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AN INTRODUCTION TO DIVINE RELATIVITY: BEYOND DAVID BRADSHAW'S *ARISTOTLE EAST AND WEST*

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CATHOLICS AND LUTHERANS more or less agree on what it is on which they disagree. It is more complicated to specify why the Orthodox disagree with them both. Speaking in "phenomenological" terms, the difference of "religious world" between Eastern-Byzantine and Latin-Western Churches is primary evidence for the faithful on both sides. However, defining what it is that makes those religious worlds so different seems a desperately tricky venture. The difference in ecclesiastical structure is not the cause, but the consequence of the splitting of the *Oikoumene* into Western-Latin and Eastern-Byzantine parts. Differences between specific religious rituals and practices can well express a difference of religious world views, but a harmonious religious world-view cannot be born out of specific rituals and practices. One can always point to dogmatic divergences between Western and Byzantine Churches, such as the famous *Filioque.* However, though the subjects of disagreement between Catholics and Lutherans are much more numerous, they do not give rise to a similar difference of *religious worlds.* Conversely, one cannot conceive of an agreement on matters of dogma or ecclesial practice between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches that would suppress the difference in the "religious world" between the Latin-Western and the Byzantine-Eastern forms of Christianity. [1]

[1] This conviction lies at the core of Uniatism as a specific historical phenomenon: non-Western Churches claim to be respected in their "otherness" by the Roman Church even when there is complete coincidence of views at the dogmatic level.

It would seem that this difference is not really a divergence-it is rather due to the set of positive properties that makes one mental world different from another. Both John and Peter have their own mental worlds, and this can lead them to disagree on a number of things, like who is the most inept politician in England or what color they should paint the kitchen wall. These disagreements are consequences of their different mind sets, and not the other way round. It is difficult to explain what makes the mind-set of individual human beings so different. It is all the more difficult to describe the difference of the religious world-view between the Byzantine tradition and its Western equivalent. The clues that can be gleaned from the extant literature on the subject-cultural influences, conflicts of political ambitions, etc.-are disappointingly vague. What then about the constitution, throughout the ages, of two original, consistent world views which, despite the existence of a relatively wide consensus on dogmatic issues, seem to have remained utterly foreign to each other by successfully resisting any form of higher synthesis?

Keeping these preliminary considerations in mind, one can fully appreciate the monumental undertaking of David Bradshaw in his *Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom.* [2] As the title and subtitle suggest, the author does not appeal to difference of dogmatic stances or to the infinitely contingent list of religious practices in order to explain the estrangement of the two Church traditions. It is in the living process initiated by the encounter between Christian revelation and Greek philosophy that Bradshaw claims to identify the reasons for the silent emergence of two distinct religious worlds within Christendom. This approach contrasts with the rash judgements and the confessional invectives to which, probably for lack of convincing arguments, theologians from both sides have had abundant recourse in the past. Relying on an impressively wide range of literary sources, the study possesses the basic feature of the scientific genre: it is open to further discussion. This is precisely the purpose of the present argument. As I launch

[2] Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

into a critical response to the positions of the author, I recognize that I owe this opportunity to Bradshaw's innovative approach. I am convinced that he will welcome the possibility to discuss his conclusions further and to scrutinize new perspectives sketched out on the very issues with which he wrestles. If the following argument fails to convince, the responsibility rests on the critic, not the original author. If, on the contrary, it opens the door to further debate, there can be no more rewarding result for the two researchers.

I will start by summarizing the content of Bradshaw's view on the evolution of the two traditions. I will then focus on a point which I find to be pivotal, but unfortunately overlooked in his study: the relativistic aspect of God's operations *ad extra.* This will lead me to sketch another way of accounting for the genesis of the Byzantine and the Latin theological world-views.

I. BRADSHAW ON THE MAKING OF TWO THEOLOGICAL UNIVERSES: A PROMISING DISAPPOINTMENT

It is not easy to synthesize the main line of Bradshaw's argument. He starts by carefully laying out distinct meanings intertwined in the writings of Aristotle that are said to witness the evolution in the philosopher's thought: *energeia* as pertaining to the very principle that makes things real in contrast with potentiality, *energeia* as defining the capacity on which all forms of activity rest, and finally *energeia* as the static condition of all physical movements (chap. 1, "The Aristotelian Beginnings"). This set of meanings circumscribes the conceptual field that will be exploited in various ways by later commentators, glossators and original thinkers alike.

At this point the reader comes across the first problematic aspect of Bradshaw's study. Nowhere is the reason for the impressive speculative developments to which Aristotle's complex notion of *energeia* has given rise in later scientific, philosophical, and theological literature clearly stated. Is it the difficult harmonization *ad intra* of Aristotle's considerations on *energeia?*

If so, what is it that makes this harmonization so difficult? In what sense does a new formulation of the notion constitute an adequate solution? On the other hand, the developments could also be due to the desire to harmonize Aristotle with other schools of thought, such as the Platonic .

. Leaving aside this question for the time being, it seems that the attention of Aristotle's readers has been drawn toward the type of causality exercised by the motionless being-in-actuality of God (chap. 2, "The Prime Mover") as the source of the understanding of natural causality. Being logically prior to potency and implied by any type of movement in the mode of a causal prerequisite, *energeia* is no longer seen primarily as the perfection of the natural *ousia's* being (the opposite of its being-in-potency) but as the power, the actual *dynamis* that the *ousia* possesses and exerts without movement upon other substances. In Plutarch's and Quintillian's comments on rhetorical art, in Polybius's *Histories* and Strabo's *Geography* as well as in the medical treatises of Galen, *energeia,* qualifying the efficiency connected with the condition of actuality, is used to designate an active power related to specific essences, *ousiai,* and therefore somehow emanating from them (chap. 3, "Between Aristotle and Plotinus"). Alexandrian Judaism (Pseudo-Aristeas, Philo of Alexandria) does the same in a theological setting: the deeds of God result from God's *energeia* or *energeiai.* Human beings cannot know God's *ousia,* but they can make reliable theological assumptions on the grounds of his *energeiai* (Philo). In this manner, Middle Platonists such as Numenius and Alcinous assume that the First God, being eternally at rest, produces the whole universe in virtue of its intellectual, self-directed *energeia,* whereas the strictly demiurgic *energeia,* which is mixed with movement, pertains to the Second God. The teaching of Plotinus goes one step further: the motionless, unspeakable *energeia* of the One is conceived as the inner source of an outward, overabundant *energeia* which crystallizes hypostatically and animates the whole hierarchy of beings teleogically. While this creative *energeia* gradually disperses down to the unreality of pure matter, its source never comes to exhaustion

(chap. 4, "Plotinus and the Theory of Two Acts"). In passing, Bradshaw observes that Alexander of Aphrodisias might have been the missing link between Aristotle's theory of the Prime Mover and Plotinus. In Alexander's comments on the mechanisms of sense-perception in *De Anima,* light, understood as a kinetic energy, gives the aerial *medium* substance by granting it actuality. According to Plotinus, the outward diffusion of the One's "inner" *energeia* likewise "substantifies" or "hypostasizes" the Intellect.

As regards the Latin-speaking West, Bradshaw assumes that it came into contact with the Greek philosophical speculations on the *energeiai* through Porphyry or Porphyrian-inspired treatises such as the *Commentary to the Parmenides* (chap. 5, "The Plotinian Heritage in the West"). This explains the fact that the main Latin-speaking proponent of Greek Neoplatonism, the Christian Marius Victorinus, tends to assimilate the One's outwardly diffusive energy with the notion of being *(einai/esse).* In his triadology, Being, as a category, relates to the Father as to the first divine Hypostasis. According to Bradshaw, this "energetic" concept of being, elaborated in the Porphyrian line, lies behind Boethius's understanding of participation, based on the celebrated distinction between *esse* and *quid quad est.* With Boethius, however, diffusive ontology yields to a logico-grammatical approach. Bradshaw maintains that the Latin word *operatio* cannot express the semantic riches of the Greek *energeia,* designating a source of power, a motion, and the achievement of motion altogether. Moreover, the Latin tradition remains foreign to philosophical developments that take place in the Greek-speaking Neoplatonic (Iamblichus, Proclus) and Hermetic ambient (chap. 6, "Gods, Demons and Theurgy"). The physical universe appears here as pervaded by the *energeiai* of the One, continuously reverberating from one level of the hierarchy of Being to the other. Participating in these divine *energeiai,* by exercising the virtue of speculative intellect (Proclus) or using semi-magical, "theurgical" practices (Iamblichus), emerges as the main purpose of the human path towards perfection.

Bradshaw further asserts that the Eastern Church tradition integrated these later elaborations on Aristotle's *energeia* into a dogmatically orthodox framework (chap. 7, "The Formation of Eastern Tradition"). As a matter of fact, "unorthodox" Christian thinkers were probably the first to adapt this philosophical apparatus to their doctrine. Ironically, in striving to refute such erroneous positions, the Fathers also *volens no/ens* relied on the same apparatus. They modified it, though, to fit their own views on dogmatic truth. In this manner, Eunomius, the fourth-century theoretician of a renewed version of Arianism, distinguished between *Ousia* as designating the knowable essence of the Father and *energeia* as the Son whom the Father has once generated. Against this theory, the Cappadocian Fathers argued that both *Ousia* and *energeia* designate what Father and Son have in common but, whereas God's *Ousia* is unknowable and beyond participation, his *energeiai* are knowable and participatory. According to the Cappadocians, although creation provides a reliable basis to understand something about God, it does so only to the extent to which it discloses God's *energeiai* to the inquisitive mind. Conjectures based on created beings cannot tell anything about what God *is* beyond the free and eternal decision out of which creation itself stems. The divine *Ousia* as the principle on which rests the divine decision to produce something out of nothing remains out of reach. Still, while the names that qualify God in human languages are derived from an understanding of these various *energeiai,* knowing God according to his *energeiai* can go much further than the conclusions of a "scientific" or discursive reflection. There is a knowledge that comes out of an instantaneous participation in the energetic reality that produces and supports created beings. This is the work of grace which, through the *synergy* or cooperation of human freedom, grants access to the creative and life-giving *energeiai* of the Holy Spirit (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa).

The cosmic contemplation of the fifth- or sixth-century author known as Dionysius the Areopagite forms, according to Bradshaw, an almost perfect congruence with the Cappadocians' doctrine.

The *energeai* that, originating from the unknowable One in some kind of discretive process of *ek-stasis,* produce and support existent beings, are the same *energeai* that, through the purifying and illuminating synergy of the angelic hierarchies, bring finite intellects back into unity with the unknowable One.

Bradshaw goes on to cite the crucial influence of the divine *energeiai* theory on the insights of later Greek Fathers such as St. Maximus the Confessor, St. John Damascene, Symeon the New Theologian and Gregory of Cyprus (chap. 8, "The Flowering of Eastern Tradition"). In his ascetic writings, Maximus explains the synergy of human spiritual capacities with God's *energeiai.* His understanding of nature, in the *Ambigua,* rests on the intermediary role of the divine *energeiai* between created beings and their *logoi,* their eternal reasons which dwell in God's mind. Angelic and divinized created minds perceive the attributes of God (wisdom, goodness, etc.) as so many *energeiai* eternally emanating from God's unknowable *ousia* ("the things around God which have no beginning").[3] Thus, divine *energeiai* are at the same time conceived as eternal and diffused throughout the whole creation. Referring to the teaching of John Damascene, Bradshaw claims that the identification of Dionysius's *proodoi* with a divine light, divided into as many rays as there are finite beings capable of partaking in it, plays a fundamental role in regard to the theologian's way of conceiving the "energetic" mode of the presence of God within the world. The reader is cautioned that the understanding of the divine *energeia* as a supernatural light should not be taken as a mere metaphor. The mystic teaching of Symeon the New Theologian stems from the experience of the light which is manifested at the Transfiguration. Moreover, Gregory of Cyprus's triadology describes the Holy Spirit as proceeding from the Father through the Son as radiance originates in the sun and is conveyed through its beams.

The last chapter of the book (chap. 9, "Palamas and Aquinas") is also the most decisive. As epitomized by the conflict between Thomism and Palamism, the difference of doctrinal fate associated

[3] Maximus the Confessor, *Chapters on Theology and Economy* 1.48 (PG 90:1100d).

with the notion of divine *energeia* is presented as accounting for the estrangement between the Eastern and the Western traditions. Bradshaw starts by pointing to the "non-energetic" aspect of the "school-master" of Western theological thought, St. Augustine. Construing God as Being in its fullness, Augustine defines this divine Being in terms of *essentia,* not of *operatio:* no divine *operatio* exists distinct from God's *essentia.* Finite beings thus participate in God's essence (whereas from the Eastern perspective they participate in God's *energeiai)* and the vision granted to the elect has God's essence as its perceptive object (whereas the East defines God's *Ousia* as beyond the knowledge of finite beings, even of angelic minds).

The fourteenth-century dispute over hesychast prayer, in the East, has been instrumental in revealing the gap between the two theological traditions. Criticizing the Athonite monks' claim to contemplate the uncreated light of the Transfiguration through the exercise of uninterrupted prayer, Barlaam of Calabria is described as being deeply influenced by the theological views of Augustine. This happened either directly through Planudes' translations, or indirectly, through Barlaam's familiarity with Western Scholasticism. Defending the spiritual practice of the Athonite monks on doctrinal grounds, St. Gregory Palamas, on the contrary, emerges as an heir to the genuine Eastern tradition: God is the unknowable *Ousia,* but he is also the knowable *energeia,* divisible in so many distinct *energeiai* as there are finite participants. The divine *energeia* eternally emanates from the *Ousia,* the former being "enhypostasized," as it were, in the latter. In this context, grace is nothing else than human beings' participation in God's uncreated and sanctifying *energeiai* according to their own faith and free-will.

Quite naturally, as set in Bradshaw's historical perspective, this account of the dispute raises some questions: if the Byzantine East appears to be unconsciously indebted to Aristotle, *via* the Neoplatonic and Christian elaborations on the philosophico-theological notion of *energeia,* what about the West? What can be said about a type of theological thinking that, underlying the

critical attitude of Barlaam, is so often associated with Aristotelianism? Bradshaw focuses here on Thomas Aquinas, as being both the main theoretician of Western Scholasticism and the main authority which the anti-Palamites usually put forward (with the exception of Barlaam himself, notorious for his anti-Thomistic treatises).

Bradshaw argues that the Augustinian framework combined with the deficient reception of Aristotelianism's later developments by the Latin West prevented Thomas Aquinas from finding an appropriate use of the notion of *energeia* within his theological vision. Thomas's understanding of God as *Actus purus* led him to conceive of the communication of *esse* to creatures almost only in terms of causal, "extrinsic" efficiency. According to Bradshaw, God's all-productive actuality, identified with his essence for the sake of divine simplicity, never unites with the being nor with the activity of creatures. This metaphysical escape from pantheism comes therefore at the price of a genuine concept of synergy. Moreover, it implies philosophical inconsistencies. If the act of creation follows from God's nature, since operation and will are identified with the essence in God, it seems difficult to conceive this act as being entirely free, according to the contingent nature of its object. Conversely, if this act is conceived as free, that is, as bearing on mutually exclusive possibilities, it is difficult to hold any longer to the idea that God's will and operations are identical *uno numero* with his intrinsically necessary nature.

In his "Epilogue," Bradshaw claims that the doctrine of Palamas, by postulating a real distinction between *Ousia* and *energeia* in God, is spared from inner contradictions of such kind. Some *energeiai* are temporal, willed by God in a contingent mode, in contrast to the necessity of the divine *Ousia;* others are eternal, emanating from God's unknowable *Ousia* in a "natural" way. However, all the *energeiai* of God are self-manifestations of God; all are "relational" as "indicative" of the eternal relations between the divine Hypostases. Bradshaw's general conclusion includes considerations on the evolution of the Western and Eastern types of civilizations. In Thomas's failure to secure a proper under-

standing of the synergy between God and creatures, Bradshaw discerns the deepest source of the Western world's process of "laicization." The order of nature, and even the order of grace, now stand at a distance from the divine being. According to Bradshaw, this shift lies at the root of the radical questioning of faith bound up with the modern age, as a purely Western development. One has to look therefore towards the Eastern tradition to find an adaptation of Aristotle's insights that really fits a Christian vision of the world.

Against the background of classical East/West confessional polemics, the whole of Bradshaw's demonstration stands out as quite idiosyncratic. The apologists for the Eastern tradition usually claim that an excess of philosophy-that is, of Aristotelianism-is responsible for the manner in which Western theology was led astray from a correct interpretation of the revealed truth. Bradshaw claims the exact opposite: in contrast with the East, the West falls victim to a much too narrow, shallow, almost pietistic treatment of the metaphysical insights expressed in the writings of Aristotle. Of course, at the end of the day, the consequences of this comparison are exactly the same-unfortunately for the West. In this regard, the gauntlet that I threw down at the beginning of this review, that of defining the positive properties that make the Western and the Eastern religious universes so different from each other, is not really taken up. One seems to be inevitably led back to conceiving the difference between the two worlds in terms of superiority versus inferiority, fullness versus deficiency.

As I have written above, I believe that there is much to criticize in Bradshaw's historical "demonstration." Nonetheless, as I have also mentioned above, I believe that his study opens a path towards a correct understanding of the estrangement between the Western and the Eastern religious worlds. The conceptual history of *energeia* does indeed, in my view, provide the thread that is vital in unwinding the maze of defining the precise nature of the divide between the two religious worlds. By localizing the exact point on which the analysis of Bradshaw comes up short, a critical

approach to the book could enable us to recover this vital thread, so that we might follow it to the exit of Ariadne's labyrinth. Let us then start from the point where the historical itinerary sketched out in the book ends. Retracing KaTa nafltvo&fav the steps that the author has made in a false direction provides perhaps the only opportunity to find the crossroad that he seems to have missed.

II. THOMAS AQUINAS VS. GREGORY PALAMAS: A QUESTIONABLE DIVERGENCE

The core of Bradshaw's comparison between Gregory Palamas and Thomas Aquinas is the opposition between Thomas's "extrinsic" approach of divine causality through efficiency and Gregory's "intrinsic" approach through the *energeiai,* which Bradshaw calls "synergistic." I would like to question the coherence of this supposed opposition by arguing that it rests on a double misunderstanding.

It is not easy to understand exactly what Bradshaw has in mind when he so emphatically writes about the "synergism" of the Eastern tradition as being the key philosophical principle that distinguishes it from the Western tradition. [4] He describes it as "a way of knowing another by sharing in his activity" (177), "a sharing of life and activity" which is "an on-going and active appropriation of these aspects of divine life which are open to participation"(265). Similar expressions are distressingly vague when it comes to defining the specific type of relationship between God and creatures to which the term is supposed to refer.

One might get a dearer idea about what Bradshaw believes synergy to be by taking a closer look at what he thinks it is not. Thomas Aquinas's understanding of creation as a communication of being is said to fall short of synergism, since the divine Being, albeit conceived as a living source of activity, *Actus purus,* in the Aristotelian model, remains beyond the reach of creatures (250-

[4] "If one were to summarize the differences between the eastern and western traditions in a single word, that word would be synergy" (Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West,* 177).

53). One wonders however what a truly synergistic participation could mean here. Should the activity of God mix ontologically or essentially with the activity of the creature? Should the *esse* of the creatures fuse with the *esse* of God? Bradshaw seems to blame Thomas for making a distinction between *esse commune* and the divine being, as if the medieval theologian did not take Dionysius's saying on God's being "the being of the existents *(to einai tois ousi)"* seriously enough (244-45, 251). One may spare Bradshaw accusations of pantheistic tendencies akin to those which were so repeatedly rejected by the Eastern Fathers. Contrasting synergy with the ontological stance of Aquinas, Bradshaw describes it as a "fusion of efficient and formal causality in that God would cause the being of creatures by enacting their *esse"* (251). However, if this is "precisely" what Dionysius's formula intends, is it not also "precisely" what Thomas does when he writes that "God is the *esse* of all things not essentially but causally" *(STh* I, q. 4, a. 2; quoted on p. 245)? It is true that, according to Thomas as well as almost all Western theologians, the activity of God is one *realiter* with the divine essence. Yet the fact that causal efficiency is not to be thought of as a combination of mutually exclusive essences-uncreated and created-does not, in this framework, prevent creatures from partaking of God's activity by virtue of the *communicatio esse.* Creation does not only allow creatures to participate in God's *esse* by reason of their form, which implies a determinate analogy with God's infinite perfection (this holds for Bradshaw's "formal causality"). It also grants them participation in God's *esse* through a transcendent communication of existence which continuously actualizes their specific forms. In this way, nothing lies deeper in the creature than the relationship that binds it to God as to the *Actus purus:* "Being itself is the most universal *[communissimus]* effect of divine power which is more intimately *[intimior]* inscribed in the creature than all its others effects."[5]

Yet at the same time, this communication is to be understood in a causal sense, *via efficientiae,* and not as a transmission or

[5] Aquinas, *De Pot.,* q. 3, a. 7.

mingling of substance. The Agent and the "patient" realities remain ontologically distinct from each other. As Bradshaw observes (251), the interaction between the sun and the air during daylight provides Thomas with the most consistent representation of this *communicatio.* Even when the air becomes radiant under the causal impact of the sun's own radiance, the illuminated air remains substantially different from the radiating sun. As the sun recedes (end of efficient causation), without its radiance being in the slightest diminished, the air loses the quality that bore a certain resemblance to the sun's radiance (end of formal causation).

Is there any reason to think that Gregory Palamas, as the legitimate heir of the whole Eastern tradition, conceives some other way in which God produces and maintains the universe? If the doctrine on God's *energeiai* is so crucial in Palamas's plea for the hesychast way of prayer, it is because union with the divine light does not imply any substantial nor essential unity with God. The divine *energeia* deals with the deifying *effect* of a determinate *power,* so that Barlaam's accusations of pantheism cannot hold.[6] As Palamas holds, the same idea is present in the writings of the Fathers, as when they conceive of the relationship between God and the world. Drawing a comparison between the way God regulates the universe and the interaction of soul and body, Gregory of Nyssa writes:

> there is no sort of communion [Kotvwvfa nc;], as has been just said, on the score of substance [Kma TOY Tfj<; oucrfac; Myov], between the simplicity and invisibility of the soul, and the grossness of those bodies; but, notwithstanding that, there is not a doubt that there is in them the soul's vivifying *energeia* [aAA' oμwc; TO EV TOUTOt<; 1:1vm Tfj<; \jluxfic; f.v£pynav], exerted by a law which is beyond the human understanding to comprehend [Myl\l nvi KpcfTTOVl Tfj<; av8pw1TLYT]<; avaKpa8£1crav].[7]

[6] "There will be no participation in the substance of the Creator" (Gregory Palamas, *Capita* 94); "All things participate in the sustaining *energeia* but not in the substance of God" (Palamas, *Capita* 104).

[7] Gregory of Nyssa, *Dialogue on the Soul and the Resurrection (PG* 46:44c; Eng. trans. *NPNF* 5, slightly amended).

I cannot see why Gregory Palamas's idea of created substances, endowed with natural faculties of their own, is to be thought of as more "synergetic" than its equivalent in Thomas's theology. For both theologians, created substances enjoy a legitimate autonomy at the natural level, while simultaneously depending on God as on an unceasing and utterly pure source of activity. Should we then suppose that the alleged synergetic superiority of Gregory Palamas is more obvious at the supernatural level, when dealing with the participation of the faithful in the grace of the Holy Spirit? Here also, Bradshaw blames Thomas for his extrinsicism, due to the excessive role of efficient causality. The speculations of Karl Rahner on uncreated grace are dismissed in the book as so many vain attempts to salvage Thomas's theory from this extrinsicism. If the activity of God cannot be dissociated from his essence, there is no way in which it could play the role of a "quasi forma" that would raise the created mind from the inside to the reality of communion with God (257-59). Even the divine light that enables the elect to contemplate God's essence as they participate in his eternal life is something created as a result of God's causal efficiency according to Thomas (or, rather, according to Bradshaw's interpretation of Thomas [253]). But here again, one wonders what kind of relationship between the faithful/the elect and God is required in order for the former to participate in the latter's uncreated activity in a truly synergetic mode. Should they fuse in a unique divino-human intellectual activity? According to Thomas, the relationship between the created mind and the uncreated reality, as contained *inchoative* in the gift of faith and as fully developed in the vision of the elect, rests on a supernatural transformation of the faculties of the soul due to the inner influence of an utterly transcendent source of activity. The source of activity is uncreated, the result is created, namely, the supernatural transformation of the soul, becoming fit to sense a Reality beyond any material sense.[8] This creative

[8] "the communication of grace *[infusio gratiae]* comes within the principle of created realities *[accedit ad rationem creationis]* insofar as this grace does not have any cause in the subject, either in the mode of an efficient cause or of some matter in which it would be potentially contained" (Aquinas, *De Pot.,* q. 3, a. 8, ad 3).

communication from which grace, as a supernatural *habitus,* originates, respects the ontological distinction between the uncreated cause and the created receptacle.

As Bradshaw observes, the best analogy is once again provided by the relationship between the air and the sun:

> The creature must be "elevated to a higher operation .... by the imposition of a new form" *(Contra Gentes,* III, 53.6) much as the diaphanous object becomes luminous by being filled with light.[9]

Although the diaphanous object has to be filled with light in order to become luminous, the luminosity that becomes a qualitative determination of its being remains distinct from the light. In a similar manner, the *lumen gloriae,* operating as the continuous *medium sub quo* of the beatific vision, never becomes a created reality (the *species increata* remain *increata).* At the same time, this *lumen* produces the supernatural quality, *habitus gloriae,* which enables the intellect, henceforth released from any *medium in quo,* to perceive God directly.

Do Gregory Palamas and the Eastern tradition understand the union of grace between created intellects and God differently? It has been said that Gregory, striving to dismiss the accusations of Barlaam, had built his line of defense on the traditional distinction between substantial and "energetic" participation.[10] In order to stress that energetic participation involves some kind of real blending between the created and the uncreated, Bradshaw puts forward the *Ambiguum* 7 of Maximus the Confessor, one of Gregory's more respected authorities. In this text, the elect are said to possess "one single *energeia"* with God, since the *energeia* of God has totally taken hold of their own.[11] Seeing the divine light, they are themselves transformed into light. Yet in the same passage Maximus emphasizes that he does not conceive here of "a

[9] Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West,* 254.

[10] "God, while remaining entirely in himself, dwells in us by his superessential power, and communicates to us not his nature, but his proper glory and splendor" *(Triads* 1.3.23 [Gregory Palamas, *The Triads,* trans. Nicholas Gendle and John Meyendorff, The Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1983), 39]).

[11] *PG* 91:1076bd; quoted in Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West,* 194.

destruction of self-determination." This means that the elect are not deprived of their own natural *energeia.* They freely use it to welcome the divine one, so that this divine *energeia* might raise their own created *energeiai* far above their natural limits, allowing limited minds to contemplate an infinite Reality.[12] This indwelling of God in human beings is therefore described as a circular or perichoretic chain of *energeia* and *pathos,* perfective *actio* and perfected *passio,* generated by the causal influx of God and implying the free will of the creatures. The elect are able to see God as long as their intellectual faculty is raised to a supernatural level of activity under the influx of the divine *energeia.*[13] This circular synergy, manifesting the uninterrupted movement of God's *energeia* which pours forth from the divine essence towards the elect and comes back to its source through their contemplation, does not involve a blending between the uncreated *energeia* of God and the created *energeiai* of the creatures at any stage. The *energeia* of the reality that moves does not mix with the *energeia* of the reality that it sets in movement. If it happened otherwise, the *energeia* of the creature would blend with the essence of God, there being no ontological separation between God's *ousia* and his *energeia. AB* stated in *Ambiguum* 41, the union between God and the elect is complete according to the *"hexis [habitus]* of charity." It is total but in the "identity according to the essence Km' oucriav

In summary, the alleged divergence between the two theological traditions regarding the causal process involved in creation and divinization is far from convincing. It seems to derive

[12] In an another text explicitly intended to clarify this passage, Maximus does away with any possible ambiguity pertaining to this *Ambiguum.* Writing about the unique *energeia* of God and his saints, Maximus "did not intend to suppress the natural *energeia* [of the saints] ... but I have only shown the superessential power which produces the divinization and becomes these realities for the sake of those who are divinized" (Maximus the Confessor, *Opuscula Theologica et Politica* [PG 90:33ad]).

[13] See *Maximus,Amb.* 42 *(PG* 91:1341): in any supernatural event (the miracle of the Red Sea, the birth of Christ, etc.), the created effect of the divine *energeia* is to raise the "mode of activity" (Tp61m; Tfj<; EVEpyda<;) of the creature to a degree which is far above its natural possibilities, as defined by the "word of nature"(Myoi; Tfji; <j>ucrcwi;).

[14] *Maximus,Amb.* 41(PG91:1307b).

both from a prejudiced reading of Thomas and from a superficial treatment of the Greek Fathers' notion of synergy. Dealing with the principles of cosmic order and deifying grace, the Greek Fathers and Thomas equally believe that participation without confusion rests on efficient causality. However, this does not suppress the basic problem which Bradshaw tackles in the line of a great number of theologians from the time of Demetrios and Prokhoros Kydones. Whereas Gregory Palamas formulates a distinction between God's essence and his energy(ies), Thomas Aquinas postulates an identity between *essentia* and *operatio* in God. Whereas Gregory, although not denying the existence of a created grace, emphasizes the uncreated aspect of divinization, Thomas seems to do exactly the opposite when he advocates the created nature of grace despite its divine cause. Finally, Thomas is interested in defining how the elected will attain to the contemplation of God's essence, whereas, according to Gregory, God's essence cannot be known by any creature. If there is no significant divergence between the manners in which the two theologians conceive the natural and the supernatural orders, where does such heterogeneity of views stem from?

In order to shed a new light on this old problem, I suggest pondering the metaphysical conditions of God's transcendent interaction with the world. In my view, one of the major shortcomings of Bradshaw's argument lies here.

Bradshaw blames the Western tradition, as permeated with the theology of Thomas Aquinas, for being inconsistent when it comes to the articulation of necessity and freedom in God (see above). In this regard, Gregory Palamas's distinction between God's *Ousia* and his *energeia,* resulting from a long and innovative maturation of Aristotle's insights, is presented as much more satisfactory than the Augustine-based assimilation between *essentia* and *operatio* in God. Of course, one can hardly expect Bradshaw to take a sympathetic look at the most essential claims of Aquinas's metaphysics (although when reading contemporary theologians, one cannot help but yearn after the generous manner in which Aquinas treats adverse doctrines). Still, one is at least entitled to

require a similar level of philosophical precision when it comes to the metaphysics that Bradshaw advocates as supremely consistent. It is not the case here, and this vagueness might conceal a major problem of understanding concerning the very issue the book claims to settle.

It is tempting-since it seems to make things simpler-to think of the distinction between God's inner being and his free act of creation in terms of a one-to-one correspondence with Gregory's distinction between *Ousia* and *energeia* in God. However, following Bradshaw's line of argument, this would lead back to the flaws he attributes to Thomas Aquinas's theory. If the *energeia* of God, identified with the divine act of creation, proceeds from God's *Ousia* in a natural or necessary way, how would this act be really free? And if dealing with possible worlds is the condition of a free act of creation, why would it imply the imperfection associated with passive potency in the case of Thomas's God but not in the case of Gregory's? The interesting point is that Gregory does not make such a simplistic assumption. If all the divine *energeiai* which rule the world and divinize the saints reflect God's providential design, the converse is not true. Not all the *energeiai* of God appear as having an external, temporal end, like creation and divinization. Bradshaw eagerly acknowledges this aspect:

> No essence can be without its powers or 'natural energies' so in the case of God these two are without beginning (*Triads* III.2.6). The same is true of the 'things around God', or what Maximus has referred to as His uncreated works: His foreknowledge, will, providence, and self-contemplation, as well as reality (oYTOTT]c;), infinity, immortality, life, holiness, virtue and everything that is 'contemplated as a real being around God' (III.2.7, cf.III.3.8). All are uncreated, yet none is the essence of God, for God transcends them as cause.[15]

However, what is the difference between those divine *energeiai* which have a beginning and an end and those which are deprived of beginning and end? Discussing E. Perl's interpretation of Palamas's *energeiai* as referring to God's eternal act of creation,

[15] Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West,* 238.

Bradshaw writes: "Just as some *energeiai* are fully temporal, some could be different than they are."[16] According to Bradshaw, some *energeiai* are eternal, as pertaining to "the things around God," others are temporal and purely contingent, as produced in relationship to creation (272-73). The unique feature that these "extremely heterogeneous" *energeiai* have in common is that they all are "God's self-manifestation." One cannot help contemplating with some sense of perplexity the idea that God's act of creation is to be wholly subsumed under the categories of space and time:

> Palamas says specifically that God's creative act has a beginning and an end. In this, he is typical of the Greek Fathers, who generally think of creation as a specific act taking place at the beginning of time, not as the relation between an eternal Creator and a (possibly beginningless) temporal world.[17]

Is the existence of such created entities as space and time required in order for creation to take place? This assumption sounds like the best possible example of a self-contradictory statement, and gives way to many similar interrogations. Are the eternal *logoi* or reasons of the things that are created in time and space also created in time and space? If time is in the mind of God, is God eternal? Ultimately, is God God? That God's creative decision does not imply time, although time depends on this decision, is a fact unambiguously stated by Gregory himself:

> My discourse (guided by the absolute and eternally preexisting nature) now leads me briefly to show the unbelieving that not only the divine powers (which the Fathers often call "natural energies"), but also some works of God are without beginning, as the Fathers also rightly affirm. For was it not needful for the work of providence to exist before Creation, so as to cause each of the created things to come to be in time, out of non-being? Was it not necessary for a divine knowledge to know before choosing, even outside time? But how does it follow that the divine prescience had a beginning? How could one conceive of a beginning of God's self-contemplation, and was there ever a moment when God began to be moved toward contemplation of Himself? Never![18]

[16] Ibid., 273.
[17] Ibid., 272.
[18] Gregory Palamas, *Triads* 3.2.6 (Gendle and Meyendorff, trans., 94).

The "natural energies" from which creation stems preexist creation and are eternal. Writing somewhat earlier about God's power of prescience, creation, deification *(Triads* 3.2.5), Gregory points out that if these *energeiai* had begun in time, God would have acquired them, and therefore God would be imperfect. However, as Bradshaw rightly points out (238, 272-73) creation, providence, deification are also said by Gregory to have sometime a beginning (deification), sometime an end (prescience), sometime both (creation). Could it not mean, contrary to Bradshaw's interpretation, that one and the same *energeia* is to be conceived as simultaneously without beginning and with a beginning, depending on the point of view chosen? Bradshaw dismisses the notion of relativity put forward by Perl in the case of the *energeiai* "with a beginning and an end" on the grounds that there are *energeiai* without end, and that all these "finite" *energeiai* are not related to the act of creation, as for instance deification (240). Notwithstanding, this relativistic aspect is implied in the very passage that falls under these controversial comments: "there is a beginning and an end, if not of the creative power itself, at least of its action and clearly of the *energeia relating* to created things (KaTa 8d5T]µtoupy1iµ£va)."[19] Deification pertains to creation in the sense that it is an event occurring within space and time, which is therefore related to created things. Oddly enough, Bradshaw refuses here to translate *energeia* by energy, as he does everywhere else: "Palamas does not mean that there is an end of the divine energy in relation to created things, but that there is an end of the divine *activity* of creating."[20]

But again: how can this divine activity be conceived in the categories of time and space? The interpretation of Gregory's sentence that Bradshaw dismisses here is an exact repetition of the words of Gregory himself: *in relation* to created things, the divine *energeia* has a beginning and an end. It is worth paying some attention to the singular form of *energeia* in the previous passage. As Perl has rightly emphasized, it is in relationship to the

[19] Gregory Palamas, *Triads* 3.2.8, quoted in Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West,* 238 (emphasis added).

[20] Ibid., 239.

multiplicity of those who are to participate in it that the one and unique *energeia* of God finds itself proportionally multiplied[21]. If the partakers undergo the perfective influence of this unique *energeia* according to their own finite dimensions, why should not the unique, infinite, and absolute *energeia* of God be described here as simultaneously finite and transient? It is indeed such, insofar as its *praxis,* that is, its creative and deifying action, is limited.

Bradshaw seems at pains to explain how Gregory can bluntly ascribe God's *energeia* to the sphere of the relative:

> Not everything which is said about God refers to the essence. For the 'toward something' (To Tipoc; n) is also said; which is relative (avacpoptK6v) and is indicative not of the essence but of a relation to another. Such is the divine *energeia* in God.[22]

Although this idea is never mentioned in the wntmgs of Gregory, Bradshaw argues that "relationship" here refers to the relationship between the divine Persons. All the *energeiai* have the capacity to be God's self-manifestation, which implies a Trinitarian dimension (273). In this case, however, the *energeiai* would not be more related to the divine persons than they are related to the divine essence-so why should they indicate the persons and not the essence? It seems more reasonable to assume that "indication of a relation to another" is meant of the mode in which creatures relate to God. In actual fact, the manner in which creatures relate to God prevents them from understanding God "according to His essence," or "according to what He is absolutely" (if the expression has any meaning, "absolute relationship to God" is the privilege of God himself). Creatures merely understand God according to the conditions induced by his free decision to create and sanctify them: "Therefore, as Creator and Cause of these things, God is known and is named from them and

[21] *Triads* 3.2.13: "[The divine] essence is one, even though the rays are many, and are sent out in a manner appropriate to those participating in them, being multiplied according to the varying capacity of those receiving them" (Gendle and Meyendorff, trans., 99).

[22] *Capita* 127 *(PG* 150: 1209); see Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West,* 271.

according to them, and 1s seen in a certain relation (crxfoEt) according to them. "[23]

God's absolute *energeia,* proceeding necessarily and motionlessly from God's essence, as radiance stems from the very being of the sun, is also and at the same time the efficient cause of what happens to the creatures in time. Consequently, it can be considered simultaneously from two distinct points of view: relatively to the creatures it affects, and as subsisting ("enhypostasized") in God[24]. Deification has a beginning (albeit no end) in the sense that no ordinary human being is holy from birth: he eventually becomes so under the influence of the Holy Spirit's sanctifying *energeia* working within the bonds of space and time (and *ultra* for the elect). Yet, and at the same time, deification has no beginning, since it means nothing but the participation of the creature in a holiness that is utterly foreign to the bonds of time and space. It is the holiness of God himself, perceived as an eternal irradiation of God's essence. Probably alluding to the famous saying of Maximus on the "unrelated or absolute (acrx£To<;) grace" of Melchisedek as the paradigm of deification, Gregory writes:

> This grace is in fact a relationship (axfou:;) albeit not a natural one; *yet it is at the same time* beyond relationship (aax£TOc;) not only by virtue of being supernatural, but also *qua* relationship. [25]

[23] "On Union and Distinction," in *Syngrammata,* ed. P. Chrestou (Thessalonike, 1988), vol. 2, p. 83.

[24] The weakness of Perl's interpretation lies in the identification of Gregory's divine *energeiai* with God's eternal decision regarding creation, as if these *energeiai* had no other existence but "in-relationship-to-creation," the divine essence assuming alone the dimension of God's absolute being. However, the consequences of Perl's complete relativization of the divine *energeiai* appear as inconsistent as Bradshaw's "absolutization" of the same. What about *energeiai* such as wisdom, kindness, etc-? Is God kind only in relationship to creation? Is it not, on the contrary, the good of creation which is relative to the absolute goodness of God? In actual fact, the divine *energeia* is both relative, as a creative/perfective cause and absolute, as enhypostasized in the divine essence.

[25] Gregory Palamas, *Triads* 3. 1.29; see *Maximus,Amb.* 10 (PG 91.1141ab): "it is not by virtue of created nature, created and coming from nothingness, nature according to which he has started and ceased to exist, but by virtue of the divine grace, uncreated, immortal, above all nature and all times-and only by such virtue-that [Melkisedek] has been considered as being totally and in everything generated from God according to the practical intellect."

The same can be said about prescience. On one hand, this *energeia* has an end, since it strives to move creation towards the goal that God has assigned to it. On the other hand, it has no end, since it does not differ *numero* from God's eternal act of self-contemplation. [26]

The first conclusion that can be drawn from this rectification of Bradshaw's interpretation is that a correct understanding of Gregory's idea of creation is liable to the very same criticism that Bradshaw formulates against Thomas's thought. If the *energeia* of creation stems from God's essence naturally, as being among "the things around God" (*Triads* 3.2.5), how can it at the same time pertain to God's freedom? How can it relate to the eternal choice between the opposites (*Triads* 3.1.29)? Is it not because the "necessity" of God's nature should not be conceived, following Thomas's teaching, as the hold of a foreign law on God that would restrict God's possibilities of choice, but precisely as an unlimited possibility of choice entailed by the absence of such a law? The necessity of God's being, properly understood, cannot be conceived separately from the exercise of an absolute, unrestrained freedom, as the positive power (and not the imperfect potency) of choosing between opposites. [27]

The second conclusion that can be drawn from the same considerations raises concerns about the global framework of Bradshaw's foray into conceptual history. Leaving aside the succinct treatment of the Latin tradition, Bradshaw's study seems to have overlooked a pivotal aspect of the notion of divine *energeia,* as elaborated within the Greek-speaking philosophical and theological tradition: the dialectics between the absolute and the relative. After all, if it is true that Gregory's doctrine merely displays the thought of the Fathers without adding anything to it, this dialectics is likely to have appeared at a much earlier stage of the tradition. How could Bradshaw effectively measure the estrangement between East and West without taking this crucial element into account? Conversely, exploring this neglected aspect

[26] See above, Gregory Palamas, *Triads* 3.2.6.

