be found in ecclesial writing prior to the Second Vatican Council. Only in 1977 was it first used by the Pontifical Council for the Revision of the Code to describe an end of marriage.<sup>12</sup> Neither the 1983 *Code* nor the 1994 *Catechism* any longer expresses the ends of marriage in terms of a hierarchy but places them together as, so it seems, of equal standing. My impression is that we have moved into a new stage where the Church wishes to emphasize not any possible ranking of the ends, but the *interconnection* between them.<sup>13</sup>

With regard to the *mutuum adiutorium*, a former secondary end, it is not my purpose to study its place in the present scheme of the ends of marriage. There seems to be little if any disagreement among authors that, even if not specifically mentioned

<sup>10</sup> See also CCC 2201 and 2249.

<sup>11</sup> "[D]uplex matrimonii finis." This point of the *Catechism*, we can note in passing, confirms that the expression "is ordered to" (in the *Code* or in CCC 1601) is simply equivalent to "has as an end."

<sup>12</sup> I have written elsewhere at some length on this, and would refer the interested reader to these studies: "The '*bonum coniugum*' and the *bonum pro/vis*: Ends or Properties of Marriage?" *The Jurist* 49 (1989): 704-13; "Progressive Jurisprudential Thinking," *The Jurist* 58 (1998): 437-78.

<sup>13</sup> See C. Burke, "Personalism and the 'bona' of Marriage," *Studia Canonica* 27 (1993): 401-12; Burke, "Marriage: A Personalist or an Institutional Understanding?"

in these recent magisterial texts, "mutual assistance" is to be included within the proper meaning of the "good of the spouses." <sup>14</sup>

A particular point of interest for the present study is the absence, in the documents of the Second Vatican Council and in subsequent magisterial teaching, of any direct or indirect mention of the former *remedium concupiscentiae* or "remedy of concupiscence." <sup>15</sup> That this omission was deliberate cannot be doubted. Moreover, though the other secondary end, the *mutuum adiutorium*, fits simply enough within the new concept of the *bonum coniugum*, <sup>16</sup> this is not so of the *remedium concupiscentiae*. Rather than suggest (as some have done) an implicit presence of the *remedium concupiscentiae* within the new scheme of the ends of marriage-and thus try to show a certain continuity of ecclesial thinking-I prefer to submit that, despite the long presence it has enjoyed in much of ecclesial writing and its acceptance over fifty years in the 1917 *Code*, the concept of the *remedium concupiscentiae* (a) lacks theological and anthropological substance (and, contrary to generalized opinion, has little if any backing in the thought of St. Augustine or St. Thomas) and (b) its currency, over centuries, has accompanied (and possibly explains in large part) the failure of moralists to develop a theological and ascetical consideration of marriage as a way of sanctification.

As I seek to develop my argument, I would ask the reader to bear two things in mind. The first is that sexual concupiscence or lust, as I use the term, is not to be taken in the sense of simple sexual attraction or indeed the desire for marital intercourse and the pleasure that accompanies it. Lust or bodily concupiscence is the *disordered* element that in our present state tends to

<sup>14</sup> See Burke, "Progressive Jurisprudential Thinking," 459ff.

<sup>15</sup> As late as 1977 the Pontifical Commission for the Revision of the Code of Canon Law did consider a draft in which the *remedium concupiscentiae* appeared among the ends of marriage (*Communicationes* [1977]: 123). This passing nod to traditional terminology did not, however, prevent the consultors from dropping the notion completely when it came to the final draft of the new code, approved and promulgated only six years later.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. the biblical juxtaposition of *bonum* and *adiutorium* in the Jahwist account of the divine institution of marriage in Genesis 2:18.

accompany marital intercourse, threatening the love it should express with self-centered possessiveness. On that supposition, my main point is that the use (however longstanding) of the term *remedium concupiscentiae* to signify an end of marriage has had a profoundly negative effect on married life, inasmuch as it suggests that lust or concupiscence is "remedied" or at least "legitimised" by marriage, in the sense either of automatically disappearing or else of being no longer a self-centered element to be constantly taken into account if married love is to grow. To my mind the faulty reasoning behind this has been a major block to understanding how love in marriage stands in need of constant purification if it is to achieve its human fullness and its supernatural goal of merging into love for God. I will endeavor to justify my position on both points.

*B) Concupiscence: An Evil Present in Marriage?*

It is impossible to study the development of Christian thought on marriage without reference to St. Augustine. The many-faceted and nuanced character of Augustinian thinking in this field is probably to be attributed not so much to Augustine's personal experience in sexual matters as to his having been involved over some forty years in very particular and very contrasting controversies concerning matrimony. The earlier part of his Catholic life saw him engaged in conflict with the pessimism of the Manicheans; in his later years he combated the naturalistic optimism of the Pelagians. The Manicheans saw marriage and procreation as major expressions of material and bodily creation and hence as evil; Augustine defended the goodness of both. The Pelagians, in their excessive optimism about man's present state, took little or no account of the disordered element now strongly present in sex, also in conjugal sexuality; and Augustine sought to alert people to this disorder.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> See C. Burke: "St. Augustine and Conjugal Sexuality," *Communio* 17 (1990): 545-65.



## 1. Saint Augustine and the *bona* of Marriage

The greatest of Augustine's legacies in this field is his doctrine of the matrimonial *bona*. He sees marriage as essentially characterized by three principal elements or properties each of which shows the goodness and greatness of the marital relationship. <sup>18</sup> So convinced is he that each of these characteristics underpins the goodness of marriage that he refers to each not just as a "property" or "characteristic" but as a *bonum*, as something *good*, as a uniquely positive value: "Let these nuptial goods be the objects of our love: offspring, fidelity, the unbreakable bond . . . . Let these nuptial goods be praised in marriage by him who wishes to extol the nuptial institution." <sup>19</sup>

This doctrine of the *bona* is without a doubt Augustine's main contribution to the analysis of marriage in its divinely instituted beauty. And it has come down to us over 1500 years of unbroken tradition. <sup>20</sup>

Another important legacy of Augustine has colored ecclesial reflection on sexuality and marriage: his teaching about the presence and effect of concupiscence in all sexual activity, including marital intercourse between spouses themselves. It is this aspect of his thought that interests us here.

## 2. Saint Augustine and "Putting Bad to Good Use"

One of many seminal ideas in Augustine's thought is that "bad can be *used* to good purpose." <sup>21</sup> God, he points out, makes positive use of those aspects of creation which seem to have gone

<sup>18</sup> In Augustine's view offspring was certainly the purpose or end of marriage ("Cum sint ergo nuptiae causa generandi institutae" [*De coniugiis adulterinis* 12]). Nevertheless this was not his major point of focus and interest. He took the end of marriage for granted; his interest and arguments were directed to defending its goodness.

<sup>19</sup> "In nuptiis tamen bona nuptialia diligentur, proles, fides, sacramentum . . . . Haec bona nuptialia laudet in nuptiis, qui laudare vult nuptias" (*De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1.17.19; cf. 1.21.23).

<sup>20</sup> See B. Alves Pereira, *La doctrine du mariage selon saint Augustin* (Paris, 1930); A. Reuter, *Sancti Aurelii Augustini doctrina de bonis matrimonii* (Rome, 1942).

<sup>21</sup> Of course, this is not the same as saying that one can *do* bad so as to achieve good.

wrong; we have to learn to do likewise. The idea is repeatedly expressed: "God uses even bad things well"; "God knows how to put not only good things, but also bad things, to good use"; "Almighty God, the Lord of all creatures, who, as it is written, made everything very good, so ordered them that he could make good use both of good things and of bad"; "Just as it is bad to make bad use of what is good, so it is good to make good use of what is bad. When these therefore-good and bad; and good use and bad use-are put together, they make up four differences. Good is used well by whoever vows continence to God, while good is used badly by whoever vows continence to an idol; evil is used badly by whoever indulges concupiscence through adultery, while evil is used well by whoever restricts concupiscence to marriage." <sup>22</sup>

In his writings on marriage, Augustine refers this principle particularly to the presence of concupiscence in conjugal intercourse. Such intercourse is good, but the carnal concupiscence or lust that accompanies it is not. Nevertheless spouses in their intercourse use this evil well, <sup>23</sup> and he wants them to be aware of this. "So let good spouses use the evil of concupiscence well, just as a wise man uses an imprudent servant for good tasks"; "I hold that to use lust is not always a sin, because to use evil well is not a sin"; "as for the warfare experienced by chaste persons, whether celibate or married, we assert that there could have been no such thing in paradise before [man's] sin. Marriage is still the same, but in begetting children nothing evil would then have been used; now the evil of

<sup>22</sup> "Deus utitur et malis bene" (*De civitate dei* 18.51); "non solum bonis, verum etiam malis bene uti novit [Deus]" (ibid. 14.27); "Deus omnipotens, Dominus universae creaturae, qui fecit omnia, sicut scriptum est, bona valde, sic ea ordinavit, ut et de bonis et de malis bene faciat" (*De agone christiano* 7); "Sicut autem bono male uti malum est, sic malo bene uti bonum est. Duo igitur haec, bonum et malum, et alia duo, usus bonus et usus malus, sibimet adiuncta quattuor differentias faciunt. Bene utitur bono continentiam dedicans Deo, male utitur bono continentiam dedicans idolo; male utitur malo concupiscentiam relaxans adulterio, bene utitur malo concupiscentiam restringens connubio" (*De peccatorum meritis* 1.57).

<sup>23</sup> *De nupt. et cone.* 1.9; 1.27; 2.34; 2.36; *De continentia* 27; *Contra Iulianum* 3.53; 4.35; 4.65; 5.46, 66; *Imperfectum opus Contra Iulianum* praefatio; 1.65; 2.31; 4.29; 4.107; 5.13; 5.20; 5.23; *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* 1.33; *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* 2.42; *De Trinitate* 13.23; etc.

concupiscence is used well"; "this evil is used well by faithful spouses."<sup>24</sup>

So, for Augustine lust is an evil. Nevertheless, spouses can nevertheless use it well in their truly conjugal intercourse, whereas unmarried people who yield to lust sin by using this evil badly.<sup>25</sup> It follows, within this logic, that the married person who engages in *illicit* intercourse uses lust badly and therefore sins. Illicit intercourse obviously comprises adultery, and there is no doubt that in Augustine's thought, it also covers contraception.

Augustine goes further still and proposes an opinion well set to clash directly with modern views on married sexuality. He holds that married intercourse is "excusable" (and wholly conjugal) only when it is carried out for the conscious purpose of having children.<sup>26</sup> If it is engaged in just for the satisfaction of concupiscence, it always carries with it some element of fault, at least of a venial type.

In his view, the intention of spouses in intercourse should not be pleasure for its own sake but rather procreation, adding that if in their intercourse the spouses intend more than what is needed for procreation, this evil (*malum*), which he refuses to consider as proper to marriage itself, remains excusable (*veniale*) because of the goodness of marriage itself.<sup>27</sup> Elsewhere he puts his view even more clearly: if pleasure-seeking is the main purpose of spouses

<sup>24</sup> "[S]ic utantur coniuges bani malo concupiscentiae, sicut sapiens ad opera utique bona ministro utitur imprudente" (*Contra Iulianum* 5.60); "Ego enim dico, uti libidine non semper esse peccatum; quia malo bene uti non est peccatum" (ibid.); "bellum quad in se casti sentiunt, sive continentes, sive etiam coniugati, hoc dicimus in paradiso, ante peccatum nullo modo esse potuisse. Ipsae ergo etiam nunc sunt nuptiae, sed in generandis filiis tunc nullo malo uterentur, nunc concupiscentiae malo bene utuntur" (ibid. 3.57); "hoc enim malo bene utuntur fideles coniugati" (ibid. 3.54) (cf. ibid. 4.1; 4.35; 5.63; etc.).

<sup>25</sup> "[W]ith shameful lust to have licit intercourse, is to use an evil well; to have it illicitly, is to use an evil badly" ("pudenda libidine qui licite concumbit, malo bene utitur; qui autem illicite, malo male utitur" [*De nupt. et cone.* 2.36]).

<sup>26</sup> "sexual intercourse necessary for begetting is free from blame, and it alone is [truly] nuptial" ("Concubitus enim necessarius causa generandi, inculpabilis et solus ipse nuptialis est" [*De bono coniugali* 11]); cf. "Only for the cause of procreating is the union of the sexes free from blame" ("Sola enim generandi causa est inculpabilis sexus utriusque commixtio" [*Senno* 351]).

<sup>17</sup> "non nuptiarum sit hoc malum, sed veniale sit propter nuptiarum bonum" (*De bono viduitatis* 4.5).

in their intercourse, they sin-but only venially on account of their Christian marriage.<sup>28</sup>

In support of this view Augustine time and again cites the passage in the seventh chapter of the First Letter to the Corinthians, where St. Paul "allows" Christian spouses to refrain from conjugal intercourse by mutual consent and for a time, but recommends that it not be for too long, "lest Satan tempt you through lack of self-control," adding that this advice of his is given not as a command, but *secundum indulgentiam*, or, as Augustine translates it, *secundum veniam*.

### 3. Saint Paul and 1 Corinthians 7:1-9

The first verses of this chapter have had extraordinary (and possibly disproportionate) importance in the development of Christian moral thought concerning conjugal relations. Bringing the full text before our mind can help us consider to what extent Augustine's and parallel subsequent interpretations are justified. Augustine of course wrote in Latin, so for key passages we reproduce parenthetically the Latin version which has been in common use over the ages—the Vulgate translation of his contemporary, St. Jerome.

It is well for a man not to touch a woman. But because of the temptation to immorality, each man should have his own wife and each woman her own husband. The husband should give to his wife her conjugal rights, and likewise the wife to her husband. For the wife does not rule over her own body, but the husband does; likewise the husband does not rule over his own body, but the wife does. Do not refuse one another except perhaps by agreement for a season, that you may devote yourselves to prayer; but then come together again, lest Satan tempt you through lack of self-control. I say this by way of concession, not of command [*Hoc autem dico secundum indulgentiam, non secundum imperium*]. I wish that all were as I myself am. But each has his own special gift from God, one of one kind and one of another. To the unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain single as I do. But if they cannot exercise self-

<sup>28</sup> "illis excessibus concumbendi, qui non fiunt causa prolis voluntate dominante, sed causa voluptatis vincente libidine, quae sunt in coniugibus peccata venialia" (*De nupt. et cone.* 1.27); "veniale peccatum sit propter nuptias Christianas" (*Contra Julianum* 4.33; cf. 3.43; *contra ep. Pel.* 1.33; 3.30).

control, they should marry. For it is better to marry than to be aflame with passion [*Melius est enim nubere quam uri*]. (1Cor7:1-9 [RSV])

Our attention for the moment centers on the words "Hoc autem dico secundum indulgentiam, non secundum imperium." Augustine translates as "secundum veniam" what Jerome renders as "secundum indulgentiam," and understands "venia" in the sense of pardon or forgiveness for what carries guilt.<sup>29</sup> Augustine's argument in fact rests wholly on this rendering, for he holds that if something requires a "venia" it necessarily involves a fault that qualifies as a sin.<sup>30</sup>

It is not dear, however, that Augustine is justified in his rendering; if he is not, his whole argument can of course be questioned. To suggest that in this passage St. Paul proposes to condone sin seems by all lights to force the original text. The Greek word used by St. Paul, *suggnome*, means "allowance" or "concession."<sup>31</sup> Saint Paul's mind is surely not that concession can be made to people so as to sin, but rather that allowance can be made to follow a less perfect way. This is precisely what he goes on to say in the following verse: "I wish that all were as I myself am. But each has his own special gift from God, one of one kind and one of another." It is clear that Paul regards the celibacy he has chosen as a more desirable way; at the same time, however, he presents marriage too as a "gift of God."

The thrust of St. Paul's thought seems rather to pass from a simple ascetical counsel for married people (it could be good to abstain for a time from conjugal relations), to a clarification that he regards his own choice of celibacy for God as higher than the

<sup>29</sup> Nowhere in the New Testament does the Vulgate employ "venia" in this sense; in the Old Testament four occurrences are to be found (Num 15:28; Wis 12:11; Sir 3:14-15; 25:34). "Indulgentia" appears three times in the Old Testament (Jdt 8:14, Isa 61: 1; 63:7); and once, in the passage we are considering, in the New Testament.

<sup>30</sup> *Contra ep. Pel.* 1.33; *De nupt. et cone.* 16; *De gr. et pecc. or.* 2.43; cf. *Contra Julianum* 2.20; 5.63; *Imperf. opus contra Julianum* 1.68; etc.

<sup>31</sup> The Revised Standard Version has "I say this by way of concession, not of command"; the New American Bible (1986) also uses "concession"; the Jerusalem Bible renders the whole passage more loosely: "This is a suggestion, not a rule."

married state, to the concession (with an "indulgent" outlook) that those who choose marriage also choose a gift of God.

If we turn to Saint Thomas, we find that he reads 1 Corinthians 7:6 according to the Vulgate "secundum indulgentiam" and not "secundum veniam," but seems to interpret the passage in much the same way as Augustine.<sup>32</sup> Elsewhere, however, he modulates his position more. Quietly observing that the Apostle appears to be expressing himself "a bit carelessly" (*inconvenienter*), inasmuch as he seems to imply that marriage is sinful,<sup>33</sup> Thomas comes up with two possible readings. In one "secundum indulgentiam" would refer to a permission not for sin but for what is less good; that is, Paul says it is good to marry, but less good than to remain celibate.<sup>34</sup> This seems to me the better interpretation. However, Thomas does allow another reading according to which sin may be present in marital intercourse: namely, when it is engaged in out of lust, albeit lust restricted to one's spouse. In this case there is venial sin, which would become mortal if one were indifferent whether the object of one's lust were one's spouse or not.<sup>35</sup>

### *C) Transition: From Marriage Affected by Concupiscence to Concupiscence "Remedied" by Marriage*

How and when did the notion of marriage being directed to the *remedy* of concupiscence emerge? While roots of the idea can be found in Augustine and Thomas, I do not consider that either

<sup>32</sup> The spouse who seeks married intercourse simply because he or she will otherwise not be continent, sins venially (*IV Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2).

<sup>33</sup> "videtur apostolus inconvenienter loqui; indulgentia enim non est nisi de peccato. Per hoc ergo quad apostolus, secundum indulgentiam se <licitmatrimonium concessisse, videtur exprimere quad matrimonium sit peccatum" (*Super I Car.*, c. 7, lect. 1).

<sup>34</sup> "apostolus hic indulget, id est, permittit matrimonium, quad est minus bonum quam virginitas, quae non praecipitur, quae est maius bonum" (*ibid.*).

<sup>35</sup> "Alia modo potest accipi indulgentia prout respicit culpam.... Et secundum hoc indulgentia refertur ad actum coniugalem secundum quad habet annexam culpam venialem... scilicet cum quis ad actum matrimonialem ex concupiscentia excitatur, quae tamen infra limites matrimonii sistit, ut scilicet cum sola uxore sit contentus. Quandoque vero est culpa mortalis, puta cum concupiscentia fertur extra limites matrimonii, scilicet cum aliquis accedit ad uxorem, aequae libenter vel libentius ad aliam accessurus" (*ibid.*; cf. *STh suppl.*, q. 40, a. 6).

of them held or proposed it in the sense that was current for centuries prior to the Second Vatican Council—a sense advanced and established by writers of those intervening centuries.

Both Augustine and Thomas are conscious of a sully and negative effect of concupiscence, even in married intercourse. Both try to show that the conjugal act is nevertheless "justified" <sup>36</sup> through its natural connection with the *bona* of marriage. For Augustine it is fundamentally the *bonum prolis* that justifies conjugal intercourse. Thomas is broader in his outlook and relates this justification also to the good of fidelity, <sup>37</sup> and to the unique unbreakable nature of the married bond. <sup>38</sup>

Whatever the merit of this viewpoint, it is clearly one thing to hold that the concupiscence of marital intercourse is "justified" or "excused" by marriage, and another to hold that it is "remedied" thereby. My reading of these two doctors is that the idea of marriage being a *remedium* of concupiscence is not directly proposed by either. Hence it should rather be considered a subsequent development.

The idea of marriage as a "remedy" appears only once or twice in Augustine's writings, while he never uses the actual phrase *remedium concupiscientiae*. In one of his most appealing passages in defense of the goodness of marriage, he writes: "The goodness of marriage is always a good thing indeed. In the people of God it was at one time an act of obedience to the law; now it is a remedy for weakness, and for some a solace of human nature." <sup>39</sup>

It is true that in another of his works, where he combats Pelagian viewpoints, one may claim to find a more direct reference to marriage considered as a remedy to *libido* or disordered sexual desire. The Pelagian bishop Julian of Eclanum had written that holy virginity, in its readiness to fight greater

<sup>36</sup> "Justified," as used by these two authors, would seem to have a much more positive meaning than modern parlance attributes to it. It is not merely that the act is "excused," but that it is rendered *just* in the biblical sense, that is, holy and pleasing to God.

<sup>37</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 2.

<sup>38</sup> See IV *Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1.

<sup>39</sup> "Nuptiarum igitur bonum semper est quidem bonum; sed in populo Dei fuit aliquando legis obsequium; nunc est infirmitatis remedium, in quibusdam vero humanitatis solatium" (*De bono vid.* 8.11; cf. *Gen. ad litt.* 9.7).

battles, had ignored the "remedy" of marriage. Augustine seizes on this point, and asks Julian: Against what disorder do you regard marriage as a remedy? Obviously (he answers) against the disorder of lust. Then, concludes Augustine, we are both agreed that marriage is a remedy; so why do you defend the very disorder of lust against which this "conjugal remedy" is directed?<sup>40</sup> The weight of this passage is debatable, but the context certainly countenances the view that the idea of marriage as a remedy, carelessly put forward by Julian, is used by Augustine rather to score a point against Pelagian logic than to propose his own considered mind on the subject.

Regarding Thomas, we find him twice briefly expressing the notion that matrimony exists also for the *remedium concupiscentiae*.<sup>41</sup> But particular attention should be directed to another passage where his mind appears more precisely. To the suggestion that marriage does not confer grace but is simply a "remedy," he replies,

this does not seem acceptable; for it implies that marriage is a remedy of concupiscence, either inasmuch as it curbs concupiscence—which cannot be without grace; or inasmuch as it satisfies concupiscence in part, which it does from the very nature of the act independently of any sacrament. Besides, concupiscence is not curbed by being satisfied but is rather increased, as Aristotle says in his *Ethics*.<sup>42</sup>

Here there is not the slightest hint of marriage being simply in itself a remedy of concupiscence. Thomas insists rather that either the remedy in question lies in the *curbing* of concupiscence—which is not possible without grace—or else it is to be taken in the sense of the simple satisfaction of concupiscence, and then it is not a remedy at all, but tends rather to its increase.

<sup>40</sup> "Dixisti enim: 'Sanctam virginitatem confidentia suae salutis et roboris contempsisse remedia, ut gloriosa posset exercere certamina'. Quaero quae remedia contempserit? Respondebis: Nuptias. Quaero: Ista remedia contra quem morbum sunt necessaria? Remedium quippe a medendo, id est a medicando, nomen accepit. Simul itaque videmus ambo remedium nuptiarum: cur tu laudas libidinis morbum ... si non ei resistat aut continentiae retinaculum, aut coniugale remedium?" (*Contra Jul.* 3.21.42).

<sup>41</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4; *Super I Car.* c. 7, lect. 1.

<sup>42</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1.



Later, again on the issue of whether marriage confers grace, he clinches his argument. Taking up again the objection that marriage, precisely because it tends to increase concupiscence, cannot be a vehicle of grace, he turns the objection around and says that grace is in fact conferred in marriage precisely to be a remedy *against* concupiscence, so as to *curb* it at its root (i.e., its self-absorbed tendency).<sup>43</sup> Clearly, to curb or repress concupiscence is not the same as to "remedy" it.

The attribution to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas of the teaching that marriage is directed to the "remedy *of* concupiscence" therefore lacks solid grounds. The simple term *remedium concupiscentiae* appears nowhere in Augustine's writings. He regards concupiscence as an evil factor affecting human life which married persons can nevertheless use well in intercourse ordained to procreation. Having given a broad description of marriage as a "remedy for weakness," he accepts that it is also a remedy *against* concupiscence. On a couple of occasions and speaking in general terms, Thomas does apply the phrase *remedium concupiscentiae* to marriage; but the more precise expression of his mind shows that for him too marriage is meant to be a remedy *against* concupiscence. He clearly shares Augustine's conviction that concupiscence is a negative element, even in married life, and one to be resisted. Expounding how each sacrament is given as a remedy against the deficiency of sin, he says that marriage is given as a "remedium contra concupiscentiam personalem," a remedy against concupiscence in the individual.<sup>44</sup> Concupiscence remains an enemy of personal holiness; each Christian has to fight against it. Marriage, especially in its sacramental nature, helps to fight this enemy.

Nowhere in Thomas's teaching do we find any suggestion that concupiscence or lust is "neutralized," and less still "emancipated," by the fact of getting married. It remains a threat to the married as to the single. Those who marry do have a special grace to fight against this threat so as to purify their marital intercourse

<sup>43</sup> IV *Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4.

<sup>44</sup> *STh* III, q. 65, a. 1; cf. IV *Sent.*, d. 2, q. 2; d. 26, q. 2.

of self-seeking and turn it more and more into an act of loving self-donation. But concupiscence remains a negative reality, a *malum* or evil to be used well, that is, to be purified.

In the century before Thomas Aquinas, Hugo of St. Victor (1096-1141) follows Augustine in presenting the "good" of marriage as countering the "bad" of concupiscence,<sup>45</sup> while Peter Lombard (1100-1160) simply says that marriage is "ad remedium" or "in remedium," without specifying the operation of this remedy.<sup>46</sup> Saint Bonaventure (1217-74) is as precise as his contemporary Thomas in his teaching: "The use of marriage ... acts as a remedy *against* concupiscence, when it checks it as a medicine."<sup>47</sup> Yet this precision is to be less and less respected and the importance attaching to it seems to be less and less understood. Already just before Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales (1170-1245), had written, "Matrimony is a remedy of lustful concupiscence."<sup>48</sup> This, rather than the precision of Thomas, is the line that will be followed in later centuries.<sup>49</sup> Theologians, without qualification or comment, state matter-of-factly that marriage exists (also) for the "remedy of concupiscence."

In the seventeenth century, the Jesuit Hermann Busenbaum writes that the spouses are united "ad remedium concupiscentiae."<sup>50</sup> Saint Alphonsus Liguori (1696-1787), the patron of moral theologians, teaches, "The accidental intrinsic ends of marriage are two: the procreation of offspring, and the remedy of concupiscence."<sup>51</sup>

By the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this form of expression is firmly established. The manuals of moral theology

<sup>45</sup> Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* 2.11(PL176:494).

<sup>46</sup> Peter Lombard, *N Sent.*, d. 26 (PL 192:908-9).

<sup>47</sup> "Est usus matrimonii ... in remedium contra concupiscentiam, dum ilia refrenat ut medicamentum" (Bonaventure, *IV Sent.*, d. 26, a. 1, q. 1).

<sup>48</sup> "Coniugium ... quod est in remedium libidinosae concupiscentiae" (Alexander of Hales, *In lib. IV*, d. 26 [*Glossa in IV Libras Sententiarum* (Quaracchi, 1957), 457]).

<sup>49</sup> One of the few exceptions is Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621): "Tertius finis est ut sit coniugium in remedium *contra* concupiscentiam" (*De sacramento matrimonii* 1.10).

<sup>50</sup> Hermann Busenbaum, *Medulla theologiae moralis.*, tract. 6, *De matrimonio*, c. 2.

<sup>51</sup> "Fines [matrimonii] intrinseci accidentales sunt duo, procreatio prolis, et remedium concupiscentiae" (Alphonsus Liguori, *Theologiae moralis* [Turin, 1888], lib. 6, p. 881).

m most common use before the Second Vatican Council unanimously propose the *remedium concupiscentiae* as one of the secondary ends of marriage, without subjecting the idea to any true critical analysis. One finds this not only in all of the Latin manuals,<sup>52</sup> but also in the best-known vernacular texts. Thomas Slater's manual speaks of "a lawful outlet for concupiscence" as does the even better-known manual of Henry Davis.<sup>53</sup> The *Dictionary of Moral Theology* says that "the secondary end is the remedy of concupiscence."<sup>54</sup>

Bernard Haring's *The Law of Christ*, although professedly updated in the light of Vatican II, repeats the same: "the sacrament of matrimony has a secondary or subordinate end or function (*finis secundarius*): the healing of concupiscence (*remedium concupiscentiae*)."<sup>55</sup> The 1967 *New Catholic Encyclopedia*<sup>56</sup> restates this traditional doctrine, as does the University of Salamanca's *Biblia Comentada*.<sup>57</sup> The 1963 edition of the well-known Ford-Kelly *Contemporary Moral Theology* lists the "remedy of concupiscence" among the essential ends of marriage.<sup>58</sup> The authors observe: "The remedy for concupiscence is

<sup>52</sup> Here is an extensive though not exhaustive list: A. Ballerini, S.J., *Opus theologicum morale* (Prati, 1892), 6:167; G. Bucceroni, S.J., *Institutiones theologiae moralis secundum doctrinam S. Thomae et S. Alphonsi* (Rome, 1898), 2:334; C. Marc, C.Ss.R., *Institutiones morales Alphonsianae* (Lugduni, 1900), 2:447; C. Pesch, S.J., *Praelectiones dogmaticae* (Freiburg, 1900), "De sacramentis," pars 2, n. 691; A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., *Theologia moralis* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1914), 2:616; F. M. Cappello, S.J., *Tractatus canonico-moralis* (Rome, 1927), 3:39; L. Wouters, C.Ss.R., *Manuale theologiae moralis* (Bruges, 1933), 2:542; E. Genicot, S.J., *Institutiones theologiae moralis* (Brussels, 1936), 2:410; J. Aertnys, C.Ss.R. and C. A. Darnen, C.Ss.R., *Theologia moralis* (Turin, 1950), 2:473; H. Noldin, S.J., *Summa theologiae moralis* (Innsbruck, 1962), 429; B. H. Merkelbach, O.P., *Summa theologiae moralis* (Bruges, 1956), 3:759; E. F. Regatillo, S.J., et M. Zalba, S.J., *Theologiae moralis summa* (Madrid, 1954), 3:582; G. Mausbach, *Teologia morale* (Alba, 1956), 3:144; Ad. Tanquerey, *Synopsis theologiae moralis et pastoralis* (Paris, 1955), 381.

<sup>53</sup> T. Slater, S.J., *A Manual of Moral Theology* (New York, 1925), 200; H. Davis, S.J., *Moral and Pastoral Theology* (New York, 1958), 4:69.

<sup>54</sup> *Dictionary of Moral Theology* (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1962), 732.

<sup>55</sup> Bernard Haring, *The Law of Christ* (Cork: Mercier Press, 1967): translated from the 7th German edition of *Das Gesetz Christi* of 1963.

<sup>56</sup> *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (1967), s.v. "MARRIAGE (THEOLOGY OF)."

<sup>57</sup> *Biblia Comentada* 6:403 (Madrid: BAC, 1965).

<sup>58</sup> John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., *Contemporary Moral Theology* (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1963), 2:48, 75.

now beginning to be called, or at least partially explained as the sexual fulfillment of the partners, thus giving it a more positive content" ;<sup>59</sup> "sexual activity and sexual pleasure are now considered by theologians to have positive values. Formerly the attitude toward sex was negative and disparaging. Sexual expression even in marriage was somewhat reluctantly given its place. It needed to be 'excused' by the *tria bona* of marriage. Today Catholic theologians attribute positive values to sex, which would have surprised St. Augustine, if not St. Thomas."<sup>60</sup> Nevertheless, the authors state that they prefer to continue using the traditional expression *remedium concupiscentiae*.<sup>61</sup>

It is right to remark that, rather than in specific teachings of Augustine or Thomas, this century-old traditional view has sought its justification in the difficult phrase-"melius est nubere quam uri"-used by St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 7:7-9. Paul first remarks, "I wish that all were as I myself am [i.e., celibate]. But each has his own special gift from God, one of one kind and one of another." He then addresses those who are not married: "To the unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain single as I do. But if they cannot exercise self-control, they should marry, for it is better to marry than to burn [with passion]."

The last sentence of this passage seems clearly addressed to particular persons: not to the unmarried generally, but to those among them who lack sexual self-control. Nevertheless, a whole tradition of moral thinking zeroed in on these words and, taking them out of their limited scriptural context, used them to sustain a broad and generalized doctrine with a twofold implication: marriage is for those who lack self-control; <sup>62</sup> hence, self-control

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 2:48.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 2:97. Augustine might have been surprised at this comment which fails to grasp the distinction he makes between sexual pleasure (which is a good accompaniment of marital intercourse) and lust which is its bad accompaniment: see Burke, "St. Augustine and Conjugal Sexuality," 551-53.

<sup>61</sup> Ford and Kelly, *Contemporary Moral Theology*, 2:99.

<sup>62</sup> The 1950 edition of a much-used manual thus explains the purpose of the *remedium concupiscentiae*, as an end of marriage: "so that those who are conscious of their weakness, and do not want to sustain the attack of the flesh, can use the remedy of matrimony in order to avoid sins of lust" [Aertnys-Damen, *Theologia Moralit*, 2:473].

in marriage, at least in the spouses' sexual relations, is not of special importance.

It is hard to say which of these two propositions should be considered the more harmful. The former underpinned the millennial mindset which regarded marriage as a sort of second-class Christian option. The latter was arguably the strongest obstacle to the development of a properly conjugal asceticism or spirituality: that is, a spiritual approach for married persons powerful and deep enough to help them seek perfection within-and not despite-the peculiar conditions of their proper way of life.

Over the centuries and up to our times the Church has unquestionably suffered from a disregard of and neglect towards the spiritual possibilities of marriage. The scant number of married persons among declared saints (extraordinarily few in proportion to celibates) reflected or perhaps provoked the widespread idea that "getting married" was the normal alternative to "having a vocation." Marriage was not for those who were called; it was rather for the disadvantaged.

Not only that. The main handicap that those who chose to marry apparently suffered from-their lack of self-control-was considered either to be automatically remedied by the act of marrying, or in any case to be no longer of great account. It was not that to marry stopped the "burning" of lust or concupiscence, but that once married one could yield unconcernedly to this "burning," whose satisfaction is legitimized by marrying. In this view, conjugal relations, justified by being oriented to procreation, were exempt from any further moral or ascetical issue of control or purification. Lust, having been "remedied," is no longer a troublesome force for married people, nor need one consider it as a source of imperfection, or an enemy to the growth of their married love and their sanctification before God.

In practice, the idea that marriage was the *remedium concupiscentiae* seemed to suggest to many-ordinary people and pastors-that concupiscence in marriage could be given way to quite freely. The only requirement laid down for the satisfaction of sexual desire in marriage was that the procreative orientation

of the conjugal act be respected. If that condition was fulfilled, neither morality nor spirituality had further guidelines to offer.

It seems to me that the moral evaluation of concupiscence remained stuck in this standpoint: the indulgence of sexual concupiscence, being always seriously sinful outside marriage, is legitimate for spouses, simply provided that the procreative orientation of the marriage act is respected. This appears as the almost universal moral analysis of sexual concupiscence: there is only one proper and licit place for its indulgence, and that is marriage. In other words, *marriage legitimizes sexual concupiscence or lust*. This is the understanding of the *remedium concupiscentiae* that has established itself among Catholic theologians and moralists, to the point of being considered well-nigh axiomatic.

Concupiscence in marriage is appraised therefore not as a force to be resisted, but as something simply "remedied" by marriage itself. This, I maintain, was the common attitude as late as the middle of the twentieth century, when the idea of "married spirituality" was being seriously proposed. Further, despite the dear teaching of the Second Vatican Council on the universal call to holiness, including married people in particular, the attitude remains prevalent today.

#### *D) The Twentieth Century: Unrealistic Optimism (?) And Pessimistic (?) Realism*

With the twentieth century, signs appeared of a desire to renew theological and ascetical reflection on marriage. Early "personalist" writers such as Herbert Doms and Bernard Krempel sought to underline the human value of intercourse as an expression of conjugal love, though on the basis of a very inadequate level of anthropological analysis. Doms saw the essence of marriage in the physical union of the spouses, and its end as their fulfillment and realization as persons. He denied that, in order to be unitive, married intercourse must retain its intrinsic orientation to offspring, maintaining that "the conjugal act is full of meaning

and carries its own justification in itself, independently of its orientation towards offspring. "<sup>63</sup> Krempel ignored offspring as an end of marriage; its end is the "life-union" of man and woman, the child being simply the expression of this union. <sup>64</sup>

This is an example of personalism working at a very superficial level. Perhaps it was in reaction that Pius XI's encyclical *Casti connubii* (1930), while giving new prominence to the importance of love in marriage, insisted that "love" is secondary to the main end of procreation. In line with the accepted tradition, the encyclical teaches that the satisfying of concupiscence is also an end which the spouses may seek, but does not broach the issue of the relationship between concupiscence itself and marital love. In matrimony, it says, "there are also secondary ends, such as mutual aid, the cultivating of mutual love, and the satisfying [*sedatio*] of concupiscence which husband and wife are not forbidden to consider so long as the due ordination of intercourse to the primary end is respected. "<sup>65</sup>

As the twentieth century progressed, it ushered in a new (and perhaps not sufficiently qualified) emphasis on the dignity of the physical sexual relationship in marriage. This no doubt left many moralists not too happy with the earlier opinion that there is venial sin in having conjugal intercourse just for pleasure. Rather than seeking a possible solution of the matter through a deeper analysis of the relationship between love and the sexual urge, the tendency was to side-step the issue. So we read in the last pre-Vatican II edition of a widely used manual:

[I]n practice there is no need to worry spouses if they exercise the conjugal act in an ordinary and upright way without actually thinking of a particular end. The reason is that the conjugal act performed in a natural way fosters marital love and this love favors the good of offspring-in view of which, as all the authors teach, conjugal intercourse is licit.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>63</sup> H. Dorns, "Conception personnaliste du mariage d'après S. Thomas," *Revue Thomiste* 45 (1939): 763.

<sup>64</sup> See A. Perego, "Fine ed essenza della società coniugale," *Divus Thomas* 56 (1953): 357ff.

<sup>65</sup> H. Denzinger, ed., *Enchiridion symbolorum*, 21-23 ed. (Herder, 1937), n. 2241.

<sup>66</sup> D. M. Priimrner, *Manuale theologiae moralis* (Barcelona: Herder, 1961), 3:504.

This begs the question of whether intercourse, in order to be a truly natural expression of marital love, needs to be purified as far as possible from the concupiscence that accompanies it.

By contrast, the late-twentieth-century magisterium offers startlingly new perspectives on this whole issue. Pope John Paul II opened his pontificate with a detailed and surprising weekly catechesis, now commonly known as the "Theology of the Body."<sup>67</sup> This extended from September 1979 to November 1984. It offered an extraordinarily profound view of the purpose and dignity of human sexuality and the conjugal union. It also dwelt on the presence and dangers of lust within marriage.

In July 1982, treating of both virginal celibacy and marriage as "gifts of God," John Paul II took up those difficult passages in St. Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians: "it is well for a man not to touch a woman. But because of the danger of incontinence, each man should have his own wife and each woman her own husband"; and "to unmarried persons and to widows I say, It is good for them to remain as I am. But if they cannot live in continence, let them marry. It is better to marry than to burn."<sup>68</sup> The pope posed the question:

Does the Apostle in First Corinthians perhaps look upon marriage exclusively from the viewpoint of a remedy for concupiscence, as used to be said in traditional theological language? The statements mentioned ... would seem to verify this. However, right next to the statements quoted, we read a passage in the seventh chapter of First Corinthians that leads us to see differently Paul's teaching as a whole: "I wish that all were as I myself am, [he repeats his favorite argument for abstaining from marriage]-but each has his own special gift from God, one of one kind, and one of another"; (1 Cor 7:7). Therefore even those who choose marriage and live in it receive a gift from God, his own gift, that is, the grace proper to this choice, to this way of living, to this state. The gift received by persons who live in marriage is different from the one received by

<sup>67</sup> Pope John Paul II, *The Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan* (Boston: Pauline Books, 1997).

<sup>68</sup> 1Cor7:1-2, 8-9. Saint Thomas, it should be noticed, is quite critical of St. Paul's phrase, "It is better to marry than to burn," which he considers an "abusive" way of putting things: "Est autem hic attendendum quod apostolus utitur abusiva comparatione; nam nubere bonum est, licet minus, uri autem est malum. Melius est ergo, id est magis tolerandum, quod homo minus bonum habeat, quam quod incurrat incontinentiae malum" (*Super I Cor.*, c. 7, lect. 1) (emphasis added).



persons who live in virginity and choose continence for the sake of the kingdom of God. All the same, it is a true gift from God, one's own gift, intended for concrete persons. It is specific, that is, suited to their vocation in life. We can therefore say that while the Apostle, in his characterization of marriage on the human side ... strongly emphasizes the reason concerning concupiscence of the flesh, at the same time, with no less strength of conviction, he stresses also its sacramental and charismatic character. With the same clarity with which he sees man's situation in relation to concupiscence of the flesh, he sees also the action of grace in every person-in one who lives in marriage no less than in one who willingly chooses continence. (*Theology of the Body*, 295)

The least that can be said from a reading of this passage is that John Paul II, while not explicitly rejecting the concept of *remedium concupiscentiae*, suggests that the traditional teaching on the matter has remained one-sided precisely because of a failure to weigh the sacramental implications of marriage.

