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THOMAS AND SCOTUS ON PRUDENCE WITHOUT ALL THE MAJOR VIRTUES: IMPERFECT OR MERELY PARTIAL?

THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR.

University of St. Thomas
Houston, Texas

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on the connection of the acquired moral virtues is in large part a disagreement over the unity of prudence.[1] Thomas thinks that the moral virtues are connected through one prudence which commands actions that belong to all of the virtues.[2] A deficiency in moral virtue is always also a deficiency in prudence. Scotus rejects this position in two ways.[3] First, he holds that there is a particular or partial prudence which

[1] For the context and background, see especially Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux xii' et xiii' siecles,* 6 vols., (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont Cesar; Gembloux: Duculot, 1942-60), 3.1:197-252; 4.2: 551-663.

[2] See especially Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.1:247-51; Fridolino M. Utz, *De connectione virtutum moralium inter se secundum doctrinam St. Thomae Aquinatis* (Oldenberg: Albertus Magnus, 1937), 97-126; Renee Mirkes, "Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 71 (1998): 589-605; Bonnie Kent, "Habits and Virtues," in *The Ethics of Aquinas,* ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 122-24; James F. Keenan, "The Virtue of Prudence,"in Pope, ed., *The Ethics of Aquinas,* 265-67.

[3] Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 4.2:655-60; Parthenius Minges, *Ioannis Duns Scoti Doctrina philosphica et theologica,* 2 vols (Rome: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1930), 2:469-70, 472-74; Marilyn McCord Adams, "Scotus and Ockham on the Connection of the Virtues," in *John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics,* ed. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, and Mechtild Dreyer (Leiden: Brill 1996), 505-9; Bonnie Kent, "Rethinking Moral Dispositions: Scotus on the Virtues," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus,* ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 369-74.

belongs to each moral virtue.[4] Consequently, the perfection of one part of prudence is independent from that of another. For instance, a defect in that part of prudence which is concerned with temperate actions does not entail a defect in that part of prudence which belongs to justice or courage. Second, he states that even this particular or partial prudence is to some extent independent of a particular moral virtue. Prudence issues judgments which the agent is free to accept or reject. The second claim has been discussed in recent scholarship and sheds light on the relationship between the intellect and the will. The first claim is about prudence's unity. I shall attempt to give a more precise description of this first issue by looking more carefully at the arguments which are given by Thomas and Scotus, and considering the ways in which their views were developed by their followers.

A few introductory remarks need to be made about the difference between imperfect and partial prudence. Thomas, Scotus, and their contemporaries reject the Stoic understanding of the connection of the virtues, according to which someone either possesses all the acquired moral virtues in the highest degree or none of these virtues at all.[5] Both Thomas and Scotus accept the Aristotelian view that a perfectly good person lacks vice, and that his virtues are connected through prudence. But they differ over whether this prudence is itself a lowest species or whether it is a genus which includes different species of prudence. This disagreement over prudence is connected to different accounts of how someone may have a true virtue even though he lacks one or more of the principal acquired virtues.

[4] Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 4.2:643-55, argues that for Scotus particular prudence depends on virtue. It seems to me that this view is successfully challenged in Stephen D. Dumont, "The Necessary Connection of Moral Virtue to Prudence according to John Duns Scotus," *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale* 55 (1988): 184-206. See also Adams, "Scotus and Ockham," 507 n. 28; Mary Elizabeth Ingham, "Practical Wisdom: Scotus's Presentation of Prudence," in Honnefelder et al, eds., *John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics,* 562-69.

[5] For the earlier, widespread thirteenth-century rejection of Stoic unity, see Lattin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.1:219-31.

For Thomas, someone who lacks a principal moral virtue has at best "imperfect" prudence.[6] Thomas thinks that the perfectly virtuous person possesses the intellectual virtue of prudence in such a way that he can judge and command about the matter of any virtue. This prudence has as its object everything the agent can do *(agibilia).* This habit is a simple quality. Someone who lacks a moral virtue has imperfect prudence, since this simple habit will be undeveloped in one area. For Thomas, perfect prudence requires an order to the good life as a whole, whereas imperfect prudence directs only some good actions.

Instead of distinguishing between imperfect and perfect prudence, Scotus distinguishes between whole and partial prudence. According to Scotus, a perfectly virtuous person has whole prudence, which is a genus that contains the different species of prudence which concern the matter of each different virtue.[7] Although whole prudence needs several distinct species, these species themselves can exist independently of each other. For example, a just but unchaste person has that partial prudence which is connected with justice but may lack that partial prudence which is connected with charity.

How do Thomas and Scotus differ? Both think that there are cases in which someone can possess one moral virtue without another. For example, someone might be just but lack

[6] Aquinas, *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 13. The discussion of Thomas in this essay is mostly on the distinction between perfect and imperfect acquired moral virtue. Prudence can be counted among the moral virtues, even though it is essentially an intellectual virtue *(STh* I-II, q. 58, a. 3, ad 1). "Acquired" virtue arises through repeated human acts, whereas "infused" virtue is efficiently caused by God *(STh* I-II, q. 55, a. 4). Although the relevant infused and acquired moral virtues do not differ on account of their matter, they differ specifically on account of their formal objects and ends *(STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4). Notice the connection between acquired moral virtue and the common good of the human city, which is also mentioned in other texts, such as *STh* I-II, q. 61, a. 5, co. and ad 4. For relevant background on civic virtue in Albert the Great, see Thomas M. Osborne, Jr., *Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 61-68. For the distinctions between imperfect acquired, perfect acquired, and perfect / infused prudence, see idem, "Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas," *The Thomist* 71 (2007): 57-62. Scotus and Scotists are among those who reject the position that there are infused moral virtues.

[7] John Duns Scotus, *Ord.* 3, d. 36, q. un., nn. 99-100, in *Opera Omnia* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950-), 10:260-61; *Leet.* 3, d. 36, q. un., n. 108 (Vat. ed., 21:340).

temperance. Thomas would describe such a person as having justice and prudence which are themselves both true and imperfect. These virtues are connected in such a way that the perfection of one depends on another. In contrast, Scotus would say that such a person might be entirely just and prudent with respect to justice even if he lack temperance and its accompanying species of prudence.

What is at stake? It can be hard to identify further the extent of their disagreement. Scotus does not address Thomas's texts at length. Although Scotus knew of Thomas's writings, his account of the connection of the moral virtues is developed mostly through contrast with that of Henry of Ghent.[8] Moreover, his rejection of the unity of prudence focuses more on Godfrey of Fontaines than it does on Thomas Aquinas.[9] The texts themselves do not address the exact nature of the disagreement between Thomas and Scotus. Later Thomists and Scotists had to develop their own accounts.

This paper has three parts. First, I shall consider the reasons Thomas and Scotus give for their different opinions. At first glance their difference might seem to be merely terminological. It is not clear how Thomas's "imperfect prudence" differs from Scotus' "partial prudence." Second, I shall look at how the Thomist Thomas de Vio Cajetan (d. 1534) and the Scotist Johannes Poncius (d. 1661) develop and defend the positions of their schools. Poncius is particularly interesting because he responds directly to Cajetan's arguments. Both figures shed light on the difference between Thomas and Scotus. Third, I shall consider the way in which the Carmelites of Salamanca (ca. 1631) develop and extend the ideas of both Thomas and Cajetan. Their

[8] John Duns Scotus, *Leet.* 3, d. 36, q. un, nn. 86-90 (Vat. ed., 21:335-36); see also the briefer remarks of *Ord.* 3, d. 36, q. un., nn. 94-95 (Vat. ed., 10:228). For further discussion, see Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 4.2:644, 655.

[9] I thank Stephen Dumont for drawing my attention to this point. See Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quaestiones Ordinariae* 3, in Odon Lottin, ed., *Le quodlibet XV et trois Questions ordinaries,* Les Philosophes Beiges 14 (Louvain: Institut Superieur de Philosophie, 1937), 119-37, esp. 129-32. Although Godfrey is drawing on Eustratius, his position also seems close to that of Aquinas. If Scotus has Godfrey in mind, he is focusing on those areas in which Thomas and Godfrey agree.

approach clarifies the original Thomistic view and makes it easier to see why it might be preferable to the Scotistic position.

I. AQUINAS AND SCOTUS

Thomas was among the first in his century to argue that the moral virtues are connected through prudence. He consistently appeals to the role of prudence in at least one of his arguments for the position that the moral virtues are connected with each other.[10] This argument is based on Aristotle's discussion of prudence in (the then-newly available) book 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics.* In his commentary on this passage, Thomas rejects the Socratic understanding of the unity of virtue, which is the identification of each virtue with knowledge.[11] In contrast, on Aristotle's view, moral virtues are not completely rational, even though they require and act with reason. Moral virtues are consequently distinct from prudence. In the *Summa Theologiae,* Thomas uses this Aristotelian understanding of the relationship of prudence to the moral virtues in his argument that prudence is one even though the moral virtues are many.[12] Moral virtue has a desirable good as its object. Since there are different appetites, there are different desirable goods and consequently distinct moral virtues. In contrast, the object of reason is truth. Consequently, the one intellectual virtue of prudence is concerned with truth in all moral matters. Through prudence the agent determines the mean of virtue and the means to the end set by virtue, and the subsequent choice depends on understanding not only the matter of one virtue but the interrelationship between the matters of different virtues.

[10] Aquinas, III *Sent.,* d. 36., a. 1 *(Scriptum super libros sententiarum,* ed. Pierre Mandonnet and M. F. Moos, 4 vols. [Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-47], 3:1214-18); VI *Ethic.,* lect. 11 (Leonine ed., 47.2:370-73); STh 1-11, q. 65, a. 1; *Quad/.* 12, q. 14, a. un. [23] (Leonine ed., 25.2:416-18); *De virtutibus,* q. 5, a. 2 *(Quaestiones Disputatae,* 2 vols. [Turin: Marietti, 1965], 2:817-21). For the development of Thomas's different arguments and the consistency of his argument from prudence, see Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3:232-35, 247-49.

[11] Aquinas, VI *Ethic.,* 6, lect. 3 (Leonine ed., 47.2:376-77).

[12] Aquinas, STh I-11, q. 60, a. 1, resp. and ad 1; 11-11, q. 47, a. 5, ad 3. For an earlier treatment, see III *Sent.,* d. 36., a. 1 in corp., ad 2, ad 3 (Mandonnet-Moos, eds., 3:1214-17).

Why does Thomas think that the acquired moral virtues are connected to each other through this one prudence? Thomas mentions that the more common moral virtues are connected through prudence because the matters of the different virtues are mutually ordered. In the *Summa Theologiae* and in *De virtutibus cardinalibus* he uses this order in his replies to objections against the connection of the virtues. Similar objections and replies appear in both works. One objection is based on the separation of one science from another: [13] since the intellect can have one science without another, it follows that there can be one moral virtue without another. Another objection is based on the separation of the different crafts *(artes).*[14] Thomas responds to both objections in part by noting that the matter of the different virtues is ordered in a way that is not found in either sciences or crafts. [15] Among sciences, the matter is so different that someone can know one object without knowing another. Similarly, an error in one craft does not entail error in another craft. But in human actions a defect concerning one kind of act might cause a defect in others, on account of the way in which the matter of the different virtues falls under one order.

Scotus addresses the unity of prudence both in his discussion of the connection between the virtues in his *Ordinatio* (3, dist. 36), his earlier *Lectura* on the same distinction, and in his *Collatio prima,* which is the most substantial account. In the *Collatio prima,* Scotus responds to three reasons in favor of the position that prudence is one, namely, (1) that prudence is concerned with the whole human good, (2) that its principles extend to all activities, and (3) that there is a unity of attribution towards one end. His response to the first and third arguments is partially based on the similarity between prudence and the different crafts

[13] Aquinas, *STh* 1-11, q. 65, a. 1, obj. 3, resp., and ad 3; *De virtutibus cardinalibus,* a. 2, obj. 8 and ad 8 (Marietti ed., 2:817, 820).

[14] Aquinas, *STh* 1-11, q. 65, a. 1, obj. 4 and ad 4; *De virtutibus cardinalibus,* a. 2, obj. 4 and ad 4 (Marietti ed., 2:817, 819-20).

[15] For an earlier discussion, see Aquinas, III *Sent.,* d. 36, a. 1, ad 2 (Mandonnet, ed., 3:1217).

and sciences.[16] Scotus thinks that he is following Aristotle in comparing prudence to craft and science. Just as the precepts of crafts and sciences differ on account of their formal objects, so do the precepts of prudence differ in respect to those things which should be done. Moreover, just as sciences are diversified according to the diversity of their conclusions, so are the parts of prudence diversified according to their conclusions. Scotus argues that prudence's unity is the same as that of a science which has many parts. He admits that prudence is one in a sense, but this unity is that of a genus.

Although he may not have Thomas in mind, Scotus presents a clear alternative to Thomas's understanding of the way in which prudence is contrasted with the crafts and sciences. Thomas and those who follow him stress the difference between prudence and the sciences or crafts by arguing that the respective matters of the moral virtues are connected whereas the matters of sciences and crafts are not so connected to each other. In contrast, Scotus and Scotists argue that prudence is more like a science in that it can be developed in one area and not in another.

Scotus uses a similar argument in his response to the second reason for the unity of prudence, which is that its principles extend to all actions. He responds that if there were one prudence with respect to all human action, then there would similarly be only one science with respect to everything that can be known.[17] The independence among prudence's various principles can be seen in the way that partial prudence is acquired.[18] Someone acquires that prudence which accompanies temperance by reasoning from that principle which corresponds to the end of temperance. The possession of other parts of prudence is unnecessary for the acquisition of that prudence which accompanies temperance, and the acquisition of this particular

[16] John Duns Scotus, *Collatio Prima,* nn. 3-4, 19 *(Opera Omnia,* 12 vols., ed. Luke Wadding [Lyons: Laurentius Durandus, 1639; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968], 3:345-46, 349). For similar argumentation, see Scotus, *Ord.* 3, d. 36, q. un., nn. 96-100 (Vat. ed., 10:259-61); *Leet.* 3, d. 36, q. un., nn. 91-108 (Vat. ed., 21:336-40).

[17] Scotus, *Collatio Prima,* n. 6 (Wadding, ed., 3:346).

[18] Scotus, *Collatio Prima,* n. 7 (Wadding, ed., 3:347).

prudence is insufficient for the acquisition of prudence's other parts.

Scotus's view of prudence is rooted in his understanding of the relationship between a habit and its formal object.[19] Under certain conditions, different habits can have the same formal object, but one habit cannot have distinct formal objects. Scotus considers an argument that the partial prudence of temperance depends on other partial prudences because its formal object involves not just the end of temperance, but this end insofar as it includes the nature of the good in accordance with reason *(ratio bani secundum rationem).* According to this argument, this rational characteristic connects the end of temperance with ends that belong to the other moral virtues. Scotus replies by stating that either the good according to reason is the object of each moral virtue, or each moral virtue has its own formal object.[20] If the first alternative were true, then there would be no way to distinguish one moral virtue from another. Consequently, the second alternative must be true. If the formal objects of the different virtues are distinct even though they all include the nature of the good in accordance with reason, then the ends and principles which belong to prudence are also independent from each other. Therefore, the corresponding parts of prudence are distinct and can be acquired independently. However, since the moral virtues have distinct formal objects, each principle that is taken from the end of one virtue belongs to a prudence that is distinct from the species of prudence that include the principles that belong to the other virtues.

The formal object of each virtue is the same as that of its corresponding partial prudence. For instance, that act which is the formal object of temperance belongs as the very same formal object to that part of prudence which is concerned with temperate acts. The objects of partial prudences are distinct formally just as the objects of the different virtues are distinct. Consequently, the

[19] See especially John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis,* q. 6, a. 1, nn. 41-65, 67-72 *(Opera Philosophica,* 5 vols. [St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1997-2006], 4:17-28).

[20] Scotus, *Collatio Prima,* n. 8 (Wadding, ed., 3:347).

distinction between the different kinds of virtues is accompanied by a distinction between the different species of prudence.

Scotus and Thomas clearly disagree over whether we should say that someone who lacks prudence in one area but possesses it in another has imperfect or impartial prudence. Is this difference merely terminological? According to Scotus, the just but unchaste agent has that particular prudence which judges the matter of justice but may lack that particular prudence which judges the matter of chastity. Such a person can possess justice and its corresponding partial prudence even in its most perfect state. Such a statement is incompatible with what Thomas says, but it is difficult to determine the exact nature of the disagreement or how it might be resolved. A proponent of Thomas's position needs to address the following questions: What kind of argument supports the thesis that the matter of the virtues is connected? Supposing that the matter is so connected, why should we conclude that prudence is one in such a way that it contains no perfect parts?

II. THOMAS DE VIO CAJETAN AND JOHANNES PONCIUS

Later Thomists and Scotists developed their views on prudence and the virtues in large part through argument with each other. The issues become more clearly delineated by Thomas de Vio Cajetan's early sixteenth-century commentary on Thomas's *Summa Theologiae.*[21] Although previous Thomists had addressed Scotus's position, Cajetan gives clearer counter-examples and develops an analogy between common sense and the particular interior senses. Cajetan's criticism of Scotus is both intrinsically interesting and historically important, since it was addressed at length by Johannes Poncius Oohn Punch), one of the most significant seventeenth-century Scotists.[22] Poncius wrote the

[21] For an early Thomistic response to Scotistic arguments, see John Capreolus, III *Sent.*, d. 36, q. un. *(Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis,* 7 vols., ed. C. Paban and T Pegues [fours: Cattier, 1900-1908; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967], 5:439-45).

[22] For Poncius's life and influence, see Maurice Grajewski, "John Ponce, Scotist," *Franciscan Studies* 6 (1946): 54-92; Benignus Millett, "Irish Scotists at St. Isidore's College, Rome, in the Seventeenth Century," in *De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti,* Acta Congressus

commentaries on Luke Wadding's edition of books 3 and 4 of Scotus's *Opus Oxoniense (Ordinatio),* and discusses Cajetan at length in distinction 36 of book 3, which is one of the key passages for Scotus's understanding of prudence.

Cajetan discusses Scotus's position on the unity of prudence in his commentary on the *Prima Secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae,* primarily in article 1 of question 60, and article 1 of question 65. In his commentary on the first text, Cajetan introduces his comparison between prudence and the power of the common sense. In the second text he uses examples to illustrate Thomas's doctrine of the connection of the virtues through prudence.

In article 1 of question 60, Thomas discusses the question of whether there is only one virtue. The first objection uses the unity of prudence to argue for the unity of the moral virtues. In his response to this objection, Thomas draws attention to the difference between the unity of reason's object, which is the true, and the variety of objects that can be desired. The multiplicity of appetible objects explains the diversity of the moral virtues. Cajetan introduces in his commentary Scotus's views that prudence has diverse species, and that it is related to human action in the way that crafts are related to human makings.[23]

Cajetan notes that prudence must judge concerning actions that belong to all the different virtues. He states that the argument for the conclusion that prudence is one is similar to the argument for the thesis that the common sense is distinct from particular senses. The need to judge between different objects shows that the habit or power must have a higher object which is unified and includes the objects of the particular powers or habits concerning which it judges.[24] In order to judge the objects of sight and hearing, the power of common sense must be one power which has one object which includes sound and color. If it were merely a collection of the particular powers, then it would not be able to judge between them. Similarly, in order for prudence to judge between moral

Scotistici Internationalis 11-17 sept. 1966, Studia Scholastico-Scotistica 4, vol. 4, *Scotismus decursu saeculorum* (Rome, 1968), 404-6.

[23] Cajetan, *In STh* I-II, q. 60, a. 1, n. 7 (Leonine, ed., 6:386).

[24] Ibid. (Leonine, ed., 6:386-87). He refers to Aristotle, *De anima* 3.2.

objects that belong to the different moral virtues, it must have as its object all of the different virtues. If prudence were merely a collection of different species of prudence, then it would not be able to judge between the members of the different species.

Cajetan's comparison of prudence with the common sense is interesting not only because it applies to the way in which prudence can be deficient, but also because it focuses on how prudence orders the different virtues. Whereas each moral virtue is concerned with some particular matter, prudence is concerned with what moral virtue should be exercised here and now. Just as the common sense judges between the particular senses, so does prudence judge between the matter of the different virtues. Since prudence makes such judgments, it must be one.

Cajetan develops several cases that he thinks cannot be accounted for by Scotus's understanding of partial prudence. He uses these cases to show how the matter of moral virtue is connected by responding to an argument that the possibility of prudence is included in Aristotle's very definition of virtue *(Eth. Nich.* 2.6), namely, "an elective habit existing in a mean *[mediatas]* determined by reason with respect to ourselves, as the wise man will determine. "[25] Someone who holds that the virtues are unconnected through prudence would also need to hold that the mean of one moral virtue can be established in complete isolation from that of the other moral virtues.

Cajetan shows the connection between the means which are established by different virtues by developing the examples of a brave soldier who is induced by intemperance to perform a cowardly act and a chaste woman who is induced by fear to perform an unchaste act.[26] An imperfectly brave soldier might be quite willing to face death, and yet love for pleasure might interfere with his action. We can imagine that he might inadequately prepare for battle or be misled during battle. The

[25] "Quaelibet virtus moralis est 'habitus electivus in medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit,' absque determinatione et electione medii in alia materia" (Cajetan, *In STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 1, n. 4 [Leonine ed., 6:420]).

[26] Cajetan, *In STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 1, n. 9 (Leonine ed., 6:421); *In STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 2, n. 13 (Leonine ed., 6:422).

point is that he quite easily avoids the excesses of rashness and cowardice, but nevertheless misses the mean on account of his love for pleasure. Similarly, a lack of courage can lead to a failure in temperance. Lucretia was ordinarily able to act chastely by avoiding the excess of bodily pleasure. But she did not have courage. Consequently, when faced with the threat of death she gave in to the excess, because her fear caused her to miss the mean of temperance. Her lack of courage led to an error of prudence even concerning the matter of temperance. In both cases, the excess of one virtue interferes with the mean of another.

These examples help explain why, unlike craft, prudence does not have different species. Cajetan mentions two ways in which prudence differs from craft: [27]

> The first is, because craft considers things to be made *[factibilia]* only in one way, namely, as matter: but prudence considers things to be done *[actibilia]* in two ways, namely, as matter, and as principles. The second is that ... things to be made are not connected, such that an error in one overflows to an error in the other: but things to be done are ordered, such that an error in one leads to an error in another, as is clear from what has been said.

The first point highlights the fact that prudence receives its end from all of the moral virtues. With respect to the second point, in his commentary on article 1 of question 60 Cajetan gives examples to show that an error in one craft need not lead to an error in another. For example, a bad shoemaker may be a good sailor. [28] Shoemaking and sailing are both different species of human craft. A mistake in one craft does not necessarily lead to a mistake in the other. In contrast, Cajetan's examples of Lucretia and the ordinarily brave soldier show that a mistake in one part of the moral life leads to a mistake in other parts.

[27] Cajetan, *In STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 1, n. 16 (Leonine ed., 6:423): "Prima est, quia ars respicit factibilia uno modo tantum, scilicet ut materiam: prudentia vero respicit agibilia dupliciter, scilicet ut materiam, et ut principia. - Secunda est quod ... factibilia non sunt connexa, ut error in uno redundet in aliud: agibilia autem sic sunt ordinata, quod error in uno errorem induceret in alio, ut ex praedictis patet."

[28] Cajetan, *In STh* I-II, q. 60, a. 1, n. 9 (Leonine ed., 6:387).

These different examples and points are all relevant to Cajetan's appeal to the definition of moral virtue, and most especially to two of its parts, namely, choosing the mean and determining it by right reason.[29] According to Cajetan, the choice of the mean should be understood not only *secundum quid,* which would be only with respect to the particular moral virtue's own matter, but *simpliciter,* which is with respect to anything that could lead away from the mean. Similarly, the determination of reason should not be understood only *secundum quid,* which would be according to some part, but *simpliciter,* which is what is reasonable with everything taken into account. It is the intellectual virtue of prudence that so determines the mean. Since the mean can be missed on account of the matter which belongs to any virtue, it follows that in order to determine the mean perfectly with respect to the matter of one virtue, the agent must have prudence with respect to any possible matter.

According to Cajetan, if prudence were absent in one area, then it would not be perfect prudence. The chaste but cowardly or avaricious person lacks prudence even with respect to chastity or, more broadly, temperance. She cannot judge correctly concerning the mean of temperance when it is threatened by fear or monetary gain. Consequently, she cannot perfectly have that part of prudence which is associated with temperance if she lacks that part of prudence which is associated with courage or liberality.

In his commentary on distinction 36 of book 3 of Scotus's *Ordinatio,* Johannes Poncius particularly focuses on defending Scotus from these arguments of Cajetan. First, Poncius addresses Cajetan's comparison of prudence with common sense.[30] According to Poncius, the common sense is needed to distinguish between the objects of the external senses precisely because there is no other power that can perform the task. In contrast, there is a power that can distinguish between the different objects of prudence, namely, the intellect. Just as the will tends to certain objects on account of the different moral virtues, so does the

[29] Cajetan, *In STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 1, nn. 6-8, 11 (Leonine ed., 6:420-21, 422).

[30] Poncius, *In Ox.* 3, d. 36, nn. 179-180 (Wadding, ed., 7.2:826-27).

intellect judge between different objects by means of specifically distinct habits of prudence. There is no sufficient difference between prudence and the other moral virtues that would allow for an argument to be made for the unity of prudence and not also for the unity of the moral virtues.

Poncius's second response is that there is no one habit of prudence that judges any act which might be done here and now.[31] He admits that one species of prudence may need to judge concerning matters that belong to another species of prudence. For example, someone who is chaste might be able to act justly in those situations in which chastity requires a just action. The prudence that concerns chaste actions in this case will also issue a judgment about a just action. Nevertheless, the partial prudence that works is that which is most proximate to the action, which in this case is the partial prudence that accompanies chastity. Poncius also suggests that there may be another third species of prudence which judges between the different virtues. This suggestion is based on the way in which habits develop from acts. The following three judgments differ: (1) that the temperate act be done here and now, (2) that the just act be done here and now, and (3) that the moral value of the just act is greater than that of the temperate act. The first kind of act gives rise to that prudence which belongs to temperance, whereas the second gives rise to that prudence which belongs to justice. Consequently, there may be a distinct third species of partial prudence which arises from the third act. It seems to me unlikely that Scotus would draw this conclusion, as it concedes to Cajetan that there could be one habit that concerns the matter of the different virtues, if even only remotely. Nevertheless, Poncius states that this conclusion is probable enough *(sequitursatisprobabiliter).*

Poncius not only gives these two arguments against Cajetan's comparison of prudence with common sense, but in another part of his commentary he responds to Cajetan's examples that purport to show how someone fails in one virtue because he lacks

[31] Poncius, *In Ox.* 3, d. 36, n. 181 (Wadding, ed., 7.2:827).

another. [32] We have seen how Cajetan uses such examples to argue for the unity of prudence by noting how the excess in relation to one virtue can interfere with prudence's determination of that mean which belongs to another virtue. Poncius mentions that others have used Cajetan's examples in order to attack the Scotistic position. He responds in part by repeating Scotus's argument that if the matter of temperance were so connected with that of the other virtues, then temperance would not be a distinct virtue. Poncius's first argument for this position is that one moral virtue is distinct from the other virtues insofar as it inclines someone to act in accordance with a determinate object in all circumstances. If temperance needs justice in order to act temperately in certain circumstances, then its object does not sufficiently distinguish it from justice.

Poncius thinks that there is a more efficacious second argument which relies on the distinction between an imperfect and a perfect virtue. He states that avarice can interfere with imperfect temperance but not with perfect temperance. According to Poncius, a virtue's perfection requires only an inclination to the morally good act in every set of circumstances and situations. Consequently, a temperate person is inclined to act temperately even if an intemperate act would enable him to satisfy some vice such as avarice. The woman who acts unchastely for money is not only avaricious but also intemperate. If she were perfectly temperate, she would act chastely in every circumstance. This perfect temperance could exist alongside avarice, since the avarice could still produce avaricious acts so long as they are not contrary to temperance.

Poncius uses these descriptions in order to provide an alternative explanation of how a normally chaste woman can perform unchaste acts on account of her avarice. First he argues that this example is incorrectly described. Since such a woman is not motivated by the love of pleasure but by avarice, she would be only materially and not formally intemperate. [33] This response to

[32] Poncius, *In Ox.3,* d.36, q. un., n. 16 (Wadding, ed., 7.2:789).

[33] Poncius, *In Ox.* 3, d.36, q. un., n. 19 (Wadding, ed., 7.2:789-90).

me seems weak in that it concedes that the matter of the two virtues is connected in such a way that one virtue requires the others. Nevertheless, Poncius does draw out an important distinction, which is that the woman is more avaricious than unchaste. But Thomas would admit this point.[34] The issue is the way in which the exercise of a virtue such as chastity depends on another moral virtue such as justice.

Poncius also draws support for his position from the fact that a woman who is intemperate for the sake of avarice can perform an unchaste act or even acts without developing a habit of unchastity. He draws attention to the Aristotelian view that the existence of a virtue is compatible with a single act against it.[35] According to Poncius, chastity gives the woman the ability to act well without difficulty, and easily to avoid sins against chastity, but it does not limit her freedom to perform unchaste actions. Poncius does not address the case in which the woman were to commit many unchaste acts out of avarice. It seems strange to say that these multiple unchaste acts would be compatible with chastity. Moreover, his statement does not on its own distinguish his view from that of Thomas, who also holds that singular vicious acts do not destroy virtue, and that a virtuous person is free to perform bad acts.[36]

Poncius's second response invokes the distinction between perfect and imperfect temperance. If the woman is perfectly temperate, then it is impossible for her to act intemperately out of avarice.[37] If the woman is unchaste for love of money or out of fear, then it follows that she only imperfectly possesses temperance. The difference between imperfect and perfect prudence is not between different species of the same virtue.[38] Poncius focuses on the woman's regard for the moral worth of chastity. By performing chaste acts such a woman is willing to develop an

[34] Aquinas, *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 6. Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.2.1130a24-28.

[35] Poncius, *In Ox.* 3, d. 36, q. un., n. 21 (Wadding, ed., 7.2:790).

[36] Aquinas, *STh* I-II, q. 71, a. 4.

[37] Poncius, *In Ox.3,* d. 36, q. un., n. 20 (Wadding, ed., 7.2:790).

[38] Poncius, *In Ox.* 3, d. 36, q. un., nn. 10-11 (Wadding, ed., 7.2:786-87). For different Thomist views, see Utz, *De connectione virtutum moralium,* 127-235.

ability to act chastely not only in opposition to pleasure, but also in opposition to any threat against the good of chastity, even if it comes from another vice. Consequently, a woman who is perfectly chaste but cowardly is able to undergo death rather than surrender her chastity. She exposes herself to death not out of courage but out of chastity. Poncius's argument is significant because of the way it connects the particular prudence to the morally worthy good which is the object of the agent's choice. If the agent perfectly knows and loves the good of one virtue, then he will know and love it under every circumstance.

How does Poncius differ from Cajetan over the unity of prudence in this case? As a Scotist, Poncius believes that an ordinarily temperate woman can commit a sin against chastity either by acting against the dictates of prudence or through an (ultimately culpable) failure of prudence. If the woman sins against chastity by following an imprudent judgment, then this imprudence shows an imperfection in that species of prudence which accompanies temperance. The perfect development of this prudence concerning temperance may depend on other virtues materially speaking, but formally it is independent. Indeed, Poncius emphasizes that there are three ways in which such a woman might be preserved from the interference of a vice such as avarice.[39] First, she might be just and not avaricious. However, in such a case justice does not play a formal role in the acquisition and exercise of either temperance or its accompanying prudence. Second, she may have a morally indifferent attitude towards money. In such a case, even though she lacks justice, she also lacks the avarice that would interfere with chastity. Third, she may have a natural nonmoral inclination to justice. In such a case, she lacks the virtue of justice and yet is inclined to act justly. In the latter two cases, the virtue of chastity develops on its own and even materially independently from the exercise of another virtue.

As a Thomist, Cajetan does not so separate the cognitive judgments of prudence from its command of an action. Nevertheless, he also thinks that an ordinarily temperate woman

[39] Poncius, *In Ox.* 3, d. 36, q. un., n. 22 (Wadding, ed., 7.2:790).

could make a false judgment about a temperate act on account of a vice such as avarice. For Cajetan, this case shows that the same prudence makes judgments about and commands acts of temperance and of justice. The matter is not separate in a way that would allow a formal or even material independence between species of prudence.

The dispute between Poncius and Cajetan seems to be in part over the way in which prudence is acquired. Can a particular species of prudence be acquired (at least formally) on its own and without the other species of prudence, or must prudence be developed alongside all of the principal moral virtues? According to Thomists, moral virtues ensure rectitude towards the end, but prudence, which is concerned with the means to the end and how the end should be attained, determines the mean of virtue.[40] How is prudence acquired if the moral virtues require prudence, and in turn prudence requires a rectitude to the end that depends on moral virtue? Against Scotus, Cajetan emphasizes that the end is originally known through natural reason, and prudence is concerned with those acts which are means to the end that is naturally known.[41] Consequently, prudence is concerned with any relevant act that might threaten the determination of these means. The growth of prudence in one area depends upon the natural knowledge of the ends and rectitude concerning the all of the appropriate subsidiary ends and means to these ends. In contrast, Scotists focus on the way in which the virtues develop through the choice of the end that belongs to a particular virtue. It is from the choice of the end that each virtue generates its own partial prudence. Therefore, the chaste person's prudence is generated from that virtue alone.[42]

Although this disagreement over the acquisition of prudence involves a number of related disagreements, it well clarifies the

[40] See especially Aquinas, *STh* II-II, q. 47, aa. 6-7; I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3; III *Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 3 (Mandonnet-Moos, eds., 3:1056-59).

[41] Cajetan, *In STh* II-II, q. 27, a. 6, nn. 2-4 (Leonine ed., 8:354). For Cajetan's more general account of how prudence and the moral virtues are acquired, see *In STh* I-II, q. 66, a. 3, n. 13 (Leonine ed., 6:433-34).

[42] Scotus, *Ord.* 3, d. 36, q. un., n. 87 (Vat. ed., 10:256).

way m which the matter of different virtues can affect the determination of the mean that belongs to one virtue. Cajetan shows that the underlying disagreement between the Scotists and the Thomists on the acquisition of prudence is probably in this understanding of the way in which different morally virtuous actions are interrelated and ordered.

III. THE SALMANTICENSES

Although Cajetan and Poncius contribute to the development of the debate over the unity of prudence, it seems to me that the Carmelites of Salamanca (hereafter Salmanticenses) present the clearest development of the Thomist response to the Scotist position. In large part they follow Cajetan, but they improve his arguments in three ways. First, their examples better illustrate the points at stake. Second, they focus not on the somewhat cumbersome analogy between prudence and the common sense, but on those texts in which Thomas distinguishes between perfect and imperfect prudence. Third, they develop the point about the interrelationship of the virtues by emphasizing the importance of the end to which all acts are ordered.

The Salmanticenses give more developed examples in order to illustrate Cajetan's argument that there must be one prudence to choose among incompatible good acts.[43] For instance, they state that someone might use money to pay a creditor out of distributive justice, or feed his parents out of piety, or sacrifice to God out of religion, or help the poor out of mercy. Each of these actions is good and belongs to a different virtue. Unlike in Cajetan's examples, the conflict here is not between vices but between virtues. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances one act will be good and the other bad. If the agent has prudence only with respect to one of these virtues, he will often err because he cannot grasp which circumstances are relevant. For example, someone without filial piety might help the poor when he should

[43] Salamanticenses, *Cursus Theologicus,* trac.t 12, disp. 4, dub. 1 (20 vols. [Paris: Palme, 1870-83], 6:378).

use the money to support his parents. This example shows how prudence must be able not only to recognize one kind of morally good action, but also some sort of order between different kinds of goods. The mean with respect to a particular virtue is threatened not only by other vices, but even by circumstances that might call for the exercise of another virtue.

In order to strengthen their argument, the Salmanticenses state that prudence could issue two types of command for a virtuous action.[44] First, the command could be for the virtuous action regardless of any circumstance which might vitiate it. In such a case the command would touch on the matter of all of the virtues, since the command would hold regardless of whatever matter belonging to another virtue could interfere with it. Second, the command could be for the virtuous action but not cover all of the different circumstances that could vitiate it. In such a case, the command would be imprudent because it would allow for an act that would be contrary to right reason. The difference between the two different commands shows that the matter of the virtues is connected, and that someone who commands a virtuous act as virtuous is concerned not only with the matter of one virtue, but with the virtuous act as a whole. The description of the second command as "imprudent" rather than "imperfectly prudent" makes an important point which is at least undeveloped if not neglected by Cajetan.

The existence of many diverse circumstances that could vitiate the action indicates that prudence must have as its object the matter of each major virtue. The Salmanticenses only briefly repeat Cajetan's analogy of prudence with the common sense.[45] They do so to argue that in order to judge between different objects of lower powers there must be some higher power which has the various objects of the lower powers as its one object. Prudence must include the objects of the moral virtues if it is to judge between them. The prudence that is concerned about the virtuous act under all circumstances can be described as "whole

[44] Salmanticenses, *Cursus Theo/.,* tract. 12, <lisp. 4., dub. 1, n. 6 (Paris ed., 6:378). See also *Cursus Theo/.,* tract. 11, <lisp. 6, dub. 1, n. 5 (Paris ed., 6:123-24).

[45] Salmanticenses, *Cursus Theo/.,* tract. 12, <lisp. 4., dub. 1, n. 7 (Paris ed., 6:378-79).

prudence" *(prudentia totalis)* since it is concerned with all the matter. The Salmanticenses' description of this prudence brings to mind Poncius's statement that perhaps there could be a further prudence which judges between the different partial prudences. But they argue that such prudence makes unnecessary Scotus's contrast between whole and partial prudence:

> ... it therefore should be held that there is one simple habit whose object is every possible act for the common end of human life, which is whole prudence. Having now posited a whole prudence of this sort, the partial prudences which Scotus distinguishes are superfluous.[46]

The contrast between imperfect and perfect prudence is connected with the position of perfect prudence as being concerned not merely with particular ends, but with the ultimate end. The language here resembles Thomas's description of perfect prudence as being concerned with the good end of a whole life, in the *Secunda Secundae* (q. 47, a. 13). The distinction between such prudence and prudence with respect to a limited matter is not the distinction between a genus and a species, but between a perfect and an imperfect virtue. The Salmanticenses therefore seem to connect Thomas's description of prudence as connecting the virtues in the *Prima Secundae* (q. 65, aa. 1-2), with the distinction between perfect and imperfect prudence in this article of the *Secunda Secundae.* The prudence that connects the virtues is the same as that perfect prudence which is concerned not only with particular ends but with the ultimate end.

The Salmanticenses' arguments are both interesting and troublesome in that they bring out an aspect of the connection of the virtues which Thomas explicitly discusses in his *Sentences* commentary and then later does not so clearly address. In the early *Scriptum,* Thomas gives three reasons for the connection of the virtues.[47] The first two he repeats throughout his later

[46] " --- ponendus est igitur unus simplex habitus cujus objectum sit omne agibile ad finem communem humanae vitae, quae est prudentia totalis. Posita vero hujusmodi prudentia totali, superfluunt illae partiales quae Scotus distinguit" (Salmanticenses, *Cursus Theo/.,* tract. 12, <lisp. 4, dub. 1, n. 7 [Paris ed., 6:379]).

[47] Aquinas, III *Sent.,* d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, in corp. (Moos, ed., 3:1215-17).

writings, namely, that they are connected through prudence and also by the fact that each can be considered as a general condition of the virtues. His third argument is that the virtues are connected insofar as they are ordered to the good of virtue. Although this order to the good of virtue is not listed as a distinct argument in his later treatments, it seems to me that it may be implicit in his later discussions of prudence's unity. For example, in *De virtutibus cardinalibus* (a. 2, ad 8), Thomas does state that the moral virtues are unlike the intellectual virtues in that the moral virtues are ordered to the ultimate end through charity. This particular argument therefore rests on the connection between particular goods of virtue and the one ultimate end. Likewise in the *Summa Theologiae*, although Thomas lists only the first two arguments for the connection of the virtues, his discussion of prudence's unity may implicitly contain elements of the earlier argument which bases the connection on their order to an end.[48] He also states in the *Summa Theologiae* that perfect prudence requires a correct order not only to particular ends but to the ultimate end.[49] Therefore, although Thomas no longer uses it as a distinct argument for the connection of the virtues, in both *De virtutibus cardinalibus* and the *Summa Theologiae*, he restates his view that the interrelationship of the matter of different virtues is made necessary by the unity of the ultimate end. The underlying position is that there is an order among the goods which requires prudence in all areas for its establishment and preservation. The Salmanticenses' argument relies on and draws out the implication that prudence is necessary for this ordering to the ultimate end.

CONCLUSION

The difference between Scotus and Thomas on the connection of the virtues and the unity of prudence is hard to resolve in part because it is difficult to understand. Many seemingly decisive cases on closer examination are found to be compatible with both

[48] For instance, Aquinas, *STh* 1-11, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3 and 4.

[49] See, for example, Aquinas, *STh* 1-11, q. 65, a. 2; 11-11, q. 47, a. 13.

views. As the case of the intemperate woman shows, there is real difference in the description of agents who commit acts contrary to a virtue for the sake of some vicious end which does not belong to that virtue's corresponding vice. But why would we decide for one description rather than another? This difference is in part related to alternative understandings of prudence and the mean.

The response of later Thomists to the Scotist position explains and develops Thomas's theory and helps to delineate the difference between the two thinkers. According to Thomists, the virtue of prudence determines the instruments to or particular instantiations of an end, whereas for Scotists it recognizes the morally worthy end. The Thomist focus on the instruments or instantiations makes it possible for the virtues to be connected through one virtue of prudence. This connection is brought out through two examples. First, there is the example in which a vice interferes with the exercise of another moral virtue, as when someone acts against chastity out of avarice. Correct judgment concerning the mean belonging to the matter of one virtue often depends on correct judgment concerning the matter of other virtues. Second, there is the example of how the prudent agent must determine which act is good here and now. This judgment also requires prudence with respect not only to one virtue but to an entire life. The cases in which diverse virtues must collaborate to choose among different seemingly good actions perhaps illustrates this point better that do cases in which one of the virtues is missing.

Although it is hard to know how Scotus would respond to the way in which Thomists develop the arguments, Poncius provides some indication of how it is possible to respond in accordance with Scotus's principles. Whether we judge his response to be successful or not, Poncius as well as the Thomists helps us to see that the two different approaches to prudence are perhaps ultimately based on diverse understandings of how the matters of the various virtues are interrelated. Cajetan's response to the Scotist position originally focused on the way in which the matter of one vice can interfere with another. But Poncius points out that

someone who truly has one vice might not allow such interference. This example might not seem to allow us to discover more than a merely terminological difference between Thomas and Scotus.