[27] See for instance Aquinas, *STh* I, q. 19, a. 3.

of *energeia* as a theological notion might lead us to a more balanced understanding of the estrangement between the Latin and the Byzantine religious worlds.

III. THE PORPHYRIAN PRINCIPLE

A) The Byzantine Tradition

The paradigm of the solar radiance, as expressing the way in which the divine *energeiai* interact with the created sphere, comes up several times in the course of Bradshaw's historical survey. It plays the role of a leitmotiv that appears at every important step of this exploration. The productive function of light in Alexander of Aphrodisias's gnoseology is said to have inspired Plotinus to form a new concept of *energeia* from the principles sketched out by Aristotle.[28] Basil of Cesarea draws a parallel between the sun's illumination and the participation of the saints in the *energeiai* of the Holy Spirit.[29] The very same paradigm is used by John Damascene to account for the providential activity of God within the created sphere. It is also a vital element of Symeon the New Theologian's mysticism as well as of George of Cyprus's triadology. Finally, the whole dispute between Barlaam and Gregory Palamas hinges on the perception of God's uncreated light, identified by Gregory as the Holy Spirit's divine *energeia*. Regarding the Latin tradition, Bradshaw shows that the paradigm of the sun's light is pivotal in Thomas Aquinas's accounts on God's creative and deifying activities (251), but he neglects to comment on the convergence with the Eastern tradition. If this is a coincidence, it is a peculiar one: are not the two traditions supposed to be mutually exclusive precisely on this very point, that is, in the understanding of divine activity?

[28] "That which is supremely visible, such as light, is the cause of other things being visible; likewise that which is supremely and primarily good is the cause of other good things being good" (De *Anima* 88.24-89.9; quoted in Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West,* 70).

[29] Basil of Caesarea, *On the Holy Spirit* 22 (PG 32:108c-109a; quoted in Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West,* 173).

Leaving for later an examination of whether this unexpected convergence is meaningful or not, I will be satisfied for the moment with showing that the solar paradigm contains a clue regarding the origin of the dialectics between the absolute and the relative *energeia.*

In his *Life of Plotinus,* Porphyry claims to have "worn out" (rrapETELVEY chro&nKVU<;) his master Plotinus asking him questions about the mode of the union between the soul and the body three days and nights in a row.[30] It is probably an oblique way to draw the attention of his readers to the originality of his own approach. The truth is that Plotinus developed more than compelling considerations about the mode of this interaction. He laid down the precise nature of the problem as well as the elements of the solution, as reported in book 4 of the *Enneads (Enneads* 4.3.18-23). What is the kind of state-of-thing involved when we say that the soul is *in* the body? According to Plotinus, the idea that the soul is contained in the body as things are said to be contained in space or in a vessel involves a series of logical contradictions. Plato's image of the steersman emphasizes that an intellective substance such as the soul remains distinct from the body while interacting with it. Still, the simile does not indicate the mode of this active presence of the soul to the body.

In actual fact, the only way in which real causal interaction can be achieved without any substantial mixing is provided by the relationship between the light of the sun and the air:

> This certainly is presence with distinction: the light penetrates through and through, but nowhere coalesces [01' o.Aou rrapov ouoEvi µ(yvurnt]; the light is the stable thing, the air flows in and out; when the air passes beyond the lit area it is dark; under the light it is lit. We have a true parallel to what we have been saying of body and soul, for the air is in the light quite as much as the light is in the air.[31]

The "illumination" of the body by the soul sets the body in movement. More precisely, specific parts of the existing body

[30] Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 13.

[31] Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.3.23 (trans. S. MacKenna [Boston: Charles T. Branford Company, 1916], 35-36).

become instruments or organs of the soul when they come into contact with its powerful presence. As the rays of the sun fill the air with light, the soul diffuses its power throughout the body by means of the nervous system, which connects the specific bodily organs to the brain. However, one should not think that the soul is located in the brain simply because the brain is the physical starting-point of rational action is not accurate. The brain is rather the initial place where the soul exercises the *energeia* which corresponds to its power:

> [it is considered] that, obviously, the one who uses the instruments is present where the instruments have their source [oo OT)AOVOTl al apxal TWV opyavwv], but it is wiser to say that "there" indicates the *energeia* of the faculty, as the point from which stems the movement of the instrument oi: i\f.yf.lv Ti)v cipxitv EKE! o8Ev yap l:'µEAAE KtvE1a8at TO opyavov].[32]

One of the main treatises in which Porphyry discussed the issue of the mind-body interaction, *Symmikta Zetemata,* is lost. As H. Dorrie has shown, the third chapter of *De natura hominis,* a famous treatise written by a Christian theologian, Nemesius of Emesa, between 390 and 400, contains a summary of Porphyry's position.[33] The problem of the interaction between the soul and the body is set here in similar terms to that of book 4 of the *Enneads,* including the reference to Plato's steersman. Furthermore, the paradigm that helps to formulate a solution is also borrowed from Plotinus. The clue to a correct understanding of the union between the soul and the body lies in the relationship between the sun and the air. It deals both with a causal interaction and with a union without confusion, dauyxuTo<;£vwcrt<;:

> as the sun through its sheer presence [Tfj transforms the air into daylight by endowing the latter with a luminous form [<1JwTOEtofi], and as daylight is united to the air in a manner which is both foreign to mixing and self-

[32] Ibid.

[33] H. Dorrie, *Porphyrios' Symmikta Zetemata,* Monographen zur Klassischen Altertumwissenschaft 20 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1959). Dorrie methodically compares the content of the chapter with a text of Priscian, the Byzantine grammarian, which clearly refers to the *Symmikta* (see ibid., 15).

diffusive [cicruyxlhwc;aμa mhQ K£XUμEvov], likewise the soul is united to the body while remaining totally deprived of mixing.[34]

Porphyry has discovered a general principle of metaphysics that accounts for any form of interaction between the intelligible and the material levels of reality in Plotinus's insight concerning the main-body interaction. Energetic causality *is* the mode in which union without confusion can be achieved:

whenever an intelligible entity comes to be implicated in a relationship [Ev crxfon] with a place or with a thing located in space, we take liberties by saying: "it is here." Since it is the farmer's energy which is there, we use the term "place" instead of relationship and energy [Tov TOTIOV dvTi Tfjc; crxfoEwc; Kai Tfjc; EYEpydac; One should say: "it operates here [&ta £v£pyELav mhoG Trjv fKE'T]" rather than: "it is here."[35]

Porphyry's concept of the interaction is fairly precise. Although there is a relationship, *skhesis,* between the place and the intelligible entity, the latter is not spatially, but merely energetically, related to the former. In virtue of this "relative-state-of-thing" between the two entities, the material entity "suffers" (mfoxa) the *energeia* belonging to an intelligible entity which itself remains "unmixed," independent of the material dimension. This "relative-state-of-thing" is therefore fundamentally asymmetrical. The fact that the intelligible substance *A* affects the material

[34] Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura hominis* (PG 40:597b). The fact that the "union without confusion" is originally a Porphyrian formula, belonging to the lost *Zetemata,* has been contested by J. Rist, who believes it to come from an independent source, the *scholia* of Ammonius attributed to Theodotus, which would have been common to Nemesius and Priscian; see J. Rist, "Pseudo-Ammonius and the Soul/Body Problem in Some Platonic Texts of Late Antiquity," *American journal of Philology* 109 (1988): 402-15. Theodotus would have attributed a Christian formula to Ammonius in order to refute Porphyry. This intricate reconstitution often relies on slight indications. Among other points, Rist points to the mention of *skhesis,* position-in-regard-to or relationship *(habitudo),* in the *Sententia* to minimize the Porphyrian paternity of the passage (ibid., 404). However, as said here, there is no other way to understand this "union without blending" than to refer to the notion of *skhesis, en skhesei,,* one of the key concepts of Porphyry, *De homine* chap. 3. On the whole, it is unlikely that, if the formula ever had a Christian origin, it had evolved into a system of metaphysics before-or independently from-Porphyry.

[35] Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura hominis* § 136-37 (ed. M. Morani [Leipzig: Teubner, 1987], 42).

substance *B* through its own *energeia,* induces a relationship from *B* to *A,* but no relationship from *A* to *B. A* remains absolute, *askhetos,* at the very moment when it affects relatively, *en skhesei,* *B.* We will designate this asymmetrical system of causation which Porphyry derives from Plotinus as the "Porphyrian Principle" (or PP).

As it is plain to see in the interaction between body and soul, the intelligible substance is not unaware of its own causal effect upon the heterogeneous substance. Since it is deliberate action that comes into focus, one has to conceive of an "intellective relationship" to the body that would subsist in the soul. This is an "idea-will," an intention, existing in the soul. In one of the few original treatises of Porphyry that have managed to find their way down to us, the *Sententia ad intelligibila ducentes,* he states:

> Since the incorporeal realities are not present in bodies in a spatial sense, they are present in the latter at their willing [chav because they have a natural inclination [ij lTE<jJUKE pfoEt v] towards them. Not being present spatially, they are present by virtue of the relationship [TJJ CTXEaEl].'[36]

This idea-will of the soul mixes energetically, not substantially, with the material element, as it is diffused throughout the parts of the body. This movement of the soul outward which never becomes a movement in a spatial sense, is described *(Sent.* 28) in terms of tension, Taat<;:

> the incorporeal has to give an existence [uTiomfjcrm] to the powers which tend outwards [prnoucrac; ... de; To according to the union, powers through which, making a descent, [the incorporeal] mingles with the body [cruµTii\frnm T0 crwµan]. The confinement of the soul in the body takes place in an unspeakable tension-outward of its own being [81' EKTacrEwc; oov dpprjTOu Tfjc; EaUTOU].[37]

One understands that this ex-tension is said to be "unspeakable." Although the soul cannot ontologically come into contact or blend

[36] Porphyry, *Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, Sent.* 3 (ed., E. Lamberz [Leipzig: Teubner, 1975] 2).

[37] Ibid.

with physical entities, it nevertheless manages to reach out to external realities, to "mingle" with them, without ever departing from its own intellectual sphere.[38]

For a Christian like Nemesius, the Porphyrian Principle could of course easily be applied to the interaction between God and the world: the "blending without mixing" or the "traveling without moving" of the higher entity to the lower, safeguards its transcendence.[39] In fact, Nemesius explicitly refers to Porphyry when he applies the principle to the union between human and divine natures in Christ.[40] But Nemesius is not the only Christian author, at least in the East, who seemed to have gleaned some theological inspiration from Porphyry. Basil of Caesarea's use of the solar paradigm, in the famous chapter 9 of the *Treatise on the Holy Spirit,* composed as early as 375, becomes clear against the background of the Porphyrian Principle. "After the likeness of the sunbeam," writes Basil, the Holy Spirit can "fill all things with his power" while at the same time "communicating Himself only to the worthy." He can be "simple according to his essence" while being at the same time "multiple according to his powers." He is said to be "impassively divided" and "shared without loss of being entire." Paraphrasing Roman 12:6, Basil replaces "grace" with *"energeia,"* so that the Holy Spirit is said to "distribute its *energeia* according to the proportion of faith" (Km ' dva!ioyfav Tfjc; TTt<JTEwc;).[41] As the one and only radiance of the sun multiplies in

[38] Ibid., *Sent.28* (Lamberz, ed., 17). In the same treatise, Porphyry describes at length how the intellect, shifting away from a potentially endless contemplation of the incorporeal realm, becomes the lowest of all the intellectual faculties, the cpavTacr(a,as it starts to deal with bodily realities; see also *sent.* 16. In *Sent.43,* we read that it is through a tension in itself that does not ontologically mingle with outer realities that the cpavrncr(ais able to "stand close to its own picture" or "mold pictures from outer realities." Porphyry's "unspeakable tension" of the soul toward the body sounds very much like Gregory of Nyssa's "incomprehensible law" according to which the soul's "vivifying *energeia"* extends to the body (see *Dialogue on the Soul and Resurrection,* quoted above). It is probably less than a coincidence.

[39] See Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura hominis* (*PG* 40:589b).

[40] Ibid. (*PG* 40:604a).

[41] Basil of Caesarea, *Treatise on the Holy Spirit* c. 9 (SC 17:147; *PG* 32:109a) Here we *come* across the theological concept of *avaJ\oyia,* "right proportion," a notion abundantly developed by the Cappadocian Fathers. The classical philosophical register of the *notion,* however, seems quite far from its use by the Cappadocians (see Plato, *Timaeus* 31c-32c,

proportion to the aerial volume that it fills, the one and only *energeia* of God fills the universe in proportion to the realities, material or intellectual, that are "able to suffer" its effect. A passage from Gregory of Nyssa's *Discourse on the Infants* perfectly describes this proportional (i.e., creature-related) multiplication of God's unique and absolute *energeia:*

> [David the prophet] turned his mind to heaven's greatness and was led to the boundless, immeasurable power which embraces the universe. Seeing the sun's rays shining down upon us from such heights, he believed that God's providential *energeiai* never cease to come down from the height of the Divinity, making their way down to us through visible realities [8ux Twv <jlmvoμ£vwv]. If one shining star encompasses all things by its luminous power, if it becomes entirely and indivisibly present, as though distributing itself, to all things that participate in this power [TICX0'l Toti; μETEXOUO'lV EaUTOV Emv£μwv o/ioi; EKUO'Tljl Kat c.i81a(pEToi;TIUp£0'Tt], then how much more will the Maker of this light make himself "all in all" as the Apostle says [1 Cor 15:28], giving himself to every subject according to its capacity [f:KaO'TljlTiap£0'TtTocrouTovfouTov 818oui;, ocrov TO U1TOKElμ£VOV OEXETCXl].[42]

The laws of nature and the order of visible realities, *ta fainomena,* rest on this invisible process of energetic multiplication which prophets like David have been able to contemplate intellectually. At the same time, these prophets have understood that this process does not entail any multiplication in God himself, since it is merely related to the creatures that undergo the effects of his creative will.

While inspired by later Neoplatonism (Proclus), the treatise on the *Divine Names,* patronymically ascribed to Dionysius Areopagita, also appears to rely on the Porphyrian Principle as it displays the picture of a Christian universe. The love that God lavishes on existing beings is said to be diffused through an innumerable variety of "providential emanations or energies"

Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* 113laff.). Nor does *"analogia"* have a wide scriptural basis (Wis 13:5; Rom 12:6). I would suggest that Basil received some inspiration from the treatises of Hero of Alexandria on optics, where *analogia* or mathematical proportion appears as an essential notion to describe the diffusion of light. This conjecture, however, remains to be grounded on some evidence.

[42] Gregory of Nyssa, *Discourse on Infants Who Have Died Prematurely (Gregorii Nysseni Opera,* ed. W. Jaeger, vol. 3/2 [Leiden: Brill, 1987], 86-87 *(PG* 46:181).

(npoVOTJTtKdlc; npo615otc; Kat EVEpydmc;), that existent beings "suffer," as it were.[43] Stemming from the *diakrisis,* the division-multiplication of the unspeakable One, they move down to existent beings, with the effect of triggering their existential, operative, and contemplative faculties. This process of proportional multiplication happens however without affecting the unspeakable One. Since God is the "cause without relationship" (aaxEToc; atTta) which is "beyond all love" (navToc; £pwrnc;), this cosmic *diakrisis* is merely relative to existent beings, said to be intrinsically *skhetikoi,* in a state-of-relationship to the unspeakable Cause.[44] Here again, the paradigm of solar radiance is put forward to depict the interaction between God and the world:

For as our sun, through no choice or deliberation, but by the very fact of its existence, gives light to all those things which have any inherent power of sharing its illumination, even so the Good (which is above the sun, as the transcendent archetype by the very mode of its existence is above its faded image) sends forth upon all things according to their receptive powers, the rays of its undivided goodness [rrifot Tote; OOCJ!V avai\oywc; E<jlll')CJl Tac; Tfjc; C5i\l')c; aya80Tl'JTOc; clKTlvac;].[45]

In order to present the relativity of created beings and the illusions associated with it, Dionysius uses the picture of a luminous, motionless chain hanging from the heavens down to existing beings. While the chain affects them merely from a causal point of view, by lifting them upwards, the human mind cannot help perceiving this influence as an illusory movement of the chain itself. Similarly, thinking that the providential *energeiai*

[43] Dionysius the Areopagite, *On the Divine Names* 9.9 *(Corpus Dionysiacum,* vol. 1, ed. B. R. Suchla [Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1990], 213; *PG* 3:916c).

[44] In fact, the Porphyrian dialectics between the akshetos (absolute) and the skhetikos (relative) is widely present in Proclus: "Thus [the gods] in exercising providence assume no relation to those for whom they provide (oOTc ouv npovooUVTcs crxfotv ava8£xovrnt TIPOs Ta npovoouµi:va), since it is in virtue of being what they are, that they make all things good, and what acts in virtue of its being acts without relation (nav OE TO Tlii c'lvat TIO!OUV acrxeTWs notd) (for relation is qualification of its yap crxfois np6a6wls fon TOG c'ivai] and therefore contrary to its nature)" (Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica,* prop. 122 *[The Elements of Theology,* trans. E. R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 109]).

[45] Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* 4.1 (trans. C. E. Rolt [repr. Whitefish, Mont.: Kessinger Publishing, 1997]; Suchla, ed., *Corpus Dionysiacum,* 1:144; *PG* 3:693b.

move from God to the created being in a spatial sense is an illusion due to the fact that created beings are themselves "moved," not in a spatial, but in a causal sense by the unique *energeia* of the unspeakable One.[46]

More or less contemporaneously with the composition of the Dionysian corpus in the Syrian region, the revival of Aristotelianism in the school of Alexandria gave rise to an interesting phenomenon. Originally the product of a reflection on the mechanisms of causality in Aristotle, and perhaps more specifically, as Bradshaw holds, on the process of sense-perception in *De Anima* (Alexander of Aphrodisias), the Neoplatonic understanding of *energeia,* as linking the realm of the intelligible to the material, was reintroduced in the commentaries on Aristotle's treatises, and especially in the commentaries on *De Anima.*

It is not difficult to show that Philoponus makes good use of the Porphyrian Principle when offering a new interpretation of the trajectory of light and colors in *De Anima.* The type of movement associated with light in the aerial medium is conceived in terms foreign to the common notion of spatial transfer; the kind of potency it involves does not relate to the mobile, as according to the Aristotelian definition of movement ("the actuality of the potential qua potential" *[Metaphys.* 201a10]), but to the medium. Being continuously affected by the sun's remote and absolute being-in-energy, what is a simple disposition or capacity (bn TTJbEtOTTJ<;)in the medium (first potentiality) changes into transparency (second potentiality or first actuality) and

[46] Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* 3.1 (Suchla, ed., *Corpus Dionysiacum,* 1:138-39; *PG* 3:680cd). We find an exactly similar insight in a passage from a *Commentary on the Parmenides* attributed to Porphyry. To explain our perception of divine providence, the author of the commentary refers to what men call a "setting" or "rising" of the sun. In reality, there are no such things, because the sun shines without interruption. It is men who now fall away from the energy of the sun, now come again in its presence: "[rising and setting] pertains to the way those who are on earth are affected. [Men] transfer [to the Sun] something which has to do with them [To rri:pl £auTOuc; de; frelvov µnacpepouaiv], thus ignoring what happens in reality [d.yvoouvTec;T0 (Jn *Parmenidem* 3.13-35 [P. Hadot, ed., *Porphyre et Victorinus* (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1968), 2:72-73]).

transparency in its turn changes into light (second actuality).[47] Light can therefore be said to be the actuality of the transparent, TO 8ta¢av£c; KaT, £v£pynav. However, the medium has no determinate potency in itself to become light, insofar as a simple disposition is not an ability to carry out an action, that is, not a *hexis* (Latin *habitus).* Taken in itself, the air is not capable of becoming 8ta¢av£c; nor of receiving light as a certain quality. It is the continuous *energeia* of the sun that provides the aerial disposition with the *hexis* of transparency and enables the latter to carry out its luminous action. The air loses the *hexis* as soon as the sun recedes. The air, in order to become daylight, is entirely dependent on the sun, as on a source of actuality that is itself utterly independent of the air. When daylight comes, no time separates the illumination of one point of the sky from the next, since all these points are at the same time undergoing the perfecting influence of the one absolute *energeia* of the sun. Consequently, speaking of the change from night to day, one has to conceive of an instantaneous movement:

> perfect actuality [tv£pyna TE.Ada] is the state which does not proceed along with the movement of time but holds similarly in every part of it, the sort of things which the production of light is. For, at the same time that the light source appears, everything that can be illuminated is illuminated, not by the actuality of light proceeding along with the movement of time [ou cruμnpo"ioucrl')s Tfjs TOU cpwTOs EVEpydas Tij TOU xpovou but by its holding similarly in every part of time [EV TiaVTL μEpEl auTOCi 6μo!ws EXOUOT)s].[48]

This is a precise account, in Aristotelian terms, of the "union without confusion" implied by the Porphyrian Principle. It is not the *energeia* of the medium that is in the medium as a quality, but the *energeia* of the sun, which does not mix substantially with the medium. It is *in* the medium, multiplied according to space and identical in every place, as a consequence of the medium's dependence on the sun. This results in transparency, as a relative

[47] Philoponus, *In Aristotelis De anima libros commentaria,* Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 15, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin: Reimer, 1897); e.g., p. 324, II. 28-33.

[48] Ibid., 297 (translation in J. C. de Groot, "Philoponus on *De Anima* II.5, *Physics* III.3 and the Propagation of Light," *Phronesis* 28 [1983]: 178).

hexis of the *medium.* Meanwhile, the *energeia* of the sun itself remains one and indivisible taken in itself. Colors, which provide sight with a perceptual content, do not move in such a highly "energized" medium.[49] Their trajectory is as simultaneous *in* the transparent medium as the trajectory of light is when it grants actuality to the transparent medium. Color itself is conceived as a specific and directional *energeia* radiated into the medium by the object under the influence of the sun's *energeia.*[50] Therefore, if one can reconstruct the trajectory of this specific *energeia* in the air, in a stained glass or in any other transparent medium, it does not mean that there has ever been an interval of time between the different points of what appears as a geometric line of motion. Similarly, the perception of colored objects by an animated subject is instantaneous. When the *energeia* coming from the sensible object triggers the visual faculty of the subject, promoting it to a state of actuality, the perceptive action and the perceived object become immediately one, exactly as the transparent medium becomes instantaneously daylight in the presence of the sun:

> Such a kind of thing is also the *energeia* implied by sensation for at the same time that we look, without the passage of time, we perceive perceptible objects. For which reason, he [Aristotle] does not say that the senses are moved but that they operate [ou8t cpT]at Ktvda8m *W.1"* f:vi:pydv].[51]

[49] After S. Sambursky *(The Physical World of Late Antiquity* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 112-14), R. Sorabji has emphasized the innovative aspect of Philoponus's interpretation of Aristotle's *medium:* "Aristotle had been prepared to say that the *medium* is affected *(paschei)* by the sense-object. According to Philoponus, on the contrary, the air is not affected *(apathes);* it merely lets through what Aristotle had called the process *(kinesis)* and what Philoponus calls the activity *(energeia)* of the color seen" (R. Sorabji, "From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality," in H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson, *Festschrift for A. C. Lloyd: On the Aristotelian Tradition,* Oxford Studies in Philosophy, supplementary volume [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991], 227-59).

[50] The works as a mere transmitter which does not retain anything from what it actually conveys. This explains that, although colors are not perceptible in the air itself, they are still somehow contained in the latter. Summing up one of Philoponus's major examples, Sorabji writes: "the activities should be compared with what happens when a sunbeam shines though stained glass. The beam throws a pool of color on the wall opposite, without coloring the intervening air" (ibid, 232-33).Philoponus applied this scheme to other nonmaterial or partly immaterial "travels" of sensible properties, like sound and smell.

[51] Ibid.

The considerations of Philoponus on *energeia* also provide the best example of the continuous connection between Aristotelian science and Christian theology. Simplicius had argued that one cannot conceive of a God producing a temporal universe without thinking of God's act of creation as a kind of movement happening in time. Refuting such a conclusion, Philoponus writes:

That it is not justified to conceive the productive action of God and, in general, his *energeia* as a sort of movement, since it brings everything to existence through mere willing, substantifying realities without need of time or of any interval, this is plain to see. Indeed, *energeia* does not indicate *per se* a movement. *Energeia* is a broader notion than movement, as Aristotle teaches. As a matter of fact, he writes that *energeia* has two meanings: there is a perfect *energeia* and an imperfect one. He calls movement the imperfect one.... When he defines perfect *energeia,* he says that it is an immediate projection *[atroa probolh]* which has a habitual-quality *[hexis]* as its starting point and which does not alter the latter. This projection does not coincide with a temporal movement; it happens instantaneously, as living light proceeds from light. From the very first moment of its appearance, the luminous reality, fire or sun, illuminates everything that can be so. Things are similar in the case of the *energeia* related to vision. From the very first moment of perception, we instantaneously perceive the sensible objects.... If the *energeia* of these realities is deprived of time and therefore perfect, without movement, is there not something astonishing in the recklessness of those who assign movement to the *energeia* of God?[52]

From this theological point of view, the influence of Philoponus's Neoaristotelian research seems to have reached out to Maximus the Confessor in his attempt to synthesize the teachings of the Cappadocian Fathers and Dionysius Areopagita on the divine *energeiai.* Indeed, commenting in *Ambiguum* 23 on various passages from Gregory Nazianzen and Dionysius, Maximus "purifies" the idea of the creative and providential *energeia* of God from the idea of movement in time and space. This happens in much the same way as when Philoponus "purified" the notion of *creatio ex nihilo* from the idea of motion:

[52] Philoponus, *De aetemitate mundi contra Proclum* (ed. H. Rabe [Leibzig: Teubner, 1899], 64-65).

Nay, there is an efficient power uTiapxouaa Mvaμu;] which, by way of principle, produces everything that comes to be according to God's will, propels and attracts moving entities by way of the goal, and finally gives them determinate boundaries How then, as it is likely to be objected, can this wonderful master [Dionysius] somehow credit the Deity with motion? [53]

Maximus's justification of Dionysius relies on the analysis of two concrete examples. The first refers to Maximus's theory of the divine *logoi* of creation. A vase or a piece of furniture is said to bring into existence the models (TTapa8dyμma) that are in the mind of the craftsman. The models, though, do not themselves move as they are granted existence. They rather move without moving the mind and the body of the craftsman who in turn frames the objects of dead matter. Motion is related to matter, not to the models. However, what about the art of the craftsman, which is the necessary link between the two? The second example is derived from the science of optics, and it refers more specifically to the divine *energeiai* as to the concrete power that molds the universe according to the eternal *logoi.* These *energeiai* are to be conceived on the model of the sunbeams: "People also say that light, while it enables us to see by moving our sense of sight, is moving, whereas, properly speaking, it sets in movement rather than moves."[54] It is relatively easy to identify these "people." We have just read in Philoponus: "For which reason, he [Aristotle] says not that the senses are moved but that they operate."[55]

[53] For the whole passage *in Amb.* 23, see *PG* 91:1258d-1260b.

[54] Ibid.

[55] It is through the distant effect of the real things' natural *energeia* that our senses are promoted to their own *being-in-energeia,* thus producing the representation of these real things. This conception is clearly expounded in a passage from *the Acta* of Maximus: "Indeed, no intellectual reality, as long as it exists, stands deprived of power and *energeia,* nor of sensible *energeia, and* power if it is of a sensible kind, nor of *energeia* of growth and mutation if it is of a vegetative kind, nor, be it totally inanimate and bereft of capacity to partake of life, of what is called the *energeia* and the predisposition [bn TTJ0EI0TTJ<;]according to the habitual-quality [KaTa e1;1v]. Even beings of this type are able to become manifest as so many objects of perception [avnATJTTTa],when they are experienced by sentient beings through sensations. Precisely, the *energeia* of this type of being consists in falling completely under the sense of sight through becoming apparent in their own way; under the sense of hearing through sounds, under the sense of smell through what they naturally inhale, under the sense of taste through their flavors, under the sense of touch through resistance. As we speak about one

God's *energeiai* do not move when, stemming from God's unique power, they induce a series of specific effects in the created realm on its behalf-such as bestowing existence, conserving it, and guiding it by promoting the movement of creatures towards God. If the motionless *energeia* of God triggers the different ontological and operative *hexeis* of the creatures, as a pianist pressing with great precision his fingers on his instrument's various keys, it is because these created *hexeis* cannot be related to God's motionless *energeia* without becoming themselves active. They naturally pass from a state of qualified potency to a state of *energeia.* Similarly, the aerial medium cannot be placed in the presence of the sun without becoming daylight. Indeed, there is no movement from the source towards the receptacle nor a movement in the receptacle. The receptacle passes instantaneously from a determinate potency to act *(hexis)* to the state of actuality, of *being-in-energeia* under the influence of a source that is itself always and unalterably in the state of actuality. Once again, it is the Porphyrian principle that underlies Maximus's speculations: created beings are in-a-state-of-relationship, *en skhesei,* whereas God is foreign-to-any-relationship, *askhetos.*[56]

One could continue this survey of the solar paradigm by exploring the thought of John Damascene and his successors (Symeon the New Theologian especially; see the summary of Bradshaw's book above). Nevertheless, by now it must be sufficiently dear that Gregory Palamas's theory regarding the simultaneously finite and infinite uncreated *energeiai* of God rests on a concept of created relativity which, originating in the Neoplatonic ambient, has been the object of a continuous and innovative effort of re-elaboration among the founding Fathers of the Byzantine tradition. It is this dialectic between God's

energeia when we designate the act of seeing for the sense of sight, we speak about one *energeia* when we designate, in the realities that are seen, the fact that they are seen. And we consider alike all the other realities" (Maximus, *Acta [Relatio motionis]* [PG 90:142c]). Perception is thus genuinely syn-energetic: it is generated by the combination of the natural *energeia* coming from the object and the perceptive *energeia* of the subject.

[56] "It is indeed plain to see that no being that has become, no created being is foreign-to-relationship [d:axfroc;]" (Maximus, *Amb.* 7 [PG 91:1073bc]).

absoluteness and creaturely relativity that one finds missing in Bradshaw's account on *energeia* in the Eastern tradition. What then of the Western tradition? Can it still be thought of as having ignored the adequate manner in which the riches of the philosophical reflection on *energeia* should be echoed in the realm of theology? There might be more than one adequate way to reassume those riches; and this legitimate difference of interpretation might supply a clue as to the deepest reasons for the theological estrangement between the Christian East and the Christian West.

B) The Latin Tradition

1. Saint Augustine

From a logical point of view, the reconstruction in Bradshaw's book is sometimes perplexing. As mentioned before, Marius Victorinus and Boethius are described as having followed the Porphyrian inspiration of the *Commentary on the Parmenides* in transforming the transcendent causality of the divine *energeia* into a system of metaphysics based on the concept of Being and participated Being. Later in his historical trek, Bradshaw claims that Augustine assumed positions utterly foreign to the eastern Fathers due to the influence of Neoplatonic authors: "Clearly, the gulf separating Augustine from the eastern tradition is immense. It encompasses such basic issues as the nature of being, the simplicity of God, the intelligibility of God, and the final goal of human existence." [57] However, did Augustine do something other than what Marius Victorinus and Boethius did? Did he not transform the transcendent "energetism" of his Neoplatonic sources into a metaphysics of Being and participated Being? This is at least what Bradshaw bases his argument upon: "in light of this simplicity, God does not simply have being. He is being. As Augustine puts it elsewhere, God is being itself, *ipsum esse.* Hence

[57] Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West,* 229.

all other things must derive their being from Him in some way."[58] Consequently, if some marginal Neoplatonic theme connects Marius Victorinus and Boethius to the Greek speculations on the operative mode of the Godhead, the same at least ought to be said of Augustine.

How then can Bradshaw hold that the ignorance of Eastern "energetism" by Augustine is the *peccatum originate* of Western theological tradition, if the consequences of this ignorance cannot be distinguished from the achievements of those who have known Eastern "energetism" and brought it to the West under this metaphysical version? The reflection that, according to Bradshaw, has molded Western theology draws on exactly the same Neoplatonic sources as the Eastern Fathers. Certainly, this reflection might open a new theological path-a path indeed as different from the Eastern Fathers as it is consubstantial to the West. Still, the modifications or the novelties that it introduces do not come from a source of influence different from that which inspired Marius Victorinus and Boethius. On the contrary, the speculations of Augustine, based as they are on the readings of Neoplatonic authors, have decisively contributed to implanting Western theology in the very philosophical ground in which the Eastern tradition has flourished. It is hasty to conclude from the fact that Augustinian theology obviously departs from the positions of the Eastern Fathers that it has cavalierly ignored the theoretical refinements of Neoplatonic "energetism." Augustine might have understood those refinements differently, but in such a brilliant manner as to pave the way for the whole destiny of Western theology.

It is true, as Bradshaw states, that the "books of the Platonists" led Augustine to identify God with Being in the fullest sense, namely, in a sense that goes beyond any human concept (see 222-25).[59] Bradshaw asserts that this understanding relieved Augustine

[58] Ibid., 225. Cf., e.g., Augustine, *De Trinitate* 5.2.3.

[59] However, the identification between God and Being, in the Plotino-Porphyrian line is in no way specific of the West, contrary to what is claimed by Bradshaw. It suffices to read Gregory of Nyssa's *Homilies on the Book of Ecclesiastes:* "everything that is, is governed by the power of the true Being [Tij Tou &uvaµn rr£p!Kpmouµ£va]. And this true

from the necessity of identifying God, after the Manichean fashion, as a subtle body spread throughout the world's material elements, "as a sponge floats in the sea" (see *Confessions* 7.5). It is certainly a good thing, from a Christian point of view, ontologically to distinguish the Creator from the creation. But how precisely did the "books of the Platonists" succeed in winning Augustine back to the Christian doctrine? Is it not due to the fact that they provide a rational explanation for the presence of a transcendent entity within the world that preserves its ontological "otherness"? The unchangeable "light" that Augustine discovers inside himself when he withdraws from sense-perception is not merely different from the material world. It created and continuously sustains the material world, and the very intellect that contemplates it: "Nor was it above my mind as oil is above water, nor as heaven above earth; but above it was, because it made me, and I below it, because I was made by it."[60] The relationship between the intellect and the light that it contemplates is an experience of utter proximity that is, notwithstanding, totally foreign to spatial determinations. This relationship has only one *analoge* in the world: it is the relationship between the soul and the body. As the soul is in the body, not spatially, but as the source of its existence and movements, God is in the soul, as the source of its existence and movements:

> This, their nature declareth unto him that beholdeth them. "They are a mass; a mass is less in part than in the whole." Now, O my soul, thou art my better part, unto thee I speak; for thou animatest the mass of thy body, giving it life, which nobody furnishes to a body but thy God is even unto thee the Life of life.[61]

The whole metaphysics of participation that Augustine is led to formulate suggests that changing beings, although having

Being is the Good in-itself.... Everything which is contemplated outside It is non-existence. Indeed, everything that stands outside what Is is not" (in Jaeger, ed., 5:406-7; *PG* 44:725). From Bradshaw's book, one can legitimately infer that the "books of the Platonists" have been as carefully read in the East as in the West.

[60] Augustine, *Confessions* 7.10 *(NPNF* 1:195).

[61] Ibid. 10.6 *(NPNF* 1:255).

substantially nothing in common with the changeless Being, somehow partake of it in some degree or another. God is present in the world but not in a spatial sense. He is the inner source for the existence and movement of creatures, but at the same time this source is totally transcendent to their being. In short, God is present to the world as its unceasingly creative cause. This is nowhere more vigorously expressed than in *Letter* 187 to Volusianus:

God so fills all things as to be not a quality of the world, but the very creative being of the world, governing the world without work, sustaining it without effort. Yet He is not extended through space by size so that half of Him should be in half of the world and half in the other half of it. He is wholly present in the whole of it, as to be wholly in heaven alone and wholly in the earth alone, and wholly in heaven and earth together; unconfined to any place, He is in Himself everywhere.[62]

This "blending without mixing" of the transcendent in the immanent sphere is, of course, reminiscent of the Porphyrian Principle.[63] As a matter of fact, Augustine, exactly like Plotinus and Porphyry, draws on the mind-body relationship to conceive the paradoxical mode of God's presence in the world:

The nature of the soul is very far different from that of the body; and how much more different must be the nature of God, who is the Creator of both soul and body! God is not said to fill the world in the same way as water, air, and even light occupy space, so that with a greater or smaller part of Himself He occupies a greater or smaller part of the world.[64]

Here again, as in Plotinus and Porphyry, this mind-body interaction rests on the model of the relationship between sun and daylight. Emphasizing as usual the immaterial nature of the soul in *De Genesi ad litteram,* Augustine writes:

[62] Augustine, *Presentia Dei Liber* (lettre 187), §14-15 (in E. Naab, *Augustinus: Uber Schau und Gegenwart des unsichtbaren Gottes* [Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1998), 226-28).

[63] As Nemesius in chap. 3 of *De natura hominis,* Augustine has recourse to the same principle to explain the union between human and divine in Christ.

[64] Augustine, *Letter 137 to Volusianus* 2.4 (in Mary T. Clark, trans., *Augustinus of Hippo, selected writings* [Mahwah, N. J.: Paulist Press, 1984)).

As God is much more excellent than any creature, the soul likewise overcomes all bodies according to the dignity of its nature. It is true that light and air, the more excellent material elements of creation, that are meant to act on behalf of their superior status *[faciendi praestantia]* more than to be acted upon on behalf of their bodily mass *[patiendi corpulentiam],* as is the case for water or earth, administer the body by means of certain elements which bear more resemblance to the spirit. Indeed, corporal light heralds something-however, the reality to which it is a herald is different from it *[cui autem nuntiat, non hoc est, quad illa].*[65]

For Augustine as for the Neoplatonic authors, the soul is an immaterial light, analogical to the sun, which illuminates the whole body, whether in terms of will or in terms of knowledge. This illumination happens through the "material light" of the body, which plays the role of an intermediary-a "herald" -between an activity that is purely intellectual and a passivity that is the specific feature of matter. In chapter 20 of the same work, Augustine describes the action of the thin particles of light and air. Dwelling along bodily circuits, they are the first to receive the commandment *(excipere nutus)* of the soul. As the aerial medium becomes daylight by virtue of the sun's presence, the "corporal light of the corporal sky" as Augustine calls it here (i.e., the "atomic arrangements" that take place in the brain) receives its diffusive existence and power from the radiating presence of the soul.[66] The *intentio* of the soul, while remaining in the soul, is transcribed in the brain according to the multiple arrangements of this "atomic" language and hence conveyed to the material organs, so as to exercise rational will. Conversely, sense impressions are transcribed into other atomic arrangements of the same kind and conveyed through the same circuits to the brain, where they are in some way "read" by the soul. This is how the mind comes to be informed about the external world. The "travel" of the *intentio* through the bodily circuits is conceived as being as instantaneous as the travel of light in the aerial medium, enabling the soul to be present locally in the organs of the body while having never stepped out of the intelligible realm.

[65] Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* 7.19.

[66] Ibid, 7.20.26.

Although Augustine probably borrowed the framework of his explanation from Plotinus in the *Enneads* (4.3.22-23), there are indications that he reads Plotinus in a Porphyrian key. The very notion of *intentio,* which plays here, as in other treatises, an important role in Augustine's thought, is not Plotinian. It could be Porphyrian. As we have seen, the idea of tension, Tame;, is a central element of Porphyry's description of the mind-body interaction in the *Sententia:* "The confinement of the soul in the body takes place in an unspeakable tension-outward of its own being [8t' EKTacrcwc;oov apptjTOU Tfjc; EaUTOU].'[67] The notion of *intentio* implies a paradox. It means stretching out *(tendere)* without coming out (by staying *in).* Yet it is precisely the role assigned by Porphyry to his *fantasia,* a faculty which is closely similar to Augustine's *memoria.* We read that it is through a tension of itself that does not ontologically mingle with outer realities that the *fantasia* is able to "stand close to its own picture" or "mold pictures from outer realities" *(Sent.* 43). Various scholars maintain that Augustine's understanding of the mind-body interaction betrays the thorough influence of Porphyry's conception of "blending without mixing."[68] Indeed, Augustine's

[67] Porphyry, *Sent.* 28.

