

DIRECT REALISM AND AQUINAS'S ACCOUNT OF
SENSORY COGNITION

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AQUINAS RECENTLY has received renewed attention from philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition who view themselves as part of a broader movement in Thomistic studies known as 'analytical Thomism'. The leading spokesman of this movement, John Haldane, who coined its name, argues that Aquinas serves "as a thinker from whom we can learn in our efforts to answer speculative questions about the nature of mind and of the world."¹ More specifically, Haldane and others argue that Aquinas provides important insights for defending realism within metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind: the position that the world both exists independently of the mind and is intrinsically intelligible to the mind, able and in some sense waiting to be known by the mind "as it is."

¹ See John Haldane, "Analytical Thomism and Faithful Reason," in idem, *Faithful Reason: Essays Catholic and Philosophical* (New York: Routledge, 2004), x. Haldane defends this claim in "A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind," *Ratio* 11 (1998): 253-77; "Forms of Thought," in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed., *The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm* (Chicago: Open Court, 1997), 149-70; "Mind-World Identity and the Anti-Realist Challenge," in John Haldane and Crispin Wright, eds., *Reality, Representation, and Projection* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 15-37; and "Realism with a Metaphysical Skull," in James Conant and Urszula M. Zegleri, eds., *Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 97-104. For a further defense of this claim, see also Jonathan Jacobs, "Habits, Cognition, and Realism," in John Haldane, ed., *Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytic Traditions* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 109-24; Jonathan Jacobs and John Zeis, "Form and Cognition: How to Go Out of Your Mind," *The Monist* 80 (1997): 539-57; and John Jenkins, "Aquinas on the Veracity of the Intellect," *The Journal of Philosophy* 88 (1991): 623-32.

This paper is a deliberate exercise in analytical Thomism.² In it, I engage Aquinas's own work as well as the work of thinkers operating within (or at least familiar with) the Anglo-American philosophical tradition in order to defend Aquinas's account of sensory cognition as undergirded by a strong commitment to direct realism. The direct realist holds that in cases of veridical sensation, or sense experience, cognitive subjects enjoy direct epistemic access to objective aspects or features (sensible aspects or features) of the external world. Put more strongly: according to direct realism, in veridical sensation cognitive subjects are in direct cognitive contact not with private objects of sensory consciousness, but with actual extrasensory and extramental objects and states of affairs. What direct realism denies, therefore, is that in cases of veridical sensation cognitive subjects and the world meet at an interface. Sense experience does not mediate our epistemic access to the world; it conjoins us to the world itself.

From a robust direct realist perspective, however, it is not enough to claim that it is merely by having certain sense experiences, or being caused to have certain sense experiences, that we as cognitive subjects can be credited with genuinely experiencing a world that exists independently of our minds.³ According to the specific form of direct realism I articulate and defend here, which I claim emerges from a proper study of Aquinas's account of sensory cognition, it is only by having sense experiences that possess definitive *content-content* that is isomorphic or formally identical with the sensible features of mind-independent reality—that we can be credited with occupying world-intending sensory states, in which we see, hear, taste, touch, and smell objective aspects or features of the world itself. Thus, it is by virtue of possessing the requisite content that

² I have in mind the work of Norman Kretzmann, Eleonore Stump, Robert Pasnau, and Anthony Kenny, in addition to the authors mentioned above. As will become clear, Pasnau is more critical of Aquinas than the others.

³ Hilary Putnam makes this claim in his recent Dewey lectures. See Hilary Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind," in idem, *The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 3-70. I will be giving an exposition of some of the claims Putnam makes in these lectures in the pages that follow.

the veridical sensations or perceptions we enjoy and possess bear directly on the world, and thereby unite us to the world.

In defending this claim, I will be giving an exposition of what I take to be the most important features of Aquinas's account of sensory cognition: most notably, the operation of the external senses, and secondarily, the role of the common sense and phantasms. Interpreting Aquinas in the right light allows us better to understand and appreciate his account of sensory cognition as well as the nature and benefits of direct realism itself.

I. AQUINAS'S ACCOUNT OF SENSORY COGNITION: THE EXTERNAL SENSES

Aquinas's account of cognition is based on the cornerstone claim that we, as cognitive subjects, always experience and apprehend the world as formed: all cognition of external objects is cognition of form, or of external objects as formed. According to Aquinas's metaphysics, the 'substantial' form of a material thing is its inner structuring or ordering principle, or that which makes a thing what it intelligibly is. A material thing is therefore a composite of substantial form and matter. In addition, Aquinas recognizes 'accidental' (nonsubstantial) forms, among which are the sensible features of the external world, or the sensible properties that external objects actually possess. Thus, in cognizing form, we sense and apprehend a material thing (or, as cognized, an external object) as it is, as an objective aspect of the empirical world that possesses objectively sensible features or properties as well as an objectively knowable nature or essence (i.e., a material thing as a composite of form and matter).⁴ My task in this paper is to explicate how it is that we cognize form-and specifically sensible form. At the heart of Aquinas's account of sensory cognition is the claim that all cognitive contact with form occurs

⁴ I am thankful to Greg Doolan for pointing out the distinction Aquinas makes in *De Ente et Essentia* 2 between *forma partis* (which refers just to the substantial form of a form-matter composite, a material thing) and *forma totius* (which refers to the whole material thing composed of form and matter). The essence (quiddity) of a material thing includes form as well as matter.

through a complex process of sensation and intellective abstraction in which the sensible and intelligible features or forms of external objects respectively 'in-form' both the senses and the intellect.

On the most basic level, cognition for Aquinas originates, as it does for Aristotle, in sensation, which Aquinas claims cognitively conjoins us to the sensible features possessed by external objects themselves (and which, given his realism, exist independently of sensation itself). He recognizes five basic external sensory powers—sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell—all of which he associates with a specific sense organ, and all of which he says correspond to 'proper' sensibles (*sensibilia*) or qualities, such as color, sound, temperature, flavor, and odor, respectively.⁵ He also recognizes 'common' sensibles such as size, number, and shape that are sensible by more than one sense, and consequently do not make a direct impression on any one sense. Common sensibles (which belong to the category of quantity rather than quality) thus "do not move the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of a sensible quality"; nevertheless, like the proper sensibles, they still are sensible *per se*, since they affect the kind of impression external objects make on the senses.⁶ For example, Aquinas says, "sense is immuted differently by a large and by a small surface," or, we could say, by a surface that is large and white versus a surface that is small and white.⁷ So while common sensibles do not impress the senses directly, they are sensed by us (and hence remain *per se* objects of sensation) nonetheless. Finally, Aquinas recognizes a third kind of sense object: 'accidental' sense objects such as Socrates, who is sensible *per*

⁵ Touch is unique in that it has several objects proper to itself: "heat and moisture, cold and dryness, the heavy and light, etc." (II *De Anima*, lect. 13 [384]). All quotations from the *De Anima* commentary will be from the *Commentary on Aristotle's "De Anima,"* trans. Kenelm Foster and Silvester Humphries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951; repr., Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1994). See also the more recent translation by Robert Pasnau in *A Commentary on Aristotle's "De anima"* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

⁶ *STh* I, q. 78, a. 3, ad 2. All quotations from the *Summa Theologiae* are from the translation provided by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1948).

⁷ *Ibid.*

accidens rather than *per se*, insofar it is accidental or incidental to the *per se* sensible-whiteness-that it also should be Socrates.⁸

My thesis that Aquinas is a direct realist is limited, at least initially, to Aquinas's claims regarding the cognition of proper sensibles. (I will extend that thesis to include the cognition of common sensibles in the final section of the paper.) My exposition of Aquinas begins with his claim that direct cognition of proper sensibles is possible because external objects, *qua* external causes of sensation, impress themselves, and more specifically, impress specific sensible features or forms—that is, proper sensibles-on the senses.⁹ Aquinas therefore understands sensation to be a primarily *passive* act, the reception of sensible forms (*species*) in the senses: "sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is what is 'per se' perceived by the sense."¹⁰ The idea here, as Aquinas further explains it, is that the same sensible forms that are 'naturally' present in external objects of sense are 'intentionally' present in the organs of sense. As present in external objects, sensible forms enjoy a 'natural' existence (*essenaturale*); as present in the organs of sense, sensible forms enjoy an 'intentional' existence (*esse intentionale*).¹¹

Thus, the presence of sensible forms in the senses effects an intentional change in the senses themselves. Aquinas writes:

Now, change [*immutatio*] is of two kinds, one natural, the Natural change takes place by the form of the agent being received according to its natural existence, into the thing changed, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual change takes place by the form of the agent being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence [*esse spirituale*], into the thing changed, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not

⁸ See II *De Anima*, lect. 8 (387).

⁹ Aquinas explicitly states that color, odor, taste, and tactile qualities "have a fixed and permanent existence in their subjects" (*II De Anima*, lect. 16 [439]). Sound, however, exists only potentially in external objects; actual sound exists in the medium and thereafter the sense organ (or the actual hearing of that sound). See *ibid.* (441).

¹⁰ *STh* I, q. 78, a. 3.

¹¹ I will be using 'intentional' rather than 'spiritual' as the proper translation whenever possible to avoid misleading the reader into thinking that 'spiritual' denotes something exclusively 'inner' only to be associated with a dualistic, Cartesian philosophy of mind.

thereby become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual change is required, whereby an intention [*intentio*] of the sensible form is effected in the sensible organ. Otherwise, if a natural change alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration.¹²

Recent interpreters of Aquinas have tried to explain intentional change (here translated as 'spiritual' change) by relying on the modern taxonomy of 'physical' and 'mental'.¹³ But on Aquinas's view it cannot be so neatly defined. For Aquinas, intentional change does occur in the bodily organ of sense (which means that it must be in 'physical' in one sense) but in such a way that it generates an act of sensation, or a cognitive act (which means it must also be 'mental' in some sense). Furthermore, Aquinas argues that intentional change occurs in the medium (e.g., the air) that separates the organ of sense from the object of sense.¹⁴ Yet he claims that, even as intentionally informed, the medium does not sense: so 'intentional' need not denote anything mental. How, then, should we properly understand intentional change in sensation, which Aquinas clearly argues is necessary for the successful operation of the senses?

To start, we should analyze intentional change in sensation (and hence sensation itself) by employing the Aristotelian vocabulary of 'matter' and 'form', as well as 'potency' and 'act', rather than the modern vocabulary of 'physical' and 'mental'. Most basically, intentional change for Aquinas is the reception of form in the relevant recipient (i.e., the senses or the medium) without matter; and the reception of form without matter is "the recipient being assimilated to the agent in respect of form and not in respect of matter," or the recipient becoming like the agent in

¹² *STh* I, q. 78, a. 3 (translation modified). See also II *De Anima*, lect. 24 (553).

¹³ See, for example, D. W. Hamlyn, *Sensation and Perception: A History of the Philosophy of Perception* (New York: The Humanities Press, 1961); Sheldon M. Cohen, "St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms," *Philosophical Review* 91 (1982): 193-209; Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Gabriele de Anna, "Aquinas on Sensible Forms and Semimaterialism," *The Review of Metaphysics* 54 (2000): 43-63.

¹⁴ In all other cases besides vision there is both natural and intentional change in the medium: sound, for example, reaches the ear through vibrations in the air. In the case of visual sensation, however, there is simply intentional change in the medium: color reaches the eye without tainting the air. See II *De Anima*, lect. 20 (493).

respect of form but not in matter.¹⁵ Thus, intentional change in sensation, or the reception of the form without matter in the senses, is the cognitive assimilation of the relevant sensory power (and hence the cognizer) to the relevant object of sense. Ever more simply: intentional change in the senses—the actualization of a sensory power by a proper sensible—just is the act of sensation itself, which cognitively unites the perceiving subject to the external object of sense itself.

We can strengthen this claim by recalling that in a thoroughly Aristotelian framework (which Aquinas adopts) our powers of sense are nothing more than capacities for being informed by the sensible features or forms of external objects themselves. Or again, our powers of sense are potentially oriented towards veridical sensation and as such only can be actualized by external objects themselves, when those objects impress their sensible features or forms on the senses. Aquinas writes:

potency is nothing but a certain relationship to act. And without this likeness there would be no necessary correspondence between this act and this potency. Hence potency in this sense is not actualized from contrary to contrary, but rather from like to like, in the sense that the potency resembles its act.¹⁶

On Aquinas's Aristotelian view, veridical sensible encounter with the world is possible because our external senses are, at bottom, capable of being acted on by proper sensibles, and common

¹⁵ II *De Anima*, lect. 24 (553). I am following M. F. Burnyeat, who argues that "receiving form without matter is not a physiological process underlying perceptual awareness. It is perceptual awareness of something, a mode of cognition" (M. F. Burnyeat, "Aquinas on 'Spiritual Change' in Perception," in Dominik Perler, ed., *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality* [Leiden: Brill, 2001], 141). Burnyeat therefore agrees that there are (a) "material necessary conditions for perception," but disagrees that (b) "these necessary conditions are material changes in the sense-organ" (ibid., 145). On Burnyeat's reading of Aquinas, we can explain sensation fully as the actualization of a natural potency or power without having to appeal to material or physical processes underlying the act of sensation itself. So while there are indeed material conditions (conditions in the sense organ) that are necessary for a sense organ to function properly, "these are static, standing conditions, not processes or events underlying the act of perception" itself (ibid.). For Burnyeat's comparable reading of Aristotle, see "Is An Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft," in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, eds., *Essays on Aristotle's "De Anima"* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 15-26.

¹⁶ II *De Anima*, lect. 11 (366).

sensibles by way of proper sensibles. Sensory power *qua* 'recipient' and sensible object *qua* 'agent' are linked by way of what we can call a proper formal correspondence (sight to color, hearing to sound, touch to temperature, taste to flavor, and smell to odor), or what Aquinas, following Aristotle, calls a correspondence of "like to like."

Commenting on Aristotle, Aquinas goes as far as to say that, as suitably informed, each of our sensory powers "cannot err" in putting us into cognitive contact with proper sensibles themselves:

What is perceived by one sense and by no other [is] in respect of which the perceiving sense cannot err; thus it is proper to sight to know color, to hearing to know sound, to taste to know flavor or savor. Touch, however, has several objects proper to itself: heat and moisture, cold and dryness, the heavy and the light, etc. Each sense judges the objects proper to itself and is not mistaken about these, e.g. sight with regard to such and such a color or hearing with regard to sound.¹⁷

The point here is not that the senses are always perfect in their operations: the eye, for example, can see properly only if there is sufficient light illuminating the medium as well as the object of sight, and the eye itself (as well as its component parts) is functioning properly (i.e., subject to no malfunction).¹⁸ Aquinas says that it is "the very essence of each sense is that it is naturally fitted to be affected by some such special object proper to itself. The nature of each faculty consists in its relation to its proper object."¹⁹ Thus, the formal correspondence that conjoins sense organ or power with proper sensible (and hence external objects) is underwritten not by perfectionism but by reliabilism, or what

¹⁷ II *De Anima*, lect. 13 (384). In *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 9, Aquinas claims that truth is in sense insofar as the senses judge sensible things as they are, even though they do not know the truth of what they sense (unlike the intellect, which can reflect on the truth of its own acts). He goes on to argue that "the judgment of sense about proper sensibles is always true unless there is an impediment in the organ or in the medium" (*De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 11; translation taken from *On Truth*, vol. 1, trans. Robert W. Mulligan [Chicago: Regnery, 1952; repr., Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994].

¹⁸ See III *De Anima*, lect. 6 (664). For an exposition of proper functionality in contemporary epistemology, see Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant and Proper Function* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

¹⁹ II *De Anima*, lect. 13 (387).

we also can refer to as a natural teleology, regarding the innate ability of each of the senses to "judge the objects proper to itself"-that is, accurately and truthfully to detect their proper sensible objects, sensible forms, and hence external reality itself.²⁰

Ultimately, then, sensation on Aquinas's view is explicable only in terms of the category of form, and what we can now identify as formal causality: in sensation, the same sensible features or forms that exist in things, and are objectively sensible by us, are received in the senses, or causally inform the senses, thereby activating our senses (already potentially oriented towards sensation) and assimilating our senses (and us) to the world itself. This transaction surely also involves efficient causality: a bodily change in the organ of sense, which is affected by the presence of sensible form. But this transaction cannot be reduced to efficient causality. The bodily change that occurs in the organ of sense is an act of sensory cognition, and Aquinas explains sensory cognition in terms of the immaterial reception of form, which means formal and efficient causality are both at work.

The temptation here, once again, may be to try to reduce formal causality and hence sensory cognition on the Thomistic/Aristotelian view to something wholly physical or mental. But as Miles Burnyeat points out, form for the Thomist/Aristotelian is equally at home in the world and in the senses, and as such, equally at home in the physical and in the mental. He writes:

[T]he form which the sense-organ receives without matter is the very same form as exists with matter in the object perceived. If it was not the same, perception would not reveal objective truth. Form and matter are basic principles of Aristotelian physics. Form's presence in the sense-organ without matter is therefore as physical a fact as its presence with matter in the object perceived. If its presence in the sense-organ is awareness, and awareness is a mental

²⁰ Kretzmann argues on Aquinas's behalf that in addition to the veridical act of sensation "a semi-automatic, sub-deliberative kind of judgment occurs ... in the cognitive process, a judgment that Aquinas assigns to sense itself, an ordinarily unexpressed judgment which, if it were expressed generally would take the form of a crude realism: *Extramental reality here and now is as it appears to be*" (Norman Kretzmann, "Infallibility, Error, and Ignorance," in R. Bosley and M. Tweedale, eds., *Aristotle and His Medieval Interpreters* (Calgary, Alberta, Canada: The University of Calgary Press, 1992), 174.

phenomenon in the modern sense, then for Aristotle and Aquinas perception is both physical and mental. ... Thus both natural and spiritual change fall within the realm of physics, because both involve form.²¹

In this passage, Burnyeat not only clearly underscores the intelligible place of form in Aristotelian physics, and hence a broader, richer understanding of physical reality; he also underscores the Thomistic/Aristotelian commitment to realism in sensory cognition. As the same form is present both with matter in sensible things (naturally) and without matter in the organs of sense, it ensures the objectivity and directness of sensation itself. Or again, it is because the same sensible features or forms that are present in external objects come to be present in the senses that we, as cognitive subjects, can be credited with world-intending sensory states—that is, sensory states whose content is isomorphic with (and hence directed on) the sensible features or forms possessed by external objects themselves.

II. SENSORY COGNITION AND DIRECT REALISM

Aquinas is a direct realist concerning our ability to sense objective aspects or features of the external world: in cases of veridical sensation, our most basic sensory states, as suitably configured by sensible forms, are in direct cognitive contact with objective, external states of affairs. For example, our seeing

²¹ Burnyeat, "Aquinas on 'Spiritual Change' in Perception," 149. In "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?" Burnyeat concludes that "Aristotle has what is for us a deeply alien conception of the physical" (26) that is no longer credible in the modern (post-seventeenth-century) world, given that it appeals to our naturally fitted powers of perception, along with the real secondary qualities at which they are aimed, without further explanation. More specifically, Aristotle's conception cannot account for how those powers of perception emerged over the course of the evolution of life. This is not surprising given that, on Aristotle's view, "the power of perception never emerged from anything" (Burnyeat, "Aquinas on 'Spiritual Change' in Perception," 151). As Burnyeat further notes, Aquinas has an explanation of sorts: God created animal life with the power perception intact (*ibid.*). Thus, the Thomist need not abandon Aristotelian physics and metaphysics entirely; in fact, he can offer a modified account that incorporates the evolution of life. God created the world with the potential to evolve, so that animal life eventually acquired the cognitive faculties necessary to experience the world as God intended and created it to be.

redness, when our senses (and specifically, our visual sense organs) have been impressed by an actual red object, just is direct cognitive contact with the redness possessed by the object itself-an objective, external feature of our environment. The epistemic access is utterly direct because our seeing redness is isomorphic with (or we could say, formally identical to) the sensed object's being red. Put negatively, the isomorphism (or formal identity) of sense and the object of sense ensures that no cognitive "gap" or "space" separates our seeing redness from the sensed object's being red. I emphasize this point in order to show how Aquinas, following Aristotle, offers an account of sensory cognition that honors the insight, central to direct realism, that acts or episodes of sensation do not mediate and hence intervene between cognitive subjects' epistemic access to the world; they (as suitably configured or informed) conjoin cognitive subjects to the world.

Consequently, and perhaps not surprisingly, Aquinas can and should be read as offering a philosophical framework for understanding sensation that refuses to equate sensory acts with 'sense-data' -construed as private mental episodes, or what Hilary Putnam calls "mere affectations of a person's subjectivity"-that conjoin us to the world only causally but not cognitively. Putnam does not employ the distinction between efficient and formal causality, but in his Dewey Lectures he clearly targets modern causal theories of perception that reduce sensation to baldly efficient causality. He argues that these theories, which claim to be compatible with direct realism, in fact suffer from the same crucial ambiguity that afflicts traditional empiricist theories of perception. According to a causal account of perception, so formulated as compatible with direct realism, cognitive subjects can and do enjoy direct epistemic access to extramental objects and states of affairs by virtue of standing in the appropriate causal relations with those objects and states of affairs, and, more specifically, by having suitably caused sensations of those objects and states of affairs. The problem with this view, Putnam claims, is that it makes a critical assumption regarding the nature of

suitably caused sensory states: namely, that they are so constituted as to afford the requisite epistemic access. In other words, this view assumes that it is merely by having certain sense experiences that cognitive subjects can also be credited with genuinely experiencing the world and, specifically, the external objects that cause them to have those experiences.

As Putnam goes on to argue, even if the appropriately caused experiences are identified with brain states—mere physical processes or events that take place within the brain—rather than the more infamous mental sense-data or 'qualia', "it [still] has to seem magical that we can have access to anything outside our 'inputs'—those 'qualia' that I thought could be identified with 'physical occurrences'." ²² According to Putnam, merely replacing sense-data with perceptual inputs (the functional equivalent of sense-data) does nothing to show how those perceptual inputs are distinctly unlike their classical analogs and hence represent something more than "the outer limit of our cognitive processing [beyond which] everything . . . is connected to our mental processes only causally, not cognitively." ²³ Arguing directly

²² Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses," 19. In a similar vein, John McDowell argues that there is a distinct temptation to equate sensory experience and appearances in particular with what he calls a "highest common factor" precisely in order to account for how veridical and nonveridical sensory experiences are often qualitatively indistinguishable. See in particular John McDowell, "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge," in idem, *Meaning, Knowledge, & Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 369-94. According to McDowell, the problems generated by this view are obvious: when appearances are construed as comprising a highest common factor common to veridical and nonveridical experience alike, then they are at best defeasibly connected with the world—that is, they still "fall short" of the facts-given that they are pictured as lying on the near side of an input interface that separates cognitive subjects and the world. According to a 'disjunctive' view of appearances, however, which McDowell advances as an alternative to the "tempting argument" he describes above, appearances are either "mere" appearances, and thus nondisclosive of worldly facts, or direct manifestations of how the world truly is, and thus direct manifestations of worldly facts. In the latter case, sense experience no longer can be understood to be an intermediary that interposes itself between the experiencing subject and the world: in the case of veridical experience or awareness, what is sensed by us is not a highest common factor, but nothing less than the world itself. For similar arguments see John McDowell, "Knowledge and the Internal," in idem, *Meaning, Knowledge, & Reality*, 395-413; and "The Content of Perceptual Experience," in idem, *Mind, Value, & Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 341-58.

²³ Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses," 16.

against what he calls the 'Cartesian cum materialist' view (to which he once subscribed), Putnam claims that the attempt to identify sense experiences with brain states fails: there is simply not enough content to the functionalist account (or an even to an ideal psychological account) to specify in what consists the relationship between sense experiences and perceptual inputs. Putnam's conclusion, therefore, is that sense experiences are neither reducible to physical states, nor are they something "extra" over and above physical states. He says:

sensory experiences are not passive affectations of an object called a "mind" but (for the most part) experiences of aspects of the world by a living being. Mind talk is not talk about an immaterial part of us but rather a way of describing the exercise of certain abilities we possess, abilities that supervene upon the activities of our brains and upon all our various transactions with the environment but that do not have to be reductively explained using the vocabulary of physics and biology, or even the vocabulary of computer science.²⁴

The particular account Putnam offers here-what he calls 'natural realism'-attempts to understand sensory experiences as exercises of "certain abilities we possess" that cannot be reduced to "the activities of our brains," even if they cannot be explained without reference to those activities. In other words, "successful perception is just a seeing, or hearing, or feeling, etc. of things 'out there,'" rather than anything that occurs exclusively inside our minds, brains, or skins.²⁵

The move Putnam makes here both to challenge a reductive physicalism, which reduces sense experiences to mere physical occurrences, and to uphold realism in sensation is thoroughly Thomistic, even if it yields a thesis that is still largely negative. Putnam is much clearer about what successful sensation is not rather than what it is. Moreover, he eschews linking his natural realism with any metaphysical (specifically Aristotelian)

²⁴ Ibid., 37-38.

²⁵ The particular wording here comes from Hilary Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind," *The Journal of Philosophy* 91 (1994): 454.

commitments.²⁶ But we can extend his important insight if we begin with the fundamental principle-itself central to both Aquinas and Aristotle-that "successful perception is just a seeing, or hearing, or feeling, etc. of things 'out there'" by cognitive subjects whose sensory capacities (Putnam's "abilities") for seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. have been actualized (for Putnam, "exercised") by their proper objects: corresponding sensible features or forms possessed by external objects themselves. Thus, according to the Thomistic view, which explains sensory cognition in terms of efficient and formal causality, veridical acts of sensation conjoin cognitive subjects to the world not only because they are suitably caused (here again we are honoring Putnam's insight), but because they are suitably (i.e., intentionally) configured and informed by the very sensible features or forms on which they directly bear.

Before moving on to develop and defend these claims further, we should note that it is indeed true on the Thomistic account that sensory cognition is indirect in one sense. Actual physical contact between sensible form and the corresponding organ of sense is always indirect, insofar as sensible forms are first received in the medium separating the sensible form from the corresponding organ of sense. But this claim in no way compromises

²⁶ Haldane underscores this point in challenging Putnam's move to "enjoy the benefits of epistemological realism without accepting aspects of its attendant metaphysics." See John Haldane, "Realism with a Metaphysical Skull," in Conant and Zegleii, eds., *Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism*, 97. In response, Putnam claims that he is not against Aristotelian metaphysics *per se*; in fact, he embraces the Aristotelian principle that the "ways things can be are both worldly-things 'out there' are some of those ways-and available to thought, contrary to a sharp 'concept / property' dichotomy." (See Putnam, "Comment on John Haldane," in Conant and Zegleii, eds., *Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism*, 108). So perhaps the rift between Haldane and Putnam is not as large as it might seem. What Putnam does reject is 'Aristotelian essentialism' or the "metaphysical fantasy" that "there is a totality of Forms, or Universals, or 'properties', fixed once and for all, and that every possible meaning of a word corresponds to one of these Forms or Universals or properties" (Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses," 6). Of course, it is not at all clear that either Aquinas or Aristotle (and consequently Haldane) accepts what Putnam deems Aristotelian essentialism. One can be committed to the existence of form without being guilty of indulging in Putnam's "metaphysical fantasy." See, for example, John Haldane, "On Coming Home to (Metaphysical) Realism," *Philosophy* 71 (1996): 287-96. I defend the importance of metaphysics in Aquinas's account below.

Aquinas's commitment to direct realism: on the contrary, direct cognitive contact with proper sensibles such as colors is only possible given the presence of a medium (in which light, for example, can enter) that separates the organ of sense from the object of sense. Aquinas writes:

An indication of this is the fact that if a colored body is placed upon the organ of sight it cannot be seen; for then there remains no transparent medium to be affected by the color. The pupil of the eye is indeed some such medium, but, so long as the colored body remains placed upon it, it lacks transparency. There has to be a medium, say air or something of the kind, which, being actualized by color, itself acts upon the organ of sight as upon a body continuous with itself. For bodies only affect one another through actual contact.²⁷

Without a transparent medium illuminated by light, colors cannot be seen; without a medium filled by vibration and vapors, sounds cannot be heard and odors cannot be smelled. Moreover, the medium ensures the proper transmission of sensory form from the object of sense to the organ of sense: the medium too is structured by sensory form (via intentional change with or without natural change), so it too serves as a formal cause of sensation. On the Thomistic view, it is formal causality that ensures direct realism; and formal causality is at work throughout the entire causal process that generates veridical sensory acts.

From a distinctly modern point of view, it may seem strange, at the very least, to locate sensible form in a medium such as air, but this view (or bias) once again wrongly presupposes that sensible form is something wholly extraphysical. Recall that on the Thomistic view, with its basis in Aristotelian physics, matter and form are basic principles of physical reality. Just as form's presence in the senses is as physical a fact as is its presence in material objects (which we have already established), so form's presence in the medium is equally as physical a fact as is its presence in material objects. Matter, the senses, and the medium are all potencies that stand to be actualized by form; as such, they are all equally disposed to be actualized by form. Recall, too, that

²⁷ II *De Anima*, lect. 15 (432).

the Thomist affirms that efficient causality is at work in sensation: sensation is surely inexplicable without appealing to efficient causality, and hence efficient causes (which include physical changes in the medium as well as bodily changes in the senses and the cognitive subject himself or herself). The Thomist merely affirms that additional causal processes-formal causal processes-are at work in sensation, and must be at work if the veridicality of sensation is to be upheld.

What is at stake, again, is preserving realism and also finally overcoming epistemological skepticism regarding the objectivity of sensation. As Putnam points out, the tendency in modern epistemology is to reduce sensations to purely subjective states, completely internal to our sensory consciousness, precisely in order to account for their immediacy and certainty: what can be more certain than what occurs inside our own "heads"? But on such a view, skepticism, if not explicitly endorsed, certainly looms: what confidence can we have that our sensations of redness, softness, or sweetness are not purely subjective? Do they bear any connection with external reality? Aquinas's answer, in part, is that sensation is, by definition, the actualization of a sensory potency or power by an external object: were no external object present, then no sensory experience of that object would occur. But the skeptic may then ask: What confidence do we have that the original cause of sensation is an external object, rather than some more proximate cause (e.g., a physical occurrence in the eye, in the ear, or on the tongue)? Here, the Thomist once again has a ready reply: the cause of sensation is not only a sensible object but sensible form, which structures the object sensed, the power of sense, and the medium between them. Were mere efficient causality alone to be at work, there would be no guarantee that the causal genesis of sensation actually lay in an external object. Presumably, any number of more proximate points in the causal process generating sensation would be sufficient to account for its occurrence, possibly rendering any appeal to an external object as the originating cause entirely superfluous. But for the Thomist, there can only be one formal

cause of sensation-sensible form-which originally inheres not in the senses but in external objects themselves. Formal causality, and its undergirding metaphysics, therefore simply eliminates skepticism as a viable epistemological stance, at least concerning sense experience.

III. THE METAPHYSICS OF DIRECT REALISM

At this point, the epistemological benefits of the Thomistic view of sensory cognition should be dear. But from a distinctly modern point of view, it may still seem that we only can gain such benefits at a significant cost. Thomistic epistemological realism carries with it certain nonnegotiable metaphysical commitments, such as the actual existence of sensible forms or qualities in things (and more broadly, the world itself). Aquinas, like Aristotle before him, is unabashed about claiming that colors, sounds, flavors, etc. are mind-independent constituents of external reality, but in making this claim does he reflect a certain naivete towards what these properties in fact are? Recently, Robert Pasnau has argued that Aquinas should have been more sensitive to the now-familiar distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and hence the possibility of reducing secondary qualities (or sensible forms) to primary qualities (e.g., sound as simply a kind of motion), thus eliminating the existence of such "mysterious qualities" altogether.²⁸ Interestingly, Pasnau then goes on to argue that Aquinas's view can be reinterpreted-dropping the Aristotelian metaphysical distinction between quality and quantity altogether-in order to be made roughly compatible with modern physicalism, which is "the view that the objects of our sensation are the various physical phenomena that in fact produce our sensations."²⁹ On this modified view, which "captures the spirit, if not the letter, of Aquinas's theory of sensation," sensible forms remain the causes and objects of sensation, but "whether these

²⁸ See Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae Ia*, 75-89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 184-86.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 185.

features turn out to be irreducibly qualitative or quantitative can be viewed as an empirical, non-essential issue."³⁰

Pasnau's interpretation is suggestive; however, I would argue that there is much about which to be suspicious in modern physicalism.³¹ It is by no means obvious-and common experience in fact tells us otherwise-that the familiar sensible qualities things possess can be successfully reduced to mere physical phenomena that produce or cause sensation. If we are already suspicious, as Putnam suggests we should be, towards attempts to reduce sensory experiences to mere physical occurrences, or perceptual inputs, that bear no cognitive relation to the objects they purport to bear upon, then we should be equally suspicious toward attempts to reduce sensory qualities to mere physical phenomena that purportedly are able produce the requisite veridical sensory experiences in us. For example, it is not at all obvious how color-construed as mere a physical property of a surface that bears no formal relation to our phenomenal experience of color-can produce the requisite veridical experience of color in us. Once we divest or drain external objects of sensible forms-actual redness now reduced to merely physical properties (whatever those may be) that cause the sensation of redness in us-then we divest or drain our experiences of those objects of any objectivity. On the Thomistic view, what ensures the objectivity and, moreover, the directness of our most basic sensory states is the formal identity or isomorphism of those states with

³⁰ Ibid., 185-86.

³¹ The move to reduce sensible qualities to physical properties is, of course, not unique to modern philosophy. In his commentary on Aristotle's *De sensu et sensato*, Aquinas notes Aristotle's criticism of Democritus and other "Ancients," first for reducing all sensible objects to objects of touch. According to Aristotle, this would mean that any sensory power (which is distinguished according to the object) would be touch; which is obviously false, "because other senses perceive through an external medium, and touch does not" (*De Sensu et Sensato* 10.44 2a29). The broader argument here (*De Sensu et Sensato* 10.442b 13) is that since sensory powers are distinguished according to their objects, reducing proper sensibles to common sensibles (e.g., size and dshape) eliminates the distinctness and the hierarchy of the senses (e.g., reducing flavor to shapes makes taste more disposed for discerning shapes rather than sight, which is false). See Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "On Sense and What Is Sensed" and "On Memory and Recollection,"* trans. Kevin White and Edward M. Macierowski (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005).

the sensible features or forms that things actually possess. Take away sensible form, and formal causality in sensation is no longer at work. It once again becomes a mystery how mere efficient causality can produce sense experiences that bear on external objects, and actually terminate in the sensible features those objects possess.

The shorthand of this is that epistemological realism and metaphysical realism go hand-in-hand: more specifically, what grounds realism in epistemology is realism in metaphysics (or ontology). To put this same point another way, it is the objectivity of sensible forms—that is, the objective existence of real colors, sounds, flavors, etc. that are qualitatively unique and distinct—that grounds the objectivity of our sensations of those forms. The move here is not to populate the world with what Pasnau calls "mysterious qualities," and thereby unnecessarily inflate a certain metaphysical picture of reality, in order to offer an explanatory account for realism in epistemology and specifically sense experience. As we have already seen, while 'form' is an irreducibly metaphysical category (sensible forms really do exist in things), it is not exclusively a metaphysical category: sensible forms are equally "at home" in the world, in the senses, and in the medium that connects them. Thus, in understanding and explaining sensory cognition, the Thomist does not first posit the existence of sensible forms in the world and then offer an epistemology of how we gain access to those forms. This mistaken move already puts cognitive subjects and the world at a distance; it places the world outside of our cognitive reach, and thereby indeed threatens to shroud the world itself—and hence the sensible forms or qualities contained therein—in an inaccessible mystery. Instead, the Thomist begins with the unity of cognitive subjects and the world in sensation (what modern epistemology in general sunders), and hence the unity of sense and *sensibiliain* sensation, and then explains that unity in terms of form (as well as formal causality). Or again: instead of beginning with a metaphysics that makes sensible forms or qualities wholly alien to us and our cognitive grasp, the Thomist begins with our cognitive grasp of

those forms or qualities in sensation-forms or qualities that are already familiar to us-and then explains that sensory grasp in terms of form (as well as formal causality).³²

This constitutes a partial response to the bias against the real existence of sensible forms (or at least the move to render them inescapably and inaccessibly mysterious), but more needs to be said. What exactly is the nature of sensible form, and is sensible form at all intelligible from a more modern or contemporary philosophical perspective? According to Aquinas, a sensible form or quality is "actual" in two ways:

(1) So far as the object is actually being sensed, i.e., when its likeness is affecting the sense-organ. In this way a sound is actual when it is heard. (2) So far as the object actually is such that it can be sensed, but is such simply in its own objective being, outside the senses. And in this way the other sense-objects, color, odor, savor, etc. exist actually in colored or odorous or savorable bodies.³³

Two important points emerge from this passage. First, sensible forms are actual in our sensing them, and "in this way a sound is actual when it is heard." Second, sensible forms (other than sound) are actual insofar as they can be sensed or perceived by us, even if they are not actually being sensed or perceived by us (e.g., it is the nature of colors to be visible). This may lead us to align Aquinas's view with modern 'dispositionalism', the view that sensible forms are simply dispositions to produce the requisite sensations in us.³⁴ Yet, according to Aquinas, while sensible forms

³² I am thankful to Tim Noone and others for emphasizing this point in response to a version of this paper I gave at the annual meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy session), Granville, Ohio, October 27-29, 2006.

³³ *II De Anima*, lect. 16 (441).

³⁴ The dispositionalist position (classically attributed to John Locke) should be familiar to those also broadly familiar with debates in the epistemology and metaphysics of sense perception, although, in giving an exposition of it and criticizing it, I am relying on Christopher A. Decaen's analysis in "The Viability Of Aristotelian-Thomistic Color Realism," *The Thomist* 65 (2001): 179-222. Amongst modern commentators, Anthony Kenny may be guilty of equating Aquinas's account of sensory cognition with dispositionalism, even though he is trying to do justice to Aquinas's realism. He writes, "Now a sensory faculty, such as that of taste, is nothing but the power to do such things as taste the sweetness of sweet objects. And the sensory property, sweetness, is nothing but the power to taste sweet to a suitable taster."

are indeed able to affect us in certain ways (even when they are not actually being sensed by us), they still enjoy an objective existence (or "objective being") apart from our sensing them. For this reason, sensible forms cannot be defined solely in terms of the ways in which they affect our senses, or in terms of their ability to make us sense them in a certain way.

Here, then, is where the incompatibility with dispositionalism lies. On the one hand, defining sensible forms as dispositions to produce the requisite sensations in us obscures their objectivity and hence independence from the way in which we sense them. On the other hand, even if we grant the dispositionalist that sensory forms or qualities are objective, defining sensible forms as dispositions still obscures the objectivity of sensation itself, insofar as it once again undermines our confidence that the way in which we sense the world-or are disposed to sense the world-is in fact the way the world objectively is. Redness, for example, really exists in external objects, but not only in the sense that it is capable of producing the visual sensation of redness in us. For the Thomist, the redness we see in ordinary visual sensation is the same redness that causes the visual sensation of redness in us (which means 'redness-for-us' and 'redness-in-things' are formally the same). Again, it is the isomorphism of our sensory states with external reality that explains and ensures their objectivity.

The move here to define sensible forms as objective, non-relational properties of objects may seem to lead us back towards physicalism, which defines such forms as purely physical phenomena, or quantitative properties of external objects. But as we have already seen, a strict physicalism that reduces sensible forms such as colors to physical properties-in the case of colors, reflective properties embedded in an external object's surface-is beset by intractable epistemological difficulties similar to the

Thus we can agree that the property in action is one and the same thing as the faculty in operation, though the power to taste and the power to be tasted are of course two very different things, the one in the sugar and the other in the animal. The sweetness of X just is the ability of X to taste sweet. (Of course it is related to various chemical properties and constituents of X; but that relation is a contingent one, to be discovered by empirical research)" (Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* [New York: Routledge, 1993], 35-36).

difficulties that plague dispositionalism. Christopher Decaen effectively makes this point in a recent article:

Once the principle of physicalism is posited—that colors [for example] are nothing more than "physical," that is, quantitative properties—it becomes difficult to discern how this view can avoid having any anti-realistic core. Any comprehensive reductionism must eliminate the thing reduced; this would abandon altogether the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of color, where nature is more rich, more diverse, than the metrically oriented physicalist takes it to be. Put another way, if color is in reality a microphysical quality though it does not appear as such, then the physicalist must say that colors are seen but not as colors. Since the color is really the microphysical property, the color is seen only indirectly, *per accidens*, by means of an appearance of an essentially different order—color is merely what underlies an experience. The physicalist, by distinguishing a color from its appearance or phenomenology, is forced to say either that the *per se* object of sight is not the color but the appearance itself, or that vision simply has no *per se* object. Either way color becomes invisible. To Aristotle and St. Thomas, this should be dismissed as patently false.³⁵

In other words, if sensible forms such as colors are reducible to microphysical properties—which makes them undetectable by ordinary empirical observation—then they cannot be sensed by us directly; even in veridical sensation they must remain hidden or invisible. What we see directly are not particular colors "in themselves" but rather mere phenomenological features that underlie our visual sensations of those colors: the appearances of those colors to us. Properly speaking, then, according to a strict physicalism, we do not see colors at all. Physicalism not only devolves into a gross anti-realism; it cannot acknowledge the seemingly obvious fact (honored by Aquinas and Aristotle) that we can and do see the true nature of colors themselves.

