

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE OLD TESTAMENT

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IN *DOMINUM ET VIVIFICANTEM*, his encyclical on the Holy Spirit, Pope John Paul II states that even though numerous Old Testament texts include a reference to God's Spirit, "nevertheless in the Old Testament context there is no suggestion of a distinction of subjects, or of the divine Persons as they subsist in the mystery of the Trinity, and as they are later revealed in the New Testament."¹ It is a commonplace of contemporary biblical exegesis and theology that the revelation of the Trinity takes place in the New Testament; God's "Spirit" is present in the Old Testament, but not explicitly as a distinct personal agent. With regard to the Spirit in the Old Testament, Pope John Paul II shares the view of contemporary exegesis: "Both in Isaiah and in the whole of the Old Testament *the personality of the Holy Spirit* is completely *hidden*: in the revelation of the one God, as also in the foretelling of the future Messiah."²

¹ Pope John Paul II, *Dominum et Vivificantem* 17, in *The Encyclicals of John Paul II*, ed. J. Michael Miller, C.S.B. (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 2001), 254.

² *Ibid.* I have retained the word "personality" rather than change the Vatican's English translation, but the literal translation here would be "person." The Latin text (available on the Vatican web site, www.vatican.va) reads: "Sive apud Isaiam, sive in toto Vetere Testamento *persona* Spiritus Sancti prorsus latet: latet in revelatione unci Dei acque etiam in annuntiatione venturi Messiae." William J. Hill, O.P., argues, mistakenly I think, that in fact the Spirit's distinct personhood is completely hidden until John's Gospel, and even then appears only implicitly. For Hill, "*Pneuma* in the New Testament is a symbolic expression articulating a people's religious experience of God's active immanence within their history. It does not take cognizance of a later alien and speculative question concerning distinct personhood. But, as symbol, neither is its

Dominum et Vivificantem grants that Isaiah 11:2, which connects the coming Messiah with the Spirit's resting upon the Messiah, serves as "a kind of bridge between the ancient biblical concept of 'spirit,' understood primarily as a 'charismatic breath of wind' and the '*Spirit*' as a person and as a gift, a gift for the person."³ In this way, then, Isaiah can be said to inaugurate "the path toward the full revelation of the Holy Spirit in the unity of the Trinitarian mystery."⁴ Yet, in accord with contemporary exegesis and theology, *Dominum et Vivificantem* remains clear that the Old Testament, including Isaiah, knows nothing of a distinct divine person called the "Spirit." Rather, although the Spirit was active in Israel (and the world) prior to the coming of Jesus, the Spirit was not known as a distinct person, but rather was understood as acting "in accordance with the will of the Lord, by virtue of the Lord's decision or choice," and thus as a manifestation of the divine will.⁵

This separation of the Old and New Testament understandings of the Spirit is challenged, or at least nuanced, by Anthony Thiselton in his recent *The Holy Spirit—In Biblical Teaching, through the Centuries, and Today*. While certainly agreeing with *Dominum et Vivificantem* that no Old Testament author was consciously a Trinitarian, Thiselton points to Isaiah 63:10, which says of the people of Israel that "they rebelled and grieved his [YHWH's] holy Spirit; therefore he turned to be

evocative power closed off to such later ventures of understanding" (William J. Hill, O.P., *The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation* [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982], 298). This understanding of "symbol" has a certain value, but it does not do justice to the way the Spirit appears in Paul and Luke-Acts: see for example Gordon D. Fee, *God's Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1994), 839-45, 898; Ben Witherington III and Laura Ice, *The Shadow of the Almighty: Father, Son, and Spirit in Biblical Perspective* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002), 105-47; Mehrdad Fatehi, *The Spirit's Relation to the Risen Lord in Paul: An Examination of Its Christological Implications* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000). For a view similar to Hill's, see M. E. Lodahl, *Shekinah Spirit: Divine Presence in Jewish and Christian Religion* (New York: Paulist Press, 1992).

³ Pope John Paul II, *Dominum et Vivificantem* 15 (Miller, trans., 253).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Pope John Paul II, *Dominum et Vivificantem* 17 (Miller, trans., 254).

their enemy, and himself fought against them.”⁶ As Thiselton observes, the word “grieved” has implications for Isaiah’s pneumatology: its use “implies a personal or suprapersonal Agent since a *force* or sheer *power* cannot be *grieved*.”⁷ One might respond that this “suprapersonal Agent” is none other than the Lord God, so that “the Lord” and “his holy Spirit” refer strictly, without any distinction, to the same reality: Isaiah means simply to say that the Lord was grieved by Israel’s rebellion. Indeed, Thiselton recognizes that in many Old Testament texts, “The Spirit of God is clearly a mode of God’s activity, whose nature and identity are inseparable from God.”⁸ Yet he suggests that we should think of the Spirit in some Old Testament texts, such as Isaiah 63:10, in the same way that we think of personalized Wisdom in the Old Testament. In some Old Testament texts, the Spirit is not simply a mere synonym for God, but is instead “an intermediary with God” or a personalized, transcendent “Agent of God, or extension of God.”⁹

⁶ For biblical quotations in this essay, I use the Revised Standard Version when possible, as a reliable modern translation of the Hebrew and as a widely used, recognizable English version of Scripture.

⁷ Anthony C. Thiselton, *The Holy Spirit—In Biblical Teaching, through the Centuries, and Today* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2013), 20.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 3, 21. Similarly, Christopher Seitz observes that “the Holy Spirit is an agent in his own right in the Old Testament. . . . What takes time is understanding the Spirit of the Lord as his own person” (Seitz, “The Trinity in the Old Testament,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity*, ed. Gilles Emery, O.P., and Matthew Levering [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011], 28-39, at 37). The key point, however, is that “[t]he independence of the Holy Spirit at work in the Old Covenant assured his integrity as a Person of the Trinity” (*ibid.*, 37; in context, Seitz’s words here have a Barthian ecclesiological tonality). For a succinct introduction to the Spirit in the Old Testament from a contemporary theological perspective, see also Brian Gaybba, *The Spirit of Love: Theology of the Holy Spirit* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1987), 3-11. Gaybba remarks that the expression “holy Spirit” became common only in the late Second Temple period, and he surmises that this was because Israelites stopped pronouncing the divine name YHWH and needed another way of indicating that the Spirit was YHWH’s. During this same period, both God’s “Spirit” and God’s “Wisdom” were personalized, but as Gaybba says, “This did not mean that either God’s wind or wisdom were regarded as being really distinct from God, or as intermediaries of some sort between God and humanity” (*ibid.*, 11). On the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament,

Even if Thiselton is right, however, do Christians need the Old Testament witness to the Spirit, or would the doctrine of the Spirit remain the same without the Old Testament witness?¹⁰ Do the Old Testament texts have anything to teach us about the person of the Holy Spirit? Given the frequency of reference to the “Spirit” in the Old Testament, despite the fact that the Old Testament authors were not explicit Trinitarians, should Christian theological exposition of the Holy Spirit’s full divinity and personal distinctiveness in the Trinity make use of the Old Testament?

These questions are too ambitious for one essay, but in what follows, I seek some preliminary answers by retrieving the theological tradition (East and West) of reflection on the Holy

see the essays in *Presence, Power and Promise: The Role of the Spirit of God in the Old Testament*, ed. David G. Firth and Paul D. Wegner (Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP Academic, 2011), also as well as the theologically informed surveys by Thierry Martens, O.S.B., *The Spirit of God in Scripture* (Baltimore, Md.: Helicon Press, 1966), 11-47; and Alasdair I. C. Heron, *The Holy Spirit* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983), 3-38. See also Christopher J. H. Wright’s work of popular biblical theology, *Knowing the Holy Spirit through the Old Testament* (Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP Academic, 2006). Wright helpfully divides the relevant material into five chapters, “The Creating Spirit,” “The Empowering Spirit,” “The Prophetic Spirit,” “The Anointing Spirit,” and “The Coming Spirit.”

¹⁰ On this topic see especially Seitz, “The Trinity in the Old Testament.” Seitz emphasizes that the New Testament descriptions of Father, Son/Word, and Spirit depend inextricably upon Old Testament language. As Seitz points out, “Had there been no reception of these writings [the Scriptures of Israel] as the sole authoritative witness to the work and identity of God, during which period the New Testament writings were coming to form, the conditions would not have been in place for the kind of Trinitarian thinking that emerged” (ibid., 31). Seitz shows that one way to move from the Old Testament God/YHWH (and “wisdom,” “spirit,” and so forth) to the New Testament Father, Son, and Spirit is to examine “the descriptions of God’s identity and work testified to in His life with Israel,” and to discern how these descriptions “pressure” us in the direction of the New Testament Trinity (ibid., 30). Seitz also is aware that we cannot restrict Old Testament expressions “univocally to a single referent” (ibid., 29), even if the human author intended only one referent. In this regard, he cites Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on Psalm 22, where Aquinas makes clear that the “literal sense” here includes, prophetically, the spiritual meaning intended by God. As Seitz puts it, for Aquinas “the human author, as inspired by God, spoke of things of such lofty significance that the final intentionality might well not have been clearly seen, and indeed probably was only seen for what it was at a later time. Yet, that single author’s literal sense-making contained the reality in earnest” (ibid., 33).

Spirit. I first examine the use of the Old Testament in the pneumatology of three fourth-century Eastern Fathers of the Church: Athanasius, Didymus the Blind, and Basil the Great.¹¹ As we will see, Athanasius's use of the Old Testament turns out to be particularly instructive, due to his debate about the referent of Amos 4:13 with a group of Christians who rejected the Holy Spirit's divinity. Second, I explore the role of the Old Testament in a sermon preached by Thomas Aquinas on the Feast of Pentecost. Although I could have chosen numerous other authors and texts, this selection will serve to display the main ways in which the Old Testament figured in pneumatological writings prior to the rise of historical-critical exegesis. The question running through this article is, do these ways of drawing upon the Old Testament's "Spirit" add anything of value to the portrait of the Holy Spirit that can be obtained from the New Testament?

I. ATHANASIUS, DIDYMUS THE BLIND, BASIL THE GREAT

A) Athanasius's "Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit" (c. 359-361)

Athanasius's first letter to Serapion is written against Christians who claim to reject Arianism, but who deny the divinity of the Holy Spirit. In Athanasius's view, such Christians—whom he calls "Tropikoi," due to their faulty mode

¹¹ For succinct discussions of and further secondary literature for these figures (and this period of patristic pneumatology), see Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*, vol. 1: *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 211-20; Basil Studer, O.S.B., *Trinity and Incarnation: The Faith of the Early Church*, trans. Matthias Westerhoff, ed. Andrew Louth (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1993), 148-53; Yves Congar, O.P., *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, trans. David Smith (New York: Crossroad, 1997), 1:74; 3:4, 25-27, 30-31. Marcus Plested has drawn attention to another fourth-century contributor to the theology of the Holy Spirit, Macarius: see Marcus Plested, "Pneumatology and the New Creation in the Macarian Writings: An Ecumenical Legacy," in *The Spirit in Creation and New Creation: Science and Theology in Western and Orthodox Realms*, ed. Michael Welker (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2012), 161-70.

of exegesis—are de facto Arians: “For if they do not wish the Son of God to be a creature—and in this matter at any rate their thinking is sound—then how are they content to countenance that the Spirit of the Son is a creature?”¹² The Son’s Spirit must have full unity with him; a mere creature could not truly be the Spirit of the Son. Nor could a Trinity worthy of worship, or coherent in any way, be comprised of two divine persons and one creature. Since Jesus teaches in John 15:26 that the Holy Spirit “proceeds from the Father,” the “Tropikoi” fail to know even the Father correctly, since they imagine that the Father’s Spirit is a mere creature.

Athanasius observes that the Tropikoi’s favorite biblical verse is Amos 4:13. In the Septuagint—used by all the Greek Fathers as their translation of the Old Testament—this verse reads, “For, behold, I am he that strengthens the thunder, and creates the wind [καὶ κτίζων πνεῦμα], and proclaims to men his Christ [καὶ ἀπαγγέλλων εἰς ἀνθρώπους τὸν χριστὸν αὐτοῦ].”¹³ For the Tropikoi, the meaning of the verse is clear: God “creates” his πνεῦμα, his Spirit, whereas God “proclaims” or speaks forth his χριστος, his Son. One can see why the Tropikoi were

¹² Athanasius, *Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit*, 1.2.2, in Athanasius and Didymus, *Works on the Spirit: Athanasius’s Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit, and Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit*, ed. and trans. Mark DelCogliano, Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, and Lewis Ayres (Yonkers, N.Y.: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011), 55. For discussion of the *Letters to Serapion*, see Khaled Anatolios, *Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian Doctrine* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2011), 137-50. See also Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 211-14 (focusing on the inseparability of the Son and Spirit); Ayres, “Innovation and Ressourcement in Pro-Nicene Pneumatology,” *Augustinian Studies* 39 (2008): 187-206, at 188, 194, 197; Thomas F. Torrance, *The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988), 205-17, 231-32; Thiselton, *Holy Spirit*, 211-13.

¹³ I employ here *The Septuagint with Apocrypha: Greek and English*, ed. and trans. Lancelot Charles Lee Brenton (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1986 [1851]). In the Revised Standard Version, this passage reads, “For lo, he who forms the mountains, and creates the wind, and declares to man what is his thought.”

persuaded that this verse conveys an important pneumatological instruction.¹⁴

Athanasius responds by first recalling Proverbs 8:22 (LXX), “The Lord made me [Wisdom] the beginning of his ways for his works.” He reminds the Tropikoi that they rightly understand Proverbs 8:22 as not implying that the Word is a creature. But since there is a way to read Proverbs 8:22 without supposing that the Word is created, there should also be a way to read Amos 4:13 without supposing that the Spirit is created. Indeed, says Athanasius, Amos 4:13 might not be about the Holy Spirit at all, since not every instance of πνεῦμα signifies the “Holy Spirit.” The meaning may simply be that God creates a spirit or wind.¹⁵ Athanasius proposes a (flexible) exegetical principle for

¹⁴ Christine Helmer draws attention to the growing post-Reformation awareness that diverse scriptural texts, in their original contexts, construe God in very different ways. She remarks, “The divine referent described in the Hebrew Bible, the ‘God of Israel,’ could not be seen on historical grounds as semantically identical with either the ‘proto-trinitarian’ God of the New Testament (e.g., the trinitarian benediction in 2 Cor 13:13 and the baptismal formula of the Great Commissioning in Mt 28:28) or the explicitly articulated Trinity of the fourth-century Niceno-Constantinopolitan creed. The breakdown of semantic unity had to do with the growing awareness that a historicized semantics was required in order to understand the Trinity in relation to its history” (Christine Helmer, “Between History and Speculation: Christian Trinitarian Thinking after the Reformation,” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity*, ed. Peter C. Phan [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011], 149-68, at 152). In this regard, Helmer points to the ways that Georg W. F. Hegel and Friedrich Schleiermacher systematically integrated the Trinity with historical experience, and thereby “probed and stretched Western thinking by contributing to its development” (ibid., 167). In my view, a better way to retrieve “semantic unity” is to bring together modern historical methods with a providential, participatory understanding of history (like Scripture’s own understanding of history). This approach can uphold the value of the fourth-century exegetical debates despite the participants’ lack of awareness of the texts’ full meaning in the original contexts. See Matthew Levering, *Participatory Biblical Exegesis: A Theology of Biblical Interpretation* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008); and idem, “Linear and Participatory History in Augustine’s *City of God*,” *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 5 (2011): 175-96.

¹⁵ John Levison challenges this distinction. He argues that although we certainly need “fresh doses of the spirit” beyond the spirit that we receive at birth, “it is time to embrace the belief that the power of God’s spirit pulses in every breath we take” (John Levison, *Inspired: The Holy Spirit and the Mind of Faith* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2013], 17). As he points out, “When they encounter the words *ruach* and *pneuma*, translators need to decide whether to capitalize the word, and they typically do

determining whether πνεῦμα signifies the Holy Spirit: “In general, if ‘spirit’ is said without the definite article or without one of the aforementioned modifiers [“of God,” “of the Father,” “of Christ,” “of the Son,” “my”], it cannot be the Holy Spirit who is signified.”¹⁶ Athanasius notes that when the

so based upon whether these words are thought to refer to the human spirit or the divine spirit. If they think the biblical authors are referring to physical life, translators tend to render *ruach* or *pneuma* as ‘breath’ or ‘spirit.’ If they think the biblical authors understand *ruach* or *pneuma* as a charismatic gift of God, they use capitalization, translating *ruach* or *pneuma* as ‘Spirit’” (ibid., 19). He argues that this problem was not present in the early Church: “The problem . . . is the absence in English of a word that can simultaneously mean human spirit or breath and divine Spirit or breath. In Israel and the early church, however, this distinction simply did not come into play. One word, *ruach* or *pneuma*, could communicate *both* the spirit or breath of God within all human beings *and* the divine spirit or breath that God gives as a special endowment” (ibid.). Levison concludes, “These translations raise an intractable problem: they introduce a dichotomy between the human spirit or breath and the divine Spirit. It is time to put this dichotomy behind us if we are to understand *ruach* or *pneuma* for what it is—both breath and Spirit. I will do this in part by refusing, in every case, to capitalize the word *spirit*, and by being careful to represent the absence and presence of definite articles in original languages. I will also frequently refer to *ruach* and *pneuma* as spirit-breath. In these ways, I will circumvent the distinction between the breath of life and the Spirit of God—or other variations of this dichotomy” (ibid., 20). The distinction, however, is more important and necessary than Levison thinks, although he is certainly right that the Holy Spirit is active in creation and indeed in every aspect of creaturely existence. Levison is aware that the New Testament authors, unlike other Second Temple Jews such as Philo (and unlike the Old Testament), distinguished rigorously between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit: “Their letters and gospels contain precious few vestiges of this conception of the holy spirit, a holy spirit given to all human beings by dint of creation, a spirit that is the energy and essence of life, a spirit that can be cultivated through study and discipline, a spirit that is the locus of virtue. This conception of the spirit within nearly evaporates in early Christian writings, where it is eclipsed almost entirely by the belief that the good gifts of God arrive only with a subsequent filling by the holy spirit” (Levison, *Filled with the Spirit* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2009], 237-38). For perspectives that differ from Levison’s, see Richard E. Averbeck, “Breath, Wind, Spirit and the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament,” in Firth and Wegner, eds., *Presence, Power and Promise*, 25-37; Gordon D. Fee, “Translational Tendency: English Versions and Πνεῦμα in Paul,” in *The Holy Spirit and Christian Origins: Essays in Honor of James D. G. Dunn*, ed. Graham N. Stanton, Bruce W. Longenecker, and Stephen C. Barton (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2004), 349-59.

¹⁶ Athanasius, *Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit*, 1.4.2 (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 58).

Apostle Paul wishes to speak of the Holy Spirit, he uses the definite article (see Gal 3:2; 1 Thess 5:19). The evangelists do the same, as Athanasius shows by citing Luke 4:1 and Matthew 4:1.