[68] The close similarities between *Augustine'sLetter 137* and *Nemesius'sDe natura hominis* has led E. Fortin to assume their common dependence on Porphyry's *Symmikta Zetemata;* see E. Fortin, "Saint Augustin et la doctrine neoplatonicienne de l'ame," *inAugustinus Magister III* (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1954). J. Pepin has drawn similar conclusions from a broader study on soul-body interaction in Augustine's treatises *(De quantitate animae; De immortalitate animae);* J. Pepin, "Une nouvelle source de Saint Augustin: Le *Zetema* de Porphyre 'Sur !'union de l'ame et du corps,"' *Revue des etudes anciennes* 66 (1964), 53-107; repr. in J. Pepin, *"Ex platonicorum persona": Etudes sur /es lectures philosophiques de saint Augustin* (Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1977). One of the arguments used by Rist ("Pseudo-Ammonius and the Soul/Body Problem") to deny the Porphyrian origin of the acruyxuTOS €vwcr1spoints to the fact that Augustine, although he knew Porphyry's views on the mind-body interaction, had never used it. The least one can say, however, is that the terminology of Augustine stands close to the formula when, comparing the union between the soul and the body and the union between divine and human natures in Christ, he writes in *Letter* 137, c. 11: "si tamen recedat auditor a consuetudine corporum ... quamquam et in ipsis corporibus aeri lux *incorrupta misceatur,* ergo persona hominis mixtura est animae et corporis, persona autem Christi mixtura est dei et hominis" (emphasis added). If, against all expectations, Augustine had no acquaintance whatsoever with *De natura hominis* 3-since Rist claims that the text of Nemesius is slightly posterior to Augustine's letter-there is hardly any other

scheme is strikingly reminiscent of chapter 3 of Nemesius's *De natura hominis:* that the soul is able to display its activity throughout bodily parts comes from the fact that the body suspends from the soul and its intrinsic power, *vis,* in the same way as the aerial medium suspends from the sun's intensity in order to become daylight. The "ontological relativity" of the body induces a "dynamic relativity" of the soul. According to Augustine, the *intentio* of the soul is "relatively" in the body while remaining in itself from an absolute point of view.[69]

This coincides with Porphyry's notion of *energeia,* but with a specific difference. Porphyry's *energeia* is said to be in the body as an efficient cause, there being no ontological divide between the source and its activity. Augustine's physical *intentio* is the effect in the body of the intellectual *intentio* remaining in the soul, the two *intentiones* being therefore essentially (but precisely not *intentionally)* distinct.

Be that as it may, Augustine applies the formula of this interaction to the relationship between God and the world, exactly as the Eastern Fathers do. Arguing in *De immortalitate animae* against the Manicheans, who thought that creation implied a temporal change in God's will, Augustine writes:

possibility than to assume that Augustine had found the formula in Porphyry, exactly as Nemesius did, and applied it to Christology, almost at the same time as Nemesius did.

[69] As a spiritual power, the *intentio* relies on the material components that channel it, while remaining in itself independent from them (rather like our modern "hardware"/ software" dichotomy). Material damage produced by illnesses, or momentary closure of sensory organs, as happens during sleep, undermines the normal functioning of the *intentio:* "the *intentio* of the soul is disturbed: it is as if someone endeavors to restore what is crumbling, but without success" (Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* 7.20.26). However, in the case of mystical rapture, the intellect contemplates the highest realities through an *intentio* that is entirely devoid of connection to matter and material forms: " when the *intentio* of the soul is totally diverted and dragged away from bodily senses, we are accustomed to call it ecstasy-one is no longer able to see bodies which are present and manifest to sight, nor to hear any voice" (ibid., 12.26). Usually the *intentio* is split between purely mental thoughts and the task of delivering inputs *ad extra,* towards the material universe. But it is easy to show that the real "home" of the *intentio* is the intellectual part. Augustine takes the example of someone who is absorbed in some intellectual reflection while taking a stroll. When the reflection becomes demanding, the individual has to stop walking: "If the *intentio* is intensely involved *[si major intentio est]* ... the will ceases to regulate the function which is setting the feet in motion" (ibid.).

> there can exist something that is not changed when it moves changeable things. For there is no change in the mover's intention *[non mutetur moventis intentio]* of bringing the body he moves to the end he wants, while that body in which the change takes place is changed from moment to moment by the same motion, and it is clear that the intention of accomplishing this remains utterly unchanged *[ilia intentio perficiendi quam immutatam manere manfestum est].*[70]

The instantaneousness of God's will, which makes it come true under the conditions of time and space, is itself an event devoid of time and space. These conditions are relative to the creatures which undergo the effect of this will. Therefore, when the intellect of creatures enclosed in space and time strives to conjecture the cause from its effect, it has to overcome its own relativity in terms of space and time. This is one of the great themes in Augustine's *Confessions:* "Thou, 0 Lord, ever workest, and art ever at rest. Nor seest Thou in time, nor movest Thou in time, nor restest Thou in time; and yet Thou makest the scenes of time, and the times themselves, and the rest which results from time." [71]

The numerical identity of will and essence in God cannot be understood separately from this mental process of "de-relativizing," which guides the famous discussion on the nature of time in book 11 of the *Confessions:*

> Lo, are they not full of their ancient way, who say to us, "What was God doing before He made heaven and earth? For if," say they, "He were unoccupied, and did nothing, why does He not forever also, and from henceforth, cease from working, as in times past He did? For if any new motion has arisen in God, and a new will, to form a creature which He had never before formed, however can that be a true eternity where there ariseth a will which was not before? For the will of God is not a creature, but before the creature; because nothing could be created unless the will of the Creator were before it. The will of God, therefore, pertaineth to His very Substance." [72]

From this point of view, there is something strange in accusing Augustine's notion of divine *essentia* of having a "static

[70] Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* 3.4.

[71] Augsutine, *Confessions* 13.37 *(NPNF* 1:383).

[72] Ibid. 11.10(NPNF1:300-301).

character," as Bradshaw does (224). Augustine's notion of divine *essentia* points merely to the fact that all the actions of God are not separated from being, *esse,* so that one must conceive of God's uncomposed *essentia* as intensively active.[73]

As we see, Augustine draws as much as the Eastern Fathers do on the Porphyrian Principle to construct his "theory of divine relativity." A determinate action of God here and now, although stemming from God's eternal being-in-activity as from its source, does not imply any movement or separation from this source. However, whereas Eastern theology strives to *display* relativity, seeing it as a means to understand the condition of creatures from a theocentric point of view, Augustine endeavours to *overcome* this relativity, as the only possibility for a creature, enclosed in the space-time continuum, to attain to the contemplation of God's absolute being. The Eastern tradition, following a descending line from God to the creatures, focuses on the *diakrisis* of the One, the atemporal process of multiplication/division of the divine *energeia* towards the world. Augustine, following a line that goes in the opposite direction, takes its starting-point in the *created effect* of God's will, and hence ascends gradually to the eternal preconditions of his experience in the space-time continuum. Accordingly, Augustine forges a perspective that is in some way the mirror-image of the Dionysian *diakrisis:* the multiplicity of God's creative operations in the world is shown to be relative to the condition of the creature, so that these actions are systematically reduced to the simplicity of an eternal *intentio* enclosing all measures of time and space within itself.

The existence of symmetrically inverse interpretations of the same "divine relativity" leads of course to different ways of expressing the mystery of God in the West and in the East. In the

[73] The Palamite notion of divine *Ousia* would be more likely to fall under the accusation of statism, since it is distinguished *kat'epinoian,* "notionally," from *energeia.* It does not however, since the Principle and the *energeia* that proceeds from it are but one uncomposed or simple reality: "The distinction [ot<Th:ptcrt<;][between divine *ousia* and divine *energeia]* is according to the notion [bnvo(<;t], whereas the union ftvwcrtc;] [between the two] is real and not liable to separation [axwptmoc;]" (Gregory Palamas, *Refutations* 5 *[PG* 151:880c]).

perspective that Augustinian theology frames, the intellects of the blessed, once removed from the physical dimensions of space and time, as are the angelic intellects, can contemplate God according to his essence. Here, the radiance of God, as the radiance of sun, is shown to be identical *uno numero* with its source. Symmetrically, from the perspective of the Eastern Fathers, this divine radiance, being perceived according to the finite capacity of created intellects, is distinct from what God is in himself, *kat'ousian,* as a Reality free from the limitations of created minds. The elect are said to contemplate God according to the unconfined variety of his *energeiai* (kindness, virtues, sanctification, creative power, etc.) which are the same *Being-in-energeia* considered under its different notional aspects. Once again, the finite nature of created intellects induces a multiplicity where there is only unity on an absolute level. However, the multiplicity contemplated by the elect does not point towards the finite realities belonging to the time and space continuum, but to the being of God himself.

It is apparent that the West and the East do not designate the same states-of-things when it comes to the "vision of God according to essence." Moreover, they manifestly designate the same state-of-thing under wordings that merely sound mutually exclusive. "The vision of God according to essence," as Augustine conceives it, does not designate a vision of God that would comprehend *uno intuitu* the wholeness of the divine Being. Yet this type of vision is precisely what the Eastern Fathers reject when they say that no created mind will ever be able to contemplate the essence of God. Correlatively, the "vision of God according to the *energeiai,"* as conceived by the Greek Fathers, does not designate the vision of an entity numerically different from the divine essence (God is uncomposed). Yet this type of vision is precisely what Augustine rejects when he states that operations and essence are one in God. Once again, it is worthwhile emphasizing, in opposition to Bradshaw, that this difference in the wordings is not due to Augustine's ignorance of the philosophical patterns that inspired the Greek Fathers, but to

his original way of reassuming these patterns. The fact that the interpretations of Augustine and of the Eastern Fathers, despite their difference of approach, coincide from a doctrinal point of view, is probably the best tribute possible to the idea that dogmatic unity within Christianity does not imply theoretical uniformity.

What then of the rest of the Latin theological tradition? On one hand, it is true that Augustine has influenced it to an extent that can hardly be overstated. On the other hand, it is not true that his influence could have led its victims astray from the dogmatic stances of the Eastern tradition. Taking into account these two facts, can we not imagine that the distance between the two traditions, as epitomized by the conflict between Thomism and Palamism, has more to do with a question of approach, of a difference of perspectives, than with genuine opposition? The goal of the present reflection is to shed some light on the construction of two different religious universes within Christendom. I shall therefore be satisfied if the theological difference that surfaces can contribute to the success of this investigation.

2. Saint Thomas Aquinas

All the apparent shortcomings specified to this point pale in comparison to the paradox that, for want of being openly addressed, affects the whole line of Bradshaw's argument. As I stated in the beginning, the idea that the flaws of Western theology stem from a neglect of an Aristotle-inspired school of thought sounds highly original. It turns upside down not only the usual criticism against the West formulated by Neopalamites, but also the traditional claim of the Eastern Fathers that they were willing to philosophize "according to Christ and not to Aristotle." Originality is welcome insofar as it is consistent. If it were such in the Bradshaw's study, one would have at least expected the following question to be raised: what happened to the prodigious renewal of Aristotelian thought in the West, from the beginning

of the thirteenth century, if, as Bradshaw claims, it produced theological results that were so deeply at odds with the thought of the Eastern Fathers? Hypothetically, it could all be "la faute a St. Augustin." After all, the weight of his theological authority might have prevented the West from rediscovering the essential connection between Aristotelianism and the Christian faith. But then what about the essential connection that Western theology has succeeded in establishing between that very Aristotelianism and the Christian faith? Is this essential connection inessential? If so, why? And ultimately, what about the whole foundation for the argument, if Augustine is shown to owe as much to this "Aristotelian vein," *via* Plotinus and Porphyry, as the Eastern Fathers? When it comes to the notion of divine operation, understanding the manner in which the Augustinian theological *habitus* of the West influenced the Aristotelian renewal of the thirteenth century deserves better. Let us take up the issue by showing how Bradshaw's interpretation of Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics falls short of grasping this definitely essential connection between Augustine and Aristotle.

As we have said before, the solar paradigm comes up everywhere Thomas considers the *communicatio esse* between the Creator and the creature: "Being results naturally from the form of a creature, given the influence of the divine action *[supposito tamen influxum Dei];* just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun."[74] Bradshaw is aware of the importance of the paradigm, but believes that its interpretation in terms of efficient causality closes Thomas's metaphysics to the synergetic universe of the Greek Fathers:

> [Thomas Aquinas] describes creatures as participating in *esse* 'vigorously or feebly' and as possessing a power or 'intensity' of being that is determined by their form. He also sees the *esse* of the creatures as an ongoing and continual dependence upon that of God. Since creation is not a change from some prior state, he argues, it is not a motion but a relation of continual dependence, like that of the air upon the sun. It is also complete at each moment that it occurs 'as a thing that at the same time is being illuminated and is illuminated' *(Contra Gentiles* II 19,6). Finally, Aquinas describes God as acting continually to

[74] *STh* I, q. 104, a. 1, ad 1.

maintain the *esse* of things just as a corporeal mover acts continually to maintain the motion of the thing moved (III, 65,5). All of this could be taken to mean that the *esse* of creatures is an ongoing activity of God. At no point, however, does Aquinas actually say it is.[75]

As I noted above, it is fortunate that Thomas never said that the being of creatures was identical to the activity of God, since no Orthodox Father ever said such a thing. Let us recall that the whole point of Gregory Palamas's argument against Barlaam is that participation in God's *energeia* involves no essential blending, no ontological confusion, between the participant and the Participated. Being distinct from its effect *(energema),* the divine *energeia* of the Greek Fathers is an efficient cause that, considered in relationship to the entity it affects, is neither natural nor viole.nt, but transcendent and perfective. Is this not the case of Thomas's *communicatio esse?*

Looking into the matter more precisely, however, one can see that the similarity between the creative *energeia* of the Fathers and Thomas's *communicatio esse* has nothing to do with a strict equivalence. The *communicatio* Thomas has in mind stands for the result of God's will, not for the creative will itself. Thomas emphasizes, in a direct line with the Augustinian tradition, that the will and operation of God cannot be really distinct from God's essence. In this manner, whereas the *energeiai* of the Greek Fathers seem to "fill the distance" between the unspeakable unity of God's *Ousia* and creatures, there seems to remain in the conception of Thomas, as Bradshaw claims, a kind of "gap" between the result of God's will and the divine will itself. But how can that be the case, if Thomas deals here with a transmission, a *communicatio esse?*

We need to take a deeper look at Thomas's metaphysical use of the solar paradigm. For this purpose, a brief analysis of a passage where the actions of animated creatures are referred to as the "ordinary communication" of a divine impulse will suffice. Interestingly enough, Thomas takes up here the Augustinian notion of *intentio:*

[75] Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West,* 251-52.

the natural virtue which is attributed to natural things when they are constituted in being has its place in them as a kind of form endowed with a determinate and steady being as to its nature. But that which derives from God in a natural thing *[id quad a Deo fit in re naturali],* by whose virtue it actually operates *[quo actualiter agat]* is a kind of sheer *intentio* *[est ut intentio sofa]* endowed with a sort of incomplete being, similar to the mode in which colors are said to be in the air and to the way the virtue of craftsmanship is to be found in the instrument of the craftsman *[virtus artis in instrumento artifices].*[76]

Thomas highlights here the difference between a capacity of action that relies on the nature of the creature and a capacity induced by an additional energetic influx from God. Whereas the former pertains to the existence of a *habitus,* of a steady potency in the creature, the latter is independent of the nature of the creature. Consequently, the creature does not own its actions in the way it owns its natural abilities. Indeed, the natural *habitus,* taken in itself, is unable to transform a capacity for action into an actual action without the addition of this transcendent and instantaneous influx. The analogy with the propagation of light and colors in the air squarely reminds us of Philoponus's interpretation of Aristotle's *De Anima,* sketched above. The aerial medium endowed with the *hexis* of transparency would not produce light, if it did not receive an additional energetic influx from the sun. This influx is received in the mode of an *energeia* and propagates instantaneously, travelling as it were through the medium, but without movement. Although the result (the action of an animal/the illumination of the aerial medium) is the actualization of a given *habitus,* affecting the medium in the mode of a quality, this quality is immediately related to its source (God/the sun) as to the intimate and exclusive principle of its existence. In other words, although daylight is a quality of the aerial medium, it is much more intimately related to the light of the sun than to the aerial matter, since there is nothing else in this matter than the mere possibility of being illuminated.[77]

[76] *De Pot.,* q. 3 a. 7, ad 7.

[77] Light, as colors, is substantially foreign to the medium that receives it: "since it is not rooted *[non habet radicem]* in the air, light ceases as soon as the action of the sun does. So as light is in respect to the sun, likewise is every creature in respect to God" *(STh* I, q. 104, a. 1).

Accordingly, as daylight is the moment in which matter receives a determinate sharing in the light of the sun, the action of an animal implies a determinate sharing in the activity of God himself.

The "intentional" aspect of the interaction between the medium and the independent source of activity is not limited to the natural level. Evoking the vision of the divine essence momentarily granted to Moses, Thomas states that it happened "by way of a transitory passion *[per modum cuiusdam passionis transeuntis],* as stated above ... and in this way that light was in Paul when he was in rapture." The momentary perception of the divine essence is the result of the essence's intensity of being reflecting itself in the intellect of Moses and Paul as in a medium. This gracious contemplation does not last because the intellect of the prophets and saints is not endowed with a *habitus gloriae.* It is not until they are *in Patria* that the elect will enjoy this vision "by way of an abiding form *[per modum formae immanentis].* "[78] The sole exception is the human mind of Christ. He was granted, from his conception, such a supernatural *habitus/hexis.* Christ intellectually contemplated the Father continuously in the days of his human life, and this contemplation was so intense that it sometimes reflected in the mode of a visible light, as at the moment of the Transfiguration. This is another example of supernatural *"passio transeuns,"* this time of a material order, illuminating the aerial medium in a literal sense. Like the vision of the divine essence in the minds of the prophets, this extraordinary light lasts no longer than an instant, since it does not encounter in the medium a *habitus* that it could raise to a state-of-activity.

In such a context, the reappearance of the Augustinian *intentio* might be more than a coincidence. Historically, as pointed out by R. Sorabji, the ontological status of the Philoponian *energeia* was used by Avicenna and Averroes in order to account for the type of reality associated with the content of sense-perception in the medium, that is, between the object existing in the material space

[78] *STh* II-II, q. 175, a. 3, ad 2.

and the percipient subject. Averroes refers to entities propagated in the medium as *intentiones (ma'na* or *ma'qul* for the Greek voriμa and Myoc;) insofar as they contain *in potentia* the sense-data that will be actualized by the agent intellect:

The existence of forms in the medium has a manner intermediate between spiritual and corporeal. For forms outside the soul have a purely corporeal existence, within the soul a purely spiritual one, and in the medium a form which is intermediate between spiritual and corporeal. [79]

Albert the Great clearly acknowledges his indebtedness to the Arabic tradition when he writes about this "travel" of colors in the medium:

this is more of an alteration than a local motion. Nevertheless, it is not truly alteration, by the fact that not a thing, but the *intentio* of a thing is generated in the medium, which *intentio* is not a thing firmly established in being but rather the spiritual likeness of a firmly established thing *[quae intentio non est res rata in esse, sed potius ratae rei similitudo spiritualis].*[80]

One recognizes here the most proximate source of Thomas's "mere *intentio,* endowed with a sort of incomplete being" as opposed to the "form endowed with a determinate and steady being as to its nature." [81]

In this philosophical context, one wonders why late-twelfth-century translators of Arabic philosophy chose *intentio* to translate the Arabic notions. [82] The only philosophical use of

[79] Averroes, *Epitome of Parva Naturalia,* trans. H. Blumberg (Cambridge, Mass., 1961); see Sorabji, "From Aristotle to Brentano," 255.

[80] Albertus Magnus, *De Anima (Opera omnia* 7/1, ed. C. Stroick [Cologne 1968], 152).

[81] On the links between Arabic philosophers and the Dominican school as regards the "gnoseological" aspect of *intentio,* see J. Spruit, *Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge* (Leiden: Brill, 1994], 1:81ff.

[82] I do not find any technical use of *intentio* among the pristine Aristotelian translations of Burgundio "Pisensiis," Jacobo "Venetiis" or in any of the anonymous translations produced before the middle of the twelfth century. This terminology seems to be entirely due to an initiative of the Toledo school of translation-Michael Scot, Domenicus Gundissalinus and his multicultural "pool" of Spanish translators working on philosophical texts written in Arabic. The philosophical use of *intentio* is well attested in Gundissalinus's own treatise *De Anima,* composed around 1140, in line with his work on Arabic treatises. Years ago, E. Gilson showed that the driving-force of Gundissalinus's treatise lay in the quest for agreement

intentio witnessed in the Latin tradition leads us back to the works of Augustine.[83] But why should translators have picked up this term from there? As we have seen, Augustine's *intentio,* as the *ma'na* and *ma'qul* of the Arabic philosophers, also includes a duality of aspects, being intelligible and static in the mind, while it is dynamic and material in the body. Moreover, it specifies a continuity between the two aspects: according to Augustine, the instantaneous "travel" of the material *intentio* in the body hinges on the intensity of the mental *intentio* in the mind, whereas the opposite is not true. Although the gnoseology of Augustine has little in common with that of Aristotle, the parallel between the "travel without travel" of Augustine's *intentio* in the body and the "movement without movement" of Averroes' *ma'na* in the *medium* is indeed striking.[84] Insofar as the views stated above in

between St. Augustine and Avicenna's views on the soul and the process of knowledge (E. Gilson, "Les sources greco-arabes de l'Augustinisme avicennisant," *Archivd'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age* [1929]: see 79ff.). In fact, it seems that the rediscovery of Aristotle was paralleled by a rediscovery of Augustine, as the main philosophical authority of the Latin tradition. The pseudo-Augustinian treatise *De spiritu et anima,* written sometime between 1161and1191 by an author whose identity is still a matter of contention, draws heavily on Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram,* especially when it deals with the "travel" of the physiological *intentio* (see *De spiritu et anima* 10 [PL 40:785]).

[83] The notion of *"intentio* cordis" is not rare in the texts; it is one of the favorite expressions of Bernard of Clairvaux. Moreover, several authors (e.g., Hildegard of Bingen, Henrie d'Auxerres, Hermanus de Runa) refer to the *intentio* as a faculty of the soul: "The four main winds correspond to the four faculties in human beings, namely the ability to conceive *[cogitatio]* and formulate *[locutio]*, the will to mean *[intentio]* the outward expression *[gemitus]"* (Hildegard of Bingen, *Liber divinorum Operum,* pars 1, visio 4, c. 49, l. 205 *[Corpus Christianorum Cont. Med.,* Turnhout: Brepols, 1996]). There is, however, no sign of further philosophical or theological elaboration.

[84]Augustine had in mind the "travel" of the *intentio* in the body, as pertaining to the interaction between the soul and the body, not the "travel" of the *intentio* in the external medium, as pertaining to the interaction between the percipient subject and the material world. Moreover, when Augustine deals with the latter, he takes up the "extramissive"conception of Plato and the Stoics: sense perception is not caused by the formal activity of the object in the intellect of the percipient, as in the Philoponian theory, but by the causal activity of the subject itself, as the light of the soul extends in conic rays towards the surrounding space in order to grasp the forms of material things (see *De quantitate animae, 66; De Genesi ad litteram,* 3.5.7). The progress of "physiological optics" in the Arabic world, at the cusp of the tenth and eleventh centuries., has led to the reversal of the old extramissive theory of vision, which had found its final exponent in Galen. The ideas of Philoponus, well known as Yahya al-Nahwi, the commentator on Aristotle's *Physics,* are probably not foreign

the present article are consistent, it is not difficult to account for this phenomenon: Augustine's *intentio* and Averroes' *ma'qul* have a common root in the Porphyrian Principle, directly for Augustine and through Philoponus's interpretation of *De Anima* for Averroes. [85] It is by virtue of the relativity of the lower entity to the higher that the *energeia* of the latter communicates itself to the former. One therefore understands that Thomas Aquinas was able to use the solar paradigm, construed in this Aristotelo-Philoponian key, as a most accurate and "scientific" expression of Augustine's insight concerning the interaction between God and the world. The "travel without travel" of the *energeia-intentio* in the medium witnesses the unilateral dependence of the creatures on their motionless and supremely actual Creator.

Historical conjecture aside, the Porphyrian logic underlying Thomas's solar paradigm proves that there is no "gap" between

to this crucial step. Avicenna relies onAl-Razi (d. 924) when he refutes the intramissive theory still defended by Al-Kindi and Hunayn ben Ishaq (d. 877). The conceptions of Al-Hazen (Ibn-al-Haytham, d. 1038), the greatest Arabic theoretician of physiological optics and a contemporary of Avicenna, stand even closer to Philoponus. Some of the results to which the experiments of Al-Hazen, making use of darkrooms, have led coincide tightly with the argument of Philoponus on the example of stained glass. Exactly like stained glass, air needs to be transparent in order to convey colors, while colors need to fall on an opaque surface in order to become visible. Al-Hazen's general theory of perceptual processes sounds very similar to that of Philoponus: sensible objects emit rays or powers (called "forms" and *"intentiones"* in the Latin translations of Al-Hazen's treatises) in a natural way, which fall into percipient eyes in perpendicular lines. While traveling in the medium, those powers, treated geometrically as points and lines, are devoid of matter (otherwise they would interfere with one another while propagating in the medium). These forms or *intentiones* are the source of the *intentiones* grasped by tl1e mind when the sense organ is properly affected by those activities. Albert the Great was familiar with Al Hazen's "physiological epistemology": "Light does not remove anything from the colored body according to matter *[per esse materiale].* It produces a similar form in the medium, like the similitude of a seal is imprinted on wax or in some other matter. Regarding the existence of such a form in the eye, Haceuben Huchaym has produced evidence of it, relying on many visible signs" (Albertus Magnus, *Liber de sensu et sensato,* tract. 1 *[Opera omnia,* ed. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vives, 1890-95), 25]). Regarding the progress of physiological optics in Arabic medieval science see Giil A. Russel, "La naissance de l'optique physiologique," in *Histoire des Sciences Arabes,* vol. 2, ed. R. Rashed and R. Morelon (Paris: Seuil, 1997).

[85] In his strenuous attempt to sketch out a deeper, metaphysical connection between the different meanings of *intentio* in Thomas, in one tight line with Marechal's transcendental Thomism, A. Hayen points also to a nonstrictly Aristotelian (i.e.,, Neoplatonic), origin of the notion (see A. Hayen, *L'intentionnel selon Saint Thomas* [Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1954]).

the *communicatio esse* and its transcendent Source. Saying that the existence of the effect is entirely dependent on the *actualitas,* the *intensitas essendi* of the Source postulates a causal continuity between the two. If there is a distance between them, it is to be understood exclusively in terms of substance or nature. The essence of the effect is utterly different from the essence of the Cause, the former being created and the latter uncreated. In this manner, the Philopono-Aristotelian structure which Thomas gives to the paradigm of the solar radiance points to the inanity of postulating an *essential continuity* on the basis of the *causal continuity* that binds the creature to the Creator. While being causally the closest reality to the creature, as creating, conserving, guiding, and sanctifying it, God remains essentially the farthest from the creature. All that he does is done in virtue of his pure *actualitas essendi,* without his having to move or to step out from eternity into the sphere of time and space.[86] This is nothing but the Augustinian approach reasserted in Aristotelian terms. The Porphyro-Philoponian scheme enables us to overcome the anthropomorphic illusions induced by the relativity to the divine inherent in our condition. Thus, while formulating Augustine's view on the interaction between God and the world in Aristotelian terms, Thomas remains faithful to the founding metaphysical intuition of the *Confessions.*

In the example of Thomas Aquinas, it becomes once again plain that the Western theological tradition has neither neglected nor minimized the importance of the synergism that lies at the core of its Eastern equivalent. The post-Aristotelian, strongly Platonized scheme which, in Augustine's works, regulated the interaction between God and the world is taken up by Thomas in an apparently Neoaristotelian, yet intimately Neoplatonic form. From a doctrinal point of view, there is no difference between the ways the West and the East envisage the causal continuity and the essential discontinuity between God and the world. However, an identical philosophical scheme has given way to two distinct

[86] See M.-J. Dodds, "Ultimacy and Intimacy: Aquinas on the Relation between God and the World," in C. J. Pinto de Oliveira, O.P., *Ordo sapientiae et amoris: Hommage au ProfesseurJ.-P. Torrell* (Fribourg: Editions universitaires, 1993).

theological perspectives. The perspective of the Greek Fathers is clearly theocentric: the *Absolute-God-being-in-energeia-is* set forth in the first place, while the energetic relativity that produces, conserves, and sanctifies creatures is understood as a consequence of it being in relationship, *en skhesei,* to the world. The perspective of the West can be called anthropocentric: the created subject, taken in the continuum of space and time where it is created, conserved, and sanctified is led to overcome the energetic relativity inherent in its condition in order to contemplate God as a source of actuality essentially secluded from time and space.

In order to understand how two different religious worlds have emerged from these two theological perspectives, notwithstanding their doctrinal identity, one should keep in mind the mutually exclusive nature of these perspectives. One and the same event can be described simultaneously from the two perspectives. This means that there is no third point of view that could allow us to embrace simultaneously both perspectives: one must choose one system of reference or the other. There is no place, in Thomas's perspective, for the Palamitic distinction between God's *Ousia* and God's *energeia,* since it relies on the theocentric view according to which the divine *energeia* "in-relationship," *en skhesei,* reaches out to existents. Conversely, there is no place in Gregory Palamas's perspective for a universe envisaged independently from the *energeiai* of God, since the identification between God's *essentia* and God's *operatio* relies on Thomas's anthropological view, whereby the creature's relativity has to be intellectually reduced. The impossibility of fusing the two perspectives into one does indeed produce two very distinct pictures of the universe. From the Eastern perspective, the phenomena, the visible and material realities, appear as continuously "energized" by the Uncreated, in virtue of the emphasis on the causal continuity between the divine *energeia* and the created beings. The will of God reaches out to the world of the subject, so that perceiving and experiencing this uncreated *energeia* tend to define the content of the Christian "science of

God," *theologia.* From the Western perspective, the phenomena appear as having a created density owing to their radical separation from the uncreated sphere. The will of God has "withdrawn" into the abyss of God's eternity, so that paying due tribute to the "natural autonomy" of the universe becomes a primary task of theology as *sacra doctrina.* Depending on the perspective embraced, the religious meaning of the universe seems to change. This might be the closest one can get to grasping the fundamental content of the estrangement between the Latin West and the Byzantine East.

CONCLUSION

Bradshaw's study ends up with a very negative assessment of the path followed by Western theology, which hardly comes as a surprise. All the problematic consequences of the Enlightenment are presented as having their roots in the various limitations and flaws of medieval theology (275-77). However, can Thomas Aquinas really be blamed for "the long movement of the West towards unbelief"?

On the other hand, our survey of Bradshaw's book, though very critical on several substantial points, does not entirely dismiss the observations that it contains. It is true that the manner in which Western theologians, especially Thomas Aquinas, have handled the notion of divine operation, on the basis of the Neoplatonic conjunction between Augustine and Aristotle, has ultimately led to an emphasis on the autonomy of the created world, either in the natural or the supernatural sphere (grace as a "created accident"). If the condition for the emergence of free-thinking in the Western world is the growing importance of a scientific attitude towards the world, then there are indeed some reasons to claim that free-thinking owes something to the theological developments that characterize the works of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.

Nevertheless, on this point, as on so many others, Bradshaw's insights are undermined by an unbalanced philosophical

judgment. If a blossoming scientific attitude is the prerequisite of modern scepticism, it also means that the scientific achievements of the modern era owe something to the medieval revival of Aristotelianism. The least one can say is that the role of Palamism in the development of modern science and in the construction of new social paradigms is not nearly so evident. Should one give one's preference to a theology that has shaped in depth what we call the modern world, with all its achievements and failures? Or should one give it to a theology that, notwithstanding its wonderful fruits of holiness, has always kept a distance from a purely immanent type of human knowledge? The question is probably unfair. Giving personal preferences is not what is expected from theologians, or rather from historians of theology. Their role is merely to explore the religious roots of present culture, with all its inner tensions and conflicts, in the most objective way possible. To this extent, such a commitment might prove crucial.

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MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MAKING ALL THINGS NEW IN CHRIST [1]

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THE TITLE OF THIS ESSAY points to two questions for a study of Aquinas's virtue ethics and the renewal of Catholic moral theology. Does Aquinas's virtue approach to ethics necessarily involve moral development? And can we rationally speak of moral development in terms of theological virtue ethics and "making all things new in Christ"?[2]

Concerning the first question, William Spohn recently claimed that "moral development has not yet become a major concern for virtue ethics."[3] Even though moral growth was central to the thought of Aristotle, the grandfather of virtue ethics, Spohn professed to be unaware of any "major concern" for moral development in contemporary virtue theory, with two minor exceptions.[4] Of course, Spohn was, in part, referring to the Kohlbergian brand of "moral development," which, because of its

[1] An earlier version of this essay was delivered at a colloquium honoring Fr. Servais-Theodore Pinckaers, O.P., "Making all Things New in Christ: Toward a Thomistic Renewal of Moral Theology" in Fribourg, Switzerland (October 2005).

[2] Eph 1:10. This translation of the Vulgate is rendered "uniting all things in Christ" in the *Revised Standard Version* of the Bible.

[3] William C. Spohn, "Conscience and Moral Development," *Theological Studies* 64 (2000): 122-38.

[4] As exceptions, Spohn points to N. J. H. Dent, *The Moral Psychology of the Virtues* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and David Carr, *Educating the Virtues: An Essay on the Philosophical Psychology of Moral Development and Education* (New York: Routledge 1991).

philosophical presuppositions, differs markedly from Aristotelian approaches to moral growth.

Concerning the second question, the fragmentation of academic disciplines and the compartmentalization of theological approaches has driven a wedge between ethics and moral theology, as well as between the latter and key Christological sources in biblical, patristic, dogmatic, and spiritual theology. In the latter part of this essay, I focus on Aquinas's understanding of a tripartite development in virtue in order to present his teaching on the moral and spiritual development of the theological virtues. The particular attention paid to the virtue of charity permits us to answer the question: in what way can we intelligibly speak of moral development in terms of "making all things new in Christ"?

I will turn to the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and Fr. Servais-Theodore Pinckaers for guidance in responding to these questions. Before doing so, I will give an overview of contemporary approaches to moral development in order to understand Spohn's difficulty and to prepare for the discussion of moral development based in a virtue approach, with application to properly theological issues in moral development.

I. CONTEMPORARY STUDIES ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT

In the 1970s and 1980s, Harvard psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive structuralist school of moral development was dominant to the point of making "moral development" seem synonymous with his research project, which he founded on Jean Piaget's cognitive developmental theories and on Immanuel Kant's philosophical ethics. Contemporary theoretical and empirical research on moral development, however, is no longer summed up in Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach. More than one serious attempt at assimilating Kohlberg's moral development theory and ethics have gone down blind alleys,[5] because of the

[5] See David Carlin, "Assimilating Kohlberg to Aquinas," *The Thomist* (1981): 121-31. According to Paul Philibert, Thomist virtue ethicists have resisted Kohlberg and Gilligan's developmental approaches because of their philosophical presuppositions or ideological limitations; cf. Paul Philibert, "Addressing the Crisis in Moral Theory: Clues from Aquinas

partiality found in their philosophical presuppositions. Moreover, the hegemony of Piaget and Kohlberg's formalist ethic was overcome in secular academia by different postmodern voices. Both psychologists and ethicists have found that Kohlberg's approach remains limited to cognitive issues correlative to justice set in a formalist framework and overly influenced by Kant, John Dewey, and John Rawls.[6] For instance, Kohlberg's moral cognitive structuralism has been repudiated by some, such as Owen Flanagan,[7] and modified by others, such as Carol Gilligan.

In 1982, Carol Gilligan, a close disciple of Kohlberg, identified his Achilles heal as Kantian formalist presuppositions, the Enlightenment disassociation of emotion and caring from moral judgment, and a misrepresentation of woman's transition to moral maturity.[8] On a constructive note, Gilligan identified feminine expressions of "care" as a further element for recognizing moral maturity. While Gilligan's feminine ethic and development theory are insightful and remain popular, they are criticized for an overly rigid conceptual division of feminine and male anthropology and developmental tasks.[9] Moreover, they have proven to be neither empirically established[10] nor philosophically adequate.[11]

and Gilligan," *Theology Digest* 34 (1987): 103-13.

[6] See Daniel K. Lapsley and F. Clark Power, eds., *Character Psychology and Character Education* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005); John C. Gibbs, *Moral Development and Reality: Beyond the Theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2003); Melanie Killen and Judith Smetana, eds., *Handbook of Moral Development* (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006); and Martin L. Hoffman, *Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[7] See Owen Flanagan's critique of Kohlberg and Gilligan in *Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1991); *Self-Expression: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and "Psychologie morale," in *Dictionnaire d'ethique et de philosophie morale,* ed. M. Canto-Sperber (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996) 1220-29.

[8] See Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), and "Reply to Critics," in Mary Jeanne Larrabee, ed., *An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

[9] See Philibert, "Addressing the Crisis in Moral Theory," 105.

[10] See Flanagan, "Psychologie morale," 1224.

[11] See Spohn, "Conscience and Moral Development," 133-35.

Faced with such critiques, Kohlberg himself partially revised the conception and annotations of his empirical studies on moral development before his death in 1987; in particular, he amended his aim as being the study of justice reasoning rather than moral development in general.[12] His approach has been complemented by various other psychological theories of moral development, such as attribution theories, social learning-social cognition, psychoanalysis, Marxist conceptions, as well as composite and specialized theories.[13] Other theories have been proposed that purport to find their bases in religious doctrine or in the structure of faith.[14] In all, recent explorations in cognition, emotion, and social relations have outstripped and complemented Kohlberg's approach and his refocused research.

On the nonformalist side, virtue ethics has returned to the limelight of philosophical and Christian ethics. Following this trend, contemporary studies that correlate virtue ethics and empirical, psychological studies are increasing in number. The largest concerted effort carries the banner of positive psychology. Interested in what constitutes and promotes the good life, positive psychology has realigned empirical psychology's focus from clinical disorders (e.g., in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* of the American Psychiatric Association) to the classification of character strengths and virtues. It describes this classification as "the social science equivalent of virtue ethics using the scientific

[12] See Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development: Essays on Moral Development,* vol. 2 (New York: Harper and Row, 1984). Increased consensus of judgment among people at the same stage and increased consistency between personal judgment and action constitute the formal development that Kohlberg's system identifies. While maintaining his system's basic moral structuralist perspective, Kohlberg (ibid., 425) rendered it more modest, acknowledging both that there are other ways of studying moral development and that he has focused on reasoning about justice rather than moral judgment in general (ibid., xix).

[13] See R. Murray Thomas, *Moral Development Theories-Secular and Religious: A Comparative Study* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press 1997), 29-168.

[14] See ibid., 169-276; James W. Fowler, *Becoming Adult, Becoming Christian* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984), idem, "Moral Stages and the Development of Faith," in *Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg: Basic Issues in Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, and Education,* ed. Brenda Munsey (Birmingham, Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1980).

method to inform philosophical pronouncements about the traits of a good person." [15] Although the project adopts some of the assumptions of philosophical virtue ethics, it distances itself from the normative aspect of virtue theory by focusing on the virtues as functional qualities that make the person good. Thus, it does not pursue virtue-related issues of moral law (normativeness) and of adjudication in the face of moral conflicts. Rather, it seeks to explain the correlation of disparate character traits, action, and a singular self by modern personality psychology. [16] It makes a contribution not on the properly ethical level, but rather on the psychological level of explaining the psychological function of the virtues. It offers an example of an empirical, comparative study that interweaves interest in positive growth, character, and virtue.

In contrast to the moral developmental models described above, certain philosophical virtue ethics tend less to integrating nuanced considerations of moral psychology into virtue theory than to describing virtue statically in the acts and obligations that correlate with moral laws, rules, and customs. This approach construes virtue simply as an a priori norm itself or reduces it to practical moral discourse and acts. Here 'virtue' serves casuistry, effectively construed as a kind of disguised virtue of obligation. [17] More generally, philosophical virtue theories tend to resist psychological theories of development, fearing uncritical presuppositions and world views. Such virtue theories disassociate themselves from psychological concerns and research on moral

[15] Christopher Peterson and Martin E. P. Seligman, eds., *Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 89. Other notable contributors to this movement include C. R. Snyder and Shane J. Lopez, eds., *The Handbook of Positive Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); P. Alex Linley and Stephen Joseph, eds., *Positive Psychology in Practice* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Son, 2004); Stephen Joseph and P. Alex Linley, *Positive Therapy: A Meta-Theory for Positive Psychological Practice* (London: Routledge, 2006); C.R. Snyder and Shane J. Lopez, *Positive Psychology: The Scientific and Practical Explorations of Human Strengths* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2007).

[16] Peterson and Seligman, eds., *Character Strengths and Virtues,* 88.

[17] See James F. Keenan and Thomas A. Shannon, eds., *The Context of Casuistry* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995), xviii. See also Stephen Toulmin and Albert R. Jonsen, *The Abuse of Casuistry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

development, preferring a priori, utilitarian, or casmst1c approaches.[18] At the base of the resistance to recognizing the mutual services that different sciences render each other (in this case, the service that moral psychology can render ethics and vice versa) is the modern tendency to compartmentalize the sciences and effectively to deny an ordering and unity of knowledge. In ethics, this tendency has reinforced the autonomy of ethics and its focus on normativeness; the cost is a reduced notion of service that has isolated virtue theory from a deeper understanding of human anthropology and development. While the notion of service itself does not destroy the relative autonomy of the sciences, it does demand that we come to terms with the ordering of the sciences.[19]

As a mere preface, this *status quaestionis* cannot treat more fully the promise or partiality of these moral development and virtue theories. It does however set the stage for a discussion of Aquinas's notion of moral development as a study not only in philosophical ethics but also in moral psychology and in theological virtue ethics.

II. AQUINAS'S DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

A) Psychology of Development

Does Aquinas necessarily imagine virtue in terms of moral growth and development? If so, what develops when the human person grows morally? The response to the first question is not obvious. Some thinkers have critiqued Aquinas's approach to human and social development for its psychological shortcomings. Certain respected Thomists-for example, Jean Porter and Anthony Kenny-have taken Aquinas to task for not presenting a

[18] See Philibert, "Addressing the Crisis in Moral Theory," 103-13.