This is not to say that sensible forms have no place within modern physics. While sensible forms are not reducible to microphysical or quantitative properties, they certainly bear some ontological relation to them. According to Decaen, 'primitivism' tries to explain this relationship in terms of 'supervenience', so that sensible forms such as colors are ontologically dependent on

³⁵ Decaen, "The Viability of Aristotelian-Thomistic Color Realism," 204.

or correlated with specific microphysical properties.³⁶ But the nature of this relationship suffers from an explanatory ambiguity: how exactly are colors and microphysical properties (two different orders of qualities) ontologically interdependent or correlative? The answer lies not within modern physics, but (perhaps not surprisingly) within Thomistic metaphysics:

Herein lies the connection between colors as the immediate objects of sensation and the quantitative microphysical properties of surfaces that are correlated with individual species of colors. While the two are essentially distinct from each other, they are related such that the former is to the latter as an accident to its proper subject, as form to matter. This allows Aristotle and St. Thomas to join the primitivists in rejecting color's identification with, and *carte blanche* reduction to, microphysical properties, while at the same time giving a greater intelligibility to what the physicalists and dispositionalists criticize as an ad hoc and contingent correlation between color and the microphysical. From a Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective, the notion of supervenience can be replaced by the idea that colors are related to their microphysical subjects as form to matter.³⁷

For Aquinas, external objects are composites of matter and form: matter exists in potentiality to form, and form is the actualizing principle of matter. Moreover, the form (whether substantial or accidental) of an external object of sense only inheres in matter; such form cannot exist without matter. Thus, as Decaen also argues, a sensible form (e.g., color), *qua* physical accident, must include in its definition a particular material principle or subject (e.g., surface and its constitutive microphysical properties) in which it is present as a form, and without which it cannot be found.³⁸ Thomistic metaphysics is therefore inclusive (it makes room for primary and secondary qualities, or quantity and quality, matter and form) without being reductive.

³⁶ Ibid., 200-202.

³⁷ Ibid., 206.

³⁸ Ibid., 205-6.

IV. SENSORY COGNITION AND DIRECT REALISM:
COMMON SENSIBLES, THE COMMON SENSE, AND PHANTASMS

A) *Common Sensibles*

Having considered Aquinas's account of the role of the external senses in enabling direct sensory cognition of proper sensibles, we are now in a position to consider other key aspects of his account of sensory cognition and their specific bearing on interpreting Aquinas as a direct realist. First, we need to consider how far his commitment to direct realism extends. Does it pertain solely to the cognition of proper sensibles, or does it also include the cognition of common sensibles? Aquinas explicitly states that common sensibles, like proper sensibles, are sensible *per se*; and yet he also claims that "strictly speaking, only the special sense-objects are directly perceived [*proprie per se sensibilia*], for the very essence and definition of each sense consists in its being naturally fitted to be affected by some such special object proper to itself."³⁹ It seems, for example, that size is only seen insofar as the colors that inhere in objects that have size are seen; thus, it may appear as if common sensibles such as size only can be seen indirectly, or *per accidens*.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Aquinas says that common sensible objects, like accidental sensible objects (and unlike proper sensible objects), are not sensed infallibly, which leaves room for further error, and hence lack of veridicality, in the cognition of common sensibles.⁴¹

While these claims may suggest that Aquinas has to modify, if not abandon, his commitment to direct realism regarding the cognition of common sensibles, other claims show otherwise. He reminds us, first, that "sensation is a being acted upon and altered

³⁹ II *De Anima*, lect. 13 (387).

⁴⁰ See II *De Anima*, lect. 13 (388).

⁴¹ In *N Metaphys.*, lect. 12 (673), Aquinas writes, "while a sense may make a mistake about common and accidental sense objects, it does not do this with regard to its proper sensible object, except perhaps when the sensory organ is indisposed." See Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Metaphysics"*, trans. John P. Rowan, rev. ed. (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1995).

in some way," and that, "whatever, then, affects the faculty in, and so makes a difference to, its own proper reaction and modification has an intrinsic relation to that faculty and can be called a sense-object in itself or absolutely."⁴² Second, he argues that "an object may affect the faculty's immediate reaction in two ways:" in one way, in respect to the agent or cause of sensation, namely, proper sensibles, that causally inform the senses, and consequently differentiate our sensations of colors, sounds, flavors, etc.; in a second way, in respect to the kind of impression that the agent makes on the senses. He writes:

For as sense-qualities affect the senses corporeally and locally, they do so in different ways, if they are qualities of large or small bodies, or are diversely situated, i.e. near, or far, or together, or apart. And it is thus that the common sensibles differentiate sensation.⁴³

Moreover, in the *Summa Theologiae*, he argues that the likeness (*similitudo*) of common sensibles, like the likeness of proper sensibles, but unlike the likeness of things sensed accidentally, is present in the senses directly and "of its own nature."

The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.⁴⁴

Aquinas's claims here amount to the following. What ensures direct realism in sensation is formal causality, or sensible forms inhering in the senses, thereby conforming our senses to the sensible forms or features that external objects actually possess. This pertains primarily to proper sensibles. But the impressions

⁴² II *De Anima*, lect. 13 (393).

⁴³ *IIDeAnima*, lect.13 (394).

⁴⁴ *STh* I, q. 17, a. 2.

proper sensibles make on the senses—the way in which they actually inform the senses—differ according to the way in which proper sensibles inhere in external objects: that is, whether they are qualities of objects that are large or small, or are "diversely situated" near or far, together or apart. What properly informs the senses, then, are not sensible forms considered in isolation, but the sensible forms of external objects that are structured by proper sensibles and common sensibles. For example, what informs the eye, and unites us to a given object of sight, is not redness considered in isolation, but the redness of a large object versus the redness of a small object; or the redness of a round object versus the redness of a square object. As suitably informed, or impressed, sensations of external objects unite us to the proper and common sensibles that external objects possess (even if, as Aquinas claims, we can be mistaken about common sensibles, rather than proper sensibles, even in normal cognitive circumstances). I take Aquinas here to be accounting for an important feature of sensory experience: we do not simply see red things; we see red things that differ in size, shape, and number. Sensible form, whether proper to one sensory power or common to multiple sensory powers, constantly impresses itself on our senses in rich and varied ways; consequently, our sensory experience of the world is rich and varied.

B) The Common Sense

Our sensory experience of the world is, moreover, unified. Aquinas recognizes this fact. He argues that all sensory cognition of external objects via the five external sensory powers terminates in a further power of 'inner' sense, namely, the 'common' sense, which serves as the "common root and principle" of all of the external senses.⁴⁵ According to Aquinas, the common sense is a sensory cognitive power that both enables us to discriminate between varying sense objects and makes us aware of what we are

⁴⁵ *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 1.

sensing (e.g., one "sees that he sees").⁴⁶ Through the operation of the common sense, we are able to discern white from sweet; through visual sensation alone, we are only able to discern white from green. That the common sense enables us to make such comparisons also suggests—as Aquinas explicitly claims—that we can be aware of the very act of sensing, a feat impossible for the external senses alone.

The ability of the common sense to discriminate between the objects of the various senses suggests to Aquinas that there is *one* sensory power that enables us to perceive "simultaneously ... both objects between which it discriminates."⁴⁷ For example, there must be one sensory power that enables us to see something white and taste something sweet in a "simultaneous apprehension" - that is, in a singular act of perception—so that it can in turn discriminate between, and hence compare, the sensations of whiteness and sweetness.⁴⁸ The common sense, as the "root and source" of all the external senses, therefore ensures that sensory experience, is not, at any moment, limited to the operation of any one of the external senses. As the terminus of our sensory powers, it unites our disparate sensations of proper and common sensibles into unified perceptions of the world, and therefore ensures that at any moment of sensation we concurrently see colors and hear sounds, or smell odors and taste flavors. This claim only strengthens Aquinas's commitment to direct realism: because of the operation of the common sense, our perceptual awareness of external objects is both direct and unified. We can speak not only of direct sensory cognitive access to particular sensible forms, but also direct sensory cognitive access to sensible objects: objects that possess certain colors, emit certain sounds and fragrances, and display certain shapes and sizes.

It may seem as if the presence of a further power of inner sense, namely, the common sense, in addition to our powers of external sense, is superfluous. But from Aquinas's point of view,

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

⁴⁷ III *De Anima*, lect. 3 (601).

⁴⁸ III *De Anima*, lect. 3 (605).

As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation.⁴⁹

Clearly, Aquinas thinks that nature has outfitted us not with superfluous powers of sense but with necessary powers of sense—both outer and inner—so that we may properly fulfill our intended role or *telos* as cognizers of the external world. The common sense, to start, clearly plays this role. While the external senses fulfill their *telos* by uniting us to their respective proper sensibles, and common sensibles by way of proper sensibles, the common sense fulfills its *telos* by uniting our disparate sensations of proper and common sensibles into singular acts of perceptual awareness. Were we not endowed with this sensory power, our sensory access to the world clearly would be impoverished. Pasnau, although he wrongly eschews Aquinas's metaphysical commitments, rightly identifies the need for the common sense, and offers a promising interpretation:

Imagine what it would be like if the various sensory powers did not have some means for their various impressions to be synchronized. Imagine if, when the ears heard something, an animal were unable to match that auditory impression with the visual impression of the surroundings. Imagine if animals could not discriminate between seeing and not seeing: if they were unable to recognize when they are not seeing what they are looking for, or when their seeing is unproductive because of too little light. Clearly, there must be some capacity within an animal that allows the various sensory impressions to interact. This is why Aquinas postulates a common sense.⁵⁰

C) *Phantasia and Phantasms*

More difficult to account for is the cognitive role of 'phantasms'—the imagistic 'similitudes' or 'likenesses' of perceived objects—which are produced by 'phantasia', itself a further

⁴⁹ *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4.

⁵⁰ Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, 198.

cognitive power of inner sense.⁵¹ Aquinas writes, "just as the sensing subject is moved by sensible objects, so, in imagining one is moved by certain appearances called phantasms."⁵² Now, while Aquinas is clear that phantasms can be imaginatively produced apart from the reception of form in the senses (but not without the initial aid of the senses), the reception of form in the senses does not occur independently of the production of phantasms. The "movement" Aristotle associates with the natural functioning of phantasia in producing phantasms does not occur independently of sensation, but is "caused by the senses in their act of sensing."⁵³ Moreover, the sensible form is received *in* the phantasm, given that the phantasm retains and preserves the sensible form. Aquinas says that "for the retention and preservation of these forms, the phantasy or imagination is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses."⁵⁴

So on Aquinas's view, while the common sense, *qua* sensory cognitive capacity, coordinates the various operations of the external senses, thereby ensuring that our sensory access to the world is not only direct but unified, phantasia, *qua* sensory cognitive capacity, retains and preserves the impressions external objects make on the external senses. This is not to negate the obvious and important link phantasms have with occurrent acts of sensation. Following Aristotle, Aquinas suggests that "imagination would seem to be one of those cognitive dispositions or powers by which things are perceived together with their differences," and that it "bears only upon things sensed."⁵⁵ Moreover, while certainly more subject to error than the external senses (which are infallible regarding proper sensibles), phantasia remains "generally truthful when it arises from the action of the 'proper sensibles'; I mean, at least so long as the sensible object is present and the image-movement is simultaneous with the sense-movement

⁵¹ *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4; *STh* I, q. 79, a. 4, ad 4; *STh* I, q. 84, a. 7, ad 2.

⁵² *III De Anima*, lect. 6 (656).

⁵³ *III De Anima*, lect. 6 (659).

⁵⁴ *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4.

⁵⁵ *III De Anima*, lect. 5 (638); *III De Anima*, lect. 6 (657).

[*quando motus phantasiae est simul cum motu sensus*]." ⁵⁶ And yet, unlike the primary *telos* of the common sense, the primary *telos* of phantasia does not seem to be to enhance or strengthen the cognition of sensible form. ⁵⁷ It is, instead, to process the cognition of sensible form-veridical sensory states-into lasting sensory impressions, which in turn serve as a reliable cognitive source or base for gaining knowledge of the empirical world.

In order to develop this claim, we need to return to Aquinas's principal reason for postulating powers of inner sense. We need these powers in order to fulfill our role or *telos* as cognizers of the external world. Aquinas makes an important distinction worth repeating: "for the reception of sensible forms, the proper sense and the common sense are appointed But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the phantasy or imagination is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses."⁵⁸ From Aquinas's point of view, it seems that cognition of sensible form only requires the operation of the external senses and common sense; were phantasia also necessary, then he would not make the distinction between the cognitive role of the external senses and common sense, on the one hand, and the cognitive role of phantasia on the other. In short, any appeal to a cognitive power in addition to the external senses or common sense in explaining cognition of proper sensibles seems superfluous. Nature already has generously outfitted us with precisely what we need. Even if phantasms are generated with veridical sensation, they are not necessary for veridical sensation.

Interpretive problems loom when we do try to make phantasms necessary for veridical sensation. Eleonore Stump, for example, argues that while phantasia serves on one level as a power of imagination-we can produce phantasms or images of objects not sensibly present-on another level it contributes directly to the way in which we sense external objects and, more

⁵⁶ III *De Anima*, lect. 6 (664).

⁵⁷ Aquinas explicitly states that the imagination apprehends a sensible thing (sensible form) when that thing is absent, as if it were present (*De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 11).

⁵⁸ *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4.

specifically, to the way in which external objects appear to us. She writes, "I think we should take phantasia as the cognitive power that makes things appear to us or that gives us access to the sensory data taken in by the senses; that is, phantasia is the power that produces conscious experience which is a component of ordinary sensing."⁵⁹ Without phantasia, she claims, we would be like blindsight patients who receive visual inputs from the external world through the senses but who report being blind because that input is not available to their sensory consciousness. Consequently, "without the phantasms, the sensible *species* alone would not produce conscious experience of what is being sensed."⁶⁰ That phantasms are necessary for conscious experience is an interpretive, not a textual claim; but even as an interpretive claim it suffers from difficulties. Even if the external senses are not equipped to produce conscious experience of external objects of sense-and it is by no means obvious that they are not-then surely the common sense, to which Aquinas explicitly affords the power of sensory recognition, is so equipped. Or perhaps the operation of the external senses and the operation of the common sense are jointly sufficient to produce conscious experience of external objects of sense. There seems to be no reason, therefore, to ascribe this capacity to phantasia, or a view of conscious experience to Aquinas more generally.

Furthermore, the more we emphasize the role of phantasia and phantasms in enabling and explaining ordinary sense experience, the more Aquinas's commitment to direct realism is put in jeopardy. If phantasms are produced in addition to our most basic sensory states, which as suitably informed are already directed on sensible form, then they further mediate and hence complicate our sensory access to the empirical world.⁶¹ If phantasms are the

⁵⁹ Eleonore Stump, "Aquinas on the Mechanisms of Cognition: Sense and Phantasia," in Stan Ebbesen and Russell L. Friedman, eds., *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition* (Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999), 390.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 391.

⁶¹ Kenny realizes this: it would be "regrettable" if Aquinas held the view "that external sense-experience was accompanied by a parallel series of phenomena in the imagination" (Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind*, 93).

end results of further cognitive processing (i.e., cognitively processed sensory states), then their immediate connection with the world-already established through the reception of sensible form in the senses-becomes less clear, and is hence harder to defend. Aquinas states that since phantasms are generated by the senses in their act of sensing, they are related to such sensory acts as effects to causes. And "just because effects, as such, are weaker than their causes, and the power and impress of an agent is less and less evident the further away are its effects, therefore imagination is even more liable to fall into the error which arises from the dissimilarity between the sense and its object."⁶² If, as Aquinas claims, phantasms are less potent and reliable than ordinary acts of sensation, how could they strengthen the bond the senses already enjoy with their proper objects? Their role here seems not only superfluous, but also potentially dangerous.

The interpretive move I am making here is not to denigrate the veracity of phantasms. It is, instead, to steer us away from making phantasms necessary components of ordinary sense experience, which threatens to undermine Aquinas's commitment to direct realism. As stated above, the primary role of phantasms is not to enhance sensory cognition of external objects but rather to retain and preserve sensory cognition of external objects through further cognitive processing.⁶³ We now can say the following: while the external senses and common sense enable immediate cognitive contact with the external world, phantasia enables sustained cognitive contact with the external world, even when external objects of sense are not sensibly present, or acting on the senses. That the phantasms furnish veridical and reliable sustained cognitive contact with the external world is clearly due to their causal connection to the activity of the senses: but this means that their veridicality and reliability-their being "generally truthful"-is linked with their ability ongoingly to preserve the cognitive contact we enjoy through the senses, not with any

⁶² III *De Anima*, lect. 6 (664).

⁶³ Pasnau defends this view in *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, 278-84. For a further defense, that informs my own interpretation more directly, see also Dorothea Frede, "Aquinas on *phantasia*," in Perler, ed., *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, 155-83.

special ability to enhance that contact. Nature has ensured this for our own good. Were we endowed solely with powers of external sense and a common sense, without the power of phantasia, then our cognitive contact with the world would be limited to what is currently impacting our senses. There simply could be no consistent and comprehensive cognitive contact with the world over time.⁶⁴

That this sort of consistent and comprehensive cognitive contact with the world is necessary becomes even more apparent when we consider the role of phantasms in enabling and explaining intellective cognition. Here, then, is where we see the true *telos* of phantasia fulfilled. Phantasia furnishes the intellect with a "storehouse" of sensible forms—both received and synthesized by phantasia—from which the intellect (and specifically the 'agent' intellect) abstracts intelligible species or forms. Phantasms, then, serve as a bridge between the world of sense (i.e., the external world) and the world of thought. Without the phantasms, the intellect could not fulfill its *telos* of apprehending material things as they intelligibly are, which remains hidden from the senses, given that the senses are directed on sensible versus intelligible form in things. That phantasms are particularly suited for serving as a cognitive source for intellective abstraction, and subsequent apprehension of intelligible form, is due in part to their greater durability and immateriality (and therefore closer proximity to the intellect). "Phantasms," Aquinas says, "differ from things of sense by their immateriality. For as we have shown, the senses receive the forms of things immaterially, and phantasms are nothing but movements started by actual sensation."⁶⁵ Moreover, insofar as phantasms furnish sustained cognitive contact with the external world, beyond occurrent acts of sensation, they provide a wider and richer base from which the

⁶⁴ Frede writes, "*phantasiai* are an important cognitive source because they remain with us over time. They make us independent of a constant external supply of sensory information that is limited in range and may vary from moment to moment. Our long-term impressions, by contrast, guarantee that the world we see, hear, and feel is a coherent world" ("Aquinas on *phantasia*," 165-66).

⁶⁵ *III De Anima*, lect. 13 (792).

intellect can abstract intelligible form, and to which it can return, in order to perceive intelligible form (which is universal) existing in particular material things.⁶⁶

Much more could be said and needs to be said about the relationship of phantasia and the intellect, as well as the role of memory and the cogitative power in enabling cognition of the external world.⁶⁷ However, given the restraints of this article—which is a basic explication and defense of Aquinas's commitment to direct realism in sensory cognition—I will conclude this section by making one final point. Aquinas's commitment to direct realism undergirds his account of intellective as well as sensory cognition. Just as the senses, as suitably informed by sensible form, bear directly on the sensible aspects or features of the external world, so the intellect (and specifically the 'possible' intellect), as suitably informed by intelligible form (according to the immaterial mode of the intellect), bears directly on the intelligible features or aspects of the external world. As Aquinas puts it, "for the sense in act and the intellect in act *are* the objects they actually sense or understand."⁶⁸ In the former case, efficient and formal causality, via the passive reception of sensible form in the senses, ensures direct sensory cognitive access; in the latter case, formal causality alone, via the abstraction of intelligible form from the phantasms (and subsequent passive reception of

⁶⁶ *STh* I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 5.

⁶⁷ Aquinas says that both memory and the cogitative power are unique sensory powers insofar as they "owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them" (*STh* I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 5). Frede finds the *vis cogitativa* to be "something of an embarrassment for it seems to be an ability that is somehow *in between* sense-perception and thought" (Frede, "Aquinas on *phantasia*," 170). However, the cogitative power should not be dismissed so quickly: it plays an important role in Aquinas's overall account of cognition insofar as it enables human persons both to recognize and to reason about particular sense objects, precisely through its interaction with the intellect. According to A. Leo White, the cogitative power also performs an essential role in determining both which individual acting on the senses should be considered by the intellect for abstraction as well as how that individual should be apprehended (whether generically or specifically); see A. Leo White, "Why the Cogitative Power?" *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 72 (1998): 213-27.

⁶⁸ *III De Anima*, lect. 13 (788); emphasis added.

intelligible form in the intellect) along with the generation of concepts, ensures direct intellectual cognitive access. Thus, while the phantasms do not play a role in enabling the senses direct access to the external world, they do play a role (*qua* material cause) in enabling the intellect's direct access to the external world.⁶⁹ They ensure that thought, whose content is universal, remains tethered to the particular objects that populate the external world.⁷⁰

CONCLUSION

Given the pervasive tendency in modern philosophy to reduce sense experiences to private episodes of sensory consciousness, and thereby to distance our cognitive contact with the world through the senses, direct realism in sensory cognition can be very hard to explain and defend. However, Aquinas, like Aristotle before him, offers an attractive and defensible view of sensory cognition that I claim is not only deeply compatible with direct realism, but also is explanatory of direct realism. Aquinas operates with a richer conception of sensible reality as well as a richer conception of the human person (and brutes, more broadly) as endowed with the requisite array of sensory powers for cognizing sensible reality directly. Far from working with an outdated metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind (or cognitive psychology), Aquinas offers the contemporary philosopher-and hence contemporary metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy

⁶⁹ Aquinas puts the point this way: "it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause" (*STh* I, q. 84, a. 6).

⁷⁰ See *STh* I, q. 84, a. 7. This is important, for as Aquinas writes, "the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. . . . Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual."

of mind-essential resources for properly understanding the world, ourselves, and our sensory experiences of the world.⁷¹

⁷¹ I am thankful to Greg Doolan and three anonymous reviewers for *The Thomist* for the thoughtful and detailed remarks they made to earlier versions of the content of this paper. I am also thankful to the editors for allowing me the opportunity to revise the paper in light of the reviewers' feedback.

CHRIST THE PRIEST: AN EXPLORATION OF
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE III, QUESTION 22

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IN HIS INFLUENTIAL *Jesus and the Victory of God*, N. T. Wright comments on the relationship between historical-critical biblical scholarship and theology:

It is a measure of the extent to which the split between history and theology has dominated recent western Christian thought that writers of all shades of opinion, from extreme orthodox to extreme radical, have tacitly affirmed that it is difficult, if not impossible, to hold the two together, especially in talking about Jesus.¹

He finds that those committed to theology often favor a historically implausible "iconic" Jesus, while those committed to history tend to assume that their research will "at least seriously undermine" traditional Christology.² By contrast, Wright hopes to show that rigorous historical research and rigorous theology (which in his view must begin without presuppositions) belong together.

The thesis to which Wright's historical research leads him is that Jesus went up to Jerusalem at the outset of the feast of Passover in order to offer his life as the sacrificial tribulation that would trigger the eschatological inauguration of the kingdom of YHWH in holiness. His sacrificial death "would be the new exodus, the renewal of the covenant, the forgiveness of sins, the

¹ N. T. Wright, *Jesus and the Victory of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 7-8.

² *Ibid.*, 8.

end of exile. It would do for Israel what Israel could not do for herself. It would thereby fulfil Israel's vocation, that she should be the servant people, the light of the world."³ According to Wright, Jesus' entrance into Jerusalem sought to "enact, symbolize and personify" the return of YHWH to Zion, to Jerusalem and the Temple mount.⁴ Jesus planned to enact YHWH's judgment upon Israel by his suffering and death, and expected to be vindicated by YHWH in a manner that would leave neither Israel nor the world as it was before. Wright argues that, in Jesus' view, "the moment had arrived for the great renewal, in which Torah would be written on people's hearts."⁵

If Wright is correct, then one can distinguish four interrelated ways in which Jesus understood his death. First and foremost, his death would accomplish the eschatological restoration of Israel. Second, by freely giving himself up to death, he intended to offer himself as the perfect sacrifice. Third, his sacrificial death would restore the holiness (and end the exile) of Israel. Fourth, and correspondingly, his death would unify Israel and make it the "light of the world." Wright observes that Jesus acted as though "all that the Temple had stood for was now available through Jesus and his movement."⁶ Jesus fulfills Israel's Temple through his priestly Pasch.

Given Wright's interest in the relationship of historical research and theological inquiry, his project offers an opportunity for examining anew Aquinas's theological treatment of Christ's priesthood in question 22 of the *Tertia Pars*. Certainly Aquinas brings to his analysis a number of doctrinal presuppositions about Jesus, and he lacks Wright's knowledge of the Second-Temple context in which the Gospels were written. Should Aquinas's

³ *Ibid.*, 597. For Wright's historical approach see also his *The New Testament and the People of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992).

⁴ Wright, *Jesus and the Victory of God*, 615. As Wright later puts it, "he acted upon a vocation to do and be for Israel and the world what, according to scripture, only Israel's god can do and be" (*ibid.*, 649).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 646.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 436. For interesting, if occasionally overreaching, discussion of Israel's Temple, see Margaret Barker, *The Gate of Heaven: The History and Symbolism of the Temple in Jerusalem* (London: SPCK, 1991).

theology of Christ's priesthood be relegated therefore to the history of medieval thought, or does it still instruct contemporary theologians about Jesus' "priestly" role?

In seeking to answer this question, I will first ask why Aquinas considers Jesus to fulfill the role of "priest." Second, I will examine Aquinas's theology of Christ's priesthood from the perspective of the four aspects that appear central to Wright's account of Christ's death: eschatological, sacrificial, sanctifying, and unitive. While Aquinas approaches these aspects of Jesus' priesthood somewhat differently than from Wright, I will suggest that question 22 of the *Tertia Pars*, to which this essay is devoted, theologically enriches the insights of Wright's historical research.

I. JESUS THE "PRIEST"

A) *Jesus and Israel*

Wright locates his understanding of Jesus firmly within the context of ancient Israel. It is important to recognize that Aquinas does the same. In asking whether the Messiah should be a priest, Aquinas gives three reasons why one might answer in the negative. Each of these reasons expresses a spiritualization of Christ, in which he is set in opposition to Israel.

The first reason is that Christ is far greater than the angels (Heb 1:4).⁷ Aquinas quotes Zechariah 3:1, "Then he showed me Joshua the high priest standing before the angel of the Lord." The angel is greater than the high priest of Israel, and the angel, by contrast to a high priest of Israel, offers no sin-offering, or cultic worship. If the Messiah is far greater than the angels, then surely the Messiah, too, would stand above the kinds of cultic offerings the high priest of Israel was consecrated to offer. On this logic, the Messiah should not descend, as it were, to the level of the high priests of Israel, who offered bloody sacrifices.⁸ Rather, he

⁷ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 1, obj. 1.

⁸ Although some of her exegesis seems a stretch, Margaret Barker has shown that some late Second-Temple noncanonical texts envision a high priesthood that attains to the rank of the angels. She comments for example regarding a text from 2 Enoch, "The process of passing

should raise the level of worship to that of the angels, an intelligible worship of praise. From the premise that "a priest is less than an angel," Aquinas draws the conclusion that "it is unfitting that Christ should be a priest."⁹

The second reason is that the Old Testament prefigures the New, and thus the reality of Christ in the New Testament surpasses the realities in the Old Testament that prefigured him, among them the Old Testament priesthood.¹⁰ Here Aquinas quotes Colossians 2:17 (to which we can add 2:16 by way of context): "Therefore let no one pass judgment on you in questions of food and drink or with regard to a festival or a new moon or a sabbath. These are only a shadow of what is to come; but the substance belongs to Christ."¹¹ Aquinas points out in this regard

from earthly to heavenly life was indicated by the change of garments, from earthly clothing to garments of glory, and the oil conferred the Spirit, Wisdom, Divinity. In other words, Enoch the high priest was resurrected and transformed into an angel by his consecration as a high priest. It is one of the complications of the Hebrew Scriptures that to consecrate, as in the English, is literally 'to make holy', but Hebrew has the added complication that angels can be known as holy ones. When a high priest was consecrated, he was literally *made into a holy one*. Moses' radiant face as he came down from Sinai (Exod. 34.29-35) is an early example of this belief in apotheosis, and also an early example of Moses absorbing the traditions of the temple" (Margaret Barker, "The Angel Priesthood," in idem, *The Great High Priest: The Temple Roots of Christian Liturgy* [New York: T. & T. Clark, 2003], 103-45, at 129).

⁹ Quotations from Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* are taken from the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947). For discussion of Aquinas's treatment of Hebrews 1:4 in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, see Antoine Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, grand pretre de l'ancienne et de la nouvelle alliance: Etude du Commentaire de saint Thomas d'Aquin sur l'Epître aux Hebreux* (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2004), 415f. Thomas Weinandy writes of Aquinas's commentary: "what Aquinas does do is take seriously the inbuilt logical structure of the Letter to the Hebrews and in so commenting on the first part of the Letter (chapters 1-10) he clearly articulates two interrelated aspects that are essential to the Letter's argument: first, the fulfilment of Old Testament revelation as found in the supremacy of the Incarnation and, secondly, the ensuing fulfillment and supremacy of Christ's priestly sacrifice" (Thomas G. Weinandy, O.F.M.Cap., "The Supremacy of Christ: Aquinas' Commentary on Hebrews," in *Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to His Biblical Commentaries*, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum [New York: T. & T. Clark, 2005], 223-44, at 225). On Hebrews 1:4 see *ibid.*, 230.

¹⁰ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 1, obj. 2.

¹¹ Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Colossians*, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P., ed. Daniel A. Keating (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2006), 65-67 (118-21). Parenthetical numbers in references to Aquinas refer to paragraph numberse in the Marietti edition.

that it is significant that Christ did not descend from the tribe of Levi, to which the hereditary Old Testament priesthood belonged. Christ is something entirely different from an Old Testament priest. The implication is that his deeds could not rightly be described as "priestly," since this would be to draw him once more into the ambit of the Old Testament priesthood, and to confuse the figure with the reality.

The third reason is that under the Old Covenant God in his wisdom distinguished between lawgivers and priests.¹² As Aquinas remarks, quoting Exodus 28, Moses was lawgiver, whereas his brother Aaron was priest. Why did God set up this distinction in his people Israel, if not to reveal something about the Messiah who was to fulfill and transform the Law of Israel? In this respect Aquinas quotes the well-known prophecy from Jeremiah 31:33 (to which I add verses 31-32 and 34):

Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah, not like the covenant which I made with their fathers when I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt, my covenant which they broke, though I was their husband, says the Lord. But this is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel after those days, says the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no longer shall each man teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, "Know the Lord," for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, says the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more.

The prophecy states that God will act again as lawgiver, but this time he will inscribe his law in the very heart of each member of Israel, so that all will know and follow the Lord. The actions of the lawgiver will suffice to accomplish the forgiveness of sins and the restoration of a holy people with whom God dwells intimately. If a lawgiver (a new and greater Moses) can accomplish so much, who needs a new and greater Aaron, a new cultic priest? The inscription of divine wisdom in the heart, and the action of bloody cultic sacrifice, are obviously two quite different things. Since "Christ is the giver of the New Law," Aquinas concludes

¹² *STh* III, q. 22, a. 1, obj. 3.

that "it is unfitting that Christ should be a priest." Why would cultic worship, on the part of Christ or on the part of his followers, be necessary if God's wise law of love could be inscribed directly on the heart? A spiritual worship here seems entirely to replace cultic worship-as some modern readers of Jeremiah have also supposed. Although Aquinas does not quote them at this stage, one might also think of Jesus' words to the Samaritan woman in John 4:23-24, "But the hour is coming, and now is, when the true worshipers will worship the Father in spirit and truth, for such the Father seeks to worship him. God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth."

Thus in all three objections raised by Aquinas to the description of Jesus as a priest the guiding theme is the surpassing of the carnal mode of the Old Testament by the spiritual mode of the New-reflected already in the Old Testament through the ministry of the angels, the prophecies of a Messiah, and the distinction between priest and lawgiver.¹³

¹³ For contemporary argumentation that cultic sacrifice, rooted in violence, has been abolished by Christ, see the work of Rene Girard and those influenced by him. For Girard's approach, see especially his *Violence and the Sacred* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977) and *The Scapegoat* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). For work on sacrifice by theologians influenced by Girard, see, e.g., Raymond Schwager, *Brauchen wir einen Sündenbock? Gewalt und Erlosung in den biblischen Schriften* (Munich: Kosel, 1978); Gil Bailie, *Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads* (New York: Crossroad, 1995); S. Mark Heim, *Saved from Sacrifice: A Theology of the Cross* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2006). Hans Urs von Balthasar discusses Girard's approach in *Theo-Drama*, vol. 4: *The Action*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 297-313. Balthasar points out what is fundamentally lacking in Girard's approach: "God's forgiveness and the Cross (that is, the bearing of sin) cannot be left in mutual isolation: they are related. In this case, it will not be enough to follow Girard and Schwager in demythologizing the Old Testament picture of God so that he changes from a violent, wrathful God and becomes a powerless God who does not engage in retribution. What we have, in fact, is a new form of the problem latent in both Old and New Covenants: What is the relationship between God's love and his justice, particularly in the case of the Cross? God's justice, which Girard never acknowledges as something primal, is evidently quite different from power. If we recognize this, Anselm's presentation of the problem acquires a new significance" (312). Yet Balthasar agrees with Girard, mistakenly I think, that the incarnate Son is a "scapegoat." See also Bruce Chilton's extended survey and critique of Girard's view of sacrifice: Bruce Chilton, *The Temple of Jesus: His Sacrificial Program within a Cultural History of Sacrifice*, 15-42 and Appendix 1. In Chilton's view, the effort to understand sacrifice in any exhaustive fashion is misguided: "Now that vigorous efforts have been made for better than a century to 'explain' sacrifice in

B) *The High Priest of the Letter to the Hebrews*

Aquinas's fundamental answer to these objections comes from the Letter to the Hebrews, which, he observes, freely uses the language of "high priest" to depict Christ's work: "Since then we have a great high priest who has passed through the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God, let us hold fast our confession" (Heb 4:14).¹⁴ The quotation from Hebrews, however, does not yet set forth what is meant by ascribing to Jesus a "priesthood." Aquinas defines priestly ministry as follows: "The office proper to a priest is to be a mediator between God and the people: to wit, inasmuch as He bestows Divine things on the people, wherefore *sacerdos* [priest] means a giver of sacred things [*sacradans*]." ¹⁵ This priestly mediation of divine gifting occurs, he goes on to say, in two ways.

First, priestly mediation occurs through faithful communication of divine teaching: "according to Mal. ii. 7: *They shall seek the law at his*, i.e. the priest's, *mouth*." This section of Malachi, which takes the form of a warning from the Lord, has to do with the mission of priests to teach the truth about God and about the covenant of life, and is worth quoting in full:

that manner, that is, by locating a primal or original explanation, and now that no such effort has won support, there is some practical warrant to consider the possibility that no such explanation exists" (39). Chilton grants that "violence, its concealment, its justification, and its propagation are involved within institutions of sacrifice," but he denies that "violence may be identified with sacrifice, in both its ritual and mythic components" (ibid., 27).

¹⁴ See *STh* I, q. 22, a. 1, sc. On Jesus' priesthood according to Aquinas's reading of Hebrews 9, see Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, Grand Pretre*, part 2, chapter 7. Aquinas focuses on Christ's priestly action in discussing Hebrews 9:11-14: see Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, Grand Pretre*, 286-307. See also Gilles Berceville, O.P., "Le sacerdoce du Christ clansle *Commentaire de l'epître auxHebreux* de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *RevueThomiste* 99 (1999): 143-58; Mario Caprioli, O.C.D., "Il sacerdozio di Cristo nella *Somma Theologica* e nel *Commento Super Epistolam ad Hebraeos*," in *Storia de! tomismo* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1992), 96-105; Weinandy, "The Supremacy of Christ," 236-40.

¹⁵ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 1. See also Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P., "Le sacerdoce comme institution naturelle selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Thomiste* 99 (1999): 33-57; Gerard Remy, "Sacerdoce et mediation chez saint Thomas," *Revue Thomiste* 99 (1999): 101-18; and Roger Nutt's forthcoming essay in *Nova et Vetera*, English edition, 5 (2007).

And now, O priests, this command is for you. If you will not listen, if you will not lay it to heart to give glory to my name, says the Lord of hosts, then I will send the curse upon you and I will curse your blessings; indeed I have already cursed them, because you do not lay it to heart. Behold, I will rebuke your offspring, and spread dung upon your faces, the dung of your offerings, and I will put you out of my presence. So shall you know that I have sent this command to you, that my covenant with Levi may hold, says the Lord of hosts. My covenant with him was a covenant of life and peace, and I gave them to him, that he might fear; and he feared me, he stood in awe of my name. True instruction was in his mouth, and no wrong was found on his lips. He walked with me in peace and uprightness, and he turned many from iniquity. For the lips of a priest should guard knowledge, and men should seek instruction from his mouth, for he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts. But you have turned aside from the way; you have caused many to stumble by your instruction; you have corrupted the covenant of Levi, says the Lord of hosts, and so I make you despised and abased before all the people, inasmuch as you have not kept my ways but have shown partiality in your instruction. (Mal 2:1-9)

One form of the priestly mediation of divine gifting, therefore, consists in the communication of divine instruction or teaching. The second form involves the mediation of human offerings to God, both thanksgiving/praise/petition offerings and sin offerings. Following Hebrews, Aquinas states that a priest

offers up the people's prayers to God, and, in a manner, makes satisfaction to God for their sins; wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. v. 1): *Every high-priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins.*¹⁶

These "gifts and sacrifices," even when offered by human beings, come from God in the sense that God creates and sustains everything in being. The very offering of these "gifts and sacrifices," furthermore, is an exercise in divine gifting because the offering does not change God, but rather changes the offerers vis-a-vis God. God gifts us by enabling us to offer our gifts to him.

¹⁶ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 1. For discussion of Aquinas's treatment of this verse in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, comparing Christ's priesthood to the Aaronic priesthood, see Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, GrandPrietre*, 159-67. See also Albert Vanhoye, S.J., *Old Testament Priests and the New Priest According to the New Testament*, trans. J. Bernard Orchard, O.S.B. (Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1986), 116-20. Vanhoye argues that the text describes the high priesthood, not the Jewish priesthood in general.

In turn, our sacrifices to God aim to restore us to justice and holiness, so that we can dwell with God.

If this is what the Letter to the Hebrews means by the fullness of the priestly office—namely, mediating God's gifting and the people's (healing and deifying) participation in this gifting—Christ, says Aquinas, fulfills this office most perfectly.¹⁷ Just as the Levitical priests taught the Torah and offered sacrifices on behalf of the people, Christ mediates the divine gifts to us both by his teaching and by his offering of the perfect sacrifice on the Cross. To describe this twofold work, Aquinas turns to two biblical texts:

For through Him are gifts bestowed on men, according to 2 Pet. i. 4: *By Whom* (i.e. Christ) *He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature.* Moreover, He reconciled the human race to God, according to Col. i. 19,20: *In Him* (i.e. Christ) *it hath well pleased (the Father) that all fullness should dwell, and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself*¹⁸

Through Christ's priesthood, human beings become "partakers of the divine nature" and are reconciled to God. Thus Christ is the perfect priest, and indeed the only priest who can truly

¹⁷ For further discussion see Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., "Le sacerdoce du Christ dans la *Somme de théologie*," *Revue Thomiste* 99 (1999): 75-100; Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, Grand Pretre*, especially part 3; Vanhoye, *Old Testament Priests and the New Priest according to the New Testament*, 133-36 and elsewhere. At perfect, Christ's priesthood transcends the priesthood of the Old Testament, which could only prefigure it: his priesthood is not a continuation of the Levitical priesthood. Yet neither does his priesthood negate the Levitical priesthood, since the latter participates in its fulfillment in Christ.