The more difficult issue is whether the virtuous person needs to consider not merely the object of one virtue, but rather the good life as a whole. Poncius suggests that perhaps there could be a further kind of prudence which helps to order the partial prudences. It seems to me that this response is necessary to defend Scotus's doctrine of partial prudence, but ultimately it concedes to the Thomists that there is a need for some prudence that is concerned with the good life as a whole. As the Salmanticenses point out, if there is such prudence, it would best be identified with what Thomas Aquinas describes as perfect prudence, and it would seem to make partial prudences unnecessary. Their position develops the Thomistic position in such a way that they are able both to respond to the new arguments of the Scotists and also to explain how Thomas's understanding of the connections of the virtues through prudence is related to the distinction between perfect and imperfect prudence. Their position is not only historically significant; it also shows the way in which contemporary Thomists should explain and defend the connection between the virtues.[50]

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THOMAS'S CATEGORIZATIONS OF VIRTUE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE

WILLIAM C. MATIISON III

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

THOMAS AQUINAS IDENTIFIES groups of virtues according to a variety of distinctions. [1] Three are examined here, namely, those concerning efficient cause, ultimate end, and object of virtue. Thomas distinguishes acquired virtues from infused virtues based upon how they are obtained (efficient cause). He distinguishes natural from supernatural virtues based upon the type of happiness toward which they direct a person (ultimate end). And he distinguishes theological from cardinal virtues based upon a difference between what he calls the "objects" of these different groups of virtues. [2] Each of these distinctions engenders two different *categories* of virtue, or what is called here a single *categorization* of virtue. Each categorization of virtue (e.g., acquired vs. infused virtue), therefore, includes a pair of categories of virtues (e.g., acquired virtues and infused virtues), which are distinguished on some basis or rationale (e.g., efficient cause) that Thomas explicitly supplies.

Though each of these distinctions and categories is well known, there is a certain amount of confusion as to how different

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[2] At times Thomas distinguishes theological virtue from "moral and intellectual virtue," and the relation of this latter to "cardinal virtue" is explained below.

categorizations relate to one another. For instance, in a recent publication, a renowned Thomist remarks, in passing, while discussing *synderesis,* that "discerning and judging action in light of the natural law need to be perfected and stabilized by the cardinal virtues (acquired habits) and infused virtues (faith, hope and charity). "[3] This remark implies that all cardinal virtues are acquired virtues and suggests that the bases for the categorizations "acquired vs. infused" and "cardinal vs. theological" are one and the same. Neither of these is the case. As will be seen below, certain categorizations, though made on different bases, do indeed graft onto each other. However others (including those in this quotation) do not. Examples of such confusion are not infrequent, as will be seen more fully in the final section of this essay.[4] The confusion is particularly evident in historical and contemporary discussions of the relationship between grace and virtue (and the related classic question of pagan virtue), since scholars have commonly approached these questions by offering different categorizations of virtue. In such discussions, precision is especially important, given the nuance required in describing the relationship between nature and grace.

The purpose of this essay is to help dispel such common confusion by explaining how Thomas's different categorizations

[3] See Russsell Hittinger's review (of Douglas Kries' *The Problem of Natural Law)* entitled "Examination of Conscience" in *First Things* 189 Oanuary 2009): 59-61 (at 60). So careful a reader of Thomas as Hittinger knows of course that not all cardinal virtues are not acquired, and that the terms "cardinal" and "infused" refer to different bases of categorization. Yet the quotation, in itself, obscures these facts.

[4] For another example by a renowned Thomist, see Herbert McCabe, O.P., *The Good Life* (London: Continuum, 2005), where he says "Aquinas sets this within the context of what he calls *the* end of man, blessedness *(beatitudo),* and he seeks to show that the political virtues, the cardinal virtues, take their place in the deepest meaning of human life, which is our vocation to the heavenly *polis,* the divine life" (52; emphasis in original). While actually trying to make a point consonant with a main concern of this essay, namely, that cardinal virtues can be directed to one's supernatural happiness, McCabe along the way equates the categories "political" and "cardinal." While cardinal virtues may often be political virtues in Thomas' categorizations of virtue, these two terms do not rely on the same basis of categorization and thus should not be identified with one another.

of virtue are related to one another. [5] The first section presents the ways in which thinkers in the century and a half leading up to Thomas Aquinas explained the bases for different categorizations of virtue. For a variety of reasons, the period of High Scholasticism saw an explosion in attention to categorizations of virtue. The Scholastics of course affirmed established groups of virtues. But they also increasingly tried to explain the *bases* for categorizations of virtue. For example, faith, hope, and charity have been at the center of the Christian tradition since the beginning, and have been understood as virtues for nearly as long. But explaining what these three virtues have in common that makes them members of one category of virtue, and identifying what virtues *not* in this category have in common that places them outside this category, was a topic of great interest for many Scholastics. [6] Their work is surveyed here in the first section through the lens of Thomas's synthesis of three categorizations of virtue (on the basis of efficient cause, ultimate end, and object), for two reasons. First, examining the work of Thomas's predecessors reveals that every one of these three bases of

[5] There is a growing and important body of scholarship explaining the nature of, and too-often neglected importance of, a category of virtues called "infused moral (or cardinal) virtues." This is not the purpose of this essay. Neglect of the infused cardinal virtues is indeed one manifestation of the confusion addressed in this essay. But it is not the only one. For more on this topic see Romanus Cessario, O.P., *The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics*, 2d ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 165-72; idem, *Introduction to Moral Theology* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 200ff.; Servais Pinckaers, O.P., *The Sources of Christian Ethics* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 178-81; Michael Sherwin, O.P, "Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice: A Test Case for the Thomistic Theory of the Infused Cardinal Virtues," *The Thomist* 73 (2009): 29-52; idem, *By Knowledge and By Love* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 170-75; Angela McKay, "Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue," *The Thomist* 69 (2005): 535-55; Robert Miner, "Non-Aristotelian Prudence," *The Thomist* 64 (2000): 401-22.

[6] For an example of the difference between employing a known grouping of virtue and explaining the basis of categorization for said grouping, consider Augustine's *Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love.* In hindsight it is easy to think that Augustine wrote this treatise on the three theological virtues, and of course in a sense he did. But he never labels them as such in that work; nor does he explain any commonality of the three that explains why they are grouped together; nor does he contrast these three virtues as members of one grouping with another grouping of virtues that are not "theological." He simply calls them "three graces" (vi, vii) and is concerned to differentiate them *from each other* by their "objects" (iii, vi).

categorization was developed prior to Thomas. We can better understand how Thomas understood each one by tracing its origin in his predecessors. Second, none of these thinkers offers the synthesis found in Thomas' work, either because they do not attend to all the needed bases of categorization, or because they are unable to offer a satisfactory account of how the different categorizations were related to one another.

The second section traces these three bases for categorization in Thomas's work. The terms found in this section are very familiar to readers of Thomas. What is new is a presentation of these three categorizations in light of their historical development, in a manner that directly explains how Thomas's understanding of the relationship between them avoids some of the problems that persisted in his predecessors' work.

The third section offers several examples of recent work on virtue which evince confusion as to how Thomas's categorizations of virtue are related to one another. Many of the problematic contemporary claims about virtue adduced here (including the ones mentioned briefly above) replicate exactly the problems that beset Thomas's predecessors, problems that can be resolved with the help of the careful reading of Thomas's synthesis offered in section II.

I. THOMAS'S PREDECESSORS, AND THEIR CATEGORIZATIONS OF VIRTUE

The point of this historical survey is to examine how Thomas's twelfth- and thirteenth-century predecessors categorized the virtues, and in particular how they understood different categorizations of virtue to be related to one another. Much like today, thinkers of this period were interested on the one hand in explaining the ways in which the virtues are accessible to or found in non-Christians, and on the other hand in what ways the grace of the Christian life perfects the virtues. Also like today, they commonly approached this problem by categorizing the virtues. To anticipate the conclusions of this section, the thinkers

examined below categorized virtues based on three things: the *object* of virtues, the *end* of virtues, and/or the *cause* of virtues. In these authors there is growing sophistication in naming the bases of different categorizations of virtue, and in describing the relationships between these different categorizations. Nonetheless, in each of these thinkers' categorizations there remains at least one problem or lacuna which will be addressed in Thomas's synthesis.

A) Hugh of St. Victor

This historical survey and inquiry begins in the first half of the twelfth century,[7] with Hugh of St. Victor.[8] In the scattered treatments of virtue in his masterpiece *De sacramentis christianae fidei* (c. 1134), Hugh nowhere lists or distinguishes the cardinal virtues. And though he examines both faith and charity, he nowhere lists what are commonly called the theological virtues.[9] Yet Hugh's work on virtue is enormously helpful in clearly addressing one categorization of virtue, based upon what later

[7] The groundbreaking study for the questions of this essay remains Odon Lottin's *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIII e siecles,* 6 vols. (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont Cesar, 1948-60), esp. vol. 3.2:99-194. Lattin begins his survey with brief mention of Hugh of St. Victor before turning in more detail to Peter Lombard and then especially Abelard and his school of thought (see ibid., 3.2:100). See also Istvan Bejcvy, "The Problem of Natural Virtue," in Istvan Bejcvy and Richard Newhauser, eds., *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 133-54. Bejcvy searches writings of the first half of the twelfth century for references to "natural virtue" and concludes "by 1150 some ground-breaking work for the acceptance of natural virtues had been done. Although scholars agreed that virtue in its truest sense required grace, the Christian monopoly on virtue had been broken .... A much fuller recognition of natural virtue was achieved during the second half of the twelfth century" (ibid., 144). As noted below, Bejcvy himself makes some problematic omissions about categorizations of virtue that blemish his otherwise enormously helpful research.

[8] For a basic introduction to Hugh of St. Victor and the role of this work in his corpus, see Roy J. Deferrari's "Introduction" to his translation *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith* (Cambridge, Mass.: Medieval Academy of America, 1951), ix-x.

[9] Hugh's only list of virtues in this work is found during his treatment of Gregory the Great's famous list of seven capital vices. He identifies the following antidotes to those seven vices: humility, clemency, remorse of mind, desire of justice, mercy, cleanness of heart, and internal peace of mind (Deferrari, trans., *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith,* 376). As was common in the Middle Ages, this list of virtues is a direct reflection of the seven beatitudes from Matt 5:3-9.

thinkers will call the *cause* of virtue. Hugh distinguishes virtues possessed "according to nature and according to grace," [10] or again what he calls natural virtues and virtues "formed by restoring grace superadded to nature." [11] Such a distinction will become standard in the tradition. Hugh's treatment is noted here both because he is an early Scholastic who makes the distinction, and because he makes the distinction in a manner that explains the different ways grace is present in both categories of virtue.

The context of this treatment is important. Hugh is examining the "virtue of man before sin," and in doing so finds it necessary to cite the distinction between creating and saving grace.

> By creating grace are made those things that were not, by saving grace are restored those which had perished. Creating grace first implants certain goods in founded nature, saving grace *both* restores the good which nature when first corrupted lost *and* inspires those goods which nature being imperfect has not yet received .... In the first goods God operates in man, in the second goods God cooperates with man. [12]

This distinction immediately leads Hugh to the topic of merit, as he claims that "when the will of man moves according to nature only, it does not merit outside of nature, but when it moves according to God, it merits above nature, since it deserves Him through whom and for the sake of whom it moves." [13] In the latter case man merits, since "for the sake of God one wills what he wills, and for the sake of God he does what he does." [14]

Hugh immediately connects these two types of grace to two categories of virtue. He claims that "the goods of nature and the

[10] Ibid., 105. See Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* l.6 *(PL* 176:273).

[11] Deferrari, trans., *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith,* 106 (Hugh, *De sacramentis* l.6 *[PL* 176:274]).

[12] Deferrari, trans., *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith,* 105 (emphasis added) (Hugh, *De sacramentis* l.6 *[PL* 176:273]). We see here in the use of term "imperfect" with regard to natural human capacities a foreshadow of one of Thomas's uses of that term to describe virtues that direct humanity to genuine goods which are nonetheless not humanity's supernatural, or perfect, end. See, e.g., *STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 2.

[13] Deferrari, trans., *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith,* 105 (Hugh, *De sacramentis* l.6 *[PL* 176:273]).

[14] Deferrari, trans., *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith,* 106 (Hugh, *De sacramentis* l.6 *[PL* 176:274]).

affections ordered according to nature are natural virtues."[15] These are indeed good and praiseworthy, though they do not merit anything beyond the "goods which were founded for the sake of nature."[16] He distinguishes these natural virtues from the following:

> But the virtues which are formed by restoring grace superadded to nature, since in merit they receive something above nature, are worthy in being requited in reward also above nature, so that for those to whom love of God is the cause in work, the presence of God is reward in requital.[17]

Hence from Hugh's work we can discern one categorization based upon the cause of the virtue, which is either natural goods or "grace superadded to nature."

Two observations are pertinent to this study. First, it is already evident in Hugh's work that the cause of virtue is closely aligned with the ultimate end of virtue, since Hugh claims that when one "moves according to God," it is done "for the sake of God" and "merits above nature." This alignment between categorizations based upon cause and upon ultimate end will be corroborated in later thinkers. Second, Hugh explains lucidly that even when natural virtues are distinguished from virtues "according to grace," neither category is wholly outside the realm of grace, since both rely on creating grace. Hugh's assumption, which may be attributed to all Scholastics treated here, is that it is nonsensical to speak of any virtue with no connection to creating grace. Yet only "virtues which are formed by restoring grace superadded to nature" require saving grace, are done for the sake of God, and are meritorious. Though his methods of categorizing virtues are rudimentary, Hugh's description of the ways grace is and is not present in "natural" virtues applies even in later Scholastic thinkers who will use terms like "acquired" and "infused."

[15] Deferrari, trans., *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith,* 106 (Hugh, *De sacramentis* l.6 [PL 176:274]).

[16] Deferrari, trans., *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith,* 106 (Hugh, *De sacramentis* l.6 [PL 176:274]).

[17] Deferrari, trans., *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith,* 106 (Hugh, *De sacramentis* l.6 [PL 176:274]).

B) Peter Lombard

Despite the fact that commentaries on Peter Lombard's *N Libri Sententiae-and* in particular distinction 33 of book 3-contain some of the most important work on the categorization of virtue provided by Lombard's successors, Lombard himself offers no explicit explanation for any categorization of virtues. He does group the virtues. He clearly examines faith, hope, and charity on the one hand and prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance on the other hand. In his discussion of virtue he spends ten distinctions successively examining faith, hope, and charity (primarily pertaining to their presence in Christ). [18] Yet nowhere does he define a category (such as "theological virtue") that would include these three virtues. He then spends a single distinction on the four "principal, or cardinal" virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. [19] Once again, no explanation is offered as to what these four virtues have in common. Lombard notes only that we find this list in the Book of Wisdom (8:7), and that according to Jerome, those virtues are called cardinal "by which one lives well in this mortal state and afterwards is led to eternal life." [20]

However, though Lombard devotes no explicit attention to explaining the bases for categorizations of virtues, his treatment of the cardinal virtues does offer an implicit rationale for what the four cardinal virtues have in common. The majority of this brief, two-page distinction is spent on the question of whether or not the cardinal virtues remain in eternity. Lombard relies almost exclusively on Augustine's *De Trinitate* to argue that these four virtues do remain in eternal life, but with important differences. This is interesting for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that, for Lombard, the cardinal virtues certainly pertain to humanity's destiny in eternity, a claim which Thomas also affirms, but upon

[18] Peter Lombard, III *Sent.*, dd. 23-32.

[19] Peter Lombard, III *Sent.*, d. 33, c. 1.

[20] Ibid.: "... *quibus in hac mortalitate bene vivitur, et post ad aetemam vitam pervenitur.*" This is a reference to Augustine, *De Trinitate* 14.9.12.

which there is some vacillation in the tradition in the time between Lombard and Thomas. Second, because the cardinal virtues are initially described as virtues "by which one lives well in this mortal state" and because their presence in the next life requires further discussion, it seems that their activities are primarily associated with temporal life. This is a foreshadowing of how certain thirteenth-century thinkers, including Thomas, will distinguish the cardinal virtues as a category.

Yet this is still far from a precise categorization, and likely what leads Odon Lottin to observe that neither Peter Lombard nor his student Peter of Poitiers is much concerned with categorizations of the virtues.[21] At one point Lottin even recalls how Peter of Poitiers claims that people variously distinguish virtues as the four cardinal virtues, the three theological virtues, or the seven gifts of the Spirit.[22] Lottin claims that the implication is that these are three ways of speaking about the same grace that we call virtue, rather than distinct categorizations of the entity called virtue, or different sorts of habits.[23] In sum, we can say that Lombard examines faith, hope, and charity, as well as the cardinal virtues, and that his treatment of the latter suggests they are concerned with temporal affairs; yet there is no formal

[21] Lattin reports Lombard's famous claim that grace is virtue (Lattin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2:101 n. 1). The implication seems to be that for Lombard there is no virtue without grace, which would leave no place for "natural virtue," or "pagan virtue." However, for this claim in Peter Lombard, Lattin references Lombard, II *Sent.,* d. 27, cc. 5 and 6 and 11. Lattin neglects to note that in each of these three citations, virtue is equated with operative, or prevenient, grace. This suggests that Lombard's treatment of grace and virtue may not be as divergent from that of Hugh of St. Victor as implied by simply noting that for Lombard, virtue and grace are identified. Those references from Lombard given by Lattin state: *"gratiam praevenientiem vel operantem esse virtutem"* (c. 5); *"Et ilia gratia* [referring to *secundum quad dicitur operans] virtus non incongrue nominatur"* (c. 6); *"Illa autem gratia praeveniens, quae et virtus est"* (c. 11). A closer examination of grace and virtue in Lombard is beyond the scope of this essay.

[22] Lattin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2:102.

[23] Though Lattin is correct that Lombard's categorizations of virtue are very underdeveloped, one should not underestimate the importance of his transmission of Augustine's discussion of the presence or absence of the cardinal virtues *"in patria,"* as standard treatments of this question both associate the cardinal virtues with worldly matters and yet affirm their connection to humanity's supernatural destiny of union with God.

categorization of either group akin to that found in later medieval authors. [24]

CJ *Peter Abelard and the Porretans*

Peter Abelard's work on virtue contains little that is useful for the present study. In his *Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian,* he discusses what we term the cardinal virtues (without using that exact term) and even the relationship of charity to other virtues. [25] He clearly has in mind the grouping faith, hope, and charity, though he never offers a label such as "theological" for this type of virtue. [26] He cites Socrates' distinctions between prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, but neither labels these virtues "cardinal" or "principal" as Lombard did, nor ever explains or even intimates why these virtues are grouped together. [27]

The unknown authors of *Sententie Parisienses* and *Ysagoge in Theologiam,* two roughly contemporaneous texts in the Abelardian school of thought, largely mimic Abelard's work with regard to categorizations of virtue. [28]

[24] See also Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 2:505-7 for Lombard's treatment of the cardinal virtues. Colish claims "Peter offers no suggestions as to how, or whether, the cardinal virtues are related to the theological virtues.... This is clearly an area for further reflection" (507).

[25] See *Dialogus inter Philosophum,]udaeum, et Christianum (PL* 178: 1611-84, esp 1651-58).

[26] See ibid. *(PL* 178:1648-52).

[27] See ibid. *(PL* 178: 1651-58). Abelard does offer some interesting arguments as to why prudence is not properly a virtue, even though it is requisite for the exercise of virtue (ibid. *[PL* 178:1652]). See the subsequent (of uncertain authorship) *Ysagoge in Theologiam* (in Arthur Landgraf, ed., *Ecrits theologiques de l'ecole d'Abelard* [Louvain: Spicilegium Scarum Louvaniese, 1934], 61-289, esp. 74), for development of this tradition. Abelard does at one point mention, but does not explicate in any detail, "political virtue" from the Neoplatonic tradition's fourfold division of *virtutes politicas, purgatorias, purgati animi, et exemplares (Dialogus [PL* 178: 1649]). The category "political" is important for this study, and is treated below starting with Abelard's disciples.

[28] The *Sententie Parisienses* is also found in Landgraf, ed., *Ecrits theologiques de /'ecole d'Abelard,* l-60. Two observations about these works' discussions of virtues warrant mention here. First, though both extensively examine faith, hope, and charity (the *Sententie Parisienses* treating hope within the context of faith), neither examines those three primarily through the lens of virtue, or even describes them as members of one category of virtues. Second, while

However, two disciples of Abelard, described by Lottin as representing the Porretan school of thought, warrant extended mention: Alan of Lille and Simon of Tournai.[29] The cardinal virtues feature prominently for both of them. Indeed, Alan claims that these four virtues are the principles, or sources, of all virtue.[30] This claim is substantiated by the fact that even the virtues of faith, hope, and charity are treated as parts of the virtue of religion, which is itself a part of justice.[31] Though never defined as a category (likely since they seem to cover all virtues, suggesting there is no other category against which to distinguish them), the cardinal virtues are enormously important in this school of thought.

Despite their lack of a complementary category for "cardinal" virtue, Alan and Simon do offer a categorization that is very important for this study. Both rely heavily on the distinction "political" vs. "catholic" virtue. The descriptor "political" was commonly attributed by medieval thinkers to Macrobius, and is the first part of a fourfold division of virtue.[32] Though the term "political" virtue is well-entrenched in the tradition (even if the

faith, hope, and charity are not treated as a category of virtue, they are clearly related to the virtues. In the *Sententie Parisienses,* prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude are treated within the section on charity. Seemingly following Augustine, the author claims that indeed "all virtue is charity." (See *Sententie Parisienses* [Landgraf, ed., 51]. This claim is never expanded upon.) In the *Ysagoge in Theologiam,* these four virtues are treated first, leading into a section on faith, hope, and charity. Though the explanatory usefulness of the concept of virtue is all but left behind in the latter section, the author's transition between these two sections is the direct claim that he will now proceed on to the "three greatest virtues: faith, hope, and charity." (See Landgraf, ed., 78.)

[29] Alan of Lille's entire *De virtutibus et de vitiis et de donis spiritus sancti* is printed in a later volume of Lottin's magisterial study. See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 6:45-92. The page and line numbers cited here to reference this text are from Lottin's volume. Texts from Simon used here are scattered manuscripts found in Lottin. See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2:105-18.

[30] Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis,* c. 1, a. 1 (Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 6:50).

[31] Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis,* c. 1, a. 2 (Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 6:53-54).

[32] For the origin of this Neoplatonic fourfold division of virtue, see Joshua Hochschild, "Porphyry, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas: A Neo-Platonic Hierarchy of Virtues, and Two Christian Appropriations," in John Inglis, ed., *Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition* (Richmond, Surrey: Vurzon Press, 2002), 245-59. Hochschild observes that Macrobius attributes the categorization to Plotinus, but it seems instead to come from Porphyry (ibid., 245).

same may not be said for the Porretan school's meaning for the term), according to Lottin the term "catholic" virtue is a creation of the Porretan school.[33]

Both Alan and Simon are explicitly concerned with the question of the status of virtue in Jews, infidels, and Gentiles.[34] They affirm the presence of virtue in these people, and yet claim that infidels, Jews, and Gentiles have different virtues. Describing this difference is the function of the "political" vs. "catholic" distinction. The following text from Simon is indicative of Porretan thought:

> What are the species of virtue? The species of virtue are twofold, and distinguished by duty and end. If a quality fixes the mind toward attainment of a political duty for a political end, it is called a political virtue. In such a way citizens, even including infidels such as Jews or gentiles, are said to have virtues, if they have their minds firmly set on the pursuit of necessary civic duties according to the decrees of their land, for establishing or preserving the common good. Political virtue is thus named for the *polis*, which is the multitude or citizenry, because it is approved by the judgment of the multitude or citizenry, although it is insufficient for salvation. However, a virtue is catholic which fixes the mind in firm resolution toward the pursuit of a catholic duty to a catholic end. In this way the faithful have virtues, according to the decrees of the Catholic religion, ultimately for the sake of God as he [alone] is enjoyed.[35]

[33] See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2: 106 n. 1.

[34] Alan and Simon repeatedly speak of virtue outside the Catholic faith. Comments like these prompt Bejcvy to claim that the second half of the twelfth century sees a "much fuller recognition of pagan virtue" ("The Problem of Natural Virtue," 144). As is evident in Lottin, a primary concern of Simon and Alan, following Abelard, is distinguishing natural capacities and particular acts from more established qualities of a person, such as virtues. Given this concern, it is not surprising they are willing to affirm the presence of virtues in people without charity. Nonetheless the claim is noteworthy for this study, especially given its juxtaposition with Lottin's claim about the basic equation of virtue and grace in Lombard and his followers. This important difference prompts Lottin to distinguish what he calls a theological and a philosophical school of thought on defining virtue in the era (see Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2:100-106, 142-50), though his claim that the theological school "wins out" may rest on inadequate assumptions about the possibility of simultaneously affirming the presence of virtue in those without charity, and its perfection in those with charity.

[35] The text from a manuscript of Simon of Tournai is found in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2:107: "Que sint species uirtutis. Due sunt species uirtutis, que his officiis et finibus distinguuntur. Si enim qualitas mentem constituat ad exsequendum officium politico fine politico, dicitur uirtus politica; quo modo ciues,licet infideles ut iudei uel gentiles, dicuntur habere uirtutes, si mentes habeant firmo proposito constitutas ad exsequendum debita officia secundum instituae patrie propter rem publicam conseruandam uel confederandam.

Therefore, the primary distinguishing factor between political and catholic virtue, according to Alan and Simon, is the ultimate end of the activity of the virtue, which always entails a corresponding duty.[36] This raises the question of how a difference of ultimate end changes the acts of political and catholic virtues. According to Lottin, Alan and Simon seem to think that the only difference between the acts of these two categories of virtue is the merit associated with catholic virtues. He asks, "Why couldn't one who commits an act with an eye toward a natural end commit the *same act* toward a supernatural end?"[37] Lottin summarizes Alan's answer to the question by saying, "God gives a great gift to humanity when, by his grace and the charity he inspires, he renders meritorious for eternal life acts which beforehand would only be natural."[38] A common question at the time, whether or

Diciturautem uirtus politica a polis, que est pluralitas uel ciuitas, quia iudicio pluralitatis uel ciuitatis approbatur, licet sit insufficiens ad salutem. Virtus autem catholica que constanti proposito mentem constituit ad exsequendum officium catholicum fine catholico: quo modo dicuntur fideles habere uirtutes, si mentes habeant constitutas ad exsequenda officiasecundum catholice religionis instituta, finaliter propter Deum ut eo fruantur." For a comparable quotation from Alan of Lille see his *De virtutibus et de vitiis,* c. 1, a. 1 (Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 6:49-50). Alan accentuates the difference in scope in the meaning of the words "political" (as civic) and "catholic" (as universal).

[36] Though Alan and Simon claim that virtues may be distinguished by duty and end, in reality these two descriptors always function in parallel fashion, such that they yield two, not four, categories of virtue. In other words, never does either Scholastic describe an occasion where the end of virtue is catholic, and duty is political (or, for that matter, where the end of virtue is political and duty is catholic). For instance, even the virtuous Jew who clearly carries out duties not in accord with the Catholic faith but nonetheless for the sake of God is described as having political virtue. For a helpful explanation of the meanings of end and duty, see Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis,* c. 1, a. 1 (Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 6:48-49). See also a helpful text from a manuscript Lottin attributes to Alan, at Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2:120. For an attempt by Alan to explain the virtue of the Jews in a system that conflates end with the duties of the Catholic religion, see his *De virtutibus et de vitiis,* c. 1, a. 1 (Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 6:50).

[37] "Si la vertu est politique ou catholique, naturelle ou surnaturelle, en partie du moins selon les fins poursuivies, pourquoi celui qui pose un acte en vue d'une fin naturelle ne pourrait-il pas exercer *ce meme acte* pour un fin surnaturelle?" (Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2:115, emphasis added). Though the descriptors are accurate, neither Alan nor Simon uses "natural" and "supernatural" as technical terms synonymously with "political" and "catholic" in describing virtues.

[38] For an example of this claim in Alan, see *De virtutibus et de vitiis,* c. 1, a. 3 (Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 6:59): *"Deus homini conferre, cum per ea que prius habebat facit eum dignum uita eternal, informans ea debito fine et debito officio."* This description makes it seem

not political virtues can become catholic, thus receives a resounding yes.[39] Lattin summarizes Simon's answer to this question by saying, "Thanks to the virtues of faith, hope, and especially charity, a political virtue becomes a catholic virtue, that is, meritorious of eternal recompense."[40]

There are several problems with Alan's and Simon's use of the "political vs. catholic" distinction. First, differentiating virtues according to only one distinction-in this case ultimate end-conflates some virtues which are helpfully distinguished at other points in the tradition. For instance, when Simon claims that faith, hope, and charity can make political virtues catholic, he fails to explain what differentiates faith, hope, and charity from the political virtues made catholic. Once a virtue such as temperance becomes catholic, what differentiates it from faith, hope, and charity?[41] Furthermore, what is it that political temperance and catholic temperance share that renders them both to be properly described as "temperance"? Surely Alan and Simon would reply that in both cases the virtue concerns, say, eating moderately. But by failing to offer a category that includes all of the cardinal virtues, and yet is distinct somehow from faith, hope, and charity, Alan and Simon end up both conflating virtues that have important differences, and failing to account for commonalities in virtues that are in other ways importantly

that it is the same acts one previously performed that become meritorious. In another place Alan claims that acts of political and catholic virtue differ only in their "mode of use" (ibid.). As seen below, Aquinas offers a more satisfactory account of how meritorious action directed toward one's supernatural end is transformed. For more on merit and grace, see Joseph Wawrykow's *God's Grace and Human Action: Merit in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).

[39] See Alan's *De virtutibus et de vitiis,* c. 1, a. 3 (Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 6:57). For Simon's treatment of the same issue, see Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2:118 n. 1.

[40] Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2:118. This is a noteworthy difference between Simon and Alan, as Alan nowhere claims that it is faith, hope, and charity that elevate the political virtues to become catholic.

[41] This is one reason why it is inadequate to speak of faith, hope, and charity-rather than God's grace-as elevating virtues such as temperance to be directed toward one's supernatural end. Alan addresses the objection that it is the grace of the Holy Spirit that engenders catholic virtues, but does not incorporate it into his own response. See Lottin's citation of a manuscript from Alan (Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2:120).

different.[42] In hindsight it is clear that what is required here is an additional categorization on the basis of object.

The second problem with Alan's and Simon's categorization solely by ultimate end is that it fails adequately to describe how a change in ultimate end of a virtue changes the acts of that virtue. These thinkers of course claim that merit is only attached to catholic virtue. However, armed with only one categorization and thus unable to describe any other way to name the similarities that exist between, for example, political chastity and catholic chastity, they end up claiming that God makes what was already possessed worthy of eternal life through the assignment of merit. This makes the assignment of merit appear arbitrary, and fails adequately to describe the difference between acts that have different ultimate ends.

Both of these issues will be resolved in Thomas's work, largely through the availability of additional bases of categorization. In sum, Alan and Simon helpfully distinguish virtues based upon different ultimate ends, and yet their categorization reveals the deficiencies of utilizing only one basis of categorization.

D) William of Auxerre

William of Auxerre moves in important ways beyond the categorizations of the twelfth century. William is the first of those surveyed here to identify the category "theological virtue" (which includes faith, hope, and charity) and to attempt to explain the basis of that category.[43] In his opening treatment of distinctions

[42] For instance, Alan adduces chastity as an example of an action that may be political or catholic. If one is chaste in service to the common good, the virtue is political. If one is chaste is service to God, it is catholic. Hence in this categorization, charity and faith on the one hand, and holy chastity and Lenten abstinence on the other, are all catholic virtues. Alan and Simon oppose these to virtues such as political chastity and political temperance. In sum, by offering only one basis for categorizing, according to ultimate end, the Porretans are unable to delineate differences between virtues with the same ultimate end, and similarities between virtues with different ultimate ends.

[43] See William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tracts 11-29 (ed. Jean Ribailler [Paris: Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1980-87], 170-584). In my research for this essay William of Auxerre is the first person I encountered in the Christian tradition to name and explain the basis of the category "theological virtue."

between virtues, William distinguishes theological from political virtues: "this is the difference between political virtues and theological virtues, that political virtues are engendered by frequent good acts, while theological virtues are generated by God alone."[44] Here he seems to focus on the *cause* of virtue, but in his discussion of the theological virtues he also attends to what Thomas eventually understands to be the basis of this categorization, namely, their *object*. In William's words, "Faith, hope, and charity are called theological virtues because through them we are moved into God *[in Deum]* immediately."[45]

This lack of clarity of a basis for the category of theological virtue is revealed when William attempts to names those virtues from which the theological virtues are distinguished. As noted, he opposes theological virtue to political virtue on the basis of the cause of virtue (what Thomas will call acquired vs. infused virtue), with political virtues being caused by frequent good acts. At times he also claims that political virtues do not concern salvation, and that they do not exceed the capacity of human nature.[46] This latter claim would appear to be an ultimate end distinction, akin to Alan's and Simon's "political vs. catholic" distinction. It seems that William can reliably graft the ultimate end and cause distinctions onto one another, such that, in his categorization of theological and political virtue, theological virtues are always

[44] William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tract. 11, cap. 1 (Ribailler, ed., 172 and 174).

[45] William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tract. 11, c. 3, q. 5 (Ribailler, ed., 193). See also ibid. III, tract. 11, cap. 2 (Ribailler, ed., 181) for God as the immediate end of the theological virtues. Also in this chapter, In a clear reference to Augustine's *De doctrina christiana,* William claims that by theological virtues we desire to enjoy God (Ribailler, ed., 179). (See also *Summa aurea* III, tract. 36, cap. 1 [Ribailler, ed., 684-85] for the link in the theological virtues between "enjoying" God and having God as one's immediate end.) The use of Augustine's classic distinction is treated below under Philip. Note also that William actually uses the term "end," not "object" as Thomas does. But William qualifies this by saying that he means not ultimate end-since all virtues have one ultimate end, namely, God-but rather principal end.

[46] William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tract. 11, c. 2 (Ribailler, ed., 772): *"quod politica virtus dicitur, que non excedit metas nature"* and *"quoniam secundum hoc virtutes politice non excedunt fines nature."* There William also claims, *"quoniam opera virtutum politicorum non valent ad salutem, nisi adsit caritas"* (ibid. [Ribailler, ed., 773). It is noteworthy that William adds *"nisi adsit caritas";* it is not clear from that text in what way the political virtues could still be called political with the presence of charity.

infused and concern salvation, while political virtues are always acquired by frequent acts and do not concern salvation. But the problem lies in trying to explain where the cardinal virtues fit into this picture.

At times, William clearly equates the political virtues and cardinal virtues; indeed, his whole question on political virtue assumes a reference to the four cardinal virtues.[47] Yet already in this very question the problems with conflating "political" and "cardinal" are evident when William (citing Wis 8:7) claims that nothing is more useful in life than these four cardinal virtues when they are informed by charity and merit eternal life.[48] Given the above claims about political virtue, the equation of cardinal virtue and political virtue would mean that the cardinal virtues are also always acquired by frequent acts and do not concern salvation. Yet how can this be when the cardinal virtues are also said to be informed by charity and merit eternal life? William seems to recognize this tension in a later question on the connection between the virtues when he opposes theological virtues to political virtues, and says that political virtues are of two sorts: the sort described by Aristotle (which can be possessed in mortal sin and are not necessarily connected with each other) on the one hand and the four cardinal virtues from Wisdom 8:7 (which are dispelled by mortal sin and connected with each other as well as faith, hope, and love) on the other hand.[49] Here the cardinal virtues in one sense are a subset of the political virtues, and in another sense both refer to humanity's supernatural end and are infused.[50]

The possibility of resolving these claims by saying that there are political virtues that-unlike the cardinal virtues-are not

[47] See William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tract. 19, on the political virtues. Here he repeatedly refers to "these four" virtues (e.g., *"Iste enim quatuor virtutes")* and cites Wisdom 8:7 to say that nothing is more useful in life than these four (Ribailler, ed., 385).

[48] See William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tract. 19 (Ribailler, ed., 385): *"Ve/ potestdici quod hiis virtutibus nichil est utilius in vita, secundum quod sunt informat<e> caritate."*

[49] See William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tract. 11, c. 2 (Ribailler, ed., 770).

[50] Interestingly enough for contemporary debates on "perfect vs. imperfect" virtue, William uses this terminology in this question, which is a helpful context within which to read Thomas's *STh* I-II, q. 65, aa. 1-2.

infused and do not concern salvation runs aground, for William elsewhere equates the cardinal virtues and the political virtues.[51] Indeed, he grants that the cardinal virtues are, at times, *not* directed toward humanity's eternal destiny. For instance, he distinguishes political justice, which is acquired and available to humanity through the use of reason, from theological justice, which is infused by God alone and through which one earns eternal life.[52]

The solution to William's confusion appears obvious to readers well acquainted with Thomas's categorizations of virtue: positing a category of virtue (such as cardinal virtue) that is opposed to theological virtue in terms of object (i.e., having an object that is *not* God immediately). Despite William's description of theological virtue as moving us to God immediately, he never articulates a corresponding category of virtue that directs us in activities that do *not* concern God immediately. As was the case with Alan and Simon, employing only one categorization of virtue impedes William from being able to distinguish all that requires distinguishing. Despite William's superb work on defining theological virtue, a description of the different ways other virtues are opposed to these, particularly with regard to object,[53] awaits further development in the tradition.

E) Philip the Chancellor and Other Mid-Thirteenth-Century Work on Virtue

In his survey of Thomas's predecessors, Lottin ends one chapter with William of Auxerre, and starts the next with Philip

[51] William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tract 19.

[52] Here William rightly relies on "theological" to refer to end, but defies his earlier claim that "theological" means related to God *immediately,* which is clearly not the case with justice. See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2:145-46.

[53] William is not unaware of distinctions according to object, as is evident in his claim about theological virtues concerning God immediately. He also associates different virtues with different powers of the soul (though not in nearly the detail found in Philip [see below]) *(Summa aurea* III, tract. 11, c. 3 [Ribailler, ed., 183-96]). But he never articulates an umbrella category of virtue such as "moral" or "cardinal" that may be opposed to "theological" on the basis of object.

the Chancellor. Just a decade separates William's *Summa aurea* (1220-25) from Philip's *De bona* (1232), but the division between their categorizations of virtue is as significant as Lottin's organization of the history suggests.[54] To be sure, there are both important commonalities between William and Philip and developments between Philip and Thomas.[55] Nonetheless, it is in Philip that we finally see the articulation of the category that is missing in William and yet that is crucial to explaining the best instincts of William's own thought. Philip explains perfectly the distinction between theological and cardinal virtues.

Like William of Auxerre in echoing Augustine's distinction *betweenfrui* and *uti*, Philip claims that the theological virtues take us all the way "into" our ultimate end, who is God, while the cardinal virtues concern those things directed "toward" our ultimate end.[56] Without using the term "object," as Thomas does, Philip distinguishes theological virtues from cardinal virtues, not according to their ultimate end, but according to the types of

[54] It also explains why R. E. Houser puts Philip first (with Albert and Thomas) in his book on cardinal virtues *(The Cardinal Virtues: Aquinas, Albert, and Philip the Chancellor* **[f**oronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2004]). For more on the influence of Phillip (and esp. his support of, and appreciation by, the Dominicans), see ibid., 3-4 and 56. See also Hauser's introduction to Philip's thought in "Philip the Chancellor," in Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone, eds., *Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, Publishing, 2003), 534-35. Philip's advances in categorizing virtues are not to be explained by the introduction of Aristotle's thought, for historical reasons and conceptual ones. For historical analysis, see Brother Azarias, "Aristotle and the Christian Church: An Essay" (New York: Sadlier, 1888 [posted on Notre Dame's Maritain Center's webpage (http://www2.nd.edu/Departments//Maritain/etext/aatcc.htm)]), which argues for the incorporation of Aristotle's thought by William. As for the conceptual consideration, a main purpose of this study is examining how thinkers have understood the cardinal virtues in relation to a life of grace, a topic obviously not addressed by Aristotle.

[55] For example, Philip places justice with prudence in human reason without explaining (as Thomas does) that justice is in the rational appetite or will. Philip also orders the cardinal virtues as follows: prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice. See Houser, *Cardinal Virtues,* 64-73 on these matters.

[56] Philip the Chancellor, *Summa De bonoIII,* 2, C, 1 (ed. Nicolai Wicki [Berne: Editiones A. Francke SA, 1985], 756): *"iste* [the cardinal virtues] *sint circa ea que sunt ad finem et non in finem, scilicet Deum."* See also Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues,* 49.

activities each category concerns.[57] The cardinal virtues concern temporal things, the theological virtues eternal things.[58]

Philip is quite aware that the cardinal virtues also "concern" eternal things, and may be ultimately directed toward one's supernatural destiny of union with God. As R. E. Houser puts it, they concern temporal things but "with God in sight."[59] In one passage Philip grants an objector's observation that the cardinal virtues may be infused by God.[60] Yet that relation does not define the category. Thus we see more clearly in Philip than in anyone else yet the simultaneous recogmt10n of the bases of categorization which will be called by Thomas the ultimate end and the object of activity.[61] What marks a development in Philip's work over William's is that Philip offers a clearer explanation of how cardinal and theological virtues differ in object, all the while noting how the two types of virtue can share the same ultimate end in God.

Yet even in Philip, we see lingering confusion over the relationship between the categorizations based upon object and those based upon ultimate end. As in previous authors such as William, the confusion comes while explaining the relationship between the categories "political" virtue and "cardinal" virtue, and in the author's treatment of the connection between the

[57] Houser notes that Philip does share Thomas's understanding of object, even if he does not use the term on certain occasions where Thomas does (Houser, *Cardinal Virtues,* 44). Philip also correlates this understanding of object with the superior and inferior parts of reason. See *Summa De bono* III, 2, C, q. 1 (Wicki, ed., 746).

[58] Philip the Chancellor, *Summa De bono* III, 2, C, q. 1 (Wicki, ed., 746): *"quia secundum tres virtutes theologicas ordinatur anuima ad eternal contemplanda, secundum quatourvirtutes cardinals et humanas dirigitur ad temporalia et corporalia dispensanda."* Note here that Philip seems to use the descriptor "human" in reference to the object of virtue. The problems with variable usage of "human" in reference to a category of virtue are treated below.

[59] Houser, *Cardinal Virtues,* 49.

[60] Philip the Chancellor, *Summa De bono* III, 2, C, 1 (Wicki, ed., 756): *"cum* [virtutes cardinales] *sint infuse ad differtiam I politicarum* ... ."

[61] Thomas at times says "object" *(STh* I-II, q. 62, aa. 1and2) and at other times "material object" *(STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4), the latter to distinguish it from formal object, as is discussed below. Also, what Thomas calls "object" Philip at times labels "end," meaning not ultimate end but rather proximate end. See Houser, *Cardinal Virtues,* 44.

virtues.[62] In asking whether or not the virtues are connected, Philip says the question is twofold, concerning virtues from grace on the one hand and moral virtues on the other.[63] By virtues from grace it becomes clear he means the theological virtues. As to what he calls "moral virtues," he claims he will first discuss the political virtues, and then the cardinal virtues.[64] William had equated the cardinal virtues and the political virtues, and so his placing the cardinal virtues as a subset of political virtues in this discussion was problematic. Philip examines first *moral* virtue, and then theological virtue. He divides moral virtue into political and cardinal virtue. Though this is a clear advancement over William's work, one serious problem remains. When explaining his treatment of the moral virtues, then the theological virtues, Philip says he will treat first the moral virtues, and then virtues from grace, clearly implying that the moral virtues are not infused by God's grace, which is incommensurate with the claims noted above about the cardinal virtues concerning God and being infused. This confusion leads Houser to remark that Philip "backed away" from his prior position that the cardinal virtues could be infused.[65] This otherwise inexplicable (and ultimately inadequate) claim by Philip is more understandable given the precedence in William's treatment, upon which Philip actually

[62] See Philip the Chancellor, *Summa De bona* III, 2, C, cont., q. 1 (Wicl<i,ed., 1069-84). This discussion parallels other authors' treatments of Lombard's III *Sent.,* d. 36. It also parallels William's *Summa aurea* III, tract. 40. Interestingly enough, it is precisely in the context of examining Thomas mature treatment of this question at *STh* I-II, q. 65, aa. 1-2 that certain contemporary commentators have evinced confusion as to the relationship between categorizations of virtue (see below).