[19] Benedict Ashley demonstrates a constructive Thomist vision of the ordering and unification of knowledge in his *The Way of Wisdom: An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Introduction to Metaphysics* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). John Paul II's encyclical *Fides et ratio* also recognizes the necessary role that experimental sciences play in philosophy (*FR* 77).

more nuanced notion of the psyche's dynamic development. Although Aquinas's account of the virtues remains fundamentally sound and normative, it needs reformulation, according to Porter. She says that Aquinas "has no sense of the dynamic development of the psyche, and, perhaps more importantly, he also has very little sense of the significance of social forces in shaping individual identity." [20] This critique, while expressing a valid concern to advance Aquinas and the tradition's reflections on virtue, seems overstated or perhaps limited to a modern notion of subjective "identity." There is no reason to defend Aquinas for not having foreseen contemporary debates with both their drawbacks and their advances concerning human individuation and socialization. Nonetheless, we need to look more extensively at the structure and content of his moral anthropology and virtue theory in order to examine his developmental insights.

Aquinas's developmental approach differs significantly from both Kohlberg's theory of "moral development" and Gilligan's theory of the dichotomy between male justice and female care. Aquinas's notion of moral development is rooted in an inclusive vision of nature and the human person and society. Its backbone is constituted by the virtues, which are understood through the developmental concepts of habitus (i.e., a disposition to act and a key for understanding the development of human powers) and connaturality (i.e., the need to develop a second nature to act competently). His notion of development furthermore involves following nature *(sequi naturam)* and the natural law through the human rational participation in the divine law, and, proper to the theological and infused virtues, receptivity to the grace of the New Law of the Holy Spirit, given to those who believe in Christ and act in love. Pinckaers has made a significant contribution to

[20] Jean Porter, *Moral Action and Christian Ethics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 167. She "reformulates" an educational perspective based on virtue and on "how the prudent and virtuous person ... is capable of rational self-criticism and transformation of her individual and cultural ideals for virtue, precisely in and through her continued reflective practice of the virtues" (ibid., 168). Concerning "the difficulties" in Aquinas's account of human faculties she refers to Anthony Kenny's *Aquinas on Mind* (London: Routledge, 1993), 145-60.

reviving interest in Aquinas's understanding of the New Law of grace as the keystone in moral theology.[21] According to Aquinas, a connatural disposition for a freedom of excellence develops from a natural foundation toward a spiritual goal through personal experience and divine grace,[22] the latter manifesting itself as an instinct of the Holy Spirit.[23]

Aquinas's vision of virtue focuses on that personal experience which does not come to be without sense perception of the environment, intellectual reflection and choice, social influences, and grace.[24] Moral progress requires a transformation of the person's emotional and intellectual capacities, which include social dimensions. Aquinas says: "it pertains to man's good that the whole of human nature should be subject to virtue, that is, that virtue should involve the intellectual part, the sensitive part, and the body."[25] Virtues instill changes that are not simply quantitative, but intensive, and that involve the correlation of receiving and giving at natural and graced levels.

Without attempting here to explore all the elements of Aquinas's philosophical and theological anthropology that are significant for his theory of development, I would like to address more fully two oft-neglected aspects of that anthropology: the natural inclinations and the evaluative sense.

[21] See Servais Pinckaers *The Sources of Christian Ethics* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995) 178-94, 464-67; idem, "The Return of the New Law to Moral Theology," in *The Pinckaers Reader,* ed. J. Berkman and C. S. Titus (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 369-84; and idem, *La vie selon ['Esprit: Essai de theologie spirituelle selon saint Paul et saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Luxembourg: Editions Saint-Paul, 1996).

[22] See Thomas Ryan, "Revisiting Affective Knowledge and Connaturality in Aquinas," *Theological Studies* 66 (2005): 54 ff.; and Craig Steven Titus, "The Development of Virtue and 'Connaturality' in Thomas Aquinas' Works" (S.T.L. thesis, University of Fribourg, Switzerland, 1990).

[23] See Servais Pinckaers, "Morality and the Movement of the Holy Spirit: Aquinas' Doctrine of *Instinctus,"* in Berkman and Titus, eds., *The Pinckaers Reader,* 385-95.

[24] On the place of grace (as instrumental to moral progress) and prayer (for divine assistance in moral progress), see *STh* I-II, q. 109, aa. 9-10; and *STh* I-II, q. 106, a. 1, ad 2.

[25] Aquinas, *De Malo,* q. 12, a. 1.

B) Natural Inclinations and Moral Development

Aquinas construes natural inclinations as seeds for moral development. He grounds this vision on a metaphysical understanding of creation and on the human sense and intellectual capacity to be informed by the hierarchical order of being.[26] His classic treatment of natural inclinations in question 94, article 2 of the *Prima Secundae* addresses the question whether the natural law contains several precepts.[27] Nominalist, casuist, proportionalist, and utilitarian perspectives have interpreted the natural inclinations legalistically and extrinsically, without adequate reference to the *Summa's* developmental perspective, as Pinckaers has astutely observed.[28]

The natural inclinations speak of the human person's basic tendencies to desire good and shun evil, to seek self-preservation, to tend toward the goods of family, to search truth, and to intend the goods of society,[29] which all underlie a basic and natural desire for happiness, both natural and supernatural.[30] They are an expression of the natural law and the indelible image of God imprinted in each human being, a participation in the eternal law and divine likeness, which includes a tendency "to spread abroad their own good amongst others."[31] The natural inclinations correlate with the precepts of natural law, which are ordered from the self to family and then to others and to God.[32] This generosity

[26] See Ashley, *The Way of Wisdom,* esp. 53-54; Pinckaers, *Sources of Christian Ethics,* 400-456; and Ryan, "Revisiting Affective Knowledge and Connaturality in Aquinas," 53££.

[27] For an extensive analysis of three Catholic perspectives on the relationship of natural inclination and natural law, see Matthew Levering, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer, Pinckaers, McAleer," *The Thomist* 70 (2006): 155-201.

[28] See Pinckaers, *Sources of Christian Ethics,* 354-74; idem, "A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts," in Berkman and Titus, eds., *The Pinckaers Reader,* 185-235; and idem, "Revisionist Understandings of Actions in the Wake of Vatican II," in Berkman and Titus, eds., *The Pinckaers Reader,* 236-70.

[29] See *STh* I-II, q. 51, a. 1; *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 1; *STh* I-II, q. 27, a. 3; III *Sent.,* d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 3; as well as Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.4.

[30] See Pinckaers' article on the natural desire to see God: "Le desir nature! de voir Dieu," *Nova et Vetera* 51 (1976): 255-73.

[31] *STh* I, q. 19, a. 2. See also *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad *2;* I-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1.

[32] *STh* I-II, q. 94, a. *2;* see also *STh* I, q. 19, a. *2;* II-II, q. 175, a. *2,* ad 1.

expresses the Neoplatonic dictum "Goodness is diffusive of itself" *(bonum diffusivum sui).*[33] As Aquinas says, these "seeds of virtue," which are in us, are an ordering of the will and reason to the good connatural to us.[34] He does not specify how the inclinations *per se* develop chronologically or according to stages. They are so basic that they progressively manifest themselves at different periods of human life, even in the early acts of an infant who seeks to preserve her life by crying for food. Through sense experience, the natural inclinations' ordered interrelations are received in our perceptual, emotional, rational, and volitional capacities. Moreover, led by the virtue of prudence through a quest toward true happiness and virtue, their interrelation deepens over time and according to one's state in life.

The mere presence of natural inclinations, though, is inadequate for responsible moral action or character development. These seeds of virtue are underspecified for concrete action. Our intelligence must be engaged in choice and action. Of course, this can only be understood in the context of time and space, communal practices, environmental influences, and grace as well. Although basic inclinations become the well-ordered personal and social dispositions of the virtues that produce moral and spiritual acts, Aquinas cautions us that

> the natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue *[inchoatio virtutis],* but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt.[35]

Thus, we give birth (though not alone) to various more or less deep-seated tendencies or dispositions that either are in "accord

[33] On the self-diffusive nature of good as a final end, see *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2; *STh* I, q. 19, a. 2; I-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1. For an extensive discussion, see: Graham J. McAleer, *Ecstatic Morality and Sexual Politics: A Catholic and Antitotalitarian Theory of the Body* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005).

[34] *STh* I-II, q. 51, a. 1; cf. *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 1; I-II, q. 27, a. 3.

[35] *STh* I-II, q. 58, a. 4, ad 3.

with reason" and true goods or are objectively disordered.[36] The level and malleability of these dispositions, and our responsibility for them, is an issue for developmental virtue theories.

C) The Evaluative Sense's Contribution

Aquinas's assessment of the importance of the internal senses for the life of virtue (and their relationship to the natural inclinations) is often neglected. Of special interest in his fuller notion of the embodied person is the cogitative or evaluative sense *(vis cogitativa),* which is the human sensate capacity for prerational judgment. Aquinas also calls this power "particular" intelligence, because of its association with intellect and its capacity to compare and infer the intentions of individual things.[37] The other three internal senses, namely, imagination, memory, and the common or synthetic sense serve the evaluative sense as well as the higher cognitive and affective capacities. Aquinas would have us understand that this sensate perception and judgment directly influence the emotions and our exercise of the intellectual and moral virtues. Human emotions, reason, and will count on these first movements of the sensate perception and judgment quickly to perceive and recognize what attracts and repels human beings. Evolutionary theory identifies the utility of such judgments for hygiene and genetic health (e.g., disgust for feces or repulsion at thoughts of incest). With great understanding of the human as an embodied person, Aquinas distinguishes the evaluative sense's embodied judgments about what will suit or harm us from other internal senses (tying this capacity to memory and imagination). In his view, a type of sensate judgment about the "individual intentions" *(intentionum individualium)* of the world around us produces an attraction (desire) or repulsion (disgust) that precedes

[36] The image of "deep-seated tendencies" (found in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* no. 2358, for example) raises questions such as, are we determined by our actions of the past and our desires of the present? The debate on the malleability and continuity of certain tendencies (in particular, what is called "sexual orientation") needs to include their relationship to natural inclinations and the evaluative sense.

[37] See *STh* I, q. 78, a. 1; and *De Veritate,* q. 14, a. 1.

emotional expressions[38] and gives us a first approximation or "imperfect" perception of our end.[39] Nonetheless, these sensate judgments are not the last word on moral action. Through rational and affective deliberation, the person evaluates the accuracy of these first approximate judgments and enacts the practical work of deliberating, discerning, and judging what is true and good to do, in the context of his historical commitments and personal goals.

Moral dispositions (that is, virtues and vices) are not located at the level of the internal senses,[40] yet Aquinas's discussion of the participation of acquired dispositions in the goods of reason does apply to internal sensate perception and judgment. Following Aristotle, Aquinas recognizes that we form bodily dispositions in the internal senses, notably through memory which is modified by the force of the object, meditation, and repeated acts.[41] When well-disposed (by nature and by habituation) the evaluative sense

[38] See *Sfh* I, q. 78, a. 4; I, q. 81, a. 3; *De Anima,* q. 13; and ScG II, c. 73. We should note the importance of the individual bodily dispositions that affect the way in which we are disposed to virtue. The dispositions of bodily sensory and emotional powers aid or hinder the rational powers that they serve. See *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 1; John Deely, *What Distinguishes Human Understanding?* (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2002); and R. E. Brennan, *General Psychology: A Study of Man Based on St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: MacMillan, 1952).

[39] Aquinas says that through the evaluative power we have an "imperfect knowledge of the end [that] consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end" *(STh* I-II, q. 6, a. 2). This imperfect knowledge of the end manifests itself through our natural inclinations in the work of the evaluative sense. However, it is only at the level of rational and graced acts that we can achieve a type of perfect knowledge of our end, as well as how to attain it.

[40] See *STh* I, q. 81, a. 3; ibid., ad 2. Moreover, Aquinas *(STh* I-II, q. 50, a. 1; I-II, q. 50, a. 3) distinguishes dispositions of the body (orexic habitus, like psychical health and beauty or memory and the evaluative power) from dispositions of the mind (operative habitus, which cover three closely related domains: (a) temperament or character traits, such as shyness and kindness; (b) acquired stable dispositions to act, that is, the virtues and vices; and (c) single acts). See also *STh* I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 1; *STh* I-II, q. 49, a. 3, ad 3; and *STh* I-II, q. 49, a. 4.

[41] Aquinas says *(STh* I-II, q. 51, a. 3): "But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says that 'meditation strengthens memory' [De Memoria et Reminiscentia ch. I:451, art. 12-14]." See also *STh* I-II, q. 51, a. 3, ad 3.

serves our exercise of prudence and of the other virtues.[42] When disordered, on the other hand, it can disserve the functioning of our emotions, reasoning, and willing, which it misleads toward apparent or compromised instead of true goods (*STh* I, q. 77, a. 1). The evaluative power's positive impact on human thought and action comes from its excellence, which it owes "not to that which is proper to the sensate part; but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them" (*STh* I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 5) and guides them.[43] The evaluative power's negative potential comes from the influence of underdeveloped capacities and ignorance of the true nature of the good or evil on hand, disordered passions and acquired vices, personal or social bias and sin, learned errors and mistakes, and the effects of other developmental factors or psychosocial pathologies. For example, good sensate judgments can be overridden by passions that fixate only on one aspect of reality at the expense of other morally decisive factors (*STh* I-II, q. 24, a. 3). In such a case, the evaluative sense can end up following disordered emotion (*STh* I-II, q. 77, a. 1). Focusing exclusively on the savory meal, for example, will distract one from the otherwise evident plight of one's neighbor.

Further study of these two areas-natural inclinations and the evaluative sense-will aid in retrieving the wisdom of the tradition concerning moral development and advancing it in dialogue with contemporary sciences. While Aquinas's philosophical principles are solid, the neurological and psychological sciences offer fine-tuned observations on the functioning of perception, affection, and cognition that need to be taken up (and interpreted) in such a sound philosophical anthropology and to be put into the service of a properly theological anthropology and virtue theory.

[42] See *STh* I, q. 85, a. 7. Aquinas recognizes that the quality of understanding is not simply determined by a person's intellectual capacities, but also by the disposition of the internal sense powers (evaluative power, memory, imagination, and synthetic sense).

[43] Aquinas says that universal reason also guides the evaluative power, for example, by focusing the images of the imagination (*STh* I, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2 and ad 3; see also *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4).

III. TRIPARTITE DEVELOPMENT IN VIRTUE

Without going into the extensive discussion of moral agency and virtue found in Aquinas's *Prima Secundae,* I would now like to focus this study on his tripartite understanding of growth in virtue, particularly theological virtue. Evocative descriptions of this are found in his account of the subject of the theological virtue of charity *(STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 9), freedom *(STh* II-II, q. 183, a. 4), and of the fruits of the Holy Spirit *(STh* I-II, q. 70, a. 3, ad 2).[44]

A) Analogies for Development

Aquinas employs three analogies he draws from human growth, physics, and biology in order to illustrate the trajectory of moral growth in virtue. First, human psychosocial growth provides an analogy of the relationship between stages of growth and types of action and pursuit. Aquinas observes "fixed divisions according to those particular acts *[actiones]* and practices *[studia]* to which we are brought" by growth through infancy and childhood, to adolescence and adulthood *(STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 9). He notes that infants learn to use their intelligence *(usum rationis)* before learning to speak and to perfect their reasoning *(incipit loqui et ratione uti),* and that human beings learn to master generative powers and responsibilities *(incipit posse generare)* before refining an array of other acts and practices that indicate maturity *(ad perfectum).*

Second, a spatial metaphor illustrates the tripartite structure of virtue development, which is likened to local motion that at first involves "withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other, and thirdly, rest in this term" (ibid.). Although the "rest" of an inanimate object may appear an insignificant goal in the context of human perfection and maturity, application of this metaphor to the interior realities of human virtues brings a different assessment. In the human context, Aquinas's notion of rest

[44] See also *STh* I-II, q. 72, a. 6, ad 2.

identifies the progression from love, through desire, to pleasure and differentiates the typology of pleasure, while distinguishing the properly spiritual pleasure called joy.[45]

Third, in the article on whether the virtue of charity increases with every charitable act, Aquinas likens spiritual increase in virtue to the nonproportional bodily growth of animals and plants.[46] Fallow times prepare for extended periods of increase, which also depend on other factors including light, warmth, and nutrition. Nature disposes for increase before an actual increase occurs. Aquinas draws his model from biology or horticulture rather than mathematics or geometry in order to affirm that this growth is neither linear nor continuous. He explains that:

> charity does not actually increase through every act of charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity, insofar as one act of charity makes a person more ready to act again according to charity, and this readiness increasing, the person breaks out into an act of more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity, and then his charity increases actually. (*STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 6)

Here Aquinas recognizes the interrelation and distinction between the disposition and the act of charity. There is not a simple increase of act; rather, an increase in readiness and striving to act occurs at the level of disposition. Acts modify dispositions, which lead to modified acts.

B) Three Moral Stages

Through these parallels between spatial movement, biological growth, and psychosocial development, Aquinas identifies three moral stages, namely, discipline, progress, and maturity. First, growth in virtue involves a disciplined distancing of oneself from what is destructive, empty, or undeveloped. It involves employing law as a sure rule to protect our burgeoning affections and cognitions as well as self-mastery to aid us to resist disordered emotions and to act morally with greater consistency. Second, we

[45] *STh* I-II, q. 23, a. 4; I-II, q. 25, a. 2; I-II, q. 31, aa. 3 and 5.

[46] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 6.

advance toward a perfective goal through the habituation (teleological growth) of our malleable capacities. In our quest for goodness, we start to make progress in virtue, encouraged by family, teachers, friends, and the community. We develop patterns of being that are more receptively and actively disposed to goodness and truth, tending toward self-preservation and life in family and in society. Finally, we obtain maturity and rest, as well as joy and spontaneity, in the internal exercise of virtuous ways that express a creative freedom of excellence. Over time, our moral powers can continue to be perfected in the pursuit of personal acts and communal practices that accord with reason, including faith-informed reason.[47]

In order to understand moral growth and Aquinas's teaching here, Pinckaers has used two analogies from the arts: learning to play the piano and to speak a foreign language.[48] The piano analogy addresses the need for predispositions (such as attraction to music and an ear for it), a teacher to articulate the rules of the art and to mentor the budding artist, and exercise in order to develop raw talent into consolidated skills. There are stages in growth (1) from difficulty and painful effort in the acquisition of basic skills and self-discipline; (2) through progress in art, such as playing the piano with accuracy and good rhythm (acquiring ease, spontaneity, and pleasure); (3) to establishing the capacity to interpret and improvise-a freedom of creative excellence.

In discussing the duties and states of life, Aquinas also employs the notion of three stages in order to explain deliberate growth in spiritual freedom or servitude. In spiritual matters, a person's internal state of freedom can be aimed at servitude or justice *(STh* II-II, q. 183, a. 4). On the one hand, the servitude of sin leads to the freedom from justice that is actually a habitual inclination to sin. This is true servitude. On the other hand, the servitude of justice leads to the freedom from sin, whereby a person is inclined to good by a disposition of justice. This is true freedom. Moreover, Aquinas recognizes that perfect states are attained

[47] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 6, ad 3.

[48] Pinckaers, *Sources of Christian Ethics,* 354££.

gradually and with intentional effort, following St. Paul's teaching in the Letter to the Romans (Rom 6:16, 20-22). As in every human effort, and no less in those that are fully under the aegis of grace, a person grows in spiritual freedom or servitude through three stages as beginner, proficient, and perfect.[49]

Aquinas draws upon Aristotle and Augustine to show that moral growth involves a basic structure of human nature that we express in terms of the virtues. Neither Aquinas nor Aristotle nor Augustine are formalists in terms of a Kantian emphasis on good will or in terms of a Kohlbergian priority on the universal form of justice reasoning. Rather, their approaches are content driven and teleologically structured around the virtues. Augustine and Aquinas moreover distinguish the natural principles that underlie acquired intellectual and moral virtues from the infused dispositions that underlie the theological and infused moral virtues that direct us to our supernatural end, so that we behave well as "fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of God" (Eph 2:19).[50] On the one hand, there are the acquired dispositions. Fortitude, as an example of an acquired virtue, concerns an external norm about rationally adjudicating what to do in a fearful situation. Through this virtue, our affective dispositions to experience and express fear and daring tend toward courageous, good, and just acts, supported by the adjudication of reason and the motivation of will. On the other hand, as an infused virtuous disposition (infused by grace and informed by Judea-Christian Scripture, models, and teaching), Christian courage expresses a theological mean and finality at work in emotional, rational, and volitional dispositions in order to express and defend Christian convictions about faith and justice in fearful situations, even being prepared to give one's life for Christ and for others.[51]

[49] *STh* II-II, q. 183, a. 4, ad 2.

[50] As cited by Aquinas, in *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4; see also *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 3.

[51] See *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4.

IV. DEVELOPMENT IN THE THREE STAGES OF CHARITY

With this foundation in place, we can now address moral development more explicitly in terms of "making all things new in Christ." Aquinas presents his clearest treatment of three stages of development while discussing the theological virtue of charity (*STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 9). This virtue must itself be studied in its larger context. Here we enter the realm of theological transformation that is active in the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, concerning which Aquinas calls upon the authority of Scripture (especially the Gospel of John and the Sermon on the Mount), St. Augustine, and St. Gregory the Great.[52] In so doing, Aquinas construes the virtue of charity as the perfection of the person's will in "a friendship of a human person for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness."[53] This virtue grows through the exercise of various practices (in family and community, sacrament and worship, work and so on), according to three stages: from difficult beginnings, through effort-filled progress, to more spontaneous maturity.[54]

A) The Beginner and the Law

The beginner, while seeking the proper object of virtue, which in the case of charity is union with God through friendship with Christ, will have certain developmental preoccupations, if not distractions. Aquinas explains that beginners advance in their love for God, self, and neighbors through a stage in which they must adapt their behavior and train their dispositions with the aid of the commands of law, in particular the Decalogue,[55] but also the practices, customs, and rules that constitute the good life of a

[52] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 9; and II-II, q. 183, a. 4.

[53] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 2; cf. *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 1.

[54] For a further treatment of Aquinas's understanding of the development of charity, see Pinckaers, *Sources of Christian Ethics,* 354-78; idem, *La vie selon l'Esprit.*

[55] See *STh* I-II, q. 100, a. 6; I-II, q. 100, a. 9; and I-II, q. 72, a. 4. See also Matthew Levering, *Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).

family, community, profession, and so on.[56] When consciously seeking to be united to God, a person seeks to follow the commandments especially as formulated in Scripture (most notably in the Decalogue and the New Testament commands and lists against sin). As an external principle of action, law leads a person away from immoral extremes and sin and, at the same time, toward moral and spiritual goals. The law's pedagogical role involves the basic training needed for self-actualization and maturity.[57] For the law to have its full effect, though, each person must not only apply himself but also receive further assistance (parental training, social input, and divine grace). Moreover, the Decalogue is established according to the order of the generation of human goodness (from acts of religion, to filial piety, to justice and to moral integrity writ large), so as to create a culture for advancing not only virtuous acts, but even virtuous dispositions.[58]

This first stage of development involves a special focus on avoiding sin and resisting disordered passions that lead us away from God and parents, and that tend toward death, adultery, theft, dishonesty, and covetousness. Depending on dispositions and upbringing or training in particular practices, a person may have more or less difficulty in avoiding the extremes that are excluded by the negative precepts (do not kill, do not steal, and so on) or in concentrating on the means toward positive ones (love of God, neighbor, and self-including specific positive precepts to honor parents and love enemies). Aquinas recognizes that, at a lower degree of virtue, negative precepts of law have particular importance, while positive ones aid us to progress, especially at a higher degree. Moreover, he draws a parallel between the degrees of virtue and the types of precepts in his discussion of sin:

> In God's law, the various affirmative and negative precepts serve to gradually lead people to virtue, first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the

[56] See Alasdair Macintyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues* (Chicago: Open Court, 1999).

[57] See *STh* I-II, q. 95, a. 1.

[58] See *STh* II-II, q. 122, aa. 1-6; as well as *STh* I-II, q. 72, a. 4; and I-II, q. 100, a. 9.

negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different degrees of virtue.[59]

At the first stage, there is a tendency to a servile relationship to the law, which is perceived as oppressive and foreign.[60] Just as a faint flame needs shelter and fanning, burgeoning charity needs protection and promotion. Law serves to protect it from self-destruction since contrary acts corrode and crush love. In conscious and unconscious ways, the person progresses in charity through the practice of obedience to law and in the exercise of good and just practices inasmuch as he employs such experiences for constructive discipline and positive pedagogy. Aquinas thus construes law, not as an end in itself, but as a means to promote the growth of internal virtuous dispositions[61] and to provide the arena for practices *(studia)* that model charity.

B) Progress in Virtue and the Encouragement of the Sermon on the Mount

At the second stage, we progress in the good of virtue through a new internal, embodied quality of our personal acts and communal practices. The Christian model for this advancement is formulated in the Sermon on the Mount.[62] Aquinas places great importance on the Sermon on the Mount not only as a model for growth and renewal, but as a corpus of spiritual teaching and moral practices for imitating Christ (Matt 5-7; Luke 6). Following yet outstripping Augustine's *Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount,*[63] Aquinas correlates the Sermon's seven beatitudes not

[59] *STh* I-II, q. 72, a. 6, ad 2.

[60] *STh* II-II, q. 183, a. 4, ad 1.

[61] Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 90, a. 1; I-II, q. 92, a. 1; I-II, q. 95, a. 1.

[62] On the role of the Sermon on the Mount and the Beatitudes in moral theology, see Servais Pinckaers, "Beatitude and the Beatitudes in Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae,"* in Berkman and Titus, eds., *The Pinckaers Reader,* 115-29, esp. 124-29; idem, *Sources of Christian Ethics,* 134-67.

[63] Augustine, *Commentary on the Lord's Sermon on the Mount,* trans. Denis J. Kavanagh (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1951).

only with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, but also with the seven principal theological and cardinal virtues.[64] The importance of the disciplined practices outlined in the Sermon cannot be over-emphasized nor can the need for each person to have a spirit of initiative in seeking to instantiate this teaching. The beatitudes, for example, identify general areas in which one must engage in concrete action with real neighbors and personal challenges. The affirmations and admonitions of the Sermon point to types of practice that must be personalized in terms of substantial good works, patience, respect for others, conjugal commitment and purity, truth-telling, pardon, love of enemies, and confidence in God. Specific types of almsgiving and generosity, prayer, and fasting (Matt 6) further structure the internal life of one who is making progress in Christian virtue.

Charity's intensity is strengthened by the knowledge and practices found in the Sermon. Aquinas extensively explains how the intellective appetite (the will) as the subject of charity can grow in a person,[65] but not without knowledge. In the act of charity the human mind *(mens)* is united to God and to others for love of God. A person's charity increases according to the excellence of the object and the number of objects known, but also according to the intensity of the act of the will, for someone can be loved more or less.[66] An increase in charity is nothing other than an alteration in the person, in whom the form of charity intensifies, thus changing the person who loves.[67] Aquinas says that "this is what God does when he increases charity, that is, he makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and the likeness of the Holy Spirit to be more perfectly participated by the soul."[68] For

[64] Aquinas's originality is found in his treatment of the seven major virtues (throughout the *Secunda secundae); STh* I-II, q. 69, aa. 1-4, and his commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. Concerning the authenticity of parts of this commentary, see: J.-P. Renard, *"LaLectura super Matthaeum* V,20-48 de Thomas d'Aquin," *Recherchesde theologie ancienne et medievale* 50 (1983): 145-90; and J.P. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas,* vol. 1: *The Person and His Work* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 55-59.

[65] See *STh* II-II, q. 24, aa. 2-9.

[66] See *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 4, ad 1.

[67] See *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 5; *De Caritate,* a. 11.

[68] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 5, ad 3.

Aquinas, this change of the soul involves a change of the embodied person, whose "body and those things which are necessary for the body help to tend toward God, albeit instrumentally."[69] At this moral-spiritual level which involves various types of suffering and joy, ascetical and purgative practices and spiritual exercises are vital Christian disciplines that promote growth and awaken in us a greater awareness of and attraction to true good, as Pinckaers has reminded us.[70]

This process is a two-way street; increase is not guaranteed. Charity can be undercut through acts that oppose charity, namely, two types of sin. Mortal sin does not so much diminish as destroy charity. This loss of charity effectively results when a changeable subject freely "prefers sin to God's friendship," evidenced when he chooses to disobey God's will and the rule of his commandments.[71] Venial sin, on the contrary, decreases one's disposition to act in charity. The cessation of the "practice of works of charity"[72] and slack acts can thus dispose one to a lower degree of that virtue. As Aquinas says: "The effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But an act of charity is sometimes done with some tepidity or slackness *[cum aliquo tepore vel remissione].* Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity, rather does it dispose to a lower degree" *(STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 6, sc). Here we should speak of the effect of venial sin rather then an act of charity *per se.* This case, moreover, clarifies the interconnection of deliberate choice (volition and intention), progress in virtue, and the divine law (the latter being expressed not only in the Decalogue but also in the Sermon).[73] It also brings nuance to the adage that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back."[74]

[69] *De Caritate,* a. 9.

[70] Cf. Servais Pinckaers, *Morality: The Catholic View,* trans. Michael Sherwin (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2001), 109-11, and 69-72; and idem, *La vie selon l'Esprit,* esp. 233-46.

[71] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 12; see also *STh* I-II, q. 24, a. 10; I-II, q. 24, a. 11.

[72] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 10.

[73] See *STh* I-II, q. 100, a. 9.

[74] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 6, obj. 3, where Aquinas attributes this phrase to St. Gregory the Great.

C) Maturity and the Inspiration of the New Law

At the third stage, Aquinas speaks about the maturity in virtue and freedom that render one fruitful and give a certain mastery. A person efficaciously attains this higher goal through the connaturality of virtue, but principally under the inspiration of the New Law, which "is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Spirit, given to those who believe in Christ" [75] and "working through love." [76] For Aquinas, each virtue has (1) its proper content; (2) its subject, faculty, or power; and (3) its object. Moreover, each virtue necessarily draws from the other virtues, that is, from the complete dispositions and acts of the embodied person. The specific "theological" transformation of patience, courage, prudence, and the like is worked through the grace that underlies infused moral and theological virtues. Nonetheless, there is a human participation therein, for "a movement of the free-will is requisite in the infusion of charity." [77] Besides divine help, Aquinas identifies two other levels of assistance in tending toward God as an end, namely, self-help and the cooperation of fellow men. [78]

For Aquinas, drawing from St. Paul (1 Cor 2:6), people can have a type of mature or "perfect" love according to the use of their present capacities, when seeking wholeheartedly to serve God and others, or at least habitually to "neither think nor desire anything contrary to the love of God." [79] There can be continual increase in charity at the third stage, since God's infinite goodness can always lead a human person to fuller "participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Spirit." [80] In this life, God can continue to enlarge the heart (the intellective appetite) to be capable of further increase. Determinative factors for charity are knowledge and faith, which will give way to vision for the blessed

[75] *STh* I-II, q. 106, a. 1.
[76] *STh* I-II, q. 108, a. 1.
[77] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 11, ad 3; see also *STh* I-II, q. 113, a. 3 on the justification of sinners.
[78] *De Caritate,* a. 9.
[79] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 8.
[80] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 7.

in heaven. By his commitment to the connection of the virtues,[81] in general, and to the mutual dependency of charity and knowledge, in particular,[82] Aquinas avoids a formalist reduction of moral goodness to the goodness of the will.

Aquinas construes a unity of object (for the virtue of charity) when speaking of the same virtue that develops from beginning to end, through the three stages. Charity is analogous to other virtues. Nonetheless, besides the principal act of charity, which is a knowing love ("a friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness"),[83] a fuller account of it includes the interior effects of joy, peace, and mercy, in addition to the outward effects, such as acts of beneficence, almsgiving, and fraternal correction.[84] This stage of perfection in charity chiefly involves aiming for union with God, and brings an increased joyful preoccupation with and consciousness of God. The issue of its development, while related, is distinct from its pedagogy (or how we learn to exercise charity in personal efforts and struggles, in communal practices and through the instruction and modeling of others-in particular Christ, the saints, and the Church).[85]

Aquinas says that moral and spiritual maturity gives birth to a type of ease and even spontaneity in regards to charity, rooted in the instinct of the Holy Spirit *(instinctus Spiritus Sancti).*[86]

[81] See *STh* I-II, q. 65, aa. 1-2; *De Virtutibus cardinalibus,* a. 2. For a discussion of the role of the virtue of prudence in the connection of the virtues, see the debate in *The Thomist* between Thomas Osborne ("Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas," *The Thomist* 71 [2007]: 39-64), Angela McKay ("Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue," *The Thomist* 69 [2005]: 535-55); and Brain Shanley ("Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," *The Thomist* 63 [1999]: 553-77).

[82] See *STh* 1-11, q. 65, aa. 3-5; *STh* III, q. 2, a. 10; and Michael Sherwin, *By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005).

[83] *STh* II-II, q. 24, a. 2; cf. II-II, q. 23, a. 1.

[84] For the rest of the positive treatment of charity, see *STh* II-II, qq. 28-33. For the related vices, see *STh* 11-11, qq. 34-43. For the precepts of charity, see: *STh* II-II, q. 44. And for the related gift of the Holy Spirit, namely, wisdom, see *STh* II-II qq. 45 to 46.

[85] Cf. Michael Sherwin, "Christ the Teacher in St. Thomas's Commentary on the Gospel of John," in Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais, eds., *Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 173-93.

[86] Servais-Theodore Pinckaers, "Morality and the Movements of the Holy Spirit: Aquinas' Doctrine of *Instinctus,"* in Berkman and Titus, eds., *The Pinckaers Reader,* 385-95.

Charity's highest form involves spontaneously exceeding minimal normative and conventional demands, taking the Sermon on the Mount and the New Law of the Holy Spirit as its guide, while not neglecting (but rather fulfilling) the requirements of the Decalogue.[87] This teaching is unpopular among some ethicists and many moral theologians, who focus on the acquired connaturality or normativeness of pure reason or the Decalogue alone. A renewed vision of moral development has to grapple with challenges to recognize the place of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and friendship with Christ in the moral life, and the reasons moral theologians have neglected them and hesitated to use the word 'instinct', for example, in this regard.

Part of the problem is to resolve the putative conflict between law and instinct in the context of the effects of sin (wounded human nature) and the promise of divine grace. For Aquinas, law and instinct (their highest and purest levels) do not conflict. At the first two stages though, a person will inevitably experience instinctive or emotive conflicts between certain customs and civil law, on the one hand, and natural law and the evangelical or New Law of the Holy Spirit, on the other. Some conflicts are due to ignorance or the inapplicability of a custom or rule, which demands the virtue of prudence for discernment. Aquinas's notion of the grace (the graced instinct) of the Holy Spirit does not constitute parallel realms or competitive worlds that divide nature from graced-nature or law from spiritual instinct.[88] Rather the grace of the sevenfold gift of the Holy Spirit disposes one to the impulses that bring a further measure to reason.[89] In this regard, Fr. Pinckaers[90] and Pope John Paul Il's *Veritatis splendor* (which

[87] See Pinckaers, *Sources of Christian Ethics,* 365.

[88] For a further discussion of the correlation of the natural law and the New Law, see Pinckaers, "Aquinas and Agency: Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy?" in Berkman and Titus, eds., *The Pinckaers Reader,* 167-84.

[89] *STh* I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

[90] See Pinckaers, "Morality and the Movement of the Holy Spirit," 385-95. There have been two articles that have recently followed this lead: Charles Bouchard, "Recovering the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in Moral Theology," *Theological Studies* 63 (2002): 49-68; and Ryan "Revisiting Affective Knowledge and Connaturality in Aquinas."

speaks of a participated theonomy)[91] offer intelligent keys to resolve the problem of law and instinct and to understand how Christian theological and infused moral virtues mark a developmental pathway that transforms people and communities from without and from within.

CONCLUSION

Aquinas's correlation of virtue ethics with personal moral growth offers a firm philosophical foundation on which to advance a vision of development in theological and infused virtues. By its scope, this ethical theory covers moral growth in a complete fashion, without being exhaustive; for, as we have suggested, it is open to dialogue with the biological and psychosocial sciences, which each contribute insights about human growth and development according to their respective competencies and level. Moreover, Aquinas employs his ethical edifice in a theologically innovative way, for his theological virtue theory integrates considerations of the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, spiritual practices, and the human quest for beatitude in Christ, which all need reappropriating in moral theology after the long winter of modernity. In sum, Aquinas's tripartite model of growth in virtue gives us both philosophical and theological bases for understanding moral development and a way to speak intelligibly about making all things new in the love of Christ.

[91] John Paul II, *Veritatis splendor* (6 August 1993), n. 41.

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THE *IMAGO DEI* IN DAVID NOVAK AND THOMAS AQUINAS: A JEWISH-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE

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AT THE ROOT OF Jewish and Christian understandings of human nature are God's words in the first chapter of the Bible:

> Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth." So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. (Gen 1:26-27)

Interpreting this passage, Richard Middleton describes the contemporary debate between "a metaphysical, substantialistic analogy" (the image of God as rooted in human rationality) and "a dynamic, relational notion of the image as ethical conformity or obedient response to God." [1] Middleton's concerns regarding

[1] Richard Middleton, *The Liberating Image: The "Imago Dei" in Genesis 1* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos, 2005), 20. He attributes the latter position to Karl Barth, among others. See also Marc Cardinal Ouellet, S.S., *Divine Likeness: Toward a Trinitarian Anthropology of the Family,* trans. Philip Milligan and Linda M. Cicone (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2006). Regarding Genesis 1:26-27 Ouellet observes that "current exegesis is moving beyond two extremes. On the one hand, one finds the purely spiritual interpretation-which is the commonly held opinion of Christian exegesis since Philo-that the notion of image of God concerns only the spiritual dimension of man, allowing him to have dominion over animals and things. On the other hand, there is the purely material interpretation of the image: the fact that the Hebrew term *selem* (sculpture, statue) would bring us back to the bodily configuration proper to man, that is, his vertical posture. The majority of exegetes can

the traditional account of the image of God as human rationality are shared by Jewish theologian David Novak, who sets forth his position especially in two books, *Natural Law in Judaism* and *Covenantal Rights.* In what follows, I will explore Novak's approach in detail, and then examine Thomas Aquinas's theology of the image of God in light of Novak's insights and criticisms. The goal is to offer an account of the *imago dei* that engages constructively with contemporary concerns about "a metaphysical, substantialistic analogy."

I. THE IMAGE OF GOD ACCORDING TO DAVID NOVAK

A) Human Nature and Divine Power: Creation and Covenant

Novak argues against the view, held by Aristotle as well as by Jewish thinkers such as Maimonides, that the human relationship with God is part of a cosmic teleology. For Novak, such a view undermines the priority and gratuity of the covenantal relationship of human beings with God.[2] Although for Maimonides the eschatological "world-to-come" will include only persons "whose moral conduct is oriented in the context of a relationship with God,"[3] nonetheless he reaches this conclusion primarily on the basis of the doctrine of creation rather than that of covenant. As Novak says regarding Maimonides' teleology,

currently be found between these two opinions" (27).

[2] See, e.g., David Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chaps. 4-5; idem, *Jewish-Christian Dialogue: A Jewish Justification* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 125, 139, 154; idem, *Covenantal Rights: A Study in Jewish Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 53. As he puts it in *Jewish-Christian Dialogue,* "in Scripture, the Lord God is the creator of this cosmic order, and as creator he transcends its limits. Holiness *(qedushah)* is not part of the cosmic order. Being God's own relational capacity with man, it, too, transcends that order. Those addressed by God's covenant also transcend therein the limits of that order: 'You shall be holy because I the Lord your God am holy' (Leviticus 19:2). The relationship, on the human side, only presupposes the cosmic order for its formal structure, but it transcends it in its substantial being-with God" (154).

[3] Novak, *Jewish-Christian Dialogue,* 139. Novak emphasizes that Maimonides also affirms that "we can be intelligently decent without being oriented to the realm of the transcendent" (ibid., 139).

"the whole orientation of the human person is to be related with God; that relationship is the telos for which human nature is ordered at creation."[4]

Novak argues for the priority of covenant. Even so, he underscores the importance of a philosophical "theory of human nature, one that recognizes a basis of concern with one's fellows."[5] As examples of nonteleological theories of human nature, he cites those of Immanuel Kant and Martin Buber. Such theories help "explain the rules that structure the relationship between humans in society and even the supreme relationship with God."[6] Novak suggests that Jews and Christians can contribute to such theorizing about human nature by working within their covenantal commitments. On the basis of the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament, Jews and Christians affirm that God creates human beings to be related to him.[7] Novak distinguishes here between philosophical and theological thinking on the part of Jewish and Christian scholars: "By philosophical grounds, I mean theories about human nature and its capacity for concern with fellow humans, its sociality. By theological grounds, I mean theories about the human capacity for a relationship with God."[8]

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., 141. As Novak shows earlier, Maimonides argues that Christian theology is "polytheistic" and therefore "presupposes a material element in God," in contrast to Islam (60). Yet Maimonides appreciates that Christians, unlike Muslims, have retained the Hebrew Bible. Maimonides teaches, "It is permitted to teach the commandments to Christians *[notzrim]* and to draw them to our religion, but this is not permitted with Muslims because of what is known to you about their belief that this Torah is not divine revelation *['aynah min ha-Shamayim]* . .. but the uncircumcised ones [Christians] believe that the version *[nosah]* of the Torah has not changed, only they interpret it with their faulty exegesis.... But when the Scriptural texts shall be interpreted with correct exegesis *['al ha-perush ha-nakhon],* it is possible that they shall return to what is best *['el ha-mutabj* . ... There is nothing that they shall find in their Scriptures that differs from ours" (Maimonides, *Teshubot Ha-Rambam,* no. 149, ed. J. Blau Uerusalem, 1960], 1:284-85; quoted in Novak, *Jewish-Christian Dialogu-e,* 64). For Maimonides on Islam see also David Novak, "The Treatment of Islam and Muslims in the Legal Writings of Maimonides," in *Studies in Islamic and Judaic Traditions,* ed. W. M. Brinner and S. D. Ricks (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 233-50.