¹⁸ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 1. For Aquinas's account of deification, see Daniel A. Keating, "Justification, Sanctification and Divinization in Thomas Aquinas," in Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum, *Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction* (New York: T & T Clark, 2004), 139-58. Keating remarks, "It is noteworthy that among the several citations of 2 Pet. 1:4 in the *Summa*, the densest concentration appears in his Treatise on Grace.... Here we see quite clearly that Thomas' doctrine of grace is, in fact, a doctrine of divinization whereby God deifies the soul by granting to it (through Christ) a participation in his very nature. The biblical account of our new nature-of the new creation in Christ-is in fact at the centre of Aquinas' concern. By the power of the Holy Spirit, we are regenerated and given a new nature in Christ, enabling us to live a new way of life characterized principally by charity. For Thomas, this new, graced nature is our participation in the divine life" (154). See also A. N. Williams, *The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

accomplish the mediation of divine gifting-healing and deification¹⁹-that God wills to bestow. Because of who Christ is, he is able to mediate these divine gifts through his human actions. As the Letter to the Hebrews emphasizes, he mediates divine gifts with an efficacy that far exceeds what a merely human, and thus sinful and weak, priest could achieve.

The power that enables Christ to be such a priest requires explanation. Aquinas offers such an explanation in his replies to the three objections, which, as we recall, focused upon the idea that the Messiah should entirely transcend the carnal and cultic office suggested by the term "priest."

With respect to the first objection, Aquinas notes, following Pseudo-Dionysius, that the angels, too, possess "hierarchical power."²⁰ Hierarchical power in this sense is not the power to dominate, but the power to teach, heal, and uplift. It is the true meaning of "power." But how could Jesus, as a human priest, possess more hierarchical power than the angels, as Hebrews claims? Aquinas responds that "Christ was greater than the angels, not only in His Godhead, but also in His humanity, as having the fullness of grace and glory."²¹ That is to say, by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit transforming his human nature, Christ received hierarchical power. The Holy Spirit, whom in the *Prima Pars* Aquinas names as "Love" and "Gift,"²² bestows hierarchical power upon Christ. This power is the power to mediate divine

¹⁹ The themes of "image-restoration" (healing) and "image-perfection" (deification) recur throughout Romanus Cessario, O.P., *The Godly Image: Christ and Satisfaction in Catholic Thought from Anselm to Aquinas* (Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1990). See also idem, "Aquinas on Christian Salvation," in Weinandy, Keating, and Yocum, eds., *Aquinas on Doctrine*, 117-37. As Cessario notes in the latter essay, "the essentially cruciform pattern of Christian life harmonizes the themes of image-perfection and satisfactory suffering" (127).

²⁰ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 1, ad 1.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² See *STh* I, q. 36, a. 1; I, qq. 37-38; as well as Augustine, *De Trinitate*, books 5 and 15. See also the extraordinarily rich biblical reflection on these Augustinian names for the Spirit in Joseph Ratzinger, "The Holy Spirit as Communion: On the Relationship between Pneumatology and Spirituality in the Writings of Augustine," in idem, *Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith: The Church as Communion*, ed. Stephan Otto Horn and Vinzenz Pfnir, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 38-59.

gifting, divine love. Because the degree of transformation of his human nature by the indwelling Holy Spirit makes his human nature greater than any graced angelic nature, Christ, according to Aquinas, "had the hierarchical or priestly power in a higher degree than the angels, so that even the angels were ministers of His priesthood."²³ It is evident that we are dealing with an understanding of priestly power far different from what the understanding of power would be if the Holy Spirit were not the source of Christ's power. Following Hebrews 2:9, which teaches that Jesus "for a little while was made lower than the angels," Aquinas observes that Jesus' passibility makes him like "those wayfarers who are ordained to the priesthood."²⁴

Yet can "hierarchical power," understood as the mediation of kenotic divine gifting, withstand "power as domination"? On the Cross, Christ gives the divine answer: true hierarchical power will accomplish its work of mediation despite the most devastating abuses that worldly power, the distortion of love and gift, can devise. If this were not so, the forgiveness of sins would lose its warrant. This explains Aquinas's replies to the second and third objections. Aquinas differentiates Jesus' priesthood from that of others because "Christ, as being the Head of all, has the perfection of all graces"-thereby holding that Jesus stands above the Old Testament priesthood and unifies in himself the offices of priest, prophet/lawgiver, and king.²⁵ Aquinas thereby supposes not

²³ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 1, ad 1. See also Albert Vanhoye, S.J., "The Expectation of a Great High Priest in Messianic Times," in idem, *Old Testament Priests and the New Priest according to the New Testament*, 43-47.

²⁴ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 1, ad 1. See Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, Grand Pretre*, 131-39.

²⁵ See *STh* III, q. 22, a. 1, ad 2 and 3. See also Benoit-Dominique de La Soujeole, O.P., "Les tria munera Christi: Contribution de saint Thomas à la recherche contemporaine," *Revue Thomiste* 99 (1999): 59-74; Yves Congar, O.P., "Sur la trilogie: Prophete-roi-pretre," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 67 (1983): 97-115. For Christ as prophet, priest, and king in Hebrews according to Aquinas's commentary, see Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, Grand Pretre*, 535. Regarding Christ's tria munera and believers' participation in them, see also Herwi Rikhof, "Thomas on the Church: Reflections on a Sermon," in Weinandy, Keating, and Yocum, eds., *Aquinas on Doctrine* (New York: T. & T. Clark, 2004), 204-5. Rikhof observes, "Thomas refers to the triplet priest-king-prophet. He uses it to explain the name 'Christ'. He also uses it to indicate the dignity or excellence of Christ, with an emphasis on his sanctifying work. Moreover, he uses the triplet with regard to the Christian and

that Jesus will dominate over the worldly, but only that the Christological mediation of divine gifting will not be rendered "powerless" but instead will be shown to be powerful despite operating in the very midst of sin. As St. Paul puts it, "where sin increased, grace abounded all the more, so that, as sin reigned in death, grace also might reign through righteousness to eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom 5:20-21).

II. JESUS' PRIESTLYWORK: FOURASPECTS

For Aquinas as for Wright, then, Jesus' priestly action locates him within the context of Israel, even as he also transcends this context. Recall now the four aspects of Jesus' priestly action, his "hierarchical power," that we noted in Wright: eschatological, sacrificial, sanctifying, and unitive. In what ways does question 22 of the *Tertia Pars* enrich our understanding of these dimensions of Jesus' priestly action?

A) *An Eschatological Action*

Contemporary biblical scholars use the word "eschatological" in accord with the meaning it had in Second-Temple Judaism, where it meant ushering in, through the Day of YHWH, the messianic age of the restoration of Israel as a holy people who dwell with God. Does any comparable notion play a role in Aquinas's theology of Christ's priesthood? For Aquinas, Christ's priestly action inserts time (treated and fallen, and in Christ redeemed and elevated) into divine eternity, into the life of the

indicates a relationship between the two anointings. Again, one can perceive here a connection with *Lumen Gentium*, or rather with the *Codex* which translates Vatican H's insights within its definition of the *christifideles*: by baptism the faithful participate in the threefold task of Christ" (ibid., 205). In a footnote, Rikhof notes that, given the absence of any reference to Christ's anointing in the *Summa Theologiae's* question on Christ's priesthood, "It seems therefore stretching the evidence too far if one argues that Thomas presents a more or less complete *munus triplex* doctrine" (ibid., 222 n. 26). The reality of the *munus triplex* is present in Aquinas's account of Christ's person and work, but a complete doctrine, if by that one means a systematic elucidation, is lacking.

triune God.²⁶ Christ's priestly action thus marks the everlasting presence of God among his people, YHWH's permanent "return to Zion."²⁷

One of the key problems for an "eschatological" understanding of Jesus' words and deeds in Israel, however, is that little seems to have changed after his death and resurrection.²⁸ It comes as no

²⁶ See Matthew L. Lamb, "The Eschatology of St. Thomas Aquinas," in Weindandy, Keating, and Yocum, eds., *Aquinas on Doctrine*, 225-40. Lamb writes, "The sapiential eschatology of Aquinas, building upon patristic eschatologies, understands the eschatological and apocalyptic passages in Scripture as revealing the transformation of the whole of creation so that it fully manifests the divine wisdom, beauty and goodness. This contrasts with those who view these passages as involving or portending widespread devastation or ultimate doom. A wisdom approach indicates clearly how what is catastrophic from the viewpoint of this world is only the purification needed for transition to the kingdom of God" (ibid., 236).

²⁷ For a historical-critical defense of Wright's claims about the ongoing exile and the eschatological restoration inaugurated by Jesus, see Craig A. Evans, "Jesus and the Continuing Exile of Israel," in Carey C. Newman, ed., *Jesus and the Restoration of Israel: A Critical Assessment of N. T. Wright's 'Jesus and the Victory of God'* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 77-100. Evans comments, "It is interesting to reflect on Jesus' use of traditions from Daniel, Zechariah and Isaiah. All three of these books play a major role in Jesus' theology; and all three reflect periods of exile in the life and history of Israel. Daniel reflected an exilic perspective, ostensibly the Babylonian exile but in reality the Seleucid period of oppression and terror. Zechariah stems from the exilic period and entertains hopes that Israel's kingdom will be restored under the leadership of the 'two sons of oil' (Zech 4:14)-Zerubbabel of Davidic descent and Joshua the High Priest. Second Isaiah calls for a new exodus and a new Israel, which he dubs the 'servant' of the Lord. Jesus' use of these books, indeed his being informed and shaped by them, is very revealing. It strongly suggests that Jesus identified himself and his mission with an oppressed Israel in need of redemption and that he himself was the agent of redemption. He was the Danielic 'Son of Man' to whom kingdom and authority were entrusted. He was the humble Davidicking of Zechariah's vision who entered the temple precincts and offered himself to the High Priest and took umbrage at temple polity. And, of course, he was the eschatological herald of Second Isaiah who proclaimed the 'gospel' of God's reign and the new exodus" (ibid., 99-100).

²⁸ This is the point that Dale C. Allison, Jr., presses in his response to Wright's *Jesus and the Victory of God* ("Jesus and the Victory of the Apocalyptic," in Newman, ed., *Jesus and the Restoration of Israel*, 126-41). Allison sees no reason to assume that the eschatological descriptions of cosmic change employed by Jesus and his followers were intended metaphorically. For Allison, Jewish apocalyptic prophecies (including those of Jesus) remain radically unfulfilled by Jesus: "The last have not become first, nor have the meek inherited the earth. Maybe, in the person of Jesus, we can speak of the initial or proleptic victory of God. But that victory remains agonizingly incomplete, and we cannot, if I may so put it, yet speak of the victory of the apocalyptic" (ibid., 141). Wright responds to this concern: "An eschatological reading of Jesus demands, I believe, that we get used to thinking in terms of the dialectic between achievement and implementation" ("In Grateful Dialogue: A Response," in

surprise, for instance, that Albert Schweitzer's view that Jesus died expecting the end of the world, given that the world did not end in any evident sense, tended for some time to dampen enthusiasm for Schweitzer's insights into Jesus' "eschatological" worldview.²⁹ Yet for Wright and Aquinas, Jesus' priestly action is better understood as the beginning of the eschatological "day" rather than the "end of the world." Recall Zechariah's announcement that the "day of the Lord" (Zech 14:1), a day of profound tribulation and restoration, will inaugurate "continuous day (it is known to the Lord), not day and not night, for at evening time there shall be light" (Zech 14:7).

Does Christ's priestly action constitute a "continuous day," a mediation of the divine gifting that endures forever? Aquinas prepares his affirmative response by noting three reasons why the answer might be no. The first objection states that Christ's priestly action cannot be eschatological because it has no part in the eschaton. Christ's action does not pour out eschatological blessings, but rather at best prepares for the eschaton. In this respect Aquinas quotes Isaiah 60:21, "Your people shall all be righteous." While this may come about through Christ's priestly action, that action has no place in it, because "those alone need the effect of the priesthood who have the weakness of sin."³⁰ The saints in heaven do not have the weakness of sin, while those in hell can no longer benefit from priestly expiation. On this view, a radical divide exists between historical redemption, to which Jesus' work belongs, and the eschaton. The messianic age is here separated radically from the work of the Messiah. The Messiah might have "eschatological" intentions, but no continuity exists between the Messiah's work to usher in the eschaton and the

Newman, ed., *Jesus and the Restoration of Israel*, 244-77, at 272; cf. 261-72 for Wright's full discussion), although Wright seems to have primarily this-worldly ethical implementation in mind.

²⁹ On Schweitzer's views see the different readings of Allison and Wright in Newman, ed., *Jesus and the Restoration of Israel*, 129-30, 262.

³⁰ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 5, obj. 1. This article takes up the question, "Whether the priesthood of Christ endures for ever?"

eschaton itself. Jesus' Cross, on this view, is not an eternally significant event.

The second and third objections likewise limit Jesus' priestly action in accord with the limitations of its historical plane. Granted that Jesus' priesthood "was made manifest most of all in His passion and death, when *by His own blood He entered into the Holies* (Heb. ix. 12)," one can observe that Jesus died once and rose from the dead.³¹ Therefore Jesus was once a priest and is such no longer, since he dies no longer but instead enjoys everlasting life. Likewise, since a priest mediates the divine gifting, Jesus is priest as a man, not as God. In his human nature, Jesus can mediate to other human beings; in his divine nature, he can act directly in the bestowal of divine gifts, in an unmediated fashion. Priestly mediation belongs to Jesus as man. Aquinas points out, however, that for three days, Jesus' body and soul were separated in death. One cannot call a separated soul a "man," nor can one call a corpse a "man." During this period of death, then, Jesus could not have acted as a priest; and thus his priestly act does not instantiate a "continuous day," but instead marks a historical rupture, whatever its other effects. His priestly action could not itself be fully "eschatological," because his priestly action and the eschaton are disjoined. In a nutshell, his death has no place in the eschaton.

The position of the objectors sounds rather like that of some contemporary biblical scholars. If Jesus envisioned his death as the trigger for the eschatological age, the "eschaton" itself—the restoration of Israel—would involve not his death but his triumphant vindication, when he will eat and drink once more with his followers. As he says to his disciples after giving them the wine as his "blood of the covenant" at the Last Supper, "Truly, I say to you, I shall not drink again of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God" (Mark 14:25). It must be emphasized, then, that Aquinas affirms that the fullness of the eschaton is not marred by death. He observes, "The Saints who will be in heaven will not need any further expiation by the

³¹ Ibid., obj. 2.

priesthood of Christ" and "Christ's passion and death are not to be repeated." ³² Underscored by texts elsewhere in the *Tertia Pars*, Aquinas holds that Christ's priestly action inaugurates the eschatological day, both in this world by reconstituting Israel in holiness as "Christ's mystic body" ³³ and in the world to come (as Aquinas interprets it) by opening "the Holy Way" prophesied in Isaiah 35: 8 by which "the ransomed of the Lord shall return, and come to Zion with singing; everlasting joy shall be upon their heads; they shall obtain joy and gladness, and sorrow and sighing shall flee away" (Isa 35: 10).³⁴ But the actual eschaton does not require Christ's ongoing suffering.³⁵

Because of what it achieves, Christ's priesthood endures forever. Aquinas explains, "In the priestly office, we may consider two things: first, the offering of the sacrifice; secondly, the consummation of the sacrifice, consisting in this, that those for whom the sacrifice is offered, obtain the end of the sacrifice."³⁶ It endures in its end or goal. In Aquinas's understanding of causality,

³² *Ibid.*, ad 1 and 2.

³³ *STh* III, q. 49, a. 1.

³⁴ Aquinas writes in *STh* III, q. 49, a. 5: "it is on account of sin that men were prevented from entering into the heavenly kingdom, since, according to Isa. xxxv. 8: 'It shall be called the holy way, and the unclean shall not pass over it.' Now there is a twofold sin which prevents men from entering into the kingdom of heaven. The first is common to the whole race, for it is our first parents' sin, and by that sin heaven's entrance is closed to man. Hence we read in Gen. iii. 24 that after our first parents' sin God 'placed ... cherubim and a flaming sword, turning every way, to keep the way of the tree of life'. The other is the personal sin of each one of us, committed by our personal act. Now by Christ's Passion we have been delivered not only from the common sin of the whole human race, both as to its guilt and as to the debt of punishment, for which He paid the penalty on our behalf; but, furthermore, from the personal sins of individuals, who share in His Passion by faith and charity and the sacraments of faith. Consequently, then, the gate of heaven's kingdom is thrown open to us through Christ's Passion."

³⁵ By contrast Hans Urs von Balthasar argues that Christ's suffering and death-as an experience of hellish infinite "distance" from the Father that encompasses every possible created alienation from God-belongs analogously to the life of the Trinity, and thus to the kingdom of God as a participation in the Trinitarian life. For a critical evaluation of Balthasar's position, see Matthew Levering, *Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), chap. 4.

³⁶ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 5. Cf. Denis Chardonens, O.C.D., "Eternite du sacerdoce du Christ et effet eschatologique de l'eucharistie. La contribution de saint Thomas d'Aquin à un theme de theologie sacramentaire," *Revue Thomiste* 99 (1999): 159-80.

the goal of the action inheres in the action itself; likewise, when the goal is achieved, the action that brought about the goal is not lost, but instead shares in its completion or consummation. The consummation of Christ's priestly action is eternal life. Therefore, eternal life belongs to Christ's priestly action as its goal, and in this sense Christ's priesthood endures everlastingly. Eternally, the consummation enjoyed by the saints in heaven depends upon Jesus Christ. In this respect Aquinas quotes Revelation 21:23, "And the city [the heavenly Jerusalem] has no need of sun or moon to shine upon it, for the glory of God is its light, and its lamp is the Lamb."³⁷ The "Lamb standing, as though it had been slain" (Rev 5:6), is Christ the priest. Even though in heavenly glory he no longer performs his priestly action of expiatory sacrifice, the heavenly glory enjoyed by the saints is enjoyed through him as the priestly mediator. His sacrificial action is consummated in the heavenly communion of the saints. Quoting Hebrews 10:14, "For by a single offering he has perfected for all time those who are sanctified," Aquinas observes that "the virtue [power] of that Victim endures forever."³⁸

Even so, however, does the Old Testament, whose promises Jesus came to fulfill, envision an "eternity" that is not an extension of historical time? Is Aquinas's understanding of the "eschaton" fundamentally and unavoidably at odds with the resources available in the Old Testament for envisioning an "eschatological" restoration? Following the Letter to the Hebrews, Aquinas suggests—and I would agree—that his understanding of the eschatological significance of Christ's priestly action accords with the liturgical pattern described by Leviticus 16, which gives instructions for Israel's observance of the Day of Atonement. He states, "Now this [eternal] consummation of Christ's sacrifice was foreshadowed in this, that the high-priest of the Old Law, once a year, entered into the Holy of Holies with the blood of a he-goat and a calf."³⁹ In Leviticus

³⁷ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 5, ad 1.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, ad 2. See Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, Grand Pretre*, 520-33.

³⁹ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 5. See Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, Grand Pretre*, 70-71, 467-68, and elsewhere.

16, God commands that the people of Israel, through the work of the high priest, make atonement "once in the year because of all their sins" (Lev 16:34). On this day alone, the high priest may enter into "the holy place" (Lev 16:2) in the Temple and sprinkle the sacrificial blood "upon the mercy seat and before the mercy seat" (Lev 16:15), the mercy seat on the ark of the covenant being where "I [YHWH] will appear in the cloud" (Lev 16:2). In order to make expiation for the people, the high priest enters into the very dwelling-place of the Lord with Israel. The divine presence there is so powerful that normally anyone who dared enter this holy place would die (*ibid.*).

This historically concrete holy place, Aquinas suggests, evokes the transhistorical holy place where God dwells in the glory and majesty of the divine eternity. Christ enters as priest into that transcendent holy place. As Hebrews states,

But when Christ appeared as a high priest of the good things that have come,⁴⁰ then through the greater and more perfect tent (not made with hands, that is, not of this creation) he entered once for all into the Holy Place, taking not the blood of goats and calves but his own blood, thus securing an eternal redemption. (Heb 9:11-12)

The eschatological restoration of Israel hardly need exclude such a transhistorical dwelling with God, since Israel knew that, in the words ascribed to Solomon at the dedication of the Temple, "heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain thee [God]; how much less this house that I have built!" (1 Kgs 8:27).⁴¹

⁴⁰ The RSV includes a footnote here: "Other manuscripts read *good things to come.*" Aquinas had this latter version of the verse.

⁴¹ For the trans-historical dimension of the Temple, see Jon D. Levenson, *Sinai and Zion: An Entry into the Jewish Bible* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), part 2. Levenson states, "Whereas Sinai, as we saw in Part I, represents the possibility of meaningful history, of history that leads toward an affirmation, Zion represents the possibility of meaning above history, out of history, through an opening into the realm of the ideal. Mount Zion, the Temple on it, and the city around it are a symbol of transcendence, a symbol in Paul Tillich's sense of the word, something 'which participates in that to which it points.' For the two tiers, the earthly and the heavenly, are not closed to each other, but open, and interpenetrating on Zion" (*ibid.*, 41-42). This sense of "interpenetration" of the transhistorical and the historical explains, Levenson argues, why "Jewish tradition did not accept the finality of the destruction of the Temple and the absence of the redemption of which it was taken to be the symbol. On the contrary, the

Thus, although Aquinas does not have Wright's knowledge of Second-Temple understandings of Israel's "restoration," he develops a nuanced view of the eschaton and places Christ's priestly action at the center of this eschatological consummation. Christ's priesthood stands as the eschatological turning point, both on earth (the new Israel) and in heaven.

B) A Sacrificial Action

What does Aquinas say about the sacrificial character of Christ's hierarchical power? He raises the question of whether Jesus intended to die a sacrificial death, and by consequence whether Jesus saw himself as a sacrificial victim.⁴² There are two obvious problems with this view, in addition to a third problem, less obvious but equally troubling. First, Jesus did not kill himself, nor was he slain by priests. Could he really, then, have envisioned his Cross as a sacrificial offering? Those who crucified him certainly did not intend to offer cultic sacrifice (thus making Jesus an unlikely sacrificial victim), and whatever Jesus' intentions, he

Jewish liturgy gives eloquent testimony to the longing for the reconstruction of the shrine and its city. The longing for the Temple was, as we have seen, a prominent theme in biblical times. It was only rendered more intense by the absence of the physical object of this passionate desire.... Throughout history, there have always been some Jews who wish to see not only God's presence, but also that of his people Israel restored to Zion even before the end of time. And thus it is appropriate that the movement for the restoration of Jewish sovereignty should have acquired the name *Zionism*, after the mountain tied so closely to the fortunes of the people Israel. However much Zionism may resemble a typical modern nationalism with the unfortunate consequences for outsiders that such movements entail, we should still not overlook Martin Buber's point that 'this national concept was named after a place and not, like the others, after a people, which indicates that it is not so much a question of a particular people as such but of its association with a particular land, its native land.' For the modern Zionist the ancient association of the people of Israel and the land of Israel has been rejoined. This return to the land was possible because for the most part, the Jewish tradition did not spiritualize the concept of Zion/Jerusalem/the land of Israel to the extent that it ceased to have any reference to real history" (ibid., 179-80). For further reflection, from a Christian perspective, upon the significance of the land of Israel see Gregory Vall, "'Man Is the Land': The Sacramentality of the Land of Israel," in David G. Dalin and Matthew Levering, eds., *John Paul II and the Jewish People* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).

⁴² *STh* III, q. 22, a. 2.

had no choice in the matter as he hung dying from the Cross (thus making him an unlikely sacrificial priest).⁴³

Second, if Jesus was in fact acting as a priest in his Passion, then he himself was the victim, and he thus was a human sacrifice. Not only is the idea that God would desire human sacrifice appalling, but in the Old Testament God frequently condemned human sacrifice, which was a mark instead of pagan idolatry and moral corruption. Aquinas quotes in this vein Psalm 106:38 (to which I will add verses 36-37), "They served their idols, which became a snare to them. They sacrificed their sons and their daughters to the demons; they poured out innocent blood, the blood of their sons and daughters, whom they sacrificed to the idols of Canaan; and the land was polluted with blood." The "they" described here, of course, is the people of Israel. The Psalmist and Aquinas, like modern archeologists, were well aware that the Israelites offered worship to gods other than YHWH. The fact that the people of Israel offered up human sacrifice not only does not legitimate human sacrifice in God's eyes, but makes it even more appalling to suppose that Christ himself intended to offer a human sacrifice.⁴⁴

⁴³ See *ibid.*, obj. 1.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, obj. 2. In this vein, Mark Heim, having presented the range of contemporary criticisms of sacrificial accounts of Christ's Cross, rightly observes that they "assert no minor flaw in Christianity, but a consistent fault line in the whole foundation that runs from distorted views of God to spiritual guilt fixation to sacrificial bloodshed to anti-Semitic persecution to arrogant ignorance of world mythology. All this adds up to a fatally skewed faith, revolving around a central narrative based on sacred violence and the glorification of innocent suffering" (Heim, *Saved from Sacrifice*, 27). Following Rene Girard's argument that "sacrifice" is to be understood as human beings' effort to undo "bad" violence by means of supposedly "good" (sacred) violence, Heim seeks to preserve the place of the Cross within Christianity by arguing that the Cross is the ultimate repudiation of sacrifice: "The way of life that follows on the cross depends on recognition that the death of Jesus ought not to happen. It is not God's recipe that innocent suffering is the way to restore peace: God's purpose (to end such a pattern) is superimposed on that event of humanly sanctified violence. Sacrificial scapegoating is not something invented by those under the spell of the passion narratives, but something revealed and opposed there. Just as it is an error to think that it is somehow a Christian requirement to be a victim of redemptive violence, so it is an error to think there is a Christian responsibility to administer it" (*ibid.*, 252). Heim summarizes his position: "Scapegoating sacrifice is the stumbling block we placed between God and us. It is a root sin buried in our life together. The passion is a divine act revealing, reversing, and replacing our redemptive violence, which we so long and tenaciously hid from ourselves in the very name

The third problem is less evident, perhaps, but appears equally difficult to resolve. Priests consecrated sacrifices to the Lord; the consecration was an integral part of the offering. But the human nature of Christ, by the indwelling Holy Spirit, "was from the beginning consecrated and united to God."⁴⁵ Therefore why should Christ's human life be offered in sacrifice to God, if the very purpose of ritual "sacrifice"-namely, consecration and union of the offering with God-has already been completely achieved in Christ?⁴⁶

Without at first directly resolving these problems, Aquinas explores Christ's Passion in light of the Old Testament sacrifices. He takes this approach because St. Paul interprets Christ's Passion through this Old Testament lens: "And walk in love, as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God" (Eph 5:2).⁴⁷ On the one hand, the Old Testament itself recognizes the spiritual core of "sacrifice." In this respect Aquinas quotes Psalm 50:17 (to which I add verses 14-16):

Deliver me from bloodguiltiness, O God, thou God of my salvation, and my tongue will sing aloud thy deliverance. O Lord, open thou my lips, and my mouth shall show forth thy praise. For thou hast no delight in sacrifice; were I to give a burnt offering, thou wouldst not be pleased. The sacrifice acceptable to God is a broken spirit; a broken and contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.⁴⁸

If the words of this psalm are true, however, why does God elsewhere command Israel to perform animal sacrifice? Aquinas

of the sacred. When our sin had so separated us from God and built our peace on blood, God was willing to come and die for us, to bear our sin and suffer the condemnation that we visit upon our victims and so deserve ourselves. God saved us from our form of reconciliation, healed us of our dependence on that sad medicine" (ibid., 329).

⁴⁵ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 2, obj. 3.

⁴⁶ Ibid., obj. 3.

⁴⁷ Quoted in *STh* III, q. 22, a. 2, *sc.*

⁴⁸ On the sacrifice of praise, cf. Thomas F. Ryan, *Thomas Aquinas as Reader of the Psalms* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 130-31, 133. For Aquinas, as Ryan says earlier, "the Psalms are not simply about Christ or prayer but about *Christ praying*" (108).

turns to Augustine for insight into this question. In *City of God* Augustine, also with Psalm 50 in view, comments,

If in times gone by our ancestors offered other sacrifices to God, in the shape of animal victims (sacrifices which the people of God now read about, but do not perform) we are to understand that the significance of those acts was precisely the same as that of those now performed amongst us—the intention of which is that we may cleave to God and seek the good of our neighbour for the same end. Thus the visible sacrifice is the sacrament, the sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice.⁴⁹

Augustine does not underestimate the importance of "signs" for human beings. Since we do not gaze directly upon intelligible realities, but rather acquire knowledge of them through sensible realities, we require sensible signs to unite us in true worship of spiritual realities.⁵⁰ Following Augustine, Aquinas interprets the animal sacrifices of the Old Testament as important sensible signs

⁴⁹ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 10.5 (*City of God*, trans. Henry Bettenson [New York Penguin, 1972], 377); Aquinas quotes the last sentence of this text in *STh* III, q. 22, a. 2. Both Augustine and Aquinas agree with Mark Heim that bloody sacrifice is by no means an end in itself. For Heim, following Girard, Christ's sacrifice makes possible charitable union with God and neighbor precisely by ending bloody sacrifice, now replaced by a communal meal: "The Last Supper can be seen in continuity with Jesus' practice of table fellowship, giving it an explicitly liturgical tone that casts it in explicit contrast with sacrificial practice. Instead of the rite of scapegoating sacrifice that lies at the base of historical human community, and instead of the cultic rite of animal sacrifice that reproduces its logic of exclusion and violence, this new community is founded on the communion meal. The early church was continually amazed and thankful that this table brought into one circle those who otherwise would be irrevocably separated by purity boundaries, who otherwise would be scapegoating each other and shedding each other's blood" (Heim, *Saved from Sacrifice*, 233-34 [cf. 232]).

⁵⁰ Aquinas argues that before original sin, because of the right ordering of the higher and lower powers of the soul, "the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge" (*STh* I, q. 94, a. 1). Nonetheless, sacrifice belongs to the natural law: "it is a dictate of natural reason in accordance with man's natural inclination that he should tender submission and honor, according to his mode, to that which is above man. Now the mode befitting to man is that he should employ sensible signs in order to signify anything, because he derives his knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in sign of the subjection and honor due to Him" (*STh* II-II, q. 85, a. 1). See also *STh* I-II, q. 101, a. 2; I-II, q. 102, a. 3.

that assisted the people of Israel in offering the spiritual sacrifice God requires.

Observing thus that the animal sacrifices of the Old Testament are not to be despised, Aquinas turns his attention to the fact that God ordains such a complex sacrificial system for Israel. He connects this sacrificial system with the diverse purposes of sacrificial offering. In this regard, he names three purposes, on an ascending scale: the remission of sin, the preservation of the state of grace, and perfect union with God.⁵¹ The first purpose belongs to the very rationale of the divinely ordained priesthood, both that of the Old Testament and that of Christ. Here Aquinas quotes Hebrews 5: 1, "For every high priest chosen among men is appointed to act on behalf of men in relation to God, to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins."⁵² If the first purpose pertains to the sacrificial system in general, the second purpose has to do in particular with "the sacrifice of peace-offerings," as described in Leviticus 3. The state of grace is a state of "peace." Finally, the third purpose particularly involves the burnt offerings described in Leviticus 1, because such offerings signify the perfect union of human beings with God in the state of glory.⁵³

Recalling, then, that the center of any "sacrifice" is the invisible sacrifice of charity signified by the visible sign, how might the Old Testament sacrifices assist in understanding St. Paul's depiction of Christ's Passion as a priestly action of "sacrifice"?⁵⁴ First as regards the three purposes of sacrifice: does

⁵¹ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 2.

⁵² *Ibid.*; cf. Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, Grand Pretre*, 160-61. Following Serge-Thomas Bonino, Guggenheim argues that neither Aquinas nor Hebrews has in view "priesthood" in a general sense common to Israel and other nations. Rather, Aquinas recognizes that what is at issue is the role of the Aaronic priesthood. As Guggenheim states in this regard, "Saint Thomas reflects on priestly mediation, and still more the mediation of the high priest, from within the Old and New Covenants" (161). See also Bonino, "Le sacerdoce comme institution naturelle selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," 34-35.

⁵³ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 2.

⁵⁴ Anscar Vonier, O.S.B., cautions in his classic *A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist* (repr.; Bethesda, Md.: Zaccheus Press, 2003) that "no theory of sacrifice could ever adequately meet the case of Christ's sacrifice on the Cross. It is a sacrifice so entirely *sui generis* that it has to be defined by itself" (105) and that "the whole ancient sacrificial rite was figurative of Christ's sacrifice on the Cross. This means that we are to explain the ancient

Christ's Passion remove our sins, draw us into God's "peace," and unite us to God in glory? Aquinas answers with three biblical passages, corresponding respectively to the three purposes: Christ "was put to death for our trespasses" (Rom 4:25), he "became the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him" (Heb 5:9), and he unites us to God in glory "since we have confidence to enter the sanctuary by the blood of Jesus" (Heb 10:19). By his Passion and death, then, Christ fulfills the three purposes of the priest offering sacrifice. His sacrifice is also "once for all" (Heb 9:26): "For by a single offering he has perfected for all time those who are sanctified" (Heb 10:14). Aquinas states with regard to the Eucharistic sacrifice instituted by Christ,

The Sacrifice which is offered every day in the Church is not distinct from that which Christ Himself offered, but is a commemoration thereof. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x. 20): *Christ Himself both is the priest who offers it and the victim: the sacred token of which He wished to be the daily Sacrifice of the Church.*⁵⁵

The commemoration, as sacramental, truly unites the Church to Christ's historical sacrifice.⁵⁶

Although we will explore how his shedding of blood takes away sins in more detail when discussing the sanctifying dimension of Christ's priesthood, we can already say that Christ accomplishes, in a unique and transcendent way, a sacrificial mission. Even so, what is offered in Christ's sacrifice is his human

sacrifices through the sacrifice of the Cross and not *vice versa*" (106).

⁵⁵ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 3, ad 2.

⁵⁶ For Aquinas on Hebrews 10:14 see Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, Grand Pretre*, 474. For recent theological discussion of the Eucharistic sacrifice see Yves Congar, O.P., *Lay People in the Church*, trans. Donald Atrwater, rev. ed. (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1965), 165f.; Avery Dulles, S.J., "The Eucharist as Sacrifice," in Roch Kereszty, O.Cist., ed., *Rediscovering the Eucharist: Ecumenical Conversations* (New York: Paulist Press, 2003), 175-87; idem, "The Death of Jesus as Sacrifice," *Josephinum Journal of Theology* 3 (1996): 4-17; William T. Cavanaugh, "Eucharistic Sacrifice and Social Imagination in Early Modern Europe," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31 (2001): 585-605. For an example of contemporary mainstream Catholic rejection of Eucharistic sacrifice as taught by the Council of Trent, see Robert J. Daly, S.J., "Sacrifice Unveiled or Sacrifice Revisited: Trinitarian and Liturgical Perspectives," *Theological Studies* 64 (2003): 24-42; idem, "Eucharistic Origins: From the New Testament to the Liturgies of the Golden Age," *Theological Studies* 66 (2005): 3-22.

life. Can that life appropriately be conceived as a sacrificial victim? What kind of priest would offer his own life in sacrifice? This is the difficulty pressed, against the weight of the New Testament language, by the objections that we reviewed above. Is there a sense in which Christ's human life could be appropriately conceived as a sacrificial victim?

In addressing this question, Aquinas begins by emphasizing that the passive sense of "victim," which we associate with animal sacrifice, does not apply to Christ's Passion. If Christ is a sacrificial victim, he is such only as an active agent, the person of the Son of God, moved throughout by the charity with which the Holy Spirit graces Christ's human nature.⁵⁷ The fundamental offering of his human life, then, is the active offering that he makes spiritually, not the more passive submission of his flesh to the nails of the Roman soldiers (although according to Aquinas, Christ, as the incarnate Son, actively permits even this apparently wholly passive submission of the flesh).⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Miroslav Volf thus emphasizes that the significance of the Incarnation for understanding the crucifixion: "If we view Christ on the cross as a third party being punished for the sins of transgressors, we have widely missed the mark Christ is not a third party. On account of his divinity, Christ is one with God, to whom the 'debt' is owed. It is therefore *God* who through Christ's death shoulders the burden of our transgression against God and frees us from just retribution. But since on account of Christ's humanity he is also one with us, the debtors, it is *we* who die in Christ and are thus freed from guilt" (Miroslav Volf, *The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2006], 117). Volf goes on to observe, "We also miss the mark if we believe that Christ's suffering somehow encourages the abused passively to accept their abuse. The message of the cross is not that it is legitimate to 'force people to serve in functions that ordinarily would have been fulfilled by someone else,' as Dolores Williams has stated. Since no third party is involved, in Christ's Passion no one is forced to do anything for anyone else. Substitution is a gift initiated and willingly given to wrongdoers by the One who was wronged, not a burden of service placed on an outsider. And it is a gift that, far from signaling the passive acceptance of abuse, most radically calls into question such abuse. For it condemns the wrongdoing while at the same time freeing the wrongdoers, who receive forgiveness in repentance, not just from punishment and guilt but also from the hold of the evil deed on their lives" (ibid., 117). While "satisfaction" seems to me a more fruitful term than "substitution," Volf's reflections on Christ's Passion are theologically rich.

⁵⁸ As Vonier says, however, "To entirely spiritualize the oblation and make of it exclusively an act of the created mind and will would be the abolition of the sacrifice; all sacrifices are of the things that are bodily To give to Christ's crucifixion and death only moral worth, even if it be to an infinite degree, is not the whole of Christianity; there is something besides

This point places at the forefront a crucial distinction between Christ's priesthood and the actions of Old Testament priests vis-a-vis their sacrificial victims: Christ the priest did not slay himself in sacrifice. Rather, through his active spiritual agency, he allowed himself to fall into the hands of those who sought to kill him. As Aquinas puts it, "of His own free-will He exposed Himself to death" and "freely offered Himself to suffering."⁵⁹ In allowing his enemies to kill him, he did not kill himself, but rather allowed their wickedness to take its course. Aquinas refers here to the Suffering Servant of Isaiah 53, who in dying for "our iniquities" (Isa 53:5) does not kill himself but allows his persecutors to do their will: "He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth; like a lamb that is led to the slaughter, and like a sheep that before its shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth" (Isa 53:7).⁶⁰ Christ, like the Suffering Servant, is a sacrificial victim, but he is not a human sacrifice, because the only sense in which he is a sacrificial victim is the sense in which he allows his enemies to do their worst. In this sense, however, it is indeed his human life that, in freely and lovingly bearing our sins, he offers to the Father in a perfect priestly action.⁶¹

the moral worth of the suffering and dying Christ, there is the sacrifice" (Vonier, *A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist*, 107-8). Not Christ's love alone, but Christ's love in union with his spilling of his blood changes the world. It remains the case that, as Romanus Cessario states, "it is not the sacrifice of his body on the altar of the cross in which this perfect worship formally consists, but his personal offering of obedience and love" ("Aquinas on Christian Salvation," 125). Thus when speaking about the crucifixion and death of Christ it is necessary to interpret "the efficacy of Christ's sufferings and death in relation to his human soul" (ibid.) without thereby leaving out the bodily dimension of his action.

⁵⁹ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 2, ad 1 and 2.

⁶⁰ Quoted in ibid., ad 1. Drawing largely upon 1 Enoch, Margaret Barker proposes that "the Servant figure was modeled on the one who performed the atonement rites in the first temple" (Barker, "Atonement: The Rite of Healing," in idem, *The Great High Priest*, 42-55, at 54).

⁶¹ For further discussion see Cessario, "Aquinas on Christian Salvation," 123-25. Cessario comments, "Three features of Aquinas' theology of satisfaction merit careful attention. First, Aquinas locates the essence of Christ's sacrifice in the perfect meshing of his human will with what the Father from all eternity wills for the salvation of the world. Aquinas offers no support for those who would advance a theory of penal substitution as the mechanism by which the benefits of Christ reach the human race. Love, not punishment, dominates Aquinas' account of the efficacy of the Passion. Thus and second, the love and obedience of the Incarnate Son inaugurates the new dispensation. Christ reveals the perfection of the beatitude

C) *A Sancti"fyngAction*

Even if God certainly does not then require a passive human sacrifice-and thus does not require a human sacrifice at all-does he nonetheless require a human victim? This question turns our attention to the "sanctifying" dimension of Christ's priestly action. Why should Christ's suffering and bloody death serve to make us holy? Why does the eschatological and sacrificial expiation of sins come about through the suffering and death of Christ?