Some months later in 1982, the pope's catechesis turned more directly to the sacramentality of marriage. Once again he showed a clear reserve regarding the concept of marriage as a remedy for concupiscence, and insisted rather that the sacramental grace of marriage enables the spouses to dominate concupiscence and purify it of its dominant self-seeking.

These statements of St. Paul [quoted above] have given rise to the opinion that marriage constitutes a specific remedy for concupiscence. However, as we have already observed, St. Paul teaches explicitly that marriage has a corresponding special "gift," and that in the mystery of redemption marriage is given to a man and a woman as a grace.

Within this mystery of redemption, as the pope sees it, the sacramental graces of marriage, sustaining conjugal chastity, have a special effect in achieving the redemption of the body through the overcoming of concupiscence.

As a sacrament of the Church, marriage ... [is] a word of the Spirit which exhorts man and woman to model their whole life together by drawing power from the mystery of the "redemption of the body." In this way they are called to chastity as to a state of life "according to the Spirit" which is proper to them (cf. Rom 8:4-5; Gal 5:25). The redemption of the body also signifies in this case that hope which, in the dimension of marriage, can be defined as the hope of daily

life, the hope of temporal life. On the basis of such a hope the concupiscence of the flesh as the source of the tendency toward an egoistic gratification is dominated .... Those who, as spouses, according to the eternal divine plan, join together so as to become in a certain sense one flesh, are also in their turn called, through the sacrament, to a life according to the Spirit. This corresponds to the gift received in the sacrament. In virtue of that gift, by leading a life according to the Spirit, the spouses are capable of rediscovering the particular gratification which they have become sharers of. As much as concupiscence darkens the horizon of the inward vision and deprives the heart of the clarity of desires and aspirations, so much does "life according to the Spirit" (that is, the grace of the sacrament of marriage) permit man and woman to find again the true liberty of the gift, united to the awareness of the spousal meaning of the body in its masculinity and femininity. (*Theology of the Body*, 348-49)

This dense passage teaches in summary that through the specific grace of matrimony, spouses can purify the conjugal act of the grasping and self-centered spirit inherent in concupiscence, and so recapture the truly donative experience and pleasure of marital intercourse. This marks a step forward in magisterial teaching of extraordinary significance. (We will return to this below.)

New stances and insights continue to be presented by the magisterium of these last decades. They show that while the Church is expressing a deepened appreciation of the dignity of sexual intercourse in marriage-as an act of love-union and mutual self-giving-it has not weakened its teaching that our whole nature, and sexual desire in particular, was seriously impacted by the Fall.

The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* teaches clearly and emphatically that, as a result of original sin, an operative evil is to be found in human nature-not least in the sexual attraction between man and woman, also inside marriage. In a section entitled "Marriage under the regime of sin," the *Catechism* insists,

Every man experiences evil around him and within himself. This experience makes itself felt in the relationships between man and woman. Their union has always been threatened by discord, a spirit of domination, infidelity, jealousy, and conflicts that can escalate into hatred and separation. (1606)

According to faith the disorder we notice so painfully does not stem from the nature of man and woman, nor from the nature of their relations, but from sin.

As a break with God, the first sin had for its first consequence the rupture of the original communion between man and woman. Their relations were distorted by mutual recriminations; their mutual attraction, the Creator's own gift, changed into a relationship of domination and lust. (1607)

A relationship of lust! Strong words indeed, to describe a distortion that tends to affect relations between the sexes from adolescence to old age—even, as the context makes clear, in inter-spousal relations. As is evident, the *Catechism* gives no support to the idea that concupiscence is in some way "remedied" —in the sense of being eliminated or reduced to nonimportance—by the simple fact of getting married: just the contrary.

With deliberate directness, the *Catechism* puts forward ideas not likely to gain easy acceptance among our contemporaries. Some may take them as showing that the Church is still imbued with Augustinian (or Thomistic) pessimism about sexuality. That must be firmly contested: what is being taught here is not pessimism but realism. In pointing to real difficulties that accompany and can threaten sexual love, these texts rather call Christians to deeper reflection on ways of solving these dangers, so that love itself can grow.

## II. CONUPISCENCE AND MARRIED LOVE: A DEEPER ANALYSIS

### A) *Lust, Normal [Simple] Sexual Desire, and Conjugal Desire*

Fine distinctions need to be drawn here; to begin with, between lust and 'normal' sexual desire. This may provoke the reaction: but surely 'normal sexual desire' is inseparable from some element of lust? The objection itself points to the need for deeper analyses of sexuality, sexual reaction, and sexual attraction.

The concept of 'normal' bears reference not first to frequency but to order. Civil disorder may be frequent in certain situations, but only an improper use of language would classify it as normal. In most intersex relations concupiscent lust is just below the

surface, present and ready to assert itself. Its constant presence suggests a disorder and indicates in fact a state of abnormality.

The modern difficulty in understanding the Church's teaching on married sexuality stems in large part from a failure to distinguish between lust and what is (or should be) normal sexual desire: that is, between assertive and unregulated sexual desire, bent foremost on physical self-satisfaction, and simple sexual attraction, which can include a desire for union and is characterized by respect and regulated by love. The two are not to be equated. Pope John Paul II insists on the distinction: "the perennial call . . . and, in a certain sense, the perennial mutual attraction on man's part to femininity and on woman's part to masculinity, is an indirect invitation of the body. But it is not lust in the sense of the word in Matthew 5:27-28" (*Theology of the Body*, 148).

Lust or sexual concupiscence is a disorder and hence always an evil. Sexual desire (just as sexual pleasure) is not an evil but a good, provided it is directed and subordinated to conjugal love and made a proper part of it. Sexual desire is part of conjugal love; concupiscence, though present also in marriage, is not. Hence their moral evaluation is totally different. The distinction should be evident, but only if one carefully ponders and respects the propriety of terms.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>69</sup> It is good news to hear of the new translation by Michael Waldstein of *Theology of the Body*. However, in one point of his rendering of John Paul H's text, there seems to be room for disagreement (I follow his comments given in an interview with Zenit, 1June2006). He considers that the English translations hitherto in use are misleading in speaking of "lust," when simple sexual desire is closer to John Paul H's thought ("Desire can be good or bad; lust is a vice", he rightly says). As a particular example he adduces precisely the passage in Matt 5:28. Translations up to now have followed the Revised Standard Version according to which Jesus says, "Whoever looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart." Waldstein considers that "John Paul H's translation is much closer to the Greek original; it has 'Whoever looks at a woman to desire her' . . .".

It is seldom that translations are not debatable. In this case I would not agree with Michael Waldstein. The Freiburg Greek Lexicon gives three shades of meaning (and three biblical examples) for the Greek word used here, *epithumeo*: "(1) gener. of a strong impulse toward someth. *desire, long for* (Lk 16.21); (2) in a good sense, of natural or commendable *desire long for, earnestly desire* (Lk 22.15); (3) in a bad sense, of unrestricted desire for a forbidden pers. or thing *lust for or after, crave, covet* (Mt 5.28; Acts 20.33)" (cf. BibleWorks commentary). Surely it is indisputable that in this passage Jesus is speaking of desire that is gravely

## 1. Sexual Concupiscence

Lust or carnal concupiscence can be described as the engrossing urge for pleasure and exploitative possession which, in our present condition, almost always accompanies sexual desire and tends to take it over. From the moral point of view, it is a negative force and a powerful enemy of true human and spiritual growth.

The Christian idea of sexual concupiscence can only be understood in the light of the Fall. Christians hold that the original state of man and woman vis-a-vis each other was one of joyous harmony, particularly in relation to their reciprocal sexuality with its potential for mutual appreciation and enrichment, and for unitive and fruitful love. The mutual attraction between man and woman naturally has its physical aspect and this too, as the *Catechism* says, is part of "the Creator's own gift" (1607).

Sin wrecked this easy and harmonious peace of the man-woman relationship. After the Fall, says the *Catechism*, "the harmony in which they [Adam and Eve] had found themselves, thanks to original justice, is now destroyed: the control of the soul's spiritual faculties over the body is shattered" (400); and this disorder can extend to the marital relationship itself: "*the union* of man and woman becomes subject to tensions, their relations henceforth marked by lust and domination" (*ibid.*; cf. 409).

## 2. Normal Sexual Attraction

Sexual concupiscence cannot be equated simply with physical sexual attraction or even with a desire for genital union. The

disordered; otherwise how explain his judgment that the look is equivalent to having "already committed adultery with her in his heart"? It is clear that John Paul II himself, in his audience of 17 September 1980, proposes this understanding (*Theology of the Body*, 148; cf. *ibid.*, 157).

Randall Colton, in a recent article, shows the philosophical confusion that results from identifying lust with simple sexual desire (see Randall Colton, "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity," *The Thomist* 70 [2006]: 71-101).

romantic or idealistic love between a teenage boy and girl (frequently still to be found even in our modern sensualized world) may be accompanied by a desire to show bodily affection—a desire filled with a tenderness and respect that operate as a powerful curb, not only on lust if it seeks to assert itself, but also on bodily expressions of love which would not be true to the real existential relationship between the couple. This is part of the chastity natural to incipient adolescent sexuality. Its power should not be underestimated, not least because natures fresh to sexuality can have a purer sense of the mystery of the body and a spontaneous understanding of the true relationship of bodily actions to human love.

### 3. Sexual Attraction (Desire), and Conjugal Attraction

In virtue of their complementarity, the sexes naturally experience an attraction to each other that does not always take the form of a physical desire (though, as we have mentioned, unbalanced desire may in our present state be just below the surface). Ability to appreciate and admire well-developed masculine or feminine characteristics is a sign of growing human maturity. As young people meet in the context of normal social friendships between men and women, more particularized one-to-one relationships develop in response to what could be called the "conjugal instinct" or attraction. In its essence this "instinct" is more spiritual than physical; in the Christian understanding it corresponds to the natural desire for forming a committed and exclusive life-long partnership with a spouse.<sup>70</sup> As the conjugal instinct inspires two persons in preparation for marriage, it leads them to avoid any physical relations that would express a permanent union which they have not yet freely and mutually

<sup>70</sup> A rota! sentence quotes St. Thomas, "Man is naturally made for marriage. Hence the conjugal bond, or marriage, is natural" (*STh suppl.*, q. 41, a. 1), and adds: "Marriage as proposed by the Church corresponds to the natural understanding which man and woman have of that exclusive, permanent and fruitful union with a member of the other sex to which one is naturally led by the human conjugal instinct" (*coram* C. Burke, 12 December 1994, *Rotae Romanae Decisiones* [Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1997], vol. 86, p. 719).

ratified. This is the human and anthropological sense of premarital chastity. Once they are married, their physical conjugal union becomes *the* conjugal act which, when realized in a human way, gives true and unique expression to their spousal relationship. In participating in it in its full significance, they express their marital chastity.

#### 4. When Love and Lust Collide

We mentioned above the pure air of first adolescent love. Unfortunately sexual attraction finds it more and more difficult to keep breathing that air. Love needs to be very strong indeed if it is to remain pure and delicate, generous in gift and not grasping in possession—even when, ultimately, it has the right to possess. This applies to the whole of premarital friendship between the sexes, to courtship, and to marriage itself.

Normal friendship between a teenage boy and girl can only be sincere and grow if they are on guard against lust. When the attraction between a boy and girl or a young man and woman takes the form of a more particularized love, then it is even more important to keep love free from lust. Clarity of mind and firmness of purpose are needed to achieve this. If love is sincere, there is little difficulty in noting the issues or differences that may arise. On the one hand, the indiscriminate instinct of lust with its promptings to seek satisfaction with the first appealing person available; on the other hand, there is the particularized human instinct (the conjugal instinct already present) urging to keep the gift of sexuality for *one*, and to respect that one when found before there is a mutual conjugal commitment. No one will say that this instinct of respect is easy to follow; but if true love is there, the instinct too will be there.

Let us consider now the union of man and woman in marriage,<sup>71</sup> which is the fullest setting for human love. It is in

<sup>71</sup> Conjugal union is a matter of both body and spirit. To be attracted by the body of one's spouse and to want to be united in body with the spouse is indeed part of normal conjugal desire. But another, and more important, part of that desire is to be attracted by the person of the other and to want to have a union of persons. The importance of this double aspect

marriage that the collision of love and lust can be most dramatic, with so much depending on its outcome. We recall the title-"Marriage under the regime of sin"-under which the *Catechism* insists that the harmony and ease of the original communion between man and woman have been ruptured by a "disorder [that] we notice so painfully": the disorder of concupiscence which takes over when mutual sexual attraction, instead of being filled with respect and love, is "changed into a relationship of domination and lust" (1607).

Here our thoughts go naturally back to Augustine and to the terms in which he described this disorder: the evil of lust that spouses need to "use well" (i.e., to turn to good use), but which can frustrate and separate them if they use it badly. Augustine's view is nuanced and complex, but our reflections may help us see that it is neither pessimistic nor characterized by an anti-sex spirit.<sup>72</sup> One might perhaps give a modern 'personalist' expression to his view by saying that spouses use the sexual attraction between them well when, through constant vigilance, they raise it to the level of conjugal vitality and keep it there; and they use it badly when they let it decline toward the level of mere animal mating.

becomes clearer if we think in terms of love and not just of attraction or desire. Human spousal love is directed not mainly to the body but above all to the person of the other. The two loves-for the body and for the person-should ideally be in perfect harmony. In practice they often are not. In fact they can be in opposition (i.e., when desire for the body detaches itself from love for the person). That this can happen is nothing new, but it is certainly disturbing and a matter to be taken firmly into account.

<sup>72</sup> I am seeking to develop an argument in personalist terms, and Augustine can scarcely be classified as a personalist in the modern sense. He nowhere distinguishes concupiscence from good sexual attraction, and some of his statements can indeed appear to equate concupiscence with simple sexual desire or with the pleasure accompanying marital intercourse. Nevertheless, as I have sought to show elsewhere, this is not his true mind: concupiscence for him does not mean the physical pleasure accompanying conjugal intercourse (which he defends), but the tendency to let the urge for that pleasure eclipse its true purpose and meaning (see Burke, "St. Augustine and Conjugal Sexuality," 551-53). Those modern commentators who accuse Augustine of pessimism fail at least as much he does to distinguish between "good" and "bad" sexual desire. My wish is not to present Augustine as a personalist but rather to draw attention to the depth and realism of his analysis, so underappreciated today.



The contemporary magisterium insists time and again that each human being must be treated as a person and never as a thing. This is a rule for all human relationships, but for none as much as marriage. The conjugal instinct-as we have called it-wants to relate to one's spouse as to a person, never just as to a mere object to be used for one's own physical satisfaction. Carnal concupiscence, on the other hand, also present in marriage, tends in its self-centered forcefulness to disturb the loving relationship that should exist between husband and wife, and so can easily prevent marital sexuality from being completely at the service of love. Concupiscence wants to have and use the other person. Possession and satisfaction, not gift and union, are its concern. "In itself, concupiscence is not capable of promoting union as the communion of persons. By itself, it does not unite, but appropriates. The relationship of the gift is changed into the relationship of appropriation" (*Theology of the Body*, 127).

*B) A More Comprehensive Moral Evaluation of Conjugal Intercourse*

At this point in our study the need for a deeper moral appraisal of conjugal sexuality is apparent. The hitherto prevalent evaluation of conjugal intercourse-centered almost exclusively on its procreative function and finality-is both dated and deficient. Recent magisterial teaching has made it clear that the evaluation must be made also in view of the unitive function of the conjugal act, precisely bearing in mind that the two aspects, procreative and unitive, are inseparable (cf. *Humanae vitae* 12).

A strong warrant for this broadened moral basis can be drawn from the personalist emphasis-on the dignity of the person, on the unity between body and soul and on the union between the spouses-that is to be found in magisterial teaching over the past forty years. This is noticeably present in *Gaudium et spes*,<sup>73</sup> especially in the chapter it devotes to marriage.<sup>74</sup> The constitution

<sup>73</sup> See *GS* 12, 23, 26, 28-29, 40-46.

<sup>74</sup> *GS* 47-52.

proposes a new and important principle governing the evaluation of the conjugal act: "the acts in marriage by which the intimate and chaste union of the spouses takes place are noble and honorable; the performance of these acts *in a truly human way [modo vere humano]* fosters the self-giving they signify."<sup>75</sup> The insistence that the conjugal act must be carried out "in a truly human way" raises the whole subject of conjugal intercourse above any merely corporal-physiological analysis. Intercourse is a physical corporal reality indeed; but depending on "the humanity" with which it is (or is not) performed, it will truly express, or may deny, the loving donation of the marital relationship.

This phrase from *Gaudium et spes* has taken on new significance with the 1983 *Code of Canon Law*. These three words, "modo vere humano," now qualify the juridical understanding of the consummation of marriage. A marriage is considered "consummated, if the spouses have *in a human manner* engaged together in a conjugal act in itself apt for the generation of offspring, to which act marriage is by its nature ordered, and by it the spouses become one flesh" (c. 1061, §1). The qualifying phrase was not present in the corresponding canon of the 1917 *Code* (c. 1015, §1) and jurisprudence, in line with the general teaching of moral theology, tended to limit consideration of what constitutes "a conjugal act in itself apt for the generation of offspring" to the simple physical completion of intercourse through natural insemination. This is no longer adequate. The addition of the phrase "in a human manner" seems to preclude any consideration of the act limited exclusively to its physical aspect.<sup>76</sup> The determination of the value of the phrase, for the purposes of canonical jurisprudence, poses no small problems but,

<sup>75</sup> GS 49.

<sup>76</sup> It is clear that there is no consummation through a *copula* not carried out "humano modo," as verified for instance in the case of contraceptive intercourse-where there is no true *unio carnis*. It is not so clear to what degree or at what point insistence (short of physical brute force) of one party overcoming the reluctance of the other to have intercourse so "dehumanizes" the act that it can scarcely be considered any longer a physical expression of marital union.

independently of how canonists deal with these questions, it is very suggestive from the anthropological and ascetical points of view, dearly calling for an enriched understanding of the marital copula. The major implication would be that intercourse is not done "humano modo" just because it is open to procreation. The human nature of the act also lies in its being an act of intimate self-donation to, and of union with, one's spouse: a reconfirmation in the body of one's singular choice of him or her, a reconfirmation that is humanly expressed not only in the giving and receiving of pleasure but even more essentially in the care, respect, tenderness, and reverence accompanying the physical act.

We could already ask whether, in the present state of human nature, the sexual act tends spontaneously and easily to express all of this. Most people would agree that it does *not-at least not* easily. It can and should express it, but will only do so with an effort because, so to speak, much of the humanity of the conjugal act has been lost. It will be recovered only by those who consciously exercise a control over the self-absorbed mood that now tends to dominate it. But lest we anticipate conclusions that should come later, let us continue with the implications of "modo vere humano exerciti."

The phrase itself suggests the disjunction: while conjugal intercourse can take place in a "truly human way" that gives it its dignity as a means of expressing and fostering conjugal love, it can also be performed in a way that, being less than truly *human*, neither properly expresses nor fosters spousal love.

The conjugal act is a physical-corporeal action charged with human significance which-it must be emphasized-derives from its unitive as well as its procreative aspects, both in inseparable connection. Anti-procreative measures destroy the unitive function of the act, but it is also true that anti-unitive practices, even if the procreative orientation is respected, undermine the human significance of the act. A union effected in a mood of grasping appropriation gives poor expression to the mutual loving gift that should mark true conjugality; and the same is true of a union motivated mainly by self-seeking. Here we are touching the

particularly human dimensions of conjugal intercourse. And the morality ("morality" here is as much as to say "the truly human quality") of the act must consider the special moral dimension that arises from the self-centeredness or the other-centeredness lived by each of the spouses in conjugal intercourse.

Biology alone is not capable of furnishing the true moral and human dimension of conjugal intercourse, since it cannot be exclusively considered as a corporal act directed to biological procreation. It is a human act of spousal union, not just of the spouses' bodies but also of their very persons. The bodily act should in every respect express the loving union of persons. As we read in *Familiaris Consortia*:

Sexuality, by means of which man and woman give themselves to one another through the acts which are proper and exclusive to spouses, is by no means something purely biological, but concerns the innermost being of the human person as such. It is realized in a truly human way only if it is an integral part of the love by which a man and a woman commit themselves totally to one another until death. The total physical self-giving would be a lie if it were not the sign and fruit of a total personal self-giving. (PC 11)

The last sentence in this passage suggests the moral goal and challenge before the spouses: that every aspect of their married life should be marked by loving participation, by generous giving and not by selfish taking.

### 1. What Makes the Conjugal Act Unitive

It is an extraordinary fact that right down to our days there has been so little attempt to analyze and put in clear light what it is that turns sexual intercourse into a unique expression of conjugal love and self-giving. The formidable and widespread contraceptive movement of the last century, with its pretense that the conjugal act is fully and singularly expressive of marital love and union *even if* its procreative orientation is artificially excluded, forced a deeper anthropological analysis of why this is simply not so.

The procreative design of the conjugal act is evident and undeniable. The contraceptive movement proposes various

physical or chemical ways to cancel or negate this procreative design, claiming at the same time that this can be done without in any way rendering the act less expressive of the unique relationship of the partners as husband and wife (i.e., less an act of spousal union).

Elsewhere I have examined the inherent fallacy of this contraceptive argument.<sup>77</sup> What makes intercourse between spouses a unique expression of distinctive conjugal union is precisely the sharing in their mutual complementary procreative power. If the procreative orientation of the act is deliberately frustrated through contraception, then it no longer unites the spouses in any distinctively conjugal way. It is no longer *the* conjugal act—the most distinctive physical expression of full mutual surrender and permanent loving union. It is in fact no longer a sexual act in any true human sense, for there is no actual sexual intercourse or communication. The spouses refuse true carnal converse with one another, each rather using the other's body for pleasure. But a mere exchange together of pleasure neither expresses nor achieves spousal union, for there is nothing in that pleasure that draws a person out of his or her solitude and draws each into a greater oneness with the other. This refusal of union, this voluntary remaining in solitariness, tends inexorably to the separation of the spouses. Contraception may be mutually gratifying but is no way unifying, tending rather to shut each spouse off in individual satisfaction. Hence it is not wholly exaggerated to speak of it as a mutual experience of solitary sex.<sup>78</sup>

## 2. Self-centeredness, the Enemy of Conjugal Love

Love moves outward toward the loved one; it seeks the good of the beloved. It is donative and, although it naturally tends toward union, the simple desire to possess or to take is not of the nature of true love. Hence the difficulty for the self-centered

<sup>77</sup> C. Burke, "The Inviolability of the Conjugal Act," in John F. Boyle, ed., *Creative Love: The Ethics of Human Reproduction* (Front Royal, Va.: Christendom Press, 1989), 151-67.

<sup>78</sup> George Bernard Shaw was being perhaps crude, but not flippant nor cynical, when he commented that contraception amounts to "mutual masturbation."

person (all of us, since the Fall) to learn to love, for she or he must strive to make other-centeredness take priority over self-centeredness.

To love another with all one's heart is difficult; it is not in fact possible without a constant battle to purge one's actions and motives, since some element of self-seeking tends to remain in the best of our actions. This applies constantly in married life; it is in the small details that love is shown, that it grows or dwindles. If all aspects of conjugal relations need purification, this is also true for the most intimate conjugal relationship of all.

If self-seeking predominates in sexual relations, then intercourse, even marital intercourse, is not mainly an expression of love. The natural satisfaction of the sexual urge is legitimate within marriage, but even there it may carry with it a degree of self-seeking that is contrary to love, hindering it rather than expressing or increasing it. "Disinterested giving is excluded from selfish enjoyment" (*Theology of the Body*, 130).

It is necessary to repeat that intercourse can and should be a maximum human expression of total conjugal love and donation. It ought to express full self-donation—more centered, ideally, on what the other receives than on what one gets. But it can be an act of mere selfish satisfaction. This has always been a main problem to be faced by conjugal spirituality and the pursuit of perfection in marriage.

Lust is one of the most radically self-centered appetites. As such it impels toward a joining of bodies that in fact causes a separation of persons, because those who are carried away by it in their mutual relations are afterwards left more separated from one another than before.

As a result of the Fall, says John Paul II, bodily sexuality

was suddenly felt and understood as an element of mutual confrontation of persons ... as if the personal profile of masculinity and femininity, which before had highlighted the meaning of the body for a full communion of persons, had made way only for the sensation of sexuality with regard to the other human being. It is as if sexuality became an obstacle in the personal relationship of man and woman. (*Theology of the Body*, 118-19)

We are brought back to those strong statements of the *Catechism* that the original communion between man and woman was distorted as a result of the Fall, and their mutual attraction changed into "a relationship of domination and lust" (see pp. 507-8). Pope John Paul II did not hesitate to express the matter in an even more startling manner.<sup>79</sup> Commenting the words of Jesus about how adultery "in the heart" (see Matt 5:27-28) is committed by the one who *looks* lustfully (without any further exterior action), he points out that this can apply to a man even in relation to his own wife:

Adultery in the heart is committed not only *because* man looks in this way [lustfully] at a woman who is not his wife, but *precisely* because he looks at a woman in this way . . . . A man who looks in this way, uses the woman, her femininity, to satisfy his own instinct. Although he does not do so with an exterior act, he has already assumed this attitude deep down, inwardly deciding in this way with regard to a given woman. This is what adultery committed in the heart consists of. Man can commit this adultery in the heart also with regard to his own wife, if he treats her only as an object to satisfy instinct. (*Theology of the Body*, 157)

Is this an exaggerated statement? Does it show a pessimistic or Manichean view of the married sexual relationship? Or is it a real possibility to be taken into account? Can a man *lust* after his wife; or vice-versa? If he or she can, is this a good or a bad thing for married life? Or is it something to be looked on with indifference?

Is a spouse not meant to be the object of a different and nobler sort of desire than simple self-satisfaction? Should we be surprised then at St. Thomas's opinion that "consentiens concupiscentiae in uxorem" is guilty not of a mortal sin, but indeed of one that is venial?<sup>80</sup> One can see this as Manichean if one wishes; yet one can also see it as a challenge to love and virtue. To the extent that intercourse is dominated by lust, it is far from virtue. It becomes

<sup>79</sup> Countless examples could be cited of the strong reaction the pope's words provoked in many quarters, revealing just how far our world is from appreciating the true challenges of married love.

<sup>80</sup> Aquinas, *Super I Car.*, c. 7, lect. 1.

truly virtuous in the measure in which it is a genuine expression of self-giving.

Concupiscence, with its self-absorbed desire for physical satisfaction, threatens the full authenticity of conjugal intercourse intended to be an expression of love-union. Concupiscence has brought about

a violation, a fundamental loss, of the original community-communion of persons. The latter should have made man and woman mutually happy by the pursuit of a simple and pure union in humanity, by a reciprocal offering of themselves.... After breaking the original covenant with God, the man and the woman found themselves more divided. Instead of being united, they were even opposed because of their masculinity and femininity .... [They] are no longer called only to union and unity, but are also threatened by the insatiability of that union and unity. (*Theology of the Body*, 120).

The presence of lust or concupiscence within marriage itself is undeniable. At this stage in our study, far from being able to confirm that marriage offers a remedy for concupiscence, we realize that lust, inasmuch as it introduces an anti-love element into the sexual relationship, poses a threat to marriage and particularly to married love itself. How then, within a truly Christian understanding of marriage as a call of love and as a vocation to sanctity, should married persons treat the presence of concupiscence?

### 3. Abstinence?

Till the present day, spouses who really sought to live their conjugal relationship as God wished, to sanctify themselves in and through their marriage, received little orientation from the teaching of the Church, aside from the idea that a certain abstinence is a recommendable means not just of family planning but of positive growth in married sanctity.<sup>81</sup> Abstinence in this

<sup>81</sup> Abstaining from or renouncing secular activities and the satisfactions or pleasures that may derive from them has been central to religious life since its inception. While the roots of this religious spirituality go back to Jesus' invitation to the rich young man (Matt 19:21), it is debatable whether it has offered the necessary inspiration and dynamism to guide lay people in general and married people in particular to the full goal of Christian life. It is true that Jesus



view often seemed to be presented as the ideal, or at least as the main means to union with God and the sanctification of one's life. One senses here (and this is the heart of the problem) a continuing underlying presumption that marital intercourse is something so "anti-spiritual" that spouses would do better and grow more in love for God by abstaining from it than by engaging in it. This presumption should be firmly resisted.

If marriage is in itself a divine way of holiness, then all of its natural elements, including of course intimate conjugal relations, are a matter of sanctification. Certainly (as we will see below) these relations must be marked by temperance; yet total *abstinence from* such relations cannot be proposed as an ideal or ascetical goal for married people.<sup>82</sup> Total abstinence as a means to counter the problem of lust is not a practical proposal for married people, and yet lust has to be countered.

### III. MARRIED LOVE AND MARRIED CHASTITY

#### A) *Rediscovering Conjugal Love as It Was 'In the Beginning'*

The constant reference point for married life and vocation that Pope John Paul II presented throughout his 1979-84 weekly catechesis was "marriage constituted in the beginning, in the state of original innocence, in the context of the sacrament of creation" (*Theology of the Body*, 338), called to be a "visible sign of God's creative love" (*ibid.*, 379). That original human state was marked by a perfect harmony, within each one, of body and spirit.<sup>83</sup>

said "whoever of you does not renounce all that he has cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14:33), yet it is also dear that celibacy, whether in religious life or otherwise, is not the only Christian way and indeed that, despite St. Paul's wish ("I wish that all were as I myself am"), God is not calling everyone to be celibate. Pope John Paul II recalls how Paul himself acknowledges that each one "has his own special gift from God."

<sup>82</sup> There are various reasons why abstinence may enter periodically into conjugal life, but it would seem fundamentally flawed to propose abstinence as an ideal, or as a condition for holiness, in those called to Christian marriage. Saint Paul's suggestion to spouses to abstain "for a time" (1 Cor 7:5) cannot be broadened into a general norm.

<sup>83</sup> Interpersonal harmony, between spirit and spirit, was not a necessary part of that state. Man and woman had freely to create that harmony between themselves, and each one with God. How in their first test they failed to do so, and then had to seek to restore it, forms the

The Creator endowed the body with an objective harmony . . . [which] corresponded to a similar harmony within man, the harmony of the heart. This harmony, that is precisely purity of heart, enabled man and woman in the state of original innocence to experience simply (and in a way that originally made them both happy) the uniting power of their bodies, which was, so to speak, the unsuspected substratum of their personal union or *communio personarum*. (Ibid., 204).

That original harmony was short-lived, however; man sinned and it was broken. With the sin of Adam and Eve concupiscence made its appearance. It became present in their marriage (and is present in every subsequent marriage), posing a threat to love and happiness.

"Theology of the Body" catechesis, John Paul II made a lengthy examination of the discordant presence of lust in spousal relations (ibid., 111-68). Its fundamental effect is a loss or a limitation of the full freedom of love.

Concupiscence entails the loss of the interior freedom of the gift. The nuptial meaning of the human body is connected precisely with this freedom. Man can become a gift—that is, the man and the woman can exist in the relationship of mutual self-giving—if each of them controls himself. Manifested as a "coercion *sui generis* of the body," concupiscence reduces self-control and places an interior limit on it. For that reason, it makes the interior freedom of giving in a certain sense impossible. Together with that, the beauty that the human body possesses in its male and female aspect, as an expression of the spirit, is obscured. The body remains as an object of lust and, therefore, as a "field of appropriation" of the other human being. In itself, concupiscence is not capable of promoting union as the communion of persons. By itself, it does not unite, but appropriates. The relationship of the gift is changed into the relationship of appropriation. (Ibid., 127).

Insatiable desire,<sup>84</sup> appropriation instead of communion, taking instead of giving, possessive self-love overshadowing donative love of the other, etc.: all of these are major disruptions that concupiscence now inflicts on the lost harmony of the sexual relationship.

background to the whole human drama and to our present study.

<sup>84</sup> See John Paul II, *Theology of the Body*, 122-23.

Is it possible for men and women to return to that original harmony and respect, or are they lost for ever? They are not irreparably lost, for they can be recovered in hope and struggle. In the human person there always remains, however unconsciously, a longing for the respect inherent in a pure love, in part because of what John Paul II terms "the continuity and unity between the hereditary state of man's sin and his original innocence" which remains a key to "the redemption of the body" (ibid., 34-35). However, the recovery and maintenance of what can be repossessed of that original harmony is possible only through constant effort and with the help of prayer and grace.

A particularly striking part of John Paul H's analysis is the place he gives to *sexual shame* in the work of recovering that harmony. He places shame among the "fundamental anthropological experiences,"<sup>85</sup> but over and beyond mere anthropology, it is for him a mysterious fact, a sort of due or pointer to the re-establishment (however tentative) of that enviable and joyous sexual harmony and peace.

In the present human condition, a certain instinct of shame acts as a guarantor of the mutual respect that is a *sine qua non* condition of true love between the sexes. The deeper and truer the love between a man and a woman, and especially between husband and wife, the more they will be prompted to pay heed to shame, and to seek to understand it and to respond adequately to it. The consequence is a naturally modest behavior between them—a modesty that has its place even in the relationship of husband and wife.

In this sense each married couple should turn to the Bible seeking the lessons of the divine narrative: not just imagining how the relationship of Adam and Eve must have been before the Fall, but learning from their reactions afterwards—reactions that show a desire to preserve, in new and troublesome circumstances, the purity of that original attraction which they alone had experienced and which they could still recall.

<sup>85</sup> - --- contemporary anthropology, which likes to refer to so-called fundamental experiences, such as the 'experience of shame' (John Paul II, *Theology of the Body*, 52).

Before the Fall, Adam and Eve were naked and not ashamed. As John Paul II puts it, "the man of original innocence, male and female, did not even feel that discord in the body."<sup>86</sup> After the Fall is when shame appeared as a response to lust, as a sort of protection against the threat that lust now offered to the simple joy and appreciation they had experienced in each other's sexuality "in the beginning." The importance of this sense of shame is powerfully brought out in the papal catechesis.

On the one hand,

if the man and the woman cease to be a disinterested gift for each other, as they were in the mystery of creation, then they recognize that "they are naked" (cf. Gn 3). Then the shame of that nakedness, which they had not felt in the state of original innocence, will spring up in their hearts . . . . Only the nakedness that makes woman an object for man, or vice versa, is a source of shame. The fact that they were not ashamed means that the woman was not an "object" for the man nor he for her. (Ibid., 74-75)

In the light of the biblical narrative, sexual shame has its deep meaning. It is connected with the failure to satisfy the aspiration to realize in the conjugal union of the body the mutual communion of persons. (Ibid., 121)

The reaction of shame before the other, even of wife before husband or vice-versa, betrays an awareness that the urge to bodily intercourse is not of the same human quality as the desire for the communion of persons, and cannot give this desire full effect.

On the other, while shame

reveals the moment of lust, at the same time it can protect from [its] consequences . . . . It can even be said that man and woman, through shame, almost remain in the state of original innocence. They continually become aware of the nuptial meaning of the body and aim at preserving it from lust. (Ibid., 122)

The desire to preserve respect for the loved one is inherent in every genuine love. So, in John Paul II's analysis, the sense of

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 204. John Paul II is at one with Augustine's analysis of the situation. Original nakedness provoked no untoward desire and hence no shame in Adam and Eve, "not because they could not see, but because they felt nothing in their members to make them ashamed of what they saw" (*De nupt. et cone.* 1.5.6).

shame becomes not only a guardian of mutual respect between husband and wife, but also a starting point for the recreation of a new spousal harmony between body and soul, between desire and respect, achieved on the basis of united purpose aided by prayer and grace. The pope does not suggest that this "recreation" is in any way easy; it obviously is not. But his message for married people is that it should be attempted. Their mutual love should reveal the need, and the sacramental graces of their marriage along with their personal prayer are powerful means they have to achieve it.

### *B) The Purification of Conjugal Love from Excessive Sensuality*

In contrast to the effects of concupiscence, chastity and a right sense of shame protect and preserve the "freedom of the gift" proper to conjugal intercourse. John Paul II insists that this interior freedom of the gift "of its nature is explicitly spiritual and depends on a person's interior maturity. This freedom presupposes such a capacity of directing one's sensual and emotive reactions as to make self-donation to the other possible, on the basis of mature self-possession."<sup>87</sup>

This is the proper sense of chastity in marriage: the redirecting and the refinement of sensual appetite so that it is at the service of love and expresses it, and the refusal to take advantage of the married relationship just for egoistic satisfaction. In a real sense, the task facing married couples is purification of sensual appetite, so that its satisfaction is sought not mainly for concupiscent self-centeredness but as an accompaniment to the donation of self that must underlie every true conjugal union. One can say that this task engages them in a constant *humanizing* of their marital love, facilitating the growth of mutual appreciation of each other as persons.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>87</sup> John Paul II, *Theology of the Body*, 414; cf. 75, 120-22, 127, 349., etc. Augustine emphasizes that the desires of concupiscence must be resisted; otherwise they dominate us: "Est ergo in nobis peccati concupiscentia, quae non est permittenda regnare; sunt eius desideria, quibus non est oboediendum, ne oboedientibus regnet" (*De continentia*, 8).

<sup>88</sup> See John Paul II, *Theology of the Body*, 151-52, for the "depersonalizing" effect of concupiscence.

True conjugal love is evidently characterized more by caring for and giving to the other than by wanting and taking for oneself. This is the classical distinction between *amor amicitiae* and *amor concupiscentiae*. Where the love of concupiscence dominates, the lover has not really come out of himself or overcome self-centeredness, and so gives himself at most only in part: "in the love of concupiscence, the lover, in wanting the good he desires, properly speaking loves himself."<sup>89</sup> The dominance of pleasure-seeking in marital intercourse means that there is too much taking of the body and not enough giving to the person; and to the extent of that imbalance the true conjugal communion of persons is not realized.

In an age like ours, the difference between lust, sexual desire, and conjugal love has become progressively obscured. If, in consequence, many married couples do not understand or recognize the dangers of concupiscence, and so do not endeavor to contain or purify it, it can dominate their relationship, undermining mutual respect and their very capacity to see marriage essentially as giving and not just as possessing and enjoying, much less as appropriating and exploiting.

So we return to St. Augustine's invitation to married couples to purge their good marital intercourse of the evil that tends to accompany it: that evil which is not the pleasure of conjugal union but excessive and self-centered absorption with that pleasure. This is an unescapable task facing all married couples who in some way wish to restore the loving harmony of a spousal relationship filled with growing appreciation and respect. We spoke above of how abstinence or renunciation, as a governing principle of religious life, was often presented to married couples wishing to grow spiritually, with the implicit or explicit invitation to apply it to their conjugal intercourse. We must add here that while renunciation is certainly a main gospel theme, it is not the only or even the dominant one. *Purification*, above all of one's inner intention and heart, is even more fundamental to the achievement of the ultimate Christian goal: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for

<sup>89</sup> Aquinas, *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 3.

they shall see God" (Matt 5:8); "we know that when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. And every one who thus hopes in him purifies himself as he is pure" (1John3:2-3). These verses are of universal application.

This work of purification faces married people in all the aspects of their lives. It is a particular challenge to them with regard to their intimate conjugal relations. To purify conjugal intercourse of the self-absorption that so easily invades it must be a major concern and point of struggle for spouses who wish their marriage to be marked by growing love and so also to become a way of sanctity.<sup>90</sup>

Marital intercourse is purified when the urge for self-satisfaction plays a lesser part in it, intercourse being rather sought, lived, and felt as participation and particularly as other-centered donative love. Possession and pleasure will then be the *consequence* of generous self-giving. As John Paul U says,

a noble gratification, for example, is one thing, while sexual desire is another. When sexual desire is linked with a noble gratification, it differs from desire pure and simple . . . . It is precisely at the price of self-control that man reaches that deeper and more mature spontaneity with which his heart, mastering his instincts, rediscovers the spiritual beauty of the sign constituted by the human body in its masculinity and femininity. (*Theology of the Body*, 173)

One could note in passing that if pleasure is received with gratitude-to God, to one's spouse-this is already a positive and significant step towards purifying it of self-centeredness, for gratitude is always a coming out of self and an affirmation of the other. On the other hand, if the seeking of pleasure is mainly self-centered, it may give momentary satisfaction but not real peace, the peace that arises from the experience of true donative union. We may recall here how St. Thomas, invoking Galatians 5:17, explains that a lack of interior peace is often due to an unresolved conflict between what one's sense appetite wants and what one's mind wants (*STh* II-II, q. 29, a. 1).