[8] Novak, *Jewish-Christian Dialogue,* 141.

Against any hint of human autonomy, Novak holds that the human being "has no ontological foundation upon which any basic moral claim must ultimately rest."[9] Not even the created order circumscribes God's absolute power; God may do anything he wishes to creatures. Merely as created, human beings have no claim in justice upon the transcendent God: "At this level, they have not yet been given any ground from God. Here we are painfully aware of the edges of our mortality, where we have no power at all."[10] As Novak puts it elsewhere, "God creates everything, even justice itself, and nothing in the world can stand over God as judge."[11] Related to Novak's emphasis on God's absolute power is his insistence that "[t]he primary response of humans to the power of God is terror *(pahad).*"[12] He cites Deuteronomy 32:39, "See now that I, I am He and there is no power *(elohim)* along with me. I kill and I give life; there is no one who can escape my hand." Before the living God, human beings cannot but feel their tremendous weakness, ignorance, and dependence.

Although Novak regards the movement from terror to fear as "a concession to us by God" in which "God limits the full range of his power," nonetheless Novak also appreciates God's wisdom: "our terror of God's power is mostly sublimated into our reverence for God's wisdom."[13] Yet in light of the unity of wisdom and will in God, could one hold that rational creatures have a "moral claim" upon him-not a moral claim that proceeds

[9] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 39.

[10] Ibid., 40.

[11] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 43. He cites Proverbs 21:30, "There is no wisdom, no understanding, and no counsel that can stand against the Lord." In Novak's view, Hugo Grotius and other classical liberal theorists have undercut God's sovereignty by positing a "justice" that stands above God.

[12] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 39. "Terror" does not seem to be the right word. Were God's power arbitrary, we would rightly feel terror before God (as do sinners who reject God's love). Novak holds that "fear" displaces "terror" when one experiences being commanded by God. He states, "Whereas the terror we experience in the face of the power of God takes away the ground from under us and thus leaves us no space around us to act, the fear we experience in the observance of the negative commandment of God demarcates the ground under us and a space around us in which to act" (ibid., 46).

[13] Ibid., 45, 46.

primarily from the creature, but a moral claim that expresses what God owes to himself as the wise Creator who orders his creatures to an end (a fulfillment) that he knows from all eternity? In this light, the word "terror" would mistakenly suggest an arbitrary rather than a wise and good God. Even if "terror" does not accurately describe the human position, nonetheless, as Novak emphasizes, in the presence of the living God we experience fear, since we are not autonomous self-creators. Novak observes that when applied to ethics, "fear of God" means refusing to violate the moral "order that God has enabled humans to know through their very nature."[14] Thus Novak affirms that there exists a "natural law" that is "the law of God by which the universe is run."[15] God gives this law an "ontological foundation" in the created order so that it "is universally intelligible to all humankind."[16] Natural law guards human beings against the encroachment of positive law that claims to be autonomous.

In describing both God's absolute power and the natural law inscribed in the created order, Novak aims to repudiate human claims to autonomy by recalling God's power.[17] Although Novak does not locate the relationship of justice between human beings and God in the order of creation, therefore, he does locate in the order of creation the relationship of justice between humans. He also recognizes the importance of affirming that rational creatures have some "ground under them upon which to stand up before God."[18] He argues that God freely gives this ground by

[14] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 48. Commenting on Genesis 20:11, where Abraham says, "There is no fear of God at all in this place," Novak remarks, "'Fear of God' means the elementary decency that requires human beings to restrain their desires out of fear/respect for the rights of other humans, in this case the right to inviolable marriage, because of the way God has created humans and their dignity. Restraint is called for in the name of a law higher than that of human making when desire leads to unjustified violence of any kind" (ibid.). See also *Covenantal Rights,* 46.

[15] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 54.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., 55.

[18] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 40. For a Christian appropriation of this view, indebted to Jewish mysticism, see Olivier Clement, *You Are Peter: An Orthodox Theologian's Reflection on the Exercise of Papal Primacy,* trans. M. S. Laird (French 1997; New York: New City Press, 2003), 102-3. Divine action, however, occurs at an entirely different metaphysical level than

relinquishing some of his own power. In order for human beings to have a relationship with God, "God must relinquish some of his own space, as it were, to allow his human creatures a place on which to stand before him-but never successfully against him."[19] He relinquishes "some of his own space" by inviting human beings into a relationship of mutuality (even if not equality) with him. Following Genesis, Novak states that

> humans, the only beings whom we know to be addressed by God, are granted a special status at the time of their creation. "And God created humans *(adam)* in his image, in the image of God *(be-tselem elohim)* He made him: male and female He created them" (Genesis 1:27). And when humans leave the otherworldly haven of the Garden of Eden to take their place in this world, God says: "Now humans *(ha'adam)* are one like Us, knowing good and bad" (Genesis 3:22).[20]

Humans receive the "special status" of being "in the image of God" (Gen 1:27).

Novak suggests that the special status is confirmed "when humans leave the otherworldly haven of the Garden of Eden to take their place in this world," because it is only then that "God says: 'Now humans *(ha'adam)* are one like Us, knowing good and bad' (Genesis 3:22)." Does Adam and Eve's disobedience, then, receive a reward rather than a punishment? Certainly Novak by no means approves of Adam and Eve's actions. On the contrary,

does human action. If so, then *(pace* Novak and Clement) God does not need to restrain his freedom or power so that human beings might exercise their own.

[19] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 40.

[20] Ibid. The image of God, then, is already a covenantal reality. Novak's connection of the image of God with covenant helps to respond to Michael Walzer's remark that "after those early verses of Genesis, it [the image of God] is never mentioned or referred to again in the Bible" (Michael Walzer, "Morality and Politics in the Work of Michael Wyschogrod," *Modem Theology* 22 [2006]: 687-92, at 691). Walzer argues that the image of God "does serve to ground much of our common morality.... It provides a theological basis for sentiments that we think, independently of theology, we ought to have. It also lends itself to a particular political appropriation-by the liberal left, as in the civil rights speeches of Martin Luther King. It supports an egalitarian politics. I would be inclined to say that this is actually the reason for its power" (ibid.). What Walzer misses is the Bible's consistent point that humans are not autonomous vis-a-vis God: they are his image and owe covenantal obligations to him. For its part, Novak's statement should be altered to take into account that God also addresses angels in Scripture.

he rejects the "frequently uttered modern liberal Jewish notion" that "Judaism has no doctrine of original sin, that Christianity teaches that humans are evil by nature whereas Judaism teaches that they are good by nature." [21] But he does distinguish sharply between the "eating of the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden" and the "subsequent human attempt to see this act as making humans God's equals, thus making God no longer God." [22] Only the latter, Novak thinks, is sinful and merits punishment.

Novak explains that God's commandment regarding the tree of the knowledge of good and evil intends only "to present a conditional offer rather than a categorical imperative: If you want to experience good and bad-that is, to be part of the world-then you must accept your own mortality in the bargain." [23] Seen in this light, Adam and Eve's eating from the tree is not an act of disobedience. Rather, as a free acceptance of mortality, their eating from the forbidden tree inaugurates their entrance into full personhood and full dialogue with God. According to Novak, then, humans receive their dialogic status vis-a-vis God by stepping forward to "experience good and bad-that is, to be part of the world." God relinquishes "some of his own space" in order to make this human experience possible. The fact that they can now either obey or disobey God's

[21] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 31. Similarly,Jon D. Levenson writes that "it has often been observed, mostly by liberal apologists for Judaism, that the Christian doctrine of original sin finds scant resonance in Jewish tradition. If the point is that Judaism is optimistic about human nature, regarding the impulse to sin as unrooted in our innate constitution, then the observation is altogether in error and fails to reckon not only with the theological anthropology of the Hebrew Bible but also with the pervasive rabbinic idea of the *yetzer ha-ra',* or 'evil inclination.' This is the inborn force within all of us that requires us to engage in a lifelong struggle if we are to do the right thing" (Jon D. Levenson, "Did God Forgive Adam? An Exercise in Comparative Midrash," in *Jews and Christians: People of God,* ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003], 148-70, at 164). Compare Harold Bloom's comment in his *Jesus and Yahweh: The Names Divine* (New York: Riverhead Books, 2005), 148: "I begin by dismissing St. Paul's and St. Augustine's apologies for God: in Adam's fall, we sinned all. The great Sages of the Talmud held no such barbaric doctrine, a Hellenic importation from the myth of the fire-bringer Prometheus tormented by a sadistic Zeus, and ultimately the Orphic shamanistic story of the revenge of Dionysus upon those who first had torn apart and devoured that infant god."

[22] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 31-32.

[23] Ibid., 32.

commandments indicates that God has given them "some power as persons."[24]

Novak notes that "no orthodox Christian exegete could possibly interpret the text in this way in good faith."[25] This is so, first and foremost, because of the interpretation that St. Paul gives to Genesis 2-3. Paul states, "Therefore as sin came into the world through one man and death through sin, and so death spread to all men because all men sinned" (Rom 5:12); to which he adds that "the wages of sin is death" (Rom 6:23). But even employing only the texts of Genesis, one wonders whether Novak's reading is plausible. The Lord explicitly commands that "of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat" (Gen 2:17). Having issued this command-"you shall not"-the Lord describes what will happen if Adam and Eve disobey his command: "you shall die" (Gen 2:17). Tempted by the serpent, Adam and Eve disobey the Lord's command. Why would their disobedience not be sinful? Correspondingly, in his list of specific punishments for Adam and Eve's disobedience, the Lord includes death: "you are dust, and to dust you shall return" (Gen 3:19).[26] From this perspective, the exile of humans from Eden is not the culmination of the human initiation into freedom/power, as Novak thinks, but rather a reduction of true human power.

Whether or not Novak's particular interpretation of Genesis 2:16-17 can stand, his fundamental point is that God freely grants dialogic status to human beings. As we have already intimated, Novak holds that since "God's power is inherently infinite," it follows that "the consistent execution of justice is actually God's

[24] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 40.

[25] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 32.

[26] This does not mean that the first human beings could have avoided death without God upholding them in a unique way, and neither does it mean that human beings become "the exception to creation" and "blur the difference between God and creation" *(Covenantal Rights,* 38). Novak asks, "Were humans immortal, being born without having to die, could they not even assume that they have succeeded God in the order of things?" (39). Immortality itself need not "blur the difference between God and creation," since God's eternity is infinitely distinct from and superior to created immortality. For Pope John Paul H's interpretation of Genesis 2:17, see *Veritatis Splendor* §41. See also Russell Hittinger's discussion of this section of *Veritatis Splendor* in Hittinger's *The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World* (Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2003), 40-46.

own limitation of that infinite power for the sake of covenantal relationalitywith the world."[27] For Novak, this accentuates God's free gift of mercy and justice; God accedes to Abraham's plea that the Lord not destroy Sodom if even ten righteous men reside there (Gen 18:22-32). As Novak understands this passage, Abraham argues with God that "if you choose to be involved in the world with your human creatures, especially as their judge, then you must function as the archetype and model of justice."[28] By choosing to enter history, God enters into the moral context of the world (even if the world as created, "prior" to God's covenantal entrance, can make no claim upon God). Yet the covenant does not determine God's justice or limit his freedom; rather he freely determines covenantal justice.

For this reason, Novak emphasizes that divine justice in history, the ground upon which Abraham successfully argues with God, does not impinge upon divine freedom. He states, "When he [God] chooses Israel, he owes them nothing, just as when he creates the world, he owes it nothing. All obligations on God's part are subsequently self-imposed."[29] To imagine otherwise, in Novak's view, would be to fall into anthropocentrism ("liberal theology").[30] Comparing human freedom to God's freedom, he observes that for human beings justice comes before freedom, because we humans find ourselves located in a moral context (the world) not of our own choosing. By contrast, "With God,

[27] Ibid., 42 n. 54. I would note, however, that divine action occurs at an entirely different metaphysical level than does human action. God does not need to restrain his freedom or power so that human beings might exercise their own. Along the same lines, the true image of God is not achieved "when humans leave the otherworldly haven of the Garden of Eden to take their place in this world." *(Covenantal Rights,* 39). The exile of humans from Eden is not the culmination of the human initiation into freedom/power, but rather a reduction of true human power. This is so because created power, insofar as it is fully an image of God, is power to accomplish the good known in wisdom, not power as open-ended choice between good and evil.

[28] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 42 n. 54.

[29] Ibid., 47.

[30] Novak comments, "But is this connection of freedom and justice the same for God as it is for humans? To answer 'yes,' as liberal theology basically does, is to land ourselves in a dead-end .... Only when divine freedom is seen as being different from human freedom, can we then see that God is related to justice differently than humans are related to it" (ibid., 44).

however, freedom is entirely creative. According to Scripture, only God has autonomy; only God can make laws that are not derivative from something else in the world. 'Justice is God's' (Deuteronomy 1:17).... God's freedom, then, comes before justice."[31] Although God "invokes the natural created order to 'testify' against Israel" when Israel violates "natural justice"-as he does with respect to Sodom and Gomorrah-this "natural created order" does not bind him, because "when he creates the world, he owes it nothing."[32] When he chooses to enter into a relationship of justice with his creatures, he imposes justice upon himself "subsequently" to his creative action.

We find a similar emphasis on God's freedom in Novak's understanding of divine transcendence. As we have seen, Novak insists that God is "the free creator of the world and everything in it" and that he is not determined by anything created.[33] Novak remarks, "God has the freedom either to make or not to make a covenant with anyone, which is like his freedom to create nature or not."[34] Thus he radically transcends history. Yet when confronted with the metaphysically "unchanging" (eternal) God of Maimonides, Novak fears that such a God cannot truly enter into history. He remarks that in Maimonides' understanding of the relationship of humans to God, "All concern is in one direction: from man to God. Maimonides in no way ever attempts to constitute a truly responsive role for God. There is no real reciprocity here. But the covenant is surely characterized by constant transaction between God and Israel, with that activity being mutual."[35]

[31] Ibid., 45. He points out in this context that "Kantian autonomy is a substitution of human will for God's will" (ibid.).

[32] Ibid., 47. It would be better to say that in creating the order of finite beings, God orders finite beings to the ultimate end of his goodness, and he owes it to his own goodness that his (free, covenantal, historical) plan not fail in execution.

[33] Ibid., 46.

[34] Ibid., 47.

[35] Ibid., 135. See also Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 53. As Novak knows, the unity of divine wisdom and divine will characterizes Maimonides's theology. Indeed, Novak himself may not intend to go as far as he does in his account of divine freedom, unconditioned by the divine wisdom or by the divine ordination for creation. In *Natural Law in Judaism,* after rightly observing that human reason is the precondition of divine revelation, he approvingly cites

The question is how God can be responsive if his action is transhistorical, that is, if he creates and redeems without moving from potency to act (in accord with Aristotle's understanding of Pure Act). If God's action is so different from ours as to involve no "change" on his part and thereby to take place on an entirely different metaphysical level, how can God respond historically to the actions of his covenantal people? Moreover, if God already is the fullness of being, lacking nothing and therefore absolutely transcendent, what does he gain from his covenantal relationship with Israel? Novak comments in this vein that "the relationship Maimonides constitutes is more than anything else a relation *to* a God who seems to closely resemble the God of Aristotle. It is a relation where only God and not man is the object of love."[36] In Novak's view, Maimonides cannot account for the intimacy between Israel and God, an intimacy inseparable from the human status as the "image of God," in which Israel truly acts *with* and even *for* God rather than simply worshiping God from afar. In short, Maimonides accounts for God's transcendence but not for God's immanence, and thereby gives Israel no real, active "participation in her salvation."[37] As Novak remarks, "Pascal was right at this point: the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is not the God of the philosophers, certainly not the God of Plato and all whom he influenced."[38]

In short, Novak strongly affirms divine transcendence as regards God's freedom, even though he fears that divine transcendence, at least as depicted in Aristotelian terms by Maimonides, undermines God's freedom to engage in a true,

Maimonides: "For Maimonides, this is so because both the Torah and the world are creations of the same divine wisdom. That is why the science *(madda)* of the Torah and the *scientia* of the world can employ the same methods. Both are the result of a creative word" *(Natural Law in Judaism,* 30). Given the above discussion, Novak's views might be interestingly compared with Walter J. Houston, "The Character ofYHWH and the Ethics of the Old Testament: Is *Imitatio Dei* Appropriate?" *Journal of Theological Studies* 58 (2007): 1-25. See also Martin Buber, *"Imitatio Dei,"* in Buber, *Israel and the World* (New York: Schocken, 1948), 66-77.

[36] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 135.

[37] Ibid. Novak observes that "there is a trend in rabbinic teaching, which is considerably developed in kabbalistic theology, that sees what Israel does *with* God as also being *for* God as well" (ibid.).

[38] Ibid., 43.

reciprocal covenantal relationship with Israel in history. So far as I know, Novak does not pursue this metaphysical tangle further. He insists upon God's absolute freedom in both contexts, without seeking to reconcile the metaphysical issues involved.

B) The Image of God as Relationship

With these metaphysical preliminaries, we are now ready to focus on how Novak's emphasis on divine freedom and agency shapes his discussion of the image of God, which he depicts in light of the interpersonal relationship of God and Israel. Crucially, he argues that "the problem with seeing the image of God in substantial terms, as some inherent property of human nature, is that such a characteristic can be constituted phenomenologically without reference to God."[39] Once one makes the image of God an "inherent property," how can one uphold the view that the image of God involves a relationship with God? After all, an ontological relationship need not be characterized by the (phenomenological) mutual responsiveness that we normally associate with interpersonal relationships. An ontological relationship can exist without any mutual responsiveness at all; human beings need not even be aware of it. As Novak observes, if "the image of God is a transfer of some divine power, be it reason or will, to a special creature," then this creature can exercise this power (reason or will) without any reference to the God whom the power images.[40] The image of God then denotes simply a power that human beings can and do experience as exercised autonomously from God, indeed as having nothing to do with God.

If the image of God does not constitute an identifiable and concrete relationship with God, however, then the phrase "image of God" loses the promise contained by the notion of being God's very image. As Novak asks rhetorically, "What does saying 'humans *receive* their reason or their will from God' add to the

[39] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 41.
[40] Ibid.

meaning of the proposition 'humans are rational or willful' ?"[41] How can it add something if the affirmation that "humans are rational and willful" remains true in the very same way even without any mention of God? Even if the rational and volitional powers were God-like, the lack of a need to mention God would suggest that the human person can be God-like in an autonomous fashion. Novak thus finds that those who wish to locate the image of God in a human attribute (reason and/or will) make of God merely the extrinsic cause of the attribute in which is supposed to reside the divine "image." Surely for humans to be the "image" of God means something richer than that a human power, with God as its extrinsic cause, enables human beings to experience themselves as autonomously God-like.

Having offered this critique of accounts of the image of God that envision it as "some inherent property of human nature," Novak argues that what is needed is more attention to the phenomenological dimensions of God's richly evocative words, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness" (Gen 1:26). These words, Novak observes, suggest that God intends to have a relationship with human beings that goes beyond the ontological relationship that he has with the other creatures he has made. The fact that human beings are made in God's "image" is thus not primarily an ontological statement, but rather primarily a statement about the kind of relationship God the Creator wills to have with the human creature. God's words express the establishment of a common bond between God and the human creature, so that God and the human creature will be able to relate personally to each other. As Novak puts it, God's words promise "the intimacy of a relationship *between* God and humans," the "intimacy of a relationship *with* God."[42]

What is required for a relationship to be both intimate and mutual (*"between* God and humans")? The activity in the relationship cannot all be on the side of the "image"; God too must be active in the relationship. This mutually active

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

relationship must occur on the level of history, and so in order to describe the intimate mutual relationship between God and the human creature, a relationship worthy of God's "image," Novak suggests that we should look not to human ontology or "some property of human nature," but to human history. He states, "The only way one can constitute the intimacy of the relationship *with* God, which Scripture suggests is a possibility *for* humans from the very beginning and continually thereafter, is to see the 'image of God' as that which God *and* humans share in what they do *together.*"[43] The "image of God" is nothing less than a real historical participation in God's action. Far from being an inherent ontological property that precedes human intentionality (and phenomenologically does not require divine intentionality), "The image of God is the active mutuality possible only between God and humans."[44]

For Novak, the "active mutuality" that defines the image of God is especially manifest in the covenantal relationship of God and Israel, constituted preeminently by the observance of Torah. Through this relationship, Israel shares in "the creative word of God" and co-constitutes with God a "covenantal world."[45] Israel's

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid. Novak is indebted to Hume's way of posing the question of ethics: "In the true order of the created world, human action *for* ('ought') precedes human description *of* ('is')" (ibid.). Yet, when explaining why murder is always wrong, Novak writes, "Here we are not deriving an *ought* from an *is,* at least not in the usual sense. Instead, the very *'is-ness'* or being or presence-in-the-world of that other person is itself an *ought* (which twentieth-century French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas described with great phenomenological insight)" (David Novak, *The Sanctity of Human Life* [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007], 38). This insight goes a long way toward overturning the faulty logic of Hume's claim. Moreover, Novak does not think that the created order is devoid of moral weight: "We humans not only owe God everything for having made us, but more directly and positively we owe God everything for enabling us to know how to live according to our own nature and in consistency with the nature of the rest of creation" (Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 42). In *Natural Law in Judaism,* he remarks that "human sociality presupposes a physical order surrounding it, upon which it can depend for its own continuity. But humans discover their own essential order, their own essential law, from their own social experience. Only thereafter do they discover the order of the nonhuman realm by analogy. Both realms are subject to God's law, but humans must freely accept that law upon themselves, unlike the physical realm onto which that order is imposed by determination" (38-39).

[45] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 41.

human intentionality unites with God's intentionality: "Essential human action, which is the practice of the commandments of God, is unlike all other things that are made *by* the creator. Instead, it is done *along with* the creator. In rabbinic teaching, even God himself is imagined to observe the pos1t1ve commandments of the Torah in order to share with his people the basic reality of *their* active life together."[46]

Although Israel's Torah observance makes especially manifest for the world the true content of the image of God, Novak does not limit the image of God solely to the people of Israel in relation to their God. On the contrary, "all human beings are either the subjects or the objects of God's commandments."[47] Universalized, the image of God consists in "the normative relationship when humans recognize that the moral law, which is consistent with their nature, is rooted in the commandment of God."[48] This recognition does not require revelation, let alone being part of the Torah-observant people of Israel. In Novak's view, "Any inkling of the presence of God, however mediated by nature or tradition, always calls forth a dutiful response or a rebellious refusal on the part of any human."[49] As the image of

[46] Ibid., 42.

[47] Ibid., 43. Novak explains that "the difference between active subjects and passive objects of these commandments is one of degree rather than one of kind. Even the most active persons need to be passively dependent at times and thus to be the objects of the concern others are commanded *(mitsvah)* to show them in imitation of God. Even the most passive, dependent persons are often able to show some response to the concern of others for them, some form of thankful (even nonverbal) recognition like the way they are to thank God for any benefit" (ibid.).

[48] Ibid., 42.

[49] Ibid. Novak sees Genesis2:16-17 as an example of this moral imperative in the presence of God: "This can be seen in the first explicit address of God to the first humans after their creation. 'And the Lord God commanded *(va-yitsav)* the human being saying: "from all the trees of the garden you may surely eat. But from the tree of the knowledge of good and bad you may not eat, for on the day you eat from it you shall surely die"' (Genesis 2:16-17)" (ibid., 42-43). Novak finds suggestivea Talmudic interpretation that finds in Genesis 2: 16-17 the roots of the commandment against murder, which Cain violates: "In the view of the third-century Sage, Rabbi Yohanan bar Nappaha, the human being is both spoken *to* and spoken *about* in this statement [Genesis 2:16-17], for the Hebrew reads *al ha'adam,* which means both *'to* the human being' and *'about* the human being.' From this phraseology, Rabbi Yohanan sees an allusion to the prohibition of murder. This location of the prohibition of murder needs to appear in the scriptural narrative before Cain's murder of his brother Abel.

God rather than autonomous self-creators, all humans find themselves in the presence of the God whose creative word requires obedience. Drawing upon the biblical portrait of God's creating by speaking a word, Novak notes that the proper human response to God's creative word is to ensure that "our words correspond to God's word." [50] Humans accomplish this correspondence by acknowledging that the moral law is God's commandment and should be obeyed as such.

Put another way, in order for our words to "correspond to God's word," we must accept that we are subject to norms that do not originate with us. In order to cospeak with God rather than to descend into babble, we must accept the primacy of God speaking. When we do so, we make possible the human flourishing that follows from correspondence to God's creative word. *As* Novak states, "Being commanded, however we hear that commandment, is something that enables us to do well in the world. Without that sense of being commanded, when our own practical power becomes the measure of all things, we destroy ourselves and our world. "[51] Outside of the relationship of "active mutuality" in which "God is for us through his commandments" and "we are for God through our obedience," [52] we obscure the image of God in us by our pride. Such pride spurs us to reject any created order and to suppose that we can construct human

Without such a prohibition-albeit one that is inferred *about* the dignity of human life rather than an explicit proscription-how could Cain be held responsible for Abel's murder? Can one be held responsible for something whose prohibition he or she was unaware of *(nu/la poena sine lege)?"* (ibid., 43). In *Natural Law in Judaism,* Novak ascribes Cain's knowledge that murder is a crime to natural law (or "Noahide law"): "there is no record theretofore that God has explicitly commanded him not to commit murder, let alone to actually protect his brother from danger to his life from anyone or anything else. In the literal sense of the term, he is surely not his brother's keeper. So why is he guilty anyway? The only cogent answer is that it is already assumed that he knows murder is a crime. And how if not by his own reason?" *(Natural Law in Judaism,* 34). Responding to Rabbi Yohanan's interpretation, Novak remarks, "Even were one to accept this interpretation as the most plausible meaning of the text from Scripture, it still has natural law implications, namely, from the recognition of the uniqueness of human existence one learns its inviolability" (ibid., 34 n. 25).

[50] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 41. See also idem, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 30.

[51] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 42.

[52] Ibid., 42-43.

happiness out of human resources alone. The result is violence, as the biblical account of Cain and Abel makes clear. Commenting on Cain's murder of Abel, Novak elsewhere states that "the original sin of humankind, namely, that which is repeated by everyone at one time or another, is twofold: the temptation to see oneself as God's equal, and as the absolute superior of one's fellow humans. Idolatry thus breeds violence."[53]

Novak buttresses his view by noting that if the image of God is human rationality, what about people who are unable to exercise reason? Would not such a doctrine of the image of God validate the denial of the humanity of such individuals as "the unborn, the permanently and severely retarded, the irrevocably comatose"?[54] Since for Jews (and Christians) "all those born of human parents" must be humans made in the image of God, the exercise of rationality cannot be constitutive for the image of God.[55] Prior to recent decades, biblically influenced societies had not challenged the humanity of "all those born of human parents." By contrast, societies now routinely deny the humanity of those unable to exercise reason.[56] To suppose that the image of God is human rationality now means to condone the killing of the innocent, which is the primal consequence of the distortion of the image of God by idolatry.

C) The Image of God as Shadow

Novak offers yet another way to facilitate discourse that takes place outside the covenantal commitments of Jews and

[53] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 35.

[54] Ibid., 169.

[55] Ibid., 168.

[56] As Novak puts it, "The issue now is anything but academic, as it once might have been. Maximally, this anthropology must be rejected because it has been invoked as grounds for dehumanizing those at the edges of human life in order to kill them. Minimally, this anthropology must be rejected because even when its adherents avoid drawing immoral conclusions from it in practice, they are still unable to reject with adequate reason such conclusions when they are drawn by others" (ibid., 169).

Christians.[57] He suggests that the image of God can be defined "negatively," according to a *"via negativa,"* which "helps us to determine what humankind is not, thereby preparing us to know what humankind is."[58] Since the knowledge of "what humankind is" comes ultimately through revelation, however, the question must be raised whether biblical revelation warrants the idea that the image of God is a "negative" concept.

By means of an etymology of the Hebrew phrase translated as "image of God," *tselem elohim,* Novak seeks to show that the answer is yes. He argues that "[a] plausible etymology of the word *tselem* is that it might come from the noun *tsel,* which means a 'shadow."'[59] By contrast to an image, which has a positive content, a shadow has only outlines. A shadow "simply tells us that something is there *(Dasein),* but not what it is."[60] When one sees a shadow, one knows that something is producing the shadow, but often little else.

Novak emphasizes the interpretative and theological potential of this etymology on the grounds that it radically undercuts the temptation to posit human autonomy. When one says that humans are the image of God because of rationality, "image of God" inevitably comes to seem a mere ornamental phrase. We experience ourselves as exercising rationality autonomously, without the assistance of God. By contrast, the focus on shadow "prevents us from assuming that what is there comes from ourselves. It thus reminds us that everything we can possibly say about the shadow is only tentative until the real presence behind

[57] In *Covenantal Rights,* Novak aims both to set forth "the insights of the Jewish tradition about rights" and to show the value of these insights for "current political discourse in general," including secular discourse (Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* x). Novak observes however that "[s]ince this book brings in as many biblical texts as possible, it should be most readily appropriable by Christians, whose view of polity must come from this primary source of their faith in order to be authentic. And, indeed, it has been in the area of ethics and politics (which cannot be separated one from the other) where Judaism and Christianity have the most in common. In fact, one could say that Christianity consciously appropriated Jewish ethical and political teaching without qualification" (ibid.).

[58] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 170.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

it makes itself known."[61] A shadow does not possess substantial attributes that can be mistaken for autonomous powers; rather, a shadow always points to the mysterious reality of which it is merely the shadow. Instead of allowing one to rest content in what one sees, a shadow makes one desirous of coming to know the reality so as to understand the shadow.

In other words, if human beings are "shadows," we cannot construct a doctrine of human nature that can stand on its own. Autonomy would be the very opposite of God's intention in making human beings in his image. Novak states, "The shadow itself is *nothing* without its connection to what lies behind it. As a shadow of something *else,* it limits what use we can make of the space that it occupies. One can thus see the relation of the shadow to its source as limiting our pretension, both theoretical and practical."[62] Our knowledge of human nature is thus dependent upon what stands behind the shadow; we can truly know what is human only by coming to know what stands behind the shadow.[63] Unlike subhuman natures in the world, the human can be known only at the *personal* level, as pointing toward the transcendent. In a significant sense, the *humanum* is a mystery waiting to be unlocked by divine revelation, because "the human person cannot be definitively categorized by any category by which we determine the nature of the things of the world. Any such categorization, including the category of *animal rationale,* reduces the human person to a merely worldly entity."[64]

One might object that rationality need hardly be restricted to merely worldly entities. After all, God does not lack rationality, even if he utterly transcends our finite apprehension of that perfection. We can understand Novak's negative view of "rational animal" by returning to his critique of the traditional connection

[61] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 171.

[62] Ibid.

[63] The emphasis on the impossibility of knowing created realities in themselves is, as Novak recognizes, similar to Kant's philosophy. Novak remarks that his understanding of the shadowy constitution of the human "is quite similar in its logic to the way Kant constitutes the relation of phenomena to the mysterious *Ding an sich,* the 'thing-in-itself' that lies behind them and is never subsumed in them" (ibid.).

[64] Ibid.

of rationality with the image of God. He summarizes this traditional connection: "Just as God is the rational power in the macrocosmos, so man is the rational power in the microcosmos. Creation in the image of God means, then, that reason is what distinguishes humans from the rest of creation by enabling humans to have something substantial in common with God."[65] When described in this manner, the connection gives rise to a twofold problem. First, since the spheres governed by divine rationality and by human rationality are quite distinct, human beings appear to have autonomy in their sphere ("the microcosmos"). Second, rationality is presented as a substantial property shared by God and humans, which seems to undercut (through univocity) the transcendence of divine rationality. If God and humans have rationality "in common," then such rationality must be simply the rationality that we observe in this world. In short, rationality belongs firmly to the sphere of this world, and therefore this categorization "reduces the human person to a merely worldly entity."

In Novak's view, therefore, the identification of human beings as "rational animals" cedes ground that must not be given up, even if human beings are the only creatures in this category. Rationality is a capacity that we experience as an autonomous possession, no matter how much one might insist that it is a gift of God. Thus the notion of rational animal seems to give human beings, rather than God, charge over the worldly sphere. Indeed, Russell Hittinger, surveying the development of Catholic moral theology over the past forty years, concludes that many Catholic theologians have treated the natural law in exactly the manner feared by Novak. Taking Josef Fuchs as an example, Hittinger notes that, for Fuchs, "the notion that the human person 'is illuminated by a light that comes, not from one's own reason .. . but from the wisdom of God in whom everything is created .. . cannot stand up to an objective analysis nor prove helpful in the

[65] Ibid., 168.

vocabulary of Christian believers.'"[66] In the same vein, comparing Fuchs's position on natural law (as a participation in the eternal law) to that of Augustine and Aquinas, Hittinger observes,

> For the older tradition, there is a clear distinction between the mind's *discovering* or discerning a norm and the being or *cause* of the norm. The human mind can go on to make new rules because it is first ruled. This, in essence, is the doctrine of participation as applied to natural law. Natural law designates for Fuchs, however, the human power to make moral judgments, not any moral norm regulating that power-at least no norm extrinsic to the operations of the mind.[67]

The question however is whether Novak's answer, namely, his emphasis that human beings "are always *in* the world, but never truly *of* it,"[68] suffices. On the one hand, it seems that Novak's answer does suffice. If human beings are never "*of*" the world, then human identity, human nature, comes from a transcendent source and is intelligible only in relationship to this source ("active mutuality"). It follows that human life must be given value no matter what attributes the particular human being does or does not possess. As God tells Cain, "The voice of your brother's blood is crying to me from the ground" (Gen 4:10).

[66] Hittinger, *The First Grace,* 23, quoting Josef Fuchs, *Moral Demands and Personal Obligations,* trans. Brian McNeil (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1993), 157.

[67] Hittinger, *The First Grace,* 24. Hittinger goes on to remark, "It is surely a token of the disrepair of Catholic moral theology that the Bishop of Rome [Pope John Paul II in his encyclical *Veritatis Splendor]* would have to remind the episcopacy, and through them the moral theologians, that natural law does not constitute a sphere of immunity (a kind of cosmic tenure for moral theologians) from the plan of divine laws. But once again, what the Pope has to grapple with in this respect is not only decades of neglect *ad intra,* where the theme of natural law was detached from the fundamental principles of theology, but also the history *ad extra,* where natural law and natural rights betokened that ground of liberty in which men find themselves under no mundane authority. This secular myth, which was developed as a counter to Genesis, is contrary to the most fundamental principles of Christian theology" (ibid., 31-32). As Hittinger shows in a separate essay, also contained in *The First Grace,* "Fuchs's case proceeds from the premise that, at creation, God gave humankind a plenary jurisdiction over natural goods. Natural law is nothing more nor less than the competence of human reason to render moral judgment" (ibid., 49).

[68] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 172.

On the other hand, the price of claiming that human beings are "never truly *of'* the world is a steep one. By placing human freedom and identity far above this-worldly human characteristics, one leaves the latter open to dehumanization. The strong separation between personhood and nature, with the latter pertaining to the this-worldly realm, tends toward the denigration of what is "natural" in the human, with the result that human flourishing seems to depend solely upon the workings of human freedom. As Bittinger shows in another essay, this is the result that Enlightenment philosophers sought in their efforts "to tame the biblical myth, and to render it 'speculatively' amenable to the notion that man causes himself to be distinct from his zoological fundaments. "[69] As Bittinger describes the Enlightenment account of human freedom over against human bodiliness: "Like the animals that serve man, the proto-human must be tamed, shaped, and humanized. Of course, the proto-human is knowable in terms of physical and psycho-somatic structures; in another, and more important sense, however, it is not knowable as specifically or normatively human. The latter knowledge is a function of freedom and culture." [70]

[69] Russell Bittinger, "Human Nature and States of Nature in John Paul H's Theological Anthropology," in *Human Nature in Its Wholeness: A Roman Catholic Perspective,* ed. Daniel N. Robinson, Gladys M. Sweeney, and Richard Gill, L.C. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 9-33, at 18.

[70] Ibid., 18-19. As Hittinger goes on to explain, drawing upon John Paul's interpretation of Genesis 2 in his *Theology of the Body,* "The Adam is constituted in a unique, exclusive, and unrepeatable relationship to God; any attempt to resolve himself into a succession of animals would be his death. It is the first clue why his humanity cannot be a suitable object of dominion. In one direction, it would erase the threshold between man and animal, and thus require treating man as something less than himself; in another direction, it erases the threshold between man and God, for man would have to create himself out of pre-human matter, the very dust from which God originally made the *imago"* (ibid., 28). In this vein Hittinger (following Karol Wojtyla) remarks that "the anthropological premises of Vatican II require at least partial intelligibility of the first Adam. For this Adam is the natural reality, and therefore the natural 'sign' of Christian mysteries. So, while it is true that 'without its creator the creature simply disappears' *[Gaudium et Spes* §36], it is also true that deconstruction of the first Adam will cancel the second" (ibid., 23-24). Without the "at least partial intelligibility of the first Adam," it would follow that "Christian anthropology, and all of the social teachings that flow from it, would be a 'sectarian' construction of the indeterminate *humanum"* (ibid., 24).

Novak, however, seeks to take in another direction the dictum that humans "are always *in* the world, but never truly *of* it." As we have seen, he argues that "negative anthropology," which refuses to determine what human nature is, "prevents us from appropriating the shadow into any of our own schemes."[71] Negative anthropology glimpses, without being able to apprehend, the transcendent source toward which the *humanum* points. Novak says in this regard that "even before revelation, humans have some inchoate notion of their special status, and that it is beyond anything one could get from the world."[72] This "inchoate notion" can be misused by those who wish to proclaim Adam's autonomous rule over himself and over all things. Such thinkers see only the "special status" without attending to the fact that it implies a transcendent source. Yet the very claim of such thinkers to *autonomous* human transcendence over nature reveals the contradiction. How could transcendence be the accomplishment of one who is fundamentally *"in* the world"? As Novak says, "Our existence intends more transcendence than our action does or could do. That is so whether our action be thought or deed."[73] Transcendence is something that we strive for, that we desire. It is not something that we autonomously give ourselves. We cannot accomplish what we seek.

For Novak, then, it is our desire that gives the lie to any claim to autonomy, and that is the mark of our "special status" and our transcendence of the categories of this world: "Without that desire, I am something much less, a disposable thing of the world."[74] We are not *"of"* the world because we desire to be known by our transcendent source. This desire is both what separates us from any purely worldly reality, and what exposes our neediness, our lack of autonomy. Novak remarks that "one can take this essential limitation of human pretense as knowledge that can well inform human action. Only when human finitude has been properly accepted can God's light shine through into the

[71] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 171.
[72] Ibid., 172.
[73] Ibid., 173.
[74] Ibid.

world."[75] Despite views to the contrary, our rationality does not give us dominion over ourselves, because our rationality cannot enable us even to know ourselves. Our rationality can only teach us inchoately that our fulfillment-and therefore the answer to the question, "what is human nature?"-utterly transcends the worldly realm compassed by our finite powers. It is only in this transcendent realm, the realm not of our dominion but of the Lord's, that we can find out who we are. Novak's separation of human personhood from every "worldly category" thus stands at the service not of elevating human freedom to de facto autonomy over every natural order, but of deflating every human pretense to autonomous self-fulfillment in this world.

In short, unlike other creatures, which fit worldly categories, humans are like a "shadow" because we are *"nothing"* without our connection to our transcendent source. Only in this source does our life make sense, and so human dignity (far from being autonomously constituted) derives from this source: "Ultimately, we affirm the worth of every human person because we believe somehow or other that we are all the objects of God's concern. To apprehend that concern and Who is so concerned for us is the desire of all desires."[76] On this basis, Novak argues that the separation of what is human from everything this-worldly, to the point of rejecting the definition "rational animal," does not increase violence against human beings, but rather stands firmly against such violence.

Recall Hittinger's point that the separation of freedom from nature results in the postulate of a "proto-human" realm of "physical and psycho-somatic structures" that is "not knowable as specifically or normatively human," and that therefore opens the entire human being to degradation by unmoored human

[75] Ibid., 172.

[76] Ibid. Novak argues here for the priority of practical reasoning over theoretical. He continues: "That desire is so powerful, so urgent, that we cannot suppress it to wait for confirmation of the reality of its goal, to wait for the truth of the Subject of that concern to be revealed to us" (ibid., 172-73).

freedom.[77] Novak, by contrast, rejects the definition "rational animal," in which the terms are both categories of this world. If we cannot define ourselves in this-worldly terms, he suggests, then the ground of our value and dignity must also be located beyond this world.