First and foremost, God requires neither a human sacrifice nor a human victim. He needs nothing from creatures. One cannot emphasize enough that God did not institute the sacrificial worship of Israel because he desired blood. In the chapter of *City of God* quoted by Aquinas, Augustine observes, "When he [the author of Psalm 50] says that God does not want sacrifices he means that he does not want them in the way supposed by the fools, namely for his own gratification. "⁶² Yet God does desire the salvation of human beings. God "desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth" -the truth that "there is one God and there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all" (1 Tim 2:4-5). Why would Christ the mediator give "himself as a ransom for all"? How could Christ's suffering and death be the efficacious expression of God's desire for "all men to be saved"?⁶³

that he himself teaches as constitutive of the new law: 'Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven' (Matt. 5: 10). Third, Christ fulfils the role of Suffering Servant as described in Isaiah and in the Pauline writings. Although the biblical theme of the Suffering Servant has occasioned an unbalanced theological presentation of Christ's suffering, Aquinas presents Christ's obedience to God's plan of salvation without suggesting a vengeful God who exacts a terrible punishment from an innocent victim. Instead, he points to the example of virtue which Christ exhibits for our edification. In sum, the heart of Aquinas' salvation theology lies in the loving service of a priest-Son to God" (ibid., 124-25). Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory*, vol. 5: *The Last Act*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 256-69.

⁶² Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 10.5 (Bettenson, trans., 378).

⁶³ It is here that Anselm's doctrine of satisfaction goes astray, in Mark Heim's view: "The classic penal substitutionary theology of atonement (we will take Anselm as its representative) constructs the terms of just such a hidden transaction. It posits a cosmic bargain that takes

In order to accomplish the salvation of human beings, Aquinas points out, God does not need human action. No human being can forgive sins. If God wills to forgive sins, he needs no human cooperation to do so, since the forgiveness of sins is entirely his prerogative. In this regard Aquinas quotes Isaiah 43:25, where God says, "I, I am He who blots out your transgressions for my own sake, and I will not remember your sins."⁶⁴ It would seem, then, that as regards the forgiveness of sins Christ's priestly action-which, as the action of the mediator, is Christ's action as

place on a plane quite distinct from the historical reality of the crucifixion" (Heim, *Saved from Sacrifice*, 297). For Heim "the Anselmian view of the cross is defined by two major additional steps. The first is the decision to privilege legal images to represent the basic dynamic of 'death for us.' ... The second step is to conflate this legal framework with a vision of divine justice that dictates God's purpose in suffering death. If Christ steps in to intercept a blow meant for us, where does that blow itself come from? It is occasioned by our sin (so far, a view fully in accord with the general tradition). Anselm's departure is to insist with new systematic rigor that it is actually coming from God. What we need to be rescued from is the deserved wrath and punishment of God. God wishes to be merciful, and so God becomes the one to be punished on behalf of us all. God strikes the same blow that God protects us from" (ibid., 299). Heim goes on to note that "[t]he key error is to refer both the meaning and need of Jesus' death to its character as an offering to God. What Anselm rejects at the level of human community, he re-creates at the level of community between God and humanity, a community whose reconciliation depends on the offering of an innocent victim. Most important, Anselm presents God as the one who *requires* this sacrifice and also as the one *to whom* it is offered. Scapegoating is a human practice, and Anselm is clear that such a practice cannot solve our estrangement from God. But in his view God has taken over a human scapegoating sacrifice (the execution of Jesus) and turned it into a unique scapegoating sacrifice of unimaginable magnitude. God is doing what human sacrifice does, but on a much larger scale, and one time only. God has not stepped into the process to oppose it, but to perfect it. Sacrifice to end sacrifice is an accurate and biblical way to describe Jesus' death, but it is an ambiguous and delicately poised idea. Anselm has taken it to mean that God does the same thing that human scapegoaters do, taking it to an ultimate extreme. Instead of God throwing a wrench into the gears of human sacrifice, Anselm's God has endorsed that machinery, borrowing it to perform the biggest and most effective sacrifice of all. Jesus has become our all-purpose scapegoat, whose suffering generates an infinite reservoir of merit that, like his shed blood, can be dispensed through the sacraments" (ibid., 300). As Heim concludes, "These are fatal steps" (ibid.), because "[r]ather than a strategic act of resistance to overthrow sacred violence, the cross becomes a divine endorsement of it" (ibid., 302). In response to Heim's eloquent and incisive critique, two questions should be posed: Is there a relational, personal "order" of justice (an "order" of offering what is due) inscribed in the very being of rational creatures (against the view of an extrinsic "divine wrath") that our sins against God and against other human beings wound? Does Jesus' active self-sacrifice, in which the defining element is love, make him a passive "scapegoat"?

⁶⁴ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 3, obj. 1.

man, not as God-is of no account. Another difficulty arises from the fact that, even if Christ's suffering and death were supposed to be a sufficient "ransom," Christians continue to pray for the forgiveness of their sins and "the [Eucharistic] Sacrifice is offered continuously in the Church." ⁶⁵ Again it would seem that Christ's human (priestly) action has hardly been sufficient, even if one were to suppose that it could be sufficient.

In light of these difficulties, Aquinas takes his bearings from three New Testament verses in particular: Romans 3:24-25, "they are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, whom God put forward as an expiation by his blood"; Hebrews 9:14 (to which I will add verse 13), "For if the sprinkling of defiled persons with the blood of goats and bulls and with the ashes of a heifer sanctifies for the purification of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to God, purify your conscience from dead works to serve the living God"; and John 1:29 (the words of John the Baptist), "Behold, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world!" In each case, Jesus' sacrificial "blood" clearly causes, according to the New Testament, our sanctification. How could this be so?

Aquinas proposes two ways, both having to do not with a change in God, but with a change in human beings. Christ's priestly action does not cause God to forgive us by an outpouring of love, but rather removes the impediments in us to God's merciful outpouring of love. The change in us sanctifies us. But how, specifically, does Christ's priestly action accomplish a change in us? Aquinas first observes that we possess two impediments to our reception of God's mercy. Namely, our hearts are "stained" by sin, in that we willfully turn away from God's mercy, and in addition we owe a "debt of punishment" due in justice to those who willfully turn away from God. The twofold problem, then, is that our hearts are evil and that our evil merits punishment. We require, therefore, a twofold interior change:

⁶⁵ Ibid., obj. 2.

first, our hearts must be turned back to God (removing the "stain"), and second, our "debt of punishment" must be paid.⁶⁶

In human relationships, we can understand that a man who murders out of hatred not only needs healing in his heart, but also owes a debt of punishment to those he has offended. If one steals money, one cannot solely have a change of heart and experience true repentance; one must also make recompense for the injury of the theft. These juridical cases, however, seem ill-suited to the human relationship with God. We already owe everything to God, and God's mercy is infinite. Why would God demand punishment or recompense from us? Why would not simply healing our hearts be sufficient?

In setting forth Aquinas's position in this respect, I will not limit myself to texts from question 22. Aquinas certainly holds that Christ's priestly action heals our hearts. Inquiring into whether Christ's Passion was the most fitting way of liberating human beings from sin, for example, he notes,

In the first place, man knows thereby how much God loves him, and is thereby stirred to love Him in return, and therein lies the perfection of human salvation; since the Apostle says (Rom. v. 8): *God commendeth His charity towards us; for when as yet we were sinners ... Christ died for us.*⁶⁷

Similarly, he remarks upon the relationship that the members of Christ's mystical body have to their Head and observes that Christ's merit in suffering for the sake of justice redounds to all his members.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ See *ITh* III, q. 22, a. 3; the quotation from Hebrews comes from the *sed contra* and the quotation from John comes from the reply to the third objection. As Volf says (in critical dialogue with Kierkegaard), "Love includes a concern for justice and is not opposed to it. The two, love and justice, come together in forgiveness. Because forgiveness presupposes that the claims of justice are valid (blame being prerequisite to forgiveness), repentance is an appropriate way for the wrongdoer to receive the gift of forgiveness and then cease to be remembered as guilty" (Volf, *The End of Memory*, 174).

⁶⁷ *STh* III, q. 46, a. 3.

⁶⁸ *STh* III, q. 48, a. 1. On Aquinas's use of the phrase "corpus mysticum," see Martin Morard, "Les expressions 'corpus mysticum' et 'persona mystica' dans l'oeuvre de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Thomiste* 95 (1995): 653-64. In this regard Henri de Lubac, S.J., *Corpus Mysticum*, 2d ed. (Paris: Aubier, 1949) caused some misunderstanding. De Lubac argues that in the early Middle Ages the Eucharist's intrinsic ecclesial referent was lost due to

Why then should Christ's priestly action also operate as an expiatory sin-offering, as a satisfaction of the "debt of punishment"?⁶⁹ In addition to using the New Testament texts noted above, Aquinas approaches this question through Isaiah 53:4 ("he has borne our griefs and carried our sorrows") and Jeremiah 11:19 ("I was like a gentle lamb led to the slaughter").⁷⁰ Such texts might be seen as implying an extrinsic juridical relationship between creature and Creator. Aquinas, however, recognizes an order of justice inscribed in the very heart of human beings' relationship with God and each other. Justice is not extrinsic to

a shift in theological terminology: the phrase "corpus mysticum" came to mean the Church rather than the Eucharist, with the result that ecclesiology became overly juridical. De Lubac holds that Aquinas's theology reflects a late stage of this deleterious shift due to the use of "corpus Ecclesiae mysticum" rather than "corpus Christi mysticum." Morard, however, shows that Aquinas's theology does not in fact evidence such a shift. De Lubac's thesis has received wide circulation through Michel de Certeau, *The Mystic Fable*, trans. Michael B. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). In popularized form, one finds the thesis in the criticisms made by Paul McPartlan against medieval ecclesiology in his *Sacrament of Salvation: An Introduction to Eucharistic Ecclesiology* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995), 37-38. As regards the ninth- and eleventh-century debates, Ephraim Radner has challenged de Lubac's thesis (while otherwise accepting it): see Ephraim Radner, *The End of the Church: A Pneumatology of Christian Division in the West* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998), 208-10, 228-39. John Milbank takes up the thesis in his *Being Reconciled* (London: Routledge, 2003), 122-37, although he makes an exception for Aquinas and Bonaventure. Typical of the popularization, which cannot be blamed on de Lubac, is Joseph M. Powers, S.J.'s claim that the cultic priesthood gradually displaced the Eucharistic community between the eighth and thirteenth centuries (see Joseph M. Powers, *Eucharistic Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 26-31).

⁶⁹ On Christ's Cross as "satisfaction" for sins, see the following studies, which are both historically and speculatively rich: Emmanuel Perrier, O.P., "L'enjeu christologique de la satisfaction" (I) and (II), *Revue Thomiste* 103 (2003): 105-36 and 203-47; Rik Van Nieuwenhove, "St Anselm and St Thomas Aquinas on 'Satisfaction': Or how Catholic and Protestant Understandings of the Cross Differ," *Angelicum* 80 (2003): 159-76; Romanus Cessario, O.P., *The Godly Image: Christ and Satisfaction in Catholic Thought from Anselm to Aquinas*; idem, "Aquinas on Christian Salvation," especially 121-34.

⁷⁰ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 3. The quotation from Jeremiah appears in the third objection. For contemporary debates regarding the meaning of Isaiah 53 and its interpretation in the New Testament and later Christian writings see, e.g., Bernd Janowski and Peter Stuhlmacher, ed., *The Suffering Servant: Isaiah 53 in Jewish and Christian Sources*, trans. Donald P. Bailey (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2004); William H. Bellinger, Jr. and William R. Farmer, eds., *Jesus and the Suffering Servant: Isaiah 53 and Christian Origins* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1998). See also Christopher R. North, *The Suffering Servant in Deutero-Isaiah: An Historical and Critical Study*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

any personal relationship. Aquinas does not recoil from the New Testament's juridical language, which he understands to express the intimate, yet wounded, relationship between the creature and the Creator. Even so, does God in fact demand "recompense"? If sinful human beings suffer from their self-inflicted wounds, why should a sinless human being suffer on their behalf, thus perpetuating, in some sense, the history of human suffering (even so as ultimately to end it)? Could not God sanctify human beings without any further suffering, let alone the agonizing suffering of the incarnate Son of God?

Indeed, Aquinas affirms that God could have sanctified human beings in another way: "speaking simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to deliver mankind otherwise than by the Passion of Christ, because *no word shall be impossible with God* (Luke i. 37)." ⁷¹ In willing the Passion of Christ, God was not constrained by the order of justice, as if God, like a human judge, had to exact the proper penalty for the crime. On the contrary, he was entirely free. Aquinas points out that unlike a human judge, "God has no one higher than Himself, for He is the sovereign and common good of the whole universe." ⁷² When human beings sin against God (and all sin is ultimately against God), we wound our relationship with him—a relationship that, like any relationship, is constituted by an order of justice. God can mercifully forgive sins against himself without exacting just punishment, "just as anyone else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts mercifully and not unjustly." ⁷³ Why then did not God simply forgive all sins in this way, rather than through the bloody death of his incarnate Son?

Guided by the Scriptures, Aquinas answers that God freely chose the most merciful way to re-establish the justice between humans beings and God lost by sin. Aquinas gives a number of reasons why salvation through Christ's Passion is more merciful than God simply forgiving our sins by fiat. The central reason has to do with the dignity that God gives human beings by allowing

⁷¹ *STh* III, q. 46, a. 2.

⁷² *STh* III, q. 46, a. 2, ad 3.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

our injustice to be healed from within human nature. The dignity of human cooperation and achievement would be entirely lost if God had simply forgiven our sins by fiat. The seriousness of history, of human free actions, would have been lost. If God simply forgave sin by fiat, furthermore, he would not have conquered sin by uniting to himself a human nature in the person of the Son, a union which is the greatest possible affirmation of human dignity. The hypostatic union grounds human dignity in an unfathomably rich manner. Jesus Christ, a man, establishes justice between humankind and God by his Passion, and this human achievement by which we are made holy is possible because this man, while fully human, is the Son of God: "Although Christ was a priest, not as God, but as man, yet one and the same was both priest and God."⁷⁴

When discussing Christ's Passion, then, Aquinas frequently returns to God's merciful promotion of human dignity in the chosen path of salvation. He observes with regard to Christ's achievement as the new Adam, for example, that "it redounded to man's greater dignity, that as man was overcome and deceived by the devil [in Eden], so also it should be a man that should overthrow the devil; and as man deserved death, so a man by

⁷⁴ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 3, ad 1. Citing the Christology of the Council of Ephesus, Aquinas goes on to observe here, "Hence in so far as His human nature operated by virtue of the Divine, that sacrifice was most efficacious for the blotting out of sins." See also the beautiful discussion of the purpose of the Incarnation in *STh* III, q. 1, a. 2. Christ's priestly action is his human action of his Passion, but his human action, one must recall, is the action of the Son of God (since Christ is one Person). Aquinas observes, "Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two ways—first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons could not make up adequately for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man. Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient, imperfectly—i.e. in the acceptance of him who is content with it, even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as everything imperfect presupposes some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that the satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction of Christ" (*STh* III, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3).

dying should vanquish death. "⁷⁵ The proper penalty for sin against God is death; as St. Paul puts it, "the wages of sin is death" (Rom 6:23). This is so both because sin, in wounding the relationship of human beings to God, disorders the human person interiorly and leads ultimately to the rupture of the soul and body in death, and because what Adam and Eve strove for was immortality on their own terms rather than as dependent creatures, and so separated themselves willfully from the source of life. The penalty of death is not an extrinsic requirement of a wrathful god, but rather belongs intrinsically to the relational wound or rupture that sin brings about.

It pertains to human dignity that the relational wound be healed from within, from the side of human beings. Jesus Christ makes satisfaction, heals the wound, by paying our penalty of death without, as a sinless man, owing it. Jesus' overflowing justice—the glorious goodness of his created charity, obedience, and humility as the incarnate Son of God—heals the woundedness of human beings' relationship with God by restoring super-abundantly the lack of goodness that characterizes humankind due to the history of sin's destruction of human goods. Baptism unites us, Christ's members, with his glorious goodness in his salvific death:

Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life. For if we have been united with him in a death like his, we shall certainly be in unity with him in a resurrection like his. (Rom 6:3-5)⁷⁶

⁷⁵ *STh* III, q. 46, a. 3.

⁷⁶ In his recent *Saving Power: Theories of Atonement and Forms of the Church* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2005), Peter Schmiechen seeks to uncover, among other things, "the relations between theories of atonement and the formation of the church—its basic structure, faith, life, and work" (353). In the context of his inquiry, he observes that Anselm's "theory of the restoration of creation ... concludes with a direct connection with the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. The benefits of Christ, received from God the Father, are shared with believers who follow the mandates of Scripture and participate in the sacramental life of the church" (*ibid.*, 357-58). Could this theory of atonement, Schmiechen asks, exist outside the bounds of a sacramentally organized Church, for which Anselm's theory provides

Reconciliation with God is accomplished in Christ's Pasch, rather than being merely a "word" spoken to us.

Similarly, commenting in the *Summa Theologiae* on Romans 3:24-25, Aquinas affirms that God's will that Christ's Passion make satisfaction for all sins "was in keeping with both His mercy and His justice."⁷⁷ He goes on to explain:

With His justice, because by His Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race; and so man was set free by Christ's justice: and with His mercy, for since man of himself could not satisfy for the sin of all human nature, as was said above (Q. 1, A. 2), God gave him His Son to satisfy for him.... And this came of more copious mercy than if He had forgiven sins without satisfaction. Hence it is said (Ephes. ii. 4): *God, who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ.*⁷⁸

Here we discover why an eschatological messianic tribulation, as Wright shows, was expected to inaugurate the restoration of Israel through the outpouring of the eschatological blessings of holiness. As the son of Abraham and the David through whom all nations are to be blessed (cf. Gen 12:3; 22; 2 Sam 7:13), Christ pours out the eschatological blessings not only through the justice that his priestly action achieves, but also, as we have seen, through the

"a theological rationale" (ibid., 358)? He thinks that it could, but he remarks nonetheless that "if Jesus participates in our life to restore the creation, then our sacramental participation in his life is a natural and reasonable mode of transmission" (ibid., 359-60) and he adds that "the interpretations of sacrifice, renewal (Athanasius), and restoration (Anselm) are tightly linked to sacramental transmission. These associations are so strong that it is difficult to decide whether it is the historical association or a truly natural link between interpretation and mode of transmission" (ibid., 361). Schmiechen argues that Luther's understanding of Christ's saving work results in a new form of the Church: "Perhaps the strongest example of how a shift in the interpretation of Jesus' death and resurrection leads to a reformulation of the church is the sixteenth-century use of justification by grace. Once the focus shifts to the proclamation of the gospel as the Word of promise, attention shifts from human works offered to God to the human response of faith as trust of the heart. But to allow such proclamation and response to be at the center of worship and teaching, the shape of the church must be altered. Thus, a vernacular Bible, a new catechism, the sermon (vs. the homily), and a new hymnody come into being to enable proclamation, while the hierarchy of the religious and laity is demolished in favor of the priesthood of all believers" (ibid., 358).

⁷⁷ *STh* III, q. 46, a. 1, ad 3.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

divine mercy and love that it reveals. Christ's incomparable manifestation of divine love stimulates human beings to love God in return, and Christ in his Passion displays the virtues-among them "obedience, humility, constancy, justice"-that "are requisite for man's salvation."⁷⁹ If God loves us so much as to become one of us, and suffer and die for us, then "man is all the more bound to refrain from sin, according to 1 Cor. vi. 20: *You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body.*"⁸⁰

D) A Unitive Action

What about the unitive dimension of Christ's priestly action? In seeking the reason for the Letter to the Hebrews' statement that God designated Jesus "a high priest after the order of Melchizedek" (Heb 5: 10), Aquinas holds that "the excellence of Christ's [priesthood] over the Levitical priesthood was foreshadowed in the priesthood of Melchisedech," in part because Abraham, from whom the Levitical priesthood descended, tithed to Melchizedek.⁸¹ But the deeper reason, in Aquinas's view, has to do with how Melchizedek's priesthood foreshadows the unity accomplished by Christ's priestly action, a unity that could not be accomplished by the Levitical priesthood. The Levitical priesthood was unable to accomplish a lasting unity in holiness. Instead, the people of Israel continually offered new sacrifices, and these sacrifices did not succeed in establishing a holy people.

⁷⁹ *STh* III, q. 46, a. 3. Here Aquinas quotes 1 Peter 2:21 (to which I will add verses 22-25), "For to this [the patient suffering of injustice] you have been called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, that you should follow in his steps. He committed no sin; no guile was found on his lips. When he was reviled, he did not revile in return; when he suffered, he did not threaten; but he trusted to him who judges justly. He himself bore our sins in his body on the tree, that we might die to sin and live to righteousness. By his wounds you have been healed. For you were straying like sheep, but have now returned to the Shepherd and Guardian of your souls."

⁸⁰ *STh* III, q. 46, a. 3. See the valuable study of Karl Olav Sandnes, *Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

⁸¹ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 6. On Christ and Melchizedek in Aquinas's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, see especially Guggenheim, *Jesus Christ, Grand Pretre*, part 2, chap. 5. On Christ and Melchizedek, see also Vonier, *A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist*, 148-49.

If they had, then the people of Israel would never have looked for a Messiah. As Aquinas puts it, the Levitical priesthood "did not wash away sins" and "was not eternal."⁸²

By contrast, Jesus' priestly action is "once for all" (Heb 9:26); his sacrifice never needs to be repeated, because it permanently establishes holiness. His priesthood is "eternal": no high priest ever takes his place. If it is by means of communion in the Eucharist that human beings participate in the unity in holiness that Jesus' priestly action establishes, then the primacy of the symbolic role of Melchizedek's priesthood becomes clear: the Levitical priesthood symbolizes sacrifice (through the shedding of blood), while Melchizedek's priesthood symbolizes communion (through the bread and wine). Following Augustine's view that the many grains united in the bread and the many grapes united in the wine symbolize the unity of the Church, Aquinas affirms that as regards "the participation of this sacrifice and the effect thereof, wherein the excellence of Christ's priesthood over the priesthood of the Law principally consists ... the former was more distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of Melchisedech" than by the Levitical priesthood.⁸³ Since human beings receive the effect of Jesus' saving sacrifice (and thus of the Eucharistic sacrifice) through communion in faith in the Eucharistic elements, Melchizedek's priestly offering of bread and wine best symbolizes the unitive dimension of Jesus' priestly action. The unitive dimension of Christ's priesthood explains for Aquinas why Jesus' priesthood receives its primary definition through the Letter to the Hebrews' application of Psalm 110:4, "Thou art a priest for ever, after the order of Melchizedek" (Heb 5:6; 7:17).

The fruit of Jesus' sacrifice, and of the Eucharistic sacrament-sacrifice that re-presents Jesus' sacrifice, is the unity of the people of God, the mystical body of Christ, in the holiness attained in

⁸² *STh* III, q. 22, a. 6.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, ad 2; see also *STh* III, q. 75, a. 2, obj. 3 and elsewhere for the citation from Augustine's tractate 26 on the Gospel of John.

and through Jesus' sacrifice.⁸⁴ Jesus dies not for himself or his own needs, but to unify all others in himself.⁸⁵ Saint Paul speaks of the Father's "purpose which he set forth in Christ as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth" (Eph 1:9-10). The Father "has put all things under his feet and has made him the head over all things for the church, which is his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all" (Eph 1:22-23). Aquinas explains therefore that "it is not fitting for Christ to be the recipient of the effect of His priesthood, but rather to communicate it to others."⁸⁶ His priestly action is the source of all unity in holiness, both of Israel (as the fulfillment of Torah and Temple) and of the Church: "Christ is the fountain-head of the entire priesthood: for the priest of the Old Law was a figure of Him; while the priest of the New Law works in His person."⁸⁷

Emphasizing the unitive aspect of Christ's Pasch, Aquinas concludes his discussion of Christ's priesthood by attending to the symbolism of Melchizedek's offering of bread and wine. He refers to the statement in Hebrews 7:2 that Melchizedek "is first, by translation of his name, king of righteousness, and then he is also king of Salem, that is, king of peace."⁸⁸ As the true "king of righteousness" and "king of peace," Jesus Christ, through his priestly action, has the power to unite the human race in the holiness of God. By washing away sins, Jesus' eternal priesthood establishes the unity of the "church of God" (Gal 1:13). The restoration that Jesus accomplishes thereby blesses all nations.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ See most recently Gilles Emery, O.P., "The Ecclesial Fruit of the Eucharist in St. Thomas Aquinas," trans. Therese C. Scarpelli, in idem, *Trinity, Church, and the Human Person: Thomistic Essays* (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2007), 155-72.

⁸⁵ *STh* III, q. 22, a. 4.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ See *STh* III, q. 22, a. 6, obj. 3.

⁸⁹ For further discussion of the themes treated in this essay, see Levering, *Sacrifice and Community*, especially chaps. 2 and 3; and Matthew Levering, *Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), as well as the further secondary sources cited in both works.

CONCLUSION

Engaging a wide array of themes in Aquinas's theology of salvation, I have argued for the theological cogency of his account of Christ's priestly action. In contemporary theology, many consider that Aquinas goes too far in his appreciation of sacrificial and "satisfactory" suffering, which seems at best overly juridical and at worst monstrous. Others hold that Aquinas does not go far enough, largely because he somewhat limits the scope of Christ's human suffering and does not locate it within an intra-Trinitarian distance or rupture. By contrast, I find Aquinas's theology of salvation instructive for understanding more deeply the realities taught in Scripture. What one makes of Aquinas's theology of salvation depends upon what one makes of question 22 of the *Tertia Pars*. This is so not only because of the wide range of themes addressed here, but also because the topic of Christ's priesthood requires attention to his historical context in Israel, which contemporary historical research has explored particularly deeply. As I hope to have shown, contemporary historical research does not undermine Aquinas's theological approach, but rather exposes even more clearly the theological depth of his main lines of inquiry. In seeking to know Jesus better as the true high priest-whose work is eschatological, sacrificial, sanctifying, and unitive-Christians will continue to find valuable instruction in Aquinas's teaching in question 22.

THE PASSIONS AND THE MORAL LIFE:
APPRECIATING THE ORIGINALITY OF AQUINAS¹

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THE ANCIENT GREEK DRAMA *Oresteia* recounts the story of how the young Orestes, after avenging his father's murder by slaying the killer, Orestes's own mother, must flee from the relentless pursuit of the dreadful Furies. These latter are the pre-Olympian earth goddesses who avenge the killing of one's kin. Eventually, the Olympian goddess Athena convinces the Furies to suspend momentarily the pursuit of blood vengeance and allow a trial by jury to settle Orestes's fate. During the trial, the Furies, not without due cause, make their case for just retribution. After a tie vote results in a hung jury, Athena, mindful that blood vengeance leads to unending carnage, intervenes and casts the deciding vote in favor of Orestes, thereby acquitting him.

Pointing out that the tie vote legitimates the Furies' case, Athena follows by offering the Furies a place, albeit a subservient one, among the Olympian gods, where they will serve no longer as goddesses of blood vengeance but as protectors of households. They accept, and become transformed into the Eumenides-in Greek, "the friendly ones." That is, they take their place as earth goddesses who subordinate their lower instinctive desires for blood vengeance to the wise judgment of the higher gods, like Athena. Dwelling in the sky on the top of Mount Olympus, these

¹ This paper was offered at a conference honoring the eightieth birthday of Fr. Servais Pinckaers, O.P., in October 2005, at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.

higher gods follow the guidance of reason and enlightened wisdom.

One of the many lessons to be gleaned from Aeschylus's drama is the invaluable insight it imparts on the nature of human emotion and its relation to reason. The lower instinctual drives, the emotions, exemplified in the *Oresteia* by the desire for just retribution on the part of the Furies, are not bad in themselves and might be quite legitimate. For this reason, they should not be eradicated from human life. Movements of the lower appetites, the emotions play an integral and essential role in our lives, paralleling the way the Furies, once transformed into the kindly Eumenides, go on to play an integral and essential role in the Olympic pantheon as protectors of households. But because the emotions belong to the lower, impulsive dimension of the human person, they are by nature subordinate to our higher faculties and ought to be subservient to the commanding role of human reason, of our higher cognitive power, represented in the *Oresteia* by Athena and the other Olympian gods. Reason's role, as Aeschylus understands it, is harmoniously to integrate the lower drives, the emotions, into human life in a balanced way, neither suppressing them outright nor giving them free reign over our actions.

Aeschylus provides us with a view of human emotion and its relation to our overall good that resonates well with St. Thomas Aquinas's vision of the role of the passions in the moral life (and thus with a view, we should add, that helps offset the infamously one-sided read on Greek tragedy offered by Sigmund Freud). If one can look to Aquinas as the standard-bearer for a genuine morality of human affectivity, it is because of his almost singular affirmation of the essential role the passions play in the pursuit of moral excellence. On this score, the noted moral theologian Servais Pinckaers asserts that Aquinas's regard for the role of the passions in the moral life, particularly as he outlines it in his *Summa Theologiae*, marks a "unique" achievement "of remarkable genius."²

² Servais Pinckaers, *The Sources of Christian Ethics*, trans. Mary T. Noble (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 224; and idem, "Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions," in *The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral*

In what follows I shall attempt to corroborate Pinckaers's claim. To this end, I shall focus on two particular points: (1) the moral vision of human affectivity implied in Aquinas's decision to place his systematic study on emotion, the treatise on the passions, in the *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*, that is, in the part of the *Summa* that deals with morals; and (2) Aquinas's insistence, indebted to Aristotle but taken to heights that may have surprised even the Philosopher, that the passions play an active collaborative role in the work of moral virtue, that human emotion becomes *rational by participation*. On this last point Aquinas stands in sharp opposition to the prevailing philosophical tradition. In a word, Aquinas's position falls between the two extremes we see frequently proposed in the history of philosophical thought, the one excluding emotion from moral action and the other identifying emotion with moral duty as such. I shall close this essay with a brief examination of this history.

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LOCATION OF THE TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS

A) *Movements of the Animal-like Sensitive Appetite*

Aquinas ties the emotions, and human affectivity in general, to the sensory (or sensitive) appetite. He links them, in other words, to our internal animal-like inclination to bodily goods or evils perceived by the senses, and to the eventual procurement or evasion of these sense goods or evils. The passions, then, are movements of this lower animal-like inclination to sense goods or evils, movements that are natural to the human condition.³ Contrary to its usage in modern parlance, where it often connotes fits of affective vehemence, the term 'passion', for Aquinas, means simple sensate (or lower animal-like) movements of the soul which are natural to the human condition: "Man is similar to other animals in his sensitive nature," Aquinas explains, "hence,

Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 273-87, at 273-74.

³ Aquinas, *Expos. super lob ad litt.*, on 6:4.

reactions that follow upon the sensitive nature are present in man naturally, just as they are in other animals.⁴ Mindful that passion (*passio*) signifies for Aquinas simple sensitive movements of the soul, I shall use the terms 'passion' and 'emotion' as rough equivalent renderings of the Latin *passio*.

Aquinas recognizes that the human experience of emotion confronts us with a paradox. On the one hand, because we share our internal affective ordering to created bodily goods in common with the animals, our passions are expressive of the "animal" side of human nature. On the other hand, we are not mere animals, and we therefore experience emotion in a unique fashion. The interplay that our lower sensitive appetite enjoys with reason and will, our highest faculties, introduces a whole new dynamic into the human experience of emotion.⁵ In addition to our internal affective ordering to created bodily goods, from which arise the emotions, we enjoy a higher appetitive ordering: that of the will which orders us internally to the universal good, the *summum bonum*.

B) Emotion and the Hylemorphic Makeup of the Human Being

This twofold appetitive inclination to the *summum bonum* and to goods of the body does not mean that the human being suffers

⁴ In *STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 3, sc, Aquinas cites John Damascene's definition of passion (found in *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22 [*De fide orthodoxa. Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. E. M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1955), 132]; cf. Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura hominis* 15 [*Nemesius d'Emese De natura hominis. Traduction de Burgundio de Pise*, ed. G. Verbeke and J. R. Moncho, *Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum*, suppl. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), 93]) as "a movement of the sensitive appetitive faculty in response to the perception of something good or bad [*passio est motus af] [Jettivae virtutis sensibilis in apparitione bani et mali]."*

⁵ *STh* I-II, q. 24, a. 1, ad 1: "Considered in themselves the passions are common to both man and animal, but as commanded by reason (*a ratione imperantur*), they are proper to man." As Pinckaers ("Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions," 276) observes: "[At the outset of the treatise on the passions] the problem of the moral quality of the emotions situates them in relation to reason and will, and attributes to them a dimension they do not have among the animals. St. Thomas considers them as human emotions, integrated in the human composite." See also Stephen Loughlin, "Similarities and Differences between Human and Animal Emotion in Aquinas's Thought," *The Thomist* 65 (2001): 45-65.

from an internally truncated ordering. For Aquinas, the human person is not a disintegrated self. He is a unified, integrated being. The Cartesian tendency to internalize only the life of the mind, according to which the appetites and emotions serve as mere mechanized tools of the mind, and the passions inhabit their own lower animal sphere with little or no interaction with the life of the mind, yields, from a Thomist perspective, an inadequate, disembodied anthropology.

Aquinas of course opts to ground his view of these two appetitive orderings-and of their integration in view of man's moral good-in a robust metaphysical conception of the human being as a body-soul, or matter-form, composite. In Aquinas's system of thought, which assiduously observes the Scholastic principle that action follows being (*agere sequitur esse*),⁶ it is paramount to see how man's hylemorphic (matter-form) makeup stands as the backdrop of all his moral action. Human affectivity provides an ideal case in point of this, for two principal reasons.

The first centers on the way human emotion uniquely expresses our matter-form constitution. Aquinas points out how an emotion involves, in every case, some kind of change in the body, such as an increased heart rate, trembling of the hands, flushing of the face, hormonal and biochemical changes (the chemical oxytocin, for instance, has been linked to emotional feelings of love). The bodily alteration (or what Aquinas terms the *transmutatio corpora/is*) of a passion accounts for why biochemical and neurological phenomena are so intimately bound up with the emotions (and why, today, psychopharmacology and neuropsychology can be of therapeutic benefit in certain cases of emotional imbalance). In point of fact, the *transmutatio corpora/is* is so essential to every movement of passion that we could not even undergo emotion if we did not have bodies (which explains why God and the angels are not subject to emotion).

At the same time, Aquinas is careful not to reduce the emotions solely to the biochemical or to the neurological (as, for example,

⁶ See *STh* I, q. 89, a. 1; *HI*, q. 55, a. 2, ad 1; *III*, q. 19, a. 2, sc; and *III*, q. 77, a. 3. Ultimately, this methodology observes the order of Aristotle's *De anima* and was followed throughout the Middle Ages.

if we would reduce love to the release of oxytocin, or happy feelings to the chemical endorphin). The *transmutatio corporalis* represents merely one essential component of an emotion, namely, its material component. There is also its formal element. This Aquinas identifies with the internal movement itself of the lower sensitive appetite.⁷ What specifies an emotion is the psychical motion (inclination) towards a perceived bodily good (or avoidance of a perceived bodily evil). An emotion always involves a change of disposition in the person who undergoes it; that is, an emotion issues only after the lower sense appetitive ordering has been acted upon.

With the *transmutatio corpora/is* marking the material component of every emotion and the internal movement of the sensitive appetite its formal component, we can see how the passions belong both to the body and to the (sensitive) soul (though in different respects). They stand out as body-soul phenomena, or as psychophysiological states, to use one author's term.⁸ The sensitive appetite (a power of the soul) acts by means of a bodily organ, as Aquinas affirms:

[T]he sensitive appetite differs from the intellectual appetite, or the will, in the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of a bodily organ, whereas the will is not. Every act of a power that uses a bodily organ depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that bodily organ.... Hence, the act of the sensitive appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition of the body.⁹

The other reason human emotion relates to the hylemorphic (matter-form) composition of the human being in a privileged way

⁷ For passages affirming how the *transmutatio corpora/is* accompanies the internal motion of the lower sensitive appetite in the way that matter accompanies form, see *STh* I-II, q. 44, a. 1; I-II, q. 17, a. 7; I-II, q. 22, a. 3; I-II, q. 28, a. 5.

⁸ Peter King, "Aquinas on the Passions," in *Aquinas's Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann*, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 101-32, at 109.

⁹ *STh* I-II, q. 17, a. 7. One can detect shades of this position in Albert the Great, *De motibus animalium*, bk. 1, tr. 2, ch. 4; and *De incarnatione.*, tr. 6, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1; and tr. 6, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. I. Backes, in *Opera omnia*, editio Coloniensis, vol. 26 [Munster: Aschendorff, 1958], 220-21); cf. George C. Reilly, *The Psychology of Saint Albert the Great Compared with that of St. Thomas* (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 1934), 59-60.

is the manner in which our lower animal-like appetite, which orders us to goods of the body, participates in our higher mental or spiritual dimension, namely, in our rationality. What Aquinas's anthropology promotes, in other words, is what we could term a "participated psychology." In his view an intimate synergy and interpenetrability exist between the emotions and reason and will, making the emotions not merely "animal-like" acts but genuine *human* acts. After all, the sensitive appetite forms part of the larger whole which is the human being. We are rational even in our bodies, in our eyes, in our muscles, in that which is biochemical in us: "it pertains to man's good," Aquinas explains, "that . . . virtue [i.e., the life of reason] should involve the intellectual part, the sensitive part, and the body."¹⁰ We find something like this illustrated in the *Oresteia*, where the Furies could be integrated into the Olympic pantheon only because there was already something of the rational in them.

That the sensitive appetite and its movements, the passions, form part of the larger whole which is the human being, that they participate in our humanity, is attested by the fact that reason and will can incite movements of passion, just as movements of emotion can rouse the will and influence a judgment of reason. Our passions and desires often shape how we think, thereby influencing how we act. For Aquinas, this offers plain evidence of the fact that the lower appetitive ordering to goods of the body truly participates in the higher appetitive ordering to happiness and fulfillment, to goodness itself.

Furthermore, as the form of a material body, the soul is so essentially bound to the body that it cannot operate without the body. The life of the body must be sustained if the soul, even in the operation of its rational or spiritual powers, is to act, let alone flourish. That the emotions move us towards those goods which sustain the life of the body evinces just how much the properly human, that is, the rational or intellectual, dimension of our lives must make room for the integration of our emotions. We see this particularly in the case of the desire (an emotion) for pleasures

¹⁰ *De Malo*, q. 12, a. 1. For more on this element of Aquinas's teaching, see Peter King, "Aquinas on the Passions," 126-31.

associated with eating and drinking, which directly sustain the life of one's own body. There is no spiritual or moral excellence if the needs of the body are ignored.

C) A Necessary First Step in the Human Quest for Happiness and the Highest Good

We are now in a position to consider Aquinas's decision to locate his exhaustive study on human affectivity, the treatise on the passions, at the heart of his systematic study of human morality, namely, in the *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*.

The treatise on the passions, as Pinckaers has observed, marks the largest treatise in the entire *Summa*, comprising twenty-seven questions of one hundred thirty-two articles.¹¹ Such a study dwarfs the only known historical precedents, both of which Aquinas draws upon: Nemesius of Emesa's short treatise on the passions in his *De natura hominis* and, following this, John Damascene's treatise on the same in his *De fide orthodoxa* (Aristotle left us no systematic treatment of the passions).¹²

¹¹ See Pinckaers, "Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions," 273. Pinckaers here also examines Aquinas's earlier works in which he displays a clear and developing interest in the passions. In this treatise in the *Prima Secundae*, Aquinas offers a systematic study of: the passions in general, including their morality (qq. 22-25); the nature, causes, and effects of the passion of love (qq. 26-28); the nature of the passions of hate (or dislike) and desire (qq. 29-30); the nature, causes, effects, and morality of the passion of pleasure (qq. 31-34); the nature, causes, effects, remedies, and morality of the passions of pain and sorrow (qq. 35-39); the nature of the passions of hope and despair (q. 40); the nature, object, causes, and effects of the passion of fear (qq. 41-44); the nature of the passion of courage (q. 45); and the nature, causes, remedies, and effects of the passion of anger (qq. 45-48).

¹² The former work, written between 390 and 400 and falsely attributed to Gregory of Nyssa in the Middle Ages, studies the passions of desire, pleasure, sorrow, anger, and fear. For this treatise in the critical edition of the Latin text known to Aquinas, see *Nemesius d'Emese De natura hominis*, ed. Verbeke and Moncho, 92-126. Damascene reproduces Nemesius's treatise almost verbatim, as he examines in book 2 of his *De fide orthodoxa* the passions of joy, sorrow, fear, and anger (ed. Buytaert, 119-47). P. Bonifatius Kotter (*Die Schriften des Johannes van Damaskos*, 5 vols., Patristische Texte und Studien [Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1969-88], 2:xxix) has identified seventy passages in *De fide orthodoxa* in which Damascene's remarks concerning psychology and anthropology can be traced to Nemesius. As for Aristotle, we find passing comments on the passions inasmuch as they relate to moral virtue and to pleasure in *the Nicomachean Ethics* (especially 2.5-6; 3.6-7; 4.5-6; and 7.3-10), and inasmuch as the passions affect the dispositions of an audience targeted for convincing

That Aquinas places the treatise on the passions in the moral part of the *Summa* is surprising if we recall that the dominant *telos* of the moral life, and the governing principle of the entire *Secunda Pars*, is eternal beatitude. Indeed, at first sight one would expect Aquinas to have placed his study on the passions earlier, in the *Prima Pars*, specifically in the treatise on the human soul (qq. 75-90), whose prologue proposes to study "the essence of the soul, its powers, and its operations" (q. 75). As movements of the sensitive appetite (a power of the soul), the emotions are certainly to be included among the soul's operations.

