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SACRAMENTUM AND THE EUCHARIST IN ST. AUGUSTINE

JOSEPH T. LIENHARD, S.J.

Fordham University
Bronx, New York

SAINT AUGUSTINE'S TEACHINGS on *sacramentum* and the Eucharist are scattered throughout his writings.[1] He never devoted a treatise specifically to the Eucharist (nor did any other Father of the Church; the first such treatise, by Radbertus of Corbie, dates from the ninth century). My intention here, drawing on previous, more complex studies, is to present his teachings on *sacramentum* and the Eucharist in a concise and ordered fashion, to the extent that such order is possible, using the thesis form as an organizing principle.

Some passages on sacraments and the Eucharist in Augustine's writings have become classic. Frederick van der Meer calls letters 54 and 55 to Januarius "Augustine's most important liturgical document."[2] Augustine's mystagogical sermons, preached to the newly baptized after Easter, contain significant statements on the Eucharist.[3] Some of the *Tractates on the Gospel of John* deal with the Eucharist.[4] The tenth book of the *City of God* includes Augustine's well-known treatment of sacrifice. And several of the

[1] This study was presented as the presidential address at the meeting of the Academy of Catholic Theology in Washington, D.C. in May 2012. It has been revised for publication.

[2] F. van der Meer, *Augustine the Bishop: The Life and Work of a Father of the Church*, trans. Brian Battershaw and G. R. Lamb (London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), 277.

[3] See especially sermons 227, 272, and 277.

[4] See especially tractates 25, 26, and 80 (particularly the last).

Enarrationes in psalmos include important remarks on the Eucharist.[5]

The early and mid-twentieth century, which saw the publication of number of comprehensive studies of Augustine's theology, also produced significant studies of his thought on *sacramentum* and the Eucharist.[6] In 1908, Karl Adam published a thorough study of Augustine's teaching on the Eucharist.[7] In 1933, Fritz Hofmann published what many consider the foundational modern study of Augustine's ecclesiology;[8] it includes an extensive treatment of the Eucharist. In 1953, Charles Couturier published an exhaustive word-study of *sacramentum* and *mysterium* in Augustine.[9] Another foundational book on Augustine's ecclesiology is the dissertation written by Joseph Ratzinger at the University of Munich and published in 1954.[10] The German *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte* has a concise treatment of Augustine's thought on this topic.[11] Although some articles on sacraments and the Eucharist in Augustine have been published in recent decades, general studies of Augustine's thought have taken a different direction, often towards social history.[12]

[5] *Enarratio* 99 is especially important.

[6] The most complete bibliography on Augustine is maintained by the Zentrum für Augustinusforschung in Würzburg, at www.augustinus.de.

[7] Karl Adam, *Die Eucharistielehre des hl. Augustin*, Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte 8/1 (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1908).

[8] Fritz Hofmann, *Der Kirchenbegriff des hl. Augustinus in seinen Grundlagen und in seiner Entwicklung* (Munich: Max Hueber, 1933).

[9] C. Couturier, "'Sacramentum' et 'mysterium' dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin," *Études augustiniennes*, ed. H. Rondet and others, Théologie 28 (Paris: Aubier, 1953), 161-334. The author collects every instance of these words in Augustine's writings, and classifies and analyzes them.

[10] Joseph Ratzinger, *Volk und Haus Gottes in Augustins Lehre von der Kirche*, Münchener theologische Studien 2/7 (Munich: Karl Zink, 1954).

[11] Johannes Betz, *Eucharistie in der Schrift und Patristik*, Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte 4/4a (Freiburg: Herder, 1979).

[12] For example, Eugene TeSelle's *Augustine the Theologian* (London: Burns & Oates, 1970), has no chapter on the sacraments, perhaps because of its Protestant orientation. *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2001) is strongly oriented towards philosophy and has no chapter on Donatism, baptism, or other sacraments. *A Companion to Augustine*, ed. Mark Vessey, Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World (Chichester, U.K. and Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) concentrates on personal and social history and offers little on

The topic of *sacramentum* and the Eucharist in its larger context, from the secular use of the word μυστήριον to the high medieval doctrine of the Eucharist, is marked by a series of advances or developments. At the middle of this long path stands Augustine. The Greek word μυστήριον had a clear set of meanings in the pagan world. Its meaning in the Septuagint, and especially in the corpus of Pauline letters, where it is a key concept, shows a development from the earlier sense of the word. In the Old Latin Bible and later in the Vulgate, μυστήριον was translated as *sacramentum*, a translation that was not immediately obvious. The Church, from its earliest times, had a set of sacred rites like baptism, anointing, the Eucharist, and the conferral of orders, but designating these and other rites collectively as *sacramenta* came only later. Augustine's joining a theory of signs to the concept of a sacrament was another advance. Finally, some sentences in Augustine's writings, scattered throughout his works, were incorporated into Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and became the basis for a systematic doctrine of the sacraments and of the Eucharist in the high Middle Ages.

I. Μυστήριον AND *SACRAMENTUM*

1. *In classical Greek, "μυστήριον" designates something secret; later, the plural acquired a cultic sense.*

In classical Greek,[13] μυστήριον designates something secret, unapproachable, hidden, but not incomprehensible. Its basic sense was not religious, although it was used in some religious contexts. In the Hellenistic era a distinction set in: the plural, μυστήρια, came to be used in a cultic sense, while the singular retained a more general meaning.

Augustine's theology. An exception is Phillip Cary, *Outward Signs: The Powerlessness of External Things in Augustine's Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), who treats sacraments in Augustine as part of his study of Augustine's semiotics.

[13] See Josef Finkenzeller, *Die Lehre von den Sakramenten im allgemeinen: Von der Schrift bis zur Scholastik*, Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte 4/1a (Freiburg: Herder, 1980), 5. For a concise summary of the topic see Emmanuel J. Cutrone, "Sacraments," in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan J. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999), 741-47.

2. *The Septuagint avoided using "μυστήριον" in a cultic sense; the usages (all late) are profane.*

The Septuagint shied away from using the word μυστήριον in a religious context, perhaps because it was incompatible with the Hebrew understanding of God and of the cult. The twenty occurrences of the word in the Septuagint are all in books that date from Hellenistic times, and the meaning of the word is most often profane: for example, the king's secret plans (Tob 12:7, 11; Jdt 2:3), or plans for war (2 Macc 13:21). In a religious context, the word can designate God's secret plans for men (Wis 2:22). But μυστήριον never designates sacrifices or other cultic acts.

3. *In the New Testament, "μυστήριον" is primarily a Pauline word and designates the mystery of redemption in Christ. Paul's source was not the mystery religions but the Septuagint and the common language of his day.*

In the New Testament, the word μυστήριον never occurs in the context of baptism or the Eucharist. The most significant uses of the word are in the Pauline corpus. Paul uses the word almost exclusively in the singular, to designate and sum up the secret or mystery of salvation and redemption in Christ, which is accomplished through the Church in the sacraments.[14] It designates the Christ-event, beginning from his eternal hiddenness in God up to its realization in the Paschal mystery and its proclamation by the apostles. For Paul the μυστήριον is to be proclaimed, not kept secret.

An old debate between Odo Casel and Karl Prümm, whether or not Paul's use of μυστήριον is rooted in the Greek mystery religions, is more or less resolved. The great scholar of Christian Latin Christine Mohrmann has shown that the sense of μυστήριον

[14] Finkenzeller, *Lehre*, 10. Six Pauline texts are key: Rom 16:25-26; 1 Cor 2:7-10; Eph 1:7-10; 3:3-7; 3:8-12; Col 1:24-27. See also Günther Bornkamm, "Μυστήριον μυέω," *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* 4 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1967), 802-28.

in Paul is to be sought not in mystery religions but in the Septuagint, and in the current, common language of the day.[15]

4. *The pre-Vulgate Latin Bible translated "μυστήριον" almost exclusively with "sacramentum," even though "mysterium" was available.*

Both *mysterium* and *sacramentum* were used in Christian Latin from the second century on. The pre-Vulgate African Latin Bible translated μυστήριον almost exclusively with *sacramentum*, a translation whose accuracy is not immediately obvious. Mohrmann formulated a rule: when Christian language moved from Greek to Latin, concrete things were designated by Greek loan words but abstract ideas were translated into native Latin words.[16] Examples of the former are *baptisma, diaconus*, *ecclesia, episcopus*, *eucharistia, presbyter*, *synaxis*, and many more. But the abstract term μυστήριον was translated as *sacramentum*, even though the loan-word *mysterium* had been available at least since the time of Cicero.[17] A phrase in Tertullian illustrates the contrast: he writes of the devil, "who imitates even the realities of the divine sacraments by the mysteries of idols."[18] Tertullian here contrasts "divine sacraments" with the *mysteria* of idols.

5. *Translators adopted "sacramentum" because it designated a religious engagement.*

Why was *sacramentum* adopted as the equivalent of μυστήριον? Another of Mohrmann's principles explains the phenomenon.[19] Christian writers, she maintains, took as their point of departure the common, profane Latin language and not specialized usages. Against an older opinion, the root sense of *sacramentum* is not "oath," and *sacramentum* in Tertullian is not adequately explained as "military oath." The root sense of *sancio*

[15] Christine Mohrmann, "Sacramentum chez les plus anciens textes chrétiens," *Harvard Theological Review* 47 (1954): 141-52, here 146.

[16] Ibid., 143.

[17] In the plural, the loan-word *mysterium* meant "mystery-cults"; in the singular, it meant "secret."

[18] Tertullian, *De praescriptione haereticorum,* 40.

[19] Mohrmann, "Sacramentum," 145.

in Latin is "I give a religious guarantee to something," with a sense that is both religious and juridical.

The root meaning of *sacramentum*, as Mohrmann sees it, is "initiation." This initiation can take various forms: admission to a religious community; the juridical and sacred act of engagement, in an oath; or a sacred and juridical link, a sacred union. *Sacramentum* is distinguished from *iusiurandum* by the presence of an element of the sacred, and from *initiatio* by a juridical and legal element.

Why was *sacramentum* the standard translation of μυστήριον? Again, one of Mohrmann's principles applies: "the ancient translators of the Bible were people who sought out—with a scrupulous conscience and not without intelligence—Latin equivalents for Greek words. But, once they found them, they substituted them for the Greek word mechanically, in various senses, without concern for differences of meaning."[20]

6. Both "mysterium" and "sacramentum" occur frequently in Augustine's writings. "Mysterium" generally designates matters that are doctrinal, while "sacramentum" refers to what is ritual.

When we turn to Augustine, we find both continuity and discontinuity with the previous tradition. Augustine makes frequent use of the words *sacramentum* and *mysterium* in his writings—by one count, the two words occur 2,279 times.[21] Stated most generally, Augustine uses *mysterium* to designate things that are doctrinal and *sacramentum* to refer to what is ritual.

7. "Sacramentum" in a broad sense designates any sensible reality that points to a spiritual reality.

Augustine uses *sacramentum* in both a broad sense and a narrow sense. Broadly, the word designates every sensible reality whose meaning is not exhausted by itself but points to spiritual or supernatural realities. Augustine writes of the sacraments of the Old Testament, so many that they cannot be counted or listed. Among the many examples he mentions are the Sabbath,

[20] Ibid., 148.

[21] See Couturier, "Sacramentum," and the extensive tables included in his article.

circumcision, sacrifices, Passover, the temple, unleavened bread, altars, dietary laws, the new moon, the anointing of priests and kings, and even John the Baptist's baptism.[22]

8. *In a narrower sense, "sacramentum" designates the sacraments of the Church. In the narrowest sense, it designates the Christian mystery of the incarnate Christ.*

In the narrower sense, *sacramentum* designates the sacraments of the Church. Among these sacraments, baptism and the Eucharist hold pride of place; about one-third of Augustine's uses of *sacramentum* apply to baptism and the Eucharist. Augustine writes in a letter that the sacraments of the New Testament are "baptism made sacred by the name of the trinity, the partaking of his body and blood, and any other that is mentioned in the canonical scriptures."[23] But the use is not exclusive; in one mystagogical sermon Augustine lists as sacraments of the New Testament the symbol or creed, the Lord's prayer, the font and baptism, and the sacrament of the sacred altar.[24]

In a famous statement, Augustine writes that the sacraments of the New Testament are "very few in number, very easy in their observance, and most excellent in what they signify."[25]

Similarly he writes, "Instead of many signs there are now but a few signs, simple when performed, inspiring when understood, and holy when practiced, given to us by the teaching of our Lord himself and the apostles, such as the sacrament of baptism and the celebration of the Lord's body and blood."[26]

[22] See ibid., 181.

[23] *Letter* 54, 1.1 (*Letters*, trans. Roland J. Teske, Works of Saint Augustine [= WSA] 2/1 [Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2001], 210).

[24] "We have explained to the 'infants' about the sacrament of the symbol, or creed, on what they ought to believe; we have explained about the sacrament of the Lord's prayer, how they ought to make their petitions; and about the sacrament of the font and baptism. But about the sacrament of the sacred altar, which they have seen today, they have as yet heard nothing" (*Sermon* 228, 3 [*Sermons*, trans. Edmund Hill, WSA 3/6 (New Rochelle, N.Y.: New City Press, 1993), 258]).

[25] *Letter* 54, 1.2 (trans. Teske, WSA 2/1:210).

[26] *De doctrina christiana* 3.9.13.31 (*On Christian Teaching*, trans. R. P. H. Green [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997], 75).

Augustine also uses phrases like *sacramentum incarnationis*[27] or *sacramentum divinitatis et humanitatis Christi*[28] to designate the greatest of all sacraments.[29] Or, as he writes in one letter, "There is no other *mysterium* of God except Christ." [30]

9. *Sacraments are signs, and sacred signs.*

Augustine defines signs as "things that are used to signify something"[31] or "a thing that of itself causes us to think of something in addition."[32] He distinguishes between natural signs and given or conventional signs. In a natural sign, like smoke, the nexus between signifier and signified lies in the nature of the signifier; in conventional signs, like the flag, the nexus is established arbitrarily. Between the two kinds of signs are symbols, in which the signifier has some natural likeness to the signified, but the likeness is completed by an act of institution. Sacraments are a distinctive kind of symbol.

In a sermon to the neophytes, Augustine says, "The reason these things . . . are called sacraments is that in them one thing is seen, another is to be understood. What can be seen has a bodily appearance, what is to be understood provides spiritual fruit."[33] Elsewhere he writes, "[signs,] when they pertain to divine things, are called sacraments."[34]

[27] *Enarrationes in psalmos* 67, 16; *Sermon* 341, 3.3. A complete version of this sermon was discovered by François Dolbeau (= Dolbeau sermon 22). See Augustin d'Hippone, *Vingt-six sermons au peuple d'Afrique*, ed. François Dolbeau, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série antiquité 147 (Paris: Institut d'Études augustiniennes, 1996), 553-78. Previously only excerpts had been known.

[28] *De natura et gratia* 2.2.

[29] Couturier, "Sacramentum," 169.

[30] "Non est enim aliud dei mysterium nisi Christus" (*Letter* 187, 11.34 (*Epistulae*, ed. A. Goldbacher, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum [= CSEL] 57 [Vienna, 1911], 113).

[31] *De doctrina christiana* 1.2.2.5.

[32] Ibid., 2.1.1.1.

[33] "Ideo dicuntur sacramenta, quia in eis aliud videtur, aliud intelligitur. Quod videtur, speciem habet corporalem, quod intelligitur, fructum habet spiritualem" (*Sermon* 272 [PL 38:1247]).

[34] "Nimis autem longum est, convenienter disputare de varietate signorum, quae cum ad res divinas pertinent, sacramenta appellantur" (*Letter* 138, 7 [CSEL 44:131]).

Sacraments are a distinctive kind of sign, namely, sacred signs, a phrase that Augustine uses in a well-known passage in the *City of God*, where he writes, "A sacrifice as commonly understood, therefore, is the visible sacrament of an invisible sacrifice; that is, it is a sacred symbol."[35]

Augustine's understanding of sacraments is an outgrowth of his highly developed theory of signs, worked out especially in *De magistro* and *De doctrina christiana*. By applying his theory of signs to the sacraments, Augustine made a significant advance in the understanding of a sacrament, bringing into clear focus the specific character of the Church's sacraments as signs.

In his doctrine of signs, Augustine combines Neoplatonic dualism, the New Testament understanding of sign, and his basic understanding of salvation history. The Neoplatonic dualism is that between matter and spirit, and time and eternity. The New Testament understanding of sign (especially as found in the Fourth Gospel) contrasts the earthly with the heavenly world. Salvation history, for Augustine, is attested primarily in the Incarnation, the *sacramentum incarnationis*, as he will call it.

10. *Sacraments are specifically signs to which a word has been added.*

Sacramental signs differ from other signs insofar as they are, in some fashion, what they signify. What raises a sacrament above the level of a symbol is the fact that the meaning of a sacrament is not exhausted by the symbolic interpretation of its matter; the sacramental sign is both more than and different from the natural element.

One of Augustine's more striking phrases is his naming of a sacrament as a visible word. Arguing against Faustus the Manichee in an early work, Augustine writes: "After all, what else are certain bodily sacraments but certain visible words—sacred, of course, but

[35] "Sacrificium ergo visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum signum est" (*De civitate dei* 10.5 [CCL 47:277]; *The City of God against the Pagans*, trans. R. W. Dyson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 397).

still changeable and temporal."[36] Both water and word are needed: "What is the baptism of Christ? The bath of water in the Word. Take away the water; there is no baptism. Take away the Word; there is no baptism."[37] In the oft-quoted eightieth tractate on the Gospel of John, he writes in a similar vein, "Take away the word, and what is the water except water? The word is added to the elemental substance, and it becomes a sacrament, also itself, as it were, a visible word."[38] The water, he adds, has the power to cleanse the heart by the words effecting it—"not because it is said, but because it is believed."[39] (This text led to extensive theological reflection and controversy over whether Augustine taught a doctrine of *ex opere operato* or not.[40])

In the case of each sacrament, the word is added to the sign or symbol: the Eucharistic bread and wine are consecrated, but the baptismal water is also blessed, and even the salt given to catechumens receives a blessing. These words raise the material element to a new level. In other words, the decisive element in a sacrament, as a sacred sign, is the word, which is itself a sign.

Both the sacraments of the Old Testament and those of the New Testament derive their meaning from Christ. The sacraments of the Old Testament point to his coming; the sacraments of the New Testament proclaim that Christ has come. "The sacraments of the New Testament impart salvation; the sacraments of the Old Testament promised a Savior."[41]

Faustus, Augustine's Manichean opponent, maintained that the signs and sacraments had changed from the Old Testament to the New, and as a result the realities were different, too.[42] Augustine

[36] *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 19.16 (*Answer to Faustus, a Manichaean*, trans. Roland J. Teske, WSA I/20 [Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2007], 247).

[37] *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 15.4.2 (*Tractates on the Gospel of John*, trans. John W. Rettig, Fathers of the Church [= FOTC] 79 [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988], 80).

[38] *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 80.3.1 (trans. John W. Rettig, FOTC 90 [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1994], 117).

[39] Ibid., with an extended bibliographical footnote.

[40] See bibliography mentioned in the preceding note.

[41] "Sacramenta novi testamenti dant salutem; sacramenta veteris testamenti promiserunt salvatorem" (*Enarrationes in psalmos* 73, 2 [CCL 39:1006]).

[42] *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 19.16; see also 19.13; 19.14.

found their unity in Christ and writes, "And yet, rather, he did not destroy them but fulfilled them, because it is no longer promised that he will be born, will suffer, and will rise, which those sacraments once proclaimed. Instead it is declared that he has been born, has suffered, and has risen, which these sacraments that Christians perform now proclaim."[43]

II. Eucharist

Augustine's teaching on the Eucharist is difficult to grasp and to put into order—perhaps because it is not orderly. His language is more catechetical and even poetic than systematic, and he never developed a fixed set of terms, as, for example, the Scholastics did. He affirms many beliefs about the Eucharist. Some of them are starkly realistic, while others can be taken as approaching the symbolic. Most of his statements on the Eucharist are found in sermons, or discourses on Scripture, rather than in doctrinal works. He never had occasion to synthesize and to order his thoughts on this sacrament, since it was never the object of a controversy. What follows deals with the Eucharistic presence, and not with the Eucharistic sacrifice or with the effects of the Eucharist.

11. *Augustine's understanding of the Eucharist is one of the darkest and most difficult points of his theology. Further, he left many questions in his teaching on the Eucharist unresolved.*

Fritz Hofmann wrote that "not without reason has [Augustine's] understanding of the Eucharist been seen as one of the darkest and most difficult points of his theology."[44] And, "Augustine left many questions in his teaching on the Eucharist unresolved."[45]

In Augustine's time, there were no opposing opinions on the Eucharist that would have caused him to develop or refine his views. In his own statements on the Eucharist, his interest was

[43] Ibid., 19.16 (trans. Teske, WSA 1/20:247).

[44] Hofmann, *Kirchenbegriff*, 392.

[45] Ibid.

religious and practical, and not speculative or dogmatic,[46] a point that sets him off from the sort of speculation that began in the ninth century with Paschasius Radbertus of Corbie and his opponent Ratramnus.

12. *Augustine's understanding of the Eucharist underwent development.*

In the early period of his writing, Augustine stressed the didactic value of a sign, and he readily applied his general concept of a sacrament to the Eucharist. His earlier formulations on this point could be interpreted as a spiritual understanding of the Eucharist, as when he distinguishes the sacramental existence of the Eucharist—a material, visible, transitory sign—from the thing signified, which is perduring and spiritual, as for example in the work *Against Faustus*, in which he distinguishes bodily sacraments as changeable and temporal, while the power that works through them remains constant.[47]

As his thought developed, however, he saw the Eucharist more and more as effecting grace—moving toward a sense of *ex opere operato*, as a later tradition would have it.[48] The Eucharistic flesh has salvific meaning; even children need the Eucharist.[49]

13. *The Eucharist is a visible sign of an invisible reality.*

The Eucharist as sacrament is the visible sign of an invisible reality: "aliud videtur, aliud intellegitur."[50] The visible sign is one thing, the intelligible signification another.[51] The sign of the Eucharist points to the reality of the object of Christian faith,

[46] Ibid., 400.

[47] *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 19.16.

[48] Hofmann, *Kirchenbegriff*, 394. Cary, *Outward Signs*, separates signs, including sacraments, from inward realities, such as grace, as far as possible, by his invocation of Augustine's expressionist semiotics. Thus he would deny that Augustine held any sort of doctrine of *ex opere operato*.

[49] Augustine mentions offering the Eucharist to little children in letter 98, 4. See also Adam, *Eucharistielehre*, 78–79.

[50] Sermon 272.

[51] See *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 45, 9, 3.

hope, and charity,[52] namely, Jesus Christ the mediator. The Eucharist is the sacrament of the humanity of Christ.

Augustine's vocabulary remains fluid rather than fixed; he can also call the Eucharist a *figura* of the Body and Blood of Christ, as Tertullian and Ambrose before him did.[53] Or he can write:

> If the sacraments did not have some likeness to those events of which they are sacraments, they would not be sacraments at all. But because of this likeness they generally receive the name of the realities themselves. Just as, then, in a certain way the sacrament of the body of Christ is the body of Christ and the sacrament of the blood of Christ is the blood of Christ, so the sacrament of faith is the faith.[54]

14. *Besides the well-known image of many grains of wheat making one bread, and many grapes making one chalice, Augustine writes of all the bread on all the altars of the world being one bread, and that that bread is the one body that we are.*

Augustine often invokes the well-known image of many grains of wheat making one bread and many grapes making one chalice, but he also writes of all the bread on all the altars of the world being one bread.[55] In a tractate on John he writes, "Our Lord Jesus Christ manifested his body and blood in those things which are reduced from many to some one thing. For the one is made into one thing from many grains, the other flows together into one thing from many grapes."[56]

But in a sermon, Augustine juxtaposes 1 Corinthians 10:17 ("one loaf, one body") and 1 Corinthians 12:27 ("you are the body of Christ") and says:

> However many loaves may be placed there, it's *one loaf*, however many loaves there may be on Christ's altars throughout the world, it's *one loaf*. But what does it mean, *one loaf*? He explained very briefly: "one body is what we, being many, are." This is the body of Christ, about which the apostle says, while addressing

[52] "Quomodo ergo unum videtis esse quod factum est, sic unum estote vos, diligendo vos, tenendo unam fidem, unam spem, individuam caritatem." Sermon 229 (Patrologia Latina [= PL] 38, 1103).

[53] See *De doctrina christiana* 3, 16, 24, 55; *Enarrationes in psalmos* 3, 1.

[54] *Letter* 98, 9 (trans. Teske, WSA 2/1:431).

[55] Hofmann, *Kirchenbegriff*, 398 n. 182.

[56] *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 26.17 (trans. Rettig, FOTC 79:274).

the Church, “But you are the body of Christ and his members” (1Cor 12:27). What you receive is what you yourselves are, thanks to the grace by which you have been redeemed.[57]

15. *The verb that Augustine regularly uses to describe what happens in the Eucharist is “fieri”; his languages does not raise the question of substantial change more specifically.*

To describe what happens in the Eucharist, Augustine regularly uses the verb *fieri* and not some other, more specific verb.[58] More generally, he speaks of the consecration of the elements through the mystical word and the Holy Spirit.[59] Augustine writes freely about the relation of the elements to the Eucharistic Christ, but he does not deal more explicitly with the question of the substantial change of the elements.[60]

In the sacrament of the Eucharist, the physical and mystical body of Christ is present in such a way that, after the consecration, the bread and wine are not mere symbols of this body, but the reality; “something else” now rests on the altar. But Augustine does not define the relation of this new reality to the reality of the bread and wine. This new reality is the objective image of that which it will effect in the sacrament. It stands between the natural reality of the bread and wine and the higher reality of the physical and mystical body of Christ. Thus the Eucharist, in its sacramental reality, remains a symbol, in the full, Augustinian sense of that word.

16. *Donatism raises for Augustine the question of what evil men receive when they receive the Eucharist. They do not receive the spiritual reality. Do they receive the body of Christ, or not?*

[57] *Sermon* 229A, 1 (trans. Hill, WSA 3/6:270). The key phrase is “Quotquot ibi panes positi fuerint, unus panis; quotquot panes fuerint in altaribus Christi hodie per totum orbem terrarum, unus panis est. Sed quid est unus panis? Exposuit brevissime: Unum corpus multi sumus.” Sermon 229A (*Miscellanea Agostiniana* [= MA], ed. Germain Morin [Vatican City: Tipografia poliglotta vaticana, 1930], 1:463, reprinted in Patrologiae Latinae Supplementum 2:554-56).

[58] In contrast, for example, with Ambrose, who uses *mutare* in a Eucharistic context; see *De sacramentis* 4.4.17.

[59] See *De trinitate* 3.4.10; *Sermon* 227.

[60] Hofmann, *Kirchenbegriff*, 398.

Augustine cannot separate the Eucharistic body of Christ from Christ's ecclesial body. Hence, he has to ask what those who are not part of the one Church receive when they receive the Eucharist. In a sermon preached on Easter Sunday to the neophytes, he says, "When the heretics receive this sacrament, they receive what is a testimony against themselves; because they insist on division, while this bread is a sign of unity."[61] He writes, similarly, in the well-known letter on the correction of the Donatists, "The Lord's banquet is the unity of the body of Christ, not only in the sacrament of the altar but also 'in the bond of peace' (Eph 4:3)."[62] In one of the tractates on John, Augustine writes that one who does not abide in Christ, and in whom Christ does not also abide, does not in fact eat the flesh of Christ or drink his blood,[63] implying that the heretic who receives communion does not receive the body of Christ. By the time of Bede and Alcuin, this text was disturbing enough that it was corrected with an interpolation, which asserts that, while the unworthy recipient crushes the sacrament carnally with his teeth, spiritually he neither eats the flesh nor drinks the blood, a distinction that would have been foreign to Augustine.[64]

When the unworthy do not receive the spiritual reality, or eat the body of Christ, perhaps it is for this reason: this spiritual reality does not touch or affect the sacramental sign; it does not happen in the sign or to the sign; it happens immediately in the recipient. The sacramental action is not the cause but only the occasion for God to give the reality of grace, the Spirit. The act of the recipient is key: one must eat the body of Christ and drink his blood spiritually. This explains Augustine's axiom, "crede et manducasti."[65] In one of the tractates on John he writes, "Why do you make ready your teeth and stomach? Believe, and you have eaten."[66]

[61] *Sermon* 229, 2 (trans. Hill, WSA 3/6:266).

[62] *Letter* 185, 6.24 (trans. Teske, WSA 2/3:194).

[63] *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 26.18.1.

[64] See notes in Rettig, trans., FOTC 79:274.

[65] *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 25.12.1; similarly 26.13.1.

[66] Ibid., 25.12.1 (trans. Rettig, FOTC 79:249).

17. *Augustine expresses his belief in the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, particularly in his sermons. He even writes of Christ at the Last Supper holding himself in his hands.*

As a man of the Church and a bishop, Augustine repeatedly states his belief in the real presence.[67] The most striking passages are in his mystagogical sermons, in which he is explaining the Eucharist to the newly baptized for the first time. He says, for example: "That bread which you can see on the altar, sanctified by the word of God, is the body of Christ. That cup, or rather what the cup contains, sanctified by the word of God, is the blood of Christ."[68]

In another sermon: "The faithful know what I'm talking about; they know Christ in the breaking of bread. It isn't every loaf of bread, you see, but the one receiving Christ's blessing, that becomes the body of Christ."[69]

And in another sermon: "What you can see on the altar, you also saw last night; but what it was, what it meant, of what greater reality it contained the sacrament, you had not yet heard. So what you can see, then, is bread and a cup; that's what even your eyes tell you; but as for what your faith asks to be instructed about, the bread is the body of Christ, the cup the blood of Christ."[70]

And again, "It's still, indeed, as you can see, bread and wine; come the consecration, and that bread will be the body of Christ, and that wine will be the blood of Christ. This is brought about by the name of Christ, brought about by the grace of Christ, that it should continue to look exactly like what it used to look like, and yet should not have the same value as it used to. You see, if it was eaten before, it would fill the belly; but now when it's eaten it nourishes the spirit."[71]

[67] Betz, *Eucharistie*, 150.

[68] *Sermon* 227 (trans. Hill, WSA 3/6:254).

[69] *Sermon* 234, 2 (trans. Hill, WSA 3/7:37). "Non omnis panis, sed accipiens benedictionem Christi, fit corpus Christi" (PL 38:1116).

[70] *Sermon* 272 (trans. Hill, WSA 3/7:300).

[71] *Sermon* 229A (trans. Hill, WSA 3/6:269).

And finally, a remarkable passage in the *Enarrationes in psalmos* speaks of Christ at the Last Supper holding himself in his own hands.[72]

Thus Augustine attributes to the words of consecration a meaning that makes sense only if they indicate something new, not only symbolically but in reality. In an unseen way, the Holy Spirit effects a sanctification, so that the mystical bread is different from ordinary bread.[73] Augustine writes against Faustus, "*Our* bread and cup, not just any bread and cup, is made sacramental for us by a particular consecration; it was not naturally such. . . . Hence, what is not consecrated, though it is bread and cup, is food for refreshment, not the sacrament of religion."[74]

Augustine alludes to adoration of the Eucharist in a passage on the psalms, where he writes: "He walked here in very flesh, and gave that very flesh to us to eat for our salvation; and no one eats that flesh unless he has first worshiped."[75]

18. *Augustine's words (especially in his preaching) point to Eucharistic realism; but he does not have a clear metabolic doctrine (and clearly not a teaching of transsubstantiation).*

The acknowledgement of the real presence remains on the level of confession of faith, not reflection or speculation. Augustine's interest in the Eucharistic mystery was catechetical rather than speculative.[76]

His understanding of the Eucharistic reality can be expressed this way: What is on the altar after the *sanctificatio* is distinct from ordinary bread, both in its being and in its power.[77] With this

[72] "Ferebatur enim Christus in manibus suis, quando commendans ipsum corpus suum, ait: 'Hoc est corpus meum' (Mt 26:26). Ferebat enim illud corpus in manibus suis." *Enarrationes in psalmos* 33, 1.10 (*PL* 36:306).

[73] Hofmann, *Kirchenbegriff*, 401.

[74] *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 20.13 (trans. Teske, WSA 1/20:273). The key phrase is "Noster autem panis et calix non quilibet . . . sed certa consecratione mysticus fit nobis, non nascitur" (CSEL 25:552).

[75] *Enarrationes in psalmos* 99, 8 (CCL 39:1385; trans. in *Expositions on the Book of Psalms*, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 1.8 [1888; repr. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974], 485).

[76] See Hofmann, *Kirchenbegriff*, 400.

[77] Ibid., 403.

understanding, Augustine moves in the direction of a metabolic understanding of the Eucharist. The power of the sacrament incorporates the recipient into the *totus Christus*.

To explain better the new being and power of the consecrated bread, Augustine draws a parallel between the Eucharist and baptism. In baptism, the candidate is buried with Christ in death and rises to a new life. In the power of the Eucharist, the Christian is drawn into the unity of the body of Christ. The characteristics of baptism are death and resurrection, and the remission of sins and the beginning of a new life that correspond to them. The characteristic of the Eucharist is the union of the individual Christian and of the whole Church with Christ.[78]

The relationship is not one of substance and accidents, but of archetype and image; as image, the sacramental sign stands above the merely natural sign of bread but beneath the archetype.[79]

19. *Among the more difficult aspects of Augustine's theology of the Eucharist to grasp is his conviction that in the Eucharist there is present both the sign of the body of the historical Christ (now with the Father in heaven) and the sign of the body of Christ that is the Church.*

But—and here Augustine's thought becomes distinctive and sometimes difficult to sort out—the Eucharist is not only the sign of the body of the historical Christ, now with the Father in heaven, but also the sign of the body of Christ that is the Church. It is precisely because the Eucharist is the sign of the historical humanity of Christ that it is also the sign of the mystical body of Christ.[80]

Some of Augustine's most dramatic statements result from his seeing the historical body and the ecclesial body as one, statements on the model of "You are what you receive."

Speaking to neophytes of the Lord's body and blood, he says, "If you receive them well, you are yourselves what you receive." Here he quotes 1 Corinthians 10:17, "We, being many, are one

[78] Ibid., 403-4; see *Sermon* 229A (MA 1:462).

[79] Hofmann, *Kirchenbegriff*, 404-5.

[80] Ibid., 396.

loaf, one body," and adds, "That's how [Paul] explained the sacrament of the Lord's table; one loaf, one body, is what we all are, many though we be."[81]

In another sermon to neophytes, he says, after quoting 1 Corinthians 12:27 on the body of Christ and its members, "So if it's you that are the body of Christ and its members, it's the mystery meaning you that has been placed on the Lord's table; what you receive is the mystery that means you. It is to what you are that you reply *Amen*."[82]

Or, "The faithful know the body of Christ if they should not neglect to be the body of Christ. Let them become the body of Christ, if they want to live from the Spirit of Christ."[83]

20. *For Augustine the Eucharist exists on three levels: the material sign (the bread), the spiritual sign (the body of Christ, historical and mystical) and the reality that is signified (the divine economy of salvation, the source of grace).*

Augustine sees three levels in the Eucharist: the sign of bread, the sacramental presence of Christ, and the spiritual meaning of the sacrament. These three levels can be formulated in different ways. Hofmann writes of the visible, transitory *signum*; the invisible, spiritual *res*; and the effect of the *res*, the *fructus sacramenti*. Ratzinger writes of the triad *sacramentum corporis Christi*, *corpus Christi*, and *caritas*.[84]

Once again, for those who live after the Eucharistic controversies of the Middle Ages, and the theological clarifications worked out then, Augustine's frequent references to the Eucharist as the body of the whole Christ, head and members, are, perhaps, difficult to categorize. The Eucharistic sacrament or sign points both to the humanity of Christ and to his mystical body, and the latter point beyond themselves to their effects. Augustine would not have cultivated a Eucharistic piety like the one developed in

[81] *Sermon* 227 (trans. Hill, WSA 3/6:254).

[82] *Sermon* 272 (trans. Hill, WSA 3/7:300).

[83] *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 26.13.1 (trans. Rettig, FOTC 29:271).

[84] Ratzinger, *Volk und Haus Gottes*, 213.

the Middle Ages, but he experienced a closer relationship of the Eucharist and the Church than later Catholics did.

As Augustine writes in the *City of God*, the whole of Christianity, the entire redeemed City of God, the communion of saints, the universal offering, is brought to God through the High Priest, who in the form of a servant offered himself to God, so that we, the body, should have so sublime a head.[85]

Conclusion

In Augustine's writings, *sacramentum* designates a sign—not any sign, but one that points to a spiritual reality. More specifically, sacraments are signs to which a word has been added; they are "visible words," he likes to say. His use of the word "sacrament" is broad, but most frequently he applies it to baptism and the Eucharist. His understanding of the Eucharist moves, during his life as a priest and a bishop, from seeing it as a "mere" and transitory sign of a perduring spiritual reality to emphasizing the real presence of Christ in the Eucharistic elements, deepening and enriching his understanding of "sign" without abandoning it. The real presence of Christ embraces both the historical body of Christ, now in glory, and the mystical body of Christ, the whole Church, a perception developed out of St. Paul's phrases about the body of Christ. This complex thinking is both the glory and the frustration of Augustine's Eucharistic theology.

[85] Paraphrased from *City of God* 10.6.

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VIRTUOUS DELIBERATION AND THE PASSIONS

STEVEN J. JENSEN

University of St. Thomas
Houston, Texas

IN HIS 2006 ARTICLE "On Reason's Control of the Passions in Aquinas's Theory of Temperance" Giuseppe Butera argues that, according to Aquinas, the virtuous person feels no passions or emotions until he judges what is best to be done, at which point his passions follow the lead of his judgment.[1] The only exceptions—a concession on account of original sin—are mild passions, passions so mild that they have no impact upon the person's deliberations. The idea is that passions get in the way of clearheaded thinking, so that any passions preceding the judgment of reason have the potential to cloud that judgment. Only when the judgment has been finally made can the virtuous passions then follow, obedient to the judgment of reason.

This interpretation portrays Aquinas in a rather stoic light. Butera does give some role to the passions within virtue (contrary to the Stoics, or at least some interpretations thereof), but this role is minimal. The passions never lead the way, but simply follow reason, and reason itself operates virtuously only when undisturbed by the emotions, deliberating with a dry intellectual calculation. Passions are useful only to help us execute the judgments we have already reached apart from passion. Virtuous

[1] See Giuseppe Butera, "On Reason's Control of the Passions in Aquinas's Theory of Temperance," *Mediaeval Studies* 68 (2006): 133-60. More precisely, Butera is speaking only of passions for the virtue of temperance, but given the texts that he cites, it seems reasonable to extrapolate his conclusion to all virtuous passions.

passions are the obedient slaves of reason; in no way do they help reason to reach its judgment.