<sup>90</sup> This certainly implies a restraint, but it is a restraint that should be an expression of love and consideration, just as when husband or wife restrains his or her temper out of consideration for the other.

The goal then, as indicated above, is that spouses *humanize* their intimate relations, rather than abstain from them. This is the work of purification proposed to them; this has to be the tone of married *chastity*.<sup>91</sup>

Sound Christian thinking has always been aware of the self-absorbing force of the urge to physical sexual satisfaction. The constant moral principle that to seek this satisfaction outside marriage is grievously wrong derives in part from the fact that his urge is so deeply egoistic. But there has been no parallel consideration of the possible effect on married life itself of this self-engrossed power. Moral theology has tended to ignore this question which is today resurfacing as a major issue facing theological and pastoral reflection. Simply to find reasons that "justify" marital sexual intercourse is an approach of the past. Also dated is the approach that would overstress the idea of *abstention* from intercourse as a key to spiritual growth in marriage. What has to be put to spouses is the need to *purify* their intercourse, so that they may more and more find in it the unmixed character of loving personal gift-acceptance which it would have had in Eden.

Sensitive married couples who sincerely love each other are readily aware of this self-absorbed drive which takes from the perfection of their physical conjugal union. They sense the need to temper or purify the force drawing them together, so that they can be united in true mutual giving-not mere simultaneous

<sup>91</sup> "In earthly life, the dominion of the spirit over the body--and the simultaneous subordination of the body to the spirit--can, as the result of persevering work on themselves, express a personality that is spiritually mature" Gohn Paul II, *Theology of the Body*, 241). This implies not a one-sided victory of the spirit over the body, but a perfect harmony between the two; so it "does not signify any disincarnation of the body nor, consequently, a dehumanization of man. On the contrary, it signifies his perfect realization. In fact, in the composite, psychosomatic being which man is, perfection cannot consist in a mutual opposition of spirit and body. But it consists in a deep harmony between them, in safe-guarding the primacy of the spirit" (ibid.). John Paul II, applying the Pauline phrase about "discord in the body" (1 Cor 12:25) to the phenomenon of bodily shame resulting from original sin, insists on how a "transformation of this state" can be achieved "to the point of gradual victory over that discord in the body. This victory can and must take place in man's heart. This is the way to purity, that is, 'to control one's own body in holiness and honor'" (ibid., 204-5).



taking. Their heart calls for this; insofar as they are mainly yielding to lust, a sense of cheating and of being cheated will always remain. John Paul II reads this situation well: "I would say that lust is a deception of the human heart in the perennial call of man and woman to communion by means of mutual giving" (*Theology of the Body*, 148).

It is their very sensitivity to love that makes them troubled by this disorder they would like to remedy; but they have seldom been guided as to how to achieve this, or as to why the endeavor and effort to do so is an integral part of their married calling to keep growing in love and so, ultimately, to attain sanctity.<sup>92</sup>

### C) Chastity Gives Freedom to Conjugal Love

In our present condition, concupiscence (or the over-absorbing desires of the flesh) ranges itself easily against the "spirit," which also means against love and the desires of love. This is the case before marriage, and remains so in marriage. Scripture insists on this, and so it is a truth that every Christian needs to ponder. At the start of our study we noted how the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (2525) identifies concupiscence with the *caro adversus spiritum* of the Letter to the Galatians: "the desires of the flesh are against the spirit, and the desires of the spirit are against the flesh" (Gal 5: 17). Pope John Paul II opens part 2 of his *Theology of the Body* with detailed consideration of this Pauline passage.

According to the pope, Paul refers here to

the tension existing within man, precisely in his heart ... [which] presupposes that disposition of forces formed in man with original sin, in which every historical man participates. In this disposition, formed within man, the body opposes the spirit and easily prevails over it. (*Theology of the Body*, 191)

**If** we let the body prevail in this battle, we lose our freedom and hence our very ability to love, for freedom is not true freedom

<sup>92</sup> Pope John Paul has provided this clear and positive guidance-albeit in a dense catechesis whose very length may make it appear inaccessible to the ordinary reader. The "popularizing" of his teaching, in a form accessible to married couples and those preparing for marriage, is a pastoral task of immense importance.

unless it is at the service of love (cf. *ibid.*, 197), Only so, by using freedom truly and well (and guarding against its false use), can the battle against concupiscence be gradually won, Only so can we fulfill our vocation to love in all freedom-in that freedom for which Christ has set us free.

To understand the vocation to freedom in this way ("You were called to freedom, brethren" -Gal 5:13), means giving a form to the ethos in which life "according to the Spirit" is realized. The danger of wrongly understanding freedom also exists. Paul clearly points this out, writing in the same context: "Only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, but through love be servants of one another" (Gal 5:13). In other words, Paul warns us of the possibility of making a bad use of freedom. Such a use is in opposition to the liberation of the human spirit carried out by Christ and contradicts that freedom with which "Christ set us free." ... The antithesis and, in a way, the negation of this use of freedom takes place when it becomes a pretext to live according to the flesh. Freedom then ... becomes "an opportunity for the flesh," a source (or instrument) of a specific yoke on the part of pride of life, the lust of the eyes, and the lust of the flesh. Anyone who lives in this way according to the flesh, that is, submits ... to the three forms of lust, especially to the lust of the flesh, ceases to be capable of that freedom for which "Christ set us free." He also ceases to be suitable for the real gift of himself, which is the fruit and expression of this freedom. Moreover, he ceases to be capable of that gift which is organically connected with the nuptial meaning of the human body (*Theology of the Body*, 197-98)

John Paul H's warning here about "good" and "bad" uses of freedom brings back to mind St. Augustine's distinction regarding the use of the body, In one of his sermons, Augustine too invokes Galatians 5:17 in particular relation to chastity:

Listen well to these words, all you faithful who are fighting. I speak to those who struggle, Only those who struggle will understand the truth of what I say. I will not be understood by whoever does not struggle, . . . What does the chaste person wish? That no force should arise in his body resisting chastity. He would like to experience peace, but does not have it yet.<sup>93</sup>

Augustine's words are directed to the married as much as to the unmarried. Both, he is convinced, will understand the truth he expresses if they are prepared to fight the constant warfare of

<sup>93</sup> Augustine, *Sermo* 128.

Christian life. The Church has not changed her doctrine about this fight.

[A] monumental struggle against the powers of darkness pervades the whole history of man. The battle was joined from the very origins of the world and will continue until the last day, as the Lord has attested. Caught in this conflict, man is obliged to wrestle constantly if he is to cling to what is good, nor can he achieve his own integrity without great efforts and the help of God's grace. (*Gaudium et spes* 37)

#### D) The "Remedy" of Concupiscence: Chastity

"The problem for [sexual] ethics is how to use sex without treating the person as an object for use."<sup>94</sup> A perceptive observation which brings a properly human focus to bear on the question of the pleasure of marital intercourse. Pleasure should not be sought just for its own sake, since self-seeking (and "other-using") will then tend to dominate. But pleasure can and should come, as an important concomitant of the union achieved. This in the truest sense is what is implied in the *remedying of concupiscence*. It is a challenge to love and a work of chastity.<sup>95</sup> Earlier we quoted St. Thomas (IV *Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4) on how grace is given in marriage as a remedy *against* concupiscence, so as to curb it in its root (i.e., in its self-absorbed tendency), and I have suggested elsewhere that one of the main graces bestowed by the sacrament of matrimony, as a "permanent" sacrament, is that of marital chastity in this precise sense.<sup>96</sup>

The goal cannot be *not* to feel pleasure or *not* to be drawn by it (both pertain to the instinct of conjugality), but *not to be dominated* by its quest (which is the very instinct of lust). Saint Augustine points out the alternatives: "whoever does not want to serve lust must necessarily fight against it; whoever neglects to

<sup>94</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. H. T. Willetts (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1993), 60.

<sup>95</sup> Concupiscence is an effect of original sin. What stems from sin can only be remedied by virtue. So it is not marriage itself but marital chastity that remedies concupiscence.

<sup>96</sup> C. Burke, "Marriage as a Sacrament of Sanctification," *Annales Theologici* 9 (1995): 85-86.

fight it must necessarily serve it. One of these alternatives is burdensome but praiseworthy, the other is debasing and miserable."<sup>97</sup>

Marital intercourse is indeed a unique way of giving physical expression to married love, but it is not the only way. There are moments in married life (sickness, for instance, or periods just before and after childbirth) when love will not seek intercourse but still express itself in many other ways, even on the physical level. It is commonplace among marriage counselors and psychologists to assign as much or even more importance to these "lesser" physical expressions of affection and love as to the frequency of marital intercourse itself. John Paul II does not pass over this point. With finely drawn distinctions, he differentiates "sexual excitement" from "sexual emotion" in man-woman relationships, and comments:

Excitement seeks above all to be expressed in the form of sensual and corporeal pleasure. That is, it tends toward the conjugal act. . . . On the other hand, emotion . . . even if in its emotive content it is conditioned by the femininity or masculinity of the "other," does not *per se* tend toward the conjugal act. But it limits itself to other manifestations of affection, which express the spousal meaning of the body, and which nevertheless do not include its (potentially) procreative meaning. (*Theology of the Body*, 413)

Men and women, married or single, who wish to grow in mutual love cannot adapt themselves passively to the prevalent modern lifestyle which, especially as reflected in the media, is permeated with "sexual excitement" and forms a constant stimulus to it. Purity of heart, sight, and thought is essential if they are to keep sexual excitement within limits where it is at the service of sexual emotion and of genuine intersexual love. Their own intimate consciousness of the real nature of love will be the best incentive to help them keep firmly clear of all those external stimuli which necessarily subject a person more and more to the absorbing power of lust, and so lessen his or her capacity for a true, freely given, and faithful love.

<sup>97</sup> Augustine, *Contra Julianum* 5.62.

*E) Chastity Is for the Strong; As Is Growth in Love*

Among the deceptions of marriage is the experience that what should so uniquely unite can separate; it can be filled with tensions and disappointment rather than harmony and peace. The tensions come from the divisive force of concupiscence which can only be overcome and purified through a love that is truly donative rather than possessive. "It is often thought that continence causes inner tensions which man must free himself from. [But rather] continence, understood integrally, is the only way to free man from such tensions" (*Theology of the Body*, 411). In fact, the chastity proper to marriage unites, reduces tensions, increases respect, and deepens spousal love, so leading this love to its human perfection and preparing the spouses themselves for a love that is infinite and eternal. "The way to attain this goal," Pope Benedict XVI insists, "is not simply by submitting to instinct. Purification and growth in maturity are called for; and these also pass through the path of renunciation. Far from rejecting or 'poisoning' *eros*, they heal it and restore its true grandeur" (*Deus caritas est* 5).

"True conjugal love ... is also a difficult love" (*Theology of the Body*, 290). Of course: love of another is always a battle against self-love. That division of the heart between self and spouse must be overcome: conjugal love gives unity to each heart and unites the two hearts in one love. Carnal concupiscence is not the only expression of self-love, but, since it so pervasively affects the most significant bodily expression of conjugal love, its tendency to dominate must be specially resisted. If it is not, love may not survive this battle.

The heart has become a battlefield between love and lust. The more lust dominates the heart, the less the heart experiences the nuptial meaning of the body. It becomes less sensitive to the gift of the person, which expresses that meaning in the mutual relations of man and woman. (Ibid., 126)

The need for this battle, John Paul II insists, will be evident to those who reflect on the nature of conjugal-corporal love itself,

who sincerely face up to the dangers it is subject to, and who wish to do whatever is necessary to ensure its protection and growth.

Purity ... tends to reveal and strengthen the nuptial meaning of the body in its integral truth. This truth must be known interiorly. In a way, it must be felt with the heart, in order that the mutual relations of man and of woman—even mere looks—may reacquire that authentically nuptial content of their meanings. (*Ibid.*, 213)

John Paul II is sure of the fundamental optimism and attraction of the understanding of married sexuality he outlines. His anthropological analysis becomes moral teaching that is imbued with human appeal.

Does not man feel, at the same time as lust, a deep need to preserve the dignity of the mutual relations, which find their expression in the body, thanks to his masculinity and femininity? Does he not feel the need to impregnate them with everything that is noble and beautiful? Does he not feel the need to confer on them the supreme value which is love? (*Ibid.*, 167-68)

And yet, however humanly true and appealing the pope's analysis is, it is completely inserted into the Christian framework of Redemption. Love inspires generosity and sacrifice, but if these remain at the purely human level they are not enough. The help of God, obtained especially through the sacraments and fervent prayer, is necessary to attain that conjugal chastity and mutual loving respect without which the best aspirations of love may fail. To illustrate this, John Paul II has recourse to two of the more "romantic" writings of the Old Testament, the Song of Songs and the Book of Tobit. He sees the well-known verse of the former, "fortis est ut mors dilectio" ("love is as strong as death," or "as stern as death" [Cant 8:6]), as perhaps over-idealized in the Canticle but expressed at the true level of spousal love and of humble human experience in Tobit.

It is the concupiscent approach that destroyed the previous marriages of Sarah. Tobiah is well aware of this and leads Sarah to understand how prayer brings strength to pure love so as to enable it overcome the deadening power of concupiscence.

From the very first moment Tobiah's love had to face the test of life and death. The words about love "stern as death," spoken by the spouses in the Song of Songs in the transport of the heart, assume here the nature of a real test. If love is demonstrated as stern as death, this happens above all in the sense that Tobiah and, together with him, Sarah, unhesitatingly face this test. But in this test of life and death, life wins because, during the test on the wedding night, love, supported by prayer, is revealed as more stern than death"; their love "is victorious because it prays." (Ibid., 376)

Those who love readily understand the human value and attraction of pure, chaste, and disinterested love. But to feel the human attraction is not enough. In the Christian view, chastity remains a gift of God, one that is only achieved through prayer. "Since I knew I could not otherwise be continent unless God granted it to me (and this too was a point of wisdom, to know whose the gift is), I went to the Lord and besought him" (Wis 8:21).<sup>98</sup> Opening his work on continence or chastity, Augustine insists that this virtue is a gift of God for both the single and the married: "Dei donum est."<sup>99</sup> He stresses the same idea elsewhere with special reference to marriage: "The very fact that conjugal chastity has such power, shows that it is a great gift of God."<sup>100</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

We have studied the establishment and prevalence over many centuries of the notion that marriage is ordered to the "remedy of concupiscence." The practical effect of this, in our view, has been to create a certain idea that marriage "legitimizes" concupiscence, an idea which, if further analyzed, amounts to saying that "marriage legitimizes *disorderedsexuality*."

I believe that Christian life has suffered from those longstanding and widely held views which have regarded concupiscence not as a force to be resisted (and purified) in marriage, but as simply legitimized by marriage itself where, in

<sup>98</sup> "ut scivi quoniam aliter non possum esse continens nisi Deus det, et hoc ipsum erat sapientiae scire cuius esset hoc donum, adii Dominum et deprecatus sum illum."

<sup>99</sup> Augustine, *De continentia* 1.

<sup>100</sup> Augustine, *Contra Julianum* 3.43.

consequence, it can be given free rein. The understanding of marriage as an outlet for concupiscence is, I claim, what seems to be implied in the simple phrase *remedium concupiscentiae*, and what has in fact been the well-nigh universal interpretation given to the term.

From the standpoint of pastoral theology, I have endeavored to show that the longstanding use of this term has propagated a narrow and impoverished view of marriage which has consistently ignored the consideration of matrimony as a sacrament of *sanctification*. If so, then the disappearance of the term should further facilitate the renewed theological, ascetical, and vocational understanding of marriage which has been emerging in the last three quarters of a century, and which the current magisterium has so insistently fostered.

In this renewed understanding, rather than being a "remedy" or even as an outlet for concupiscence, marriage should be seen and presented as a call to a particular growth in love-in an effort, with the help of grace, to recapture the purity and chaste self-donation of the original human sexual-conjugal condition.

A balanced Christian vision will avoid both naive optimism and radical pessimism about human nature. It will always see man as a sick creature made for a divine destiny. This balanced view is needed also because the pathologies of human nature can only be properly evaluated by those who both face up to the reality of sin and, being convinced of the goodness of creation and the nature of original health, know the means and effectiveness of the Redemption worked by Christ-which enables us, despite our ailments, to achieve something much greater still than the fullness of that original health.



THOMAS SUTTON ON  
UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

*Georgetown University  
Washington, D.C.*

THOMAS SUTTON, O.P., was one of the most forceful and perceptive proponents of key theological and philosophical doctrines of St. Thomas Aquinas in the closing decades of the thirteenth and opening decades of the fourteenth century.<sup>1</sup> Gilson wrote that he "maintained the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas against two successive generations of opponents: (1) the representatives of the late thirteenth century Augustinism ... (2) the new theology of John Duns Scotus."<sup>2</sup> Francis Kelley and Gyula Klima have examined Thomas Sutton's defense of various of Aquinas's teachings against the criticism of Henry of Ghent, a representative of the first generation of opponents to the Angelic

<sup>1</sup> For Thomas Sutton's life (ca. 1250-ca. 1315) and works, see D. E. Sharpe, "Thomas of Sutton, O.P., His Place in Scholasticism and an Account of His Psychology," *Revue neoscholastique de philosophie* 36 (1934): 332-54; idem, "Thomas of Sutton," *Revue neoscholastique de philosophie* 37 (1934): 88-104, 219-33; this second article of Sharpe deals with Sutton's views on certain metaphysical doctrines, angelology, and natural theology. W. A. Hinnebusch, *The Early English Friars Preachers* (Rome: Ad S. Sabinae, 1951), 396-410; Frederick J. Roensch, *Early Thomistic School* (Dubuque, Iowa: Priory Press, 1964), 44-51; Johannes Schneider, "Einleitung," in Thomas Sutton, *Quaestiones Ordinariae*, ed. Johannes Schneider (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1977), 15"-267"; Gyula Klima, "Thomas of Sutton," in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 664-65; W. Senko, "Trzy studia nad spu8cizn1li pogh1dami Tomasza Sutttona dotycz1cymi problemu istoty i istnienia," *Studia Mediewistyczne* 11(1970):111-52.

<sup>2</sup> Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), 738; Hinnebusch, *English Friars*, 397-400, 409-10. See also Roensch, *Thomistic School*, 47.

Doctor.<sup>3</sup> In this article, I explore Sutton's defense of a key doctrine of Aquinas, the analogical concept of being, against the second generation of opponents, specifically Duns Scotus's innovative doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being.

In his defense of his fellow Dominican, Sutton also treats the problem of the divine names, such as 'wisdom' and 'goodness', stoutly maintaining that they are predicated of God and creatures analogically, not univocally. But which of the various types of analogy is Sutton defending?<sup>4</sup> We know that the complexities of analogy and its use in a number of contexts stimulated Aquinas to rethink and deepen his theory during his career. While discussing the problem of the divine names, Aquinas in his early works used a form of the analogy of attribution, while in *De Veritate* (1256-59) he argues for another type of analogy, that of proportionality. Finally in his later works, such as *De potentia* and the *Summa Theologiae*, he quietly abandons the views of *De Veritate* and returns in the main to his earlier opinion.<sup>5</sup> It is no surprise, then, that those who have studied the texts of Thomas Sutton dealing with this issue have also found a complex and articulated teaching. Hence, I examine not only the main reasons and arguments that Sutton brings forward against Scotus's univocal concept of being, but also Sutton's use of various types of analogy

<sup>3</sup> Gyula Klima, "Thomas of Sutton on the Nature of the Intellective Soul and the Thomistic Theory of Being," in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 28, ed. J. Aersten, K. Emery, and A. Speer (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 436-55; Francis E. Kelley, "Two Early English Thomists: Thomas of Sutton and Robert Orford vs. Henry of Ghent," *The Thomist* 45 (July 1981): 345-89. Kelley takes up three problems: the relation of the faculties of the intellect and will to the soul, the possibility of creation of matter without form, and the distinction between essence and existence in the creature. For Sutton as author of the completion of two commentaries of Aquinas, see Osmund Lewry, "Two Continuator of Aquinas: Robertus de Vulgarbia and Thomas Sutton on the 'Perihermeneias' of Aristotle," *Mediaeval Studies* 43 (1981): 58-130; and Thomas of Sutton, *Expositionis d. Thomae Aquinatis in libros Aristotelis de generatione et corruptione continuatio per Thomam de Sutona*, ed. F. E. Kelley (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1976).

<sup>4</sup> See Schneider, "Einleitung," 241 \*-265\*.

<sup>5</sup> John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being*, *Monographs of the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 543-72.

in different contexts and how his teaching differs from that of his Dominican confrere.

To understand Sutton's position, it is necessary to recall that the Scholastics had two distinct contexts for their discussions of whether the term 'being' is said univocally, equivocally or analogically: a philosophical context (i.e., that of the Aristotelian ten categories), and a theological context concerning language about God and creatures. In the first, they asked how the term 'being' is predicated of substance and accidents, while in the second they asked how it is predicated of God and creatures. Following Cornelio Fabro and others, I refer to these two contexts as 'predicamental' (or horizontal) and 'transcendental' (or vertical).<sup>6</sup> It was, of course, in the transcendental context that they also inquired about the divine names.

Thomas Sutton debated these problems in his Ordinary Questions, 32, 32A, 33, and 34,<sup>7</sup> and in a short question directed against Robert Cowton.<sup>8</sup> The editor of the Ordinary Questions,

<sup>6</sup> Cornelio Fabro, *Participation et causalite selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain; Paris: Editions Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1961), 510-13, 523. This terminology was adopted in the insightful and influential study, Bernard Montagnes, *La doctrine de l'analogie de l'etre d'apres Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: Editions Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1963), 33-41; English translation, Bernard Montagnes, *The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas*, trans. E.M. Macierowski (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004).

<sup>7</sup> Thomas of Sutton, *Quaestiones Ordinariae*, ed. Johannes Schneider (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1977), 870-953. The best study of these questions of Sutton is by E. J. Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thomas Sutton, O.P.," in *Vestigia, Imagines, Verba: Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIII-XIV Century)*, Acts of the 11th Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, San Marino, 24-28 May 1994, ed. Costantino Marmo (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 289-303. Also see Alessandro Conti, "La composizione metafisica dell'ente finito corporeo nell'ontologia di Tommaso Sutton," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 2, no. 2 (1991): 323-26; and the earlier study by Joseph Przedziecki, "Thomas of Sutton's Critique of the Doctrine of Univocity," in *An Etienne Gilson Tribute*, ed. Charles O'Neil (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959), 189-208. This last should be used with caution; see Ashworth, "Analogy in Thomas Sutton," 290. See finally the section on Sutton in Franco Riva, *Tommaso Claxton e l'analogia di proporzionalita: Indagine sull'analogia nella scuola tomistica tra XIV e XV secolo* (Milan: Pubblicazioni della Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1989), 31-47.

<sup>8</sup> Thomas Sutton, "Utrum de deo et creaturis sit aliquid positivum univocum"; see "Streitschrift gegen Robert Cowton" in Michael Schmaus, *Zur Diskussion uber das Problem der Univocitaet im Umkreis des Johannes Duns Scotus* (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen

Johannes Schneider, dates them tentatively between 1305-10 at Oxford, and the question against Cowton as later.<sup>9</sup> He combines both 'horizontal' and 'vertical' contexts in the title to question 32: "It is asked whether this term 'being' is predicated univocally of God and of all things of whatever category." In fact, in Sutton's own response to this question, he deals almost exclusively with the predicamental context, that is, the philosophical question whether 'being' is said univocally or analogically of substance and accidents; other than a brief programmatic statement, he devotes only one short paragraph to the transcendental context, to God and creatures.<sup>10</sup> This favoring of the categorical context is also evidenced in the thirty-three initial arguments for univocity and Sutton's corresponding replies. Questions 33 and 34 both ask about the divine names. Question 33: "It is asked concerning the divine names, and firstly, whether names which are said of God and creatures are said univocally of God and creatures." Question 34: "Secondly, it is asked whether this name 'substance', as it is a name of a most general genus, is said univocally of God and caused substances; and this is to ask whether God is in the predicament of substance."<sup>11</sup> Hence the very way Sutton poses his questions, that is, in terms of univocity, evidences the change in the *status quaestionis* wrought by Scotus. I believe his devoting separate questions to each context, predicamental (question 32) and transcendental (questions 33 and 34), is not accidental, but a

Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1957), 105-23. For a discussion of the authorship, see Schmaus, *Problem der Univocit t*, 11-12. For the text of Robert Cowton (*1 Sent.*, pro!., q. 4), see Stephen F. Brown, "Robert Cowton, O.F.M., and the Analogy of the Concept of Being," *Franciscan Studies* 31 (1971): 5-40.

<sup>9</sup> Schneider, "Einleitung," 54\*. Schneider has found that question 32A is different from the rest in structure and style, leading him to propose that it is from a different context than the other questions and is later (*ibid.*, 53\*-54\*).

<sup>10</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 878, II. 240-41; and 884, II. 398-410).

<sup>11</sup> "Quaeritur de nominibus divinis, et primo, utrum nomina quae dicuntur de deo et creaturis, dicantur univoce de deo et de creaturis" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 [Schneider, ed., 909]). "Secundo quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen substantia, prout est nomen generis generalissimi, dicatur univoce de deo et substantiis causatis; et hoc est quaerere, utrum deus sit in praedicamento substantiae" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 34 [Schneider, ed., 936]).

deliberate vehicle for his two-part solution, relying on two types of analogy.<sup>12</sup>

Before discussing Sutton's questions, we should recall that a key source for this medieval debate was a passage at the very start of Aristotle's *Categories* as translated by Boethius:

Those that have only a name in common but a different *substantiae ratio* in accordance with that name are said to be equivocals, e.g., 'animal' [in relation to] man and what is painted .... Those that have both a name in common and the same *substantiae ratio* in accordance with that name are said to be univocals, e.g., 'animal' [in relation to] man, ox.<sup>13</sup>

It was agreed that the crucial terms *substantiae ratio* of a name "included all that in some way expressed the essence or quiddity of a substance or accident."<sup>14</sup> Although there was disagreement in the thirteenth century over how these terms were to be specifically translated, whether as an Avicennian nature or an 'inner word', in the fourteenth century the *substantiae ratio* of a name was normally identified with a concept, whatever its ontological status might be. Hence a key assumption of the discussion was that a univocal term is subordinated to one nature, concept, or *ratio* while an equivocal term is subordinated to more than one.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup> We now know that question 32A contains Sutton's response to Henry of Harclay's criticism of Aquinas, as found in Harclay's *Quaestiones Ordinariae*, q. 12 (paras. 30-40); see Henry of Harclay, *Ordinary Questions I-XIV, XV-XXIX*, 2 vols., ed. M. Henninger, trans. R. Edwards and M. Henninger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming in the *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi* series). This is a very focused debate, centered on Aquinas's arguments in his *Summa contra Gentiles*, and merits more attention than can be given here.

<sup>13</sup> Aristotle, *Categories* 1.1a1-9: "Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commtme est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quad pingitur .... Univoca vero dicuntur quorum et nomen commune est et secundum nomen eadem substantiae ratio, ut animal homo atque bas" (Aristotle, *Categoriae vel praedicamenta*, Aristoteles Latinus 1.1-5 [Bruges and Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961], 5). I use the translation of E. J. Ashworth, "Analogy, Univocation, and Equivocation in Some Early Fourteenth-Century Authors," conference presentation in Aristotle in Britain During the Middle Ages, Proceedings of the international conference at Cambridge 8-11 April 1994 organized by the Societe Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Medievale, ed. John Marenbon (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996), 234.

<sup>14</sup> Ashworth I, "Analogy, Univocation, and Equivocation," 234.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 234-35; E. J. Ashworth, "Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan," in *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: B. R. Gruner, 1991), 28-30.

And, to anticipate, Sutton holds that the term 'being' is a type of equivocal term, in that it is subordinated to a plurality of concepts; more accurately it is an analogous term, since it is subordinated to a plurality of related concepts.

#### L BEING IN THE PREDICAMENTAL CONTEXT: QUESTION 32

Sutton begins his own answer (*determinatio*) to question 32 by citing at length a key passage of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, book 4, chapter 2:

So too there are many senses in which a thing is said to be. But every being is related to one first, that is, to substance. For some things are said to be because they are substances, while others because they are passions of substance, still others because they are a passage towards substance or corruptions or privations or qualities or productive or generative of substance, or of those things that are said relative to substance, or negations of these things or negations of substance.<sup>16</sup>

Sutton cites Averroes with approval that in this passage, 'being' is not said equivocally, as 'dog' referring to a barking dog and to a sea dog, nor is it said univocally, as 'animal' is of a human being and an ass. Rather, Averroes claims, "it [*ens*] is one of those terms that are said of things by attribution to one, and they are midway between equivocal and univocal terms."<sup>17</sup>

That 'being' is said analogically and not univocally of substance and accident was a widely held doctrine at Sutton's time, and indeed he claims that "all authoritative teachers agree in this."

<sup>16</sup> "Ita et ens multipliciter dicitur. Sed omne ens ad unum primum refertur, scilicet ad substantiam. Haec enim entia dicuntur, quia sunt substantiae, illa vero, quia sunt passiones substantiae, alia vero, quia sunt via ad substantiam aut corruptiones aut privationes aut qualitates aut effectiva aut generativa substantiae aut eorum, quae dicuntur per habitudinem ad substantiam, aut negationes eorum aut negationes substantiae" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 [Schneider, ed., 878, II. 231-37]); see Aristotle, *Metaphys.* 4.2.1003b5-10 (Aristotle, *Metaphysica, Translatio Anonyma sive 'Media'*, Aristoteles Latinus 25.2 [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976], 60-61). All translations of Sutton are my own.

<sup>17</sup> "Sed est de nominibus, quae dicuntur de rebus per attributionem ad unum, et sunt media inter aequivoca et univoca" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 [Schneider, ed., 878, II. 226-28]; see Averroes Cordubensis, *InAristotelis Metaphysicorum Libras Commentarium*, vol. 8 of *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venice: apud Junctas, 1562-74), fol. 65B.

Further, he claims 'being' is said analogically of God and of all other things of whatever category.<sup>18</sup> But he claims that many are deceived about the signification of the term 'being' and take it to be univocal. Hence Sutton is conscious of adopting the traditional opinion against the recent innovations of Scotus and his followers, who in a short time, at least in Sutton's mind, have become "many."<sup>19</sup>

The reason many are deceived on this question is the maximal commonness (*maximam communitatem*) of the term 'being': whatever is understood, whether a substance or accident, is immediately understood to be a being.<sup>20</sup> Even if one does not know whether, for example, the powers of the soul are accidents or are to be identified with the substance of the soul itself, still one knows that they are beings. In this way 'being' is very similar to genus terms that are common and univocal: when I conceive of a human being, a horse, or a lion, I always conceive of an animal, and when I see something moving in the distance, I may not know specifically what it is, but still I know it is an animal. So, as the term 'animal' is associated with a concept common to its various species, which generic concept is included in the concept of each species, so it seems to many that the term 'being' has one concept common to all things, and this concept is included in the concept

<sup>18</sup> "I respond: it should be said that all authoritative teachers agree in this, that being is not said univocally about things of different predicaments, but analogically, and this is necessary to say; and similarly, being is said analogously of God and other things, of whatever predicament they may be" ("Respondeo: Dicendum quod omnes auctores conveniunt in hoc, quod ens non dicitur univoce de rebus diversorum praedicamentorum, sed analogice, et hoc necesse est dicere; et similiter dicitur ens analogice de deo et de rebus aliis, cuiuscumque sint praedicamenti" [Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 878, II. 238-41)]). In the *apparatus criticus*, 'auctoritates' is found as an alternative reading to 'auctores'. However, in another work, *Contra Quodlibet* is indeed by Sutton, as Schneider holds, the sense is clear. In this latter work, the author writes of the univocity of being: "But that theory is impossible and against all doctors" ("Sed ilia positio est impossibilis et contra omnes doctores" [Thomas of Sutton, *Contra Quodlibet Iohannis Duns Scoti*, ed. Johannes Schneider (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1978), 81]). Schneider comments that Sutton uses the term '*doctor*' not for just any teacher, but only for one he recognizes as an authority. Similarly in our text, I take him to mean not the authorities of the past, but the authoritative teachers of his time.

<sup>19</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 878, II. 242-43).

<sup>20</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 878, I. 242-879, I. 268).

of every thing. This is especially true since 'being' is thought by some to be predicated *per se* of all things in the first way of predicating *per se*, just as a genus term is predicated of its species in the first way of predicating *per se*. Here Sutton seems to be alluding to a claim of Scotus that both substance and accidents are beings *per se*.<sup>21</sup>

On the other hand, analogical terms, as 'healthy', do not have this similarity to genus terms. Whoever conceives of animal, diet, and urine (of which 'healthy' can be said analogically) need not at the same time conceive of healthy, nor is 'healthy' predicated of them in the first way of predicating *per se*, but rather *per accidens* and denominatively. Thus one is not misled into thinking that 'healthy' signifies one concept common to them so that it could be predicated of them the way a genus term is predicated of its species. But it does appear, at least to some thinkers, that the term 'being' is predicated with one common concept of all things, God and creatures of whatever category.

Sutton claims that without a doubt they are deceived, and offers an argument against them based on the assumption that if 'being' were said univocally of the categories it would be "contracted" to the various categories in the way a genus, as animal, is contracted by a difference, for example, rational.<sup>22</sup>

(1) If the term 'being' is said univocally of all of the categories, then being has one concept common to the ten categories.

(2) If being has one concept common to the ten categories, being is common to the categories in the way a genus is common to its species.

(3) If being is common to the categories in the way a genus is common to its species, it is contracted to various categories by differences in the way a genus is contracted to its species by differences.

(4) For any genus, its concept is not included in the concept of the difference.

(5) But the concept of being is included in the concept of anything that is understood, including any purported differences.

(6) Hence, being cannot have any difference that contracts it to various categories in the way a genus is contracted to its species. (4, 5)

<sup>21</sup> See John Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, n. 119 (*Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia*, ed. Commissio Scotistica [Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1960], 16:269); *Ordinatio I*, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 164 (Vatican ed., 3:101-2).

<sup>22</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 879, l. 269-880, l. 299).



[(7) Hence, being is not common to the categories in the way a genus is common to its species. (Unstated subconclusion, from 3, 6)]

(8) Hence, being cannot have one concept common to the ten categories. (2, 7)

(9) Therefore, the term 'being' is not said univocally of all of the categories. (1, 8)

Premise 1 assumes the views on univocity found in Aristotle's opening remarks in the *Categories* mentioned above, and premise 2 is the key assumption that equates the community of being with that of a genus. Premise 3 assumes that as the genus animal is contracted by the specific difference rational, resulting in the species of human being, so being would be contracted to the category of, say, substance, by one difference, and to the category of quantity by another difference. Substance, quantity, and the other categories would therefore be species of being (i.e., contained 'under' being as species are 'under' a genus).<sup>23</sup> In support of premise 4, Sutton argues *ad absurdum* that if the concept of the genus were included in that of the difference, the concept of the difference would be equivalent to the species, since it is constituted by the genus and difference.<sup>24</sup> Premise 5 may be Sutton's interpretation of Scotus's claim, mentioned above, that both substance and accidents are beings *per se*.

In premises 2 and 3, Sutton imputes to his opponent a view that imagines a close parallel between 'being' and 'genus', and this comparison will have a role in the history of the debate. However, Scotus himself knew of and responded to this type of argument, being well aware that whatever community was to be accorded the concept of being, it could not be that of a genus. His definitive explanation of the nongeneric character of being, found for example in his *Lectura* and *Ordinatio*, is that being is not contracted to God and creatures, or to the various categories, by any positive reality or formal perfection extrinsic to it, as in the case of a genus, but rather is qualified by intrinsic modes, as it is contracted to God and creatures by the intrinsic modes of infinity

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 880, II. 286-91).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 880, II. 274-83).

and finitude.<sup>25</sup> Hence the distinction involved is not that between realities or formalities, but is a lesser distinction between a reality and its intrinsic mode.<sup>26</sup> It is dear, then, that Scotus would deny Sutton's premises 2 and 3, a gross simplification in stating baldly that being is like a genus and is contracted in the way of a genus.

Sutton, however, convinced that he has pinpointed the error of those who uphold the univocal concept of being (i.e., they take being to be a supergenus over the categories) and that he has disproven it, concludes:

Since being is not a genus of substance and quantity and the others, therefore in no way can it be predicated of them univocally. For what is predicated univocally of many is either their genus or species or difference or property or accident.<sup>27</sup>

This last argument, a standard at the time, maintains that if a term is said univocally, it must be one of the five predicables of Porphyry. The only real candidate for 'being' would be genus, which Sutton has just eliminated. Scotus's response to this objection had been that the assumption that a univocal term must be one of the predicables is valid only for the categories, but it is not for the transcendentals, as being, which need not be one of the predicables.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, Sutton, for his part, draws a further conclusion from the fact that being is not a genus: there is no genus above the ten categories, which categories "are distin-

<sup>25</sup> Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 157 (Vatican ed., 3:95). Scotus does not respond to this objection (see 3:103 n. 8). See also *Ord.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 39, 136 (Vatican ed. 4:169, 221); *Leet.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 109, 123 (Vatican ed., 16:265, 272).

<sup>26</sup> One should also mention that in Scotus's *Questions on De anima* another explanation is given: the model for being as contracted to its inferiors is not that of a genus to a species, but rather that of a species *specialissima* to its individuals. Stephen Dumont has shown the difficulties of this theory on Scotus's own principles and raises the possibility that it may be authored by a *scotellus*, perhaps Antonius Andreas (Stephen D. Dumont, "The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scotus and William Alnwick," *Mediaeval Studies* 49 (1987): 10-15). But Scotus's final position on the nongeneric character of being is that of being and its intrinsic modes.

<sup>27</sup> "Relinquitur ergo quad, ex quo ens non est genus substantiae et quantitatis et aliorum, quad nullo modo potest praedicari univoce de ipsis. Omne enim quad praedicatur univoce de multis, vel est genus eorum vel species vel differentia vel proprium vel accidens" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 [Schneider, ed., 880-81, ll. 300-303]).

<sup>28</sup> Dumont, "Concept of Being," 14-15.

guished according to ten diverse modes of predication, of which none can be reduced to another, nor can there be found in reality any other mode of predicating beyond them."<sup>29</sup>

Having eliminated univocity to his own satisfaction, Sutton says that 'being' is said either equivocally or analogically, and then proceeds to eliminate equivocality, following a method found in a number of works of Aquinas.<sup>30</sup> A few clarifying comments on equivocation and analogy in the medieval context are necessary to understand Sutton's position. Aristotle's remarks in the first chapter of the *Categories* provided an opportunity for later commentators, both Greek and Latin, to divide and subdivide various senses of equivocation.<sup>31</sup> The *expositores philosophi*,<sup>32</sup> such as Boethius and the author of the pseudo-Augustine *Categoriae decem*, took from Porphyry the first and largest division, that between chance equivocals (*aequivoca a casu*) and deliberate equivocals (*aequivoca a consilio* or *a proposito*). The first group comprises equivocal terms that are the same for whatever chance reason, as 'pen' in English happens to designate things of quite different types. The second group comprises terms whose meanings are the product of human intention in any number of ways.

Sutton, in the following question 33, gives this basic division of equivocal terms, calling the chance equivocals "equivocals properly so-called." For the deliberate equivocals he gives the four subdivisions found in Boethius and Simplicius.<sup>33</sup> The first of these

<sup>29</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 881, II. 303-8).

<sup>30</sup> See the discussion of the chronology of Aquinas's treatment of analogy in Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 543-72.

<sup>31</sup> Anonymous, *Paraphrasis Themistiana (Pseudo-Augustini Categoriae Decem)*, Aristotelis Latinus 1.1-5 (Bruges and Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961), 136-37; Boethius, *In Categoriae Aristotelis libri quatuor*, Patrologia Cursus Completus, series Latina 64 (Paris: J.-P. Mignes, 1847), 166; Simplicius, *Commentaire sur /es categories.d'Aristote: Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, Edition critique*, ed. A. Pattin in collaboration with W. Stuyven, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum Aristotelem Graecorum (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain; Paris: Editions Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1971), 42-44.

<sup>32</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 (Schneider, ed., 917, I. 227).

<sup>33</sup> "But it must be noted that according to the commentators of the Philosopher equivocals are said in two ways. For some are equivocals by chance and others by deliberation or on purpose. Equivocals by chance are those to which one name is imposed by chance, as

is *secundum similitudinem*, or by resemblance, as a human being and his picture.