But Aquinas prefers the moral life, not the more metaphysical study on the human soul, as the backdrop for his study on the emotions. Such a move allows him to drive home the point that the emotions play a necessary first step in our striving for happiness, in our attaining the end of seeing God. Although the passions incline us to the lowest kind of goods, to bodily goods, which cannot bring us complete fulfillment as rational beings, these goods do participate in goodness itself—they are, after all, "good." These interim lower goods remain ordered ultimately to the perfect and sufficient good (*summum bonum*), to the absolute perfection of God.¹³

By being inclined internally to limited bodily goods, we are already on the road, as it were, to the highest good. We are set on a trajectory, even if only in its initial stages, that has as its ultimate end point God himself. It bears insisting: the life of spiritual and moral excellence is not bereft of the enjoyment of earthly and bodily pleasures. On the contrary, such enjoyment is foundational to the life of holiness and moral perfection. The life of holiness is

argument in the *Rhetoric* (especially 2.2-14). These passing comments yield what Mark Jordan ("Aquinas's Construction of a Moral Account of the Passions," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 33 [1986]: 71-97, at 75-8) calls "innumerable details and applicable maxims."

¹³ Michael Sherwin ("In What Straits They Suffered: St. Thomas's Use of Aristotle to Transform Augustine's Critique of Earthly Happiness," *Nova et Vetera*, English edition, 3 [2005], 321-33) underscores well Aquinas's achievement in uniting, rather than opposing, ultimate happiness with an earthly happiness that human natural powers alone can attain: "Aquinas is able to describe Aristotle's [earthly notion of] happiness as a participation of ultimate beatitude [I]t is a true participation of heavenly beatitude" (333).

inclusive of our desires, not at odds with them. In a word, God wants all of us to share in beatitude, bodily desires and all, not just our "cerebral" sides; he does not want love of him to exclude desiring and loving created earthly goods.

We should stress that this view on the primordial, indispensable role emotion plays in the human striving for the *summum bonum* exhibits a somewhat Platonic strain in Aquinas's thought. While ambivalent on the matter, Plato nonetheless understands well that our lower animal-like drives (what he terms 'spirit' and 'appetite') should not be suppressed as such or inhibited excessively. Rather, they are like steeds which, although unruly and needing to run, are the "erotic" drive we depend upon to propel us on toward the highest Beauty and the highest Good. Reason acts as the charioteer, to use Plato's legendary metaphor, by which the motive force provided by the steeds is properly harnessed and oriented to the highest of the forms, the Good. This holds even if, as Plato admits, such harnessing "of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to (the charioteer)." ¹⁴

Christian spiritual writers both before and after Aquinas, however, have been loath to recognize the foundational role the enjoyment of limited bodily goods plays in our pursuit of spiritual excellence. This is due in no small measure to the disordering effects of sin on human affectivity and to the enduring influence of the Stoic disdain for human emotion. ¹⁵ Such disdain has led the

¹⁴ Plato, *Phaedrus* 246-56, in Benjamin Jowett, trans., *The Dialogues of Plato* (New York: Random House, 1937); for other remarks on the division of the soul, see *Republic* 4. Plato's ambivalence stems from his disdain for the body, which probably accounts for why in *Phaedo* (64-84) he speaks of how one must move beyond sensible pleasures in order to attain true spiritual joy. This undoubtedly explains why Aquinas rarely comments on Plato's regard for the morality of the passions (for one passage in which Aquinas addresses Plato's position, see *STh* I-II, q. 34, a. 3). Pope Benedict XVI's inaugural Encyclical Letter, *Deus caritas est*, which opens with an attempt at reconstructing a renewed and purified understanding of *eros* and *agape*, approximates the Platonic understanding of *eros* in saying that *eros* is a form of love the Greeks see as "a kind of intoxication, the overpowering of reason by a 'divine madness' which tears man away from his finite existence and enables him, in the very process of being overwhelmed by divine power, to experience supreme happiness" (*Deus caritas est* 4 [translation taken from the Vatican web site (www.vatican.va)]).

¹⁵ See below for references to Stoic texts (principally from Cicero, Seneca, and Virgil). For numerous texts from Aquinas criticizing the Stoic view and which span his entire career, see Paul Gondreau, *The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Beitrage

Christian spiritual tradition in the main to relegate the passions, and human affectivity in general, to the margins of the spiritual life, usually as obstacles to be shunned.¹⁶ With expressive imagery, Pinckaers notes the danger of reviling this essential element of human life:

zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge 61 (Munster: Aschendorff, 2002), 282 n. 46. Two examples are *Sth* I-II, q. 59, a. 3, where he denounces the Stoic view as "unreasonable" (*hoc irrationabiliter dicitur*), and *In loan.*, c. 11, lect. 5 [Marietti ed., 1535], where he calls the Stoic disdain for emotion "excessively inhuman" (*valde inhumanum*). For an analysis of the influence of Stoicism on Aquinas's thought, including the morality of the passions, see E. K. Rand, *Cicero in the Courtroom of St. Thomas Aquinas*, The Aquinas Lecture 1945 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1946); Gerard Verbeke, *The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 1-19; and Michel Spanneut, "Influences stoïciennes sur la pensée morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin," in *The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas: Proceedings of the Third Symposium on St. Thomas Aquinas' Philosophy*, ed. L. J. Elders and K. Hedwig, Studi tomistici 25 (Vatican City: Libreria editrice vaticana, 1984), 50-79.

¹⁶ An exception to this general rule would be the great twelfth-century mystic Bernard of Clairvaux, who stresses heavily the affective side of the human love for God (e.g., in his "Sermon 7 on the Song of Songs" [in *Bernard of Clairvaux: Selected Works*, ed. G. R. Evans, Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 110-15]). Pinckaers ("Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions," 274) points to D. M. Prilmmmer's influential *Manuale Theologiae Moralis* (11th ed.; Freiburg im Breisgau, 1953) as a good example—despite its claim of being written "according to the principles of St. Thomas Aquinas"—of moral hostility to the emotions, since its treatment of the passions comes in the section entitled "On the Enemies of Voluntary Acts (*De hostibus voluntarii*)." Two spiritual writers who lived shortly before Aquinas and who repeated the Stoic charge that the passions are "sicknesses" of the soul were William of St. Thierry (d. 1148), *De natura corporis et animae* (PL 180:714) and Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173), *De statu hominis interioris* 1.9 and 34 (PL 196:1122 and 1141). One could also list Gregory of Nyssa, who, as Michael Dauphinais tells us ("Languages of Ascent: Gregory of Nyssa's and Augustine of Hippo's Exegeses of the Beatitudes," *Nova et Vetera*, English edition, 1[2003], 141-63, at 151-52), sees passion as signifying unruly, disordered desire as such. See Gregory of Nyssa, Homily 5.131-33, in *Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Beatitudes: An English Version with Commentary and Supporting Studies. Proceedings of the Eighth International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa* (Paderborn, 14-18 September 1998), ed. Hubertus R. Drobner and Albert Viciano (Boston: Brill, 2000). The influential modern Lutheran thinker Dietrich Bonhoeffer (*The Cost of Discipleship* [repr.; New York: Touchstone, 1995], 127) carries on the Christian-Stoic heritage when he writes the following on the emotion of anger: "Jesus will not accept the common distinction between righteous indignation and unjustifiable anger. The disciple must be entirely innocent of anger, because anger is an offence against both God and his neighbour." For a recent theological essay arguing that the Christian life should be devoid of the emotion of anger, see Paul Lauritzen, "Emotions and Religious Ethics," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 16 (1988): 307-24; idem, *Christian Belief and Emotional Transformation* (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1992).

Some think that [moral excellence] can only be achieved by suppressing our feelings and passions in a kind of self-mutilation. But would we want an animal trainer to use such methods? Wouldn't we mock him if he showed us tigers without fangs or claws? On the moral level such tactics would be more serious, not to say ridiculous, for movements of sensibility exist and act within us.¹⁷

In order to break ranks with the Stoic-inspired school of thought, then, and to stress that we cannot secure a happy life—the goal of moral action—without the emotions, Aquinas takes the unprecedented step of situating the passions at the heart of his study on human morality. Such a tactical maneuver underscores the point that we cannot jettison the emotions from "the universal consideration of moral agency," as Pinckaers puts it.¹⁸ Our sensitive appetite, our animal-like inclination to lower goods, acts as a kind of germinating seed from which our desire to possess the first good sprouts forth. In this good our entire appetitive longing (our "erotic" longing, to use Platonic language), both intellectual and sensitive, both rational and animal, finds its complete rest. Such longing no doubt accounts for Aquinas's rather bold, if not controversial, assertion that the passion of love, *amor*, acts as the source of two theological virtues, namely, hope and charity.¹⁹ In a word, the whole of man is made to be moved from within, moved even by his lower sensitive appetite, to the acquisition of eternal happiness, to the proper end of human life.

¹⁷ Servais Pinckaers, *The Pursuit of Happiness—God's Way: Living the Beatitudes*, trans. Mary T. Noble (New York: Society of St. Paul, 1998), 62-63.

¹⁸ Pinckaers, "Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions," 273.

¹⁹ *STh* II-II, q. 17, a. 8: "[The virtue of] hope precedes charity, and this is clear from the fact that hope and all movements of the appetite [including charity] derive from love [*ex amore derivatur*]" (cf. *ibid.*, ad 2). By this Aquinas means all appetitive movements toward the good, even those of the most spiritual kind, have simple affective connaturality as their foundation: "every movement towards something or rest in something [including the virtues of hope and charity] arises from some connaturality [*connaturalitate*] or apress [*coaptatione*] to that thing, and in this does [the passion of] love [*amor*] consist" (*STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 4). Pinckaers ("Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions," 276) adds that when Aquinas examines the effects of the passion of love, he employs terms (e.g., union, mutual indwelling, ecstasy, zeal, and wounding) that "directly evoke the language and experiences of Christian mysticism." I am grateful to Vivian Boland, O.P., for bringing this point to my attention (in personal conversation).

II. How HUMAN EMOTION BECOMES RATIONAL BY PARTICIPATION

A) *Competing Appetitive Pulls*

As Aquinas knew well, only too rarely do our intellectual and sense appetitive longings work harmoniously toward the attainment of our true end. Although the highest faculties of the human soul, reason and will, retain a natural "power to command" (*imperium*) the lower animal-like faculties, this power is not absolute. The sensitive appetite retains a kind of quasi-autonomy. As a result, the lower sensitive appetite, inclining as it does to interim sense goods, remains ever ready to rebel against reason and will's *imperium*, or, conversely, to consent to it.

This gives rise to a veritable strife within each of us, a clash between competing appetitive pulls: the one to bodily goods (the lower sensitive pull) and the other to our highest good, the good of reason (the superior intellectual pull). The Christian theological tradition has employed the term 'concupiscence' to refer to this contest of appetitive pulls in the human person. Saint Paul poignantly describes it as a "war among my members" making him "not do the good I want" (Rom 7:14-24). Every person finds himself subject at times to the inordinate pull of emotions that, to varying degrees, oppose his better judgment. In a word, concupiscence encapsulates the entire package of disordering effects that sin has wreaked on the passions, or on human affectivity in general.²⁰ Pinckaers, again using vivid metaphorical imagery, expresses well the interior state of disorder that pertains to the experience of every human individual:

²⁰ In Aquinas the term 'concupiscence' denotes a state of general disorder in the human condition, wherein the sensitive appetite remains inordinately inclined to lower, mutable goods. See *STh* I-II, q. 82, a. 3; I-II, q. 82, a. 4, ad 1; I-II, q. 91, a. 6; *De Malo*, qq. 3-4; and *De Veritate*, q. 25, aa. 6-7. For a detailed analysis of this point, cf. M.-M. Labourdette, "Aux origines du peche de l'homme d'apres saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue thomiste* 85 (1985): 357-98, at 371-85; and Gondreau, *The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 294-300.

If we look within ourselves and study our conscience and reactions a bit, we can perceive the shadowy figures of all kinds of animals who live there and threaten us.... We find the proud, domineering lion, the bragging rooster, and the vain peacock, the flattering cat and the sly fox.... We discover the brutal rhinoceros and the sluggish elephant, the scared rabbit and the sensual pig, the fierce dog and the gnawing worm.... What power and firmness is needed, what clear-sightedness and skill, if we are going to control all these instincts, bring them to heel, and compel them to obey and serve charity! Complete self-mastery is a long and exacting work.²¹

B) Reason's and Will's Limited Power to Command the Sensitive Appetite

To signify this unique relationship between the lower sensitive appetite and the higher intellectual powers, and the appetitive conflict accruing to it, Aquinas resorts to a term coined by Aristotle, *principatus politicus*.²² By this term Aquinas, following the Philosopher, attempts to convey a political metaphor whereby the lower appetite can be likened to free subjects who participate in limited ways (viz., through their free consent) in the governance of a sovereign, the sovereign in this case being reason and will. Today we would say constitutional monarchy best corresponds to the type of political model to which Aquinas wishes to compare the *imperium* that reason and will exercise over the sensitive appetite.

Continuing to follow Aristotle, Aquinas singles out the cultivation of the moral virtues (along with the assistance of divine grace, he would add) as the way reason and will harmoniously exercise their *imperium* over the sense appetite and its movements, the passions. Moral virtue acts as the vehicle by which the sensitive appetite cooperates serenely with its "sovereign," reason and will. To moral virtue belongs the task of "humanizing" the emotions, the movements of our lower sensitive appetite.

²¹ Pinckaers, *The Pursuit of Happiness*, 62.

²² The classical text from Aquinas affirming this comes in *STh* I, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2. For the term in Aristotle, see *Politics* 1.5.1254b2-5 (translations of Aristotle are from Richard McKeon, *The Basic Writings of Aristotle* [New York: Random House, 1966]).

If this insight is not unique to Aquinas, neither is it to Aristotle. Ancient Greek wisdom as a whole perceived the need to balance and humanize, through the governing role of reason, our lower animal-like drives. Not only is this the implication of Plato's allegory of the charioteer, it is also, as indicated at the outset of this essay, dramatized especially powerfully in Aeschylus's *Oresteia*, written a full century before Aristotle. It is implied as well, I think, in as ancient a work as Homer's *Odyssey*. Here we read how Odysseus survives his long return journey to Ithaca by the balanced self-control he persistently exercises over his lower urges—in contrast to his shipmates, who all eventually lose their lives as a consequence of their lack of said self-control. We see this in the case of the cattle of the sun god Helios, which Odysseus and his men are forbidden to eat under pain of death but which Odysseus's shipmates, succumbing to their hunger, find impossible to resist. We see it as well when Odysseus's men yield to the allure of the lotus plant, the fruit of which saps a man of all memory of his native land and of all desire to return home.

If this regard for the balanced integration of the emotions through the governance of reason is implied in Aeschylus and in Plato (despite the latter's ambivalence) and even in Homer, it is made fully explicit in Aristotle, for whom moral virtue "is concerned with passions and actions" (Aquinas will assert that the passions constitute the proper "matter" of the moral virtues).²³ Such a designation means that moral virtue, more than anything else, involves the transforming of our lower animal-like desires and passions into actions that conform to and participate in the genuine human good, into actions that set us on a trajectory toward, rather than divert us from, our highest good. Moral virtue orients the moral agent, inclusive in particular of his affectivity, to God himself.²⁴

²³ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.6.1106b15-16; Aquinas, *STh* I-II, q. 59, aa. 4-5; I-II, q. 60, a. 3. See as well Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura hominis* 31 (ed. Verbeke-Moncho, 126); and Albert the Great, *De bona*, tr. 1, q. 5, a. 1, ad 4 (ed. C. Feekes, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Colon., vol 28 [Munster: Aschendorff, 1951], 74).

²⁴ While the view that virtue orients the moral agent to God is central to Aquinas's teaching, such a view is practically absent from the likes of Elizabeth Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre, both of whom played a key role in the twentieth-century recovery of the "virtue

C) "*Rational by Participation*"

Aquinas takes the notion of *principatus politicus* and its close association with moral virtue further. While continuing to draw upon Aristotle, specifically upon the Stagirite's observation that the sensitive appetite "participates in reason to some extent,"²⁵ the Dominican Master forges a doctrine on the transformative power of moral virtue that becomes truly his own.

In Aquinas's participated psychology, the lower animal-like powers (including the sensitive appetite) flow from and participate in the higher intellectual ones, all the while remaining ordered back, drawn, to these higher powers. Because it retains its own quasi-autonomy, namely, the ability to obey (or disobey) its own reason's *imperium*, the sensitive appetite enjoys a privileged participation in and drawing towards the higher powers, reason and will. It enjoys a unique synergy with the rational dimension of the human person.

This is especially the case when it concerns a virtuous act, that is, an execution (*electio*) by the will of a judgment of right reason on the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of a given movement of emotion (a judgment made in light of the truth of the human person and of how the sensible good in question is ordered to our highest good).²⁶ Simply put, since the sensitive appetite must give its consent to the will's command that it carry out said judgment of right reason, it follows that this lower appetite can act as an active principle, as a source, of virtuous behavior. Moral virtue, in other words, succeeds in converting the

ethics" of Aquinas (and Aristotle). For two recent works that seek to reinstate this view among current virtue-ethics proponents, see Fulvio Di Blasi, Joshua Hochschild, and Jeffrey Langan, eds., *Virtue's End: God in the Moral Philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas* (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2007); and idem, *Ethics without God? The Divine in Contemporary Moral and Political Thought* (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2007).

²⁵ Aristotle, *Nie. Ethics* 1.13.1102b13-14.

²⁶ We can see here how essential the virtue of prudence is to living appropriately in relation to our emotions, since prudence allows right reason to know when a particular inclination to some sense good falls in line with our ordering to the first good. For an excellent study on right reason as the rule and measure of human acts, see Laurent Sentis, "La lumière dont nous faisons usage: La règle de la raison et la Loi divine selon Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 79 (1995): 49-69.

very emotions themselves into virtue-oriented movements. Aquinas does not hesitate to assert that the lower appetite, our animal-like inclination to bodily goods, has the capability of becoming, in its very act, "*rational by participation*."²⁷ Not rational *per se*, the passions become rational by active, co-opted collaboration with reason and will; in this way does Aquinas consider them rational by participation.

This teaching, while plotting, as we shall see, a middle course, is remarkable. *Prima facie* it seems nonsensical to hold that emotion can give rise to virtuous acts, or partake in human rationality. After all, the passions flow from the animal-like side of the human person, and virtue is nothing other than the will's execution of what is cognitively judged to be rationally appropriate behavior. Human rationality and free choice, not emotion, make an act virtuous.

While Aquinas agrees that virtue consists first and foremost in an act of the will—"the principal act of moral virtue," he affirms, "is choice [*electio*], and choice [*electio*] is an act of the rational power"²⁸—he understands that it need not consist exclusively in an act of the will. In no case does he hold that our passions and desires have, or at least should have, little or nothing to do with our moral obligations, that we should do what we ought to do regardless of our passions and desires.

²⁷ I *Ethic.*, lect. 13 (Marietti ed., 242) (emphasis added) (Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics,"* trans. C. I. Litzinger, O.P. [Notre Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1993]). Aquinas outlines this position in much greater depth in three principal *loci*: *STh* I-II, q. 56, a. 4; *Quaestiones disputatae De virtutibus in communi*, a. 4 ("Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites can be the subject of virtue"), which was written just after the completion of the *Prima Secundae*; and *III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, qcla. 2. Classic studies of this issue are found in M.-D. Chenu, "Les passions vertueuses: L'anthropologie de saint Thomas," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 72 (1974): 11-18; and idem, "Body and Body Politic in the Creation Spirituality of Thomas Aquinas," *Listening* 13 (1974): 214-32. For another excellent study of this issue, see William Mattison, "Virtuous Anger? From Questions of *Vindicatio* to the Habituation of Emotion," *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 24 (2004): 159-79; see also Bonnie Kent, *The Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995).

²⁸ *STh* I-II, q. 56, a. 4; *De virt. in comm.*, a. 4. The first part of this phrase is a quotation of Aristotle, *Nie. Ethics* 2.6.1106a36; and 6.2.1139a22-3.

D) The Case of Continnence: Doing the Good without the Affective Desire for It

Aquinas's discussion of the virtue of continence and how it differs from the virtue of temperance may help clarify what it means to say the emotions become rational by participation. Here he takes his inspiration once again from the thought of Aristotle, though he is more explicit than the Stagirite in drawing out its implications.

The continent individual is the person who acts virtuously but only after waging a struggle against disordered bodily desires. The continent differs from the incontinent in that the latter succumbs to his disordered bodily desires, and thus acts contrary to his principles, contrary to what he knows he ought to do.²⁹ Though seduced by his sensual desires, the continent person, unlike the incontinent, does not yield to such desires and persists in accomplishing the good of reason: "the continent man is to be praised," Aquinas observes, "because he is overcome not by sensual desire [as is the incontinent person] but by reason."³⁰

Nonetheless, the continent individual's problem centers on the fact that he fights against strong desires for bodily pleasures not in accord with his better judgment. This is why Aristotle says such a person "acts on decision [i.e., on rational judgment], not on appetite [or on sensual desire]."³¹ The continent person does the right thing, though not because he has the affective desire for it. Put another way, the continent individual does the virtuous deed through raw will power alone, not with the help of his passions.

If the continent person is to achieve complete moral perfection, he must attain a proper regulation of his sensual desires or, more generally, of his internal affective ordering to created bodily goods. He must be good not only in his rational judgment but in all his internal desires as well. Contrary to the

²⁹ Aristotle notes that in the continent individual, "reason rightly induces to what is best, but something besides reason seems to be innate ... which conflicts with reason and resists reason" (*Nie. Ethics* 1.13.1102b17-19; see also 7.9-10.1151a30-1152a35).

³⁰ *VII Ethic.*, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 1443).

³¹ Aristotle, *Nie. Ethics* 3.2.1111b15.

view of, say, Immanuel Kant, who holds that we should observe our moral duty in spite of what we desire, the moral life is meant to be a life of joy, both affective and spiritual. This can only happen when we act on rational judgment and on sensual desire together, when our virtuous actions flow from our passions and desires: "it belongs to man's moral good to be moved toward the good both by the will and by the sensitive appetite," Aquinas insists.³²

E) The Case of Temperance: Doing the Good with the Affective Desire for It

Aquinas understands that one can affirm precisely this of the fully temperate individual. The person who has acquired the habit, the character (*habitus*), of being temperate experiences little or no inordinate pull from his concupiscible appetite. He *is* pulled by his concupiscible appetite, but toward the rational good, as his internal desires assist him in acting temperately. He performs the virtuous deed not through raw will power alone but with the help of his passions. In this way even his desires are morally praiseworthy. Such a person acts with pleasure and promptness, and finds ease, not burdensome toil, in living virtuously.³³ This person has attained the goal of the moral life.

The regulation of pleasures associated with sex, which more specifically concerns the virtue of chastity (temperance oversees the balanced enjoyment of bodily pleasure in general), illustrates well how the temperate (or chaste) person differs from the continent one. While both the chaste individual and the continent do what reason commands as regards sexual pleasure, the continent person does so only through struggling with desires for illicit sexual pleasure. Conversely, the truly chaste individual experiences no such struggle. This person enjoys good affective desires, chaste desires, and these help him accomplish the good of reason. Aquinas would argue that, whereas both observe the

³² *STh* I-II, q. 24, a. 3.

³³ See *STh* I-II, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1.

chaste duty, there remains a clear moral difference between the two. The chaste man has acquired the character (*habitus*) of being chaste, which results in rightly ordered internal desires, whereas the continent individual simply does the chaste thing without having chaste desires. As Aquinas affirms in two key passages from his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

[I]n these men [endowed with the habit of moral virtue] nearly everything—both external actions and internal desires—harmonize with reason [And so when we consider the difference between the virtues of temperance and continence, we see that] the temperate man does not have the evil desires of the continent because his sensual desire is well ordered by his habit of temperance Hence, by his habit of temperance the temperate man takes no delight in desires contrary to reason, while the continent man is disposed to take unreasonable pleasure though he is not seduced by his passion.³⁴

This leads Aquinas to conclude, rather boldly, that the chaste individual enjoys a virtuous concupiscible appetite, that is, a rightly (or rationally) ordered concupiscible appetite which offers its active assistance to living chastely. His concupiscible appetite is inclined, of itself, to being chaste; it possesses the habit, the character, of the virtue of chastity ("his sensual desire is well ordered by his habit of temperance").³⁵ Conversely, the continent man is foiled by his concupiscible appetite. His desires speak a different voice from his reason. Herein lies the moral difference.

F) Emotion as a Goad to Acts of Self-Mastery

What we see concretely illustrated in the case of the chaste individual drives home the moral implications of the notion of *principatus politicus* and what it means to say that the emotions become rational by participation. For additional clarification on

³⁴ I *Ethic.*, lect. 13 (Marietti ed., 239); and VII *Ethic.*, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 1453-4); emphasis added.

³⁵ In *Nie. Ethics* 1.13.1102b29, Aristotle affirms that in the fully virtuous person, "every act [of the lower sensitive appetite] harmonizes [*homophonia* (lit., 'is of one voice')] with reason."

this point, we should consider briefly the notion of the human being as master of his actions.

Aquinas notes that it is unique to the human person, who is endowed with reason and will, to have mastery over his actions, or to enjoy the ability of governing his internal movements which may otherwise oppose his rational judgment.³⁶ The need for self-mastery does not extend to *all* our actions, however. Our bodily limbs, for instance, do not require the oversight of reason and will in order to ensure they do as they are commanded; the hand, the foot, the arm, the neck will always observe what the mind commands of them and would never, on their own, resist the commands of reason and will. Strictly speaking, we do not gain "mastery" over the running of our legs or the turning of our heads.

Our lower animal-like appetite and its movements, the passions, belong to a different realm. It is the realm of the truly human, that is, the realm of the rational (by participation) in virtue of reason and will's governance: "[the passions are acts] common to men and brutes," writes John of St. Thomas, "but in man [they are] governable by reason."³⁷ Because it has the power to obey or disobey reason and will's *imperium*, the sense appetite, in its operation, requires the proper oversight of our higher powers. In a word, the lower appetite incites the human person to acts of self-mastery, since over the emotions the human person can and must gain mastery. This is to say nothing other than that the emotions incite the human person to acts of virtue, as gaining such self-mastery belongs of course to the task of moral virtue.

Insofar, then, as an emotion leads us to gain mastery over it, it is brought up into the work of our higher intellectual faculties. It

³⁶ "Man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human of which man is the master. Now man is the master of his actions through his reason and will" (*STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 1).

³⁷John of St. Thomas (John Poinsot), *Introduction to the "Summa Theologiae" of Thomas Aquinas. Isagogue of John of St. Thomas*, bk. 2, pt. I-II, trans. Ralph Mcinerny (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2004), 65. For more on this theme, see Claudia Eisen Murphy, "Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 8 (1999), 163-205 (also idem, *Virtues and Vices of the Passions: An Analysis of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Psychology* [Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1998]).

is finalized as a properly human act, as a rational act, as a virtuous act. In the case of the chaste individual mentioned above, we can say his desires for sexual pleasure are finalized as rationally appropriate, as virtuous desires, all the while remaining affective desires. He enjoys chaste or "humanized" affective desires.

Just as importantly, to say that the emotions incite us to acts of virtue, that the sense appetite acts as a goad to virtue, is to affirm that this lower appetite is a source of rationally appropriate (i.e., virtuous) behavior. The human sense appetite, our animal-like ordering to created bodily goods, gives rise to acts of virtue as from a principle or source, as from a cause.³⁸

We see here just how far Aquinas pushes his participated psychology. What the sensitive appetite sets in motion reason and will finalize through a transformative synergistic process. Recall how the *Oresteia* illustrates this transformative process when, after the Furies have agreed to subordinate their instinctive desires for blood vengeance to the commanding role of reason, represented by Athena and the other Olympian gods, these desires are transformed and "humanized," that is, integrated into and thereby made to collaborate with a system of justice informed by reason (namely, trial by jury).

G) The Lower Sense Appetite as a Virtuous Habit

Since the sensitive appetite participates in the rational dimension of the human person through its acting as a source of virtue, nothing prevents us from locating moral virtue in this lower animal-like inclination to sense goods. On this point

³⁸ As the fifteenth-century Thomist John Capreolus, commenting on this teaching of Aquinas, succinctly puts it: "Every power that is able to be a principle of a human act, and is not of its nature determined ... to obeying reason, can be the subject of a virtue" (*Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis*, bk. 3, d. 33, a. 1, end of concl. 1 Uohn Capreolus, *On the Virtues*, trans. K. White and R. Cessario (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 250]). Aquinas does affirm in *STh* I-II, q. 77, a. 6, ad 2 that emotion can lessen the freedom of an action when it acts as a cause of virtue. But this is not the same as what is at issue here, which Capreolus well explains. It is more what Aquinas argues in *STh* HI, q. 56, a. 4, namely, that any power of the soul that operates as a principle of a genuine human act must participate in human rationality.

Aquinas is unequivocal: "it follows that there [is a kind of] human virtue ... [which] is placed in what is rational by participation, that is, in the appetitive part of the soul."³⁹

Once we say this, we can, with Aquinas, speak of the sense appetite as a virtuous habit (*habitus*), since virtue is nothing other than a *habitus*, a quality of the soul, whereby our repeated good acts incline us to acting rightly, or endow us with a stable, character-shaping skill at acting well.⁴⁰ The sense appetites are operative passive potencies that are capable of receiving a character-determining formation (*habitus*).

Some moralists, pointing to a text by Aristotle for support, continue to debate whether virtuous habits, because they incline us to a certain type of comportment, actually lessen our freedom.⁴¹ We must recall, however, that the faculty of choosing, the will, has as its object the universal good, the good of reason. Because virtuous habits incline us to the rational good, they order the will to its proper object. In so doing they ensure a proper functioning, and thus the proper fulfillment or flourishing, of the will. Aquinas does not look upon free will as a radically open-ended, undetermined power, indifferent to whatever stands before it, whether good or evil. Rather, freedom is determined and perfected by, because inscribed in, the human person's natural inclination to the good.⁴² While it may hold, then, that vicious habits lessen our freedom (the type of habit, in fact, mentioned by Aristotle), just the reverse is the case for virtuous habits.

Through growth in moral virtue, the lower sense appetite advances from a power that contests reason and will's power to command to one that cooperates more and more, through its own impulses, with this *imperium*. Not simply forced to submit to reason and will, the sense appetite is treated as a kind of equal,

³⁹ I *Ethic.*, lect. 13 (Marietti ed., 243).

⁴⁰ III *Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, qcla. 2; and *De virt. in comm.*, a. 4.

⁴¹ The key passage from Aristotle comes in Nic. *Ethics* 3.5.1114a3-22, where the Stagirite asserts that those who have cultivated the vicious habit of intemperance or injustice lack the ability, the freedom, to be anything but intemperate or unjust.

⁴² "The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires ... [since] the appetible good is the object of the will" (*STh* I, q. 82, aa. 2 and 3; see also I, q. 83, a. 3).

and thereby conscripted into active, collaborative service in the acquisition of the moral virtues. The temperate individual, as we saw, is no longer foiled by disordered desires for bodily pleasures, but actually enjoys rightly ordered, virtuous desires for said pleasures. As Aquinas affirms in a key passage:

It is not the function of moral virtue to make the sensitive appetite altogether idle, since virtue does not deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but instead makes them execute [*exequantur*] the commands of reason *through the exercise of their proper acts*. Virtue therefore ... orders the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.⁴³

If this did not happen, our attempt at acting virtuously would meet often with resistance from our lower animal-like inclination to sense goods. This would severely limit the extent to which virtuous behavior perfects our character, since we would never rise above the virtue of continence. The internal acts that stem from our lower sensitive appetite, the emotions, would never be genuinely "humanized." To attain the state of moral perfection we need to become good in our emotions and desires as well as in the choices of our will.

III. THE UNIQUENESS OF AQUINAS'S THEORY

As noted at the outset of this essay, this element of Aquinas's thinking stands out in striking relief when we situate it against the backdrop of the history of philosophical thought. With the obvious exception of Aristotle, philosophers typically adopt one of two extremes on the matter. Either they assign the passions a negligible, if not inimical, role in the moral life, or they allot emotion a governing, commanding role in the moral life.

A) Theories Disparaging the Passions

For the former, beyond the ambivalences of Plato, Stoicism marks the first philosophical school of thought to harbor a clear

⁴³ *STh* I-II, q. 59, a. 5 (emphasis added).

disdain for emotion. Failing to distinguish passion (i.e., an internal movement of sense inclination to bodily goods) from the movements of our intellectual appetite (i.e., the will), and preoccupied with emotion's ability to cloud our judgment and to hamper our duty to live virtuously, the Stoics can manage no better than to revile the passions as "sicknesses of the soul."⁴⁴ The goal of the moral life is *apatheia*, indifference to one's emotional states.

Neoplatonism carries on this contemptuous attitude for human emotion, looking upon passion as an inherent hindrance to the spiritual ascent of the soul toward union with the One.⁴⁵ Influenced by the neo-Platonic view and representative of the Franciscan voice, Bonaventure in Aquinas's own day takes issue with the Master from Aquino's decision to assign a seat of moral virtue to the sense appetite; at the end of the thirteenth century John Duns Scotus amplifies the Franciscan criticism.⁴⁶ Neither of

⁴⁴ For Stoic texts indicating a contempt for the passions, see Cicero, *De finibus* 3.20; *Tusculanae Quaestiones*. 1.80; 3.4 and 10; 4.5-6; Virgil, *Aeneid* 4.449; and Seneca, *De dementia* 7; *Moral Epistles*, IX, epistles 5, 9 and 85; and *De constantia sapientis* 7. For more on this, see Gondreau, *The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 281n.44.

⁴⁵ Plato's remarks in *Phaedo* 64-84, where again he speaks of how one must move beyond sensible pleasures in order to attain true spiritual joy, probably explain why Neoplatonism blames the passions for much of human suffering and disorder, as Pierre Hadot notes in his *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 83-100. Commenting on this aspect of Hadot's work, Michael Dauphinais ("Languages of Ascent," 144-45) writes: "The passions debilitate human beings; the spiritual exercises of the philosophers cure the sickness. . . . [T]o be a neo-Platonist meant that one submitted to a set of progressive spiritual exercises moving one away from the disturbance of the passions toward union with the One." Pinckaers ("Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions," 275) agrees: "The Platonists favor the overcoming of the sensible pleasures in order to attain the joy caused by contemplation of Ideas." For his part, Augustine takes a positive reading of the Platonists' regard for the morality of the passions in *De civ. Dei* 9.4 (CCSL 47:251).

⁴⁶ Bonaventure forges his position in *III Sent.*, d. 33, a. 1, q. 3 (Quaracchi, Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882-89, 3:715-18). The dispute with Aquinas on this matter is well documented by M.-D. Chenu in "Les passions vertueuses. L'anthropologie de saint Thomas," 11-18; and idem, "Body and Body Politic in the Creation Spirituality of Thomas Aquinas," 214-32. Cf. Peter King, "Late Scholastic Theories of the Passions: Controversies in the Thomist Tradition," in *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, ed. Henri Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), 229-58.

these two Franciscan thinkers will allow Aquinas to ascribe an active principle of virtuous conduct to our animal-like inclination to bodily goods, that is, to our sensitive appetite. For them, virtue can *only* arise from an act of the will, not from the lower appetite as well, since they hold that free choice alone appends moral worth to our actions.⁴⁷

In short, Bonaventure and Scotus conceive of the relationship between the higher powers of the soul and the lower powers more in terms of imposed submission; reason and will simply impose their rule on the lower sensitive appetite. Virtue does not transform the emotions into virtue-oriented movements. It only "tames" the passions through what Bonaventure calls a forced "submission to reason" (*optemperat rationi*).⁴⁸ This submission to reason comes from the rational powers from on high and as from without. On this point Augustine, for whom reason rules sensuality despotically, emerges as another probable source for Bonaventure's position.⁴⁹

One could also list Descartes, who otherwise derides the writings of his predecessors on emotion, as a proponent of the view that would truncate any real synergy or communication

⁴⁷ Scotus sums up his position when he writes in *Opus Oxoniense*, bk. 3, d. 33, q. 1: "the moral virtues should not be posited as present principally in the sensitive part of the soul... [For] the will [alone is related to acting] rightly and not-rightly And the only necessity of positing virtues in powers is so that powers that of themselves are able to act rightly and not-rightly might be ruled by them." For studies on Scotus's teaching on the passions, see Alan R. Perreiah, "Scotus on Human Emotions," *Franciscan Studies* 56 (1998): 325-45; and F. de J. Chauvet, "Las ideas filosóficas de J. Duns Escoto sobre las pasiones," *Estudios Franciscanos* 48 (1936): 244-65. For a general presentation of Scotus's thought, see Allan B. Wolter, *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986); Tobias Hoffmann, "The Distinction between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 66 (1999): 189-224; and, for the virtue of prudence in particular, Mary Elizabeth Ingham, "Practical Wisdom: Scotus's Presentation of Prudence," in *John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics*, ed. L. Honnefelder et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 551-71.

⁴⁸ Bonaventure, *III Sent.*, d. 33, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1 (Quaracchi ed., 3:717). Scotus's position, as cited in the previous note, matches Bonaventure's closely: "the only necessity of positing virtues in powers is so that powers that of themselves are able to act rightly and not-rightly might be ruled by them" (*Op. Ox.*, bk. 3, d. 33, q. 1).

⁴⁹ The position of Augustine, drawn from *De civitate Dei*, is reported by Graham McAleer, "Pleasure: A Reflection on *Deus Caritas Est*," *Nova et Vetera*, English edition, 5 (2007): 315-24, at 317.

between the lower affective dimension of human life and reasoned judgment.⁵⁰ Stirred by his dualist anthropology, Descartes confines the passions exclusively to the realm of the body. And since the body is superficially joined to the soul, the passions bear no intrinsic relation to the true human good, the concern of the soul.⁵¹ His view approximates the position of Bonaventure and Scotus in that he assigns virtue the task of "reining in" or "domesticating" the emotions almost against their will, or at least in spite of the lower sensitive appetite's proper inclination.

Not far removed from the position of Bonaventure and Scotus, or of Stoicism for that matter, is the view of Immanuel Kant. Kant, of course, builds his moral system on an anti-realist rejection of the objective nature of the human being as a basis for moral theory. That is, his moral thought presupposes a denial of any objective knowledge of being. This leads Kant (upon whom

⁵⁰ In his *The Passions of the Soul*, pt. 1, a. 1 (in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. Robert Stoothoff [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 1:328), Descartes writes: "The defects of the sciences we have from the ancients are nowhere more apparent than in their writings on the passions.... [T]he teachings of the ancients about the passions are so meagre and for the most part so implausible [*si peu croyable*] that I cannot hope to approach the truth except by departing from the paths they have followed." Descartes, who for his own part gives scanty attention to the morality of the passions in this lengthy work, since he separates the passions from virtuous action, either had not read Aquinas or simply fails to give Aquinas his due (Aristotle too, for that matter). Pinckaers offers a detailed comparison of Descartes's teaching on the passions to Aquinas's in "Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions," 279-82.