[63] See Philip the Chancellor, *Summa De bona* III, 2, C, cont., q. 1 (Wicki, ed., 1069): *"Questio est utrum habet unam virtutem habeat omnes, et hec question bipartite est, tum quantum ad gratuitas tum quantum ad morales. Et queratur primo de moralibus, quia de illis minus videtur."* Philip's following treatment of the moral virtues focuses on the cardinal virtues.

[64] See Philip the Chancellor, *Summa De bona* III, 2, C, cont., q. 1 (Wicki, ed., 1071).

[65] Houser, *Cardinal Virtues,* 50. Characteristic of his study, which offers a superb analysis of how different scholastics treat the "parts" of the cardinal virtues, Houser notes how the cardinal virtues are "complicated" to address since they may refer to general or specific virtues. That claim is not denied here. What is further claimed here is that confusion is engendered in thinkers who preceded Thomas by their failure to explain how different categorizations of virtue are related to one another.

made improvements. Despite recognizing the importance of categorizations of virtue by object, Philip still falters by at times distinguishing theological virtue and cardinal virtue on the basis of *object* (a categorization adopted by Thomas), and at other times assuming that because theological virtues are infused by grace *(cause)* and concern humanity's supernatural end *(end),* the cardinal virtues must therefore differ from theological virtues on these bases as well, when in fact they need not.

F) A Word on Albert the Great and Bonaventure

Before turning to Thomas, it should be noted that, for the purposes of the questions driving this essay, Albert the Great offers no significant development over Philip. Philip's distinction between the theological and the cardinal virtues is found in Albert's work, but it plays no significant role.[66] In fact, he offers little treatment of the theological virtues, prompting Houser to claim, "Content with Philip's work on the theological virtues, Albert could then confine his *De bona* to the four cardinal virtues."[67] Albert does have a clear understanding of the distinction and relationship between the end and efficient cause of different categories of virtue, as when he claims that political virtues and virtues from grace differ according to the intention of the agent, since the former are done for the civic good while the latter are done for the sake of God.[68] Here he correctly notes that the cause and the ultimate end of virtue may be conflated. He also

[66] See Albert, III *Sent.,* d. 33, a. 1, where he affirms the objector's distinction between our end *(finis)* and what leads to our end *(ad finem),* and claims that the theological virtues concern the former and the cardinal virtues the latter. Albert's *ad finem* echoes Philip's distinction, though Albert does not oppose it to the exact phrase *in finem* as Philip does. See Houser, *Cardinal Virtues,* 128 and 131.

[67] Houser, *Cardinal Virtues,* 57. Houser claims that Albert's main contribution in *Summa De bona* is his expansion of Philip's work on the parts of the cardinal virtues.

[68] See Albert the Great, *De bona,* tract. 5, q. 4, a. 2 (Geyer et al, eds., *Opera Omnia* 28 [Cologne: Aschendorff, 1951], 301): *"Non enim differunt virtutes politicae a gratuitis secundum actus, sed secundum intentionem agentiis, quia operatio virtutis politicae est propter bonum civile, operatio gratuitorum est propter Deum."*

claims that the cardinal virtues can be infused.[69] Yet despite these affirmations, the main thrust of Albert's work equates political virtue and cardinal virtue, and he repeatedly claims without qualification that the cardinal virtues are obtained by repeated action.[70]

Bonaventure's work is of minor importance for the purposes of this study, though two points should be noted. First, he also offers a clear distinction between theological and cardinal virtue according to object: the theological virtues regulate our actions toward God while the cardinal virtues regulate those activities that concern other persons and ourselves.[71] Second, his thought on the political virtues seems inconsistent at times. In his *Commentary on the Sentences* he distinguishes political virtues from cardinal virtues by saying that the former concern life among men, while the latter concern our entry into heaven.[72] Yet at another point in that text he makes political virtues one subset of cardinal virtues by saying that political virtues are cardinal virtues that are acquired and concern civic life, while other cardinal virtues are infused, meritorious and concern our eternal home.[73] Yet again in his *Collationes in Hexaemeron,* which one commentator claims best represents his own thought on virtue,

[69] See his *Commentary on the Sentences* III, d. 33, a. 2, where Albert claims that when cardinal virtues are infused and thus well-formed, they are called cardinal in relation to other (unlabeled) virtues. See Houser, *Cardinal Virtues,* 134.

[70] For the equation of political and cardinal virtue, see *De bona,* tract. 1, q. 4, "on the good of the political virtues," which is about the cardinal virtues without distinction. *De bona,* tract. 1, q. 6, a. 2 asks, *"Quare dicitur cardinals vel politicae?",* and III *Sent.,* dd. 33 and 36, similarly equates those terms. This is somewhat odd since it is in his commentary on distinction 33 that Albert mentions that the cardinal virtues can be infused. Citations such as these prompt Houser to claim that Albert "was more consistent than Philip the Chancellor about the fact that the cardinal virtues are acquired virtues" *(Cardinal Virtues,* 63) and "both [i.e., cardinal and political virtues] are acquired" (ibid., 57). Though Houser is right that this problematic assumption that cardinal virtue is acquired is consistently found in Albert's work, there are exceptions as noted above. See also Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.1: 183 for a view of Albert as more consistent with Philip than Houser implies with respect to the cardinal virtues being infused and directed toward our ultimate end of God.

[71] See Bonaventure, III *Sent.,* d. 33, a. 1, q. 1. See also Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.1:173.

[72] See Bonaventure, III *Sent.,* d. 33, dub. 5. See also Lottin, *Psychologie et morale,* 3.1:179.

[73] Bonaventure, III *Sent.,* d. 33, q. 5.

Bonaventure addresses the fourfold Neoplatonic division of virtue and clearly understands all four divisions-including "political" virtue-as directing one toward God.[74] Again we see a Scholastic thinker struggling to explain the relationship between cardinal and political virtue. Bonaventure's work thus contains material of interest regarding the categorization of virtue, but no further advances toward the Thomistic synthesis.

G) Concluding Observations

Numerous advances in explaining the bases for categorizing different groups of virtue are evident in the survey carried out in this section. Two groups of virtues can be distinguished: one caused by God's grace, and the other caused by repetitious actions arising from the "goods of nature," to use Hugh's term. The latter do not involve saving grace, though of course they are rooted in creating grace. Two groups of virtues can also be distinguished on the basis of the "end" to which they direct the person: this is either the political good or the higher end of a supernatural destiny. Alan and Simon's "political vs. catholic" distinction is a fine example of this basis of categorization, even though the term "catholic" will not be used in this way by later Scholastics. It should also be noted that the categorizations based on cause and end appear correlated, such that "political" (to use the Porretans' term) virtues are obtained by repeated acts of one's natural endowments, while virtues "above nature" (to use Hugh's term) are caused by God's grace. This is seen particularly clearly in Hugh's work.

[74] For a discussion of Bonaventure on the cardinal virtues (and the claim that the *Hexaiimeron* represents his most mature thought), see Edward Synan, "Cardinal Virtue in the Cosmos of Saint Bonaventure," in *S. Bonaventura 1274-1974,* vol. 3 (Roma: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1973), 21-38. For another helpful look at Bonaventure on the virtues, see Jean Chiitillon, "Le primat de la vertu de charite dans la thfologie de Saint Bonaventure," in *San Bonaventura: Maestro Di Vita Francescana e di Sapienza Cristiana,* vol. 3 (Roma: Pontificia Facolta Teologica «San Bonaventura» 1976), 217-38. Also see Hochschild, "Porphyry, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas," 248-50 for Bonaventure's claim that all four levels are stages of a purification and ascent toward God, including the political virtues.

We also see growing clarity in the tradition on another basis of categorization, which Thomas calls "object." Two groups of virtues may be distinguished on the basis of whether their activities concern God directly *(in finem),* or things leading to God *(ad finem).* This is best seen in Philip's distinction between the theological and cardinal virtues. The recognition of this basis for categorization is an achievement, hinted at in William and seen most clearly in Philip. Problems remain, however. For instance, neither of these authors were able adequately to explain the relationship between what Philip calls the "theological vs. cardinal virtue" categorization on the one hand, and the other categorizations based on end and cause on the other hand. Thus, we see Philip alternately claiming that the cardinal virtues may be infused and that they are only caused by repeated acts. There is also vacillation, noted above, on whether or not these virtues concern our eternal destiny. These problems appear most evidently when the Scholastics try to explain the relationship between cardinal and political virtue. Thus, though all the basic distinctions employed by Thomas appear in his predecessors, what remained to be achieved was a synthesis of the categorizations of virtue that would explain how the different bases for categorization related to one another.

II. ST. THOMAS'S CATEGORIZATIONS OF VIRTUE

Saint Thomas's work on virtue leads Houser to claim, "At long last, someone had finally achieved a fully integrated treatment of the general nature of the seven fundamental moral virtues."[75] The

[75] Houser, *Cardinal Virtues,* 66. Houser unfortunately uses the term "moral" here in a nontechnical sense, presumably meaning the more general "morally important," which certainly faith, hope, and charity are even if they are not technically "moral" virtues for St. Thomas. Houser's work on the cardinal virtues in the thirteenth century is the closest English equivalent to Lottin's magisterial work in *Psychologie et morale,* 3.2. However, particularly in his work on Thomas, Houser focuses more on Thomas's ingenuity in explaining the general and specific meanings of virtue, and the parts of each virtue. Houser's work is helpful for the topic of this study, though this study's topic is not his direct focus. As for the primary Thomistic texts used here, for the *Summa Theologiae* see *Opera omnia iussa edita leonis xiii p.m.* (Rome: Typographia polyglotta, 1888-1904 }, vols. 4-12. Translations of the *Summa* are

task of this section is to explain how Thomas employed three distinct categorizations of virtue and how he understood the relationships between those categorizations, in light of his predecessors' work. The contention of this section is that Thomas's categorizations of virtue on the bases of object, ultimate end, and efficient cause glean the best insights from his predecessors' work, and yet achieve a synthesis absent from any of their presentations. Explaining his understanding of these three types of categorization, and in particular how the cardinal (as distinguished from the theological) virtues are related to the other two categorizations of virtue, will reveal Thomas's contribution to contemporary discussions of the relationship between virtue and grace. In short, while Thomas recognizes that the categorizations of virtues by end and cause may be aligned with one another, he also demonstrates why it is importantly not the case that categorizations of virtue on the basis of object can be grafted onto the other two categorizations.

As seen above, William of Auxerre offered a developed vision of the theological virtues, but struggled in naming and explaining which virtues are defined in opposition to the theological virtues and on what bases. Thus it is helpful to begin here with Thomas's understanding of the key characteristics of the theological virtues in order to determine the ways in which different categories of virtues are distinct from the theological virtues. In the opening article of question 62 of the *Prima Secundae,* on the theological virtues, Thomas lists three characteristics of these virtues that parallel the three bases of categorization examined in this essay: (a) "their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God"; (b) "they are infused in us by God alone"; and, (c) they direct humanity to its "supernatural happiness," a "happiness

from *Summa Theologica,* trans. English Dominican Fathers (New York: Benziger Bros., 1948), unless otherwise noted. For Thomas's *On the Virtues in General, On the Cardinal Virtues,* and the *Commentary on the Sentences* the Latin text used here is the Parma edition, found in *Opera Omnia* (New York: Musurga Publishers, 1948), vols. 7-8. Houser's English translation of *On the Cardinal Virtues* is particularly helpful since he used the Marietti text but was able to correct it with manuscripts provided by Fr. Deronne of the Leonine Commission (see Houser, *Cardinal Virtues,* 2).

surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead. "[76]

A) Categorization by Object: Theological Virtues and Cardinal Virtues

The first claim concerns the "object" of the theological virtues. Here Philip's contribution to Thomas's work is evident. Like the Chancellor, Thomas claims that "the object of the theological virtues is God himself."[77] Like Philip echoing Augustine's distinction between *frui* and *uti*, Thomas claims, "The theological virtues direct us to ... God himself immediately," who alone is to be enjoyed.[78] Unsurprisingly, the theological virtues are then distinguished from virtues that concern not God immediately but things in relation to God *(ad finem).* Thomas says that the moral and intellectual virtues perfect one with regard to "other things, yet in relation to God," that is, those things Augustine would describe as to be used.[79] All moral and intellectual virtues share a commonality as regards their proper activities, or objects: "the object of the moral and intellectual virtues is something comprehensible to human reason."[80] The objects of the moral and intellectual virtues are manifold, but they are all activities that are

[76] From *STh* 1-11, q. 62, a. 1, respectively: "tum quia habent Deum pro objecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum"; "tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur"; and, "Alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem." Note the three claims pulled out of this *respondeo* for the purposes of this article are not the same as Thomas's list of three claims that concludes that article.

[77] *STh* 1-11, q. 62, a. 2. See also *On the Virtues in General,* a. 12: "Whence they are called theological, since they have God not only for their end, but also for their object." In *STh* 1-11, q. 62, a. 1, cited above, Thomas employs Philip's *in finem.*

[78] See *STh* 1-11, q. 63, a. 3, ad 2.

[79] See ibid.: "Sed oportet quod per alias virtutes infusas perficiatur anima circa alias res, in ordine tamen ad Deum." Thomas's language echoes the tradition here, both in the general influence of Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* and in the technical phrase *ad Deum* to refer to the objects of cardinal virtues. See also *On the Virtues in General,* a. 12, ad 12. Finally, see *On the Cardinal Virtues,* a. 2 where Thomas describes charity as concerned with the ultimate end *(cum sit circa finem ultimum)* and commanding those (moral) virtues which concern things for the sake of the end *(his quae sunt circa finem).*

[80] *STh* 1-11, q. 62, a. 2.

accessible to unaided human reason. In this way, the category of moral and intellectual virtue (which contains a large number of particular virtues) is distinguished from another category of virtues (which contains far fewer virtues), namely, the three theological virtues.

Why has the term "cardinal" not appeared in the preceding paragraph? Thomas sorts through the multitude of virtues that concern activities accessible to unaided reason. There are distinctions within this broad class of virtues, such as the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues.[81] Yet Thomas understands this entire range of virtues to be "summed up" by the four cardinal virtues. He most explicitly aligns "moral" virtues with "cardinal" virtues in article 1 of question 61 of the *Prima Secundae,* where he responds affirmatively to the article's question "whether the moral virtues should be called principal or cardinal virtues."[82] In *On the Virtues in General,* when explaining the distinctions among virtues, he explains how the moral and intellectual virtues differ from the theological virtues, and in several replies to objections he uses the four cardinal virtues to exemplify the former category.[83] Indeed, when explaining the different ways the types of virtues are obtained (addressed below), Thomas's favorite example of the different sources of moral virtue is temperance.[84] Finally, Thomas organizes his *Secunda Secundae* according to the three theological and four cardinal virtues. In short, for Thomas, the moral and intellectual virtues concern the same sort of "innerworldly" activities, or objects, as the cardinal virtues.[85] This fact, combined with the fact that Thomas uses the term "moral" sometimes in opposition to theological virtue and sometimes in opposition to intellectual virtue, prompts the

[81] See *STh* 1-11, q. 58.

[82] This is already a significant development from Philip, who as noted above called cardinal virtues one of the two subsets of moral virtues. See Philip, *Summa De bono* III, 2, C, cont., q. 1 (Wicl<i, ed., 1071).

[83] See *On the Virtues in General,* a. 12, ad 23-27.

[84] See *STh* 1-11, q. 63, a. 4; and *On the Virtues in General,* a. 10, ad 11.

[85] The term "innerworldly," from *Veritatis Splendor* 65, is employed here to refer to those activities that are, as Thomas says, "accessible to [unaided] human reason."

labeling of Thomas's categorization of virtues by object as "theological vs. cardinal."[86]

Thomas's categorization "theological vs. cardinal" is the culmination of several questions on different types of virtue. A quick comparison of the questions on virtue with those on habit and sin reveals an interesting structural difference. In those other two "treatises," Thomas moves immediately from their subjects to their causes. But in the set of questions on virtue, this inquiry is delayed for six questions. Part of the reason is the greater attention required to distinguish certain categories of virtue (such as moral and intellectual virtue, and the different virtues in each of those categories). But a further reason is that examination of the different causes of virtue would be more accessible after an explanation not only of the differences of object among different moral and intellectual virtues, but also of the difference in types of object between the moral virtues on the one hand (typified by the cardinal virtues), and the theological virtues on the other. Furthermore, Thomas must also attend to a distinction between the different "ends" of virtue, which he does in questions 61 and 62, before turning to the cause of virtue in question 63.

B) Categorization by Ultimate End: Supernatural Virtues and Natural (i.e., Political) Virtues

As noted above, Thomas claims that the theological virtues concern "supernatural happiness." His explanation of humanity's twofold happiness is as follows:

[86] Though this move is based on distinctions found in Philip's work, this is a development of Philip's work. The Chancellor's vacillation on whether the cardinal virtues are infused led him at times to associate moral and cardinal virtues (e.g., *Summa De bona* III, 2, C, cont., q. 1 [Wicl<i, ed., 1069]) and at times to claim that the cardinal virtues are infused and thus distinct from the moral virtues. As seen below, when Thomas aligns these categories it is under the assumption that the cardinal virtues are not always infused but certainly may be.

There are other arguments Thomas offers for summing up the intellectual and moral virtues with the cardinal virtues, such as the latter's correspondence with four human capacities (intellect, will, irascible passions, and concupiscible passions). For more on this point, which is less important for the purposes of this study, see Houser, *Cardinal Virtues,* 69-70.

One is proportionate to human nature, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead. [87]

Thomas immediately aligns the twofold human happiness with two types of virtues. He claims the cardinal virtues "perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues supernaturally. "[88] The reader of the *Summa* now realizes that up until this point in the questions on virtue, two distinctions have been operative: categorizations of virtues according to object and categorizations according to "end" (supernatural vs. natural). Which virtues has Thomas been discussing? Looking back at the seven questions preceding question 62, we unsurprisingly see that Thomas has been very precise in nearly uniformly discussing only "natural" virtues, or those virtues concerning humanity's happiness as accessible to human reason. He says as much in the last article before question 62. In defining "political" virtues as those which "are in man according to his nature" and enable him to "behave well in the conduct of human affairs," Thomas states, "It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues *until now.* "[89]

[87] *STh* 1-11, q. 62, a. 1. Close examination of the nature of, and relationship between, the two types of human happiness is beyond the scope of this essay, although the conclusions of this essay may contribute to that discussion. See Denis J.M. Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997) for several lines of debate and the various Thomistic texts on the types of happiness (esp. 395-404, 431-39). For another perspective on this issue see Steven A. Long, "On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man," *The Thomist* 64 (2000): 211-37.

[88] *STh* 1-11, q. 62, a. 2, ad 1. For an even more extended treatment of the two types of happiness toward which humanity is directed, see *On the Virtues in General,* aa. 9 and 10 where Thomas distinguishes virtues gained by repeated action from those infused by God primarily by distinguishing the two types of happiness toward which humanity is destined.

[89] *STh* 1-11, q. 61, a. 5 (emphasis added). On this point, see Miner, "Non-Aristotelian Prudence in the *Prima Secundae,"* 401-22. Looking back on the questions on virtue up until *STh* I-II, q. 61, a. 5, we see Thomas occasionally explicitly say "human virtues," as at *STh* I-II, q. 58, a. 3; and I-II, q. 61, a. 1. The obvious exception is of course *STh* I-II, q. 55, a. 4, where Thomas uses Lombard's formulation of Augustine's definition of virtue with its closing phrase, "which God works in us without us." Even there Thomas says that the definition applies to all virtue if we omit that phrase, and it is noteworthy that the title questions in each of the three articles preceding this one explicitly say "human virtue." This question of natural vs.

It is Thomas' characteristic attempt to synthesize traditions in article 5 of question 61 (on the cardinal virtues) that forces him to address explicitly the two types of happiness in the following question (on the theological virtues). In article 5, Thomas asks whether the cardinal virtues can be fittingly divided into political, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar.[90] In this question, we see Thomas not only further illuminate his categorization based upon the end of virtue, but also address a type of virtue that disrupted the categorizations of virtue in many of his predecessors. He affirms the fourfold categorization which includes political virtue. Exemplar virtues pre-exist in God. Political virtues concern natural activities in the realm of "human affairs," and by them man acts well in such affairs.[91] To borrow terminology from the following article (*STh* I-II, q. 62, a. 1), with the political virtues, we are dearly speaking of those which concern natural happiness.[92] Or, as Thomas says in *On the Cardinal Virtues,* "The political virtues . . . are ordered only to the civic good of the present life."[93] Thomas goes on to claim, "But because it pertains to man, as he is able, to strive toward divine things ... it is necessary to posit some virtues between political virtues, which are human virtues, and exemplar virtues, which are divine virtues."[94] The exemplar virtues are in God. The political virtues

supernatural virtues reminds the reader of Thomas's discussion of the different types of happiness (see *STh* I-II, q. 3, a. 8; and I-II, q. 5, a. 5), but discussion of the impact of the two types of happiness on virtue is not fully clear until *STh* I-II, q. 62, a. 1.

[90] The Latin terms for the four in the tradition are consistently *politcas, purgatorias, purgati animi* and *exemplars.* English translations (such as that of the English Dominicans) that use "social" for the first type can mask the reference here to the tradition on *politicas virtutes.*

[91] *STh* I-II, q. 61, a. 5.

[92] That Thomas claims the political virtues concern civic life is particularly apparent in *On the Cardinal Virtues,* a. 4, on whether or not the cardinal virtues exist in heaven. Though he does not explicitly refer to these four Neoplatonic types of virtue by name, that division clearly structures his *respondeo.* (He treats the four in a slightly different order than in *STh* I-II, q. 61, a. 5: exemplar, perfect, political, and perfecting.) In the *respondeo* he uses the term "acquired" rather than political, thus equating the two (a point examined below).

[93] See *On the Cardinal Virtues,* a. 4, ad 7: "sed virtutes politicae de quibus ipse loquitur, ordinantur tantum ad bonum civile praesentis vitae."

[94] *STh* I-11, q. 61, a. 5: "Sed quia ad hominem pertinetutetiam ad divina se trahat quantum potest, ut etiam philosophus <licit, in X Ethic.; et hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est illud Matth. V, *estate perfecti, sicut et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est,*

are in humanity concerning natural human activities. But what of human activities that direct persons toward the supernatural happiness of union with God? Though he only explicitly describes the two types of happiness as they concern virtue in the next article, Thomas claims that perfecting virtues are those which tend toward divine similitude, and perfect virtues are possessed by those who have attained divine similitude. [95] In other words, the perfecting virtues are possessed by those living graced lives in the *status viatoris,* and the perfect by those in the *status comprehensoris.* [96]

The fact that Thomas does not consistently rely in the *Prima Secundae* on Macrobius's fourfold division could suggest that article 5 of question 61 is a simple acknowledgement of a respected authority, but substantively unimportant. Yet Thomas's claims in this article are actually crucial for this essay for two reasons. First, given Thomas's interpretation of the Neoplatonic categories, he is forced to attend explicitly to virtues that concern humanity's supernatural happiness of divine similitude, something he had been putting on hold "until now." How he categorizes virtues by object, end, and cause in questions 62-63, while relating those categorizations to each other, is addressed below. Second, Thomas subtly yet brilliantly subverts an entire tradition of a problematic category of virtue in this article. The category "political" was firmly entrenched in medieval writing on virtue, doing important (but different and at times confusing) work in people such as Alan of Lille, Simon of Tournai, William of Auxerre, and Philip the Chancellor. True to his *modus operandi,* Thomas does not simply reject such a prominent feature of the

necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt virtutes divinae" (my translation). Deftly handling the nature/grace issue, Thomas in the ellipsis cites both Aristotle and the Sermon on the Mount to claim that humanity is directed beyond its nature to divine things.

[95] For further description of the perfecting and perfect, albeit without the use of those terms, see the *respondeo* of *On the Cardinal Virtues,* a. 4.

[96] For a helpful overview of Thomas's thought on these states, particularly as they pertain to hope, see Josef Pieper, *Faith, Hope, and Love,* trans. Sr. Mary Frances McCarthy, S.N.D., and Richard and Clara Winston (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), esp. 91-98. Pieper develops Thomas's terms from *STh* III, q. 15, a. 10.

tradition. He rather delineates an exact and proper use of the term, thus explaining how that meaning is referenced in a respected authority's thought. "Political virtue" in article 5 refers to humanity's natural end. This is why Thomas places an important dividing line between this and the other three types of virtue in the fourfold division. In nearly all of his responses to objections, Thomas confirms that the political virtues are "human virtues" concerning "human affairs."[97]

Yet the term "political virtue," as we have seen in Alan and William, lends itself to confusion. This may be why Thomas does not often use it.[98] In the remainder of his work on virtue in the *Summa Theologiae,* he more commonly uses the terms "human" and "natural" to refer to virtues directed to natural human happiness-which is, in principle, accessible to unaided human capacities-as ultimate end.[99] Having seen the confusion engendered by the use of that term by figures such as Alan and William, Thomas's decision is not surprising. When Thomas does use the term, however, he gives it a precise and consistent meaning, that is, concerning humanity's natural end. He thus avoids the common error of alternating between meanings which would have the term sometimes referring to end and sometimes referring to object, since Thomas knows those two bases of categorization cannot be conflated.

[97] See *STh* I-II, q. 61, a. 5, ad 1 *(quad sunt circa res humanas),* ad 3 *(res humanas),* or slightly shifting to language of common good in ad 4 *(pertinet non so/um bene operari ad commune).*

[98] After this treatment at *STh* I-II, q. 61, a. 5, Thomas uses the term "political virtue" only two more times in the *Summa Theologiae:* II-II, q. 26, a. 3; and II-II, q. 136, a. 3, ad 2. Both passages affirm that political virtue concerns humanity's happiness in a manner commensurate with human nature ("bonum politicae virtutis est commensuratum naturae humanae" *[STh* II-I!, q. 136, a. 3, ad 2).

[99] These terms are not without problems of their own. For instance, the theological virtues should not be regarded as "unnatural" but rather as "super-natural." More problematically, labeling certain virtues "human" can imply that virtues such as the theological virtues are not human, or better, not truly one's own. This recalls the classic Lombard position that virtue simply *is* grace. Again, the counterpart of human here is not inhuman but rather "super-human," a term only occasionally employed by Thomas (see *STh* I-II, q. 61, a. 1, ad 2).

C) Categorization by Cause: Infused Virtues and Acquired Virtues

In questions 61-62 of the *Prima Secundae,* Thomas explains two categorizations of virtue: by object (theological and cardinal) and by end (supernatural and natural). There remains one important distinction to address: that of cause, which is taken up in question 63. To this point, this categorization has only received brief mention (e.g., *STh* 1-11, q. 55, a. 4; 1-11, q. 62, a. 1). In the course of explaining it, however, Thomas also attends to a potential misreading of the relationships between categorizations he has already offered.

In article 2 of question 62, Thomas spoke of both the object and the end of the theological virtues in distinction to those of the cardinal virtues. He claimed that the theological virtues have for their object "God himself," while the objects of the moral and intellectual virtues are things "comprehensible to human reason." He went on to distinguish them according to their ends: the cardinal virtues perfect human activity "according to the capacity of human nature," whereas the theological virtues do so "supernaturally." A reader of these lines could easily misinterpret Thomas to be conflating categorizations by object and end, in effect claiming that all theological virtues concern humanity's supernatural happiness (true), and all cardinal virtues concern humanity's natural happiness (false). Of course, given the fact that in article 5 of question 61 he addresses whether the *cardinal* virtues are fittingly categorized by Macro bius, and that his affirmative answer clearly places perfecting and perfected *cardinal* virtues in reference to humanity's supernatural end, Thomas has already offered resources to head off such an erroneous interpretation. [100] But in question 63 he makes his point even more clearly.

[100] In doing so Thomas assumes that the category "cardinal virtue" is a larger category than political virtue in that it includes "political virtue" but also cardinal virtues that (unlike political virtues) are directed to humanity's supernatural end. This avoids William's mistake of at times equating cardinal and political virtue, while at other times making cardinal virtue a subset of political virtue (rather than vice versa). It also avoids Philip's mistake of making cardinal virtues and political virtues both subsets of "moral virtue," while at the same time affirming both that moral virtues are not caused by grace and that cardinal virtues can direct one to one's supernatural end.

Thomas's third categorization addressed here is rather straightforward. He claims that virtues may be obtained by repeated activity (in which case they are called "acquired") or given by God's grace (in which case they are called "infused").

> It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts [i.e., acquired]: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by Divine Law, and not by human reason, *cannot be caused by human acts*, the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by divine operation alone.[101]

Thomas not only claims that the efficient cause of virtues may be infusion or repeated activity, he also explains that distinction by saying that virtue directing us to our supernatural good which surpasses human reason *cannot* be caused by human acts, and thus must be infused. Thomas in effect aligns two categorizations here: end and cause.[102] Infused virtues direct us ultimately to our supernatural end, whereas acquired virtues direct us ultimately only to our natural end.[103] In fact, acquired virtues *cannot* direct us to our supernatural end. In terms of their end, infused virtues are always supernatural and acquired virtues are always natural.

Two comments are warranted on this distinction between acquired virtue and infused virtue. First, what is essential to infused virtue is that it directs us to the supernatural good which surpasses human understanding and achievement, and therefore must be provided by God. Despite the connotations of the English word "infused," it is *not* necessarily the case that such virtues involve no repeated acts or human effort and involvement.[104] Yet

[101] *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 2 (emphasis added). See also *On the Virtues in General*, a. 10.

[102] See also *On the Virtues in General*, aa. 9 and 10, where acquired virtue is claimed to direct humanity to natural happiness, and infused virtue to a happiness that exceeds the capacity of unaided human nature.

[103] For reaffirmation of this point see *On the Cardinal Virtues*, a. 4, ad 3: "the civil good is not the ultimate end of the infused cardinal virtues, of which we speak, but of the acquired virtue of which philosophers spoke" ("bonum civile non est finis ultimus virtutum cardinalium infusarum de quibus loquimur, sed virtutum acquisitarum de quibus philosophi sunt locuti").

[104] For a less technical examination of this point, see William C. Mattison III, "Moral Virtue, the Grace of God, and Discipleship," in David Matzko McCarthy and M. Therese Lysaught, eds., *Gathered for the Journey: Moral Theology in Catholic Perspective* (Grand

even where there is such participation of the person, God's grace is still the efficient cause of the virtue since one is directed to an end not accessible (let alone attainable) by unaided human powers. Conversely, it is *not* the case that acquired virtues have nothing to do with God. We recall here Hugh of St. Victor's superb explanation of natural virtue and virtues superadded by grace (despite the fact that he never uses the terms "acquired" and "infused"), as it was quite clear in Hugh's thought in what way creating grace is indeed present in natural (or, here, acquired) virtues. Second, saying that infused virtues always direct one to one's supernatural end does not at all mean that they ignore or obliterate the natural end of one's activities.[105] Thomas's claim is simply that the natural or "civic" good is not the *ultimate* end of the infused virtues.

D) Relating Thomas's Three Categorizations to One Another

At this point it is clear that two of Thomas's three categorizations graft neatly onto one another. All supernatural virtues are infused, and all natural (or human) virtues are acquired. Thus a pair of categorizations yields two, not four, total types of virtue, namely, supernatural infused virtue and natural acquired virtue. Yet how are these two categorizations related to the categorization of theological and cardinal virtues? One of the main sources of confusion in the tradition leading up to Thomas concerns the relationship between categorizations of virtue by end and by efficient cause on the one hand, and by object on the other. We saw above the problem with the Porretans' attending only to end and neglecting object. We saw William grasp the way that "theological" virtue refers to both a supernatural object and a supernatural end, but fail to distinguish how other virtues may

Rapids, Mich.: Eerdman's Publishing Co., 2007), 198-215.

[105] We run into the classic Scholastic dictum that "grace does not take away but rather perfects nature." See *STh* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2: "cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat." For examples of how graced life respects the integrity of human nature even while surpassing that nature, see Jean Porter, *Nature as Reason* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdman's Publishing Co., 2005), esp. 394-98.

be differentiated from the theological virtues in these distinct ways. In the face of the error, common among Thomas' s predecessors, of grafting a categorization by object onto categorizations by end and efficient cause, Thomas clarifies and advances that tradition of categorizing virtues by explaining not only that, but how, this conflation is inaccurate.

In article 3 of question 63, Thomas asks "whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion." It is important that he says *moral* virtues.[106] He has already affirmed that theological virtue is in us by infusion and only by infusion. He has also affirmed that moral, or cardinal, virtues are in us by repeated activity. But to deny the conflation of categories noted above, Thomas here affirms that moral virtues can be infused in us by God. Why? In the *respondeo* Thomas describes a parallel between the natural principles of virtue and acquired cardinal virtues on the other hand, and the theological virtues and infused cardinal virtues on the other. In the reply to the second objection he succinctly explains that

> The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e., to God himself immediately. But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God.[107]

Reminiscent of Philip the Chancellor and others who have at least implicitly relied on Augustine's *frui* and *uti* distinction, Thomas recognizes that activities that are accessible to unaided human reason can be done for the sake of one's supernatural happiness, and that this requires the grace that renders the virtues governing such activities "infused." When activities of the cardinal virtues are done for one's supernatural end, we must call those cardinal virtues infused.

The activities of infused cardinal virtues are also performed differently than their counterparts among the acquired cardinal

[106] Here is another example of confusing use of the term "moral." As is clear from the *respondeo,* Thomas here means "moral" to include intellectual virtue (rather than being distinct from it), and as opposed to theological virtue. This is another reason why this essay employs "cardinal" virtue rather than "moral" and "intellectual" virtue to refer to those virtues whose objects are accessible to unaided human reasoning.

[107] *STh* 1-11, q. 63, a. 3, ad 2.

virtue, a point affirmed by Thomas in the last article of question 63. In that article Thomas asks, "whether virtue obtained by repeated activity belongs to the same species as infused virtues." He replies in the negative, and uses his stock example of temperance to exemplify his point, noting that the person with acquired temperance eats differently from the (fasting) person with infused temperance. Directly refuting the Porretan claim that the acts of virtues differing in end (for the Porretans, "catholic vs. political" virtue) are still the same acts, Thomas claims that, although acquired and infused temperance both share the same material object (hence their both being fittingly labeled "temperance"), they differ as to their formal object. Although acts of all cardinal virtues observe the mean,[108] in the case of the acquired cardinal virtues the mean is determined by the rule of human reason, while in the case of the infused cardinal virtues the mean is determined according to divine rule.[109] Hence Thomas concludes that "infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other [cardinal] virtues."[110] In the next lines Thomas correlates this difference of "rule" for infused and acquired cardinal virtue with a difference in what he calls "ultimate end."[111] Acquired cardinal virtues dispose one to behave well with regard to human affairs, while the infused cardinal virtues regulate one's behavior with regard to the ultimate goal of citizenship in the heavenly kingdom.[112]

[108] *STh* I-11, q. 64, a. 1.

[109] *STh* I-11, q. 63, a. 4. Note that we are clearly talking only of cardinal (i.e., moral) virtues since there is a mean, which does not hold for theological virtues. This article anticipates Thomas' claim in *STh* I-II, q. 64, a. 4 that there is no mean regarding the theological virtues. This claim is true not because the theological virtues concern one's supernatural happiness, for this is true of the infused cardinal virtues which do observe a mean. Rather, it is true because God is the "object of theological virtue," which is not true of infused cardinal virtue.

[110] *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4.

[111] Ibid., ad 1: "Infused and acquired virtues differ not only in relation to the ultimate end

[112] *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4: "Et per hunc etiam modum differunt specie virtutes morales infusae, per quas homines bene se habent in ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici Dei; et aliae virtutes acquisitae, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad res humanas." See also *On the Cardinal Virtues,* a. 4 on the cardinal virtues remaining in heaven.

Thus we have in this final article on the cause of the virtues an explanation of how the cause of virtue (acquired vs. infused), which is correlated with the ultimate end of virtue (natural or human vs. supernatural), renders virtuous activities of the same material object formally distinct. Even though infused and acquired cardinal virtues may regulate the same sorts of activities, the very meanings of those actions differ, since they are done "for different reasons"-that is, with an eye toward different ultimate ends.[113] Two conclusions may be drawn from Thomas's work outlined here.

First, it is not accurate according to Thomas's thought to graft the categorization of (supernatural) infused and (natural) acquired virtues directly onto the categorization (by object) between theological and cardinal virtues, a mistake commonly made in the century leading up to Thomas. Though it *is* the case that theological virtues are always (supernatural) infused virtues, it is *not* the case that cardinal virtues are always (natural) acquired virtues, and Thomas explains quite clearly how cardinal virtues may be infused and directed to our supernatural happiness.

Second, it is *not* the case, as affirmed in the Porretan school and reported by Lottin, that the same act can be done for either a natural or a supernatural end. Thomas explicitly denies this claim *(STh* 1-11, q. 63, a. 4). We therefore have in Thomas's set of categorizations by object, end, and cause a way to explain how "worldly" activities differ from activities that concern God immediately, namely, by object. We also have a way to distinguish how activities that share the same (material) object (i.e., those of the cardinal virtues) may be importantly different in species, or meaning, depending on whether they are ultimately directed to natural or supernatural happiness, a distinction that also correlates

[113] *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 4, ad 2: "Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons." Note this is true even when the actions of these two sorts of virtue appear similar "from the outside," such as when a person of faith eats temperately while not fasting, and thus performs the same material act as the person with acquired temperance. Even here the "meaning" is different since the eating is done with an eye toward one's supernatural happiness (caring for the body as an act of worship in recognition of it as a gift from God), and not simply for the natural end of bodily health.

with the cause of virtue as acquired or infused, respectively. The resulting tripartite vision of virtue in Thomas-acquired (natural) cardinal virtue, infused (supernatural) theological virtue, and infused (supernatural) cardinal virtue[114]-enables Thomas more easily to address questions such as whether one can have moral virtue without charity *(STh* **1-11,** q. 65, a. 2; *STh* **11-11,** q. 23, a. 7), and whether the moral virtues remain in the next life *(STh* **1-11,** q. 67, a. 1).

Thomas's vision of virtue solves the problems identified in the previous section's survey of the categorizations of virtue offered by thinkers such as Alan of Lille, William of Auxerre, and Philip the Chancellor. Unlike the Porretans, Thomas is able to account for the difference between cardinal and theological virtues by attending to more than the ultimate end of virtue. Whereas the Porretans cannot explain the difference between "catholic" virtues such as faith and charity on the one hand and temperance and justice on the other, Thomas can, thanks to his distinction by object (theological vs. cardinal). Unlike William of Auxerre, he is able to explain in what distinct ways a variety of categories of virtue differ from the theological virtues. William was correct that the theological virtues are infused (cause) and concern God directly (object). But he tried to use only one grouping of virtue to describe how virtues can differ from theological virtues, even though there are two ways in which this is possible (i.e., by object, as in the cardinal virtues, and by cause, as in the acquired virtues). And these two ways cannot always be identified with each other; in other words, they require distinct categorizations. Unlike Philip the Chancellor, Thomas is able to explain exactly how the cardinal virtues may be at times acquired and at other times infused. Finally, again unlike the Porretans, Thomas is able to explain how, despite important commonalities between the acquired cardinal virtues and infused cardinal virtues (enabling both rightly to be called cardinal), there is a difference of species

[114] Since "natural" and "supernatural" correlate with "acquired" and "infused," these terms are actually redundant. Hence they are inserted parenthetically here simply for additional clarity, but will not be included below. For another mention of Thomas' three categories of virtue, see Miner, "Non-Aristotelian Prudence in the *Prima Secundae*," 419.

between acts of, for example, infused temperance and acquired temperance (which the Porretans would call "catholic temperance" and "political temperance").

III. CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSIONS OF VIRTUE AND GRACE

The purpose of this final section is not to engage in any great depth the arguments of the texts adduced below. Its far more modest task is to demonstrate how contemporary work that employs categorizations of virtue to describe the relationship between virtue and grace could be clarified by more careful attention to Thomas's categorizations of virtue, and to the relationships between these different categorizations. Recall from the beginning of this essay the following quotation: "Discerning and judging action in light of the natural law need to be perfected and stabilized by the cardinal virtues (acquired habits) and infused virtues (faith, hope and charity)." It should be clear that while the cardinal virtues certainly may be acquired, they may also be infused (and thus should not be parenthetically identified as acquired habits). Furthermore, the statement implies that the two groups of virtue share a common basis of categorization, when, in fact, "cardinal virtue" is a distinction by object and "infused virtue" is a distinction by cause.

Another example of possible confusion engendered by a lack of careful attention to the relationships between the categorizations of virtue is found in no less authoritative a source than the *Catechism of the Catholic Church.* In the *Catechism,* the material on virtue is divided primarily into two sections: one on "human virtue" and one on "theological virtue."[115] From the perspective of the Thomistic tradition, this categorization is a problem, since, for Thomas, "human virtue" refers to ultimate end (and, accordingly, cause), while "theological" refers to the object of virtue. Indeed, the category "theological virtue" is defined in the *Catechism* by object: "the theological virtues relate

[115] See *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* 1804-11 and 1812-29, respectively. See also the introductory material at 1803, and the brief section on the gifts (and fruits) of the Holy Spirit at 1830-32.

directly to God."[116] The material under "human virtue" is subdivided into the four cardinal virtues, suggesting also a reference to object rather than end. This in itself could simply mean that "human virtue" is here a reference not to ultimate end, but rather to object, akin to "moral" or "cardinal" virtue in the Thomistic tradition. Indeed, while the first half of the opening paragraph on human virtue uses the term "human," the second half shifts to "moral virtue," seemingly equating those terms.[117] In that case, "human" would be synonymous with Thomas's own phrase "accessible to human reasoning," and would refer to object.

This picture, however, is complicated by references to the cause of the virtues, particularly in the section on the human virtues. Assuming that "human" refers to object rather than ultimate end, the most problematic line is found in the second half of the opening paragraph on human virtue: "the moral virtues are acquired by human effort."[118] Despite the next line's claim that they dispose us to communion with God (ultimate end), and the previous claim that they "guide our conduct according to reason and faith," the directness of the claim about the cause of moral virtue being repeated activity is not only problematic in itself, but distorts the seeming parallel of human and theological virtue according to object by introducing the efficient cause of virtue, which is aligned with ultimate end instead of object.

Despite this problematic line, in the closing lines of the section on human virtue, under the subtitle, "The virtues and grace," the *Catechism* clearly affirms that moral or cardinal virtues may be infused. There we read that "human virtues acquired by . . . repeated efforts are purified and elevated by divine grace."[119] With this claim in mind, the only possible consistent explanation of the problematic line above is that it must mean that the moral

[116] See *Catechism,* 1812.

[117] *Catechism,* 1804.

[118] Ibid.