'Animal' is predicated of each but equivocally by resemblance . . . . For 'animal' is said of the human being according to that *ratio* which is an animated sensitive substance, but of the picture it is said according to another *ratio*, which is the resemblance to the animated sensitive substance.<sup>34</sup>

The second class of deliberate equivocals Sutton calls *secundum proportionem*. For Sutton, it is only terms of this class that properly can be called 'analogical'; terms of the other three classes are analogical only in a broader sense. From Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, book 5)<sup>35</sup> he gives the standard example of the term *principium* (principle, origin):

... as when 'principle' is said of a unit which is the principle of number, and of a point that is the principle of a line, of a source that is the principle of rivers, and of the heart which is the principle in an animal. ... And well are they called equivocals *secundum proportionem* and most properly, for they are said proportionately of diverse things. For as unit is the principle of number, so a point is the principle of a line, and so for the others. And so such equivocals are properly called analogous, and the other [deliberate equivocals] are not properly called analogous, but in a broad sense. For analogy is the same as *proportio*.<sup>36</sup>

Alexander the son of Priam and Alexander the Macedonian, and these properly are called equivocals. But some are deliberative equivocals and are divided in four ways: some are by resemblance, some by proportion, some from one and some to one" ("Sed advertendum est quad secundum expositores philosophi dupliciter dicuntur aequivoca. Quaedam enim sunt aequivoca a casu et quaedam a consilio vel a proposito. Aequivoca a casu sunt ilia quibus a casu imponitur unum nomen, ut Alexander Priami filius et Alexander Macedo, et ista proprie dicuntur aequivoca. Quae autem sunt aequivoca a proposito, dividuntur quadrupliciter; quaedam enim sunt secundum similitudinem, quaedam secundum proportionem, quaedam ab uno, quaedam ad unum" [ibid. (Schneider, ed., 917, IL 227-34)]).

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 917, II. 235-41).

<sup>35</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphys.* 5.1.1012b34-1013a10 (*Translatio Anonyma sive 'Media'* [Brill ed., 84]).

<sup>36</sup> " ... ut cum principium dicitur de unitate quae est principium numeri, et de puncto quod est principium lineae, et de fonte qui est principium fluviorum, et de corde quod est principium in animali. . . . et istud exemplum aequivocorum posuit Aristoteles in V *Metaphysicae*. Et bene dicuntur aequivoca secundum proportionem et propriissime, quia proportionaliter dicuntur de diversis; sicut enim unitas est principium numeri, ita punctus est principium lineae, et sic de aliis. Et idea talia aequivoca dicuntur proprie analogae, et alia non dicuntur analogae proprie, sed communiter. Analogia enim idem est quad proportio" (Thomas

The third type of deliberate equivocal are those called equivocal *ab uno*, that is, in relation to one origin:

they descend from some one thing to many, of which things the term is said equivocally, as from medicine 'medical' is said of a book in which is written the science of medicine, and 'medical' is said of an instrument used to cut according to the medical art, and 'medical' is said of a potion which is very good for health according to the medical art. This equivocation descends to all these from one, namely from medicine.<sup>37</sup>

The fourth type are those equivocal *ad unum*, that is, in relation to one end, as

when diverse things are referred to one, and so the same term is said of them, as 'healthy'. For food is said to be healthy, and a potion and exercise to be healthy, and urine to be healthy, because they are referred to one end, namely, to the health of an animal. And in this way being is equivocal to substance and to the other predicaments, for being is said of quantity and quality and the other predicaments of accidents as they have a relation to one, namely, to substance which is the first being, but not however as to one end, but as to one subject.<sup>38</sup>

In this question 33, then, 'being' is not said of substance and accident as a "chance equivocal," but as a "deliberate equivocal," namely, a deliberate equivocal of the fourth type, an equivocal *ad unum*.

Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 [Schneider, ed., 917, l. 243-918, l. 252]). Aristotle's Greek term for this type of equivocal, *avalloy(a)*, Boethius had translated as *proportio*, while William of Moerbeke, in his translation of Simplicius, used *analogia*. See Ashworth, "Analogy in Thomas Sutton," 292.

<sup>37</sup> "descendunt ab uno aliquo ad multa, de quibus dicitur nomen aequivoce, ut a medicina dicitur medicinalis liber in quo scribitur scientia medicinae, medicinale ferramentum incisivum secundum artem medicinae, medicinale pharmacum quod est optimum ad sanitatem secundum artem medicinae; ad omnia ista descendit haec aequivocatio ab uno, scilicet a medicina" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 [Schneider, ed., 918, II. 253-59]).

<sup>38</sup> "quando scilicet diversa referuntur ad unum, et ex hoc dicitur de illis nomen idem, sicut sanum. Nam cibus dicitur sanus et pharmacum sanum et exercitium sanum et urina sana, quia referuntur ad unum finem, scilicet ad sanitatem animalis. Et hoc modo ens est aequivocum ad substantiam et ad alia praedicamenta, quia ens dicitur de quantitate et qualitate et ceteris praedicamentis accidentium, prout habent habitudinem ad unum, scilicet ad substantiam quae est primum ens, non tamen tamquam ad unum finem, sed tamquam ad unum subiectum" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 918, II. 260-68]).

On this point, Sutton is consistent in questions 32 and 33. In question 32, as we have seen, after eliminating univocity he asks whether 'being' is said of substance and accidents equivocally or analogically. Here he identifies equivocality with the "chance equivocals," the pure equivocals. This is rejected as it is not simply by chance that 'being' is predicated of substance and accidents. He reasserts the traditional teaching:

substance is being absolutely and through itself, and others are beings in a qualified sense, and are said to be beings because of substance . . . . Because, therefore, 'being' is said principally of substance and is said of the other [categories] only in relation to substance, it is necessary to say that 'being' is not said purely equivocally of them, but is said analogically first and foremost [of substance] and in a second fashion [of accidents].<sup>39</sup>

This, in other terminology, is the fourth class of deliberate equivocals found in question 33.

This is the teaching of the vast majority of Scholastics and Sutton argues ably for it, both from the authority of Aristotle and various commentators and from argument. From this basic position, he draws further consequences that emphasize the diversity of the senses of 'being' when said of the individual categories, in direct opposition to the positing of a univocal concept for all of the categories. For example, since there is nothing univocally common to the diverse categories, it is necessary that 'being' is said in as many different ways as there are categories. Sutton quotes in full another key text of Aristotle:

Those things are said in their own right to be that signify the figures of the predicaments. For in as many ways is something predicated, in so many ways is being signified. And so since some of the predicaments signify what something is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity, others

<sup>39</sup> "Substantia enim est ens simpliciter et per se ipsam, et alia sunt entia secundum quid et propter substantiam dicuntur entia . . . . Quia igitur ens dicitur principaliter de substantia et de aliis non dicitur nisi in habitudine ad substantiam, oportet necessario dicere quod ens non dicitur pure aequivoce de ipsis, sed secundum prius et posterius analogice" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 [Schneider, ed., 881, ll. 314-15; 881-82, ll. 328-31]).

passivity, others its place, others its time (others its position, others its having), each signifies the to be (or being) answering to each of these.<sup>40</sup>

For Sutton, there are ten different concepts of being, one for each of the categories:

So it should be said that 'being', as it is said of the things of the ten predicaments, has ten significations, according to which it ['being'] is said of them analogically, because first and principally it is said of substance according to one signification, and in a second fashion it is said of the other categories according to the other significations, and it is said of them because they belong to the first being, which is substance.<sup>41</sup>

It should not be thought, however, that each of these concepts of being is identical with the concept of each of the categories. For if so, then being would be a genus as, for example, substance is a genus, and as quantity is a genus. But this cannot be, for just as being cannot be a supergenus to all the categories, so being cannot be a genus within each of the categories, and this for the same reason: there can be no difference that could contract being to the various species of a particular category.<sup>42</sup>

How then does the concept of being as it pertains to substances differ from the concept of substance, and how does the concept of being as it pertains to quantities differ from the concept of quantity, and so for the other predicaments? Because of the importance of this reply, it is worth quoting in full:

<sup>40</sup> "Secundum se esse dicuntur, quaecumque significant figuras praedicamentorum. Quot modis enim aliquid praedicatur, tot modis ens significatur. Quoniam ergo praedicamentorum alia quid est significant, alia quale, alia quantum, alia ad aliquid, alia facere, alia pati, alia ubi, alia quando (alia positionem, alia habitum), horum unicuique idem significat (ens vel) esse" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 882, ll. 335-41]). The phrases in parentheses in Schneider's edition of Sutton are not found in the recension and translation of William of Moerbeke nor in the *Translatio Anonyma sive 'Media'*.

<sup>41</sup> "Dicendum est igitur quod ens, prout dicitur de rebus decem praedicamentorum, habet decem significaciones, secundum quas dicitur de eis analogice, quia primo et principaliter dicitur de substantiis secundum unam significacionem, et posterius de aliis secundum significaciones alias, et de illis dicitur propter hoc quod sunt primi entis quod est substantia" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 882, ll. 342-47]).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 882-83, ll. 347-59).

Being, therefore, is a genus in none of its significations, but according to each of its significations [with respect to each category] it has a concept other than the concept of the genus about which it is said. For although being said of substance does not signify a thing other than the substance, it signifies the same thing under another aspect. For 'substance' signifies the thing under the aspect of standing under, but 'being' said of a substance signifies the thing under the aspect of being *per se*. And similarly, 'quantity' signifies the thing under the aspect of measure, but 'being' said of a quantity signifies the same thing under the aspect of being that pertains to such a thing. And so it is to be understood of the other categories, that they signify under an aspect other than 'being' which is said of them.<sup>43</sup>

This distinction, between what the terms of the categories (as 'substance', 'quantity', 'quality', 'relation', etc.) signify and what 'being' as said of any of these categories signifies, has a key role in Sutton's response to a number of arguments for the univocal concept of being, both in the predicamental and in the transcendental contexts.

For example, in one of the very few passages in question 32 treating the transcendental context, Sutton recites the following argument in favor of a concept of being univocal to God and creatures. The only reason some terms are predicated analogically and not univocally is that as they are predicated of creatures they imply some imperfection in their formal meanings (*rationes*), which imperfection must be removed when they are predicated of God. 'Being wise' and 'being just', as said of creatures, signify limited qualities and so imply imperfection, while there is no quality in God, for all that is in God is identical with his essence; hence such terms cannot be said univocally of God and creatures. **But** this is not true of 'being' which only signifies "having an essence" and implies no imperfection. Furthermore, since being transcends all categories, it does not imply any determinate mode

<sup>43</sup> "Ens igitur secundum nullam eius significationem est genus, sed secundum omnem eius significationem habet alium conceptum quam conceptum generis de quo dicitur. Quamvis enim ens dictum de substantia non significet aliam rem quam substantia, significat tamen eandem rem sub alia ratione. Substantia enim significat rem sub ratione substandi, ens autem dictum de substantia significat rem sub ratione essendi per se. Et similiter quantitas significat rem sub ratione mensurae, ens autem dictum de quantitate significat eandem rem sub ratione essendi, quod competit tali rei. Et sic intelligendum est de aliis generibus, quod sub alia ratione significant quam ens quod dicitur de illis" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 883, ll. 359-69]).



of being, neither that of quantity or quality, as 'being wise' and 'being just' imply the determinate mode of being of quality. So, the term 'being' is predicated univocally of God and all other beings.<sup>44</sup>

Sutton responds that as the term of a most general genus, as 'substance' or 'quantity', implies a limited thing, so also does 'being', since as it is predicated of these most general genera it implies limitation and so imperfection.<sup>45</sup> Recall that for Sutton, the one term 'being' is associated with ten different concepts that signify ten different limited modes of being which characterize the different categories. For 'being' to be predicated of God, one must remove any such limited mode of being from the signification of the term. But once this is done, the term is not said univocally of God and creatures, since with each of the ten concepts of being a limited mode of existence is part of its formal meaning, and hence to remove the limitation is to change the formal meaning. Hence, when 'being' is said of God and creatures, it cannot be univocal, since two different concepts are involved.

In another response, Sutton explains further why the term 'being', said of any of the categories, does imply limitation.

'Being' does not imply those imperfect aspects which are signified by the names of the ten genera. But it signifies the modes of being which pertain to those genera, and as a consequence it signifies limited and so imperfect modes, of which none can pertain to God who is an unlimited being.<sup>46</sup>

Hence, again, 'being' cannot be said of God and creatures univocally.

With this understanding of Sutton's basic position, we can follow a rapid series of arguments and counter-arguments for and against Scotus's univocal concept of being. The series begins with the concept of common being (*ens in communi*):

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 870, lines 4-15).

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 884-85, II. 412-16).

<sup>46</sup> "ens non importat illas rationes imperfectas, quae significantur per nomina decem generum. Sed significat modos essendi, qui competunt illis generibus, et per consequens significat modos limitatos et sic imperfectos, quorum nullus potest deo convenire, qui est ens illimitatum" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 885, II. 433-37]).

Furthermore, common being is the object of the intellect. And so common being is apprehended by the intellect, which requires some concept or *ratio* of it. So, common being has some concept according to which it is said of all things, and hence univocally.<sup>47</sup>

Sutton replies, following Aquinas, by denying the main assumption: the proper object of the human intellect, in fact, is not common being, but the quiddity of a material thing, for whatever else we come to know, we know through a cognition of a material thing.<sup>48</sup> The Scotist replies that the object of our intellect is that which contains all that we know and under whose aspect all things are known by us, as color, under whose aspect all things are seen by us, is the object of sight. But whatever is understood by us is understood under the aspect of being under which are contained all things. So common being is the object of our intellect. Sutton replies with his basic conviction: we do not understand everything under one *ratio* or concept of being, but under several *rationes* of being, "as substances under one *ratio* of being, and quantities under another, and the things of diverse predicaments under diverse *rationes* of being."<sup>49</sup>

Sutton holds that the commonness in "common being" is not that of univocity, but rather that of analogy. The difference is that with univocity, there is not only a common name, but also a common concept, while with analogy there is only a common name, not a common concept. Since according to Sutton the term 'being' is analogous, there is no concept common to all things to be grasped by the intellect, but being is always apprehended under one of its ten categorical aspects. This can take place in either of two ways: determinately or indeterminately. In the first way, the intellect apprehends being under one determinate mode of being, (e.g., as existing *per se*). In the second way, the intellect

<sup>47</sup> "Praeterea ens in communi est obiectum intellectus. Ergo ens in communi apprehenditur ab intellectu, sed non nisi sub aliquo conceptu vel ratione. Ergo ens in communi habet aliquem conceptum, secundum quem dicitur de omnibus, et ita univoce" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 873, ll. 90-93]). See Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 129, 137 (Vatican ed., 3:80-81, 85-86); *Leet.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 97-98 (Vatican ed., 16:261).

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 873, ll. 94-96; see also 886-87, ll. 470-79).

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 873, ll. 97-105).

apprehends being indeterminately (e.g., as existing in one or other unspecified mode of existing).<sup>50</sup>

This latter remark is clarified in Sutton's response to another argument in the series, an argument for the univocal concept of being taken from the well-known dictum of Avicenna, "Being is the first thought by our intellect." If this is so, being is thought before substance or any other category, that is, before any concept of substance or any other category. But if so, then being is known by one concept which is not the concept of any specific category, but is common to all.<sup>51</sup>

In his reply, Sutton interprets Avicenna as saying that what is first understood about anything is that it is. But this does not occur with one concept common to all the categories, but by some concept that signifies a mode of being of a thing of one of the categories, either determinately or indeterminately. This happens with purely equivocal terms. When the term 'dog' is spoken, one understands a star (a celestial dog), or Fido (an earthly dog), or a fish (a sea dog), and this in either of two ways. One can understand the term "determinately" as signifying, say, Fido. Or one can understand it "indeterminately," as signifying one of the three, "either this one or that one or that one."<sup>52</sup> Hence Sutton can agree with Avicenna that being is understood before all else according to one concept (*ratio*)-not, however, according to one concept of being common to all categories, but according to one concept of being as it pertains to one category, and this either determinately to one particular category or indeterminately, that is, disjunctively to this or that or that category.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 886, II. 460-69).

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 873, II. 106-12). See Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina I-N*, Avicenna Latinus (Louvain: E. Peeters; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), tract. 1, cap. 5 (pp. 31-32).

<sup>52</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 887, II. 480-86; see also 874, II. 113-16; and 887, II. 487-91). A number of thinkers were concerned with whether equivocal terms signified conjunctively or disjunctively, and it seems that at least in the early fourteenth century analogical terms were seen by many as disjunctive (as here with Sutton, and also with Peter Auriol). See "Appendix I: Conjunction, Disjunction, and the *Ratio Communis*" in E. J. Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context," *Mediaeval Studies* 54 (1992): 130-32.

This response of Sutton also helps him respond to another of the principal arguments of Scotus for the univocal concept of being.<sup>53</sup> According to Sutton's formulation:

- (1) There is not certainty and doubt about the same concept.
- (2) But there is certainty concerning something that it is a being, but doubt whether it is a substance or an accident.
- (3) Hence, 'being' signifies a concept other than that signified by 'substance' or 'accident'.
- (4) Therefore, 'being' signifies a concept common to all the categories.

He recites a standard example in support of the second premise: all are certain that the concept 'being' applies to the powers of the soul, but many are unsure whether the concept 'substance' or the concept of 'accident' applies to them.<sup>54</sup>

In the course of his long response to this often-cited argument,<sup>55</sup> it becomes clear that he denies the implication between the subconclusion in step 3 and the conclusion in step 4. He concedes the subconclusion that there is not one concept of being that is identical with any one category, as substance or quantity. For if it were, 'being' and 'substance', for example, would be synonyms, and by knowing that something is a being, one would know that it is a substance, which is not the case. But just because being is not a concept identical with any one particular category, it does not follow that it is a concept common to all ten categories. This is a fallacy of the consequent, arguing to one reason or cause when there are many. The reason there is certainty that the powers of the soul are beings and doubt whether they are substances or qualities is that 'being' is said of each thing according to one of its concepts, which correspond to the concepts of the ten categories. When a term is subordinated to many concepts (as with equivocal and analogical terms), there can be certainty that one or other of its many concepts is predicated of some determinate thing, but doubt as to which one. So with

<sup>53</sup> Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 27-34 (Vatican ed., 3:18-21); *Leet.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 22-24 (Vatican ed., 16:232-33).

<sup>54</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 875-76, ll. 161-67).

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* (Schneider, ed., 890-92, ll. 576-635).

powers of the soul: it is certain that 'being' is predicated of them, since it is predicated of everything; but there can be doubt concerning which of the concepts to which the term 'being' is subordinated should be said of these powers.

For it is certain that 'being' is said of them [powers of the soul], since it is said of all things, but there is doubt which of the concepts is said of them, namely, as 'being' signifies substance or as it signifies quality; or if I may speak more properly, there is doubt whether 'being' is said of them as it signifies the entity of substance or as it signifies the entity of quality, and so there is doubt whether they are substance or accidents.<sup>56</sup>

When Sutton speaks "more properly" of entity, he is referring to the way of being<sup>57</sup> appropriate to each of the categories: 'being' and 'substance' denote the same particular object, but under different aspects: "For 'substance' signifies the thing under the aspect of standing under (*sub ratione substandi*), but 'being' said of substance signifies the thing under the aspect of being *per se* (*sub ratione essendi per se*)."<sup>58</sup>

The conclusion of his response summarizes his basic opinion:

And so on account of the community of the name [of 'being'] with many significations, there is that certitude, not because of the community of one signification. For ['being'] does not signify some concept common to the ten categories, as has been said, but ten concepts.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>56</sup> "Certum est enim quod ens dicitur de eis, ex quo dicitur de omnibus, sed dubium est, secundum quem conceptum dicitur de eis, scilicet an secundum quod ens significat substantiam, an secundum quod significat qualitatem, vel ut magis proprie loquar, dubium est, utrum ens dicatur de eis prout significat entitatem substantiae, vel prout significat entitatem qualitatis, et ideo dubium est, utrum sint substantia vel accidentia" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 891-92, II. 617-23; see also 892, II. 629-35]).

<sup>57</sup> Compare the following glossary entry of Paul Vincent Spade: "Entity: Throughout the text from Scotus, 'entity' has a gerundial rather than a participial force. I.e., an 'entity' in this sense is not something that *is*, but rather what something that *does*. The word might sometimes be translated 'way of being'" (*Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham*, ed. and trans. Paul Vincent Spade [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994], 232).

<sup>58</sup> See note 43.

<sup>59</sup> "et ideo propter communitatem nominis sub pluribus significationibus est ista certitudo, non propter communitatem unius significationis. Non enim significat aliquem communem conceptum decem generibus, ut dictum est, sed decem conceptus" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest.*

Another often-used argument for the univocal concept of being is the following:

- (1) That according to which a comparison is made is univocal.<sup>60</sup>
- (2) Substance is more a being than an accident.
- (3) Hence, a comparison is made according to being.
- (4) Therefore, being is univocal with regard to substance and accident.<sup>61</sup>

Sutton responds by denying the key assumption in (1): it is not true that one can make a comparison only according to what is univocal. Rather, one can at times make comparisons according to what is analogical, especially when a form is found in many things, more in some and less in others, by different degrees of participation. But when there is no such form found in the things compared, and they are only spoken of metaphorically or according to some relation one to the other, then no comparison is possible. It is for this reason that one cannot say, "Urine is more healthy than medicine," for health is formally neither in urine nor in medicine.<sup>62</sup>

Another argument for univocity concerns the unity of metaphysics as a science. According to Aristotle, "number as number has characteristic properties, such as oddness and evenness, excess and commensurability ... so being as being has its characteristic properties."<sup>63</sup> These characteristic properties, it

*ord.* 32 [Schneider, ed., 892, ll. 631-35]).

<sup>60</sup> Aristotle, *Topics* 1.15.107b17-18: "For every univocal is comparable, for they will be said either in like manner or else in a greater degree in one case" ("Nam univocum omne comparabile; aut enim similiter dicitur aut magis alterum" [Aristotle, *Topica*, Aristoteles Latinus 5.1-3 (Brussels and Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1969), 26]).

<sup>61</sup> "Furthermore, that according to which a comparison is made is univocal. But there is a comparison according to being, since substance is more being than accident. Therefore being is univocal with regard to substance and accident" ("Praeterea illud, secundum quod fit comparatio, est univocum. Sed secundum ens fit comparatio, quia substantia est magis ens quam accidens. Ergo ens est univocum ad substantiam et accidens" [Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 877, ll. 207-9)]).

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* (Schneider, ed., 893-94, ll. 677-87).

<sup>63</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphys.* 4.2.1004b10-17: "quoniam sicut sunt et numeri et in quantum numeri proprie passiones sunt, ut imparitas paritas, commensuratio equalitas ... sic et enti in quantum ens est quedam propria et ea sunt de quibus est philosophi perscrutari veritatem" (*Translatio Anonyma sive 'Media'* [Brill ed., 1976], 63, ll. 16-22).

is argued, are common to being and proper to no genus of being. But these properties follow from a subject according to some concept (*ratio*) of it, and so being as being has a concept prior to the concept of any of the predicaments; hence being is said univocally of the predicaments according to that concept.<sup>64</sup>

Sutton's response is true to his basic opinion: as being differs analogously in the various categories, so its characteristic properties (*passiones entis*)-*such* as act and potency, one and many, the same and diverse-also. differ analogically in the various categories. He gives an example taken from Aristotle's discussion of relations in book 5 of his *Metaphysics*. Aristotle distinguishes three types of "relatives" or *relata* based on differing foundations. The first type can be characterized as numerical. The Stagirite includes in this class specific identity, qualitative similarity and quantitative equality.

For all refer to unity. (i) Those things are the same whose substance is one; (ii) those are similar whose quality is one; (iii) those are equal whose quantity is one; and one is the beginning and measure of number, so that all these relations imply number, though not in the same way.<sup>65</sup>

Sutton cleverly adapts this Aristotelian doctrine to his own purposes, showing that a characteristic property of being, namely, one, is analogous in the different categories, just as being is analogous.

For example, to be one in substance is to be the same, and it follows on being as it is said of substance; to be one in quantity is to be equal, and it follows on being according to its aspect by which it is said of quantity; to be one in quality is to be similar, and it follows on being according to the aspect of being by which it is said of quality. And so it is clear that 'one' is analogous, as also 'being' in substance, quantity, and quality.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 875, II. 148-54).

<sup>65</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphys.* 5.15.1020b25-1021b11 (*Translatio Anonyma sive 'Media'* [Brill ed., 1976], 103-5).

<sup>66</sup> "Verbi gratia, unum in substantia est idem et sequitur ad ens, secundum quod dicitur de substantia, unum in quantitate est aequale et sequitur ad ens secundum rationem eius, qua dicitur de quantitate, unum in qualitate est simile et sequitur ad ens secundum rationem entis, qua dicitur de qualitate, et patet quod unum est analogum, sicut et ens in substantia, quantitate et qualitate" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 [Schneider, ed., 889, II. 556-61; see also 892,

Another related Scotist argument is based on the necessity of univocal concepts in demonstrations.<sup>67</sup>

(1) In every demonstration, the subject of the conclusion, of which a characteristic property (*passio*) is demonstrated, is univocal.

(2) Common being (*ens in quantum ens*) is the subject of metaphysics.

(3) The characteristic properties of being are demonstrated of common being as the subject of the conclusions of demonstrations in metaphysics.

(4) Therefore, common being is univocal.<sup>68</sup>

Sutton replies, as in his response to the previous argument, that as being is analogous, so the *passiones* demonstrated of being are analogous. Thus he retorts that the argument is based in the first premise on a false assumption, for it is not always necessary in every demonstration that the subject term of the conclusion be univocal, nor that the terms of the demonstrated *passiones* be univocal.<sup>69</sup>

## II. BEING IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL CONTEXT: QUESTION 32

It seems almost as an afterthought that at the end of his determination of question 32 Sutton briefly discusses 'being' in the transcendental context of God and creatures. He dearly affirms that 'being' is said analogically of God and any creature whatever.<sup>70</sup> Here, as in his extensive discussion of the divine names said of God and creatures in the following question, he appeals to insights that go to the heart of Aquinas's metaphysics of being.

lines 648-51]).

<sup>67</sup> Scotus, *Ord. Id.* 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, n. 26 (Vatican ed., 3:18).

<sup>68</sup> "Praeterea in omni demonstratione subiectum conclusionis, de quo ostenditur passio, est univocum. Sed de ente tamquam de subiecto concluduntur passionis entis, quia ens in quantum ens est subiectum metaphysicae. Ergo ens in communi est univocum" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 [Schneider, ed., 876, II. 184-87]). As Schneider points out ("Einleitung," 250\*), Scotus does not say that univocity is needed for the subject of the conclusion of a syllogism, but for the middle term of the syllogism. Similar arguments are found in Sutton's *Contra Cowton*; see Riva, *Tommaso Claxton*, 34-35 n. 22.

<sup>69</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 892, II. 648-51).

<sup>70</sup> "Ulterius sciendum est quod ens dicitur analogice de deo et de quocumque alio" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 884, II. 398-99]).



For God is said 'being essentially', for he is his subsistent being, having all perfection of being. But all else is said 'being by participation', since nothing else is its being nor has all perfection of being, but participates in that being and partially has some perfection of being according to a determinate grade according to genus and to species.<sup>71</sup>

There is another reason why 'being' cannot be said univocally of God and creatures. Since there is a greater distance between God and creatures than between substance and accidents, *a fortiori*, if 'being' is not said univocally in the predicamental context, much less will it be said in the transcendental context.<sup>72</sup>

It is not clear what type of analogy is to be used for 'being' in the transcendental context, especially given Sutton's belief in God's transcendence over and distance from creatures. We could be led to the following conclusion, based on what we know of his ideas on analogy in the categorical context. He is advocating an analogy of attribution, a 'one to another' type of analogy, based on a relation of prior and posterior. 'Being' is said first of substance and secondly of an accident that depends on it. In the context of Aquinas's metaphysics of being, God is subsistent being, identical with his act of existence; therefore, 'being' is said first of God and secondly of creatures since they participate in the act of being in different grades according to genus and species. In arguing for the 'one to another' analogy in both the categorical and transcendental contexts, Sutton would show himself to be a faithful follower of Aquinas.

But it turns out that Sutton's views on this question are more subtle and, in fact, not easy to discern. Recall that the titles of questions 33 and 34 show that they are both treating the divine names. Question 33 says, "It is asked concerning the divine names, and firstly, whether names which are said of God and creatures are said univocally of God and creatures." Question 34

<sup>71</sup> "Deus enim dicitur ens essentialiter, quia est suum esse subsistens habens omnem perfectionem essendi. Sed omne aliud dicitur ens per participationem, quia nullum aliud est suum esse nee habet omnem perfectionem essendi, sed participat ipsum esse et partialiter habet aliquam essendi perfectionem secundum gradum determinatum ad genus et ad speciem" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 884, lines 399-404]).

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 884, lines 404-10).

says, "Secondly, it is asked whether this name 'substance', as it is a name of a most general genus, is said univocally of God and caused substances; and this is to ask whether God is in the predicament of substance."<sup>73</sup> In the latter question, Sutton argues that while 'substance' cannot be predicated of God, the term signifying the mode of being taken from created substances (i.e., *ens per se*), can be predicated of God analogically. Hence to answer our question concerning the type of analogy to be used in the transcendental context with the term 'being', it is wise first to follow Sutton in his discussion in question 33 of the divine names (e.g., 'wise' and 'good') and then return finally to his discussion in question 34 about '*ens per se*' said analogically of God and creatures.

### III. THE DIVINE NAMES: QUESTION 33

When discussing the divine names in question 33, Sutton again is guided by Aquinas's method of elimination. That is, he first eliminates the use of univocity in this context, arguing that 'wisdom' and 'goodness' when said of creatures signify a perfection contained in a category (i.e., that of quality), and as such include in their formal meaning some limitation, for an imperfect mode of being is implied. But God has no such limited quality of goodness or wisdom, but is his goodness and wisdom. Sutton continues his reasoning, eliminating the chance equivocals (*aequivoca a casu*).

Therefore the formal meanings of such names, as they are said of God and creatures, are not totally the same, and so they are not said univocally; nor even purely equivocally, such that they be chance equivocals. For those names had first been imposed to signify the perfections of creatures, and then intentionally

<sup>73</sup> "Quaeritur de nominibus divinis, et primo, utrum nomina quae dicuntur de deo et creaturis, dicantur univoce de deo et de creaturis" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 [Schneider, ed., 909]). "Secundo quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen substantia, prout est nomen generis generalissimi, dicatur univoce de deo et substantiis causatis; et hoc est quaerere, utrum deus sit in praedicamento substantiae" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 34 [Schneider, ed., 936]).

attributed to God. Hence they are not chance equivocals. It remains, therefore, that they are deliberate equivocals, which are called analogicals.<sup>74</sup>

He then proceeds to discuss in detail and very clearly the type of deliberate equivocals or analogical terms the divine names are.

But since deliberate equivocals are said in four ways, as has been said, we must find out in which of those ways those names are said analogically. And it is held commonly that they are said according to an order or respect to one, as 'health' is said of diverse things according to a relation to one.<sup>75</sup>

Here, reciting the "common opinion," he states the position of Aquinas, found in his most representative works on this question, such as the *Summa contra Gentiles*, *De Potentia*, and the *Summa Theologiae*. In these works, Aquinas had distinguished two types of analogical predication, 'many to one' and 'one to another'.<sup>76</sup> The first predicates something of two things because they are related to a third thing, as being is predicated of, say, quality and

<sup>74</sup> "Rationes igitur illorum nominum non sunt totaliter eadem, prout dicuntur de deo et prout dicuntur de aliis, et ita non univoce dicuntur, nee etiam pure aequivoce, ita quad sint aequivoca a casu. Ista enim nomina primo imposita fuerunt ad significandum perfectiones creaturarum, et ex proposito sunt attributa deo. Non igitur sunt aequivoca a casu. Relinquitur igitur quad sint aequivoca a consilio, quae vocantur analoga" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 [Schneider, ed., 922, II. 370-76]).

<sup>75</sup> "Cum autem aequivoca a consilio dicantur quattuor modis, ut dictum est, videndum est, quo illorum modorum ista nomina dicantur analogice, et ponitur communiter quad dicuntur secundum ordinem vel respectum ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de diversis secundum habitudinem ad unum" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 922-23, II. 377-81]).

<sup>76</sup> "And so it should be said otherwise that nothing may be predicated univocally of God and a creature, but not that those things that are commonly predicated are predicated purely equivocally, but rather analogically. But there are two modes of this type of predication. One by which something is predicated of two things with respect to some third thing, as being [is predicated] of quality and of quantity with respect to substance. With the other mode, something is predicated of two with respect of one to the other, as being [is predicated] of substance and of quantity" ("Et idea aliter dicendum est, quad de Deo et creatura nihil praedicetur univoce; non tamen ea quae communiter praedicantur, pure aequivoce praedicantur, sed analogice. Huius autem praedicationis duplex est modus. Unus quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum ad aliquod tertium, sicut ens de qualitate et quantitate per respectum ad substantiam. Alius modus est quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum unius ad alterum, sicut ens de substantia et quantitate" [Thomas Aquinas, *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 7]). See Wippel, *TheMetaphysicalThoughtofThomasAquinas*, 565; Fabro, *Participation et causalite*, 523.

quantity, because both are related to a third, namely, substance. The second predicates something of two things because one of them is directly related to the other. In this way, being is predicated of quantity and substance, because quantity is related to substance. In these works, Aquinas argues for the second mode of analogical predication as that holding between creatures and God.

Sutton also makes this distinction and seems to be about to decide, with Aquinas, for the 'one to another' analogy.<sup>77</sup> But at this point in his discussion, he makes a crucial distinction, that between things and the signification and imposition of names.

And that is well said considering the things about which these names are said, for created things have an order to God as their cause. But considering the signification of names, according to which analogy is principally considered, it is not in this way that names are said of God and other things. For a man is not said to be just or wise because he has an order to the justice or wisdom of God, as being is said of quantity because it is of a being that is a substance.<sup>78</sup>

The distinction is between the order of reality, how extramental things are related to each other, and our imposition of names for these realities, a distinction Aquinas himself makes in some of his discussions of analogy. For example, in the *Summa Theologiae* (*STh* I, q. 13, a. 6), he says that regarding the thing signified by the name, the names are first said of God, then of creatures. But as to the imposition of names, they are first imposed by us on creatures which we know first.<sup>79</sup> In all the cases in which Aquinas

<sup>77</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 (Schneider, ed., 923, II. 380-91).

<sup>78</sup> "Et illud bene dictum est, considerando ad res de quibus dicuntur haec nomina; omnes enim res creatae habent ordinem ad deum sicut ad suam causam. Sed considerando ad significationem nominum, secundum quam principaliter attenditur analogia, non isto modo dicuntur nomina de deo et rebus aliis. Non enim ideo dicitur homo iustus vel sapiens, quia habet ordinem ad iustitiam dei vel sapientiam, sicut ens dicitur de quantitate propter hoc, quod est entis quod est substantia" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 923, II. 389-96]).

<sup>79</sup> "as to the thing signified by the name, they [common perfections] are said firstly of God, then of creatures, for from God such perfections flow into creatures. But as to the imposition of the name, first they are imposed by us onto creatures which we first know" ("quantum ad rem significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis, quia a Deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant. Sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus" [Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*

makes this distinction, it does not affect his affirmation that the analogy between God and creatures is that of 'one to another'.

Not so for Sutton, who accords a crucial importance in his theory of analogy to imposition. Since analogy is principally concerned with the signification of names, he believes that secondary imposition characterizes analogy, not the fact that one thing is related in reality to another in some particular way.<sup>80</sup> The term 'being' was first imposed to signify substances, and then secondarily was imposed to signify accidents. This type of secondary imposition is a necessary condition for the analogy of attribution. But the order of imposition of the divine names in the transcendental context is different from that of 'being' in the predicamental context.

'being' is said analogously of substance and accident because first and foremost it is imposed on substance and secondly on accident, insofar as accident is of that substance. But it is not so with names said of God and other things, for they are not imposed first and foremost on God and secondly attributed to other things, but rather the reverse: first and foremost they were imposed on the other things, then they were attributed to God, but not so that they would be said of God to signify his relation to the other things.<sup>81</sup>

I, q. 13, a. 6]). See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 34; and *Compendium Theologiae* I, c. 27.

<sup>80</sup> "a name is not analogous for this reason, namely, because one of the things of which the name is said has an order or dependence to another, but because the name that is imposed on one is deliberately transferred to others to signify the relations of them to the one to which it is first imposed, in such a way that analogy comes from the imposition of a name on diverse things having an order and does not arise from this, that they have a real order or dependence" ("nomen non est analogum propter illam causam, quia scilicet unum eorum, de quibus dicitur nomen, habet ordinem vel dependentiam ad aliud, sed quia nomen, quod imponitur uni, transfertur ex consilio ad alia ad significandum habitudines eorum ad unum, cui primo imponitur, ita quod analogia est ex impositione nominis ad diversa habentia ordinem, et non est ex hoc quod habent ordinem vel dependentiam real em" [Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 889-90, IL 562-68); see also 872, IL 78-79: "Nomina quae attribuuntur deo, primo imponuntur ad significandam perfectionem in creaturis" ("The names that are attributed to God are imposed first to signify the perfection in creatures"))].

<sup>81</sup> "dicitur ens analogice de substantia et accidente, quia per prius imponitur substantiae et per posterius accidenti, in quantum accidens est ipsius substantiae. Non sic autem nomina dicta de deo et rebus aliis; non enim sic imponuntur prius deo et posterius attribuuntur rebus aliis, sed potius e converso: prius imposita fuerunt rebus aliis, deinde fuerunt attributa deo, non tamen sic quod dicerentur de deo ad significandum habitudinem eius ad res alias" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 [Schneider, ed., 923-24, IL 397-403]).

They are firstly imposed to signify creaturely perfections for the same reason given by Aquinas: "For according as things are more known by us, they are first named."<sup>82</sup> Hence the terms 'wise' and 'good' were first imposed to signify virtuous qualities in human beings, and secondarily were transferred to signify the divine attributes. Sutton immediately draws his own conclusion, distancing himself from the "common opinion": "And so it seems that properly speaking those [divine] names are not said analogically in that way, that is, to one."<sup>83</sup>

Having broken with the "common opinion" and rejected equivocals *ad unum* (i.e., in relation to one), Sutton proceeds to reject two other types of deliberate equivocals. The divine names are not said analogously *ab uno* (i.e., in relation to one origin): though it is true that a human being's goodness is from God, he "is not said 'good' because his goodness is from God."<sup>84</sup> Nor are they said by resemblance: although a human being does in fact resemble God insofar as he is wise or good, this is not the reason for the attribution of the name to the person.<sup>85</sup> "It remains, therefore, that the names are said of God and other things in the fourth way, that is, according to proportion."<sup>86</sup> These, it will be recalled, are for Sutton the only terms that can properly be called 'analogical', any other being called 'analogical' only in a broader sense.

With this type of analogy, Sutton is proposing a likeness based on two proportions: the number six is like four in that four is

<sup>82</sup> "Secundum enim quod res sunt nobis magis notae, secundum hoc prius nominantur." See also Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 (Schneider, ed., 921, II. 343-44).

<sup>83</sup> "Et ideo videtur quod proprie loquendo non dicuntur ista nomina analogice illo modo, scilicet ad unum" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 [Schneider, ed., 924, 403-5]).

<sup>84</sup> "quamvis bonitas creaturae descendat a bonitate dei quantum ad esse, non tamen quantum ad attributionem nominis. Non enim ideo dicitur homo bonus, quia sua bonitas est a bonitate dei, et similiter est aliis nominibus" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 924, lines 407-10]).

<sup>85</sup> "Quamvis enim omnes res habeant aliquam similitudinem ad deum, ut sapientia hominis ad sapientiam dei et bonitas hominis ad bonitatem dei, non tamen propter hoc dicitur homo bonus vel sapiens, quia habet similitudinem bonitatis dei et sapientiae dei" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 924, II. 412-16]).