We might be averse to this interpretation on two counts. First, we might desire a less slavish role for the passions; they should not always have to be completely subservient to reason. Virtuous passions should sometimes be spontaneous emotions, moving of their own accord, even apart from a judgment of reason. Second, we might desire a less dry and cold deliberation. Our deliberations should sometimes be moved, it seems, by virtuous emotions. Butera presents virtuous emotions as always being moved by deliberation. Does the reverse never happened? Realistically, it seems that a person's virtuous desires might help him to reach a judgment about what is to be done.

These two criticisms of Butera's interpretation of Aquinas might well be combined. Or, more likely, they might be confused. Someone might criticize Butera's view without having clearly separated these two elements: the desire for spontaneous emotions and the desire for a kind of affective deliberation. Arguing for one of these points might well be confused with arguing for the other. In fact, Butera focuses almost exclusively on rejecting the spontaneity of the emotions. He tries to argue that virtuous passions are not spontaneous; they always follow upon some judgment of reason. His argument does not immediately concern the character of deliberation. Rather, the dry character of deliberation is a consequence of his view, for if virtuous passions do not arise until judgment is reached, then the deliberation leading up to judgment can have no virtuous passions.

I wish to separate the two points, criticizing Butera on the latter but not the former. Butera is correct in his main assertion: virtuous passions do indeed always follow upon the judgment of reason; they do not arise spontaneously, apart from reason. At the same time, I wish to argue that virtuous deliberations are not always dry deliberations; sometimes our passions assist us in

judging what is to be done.[2] How can these two points be combined? How can virtuous passions, which always follow the judgment of reason, enter into our deliberations by which we reach that judgment? Something, it seems, must give. What must be given, and what must be taken away, however, will become evident only as the argument develops.

My argument, then, will proceed in two steps. First, I will defend Butera against those who would claim that virtuous passions are sometimes spontaneous. Second, I will show that Butera's view can be developed to include passions within deliberation. Without contradicting Butera, we might discover emotions within virtuous deliberations. This addition to Butera, however, might also be an addition to Aquinas, although a friendly amendment. As a preliminary, I will briefly present the case for Butera's interpretation.

I. A Brief Case for Butera

The strongest textual case for Butera arises from Aquinas's distinction between antecedent passions and consequent passions.[3] Consequent passions follow upon the judgment of reason, while antecedent passions precede reason's judgment. Since only consequent passions are virtuous, it follows that only those

[2] Judith Barad, in "Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and Activity," *The Thomist* 55 (1991): 397-414, maintains the same position, but she provides no detailed account of it and no details of how it is to be reconciled with the texts of Aquinas. The account of Elisabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens ("Rationalized Passion and Passionate Rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Reason and the Passions," *Review Of Metaphysics* 56 [2003]: 525-58), which she develops further than Barad (at 555-56), will provide some basis for my own account.

[3] For an excellent treatment of Aquinas's account of the passions in general, see Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22 to 48* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); also see Diana Fritz Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions: a Religious-Ethical Inquiry*, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009); also see Nicholas E. Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011).

passions following the judgment of reason are virtuous.[4] As we will see, this line of reasoning will be opposed by various thinkers primarily by questioning what exactly is meant by 'antecedent' and 'consequent'.

In addition to presenting the texts of Aquinas, Butera repeatedly employs an argument that is difficult to gainsay.[5] Virtuous passions must always follow the judgment of reason because what counts as virtuous in any particular situation can be determined only by reason. Suppose that someone regularly eats a breakfast of two eggs and ham, which reason has determined to be appropriate, given his bodily constitution. As a result, he develops a habit of desiring this breakfast, both as to its contents and as to its quantity. Does he now have a virtuous emotional desire so well ingrained that he does not need the judgment of reason? Not so, argues Butera. While this breakfast for the most part proves to be the proper breakfast, it will not always be so. Perhaps he is hiking one morning and needs a heartier breakfast. Perhaps he is having a medical procedure, and he must abstain from breakfast. In either of these situations, his habitual desire will prove not to be virtuous; what is in fact virtuous can be determined only through reason's deliberations. How could the passions "know" ahead of time, prior to the judgment of reason, that they should desire more or less than usual?[6]

[4] Relevant texts include the following: IV *Sent.*, d. 50, q. 2, a. 4, qcla. 2; *De Veritate*, q. 26, a. 7, corp. and ad 1, 3, and 6; *STh* I-II, q. 77, a. 1; I, q. 95, a. 2; I-II, q. 10, a. 3; I-II, q. 24, a. 3, corp. and ad 1 and 3; I-II, q. 44, a. 2; I-II, q. 77, a. 6, corp. and ad 2; *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 11; *De Malo*, q. 12, a. 1, corp. and ad 4.

[5] Butera, "Reason's Control," 149-50.

[6]Mark Drost has emphasized that the emotions are directed not to the material subject of their object but to an object under a certain formality, which formality arises from the judgment of some knowing power ("Intentionality in Aquinas's Theory of Emotions," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 31 [1991]: 449-60). In short, temperance is not directed to two eggs and ham; it is directed to this food under the formality of what is fitting for the individual. That formality is not sensed, but must be perceived by reason or by the cogitative power. There is no such thing, then, as a habitual desire that is somehow directed to its object apart from some judgment. A habitual desire must be a habitual desire following upon some judgment or other. Butera claims the judgment must be from reason, for only reason can perceive the formality of virtue.

II. Objections

The secondary literature says little directly concerning Butera.[7] Despite this paucity of explicit argumentation, several objections against Butera can be culled from the literature.

A) Objection 1: False Definition of Antecedent Passion

Nicholas Lombardo directly accuses Butera of a fundamental misunderstanding concerning what Aquinas means by antecedent and consequent passions.[8] Butera, he claims, has what might be called a "temporal" account, in which antecedent passions are identified as those that temporally precede the judgment of reason; consequent passions are those that temporally follow the judgment of reason. This definition has the advantage of corresponding well with the words "antecedent" and "consequent," as well as Aquinas's recurring statements that antecedent

[7] Richard K. Mansfield, in "Antecedent Passion and the Moral Quality to Human Acts according to St. Thomas," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 71 (1997): 221-31, holds an identical position, and Claudia Eisen Murphy, in "Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions," *Medieval Philosophy And Theology* 8 (1999): 163-205 seems to hold the same, although she is addressing other matters; Uffenheimer-Lippens ("Rationalized Passion") appears to hold a similar view. Only Nicholas Lombardo explicitly challenges Butera's claims, and he relegates his objections to a footnote (*Logic of Desire*, 186 n. 208). Paul Gondreau (*The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* [Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2008]; and "The Passions and the Moral Life: Appreciating the Originality of Aquinas," *The Thomist* 71 [2007]: 419-50) seems to hold a position in opposition to that of Butera, but he does not mention Butera and he provides few details of his own view and even less by way of argumentation in favor of it. Jeffrey Hause ("Aquinas on the Function of Moral Virtue," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 81 [2007]: 1-20) opposes Butera's position, but he argues in favor of his own view in a roundabout manner, admitting there is no direct textual evidence for it. Others, including Craig Steven Titus, in "Passions in Christ: Spontaneity, Development, and Virtue," *The Thomist* 73 (2009): 53-87; and Miner, *Aquinas on the Passions*, vaguely imply some position contrary to Butera's.

[8] Lombardo, *Logic of Desire*, 186 n. 208.

passions precede (*praecedere*)[9] or come before (*praevenire*)[10] the judgment of reason.

What alternative account does Lombardo offer? Two possibilities emerge, one implicitly and the other quite explicitly. While discussing the passions of Christ, Lombardo says,

> Aquinas has no difficulty affirming that Christ's passions may chronologically precede the conscious judgment of Christ's reason. He does, however, exclude from Christ those spontaneous movements of disordered passion that Aquinas calls antecedent passion.[11]

According to Lombardo, then, antecedent passions are the same as disordered passions.[12]

This account of antecedent passions—which might be called the "objective" account—cannot bear scrutiny, as Lombardo himself seems to acknowledge at other points. The very text that he is commenting upon contradicts this notion of antecedent passions. Aquinas explains that Christ's passions are different from our own in three ways, of which the first two concern us at the moment.

> First with respect to their object, because our passions often bear upon something that is unlawful, which was not the case in Christ. Second, with respect to their origin, because our passions often come before the judgment of reason, but in Christ all the movements of the sensitive appetite arose according to the disposition of reason.[13]

[9] *STh* I-II, q. 77, a. 6 co. and ad 2; q. 24, a. 3, ad 3; *De Verit*., q. 26, a. 7; *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 11.

[10] *STh* I, q. 95, a. 2; *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 224.

[11] Lombardo, *Logic of Desire*, 211.

[12] Titus, without referring to Butera, also claims that antecedent passions are misunderstood as those that temporally precede reason ("Passions in Christ," 74-78). According to Titus, an antecedent passion is, by definition, one that obscures the judgment of reason, so that passions preceding the judgment of reason, without overpowering reason, should not be called antecedent. In effect, Titus holds the same position as Lombardo.

[13] *STh* III, q. 15, a. 4. "Primo quidem, quantum ad obiectum. Quia in nobis plerumque huiusmodi passiones feruntur ad illicita, quod in Christo non fuit. Secundo, quantum ad principium. Quia huiusmodi passiones frequenter in nobis praeveniunt iudicium rationis, sed in Christo omnes motus sensitivi appetitus oriebantur secundum dispositionem rationis." I prefer to translate *praeveniunt* more literally as "coming before" than the "forestall" used by Lombardo. I also prefer the more literal "arose" (for *oriebantur*) to Titus's "were ordered in

If, by definition, a passion comes before the judgment of reason when it is contrary to reason, then these two points concerning Christ's passions would be identical.

According to Aquinas, antecedent passions are not always disordered; sometimes they direct us to an appropriate object. Even then, however, they still diminish the voluntariness of an action. Consequently, antecedent passions diminish the goodness of good actions as well as the sinfulness or evil of bad actions. Someone who performs an act of mercy upon the promptings of the antecedent passion of pity does indeed do a good act; nevertheless, to the extent that he does so under the influence of the passion, his action is not as good as it could have been.[14] Antecedent passions, then, are a hindrance not simply because they distract reason toward an evil object. Even when they lead a person to choose a virtuous action, they still diminish the virtue of the action.

Of course, Lombardo is not, in the passage quoted above, directly attempting to define antecedent and consequent passions; when in fact he does address the topic directly, he gives an account other than the one implied in passing. He defines antecedent and consequent in relation to the desires of the will.[15] In several places, Aquinas does describe the consequent passions as following upon the choice of reason, or upon free decision, or even upon the will.[16] In short, the focus of these texts shifts from reason to the will.

These texts make clear that what is at issue is neither the time of the judgment nor the object of the judgment. Causality is the determining feature. A passion that is caused by the judgment of reason—or in these texts, by the movement of the will—is consequent, while a passion that in some manner causes the judgment of reason (or the act of the will) is antecedent. Perhaps

accord with" ("Passions in Christ," 81), which seems to collapse the second difference into the first.

[14] *STh* I-II, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1; also see IV *Sent.*, d. 50, q. 2, a. 4, qcla. 3, ad 3; *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 7; *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 11; *STh* I-II, q. 77, a. 6, ad 2.

[15] Lombardo, *Logic of Desire*, 109, 186.

[16] See *STh* I-II, q. 77, a. 6; *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 7; *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 11.

the clearest of these texts is from the disputed questions *De Veritate*:

> The passions of the soul can be related to the will in two ways, either as preceding it or as following upon it. Passions precede the will insofar as they incline the will to will something; they are consequent insofar as the vehemence of the will moves the lower appetite—by way of a certain overflow—toward these passions, or also insofar as the will excites and moves these passions of its own accord.[17]

This causal meaning is clearly superior to the temporal notion, which would allow any passion, however disordered, to be called consequent just so long as it comes after the judgment of reason. This causal meaning also explains what the objective meaning cannot, namely, that a passion in conformity with reason can still be antecedent. Pity, for instance, is antecedent when the emotion leads one to make the choice; it is consequent when one's choice leads to the emotion of pity. The idea is that an emotion that causes one's choice diminishes the voluntariness of the action, because the more an action arises from the will's own inclination, the more it is voluntary.[18]

In what manner does a passion arise from the will's own inclination? Aquinas does not say. The will itself is always inclined to its object following upon some judgment of reason.[19] This judgment itself might be influenced by a passion or it might not.[20] When someone is angry, for instance, he might judge that it is good to yell. However, he could have reached the same judgment with a cool head (presuming it is appropriate to yell). In the first case, the judgment is influenced by his anger; in the second case it is not. In either case, when the person chooses to yell, he chooses based upon a judgment of reason.

Whatever the difference between the two cases might be, it must be found first of all in the judgment of reason, and only secondarily in the will. In other words, these texts that shift our

[17] *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 7. See also *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 11; and *STh* I-II, q. 77, a. 6.

[18] *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 11, ad 3.

[19] *STh* I-II, q. 9, a. 1.

[20] *STh* I-II, q. 9, a. 2.

attention from reason to the will ultimately redirect our attention back to reason, sometimes quite explicitly.[21]

From this analysis it becomes clear that Lombardo is correct. The temporal definition of antecedent and consequent passions is woefully inadequate. Aquinas seems to endorse some sort of causal definition.[22] It is not at all clear, however, that Lombardo has succeeded in criticizing Butera or his view. If anything, it seems that Butera's case is strengthened. Virtuous passions are consequent passions, and consequent passions are not those that follow temporally upon the judgment of reason; rather, they are those that are caused by the judgment of reason.[23]

It is worth noting that the causal definition allows for a third kind of passion, not mentioned by Aquinas. Some passions might temporally precede the judgment of reason but not influence the judgment. As such, they are not antecedent passions, but then neither are they consequent; we simply have some passions that have no bearing whatsoever upon the person's reasoning or choice.[24]

[21] See *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 11.

[22] Eisen Murphy gives a similar account of antecedent and consequent passions ("Responsibility for Our Emotions," 182-84, 190). Mansfield's account ("Antecedent Passion") is unclear, but it is certainly consistent with this causal notion. Similarly, everything that Uffenheimer-Lippens ("Rationalized Passion") says conforms with the causal notion.

[23] Hause ("Function of Moral Virtue") takes the causal definition one step further, claiming that passions are consequent if they follow from a habit formed by reason. In short, no immediate judgment of reason is needed; only a habit is needed (Hause does not concern himself with Drost's point ["intentionality"], mentioned above, that even habituated desire moves to an object under a formality perceived through some judgment). Hause gives no argument that Aquinas speaks in this manner. On the contrary, Hause acknowledges that Aquinas never indicates a positive role of habituated emotions in forming judgments; he also acknowledges that Aquinas never indicates this role for infused virtues. Nevertheless, Hause concludes that Aquinas must have held this view anyway, because he disagrees with the reasons that Aquinas gives for distinguishing infused and acquired virtues. Aquinas, therefore, must have meant something more. The claim is unusual: Aquinas never said this, but since he gives some bad arguments, he must have meant it anyway. The conclusion that anyone not already committed to the views of Aquinas would naturally reach is that, on this point, he should not be taken seriously.

[24] Eisen Murphy avoids the terminology of antecedent and consequent, preferring "reason dependent" and "reason independent" passions. Her account corresponds with the causal definition given above, but her second category, the reason independent passions, can be more clearly divided into two, those that influence reason and those that do not.

Butera himself allows for such passions; he says that antecedent passions, if they are sufficiently weak so as not to affect the judgment of reason, are consistent with virtue. In short, these passions pose no threat to Butera's view. Butera is required only to change his terminology. He must not call these passions antecedent, since they do not affect the judgment of reason.

B) Objection 2: Common Experience

Lombardo also provides what might be called the "common-experience argument." Using the example of deliberation interacting with anger, he says that our common experience reveals a certain liberty in the passions, independent of reason.[25] In our day-to-day deliberations, emotions often precede the judgment of reason and they do not always interfere with it; indeed, they may even assist in the deliberations of reason. Butera himself seems to put stock in this argument, and he is concerned to show that perhaps somehow or other we can have quasi-virtuous emotions that precede the judgment of reason.[26]

I am inclined to think this common-experience objection is correct. Just as stated, however, it suffers a debilitating weakness: common experience is not virtuous experience. Most people are not virtuous, and that includes almost everybody agreeing or disagreeing with Butera. Perhaps common experience belies Butera's thesis, then, only because common experience is not virtuous experience.

C) *Objection 3: Spontaneity*

Lombardo and Titus present, by implication, what might be called the "spontaneity" argument.[27] Virtuous emotions, it seems, should at least sometimes be spontaneous, not always subservient to the coldhearted judgments of reason. Lombardo bases this

[25] Lombardo, *Logic of Desire*, 239.

[26] Butera, "Reason's Control," 158-60.

[27] Butera, "Reason's Control," presents this objection at 134-35. Titus also presents this argument ("Passions in Christ," 70-74), but his reasons fit better in the next objection.

claim upon the natural tendency of the emotions to conform with reason.[28] For instance, he perceives Aquinas's teaching that the passions naturally obey reason to imply that the passions, on their own, tend to support reason.[29]

This spontaneity, however, need not be opposed to Butera's interpretation, for Butera uses this same natural tendency—of the passions to obey reason—in support of his position. He agrees that virtuous passions are spontaneous in some sense, for they spontaneously follow the judgment of reason.[30] In other words, the spontaneity objection demands that spontaneity means something like "apart from or prior to the judgment of reason," which sounds a lot like what Aquinas means by antecedent passions. Butera has no room for such spontaneity. He can allow, however, another sort of spontaneity, in which a passion arises with ease in conformity with the judgment of reason. Virtuous passions arise from a judgment of reason, but they flow from this judgment with ease.

D) Objection 4: The Political Rule of the Passions

A closely related argument, presented by Lombardo and Paul Gondreau, employs Aristotle's metaphor of tyrannical and political rule. Aristotle says that the bodily members submit to reason as to a despotic ruler, for they do not resist reason; in contrast, the passions submit to reason as to a political rule—which the citizens can resist—since they have something of their own.[31] The passions, then, are not mere slaves to reason, but have their own contribution to make.

Butera explicitly argues that the ideal relationship between reason and the emotions is tyrannical, and in fact this relationship held sway in Christ and the Blessed Virgin, as well as in Adam and Eve.[32] In the rest of us, the passions do not submit to reason as to

[28] Lombardo, *Logic of Desire*, 214, 230.
[29] Lombardo, *Logic of Desire*, 99-101.
[30] Butera, "Reason's Control," 143.
[31] Aristotle, *Politics* 1.5.1254b1-5.
[32] Butera, "Reason's Control," 152-57.

a tyrant, but the resistance arises only on account of original sin. Richard Mansfield argues in the same vein as Butera, emphasizing that the passions of Adam were "totally" subject to reason.[33]

The objection to Butera argues otherwise. The political metaphor is not merely a description of how things in fact are, consequent to original sin; it is a description of how things should be in the properly ordered human soul.[34] Passions should not be mere inert sticks to be pushed about by reason. Unlike the body, they should have an impetus of their own, independent of reason. Gondreau speaks of the "Empire of reason" in opposition to Butera's "command" of reason. Lombardo says that "the metaphor implies that the inclinations of the passions are basically legitimate, just in need of some guidance."[35]

A metaphor, of course, is just that, a metaphor; it is not a philosophical argument. We must observe, then, how Aquinas himself uses the metaphor. He states explicitly that the passions have a movement independent of reason. He says that they can move consequent upon a sudden (spontaneous?) image in the imagination or in the senses. Nothing he says, however, indicates that this state is an ideal, rather than a defective fallen state. To the contrary, in every instance in which I have found Aquinas using this metaphor, he uses the metaphor precisely as Butera would have him do.[36] He always states that the passions have something of their own insofar as they can resist reason. Resisting reason, however, is not the way that things should be, although it is the way they often are, after the fall.

[33] Mansfield, "Antecedent Passion," 227.

[34] One might cull this interpretation out of Gondreau, *Passions of Christ's Soul*, 273-76; also in "Passions and the Moral Life," 434-35. Miner (*Aquinas on the Passions*, 94-96) also suggests a positive role for the political metaphor. Titus also seems to presume that the political rule implies spontaneous virtuous passions ("Passions in Christ," 72). G. J. McAleer, in "The Politics of the Flesh: Rahner and Aquinas on Concupiscentia," *Modern Theology* 15 (1999): 355-65, uses this metaphor as his whole basis of the analysis of Aquinas on concupiscence. For Lombardo, see *Logic of Desire*, 99-101, 237-41.

[35] Lombardo, *Logic of Desire*, 100.

[36] See *STh* I, q. 81, a. 3 ad 2; *STh* I-II, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3; q. 17, a. 7; q. 56, a. 4 ad 3; q. 58, a. 2; *De Virtutibus*, q. 1, a. 4; q. 1, a. 4, ad 11; *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 9, ad 14; I *Polit.*, lect. 3; X *Ethic.*, lect. 10.

Someone might hope that virtuous passions have something of their own not only in that they can oppose reason but also insofar as they are habituated to follow reason. Virtuous passions become so automatic, on this view, that they no longer need an explicit judgment of reason (at least usually). Jeffrey Hause, for instance, asserts that passions that have been habituated by previous judgments of reason should not be called antecedent, even though they precede the present judgment of reason.[37]

No one can doubt, Butera included, that virtuous passions do add an easy automatic response, but Butera has his own interpretation on this point. The easy and automatic response is precisely the passions following the judgment of reason. A person who lacks virtue, such as a continent person, might sometimes have passions that follow his judgment of reason, but they will not follow reason quickly, automatically, and with ease.

Do the passions become so automatic that they no longer need an explicit judgment of reason, except in unusual circumstances? No, says Butera, the automatic response is precisely the ability to follow the judgment of reason with ease, not the ability to act independently of reason.[38] How could these habituated emotions "know"—apart from any judgment of reason—when something out of the ordinary occurs? The passions must always rely upon reason in the ordinary cases to determine what is ordinary and in the exceptional cases to determine what is exceptional.

Since the passions are appetites, they follow upon some immediate apprehension,[39] the apprehension either of the senses, of the imagination, or of reason.[40] Butera claims that a virtuous habit of the passions is precisely a habit of following the immediate judgment of reason (as opposed to an apprehension of the senses or imagination). If virtuous habits do indeed act independently of the immediate judgment of reason, as is being claimed, then they must follow immediately upon some other

[37] Hause, "Function of Moral Virtue," 10.

[38] Butera, "Reason's Control," 143.

[39] *STh* I, q. 80, a. 1.

[40] *STh* I, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2.

awareness, either upon sensation or upon imagination. Now when Aquinas uses the metaphor of the political rule, he explicitly mentions sensation and the imagination as providing something independent of reason; unfortunately, what they provide is resistance to reason.

The senses or the imagination can provide a judgment that is consonant with reason. According to Butera, however, virtuous passions could not respond to this perception, for nothing in the object of the imagination marks it as according to reason and therefore as virtuous. Nothing about two eggs and ham, in itself, makes it an appropriate breakfast. Only reason can judge whether it is, not the senses nor the imagination.

Besides, Butera might argue, if something is usually the virtuous course of action, then what will be easy and automatic is not the passions following the imagination, but rather reason's judgment. As Aquinas himself states, there will be no need for deliberation.[41] What is "spontaneous" in such situations, then, is not the movement of the passions but the judgment of reason. If two eggs and ham is usually the appropriate breakfast, then the judgment of reason will be ready to hand, unless there is some contraindication.

For some reason, we suppose that habitual activity is mindless activity, and that a habituated response is a response without reason. In fact, the habituated response can be the response of reason itself. There is no need to suppose that what the virtues of the passions provide beyond the judgment of reason is some kind of movement independent of the judgment of reason. What they provide is a ready response to the judgment of reason, a judgment that can be, in its turn, a ready response to a typical situation. The person's reaction is immediate on all counts. He sees the situation, immediately judges what is to be done, and immediately desires to do it. Why suppose that he desires without the judgment of reason, when the judgment of reason is itself so automatic (that is, without reflection) and immediate?

[41] *STh* I-II, q. 14, a. 4; and *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 12.

Even for unusual situations, the judgment of reason could be rather rapid. Aquinas says, for instance, that the virtue of fortitude often confronts situations concerning which the person cannot have thought ahead of time what should be done. He must make rapid judgments in difficult situations.

> Fortitude most of all concerns what happens suddenly, for as the Philosopher says in book 3 of the *Ethics*, the habit of fortitude is revealed most clearly in sudden dangers, since a habit acts after the manner of nature. Therefore, when someone does without premeditation those things that belong to virtue, as when necessity threatens because of some sudden danger, then it is most clearly revealed that fortitude is established habitually in the soul.[42]

Could this lack of premeditation refer to habituated passions acting without the judgment of reason? It seems unlikely, since the situations that fortitude must confront are unusual situations. Habituated passions are supposed to be able to act without reason in ordinary situations; they are supposed to require reason only in exceptional situations. The immediate decisions that the courageous person must make within battle, however, are far from ordinary. They require a judgment of reason; this judgment, however, cannot be thought out ahead of time, precisely because of the unpredictable nature of the situation. Virtuous passions must be ready to follow reason, even without a premeditated period of preparation.

I suspect that the force of the metaphor against Butera is precisely the force of a metaphor, not the force of an argument. The notion of a tyrannical rule has negative connotations, and Butera's position seems to imply that the emotions are negative and must be crushed by reason. Butera himself does not seem to have this negative view of the emotions, but he does not go out of his way to dispel it.

In her exceptional article, Elisabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens portrays the emotions in a very positive light, but what she says in her continual references to the political rule of reason is in full

[42] *STh* II-II, q. 123, a. 9.

accord with Butera.[43] Perhaps wisely, she never suggests that the proper control of reason is tyrannical; nevertheless, the subjection of the emotions to reason that she describes is the same as that given by Butera. The emotions are not negative. They are a needed and positive force in human life, but precisely insofar as they follow the judgment of reason. The political rule is the proper rule not because it is sometimes good for the passions to act apart from reason; rather, it is proper to the nature of the passions to be a moving force. Reason must recognize this impetus of the passions in its efforts to bring them under its guidance. Reason does not move the passions by efficient causality, as someone might move a stick; to the contrary, the passions are the moving force, drawn on by the vision provided by reason.

E) Objection 5: Hylomorphism

Aquinas, following Aristotle, believed that human beings are not ghosts in a machine, but rather body/soul composites. This union of body and soul should be reflected throughout human activity, so that the passions should play an integral role in truly virtuous activity; they should not be merely an afterthought, following upon a coldhearted judgment of reason. According to the hylomorphic objection, however, Butera presents us with a Cartesian model of the moral life—a pure soul without a body—and not an Aristotelian model.[44]

We should note that body/soul composition, or hylomorphism, relates to the emotions in two ways. Gondreau, Uffenheimer-Lippens, and Lombardo emphasize that the emotions themselves have a material and a formal component.[45] This point, which will have important ramifications as we proceed, is unquestionably consonant with Butera. Gondreau, however, proceeds to give

[43] Uffenheimer-Lippens, "Rationalized Passion."

[44] G. Simon Harak, *Virtuous Passions: The Formation of Christian Character* (New York: Paulist Press, 1993) is very concerned to correct this Cartesian view of the passions, but it is unclear how his account relates to Butera's.

[45] Gondreau, "Passions and the Moral Life," 422-24; Uffenheimer-Lippens "Rationalized Passion," 535-37; Lombardo *Logic of Desire*, 44-48.

another sense in which hylomorphism might impact the emotions. The emotions themselves must interact with our higher capacities of reason and will.[46]

While this argument is fundamentally correct, as stated it does not quite make the case. Butera can allow the premise and reach his own conclusion. Our body/soul composition, he might argue, implies two things concerning the passions. First, the passions should partake of reason, which they do by following the judgment of reason. Second, our judgments of reason should be aided by our bodily element, that is, by the passions carrying out our judgments.

Indeed, Aquinas himself makes just these two points: that the passions must submit to reason and that we should act under the impetus of good emotions.[47] Furthermore, he says that virtue consists in the passions executing the command of reason.[48] Are the demands of hylomorphism sufficiently met by these two points? Or must the passions play some further role? In particular, must the passions play some role prior to the judgment of reason? Unless these questions can be answered, the hylomorphic objection does not overturn Butera's case. Butera also incorporates hylomorphism. The question—not easy to answer—is whether he incorporates it sufficiently.

III. The Role of the Passions within Virtuous Deliberation

I will not dispute Butera's account of antecedent passions, at least in its essentials. Nevertheless, I wish to make room within deliberation for a positive role of the passions. Someone's repugnance toward pornography, for instance, might help in his

[46] Gondreau, "Passions and the Moral Life," 424-26. Uffenheimer-Lippens ("Rationalized Passion, 542) also acknowledges this second role of hylomorphism, but she limits it, as does Butera, to reason's immediate control of the passions together with the impetus for action provided by the passions.

[47] *STh* I-II, q. 24, a. 3. See also *De Verit*., q. 26, a. 7; *De Malo*, q. 12, a. 1; *STh* I-II, q. 56, a. 4.

[48] *STh* I-II, q. 59, a. 5.

deliberation concerning what is to be done about it, or someone's fear might help in his deliberations about how to avoid a danger. Butera's account seems to give us a cold deliberation, allowing for passions only when deliberation has been completed. Perhaps such an account appears unrealistic only because, as suggested above, most of us have deliberations that are not virtuous.

My argument will proceed in five steps. First, I will consider the texts of Aquinas, showing that there is some ambiguity in them regarding the role of the passions within deliberation. Second, I will show how Butera's account allows for virtuous passions within deliberation. Third, I will suggest two ways in which the passions might aid virtuous deliberation. Fourth, I will consider in what manner the passions interfere with deliberation. Fifth, I will consider why Aquinas is inclined to say that passions must interfere with deliberation.

A) Deliberation and the Passions in Aquinas

Aquinas himself seems, quite explicitly, to endorse passionless deliberation as an ideal. The role of passions, he says, is to help in the execution of the action.

> Anger and other passions of this sort can relate to the judgment of reason in two ways. First, antecedently, and in this way anger and all such passions necessarily always hinder the judgment of reason, because the soul is best able to judge the truth in a certain tranquility of mind, for which reason the Philosopher also says that the soul gains knowledge and prudence in peace. Second, anger can be consequent to the judgment of reason, such that after reason has judged and ordered the proper manner of retribution, then the passion rises up to execute the action. In this manner, anger and other passions of this sort do not hinder the judgment of reason, which has already been passed, but they help in the prompt execution of the judgment, and in this manner they are useful to virtue.[49]

Consequent anger does not interfere with the judgment of reason, it seems, only because that judgment has already been passed and

[49] *De Malo*, q. 12, a. 1.

can no longer be obscured. This assessment is confirmed in the reply to the fourth objection.

Anger consequent to the judgment of reason does indeed in some manner disturb reason, but it helps for the execution of the judgment, so that it does not destroy the order of reason, which has already been established by the preceding judgment of reason, for which reason Gregory says in his *Moralia* that vicious anger blinds the eye of the mind while zealous anger does not blind but only disturbs.[50]

Even consequent anger, it seems, disturbs the judgment of reason to some extent, although it does not blind reason.

This account of passionless deliberation and passion-filled execution presents an unrealistically sharp dichotomy between deliberation and execution, as if we sit down and figure out what to do and then carry it out. In fact, the two are often intertwined. When Alden is faced with some danger, he determines that he cannot overcome it, so that he should fear it (rather than brave it). The fear, however, might take various avenues. Perhaps Alden should hide from the danger; perhaps he should flee from it. Suppose he decides to flee, and only then begins to fear. Even then, his flight will not be entirely worked out. He must deliberate concerning the means of escape. This deliberation, however, might itself be a step-by-step process. First he must flee in this direction, but where to go from there he does not yet know. The picture presented is not of someone who first deliberates and then executes, but of someone who deliberates as he executes.

A similar picture can be presented for anger. Avis judges that an injustice must be redressed. She may not yet have worked out, however, the details of how to redress it. Indeed, she might need to begin prosecuting the matter before the details can be worked out. Once again, there is not a clear-cut process of deliberation followed by a clear-cut process of execution. Deliberation and execution are intertwined.

Aquinas, however, argues the opposite.

[50] Ibid., ad 4.

> In virtuous deeds both choice and execution are necessary. For choice, discretion is required, while the execution of what has already been determined requires prompt action. *It is not much required, however, for a man in the very act of executing the deed, to think at length upon the action.* As Avicenna says, reflection is more likely to hinder than to help, as is plain for a lyre player, who is greatly hampered if he thinks upon every touch he must place upon the strings, or for someone who is writing, who is hindered if he thinks upon every single letter that he must form. For this reason, passions coming before choice hinder the act of virtue, insofar as they hinder the judgment of reason necessary for choice. After the pure judgment of reason has been reached then choice is completed, and at that point a passion following choice is more a help than a harm, for even if it disturbs the judgment of reason to some extent, it assists in the prompt execution of the action.[51] [Emphasis added]

Aquinas is certainly correct for those actions that are repetitive and habitual for a person, such as writing or playing a lyre, actions that he elsewhere says do not require deliberation.[52] In contrast, actions that have not been performed before, or at least not in this precise manner, do require deliberation during the execution. In such situations, which are not uncommon, Aquinas's virtuous individual will have consequent passions that interfere with his subsequent, more detailed, deliberations, since according to Aquinas every passion, even those consequent upon reason, disturb the deliberations of reason to some extent.

I wish to suggest that some passions do not disturb deliberation; to the contrary, they positively assist it. Indeed, deliberation without passions is likely to derail. The person in a dangerous situation who does not feel fear may not deliberate with as much urgency, or with as much focus, as the person who deliberates while fearing. Aquinas himself seems to acknowledge as much when he asks whether fear interferes with our bodily activities.

> If this fear is moderate, such that it does not disturb reason very much, then it helps the person to act well, insofar as it causes a certain solicitude and makes him pay more attention to his deliberations and to his actions. But if the fear

[51] *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 7, ad 3.

[52] *STh* I-II, q. 14, a. 4.

increases so much as to disturb reason, then it hinders a person's action even on the part of the soul.[53]

Only two articles earlier, however, Aquinas asserts that fear might help by leading someone to take counsel, but, like all emotions, it inevitably interferes with the deliberation itself.

Neither fear nor any other passion helps deliberation, because something appears—to the man affected by some passion—either more or less than it really is, for example, to the lover that which he loves appears better and to the one who fears that which he fears appears to be more frightful. Consequently, any passion, just by itself, hinders the ability to deliberate well, insofar as it causes a failure in right judgment.[54]

Perhaps in this passage Aquinas is speaking only about antecedent passions, although his universal assertions seem to indicate otherwise. In any case, it is odd that he should suppose passions can only skew the value given to something. Why could not a person's fear make him evaluate the danger just as it should be evaluated, especially if that fear is consequent upon a judgment of reason? And why could not a person's lack of fear lead him to evaluate the danger as less significant than it really is? No doubt, of course, our fears are usually excessive, so that they distort our judgment. Presumably, however, a consequent fear is not excessive. Why should it distort our judgment?

Within Aquinas, then, we find a certain ambiguity. He sometimes asserts that passions inevitably interfere to some extent with clear thinking, so that deliberation is best accomplished without passions. At other times, however, he says that mild passions, which disturb reason very little, can assist in deliberation. While it seems to me that Aquinas, for the most part, emphasizes passionless deliberation, I wish to suggest, to the contrary, that passions can be a great assistance in deliberation, and that passionless deliberation might become interminable.

[53] *STh* I-II, q. 44, a. 4.
[54] *STh* I-II, q. 44, a. 2.

Furthermore, I wish to suggest that an account of passion-guided deliberation can find its source within the teachings of Aquinas.

B) Diverse Kinds of Judgments

Butera, however, poses a special difficulty. Passions that occur within deliberation itself must precede the judgment of reason, that is, they must be antecedent passions; therefore, passions occurring within deliberation must be unreliable, and they will, more than likely, impair the judgment of reason. Even those that happen to lead reason to a good conclusion, such as the pity that leads to the act of mercy, will nevertheless diminish the voluntariness of the action, making it less virtuous. Put another way, consequent passions, which are the only virtuous passions, must follow the judgment of reason, a judgment that comes at the end of deliberation. Passions occurring within deliberation, therefore, cannot be virtuous.

This particular difficulty is not insurmountable, for what is meant by a judgment of reason is ambiguous.[55] Aquinas often means by "judgment" some final determination about what is to be done. He says, for instance, "While the judgment remains to be made concerning some matter, then the final decision is not yet given."[56] What counts as "final," however, is not straightforward. In the example given above, Alden judges that he must avoid a danger. Is that final? No, because he further judges that he must avoid it by fleeing rather than by hiding. Is that final? No, he must next judge that he should flee in this direction rather than that direction. But this judgment, as well, is not final, for he must yet determine the details of his flight. If the passion of fear waits until some ultimate manner of escape is determined, then Alden will likely not escape. The assistance that the passion of fear provides for his flight will have come too late.

Outside of the context of practical reasoning Aquinas speaks of "judging" much more broadly, to include any thought that

[55] *De Verit.,* q. 16, a. 1, ad 15.

[56] *STh* I-II, q. 15, a. 4. See also *STh* I-II, q. 14, a. 1; *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 8; *De Verit.*, q. 17, a. 1, ad 4.

something is the case.[57] "Two plus three is equal to five" is a judgment in this broader sense. Within deliberation, many such judgments arise, and they are often practical in nature. For example, Alden judges that wild tigers are dangerous. This is not a final judgment, nor even a semi-final judgment, if we take judgment in the narrow sense to refer to a conclusion about what is to be done. It is, however, a judgment in the broader sense. Do any virtuous passions follow upon judgments such as these?

There is reason to suppose that they do. Aquinas's treatment of Christ's agony in the garden of Gethsemane, which poses a special difficulty, implies as much. During this agony, Christ experiences various passions that seem contrary to his judgment about what should be done. He judges that he should go forward and face his suffering and death; nevertheless, in his emotions, he experiences dread and fear of death. These emotions must either precede his judgment about what is to be done or follow upon it. Since Christ is perfectly virtuous, however, he can have no antecedent passions; indeed, Aquinas says that Christ's passions always follow the judgment of reason.[58] Should we suppose, then, that Christ's fear follows upon his final judgment of reason? This possibility, it seems, is unacceptable as well, for then Christ has consequent passions that are outright opposed to his judgment.

Aquinas addresses this difficulty within his discussion concerning the will of Christ, but he follows Peter Lombard's terminology, so that he includes the passions as a certain kind of will. He first distinguishes between the will of sensuality and the will of reason.[59] The latter is the will properly speaking, an intellectual appetite following upon a judgment of reason. The will of sensuality, on the other hand, is the passions, but considered precisely insofar as they submit to reason, for in this manner they have something of freedom and can be called "will" in an extended sense.

Within the will of reason, Aquinas—again following the terminology of Peter Lombard—further distinguishes between the

[57] See *STh* I, q. 16, a. 2; q. 17, aa. 2 and 3.

[58] *STh* III, q. 15, aa. 2 and 4.