[119] *Catechism,* 1810. See also 1812-13, where we read that "the human virtues are rooted in the theological virtues" (1812), and that the theological virtues "inform and give life to all the moral virtues" (1813). This is actually a very helpful affirmation of the compatibility of infused virtue and human effort, a point made above.

virtues may be acquired by human effort, a claim completely consistent with the Thomistic tradition. [120] In sum, we see in the *Catechism* itself how claims about the object, cause, and end of virtue may be presented in a manner that fails to explain clearly the relationship between these different categorizations of virtue. Though everything important and true about virtue is present in the section on virtue, the obfuscation of the categorizations examined in section 2 of this article impedes the pedagogical intent of the *Catechism.*

Another example of confusion engendered by failing to attend accurately to the categorizations of virtue noted above occurs in the fine historical scholarship of Istvan Bejcvy, in his recent article "The Problem of Natural Virtue." Bejcvy rightly assumes that "natural virtue" refers not to natural dispositions or capacities but to virtue obtained without God's cooperative grace. He thus implicitly attends to both the ultimate end and cause of virtue, but does not name them and never correlates them in any way with the object of virtue. This prevents him from adequately replying to the claim that

> If Abelard should really have sustained the idea that human beings could acquire virtue by natural means ... this would imply that he was something worse than a Pelagian: Christians as well as non-Christians would have the possibility of bringing about their own salvation. [121]

It must be stressed that Bejcvy strenuously denies that Abelard held a strongly Pelagian position. But his defense of Abelard is obstructed by his failing to note the obvious *non sequitur* in the charge, which attention to the relationship between the categorizations of virtue outlined here would make clear: "natural" virtue does not concern salvation. Bejcvy goes on to examine the cardinal virtues, but his failure to attend either to what is distinctive about their objects, or to the natural end toward which

[120] Of course, one could interpret this section as referring only to humanity's supernatural end of union with God. But this would not only betray the consistent Thomistic meaning of the descriptor "human" as a modifier of virtue, but also fail to explain the direct claim that such virtues are "acquired" (a technical term) by human effort.

[121] Bejcvy, "The Problem of Natural Virtue," 138.

they may be directed, impedes not only his discussion of Abelard, but the later (otherwise accurate) discussion of problems within the Porretan school of thought. [122]

A final example of confusion regarding Thomas's categorizations of virtue can be found in a recent contribution to an ongoing debate in *The Thomist* over the possibility of pagan virtue. [123] In the first of his two contributions to this debate, Thomas Osborne sets out to examine how "the distinction between the moral and theological virtues was worked out in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries." [124] Osborne immediately turns to the Porretan school's "catholic vs. political" distinction without explaining that this distinction (based on ultimate end) is not made on the same basis as Thomas's "moral vs. theological" distinction (based on object) which Osborne states he is investigating. [125]

He then turns back to moral virtue and claims, "As Shanley observes, Thomas does describe acquired moral virtue as political virtue, and he states that political virtue is concerned with the political common good." As noted above, it is correct to say that Thomas "describes" acquired moral virtue as political virtue, since all acquired virtue directs one toward the natural end of humanity ("the political common good"), which is precisely what Thomas means by political virtue. However, Osborne goes on to say "the *identification* of moral virtues as political virtues is standard for

[122] Ibid., 149.

[123] *The Thomist* thread of the debate begins with Brian Shanley, O.P, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue" *The Thomist* 63 (1999): 553-77. Shanley responds there to Bonnie Kent's "Moral Provincialism," *Religious Studies* 30 (1994): 269-85, which is itself a response to the work of Alasdair Macintyre on virtue in Thomas and Augustine, esp. his *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Danie, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). Shanley in turn is responded to by Thomas Osborne, Jr., "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory," *The Thomist* 67 (2003): 279-305. Osborne is responded to by Angela McKay, "Prudence and Acquired Mortal Virtue," *The Thomist* 69 (2005): 535-55, to which Osborne replies again in "Perfect and Imperfect Virtues," *The Thomist* 71 (2007):39-64.

[124] Osborne, "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory," 290.

[125] Alan and Simon base their distinction on *finis et officium,* but as seen above this is actually what Thomas refers to as ultimate end. Recall the treatment of "catholic vs. political" chastity in Alan (both of which would be "moral" and not theological for Thomas).

medieval thinkers. Thomas is merely repeating common usage." [126] There are two problems with this statement. First, as explained above, there is *not* a consistent usage of the term "political" in Thomas's predecessors. Though it commonly refers to humanity's natural end as distinguished from one's supernatural (for the Porretans "catholic," for William "theological") end, "political" is also used at times to refer to the object of virtue and is contrasted with "theological" (as in the case of William), or even at times to refer to virtues obtained by repeated action rather than infused (as in Philip's problematic passage). The problem with such vacillation in the tradition is that it implies that one can reliably graft the final-end and efficient-cause distinctions onto the object distinction, which holds true with the virtues faith, hope, and charity, but not the virtues prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. By affirming an identification of political with acquired moral virtue, Osborne not only mixes up different bases of categorization but also implies that they are interchangeable when they are not.

Second, Thomas does not use the term "political" in a manner that "repeats common usage," nor does he identify "moral virtue as political virtue." The term "moral" (or as used above, "cardinal") refers to a distinct basis for categorizing virtues, namely, object. For Thomas, "political" refers to the ultimate end of the virtuous activity, in this case as the natural civic good. Political virtues governing activities directed toward the natural good may indeed be "described" as acquired moral virtues, since they are always caused by repeated human acts and concern this-worldly activities. But political virtue may not be "identified" with moral virtue, since not all moral virtues are political virtues. "Political" refers to a different basis of categorization than "moral." The problem with Osborne's claim is not only that it is untrue of Thomas; it also conflates categorizations that are importantly distinct. Therefore, "identifying" political and moral virtue as Osborne suggests would lead to exactly the same

[126] Osborne, "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas' Moral Theory," 291 (emphasis added).

problems as were found in Thomas's predecessors, problems which Thomas so strenuously avoids in his own presentation of the various categorizations of virtue and the relationships between them.

One last example of confusion in Osborne's use of the categorizations of virtue and the relationships between them is his claim, central for his second contribution to this debate in *The Thomist*, that "someone cannot possess the perfect acquired moral virtues and perfect acquired prudence without the help of grace." [127] The cogency of Osborne's argument, and the reasons for positing this category, are beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that Osborne is trying to reconcile Thomas's claim that there can be prudence without charity (e.g., *STh* 1-11, q. 65, a. 2) with Osborne's own claim that perfect (in the sense of connected to the other virtues) prudence requires grace. [128] Despite my sympathy with Osborne's attempt to refute the existence of any "purely natural" ethic in Thomas, positing a category of perfect *acquired* virtue that *requires grace* is oxymoronic. The problem is not the "perfect," which for Osborne here means connected with other virtues. The problem is positing a category of "acquired" virtue that requires grace. [129] The requirement of grace is exactly what renders a virtue "infused" instead of acquired. According to Thomas, acquired virtue is obtained by repeated activity and directs people to the human good as apportioned by the rule of human reason. [130] Infused virtue, however, directs people to the good as defined by Divine Law, a

[127] Osborne, "Perfect and Imperfect Virtues," 63.

[128] As Osborne's contributions to this ongoing debate helpfully demonstrate, Thomas does use the distinction "perfect vs. imperfect" in varying ways. One of those ways is the sense referred to by Hugh of St. Victor *(supra,* n. 7), namely, as referring to humanity's supernatural vs. natural end, respectively. See, e.g., *STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 2. Osborne uses "perfect vs. imperfect" to mean connected or not, respectively, to other moral virtues. See, e.g., *STh* I-II, q. 65, a. 1.

[129] Osborne's claim about the necessity of grace for perfect acquired virtue is never made in the language of operative, or creative, grace. He must be making a stronger claim about the necessity of cooperative, or saving, grace to justify his debate with McKay. Here Hugh's distinctions regarding grace are most helpful.

[130] *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 2.

good that exceeds and thus *cannot be* caused by human acts.[131] It therefore requires God's grace, which is what is meant by "infused." [132] Osborne's claim about the necessity of grace for perfect acquired virtue thus represents a categorization mistake.

These examples of confusion in contemporary categorizations of virtue at times replicate confusion found in the century and a half of tradition leading up to the Thomistic synthesis on different categorizations of virtue. The purpose of this essay has been to outline those developments, both to illuminate Thomas's thought and to demonstrate how it solves certain problems found in his predecessors, problems which at times appear in contemporary discussions of virtue. It is hoped that this presentation of Thomas's categorizations in light of his predecessors will illuminate ongoing debates on the different categorizations of virtues, especially as they concern the relationship between virtue and grace.

[131] Ibid.; and *STh* I-II, q. 62, a. 1.

[112] Osborne is not here addressing the long-standing debate in the Thomistic tradition (and even before) over whether the person with infused virtues continues to possess acquired (cardinal) virtues. In his own five-level interpretation of Thomas's work on virtue, Osborne is speaking at level four of people who do *not* have the infused virtues. He is actually trying to establish that the presence or absence of grace distinguishes the disconnected moral virtue of level three and the connected acquired moral of level four. He is doing this in order to support his larger concern that even "natural" virtue requires grace. But his refusal to use the category "natural vs. supernatural" leads him to have to describe the graced virtue of level four as acquired, which engenders the problems addressed here.

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THE MORAL ACT IN ST. THOMAS: A FRESH LOOK

KEVIN F. KEISER

Aquinas College
Nashville, Tennessee

Even a child makes himself known by his acts, whether what he does is pure and right. (Prov 20:11)

DESPITE ALL PROTESTATIONS for and attempts at renewal, moral theology today is lacking in clarity, thus serving to confuse souls more than guide them. While human acts are very contingent things that never come close to permitting the certitude of other disciplines,[1] it" would be a mistake to use this as an excuse for not expecting clarity from the specialists in moral matters. We should not repeat Descartes's mistake of confounding absolute certitude (which moral matters cannot always have) with clarity. Nor should we shrink from seeking what certitude can be had.[2]

One area that seems to be suffering from such a lack of clarity has to do with the so-called three sources of morality, and in particular how these are presented in the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas. Much has been said, for instan"ce, about the "moral object" by many who would consider themselves to be faithful commentators of St. Thomas on this point. And yet the conclusions reach no consensus, and cover a spectrum that certainly pushes the limits of Catholic orthopraxis. For example, various conceptions of the moral object by self-professed commentators

[1] St. Thomas Aquinas, I *Ethic.*,*lect.* 3 (Marietti ed., 32).

[2] Ibid. (Marietti ed., 36): "And therefore the well-disciplined student must neither seek greater certitude, nor be content with lesser certitude than may be fitting to the thing which is being treated."

on St. Thomas have aided the conclusion that masturbation may be permissible if it is done to procure semen for a fertility test[3] (even though pollution for medicinal purposes has been specifically forbidden by the Holy Office);[4] infantile craniotomies are possibly licit;[5] speech signifying the false is not considered lying if we can safely assume that "the communicative community" has broken down;[6] and last but not least, the sin against nature is seen as legitimate if it is done to prevent AIDS, not children[7] (also despite magisterial statements declaring the use of a condom an intrinsic evil).[8] How are such views purportedly based in St. Thomas? What is the source of the confusion?

Every Catholic who has had any interest in moral matters is familiar with the teaching that "the object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the 'sources,' or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts."[9] Yet when one goes to questions 18 to 20 of the *Prima Secundae*, often matters seem to be quite complicated and confusing. Is the moral object a thing or an act? Is the specification from the object most important, or is it the specification from the end? Do circumstances change the species or do they not? Do circumstances and intention factor in at all, or is it the object alone that specifies the will? A first reading of these

[3] Martin Rhonheimer, "Intentional Actions and the Meaning of the Object: A Reply to Richard McCormick," *The Thomist* 59 (1995): 296.

[4] *DS* 3684. On fertility testing, see also Pope Pius XII, Address *Vous nous avez* to participants of the Second World Congress on fertility and sterility (19 May 1956), available on the Vatican website (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/speeches/1956/documents/hf_p-xii_spe_19560519_vous-nous-avez_it.html [accessed 1May2009]).

[5] John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle, "'Direct' and 'Indirect': A Reply to Critics of Our Action Theory," *The Thomist* 65 (2001): 21-33.

[6] Benedict Guevin, "When a Lie Is Not a Lie: The Importance of Ethical Context," *The Thomist* 66 (2002): 273; for a different argument with practically the same conclusion, see Alexander Pruss, "Lying and Speaking Your Interlocutor's Language," *The Thomist* 63 (1999): 445.

[7] Martin Rhonheimer, "The Truth About Condoms," *The Tablet* (10 July 2004): 10-11; Benedict Guevin, O.S.B., and Martin Rhonheimer, "On the Use of Condoms to Prevent Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome," *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* 5 (2005): 40-48.

[8] *DS* 2795.

[9] *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2d ed. (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1997), par. 1750.

cardinal questions in St. Thomas's treatment of morals may leave the impression that his thought was not quite coherent, or if it was, he simply was not writing very clearly.[10] What seems so simple in the *Catechism* appears to be very complicated in moral theology.

My view is that St. Thomas is fundamentally coherent, and that, *secundum se*, he is not particularly complex or confusing on the sources of morality. Rather, the undeniable confusion that readers suffer should be regarded as an unintelligibility *quoad nos*. Admittedly, equivocations or apparent equivocations abound in questions 18-20 and in the parallel *loci*. But they are equivocations or applications of broad terms that St. Thomas himself understood and presumed his readers would understand. It is only when we look back on them today, with our firmly entrenched, univocal understanding of the three sources of morality, that we end up being confused when we try to go to St. Thomas for light-as *Veritatis Splendor* encourages us to do with regard to this very topic.[11] The confusion is aggravated because, in going to St. Thomas, many put the greatest emphasis on question 18, since it is there that he treats of all three "sources" *ex professo*. My own opinion, which I shall elucidate in section II below, is that everything becomes clearer if we place the interpretative key for these three questions in question 20, article 3 ("Whether the goodness and badness of the interior and exterior act is the same"), assuming what is said in question 18, article 6 ("Whether the act has the species of good or bad from the end"), rather than in the whole of question 18. This is a better approach *quoad nos*. Such a reading would, so to speak, "subsume" the consideration of the moral act from its "three sources" into a consideration of the one act that is composed of the exterior act

[10] Cf. William F. Murphy, Jr., "Aquinas on the Object and Evaluation of the Moral Act: Rhonheimer's Approach and Some Recent Interlocutors," *Josephinumjournal of Theology* 15 (2008): 208: "… the complex, insufficiently clear and perhaps underdeveloped character of Aquinas's teaching on the moral object."

[11] vs 78.

and the interior act, an approach that, I would propose, is more helpful, even if it comes to the same thing.

The goal of this article, then, will be to lay out my proposal for a clearer understanding of St. Thomas's "moral action theory." To this end, I will begin (section I) by defining and distinguishing the often equivocal or at least broad terms that St. Thomas uses. Then I will lay out my proposal for the understanding of the specification of the moral act according to St. Thomas (section II). Lastly, I will take up and respond to some objections to my own view (section III), objections that lie at the root of many of the misunderstandings that afflict moral theology today with regard to St. Thomas's "action theory." I will principally be making use of the texts of St. Thomas, [12] particularly the *Summa Theologiae,* the *Scriptum* on Peter Lombard's *Sentences,* and the disputed questions *De Malo.* [13]

I. CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

As many admit, part of the confusion regarding St. Thomas's "moral action theory" is due to the evident fluidity of the terms he uses. This is especially so with the very three terms that make up the three sources of morality, namely, "object," "intention," and "circumstance." It may seem an impossible task to specify precisely the different ways in which these terms are used. Nevertheless, my proposal here is to lay out those meanings that may be helpful to our particular inquiry. Such an attempt will be helped by first recalling the basic definition of each one of these terms, the *quid nominis,* based on which the terms find their various legitimate applications in distinct contexts.

[12] Translations of St. Thomas are by the author.

[13] For accounts of the moral act similar to the view I argue for here, see Steven Jensen, "Do Circumstances Give Species," *The Thomist* 70 (2006): 1-26; idem, "A Long Discussion regarding Steven A Long's Interpretation of the Moral Species," *The Thomist* 67 (2003): 623-43; Fr. Stephen Brock, *"Veritatis Splendor* 78, St. Thomas, and (Not Merely) Physical Objects of Moral Acts," *Nova et Vetera* 6 (2008): 1-62; and Lawrence Dewan, O.P., "St. Thomas, Rhonheimer, and the Object of the Human Act," *Nova et Vetera* 6 (2008): 63-112.

A) "Object"

The basic meaning of the term "object" is "that which is borne upon." [14] It is a relational term, implying something that does the "bearing upon." This is in a certain way the acting subject, or the agent, but only by means of an act by which the agent and the object are united or mediated to each other in some way. [15] Such acts are always the acts of powers possessed by the agent. [16] In fact, for St. Thomas, "power" and "object" are correlative terms. [17] In the case of the act of an active power, the object is its term. In the case of the act of a passive power, the object is its principle. [18] Furthermore, since a power is a principle of many actions, (whether in number, or even in kind for powers that are not "determined to one"), [19] the *ratio,* or formal aspect, of the object of the power will have a relation of universality to the *ratio* of the object of the action or passion. For example, the will of a rational creature has the universal good as its object, and any particular act of willing bears upon its object only insofar as it is perceived as a good, however else the object of that particular act of willing may be defined. The same can be said for various habits and powers that are arranged in an order. Thus, the *sensus communis* bears upon the sensible as such, whereas sight, one of the particular five senses, bears upon the visible; and a particular "passion" of seeing [20] will bear upon a particular colored thing insofar as it is visible. [21] Likewise, charity, which perfects the will, bears upon God himself as a good, whereas an act of mercy imperated by

[14] See for example *STh* I-II, q. 88, a. 2; q. 19, aa. 8 and 10; q. 29, a. 6; q. 72, a. 8; a. 10; II-II, q. 25, a. 1; *De Verit.,* q. 10, a. 9; q. 15, a. 1, ad 3; q. 15, a. 3, ad 5; q. 18, a. 6, ad 2; *De Malo,* q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; q. 2, a. 1; q. 8, a. 3; q. 8, a. 3, ad 4; *Quodl.* VIII, q. 9, a. 1; *Quodl.* III, q. 12, a. 2; III *Ethic.,* lect. 3, n. 2; etc.

[15] Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 13, a. 4.

[16] *STh* I, q. 77, a. 1.

[17] *De Caritate,* q. 2, a. 4.

[18] *STh* I, q. 77, a. 3.

[19] *STh* I-II, q. 50, a. 3; q. 72, a. 3.

[20] Sense powers are passive *(STh* I, q. 79, a. 3, ad 1), though we legitimately speak about their "acts." Cf. II *De Anima,* lect. 10, n. 7.

[21] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.

charity will bear upon someone in need insofar as he is also able to participate in God's beatitude, and a concrete act of almsgiving will bear upon someone perceived to be in need.

This is important for our inquiry, since in the consideration of the moral act, there are principally two objects to be considered. [22]

1. The Object of the Exterior Act

As the name indicates, the exterior act is that act which is commanded, or imperated, by the will, [23] carrying out the command of reason, [24] but executed by the other powers of the soul and our bodily members. [25] The object of this exterior act is the nonaction upon which it bears. Saint Thomas refers to this object as the *materia circa quam,* [26] or sometimes simply as the matter. [27] This is not to say that the object of the exterior act is necessarily material, or physical in the sense of a material substance. It is simply to say that the exterior act bears upon something that is not identical with itself or the powers that execute it, although the *materia circa quam* must have some *ratio* that contains it within the common object of these executing powers (e.g., an exterior act of our sexual powers will be an object that by definition has to do with *venerea* and not nutrition). But that is not all; for, since this exterior act is imperated by the will, its own object must somehow also be contained under the object of the will as a power, as we shall see further below. That is, the object of the exterior act is the object of such an act immediately, but it is also the object of the will insofar as such an object is perceived as a good to which the subject must be united

[22] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 6: "But in the voluntary act, there is found a twofold act, namely, the interior act and the exterior act, and each of these has its object."

[23] *STh* I-II, q. 6, a. 4; *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 1.

[24] *STh* I-II, q. 17, a. 3, ad 1.

[25] *STh* I-II, q. 16, a. 1; q. .16, a. 4, co. and ad 1. Cf. I-II, q. 6, a. 4; q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 1. Such an execution by the powers other than the will is distinct in *ratio* from the acts of the will themselves. Cf. I-II, q. 11, a. 2; q. 16, a. 4, ad 1.

[26] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 2, ad 2; II *Sent.,* d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, co. and ad 4.

[27] *STh* I-II, q. 20, aa. 1-4; and q. 20, a. 4, ad 2.

by means of the action of the bodily members and/or the powers of the soul that are imperated by the will.

2. The Object of the Interior Act of the Will

The interior act of the will is an act that is elicited (not imperated) from the will,[28] an act of willing as such. The object of this act is simply the *volitum,* the thing willed.[29] Since the will as a power has the good in general as its object, any object of the act of willing must be something that reason has proposed as good. And since the good has the character of an end,[30] such an object is also an end. That is, for the will, object and end come to the same thing. However, since man's action always involves a series of many ordered ends, many so-called ends of the will also have the character of being means to other ends. All are goods of the will, and all thus have the notion of an end; but that which is considered as a means only bears its notion of good by participating in the goodness of the end to which it is ordered. That is, it is a useful good.[31] Thus, if we consider the order of things willed to each other, we can also distinguish the elicited (interior) act of the will into two different aspects, each of which has its own object:

(1) The interior act of choice or election,[32] which bears upon that which is perceived as a good insofar as it ordered to another end.[33] As I will make clear below, the object of the act of choice is precisely the exterior act itself in those actions that involve the bodily members.[34] This object of choice (the exterior act) is what people usually mean when they refer to "the moral object" as distinct from "intention."

[28] *STh* I-II, q. 6, a. 4.

[29] Cf. for example *STh* I-II, q. 20, a. 2; II *Sent.,* d. 38, exp . textus.

[30] "Bonum habet rationem finis." See, e.g., *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4, ad 10.

[31] *STh* I-II, q. 16, a. 3; *De Verit.,* q. 22, a. 15.

[32] Throughout this article, I take the terms "choice" and "election" to be equivalent, as properly an elicited act of the will that has as its object a means insofar as it is ordered to an end.

[33] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3; q. 13, a. 3.

[34] *STh* I-II, q. 17, a. 3, ad 1; q. 16, a. 4.

(2) The act of intention, which bears upon that which is perceived as good in a more perfect way, insofar as it is an end to be acquired through a means.[35] The object of this action is some further end beyond the immediate exterior action to be performed, an end for the sake of which the exterior action is performed. This further end is also a moral object,[36] since it is an object of the will, the principle of moral acts.[37]

This introduces us to the term "intention," which needs to be explained as well.[38]

B) "Intention"

The basic meaning of "intention" is "an act of tending, or stretching out toward something."[39] It implies a kind of pursuit.[40] Of course, everything that has an admixture of potency pursues something, in the sense that it is inclined to its proper act. In a particular way, intention is proper to cognitive beings, that is, those with sense or intellectual knowledge, since their cognitive faculties permit them to "proceed outside themselves,"[41] and possess the form of another as other. In this sense, *intendere* in Latin has the sense of "attend to," "direct oneself to," "apply one's vision to."[42] But even more properly, it is said of appetitive powers, since inclination and pursuit are appetitive movements.[43] More properly still, it applies to the appetitive movements of the

[35] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 2; q. 12, a. 4, co. and ad 3.

[36] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 6; *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4, ad 10.

[37] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

[38] These different uses of the term "object" are not analogous, but properly univocal, since in each case, the thing designated by the term retains the same definition, with the difference being only the action to which the object refers. While Murphy may be bothered that this puts the moral object on par with other objects (see "Aquinas on the Object," 222 n. 52), if the moral object does not retain this definition, it is simply not an object. Cf. *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6, ad 2: "just as an act in general receives it species from the object, so the moral act receives its species from the moral object."

[39] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 1.

[40] *De Verit.,* q. 22, a. 13, s.c. 2; II *Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 3.

[41] *De Verit.,* q. 1, a. 9.

[42] II *Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3; *De Verit.,* q. 22, a. 13, ad 10.

[43] II *Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, co. and ad 2; *De Malo,* q. 16, a. 11, ad 3 and ad 4.

will, since irrational beings are more moved than movers in their pursuit of particular goods, and hence their intentions are not really their own acts; that is, although they have their own inclinations, such inclinations are not based on their own ordering of themselves to an end. This is the case, however, with the will of a rational creature, which is both the mover of the other powers of the agent, and is cojoined to reason itself, by which the rational agent is able to order itself to its end.[44] Finally, the word "intention" implies a distance from the the thing toward which one tends. Hence, it does not properly apply to an immediate end that is before one. This, rather, would be the object of choice, as I suggested above.

In the end, then, there are six analogous meanings of intention. (1) The application of one's cognitive powers to the act of knowing something.[45] (2) The product of such an act, such as, for example, the first and second intentions in intellectual knowledge. (3) The motion of any appetite towards a good. (4) The motion of the will towards a good/end. This is a very common use of the word "intention," though more properly this is called the *voluntas finis*, or simply *voluntas*.[46] It is what we mean when we say that our act was "intentional": that we meant to do it, that we did it knowingly and willingly. In this sense, it can even apply to things that are properly the object of choice.[47] (5) The motion of the will

[44] II *Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3.

[45] Cf. *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 9; *STh* I, q. 79, a. 10, ad 3.

[46] II *Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5; *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4; *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 12. Cf. also Brock, "(Not Merely) Physical Objects," 47, and n. 105.

[47] *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 8: "If nevertheless under intention be included not only the intention of the end, but the will of the deed, thus it is true in good and evil that as much as someone intends, so much does he do." Cf. also I-II, q. 12, a. 3; *Super Matt.*, c. 7, lect. 2. This wide meaning of intention is also noted by Murphy, "Aquinas on the Object," 233: "we must also mention the important distinction between two senses of intention. The first (i.e., I-II, 12) and narrower sense of 'intention' is an act of the will regarding the end, which is distinguished from the act of the will regarding the means to the end, namely the choice or 'election' of the means. The second and broader sense of intending, in the sense of 'tending towards,' belongs to all acts of the will"; cf. Martin Rhonheimer, "'Intrinsically Evil Acts' and the Moral Viewpoint: Clarifying a Central Teaching *ofVeritatis Splendor," The Thomist* 58 (1994): 19 n. 20; Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle, "'Direct' and 'Indirect'," 16-19, and nn. 4 and 22; Lawrence Dewan, "St. Thomas, Steven Long, and Private Self-Defense," *Nova et Vetera* 8 (2010): 192-95; Steven Jensen, "A Long Discussion," 625, 631-33; and Steven Long, "A Brief Disquisition

towards a good specifically insofar as it is an end to be acquired through a means. This is the most proper notion of "intention, "[48] the one by which it is distinguished in *ratio* from choice.[49] (6) The intended end itself, that is, the object of an act of intention.[50] This is a very common use of the word today, especially when discussing the three sources of morality. In this context, "intention" usually refers to the end intended, rather than to the act of intention.

For our inquiry, elements (4) and (5) of the above division will be the most important.

C) "Circumstance"

The etymological meaning of "circumstance" is simply "that which stands around." We tend to use the word only in reference to actions. In this consideration, the basic idea of circumstance is the nondefining conditions under which the act is done.[51] Thus, it stands in relation to the act as accidents stand in relation to a substance.

However, one must be careful, since one act can bear diverse considerations of reason. Therefore, what may stand as a circumstance in one consideration of the act may actually be a defining characteristic in another consideration.[52] This is certainly

regarding the Nature of the Object of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas," *The Thomist* 67 (2003): 50, 62-65; idem, *The Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act* (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2007), 28-29, although Long has a very different emphasis from all these other authors, particularly when it comes to *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7. Cf. also G. E. M. Anscombe, *Contraception and Chastity* (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1975) repr. in *Why Humanae Vitae Was Right: A Reader*, ed. Janet Smith (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 135: "The reason why people are confused about intention … is this: They don't notice the difference between 'intention' when it means the intentionalness of the thing you're doing-that you're doing this on purpose-and when it means a further or accompanying intention with which you do the thing."

[48] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 4; *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 15; II *Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5.

[49] *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3; *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 13, ad 16; II *Sent.*, d. 40, q. 1, a. 2.

[50] II *Sent.*, d. 38, exp. textus.

[51] *STh* I-II, q. 7, a. l; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 6; IV *Sent.*, d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 1.

[52] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 10. Cf. also *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 5, ad 4; *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1 and 7; q. 2, a. 7, ad 8; IV *Sent.*, d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 3, ad 1.

the case when one considers the act in its natural species as opposed to when one considers the act in its moral species. To consider the act in its natural species is simply to consider the substance of the act absolutely,[53] as it proceeds from a natural active power,[54] along with its natural effects. From these, the natural species can be known, since "nature is determined to one."[55] To consider the act in its *moral species,* on the other hand, is to consider the act as it relates to reason, the principle of moral acts.[56] For example, as far as nature goes, completed sexual intercourse of higher animals is simply a male and a female of the species joining their genital organs in such a way that their generative matters may meet each other. The act is known from the powers that produce the act. Any other relation between the individuals of either sex that engage in it, the place where it is done, the time when it is done, the presence of others-none of these define the natural act of sexual intercourse. Nevertheless, they all either have or might have some import for reason's consideration of the act when the agents are human beings, endowed with reason and free will. Conditions that appear to be circumstantial in one instance may not be so circumstantial in the other, such as the two persons being unmarried.[57] Saint Thomas gives another example: to kill the innocent and to kill the guilty are two acts that are the same in their natural species (proceeding from our motive powers with the effect of the death of another human being), but are quite different morally, since one belongs to murder, the other belongs to justice.[58] Even the selfsame act of

[53] IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 2, ad 2: "However, although that from which the act is found to be in such a genus may be from its substance insofar as it is belongs to its moral genus, it is nevertheless outside its substance according as the substance itself of the act is considered absolutely; wherefore, some acts are the same in the species of nature which are different in the species of morals, such as fornication and the matrimonial act." Cf. also *Quad/.* IX, q. 7, a. 2.

[54] *ScG* III, c. 8: "Wherefore, moral things are allotted their species from the end, just as natural actions from the form of their active principle, as heating from heat."

[55] *STh* I-II, q. 72, a. 3

[56] *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 3.

[57] Saint Thomas uses this very example in *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4; cf. also *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4, ad 6.

[58] III *Sent.,* d. 23, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 3.

killing the guilty, which is by definition the same act naturally speaking, can belong to different species of morals depending on other relations of reason, for example, whether one does it out of justice or out of anger.[59] Finally, acts that are distinct in natural species can be generically the same in moral species. Saint Thomas gives the example of killing a thief and of freeing an innocent person: these are acts of our motive powers that have different natural effects and are in different natural species, but both belong to the virtue of justice.[60] In each of these examples, that which makes for the substance of the act considered morally is circumstantial to its natural species, and that which makes for the substance of the act considered its natural species may be circumstantial to its moral consideration. This diversity of consideration, and the ensuing diverse interpretations of what qualifies as circumstantial, can cause no little confusion.

As for the circumstances themselves, St. Thomas adopts his list from the discipline of rhetoric.[61] They are *who, what, when, where, why, how,* and *by what assistance.* Among these, *what* and *why* seem to merit special consideration. Are not these the object and the intention? And are not these precisely distinguished from circumstance in the traditional enumeration of the three sources of morality? Saint Thomas gives different answers to these questions in different places. For example, he explains that the remote reason *why* somebody does something is in reality a circumstance of the immediate moral act.[62] This understanding of *why* refers to the object of the strict meaning of intention (number [5] in my division above). Nevertheless, if *why* means the

[59] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.

[60] III *Sent.,* d. 23, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 3.

[61] *STh* I-II, q. 7, a. 3 (where St. Thomas also refers to the third book of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics);* IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 2.

[62] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 7, ad 8: "Moreover, the remote end is placed as a circumstance." Cf. also *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 9: "And it is necessary that any individual act have some circumstance through which it is drawn to good or evil, at least on the part of the intention of the end"; IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 2: "[the circumstance] 'why' regards the intention of the one acting interiorly"; ibid., ad 3: "But it is one thing to speak of the end of the agent, who sometimes intends good from a bad act, or vice-versa; and this end is called this circumstance **'why'."**

immediate end itself, not any further end of the agent, then it is, strictly speaking, not a circumstance, considering the act morally. [63] A similar interpretation is given with respect to *what. What* can include the object of the exterior act and the effect of the act, and even these can be called circumstances. [64] *What* can also refer to the act itself considered morally, and in this sense it may not be considered a circumstance morally speaking, though naturally speaking it may be (e.g., the unmarried condition of one's sexual partner is not a mere circumstance morally, though it may be considered so naturally). [65]

The crucial point is that certain conditions are identified as circumstantial in relation to what is being considered. Thus, if a certain condition is considered insofar as it gives species to the act, it will be considered no longer as a circumstance, but rather as a "principal condition of the object." [66] This obtains not only in considering natural species as opposed to moral species, but also when considering different moral species related to each other as more universal to less universal. For example, that a certain amount of money belongs to someone else is circumstantial to the act of "taking up some money," but not circumstantial to theft; and that the money is in the Church's poor box is circumstantial

[63] *STh* I-II, q. 7, a. 3, ad 3; *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 7, ad 8: "Likewise it must be said about the end that the proximate end is the same as the object, and matters hold similarly for it as they do for the object"; IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 2, ad 3: "there is a certain [end] which is the end of the deed, according as the Philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics, that certain things are cojoined to a bad end; and this end gives species to the act; wherefore, it is either not a circumstance, if only the genus of morals be considered; or it is included in this circumstance 'what' by referring to the very substance of the act."

[64] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6: "Nevertheless ['what' is counted as a circumstance] in such a way that within 'what' we should include not only the effect, but also the object, so that it should be understood as both 'what' and 'concerning what'"; IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 2: "For the act not to be proportionate to the end, this circumstance 'what' is pertinent, through which the notion of evil is implicated in the act; and for that reason, all things which can give the species to a sin are introduced in this circumstance."

[65] IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 2, ad 2. Cf. also *STh* I-II, q. 7, a. 3, ad 3; *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6, s.c. 2.

[66] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 10: "as a principal condition of the objectthat is repugnantto reason"; Cf. also *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6, ad 1 and ad 7; IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 3, ad 1 and ad 2.

to theft, but not circumstantial to sacrilege.[67] It is important to recognize this latitude for the application of the term "circumstance," since there are some conditions that are considered as circumstances from one point of view that can nevertheless make an act objectively evil. Thus, in response to the following objection:

> But it should be said that that which is a circumstance to the act in its species of nature gives the species to the act insofar as it is moral. But on the contrary, as the object is related to the act in its genus, so the moral object is related to the moral act. But the object gives species to the act. Therefore, the moral object gives species to the moral act; a circumstance, therefore, does not.[68]

Saint Thomas explains:

> To the second, it must be said that just as an act in general receives its species from the object, so the moral act receives its species from the moral object; nevertheless, this does not exclude that it may receive a species through the circumstances; since from a circumstance, there can be considered some new condition in the object through which it gives species to the act.[69]

Are any circumstances just circumstances, always? Certainly: those that do not imply *primo* and *per se* a special fittingness or repugnance to reason's order.[70] For example, to take a lot of money or a little bit of money are not two new species of evil; they only aggravate or diminish guilt already presupposing the disorder that would be there if the money was not one's own. The condition of "not one's own" constitutes a new disorder, but the condition of "how much" only implies greater or lesser disorder

[67] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6; cf. also ibid., ad 2 and ad 3; *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 10; IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 3.

[68] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 5, arg. 2.

[69] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 5, ad 2; cf. also *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 5, ad 4; q. 18, a. 10, ad 1 and ad 2; IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 3, ad 2.

[70] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 7: "But if it has some difference in relation to reason, it either implies something repugnant to reason *primo* and *per se,* and then it gives species to the sin, such as to take someone else's thing; or it does not imply something repugnant to reason *primo* and *per se;* but by comparison to that which is repugnant *to* reason *primo* and *per se,* it does have some repugnance to reason, as to take someone else's thing in great quantity betokens a greater repugnance to reason."

on the supposition of a previous disorder.[71] Contrariwise, any circumstance that does entail a special fittingness or repugnance *primo* and *per se* (i.e., on the supposition of no other disorder) is, as it were, the specific difference establishing another kind of willing, all the way down to the *speciesspecialissima.*And as such, it is no longer considered as a circumstance, but as an object specifying the will. For example, the fact that a stolen object is a consecrated vessel may be circumstantial in relation to an act considered as the act of taking something (i.e., the natural species), and circumstantial even to the act considered as the act of taking something that is not one's own (i.e., the moral species of theft). Indeed, a thief most probably did not care one way or the other about its consecration.[72] But his will still bore upon it, at least consequentially,[73] in that, knowing that the item was

[71] *N Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 3: "However, one circumstance of sin alone removes the rectitude of virtue; wherefore, if the other circumstances give no other obliqueness to the sin except from the supposition of a preceding one, they will not change the species of sin, but perhaps they will aggravate the quantity of that sin."

[72] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6, arg. *6:* "Furthermore, every sin is voluntary, as Augustine says. But the will is not borne upon some circumstance, as when someone steals a consecrated golden vessel, he does not care about the consecrated thing, but only about the gold. Therefore, this circumstance does not give species to the sin, and for a like reason, neither do any of the others."

[73] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6, ad *6:* "To the sixth it must be said that although the will of the one stealing is not principally borne upon the sacred thing, but upon the gold, nevertheless, it is borne upon a sacred thing consequentially; for he wills more to take a sacred thing than to be without the gold"; see also IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3. a. 2, qcla. 3.

In my estimation, a clear enunciation of the will bearing upon circumstances beyond the principal intention is what is lacking in the synthesis of Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle. These authors certainly do not deny that a person can be responsible for effects or concomitants of their act that go beyond the principal intention. But when it comes to ascertaining which are morally significant and which are not, their analysis is not satisfactory. In the examples they give in "'Direct' and 'Indirect'," 3-8, there is no manifest criterion for the judgments they render. For example, it is not evident why their farmer should not be said to employ sterilization as a means to fattening his bulls, and yet their spy cannot be said not to have employed murder as a means to silencing someone who knows too much. Certainly the authors are persuaded that they have such a criterion: "... the theory of action discussed in this paper is sound, and is applicable across the whole range of choices and actions, quite independently of moral judgments about their goodness or badness, rightness or wrongness." This is a weighty and, I think, impossible claim. In fact, in my reading of "'Direct' and 'Indirect'," it seems the authors are trying to propose a theory that requires little or no moral content for it to solve most or all moral questions. It is a purely formal moral theory, reflexive

consecrated, he proceeded to the act anyway, against another order of reason dictating that sacred things should be respected. [74]

This example highlights a distinction in the consideration of circumstances that will be useful to our inquiry. [75]

(1) Circumstances with regard to the the natural act, or any more generic consideration of the act. For example, in the case of sacrilege by theft, the circumstances to the natural act would be those conditions not included in the consideration of the physical act of "taking a vessel."[76] This is usually what people are referring to when they say that a certain condition is "just a circumstance" of the act. That is, we tend to think of circumstances at first in relation to the genus of the act, and not always in relation to its most specific nature, as understood by reason. Hence, the fact that a chalice does not belong to the one taking it might be called a circumstance of the act. Or, if one is more honest and even admits that this is part of the object, the fact that the chalice was consecrated might be called a mere circumstance, even though this also would give a new species to the act. Calling both of these

of the trends of contemporary philosophy. Perhaps motivated by a zeal to make the natural law relevant in a pluralistic society, they certainly have the semblance of ruling out unwanted side effects from moral specification solely by the intensity of the directedness of one's act of reason and will. In this way, there is no need to undertake the question of which one of these side effects is just or unjust, right or wrong, good or bad when tolerated or not (for example, it never comes up to have to weigh whether the killing of another human being might sometimes be a legitimate or illegitimate chosen action, since by their analysis, it can simply be removed from the realm of moral responsibility; seep. 43). St. Thomas does not proceed this way, as I shall show below (n. 114).

[74] IV *Sent.*, d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 3: "However, the fact that he takes someone else's consecrated thing implies another deformity: since any irreverence shown to sacred things has a special notion of sin; and for that reason, such a circumstance is said to change the species"; cf. also *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6, ad 2; *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 10.

[75] As with the term "object," these differences of the term "circumstance" are yet univocal, since in every case, the term signifies a relation of not belonging to whatever is being considered as the substance of the act in one's present consideration.

[76] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6: "just as if we consider this act which is taking money, it does not belong to its notion that the money be someone else's; wherefore, it is related to the act considered in this way as a circumstance; but it does belong to the notion of theft that it be someone else's; hence, this is not a circumstance of theft"; see also ibid., s.c. 2 for the same consideration of adultery: "Furthermore, if someone knows a married woman, he commits adultery, which is a certain species of sin. But to be a single or a married woman is a certain circumstance of the act. Therefore, a circumstance gives species to a sin."

"circumstances" is legitimate in a sense, since, under one consideration, they are circumstances. [77]

(2) Circumstances with regard to the exterior act considered morally, that is, as chosen by the will. [78] Such circumstances would be those conditions that do not have a special fittingness or repugnance to reason, since it is reason that proposes the exterior act to the will, and the will consents to it and chooses it, with all the orders or disorders that might be entailed in it. In our example, any condition not included in "taking someone else's possession" and "profaning a consecrated thing" would be circumstantial, even if they might aggravate guilt (e.g., if two chalices were stolen; the amount is still only a circumstance, not a new object, though it aggravates the guilt). These are the circumstances that remain circumstances in *any* moral consideration. They may either aggravate or diminish guilt, or they may be completely irrelevant from a moral point of view. They cannot change the species of the act, since any circumstances that would change the species of the act are already included in the specification of the exterior act as it is chosen by the will, and hence, by this point, they would no longer be considered as circumstances.

One might think that if we can speak of the circumstances of the exterior act, we should also speak about the circumstances of the interior act. The interior act of the will, however, does not have any circumstances that modify it, since the act of willing is simple and within the agent himself. When the will chooses or intends something, no circumstances of its act of willing will modify its goodness or badness. The interior act of the will is specified by its object alone. [79] Saint Thomas explains:

> Therefore, when it is said that someone wills some good when he must not or where he must not, it can be understood in two ways: in one way, so that this circumstance be referred to the thing willed [i.e., the exterior act]. And thus, the willing would not be the willing of a good thing, since to will to do something

[77] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6.

[78] Cf. *De Verit.,* q. 22, a. 15, ad 3; *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 1; II *Sent.,* d. 40, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

[79] *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 2.

when it must not be done is not to will the good. In another way, so that it be referred to the act of willing [i.e., the interior act]. And thus it is impossible that someone should will the good when he must not, since a man must always will the good, except perhaps *per accidens*, insofar as, by willing this good, someone is hindered from willing at that moment some due good. And then the evil does not come in from the fact that someone wills the good, but from the fact that he does not will some other good. And the same is to be said for all the other circumstances. [80]

The will's own act can only be modified by circumstances as regards its object (the exterior act), not as regards its own simple act of willing. Said in another way, morally significant circumstances regard what is willed, not the willing itself; and yet, the will is evil if it chooses an object that is disordered, even if that disorder accrues because of what seemed to be a mere circumstance of the exterior act upon first glance (but which in actual fact is sufficient by itself to entail a new disorder with respect to reason).

I have tried to give the basic notions of the three terms that signify the three sources of morality, with the hope of thereby manifesting the reason for the apparent latitude in St. Thomas's usage of them. This latitude, in my opinion, is not a sign of confusion or sloppiness. It is simply due to the fact that these are very general terms, with a variety of applications. And St. Thomas is quite faithful to common usage when he uses them. One cannot accuse him of an esoteric redefinition of common terms or a gratuitous coining of new ones.