⁵¹ Descartes himself writes: "It is to the body alone that we should attribute everything that can be observed in us to oppose our reason.... [I]t must be observed [then] that (the passions) are all ordained by nature to relate to the body, and to belong to the soul only in so far as it is joined to the body" (*The Passions of the Soul*, pt. 1, a. 47; and pt. 2, a. 137 (Stoothoff, trans., 346 and 376). This leads Descartes to isolate the passions from the work of virtue in part 2, article 148 (Stoothoff, trans., 382): "For if anyone live in such a way ... [of] what I here call 'pursuing virtue,' he will receive from this a satisfaction which has such power to make him happy that the most violent assaults of the passions will never have sufficient power to disturb the tranquillity of his soul." Also, in part 3, article 212 (Stoothoff, trans., 404), he writes: "the chief use of wisdom lies in its teaching us to be masters of our passions and to control them with such skill that the evils which they cause are quite bearable." For an interesting study criticizing Descartes's radical dualism and how it impacts his teaching on the passions, see Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Putnam, 1994). Damasio shows how practical reasoning and affective states are severely impaired by damage to areas of the brain that are responsible for affectivity.

we cannot discount the overriding influence of nominalism (via Luther) to cast aside our inclinations and sensible movements, including the emotions (part and parcel of an "objective human nature"), in the pursuit of moral excellence. He insists that the only intrinsically good thing and the only subject of good moral action is a good will.⁵² Human reason, Kant famously writes in a way reminiscent of the Stoic view, must therefore issue its commands "with disregard and contempt" for the "impetuous" natural inclinations (including the emotions). The natural inclinations represent nothing more than "the powerful counterweight to moral duty."⁵³

Whereas, then, for Aquinas what we ought to do should include our passions and desires, and whereas the moral life should ultimately be a life of joy, for Kant moral duty requires us

⁵² "[M]oral worth ... can lie nowhere else than in the principle of the will" (Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], sect. 1, p. 13. We should be struck by how similar this statement is to the one cited above from Scotus, *Op. Ox.*, bk. 3, d. 33, q. 1: "the moral virtues should not be posited as present principally in the sensitive part of the soul. ... [For] the will [alone is related to acting] rightly and not-rightly." To be sure, in the same section from the *Groundwork*, Kant ascribes "genuine moral worth" only to a good deed done "not from inclination but from duty" (12), since "an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of inclination" (where inclination would include the movements of sensibility, the emotions) (13); he holds up as honorable only that kind of love which "lies in the will and not in the propensities of feeling [*empfindung*]" (ibid.); and he asserts that the grounding for duty stems from the fact that "there is left for the will nothing that could determine it except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and so the maxim of complying with such a law even if it infringes upon all my inclinations" (13-14). For an insightful, concise study of Kant's moral philosophy, see Robert Sokolowski, *Moral Action: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), Appendix D, "Kant," 215-20.

⁵³ Kant writes in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Gregor, trans., 17): "The human being feels within himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands of duty ... -the counterweight of his needs and satisfactions.... Now reason issues its precepts unremittingly, without thereby promising anything to the inclinations, and so, as it were, with disregard and contempt for those claims [of the inclinations], which are so impetuous and besides so apparently equitable (and refuse to be neutralized by any command)." Commenting on this element of Kant's thought, Sokolowski (*Moral Action*, 215-16) observes: "The good inclination is contrasted to the moral goodness of the will. ... Reason thus legislates for itself; it does not have its rules set for it by nature Kant's moral philosophy [therefore] assumes a conflict between practical reason or will, on the one hand, and need, inclination, desire, aversion, or sensibility, on the other."

to tear ourselves away from our emotions and desires. Our passions and desires have, or at least should have, little or nothing to do with our moral obligations. We should do what we ought regardless of our passions and desires.⁵⁴

B) Theories Making the Passions Regnant

As for the philosophical extreme that hands the reins of moral conduct to the passions as such, first mention must go to Epicureanism. According to this ancient moral philosophy, the good life, the life of moral excellence, consists in the pursuit of pleasure and in the avoidance of pain; the Epicurean goal is to attain a life free of all disturbance (*ataraxia*).⁵⁵ As Pinckaers notes, "[t]he Epicureans place their beatitude at the level of the emotions."⁵⁶

A close parallel to the Epicurean view later emerges in the moral thought of David Hume. Hume's moral philosophy, like Stoicism, blurs any real distinction between acts of the will and lower animal-like movements of sensibility. However, whereas in Stoicism this blurring leads to a disparaging attitude toward emotion, an attitude shared by Kant, in Hume it leads to the opposite conclusion. For him, virtue is identified with movements of passion as such. To say "pleasure" is to say "virtue" and to say "pain" is to say "vice."⁵⁷ In short, moral judgments, in Hume's

⁵⁴ Without exaggeration, Richard Taylor (*Good and Evil: A New Direction* [New York: Macmillan, 1970], 103-15) describes Kant's moral system accurately when he writes: "To be genuinely moral [for Kant], a man must tear himself away from his inclinations as a loving being, drown the sympathetic promptings of his heart, scorn any fruits of his efforts, think last of all of the feelings, needs, desires, and inclinations either of himself or of his fellows and, perhaps detesting what he has to do, do it anyway-solely from respect for the law."

⁵⁵ The materialist Epicurus, the founder of Epicureanism who lived 341-270 B.C., writes: "pleasure is the starting-point and goal of living blessedly" (*Letter to Menoeceus*, in *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, trans. and ed. Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988], 24).

⁵⁶ Pinckaers, "Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions," 275.

⁵⁷ In *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. 3, pt. 3, sect. 1 (ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960], 574), Hume writes: "The chief spring or actuating *principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain*. ... The most immediate effects of pleasure and pain are the propense and averse *motions of the mind*; which are diversified *into volition*, into desire and

view, are nothing other than expressions of feeling. We should not be surprised, then, when we read Hume assert, rather provocatively: "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."⁵⁸

Closely related to Hume's position is that of his British predecessor, Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes defines our internal life entirely in mechanistic terms, or entirely in terms of matter in motion. The human person's internal states consist in nothing other than sense perceptions of material objects that give rise to pleasant or unpleasant sensations. These in turn end, respectively, in desires or aversions (or fears).⁵⁹ As with Hume, then, Hobbes's moral system is based entirely on our passions, on our affective likes or dislikes. The "good life," the moral life, consists in the simple satisfaction of our self-interested desires. Like animals, we are entirely self-serving, self-interested creatures, for whom "good" is meaningful only in relation to bodily objects. "Good" simply names objects of our desires or aversions, not some ultimate, common end shared by all human beings.⁶⁰ If for

aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, according as the pleasure or pain changes its situation" (emphasis added). Hume then follows with the stark moral implications of this position (574-75): "We have already observ'd that moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and that whatever mental quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction [i.e., pleasure], is of course virtuous; as every thing of this nature, that gives us uneasiness [i.e., pain], is vicious." He repeats this a bit later (590): "Each of the passions and operations of the mind has a particular feeling, which must be either agreeable or disagreeable. The first is virtuous, the second vicious."

⁵⁸ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. 2, pt. 3, sect. 3 (Selby-Bigge, ed., 415). Later Hume states: "Moral good and evil are certainly distinguish'd by our *sentiments*, not by *reason*" (ibid., bk. 3, pt. 3, sect. 1 [Selby-Bigge, ed., 589]). Judith Barad ("Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and Activity," *The Thomist* 55 [1991]: 371-413, at 371) observes accordingly: "David Hume ... hold[s] that the choice of ultimate values is always made by the emotional side of our nature."

⁵⁹ "Life it selfe is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense" (Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson [Middlesex-Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968, repr. 1981], pt. 1, c. 6, p. 130).

⁶⁰ As Hobbes affirms in *Leviathan*, pt. 1, ch. 6 (Macpherson, ed., 120-22): "For these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used in relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good or Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man *Pleasure*, therefore, (or *Delight*) is the appearance or sense of Good; and *Molestation* or *Displeasure*,

Aquinas, then, our emotions mark one lower dimension of the inner life of the human being, for Hobbes they are part and parcel of the only dimension of human life, since he defines man as nothing more than a machine—a definition one modern author claims marks "a great step forward in thought" (!).⁶¹

An equivalent of the Humean-Hobbesian view resurfaces later in the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. For these philosophers, moral duty lies in strict correspondence with sensible inclinations to pleasure. What one ought to do is that which accords the greatest and most lasting pleasure. This is because, for them, pleasure marks the only intrinsic good (and pain the only intrinsic evil): happiness, as Mill starkly puts it, consists in "pleasure and deliverance from pain."⁶² Enjoyment of the greatest number of sense goods by the greatest number of people marks the goal of British utilitarianism.

CONCLUSION

Counterbalancing various strong voices in the philosophical tradition, Aquinas smiles kindly upon the role of emotion in the moral life. In no way should our passions and desires, which significantly impact the way we think and choose, be excluded

the appearance, or sense of Evil! And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some Delight; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse Displeasure and Offence." Hobbes's identification of good with pleasure and evil with pain, or his blurring of emotion with virtue and vice, is seen later in the same chapter (Macpherson, ed., 122-27). Here Hobbes lists what he calls the various kinds of pleasures (or delights) and displeasures (or aversions): appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, grief, pain, hope, despair, fear, courage, anger, confidence, diffidence, indignation, benevolence, good nature, covetousness, ambition, pusillanimity, magnanimity, valor, liberality, miserableness, kindness, lust, luxury, jealousy, revengefulness, curiosity, religion, superstition, panic, terror, admiration, glory, vain-glory, dejection, sudden glory, laughter, sudden dejection, weeping, shame, blushing, impudence, pity, cruelty, emulation, envy, deliberation.

⁶¹ The claim that Hobbes's mechanistic view of the human being marks a significant advancement in human thought comes from R. S. Peters, in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1972), s.v. "Hobbes, Thomas."

⁶² John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism* (in *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963], 10:210); Jeremy Bentham, *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (in *The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham*, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L.A. Hart [London: Athlone Press, 1970], 1:1).

from the human quest for moral excellence. No matter their often disquieting interference in the moral life, they are meant to play an integral part in our striving for the first good and ultimate happiness. Aquinas goes even further, insisting that moral virtue can heal the disordered nature of the passions to the extent that the virtuous individual is not merely untroubled by his passions, he is actually helped by his passions in living virtuously. Through growth in moral virtue, the passions become able to incline us to our highest good. They can help shape our lives into works of moral excellence.

In practical terms, this means the more virtuous a person becomes, the more he can trust his emotional reactions to persons and events around him, and the less he will struggle with his lower animal-like impulses. There is a greater likelihood his emotions will incline him to what is morally good for him. Certainly, there always remains the possibility that one's emotions will steer one away from the rational good. But for the virtuous individual, for whom the virtue of prudence safeguards against faulty judgments regarding particular movements of emotion, there is a greater likelihood that his passions will draw him to created bodily goods that share authentically in the good of reason. There is a greater likelihood they will help him attain his proper human flourishing. Such, in any case, is what the "remarkably ingenious" doctrine of Aquinas on the role of the passions in the moral life allows us to conclude.

AQUINAS, SCOTUS, AND THE CHRISTOLOGICAL
MYSTERY: WHY CHRIST IS NOT A HUMAN PERSON

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THE INCARNATION is the central mystery of the Christian faith. It is the mystery that distinguishes Christianity from all other theistic beliefs, and provides the path to another demarcating Christian mystery, the Holy Trinity. Through the mystery of the Incarnation the believer affirms that Jesus is both divine and human, God and man, while the mystery of the Trinity affirms that, although the Godhead is one in nature, it consists of three distinct persons. The latter mystery, while prior in nature to the first (for God is eternally triune while temporally human), is, however, secondary in terms of its revelation to mankind, for it is only through the teaching of Jesus that the Trinitarian personhood of God was explicitly revealed to man.

It is through the Incarnation of the Son that the triune personhood of God was revealed. This explains why the mystery of the Incarnation occupies center stage among Christian beliefs, and why, throughout the past two millennia, theologians have striven to expound its nature and signal importance for Christian believers. On this topic St. Thomas Aquinas could hardly have been more explicit. "Whatever is within a person," he states, "whether or not it pertain to his nature, is united with that person in its personhood [*in persona*]. If, therefore, *a human nature is not united to the Word of God in a person, it is in no way united with it.* The result of this is that faith in the Incarnation is completely

removed, further resulting in the total subversion of Christian belief." ¹

To the unbelieving, the mystery of the Incarnation often seems either indistinguishable from a pantheistic view, identifying God with nature and the world, or is interpreted as being merely a religious metaphor, affirming that Christ is god-like, though, in truth, a human person only. It is the theologian's calling, using human language and reason, to help clarify the meaning and implications of the dogmatic teachings of faith. Theologians do not thereby have either the first or the last word regarding what is to be believed, but they do perform an invaluable, subsidiary task of elucidating and defending the various mysteries of Christian belief. The theologian thus positively assists in uncovering much of the hidden riches and meaning of the revealed word, as well as in drawing attention to the splendid unity of the Church's dogmatic teachings. By the mystery of the Incarnation the Christian faith affirms that Christ is truly both God and man. Christ is not God appearing to be human; nor is he a human appearing to be divine.

The present study restricts its consideration to the contrasting positions taken regarding the mystery of the Incarnation by perhaps the two preeminent theologians of the High Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. Both are, of course, in agreement regarding the doctrinal content of the mystery of the Incarnation. It is their views regarding its theological explanation that are at variance. How and why this is the case is the focus of the present study.

I

We begin by addressing Scotus's view regarding personhood. For Scotus, a human person is a singularly existing being composed of body and soul, capable of reasoning. He insists that

¹ *STh* III, q. 2, a. 2, resp. *prope finem* (emphasis added). Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas are my own.

nothing further is required, other than being singular, to render a human incommunicable, and hence a person.²

Scotus's position, then, is that no further positive entity need be added to an existing singular human nature to constitute it as a person. What lies behind Scotus's affirmation is his position regarding the source of singularity in created beings. He rejects the view of singularity advanced by Aristotle, later embraced by Aquinas and others, that it is secondary matter, quantity, that is the cause of singularity within material beings. Contrarily, Scotus affirms that individuation is brought about by a uniquely positive entity that both contracts and perfects the underlying common nature of existing things. Though this singularizing principle does not add to or in any way modify the nature as nature, it does account for its positive and ultimate perfection of singularity.

It is this unique entity that for Scotus brings the nature to its final state of perfection. At the same time he insists that this principle is not an accident, since it is the ultimate perfection of the nature; it is, however, what justifies our affirming that this nature is a singular thing. To the inevitable question, what is this singularizing principle? Scotus responds: "And if you ask me what is that individual entity from which the individual difference is derived, is it matter or form or the composite of both, I answer that ... that entity is not matter nor form nor the composite, inasmuch as these are nature, but it is the ultimate reality of the being which is material or form or composite."³

Scotus, then, sees the individuating principle as a positive entity that provides the ultimate perfection of the nature of an existing thing, rendering it this particular thing. The term later given to this entity, and with which it has often been identified, is the Latin neologism *haecceitas* (i.e., haecceity, thisness). A human person, according to Scotus, requires no further perfection beyond that of the principle of individuation, haecceity, since individuation entails incommunicability. Thus a singularly existing human nature is for Scotus, by dint of its singularity, a human

² Scotus, *Quodlibet* 19, a. 3.

³ *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, no. 187-88. Translations from the Latin, unless otherwise noted, are mine.

person, since it is that which provides the nature with its ultimate actuality. Further, since a singular thing is an actually existing thing, requiring nothing further to perfect it, it suffices to render the existing thing incommunicable.

If the singular nature is human, the singular, existing entity is, *ipso facto*, a person. As a consequence, it could not, under ordinary circumstances, be united with another existing being without losing the perfection of its own personhood, for, by being so joined, it would have lost the prerogative of incommunicability essential to personhood. Such a union would ordinarily be possible only if its principle of individuality were surrendered and hence, in the case of a human nature, its personhood as well. Consequently, no singular human nature can be joined to another singular nature without losing its personhood. It would no longer exist in its own right, for only singular things exist in an independent state, and are thus incommunicable.⁴

II

Having examined Scotus's position regarding the principle of individuation as ultimately constitutive of created personhood, we are now in a position to raise the crucial question regarding the mystery of the Incarnation. The theological dogma of the mystery of the Incarnate Word requires the belief that Christ is both God and man, possessed of a singular divine and a singular human nature. It also entails the further belief that the personhood of Christ is divine only. He is not a human person.

The question, why is Christ not a human person? is, historically, *the* question that has long engaged theologians seeking a coherent explanation of the mystery of the Incarnation. This Scotus clearly recognizes, nor is he unaware that his theory of human personhood does not permit him the easy way out of simply denying the singularity of the human nature Christ assumed. Were he to make this claim, he would be saying that the

⁴ For a discussion of Scotus's theory of individuation see my article, "Scotus and *Haecceitas*, Aquinas and *Esse*, A Comparative Study," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 80 (2006): 63-75.

second person of the Trinity would have taken to himself an incomplete nature, and hence an imperfect one. This would follow for Scotus since the individuating principle, haecceity, is a positive perfection of the nature it singularizes. Further, all existing beings are actually singular; no nonindividual or common natures exist as such. On this point Scotus and Aquinas are in full agreement.

It would, as Scotus recognizes, be illogical to contend that the human nature assumed by the Godhead could be anything less than perfect; it could not lack whatever a human must ordinarily possess to be human. This would clearly be the case were one to allege that the human nature of Christ is lacking its own individuating principle. If one maintains that human personhood arises from a positive entity distinct from the individual nature, then the human nature assumed by the Second Person of the Trinity must be lacking that entity, since the mystery of the Incarnation requires unconditionally the acceptance that Christ is a divine but not a human person.⁵

Hence, should the assumed human nature be released by the Divine Word and no longer be united with it, that nature would, on Scotus's account, fall short of being a human person, since it would lack the final positive entity constitutive of human personhood. Recognizing this as unacceptable, Scotus concludes that created personality is not constituted by a further *positive* reality beyond the principle of individuation. Only negative realities could account for this, such as a denial of its being communicated, or its being in a state of dependency.⁶

Commenting on Scotus's definitive position regarding the status of the assumed human nature of Christ, and why this nature does not fulfill the requirements for human personhood, Allan

⁵ Scotus, *Quodlibet* 19, a. 3.

⁶ Ibid.: "Since beyond singularity no other positive entity is to be found by which a fully singular thing becomes incommunicable, all that can be added to singularity is a denial of communicability or dependency, which the state of incommunicability entails" ("quia ultra singularitatem non invenitur aliqua entitas positiva qua singulare complete sit incommunicabile, sed tantum singularitati superadditur negatio communicationis sive dependentiae, quae est incommunicari").

Wolter remarks: "originally Scotus had tentatively proposed a theory of accounting for how a singular human nature becomes a person by attributing this development both to a positive entity of some kind, perhaps a relation, complemented with a negation of communicability."⁷ He acknowledges that Scotus's position alluded to above, namely, that personhood results from the double negation of actual and aptitudinal communicability, represents his definitive position. Commenting on Scotus's views as expressed in *Quodlibet* 19 (article 3), Wolter states: "The denial of the positive entity theory of human personality and the substitution of the double negation theory . . . is presented categorically as Scotus's own view." He concludes: "Being a late work, it can be accepted as Scotus's final opinion on the subject."⁸

In Scotus's view, the singular human nature of Christ does not lack anything positive that would be required for it to be a person, for the human nature assumed by Christ was a singular, not a common one. The nature assumed by Christ must, for Scotus, possess everything the nature of a human person ought to possess in order for it to be a perfect human nature. What it does lack, he concludes, is nothing more than the state of incommunicability itself, for the singular human nature has been assumed by the second person of the Trinity, the Eternal Word. For Scotus, Jesus is not a human person precisely because the singular human nature has been assumed. Since it exists in communion with the Word, it lacks the status of incommunicability, and hence cannot be a person. It lacks nothing positive, however, which would ordinarily be an indispensable requirement for its being a human person. What prevents it from being a human person is the twofold negation of its status as incommunicable and independent.

One may further conclude that the *ultima realitas entis* (the crowning reality of being), is, for Scotus, the individuating principle, haecceity. If this ultimate reality pertains to a rational

⁷ Allan Wolter, "John Duns Scotus," in Damian McElrath, ed., *Franciscan Christology* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1980), 142.

⁸ *Ibid.* In a footnote Wolter suggests that this conclusion seems corroborated by another reliable text, *Ordinatio* III, d. 5, q. 1.

or human nature, it is the positive factor rendering that nature a human person. The individuating principle performs the twofold task of contracting and perfecting the nature to which it pertains. It contracts the nature, rendering it singular (whereas many individuals share in a common nature, humanity). It completes the nature in that it provides it with its culminating perfection, making it to be this unique individual distinct from all other existing things, even those sharing the same nature.

III

We turn now to Aquinas's position regarding the human person, and its application to the key Christological question: Why is the singular human nature of Christ not a human person? On this issue there is, clearly, basic disagreement between Scotus and Aquinas. The latter concludes that the human nature assumed by the Word is not a human person precisely because it does lack a positive entity required to render a singular human nature a person. For Aquinas the supposit (or person, in the case of humans), the singularly existing thing, is not to be traced, as it is for Scotus, to the individuated nature. Rather the singular nature as supposit or person includes within it additionally the act of being, that is, *esse*. It is thus not enough that the nature be fully actualized as nature, and hence individuated, for it to possess the final perfection that renders it a singularly existing thing, possessing existence in itself and not in another.

For Aquinas it is the act of being, *esse*, that roughly parallels the expression "*ultima realitas entis*" Scotus employs to identify his individuating principle, haecceity, which formally constitutes the individuated nature an existing thing or supposit, and, where the nature is human, a person.⁹ Furthermore, by distinguishing between the act of being and that which it actualizes—namely, essence (nature)—Aquinas is able to account for that ultimate

⁹ For a more detailed discussion of the role of *esse* as the formal constitutive of created supposit/personhood according to Aquinas, see James B. Reichmann, S.J., "St. Thomas, Capreolus, Cajetan and the *Created Person*," *The New Scholasticism* 30 (1959): 1-30, 202-30.

positive perfection of nature that Scotus will ascribe to haecceity, in addition to its power to individualize the nature.

Aquinas can affirm with full consistency that personhood is not formally (i.e., most properly) constituted by the nature's having been singularized. The individuated nature further requires its own proper act of being (*esse*) which, as the ultimate actuality of nature, renders the nature actually existent, and hence absolutely incommunicable, incapable of being assumed by another, and therefore personalized. It is only through the actuality conferred by *esse* that the singular nature exists independently, and hence in its own right.

It is important at this point that we take note of a subtle refinement of Aquinas's position that has on occasion been overlooked: namely, that while Aquinas not infrequently does refer to the supposit (person), as a 'distinct subsisting thing', he is in these instances viewing the supposit from its essential or material side only.¹⁰ In thus alluding to supposit Aquinas is clearly speaking of it denominatively, not existentially.¹¹ That is, he is considering the makeup of the supposit or person exclusively from the side of essence, and prescindendo from the purely actualizing principle, *esse*, since this does not contribute to the 'what it is' of the subsisting thing. The supposit considered formally or most properly, however, does include for Aquinas everything within the singularly existing being, and hence its *esse* as well, even though the latter imposes no limitation on the nature it actualizes.

Since the act of being does not alter the supposit either essentially or incidentally, the supposit or singular nature can truly be said to be one and the same in terms of content. Since,

¹⁰ Thus he states: "But since whatever subsists distinctly in human nature can only be an individualized thing, and thus distinct from others through individuated matter, this must be materially included whenever something is said to be a human person" ("Sed quia distinctum subsistens in natura humana non est nisi aliquid per individualement materiam individuatam et ab aliis diversum ideo oportet quod hoc sit materialiter significatum, cum dicitur persona humana" [*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 4]).

¹¹ *Ibid.*: "It is evident, therefore, that 'person', commonly understood, signifies an individual substance rational in nature" ("Patet ergo quod persona communiter sumpta, significat substantiam individualement rationalis naturae").

then, the act of being does not function as an essential or accidental principle, it exerts neither formal nor material causality on what it actualizes. It does not limit what it actualizes; rather, as pure actuality, it simply actualizes by giving being, though it is indeed limited by whatever potency it actualizes.¹² *AB* will be stressed later, it is precisely here that the metaphysical, and, consequently, the Christological views of Aquinas and Scotus significantly diverge.

It might indeed be surmised that it was in applying his theory of *supposit* to the mystery of the Incarnation that Aquinas's position on human personhood achieved its ultimate clarity. This must remain a matter of conjecture. Nonetheless, the distinction between the singular nature and *supposit*, or person, is central to Aquinas's theological explanation of why the singular human nature assumed by the Divine Word is not a human person. His position, again briefly stated, is that the humanity of Christ, though fully individual and lacking none of the essential or accidental attributes proper to a human person, is not a human person because this individual human nature is 'actualized' not by a human *esse*, but by the divine *esse* itself.¹³

Thus, for Aquinas, although Christ possesses two natures, he has but one existential actuality that encompasses both. It is perfectly consistent for Aquinas to affirm, as the Catholic faith teaches, that Christ is truly man, for he does possess a totally complete and singular human nature, and, at the same time, is truly God, since his sole act of being is the divine *esse*, which in turn is wholly one with the divine essence. Thus, though he has

¹² *Quodl.* 2, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: "[A]lthough *esse* is not itself included in the definition of *supposit*, yet, since it pertains to *supposit*, and is not included in the definition of nature, it is clear that *supposit* and nature are not altogether the same in anything whose nature is not identified with its 'to be' (*esse*)" ("[L]icet ipsum esse non sit de ratione *suppositi*, quia tamen pertinet ad *suppositum*, et non est de ratione naturae, manifestum est quod *suppositum* et natura non sunt omnino idem in quibuscumque res non est suum esse"). It is noteworthy that Aquinas employs the same argument in concluding that the essence and *supposit* in angels are not altogether the same: "In them [angels] *supposit* is not entirely the same as nature" ("*Suppositum* in eis [angelis] non omnino est idem cum natura" [ibid., ad 1]).

¹³ Ibid. For a fuller development of this distinction, consult the article referred to in note no. 9. Subsequently, we will investigate Thomas's view regarding a twofold *esse* in Christ.

two natures, Christ has but one *esse*, one transcendent act of being, and is, therefore, but one being, and hence one person.¹⁴ Christ is but one person on this account precisely because he lacks the overarching and crowning human perfection needed for him to be a human person, namely, an *esse* limited by the very nature it actualizes, that would forthwith constitute it a distinct human supposit.¹⁵

Aquinas makes this incontrovertibly clear when he hypothesizes that, were the humanity of Christ to be separated from its divinity, it would straightway become a human person, for the human nature of Christ lacks nothing human personhood requires other than its very own *esse* (*esse suum*).¹⁶ All that previously impeded the human nature from being a subsistent human being, and hence a person in its own right, was the fact that it lacked an *esse* proper to itself (i.e., one that is determined and hence limited by the essence it in turn actualizes). Aquinas reiterates this position in the *Tertia Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae* where he concludes: "For if the human nature had not been assumed by a divine person, the human nature would have its own personality."¹⁷

It should be noted that Aquinas's hypothesis regarding a separated human nature does not assume that there would be any change in the human nature itself. The latter would lose nothing pertaining to its essential or accidental human perfection, nor would it even be a different individual nature. The only way it would differ would be that, once separated, it would straightway

¹⁴ In the concluding portion of this study we shall return to this point, taking a closer look at Aquinas's argument.

¹⁵ There is, indeed, one text in particular where Aquinas does refer to a twofold *esse* in Christ. Hence the above statement requires qualification, which, for reasons that will become apparent, is presently passed over, but will be provided subsequently.

¹⁶ *Quad.* 9, q. 2, a. 2: "If, however, it is claimed that the humanity [of Christ] is separate from his divinity, then his humanity will have its being [*esse*] distinct from the divine *esse* itself, for the only thing that impeded its having its own proper [human] *esse* was that it was not subsistent in itself" ("Si tamen ponatur humanitas a divinitate separari, tunc humanitas suum esse habebit aliud ab ipso divino, non enim impediabat quin haberet proprium esse nisi hoc quod non erat per se subsistens").

¹⁷ "Si enim humana natura non esset assumpta a divina persona, natura humana propriam personalitatem haberet" (*STh* III, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3).

become an independent being with a human existing nature, and thus a human person. Its nature would be actualized by an act of being that is its 'own', that is, by an *esse* commensurate with, and hence limited by, the nature it actualizes. Aquinas adds that the separated human nature would suffer no frustration with regard to its own natural tendencies, since the actuation it previously enjoyed while united with the divine *esse* elevated it to a state far exceeding the requirements of its own nature.¹⁸

IV

The foregoing enables us to understand how the cutting-edge Christological question as to why Christ is not a human person was answered by Aquinas and Scotus. Unable to affirm that the singular human nature of Christ fails the test of human personhood because it lacks some human perfection, Scotus must base his conclusion that Christ's human nature does not render him a human person on a twofold negation: namely, that of incommunicability and independence.

Recognizing that to conclude that the human nature of Christ is not a human person because it lacks its own individuality is theologically untenable, Scotus must look elsewhere for his explanation, for the doctrine of the Incarnation entails that the human nature of Christ must possess everything that nature requires. It must, therefore, have its own haecceity, since for Scotus individuality is the ultimate perfection, the capstone, of every created thing. Haecceity is, for all human persons, the *a fortiori* positive entity rendering the human nature a person, and hence unique and incommunicable. All existing individual human natures are, therefore, in and of themselves, persons, and it is firm Christian teaching that the nature the Second Person of the Trinity assumed was an individual human nature.

Scotus is thus faced with a dilemma. If he agrees that the human nature of Christ is singular, and in all other instances of particular human natures the said natures are persons, why is the

¹⁸ Ibid.

singular nature of Christ not a human person? The response Scotus has given, as alluded to above, is notably atypical of the Subtle Doctor, for it provides no positive reason, but rests solely on a twofold negation. The assumed human nature of Christ is not a person because it has been assumed. Speaking positively, the singular nature possesses every perfection a human person must possess to be human. Negatively, however, Christ's human nature exists neither independently nor incommunicatively, for it has been assumed by the Second Person of the Trinity.

Yet this response cannot be viewed as satisfactory, for it forthwith invites the probing question: What does being assumed positively entail? If an assumed, singular human nature lacks nothing possessed by an individual human person, how can it fail to be a human person? How, precisely, does the act of assuming relate to human personality? Must not every negation rest on a prior affirmation?

If a singular human nature is not a human person, there appears to be but one viable option: namely, that this is owing to the human nature's lacking a positive perfection required for human personhood. To limit the difference to negation only, affirming that the human nature of Christ is not a person solely because it was assumed by the Second Person of the Trinity, without grounding the affirmation on a positive entity of any kind, would appear to render the assumption all but meaningless. It would further make it difficult to differentiate between divine adoption of humans by grace and the mystery of the Incarnation. The meaning of the term 'assumed human nature' seems seriously compromised, and with it a supportable defense of the claim that Christ, though not a human person, is nonetheless, fully human.

The respected Italian Scotist scholar Efrem Bertoni appears to agree with this critique, for he strongly criticizes a contemporary of Scotus, Henry of Ghent, for having defended a position regarding individuation with an argument that parallels the position later upheld by Scotus regarding the assumed human nature of Christ. Bertoni comments, "To affirm with Henry of Ghent that individuation does not require a positive principle

because the essential characteristics of the individual are negative, i.e., they consist in the intrinsic indivisibility and incommunicability of the individual to other things, is not to solve the problem but to avoid it."¹⁹ He then concludes, "The principle of individuation must be sought in something positive."²⁰ Bettoni's critique of Henry can be, it would seem, *mutatis mutandis*, fairly directed against Scotus's own theory of personality as it applies to the major question at issue here.

Walter's comment on Scotus's position regarding human personhood appears to defend it, for he subsequently comments that Scotus's position "paves the way for the claim that there are two distinct ways in which a human nature can become a person, one by consciously recognizing and deliberately accepting its autonomy or self-identity as a person (the *ultimata solitudo*), the other by the surrender of this autonomy in dedication to God."²¹ Such a comment, however, is disquieting, for it seems to suggest that the issue of personhood has been transferred from the purview of philosophy and consigned to that of psychology.

In a recent work providing a brief introduction to Scotus's thought, Mary Beth Ingham refers to the central role the mystery of the Incarnation plays in the overall theological views of Scotus, but she does not refer to the crucial question that has been the prime subject of this study, namely, why is the assumed human nature of Christ not a human person? Underscoring the Christocentric vision of Scotus, she affirms that: "The supreme value of the human person stands at the center of Scotus's vision of the created order Jesus Christ stands at the center, both historically in salvation history and methodologically, as Scotus reflects on the cognition he enjoyed in his earthly life."²² She further concludes, "His [Scotus's] teaching on *haecceitas* points to

¹⁹ Efreem Bettoni, O.F.M., *Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy*, trans. Bernardine Bonansea, O.F.M. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1961), 59.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Wolter, "John Duns Scotus," 142-43.

²² Mary Beth Ingham, *Scotus for Dunces: An Introduction to the Subtle Doctor* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2003), 73-74.

the unique character of each individual, of each being. His position on the Incarnation and Immaculate Conception reveal the fundamental insight of the value of the human nature, and of each human person.²³ Elsewhere in the same book she writes, "The Incarnation is the centerpiece to the covenant and represents for the Franciscan tradition the Christological point of entry toward understanding the trinitarian nature of God."²⁴ In all of this, however, Ingham has given slight indication of having attended to the question underlying the mystery of the Incarnation that has historically been the major focus of theologians. No comment is offered concerning the viability of Scotus's Christological position—namely, that although the individuated human nature of Christ possesses the final perfection of human personhood, *haecceity*, it fails nonetheless to qualify as a human person.

In an article that appeared several years ago in *The Thomist*, Richard Cross criticized Aquinas's teaching on the Incarnation.²⁵ In a more recent study of the philosophy and theology of Duns Scotus²⁶ he supported Scotus's philosophy on the whole, particularly specifying the latter's treatment of the theological question regarding the personhood of Christ. In concluding his examination of Scotus's position, Cross remarks: "Scotus's account of the assumed human nature seems to me to have much to offer. He stresses that the human nature [of Christ] lacks none of the positive features required for being human. It fails to be a person not in virtue of anything that it lacks, but in virtue of an additional relational property that it uniquely has."²⁷ In the same work, alluding to Aquinas's view regarding the Incarnation, Cross observes, "Thomas Aquinas proposed a highly innovative solution to this problem—a solution with which almost everyone disagreed. Aquinas spells out his solution by appealing to his

²³ *Ibid.*, 135-36.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 73-74.

²⁵ Richard Cross, "Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation," *The Thomist* 60 (1996): 171-202.

²⁶ Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 121.

account of existence, *esse*, drawing on an analogy afforded by created substance, that of a substance and its concrete parts."²⁸ Cross then adds the following crisp comment: "This account was certainly generally rejected by all medievals other than *card-carrying Thomists*."²⁹

V

In order to address Cross's critique of Aquinas's view, it will prove helpful to examine several texts of Aquinas that provide his most explicit and mature treatment of the question of personhood and nature as they relate to the Incarnation-texts on which Cross principally focuses in formulating his critique. The texts are found in questions 2, 3, and 17 of the *Tertia Pars*, and in the disputed question *De Unione Verbi Incarnati*. In interpreting these texts it is crucial to bear in mind that they were composed near the end of Aquinas's life (i.e., ca. 1272, his death coming a short two years later). One can, then, be confident that these texts contain Aquinas's definitive thought on the matter of personhood. Further, it is now established that the third question of the *Tertia Pars* predates the separate short treatise on the Incarnate Word, while question 17 postdates that same treatise. Keeping this time frame in mind is important, for Cross claims that in *De Unione Verbi Incarnati* there is a significant shift in Aquinas's position from that taken earlier in the *Summa Theologica*.³⁰

The alleged discrepancies to which Cross refers pertain to Aquinas's emphasizing in some texts that there is but one *esse* in Christ, while in other texts he affirms two. Thus, in question 17 of the *Tertia Pars*, he expressly states that "*esse* pertains to the hypostasis and to the nature: to the hypostasis indeed as to that which has *esse*, and to the nature as to that by which something has *esse*; for nature signifies as a form."³¹ A close reading of this

²⁸ Ibid., 114.

²⁹ Ibid., 115 (emphasis added).

³⁰ Cross, "Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation," 198-200.

³¹ *STh* III, q. 17, a. 2.

text discloses that nature here acts as a formal cause only, giving being inasmuch as it gives determination to *esse*, thus making the existing thing to be the kind of being it is. There is at the same time, Aquinas adds, nothing to prevent a multiplication of *esses* that are incidental to the being, such as color or size, that modify but do not change a being's nature.

In the same question, however, Aquinas emphasizes that what completes a being, rendering it distinct and separate from all others, and hence a person, cannot be multiplied within a being "because it is impossible that one thing should not have one act of being [*esse*]." ³² Much earlier, in his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, Aquinas had underscored the same point when he concluded, "Hence, if there be a plurality of *esses* according to which something is said to be without qualification, it is impossible to say it is one." ³³

In *De Unione Verbi Incarnati*, Aquinas states that there is no better analogy of the hypostatic union taken from the world of created things than that of the union of soul and body. He cautions, however, that the analogy is to be understood not in terms of the soul as the form of a material body, since the Word cannot be the form of matter, but rather in terms of the body as an instrument of the soul. ³⁴ He immediately adds that none of the examples we might employ will perfectly convey this truth, "since an instrumental union is an accidental one; but the incarnation involves an altogether unique kind of union exceeding all other manner of unions known to us." ³⁵

In response to an objection that argues that the mystery of the Incarnation would imply a union of natures in Christ (i.e., the Monophysite heresy), Aquinas unequivocally says that in Christ there is indeed a union of natures, but that the union referred to is not in nature but rather in the person. This, he adds, is apparent from the fact that our faith tells us that the natures are

³² Ibid.

³³ III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2.

³⁴ *De Unione Verbi Incarnati*, a. 1.

³⁵ Ibid.

inconvertibly and unalterably united.³⁶ The two natures must be united, but in a way that permits them to remain distinct as natures.³⁷ In a word, the human and divine natures of Christ are one hypostatically, but not one in nature. They do not fuse together to form a new nature distinct from the original two, as, for example, hydrogen and oxygen come together to form water.

Article four of *De Unione Verbi Incarnati* addresses the same central issue considered in question seventeen of the *Tertia Pars*, namely, "Whether in Christ there is but one *esse* only." This article has been the source of considerable controversy, since it does speak of two *esses* in Christ, one divine and one human. It is this text that provides the prime basis for Cross's claim that Aquinas has either contradicted his earlier position (later repeated in *STh* III, q. 17, a. 2) or changed it. A close reading of this article, however, reveals that its teaching on Christ and personhood affirms nothing that is not fully congruent with both Aquinas's prior and his subsequent teaching on the singularity of personhood in Christ.

The opening sentence of the *respondeo* to this fourth article of *De Unione Verbi Incarnati* supplies the key to understanding what follows. "I answer that: it should be recognized that the nature and premisses of this question are in some respects the same, since it is on the same account that we say that a thing is one and being."³⁸ Aquinas then adds: "*Esse* is indeed properly and truly said of a subsisting supposit. Accidents and nonsubsistent forms are said to be inasmuch as something supports them; as whiteness is said to be, inasmuch as by it something is white."³⁹ He then

³⁶ *Ibid.*, ad 3: "The natures in Christ are indeed united; not however, as natures [*in natura*], but personally [*in persona*], which is evident from the very fact that they are said to be natures inconvertibly and unalterably united" ("*Naturae quidem unitae sunt in Christo; non tamen in natura sed in persona, quod apparet ex hoc ipso quod dicuntur inconvertibiliter et inalterabiliter naturae esse unitae*"). Cross does not refer to this aside.

³⁷ *De Unione Verbi Incarnati*, a. 1.

³⁸ *De Unione Verbi Incarnati*, a. 4: "Dicendum est quod huius questionis est quodammodo eadem ratio et praemissae, quia ex eodem dicitur aliquid esse unum, et ens."

³⁹ *Ibid.*: "Esse enim proprie et vere dicitur de supposito subsistente. Accidentia enim et formae non subsistentes dicuntur esse, in quantum eis aliquid subsistit sicut albedo dicitur ens, in quantum ea est aliquid album."

remarks that those forms that make something be, not without qualification, but in some subordinate way, are said to be accidental forms.

What immediately follows is critical for understanding Aquinas's teaching regarding the unity of Christ. "There are, however," he says, "some forms that account for a subsisting thing's having *esse* without qualification, because, that is, they determine the substantial *esse* of a subsisting thing."⁴⁰ In Christ, the subsistent supposit is the person of the Son of God, who is, by sharing the divine nature, unqualifiedly a substance; but he is not, by his human nature, rendered a substance unqualifiedly.⁴¹ Aquinas then concludes that, although the Eternal Word was not perfected in any way by having assumed the individuated human nature, the eternal supposit is 'substantialized' (*substantificatur*) by the human nature assumed, in that the Word is this man.⁴² He further concludes: "And thus as Christ is, strictly speaking, *one because of the unity of the supposit*, and *two in a restricted sense because of the two natures*, he thus has one *esse* strictly speaking, because of the one eternal *esse* of the eternal supposit."⁴³ Aquinas then carefully qualifies in what sense there is another *esse* in Christ: "There is, however, another *esse* of this supposit, not inasmuch as it is eternal, but inasmuch as in time it became human."⁴⁴ He further concludes, "though this *esse* is not an accidental one, since 'human' is not predicated incidentally of the Son of God, as previously established, yet neither is it the principal *esse* of the supposit, but a subordinate [*secundarium*]

⁴⁰ Ibid.: "Aliquae autem formae sunt quibus res subsistens simpliciter habet esse, quia videlicet constituunt esse substantiale rei subsistentis."