According to Novak, humans can only be understood as the object of a transcendent subjective concern (whether or not this transcendent subjective concern actually exists cannot be known, he maintains, outside of divine revelation).[78] He notes that "to regard any human person as anything less than the object of God's concern is to fundamentally deny the true intention of his or her existence-and our own, even if the goal of that intention is only to be found in our desire of it."[79] All humans, no matter whether capable of exercising rationality or not, possess this claim to "God's concern." Each human thus owes every other human the treatment owed to God's beloved. Quoting Proverbs 17:5, "Whoever belittles *(lo'eg)* the poorest one blasphemes his Maker," Novak remarks that "[n]o one can desire God's concern for himself or herself alone without denying the very meaning of that concern. Its very operation can only be apprehended as being for more than one existence."[80] Whereas the "image of God," when viewed as reason, can be distorted both in the direction of substantial autonomy and in the direction of supposing that only those who exercise rationality are in the image of God, the image of God viewed under the rubric of "shadow" underscores the finitude of human beings and our utter dependence on the transcendent source toward whom each and every one of us is oriented.

[77] Hittinger, "Human Nature and States of Nature in John Paul II's Theological Anthropology," 18.

[78] Cf. David Novak, "Are Philosophical Proofs of the Existence of God Theologically Meaningful?," in idem, *Talking with Christians: Musings of a Jewish Theologian* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2005), 247-48.

[79] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism*, 173.

[80] Ibid. The biblical translation is Novak's own. With respect to his argument about human desire for God, he quotes Psalm 38:10, "Towards you *(negdekha)* O Lord is my whole desire *(kol ta'avati)*; let not my cry be hidden from you" (ibid.; for the translation of this verse see ibid., 173 n. 69).

D) Novak's Position vis-a-vis the Traditional View

Like Hittinger, Novak argues against the notion that humans must "humanize" themselves in order to achieve their proper dignity. As Novak states, "human beings *are* more than they can ever *do* or *make* of themselves."[81] Because he consistently affirms God's dominion, he would not agree with the claim (as Hittinger puts it) that "the human body is raw material to be shaped according to a mandate of dominion."[82] Similarly, Hittinger, following Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II, is open to the kind of phenomenological analysis by which Novak defines the image of God. Hittinger notes appreciatively that, in *The Acting Person,* "Wojtyla believes that he has uncovered one sturdy piece of evidence confirming the fact that man is *ad imaginem Dei.* Namely, that he is unrepeatable, inalienable, and incommunicable."[83] Yet Hittinger emphasizes the unity of the human person and construes this unity so as to account for the participation of human reason in divine reason (and thus of the natural law in the eternal law). This participation requires that the human person, through rationality, be an "image of God."[84]

Is there a case, then, for a more positive assessment of the traditional view that the human person, through rationality, is the image of God? It seems to me that the answer is yes, and I will seek to make this case by examining Thomas Aquinas's approach to the image of God.[85] Given the profundity of Novak's concerns,

[81] Ibid., 168.

[82] Hittinger, "Human Nature and States of Nature in John Paul II's Theological Anthropology," 30.

[83] Ibid., 24.

[84] As Bittinger writes with respect to *Veritatis Splendor,* "Relying chiefly on St. Thomas, the Pope contends that practical reason is not, *ab initio,* its own norm. The human agent orders himself (or others) to justice by virtue of participating in a received norm" (Bittinger, *The First Grace,* 48). This participation occurs due to the constitution of human reason, not through the volitional reception of a commandment.

[85] For further discussion of the image of God according to Aquinas, see D. Juvenal Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity: A Study in the Development of Aquinas' Teaching* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990); Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas,* vol. 2, *Spiritual Master,* trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The

I will pursue my examination of Aquinas's doctrine in light of questions raised by Novak. Among these questions are the following: If the image of God is an inherent and substantial property of human nature, does that image name a power exercised in isolation from God's activity, and thereby foster human presumption and pride? Does the affirmation that humans are in the image of God through rationality include or even allow for the active mutuality of God and human beings? Does it constitute a true locus of intimacy between God and humans? Does it fit either with the God who commands Israel in the Torah, or with the biblical emphasis upon divine love? Does it emphasizes reason above freedom, and thereby reduce God's transcendence and freedom? Would humans who cannot exercise rationality thereby not be made in the image of God, and not be the objects of God's concern? Is historical revelation necessary if reason is already the image of God? And how would such revelation not merely be a refurbishing of reason?

II. AQUINAS ON THE IMAGE OF GOD

A) The Divine Image

Aquinas shares Novak's concern that thinkers have construed "the image of God as consisting in some quality humans share with God by virtue of a divine transfer," which provides human beings with "something substantial in common with God." [86] Such an image, Aquinas points out, could only be idolatrous: "For it is written (Isa. xl.18): 'To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make of him?'" [87] Because God is the Creator, Isaiah teaches, he is incomparable to creatures. As Aquinas puts it, "God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other," and nothing belongs "in the same way to God and to

Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 80-100; Michael Dauphinais, "Loving the Lord Your God: The *Imago Dei* in Saint Thomas Aquinas," *The Thomist* 63 (1999): 241-67.

[86] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 168.

[87] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 93, a. 1, obj. 1. See also Isaiah 40:25.

man."[88] Aquinas further remarks that "it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures."[89] To suppose that the image of God means that human beings possess "something substantial in common with God" would therefore be a grave mistake, if by "in common with God" one meant that God and humans are united by possessing the same attribute in fundamentally the same way.

Interpreting Genesis 1:26, therefore, Aquinas first discusses "image" in the divine Trinity. Explaining that "[i]mage, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another,"[90] he holds that the procession of the Son from the Father is an Image. In the strictest possible sense of equality, then, there is an Image of God, and this eternal Image "became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father" Gohn 1:14). Aquinas cites Colossians 1:15, "He is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation."[91]

But how can such an Image be divine without destroying God's unity? Aquinas (following Augustine) argues that plurality can in some cases be joined to unity. In particular, he notes that the act of understanding involves a procession within the one mind. This procession does not diversify the mind into two minds, but it does result in a two distinct relations: generating and being generated. Aquinas distinguishes this from physical generation: "Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas, whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct."[92] This intelligible procession results in a mental word or concept. In the intellection that we experience as creatures, this mental word lacks full identity with the mind, but Aquinas points out that this need not be the case in spiritual generation per se. If the mind could generate a perfect concept of itself, its mental word or concept would be the same as the mind itself. Thus Aquinas

[88] *STh* I, q. 13, a. 5 (and sc).
[89] *STh* I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 4.
[90] *STh* I, q. 35, a. 1, ad 1.
[91] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 1, obj. 2.
[92] *STh* I, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2.

comments that "the more perfectly it [the mental word] proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood." [93]

Since "God is spirit" Gohn 4:24), his act of understanding generates a perfect Image of him. This Image does not differ from God, but it does involve a distinction between generation and being generated in God. In this relation of origin, the two "terms" of the relation differ in a real way from each other. Do they thereby differ from God? According to Aquinas, "whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom."[94] With respect to the subsistence of the relation *in* God, the relation does not differ from God in any way. Yet "in so far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather its opposite term."[95] In this regard the two relations in God are distinct.

We have already noted, however, that God is not like creatures, including the human mind. Furthermore, Aquinas holds that the study of created things (such as the mind) cannot lead us to knowledge of the Trinity: "It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason." [96] How then can the human mind and its operations assist us in understanding what Colossians reveals about the divine Image? It would appear that Aquinas's theology of the divine Image founders on these shoals.

[93] Ibid.

[94] *STh* I, q. 28, a. 2. See also *STh* I, q. 3, a. 6.

[95] *STh* I, q. 28, a. 2. For further discussion see Gilles Emery, O.P., *Trinity in Aquinas* (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2006), especially chapters 4 and 5; idem, *Trinity, Church, and the Human Person: Thomistic Essays* (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2007), especiallychapters 1-3.

[96] *STh* I, q. 32, a. 1.

Aquinas responds to these concerns by noting that the fact that God is not like the creature does not mean that the creature is not "in some sort like God."[97] This is so because God the Creator causes the creature to be; the doctrine of creation requires a "relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause."[98] In order to bestow perfections upon his creatures, the Creator must possess these perfections himself, but he cannot possess these perfections according to the finite mode of creatures. When we speak about God in terms of these perfections, we use language drawn from the realm of creatures (God's effects) analogously to describe their cause. We name the Creator from a transcendental perfection, such as being and goodness, without ascribing to the Creator the finite mode in which we know the perfection.

When Aquinas discusses the Son of God as the divine Image, therefore, he analogously employs the human mind and its operations in order "to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible."[99] Because "the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally," we cannot hold "the image in our mind [to be] an adequate proof in the case of God."[100] It is not a question of proving that the divine act of understanding requires the generation of a divine Image. Rather, once Christians have learned of the divine Image from revelation, the analogy can show that believers need not affirm a divine Image in a polytheistic manner.

By locating the doctrine of the "image" at the level of the triune God, Aquinas both avoids an anthropocentric account of the image and emphasizes the limitations of the merely human image of God. As regards the human image of God, Aquinas says, the "likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy."[101] Following Augustine, Aquinas likens the human image of God to "the image of a king in a silver coin."[102] Compared with a living king, a portrait on a lifeless coin gives some sense of the distance of the human image of God from the

[97] *STh* I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 4.

[98] *STh* I, q. 13, a. 5.

[99] *STh* I, q. 32, a. 1.

[100] Ibid., ad 2.

[101] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 1.

[102] Ibid., ad 2.

divine Image. The human image of God exists in a nature that is "alien," completely other, from God.[103] The image of God in humans thus does not mean that God is not "more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other";[104] the difference between the living king and the lifeless portrait is nothing compared to the infinite difference between the image and the Image.

B) The Image of God as Human Rationality: Three Problems

What then is the image of God in human beings? Is it an "inherent property of human nature," with the result that its constitutive presence in the human person "can be constituted phenomenologically without reference to God"?[105] If so, it would be more like the divine Image than like a mere portrait on a coin, possessing a subsistence and vitality of its own, while in the coin the lifeless image of the king is unintelligible outside an explicit reference to the king. On Aquinas's own terms, therefore, would it not be better to follow Novak's view that the image of God is the area of "shadow" that expresses the neediness that the human creature has for the Creator?

Aquinas thinks that we can say that humans are the image of God because of their rationality. He observes in this regard that "specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83; qu. 51), 'approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him.'"[106] It is clear that Aquinas holds

[103] Ibid. The Latin is "in aliena natura."

[104] *STh* I, q. 13, a. 5, sc.

[105] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 41.

[106] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 2. Aquinas concludes, "It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image." This does not mean, however, that he excludes the body entirely. One would expect that the body, whose form is the soul, would participate in the imaging, and Aquinas grants that in certain ways this is so. Comparing the image of God in humans and angels, he argues that the image of God can be considered in two ways. The first is "that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature" *(STh* I, q. 93, a. 3). The second is "as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a

that, in Novak's words, "reason is what distinguishes humans from the rest of creation," [107] and that humans are in the image of God because they possess reason. Does Aquinas thereby fall into the problems that Novak, citing Philo, identifies with this traditional account of the image? In what follows, I will examine Aquinas's theology for evidence of the three key problems: (1) Such an image fosters an illusion of human autonomy. (2) Such an image excludes humans who cannot exercise rationality. (3) Such an image seems to undermine divine transcendence by claiming for humans an area of substantial identity with God.

C) The Image of God and Autonomy

Aquinas accepts the dictum that "an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image." [108] In its fullest expression, therefore, the image of God is found in humans when human rationality is in act. Following Augustine (in *De Trinitate* 14) Aquinas points out that "in our soul word 'cannot exist without actual thought."' [109] He concludes that the image of God, insofar as it is an image of the Trinity, exists primarily "in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love." [110] Augustine goes on to say that the image of the Trinity does not reveal itself in any acts of the soul whatever but more properly in those acts that have God as their object. In Augustine's words, quoted by Aquinas, "The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember,

certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world .... But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to God's image" (ibid.).

[107] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 168.

[108] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 5, obj. 3.

[109] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 7.

[110] Ibid.

understand, and love God by Whom it was made." [111] As an image of the Trinity, then, the human image of God is not self-enclosed but rather is our knowing and loving *God.*

In other words, the image of the Trinity in human beings is an image formed in relationship with God, in the "active mutuality" and mutual intimacy that Novak commends. The human person cannot be the image of God in this fullest sense unless the person fulfills God's law. As Aquinas points out, the Torah commands that "you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might" (Deut 6:5). [112] Lacking such charitable intimacy with God, one cannot love in the way requisite for the image of the Trinity and so one does not fully manifest the image. [113]

Aquinas thus would agree with Novak that the fullness of the human image of God comes about within the covenantal relationship that God bestows upon his people, although Aquinas understands this in light of the New Covenant in Christ and the Spirit. Does this emphasis on human relationship with God hold also when the human image of God is understood as an image of divine unity? Aquinas notes that because God's unity is not

[111] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 8, sc, quoting *De Trinitate* 14.12.

[112] *STh* I-II, q. 100, a. 10.

[113] Aquinas also notes that in every creature there is an ontological "trace of the Trinity." As we have seen, "in rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding" *(STh* I, q. 45, a. 7). What then differentiates an image of the Trinity from a trace of the Trinity? Aquinas explains that "in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the *principle from no principle.* According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says *(De Trin.* vi.10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according as 'it is one individual,' and according 'as it is formed by a species,' and according as it 'has a certain relation of order.' And to these also are reduced those three, *number, weight,* and *measure,* mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (xi.21)" (ibid.).

opposed to God's Trinity, "to be to the image of God by imitation of the divine nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other."[114] In this regard, Aquinas turns from Augustine to the Greek Fathers, notably Gregory of Nyssa and John of Damascus. For Gregory of Nyssa this image is ontological, involving human participation in divine goodness, whereas for John of Damascus "the image of God in man belongs to him as 'an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement.'"[115] Aquinas agrees that these attributes make the human being an "image" rather than merely a "trace" of God.[116]

When understood in this way, however, is the image of God reduced to being "constituted phenomenologically without reference to God"? Much depends upon how one understands ontological goodness and free will. For the ancient philosophers and their patristic and medieval inheritors, goodness had a richer signification than it does in modern thought. Aquinas remarks that "according to the Platonists . . . goodness is more extensively participated than being," and he cites Pseudo-Dionysius in favor of the view that "goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is first

[114] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 5.

[115] Ibid., obj. 2, quoting Gregory of Nyssa, *De hominis opificio* 16; and John of Damascus, *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2.12. Robert Grossteste made a Latin translation of *The Orthodox Faith* in the mid-thirteenth century, and Aquinas would have had access to a full translation. On the basis of the critical Greek edition in *Migne'sPatrologia,* Frederic Chase translates the relevant passage as follows: "with His own hands He created *man* after His own image and likeness from the visible and invisible natures. From the earth He formed his body and by His own inbreathing gave him a rational and understanding soul, which last we say is the divine image-for 'according to His image' means the intellect and free will, while the 'according to His likeness' means such likeness in virtue as is possible" (St. John of Damascus, *The Orthodox Faith,* in St. John of Damascus, *Writings,* trans. Frederic H. Chase, Jr. [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1958], 234-35). See also *The Orthodox Faith* 3.14: "if man has been made after the image of the blessed and supersubstantial Godhead, then, since the divine nature is naturally free and volitive, man as its image is also free and volitive by nature. For the Fathers have defined free will as volition" (Chase, trans., 299).

[116] Traces represent "only the causality of the cause, but not its form"; images "represent the cause as regards the similitude of the form, as fire generated represents fire generating" (*STh* I, q. 45, a. 7). Human goodness and free-will are a likeness not only of God's causality but also, however distant, of God's being.

among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end." [117] For Aquinas, to say that human ontological goodness is a likeness of God's goodness thus includes reference not only to God's creative activity (as final cause), but also to our activity as ordered to God as our end or goal. Ontological goodness means that human beings never exist in a state of neutrality toward good; we are always in motion toward God in some way, and it is this inclination that undergirds our intentional activity toward God through knowledge and love.

It follows that the "active mutuality" in the relationship of human beings and God extends all the way down, as it were, rather than being solely based upon human intentionality. While the fullness of such active mutuality takes place on the intentional level, it cannot be restricted to that level without ignoring the basis for the human drive toward relationship with the Creator. As Aquinas points out, goodness requires "a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form"-that is, its proper inclination and action-"for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form." [118]

In short, for Gregory of Nyssa and Aquinas, goodness involves an intimacy with God, especially insofar as humans seek the divine goodness as their end or goal. This dynamism toward God belongs intrinsically to all creatures: "All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing ... because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God." [119] In human beings, as intentional agents, this desire grounds the intimate active mutuality that attains its pinnacle in the consummation of the covenantal relationship. As Aquinas states, "The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine

[117] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.

[118] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 5.

[119] *STh* I, q. 44, a. 4, ad 3. For further metaphysical precisions, see *STh* I, q. 6, a. 4; and *STh* I, q. 4, a. 3. In Aquinas's view the very existence of more or less goodness (in the ontological sense) leads to the conclusion that a divine cause of goodness must exist (*STh* I, q. 2, a. 3).

likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness." [120]

What about John of Damascus's view that the image of God consists in human free will and self-movement? Does this view require reference to God, or does it open the door for the modern portrait of the human being as autonomous? Nothing other than the divine will, Aquinas observes, causes the divine willing. [121] God's knowledge does not determine his will, because while God knows all things that are possible, he does not will all things that are possible. Yet the divine will is not autonomous from the divine wisdom, nor does the divine will have an unlimited freedom of choice. Regarding the role of divine wisdom, Aquinas notes that "effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect." [122] With respect to freedom of choice, he points out that the divine goodness is the "proper object" of the divine will, which wills the divine goodness by absolute necessity. [123] The act of will does not begin from a position of neutrality toward all objects; rather, the will is a rational appetite for the good. The good attracts and draws the will. The divine goodness, as infinite perfection, supremely fulfills this appetitive movement.

Yet this necessary movement of the divine will, willing the divine goodness that the divine intellect knows, does not mean that God wills creatures by a necessary movement. God freely loves creatures into existence: "since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary." [124] Were this not the case, God would not truly transcend the creaturely realm. But since it is the case, we can say that God's will, by which he necessarily wills his goodness and freely wills creatures, is uncaused.

[120] *STh* I, q. 77, a. 2, ad 1.
[121] *STh* I, q. 19, a. 5.
[122] *STh* I, q. 19, a. 4.
[123] *STh* I, q. 19, a. 3.
[124] Ibid.

If goodness draws even the divine will, however, is God truly free? Yes, because the embracing of perfect goodness is true freedom. If God were neutral toward goodness, what would trigger his appetitive movement? If he desired neither being (apprehended by the rational appetite as good) nor nonbeing, how could he move toward anything? Lacking an appetitive desire for being as good, God would remain in a state of frozen neutrality. Such a situation would constitute the slavery of the will, not its freedom. True freedom requires the ordering of appetite to being as good, since a neutrality of appetite, while seeming to promise a radical freedom, in fact makes motion toward anything impossible. Will is not a neutral appetite, but a rational appetite for being as good. God's freedom consists in his willing his own infinite goodness, rather than being "free" to hate his infinite goodness.[125]

What does this mean for human free will and self-movement? Aquinas points out that "by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity."[126] It would seem that human free will is incompatible with any kind of necessitation. Yet all people desire happiness, even though people identify diverse goods with happiness.[127] No one desires to be unhappy. Does "happiness" necessitate the will? Aquinas distinguishes between three kinds of necessity: natural or absolute necessity (for instance that the angles of a triangle add up to 180 degrees), necessity of coercion, and necessity of end. Necessity of end signifies that certain ends require certain means: if one wishes to get from New York to San Francisco in three hours, one needs more than an automobile. Necessity of coercion, on the other hand, militates against free will. We are not free if something coerces the movement of the will. Yet Aquinas points out that coercion, which implies violence, is quite different from inclination. If we incline toward knowing and loving others, this does not mean that others are coercing us or even that our own

[125] Cf. *STh* I, q. 19, a. 10.

[126] *STh* I, q. 82, a. 1, obj. 3.

[127] *STh* I, q. 82, a. 1, sc. For Aquinas's extensive treatment of the desire for happiness in relation to human action, see *STh* I-II, qq. 1-5.

nature is coercing us. When the will inclines toward a good, it acts in a voluntary fashion. What about natural necessity, however? Again, Aquinas affirms that natural necessity differs from coercion. He remarks that "as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters." [128] Were there no "end," the will could not move toward any particular good; the will, as a rational appetite, would remain stuck in neutral.

The above discussion of the nature of divine and human freedom has important consequences with respect to John of Damascus's (and Aquinas's) view that human free will and self-movement constitute humans in the image of God. To act consciously for an end is intrinsic to rational freedom. [129] The "end" toward which the rational appetite tends does not constrain the will, even though the will's movement is not free in the sense of determining its own ends. These ends are inscribed in human nature-and indeed the very postulate of a human nature with determinate ends leads ultimately to the reality of a Creator. Aquinas also observes that the ultimate source of the movement from potency to act, in every movement, is God (not simply the ultimate source in the sense of a chain that stretches back in time, but the ultimate source, presently active, of the requisite actuality). [130] The human free will, in other words, does not constitute itself in autonomy from God. Even phenomenologically speaking, one cannot correctly conceive of the free action of the human will apart from inscribed ends or apart from a source of the will's being.

The role of happiness in framing the view of free will as the image of God must be emphasized. Human action, insofar as it is

[128] *STh* I, q. 82, a. 1.

[129] Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 6, a. 1, where Aquinas remarks, "Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene, the voluntary is defined not only as having *a principle within* the agent, but also as implying *knowledge.* Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found."

[130] See *STh* I, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3; and elsewhere.

rational and free, always aims at an end. Following Augustine (in *De civitate Dei* 19 and *De Trinitate* 13), Aquinas explains that human action takes place within a hierarchical ordering of ends, wherein one end is valued over all others as the ultimate source of happiness. The acting person seeks to attain other ends or goods with a view to attaining this "ultimate end" as the "perfect and crowning good" that fulfills the desire that motivates volition. Happiness, Aquinas states, is the ultimate end for which all human beings act. But what constitutes happiness? Aquinas examines various candidates, including wealth, honors, fame, power, health, pleasure, and care of the soul. He concludes: "It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired." [131]

According to this perspective, humans are in the image of God because human free will leads ineluctably toward intimate relationship with God as the constitutive element of happiness. When understood in this way, the image of God in human beings does not render us autonomous, but instead leads us upward to the fulfillment of volition in the happiness that consists in communion with God. [132]

Holding that humans are in the image of God through human rationality does not put the doctrine of the image of God in the service of human autonomy. This is especially true with regard to the image of the Trinity, which is fulfilled in the covenantal relationship of knowing and loving God. Aquinas emphasizes that Augustine's famous triad-the mind remembering itself, understanding itself, and loving itself-is in the image of God "due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to God." [133] In this respect Aquinas agrees with the teaching of Augustine: "Augustine says *(De Trin.* xiv. 12): 'The image of God exists in the mind, not

[131] *STh* I-II, q. 2, a. 8.

[132] In this communion, divine transcendence serves divine immanence: Pure Act does not need to become less in order to be fully and historically present to human persons. See Weinandy, *Does God Suffer?,* esp. 55-57, 123-27.

[133] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 8.

because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made."' [134] As we have seen, neither does emphasizing the divine unity connect the image of God with human autonomy, once goodness and freedom are rightly understood.

D) The Image of God and Rational Activity

Novak's second concern has to do with the possibility that locating the human image of God in rationality excludes human beings who cannot exercise rationality, including the unborn, the permanently and seriously mentally disabled, and the comatose. In modern societies, where abortion and euthanasia are common modes of death, the affirmation that God has bestowed the image of God upon all human beings, including those who cannot exercise rationality, is, as Novak puts it, "anything but academic." [135] Does the traditional view of the human image of God as constituted by rationality provide, however unwittingly, a foundation for horrific contemporary violations of the commandment "You shall not kill" (Exod 20:13)? [136]

Aquinas states that "since [the mind] is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers." [137] The habits qualify the

[134] Ibid., sc. Aquinas elsewhere states that "as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (A. 2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise, as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q. 28, A. 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species" (*STh* I, q. 93, a. 6).

[135] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 169.

[136] The Hebrew verb has the sense of "murder," and does not forbid killing in warfare or by the death penalty. Whether or not Jesus Christ prohibits all killing is another issue.

[137] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 7, ad 4.

powers, and so virtues and vices denote habits of the powers of the soul.[138] The powers themselves are not the soul's essence, since only in God is operation the same as essence.[139] Aquinas notes that "if the very essence of the soul were the immediate principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an actually living thing."[140] This distinction between the essence and powers of the soul already provides a basis for denying that human beings who lack rationality thereby lack the image of God.

Can one possess the rational powers of the soul without being able to exercise them? It would seem not: if the spiritual soul is the "primary principle" of human intellection,[141] how could the body prevent such intellection from occurring? Aquinas's answer is that since human intellection requires sense knowledge, human intellection cannot occur without a fitting "corporeal instrument,"[142] and so bodily disorders (as is well known from observation) prevent intellection. While such bodily disorders may prevent intellection, however, no bodily disorder-including the rupture that is death-can erase the powers of intellect and will from the soul. Even the soul's sensitive and nutritive powers, which are destroyed by death, nonetheless remain "virtually in the

[138] See *STh* I-II, q. 54, a. 3, where Aquinas explains that habits are distinguished (among other ways) "by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason."

[139] *STh* I, q. 77, a. 1.

[140] Ibid.

[141] *STh* I, q. 76, a. 1.

[142] *STh* I, q. 76, a. 5 (and ad 2); see also *STh* I, q. 85, a. 1, where Aquinas notes that the human intellect "is not the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the body, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 76, A. 1). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial."

soul, as in their principle or root."[143] Either really or virtually, then, powers of the soul can be present in the soul despite their seeming absence. In the case of unborn children, permanently and seriously mentally disabled persons, and the comatose, the rational powers are present in the soul. Such persons simply "lack the use of reason accidentally," due to bodily immaturity or impairment.[144]

Aquinas therefore holds that human beings who cannot exercise rationality may be baptized and enjoy the life of grace, including friendship with God through the elevation of the rational powers.[145] With regard specifically to unborn children, Aquinas observes that while they cannot physically be baptized while living inside the womb, they can already "be subject to the action of God, in Whose sight they live, so as, by a kind of privilege, to receive the grace of sanctification."[146] The grace of sanctification heals and elevates the essence of the soul, and through the essence flows into the powers of the soul so as to infuse the virtues.[147] The same holds for newborn infants and young children. Although as yet unable to exercise rational acts,

[143] *STh* I, q. 77, a. 8. In *STh* I, q. 89, a. 1, on the separated soul's intellection, Aquinas affirms that "the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasms." But he adds that God enables the separated soul to understand "by means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx both of the light of grace and of the light of nature" (ibid., ad 3). Elsewhere, discussing the relationship of the powers of the soul to the soul's essence in this life, he comments, "Since the powers of the soul are natural properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them. Yet, granted that it was without them, the soul would still be called intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species, from which these powers naturally flow" (*STh* I-II, q. 110, a. 4, ad 4).

[144] *STh* I, q. 68, a. 12, ad 2.

[145] *STh* I, q. 68, a. 12. Aquinas observes that if the person has had a lucid interval in which he or she "showed no desire to receive Baptism," then that lack of desire should be respected rather than overruled.

[146] *STh* I, q. 68, a. 11, ad 1. As examples, he has in view such persons as Jeremiah and John the Baptist (and, to a different degree, the Virgin Mary).

[147] *STh* I-II, q. 110, a. 4.

they can possess the infused habits that qualify the soul's rational powers m grace.

How can one have habits in the rational powers, however, without being able to act rationally? Aquinas observes that while "it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act," nonetheless a habit is "in a state of potentiality in respect to operation." [148] In general, of course, it requires at least one act, and often many acts, to cause a habit to form in one of the soul's powers. [149] Yet since a habit is not an act, but rather is ordered to action, actions on the part of the person are not absolutely necessary for the presence of a habit. It can happen that even before being able to act, a human being may possess habits-infused by a special divine sanctifying action or by baptism-that qualify the powers of intellect and will. Among such habits are faith and charity. [150]

The view that humans are in the image of God through rationality does not, then, exclude human beings who are unable to exercise rationality. Does the above argument, however, hinge on the claim that human beings possess a spiritual soul? Certainly, were one to hypothesize that the human soul is solely material, as animal souls are, then one would have more trouble defending the

[148] *STh* I-II, q. 49, a. 3, ad 1.

[149] See *STh* I-II, q. 51, aa. 1-3. Aquinas notes that "in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part: and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part-this he cannot know except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms. . . . But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect. In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the *nurseries of virtue.* The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers. But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like" (*STh* I-II, q. 51, a. 1).

[150] See *STh* I-II, q. 51, a. 4.

humanity of human beings who cannot exercise rationality. Peter Singer and others have made clear this difficulty. Likewise, were one to suppose that human beings were simply well-developed animals, one would have much more trouble defending the view that all human beings, and not just some, possess a unique "shadow" -image. Suffice it to say that even if the doctrine of the spiritual soul were rejected, God could elevate the human rational powers by infused grace. [151]

With regard to human beings who cannot exercise rationality, recall also Novak's remark about the image of God: "The only way one can constitute the intimacy of the relationship *with* God, which Scripture suggests is a possibility *for* humans from the very beginning and continually thereafter, is to see the 'image of God' as that which God *and* humans share in what they do *together."* [152] The position that humans are in the image of God through rationality largely accomplishes what Novak has in mind here. It might appear that human beings who cannot exercise rationality do nothing together with God; they cannot obey God's commandments or even be rational subjects of God's commandments, although they can be passive objects. But as we have seen, the image of God enables God to work even with those who cannot exercise reason and will. God enables them to possess the habits of faith and charity. They become full members of the mystical Body that seeks, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, to instantiate Christ's charity in the world until the fullness of the new creation arrives. The fullness of the image of God is this working together to bring about the restoration and fulfillment of

[151] There is no need to abandon the doctrine of the spiritual soul. For an excellent account of Aquinas's teaching on the human soul, see Gilles Emery, O.P., "The Unity of Man, Body and Soul, in St. Thomas Aquinas," in Emery, *Trinity, Church, and the Human Person,* 209-35. Emery points out that the soul's spiritual nature "does not mean that the soul escapes the creaturely condition, or that it arrogates to itself a divine prerogative, as is sometimes unfortunately thought. If the soul is granted self-subsistence, it is only in virtue of God's creative act, that is, as a gift from the creative wisdom of God.... This also means that man, whose soul is created by God, is made for a direct relationship with God" (ibid., 227). Cf. my review of Nancey Murphy, *Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), in *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* 7 (2007): 635-38.

[152] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 41.

creation in wisdom and holiness, by means of human beings' sharing in the divine life.[153]

E) The Image of God and Divine Transcendence

Novak's third concern is that the traditional approach exaggerates the image of God by understanding it not as a shadow but as "a transfer of some divine power"[154] that enables "humans to have something substantial in common with God."[155] If humans have "some divine power" that is possessed "in common with God," what happens to the God who commands Israel, the God who relinquishes "some of his own space, as it were, to allow his human creatures a place on which to stand before him-but never successfully against him"?[156] If humans already have divine power, will humans fear God (let alone have "terror" of him)?[157] Will humans desire to be "the objects of God's concern"?[158] In other words, having received divine power, why could not human beings stand on their own and be self-sufficient? As Novak cautions in light of the view that the rational soul (as an incorruptible image of God) is immortal, "Were even humans, whom Scripture teaches are the highest of all creatures, to believe themselves to be immortal, that would blur the difference between God and creation. . . . Were humans immortal, being born without having to die, could they not even assume that they have succeeded God in the order of things?"[159]

As we have seen, Aquinas addresses such concerns by emphasizing that the image of God is "some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one

[153] Commenting on the relationship between the divine "image" and the divine "likeness" (Gen 1:26), Aquinas observes that "likeness" can either signify something less than the image or a certain perfection of the image. John Damascene and others understood "likeness" in the latter sense, as a fullness or perfection of the image. See *STh* I, q. 93, a. 9.

[154] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 41.

[155] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 168.

[156] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 40.

[157] Ibid., 39.

[158] Novak, *Natural Law in Judaism,* 172.

[159] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 38-39.

of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy."[160] Because of this infinite difference, no attribute can be predicated univocally of God and of human beings. God cannot "transfer" anything divine to human beings, nor can human beings possess anything "in common" with God. The infinite difference between God and humans means that even though creatures can analogously have a likeness to the Creator, "it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures. "[161] Even so, in claiming that human beings are the image of the infinite God in some positive way, rather than limiting the image to the *via negativa* of the shadow, how can we avoid fostering the illusion that humans "have succeeded God in the order of things"?

Aquinas suggests that the fact that "God understands and loves Himself" is the root of the image of God in human beings.[162] Among bodily creatures, only human beings can know God. The fact that other animals do not share the perfection of rationality (intellect and will) has significance, Aquinas suggests, for the interpretation of human beings' special creation in the image of God in Genesis 1.[163] How could humans imitate or image God more distinctively than in knowing and loving? Aquinas has in view not the mere knowing and loving of anything, but rather the supreme relationship made possible by intellect and will, namely knowing and loving God. But does this mean that humans do what God does, so that, in our own domain at least, humans "have succeeded God in the order of things"? What kind of power is the power to know and love God? To what degree is it something that humans have "in common" with God?

Aquinas here distinguishes between our natural knowing and loving, and the knowing and loving that grace and glory make possible for us. To avoid misunderstanding, two points should be

[160] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 1.

[161] *STh* I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 4. Aquinas comments, "Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation" (*STh* I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3).

[162] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 4.

[163] See *STh* I, q. 3, a. 1 (especially ad 2), where Aquinas explains why God is not bodily and why the image of God consists in "reason and intelligence."

made at the outset. First, Aquinas does not conceive of our natural knowing and loving as a neutral realm, impervious to God or to the grace of the Holy Spirit. Even our created powers of knowing and loving are always being drawn by God toward himself as Truth and Goodness. The distinction between nature and grace does not indicate an opposition between the two, but rather expresses the scope of the gift of creation, in and through which the grace of the Holy Spirit transforms and deifies human beings. Second, Aquinas does not conceive of even our glorified powers of knowing and loving as divine. Even heavenly glory is simply a "likeness" of God, a participation in God rather than a full crossing of the gap between finite creatures and infinite Creator.

Aquinas sets forth three ways in which human knowing and loving imitates or images God's knowing and loving. The first way is our "natural aptitude for understanding and loving God," an aptitude that "consists in the very nature of the mind." [164] As I noted above, the intellect and will are never neutral vis-a-vis God, even when we do not consciously know and love God. The second way comes through the grace of the Holy Spirit elevating our natural powers, "inasmuch as man actually or habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly." [165] Aquinas presents this as an imperfect "conformity" to God, which leads into the third way, which consists in a perfect human knowledge and love of God. [166] Far from displacing God, the three levels of the image depict God's activity in human beings in creation, re-creation, and heavenly conformity. As Aquinas states, "The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed." [167]

[164] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 4. As Aquinas remarks elsewhere, "The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (Q. 12, A. 12; Q. 56, A. 3; Q. 60, A. 5). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; 'whether this image of God be so obsolete,' as it were clouded, 'as almost to amount to nothing,' as in those who have not the use of reason; 'or obscured and disfigured,' as in sinners; or 'clear and beautiful,' as in the just; as Augustine says *(De Trin.* xiv. 6)" *(STh* I, q. 93, a. 8, ad 3).

[165] *STh* I, q. 93, a. 4.

[166] Ibid.

[167] Ibid.

Understood in this way, the image of God does not raise us to God's level or makes us his competitors. On the contrary, the image of God describes God's activity in us, with us; it is a theocentric reality. In and through the image of God, God acts uniquely in and with us to accomplish historically and covenantally his purpose of salvation. When we imagine that the image of God describes primarily our own activity rather than God's activity in us, we fall into the trap of pride. But the fact that the image of God can be distorted does not mean that we would do better to think of it as a shadow. Our knowing and loving are more than a mere shadow; they are what constitute the possibility, through their teleological ordering, of the gratuitous gift of the covenantal relationship. Only those who know and love can enter joyfully into a relationship with the God who teaches and commands.

F) Image and Incarnation

In affirming that humans are the image of God through rationality, therefore, one does not isolate the human being from God's activity or undermine his transcendence; nor does one exclude those human beings who cannot exercise rationality. Rather, the image of God, when construed as rationality, highlights the intimacy between God and human beings, fulfilled in the "active mutuality" [168] that takes place when human beings know and love the God who creates and redeems them in covenantal love. Yet, given this account of the image of God, one might still ask what exactly revelation accomplishes. Does God's covenantal election of Israel, as fulfilled in Christ Jesus, merely refurbish (without elevating) human rationality? Likewise, does the image of God as human rationality have a place for Novak's insight that the image of God is ultimately "that which God *and* humans share in what they do *together"?* [169]

For Aquinas, these questions require contemplation of the union of the Image and the image, that is to say the incarnate

[168] Novak, *Covenantal Rights,* 41.

[169] Ibid.

Word. It would take us too far afield to enumerate all the ways in which this is so. For our purposes, it will suffice to explore Aquinas's analysis of why it was particularly fitting that the Word (and not the Father or the Holy Spirit) became incarnate. The first reason for this fittingness is that in the Word, God knows all the ways that he can be participated. Therefore the Word is the "exemplar likeness" of all creatures, because God knows all creatures by knowing his Word. [170] Just as a craftsman turns to his original idea of his artwork in order restore his tarnished work, God the Father sends his Word or Image in order to refurbish his fallen creation, so that creatures might participate in God as they were intended to do, in the manner that God knows in the Word. Since the incarnate Word is not the highest participation in God (but rather is God), the incarnate Word can accomplish the refurbishing of all that participates in the Word. Commenting on 2 Corinthians 5: 19, "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself," Aquinas emphasizes the aspect of new creation: "The first creation of things was made by the power of God the Father through the Word; hence the second creation ought to have been brought about through the Word, by the power of God the Father, in order that restoration should correspond to creation. "[171]

It will be already clear that the Word/Image's taking up of the human image of God (in the hypostatic union) enriches the notion of the rational image. The divine Image renews the rational understanding and volition of the human image. As Aquinas says, the renewal and elevation of our rationality comes "by participating the Word of God, as the disciple is instructed by receiving the word of his master." [172] This master is Christ, in whom the image of God has been taken up and perfected by the divine Image. In his human image, Christ displays the divine Image; he is "the image of the invisible God" (Col 1: 15). As Christ says in response to the question of his disciple Philip, "He who has seen me has seen the Father" (John 14:9). Reflecting

[170] *STh* III, q. 3, a. 8.

[171] Ibid., ad 2.

[172] *STh* III, q. 3, a. 8.

upon the renewal of the image in the Image, Aquinas remarks that "for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting that the very Word of God should be personally united to human nature." [173] The Word incarnate leads us to the Word, from whom our wisdom comes.

In this first reason of fittingness, we see that the Word incarnate, the Messiah of Israel, does more than simply renew the rational image of God; he also accomplishes "the consummate perfection of man" by transforming human participation in the Word. Human nature now does not merely participate distantly in the Word. Through the hypostatic union, human nature belongs to the Word, so that Christ is the Word. This profound elevation of the human image means that in Christ, who as human is the image of God, we see the very Image of the Father. It is through the mutual activity of the humanity and divinity of Christ that the image of God in us is restored. In this sense, the image of God, as consummated in Christ, becomes a "theandric" reality. When the Holy Spirit configures us to Christ's image/Image, we too share in the perfected and elevated image of God. This mutual activity of God and humans resonates with Novak's view of the image of God as "that which God *and* humans share in what they do *together."* In Christ, it seems to me, we experience the image of God as the "active mutuality" emphasized by Novak.

This point is strengthened by Aquinas's second reason for why the Word, in particular, fittingly became incarnate. The first reason proceeds on the basis of the claim that "such as are similar are fittingly united." [174] The second reason proceeds from the goal of the union, namely, salvation through adoptive sonship. In this vein Aquinas quotes Romans 8:17, which teaches that we are to be "fellow heirs with Christ." [175] Aquinas observes that we are "conformed to the image of his Son" (Rom 8:29) and become adopted sons. This happens when Christ, by his external and interior teaching, configures us through the Holy Spirit to the divine Image. It is fitting that the Word/Image be the one who

[173] Ibid.

[174] Ibid.

[175] Ibid.

conforms the human image to the divine Image. Once again we find a strong emphasis on the mutual activity of God and human beings in the perfection and elevation of the human image of God.

Aquinas's third reason for the fittingness of the Word's incarnation comes from his reading of Genesis 3, the fall of Adam and Eve. He points out that Adam and Eve sought knowledge, but sought it in an inordinate way. The serpent promises Eve, "For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil" (Gen 3:5). Eve determines to eat the fruit partly on the ground "that the tree was to be desired to make one wise" (Gen 3:6). Disobedience to God's commandment, however, results not in a deeper participation in God's Word, but in alienation from God's Word/Image and correspondingly in loss of wisdom.[176] Aquinas observes that "it was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man might be led back to God, having wandered from God through an inordinate thirst for knowledge."[177] By obeying the incarnate Word's teaching and commandments human beings receive, in love, the true knowledge that Adam and Eve mistakenly sought to claim for themselves by disobedience. This true knowledge exceeds the limits of natural human knowledge: "For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully understood" (1 Cor 13:12).