[59] *STh* III, q. 18, a. 2.

will as natural and the will as rational.[60] The will as natural moves toward (or away from) an object that is good (or evil) considered in itself, while the will as rational moves towards an object considered in comparison to other things, especially in comparison to the final end. The will as natural, therefore, might find the taking of bitter medicine repugnant, but the will as rational moves towards this medicine insofar as it is ordered to health. In this instance, says Aquinas, these two wills are not strictly opposed to one another, because they move towards (or away from) the object considered in diverse lights.[61]

The will as rational follows upon the judgment of reason concerning what is to be done, for this judgment traces an action back to the ultimate end. The will as natural, on the other hand, follows upon the judgment of reason—judgment taken in the broader sense—concerning an object considered in itself, without including its relation to the ultimate end. It considers, for instance, the taking of bitter medicine in itself, without any consideration of how this action is ordered to health or to the ultimate end.

Which judgment does the will of sensuality follow? Aquinas says that the passions are unable to follow the judgment of reason that traces back to the ultimate end, because the passions do not respond to this ordering of reason.[62] Consequently, the passions must follow the judgment of the object considered in itself.

Aquinas says that the passions have a natural aversion toward sensible pain, and it is this natural aversion that is found in Christ's will of sensuality.[63] This natural movement of the will of sensuality, however, is not a movement following simply upon imagination. By definition, the will of sensuality follows reason. It must be following, therefore, the judgment of reason considering the object in itself.[64] Christ, then, had an aversion, at

[60] *STh* III, q. 18, a. 3.

[61] Ibid.; III *Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 1.

[62] III *Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 1.

[63] *STh* III, q. 18, a. 5.

[64] Or rather, as Lombardo might insist (*Logic of Desire*, 97-98), the concrete thing, considered simply in this respect.

the sensitive level, for the suffering and death he was about to face. This aversion followed upon a judgment of reason, but not the final judgment of reason.

Is this natural movement of the passions a consequent passion or an antecedent passion? Because Christ has only consequent passions, it cannot be antecedent. Furthermore, by definition the will of sensuality follows reason, so its movements must be consequent passions. Christ, then has consequent passions that do not follow the final judgment of reason. Nevertheless, these consequent passions do follow some judgment of reason. They are not "spontaneous" in the sense that they arise automatically apart from some judgment of reason.

I am suggesting, then, that Butera's thesis is correct on all counts, except for one oversight. Butera is correct in stating that antecedent passions are those that do not arise from some immediate judgment of reason and that all consequent passions must arise from some current judgment of reason. He is correct in claiming that antecedent passions, when they are strong, interfere with sound reasoning, so that they diminish the voluntary nature of any virtuous action. He is incorrect, however, in supposing that the virtuous person experiences no passions prior to the final judgment of reason. Virtuous passions must follow some judgment of reason, but not necessarily the final judgment. They can follow upon a judgment of something considered in itself, a judgment that arises within deliberation, rather than at the end of deliberation.

C) Passion-Guided Deliberation

How might passions be incorporated within virtuous deliberation? The passions are not knowing powers, but moving powers. They do not know the good; rather, they move out to the good. Furthermore, this movement follows only upon some awareness of the good; they move to the good *as known*.[65] It makes sense, then, that the passions should play the role that

[65] *STh* I, q. 80, a. 2, ad 1.

Butera and Aquinas attribute to them: they provide impetus to carry out the good once it is known through the judgment of reason.

It does not make sense, on the face of it, that the passions should play any role in our deliberations, that is, in our coming to know the good that should be done. As moving powers, it seems, they cannot contribute to our knowledge of the good.[66] Indeed, since the passions arise only consequent to some awareness of the good (whether of reason or of the imagination), it seems impossible that they could contribute any knowledge. Suppose, for instance, that someone thinks about bitter medicine, and then has an emotional aversion for it; he also thinks about health, and has an emotional attraction towards it. The aversion, however, does not provide him with knowledge that the bitter medicine is bad (in its taste), for only by first being aware that it is bad can he have an aversion to it. Likewise, the attraction towards health does not tell him that health is good, for he must have already known that health is good before he could have been attracted to it.

I will suggest two ways in which the passions might contribute to our deliberations. First, as Uffenheimer-Lippens says, "One's passions can make a person attentive to those moral aspects of the situation which he had never before taken into consideration."[67] More generally, our passions can help focus our attention upon the important features of actions. Second, the passions might help to form a kind of affective judgment concerning the good. I will consider each of these possibilities in turn.

Clinical evidence of individuals with damaged frontal lobes suggests that the passions help to focus our deliberations. As Antonio Damasio interprets the evidence, these individuals have

[66] Apparently, Miner (*Aquinas on the Passions*, 96-99) gives a cognitive role to the passions. Thomas Ryan, in "Revisiting Affective Knowledge and Connaturality in Aquinas," *Theological Studies* 66 (2005): 49-68, goes so far as to say that the emotions are in fact cognitive, they are ways of knowing (at 52-53). Uffenheimer-Lippens ("Rationalized Passion," 538), on the other hand, is clear that for Aquinas the passions are not a kind of knowledge.

[67] Uffenheimer-Lippens, "Rationalized Passion," 556. Hause also recognizes this function of the passions in our deliberation, but he notes (as I will below) that Aquinas mentions this role almost exclusively as a negative ("Function of Moral Virtue," 6).

defective emotions, and as a consequence they have difficulty reaching coherent judgments about what is to be done.[68] According to Damasio, good deliberation requires emotions that precede the final judgment. The emotions, he says, play the role of "markers": they do not introduce practical information but they do keep our minds focused upon the information that is most relevant and helpful.[69] Without the emotions, says Damasio, the mind dwells endlessly upon the many features of actions, never concentrating upon those features most important for a decision.

Aquinas assigns a similar role to passions; he says that the passions focus our attention upon certain desirable features of an action, so that, for instance, the overactive sexual desire of an incontinent person focuses his attention on the pleasurable aspect of adultery.[70] Similarly, an angry person continually returns to thoughts of the injustice done against him. Only on rare occasions does Aquinas consider this role of the emotions to be positive; typically, he sees the emotions as pulling our attention away from that which we should consider. He does say, however, that moderate sorrow can help focus our attention upon what we need to know.[71]

If disordered emotions can focus our attention upon particular details of an action, then it seems that consequent emotions can also direct our attention to features of an action. Indeed, Aquinas seems to maintain that the powers by which we judge singular matters, the imagination and the so-called estimative power, follow the lead of the passions: "Plainly, the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the judgment of taste follows upon the disposition of the tongue."[72] If these powers have no passions to guide them during deliberation, then perhaps

[68] Antonio R. Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Putnam, 1994).

[69] Ibid., 174-75. Hause also uses Damasio to reach a similar conclusion about the role of the passions in deliberation ("Function of Moral Virtue," 10).

[70] *STh* I-II, q. 77, a. 2, corp. and ad 2.

[71] *STh* I-II, q. 37, a. 1, ad 1.

[72] *STh* I-II, q. 77, a. 1.

deliberation will continue indefinitely, as Damasio suggests is sometimes the case for his patients with defective emotions.

Have we turned the passions, which are appetites, into some kind of cognitive power? By no means. This "cognitive" role of the passions derives readily from the nature of the passions as moving powers. In this instance, they are moving our cognitive powers to think upon this or that aspect of an action. Of course, the passions do not originate the thought, but they keep the mind concentrated upon this or that thought, even as a person fearful of intruders dwells upon every noise in a house.

The second possible role of the emotions within deliberation, derived from Aquinas's teaching concerning affective knowledge or knowledge by inclination, is more enigmatic.[73] Apparently, we can better come to know some realities by way of knowing our appetitive inclination toward them, for example, we can better know a friend through our love of him. Aquinas does not say much concerning this affective knowledge, and he gives no account of its role within deliberation. Furthermore, it can provide no new content, or so it appears. After all, before we can love something we must know what is good about it, and our love is directed to the object precisely under this formality of good. What can our knowledge concerning this love add to the knowledge of the good that preceded the love?

Aquinas says, however, that our desires sometimes have an advantage over knowledge. Knowledge or awareness, says Aquinas, takes an object into the mind; in contrast, affective states move the soul out to the object.[74] Sometimes our acquisition of an object through knowledge is deficient, because the manner in which it exists in our mind cannot live up to the reality it has outside the mind. When we know God, for instance, our knowledge is woefully inadequate, because our minds cannot

[73] Victor White, in "Thomism and Affective Knowledge," *New Blackfriars* 24, no. 274 (1943): 8-16, wishes to emphasize this "affective knowledge," but he provides no convincing evidence of its role within the thought of Aquinas. Similarly, Ryan ("Revisiting Affective Knowledge") provides nothing more than generalities concerning the emotions contributing to our knowledge.

[74] *STh* I, q. 82, a. 3; *STh* I-II, q. 22, a. 2.

capture his essence. The love of God, on the other hand, goes out to the reality, so that the love need not have any defect. Is it possible, then, that our awareness of our own love of God—however mystically obscure it may be—captures more of God than the cognitive knowledge that must reduce him to propositions?[75]

Such possibilities may be plausible for the mystical knowledge of God, since God is so far above our minds. The same cannot be said of day-to-day deliberations concerning concrete actions. Often, such deliberations concern material realities, which are below our minds; as such, they can be fully captured by our minds. Affective knowledge, it seems, will provide no advantage over the propositional knowledge that precedes our passions.

On the other hand, our minds have another sort of inadequacy regarding these objects. Practical deliberation is concerned with material realities precisely as singular. Even though these objects are below the mind, they cannot be fully captured in their singularity, since by nature our minds must abstract bits of knowledge. But the passions, says Aquinas, are concerned with the singular, and as appetites they move out to the object itself, rather than take it into the mind. Can we better know the singular objects of deliberation, then, through the awareness of our own desires concerning these objects? The possibility is appealing.

Let me suggest something more precise. A complex singular object has many features about it, some of which are good and others of which are bad. Our knowledge of the singular must collate these many details concerning the object. From these many details arise diverse passions. Is it possible that these diverse passions, going out to the singular object itself, help us to "feel" our way to those features of the concrete object most worthy of our consideration?

All of this is speculation with regard to Aquinas, who says nothing about it. He provides us with some hints and some tools, but we must work out the details. At least the first point does seem clear enough. Aquinas does think that our desires

[75] *STh* II-II, q. 97, a. 2, ad 2.

concentrate our attention upon this or that aspect of an action under consideration. If bad passions have this effect adversely, then it seems reasonable that consequent passions—passions concerning an object considered in itself—could have a parallel positive impact upon our deliberations.

D) The Causality of the Emotions upon Reason

The question that remains, then, is whether a passion consequent upon some judgment of reason will obscure the final judgment of reason and hence diminish the voluntariness of the action. That depends, of course, upon what it is about the passions that obscures the judgment of reason.

Causality again seems to be key. Passions might cause the judgment of reason in several ways. They might, for instance, merely be the occasion for a judgment of reason. When someone sees a sick person, pity might arise antecedent to any judgment of reason, but then reason might evaluate the situation independently of this antecedent emotion. In this case, the antecedent passion has drawn the person's attention to an object, but it has in no manner affected the evaluation of that object. Such antecedent passions seem quite benign, for they are quickly transformed into consequent passions. Indeed, it is not clear (as mentioned earlier) that they should be called either antecedent or consequent, since they do not, strictly speaking, cause the judgment of reason, nor are they caused by reason. Butera himself recognizes these sorts of antecedent passions as being compatible with virtue, although they are not virtuous passions.[76]

Antecedent passions might cause the judgment of reason in more significant ways. The passions, for instance, might provide the very reason that the action is judged to be good or bad. Helping a sick person might be judged to be good because it satisfies an emotion of pity. Such passions obscure the judgment of reason, because they provide a standard of judgment independent of reason, independent of the good sought by the

[76] Butera, "Reason's Control," 158-59.

virtuous person, independent of the impulse arising from his will.[77]

As we have seen, antecedent passions might also affect the judgment of reason because they focus the mind upon some particular feature of an action. A person's sexual desire focuses his mind upon the pleasure of adultery, or the angry person focuses upon the injustice done to him. If a person chooses under the influence of these goading passions, then he chooses not fully certain that he has focused upon the truly significant aspects of the action. By a kind of ignorance, then, the voluntariness of his action is diminished.

Finally, antecedent passions might conceivably affect the judgment of reason by way of affective knowledge, or knowledge by inclination. How this might happen, and how it might diminish the voluntariness of an action, remains as obscure as the nature of this knowledge itself.

What of consequent passions? Can they play a causal role in deliberation without adversely affecting the judgment of reason, thereby diminishing the voluntariness of the action? Let us consider each of the causes examined above.

Consequent passions cannot play the first causal role, of being an occasion of some judgment, for by definition the consequent passion already follows upon some judgment of reason. Neither can consequent passions play the second causal role, of providing the very reason or motive for which the action is performed, for consequent passions cannot provide an independent motive; they arise from and are directed to the very ends or goals that reason has discovered.

Third, I have already suggested that consequent passions could play the role of focusing our attention upon certain features of an action. When they would do so, however, they would not be taking away from the judgment of reason and diminishing the voluntariness of the action. Rather, reason would be using these passions as instruments to reach its final judgment. These passions

[77] Of course, sometimes reason might judge that the preference of the passions is to be consulted, for instance, when somebody is deciding between chocolate and vanilla ice cream and no health concerns—or any other significant concerns—affect the judgment.

would help the person to focus upon those features of the action that reason itself has deemed important and would thereby aid in the certainty of the final judgment.

Finally, I have also suggested that these consequent passions could play the role of knowing an object by way of inclination. In so doing, would they detract from the judgment of reason and from the voluntariness of the action? It is difficult to say, since we know so little concerning this manner of knowledge. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that an affective knowledge that begins with reason would not interfere with reason.

In short, we have no reason to suppose that passions consequent upon the judgment of an action considered in itself would in any way diminish the voluntariness of an action. To the contrary, they might increase its voluntariness insofar as they aid reason in its judgment.

E) Propassions

Why, then, does Aquinas say, as we have seen, that all passions, even consequent passions, disturb the judgment of reason? The answer is that we have not considered all the ways in which a passion might causally interfere with a judgment of reason. The sort of disturbance that Aquinas has in mind differs from any suggested above. It relies upon a distinction between the formal and material elements of a passion. The formal element is taken from the object; it is that to which the emotion tends. The material element is the bodily change that takes place as part of the emotion, such as the heart beating faster while afraid, or the muscles tensing. Aquinas's physiology is outdated on these points, such as in his belief that anger involved an agitation of blood around the heart, but he is on the mark on the essential point that emotions involve some bodily change, preparing the person for action.

Up to this point we have considered various ways in which the passions might derail the deliberations of reason. All of them concern the formal element: an emotional desire for some object

might distract reason from the proper good. This possibility, however, is only one of three discussed when Aquinas wonders whether reason can be overcome by the passions.[78] He also suggests that the material element, the bodily change that accompanies the passion, can interfere with the judgment of reason. This third possibility is also Aquinas's focus in that article of the *De Malo*, noted above, which emphasizes the tranquility of deliberation, indicating that even consequent passions disturb the judgment of reason. He says,

> In anger, just as in any other passion, we may consider two things, one quasi-formal and another quasi-material. That which is formal in anger is from the part of the desiring soul, namely, anger is a desire for retribution. That which is material in anger, however, concerns the bodily agitation, namely, anger is the stirring of blood around the heart. . . . The whole controversy [between the stoics and the peripatetics] turns upon the material element in anger, namely, the agitation of the heart, because this agitation hinders the judgment of reason, in which the good of virtue principally consists.[79]

Apparently, then, even good passions, that is, even passions consequent to some judgment of reason, can hinder reason on account of the bodily change. One might dispute, with modern research, whether Aquinas is correct on this point, but it seems plausible enough, at least when the passion is strong. Even apart from the distracting nature of a passion, an emotion can hinder reasoning simply because of the bodily agitation involved with the emotion.

Aquinas seems to think (see the reply to the fourth objection quoted earlier) that this detraction from clearheaded reasoning is worth the pay off, that is, the value of the emotion in helping a virtuous person execute his actions is worth risking, whatever hindrance of reason might ensue. He thinks so, in part, because the judgment of reason has already been made. Can the same be said of a passion that occurs within deliberation? Could its assistance within deliberation outweigh the hindrance that might occur from its material element? Evidently Aquinas did not

[78] *STh* I-II, q. 77, a. 2.

[79] *De Malo*, q. 12, a. 1.

envision this possibility. From what we have seen, however, such a passion might well be worthwhile, especially if it is not so intense, such that its material element does little, if anything, to diminish the power of reason.

Aquinas himself at various points recognizes the existence of some passions that do not disturb reason. He speaks of "propassions" that do not reach to reason and do not disturb reason.[80] He says that these propassions are not complete passions, but we should not mistakenly suppose that they are in any way less complete emotions than those that do disturb reason. He is using a very strict meaning of the Latin word *passio*, a kind of undergoing of change. In its fullest sense, a *passio* reaches to all parts of the soul, for then the whole person undergoes a change.[81] If an emotion changes only the sense appetite, with the concomitant change in the body, but it does not affect some other power of the soul, such as reason, then it is an incomplete change and can be dubbed a propassion.

Uffenheimer-Lippens emphasizes that, properly speaking, an emotion is a passion in the sense that it involves the reception of some form that displaces another.[82] A more precise meaning of *passio* involves a negative change. The emotions need not realize this negative meaning of *passio* but they do when they impact reason; then they hinder the human order to the end. Emotions, then, can be divided into two kinds. Those that do not impact reason can be called propassions; those that do impact reason are called passions in the fullest sense.

Propassions need not be weak. Christ's passions were all propassions, since they did not disturb his reason. Nevertheless, they could be quite intense, as was the fear that caused him to sweat blood in the garden of Gethsemane. Passions might fail to disturb reason, it seems, either on account of their own weakness or on account of the strength of the individual's reason.

Conceivably, then, passions that play a role within deliberation, assisting reason to reach its conclusions, might be

[80] *Super Ioan.*, c. 13, lect. 4.

[81] III *Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3 qcla. 3, expos; *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 8.

[82] Uffenheimer-Lippens, "Rationalized Passion," 532-34.

propassions, emotions that do not disturb reason. Or perhaps they disturb reason only a little, such that the assistance is worth the disturbance; after all, Aquinas thought that the virtuous passions assisting in the execution of an action might still disturb reason to some extent.

Conclusion

We have seen that Butera's interpretation of Aquinas must be upheld. Aquinas consistently maintains that virtuous passions are consequent, that is, passions caused by the judgment of reason, and it is difficult to see how this judgment could be anything other than what Butera says it is, an immediate judgment. We have also seen, however, that this judgment of reason need not be taken so narrowly as to refer only to the final judgment reached by reason on some practical matter. Judgments along the way to the final determination might also give rise to consequent passions. Most significantly, judgments of objects considered in themselves might give rise to passions, as seems to have been the case for Christ. Furthermore, we have reason to believe that these passions can actually assist deliberation, even if, at the same time, they cause some material disturbance that might interfere with reason to some extent. Aquinas himself did not seem to reach this conclusion, although his principles allow for it.

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CAN VIRTUE BE TAUGHT? THOMISTIC ANSWERS TO A SOCRATIC QUESTION

MATTHEW ROSE

Berkeley Institute
Berkeley, California

IN HIS 1918 ADDRESS "Scholarship as a Vocation," Max Weber outlined a vision for higher education that would come to inform much of the twentieth-century academy. The lecture is famous for its sharp distinction between facts and values, its discussion of the process Weber named "disenchantment," and its argument that the advancement of learning depended on refining the techniques of specialization. While "Scholarship as a Vocation" is often read for its austere views on the nature of modern academic institutions, its deeper goal was to challenge traditional understandings of pedagogy. Weber argued that as scholarship became ever more focused and provisional, the modern academic had to relinquish the notion that one could impart anything like wisdom or virtue. Among the most important of his arguments was that teachers renounce their claims to moral authority. Since all views about the purpose of life are a matter of subjective opinion and personal preference, the classroom is no place to entertain questions like, What kind of person should I be? What should I live for? What has real worth and significance? Students interested in life's *meaning* were told to look to "demagogues" and "prophets," not scholars. *De finibus non est disputandum*.[1]

[1] Alarmed by those who offered guidance in such questions, Weber criticizes the ideal of the teacher as a custodian and transmitter of wisdom to which students apprentice themselves in the quest for human fulfillment. Because such questions are unanswerable from the perspective of scientific inquiry, a young person asking "How shall I live?" is really asking

Today there is widespread dissatisfaction with Weber's vision and growing agreement that higher education has been derelict in the moral formation of students. Once limited to religious and political conservatives, these complaints now come by way of a broad spectrum of observers, including administrators at elite universities, social scientists alarmed at the ways higher education shapes moral identities, and defenders of liberal education who worry the humanities have been drained of their moral dimension.[2] All of this is to say that it is no longer inflammatory, as it was a generation ago, to wonder if the moral education of American undergraduates is a matter of public emergency. In the face of such concerns many suggest that Catholic institutions are better positioned to respond than are their secular peers, whose internal disagreements are so deep as to include the rationale behind the education they claim to offer. Pope Benedict's *ad limina* remarks to American bishops implored them to emphasize character development in Catholic education. His comments echoed statements by Pius XI, the Second Vatican Council, and John Paul II about the centrality of moral education in Catholic institutions of higher learning. A review of recent papal teaching

"Which of the warring gods should I serve?" (Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills [New York: Oxford University Press, 1958], 153) I hasten to add that Weber's amoral vision was imperfectly adopted. As Julie Rueben has chronicled, modern universities never abandoned the idea that they should prepare students to live morally and contribute to the common good. They simply did so fitfully, dispassionately, and lacking substantive agreement on moral norms. See Julie Reuben, *The Making of the Modern University: Intellectual Transformation and the Marginalization of Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[2] For administrative complaints, see Derek Bok, *Our Underachieving College* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); *Task Force on General Education of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University* (2007); *Millennial Values Survey Report* by the Berkeley Center at Georgetown University (2012). For social scientific research, see Perry Glanzer and Todd Ream, *Christianity and Moral Identity in Higher Education* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009); Christian Smith, *Lost in Transition: The Dark Side of Emerging Adulthood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); James Davidson Hunter, *The Death of Character: Moral Education in an Age without Good or Evil* (New York: Basic Books, 2001). For humanistic criticism, see Anthony Kronman, *Education's End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given up on the Meaning of Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Mark Roche, *Why Choose the Liberal Arts?* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010); Martha Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

by Cardinal Raymond Burke concluded: "Special care must be exercised in the teaching of moral theology . . . and to ground students in Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics."[3]

But how should Christians think about teaching ethics in an academic setting? That the question might be said to belong to disciplines outside theology is worrisome, because Christian ethicists often experience difficulty in explaining the pedagogical aims of their discipline. I do not mean to suggest, against mounting evidence to the contrary, that my colleagues in ethics are speechless when asked what they do for a living. I only mean that many struggle to explain what teaching and learning *are* in ways beyond academic slogans and platitudes. Should an ethicist propose that liberal education is about the formation of character, chances are good he will be unprepared to explain how virtue (and which virtues) are formed through the study of ethics. One reason for this I suspect is that so little attention is paid to the activity of teaching ethics itself. It was not always so. A thinker in an earlier age asked, "Can virtue be taught?" The question should interest us still, and not only because Socrates was skeptical that virtue could be taught—a claim that ought to concern all ethicists in its own right—but also because of the history of theological commentary to which it gave rise. Christians were foremost among those who responded to Socrates with proposals about the teacher of ethics. In doing so they turned their attention from rival teachings and toward the act of *teaching*. They asked questions like, How can one person produce moral knowledge in the mind of another? Can virtue be taught or learned? What makes for a good moral educator?

Yet if these questions are now being pursued in other disciplines, Christian ethicists evince no burning interest in a subject that once preoccupied their own. It is revealing, for

[3] Benedict XVI, "Address of His Holiness to the Bishops of the United States of America on Their 'Ad Limina' Visit" (May 2012); and "Meeting with Catholic Educators" (April 2008); Pius XI, "Christian Education of Youth" (1929); *Gravissimum educationis* (Declaration on Education, 1965); John Paul II, "Ex corde Ecclesiae" (1989); and "Excellence, Truth, and Freedom in Catholic Universities" (1979); Raymond Leo Cardinal Burke, "Some Fundamental Aspects of Catholic Higher Education in the Magisterium of Venerable Pope John II and Pope Benedict XVI," *The Thomist* 74 [2010]: 511).

example, that there is little enthusiasm among theologians for that branch of social philosophy concerned with education, a situation that stands in stark contrast with an explosion of Catholic interest in the philosophy of education two generations ago.[4] As a contribution to a theological deepening of this conversation, I wish to hold out the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Although he never wrote a proper treatise on education, Aquinas has much to teach us about the aims of education, the structure of curricula, and the nature of teaching ethics.[5] Since moral education has been a widely discussed topic in Thomistic scholarship following Leonard Boyle's historical work on the composition of the *Summa*, I should take care to note how my proposal stands with respect to it.[6] Boyle's landmark work stands as a guide, not an obstacle, to my attempt here to extend and apply Aquinas's pedagogical arguments beyond the pastoral context Boyle did so much to help us appreciate. If nothing else, I want to show that teachers of theological and philosophical ethics have a great deal to learn from Aquinas's understanding of teaching and virtue even when they teach in environments scarcely envisioned by Aquinas himself. They might particularly come to grasp better what sorts of pedagogical goals are consistent or simply inconsistent with the nature of their discipline, and that is no inconsiderable help for scholars in any field. Aquinas would likely be puzzled by the presence of moral philosophy and moral theology in at least some of today's college curricula, but surely he still has a great deal to

[4] For an extensive bibliography, see Pierre Conway, *Principles of Education: A Thomistic Approach* (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1960), 186-92. See also John L. Elias, "Whatever Happened to the Catholic Philosophy of Education?" *Religious Education* 94 (1999): 92-110.

[5] As Vivian Boland reminds us in his fine study on Aquinas's philosophy of education, *St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Continuum, 2007). For other recent contributions, see Patrick Quinn, "Aquinas' Views on Teaching," *New Blackfriars* 82 (2001): 108-20; Brian Davies, "Aquinas and the Academic Life," *New Blackfriars* 83 (2002): 336-46.

[6] Leonard Boyle, *The Setting of the Summa Theologiae* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982). See also Mark Johnson, "Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* as Pedagogy" in *Medieval Education*, ed. Ronald Begley and Joseph Koterski, S.J. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). More on this below.

say about how to *understand* these activities, as he does so many other practices he could not have imagined.[7]

My argument in pursuit of this goal will be a fairly modest one, namely, that Aquinas can be shown to transform an ancient problem about moral pedagogy, as well as raise concerns about the limits of ethical instruction, particularly when it comes to the impossibility of teaching moral virtue. The essay comes in three parts. In the first I sketch the theological background to Aquinas's views by surveying early Christian thinking about pedagogy and how certain questions in ancient philosophy found expression in Scripture. In the second I discuss Aquinas's proposals about the activities of teaching and learning generally, showing how he responds to both Aristotelian and Augustinian conceptions of the teacher. The concluding section details Aquinas's views on the nature and goals of teaching ethics, in which I explain his distinctive reasons for defending the view that certain intellectual virtues, but not moral virtue, can be taught. The essay closes with some thoughts about the place of ethical instruction in contemporary higher education.[8]

I

Aquinas's views on pedagogy are best understood in light of a history of Western reflection on teaching that begins in ancient philosophy. The Christian moral tradition has long acknowledged the influence exercised on it by Greek philosophy and culture; the forms of thought and expression that enter Christian thinking with the language of the New Testament alone make it impossible to

[7] It is worth recalling that Aquinas argued against those who thought that vowed religious should not offer academic instruction to the laity or teach in "secular" institutions; see *Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem*, II, c. 2. See also *STh,* prologue.

[8] Since the traditional Thomistic view is that the end of the school is a natural end (it is an extension of the family) I will be limiting my remarks to questions of acquired intellectual and moral virtue. Aquinas has profoundly important things to say about the special pedagogical responsibilities of vowed religious, but that topic remains for another time. On the special gifts needed to teach supernatural things see *STh* I-II, q. 68, a.6; and q. 111, a. 4. See also Michael Sherwin, O.P., "Christ the Teacher in St. Thomas's Commentary on the Gospel of John," in *Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005).

imagine the rise of Christianity apart from the influence of the Hellenistic world. This is not to suggest there was an easy harmony between the two cultures, as disputes in Acts 6 testify. But even so, one risks no overstatement in noting that early Christian moral thought is difficult to understand apart from its use of Greek literary forms and categories of thought. While many accounts highlight Christian interest in Greek metaphysical concepts, such as Platonic doctrines of the soul and Stoic views of natural order, another feature of the surrounding intellectual culture was its high view of the teacher or sage, and this too left its mark on the way Christians thought about the moral life.

Those trained in modern ethics sometimes find it difficult to appreciate the importance placed on pedagogy in ancient philosophy. According to Pierre Hadot, the great philosophical schools of antiquity, whatever their doctrinal differences, each represented a way of life that required a transformation of a student's entire being; entering a philosophical school indicated nothing less than a choice to be and live in a distinctive way. Of utmost importance in this conversion was the authority of a teacher or sage. Hadot argued that to embrace a philosophy was not simply to accept its written dogmas—a student would never profess belief in *sola scriptura*, as it were—but to model oneself on a teacher who had perfected the art of living. For it was the *life* of an Epicurus, Zeno, or Socrates that expressed a school's moral vision, and it was that life that allowed students to contemplate wisdom in its truest form. As Aristotle noted, "What more accurate standard or measure of good things do we have than the Sage?"[9]

[9] Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault,* trans. Arnold Davidson (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), 261. Quotation from Aristotle's *Protrepticus* taken from ibid., 195. Linda Zagzebski has recently proposed a virtue theory, drawing on Putnam-Kripke's theory of direct reference, that similarly begins with direct reference to the experience of paradigmatically good individuals (Linda Zagzebski, "Exemplarist Virtue Theory," *Metaphilosophy* 41 [January 2010]: 41-57). Here it is also instructive to notice how often modern philosophy *reverses* this relationship between exemplary pedagogue and pupil. On the ancient model, a student seeking guidance in the conduct of life is effectively admonished, "Find and follow a teacher whose life is exemplary; if necessary, study the doctrines that explain *him*." But on the modern model, a student is often counseled, "Find and follow the true theory; if necessary, find a teacher to explain *it*."

Early Christian thinkers emphasized the continuity of their faith with this pedagogical context even as they insisted it had been superseded. They were especially drawn to the notion that learning to live rightly requires imitating an authoritative teacher; it is intrinsic to the nature of Christian convictions, after all, that Christian lives can be transformed only under the direction of a master.[10] As Werner Jaeger showed, they drew particularly close parallels between the Greek concept of *paideia* and God's saving instructions in salvation history. By understanding God's revelation in resolutely pedagogical terms, Christians could demonstrate how their teachings allowed believers to fulfill the Greek ideal of a person tutored in the highest things.[11] In making these claims, Christians drew on Scripture's witness to Jesus Christ as "Teacher," perhaps the least controversial and most immediately intelligible of his titles in both Jewish and Gentile contexts. The Gospels portray Jesus as the Master who interprets the law of Moses and the Teacher who initiates students into the mysteries of the kingdom of God. Jesus questions, corrects, and lectures, and does so in the manner of a sage. In John 3:2 the apostles proclaim that Christ has "come from God as a teacher" and they reserve for him the title of Rabbi.[12]

But if Christian claims thereby elevated the office of Teacher to previously unimaginable heights, they also threatened to undercut it, because if Scripture calls Christ Rabbi and Teacher, it sends mixed signals on the status of all other teachers. No Christian

As Brad Gregory has recently argued, "the pioneers of modern philosophy paradoxically turned their backs on the inherently social, deeply collaborative character of the learned circles to which they themselves almost always belonged" (Brad Gregory, *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012], 114).

[10] See Stanley Hauerwas, *A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 131.

[11] See Werner Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). For a classic treatment, see A. D. Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 164-92. For apologists like Clement and Justin, the Church thus offered the true philosophy because it was an academy founded by the Pedagogue who was himself the Logos dimly reflected in the teachings of the pagan sages. To become wise, indeed to be a lover of the true and good, now required one to enroll in the school of Christ.

[12] John the Baptist is addressed as Rabbi by his followers at John 3:26 and Luke 3:12.

could be called Messiah. But could they be called Teacher? The New Testament leaves matters curiously unresolved. On the one hand, Jesus declares in Matthew 23:8 that Christians are *not* to call themselves teacher (*rabbi*) and Galatians 3:24 compares life under the Old Law to that of a child under a pedagogue; but life under the New Law, Paul says, is that of an adult no longer in need of a master (*paidagogos*). On the other hand, 1 Corinthians 12:28 and Ephesians 4:11 reserve a special office for the teacher (*didaskalos*) in the Christian community alongside priests and deacons; to this could be added the claims of the author of 1 Timothy 2:7 and 2 Timothy 1:11 that he has been appointed a teacher by God. There is also the ambivalent advice of James 3:1 that few believers should endeavor to become teachers (*didaskalos*). In reflecting on these scriptural tensions, one notices how closely they mirror those in the ambient culture, which was similarly marked by disagreement about the nature of moral education. Socrates' question "Can virtue be taught?" ignited a debate that consumed ancient philosophy because it exposed rival views about the nature of knowledge, politics, and the human good.[13] As a result, the Christian community was forced to confront a set of questions coming from within and without. Can Christians claim to be teachers? Can one person instruct another in virtue? In the Latin church, the most significant patristic attempt to resolve these tensions was Augustine's *De magistro*, a text, we will eventually see, that only raised further questions for later readers.[14]

[13] See *Meno* 82b. For further background, see Boland, *St. Thomas Aquinas*, 24; Thomas Deman, "Socrate dans l'oeuvre de S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 29 (1940): 177-205.

[14] To place Aquinas in this ancient conversation might nonetheless seem misconceived from the start. For one, despite the fact that Aquinas offers Socrates the rare praise of being a teacher of "great excellence," there is probably no avoiding the crude objection that Aquinas's unfamiliarity with a wide range of Plato's texts means he cannot be understood as replying directly to a Socratic question (*STh* III, q. 42, a. 4). This objection is misplaced, however, since not only did Aquinas have a profound, if usually secondhand, appreciation of Platonic writings, but there is good reason to think Aquinas had read the twelfth-century translation of the *Meno* by Henry Aristippus, in which a classic formulation of the Socratic problem is found. A second reason for skepticism is Pierre Hadot's controversial thesis, later somewhat tempered, that medieval Scholasticism broke with the pedagogical project of

II

Aquinas's remarks on teaching are found throughout his work and show him engaged steadily with the theory and practice of pedagogy. While the texts show him turning to the topic at different times, approaching issues by way of different Scholastic genres and motivated by different immediate problems, his views are consistent enough to make chronology and development a peripheral concern. To appreciate just how preoccupied Aquinas was with pedagogy, one has to read no further than the prologues of his two major systematic works, which announce his goal of establishing a sound teaching method (*ordinem disciplinae*). Young teachers might find relief in comparing their own student reports with the harshest teaching evaluation ever composed by a doctor of the Church. The *Summa Theologiae* opens with Aquinas indicating his intention to correct teaching methods he has found useless, boring, and disordered. It is ambiguous (something uncharacteristic of him) whether he is referring to people, texts, or both.[15]

ancient philosophy by turning philosophy into a theoretical examination of abstract propositions (for his partial retraction see Pierre Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy,* trans. Michael Chase [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004], 254). But Hadot's thesis also seems misdirected, and for both historical and hermeneutical reasons. Leonard Boyle's work has provided a great deal of historical confidence for believing the *Summa* was composed and structured as a reform of Dominican moral theology and was chiefly intended to provide pedagogical guidance for Christian preachers and pastors (Boyle, *Setting of the Summa Theologiae*). A more fundamental challenge to Hadot's critique is to see Aquinas's writings as pedagogical exercises in their own right. Mark Jordan has pointed to the dialectical structure of Aquinas's texts, which he reads as providing exemplary patterns of persuasion to Christian wisdom. By this Jordan means that Aquinas's *summae* not only exhort their readers to wisdom but are a school for its practice (Mark Jordan, *Rewritten Theology: Aquinas after His Readers* [Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006], 120). Taken together, Boyle and Jordan give good reasons to think that Aquinas's ethics cannot be fully grasped apart from expressing and directing the practice of Christian pedagogy. As noted above, I think Boyle's work can particularly help teachers better understand the ways in which Aquinas's views about moral education remain relevant (though differently relevant) in a variety of contexts. Boyle never to my knowledge denied as much and I offer the following reading of Aquinas with Boyle's work firmly in mind.

[15] *STh* prologue. All translations taken from *Summa Theologiae*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947).

The prologue of the *Summa contra Gentiles* more explicitly continues the ancient tradition of reflection on the sage discussed above. Aquinas opens with an appeal to aspiring teachers by reflecting upon the "office of the wise," and states that the wise teacher "puts things in their right order."[16] Since for every kind of activity there is a proximate end, the wise person will understand each of these activities in light of a hierarchy of ends. Some teachers are knowledgeable in this or that particular respect, Aquinas says, but those wise "without qualification" understand all things in relation to the end of the universe. The claim seemingly reaffirms Aristotle's idea that wisdom pertains to knowledge and order, and that its mark is the ability to order parts (in the abstract as well as in practice) in relation to the whole, and lower practices in relation to higher practices.[17] Yet Aquinas also offers a subtle pedagogical correction to the philosopher, and this provides an opening into the deeper contours of his philosophy of education. In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle had maintained that a mark of the *sophos* is the ability to teach (διδάσκειν); for each thing is perfect in being able to communicate its likeness to another.[18] The wise are uniquely fit to offer instruction because, as free persons, they move others rather than being moved by them. But where Aristotle regarded teaching as an aristocratic privilege, Aquinas insists it is a responsibility to "speak out the truth" through instruction.[19] The wise are *obligated* both to defend truth and to impugn error, and this noticeably contrasts with Aristotle's idea that the life of wisdom terminates in leisure. In regarding the

[16] *ScG*, prologue. All translations taken from *Summa contra Gentiles*, trans. Anton Pegis et al. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975).

[17] Aquinas summarizes the attributes of the Aristotelian *sophos*: "the wise man is described as one who knows all, even difficult matters, with certitude and through their cause; who seeks this knowledge for its own sake; and who directs others and induces them to act" (I *Metaphys*., lect. 1 [17] [English translation: *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle,* trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961)]). See also *STh* I-II, q. 66, a. 5; and *ScG* I, c. 9; *ScG* II, c. 24.

[18] On teaching, Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 981b9; *Physics* 202b5-20. On causal likeness, Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1049b24. Cf. *ScG* II, c. 20; c. 35.