Athanasius finds the requisite modifiers attached to the word πνεῦμα in the following Old Testament passages, which he considers to instruct us about the divine Holy Spirit and which he lists for the benefit of the Tropikoi:

- Genesis 1:2, “And the Spirit of God was moving over the water”;
- Genesis 6:3, “My Spirit shall not abide in these people because they are flesh”;
- Numbers 11:29, “Would that all the people of the Lord were prophets, when the Lord bestows his Spirit upon them!”;
- Judges 3:10, “And the Spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he judged Israel”;
- Judges 11:29, “And the Spirit of the Lord came upon Jephthah”;
- Judges 13:25, “And the Spirit of the Lord began to stir him”;
- Judges 15:14, “The Spirit of the Lord sprung upon him”;
- Psalm 51:11 (50:13 LXX), “Do not take your Holy Spirit away from me!”;
- Psalm 143:10-11 (142:10-11 LXX), “Your good Spirit shall guide me on level ground for your name’s sake, Lord”;
- Isaiah 61:1, “The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me”;
- Isaiah 30:1, “Woe to you, rebellious children! Thus says the Lord: ‘You have carried out a plan, but not with me; you have made covenants, but not with my Spirit, adding sins to sins’”;
- Isaiah 48:16, “And now the Lord has sent me, and his Spirit”;
- Isaiah 59:21, “This is my covenant with them, said the Lord, my Spirit which is upon you”;
- Isaiah 63:10, “But they did not believe and they enraged [RSV: grieved] his Holy Spirit, and he turned to them in animosity”;
- Ezekiel 11:24, “And the Spirit took me, and he led me into the land of the Chaldaeans, into captivity, in a vision, in the Spirit of God”;
- Daniel 13:45, “God aroused the Holy Spirit of a young man whose name was Daniel”;
- Micah 2:7, “The house of Jacob provoked the Spirit of the Lord”;
- Joel 3:1, “And it shall come to pass after these things that I will pour out upon all flesh from my Spirit”;
- Zechariah 1:6, “But receive my words and my laws, which I have enjoined by my Spirit upon my servants, the prophets”;

- Zechariah 7:12, “And they made their hearts disobedient in order not to obey my law, and the words which the almighty Lord had sent by his Spirit by the hands of the prophets of long ago.”

What are we to make of this list? It is certainly quite varied. Most of the texts appear to speak of God’s Spirit, but there are some that, despite Athanasius’s endorsement, seem rather to speak of the human spirit. For example, Daniel 13:45 surely speaks of Daniel’s human spirit, which was holy. Likewise, Genesis 6:3, when read in its context, appears to be about the life-force or spirit that we receive from God and that literally sustains our life. God says in Genesis 6:3 that he does not intend for this spirit to “abide in man for ever,” with the result that the maximum lifespan for humans will be 120 years. In the RSV at least, this verse does not seem to refer to the Holy Spirit who works our new creation. In the Septuagint version of Genesis 6:3 that is used by Athanasius, however, God appears to be saying that his Spirit—his divine power—will not sustain mere mortals (*qua mere mortals*) in life forever.

Other passages, while evidently about God’s Spirit, are troubling in other ways. For instance, Athanasius cites Judges 11:29, “And the Spirit of the Lord came upon Jephthah”; but he does not mention that the Spirit moves Jephthah not only to attack the Ammonites, but also (although the Spirit’s role is not stated explicitly) to make a vow to God that “[i]f you will give the Ammonites into my hand, then whoever comes forth from the doors of my house to meet me, when I return victorious from the Ammonites, shall be the Lord’s, and I will offer him up for a burnt offering” (Judg 11:30-31). One could hardly conceive of a worse vow. Not only does it cost the life of Jephthah’s daughter, but also it supposes that God wants human sacrifice. Similarly, Judges 13:25 and Judges 15:14 have to do with Samson, whose behavior is highly erratic. In Judges 15:14, the Spirit of the Lord comes upon Samson and liberates him from his bonds; but the result is that Samson “found a fresh jawbone of an ass, and put out his hand and seized it, and with it he slew a thousand men” (Judg 15:15). He can hardly be said to be a model of a man filled with the Holy Spirit, at least as

Paul understands the virtues associated with the Spirit's indwelling.

Other verses on the list are more promising. Genesis 1:1 states that "God created the heavens and the earth," and Genesis 1:2 continues by remarking, "And the Spirit of God was moving over the water." Without needing to believe that the author of Genesis 1:2 envisioned the Spirit as a distinct divine Person, we may possibly learn something about the Spirit's distinctive personhood from Genesis 1:2, because the author employs the phrase "Spirit [or "wind": *rûach*] of God" in order to signal the divine creative presence. As the Old Testament scholar Bill Arnold remarks, "this announcement that the 'wind/spirit of God' was hovering over the waters announces God's presence on the scene, anticipating God's dramatic decree in v. 3."¹⁷ By deliberately associating the "Spirit" with divine creative presence, Genesis 1:2 arguably illumines something distinctive about the Spirit.

Another of the texts that Athanasius includes is Numbers 11:29, "Would that all the people of the Lord were prophets, when the Lord bestows his Spirit upon them!" Arguably, this text partially reveals the Spirit's distinctive personhood as gift, although this gift-character is not reflected upon explicitly by Athanasius. In Numbers 11:25, "the Lord came down in the cloud and spoke to him [Moses], and took some of the spirit that was upon him and put it upon the seventy elders; and when the spirit rested upon them, they prophesied." The "spirit that was upon" Moses is Moses' spirit; but Moses' spirit is God's gift and serves to unite Moses uniquely with God. God's sharing of Moses' "spirit" underscores the gift-character of divine Spirit.¹⁸ Of course, Numbers 11 does not reveal the Spirit as divine Gift

¹⁷ Bill T. Arnold, *Genesis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 39.

¹⁸ Here Levison's thesis regarding Spirit/spirit is apropos, although Levison is not speaking specifically about Numbers 11:25: "There is no need to introduce an artificial bifurcation between the so-called 'actual spirit of God' and a physical life-principle. In this instance . . . the spirit must be understood to encompass both simultaneously" (Levison, *Filled with the Spirit*, 69; cf. 413-15 for an instructive comparison of Numbers 11 and 1 John 4).

in the way that the New Testament does.¹⁹ But the Spirit (or, in this case, “spirit”) is given by God, and when this Spirit is given, the minds of the elders are enlightened so that they are able to prophesy—surely a divine gift.²⁰ In another verse that Athanasius cites here, Psalm 51:11, the psalmist begs God, “Create in me a clean heart, O God, and put a new and right spirit within me. Cast me not away from your presence, and take not your holy Spirit from me” (Ps 51:10-11). God’s presence here is his “holy Spirit.” Insofar as God’s active presence or Spirit produces a “clean heart” and “right spirit” in the person, the Spirit as the gift of love seems to be indicated.

The connection between the Spirit and love—a connection not made explicit by Athanasius—appears in another text quoted by Athanasius, Psalm 143:10. The psalmist implores, “Teach me to do your will, for you are my God! Let your good spirit lead me on a level path!” This verse draws together God’s teaching us his will with his leading us by his Spirit. God’s Spirit and God’s teaching are here essentially synonymous, and the function of his Spirit is to lead us “on a level path,” founded upon his “righteousness” and “steadfast love” (Ps 143:11-12).

One may wonder, however, if this seeming connection of the Spirit and love is negated by such texts as Isaiah 63:10 and Micah 2:7, also cited by Athanasius. Isaiah 63:10 states that

¹⁹ See Matthew Levering, “The Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian Communion: ‘Love’ and ‘Gift’?,” *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 16 (2014): 126-42, which expounds the way in which Augustine, in exegeting the New Testament, identifies the Spirit as properly or distinctively Love and Gift. For further discussion see idem, *Engaging the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit: Love and Gift* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, forthcoming).

²⁰ Arguing for the “continuity” of Athanasius’s position with that of Augustine, Anatolios observes, “Augustine designates the Spirit’s role as the outward actualization of divine life by referring to the Spirit’s biblical name as ‘Gift.’ He asks what the eternal character of the Spirit as gift can be if considered independently of creation and as the recipient of the gift. His response is that the Spirit eternally exists as ‘the Giveable God’ (*Deus donabilis*) whose giveability is not strictly contingent on the existence of any recipients. Athanasius’s speculative ken does not stretch that far; he is content simply to clarify the scriptural designation of the Spirit as the one in whom divine life is given. Divine life has its source in the Father; its content is imaged in the Son; and it is outwardly given in the Spirit” (Anatolios, *Retrieving Nicaea*, 143).

Israel “rebelled and grieved his [God’s] holy Spirit; therefore he turned to be their enemy, and himself fought against them.”²¹ It might seem that far from showing “steadfast love” (Isa 63:7), God exhibits a petulant anger. Similarly, Micah 2:7 in the Septuagint speaks of God’s Spirit being “provoked” (although this verse differs quite significantly from the RSV, which asks rhetorically, “Is the Spirit of the Lord impatient?” with the clear implication that the Spirit is not so). In the Septuagint version at least, it might seem that the Spirit is more connected with divine anger than with God’s gift of love.

It is important to compare this with the revelation of the Spirit in the New Testament. Jesus warns that “every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven men, but the blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven. And whoever says a word against the Son of man will be forgiven; but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either in this age or in the age to come” (Matt 12:31-32). Similarly, Jesus tells his disciples in his Farewell Discourse that the Holy Spirit “will convince the world of sin and of righteousness and of judgment” (John 16:8). The Spirit as revealed in the New Testament, too, is connected with judgment of sin. When we grieve the Holy Spirit, God “fights” against us, not because he hates us, but because we hate love. This also accords with Isaiah 30:1, another text quoted by Athanasius, since in this verse God warns that those who make plans and covenants that do not come from God’s Spirit “add sin to sin.” This is clearly not a revelation of a Trinitarian person, but it does illumine, however indirectly, the love that distinguishes the Spirit.

Athanasius also quotes Isaiah 61:1, “The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me” and Isaiah 48:16, “And now the Lord has sent me, and his Spirit.”²² Here the Lord bestows and sends the Spirit as a gift. According to Isaiah 59:21, God will send his Spirit upon the whole people as the mark of

²¹ For the significance of Isaiah 63 for Athanasius (and Didymus and Cyril of Alexandria), see Pelikan, *Emergence of the Catholic Tradition*, 214.

²² For contemporary discussion of this verse, see Paul D. Wegner, “Isaiah 48:16: A Trinitarian Enigma?” in Firth and Wegner, eds., *Presence, Power and Promise*, 233-44.

his covenant. God's covenantal gift, which makes the people holy by uniting them with him, is his Spirit.

In addition, Athanasius quotes Ezekiel 11:24, "And the Spirit took me, and he led me into the land of the Chaldaeans, into captivity, in a vision, in the Spirit of God" (11:24). The Spirit is connected with power and prophetic vision. Joel 3:1 (2:28 RSV), also cited by Athanasius, proclaims that "it shall come to pass after these things that I will pour out upon all flesh from my Spirit." Again, the Lord shares his Spirit as gift. This same sense of gift—in this case a gift refused by the people of Israel—comes across in another text quoted by Athanasius, Zechariah 7:12: "And they made their hearts disobedient in order not to obey my law, and the words which the almighty Lord had sent by his Spirit by the hands of the prophets of long ago." The Spirit here is the agent of the Lord's gifting.

Athanasius chose these texts, along with a similarly lengthy set of New Testament texts, because they contain markers that make clear, in his view, that it is the Holy Spirit (rather than a human spirit) that is under discussion. As we noted, these texts serve to contest the Tropikoi's reading of Amos 4:13. The Tropikoi also give a central place to 1 Timothy 5:21, "In the presence of God and of Christ Jesus and of the elect angels I charge you to keep these rules without favor, doing nothing from partiality." For the Tropikoi, this means that the Holy Spirit, in the triad God-Christ-Spirit, has a place like that of "the elect angels."²³ These angels are creatures, and so is the Spirit.

²³ For background see Bogdan Gabriel Bucur, *Angelomorphic Pneumatology: Clement of Alexandria and Other Early Christian Witnesses* (Leiden: Brill, 2009). Bucur treats Clement of Alexandria, the *Shepherd of Hermas*, Justin Martyr, and Aphrahat. See also Jean Daniélou, S.J., *The Theology of Jewish Christianity* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1964), 117-46. Daniélou finds instances in which "Christ and the Holy Spirit are represented in their eternal nature, and not simply in their mission, by means of the imagery of various angelic beings" (146). For further background see John R. Levison, *The Spirit in First-Century Judaism* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 27-55. Levison discusses the way in which Philo and Josephus render the biblical story of Balaam and Balak in light of an angelic spirit: see Numbers 22:35 and 24:2. Bucur is indebted to recent portraits of Jewish binitarian theology: see Alan F. Segal, *Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism* (Leiden: Brill, 1977); Daniel

Like the Tropikoi, Athanasius is aware of Old Testament texts that seem to link the function of the Spirit with that of angels. As an example, he mentions Zechariah 4:5, which in the Septuagint reads, “Thus says the angel who speaks within me.” As Athanasius points out, however, the angel in the very next verse refers directly to God’s Spirit in a manner that makes clear that the angel is not the Holy Spirit. In responding to the problem posed by 1 Timothy 5:21, Athanasius emphasizes that the Spirit “is called ‘Paraclete,’ ‘Spirit of adopted sonship,’ ‘Spirit of sanctification,’ ‘Spirit of God,’ and ‘Spirit of Christ.’ Nowhere is he called ‘angel,’ or ‘archangel,’ or ‘ministering spirit,’ as are the angels.”²⁴

Athanasius also argues that “where the Word is, there also is the Spirit, and the things created through the Word have their

Boyarin, *Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 112-27; Margaret Barker, *The Great Angel: A Study of Israel’s Second God* (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1992). Bucur distinguishes between “a ‘creedal’ and a ‘functional’ level of theology” and finds “a certain incongruence, in early Christianity, between the ‘creedal’ level of theology (i.e., *what* is defined as normative faith) and the ‘functional’ level of theology (i.e., *how* faith is expressed theologically)” (*Angelomorphic Pneumatology*, 191). He adds, “To take the ‘Father, Son/Spirit, and angelomorphic Spirit’ scheme as a (very deficient) statement on *theologia* rather than *oikonomia* would be not only an anachronism, but also a theological misinterpretation” (ibid., 192). The texts have to do with a “*functional identity* of Christ, the Holy Spirit and the angel as grasped by religious experience” (ibid.). See also the discussion of “Angel Pneumatology” in Michel René Barnes, “The Beginning and End of Early Christian Pneumatology,” *Augustinian Studies* 39 (2008): 169-86, at 174-76; as well as Charles Gieschen, *Angelomorphic Christology* (Leiden: Brill, 1998). For a fuller account of Justin Martyr’s theology of the Holy Spirit, see Studer, *Trinity and Incarnation*, 52-53; Matthew W. Bates, *The Hermeneutics of the Apostolic Proclamation: The Center of Paul’s Method of Scriptural Interpretation* (Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2012), 200-208 (Bates argues, as an example of prosopological exegesis, that “Justin presents several passages in which he claims the prophetic Spirit speaks ‘as from the person of Christ’” [204]).

²⁴ Athanasius, *Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit*, 1.11.1 (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 70). George T. Montague, S.M., comments that in 1 Timothy 5:21, it is “as if Paul were putting Timothy under oath. The scenario is the final judgment: God, Christ, and the righteous angels all have a role, biblically, in the final judgment” (George T. Montague, *First and Second Timothy, Titus* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2008], 115). Montague cites Daniel 7:10 as evidence for the angels’ role.

strength to exist through the Spirit from the Word.”²⁵ To demonstrate this, he cites Psalm 33:6, “By the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and all their host by the breath [LXX: πνεῦμα] of his mouth.” In this verse, the Word and Spirit (the Lord’s πνεῦμα) are joined together in the act of creation. Athanasius observes that “since Christ is *the Power of God and the Wisdom of God* [1 Cor 1.24], it is logical to say that the Spirit is *the Spirit of Wisdom* [Is 11.2] and *the Spirit of Power* [Wis 5.23 and 11.20].”²⁶ The Spirit and the Word go together, even in the Old Testament.

In sum, in the Old Testament texts that Athanasius considers to be about the Holy Spirit, the Spirit’s distinctive personhood does not seem to be completely hidden. Especially in the Psalms and Isaiah, we find a Spirit that is distinctively associated with divine gift and love, and that has a role in creation and prophecy. Were we to read the New Testament texts about the Spirit without this background, we would not be able fully to appreciate the New Testament texts, and we would deprive ourselves of an inspired source for reflection upon what distinctively characterizes the Spirit. With regard to the Trinity in the Old Testament, the contemporary biblical scholar Christopher Seitz suggests that there is “a surplus” of meaning “planted in the original inspired testimony and so ingredient in the witness and so also in God’s act of self-revelation.”²⁷

²⁵ Athanasius, *Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit*, 2.14.1 (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 124). See Ayres, “Innovation and *Ressourcement* in Pro-Nicene Pneumatology,” 197.

²⁶ Athanasius, *Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit*, 3.4.1 ((DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 132).

²⁷ See Seitz, “Trinity in the Old Testament,” 32. As Seitz notes, “if it were a dogmatic *ad extra*, or if it was the creation of an imaginative exegesis capable of correlation with Second Temple methods historically made more precise (as useful as this is in its own way), and *understandable chiefly on those grounds*, it would not be the kind of Trinitarian claim that Christians could say was true to who Jesus Christ genuinely is, such that he is to be worshipped and called Lord. What Christians (comprised in the first instance of the one people of God) claimed to be true of Jesus they grounded as truthfully alive in the one literal sense witness of the only scriptures, and their only true account of who God was and is and is to be, YHWH, the Maker of Heaven and Earth” (ibid.).

Athanasius can help us to perceive this “surplus” and thereby to learn from the Old Testament about how to name the Spirit who comes to us in the New.

B) Didymus the Blind’s “On the Holy Spirit” (ca. 360-65)

Desirous of showing the divinity of the Holy Spirit, Didymus proposes to “set forth our opinion on the Holy Spirit by means of proof-texts from the Scriptures.”²⁸ He first emphasizes that the same Holy Spirit was at work in the people of Israel who is now at work in the Church. The Holy Spirit was not “one thing in the saints before the coming of the Lord and another thing in the Apostles and the other disciples.”²⁹ Didymus places emphasis on the statements in Hebrews and Acts that specify that the Holy Spirit was speaking through the psalmist and the prophets, who therefore must have experienced the Spirit. As he observes, “David, a man of the Old Testament who was made a sharer in him [the Spirit], used to pray that he would remain in him, saying: *Do not take your Holy Spirit from me!* [Ps 51:11]. And it is said that God stirred up the Holy Spirit in Daniel while he was still a boy, as if the Holy Spirit were already dwelling in him [Dan 13:45].”³⁰ Didymus goes on to make the case for the Spirit’s divinity on the basis of the fact that the Spirit sanctifies (as only God can do) rather than receiving his sanctity from outside himself, as creatures do. In addition, the Spirit is not

²⁸ Didymus the Blind, *On the Holy Spirit* (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 143-44). For discussion, see Lewis Ayres, “The Holy Spirit as the Undiminished Giver: Didymus the Blind’s *De Spiritu Sancto* and the Development of Nicene Pneumatology,” in *The Theology of the Holy Spirit in the Fathers of the Church*, ed. Janet Rutherford and Vincent Twomey (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010), 57-72. J. Lionel North points out that this this work is extant only in Jerome’s Latin translation: see J. Lionel North, “The Transformation of Some New Testament Texts in Fourth- and Fifth-Century Disputes about Πνεῦμα: *Disputando Inclarescet Veritas*,” in Stanton, Longenecker, and Barton, eds., *Holy Spirit and Christian Origins*, 335-48, at 343. North examines Didymus’s altering of the Greek of Romans 8:11.

²⁹ Didymus the Blind, *On the Holy Spirit* (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 144-45).

³⁰ *Ibid.* (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 144).

localized as creatures are, but instead is omnipresent and fills creatures with goodness, virtues, and spiritual gifts.³¹

Didymus does not use Old Testament texts as much as does Athanasius. But it is notable that he underscores the Holy Spirit's personal characteristic as gift—what he calls “the point made in many passages, that the Holy Spirit is given by God”—by reference to Isaiah 42:1, which in the Septuagint reads, “Jacob is my servant, I will help him: Israel is my chosen, my soul has accepted him; I have put my Spirit upon him; he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles.”³² He notes that the Spirit is also given by God in the vision of Joel 2:28 (in the RSV numbering), where God promises to pour forth his Spirit upon all humans. He connects this with Paul's way of speaking in Romans 5:5, “The love of God is poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.”³³ Didymus's main concern here is to show the Spirit's divinity: if the Spirit proceeds from God, then he is uncreated and bestows God rather than participating (as all creatures do) in God. As Didymus observes, with reference to Hebrews 10:29 and Zechariah 12:10, “For whenever anyone receives the grace of the Holy Spirit, he has it as a gift from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ.”³⁴ The Spirit's association with gift exhibits his place in the Trinity, not least with regard to divine unity: “the fact that there is a single grace of the Father and the Son perfected by the activity of the Holy Spirit demonstrates that the Trinity is of one substance.”³⁵

Like Athanasius, Didymus devotes a section of his book to denying that Amos 4:13 should be read as a testimony to the created status of the Spirit. Didymus, however, argues in a more simple fashion—quite accurately—that “if we closely follow the narrative just cited [in verse 13], namely, *thunder* and *dawn* and *foggy mist*, we ought also to place *spirit* in the same narrative

³¹ See *ibid.* (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 146-61).