II. THE SPECIFICATION OF THE MORAL ACT ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

Having laid out the basic meanings of the terms that designate what has come to be called the "three sources of morality," I will now attempt to explain why I think a consideration of these three concepts needs to be subsumed into an examination of the moral act as the one voluntary act composed of the exterior and interior

[80] Ibid., ad 2.

act[81] for a fuller understanding of St. Thomas's "moral action theory." It is easier to understand the specification of moral acts through such an examination rather than in a direct consideration of the three sources of morality (though it may be easily seen how these are related to the exterior act and the interior act). This is in part precisely because of the latitude of the three terms defined above, which seems to cause no little confusion. For example, if we are to speak of the three sources of morality-object, intention, and circumstance-as determining the morality of a given concrete act, these terms must mean: (1) the object of the exterior act (which is a nonaction; the first definition of object above); (2) the intended end for the sake of which the exterior act is done (the sixth definition above); and (3) either one of the definitions of circumstance (i.e., conditions that either do enter into the object, or that merely aggravate or diminish guilt, or that have no moral bearing whatsoever). This seems to be the correct way of looking at these three terms if they are to be used all together. However, when we speak of "the moral object" so as to distinguish it from further intentions, the word "object" in that context refers to something completely different, namely, the exterior act itself, considered as it is chosen by the will (i.e., along with its own object [a nonaction] and circumstances). This would correspond to the second definition of object above. These are two very different meanings of the word "object"; much of the debate about the moral object stems from the fact that the word has these two principal meanings.[82]

My thesis is that the exterior act performed is specified by its own object, that is, the *nonaction* upon which it bears. It is so specified not only by this object in its natural consideration, but along with any "circumstances" that reason sees as entailing a certain fittingness or disorder, *primo* and *per se*. This exterior act *as it is consideredby reason,* and thus specified by its object and rationally significant circumstances (which, strictly speaking, are no longer just circumstances), and along with any pure

[81] Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 20, a. 3.

[82] Saint Thomas says the same in *STh* 1-11, q. 18, a. 6.

circumstances that merely aggravate or diminish guilt, is altogether the object of the will, that is, of the interior act of choice. This is normally what we mean by "the moral object." And since the will chooses it for some ulterior end (the object of intention) which the agent intends to obtain through the exterior act, the exterior act *as it is performed by the agent* also bears within it a relation to that end, which also modifies its goodness or badness.

The first step to explaining this thesis is to explain how all the determinants of morality are only determinants because they are objects of the will in one way or another.

A) The Primacy of Object

One reason that it is insufficient to consider the three sources of morality alone can be seen in the fact that, even though we speak of "the morality of human acts [as depending] on: the object chosen; the end in view or the intention; [and] the circumstances of the action," [83] nevertheless, when it comes to the species of the moral act, that is, the voluntary act,[84] each one of these three sources (discussed in *STh* 1-11, q. 18, aa. 2-4) only specifies the will insofar as it is somehow a good willed, that is, insofar as it becomes the object of the will. Put more bluntly, for something to be morally relevant, it must be the *object* of the will in some way. For example, with regard to circumstance, St. Thomas says: "The circumstance is sometimes taken as an essential difference of the object, according as it is compared to reason, and then it can give species to the moral act" *(STh* 1-11, q. 18, a. 5, ad 4) The same is said in reference to both circumstances and intention in *De Malo* (q. 2, a. 6, ad 2):

> It can be understood that the circumstance gives the species … according as that circumstance is considered as the object of another adjacent act; for example, if someone commits adultery so that he may steal, there is added another species of sin because of the act of intention tending to a bad end, which is the object of

[83] CCC1750.

[84] Cf. *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 6.

the intention; and likewise, if someone does something unfitting in a holy season, the holy season that is considered as a circumstance with respect to the unfitting act which is done in it, can be considered as an object with respect to the adjacent act, which is "to disdain a holy season."

The reason for this we have already seen: as far as the interior act of the will goes, specification is from the object alone.[85] Even the intention of an ulterior end only bestows a separate *ratio* of good or evil upon the exterior act (viz., the act which is the object of choice)[86] insofar as the object of choice (i.e., the exterior act) bears an order within it (due to reason) to the object of intention (i.e., the end *cuius gratia);* for example, the fact that I choose almsgiving for vainglory adds a *ratio* of vainglory to this act of almsgiving.[87] Both the act and the end to which it is related are objects of the will (in its act of choice and in its act of intention).

That morality only comes into play insofar as the will bears upon things or actions as objects is manifested well by St. Thomas when he first introduces the exterior and interior act in questions 18-20 (viz., in q. 18, a. 6):

I respond it must be said that certain acts are called human *insofar as they are voluntary,* as was said above. In the voluntary act, however, there is found a twofold act, namely, the interior act of the will, and the exterior act, and each of these acts has its own *object.* The end, however, is properly the *object* of the interior voluntary act, but that which the exterior act is about, is its object. Therefore, just as the exterior act receives its species from the object that it is about, so the interior act of the will receives its species from the end *as from a proper object;* in such a way, however, that that which is on the part of the will is related as formal to that which is on the part of the exterior act, since *the will uses the members for acting, as instruments; nor do exterior acts have the ratio of morality, except insofar as they are voluntary* [i.e., insofar as they are objects of the will, by the act of choice]. And therefore, the species of the human act are considered formally according to the end, but materially according to the object of the exterior act. Wherefore, the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the

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[85] *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 2. Stephen Brock explains this well: "Now, in ST I-II, q. 19, a. 2, Thomas tells us that the goodness or badness of the interior act is solely from its object. This is because the object of the interior act includes circumstances and end. So an act whose circumstances and end add to the object must be an exterior act" ("[Not Merely] Physical Objects," 35 n. 81).

[86] Cf. II *Sent.,* d. 40, q. 1, a. 2; d. 38, q. 1, a. 5.

[87] *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 7. See also ibid., ad 1 and ad 2.

Ethics that "he who steals that he might commit adultery is, *per se* speaking, more of an adulterer than a thief." (Emphasis added)

B) The Exterior Act, the Interior Act, and Intrinsic Evils

Article 6 of question 18 introduces us to the consideration of the exterior and interior act. The exterior act has its object, which is that which it is about, or as St. Thomas says elsewhere, the *materia circa quam.* [88] But the interior act also has its object, which actually gives human and moral formality to the exterior act (since the exterior act is only moral insofar as it is chosen by the will). The object of that interior act is the end. This is not surprising, since the will's object is the good in general, and the good always has the character of an end. [89] But, of course, in any human action, there are many ordered ends, until we are face-to-face with our ultimate end itself. And each successive end may itself be a means with regard to another end. In this successive order, it is the most proximate end that gives the species to the act that is immediately being done. As St. Thomas puts it, "the same act in number, according as it goes out from the agent once, is only ordered to one proximate end, from which it has its species; but it can be ordered to many remote ends, of which one is the end of another. "[90]

In this ordered succession of ends of the will, with each end specifying the interior act of the will that bears upon it (i.e., the proximate end specifying choice, and the remote ends specifying intention), [91] how does the exterior act fit in? It is precisely the object of choice:

To the first therefore it must be said that the will is midway between the intellect and the exterior operation, for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and

[88] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 2, ad 2.

[89] See for example *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4, ad 10.

[90] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3. See also *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4, ad 9; q. 2, a. 6, ad 9; q. 2, a. 7, ad 8; II *Sent.,* d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, ad 5; d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.

[91] See *De Verit.,* q. 22, a. 15; *STh* I-II, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3; q. 13, a. 3; cf. II *Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 3.

the will itself causes the exterior action .... Election, however, names the act of the will already determined to that which is to be done by this man.[92]

And thus the exterior act, as the object of choice, is also the proximate end of the will:

for the goodness of a thing, there is not only required the goodness of the ultimate end which the intending will regards, but also the goodness of the *proximate end, which the choosing will regards;* and therefore it does not follow that the goodness of the intending will may suffice for the goodness of the act.[93]

Hence, the exterior act itself is an object of the will, its first end, specifying the act of the will. It does this along with all of its circumstances, as has been mentioned above.[94] It is even chosen along with any further *rationes* of goodness or badness that it has from its ordering to further ends, as has also been mentioned above.[95] But does it have any other moral import apart from these?

To answer that question, St. Thomas begins by making a distinction:

Certain exterior acts can be called good or bad in two ways. In one way, according to their genus, and according to the circumstances considered in them, as to give alms, with the due circumstances being observed, is said to be good. In another way, something is said to be good or bad from the order to the end, as to give alms for the sake of vainglory, is said to be bad.[96]

In the next article, St. Thomas explains what the specification of the exterior act "according to its genus and according to the circumstances considered in it" means: such a consideration of the act is the same as considering it "according to its matter and

[92] *STh* I-II, q. 13, a. 5, ad 1. See also II *Sent.,* d. 40, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2: "To the second it must be said that the exterior act is called good or bad according to the will; but not only according to the will intending, but according to the will electing."

[93] II *Sent.,* d. 40, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 (emphasis added). *STh* I-II, q. 20, a. 1, ad 1; q. 20, a. 4; II *Sent.,* d. 40, q. 1, a. 3; *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 3; q. 2, a. 4, ad 9.

[94] *STh* 1-11, q. 19, a. 2, co. and ad 2.

[95] *STh* 1-11, q. 19, a. 7.

[96] *STh* I-II, q. 20, a. 1.

circumstances. "[97] This matter is nothing other than the object of the exterior act, which St. Thomas calls the *materia circa quam (STh* 1-11, q. 18, a. 2, ad 2), and which he says specifies acts according to their genus *(STh* 1-11, q. 18, a. 2).[98] Thus, St. Thomas considers the exterior act, that is, the act executed by the bodily members,[99] according to what that act bears upon and the other significant circumstances under which the act is performed, all as considered by reason. This is a consideration, nevertheless, that abstracts from the further intentions of the will to which that act is ordered. An exterior human act is never performed without ulterior intentions;[100] but the exterior act can be considered abstracting from such an ordering to further ends.

It is just such an abstraction that sometimes yields the judgment that an act is intrinsically evil. Saint Thomas explains this in article 3 of question 20, an article that I would suggest is very important:

However, it sometimes happens that, in those things which are ordered to something else, something is good from the fact alone that that it is ordered to

[97] *STh* I-II, q. 20, a. 2: "just as was already said, in the exterior act, there can be considered a twofold goodness or badness: one according to the due matter and circumstances; another according to the order to the end."

[98] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 2: "so the first evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, such as to take someone else's things. And this is called evil from the genus, with genus being understood as the species, after that manner of speaking by which we call the human species the human race *!genus]."*

Stephen Brock has already pointed out the identification of the "matter" in *STh* I-II, q. 20, a. 2 with the *"materia circa quam/object"* of I-II, q. 18, a. 2 in "(Not Merely) Physical Objects," 33: "In saying that the exterior act's intrinsic morality, the morality that it has in itself, derives 'from reason,' is Thomas *opposing* this to 'from its *materia circa quam'?* If we still want to say that the exterior act has its intrinsic goodness or badness from its 'object' (a term Thomas does not use here), should we understand its 'object' to be something *other* than its *materia circa quam;* say, some further 'significance' conferred upon it by reason, this being what gives it its true moral 'form'? I do not think so. Indeed I think the text is quite clear about this: The goodness or badness that an exterior act has from reason is 'the goodness or badness that an exterior act has in itself, *on account of* {propter) *its due matter and due circumstances"';* and ibid., n. 79: "In any case, the mention of an act's goodness 'secundum genus suum' in a. 1 is a clear allusion to q. 18, a. 2, where the genus is said to a be a function of the object."

[99] *STh* I-II, q. 6, a. 4; q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; q. 16 a. 1; q. 17, a. 9; q. 18, a. 6; *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 1.

[100] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 9.

something else, just as bitter potion is good from the fact alone that it is healing. Wherefore, the goodness of the health and the potion are not two different goodnesses, but one and the same. But sometimes that which is ordered to something else has in itself some notion of the good, even besides its order to another good, as tasty medicine has the notion of the delightful good aside from the fact that it is healing. Thus, therefore, it must be said that when the exterior act is good or bad only from its order to the end, then the goodness or badness of the act of the will, which *per se* regards the end, is completely the same as the goodness or badness of the exterior act, which regards the end by the mediation of the act of the will. But when the exterior act has goodness or badness according to itself, namely, according to its matter or circumstances, then the goodness of the exterior act is one goodness, and the goodness of the will that is from the end is another, nevertheless, in such a way that both the goodness of the end from the will redounds to the exterior act, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances redounds to the act of the will, as was already said.

The point of this article is that the exterior act can sometimes have its own measurability according to reason as ordered or disordered, independent of any ends beyond itself. It can do this precisely because it is itself the will's own first end/object. [101] That is, insofar as a will chooses it-sometimes by that fact alone-the will becomes bad or good, because the exterior act gives a species to the will's choosing. [102]

Of course, St. Thomas says that the exterior act may have no *ratio* of goodness or badness apart from its further ordering to an end. This is the case with acts that are morally indifferent in kind. [103] But not all exterior acts are indifferent. Some entail an order for or against reason simply by a consideration of their object and circumstances. [104] This is precisely the definition of intrinsically evil acts, acts that no intention or circumstances can render good, as Aristotle points out:

But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply badness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy; and in the case of actions, adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must

[101] See nn. 92 and 93 above.

[102] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.

[103] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 8.

[104] Cf. *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 3; q. 2, a. 5; II *Sent.,* d. 40, q. 1, a. 3; d. 40, q. 1, a. 5.

always be wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong. [105]

Other examples not on Aristotle's list are the sin against nature [106] and lying. In reference to the latter, St. Thomas gives one of his clearest texts on acts that are *per se* evil.

It must be said that whenever some act has some disorder inseparably annexed to it, it can never be done well, since the very disorder is something too much or too little, and thus the mean-in which virtue consists, according to the Philosopher in book 6 of the Ethics-cannot be understood in such an act. However, a lie is such an act. For words or vocal sounds were invented so that they may be signs of concepts, as is said in the first book of the *Peri Hermeneias;* and therefore, when someone enunciates by his voice what he does not have in mind, which is implied by the word "lie," there is there a disorder through the abuse of voice. And therefore we concede that a lie is always a sin. [107]

There are other sins that, for their very definition, require some ordering to an end in order to entail a disorder of reason. For example, detraction is not defined simply as an act that diminishes another's good name; rather, this must be intended as an end (i.e., under the proper sense of intention, bearing on a remote end to be obtained through a means). [108] Scandal is not simply performing an act that our neighbor then takes as an occasion of sin; rather, inducing our neighbor to sin must be part of the intention. [109] Even killing a fellow human being is not an exterior act that necessarily implies a disorder to reason, [110] as St.

[105] *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.6.1107a9-17 *(The Basic Works of Aristotle,* ed. Richard McKean [New York: Modern Library, 2001], 959).

[106] *De Malo,* q. 15, a. 1.

[107] *Quodl.* VIII, q. 6, a. 4.

[108] *STh* 11-11, q. 73, a. 2.

[109] *STh* 11-11, q. 43, a. 3.

[110] Although for St. Thomas, there is kind of presumption against it due to its natural badness, *Quad.* IX, q. 7, a. 2: "But there are certain actions which, absolutely considered [i.e., in their natural species; see above, nt. 53] imply a certain deformity or disorder, which nevertheless are made good with the arrival of some circumstances; such as to kill a man or to strike him in themselves imply a certain deformity, but if it be added, to kill a man for the sake of justice, or to strike a delinquent for the sake of discipline, it will not be a sin, but **virtuous."**

Thomas says (in response to an objection posed to the article just quoted above):

To the first therefore it must be said that homicide is always a sin, since it has a disorder inseparably annexed to it. For homicide implies more than the slaying of a man; for composite names frequently imply more than their component parts; for homicide implies the undue slaying of a man. And therefore, homicide is never licit, although to slay a man may sometimes be licit.[111]

[111] *Quodl.* VIII, q. 6, a. 4, ad 1. On the topic of the licit killing of another man, Rhonheimer confuses the distinction in elective will between self-defense and capital punishment. See "Intrinsically Evil Acts," 19 n. 20: "This affirmation, as is obvious, presupposes that killing as the execution of capital punishment (pronounced by the competent judicial authority) and taking into account the fact that the punished is really guilty according to the standards of penal law, cannot be described as a choice of the death of a person … in an objective-intentional sense it is 'punishment' and therefore an act intentionally and objectively belonging to the virtue of justice, and not the choice that a person not be, whether as a means or as an end." This leads him to make the strange claim that capital punishment is different from the unjust slaughter of Jews not only because the latter is unjust, but also because the former is not a choice to kill. See "Intentional Actions", 299: "Paul Touvier had no power to decide what would be his basic intention in killing seven innocent people. To describe his action properly, one must include the purpose or the intention, 'wanting them to be dead' (even if he would regret it; that is only a motivational side-feature, but not the very intention of his acting). Touvier clearly wanted the seven to be killed; he chose their deaths for the sake of some greater benefit"; and ibid., n. 41, "This is precisely what does not occur in the case of capital punishment (the argument applies also if one is for other reasons opposed to capital punishment), nor in that of legitimate self-defense, nor in that of killing in a just war (which must always have a defensive, anti-aggression character)."

This is not true. Despite Rhonheimer's use of *STh* II-II, q. 64, a. 7 in explaining the former assertion, capital punishment is not self-defense, and neither is just war. In both cases, the ministers of the state are intending to kill. That is their prerogative as custodians of the common good, which is more universal, more far-reaching than the private good *(STh* II-II, q. 64, aa. 2-3). Thus, the private person never has the power to intend killing, not even in self-defense (II-II, q. 64, a. 7). But in the very same article, St. Thomas is clear that the ministers of the state do intend the death of the one they kill: "But since to slay a man is not licit except by public authority for the sake of the common good, as is clear from the things said above, it is illicit that a man should intend to kill a man so that he might defend himself, *except to him who has public authority,* who, *intending to slay a man* for his own defense, refers this to the public good, as is clear in the soldier fighting against the enemy, and in the minister of the judge fighting against thieves" (emphasis added). See also *STh* I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1: "the just judge simply wills that the murderer be hanged." Rhonheimer comments, "In my view, St. Thomas would never say that the death of the criminal is chosen as a means to restore justice or to preserve the common good!" *(Vital Conflicts in Medical Ethics: A Virtue Approach to Craniotomy and Tubal Pregnancies,* ed. William F. Murphy, Jr. [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009], 71). But St. Thomas does indeed say so, in rather blunt terms: "man by sinning withdraws from the order of reason; and therefore … in a

Nevertheless, some sins are defined by the exterior act alone, considered by reason according to its matter and circumstances, even apart from intention in the proper sense[112] (though not apart from intention in the sense of being done on purpose).[113] In the case of such acts, for a person to choose them is enough to make the will bad.

C) Judging Voluntary Acts

How is all this helpful in trying to understand the specification of moral acts? Saint Thomas gives a good example in *De Malo*, question 2, article 6:

> Thus, having considered how sins may differ in species, it must be considered what a circumstance is. Now, a circumstance names that which stands around the act, as if considered extrinsically outside the substance of the act. And, indeed, this is in one way on the part of final cause, when we consider *why* he did it; or on the part of the principal agent cause, when we consider *who* did it; or on the part of the instrument, when we consider *by what instrument* or *by what assistances.* In another way, it stands around the act on the part of a measure, for example, when we consider *where* or *when* he did it. In the third way, on the part of the act itself, whether we consider the mode of acting, for example, whether he struck slowly or strongly, frequently or once; or we may consider the object or matter of the act, for example, whether he struck his father or a foreigner; or also the effect which the agent induced by acting, for example, whether by striking he wounded, or even killed him;[114] all of which are

certain way he falls into the slavery of beasts, namely, so that it may be ordered about him according as he is useful to others … and therefore … to slay a sinful man can be good, just as to slay a beast, for a sinful man is worse than a beast and more harmful" *(STh* II-II, q. 67, a. 2, ad 3).

112 I.e., the sense in which it is a movement of the will toward the end as opposed to the choice of the means--my fifth definition above.

!LI I.e., my fourth definition above: intention in the sense of any movement of the will.

114 It is this point about the effect of an action that separates Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle from St. Thomas. The New Natural Law authors write: "Considering the behavior and its results as an event, or sequence of events, or set of causes and effects in the natural world, observers can readily see craniotomy to be killing the baby and rightly describe it as doing so directly. But *Veritatis splendor* teaches that it is wrong to consider behavior and its results that way when carrying out moral reflection and seeking to determine what kind of human act is or was being deliberated about, chosen, and done" (Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle, "'Direct' and 'Indirect'," 22). I doubt that this interpretation of *Veritatis splendor* is correct; it is certainly not the thought of St. Thomas. Saint Thomas uses precisely the terms "effect," as he does

contained in this verse: *who, what, where, by what assistance, why, how, when.* Nevertheless, in such a way that in *what* is included not only the effect, but also the object, so that it may be understood as both *what* and *about what.*

Using the case in this text as a guide, we can come to understand how to evaluate what is morally relevant in a human act. If one would find out what the person is intending or choosing in a particular act, a good algorithm to follow is first to simply identify the act, even if only in its natural species. If this seems difficult, one can refer to the powers that executed it. This is perfectly legitimate, since although acts have their specification from their objects, a reference to the powers that executed them can at least provide the genus. For although in agents whose action is not determined to one[115] the specification of the act is from the object, the power's object is also universal in relation to the object of the act.[116] Once one has a basic act, designated by a verb, it might be helpful to consider first what is the proper object of this exterior act in relation to reason. Does the object upon which the agent is actually bearing correspond to this reasonable object? If it does not, the act is sinful, from the object of the exterior act, which is included in the object of the will, insofar as the exterior act itself is chosen by the will. If it does, then the next question is whether there are any other circumstances of the act thus far named that have a special repugnance to reason *primo* and *per se* (that is, not assuming another disorder of reason upon

here, and "event," as he does in *STh* I-II, q. 20, a. 5; and in *De Malo,* q. 3, a. 10, ad 5. To these texts may be added *STh* I-II, q. 73, a. 8 (though this one is rejected as irrelevant by Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle because it deals with aggravation of already sinful action ["'Direct' and 'Indirect'," n. 38]); and *De Malo,* q. 1, a. 3, ad 15: "Sometimes an accident of some effect is cojoined to it as in the fewer cases and rarely; and then the agent, while he intends the *per se* effect, it is not necessary that he intend in any way the *per accidens* effect. But sometimes such an accident is concomitant to the effect principally intended always, or as in the more numerous cases, *and then the accident is not separated from the intention of the agent"* (emphasis added). The same doctrine is found in all of these texts: if the effect or event is foreseen *or* one that follows *per se* and *ut in pluribus,* it does not wholly escape the intentionality of the agent; and if it bears a special repugnance or fittingness to reason, it will specify the act. But this goes well beyond the bounds of intentional analysis (seen. 73 above).

[115] See *STh* I-II, q. 50, a. 3; q. 72, a. 3, co. and ad 3.

[116] See *STh* I-II, q. 54, a. 1, co. and ad 2; II *Sent.,* d. 36, q. 1, a. 5; *STh* I, q. 77, a. 3, co. and ad 4; I-II, q. 72, a. 3, co. and ad 1; *De Verit.,* q. 10, a. 3, s.c. 3.

which the disorder from the circumstance depends).[117] If so, then the act is sinful, though not properly from a circumstance, but from the object of the interior act of the will, which chose the exterior act even under such circumstances. But if there are no circumstances of the exterior act according to which it has a special repugnance to reason *primo* and *per se*, then the final question is, Why is one performing this act? And if the object of one's intention is bad, then this also bestows a notion of badness on the exterior act, not considered as to its genus, but considered as it is chosen for such an end.[118]

An example will be helpful. John is having sexual intercourse. What is the act in its natural species? It is generative, for John is using his generative powers.[119] What does reason say is the rational object of the use of one's generative powers? One with whom offspring may be produced and educated properly, which implies an already made long-term commitment. What is the object of John's action? If it is an animal of another species, then his act is clearly disordered, according to reason's consideration of the object of the exterior act. If it is another man, or if another party is altogether lacking, the same is true. But if it is a woman, reason still asks, "Which woman?" If it is one married to John, then the act is good; if not, the act is bad. Whether one considers "married" or "unmarried" as a circumstance or as part of reason's consideration of the object does not really matter, since reason must consider both, and wherever the special disorder falls, that will always be the object of the will. Assuming that John is having intercourse with his wife, are there any other circumstances that might make the act repugnant to reason? One can run through the list of circumstances. *Who* (which refers not to the person as agent, but to conditions of the person):[120] Does John know he has AIDS and has not told his wife? *When:* Did they give up sexual intercourse for Lent, for instance? *Where:* Are they doing it in public? *How:* Are they keeping the natural mode? *By what*

[117] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 7; IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 3. See nn. 70 and 71 above.

[118] *STh* I-II, q. 20, a. 3; q. 19, a. 7, ad 2.

[119] For the sake of clarity, I will only consider the act as the moral act of John.

[120] IV *Sent.,* d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 2, ad 1.

assistance: Is John using a condom? If any of these is the case, then it is only a circumstance in one's initial consideration, that is, a consideration of the natural act or of some more general moral species of the act (according to my first definition of "circumstance" above). Since they all imply a special repugnance to reason that does not depend on a former disorder, they are objects of the will, at least consequentially. [121] Finally, reason asks *Why:* Is John having intercourse with his wife only so that he may deceive her so that he can continue an affair with another woman? If so, then the act of sexual intercourse is bad as it is performed by John, since he has ordered it to an evil end, and his disordered intention informs his proximate act. This intended end is both an object of the act of intention (i.e., the intention of the end that is opposed to the choice of the means-my fifth definition above), and it endows a *ratio* of disorder upon the object of choice. [122]

Or we can consider St. Thomas's example. What is the natural act? It is one of my motive powers. I am "striking." What does reason say is the rational object of striking? Something that may harm my own bodily integrity, something subject to me that requires discipline, something over which I have the authority to do violence for punishment of moral guilt, or any number of irrational objects. What am I striking? My father. Is that against reason? Normally, it would seem so, but even for this, there is not enough data. What are the other circumstances? *What* (as to effect): Did I wound him or kill him? If the latter, was that against reason? Most probably, but even now, we must refer to other circumstances, such as *who* (do I have the proper authority), and most importantly, *why:* Is he a criminal brought before me for a capital crime? Most likely, the answer to these latter two will be "no," of course, which is why in most cases reason can perceive disorder as soon as it considers "father" and "killing." Such "circumstances," in fact, place the object of the will in patricide, not just violence, not just murder. [123]

[121] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 6, ad 6. See nn. 72 and 73 above.

[122] *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 7.

[123] For a similar, very helpful explanation, see Brock's analysis of Macbeth's stabbing of Duncan ("[Not Merely] Physical Objects," 50-55).

I have tried to give a basic account of my own understanding of the moral act according to St. Thomas. In order to further clarify this account, it will be be helpful to answer briefly some possible objections.

III. REPLIES TO COMMON OBJECTIONS

In this section, I would like to consider the following five observations that seem to go against my understanding of St. Thomas: (A) the moral object is never a thing, but an act; (B) the moral act cannot be defined without a basic intentionality; (C) moral acts are specified by what is intended, not by what is *praeter intentionem;* (D) the object of the interior act is related to the object of the exterior act as form to matter; (E) the physical act as such cannot even belong to morality, since an act is moral insofar as it proceeds from reason.

A) The Moral Object Is Never a Thing, but an Act

I made the claim above that the object of the exterior act is a nonaction. But morality is about human actions. Mere things belong to another genus of science completely. Therefore, it would seem that the moral object is always an action.

Nevertheless, the statement, "the moral object is never a thing, but an act," is, simply speaking, false. It is true that a thing, in the sense of a nonaction, is not in the realm of morality insofar as it is a thing. But insofar as it is an object of a human act (i.e., a moral act)[124] it can be a moral object, just as medicinal substance is not healthy except insofar as it causes health in an animal.[125]

The numerous texts of St. Thomas that manifest that he clearly had no problem with referring to things as moral objects have

[124] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 3; q. 6, pr.; q. 18, a. 8; q. 19, a. 1, ad 3; q. 20, a. 6, ad 2.

[125] Stephen Brock already mentions this example in "(Not Merely) Physical Objects," 30-31, where he cites *STh* I, q. 16, a. 1, ad 3 and, applying the analogy to the relation of interior act-exterior act, *STh* I-II, q. 20, a. 3, ad 3.

already been pointed out.[126] The fact is that, metaphysically speaking, at some point the object of a moral act *must* be a thing. This is for at least two reasons.

(1) Moral acts are acts that proceed from the will. They are voluntary.[127] But the will's object is the good. The good, however, is not like the true. For the good is in things, whereas the true is in the mind.[128] That which most properly has the notion of the good is the thing outside of the subject by union to which the subject is perfected. This makes it desirable or "appetible" to the subject. Indeed, the nominal definition of the good is "that which is appetible."[129] All beings having any admixture of potency seek to obtain their perfect act by somehow being united to those things capable of bestowing a perfection on them.[130] The moral act is no different.[131] Eventually, at the term of the many steps of the human act, there has to be some kind of uniting with a nonaction that is exterior to us. Nevertheless, in the intention of the agent, the action is sought· more than just the thing, since the agent cannot be united to the thing except by some operation. But the goodness that it seeks, even in the action, accrues to it from the thing.[132]

[126] See Brock, "(Not Merely) Physical Objects," 23; Dewan, "St. Thomas, Rhonheimer, and the Object," 73-78.

[127] See *STh* I-II q. 18, a. 6; q. 19, a. 6; etc.

[128] See *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 2; q. 21, a. 1; VI *Metaphys.*, lect. 4 (Marietti ed., 1240); XII *Metaphys.*, lect. 7 (Marietti ed., 2526); *STh* I, q. 16, a. 4, ad 2.

[129] *STh* I, q. 5, a. 1.

[130] *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 1; q. 21, a. 6: "Moreover, the relation implied in the name 'good' is a relation of something perfective, according as something naturally perfects"; see also *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 3, ad 2; *STh* I, q. 5, aa. 1, 3-5; II *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1.

[131] Since metaphysics is the science that has being as such for its subject, its conclusions apply to all things that are, including moral matters. Not even the moralists can escape metaphysics.

[132] See for instance *STh* I-II, q. 16, a. 3: "But it must be considered that the ultimate end is said in two ways: in one way, simply, and in another way, as far as concerns someone. For as was said above, since the end sometimes names the thing itself, but sometimes the obtaining of the thing or its possession-just as for the avaricious man, the end is either money or the possession of money-it is manifest that, simply speaking, the ultimate end is the thing itself, for the possession of money is only good because of the good of money. But as far as concerns this man, the obtaining of money is the ultimate end: for the avaricious man would not seek money except that he might have it." See also Brock's treatment and his many supporting texts

(2) Everyone admits that acts are specified by their objects. And while it is true that an action can have another action as its object, and thus be specified by it, that latter action in turn requires an object for its specification. There is no such thing as an action without an object. And at some point, this series will have to be terminated to a nonaction, for there cannot be an infinite regress. [133]

According to my view, the object of the exterior act is an exterior thing, not necessarily a physical thing, but certainly a nonaction. This exterior thing can even be called an object of the interior act, but not immediately speaking. The interior act of the will, namely, choice or intention, can only bear upon the exterior thing by the mediation of some action executed by the bodily members and powers of the soul. [134] Certainly, there are some choices or intentions that do not bear upon exterior things. This is particularly so in the case of acts of temperance. [135] But even in that case, the act of choice bears upon another action that at some point has for its object a nonaction, namely, the *venerea,* by the mediation of the· moderation of the movements of the concupiscible appetite. [136] But where exterior things are involved, the immediate object of choice is the exterior action by which one is united to the thing. [137] And the immediate object of intention is another action by which one is united to another thing. [138] Indeed, this even obtains with regard to our ultimate end. God, as such, is the *thing* to which we and all creatures of the universe are drawn. He is the object of our beatific vision, even if in our intention, our desire for the ultimate end is a desire for that operation by which we are united to God. [139]

in "(Not Merely) Physical Objects," 24-27.

[133] This has also already been pointed out by Brock, "(Not Merely) Physical Objects," 23.

[134] *STh* I-II, q. 13, a. 4; q. 16, a. 4, co. and ad 1; q. 17, a. 3, co. and ad 1.

[135] IV *Sent.,* d. 33, q. 3, a. 2, ad 5.

[136] III *Sent.,* d. 33, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 2, ad 2.

[137] See nn. 92 and 132 above.

[138] *STh* I-II, q. 13, a. 4.

[139] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 8; q. 2, a. 7.

B) The Moral Act Cannot Be Defined without a Basic Intentionality

I claimed above that reason can consider the exterior act with its object and circumstances apart from any consideration of any further intended ends to which it may be ordered by the will. But if an action performed by our powers or bodily members has no intentionality behind it, this means it is not commanded by the will, which always acts for an end. Hence, it would seem that we cannot define the moral act without a basic intentionality.

This statement, "the moral act cannot be defined without a basic intentionality," requires a distinction. If it refers to "moral act" as a genus of actions, then it is true. The moral act is an act that proceeds from the deliberate will. Thus, the properly moral act is one that is done by an agent *sciens et eligens.* And in this sense, it is by definition intentional in the sense that it is done on purpose (my fourth definition above). It is even intentional in the sense that the moral act is performed for the sake of an end to be obtained through a means (my fifth definition of intention above), since the moral act proceeds from reason, and reason always orders the immediate act to further ends, and this means that there is a further intention behind every moral act.[140] This is nothing other than to consider the moral act from "the perspective of the acting person."[141]

However, if "the moral act" means a species of moral act, then the statement is false. If "intentionality" is taken to mean a specific intentionality, that is, the specific intended end (my sixth definition above) then it is false, since some moral acts do not require a reference to further intention for their definition. This is the case for those acts that are intrinsically evil, in which the exterior act by itself already carries in it a disorder. The "what"

[140] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 9.

[141] John Paul II, *Veritatis splendor* 78.

does not always need the "why."[142] Can the statement be true if intentionality in general is all that is meant, that is, that we cannot ascertain the moral species without intentionality as such? Strictly speaking, no; for although the moral act in general requires intentionality just to be the moral act, nevertheless, the species of some moral acts can be determined by the exterior act alone, apart from the consideration of the intentionality that is a property of all moral acts. It is a matter of abstraction, just as one can specify a circle by a definition that never mentions the fact that mathematical beings can only have their actual existence in matter.[143]

For example, the moral act of "stealing" can be specified merely by the exterior act of "taking someone else's thing," without any inclusion of a specific intention,[144] or any mentioning of the fact that this act must proceed from an ordering reason that cannot but order this act to ulterior ends; for this is already assumed in the genus, in the fact that we are specifying human acts.

Of course, St. Thomas says it better, and multiple times, usually responding to an objection like the following:

> Furthermore, since the good is convertible with being, something will have it that it be good from the same thing that it has being. But the act has moral being from the will; for if it is not voluntary, it is not a moral act. Therefore also it has moral goodness and badness from the will. Therefore, according to itself, it is neither good, nor bad, but indifferent.
>
> But it may be said that, although the act may have it that it is moral insofar as it is voluntary, which is a certain common characteristic; nevertheless, this special characteristic that it is good or that it is bad it has according to itself-But on the contrary, good and bad are differences of moral acts. But differences *per se* divide the genus; and thus it is necessary that the differences not be referred to something other than the genus. If, therefore, the act has this common

[142] Cf. for the contrary view Rhonheimer, "Intrinsically Evil Acts," 30; idem, "Intentional Actions," 297; Martin Rhonheimer, "The Perspective of the Acting Person and the Nature of Practical Reason: The 'Object of the Human Act' in Thomistic Anthropology of Action," *Nova et Vetera* 2 (2004): 499.

[143] I *Phys.*, lect. 1 (Marietti ed., 3).

[144] See Dewan, "St. Thomas, Rhonheimer, and the Object," 84-92.

characteristic which is to be moral from the will, it will also have from the same will that it be good or bad, and thus, according to itself, it is indifferent. [145]

He replies:

To the third it must be said that to be voluntary pertains to the *ratio* of the human act insofar as it is a human act; wherefore, what is in it insofar as it is voluntary, whether according to its genus, or according to its difference, is not in it *per accidens* but *per se.*[146]

And as St. Thomas points out in the article, "according to its difference" refers to the moral act judged from the relation of its object to right reason. [147] Though the the genus of the act is from its ordering by the will, its species does not come from the will, but from the judgment of right reason concerning its object. Yet since the will has taken up the act for its own ends, this is enough to render the act voluntary and imputable, as to both genus and species. To say that the species also comes from the will is to confuse the generic nature of the moral act with its specification. Saint Thomas identifies this problem very well in his commentary on the *Sentences.*

Who say all acts are indifferent. These men considered acts only according to the *ratio* of their genus; since insofar as the act is taken generally, it is indifferent to moral goodness or badness, although it may have natural goodness. Nevertheless, if they understood it of the act taken in the particular, thus that opinon was simply false. But they seem to not have understood this, since they said that the action taken in the particular is cojoined to a certain end, from which it has its goodness or badness, such as stealing or some such thing. [148]

Sometimes the exact same misunderstaning is found today: it is assumed that the an exterior act can only be good or evil by reference to some intended end. [149]

[145] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4, arg. 3 and 4.

[146] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4, ad 3.

[147] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4, co. and ad 5.

[148] II *Sent.,* d. 40, exp. textus.

[149] Cf. Rhonheimer, "The Perspective of the Acting Person," 499: "we cannot understand and define the object of a human act without including in this definition an intentional element that expresses the 'why' one does what one (externally) does. Without such a 'why'

C) Moral Acts Are Specified by What Is Intended, Not by What Is "praeter intentionem"

I claimed above that the exterior act as a moral object is specified by its own object (a nonaction) and its species-changing circumstances. But in many moral actions, circumstances, and in some cases even the object of the exterior act itself, are not intended, but materially cojoined to what is intended by the agent. Indeed, no one is able to intend evil as such.[150] And yet, there is the Aristotelian axiom that what is *praeter intentionem* is *per accidens.* Thus, moral actions must be specified by what is *secundum intentionem.*

This statement, "moral acts are specified by what is intended, not by what is *praeter intentionem,"* requires a distinction. According to the strict meaning of intention, namely, the act of the will that has as its object an end to be acquired through a means (my fifth definition above) it is false. For in that case, the immediate moral act is specified not by what is intended, but by what is chosen, that is, the proximate end, the first object of the will which is the exterior act.[151]

Nevertheless, it is, of course, true that St. Thomas says precisely that "moral acts receive their species according to that which is intended, not, however, from that which is outside the intention, since it is *per accidens."*[152] Such statements and others like it, such as the Gloss's "As much as you intend, so much do you do,"[153] are to be understood in the wider sense of intention (my fourth above) which includes as its object whatever one does on purpose, that is, knowingly and willingly. In this sense, it includes objects of choice. This is a very common use of the term of which St. Thomas is quite aware, as he explains when he manifests how the statement "As much as you intend, so much do you do" can be true:

(a basic intentionality is configured by reason) we would be left with only the material elements of the action, not yet ordered by reason."

[150] *STh* 11-11, q. 78, a. 1, ad 2; I, q. 19, a. 9; 1-11, q. 8, a. 1.

[151] See n. 93 above.

[152] *STh* 11-11, q. 64, a. 7.

[153] Cf. *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 8; II *Sent.,* d. 40, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.

If nevertheless under intention be included not only the intention of the end, but the will of the work, thus it is true in both good and evil that as much as someone intends, so much does he do. For he who wills to slay the saints that he may lend a service to God, or he who wills theft that he may give alms, seems indeed to have a good intention, but a bad will. And because of this, if under intention, the will also be included, so that the whole thing is named "intention," his intention will also be bad.[154]

Thus, "as much as you intend, so much do you do" is true if intention simply refers to what one bears upon as an object of his will, which is always what makes an act to be moral in the first place. But if intention refers only to a further end (my fifth defintion above), then the statement is false. Nevertheless, it has been the source of no little confusion, since many morally good or bad acts in fact do require some intentional content for their definition.[155] One often makes general statements regarding specification from intention since this is what makes the will good or bad *ut in pluribus,* as Peter Lombard hints, echoing St. Augustine:[156] "Therefore, all the works of man are judged good or bad according to intention and cause, except those which are *per se* bad, that is, which cannot be done without transgression."[157]

Be that as it may, if intention is understood in the wider sense, as including election, such statements are true without exception.[158]

D) The Object of the Interior Act Is Related to the Object of the Exterior Act as Form to Matter

I claimed above that the exterior act is specified by its own object and any of its circumstances that imply a *primo* and *per se* fittingness or repugnance to reason. These together finally place

[154] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 8.

[155] See the examples of detraction, scandal, and murder above.

[156] Augustine, *Contra Mendacium,* c. vii.

[157] Peter Lombard, II *Sent.,* d. 40.

[158] Thus, St. Thomas comments on the words of St. Ambrose: "'Your desire places the name upon your deed.' If it is understood univerally, it must be expounded about electing desire, and not only intending desire" (II *Sent.,* d. 40, exp. textus). For current authors who have made the same judgment, seen. 47 above.

the concrete exterior act in a species, apart from any end to which it is ordered. Yet St. Thomas says that the object of the interior act is formal with respect to the object of the exterior act. But form is what makes a thing to be what it is. Hence, although the object of the exterior act may put the act in one species, nevertheless, when the interior act takes this exterior act up, it would seem that it endows its own species upon it.

The basic statement, "the object of the interior act is related to the object of the exterior act as form to matter," is true. Saint Thomas makes the analogy in *Prima Secundae,* question 18, article 6:

> Therefore, just as the exterior act receives its species from the object that it is about, so the interior act of the will receives its species from the end as from a proper object; in such a way, however, that that which is on the part of the will is related as formal to that which is on the part of the exterior act, since the will uses the members for acting, as instruments; nor do exterior acts have the *ratio* of morality, except insofar as they are voluntary. And therefore, the species of the human act are considered formally according to the end, but materially according to the object of the exterior act. Wherefore, the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the *Ethics* that "he who steals that he might commit adultery is, *per se* speaking, more of an adulterer than a thief."

However, if one were to interpret this to mean that the species of the one moral act is set exclusively by the interior act, such an understanding would be false. Saint Thomas makes it clear in the very next article that the species comes more from the object than from the end (and in this particular context, following as it does article 6, the word "end" refers to the object of the interior act, whereas the word "object" refers to that of the exterior act):

> the specific difference which is from the end is more general; and the difference which is from the object *per se* ordered to such an end is specific with respect to it. For the will, whose proper object is the end, is a universal mover with respect to all the powers of the soul, whose proper objects are the objects of particular acts.[159]

[159] *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 7. See also IV *Sent.*, d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 2, ad 3: "But the end of the agent is different, since sometimes he intends good from a bad, or vice-versa; and this end is called the circumstance 'why.' But from this the act does not receive its proper species, but as it were its common species."

Even more enlightening is the reply to the third objection. The objection itself runs as follows:

Furthermore, the more formal some difference is, the more specific it is, since the difference is compared to the genus as form to matter. But the species which is from the end is more formal than that which is from the object, as was said. Therefore, the species which is from the end is contained under the species which is from the object, as the *speciesspecialissima* under a subalternate genus.

Saint Thomas's reply shows just how one is to understand "form" as it applies to either the interior or the exterior act.

To the third it must be said that the difference is compared to the genus as form to matter insofar as it makes the genus to be in act. But the genus is also considered as more formal than the species according as it is more separated and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is said in the *Physics.* And according to this, the genus is a formal cause of the species, and it will be the more formal the more general it is.

This is very significant, since it makes clear that in St. Thomas's own judgment the fact that the end is formal with respect to the object of the exterior act does not mean that the end sets the *species specialissima,* but only the genus.[160] "More formal" here

[160] I must mention here my strong disagreement with Steven A. Long. Long makes his entire moral synthesis rest on his reading of *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 7 ("Response to Jensen on the Moral Object," *Nova et Vetera* 3 [2005]: 103). He does recognize that the genus comes from the end and the specific difference comes from the object ("A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas," *The Thomist* 67 [2003]: 58) but, in his words, "if, and only if, the object is naturally *(per se)* ordered to the end, will the moral species derived from the end be most formal and most containing and defining, such that the moral species derived from the object is merely a specific difference of that species" *(Teleological Grammar,* 25-26).