[19] "Unde sicut sapientis est veritatem praecipue de primo principio meditari et aliis disserere, ita eius est falsitatem contrariam impugnare" (*ScG* prol.; see also *STh* II-II, q. 9, a. 2).

sapientes as diffusive rather than retiring, Aquinas reveals he has fundamentally altered the life of the sage, who must now be dedicated to a special craft. The wise can no longer rest in the contemplation of truth but must perfect the art of transmitting it; they are henceforth bound, in the words of the Dominican motto, "to hand on to others what is contemplated." As Thomas Hibbs notices, by holding the life of a teacher as superior to the speculative life, Aquinas "transforms the practices constitutive of the life of wisdom."[20]

This insight helps us appreciate why the question on teaching in the *Summa Theologiae* is not placed in the *Secunda Pars*, where one might assume it belongs, but with Aquinas's doctrines of creation and providence in the *Prima Pars*. The context of the question is critical in grasping its understated significance. Before asking whether one human being can teach another, Aquinas must explain the various ways creatures are subject to the divine governance. The metaphysics of creation, and in particular its account of how the diversity and inequality of natural kinds reflect God's goodness, informs Aquinas's philosophy of education at every point. His proximate aim is to show how creatures that depend on God for their existence are still capable of free action in their own right. Although all creatures are subject to divine rule, those in possession of intellect and will can actively share in God's governance by being masters of their own actions as well as acting intelligently upon others through instruction or command. Aquinas provides two intriguing examples—child-rearing and teaching—and their placement at the close of the *Prima Pars* provides an arresting pivot into the moral sections of the *Summa*. The first causes other humans to be such that they can seek their end; the second causes truth in a pupil's intellect so that he can be rightly ordered to his end. Both activities, Aquinas demonstrates, share in God's ordering of creation by bringing about movement

[20] Thomas Hibbs, *Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion: Metaphysics and Practice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 115. In this paragraph and the next I am also indebted to ibid., 98, 132.

and change in accordance with a creature's true end, a position he defends with his doctrine of potency and act.[21]

Although states his insight very briefly, it is worthwhile to acknowledge the astonishing reach and depth of its implications: to teach is nothing less than to participate in the divine rule of the universe. His response to a classical debate is first to endow the teacher with a metaphysical significance no Hellenistic sage could have imagined, a position made possible through a Christian doctrine of creation that safeguards and promotes the freedom of rational beings. God has determined some effects to be accomplished contingently, and a special dignity of rational creatures is that they participate in the providential ordering of nature through instructing others. As "teaching animals" human beings are thus distinctive in that God has endowed them with such gifts as to be capable of imitating him through the craft of pedagogy.[22] Teaching participates in causal order in two ways. First, all teachers are transmitters of a body of knowledge that bind them to a tradition of knowledge; the very structure of question 117 makes plain that the ability to instruct others depends upon an order of causality *per accidens* linking a teacher to other wise persons. Second, the teacher stands in an order of causality *per se* that preserves and sustains all created being. Perhaps no pedagogical view of Aquinas is more important than this conviction that the office of the teacher is inscribed into the very fabric of created reality. All theories of education rest upon

[21] *STh* I, q. 117; see also Francis Wade S.J., "St. Thomas Aquinas and Teaching," in *Some Philosophers on Education*, ed. Donald Gallagher (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956), 84. Aquinas notes that human teachers cannot imitate the divine governance in one supremely important respect—by moving the will of another through imparting knowledge—and this will have momentous repercussions for his views about teaching ethics (*STh* I-II, q. 6, aa. 3-5; q. 68, a. 1). "[M]an teaches by outward ministration, but God by inward operation" (*ScG* II, c. 75). For Aquinas, only Divine Wisdom "teaches temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude" (*STh* I-II, q. 57, a. 5).

[22] On man as a teaching animal: "Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government; as a master [*magister*], who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching [*doctores*] to others" (*STh* I, q. 103, a. 6). On man as a learning animal: "Man has a natural aptitude for docility . . . he must carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned" (*STh* II-II, q. 49, a. 3). See also *ScG* III, c. 122.

answers given to fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of human life, even when they avoid advertising them. But Aquinas pushes us to see pedagogy in a genuinely cosmic perspective. A proper understanding of teaching depends upon a panoramic awareness of where rational beings stand in the order of creation.

But how can one human being teach another at all? For this we turn to a work Aquinas composed a decade earlier while a master in Paris.[23] His most thorough treatment of pedagogy, article one of the eleventh disputed question *De Veritate*, summarizes the state of the question by entertaining some eighteen objections. Its placement within the work narrows our focus by requiring us to see teaching within a hierarchy of divine and created minds. The reader approaches the article having been shown in earlier questions that, unlike the divine intellect, whose essence and understanding are one and the same act, the human intellect is in potency until perfected through the good of truth: human knowledge is attained by the intellect's abstraction of universals through sense experience, a capacity rooted in our mind's participation in the exemplary cause of all created things.[24] Only after having established this is Aquinas prepared to inquire into the relation between two created intellects—between a teacher and student—but an important claim is thereby established. Teaching is an art whose end is set by the end of the student's intellect, whose exercise of reason participates in an order of knowing grounded in a divine intellect.

The question is notable in that it represents the closest Aquinas ever comes to authoring a commentary on a work of Augustine; it is conceived as a response to *De Magistro*, from which it borrows its title. For teaching to be possible, Aquinas says a

[23] For historical context, see James Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 362; Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *St. Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, *The Person and His Work,* trans. Robert Royal (rev. ed.; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 65.

[24] Cf. *STh* I, q. 103, a.3.

pedagogue must be the "cause" of knowledge in a student.[25] But is this possible? Augustine's early dialogue had answered in the negative: one man cannot teach another and Christians ought to call no man their master. Through a discussion with his son Adeodatus, Augustine offered an argument, inelegant by the standards of later work, intended to provide a Christian solution to our Socratic problem. Socrates had of course refused to call himself a teacher of virtue because he thought the good life could not be taught. In a way it could be *learned*, but only since a student might be led to recall knowledge of the good glimpsed before birth but since forgotten. No teacher, Socrates protested, could simply transfer moral knowledge into the mind of another, as one might pour water from one container into another; at best, a teacher could act as spiritual midwife to help pupils give birth to knowledge of the good on their own.[26] Versions of these Socratic dilemmas appear throughout Augustine's writings, and some evidence suggests Augustine espoused a recollection theory of truth as a young convert.[27] *De Magistro* states the paradox conventionally: How can a student learn something if he does not somehow know it already? Either a student does not understand what a teacher's word signifies—in which case he learns nothing—or he already knows a word's meaning—in which case the teacher only awakens him to what was previously known. In neither event can a teacher be regarded a genuine cause of knowledge in a pupil. Augustine's most lasting contribution to this problem was to argue that a "teacher" can provide *signs* that help a student attain knowledge by a kind of divine illumination. When a student comes to know something with certitude, Augustine says, his intellect consults (*consulit*) the inward light of truth, and this divine light

[25] *De Veritate,* q. 11, a. 4. All translations from *Truth*, trans. James McGlynn, S.J. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994). "Learning is nothing else than the taking of knowledge from another" (*In Boet. De Trin*., q. 6, a. 1 [English translation: *The Divisions and Methods of the Sciences,* trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1986), 67]).

[26] For the crucial passages in Plato, see *Protagoras* 319b; *Meno* 86b; *Phaedo* 72e; *Symposium* 175d; *Theaetetus* 149a-151d; *Republic* 532e.

[27] On Augustine and recollection, see *Soliloquies* and *Letter 7 to Nebridius*. For a clear rejection of this teaching, see *De Trinitate* 12.4.

alone is a pupil's *magister interior.* All learning is from God, not from a human teacher, and certainly not from the kind of pre-mortal knowledge imagined by Socrates.[28]

Aquinas examines a second approach. On the one side are Socrates and his Platonic heirs, Christian or otherwise, who maintain that learning requires looking inward to a transcendent source of instruction. Bonaventure would later defend a version of this position in a sermon on Matthew 23:8, an interpretation Kierkegaard would subsequently radicalize.[29] On the other side Aquinas finds readers of Aristotle who offer different reasons for a nearly identical pedagogical conclusion. Averroës had equally held that no man could teach another given that all knowledge resides in one "possible intellect." For the Commentator, the fact that individual knowers are not the unique subjects of their own cognitive activity meant that whatever one knower understands is numerically the same as another. It follows that teaching is strictly speaking impossible in that an instructor cannot cause a meaningfully different understanding in the mind of a student; learning is impossible too in that a student cannot acquire knowledge in a manner perfective of his own unique intellect.[30]

It is certainly tempting to read this debate as little more than a proxy dispute over rival positions in epistemology and secondary causality, and what scholarship is devoted to the question has

[28] *De Magistro* 12; see also, *De Trinitate* 14.2; *De Vera religione* 39; *Confessions* 7.16, 23. For a particularly important resolution of the learner's paradox, see *De Trinitate* 8.3. John Cavadini argues that the pedagogical theory of signs found in *De Magistro* is fundamentally overhauled in *De Trinitate*; see "The Quest for Truth in Augustine's *De Trinitate*," *Theological Studies* 58 (1997): 439.

[29] Bonaventure, *Christus unus omnium magister* (*Opera Omnia* 5 [Quarrachi: Typographia Collegii Sancti Bonaventurae, 1882-1902], 567-74); Soren Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, trans. Edna and Howard Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 23ff.

[30] *De Verit*., q. 11, aa. 1, 4. See also *ScG* II, c. 75; and Boland, *St. Thomas Aquinas*, 53. Averroës had held that the intellect must be entirely separate from any corporeal or sensible nature, a position Aquinas finds untenable because it contradicts the indubitable experience of individual acts of understanding. For Aquinas's technical resolution to the problem of how universal objects of knowledge are known through uniquely individual cognitive acts, see *De Unitate intellectus,* c. 5; *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima*, qq. 1-2; *STh* I, q. 76, a. 2; q. 79, a. 5, ad 3.

focused on those issues almost exclusively.[31] I have moved briskly through the familiar arguments, however, convinced that such a reading overlooks the avowedly pedagogical purpose of the question. Because Aquinas settles the dispute by offering concrete guidance for Christian teachers, what should specially interest us is not his theory of cognition, which is more ably defended elsewhere, but his pedagogical theory of signs. Seizing on Augustine's ideas about communication, Aquinas contends that teaching is indeed possible because teachers can imitate God by presenting words, symbols, and examples that bring students to understanding. God's activity with respect to humanity is itself pedagogical—it is to draw rational beings to beatitude through spoken knowledge of himself—and teachers share in his self-communicative life by transmitting truth to students.[32] A teacher accomplishes this, Aquinas explains, through the use of signs that depict reality in such a way that a student can understand its essential metaphysical structure.[33]

So teaching is through language and a teacher is a user of signs. This is one of the three chief functions of language. "One skilled in speech," Aquinas remarks, "should so speak as to teach, to delight, and to change; that is, to teach the ignorant, to delight the bored and to change the lazy."[34] Aquinas pushes further in noting that the right use of language in the classroom corresponds to the

[31] The literature is voluminous, but a representative recent treatment of the eleventh question of *De Veritate* can be found in Martin Pickavé, "Human Knowledge," *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas,* ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 311-26. I do not mean to suggest that such readings of are somehow out of bounds or uncomprehending.

[32] *STh* III, q. 1, a. 1; *ScG* IV, c. 13.

[33] *De Verit*., q. 11, a. 1, ad 2. This move is possible in principle because Aquinas's account of language sees words as standing for the ideas of the intelligible features or species of things. Where Augustine's early dialogue had seen the usefulness of language as limited to drawing attention to the Inner Teacher, Aquinas regards language as a bearer of essential truths. Hence, *De Veritate* could say what *De Magistro* plainly could not: "The words of the teacher . . . have the same efficacy in causing knowledge [hoc modo se habent ad causandum scientiam] as things which are outside the soul" (*De Verit*., q. 11, a. 1, ad 11). See also *STh* I, q. 13, a. 1; V *Metaphys*., lect. 5 (824); Wade, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Teaching," 79.

[34] Aquinas, "Commendation of and Division of Sacred Scripture," in *Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings*, ed. Ralph McInerny (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 5. On speech and teaching, see also *ScG,* III, c. 87; IV, c. 8; and *De Interpretatione,* prologue.

right relationship between the inquiring intellect and reality. For language to instruct a student, it must somehow describe or depict the activity of attaining knowledge. In other words, a teacher ought to employ signs such that a student might understand *how* or *by what means* a knower arrives at truth. Aquinas's idea, then, is that the teacher traces the path which knowers have gone (or would go) in moving from ignorance to understanding. To teach is to display by signs and examples the ideal route a human intellect would take were it to discover (*inventio*) knowledge on its own. In describing this dialectical technique, Aquinas emphasizes the relationship between metaphysical principles and conclusions about *what is* in a given situation. "The key notions of teaching are these: the teacher knows a conclusion as seen in the light of a self-evident principle; he goes through the reasoning process before the student, using signs, words, things, gestures, to manifest his reasoning; the student's natural reason then acts on its own to know what the teacher knows."[35]

In explaining how a student might understand a teacher's signs, Aquinas modifies in a quite revolutionary way Aristotle's claim that all learning depends on previous knowledge. The learner's paradox is solved by establishing a shared starting point and common ground between pedagogue and pupil, located in the first principles of the speculative intellect. A student is capable of learning because his intellect depends on these first principles, and from these "seminal" conceptions of the mind other knowledge arises as if from "seeds."[36] Thus, not only is it impossible to argue with a student who rejects the first principles of knowing; it is also quite impossible to *teach* him. Now Aquinas maintains that these first principles, presupposed in every intellectual operation, are implanted in us by God, and an important pedagogical consequence follows. It cannot be said that a human teacher is the "primary" cause of a student's knowledge. As to whether one man can teach another, Aquinas answers yes, but only in an "external"

[35] Wade, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Teaching," 74. See also Joseph Colleran, *The Treatises "De Magistro" of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas* (New York: Paulist Press, 1945), 105.

[36] See *De Verit*., q. 10, a. 6; *STh* I, q. 84, a. 5; and *STh* I-II, q. 63, a. 1. For the Aristotelian texts, see *Posterior Analytics* 71a1 and *Nicomachean Ethics* 1103a24, 1143b6.

and "secondary" way. Since the natural light of reason is placed in students by God, whose likeness its first principles reflect, God alone teaches "principally" and "interiorly."[37] Jesus' warning that Christians ought not to be called teachers is therefore upheld. As Mark Jordan observes, "A teacher can neither give nor augment that intellectual light; he can only be the external, the supplementary cause which brings those terms and principles from potentiality to actuality."[38]

Another consequence of this argument is that teaching is an activity that aims solely at the good of the student's intellect. The end (*finis operis*) of pedagogy—which is an art—is not found in the development of the instructor, but in fostering the development of the student's natural cognitive powers. Teaching is therefore not a taming, ruling, or conditioning of the student's will or appetite in any direct way (a point to which we will return). A teacher's proper goal, Jacques Maritain commented, is "to foster those fundamental dispositions which enable the principal agent to grow in the life of the mind."[39] Aquinas's favorite model for discussing pedagogy is medicine, and he draws repeated parallels between instruction and healing, going so far to say teaching can be considered a spiritual work of mercy, indeed a kind of spiritual almsgiving.[40] One teaches a pupil much in the same way a doctor heals a patient; both assist nature and succeed only to the extent that they aid a power or faculty in attaining its natural finality. Since the rational soul is in "active potency" to

[37] *De Verit*., q. 11, a. 1, ad 8; *STh* I, q. 117, a. 1, ad 1 and *STh* I, q. 105, a. 3.

[38] Mark Jordan, *Ordering Wisdom: The Hierarchy of Philosophical Discourse in Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 196. Boland comments: "As the teacher, *magister*, does not cause the intelligible light in the pupil, neither does he directly cause the pupil's understanding. What the teacher can do, through the techniques of teaching, is move the pupil to the point where, by the strength of his own mind, he forms intelligible conceptions, the signs of which the teacher proposes externally" (Boland, *St. Thomas Aquinas*, 57).

[39] Jacques Maritain, *Education at the Crossroads* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 39. A teacher's duty, therefore, "is not to shape the will and directly to develop moral virtues" (ibid., 69).

[40] *STh* II-II, q. 32, a. 2. On the connection between medicine and pedagogy, see Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideal of Greek Culture*, vol. 3 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 3-46.

knowledge, teaching should strengthen the intellect and remove impediments to its inherent directedness to truth.[41] Here it should be noted how adamant Aquinas is that teaching be adapted not only to the human *mode* of knowing, which depends entirely upon sense experience, but also to the developmental *stages* of human knowing, whose capacities depend on age, character, and cultural background.[42]

In *De Veritate*, as elsewhere, Aquinas is concerned only with showing teachers how to foster the virtues of wisdom, understanding, and science—those habits that help students to make good judgments about necessary truths. A teacher who offers such instruction does not impart a body of facts or a practical skill, but develops those intellectual virtues that improve a student's ability to see the truth of self-evident propositions and to reason more soundly from principles to conclusions. If one sticks to the letter of Aquinas, one will therefore maintain that a Christian pedagogy will cultivate a student's ability to see reality under the divisions of form and matter, act and potency, and essence and existence; to understand each particular science in its relation to other sciences; and to grasp the relation of parts to their ultimate divine cause.[43] Aquinas's stress on helping pupils to acquire the habit of making sound judgments concerning necessary matters might sound metaphysically restrictive given his belief that knowledge is achieved understanding of a demonstrated science. It was for just

[41] "Therefore, just as the doctor is said to heal a patient through the activity of nature, so a man is said to cause knowledge in another through the activity of the learner's own natural reason, and this is teaching" (*De Verit.*, q. 11, a. 1).

[42] See, e.g., *ScG* IV, c. 55; *STh* I, q. 84, a. 7. "Now the master leads [*ducit*] the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown . . . by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction. . . . For instance, he may put before him [*proponit*] certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples . . . from which the learner is led to knowledge of truth not previously known" (*STh* I, q. 117, a. 1). Since the learning process must be gradual, "the master does not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's capacity and instructs him little by little" (*STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 7). Aquinas's remarks may help us better appreciate Aristotle's vague reference to "visual aids" at *Nicomachean Ethics* 1107a30.

[43] See Herbert Johnston, *A Philosophy of Education* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963), 70. The rule and measure of the intellectual virtues are "things themselves" (*STh* I-II, q. 64, a. 3, ad 2).

this reason that Bernard Lonergan sharply criticized Aquinas's philosophy of education for promoting "an abstract education for abstract human beings." Lonergan complained that "an educational philosophy that appeals to the immutable elements in things, to their eternal properties . . . is defending a negative position. . . . If one appeals simply to what is immutable, then one appeals to what holds equally for the education of primitives . . . and people today." But Lonergan's observations, while not inaccurate in every respect, misread Aquinas, who is merely demonstrating the metaphysical ground on which all genuine teaching and learning occur, not outlining the only legitimate course of study. Newman, for his part, spoke better on Aquinas's behalf when he wrote that a university "is a place of teaching universal knowledge."[44]

III

I opened with the question of whether virtue can be taught. The response of Aquinas is that a teacher can aid in the development of the intellectual virtues of science, understanding, and wisdom, and in doing so specially shares in the self-communicative life of God. It would thus appear that not only can virtue be taught but that teaching virtue is a way of life surpassing almost all others. But this is only a part of Aquinas's answer and the ethical implications of this pedagogy remain undiscussed. Can moral virtue be taught?

Answering this question requires attending more closely to the relationship between intellectual and moral virtue, a distinction traditionally said to correspond to the different powers of the human soul that partake of reason. Some of the rational soul's activities involve the mind's power to know and are perfected by the intellectual virtues, whereas others involve the appetite's

[44] Bernard Lonergan, "The Problem of a Philosophy of Education," in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: Topics in Education* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 9. John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), preface. Although Lonergan was surely aware of the fact, it is worth recalling that the disciplines Aquinas counts as *scientiae* include not only logic, mathematics, and metaphysics but sacred theology, natural philosophy, and ethics.

power to act and feel, and are perfected by the moral virtues.[45] But this division is perhaps not completely explanatory, and even Aquinas refrains from calling both virtues in a univocal sense. There are activities, for example, that might *appear* not to involve a perfection of our sensitive appetite for which we nonetheless offer moral praise and blame—think of the "academic virtues" of attentiveness and open-mindedness, habits of mind for which human beings are typically held morally responsible.[46] For these reasons, drawing the distinction solely in terms of the cognitive versus the volitional and affective powers is unsatisfying to many. Aristotle proposes another, often overlooked way when he says the virtues might be distinguished by their manner of acquisition, and that certain intellectual virtues can be taught whereas moral virtues cannot.[47]

On the matter of teaching virtue Aristotle submits (without argument) that a student can be instructed in wisdom or science, but that temperance, justice, and fortitude are learned only by repeated acts. His point of course is that one becomes morally virtuous not by thinking rightly about the good, but by doing as one ought. If a mark of moral virtue is that it apparently cannot be acquired through academic instruction, only learned by imitation and practice, what does this mean for teaching and studying ethics? In turning to Aquinas's distinctive handling of this question, we observe he is guided partially by Aristotle, who is frankly dubious about the value of these activities. Aristotle famously maintains that teachers must respect the cognitive deficiencies of students and that certain subjects should be studied only at an advanced age. As far as the formal study of ethics goes,

[45] *Nicomachean Ethics* 1103a14-18; *Eudemian Ethics* 1219b27-1220a13; *Metaphysics* 993b20. Cf. *De Virtut.,* q. 1, a. 12, ad 5; *STh* I-II, q. 56, a. 5; and I *Ethic.*, lect. 1 (1118-23).

[46] I am not, to be sure, suggesting that Aquinas would regard such virtues as a refutation of the traditional way of distinguishing between intellectual and moral virtues, since he would identify them as good dispositions necessary for acting well; I am only pointing out that many scholars now regard them (*pace* Aquinas) as cognitive states perfected by the moral virtues (see note 55 below). I am grateful for an anonymous reviewer for urging greater clarity on this point.

[47] *Nicomachean Ethics* 1103a14-18; *Eudemian Ethics* 1220a. Alisdair MacIntyre comments on the importance of this remark in *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 3d ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 154.

he insists it is counterproductive for those who lack self-control and the necessary gifts of nature, a class of people that notoriously includes the uncivilized, women, and workers.[48] But might not moral inquiry produce the habits required for reflecting on the human good? No, Aristotle says, studying ethics depends on the *previous* acquisition of those virtues that subject the passions to the rule of reason—and a student's appetites cannot, strictly speaking, be disciplined through instruction. Enrolling in the fifty-drachma class in ethics is not the first step in acquiring moral virtue.

Aquinas mostly agrees and even says the academic study of ethics is of "no value" so far as moral virtue is concerned.[49] The end of teaching is to strengthen the intellect, not to shape the will; it helps students to make acts of intellectual assent, not acts of choice. But is it not the case that right thinking at least *inclines* a pupil to right action? Is it not true that forming right beliefs *disposes* a student to forming right desires and emotions? One of Aquinas's most important arguments for ethicists is that this is manifestly not the case and that a teacher's imparting of knowledge confers no rectitude to the student's will; indeed, the intellectual virtues (save prudence) can exist without the moral virtues entirely.[50] Aquinas has two reasons for maintaining this strict pedagogical division between intellectual and moral virtue, and together they explain why he recognizes no necessary causal relation between teaching and moral character.[51] First, Aquinas

[48] *Politics* 1259b21-1260a33, 1328b33-1329a2. For Aristotle's remarks on when it is appropriate to study ethics, see *Politics* 1337a1-3; *Ethics* 1095a4-9, and 1142a12-21.

[49] *De Virtut*., q. 1, a. 6, ad 1 (see *Disputed Questions on Virtue*, trans. Ralph McInerny [South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2009]; McInerny translates the text as "little or no avail," but elsewhere he glosses it as "no value"). See also *ScG* I, c. 4.

[50] *STh* I-II, q. 59, a. 4. In taking this position, Aquinas distances himself from Augustine on the relation between knowledge and moral character: "St. Augustine had wrongly held that the will influences intelligence essentially—that there are at least a few truths that can be understood adequately only by those in a high state of virtue. St. Thomas avoided this error and contended that virtue is related to speculative thinking *dispositively*; in other words, by subduing the vehemence of passion . . . it disposes the mind for undistracted and untrammeled activity" (John Hugo, "Intelligence and Character: A Thomistic View," *The New Scholasticism* [1956]: 64).

[51] *STh* I-II, q. 58, aa. 4-5.

argues that a student cannot be properly instructed in particular matters of action (*operabiles*) at all "because the intellect cannot infallibly achieve conformity with things in contingent matters."[52] By this Aquinas means that practical judgments, involving as they do variable and not necessary things, are unfit to be the subject of a demonstrated *scientia*. As Yves Simon puts it, "practical truth . . . can never be the truth of knowledge strictly speaking."[53]

Second, Aquinas says that whereas the will can influence the intellect, the intellectual virtues *in themselves* "do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect [*respiciant*] it in any way," by which he means that speculative judgments operate independently of any exercise of the will.[54] What a student knows can therefore never compel him to act or feel a certain way; the intellectual virtues (save prudence) simply do not require good dispositions of the will to function well. Gregory Reichberg observes that the speculative virtues "enable an agent to perfect his or her skill for theoretical knowing without directing the voluntary utilization of that skill to moral or immoral ends." In this way such virtues can be put to either good or bad use and are "morally neutral."[55] Although it has

[52] "Et quia intellectus non potest infallibiliter conformari rebus in contingentibus, sed solum in necessariis" (*STh* I-II, q. 57, a. 5).

[53] Yves Simon, *A Critique of Moral Knowledge*, trans. Ralph McInerny (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 12. On the impossibility of a moral science of particulars, see VI *Ethic*., lect. 7 (1214); see also Aquinas's remarks about the "incomplete cognition of contingent things" at *STh* I, q. 79, a. 9, ad 3. Alisdair MacIntyre remarks: "This is why we would not meet the practical needs of contemporary plain persons by simply providing them with copies of the Nichomachean Ethics and of Aquinas's commentary, nor even of the Ia-IIae of the Summa" (Alasdair MacIntyre. "Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 66 [1992]: 3-19, at 14). There is an exception to this claim involving those particular precepts of the natural law that would identify particular species of acts as intrinsically evil. I will not enter into the debate here about whether Aquinas endorses the possibility of an act *malum in se*, though I happen to think *STh* I-II, q. 18, a. 2; q. 20, a. 5; and *Quodl*. VIII, q. 6, a. 4 are consistent with the notion, even if he never provides a list of actions whose very object makes them evil. I would like to thank an astute reviewer for reminding me of this point.

[54] *STh* I-II, q. 57, a. 1.

[55] Gregory M. Reichberg, *Moral Choice in the Pursuit of Knowledge: Thomas Aquinas on the Ethics of Knowing* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1991), 213. On the ethical neutrality of the intellectual virtues, see also idem, "The Intellectual Virtues," in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, ed. Stephen Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001), esp. 140ff. "Thus it is clear that habits of intellect are related to will in different ways,

become philosophically fashionable to criticize Aquinas's claim that cognitive states can operate apart from states of feeling or emotion—that even the virtuous intellect neither confers nor requires uprightness of will—Aquinas is adamant that this follows from the fact that particular virtues are seated in different operations of the soul.[56] Given this second position, Aquinas deems the intellectual virtues to be virtues only "in a manner of speaking" (*secundum quid*). They only enable a student to do something—they "confer an aptitude for good operation"—rather than motivate him to exhibit a particular capacity, and thus fail to make their subject fully good.[57]

for some depend on will only for their use, and this is incidental to them. Use depends on will in one way and on such habits as science and wisdom and art in another. These habits do not perfect a man in such a way that he chooses to use them well, but give him only the capacity" (*De Virtut.*, q. 1, a. 7).

[56] *STh* I-II, q. 50, a. 5, ad 2; q. 57, a. 5, ad 3; *De Virtut.*, q. 1, a. 12; II *De Anima,* lect. 6. Since knowledge-seeking is one of several distinct activities pursued by human beings, Aquinas insists that the intellect's desire for truth must be regulated and perfected *in its own right*. Things would thus appear quite differently if he instead regarded intellectual virtues as a species or subset of moral virtues along the lines proposed by Linda Zagzebski's *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. 137-58, 213-17; Jason Baehr, *The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. 206-22; and Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 60, 69, 114. In different ways, each of these authors flatly reject Aquinas's manner of dividing intellectual and moral virtues and thus his claim that cognitive activities can be distinct from the will *in se* despite being voluntary in their exercise. For a sensitive reading that places Aquinas in close conversation with the central theses of virtue epistemology, see Gregory Reichberg, "Moral Responsibility in Knowing," in *Thomas Aquinas and His Legacy*, ed. David Gallagher (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1994), esp. 72-73.

[57] *STh* I-II, q. 57, a. 1; see also *De Virtut.,* q. 1, a. 7, ad 5). The speculative virtues are only virtues in an analogous sense because a virtue properly so-called "is a perfect habit by which it never happens that anything but good is done" (*STh* I-II, q. 56, a. 5). For deft treatments of this topic, see Mary William, "The Relationships of the Intellectual Virtue of Science and Moral Virtue," *The New Scholasticism* 36 (1962): 486; Thomas MacLellan, "The Moral Virtues and the Speculative Life," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 12 (1956): 185ff; and Reichberg, *Moral Choice in the Pursuit of Knowledge*, 213ff. If the acquired intellectual virtues are thus independent of an upright will in the order of specification, their acquisition and use most certainly *do* come under the influence of the will, which Aquinas says must "exercise" the intellect's act (e.g., the intellect is moved [*motus, exercentur*] to begin or cease considering something). But the fact that the will moves the intellect as its efficient cause (*per modum agentis*) is a separate matter entirely and a point many critics of Aquinas fail to grasp (see *STh*

Since Aquinas devotes such little attention to the intellectual virtues (two articles in the *Summa Theologiae*, none on their corresponding vices), his arguments about teaching virtue might be supplemented and hence better grasped by showing how they dictate where ethics is placed in his proposed curriculum. Drawing from a classical sequence, he lists the ideal order of learning (*ordo addiscendi*) as logic, mathematics, natural science, moral science, and metaphysics. A young student is able to study logic and math because they are known by abstraction from sensible things and hence require little experience or imagination to understand. The next stage, natural science or natural philosophy, requires more life experience and greater powers of observation; their study depends on an intellect capable of perception and discernment about natural kinds and their characteristic activities. Finally, with respect to morals and metaphysics, Aquinas argues their study presupposes much experience, a soul free from bodily passions, and a sharp mind.[58] Of ethics Aquinas therefore claims it is an "unprofitable" and potentially "useless" subject for the inexperienced. Of course, students might *claim* to understand practical matters, but Aquinas archly notes that they will only

I, q. 82, a. 4; I-II, q. 16, a. 1; q. 17, a. 6, q. 57, a. 4; *ScG* III, c. 26; *De Verit*., q. 22, a. 12). As Etienne Gilson remarked, "Aquinas was an intellectualist because he never relied on anything other than his intellect in order to know truth. Just as one can see only with his eyes, so he can know only with his intellect; but this truth should not lead us to imagine that man's intellectual life proceeds in him solely from the functioning of his intellect. . . . To forget this fact is also to forget the further fact that there are practical conditions for the achievement of speculative knowledge" (Etienne Gilson, *Wisdom and Love in St. Thomas Aquinas* [Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1951), 5-6). I have left unexamined a vital point about the relation between the *infused* gifts of wisdom, understanding and science and the human will. For Aquinas, only the infused knowledge of the Spirit necessarily redounds on the will, and this is one way human teaching cannot imitate divine teaching (*STh* I-II, q. 69, a. 8; see also *De Virtut.,* q. 1, a. 10, ad 13-14).

[58] For expositions of this proposed curriculum, see *In De causis,* preface; I *Post. Anal*., no. 5; and VI *Ethic*., lect. 7 (1210). For excellent commentary, see Hibbs, *Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion*, 80; Gerard Verbeke, "Arts liberaux et morale d'apres Saint Thomas," in *Actes* (1969): 653-61; and Ralph McInerny, "Beyond the Liberal Arts," in *The Seven Liberal Arts in the Middle Ages*, ed. David L. Wagner (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1983), 257-58.

"speak with their lips" what they "do not understand with their minds."[59]

It is critical for teachers of ethics to appreciate why Aquinas holds this, especially since it is rooted in special features of his moral pedagogy rather than Aristotle's elitism. The argument is that a student ought to have acquired two qualities before entering a class in ethics. In the first place, the student must have attained a degree of moral virtue providing the self-mastery required for dispassionate reflection. As is well known, Aquinas states that a pupil cannot contemplate the human good when "hindered by the impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's intention from intelligible to sensible things."[60] The virtues of docility and studiousness are particularly important where the topic of study acknowledges the passions as both guides and hindrances to knowledge of the good. In the second place, the student must have attained a sound way of perceiving and interpreting the order of nature generally. As is less well known, this picture of the world is not provided by metaphysics—as Benedict Ashley reminds us, those who "rank metaphysics as a kind of prelude to ethics can in no way claim to be following the thought of the Angelic Doctor"—but by the discipline Aquinas variously calls science, natural philosophy, or physics.[61] Thus, a necessary prelude to ethics is a proper perception of the natural world, along with a basic grasp of (Aristotelian) logic that will allow students to order their judgments about the observed world. Teachers of ethics should find it especially interesting that this "background

[59] "non attingunt mente, licet ea dicant ore" (V I *Ethic.*, lect. 1 [38, 40]; and lect. 7 [1210]). Aquinas is not simply repeating Aristotle on this point, however. His comments suggest that such forced disingenuousness involves both teacher and student in a kind of dishonesty, a failure of truthfulness about which Aristotle is not obviously concerned. With this concern in mind, one can see how Aquinas identifies two different kinds of imitation in pedagogy—a wholesome kind with respect to developing moral habits and a potentially vicious kind with respect to developing intellectual habits. As Aquinas remarks elsewhere, "It should be said that virtue is generated by acts that are in a way virtuous and in a way vicious" (*De Virtut.*, q. 1, a. 9, ad 13).

[60] *STh* II-II, q. 180, a. 2. On the importance of temperance for the speculative life, see *STh* I-II, q. 33, a. 3; II-II, q. 15, a. 3; II *Ethic.*, lect. 1 [245]).

[61] Benedict Ashley, *The Liberal Arts in St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1959), 13.

awareness" is cultivated by disciplines that do not emphasize a first-person perspective. While it is true that ethics proceeds by way of reflection on our capacities for intelligent deliberation and choice, Aquinas maintains that a student is not made ready for moral inquiry by an analysis of his own practical, intentional activity. A student properly trains for the study of ethics through the study of *other* forms of life, including the third-person observation of the activities of the human soul.[62]

After having elevated the role of the Christian teacher so far as the intellectual virtues are concerned, Aquinas might now seem to have significantly demoted the teacher so far as the moral life is concerned. Insofar as moral virtue is not acquired by precept or demonstration, how should a teacher regard the goal of teaching ethics at all? And which students does Aquinas think should submit to this course of study? Answers to these questions might appear to move in different, though not opposite, directions and I will begin with the latter.

According to Benedict Ashley, the inclusion of ethics in Aquinas's ideal curriculum corresponds to the need for a liberally educated person to be able to play a leading part in a community's striving for the good. A student must study ethics in order "to recognize and foster civic or legislative steps toward virtue, in which the common good lies."[63] On this broader interpretation, the discipline is appropriate for those to be entrusted with care of the community, rather than, say, those seeking to foster private

[62] Aquinas provides no concrete examples of this type of reflection nor does he pause to explain how such observations provide a fitting entry-point into moral inquiry. I think it likely, however, that he insists that natural philosophy precede the study of ethics for two reasons. First, he means for students to be able to identify created things in terms of their composition of form and matter, and especially to be able to identify a creature's distinctive good in terms of its appropriate natural functions. Practicing rudimentary forms of natural philosophy on plants and animals would thus ready students for dispassionate reflection on the life-form distinctive of rational animals. Second, he places the science of the human soul within the field of natural philosophy, and, as he writes in a commentary, "we cannot arrive at moral science perfectly, unless we know the powers of the soul" (I *De Anima*, lect. 1 [4-7]). Recall that Aquinas places *De Anima* not among Aristotle's philosophical works but among the biological treatises.

[63] Ashley, *Liberal Arts*, 10. Cf. Maritain, *Education at the Crossroads*, 15. On the need for lawmakers to study ethics, see X *Ethic.*, lect. 15 (2163); and III *Polit.*, lect. 3 (374-76).

virtue. Aquinas's brief *ex professo* comments thus suggest that studying ethics is important to prepare students for promoting the flourishing of a shared life; as he says, "it is for the wise man to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but also, and much more, to safeguard [its] foundation."[64] Leonard Boyle has deepened Ashley's arguments by showing that that Aquinas's views on moral pedagogy are firmly grounded in the unique mission of Dominican education. Boyle's magisterial work demonstrates that the moral pedagogy envisioned in the *Summa Theologiae* reflects the fact that Aquinas is speaking as a *magister* in sacred doctrine and to students whose pastoral duties will focus on the threefold magisterial task *legere, disputare, praedicare*. The pupils Aquinas envisaged are those *fratres communes* for whose benefit his work was originally composed.[65]

Does this mean ethicists now working in contexts Aquinas could not have foreseen do not stand to benefit significantly from his proposals about teaching and virtue? The question is not rhetorical and it is difficult to minimize the importance of institutional practices for the disciplines of moral theology and moral philosophy.[66] If the full weight of Aquinas's moral thought likely cannot be transmitted in many academic settings, particularly those critical sections concerned with preaching and

[64] "pertinet ad sapientes viros ut non solum inducant homines ad observantiam praeceptorum, sed etiam multo magis ad conservandum legis fundamentum" (*STh* II-II, q. 22, a. 1).

[65] See Boyle, *Setting of the Summa Theologiae*, 12. For historical background see also Leonard Boyle, "Notes on the Education of the 'Fratres Communes' in the Dominican Order in the Thirteenth Century," in *Pastoral Care, Clerical Education and Canon Law 1200-1400* (London: Variorum, 1981). For comments on Boyle's contributions, see Thomas Hibbs, "Interpretations of Aquinas's Ethics since Vatican II," in Pope, *Ethics of Aquinas*, 412. MacIntyre takes a capacious view of Aquinas's intended audience: "What then is the point of including moral and political philosophy in the curriculum? . . . What is it that [students] have to learn? The answer is: the theory needed to inform the practice of the legislator, the teacher, those responsible for the life of the household, the pastor. . . . Aquinas's purposes in his philosophical and theological writings on morals and politics closely resembled Aristotle's. He too aimed at educating the educators, although primarily pastors, confessors and teachers" (Alasdair MacIntyre, "Aquinas' Critique of Education," in *Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives,* ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty [New York: Routledge, 1998], 104-5).

[66] As Alasdair MacIntyre recently discussed in *God, Philosophy, Universities: A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition* (Lanham, Md.: Roman and Littlefield, 2011).

assigning penance, I hope to have indicated that Aquinas does offer guidance to ethicists concerning what pedagogical goals might be consistent or simply inconsistent with their discipline. Understanding what the study of the ethics can do for "plain" students nevertheless requires looking past some of Aquinas's animating concerns as well as going beyond the plain letter of his texts, and I would advance the following lines of thought as consistent with their *sensus plenior*.