³² *Ibid.* (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 158).

³³ See *ibid.* (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 159).

³⁴ *Ibid.* (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 167).

³⁵ *Ibid.*

order.”³⁶ Didymus also points out, as Athanasius did, that the absence of the definite article indicates that the text is not speaking of the divine Spirit. Whereas Athanasius cites Isaiah 11:2 to describe the Spirit as “the Spirit of Wisdom,” thereby linking the Spirit to Christ (as depicted in 1 Corinthians 1:24), Didymus employs another Old Testament text to draw the same connection: Deuteronomy 34:9, “Joshua the son of Nun was full of the spirit of wisdom.”³⁷ To display the Holy Spirit’s status as Creator, Didymus quotes Psalm 104:30, “When you send forth your Spirit, they are created.”³⁸ He notes that the psalm’s testimony to the Spirit’s creative role accords with the angel Gabriel’s promise to Mary that the Holy Spirit would enable her to conceive Jesus (see Luke 1:35).

Didymus discusses Isaiah 63:7-12 at some length, with the goal of learning “not only from the New Testament but also from the Old Testament what we should believe and understand about him [the Holy Spirit].”³⁹ It is to be expected that the Old Testament will teach us about the Spirit, says Didymus, because the saints (the patriarchs and prophets) who lived before Christ received the grace of the Holy Spirit. Filled with the Spirit, the prophet Isaiah knows to give praise for God’s merciful gifts. Didymus comments that it is heretical to imagine that the New Testament reveals the good God and the Old Testament the just God, as if the same God were not revealed in both Testaments.

³⁶ Ibid. (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 163-64).

³⁷ Ibid. (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 172).

³⁸ See *ibid.* (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 189). For discussion of “Spirit Creator Pneumatology,” see Barnes, “Beginning and End of Early Christian Pneumatology,” 171-74. Barnes observes, “The fact that the catholic gospels contain no mention of the Holy Spirit as creator makes the Jewish testimonies to this effect all the more important for early Christian pneumatology. Psalms 33:6 and 104:30, as well as Isaiah 42:5, figure significantly in early patristic declarations [beginning in the late second century A.D.] that the Holy Spirit is involved in the creation of the cosmos” (*ibid.*, 173). Yet, as Barnes points out, “With Irenaeus we come to the end of a theology of *the Spirit as creator* in earliest Christian pneumatology: this theology disappears from theological reflection, in both Latin and Greek authors, until the late fourth century” (*ibid.*, 174).

³⁹ Didymus the Blind, *On the Holy Spirit* (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 203-4).

In Didymus's view, Isaiah 63:8-9 describes the righteous of Israel, who are God's children and receive salvation from God. God "lifted them up and carried them," which Didymus takes to mean that God "bestows life upon them and is the author of salvation even to the consummation of the age."⁴⁰ Those who rebel against God thereby anger "his holy Spirit" (Isa 63:10), which shows that God and his Spirit are one.

Unlike Athanasius, Didymus reads this text through the lens of Christ's Cross and, in a rather unfortunate manner, applies Isaiah's statement that God "fought against them" (Isa 63:10) to the Jewish people after Christ's crucifixion. Continuing with his effort at a Christological reading, he interprets the next verse's reference to the one "who led the shepherd of the sheep from the earth" (Isa 63:11 LXX) to be a reference to Christ's resurrection. The next verse, which in Didymus's text reads "Where is he who put the Holy Spirit upon them?" leads Didymus to reflect upon how the Spirit, who once led the people of Israel, turned away from the people of Israel when they forsook him.

In drawing these connections, Didymus is seeking to warn his fellow Christians. He emphasizes that "the Holy Spirit is only introduced to those who have forsaken their vices, who follow the choir of the virtues, and who live by faith in Christ in accordance with and through virtue."⁴¹ But if such believers become spiritually negligent, lacking in love and the other virtues, then they too will forsake the Spirit and become the enemies of God. Christians should instead remember Moses, mentioned positively in Isaiah 63:12. According to Didymus, Moses here signifies the purity of God's law. Moses was guided by Christ, who is symbolically referenced, Didymus thinks, by the phrase "right hand" (Isa 63:12).

For Didymus, it must be true that the Old Testament instructs us about the Spirit, because the authors of the Old Testament, such as David and Daniel, experienced the Spirit. When he reads the Old Testament Christologically, he has this

⁴⁰ Ibid. (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 208).

⁴¹ Ibid. (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 211).

experience in view: by arguing that God can take away the gift of the Spirit from Israel, he hopes to demonstrate to his Christian audience that God can take away the gift of the Spirit from them unless they seek holiness. The main thing that Didymus finds the Old Testament to contribute to the scriptural portrait of the Spirit consists in the association of the Spirit with gift, which Didymus perceives especially in the prophets, including Zechariah 12:10, Joel 2:28, and Isaiah 42:1. The prophets' characteristic connection of the Spirit with gift should instruct Christians about the distinctive properties of the Spirit who is revealed in the New Testament. Didymus also draws attention to the Spirit's creative work.

C) Basil the Great's "On the Holy Spirit" (373-75)

In *On the Holy Spirit*, the first significant references to the Old Testament occur in chapter nine, where Basil notes that the names of the Holy Spirit are found in both Testaments: "Spirit of God" and "Spirit of truth" in the New (Matt 12:28; John 15:26), and "Spirit of righteousness" and "directing Spirit" in the Old (Ps 50:12, 14 LXX; cf. Ps 51:10, 12 RSV).⁴² When Basil later returns to the names of the Holy Spirit, he again makes significant use of the Old Testament, specifically Lamentations 4:20 (LXX: "Πνεῦμα προσώπου ἡμῶν χριστός Κύριος), as well as Job 33:4 and Exodus 31:3 (both of which speak of "the Spirit of God").⁴³ Similarly, in asking why Paul sometimes names only Christ when speaking of baptismal anointing, Basil argues that the name "Christ" can evoke for Paul an anointing in all three names, since the Father anoints Christ with the Spirit. In this regard, he cites Isaiah 61:1 and

⁴² See Basil the Great, *On the Holy Spirit*, 9.22 (trans. Stephen Hildebrand [Yonkers, N.Y.: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2011], 52). For discussion of this work, see Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy*, 215-21; Anthony Meredith, "The Pneumatology of the Cappadocian Fathers and the Creed of Constantinople," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 48 (1981): 196-212.

⁴³ See Basil, *On the Holy Spirit* 19.48 (Hildebrand, trans., 84).

Psalm 45:7 (44:8 LXX) for their account of God's anointing of his servant with the Spirit.⁴⁴

Describing the perfective work of the Spirit in creation, Basil quotes Psalm 33:6, which we saw above in Athanasius's *Letters to Serapion*; and he cites a few Old Testament passages in support of his view that the Holy Spirit sanctifies angels and humans.⁴⁵ In a later chapter, he further defends his view that the Spirit in the Old Testament possessed divine agency. He refers in particular to Isaiah 48:16, Isaiah 63:10, and Isaiah 63:14. Isaiah 48:16, which we saw already in Athanasius, states that "now the Lord God has sent me and his Spirit." The first passage from Isaiah 63 states that the Israelites "rebelled and grieved [LXX: provoked] his holy Spirit" (Isa 63:10; cf. Eph 4:30). This verse is taken by Basil as evidence that the Spirit is fully divine rather than being "an instrument, obedient subject, one who is equal in honor to creation and a fellow-slave with us."⁴⁶ Likewise, Isaiah 63:14 in the Septuagint describes the strong agency of the Spirit: "the Spirit came down from the Lord, and guided them."

Basil reads Isaiah 42:5, in which "πνεῦμα" appears without a definite article, as signifying the divine Spirit,⁴⁷ whereas the translators of both the Septuagint and the RSV are united in reading the text as praising God for giving "breath to the people upon it [the earth] and spirit to those who walk in it." Much more frequently, however, Basil's Old Testament references are drawn from texts that are clearly about God's Spirit and that attribute divine functions to the Spirit. In chapter 23, for example, Basil quotes Wisdom 1:7's description of personified Wisdom, "the Spirit of the Lord has filled the world";⁴⁸ and he

⁴⁴ See *ibid.* 12.28 (Hildebrand, trans., 59).

⁴⁵ See *ibid.* 16.38 (Hildebrand, trans., 71-73).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 19.50 (Hildebrand, trans., 87).

⁴⁷ See *ibid.* 22.53 (Hildebrand, trans., 92).

⁴⁸ Levison demonstrates the impact of Stoic philosophy on the Wisdom of Solomon's doctrine of the spirit (Levison, *Filled with the Spirit*, 142-45). As Levison observes, for the Wisdom of Solomon, "The spirit within, 'a disciplined holy spirit,' avoids deceit, foolishness, and injustice. It corresponds to the spirit of the Lord, which is described in quintessential Stoic terms as that which 'has filled the world' and which 'holds all things

backs up this quotation with texts from Psalm 139:7, “Whither shall I go from your Spirit?” and from Haggai 2:5-6 (LXX), “for I am with you, saith the Lord Almighty; and my Spirit remains in the midst of you.” The key point is that the Spirit fills the whole world in a way that a creature could not. Basil similarly finds the Spirit’s presence in Daniel 4:5 (numbered as verse 8 in the RSV). Nebuchadnezzar describes “the spirit of the holy gods” (Daniel 4:8 RSV) as dwelling in Daniel; and such indwelling, for Basil, is a divine prerogative.⁴⁹

Basil also is willing to read the Old Testament typologically, so as to connect the Spirit with texts where we might not otherwise have thought to find him. Thus when God tells Moses that “there is a place by me where you shall stand upon the rock” (Exod 33:21), Basil considers that this “place” must be the Spirit. He reasons in the same way regarding Deuteronomy 12:13-14, “Take heed that you do not offer your burnt offerings at every place that you see; but at the place which the Lord will choose.” In light of Jesus’ words in John 4:23, “true worshippers will worship the Father in spirit and truth,” Basil considers that this “place which the Lord will choose” must be the Holy Spirit.⁵⁰ (Basil arrives at this conclusion even though Deuteronomy 12:14 continues by noting that the place will be “in one of your tribes.”) Likewise, he finds the same signification of “place” in the words that Jacob speaks after awakening from his dream about the ladder spanning heaven and earth: “Surely the Lord is in this place” (Gen 28:16).⁵¹

together.’ This cosmic spirit, like a disciplined holy spirit, cannot tolerate injustice. The effect of these three references to the spirit in such rapid succession [in Wisdom 1:5-8] in relation to humanity, wisdom, and the cosmos is to give the distinct impression that all belong together, that all share in the same substance as *pneuma*, that all evince the same commitment to virtue and an abhorrence of vice” (ibid., 144). For reflection on the difference between Stoic and Christian views of “Spirit,” see Raniero Cantalamessa, *The Mystery of Pentecost*, trans. Glen S. Davis (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 2001), 24.

⁴⁹ See Basil, *On the Holy Spirit* 26.63 (Hildebrand, trans., 102).

⁵⁰ See ibid. 26.62 (Hildebrand, trans., 101).

⁵¹ See ibid.

The central point of all Basil's Old Testament references is to uphold the Spirit's divinity. Thus he concludes by applying Sirach 43:30's exhortation to the Spirit: "When you praise the Lord, exalt him as much as you can; for he will surpass even that."⁵² When combined with his more frequent New Testament references, Basil's scattered Old Testament references teach us especially about the relationality of the Spirit: the Spirit is of God (the Father) and of Christ, as can be seen in such texts as Lamentations 4:20 (in the Septuagint version); Job 33; Exodus 31:3; Isaiah 61:1, and Psalm 45:7. The Spirit's relationality vis-à-vis the Father and Christ is also characteristic of the Spirit in the world. The Old Testament teaches us about the Spirit's creative and sanctifying agency and about the Spirit's all-encompassing presence, inclusive of the typological rendering of the Spirit as a "place." For Basil, the Old Testament thereby adds to the New Testament portrait of the Spirit a strong emphasis on the Spirit as a bond of presence and relationship. This emphasis reinforces what we learn about the Spirit from the New Testament, which would be impoverished (and much less comprehensible) without the Old Testament witness.

II. THOMAS AQUINAS'S SERMON ON PENTECOST, *EMITTE SPIRITUM*

As noted above, *Dominum et Vivificantem* contends that "in the whole of the Old Testament *the personality of the Holy Spirit* is completely *hidden*."⁵³ As we have seen, the Greek Fathers strive to show that the Spirit can be identified in the Old Testament. In the Old Testament, the Greek Fathers find characteristics that also distinguish the Spirit in the New Testament, among them an association with gift and love, and a creative agency. The Greek Fathers use the Old Testament to develop a foundation for reading the witness of the New to the Spirit's distinctive personhood. In so doing, they make clear

⁵² See *ibid.* 28.70 (Hildebrand, trans., 110).

⁵³ Pope John Paul II, *Dominum et Vivificantem* 17. "Completely hidden" of course need not mean "absent."

that activities and properties can be found in the Old Testament that deepen our understanding of the Spirit who is sent at Pentecost.

We turn now to Thomas Aquinas's sermon for the feast of Pentecost, "*Emitte spiritum.*" As a representative of medieval Western pneumatology, how does Aquinas benefit from the Old Testament portraits of the Spirit? As the guiding biblical text for his sermon, Aquinas takes a text that we also found in Didymus: Psalm 104:30, "Send out your Spirit, and they will be created, and you will renew the face of the earth."⁵⁴ Like Didymus, Aquinas considers this Spirit—the Spirit of the psalmist David, God's Spirit—to be the same Spirit that God sends upon the disciples at Pentecost in order to "renew the face of the earth."⁵⁵

⁵⁴ See Thomas Aquinas, "*Emitte spiritum: Sermon on Pentecost,*" in Aquinas, *The Academic Sermons*, trans. Mark-Robin Hoogland, C.P. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 138-58, at 138. For discussion of this sermon, see especially Kenneth M. Loyer, *God's Love through the Spirit: The Holy Spirit in Thomas Aquinas and John Wesley* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 165-79. See also Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., "La pratique pastorale d'un théologien du XIIIe siècle: Thomas d'Aquin prédicateur," in idem, *Recherches thomasiennes* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2000), 282-314, at 305. Torrell emphasizes that "in order to have a more complete idea of the way in which Thomas speaks of the Spirit, it is necessary to read his Pentecost sermon" (ibid., 305). As Torrell summarizes Aquinas's approach to the Spirit in this sermon, "Thomas sees in the Spirit essentially the source of everything, because it is love that is at the origin of creation, the source of all life, of all movement, of all sanctity. . . . [T]he Spirit can only move towards the hidden source from which he proceeds, God himself. But when one speaks of the Creator Spirit, it is necessary not to think only of the first production of things in their natural being, but also equally of their re-creation in the order of grace" (ibid.). See also Torrell's discussion of *Emitte spiritum* in his *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 2: *Spiritual Master*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 173-74. On the Holy Spirit in creation, see also George Sabra's helpful summary of *Summa contra gentiles* IV, cc. 20-22 in George Sabra, *Thomas Aquinas' Vision of the Church* (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1987), 95.

⁵⁵ Aquinas's text of the Bible was "the Latin Vulgate according to the early thirteenth-century Paris exemplar; it seems likely that he consulted the corrected version, the Jacobin Bible, edited in his own community of Saint-Jacques" (Thomas Gilby, O.P., "Appendix II: The *Summa* and the Bible," in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, vol. 1 [Ia.1], *Christian Theology* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 133-39, at 134). Identifying the precise version Aquinas is using at particular points can be difficult.

In the prologue of his sermon, Aquinas prays to the Holy Spirit to receive wisdom for preaching. At Pentecost, of course, the apostles “were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in other tongues” (Acts 2:4). The Spirit here empowered the disciples to understand and to proclaim the gospel. This gift of the Spirit, Aquinas points out, is anticipated by Wisdom 9:17, “Who has learned your counsel, unless you have given wisdom and sent your holy Spirit from on high?” To receive God’s Holy Spirit is to be given wisdom that comes from God, and we cannot proclaim God’s wisdom without this gift.⁵⁶

After this prologue, Aquinas goes on to explain how he is going to interpret Psalm 104:30. In accord with the mode of medieval exegesis, he argues that in the words of Psalm 104:30 we find four revealed truths: “(1) the property of the Holy Spirit, (2) his mission, (3) the strength of the One sent, and (4) the receptive *materia* of this strength.”⁵⁷ The “property” of the Holy Spirit is his coming forth from God (“your Spirit”); his “mission” is when he is sent into the world (“Send out”); his “strength” or effect is to create and renew (“they will be created, and you will renew”); and what is renewed is the whole world (“the face of the earth”).⁵⁸

Discussing first the Spirit’s “property” of coming forth from God, Aquinas argues that the very name “Spirit” is important. In addition to the simple fact of not being matter, “Spirit” indicates for Aquinas “the perfection of life.”⁵⁹ He points out that, according to Psalm 146:4, life seems to depend upon spirit; when spirit or “breath” departs from us, we die. Perfect “Spirit,” then, would be perfect “life.” The name “Spirit” also indicates movement: Aquinas notes that Psalm 107:25, for

⁵⁶ For discussion see John Mahoney, S.J., “The Spirit of Wisdom in St. Thomas Aquinas,” in *The Spirit in Action: Papers Read at the Second Catholic Dogma Course Roehampton 1967*, ed. Robert Butterworth, S.J. (Langley, England: St Paul Publications, 1968), 45-57, at 47-48. Mahoney’s essay is focused on moral decision-making.

⁵⁷ Aquinas, “*Emitte spiritum*” (Hoogland, trans., 139).

⁵⁸ For an emphasis on the mnemonic dimension of Aquinas’s sermons, see Randall B. Smith, “How to Read a Sermon by Thomas Aquinas,” *Nova et Vetera* 10 (2012): 775-803.

⁵⁹ Aquinas, “*Emitte spiritum*” (Hoogland, trans., 139).

example, speaks of a “stormy wind” or spirit. Third, the name “Spirit” suggests a “hidden origin,” like wind whose source we do not know.⁶⁰ Thus the name “Spirit,” as present in the Old Testament, already contains key characteristics of the perfect, divine Spirit: life, movement, hidden origin. After all, God is the hidden source of life and movement, and God is the cause of previously hidden things that are coming to be.

On this basis, Aquinas suggests that the presence of “the Spirit of God” at the creation (Gen 1:2) indicates that the Spirit is in fact the source and fullness of life, movement, and origin.⁶¹ In this regard Aquinas points out that the deepest origin of things is love. God’s love is the reason why he causes things to come to be. Here Aquinas quotes Wisdom 11:24, “For you love all things that exist, and have loathing for none of the things which you have made, for you would not have made anything if you had hated it.”⁶² Likewise, the first *movement* of the will is love. And all things that move by themselves have life. The name “Spirit,” therefore, already suggests that “the Spirit has a hidden origin, the property of which is love.”⁶³ As personal Love, the Spirit “is the principle of the movement of all things” and “is life.”⁶⁴ Especially when connected with Genesis 1:2, then, Aquinas finds the name “Spirit,” given in the Old Testament, to be rich in significance. The name “Spirit” leads us to the name “Love.”

⁶⁰ Ibid. (Hoogland, trans., 140). See Martin Sabathé, *La Trinité rédemptrice dans la “Commentaire de l’Évangile de saint Jean” par Thomas d’Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 2011), 255.