⁴¹ Ibid.: "In Christo autem suppositum subsistens est persona Filii Dei, quae simpliciter substantificatur per naturam divinam, non autem simpliciter substantificatur per naturam humanam."

⁴² Ibid.: "Quia persona Filii Dei fuit ante humanitatem assumptam, ne in aliquo persona est augmentata, seu perfectionata, per naturam humanam assumptam. Substantificatur autem suppositum aeternum per naturam humanam, in quantum est hic homo."

⁴³ Ibid.: "Et ideo sicut Christus est unum simpliciter propter unitatem suppositi, et duo secundum quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi" (emphasis added).

⁴⁴ Ibid.: "Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non in quantum est aeternum sed in quantum est temporaliter homo factum."

one."⁴⁵ He draws from this a profoundly important conclusion: "Were there two suppositis in Christ, each supposit would have its own *esse* primal to it, resulting in Christ being not just one divine person alone but two persons, one divine and one human."⁴⁶ The view that Christ is two persons represents, of course, the historically celebrated Christological teaching of the heresiarch Nestorius.

Consequently, the two *esses* Aquinas refers to are clearly understood by him as predicable of Christ not univocally, but analogically. The term *esse*, as Aquinas expressly states in the very same article, taken in its proper and true sense (*proprie et vere*), refers exclusively to a supposital, that is, personal, *esse*. Such an *esse* is the actuality not of a nature only, but of the entire existing or subsisting being. In Christ, as Aquinas adds shortly thereafter, this supposital *esse* is the *esse* of the Divine Word. Hence, Christ is, properly speaking, but one being, precisely because he has but one supposital or personal *esse*, which also actualizes his assumed human nature.

VII

Aquinas thus makes clear in what sense there is but one *esse* in Christ and in what sense two. The 'human *esse*' is not the *esse* of the supposit properly speaking, since the human nature does not exert formal causality on the *esse* that activates it, as would be the case for Aquinas in every instance of a created supposit. Since, in this unique instance of the Incarnation, the human nature is actualized by the divine *esse* of the Word, it does not in any way determine or limit that *esse*, as the citation just given clearly affirms. In this singular instance of the hypostatic union, the divine *esse* actualizes an essential form without itself being in any way determined or perfected by that form.

⁴⁵ Ibid.: "Quod esse etsi non sit esse accidentale, quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra habitum est, non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi sed secundarium."

⁴⁶ Ibid.: "Si autem in Christo essent duo supposita, tunc utrumque suppositum haberet proprium esse sibi principale. Et sic in Christo esset simpliciter duplex esse."

In that the human nature of Christ is actualized from its union with the Word, it has *esse* not previously possessed. Yet the *esse* actualizing the nature is not thereby rendered singular and human, the *esse* of a human person. It is precisely for this reason that the assumed nature of Christ is not a person in its own right, for, although it has substantial *esse*, that *esse* is not configured to the dimensions of the nature assumed. Thus Aquinas concludes his response in the fourth article of *De Unione Verbi Incarnati* by stating categorically: "If, however, there were two supposita in Christ, each supposit would have its own primary *esse*. And thus in Christ there would in the strict sense be a twofold *esse*."⁴⁷

Accordingly, this secondary *esse* is not an *esse* distinct from the divine *esse* of the Word which actualizes the human nature. Were it so, Christ would then indeed be a human person and, as such, incommunicable, and hence a supposit distinct from the divine person. Assuredly, the human nature is actualized, and, viewed from the perspective of this nature, the *esse* actualizing it does actualize a nature limited in scope, for it is limited by its being singular as well as by its being human. In this regard, then, the human nature can be said to have *esse*, for it does indeed exist. Yet the actuality by which it is, is not, properly speaking, its own actuality, in the sense that it is limited and shaped by the very nature it actualizes. "The *esse* of the human nature is not the divine *esse*. Nor can one simply say that Christ is two *esses*, since each is ordered diversely to the eternal supposit."⁴⁸

A citation from the *Summa Theologica* succinctly underscores the analogical parallel between the natural sonship of Jesus as divine, and the spiritual sonship accorded humans by the gift of adoption: "In the union of the human with God, which is through the grace of adoption, nothing is added to God: but what is divine is apportioned to man. Hence it is not God who is perfected but

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nee tamen simpliciter dicendum est quod Christus sit duo secundum esse; quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum. Et similiter etiam dicendum est ad alia."

man."⁴⁹ Divine adoption is, to be sure, an absolutely unique occurrence, in the order of created things, though it falls far short of the union of the humanity of Christ with the Godhead, for Christ's humanity is actualized not by a created act of being, *esse*, but by one that is uncreated and hence unqualifiedly divine. Consequently, Aquinas specifically notes that the *esse* of the human nature of Christ is not a personalized *esse*, limited by the nature it actualizes, for it is the *esse* of the Word which reaches out to 'existentialize' a human nature, which nonetheless remains undetermined by the nature it actualizes. Since, then, for Aquinas *esse* is the ultimate constituent of created personhood, Christ, having two natures, but only one unqualifiedly existential act (*esse simpliciter*), is one person, not two.

VII

The original champion of the foregoing teaching of Aquinas regarding the unity of Christ seems to have been Johannes Capreolus, upon whom has been bestowed the honorary title, Prince of Thomists. A Dominican theologian, Capreolus's life spanned the late fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth centuries (1380-1444). Much more recently, guided and inspired in good part by Capreolus's commentary, two French Jesuit theologians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Louis Billot and M. de la Taille, have signally contributed to a latter-day reawakening to Aquinas's theology of the hypostatic union.⁵⁰

In a presentation given in 1925 at the University of Cambridge, de la Taille provided his hearers with a trenchant, perhaps unmatched, commentary on Aquinas's treatment of the Christological mystery. The following excerpt from that address provides a fitting conclusion to the present study.

⁴⁹ *STh* III, q. 3, a. 1, ad 1. "In unione hominis ad Deum, quae est per gratiam adoptionis, non additur aliquid Deo" sed id quod divinum est apportitur homini. Unde non Deus sed homo perficitur."

⁵⁰ The present study is much indebted to this work.

Thus it appears that when we speak of the existence of Christ's humanity, there may be two meanings to the word. We may mean the actualizing principle: the *esse*. In that sense, we say that there is only one existence (one *esse*) of the Word and His humanity: the existence of the latter is the existence of the former; is the former Himself. But we may mean also by existence of the humanity *not the actuating principle, but the actuation by it*.

In that sense, the existence of the humanity is not the Word, nor His divine existence; it is something belonging to the created order; and, in the created order, it has two different aspects; it is absolute, as a substantial actuation; and it is relative, essentially relative to the Word's personal existence No, Cæreolus is not confounded. He seems to have understood St. Thomas best of all...⁵¹

In a subsequent article de la Taille underscored why St. Thomas sometimes speaks of one act of existence in Christ, and at other times two.

Consequently, if we are asked how many existences there are in Christ, we shall have to reply, one or two, according to the sense of the inquiry. *One, if there is question of the Act by which the natures exist, two, if there is question of the actuations, because the actuation of the human nature is temporal and created while the actuation of the Word, who is Himself the Act, is uncreated and eternal.* This is why St. Thomas, in the Disputed Question on the Union of the Incarnate Word, held two existences, whereas in the Summa he admits only one existence. III, q. 17, a. 2.⁵²

De la Taille thus incisively explains why Aquinas refers now to one, now to two acts of being in Christ. He further shows why this manner of speaking involves no incoherency. Indeed, he goes even further: "the one is not merely capable of reconciliation with the other, but demands the other. Two existences in that which is substantially one cannot be conceived except in virtue of the unity of the act of existence; and community in the act of existence between the diverse composing units necessarily supposes in one of the two an actuation quite different from that which is found

⁵¹ M. de la Taille, "The Schoolmen," ed. C. Lattey, in *The Hypostatic Union and Created Actuation by Uncreated Act* (West Baden Springs, Ind.: West Baden College, 1952), 22

⁵² M. de la Taille, "Created Actuation by Uncreated Act," trans. Cyril Vollert, in *The Hypostatic Union and Created Actuation by Uncreated Act*, 40 (emphasis added).

in the other."⁵³ "For this reason it [the *two-esse* theory] is a preferable account."⁵⁴

Failing to appreciate how the two accounts given by Aquinas complement each other, Cross concludes that during the spring of 1272 "Aquinas will have been committed to two quite different accounts of the incarnation."⁵⁵ Cross agrees with Scotus's view that the assumed human nature "fails to be a person, not in virtue of anything that it lacks, but in virtue of an additional relational property that it uniquely has."⁵⁶ Yet, how that 'relational property' is acquired is left unexplained.

IX

In summary, for Aquinas the singular human nature of Christ falls short of meeting the requirements of human personhood because it lacks that reality quintessential to a human person, that is, an *esse* limited by the very nature it activates. What is lacking, therefore, pertains neither to the order of essence nor accident, but to the highest order within existing things, namely, *esse*, the actuality of actualities. It is here that the defining difference between the views of Aquinas and Scotus relative to the Christological mystery is to be found. For Aquinas, the human nature of Christ lacks nothing at the level of nature or accidental perfection, including individuation, that would prevent it from being a human person. Rather, what is lacking is its own human existential act, for the nature, though actual and singular, is not actualized by an *esse* that is uniquely its own by reason of its being limited, and hence determined, by the nature it actualizes.

Hence Christ is not a human person, because the ultimate actualizing principle of his human nature is not unqualifiedly human but is, rather, unqualifiedly divine.

Scotus, on the other hand, is, on his own account, unable to fix on any positive perfection Christ is lacking that could account for

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Cross, "Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation," 200.

⁵⁶ Cross, *Duns Scotus*, 121.

why he is not a human as well as a divine person. Nor has he the option of denying haecceity or thisness to the human nature of Christ, for, as he maintains it to be the ultimate perfection of the nature, haecceity must be present, if one is to ascribe to Christ a nature that is truly and fully human. Hence, although in all other instances of existing humans haecceity is for Scotus the supreme personalizing principle, it cannot so function in the instance of Christ. Were it to do so, Christ would be two persons, both human and divine. Scotus cannot deny to the humanity of Christ any positive entity whose lack could provide grounds for denying to it the status of human personhood. Hence, the only path left open for justifying such a denial must lie in the direction of negation. Scotus is constrained to appeals to the twofold negation of incommunicability and independence to account for why the singular human nature of Christ does not suffice to constitute him also a human as well as a divine being. This twofold negation, in turn, he traces to the singular human nature's having been assumed by the Second Person of the Trinity.

This response is, however, unsatisfactory, since it leaves unanswered the question, what, precisely, does being assumed entail? How does the ontological status of an assumed singular human nature differ from one that, though existing, has not been assumed? Unless this question is candidly and satisfactorily addressed, one risks diluting, even imperiling, the critical distinction between Christ as man and other human beings who are, through grace, God's adopted children. If one relies wholly on mere negations to differentiate between these two forms of union, (i.e., divine adoption and assumption), is not the possibility, perhaps even the likelihood, of fatally obscuring the extraordinarily profound truth of the Christological mystery threateningly real? In light of this, it is puzzling that, in our own time, it has befallen the Christology of Aquinas to have been singled out as incongruous.

BOOK REVIEWS

Pope John Paul II on the Body: Human, Eucharistic, Ecclesial. Edited by JOHN M. MCDERMOTT, S.J., and JOHN GAVIN, S.J. Philadelphia: Saint Joseph's University Press, 2006. Pp. 410. \$45.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-916101-54-1.

While the subject of this volume is Pope John Paul II's thought and teaching, it is a *Festschrift* in honor of Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., and its contributors, with the exception of Cardinal Egan, who wrote the Preface, are all members of the Society of Jesus. Cardinal Dulles's contribution to the study of the late Holy Father's magisterium is reflected in two major contributions to this volume, which publishes the deliberations of the last two biennial Jesuit Conferences on the thought of Pope John Paul II. The book is richly complex, not only because it is a collection of essays that do not always pursue a sustained, systematic argument but also because the three senses of "body-human, Eucharistic, and ecclesial" are significantly different. Yet the unity of these three senses is not adventitious, since Christ's human body, his sacramental body, and his body the Church are each a means of being truly incorporated into the Person of Christ.

Not Christ directly but the late pope's teaching is the point of reference for the book's discussions. The introduction situates the papal teaching as presented in the writings of Cardinal Dulles and therefore introduces a further complication by advancing a thesis not immediately germane to Wojtyła's thought. John M. McDermott, after presenting the historical context of U.S. Catholicism at the time of the Second Vatican Council, argues skillfully that the council should be read theologically as a conflict between conceptualist and transcendentalist methods. This insight is used to clarify theological presentations at points throughout the book, but neither Avery Dulles nor Karol Wojtyła fits easily into either camp. For neither thinker is theology a system of rational deductions, and for both the authority of divine revelation resists being relativized by subjective dynamisms.

Convinced from the faith itself that the magisterium of pastors is necessary for the guidance of teachers of Catholic theology, Dulles became a primary interpreter of Pope John Paul's teaching. He contributes to this volume two articles in ecclesiology, one of which treats the Church as the body of Christ. Dulles's generous and clear exposition of sometimes complex or even convoluted arguments in Wojtyła's writings also informs the approach of those contributors

who discuss Christ's sacramental body in the Eucharist and those who present the pope's theology of the human body as spousal.

The theology of the body is examined scripturally and anthropologically. Wojtyla's use of Scripture, especially in his theology of the body, has been criticized for moving too quickly or even illegitimately from the reconstruction of the human author's intention at the time a book was written to philosophical and doctrinal conclusions that seem, at best, to be extrapolations from the scriptural text. William S. Kurz points out that the pope teaches as a pastor and consults Scripture "precisely as Scripture, as God's revealed and inspired word and guidance for his people and as the Church's book." Thomas D. Stegman sees the papal treatment of Scripture as close to what the liturgists call "actualization," respecting the historical context but putting the text now into a setting that changes our lives. Stegman believes this approach to be legitimate, but he is critical of the pope for sometimes overreaching the text in his conclusions. The lengthy discussion of scriptural methodology in this section of the book is useful but it doesn't directly raise the question the pope himself asks: What are the truths about the human body to which Scripture gives written witness?

From the standpoint of anthropological theory, the commentators examine the theology of the body in terms of causality and in terms of its being image or sign. These sections on the nature of matter, of subject, of solitude and marriage, of conscience and freedom pick up major components of the late pope's thinking and recast them in provocative ways. John Paul thought not only scripturally and philosophically but also incarnationally. His work is so synthetic that it lends itself to new insights even as one grapples to understand its primary message. The presentations by Cullen, Jamros, Muller, and McDermott contribute significantly to seeing in the theology of the body what the pope himself did not make explicit.

The discussion of the body of Christ, which is the Church, is presented by Cardinal Dulles and his responders, Joseph G. Mueller and Peter J. Bernardi. Dulles situates Wojtyla's teaching on the Church in his teaching on the Eucharist, so that the sacramental body of Christ, understood according to a sacramental realism, tells us what the ecclesial body should be. The image of the Church as bride enables the pope to bring his understanding of the nuptial or spousal nature of the body into ecclesiology: "The Church as a whole," Dulles writes, "has a predominantly feminine character." Mueller contrasts the traditional understanding of natural subordination of female to male (Eph. 5) with John Paul's teaching on mutual subordination of husband and wife in a communion of love. He then applies the pope's teaching on this mutual relationship to the relation between bishops and academic theologians in directing the Church.

Cardinal Dulles's reflections on Church governance focus on Pope John Paul's teaching on primacy and collegiality. In a theology of ecclesial communion, mutual relationships do not impede specific responsibilities. That papal primacy is part of episcopal collegiality is attested to in John Paul's consistent appeal to "the ordinary and universal magisterium" of the pope and all other bishops

teaching together. Cardinal Dulles sees episcopal conferences and the Synod of Bishops as expressions of collegiality, but not in its fullest sense. Nevertheless, the pope's presence in these gatherings, whether personally or by law, makes it "difficult to make any precise distinction between papal and collegial acts. Every collegial act is also an act of the Pope, since the college includes him as its head. Conversely, it is hard to identify any act of the Pope, in his capacity as successor of Peter, that is truly extracollegial. The Pope's role in the college is not that of a mere member but that of head." Bernardi picks up on Dulles's careful analysis by addressing, within the context of a theology of communion, multiple forms of participation in the teaching and governing authority that Christ gave the Church.

Discussion about the Eucharistic body of Christ center on the pope's teaching that the Eucharist manifests and makes present an infinite love freely sacrificed. Stephen M. Fields develops the relation between self-sacrifice and freedom to show how John Paul's teaching on the person as self-creative through deliberate moral choices informs his Eucharistic theology. Kenneth J. Rudnick responds by appealing to semiotic analysis to relate sign and causality, complementing Fields' presentation more than contesting it. The Eucharistic theology of Pope John Paul is used by Brian E. Daley to present the pope's theology of ordained priesthood.

In the course of the conference whose acts are published in this volume, the major presentations on the three senses of body were followed by individual and group reflections. The theology of the body evoked reflections on marriage, purity, virginity, and bodily resurrection; the theology of Church led to reflections on Sunday observance; and the theology of Eucharist opened conversation on suffering and on devotion to the Virgin Mary. A final section of the volume comments on papal encyclicals and writings that do not make use of the body as organizing principle. It contains another important piece by John M. McDermott, using John Paul's encyclicals on the Holy Spirit (*Dominum et vivificantem*) and on missionary activity (*Redemptoris missio*) to reflect on the tension between the universal and efficacious salvific work of the Spirit and the need for explicit evangelization and belief in Christ.

What can be said about these sometimes loosely connected presentations and multiple conversations? First of all, the participants use Pope John Paul's teaching on the three senses of body as a starting point for some original and faithful developments of Catholic teaching. Some participants in the conference seemed more wedded to a particular academic methodology and consequently wrestled with the pope's personal freedom in drawing from many sources to create his own original theological synthesis. Others entered deeply into the pope's teaching in order to elucidate themes he had not himself developed or to raise questions he had not himself asked. The latter approach especially, I believe, would have personally pleased Pope John Paul II.

Secondly, the book holds together because the contributors, for the most part, seem to understand that, beneath analyses and particular ideas, the strength of John Paul's teaching lies in his desire to find the unity necessary for effective mission. The Church must be an acting Church. He repeated often that the

Second Vatican Council was an exercise in ecclesial self-consciousness that enabled the Church to relate to every dimension of human experience. The Church as communion rooted in Trinitarian life and made visible in the Eucharist, the Church as a network of relationships that begin with the spousal nature of the human body itself, works always to unite all people to one another in Christ, the redeemer who sacrificed himself for the entire human race. Pope John Paul's thinking strove to move beyond the intellectual and other divisions that can paralyze the Church and cause her death through the abandonment of her universal mission.

Academics especially are right to be wary of a unity achieved by running roughshod over those distinctions that are necessary to understand the truth of things and to safeguard freedom. Nonetheless, Pope John Paul's synthetic vision traced the unity of the books of Scripture as a whole, the unity of body and soul in the human person, the unity of Christ and the Church in ecclesial communion, the unity of man and woman in marriage in order to understand the truth of things and to safeguard freedom. This volume is a tribute to him and to Cardinal Dulles as well as to all who contributed to it.

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Aristotle and the Science of Nature: Unity without Uniformity. By ANDREA FALCON. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xvii+ 139. \$75.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-521-85439-3.

The division of the natural world into two radically different kinds of physical substance—one often called "aether" and the other called "ponderable," or sometimes just "ordinary," matter—barely more than a century ago was not uncommon among natural scientists. The rudiments of the idea trace back to Aristotle, although for him these two substances were rigorously localized in the two principal regions of the cosmos, and thereby would acquire appropriate names: the celestial bodies and sublunary bodies. Copernicus and Galileo quickly did away with the isolation of the two substances, so aether's proponents found themselves positing it as much above as below. Yet after the acceptance of the theory of relativity, the idea of aether fell out of style among mainstream natural scientists, and ever since the very notion that nature should be thought to be so "bifurcated" has been considered to be a scandalous weakness in the Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Even among modern-day Thomists this bifurcation has often been held up as an instance of something that Aristotle simply got wrong, and so as a sign that the Stagirite's philosophy of nature is now of only historical

interest; we realistic Thomists (the story goes) should focus our interest on more relevant parts of Aristotle's corpus. Science has shown us that he was on the wrong track, so we must defer to it on these matters. There are, however, at least two problems with this approach: (1) few modern Thomists have tried to keep up with where modern science is going, so we are ignorant of what science thinks on these matters; and (2) even fewer Thomists have made careful study of the more obsolete parts of Aristotle's natural philosophy where he begins to spell out in detail his thoughts on the basic structure of the cosmos, so they do not know what they are dismissing.

Andrea Falcon's *Aristotle and the Science of Nature* addresses the latter problem and is a superb introduction not merely to the text and substance of Aristotle's *De Caelo*, especially as it bears on this division of nature into the sublunary and the heavenly, but also to the scholarly work on the subject in the last thirty years. Trying to see nature the way Aristotle does, Falcon argues that, although his contemporaries and successors (especially the Platonists) rejected his view, Aristotle posits an important discontinuity in nature that may in fact be a philosophical virtue. Aristotle's principled acceptance of the radical diversity of kinds of activities and natures in daily experience leads to an openness to finding still more fundamental divisions in the cosmos; combining this with the equally evident dynamic interconnectedness of the natural world, Aristotle is able to look see its "unity without uniformity," as the subtitle of this book puts it. Unlike the materialists of his day (and their modern-day heirs), Aristotle does not end up intellectually disintegrating nature into unconnected atoms but allows the mind to admit distinctions that do not require isolations of the things distinguished. Further, Falcon points out, Aristotle is not beginning with some sort of *a priori* commitment to there being a uniquely celestial matter, from which he concludes that nature must be twofold; rather, he is reflecting upon and inferring from a fundamental and observed discontinuity in nature to the postulation of celestial matter. Falcon proposes that Aristotle tries to understand what he observes on its own terms, not forcing the phenomena into prepackaged doctrines. Indeed, this honesty is something that Falcon wishes us to ruminate upon for it implies a recognition of the "human limitations on the extent of what can be known of this world" (x), and is in fact one of the sources of Aristotle's famous distinction, and even inversion, between our cognitive powers and nature's own knowability: "what is intrinsically intelligible does not collapse into what can be known by us" (ibid.).

The first two chapters lay the groundwork for the overarching claim of the work. Chapter 1 outlines the main parts of nature, and therefore of the philosophy of nature, using as a point of departure Aristotle's remarks at the beginning of the *Meteorology*. In particular, Falcon shows that Aristotle's insistence here that the heavens are to be studied well before plants and animals is at first surprising but also intelligible if Aristotle is already assuming in the *Meteorology* both that the structural unity and ultimate accessibility of nature derive from causal relationships, and that the heavens in particular exert a peculiar sort of one-way causality on the sublunary world of plants and animals.

Falcon argues that specifically the sun and its yearly motion must be understood in some measure in order to understand the generation here below, for, as he translates it, "it takes a man *and the sun* to generate a man" (9 [194b13; 1071a13-16]). Somewhat controversially, he interprets this famously cryptic reference to mean merely that the sun's yearly approach and recession from the sublunary realm in an almost mechanical way stirs up the elements, thus keeping them out of the static equilibrium that their natural motions incline toward, thereby perpetuating generation and corruption of organisms.

In the second chapter Falcon takes a close look at the opening of *De Caelo*, focusing on Aristotle's statement and restatements of a definition of *soma* ("body"). This definition progresses from "the divisible in three dimensions" and "the divisible in *all* dimensions" -both of which are compatible with the subject of solid geometry-to "the complete/perfect (*teleion*) magnitude" (31-33). The motivation behind this strategy, Falcon says, is Aristotle's "intention of obstructing the path to the geometric reconstruction of the natural world attempted by Plato" (54). Not only the initial definition of motion but the entire first chapter of *De Caelo* is a nod to the language and doctrine of the *Timaeus*. However, by inferring that this finally means that body is *teleion* magnitude, Aristotle is reminding us that natural bodies are not mere mathematical forms, and that every body has a nature that subordinates it to the order of the cosmos, which is itself the most complete/perfect magnitude. Whereas for Plato a soul unifies the cosmos, Aristotle sees that such a principle of unity would render the cosmos one substance and draws back from such a conclusion. While he affirms the unity of the universe, he sees distinct signs that it lacks unity in form. The unity of the cosmos is a relational unity where the being of one kind of substance consists in acting upon another kind of substance.

The third chapter is a careful explication of the arguments Aristotle employs in *De Caelo* 1.2 to show that there must be a celestial body that explains the circular motions we observe in the heavens. Herein Falcon lays out very clearly the distinction(s) between natural and nonnatural motions and their connections with the simple bodies, a matter much discussed in recent scholarly work and often with less lucidity. In short, because the other four elements have rectilinear natural motions, the celestial circular motion must be the natural motion of some other, and very different sort of, matter. To illuminate the case Aristotle makes, Falcon presents the counterarguments Aristotle's near contemporary Xenarchus offers, who insists upon the novel idea that circular motion is the natural motion any body has when it is in its natural place, whereas only what is becoming but is not yet an element can move rectilinearly. (Falcon does not address this, but it is not insignificant that this view will later be adopted by Copernicus and Galileo in defending the heliocentric hypothesis.) Falcon's discussion here of Aristotle's largely undefended assertions that the heavenly substance is alive and ensouled, and that its circular motion, albeit regular and inflexible, is voluntary, is insightful for its analysis of both Aristotle's doctrine and modern prejudices.

The last chapter explores Aristotle's often forgotten and unusual blend of pessimism and eager determination about studying the heavens. On the one

hand, "the celestial bodies are the most honorable and divine" of natural substances and the study of them is the "culmination of natural investigation" (110). On the other hand, there is little we can know of them because "the celestial bodies are conceptually, and not simply geometrically, remote" (87) to us, being so unlike the matter that is more proportioned to our mode of knowing. Falcon confirms this interpretation with another look *at De Anima* and a consideration of why, in spite of calling the heavens alive and intelligent, Aristotle resists applying his conclusions about life and soul to them. Aristotle argues in *De Caelo*, in opposition to his predecessors (and successors), that the heavenly bodies "are not engaged in any of the activities that are minimally constitutive of sublunary life" (93), because their eternity and simplicity preclude growth and decay, and therefore self-nourishment and reproduction, the foundation of life as we commonly experience it. Falcon concludes that Aristotle believes that "we should neither go beyond what we can say nor stop making an effort to provide an account, but state what appears to be the case to us, human beings with a limited access to the celestial world" (101).

This last chapter seems to be most important for those annoyed or puzzled by the errors in Aristotle's more particular studies of nature, as it is a corrective of the caricature perpetuated since the Enlightenment that Aristotle, and even more so his Scholastic disciples, were mere dogmatists about nature, constraining it into preconceived notions and refusing to look through telescopes. In fact, Aristotle insists that when explaining these things "if someone hits upon more exact necessities, then we should be grateful to the discoverers" (98 [287a]). Falcon shows that Aristotle always intends to be presenting "an account which is as objective as possible" (99), and while remaining tentative, he does not think his is merely "a provisional account that will be, sooner or later, replaced by a genuine explanation" (98), for man as such can have only better or worse explanations, not *the* explanation. This chapter makes it clear that Aristotle is neither a positivist who thinks no real insight into the natures of things is possible, nor a triumphalist about the powers of human reason. With Falcon's work in hand anyone wishing to learn from Aristotle's natural philosophy, whether to separate philosophical wheat and chaff or to appreciate the plausibility even of the chaff, will be better able to appreciate the spirit in which works like *De Caelo* were written. Further, one can better see Aristotle's seriousness about two of the principles enunciated at the beginning of the *Physics* (184a1 7-22): that there is an inversion between what is most knowable to us and what is most knowable by nature, and that in all investigation we must begin with what is best known to us.

Aristotle and the Science of Nature is not without faults, however, and at times what Falcon takes as obvious is not so. For example, he declares that it is very "difficult to establish what the simple body does once it has reached its natural place.... Both [Aristotle's and Xenarchus'] claims are equally difficult to verify" (67). This is a strange thing to insist upon, as *prima facie* evidence manifestly points Aristotle's direction. Air and earth appear to rest after they (respectively) bubble out of or sink to the bottom of water; certainly there is no sign that any

element begins rotating around the center of the earth when the natural places are reached, as Xenarchus maintains. Falcon also seems to miss certain passages in Aristotle that would deepen his insights, such as when he speculates about why Aristotle never calls the motions of the planets and stars *poreia*, "progressive motion" (93-94), proposing that it is due to their "lack of flexibility" (94). Looking at the treatment of place in *Physics* (212a24-b23) and even some comments on the motion of the stars in *De Caelo* (289b31-290b10), we could add that the heavenly bodies are, properly speaking, not the planets and stars but the mutually contiguous transparent orbs that bear them, and that these orbs rotate in place, so naturally this rotation is neither progressive nor a motion like anything we see here below. Other shortcomings include a tendency for reiteration of the main theses of the book—for example, Falcon reminds the reader several times that Aristotle does not call the celestial matter "aether" and then devotes much of the epilogue to drilling the point home. Also, the classical commentators play a principal role in the exegesis of Aristotle; one sees here the typical modern academic silence about the medieval commentators. As a result one familiar with the work of, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas may find Falcon reinventing a few wheels. But these are small criticisms of a brief book that is packed full of matter for reflection and which is both a significant contribution to Aristotle scholarship and an important starting point for any attempt at rehabilitating Aristotelian natural philosophy.

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God and the Evil of Scarcity: Moral Foundations of Economic Agency. By ALBINO BARRERA. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. Pp. 394. \$46.00 (cloth), \$22.00 (paper). ISBN 0-268-02192-9 (cloth), 0-268-02193-7 (paper).

Economic Compulsion and Christian Ethics. By ALBINO BARRERA. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. 248. \$75.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-521-85341-9.

True interdisciplinary work is more talked about than done in the academy. Rewards in the modern university still tend to go to those who are eminent in a specialized area. Indeed, sub-specializations have proliferated to the extent that within large departments of research universities members of the same department may have little to say to each other. Although interdisciplinary majors and minors are growing at the undergraduate level, the institutions of

higher education continue to be dominated by departmental organization. Hiring, tenure, and promotion still go through the departmental screening process in the vast percentage of cases. Thus, it is no surprise that young faculty learn that the reward system does not favor interdisciplinary research. There is an old quip made about Pierre Teilhard de Chardin that all the theologians thought he was a marvelous scientist while all the scientists thought he was a terrific theologian. However unfair that was about Teilhard, it indicates the peril of crossing disciplinary boundaries. Those with whom you dialogue appreciate that someone is trying to build bridges, but no one claims you as one of their own.

Philosophy has traditionally been the dialogue partner with theology. While that conversation continues, albeit somewhat one-sidedly as many in philosophy no longer read serious theology, there is an expanding need for additional partners in dialogue. In our time a conversation with the natural sciences is seen to be crucial to the vitality of theology. And we are regaining an appreciation for the import of the fine arts for theological reflection, as the beautiful returns to its rightful place alongside the true and the good as a theological category. The conversation with the social sciences, however, has not progressed as far as one might have anticipated; and nowhere is this more true than in theology's interaction with economics. Given the centrality of economic discourse in our society and the broad claims that economists are making for their discipline-as explanatory of just about any phenomenon involving choice, tradeoffs, or preferences-it is curious that so few theologians are economically literate.

I state the above by way of explaining my appreciation for Albino Barrera's academic project. Beginning with his first book, *Modern Catholic Social Documents and Political Economy*, Barrera has been adeptly integrating theology and economic theory. The two books under review here continue this interdisciplinary agenda as they treat both theological concerns and economic-policy issues. In his first book Barrera's concern was to show that Catholic social teaching developed as a consequence of its interaction with changing economic conditions. He also pointed out the differences in underlying anthropology between the church's social teaching and mainstream neoclassical economics. Finally, he offered guidance for likely change in Catholic social teaching as it encounters a post-industrial, globalized economy.

In *God and the Evil of Scarcity*, Barrera's focus is more theological. He uses the problem of scarcity in material goods to probe the operative theodicy of classical economic thought. Beginning with a critique of Thomas Malthus and his viewpoint that a loving God created a world of scarcity in order to make human beings disciplined and hardworking, Barrera proceeds to offer a more satisfactory theological assessment of the prevalence of scarcity in human history.

His line of argument proceeds two ways. One is a fairly brief and quite standard treatment of Thomistic thought on secondary causality and the role of human agents as participants in God's plan for creation. The second and more extensively treated aspect of his argument is a biblical theology of economic life.

Barrera is not an exegete, but he has read widely in biblical scholarship. I found the chapters on the Hebrew Bible particularly valuable as Barrera skillfully lays out the import of biblical teaching on topics like the land, treatment of slaves, the sabbath, debt laws, and the jubilee. While by no means ignoring the theme of the option for the poor, Barrera takes the reader far beyond a simple appeal to that theme as the sum and substance of the Bible's teaching on economics.

In the final chapters of the book he advances his viewpoint about the deeper meaning of economic agency. For Barrera, God's desire for creation is abundant life and the material resources for this are present in the created order. But material abundance is conditional; it is premised on human participation in God's plan. Scarcity is really the occasion for God to provide for us through the way that we care for each other by responsible economic agency. Thomistic metaphysics and biblical theology are put to the service of establishing both the generosity of God as Creator and the key role of humans as participants in the divine plan.

What Barrera provides is a theological argument for why economics matters. It is an argument that is distinctively Catholic in its conclusions about the nature of the created order and human nature in particular. In his presentation of Thomistic thought he is clear, though somewhat quick to assume the persuasiveness of Thomas's metaphysical outlook. When presenting the biblical material he develops his argument more patiently and in greater detail.

One of Barrera's claims is that his theology of economic life provides a rationale for an interventionist set of public policies to regulate and ameliorate the negative consequences of free markets. It is this theme that looms larger in the second book under review. To overstate the difference a bit, *God and the Evil of Scarcity* uses economic theory to develop a theological agenda, while *Economic Compulsion and Christian Ethics* uses theology to address an economic and moral issue.

The question that Barrera takes up in the latter book is what are we to make of the fact that the behavior of agents in economic markets creates consequences that drive other parties into circumstances where they are compelled to make less than palatable choices. Middle-aged workers who are laid off and must choose between ongoing unemployment or jobs that do not utilize their experience and pay far less than they have earned in the past would be an example of the phenomenon that Barrera calls "economic compulsion." The book's focal concern is summed up by the author: "What is at stake here is whether or not we, as a community, will take the easy route of simply viewing and accepting unattended harmful pecuniary externalities as a normal part of market operations" (224).

For Barrera, we have allowed a neoclassical model of economic theory to dull us to the suffering of oft-time innocent parties who are confronted with choices such as either buying food or buying medicine on limited incomes through no direct fault of theirs. Instead the economic compulsion forcing such dire choices upon people is a result of aggregate choices in the marketplace that alters an

individual's economic standing. We have become accustomed to see such consequences as the "normal" outcome of the market's allocative efficiency by means of price adjustments. Precisely because of his theologically informed understanding of what an economy is, and how it ought to work, Barrera argues that we need to examine our taken-for-granted economic world.

The book is a carefully plotted argument. It begins with two chapters that closely examine the phenomenon of "economic compulsion" and that clearly explain just what Barrera means by the term. He also takes pains to stipulate the parameters of his study. Part 2 consists of a biblically grounded treatment of "economic security." Barrera nicely distills the contemporary import of biblical norms of economic life. The two chapters constituting this section rehearse several themes found in his book on economic scarcity.

Part 3 is made up of three chapters, the first of which returns to and further refines themes that Barrera treated in his initial book on Catholic social teaching. Cogently and carefully he develops his understanding of economic rights and how these are situated within a vision of the common good, understood as due order and due proportion. This chapter is a constructive exercise in Christian social ethics and merits further commentary from moral theologians, for it is a sophisticated presentation of the case for economic rights as human rights. The final chapters of the volume apply Barrera's thesis to the issue of agricultural protectionism and provide a closing reprise of the themes and argument of the book. The chapter treating protectionism illustrates Barrera's balanced and informed style. He makes a compelling case for disbanding the protectionist regimes that developed nations use to keep the goods of poorer nations out of home markets.

Barrera's writing style is lucid and his logic is easy to follow. Like a good teacher he continually states what he is going to do in a chapter, develops his point, and then reminds the reader of what he has just written. He explains the vocabulary and basic rules of economic theory to the benefit of the noneconomist. It seems to this reviewer that he generally does a good job of explaining the biblical and theological material to an economist, but that is best judged by a different kind of reader.

Notably, there is a courteous tone to both volumes. Barrera rarely criticizes without acknowledging the insights or strengths of those views that he challenges. He is a supporter of free-market economics and is no anticapitalist ideologue. At the same time, his treatment of ideas like economic security, economic compulsion, participative agency, economic rights, and the common good all lead him to important, and quite sensible, proposals for changes that are both regulative and ameliorative of market excesses.

The overall impression one is left with is that Barrera is engaged in a much-needed project. His sophistication in both economics and theological ethics allows him to carry forward a conversation that has too often stayed at the level of vague generalities about capitalism and socialism, or well-meaning but not particularly strategic pleas on behalf of the poor. Barrera's method and style may

lack some of the passion and straightforwardness of the prophets; but his critical analyses and sophisticated methodology surely provides the sort of intellectual foundation that true economic reform requires.

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The Creation-Evolution Struggle. By MICHAEL RUSE. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005. Pp. 336. \$16.95 (paper). ISBN 0-674-02255-6.

In *The Creation-Evolution Struggle*, Michael Ruse, the Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Program in the History and Philosophy of Science at Florida State University, describes evolutionism and creationism as direct, though admittedly opposite, reactions to the intellectual upheavals associated with the Reformation and the Enlightenment. He is not concerned with an examination of the logic or truth of either of these positions. In fact, he goes so far as to assert in his introduction that "so strong is my conviction that the evolutionists are right and the creationists are wrong about the origins of life's diversity that I am going to take that as a given" (2-3). Instead, through his historical analysis, he seeks to differentiate between the scientific theory of evolution and the social ideology of *evolutionism*. Moreover, he argues that certain forms of evolutionism can even be considered, oxymoronomically, a secular religion. Therefore, Ruse acknowledges that the creation-evolution struggle is not a simple dispute between science and religion. Rather, he concludes that "in both evolution and creation we have rival religious responses to a crisis of faith—rival stories of origins, rival judgments about the meaning of human life, rival sets of moral dictates, and above all what theologians call rival eschatologies—pictures of the future and of what lies ahead for humankind" (3).

The historical narrative in *Struggle* can be divided into three movements. Ruse begins by tracing the roots of the evolution-creation struggle to the crisis of faith that followed the Reformation and the Enlightenment. As he points out, the divisions within Christendom raised doubts about the truth claims of revealed religion: "Is God a Catholic? If not, then he must be a Protestant. But if so, what kind of Protestant?" (13). Two major and diametrically opposed responses to this epistemological crisis stand out. The first reaction was simply to give up on reason as a deceptive tool of the devil. According to this view, the way to God is through emotional commitment rather than rational choice. In Ruse's account, this approach gave rise to evangelicalism as a religious movement. In contrast, the second reaction was to give reason a central role in religious discourse.

According to Ruse, this approach became centered on the notion of progress: "Rather than thinking of progress as an alternative to conventional religion in the late eighteenth century, it is more accurate to think of progress as a world system that was trying to challenge or improve on older world systems, especially Christianity" (24).

Within this milieu, evolution originated as pseudoscience, which was considered a convenient yet nontestable theory that could be used to support doctrines of progress. According to Ruse, "the cultural idea of progress led to the biological idea of evolution. People took the cultural notion and read it into the living world." (28) For instance, Lamarckism, promoted by the eponymous French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, transferred the social concept of cultural progress into the realm of biology. Lamarck described how nature could bring about change in response to certain needs. Yet social values conveniently applied to biology do not create a genuine science. Consequently, according to Ruse, in the early nineteenth century, instead of a fully-fledged theory or doctrine of evolution, we have an ideology of evolutionism: "Evolution, like phrenology, was a vehicle for pushing doctrines of progress" (48).