This is speech that fails to signify. To be both the most containing and the most defining at the same time is to be both the most general and the most specific at the same time. And to be the specific difference and not be the most defining is to be the most defining and not the most defining. Man is not most defined by the genus of "animal" that contains him, but by the "rational" that is his specific difference. It would be absurd to answer the question, "What most defines man?" with the response, "His animality." The specific difference is that which signifies how a thing is what it is.

This claim is the very bedrock of Long's moral synthesis, repeated frequently throughout his works *(Telelogical Grammar,* 25, 25-26, 48, 50, 51, 84 [twice], 84-85, 86; "A Brief Disquisition," 58, 59 [twice], 61; "Response to Jensen," 102 [three times], 103, 105, 107, 107-8, 108; *"Veritatis Splendor§* 78 and the Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act," *Nova*

means more general, more universal, less restricted, less defined. This is not just a one-time exception to how we understand "form." In fact, whenever we are dealing with ordered powers, that which is material is actually that which supplies the substance of the act produced. [161] Even more importantly, whenever we are speaking about "form" in relation to the objects of powers, we are not designating the *speciesspecialissima,*but that which makes the object relatable to the power in question. [162] This is precisely why charity is known as the "form of the virtues," although each of the virtues remains essentially distinct from charity: charity imposes its own form on the virtues [163] in that it is by charity that the other

et Vetera 6 [2008]: 146 [twice]; "An Argument for the Embryonic Intactness of Marriage," *The Thomist* 70 [2006]: 276-77). In all of these places, it stands as a major premise.

It is possible that Long is incautious about the meaning of "specific difference" or "defining." See *Teleological Grammar,* 51, 84, where he replaces the term "specific difference" with "accidental specification," even though *accident* is precisely distinguished against *specific difference* among the predicables.

Long's other general point about the need for attention to "natural teleology" is well taken, and with it I agree (see nn. 73 and 115 above). But he uses the wrong article: he should have focused on the *loci* where St. Thomas actually discusses the moral import of effects and outcomes of actions *(STh* I-II, q. 20, a. 5; q. 73, a. 8; *De Malo,* q. 1, a. 3, ad 15; q. 3, a. 10, ad 5). The primary goal of *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 7 is threefold. First, it is to establish that only certain acts, namely, those *per se* ordered to the end, can have the formality of their end endowed upon them (e.g., only reasonable acts, *per se* ordered to the ultimate end, can be informed by charity *[STh* II-II, q. 23, aa. 7-8; cf. also II-II, q. 58, a. 6; V *Ethic.,* lect. 2, where the identification is essential, not just in final or efficient cause]), and this Long grants. Second, it is to establish that when the act is not so *per se* ordered to the end, the exterior act sets its own species from its own object and there is no further determination needed; this, too, Long grants. Third, it is to establish that when the act *is* so *per se* ordered, the *species specialissima* (i.e., that which most of all accounts for what the act is) is *still* set by the exterior act's object (e.g., even if an act of fortitude is informed by an act of charity, it still remains essentially and substantially an act of fortitude *[STh* I-II, q. 13, a. l]). In other words, no matter what, the definition of the act done is set by the exterior act's object. In this, the doctrine of *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 7 is no different from St. Thomas's doctrine elsewhere: the exterior act as chosen, that is, the proximate end, sets the species (cf. *STh* II-II, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2, which apparently refers back to I-II, q. 18, a. 7; cf. also the numerous texts cited inn. 169 below; and Jensen's treatment in "A Long Discussion," 634-36). This Long denies, saying the exact opposite.

[161] See *STh* I-II, q. 13, a. 1.

[162] *De Caritate,* a. 4: "That is formal in an object according to which the object is referred to a power or habit"; cf. also III *Sent.,* d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, qcla. 1, ad 3.

[163] *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 8, ad 1.

virtues are truly virtuous, ordered to the ultimate end.[164] But each of the virtues still obtains its species from its own proper object.

Saint Thomas's common analogy of light and color being related as form to matter, often used in his treatments of morals,[165] should make the proportion clear. Although light is that by which colors are rendered visible,[166] nevertheless, the species are still from color.[167] So the interior act of the will, as it tends to an end, is that by which acts are moral.[168] But its determination is still from the object of the exterior act.[169] The man who commits theft so that he may commit adultery may be more of an adulterer than a thief, "but he is also a thief,"[170] and, more importantly, his proximate act is more theft than adultery.

E) The Physical Act as Such Cannot Even Belong to Morality, since an Act Is Moral Insofar as It Proceeds from Reason and Will

I claimed above that a will can be judged as bad solely from the fact that it chose an exterior act with undue matter and/or circumstances. And the exterior act is defined as an act executed by man's lower powers or bodily members, bearing upon a nonaction as its object. This seems to make the will's specification depend on a physical action. But that is impossible, since morality is precisely about actions that have reason and will as their principle, and are thus beyond the physical.

The statement, "The physical act as such cannot even belong to morality," requires a distinction. If "physical act as such" means

[164] Ibid., co.

[165] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 and ad 11; *De Caritate,* a. 3, ad 11; II *Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1. Cf. Murphy, "Aquinas on the Object," 224.

[166] *De Verit.,* q. 22, a. 14, s.c. 2: "just as light is the *ratio* of visibility to color, so the end is the *ratio* of appetibility for that which is toward the end"; *De Caritate,* a. 3, ad 11; *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 2, ad 5.

[167] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4, ad 7; q. 2, a. 6, ad 16; ; *Quod.* III,, q. 12, a. 2.

[168] *STh* II-II, q. 23, a. 8; *De Caritate,* a. 3; III *Sent.,* d. 23, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 1; II *Sent.,* d. 26, q. 1, a. 4, ad 5.

[169] III *Sent.,* d. 23, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 1, co. and ad 2; d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, qcla. 3, ad 5; *De Caritate,* a. 3, ad 9 and ad 10; III *Sent.,* d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 2; IV *Sent.,* d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 3; II *Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.

[170] Brock, "(Not Merely) Physical Objects," 50.

that the act is simply an action that is only natural, that is, that does not proceed from reason and will, then of course it could not belong to morality. Even if it proceeded from other interior principles, if these in turn were not imperated by reason and will, the act would not be moral.

But no one says this.[171] When we speak of the exterior act in the context of morals, we are talking about the exterior act insofar as it is a human act, proceeding from a deliberate will.[172] And while it must always be acknowledged that such an act must actually proceed from reason and will, nevertheless, when it comes to determining the species of the moral act, one can abstract from the fact that the act proceeds from an individual's reason and will, and simply consider the exterior act according to its matter and circumstances in their relation to right reason.[173] Such an abstract consideration takes for granted that the exterior act is chosen by a will based on a proposal by reason. Again, St. Thomas addresses this many times:

> But those who considered in sin only that from which it has the notion of fault said that sin only consists in the will. But it is necessary to consider not only the

[171] Cf. Brock, "(Not Merely) Physical Objects," 12: '"It is therefore wrong to understand, as object of a given moral act, a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world' *[VS* 78]. This is the sentence that bears most directly on the main question of this paper: whether physical or bodily entities can be objects of moral acts. Taken by itself, the sentence does seem to answer negatively. Nevertheless I think it would be a mistake to read it in this way, because I do not believe that it is meant to answer that question at all. The question that it is meant to answer is whether an object of choice can be something 'premoral,' or 'ontic,' or *'merely* physical'-something that is not in itself a moral object. To this the answer is no. But this is not to say that the object of choice cannot be something physical. It is only to say that the object cannot be *merely* physical. Whatever else an object of choice is, it must be moral too … no one is saying that what is merely premoral can itself be a moral object." See also Brock's treatement of "as such" in ibid., 49 n. 109. The reasoning to which Brock is responding is a classic *ignoratio elenchi,* which is an ignorance of what it is to refute (Aristotle, *Sophistic Refutations* 5.167a21-23). A refutation is produced when the conclusion of an argument is the contradictory of the statement which the opponent is claiming as true. In the case at hand, the refutation of "physical acts can imply a disorder of reason in themselves" can only be "physical acts cannot imply a disorder of reason in themselves." To counter with the conclusion that "physical acts as physical have no relation to reason" is not a refutation.

[172] *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

[173] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 4 (seen. 147 above).

deformity itself, but also the act that underlies the deformity, since sin is not the deformity, but a deformed act. The deformity of the act, however, is by the fact that it is discordant from the due rule of reason or the law of God. And this deformity, indeed, is found not only in the interior act, but also in the exterior act. But nevertheless, the very fact that the deformed exterior act is imputed to man for fault is from the will. And thus it is clear that if we wish to consider everything that is in a sin, sin not only consists in a privation, nor in an interior act alone, but also in the exterior act.[174]

It is not a particularly difficult distinction. It only requires the ability to abstract.

CONCLUSION

The reason it was necessary to mention and reply to some of these objections is because they are not merely theoretical. They are being taught, and I would argue that they are contributing to the confusion in Moral Theology today. I also think that they are rather shocking, since most of these problems were resolved long ago. The dangers of putting the definition of all moral acts in intention, even just one basic intention, were evident to St. Augustine:

For of what most heinous deed, what most foul crime, what most impious sacrilege, may it not be said that it is possible for it to be done rightly and justly; and not only with impunity, but even gloriously, that in perpetrating thereof not only no punishments should be feared, but there should be hope even of rewards: if once we shall concede in all evil works of men, that not what is done, but wherefore done, must be the question; and this, to the end that whatever are found to have been done for good causes, not even they should be judged to be evil?17s

While almost no Catholic theologian would like to say that his system does away with objective morality, it sometimes becomes

[174] *De Malo,* q. 2, a. 2; see also ibid., ad 13; II *Sent.,* d. 35, q, 1, a 4, co. and ad 1; IV *Sent.,* d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 3; *STh* I-II, q. 20, a. 4, ad 2.

[175] Augustine, *Against Lying,* trans. H. Browne, in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,* first Series, vol. 3, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887); rev. and ed. for Kevin Knight, http://www.newadvent.org!fathers/1313.htm (accessed 1 May 2009).

difficult to see how any claims to the contrary are not anything more than mere assertions. Indeed, the position that the exterior act, even apart from intention, is not enough to specify moral acts manifests its dangers and absurdities in the conclusions that some reach, some of which have already been mentioned at the beginning of this article. At a certain point, it becomes clear that those moral systems that give primacy to intention in the specification of moral acts retain objective morality only in name.

Nevertheless, even if such a moral theory could retain its place in theological speculation, one thing is certain: it is not the thought of St. Thomas. The fact that such views are being entertained as his thought comes from a misunderstanding of St. Thomas' texts, a misunderstanding which can, I think, be avoided if one understands the terms "object," "intention," and "circumstance" within the schema of the one moral act composed of the exterior act and the interior act, where the former is the object of the latter, and yet has its own constitution by its own object and species-changing circumstances.

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THREE THEMES IN PR'.ZYWARA'S EARLY THEOLOGY

KENNETH R. OAKES

University of Aberdeen
Aberdeen, Scotland

« Furcht und Liebe », wohinein man den Inbegriff des religiosen Verhaltnisses legen kann, ist eben nichts anderes als der religiose Ausdruck der *analogia entis:* Gott in den Geschopfen und darum Liebe, Gott iiber den Geschopfen und darum Furcht: « Liebende Furcht und filrchtende Liebe »
(Augustinus, *In Ps* 118 s. 22, 6).[1]

THE EARLY THOUGHT of the Upper Silesian Erich Przywara (1889-1972) constitutes a rich and largely untilled field of inquiry within English-language scholarship.[2] Within the period from the 1917 "Eucharist und Arbeit" to the seminal 1932 *Analogia Entis,* the basic orientations of Przywara's later thought both were established and underwent several significant shifts. In the early to mid-1920s Przywara elaborated his "philosophy of polarity" that (1) allowed God to be God and creatures to be creatures made in the likeness of God, and (2) accounted for the perpetual rhythms between subject and object, being and becoming, and personality and form within creaturely

[1] Erich Przywara, "Weg zu Gott" in idem, *Schriften,* vol. 2, *Religionsphilosophische Schriften* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1962), 3-120. Also in *Ringen der Gegenwart. Gesammelte Aufsiitze 1922-192* 7 [hereafter *Ringen der Gegenwart],* vol. 1 (Augsburg: Filser Verlag, 1929), 389-539. "'Fear and love,' the quintessence of religious relationships, is nothing other than the religious expression of the *analogia entis:* God in creation and therefore love, God over creation and therefore fear: a loving fear and a fearing love."

[2] I am classifying Przywara's "earlier theology" as the period up until the *1932Analogia Entis (Analogia Entis: Metaphysik.* vol. 1, *Prinzip* [Miinchen: Kosel & Pustet Verlag, 1932]; the locution should be taken in a chronological and heuristic sense, with material issues being bracketed for present purposes.

existence. As the 1920s marched on, this philosophy of polarity was gradually replaced by and absorbed into the *analogia entis.* It was also during this time period that Przywara wrote some of his more devotional and poetic works on the parables, the ecclesial calendar, love, and lgnatian spirituality, works that Berhard Gertz argues were essential for his later theological and philosophical formation [3] and that prefigured his later interactions with Scripture and the lgnatian *Exercises.*[4] Przywara also began to engage the works of Scheler, Simmel, Kierkegaard, Kant, Aquinas, and Newman, formed a friendship with Edith Stein, and offered one of the earliest Roman Catholic responses to the new theologians of crisis.

Within the fairly diverse genres exhibited by Przywara's *fruhe Werke,* there are three interrelated themes that constantly reappear and that can already be seen in this article's epigraph: the God who is in creation and beyond creation, the *analogia entis,* and a loving fear and a fearing love. This article is a descriptive analysis of these three motifs within Przywara's early thought.

I. THE GOD WHO IS IN US AND BEYOND US

> He is ... both interior to every single thing, because in him are all things, and exterior to every single thing, because he is beyond all things. [5]

In some sense, the doctrine of God beyond and in us was Przywara's preliminary answer to a question he raised in his 1915 work *Unsere Kirche:* "to understand the 'ultimate' religious relationship between God and creation. "[6] Przywara's primary

[3] Berhard Gertz, *Glaubenswelt als Analogie. Die theologische Analogie-Lehre Erich Przywaras und ihr Ort in der Auseindersetzung um die analogia fidei* (Diisseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1969), 122-23, 131-32. Throughout this article I am heavily indebted to Gertz's magnificent work.

[4] Erich Przywara, *Evangelium. Christentum gemap Johannes* (Niirnberg: Glock und Lutz, 1954); idem, *Alter und Neuer Bund. Theologie der Stunde* (Vienna: Herold, 1956); and idem, *Logos-Abendland-Reich-Commercium* (Diisseldorf: Patmos, 1964).

[5] Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim,* 8.26.48.

[6] Erich Przywara, *Unsere Kirche: Neue religiose Volkslieder* (Regensburg: Habbel, 1915), quotd in Przywara, *Analogia Entis,* vii.

response to this question is to identify and then avoid the interrelated errors of "theopanism" [7] and pantheism. Following Franz Kiefl and Ernst Troeltsch, the Przywara of the 1920s traced theopanism, or "God alone," back to the Reformation, particularly to Luther and his doctrine of God's *Alleinwirksamkeit,* or sole-causality. [8] Such a doctrine was, for Przywara, nothing less than disastrous for theology and philosophy. On the one hand, it negated the reality of creation. On the other hand, it rendered the concept of God unstable, as such a doctrine could readily become inverted into a philosophy of pure immanence, or "creation alone," as witnessed within the diverse philosophies of modernity. Luther's God lived on in the twentieth century in the guises of the. *"Eschatologismus"* [9] of the "Barth-Thurneysen-Gogarten Schule," [10] as well as the philosophies of Scheler and Simmel. If Barth attempted to steer a course between liberal Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, then Przywara navigated a course between Protestantism (basically theopanism) and modern philosophy (effectively pantheism); [11] both, then, offered theologies with polemic edges.

Given his assessment of where Protestant theology and modern philosophy erred, Przywara's primary battlefields at this time were accounts of transcendence and immanence within the doctrine of God, and modern epistemologies and metaphysics. Both fronts were necessary inasmuch Przywara believed that misconstrued accounts of transcendence and immanence, whether theological or philosophical, have deleterious effects upon metaphysics of

[7] Przywara picked up this term from a letter of Rudolf Otto to Franz Heiler. See Przywara, *Schriften,* 2:265, 352, and 395.

[8] Important for Przywara's interpretations of Luther at this time were articles by Franz Xavier Kief!, "Martin Luthers religiiise Psyche als Wurzel eines neuen philosophischen Weltbildes," *Hoch/and* 15 (1917/18): 7-28; and Ernst Troeltsch, "Luther und der Protestantismus," *Die neue Rundschau* 28 (1917/18): 1297-1325. Both alleged that the core of Luther's theology is God's sole-causality. See Przywara, "Gott in uns und iiber uns," in idem, *Ringen der Gegenwart,* 2:548.

[9] Przywara, "Neue Religiositiit," in *Ringen der Gegenwart,* 1:48-77, at 49.

[10] Erich Przywara, "Gott in uns oder iiber uns? (lmmanenz und Transzendenz im heutigen Geistesleben)," *Stimmen der Zeit* 105 (1923): 343-62. A modified version of this essay can be found under the title "Gott in uns und iiber uns," in *Ringen der Gegenwart,* 2:543-78.

[11] Przywara, *Schriften* 2:87.

creation and epistemologies. Przywara rehabilitates Augustine's *Deus interior et exterior*, "God in us and beyond us," as a doctrine that is able to retain a Roman Catholic "unity of tension" *(Spannungseinheit)*, "polarity," or "doctrine of opposition" *(Gegensatzlehre)*. It is this polarity or unity of tension that is able to affirm that God is in and beyond us while not inverting or reducing one into the other.[12] The counterpart to this doctrine of God is a doctrine of creation that allows creatures to be creatures, and that will exclude any thrashing between the poles of creation as nothing and creation as everything. Przywara also begins to elaborate a "philosophy of polarity" or what he will soon call a "creaturely metaphysics,"[13] that will describe the inherent unsettledness and fleetingness of creaturely existence without sublimating creation into a mist or inflating it into the divine.

Two representative works from this period in which Przywara attempted to reformulate the doctrines of God and creation are his *Gottgeheimnis der Welt*[14] and *Gott.*[15] The former is more oriented towards the working-out of a philosophy of polarity, while the latter focuses primarily on showing how God is beyond and in us (and beyond and in us both in Christ and in the Church), but both exhibit a similar structure. In each of these works Przywara examines current cultural and intellectual phenomena before offering his own positive theology and philosophy. In *Gottgeheimnis*, for instance, he initially interacts with three of his main cultural interests at the time: phenomen-

[12] For the earlier discussions of how this differs from dialectic see Erich Przywara, "Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie," in *Schriften*, 2:373-511, at 405-6; and the discussions in idem, *Analogia Entis*, 67-69.

[13] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 7, 13, 31-33, 37, 42.

[14] Erich Przywara, "Gottgeheimnis der Welt. Drei Vortrage iiber die geistige Krisis der Gegenwart," in Przywara, *Schriften*, 2:121-242. This work was originally a series of lectures delivered at IBm in 1923 and published that same year. The title of Eberhard Jiingel's work *Gott als Geheimnis der Welt: Zur Begriindung der Theologie des Gekreuzigten im Streit zwischen Theismus undAtheismus* (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001) bear a striking similarity to this piece. Although Jiingel was familiar with Przywara's work, I am unaware of any intended connection.

[15] Erich Przywara, "Gott. Fiinf Vortrage iiber das religionsphilosophie Problem," in Przywara, *Schriften*, 2:243-3 72. This work comes from a series of lectures delivered at Leipzig in 1922.

ology, the liturgical movement, and the youth movement. [16] Each movement, he argues, contains inarticulate metaphysical, ethical, and theological concerns and presuppositions that deserve theological reflection. Phenomenology, by which Przywara means Husserl but most especially Scheler, raises the *aporiae* of the relationships between subject and object (i.e., epistemology), being and becoming (metaphysics), while the liturgical and youth movements raise questions of personality and form (ethics). These movements also inevitably pose the question of God within the context of these earlier relationships, for "consciously or unconsciously, every worldview depends upon its understanding of the mystery of God." [17] The first sections of *Gott,* by contrast, deal with the fashionable philosophy of religion texts being published by Scheler, Hartmann, and Wobbermin, after which Przywara offers a typology of doctrines of God within antiquity and modernity. This pattern of beginning by analyzing various historical and contemporary philosophies and theology is repeated in the slightly later *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie* and in the second half of the *Analogia Entis.*

Przywara's positive response in *Gottgeheimnis* to the polarities of subject and object, being and becoming, personality and form, and even God and creation, is nicely summarized in this statement:

> The philosophy of polarity grows out of our religiosity of polarity because we can only know him [God] as the incomprehensible unity of object and subject, life and the now of eternity, person and form, as a unity that we can only grasp in a questioning and limited manner, with the posture of a perpetual movement between two poles of thought, as a unity that is in him alone, while creation can only strive constantly towards this unity, *becoming* a unity, never *being* a

[16] By the Liturgical Movement, Przywara usually means the texts and work of Romano Guardini. On the various youth movements within Germany from the 1890s until the 1940s, see Walter Laqueur, *Young Gennany: A History of the Gennan Youth Movement* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1984). For the Catholic youth movements in particular, see Mark Edward Ruff, *The Wayward Flock: Catholic Youth in Postwar West Gennany, 1945-1965* (Chapel Hill, N.C., and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), which, despite its title, also deals with the 1920s.

[17] Przywara, "Gottgeheimnis," 214.

unity-because in the innermost depths of our souls, in the depths of our *solus cum Solo*, we inhabit a polarity of knowing and of living.[18]

What follows in the text is an account of the absolute identity of object and subject, being and becoming, personality and form within God, their ceaseless difference within creation, and the movement of thought required within theology so that God is not reified into one pole of experience or thought.[19] The subtle yet sweeping premise of Przywara's method is that the doctrine of God beyond and in us works to guide theological and philosophical accounts of epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Two moves repeatedly appear as Przywara progresses through these polarities. First of all, he uses the "God beyond us" half of his couplet to demarcate Creator and creation, hence the repeated admittance of *"Tu So/us"* at the beginning of each reflection. For example, it is only in the God who is beyond us, the *Deus-Veritas* of Augustine and the *ipsum intelligere* of Aquinas, that subject and object, the act of knowing and the object known, are utterly identical. Creaturely knowledge, by contrast, consists of an unceasing movement between subject and object. Any attempt to absolutize either by a transcendental idealism of the knower or the known "empties and devalues the proper fullness of the world."[20] Przywara's second move is to employ the "God in us" half of his couplet to argue that the very difference between subject and object within creation is a sign that God is within all of the distinctions and dualisms of our created reality. He writes,

> God beyond us and therefore he alone the identity of subject and object; but God in us, in the ultimate depths of the created dualism between subject and object and their being directed towards one another, the polarity, the unity in opposition and tension of subject and object.[21]

[18] Ibid., 216.

[19] In terms of the proper movement of theological thinking, Przywara's argument squarely lines up with that of Karl Barth in his "Fate and Idea within Theology" (in *The Way of Theology in Karl Barth: Essays and Comments,* ed. H. Martin Rumscheidt (Allison Park, Penn.: Pickwick Publications, 1986).

[20] An argument most poignantly expressed in the first half of the *Analogia Entis* (3-61).

[21] Przywara, "Gottgeheimnis," 221.

God's being both beyond and in us, and our own knowing as creatures of this God, are thus the bases of an epistemology of polarity.

This same pattern of differentiation without separation occurs within the sections on being and becoming, and person and form. It is again *Tu So/us,* the God who is beyond us, Augustine's *operando requiescit et requiescendo operatur* and Aquinas's *actus purus,* in whom being and becoming are identical in infinite life. Within creatures, conversely, there is an irreducible difference-Aquinas would call it a real distinction-between being and becoming, *essentia* and *existentia.* Przywara again concludes by stating,

> God beyond us and thus he alone the identity of flowing life and unchanging eternity; but God in us, in the ultimate depths of the created dualism of being and becoming and their being directed towards one another, the polarity, the unity in opposition and tension of becoming and being.[22]

God in us and beyond us, and our own existing as creatures of this God, are thus the bases of a metaphysics of polarity. Finally, there is the *Tu Salus* of God as person and form, which is perhaps the most obscure of the pairs. Przywara writes, "you alone in whom person and form, life and law coincide,"

> absolute form as absolute personality and absolute personality as absolute form, absolute ideal as life and life as absolute ideal, the absolute law as personal reality and personal reality as absolute law: *Tu Solus,* only he, the God beyond us.[23]

In creation, by contrast, the ideal rules over the personal, form over life, law over actuality. These contrasts are cast in an ethical register, specifically in terms of maturation towards personhood. The God beyond and in us, and our own dialectic between personhood and form, form the bases of an ethics of polarity.

The God in us and beyond us is also the main character in the work *Gott,* yet here Przywara is less interested in articulating an epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics of polarity than in the Christological and ecclesiological effects of this doctrine of God.

[22] Ibid., 226.
[23] Ibid., 235.

What, then, is the relationship between the God in and beyond us and God in Jesus Christ? Several interesting shifts occur as Przywara explains his answer. The simplest connection he makes to his earlier arguments is that theopanism inevitably denies Christ's human nature, while pantheism inevitably dissolves Christ's divine nature. As for the immanence-transcendence discussion, Przywara notes that the supposed tensions between the two are exacerbated in Jesus Christ. In Christ, God's immanence to creation "is heightened until the point of being identical, the man Christ is God," but so is God's transcendence, for "humanity and divinity are not identical in Christ, but Christ, the visible, created man, is God, who essentially and unmixedly remains the invisible God beyond all creation. "[24] Even so, Przywara is aware of the limitations of the transcendence-immanence conjunction when it comes to narrating the person and work of Jesus Christ. In the man Jesus Christ we encounter the "God, who is not merely 'beyond us' while remaining 'in us,' *transcendendo immanet et immanendo transcendit,* but who now is even 'God' while remaining 'one of us.'" [25] Or again, what is at stake in Jesus Christ is "not merely God in-beyond creation, but God, remaining God, as creation. "[26] Hence the strategy of positing the God beyond and in us is modified, but what does remain is the affirmation and union of apparent contradictions: "the form of Christ as the great incomprehensible paradox: the infinity of God entered into the tensions and oppositions of the world. God in Christ is himself the tension between God and creation. "[27]

As the point of the exercise is not to shirk from the affirmation of Jesus Christ as the fullness of God and as fullness of humanity, regardless of the metaphysical or historical conundrums incurred, Przywara plays up the contrasts he sees inhert>nt to any account of Christ's person and Christ's work. Regarding what we might call the metaphysics of Christ's person, Przywara briefly expounds on

[24] Przywara, "Gott," 282.

[25] Ibid., 287.

[26] Ibid., 288.

[27] Ibid. Here Christ is also the *"anakephalaiosis panton,"* or the recapitulation of all things. Przywara understands by this phrase that Jesus Christ is "the personal unity of the infinity of the Creator and the fullness of the oppositions within creation" (ibid., 293).

the tensions between (1) the absoluteness of God and the relativity of one person, (2) the invisibility of God and the visibility of one person, and (3) the nature of God as Spirit and the irreducible bodiliness of one person. To these correspond the historical paradoxes of Christ: (1) that the necessary God assumes creaturely contingency inasmuch as Christ comes from the Jews, (2) that the invisible God assumes creaturely visibility, and (3) that the free and majestic God assumes the weakness of creaturely flesh.[28] The resolution of these apparent contradictions is none other than the mystery of the person of Jesus Christ, the God-man. There is neither sharp conceptual delineation of how these tensions coinhere within Christ nor is there extensive description of how this is so. Przywara merely presents them as part of the paradoxes of Christ's person and work without recourse to traditional concepts such as the *anhyposton/enhyposton* distinction, the various *genera* of the *communicatio idiomatum,* or an account of *krypsis* or *kenosis.* The God beyond and in us thus simply becomes this particular, visible, historical, and weak man while not ceasing to be God. Przywara can, therefore, happily quote Newman to the effect that

> if we only confess God as the Almighty One then we have known only half of him. He is the omnipotent one who can at the same time commit himself to the swaddling clothes of powerlessness, the captive of his own creatures. He has, so to say, the incomprehensible power to make himself weak.[29]

The usefulness of the in-beyond and immanent-transcendence couplets returns when Przywara articulates the relationship between Jesus Christ and believers, for Christ is "the fullness that fills all" (Eph 1:23) of the God who is "all in all" (1Cor15:28). Thus is "Christ in me" (Gal 2:20), "Christ living in me," and "Christ our life" (Col 3:4). Yet for all "mysticisms of Christ," or "Christ in me" or Christ as "one of us," it is also necessary to recognize Jesus Christ as the one who lies before and beyond us.

[28] Ibid., 290-92.

[29] John Henry Cardinal Newman, *Sermons Preached on Various Occasions* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921), 87f. I have translated the Newman quotation directly from the German.

Przywara has no difficulty with speaking of the participation of believers in Christ's reconciling work (particularly in the form of believers filling up in their bodies the sufferings Christ lacks [Col 1:24]), and yet this is just one beat in the overall rhythm of Christ both in and beyond us. So, for instance, Przywara regularly makes usage of Augustine's *totus Christus*, *"caput et corpus unus est Christus,"*[30] and yet he still speaks of the irreducible difference of the head from the members. As he argues in the essay "Mystik und Distanz," "Christ in me" cannot mean "an incorporation of Christ into Christians" but is instead "the incorporation of Christians into Christ." There is only the unceasing movement of

> Christ into Christians and yet this same Christ is eternally at the right hand of God, beyond the Christian and Christianity: *Tu Salus Daminus, Tu Salus Altissimus,fesu Christie-that* is the fundamental law for a genuine mysticism of Christ. [31]

Equally, that God in Christ is in and beyond us entails that any righteous within us comes from without:

> "God's righteousness ... which is from God and not from me," as St. Augustine says in the same place. "Not my own righteousness within me ... but the righteousness of God that is in me is not from me, but is from God. "[32]

The final application of "God in and beyond us" occurs when Przywara discusses the tensions and polarities of the Church. The primary doctrine that he employs to harness these contrasts of the Church fruitfully is again Jesus Christ as the fullness of divinity and humanity and the Church as the living and breathing continuation *(Fortleben)* of that fullness. Przywara begins by detailing the problems that arise in ecclesiology when either a one-sided God beyond us or a one-sided God in us functions as

[30] Augustine, *De Trinitate* 4.9.12. Two other of Przywara's central refrains regarding Christ and the Church from this time are "God in Christ in the Church," and "God, who [is] illuminated the face of Jesus Christ, whose body is the Church" (2 Cor 4:6).

[31] Przywara, "Mystik und Distanz," in *Schriften,* 2:66-90, at 71 (also in *Ringen der Gegenwart,* 1:469-501).

[32] Przywara, "Natur und Obernatur, "in *Schriften,* 2:33; from Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118, serm. 25.6; for an English translation, see Augustine, *Expositions of the Psalms 99-120,* trans. Maria Boulding (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2003), 464.

the dominant motif. The former can lead to an individualistic "Christ in me" (Gal 2:20) while the latter can lead to a collectivist "head and body, one Christ" (Eph 5:23-25). Przywara details three tensions that arise between "Christ in me" and "head and body, one Christ": (1) individualism and collectivism, (2) a religiosity of interiority or of outward cult, and (3) the invisibility of God and the human visibility of the Church. He attempts to render these polarities as signs of the harmonious fullness of life within the Church and not a tragic set of dangers for the Church's life. With respect to the first apparent contradiction, Przywara states,

> because the church is the visibility of God, it therefore shares in the final transcendence of God beyond the tension of I and community, it is truly the continuing *"anakephlaiosis panton"* of the incarnate one: the moving fullness of all types as the visibility of the God all in all.[33]

With respect to the second, there is a perpetual back and forth within the Christian life between interiority and exteriority, between praying in secret (Matt 6:5-7) and petitioning the Father "in spirit and in truth" Oohn 4:23), and an objective cult of baptism, bread and wine, between the salvation of the individual and the promise of the renewal of the whole of humanity and the cosmos. The third tension is actually a recapitulation of the earlier ones. Przywara attempts to balance the invisibility of the Church's source in the invisible God and an "all too human" visibility of the Church, which participates in the scandal and folly of Christ *("scandalum ecclesiae scandalum Christi").*[34]

Several words about Przywara's Christology are in order given the central place most interpreters and critics of Przywara lend to the analogy of being (at the expense of other material). First, while Przywara's Christological reflections no doubt seem crude and simplistic, it is worth noting both their presence within his theology and their prominent use within the ecclesiology

[33] Przywara, "Gott," 318.

[34] Ibid., 327. For Przywara, the riddle of the Church is none other than the riddle of Christ, who is the riddle of God; and through the problem of the Church shines the problem of Christ, which recasts the problem of God (ibid., 329).

discussed above. Second, Przywara is careful to temper and modify his account of the God beyond and in us in order to describe the utterly unique and irreducible mission and person of the incarnate Son. The theme of "God beyond us and in us" is supposed to be useful across a range of doctrines (although its natural task seems to be explicating God's creative and providential care for his creatures) but clearly in the case of the person and work of Christ other conceptual materials need to be employed. Third, the disruptive and paradoxical accents within Przywara's Christology will only be heightened in his later work. This is especially the case with his adopting and furthering of the 0 *admirabile commercium* tradition, which first appears in his commentary on the Gospel of John. [35]

Given the central place afforded to developing an account of God in and beyond us in both *Gottgeheimnis* and *Gott,* it is interesting that the central motif of Przywara's next main work from this time period, the 1926 *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie,* is the *analogia entis.* It will be well worth the effort, then, to consider the beginnings and development of Przywara's account of the *analogia entis.*

II. EARLY ACCOUNTS OF *THEANALOGIA ENTIS*

> Just as real things of any kind require proper active principles, even though God is the first and universal agent ... [36]

Przywara began to develop the idea of the *analogia entis* as a response to the work of Max Scheler in late 1922. [37] The phrase first surfaced in Przywara's writings in the 1923 article "Gotteserfahrung und Gottesbeweis, "[38] and gained momentum during the mid-1920s. Although the phrase does not appear in the main text of *Gott* and only a couple of times in *Gottgeheimnis der*

[35] Erich Przywara, *Evangelium. Christentum gemaμ Johannes* (Nurnberg: Glock & Lutz, 1954).

[36] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio Disputata de Anima,* a. 4, ad 7.

[37] Przywara, *Analogia Entis,* vii.

[38] Erich Przywara, "Gotteserfahrung und Gottesbeweis, *"Stimmen der Zeit* 104 (1923): 12-19. This article was later collected into his "Weg zu Gott," and is reprinted in *Schriften,* 2:3-13, and *Ringen der Gegenwart,* 1:389-402.

Welt, it became the central theme of the 1926 *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie* and, to state the obvious, of the first edition of *Analogia Entis.* One of the primarily reasons for this rapid development of the *analogia entis* is due to the fact that it is meant to be a reiteration of the "God in us and beyond us" formulations, albeit with a different emphasis. Overall, the analogy of being is supposed to serve the same causes of banishing both theopanism and pantheism, and allowing God to be God and creatures to be creatures of this God.[39] Przywara himself states that the doctrine of the *analogia entis* expresses nothing other than the doctrine of God beyond and in us.[40]

The earliest definitions of the *analogia entis* are rather simple. In "Gotteserfahrung und Gottesbeweis," Przywara states that the *analogia entis* is

> the knowledge of a basis of the changing and the finite in an unchanging and infinite that is essentially different from it, such that every perfection of creation is a likeness of the infinite perfection of the Creator, and on this basis the Creator announces himself in the created.[41]

This definition of the analogy of being as the "metaphysical" or "essential" "basis of the being and reality of the changeable and the finite in the unchangeable and infinite" reappears two more times in this essay. One could view this definition as an abstract elaboration of Augustine's contrast between the "was" and "will be" of creation and the sheer "Is" of God, a key concept for Przywara at this time.[42] It is important to note that the above definitions refer to both the differences between and the

[39] "Thus it is clear how the *analogia entis* forms the fundamental structure of the Catholic solution. For in it lies the decisive direction between the two extremes described above. As God can never cease being God, and the creature being the creature, such that every yet so great a condescension of God into the creature and every yet so high an elevation of the creature towards God always and necessarily remains in the limits of the final likeness-unlikeness tension between God and the creature as it is based in the *analogia entis"* (Przywara, "Religionsphilosophie," 452). This fact is as true in the doctrine of creation as it is in the doctrines of reconciliation and redemption.

[40] Ibid., 404 and 461.

[41] Przywara, "Gotteserfahrung und Gottesbeweis," 7.

[42] Przywara, *Schriften,* 2: 133. The source here is Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* 101, serm. 2.10 (Boulding, trans., 70-71).

likenesses of the perfections of creation and the perfections of the Creator, upon whom the former are based. During this phase of his thought, Przywara even called the analogy of being the "likeness-difference polarity" between "the God who according to the Apostle 'is all in all' and 'works all in all,' indeed who according to the wise Sirach 'is all' (To m:lv), and the proper being and reality of creation. "[43] This is why Przywara could still argue that the *analogiaentis* is none other than the God in us and God beyond us: "The content of this announcement [the *analogia entis],* however, is the concept of God that radiates from Augustine's writings: God in all and yet over all."[44]

Furthermore, as is often the case with Przywara, a Church council stands not too far behind his material decisions. In this particular instance, the language of the perfections of creation manifesting the Creator comes directly from the First Vatican Council's rationale for God's willing of creation as not from necessity or lack but "ad manifestandam perfectionem Suam."[45] Hence all of creation, and each creature in its sheer particularity, is a likeness of the God who created in order to shed *ad extra* his perfections and gifts. Equally, the council's affirmation of the possibility of knowing with certainty God as "the beginning and end of all things"[46] serves as the inspiration for his linking the analogy of being with the knowledge of God's self-revelation in creation,[47] as when Przywara states that the analogy of being contains the "origin, basis of truth, content and beginning of our natural knowledge of God."[48]

It is, of course, one thing to say that the possibility of knowing God as *principiumet finis omnium rerum* aligns with the doctrines

[43] Przywara, "Gottgeheimnis," 213. Gertz reports that the similar-dissimilar *("iihnlich-uniihnlich")* couplet, so characteristic of Przywara's later thought, is first found in the 1923 *Religionsbegrnndung. Max Scheler - J.H. Newman* (Freiburg: Herder, 1923) (Gertz, *Glaubenswelt als Analogie,* 237).

[44] Przywara, "Gotteserfahrung und Gottesbeweis," 7.

[45] Heinrich Denzinger, *Sources of Catholic Dogma,* trans. Roy J. Deferrari (London: B. Herder Book Co.), §1783 (p. 443). This point is also emphasized in Przywara, "Religionsphilosophie," 400-402, 416-20.

[46] Denzinger, *Sources,* §1785 (p. 443).

[47] See also Przywara, *Analogia Entis,* 42-47.

[48] Przywara, "Gotteserfahrung und Gottesbeweis," 10 (emphasis in original removed).

of God and creation as expressed by the analogy of being, and quite another thing to say that the analogy of being itself constitutes a form of "natural theology." As we have seen, Przywara used the analogy of being at this time as a synthetic recasting and reinterpretation of Augustine's God beyond and in us; its primary pedigree was theological. Yet Przywara had no scruples about employing the analogy of being in the service of what the Fathers of Vatican I promulgated regarding the natural knowledge of God, a knowledge he identifies as practical knowledge concerning the duty and service owed to God.[49] Understood in this way, claims about the analogy of being and claims about the possibility of natural knowledge of God are conceptually and historically distinct. Furthermore, it should be noted that when Przywara develops these interconnections between the council and the *analogia entis* more fully in *Analogia Entis,* the knowledge of God, even only the knowledge of God as the beginning and end of all things, does not signify a positive epistemological achievement or capture, or the mere addition of one fact to an already lengthy catalogue of facts. Instead, the knowledge of God as *principium et finis* presents more of a deprivation, rendering the whole of creation more mysterious, upsetting any notions of metaphysical progress or certitude, and opening up epistemologies to new and unfamiliar realms.[50]

The initial definitions of the *analogia entis* are rather thin, but they quickly begin to acquire a variety of expressions. Przywara can use, for instance, the more causal language of the Schools to state,

> the *analogia entis* points to God as *ipsa forma* of *formae rerum (causa exemplaris),* but as the *analogia entis* to God as *principium (causa efficiens)* and *finis (causa finis).* In this way the three relationships between God and the world *(causa exemplaris, efficiens, finalis)* are bound together in the one *analogia entis.*[51]

[49] Ibid., 12-13. Przywara also points out here that the council never characterizes in what way this knowledge is reached.

[50] *Przywara, Analogia Entis,* 42-61.

[51] Ibid., 7.

He can also speak more theologically of the "law of the *analogia entis"* as "the positive yes of the omni-causal Creator, Savior, and Sanctifier to the active creatures and children of God."[52] The analogy of being, then, functions as a synthetic concept. It represents, for instance, a common basis for both the more "psychological" experience of God found in Augustine and Newman and the more "logical" proofs for God's existence found in Aquinas.[53] This tactic of conjoining differing theological styles within the bounds of the analogy of being reaches full expression within *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie.*[54] Yet the fact that Przywara uses the *analogia entis* to house a whole family of doctrines is readily seen in this passage from the 1925 article "Zwischen Religion und Kultur":

> The primal metaphysical fact is the tension of the *analogia entis,* or otherwise said, the tension between God in us and God beyond us, expressed otherwise yet again, the tension between creation's own reality and causality and God's omni-reality and omni-causality of God, between the whole of creation as the visibility of God and the invisibility of this same God over the whole of creation. God is not the final, formal rhythm of the reality of creation; God is *the* content and *the* reality that is before all content and all reality.[55]

Przywara is clearly linking the God beyond and in us and the analogy of being within this passage, but we can also see one of the most decisive components of the *analogia entis:* Aquinas's teaching regarding secondary causes.[56]

[52] Erich Przywara, "Zwischen Religion und Kultur," in *Schriften* 2:99 n. 4.

[53] Przywara, "Gotteserfahrung und Gottesbeweis," 8-9.

[54] In this Przywara believes himself to be following the *katholische Geist.* When he points approvingly to "Fr. v. Hiigel's definition of Catholicism as 'essentially balance, inclusiveness, richness' and as 'universal' because God is 'universal,'" it is difficult not to see his own vision of Catholicism also present (Przywara, *Schriften,* 2:370, referring to Friedrich [Baron] von Hugel, *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion* [London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1921], 227-41, 252f.).

[55] Przywara, "Zwischen Religion und Kultur," 93.