III. SUMMARY

As we have seen, Novak emphasizes the primacy of the relationship with God for any account of human nature. According to Novak, we begin in a condition of "terror" before

[176] The further narrative of Genesis confirms the truth of St. Paul's remark: "for although they knew God they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles" (Rom 1:21-23).

[177] *STh* III, q. 3, a. 8.

God, before whom we cannot stand on the basis of our own resources, and we discover that God graciously allows us room to stand before him. In this relationship of intimate "active mutuality," which is ultimately one of commandment and obedience (whether constituted covenantally by Noahide law or by Torah), we find the basis for envisioning ourselves as God's "image." Novak also argues that one can fruitfully conceive of the image of God as a shadow, by means of a *via negativa* that exposes a profound neediness in human beings that requires a transcendent referent. In this way, one avoids reifying the "image" as something humans autonomously possess rather than as something that God freely bestows upon us.

By emphasizing that human nature is constituted in the free response of humans to God, however, Novak risks relegating the other concrete dimensions of human nature to the subhuman (which becomes open to the manipulation by human freedom). His account of divine power and divine transcendence also seem to me to require some clarification. In dialogue with Novak's views, therefore, I explored Aquinas's presentation of the image of God with particular attention to three problems: whether Aquinas's view of the image of God posits human autonomy, whether it excludes those who cannot exercise rationality, and whether it ascribes a divine power to human beings, as though divinization were a human ontological attribute. While in my view Aquinas's account does not fall into these problems, attending to these problems enriches and deepens our understanding of the traditional account of the image of God. The theology of the image of God must emphasize relationality vis-a-vis God (in accordance with the dictum that an image leads to that which it images), and must also be careful to stress that the image of God does not name a "divine," and thus autonomous, human power. Moreover, the theology of the image of God must be inscribed within a theology of God's salvific activity that reminds us that God and the human soul can be in mutual relationship even if the human person lacks an adequate bodily instrument for the normal processes of cognition and volition.

With respect to Christian theology, Aquinas's account attains its highest point in the personal unity of the divine Image and the human image in the incarnate Son, whose humanity is formed by the Holy Spirit. From this perspective, the human image of God thus has its fullest meaning in the covenantal fulfillment that accomplishes the unity of divine and human knowing and loving. In the *imago dei* as the meeting point of nature and grace, we find the revelation of "the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband" (Rev 21:2). To quote John Paul II's favorite passage from the Second Vatican Council: "Christ the new Adam, in the very revelation of the mystery of the Father and of his love, fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high calling" *(Gaudium et spes* 22).[178]

[178] English translation in *Vatican II,* vol. 1: *The Conciliar and Postconciliar Documents,* ed. Austin Flannery, O.P. (Northport, N.Y.: Costello Publishing Company, 1998), 922. The Latin reads, "Christus, novissimus Adam, in ipsa revelatione mysterii Patris eiusque amoris, hominem ipsi homini plene manifestat eique altissimam eius vocationem patefacit." For the theme of the new Adam, in whom we behold all the virtues, cf. St. Symeon the New Theologian, *The First Created Man: Seven Homilies,* trans. Seraphim Rose (Platina, Calif.: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 2001), 54-58.

BOOK REVIEWS

Les debuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la Sacra Doctrina: Edition du prologue de son commentaire des Sentences de Pierre Lombard. By ADRIANO OLIVA. Paris: Vrin, Bibliotheque Thomiste, 2006. Pp.432. 35 €(paper) ISBN: 978-2-7116-1827-9.

Here, from a former student of Jean-Pierre Torrell who is now president of the Leonine Commission, is an exceptionally valuable piece of Thomistic scholarship. In keeping with the importance of paying attention to beginnings, it provides, as its title promises, an historical examination both of the circumstances surrounding the beginnings of Aquinas's teaching at the University of Paris, and of the distinctive understanding of *sacra doctrina* that he first had occasion to articulate at the start of his Parisian commentary on Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences.* The double concern echoes an interest of Torrell and of James A. Weisheipl, both of whose biographical investigations naturally led them to look into the meaning of Aquinas's term for his *metier, sacra doctrina.* As the subtitle indicates, the volume culminates in an edition of the commentary's prologue (301-46), which provides a focus for the volume's various biographical and interpretative considerations in a crucial early passage of the work composed at a crucial early moment of the life.

The first part of the volume (13-300) introduces the edition with a critical and literary study in seven chapters. The first chapter explains the method of text editing developed by the Leonine Commission in its gradual production of volumes of Aquinas's *opera omnia.* Chapters 2 and 3 discuss respectively the witnesses to the text of the *Sentences* commentary (including a manuscript that belonged to Pierre Roger, the future Clement VI [see 52-53]) and the chain of transmission of the text from a university exemplar. Such exemplars were divided into *peciae* for piecemeal copying, and in the exemplar of the commentary the first *pecia* almost coincided with the text of the prologue. Chapter 4, on corrections Aquinas introduced into the university exemplar, and chapter 5, on the chronology of his early years in Paris, are the longest chapters, together making up roughly half of the first part. Chapter 6 discusses the novelty of the questions Aquinas addresses in the prologue, and chapter 7, on the presentation of the text, discusses the admittedly problematic Leonine ideal of printing words in medieval spellings, and explains the three apparatuses-of variants and of sources mentioned and unmentioned by Aquinas-with which the

text is furnished. Throughout these six chapters the author displays the acumen of a gifted historian who, without neglecting the relevant Thomistic scholarship of the past century-including that of eminent Leonine editors such as Gauthier, Bataillon, and Gils- takes nothing for granted (341), as he reasons and imagines, while patiently and thoroughly sifting the evidence.

The import of the word *prologue* (67 n. 3) here calls for clarification. Strictly speaking the term would refer to the first two units of text in the commentary, both of which are included in the edition. The first of these is a general introduction that begins by quoting Ecclesiasticus 24:5 and then develops a reflection on divine wisdom that turns into an explanation of the divisions of both the scriptural verse and Lombard's work into four parts, each division reflecting four things done through the divine wisdom: (1) manifestation of the hidden things of God, (2) production of creatures, (3) restoration of man in the Incarnation, and (4) perfection of man in his final end. The second unit of text is a *quaestio* of five articles, the third divided into three subquestions, on the nature of *sacra doctrina:* (1) whether any teaching is necessary to man besides the philosophical sciences; (2) whether *sacra doctrina* is one doctrine or more than one; (3a) whether it is practical or speculative, (3b) whether it is science, and (3c) whether it is wisdom; (4) what its subject is; and (5) what its mode.

The text edited, however, includes not just this two-part prologue of Aquinas's commentary, but also his commentary on Lombard's prologue, which, with reference to a classical rhetorical principle, he divides into three parts, in which, he says, Lombard makes his audience well-disposed, teachable, and attentive respectively. (On the significance of this principle in Aquinas's work see my "St. Thomas Aquinas on Prologues," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 98 [2005]: 803-13). Aquinas subdivides the first part of Lombard's prologue with reference to causes Lombard mentions as moving him to or dissuading him from the writing of the *Sentences;* he subdivides the second part with reference to application of the four Aristotelian causes to the *Sentences* itself; and he subdivides the third part in keeping with three things Lombard does at the end of his prologue to make his audience attentive.

Four books of the work, then, five questions concerning the nature of the teaching, and three main divisions of the work's prologue: the young Aquinas, of course, has his readers busy counting from the start.

The edition presents a draft of the text of the prologue, thus comprehensively understood, that will appear in the critical Leonine edition of Aquinas's commentary on book 1 of the *Sentences,* that is, the edition of "Thomas's first" *(Primus Thome;* 24 n. 26), as early manuscripts referred to it. Although the editor is loath to call the present edition critical (22), it is a superb piece of work that replaces the hitherto standard text of the prologue in the 1929 Mandonnet edition of the commentary on book 1 (Mandonnet 1-24), with many emendations of which the following may be taken as representative.

- The first question in the *quaestio* is not whether any doctrine is necessary to man beyond *natural* or *demonstrative* studies *(praeter physicas disciplinas;*

Mandonnet 6 [on the connotation "demonstrative" see Oliva 276 n. 88]), but whether any doctrine is necessary to man beyond *philosophical* studies *(preter philosophicas disciplinas;* Oliva 310.1).

- Attractive though the image may be, Aquinas does not say that *sacra doctrina* makes use of all other sciences, which are brought into obedience to it "like *vassals" (quasi vassalis;* Mandonnet 8), but rather that it itself, "like *someone making use" (quasi usualis;* Oliva 313.44), uses all other sciences, which are brought into obedience to it. This correction provides occasion for showing both the derivation of the error from the printed edition of 1659 (97), and the currency of the correct term *usualis* in thirteenth-century discussions (313.43-44 *adn.).*

- Peter Lombard begins his work with reference to the widow's mite mentioned in Mark 12:42-43 and Luke 10:33-35: "Desiring, with the poor woman, to put something *[aliquid]* of our poverty and insignificance into the treasury of the Lord .... "Aquinas comments not that Lombard's "something" implies *a not small amount (sonat immodicitatem;* Mandonnet 19), but, to the contrary, of course, that it implies, precisely, *a small amount (sonat* ill *modicitatem;* Oliva 333.19).

A major change of a different kind concerns the placement of an argument in article 2. The argument, which begins *vel dicendum quad in scientia duo est considerare* (Mandonnet 13-4), is that theology is a science subalternated to God's knowledge or "science," from which it receives its principles, and Mandonnet, with the entire textual tradition, presents it as the second part of a reply to the objection that *sacra doctrina,* because it concerns particulars, cannot be a science. But this is incongruous: to argue that *sacra doctrina* is subordinated is not to address the objection that it concerns particulars. Oliva establishes that the argument is rather the second part of the reply to the subsequent objection, which is that *sacra doctrina* is not a science because it does not proceed from principles granted by everyone, which is more coherent: the first part of this reply having argued that *sacra doctrina* does proceed from principles that *are* known per se to the believer, the second part-that is, the argument now placed here-offers the alternative explanation *(vel dicendum quad)* that the principles of *sacra doctrina* are *not* known per se but are received from God's knowledge, to which *sacra doctrina* is subalternated (323.67-324.90). (Incidentally, while there is no doubt good manuscript warrant for the term *scientia* at 323.69, the context might suggest that the term should be *disciplina.)*

Oliva traces the erroneous positioning of the argument to almost the very beginning of the text's transmission. The addition of the argument, at first in a marginal note and with a faulty indication of where it was to be inserted by copyists, was an attempt to implement one of three major corrections that Aquinas made to the original university *exemplar* of his commentary on book 1. The second such correction was his addition to distinction 2 of the long article 3 (Mandonnet 63-72), on whether the plurality of *rationes* by which divine attributes differ is in any way in God or is only in the intellect of those who

consider them (109-17, 130-39). And the third major correction was in distinction 27, question 2, article 2, on whether *Verbum* in God is said essentially, that is, of the divine nature, or personally, that is, of the second person; here Aquinas replaced his first determination of this question (given partially in Mandonnet 659-60 n. 3 and completely on Oliva 124) with a longer and more nuanced determination (Mandonnet 659-60; Oliva 124-26).

Chapter 5 cogently argues that Aquinas arrived in Paris in the summer of 1251or1252 (224); that it was during his first year there, and not, as Weisheipl proposed, in Cologne and prior to his coming to Paris, that he commented *cursorie* on Isaiah and Jeremiah (225); that he spent another two years in Paris lecturing on the *Sentences* (241); and that, instead of following the practice of lecturing on book 4 before lecturing on books 2 and 3, he commented on the four books according to Lombard's original order (252).

In 1265-66, Thomas was in Rome, where he began but did not complete a second commentary on the *Sentences,* a commentary preserved only by *reportatio,* and this attempt at a new beginning in *sacra doctrina* led to the still further attempt that turned out to be the most radical such beginning of his career and one of the most illustrious such beginnings in the history of theology, namely, the opening of his work addressed to beginners, the *Summa Theologiae.* The Roman *Sentences* commentary is the subject of another recent publication of outstanding scholarly importance, *Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi,* ed. Leonard E. Boyle, 0.P., and John F. Boyle (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2006).

Oliva probes deeply into what teaching meant to Thomas, with reference both to the *lectiones* or classes that he taught (225-41) and, more formally, to the *sacra doctrina* that was his *milieu vital* (279-87). The term *sacra doctrina,* Oliva shows, held for Thomas an analogical range of meaning that began with sacred Scripture and extended to patristic meditation on Scripture, Lombard's recapitulation of the Fathers, and Thomas's reactions to the *Sentences.* Reflecting on the novelty of the questions Thomas presents in the prologue of his Parisian *Sentences* commentary, Oliva argues that he had been inspired by the four questions of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* 8%23-25, making his own questions consider, with respect to *sacra doctrina, an sit, quid sit, quale sit,* and *cur sit.* But if the first question concerns the *an sit* or the existence of *sacra doctrina,* Thomas formulates it, both here and in the later *Summa Theologiae,* as a question of need, that is, a question of the necessity of a teaching that goes beyond the philosophical disciplines, and Oliva appropriately closes by dwelling on the importance of this novel beginning (345-46). Thomas's highly original point of departure in *sacra doctrina* was to pose this question of the necessity of *sacra doctrina* and then reply by arguing that indeed there is a human need of a more than philosophical, more than human teaching.

Thomists will look forward with interest to the appearance of two related publications, namely, the French translation of the prologue on which the editor is collaborating (345 n. 3), and the commentary on the prologue that he is preparing (345 n. 4). For a foretaste of the latter, see his "Quelques elements de

la *doctrina theologie* selon Thomas d'Aquin," in *What is "Theology" in the Middle Ages?* (Aschendorff, 2007).

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Persons: The Difference between 'Someone' and 'Something'. By ROBERT SPAEMANN. Translated by OLIVER O'DONOVAN. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. 272. $85.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-19-928181-7.

The concept of the person is hardly a mere matter of esoteric philosophical speculation. After its early development in the Trinitarian and Christological controversies, through the "personalist" defense of the person against totalitarian and individualist ideologies in the twentieth century, it is now the key to many, if not most bioethical debates, from abortion to brain death and euthanasia. Robert Spaemann, a well-known German philosopher, has been one of the few outspoken intellectuals in defense of a traditional notion of personhood in his own country. The last chapter of the present book gives a short summary of some of the points he has been making throughout the recent years in German publications on abortion, euthanasia, and other topics.

This book, however, seeks to do more; it is an investigation into the philosophical understanding of personhood. The title of the last chapter is: "Are All Human Beings Persons?" And this is indeed the key question. If ethicists ask whether embryos or people in a coma are persons, they are not usually denying their humanity, but they are distinguishing their human nature from personhood, which they identify with mere consciousness. Only conscious human beings are therefore persons and enjoy human rights; the loss of consciousness would be a loss of personhood and its rights. This position, exemplified prominently by ethicists like Peter Singer, has led to the demand that human rights should be replaced by person-rights. Anything else supposedly would be unjustified privileging of the human nature or species, which Singer calls "speciecism" (analogous to "racism"); in his opinion, human beings without consciousness (including infants) can be inferior even to pigs.

Singer expects that a defense of human rights comes by way of an identification of person and (human) nature. It might come as a surprise therefore, that historically the concept of "person" developed precisely in distinction from that of "nature," namely, in the early theological controversies around the Trinity and Christology: that God is three persons within one divinity and that Jesus Christ is one person with two natures demands a

conceptual distinction. Nevertheless, in Boethius's epochal definition (although not unchallenged in the Middle Ages), person is the subsistence of a rational nature, and therefore not without that nature.

Following a first chapter on typical and significant linguistic uses of the term "person," Spaemann reflects on this complex historical context in his second chapter. He emphasizes the *distinction* between nature and person with interesting discussions of the linguistic use of the concepts, the literary phenomenon of metamorphosis (i.e., change of nature), the ways we count or identify persons, and how they do not fall under a class-concept in the same way as do members of other species. All of this is evidence of how persons *are* not their nature, but *have* it.

This characterization can be surprising or even confusing given the problematic contemporary discussion, especially if the *having* of a nature is combined with a conscious and intentional leading of one's life. It could seem to strengthen a definition of personhood through consciousness, in distinction from nature. Yet at the same time Spaemann strongly argues that human nature implies personhood. The reason for this tension is the need to defend personhood from naturalistic reductions. The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen various forms of "personalism" (often derived from M. Scheler), which-not entirely different from existentialism-defined the concept of person in square opposition to the concept of nature, the latter understood as "merely cosmological," or as a form of objectification to which persons should not be made subject; nature is a "what," person a "who" (or, with Spaemann's subtitle: a "someone" as opposed to "something"). Likewise, relationality is made a fundamental feature of personhood, as opposed to the substantiality of "nature," which is identified with Boethius's definition. Much of this approach suffers from a confusion of a Cartesian notion of nature with that of Aristotle and Boethius. The latter's notion of nature does not exclude but includes rationality, subjectivity, and relationality; personhood is the way in which natures of these kinds subsist. With this in mind, one could more easily incorporate Spaemann's personalist observations into an Aristotelian framework.

It is largely from this personalist perspective that Spaemann pursues (in ensuing chapters) profound reflections on the person's acts, intentionality, temporality, freedom, responsibility, conscience (chap. 14), promising and forgiving (chap. 17, and also p. 109), as well as the capacity to make one's death one's own or to give one's life (because one cannot give what one does not *have)* (chap. 10). All of these have something to do with how we relate to who we are, how we are not just what we are, but how we *have* all these features. For example, we can be forgiven, not because we are simply to be identified with what we have done, but because we can relate to our past, because we *have* it in a peculiar way. And we have our future in such a way that we can promise and commit ourselves (e.g., in marriage [226-29]). Having ourselves in this way is also the basis of role play, of language and culture (Spaemann develops this idea in chap. 7, "Fiction").

Spaemann argues that the subject of this "having," the person, cannot be a merely subjective state of consciousness, as authors in the tradition of empiricism tend to claim. Our identity over time, our being and happiness as persons would otherwise become inexplicable. To be sure, the subjective "inside" is an important constituent of personhood; it distinguishes us from computers and is what we mean by "life," "spontaneity," and "experiencing." Chapter 4, on "The Negative," is meant to introduce this aspect. Reminiscent of Fichte's description of an inner drive, the drive is what constitutes an inside in the first place; it means that something is striving for something else and therefore distinguishing itself from its object; it is something that is *not* or *not yet* the other-the introduction of negativity into being (also exemplified by the phenomenon of pain [46]).

Such negativity, however, does not constitute the person, because we share it with animals. Even the ascription of both mental (internal), and physical (external) predicates, which Strawson sees as characteristic of persons, could apply to robins just as well. Rather, it is the specific form in which an internal and an external perspective are integrated. Persons are constituted through a *double* negation (40). Simple negation is mere interiority, which can be tantamount to a hallucination. Reality, being, is the negation of this mere interiority; it is not reality merely for us, but also for others, an anticipated outside perspective. Reality implies the perspective of the other which we as persons always already anticipate (e.g., [49]). Even Descartes' *cogito* can be the foundation of reality only if it anticipates the perspective of God or at least a *genius malignus.* Reality is a space of persons, a space more fundamental than physical space (see chap. 6, "Transcendence," esp. 62-71; see also 148-51).

The person as transcending the inside/outside distinction is also fundamental for our perception of time in anticipation and memory, with their implied outside perspective on ourselves from past and future (the anticipation of the *futurum exactum).* Significantly, Descartes and the empiricist tradition understand subjectivity in terms of instantaneous/atomic moments (e.g., the *cogito),* because only this counts as indubitably real; yet it is precisely this reductive interpretation that makes consciousness *merely* subjective and therefore *unreal.* Because of this reduction the problem of personal identity over time arises in the first place. When J. Locke appeals to memory as constitutive of personal identity, he should have realized that personal identity is the condition of the possibility of memory, not vice versa. Otherwise memory itself becomes an inexplicable subjectivism (see chap. 9, "Time," and chap. 12, "Subjects").

Spaemann shows how such subjectivism is at the root of modern phenomena like the creation of virtual realities. From Descartes on, reality has been understood on the paradigm of simulation: if we can construct a machine that does the same thing, we have understood what something *is.* But machines are something only for us, not in themselves. Likewise, people in cyberspace are real only for me, and not also for another or for themselves. They are by definition a mere dream or hallucination, something I see, but by which I am not seen. This saves us the effort of personal relationships; relationships in cyberspace are easy,

but unreal. The artificial production of subjective states, of feelings, without the need for the persons that could be meant by them, deprives us also of the happiness that comes from being real for others.

That we now finally try to understand even *ourselves* as persons on the paradigm of computers, that is, the simulation of artificial intelligence, is the ultimate consequence: even we ourselves become unreal-as does what appears to us. Reality itself becomes unreal (74-80, 90-92).

Persons and reality at large can exist only as an integration of multiple real perspectives; persons exist only in the plural and in a common and public space. Our very identity is defined as identity within that plural space of persons. To be real is to be a potential object of someone else, and persons therefore-just as in the Trinity-exist only in the plural. Solipsism is depersonalizing (39f.).

One should hasten to say, with Spaemann, that this does not imply that the lack of acknowledgement by others could deprive us of our status as persons. Rather, the semantics and grammar of the verb "to acknowledge" itself implies that it is directed towards something that exists previously and independently. Persons are not constituted by being treated as such. A mother can smile at and talk to an ape or a computer all she wants: they will not start to talk or smile back at her. On the other hand, we will never know a person without this acknowledgement; there is no cognition of the person without recognition. Persons do not appear under the microscope (chap. 15, "Recognition," and p. 236f.).

All these somehow "personalist" considerations seem to argue from the consciousness and experience of the involved persons. How then can Spaemann make a case for the personhood of human beings who lack this consciousness (e.g., embryos)? Interestingly and curiously, Spaemann has, through these considerations, found a definition of reality that gives him an inroad to more ontological conclusions as well: the fact that persons transcend and integrate the difference of outside and inside makes persons themselves the prime paradigm of being. The loss of an adequate understanding of the person turns out to be the loss of understanding reality as such.

For Aristotle, the prime analogate for being is the substance. Spaemann seems to imply that the prime instance of a substance is the person (this is argued especially in chapters 12 ["Subjects"]and 13 ["Souls"]). Although the person in Spaemann's analysis seems to transcend the typical ontological concepts (we *have* all of these, even essence as well as existence are *had* by us [71-74]), the person is the prime analogate for what is real. This has consequences for contemporary attempts to talk about embryos or comatose patients as "potential persons." To Spaemann, this is an impossible expression. Persons cannot be potential, because they are, logically and ontologically, the foundation of potentiality. Persons are the transcendental condition of possibilities or potentialities. It is the consciousness of our freedom (peculiar to persons) that gives us the idea of potentiality. Otherwise we would be delivered up to the paradoxes and modal logic of the Megaric school. It is our freedom as persons that is the paradigm and prime analogate for an ontology of potentialities. Hence, there cannot be

potential persons, because potentiality presupposes the person, ontologically, but also conceptually. That which *has* any possible potential (and structures its unfolding), cannot itself be potential (245f.). Such potentialities are always those of a particular species. According to Spaemann, persons *are* not their nature, but they do have a nature, and they are not just something over and beyond this "having." Nor is this "speciecism," because this nature does not have to be the *human* species (although membership in the human species does always imply personhood); it could also be angels or possibly-as Spaemann suggests-dolphins (248).

The tension in Spaemann's reflections results from the combination of personalist influences with the metaphysical tradition. This tension is not peculiar to Spaemann; it can be found also in the thought of John Paul II and those who follow him. What is peculiar to Spaemann is the highly speculative, though unthematic, integration of metaphysical and phenomenological thought. Since this is perhaps itself something like an integration of outside and inside perspective, it might be significant that it happens in the context of a reflection on the concept of "person." The fertility of this thought process (sometimes of Hegelian stature, constantly engaging the whole history of philosophy) can hardly be even hinted at in a short review.

It is to be hoped that Spaemann will find many readers. Robert Sokolowski has already taken him as a source of inspiration; and that Oliver O'Donovan, himself the author of two remarkable essays on the concept of "person," has made the effort to give Spaemann's book a meticulous (though not always felicitous) translation, speaks for the importance of this text. Readers from the analytical tradition might be puzzled that their discussions do not feature largely in Spaemann's book. Much of what analytical philosophy says about personhood has been about personal identity or its denial; most of its thought experiments revolve around this question. Spaemann does not address them directly, except through the discussion of Locke and the empiricist tradition; but he provides a deeper foundation and a perspective that could also liberate this discourse from being locked into potentially sterile quandaries.

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The Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act. By STEVEN A. LONG. Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2007. Pp.166 $24.95 (paper) ISBN: 978-1932589399.

Since the mid-1960s the attention of a number of Catholic scholars has been directed toward the theory of human action. A convenient starting point for the

discussion-which has often been animated-would be Germain Grisez's 1965 essay "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the *Summa Theologiae,* 1-2, Question 94, Article 2" *(Natural Law Forum* 10 [1965]), although an historian could also use his book of the previous year, *Contraception and the Natural Law* (Bruce Publishing). In the decade or so that followed, a number of European scholars chimed in, including Peter Knauer, Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs, and Bruno Schuller. The latter scholars are often associated with proportionalism, judged incompatible with Catholic doctrine in John Paul H's encyclical *Veritatis Splendor* (1993), although even such a strong defender of Catholic doctrine as Grisez was led by his theorizing to assert that in certain situations craniotomy (i.e., the crushing of skull of a fetus whose inability to pass through the pelvic cavity threatens the life of its mother) is morally permissible, despite the Holy Office's 1884 declaration that it cannot safely be taught that such a procedure is moral. Since the 1960s and 1970s, theories of human action have led other scholars with reputations for orthodoxy to take positions difficult to reconcile with traditional Catholic thought and practice. The name that jumps out here is Martin Rhonheimer, who defended *Veritatis Splendor* against proportionalist critics *(The Thomist* 58 [1994]) but who has also come out in favor of the use of condoms by married couples with AIDS ("The Truth About Condoms," *The Tablet,* 10 July 2004).

Steven A. Long in the book under review engages with none of these scholars directly, although he clearly has them in mind throughout. In a long appendix ("Particular Applications to Difficult Cases"), which in fact comprises more than a third of the book, he discusses with great verve the handful of cases that have become standard in the literature: craniotomy, salpingectomy (surgical removal of a Fallopian tube) occasioned by ectopic pregnancy, the removal of a cancerous uterus containing a fetus, condom use by couples with AIDS, the separation of conjoined Siamese twins, and embryonic rescue by means of surrogate motherhood. Elsewhere in the book-that is to say, in its more theoretical main chapters, which are three in number-he discusses self-defense both personal and civil (pertaining especially to Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 64, a. 7), and such cases as the mountaineer who to save his colleagues cuts a cord and so brings about his own death.

Long's intuitions with respect to these particular cases are generally good and sound. I myself am favorably inclined toward the stands he ultimately takes in all the cases just mentioned, with one exception: embryo adoption. Long opposes the latter on the grounds that, although the end intended is the saving of a life, the object is "having a child not conceived within one's marriage with one's own husband and implanted in one's womb for the sake of saving its life"-and that object, "surrogacy," falls under a negative precept since it runs contrary to the natural teleology of childbearing (134-35). I am not so sure that such a precept would be exceptionless since it can be moral to do things that in normal circumstances would be unnatural: a man might saw off his own arm in order to save his life, for instance. But Long may be right: perhaps a prohibition of surrogate motherhood (for whatever motive) is part of *Humanae Vitae's*

prohibition of the separation of the procreative from the unitive aspect of sexual intercourse. But this would require demonstrating that carrying a child in the womb is part of "procreation," as understood by *Humanae Vitae* or an account of morality in accord with natural law.

Regarding salpingectomy, Long argues that "if it is true that a section of fallopian tube must in any case be removed for the sake of the mother's health, owing to its radical swelling and inflammation, then this is the end sought, and the means are *per se* ordered to it" (96). These words raise some doubts-for instance, saying that the Fallopian tube must "in any case" be removed rather skirts the issue of whether it must be removed because of swelling or inflammation caused *by* the embryo's presence-but a novel argument that Long proposes a couple of pages later is considerably more promising. In this argument he speaks rather of "moving" the embryo (so that the proper procedure would perhaps be salpingostomy rather than salpingectomy) and says: "relocation of the child out of the fallopian tube attrites [sic] the lifespan of the child, but the child dies for precisely the same reason it would die if left in the fallopian tube, namely because it is not in the womb of its mother: which has been true from the start" (100). Perhaps this *is* a way of permitting the removal of an embryo whose presence threatens the life of the mother and whose life, given the current state of technology, cannot be saved in any case. Given that the embryo will die shortly no matter what its environment, the act of placing it into an environment outside the tube cannot be called *killing* it since it would have died shortly in any case. An objection might be raised that placing the embryo in an environment that causes immediate death (as opposed to death within a week or two) amounts to hastening its death and is, therefore, immoral; but, when an adult person is close to death, we do allow the intentional shortening of life by the withdrawal of extraordinary means. This is not to say, of course, that moving the embryo is the withdrawal of extraordinary means but only to say that it is not necessarily obligatory to avoid the shortening of life when the time intervals are such as these.

The main part of *The Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act* is given over to a more theoretical discourse on action theory. Long is insistent that the analysis of an individual action must take into consideration not just the intention with which it is performed but also its object, with all of its relevant physical and teleological characteristics; he dismisses the reservations of the Grisez school about violating the "no ought from an is" dictum; and he heralds the "hierarchy of ends," which the same school finds problematic. None of this presents serious difficulties, especially since Long does not criticize anyone directly and cannot, therefore, be faulted for not taking into account clarifications issued by the interested parties. But independently of such matters, one may still harbor doubts about Long's use of Thomas.

I will mention just one such doubt. Long makes use of the remark in question 64, article 7 of the *Secunda Secundae* that a moral act receives its species "according to that which is intended *[intenditur]* and not from that which is beside the intention *[praeter intentionem]* since that is accidental *[per accidens]*"

as support for his contention that the object of an individual moral act is *praeter intentionem,* intention (at least in its primary sense) being directed solely to the end for which the individual act is performed. Long takes this line at least partly because he is aware that the intention with which one performs an action enjoys a certain preeminence in the analysis of actions. As Thomas says, if a man steals in order to commit adultery, he is more adulterer than thief *(STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 6). But the *intenditur I praeter intentionem* distinction in question 64, article 7 cannot be doing what Long wants it to be doing since Thomas makes a back reference-"Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter intentionem, cum sit per accidens, *ut ex supradictis patet"*-which reveals that he has no such thing in mind.

According to both the Leonine and the Ottawa editions, the reference is to question 43, article 3 of the *Secunda Secundae,* and question 72, article 1 of the *Prima Secundae* (although, while I think that the latter-earlier-reference is very much relevant to our understanding of *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7, I do not believe that Thomas had it in mind when he wrote "ut ex supradictis patet"). In the former text, Thomas is interested in the taxonomy of moral acts: whence come their names (and species). It is not because sometimes people scandalize others inadvertently that we have a specific sin called "scandal" but rather because they sometimes do so intentionally. This is not to say that those who give scandal inadvertently do not commit the sin of scandal (i.e., the very sin that receives its name from intentionally giving scandal: see *STh* II-II, q. 43, a. 4) but only that the name and the species come from intentionally doing so. Bearing this point in mind, it would appear that, at the point in question 64, article 7 where Thomas speaks of the species coming from the thing intended, he has not yet begun to give us his analysis of the individual act of (private) self-defense but is simply explaining how the act's name and species are determined. This is good news for Long's implicit polemic against Grisez and associates since it means that Thomas is not excluding that which is *praeter intentionem* from having a bearing upon the moral evaluation of individual acts, but it is bad news for Long's own interpretation of the article since it means that the *intenditur I praeter intentionem* distinction is not about the evaluation of individual acts. In other words, the distinction does not tell us anything about how we are to analyze-break down the structure of-justified personal self-defense (or related acts), which is how Long chooses to apply it.

Question 72, article 1 of the *Prima Secundae* is even more difficult to reconcile with Long's reading. There Thomas is also concerned with the species of acts-but of individual acts. He asks whether a sin receives its species from the sinner's object rather than from his intention (and "no one intends to do evil," notes Thomas, quoting pseudo-Dionysius). "It is manifest," says Thomas, "that anything receives its species from that which it is *per se* and not from what it is *per accidens."* A sin is *per se* the voluntary act of a sinner "who intends to perform *such* a voluntary act in *such* material"; and "voluntary acts are distinguished in species according to their objects." So his answer is, yes, "sins are properly distinguished by species according to their objects." This conclusion

flies in the face of Long's analysis of question 64, article 7 of the *Secunda Secundae* according to which Thomas is saying that an action's object is *praeter intentionem;* it also confirms the idea just proposed that, when at the beginning of that article Thomas speaks of an act's receiving its species from what is intended and not what is *per accidens,* he is concerned with the way we determine the species of types of acts and not directly with the analysis of individual acts.

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Magisterium: Teacher and Guardian of the Faith. By AVERY CARDINAL DULLES, S.J. Naples, Fl.: Sapientia Press, 2007. Pp. 209. $21.95 (paper). ISBN 978-1-932589-38-2.

Les degres d'autorite du Magistere. By ABBE BERNARD LUCIEN. Feucherolles: La Nef, 2007. Pp. 232. 22 € (paper). ISBN 2-916343-02-4.

Both books engage the magisterium. Cardinal Dulles offers a clear, concise manual, tracing the magisterium from biblical foundation to the present; he touches many current questions and comes to balanced conclusions; sixty-seven pages of appendices reproduce relevant magisterial texts. Lucien's volume collects various articles previously published in *Sedes Sapientiae.*

With habitual clarity Dulles expounds basic doctrine. His first chapter defines the magisterium's nature and function, rooted in Christ's offices as prophet, priest, and king. The magisterium was established to procure the sanctification of souls through the preservation, explication, and defense of Christ's revelation. While faith involves personal self-surrender to God's word, his truth is mediated through revealed truths; hence revelation must include "an organ capable of certifying revealed truth with divine authority" (6). The magisterium serves revelation, ultimately Christ, in Scripture and apostolic Tradition. While the Bible is authoritative in faith and cannot be contradicted, Tradition and magisterium ensure its correct interpretation and application. Chapter 2 presents the New Testament witness to Jesus as teacher and the authority of Peter, the apostles, and their successors. Chapter 3 traces the further development of the magisterium: as bishops maintained orthodoxy in dioceses and councils; the Roman see steadily asserted its primacy as ultimate court of appeal for East and West. Despite the papacy's weakness at the waning of the Middle Ages, Trent incorporated the modern papal-episcopal council. Subsequent centuries shored up papal and conciliar authority against attacks until *Humani Generis* hailed the

magisterium as the "proximate and universal norm of revealed truth," authorizing the pope to terminate debate on disputed issues.

Chapter 4 considers hierarchical and nonhierarchical teachers, who were clearly distinguished only in the nineteenth century. In modern terminology only pope and bishops possess magisterial responsibility, teaching with Christ's authority and formulating doctrine. But others can and have exercised various magisterial functions. Indeed the consent of theologians, the witness of Church Fathers and Doctors, and the *sensus fidelium* are recognized as theological sources. The present magisterium comprises various organs: episcopal college, pope as its head, papal dicasteries, and bishops speaking in groups or individually. Dulles judiciously assesses the weight of their authority. The sixth chapter considers infallibility insofar as the magisterium upholds the apostolic deposit in matters of faith and "patterns of behavior commended by the gospel." Though infallibility is promised to the whole Church, the magisterium's exercise of infallibility, which characterizes particular acts, produces "irreformable," or "definitive," statements. After considering the ordinary and extraordinary expressions of the universal magisterium, Dulles deals with infallibility's primary and secondary objects. The former embraces revelation, the latter whatever is indispensable to safeguard or expound it; that infallibility extends to the former is a matter of faith, whereas its extension to the latter is "theologically certain Catholic teaching" (74). After briefly considering dogmatic development, Dulles evaluates what falls among infallibility's secondary objects, questioning the inclusion of some "dogmatic facts" (e.g., Jansenius' intention), canonizations, and approval of religious institutes. The natural law's basic principles are generally agreed to be revealed, and the magisterium can infallibly teach "all negative moral norms that concern intrinsically evil acts" (CDF). Thus *Evangelium Vitae's* condemnation of murder, abortion, and euthanasia engages the ordinary, universal magisterium. Chapter 7 considers various responses to the magisterium. After "theological notes" disappeared, the magisterium's 1989 Profession of Faith required "firm faith" for revealed truth, firm and irrevocable assent to doctrines definitively proposed by the Church, and *obsequium religiosum* for authoritative, nondefinitive statements. Dulles adds reflections on dissent, designating public dissent "a usurpation of authority" (98). Finally "reception" is studied in various contexts: faith is received by the Church and councils have been received as ecumenical. However much popular reception manifests a teaching's efficacy, the magisterium's authentic teaching does not depend upon it. Reception also interprets and completes defined dogmas, and in ecumenical discussions dogmatic reformulations can contribute to mutual reception of Christian traditions. The magisterium is essential for ecumenical dialogue insofar as true reconciliation in faith requires doctrinal authority.

A convert from Econe, Lucien seeks to lead others back to Rome. After an opening chapter in which he defines his terminology, he argues that the magisterium's infallible declarations are not restricted to *ex cathedra* statements and solemn judgments of ecumenical councils. The ordinary, universal magisterium, that is, the episcopal body united to its head, can teach doctrine as

revealed without special formulae. Furthermore *obsequium religiosum,* though allowing for error, marks a true adhesion, excluding opposed probabilities, to magisterial decisions; the pope can call for this because Christ promised his habitual assistance (Matt 28: 10). The third chapter treats the ordinary pontifical magisterium's infallibility in *Ordinatio sacerdotalis,* which required its doctrine to be "definitively held by all the faithful." The CDF's subsequent clarification introduced ambiguity by characterizing the ordinary pontifical magisterium's act as "not in itself infallible" while demanding "definitive assent." Confronting the ambiguity, Lucien turns to Vatican I: *definire* meant "delimit with precision," designating a statement *ex cathedra;* yet the corresponding adjective and adverb designate something as "irrevocable." John Paul employed "definitive act," extending it beyond solemn acts defining truths not previously attested to include acts confirming truths already clearly attested. Msgr. Bertone specified that an infallible act of the ordinary, universal magisterium need not have the form of a definition; it can confirm a certitude of faith lived consciously by the Church or affirmed by the episcopal college. These clarifications effected development of dogma; hence Vatican I's conditions for papal infallible pronouncements are not restrictive, as minimalist theologians maintain.

Building on Msgr. Bertone's remarks on *Dominus Jesus* that "definitive" doctrine is "irreformable" and presupposes an infallible magisterial act, chapter 4 rejects the minimalist differentiation of infallible teaching from definitive doctrine. Lucien expounds conceptualist presuppositions: faith's act affirms "true propositions," which allow a deeper penetration of what is "originally vaguely indicated and obscurely grasped" into the divine reality intended. Insisting on propositions' mediating role, he refuses to oppose person to formula (74, 77). With *Fides et ratio* he affirms that dogmatic statements express a "stable and definitive truth." At the foundation of the minimalist position, limiting infallible statements to what is explicitly declared as such, stands a Molinist understanding of faith as voluntary submission to juridical authority, not intellectual assent. Magisterial teaching acts are not juridical acts. Infallibility is not added to the magisterium's act but flows from the act's object. Hence, "if that magisterium exercises its mission of determining with certitude, on such a point, the revealed truth, it is *ipso facto* infallible" (81). For "the nature and object of the supreme magisterium's act 'decides' about the presence or not of infallibility" (82). When Vatican II, therefore, listed truths to be "definitively held," they were irrevocably, that is, infallibly proposed. Lucien retraces in greater detail the historical meanings of *definire* and *definitivus* to prove that Vatican I did not limit pontifical infallibility to the extraordinary magisterium nor "define" to "solemn judgment," nor did it confuse "define" with a jurisdictional act. Hence faith's act, accepting Church authority for the necessary presentation of revealed truths, adheres to the truths in the measure in which the Church presents them. Consequently what the magisterium proposes to be held definitively, irrevocably, or certainly is to be accepted under the light of faith.

The fifth chapter considers diverse elements of tradition from a conceptualist perspective: although revelation may occur in deeds, it occurs essentially in

God's word which "makes manifest what was hidden" (105-6). Tradition provides an *ethos* for Scripture's interpretation, but it is also an oral source (114, 128). Since divine postapostolic tradition only preserves and explains the deposit of faith, the magisterium is, under the Holy Spirit, the proximate principal cause of dogmatic development, even though the *sensus fidelium* and theological science may count as subordinate causes. So the primary monuments of the tradition concern the hierarchical witness (papal, conciliar, and episcopal acts and writings, liturgies, disciplinary canons, etc.) while the secondary monuments come from secondary organs (Church Fathers, Doctors, etc.). Dogmatic development explicates the implicitly revealed, and the Vincentian canon serves as a positive, not an exclusive norm of development: what has been believed everywhere, always, and by all belongs to revelation; the lack of such attestation does not *a priori* reject a doctrine. The faithful Catholic need not perceive how Church doctrine is contained in revelation; he trusts the Spirit who renders impossible any failure in the ordinary, universal magisterium. Though bishops may err in faith and popes may fail to resist errors by silence, the magisterium remains in the Spirit's protection as the Church's living tradition develops homogeneously under the incarnate Word. A final chapter refutes traditionalists who identify the Vincentian canon with the infallibility of the ordinary, universal magisterium, showing that the canon was never so understood by St. Vincent nor his ecclesial interpreters.