<sup>86</sup> "Relinquitur igitur quod nomina dicta de deo et de rebus aliis dicantur quarto modo, scilicet secundum proportionem, prout hoc nomen principium dicitur de unitate et de puncto et de fonte" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 924, lines 418-20]).

related to two as six is related to three, Sutton gives numerous examples, showing the proper way of speaking analogically of God and humans:

For as a man knows the highest causes, and so is called wise, so God knows the highest causes perfectly, and so deservedly ought to be called wise. . . . Likewise, as a man has understanding of a thing through its proper cause, and so is called a knower, so God understands in a most perfect way the order of all causes and effects, and so, because of such a proportion, ought to be called a knower, . . . Also similarly, as a man has understanding of principles without discoursing, so God knows all things without discoursing; so as a man is called intelligent, so is God, . . . And even further, as a man has a correct pattern in his mind of things to be made (which idea in the mind of the artisan is called art), so also God has the patterns of all things which are made in his intellect. And so, according to such a proportion, a man is called 'artisan' as also is God. . . . Again, as man is called 'just' who gives to each one what is his, this, however, maximally pertains to God, for if he wishes something to be done, he wills to that person those things necessary for that thing to be done, for those things are as if owed to the person that he may have them. So, according to such a proportion, God is called 'just'. . . . Again, a man is called generous since he gives without expecting from the donation anything for himself. But God gives all good things without gaining for himself anything from it. And so according to this proportion, as man is called 'generous', so also God.<sup>87</sup>

As is well known, Aquinas in *De Veritate* (*De Verit.*, q, 2, a. 11) had proposed such an analogy for the divine names used of God and creatures. After concluding that 'knowledge' is not said of God and creatures univocally or equivocally, he concludes it is

<sup>87</sup> "Sicut enim homo cognoscit altissimas causas et ideo dicitur sapiens, ita deus cognoscit altissimas causas perfecte et ideo merito debet dici sapiens, . . . Similiter sicut homo habet cognitionem rei per propriam causam et ideo sciens dicitur, ita deus omnium causarum et effectuum ordinem cognoscit modo perfectissimo, et ita propter talem proportionem debet dici sciens. . . . Similiter etiam sicut homo habet cognitionem principiorum absque discursu, ita et deus omnia cognoscit absque discursu, et ideo sicut homo dicitur intelligens, ita et deus. . . . Adhuc autem sicut homo habet rectam rationem factibilium in mente, quae ratio in mente artificis dicitur ars, ita et deus rationes omnium quae fiunt habet in intellectu suo, Secundum igitur talem proportionem homo dicitur artifex et deus, . . . Adhuc sicut homo dicitur iustus, qui tribuit unicuique quod suum est, hoc autem maxime deo convenit, quia ex hoc quod vult aliquid, vult ei omnia quae ad ipsum requiruntur; illa enim sunt quasi debita ei, ut habeat. Sic secundum proportionem talem deus dicitur iustus. Adhuc homo ex hoc, quod dat non propter aliquod commodum, quod exspectet ex datione, dicitur liberalis, deus autem omnia bona dat absque hoc, quod aliquid exinde sibi accrescat; secundum hanc igitur proportionem, sicut homo dicitur liberalis, ita et deus" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 924-25, 11. 421-43]).

said analogically, that is, "according to a proportion." He continues by making a distinction between two types of agreement in proportion. The first is that two things are proportioned to one another in such a way that there is a determinate relation or distance between them, as the number two is related to a unit as its double. The second is that two things are proportioned to one another in such a way that there is no such determined relation to one another; rather, the agreement is based on the similarity of two proportions to one another. As mentioned above, the number six is like four in that four is related to two as six is related to three. Aquinas describes the first as an analogy of proportion, and the second as an analogy of proportionality.<sup>88</sup> Finally, it is clear that here he argues that only the second is appropriate to predication of God and creatures, since there can be no determinate relation between God and creatures.<sup>89</sup>

Sutton's terminology is different from that of Aquinas in *De Veritate*: Sutton uses "analogy of proportion" (*analogiasecundum proportionem*)<sup>90</sup> for Aquinas's "analogy of proportionality"; both terms refer to an agreement based on the similarity of two proportions to one another. It is clear that Sutton uses this type of analogy when treating the divine names, but not for the reason given by Aquinas in the *De Veritate* passage. It is not in order to protect the transcendence of God that the analogy of proportionality is upheld,<sup>91</sup> but rather because of the fact that, for Sutton, all other types of deliberate equivocal are inappropriate.

Again, Aquinas held this position on the analogy of proportionality only in this passage of *De Veritate*, and in subsequent discussions of the analogy of the divine names (in, e.g., the *Summa contra Gentiles*, the *Compendium Theologiae*, *De Potentia*, and the *Summa Theologiae*) he abandons all mention of

<sup>88</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 11.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 (Schneider, ed., 918, l. 247).

<sup>91</sup> We should perhaps not rule this out entirely in the case of Sutton. In question 32, when he briefly discusses the transcendental context, as we have seen, he points out an asymmetry between that context and the categorical context. See note 72, above.



this type of analogy, and returns to that of his earlier work, namely, the analogy of 'one to another'.

Hence, in his final and considered position, Aquinas uses the analogy of 'one to another' with regard to 'being' in the categorical context and also with regard to 'being' and the usual divine names as 'wise' and 'good' in the transcendental context. Sutton uses the analogy of 'one to another' for 'being' in the categorical context, and for the usual divine names he uses his analogy of proportion in the transcendental context. What, finally, of 'being' in the transcendental context?

#### IV. BEING IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL CONTEXT REVISITED: QUESTION 34

In question 34, Sutton asks, "Secondly, it is asked whether this name 'substance', as it is a name of a most general genus, is said univocally of God and caused substances; and this is to ask whether God is in the predicament of substance." He replies that 'substance' cannot be predicated of God, since, as we have seen, 'substance' signifies the thing under the aspect of standing under, while 'being', said of substance, signifies the thing under the aspect of being *per se*.<sup>92</sup> Since God can in no way be said to 'stand under' anything, 'substance' cannot be said of God, and God cannot be in the genus of substance.<sup>93</sup> On the other hand, 'being *per se*' can be said both of God and created substances, not however univocally.

To the nineteenth [objection] it should be said that God is a being *per se* and a caused substance is *per se* a being, but it is not said univocally: God is a *per se* being with caused substances, but analogically. For God is *aper se* being not only formally, as he is not a being in another, but also causally, because he is not a being through any cause, as other substances are beings through God causally.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>92</sup> "Substantia enim significat rem sub ratione substandi, ens autem dictum de substantia significat rem sub ratione essendi per se" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 883, ll. 363-65]).

<sup>93</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 34 (Schneider, ed., 951, ll. 425-47).

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 950-51, ll. 418-23).

In addition, Sutton, following a Thomistic metaphysics of being, divides being *per se* in two: that of a being that is its *esse* and that of beings that differ from their *esse*.<sup>95</sup> But what type of analogy is appropriate when both God and created substances are said to be *per se*? Unfortunately, in question 34 he says only that 'being *per se*' is said of God and created substances analogically, without stating explicitly which type of analogy.

E. J. Ashworth suggests that it is not a type of analogy that we have mentioned so far, but rather what Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great called the "agreement or analogy of imitation." This was a type of analogy not discussed by the logicians, but introduced by theologians to grapple with the difficult case of creatures imitating God without sharing any kind of common nature, genus, or species.<sup>96</sup>

Alessandro Conti, however, is right to remark that it is Sutton's analogy of proportion, Aquinas's analogy of proportionality of *De Veritate*. All the divine names, including being, are said of God with this type of analogy.<sup>97</sup> Question 33, which Conti quotes in support, does not explicitly talk of 'being', but only of the other divine names, as 'wisdom' and 'goodness'. Nevertheless, he is right to treat 'being' as a divine name, for as we have seen from their titles, Sutton intends to treat the divine names first in question 33 and then in question 34. Also, in question 33 he extends his use of the analogy of proportion to "all those names which absolutely signify perfection,"<sup>98</sup> which I take to include 'being'.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 952-53, II. 469-78).

<sup>96</sup> Ashworth, "Analogy in Thomas Sutton," 296.

<sup>97</sup> "So Sutton specifies that 'being' (as every other name that one wishes to attribute to God or to creatures) is analogous to them [i.e., God and creatures] in the second way (that is, according to proportion), and [being is analogous] to the ten categories in the fourth way [that is, to one]" ("Orbene, precisa Sutton, l'ente [come ogni altro nome che si voglio attribuire sia a Dio che alle creature] e analogo rispetto ad essi nel secondo senso [cioè *secundum proportionem*], e rispetto alle dieci categorie nel quarto [that is, *ad unum*]" [Conti, "La composizione metafisica," 326]).

<sup>98</sup> "Similiter intelligendum est de omnibus aliis nominibus, quae absolute significant perfectionem. Omnia dicuntur de deo et rebus aliis secundum proportionem, et ideo propriissime dicuntur analogae et non sunt univoca" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 [Schneider, ed., 925, II. 445-48J). See also Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 34 (Schneider, ed., 949-50, II. 386-99).

There are two further reasons to believe Sutton is talking here about his analogy of proportion. First, the same problem for the analogy of attribution, namely, that of the order of imposition, applies to 'being' as to the other divine names: as 'wise' is first imposed to signify a creaturely perfection and then is transferred to God with a second imposition, so also is 'being'.

To the seventh it should be said that this name 'being' is attributed to God, as it is taken from creatures, according to that signification with which it is said of substances; for thus it signifies the same as being *per se*. It is said, however, analogically of God and other substances.<sup>99</sup>

On Sutton's own principles, the analogy of attribution is inappropriate for predicating 'being' of God and created substances.

Secondly, we can easily construct a sentence that illustrates the analogy of proportion for being on the model of Sutton's sentences for the other divine names: "As a caused substance, not being in another, is being *per se* formally, so God, neither being in another nor being caused by another, is being *per se* formally and causally." As an ontological basis for such an assertion, Sutton appeals to the Thomistic metaphysics of being, with God as subsistent being and creatures as participants in being according to the limitations of genus and species.<sup>100</sup>

In sum, when Sutton discusses briefly in question 32 the transcendental context and claims that 'being' is said of God and creatures by analogy, he is only concerned to show that univocity and equivocity are inappropriate and analogy is appropriate for the divine names. It is only in questions 33 and 34, where he explicitly treats the divine names at length, that he spells out which specific type of analogy is appropriate for all these names: the analogy of proportion.

His reliance on the analogy of proportion helps him explain once again why some of his contemporaries have been misled to

<sup>99</sup> "Ad septimum dicendum quod hoc nomen ens attribuitur deo, prout accipitur a creaturis secundum illam significationem qua dicitur de substantiis; sic enim significat idem quod ens per se. Dicitur tamen analogice de deo et aliis substantiis" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 34 [Schneider, ed., 948, II. 335-38]).

<sup>100</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 884, II. 398-410).

think the "divine names" are univocal.<sup>101</sup> Basing himself on a text of Aristotle's *Physics* (*Phys.* 7.4.249a21-25), he holds that there is a gradation among equivocals. The chance equivocals are farthest from univocal terms, for there is only a community of name. Among the deliberate equivocals, those said according to a similitude, as a person and the picture of the person, or a house in the mind of the builder and the real house, can be said to be partly univocal, though not totally, for the *ratio* of the name is partly the same and partly diverse.<sup>102</sup> Other equivocals are near to the univocals, namely, those that have a similarity either in genus or in proportion. An example of the first is 'body' said of celestial bodies and corruptible bodies. Although a natural scientist recognizes that the term 'body' is equivocal, since the types of matter involved in the two cases are different and so they are not in the same physical genus, they do agree insofar as the same logical genus, 'body'; because of this agreement, the term 'body' as said of them seems to be univocal. Finally, some equivocals are said "according to proportion," as the person who presides at a school is said to be a *magister*, as also one who presides over a house: "for as this one is the rector of school children, so that one is the rector of a house." Because the nearness of the proportion is so close, the term seems to some to be univocal, when it is not. Sutton gives the standard example of *principium* for this type of equivocal according to proportion, the closest to univocals. Hence he can summarize this view on the analogy according to proportion:

All [such names] are said of God and other things according to proportion, and so most properly are they called analogical and not univocal, for they are not said of God and other things altogether according to the same *ratio*. However, such names as are properly analogical, among all analogicals [i.e., other deliberate equivocals] maximally recede from the *ratio* of pure equivocals and maximally approach the *ratio* of univocals. And so it is not surprising if some say

<sup>101</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 (Schneider, ed., 920-22, II. 315-59).

<sup>102</sup> Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 (Schneider, ed., 886, II. 458-59); Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 (Schneider, ed., 920, II. 308-14).

that they are univocal, for what is not far from some species seems to be of that species, even if it is not,<sup>103</sup>

Nevertheless, there seems to be some tension in Sutton's doctrine. He holds that names that are "properly analogical" (i.e., said according to the analogy of proportion) are, of all equivocals, closest to univocal names, and hence more like univocal names than are equivocals *ad unum*, which are used for substances and accidents, as we have seen. But in question 32, he had stated that

there is a much greater distance between the being of whatever creature and the divine being than between the being of whatever accident and the being of substance, and so much less can being be said univocally of God and a creature than of substance and accident. For with respect to God, others are more non-beings than beings.<sup>104</sup>

In this passage, he claims that 'being' said of God and creatures is further from univocal terms than 'being' said of substance and accident, based on the greater dissimilarity holding between God and creatures.<sup>105</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Despite these ambiguities, Sutton's position on analogy is nuanced and many-faceted. It is true that his defense of analogy against Scotus's univocal concept of being does not take into

<sup>103</sup> "Omnia dicuntur de deo et rebus aliis secundum proportionem, et idea propriissime dicuntur analogica et non sunt univoca, quia non secundum rationem omnino eandem dicuntur de deo et de rebus aliis, Talia tamen quae sunt proprie analogica, maxime recedunt a ratione pure aequivocorum inter omnia analogica et maxime accedunt ad rationem univocorum; et idea non est mirum, si aliqui dicant ea esse univoca, quia quod non multum distat ab aliqua specie, videntur esse illius speciei, cum tamen non sit" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 33 [Schneider, ed., 925-26, II. 446-53]),

<sup>104</sup> "Et multo longius distat esse cuiuslibet creaturae ab esse divino, quam esse accidentis cuiuscumque ab esse substantiae, propter quod multo minus potest ens dici de deo et creatura univoce quam de substantia et accidente, Respectu enim dei alia sunt magis non-entia quam entia. Unde Augustinus <licit VII De trinitate, c. 32: 'Fortasse solum deum oportet dici essentiam, Est enim vere solus, quia incommutabilis est'" (Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ord.* 32 [Schneider, ed., 884, II. 404-10).

<sup>105</sup> See also *ibid.* (Schneider, ed., 886, II. 451-59).

consideration the full rationale or arguments the Subtle Doctor had marshaled for his new position. This may be because Scotus's thinking on this topic was not fully available at Oxford at the time of Sutton's disputes; it is more likely Sutton, being among the first to confront such novelty, was not in a position really to grasp Scotus's doctrine, so complex and multifaceted, and so very unlike that of the Angelic Doctor.<sup>106</sup>

In presenting his own position on analogy, he shows himself an able 'continuator' of Aquinas, to use Lewry's term.<sup>107</sup> Sutton is indeed a true and passionate follower of Aquinas. But to appreciate his own teaching, we need to understand it in two distinct contexts: in the predicamental context, he argues for the "common opinion," an analogy of attribution of 'one to another', while in the transcendental context, he argues for the analogy of proportion. His reasons for this latter are not, principally, those of Aquinas in *De Veritate*, that is, to safeguard the transcendence of God. Nor are they to be seen as foreshadowing Cajetan's championing of the "analogy of proportionality" as the only true analogy; nor are Sutton's the well-known preoccupations of Cajetan concerning intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. The reason for his taking of his position in the transcendental context can be traced to a characteristic that helps us understand the novelty and peculiarity of his commentary on the *Categories*. There he used the theory of supposition in an attempt to deal with particular problems that arose in the context of a generally nominalist approach to the treatise while still maintaining on many points a common medieval reading that is realist.<sup>108</sup> In our case, Sutton takes very seriously the demands of an order of imposition of names, so that in the case of God and creatures, the "common opinion," that of an analogy of attribution, is ruled out.

<sup>106</sup> See the very helpful remarks on Sutton's relation to Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, and Duns Scotus in Conti, "La composizione metafisica," 359-60.

<sup>107</sup> Lewry, "Two Continuators of Aquinas."

<sup>108</sup> Alessandro D. Conti, "Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the Categories According to MS Oxford, Merton College 289," in *The Rise of British Logic: Acts of the Sixth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. Balliol College, Oxford, 19-24 June, 1983*, ed. P. Osmund Lewry (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1985), 177-81.

Hence in both his commentary on the *Categories* and in these Ordinary Questions, Sutton shows himself very sensitive to linguistic and semantic questions, whether they deal with supposition, signification, or imposition. It was a question of this type, rather than a strictly theological or metaphysical question, that forced him to find his own response, modifying, critically, the "common opinion" on analogy.

THOMAS AQUINAS ON CHRIST'S *ESSE*:  
A METAPHYSICS OF THE INCARNATION

VICTOR SALAS, JR.

*Saint Louis University*  
*Saint Louis, Missouri*

**T**HE FOURTH ARTICLE of Thomas Aquinas's *Quaestio disputata De Unione Verbi incarnati* has for centuries perplexed and frustrated the interpretive efforts of his most earnest and faithful commentators. The difficulty stems, in part, from Aquinas's introduction of a second, human *esse* (in addition to the divine *esse*) into the metaphysical constitution of Christ. He thus departs from and even seems to contradict his standard account of Christ's *esse*, for, time and again, he insists that Christ has only one *esse*, the divine and eternal *esse* of the Word.<sup>1</sup> This difficulty is compounded by the fact that *De Unione* itself offers little to no explanation as to what metaphysical status Aquinas is willing to grant Christ's human *esse*. He does state that the human *esse* is not accidental, but neither is it, he adds, the primary or substantial *esse* whereby Christ subsists.<sup>2</sup> This leads to the obvious questions: what is the human *esse*, what role does it serve, and how is this account compatible with what Aquinas says elsewhere?

<sup>1</sup> See *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 17, a. 2; III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; *Quaestiones de quolibet* 9, q. 2, a. 2; *Compendium Theologiae*, c. 212.

<sup>2</sup> *Quaestio disputata De Unione Verbi incarnati*, a. 4: "Which being, although it is not accidental-since 'man' is not predicated accidentally of the Son of God, as is shown above-is not, however, the principle being of its supposit, but secondary" ("Quod esse, etsi non sit esse accidentale--quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra [art. 1] habitum est--non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium" [*Quaestiones Disputatae*, ed. P. Bazzi et al. (Turin: Marietti, 1949), 2:432]).



In what follows I shall offer a way of reading *De Unione* that agrees both with Aquinas's other Christological texts and with his standard metaphysical account of Christ's *esse*. But, mindful that one cannot expect more certainty than his subject allows—especially when it involves offering a textual interpretation of an exceedingly vague text—in the present case I can only propose a plausible interpretation, one developed, moreover, in conjunction with texts other than *De Unione* itself. Indeed, given the vague character of this text, it seems to me that no interpretation of it can boast of apodictic certainty; and so, if my account casts even the dimmest light upon what seems to be a contradiction, it is worthy of consideration.

I submit that, contrary to appearance, there is no contradiction involved in Aquinas's treatment of the Incarnation in *De Unione* with respect to *esse*. Ultimately, I shall argue that the key to resolving the above-mentioned difficulty rests in Aquinas's notion of Christ as a composite person. This very notion has allowed him, as Michael Gorman has shown,<sup>3</sup> to escape a number of criticisms launched at his Christology, especially by contemporary thinkers. My contention is that Aquinas's understanding of Christ as a composite person can also shed some light—in a manner consistent both with his metaphysical commitments and with his other Christological writings—on the human *esse* introduced in *De Unione*.<sup>4</sup>

I

The easiest way to overcome the present difficulty would simply be to dismiss the problematic text or to disavow it as

<sup>3</sup> Michael Gorman, "Christ as Composite according to Aquinas," *Traditio* 55 (2000): 143-57.

<sup>4</sup> For a discussion on *De Unione Verbi incarnati*—its authenticity, dating, and the scholarship concerning it—see Marie-Helene Deloffre, *Thomas d'Aquin: Question Disputee L'Union Du Verbe Incarne (De Unione Verbi incarnati)* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2000). See also A. Patfoort, *L'unité d'être dans le Christ d'après S. Thomas: A la croisée de l'ontologie et de la Christologie* (Paris: Desclee, 1964).

spurious. This is what some, such as Louis Billot,<sup>5</sup> do, whereas others, Cajetan for instance, being more conservative in their assessment of the text's authenticity, argue that *De Unione* is an early text eventually rejected by a more mature Aquinas.<sup>6</sup> However, as Jean-Pierre Torrell reports in his grand survey of the Angelic Doctor's *opera omnia*, the Leonine commission, through a careful examination of the manuscript tradition, demonstrates the work's authenticity beyond any shadow of a doubt.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the commission judges *De Unione* to be a *mature* Thomistic text. Torrell, along with James Weisheipl and Palemon Glorieux, places the text's composition in the spring of 1272, relatively concurrent with that of the *Summa Theologiae's Tertia Pars*, in which is located (q. 17, a. 2) one of Aquinas's parallel treatments on Christ's being.<sup>8</sup> The historical evidence, then, will not support dismissing *De Unione* as either spurious or "youthful."

However, recent scholarship, following Cajetan's approach, has in fact appealed to the chronology of Aquinas's works to develop a solution to our present difficulty. Donald Goergen, for instance, suggests that *De Unione* was written only a few months prior to Aquinas's authoritative solution, which can be found in the *Tertia Pars*. "Thomas' opinion in the *Tertia Pars* of his *Summa* shows a development in his own thinking on the incarnation," Goergen writes. "In the *De Unione*, article 4, Thomas is still groping toward an adequate solution, and there he allows Christ to have a human *esse*."<sup>9</sup> In other words, *De Unione* must ultimately be dismissed, not as spurious, or as immature, but as a work in progress, so to speak.

Yet this position seems highly problematic. Goergen's argument depends upon the extraordinarily difficult, and not to

<sup>5</sup> Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 206.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 146-47, 206.

<sup>9</sup> Donald J. Goergen, O.P., *The Jesus of Christian History* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 220.

mention controversial, task of fixing the date of *De Unione* to within a matter of months prior to the composition of the relevant question in the *Tertia Pars*. Furthermore, Goergen's claim that the *Tertia Pars* represents a "development" in Aquinas's thought seems untenable in light of the fact that in his other works, both youthful and more mature,<sup>10</sup> he advances arguments similar to the one found in the *Tertia Pars*. Far from representing a development in Aquinas's thought, the *Tertia Pars*, according to Goergen's reasoning, suggests instead a regression. It seems to me, then, that Goergen does not take seriously the difficulty that *De Unione* poses since he fails to offer an account of *why* Aquinas vacillates back and forth on this issue.

Other scholars, however, such as Richard Cross and Jason West, have taken Aquinas's introduction of a human *esse* seriously yet have held that he only introduces this notion experimentally.<sup>11</sup> Cross sees it as Aquinas's attempt to move from a whole-part model of the Incarnation to a substance-accident model. West is unable to account for Aquinas's "experiment" at all and eventually rejects the human *esse* of *De Unione* as incompatible with an overall Thomistic metaphysics of *esse*. I am fundamentally in agreement with West concerning his criticisms of Cross's interpretation of Aquinas's whole-part model of the Incarnation as incoherent (of which I speak more bellow) and concerning his insistence upon Aquinas's "one-esse view" with respect to Christ's being. Be that as it may, I do believe that if one considers Christ's being from the perspective of his composite personhood, then, without doing violence to the unity of his divine and eternal *esse*, there remains open to Aquinas a way to consider Christ's *esse* as a human *esse*.

<sup>10</sup> See, e.g., III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; and *Quad!*, 9, q. 2, a. 2.

<sup>11</sup> See Richard Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 64 n. 46. Cross accepts the same chronology of *De Unione*; however, unlike Goergen he does offer a careful analysis of Aquinas's metaphysical development with regards to the Incarnation in order to account for what is at issue in his introduction of a human *esse*; see J. L. A. West, "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ," *The Thomist* 66 (2002): 231-50.

## II

The point has been made before,<sup>12</sup> and is well worth making again, that Aquinas develops his metaphysics of the Incarnation according to the parameters set forth in the Council of Chakedon, which, put very succinctly, held that Christ is one person subsisting in two distinct natures, human and divine.<sup>13</sup> By the thirteenth century, the three Christological opinions (the *assumptus homo*, subsistence, and *habitus* theories) summed up in Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* would also play a crucial role in the development of Aquinas's metaphysics of the Incarnation, for, as he saw it, only one opinion (viz., the subsistence theory) escapes the charge of heresy.<sup>14</sup> His reason for rejecting the other two theories was that each in its own way led to a kind of Nestorianism condemned by the Church's councils.<sup>15</sup>

With these theological considerations firmly in hand, Aquinas begins the delicate task of developing a metaphysics that could safely navigate a minefield of potential heresy but also illuminate, as far as possible, the doctrine of the Incarnation. It is in this context, then, that the unity of Christ's being (*esse*) becomes a significant issue for Aquinas, for in developing his metaphysics of the Incarnation the question "how many *esse* are there in Christ?" arises. To understand his treatment of this question, it may first be helpful to determine his understanding of *esse* as it pertains to the issue at hand. In both his *Commentary on the Sentences* and his *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* Aquinas follows his familiar practice of making a distinction between being as true and being

<sup>12</sup> See Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 143-44; Michael B. Raschko, "Aquinas's Theology of the Incarnation in Light of Lombard's Subsistence Theory," *The Thomist* 65 (2001): 409-39; Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 407ff.

<sup>13</sup> See G. Bardy, "Le «Brigrandage d'Ephese» et le Concile de Chalcedoine," in *Histoire de l'église: Depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours*, vol. 4, *De la mort de Theodose à l'élection de Gregoire le Grand* (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1945), 228-40, esp. 235.

<sup>14</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *STh* III, q. 2, a. 6; see Walter Principe, "St. Thomas on the Habitus-Theory of the Incarnation," in *St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974, Commemorative Studies* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies Press, 1974), 1:381; Raschko, "Aquinas's Theology of the Incarnation," 414-19; West, "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ," 232-33.

<sup>15</sup> *STh* III, q. 2, a. 6.

in the categories.<sup>16</sup> "According to the first way," he explains, "[esse] is what signifies the truth of a proposition, what is a copula ... and this *esse* is not in reality [*in re*] but in the mind, which joins a predicate with a subject."<sup>17</sup> In this sense being (*esse*) pertains to the knower and is attributed to the mind's activity of forming propositions or enunciations (*enuntiationes*).<sup>18</sup> Hence, it is not necessary for something to be in reality (*in rerum natura*)-which is to say, extramental or having some ontological constitution outside the knower-in order to attribute being (*esse*) to it. It need only be something about which a true proposition can be formed. Accordingly, even privations or negations may be said 'to be'.<sup>19</sup>

In another way, however, *esse* pertains to the object known, in which case it refers to the act of being (*actus entis*), that whereby something is in reality (*in rerum natura*). "In another way, *esse* is said to be the act of being inasmuch as it is being [*actus entis in quantum est ens*]," Aquinas explains, "that is, that by which

<sup>16</sup> Thomas finds the source of this distinction often enough in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (e.g., D.7.1017a22-22-35). However, Aristotle himself does not divide being simply into two divisions but four. In condensing the four divisions into two, Aquinas reveals his own metaphysical approach to the question of being in which being is seen as something both essential but also accidental. See Joseph Owens, "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," in *St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: The Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.*, ed. John Catan (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1980), 78-90. See also Scott Youree Watson, *Esse in the Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Rome: Gregorian, 1972); and John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 31-35.

<sup>17</sup> III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2: "*Uno modo, secundum quod significant veritatem propositionis, secundum quod est copula . . . . Et hoc esse non est in re, sed in mente quae coniungit subiectum cum predicato*" (*Scriptum super sententiis*, ed. R. P. Maria Fabianus Moos, O.P. [Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1933], 3:238); cf. *Quodl.* 9, q. 2, a. 2, "Vno modo secundum quod est copula uerbalis significans compositionem cuiuslibet enuntiationis quam anima facit, unde hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, set tantum in actu anime componentis et diuidentis" (*Quaestiones de quolibet*, Leonine ed., vol. 25.1 [Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1996], 94, 11. 34-38); cf. *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 1.

<sup>18</sup> *Quodl.* 9, q. 2, a. 2: "[Being is said in a twofold manner.] In one way, according as it is the verbal copula signifying the composition of whatever judgment the mind makes" ("[Esse dupliciter dicit.] Vno modo, secundum quod est copula uerbalis significans compositionem cuiuslibet enuntiationis quam anima facit" [Leonine ed., 25.1:94, 11. 34-36]).

<sup>19</sup> *De Ente.*, c. 1.

something is denominated an actual being in reality."<sup>20</sup> In this sense *esse* refers to the ultimate principle or cause of a being's reality, that by which something is designated as a being (*ens*) and thus located within the categories. Aquinas writes, "And thus *esse* is not attributed to things unless they are contained within the ten categories; whence being [*ens*], of which such *esse* is said, is divided into the ten categories."<sup>21</sup> It is *esse* taken in this second sense, as the *actus entis*, that pertains to the question of the unity of Christ's being.<sup>22</sup>

Aquinas adds further precision to this notion of *esse* before addressing the question of the number of *esse* in Christ. His distinctions, which we will describe below, are found in his *Commentary on the Sentences* and *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*. Indeed, as we shall see in what follows, these two works set the foundation for what is subsequently proposed in the *Compendium Theologiae*, *Summa Theologiae*, and *De Unione Verbi incarnati*. In those two early works, Aquinas identifies the relationship between *esse* and *suppositum*, which relationship is presupposed and of paramount importance in the later writings.

First, concerning *esse* taken as the *actus entis*, he distinguishes between subsistent and nonsubsistent *esse*.<sup>23</sup> With respect to subsistence, he suggests, in the *Summa Theologiae*, a twofold understanding. In a reply to an objection concerning the subsistence of the human soul, he states that subsistence refers to (1) anything subsistent or (2) anything subsisting in its whole or complete nature.<sup>24</sup> According to the first sense, neither accidents nor material forms may be said to subsist since they do not have

<sup>20</sup> *Quadl.* 9, q. 2, a. 2: "In another way, being is said to be that which pertains to the nature of a thing.... And this being indeed is in the thing, it is the act of being resulting from the principles of the thing" ("Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens, id est quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura" [Leonine ed., 25.1:94, II. 43-46]). Cf. III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 3: "*Alia mada* dicitur *esse* quod pertinet ad naturam rei. ... Et hoc quidem esse in re est, et est actus entis resultans ex principiis rei" (Paris ed., 238).

<sup>21</sup> *Quadl.* 9, q. 2, a. 2: "et sic *esse* non attribuitur nisi rebus ipsis quae in decem generibus continentur, unde ens a tali *esse* dictum per decem genera diuiditur" (Leonine ed., 25.1:94, II. 43-46); cf. *De Ente*, c. 1.

<sup>22</sup> III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; *Quadl.* 9, q. 2, a. 2.

<sup>24</sup> *STh* I, q. 75, a. 2, ad. 1.

their own independent existence (the former always existing in some subject, and the latter always informing some designated matter). Yet this notion of subsistence does not exclude parts. "[F]or a thing to exist *per se*," he notes, "it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or material form; even though it be part of something."<sup>25</sup> Thus, even parts may be called subsistent in the manner just described.<sup>26</sup>

However, when discussing the manner in which *esse-taken* as the *actus entis-relates* to subsistence, it is clear that Aquinas has in mind primarily the second sense of subsistence, namely, that which pertains to a complete whole, for he writes, "[N]either the nature of a thing nor its parts are properly said to be [*esse*], if being [*esse*] is taken in the accepted sense; but similarly neither are accidents, but the complete *suppositum*, which is in virtue of all these [i.e., by virtue of its constitutive principles]."<sup>27</sup> Thus when referring to subsistence, taken as a complete whole, he means it to coincide with the notion of a *suppositum*. In contrast to *supposita-that* is, complete, subsistent wholes—are those things that lack completion, and that therefore do not subsist through themselves, but through another. "All [else] which does not subsist *per se* but in another and with another, be they accidents, substantial forms, or whatever parts do not have *esse* as if they truly were," Aquinas argues, "but *esse* is attributed to these in another way, that is, as that by which something is [*quo aliquid est*]."<sup>28</sup> (It remains to be seen whether or not *esse* may be attributed to these nonsubsisting things, even if only improperly. This, as I point out below, bears significantly on the ontological situation concerning Christ's human nature.)

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, ad. 2.

<sup>26</sup> See also *De Unione*, a. 2.

<sup>27</sup> III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2: "nee natura rei nee partes eius dicuntur esse proprie, si esse predicato modo accipiatur; *similiter* autem nee accidentia, sed suppositum completum est, quad est secundum omnia ilia" (Paris ed., 239).

<sup>28</sup> *Quodl.* 9, q. 2, a. 2: "Omnibus vero que non per se subsistunt set in alio et cum alio, siue sint accidentia siue forme substanciales aut quelibet partes, non habent esse ita quad ipsa uere sint, set attribuitur eis esse alio modo, id est ut quo aliquid est" (Leonine ed., 25.1:94, IL 51-55).

Given the aforementioned consideration, Aquinas is prepared to offer a determinate answer concerning the number of *esse* in Christ. It is relevant to note, here, that wherever Aquinas attempts to answer this question in his Christological works, it is the relationship obtaining between *esse* and *suppositum* that is operative. Since the union of the divine and human natures takes place in the person of the Word,<sup>29</sup> we should say that the Incarnation takes place in the divine *suppositum* or hypostasis of the Eternal Word.<sup>30</sup> The reason is that a person is simply a kind of *suppositum* or hypostasis, namely, a rational, self-mastering kind.<sup>31</sup> Simply put, if there were two persons, there would be two *supposita*. However, given that there is only one person in Christ, the second Person of the Trinity, there is only one corresponding *suppositum*.

Furthermore, given that there is only one *suppositum* in Christ, Aquinas argues, there is, likewise, only one *esse*. Being and unity are transcendently convertible: "It is impossible that something should have two substantial beings [*esse*], since unity is founded upon being [*ens*]: whence if there were a plurality of *esse*, according to which something is said to be being [*ens*] simply, it would be impossible for it to be called one [*unum*]." <sup>32</sup> That is, to the degree that something is, it is one. A *suppositum* is a complete whole, which is to say a single substance subsisting through itself. Now, that in virtue of which a *suppositum* is a substance, Aquinas maintains, is its *esse*, specifically that *esse* which brings about its *substantial unity* (to which he refers as a substantial *esse*, as opposed to any kind of accidental *esse*). He writes, "*esse* is

<sup>29</sup> See *STh* III, q. 2, a. 2.

<sup>30</sup> See *STh* III, q. 2, a. 3.

<sup>31</sup> *STh* I, q. 29, aa. 1 and 2; *STh* III, q. 2, a. 3.

<sup>32</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2: "For it is impossible that some one thing should have two substantial beings; since one is founded upon being. Hence, if there were a plurality of being, according to which something is called a being simply, it would be impossible that it be called one" ("Impossibile est enim quod unum aliquid habeat duo esse substantialia; quia unum fundatur super ens. Unde si sint plura esse, secundum quae aliquid dicitur ens simpliciter, impossibile est quod dicatur unum" [Paris ed., 239]); cf. *De Unione*, a. 4: "It is the same for something to be called one and [for it to be called] a being" ("eodem dicitur aliquid esse unum, et ens" [Marietti ed., 2:432]).



attributed [to a *suppositum*] in a twofold way. In one way, [it is the] *esse* resulting from the principles out of which a thing's unity comes about, which is properly the substantial *esse* of the *suppositum*. In another way, *esse* is attributed to the *suppositum* in addition to that itself which brings about its unity, which is a superadded *esse*, that is, accidental. "<sup>33</sup>

In other words, since substantial *esse* is responsible for bringing about a single, complete substance, that is, a *suppositum*, if there is only one *suppositum*, then there can only be one *esse*. On the other hand, if there were indeed two substantial *esse*, then there would be two substances, that is, two *supposita*. But, again, if there were two *supposita-given* the relationship between person and *suppositum*, in which the person is understood as a kind of *suppositum-then* there would be two persons, which is the Nestorian heresy and the *assumptus homo* theory that Aquinas sought to avoid. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility of a multiplicity of accidental *esse*. What is at issue, however, is not the number of accidental *esse*, but the number of substantial *esse*. "[It] is necessary to say that there is one substantial *esse* in Christ, the proper *esse* of the *suppositum*, even though there might be in him a multiplicity of accidental *esse*."<sup>34</sup> Therefore, in Christ, since there is only one subsistent *suppositum*, there is necessarily only one personal *esse*, the eternal *esse* of the Word. And, Aquinas explains, it is this divine *esse* that actualizes Christ's human nature, so that Christ's humanity receives its being from his divine person. <sup>35</sup>

<sup>33</sup> *Quad.* 9, q. 2, a. 2: "Huic autem attribuitur esse duplex. Vnum scilicet esse quod resultat ex hiis ex quibus eius unitas integratur, quod est proprium esse suppositi substanciale. Aliud esse est supposito attributum preter ea que integrant ipsum, quod est esse superadditum, scilicet accidentale" (Leonine ed., 25.1:95, ll. 83-86).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*: "oportet dicere quod in Christo est unum esse substanciale, secundum quod esse proprie estsuppositi, quamvis sit multiplex esse accidentale" (Leonine ed., 25.1:95, ll. 83-86).

<sup>35</sup> *STh* III, q. 17, a. 2, ad. 2: "It must be said that the eternal being of the Son of God, which is the divine nature, becomes the being of a human, inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the Son of God into the unity of person" ("[D]icendum quod illud esse aeternum Filii Dei quod est divina natura, fit esse hominis, inquantum humana natura assumitur a Filio Dei in unitate personae" [Leonine ed., 11:222]).

A similar line of argument is evident in both the *Compendium Theologiae* and *Summa Theologiae* (as well as in *De Unione*). In the *Compendium Theologiae* Aquinas writes, "[W]hatever belongs to the *suppositum* or hypostasis must be declared to be one in Christ."<sup>36</sup> In the *Summa Theologiae* he states, "things belonging to the nature in Christ must be two; and ... those belonging to the hypostasis [i.e., *suppositum*] in Christ must be only one."<sup>37</sup> Thus, since in Christ there is only one *suppositum*, it follows that there can be only one *esse* whereby that *suppositum* subsists. And this *esse*, Aquinas maintains, is that of the Word, the divine *esse*, since the single *suppositum* of which we are here speaking is that of the Word: "in Christ the subsisting *suppositum* is the person of the Son of God."<sup>38</sup> To this he adds, "being [*esse*] pertains ... to the hypostasis as that which has being."<sup>39</sup> Since Aquinas understands hypostasis to be convertible with *suppositum* (see *STh* I, q. 29, a. 2), one can take from this claim that *esse* pertains to *suppositum*. And so he concludes, "if existence is taken in the sense that one *suppositum* has one existence, we are forced, it appears, to assert that there is but one existence [*esse*] in Christ."<sup>40</sup>

From what we have seen thus far, it is clear that in his Christological writings Aquinas articulates his metaphysics of the Incarnation in terms of only one substantial *esse*. Any other account of Christ's being would do violence to the unity of his personhood. I therefore agree with West when he argues that Aquinas's standard metaphysics of the Incarnation holds to Christ's having only one substantial *esse*.<sup>41</sup> What, then, are we to

<sup>36</sup> *Comp. Theo!*, c. 212: "Ea uero que ad suppositum siue ypostasim pertinet, unum tantum in Christo confiteri oportet" (*Compendium Theologiae*, Leonine ed., vol. 42 [Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1979], 165, ll. 26-28).

<sup>37</sup> *STh* III, q. 17, a. 2.

<sup>38</sup> *De Unione*, a. 4: "In Christo autem suppositum subsistens est persona Filii Dei" (Marietti ed., 2:432).

<sup>39</sup> *STh* III, q. 17, a. 2.

<sup>40</sup> *Comp. Theo!*, c. 212: "Vnde si esse accipiatur secundum quod unum esse est unius suppositi, uidetur dicendum quod in Christo sit unum tantum esse" (Leonine ed., 42:165, ll. 28-30).

<sup>41</sup> West, "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ," 232, 250. Although I agree with West on this point, I do not think it commits one to rejecting the human *esse* introduced in *De Unione* for reasons I shall describe shortly.

make of the suggestion in *De Unione*, which seems contrary to what has just been described concerning the relationship between *esse* and *suppositum*? There, Aquinas states: "There is another *esse* of [Christ's] *suppositum*, not in as much as it is eternal, but in so far as it was made human temporally."<sup>42</sup> That is, in addition to the divine *esse*, which Aquinas describes throughout all his texts on the Incarnation, there is also a created human *esse*. But, given the aforementioned, how can this be? If there are two *esse*, then clearly there would be two beings, two things; but Christ is one. Could it be, perhaps, that the human *esse* is some sort of accidental *esse* that the divine *esse* accrues through the hypostatic union? Maintaining that this other *esse* is accidental would, indeed, preserve the unity of Christ's personal *esse*. Yet, Aquinas makes it clear that this is precisely what he does *not* have in mind, for he adds, "Which being [*esse*] . . . [is] not an accidental *esse*-since man is not predicated accidentally of the Son of God."<sup>43</sup> He emphasizes more than once that human nature is not united to the Word accidentally. This would destroy the *unique* relationship that God has to man, one which is more than accidental, and it would commit Aquinas to a *habitus* theory of the Incarnation, which he sought to avoid.<sup>44</sup> Still, even though this *esse* is not accidental, Aquinas hastens to add that it is not the *primary esse* of the *suppositum*, but is, instead, *secondary*.<sup>45</sup> The question remains: secondary in what way?<sup>46</sup>

<sup>42</sup> *De Unione*, a. 4: "Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non in quantum est aeternum, sed in quantum est temporaliter homo factum" (Marietti ed., 2:432).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.: "Quod esse, etsi non sit esse accidentale-quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei" (Marietti ed., 2:432).

<sup>44</sup> See *STh* III, q. 2, a. 6.

<sup>45</sup> *De Unione*, a. 4.