First, Aquinas's arguments strongly imply that the teacher of ethics ought not to aim at behavior modification but at fostering those intellectual virtues that will equip students to make true judgments about necessary matters, as well as to engage in sound moral reasoning. A teacher who cultivates the right habits of mind will help students to see their lives oriented, as a matter of fact, toward certain goods that they have the freedom and power to pursue. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that a student properly initiated into moral inquiry will thus be able to distinguish "between what I would do, if I did what would please me most here and now, and what I would do, if, in the light of the best instruction available to me, I were to do what would make me excellent."[67] Such self-awareness is the mark of a participant in the moral world and involves an acknowledgement that thinking ethically will likely require a modification of existing goals and desires, rather than their uncritical pursuit and implementation. Although this achieved understanding will do nothing to guarantee a student's moral virtue or even incline him to it, Aquinas remarks in an early commentary that moral science can help a mature student "when it is used as a rule of action."[68]

[67] MacIntyre, "Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy," 7. See, e.g., *STh* I, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3; I-II, q. 10, a. 1; and *De Verit.*, q. 24, a. 1. In this respect a teacher can help the student to more fully to know the good, which Aquinas says "is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason" (*STh* I-II, q. 56, a. 2). For brief comments on how to approach the *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa* in light of this pedagogy, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 178.

[68] III *Sent.*, d. 35, a. 3, q. 2. "Hence in the order of specification, the acquired speculative intellectual virtues have but a *remote potentiality* to aid and influence the moral virtues" (William, "The Relationships of the Intellectual Virtue of Science and Moral Virtue," 493). William's insight opens up a potentially fruitful path for further inquiry.

Second, while a student can come to understand universal judgments about what ought to be done or avoided, as well as what virtues are perfective of human nature, Aquinas maintains that this knowledge does not in itself provide students with the ability to see the demands of the good in particular contexts. In point of fact, the very universality and immutability of the first principles prevents their immediate utility apart from the application of conscience.[69] It follows that a teacher cannot reliably help a student draw the secondary distinction, in MacIntyre's words, "between what it would be to achieve what is good and best unqualifiedly and what is good and best here and now for me, at my stage in the education of my capacities, to do."[70] And this is no small thing, because the prudential knowledge needed to reason rightly about things to be done is knowledge a teacher can provide in only exceptional cases. When it comes to discerning what is to be done in singular circumstances there is simply no course of instruction available; such knowledge being incommunicable, it cannot be imparted in a lecture nor committed to the page: "We have arrived at the level of singular thought, where there is no science and where practical discourse is fulfilled."[71]

* * *

If the modest lessons I have drawn from Aquinas's moral pedagogy are sound, I think it likely that Catholic institutions,

[69] Aquinas remarks that to "reason aright about particular cases" it is not enough to know the "universal principles of action" (*STh* I-II, q. 58, a. 5). Yves Simon comments: "Thus, practical truth, whose attainment is ensured by the virtues of art and prudence, can never be the truth of knowledge strictly speaking" (Simon, *Critique of Moral Knowledge*, 12). See also Charles O'Neill, "Prudence: The Incommunicable Wisdom," in *Essays in Thomism*, ed. Robert Brennan, O.P. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), 192.

[70] MacIntyre, "Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy," 7. Again, there is an exception for those particular precepts of the natural law that identify particular species of acts as intrinsically evil.

[71] Simon, *Critique of Moral Knowledge*, 40. Aquinas writes that prudence "is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as the prudent man would appoint it" (*STh* I-II, q. 59, a. 1). None of this is therefore to obscure the fact that a student should take counsel from the learned (*STh* II-II, q. 49, a. 3).

teachers, and students could all benefit from paying closer attention to Aquinas's reasons for having little confidence in a necessary causal relationship between knowledge and moral character. The kind of excellence acquired through the formal study of ethics would (and must) remain a strictly intellectual excellence—a defense against cognitive error, to be sure, but not against deliberate falsification, wrong use, or moral evil.[72] Although this was a lesson first delivered in Aquinas's *studium* I am persuaded it should strike Christian ethicists today with renewed force and urgency, especially those convinced that the path to cultural renewal is paved by instruction in wholesome moral theory and forgetful that "a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the virtue."[73] Yet recognizing just *this* provides at least one good reason that recent papal teaching is right to insist on the centrality of ethics in Catholic institutions of learning. As Ralph McInerny wrote, the study of ethics "is thus of restricted utility. But one of its most useful lessons is that the kind of thought that goes into [it] is *not* the kind of that is identical with virtue."[74] Does Aquinas thus argue that the teacher of ethics can help a student to know better, but is of no help in being better? Is Aquinas a Weberian *avant la lettre*? Of course not; a wise teacher will always put a student's intellect in right order. Aquinas instructs us, however, that a pedagogue's moral influence will not be primarily through precept or demonstration. It will more likely be found

[72] William, "The Relationships of the Intellectual Virtue of Science and Moral Virtue," 486. Compare, for example, *STh* I-II, q. 58, a. 2 with Martha Nussbaum's confidence in the moral effects of studying ethics: "Argument doesn't just provide students with reasons for doing thus and so; it helps to make them more likely to act in certain ways, on the basis of certain motives. In this very deep way, it produces people who are responsible for themselves, people whose reasoning and emotion are under their own control" (Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity*, 29-30).

[73] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 6. Cf. John Henry Newman, "Knowledge of God's Will without Obedience," in *Parochial and Plain Sermons* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 1:22-30.

[74] Ralph McInerny, *Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,* rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 122, emphasis added. Nor (*pace* Aristotle) is the exercise of the speculative virtues sufficient for complete happiness, even if "they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss" (*STh* I-II, q. 3, a. 6; q. 57, a. 1; *ScG* III, c. 48).

where the ancients and early Christian thinkers always insisted in would be found—in the exemplary character of a teacher's life. If ethicists have somehow forgotten, it will be good for them to be reminded that "example moves more than words."[75]

[75] *STh* I-II, q. 34, a. 1. "In practical matters the truth of a man's assertion is tested more by deeds and his way of living than even by argument, because the dominant or principal factor in practical affairs consists in them, i.e., deeds and way of life. For in questions of this kind our principal aim is not knowledge but conduct. . . . This is why we ought to consider what has been said by comparison with the actions and life of the philosophers. Statements in keeping with the conduct of the philosophers should be accepted. . . . But if their actions are not in accord we should suspect that their words lack truth" (X *Ethic.*, lect. 13 [2132]; cf. John 13:15).

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MCDOWELL AND AQUINAS: PHILOSOPHICAL CONVERGENCES

GAVEN KERR

Queen's University / St. Malachy's Seminary
Belfast, Northern Ireland

IN THIS ARTICLE I shall explore the philosophical convergences between the thought of the great thirteenth-entury Dominican theologian St. Thomas Aquinas and that of the twentieth-century analytic philosopher John McDowell. In particular, I shall argue that the philosophical issues motivating McDowell's closing of the gap between mind and world can be seen to have been anticipated and addressed in a similar fashion by Aquinas. By way of an introduction, and in order to set the context of the ensuing philosophical discussion by indicating the conclusion at which I hope to arrive, we can read the salutary message behind the following text from *Mind and World*;. In *Mind and World* McDowell makes the following claim: "Before the modern era, the idea that knowledge is a normative status was not felt to stand in tension with, say, the idea that knowledge might be the result of an exercise of natural powers."[1]

The context of this passage is McDowell's elucidation of his own conception of naturalism. He wants to depict a type of naturalism that does not 'disenchant' or disrobe nature of conceptual content, yet he does not want to enchant the natural realm to such an extent that he supernaturalizes it. Within the more general context of his philosophical project, McDowell wants to avoid a conception of the human being as a minded

[1] John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 80 n. 12.

entity thoroughly detached from nature, yet with one foot in the natural realm, as it were; he carves out a middle path between bald naturalism and what could be called 'supernaturalism'. Such a path should be seen as indicative of the more general desire, to the fore in McDowell's work, of avoiding the myth of the Given.[2] McDowell wants to depict the mind/world relationship as one wherein our concepts have empirical content, but not as construed by traditional empiricism. The latter, claims McDowell, falls foul of the myth of the Given, holding the view that mind is thoroughly juxtaposed to sensibility, but acquires empirical content through impingements from a conceptually naked Given. McDowell wants to hold that there is no such dipolarity to the minded individual, that one can be a minded individual living within a natural realm and engaging with the world by means of one's mental powers. Such a conception of human rational engagement seeks to avoid the entailment of two *sui generis* spheres, fundamentally distinct, yet somehow interacting so that our concepts can be taken as 'world involving' and our perceptions can be taken as 'concept involving'.

As noted, McDowell indicates that in the premodern era the dualistic view of man, having one foot in a natural realm and another in a normative realm, was not envisaged. The premodern view, particularly that influenced by Aristotle, looked at man as part and parcel of the natural world: though man engages with the natural world in a special way, one that is cashed out in terms of his rational agency, he is inherently part of the natural world. Thinkers inspired by Aristotle were not (and are not) beset with anxieties concerning how two *sui generis* spheres, one of reasons/normativity/justifications and one of nature/laws/facts, could interrelate such that the latter could provide justifications

[2] Following McDowell's usage, I shall use a capitalized 'G' when speaking of the Given as it appears in the myth of the Given, and a lower case 'g' when speaking of what is received in sensory experience. For a concise yet helpful account of what McDowell takes the myth to entail, see *Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2009), Essay 14, 'Avoiding the Myth of the Given', § 1. The terminology is of course Sellars's, whose essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (chap. 5 in *Science, Perception and Reality* [New York and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963]) is a robust attack on the myth of the Given.

for the former. Thus, Aristotelian-inspired conceptions of rationality tend not to involve questions of how to bridge the gap between mind and world.

The upshot of all of this is that when Aristotelian philosophers, both past and present, engage in discussions of man's ability to know the world, they do not view the intellect as standing aloof from the world yet somehow trying to derive justifications from it. They look upon the intellect as a natural power of an agent living within the world and capable of knowing it through the exercise of such power. It is a tantalizing suggestion then that, not sharing the prejudices of a thoroughly modern outlook, Aristotelian conceptions of the mind/world relationship could offer some enlightenment to contemporary epistemological problems—particularly when such problems are raised in discussions the goal of which is to avoid the anxieties that only emerge when a modern presupposition of the separation and juxtaposition of mind and world is made.

McDowell wishes to tidy up contemporary epistemological discussions by pointing out that some problems only emerge when certain presuppositions are made. In particular, he argues that the problem of crossing the bridge from mind to world is, to a certain extent, a result of modern presuppositions as to the mind/world relationship, and if such presuppositions can be rejected, then we can face the epistemological aspect of the mind/world relationship afresh. Given that premodern philosophers, particularly those influenced by Aristotle, did not envisage the mind/world relationship as one in which a chasm separating a realm of fact from a realm of reasons had to be crossed, it is natural to think that there could be fruitful interaction between McDowell's work and that of contemporary philosophers influenced by the premodern tradition.

As indicated, the philosopher I have in mind is Thomas Aquinas. In order to show how there can be fruitful interaction between the thought of McDowell and that of Aquinas, I shall argue as follows. In part I, I shall point out three convergences between the thought of Aquinas and that of McDowell: (i) that

McDowell's view of experience as involving a spontaneity in receptivity is a view that is by and large characteristic of the Thomistic conception of the mind/world relationship, (ii) that support for the unboundedness of the conceptual (a characteristic McDowellian position) is to be found in Aquinas, and (iii) that McDowell's (later) affirmation between the possession of conceptual content and the recognition of such can also be found in Aquinas. Rather than presenting these as interesting historical convergences of two seemingly diverging philosophical positions, I shall argue (part II) that the Thomistic conception of the mind/world relationship, while in accord with McDowell's conception of the issues outlined above, allows the Thomist to advance the further claim, not supported by McDowell and in fact explicitly denied by him for Wittgensteinian reasons, that the cognitive act by which we grasp conceptual content is one of abstraction.[3] Thus, not only will Thomistic epistemology be seen to have a place in contemporary epistemological discussions, it will also be seen to add to such discussions by making room for a notion of abstraction, one that is not easily undermined by post-Wittgensteinian developments in philosophy. Finally (part III), I shall conclude that the convergences between the thought of Aquinas and that of McDowell bring to light three interesting conclusions for contemporary epistemology: (i) that there can be a form of realism intermediate between extreme realism and idealism, (ii) that one can adopt a form of abstractionism not beset with the problems that motivate McDowell to reject abstraction, and (iii) that we must rethink the way in which we engage in the epistemological enterprise.

[3] See *Mind and World*, 7 and 20, for McDowell's denial of abstraction. Essentially, McDowell argues that the believer in abstraction falls foul of the moral behind Wittgenstein's private-language argument, and thereby falls into the myth of the Given, whereby it is a private piece of the given (abstracted no doubt) that plays the justificatory role in our knowledge. This denial of abstraction is influenced by Geach's reading of Wittgenstein, which is all the more interesting since Geach himself is a philosopher heavily influenced by Aquinas.

I. MCDOWELL AND AQUINAS

A) McDowell

I have already alluded to McDowell's desire to avoid a conception of the mind/world relationship that characterizes man as having a foot in nature and a foot in some mental sphere. McDowell believes that such a conception goes hand in hand with the myth of the Given. The myth of the Given suggests that in order for our conceptual thought to have empirical content—to face the tribunal of experience—there must be an impingement from the Given on our thoughts. This is turn presupposes that the realm of thought is a bracketed sphere, thoroughly detached from the Given, yet suitably disposed to receive content from it. The conceptual sphere then comprises the sphere of reasons, concepts, justifications, etc., whereas the Given is enclosed within a sphere comprising facts, laws, nature, etc. By McDowell's lights, the problem with such a dualistic scheme is that empirical content (signified by the Given) cannot provide justification for thought. Justifications, in this framework, belong within the space of reasons, and this space is wholly juxtaposed to the Given; impingements by the Given on the space of reasons cannot then be justificatory in nature, since justificatory work is done within a space wherein conceptual content is present. But since *ex hypothesi* the space wherein conceptual content is present (the space of reasons) is juxtaposed to the Given, the Given cannot justify our knowledge of empirical reality. Consequently, if the burden of justification is placed squarely on the shoulders of the Given, justification will not be forthcoming, and one will have two *sui generis* spaces, one of reasons and one of facts, pushing against each other, with no meaningful interchange. The result is that the Given does not offer justifications but exculpations.[4]

[4] Ibid., 8: "What happens there [at the boundary between the conceptual sphere and the Given] is the result of an alien force, the causal impact of the world, operating outside the control of our spontaneity. But it is one thing to be exempt from blame, on the ground that the position we find ourselves in can be traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite another thing to have justification. In effect, the idea of the Given offers exculpations where we wanted justifications."

The myth of the Given is a result of a certain anxiety about the empirical content of our thought. Unless our thought has some sort of constraint by the world, it is, to use McDowell's metaphor, free to spin frictionlessly in the void. The Given, by contrast, was meant to introduce friction and make our thought at least answerable to the world.[5] In rejecting the Given, McDowell does not wish to reject the view that empirical content offers justification for thought, for that would be to reinstitute the familiar anxieties concerning a lack of empirical constraint for thought that call upon the Given for their resolution.[6] Rather, what McDowell envisages is a conception of what is given in experience that successfully navigates the poles of (i) viewing experiential intake of the world as a nonconceptual Given, and (ii) denying any relevant justificatory role to experiential intake (the latter being a type of coherentism that McDowell ascribes to Donald Davidson).[7]

McDowell's task is clear: while avoiding the Given he must allow for there to be some rational constraint on thought, otherwise thought spins frictionlessly in the void. Now in order to allow for a rational constraint on thought, one must combine two seemingly opposite factors: receptivity of intake from the world and spontaneity in our understanding. That is to say, we take in (receive) content from the world, while at the same time having the freedom of spontaneity to think about the world as we like. The temptation of the Given is apparent: if we are free to think of

[5] Ibid., 11: "What generates the temptation to appeal to the Given is the thought that spontaneity characterizes exercises of conceptual understanding in general, so that spontaneity extends all the way out to the conceptual contents that sit closest to the impacts of the world on our sensibility. We need to conceive this expansive spontaneity as subject to control from outside our thinking, on pain of representing the operations of spontaneity as a frictionless spinning in a void. The Given seems to supply that external control."

[6] Ibid., 8-9: "It can seem that if we reject the Given, we merely reopen ourselves to the threat to which the idea of the Given is a response, the threat that our picture does not accommodate any external constraint on our activity in empirical thought and judgement. It can seem that we are retaining a role for spontaneity but refusing to acknowledge any role for receptivity, and that is intolerable. If our activity in empirical thought and judgement is to be recognizable as bearing on reality at all, there must be external constraint. There must be a role for receptivity as well as spontaneity, for sensibility as well as understanding."

[7] See *Mind and World*, Lecture 1, § 8, for a summary of the standoff between these two positions.

the world as we like, there is a tendency to think about the world in any exotic sort of way, in which case what we receive in sensory experience is a Given that places a constraint on thought. Owing to his rejection of the Given, McDowell paints a different picture. While recognizing that there are roles to play for both receptivity and spontaneity, the spontaneity of thought is not seen as a spontaneity practiced on a nonconceptual Given. Rather, in McDowell's picture conceptual capacities come into play in receptivity: they are drawn upon in the reception of content from the world.[8] The mind/world relation then is one wherein the subject with his or her conceptual capacities rationally engages with the world and in such rational engagement his or her conceptual capacities are drawn upon. In the ideal situation, when the subject experiences the world as thus and so, he or she conceptualizes the world as thus and so; in which case the spontaneity of thought is constrained to think of the world as thus and so.

Experience is thus not the reception of a conceptually naked Given, but the appearance of the world to the subject as thus and so, that is, as conceptual, and the engagement of the subject with such conceptual content by bringing his or her conceptual capacities into play. What is given then in sensory experience is not the Given, a naked presencing of the world to the subject, but a given that is imbued with conceptual content, a world that conceptually appears and brings into operation the subject's conceptual capacities. On this account, the sensorily given can offer justifications, as opposed to exculpations, for our knowledge, since knowledge (our understanding of the world as thus and so) will be answerable to what is given in sensory experience (the world as thus and so). The upshot of McDowell's account is that it obviates the oscillation between sheer Givenness and a coherentism that denies any relevant justificatory role to sensory intake.

What is entailed by this account, however, is that conceptual content is not restricted to a space of reasons wherein the spontaneity of thought is operative, but that conceptual content is

[8] *Mind and World*, 9-13.

present in the world, independent of the space of reasons as it were.[9] What we are offered is the affirmation of the conceptual as unbounded and the denial of nonconceptual content (cf. *Mind and World*, chaps. 2 and 3). For the purposes of this article, I do not wish to focus in-depth on McDowell's defence of these mutually entailing views.[10] It is enough for a positive appraisal of McDowell's position in relation to Aquinas's to note simply *that* McDowell holds these views; if one can agree with McDowell on these views, then the connection between McDowell and Aquinas will not be too difficult to accept. I will however draw from one objection to McDowell's view in order to clarify his (changing) thought on the nature of conceptual content.

In *Mind and World*, chapter 3, McDowell mentions one of the factors motivating Gareth Evans's defence of nonconceptual content, to the effect that brute (nonrational) animals have the same perceptual experience as ourselves, and even though they do not conceptualize the world around them we should not like to say that the content of a brute's experience of an object is any different from the content of a human's experience of the same object.[11] Arthur Collins draws out the appeal of Evans's position by proposing a thought experiment. Suppose that a rational

[9] Ibid., 26: "Although reality is independent of our thinking, it is not to be pictured as outside an outer boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere. *That things are thus and so* is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the subject of the experience is not misled, that very same thing, *that things are thus and so*, is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world"; ibid., 34: "But I am trying to describe a way of maintaining that in experience the world exerts a rational influence on our thinking. And that requires us to delete the outer boundary from the picture."

[10] One can follow his defence of these views against Evans, Peacocke, et al. not only in *Mind and World*, chapters 2 and 3, but also in the book symposium on *Mind and World* in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 58, no. 2 (1998), where he repeats (and clarifies) his thought in response to several significant interlocutors in the debate.

[11] For McDowell's treatment of Evans and the nonconceptual content we share with animals see *Mind and World*, 47-49ff.; for Evans, see *The Varieties of Reference*, ed. John McDowell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 122-29. Note in particular the following wherein Evans claims that certain features of human perception are shared with animals: "The operations of the informational system are more primitive. Two of them, after all, we share with animals; and I do not think we can properly understand the mechanism whereby we gain information from others unless we realize that it is already operative at a stage of human intellectual development that pre-dates the applicability of the more sophisticated notion" (ibid., 124).

individual sees a cat on the mat. Not only does he or she see the cat on the mat, in which case he or she experiences the world as conceptual, the world as thus and so, but he or she also sees *that* the cat is on the mat, that is to say, there is propositional content to the individual's seeing the cat on the mat, expressible in terms such as the following: "I see that there is a cat on the mat." Now suppose that a brute animal sees the cat on the mat. It is true to say that the brute experiences the cat's being on the mat, but, given that it is a *brute* animal, it is not true to say that the brute sees *that* the cat is on the mat.[12] In other words, both the brute animal and the rational animal experience the same thing, in which case, at some basic level, they have the same content in experience. And if the brute animal's experience of the same state of affairs does not draw into operation conceptual capacities, thereby indicating that the content of such experience is nonconceptual, then the content of the rational animal's experience, as in some minimal sense identical with the brute's, must also be nonconceptual. In *Mind and World* at least, conceptual content for McDowell is propositional content, such that, experience of the world as thus and so and thereby as justifying a thought about the world is seeing *that* the world is thus and so.[13] Of course, Collins's proposal (following Evans) does not necessarily entail that there is nonconceptual content, only that the content of an experience of a cat on the mat cannot be conceptualized and worked up into a judgment by nonrational animals; in other words, the conceptuality of the content of experience can be present, even though the brute is not equipped to pick up on it. Nevertheless, this objection does raise the issue of the distinction between conceptual content and conceptualized content, that is, the distinction between there being conceptual content and the picking up on conceptual content. In *Mind and World* at least, McDowell seems to conflate two distinct issues:

[12] Arthur Collins, "Beastly Experience," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 58, no. 2 (1998): 377. I here of course abstract from the issue of which animals are exactly brutes.

[13] Collins points out McDowell's conflation of conceptual content with propositional content, and indicates that such a conflation will be a stumbling block for those who are sympathetic to McDowell's views (ibid., 379).

experience being of something conceptual (a type of experience we share with brutes), and the conceptualization of the world, seeing *that* the world is thus and so. For the most part, McDowell treats conceptual content as synonymous with propositional content.[14]

I focus on this issue because it is important to understand the development of McDowell's thought after the publication of *Mind and World*. This development begins with his Woodbridge Lectures, delivered in 1997, originally published in the *Journal of Philosophy* in 1998, and now published in *Having the World in*

[14] However, notice the following from *Mind and World*, 48-49: "According to the picture I have been recommending, the content of a perceptual experience is already conceptual. A judgement of experience does not introduce a new kind of content, but simply endorses the conceptual content, or some of it, that is already possessed by the experience on which it is grounded." It would seem that here McDowell is prepared to recognize a stage of rational engagement that carries with it conceptual content, and a stage whereby such content is recognized (endorsed?) as conceptual, or conceptualized. Furthermore, McDowell suggests (ibid., 49 n. 6) that given the richness of experience the judgment of experience "selects from the content of the experience on which it is based," thereby suggesting that the judgment of experience occurs at a different stage from the experience itself, which is to say that experiencing the world as thus and so is a necessary though not sufficient condition for recognizing the world as thus and so. However, the foregoing is at odds with the general picture in *Mind and World* that the recognition by judgment of the conceptual content of experience is somewhat automatic, since the spontaneity of understanding is drawn upon immediately in experience; this more general picture does not appear to include the deliberation that would be required for the judgment of experience to endorse the conceptual content of experience. Indeed, within McDowell's account of second nature experience goes hand-in-hand with conceptual capacities. Insofar as we experience within the context of a second nature it is not the case that we have an experience, conceptually imbued no doubt, which the judgment of experience endorses, as the above passage (*Mind and World*, 48-49) would suggest. Contrast the foregoing quotation with what McDowell says a little later (ibid., 62): "According to the position I am recommending, conceptual capacities are *already* operative in experience itself. . . . Having things appear to one a certain way is *already* itself a mode of actual operation of conceptual capacities" (emphasis added). The use of "already" is striking here. Whereas before (ibid., 48-49 and the relative footnote) McDowell held that the judgment of experience endorses the content of experience—indicating a logical priority of experience to judgement—the passage just quoted (indicative of what I call the general picture) holds that conceptual capacities are "already" operative in experience, in which case there is no priority of one over the other. There is something of a tension here in McDowell's thought; nevertheless, the suggestion, borne out in the previous passage, that there is some sort of priority of experience to the judgment of experience, is indeed a valuable suggestion and one whose epistemological import has come to the fore in McDowell's more recent thought.

View.[15] In these lectures, McDowell reiterates his view that in experience conceptual capacities are brought into operation. Experience of the world carries with it content that actualizes our conceptual capacities. Experience as such contains a claim about the world, the world as thus and so. However, although experience contains a claim, it does not make a claim—it is judgment, a further act, that makes a claim about the world.[16] Thus, in the ideal scenario we see a red cube in front of us; this seeing contains a claim: this red cube. It is a further act of judgment that makes the claim: there is a red cube in front of me. This is the traditional Kantian distinction between intuition, which is in immediate contact with objects, and judgment, which seeks to direct our thought to objects.[17] Having said this, McDowell believes that the distinction between intuition and judgment does not entail a similar distinction in the content of each.[18] Focusing on the following passage from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, McDowell argues that the content of intuition and the content of judgment are identical: "The same function which gives unity to various representations *in a judgement* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*."[19]

In *Mind and World,* McDowell locates the conceptuality of experience in its drawing our conceptual capacities into operation. McDowell retains this position in the Woodbridge Lectures and he holds that, insofar as the above quotation from Kant is true, the content of intuition is the same content as that of judgment, since the same conceptual capacities are drawn upon in both intuition and judgment. Thus, an intuition represents an individual as a this-

[15] *Having the World in View*, part 1, essays 1-3 comprise the Woodbridge Lectures. Lectures 1 and 2 are the most significant for our present purposes.

[16] Ibid., 10-11, 30-31.

[17] McDowell's entire discussion is a sustained engagement with Sellars's reading of Kant and what he (McDowell) believes to be a deficiency in that reading. For the purposes of this article, I shall not focus on McDowell's views on Sellars; I shall instead concentrate on McDowell's own positive views.

[18] Sellars's view is that intuition carries with it a type of content that is proto-conceptual, capable of being worked up into a judgment; it is precisely this view that McDowell seeks to avoid.

[19] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Houndmills-Basingstoke-Hampshire: Palgrave, 1929), A79/B104-5.

such (e.g., this red cube); as representing an individual in such a fashion, it exercises two conceptual capacities, one for color and one for shape, in a certain mode of togetherness that contains a claim about the world. Judgment then makes the claim that the world is thus and so (e.g., that there is a red cube); the conceptual capacities exercised in judgment, whose content is found in the *oratio obliqua* clause, are the same as those exercised in intuition: one for color and one for shape, in the same mode of togetherness. And, as Kant points out, given that it is the same function that gives unity to our representations in a judgment as it is that gives unity to the synthesis of appearances in intuitions, the content of intuition and the content of judgment, as exercising the same conceptual capacities in the same mode of togetherness, is thereby the same content across the board. Thus, a seeing of *x* (the world as thus and so) exercises the same conceptual capacities as a judgment that *x* (that the world is thus and so).[20] What differs is the mode whereby the content is held in either intuition or judgment. In intuition the content, the actualization of conceptual capacities, is involuntary, whereas in judgment, the content is voluntary—we make up our minds in judgment and endorse the content of intuition.[21] Nevertheless, the content is the same across intuition and judgment, and the content is such that it is neither protoconceptual nor nonconceptual; it is conceptual, for it permits the actualization of conceptual capacities, whether in intuition or judgment.

[20] *Having the World in View*, 33-34: "The fact that, say, 'cube' figures in a specification of the content of an intuition—the intuition represents its object as that red *cube*—reflects the fact that for one to be the subject of such an intuition is in part for there to be actualized in one's sensory consciousness the very same *conceptual* capacity—possession of the concept of a cube—whose exercise would partly determine the predicative element in the content of a judgement whose content we could specify . . . in the form 'That is a red cube'. In fact the actualization of the relevant conceptual capacity in the intuition *is* an actualization of it in a conceptual occurrence whose content is, so to speak, judgement-shaped, namely a seeing (a seeing that . . .) whose content is that there is a red cube *there*. This seeing that . . . in describing which we explicitly place an expression for the concept in question in predicative position, is the very same conceptual occurrence—an actualization of the same conceptual capacities with the same 'logical' togetherness—as the intuition."

[21] Ibid., 12, 35, 44.

In “Avoiding the Myth of the Given” (originally published in 2008 in *Experience, Norm and Nature*, now republished as Essay 14 in *Having the World in View*), McDowell reiterates much of what he said in the Woodbridge Lectures regarding intuitional and propositional content, and he explicitly rejects the view that experience has propositional content.[22] He distinguishes between intuition and judgment by pointing out that the latter is a discursive activity that makes the content of intuition explicit, whereas the former is not discursive, but given in a way that avoids the myth of the Given.[23] Now, as is clear, for McDowell, the way in which the content of experience can be given without falling into the myth of the Given is if such content is conceptual. However, in distinguishing intuition from judgment—the paradigm of conceptual activity—and denying the discursive nature of intuitional content, it would appear that McDowell has fallen into the trap of affirming nonconceptual (intuitional) content and thereby verged into the Given.[24] However, McDowell argues that, though intuition is not a discursive activity, the content of intuition is conceptual, insofar as it is present in a way that can be suitably associated with the content of a discursive activity.[25] This is a key point: intuition carries with it content that is conceptual insofar as it brings the world into view and can play a role in a judgment that the world thereby brought into view is thus and so. Thus McDowell claims at the end of “Avoiding the Myth of the Given” that intuition (experience) does not tell us that

[22] Ibid., 258: “I used to assume that to conceive experiences as actualizations of conceptual capacities, we would need to credit experiences with *propositional* content, the sort of content judgements have.” In the same passage, McDowell sets out another assumption of his, namely, that the content of experience would need to include everything the experience enables its subject to know noninferentially, such that the content of an experience would not only possess a claim, but also make a claim, that is, set forth a proposition, so to speak. No doubt these assumptions are connected, but it is the assumption, which he goes on to rescind, that the content of experience is propositional on which I shall focus.

[23] Ibid., 262: “We should centre our idea of the conceptual on the content of discursive activity. Now intuiting is not discursive, even in the extended sense in which judging is. Discursive content is articulated. Intuitional content is not.”

[24] Ibid., 264: “If intuitional content is not discursive, why go on insisting it is conceptual?”

[25] Ibid.: “Every aspect of the content of an intuition is present in a form in which it is already suitable to be the content associated with a discursive capacity, if it is not—at least not yet—actually so associated”; see also ibid., 265-67 for the same.

the world is so (propositional content), but rather brings the world into view so that we may be entitled to make the claim that the world is so. Nevertheless, the content of an intuition is the content of a judgment, worked up into a discursive form by the subject; and this is to recognize the distinction, not made explicit though at times envisaged in *Mind and World* (cf. n. 14 above), between having conceptual content and conceptualizing such content.[26] Therefore, the content of both activities is conceptual, yet—to repeat a position from the Woodbridge Lectures—held in a different way by each.

There are several overall features of McDowell's position that I would like to emphasize and that I will connect with Aquinas in the next subsection: (i) his conception of experience as drawing on conceptual capacities, (ii) his affirmation of the conceptual as unbounded and the associated denial of nonconceptual content, (iii) his (post *Mind and World*) recognition of the distinction between having conceptual content and conceptualizing such content. I believe that these are characteristic features of McDowell's position, and permit a connection with Aquinas's position.

B) Aquinas

There is a commonality between Aquinas and McDowell concerning the respective frameworks within which their discussions take place. McDowell wants to resist a conception of man as a dualistic animal with one foot in the natural world and another in a quasi-mystical noetic heaven, whilst at the same time holding that, in a sense that distinguishes him from other animals, man can know something of the natural world. On a cursory reading of Aquinas, one might think he adopts a thoroughly different position, since he undeniably advocates a dualistic view of man—a composite of body and soul—and that the soul, one of whose powers is intellect (*intellectus*), is capable of knowing the

[26] Ibid., 269: "In bringing our surroundings into view, experiences entitle us to take things to be so; whether we do so is a further question."

natural world.[27] Thus, on a cursory reading, one could be forgiven for thinking that Aquinas wants to orient man with one foot in the natural world (the body) and another in a noetic world (the intellectual power of the soul), which is something that McDowell does not wish to endorse. However, while Aquinas does indeed hold that the soul, as the primary principle of life of a body, is not to be identified with the body,[28] he nevertheless does not adopt a proto-Cartesian view of the soul, whereby it is a separate substance that merely interacts with the body and within which knowledge is found.[29] On the contrary, Aquinas holds that the soul is intimately united with the body and while it can be without its body,[30] such a state is unnatural for it.[31] Fundamentally, man is not his soul: the soul is an integral part of man, but not the sole identifying feature of man,[32] nor is the possession of a soul sufficient for personal identity.[33] Having said this, Aquinas is a dualist of sorts, insofar as he holds that the intellect does not

[27] For 'understanding' as a power of the soul see *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 1. Unless otherwise stated, all translations from the works of Aquinas will be my own; however, where possible, I have consulted the standard English translations.

[28] *STh* I, q. 75, a. 1.

[29] Note the very strong statement from Aquinas, commenting on Aristotle's argument in *De Anima* for the difference between the intellect and the senses and the separability of the intellect (*De Anima*, 429a29–429b5): "This same text has been, for some, an occasion of falling into the error of regarding the intellectual power as quite separated from the body, as a substance that exists on its own. Which is an utterly indefensible position" (*Commentary on Aristotle's "De Anima"*, trans. Kenelm Foster and Silvester Humphries [Notre Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1994], n. 689). I shall not here pursue the interesting question of why Aquinas thinks substance dualism is an utterly indefensible position. Note also his denial that the intellect is in the body like a motor, in *STh* I, q. 76, a. 1, where he provides no less than four arguments showing the absurdity of the view that the intellect is something separate from yet controlling the body. All this should be seen as fundamentally contrary to the spirit of Cartesianism.

[30] *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 79 (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, ed. P. Marc, C. Pera, and P. Camarello [Turin: Marietti, 1961]).

[31] *ScG* IV, c. 79: "It was shown [lib. II] that the souls of men are immortal. They remain after their bodies, having been released from their bodies. It is also manifest from what has been said [lib. II] that the soul is naturally united to the body, since it is essentially the form of the body. It is therefore contrary to the nature of the soul to be without a body."

[32] *STh* I, q. 75, a. 4.

[33] Ibid., ad 2.

depend on a material organ; yet this dualism is not itself inimical to McDowell's position.

Knowledge for Aquinas is not something to be found *in* the intellect, a private happening in inner-space; rather, just as it is not the eye that sees but the man by means of his eye, just as it is not the hand that feels, but the man by means of his hand, so too it is not the intellect that knows, but the man by means of the intellect.[34] Thus, Aquinas wants to hold that knowledge is attributable to the entire human individual, and not just to some attribute that that individual possesses. *Prima facie* then, Aquinas and McDowell share the same outlook with regard to the position of man as a knowing subject, since neither wish to attribute knowledge to man as some private aspect of an intellectual substance residing in a noetic sphere; rather, both want to hold that it is the human subject, situated within an environment, that knows by means of particular intellectual acts, or (more Kantian) conceptual episodes. While Aquinas's philosophical anthropology is somewhat dualistic, this is not to be understood in the Cartesian sense, and indeed, from the prefatory notes just outlined, it would appear that Aquinas wants to advocate a position not significantly different from McDowell's.

The first convergence between Aquinas and McDowell on which I would like to focus is McDowell's notion of experience as involving conceptual capacities. As we have seen above, McDowell holds this position in order to avoid the myth of the Given—that is to say, if our experiential intake of the world is not one of mere receptivity, but involves our conceptual capacities, experience itself will be conceptually informed. The question is whether or not there is anything comparable in Aquinas's thought.

The general picture that Aquinas adopts straddles Aristotle's. Aquinas holds that external objects are composites of matter and form. Objects act upon the subject by means of their proper sensibles, that is, sensible properties coordinated to the five exterior senses, and these sensibles are put together by the subject by means of a faculty of inner sense. What is produced "internally" is a phantasm and this phantasm or representation is

[34] *STh* I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2.

so formed as to match the form of the object whose phantasm it is. Thus, external objects are such that they have sensible properties that exist in a certain mode of togetherness, such as a red cube; in a veridical case of sensory experience, when these properties are sensed they are brought together in the same mode of togetherness, the same form, in which they were externally: a phantasm of a red cube. This phantasm stands to the intellect as, in a sense, its object (I say "in a sense" because insofar as the mode of togetherness of the sensible properties is identical both internally and externally, when the intellect confronts the phantasm as its object it is actually confronting the external object whose properties are represented with the same mode of togetherness in the phantasm).

What is clear is that Aquinas advocates a type of receptivity proper to experience, and the deliverances of such experience are phantasms—the representational content of the object of sense. Not only does Aquinas take sensory experience to be receptive and thereby passive, he also holds that the intellect is to some degree passive.[35] This passivity is to be understood in the sense of a movement from potency to act: initially, the intellect is devoid of knowledge and must undergo a process of knowledge acquisition, moving from a state of potential knowledge to one of actual knowledge.[36] However, this is not the full story. Anybody who wants to maintain that our knowledge is in some sense constrained by our empirical intake of the world will recognize that we are affected by the world, and that our intellects must be so affected in order to be answerable to the world. Aquinas's recognition of the passivity of the intellect amounts to nothing more than this: that the intellect is initially devoid of content and receives content

[35] *STh* I, q. 79, a. 2.

[36] Ibid.: "In a third way something is said to be passive in a general sense when it is in potentiality to something and it receives that to which it was in potential without thereby being deprived of anything. . . And thus our understanding [*intelligere*] is passive. . . . The human intellect which is the lowest in the order of intellects and especially distant from the perfection of the divine intellect is in potency with respect to intelligibility. . . . This is made manifest in the fact that initially [*in principio*] we understand only potentially [*in potentia*], after which we come actually to understand. Therefore, it is evident that our understanding is passive, in the third sense of passivity."

from the world in the manner that a patient is acted upon by an agent.[37] So far Aquinas has given us no indication about the cooperation of this receptive passivity with spontaneity; indeed it could be the case that this passive intellect is separated from the world, existing in what could be characterized as a Platonic realm, directly intuiting the intelligible, self-justifying, forms of the world. It is precisely because of the danger of Platonism that Aquinas argues that our intellectual receptivity cooperates with a certain type of intellectual activity that renders the material object intelligible to the subject. He contends that insofar as the proper object of the intellect is the material particular, what it understands (the intelligible nature of such objects or "species") is not itself intelligible in act; rather, it only becomes intelligible through the cooperation of the intellect, specifically, through the power of the agent intellect abstracting the species of the material particular from its material conditions, thereby making the object intelligible to the possible intellect.[38]

The picture we see emerging in the thought of Aquinas is that the subject only potentially knows the material particular represented in the phantasm, and through the agent intellect's abstraction of species, the object is rendered actually intelligible to

[37] Aquinas, *Quodl.* VIII, q. 2, a. 1 (*Quaestiones de Quolibet* [Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1996], 56): "The soul takes the likenesses of the things through which it knows in the way that a patient is affected by an agent."