⁶¹ On the Holy Spirit’s creative love and universal operation in the divine government (the working of divine providence) and the propagation of creatures, see Gilles Emery, O.P., *The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 245-49. In this section Emery draws primarily upon the *Summa contra gentiles*. As Emery states, “nothing is more alien to St Thomas than a ‘static’ vision of the universe. The Holy Spirit is the divine impulse of love: the world and its history are formed by this impulsion, in which they participate. . . . It is by means of the eternal property of the Spirit as Love, in the style of a ‘love-impulse’, that one can set forth the deep reason for the acts attributed by Scripture to the Holy Spirit” (ibid., 249).

⁶² See Aquinas, “*Emitte spiritum*” (Hoogland, trans., 141).

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid. (Hoogland, trans., 142).

Aquinas adds other Old Testament passages to support the connection of the Spirit with immateriality, life, movement, and hidden origin. With respect to movement, he appeals to Ezekiel 1:12's visionary description of the living creatures of the divine chariot, "wherever the spirit would go, they went." With respect to life, he appeals to Psalm 36:9's praise of our loving God: "with you is the fountain of life."⁶⁵ He employs Wisdom 7:22-23 to underscore the Spirit's life-giving (sanctifying) movement. Regarding Wisdom 7:22-23, Aquinas states that the Spirit is called "intelligent" insofar as he enlightens us by uniting us to divine Wisdom, and the Spirit is called "holy" insofar as he purifies us by uniting us to the perfect good. The Spirit is called "multiple" because he unites many people to himself.

The Spirit sanctifies us, Aquinas observes, by leading "us back to the hidden origin, that we may be united with God."⁶⁶ In this regard, Aquinas draws support from 1 Kings 18:12, where Obadiah tells the prophet Elijah, "the Spirit of the Lord will carry you whither I know not." Aquinas also cites Psalm 143:10, which in his version reads "Your good Spirit will lead me away" (RSV: "Let your good spirit lead me on a level path"). He notes, too, that in Isaiah 59:19 the Spirit can be seen as inciting the movement of God the Redeemer. Again his version and the RSV differ notably; his version reads, "he comes like a wild river, driven by the Spirit of the Lord," whereas the RSV states that "he will come like a rushing stream, which the wind of the Lord drives." Similarly, Aquinas finds in Ezekiel 37:5, the famous passage of the dry bones, an evocation of the Spirit's life-giving and sanctifying power: "Behold, I will cause breath [spirit] to enter you, and you shall live."

Aquinas also uses the Old Testament to reflect upon the Spirit's mission. He explains that the Spirit's mission "is wondrous and unknown to us, because the Spirit is sent without a need on his part, without a change in him, without subjection,

⁶⁵ See *ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* (Hoogland, trans., 144).

and without separation.”⁶⁷ The sending of the Holy Spirit into the world is not required, strictly speaking, for God’s purposes to be accomplished. The Holy Spirit, after all, is God and therefore could accomplish his purposes in another way. In this regard Aquinas quotes Wisdom 7:23, which states that in personified Wisdom “there is a spirit” that is “all-powerful, overseeing all.” The all-powerful Spirit is freely sent to us because, first of all, we desire to enjoy God. Here Aquinas cites two passages of Old Testament testimony: Lamentations 3:24, “My portion is the Lord of my soul” (RSV: “‘The Lord is my portion,’ says my soul”), and Psalm 73:28, “Clinging to God is my good” (RSV: “But for me it is good to be near God”). To be moved to the supernatural end of enjoying God, we must be moved “by knowledge and by love,” and this occurs when divine wisdom is revealed to us and the Holy Spirit, as Love, is sent to direct our hearts to this wisdom.⁶⁸ Aquinas here has in view Pentecost, of course; but he also quotes an Old Testament passage that prepares for Pentecost, “Who has learned your [God’s] counsel, unless you have given wisdom and sent your holy spirit from on high?” (Wis 9:17).⁶⁹

Does the mission of the Holy Spirit require him to change, either by changing in location (if we wrongly imagine God to be spatial) or in some other way? Aquinas answers no, of course, because to say otherwise would be to turn God into a creature. He defends this answer by appealing once more to the seminal text in Wisdom 7 seminal text on personified Wisdom and Wisdom’s Spirit. As he notes, in Wisdom 7:27 we find that “while remaining in herself, she renews all things.”⁷⁰ Aquinas applies this text to the Spirit rather than (as context requires) to personified Wisdom, but he does so consciously, transferring to the Spirit what belongs to the Word. He goes on to pair

⁶⁷ Ibid. (Hoogland, trans., 145).

⁶⁸ For discussion of the relationship of knowledge and love in Aquinas’s theology of charity, see Michael S. Sherwin, O.P., *By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005).

⁶⁹ Aquinas, “*Emitte Spiritum*” (Hoogland, trans., 145).

⁷⁰ Aquinas’s version of this text employs masculine pronouns.

Wisdom 9:10 and Galatians 4:6, so as to make explicit the connection between the missions of the Word (personified Wisdom) and the Spirit: “Send her forth from the holy heavens, and from the throne of your holy glory send her” (Wis 9:10) and “God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, ‘Abba! Father!’” (Gal 4:6). The visible mission of the Spirit at Pentecost comes after the visible mission of the Son, Jesus Christ. But it is also true that their invisible missions, through interior enlightenment and sanctifying grace, have always been ongoing “throughout all nations,” since as Wisdom 7:27 says (referred to obliquely by Aquinas at this juncture of his argument), “in every generation she [personified Wisdom] passes into holy souls and makes them friends of God.”

Aquinas pauses briefly to argue, on the basis of New Testament texts, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. He then turns to the effects of the Spirit’s mission, namely, creation and renewal. Regarding the Spirit’s creative role, he cites not Genesis 1:2, but Judith 16:14. In this verse from Judith’s triumphant song, she sings to God, “Let all your creatures serve you, for you spoke, and they were made. You sent forth your Spirit, and it formed them.” Aquinas adds that the term “creation” can apply not only to humans’ coming into existence, but also to our receiving new existence as adopted children of God. In this regard, he notes, the Spirit’s role goes beyond what we find in Wisdom 1:14, “For he created all things that they might exist.” He holds that the new creation or re-creation attributable to the Holy Spirit is announced explicitly in Galatians 6:15, “For neither circumcision counts for anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creation.”⁷¹

The state of “new creation,” Aquinas goes on to say, involves four aspects: the grace of love, the wisdom of knowledge, peaceful harmony, and the constancy of strength. He draws his discussion of love almost entirely from the Johannine writings, with the addition of Romans 5:5, since it explicitly connects love to the Holy Spirit. Indeed, he finds Romans 5:5 to be the confirmation of Psalm 104:30 (his text for this sermon on

⁷¹ See Aquinas, “*Emitte Spiritum*” (Hoogland, trans., 149).

Pentecost, as noted above). When God sends forth his Spirit, we are created anew “into the existence of a life of grace through love.”⁷² With regard to the peaceful harmony that the Spirit brings, Aquinas quotes from James and Jude, and also returns to the moral teaching of the Old Testament (Prov 28:25). The Spirit is the peacemaker; in this regard Aquinas employs Ephesians 4:3. He also reflects at some length on the nature of true peace (the communion of charity), employing Jesus’ words in John 14, Augustine’s theology of peace, and Wisdom 14:22 as a description of the false peace known to the world. Lastly, on the constancy of strength, he quotes Ephesians 3:16 and supports it with Ezekiel 2:2, “the Spirit entered into me and set me upon my feet.” The Holy Spirit gives us strength to stand upright, in every sense.

Aquinas also treats the Spirit’s work of renewal. Again he identifies four aspects: cleansing grace, progressing justice, illuminating wisdom, and glory. He cites Pauline texts for cleansing grace, but with regard to growth in justice, he turns to the Old Testament. Job 29:20, Aquinas suggests, speaks prophetically about the renewal brought by the Spirit: in Aquinas’s version, this text reads, “My glory will be renewed, and the bow in my hand will be restored” (RSV: “my glory fresh with me, and my bow ever new in my hand”). The theme of growth in justice, as an aspect of the Spirit’s renewing work, leads Aquinas to quote three other Old Testament texts, two of which are from Isaiah. Thus Isaiah 40:31 speaks explicitly about renewal and about the upward ascent (in virtue): “they who wait for the Lord shall renew their strength, they shall mount up with wings like eagles, they shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint.” That it is the Spirit who causes this renewal is shown by Aquinas through Isaiah 63:13-14, which in Aquinas’s version reads, “He has led us through the depths like a horse in the desert that does not stumble; the Spirit of the Lord led him” (RSV: “Like a horse in the desert, they did not stumble. . . . the Spirit of the Lord gave them rest”). Aquinas

⁷² Ibid. (Hoogland, trans., 150).

also cites Psalm 119, the great paean to the precepts of God's law.

In Aquinas's view, the Old Testament "Spirit of the Lord" is the same Spirit that we find active in the New Testament. Nonetheless, Jesus Christ reveals new "goods of God," specifically through his Incarnation, birth from a virgin, sinless suffering, Resurrection, and Ascension.⁷³ None of these things happened in the Old Testament, despite all the miracles that God performed for the people of Israel. Aquinas states that even Enoch and Elijah, who ascended into heaven and who thus might seem (in this respect) on par with Jesus, did not ascend by their own power, as Jesus did. The newness manifested in Jesus' deeds causes Aquinas to think of Sirach 36:6, "Renew the signs and change the wondrous deeds" (RSV: "Show signs anew, and work further wonders"). The illuminating wisdom that enables us to have faith in Jesus' deeds comes from the Holy Spirit. As confirmation, Aquinas cites a rather unlikely text, Job 32:8. The RSV translates the verse, "it is the spirit in a man, the breath of the Almighty, that makes him understand." In Aquinas's version, however, the verse reads "the Spirit is in people, and the inspiration of the Almighty gives understanding."

As a final step, Aquinas asks who receives the Spirit's gift of renewal. He begins by noting that the whole world needs it, since, as he says, "'the face of the earth,' that is, the whole world . . . was once full of idolatry."⁷⁴ The Old Testament predicts the reversal of this situation, as we see in Isaiah 27:6, quoted by Aquinas: Israel is to "fill the whole world with fruit." He also interprets our mind or soul as "the face of the earth," since our soul is like the "face" of our earthy flesh. In this regard, he again lists four aspects of our renewal by the Spirit: our mind should become clean, uncovered, directed, and stable or firm. As he notes, the Psalmist prays for this gift of cleanness: "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and put a new and right spirit within me" (Ps 51:10). Similarly, Job—whom Aquinas treats as a prophet—describes the obscured mind that needs the

⁷³ Ibid. (Hoogland, trans., 155).

⁷⁴ Ibid. (Hoogland, trans., 156).

Spirit's renewing work: "he has covered his face with his fat" (Job 15:27) and "thick darkness covers my face" (Job 23:17; in Aquinas's version, Job is presented as free from this darkness). Aquinas takes Tobit as an exemplar of a person who, guided by the Spirit, directs himself to God and neighbor in love: "And now, O Lord, I have turned my eyes and my face toward you" (Tobit 3:12) and "Do not turn your face away from any poor man, and the face of God will not be turned away from you" (Tobit 4:7). When we look toward God in a stable and firm fashion, says Aquinas, we will be like Anna, Samuel's mother, who rejoiced after Eli prayed for her to the Lord. We will also be like the one described by Job's friend Zophar the Naamathite: "Surely then you will lift up your face without blemish" (Job 11:15).⁷⁵ Aquinas concludes that such people receive the mission of the Spirit.

In sum, in Aquinas's sermon on Pentecost, we obtain a strong sense of the Holy Spirit as revealed personally in the Old Testament, even if Aquinas certainly does not hold that the worship of the people of Israel was explicitly Trinitarian. The name "Spirit" is revealed in the Old Testament, and it delivers particular connotations and is associated with definite characteristics. Aquinas shows via Old Testament texts that this name indicates perfection of life, movement, and hidden origin—all of which point us to the Holy Spirit as he exists in the Trinity. Aquinas connects the Spirit's life, movement, and origin with divine love, again using Old Testament texts. In an understated manner, he shows that the Spirit's personal property of love has roots in a number of Old Testament texts about God and the Spirit. Since the Spirit is love and life, the Spirit is also specially associated with the gift of sanctification. The Wisdom of Solomon, especially chapter 7, provides Aquinas with a favorite source for explicating the mission of the Spirit, the Spirit's indwelling and enlightening of believers. Aquinas also investigates the Spirit with regard to creation and renewal, and draws heavily upon late Second-Temple texts such as Judith, Job, and Wisdom of Solomon, as well as Isaiah,

⁷⁵ See *ibid.* (Hoogland, trans., 157).

Ezekiel, and the Psalms. These texts often appear in a rather different form in modern translations such as the RSV, but the overall portrait is the same: the Spirit is active, in the Old Testament itself, in creating and renewing, and the Old Testament is a treasure-trove of texts that express our yearning for what the Spirit brings.

Thus, for Aquinas as for the Greek Fathers, the Old Testament augments and strengthens the New Testament portrait of the Spirit. Even if the Old Testament does not add anything about the Spirit that could not be found in some way in the New, the Old Testament adds a number of associations and patterns that profoundly strengthen our ability to appreciate the New Testament witness to the Spirit.

III. CONCLUSION

Even if in the Old Testament “the personality [or person] of the Holy Spirit” is *not* “completely hidden,” *Dominum et Vivificantem* is not therefore fundamentally mistaken. After all, the encyclical’s point is to respect the historical reality that the one God was not worshipped in Israel as three persons. But Athanasius, Didymus, Basil, and Aquinas do help us to appreciate why late Second-Temple Jews might have expected the Spirit to act in distinctive ways.⁷⁶ As Michel Barnes remarks, “early Christian pneumatology receives, continues and develops Jewish pneumatology, or perhaps more accurately, early Christian pneumatologies receive, continue and develop Jewish pneumatologies.”⁷⁷ When the angel of the Lord appears to

⁷⁶ There are, of course, also precedents for personified Wisdom/divine Son in late Second-Temple Jewish literature, and so the key development is the identification of Jesus as the Son/Word and the specification of what these titles imply. For an emphasis on these precedents, aimed in part at suggesting that Christianity is a mistaken Jewish heresy, see Segal, *Two Powers in Heaven*; Segal, “‘Two Powers in Heaven’ and Early Christian Trinitarian Thinking,” in *The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity*, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, S.J., and Gerald O’Collins, S.J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 73-95.

⁷⁷ Barnes, “Beginning and End of Early Christian Pneumatology,” 170. Barnes adds, “Christian pneumatology is from the beginning Jewish pneumatology re-ordered by the theology that Jesus was the Kurios, the Son of the Most High, through Whom all things

Joseph in a dream and tells him that “that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit” (Matt 1:20), the revelatory mystery is the conceived child, not the Holy Spirit. John the Baptist does not need to explain himself when he refers to “the Holy Spirit” (Matt 3:11); the revelatory mystery is focused instead upon the Christ who is coming and who is the center of attention. When Jesus sees “the Spirit of God descending like a dove, and alighting on him” (Matt 3:16), it is not the Spirit per se who is the revealed mystery; rather, the Spirit’s descent aims at illuminating the mystery of Jesus’ Sonship.

Likewise, in Mark’s gospel we find the Spirit doing things that, as the Greek Fathers and Aquinas make clear, he had long been doing in the Old Testament. The Spirit is associated with movement: “The Spirit immediately drove him [Jesus] into the wilderness” (Mark 1:12). The Spirit has a hidden divine origin, as we find when “the heavens opened” and the descending Spirit appears (Mark 1:10). The Gospel of Mark focuses on the Son, not least because the Spirit’s presence clearly does not surprise. By comparison, the Gospel of John gives more attention to describing who the Spirit is. It does so, however, not because the Spirit’s personal characteristics are not found in the Old Testament, but rather in order to connect the Spirit and Jesus Christ even more firmly. Jesus is the one who makes it possible to be “born of the Spirit” (John 3:8). It is through faith in Jesus that we will receive the Spirit, which will be like a river of living water in us (see John 7:38-39). The Spirit will “bring to your remembrance all that I [Jesus] have said to you” (Matt 14:26). Jesus promises that the Spirit “will glorify me, for he will take what is mine and declare it to you” (John 16:14). The central mystery of the Gospel of John is the Word, the Son, but it is in the Spirit that we come to know and to be united to the Son.

were made. . . . [T]he proper way to read references of the first two hundred years by Christians to the Holy Spirit is by setting them within a Jewish context” (ibid.). In Barnes’s view, this Jewish context—which is set aside by Origen and Tertullian, who shape later Christian pneumatology—includes “the theology of the *Spirit as creator*; *angelic pneumatology*; *wisdom pneumatology*; and *consort pneumatology*” (ibid.).

In his contest with the Tropikoi, Athanasius cites texts about the Spirit from Genesis, Numbers, Judges, the Psalms, Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Micah, Joel, and Zechariah, and he notes that he has “recorded only a few” of the many texts that he could have cited.⁷⁸ In these texts, we find the Spirit’s work in creation and in prophecy, but most of all we find a connection with love and gift. Didymus emphasizes the experience of the Spirit enjoyed by the psalmist and prophets, and he underscores the Spirit’s characteristic association with gift (inclusive of being a gift that can be taken away). Basil emphasizes the Spirit’s relation to the Father and to Christ, and he shows that this relation grounds the Spirit’s creative and sanctifying relation to us. When Basil reviews the Spirit’s names, he consistently combines Old and New Testament texts; the Old Testament is seen to glorify the Spirit almost as much as does the New, although the New retains priority.

Aquinas’s Sermon on Pentecost helped us to perceive even more clearly the difference that the Spirit’s revealed Old Testament personhood makes. Aquinas connects the name “Spirit” with life, movement, and hidden origin, all of which he finds expressed in the Old Testament. It might seem that the Spirit’s name “Love,” which along with “Gift” is central to Aquinas (as for Augustine), becomes clear only in the New Testament and specifically in Romans 5:5. But by underscoring the Old Testament Spirit’s connection with movement and with creation and renewal, Aquinas shows that the Old Testament, too, serves our understanding of the Spirit as Love and Gift, not least since (as he observes in the *Summa theologiae*) the Father “loves himself and every creature by the Holy Spirit” and since “the love of God infuses and creates goodness.”⁷⁹

If we removed the Old Testament quotations from Aquinas’s sermon, the Spirit would still be there. But the Spirit would not be there in the “thick” way made possible by the linking of Pentecost with the Psalmist’s proclamation, “When you send

⁷⁸ Athanasius, *Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit*, 1.5.8 (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, trans., 60).

⁷⁹ *STh* I, q. 37, a. 2, ad 3; q. 20, a. 2.

forth your Spirit, they are created; and you renew the face of the ground” (Ps 104:30). The Old Testament does not explicitly present a Trinitarian (or binitarian) God. But the Old Testament does constantly refer to God’s Spirit in a manner that builds up personal, functional characteristics of the Spirit, by which we learn to identify the Spirit in a distinctive way. Certainly the New Testament is required for us to know the Holy Spirit more fully, and to affirm the Spirit’s personal standing as the Love and Gift of the Father and Son. But we do well to listen to the theological tradition when, in setting forth the divine Holy Spirit, it insists upon exposing the Spirit’s characteristics in a fully two-Testament mode, because the Old Testament greatly enriches the Church’s witness to a Trinitarian pneumatology.

PERALDUS AND AQUINAS:
TWO DOMINICAN APPROACHES TO THE SEVEN
CAPITAL VICES IN THE CHRISTIAN MORAL LIFE¹

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OF THE TWO DOMINICANS William Peraldus (ca. 1200-1271) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), Peraldus is now barely known whereas Aquinas, canonized and a doctor of the Church, is one of the most persistent influences on Catholic philosophy and theology. During their lives, it was a different story. A decree required that every Dominican convent hold a copy of Peraldus's *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* in its library, and this work—as the number of extant manuscripts testifies—was widely diffused across the whole of Christian Europe.² Dominican

¹ I would like to thank Michael Wilkinson and John Marenbon for inviting me to present earlier and later versions of this argument to, respectively, the Christian Philosophy Conference and the Medieval Philosophy Network. I am also very grateful to Zygmunt G. Baranski, Simon Gilson, and the two anonymous peer reviewers of *The Thomist* for their meticulous comments.