[56] There are several items from Aquinas that the early Przywara found helpful. One of them is Aquinas's *potentia oboedentialis,* which is first used in *Przywara'sReligionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie,* and expanded *inAnalogia Entis.* Also important for Przywara at this time was Aquinas's maxim on the relationship between nature and grace, the real distinction of essence and existence within creation, and his teaching on the relationship between soul and body. Regarding individuation within Aquinas's thought, however, Przywara consistently

Przywara interprets Aquinas's account of divine and creaturely causes as positing that "the meaning and goal of the divine omni-causality is creation's own genuine causality."[57] Przywara is not arguing for God's own proper causality *(Eigentatigkeit)* alongside creation's own proper causality *(Eigentatigkeit),* which would merely reduce God to another finite cause that would need to be coordinated with other finite causes. Instead he is arguing that God's omni-causality *(All-Tatigkeit)* can and does include creation's causality *(Eigentatigkeit),* and hence the existence of independent creatures is actually a sign of the goodness and power of the Creator.[58] This concept functions very similarly to the "God beyond and in us," for here too God is working within creation to create and preserve its relative independence, but as the *Ursache* God perpetually remains beyond creation. Interestingly, Przywara believes that secondary causes help overcome a constant temptation for Augustinianism: the dissolution of the creaturely into the divine. Przywara maintains that Aquinas's account of secondary causes stresses the difference between Creator and creation as opposed to the immediacy of Augustine.[59] Thus, "the fundamental overcoming of eschatologism is precisely Aquinas' doctrine of secondary causes, for it uproots the eternally fruitful seed of all eschatologism: the Platonic and Augustinian devaluation of creation's own actuality and law."[60] Positively stated, Przywara sees Aquinas's elaboration of secondary causes as an affirmation of all "creaturely activity and culture against all fanatical eschatologism and hatred of the world and of life," and

followed Scotus, Cardinal Cajetan, and Suarez and thought them to be developing or improving Aquinas and not contradicting him, as he also believed the case to be with Molina and the *scientia media.* The clearest presentation of Przywara's appreciation of Aquinas's theological and philosophical achievements is found in "Thomas von Aquin," in *Ringen der Gegenwart,* 2:906-29.

[57] Przywara, "Katholizismus der Kirche und Katholizismus der Stunde," in *Ringen der Gegenwart,* 1:97.

[58] Erich Przywara, "Neue Religiositat," 57. For the background to this argument, see Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate,q.* **ll,** a. 1.

[59] Cf. Przywara, *Schriften,* 2:98, 189-93. This contrast between Augustine and Aquinas is maintained throughout *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie,* and plays an important role in the *analogia entis* as a synthesis of positions in tension (Przywara, "Religionsphilosophie," 468-70, 481-511).

[60] Przywara, "Neue Religiositat," 64.

thus it is Aquinas and not Luther who should be identified as the pioneer of the "holiness of vocation."[61]

If we phrase Przywara's concerns in another key, we might identify what he is after as a Catholic doctrine of *concursus.* While unafraid of the more technical discussions and debates between Thomists and Jesuits and the Reformed and Lutheran divines on issues like *praemotio* versus *praevisio, scientia de individualibus* versus *scientia de universalibus,* Przywara tends not to spend a great deal of time exploring them or deciding between them. In *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie,* he argues that both Aquinas and the accent on God alone and Molina and the accent on creation's integrity together express the analogy of being, the simultaneous and fruitful holding of these unities in tension.[62] Indeed, inasmuch as there has never been a conciliar decision regarding Thomism or Molinism on the interrelationship between election and faith, Przywara believes himself to be following the tenor of the Catholic Church (or at least Paul V), when he includes both within the analogy of being.[63] It is unsurprising, then, that these tensive accents also appear in his doctrine of salvation. Przywara argues that "the Church does not reduce creation's own actuality to God's omni-causality (in an extreme supernaturalism) nor the divine omni-causality (in an extreme rationalism or naturalism) to creation's own causality."[64]

[61] Erich Przywara, "Tragische Seele," in *Ringen der Gegenwart,* 2:880-905, at 897.

[62] Such a move is similar to Barth's affirmation of both the Reformed and Lutheran emphases in *Church Dogmatics* 3/3, trans. G. W. Bromiley and R. J. Ehrlich (London: T. & T. Clark, 2004), 115-17, 133-34, 145-46, even if he finally sides with the Reformed.

[63] That being said, Przywara exhibits a decided sympathy towards Molina, and views Molinism as the result of Aquinas's own theology when its unsatisfactory (at least to Przywara) account of individuation through matter is supplemented with the Scotist *haecceitas* or with Suarez's account of individuation through form; see Przywara, "Gottgeheimnis," 191-94. For a treatment of the nuances within Aquinas's thought regarding individuation, see John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of American Press, 2000), 351-75. Yet these Molinist sympathies are counterbalanced by Przywara's continual insistence that Catholicism must be fundamentally theocentric and not anthropocentric, which he believes is a danger for Molinism taken in itself. See Przywara, "Theozentrische und anthropozentrische Friimmigkeit," in *Schriften,* 2:46-65.

[64] Przywara, "Katholizismus der Kirche und Katholizismus der Stunde," 98.

Any perceived tension is the result of these two positive claims, which must be upheld regardless of any conceptual dissonance produced. Invoking the Council of Trent, Przywara notes that the Catholic understanding of salvation

> remains in reverent adoration before this mystery: when "Holy Scripture says 'turn to me, and I will turn to you' [Zech 1:3], we remember our freedom; then we answer 'turn us, Lord, to you, and we shall turn' [Lam 5:21], we confess that we are anticipated by the grace of God."[65]

As can be seen from the descriptions of the analogy of being above, these earliest accounts do not yet include one of the most significant elements of Przywara's later thought: the Fourth Lateran Council's formula of an ever-greater dissimilarity within every similarity between Creator and creation.[66] Przywara began to adopt this definition for his analogy of being in late 1925,[67] and it would prove to be immensely productive for his later thought. Even so, just as the *analogia entis* attains greater sophistication in the *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie* and the *Analogia Entis,* this resource is not quite exploited to its fullest potential, as it later would be, for instance, in the article, "Reichweite der Analogie als katholischer Grundform."[68] Far more prevalent and fruitful at this stage was Przywara's creative integration of Aquinas's real distinction and the *potentia oboedentialis* into the analogy of being.[69] In the preface to the *Analogia Entis,* Przywara reports that a period of intensely studying Aquinas's *Quaestiones Disputatae* and *De Ente et Essentia* in 1912/13 proved crucial to

[65] Ibid. The interior quotation can be found in Denzinger, *Sources,* §797 (p. 250).

[66] It is curious that this central element of Przywara's thought never appears in Hans Urs von Balthasar's accounts of Przywara in his *The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and Interpretation,* trans. Edward T. Oakes S.J. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 255-57, 328-29, 360-61.

[67] Gertz, *Glaubenswelt alsAnalogie,* 238. The Lateran formulation first appears in a speech delivered in Munich on 12 January 1925, "Die religiiise Krisis in der Gegenwart und der Katholizismus," which was eventually published under the same title in *Das Neue Reich* 8:32 (1926): 657-58; and *Das Neue Reich* 8:34 (1926): 702-4.

[68] Erich Przywara, "Die Reichweite der Analogie als katholischer Grundform," *inSchriften,* vol. 3, *Analogia Entis. Metaphysik, Ur-Struktur und All-Rhythmus* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1962), 247-301.

[69] See Przywara, "Religionsphilosophie," 404-5.

his subsequent thought.[70] He certainly develops the tension between *existentia* and *essentia* in his earlier works, but it is in *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie* that these ideas gain traction and undergo elaboration. Thus the analogy of being is now an account of the distinction between essence and existence within creatures and their identity in God. It is also in this work that the *potentia oboedientialis* makes its first appearance, and at this time it means "creation's readiness before God,"[71] and creation's openness to God from God's perspective, claims that flow naturally from Przywara's insistence that God works all in all, even working within a rebellious humanity.[72] These two ideas are also put to far greater use in *Analogia Entis*, despite Przywara's growing reliance upon the Fourth Lateran Council and an increasing emphasis on the "ever beyond" nature of God. How easily this formula of "ever-greater dissimilarity" could settle in with Przywara's earlier "philosophy of polarity" is an important question. On the one hand, it fits in smoothly with the lgnatian "ever greater" and "ever more,"[73] and the rhythms of the "in and beyond," "similar and dissimilar" already encountered. On the other hand, the ever-greater dissimilarity could equally upset the balance or equilibrium that Przywara was working to maintain, especially between Creator and creation.[74] There is, however, one more aspect of Przywara's early thought that requires elucidation in order to round out this presentation: the polarity of love and fear.

[70] Przywara, *Analogia Entis,* v.

[71] Przywara, "Religionsphilosophie," 448.

[72] For an account of Aquinas's *potentia oboedentialis,* see Denis J. M. Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold* Good: *Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 448-55.

[73] Even in "Eucharistie und Arbeit" (1917), Przywara notes that one's heart must yearn "more, ever more" for Christ (Erich Przywara, "Eucharistie und Arbeit," in Przywara, *Schriften,* vol. 1, *Friihe Religiose Schriften* [Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1962], 10). See also the important section in *Gott* in which Przywara describes God's "ever greater-ness," itself a gloss of Sirach 43:32-34, not in the terms of a negative theology, but as an all-too-positive interaction with the sheer strangeness of God as given in Scripture, whose ways are fundamentally not our ways (Isa 55:8} (Przywara, "Gott," 327-28).

[74] Gertz argues, "thus the 'likeness-unlikeness polarity' is overcome" with the introduction of this aspect (Gertz, *Glaubenswelt als Analogie,* 238).

Ill. LOVE AND FEAR

The fear of God is the beginning of wisdom; till you see Him to be a consuming fire, and approach Him with reverence and godly fear, as being sinners, you are not even in sight of the strait gate. I do not wish you to be able to point to any particular time when you renounced the world (as it is called), and were converted; this is a deceit. Fear and love must go together; always fear, always love, to your dying day.[75]

The first two sections of this essay have dealt with what Przywara might call the "theological" outworking of the confession that God is in and beyond us and its "metaphysical" implications in the *analogia entis* of the omni-working and causing of the Creator and creation's own relative working and causing. Przywara's pattern of offering us paired contrasts, polarities and rhythms continues as we consider the "religious" backdrop to both of these concepts: a life of fearing love and loving fear before the God who is beyond us and in us and who works all in all.

This paired contrast appears in the initial salvo Przywara leveled at the dialectical theologians. In the course of his argument for the Catholic unity of mysticism and distance, Przywara states that

in this way we know Augustine's basis for the soul in a mysticism that becomes distance and a distance that rests upon mysticism. Love, according to him, is the root, but a love that is united with holy fear. "You are more inside of me than my innermost," and therefore his profoundest prayer runs, "you have placed your law on my heart though your Spirit, which is your finger, so that I do not tremble before you like a slave without love, but as a son loving in chaste fear and fearing in chaste love."[76]

The origin of this tensive couplet, like so many other phrases used by Przywara at this time, is Augustine's commentary on the

[75] John Henry Newman, *Parochialand Plain Sermons,* vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), 322. This passage is from Sermon 24, "The Religion of the Day" (ibid., 309-24), whose epigraph is Heb 12:28-29: "Let us have grace, whereby we may serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear. For our God is a consuming fire."

[76] Przywara, "Gott in uns und iiber uns," 545.

Psalms.[77] Augustine, as Przywara relates, initiated a line of reflection concerning the God beyond and in us, and a fearing love and loving fear, that runs to Aquinas and finally to Newman,[78] whose "opposite virtues" aptly encapsulate the matter. Indeed, Przywara actually commented on these contrasts within Newman during the course of editing the German translation of Newman's writings.[79]

The posture of humanity before the God who is beyond all and so in all, and who wills and works so that creatures can move and live, as also expressed in the *analogia entis,* is one of love *(Liebe)* and fear *(Furcht)* or reverence *(Ehrfurcht).* More specifically, love is the response to God's being and working in us while fear is the response to God being and working beyond us. This religiosity is, then, specific to this particular God. When Przywara charts the differences between ancient and Christian philosophy in *Gottgeheimnis,* he notes

> that wonderful pairing of the nearness of love and the distance of reverence, as Augustine's antithesis formulates it, that deepest ethos of Christianity is now changed at its most decisive point: in God himself. As the distance of reverence is an adumbrated glimmer of the God beyond me, so is the nearness of love the expression of the God in us.[80]

Przywara's ideas of opposite virtues, polarity, and the forms of Christian life shine out most brightly from his so-called "early religious writings."[81] In the 1923 *Kirchenjahr,*[82] a commentary on

[77] Augustine, *Enar. in Ps.* 118, serm. 22.6: "Tu interior intimis meis, tu intus in corde legem posuisti mihi spiritu tuo, tamquam digito tuo; ut earn non tamquam servus sine amore metuerem, sed casto timore ut filius diligerem, et dilectione casta timerem" (see Boulding, trans., 448).

[78] Przywara, "Gott," 364. See also Erich Przywara, "Der Newmansche Seelentypus in der Kontinuitat katholischer Aszese und Mystik," 857-61 in *Ringen der Gegenwart,* 2:845-71.

[79] Przywara comments, "Newman always and again brings authentic Christian life to the foundation of opposite virtues" (Erich Przywara, ed.,J. *H. Kardinal Newman, Christentum* [Freiburg, 1922], vol. 4, 79; quoted in Gertz, *Glaubenswelt als Analogie,* 119).

[80] Przywara, "Gottgeheimnis," 193.

[81] These are collected in volume 1 of Przywara's *Schriften.* Although usually overlooked in Przywara scholarship, Przywara himself repeatedly stressed their importance for understanding his work. These writings are also important inasmuch as they contain far greater use of Scripture and liturgical materials, and thus stand as a helpful supplement to the more abstract doctrines of God in his other works, for when reading these works there can

the feast cycles appropriately subtitled, *"Die christliche Spannungseinheit"* ("The Christian Unity of Tension"), Przywara spends his time reveling in the rhythms of the liturgical year. There he writes, "one life with and in God, for he is the one who is simultaneously beyond us and in us, so that there can be no genuine union of love with him without the interval of reverence and the humble knees of worship."[83] This line of thought continues in the 1924 *Liebe,*[84] a glowing series of reflections on love within the Christian life replete with selections from Scripture and Augustine. Przywara again notes,

> there is a God, eternally living beyond you and yet mysteriously living in you, in whom you live, move and are-the infinite personality of Father, Son and Spirit beyond you and yet the final, mysterious depths of your very personality within you; the puzzling depths of the personal unity of God and man beyond you and yet your I says 'no more I but Christ in me."[85]

Yet is this a love that "blots out fear," or "that matures in fear"?[86] Is fear "the foundation of love" or "love the root of fear"?[87] Przywara's response is to call it "as St. Augustine puts it, a fearing love and a loving fear."[88] This polarity reappears in the 1925 *Wandlung,*[89] a *"Textmosaik"* comprised almost entirely of biblical and patristic texts with sparse editorial interjections and which Balthasar identifies as the key book of Przywara's early period.[90]

be no doubt that the identity of this God beyond and in us is none other than the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

[82] Erich Przywara, *Kirchenjahr: Die christliche Spannungseinheit* (Freiburg, 1924; also in *Schriften,* 1:273-321).

[83] Przywara, "Kirchenjahr, "310.

[84] Erich Przywara, *Liebe: Der christliche Wesensgrund* (Freiburg, 1924; also in *Schriften,* 1:323-77).

[85] Przywara, "Liebe," 332.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid., 333.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Erich Przywara, *Wandlung: Ein Christenweg* (Augsburg, 1925; also in Przywara, *Schriften,* 1:379-472).

[90] Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Einfiihrung," in Leopold Zimny, ed., *Erich Przywara: Sein Schrifttum 1912-1962* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1963), 6. Given the book's genre, this judgment no doubt appears surprising. The initial disbelief wears off, however, when one considers that is an exposition of God, Christ, and Church, Przywara's favorite commonplaces

There Przywara observes, "yet still, in the children's love of the Father, and in the indwelling of life within life: maintain a gentle separation and a reverential distance."[91] In the 1925 *Majestas Divina*,[92] a collection of passages from the Ignatian *Exercises* that anticipate Przywara's later 1938 commentary on them, *Deus Semper Maior*,[93] he discusses the Ignatian virtues of loneliness, service, sacrifice, and love. The Ignatian background to the polarity of love and fear is especially evident when he quotes the *Exercises:* "man is created to love God, to show him reverence and to serve him, that is your salvation."[94] "Your happiness," Przywara contends, "is that 'the God beyond you' is in you" filling your life and your love, "but this can only occur when he is the divine majesty to which loving fear and fearing love, serving love and loving service is your corresponding disposition."[95]

As the *analogia entis* begins to assume some of the work previously allotted to the concept of God beyond and in us, fear and love become and inform the religiosity of the *analogia entis.* In an earlier essay Przywara argued that humility, as the appropriate form of religiosity in the *analogia entis,* is the Christian response to tragedy, inasmuch as it means that even in salvation "man always knows himself as man, not as God."[96] Or as he says elsewhere, the *analogia entis* inspires "a religiosity of trust versus the religiosity of eschatologism,"[97] by which Przywara primarily means Barth or Hegel. Yet it is in *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie* that Przywara most extensively details how fearing love and loving fear form the religious inspiration for the *analogia entis.* Just as the *analogia entis* allows God to be God and creatures to be his creatures, so too do fearing love and loving fear ward off any confusion between Creator and creation. Thus

of the time.

[91] Przywara, "Wandlung," 455.

[92] Erich Przywara, *Majestas Divina: Ignatiansiche Frommigkeit* (Augsburg, 1925; also in Przywara, *Schriften,* 1:471-518).

[93] Erich Przywara, *Deus Semper Maior: Theologie der Exerzitien* (Freiburg, 1938f.); also *Deus Semper Maior: Theologie der Exerzitien,* 2 vols. (Vienna, 1964).

[94] Przywara, "Majestas Divina," 486, from the *Spiritual Exercises,* "Fundamentum."

[95] Przywara, "Majestas Divina," 489-90.

[96] Przywara, "Tragische Welt," in *Ringen der Gegenwart,* 1:373.

[97] Przywara, "Neue Religiositat," in *Ringen der Gegenwart* 1:67.

Przywara distinguishes between the religiosity of Augustine and Aquinas and a Kantian-Hegelian religiosity of the union of contradiction and identity between the empirical ego (itself tempted to become God) and the absolute distance of the pure transcendental ego as God. The language of this religiosity is that of being swallowed up in contradictions. In Augustine and Aquinas, by contrast, there "is the 'unity of tension' of a revering love and a loving reverence towards God, and it is in this posture that God is experienced as in us but also as essentially beyond us."[98] The language of this religiosity is that of prayer, corresponding to "its original metaphysics of the *analogia entis* between the unity of tension of the creaturely 'will be' (between essence and existence) and the 'identity of nature' of the divine 'Is' (of essence and existence)."[99] Hence the love of the God who is beyond and in us is "not a love of complete fusion with God, but a love which is placed at a distance: fearing love and a loving fear."[100] The relationship between metaphysics and the religious life is the analogy of being, for "it is at the same time a 'practical basis' and 'theoretical basis.' Its religious, practical form is that original Augustinian 'love in fear and fear in love,' which is only a short expression of the relationship between immanence and transcendence."[101]

CONCLUSION

These descriptions have no doubt elicited a host of questions and worries about Przywara's early thought. One might fault his underdeveloped accounts of the Holy Spirit and sin, his lack of "historical sense," his lingering romanticism, the potentially distorting effects of his overarching philosophy of polarity upon Christian doctrine, the wisdom of undertaking "responses" or

[98] Przywara, "Religionsphilosophie," 406.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid., 467.

[101] Ibid., 417. In "Metaphysik und Religion," (Przywara, *Schriften*, 2:14- 26), Przywara argues that any and every metaphysics, and even metaphysical reflection, both entails and presupposes a religious disposition. The metaphysics of the *analogiaentis* works itself out in the "basic religious relationship between 'fearing love and loving fear'" (ibid., 26).

"solutions" to the antinomies of antiquity or modernity, his highly conceptual and compact manner of presenting and resolving theological and philosophical difficulties, and, perhaps most disconcerting for some, his account of God's self-revelation within creation. Some of these problems and deficiencies are corrected in his later works, other are exacerbated.

Przywara's philosophy of polarity in particular elicits some worries. Perhaps the most glaring problem is the potential subsumption of God and creation under a more overarching principle of polarity itself, as when in *Gottgeheimnis* Przywara presents the Creator-creation polarity alongside the other metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical polarities under discussion. This objection can be countered, however, by attending to the role of the refrain *Tu So/us* throughout the discussion. Another possible criticism of Przywara's philosophy of polarity is that God merely becomes a projected placeholder for the reconciliation of tensions within philosophy, an idealist *coincidentia oppositorum* in which the differences between being and becoming, subject and object, personality and form are virtually unified. Przywara specifically dismisses this notion inasmuch as he denies that God is absolutization of any piece of creation, including the experience of oppositions and their reconciliation. [102] Even so, to deflect this charge Przywara would need to specify further the dogmatic backdrop and necessity of linking various lived and conceptual tensions within creation to their unity in God.

One important genre of Przywara's early writings was not covered in this article. I have not dealt with his studies of individual theologians and philosophers, [103] as in his pairing of Scheler with Newman in *Religionsbegrundung,* his readings of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Hartmann, and Heidegger in his two-volume *Ringen der Gegenwart,* or his book on Kierkegaard, in which Przywara sees a movement, probably illusory, towards

[102] Przywara, "Gott," 279.

[103] For the best account of Przywara's interactions with Augustine, Aquinas, Newman, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, see Martha Zechmeister, *Gottes-Nacht: Erich Przywaras Weg Negativer Theologie* (Berlin, Hamburg, Munster: LIT Verlag, 1997), 94-283.

Roman Catholicism in Kierkegaard's criticisms of Lutheranism. [104] Furthermore, Przywara's three main influences at this time, namely, Augustine, Aquinas, and Newman, have been dealt with, but the predecessors to his own philosophy of polarity in Gorres, Goethe or Deutinger have been left unexplored, along with the influences of German romanticism and mysticism upon his thought. [105]

In the preface to the 1932 edition of the *Analogia Entis,* Przywara offers a short account of the development of his thought from his earlier writings. Briefly detailing the history of his rehabilitation of the *analogia entis,* he notes, "in its objective form it bore, above all in my religious writings, the Augustinian name God in us and beyond us." [106] *Analogia Entis* itself should no longer seem so bewildering given the multitude of resemblances it bears to earlier works. Familiar moves are seen throughout the first half of the work, in which Przywara begins with "metaphysics generally." He first isolates and deconstructs opposing extremes encountered in the history of epistemology and metaphysics and shows the relationships of these extremes to theopanism and pantheism. He next develops a dynamic distinction between essence and existence and a doctrine of the God in and beyond creation. Finally, he offers creative interpretations of Aquinas's maxim on nature and grace and the documents of Vatican I in order to coordinate the relationship between theology and philosophy and to criticize Hegel. [107] In the second half of the work, we again encounter historical studies dealing with analogy and dialectic in Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Heidegger, and Parmenides and Heraclitus. Przywara offers a unique interpretation of the *potentia oboedentialis,* and longer accounts of

[104] Erich Przywara, *Das Geheimnis Kierkegaards* (Munich and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1929).

[105] Przywara, *Analogia Entis,* vi.

[106] Ibid., vii. In an autobiographical section of *In und Gegen,* Przywara traces back these concerns with unity and tension to the cultural differences between his paternal and maternal lines, and to the influence of a early music instructor, Oskar Meister (Erich Przywara, *In und Gegen: Stellungnahmen zur Zeit* [Niirnberg: Glock und Lutz, 1955], 11-13).

[107] An important precedent in this regard is the essay "Thomas und Hegel" in *Ringen der Gegenwart,* 2:930-57. This work is also revealing inasmuch as Przywara distinguishes his own theological and philosophical use of polarity and analogy from that of German Idealism.

analogy in Augustine and Aquinas, with a short summary of the results serving as the work's conclusion. *Analogia Entis* is, by all means, a novel and creative advance on Przywara's earlier works, but it nevertheless has precedents within them. [108]

[108] I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers from *The Thomist* for their very helpful suggestions and comments on an earlier draft of this piece.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, vol. 32, *Supplement.* Edited at the Birmingham Oratory. Notes and introduction by FRANCIS J. MCGRATH, F.M.S. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. xvi+ 731. $180.00 (cloth). ISBN 978-0-19-953270-4.

Unlike any of the previous thirty-one volumes in the masterful collection of Cardinal Newman's *Letters and Diaries,* each of which covered about two or three years, the present volume of 525 letters knows no fixed time parameters (references below will include the page number and the year in which the letter was written). These letters came to light after all 17,777 of Newman's previously known letters had gone to press. This total-series tabulation does not include the many Newman-composed memoranda, his diary and journal entries spanning a half-century, and the thousands of letters written to Newman that the *Letters and Diaries* series editors, from C. S. Dessain to Frank McGrath, have included and that place Newman's own letters in context. The full collection is monumental by any standard. My recent review of the tenth volume of the *Letters and Diaries (The Thomist* 72 [2008]: 517-23) provides an overview of the vast series and of the strategy governing when volumes appeared.

A ready criterion to bring to these recently discovered letters is to ask, "So what's new?" Do we learn anything new about the Oxford Movement of 1833, the Tract Ninety affair, Newman's 1845 conversion to Roman Catholicism, his 1859 article on the role of the laity that caused such consternation in conservative circles, his acclaimed 1864 autobiography entitled the *Apologia Pro Vita Sua,* other seminal books such as the *Grammar of Assent,* the infallibility and papal primacy issues swirling around the First Vatican Council, his emergence from under a Vatican cloud when Leo XIII named him a cardinal in late life, and so forth? We learn a few things, as I shall instance. But we gain much more from the exhaustive scholarship of Francis McGrath, whose footnotes to the letters and whose 150 pages of appendices make this concluding volume to the entire series a bookshelf treasure trove.

Some very personal materials have surfaced, and Newman's letter of 26 November 1852 to Mrs. John Uemima) Mozley is noteworthy. Newman had three sisters. Mary died suddenly in 1828, barely nineteen years old. Harriett married Tom Mozley, blamed her brother for Tom's earlier Roman Catholic sentiments, and then disowned her brother when he converted years later.

Jemima married Tom's brother, John, and she remained close to her brother her whole life long. To her Newman confided his thoughts about the libel trial he was enduring. Newman had publically denounced an expelled Italian Dominican, Giovanni Achilli, for his immoral behavior while a friar. The anti-Catholic Evangelical Alliance had brought Achilli to England to deliver diatribes against the Vatican. Newman sought to defang the defrocked cleric, and he was put on trial for it. While McGrath's footnotes provide full background to the trial issues, Newman's letter to Jemima (LD 32:61-66 [1852]) brings readers inside the heart of the unjustly accused defendant.

To assist Newman scholarship concerning the establishment of a Catholic university in Dublin in the 1850s, McGrath has brought to print, for the first time, materials from the private journal Newman maintained from November 1853 to March 1856 describing his work in Dublin and labeled by Newman "My University Journal, Private" (LD 32:73-144, passim). It complements known materials. In 1873, in a fifteen-year retrospective view, Newman composed a "Memorandum" on his involvement in founding the university (see *Autobiographical Writings,* ed. Henry Tristram [New York: Sheed & Ward, 1957], 280-333), and especially on what he thought caused its failed initiatives. In it, Newman occasionally quotes from this journal, which we can now access in its completeness. These two sources, along with apposite correspondence material in *Letters and Diaries* volumes15-18 and now 32, and the privately printed material posthumously published as *My Campaign in Ireland* by Newman's literary executor, William Neville (Aberdeen: King & Co., 1896), provide scholars the full range of background material to the Dublin experiment for English-speaking Catholic higher education. Newman's more theoretical views on university education are found, of course, in his Uniform Edition writings, *Idea of a University* and *Historical Sketches.* To give but two examples from the newly published journal material: In a scene familiar to any dean or provost today, Newman recorded on March 7 his negotiations with Prof. Denis McCarthy over the salary for a lectorship (LD 32:79 [1854]). The journal entry for June 21 (LD 32:90 [1854]) sketches the neuralgic topic of a professor's nationality. Newman saw the need for scholarly appointments, whether Irish or British or from the Continent, but the bishops, especially feisty John McHale of Tuam, wished Irishmen only to be appointed professors.

The present volume adds nothing new concerning Newman's controversial 1859 *Rambler* article, "On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine," for which he was delated to Vatican authorities. It provides, however, Bishop Ullathorne's 1862 letter to his Birmingham diocesan clergy rebuking the *Rambler's* successor publication, *The Home and Foreign Review* that Richard Simpson and John Acton continued to edit (LD 32:237 nn. 1 and 2). Regarding questionable articles from them and the bishop's displeasure with the *Review,* Newman sided quite clearly with the bishop. "The question is not whether [Ullathorne] is right or wrong in his interpretation of these Articles; for he has the right to interpret them, and it is useless to argue that the writers do not mean

so an so. . . . There would be an end of all discipline, if the competent ecclesiastical authority could not overrule all such private judgment" (LD 32:236). While Newman supports rightful theological freedoms, he also supports the rights of church authorities. A certain balance was to rule matters, but Newman never supported public dissent from the magisterium. On the other hand, he feared the hegemony of a single theological viewpoint, as happened later with the Ultramontane orientation of the *Dublin Review* and its editor, W. G. Ward, who came to distrust Newman's more liberal views on Church matters. How ironic, then, was Ward's letter to Newman in 1862, announcing that Cardinal Wiseman had just appointed him editor. "I am very desirous to avoid ... all appearance of *cliquiness*, and my notion is when I go back to town to call on as many different kinds of [writers} as I can.... I wish I could hope there was any chance of persuading you to write" (LD 32:239 n. 1).

In the *Apologia*, Newman had referred favorably to the Anglican Church as a "breakwater" against doctrinal errors afoot. When Edward Pusey, Newman's old Tractarian colleague, had occasion in 1866 to publish that even Roman Catholics (i.e., Newman) rejoiced in the Established Church's being a "bulwark" against infidelity, Archbishop Edward Manning responded by denying that there could be any Catholic appreciation of Anglicanism. Manning's target was really not Pusey but Newman. Manning had a more jaundiced view than Newman of the Church both men quit for Roman Catholicism, and the attack on Pusey from British Catholicism's leading prelate caused Newman to backpedal somewhat for the sake of public propriety. However, McGrath has provided a November 1864 letter from Newman to an unknown correspondent that has the advantage of summarizing Newman's views of both Protestantism and the Established Church in a calmer context than in the tempest Manning later created. *(Mirabile dictu*, the letter's provenance was Lansdale [Pennsylvania] Catholic High School, a mile distant from this reviewer's home.)

The unnamed correspondent asked Newman to square his contention that he "owe[d] nothing to Protestantism" *(Apologia pro vita sua* [London: Penguin Classics, 1994], 455) with the influential role accorded Thomas Scott, an early Evangelical mentor in his life, in the *Apologia* (p. 5 of the Uniform Edition). Newman responded:

> By Protestantism I mean that system of theology which came into the world in the 16'h century-its characteristics are such as these-the doctrine of justification by faith only-the bible the sole rule of faith-the denial of sacramental influence-assurance of personal salvation-and, as regards Calvinism, the doctrine of reprobation. Some of them I professed, from the writings of Protestant writers, when I was young-some I never could stomach-but, at least afterwards, I unlearned them all. The only doctrines of Thomas Scott which stuck . . . are those [reflecting] Catholic truth from the beginning-the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, of the Incarnation, of grace. . . . I hold none of the distinguishing doctrines of

> Protestantism .... But I *do* owe much to Anglicanism. It was in the divines of the Anglican Church, Laud, Hooker ... that I found [Catholic] doctrines .... As to the second [point] ... I have said that I have had *milder* thoughts of the Establishment more than I had as an Anglican, because I consider it to be, to a certain extent, a guardian of the true faith.... With a violent hand the State kept down the multitude of sects that were laying England waste during the Commonwealth. The State kept out Unitarianism, not to say infidelity, at the era of the Revolution. It was the State which prevented the religious enthusiasm of the Methodist revival from destroying dogma.... I do not wish to weaken the Anglican Church, *while* it sustains dogma (LD 32:261-62 [1864]).

One can sense that it is but quibbling whether *bulwark* or *breakwater* better describes the value of the Anglican Church Establishment for Newman.

There is continuing theological debate today whether ordinations to priesthood and episcopate in the Anglican Church are valid from a Roman Catholic point of view. Newman's view in the *Apologia* (Uniform Edition, p. 341) is well known: He doubted the existence of apostolic succession in the Anglican episcopate because "antiquarian arguments are altogether unequal to the urgency of visible facts." By the latter Newman meant the Protestantizing drift of the church's bishops that untied his own adherence to the Church of England in the 1840s-for example, the Anglican-Lutheran agreement for a joint bishopric in Jerusalem. Newman's letters here under review place the validity question on a sounder theological footing than the apostolic succession criterion in the *Apologia.* His principle is that valid orders spring from being the true church, not that a church is to be considered true if its ordinations are valid.

> As to the Catholic Church, there have been very many bad bishops before now, but, *as being* the Catholic Church, it has a supernatural providence, watching over it, and hindering bad bishops doing acts to invalidate sacraments, just as a Providence watches over its bad Popes to hinder them from erroneous decisions. It is the Catholic Church, not because of its orders, but because it is the one visible body from which the Apostles set off once for all, and from which the Anglican Church split off, just as the present English nation is the representative of the past English nation, and not the United States, though they came out of it. The Catholic Church does not depend on its orders, but its orders depend on it (LD 32:317 [1871]).

After the famous novelist and Cambridge church history professor Charles Kingsley had attacked Newman's integrity in the January 1864 issue of *Macmillan's Magazine,* and following an unresolved exchange between the two men, Newman began publishing a weekly series of pamphlets that he later compiled, reedited, and published as the *Apologia* (see *LD* 32:258 n. 2, describing the installments). It is known that Newman wrote untiringly for each

pamphlet, perhaps fifteen hours daily. What has not been fully appreciated is how emotionally draining the writing of these installments was. Charles Furse, who had reestablished friendship with Newman in the 1870s and visited him occasionally at the Birmingham Oratory, recounted one such visit to his wife: "But let me note this. [Newman] says in answer to my question, whether the intense effort of the Apologia hurt his health-Mr William Monsell had told me of the marvelous rapidity of it's [sic] composition-'Did William Monsell tell you another thing? did he know it? I fancy not. I wrote the greater part of it, *crying* all the time'" *(LD* 32:365 [1876]) Newman's heartache referred to the loss of so many Anglican and Oxford friends that his 1845 departure for the Church of Rome caused. The *Apologia* needed to retrace and explain why he left the Anglican Church. The memory of those earlier days and friends was almost too much for him. As he wrote to Furse himself, "For seventeen years, I do not say by whose fault, if by any one's, my own or that of others, I was simply cut off from my former friends. Many of them died in that estrangement; some of that old generation still remain unforgiving" *(LD* 32:335 [1873]).

But God blessed Newman's tears. Former friends came forward to help him with documentation as he retraced the Oxford Movement years. Others, their hard feelings melted away after reading his weekly pamphlets, rekindled old friendships. One such was with Henry Arthur Woodgate who had come running to Newman's side when Newman's sister Mary died suddenly on 5 January 1828. To Woodgate, Newman dedicated his book *Discussions and Arguments* in 1874 and chose the fifth of January to do it *(LD* 32:320 [1872]). Another resurrected friend, and a dear one indeed, was Richard William Church who became dean of St. Paul's Cathedral in 1871 and with whom Newman, even when a cardinal, preferred to stay when visiting London. Church wrote the must-read obituary in the *Guardian* when Newman died *(LD* 32:601). He called Newman "the founder, we may almost say, of the Church of England as we see it. What the Church of England would have become without the Tractarian movement we can faintly guess, and of the Tractarian movement Newman was the living soul and the inspiring genius."

Although the present volume does not shed new light on the dogmatic definition of papal infallibility at Vatican I (18 July 1870), with respect to this event it corroborates the vast difference in attitude between Archbishop Manning and Newman regarding Pusey's High Church faction in the Anglican Church. "As to the Anglican Church ... those of its members who are what is called Evangelical, and those who are Liberals, cause a re-action in favor of Catholicism, and those who take the high line of Pusey are but educating souls for a communion holier and truer than their own" *(LD* 32:277 [1867]). In other words, as the traditions of an older Anglicanism continue to wane under the growing hegemony of Evangelical and Broad Church sentiments, the Puseyites will drift more toward communion with Roman Catholicism. But the definition of papal infallibility was an obstacle for them, at least momentarily, just as it was

for many Roman Catholics when faced with Manning's insistent and severe interpretation of the dogma.

> As to Dr. Pusey, the one thing which was sure to throw him and his friends back, was the definition of the Pope's Infallibility. Indeed, I am not sure that it was not with this very object that some of the most earnest supporters of the definition went to work-because they considered persons who denied or doubted the infallibility worse Catholics than infidels themselves. I almost think they have said so. Any how, Dr Pusey has now finally given up any prospect of ever being in communion with Rome. To me this is a great pain *(LD* 32:311 [1870]).

Manning wished an all-or-nothing adoption of Catholicism by Anglicans. Conversion was the story of moving from evil to good. Newman saw conversion arising from a slower unfolding of convictions along with the retention from one's past of whatever was good.

Throughout the many volumes of the *Letters and Diaries* there are innumerable letters from Newman to potential converts, counseling them on whatever troubles or perplexes them. The topics are as varied as the persons writing the letters. A 4 September 1870 letter to an unknown correspondent provides in a nutshell Newman's philosophy for approaching such letters and for the fundamental issue at stake in deciding to convert to Roman Catholicism.

> You will easily understand that the circumstance of my not knowing you personally makes it impossible [to answer your question]. I ever feel that religious questions are simply personal, and that the advice and arguments suitable to one inquirer are not suitable to another. . . . You have to consider therefore whether you have that conviction that the Catholic Church is (as *I* firmly believe it to be) the one communion to which the promises are attached, the one ark of salvation, which will carry you through a great trial. You leave friends and come to strangers, and our Lord bids us "count the costs." A mere liking for Catholic devotions or opinions is no sure ground for conversion. You have no call on you to leave your present position unless you believe that such a step is necessary in order to save your soul. ... However, if you have a clear view that the Catholic Church is the true and only Fold of Christ [,]you are *bound* at all hazard and suffering to join it, and God will give you strength *(LD* 32:312 [1870]).

The advice, of course, is autobiographical, and my review of volume 10 of the *Letters and Diaries* (noted *supra)* recounts Newman's movement toward this kind of a decision for himself.

As with the previous volumes of *Letters and Diaries,* this volume includes pastoral counseling letters that display a side of Newman as admirable as his

theological abilities. I conclude my sampling of Newman's writings with a letter he sent a Balliol College undergraduate who had written him concerning the allure of atheism and whether the student was duty bound to quit his studies in order to resolve matters. Recall that one needed to subscribe to Anglicanism's Thirty-Nine Articles in order to stand for a degree.

> I cannot see that it *is* your duty. Your direct duty is to go on with your reading for your degree examination.... [Otherwise], you would fall between two stools-you would not only lose your honors, but you would get into greater confusion of mind as regards religion than ever. Yours is no unusual case-it is the case of intellectual youth of this day generally-It is like an epidemic, which one man may have in a severe form and another in a lighter.... You cannot hasten what is a natural process, like the diseases of children. Put yourself in God's hands, and never mind, though you say to yourself, "Perhaps there is no God." Our Lord praised the woman who "did what she could." Let all your reading be done in His sight, with a desire to please Him.... Go to God as a loving Father, and ask Him to make you love Him. Write again, if you have any thing to say.

Newman could discourse on theism vs. atheism with the brightest of minds, but his savvy response to this undergraduate took a calmer approach lest it "only make [matters] worse (*LD* 32:352 [1875]).

This concluding impression of the deeply spiritual side to Newman accords well with the reason why the pope led his beatification ceremony in September 2010. Newman was a giant of the spiritual life. In lieu of describing the many appendices with which McGrath has enhanced the present volume, I would merely direct readers to the testimonies to Newman's character that appeared in the newspapers all over the United Kingdom and elsewhere when he died in 1890. In Appendix 9, McGrath has unearthed and collated 93 of them! Newman died so esteemed by so many.

So many letters-18,302 thus far. This is what editors, beginning with the scholarly Charles Stephen Dessain in 1961 and ending with the equally scholarly Francis]. McGrath today have provided Newman experts and Newman devotees and Newman admirers over almost fifty years. Given all these letters, one still must nod in agreement with the final words of McGrath's "Introductory Note": "And the probability is that more Newman letters will continue to surface for years to come" (*LD* 32:xvi).

EDWARD JEREMY MILLER

Gwynedd-Mercy College
Gwynedd Valley, Pennsylvania

justification as Argued by Newman. By STANLEYL. *JAKI.* New Hope, Ky.: Real View Books, 2007. Pp. viii+ 286. $22.00 (paper). ISBN 978-0-9790577-4-8.

Fr. Stanley Jaki's monograph on BL John Henry Cardinal Newman's 1838 *Lectures on justification* is an impassioned, comprehensive, keen, and timely treatment of Newman's classic. (Newman reissued the lectures as a Catholic in 1874; references will be to the edition by Longmans, Green, and Co., 1900.) The recent beatification of Newman renders all of Jaki's commentaries on Newman timely, but this monograph is especially so in light of recent ecumenical dialogues. Growing is the number of those appreciative of the ecumenical intent and import of Newman's classic. At the same time, Jaki's commentary is timely as a well-researched and well-argued alternative to certain interpretations of the *Lectures* which, though undertaken in search of the good of Christian unity, risk false irenicism.

Always with one eye on this risk, which he confronts throughout with the support of Newman's own pen, both directly and indirectly, Jaki intends chiefly to usher the reader into the pith and marrow of Newman's text, tracing his intention and method as well as expounding the book's contents. Under Jaki's guidance, one hears Newman, in his literary mastery, logical acumen, and genuine humanity, laud God the Father as he who pardons past offenses and really cleanses the wretched, accomplishing both by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit into hearts on account of the one sacrifice and many petitions of Christ. Jaki's central thesis is that Newman aims above all, as the first and second lectures make clear, to defend the ontologically real character of justification, and, secondly, to denounce the doctrine of a sheer nonimputation of sin. Helpfully, Jaki cautions Newman's reader, while wading into the *Lecture's* speculations concerning a rapprochement between moderates on both sides, not to forget the two opening lectures.

In literary style, theological acumen, and human solicitude, Jaki shows himself a good student of his erudite master, competent to suggest where the teacher may have wandered from the path. Still, in tone and focus, Jaki departs somewhat from Newman's equanimity (relatively speaking) and vantage point. Before discussing the strengths of the text, I wish to indicate these weaknesses.

First, Jaki's rhetoric is heated; one is reminded of Augustine against Pelagius or Nazianzus against the Arians. It is to be lamented that the flares punctuating Jaki's insights may deter from reading his fine work some who might benefit from its theological solidity and scholarly breadth. What are these flares? Jaki writes harshly at times, almost vilifying Luther and his recent advocates. To be sure, Jaki anchors his remarks in textual evidence and is not without respectable company. Among others, there comes to mind St. Thomas More, who judged Luther's doctrine a cause of dissolute behavior: "As for the doctrine of this unhappy sect, and the behavior, also, of the beginners of the same, they are such that, as every sensible person well perceives, do teach and give rise to their evil deeds" *(Dialogue concerning Heresies,* rendered in Modern English by Mary

Gottschalk [New York: Scepter Publishers, Inc., 2006], §8, p. 424). Especially on account of Luther's conception of divine predestination, not unrelated to his thesis *"iustificatio sofa fide,"* More pronounces Luther's doctrine "the very worst and most harmful heresy that ever was thought up; and, on top of that, the most insane" (ibid., §11, p. 453). In the hands of many whomJaki hopes to convince, his adjectives for Luther, as used in the titles of thirteen chapters ("antirational," "unscriptural," "paradoxical," etc.), albeit tame in comparison with More's slings, may betray him. Of course, one must not neglect to note that the sense of these very slings was traced by Newman's own pen: "Surely it is a paradox to maintain that the only safeguard of the doctrine of our being accepted freely and without price, is that of our hearts being left odious and offensive to God" *(Lectures,* III, sect. 8, n. 3 Uohn Henry Newman, *Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1900), 78f.]); this doctrine is an "utter perversion of the truth" *(Lectures,* II, sect. 14 [Longmans ed., 60]). It was on account of these that Ian Ker described the *Lectures* as "hardly eirenic in intention or tone" *(Newman the Theologian: A Reader* [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990], 29). (In tone, especially with regard to today's standards, yes. In intention? To the contrary, the set of *Lectures* has this intention, even if it employs heated rhetoric in service of this aim. Newman subdues his pen to his earnest prayer "Lead kindly".)