[38] *STh* I, q. 79, a. 3. Note in particular: "Nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses are made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect." It should be noted that from our perspective material objects are not intelligible in act until actually understood by us, but from God's perspective, material objects are intelligible in act, whether or not they are understood by us. Epistemologically speaking, this is of no consequence to Aquinas's view that for us material objects are not intelligible in act until actually understood, but it does have consequences for a metaphysical explanation of the intelligible features of material objects. Effectively, Aquinas adopts a Platonizing Aristotelianism to the effect that material particulars are composites of matter and form, and that the formal properties of particulars are such through their participation in ideas in the mind of God. For the metaphysics of this view see Vivian Boland, *Ideas in God according to St. Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis* (Leiden: Brill, 1996) and, more recently, Gregory Doolan, *Aquinas's Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008).

the possible intellect so that the subject may be said actually to understand the particular object in question. What is striking about this account is that the process of acquiring knowledge is one of cooperation between receptivity and activity—or to use the more Kantian terminology employed by McDowell, there is a cooperation between receptivity and spontaneity. The subject receives representational content through the phantasm; such content is only potentially intelligible and to this extent the subject only potentially knows. Nevertheless, such content exercises the intellect's powers to know, to grasp its intelligibility. Representational content thus exercises intellectual acts, that is to say, the agent intellect goes to work on such content abstracting its species and thereby making it intelligible to the possible intellect; as a result the subject is capable of recognizing in the phantasm the world as thus and so. The representational content of the phantasm then must be capable of being scrutinized by the agent intellect, and thus must in itself be intelligible, though not actually recognized as such until the agent intellect plays its abstracting role.

The communion with McDowell now starts to become apparent, since an important factor motivating McDowell's rejection of the myth of the Given is that conceptual capacities must play a role in receptivity in order that what is contained in receptivity be not some naked nonconceptual Given—so, there is cooperation between receptivity and spontaneity. In Aquinas, we see that the intellect plays a role in receptivity insofar as the representational content contained in the phantasm exercises what he calls the agent intellect to inspect it and abstract therefrom the intelligible species. Thus, Aquinas does not take representational content to be a conceptually naked Given, but something that can play a role in concept formation, and, as such, draws into cooperation with it the activity of the intellect. There is thus in Aquinas a commingling of receptivity in representation with spontaneity in understanding. For both Aquinas and McDowell, we can say that experiential intake represents the world as thus and so and the understanding of this involves a certain intellectual

activity the result of which puts the subject in a state whereby the world is recognized as thus and so.

At this point we move quite naturally onto McDowell's contention that the conceptual is unbounded, and the associated denial of nonconceptual content. Metaphysically speaking, for Aquinas, all creatures are intelligible, since they are formed particulars whose forms are participations in their respective ideas in the mind of God. As I indicated above (n. 38), this need not deter us in the epistemological discussion. What matters for epistemology is that Aquinas holds that the object of knowledge is the material particular; the metaphysical origin of this particular and its dependence on or independence from a divine source ought not to distract us.

As we noted above, representational content must be content that is abstractable by the agent intellect, and this because it is the content of the phantasm, which represents the object, on which the agent intellect focuses and from which it abstracts intelligible species. Any content then that the subject receives will be such that it is conceptual. That this is so is owing to the fact that intellectual acts in general are directed towards what is called in a post-Kantian framework conceptual content, and thus the content that motivates intellectual acts (the representational content in the phantasm), insofar as it is intelligible, must itself be conceptual.

Aquinas understands mental content on the basis of form, and he conceives of the mind/world relation as one of identity in form between the knower and the known. Much has been made in recent years of Aquinas's notion of form and its role in his epistemological thought.[39] I myself have affirmed that for Aquinas

[39] The standard view tends to be something like the following: objects, as possessors of form, act on the subject and in so acting in-form the subject's intellect in such a way that the subject becomes the bearer of the form whose possessor has acted upon the subject. Thus Aquinas holds that there is a kind of epistemic formal causality between object and subject. Cf. John Haldane, "Mind-World Identity Theory and the Anti-Realist Challenge," in *Reality, Representation, and Projection*, ed. John Haldane and Crispin Wright (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); "Aquinas on Sense Perception," *The Philosophical Review* 92 (1982): 233-39; "Aquinas and the Active Intellect," *Philosophy* 67 (1992): 199-210; "On Coming Home to (Metaphysical) Realism," *Philosophy* 71 (1996): 287-96; John O'Callaghan, "The Problem of Language and Mental Representation in Aristotle and St. Thomas," *Review of Metaphysics* 50 (1997): 499-545; "Concepts, Beings, and Things in Contemporary

objects act on the subject as formal causes.[40] Here I would like to side-step the scholarly issue and get to grips with Aquinas's actual point. His point is that between the intellect and the object there is a structural identity such that the structure of the object so determines the subject's understanding thereof that the subject's understanding is *of* the object in question. In other words, the subject's understanding is about the object before it and the content of the subject's intellect is intentional content, suitably construed to be about the object. O'Callaghan uses the imagery of a grasp to explain Aquinas's thought on the matter. If I grasp a pen, then my hand is so formed as to be able to grasp the pen, as opposed to a ball. The physical construction of my hand is itself dependent on certain physical goings on that cause my hand to take the shape that it does. Nevertheless, such goings on at a more basic level are for the sake of my overall grasp of the pen.[41] So, to transpose the analogy to the sphere of thought, in becoming involved with the object in experience, my intellect attempts to grasp the nature of the object—this is a reiteration of what I have outlined above as the cooperation between receptivity and spontaneity, between the deliverances of sensory experience and the agency of the agent intellect in abstracting species. When successful, the intellect grasps the nature of the object by means of the agent intellect and thereby renders it intelligible to the possible intellect. This process certainly involves a cognitive machinery at the subpersonal level—which is nevertheless for the sake of the knowledge of the object at the personal level. Note that this conception of things does not entail that there are interposed between mind and world entities that mediate the world in the strict sense—that is to say, the object of knowledge remains the

Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas," *Review of Metaphysics* 53 (1999): 69-98; *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002); and Paul MacDonald, "Direct Realism and Sensory Cognition," *The Thomist* 71 (2007): 343-78.

[40] See Gaven Kerr, "Ontological Commitment and Thomistic Realism," in *Thomas Aquinas: Teacher and Scholar* ed. James McEvoy, Michael Dunne, and Julia Hynes (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012).

[41] O'Callaghan, "Concepts, Beings, and Things in Contemporary Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas," 80-81.

object in reality and not some abstracted intelligibility (this is important for an understanding of Aquinas's notion of abstraction, the goal of my next section).

Let us return to the harmony that I see between McDowell and Aquinas. McDowell holds that the conceptual is unbounded insofar as every occasion of receptivity involves the exercise of conceptual capacities. Similarly for Aquinas sensory experience carries with it an element of receptivity that involves the intellect, invites the intellect to engage with its content, and ultimately results in the grasp of intelligibility in the way outlined above. The content of sensory experience must be such that it is capable of exercising the agent intellect to abstract it and thereby render the object intelligible; but what brings about intellectual acts (i.e., what exercises intellectual acts so as to render the object intelligible), must itself be conceptual. Thus, the content of sensory experience must itself be conceptual. In more Thomistic terms, the content of sensory experience is identical in form to the nature of the object and such form brings into operation an activity that abstracts the species of the material particular and thereby renders the world intelligible for the subject. Given that the content of sensory experience is such that it is capable of being abstracted by the agent intellect, what the intellect abstracts must itself be intrinsically conceptual, whether it is abstracted or not.

The final qualification of the previous sentence brings us appropriately to the final correspondence between McDowell and Aquinas on which I would like to focus: the distinction between content's being such that it is conceptual and its being grasped as conceptual. Aquinas undoubtedly adopts the two-tiered approach that I have pointed out is representative of McDowell's later position. In the Woodbridge Lectures and "Avoiding the Myth of the Given," McDowell holds that experience carries with it intuitional content, that is, content that puts the subject in such a state whereby he could say that the world is thus and so; however, (as indicated above [n. 26]), whether or not we do take things to be so is a further question.

Aquinas sees experience as bringing with it representational content that is intrinsically capable of being abstracted by the

agent intellect, but is not necessarily grasped as such. It takes time and effort to understand the content of experience.[42] Nevertheless, the content of experience is there to be understood, it is so constituted that it can be understood rather than being constructed by the workings of the intellect's cognitive machinery on a naked Given. Thus, it is a further stage by which the subject forms a proposition about the content of experience; and this accords well with McDowell's position on the distinction between intuitional and propositional content. Aquinas holds that the agent intellect's engagement with the deliverances of sensory experience results in the grasp of intelligible species and in turn the formation in the possible intellect of a concept that the intellect elucidates from the content of experience through the act of abstraction.[43] So, for Aquinas, we have experience and such experience, as intrinsically intelligible/conceptual, brings into operation the subject's conceptual capacities (the agent intellect's abstraction of intelligible species thereby rendering the object intelligible to the possible intellect), the result of which brings the world in its intrinsic intelligibility into view. Thus, there is a definite stage beyond experience for Aquinas, a stage arrived at through what he calls 'abstraction', and this in turn leads to the grasping of the conceptual content present in experience.[44] What McDowell has come to recognize as a distinction between the content of experience being conceptual and its being grasped as so is also recognized by Aquinas when he distinguishes between experience as being intrinsically formed and the intellect's grasp of such form through the abstraction of intelligible species.

At this point we must point out a difference between McDowell and Aquinas. Whereas both of them take a two-tiered approach

[42] An important theme in Lonergan's Kantian appraisal of Aquinas's epistemology; see *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), chap. 1.

[43] *STh* I, q. 85, a. 1.

[44] There is also a further act for Aquinas by which the intellect judges that what it grasps in experience is in fact in accord with the state of affairs in reality; and this is the act of judgment. I do not focus on the Thomistic act of judgment in the present article. What I am focusing on here is the distinction between experiencing the world as conceptual and being able to understand the conceptual content of the world through the agency of the intellect.

that recognizes (i) experience as possessing conceptual content, and (ii) such content's being conceptualized, Aquinas sees the transition from possessing conceptual content to understanding it as such on the basis of abstraction, and this McDowell denies. This divergence may be enough to make us discount the previous convergences upon which I have been insisting. It is thus to Aquinas's understanding of abstraction and whether or not it can be accommodated within McDowell's wider view, specifically, whether or not it is simply another masquerade for the myth of the Given, that I now turn.

II. Abstraction

McDowell rejects a doctrine of abstractionism as falling foul of the myth of the Given.[45] He refers to Wittgenstein's private-language argument and the use that Geach makes of it in his trenchant criticism of abstractionism in *Mental Acts*. Effectively, *abstracta* are seen to be bits of a private inner sphere to which we point in order to justify our knowledge of the empirical world. As such, *abstracta* are private ostensive definitions, not available for inspection by anyone other than oneself, and thereby only serve to give us exculpations rather than justifications. If Aquinas views *abstracta* as private ostensive definitions, mere pointings at an abstracted Given, in order to justify our knowledge of the empirical world, it would seem then that he does fall foul of the myth, and the convergences on which I have been focussing here come to nothing. It is a pressing issue then to see what Aquinas actually does say about abstraction.

It should be noted that Geach adds in an appendix to *Mental Acts* that the doctrine of abstractionism that he criticizes is not Aquinas's. Yet he offers nothing more than some promising themes from Aquinas's thought that would indicate why the doctrine he criticizes is not Aquinas's. For some Thomists, it could appear that Geach wants to have his cake and eat it—thoroughly

[45] See above, n. 3.

to criticize a position that Aquinas seems to have adopted, yet to defend a type of Thomistic epistemology.[46]

The worry with abstractionism is the following. It seems to suggest a type of transmission of content from the world to the mind, such that in gazing upon the world the mind takes therefrom intelligible content by means of which it can be said to be in a state of knowing. Within the context of the myth of the Given the anxiety over the foregoing type of abstractionism is palatable: some ostensible feature of reality impinges itself on the subject and is adverted to by the mind and thereby taken to be a type of justification for knowledge. But mere pointing to a piece of the Given is not so much justification as exculpation; justification is being able to give a reason for what one believes, exculpation is exempting one from blame by transferring the burden of justificatory work to some ostensible item of experience (in this case, *abstracta*) and claiming that our thought is accountable thereto. Not only that, the foregoing account sets up a substantially dualistic view of man, to the effect that he has a "mind" separated from the world and into which *abstracta* enter. The spatial metaphor is unfortunate, yet it brings to light a disagreeable feature of abstractionism, to the effect that *abstracta* migrate from the world into the "mind" in the manner that one enters an empty house.[47] This would appear to feed into the dipolarity of man such that he has one foot in the empirical world and another in a noetic sphere, a dipolarity that McDowell wishes to avoid.

We must be careful not to assimilate such a substantially dualistic view to Aquinas, since, as we have noted, he is not a dualist of a proto-Cartesian sort, and therefore not prone to thinking of man's rational engagement with the world as one wherein content migrates from the world into some mental

[46] Cf. *Mental Acts*, 130-31 for Geach's historical note to the effect that what he calls abstractionism is not a position that Aquinas adopted.

[47] Kant expresses incredulity at a similar view when he writes in *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself as a Science*, trans., Peter G. Lucas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971]), § 9, p. 38: "Of course it is still inconceivable how the intuition of a thing that is present should make me know it as it is in itself, for its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation."

sphere. Nevertheless, Aquinas does use an unfortunate spatial metaphor, borrowed from Aristotle, to the effect that the mind is initially like a blank slate on which nothing is written.[48] I call this unfortunate because it suggests that there is a mind, detached and separated from the world onto which content is written; and this would seem to signify the private ostensive definitions about which Wittgenstein expresses reservation in his private-language argument. It is also an unfortunate metaphor insofar as it somewhat obscures Aquinas's actual thought. To be clear, Aquinas explicitly denies that conceptual content (intelligible species or form) moves from the world to the mind in the way that one moves from place to place.[49] Moreover, we have already seen that for Aquinas knowledge occurs through the engagement of the intellect with the deliverances of sensory experience and the abstraction of intelligible species therefrom, in which case, insofar as it is the agent intellect that performs the abstraction, abstraction cannot be understood in isolation from the cooperation of the intellect with sensory receptivity. So, we must be clear on the type of abstractionism that Aquinas does endorse, given that from what has already been said he does not seem to endorse the type that gives rise to anxieties over (i) the myth of the Given and (ii) the dipolarity I mentioned at the beginning.

Aquinas gives us a clue to what he thinks of the nature of abstraction when he attempts to distinguish the powers of the soul. He holds that the object of a passive power of the soul stands to that power as principle and cause, but the object of an active power of the soul stands to that power as the goal or final cause: it is that towards which that active power directs itself.[50] An active power then directs itself to its object and seeks to become

[48] *STh* I, q. 79, a. 2: "The human intellect . . . is in potency with respect to intelligibility . . . and is initially like a 'blank slate, on which nothing is written'."

[49] *STh* I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 3: "It is not that a form that was first in the phantasms afterwards finds itself in the possible intellect in the way one body is taken from one place and transferred to another."

[50] *STh* I, q. 77, a. 3: "The nature of an act is distinguished according to the diversity of the object; every action is either of an active power or a passive power. The object is thus compared to the act of a passive power as a principle and moving cause. . . . [On the other hand] the object is compared to the act of an active power as its terminus or end."

conformed thereto. Bearing the latter in mind, the agent intellect, when abstracting, does not lift out some ghostly "key" (a private ostensive definition: part of the Given) by which the subject may stand in a knowledgeable relation to the object in question; rather, the act of the agent intellect seeks to conform itself to the form of the object in question and thereby render in the possible intellect a likeness to the object.[51] This is not done in the manner of moving form from one place to another (cf. n. 47), but through the intellect's directing itself to the form of the material object as to its end. Aquinas tells us that the latter is achieved through focussing on the phantasm whereby the object is represented and thereby considering the nature of the object, without considering its material conditions.[52] The agent intellect thus abstracts what is proper to the nature of the thing and passes over the individuating material conditions.

Drawing all of this together within a more contemporary setting, I would say that Aquinas is suggesting that the cooperation of the intellect with the deliverances of sensory experience entails that the intellect directs itself to the nature of the external object by focussing on the phantasm; in doing so, the intellect seeks to take the conceptual content of sensory experience and put it together in a proposition capable of stating how the world is thereby represented. On the subpersonal level, there is no doubt a cognitive machinery that permits this to occur, but such cognitive machinery is for the sake of directing the intellect towards the external object in a knowledgeable relation at the personal level. This knowledgeable relation is cashed out in terms of the identity of the conceptual content presented by the world, abstracted by means of the agent intellect, and deposited in the possible intellect. The notion of a "grasp" as significative of this

[51] *STh* I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 3: "Through the power of the agent intellect there results a certain likeness/similitude in the possible intellect through a conversion of the agent intellect to the phantasm, which is representative of those objects of which it is the phantasm, only insofar as it is to the nature of the species."

[52] Ibid., ad 4: "The agent intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, insofar as through the power of the agent intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs the passive intellect."

procedure is helpful; the intellect in "grasping" the form of the material particular does not lift out form, but so structures itself, on the basis of the intellect's subpersonal cognitive machinery, so that it has the world in view and can put into propositional form the world that it has in view. On this account, there is not an abstraction *of* form, understood as the lifting out of form from the object, but an abstraction *from* the individual material conditions by means of which the form is presented to the subject, but not to which the form is restricted (since there can be many material individuals of the same form).

This account of abstraction certainly does not have the same fault as the dualistic sort wherein conceptual content migrates from the world into the mind; rather, the mind seeks to conform itself to the object in question, that is to say, the rational subject seeks to direct himself by means of his mental powers, constituted by a subpersonal cognitive machinery, to the extent that he is able to have the world in view and form a proposition about the world that is thereby brought into view. If we return to O'Callaghan's analogy of the grasp of the pen, the hand grasps the pen on the basis of a physical machinery that permits it so to form itself that its grasp is *of* a pen and not *of* a ball; the intellect similarly so orientates itself, on the basis of its cognitive machinery, so that its act (the act of the agent intellect) "grasps" the nature of the thing in question the likeness of which is formed in the possible intellect so that the subject is consciously directed to the form of the material object. Furthermore, this account of abstraction does not fall foul of the moral of Wittgenstein's private-language argument, since on Aquinas's account there are no private *abstracta* to which the subject points as a justification for knowledge; rather, there is a specification of the subject's consciousness such that it is directed to the form of the thing in question. Thus, for Aquinas, there are no private ostensive definitions in this respect, there is simply the world brought into view through the cooperation of the intellect in the receptivity of sensation. Knowledge is justified by the material object itself. What (*id quod*) the subject knows, and what

thereby justifies the subject's knowledge, is the object in reality by means (*id quo*) of its form.[53]

I contend then that Aquinas's notion of abstraction is not a notion that need deter a follower of McDowell, or Geach or Wittgenstein for that matter, from accepting Aquinas's account of the mind/world relation. Consequently, the convergences that I have noted between the thought of Aquinas and that of McDowell in this paper do not come to nothing simply because Aquinas adopted a type of abstractionism.

CONCLUSION

At this point, the interested reader might be saying: "Well and good, but what is the point?" As I see it, the significance of the convergences highlighted in this paper is threefold: (i) it sets forth a kind of realism that functions as a half-way house between extreme realism and idealism, and which is a defensible position in contemporary epistemology; (ii) it brings to the fore a type of abstractionism that has been forgotten in contemporary epistemology, but which is certainly viable for anybody with sympathies for the realism inherent in Aquinas and McDowell's positions; and (iii) it has repercussions for the way in which we do epistemology.

Let us begin then with the realistic implications of Aquinas and McDowell's positions. A central issue in McDowell's work is his attempt to remove the traditional interface between mind and world while at the same time leaving room for the notion that our spontaneous acts of intellect are constrained by means of our relation to empirical reality. McDowell cashes this out in terms of the bringing into operation of conceptual capacities in perception, in which case conceptual capacities do not go to work on the

[53] *STh* I, q. 85, a. 2: "Thus, conceptual content [*species intelligibilis*] relates to the intellect as that whereby [*id quo*] it understands. . . . The likeness, i.e. the conceptual content, of the thing understood is the form according to which the intellect understands. . . . And thus the understood content [*species intellecta*] is secondarily that which [*id quod*] is understood; but that which [*id quod*] is primarily understood is the thing in reality of which the conceptual content is the likeness." See also *De Verit*., q. 2, a. 6; III *De Anima*, lect. 8 (718); *Q. D. De Anima*, q. 2, ad 5.

blank deliverances of sensory experience, but are exercised by the conceptual content of such experience. What McDowell's account comes to is that the world appears to us in a certain manner in experience and through the exercise of conceptual episodes we form propositions that affirm the world to be as it appears. What this entails is that our conceptual episodes are correlated to the conceptual content of experience, that is, it is the conceptual content of experience and the mode of categorial togetherness of such content that determines the content of our conceptual episodes and its categorial togetherness. In the words of Aquinas, the intellect in act is the intelligible in act: the form that the agent intellect grasps in the phantasm, the likeness of which is in the possible intellect, is the form of the material object.[54] The mind is thereby modulated by the world insofar as the subject's conceptual content formulated in a proposition conveys the world as it appears in a veridical case of sensory experience. In the Scholastic tradition, this is known as mind/world identity theory, wherein the mind does not physically become identified with the object to which it is directed, but the world as it appears so impinges itself on the subject that the subject, in a veridical case, conforms itself by means of its mental powers to the world that is so impinging. The positions of McDowell and Aquinas end up affirming a type of direct or immediate realism whereby the world is brought directly into the view of the subject.

It is important to note the realistic interpretation of the mind/world relationship that both McDowell and Aquinas adopt, since some might think that the inescapability of reality from the activity of thought smacks of idealism insofar as it does not give due weight to the independence of reality. On this view, unless one's realism espouses some sort of recognition-transcendent reality, which the realism of Aquinas and McDowell does not, then one's position falls into idealism. McDowell himself is

[54] *STh* I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 1: "The thing understood [*intellectum*] is in the one understanding through its [the thing understood] own likeness, and in this way it is said that the intellect in act is the intelligible [*intellectum*] in act"; *STh* I, q. 87, a. 1, ad 3: "The intellect in act is the intelligible [*intellectum*] in act according to a likeness of the thing understood, which is the form."

sensitive to the charge of idealism and claims that it is easy to understand and sympathize with, but it is nevertheless wrong. The charge of idealism in this case carries with it a presupposition about what realism should look like. We can cite Michael Dummett's definition as a foil for the sort of realism that Aquinas and McDowell are led to adopt. Dummett writes:

> The very minimum that realism can be held to involve is that statements of the given class relate to some reality that exists independently of our knowledge of it, in such a way that that reality renders each statement in the class determinately true or false, again independently of whether we know, or are even able to discover, its truth value.[55]

If we interpret this passage as making a strong claim that the mind-independent reality typically recognized as an essential feature of realism is itself impossible of recognition, realism will then minimally be a position that stresses that our thought about reality is justified by a recognition-transcendent reality.[56] The contrast with idealism is that the idealist's reality is not recognition-transcendent but something that comes within the sphere of conceptual processes.[57] However, surely the strong interpretation of Dummett's definition is itself a reformulation of the myth of the Given? For it states that, minimally, the reality to which the realist holds that thought is answerable is a reality incapable of recognition, in which case it is a nonconceptual Given that pushes against our conceptual sphere. McDowell, not commenting on Dummett but answering a charge of idealism, says something similar, to the effect that the charge of idealism to the view that all reality comes within view of a conceptual sphere

[55] Michael Dummett, "Realism: Part II," *Synthese* 52:1 (1982): 55.

[56] I stress that this is a strong interpretation of the passage and certainly not to be taken as Dummett's considered view; I merely use this interpretation as a foil for the position I wish to develop.

[57] This was a view that the early Neo-Thomists reacted to, and it was characterized by the slogan: an outside of thought is unthinkable. Some Neo-Thomists, notably Léon Noël, argued that one could adopt the view that an outside of thought is indeed unthinkable, and yet be a realist of sorts (a moderate realist) such that while there is no thinkable reality that cannot be thought, not all of reality must be reducible to acts of thought. I have not made a consideration of Noël's position my task in this article, but *prima facie* it appears that it could sit nicely with McDowell's.

really reflects the conviction, on the part of the objector, that we are faced with the choice between a coherentism with no external constraint or the Given.[58] McDowell's point is that there is a third option that recognizes the independence of reality, yet affirms that reality is such that it is capable of exercising the subject's conceptual capacities. As I have shown above, Aquinas adopts a similar position, and thereby along with McDowell navigates the dual horns of the Given and unconstrained coherentism. Such a position can and should be called a 'realism', though not the strong type suggested by Dummett's passage, since it holds that thought is answerable to a mind-independent, though not conceptually naked or recognition-transcendent, reality. Thus both Aquinas and McDowell cut a path for immediate realism in contemporary epistemology, one that navigates the dual horns of extreme realism and idealism.

Turning to abstractionism, I pointed out that while I have stressed the convergences between the thought of Aquinas and McDowell, there is one divergence capable of threatening the whole project, and that is Aquinas's acceptance of a type of abstractionism and McDowell's repudiation thereof. We saw above that Aquinas's doctrine of abstraction is not the suspect kind that McDowell rejects, but is in fact a position quite amenable to McDowell's. Furthermore, by recognizing abstraction as the important intellectual act that renders the world intelligible to the subject, Aquinas is able to tie down the mind/world relationship in a particular cognitive ability specific to rational individuals. Through this cognitive ability, the human intellect is able to grasp intelligible species and thereby have a view on the world incapable of being possessed by brutes.

The benefits of this endorsement of abstractionism are twofold. First, by identifying a cognitive feature of the rational subject that is such that it enables the subject to recognize the world as thus

[58] McDowell, *Mind and World*, 26: "But though this objection [of idealism] is easy to understand, and even to sympathize with, it is wrong. It reflects the conviction that we have to choose between a coherentist denial that thinking and judging are subject to rational constraint from outside, on the one hand, and an appeal to the Given as what imposes constraint, on the other."

and so, Aquinas is not led to open a gap between mind and world, since the recognition of the world as thus and so occurs through the mediation of an intrinsic cognitive ability that the subject has, and not through the transfer of experiential content to some detached mental place. Second, insofar as for Aquinas this cognitive ability puts the subject in a state such that the world is seen to be thus and so, no being other than a being with this cognitive ability, that is, other than a rational individual, is capable of seeing the world as thus and so. Consequently, given that this cognitive ability extends to all aspects of the rational individual's awareness, and that to which it so extends must be intrinsically capable of being abstracted by the intellect, the content of all perceptual experience is intrinsically intelligible, such that all experience is experience of a world as thus and so, in which case experience is content-full. Recognition of Thomistic abstractionism entails that experience is not the bare presencing of an object to a subject, but that experience mediates the object to the subject in such a way that the object is seen *as* an object of a certain kind, in which case conceptual content does not stop short of any boundary between mind and world, but is itself unbounded.

By tying down the mind/world relation in man's ability to abstract intelligible species, Aquinas is able to cut to the very heart of McDowell's turgid and often metaphorical depictions of mind and world. Aquinas offers us a cognitive ability that enables man to engage with the world, which can appeal to those sympathetic to McDowell's position, but who are suspicious of his metaphorical language. Conversely, McDowell offers Thomism a post-Kantian philosophical vocabulary that I believe gets to the heart of what Aquinas was saying in his Scholastic idiom. If Aquinas can provide McDowell with a clear nonmetaphorical idiom, McDowell can provide the Thomist with a non-Scholastic vocabulary with which to express the Thomistic position on mind and world. In any event, acceptance of what is at the core of both of their positions—that there is a homogeneity between mind and world located in the common conceptual content for each—closes the doors on a number of contemporary epistemological problems that only come to the fore when we envisage a chasm that

separates mind and world. This chasm does not open in the realism of Aquinas and McDowell, and because of this, their common position is of some value to the contemporary epistemologist.

Just what this value is can be seen not only from the realism that they endorse but also from the implications of their common position for the practice of epistemology. Ever since Descartes, it has been customary to begin epistemology with the question of whether or not we have knowledge. Thus, epistemology customarily begins by grasping the skeptical bull by the horns, and all sorts of exotic "brain-in-a-vat" scenarios are dreamt up in order to show that one cannot know that one is not a brain in a vat. But such skepticism only emerges when it is assumed that mind and world are so disconnected that the latter can only be present to the former by means of representational intermediaries whose veracity is questionable. In other words, only if there is envisaged a heterogeneity between mind and world do skeptical questions become urgent in the first place. So in the brain-in-a-vat case, it is assumed that knowing is a private happening locatable in some private space (somewhere in the brain), brought about by suitable manipulation (of the brain). Despair at any suitable solution to skeptical problems about the veracity of inner representation can lead one to doubt the very possibility of doing epistemology from a standpoint where conscious states are central. Why not simply relegate epistemology to a chapter of empirical psychology, replacing conscious states with stimulation of sensory receptors?[59] Such a reaction would have the benefit of closing the door to skepticism, but at the cost of abandoning talk of conscious states as playing any significant role in knowledge. Perhaps then a third way, intermediate between a Cartesian approach that centralizes consciousness and a naturalized approach that centralizes science, might be preferable.

If Aquinas and McDowell are correct, and there is no gap between mind and world and the two are homogeneous and capable of coming into conformity with each other, then skeptical

[59] Cf. W. V. O Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969).

problems need not arise, since there is no wedge inserted between mind and world that would pry them apart and bring about the need for representational intermediaries that in turn function as the objects of knowledge. Thus, on the account advocated by Aquinas and McDowell, skeptical problems lose their urgency, since the assumption that knowing is having some sort of mental item in a private inner space, a highest common factor between veridical and nonveridical experiences, is undermined. It may however be suggested that such a manner of dealing with skepticism is cheating, since it does not tackle the problem head on but circumvents it. The charge then is that skepticism has not been refuted but set aside. This charge carries with it the assumption that skepticism is a genuine philosophical problem, but on the account endorsed by Aquinas and McDowell, it is not a genuine problem; rather, it only becomes a problem when erroneous presuppositions are made as to the relationship between mind and world, and, that being the case, skepticism is an erroneous problem whose resolution lies in highlighting that fact.

Given the nonurgency of skepticism, the way in which we proceed in epistemology must take on a certain character. On the one hand, we can avoid the Cartesian fetish for the centrality of conscious states, since we need not worry about representational intermediaries that mediate mind and world. On the other hand, we need not take a wholly naturalized approach, since there are indeed conscious states, but these do not strictly represent or mirror the world—rather, they bring the world into view such that the world can be perceived and affirmed to be thus and so. In effect the practice of McDowell and Aquinas offers us a non-naturalized alternative to traditional skeptically motivated approaches to epistemology, and this I submit is a welcome alternative.

I would like finally to close with a general reflection on the significance of the convergence of differing philosophical traditions. McDowell is a philosopher who has attempted to break down barriers and interfaces not only between mind and world, but also between certain philosophical traditions that, for some, are mutually incompatible. I am of course referring here to his

reintegration of certain Hegelian modes of thinking into the analytic philosophical tradition; for this he is to be commended. I doubt that in his work he consciously sought to make the convergences with Aquinas's thought that I have presented in this paper.[60] Nevertheless, convergences they are and it is to be hoped that further convergences can be drawn not only between the thought of McDowell and Aquinas but between the Scholastic and analytic philosophical traditions more generally.

Emphasizing the conceptual connections between two important thinkers is of some value for the contemporary philosopher insofar as it enables him or her to engage with philosophical traditions alien to his or her own, but with which he or she is capable of having a dialogue. This leaves space for a notion of perennial philosophy, that is, a view of philosophy as an ongoing affair that deals with recurring problems in the history of thought in a way that does not ignore the input of our mighty predecessors. Furthermore, by outlining the convergences between two thinkers separated by centuries, I hope that some will be motivated to delve into the history of thought and ascertain what the cardinal points were that led to a whole new outlook. In this particular instance, I hope that some will be motivated to trace the historical development of philosophy from Aquinas, for whom immediate realism seemed like the natural option, to Descartes and his successors, for whom immediate realism was somewhat

[60] He is however aware of the Thomistic tradition, and in fact gave the Marquette Aquinas Lecture in 2011, now published as *Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2011). Furthermore, he comments on Sellars's admiration of Thomism in "Sellars's Thomism," essay 13 in *Having the World in View*. In the latter essay, McDowell explores Sellars's engagement with Aquinas in the article "Being and Being Known," originally published in *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (1960), 28-49, now reprinted as chapter 2 in *Science, Perception and Reality*. McDowell goes so far as to suggest that Sellars could have perhaps learned something from the Thomistic tradition. Unfortunately, I did not find in "Sellars's Thomism" or in *Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge* material related to the convergences between Aquinas and McDowell on which I have focused in this article. One could, though, read the following as capturing the spirit of this present article: "However keen we are to stress the pastness of past philosophers, we cannot cleanly separate a concern with what they had to say from a willingness to treat them as interlocutors in a conversation, in which the living parties had better be at least open to the possibility that they might have something to learn from the dead" ("Sellars's Thomism," 254).

suspect, and thereby find the crucial turning point without which there would have been no modern revolution in philosophy. This then will help to dilute the common prejudice that epistemological problems were not taken seriously by pre-Cartesian philosophers. One may grant that the Cartesian manner of dealing with epistemological problems was not taken seriously by a thinker like Aquinas, but rather than assume naivete on Aquinas's part, one might well consider that this is because Cartesian modes of philosophizing ought not themselves to be taken seriously.[61]

[61] I wish to thank Rev. Timothy Bellamah, O.P., and the editorial team at *The Thomist* along with the referees for their assistance in bringing this paper to publication. I also wish to thank the staff and students at Queen's University Belfast who listened to a version of this paper and presented some questions at once both difficult and penetrating. Finally, I wish to thank God, the unique subsisting act of being and goodness from whom all that is comes to be.

BOOK REVIEWS

Person, Being & History: Essays in Honor of Kenneth L. Schmitz. Edited by MICHAEL BAUR and ROBERT E. WOOD. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011. Pp. 388. $55.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-8132-1857-1.

It is evident from this collection of essays that Kenneth Schmitz is not only an inspiring teacher and scholar but someone who brings forth in those who know him the admiration due a beloved colleague and sterling person. The editors describe the book as a "long overdue Festschrift" by eighteen contributors, mostly former students whom Schmitz taught at Marquette University and University of Toronto, but also fellow colleagues who have been engaged with his work and themes over his long career. As can sometimes happen with a Festschrift, there is heterogeneity to the different contributions, and the book sometimes has the feel of a miscellany of essays, reflecting the interests of the contributors as much as the dominant concerns of Schmitz.

The editors divide up these diverse contributions under three headings. Part 1 deals with "Themes in the Philosophy of Kenneth L. Schmitz," part 2 deals with "Reading the History of Philosophy in the Spirit of Kenneth L. Schmitz," and part 3 deals with "Themes in the Spirit of Kenneth L. Schmitz." The number of contributors in part 2 (13) exceeds by far the number in the other two parts (3 and 2, respectively). This distribution of concerns is understandable in that part 2 reflects very much the influence of Schmitz as a teacher, and more particularly as a teacher of Hegel to whom he introduced many of these contributors. It is evident that this influence has had long-lasting effects.

For someone who is coming to Schmitz's work for the first time, the contributions in part 2 will not help greatly in telling us fully of his thematic concerns, either in their extensive range or in their intensive comprehension. On this score the essays in part 1 will be of greater assistance, and in particular the long opening essay by James Kow. Entitled "The Philosophy of Kenneth L. Schmitz: The Recovery and Discovery of Things, Being and the Person," it gives a very helpful introduction, both chronologically and thematically, to the philosophical concerns and published work of Schmitz. One might have preferred more engagement with the substance of Schmitz's view by more of the contributors, and hence more communication of what is distinctive in the contribution he has made beyond his obvious personal influence as a teacher.

Such an engagement is not absent from the contributions in part 2, yet on the whole it is not extensive, with exceptions, such as the piece by Jennifer Bates who takes up the theme of wonder in Schmitz as well as Hegel.

Kow's opening discussion is helpful in highlighting some of the themes dear to Schmitz's heart. These themes might be summarized in relation to a succinct statement Kow quotes from Schmitz himself concerning his own studies of the Middle Ages. What Schmitz found "most distinctive and pervasive" was "a certain luminous density." He explains: "I want to remark the . . . medieval sense of the concrete . . . what I call a certain earthiness. . . . For medieval concreteness was a physical concreteness that made room within it for the symbolic and the vicarious; in a word, it was a sacramental concreteness" (5). Kow goes on to illustrate how this realization formed something of a background: for Schmitz's examination of the nature of things and being, with Aquinas as a central partner in his search; for his recognition of the importance of history, with Hegel as an important point of reference; for his stress on the person, in the company of Gabriel Marcel in particular. Schmitz's recovery of medieval realism is inseparable from the following concerns: his understanding of creation as gift; his critical encounters with contemporary thought; his weighing of the contributions of German idealism (with Aquinas never out of earshot); his exploration of the meaning of being a person, with the works of Pope John Paul II as a central interest; and finally his efforts to recover the meaning of wonder in its porosity to the ontological density of true things.

Also in part 1, Louis Dupré, in an essay entitled "The Gift and the Giving," reflects on Schmitz's own exploration of the gift of creation. This leads to discussion of the relation of philosophy to theology, as well as the final inseparability of the history of metaphysics from religious sources. This was granted in premodern thought, closed off in the modern period, and reopened again after Kant with the help of a variety of thinkers. Dupré, in an erudite and engaging way, calls attention to the spirit of a new openness that enabled Schmitz to take up again the question of creation from a fresh and illuminating perspective.

The final essay in part 1 is by James Crooks, and is entitled " 'Praise the World to the Angel': Heidegger, Schmitz and the Liturgy of the Thing." This lovely title invokes Rilke's poem and is very suggestive concerning the consecration of things. The dialogue between Schmitz and Heidegger is deftly handled. Where Heidegger stresses the invocation of the liturgy of things, Schmitz stresses communion and things, with emphasis on generosity and the original act of creation as giving things to be. Crooks's reflections are very much in tune with Schmitz's discussion of things in his book *The Recovery of Wonder* (2005).

As already mentioned, part 2 is by far the longest, but one might divide the contributions into three types: a first set of essays deals with ancient and medieval thinkers, a second set deals directly with Hegel, and a third set constitutes a group dealing with post-Hegelian philosophers. In the first set, Michael Baur in "Coming-to-Know as a Way of Coming-to-be" presents us with a close analysis

of Aristotle's *De Anima* 3.5. It is a careful, articulate, well-ordered unfolding of the issues at stake, including a discussion of, among other things, wonder and the intrinsic intelligibility of being, following the problem of the *Meno*.