² See Leonard Boyle, “The Setting of the *Summa Theologiae* of Saint Thomas,” in *Facing History: A Different Thomas Aquinas* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Collège Cardinal Mercier, 2000), 65-91. Humbert of Romans stipulated in his *Liber de instructione officialium* a list of books which each Dominican house must hold ready to hand. As Boyle notes, “‘Scientific’ theology, in so far as it occurs on the list, is represented by Raymund’s *Summa de casibus* and the *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* of Peraldus, the two well-springs, as it happens, of Dominican practical or ‘moral’ theology” (ibid., 78). A chapter of the Province of Spain at Toledo in 1250, moreover, “ordered each house in the Province to inscribe its name on its copies of breviaries, Bibles and these two *Summae*. In 1267 the two *Summae* are again mentioned in one breath at a Chapter at Carcassonne of the Province of Provence. Some five hundred manuscripts of the *Summa* of Peraldus are extant” (ibid., 83). See also “Notes on the Education of the Fratres Communes in the Dominican Order in the Thirteenth Century,” in Leonard Boyle, *Pastoral Care, Clerical Education and Canon Law, 1200-1400* (London: Variorum Reprints,

friars were expected to know Peraldus's *Summa* "inside out" and to be able to recite, on demand, any chapter or title from the work.³ The second part of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* would only supersede Peraldus's treatise as the Dominican handbook for moral theology and pastoral care in the late fourteenth century.⁴ Thus, for example, Dante—in the early fourteenth century—turns to Peraldus and not to Aquinas to provide the moral order of his vision of Purgatory.⁵ Given the authoritative status of Peraldus's

1981), 6:249-67, at 257; and Humbert of Romans, *Opera*, 2 vols., ed. J.J. Berthier (Rome: A. Befani, 1888-89), 2:265.

³ See M. Michèle Mulchahey, "Aids to the Confessor: Manuals of Moral Theology," in *"First the Bow is Bent to Study . . .": Dominican Education before 1350* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998), 527-52: "The friars were supposed to know both [Peraldus's] *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* and [Raymond of Penafort's] *Summa de casibus* inside out, they were to be able to recite from whatever chapter or title within these works they might be asked to, just as they should know the Gospels and the letters of St Paul like the backs of their hands. The one would help them preach repentance, the other to serve as responsible confessors to those whom they had converted with their words" (541).

⁴ See John Inglis, "Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues: Rethinking the Standard Philosophical Interpretation of Moral Virtue in Aquinas," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 27 (1999): 3-27: 'In the generation before the appearance of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, no treatise on moral virtue was as frequently used in Dominican circles as Peraldus's *Summa*' (7). But even in the later fourteenth century, the chancellor Jean Gerson could remark that, "if all the books in the world were to disappear suddenly and only Peraldus's *summae* survived, the loss would be tolerable" (cited in Siegfried Wenzel, "Dante's Rationale for the Seven Deadly Sins ['Purgatorio' XVII]," *The Modern Language Review* 69 [1965]: 529-33, at 531). The main diffusion of Aquinas's *Secunda secundae*, meanwhile, seems to have been through second-order influence: "In spite of the great number of manuscripts of the *Secunda secundae* itself for the years 1300-1500, it is probably fair to state that it was largely through the *Summa confessorum* of John of Freiburg or derivatives such as the popular *Pisanella*, that the moral teaching of St. Thomas in the *Secunda secundae* became known and respected all over Europe in that period" (Boyle, "The Setting of the *Summa*," 90). See also "The *Summa Confessorum* of John of Freiburg and the Popularization of the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas and of some of his Contemporaries," in Boyle, *Facing History*, 37-64: "the *Summa confessorum* was the Dominican manual in as much as it had distilled the moral teaching of the greatest of the Dominican theologians, and had placed it at the disposal of a vast audience" (64). See also Mulchahey, *Dominican Education*, 547-52.

⁵ Dante, *Purgatorio*, 17.91-139. The influence of Peraldus's *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* on the moral structure of Dante's Purgatory was convincingly demonstrated by Siegfried Wenzel (Wenzel, "Dante's Rationale," 529-33). For further studies, see also Franco Mancini, "Un auctoritas di Dante," *Studi danteschi* 45 (1968): 95-119, esp. 101-2; Carlo Delcorno, "Dante e Peraldo," in *Exemplum e*

Summa even well beyond Dominican circles, we can be confident that Aquinas knew it well. It is plausible, furthermore, as Leonard Boyle suggests, that Aquinas presents the second part of his *Summa* as, specifically, an improvement on and even a corrective to Peraldus's *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus*.⁶

It is striking, in this light, that there are no detailed comparative studies of the two authors and their works.⁷ A thorough comparison between Peraldus's *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* and the second part of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* would be an enormous, if nonetheless important, undertaking. The aim of this article is more modest: to compare Peraldus's rationale for the seven capital vices in *De vitiis* with Aquinas's approach in *De malo*.⁸ The first, introductory section briefly contextualizes the approaches of Peraldus and Aquinas in relation to a broader pastoral exigency to provide a convincing psychological rationale for the seven capital vices. The second part shows how Peraldus adapts the Augustinian theory of disordered love to structure his own rationale in *De vitiis*. I argue that this approach works effectively for the vices of sloth, avarice, gluttony, and lust, but is more problematic for the vices of pride,

letteratura tra medioevo e rinascimento (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989), 195-227; Luca Azzetta, "Vizi e virtù nella Firenze del Trecento (con un nuovo autografo del Lancia e una postilla sull' 'Ottimo Commento')," *Rivista di studi danteschi* 8 (2008): 101-42; and, most recently, George Corbett, "The Christian Ethics of Dante's Purgatory," *Medium Ævum* 83 (2014): 265-86.

⁶ See Boyle, "Setting of the *Summa*," 83-85: "His [Aquinas's] point of departure, and possibly the chief target of his strictures on works in this area, was, I suspect, the great and, by his time, hallowed *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* of his senior colleague, William Peraldus or Peyraut" (83). Boyle does not develop in detail, however, the parallels between the two works, and it would be interesting to do so. See Leonard Boyle, "The Setting of the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas—Revisited," in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 1-16, esp. 9-11.

⁷ This may be, in part, because of a lack of a critical edition with translation of Peraldus' *Summae*. A critical edition with translation of the *Summa de vitiis* is currently being prepared for Oxford University Press by Richard Newhauser and Siegfried Wenzel. See the Peraldus Project: <http://www.public.asu.edu/~rnewhaus/peraldus/>.

⁸ My longer-term aim is to use this comparative analysis of Peraldus's *De vitiis* and Aquinas's *De malo* as a pilot project, and to produce a full-length treatment of Peraldus and Aquinas, focusing on Peraldus's *De vitiis et virtutibus* and the second part of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*.

envy, and anger. The third section is an analysis of Aquinas's innovative rationale in light of Peraldus. I show how Aquinas seeks to harmonize the Church's traditional teaching on the seven capital vices with his Aristotelian understanding of the different powers of the human soul. Some scholars seek to chart a major development in Aquinas's approach to the vices from *De malo* to the *Summa theologiae*.⁹ While not addressing this question in detail, I argue in the fourth and final section that—in light of the comparative analysis of Peraldus's *De vitiis* and Aquinas's *De malo*—this view is, at least, in need of some qualification.

I. ORGANIZING THE SEVEN CAPITAL VICIES

The tradition of the deadly sins or capital vices takes its Christian origin from the desert fathers. For Evagrius Ponticus, the eight “evil thoughts” reflect the full arsenal of the devil through which he attempts to attack the monk in the desert.¹⁰ The earliest form of organizing the vices seems to have been as a causal series. This model was introduced to the West through John Cassian, for whom the vices “are linked among themselves by a certain kinship and, so to speak, concatenation” (*Collationes*, v. 10).¹¹ Like Ponticus, Cassian orders the vices from the carnal to the spiritual:

⁹ See, most recently, Eileen C. Sweeney, “Aquinas on the Seven Deadly Sins: Tradition and Innovation,” in *Sin in Medieval and Early Modern Culture: The Tradition of the Seven Deadly Sins*, ed. Richard G. Newhauser and Susan J. Ridyard (Woodbridge, Suffolk: York Medieval Press, 2012), 85-106. Sweeney asks, “Why, after exploring the capital sins so thoroughly in *De malo*, did Aquinas choose not to use this structure to organize his discussion of sin in the *Summa*?” According to Sweeney, Aquinas's account of the sins in the *Summa* shifts away from three previously dominant ways of approaching sin: first, that the moral life is essentially a struggle against evil; second, that the goal of the moral life is not moderation but asceticism; and, third, that the sins must be placated with opposing groups of sevens such as the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, seven beatitudes, seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer (88-90). This transition is, however, already clear in Aquinas's *De malo* and is, moreover, arguably equally apparent by comparing *not* the *Secunda secundae* with *De malo* but, rather, Aquinas's *De malo* with Peraldus's *De vitiis*.

¹⁰ See Columba Stewart, “Evagrius Ponticus and the ‘Eight Generic Logismoi’,” in *In the Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages*, ed. Richard Newhauser (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2005), 3-34.

¹¹ See Siegfried Wenzel, “The Seven Deadly Sins: Some Problems of Research,” *Speculum* 43 (1968): 1-22, at 4. See also Carole Straw, “Gregory, Cassian, and the Cardinal Vices,” in Newhauser, ed., *In the Garden of Evil*, 35-58.

gluttony leads to lust, from lust comes avarice, from avarice wrath, from wrath sadness, and from sadness sloth. The monk's moral development may itself lead to the final, most severe, vices of vainglory and pride: in other words, in overcoming each of the six vices the monk is tempted to set himself up above others.¹²

It was the order established by Gregory the Great, however, that would become standard in the Latin West.¹³ Like the desert fathers, Gregory underlined the causal connection between the seven capital vices. Unlike them, Gregory gave priority to the spiritual over the carnal vices; he added envy to the list, conflating, in the process, *tristitia* (sadness) and *acedia* (sloth); and he made pride the root of all. So, for Gregory, the first vice, vainglory, begets envy because in seeking an empty renown the soul feels envy towards one who is able to obtain it; the last, lust, is caused by gluttony as the inordinate consumption of food disposes the soul to sexual wantonness.¹⁴ Allied to his reforming zeal and concern with evangelization, Gregory's authoritative ordering of a system of Christian ethics around the seven capital vices had an enormous influence on the medieval Church. Thus, for example, Peter Lombard's *Sentences*—the theological textbook for the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries—simply states that “it is well known that there are seven capital or principal vices, as Gregory says on Exodus, namely vainglory, anger, envy, sloth or sadness, avarice, gluttony, lust.”¹⁵ The whole moral abyss of sin is then pegged onto this skeleton structure: “From these, as if from seven springs, all the deadly corruptions of souls emanate.

¹² See Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *I sette vizi capitali: Storia dei peccati nel Medioevo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2000), 181-84.

¹³ See, for example, René Wasselynck, *Saint Grégoire le Grand: Commentaire moral du livre de Job* (Namur: Editions du soleil levant, 1964); “Les compilations des *Moralia* in Job du VIIe au XIIe siècle,” *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 29 (1962): 5-32; “Les ‘*Moralia* in Job’ dans les ouvrages de morale du haut moyen âge latin,” *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 31 (1964): 5-31; and “L’influence de l’exégèse de S. Grégoire le Grand sur les commentaires bibliques médiévaux (VIIe-XIIe s.),” *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 32 (1965): 157-204.

¹⁴ Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* 31.45.89.

¹⁵ Peter Lombard, II *Sent.*, d. 42, c. 6 (Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, trans. Giulio Silano [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2008], 210).

And these are called capital because from them arise all evils."¹⁶

There were, nonetheless, obvious theoretical problems with the system of the seven vices. It was difficult to find seven virtues to oppose them. A standard medieval grouping of the virtues into the cardinal (prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude) and the theological (faith, hope, and charity) does not provide a meaningful parallel with the seven vices and, although there were lists of seven remedial virtues, these ran into conceptual difficulties.¹⁷ Moreover, the list seemed to exclude such primary and pressing vices as faithlessness and heresy.¹⁸ Theologians experimented, therefore, with alternative systems of classification, each of which had distinct advantages over the list of seven vices.¹⁹ The sins of thought, word, and deed conveniently parallel the three stages of confession: compunction (of heart), confession (of mouth), and satisfaction (through actions). The three concupiscences (of the flesh, the eyes, and the pride of life) have strict biblical foundation (1 John 2:16) and map onto the desires of the body, the desire for external goods, and the mind's desire to raise itself above others. The Decalogue, moreover, gives a more comprehensive account of the moral law in its positive dimension.

Why, then, did these alternative models not displace the system of the seven vices? Why, instead, were they actually incorporated and assimilated by it? The reason is not theoretical clarity but, rather, pastoral effectiveness. The system of the vices was, quite simply, more popular and more memorable. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) had formally impelled all Christians to confess their sins to a priest at least once a year; the scheme of the seven vices gave

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ See, for example, Wenzel's analysis of Robert Grosseteste's sophisticated schema according to which the seven remedial virtues are considered as the mean between two extremes of vice (the seven capital vices and seven further opposing vices) (Wenzel, "Seven Deadly Sins," 11).

¹⁸ See *ibid.*, 14 n. 57: "In *De tentationibus et resistentiis*, for example, William [of Auvergne] declares: 'Many people have divided the vices . . . into seven. . . . But these people talk . . . as if faithlessness and heresy were no vices, or as if faith were not a virtue. Don't you accept their divisions.'"

¹⁹ A detailed account of the debates about alternative systems of classification of the vices is given in Casagrande and Vecchio, *I sette vizi capitali*, 181-224.

each individual layman a simple, but potentially rich, structure to his or her moral life. Preaching on the seven capital vices, indeed, became “commonplace in sermons following the Fourth Lateran Council.” Medieval theologians did not, in other words, start from the drawing board. Whether they liked it or not, the tradition of the seven capital vices was ingrained in the practices and cultural imagination of medieval laypersons. The theoretical exigency moved, therefore, from replacing the system altogether to reforming it from within. One key area for development was in the organization of the vices: there were clear limitations in a simply causal account (with one vice leading to another in a linear series). So theologians adopted new rationales for the vices based on human psychology and even on cosmology or symbolism.²⁰ It is within this wider context that we may productively compare the approaches of Peraldus and Aquinas.

II. PERALDUS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN THEORY OF DISORDERED LOVE

William Peraldus—a prior of the Dominican Order in Lyon—composed his treatise on the vices (*De vitiis*) around 1236 and his treatise on the virtues appeared early in 1249.²¹ From the mid-thirteenth century, the two treatises began to circulate together. Three illuminated letters in an early-fourteenth-century manuscript may illustrate the scope of *De vitiis et virtutibus* as a whole.²² The first shows the treatise being passed from one preacher to another, and this may reflect its primary purpose as a key resource for

²⁰ Wenzel notes that “a major aspect of the history of Seven Deadly Sins which has as yet not received sufficient attention is the scholastic analysis of the scheme. Bloomfield deliberately excluded ‘theology’ from his study, which is a pity because the theological discussion about the scheme from approximately 1130 to 1275 is one of the most interesting phases in the history of the sins” (Wenzel, “Seven Deadly Sins,” 3).

²¹ Mulchahey, *Dominican Education*, 540.

²² Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. G.4.856. (Santa Maria Novella manuscript), 1ra-359va. I came across these beautiful illustrations while doing an inventory of the Florentine manuscripts for the critical edition of Peraldus’s *Summa de vitiis* edited by Richard Newhauser and Siegfried Wenzel.

Dominican practical and moral theology.²³ The second (opening the treatise on the vices) shows the stern teaching of the preacher against vice: Peraldus's right index finger is raised in didactic pose, his eyes look down in stern admonition, and a red book is closed in his left hand.²⁴ The third (opening the treatise on the virtues) shows a haloed Dominican unshadowed by the sun: with an open book in his right hand, his left beckons his audience to follow the virtuous path to heaven.²⁵ In other words, the treatise on the vices maps out man's journey from the perversion of sin; the treatise on the virtues, his path to his heavenly home.²⁶

Peraldus's *De vitiis* is perhaps best described as an anthology of resources on each of the seven vices to be used by Dominicans in preaching and confessing.²⁷ It is a treasure trove of quotations from Scripture, the Church authorities (especially the Latin Fathers) and the classics (with a preference for the moralists Cicero and Seneca). There are lists of *exempla* (principally from the New and Old

²³ BNC, Conv. Soppr. G.4.856, 1ra. The first illustration is the opening "T" (of "Tractatus iste") which introduces the detailed prologue listing all the parts and chapter headings of the treatise. On either side of the letter's stem is a Dominican. To the left of the T, it seems, is Peraldus who passes over his treatise to the other Dominican (whose hands are open to receive it) on the right.

²⁴ BNC, Conv. Soppr. G.4.856, 8ra. The second image illustrates the initial "D" (of "Dicturi de singulis vitiis"). The face of the Dominican is the same as that of the Dominican to the left of the "T" in the first illustration who, I have suggested, is Peraldus.

²⁵ BNC, Conv. Soppr. G.4.856, 155ra. The third illustration opens the treatise on the virtues ("Tractatus de virtutibus").

²⁶ It is for this reason that, in another fourteenth-century manuscript, a later scribe has written (on the inside cover) that the two treatises taken together are, simply, a *summa theologiae*. See Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. E.1.1047, 1ra-282rb.

²⁷ Mulchahey, *Dominican Education*, 540-42: "Peraldus' *Summa* gave the confessor a means of identifying sin and its opposites theologically, objectively, and in its universal manifestations. . . . But there was yet more to the *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus*. In both parts of his tract Peraldus uses the topics he introduces, whether virtue or vice, as a springboard to lessons in how the material can be preached" (541). Wenzel also underlines the importance of Peraldus's *Sermones* in which he "mentions 'septem vitia' or 'septem capitalia vitia' several times, on one occasion even as one of five catechetical set pieces, on another as the seven heads of the apocalyptic dragon. The seven standard sins are listed as opposed by the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, as seven demons named in scripture, and as seven bonds by which the donkey on which Jesus rode into Jerusalem is bound" (Siegfried Wenzel, "Preaching the Seven Deadly Sins," in Newhauser, ed., *In the Garden of Evil*, 157).

Testaments) with pithy accounts of their lives and the moral lesson drawn, as well as memorable similes, images, and extended metaphors (for example, with regard to the mountain of pride).²⁸ In the longer and more comprehensive chapters, detailed manifestations of each vice are treated as well as aspects of a vice that are specific to a given sector of society. For example, a section is devoted to the evil of cloistered religious (*claustrales*) taking pride in magnificent buildings: as they are dead to the world, a sepulcher is more fitting for them than a palace.²⁹ Entertaining stories and anecdotes also color Peraldus's treatise. Thus, to explain the avarice that may ensue upon love of one's children ("amor filiorum"), Peraldus tells the story of a hermit who, guided to hell in a vision, finds his father and brother cursing each other in a well of fire. The father says, "Cursed be you, because for you I was a usurer"; the son, "no, cursed be you, because if you had not unjustly acquired your wealth, I would have not have kept it unjustly, nor would I be damned."³⁰ In this way, Peraldus drives home his moral: that

²⁸ Mancini, "Un *auctoritas* di Dante," 97: "In effetti il Peraldo è un compilatore formidabile, abilissimo nel far coesistere il nuovo e il vecchio testamento, citazioni letterali (o transunti) da scrittori classici e da padri della Chiesa, derivazioni da bestiari e lapidari, glosse, esempi, dialoghi, favole, credenze popolari, etimologie, proverbi, massime, immagini e similitudini." See also A. Dondaine, "Guillaume Peyraut, vie et oeuvres," in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 18 (1948): 162-236, esp. 191.