Second, due to his focus on rescuing Newman from the abuse of false irenicism, Jaki's gaze materially diverges from Newman's. Their compass-settings are identical-veritas *et amor-but* their situations opposed. Really buffeted, Newman labors patiently to unite the diverging; Jaki, engulfed by what he considers an overly facile consensus, strives to distinguish the confused. Newman begins and ends his treatise, punctuating it throughout, with his central thesis-namely, that at the core of moderate Protestant and moderate Catholic doctrine lies a *via media,* acceptable in principle to the absolute strictures of both parties: There are two partial so-called formal causes of justification, the Holy Spirit indwelling and the genuine albeit inchoate, insufficient renewal that attends that indwelling *(Lectures,* Appendix, par. 1 [Longmans ed., 343 n. 1). This thesis, remarkably akin to a number of recent proposals for an ecumenical rapprochement (esp. that of the Finnish school of Luther research), is prescient. Jaki has his sites so trained on the insinuation into Catholic discourse of errors grounded in Luther-the "basic target" of the *Lectures* (24), which are "profoundly anti-Lutheran throughout" (17)-that he does not do full justice to what Newman took to be the purport of the *Lectures.* (Of course, one might note that Alister McGrath also observes Luther to be the "primary target" of the *Lectures:* ["Newman on Justification: An Evangelical Anglican Evaluation," in *Newman and the Word,* ed. T. Merrigan and I. Ker (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 97].) Notwithstanding,Jaki knows and states (e.g., 16, 30, and 74) that numerous outstanding Lutherans variously parted ways with Luther, and rather soon (e.g., Melanchthon, Chemnitz, Gherard). These Lutherans, Jaki notes, pressed in Catholic directions in various ways. (But again, on this point, the Lutheran scholarship is mixed, some claiming that Luther was closer to the

Catholic view, others claiming that official Lutheran statements mollify some harsh elements in Luther's doctrine.)

Jaki does recognize that Newman is trying to "put the best light on the difference of Protestant and Catholic discourse" (80). So, Jaki gives us a corrective to his own excesses: He points out that, in his reading of these and also of the Reformed divines, Newman is not being *anti-Lutheran* but rather "anti-" a certain exclusive, or "paradoxical," thesis-that justification is but the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and that, correlatively, renewal and works, albeit always concomitant, are not really a condition of final salvation. Jaki would have us note, also, that Newman does not hesitate to credit this paradoxical thesis to Luther (see, e.g., *Lectures,* I, sect. 4 [Longmans ed., 9 n. 1) as well as to a swath of his nineteenth-century contemporaries. Jaki is quite lucid regarding Newman's central, conciliating thesis.

A supporting reason for Jaki's divergent gaze is that, according to him, Newman claims to accomplish too much and thus unwittingly cloaks outstanding differences between the absolute strictures of Protestant and Catholic positions (see, e.g., 81-83 and 146-49). These claims seem to me warranted. For this reason, Jaki's angle, which at first glance appears a weakness, makes the publication of his book opportune, while his rhetoric may curtail the longevity the strengths of his commentary merit. It is to these I now turn.

Among the many strengths of the book that render it a must read for the serious ecumenist and scholar and an enjoyable read for others the following can be indicated. First, Jaki is attuned to the *Lectures'* modality: Newman wrote the lectures neither as a merely scholastic exercise nor as a merely homiletic exhortation (22). Weaving two genres together, he challenges readers of all stripes. This synthetic approach is not uncharacteristic: "One has to use more than one's brains in approaching almost anything Newman wrote" (24). This coupling of genres manifests Newman's concern for souls, whether intellectual or simple, each one of whom is confronted by personal sin and offered grace throughout life. As Jaki shows, the stuff of which Newman's classic is woven is Scripture. Yet, in attending to the remedy of souls, Newman does not shrink from certain theological precisions, which Jaki accurately deems as "Scholastic" in tenor and "ontological" in sense. These precisions are conveyed with conventional terms, for Newman's audience as he well knew was determined to attend to *biblical* phrases (249f.). Still, Newman occasionally employs even technical terms.

Second, the monograph is thoroughly researched. Extensive is Jaki's command of the secondary literature, knowledge of the history of disputes over justification, and grasp of Newman's corpus (including the different stages of the drafting, delivery, and preparation for publication of the *Lectures).* Jaki thus bursts asunder the myth that speculative thinkers cannot competently remark on historical figures. On the contrary, historians not philosophically adept are unfit to read the history of ideas.

Third, and most importantly, is Jaki's profound grasp and love of the full scope of Catholic teaching on justification. He was trained in a rigorous theological methodology and availed himself of twentieth- and twenty-first-

century scholarship on the teachings of Trent. Reading Newman with methodological precision and scholarly acumen, Jaki is able to indicate shortcomings in Newman's masterful synthesis.

This brings me to a fourth strength: Jaki's remarkable capacity for sympathetic criticism. He does not dispense with Newman's great work on account of certain rhythmic drawbacks, as might a less patient and appreciative reader. On the contrary, Jaki defends it as a "masterpiece." Still, he observes therein a tragic flaw: Newman never fully appreciated the precision of the Catholic doctrine on justification and its distinction from the novel theory of "double justice." Consequently, Jaki claims, Newman at times did not trace the full scope of the Catholic position and at times conceded too much to the moderate Protestant position. Jaki points out again and again the corrective notes that Newman added to the 1874 reprinting. In these notes, Newman enters retractions that, if thought through, are no mean admissions of error. Nevertheless, Newman issued the reprint on the judgment that he still held in substance in 1874 what he wrote in 1838. Despite Jaki's incisive remarks on the weaknesses of the 1838 text, he candidly admits that, if it is acceptable, Newman's notion of divine indwelling as the (major) formal cause "would soften the doctrine of the 'unica causa formalis'" (190). Implicit, however, in Jaki's sustained criticism of Newman's failure adequately to ground that indwelling in a created corollary (sanctifying grace) is a contrary suggestion, that Newman's hypothesized *via media* is likely too tenuous. (More viable, perhaps, is Matthias Scheeben's reading of the indwelling, for Scheeben both accounts for the indwelling of an immutable divine person and steers far away from the theory of double justice.)

Fifth, connected with this last point, Jaki's major contention, noted above, that Newman's central insight concerns the thoroughly ontological character of justification *in the concrete* (157-62) is wholly accurate. Jaki's monograph sustains this claim with evidence culled from throughout the text of the *Lectures.* Jaki also drives the point home with numerous very helpful references to Newman's corrective notes, which appear more substantial than Newman's *Preface* avows.

Collectively, the strengths of Jaki's monograph are unmatched by those of recent works on Newman's *Lectures.* (It should be noted, as Jaki does, that several dissertations on the *Lectures* were written in the middle of the twentieth century.) Ian Ker *(Newman the Theologian)* and Avery Cardinal Dulles (chap. 2 of his *John Henry Newman* [New York: Continuum, 2002]) offer balanced presentations of Newman's central thesis, but both treatments are of necessity brief. Thomas Sheridan wrote a monograph on Newman's development up to his mature position in the *Lectures* but features the *Lectures* only in a concluding chapter *(Newman on Justification* [New York: Alba House, 1967]). More recently, Sheridan (in sync with the Finnish school) has shown that Luther resonates with the *Lectures'* stress on divine indwelling ("Newman and Luther on Justification," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 38 [2001]: 217-45). I would recommend Sheridan's article as a companion piece to Jaki's monograph. One

might also avail oneself of works of the Finnish school. Alister McGrath, more trenchant the more he reflects on the *Lectures,* observes, as does Sheridan, critical flaws in Newman's reading of Lutheran positions. Some elements are "seriously inaccurate," demonstrating "a standard of intellectual integrity which falls short of what one might have hoped to encounter" (McGrath, "Newman on Justification," 94). John Perry concludes similarly Gohn F. Perry, "Newman's Treatment of Luther in the *Lectures on Justification," Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 36 [1999]: 303-17). One sympathizes with McGrath's and Perry's criticisms of Newman's scholarship on Luther. To be clear, these criticisms cut in two directions. They both mitigate some of Newman's accusations against Luther (he did not wish to interpose faith, much less as some *feeling,* between Christ and the soul) and distance Luther from Newman's occasional reading of him in support of the *Lectures'* conciliating thesis: Luther indeed taught *justificatio sola fide,* contrary to Newman's attempt to call him to his aid (against *sola fide)* with a citation that omits by ellipsis Luther's most important precision *(Lectures,* XII, n. 11 [Longmans ed., 300£.]; see McGrath, "Newman on Justification," 101-5).

Essentially the first of its kind, Jaki's monograph is a helpful Catholic complement to the scholarship of Perry, McGrath, and Sheridan. It is a marvelous commentary on the *Lectures* from a leading disciple of Newman who does not neglect a (once again, sympathetic) critique from the Catholic doctrinal perspective. It may prove more substantiated than some Catholic efforts to wield Newman without due regard for Tridentine doctrine. Most importantly, the monograph's scholarly erudition, theological acumen, and literary-interpretative skill make this work important reading for those involved or interested in ecumenical dialogues on justification. It is to be hoped that Jaki's labor will be given the attention it deserves and thereby direct even greater attention to Newman's own *Lectures.*

CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

The University of Dallas
Irving, Texas

Catholicity and Heresy in the Early Church. By MARK EDWARDS. Surrey, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009. Pp. 201. $29.95 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-7546-6297-6.

"The phenomenon, admitted on all hands," writes John Henry Newman, "is this: That great portion of what is generally received as Christian truth is, in its rudiments or in its separate parts, to be found in heathen philosophies and religions" *(Essays,* vol. 2, as repeated in his *Development of Doctrine* 2.8.2.12).

Newman's examples include the doctrine of the divine Word being Platonic and the doctrine of the Incarnation being Indian. If much of Christian truth can be found piecemeal outside of Christianity, would it be so disturbing to argue that various elements of that same truth were in heresy prior to orthodoxy?

Mark Edwards, Lecturer in Patristics at Christ Church, Oxford, has written a challenging book that seems meant to disturb. It re-examines the role of heresy in the formation of early Christianity. Rather than simply being a catalyst for future development, Edwards argues, heresy actually served a positive role in formulating teachings that would be appropriated by future catholicity. Conversely, some tenets proposed by catholic writers to counter heretical claims would later be considered beyond orthodoxy's limits. It is a book, I think, that Newman would have read with interest.

Contrasting his own approach with that found in the *Essay on the Development of Doctrine*, Edwards faults Newman for preferring the notes of preservation of type and continuity of principle. For Edwards, neither one is satisfactory "since there is no early Christian movement which is demonstrably unfaithful to the type laid down by Jesus, and there is no hermeneutic or philosophic principle which yielded only heterodox logomachies without enlarging the catholic proclamation" (2). In place of Newman's preference, Edwards argues for the test of the assimilation of teachings "which to Newman himself seemed aberrant and unworthy of the name 'Christian'" (ibid.). Edwards does not explain himself more on this point, which is a pity as Newman offers the power of assimilation as the third note of true development. Writing on assimilation, Newman himself borrows an image from Jerome: "The Church, like Aaron's rod, devours the serpents of the magicians" *(Essays,* vol. 2, as repeated in *Development of Doctrine* 2.8.2.12). Perhaps Newman and Edwards do not mean the same thing by assimilation. Newman's interest is to investigate how the Church has a genuine development of doctrine without undergoing corruption-even unifying through assimilation the scattered seeds of truth found outside the bounds of the Church. Edwards, on the other hand, has the consistent aim "to dismantle the antithetical constructions which obscure the diversity of Christian thought in our modern patrologies" (142). The ultimate antithetical construction seems to be expressed in the first part of the book's very title: *Catholicity and Heresy.* The title further suggests a unity beyond the diversity of Christian thought: *in the Early Church.* Orthodoxy, for Edwards, is "whatever is taught in any epoch by the majority of bishops, and to be catholic is to concur with this majority" (7). The provisional aspect should not be overlooked. Edwards closes his introduction with this statement on assimilation which surely would have irritated Newman:

> The present study suggests that it [the church] was catholic in a sense that it might have preferred to disown, since, notwithstanding its fanciful claim to preserve the one truth handed down to the heirs of the apostles, it was the church that lent its countenance most readily to the mingling of the old and the new, as liberal in receiving the

> chastened form of an idea that it had once declared unlawful as in taking back the excommunicate who abjured his sin. (9)

Edwards's argument, laid out in the Introduction and reprised in the Epilogue, unfolds over the course of six engaging chapters. The first is provocatively entitled "The Gnostic Beginnings of Orthodoxy." It argues that those reckoned to be some of the first heretics, such as Valentinus, Basilides, and Marcion, contributed key ideas to the formation of catholicity. The second chapter tackles the catholicity of Irenaeus, showing how he is in various ways indebted to his heretical enemies and not influential in certain ways that he diverged from them. The third chapter presses the argument further by examining figures after Irenaeus, such as Theodotus, Clement, Origen, Hippolytus, and Tertullian. The fourth chapter studies "Origen and Orthodoxy," especially through the *Apology for Origen* by Pamphilus of Caesarea. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the first four ecumenical councils. Chapter 5 argues that Eusebius of Caesarea and the homoiousians should be credited with the real victory of asserting the Son's metaphysical equality with the Father; chapter 6 positions the heresiarch Apollinarius of Laodicea as the champion leading Christians to Chalcedon's definition on the Incarnation.

What might be the contemporary significance for theology from this reconfiguration of early Christianity? In the book's Epilogue, Edwards assures his reader that his goal is not to confuse what is right with error: "Not only the Curia but the academy requires its theologians to decide that this is false because that is true" (175). But his plea follows what he calls the "emollient recommendations" of Hans Kiing, quoted as writing:

> The one essential thing is understanding: the 'unmasking and refutation' of heretical doctrines, which from the time of Irenaeus was always regarded as the main aim of the Christian heresiologists, generally makes true understanding impossible.... Heresy should be seen, not primarily as a challenge to the unity of Church fellowship, but as a challenge to the Church to discover a new, purer and deeper unity. (Ibid.)

Edwards wants that deeper unity to press beyond any strict division between catholicity and heresy, and to find that catholicity has within itself building blocks borrowed from heresy. In the end, the label of "heresy" is itself questionable: "it would not have been impossible for the same church to accommodate contradictory inferences from the same text without deeming any of them heretical" (ibid.).

While space prevents a full engagement of the theology that Edwards expresses in his writing (and I do think Newman's *Development of Doctrine* would be a handy resource in such a dialogue), I would like to concentrate on just one historical figure that Edwards adduces so as both to display his interesting inquiry and to respond to it. Either Origen or Apollinarius would be an obvious choice given their prominence in the book, but I will select someone

from the first half of the second century to make the task more manageable. I turn to how Edwards handles the case of Marcion.

In concentrating on early heretics like Valentinus, Basilides, and Marcion, Edwards seems too quick to dismiss the likes of Ignatius of Antioch and Justin Martyr as formative for subsequent theology. He writes, "[I]t has seldom been profitable to look for intimations of a future orthodoxy in the writings of the apostolic fathers or the apologists, as the latter wrote primarily to deflect false accusations while the former touch on doctrine only so far as is necessary to arm the faithful against temptation or distress" (7). Edwards turns to those early heretics, such as Marcion, to show how they "can be associated with the first expression of a principle which has become an axiom of catholic doctrine" (11).

Because Marcion sets himself as an interpreter of Paul, it is important to see what Edwards thinks of Marcion's version of the Apostle. Edwards writes, "Matter is irredeemable, and Christ came not in the flesh but (as Paul discloses at Romans 8.3) in the phantasmal likeness of flesh" (29). This parenthetical comment seems partial to Marcion's construal. The Apostle says: "For what the law, weakened by the flesh, was powerless to do, this God has done: by sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for the sake of sin, he condemned sin in the flesh" (Rom 8:3). The Son did not have *sinful flesh*, but he was sent in that likeness for the reason of God condemning sin *in the flesh*. Moreover, Edwards is quite generous toward Marcion in interpreting Paul's understanding of the resurrection. Marcion denied the Incarnation, saying that Christ came only in spirit-and so it should not surprise that Marcion believed that the resurrection is only of a spirit. Edwards says that there is nothing in Paul's testimonies to imply that Paul saw a body. Edwards chastises Tertullian for quoting Luke 24:40 "a spirit has not flesh and bones, as you see me having" when he writes: "But his [Marcion's] true preceptor is Paul, not Luke, and the strength of his position is revealed by the strange constructions that his adversaries put on Paul's exclusion of flesh and blood from the kingdom of heaven" (32). What should not be overlooked in this analysis is that Marcion, by clinging to a selective reading of Paul, fails Edwards's own test of assimilation for catholicity. Marcion cannot represent catholicity, but how did the Church assimilate Marcion's teaching?

Edwards gives three considerations of Marcion's legacy for catholicity: "his choice of Paul as a privileged amanuensis of the mind of Christ, his perception that any theory of obligation to the Law involves a theory of human nature, and his insistence that when Paul hailed Christ as the end of the Law he did not mean simply that Christ fulfilled the prophecies of the Old Testament and left us an example of righteous works" (33). In each case, Edwards has touched upon something significant, but perhaps some further distinction is required. Yes, Marcion may have brought Paul to greater prominence in the tradition, but no one in the mainstream after Marcion-not even John Chrysostom-would have concurred with Marcion's way of privileging Paul. As for the second, yes again. But does not Paul himself give in his Letter to the Romans an implicit theory of human nature? The third aspect of Marcion's legacy is oddly expressed. What

is the significance of saying that Marcion's version of Paul did "not mean simply that Christ fulfilled the prophecies of the Old Testament"? The word "simply" is a problem. Marcion seems more to say that Christ was the antithesis, rather than the fulfillment, of Israel's Scriptures. The Church had considerable work to show, both against Marcion and against Jews who did not accept Jesus as the Messiah, that Jesus fulfills the Law for our salvation. Furthermore on this third point, did the Church need Marcion to say that Jesus was not simply giving an example of righteous works, or was that already imbedded within the apostolic tradition of understanding the person of Christ?

Edwards has done a great service in writing this book, and its power is demonstrated in its ability to provoke reconsiderations of what is too facilely believed about the fascinating world of early Christianity. Theologically, the book succeeds in disturbing even those who accept Newman's note of assimilation. It will prove especially valuable to those dealing with accounts of who is "in" and who is "out" in the first five Christian centuries, and should also be read by ecclesiologists, ecumenists, and others interested in broad questions pertaining to the nature of Tradition, Church teaching, and the theological enterprise.

Readers should be alerted that the book suffers from some poor proofreading. I was frequently distracted by errors, as many as three or four on a single page (e.g., pp. 41, 155, 168, 171, and 175). Some mistakes are howlers, such as this Christological affirmation: "there is one Sin and not two" (8). Others require a theological eye. Genesis 1:3 does not say "Let us make man in our image" (15), and it is misleading to speak of the Council of Ephesus occurring in 433 (6 and136). The back cover even misrepresents the prodigious work by Edwards. He has a very useful translation of *Optatus, Against the Donatists,* not *Optatus, Against the Gnostics.*

ANDREW HOFER, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D.C.

Thomistenlexikon. Edited by DAVID BERGER and JÖRGEN VIJGEN. Bonn: Nova & Vetera, 2006. Pp. viii+ 374. 98.00€ (cloth). ISBN 978-3-936741-37-7.

In the third edition (1993-2001) of the prestigious eleven-volume German Catholic theological encyclopedia, *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche,* edited by Walter Cardinal Kasper in cooperation with a group of leading German Catholic theologians, the competent entry in volume 9 on "Thomism" (pp. 1517-22) by Klaus Obenauer ends with the following noteworthy statement: "Although currently Thomism has lost its significance to a large degree, it still contains a

rich reservoir of metaphysical insights that could be reactivated, if one only were to think beyond certain narrow hyper-concentrations *[Engfuhrungen]* of Thomism in particular and scholastic philosophy in general" (p. 1521). Attracted by the promise of this rich reservoir of metaphysical insights and guided by the entries on "Thomism" and "Neoscholasticism/Neothomism," the student of Thomism in search of further and deeper orientation will most likely turn to various entries on individual representatives of this veritable intellectual tradition and school of thought-to not much avail, alas. While Thomas de Vio Cajetan is covered in one full column and while Domingo Soto receives thirty-four and Gustav Siewerth twenty-four lines of one column, Ambroise Gardeil and Josef Pieper have to content themselves with seventeen lines of one column each, Francisco Marin-Sola with fourteen, Antonin Sertillanges with thirteen, Hermann Plassmann and Franz Diekamp with eleven, John Capreolus, Ceslaus Maria Schneider, and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange with eight lines each. One searches in vain for entries on the Belgian Charles de Koninck, the French Thomas Deman, or the American Joseph Owens. In order to get the larger picture right, one needs to understand that in this most recent edition of the *Lexikon fur Theologieund Kirche,* St. Dominic, Matthias Josef Scheeben, and the early nineteenth-century German Catholic rationalist Anton Gunther each receive forty lines of one column-while the other early nineteenth-century German Catholic rationalist, Georg Hermes, receives sixty-four lines! Needless to say, with very few exceptions, the entries on most Thomists across the centuries offer very little beyond the bare bones of the biographical and historical data.

Fortunately, the student who wishes to tap the rich reservoir of the metaphysical, let alone the theological, insights still hidden in Thomism is not left without help. On behalf of the German and Dutch Thomas societies, David Berger and Jorgen Vijgen gathered an impressive international group of scholars to produce what according to my knowledge is a singularity-a lexicon that introduces the life, works, and thought of over 230 Thomists in 738 columns. The entries range from Aegidius of Rome and Juan Arintero to Karol Wojtyla and Francisco Zumel, from 1272 (the death of Hannibaldus de Hannibaldis, a student of Thomas Aquinas) to 2005 (the death of Joseph Owens, one of the leading figures at the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto). All entries are of a consistently high scholarly quality and offer extensive bibliographic resources for further study. In many cases, this bibliographic information pertains to works that are preciously rare and exceedingly hard to come by. To the persistent reader of this lexicon, the richly varied, but profoundly coherent picture of an intellectual tradition stretching over more than eight centuries will emerge in front of the mind's eye. Such a reader will quickly reach a much more nuanced understanding of the richness, rigor, and ongoing relevance of the Thomist and-yes, indeed-even neo-Thomist thought stretching well into the twentieth century and will discover (next to some justly forgotten figures) a range of important and currently quite unjustly neglected or forgotten thinkers, especially of the nineteenth century.

Some of the entries are small masterpieces. Among the many worthy candidates I would like to highlight from the earlier periods the entries on John Capreolus (Cessario/White), Cajetan (Klueting), Sylvester of Ferrara (Elders), Banez (Martinez), John of St. Thomas (Stohr), and Vitoria (Spindelbock); from the nineteenth century the entries on Benoit Henri Merkelbach (Hauke), Norberto de! Prado (Berger), Matthias Joseph Scheeben (Berger), and Ceslaus Maria Schneider (Berger); and from the twentieth century the entries on Cornelio Fabro (Ferraro), Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (Berger), Etienne Gilson (Stickelbroeck), Marie-Michel Labourdette (Vijgen), Bernard Lonergan (Sala), Gallus Manser (Braun), and Jacques Maritain (Ritzier). One finds rich entries on the Salzburg Benedictine Thomists (Vijgen) and on the Salmanticenses (Berger), and in addition, entries on Catherine of Siena, Dante, Savonarola, Edith Stein, and Popes John XXII, Pius V, and Leo XIII. Being myself German, I admittedly was especially pleased to find entries on lesser known and barely remembered figures like Ernst Commer (Berger), Franz von Paula Morgott (Peitz), and Hermann Ernst Plassmann (Peitz), or figures which are mainly (and arguably, quite unjustly) seen in a negative light as Friedrich Heinrich Suso Denifle (Klueting) and Franz Diekamp (Hauke).

For the student of Thomism, the *Thomistenlexikon* is an indispensable tool. It not only offers reliable and in many cases fecund entries (together with commendably comprehensive bibliographies of primary and secondary resources) for virtually every important philosopher and theologian from the distant to the most recent past who could reasonably be identified as a Thomist. For students of theology and philosophy in general, the consistent consultation of this lexicon will irreversibly undermine the currently conventional wisdom that Thomism is a monolithic, sterile, and therefore rightly bygone intellectual tradition and will provide all the necessary markers to guide them sooner or later to the rich reservoir of metaphysical and theological insights still hidden in Thomism.

In conclusion, I would mention one criticism and two *desiderata.* As for the criticism: the lexicon could have profited from one more round of careful proof-reading. The first *desideratum* is the inclusion as an entry, in a future second edition, of an entry by Jorgen Vijgen on Bernhard of Trilia and another entry by M. Hauke on Alexis-Henri-Marie Lepicier that appeared as a separate essay in *Doctor angelicus* 7 (2007): 189-97. Such a second edition should also include entries on Josef Kleutgen, Jean-Pierre Torrell, and Servais Pinckaers, Ferdinand Ulrich, and Carl Werner. The second *desideratum* is an English translation of this important lexicon, appropriately supplemented and updated, though, with entries on Benedict Ashley, W. Norris Clarke, Fergus Kerr, Alasdair Macintyre, Ralph Mdnerny, and William A. Wallace. After all, as with all living traditions, the story of Thomism goes on. And this lexicon is the best reminder of it.

REINHARD Hi'rITER

Duke University Divinity School
Durham, North Carolina

He Became Poor: The Poverty of Christ and Aquinas's Economic Teachings. By CHRISTOPHER A. FRANKS. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2009. Pp. 207 $27.00 (paper) ISBN: 978-0-8028-3748-6.

This is an interesting book with an underdeveloped argument. A significant part of the book's interest is that Franks turns the light on a crucial topic, the moral standing of credit. As the West ponders the guiding principles of its banking system, the topic could not be more timely. To show that Thomas might have much to say on this topic is, of course, very welcome. The point is crucial to the book. Catholic social thought has Thomas's ideas at its moral center and *He Became Poor* wants to show why Thomas remains a touchstone for the Church's continuing engagement with the social arena.

The reasons for the West's 2008 credit problems are multiple and still not well understood. One of many unsavory parts of the story, however, is usury: Some lenders only released credit at exorbitant interest rates. Franks makes the interesting claim that Thomas's arguments about lending at interest are a central front in the persuasiveness of his natural-law reasoning *in toto.* Natural law's deep teaching is that humans are from the outset placed in a moral order. It is also, says Franks, an order of provision, wherein God has lovingly crafted a natural fecundity to meet our "natural human needs."

Some might wonder at this dual construction of natural law but Franks cleverly puts it to use in the matter of lending at interest. Franks argues that usury is unjust because it is a sin of presumption. Contracting the borrower to pay interest even when the foreseen benefits of the loan are swallowed up by adverse circumstances is an injustice to the borrower; the entire exchange relies on the presumption of security in God's continuing material beneficence. Contrasting investing and usury, Franks writes: "While the investor entrusts his money at his own risk, the usurer transfers risk to the borrower .... The usurer thus claims a title to a return that neglects any attempt to conform to God's actual provision" (81).

This strikes me as Franks's deeper argument but he has another on which he relies. He wants to argue against a consensus that Thomas's comments on usury lack power because they mischaracterize the nature of money (77). Thomas's image is well-known: The use of money is like drinking wine. Renting a house is permissible because the rent is the sale of the use of the house; after the rental period the house is returned. Renting money is not comparable, however. Money's use is its consumption; I spend the money and it is gone. It is just like when I pay for the wine, use it, and it is gone. Who would pay both for the wine and, separately, for its use? If the use of something is its very consumption, to charge for the use and to also expect the borrowed original returned is unjust: one thing has been charged twice and this is thus stealing from the borrower. When I borrow money at interest, and must return the original money and also pay interest, then I have been charged twice for the same thing; so the lender has stolen from me.

To the modern mind, something seems wrong with Thomas's analogy: borrow money at interest to put it to work on my behalf; I borrow money, and pay to do so, because money's function isn't consumption, but generation. Money has a genuine use value, therefore: I pay back the loan, I pay the interest, and I keep what the money generated. This is the role of a mortgage, for example, or a business loan. Of course, not everyone relies on credit with its generative capacity in mind, and there is risk all around, but the main point is that the money borrowed isn't simply like wine. Franks thinks this typical response to Thomas-that he assumes money's sterility-misses his real point. The standard critical account is wrong because, "Thomas's point is that insofar as money is nothing more than that convention-nothing but pure exchange value-there is no way to exchange the use of it without exchanging it. It has no separable use such that the potential uses of a sum of money could accumulate with time" (79). So far as I can tell, this is Franks's counterclaim, and I do not see that it is expanded upon elsewhere. The point is too condensed. I wish Franks had expanded upon the argument, perhaps by explaining why a mortgage is illicit, as many in the Islamic world think. Perhaps I am missing something but a mortgage does seem like a counterexample to his construction of Thomas's argument, a construction that does not itself seem to escape the basic charge against Thomas, his sterility assumption. My basic fear is that Franks "thins out" the reality, institutional character, and variety, of money.

The way Franks embeds the question of usury in the general topic of consumerism is interesting, however. Part of the problem attending credit in recent years is not reducible to poor regulation or exploitative sales agents foisting mortgages on the unsuspecting, but a general cultural drift to an inflation of self and choice. Most needful, insists Franks, is a new sensibility of deference to God's providential order, a humble grasp that God has so ordered the natural world that our central needs are met. Franks spells this out with reflections of what he terms our "ontological poverty." Pointing towards our vulnerability as the proper context in which to examine economic and business policy seems exactly right to me, and Franks's work is a useful reminder about the deeper meanings in play if anyone wants to give an adequate account of banking and business.

Like his previous argument, this one is never really made, however. The argument is undeveloped both in terms of Thomas and in terms of Thomism. Thomism seeks to take the arguments of Thomas out onto the contested field of modern ideas. For example, Franks would have us take comfort that Malthus's vision of nature is wrong and that a gentler providential order reigns. Thomists agree but few other intellectuals do. Franks needs to argue against Malthus: Where did his powerful analytical mind go wrong? Moreover, where did Darwin go wrong? As early as his *Voyage of the Beagle*, Darwin was overwhelmed by the pervasive evidence that large-scale extinction is the normal run of nature. Rare is the species that survives; death, not life, is the history of Earth. Later, of course, in *The Origin of Species*, Darwin harnesses Malthus's analytics of population as a central explanation for this observation. Thomism cannot ignore

the Darwin-Malthus alliance when making the claim that there is a sufficient providential order writ large in nature.

A not dissimilar problem is misidentifying the target of one's arguments. A surprising number of Christian critics of commercial civilization think that ours is a culture of narcissistic egoism (187). To say this is to fail to engage seriously the Whig architects of our civilization. Smith, for example, is explicit that commercial life is a sacrificial life, devoted to satisfying the rigors of an aesthetic imagination. Beauty is an exhausting mistress but as she uses up our lives nature is made fertile in new ways and poverty overcome. Hume and Burke agree. Thomism cannot ignore their arguments: To contest the Whig consensus that now sits at the heart of the West, and increasingly much of the world, a first necessary start is to identify its animating logic.

These two examples combine in the sense that this reader at least has that the book is a bit one-dimensional. It is a heartfelt book but gives the sense of preaching to the choir. There is much in the book for students of Thomas to think about, but the choir might also start raising questions.

Two dramatic claims are made. Thomas's natural law is intimately tied to his arguments on usury and if the latter fail then the overall persuasiveness of Thomas's natural-law reasoning crumbles. On the face of it, this seems wrong. Relatively little attention has been paid Thomas's arguments about credit for hundreds of years yet reflection of his natural-law thinking has never abated. Earlier I specified the exact contours of Franks's claim and here I only add why his tight running together of Thomas on credit and Thomas on law is wrong. It seems to me that Thomas is just wrong about credit because he is wrong about the nature of money. Thomas, ever alert to all the other places throughout creation where fertility abounds, appears not to have seen that money too could be fecund. Thomists do not need to be defensive about this. There is nothing wrong in simply acknowledging that things like bond markets hadn't been invented when Thomas was alive and so he didn't understand money very well. Norris Clarke often spoke about the "creative completion" of Thomas and this is a case in point. Thomists should be pluralists, I believe, and harness good arguments where we find them in order to make Thomas's broader points. Ultimately, it does Catholic social thought little good if we make Thomas do work he cannot really manage.

Perhaps there are Tho mist purists who would reject this suggestion but Franks will certainly have a problem with them, too. His second audacious claim comes in the third chapter where he argues that the counsels have priority over the precepts. He argues there that in Thomas the poverty of the crucified Christ is a norm of faithful Christian life. This is true but it does not have the implication he thinks. He thinks that Christians who go to the mall on Saturday and church on Sunday are confused: The whole tenor of Christian life respecting material needs and property ought to be governed by the poverty of the Cross. Yet this claim in itself confuses the diverse requirements of our spiritual and moral lives. Of course, my saying this is precisely what Franks wants to reject. My comment assumes a two-tier mentality to nature and grace that de Lubac is presumed to

have overcome. This is not the place to engage what is a great debate in the Church today but any variety of Thomist is likely to suspect that Franks goes too far when arguing that living the poverty of the Cross requires the gift of fear: "As we sense our lowliness and God's greatness, we also recognize the extent of our dependence. So the gift of fear shores us up for the arduous task of trusting God for all our needs.... The fear of the Lord is not only a stumbling block for modern thought; it also evokes a sense of our ontological poverty" (111). It goes too far, because Franks believes a sense of ontological poverty sits at the heart of natural law. Franks's position seems to collapse into the idea that our moral sensibility relies heavily on the gifts of the Holy Spirit and this does seem like a sin of presumption. One wonders whether Franks's-in my opinion-incautious formulations, running too closely together the natural law and the virtues of spiritual perfection, point to a troubling lust for perfection immanent to a de Lubacian outlook. Despite my wanting to see the argument of the book clarified and tightened, I enjoyed this book and found it genuinely thoughtful.

G. J. MCALEER

Loyola University of Maryland
Baltimore, Maryland

Aesthetic Perception: A Thomistic Perspective. By KEVIN E. O'REILLY. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007. Pp. 131. $55.00 (cloth). ISBN 978-1-84682-027-4.

The study of Aquinas's aesthetics is inevitably hampered by the fact that he wrote no sustained discussion of the topic. He devoted neither a question nor a single article to the nature of beauty. This is not to suggest the topic is unworthy of scholarly attention. Though Aquinas did not pursue the topic directly, he did bequeath ample resources by which his students might do so themselves. As a number of recent studies have indicated, such an undertaking more than compensates for the labors required, leading to a deeper and broader appreciation of Aquinas's philosophical achievements. Not only do we stand to gain deeper insights into his understanding of beauty, we might also appraise this in relation to other aspects of his thought.

The expectation that we might find an aesthetic theory in Aquinas is perhaps due to developments of post-Enlightenment thought. With the dissatisfaction of rationalism, an explicit consideration of beauty and our experience of it assumed much greater importance than it had before. After the publication of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* the topic came to be highly appreciated, if not as the locus of metaphysical speculation, then as that which readily engages our speculative attention in our more common experiences. It is within this modern context that

the study of Aquinas's aesthetics acquires an added significance. It offers Thomists the possibility of introducing his thought to a wider audience which might not understand or appreciate his relevance, not only as a representative of the Middle Ages, but also as a thinker who affords us a thoroughgoing understanding of our own experience.

Kevin O'Reilly's *Aesthetic Perception: A Thomistic Perspective* is a welcome addition to this topic, not only for its study of Aquinas's aesthetics but also as it leads us to appraise the importance of that aesthetics within a broader philosophical spectrum. O'Reilly provides a penetrating and expansive treatment of this field. Beyond his thoughtful review of the psychological and metaphysical moorings of Aquinas's aesthetics, he also considers its moral significance, which has received scant attention in other studies. Moreover, he proposes Aquinas's thought as a response to some more recent developments, thus encouraging Thomists to consider how the Angelic Doctor might be introduced into quarters where he might have been previously unknown.

Though an insightful study, one of the disappointments of this volume is that it does not always pursue the implications of its findings, some of which are quite significant, to the degree they deserve. Another unfortunate aspect of the project is the degree to which the author allows his insightful analysis of Aquinas to be unduly indebted to debates among relatively recent Thomists. One of O'Reilly's principal aims is to establish the superiority of Jacques Maritain's reading of Aquinas to that of Umberto Eco. His preference stems from his belief that Eco's interpretation obscures Aquinas's presentation of the unity of the human person, which he believes Maritain's reading preserves. However viable this assessment, it does not serve O'Reilly as well as it might. He cannot always maintain it: he must occasionally acknowledge his debt to Eco's more astute analysis. Moreover, it is not clear how much Maritain helps bolster O'Reilly's discussion of the ethical implications of this topic. Although O'Reilly indicts Eco's rationalist approach, he hardly considers the fact that it is possible to underemphasize reason. To be sure, one does not wish to engage in an endless debate over the relative merit of reason in Aquinas's aesthetics, but we might more profitably gauge a balanced adjudication between the alternatives if we base our approach in Aquinas's deep metaphysical and anthropological roots. We might further appropriate him as a reply to the claims of the post-Enlightenment as well as the Enlightenment.

O'Reilly's first chapter introduces competing interpretations of Aquinas's aesthetics. His complaint is that Eco's preoccupation with the role of reason leads him to ignore such key elements as human emotions. Maritain's interpretation is "supremely integrated and is sensitive to the dynamic interplay between reason, the emotions, and our bodies" (16). Yet O'Reilly still has to concede his debt to Eco (33 and 51). Reason must be given its proper emphasis, and one must also determine its role relative to all the other factors that O'Reilly himself so thoroughly enumerates.

The second chapter summarizes what Aquinas counts as the formal constitutive elements of beauty: (1) *proper proportion* of the various ontological

factors of a object, which include the relation between its form and matter, between its essence and existence, etc.; (2) *integrity:* the adequacy of an individual object to its nature, that is, that it lacks nothing it ought to have; (3) *clarity:* how well the object manifests its form. Recent literature has devoted a fair amount of attention to these elements and their interrelations-rightfully so, as they are the objective constituents of beauty. While O'Reilly recognizes their importance, his concern to avoid overemphasizing reason allows these objective elements to recede into the background. This has the unfortunate consequence of leading us to weigh one set of subjective factors (reason) against another (emotion), to the point that we nearly lose sight of what are the objective grounds of both.

Chapter 3 reviews the various moments wherein concepts are produced in the intellect thorough the interplay of the external and internal senses. O'Reilly concedes Eco's insight that aesthetic experience necessarily occurs after we abstract concepts from experience, not, as Maritain supposes, through intuition alone. As he notes, only as "a subject actualizes his aesthetic *visio* in relation to an aesthetic artifact by means of a series of judgments ... will he be able to encounter and experience the artifact's aesthetic quality" (37). He then describes the relative contributions of the cognitive factors limned by Eco with those identified by Maritain. This allows him to develop his insights in terms of the contribution of the will.

One of the more noteworthy parts of O'Reilly's study is his reading of *De Veritate,* which describes reason's progression toward understanding. Reason, through its discursive engagement with multiple truths, eventually arrives at simple and uniform insight (understanding). Although most interpreters read this in relation to the abstract truths of science, O'Reilly proposes that this also pertains to aesthetic experience: we come to a deeper appreciation of beauty through a series of judgments. In this way, he advances his argument against Enlightenment allegations that Aquinas's aesthetics is unduly static. He then develops this possibility along the ethical axis of his analysis: as our appreciation of beauty deepens, so does our capacity for moral reflection. This dynamic was also considered by a number of post-Enlightenment authors (e.g., Kant and Schiller), but one factor that differentiates Aquinas from his post-Enlightenment counterparts is that he gives much greater emphasis to the ontological basis of our aesthetic engagement: that which we are drawn to is what we find in given patterns of existence (creation), not merely in ourselves-a possibility O'Reilly tentatively introduces but does not actively pursue.

Oddly, O'Reilly continues to base his analysis on Maritain's interpretation, even after he concedes its deficiencies. Essentially, he appeals to Maritain's theory of poetic intuition as a paradigm for what he identifies as "judgment by inclination." Such poetic knowledge, while it arises preconsciously, emerges in our consciousness through our emotional and intellectual engagements (55). This helps counter the various readings of Aquinas that restrict our consideration of beauty to a cognitive engagement alone. Because beauty is related to the true and

the good, it necessarily elicits a response from the mind and the will. As O'Reilly makes clear, the agent's response must be fully informed, that is, it must occur at the level of judgment, rather than that of intuition or emotion. Whatever our debt to Maritain, it need not obscure what we learn from Eco.

In what is the strongest and most helpful part of the text, chapter 5 calls our attention to Aquinas's distinction between judgment by cognition alone, as in the exercise of moral science, and judgment by inclination which includes cognition *and* will, that is, a more complete and personal engagement with the exigencies of one's own life. O'Reilly underscores the role of *habitus,* the "definite ability for growth through activity" (65), as the means by which we learn to form judgments by inclination. Presumably this means that as we become more familiar with beauty our moral acuity increases, not merely because we know more about the world, but because we are increasingly inclined to restore it to its proper order. Citing Aquinas's *De Potentia,* O'Reilly invites us to consider the circular exchange between cognition and will: the more we know of the beautiful, the more we seek to draw near to it, which, in turn, increases our knowledge of it, etc. This, along with the dynamic between reason and understanding, highlights O'Reilly's articulation of a more integrated Thomistic view of the human person than that which the Enlightenment offered. Yet by what he has invited us to consider, we might continue his lead further than he advances it. Not only is Aquinas's view of the human person anthropologically integrated-a *desideratum* of Kant and Schelling-it is ontologically grounded: not only does our engagement with beauty bring about a personal integration, it also brings about an integration with the world, or, more specifically with God's creation. Here again, we encounter a possibility that O'Reilly does not pursue.

Chapter 6 draws our attention to the possibility of integrating the individual into the community through aesthetic education. By schooling the young in the proper standards of taste and morality, the community can lay the psychological groundwork by which they learn to appraise the goodness, and thus the moral significance, that they find in beauty. As O'Reilly observes, this was a theme common to the German Idealists. For example, Kant sought to articulate a synthesis of individual subjective experience that was yet universal because of the same interplay of subjective faculties in all humans. O'Reilly reminds us that Aquinas secures such an assurance by the claim that we know things as they are (89), rather than in their mere appearance, the implication being that not only is there a commonality in how we know but also in what we know. This suggests that our aesthetic engagements may bring us closer to objective reality even in our individual encounters with it. This is the closest O'Reilly comes to proposing Aquinas as a counterweight to both the post-Enlightenment and the Enlightenment, but here again, he declines to provide further development.

Chapter 7 reviews Aquinas's treatment of the transcendentals. Conceding that Aquinas does not include beauty in this list, O'Reilly argues that it is only a transcendental in a secondary sense, that is, in its relation to truth and goodness. This insight effectively undergirds the entire sweep of his analysis: beauty is not

merely what we know of being, it is also that toward which we are drawn. A thoughtful inclusion of the latter is one of the more powerful endorsements of O'Reilly's approach. Had he presented this assertion toward the beginning of his discussion, it might have served as a powerful guiding theme.

In his final chapter O'Reilly characterizes his study as a "humble effort in the direction of what one might call a virtue aesthetic" (119). Though humble in its length, it is certainly thorough in its survey of the relevant elements of the subject. If it does not completely synthesize these elements to the degree that it might, it leaves subsequent attempts ample means by which to begin and to proceed.

BRIAN CHRZASTEK, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D.C.