<sup>46</sup> A number of contemporary commentators have offered solutions to the present difficulty. Jacques Maritain, for instance, in the fourth Appendix of his *The Degrees of Knowledge* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), draws a distinction between *esse* as received and *esse* as exercised, arguing that to exist an essence must not only receive its act-of-existence but then exercise it, for it is in the exercise of *esse* that something actually exists. Maritain writes, "Since existence [*esse*] is by its very notion an exercised act, the essence can be so held outside the realm of simple possibility only on condition of being at the same time carried by the subsistence to the state of subject or supposit capable of exercising existence" (462). He also adds, "it must be said that (substantial) essence or nature

## m

In attempting to provide some sort of answer to this question, let us begin with the fact that it is clear that Aquinas himself holds that there is only one unqualifiedly subsistent *esse* in Christ, that of the eternal Word. He maintains this thesis constantly throughout his Christological works, as we have seen, and even in the problematic *De Unione Verbi incarnati*. In the latter work he once again insists upon the transcendental convertibility of unity and being, saying "whatever is one simply is one according to being [*esse*]. But Christ is one simply ... therefore in him there is one being [*esse*]."<sup>47</sup> Of course, this quotation is from a *sed contra*, and, since Aquinas does, from time to time, disagree with the arguments to be found in such sections, one should, of course, approach what is held in these sections with reserve. Yet, it is worth noting that Aquinas does not gainsay anything in the *sed*

can receive existence only by exercising it" (461). Thus, *esse* is, as Maritain describes it, an exercised act and cannot be thought of otherwise. Yet, when he comes to describe the created *esse* of Christ's human nature, Maritain writes, "But this *esse* [viz., the human one] is only received by the human nature, it is not exercised by it" (ibid.). This leads to the obvious question: how can *esse-even* if it is not the primary *esse* whereby Christ subsists-only be received and not exercised? After all, does not Maritain say that *esse* must be understood, if it is to be understood at all, as an *exercised act*? Granted, the human *esse* is not that of a *suppositum*, yet the question still facing Maritain is: What role does the human *esse* of Christ have? Indeed, can it have a role at all if it is only received and not exercised? Furthermore, some scholars, for example, West ("Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ," 250, n. 9), have even suggested that Maritain's view turns out to be a variation on the *assumptus homo* theory, clearly at odds with the subsistence theory Aquinas wants to embrace.

Some (e.g., Charles Rene Billuart) have even suggested that the human *esse* is the *esse essentiae* of Christ's human nature. But as West points out (ibid., 235, 236), this suggestion is untenable, especially in light of the interpretive efforts of Thomists such as E. Gilson and J. Owens, who argue convincingly that, for Aquinas, *esse* is not to be understood as a *thing* distinct from essence, itself considered as a *thing*. Put briefly, owing to the real distinction that Aquinas describes, *esse* is to be understood not as a thing, essence, or form, but as an act, the act of the essence, one might say. To regard *esse* and essence as two distinct things (*res*) is an unfortunate misinterpretation of Aquinas extending as far back as Giles of Rome. See, in particular, Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Philosophy, 1952); Owens, *St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God*; idem, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1980).

<sup>47</sup> *De Unione*, a. 4, *sed contra*: "quidquid est unum simpliciter est unum secundum esse. Sed Christus est unum simpliciter, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in eo est unum esse" (Marietti ed., 2:432).

*contra* of the fourth article in *De Unione* with respect to the transcendental convertibility of being and unity, this particular *sed contra* mirroring what he holds elsewhere within the very corpus of his argument.<sup>48</sup>

In article 4 of *De Unione*, Aquinas holds that in Christ there is only one subsisting *suppositum*, that of the Son of God, and "therefore as Christ is one simply according to the proper unity of the *suppositum*, and two according to his two proper natures, he has one *esse* simply and properly, the one eternal *esse* of the eternal *suppositum*."<sup>49</sup> Thus, Aquinas, even in *De Unione*, is consistent in his teaching on the singular *esse* in Christ. The problem arises, as mentioned, when he claims that, in addition to the divine *esse*, there is also a human *esse*, which, though not the primary *esse* of Christ, still is not accidental.

It seems to me that Aquinas's notion of Christ as a *composite person* can serve as a hermeneutic principle by means of which *De Unione* can be interpreted in a way that is consistent with his other Christological texts. As mentioned above, I shall focus upon a text to which Michael Gorman has also directed attention, namely, *Summa Theologiae* III, question 2, article 4.<sup>50</sup> There, Aquinas writes:

The person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence he is said to be a composite person, inasmuch as one being subsists in two.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>48</sup> See *STh* I, q. 11, a. 1; *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1; q. 21, a. 1; *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 16, ad 3; q. 9, a. 7; *Quodl.* 10, q. 1, a. 1.

<sup>49</sup> *De Unione*, a. 4: "Et ideo sicut Christus est unum simpliciter propter unitatem suppositi, et duo secundum quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi" (Marietti ed., 2:432).

<sup>50</sup> Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 143.

<sup>51</sup> "persona sive hypostasis Christi dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum id quod est in se. Et sic est omnino simplex: sicut et natura Verbi.-Alio modo, secundum ratione personae vel hypostasis, ad quam pertinet subsistere in aliqua natura. Et secundum hoc, persona Christi subsistit in duabus naturis. Unde, licet sit ibi unum subsistens, est tamen ibi alia et alia ratio subsistendi. Et sic dicitur persona composita, in quantum unum duobus subsistit" (Leon. 11.31).

It seems that there are two ways in which Christ's being may be considered. One may regard Christ simply as a subsisting being, without concern for the nature (or natures) in which he subsists. In this way Christ is purely simple.<sup>52</sup> Considered from this perspective (i.e., from the perspective of Christ as a divine person), then, one must say, as Aquinas does so consistently throughout his works, that Christ has only one *esse*, for what is described here is the subsistence corresponding to the *suppositum*, that complete and integral whole whereby 'that which is' subsists. And, since there is only one *suppositum* in Christ, that of the Word, there is only one *esse* whereby that *suppositum* subsists, namely, the divine *esse*.

Yet there is another way in which something's subsistence may be considered: we may also take into account the *nature* in which it subsists. That is, there is no being (*esse*) without being some kind of thing, and there is no nature without being. To use Aquinas's terminology, there is no *esse* without *essentia* and no *essentia* without *esse*. Thus, if something subsists, it subsists as something, which is to say that it subsists in some nature. In Christ, however, there are two natures, and therefore it may be said that Christ's subsistence is composite, subsisting as it does in these two natures.<sup>53</sup>

Viewed in this second way, then, Christ's being, his *esse*, may be considered from the perspective of his compositeness, that is to say, in light of his divine and human natures-in terms of that *by which* he subsists. Before the Incarnation, the Word eternally subsisted only in its divine nature, but since that union, the Word subsists not only in its divine nature but also in a human nature, by reason of which God is said to "become human." To describe this same situation in terms of *esse*, one could say that the divine

<sup>52</sup> "Christ subsists, he exists in himself, and it is because he is the Word that he does so. He has his absolute subsistence ... not from being human but instead from being the divine Word" (Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 146).

<sup>53</sup> "[W]e consider a supposit as existing in its substantial nature. For example, we can think of Christ as something that exists as divine and human. When we look at Christ in the second way, that is, with regard to the principles by which he subsists, we must say that he is composite" (ibid., 145).

*esse* has from eternity subsisted only in its divine nature. But, after assuming a human nature through the Incarnation, the divine *esse*, the Word, no longer subsists only in its divine nature, but also through a human nature. "[T]hrough [its] human nature," Aquinas writes, "[the Word] is constituted to be human."<sup>54</sup>

After the Incarnation, then, and considered from the perspective of Christ's humanity, the divine *esse* subsists in a human nature whereby it is, as it were, made to be a human *esse*- "there is another *esse* of this *suppositum*, not inasmuch as it is eternal, but *inasmuch as it was made human temporally*"<sup>55</sup>-which is to say, God is made human.<sup>56</sup> Simply put, the human *esse* introduced in *De Unione* seems to be none other than the divine *esse* when considered from the point of view of its subsisting in a human nature. One could say, then, that the divine *esse* of the Word becomes Christ's human *esse*. Aquinas himself admits as much when he says, "The eternal being [*esse*] of the Son of God, which is the divine nature, *becomes the being [esse] of man*, inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the Son of God to unity of person."<sup>57</sup>

Aquinas's introduction of the human *esse* as secondary begins to make sense in light of his notion of Christ as a composite person. The human *esse*, understood as the divine *esse* subsisting through a human nature, is not that whereby Christ exists simply (*simpliciter*), but stems from his subsisting as a human being.

<sup>54</sup> III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 4, sol. 3, ad 1, "per naturam humanam [Verbum] constituitur quod sit homo" (Paris ed., 229); cf. Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 149.

<sup>55</sup> *De Unione*, a. 4: "Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non in quantum est aeternum, sed in quantum est temporaliter homo factum" (Marietti ed., 2:432; emphasis added).

<sup>56</sup> Edward Schillebeeckx seems to have in mind something very similar to what I am here describing. See *Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God* (New York: Sheed and Ward 1963), 13, 14, "The second person of the most Holy Trinity is personally man; and this man is personally God. Therefore Christ is God in a human way, and man in a divine way. As a man he acts out his divine life in and according to his human existence. Everything he does as man is an act of the Son of God, a divine act in human form; an interpretation and transposition of a divine activity into a human activity. His human love is the human embodiment of the redeeming love of God."

<sup>57</sup> *STh* III, q. 17, a. 2, ad. 2, "illud esse aeternum Filii Dei quod est divina natura, *fit esse hominis*, in quantum humana natura assumitur a Filia Dei in unitate personae" (Leonine ed., 11:222; emphasis added).

"[T]he Word is not constituted by [its] human nature such as to be simply [*simpliciter*], however through [its] human nature [the Word] is constituted to be human."<sup>58</sup> Aquinas also writes, "human nature does not make the Son of Man to be simply, since he was from eternity, but only to be man. It is by the divine nature that a divine person is constituted simply."<sup>59</sup> In other words, the human *esse*, understood as the divine *esse* subsisting through a human nature, cannot be said to be that whereby Christ, understood as a subsisting whole, subsists in the first way of considering his composite personhood as described above (see *STh* III, q. 2, a. 4). It is purely and simply the divine *esse* that is said to be responsible for the subsistence of Christ's *suppositum simpliciter*. And, therefore, the divine *esse*, considered not as subsisting through a human nature but as it is in itself, is said to be primary, whereas Christ's human *esse* is said to be secondary. One might also say that Christ's human *esse* comes about temporally once the divine *esse* begins to subsist in a human nature. Christ's human *esse*, it seems, is secondary both with respect to time and in terms of metaphysical priority.

Accordingly, I find Thomas Weinandy's solution to the present difficulty unacceptable. He argues that there are, in fact, two *esse* in Christ and, moreover, that Aquinas consistently held such a position, only making it explicit in *De Unione*.<sup>60</sup> Weinandy correctly holds that the second, created human *esse* is not accidental—the text of *De Unione* makes that much clear—but he goes too far when he suggests that it is *substantial*. "The created *esse* is more than accidental," he writes, "because the humanity is

<sup>58</sup> *III Sent.*, d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 4, sol. 3, ad 1: "verbum non sit constitutum per naturam humanam ut sit simpliciter, tamen per naturam humanam constituitur quod sit homo" (Paris ed., 229); cf. Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 149.

<sup>59</sup> *STh* III, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3, "natura humana non constituit personam divinam simpliciter: sed constituit eam secundum quod denominatur a tali natura. Non enim ex natura humana habet Filius Dei quod sit simpliciter, cum fuerit ab aeterno: sed solum quod sit homo. Sed secundum naturam divinam constituitur persona divina simpliciter" (Leonine ed., 11:53-54); cf. Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 150.

<sup>60</sup> Thomas Weinandy, "Aquinas: God JSMan: The Marvel of the Incarnation," in Thomas Weinandy, Daniel Keating, and John Yocum, eds., *Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction* (New York: T & T Clark International, 2004), 80.



an authentic substance in its own right (manhood), and it possesses its own integral created human *esse*."<sup>61</sup> As Weinandy sees it, in order for God to subsist as man, he must have assumed a substantial human being. "If the Son of God actually did assume the substantial nature of manhood and so come to exist as an authentic man, then the authenticity of that substantial manhood demands a human created *esse*."<sup>62</sup> I appreciate Weinandy's concern for preserving Aquinas from any semblance of Monophysitism;<sup>63</sup> however, to insist that Aquinas must posit two *esse* suggests, to me, a reduction of his existential understanding of *esse* to an essentialistic conception of being. That is, if there is a desire to maintain two *esse* so that Monophysitism—which holds that the divine and human natures become one in a kind of commingling resulting in a *tertium quid*—can be avoided, then it is clear that Weinandy views Thomistic *esse* as itself a kind of nature. I find this somewhat surprising given Weinandy's sensitivity to the "existential" character of Thomistic *esse* in his earlier work, *Does God Change?*<sup>64</sup>

Weinandy's thesis should also be questioned in light of Aquinas's own insistence that Christ's human nature is *not* a substance, that is, it is not its own *suppositum* or hypostasis.

Since the human nature in Christ does not subsist in itself separately but exists in another, that is, in the hypostasis of the Word of God (not as some accident in a subject, nor properly as a part in a whole, but through an ineffable assumption), therefore the human nature in Christ can be said to be some individual, particular, or singular; however, it cannot be called a hypostasis or *suppositum*, as it cannot be called a person.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 80.

<sup>64</sup> Thomas Weinandy, *Does God Change? The Word's Becoming in the Incarnation* (Still River, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1985), 89.

<sup>65</sup> *De Unione*, a. 2: "quia humana natura in Christo non per se separatim subsistit sed existit in alio, id est in hypostasis Verbi Dei (non quidem sicut accidens in subiecto, neque proprie sicut pars in toto, sed per ineffabilem assumptionem), idea humana natura in Christo potest quidem dici individuum aliquod vel particulare vel singulare, non tamen potest dici vel hypostasis vel suppositum sicut nee persona" (Marietti ed., 2:427).

Indeed, were Christ's human nature its own *suppositum* or substance, then it would subsist as a person, which is simply, as Aquinas says, an individual substance of a rational nature.<sup>66</sup> But there is only one person in Christ, that of the Word; to insist otherwise would lead, as Aquinas sees it, to a kind of Nestorianism. Philosophically speaking, to suggest that within Christ there are two substantial *esse* can only result in two substances and, therefore, two distinct ontological entities or beings. But again, as Aquinas writes, "It is impossible that something should have two substantial beings [*esse*], since unity is founded upon being [*ens*]: whence if there were a plurality of *esse*, according to which something is said to be being [*ens*] simply, it would be impossible for it to be called one [*unum*]." <sup>67</sup> The unity of Christ would be shattered given two substantial *esse*.<sup>68</sup>

Thus, one should not interpret the human *esse* that Aquinas introduces in *De Unione Verbi incarnati* as an entirely new principle for the substantial, subsistent being of Christ's *suppositum*, as something other than the divine *esse-which* is the sole principle for the substantial being of Christ—for to do so would lead to obvious difficulties or, more bluntly, metaphysical contradictions. In other words, Aquinas does not suggest that Christ is a combination of a substantial divine *esse* and a substantial human *esse*. He addresses this very misunderstanding in the form of an objection to his article on Christ's being in the *Summa Theologiae*. "[T]he being [*esse*] of the Son of God is the Divine Nature itself, and is eternal," the objection argues, "whereas the being [*esse*] of the Man Christ is not the Divine Nature, but is a temporal being." Therefore, the objection

<sup>66</sup> *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1.

<sup>67</sup> III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2: "Impossibile est enim quod unum aliquid habeat duo esse substantialia; quia unum fundatur super ens. Unde si sint plura esse, secundum quae aliquid dicitur ens simpliciter, impossibile est quod dicatur unum" (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1933; 239); cf. *De Unione*, a. 4.

<sup>68</sup> See pp. 585-88 above for my reasoning as to why, given Aquinas's understanding of *esse*, there can only be one substantial *esse* in Christ. See also West's own similar argumentation for the same position ("Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ," 232, 250).

concludes, there are two beings (*esse*) in Christ.<sup>69</sup> Aquinas replies along the lines I have just described, and again I quote this same passage to emphasize my point: "The eternal being [*esse*] of the Son of God, which is the divine nature, *becomes the being [esse] of man*, inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the Son of God to unity of person."<sup>70</sup>

Now, however, a question arises: In what way can God be said to *become* human, indeed, how can God become anything if, like Aquinas,<sup>71</sup> one understands God to be immutable? This same concern faces Aquinas in the form of the following objection (*STh* III, q. 16, a. 6, obj. 2): "to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot be the subject of change, according to Mal. iii. 6: *I am the Lord, and I change not*. Hence this is false; *God was made man*."<sup>72</sup> However, as Gorman points out, the solution to this difficulty stems, once again, from Aquinas's notion of Christ as a composite person.<sup>73</sup> That is, the difficulty that this objection poses comes about only if one considers Christ to be completely simple. Given such an understanding, suggesting that the Word *becomes* human would necessitate a change in the Word itself, for here change is predicated *absolutely* of the Word.<sup>74</sup> "If Christ is now simple, if he is simply divine, then indeed he cannot have come to be other than he is except by his divine nature having come to be other than it is," explains Gorman; "on that supposition, if Christ became human, his divinity became human."<sup>75</sup>

<sup>69</sup> *STh* III, q. 17, a. 2, obj. 2: "esse Filii Dei est ipsa divina natura, et est aeternum. Esse autem hominis Christi non est divina natura, sed est esse temporale. Ergo in Christo non est tantum unum esse" (Leonine ed., 11:222).

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 2: "illud esse aeternum Filii Dei quod est divina natura, *fit esse hominis*, inquantum humana natura assumitur a Filio Dei in unitate personae" (Leonine ed., 11:222; emphasis added).

<sup>71</sup> See, for example, *STh* I, q. 9, a. 1, wherein Aquinas argues against any notion of divine mutability.

<sup>72</sup> "fieri hominem est mutari. Sed Deus non potest esse subiectum mutationis: secundum illud Malach. III: *Ego Dominus, et non mutor*. Ergo videtur quod haec est falsa: *Deus factus est homo*" (Leonine ed., 11:206).

<sup>73</sup> Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 151.

<sup>74</sup> See *STh* III, q. 16, a. 6, ad 2.

<sup>75</sup> Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 152.

However, since the relationship between the divine and human natures of Christ is what might be called a "mixed relation" -that is, a relationship that is real in one term and logical or rational in another<sup>76</sup>-the change, Aquinas holds, must be understood to take place not on the side of the Word, but on the side of Christ's humanity.<sup>77</sup> Here, Aquinas appeals to his understanding of the doctrine of relation to extricate himself from any undesirable or contradictory conclusions. Since the doctrine of relation as he articulates it cannot be fully explored here, I shall only describe its main features so as to gain some intellectual traction in understanding what he means by 'becoming'.

Aquinas frequently appeals to three main kinds of relation,<sup>78</sup> one of which we have already mentioned (viz., mixed relations) the other two being 'logical' or 'rational' relations and 'real' relations. 'Logical' relations are constituted through the intellect's ordering of (at least) two terms to one another so that their relation arises, not from any reality within the terms themselves, but from an act of reason.<sup>79</sup> 'Real' relations, by contrast, are those in which the terms themselves have in their very reality an ordering to one another independent of the intellect's operations.<sup>80</sup> Finally there are relations-mixed relations-in which one term is logical while the other is real. In this kind of relation, the real term is constituted as such through its relation to

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Weinandy, *Does God Change?*, 89.

<sup>77</sup> *STh* III, q. 16, a. 6, ad 2. See *STh* I, q. 13, a. 7 for Aquinas's threefold division of the kinds of relation: logical, real, and mixed. Cf. Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 147-48. For a discussion of Aquinas's teaching on relation in general see A. Krempel, *La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952). On the matter of mixed-relations as it pertains directly to the relationship between God and creation and especially in the Incarnation, see Weinandy, *Does God Change?*, 88-98; cf. Thomas Weinandy, *Does God Suffer?* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 206-8. In this latter work, Weinandy is more concerned with the subject of divine impassibility than he is with divine immutability strictly speaking. That is, he is more concerned with arguing that God cannot, as God, suffer, grieve, experience pain or death, etc., than he is with arguing that God is immutable; cf. Weinandy, "Aquinas: God *IS* Man: The Marvel of the Incarnation," 75-79.

<sup>78</sup> See *STh* I, q. 13, a. 7.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

the logical term.<sup>81</sup> So, for example, it is because a creature is really related to God as its creator that the creature is constituted as a being, that is, exists. God himself, in his act of creating, does not change.<sup>82</sup> He does not change because, as Aquinas sees it, the act of creation is unlike any other "change" we experience.<sup>83</sup> All change that we experience is relative, that is, a change from some thing to some *other* thing. With creation, however, there is the absolute bringing into existence of some thing from *no-thing*, or, if one prefers, an absolute change. Such an absolute act of creation requires something that is itself absolute being, something that is being itself (*ipsum esse*). But this is precisely what God is. Weinandy correctly points out that "if the act of creation demands that God act by no other act than by the act that he is as *ipsum esse* then obviously creation does not change or affect God."<sup>84</sup> There is between God and creature, then, a mixed relation. The creature is *really* related to God because in its relation to God the creature is constituted and sustained in being; however, God in so sustaining the creature through his creative act, an act that is identical with that which he is, *ipsum esse*, undergoes no change and so is only *logically* related to the creature.

In his treatment of the Incarnation, Aquinas uses his understanding of mixed relations to account for the relationship between the Word and Christ's human nature. He insists that the Word, being the logical term of a mixed relation, does not change. Rather, Christ's human nature has a real relation to the Word, whereby it is sustained in existence. There is no mediating act between the Word and humanity whereby the union between the two occurs. Quite the contrary, the Word, through its own *esse personale*, which is its very act of being, relates humanity to itself.<sup>85</sup> Still, in this act of relating, which is simply that of a logical term's relating a real term to itself, the Word undergoes no change. One might say, perhaps, that the Word does change-not

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> *STh* I q. 45, a. 3, ad 1.

<sup>83</sup> *ScG* II, c. 18.

<sup>84</sup> Weinandy, *Does God Change?*, 92.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Weinandy, *Does God Suffer?*, 207, 208.

*absolutely* (for then the Word would change in its very divine, immutable being), but only *relatively*, that is, relative to Christ's humanity, for now there is a new relation on the part of Christ's humanity to the pre-existing *esse personale* of the Word.<sup>86</sup> That is to say, it is Christ's humanity that changes absolutely, in the same way in which an act of creation results in an absolute change of the creature from nonexistence to existence. "[W]hatever is predicated relatively can be newly predicated without its change," says Aquinas, "as a man may be made to be on the right side without being changed, and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was."<sup>87</sup> Again, Christ's composite nature provides some intelligibility, Gorman insists, to the Word's immutability within the incarnational act: "Christ is a composite of humanity and divinity. He became human by coming to possess the humanity as a constituent, and because its coming to be a constituent was the coming-to-be of a mixed relation, the divine nature remained untouched."<sup>88</sup>

Furthermore, Aquinas points out that, as a result of the composition of two natures in Christ, whatever pertains to the human nature can now be predicated of God.<sup>89</sup> Since there is only one *suppositum* subsisting in two natures, the single *suppositum* is signified by either nature. Thus, "[W]hether we say *man* or *God*, the hypostasis [i.e., *suppositum*] of divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the man may be said what belongs to the divine nature, as of a hypostasis of the divine nature; and of God may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of human nature."<sup>90</sup> Thus, one may say that 'humanity', in its fullest sense, may be attributed to God, to the divine *esse*, whereby the Word, now possessing two constituent principles, is

<sup>86</sup> *STh* III, q. 17, a. 2.

<sup>87</sup> *STh* III, q. 16, a. 6, ad 2: "Ea vero quae relative dicuntur, possunt de novo praedicari de aliquo absque eius mutatione: sicut homo de novo fit dexter absque sua mutatione, per motum illius qui fit ei sinister" (Leonine ed., 11:207).

<sup>88</sup> Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 152.

<sup>89</sup> *STh* III, q. 16, a. 4.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*: "Sive ... dicatur *homo*, sive *Deus*, supponitur hypostasis divinae et humanae naturae. Et ideo de homine dici possunt ea quae sunt divinae naturae: et de Deo possunt dici ea quae sunt humanae naturae" (Leonine ed., 11:204).

said to be (*esse*) human. Christ's human *esse*, then, represents the new relation that the Word has to Christ's humanity-not an absolute change in the Word itself but an entering into a new relation wherein it subsists now as a human being, as a human *esse*.<sup>91</sup>

Michael Raschko seems to have in mind something similar. However he does not explicitly derive his position from the metaphysical implications of Aquinas's notion of Christ as a composite person, but rather from what one might call-for lack of a better description-his semantics of the Incarnation (especially as it is spelled out in *STh* III, q. 16, aa. 10-12). Raschko writes:

If one can say Christ as man has *esse*, it must be in the same manner that one says Christ as man is person. This can be done one by reference to the one supposit of both predicates, the person of the Word. Thus one can no more speak of a duality of *esse* in Christ than one can speak of a duality of person. There is a person, an *esse*, an *aliquid* in the human nature of Christ, but it is that person, *esse*, and *aliquid* of the divine person subsisting in human nature.<sup>92</sup>

Again, the notion of a human *esse* can only make sense, at least according to Aquinas's metaphysical principles, when considered as the divine *esse's* subsisting through a human nature, whereby it is said to be human. Thus, one need not posit two substantial *esse* in Christ.

#### IV

Given Aquinas's notion of Christ as a composite person, one finds that what the Angelic Doctor presents in *De Unione Verbi incarnati* is entirely consistent with views espoused in his other Christological works. Consequently, there is no need to suggest-as does Goergen-that Aquinas, in *De Unione*, contradicts himself. Nor should we think, as does Richard Cross, that Aquinas adopts an entirely different metaphysical model to

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *STh* III, q. 17, a. 2.

<sup>92</sup> Raschko, "Aquinas's Theology of the Incarnation in Light of Lombard's Subsistence Theory," 437.

render an account of the Incarnation. In *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation* Cross argues, partly in effort to explain Aquinas's introduction of a human *esse*, that Aquinas abandons his earlier "whole-part model," wherein the divine and human natures are seen in an analogous way as parts<sup>93</sup> constituting the whole Christ, in favor of what seems to be a substance-accident model.<sup>94</sup> According to Cross, Aquinas consistently maintains throughout all of his Christological works (save *De Unione*) that Christ's human nature can be regarded analogously as a part. The reason for this is that parts do not possess any *esse* of their own but share in the substantial *esse* of the whole. Moreover, since parts do not contribute any *esse* to their whole, they cannot be said to actualize their whole.<sup>95</sup> Now, given that Aquinas maintains throughout his *opera* that there is only one *esse* in Christ, the divine *esse*, one may conclude that Christ's human nature has no *esse* of its own to contribute and should therefore be regarded along the lines of a part.

However, continues Cross, in *De Unione* Aquinas seems to suggest something different. Now it seems as though he argues that Christ's human nature does in fact have its own *esse* to contribute, making it appear to be more analogous to an accident, which actualizes its subject through the contribution of its own *esse*. Given this, and also given the fact that Cross finds Aquinas unable to maintain that parts do not actualize their wholes while accidents do, he argues that Aquinas, in *De Unione*, is shifting metaphysical gears, so to speak. "On Aquinas's standard account, the human nature is a truth-maker in virtue of its dependence on

<sup>93</sup> Strictly speaking, Christ's human nature, as Aquinas sees it, is neither an accident nor a part (*De Unione*, a. 4). Aquinas maintains that the union of the two natures is made, not through a composition of parts, but through an "ineffable assumption" (*ibid.*, a. 2). It is the nature of a part to be imperfect, inferior to the perfection of the whole. Such imperfection cannot be attributed to the divine nature, for, as Aquinas maintains, "this is against the very concept of divine perfection" (*Comp. Theo!*, c. 211). The notion of part is also contrary to the specific perfection of human nature since it too is in its own right complete. The two natures in Christ, then, cannot be called parts since each is complete in its own right, lacking none of its own essential, or natural, perfection. Cf. *STh* III, q. 2, a. 4, ad 2.

<sup>94</sup> Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation*, 62-64.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.



the divine *suppositum* [much in the same way that a part is]; in the *De Unione*, the nature is a truth-maker in virtue of its communicating *esse* to the divine *suppositum*. "96

In treating the human *esse* of Christ as if it were something *added* or *contributed* to the divine *suppositum* after the manner of an accident, however, Cross is left with the difficulty of how it can be said (along any line remotely Thomistic) that anything can be related to the divine *suppositum*-*which* Aquinas maintains without exception is *pure act-in* such a way that the latter stands in a relation of potency to the former. Cross is himself aware of the difficulty but offers no solution. "[*De Unione's*] account is agnostic to the extent that it is unclear how, given Aquinas's general emphasis, something can communicate *esse* to a *suppositum* without thereby actualizing any passive potency in the *suppositum*. "97

Given this rather perplexing *aporia*, it seems to me that Cross's principle of interpretation with regard to *De Unione* is wrongheaded. Indeed, the *aporia* disappears if one recognizes that the human *esse* of which Aquinas speaks is not *really* something other than the divine *esse*, is not something that is contributed to the divine *suppositum* as if it were completely other. Again, the human *esse* is the divine *esse*. They are the same in reality but different when one views them from the perspective of Christ's compositeness as a person. What causes Cross his difficulty is that he separates the two in reality, hypostatizes the human *esse* (one might say), and then does not quite know what to do with it.<sup>98</sup>

However, as I hope to have shown, it can be argued that even in the troublesome *De Unione Verbi incarnati* Aquinas maintains consistently with his other Christological treatments that there is

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 64.

<sup>98</sup> Against Cross's overall claim that Aquinas's so-called whole-part model of the Incarnation ultimately reduces into incoherence, I would simply point out West's insightful critique of Cross's position (see West, "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ," 240-41). Put very briefly, Cross's difficulty, West contends, stems from his confusion and misunderstanding of the various senses in which Aquinas speaks of parts—namely, parts of a form or species as opposed to parts of matter—which he then foists upon Aquinas's Christological whole-part model (ibid.). See Aquinas, *Super Boet. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.

only one personal *esse* in Christ. I also hope to have shown that the key to resolving the difficulties pertaining to *De Unione* rests in Aquinas's notion of Christ as a composite person. For, as he points out, one may consider Christ as composite inasmuch as he subsists *in two natures*. In his compositeness, then, Christ subsists not only as the Word (i.e., as the divine *esse*) but also as a human being. Thus, the Word becomes flesh; the divine *esse*, through the assumption of a human nature, becomes-in the sense described above-a human *esse*, by which we can say that "God became man."

THE BEATIFIC VISION AND THE INCARNATE SON:  
FURTHERING THE DISCUSSION

THOMAS G. WEINANDY, O.F.M., CAP.

*Capuchin College  
Washington, D.C.*

**T**HERE IS NOTHING more stimulating than to ponder the mysteries of the Catholic faith in an attempt to conceive them more dearly and to articulate them more precisely. To my mind, no mystery is more challenging than the mystery of the Incarnation—even that of the Trinity itself. My good and longstanding Dominican friend Thomas Joseph White has taken up this exhilarating challenge in his thoughtful article on the Incarnation and the necessity of the earthly Jesus possessing the beatific vision.<sup>1</sup> Jean Galot and I were the primary catalysts that impelled him to do so, for we have argued that a proper understanding of the Incarnation does not warrant maintaining that the earthly incarnate Son of God possessed the beatific vision, despite the venerable, and to some extent magisterial, tradition to the contrary. Although White has marshaled a formidable array of scholarly arguments in support of his position, I believe that his arguments actually undermine what he ardently wants to achieve, that is, to uphold and articulate an authentic understanding of the Incarnation.

White argues that his position is in keeping with the Angelic Doctor. Here, Thomist though I am, I will not address the validity of Aquinas's arguments or White's interpretation of them.

<sup>1</sup> "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision," *The Thomist* 69 (2005): 497-534. Parenthetical page numbers in what follows refer to this article.

My response will be threefold. First, I will briefly summarize White's position. I will then offer an assortment of critiques of his position. Finally, I will attempt to sort out the whole issue by briefly articulating how I believe it must be addressed.

#### I. WHITE ON THE INCARNATION AND THE BEATIFIC VISION

The answer to the question of whether or not the earthly Jesus possessed the beatific vision must be found in discerning the incarnational principles or rules that govern the earthly, human life of the Son of God. Given that within the Incarnation it is the Son of God who exists as man, what necessarily follows regarding the manner or type of human life that the Son of God lived? White and I disagree on the answer to this question, that is, as to what does or does not necessarily ensue from the Incarnation as to the human life of the Son of God.

White argues that the very nature of the Incarnation demands that the Son of God as man must possess the beatific vision if he is properly to live out his human life. For White, the beatific vision ensures not only that the human intellect is cognizant of "his" divine filial identity, but also that the human intellect knows and the human will acts in complete conformity with the divine intellect and will of the Son. (I have written the above sentence in conformity to White's manner of speaking. I would not articulate the issue in such a manner, as will be seen.) As White states at the onset:

[T]his unity of personal action in Jesus requires a perfect cooperation between the human will of Christ and his divine will. In effect, Christ's will and consciousness must act as the instruments of his divine subject, being directly specified at each instant by his divine will. For this, knowledge of his own filial nature and will is necessary. The virtue of faith, or a uniquely prophetic knowledge (by infused species), is not sufficient. The unity of activity of the Incarnate Word requires, therefore, the beatific vision in the intellect of Christ, so that his human will and his divine will may cooperate within one subject. (507)

White argues that without the beatific vision the human intellect and will of Christ would exercise an autonomy that would undermine the unity of subject, that is, the Son, acting through the instrumentality of his humanity. The Son can act through the instrumentality of his humanity only if his human intellect and especially his human will are in complete accord with his divine intellect and will, and this assurance is only obtained if the human intellect of Christ possesses the beatific vision. As White, again, states:

If Jesus is truly the Son of God, and therefore a divine person, then his divine will is present in his person as the primary agent of his personal choices. This means that, necessarily, his human will must be continually subordinate to, informed by, and indefectibly expressive of his personal divine will in its human, rational deliberation and choice making . . . . [I]t is only if Christ's human intellect is continuously and immediately aware of his own divine will (by the beatific vision, and not merely by infused knowledge and by faith), that his human will can act in immediate subordination to his divine will as the "assumed instrument" of his divine subject. (516)

White illustrates the incarnational need for the beatific vision by way of the examples of Christ's obedience and prayer. As seen above, only the beatific vision guarantees that the human will of Christ is conformed to his divine will, for only through the beatific vision is his human intellect conformed to his divine intellect. Equally, the beatific vision empowers Christ to pray to the Father fully aware that he is the divine Son (see 523-33). For White, this is only possible "due to the correspondence between the human and divine wills of Christ within his *unified* personal action, effectuated by means of the beatific vision" (522).

From the above, I think it is obvious how White conceives the incarnational principles or rules that necessarily govern how the Son orders and regulates his earthly life. Simply put, the Son of God comes to exist as man and in so doing now possesses a divine and human intellect and a divine and human will. These two distinct intellects and wills interact practically within Jesus' everyday earthly life through the beatific vision: the human intellect possesses the knowledge of the divine intellect and thus

the human will is able to be conformed to the divine will by means of the divine knowledge, now resident within the human intellect.

This mutual conforming of intellects and wills also ensures that the Son is the sole acting subject. Through the beatific vision, everything the Son does humanly is performed in accordance with his divine knowledge and will. Thus, the beatific vision mediates between the Son existing as God and the Son existing as man so as to ensure that the Son as God and the Son as man *are both* "on the same page." Without the beatific vision, for White, the Son of God as man would not, with certainty, but only by faith or prophetic infused knowledge, be able to be on the same page as the Son of God as God because the Son as man would not know with certainty what the Son as God knows and so would not be certain as to what the Son as God wills.

## II. A SLIGHT WHIFF OF NESTORIANISM

Eyebrows may have been raised at the above words "are both" and rightly they should have been. Despite the fact that White wants to guarantee, through the beatific vision, a unity of subject and a unity of action between the divine and human natures, and so avoid Nestorianism, his conception of the "mechanics" of the Son's incarnational life bears the odor of Nestorianism be it ever so slight. We need to examine his argument more closely.

White rightly wants to hold, and often states, that in the Incarnation the Son of God came to exist as man, and therefore he is the one acting subject within his human life as man. Yet, when it comes to the inner dynamics of the Son's incarnational life as man, White's articulation becomes somewhat imprecise.

For White, within the Incarnation, the manner in which divine knowledge and with it the divine will come to the human Jesus is through the beatific vision. The beatific vision mediates between the human intellect and will of the Son and the divine intellect and will of the Son and thus allows the human intellect to know and the human will to will in unison with the divine Son.

However, in conceiving the inner workings of the earthly life of the Son incarnate in this manner, White gives the impression that the human intellect had a mind of its own and that the human will had a will of its own apart from the Son and that it is only if the human intellect and the human will are tamed by the beatific vision that we (or for that matter, the Son of God) are assured that they will not run autonomously wild on their own. White's understanding of the Incarnation is here faulty.

Because the Son is the sole person or subject within the Incarnation, what he knows and wills as man is done by him and so, from the very ontology of Incarnation, the human intellect and will are never autonomous "things" in need of being "brought into line," whether by the beatific vision or by any other means. It is the Son of God who exists as man and, like every human being, personally acts through his human intellect and his human will, for they are personally his own. They are ontologically constitutive of who the Son of God is as man and thus are incapable of having a "self" life of their own.

Without realizing it, White, in his attempt to find a necessary reason why Christ must possess the beatific vision, first had to rend asunder the human intellect and will from the divine Son with his divine intellect and will and then he had to impose, the beatific vision as the necessary means for uniting the human intellect and will with the divine intellect and will within the one Son of God. White really does not want to disconnect the human intellect and will from the divine Son, as he himself argues profusely in his article, but his arguments on behalf of the beatific vision of Christ have forced him to do so. This is why the articulation of his position always bears the slight whiff of Nestorianism, and why he is also forced at times to articulate his position in an imprecise manner.

### III. THE AMBIGUOUS USE OF THE TERM "Hrs"

White often employs the term "his" in relation to "the man," "the human intellect," and "the human will" in a fascinating, but

highly ambiguous, way. He states that through the beatific vision "the man Jesus knows immediately that he receives his divine will from the Father, and his human acts of obedience bear the imprint of this unique filial certitude" (526). But within the Incarnation, there is no "man" Jesus apart from the Son who "knows," there is no human "he" who receives, and there is no human "who" who possesses the certitude of "his" filial human acts. Within the Incarnation there is only the Son of God existing as man and thus there is only one "he" and one "his," that of the divine Son.

Again, as quoted previously, "Christ's will and consciousness must act as the instruments of his divine subject, being directly specified at each instant by his divine will. For this, knowledge of his own filial nature and will is necessary" (507). Who is the subject/person (the "who") of all of these various uses of the term "his"? The first "his" refers to Christ, but this gives the impression that Christ is a different human subject from the later designated "divine subject." But how can there be a "his" that differs from the divine subject to which the "his" refers? The second "his" appears to shift from referring to the human subject of "Christ" to, presumably, referring to the Son of God as God, since it speaks of "his divine will." This may be an attempt at employing the communication of idioms, but it fails for, within the communication of idioms, divine and human attributes are predicated of one and the same subject, namely, that of the divine Son.

The first "his" refers to a human subject other than the Son as God and the second "his" refers to the Son as God. The third use of the term "his" does not appear to have any incarnational logic whatsoever ("knowledge of his own filial nature"). This "his" implies a human "who" who comes to know that "who" he really is is the Son of God. However, within the Incarnation one does not have *a man* who comes to know that he is God, but rather, within the Incarnation, the Son of God *humanly* comes to know or *humanly* becomes conscious, within his human intellect and human consciousness, that he is the Son of God. Again, the reason White is forced to employ such strained terminology and to state



his position in such a tangled fashion is that, in a Nestorian manner, he has separated the human intellect and will from the Son of God with the intention of glueing them back together by means of the beatific vision,

#### IV. GIVING "SUBJECTIVITY" TO THE HUMAN INTELLECT AND WILL

This can equally be seen in the way White speaks of the divine and human wills as if they could act apart from the person of the Son, so implying that they possess their own distinct subjectivities. In a passage already quoted, White speaks of "Christ's human intellect" being "immediately aware of his divine will" and it is the beatific vision that ensures that "his human will can act in immediate subordination to his divine will" (516). But an "intellect" is not aware, nor does a "will" act; only a person knows and only a person acts and he does so through his will. Later White speaks of the "divine will" moving the "human will" (519) as if these were wills of different subjects. It is the Son of God who wills either with his divine will or with his human will, but the wills themselves do not interact apart from the one who is willing, the divine Son.

Within the same passage, White states that "the human will of Christ acts 'instrumentally,' that is to say, through an immediate subordination to his divine will" (ibid.). As man, the Son's humanity is the personal instrument through which he acts, in a similar way as I personally act through the use of my hand. However, my hand does not act "instrumentally" and neither does Christ's "human will." Moreover, a "will" does not act apart from the one whose will it is, nor does a "will," as if it were an acting subject, subordinate itself to another will. Only persons subordinate their will to another person. To say that one will subordinates itself to another will implies two persons.