The narrative in *Struggle* then turns to Charles Darwin, the father of evolutionary theory. Though Darwin was certainly not the first person to suggest evolution, he was, for Ruse, the first to attempt to raise it to the level of a professional science. Claiming natural selection as the chief engine of evolution, Darwin first proposed his theory in *The Origin of Species*, published in 1859. Wanting more than a pseudoscience he attempted to show that natural selection satisfied both empiricist and naturalist criteria. In response, his opponents raised two main scientific objections: There was no mechanism to explain the heredity required for evolution to occur, and there was an insufficient timeframe for evolution to occur since physicists at the time believed the earth to be only about 100 million years old. Despite these concerns, however, evolution was widely adopted, albeit with one major reservation: the validity of natural selection. This mechanism was not believed to be sufficient to explain the complexity of evolution. Several alternative solutions were proposed, even hailing back to Lamarckism. Others included saltationism (evolution by leaps), guided variation (evolution by small changes guided in the right general direction), and orthogenesis (evolution driven by forces that compel groups rather than individuals to change). Significantly, however, as Ruse details, many of these alternative mechanisms relied upon the social values of the day and were not supported by much empirical evidence: "Evolutionary biology as a professional science was distinctly second-rate. It failed to be properly causal; its "laws" often failed to predict; and worst of all it was riddled with cultural values, especially related to notions of progress" (101).

During this period, ideas taken from an evolutionary perspective were also being used to support a moral and philosophical system that would supplant religious faith. The most prominent proponent of this project was Herbert Spencer, a contemporary of Darwin, who wrote on a wide range of subjects, including the socioeconomic policy of *laissez-faire*. Coining the term "survival of

the fittest," Spencer attempted to construct a moral code from belief in evolution and proposed a grand metanarrative that saw human history as progress from the homogenous to the heterogeneous. In effect, the process of evolution became a substitute for a creator God. Despite these historical developments, however, Ruse points out that Spencer developed his ideas before reading Darwin's work. Therefore, he concludes that there is not necessarily a causal relationship between belief in evolution and belief in a naturalistic or even in an atheistic universe: "Evolution was derivative; evolutionism was basic" (108). Nevertheless, even after Darwin, evolution as a science risked becoming overshadowed by an evolutionism that was being used as a social ideology.

Not surprisingly, Spencer's evolutionism and other attempts to replace Christianity with a belief system grounded in the process of evolution evoked strong Christian responses, especially from Protestants. Some, like Frederick Temple, future archbishop of Canterbury, tried to introduce evolutionary thinking into natural theology. In general, however, and especially in the United States, Protestants with an evangelical cast responded to the challenge of evolutionism by returning to the "fundamentals." As Ruse notes, "nothing was more fundamental than opposition to evolution" (154). In the eyes of fundamentalists, evolution went against a literal reading of the Bible and was associated with atheism. As such, it had to be opposed. This opposition gave rise to the creationist movement that emphasized a literalist reading of the creation narratives in *Genesis*. And what about the Catholics? Ruse's answer: "To put it bluntly, evolution was not their fight" (142).

Finally, the narrative in *Struggle* ends with a consideration of how the evolution-creation struggle has fared in the twentieth century. In the 1920s, evolution was finally raised to the level of a professional science and it has remained as such largely due to the efforts of two men: Ronald Fischer and Sewall Wright. Fischer was a statistician who helped to refine the mathematics behind evolution. He single-handedly invented the field of population genetics in his *The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection* (published in 1930), considered by many evolutionary biologists to be second in importance only to Darwin's *Origin of Species*. Wright, an animal geneticist, proposed and fleshed out the mechanism of genetic drift. Necessarily a nonadaptive form of evolution, this theory went far to help to create an evolutionary science divorced of the cultural ideal of progress. Theodosius Dobzhansky, a disciple of Wright, continued this work by strictly segregating the science of evolution from the ideology of evolutionism. He even went so far as to publish two separate journals, each devoted to one of the two distinct fields. As Ruse is quick to highlight, Dobzhansky and his colleagues considered "evolution ... their profession. But evolutionism was their obsession" (187).

Evolutionism too has thrived in recent times. According to Ruse, there are three different versions of evolutionism today. The camp furthest from the creationists is exemplified by Richard Dawkins, an atheist who vehemently opposes organized religion of any sort, believing that religions and blind faith are the sources of most of the evil in the world. A major part of his nonbelief stems

from the pain and suffering inherent in the process of natural selection, a reality that appears at first glance to be incompatible with a providential Creator God. In a very succinct summation, Ruse describes Dawkins's reasoning as follows: "Religion leads to evil. Darwinism counters religion. Ergo, Darwinism counters evil" (208). Dawkins believes that the worldviews of religious people are "puny, pathetic and measly in comparison to the way the universe actually is" (205). In contrast, the camp exemplified by Stephen Jay Gould takes a middle road. Gould describes science and religion as occupying different "magisteria" or different areas of experience and understanding. Thus the two areas cannot be in direct conflict with each other, as they govern separate areas of human comprehension. Finally, Edward O. Wilson occupies the camp most amenable to organized religion, believing that religions are biologically adaptive and that human beings require religion to function.

Ruse concludes his historical narrative by describing recent responses to evolutionism. On the one hand, he discusses several Christian thinkers who have "wrestled with evolution in an attempt to use it fruitfully in building an adequate theology for the modern world" (217). These theistic evolutionists include, among others, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J., Simon Conway Morris, John Haight, and Holmes Rolston III. On the other hand, Ruse also admits that creationism continues to influence a significant number (47 percent in one Gallup poll) of contemporary Americans, both in its classical young-earth version and in its more recent incarnation, called Intelligent Design (ID). He concludes that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the evolution-creation struggle is alive and well.

The Evolution-Creation Struggle should be required reading for anyone seeking better to understand one dimension of the culture wars that have preoccupied American society. In *Kitzmiller v. Dover School Board*, a landmark decision in the first direct challenge in a federal court against a public school district that required the teaching of ID in science classes, Judge John E. Jones III declared that ID is not science because it "cannot uncouple itself from its creationist, and thus religious, antecedents." Reports in the mainstream media portrayed the judicial decision as the end of another chapter in the centuries-long fight between science and religion. As Ruse convincingly argues in *Struggle*, however, the evolution-creation struggle playing out in the public square should be understood not so much as a duel between science and religion as a contest between two religious views. For Ruse, evolutionism itself is a type of religion—a secular religion. Some may quibble with the details of Ruse's narrative or with his conclusions. Religion has been notoriously hard to define, and Ruse compromises with "a world picture, providing origins, a place (probably a special place) for humans, a guide to action, a meaning to life" (122). Religion or not, however, it is clear that evolutionism like Christianity is a comprehensive doctrine in the Rawlsian sense of the word. It is a conceptual framework, a worldview, an overall perspective, from which one sees and interprets the world and its meaning. Like Christianity, evolutionism is grounded in assumptions and epistemological claims that cannot be substantiated by appeal to empirical data

alone. It should not have a privileged position in our liberal democracy simply because it appears at first glance to have a purely scientific provenance.

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The Local Church: Tillard and the Future of Catholic Ecclesiology. By CHRISTOPHER RUDDY. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2006. Pp. vii-259. \$29.95 (paper). ISBN 978-0-8245-2347-3.

One of the fruits of Vatican II was the renewed appreciation of the local church. Prior to the council and going back to the medieval Scholastics, Catholic ecclesiology had been largely cast in terms of the one universal Church, which had as its other discernible "marks" holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity. The Church's visible structure, with the pope at its apex of juridical and magisterial authority, could be easily compared to secular governments even as it defined itself in service to an invisible communion of grace. According to a certain caricature, local churches were mere "outposts" of the church of Rome, and bishops mere delegates of the Roman pontiff who acted as the "supreme bishop" over a "perfect society."

With the council came a new awareness of the local church as an ecclesial subject in its own right. Perhaps more than any other theologian since Vatican II, the late Jean-Marie Tillard, O.P. (1927-2000) has provided a highly developed theology of the local church in the Catholic world. Christopher Ruddy, who had opportunities to interview Tillard in the years before the latter's death, is an approving and insightful interpreter of the Dominican scholar's work. *The Local Church: Tillard and the Future of Catholic Ecclesiology* makes a compelling case for placing Tillard at the center of an ecumenically promising renewal of Catholic ecclesiology.

Ruddy begins his study by locating Tillard on a trajectory of modern ecclesial theologians from the Orthodox and Catholic worlds who helped pave the way to reclaiming the local-church perspective. On the Orthodox side, scholars like Alexei Khomiakov (1804-60) and Nikolai Afanasiev (1893-1966) reflected on the nature of the Church in terms of mystical communion and Eucharistic fellowship respectively. Developments among these Orthodox scholars resembled in certain respects those that took place in the context of German Romantic theology and French *mouvement théologique*, two movements that helped shape the agenda of Vatican II. The most influential of these pre-Vatican II voices, Yves Congar, O. P. (1904-95), held out the biblical-patristic concept of communion as the new basis of ecclesiology and anticipated through his vast

historical investigations many of the debates that would involve Pere Tillard. Because the Church's communion is rooted in the life of the Trinitarian persons, Congar argued, it demands not a uniformity of expression in doctrine and worship, but a unity in diversity that fosters a sharing of gifts. A similar, though more profound, grounding of ecclesial self-understanding in the very being of God characterizes the work of John Zizioulas (b. 1931), the Orthodox Metropolitan of Pergamon, whose writings have had a wide currency among Catholics.

While demonstrating how each of these particular thinkers lays a foundation stone for the renewed edifice of local-church theology, Ruddy also recognizes the limits of their approaches. Afansiev, for example, deserves credit for identifying the Eucharist as the formative element of ecclesial existence, but he fails to acknowledge that Eucharistic fellowship also calls out for unity-enhancing structures *between* local churches. Likewise, in Ruddy's view Congar commits an error when he speaks of the universal Church as existing apart from and prior to the local churches that are its necessary embodiments.

Tillard's forty years of scholarship builds on these prior achievements and, in important ways for Ruddy, corrects some of their fundamental notions. Always basing himself on firm historical and systematic grounds, Tillard must be taken seriously when he urges specific reforms of intra-church processes. In Ruddy's opinion the Dominican theologian makes an especially strong case for abolishing practices that privilege the universal Catholic Church, such as ordaining bishops (auxiliaries, diplomats, curial officials, etc.) who do not preside over local churches. The essential bond between the bishop and the local church depends on the principle, first enunciated by St. Ignatius of Antioch and later enshrined by Vatican II, that each local (Eucharistic) church makes present the one Church of God, even if it does so in a manner that is not exhaustive. That the bishop is also bound to the episcopal college and has a relationship to the universal Church should not be regarded as "prior to" his headship of the local church or diocese, even though that is precisely the contention of Vatican II's *Lumen gentium* and Pope John Paul II's *Apostolos suos* (1998).

In one particularly engaging chapter, Ruddy enrolls Tillard as a defender of Walter Cardinal Kasper in a debate that the latter had with Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger during the period of 1999-2002. The debate sought to resolve a question that had been developing in Ratzinger's own theology through the 1980s and had become, in a certain sense, "dogmatized" in the letter *Communione notio* of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (1992). Is the universal Church historically and ontologically prior to the particular churches? Building on Tillard and the other authors mentioned above, Ruddy argues for a Trinitarian model of the Church that respects the simultaneity of unicity and plurality. Just as both the oneness and the threeness of God are irreducible and coeternal, the Church cannot ever be said to be one without at the same time being locally diverse (at least *in potentia*).

Yet Ratzinger identifies the church assembled on the day of Pentecost in Acts 2:1-11 as precisely universal without being particular. His evidence for saying

this is the presence in the Lukan narrative of such universal symbols as the Twelve and the many languages spoken. For the future Benedict XVI, the evangelist Luke intends for the reader to see the apostolic community in Jerusalem as the "mother church" from which many daughters would be given birth (cf. Gal 4:26). While Ruddy acknowledges the emergence of the many churches from the one Church, he insists that the converse formula of *Lumen gentium*, paragraph 23, is an essential complement to it: "in and from [the particular churches] comes into being the one and only Catholic Church." For Ruddy, as well as for the theologians he favors, unless we hold for the "mutual interiority" of the universal Church and the many local churches *at every stage of history*, the former becomes a mere abstraction and the latter lose their rightful voice in ecclesial life.

While the nature of the Church according to the New Testament may be debated exegetically, there is another basis on which to defend universal priority which Ruddy's otherwise astute analysis does not satisfactorily engage. This other argument sees the Church's deep essence in terms of its Eucharistic constitution. Just as the Eucharist is one (as Christ is one) before being made present on the many altars, so the Church engendered by the Lord's Passover is one (cf. 1 Cor 10:17) before engendering the many churches scattered-and-inculturated-throughout the world. Between Pentecost and the Parousia the one and the many are indeed simultaneous, yet primordially and eschatologically the one Church lacks any essential connection to a geographical referent or "locality." Is it not founded by, and in, the itinerant rabbi who has "nowhere to lay his head?" (Luke 9:58). Does its future not belong to that heavenly Jerusalem toward which the pilgrim people journey? (cf. Heb 13:14) And is not this heavenly fulfillment already present within her, albeit in sacramental sign and in the witness of unambiguously holy lives?

While taking exception to some of Ruddy's conclusions, I find his scholarship to be carefully researched and well argued. In demonstrating why Jean-Marie Tillard is a necessary reference point for future discussion of ecclesial reform, Ruddy has established his own voice as an insightful proponent of a theology of the local church. The present volume belongs on the shelf of every researcher of post-Vatican II ecclesiology and of every ecumenically minded church official who labors on behalf of unity.

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Yves Congar, Theologian of the Church. Edited by GABRIEL FLYNN. Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs 32. Louvain: Peters, 2005. Pp. 503. \$45.00 (paper). ISBN 90-429-1668-0.

Though Yves Congar was widely read, especially in Europe, "Congar studies" hardly existed before 8 December 1994, when Pope John Paul II made him a cardinal. Since then, interest has grown steadily in the French Dominican's writings. Gabriel Flynn presents a commemorative volume, derived from a symposium in Dublin, Ireland in 2004, to mark the centenary of Congar's birth. Contributors span the political and ecclesial spectrum of Continental and North American Catholic theology, non-Catholic Eastern and Western Christianity, and the allied disciplines of history and philosophy. Although papers from similar symposia in Rome and Toulouse have been published, this is the first volume in English to analyze Congar's thought from so many disparate perspectives.

Flynn deserves commendation for meticulously presenting a highly useful text with notes to spur on more Congar studies. The same passionate spirit that drove Congar to write voluminously inspires Flynn in his "Introduction," situated within the new evangelization. Likewise, Flynn's "Epilogue" pleads for a "new reception" of Congar's writings and Vatican II's texts. His extremely useful bibliography and index will greatly assist this new reception. Between the introduction and epilogue, twenty scholars in four prefaces and seventeen chapters assess Congar's work. The chapters are divided into four parts: Yves Congar: Theologian; Yves Congar: Ecumenist; Yves Congar: Historian of Ecclesiology; and Yves Congar and the Theology of Interreligious Dialogue. Among these Anglican, Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant bishops, cardinals, laity, ministers, and priests, one finds the extremes of hagiography, on the one hand, and critical dismissiveness, on the other. Flynn contributes two chapters himself. In "Yves Congar and Catholic Church Reform: A Renewal of the Spirit," the Irish theologian gives a favorable exposition of Congar's possibly most original, important, and, thus, influential work, *Vraie et fausse réforme dans l'Église*. Flynn finds Congar's ideas of Church reform as relevant today as ever, and an evident line of continuity exists from Congar's ideas through Popes John XXIII, Paul VI, and John Paul II via Vatican II. In "Cardinal Congar's Ecumenism: An 'Ecumenical Ethics' for Reconciliation?" Flynn argues quite convincingly one main point. "[T]he acceptance of ecumenism as an ethical imperative for the Churches would give new impetus to ecumenical endeavors." While Flynn evidences the dramatic change in the moral landscape since Congar received his ecumenical vocation in 1930, his thesis, as well as certain ecumenical endeavors, is mortally threatened by what Pope Ratzinger calls "the dictatorship of relativism." Still, Flynn shows his faithful discipleship to Congar by organizing, executing, and publishing the papers of this landmark symposium.

Four prefaces crown this volume in a nod of acknowledgment and gratitude to Congar's ecumenical vocation. Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., leads off these personal reminiscences, including his now famous appraisal that Vatican II

"could almost be called Congar's council" (27). Kallistos Ware, distinguished Oxford don and Orthodox Bishop of Diokleia, never met Congar face to face, but became so completely captivated one day by reading his *Lay People in the Church*, that Ware forgot lunch, tea, and supper. Kenneth Stevenson, Anglican Bishop of Portsmouth, also encountered Congar through books and the spilling over of new ideas from the Catholic Church into other Churches while traveling in France during Vatican II. Finally, Marc Leinhard, Honorary Dean of the Protestant Faculty of Theology of Strasbourg and Formerly President of the Directoire of the Church of the Confession of Augsburg of Alsace and Lorraine, details his personal collaboration with Congar, including *Vocabulaire oecumenique*. Although not included as a preface, Karl Cardinal Lehmann's short chapter in part 2, "Cardinal Yves Congar: A Man of the Church," easily fits the same personal style, affirming that "far too much of his work has already gone unnoticed" (164).

One of Congar's monumental works, *Tradition and Traditions: An Historical and Theological Essay*, has enticed well-known American Evangelical theologians, like Scott Hahn, to enter the Catholic Church. Interestingly, the first chapter after the prefaces is an article by an Evangelical theologian, John Webster, Professor of Systematic Theology at King's College, University of Aberdeen. Entitled "Purity and Plenitude: Evangelical Reflections on Congar's *Tradition and Traditions*," Webster, writing from a Barthian perspective, provides a more eirenic appraisal of Congar's work than does Jonathan Robinson. Writing as a philosopher, Robinson, the Oratorian, concludes in his chapter, "Congar on Tradition," that Congar lacks logical coherence in his own argument. Webster, of course, replies to Congar's objections about Protestant doctrines like *so/a scriptura*, but, with the zeal of an apologist, he believes, "No Protestant theologian with any measure of spiritual or theological intelligence can fail to be moved by the appeal of Congar's work" (64). Robinson, though, fears that Congar's theology of tradition is too subjectivistic to support the Church's moral doctrine on matters such as homosexuality.

Four Dominican confreres contribute chapters to this volume. An Oxford Blackfriar, Fergus Kerr, provides a chapter titled "Yves Congar and Thomism." Displaying a very firm grasp of twentieth-century Continental Catholic thought, Kerr analyses what arguably might be the most overlooked of Congar's books, *A History of Theology*. Kerr believes that this 1939 article from the *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique* which Congar turned into a book in the late 1960s clearly places him within mainstream Thomism in contrast to other currents of European theology (e.g., *Lebenstheologie*). In "In Hope of Unity," Congar's most well-known student and friend from the Dominican Province of France, Jean-Pierre Jossua, writes reverently about Congar's vocation to ecumenism, first received clearly while meditating upon John 17 in preparation for priesthood ordination. Two preoccupations co-existed in Friar Yves-Marie's mind from the very beginning: the refounding of ecclesiology upon biblical and patristic notions and unity in the Church, between Christians, and among all of humanity. While

these two themes overshadow all of Congar's work, Jossua helpfully summarizes the significant evolution in Congar's thought from his first book, *Chrétiens desunis*, to one of his last, *Diversités et Communion*. Georges Cardinal Cottier of the Papal Household contributes "Notes on the Theology of Religions," paying homage to Congar indirectly by elucidating a schematic theology of religions in light of Vatican II's *Lumen Gentium*, *Ad Gentes*, *Gaudium et Spes*, and *Nostra Aetate*. What Cottier's chapter only implies, Thomas O'Meara's chapter, "Yves Congar: Theologian of Grace in a Wide World," makes explicit: Vatican II's theology of religions derives substantially from Congar's works but especially from *Vaste monde ma paroisse* (English translation, *The Wide World My Parish*). At times, though, O'Meara's interpretation of Congar not only creates tension with Cottier's principles for a theology of religions, but actually seems to fall under Cottier's critique of "a tendency, fairly widespread, and, in my opinion, quite destructive, *i.e.*, that of attributing everything immediately to the causality of grace, while ignoring that which human nature, by its own resources is capable of" (368). O'Meara's particular reading of Congar might come from his clear preference for Karl Rahner, shown by numerous quotes from the Frenchman praising the German theologian. O'Meara concludes, "Congar was the most important Catholic theologian leading up to the Council, while Rahner was the most influential thinker in the post-conciliar period" (397).

Since Congar became the premier example of the historical methodology that Marie-Dominique Chenu introduced at the Dominican Studium of Le Saulchoir, Flynn astutely invited four historians to analyze Congar's works. Cambridge patristics scholar A. N. Williams provides a retrospective survey of Congar's theology of the laity even though his major work appeared early in his career. In her judgment, "there are signs throughout Congar's works that from the beginning he was thinking in quite different terms, probing and altering his own paradigms even as he proposed them" (158). The U.S. Jesuit historian John W. O'Malley judges that Congar's works *L'Ecclesiologie du haut moyen age, de saint Gregoire le grand a la desunion entre Byzance et Rome* and *L'Eglise de saint Augustin a l'epoque moderne* are stunning achievements of historical scholarship and syntheses of the first order. Although O'Malley favors the latter volume of history of ideas over the former, he believes that the question of whether historical research can correct the tradition makes Congar's books as relevant now as when they were first published. Like astute detectives discovering clues to a great person's secret life, British historian J. J. Scarisbrick and Italian historian Alberto Melloni each write a chapter about the deeply felt expectations, despair, gratitude, and faith that Congar shared with his posthumously published diaries and journals, *Journal de la Guerre 1914-1918*, ed. and annotated by Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau and Dominique Congar; *Journal d'un theologien (1946 - 1956)*, ed. and annotated by Etienne Fouilloux in collaboration with Dominique Congar, Andre Duval, and Bernard Montagnes; and *Mon Journal du*

Concile, I et II, intro. and ed. Eric Mahieu, forward by Dominique Cougar, preface by Bernard Dupuy, O.P.

Four other chapters discuss Cougar's most well-known and least well-known publications. In contrast to Williams' judgment that Cougar's best-known, most important contribution to theology is the trilogy *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, Notre Dame professor Richard P. McBrien moans about writing on Cougar's "fairly conventional" pneumatology instead of his "anything but conventional" ecclesiology. According to McBrien, Cougar "was undoubtedly the greatest ecclesiologist not only of the 20th century but of the entire history of the Church as well" (305). From the perspective of Calvinist theology, Swiss Reformed theologian Bruno Burki in "The Church's Sacramental Celebration of the Easter Mystery: Yves M. J. Cougar and Ecumenical Liturgical Perspectives" draws out the implications of Cougar's least well-known, occasional, but rich sacramental theology for liturgical reform among Catholics and mainline Protestants. Two other chapters return to the theology of religions issue, projecting from Cougar's past writings into present and pressing issues in the Church. Despite Cougar's early assessment, according to Kerr, that Hans Urs von Balthasar's methodology was not an acceptable Thomistic approach, American Jesuit Stephen Fields argues in "Mediating the Non-Christian Religions: Cougar, Balthasar, Nature and Grace," that these two twentieth-century theological giants complement each other more on the question of nature and grace than Cougar and Rahner do, following O'Meara's perspective. Actually, Fields places Cougar closer to Balthasar than Rahner because the first two take sin, error, and the delusion experienced in fallen nature more seriously than does the latter. Most intriguing of all is the last chapter by Louvain professor Terrance Merrigan on "The Appeal to Yves Cougar in Recent Catholic Theology of Religions: The Case of Jacques Dupuis." Merrigan precisely analyzes Dupuis' position in contrast to Cougar's.

Not since Aidan Nichols's intellectual biography *Yves Congar* has a book in print covered the immense breadth of Cougar's life and thought as well as this one. No serious scholar in the English-speaking world in ecclesiology, ecumenism, interreligious dialogue, moral theology, pneumatology, sacramental theology, theology of the laity, twentieth-century Church history, or Vatican II can avoid this book. The best-received councils are built upon the shoulders of giants. Flynn's book demonstrates the breadth and strength of Cougar's intellectual shoulders upon which the greatness of Vatican II has been and will be realized.

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God and the Natural Law: A Rereading of Thomas Aquinas. By FULVIO Dr BLASI.
Translated by DAVID THUNDER. South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press,
2006. Pp. 264. \$37.50 (cloth). ISBN 1-58731-351-0.

Fulvio Di Blasi's *God and the Natural Law* is a penetrating inquiry into the theological foundation of Thomistic natural law. The book is written in response to a trend among contemporary natural-law theorists towards a theory of natural law without God. Di Blasi rightly notes the difficulty with this position: "Natural law without God easily becomes a *lex naturalis without lex*" (68). According to Di Blasi, the main features of this trend are most clearly delineated in the "neoclassical theory of natural law" proposed by Germain Grisez and John Finnis. Contrary to the neoclassical natural-law theorists, Di Blasi aims to show the central importance of God in the natural law.

After an introduction highlighting current trends among contemporary natural-law theories, chapter 1 examines in detail the neoclassical critique of the conventional or traditional reading of Thomas's natural-law doctrine. The conventional view, according to the critique of the neoclassical theorists, derives the content of the natural law from *mere facts* of nature which, of themselves, are unable to yield any sense of duty or moral obligation. Hence, conventional natural-law theorists attempt to locate the source of moral obligation in an extrinsic, arbitrarily imposed, divine command which falls prey to the "naturalistic fallacy"-the supposed fallacy of deriving an *ought* from an *is*. The neoclassical theorists instead posit principles of practical reason which are derived neither from mere facts of nature nor from the divine will, but from our primordial intuitions of basic values. Of course, the neoclassical theorists do not deny that God is the *ultimate* source of moral duty; rather, their claim is that moral obligation is knowable apart from any knowledge of God as a creator and providential governor. Hence, they effectively banish God from ethics and from the doctrine of natural law (neoclassical theorists find evidence for this position in Aquinas by appealing to the fact that for St. Thomas the being of God is not self-evident). Thus the contemporary trend towards natural law without God, Di Blasi points out, goes hand-in-hand with a trend towards separating ethics and metaphysics. This sets up Di Blasi's own account of natural law in chapters 2 and 3.

In chapter 2, Di Blasi turns to an analysis of the necessary theological pre-suppositions of Aquinas's natural-law doctrine. His aim is to show that the natural law depends upon a natural knowledge of God (not only known by means of unaided human reason, but also accessible in some way to all men) and the natural inclination to love God "before oneself and with a greater love." Di Blasi begins by showing that for St. Thomas natural moral goodness is defined by conformity to the divine will since the very essence of moral action pre-supposes that man wants something because he knows that God wants it. Indeed, the notion of moral goodness as conformity to the divine will is implied in the very meaning of natural law as an *extrinsic* principle of human action. Natural

law not only pertains to human reason; it presupposes an authority capable of imposing its will upon other subjects.

The Thomistic notion of moral goodness and the account of natural law as extrinsic principle of action, however, presuppose that we have a natural knowledge of God apart from divine revelation. Indeed, Di Blasi maintains that for Aquinas "man's moral sense is not only inseparable from his sense of God, but coextensive with it" (86). He goes on carefully to refute the claim of the neoclassical natural-law theorists that God is, for the most part, unknown to man since his existence is not self-evident. Di Blasi argues that for St. Thomas the non-self-evidence of God should not be taken as a denial of a natural knowledge of God, but as a rejection of St. Anselm's argument for the existence of God which begins with the idea of God as that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought. According to St. Thomas, the idea of God is present in everyone, but this idea is not the *starting point* for attaining certainty of his existence. The knowledge of the existence of God does not follow logically from the mere idea of God, but follows instead from a kind of *existential* evidence, an awareness of sensible reality as an effect: "the immediate evidence we have of His presence is that the being of reality intrinsically presents itself as an effect" (103). Of course, this describes the general movement of Aquinas's five ways, which Di Blasi spends some time explicating. Nonetheless, the knowledge of God's existence articulated in the five ways is contained in some manner in all men. For Aquinas, Di Blasi argues, the natural knowledge of God is known by most men, albeit in an unreflective or nonphilosophic manner. Still, this unreflective or "common sense" knowledge necessarily manifests itself in language and cultural symbols.

Di Blasi goes on to draw a further conclusion. If moral goodness resides in obedience to God's will, not only must there be a knowledge of God so pervasive that it is applicable to everyone, there must also be a natural inclination towards God in the human will. Accordingly, St. Thomas teaches that man is naturally inclined to love God *before himself and with a greater love*. This natural inclination towards God does not concern the supernatural love of charity, but is rather the natural inclination towards God as the "absolutely universal good." The key point here is that moral goodness is ultimately based not upon the desire for one's own good, but rather upon the capacity to transcend this desire out of a love of God.

Having discussed the theological presuppositions of Thomistic natural law, Di Blasi turns to a discussion of natural law as such in chapter 3. His aim is to show how the natural inclination of the will towards God as an ultimate end translates into a respect for the natural order created by God. One of the unique and interesting aspects of his discussion in this chapter is that he focuses almost exclusively on Aquinas's treatment of law in the *Summa contra Gentiles* rather than upon the more developed treatment of law in the *Summa Theologiae*. Only by starting with the overall conceptual framework of the former work, Di Blasi suggests, is it possible to understand the subsequent development in the latter. The treatment of law in the *Summa contra Gentiles* is, of course, framed by a much broader discussion of divine providence. Di Blasi highlights the fact that

the *law* by which God governs the world is identical with his *providence*. Moreover, the special manner in which God's providence is exercised over man (because the rational creature has dominion over his own acts and moves himself freely to the ultimate end) parallels the account of the natural law in the *Summa Theologiae* as the rational creature's unique participation in the eternal law. It is here that Di Blasi shows, contrary to the neoclassical theorists, that even though law is an extrinsic principle of human action, it is not arbitrarily or artificially imposed upon man, but is rather the primordial determination of human freedom that makes moral goodness possible. "For Aquinas the natural law is to be understood in the last analysis as the initial determination of freedom, or, to put it more fully, as the active presence in man's practical reasoning of the ultimate end and of the other human goods" (174).

The remainder of chapter 3 illustrates how the will's natural inclination towards God bears upon the precepts of the natural law. One of the deficiencies of the treatment of law in the *Summa contra Gentiles* (as opposed to the *Summa Theologiae*) is that it does not clearly distinguish the natural law from the divine law. Di Blasi uses this fact, however, to illustrate the fundamental convergence of the natural law and the divine law in Aquinas. He points out some key passages that emphasize the reasonableness of the divine law, and therefore its fundamental correspondence to the natural law. "We do not offend God except by doing something contrary to our own good" (*ScG* III, c. 122). "Only those things that are opposed to reason are prohibited by divine law" (*ScG* III, c. 126). The clearest illustration of the correspondence of the divine law and the natural order is the following (*ScG* III, c. 129):

[T]hose acts by which he inclines towards his natural end are naturally appropriate to an agent, but those that have the contrary effect are naturally inappropriate to the agent. Now ... *man is naturally ordered to God as his end*. Therefore, the things by which man is brought to the knowledge and love of God are naturally right, but whatever things have the contrary effect are naturally evil for man. Therefore, it is clear that good and evil in human activities are based not on the prescription of [divine] law, but also on the natural order. (189)

The upshot of the conformity of divine law to the natural order is this: the natural normativity of the will's inclination to God as an ultimate end is the source of the moral obligation found in those human goods ordered towards the ultimate end and preempts the charge of the naturalistic fallacy. The fact that the divine law corresponds to the natural order shows that the will of God is not simply arbitrary or extrinsic. On the other hand, our natural inclinations attain normative force because they proceed from the divine will since they are the means by which divine providence orders man to his ultimate end. Indeed, Di Blasi maintains that for St. Thomas the natural order as such has no normative force apart from the divine will. "If there were no God, even in the presence of an objective order of human good, the individual will would remain the ultimate

ethical criterion" (212). The notion of natural law, then, is necessarily based upon the interplay between nature and the will of God. There can be no natural law without God because the obligatory character of the natural law-what makes the natural law *to be* law-is the fact that the natural order that is discoverable by human reason is also known to be created by God and subject to his will.

Although there has been a broad revival of interest in natural-law thinking in recent years, the theonomic character of St. Thomas's doctrine has largely been obscured or forgotten. *God and the Natural Law* can help us recover the theological foundation of Aquinas's natural-law doctrine and thereby appreciate its deeper meaning. The argument of the book is at times hard to follow, perhaps because the book is translated into English from the Italian original, but it is well worth the effort for any serious student of Thomistic natural law.

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Engrafted into Christ: A Critique of the Joint Declaration. By CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY. New York: Peter Lang, 2005. Pp. 408. \$39.95 (paper). ISBN 0-8204-7408-8.

In *Engrafted into Christ*, Christopher Malloy offers a deep, honest, and critical view of the 1999 Joint Declaration on Justification between the Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation (GD). As the Preface says, this book is the result of five years of work.

The book has four parts: (1) The teachings of the Reformation Era: historical view of Protestant and Catholics positions in the 16th Cent. (17-122); (2) Contemporary attempts at rapprochement: Hans Kiing, the Finnish School (Tuomo Mannermaa, Risto Saarinen), Wolfhart Pannenberg (123-92); (3) Critical analysis of the Joint Declaration (193-313); (4) Evaluating the divide (315-87). This review will concentrate on parts 3 and 4, which are obviously the heart of the book.

Malloy studies the history of successive drafts of the JD, and comments on the evolution, "No one can doubt that the editorial changes to the various drafts witness a trajectory towards vaguer expressions. The reason for the trajectory seems to have been appeasement of ongoing Lutheran concerns" (277). On top of that, the author warns the English-speaking readers of the JD: "The German text frequently enjoys a more pronouncedly Lutheran ring than does the standard English translation" (222).

One of the points on which the JD does not dissolve the disagreements is the understanding of concupiscence: "First, Catholicism teaches that concupiscence is not a willful act but only a tendency towards sin. It can be called 'desire' only in the sense of a spuriously spontaneous, non-willed inclination. Second, Catholics believe that concupiscence incurs absolutely no punishment and that venial sins incur only temporal punishment" (280). Another delicate point is the possibility or not of an increase of grace and of degrees of participation in grace: "Trent is clear: The just can merit an increase in justifying grace, the attainment of eternal life, and an increase in eternal glory. This teaching rests upon the acknowledgment of only one formal cause of justification, the infused justice of God, by which the justified is bound to Jesus Christ, empowered by him to act as God's child, and entitled to receive the inheritance of a child" (306). This new creation, by grace, far from diminishing God's glory, shows divine power. On that point, the author considers that "The contents of the Joint Declaration . . . are not merely flawed in isolated cases; they are in organic fashion contrary to the integrity of Catholic faith" (306-7).

A typical question that has been at the very heart of debates ever since the beginning of the Reformation is the possibility of human cooperation. Malloy (cf. 294-95) sees a contradiction between paragraphs 20 (cooperation is possible as an effect of grace) and 24 ("God's gift of grace in justification remains independent of human cooperation") of the JD. Such an ambiguity in the JD will be reflected in different interpretations.

In his last part, Malloy identifies five crucial issues: "First, I investigate the eschatological implications of divergent understandings of the formal cause. Second, in a reflection on faith and self-trust, I present a Lutheran objection to this argument, followed by a Catholic response to this objection. Third, I consider the 'retrospective' implications that the ineffable grandeur of eternal life bears for its 'seed,' the formal cause of justification. Fourth, I critically examine the theory that Catholics and Lutherans offer two complementary, non-conflicting languages for the same faith. Finally, in an essay on Christological soteriology, I discuss the demerits of the structure of thought fundamental to Lutheranism. Each of these reflections is meant to be a point of departure for further theological discussion" (317).

(1) Eschatology raises questions about our understanding of the present life. Malloy comments on some insights offered by two great theologians of the past century that are in contrast to the Lutheran focus on sin. Henri de Lubac suggested that soteriology should focus on the beatific vision rather than on sin (cf. 319). Hans Urs von Balthasar asked Karl Barth why the real transformation of man by grace, if possible at the end of time, could not be possible already in the present life (cf. 161).

(2) Malloy denies that the Catholic (or Orthodox, cf. 335) view of charity would be too self-seeking, as Lutheran theologians tend to say, attributing this Catholic tendency to Aristotelian influences. He explains that a human desire for happiness is not necessarily sinful (cf. 326). A Thomist will recognize here Aquinas's partial corrections to some Augustinian tendencies.

(3) Malloy defends the realism of grace (part of the global tendency of Catholicism to realism): "Lovers long for the real presence of their beloved, and spiritual creatures contact each other by means of spiritual faculties" (338). Created grace provides a presence of God, which is far more than a mere acquittal from punishment. Malloy insists (see above all 390-91, also 134 and 214) on the distinction between efficient and formal causality in salvation: God does not only give an external input (like the sun on flowers, which is not the life of the flower but its condition) but also a really renewed internal life of the member of the Body of Christ.

(4) Many ecumenists speak of differences in terms of complementarity. Malloy does not deny that such a view can be helpful (for instance in comparing theologies of divinization and of justification-sanctification), nor does he deny that Catholics can learn from Lutherans. However, he wonders about the extent to which the argument of complementarity can be used in the Lutheran-Catholic dialogue (see 341-42). Are different languages always compatible? Do new common expressions really express the same faith as the ancient ones? If complementarity means that different theological systems can lead to the same practical effects in Christian life (in a rather Kantian way), then on which basis should one exclude the possible good effects of Pelagianism for contemporary Christians? (347).

(5) All questions are somehow linked to different Christological views. Yves Congar (summarized on 364-66) had already suggested that Luther had a different implicit Christology, because he underestimated the role of the human nature of Christ in salvation. Malloy develops the idea (359-60): the whole Catholic and Orthodox view of the relationship between God and man implies that divine causality gives to us a real, albeit subordinate, causality, without which what is saved would not be the human being. All questions depend on different views of mediation, expressed in Mariology and in anthropology: "The unique role of the Mediator does not exclude participation in his mediation" (373). And such does not seem to be the official Lutheran view: "The Lutheran World Federation declared [Oct. 31, 1998], 'The good news of justification refers to people's experiences and proclaims clearly that human beings are saved, not by works, but only by faith, through grace, on the merit of Jesus Christ alone *We do not need to do anything for our salvation*' (emphasis mine). This remark, outrageous from a Catholic perspective, ought to sound the alarm or toll the funereal bell in all quarters of the Catholic world" (257). In different ways I have already expressed the same concern myself, trying to suggest that the possibility of mediation had already been the main concern of Cardinal Cajetan about Luther as early as 1518. I could not agree more with Christopher Malloy's very careful analysis of the JD on this point.

Does Malloy conclude that the whole process is hopeless? Certainly not. He indicates some ways for a fruitful dialogue: "The continual influx and any increase of sanctifying grace are caused by God. For this reason, grace is not man's possession of God but God's possession of man. This Bonaventurian principle seems to resonate well with Lutheran doctrinal concerns. Third,

sanctifying grace is not a reason for self-trust" (389). But he maintains that a concordist interpretation of the JD is neither necessary, nor desirable, nor even credible: "Undoubtedly, numerous well-intentioned Catholic theologians will undertake hermeneutical gymnastics in order to retrieve this document on behalf of Catholic tradition. This effort is indeed understandable. Had the document magisterial force, I might have been more tempted to do the same. Notwithstanding the valiance of such efforts, I take it that few Lutherans will find such readings credible. Moreover, many will find such readings exemplary of an ecumenical disingenuousness" (234).

The author has questions about the consistency of some magisterial statements of different levels. Some questions might seem disrespectful, but he asks them because he cares for the teaching of the Magisterium. He particularly wonders about the compatibility of a remaining *simul justus et peccator* Lutheran view (in JD) with John Paul II's teaching about the perpetual validity of negative moral norms. He thinks that one might have to choose between John Paul II's teaching in *Veritatis splendor* and "his public but non-magisterial praise of the Joint Declaration" (185).

Malloy's book is a sharp critique of some ambiguities in the JD, expressed because of his concern for Christian unity. It is probably the most considerable work of a Catholic theologian in that line until now. Not a few Protestant theologians expressed their criticism of the JD, notably in two common statements published in 1998 and 1999 by about 160 German-speaking Lutheran and Reformed theologians ("Stellungnahme theologischer Hochschullehrer zur geplanten Unterzeichnung der Gemeinsamen Offiziellen Feststellung zur Rechtfertigungslehre," in *Materialdienst des Konfessionskundlichen Instituts Bensheim*, 6 [1999]: 114-15; and "Votum der Hochschullehrer zur 'Gemeinsamen Erklirung zur Rechtfertigungslehre' vom Januar 1998," in *Materialdienst des Konfessionskundlichen Instituts Bensheim*, 2 [1998], 33-35). Some of the questions come from the fact that the JD does not claim to have solved all questions related to its very object; in that regard the text might not have been matured yet when it was published. But it was perhaps difficult to produce a more mature text without changing the positions of at least one of the parts in dialogue. If so, the whole process is ambiguous and the hopes that arose from the JD might lead to delusions. In order to avoid such a sad result, theologians should take opportunity of Malloy's critiques to engage in a deeper study of the Catholic and Lutheran views on salvation.

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