While Lucien rightly insists that permanent doctrinal formulas mediate revelation, he regresses to an incomplete notion of revelation. If revelation consists principally of supernatural truths surpassing human insight accepted on authority, the problem of doctrinal development returns with sevenfold vengeance. How did bishops in ecumenical council argue about the truth of statements surpassing their comprehension and come to binding definitions with words not previously revealed: for example, *homoousios, hypostasis,* transubstantiation? How did Pius XII define Mary's corporeal assumption when no one testifies to that doctrine before the sixth century? How did Lyons II fix the number of sacraments at seven? Despite *Lumen Gentium,* Lucien tends to identify the Church with the hierarchy and absolutize it. A Vatican official's declaration that a noninfallible magisterial act presents a revealed truth of faith does not constitute a new dogma nor provide an infallible norm of interpretation. Though every true statement is determined by its object, the conceptualist act of faith does not permit insight into the truth revealed; it is accepted on authority. Hence knowledge of its authoritative truth must come through an external authoritative act, and the conditions required for such infallible acts were specified at Vatican I. These are epistemological criteria concerning the recognition of a statement's authoritative validity. While other magisterial statements can be true and therefore irreformable, the infallibility characterizing certain magisterial acts is recognized only when definite conditions are fulfilled. Other magisterial acts employ different degrees of authority, which can be recognized (cf. *LG* 25). The exact level of authority need not always be juridically specified. The Church's mystery involves various polarities which

canon law cannot entirely encompass. Does not ancient tradition recognize the possibility of heretical popes? Constantinople III's condemnation of Honorius, however mistaken, was accepted by Leo II and Hadrian IL

Believers accept Christ mediated by the Church, his Body, which includes the magisterium as an essential component for transmitting revealed truths. Since revelation culminates in Jesus, whose full reality cannot be encapsulated in propositions (cf. John 20:25; Col 2:3), difficulties in explicating his mystery may arise. A living authoritative witness to truth guarantees its translation into human language lest faith's demands for total adherence be diminished; the magisterium's conceptual formulations, while not exhaustive, must be true. Our current crisis concerns theologians' inability to ground objectively any statement whatever. Their Neoplatonic alleged encounters with absolute mystery devolve into unrestricted pluralism. Today the papal magisterium maintains the sanity of tradition, refusing to submit faith's content to any theological method, especially a transcendental philosophy which undermines its foundations by relativizing all finite intelligibility. Even if Cardinal Dulles leaves untreated metaphysical difficulties about finite words' capacity to express permanently the mystery of God incarnate, his sanity recommends itself, and his volume serves as a foundational text reflecting Catholic tradition.

Dulles's book is preferred to Lucien's more radical proposal. Admittedly Dulles refrains from considering historical difficulties, though acknowledging that a "heretical, schismatic, demented or coerced [pope] ... could not exercise his teaching authority" (72). But a manual cannot do everything and a good one leaves room for classroom expansion. On one point Dulles might be mistaken: the problem of reception affects the earlier, not the later, sessions of Constance (105). Two typographical errors pop up: Acts 20:30 instead of Eph. (18) and "proem. 5" instead of 6 in Hippolytus's *Philosophumena (23).*

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Cusanus: The Legacy of Learned Ignorance. Edited by PETER J. CASARELLA. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006. Pp. 280. $74.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-8132-1426-2.

The six-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Nicholas of Cusa in 2001 occasioned conferences around the world, from Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic to Argentina and Japan. The present volume contains papers from a conference held in 2001 at The Catholic University of America. The papers take in hand large, not microscopic, topics,

and they draw by design primarily on Cusanus's first major work of philosophical-theological spirituality, his *De docta ignorantia,* as well as its restatement in "spirituality" terms in *De visione Dei.*

As Peter Casarella's fine introduction notes, Cusanus interpretation has moved away from reading him primarily as a precocious forerunner of German idealism (Ernst Cassirer, 1927) or of modernity in general, toward a more nuanced understanding of him as both a child of his times and a hard-to-define *unicum.* This collection continues that trend. Almost all the essays explicitly or implicitly address the "forerunner" issue, and their varied conclusions suggest that the matter has certainly not yet been laid to rest. In Casarella's view, Cusanus can now be better understood as a "cartographer of uncharted spaces" of his own century (xxvi). He surveys truth as a moving image (ibid.) and shows "healthy skepticism about the real" without reducing it to a nihilism of "merely perspectival showing." One might, at this juncture, ask if a healthy skepticism about the real is not already present in most medieval authors, who were aware that even their highest *"intelligentia"* remained something of an "explanatory model" rather than a true knowledge of the Real. Man as *Deus humanatus* (God *manque* in Jasper Hopkins's terms) encapsulates Cusa's vision of man as creative artist, expressed in terms of wonder and beauty (xxviii).

Nancy Hudson and Frank Tobin ("Nicholas of Cusa's Sermon on the *Pater Noster"* [l-25]), offer an English translation of the sermon by Tobin and a brief introduction by Hudson, who argues that the sermon shows how Cusanus employed some of his characteristic "high" philosophical and theological ideas (participation in the kingdom of God, divine immanence, sin as alienation from God, creatures as living mirror of God, divinity hidden in the humanity of Christ, adopted filiation by grace alone, going forth from and return to God in the true peace that is the Holy Spirit, human nature as microcosm) at a level his untrained listeners could comprehend. One must ask, however, whether the theological ideas at the level found in the sermon itself are really Cusanus-specific, rather than representing Western theological commonplaces.

The next four essays concern theological and philosophical themes in Cusanus. Bernard McGinn ("Seeing and Not Seeing: Nicholas of Cusa's *De visione Dei* in the History of Western Mysticism" [26-53]), takes up the ancient problem in Christian mysticism of whether God can be seen and, if so, whether in this life or only in the next life. "Mystical theology is a 'black hole' into which even coincidences of opposites vanish in order to be transformed in ways that cannot be conceptualized," or expressed in language, "though they can be said to be 'seen' in a non-seeing seeing" (44). "Our never-ending desire for God is like a hunger that can be satisfied only by a meal, which, although continually eaten, can never be fully consumed, because, being infinite, it is not diminished by being eaten" (ibid.). This reviewer asks, however, how truly (rather than merely terminologically) different this is from chapter 7 of Bonaventure's *Itinerarium* or the conclusion of Bernard of Clairvaux's *On Loving God.*

Jasper Hopkins ("Nicholas of Cusa's Intellectual Relationship to Anselm of Canterbury" [54-73]), seeks to "demarcate the *creative lines of difference* that

arise from his adapting certain ... antecedent and fifteenth-century ideas to three of his own fundamental fifteenth-century tenets" (55). "... New and challenging about Nicholas's metaphysics is the amount of agnosticism that he finds to be compatible with faith" (72). We can in this life know *that* God is but not *what* God is; this does pave the way for Kant. In contrast, Anselm was seeking necessary reasons, worked *sofa ratione.* This reviewer wonders, however, whether Anselm's *sofa ratione* characterizes Anselm *in toto* rather than his apologetics; moreover, the distinction between "that God is" and "what God is" was a commonplace in the tradition.

Louis Dupre ("The Question of Pantheism from Eckhart to Cusanus" [74-88]), shows that for both Eckhart and Cusanus the relation between God and creature consisted primarily "in a more intimate divine presence that came closer to a formal cause rather than the efficient causality that springs so readily to the modern mind. The problem of a divine causality that descends 'from above' (as in Aristotelian and Neoplatonic cosmologies) ... did not exist for Cusanus ... The creature's true identity, then, consists in this immanent divine Being" (87). But Cusanus like Eckhart preserves the creature's otherness by pointing to "the imperfect participation of the creature in divine fullness" (ibid.).

Wilhelm Dupre ("The Image of the Living God: Some Remarks on the Meaning of Perfection and World Formation" [89-104]), explains that, for Cusanus, signs and images are of value in their own right, not merely as names of things: "The image is the place where truth appears" (93); man as a "second God" in his creativity (94-95) forms notions that "are realities in their own right" and "display a life of their own" (95). This "living" image of God in man is like an artist who paints a picture that not only perfectly expresses his art but that takes on its own creative imitation of the artist's art (96). In the human mind the "various movements of our being are brought together" and "the idea of a living image presents itself as [a] core event that structures the human potential in its possibilities" (98).

Three essays at least externally cluster around visual art intersecting with philosophy and theology. Karsten Harries ("On the Power and Poverty of Perspective: Cusanus and Alberti" [105-26]), notes that, "when the art of the craftsman succeeds in shaping the wood in such a way that the form shines forth fittingly, we call his work beautiful" (123), so it is with understanding, for Cusanus: if we see things in the light that shines on them, so too some kind of higher light of understanding permits us to understand (124). Walter Andreas Euler ("An Italian Painting from the Late Fifteenth Century and the *Cribratio afkorani* of Nicholas of Cusa" [127-42]), describes how Cusanus, operating out of both standard anti-Muslim perspectives and out of conditionally positive conclusions about the Qur'an, was convinced that Islam emphasizes great discontinuity between God and humanity, creator and creation, while the Christian conception of religion is "rigorously personalistic" and based on idea of man being *imago Dei* (141). Cusanus's goal in "sifting the Qur'an" was nothing less than to start an "intensive theological dialogue with Islam" (142). The painting that serves as Euler's foil, however, probably depicts Luke, Christ,

and Moses, rather than Muhammed, Christ, and Moses, according to Il Kim ("A Brief Report on the Painting of Three Haloed Figures" [143-49]).

Three essays treating of Cusanus's views on political and ecclesiological matters follow. Thomas Priigl ("The Concept of Infallibility in Nicholas of Cusa" [150-77]), shows that while infallibility represents one of the most important characteristics of the Church for Cusanus, it would be more accurately described by "indefectibility" and arises out of soteriological concern for the trustworthiness of the Church as authority. Some of the ecclesiological fullness of context that Priigl notes in Cusanus but finds wanting in Vatican I might have been glimpsed if Vatican II as the completion of Vatican I had together served as a foil. For Cary J. Nederman ("Empire Meets Nation: Imperial Authority and National Government in Renaissance Political Thought" 178-95]), both Cusanus and Aeneas Silvio Piccolomini made room in their imperial political ideal for nations; for Cusanus, universal ideals fall into the spiritual, not political, realm. Thus his vision of empire is distinct from that of, say, Dante. Paul E. Sigmund ("Medieval and Modern Constitutionalism: Nicholas of Cusa and John Locke" [196-209]), seeks a middle way between scholars who glimpsed the origins of modern representative government in Cusanus's conciliar writings, on the one hand, and Nederman's challenge in 1990, which found Cusanus's organic, corporatist conciliarism and a Church as "a mystical body of functionally interacting and hierarchically organized parts ... far removed from modern secular individualism" (200). In Sigmund's view Cusanus's "protomodern" insistence on the consent of the governed (especially in book 3 of *De concordantia Catholica)* is tempered by the principle of the *"pars sanior,"* the greater weight given to the consent of the elites.

Two concluding essays consider Cusanus in the light of mathematics and post-Newtonian cosmology. Elizabeth Brient ("How Can the Infinite Be the Measure of the Finite? Three Mathematical Metaphors from *De Docta Ignorantia"* [210-25]), takes up the paradox of two fundamental Cusan principles: no proportion exists between the finite and the infinite, yet "the infinite is the 'one, most simple, and adequate measure' of finite things" *(De docta ignorantia,* 1.23). Brient lucidly shows how the simple acts of counting numbers, dividing an infinite line, and inscribing a polygon with ever increasing number of sides inside a circle in sophisticated ways show how finite number and length depend always already upon the presupposition of the infinite and indivisible unity. (For Regine Kather, "'The Earth Is a Noble Star': The Arguments for the Relativity of Motion in the Cosmology of Nicolaus Cusanus and Their Transformation in Einstein's Theory of Relativity" [226-50], see below.)

The book has brief suggestions for further reading as well as admirably thorough name and subject indexes.

What does one make, then, of such a collection? Even though all the essays take care to pursue nuanced readings of Cusanus, to this reviewer they suggest that one might actually begin now to *reread* the Western Latin theological tradition with Cusanus in mind. Cusanus's catalytic contribution, in other words,

might just as well run chronologically backwards as forward. His remarkable inventiveness with language might provide tools by which we could plumb the depths and subtleties of the patristic and medieval Christian tradition. One might take the fine distinctions and qualifications about fundamental theological and philosophical issues, the daring language and imaginative vision for illustrating theological and philosophical principle that we find at every turn in Cusanus, and, armed with them, go back and reread the best of the tradition, for example, William of St. Thierry on faith and understanding. That, I think, is exactly what Nicholas did-he found in the patristic and medieval tradition things that had not yet been found or had been lost sight of. The womb of tradition that birthed the prodigy Nicholas Krebs of Cues may prove larger on the inside than the outside.

Regine Kather argues in the concluding article in this collection that Cusanus invented (dis-covered) a "decentered" universe, but he did so with the medieval method of science and cosmology in which empirical observation remain crucial. Cusanus, in effect, showed that one can deny that the universe has its center in any of the planets without abandoning God, philosophy, or theology (242) and without making man the new center. Even where he applied relativity of motion (known already to Aristotle), he did so without separating empirical observation from theological speculation or physical science from philosophy and theology (241).

To take another example, Cusanus sets forth a filiation or *theosis* theology usually ascribed to the Greek tradition, but, as Louis Dupre makes clear, he did not discover this nor did he avoid Eckhart's errors on the relation of the Creator and creature by sheer genius. Rather, the tools for his remarkable achievements were at least latent in the Western tradition (catalyzed, perhaps by Cusanus's direct Eastern reading and contacts). In Dupre's words, Cusanus "justifies" in a Western context an insight about the *imago Dei* that goes back to Origen.

Ironically then, for this reviewer, the most exciting result of this admirable set of skillfully edited conference papers is that it shows how vast and still unexplored remains the terrain of the tradition that gestated Cusanus. Reconnoitering that terrain for its own sake through the lens provided by Cusanus's always striking and stimulating imaginative language could prove fruitful. At the same time, the collection also functions as a fine introduction to a fascinating man, mind, and pastoral heart.

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Denys l'Areopagite: Tradition et metamorphoses. By YSABEL DE ANDIA. Paris: Vrin, 2006. Pp. 352. 42.00 €(paper). ISBN 978-2-7116-1903-0.

A leading continental authority on Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Ysabel de Andia has poured a life-time of learning into this book. Although each chapter has been previously published as a separate essay elsewhere over a period of sixteen years (1987-2003) it is useful to have all the articles collected and edited under one cover. De Andia is also the author of *Henosis: L'union a Dieu chez Denys l'Areopagite* (1996) and the editor of a comprehensive collection of articles, *Denys l'Areopagite et sa posterite en orient et en occident: Actes du colloque international, Paris, 21-24 septembre 1994* (1997).

The book is divided into two parts. The first part takes up select themes of Pseudo-Dionysius's theology, in six chapters under the following titles: "To Suffer Divine Things," "Philosophy and Mystical Union," "Symbol and Mystery," "Beauty, Light, and Love," "Negative Theology and the Cross," and "A Note on Negative Theology." The second part of the book analyzes the transformations of these Dionysian themes in the writings of such diverse authors as Maximus the Confessor, Thomas Aquinas, Hugh of Balma, John of the Cross, and Edith Stein.

Two overarching concerns run through this collection: (1) to emphasize the close correlation between theoretical and experiential dimensions of Pseudo-Dionysius's negative theology and (2) to show that the theologians who professed to be the commentators and exegetes of Pseudo-Dionysius's work in many cases have profoundly transformed the Areopagite's original vision. While the first point has not escaped most contemporary interpreters of the *Corpus Dionysiacum,* it was Vladimir Lossky who particularly stressed that Pseudo-Dionysius's negative theology was not only a theory of religious language, but more importantly reflected an experiential understanding of the inscrutable mystery of God. De Andia concurs with Lossky's somewhat apologetic interpretation of the *Corpus Dionysiacum,* especially when it comes to the criticism of those who argue that Pseudo-Dionysius's Neoplatonism is not sufficiently Christianized. In contrast to Lossky's rather tendentious judgment that the subsequent Western tradition of interpretation has simply misconstrued Pseudo-Dionysius, de Andia offers a more nuanced account of how his insights "metamorphosed" in the writings of Western theologians.

The first chapter of the book takes as its central theme the line from the *Divine Names* in which Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of "not only learning, but suffering the divine things [ou μOVOV μa8wv a;\;\a rra8wv Ta
back to the origins of the μa8dv-rra8dv pair in ancient Greek philosophy, tragic poetry, and mysteries, de Andia ably portrays a rich spectrum of connotations that the phrase would have had for Pseudo-Dionysius's contemporaries. At the risk of simplifying her findings, one could generalize that "suffering divine things" added an experiential dimension to the knowledge of God acquired through learning. Turning to the *Corpus Dionysiacum,* de Andia dwells at length on Pseudo-Dionysius's paradoxical pairing of the pathos of the transfigured eros

with equally strong insistence on the mind's acquisition of impassibility. She subsequently shows that some medieval theologians, such as, for example, Thomas Gallus, Hugh of Baima, and Thomas Aquinas, came to interpret Tia8wv Ta 8£1a as *affectus divina,* interpreting the phrase "not only learning, but suffering the divine things" as a contrast between intellectual and affective dimensions of the knowledge of God.

The following chapter approaches the theme of the first chapter from a different angle. De Andia discusses the two types of knowledge of God, philosophical and mystical, taking as her point of departure the distinction that Pseudo-Dionysius makes in *Epistle* 9.1105D. She shows that, according to Pseudo-Dionysius, philosophical knowledge can be communicated by instruction, whereas mystical knowledge is participatory and cannot be taught.

The chapter "Negative Theology and the Cross" takes up Luther's criticism that Pseudo-Dionysius is "more Platonizing than Christianizing." Among other things, Luther maintained that the Areopagite lacks a theology of the cross. By way of a response de Andia advances a thesis that apophasis functions in the order of knowing in a manner similar to the function of kenosis in ascetic and mystical life. She persuasively draws a link between Pseudo-Dionysius's concern for the purification of religious language with the ascetic goal of the purification of the self. It is far from clear, however, how this connection, no matter how persuasively made, succeeds in meeting Luther's objection. Furthermore, the kenotic texts that de Andia marshals are drawn from Maximus the Confessor and other authors, not the *Corpus Dionysiacum.* One could still maintain with Luther and numerous modern critics of Pseudo-Dionysius that the Areopagite's account of the significance of crucifixion-and indeed of the incarnation as a whole-is incomplete at best.

In the chapter on Hugh of Baima, de Andia presents perhaps the strongest argument for a genuine metamorphosis of Pseudo-Dionysius's religious epistemology by later authors. For Pseudo-Dionysius, the mystical union with God represents an ecstatic stretching of the mind beyond the confines of discursive reasoning. Hugh of Baima takes Pseudo-Dionysius to mean that the mystical union takes place by means of the *affectus,* severed at the highest point of ascent from the *intellectus.* Pseudo-Dionysius nowhere implies such a bifurcation between the affective and intellectual dimensions of participatory knowledge. De Andia perceptively points out that Hugh draws upon the terminological distinction previously elaborated by Thomas Gallus.

The chapter comparing Pseudo-Dionysius's *via negativa* with the dark night of the soul of St. John of the Cross remarks on the similarity of the paradigms chosen by the two authors: the ascent of Sinai by Moses and of Mount Carmel by the Spanish saint. De Andia attributes the differences between the two mystics to their contrasting anthropologies and eschatologies.

Given the fact that so much ink has been spilt on understanding Dionysius's negative theology in the past century's Anglo-American scholarship, it would have been desirable if de Andia had engaged these works in a more sustained manner in her presentation, rather than mentioning them briefly in the

footnotes. For example, the discussion of the Christology of Maximus the Confessor (147-84) would warrant pondering a critical question, raised by John Meyendorff and many others, whether Maximus is in fact correcting, without admitting this fact, certain weak points of Pseudo-Dionysius's Christology. More specifically, the "Note on Negative Theology" appended at the end of part 1, could have benefitted from the discussion of the studies of Jeffrey Fisher, John N. Jones, Alexander Golitsin, and numerous others. Finally, additional editorial work could have brought a greater thematic coherence to the essays that appear under one cover in this collection.

These minor reservations notwithstanding, de Andia's painstaking exegesis has enriched our understanding of this mysterious patristic author. All interested in the rich and multifaceted tradition inspired by the *Corpus Dionysiacum* will find much to learn from this work.

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The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas. By BERNARD MONTAGNES. Trans. by E.M. MACIEROWSKI. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004. Pp. 208. $25.00 (paper). ISBN 0-87462-624-2.

La Doctrine de l'analogie de l'etre d'apres saint Thomas d'Aquin was originally a Louvain doctoral thesis in 1962, published in 1963 essentially unchanged but for a new, brief concluding chapter. It has had steady influence since then among Thomist philosophers and theologians (as can be seen from such recent works as John Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* [2000] and Gregory Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God* [2004]). It has now been translated for the first time in English, without any new editorial trappings, by E. M. Macierowski ("reviewed and corrected by Pol Vandevelde" and "edited with revisions by Andrew Tallon"). Making Montagnes's work more widely available is especially appropriate, for by now it is important not just as an exercise in intellectual archeology but as itself one of the important strata of twentieth-century Thomism.

Montagnes's "Introduction" makes clear his focus on "the metaphysical significance" of analogy, with special attention to the influence of Neoplatonic metaphysics, as had been recently (at the time) brought out by Fabro. In a felicitous phrase, acknowledging both the logical and metaphysical dimensions of the topic, Montagnes says he seeks to present analogy as "the semantics of participation."

The first chapter argues that the development of Aquinas's understanding of causality, and especially "the discovery of being as act," is the key to understanding Aquinas's shifting characterizations of analogy. Comparing early and later discussions of the analogy of "being," Montagnes finds Aquinas moving away from language about formal causality, imitation, and exemplarity to a description of analogy in terms of efficient or productive causality, allowing for a notion of participation that does not imply likeness and so diminish into univocity.

This thesis provides Montagnes, in the second chapter, with a strategy for making sense of a diversity of theological texts. Well-known passages across the range of Aquinas's *corpus* (from the *Sentences* commentary, *De Veritate, Summa contra Gentiles, Compendium Theologiae, De Potentia Dei,* and *Summa Theologiae),* seem to present different and inconsistent answers to the recurring question of how creatures are related to God (or how language applies to creatures and God). Montagnes finds in these passages a development from an emphasis on likeness to an emphasis on causal dependence or "reference to one." He argues that the "likeness" account was insufficient because it could imply the sharing of a common form, and so reduce to univocity; a causal reference is preferable, since it preserves difference while allowing a kind of unity thanks to the metaphysics of participation.

So on Aquinas's mature account, according to Montagnes, the relationship between creatures and God is best understood *logically* as an analogy of attribution, with an intrinsic relationship guaranteed *metaphysically* by participation. In this story, the move toward this teaching from the more naive likeness account is briefly interrupted by an experiment with the relation of "proportionality" in question 2, article 11 of *De Veritate.* A proportional relationship (represented by the schema a:b::c:d) safeguards divine transcendence better than the relationship of likeness; but since it implies no causal connection or intrinsic relationship, Montagnes finds that Aquinas quickly abandoned it in favor of the mature view.

Because of the influence of Cajetan's treatise on analogy, the language of proportionality had long dominated Thomistic discussions of analogy. Montagnes's third chapter thus examines the place of Cajetan's analogy theory. Of course he judges that Cajetan was mistaken in universalizing the temporary and idiosyncratic proportionality doctrine of *De Veritate,* and he also faults Cajetan for attempting to treat analogy as a matter of logic apart from metaphysics. But he finds these mistakes in turn rooted in a more fundamental departure from Aquinas on the level of metaphysics itself, explored further in the book's "Conclusion." As an alternative to the received opposition between "essentialism" and "existentialism," Montagnes sets forth two alternative versions of Thomistic metaphysics: a "metaphysics of the degrees of being" and a "metaphysics of the idea of being." The former, according to Montagnes, is the authentic position of Aquinas; the latter is that of Cajetan.

As is plain from this summary, there are two main objects to Montagnes's study: if the primary and more explicit goal is to interpret Aquinas's teaching on analogy, a second and related goal is to use this interpretation to advance some general clarifications of Thomistic metaphysics, in particular the nature of the concept of being and the composition of essence and existence.

As for the first goal, Montagnes's attempt to clarify Aquinas's teaching on analogy depends heavily on a genetic or developmental interpretation of Aquinas (from Aristotelian to Christian Neoplatonist), and on a sharp critique of Cajetan. Both strategies seem in retrospect somewhat exaggerated. Montagnes's interpretation of the various passages on the analogy between creatures and God treats them as parallel attempts to answer the same question. However, although there is an undeniable parallelism of formulation (how is a term predicated of creatures and God?), does this necessarily reflect a strict parallelism of theological interest or pedagogical intent? Might the same formulation express different questions in different contexts, and if so, might Aquinas's apparently different answers in fact be consistent, but carefully tailored to say only what is necessary under the circumstances? Montagnes does not show that the relationship of proportionality is inconsistent with a metaphysics of participation, and he does not show that after *De Veritate* Aquinas ceased to believe that a relationship of proportionality obtains between creatures and God (cf. *STh* I, q. 14, a. 3, ad 2; I-II, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1). He only shows that Aquinas also had other ways of characterizing the relationship between creatures and God, and he simply proposes, without firmly establishing, a genetic interpretation of Aquinas's metaphysics to account for the changing characterizations. (It is worth noting that Wippel and Rocca, in the studies previously mentioned, while agreeing with Montagnes about the importance of the metaphysics of causality and the intrinsic relationship implied by participation, do not fully adopt Montagnes genetic thesis; they find more consistency between Aquinas's earlier emphasis on imitation and his later talk of causal dependence.) Aquinas's occasional pronouncements about analogy resist being formulated into a thematically comprehensive "theory of analogy," but it is probably no better to try to make sense of the diversity of his remarks by positing a metanarrative of metaphysical development.

As for the criticism of Cajetan's theory of analogy, this was a common move in the mid-twentieth-century project to recover a more historical approach to Aquinas (it was shared by Lyttkens and Klubertanz before Montagnes, and by Mcinerny and Burrell after him). At the time it was a reasonable corrective of previous attempts to accept the authority of Cajetan's "interpretation" or "systematization" of Aquinas (e.g., by Penido, Goergen, and Cajetan's English translators Bushinski and Koren), but by now the significance of Cajetan deserves further reconsideration. Studies of late medieval theories of analogy (by Riva, Tavuzzi, and especially Ashworth) have firmly established that Cajetan was offering his own answers to philosophical questions that developed in the centuries after Aquinas wrote. Cajetan's analogy theory is not a bad

interpretation of Aquinas on analogy because it is not really an interpretation of Aquinas after all. Cajetan sought to develop a semantics of analogy, following up comments in his *Categories* commentary on equivocation, and it is no criticism of Cajetan that his treatise "on the analogy of names" ignores metaphysical issues of hierarchy and participation. Montagnes should not have been puzzled about why Cajetan focuses his analysis on the proportional unity of the analogous concept.

As for Montagnes's attempt to redraw the lines of Thomistic metaphysics, it is not clear that it has had much of a legacy. Certainly his book is more remembered for its specific thesis about analogy than for its analysis of Aquinas's distinct contribution to articulating the relationship between being and essence. By today's standards, his distinction between a "metaphysics of the degrees of being" and a "metaphysics of the idea of being" is underdeveloped and impressionistic.

In any case, a rereading of Montagnes provides much opportunity to reflect on the development of Thomistic philosophy and historiography in the last several decades. If anything else, it is humbling to be reminded that, even granting some misleading accretions within the Thomistic tradition, the historical Aquinas does not just emerge, uncontroversially, from a direct return to his texts. It is also heartening to notice that the historical approach to Aquinas is now extending to a more historical approach to other figures (like Cajetan) in the Thomistic tradition. And we can be grateful for the perspective that allows us a critical appreciation of those historians of philosophy, like Montagnes, who perhaps despite themselves have become a part of a "Thomistic tradition."

A final word about this new edition. It is unfortunate that the English translation itself is not accompanied by a thorough introduction and retrospective on analogy and the background and influence of Montagnes's work. But if this defect is forgivable, some others are not: there are overwhelming editorial and production problems with this volume, too significant to ignore in a review. The print quality and editing are poor; the volume abounds with errors of grammar, spelling, and formatting. And the editorial defects are not just limited to problems of neglect. A decision systematically to eliminate Christian titles not only omits "Saint" from the title of the book but also, more problematically, results in references to "John of Thomas" instead of "John of St. Thomas." An English edition of Montagnes is worthwhile, and it deserved more professional execution.

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Heideggerund die christlicheTradition:Annaherungan ein schwierwigesThema. Edited by NORBERT FISCHER and F.-W. VON HERRMANN. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 2007. Pp. 288. 18.80 €.ISBN 978-3-7873-1816-2.

In May 2006, Germany celebrated the seventieth birthday of Karl Kardinal Lehmann, the president of the German Catholic Bishop's conference for more than twenty years. During the state-ecclesiastical celebration, Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel spoke and former Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl gave the *laudatio.* The academic celebration, which I had the pleasure of attending, was organized by F.-W. von Herrmann, professor emeritus ofUniversitat Freiburg and Norbert Fischer, ordentliche professor fiir philosophische Grundfragen at Universitat Eichstatt. Karl Kardinal Lehmann's *Habilitationschrift* dealt with the relation of Heidegger to Augustine of Hippo. Naturally then the conference theme was the relation of Martin Heidegger to the Christian tradition.

May 26, 2006, was the thirtieth anniversary of the death of Martin Heidegger. Former assistants or students are now reaching, or have already reached, retirement age. Many wish to share their memories, their correspondence, and their versions of Heidegger's thought and the events in his life. During the 1940-1970, in the German universities, Heidegger was "ganz einfach in der Luft": Heidegger interpretation has become a "cottage industry" in contemporary Germany.

The papers from this conference have now been edited and published in one volume, entitled *Heideggerund die christlicheTradition.* The volume consists of eleven articles with an introduction by the editors, N. Fischer and F-.W. von Herrmann. The articles are of the high quality, though the articles dealing with the poets Holderlin and Rilke are of another genre than the others. In the first article, entitled "Faktische Lebenserfahurng und christliche Religiositat. Heideggers phanomenologische Auslegung Paulinischer Briefe," F.-W. von Herrmann, the editor of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* for the past forty years and the world's leading scholar on Heidegger, writes on Heidegger's exegesis of Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians. Heidegger's exegesis is neither dogmatic nor theological-exegetical but rather phenomenological, from the point of view of his own phenomenology of *Faktizitat des Lebens.* The second article is authored by M. Roesner and is entitled "Logos und Anfang. Zur Johanneischen Dimension in Heidegger's Denken." Roesner treats the place of the Heraclitean and Johannine (Philonian) *Logos* in Heidegger's thought and notes the differences between them. N. Fischer, a leading light in Augustinian, Kantian, and Heideggerian research in Eichstatt, writes of "Selbstsein und Gottesuche. Zur Aufgabe des Denkens in Augustins 'Confessiones' und Martin Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit.' " The search for God has become a veritable *topos* in Fischer's writings. J. Greisch of Institut Catholique examines "Warum denn das Warum. Heidegger und Meister Eckhart von der Phanomenologie zum Ereigneisdenken." Meister Eckhart's mysticism and its place in Heidegger's thought has now and again occurred as a scholarly theme. Karl Kardinal Lehmann, the honoree of the conference, contributed" 'Sagen was Sagen ist': Der Blick auf die Wahrheit der

Existenz. Heideggers Beziehung zu Luther." As familiarity with Heidegger's works increases, it becomes ever more evident that Luther had a profound influence on his thought, especially with regard to the inaccessibility of God to human reason. In his contribution entitled "Heidegger und Pascal-eine verwischte Spur," A. Raffelt, from Universitiit Freiburg im Breisgau, attempts to show that Pascal might have been an intermediary for Heidegger's knowledge of the Augustinian tradition. But Heidegger knew Augustine directly. *Entia non multiplicentur sine necessitate.* P. Coriando, a much respected *Privatdozent* in Freiburg, adds "Sprachen des Heiligen, Heidegger und Holderlin." The "holy" is a theme, of course, in German literature since R. Otto. Kierkegaard and Schelling are the subject of *].* Ringleben's piece entitled "Freiheit und Angst. Heidegger zwischen Schelling und Kierkegaard." Heidegger may well have become familiar with *Angst* from the reading Kierkegaard, but his ultimate source, at least indirectly, is Augustine's *timor castus* and *timor servilis.* Finally, "Dichten und Denken: Bemerkungen zu Rilke und Heidegger" from the pen of U. Fiilleborn examines Heidegger's relation to the poet Rilke. The article, though probably of interest to Rilke scholars, has more to do with the nature of poetic speech than with Heidegger.

Two other essays are of special interest. O. Poggeler's contribution, entitled "Heideggers Weg von Luther zu Holderlin," contains many an insight into Heidegger the man, culled no doubt from Poggeler's own experience. Of particular interest is Heidegger's supposed change in view concerning Adolf Hitler. In 1932/1933 Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers had hoped to use National Socialism to promote an aristocratic university. Soon Jaspers came to see the anti-Semitism of the government Gasper's wife was Jewish). As early as 1938 Heidegger had come to regret his earlier support. According to Poggeler, this regret led Heidegger to contemplate suicide (183). This claim prompted a strong refutation at the conference from Heidegger's stepson who denied in the strongest possible terms that his stepfather had ever considered such a step.

The contribution of Johannes Schaber, O.S.B., contains many pertinent remarks on the history of philosophy. Heidegger's *Habilitationscrift,* entitled "Die Kategorien-und Bedeutungslehre des Dun Scotus. Fliissigmachen der Scholastik," though hailed for its several insights, stirred much controversy. Some thought that in his conclusions we learned much about Heidegger, but little about Duns Scotus. This criticism is of course true of the entire gamut of Heidegger's use of previous philosophers. Heidegger did not consider the historical origins of his thought particularly important. He rarely cites his sources. When he does, he does not explain them in their historical context, but rather uses them as an occasion to explicate his own thought. Often his thought has little to do with the historical meaning of texts.

Other of Schaber's insights are that the Reformation is the proper background from which to view nineteenth-century German philosophy. Both mistrust the power of the human intellect. Post-Cartesian philosophy is philosophical Protestantism. Kant's restriction of epistemology to the conditions of human

knowledge unintentionally opened the way to a wider role for empirical psychology. The list could go on

In *Unterwegs zur Sprache,* Heidegger wrote: "Ohne diese theologische Herkunft ware ich nie auf den Weg des Denkens gelangt. Herkunft bleibt stets Zukunft" ("Without this theological heritage I would never have succeeded in this way of thinking. Heritage remains constantly the future"). This conference was devoted to an examination of Heidegger's own estimate. As Kardinal Lehmann himself points out and the subtitle of the book *(Annaherung an ein schwierigesThema)* indicates, the relation of Heidegger to previous thinkers, and a fortiori to Christian thinkers, is particularly difficult to study. According to Heidegger, Western philosophy is but a series of footnotes to his own philosophy-to paraphrase Whitehead on Plato. In considering Heidegger's writings, when he wrote is often as important as what he wrote. He changed his mind and frequently these changes are not merely cosmetic or developmental-sometimes they are contradictory. His relation to Catholic theology is one such change, his relation to Greek thought another. The Heidegger corpus has been published only gradually. Heidegger himself, often years later, amended his works by hand-interpreting his handwriting is an art. Most of his works are now published. As his letters become public, personal remarks shed further light on his development as a thinker. He developed his own vocabulary. Often sentences, or even entire paragraphs, consist in exclusively technical vocabulary. This tendency makes him difficult to understand and at times impossible to translate. Mistranslation has led to misunderstanding (for example Sartre in France), or worse, to abandonment (for example, in parts of the English-speaking world). Because of his original vocabulary Heidegger is now and again thought to be a gnostic, understandable only by elitists.

Practically every page of this work contains references to God, but Heidegger is openly ambivalent about God in his philosophy. According to Karl Rahner (Raffelt [201]), Heidegger's thought could lead in either an atheistic or theistic direction. On the one hand, Heidegger speaks of Christian philosophy as an *Eisernes Holz.* God is not a matter for philosophical speculation, and indeed in his own philosophy God plays no role. Augustine, and the entire Catholic tradition, misinterpreted Romans 1:20, that the human mind can understand, and subsequently praise, an invisible God through his visible creation. According to some, Heidegger secularized the Augustinian-Paschalian tradition (Raffelt [197])-though other equally able scholars dispute this thesis (cf. Lehmann [115]). He used Duns Scotus and Eckhart in a similar vein. There remains the rumor that Heidegger had written a third part of *Sein und Zeit* concerning God, but had never let it see the light of day. Luther's influence is present: Heidegger considered God a matter of faith, not a matter for philosophical investigation. Heidegger is not atheistic, nor even agnostic. But he does not consider God to be a matter for philosophical speculation.

On the other hand, the roots of his thought, at least in a historical sense, lie in the Christian tradition. His *Habilitationschrift* concerned Duns Scotus, though his conclusions concerned his own philosophy. Later he became deeply involved

with Rudolf Bultmann. He esteemed Luther, especially his theology of the cross. Possibly under the influence of Bultmann, Heidegger thought of theology, unlike his phenomenological-hermeneutical philosophy, as a positive science, that theology was closer to chemistry and mathematics than to philosophy. Nevertheless, in 1921 he exegeted Paul and indeed Augustine according to his phenomenological *Faktizitiit des Lebens.* These works are openly theological. He asked for burial in the Catholic Church. Heidegger is ambivalent in considering the God-question.

Heidegger's ambivalence extends to Greek philosophy. Benedict XVI, in his recent theological discourse in Regensburg, discouraged tendencies to sever Christian theology from the Greeks (see Fischer and von Herrmann [16])-as in so many other matters Benedict is Augustinian. In the early 1920s and for some time thereafter, Heidegger strove to emancipate Christian thought from Greek philosophy-he was probably influenced by Luther. Later he sought to reclaim from the pre-Socratics a supposedly lost concept of being. He esteemed Aristotelian *aletheia* as a discovery of truth. Heidegger apparently nuanced his position.

The importance of understanding the roots of Heidegger's understanding of the Christian notion of being can not be underestimated. His first encounter with Christian philosophy was apologetic where his mentor emphasized the role of Aristotelian logic. Heidegger first came to understand the Christian concept of being through Aristotelian categories (Schaber [91]). This tendency he maintained throughout his life. Heidegger's understanding on this point is to some extent a misconception. This misunderstanding arises at least partially from Heidegger's failure to consider Scripture in his philosophy. But the Christian concept of being arises primarily from the creation story. There God gives "existence" to his creation from nothing. *Creatio ex nihilo* is prominent in Augustine from the beginning, but plays no role whatever in Greek philosophy, especially not in Aristotle. In the *Organon* there is no category of "existence." Exodus 3:14, "Ego sum qui sum," plays some role in Augustine. He interprets the passage as referring to God's immutability in contrast to the mutability of creatures. This exegesis is an example of Augustine using Neoplatonism to interpret the Bible. Augustine sees God as *idipsum esse.* Aquinas's debt to Exodus 3: 14 in a metaphysics of essence and existence is readily apparent and needs no further explication here. The biblical foundation of Christian metaphysics, though explicitly mentioned to him, eluded Heidegger. In fact he at least one time denied creation (Poggeler [181]). In this sense, we might attribute to Heidegger himself *Seinsvergessenheit.* It is difficult to reconcile these opinions with Gademer's remark that Heidegger returns us to ancient Christian revelation (Fischer and von Herrmann [9]).

The tendency in this volume is often, either explicitly or implicitly, intentionally or unintentionally, apologetic. Several authors strive to Christianize Heidegger and seek to emphasize possible uses of his phenomenological-hermeneutical method for developing a Christian philosophy. The reader is left to judge the possibility or desirability of such a venture.

If the task is to erect a Christian philosophy in the Catholic tradition on Heidegger's principles, much work lies ahead. Since the late second decade of the twentieth century, Luther had a distinct influence on Heidegger's thought. Luther's disdain for philosophy is well known. Accordingly Heidegger explicitly denied the possibility of a Christian philosophy. God played no direct role in Heidegger's philosophy. God is a matter of belief. As noted above, theology is a positivistic science similar to chemistry, not a phenomenology like philosophy (Raffelt [196]). Being, as we know it, exists only in time; only being in time can be known. Romans 1:20 has been misunderstood by the entire Christian tradition (Poggeler [175]). For these reasons and many more, it is not clear how Heidegger's thought can serve as a basis for Christian philosophy in the Catholic tradition.

If, however, the task is to evaluate Heidegger's relation to the Christian intellectual tradition, it will take some time to render a complete and competent judgment. Unquestionably Heidegger's greatest contribution to contemporary philosophy lies in his analysis of *Dasein* and *Existenz.* Turning the philosophical discussion away from epistemology, as in Kant, and back to ontology has long been necessary. But the question of Heidegger's importance to the history of philosophy, let alone Christian philosophy, still awaits an answer. Examination of Heidegger's correspondence, already begun, will shed light on the conditions of Heidegger's thinking. Evaluating Heidegger justly must await the completion of the *Gesamtausgabe.* Those involved directly with Heidegger studies have a contribution to make in explicating and judging his relationship to Christianity. Perhaps another generation or two must pass before historical perspective comes into play. Those well acquainted with the complete Heidegger corpus and the entire Christian tradition must take on the question. One such scholar is hard to find. Possibly only a team can bring this work to fruition. The present volume is a quite a good beginning and a reasonable presentation of the *status quaestionis.*

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