²⁹ See Peraldus, *De vitiis*, t. 6, pa. 3, c. 22 (p. 285b): "Specialiter deberent cohibere claustrales a superbis aedificiis ista quae sequuntur. Primo hoc, quod cum ipsi sint iam mortui mundo, necessaria sunt eis sepulchra potius quam palatia." As there is currently no critical edition, references to Peraldus's *De vitiis* are to William Peraldus, *Summae virtutum ac vitiorum*, ed. Rodolpus Clutius (Paris, 1629), 2 vols (available online via Google books). In this edition, the treatise on the virtues is printed first (as vol. 1) and the treatise on the vices second (as vol. 2) whereas, in thirteenth-century manuscripts, the order is the reverse. Page references to *De vitiis* will be to the second volume of the Clutius edition. For ease of reference to other editions, I give references to the treatise [t.], part [pa.], and, where applicable, chapter [c.] of *De vitiis*, as well as to the pagination in this edition.

³⁰ Peraldus, *De vitiis*, t. 4, pa. 3 (Clutius, ed., 157b-58a): "Ad ostendendum verò, quòd non sit amor, sed potius odium filiis malè congregata relinquere, potest induci tale exemplum. Erat quidam usurarius habens duos filios, quorum alter nolens succedere patri in malè acquisitis, factus est Eremita. Alius verò, volens succedere patri suo, remansit cum patre suo. Et mortuo patre, ei successit. Et post non multú tempus ipse etiã decessit. Cùm autem nunciatum esset Eremitae de morte patris & fratris, doluit valdè, credens eos damnatos esse. Et cùm rogasset

evilly to gather riches out of love for a child is not, in fact, to love him but rather to hate him.³¹

A brilliant anthology of resources for use in preaching and confessing, Peraldus's *De vitiis* is not a tightly organized account of the vices to be read in sequential order: structure is, indeed, subordinated to practical utility. After a short section on vice in general, Peraldus treats gluttony and lust. He moves on to a major tome on avarice not for a formal reason but, more crudely, because of utility: "After the vices of gluttony and lust, we must speak of avarice because a treatise on this vice is more useful to the preacher than a treatise on any of the other vices."³² Chapters on sloth, pride, envy, and anger follow, and the treatise concludes with a separate part on the sins of the tongue. Despite the unconventional order of the treatise, Peraldus does nonetheless open his fifth chapter on pride—the root sin—with a rationale for the seven capital vices as a whole. It is this that interests us here.

Peraldus starts from Augustine's understanding of virtue as ordered love and of vice as disordered love.³³ This *locus classicus* comes shortly after Augustine's depiction of the two cities in *De civitate Dei*: "Two cities, then, have been created by two loves: that is, the earthly city by love of self extending even to contempt of God, and the heavenly city by love of God extending to contempt of self."³⁴ Essentially,

Dominum, ut revelaret ei statum eorum, raptus est, & in infernum ductus, & non inveniebat ibi eos. Sed ad ultimum exierunt de quodam puteo in flamma, primò, pater, deinde filius, mordentes se, & litigantes ad invicem, patre dicente filio: Maledictus sis tu, quia pro te usurarius fui filius autem e contrario dicebat: imò maledictus sis tu, quia nisi iniuste acquisivisses, ego non retinuissem iniuste, nec damnatus fuisset"

³¹ Peraldus, *De vitiis*, t. 4, pa. 3 (Clutius, ed., 157b): "Quintum, est amor filiorum. Talibus, qui divitias amant, propter amorem filiorum, ostendendum esset in praedicatione, quòd hoc non sit amare filium, sed potius odire, divitias ei malè congregare."

³² Peraldus, *De vitiis*, t. 4, pa. 1, c. 1 (Clutius, ed., 51a): "Post vitium gulae & luxuria dicemus de vitio Avaritiae: quia tractatus de vitio isto utilior est predicationi, quam tractatus aliorum vitiorum."

³³ Peraldus, *De vitiis*, t. 6, pa. 1 (Clutius, ed., 213a): "Sicut virtus secundum Augustin[us] amor est ordinatus: sic vitium est amor inordinatus."

³⁴ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 14.28.1-4 (Bernardus Dombart and Alphonsus Kalb, eds., *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* 48 [Turnholt: Brepols, 1955], 451): "Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui."

everything must be loved (including the self) insofar as it is ordered to God. Virtue is rightly ordered love; rightly ordered love is love of the creator.³⁵ A more precise taxonomy of love of God and its disorder is found in Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*. Misdirected love, he writes, has four species: first, to love what is not desirable; second, not to love what is desirable; third, to love some lesser thing too much; fourth, to love two things the same where one is more or less desirable.³⁶ Peraldus simplifies Augustine's schema and divides disordered love into two main categories: love of an evil (*amor mali*), which may correspond to Augustine's first category, and perverted love of a good through excess or deficiency (*nimius vel nimis parvus*) which, when expanded, conflates Augustine's second, third, and fourth categories.³⁷

Considering first the love disordered through excess or deficiency, Peraldus distinguishes two kinds of good: lesser goods (temporal and corporeal) and great goods (grace and meritorious works).³⁸ If the love of great goods is small, such deficiency of love is the root of sloth.³⁹ If the love of small goods is great, such excessive love of a lesser good is the root of gluttony, lust, and avarice.⁴⁰ Peraldus's attempt to

³⁵ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 15.17.29-35 (CCSL 48:488): "Creator autem si veraciter ametur, hoc est si ipse, non aliud pro illo quod non est ipse, ametur, male amari non potest. Nam et amor ipse ordinate amandus est, quo bene amatur quod amandum est, ut sit in nobis virtus qua vivitur bene. Unde mihi videtur, quod definitio brevis et vera virtutis ordo est amoris."

³⁶ Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana* 1.27.2-7 (Joseph Martin, ed., *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* 32 [Turnholt: Brepols, 1962], 22: "Ipse est autem, qui ordinatam habet dilectionem, ne aut diligat, quod non est diligendum, aut non diligat, quod diligendum est, aut amplius diligat, quod minus diligendum est, aut aequae diligat, quod vel minus vel amplius diligendum est."

³⁷ Peraldus, *De vitiis*, t. 6, pa. 1 (Clutius, ed., 213a): "Est enim inordinatus, si sit amor mali. Licet etiam amor boni sit, est tamen inordinatus, si sit nimius vel nimis parvus."

³⁸ Ibid.: "Quaedam autem bona sunt parva, scilicet temporalia seu corporalia: quaedam vero magna: ut sunt bona gratiae & bona gloriae."

³⁹ Ibid.: "Amor ergo magni boni inordinatus est, si sit parvus. Et talis amor videtur esse radix in vicio acediae. Acedia enim videtur esse parvus amor magni boni; unde & tepiditas vocatur."

⁴⁰ Ibid.: "Amor vero parvi boni inordinatus est, si sit nimius. Et iste amor videtur esse radix in vicio gulae, luxuriae, & avaritiae." Of the three vices of excess, Peraldus distinguishes avarice from lust and gluttony because the lesser good is desired as a possession whereas, with the other two vices, it is desired insofar as it

explain the three further vices—pride, envy, and anger—in terms of the genus “love of evil” (*amor mali*) is less straightforward. Augustine, nonetheless, had once again shown the way. The sinner, Augustine notes, desires self-aggrandizement, setting himself up above his fellow men. Such self-love, Augustine affirms, is better called hate because we fail, in this way, to love appropriately our neighbor who is by nature on a level with us.⁴¹ As the desire to be exalted implies the humiliation of one’s neighbor, pride is, albeit indirectly, the love of someone else’s evil.⁴² Peraldus acknowledges, however, that—properly speaking—hatred of neighbor is only found in its pure form in the vices of anger and envy.⁴³ With anger the cause of hatred is external (in another), whereas with envy the origin of hatred is internal (the self). He who is angry hates another and desires retribution because of an evil suffered, and Peraldus defines anger, therefore, as the desire for revenge (*appetitus vindictae*).⁴⁴ The hatred consequent upon envy, by contrast, has its evil in the self (*a propria malitia*). The recognition of another’s excellence leads not to praise, or to personal aspiration, but to sadness and the purely negative desire that evil should happen to one’s neighbor so that his or her excellence is diminished.⁴⁵

Peraldus’s account of gluttony, lust, avarice, and sloth in terms of disordered love through excess or deficiency fits

is pleasurable. Finally, he distinguishes gluttony from lust by its respective sense: gluttony is primarily with regard to taste, lust with regard to touch (*ibid.*).

⁴¹ Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* 1.23.17-18 (CCSL 32:18): “Talis autem sui dilectio melius odium vocatur”; 1.23.25-27 (CCSL 32:19): “Cum vero etiam eis, qui sibi naturaliter pares sunt, hoc est hominibus, dominari affectat, intolerabilis omnino superbia est.” Likewise, Peraldus highlights the natural equality of men: alongside a common biological descent in Adam and Eve, each soul is created by God directly. See Peraldus, *De vitiis*, t. 6, pa. 3, c. 28 (Clutius, ed., 290); and *De vitiis*, t. 6, pa. 3, c. 29 (Clutius, ed., 291b).

⁴² Peraldus, *De vitiis*, t. 6, pa. 1 (Clutius, ed., 213b): “in superbiae peccato est amor proprii boni cum alieno malo. Amat enim superbus sui exaltationem & proximi deiectionem.”

⁴³ *Ibid.*: “in peccato vero irae & invidiae est amor alieni mali pure.”

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*: “in peccato irae amor alieni mali ortum videtur habere a malo alterius. Ille enim qui irascitur alicui, ideo ei vult malum, quia malum ab eo recipit. Ira enim est appetitus vindicte.”

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*: “In peccato vero invidiae amor alieni mali ortum habet a propria malitia, scilicet a superbia. Invidus enim ideo vult malum alterius, ne ille sibi parificetur.”

naturally within the wider Augustinian framework of a distorted relationship between man, the goods of creation, and the creator. As Augustine puts it, the lower goods of this world must be used on our journey to the heavenly kingdom; if our desire for them is disordered, we get left behind and may even turn back altogether from the pursuit of our true happiness.⁴⁶ This rationale also gives a sense to what, at first, might seem the haphazard organization of Peraldus's treatise as a whole. Peraldus begins with the three vices that involve an excessive desire for created things: gluttony, lust, and avarice. He then moves to the vice of sloth which involves an insufficient love of the creator, the greatest good. Finally, he treats the three vices that imply love of an evil: pride, envy, and anger.

Peraldus's attempt to fit the vices of pride, envy, and anger into an overarching Augustinian scheme of ordered and disordered love is, however, less convincing. Pride only has an indirect relation to the general category of love of a neighbor's evil. After all, the debasement of a neighbor is a potential consequence of, rather than the primary motive for, disordered self-love. With regard to anger, Peraldus's definition fails to distinguish adequately between, on the one hand, the righteous indignation at a wrong suffered with the desire for just retribution and, on the other, an unbounded hatred of a person irrespective of the limits of justice. The former would appear a virtuous, the latter a vicious, emotion. Peraldus's definition of the quiddity of envy—as motivated by the desire to bring down a person to one's own level—seems, furthermore, overly reductionist.

Peraldus's rationale only takes up a very small part of his treatise. As we have seen, the work's primary purpose is pastoral: to provide his Dominican *confrères* with an anthology of resources for preaching and confessing the seven capital sins. Nonetheless, the inadequacy of the Augustinian theory of disordered love to provide a convincing psychological framework for all seven vices left an obvious area of improvement for a successor in his order.

⁴⁶ See Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* 1.4.4-18 (CCSL 32:8).

III. AQUINAS'S POSITIVE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR THE SEVEN VICES

Aquinas's contrasting approach to the vices in *De malo* is already apparent from his introductory etymology of the term "capital vice." What makes a vice capital, for Aquinas, is that it has an end chiefly desirable as such, so that other sins are subordinated to it. An avaricious person, for example, in order to acquire money may commit the sin of fraud.⁴⁷ Whereas Peralduz regards the capital vices in terms of disordered love, Aquinas differentiates each capital sin with regard to good objects that may be desired or avoided. There are, he argues, three kinds of good object that can be desired: goods of the soul, goods of the body, and goods consisting in external things.⁴⁸ The sin of pride aims at the goods of the soul: the excellences of honor and glory. The sins of gluttony and lust aim at the goods of the body: the preservation of the individual (through nutrition) and of the species (through sexual intercourse). The sin of avarice pertains to the goods consisting in external things. The three remaining capital vices—sloth, envy, and anger—concern, by contrast, goods that are avoided because they present some kind of obstacle to another good inordinately desired. The sin of sloth (*acedia*) is an aversion to the good in itself (God) because, in seeking God, the soul is impeded in its desire for physical tranquility or bodily pleasure. The sin of envy is an aversion to the good of another insofar as it diminishes one's own excellence.⁴⁹ Finally, the sin of anger is a resistance to the good of justice because justice prevents the inordinate vengeance desired.

Let us now consider the advantages of Aquinas's framework with regard to two vices—gluttony and lust—that naturally fit into Peralduz's Augustinian schema and two vices—pride and anger—that proved for Peralduz especially problematic. Peralduz classifies gluttony and lust in terms of the perverted excessive desire for the secondary good of

⁴⁷ Aquinas, *De Malo*, q. 8, a. 1.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Aquinas's differentiation by the kind of movement of the soul enables a substantial distinction between pride and envy even though the object—honors and glory—is the same. Envy is the aversion to the good of another because it is an impediment to one's own good (*De Malo*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 5).

pleasure. Aquinas, by contrast, reframes these two vices in terms of virtuous desires for goods of the body. For Peraldus, gluttony and lust are differentiated by their primary sense (taste and touch); for Aquinas, they are differentiated in relation to the purposes of each desire: preserving the individual through nutrition and preserving the species through sexual intercourse. Aquinas's approach creates room for insufficient desire for food and drink (as in the case where someone desires to consume too little) and insufficient desire for sexual intercourse (Aquinas's example is a husband who abstains from sexual intercourse, thereby failing to fulfill his marital duty). For Aquinas, it is the respective purposes of the goods of the body that set the rule for temperance, the virtuous mean. Food is necessary for the nutritive power of the vegetative soul; pleasure in its consumption is, therefore, natural. Gluttony resides, instead, in the sense appetite—it is, more precisely, the immoderate sensual desire to consume food. The generation and education of offspring is the purpose of the sexual organs; pleasure in sexual acts ordered to this end is, therefore, natural and good. Lust concerns any sexual act that is not properly related to the begetting of offspring. In addition, as the effective education of offspring requires the mutual cooperation of parents, Aquinas argues that every sexual union outside the law of marriage is also lustful.⁵⁰ For Peraldus, the sins of gluttony and lust are related directly to an excessive desire for pleasure; for Aquinas, they are related to the disorder that occurs when the good is not related to its proper end or ends. One further advantage of measuring the desire not by quantity, as in Peraldus, but by right reason is that it enables Aquinas to relate more effectively the acquired virtue of temperance to its infused counterpart, the natural to the divine law. Thus, for example, Aquinas clarifies that virginity or celibacy is not contrary to sexual desire as an extreme. Although, before Christ, human and divine law prohibited abstinence in order

⁵⁰ Drawing an analogy with the presence of monogamy in certain animals where rearing is shared between male and female, Aquinas argues that the law of marriage was instituted to prohibit promiscuous copulation which, preventing the father from being identified, damages mutual cooperation in the education of offspring (*De Malo*, q. 15, a. 1).

to multiply the human race, in the period of grace in which Christians are obliged to pursue spiritual growth, the celibate life is more perfect.⁵¹

Let us now turn to the vices of pride and anger, which Peraldus struggles to fit convincingly into his adaption of the Augustinian schema of disordered love. He locates pride negatively within the genus of hatred of one's neighbor (alongside envy and anger). Aquinas, by contrast, reconfigures pride in relation to the excellences of honor and glory, reflecting his broader insight that every sin is based on a natural appetite for some good. In pursuing excellence, Aquinas affirms, a person seeks likeness to God's goodness: the natural desire for excellence is, therefore, a good as not only humans but all created beings seek their own perfection. This positive reframing has four distinct advantages. First, Aquinas contextualizes pride (as excess) and pusillanimity (as deficiency) in relation to the virtuous mean of magnanimity (the pursuit of excellence in accordance with reason and God's command). Second, he links the vice of pride to the faculties of the human soul: the intemperate desire for excellence derives from the irascible appetite; the prior judgment that such excellence is one's due derives from the rational will.⁵² Third, it allows for three principal species of pride: to desire an excellence beyond one's measure (presumption); to attribute an excellence attained to one's own merits or to God but given because of one's merits; and to seek to hold an excellence exclusively even where the excellence is a kind to be shared by others or by all.⁵³ Fourth, Aquinas's broad definition creates a natural connection between pride, as the excessive desire for excellence, and the vice of vainglory, as the excessive desire to manifest one's excellence.⁵⁴ By comparison, Peraldus's account of pride lacks a positive moral teleology and a convincing anthropology; its definition—"setting oneself up and debasing others"—is extremely narrow, corresponding, if at all, only to the third species

⁵¹ *De Malo*, q. 15, a. 2, ad 13.

⁵² *De Malo*, q. 8, a. 3, ad 7.

⁵³ Aquinas absorbs, in this way, the four species of pride delineated by Gregory (*De Malo*, q. 8, a. 4).

⁵⁴ *De Malo*, q. 9, a. 3, ad 1.

outlined by Aquinas; and its classification in terms of “hatred of neighbor” is very remote indeed from “glorying in one’s own merits,” a primary characteristic, for Aquinas, of vainglory.⁵⁵

A major problem with Peraldus’s account of anger—as, simply, the desire for revenge—is that it leaves little space for a potentially positive emotion. In Aquinas’s treatment, the starting point is a debate amongst the ancient schools of philosophy about whether there can indeed be a positive kind of anger. The Stoics had argued that all anger is evil; the Peripatetics, that some anger is good.⁵⁶ For Aquinas, the Stoics failed to distinguish the two kinds of appetite—of the rational will and of the sense appetite—pertinent to anger. Considering only the latter, the Stoics classed anger as an evil, reasoning that all emotions, of the sense appetite, upset the order of reason. The Peripatetics, by contrast, showed that even the sense emotion of anger may be a good. Although the spontaneous emotion of anger arising from an injury always clouds to some extent our judgment, anger—both of the sense appetite and of the rational will—may also follow upon our judgment: as such, it is an “instrument of virtue” which helps the person to execute justice more readily. Where Peraldus fails to disentangle the ambivalent emotion of anger (simply characterizing it as a vice), Aquinas distinguishes the good and evil aspects of anger in relation to its end with two further terms: zeal is the emotion of anger righteously ordered to justice while wrath signifies the inordinate desire for vengeance. In this way, Aquinas also sets out a vice of deficiency—an inordinate lack of anger—which, he argues, is equally destructive: it leads to negligence and it invites men, whether virtuous or not, to evil by creating a context in which retribution is not carried out.⁵⁷

In *De malo*, Aquinas frames his discussion of each of the capital sins in terms of a positive moral psychology: the vices reflect disorder in the proper functioning of man’s

⁵⁵ Indeed, as Aquinas clarifies in the *Summa*, the desire to put down another is a potential but not necessary consequence of pride, the excessive desire to excel (see *STh* II-II, q. 162, aa. 1-3).

⁵⁶ *De Malo*, q. 12, a. 1.