One also finds rather peculiar statements such as: "His human will cooperates indefectibly with his divine will in the unity of one personal subject" (520). "Wills" do not "cooperate"; persons

cooperate through a mutual agreement of their wills. To say that the divine and human wills cooperate "in the unity of the personal subject" implies two willing subjects being united to a third. What White wants to say is that, when the Son of God wills and acts as man, his human will and action are always in conformity with his divine will because there is only one willing and acting subject, the Son of God. The reason he cannot simply say that is that, again, within his conception of the Incarnation the human intellect and will would be in competition with the divine intellect and will unless the beatific vision is imposed so as to ensure their unity. For White, it is not the *hypostatic* union, the ontological union whereby the Son of God exists as man, that guarantees the unity, and so conformity, of the human intellect and will with the divine intellect and will, but the beatific vision.<sup>2</sup>

#### V. SORTING OUT THE INCARNATIONAL CONFUSION

The reason White has gotten himself in this incarnational tangle is that he has misconceived the incarnational principles that must be operative within the incarnate Son. For White, the manner in which the Son of God as man becomes conscious of who he is as God and the manner in which he comes to know the divine will and so act in accordance with it is through the beatific vision. For White, this all takes place within what might be called an inner-dialogue between the divinity of the Son and the humanity of the Son. Through the beatific vision, the human intellect and will are "hot wired" to the divine intellect and will. The incarnate Son comes to know who he is and he comes to know what to will and to do in relationship to his own divinity mediated through the beatific vision. This, to my mind, is

<sup>2</sup> Part of the problem may reside in White's ambiguous use of the term "Christ." One is not sure at times whether such a designation refers to the Son of God incarnate or to the man Jesus who is distinct from the Son of God. For example, White can state that without the beatific vision the "the human mind of Christ would no longer be moved by the will of the divine person" (320). This implies that "Christ" is a human subject possessing a human mind who is different from the "divine person" who possesses a divine will.

contrary to the very nature of the Incarnation and to the human life that the Son of God lived.

How then does the Son of God as man come to know who he is within his incarnate state?<sup>3</sup> The Son of God as man comes to know who he is through his incarnate relationship to his Father and he comes to know what to will and to do through his incarnate relationship to the Father, The Son incarnate becomes conscious of who he is and so knows who he is *not* in relationship to his own divinity mediated through the beatific vision, as White would argue, but through what I have termed his human "hypostatic vision" of the Father, Through his human prayer, in conjunction with his pondering the Scriptures, the person of the Son as man has a vision, though not beatific, of the Father and in so coming to know his Father he comes to know, he becomes self-conscious, that he is indeed the only-begotten Son.<sup>4</sup> White holds that if the Son of God does not possess as man the beatific vision, his divine identity and knowledge of what he should will and do would be reduced to an act of faith or prophetic infused knowledge. This is not true. The Son of God, in coming to know who he is in a human manner through his human hypostatic vision of his Father, humanly comes to know the will of the Father and so humanly acts in accordance with it. This, I believe,

<sup>3</sup> Here I am not afforded the space to give a complete account of my argument. I would refer readers to my article: "Jesus' Filial Vision of the Father," *Pro Ecclesia* 13/2 (2004): 189-201.

<sup>4</sup> In my above noted article I gave two reasons why I believe Jesus did not possess the beatific vision. The first is that the beatific vision is traditionally understood as a heavenly vision and thus a vision that is resurrectional in nature. Such a vision would then be contrary to Jesus' being able to live an authentic earthly life. Moreover, because the beatific vision has traditionally been understood as an objective vision of God obtained by someone who is other than God, to say that Jesus possessed the beatific vision implies Nestorianism, as if the man Jesus, who possessed the beatific vision, were a different subject/being from that of the Son. It is the Son of God as man who has a personal/hypostatic vision of the Father and, within that vision, not only does he humanly come to know the Father as his Father, but he also simultaneously becomes humanly conscious of his divine Sonship in relation to his Father.

I would like to note as well that White gives the impression that I agree with Galot that the beatific vision gives a Monophysite skew to the Incarnation. I do not think that such would necessarily be the case. I hold that the traditional understanding of beatific vision is simply contrary to the very nature of the Incarnation and the incarnational principles that are literally embodied within it.

is in keeping with the Incarnation and the incarnational principles that govern it. Everything concerning the Son of God within his human state as man must be conceived and articulated within that incarnate state, and, thus, not in relationship to his own divine nature but in his human relationship to his Father and to the earthly human life that he authentically lives. Thus, my understanding of the incarnational principles that govern the earthly life of the Incarnate Son radically differs from that of White.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by adding a new argument that I have not articulated before, one that may help clarify the issue. Within the life of the Trinity, the Son of God did not come to know who he is as the Son of God, *homoousios* with his Father, within his own self-contained knowledge of himself (similar to the way White wants the Son of God as man to know who he is in relationship to his own divinity through the beatific vision). Rather, the Son of God is eternally conscious of himself, and so knows who he is, as Son only in relationship with his Father and so eternally conforms, as Son, his will to the Father's will. Similarly, the eternal Son of God, through his human hypostatic vision of the Father, is humanly conscious of, and so knows, who he is as the Son, *homoousios* with the Father, in relationship to his Father, and in humanly knowing who he is as Son in relationship to his Father he humanly wills and does what the Father wills and does (see John 5:17-20). The principles that govern the Son's incarnational life are the same principles as those that govern his divine life.

I ardently hope that my critique of White has been fair and to the point. White is too good a theologian to dismiss lightly. Nonetheless, I hope that the clarifications I have attempted to offer will further the debate, though I am certain it will continue. Moreover, as I said at the onset, there is no greater joy than to contemplate, in unison with the angels and their Doctor, the

divine mysteries. To ponder, and to debate, the mystery of the Incarnation with my Dominican brother Thomas Joseph will, I am confident, bear much intellectual fruit, and hopefully abundant grace, for the both of us.

GENERAL INDEX TO *THE THOMIST*  
VOLUME 66-70 (2002-2006)

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

|                                                                                                                                                                        |                   |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Augros, Michael, "Reconciling Science with Natural Philosophy"<br>.....                                                                                                | 68 (2004) 105-41  |
| Augros, Robert M., "Nature Acts for an End" .....                                                                                                                      | 66 (2002) 535-75  |
| Baldner, Steven, "Albertus Magnus and the Categorization of Motion"<br>.....                                                                                           | 70 (2006) 203-35  |
| _____, "Thomas Aquinas on Celestial Matter" .....                                                                                                                      | 68 (2004) 431-67  |
| Berkman, John, "Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration in Medicine and<br>Moral Theology: A Contextualization of Its Past and a Direction for<br>Its Future" ..... | 68 (2004) 69-104  |
| Bradley, Denis J. M., " <i>Ephemerides Thomisticae Analyticae</i> : Metaphysics and<br>Ethics in Stump's <i>Aquinas</i> " .....                                        | 69 (2005) 593-620 |
| _____, "'To Be or Not To Be?' Pasnau on Aquinas's Immortal Human Soul"<br>.....                                                                                        | 68 (2004) 1-39    |
| _____, "Reason and the Natural Law: Flannery's Reconstruction of Aquinas's<br>Moral Theory" .....                                                                      | 67 (2003) 119-31  |
| Bradshaw, David, "Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers"<br>.....                                                                                                     | 70 (2006) 311-66  |
| Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John Crosby<br>and Thomas Aquinas" .....                                                            | 69 (2005) 173-201 |
| Brugger, E. Christian, "Catholic Moral Teaching and the Problem of Capital<br>Punishment" .....                                                                        | 68 (2004) 41-67   |
| Brugger, E. Christian, and William E. May, "John Paul H's Moral Theology on<br>Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" .....                                              | 69 (2005) 279-312 |
| Bukowski, Thomas P., "Beyond Aristotle ... and beyond Newton: Thomas<br>Aquinas on an Infinite Creation" .....                                                         | 68 (2004) 287-314 |
| Burke, Cormac, "A Postscript to the ' <i>Remedium Concupiscentiae</i> '"<br>.....                                                                                      | 70 (2006) 481-536 |
| Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth<br>Determines Ethical Good and Evil" .....                                                            | 66 (2002) 101-32  |
| Cahall, Perry J., "Saint Augustine on Conjugal Love and Divine Love"<br>.....                                                                                          | 68 (2004) 343-73  |
| Caponi, Francis], O.S.A., "Karl Rahner and the Metaphysics of Participation"<br>.....                                                                                  | 67 (2003) 375-408 |
| Cole, Basil, O.P., "Catholic Bioethics: Three Recent Studies"<br>.....                                                                                                 | 66 (2002) 133-47  |
| Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon Blackburn<br>and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" .....                                              | 70 (2006) 71-101  |

|                                                                                                                                     |                   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Decaen, Christopher A., "Aristotle's Aether and Contemporary Science"                                                               | 68 (2004) 375-429 |
| Deely, John, "The Semiosis of Angels"                                                                                               | 68 (2004) 205-58  |
| Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes"                                                                | 66 (2002) 275-309 |
| DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, "Resistance to the Demands of Love: Aquinas on the Vice of <i>Acedia</i> "                               | 68 (2004) 173-204 |
| Dobie, Robert J., "Reason and Revelation in the Thought of Meister Eckhart"                                                         | 67 (2003) 409-38  |
| Emery, Gilles, O.P., "The Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action in Saint Thomas Aquinas"                                              | 69 (2005) 31-77   |
| Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "The Field of Moral Action according to Thomas Aquinas"                                                   | 69 (2005) 1-30    |
| _____, "Applying Aristotle in Contemporary Embryology"                                                                              | 67 (2003) 249-78  |
| _____, "The Multifarious Moral Object of Thomas Aquinas"                                                                            | 67 (2003) 95-118  |
| Flores, Daniel E., "Thomas on the Problem of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Exegete"                                                       | 69 (2005) 251-77  |
| Foley, Michael P., "Augustine, Aristotle, and the <i>Confessions</i> "                                                              | 67 (2003) 607-22  |
| George, Marie I., "Aquinas on the Nature of Trust"                                                                                  | 70 (2006) 103-23  |
| Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian Natural Science"                                               | 66 (2002) 519-33  |
| Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic View of Entropy and Evolution"                               | 66 (2002) 251-66  |
| Guevin, Benedict M., O.S.B., "When a Lie Is Not a Lie: The Importance of Ethical Context"                                           | 66 (2002) 267-74  |
| Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Giving a Good Account of God: Is Theology Ever Mathematical?"                                              | 70 (2006) 367-93  |
| Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy"                                                 | 70 (2006) 537-75  |
| Hill, William J., O.P., "St. Thomas Aquinas: Teacher"                                                                               | 66 (2002) 9-13    |
| Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus" | 67 (2003) 73-94   |
| Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?"                                                                | 70 (2006) 237-65  |
| Iribarren, Isabel, "The Scotist Background in Hervaeus Natalis's Interpretation of Thomism"                                         | 66 (2002) 607     |
| Jensen, Steven J., "Do Circumstances Give Species?"                                                                                 | 70 (2006) 1-26    |
| _____, "A Long Discussion regarding Steven A. Long's Interpretation of the Moral Species"                                           | 67 (2003) 623-43  |

- Jones, John D., "An Absolutely Simple God? Frameworks for Reading Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite" ..... 69 (2005) 371-406
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life" ..... 66 (2002) 61-99
- Jowers, Dennis W., "A Test of Karl Rahner's Axiom, 'The Economic Trinity Is the Immanent Trinity and Vice Versa'" ..... 70 (2006) 421-55
- Keating, James F., "The Natural Sciences as an *ancilla theologia nova*: Alister E. McGrath's *A Scientific Theology*" ..... 69 (2005) 127-52
- Kelly, Anthony J., C.Ss.R., "A Multidimensional Disclosure: Aspects of Aquinas's Theological Intentionality" ..... 67 (2003) 335-74
- Laporte, Jean-Marc, S.J., "Christ in Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*: Peripheral or Pervasive?" ..... 67 (2003) 221-48
- Larson, Thomas R., "Aristotle's Understanding of Place" . 67 (2003) 439-62
- Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer, Pinckaers, McAleer" ..... 70 (2006) 155-201
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs, Fowl, and Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 407-67
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Beyond the Jamesian Impasse in Trinitarian Theology" ..... 66 (2002) 395-420
- Long, Steven A., "An Argument for the Embryonic Intactness of Marriage" ..... 70 (2006) 267-88
- \_\_\_\_\_, "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas" ..... 67 (2003) 45-71
- Mahoney, Edward P., "The Accomplishment of Jean Capreolus, O.P." ..... 68 (2004) 601-32
- Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Sacerdotal Character at the Second Vatican Council" ..... 67 (2003) 539-77
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Episcopal *Munera* and the Character of Episcopal Orders" ..... 66 (2002) 369-94
- Massa, James, "Lindbeck's Vision of the Church" ..... 67 (2003) 463-80
- May, William E., and E. Christian Brugger, "John Paul H's Moral Theology on Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" ..... 69 (2005) 279-312
- McCluskey, Colleen, "Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human Action" ..... 66 (2002) 421-56
- McKay, Angela, "Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue" . 69 (2005) 535-55
- McMahon, Kevin A., "Karl Rahner and the Theology of Human Origins" ..... 66 (2002) 499-517
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Christological Turn in Recent Literature on Original Sin" ..... 66 (2002) 201-29
- O'Callaghan, John P., "Aquinas's Rejection of Mind, contra Kenny" ..... 66 (2002) 15-59
- Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory" ..... 67 (2003) 279-305
- Payne, Andrew, "Gracia and Aquinas on the Principle of Individuation" ..... 68 (2004) 545-75



- Poirier, Maben Walter, "Eric Voegelin on Christ and Christianity"  
 ..... 68 (2004) 259-86
- Pristas, Lauren, "Theological Principles That Guided the Redaction of the  
 Roman Missal (1970)" ..... 67 (2003) 157-95
- Reichberg, Gregory M., "Aquinas on Defensive Killing: A Case of Double  
 Effect?" ..... 69 (2005) 341-70
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Is There a 'Presumption against War' in Aquinas's Ethics?"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 337-67
- Reynolds, Philip L., "Spiritual Cognition in Thomas Aquinas"  
 ..... 67 (2003) 505-38
- Rhonheimer, Martin, "The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the  
 Truth of Subjectivity" ..... 67 (2003) 1-44
- Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's *Esse*: A Metaphysics of the  
 Incarnation" ..... 70 (2006) 577-603
- Shanley, Brian J., O.P., "Funeral Homily for William J. Hill, O.P."  
 ..... 66 (2002) 1-7
- Smith, Janet E., "The Morality of Condom Use by HIV-Infected Spouses"  
 ..... 70 (2006) 27-69
- Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural  
 Ends" ..... 68 (2004) 507-29
- St. Amour, Paul, "Lonergan and Gilson on the Problem of Critical Realism"  
 ..... 69 (2005) 557-92
- Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and Neo-Aristotelian  
 Realism" ..... 68 (2004) 531-43
- Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of  
 Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics"  
 ..... 69 (2005) 79-125
- Twetten, David B., "Aquinas's Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of 'God'"  
 ..... 69 (2005) 203-50
- Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction and Aristotle's  
 Epistemological Realism" ..... 66 (2002) 457-71
- Vaillancourt, Mark G., "Guitmund of Aversa and the Eucharistic Theology of  
 St. Thomas" ..... 68 (2004) 577-600
- Vall, Gregory, "Inclusive Language and the Equal Dignity of Women and Men  
 in Christ" ..... 67 (2003) 579-606
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Psalm 22: *Vox Christi* or Israelite Temple Liturgy?"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 175-200
- Waddell, Michael M., "Truth or Transcendentals: What Was St. Thomas's  
 Intention at *De Veritate* 1.1?" ..... 67 (2003) 197-219
- Weinandy, Thomas G., O.F.M.Cap., "The Beatific Vision and the Incarnate  
 Son: Furthering the Discussion" ..... 70 (2006) 605-15
- West, J. L.A., "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ"  
 ..... 66(2002)231-50
- White, A. Leo, "Instinct and Custom" ..... 66 (2002) 577-605

|                                                                                                                      |                   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| White, Thomas Joseph, "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the<br>Necessity of the Beatific Vision" ..... | 69 (2005) 497-534 |
| Wright, William M., IV, "The Theology of Disclosure and Biblical Exegesis"<br>.....                                  | 70 (2006) 395-419 |

## TERMS IN TITLES

### ACEDIA

- DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, "Resistance to the Demands of Love:  
Aquinas on the Vice of *Acedia*" ..... 68 (2004) 173-204

### ACT/ACTION

- Emery, Gilles, O.P., "The Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action in Saint  
Thomas Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 31-77
- Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "The Field of Moral Action according to Thomas  
Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 1-30
- Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in  
Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"  
..... 67 (2003) 73-94
- Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?"  
..... 70 (2006) 237-65
- Long, Steven A., "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object  
of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas" 67 (2003) 45-71
- McCluskey, Colleen, "Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human  
Action" ..... 66 (2002) 421-56
- White, Thomas Joseph, "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and  
the Necessity of the Beatific Vision" ..... 69 (2005) 497-534

### AETHER

- Decaen, Christopher A., "Aristotle's Aether and Contemporary Science"  
..... 68 (2004) 375-429

### AGENT

- Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?"  
..... 70 (2006) 237-65

### ANALOGY

- Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation,  
and Analogy" ..... 70 (2006) 537-75

### ANGEL/ANGELIC

- Deely, John, "The Semiosis of Angels" ..... 68 (2004) 205-58
- Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of  
Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics"  
..... 69 (2005) 79-125

### APPETITE

- McCluskey, Colleen, "Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human  
Action" ..... 66 (2002) 421-56

**ARISTOTELIAN**

- Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian Natural Science" ..... 66 (2002) 519-33
- Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and Neo-Aristotelian Realism" ..... 68 (2004) 531-43
- Twetten, David B., "Aquinas's Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of 'God'" ..... 69 (2005) 203-50

**AUGUSTINIANISM**

- Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory" ..... 67 (2003) 279-305

**AUTHORITY**

- Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs, Fowl, and Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 407-67

**BIOETHICS**

- Cole, Basil, O.P., "Catholic Bioethics: Three Recent Studies" ..... 66 (2002) 133-47

**CHAOS**

- Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic View of Entropy and Evolution" ..... 66 (2002) 251-66

**CHARACTER**

- Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Sacerdotal Character at the Second Vatican Council" ..... 67 (2003) 539-77

**CHASTITY**

- Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" 70 (2006) 71-101

**CHRIST/CHRISTOLOGICAL**

- Laporte, Jean-Marc, S.J., "Christ in Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*: Peripheral or Pervasive?" ..... 67 (2003) 221-48
- McMahon, Kevin A., "The Christological Turn in Recent Literature on Original Sin" ..... 66 (2002) 201-29
- Poirier, Maben Walter, "Eric Voegelin on Christ and Christianity" ..... 68 (2004) 259-86
- Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's *Esse*: A Metaphysics of the Incarnation" ..... 70 (2006) 577-603
- West, J. L.A., "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ" ..... 66 (2002) 231-50
- White, Thomas Joseph, "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision" ..... 69 (2005) 497-534

**CHRISTIANITY**

- Poirier, Maben Walter, "Eric Voegelin on Christ and Christianity" ..... 68 (2004) 259-86

**CHURCH**

Massa, James, "Lindbeck's Vision of the Church" ... 67 (2003) 463-80

**CIRCUMSTANCES**

Jensen, Steven J., "Do Circumstances Give Species?" ... 70 (2006) 1-26

**COGNITION/COGNITIVE**

Reynolds, Philip L., "Spiritual Cognition in Thomas Aquinas"

..... 67 (2003) 505-38

Rhonheimer, Martin, "The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity" .....

67 (2003) 1-44

**CONDOM**

Smith, Janet E., "The Morality of Condom Use by HIV-Infected Spouses"

..... 70 (2006) 27-69

**CREATION**

Bukowski, Thomas P., "Beyond Aristotle ... and beyond Newton: Thomas Aquinas on an Infinite Creation" .....

68 (2004) 287-314

**CUSTOM**

White, A. Leo, "Instinct and Custom" .....

66 (2002) 577-605

**DIGNITY**

Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John Crosby and Thomas Aquinas" .....

69 (2005) 173-201

Vall, Gregory, "Inclusive Language and the Equal Dignity of Women and Men in Christ" .....

67 (2003) 579-606

**DIONYSIAN**

Twetten, David B., "Aquinas's Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of 'God'" .....

69 (2005) 203-50

**DISCLOSURE**

Kelly, Anthony J., C.Ss.R., "A Multidimensional Disclosure: Aspects of Aquinas's Theological Intentionality" .....

67 (2003) 335-74

Wright, William M., IV, "The Theology of Disclosure and Biblical Exegesis"

..... 70 (2006) 395-419

**DOUBLE EFFECT**

Reichberg, Gregory M., "Aquinas on Defensive Killing: A Case of Double Effect?" .....

69 (2005) 341-70

**ECCLESIAL**

Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs, Fowl, and Aquinas" .....

69 (2005) 407-67

**EMBRYOLOGY/EMBRYONIC**

Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "Applying Aristotle in Contemporary Embryology"

..... 67 (2003) 249-78

Long, Steven A., "An Argument for the Embryonic Intactness of Marriage"

..... 70 (2006) 267-88

**END**

- Augros, Robert M., "Nature Acts for an End" ..... 66 (2002) 535-75  
 Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in  
 Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"  
 ..... 67 (2003) 73-94  
 Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural  
 Ends" ..... 68 (2004) 507-29

**ENTROPY**

- Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic  
 View of Entropy and Evolution" ..... 66 (2002) 251-66

**EPISTEMOLOGY/EPISTEMOLOGICAL**

- Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction and Aristotle's  
 Epistemological Realism" ..... 66 (2002) 457-71

**EQUIVOCATION**

- Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation,  
 and Analogy" ..... 70 (2006) 537-75

**ESSE**

- Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's *Esse*: A Metaphysics of the  
 Incarnation" ..... 70 (2006) 577-603  
 West, J. L.A., "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 231-50

**ETERNITY**

- Bradshaw, David, "Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers"  
 ..... 70 (2006) 311-66

**ETHICS/ETHICAL/ETHICIST**

- Bradley, Denis J. M., "*Ephemerides Thomisticae Analyticae*: Metaphysics  
 and Ethics in Stump's *Aquinas*" ..... 69 (2005) 593-620  
 Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth  
 Determines Ethical Good and Evil" ..... 66 (2002) 101-32  
 Guevin, Benedict M., O.S.B., "When a Lie Is Not a Lie: The Importance of  
 Ethical Context" ..... 66 (2002) 267-74  
 Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?"  
 ..... 70 (2006) 237-65  
 Reichberg, Gregory M., "Is There a 'Presumption against War' in Aquinas's  
 Ethics?" ..... 66 (2002) 337-67  
 Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of  
 Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics"  
 ..... 69 (2005) 79-125

**EUCHARIST/EUCHARISTIC**

- Vaillancourt, Mark G., "Guitmund of Aversa and the Eucharistic Theology  
 of St. Thomas" ..... 68 (2004) 577-600

**EVIL**

- Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth Determines Ethical Good and Evil" ..... 66 (2002) 101-32

**EVOLUTION**

- Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic View of Entropy and Evolution" ..... 66 (2002) 251-66

**EXEGESIS/EXEGETE**

- Flores, Daniel E., "Thomas on the Problem of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Exegete" ..... 69 (2005) 251-77
- Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs, Fowl, and Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 407-67
- Wright, William M., IV, "The Theology of Disclosure and Biblical Exegesis" ..... 70 (2006) 395-419

**FATHERS, GREEK**

- Bradshaw, David, "Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers" ..... 70 (2006) 311-66

**FORM**

- Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian Natural Science" ..... 66 (2002) 519-33

**FREEDOM**

- McCluskey, Colleen, "Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human Action" ..... 66 (2002) 421-56

**GOD**

- Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Giving a Good Account of God: Is Theology Ever Mathematical?" ..... 70 (2006) 367-93
- Jones, John D., "An Absolutely Simple God? Frameworks for Reading Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite" ..... 69 (2005) 371-406
- Twetten, David B., "Aquinas's Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of 'God'" ..... 69 (2005) 203-50

**GOOD**

- Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth Determines Ethical Good and Evil" ..... 66 (2002) 101-32

**HIV**

- Smith, Janet E., "The Morality of Condom Use by HIV-Infected Spouses" ..... 70 (2006) 27-69

**HUMAN**

- Bradley, Denis]. M., "'To Be or Not To Be?' Pasnau on Aquinas's Immortal Human Soul" ..... 68 (2004) 1-39
- Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus" ..... 67 (2003) 73-94

- Jones, John D., "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 61-99
- McCluskey, Colleen, "Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human  
 Action" ..... 66 (2002) 421-56
- McMahon, Kevin A., "Karl Rahner and the Theology of Human Origins"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 499-517
- Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural  
 Ends" ..... 68 (2004) 507-29

**HYDRATION**

- Berkman, John, "Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration in Medicine  
 and Moral Theology: A Contextualization of Its Past and a Direction  
 for Its Future" ..... 68 (2004) 69-104

**IMAGINATION**

- Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and Neo-  
 Aristotelian Realism" ..... 68 (2004) 531-43

**INCARNATION/INCARNATE**

- Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's *Esse*: A Metaphysics of the  
 Incarnation" ..... 70 (2006) 577-603
- Weinandy, Thomas G., O.F.M.Cap., "The Beatific Vision and the Incarnate  
 Son: Furthering the Discussion" ..... 70 (2006) 605-15

**INCLINATIONS**

- Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,  
 Pinckaers, McAleer" ..... 70 (2006) 155-201

**INDIVIDUATION**

- Payne, Andrew, "Gracia and Aquinas on the Principle of Individuation"  
 ..... 68 (2004) 545-75

**INSTINCT**

- White, A. Leo, "Instinct and Custom" ..... 66 (2002) 577-605

**INTENTIONALITY**

- Kelly, Anthony J., C.Ss.R., "A Multidimensional Disclosure: Aspects of  
 Aquinas's Theological Intentionality" ..... 67 (2003) 335-74

**KILLING**

- Reichberg, Gregory M., "Aquinas on Defensive Killing: A Case of Double  
 Effect?" ..... 69 (2005) 341-70

**LANGUAGE**

- Vall, Gregory, "Inclusive Language and the Equal Dignity of Women and  
 Men in Christ" ..... 67 (2003) 579-606

**LAW**

- Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 275-309
- Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,  
 Pinckaers, McAleer" ..... 70 (2006) 155-201



- Rhonheimer, Martin, "The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity" ..... 67 (2003) 1-44
- Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural Ends" ..... 68 (2004) 507-29
- Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction and Aristotle's Epistemological Realism" ..... 66 (2002) 457-71
- LIE**
- Guevin, Benedict M., O.S.B., "When a Lie Is Not a Lie: The Importance of Ethical Context" ..... 66 (2002) 267-74
- LIFE**
- Jones, John D., "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life" ..... 66 (2002) 61-99
- LITURGY**
- Vall, Gregory, "Psalm 22: *Vax Christi* or Israelite Temple Liturgy?" ..... 66 (2002) 175-200
- LOVE**
- Cahall, Perry J., "Saint Augustine on Conjugal Love and Divine Love" ..... 68 (2004) 343-73
- DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, "Resistance to the Demands of Love: Aquinas on the Vice of *Acedia*" ..... 68 (2004) 173-204
- LUST**
- Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" 70 (2006) 71-101
- MARRIAGE**
- Long, Steven A., "An Argument for the Embryonic Intactness of Marriage" ..... 70 (2006) 267-88
- MATHEMATICAL**
- Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Giving a Good Account of God: Is Theology Ever Mathematical?" ..... 70 (2006) 367-93
- MATTER**
- Baldner, Steven, "Thomas Aquinas on Celestial Matter" ..... 68 (2004) 431-67
- MEDICINE**
- Berkman, John, "Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration in Medicine and Moral Theology: A Contextualization of Its Past and a Direction for Its Future" ..... 68 (2004) 69-104
- MEN**
- Vall, Gregory, "Inclusive Language and the Equal Dignity of Women and Men in Christ" ..... 67 (2003) 579-606
- METAPHYSICS/METAPHYSICAL**
- Bradley, Denis J. M., "*Ephemerides Thomisticae Analyticae*: Metaphysics and Ethics in Stump's *Aquinas*" ..... 69 (2005) 593-620

- Caponi, Francis J., O.S.A., "Karl Rahner and the Metaphysics of Participation" ..... 67 (2003) 375-408
- Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic View of Entropy and Evolution" ..... 66 (2002) 251-66
- Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's *Esse*: A Metaphysics of the Incarnation" ..... 70 (2006) 577-603
- West, J. L.A., "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ" ..... 66 (2002) 231-50
- MIND**
- O'Callaghan, John P., "Aquinas's Rejection of Mind, contra Kenny" ..... 66 (2002) 15-59
- MISSAL, ROMAN**
- Pristas, Lauren, "Theological Principles That Guided the Redaction of the Roman Missal (1970)" ..... 67 (2003) 157-95
- MORAL**
- Bradley, Denis J. M., "Reason and the Natural Law: Flannery's Reconstruction of Aquinas's Moral Theory" .... 67 (2003) 119-31
- Brugger, E. Christian, "Catholic Moral Teaching and the Problem of Capital Punishment" ..... 68 (2004) 41-67
- Brugger, E. Christian, and William E. May, "John Paul H's Moral Theology on Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" ..... 69 (2005) 279-312
- Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "The Field of Moral Action according to Thomas Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 1-30
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Multifarious Moral Object of Thomas Aquinas" ..... 67 (2003) 95-118
- Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus" ..... 67 (2003) 73-94
- Jensen, Steven J., "A Long Discussion regarding Steven A. Long's Interpretation of the Moral Species" ..... 67 (2003) 623-43
- Long, Steven A., "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas" ..... 67 (2003) 45-71
- McKay, Angela, "Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue" ..... 69 (2005) 535-55
- Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory" ..... 67 (2003) 279-305
- MOTION**
- Baldner, Steven, "Albertus Magnus and the Categorization of Motion" ..... 70 (2006) 203-35
- MUNERA**
- Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Episcopal *Munera* and the Character of Episcopal Orders" ..... 66 (2002) 369-94

## NATURE/NATURAL

- Augros, Michael, "Reconciling Science with Natural Philosophy"  
 ..... 68 (2004) 105-41
- Augros, Robert M., "Nature Acts for an End" ..... 66 (2002) 535-75
- Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth  
 Determines Ethical Good and Evil" ..... 66 (2002) 101-32
- Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 275-309
- Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian  
 Natural Science" ..... 66 (2002) 519-33
- Keating, James F., "The Natural Sciences as an *ancilla theologia nova*:  
 Alister E. McGrath's *A Scientific Theology*" ..... 69 (2005) 127-52
- Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,  
 Pinckaers, McAleer" ..... 70 (2006) 155-201
- Long, Steven A., "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object  
 of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas" 67 (2003) 45-71
- Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural  
 Ends" ..... 68 (2004) 507-29

## NECESSITIES

- Jones, John D., "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 61-99

## NON-CONTRADICTION

- Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction and Aristotle's  
 Epistemological Realism" ..... 66 (2002) 457-71

## NUTRITION

- Berkman, John, "Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration in Medicine  
 and Moral Theology: A Contextualization of Its Past and a Direction  
 for Its Future" ..... 68 (2004) 69-104

## OBJECT

- Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "The Multifarious Moral Object of Thomas  
 Aquinas" ..... 67 (2003) 95-111
- Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in  
 Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"  
 ..... 67 (2003) 73-94
- Long, Steven A., "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object  
 of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas" 67 (2003) 45-71

## OBLIGATION

- Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth  
 Determines Ethical Good and Evil" ..... 66 (2002) 101-32

## ORDERS

- Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Episcopal *Munera* and the Character of Episcopal  
 Orders" ..... 66 (2002) 369-94

**ORIGINS/ORIGINAL**

- McMahon, Kevin A., "Karl Rahner and the Theology of Human Origins"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 499-517  
 \_\_\_\_\_, "The Christological Turn in Recent Literature on Original Sin"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 201-29

**PARTICIPATION**

- Caponi, Francis J., O.S.A., "Karl Rahner and the Metaphysics of  
 Participation" ..... 67 (2003) 375-408

**PERSON/PERSONAL**

- Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John  
 Crosby and Thomas Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 173-201  
 Emery, Gilles, O.P., "The Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action in Saint  
 Thomas Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 31-77

**PHILOSOPHY**

- Augros, Michael, "Reconciling Science with Natural Philosophy"  
 ..... 68 (2004) 105-41

**PLACE**

- Larson, Thomas R., "Aristotle's Understanding of Place"  
 ..... 67 (2003) 439-62

**PRUDENCE**

- McKay, "Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue"  
 ..... 69 (2005) 535-55

**PUNISHMENT, CAPITAL**

- Brugger, E. Christian, "Catholic Moral Teaching and the Problem of Capital  
 Punishment" ..... 68 (2004) 41-67

**PURPOSES**

- Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural  
 Ends" ..... 68 (2004) 507-29

**REALISM**

- St. Amour, Paul, "Lonergan and Gilson on the Problem of Critical Realism"  
 ..... 69 (2005) 557-92  
 Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and Neo-  
 Aristotelian Realism" ..... 68 (2004) 531-43  
 Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction and Aristotle's  
 Epistemological Realism" ..... 66 (2002) 457-71

**REASON**

- Dobie, Robert J., "Reason and Revelation in the Thought of Meister  
 Eckhart" ..... 67 (2003) 409-38

**REMEDIIUM CONCUPISCENTIAE**

- Burke, Cormac, "A Postscript to the '*Remedium Concupiscentiae*'"  
 ..... 70 (2006) 481-536

## REPORTING

- Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and Neo-Aristotelian Realism" ..... 68 (2004) 531-43

## REVELATION

- Dobie, Robert J., "Reason and Revelation in the Thought of Meister Eckhart" ..... 67 (2003) 409-38

## SCIENCE/SCIENTIFIC

- Augros, Michael, "Reconciling Science with Natural Philosophy" ..... 68 (2004) 105-41
- Decaen, Christopher A., "Aristotle's Aether and Contemporary Science" ..... 68 (2004) 375-429
- Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian Natural Science" ..... 66 (2002) 519-33
- Keating, James F., "The Natural Sciences as an *ancilla theologia nova*: Alister E. McGrath's *A Scientific Theology*" .... 69 (2005) 127-52
- Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and Neo-Aristotelian Realism" ..... 68 (2004) 531-43

## SEMIOSIS

- Deely, John, "The Semiosis of Angels" ..... 68 (2004) 205-58

## SIN

- McMahon, Kevin A., "The Christological Turn in Recent Literature on Original Sin" ..... 66 (2002) 201-29
- Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics" ..... 69 (2005) 79-125

## SOUL

- Bradley, Denis J.M., "'To Be or Not To Be?' Pasnau on Aquinas's Immortal Human Soul" ..... 68 (2004) 1-39

## SPECIES

- Jensen, Steven J., "Do Circumstances Give Species?" ... 70 (2006) 1-26
- \_\_\_\_\_, "A Long Discussion regarding Steven A. Long's Interpretation of the Moral Species" ..... 67 (2003) 623-43

## SUBJECT/SUBJECTIVITY

- Rhonheimer, Martin, "The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity" ..... 67 (2003) 1-44

## SUBSTANCE/SUBSTANTIAL

- Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian Natural Science" ..... 66 (2002) 519-33

## THEOLOGY/THEOLOGICAL

- Berkman, John, "Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration in Medicine and Moral Theology: A Contextualization of Its Past and a Direction for Its Future" ..... 68 (2004) 69-104

- Brugger, E. Christian, and William E. May, "John Paul II's Moral Theology on Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" ..... 69 (2005) 279-312
- Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Giving a Good Account of God: Is Theology Ever Mathematical?" ..... 70 (2006) 367-93
- Keating, James F., "The Natural Sciences as an *ancilla theologia nova*: Alister E. McGrath's *A Scientific Theology*" .... 69 (2005) 127-52
- Kelly, Anthony J., C.Ss.R., "A Multidimensional Disclosure: Aspects of Aquinas's Theological Intentionality" ..... 67 (2003) 335-74
- Levering, Matthew, "Beyond the Jamesian Impasse in Trinitarian Theology" ..... 66 (2002) 395-420
- McMahon, Kevin A., "Karl Rahner and the Theology of Human Origins" ..... 66 (2002) 499-517
- Vaillancourt, Mark G., "Guitmund of Aversa and the Eucharistic Theology of St. Thomas" ..... 68 (2004) 577-600
- Wright, William M., IV, "The Theology of Disclosure and Biblical Exegesis" ..... 70 (2006) 395-419

## THEORY

- Bradley, Denis J. M., "Reason and the Natural Law: Flannery's Reconstruction of Aquinas's Moral Theory" .... 67 (2003) 119-31
- Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory" ..... 67 (2003) 279-305

## THOMISM/THOMISTIC

- Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes" ..... 66 (2002) 275-309
- Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic View of Entropy and Evolution" ..... 66 (2002) 251-66
- Iribarren, Isabel, "The Scotist Background in Hervaeus Natalis's Interpretation of Thomism" ..... 66 (2002) 607

## TIME

- Bradshaw, David, "Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers" ..... 70 (2006) 311-66

## TRANSCENDENTALS

- Waddell, Michael M., "Truth or Transcendentals: What Was St. Thomas's Intention at *De Veritate* 1.1?" ..... 67 (2003) 197-219

## TRINITY/TRINITARIAN

- Emery, Gilles, O.P., "The Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action in Saint Thomas Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 31-77
- Jowers, Dennis W., "A Test of Karl Rahner's Axiom, 'The Economic Trinity Is the Immanent Trinity and Vice Versa'" ..... 70 (2006) 421-55
- Levering, Matthew, "Beyond the Jamesian Impasse in Trinitarian Theology" ..... 66 (2002) 395-420

## TRUST

- George, Marie I., "Aquinas on the Nature of Trust" .. 70 (2006) 103-23

**TRUTH**

- Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth Determines Ethical Good and Evil" ..... 66 (2002) 101-32
- Rhonheimer, Martin, "The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity" ..... 67 (2003) 1-44
- Waddell, Michael M., "Truth or Transcendentals: What *Was* St. Thomas's Intention at *De Veritate* 1.1?" ..... 67 (2003) 197-219

**UNIQUENESS**

- Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John Crosby and Thomas Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 173-201

**UNIVOCATION**

- Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and Analogy" ..... 70 (2006) 537-75

**VICE**

- DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, "Resistance to the Demands of Love: Aquinas on the Vice of *Acedia*" ..... 68 (2004) 173-204

**VIRTUE**

- Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" 70 (2006) 71-101
- McKay, Angela, "Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue" ..... 69 (2005) 535-55
- Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics" ..... 69 (2005) 79-125

**VISION, BEATIFIC**

- Weinandy, Thomas G., O.F.M.Cap., "The Beatific Vision and the Incarnate Son: Furthering the Discussion" ..... 70 (2006) 605-15
- White, Thomas Joseph, "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision" ..... 69 (2005) 497-534

**VOLUNTARY**

- White, Thomas Joseph, "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision" ..... 69 (2005) 497-534

**WAR**

- Reichberg, Gregory M., "Is There a 'Presumption against War' in Aquinas's Ethics?" ..... 66 (2002) 337-67

**WELL-BEING**

- Jones, John D., "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life" ..... 66 (2002) 61-99

**WOMEN**

- Vall, Gregory, "Inclusive Language and the Equal Dignity of Women and Men in Christ" ..... 67 (2003) 579-606

## PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

### AQUINAS

see THOMAS AQUINAS, ST.