John Burbidge offers a contribution entitled "Revisiting Anselm's Ontological Argument." Although he begins in the inspiration of Anselm, he ends up with the spirit of someone like Hegel (sounding somewhat like a process philosopher): the true is the whole and it is dynamic and never to be surpassed, echoing Anselm's *aliquid quia nihil maius cogitari possit*. But is it still God?

The late Ralph McInerny offers a personal tribute to a beloved friend. It is a concise, precise summary of the reception of Aristotle in the West and Aquinas's appropriation of him. This is all presented as exemplary of a dialogue between different cultures, with philosophy as a kind of *lingua franca* for the Christian and the pagan.

The second set contains five essays that deal with some aspect or other of Hegel. John Russon writes on "Subjectivity and Objectivity in Hegel's *Science of Logic,*" and there is significant discussion of the contributions of Kant and Fichte also. Jay Lampert, like Russon and others, records his debt to Schmitz for his own study of Hegel's *Logic*. Lampert's discussion here bears on "Violent and Nonviolent Teleology in Hegel's *Science of Logic*." These two essays give excellent exegeses of Hegel, indicating that the authors have learned from Schmitz but also making one suspect that they do not follow his acceptance of certain metaphysical views that go in a quite different direction from Hegel. Martin Donougho acknowledges his debt to Schmitz in "Performing Hegel"—an interesting discussion of how Hegel's texts can be seen as calling for a performative rendition. While paying attention to Hegel's *Logic*, it offers a study of overlaps with the work of Niklas Luhmann. The attention paid to Hegel's philosophy of art is more fully to the fore in the following essay by Daniel Shannon on "Beauty and the Good." This is a theme also of concern to Schmitz, though ultimately there is more of the premodern ontological luminosity of beauty in his understanding. Jennifer Bates's contribution is entitled, "The Problem of Genius in *King Lear*: Hegel on the Feeling Soul and the Tragedy of Wonder." This is an interesting discussion of wonder (among other things) in Hegel. Wonder is only an immediate beginning in Hegel, and Bates offers an extended discussion of Schmitz on the recovery of wonder for whom, as one might put it, wonder can never be entirely dispelled, only deepened. Her discussion of *Lear* makes use of suggestions in Hegel to say insightful things that reflect Bates's own very thoughtful approach to the matter.

In the third set of essays, we encounter themes that are more post-Hegelian and contemporary. Jude Dougherty, to whom Schmitz dedicates *The Recovery of Wonder*, here writes on "Science and the Shaping of Modernity: The Reciprocal Influence of Science and Culture." This essay is thoughtful, informative, and to the point, stressing factors in Christian culture (by contrast with Islamic culture) which helped enable the unfolding of the spirit of modern science.

Daniel Dahlstrom writes on "Scheler on the Essence of Christian Religious Consciousness." Among its concerns is an exploration of Scheler's defense of

Christian love against Nietzsche's accusation of *ressentiment*. Dahlstrom is motivated by admiration for Schmitz, especially for his subtle account of Wojtyla and his advances on Scheler. Dahlstrom is sympathetic to Scheler, though not without significant questions.

Thomas Anderson's contribution, "The Pervasive Presence of the Spiritual in Gabriel Marcel's World," is a re-reading of Marcel, offering a critique of rampant materialism, with influences from Schmitz, and with an eye to reality as fundamentally spiritual. Schmitz at a deeper level, one suspects, is more Marcellian than Hegelian, where the "spiritual" is not the spirit of idealism, but invokes an incarnational sense of things and the flesh of creation.

Thomas Busch offers the personal witness that, were it not for the exemplary presence of Schmitz as an inspiring teacher, he himself might have been lost to philosophy. For him, Schmitz's spirit entered into the interpretation of Sartre. His piece "Jean-Paul Sartre: An Existentialist to the End?" gives an informed account of the early and later Sartre in which Busch argues that there is no simple rejection of existentialism but more a kind of sublation of the existential into a dialectic of social praxis.

John Deely's "The Unmasking of Objectivity" is a thought-provoking discussion of the relation between objectivity and thing. It is both an historical and a systematic exploration, admirably drawing on Deely's pioneering work on semiotics and moving in directions, not unlike Schmitz's efforts, to recover wonder and a richly ontological sense of things.

Finally, in part 3, there are two studies in the spirit of Kenneth Schmitz. The first, by John McCarthy, entitled "Seeing the Unseen," deals with Aquinas and creation, the relation of faith to reason, philosophy, and theology, and St. Paul and the mission to the gentiles. The essay in not only in the spirit of Schmitz but highlights the question of creation *ex nihilo* as perhaps the great theme of Schmitz's work.

The final essay is by Robert Wood, one of the editors of the book. He calls for a pluralistic dialogue parallel to that advocated by Schmitz in an early essay, "Philosophical Pluralism and Philosophical Truth." The influence of Hegel on Wood is clear, but he might perhaps be called a Catholic Hegelian, by contrast with what might be called the school of the Canadian Hegelians who are more represented in part 2 of this book. His theme, "Human Nature, Culture and the Dialogical Imperative" opens at the end to considerations more Buberian and Marcellian, with the heart and its *pietas* at the core.

One of the effects of this book was to send me back to Schmitz's own books, *Creation: the Gift* (1982), and *The Recovery of Wonder*, with the feeling that it is a pity that more of his work is not available in book form. There is surely much of richness in the many articles he published that are as yet uncollected. One collection, entitled *The Texture of Being* (2007), has been published, but there are many more pieces that one would like to have available in an easily consultable form. The editors of this book have done a great service in drawing attention to the notable excellences of Schmitz's work, excellences both systematic and

historical. Perhaps this will provide some impetus to make available more of his essays, surely worthy to be communicated to as wide an audience as possible.

WILLIAM DESMOND

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Belgium
Villanova University
Villanova, Pennsylvania

Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to Aquinas. By M. V. Dougherty. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Pp. 236. $99.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-107-00707-9.

The question of whether moral wrongdoing is ever genuinely unavoidable has been a longstanding concern of Western ethical thought. The mediaeval moral theorists examined this question with a great deal of sophistication, and came up with answers that have a surprisingly modern ring to them. Michael V. Dougherty has given us a full and engagingly written presentation of the mediaeval contributions to this debate. He begins, understandably (although somewhat arbitrarily) with the *Concordia Concordantium Canonum*, commonly referred to as the *Decretum*, attributed to the Bolognese canonist Gratian (composed in stages beginning around 1140), and follows a line of development over three hundred years through William of Auxerre and Raymond Lull (somewhat out of order here) to Aquinas and later Thomists such as Johannes Capreolus (*obit* 1444).

Gratian, in some preliminary distinctions of the *Decretum*, presents a hierarchy of laws, with natural law standing at the highest point. In a *dictum* in distinction 13 of the first part, he states that "no dispensation is permitted from natural law except perhaps when one is compelled to choose between two evils" (d. 13, *dictum a. c.* 1). The issue is thus whether moral dilemmas exist, that is, whether one is ever unable to avoid wrongdoing because of irreconcilable obligations. While dispensation from secular or ecclesiastical law is always possible within the legal systems of the Middle Ages, or else appeal can be made to higher legal authority, these options are not available in the case of the natural law—yet a basic principle is that it must always be possible to avoid moral wrongdoing. Gratian appears to indicate that when moral wrongdoing is inescapable, the lesser evil is always to be chosen, based on a text from the Council of Toledo and a long and somewhat difficult passage from Gregory the Great's *Moralia in Job*. Dougherty points out that various commentators on Gratian rejected the "lesser evil" escape, so that by the time of the *Glossa ordinaria* on the *Decretum* (late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries), the

majority of commentators identify every instance of *perplexitas* as "simply a subjective epistemic condition rather than real moral entanglement" (33). While the appeal to the choice of the "lesser evil" has a pedigree going back to Plato and Cicero, Dougherty presents the subjective perplexity of foolish agents as the first of the standard mediaeval ways of resolving moral dilemmas: moral dilemmas are not caused by the order of things (*res*), but simply occur in a mind that holds an opinion that is foolish or erroneous. Minds that are not thus deceived will therefore always be able to discern a course that is morally permissible in any given set of circumstances without committing sin. This is developed by Aquinas in his presentations on the failure of practical reasoning, particularly through the malformed conscience.

A second escape route is presented in the rollicking and swashbuckling *Vita coaetanea* of Raymond Lull, the Catalan philosopher and adventurer of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Here, Raymond turns to prayer upon recognizing his inability to escape wrongdoing, and God provides a way of escape (through, for example, the suicide of Raymond's accuser). The dilemmas presented are quite real, but the agent is delivered by a species of "moral luck."

The third, and by far the most common solution, appears to be the way of clarification. In these dilemmas, the simple bifurcation of options is shown to be illusory—there is a third option, which is not immoral. In a sense, the dilemma is more apparent than real because of the misleading way in which it is phrased, suggesting the unavoidability of the dilemma. Kant's homicidal maniac asking about the whereabouts of a (presumably) intended victim can be met with silence, it is suggested, so that the option is not simply to reveal the hiding place of the victim or to lie. William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales both describe the situation where a penitent reveals to a confessor that he persists in a state of unrepentant grave sin, and then publicly requests communion. If the priest refuses communion, he breaks the seal of confession (manifesting the hidden sin and causing scandal); if he gives communion, he "throws the body of Christ into the latrine of the devil." The authors conclude that the option of giving the Eucharist to the sinner is only apparently proscribed, is in fact a morally permissible route of action for the priest, and can be performed without sin. The state of affairs is brought about by the sinner rather than by the priest, and, after all, the Lord himself gave communion to Judas at the Last Supper. Although Dougherty's title ("Latrine of the Devil Dilemma") is somewhat humorous, it is also one of few mediaeval dilemmas that require no great leap of imagination to visualize in modern society.

Two parallel areas of mediaeval scholarship receive somewhat short shrift in the presentation, partially because most modern scholarly literature rarely makes these connections, and partially because they are not classified as moral theology or philosophy. The first area is in the adaptations of mediaeval canon law to what a later generation would call pastoral theology that took place beginning in the thirteenth century. These adaptations are most evident in the penitential literature of the late twelfth century and following; one of the earliest and fullest examples of this cross-fertilization is the *Liber poenitentialis* of Robert of

Flamborough, an Englishman who served as canon penitentiary at the abbey of Saint Victor at the very beginning of the thirteenth century. Writers of this period seemed intent on applying the newly revived legal science based on Gratian's *Decretum* to the work of the ordinary confessor; Rufinus, Huggucio, and others are clearly cited, and one has only to compare these penitentials with their predecessors of a century or two before to see the significant effect that canon law had on the administration of the sacraments in the high Middle Ages. Questions of the conflict between natural law and the precepts of canon law in general, and papal decretals in particular, are frequent in Robert's penitential (usually dated around 1210), and the question of the resolution of moral dilemmas finds at least a summary treatment in the penitential literature from that point on.

The second area that would show useful parallels with questions of *perplexitas* is the *insolubilia* literature which also saw a significant growth and rebirth at almost exactly the same period. While this area of concern has classical roots (most notably the *Sophistical Refutations* of Aristotle), a large number of mediaeval writers deal with the nature and function of paradox, of which the most famous example is the Liar Paradox ("This statement is false"). Since so many of the responses to moral dilemmas in the Middle Ages simply argued that the dilemma was a paradox, and that the conflict was simply apparent, a glance at the logical considerations of paradoxes in philosophical literature that enjoyed an enormous popularity during almost exactly the same period would have been instructive.

One question that remains after reading the book has to do with the structure of moral dilemmas outlined in great detail. Many of these dilemmas are given titles ("The Wayward Cleric Dilemma," "The Teacher – Student Dilemma," "The Deceiving Demon Dilemma," and my personal favorite, "The Eater's Dilemma"), and others are divided into species and subspecies. To what extent did the authors see these dilemmas as existing in various groups, particularly where several dilemmas are presented at once? It is certainly true that in most cases, each author treats what Dougherty calls "classes" of dilemmas in similar ways, but to what extent is this the imposition of a modern taxonomy on a varied mediaeval set of examples? In a number of cases, these classes make the dilemmas and their solutions appear far neater and more systematic than they actually are, and in others the dilemmas are presented in radically different contexts, rather than in a simple tract *De perplexitate*. This is all the more significant when, as in the consideration of Aquinas, these dilemmas are scattered over a dozen different works.

Dougherty occasionally seems concerned with rounding out arguments and making excuses for some authors, which leads into anachronism. His description of the Pretend Priest Dilemma in the *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre (a pretend priest is celebrating Mass and is obliged both to say the words of consecration and not to say the words of consecration—if he does not say them, he causes scandal; if he does, he sins gravely) leads Dougherty to conclude that the man simulating the celebration of the Eucharist "need not stop, presumably

because the mass will be valid by the actions of the concelebrating priests." Although it is not known when, exactly, concelebration fell into disuse in the West, by William's time it would have been limited to ordinations and the concelebration of cardinals with the pope on major feast days. The assumption of the dilemma seems to be that there is only a single priest (or, in this case, a "pretend priest") attempting the celebration of the Eucharist, so that those attending will either be scandalized (if the man stops the attempted Mass) or deceived (into thinking that they are actually attending a celebration of the Holy Eucharist).

Dougherty has examined the wrestlings of the mediaeval moralists in their attempts to reconcile the experience of moral conflict with the widespread assumption that no one should ever be forced to do wrong. In its sophistication, exposition, completeness, and, indeed, subtlety, his book is a worthy presentation of and successor to the mediaeval doctors.

W. BECKET SOULE, O.P.

Pontifical College Josephinum
Columbus, Ohio

The Promise of Christian Humanism: Thomas Aquinas on Hope. By DOMINIC DOYLE. New York: Crossroad, 2012. Pp. 248. $34.95 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8245-2469-2.

Despite its subtitle, this book is not simply a presentation of Thomas Aquinas's teaching on hope. Doyle puts the Angelic Doctor to work here, and sets forth his teaching on hope as the integrating principle missing from contemporary Christian humanisms that insufficiently draw together religious transcendence and the human good. The success of Doyle's thesis depends not only on accurately observing an antipathy or opposition between religious transcendence and moral action in contemporary presentations of Christian humanism, but also on establishing that Thomas provides a solution to this problem in his theology of hope.

Doyle develops his thesis in three clear steps: first, in a statement of the problem occasioned by contemporary programs of setting forth a Christian humanism (chapters 1 and 2); second, in a presentation of Thomas's teaching on hope (chapters 3 and 4); and third, in an application of Thomas's teaching on hope to the related problems of religious transcendence (chapter 5) and the immanent human good (chapter 6).

In chapter 1 Doyle presents Charles Taylor and Nicholas Boyle as representatives of contemporary philosophers who employ Christian humanism to address the maladies inflicted upon us by modernity: Taylor addresses the loss of the

human person's fuller identity and meaning in this secular age, and Boyle considers the isolation and atomization of the self reduced to a consumer in a marketplace. While both thinkers effectively diagnose the problematic of our own age, Doyle remains dissatisfied with the sources each brings to bear to remedy the corrosion of the fully human self. Thus chapter 2 opens with an exploration of the incipient but inadequate recourse each has to the theological sources that Doyle will propose as necessary for a Christian humanism that would effectively address the condition of humanity today. This limitation in the work of Taylor and Boyle is partly due to the scope within which each thinker sets his argument, and further due to the Hegelian framework informing the whole of each man's work. As a complement to their effective diagnoses of the problem, Doyle lays out as a partial solution the work of Jacques Maritain and John Courtney Murray, presented as examples of Christian humanism built upon a more theologically adequate ground of the explicit consideration of the Christian's faith in the Incarnation, a faith that provides a true account of the "human" in Christian humanism.

This solution is only partial, however, for while such a faith illuminates the possibility of our pursuit of the human good in this life being integrated with the transcendent destiny of each person, revealed in the teachings, ministry, and glorification of Christ, Doyle proposes that this article of faith requires a corresponding practical philosophy that would issue in actions that attain the genuine good for humans understood according to that faith. In the second part of chapter 2 Doyle argues that the theological virtue of hope is this missing element that must be incorporated into an effective Christian humanism. This claim is not an obvious one today; Doyle reviews the explicit objections of thinkers like Gordon Kaufman, Jürgen Moltmann, and Nicholas Wolterstorff who oppose the very notion of hope to the effective promotion of human flourishing in this life in accordance with the gospel's demands for mercy and justice in the kingdom of God. Hope for eternal life only serves as a distraction from right moral action in this life, and religious transcendence becomes the very enemy of the human good.

Having set forth this commonly assumed dichotomy, Doyle then engages in the next two chapters in a two-step retrieval of Thomas's theology of hope, as to both its presuppositions and its specific content. The faithful presentation of Thomas's understanding of hope itself in chapter 4 is prefaced by a much appreciated review in the prior chapter of three theological underpinnings upon which Thomas builds his account of hope as a theological virtue: the noncompetitive relationship between God and creation as causes, the inclination of the human person by nature to God as his ultimate end, and the movement of the human being to that end by the aid of divine grace. Doyle's review of these presuppositions provides a sound overview for readers unfamiliar with Thomas's thought on these points, without getting bogged down in the many contentious debates between Thomists on these issues; Doyle is aware of these debates, but usefully relegates references to and discussions of them to his abundant endnotes.

It is in chapter 4 that the reader finds the meat of Doyle's subtitle of this work. Here Doyle presents a straightforward and concise account of Thomas's understanding of hope, specifically as the infused theological virtue by which, in conjunction with faith and charity, the Christian acts rightly and merits eternal life. Doyle proves himself to be an insightful exegete of Thomas's thought on these matters, providing a precise and thorough account of hope that avoids unfruitful conflations of terms and ideas that Thomas in fact labors to keep distinct.

Chapters 5 and 6 form the third and final step of Doyle's argument, where he seeks to demonstrate how Thomas's teaching on hope serves to integrate religious transcendence with the human good in a way that is lacking in contemporary accounts of Christian humanism. In the first two parts of chapter 5, Doyle proposes the theological virtue of hope as a more accurate description of the general notion of religious transcendence operative in contemporary accounts of Christian humanism. In this schema faith serves as the potency for a union with God, charity as the actuality of union with God, and hope as the principle of the intermediate motion of humans in this life on their way to, but not yet having attained, that union. Perhaps most critically, configuring religious transcendence in terms of a Thomistic account of hope manifests the necessarily eschatological dimension of that transcendence, precluding the collapse or conflation of "secular" hopes with the God for whom and in whom the Christian hopes.

In chapter 6 Doyle explores this relationship between the secular hopes that pertain to the human good one seeks in this life and the theological hope by which one is oriented toward eternal beatitude. Here he echoes Benedict XVI's warning in *Spe salvi* against secular hopes in human goods such as political, social, or economic endeavors taking on the absolute quality proper only to the transcendent good aimed at through the theological virtue of hope. By further reference to the thought of Thomas Aquinas, however, Doyle seeks to provide a positive account of the necessary dependence of secular hopes upon a theological hope if they are to be genuinely fruitful. Through examples drawn from both the Fourth Commandment as well as the Fourth and Fifth Beatitudes, Doyle demonstrates not merely the possible, but the necessary state of "secular" hopes as the means to realizing the eschatological object of hope, for these hopes are the arena in which we are prepared to come to union with God in charity, by means of the grace by which God works in us in our loving actions towards our neighbors.

Doyle's conclusion asserts the place of hope in a humanism that would avoid the pitfalls of a pessimistic Augustinianism or an optimistic secularism, each of which wrongly evaluates the prospect of redemption's being worked in this age by the God who transcends this age. In light of the precision and thoroughness of Doyle's treatment of hope and its application to Christian life in this world, the two final reflections with which Doyle caps his conclusion are dissatisfyingly brief and imprecise. While he may in previous chapters have spoken loosely of hope as change, as a process, as an intention, or as something experienced, such statements were grounded in his prior analysis of Thomas's definition of hope as

an infused habit of the soul by which one rightly wills the good of beatitude that is both future and difficult, but possible to attain precisely by means of the agency of the One in whom that beatitude is found. Doyle's first reflection on how his prior discussion of hope may overcome the anxieties and conflicts over the change that Vatican II occasioned in the Church's manner of living its faith in relation to the world beyond itself—difficult but nonetheless possible to resolve—is too complex an application to cover in the four pages allotted. Likewise, the second reflection on how an inclusion of hope can assuage the demand for security sought through contemporary revivals of religious fundamentalism is presented in two paragraphs on a single page. Such reflections deserve a treatment that would examine with greater rigor the relationship between the difficulty of temporal goods connected with beatitude, and the difficulty/impossibility of the attainment of beatitude itself. There is an analogical relationship to be explored between the two, as Doyle indicates in earlier chapters, but the brevity of these concluding reflections falls short of the rigor that he demonstrates throughout the rest of his book.

One other element that one might expect to find in a Christian humanism animated by Thomas Aquinas, but that is notable in its absence, is a discussion and explanation of the cardinal virtues that necessarily accompany the theological virtues by which Christians live meritoriously with God and with one another. At points where Doyle speaks loosely of hope as enabling the Christian to face the difficulties of this life when one lives with an orientation toward eternal beatitude, I would have welcomed a discussion of the specifically Christian form of fortitude as a disposition in the soul by which one is able to pursue a particular good, termed here as a "secular hope," that is necessarily connected with one's eternal happiness but to which is attached the loss of some other desirable good. Thus while a virgin martyr undoubtedly faces her death virtuously on account of hope for the eternal life to which God will raise her, Thomas is interested in how she endures the danger of the particular flames or fangs through a higher perfection of the irascible powers of her soul. Adequate treatment of such a topic would not be brief, however, and thus perhaps deserves a monograph of its own.

The book's argument for the utility and necessity of incorporating the theological virtue of hope in accounts of or proposals for Christian humanism provides an essential antidote to any humanism inspired by the Incarnation that might give rise to a hope that is ultimately neither from God or for God, but essentially takes a worldly frame of reference. As Doyle carefully spells out in the account of hope he draws from Thomas, the human flourishing that serves to guide the actions of a community or an individual is only perfectly and genuinely good inasmuch as it is actually ordered to beatitude. In this life, certain accounts of human flourishing may be terribly popular and subjectively compelling, yet involve the gravest of evils by which people are individually or collectively directed away from their beatitude and toward an end or goal apart from God, in opposition to God. Conversely, individually or collectively aiming at beatitude involves a radical love of God and neighbor that, like Christ's love, will at times involve the abandonment or renunciation of certain forms of human flourishing

as mere reiterations of satanic temptations in the desert. To relinquish such "obvious" goods is to overcome what is perceived as a genuine good by ordinary standards; such a withdrawal of the self away from some particular good in order to move more perfectly toward the true Good, as known through faith, is impossible on one's own; with the knowledge of faith and the love of *caritas* this difficult move is possible, but only through the grace by which God makes such movement certain. Doyle's book ably illuminates how this virtue of hope, taken specifically as a theological virtue with Thomas, is essential for any account of humanism that would be Christian, not merely in name but in substance as well.

ROBERT BARRY

Providence College
Providence, Rhode Island

Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths. By MATTHEW LEVERING. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. 238. $110.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-19-960452-4.

Saint Ignatius told the Jesuits to talk about predestination rarely and cautiously. He was worried that they might lead people into fatalism or disdain for freedom and for good works. Although Matthew Levering's *Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths* understandably mentions predestination on every page, it would surely receive the saint's approval. By caution, Christocentrism, and emphasis on the love of God, Levering has given us a treatment of predestination that affirms common Catholic teaching while avoiding the pitfalls named by St. Ignatius. This book is controversial and ambitious, yet it ought to be well-received by many pastors and teachers.

In *Predestination* Levering writes for an ecumenical audience of theologians. His sources are Scripture (read through current Catholic and evangelical biblical scholarship) and the writings of selected Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox authors past and present, with marked appreciation for the thinking of Karl Barth, Sergius Bulgakov, and David Bentley Hart. Among Catholic authors Levering favors Sts. Catherine of Siena and Francis de Sales, whom he credits as inspiring sources for his own position. Levering's argument is that we ought to confess both predestination and God's "prodigal, superabundant love" (197) even for the reprobate while resisting the lure of "systematic clarity" (95). Levering expects that universal divine love and selective divine predestination must stand in unresolved tension "until the eschaton" (178). "The task of predestinarian doctrine is to bring these two affirmations together" (36), holding them in tension or balance "so that the logic of one does not overpower the other" (11).

As its subtitle suggests, *Predestination* is largely a description of "biblical and theological paths," starting with "The Biblical Roots of the Doctrine of Predestination" (chap. 1) and proceeding historically through "The Patristic Period: Outlining the Problem" (chap. 2), "The Medieval Period: Seeking a Balance" (chap. 3), "The Reformation and Early Modern Period: Causal Chains" (chap. 4), and "The Twentieth Century: God's Absolute Innocence" (chap. 5). The final chapter, "Two Affirmations," is where Levering sums up his case and "offers a contemporary theology of predestination" that "[reexamines] the witness of the New Testament with an eye to the insights and pitfalls found in the theological tradition" (176). Here the same thesis advanced throughout *Predestination* is repeated and augmented by further biblical reflection: theologians must affirm both God's predestination of some and his love for all without trying to resolve the apparent tension between these two points.

Chapter 1 is concerned mostly with St. Paul, and looks to J. M. G. Barclay, N. T. Wright, Brendan Byrne, Joseph Fitzmyer, and others to assess the "Biblical Roots of the Doctrine of Predestination." The bottom line, in Levering's assessment, is that the New Testament "teaches a doctrine of predestination" (33) but gives us "the challenge of holding together" the fact that God's love "has no deficiency, limitation, or stinginess" and the fact that God "allows some of his rational creatures to remain in their sins" (34-35), making the "upholding of both these affirmations . . . the measure of a proper doctrine of predestination" (35). The possibility that God may predestine all humans to eternal life is one that "calls for broader dialogue with contemporary biblical scholars" (29), and is revisited in Levering's last chapter (192-97).

Chapters 2 through 5, which take us from the Fathers to the present in 140 pages, are inevitably selective. In the early Church we meet Origen, St. Augustine, Boethius, and St. John Damascene. Each figure is praised but found wanting. Origen falls into universalism, departing from the Bible which "consistently indicates that God does not save all rational creatures" (65). Augustine, and Boethius after him, does well affirming God's "radical priority" in the work of salvation but "has trouble with the extent of God's love" (65). The Doctor of Grace, alas, offers a predestinarian theology "that seems to ill accord with Christ Jesus' revelation of the intensity of God's love for all human beings" (54). Lastly John Damascene favors human freedom at the expense of effective predestination: "his insistence that God only cooperates with humans seems contrary to Paul's teaching on grace" and "puts in doubt whether God can indeed accomplish his good purposes" (65).

Next, rejecting Origen, the medieval Church oscillated between the theologies of Augustine and John Damascene. The exception who "attains the right balance" (68) on predestination is Catherine of Siena, whom Levering names in chapter 3 as a medieval theologian alongside Eriugena, Aquinas, and Ockham. Eriugena is presented as a more radical (Pelagian) version of Damascene, and Ockham is said to reach "the same basic conclusion," namely, that predestination "generally hinges on the free human actions, not on God's will." Both Eriugena and Ockham "accord with the perspective of Damascene" (96). Saint Thomas

Aquinas, in contrast, corresponds to St. Augustine: he is right about the metaphysical priority of God, the "transcendent universal cause" whose will cannot be frustrated (76), but off target when it comes to God's love. The sticking point is that "God's eternal plan . . . includes rational creatures of whom it can rightly be said, 'It would be better for that man if he had not been born' (Matt 26:24)" (83); this makes Levering ask whether Aquinas's account adequately affirms "the eternal divine goodness," which must ultimately "be represented by the damned" (96). Levering prefers Catherine of Siena. She "clearly accepts Augustine's and Aquinas's emphasis on our radical dependence upon God's gifting, inclusive of his permission of permanent rebellion" but "also insists upon God's fiery love for each and every rational creature, so that her position also resonates with Damascene's and Ockham's effort to defend God's superabundant love" (95).

Turning to early modern theology Levering considers John Calvin, Luis de Molina, Francis de Sales, and Gottfried Leibniz in chapter 4. (Thomists will regret the scant attention paid to Domingo Bañez and the *De auxiliis* controversy, but we can't have everything.) Among the theologies of the Reformation era "Calvin's rejection of divine permission, Molina's notion of God's middle knowledge, de Sales's emphasis on God's love, and Leibniz's system of interlocking causes all take their bearings from the problem of how to understand God's causality" (98). Here Levering gives the palm to Francis de Sales. "At every step . . . de Sales refuses either to limit God's grace or to boast in the accomplishment of our free will. He insists both that God pours out abundant graces so as to make each and every rational creature a saint, and that these . . . do not achieve their aim in some rational creatures due to a rebellious exercise of free will" (123). Although de Sales has some inclination to Molinism, he avoids "Molina's focus on causal chains" (124) so that "like Catherine, he focuses on God's all-encompassing love [and so is] able to leave more room for mystery about God's eternal will—comprising as it does both superabundant love for all and permission of some to rebel permanently. As a result, his position fails in terms of logical clarity" (126) but "crucially succeeds in affirming both aspects of the biblical witness" (127).

In chapter 5 Levering canvasses twentieth-century theologians Sergius Bulgakov, Karl Barth, Jacques Maritain, and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Their "emphasis on God's love for each and every rational creature accords with the emphasis of Catherine of Siena and Francis de Sales" (175) but in each case runs into difficulties. Bulgakov, Barth, and Balthasar turn to nonbiblical universalism to secure God's innocence, while Maritain's metaphysical plan lacks cogency—it is never clear how creatures can fail to advert to the rule of reason, in turn shattering the motions of grace, without God's permissive involvement as first cause. This leaves Levering to take St. Catherine of Siena and St. Francis de Sales—both, happily, Doctors of the Church—as his inspiring guides for a new appreciation of scriptural revelation.

Chapter 6 offers Levering's own theology of predestination, already concisely indicated in the earlier chapters. He gives added attention to Christ as the one

chiefly predestined, in whom the elect are predestined, and in whose ineffable charity the Father's love is known, present, and effective. This last chapter is attractive, but might not convince many readers to change what they already think. Levering's case against logical clarity seems to arise mostly from his discontentment with earlier theologies, especially Augustinianism and Thomism, and those who find truth and rest in those schools are unlikely to jump ship. Dialectical tension and aversion to clarity are not intrinsically appealing.

The strengths of *Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths* are many. It is a timely and elegant book on a badly neglected major subject. It is clear and amply documented, passionate but not shrill. Many bishops and theologians, I imagine, would agree with it. Nonetheless this worthwhile study has two features that give me pause.

First, Levering seems to hurry the question of what we mean by "God's infinite love." He complains of St. Augustine and St. Thomas that they "run into trouble with regard to whether God . . . loves [everyone] with a prodigal, superabundant love" (197); they have "trouble with the extent of God's love" (65) and make the divine *philanthropia* look stingy and deficient. Since God's love is the great burning issue at the heart of *Predestination* it would, I think, have been better to deal with the Augustinian and Thomistic schools more patiently. For example, the difference between extensive and intensive greatness seems like a worthy distinction to consider when we talk about God's infinite, prodigal love. Also, before passing judgment on Augustine or Aquinas, it might be worth asking how much of our own prejudices we, Levering's contemporaries, bring to our reading of the truths of faith. Today who doesn't recoil from the suggestion that permanent divine retribution is a good thing? Who can resist thinking of damnation as a tragedy, a dramatic downer for a cosmic audience? If these are our instincts, do they distort our appreciation of what Augustine and Aquinas are saying? These and other possibilities deserve, I think, more attention before we find fault with any long-venerated Catholic theology of God's love.

My second hesitation about this absorbing book is that, while academically irreproachable, it seems to stand at a little distance from the Church. I do not mean that Levering conceals or sets aside his Catholic faith: he does not. More than once he expressly cites Catholic teaching as normative; he draws on Catholic theologians; he makes a point of identifying St. Catherine and St. Francis de Sales as Doctors of the Church. Still, for the most part, *Predestination* procedes as if Origen, Augustine, Aquinas, Barth, Calvin, Leibniz, and the rest were all sources in "the theological tradition." But which *traditio* is this, and whose hands does it pass through? Where are these questions about predestination at home, and who, if anyone, reliably teaches and judges the answers? Perhaps I am at fault here, and fail to understand what it means to write for a multiconfessional audience. In any case I would offer that *Predestination* would be better if it were, so to speak, ecclesially thicker. I think it is too thin on the monuments of ordinary Catholic teaching: traditional catechesis and spirituality, the liturgy, the words of the Church's pastors, and the theological *traditio* of the great monastic institutes and doctrinal schools. A *ressourcement*

that studies only great theologians, and shows them all equal veneration regardless of their relationship to, resonance within, and long reception by the Catholic Church, is a *ressourcement* that leaves me ill at ease.

Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths is strongly recommended for postgraduate and postdoctoral readers working on the theology of grace, and is a necessary addition to seminary and graduate theological libraries. It is a very fine and valuable book, one of many by a prodigious author. It should affect theological work on predestination for decades to come.

BERNARD MULCAHY, O.P.

St. Thomas Aquinas Priory
Providence, Rhode Island

Women, Sex, and the Church: A Case for Catholic Teaching. Edited by ERIKA BACHIOCHI. Boston: Pauline Books, 2010. Pp. 251. $15.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8198-8320-4.

This volume of essays, edited by Erika Bachiochi, defends the Catholic Church's teachings on various topics of sexual ethics as particularly "pro-woman." The authors are female scholars, lawyers, and writers, speaking chiefly to a Catholic and popular audience, with a potential for scholarly interest. Most of the authors deploy "personalist" language, but their most effective arguments rely on philosophical arguments or current sociological data.

Laura Garcia lays the foundation for the volume with a solid essay on sexual difference and complementarity. She argues that *Mulieris Dignitatem* and *Familiaris Consortio* (1980) mark a decisive moment in Church teaching, since they affirm both the challenge and the real good of the shifting roles of women in modern society. She finds in these documents a defense of the equal dignity and value of men and women, in a way that does not negate differences. While admitting that our ability to generalize these differences is limited, Garcia argues that a society that goes so far as to reject even a modest form of gender essentialism might initially seem more committed to equality, but in fact, such a society tends to oppress both men and women under an impersonal, competitive ethic. Garcia notes, as many personalist authors have, that a fundamental issue is the nature of freedom: is it the autonomous right to self-determination, or being ordered to happiness under some *telos* that is grounded in the language of "natures"?

Bachiochi writes on the Church's teaching on abortion, showing that abortion is harmful, physically and psychologically, and that its legality is founded on frail and outdated arguments that conform women's bodies to a logic of utility, efficiency, and economic productivity.

The theme of the ambiguous nature of freedom emerges more clearly in Cassandra Hough's essay on the Church's teaching on sex. The lifelong union of marriage fulfills the order of justice (recalling *ScG* III, c. 123) in that it provides the stability of a loving obligation, of fidelity and support, not only to the spouses, but even more to the children produced by the parents' union. She recounts the now outdated and truly bizarre argument, common from the 1970s on, that sexual promiscuity is "necessary" for female autonomy, and she challenges theologians who argue that celibacy and the prohibition of contraception are clear evidence of institutional hatred of the female body. Behaviors considered normal on university campuses have proven to be obstacles to human intimacy and committed relationships, leaving aside the problems of social isolation, depression, the abuse of women, and various forms of disease. Simone de Beauvoir wrote that freedom was worth it, even if it entailed misery. Perhaps not. Hough concludes by discussing what is really a key challenge for moral theologians and the Church's pastoral teaching, namely, cohabitation before marriage. It is remarkable that something considered so very much the norm is nevertheless statistically a failure, and a surprisingly high indicator of failure in marriage.

Jennifer Morse lays out the Church's understanding of marriage, as a good for society and for the material, psychological, and social well-being of spouses. She moves beyond individual interest and personal fulfillment to the common good, insofar as marriage is ordered to the good of new life and the constitution of human society. Angela Franks speaks to the Church's teaching on contraception. Katie Elrod (with Paul Carpentier) discusses the challenge of infertility and licit treatments for the same. Sister Sara Butler takes a distinctive approach to arguing for a male-only priesthood. Finally, Elizabeth Schiltz closes the volume, considering the modern balance of domestic and professional roles. Three of these essays merit further comment.

Elrod observes that infertility (defined as the inability to achieve pregnancy within twelve months) is extremely common, and that the reasons are not always easily determined. Typical IVF treatments are expensive, and Elrod lays out the "significant health risks" posed to women and children by these procedures. Like Franks, Elrod finds common ground between Catholic and feminist writers, in that the medical industry "exploits desires (or anxieties) about motherhood, exposes reproductive capacities to (male) technological manipulation and control, fragments and then reconstructs [women's] bodies, and depersonalizes and disintegrates them as persons" (130). The language of utilitarian calculation is rhetorically effective, but the claim that someone bearing the dignity of the image of God "deserves to be conceived in an act that reflects" this same dignity is not a particularly strong argument. Many practicing Evangelical Christians, deeply committed to the good of family, consider IVF a morally justified investment for the sake of the singular good of having a baby. Vague and underdefined terminology such as "the meaning of acts" and "dignity" must do a lot of theological work.

Elrod defends the usefulness of natural-family-planning techniques to families struggling to conceive a child. She leaves aside completely the issue of male infertility, or low fertility. Male infertility can be determined by morally licit, albeit awkward, methods. This awkwardness may explain the tendency to look first to female physiology to explain infertility, placing a further burden on the potential mother. The Church must be pastorally more sensitive toward those who are in the end unable to conceive. The pro-natalism of the Church can leave women feeling even more deeply that they have failed in their calling to married life, or that God has failed them subsequent to this calling. Catholics are *so* pro-life, they can forget that morally licit forms of treatments for infertility can be agonizing, even medically objectifying. The loss of miscarriage that frequently follows these attempts brings a deeper experience of tragedy. A rich Catholic culture of marriage will have openness to life as its core end, but in the case of varying degrees of infertility, it must help persons to be open to other modes of service and sacrificial love.

Franks speaks to the Church's teachings against the use of artificial contraception. She does a good job evaluating moral actions in relation to intention and fundamental teleology of the will. Her essay concludes with a treatment of NFP as centered around the practice and discipline of purity within marriage, or "cultivating ethical maturity." For John Paul II, periodic abstinence within marriage is a part of building the virtues needed to sustain the threefold goods of marriage. Marriage preparation is often regarded as the "last chance" for direct formation within the Church. This, however, is deeply problematic. Franks, like other authors in this book, points out that *the Church's teachings are hard to live*, and very few people see that they are intended to help Christians live better, more authentically happy, lives. The Church must see herself as directly forming and supporting the laity in the daily challenges of married life. The sexual ethics of marriage is only a part of the larger program of growing in holiness in and through marriage.

The Church's prohibition of the use of artificial contraception, even within marriage, is often seen as one of the more archaic and unbelievable aspects of her moral teaching. It seems to be the countercultural linchpin of all the other teachings. The Lambeth Council of 1930 opened the question, however cautiously, of contraceptive use within marriage. A profound transformation of marriage and the culture of sexuality has clearly occurred, and though this cannot be solely attributed to practices of contraception, the association is undeniable. In the midst of this, the Church can stand as nothing less than a prophetic voice. Statistics recounted here are impressive: Catholics who actually live and practice these teachings enjoy a divorce rate of less than 4%, while for other Catholics the rate is much closer to that for non-religiously affiliated couples. (A recent study from the Georgetown Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate indicates more favorable rates for Catholics than in the past: 28% of Catholic marriages in the United States end in divorce, while 40% of non-religiously affiliated marriages end in divorce.) Why are the marriages of couples that do not employ artificial contraception far more likely to be stable? There is surely not one factor

alone that is the cause, but a whole host of life decisions which include a choice against artificial contraception.

Franks begins her defense of the Church's teaching with a brief history of Margaret Sanger, the racist, eugenicist founder of Planned Parenthood and sometime correspondent with Adolf Hitler. The early history of the development and normalization of chemical contraceptives is no longer hard to present in the worst possible light, couched as it is in a thin defense of libertinism and an unappealing sort of feminism. This is a story that should be told, and has been told. But implying, in this day and age, that a couple using artificial contraception, even a Catholic married couple, should be linked in motivation or moral culpability to Hitler or Chinese bureaucrats forcing sterilization upon female citizens seriously limits one's rhetorical potential. Franks points out that very few Catholics observe the Church's prohibition of contraception. Reasons are given that are easily dismissed: the Church hates sex, hates women, wants control, projects celibate anxiety. But a more pressing objection is that the teaching just doesn't seem plausible. The reasons for this need to be examined with honesty more than caricature. This puts a great moral and pastoral burden upon the Church in the age of the New Evangelization. The temptation to blame "the culture" should be tempered by a sense of obligation to witness and teach more effectively and humanely.

Language from the papal addresses of John Paul II tends to predominate in this volume. Franks dismisses what she calls the alarm of "dissenting theologians" at the popularity of the Theology of the Body among young people. She fails to distinguish adequately between the Holy Father's writings and the variety of popular presentations of varying quality. It is also worth pointing out that the one article to which she refers is hardly by a dissenting theologian, but in fact is the poignant anecdotal account of a theology professor who finds that his Catholic students are moved by the high language of human sexuality, but are also mislead by excessive romanticizing. The language of "self-gift" that is present in popularizations of Theology of the Body is central for describing authentic sexual activity. While rich with Christological connotation, it is a thin moral criterion, and thus young Catholics can eagerly embrace this language in the absence of the rest of the moral-theological program that argues against contraceptive use. Does "self-gift" describe an affective state or a high ideal? Is it clear what it is describing at all, given Pope John Paul's insistence that his writing is "phenomenological" in method? In many appropriations of the language of the Theology of the Body, there is an inadequate appreciation of the reality of sin (as observed by Alice von Hildebrand) as well as the messy, ordinary contours of sanctification in married life. Sexual acts must bear a tremendous weight of theological metaphor in these popularizations, indeed, the whole meaning of the sacrament. The Theology of the Body is an important resource within the moral theological tradition, but it is only one resource, and much better work needs to be done preparing young Catholics for the reality of the sacrifices of married life.

The Theology of the Body tends to be an effective approach with those who have already accepted its conclusions, or embraced premises contained in its terminology. Is it an effective way to present the Church's moral theology to a broader audience? The deeper substance of the text is not often discussed: behind the language in the first part—original innocence, self-gift, and nuptial language of the body—there is a Thomistic theology of creation that affirms the metaphysical goodness of human persons, linked to a theology of the Cross and the transformative power of the Resurrection. The explicit defense of *Humanae Vitae* at the end of the text is relatively brief, and I take this to indicate that the hard work of marriage is the work of the whole Church, to "live and preach the Gospel." The Church's moral teachings offer clarity only in light of true holiness (as their end), and it is only when planted in this rich soil that they bring forth fruit. Call this a matter of "New Evangelization," if you will. The Church's ability to function as a moral teacher is inevitably bound up with the ongoing renewal of the spiritual life within the Church.

Butler defends a male-only, sacramental priesthood as "pro-woman." She observes that, whereas many Protestant denominations exclude women from ministry for sexist reasons, or on the basis of uncritical interpretations of particular passages from St. Paul, the Catholic Church does not. Rather, it defends the full equality and dignity of women, even to the point of proposing strong developments in biblical interpretation. It is simply not, she argues, a matter of social justice and rights, and allowing these concepts to frame the matter entails a misunderstanding of the ministerial priesthood. She observes, as does Garcia, that the wholly male membership of the institutional Church has historically resulted in some problems, such as a closed, nontransparent culture, and instances of fear and sexism. But fundamentally changing the nature of ministry as instituted by Christ, she argues, does the Church no service, since it avoids real justice in failing to address directly those things that are problematic. The laity are called, and should be called, to serve the Church more actively, according to their proper state of life. The gifts of female laity need to be welcomed in the Church, and ideally fear should not accompany their incorporation.

Butler argues for the male priesthood on the basis of nuptiality—that is, in the priest conformed to Christ-the-spouse/bridegroom most particularly through celebrating the sacrament of the Eucharist—more briefly here than she has elsewhere. This idea is based on the custom of seeing the bishop as "married" to his diocese, though there is little evidence in favor of extending analogous language to the pastor and the parish. It is also based on the centrality of the sacrament of the Eucharist to the life of the Church, although it is debatable whether this, or confession, is *the* priestly sacrament. The advantage of this approach seems to be that it avoids patriarchal modes of vertical hierarchy in favor of more horizontal, nuptial modes. I find this approach to be of interest, but basically flawed: not only does a nuptial priesthood lack any substantial foundation in the tradition, but from the perspective of seminary formation the language of nuptial love is, frankly, awkward. To reject the more traditional

language of fatherhood as the foundational mode of priestly charity and care seems to avoid the whole spiritual significance of the decisively revealed fatherhood of God. Badly enacted vertical hierarchy is not best addressed by supplanting it with another mode of relation. This requires a much more detailed discussion than is possible here.

Husbands are indeed more than a "needed accessory" to childbearing (89). Fatherhood is poorly appreciated, and badly in need of support and renewal. A crisis in the male vocation always goes hand in hand with a crisis in the female vocation. Several authors in this volume appeal to language, when convenient, of an older feminism: "The prevailing (largely male) attitude that productive work is incompatible with pregnancy, childbirth, and attentive nurturing" (19); the "unkempt contours of female fertility must be scoured away by a masculine, mechanizing ideology" (110); "women and girls internalize the war against their bodies by accepting the dominant, masculine utilitarian calculus as determining their value" (107). Catholic writers and feminists seem to have common ground in this language. But while Scripture sees a clear evidence of sin in the tendency of man to dominate woman, we should be wary of Marxist paradigms of class warfare between the sexes. These essays are most effective when they speak with clear argument, sound statistics, and clear pastoral concern for the well-being of women and families. This volume is a welcome contribution to an important and timely conversation precisely when it speaks with such a voice.

PAIGE HOCHSCHILD

Mount Saint Mary's University
Emmitsburg, Maryland

The Trinity: An Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God. By GILLES EMERY, O.P. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011. Pp. 248. $24.95 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8132-1864-9.

Gilles Emery, O.P., has authored an excellent introduction to the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. At the very outset, Emery establishes the foundational Catholic principle of his book: "Trinitarian faith is distinct from experiences that begin by observing nature, or studying cultural phenomena, or that start from argument or human introspection. It rests exclusively on the gift that God makes when he enables believers to know him in faith" (1). Emery writes in a clear and lucid style, such that undergraduates would find his book enjoyable to read. Even though it is an introduction it is not simply the retelling of an oft-told tale, rather it is imaginative, insightful, and nuanced. What makes for this study's freshness is Emery's masterful and creative weaving together of Sacred Scripture, the Fathers of the Church (both Eastern and Western), the liturgy, *The Catechism of*

the Catholic Church, and, obviously, Thomas Aquinas. Because of all of the above, Emery's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity enhances the reader's understanding of the Trinity and so strengthens and deepens his or her faith.

Emery's book is divided into six chapters. In the first chapter he delineates how the liturgy and Scripture give access to the Trinitarian faith. In so doing this chapter establishes the revelational basis for the doctrine of the Trinity. The second chapter examines more thoroughly the manner in which the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit reveal themselves and how the scriptural testimony speaks both of their unity/equality and distinctiveness. This is a marvelous chapter, for Emery clearly demonstrates that the later doctrinal development of the Trinity is thoroughly founded upon and springs from biblical revelation. The doctrine of the Trinity is not foreign to the scriptural text, but something to which the scriptural text gives birth. Chapter 3 studies the confessions of Trinitarian faith, beginning with the New Testament and ending with the Creed of Nicea and Constantinople. While Emery is known as an excellent Thomist, in this chapter he manifests his thorough grasp of the Fathers from both the East and the West. With ease he intertwines insights from Irenaeus, the Cappadocians, Athanasius, Ambrose, and Augustine. Moreover, his theological commentary on the Creed of Nicea and Constantinople is not only articulate but eloquent. Undergraduate students, especially, will come to grasp, from Emery's presentation, the theological importance and doctrinal significance of this creed.

Chapters 4 and 5 are more systematic in nature, dealing first with "person" or "hypostasis," and then offering a doctrinal synthesis on the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Emery discusses, with true Thomistic precision and insight, various significant issues in both chapters. Here I want to highlight just one of them: the notion that the persons of the Trinity are subsistent relations. Emery first notes that there is no difference between a divine person and the divine nature in the real order. Both terms signify one and the same divine being. The distinction within the Trinity is solely between the persons themselves. What then does distinguish the divine persons? Mutual relative opposition. Following the tradition that began in the East with the Cappadocians, was developed with Augustine and found maturity in Aquinas, Emery understands the persons of the Trinity to be subsistent relations. The Father subsists as the Father, that is, is constituted in his paternity, solely in relation to the Son—in begetting the Son. The Son subsists as the Son, that is, is constituted in his sonship, solely in relation to the Father—in being begotten by the Father, who empowers him to spirate the Holy Spirit in communion with him. The Holy Spirit subsists as the Holy Spirit, that is, is constituted in his procession, in relation to the Father and Son—in that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. "The Holy Spirit is not absent from the relation of paternity and filiation. . . . The power of spirating the Holy Spirit is *included* in the generation of the Son: by his generation, the Son receives from the Father to be with him the principle of the Holy Spirit" (116). Emery rightly points out: "The divine relation includes in itself the unity of the divine being and the personal distinction. This teaching (St. Thomas Aquinas)

enables one to grasp, however slightly, what 'person' in God means without destroying the mystery" (108).

I agree with Emery's presentation, but I think it could have been enhanced. While he rightly notes that the divine relations include the unity as well as the distinction, I think the point could have been made more emphatically. Relations, by their very nature, both distinguish and unite simultaneously. Thus, the ontological relations by which the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished from one another, and so are who they distinctively are, are the very same relations by which they are ontologically one and the same God. Moreover, Emery emphasizes that the relations distinguish the persons of the Trinity because they are "in opposition" to one another—the Father is the Father and not the Son, etc.—yet the relationships are also complementary in that the Father is Father not only in opposition to the Son, but also in that the Sonship of the Son complements the Fatherhood of the Father and vice-versa. The Father would not be Father without the Son and the Son would not be Son without the Father. The relations allow each to be who he is. Equally, Emery stresses, following Aquinas, that God's nature is "being itself" and thus "pure act." What would enrich the understanding that the persons of the Trinity are subsistent relations would be to apply the notion of pure act to them. The Father is a subsistent relation fully in act in that he is simply who he is only in the act of begetting the Son and spirating the Spirit. The same could be said of the Son and the Holy Spirit. While the terms "Father," "Son," and "Holy Spirit" are nouns, what they designate are the pure acts (verbs) by which each person of the Trinity is who he is.

Emery's final chapter articulates how the Trinity of Persons acts so as to unite human beings and the whole of creation to themselves. As all comes forth from the Father through the Son and in the Holy Spirit in creation, so all returns to the Father through the Son in the unity of the Holy Spirit. This is a splendid and inspiring way for Emery to conclude his outstanding introduction to the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity.

THOMAS G. WEINANDY, O.F.M., CAP.

Capuchin College
Washington, D.C.

God, Eternity, and Time. Edited by CHRISTIAN TAPP and EDMUND RUNGGALDIER. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing, 2011. Pp. 206. $100.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-4094-2391-1.

Theologians and philosophers have a long-standing interest in exploring God's relation to time. Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas and others have articulated and

defended the timeless or atemporalist position, in which God is in some significant sense not temporal. The empiricists and many recent philosophers have defended temporalism, the idea that God is, at least in some sense, temporal. *God, Eternity, and Time* brings together ten new essays that explore God's eternity through the lenses of analytic philosophy, historical philosophy, theology, and mathematics. Most of the essays are either primarily historical investigations or discussions located squarely in contemporary analytic philosophy. Two are theological and one is an exposition of process philosophy as it pertains to the eternity of God.

The book is divided into four parts. The first ("In Defence of Divine Timelessness") consists of three essays: Robert Pasnau, "On Existing All at Once"; Eleonore Stump, "Eternity, Simplicity, and Presence"; and Thomas Schärtl, "Why We Need God's Eternity." Part 2 ("Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom") contains Linda Zagzebski, "Eternity and Fatalism"; and Christoph Jäger, "Molina on Foreknowledge and Transfer of Necessities." Part 3 ("In Favour of a 'Third Way'") features Christian Tapp, "Eternity and Infinity"; Alan G. Padgett, "The Difference Creation Makes: Relative Timelessness Reconsidered"; and Reinhold Bernhardt, "Timeless Action? Temporality and/or Eternity in God's Being and Acting." Part 4 ("In Defence of Divine Temporalism, or: In Debate With Science") comprises William Lane Craig, "Divine Eternity and Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity"; and Hans Kraml, "Eternity in Process Philosophies."

Before I engage some of the essays in detail, I wish to express two concerns about the structure of the volume. While gathering philosophical and theological pieces together may be thought to bring breadth to the discussion, in this case it does not foster the kind of interdisciplinary engagement that one could wish. It may be a betrayal of my own dispositions and training, but it seems clear to me that the essays that are historical and the ones doing constructive analytic philosophy all operate on the same terrain. Even when they investigate widely different aspects of the issues concerning God's relation to time (as we see when we compare Craig's essay which engages relativity theory with Christoph Jäger's on Molinism) they are talking about the same things. It seems that each author is investigating the same kinds of questions with the same goals in mind.

The theological essays, in contrast, seem for the most part out of place. One exception is Schärtl's "Why We Need God's Eternity." Schärtl aims to defend God's being outside time against Robert Jensen's argument (taken as somewhat representative of the current state of systematic theology) that we must think of God in temporal terms. The essay takes up some of the key issues that arise in the philosophical literature but addresses them with a distinctively theological approach.

In contrast, Kraml, in his exposition of "Eternity in Process Philosophies," breezes over all sorts of important distinctions. It appears that he thinks that the only positions from which to choose are process philosophy and four-dimensionalism. There is little in this essay that sheds light on how to think about

God's relation to time, beyond a few comments that God can know the future, even if reality is not a four-dimensional whole.

Bernhardt claims to offer a defense of the reality of divine action, but he winds up denying that God ever intervenes in history. While claiming to be concerned about the notion of divine timelessness coming "into tension with the testimony of both the Old and New Testaments" (130), he offers a position that cannot be reconciled to the Scriptures without great strain. He argues that God is more like a force than a person. To interpret the biblical texts as indicating that God is a personal agent is to "deliver the view of God to anthropomorphism" (134). Apart from sustaining the world in existence, divine action turns out to be nonexistent. Equally problematic is how dismissive Bernhardt is about the philosophical discussion of God's relation to time. He simply makes assertions that in fact demand careful argumentation, and he fails to engage in discussion about any of the central issues.

My frustration with the latter two papers raised for me the question of how best to bring together philosophers and theologians to explore a common concern. One approach would be to have scholars from different disciplines clarify their methodologies and then to apply those methods consistently to the topic at hand. Then a reader steeped in one discipline can get a grasp on how another discipline operates and how that operation produces the kind of results that it does. Perhaps there is room for a book of the *Four Views* kind that engages in methodology.

My second structural concern is that the parts of the book, as they are labeled, do not reflect the content adequately. For example, the third part is called "In Favour of a 'Third Way'," yet only one of the three essays in this part (Padgett's) actually articulates a third way of understanding divine eternity. The fourth part of the book is entitled "In Defence of Divine Temporalism, or: In Debate With Science." It is not obvious that the two parts of the title are related. Is it supposed to be obvious that science favors one position over another? Moreover, this section significantly underrepresents the divine temporalist position. Craig's essay takes on the significant issue of how the special theory of relativity connects with this position, and Kraml's introduces process philosophy and its implications. While both of these issues are important, the book would be greatly improved with one or two essays that argue directly for divine temporalism.

Some of the essays are quite strong, representing real advances in the discussion of God's relation to time. I will restrict my comments to two. Stump seeks to show the compatibility of divine timelessness and simplicity with the biblical claim that God can be present to a human being. She notes that a personal presence requires more than direct causal and cognitive access between the people involved. It also requires shared attention. While it is difficult to articulate the make-up of shared attention precisely, it requires an interpersonal recognition. Stump emphasizes that the encounters with God in the Bible involve a recognition of God in the encounter. While God can interact with the world through his directly causing events, these interactions do not by themselves count as God's being *present* to or for another *person*, which requires person-to-person

recognition. Stump argues that this kind of recognition goes beyond propositional knowledge of facts about the person. One can have a minimal grasp of true propositions about a person and still have knowledge of the person as a person. Additionally, one can have exhaustive propositional knowledge and still lack any personal knowledge of the person.

The bulk of Stump's essay is an exposition of Aquinas's views that neither divine eternity, understood as timelessness, nor divine simplicity rules out either God's knowledge of us or our knowledge of God. A timeless and metaphysically simple God can be present to his people. One might argue that the fact that Aquinas thought that there was no incompatibility between these features of the divine nature and the experience of the presence of God is beside the point. After all, no proponent of timelessness and simplicity will hold that these preclude the experience of the divine presence. What one wants is an argument showing that these are compatible, or a refutation of arguments that purport to show that they are not. Stump suggests such an argument can be found in the all-at-onceness that is part of eternity. All of God's eternal existence can be present to us at any moment in our lives. If God were temporal, only a fragment of God's duration could be present at any moment. While this argument needs development in relation to the shared attention requirement for personal presence, the essay is still of great value. The issue of the experience of God is, I believe, one of the central sources of hesitancy in embracing the traditional doctrines concerning God's relation to time. Stump has provided what might be considered a first step in meeting these challenges.

Zagzebski presents the interesting argument that holding that God is outside time does not help to alleviate concerns over his knowledge of contingent events that are future to us. She argues that standard fatalist arguments are based in part on the *Transfer of Lack of Control Principle* (TLC): "If we cannot control the fact that *if p, then q,* then if we cannot control the fact that *p*, we cannot control the fact that *q*" (67). Zagzebski notes that there is nothing in TLC that refers to time. Therefore, it may hold for the beliefs of a timeless being. To argue that it in fact does, she discusses why it is that we believe we cannot do anything about the past. She then turns to see if these reasons apply to timelessness as well. She argues that the rejection of backward causation does not apply to the relation between a temporal being's choices and a timeless being's knowledge of those choices.

One other factor about our inability to affect the past does apply to the timeless realm. The past, Zagzebski notes, is complete. It does not require anything more to make it what it is. The future, in contrast, is still awaiting completion. This feature of the past, she argues, does find an analog in the timeless realm. "The timeless domain is at least as real as the past" (74). This analogy allows us to employ a principle of the Necessity of Eternity just like the principle of the Necessity of the Past. With this sort of principle, we can generate arguments for the incompatibility of timeless knowledge of what is future to us and the contingency of those future events.

Zagzebski admits that she would like to find a solution to this challenge. I think it will be found in analyzing in greater detail what it means to say that the timeless domain is as real as the past. If this fact does not ground a Necessity of Eternity principle, there may be room for a solution. This article's contribution is that it may be the catalyst necessary to launch this important work.

Stump and Zagzebski's work pushes the discussion concerning God's relation to time into new areas. These essays, along with several others included in this book, show that the tools of the analytic philosopher are among the most valuable for exploring the nature of God. Perhaps the lasting contribution of this book is to highlight this value.

GREGORY E. GANSSLE

Rivendell Institute at Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

Beauty and Being: Thomistic Perspectives. By PIOTR JAROSZYŃSKI. Toronto: PIMS, 2011. Pp. 280. $80.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-88844-733-3.

This volume is number 33 of the *Etienne Gilson Series* published by the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. It has been translated by Hugh McDonald with the collaboration of the author. While it can be as difficult to navigate through as Gilson's *Being and Some Philosophers,* it is as rewarding as his *Unity of Philosophical Experience*. In fact, I would argue that just as Gilson argued in the latter work that Descartes's modern experiment was an failure which led to the disintegration of human knowledge, and that man, by nature, is a metaphysical animal, so too, in a similar vein, Jaroszyński argues that this same experiment created a chasm between knowledge and being, a chasm that resulted in beauty's being divorced from being and nature, and becoming a concept that is an outcast, both from the God that produced her and from her rightful place at the heart of being.

Jaroszyński meticulously examines three theories of beauty given to us by the Greeks. First, there was beauty as harmony, which Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, the eminent historian of aesthetics, saw as the one great theory of beauty. Second, there was beauty as form which had its basis in Plato's philosophy of form, with its interesting variation of the theory of light—the good-sun—associated with it. Third, there was the relationist theory which claimed that beauty is about the relationship between the object and the perceiver. It is from this last theory that Jaroszyński builds his own theory of beauty.

Jacques Maritain once said that "Platonic dialectics succeeded in dividing; it was unable to unite"; and just as Maritain took Plato to task for his various dichotomies, Jaroszyński, in a similar way, takes current modern aesthetic

traditions to task. He does this first through an exploration of numerous key ancient and medieval primary texts, showing how beauty was not seen as marginal to human existence but as central to it. While many, even in the Thomist tradition, are aware of the standard division of human activity into knowing, doing, and making, or of *theoria*, *praxis*, and *poesis* (179), they tend to connect beauty primarily to the last activity and, to make matters worse, within the realm of art, to relegate beauty to a special place in the fine arts. This, Jaroszyński argues, is due to the heavy influence of post-Kantian formal aesthetics, a particularly modern approach that seeks to consider beauty in the context of an experience that is ultimately indifferent to the *existence* of the artistic objects in question. So we read our prejudices back into history and do not "see" the central place of beauty in the Greek world. When some philosophers take great pains to distinguish the good in art from the good in morality, perhaps they take the distinction too far. As we look at the Greeks, for instance, we see that beauty is involved not only in the making of a work of art but also in moral activity, as is evident in the Greek ideal of *kalokagathia.* The morally upright person is not just "good," he is "noble." The Greeks brought in elements of "beauty" to describe virtue and character. For example, Pythagoras and Plotinus both talk about the integrity, harmony, and orderliness of the morally virtuous person.

With regard to the connection of beauty to the fine arts, Jaroszyński argues that this too, is overemphasized. Beauty is the end result of all good art, not just the fine arts. Once again, the Greeks had a universal place for beauty, for we can think about our appreciation of Greek artifacts, decorations on shields, not to mention temples, vases, etc. Things can be beautiful and useful, for they can be created with a purpose or end in mind (intellect), with right reasoning with regard to the end, and with a love (will) on the part of the artist. In short, the artist, understood in a broad sense, can love these things into existence, not totally unlike God, who created beings not only through his divine ideas, but also through his love. In short, where we want to make distinctions, Jaroszyński urges us to see beauty as much more central to and pervasive throughout our lives.

This does, of course, raise interesting questions about beauty with regard to the role of the fine arts. Could they not show off beauty in a way that the productive arts do not? When a certain object is used for some purpose, might that not diminish the splendor of its beauty? Might not the freedom implied in the fine arts allow for the faculties of man creatively to soar in a transcendental way and produce an object of a fuller beauty, instead of keeping it in check with respect to some job we want the object to do for us? Might there be some aspect of beauty that we can appreciate precisely because we are *not* looking for something? I think that Jaroszyński's theory helps us to appreciate the beautiful in the many ways we act and create. This is very helpful and important. I still, however, would prefer a little more exploration of the value of the disinterested viewpoint—apart from linking it to Kant—in appreciating beauty.

Ever since Descartes's divorce between the mind and reality and his insistence upon clear and distinct ideas, beauty has become a pariah in philosophy. Since

what is now known is not being, but rather the contents of our own consciousness, beauty is seen as a function of our knowing alone and, too often, of our sensual knowing. The modern world sees beauty as in no way connected to our world or to ourselves as persons. It has become a univocal concept that becomes a "value" rather than a property of being. Lacking the global view of beauty of the Greeks, modern man sees beauty as having nothing to do with nature, but only with his own productions. Jaroszyński argues persuasively that we need to return to a philosophy that is about a real existing (*esse*) world that we, as realists, know, and to see beauty as a vital part of that world. Only when we consider the metaphysics of beauty first are we in a position to consider the aesthetic dimension of beauty.

Jaroszyński cogently argues that beauty is a transcendental, presenting certain opponents to this view and answering their objections. While I wish he had been able to address Jan Aertsen's recent objections to the transcendentality of beauty in his *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas*, the objections that Jaroszyński addresses, though not identical, are similar. He insists that beauty is not simply a species of the good alone and it is not reducible to either the true or the good. It is a property of being, "being" understood not primarily in terms of *form* but in terms of *existence,* for this allows for beauty to be an analogical notion that is flexible enough to be predicated across categories and being. While never found in St. Thomas's list of transcendentals, beauty deserves to be called a transcendental, and Jaroszyński gives us plenty of historical precedents for this view.

Rather than start from a crippled post-Cartesian, post Kantian view—his summary of Kant's position is, by the way, one of the finest I have read —Jaroszyński constructs a theory of beauty upon the metaphysics of the human person and reality. Only when we are allowed to see the human being not as simply consciousness but as a full existing person that knows being can we talk about the full role of beauty in our lives.

Jaroszyński reminds us several times of St. Thomas's great claim that beauty is "that which being seen pleases." Beauty involves both our intellect and our will. It is not reducible to simply knowing the truth or loving the good, rather, both of these activities come into play. Jaroszyński claims that this experience of the fusion of the faculties is present in our experience of being. Being is beautiful. As the adage has it, "a vision of order wakes everyman up." Beauty sets in motion our loving and our knowing. It makes an impact upon us. When it does so, it awakens our faculties in a way different from that of knowing the true or loving the good alone: it awakens a knowing with complacency—*visum placet* (6)—and this occurs not only at the sensual level described by the modern aesthetic philosopher, but at a level that involves the whole person. In fact, "Beauty is the point of contact between being and the person: being as an existing and determined content hits various faculties and awakens them to life, since, for man as a person, to live is to be thrust out by being to cognition and to love" (170). Clearly expanding upon the relationist theory of beauty, Jaroszyński claims that beauty is at the forefront of all human activity, especially knowledge. Beauty is

the integral and primordial force of being. It is the "first impact of being upon man" (171) that activates and awakens him to being, before he proceeds to know it in a theoretical way or to love it.

Given the transcendental nature of beauty, this view makes sense, especially when we think about the times when, as we have navigated through life, we really learned something new or made a new discovery, or had to make a life-changing decision. There was something about our experience in the face of the seemingly Heraclitean flux of being that caused us to venture out and to seek, and to become "complacent" at some point. Even before we knew the truth about a thing or what was good, we were led to believe that there was something "right" or "elegant" about the idea or the decision.

So before we experience the division of the activities of man, there is already a metaphysical unity. Maritain talked about the preconscious where there is a profound unity in our knowing before we discursively separate out the intelligible content into concepts, actions, or works of art. Jaroszyński claims this for being itself. Being does this to man. Being, rather than the human preconscious, is the hero that "saves" (180) man. While we can raise the question of whether or not in Jaroszyński's assessment human cognition is too passive in the face of being, we can say that this seems to be a very refreshing and healing view of reality. It restores our sense of beauty to its all-encompassing splendor in and around us. At least in the mind of this reviewer, it gives beauty its proper place among the transcendentals and in reality itself. Our longing for beauty has been starved too long and we have been often told of its death. Jaroszyński brings it back to life. And, as we know with St. Thomas and Aristotle, those deprived of spiritual delectations will often turn to carnal ones (*STh* II-II, q. 35, a. 4, ad 2).

On a final note, one of the issues Jaroszyński has with Maritain is that he thinks that Maritain's idea that "beauty is the splendor of all the transcendentals united" (203) is redundant (they are united *de facto*) and he wonders "what does the idea of splendor add?" (204). It may help to mention that the original French word that Maritain used for this same phrase in the second French edition of *Art et scolastique* was *réunir*, to reunite. The beauty of a work of art may be able to reunite and display for us the beauty in the rich unity of truth and goodness of being that was already there. The truth is that we often need this after we deplete being's freshness by repeatedly mining it for either truth or goodness or unity alone. As T. S. Eliot once said, "We must not cease from exploration and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we began and to know the place for the first time."

GREGORY KERR

DeSales University
Center Valley, Pennsylvania

Felicità e Beatitudine. By GIOVANNI GRANDI. Trieste, Italy: Edizioni Meudon, 2010. Pp. 173. $27.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-88-904287-7-7.

The title of this book faithfully renders the intention of its author. Grandi compares two key concepts in St. Thomas: *felicitas* (happiness) and *beatitudo* (beatitude). Grandi considers these notions according to two sides of human desire, stretching between the natural desire for a good life and salvation.

At the end of his book, Grandi adds a glossary (159-60) with definitions of crucial concepts. This glossary is a good starting point for presenting the book's message. Most of the concepts listed here are connected either with the happiness (*felicità*) related to the temporal life or else with beatitude (*beatitudine*). The two groups can be compared in two ways: by the paradigm of complementarity (*paradigma di completamento*) or by the paradigm of coimplication (*paradigma di coimplicazione*). Using these concepts Grandi explains the development of Aquinas's thought from the paradigm of complementarity to the paradigm of coimplication (7). The paradigm of complementarity consists in the reduction of both happiness and beatitude to the same idea of eternally perpetuated happiness (25, 159). The second paradigm shows the essential difference between them, and Grandi intends to show that Aquinas adopted this paradigm in the *Summa Theologiae* (8).

The following notions can be associated with happiness (*felicitas*): "bio-existential parabola" (*parabola bio-esistenziale*), "nature," and the "good life" (*buona vita*). Others can be connected with beatitude (*beatitudo*): "grace" (*grazia*), "salvation" (*salvezza*), and the "spiritual life" (*vita spirituale*). Already here one can notice a separation between happiness and beatitude. They form two distinct realities, which can overlap, but according to the paradigm of coimplication, they are not essentially correlated (159).

Grandi defines "beatitude" as a general condition of ontological stability given by relation with God (159), and "sin" as a state of ontological and spiritual separation from God (160). In this way beatitude acquires a more general meaning than it has in Aquinas (beatific vision), and includes the entire order of the spiritual life. Some concepts in the glossary are applicable to both levels. In some cases, however, it results in a double meaning: for example "life" at the level of natural happiness becomes a "bio-existential parable" and also "death as an event," the moment of its end. In the context of beatitude it becomes "spiritual life" and "spiritual death."

Grandi carries out his intention in a transparent manner. In the introduction he presents clearly his assumptions and main lines of argumentation, which are consistently developed throughout his book. He carefully leads the reader, recalling and summarizing what was already established, and showing the further plan of investigation (78-80, 117-19, 141-44).

The book is composed of four parts. The first three form the core, in which Grandi presents numerous analyses of the texts of Aquinas. In the fourth part Grandi outlines a contemporary perspective on his topic. He shows that human beings can overcome human death by either a personal or a communal attempt

to prolong and improve people's lives in the temporal dimension of happiness (*felicitas* [148-52]), and in going beyond its natural limits to beatitude according to the paradigm of coimplication (*beatitudo* [152-58]).

In the main part of the book, Grandi shows that at the beginning of his career Aquinas's thought can be characterized by the paradigm of complementarity (15-33), and that afterwards he starts to change the paradigm (35-60) with the final result of coimplication (61-144). The first part is based on a few quotations taken from the commentary on Lombard's *Sentences* and the *Summa contra Gentiles*. Next Grandi connects the change of paradigm with the idea of spiritual life and death, in the context of some of Aquinas's biblical commentaries (*In Matt., In Rom., In I Cor.*). Then Grandi shows the new paradigm in an extended commentary on the treatise on happiness in the *Summa Theologiae* (80-140).

Although Grandi speaks frequently about the paradigm of coimplication, and even gives its definition in the glossary, it is still not easy to determine its precise meaning. He describes it as "a perspective that poses an essential, and not only quantitative, difference between happiness and beatitude, studying their intertwining, and assuming a double intentionality of desire in one dimension of human action in history" (159). This definition leads, in fact, to a dualism in human nature between its "natural" and "spiritual" parts. They cannot be essentially correlated, if we also assume, following Grandi, the essential distinction between them, and their double intentionality (85, 100). This dualism and the unity of human "historical action" require some further anthropological clarifications. Grandi seems to ignore the risks because he intends primarily to avoid a reduction of the paradigm of complementarity (141).

Grandi's book also presents some further difficulties. He carefully distinguishes and separates natural finality and the spiritual life. As a consequence human nature in its natural capacities and powers is reduced to a kind of state of "pure nature" ordered to its natural happiness. This natural finality is separated then from the order of salvation. Divine help becomes essentially independent of any natural human action. As a consequence no human merit is possible at the natural level. Grandi proposes a kind of "fundamental option": the human being can make a free decision, a kind of "interior event" (138), by which he opts for God as the ultimate end (136). This interior event is distinct from exterior deeds. The exterior human acts considered in themselves are irrelevant for salvation: what matters spiritually is the interior choosing of God as the ultimate end.

The separation of natural and spiritual finality, as proposed by Grandi in the paradigm of coimplication, seems to pose many difficulties in relation to the *Summa Theologiae*. Aquinas correlates the natural "matter" of exterior acts and their "form" in the interior act of human will (I-II, q. 18, a. 6). Both compose a unique human act, which has at the same time a spiritual and an exterior dimension. Only when the exterior act is good can it express the goodness of the interior act of the will tending to its end; otherwise it cannot (I-II q. 20, a. 2). For Aquinas each individual human act is moral, good or bad (I-II, q. 18, a. 9), because everything, whether natural or supernatural, is an integral part of the human tending toward the ultimate end.

In the paradigm of coimplication Grandi seems to exclude the idea of the integration of natural and supernatural finalities. He proposes, instead, to see this relation as accidental (to use Aquinas's vocabulary). Aquinas seems, however, to orient human nature directly to God as to its ultimate end: *homo ordinatur ad Deum* (I, q. 1, a. 1). The human soul is by nature "open to God," *Dei capax* (I-II, q. 113, a. 10). Without reaching the vision of divine essence human natural desires cannot be completely fulfilled (I-II, q. 3, a. 8). Aquinas, of course, constantly emphasizes that it is impossible for any created nature to see God by its own resources (I, q. 12, a. 4). The human being cannot reach this goal by nature but is endowed with a faculty of free will by which he is able to turn to God for help (I-II, q. 5, a. 5, especially ad 1). It seems that Grandi carefully avoids this kind of approach. In Aquinas the natural level is ordered to the life of grace by its structure. The human being in its nature is the subject of spiritual cooperation with God. Grace becomes an integral part of human integrity, a kind of necessary supplement added to us by God, which heals, integrates, and elevates human nature in its quest for God.

An independence of natural and supernatural finalities seems also to contradict Aquinas's approach to the finality of human powers. The paradigm of coimplication by its presuppositions reduces this openness of the human mind and will to natural created truths and goods. In this way human powers are not directed to God as their highest object. Aquinas, however, convinces us in the main part of his analysis of beatitude that the natural desire for happiness cannot be in vain. It cannot be satisfied without direct knowledge of the essence of the first cause (I-II, q. 3, a. 8). Here he argues from a strictly philosophical reasoning based on the natural openness of the human mind to God, the first cause.

Even the paradigm of complementarity creates some difficulties. Grandi suggests that in his early works Aquinas reduces happiness and beatitude essentially to the same thing with the only difference being a limited versus eternal duration (25). This is, *de facto*, a reduction of *beatitude* to natural human happiness. Aquinas's intention, however, seems rather to be the opposite, namely, to elevate happiness to the level of beatitude. At the beginning of his commentary on the *Sentences*, Aquinas clearly makes a distinction between the imperfect knowledge of God derived from creatures (imperfect happiness) and the direct vision of God (I *Sent.*, q. 1, a. 1). Imperfect happiness is thus essentially different from the direct vision of God. Even if Aquinas uses "happiness" and "beatitude" as synonyms, it does not amount to a reduction of earthly and heavenly happiness to the same reality, as the paradigm of complementarity presupposes.

Already for Aristotle the desire for happiness was a kind of enigma. However, he describes happiness in such a way as allows for its theological application—a conclusion Aquinas draws in his commentary on Matthew. But Grandi interprets this text differently (40-43), and repeatedly comes back to this interpretation (78, 93, 126-28). He quotes the passage where Aquinas comments on the happiness of the active life. This type of happiness is regarded as a means to the higher end. Grandi takes the passage as standing for the entire order of the natural life, and

so reduces the entire natural finality to the order of a means as essentially distinct from the end of beatitude (42).

Aquinas comments further on the happiness of the contemplative life, and explicitly accepts the Aristotelian description of happiness. He corrects it only on one point, regarding time, "because otherwise this definition is right since the ultimate happiness consists in the vision of the highest intelligible, that is God" (*quia alias vera est, quia ultima felicitas consistit in visione optimi intelligibilis, scilicet Dei* [*In Matth*., c. 5, lect. 2]). There is no opposition between Aristotelian happiness and theological beatitude, because both of them can be characterized as the "contemplation of divine things" (cf. *STh* I-II, q. 3, a. 5).

Grandi also shows the negative side of natural human goods. They can become idols when people treat them as something ultimate: in so doing they separate themselves from God and fall into the trap of pride and self-satisfaction (44-45, 100, 133). Aquinas is aware of this danger, but usually he underlines the positive side of every good. Each being naturally tends to reflect at its own level the source of all goodness, God. Commenting on divine beatitude Aquinas observes that "whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude" (*STh* I, q. 26, a. 4). For Aquinas all forms of goodness, even the misleading ones, reflect some divine goodness, and as God's gifts they promise us something greater than themselves.

There is a note of a Protestant air in Grandi's attitude towards the natural goods of human nature. He seems to treat them with some mistrust since justification and salvation come from a higher level than that of corrupted nature. Aquinas seems to be more confident in natural goods: even the false pursuit of happiness somehow reflects divine beatitude. Grandi reads Aquinas, in my opinion, with overly strong presuppositions concerning the separation of human nature and its natural finalities from its relation to beatitude. He gives us, however, a clear and consistent presentation of his interpretation of Aquinas.

MICHAL MROZEK

Thomistic Institute
Warszawa, Poland