### ABELARD

Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus" ..... 67 (2003) 73-94

### ALBERTUS MAGNUS

Baldner, Steven, "Albertus Magnus and the Categorization of Motion" ..... 70 (2006) 203-35  
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus" ..... 67 (2003) 73-94

### ARISTOTLE

Bukowski, Thomas P., "Beyond Aristotle ... and beyond Newton: Thomas Aquinas on an Infinite Creation" ..... 68 (2004) 287-314  
Decaen, Christopher A., "Aristotle's Aether and Contemporary Science" ..... 68 (2004) 375-429  
Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "Applying Aristotle in Contemporary Embryology" ..... 67 (2003) 249-78  
Foley, Michael P., "Augustine, Aristotle, and the *Confessions*" ..... 67 (2003) 607-22  
Larson, Thomas R., "Aristotle's Understanding of Place" ..... 67 (2003) 439-62  
Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction and Aristotle's Epistemological Realism" ..... 66 (2002) 457-71

### AUGUSTINE

Cahall, Perry J., "Saint Augustine on Conjugal Love and Divine Love" ..... 68 (2004) 343-73  
Foley, Michael P., "Augustine, Aristotle, and the *Confessions*" ..... 67 (2003) 607-22

### BLACKBURN

Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" 70 (2006) 71-101

### CAPREOLUS

Mahoney, Edward P., "The Accomplishment of Jean Capreolus, O.P." ..... 68 (2004) 601-32



**CHILDS**

- Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs, Fowl, and Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 407-67

**CROSBY**

- Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John Crosby and Thomas Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 173-201

**CURRAN**

- Brugger, E. Christian, and William E. May, "John Paul II's Moral Theology on Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" ..... 69 (2005) 279-312

**ECKHART**

- Dobie, Robert J., "Reason and Revelation in the Thought of Meister Eckhart" ..... 67 (2003) 409-38

**FLANNERY**

- Bradley, Denis J. M., "Reason and the Natural Law: Flannery's Reconstruction of Aquinas's Moral Theory" .... 67 (2003) 119-31

**FOWL**

- Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs, Fowl, and Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 407-67

**GILSON**

- St. Amour, Paul, "Lonergan and Gilson on the Problem of Critical Realism" ..... 69 (2005) 557-92

**GRACIA**

- Payne, Andrew, "Gracia and Aquinas on the Principle of Individuation" ..... 68 (2004) 545-75

**GUITMUND OF AVERSA**

- Vaillancourt, Mark G., "Guitmund of Aversa and the Eucharistic Theology of St. Thomas" ..... 68 (2004) 577-600

**HERVAEUS NATALIS**

- Iribarren, Isabel, "The Scotist Background in Hervaeus Natalis's Interpretation of Thomism" ..... 66 (2002) 607-27

**HILL**

- Shanley, Brian J., O.P., "Funeral Homily for William J. Hill, O.P." ..... 66 (2002) 1-7

**JOHN PAUL II**

- Brugger, E. Christian, and William E. May, "John Paul II's Moral Theology on Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" ..... 69 (2005) 279-312
- Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" 70 (2006) 71-101

**KENNY**

- O'Callaghan, John P., "Aquinas's Rejection of Mind, contra Kenny" ..... 66 (2002) 15-59

**LINDBECK**

Massa, James, "Lindbeck's Vision of the Church" .... 67 (2003) 463-80

**LONERGAN**

St. Amour, Paul, "Lonergan and Gilson on the Problem of Critical Realism"  
 ..... 69 (2005) 557-92

**LONG**

Jensen, Steven J., "A Long Discussion regarding Steven A. Long's  
 Interpretation of the Moral Species" ..... 67 (2003) 623-43

**MCALeer**

Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,  
 Pinckaers, McAleer" ..... 70 (2006) 155-201

**MCGRATH**

Keating, James F., "The Natural Sciences as an *ancilla theologia nova*:  
 Alistair E. McGrath's *A Scientific Theology*" ..... 69 (2005) 127-52

**NEWTON**

Bukowski, Thomas P., "Beyond Aristotle ... and beyond Newton: Thomas  
 Aquinas on an Infinite Creation" ..... 68 (2004) 287-314

**PASNAU**

Bradley, Denis J.M., "'To Be or Not To Be?' Pasnau on Aquinas's Immortal  
 Human Soul" ..... 68 (2004) 1-39

**PETER LOMBARD**

Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in  
 Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"  
 ..... 67 (2003) 73-94

**PINCKAERS**

Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,  
 Pinckaers, McAleer" ..... 70 (2006) 155-201

**PORTER**

Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 275-309

**PSEUDO-DI ONYSIUS**

Jones, John D., "An Absolutely Simple God? Frameworks for Reading  
 Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite" ..... 69 (2005) 371-406

**RAHNER**

Caponi, Francis J., O.S.A., "Karl Rahner and the Metaphysics of  
 Participation" ..... 67 (2003) 375-408

Jowers, Dennis W., "A Test of Karl Rahner's Axiom, 'The Economic Trinity  
 Is the Immanent Trinity and Vice Versa'" ..... 70 (2006) 421-55

McMahon, Kevin A., "Karl Rahner and the Theology of Human Origins"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 499-517

## RHONHEIMER

- Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer, Pinckaers, McAleer" ..... 70 (2006) 155-201

## SCOTUS

- Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus" ..... 67 (2003) 73-94
- Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics" ..... 69 (2005) 79-125

## STUMP

- Bradley, Denis J. M., "*Ephemerides Thomisticae Analyticae: Metaphysics and Ethics in Stump's Aquinas*" ..... 69 (2005) 593-620

## THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA

- Flores, Daniel E., "Thomas on the Problem of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Exegete" ..... 69 (2005) 251-77

## THOMAS AQUINAS, ST.

- Baldner, Steven, "Thomas Aquinas on Celestial Matter" ..... 68 (2004) 431-67
- Bradley, Denis J.M., "'To Be or Not To Be?' Pasnau on Aquinas's Immortal Human Soul" ..... 68 (2004) 1-39
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Reason and the Natural Law: Flannery's Reconstruction of Aquinas's Moral Theory" ..... 67 (2003) 119-31
- Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John Crosby and Thomas Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 173-201
- Bukowski, Thomas P., "Beyond Aristotle ... and beyond Newton: Thomas Aquinas on an Infinite Creation" ..... 68 (2004) 287-314
- DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, "Resistance to the Demands of Love: Aquinas on the Vice of *Acedia*" ..... 68 (2004) 173-204
- Emery, Gilles, O.P., "The Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action in Saint Thomas Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 31-77
- Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "The Field of Moral Action according to Thomas Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 1-30
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Multifarious Moral Object of Thomas Aquinas" ..... 67 (2003) 95-118
- Flores, Daniel E., "Thomas on the Problem of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Exegete" ..... 69 (2005) 251-77
- George, Marie I., "Aquinas on the Nature of Trust" .. 70 (2006) 103-23
- Hill, William], O.P., "St. Thomas Aquinas: Teacher" .. 66 (2002) 9-13
- Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus" ..... 67 (2003) 73-94
- Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?" ..... 70 (2006) 237-65

Jones, John D., "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 61-99

Kelly, Anthony J., C.Ss.R., "A Multidimensional Disclosure: Aspects of  
 Aquinas's Theological Intentionality" ..... 67 (2003) 335-74

Laporte, Jean-Marc, S.J., "Christ in Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*:  
 Peripheral or Pervasive?" ..... 67 (2003) 221-48

Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs,  
 Fowl, and Aquinas" ..... 69 (2005) 407-67

Long, Steven A., "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object  
 of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas" 67 (2003) 45-71

O'Callaghan, John P., "Aquinas's Rejection of Mind, contra Kenny"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 15-59

Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral  
 Theory" ..... 67 (2003) 279-305

Payne, Andrew, "Gracia and Aquinas on the Principle of Individuation"  
 ..... 68 (2004) 545-75

Reichberg, Gregory M., "Aquinas on Defensive Killing: A Case of Double  
 Effect?" ..... 69 (2005) 341-70

\_\_\_\_\_, "Is There a 'Presumption against War' in Aquinas's Ethics?"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 337-67

Reynolds, Philip L., "Spiritual Cognition in Thomas Aquinas"  
 ..... 67 (2003) 505-38

Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's *Esse*: A Metaphysics of the  
 Incarnation" ..... 70 (2006) 577-603

Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of  
 Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics"  
 ..... 69 (2005) 79-125

Twetten, David B., "Aquinas's Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of  
 'God'" ..... 69 (2005) 203-50

Waddell, Michael M., "Truth or Transcendentals: What *Was* St. Thomas's  
 Intention at *De Veritate* 1.1?" ..... 67 (2003) 197-219

Vaillancourt, Mark G., "Guitmund of Aversa and the Eucharistic Theology  
 of St. Thomas" ..... 68 (2004) 577-600

West, J. L.A., "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ"  
 ..... 66 (2002) 231-50

**THOMAS SUTTON**

Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation,  
 and Analogy" ..... 70 (2006) 537-75

**VOEGELIN**

Poirier, Maben Walter, "Eric Voegelin on Christ and Christianity"  
 ..... 68 (2004) 259-86

## BOOKS REVIEWED

- Bagchi, David, and David C. Steinmetz, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Reformation Theology* (Gared Wicks, S.J.) . . . . . 70 (2006) 289
- Baglow, Christopher, *"Modus et Forma": A New Approach to the Exegesis of St. Thomas Aquinas with an Application to the "Lectura super Epistolam ad Ephesios"* (Steven C. Boguslawski, O.P.) . . . . . 67 (2003) 499
- Barrera, Albino, O.P., *Modern Catholic Social Documents & Political Economy* (Andrew V. Abela) . . . . . 67 (2003) 652
- Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian, *Holy Teaching: Introducing the "Summa Theologiae" of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Matthew Levering) 70 (2006) 140
- Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian, and Jim Fodor, eds., *Aquinas in Dialogue: Thomas for the Twenty-First Century* (Robert Barron) 70 (2006) 296
- Bedouelle, Guy, *The History of the Church* (Gohn Vidmar, O.P.) 70 (2006) 478
- Bellitto, Christopher M., *Renewing Christianity: A History of Church Reform from Day One to Vatican II* (Gohn Vidmar, O.P.) . . . . . 66 (2002) 654
- Blanchette, Oliva, *Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics* (Michael]. Dodds, O.P.) . . . . . 68 (2004) 469
- Bonino, S.-Th., et al., *Thomistes ou de l'actualite de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Aidan Nichols, O.P.) . . . . . 68 (2004) 636
- Boyle, Leonard E., O.P., *Facing History: A Different Thomas Aquinas* (Brian]. Shanley, O.P.) . . . . . 66 (2002) 154
- Burke, Patrick, *Reinterpreting Rahner: A Critical Study of His Major Themes* (Stephen M. Fields, S.J.) . . . . . 69 (2005) 628
- Burrell, David, *Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective* (Mary Beth Ingham) . . . . . 70 (2006) 125
- Centore, F. F., *Theism or Atheism: The Eternal Debate* (Michael]. Dodds, O.P.) . . . . . 69 (2005) 335
- Cessario, Romanus, O.P., *Introduction to Moral Theology* (Thomas Hibbs) . . . . . 66 (2002) 629
- \_\_\_\_\_, *The Virtues, or the Examined Life* (Matthew Levering) 67 (2003) 143
- Clarke, W. Norris, S.J., *The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics* (Gohn Goyette) . . . . . 67 (2003) 490
- Coda, Piero, *Il Logos e ii nulla: Trinita, religioni, mistica* (Robert P. Imbelli) . . . . . 69 (2005) 472
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Teo-logia: La Paro/a di Dia nelle parole dell'uomo* (Robert P. Imbelli) . . . . . 69 (2005) 472
- Coolman, Boyd Taylor, *Knowing God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of William of Auxerre* (Kevin L. Hughes) . . . 70 (2006) 137
- Cross, Richard, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus* (Thomas G. Weinandy, O.F.M.Cap.) . . . . . 66 (2002) 637

- Dahlstrom, Daniel O., *Heidegger's Concept of Truth* (Richard L. Velkley)  
 ..... 66 (2002) 488
- Deely, John, *The Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of  
 Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*  
 (Benedict M. Ashley, O.P.) ..... 67 (2003) 133
- Doig, James C., *Aquinas's Philosophical Commentary on the "Ethics": A  
 Historical Perspective* (Tobias Hoffmann) ..... 66 (2002) 485
- Dupre, Louis, *The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern  
 Culture* (William Desmond) ..... 70 (2006) 304
- Elders, Leo, *The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas: Happiness, Natural Law and the  
 Virtues* (Jorgen Vijgen) ..... 69 (2005) 641
- Emery, Gilles, O.P., *Trinity in Aquinas* (Gregory P. Rocca, O.P.)  
 ..... 69 (2005) 313
- Farrelly, M. John, O.S.B., *The Trinity: Rediscovering the Central Christian  
 Mystery* (Anthony J. Kelly, C.Ss.R.) ..... 70 (2006) 133
- Fields, Stephen M., S.J., *Being as Symbol: On the Origin and Development of  
 Karl Rahner's Metaphysics* (Michael G. Parker) ..... 67 (2003) 147
- Flood, David, O.F.M., ed., *Peter of John Olivi On the Acts of the Apostles*  
 (Timothy B. Noone) ..... 67 (2003) 154
- Fodor, Jim, and Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, eds., *Aquinas in Dialogue:  
 Thomas for the Twenty-First Century* (Robert Barron) 70 (2006) 296
- Foster, David Ruel, and Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., eds., *The Two Wings of  
 Catholic Thought: Essays on "Fides et ratio"* (William L. Portier)  
 ..... 68 (2004) 325
- Fowler, C. F., O.P., *Descartes on the Human Soul* (Desmond J. FitzGerald)  
 ..... 66 (2002) 163
- Franklin, James, *The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before  
 Pascal* (Barry Miller) ..... 67 (2003) 152
- Gainé, Simon Francis, *Will There Be Free Will in Heaven? Freedom,  
 Impeccability, and Beatitude* (Tobias Hoffmann) ..... 68 (2004) 643
- George, Marie I., *Christianity and Extraterrestrials: A Catholic Perspective*  
 (Ernan McMullin) ..... 70 (2006) 143
- Gerson, Lloyd P., *Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato* (Joe McCoy)  
 ..... 68 (2004) 659
- Gondreau, Paul, *The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas  
 Aquinas* (Leo J. Elders, S.V.D.) ..... 67 (2003) 498
- Grabowski, John S., *Sex and Virtue: An Introduction to Sexual Ethics* (Michael  
 Sherwin, O.P.) ..... 69 (2005) 157
- Gracia, Jorge J. E., *Metaphysics and Its Task: The Search for the Categorical  
 Foundation of Knowledge* (Michael Gorman) ..... 66 (2002) 651
- Graham, Mark, *Josef Fuchs on Natural Law* (James Keating) . 68 (2004) 336
- Greer, Rowan A., *Christian Life and Christian Hope: Raids on the Inarticulate*  
 (Jody Vaccaro Lewis) ..... 66 (2002) 647
- Guarino, Thomas G., *Foundations of Systematic Theology* (Paul J. Griffiths)  
 ..... 70 (2006) 467

- Guevin, Benedict M., *Christian Anthropology and Sexual Ethics* (Gohn S. Grabowski) . . . . . 69 (2005) 492
- Gunton, Colin E., *Act & Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes* (Michael A. Hoonhout) . . . . . 68 (2004) 639
- Gyulai, Emery De Gaal, *The Art of Equanimity: A Study on the Theological Hermeneutics of Saint Anselm of Canterbury* (Paschal Baumstein, O.S.B.) . . . . . 68 (2004) 501
- Hare, John E., *God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, and Human Autonomy* (Thomas Williams) . . . . . 66 (2002) 477
- Hart, James G., and Guy Mansini, O.S.B., eds., *Ethics and Theological Disclosure: The Thought of Robert Sokolowski* (Philip Blosser) . . . . . 69 (2005) 161
- Hartle, Ann, *Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher* (Gohn C. McCarthy) . . . . . 69 (2005) 317
- Hauser, Daniel, *Marriage and Christian Life: A Theology of Christian Marriage* (Gulie Hanlon Rubio) . . . . . 70 (2006) 148
- Healy, Nicholas M., *Thomas Aquinas: Theologian of the Christian Life* (Robert Barron) . . . . . 68 (2004) 498
- Hemming, Laurence Paul, *Heidegger's Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice* (Michael L. Raposa) . . . . . 67 (2003) 306
- Hemming, Laurence Paul, and Susan Frank Parsons, eds., *Restoring Faith in Reason* (Paul J. Griffiths) . . . . . 68 (2004) 472
- Hipp, Stephen A., *"Person" in Christian Tradition and the Conception of Saint Albert the Great: A Systematic Study of Its Concept as Illuminated by the Mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation* (Michael W. Tkacz) . . . . . 68 (2004) 161
- Bittinger, John P., *Liberty, Wisdom, and Grace: Thomism and Democratic Political Theory* (V. Bradley Lewis) . . . . . 68 (2004) 329
- Hoffmann, Tobias, *Creatura intellecta: Die Ideen und Possibilenlehre bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz van Mayronnes, Poncius und Mastrius* (Ansgar Santogrossi, O.S.B.) . . . . . 66 (2002) 643
- Houser, R. E., ed., *Medieval Masters: Essays in Memory of Msgr. E. A. Synan* (Desmond J. FitzGerald) . . . . . 67 (2003) 331
- John Paul II, Pope, *Memory and Identity: Conversations at the Dawn of a Millennium* (Paul Conner, O.P.) . . . . . 69 (2005) 636
- Kaczor, Christopher, *Proportionalism and the Natural Law Tradition* (Michael Sherwin, O.P.) . . . . . 67 (2003) 481
- Kanaris, Jim, *Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of Religion: From Philosophy of God to Philosophy of Religious Studies* (Louis Roy, O.P.) . . . . . 68 (2004) 340
- Kerr, Fergus, *After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism* (Brian J. Shanley, O.P.) . . . . . 67 (2003) 318
- Knasas, John F. X., *Being & Some 20<sup>th</sup> Century Thomists* (Oliva Blanchette) . . . . . 68 (2004) 148
- Kupczak, Jaroslaw, O.P., *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II* (Geane Butler) . . . . . 66 (2002) 493

- LaNave, Gregory, *Through Holiness to Wisdom: The Nature of Theology according to St. Bonaventure* (Gohn F. Boyle) ..... 70 (2006) 471
- Langlois, John, *A Catholic Response in Sixteenth-Century France to Reformation Theology: The Works of Pierre Dore* (Gared Wicks, S.J.) 68 (2004) 662
- Lawler, Michael G., *What Is and What Ought to Be: The Dialectic of Experience, Theology, and Church* (Thomas G. Guarino) ..... 70 (2006) 129
- Levering, Matthew, *Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas* (Francis Martin) ..... 67 (2003) 321
- Libera, Alain de, *Metaphysique et noétique: Albert le Grand* (Michael W. Tkacz) ..... 70 (2006) 474
- Lucker, Raymond A., and William C. McDonough, eds., *Revelation and the Church: Vatican II in the Twenty-First Century* (Games Massa) ..... 68 (2004) 479
- Ludlow, Morwenna, *Universal Salvation: Eschatology in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner* (Kevin Mongrain) ..... 68 (2004) 167
- Macswain, Robert, and Jeffrey Stout, eds., *Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein* (Terrance Klein) ..... 69 (2005) 479
- Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., and James G. Hart, eds., *Ethics and Theological Disclosure: The Thought of Robert Sokolowski* (Philip Blosser) ..... 69 (2005) 161
- McGinn, Bernard, *The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart: The Man from Whom God Hid Nothing* (Leonard P. Hindsley) ..... 68 (2004) 333
- McGrade, A. S., ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy* (R. James Long) ..... 69 (2005) 632
- McInerney, Ralph, *The Very Rich Hours of Jacques Maritain: A Spiritual Life* (Ronald E. Lane) ..... 68 (2004) 654
- McPartland, Thomas J., *Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence* (David Fleischacker) ..... 67 (2003) 325
- Milbank, John, *Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon* (Michael L. Raposa) ..... 69 (2005) 322
- Milbank, John, and Catherine Pickstock, *Truth in Aquinas* (Bruce D. Marshall) ..... 66 (2002) 632
- Milem, Bruce, *The Unspoken Word: Negative Theology in Meister Eckhart's German Sermons* (Leonard P. Hindsley) ..... 67 (2003) 328
- Miller, Barry, *The Fullness of Being: A New Paradigm for Existence* (Gohn Peterson) ..... 67 (2003) 485
- Miner, Robert C., *Truth in the Making: Knowledge and Creation in Modern Philosophy and Theology* (Grant Kaplan) ..... 69 (2005) 165
- Mojsisch, Burkhard, *Meister Eckhart: Analogy, Univocity, and Unity* (Robert J. Dobie) ..... 68 (2004) 482
- Moss, David, and Edward T. Oakes, S.J., eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar* (Peter J. Casarella) ..... 70 (2006) 292
- Murphy, Francesca Aran, *Art and Intellect in the Philosophy of Etienne Gilson* (Peter A. Redpath) ..... 69 (2005) 484



- Murphy, Mark C., *An Essay on Divine Authority* (Philip E. Devine)  
 ..... 67 (2003) 314
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Natural Law and Practical Reasoning* (V. Bradley Lewis) 67 (2003) 310
- Murphy, Mark C., ed., *Alasdair MacIntyre* (Christopher Stephen Lutz)  
 ..... 68 (2004) 646
- Nash-Marshall, Siobhan, *Participation and the Good: A Study in Boethian  
 Metaphysics* (John Marenbon) ..... 66 (2002) 481
- Nichols, Aidan, O.P., *Say It Is Pentecost: A Guide through Balthasar's Logic* (D.  
 C. Schindler) ..... 66 (2002) 325
- Noonan, John T., Jr., *A Church That Can and Cannot Change: The  
 Development of Catholic Moral Teaching* (Guy Mansini, O.S.B.)  
 ..... 69 (2005) 624
- Noriega, Jose, *"Guiados por el Espiritu": El Espiritu Santo y el conocimiento  
 moral en Tomds de Aquino* (Abelardo Lobato, O.P.) . . . 66 (2002) 170
- O'Callaghan, John P., *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More  
 Perfect Form of Existence* (Gavin T. Colvert) ..... 68 (2004) 319
- O'Callaghan, John P., and Thomas S. Hibbs, eds., *Recovering Nature: Essays in  
 Natural Philosophy, Ethics, and Metaphysics in Honor of Ralph McInerny*  
 (Steven Baldner) ..... 66 (2002) 320
- O'Donovan, Oliver, *The Ways of Judgment* (Thomas W. Smith) 70 (2006) 300
- O'Meara, Thomas F., O.P., *Erich Przywara, S.J.: His Theology and His World*  
 (Robert Masson) ..... 68 (2004) 153
- Oakes, Edward T., S.J., and David Moss, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to  
 Hans Urs van Balthasar* (Peter]. Casarella) ..... 70 (2006) 292
- Peddicord, Richard, O.P., *The Sacred Monster of Thomism: An Introduction to  
 the Life and Legacy of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrangé, O.P.* (Benoit-  
 Dominique de la Soujeole, O.P.) ..... 69 (2005) 621
- Perler, Dominik, *Theories de l'intentionnalite au moyen age* (Jack Zupko)  
 ..... 69 (2005) 469
- Pinckaers, Servais, O.P., *Morality: The Catholic View* (John Corbett, O.P.)  
 ..... 66 (2002) 166
- Pope, Stephen J., ed., *The Ethics of Aquinas* (Paul]. Wajda) . 67 (2003) 140
- Potworowski, Christophe F., *Contemplation and Incarnation: The Theology of  
 Marie-Dominique Chenu* (Aidan Nichols, O.P.) ..... 67 (2003) 137
- Radcliffe, Timothy, O.P., *I Call You Friends* (Basil Cole, O.P.) 66 (2002) 333
- Resnick, Irvn M., *Albert the Great: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography (1900-  
 2000)* (Michael W. Tkacz) ..... 70 (2006) 152
- Rhonheimer, Martin, *Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of  
 Moral Autonomy* (Stephen L. Brock) ..... 66 (2002) 311
- Rico, Herminio, John *Paul II and the Legacy of "Dignitatis humanae"* (Jaroslaw  
 Kupczak, O.P.) ..... 67 (2003) 662
- Rocca, Gregory P., O.P., *Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas  
 on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology* (W. Norris Clarke,  
 S.J.) ..... 68 (2004) 633

- Rowland, Tracey, *Culture and the Thomist Tradition: After Vatican II* (Brian J. Shanley, O.P.) ..... 68 (2004) 143
- Roy, Louis, O.P., *Mystical Consciousness: Western Perspectives and Dialogue with Japanese Thinkers* (James A. Wiseman, O.S.B.) .. 68 (2004) 486
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique* (M. John Farrelly, O.S.B.) ..... 68 (2004) 163
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Le sentiment de transcendance, expérience de Dieu?* (M. John Farrelly, O.S.B.) ..... 68 (2004) 163
- Ryan, Thomas F., *Thomas Aquinas as Reader of the Psalms* (Theresa Gross-Diaz) ..... 66 (2002) 329
- Schockenhoff, Eberhard, *Natural Law and Human Dignity: Universal Ethics in an Historical World* (Mary C. Sommers) ..... 69 (2005) 153
- Shanley, Brian J., O.P., *The Thomist Tradition* (Gregory M. Reichberg) ..... 68 (2004) 157
- Shanley, Brian J., O.P., ed., *One Hundred Years of Philosophy* (James Ross) ..... 69 (2005) 488
- Sherwin, Michael S., O.P., *By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Michael Dauphinais) ..... 70 (2006) 306
- Simpson, Peter Phillips, *Vices, Virtues, and Consequences: Essays in Moral and Political Philosophy* (Bruce Williams, O.P.) ..... 66 (2002) 473
- Smith, Timothy L., *Thomas Aquinas' Trinitarian Theology* (Gilles Emery, O.P.) ..... 67 (2003) 645
- Sokolowski, Robert, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Richard Cobb-Stevens) ..... 66 (2002) 159
- Springsted, Eric O., *The Act of Faith: Christian Faith and the Moral Self* (Michael Dauphinais) ..... 67 (2003) 649
- Steck, Christopher, *The Ethical Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar* (Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt) ..... 67 (2003) 494
- Steinmetz, David C., and David Bagchi, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Reformation Theology* (Qared Wicks, S.J.) ..... 70 (2006) 289
- Stickelbroeck, Michael, *Christologie im Horizont der Seinsfrage: Über die epistemologischen und metaphysischen Voraussetzungen des Bekenntnisses zur universalen Heilsmittlerschaft Jesu Christi* (Emery De Gaal) ..... 67 (2003) 666
- Stout, Jeffrey, *Democracy and Tradition* (V. Bradley Lewis) . 70 (2006) 462
- Stout, Jeffrey, and Robert MacSwain, eds., *Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein* (Terrance Klein) ..... 69 (2005) 479
- Suarez-Nani, Tiziana, *Les anges et la philosophie: Subjectivité et fonction cosmologique de substances séparées à la fin du XIIIe siècle* (Marie I. George) ..... 68 (2004) 491
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Connaissance et langage des anges* (Marie I. George) .. 68 (2004) 491
- Theron, Stephen, *Natural Law Reconsidered: The Ethics of Human Liberation* (Christopher Kaczor) ..... 69 (2005) 169

- Thiel, John E., *God, Evil, and Innocent Suffering: A Theological Reflection* (Joseph L. Mangina) ..... 68 (2004) 476
- Tracey, Gerard, ed., *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman*, vol. 8 (Edward Jeremy Miller) ..... 67 (2003) 655
- Van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel, *The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science* (Games Keating) ..... 66 (2002) 315
- Van Nieuwenhove, Rik, and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P.) ..... 70 (2006) 457
- Venard, Olivier-Thomas, O.P., *Litterature et theologie: Un saison en enfer* (David B. Burrell, C.S.C.) ..... 68 (2004) 651
- Veto, Miklos, *La naissance de la volonte* (D. C. Schindler) .. 69 (2005) 329
- Wawrykow, Joseph, and Rik van Nieuwenhove, eds., *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P.) ..... 70 (2006) 457
- Wiercinski, Andrzej, *Inspired Metaphysics? Gustav Siewerth's Hermeneutic Reading of the Onto-Theological Tradition* (Sean McGrath) ..... 69 (2005) 332
- Williams, Thomas, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus* (Mary Beth Ingham) ..... 68 (2004) 315
- Williams, Thomas D., *Who Is My Neighbor? Personalism and the Foundations of Human Rights* (Kevin L. Flannery, S.J.) ..... 69 (2005) 476
- Wippel, John F., *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (W. Norris Clarke, S.J.) .... 66 (2002) 149
- Wisnovsky, Robert, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context* (Therese-Anne Druart) ..... 69 (2005) 326
- Woodward, P.A., ed., *The Doctrine of Double Effect: Philosophers Debate a Controversial Moral Issue* (Gohn Berkman) ..... 67 (2003) 149

## REVIEWERS

|                                         |                               |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Abela, Andrew V .....                   | 67 (2003) 652                 |
| Ashley, Benedict M., O.P. ....          | 67 (2003) 133                 |
| Baldner, Steven .....                   | 66 (2002) 320                 |
| Barron, Robert .....                    | 70 (2006) 296; 68. (2004) 498 |
| Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian ..... | 67 (2003) 494                 |
| Baumstein, Paschal, O.S.B. ....         | 68 (2004) 501                 |
| Berkman, John .....                     | 67 (2003) 149                 |
| Blanchette, Oliva .....                 | 68 (2004) 148                 |
| Blosser, Philip .....                   | 69 (2005) 161                 |
| Boguslawski, Steven C., O.P. ....       | 67 (2003) 499                 |
| Bonino, Serge-Thomas, O.P.....          | 70 (2006) 457                 |
| Boyle, John F. ....                     | 70 (2006) 471                 |
| Brock, Stephen L. ....                  | 66 (2002) 311                 |
| Burrell, David B., C.S.C. ....          | 68 (2004) 651                 |
| Butler, Jean .....                      | 66 (2002) 493                 |
| Casarella, Peter J. ....                | 70 (2006) 292                 |
| Clarke, W. Norris, S.J. ....            | 68 (2004) 633; 66 (2002) 149  |
| Cobb-Stevens, Richard .....             | 66 (2002) 159                 |
| Cole, Basil O.P. ....                   | 66 (2002) 333                 |
| Colvert, Gavin T.....                   | 68 (2004) 319                 |
| Conner, Paul, O.P. ....                 | 69 (2005) 636                 |
| Corbett, John, O.P. ....                | 66 (2002) 166                 |
| Dauphinais, Michael .....               | 70 (2006) 306; 67 (2003) 649  |
| Desmond, William .....                  | 70 (2006) 304                 |
| Devine, Philip E. ....                  | 67 (2003) 314                 |
| Dobie, Robert J. ....                   | 68 (2004) 482                 |
| Dodds, Michael], O.P.....               | 69 (2005) 335; 68 (2004) 469  |
| Druart, Therese-Anne .....              | 69 (2005) 326                 |
| Elders, Leo J., S.V.D. ....             | 67 (2003) 498                 |
| Emery, Gilles, O.P .....                | 67 (2003) 645                 |
| Farrelly, M. John, O.S.B. ....          | 68 (2004) 163                 |
| Fields, Stephen M., S.J. ....           | 69 (2005) 628                 |
| FitzGerald, Desmond]. ....              | 67 (2003) 331; 66 (2002) 163  |
| Flannery, Kevin L., S.J. ....           | 69 (2005) 476                 |
| Fleischacker, David .....               | 67 (2003) 325                 |
| Gaal, Emery De .....                    | 67 (2003) 666                 |
| George, Marie I. ....                   | 68 (2004) 491                 |
| Gorman, Michael .....                   | 66 (2002) 651                 |
| Goyette, John .....                     | 67 (2003) 490                 |
| Grabowski, John S. ....                 | 69 (2005) 492                 |

|                                 |                                             |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Griffiths, Paul]. .....         | 70 (2006) 467; 68 (2004) 472                |
| Gross-Diaz, Theresa .....       | 66 (2002) 329                               |
| Guarino, Thomas G. ....         | 70 (2006) 129                               |
| Hibbs, Thomas .....             | 66 (2002) 629                               |
| Hindsley, Leonard P. ....       | 68 (2004) 333; 67 (2003) 328                |
| Hoffmann, Tobias .....          | 68 (2004) 643; 66 (2002) 485                |
| Hoonhout, Michael A. ....       | 68 (2004) 639                               |
| Hughes, Kevin L. ....           | 70 (2006) 137                               |
| Imbelli, Robert P. ....         | 69 (2005) 472                               |
| Ingham, Mary Beth .....         | 70 (2006) 125; 68 (2004) 315                |
| Kaczor, Christopher .....       | 69 (2005) 169                               |
| Kaplan, Grant .....             | 69 (2005) 165                               |
| Keating, James .....            | 68 (2004) 336                               |
| Keating, James .....            | 66 (2002) 315                               |
| Kelly, Anthony J., C.Ss.R. .... | 70 (2006) 133                               |
| Klein, Terrance .....           | 69 (2005) 479                               |
| Kupczak, Jaroslaw, O.P. ....    | 67 (2003) 662                               |
| Lane, Ronald E. ....            | 68 (2004) 654                               |
| Levering, Matthew .....         | 70 (2006) 140; 67 (2003) 143                |
| Lewis, Jody Vaccaro .....       | 66 (2002) 647                               |
| Lewis, V. Bradley .....         | 70 (2006) 462; 68 (2004) 329; 67 (2003) 310 |
| Lobato, Abelardo, O.P. ....     | 66 (2002) 170                               |
| Long, R. James .....            | 69 (2005) 632                               |
| Lutz, Christopher Stephen ..... | 68 (2004) 646                               |
| Mangina, Joseph L. ....         | 68 (2004) 476                               |
| Mansini, Guy, O.S.B. ....       | 69 (2005) 624                               |
| Marenbon, John .....            | 66 (2002) 481                               |
| Marshall, Bruce D. ....         | 66 (2002) 632                               |
| Martin, Francis .....           | 67 (2003) 321                               |
| Massa, James .....              | 68 (2004) 479                               |
| Masson, Robert .....            | 68 (2004) 153                               |
| McCarthy, John C. ....          | 69 (2005) 317                               |
| McCoy, Joe .....                | 68 (2004) 659                               |
| McGrath, Sean .....             | 69 (2005) 332                               |
| McMullin, Ernan .....           | 70 (2006) 143                               |
| Miller, Edward Jeremy .....     | 67 (2003) 655                               |
| Miller, Barry .....             | 67 (2003) 152                               |
| Mongrain, Kevin .....           | 68 (2004) 167                               |
| Nichols, Aidan, O.P. ....       | 68 (2004) 636; 67 (2003) 137                |
| Noone, Timothy B. ....          | 67 (2003) 154                               |
| Parker, Michael G. ....         | 67 (2003) 147                               |
| Peterson, John .....            | 67 (2003) 485                               |
| Portier, William L. ....        | 68 (2004) 325                               |
| Raposa, Michael L. ....         | 69 (2005) 322; 67 (2003) 306                |
| Redpath, Peter A. ....          | 69 (2005) 484                               |

|                                             |                |                |
|---------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Reichberg, Gregory M. ....                  | 68 (2004)      | 157            |
| Rocca, Gregory P., O.P. ....                | 69 (2005)      | 313            |
| Ross, James ....                            | 69 (2005)      | 488            |
| Roy, Louis, O.P. ....                       | 68 (2004)      | 340            |
| Rubio, Julie Hanlon ....                    | 70 (2006)      | 148            |
| Santogrossi, Ansgar, O.S.B. ....            | 66 (2002)      | 643            |
| Schindler, D. C. ....                       | 69 (2005) 329; | 66 (2002) 325  |
| Shanley, Brian], O.P. ....                  | 68 (2004) 143; | 67 (2003) 318; |
|                                             | 66 (2002)      | 154            |
| Sherwin, Michael, O.P. ....                 | 69 (2005) 157; | 67 (2003) 481  |
| Smith, Thomas W. ....                       | 70 (2006)      | 300            |
| Sommers, Mary C. ....                       | 69 (2005)      | 153            |
| Soujeole, Benoit-Dominique de la, O.P. .... | 69 (2005)      | 621            |
| Tkacz, Michael W. ....                      | 70 (2006) 474; | 70 (2006) 152; |
|                                             | 68 (2004)      | 161            |
| Velkley, Richard L. ....                    | 66 (2002)      | 488            |
| Vidmar, John, O.P. ....                     | 70 (2006) 478; | 66 (2002) 654  |
| Vijgen, Jorgen ....                         | 69 (2005)      | 641            |
| Weinandy, Thomas G., O.F.M.Cap ....         | 66 (2002)      | 637            |
| Wicks, Jared, S.J. ....                     | 70 (2006) 289; | 68 (2004) 662  |
| Williams, Bruce, O.P. ....                  | 66 (2002)      | 473            |
| Williams, Thomas ....                       | 66 (2002)      | 477            |
| Wiseman, James A., O.S.B. ....              | 68 (2004)      | 486            |
| Wojda, Paul J. ....                         | 67 (2003)      | 140            |
| Zupko, Jack ....                            | 69 (2005)      | 469            |

GENERAL INDEX TO *THE THOMIST*

VOLUME 70 (2006)

ARTICLES

|                                                                                                                            |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Baldner, Steven, "Albertus Magnus and the Categorization of Motion" ..                                                     | 203 |
| Bradshaw, David, "Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers" .....                                                            | 311 |
| Burke, Cormac, "A Postscript to the ' <i>Remedium Concupiscentiae</i> '" .....                                             | 481 |
| Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon Blackburn<br>and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" .....  | 71  |
| George, Marie I., "Aquinas on the Nature of Trust" .....                                                                   | 103 |
| Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Giving a Good Account of God: Is Theology Ever<br>Mathematical?" .....                            | 367 |
| Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation,<br>and Analogy" .....                               | 537 |
| Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?" ....                                                  | 237 |
| Jensen, Steven J., "Do Circumstances Give Species?" .....                                                                  | 1   |
| Jowers, Dennis W., "A Test of Karl Rahner's Axiom, 'The Economic Trinity Is<br>the Immanent Trinity and Vice Versa'" ..... | 421 |
| Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,<br>Pinckaers, McAleer" .....                         | 155 |
| Long, Steven A., "An Argument for the Embryonic Intactness of Marriage"<br>.....                                           | 267 |
| Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's <i>Esse</i> : A Metaphysics of the<br>Incarnation" .....                   | 577 |
| Smith, Janet E., "The Morality of Condom Use by HIV-Infected Spouses" ..                                                   | 27  |
| Weinandy, Thomas G., O.F.M.Cap., "The Beatific Vision and the Incarnate<br>Son: Furthering the Discussion" .....           | 605 |
| Wright, William M., IV, "The Theology of Disclosure and Biblical Exegesis"<br>.....                                        | 395 |

## REVIEWS

|                                                                                                                                               |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Bagchi, David, and David C. Steinmetz, eds., <i>The Cambridge Companion to Reformation Theology</i> (Gared Wicks, S.J.) .....                 | 289 |
| Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian, <i>Holy Teaching: Introducing the "Summa Theologiae" of St. Thomas Aquinas</i> (Matthew Levering) .....    | 140 |
| Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian, and Jim Fodor, eds., <i>Aquinas in Dialogue: Thomas for the Twenty-First Century</i> (Robert Barron) ..... | 296 |
| Bedouelle, Guy, <i>The History of the Church</i> (Gohn Vidmar, O.P.) .....                                                                    | 478 |
| Burrell, David, <i>Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective</i> (Mary Beth Ingham) .....                                                  | 125 |
| Coolman, Boyd Taylor, <i>Knowing God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of William of Auxerre</i> (Kevin L. Hughes) .....    | 137 |
| Dupre, Louis, <i>The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture</i> (William Desmond) .....                             | 304 |
| Farrelly, M. John, O.S.B., <i>The Trinity: Rediscovering the Central Christian Mystery</i> (Anthony J. Kelly, C.Ss.R.) .....                  | 133 |
| Fodor, Jim, and Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, eds., <i>Aquinas in Dialogue: Thomas for the Twenty-First Century</i> (Robert Barron) ..... | 296 |
| George, Marie I., <i>Christianity and Extraterrestrials: A Catholic Perspective</i> (Ernan McMullin) .....                                    | 143 |
| Guarino, Thomas G., <i>Foundations of Systematic Theology</i> (Paul J. Griffiths) .....                                                       | 467 |
| Hauser, Daniel, <i>Marriage and Christian Life: A Theology of Christian Marriage</i> (Gulie Hanlon Rubio) .....                               | 148 |
| LaNave, Gregory, <i>Through Holiness to Wisdom: The Nature of Theology according to St. Bonaventure</i> (Gohn F. Boyle) .....                 | 471 |
| Lawler, Michael G., <i>What Is and What Ought to Be: The Dialectic of Experience, Theology, and Church</i> (Thomas G. Guarino) .....          | 129 |
| Libera, Alain de, <i>Metaphysique et noetique: Albert le Grand</i> (Michael W. Tkacz) .....                                                   | 474 |
| Moss, David, and Edward T. Oakes, S.J., eds., <i>The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar</i> (Peter J. Casarella) .....             | 292 |
| O'Donovan, Oliver, <i>The Ways of Judgment</i> (Thomas W. Smith) .....                                                                        | 300 |
| Oakes, Edward T., S.J., and David Moss, eds., <i>The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar</i> (Peter J. Casarella) .....             | 292 |
| Resnick, Irven M., <i>Albert the Great: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography (1900-2000)</i> (Michael W. Tkacz) .....                         | 152 |



INDEX OF REVIEWS (con.)

|                                                                                                                                                          |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Sherwin, Michael S., O.P., <i>By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas</i> (Michael Dauphinais) ..... | 306 |
| Steinmetz, David C., and David Bagchi, eds., <i>The Cambridge Companion to Reformation Theology</i> (Oared Wicks, S.J.) .....                            | 289 |
| Stout, Jeffrey, <i>Democracy and Tradition</i> (V. Bradley Lewis) .....                                                                                  | 462 |
| Van Nieuwenhove, Rik, and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., <i>The Theology of Thomas Aquinas</i> (Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P.) .....                                 | 457 |
| Wawrykow, Joseph, and Rik van Nieuwenhove, eds., <i>The Theology of Thomas Aquinas</i> (Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P.) .....                                 | 457 |