⁵⁷ *De Malo*, q. 12, a. 5, ad 3.

natural faculties and are related to good objects which may be desired or avoided. Aquinas demonstrates, indeed, that the four vices of desire—pride, avarice, gluttony, and lust—undermine with a false substitute the three conditions of happiness: that which makes us truly happy must be a “complete good,” it must be “intrinsically sufficient,” and it must be “accompanied by pleasure.” Excellence, the goal of pride, appears so desirable because a good is complete insofar as it has an excellence. Riches, the goal of avarice, especially promise sufficiency of temporal goods. Food and sexual intercourse, the goals of gluttony and lust, give the greatest sensual pleasure. In this way, the four vices of desire present objects that apparently share the conditions of happiness, and it is this which draws man, who naturally seeks his happiness, to them. In a parallel way, the vices of avoidance—sloth, envy, and anger—are characterized by displacement of the true good because of a disordered desire for some lesser good: thus, with sloth, physical tranquility is preferred to the true peace of the soul in God; with envy, one’s own excellence is preferred to the truthful acknowledgment of others’ gifts and works; with anger, vengeance is preferred to the execution of justice.

IV. AQUINAS ON THE VICIES: *DE MALO* AND THE *SUMMA* RECONSIDERED

As we have shown, the advantages of Aquinas’s distinctive rationale for the vices in *De malo* emerge most strongly through comparison with its immediate Dominican precursor and, arguably, competitor, Peraldus’s *De vitiis*. What, then, of the relationship between Aquinas’s treatment of the vices in *De malo* and in the *Summa*? For Siegfried Wenzel, the Aquinas of the *Summa* is not “too interested in the by then ‘classical’ scheme” of the seven vices: in the *Summa*, “the scheme of the vices is blown to pieces and its individual members float in isolation throughout the treatise.”⁵⁸ Although we cannot address this question in detail, our comparative analysis of Peraldus’s *De vitiis* and Aquinas’s *De malo* may suggest a more qualified interpretation for at least three reasons. First, in *De malo*,

⁵⁸ Wenzel, “Seven Deadly Sins,” 14.

Aquinas is, in fact, at pains to prop up the classic moral system of the seven vices. Second, his reform of the vice system in *De malo* is radical: there are, as we have seen, major differences between *De malo* and its immediate Dominican precursor whereas there is little difference in substance between Aquinas's account of the vices in *De malo* and his account in the *Summa*. Third, although Aquinas's purpose and priorities are undeniably different in the *Summa*, this does not imply that he lost interest in the scheme of the seven vices or considered it, by then, less important.

In *De malo*, Aquinas's treatment is indeed, in some ways, staunchly conservative. Aquinas unfailingly defends Gregory's authoritative listing of the capital vices and their respective offshoot vices (or daughters) against criticism or modification. Instead of changing the list, he frames it with a new and convincing moral psychology.⁵⁹ He explicitly deals with the problem of comprehensiveness (those sins apparently not covered by the system of seven). For example, he confronts head on the problematic case of heresy (commonly highlighted by critics of the system): the failure to learn the knowledge about religion and morals necessary for a person to live well derives from sloth; obstinate persistence in an error despite correction from authority arises from pride. He has a deft solution to the problem, posed emphatically in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, of the apparent dual priority of pride and avarice as chief sins. While showing how pride and avarice—in both their general and their specific senses—may indeed be understood as the root of the other vices, Aquinas nonetheless reaffirms the

⁵⁹ Aquinas deftly relates, for example, the eight daughters of lust in Gregory's taxonomy to the effects of the vice on the powers of the soul. Drawing attention to the soul's lower powers (the concupiscible appetite and the sense of touch), lust erodes the four acts of reason—understanding, deliberation, judgment, and perseverance—leading, thereby, to the first four daughters of lust: blindness of mind (*caecitas mentis*), lack of deliberation (*inconsideratio*), temerity (*precipitatio*), and inconstancy (*inconstantia*). The consequent disorder in the will leads to the other four daughters of lust: inordinately desiring pleasure for themselves (*amor sui*), the lustful hate God (*odium Dei*) who would forbid the desired pleasure illicitly pursued; desiring this-worldly pleasures (*affectus presentis saeculi*), they are led to spiritual despair (*desperatio futuri*) inasmuch as the more one desires the pleasures of the flesh (of this world) the more one despises spiritual pleasures which draw one to the next (*De Malo*, q. 15, a. 4).

priority of pride which Gregory established by integrating the authority of Augustine: he opposes pride, as the “root and queen of all sins” to charity, as the queen of the virtues.⁶⁰ Aquinas thereby reincorporates the Augustinian framework of the two cities but mitigates the problematic approach of Peraldus with its binary opposition of love of an evil with disordered love of a good. It would have been quixotic for Aquinas to seek to undermine, and it would have been impossible for him to ignore, the practical reality that the seven capital vices were the primary way by which thirteenth-century lay people confessed their sins. His reform is, therefore, from within: he provides an Aristotelian anthropology, and develops a new positive teleological frame, in which to set the vices. This serves to buttress, rather than to blow to pieces, the classical scheme.

What about the claim that there is, nonetheless, a significant change in Aquinas’s approach to the vices between *De malo* and the *Secunda secundae*? This reading is problematic not least because these works seem to have been written (if not actually disputed) at roughly the same time.⁶¹ However, even leaving aside the compositional chronology of the works, it is also, I would argue, questionable on its own terms. Although Eileen Sweeney correctly observes that Aquinas treats the vices in traditional causal order in *De malo* (with a chapter devoted to each in turn), we should emphasize that his rationale does not: rather, in discussing the moral framework of the vices, he considers first pride, gluttony, lust, and avarice (as vices of desire), and then sloth, envy, and anger (as vices of avoidance).⁶² As in the *Summa* so in *De malo*, this is because he has moved from the organizing principle of concatenation to principles based upon human psychology and moral teleology.

⁶⁰ *De Malo*, q. 8, a. 2.

⁶¹ See Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, *The Person and his Work*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 143-48; 201-7; “The *Secunda Pars* was put together in Paris: the *Prima Secundae* in 1271, followed by the *Secunda Secundae* (1271-72)” (*ibid.*, 333); “Given that Thomas’s works in Paris were very quickly and widely circulated, we may guess that the Questions *De malo* would have been disputed in Paris during the two academic years 1269-71” (*ibid.*, 336).

⁶² Sweeney, “Aquinas on the Seven Deadly Sins,” 88.

It is, in addition, misleading to state that “in the *Summa theologiae* he [Aquinas] ignores traditional orderings of the sins.”⁶³ While it is true that Aquinas does not structure the *Secunda secundae* according to this traditional order, there is no evidence to suggest that he ignores it as a valid structuring principle. On the contrary, he not only explicitly affirms that it is correct to speak of seven capital vices in the *Summa* but he also provides a precise summary of the same organizing rationale that is found in *De malo*.⁶⁴ The only very slight difference is that, in the second category of avoidance, Aquinas’s subdividing principle in the *Summa* is no longer (as in *De malo*) between avoidance of a good (sloth and envy) and resistance to an evil (anger); rather, it is with regard either to our absolute good (sloth) or to the good of another (envy and anger).⁶⁵ Thus whereas in *De malo* Aquinas distinguishes sloth and envy with respect to the *object* avoided (avoidance of the chief good or of the good in another), in the *Summa* he distinguishes envy and anger with respect to the *mode* of avoidance (sadness or

⁶³ Ibid., 87-88: “On the one hand, Aquinas spends a great deal of time exploring each sin or vice from Gregory’s list but, on the other hand, in the *Summa theologiae* Gregory’s ordering of the sins is ignored.”

⁶⁴ *STh* I-II, q. 84, a. 4: “Movet autem aliquid appetitum dupliciter. Uno modo, directe et per se, et hoc modo bonum movet appetitum ad prosequendum, malum autem, secundum eandem rationem, ad fugiendum. Alio modo, indirecte et quasi per aliud, sicut aliquis aliquod malum prosequitur propter aliquod bonum adiunctum, vel aliquod bonum fugit propter aliquod malum adiunctum. Bonum autem hominis est triplex. Est enim primo quoddam bonum animae, quod scilicet ex sola apprehensione rationem appetibilitatis habet, scilicet excellentia laudis vel honoris, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur inanis gloria. Aliud est bonum corporis, et hoc vel pertinet ad conservationem individui, sicut cibus et potus, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur gula; aut ad conservationem speciei, sicut coitus, et ad hoc ordinatur luxuria. Tertium bonum est exterius, scilicet divitiae, et ad hoc ordinatur avaritia. . . . Quod autem aliquis bonum fugiat propter aliquod malum coniunctum, hoc contingit dupliciter. Quia aut hoc est respectu boni proprii, et sic est acedia, quae tristatur de bono spirituali, propter laborem corporalem adiunctum. Aut est de bono alieno, et hoc, si sit sine insurrectione, pertinet ad invidiam, quae tristatur de bono alieno, inquantum est impeditivum propriae excellentiae; aut est cum quadam insurrectione ad vindictam, et sic est ira.”

⁶⁵ It is noteworthy that this subdivision (grouping envy and anger) arguably makes his rationale more similar to that of Peraldus, who distinguishes these two vices in relation to the origin of this hatred: in another (anger) or in the self (envy).

resistance respectively).⁶⁶ Aside from this one minor nuance, the rationale for the vices in the *Summa* is, therefore, entirely consistent with that given in *De malo*. In both works, Aquinas affirms the positive mode of desire and avoidance that underlies a capital vice or its offspring; the difference is in the structure of the thesis as a whole, not in the treatment of the vices in particular.

We should not interpret the novel structure of the *Secunda secundae*, therefore, as reflecting a move away from the seven capital vices tradition but, rather, as a further development in its reform. Aquinas's first reason for structuring the *Secunda secundae* in terms of the three theological and four cardinal virtues concerns concision and efficiency: the path of enquiry will be more compendious and expeditious (*compendiosior et expeditior*) if the virtues, the opposing vices, the commandments, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit are treated together.⁶⁷ His second reason is in keeping with the implications of his new rationale in *De malo*. In Aquinas's schema, the vices are diversified in species with respect to their matter or object (*secundum materiam vel obiectum*). As vices thereby operate in a disordered way with respect to the same objects as virtues, all moral matters may be traced back to them. Neither of these reasons implies a rejection of the seven capital vices tradition; both of these reasons, especially in light of Peraldus, lead to its reform. Peraldus's rationale impels him

⁶⁶ *STh* I-II, q. 84, a. 4: "Quod autem aliquis bonum fugiat propter aliquod malum coniunctum, hoc contingit dupliciter. Quia aut hoc est respectu boni proprii, et sic est acedia, quae tristatur de bono spirituali, propter laborem corporalem adiunctum. Aut est de bono alieno, et hoc, si sit sine insurrectione, pertinet ad invidiam, quae tristatur de bono alieno, inquantum est impeditivum propriae excellentiae; aut est cum quadam insurrectione ad vindictam, et sic est ira. Et ad eadem etiam vitia pertinet prosecutio mali oppositae."

⁶⁷ *STh* II-II, prol. This seems to be the implication of the comparatives *compendiosior* (used only five times in Aquinas's corpus) and *expeditior* (used only four times). Where *expeditior* is paired with *compendiosior* in the prologue to the *Secunda secundae*, in *Contra retrahentes* (c. 15) it is paired with *levior*, and in *Expositio Posteriorum Analyticorum* (I, lect. 35, n. 2) with *brevior*. In his commentary on the *Sentences*, Aquinas stipulates that the more compendious way is only preferable when it leads to a desired end as well as if not better than any other way: "non semper via compendiosior est magis eligenda, sed solum quando est magis vel aequaliter accommodata ad finem consequendum" (IV *Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1, ad 4).

to treat the vices and virtues separately: he structures *De vitiis* according to disordered love through excess or deficiency (gluttony, lust, avarice, and sloth) and to the love of an evil (pride, envy, and anger); he structures *De virtutibus* according to the theological and cardinal virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the beatitudes. By relating the vices to the virtues in terms of their shared objects, Aquinas is able to treat vices and virtues together within the scheme of the virtues, thereby avoiding unnecessary repetition. Even his further decision to treat first those moral matters relevant to all states of men (*STh* II-II, qq. 1-170) and only secondarily those relevant to particular states (*STh* II-II, qq. 171-89) reflects another clear reform of Peraldus's procedure.

Aquinas's structural reorganization in the *Secunda secundae* in terms of the three theological and four cardinal virtues should not lead us to underplay, therefore, his innovative treatment of the vices. He provides extremely nuanced treatments of the capital vices and their offshoots in the *Secunda secundae*, and this treatise was initially read as an, albeit transformed, *summa* of the vices as well as of the virtues.⁶⁸ Indeed, in structuring a work of moral theory around the virtues for his Dominican brothers, Aquinas would have anticipated that—in a pastoral situation and especially, of course, in confession—sin would remain, in practice, the point of departure in Christian moral life. Critical to his reform of the tradition of the seven capital vices is that it charts a clear path from sin to virtue.

⁶⁸ As Boyle notes, Aquinas's *Secunda secundae* has "all the trappings of a *Summa de virtutibus et vitiis*. . . it is not for nothing that the copy of the *Secunda secundae* that the theologian Geoffrey of Fontaines had made for himself at Paris in the 1290s bears the following explicit, 'Summa de virtutibus et vitiis edita a fratre Thoma de Aquino'" (Boyle, "Setting of the *Summa*," 86). The principal questions in the *Secunda secundae* that treat the capital vices directly are the following: pride (qq. 162-63) and vainglory (q. 132), envy (q. 36), anger (q. 158), sloth (q. 35), avarice (q. 118), gluttony (q. 148), and lust (qq. 153-54). Aquinas, however, weaves his treatment of the capital vices (and their offshoot vices) into the fabric of the *Secunda secundae* as a whole. For a helpful diagram that illustrates some of these further instances, see Sweeney, "Aquinas on the Seven Deadly Sins," 102-6.

CONCLUSION

There has been comparatively little attention paid to Aquinas's treatment of sin. This imbalance is perhaps due, in part, to a modern scholarly tendency to characterize Aquinas as a champion of "virtue ethics" or "moral teleology." Arguably, it may even reflect a wider tendency in modern Christian culture to steer clear of the negativity of evil, sin, and indeed hell (let alone the devils), and to prefer, instead, the positive messages of good, virtue, and heaven (although the good angels seem to fare little better than their demonic counterparts). This article suggests, however, that—in purely historical terms—the study of Aquinas's ethics is enriched by a closer engagement with his innovative treatment of sin. The first part argued that the system of the capital vices was popular, memorable, and stamped upon the medieval imagination. Tradition triumphed and, for medieval theologians, the pastoral exigency moved from replacing this system altogether to reforming it from within. As explored in the second and third parts, both Peraldus and Aquinas made important contributions to this process. The advantages of Aquinas's approach in providing a convincing psychology for all seven vices within a positive moral teleology emerge most clearly through a comparative analysis of Peraldus's *De vitiis* and Aquinas's *De malo*. This comparison, in turn, has implications for our understanding of the relationship between *De malo* and the *Secunda secundae*. The fourth part stressed continuity, arguing that Aquinas's treatment of the vices is, in substance, much the same; the difference is one of approach and structure. But even this structural reorganization might be best understood as a further stage of reform in the system of the vices, rather than as an abandonment of it (which would have been, in any case, impractical in a pastoral context). Aquinas shows, in both *De malo* and the *Secunda secundae*, how reflection on the reality of a particular sin—which is the natural starting point for a penitent—is potentially transformative: it can, and should, lead a person to the path of virtue of which sin is a disorder.

KAROL WOJTYŁA'S THOMISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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THE RECENT CANONIZATION of St. John Paul II offers an invitation to revisit the philosophical thought of Karol Wojtyła.¹ In this article, I would like to concentrate on a topic that is in need of clarification, namely, Wojtyła's understanding of consciousness. Many scholars have interpreted it as a reaction against the philosophy of Aquinas. Indeed, it has become commonplace to say that, according to Wojtyła, the philosophy of being offered by Aquinas is insufficient to account for the human person.

According to some of Wojtyła's commentators, Aquinas's philosophy needs to be complemented with a modern and contemporary element: a theory of consciousness that accounts for the lived experience of the singular and unique human person. Thus, these commentators hold that Wojtyła goes beyond Aquinas, because Wojtyła gives light to the phenomenological darkness in which the Angelic Doctor's philosophy is imprisoned. This alleged "dark night" of lived experience makes Aquinas an objectivistic thinker incapable of accounting for that which is subjective and irreducible to the world within the

¹ For a broader study on the integral vision of man according to Karol Wojtyła see Angel Pérez López, *De la experiencia de la integración a la visión integral de la persona: Estudio histórico-analítico de la integración en "Persona y Acción" de Karol Wojtyła* (Valencia: Edicep, 2012).

human person. According to this view, Wojtyła has gone beyond Aquinas in his personalism, integrating a sound ontology of the person rediscovered from within subjective experience.²

² According to Ronald Modras: “Thomism’s metaphysical concept of the human person in a certain sense reduces personhood to nature. If one defines a person as an ‘individual substance of a rational nature,’ it follows that personhood is understood in terms of the faculties (*potentiae*) of human nature. Wojtyła sees Thomistic anthropology as open to enrichment with the concept of the human person offered by the philosophy of consciousness and phenomenology” (Ronald Modras, “The Moral Philosophy of Pope John Paul II,” *Theological Studies* 41 [1980]: 683-97, at 685). Andrzej Szostek holds a similar view but in relation with Thomistic philosophy at large: “On the one hand, the Thomistic philosophy of being treats the problematics of morality too objectively at the cost of diminishing the subjective dimension which is so important for philosophy of morality” (Andrzej Szostek, “Karol Wojtyła’s View of the Human Person in the Light of the Experience of Morality,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 58 [1986]: 50-64, at 51-52). Anselm Min also argues the following: “First, John Paul’s critique of Aristotelian Thomism. The basic flaw of this tradition is that it fails to grasp man as a ‘personal’ subject, which constitutes both the specificity of the human whole and its concrete dynamism” (Anselm Min, “John Paul II’s Anthropology of Concrete Totality,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 58 [1984]: 120-29, at 121). Juan Manuel Burgos, president of the Personalist Association of Spain and editor of the works of Wojtyła in Spanish, holds a similar position in different articles he has written. In one article he affirms, when trying to compare Aquinas and Wojtyła on the way to study the human person: “The first difficulty appears in the same departure point: experience. This is neither a Thomistic nor an Aristotelian concept because subjectivity is specifically included. It would be possible to accept that the objective knowledge of man can be identified substantially with the traditional gnoseology, but the knowledge of the self subjective inner experience as a departure point of the anthropology can’t be” (Juan Manuel Burgos, “The Method of Karol Wojtyła: A Way Between Phenomenology, Personalism, and Metaphysics,” *Phenomenology and Existentialism in the Twentieth Century* 104 [2009]: 107-29, at 121). In a better-known article on *The Acting Person*, Burgos argues that the Thomistic notion of *suppositum* applied to man is “in itself totally objective. It does not reflect nor capture at all the lived subjectivity of the [human] person. Although it does capture what he [Wojtyła] calls ‘ontic subjectivity’; something that could be understood as the metaphysical basis or the ontological support which allows the subjectivity to exist. However, as much as one stretches the meaning of this concept it is

I intend to show instead that the understanding of consciousness in Wojtyła's *The Acting Person* is Thomistic.³ Wojtyła owes his own interpretation of consciousness to a profound dialogue between three main interlocutors: Max Scheler, Thomas Aquinas, and John of the Cross. Thanks to a fruitful dialogue between these three thinkers, Wojtyła's own understanding of consciousness makes more explicit and recuperates Aristotelian and Thomistic elements that have been either forgotten or not seen together by many of Wojtyła's commentators.

I. A DIALOGUE BETWEEN SCHELER AND THOMISM

The Acting Person is the final word on a dialogue between Scheler's ethical personalism and Thomism, as Wojtyła makes explicit in his own words.⁴ It follows that if one does not listen

clear that it will never be able to reflect lived subjectivity" ("en sí mismo, es totalmente objetivo, no refleja ni recoge para nada la subjetividad vivida de la persona aunque sí admite que pueda recoger lo que él [Wojtyła] denomina 'subjetividad óptica' y que cabría entender como la base metafísica o el sustrato óptico que permite existir a la subjetividad personal. Pero por mucho que se amplíe el significado de este concepto, es claro que nunca va a poder reflejar la subjetividad vivida") (Juan Manuel Burgos, "La antropología personalista de *Persona y Accion*," in *La filosofía personalista de Karol Wojtyła*, ed. Juan Manuel Burgos [Madrid: Ediciones Palabra, 2007], 117-44, at 130-31).

³ Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, trans. A. Potocki, ed. A. Tymieniecka (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979). For the Polish third critical edition of Wojtyła's work see Karol Wojtyła, *Osoba i Czyn- Persona e atto*, ed. T. Styzcen (Roma: Bompiani, 2001).

⁴ "The concept of the acting person which I am presenting was born from my previous works, especially from my analysis of M. Scheler, above all of his *Wertethik*. As it is known, Scheler built his concept of *materiale Wertethik* with the thought of challenging the aprioristic ethic of pure form, or rather, of pure duty. . . . This basic controversy, conducted in the name of the return toward that which is objective in ethics (and above all in morality), presents at its very root the problem of the subject, namely, the problem of the person, or of the human being as a person. This

to what the interlocutors have previously said, one will not understand Wojtyła's final answer. If therefore one were to write a monographic study on consciousness in *The Acting Person*, one would need to do at least three things. First, one would need to consider the internal unity of all of Wojtyła's philosophical works. Second, one would have to read *The Acting Person*, keeping in mind that the whole book cannot be understood unless one is acquainted with Scheler's ethical personalism. Within this personalism, Wojtyła concentrates, as he explicitly declares, on the novelty inherent in Scheler's view of man as a human person. He further evaluates this novelty in the light of the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition. As it will be shown, part of this novelty consists in Scheler's spiritualism, actualism, and his identification of person and consciousness. These three assertions are summed up in Scheler's thesis that the human person is psychophysically indifferent. Third, only after having accomplished these two previous steps could one rethink or reread with Wojtyła the classical formulations that inspire *The Acting Person*.

The limits of an article prevent one from doing justice to this whole process. Nevertheless, I will partially concentrate on the last two steps. I will first explain Scheler's reductionistic view of the human person as a philosophical position incapable of giving an account of moral perfectionism because of its identi-

presentation of the problem, completely new in relation to traditional philosophy (and by traditional philosophy we understand here the pre-Cartesian philosophy and above all the heritage of Aristotle, and, among the Catholic schools of thought, of St. Thomas Aquinas) has provoked me to undertake an attempt at reinterpreting certain formulations proper to this whole philosophy. The first question which was born in the mind of the present student of St. Thomas (certainly a very poor student) was the question: What is the relationship between action as interpreted by the traditional ethics as *actus humanus* and the action as an experience. This and other similar questions led me gradually to a more synthetic formulation in the form of the present study *The Acting Person*" (Wojtyła, *Acting Person*, xiii-xiv).

fication of person and consciousness. Second, I will show how, by rethinking some of the classical formulations of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy, Wojtyła offers in *The Acting Person* an answer to Scheler's claims that retains their core elements of truth. Thanks to the inspiration of St. John of the Cross, the dialogue with Max Scheler, and the solid foundation of his anthropology in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, Wojtyła thereby offers a Thomistic understanding of consciousness.

II. THE PSYCHOPHYSICAL INDIFFERENCE OF THE HUMAN PERSON IN SCHELER'S ETHICAL PERSONALISM

As a good phenomenologist should do, Scheler attempts to support his proposal with facts and experience.⁵ Thus, claiming to understand and explain facts of human experience, and partially inspired by the tripartite anthropology of St. Paul (body, soul, and spirit),⁶ Scheler offers a vision of man that comprises ever-deepening concentric spheres: the corporeal, the psychic, and the spiritual.

Yet, one is soon troubled to learn that Scheler identifies only the last one as personal. The other two (the corporeal and the psychic) are merely vital. In this sense, the person is psychophysically indifferent. In Scheler's opinion, there are two essential notes to the psychophysical indifference of acts and

⁵ According to Scheler's view, phenomenology "is based on facts, and facts alone, not on constructions of an arbitrary 'understanding' [*Verstandes*]" (Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk [Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973], 52).

⁶ See John White, "Max Scheler's Tripartite Anthropology," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 75 (2001): 255-66. For a study of Saint Paul's tripartite anthropology in general see Henri de Lubac, "Tripartite Anthropology," in *Theology in History*, trans. Anne Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), 117-222.

person: being *spiritual* and being *independent* of what is vital. To be spiritual means for him, first and foremost, to have the essence of act, namely, being purely intentional, and purely actual (spontaneity and not reactivity or passivity).⁷

Second, to be spiritual entails never being an object but being capable of objectifying what is psychophysical, giving it meaning by virtue of laws independent and autonomous of what is merely vital. In this way, from the epistemological viewpoint, Scheler makes a distinction between being conscious of one's acts in their execution and apprehending their essence in a second act different from the first.⁸ Moreover, at the ethical

⁷ In this sense, he claims: "The person is a continuous actuality" (Scheler, *Formalism*, 85 n. 52). Scheler admits there is *active* potency in the human person. However, he seems to exclude any sort of passive potency in the person. This is also noted by Sergio Sanchez-Migallon, "Vitalidad y espiritualidad humanas según Max Scheler," *Anuario Filosófico* 51 (2008): 341-61; see esp. 346.

⁸ "The being of a genuine act consists rather in its performance [*Vollzug*] and therefore is *absolutely*, not relatively, distinct from the concept of an object. This performance can come out straightforwardly or with 'reflection.' Still, this 'reflection' is no 'objectification,' no 'perception,' and hence no 'inner perception,' which is itself only a particular kind of act. Reflection is only a hovering, completely unqualified 'consciousness-of,' accompanying the act as it is being performed; reflection is possible only when the person is not totally absorbed in carrying out the act. 'Reflection' is distinct from all representational [*vorstellig*] conduct in general. Even the performance of an act of external perception can be given in this way in reflection" (Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays*, trans. David Lachterman [Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973], 26-27). This concomitant consciousness of an act is to be distinguished from the intentional apprehension of the essence of the act: "Pure intuition, furthermore, can be 'given'; the quality of an act and the equality, difference, and identity of the quality in several acts can be objectively [*gegenständlich*] given. But none of this is by any means the act itself. Thus, I can in a second act verify 'that I just now remembered yesterday's fine weather.' Then the act of remembering just performed is not given to me *qua* act in act number two; only its quality, namely, that it is an act of remembering, is given. I know only, on the basis of an essential interconnection, that an act 'belongs' to it, something of the same nature as what I am now performing. Psychology is never in any way concerned with acts in this sense, acts

level, this bestowal of meaning entails a moral intentionalism reminiscent of Abelardianism. Offering an example of how it is possible for the will's power of choice to give meaning to that which is psychophysical, Scheler argues that it would be possible for one to masturbate without falling into any moral depravity. For such an act to take place, one would have to fix his intention not on himself and the sheer acquisition of pleasure, but rather on his absent spouse, and his love for her.⁹

Third, to be spiritual also means to endure after death, and to be in relation with God.¹⁰ Moreover, to be independent from life (or that which is psychophysical), means being independent from anything essentially united to life. Thus, Scheler argues that we can get at the essence of something without the mediation of the senses.¹¹ And for this same reason, he claims,

whose essential content is 'intentionally' or 'consciousness-of' and whose mode of being is 'performance'" (ibid., 27).

⁹ "Autoeroticism, where sexual pleasure is concerned, should not be objectively defined, e. g., as self-satisfaction, but must, like all such perversions be *intentionally* defined. Self-satisfaction, where it is not a feeble search for sensation of pleasure but is connected with love, is not necessarily autoerotic, e.g., it is not so if it is practiced only because the beloved object is absent, although one's fantasies remain directed upon it. . . . Autoeroticism is, on the other hand, present even in normal sexual intercourse, when one's intention is trained upon one's own person, upon one's sensation, as much as upon one's erotically important values, like beauty, life-force, etc., and the other person is grasped only as the 'servant' of one's own beauty, or as the cause of what happens in the individual in question" (ibid., 62-63 n. 69).

¹⁰ "Still, we use the term spirit [*Geist*] for the entire sphere of acts (following our procedure of many years). With this term we designate all things that possess the nature of act, intentionality, and fulfillment of meaning, wherever we may find them. This of course implies at once that all mind is by essential necessity 'personal,' and that the idea of a 'non-personal spirit' is 'contradictory'" (Scheler, *Formalism*, 389). I have altered the translation by rendering *Geist* as "spirit" and not "mind."

¹¹ "[O]ur mind [*Geist*] has a form of contact with things which in itself is *unmediated* by the sensory organism of our body and is basic and unitary, in contrast to the multiplicity of sensory functions. The senses merely *analyse* this mental contact in different ways. They are not creators but only analysts of our mind's total unitary

“there can be no doubt that the lived body does not belong to the sphere of the person or the sphere of acts.”¹²

All of this leads Scheler to define the human person in the following manner: “the person is the concrete and essential unity of being of acts of different essences which in itself (and therefore not, πρὸς ἑμᾶς) precedes all essential act-differences.”¹³ He rejects the notion of substance, however, and its distinction from accidents. Hence, this definition undermines man’s substantial unity. According to Scheler, “between *spirit* and *life*, between person and life-centre, we discern no unity of substance but only a bond of *dynamic causality*.”¹⁴ And as Juan Llambías De Azevedo points out, Scheler’s rejection of man’s substantial unity also means the rejection “of the difference between substance and powers or faculties or accidents. If we remember that, according to the Aristotelian and Thomistic view, God is pure act, we note in Scheler’s theory a theomorphism of the person.”¹⁵

Finally, this leads to the identification between person and consciousness. In Scheler’s view, provided that consciousness is understood as “consciousness of something,” including in it all intentional acts (of the intellect, the will, and the heart), one “may also call the person the concrete ‘consciousness of’.”¹⁶ Of

perception, and as analysts they are ‘concerned’ to assess the value of the datum as a biological stimulus, according to whether it may induce beneficial or harmful reactions in the organism which belongs to the mental [spiritual] person as the subject of the overall perception” (Max Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, trans. Bernard Noble [New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1960], 199-200).

¹² Scheler, *Formalism*, 398.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 383.

¹⁴ Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 76.

¹⁵ Juan Llambías de Azevedo, *Max Scheler: Exposición sistemática y evolutiva de su filosofía con algunas críticas y anticríticas* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Nova, 1966), 232.

¹⁶ Scheler, *Formalism*, 392. Wojtyła notes that this position makes Scheler quite close to Kant. Kant’s rejection of metaphysics as possible science carried with it a sharp

course, for Scheler, such “consciousness of” is compatible with his actualism, for it is a consciousness of all kinds of spiritual acts. This is why he argues that the person is, and experiences himself, only as a being that *executes acts*.¹⁷

One ethical conclusion that springs from this identification between person and consciousness is that embryos are not persons, and that abortion is not the killing of an innocent person at all. Indeed, Scheler argues that, “murder presupposes the givenness of a human being as a person.”¹⁸ He then concludes, in congruency with his identification between person and “consciousness of” spiritual acts: “Abortion is also the killing of a human (a living being), but it is never considered murder (a fact that no ‘biological’ ethics can explain). *Abortion was and is not considered murder, because the embryo is not*

reductionism. Denying the distinction between substance and accidents in the human person, Kant made of reason an autonomous subject of acting. Thereby, what traditionally had been considered the faculty of the intellect became pure consciousness, now identified with the human person: “Together with a rejection of the philosophy of being, Kant ushered in a crystallization of the philosophy of consciousness, for he conceived reason in his *Critiques* as an autonomous subject of activity. For Aristotle and St. Thomas, reason was a faculty of the soul, an attribute of the human being. Separated from this being and conceived as an autonomous subject of acts, reason became pure consciousness” (Karol Wojtyła, “In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism,” in idem, *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, trans. T. Sandok [New York: Peter Lang, 1993], 49). Scheler would not accept Kant’s conception of consciousness because, in the phenomenologist’s view, the human person is not only consciousness of intellectual acts, but also consciousness of acts of willing and loving. Scheler builds on Kant and continues this reductionism altering, nevertheless, his conception of consciousness. For this reason, Wojtyła clearly notes that “Scheler proceeded in a manner *seemingly* quite different from Kant” (ibid., 51 [emphasis added]). But this difference is only in appearance. When it comes to the reductionism of the human person to consciousness, both German philosophers substantially agree. Yet, very acutely, Wojtyła notes the following difference: “whereas for Kant consciousness had a primarily intellectual character (consciousness = reason), for Scheler it has a primarily emotional character” (ibid.).

¹⁷ Cf. Scheler, *Formalism*, 385.

¹⁸ Ibid., 314.

given as a personality."¹⁹ For this reason, according to Scheler, while all men and women are human beings, not all human beings are persons. This is why, in his view, the family is not a collective person but a mere vital or life-community, because not all the members of a family may be called persons.²⁰

These seem to be the main reasons Wojtyła insists that, despite the fact that Scheler often speaks of virtue and becoming a better person, his ethical personalism cannot account for the fact and experience of perfectionism.²¹ Although he offers a philosophy of consciousness, his position is reductionistic: it reduces the person to consciousness of spiritual acts. Based on the principles of Thomistic philosophy, Wojtyła implicitly disputes with Scheler on such identification. At the same time, Wojtyła is able to assimilate the elements of truth found in Scheler's personalistic understanding of consciousness.

III. ST. JOHN OF THE CROSS AND THE "SENSE OF THE SOUL"

The first contact that Wojtyła had with Thomism was through the mediation of St. John of the Cross.²² There is a

¹⁹ Ibid., 315.

²⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 526-30.

²¹ "A closer analysis of Scheler's system, however, shows that such perfectionistic associations are not fully warranted. The person, in Scheler's view, is in no sense a being, but is merely a unity of experiences. In every experience, e.g., in the feeling of value or in willing, we simultaneously co-experience the unity formed by all experiences. The person is merely this conscious unity of experiences, this conscious unity of acts. And so in Scheler's view the person is not a being, but solely and exclusively a consciousness. . . . [W]ith such assumptions one definitely cannot maintain that any values perfect the person. One also, therefore, cannot maintain that moral values perfect the person. In this view, values are merely contents of consciousness, and as such they do not perfect the being of the person" (Wojtyła, "In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism," 53).

²² For the Thomism of St. John of the Cross, see Marcelino del Niño Jesús, *El tomismo de San Juan de la Cruz* (Burgos: Tipografía del Monte Carmelo, 1930).

curious affinity between the two: both are theologians, poets, and philosophers.²³ Moreover, the same professor (Ignacy Różycki) who led Wojtyła to encounter John of the Cross, also led him to the study of Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler.²⁴

In an article dedicated to the humanism of St. John of the Cross, Wojtyła affirms that “the dark night [of the soul] is a symbol that has many meanings. In many instances, it is simply an abbreviation of a whole chain of *philosophical*, theological, and psychological premises.”²⁵ One of these philosophical

²³ Although St. John of the Cross did not write any philosophical work *per se*, out of the four years in which he studied at the University of Salamanca, he studied three years of philosophy with the leading Thomists of his time. For a good introduction to the life and thought of St. John of the Cross, see Federico Ruíz, *Introducción a San Juan de la Cruz: El escritor, los escritos, el sistema* (Madrid: BAC, 1968). For some interesting remarks on the affinity between Wojtyła and St. John of the Cross, see Alfred Wierzbicki, “La barca interiore: Affinità spirituale del pensiero di Karol Wojtyła con il pensiero di San Giovanni della Croce” in *Metafisica della persona: Tutte le opere filosofiche e saggi integrativi*, ed. G. Reale and T. Styczen (Milan: Bompiani, 2003), 2-20.

²⁴ When Wojtyła began his studies at the seminary, he established a profound friendship with Różycki. The latter offered a class on St. John of the Cross during which Wojtyła wrote an extensive paper on faith. This paper was the first draft of Wojtyła’s doctoral dissertation in moral theology, later directed by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. In this seminar on St. John of the Cross, Różycki always emphasized the need to read the writings of the Spanish mystic under the light of Thomas’s *Summa theologiae* (cf. Adam Boniecki, *The Making of the Pope of the Millennium: Kalendarium of Life of Karol Wojtyła* [Stockbridge: Marian Press, 2000], 99-100). This would be a constant in Wojtyła’s formation. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange emphasized the same thing in Rome (see *ibid.*, 115). Later on, when Wojtyła came back from Rome, and was in need of a topic for his *Habilitationschrift*, it was Różycki who recommended that he write on Max Scheler. See Jaroslaw Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 6.

²⁵ Karol Wojtyła, “L’umanesimo di San Giovanni della Croce,” in *Filosofia e letteratura in Karol Wojtyła*, ed. A. Delogo and A. Morace (Rome: Urbaniana University Press, 2007), 13-14.

premises is an understanding of human consciousness, based on the writings of Aquinas.

In a very interesting text, St. John of the Cross speaks of that which offers us the *lived* experience of the radical ampleness of our spiritual faculties. In this text, one can find the inspiration to read Aquinas's philosophical anthropology in an experiential key. The ampleness of man's spiritual faculties—the human *mens*—is illustrated by the metaphor of the profound “caverns” of the soul. Within them, there is room for all the forms of known things that are also remembered. There is also room in them for all things that are loved. Above all, the spiritual faculties of the human person are so ample that through them the person can get to know and to love God himself.²⁶ According to the Mystical Doctor, we have the experience or lived experience of the ampleness of our spiritual faculties. We *sense* those faculties before we get to know them reflexively. And we sense them *through them and in them*, because, thanks to our faculties, we sense and enjoy not only their objects, but also their acts.

In this way, John of the Cross suggests that this perception, or sensing of the soul, is like the experiential terrain upon

²⁶ Thus, St. John of the Cross says: “The soul here calls these three faculties (memory, intellect, and will) ‘the deep caverns of sense’ because through them and in them it deeply experiences and enjoys the grandeurs of God’s wisdom and excellence. It very appropriately calls them the deep caverns of sense because, since it senses that the deep knowledge and splendors of the lamps of fire fit into them, it knows that its capacity and recesses correspond to the particular things it receives from the knowledge, savor, joy, delight, and so on, of God” (“Y por eso a esas tres potencias, memoria, entendimiento y voluntad, las llama el alma en este verso *cavernas del sentido profundas*, porque *por medio de ellas y en ellas siente y gusta el alma* profundamente las grandezas de la sabiduría y excelencias de Dios; por lo cual harto propiamente las llama aquí el alma *cavernas profundas*, porque como *siente* que en ellas caben las profundas inteligencias y resplandores de las lámparas de fuego *conoce* que tiene tanta capacidad y senos cuantas cosas distintas recibe de inteligencias, de sabores, de gozos y deleites, etc., de Dios”) (St. John of the Cross, *Living Flame of Love* 3.69 [emphasis added]).

which intellectual knowledge reflects in order to understand and explain it. But what results, perhaps more interestingly, is that John of the Cross appeals to an analogy inspired by the philosophy of Aquinas in order to explain what this “sense of the soul” is all about. Based on an analogy to what Aquinas calls the ‘common sense’, John of the Cross calls that through which we have this lived experience of our acts and their objects the “sense of the soul.”

By the sense of the soul, the verse refers to the power and virtue that the substance of the soul has to sense and enjoy the objects of the spiritual faculties; through these faculties a person tastes the wisdom and love and communication of God. . . . All these things are received and seated in this sense of the soul which, as I say, is its virtue and capacity for experiencing, possessing, and tasting them all. And the caverns of the faculties administer them to it, just as the bodily senses go to assist the common sense of the phantasy with the forms of their objects, and this common sense becomes the receptacle and archives of these forms. Hence, this common sense, or sense, of the soul, which has become the receptacle or archives of God’s grandeurs, is illumined and enriched according to what it attains in this high and enlightened possession.²⁷

The first part of the analogy is the relationship between the external senses and common sense. According to Aquinas,

²⁷ “Por el *sentido de el alma* entiende aquí la virtud y fuerza que tiene la sustancia de el alma para sentir y gozar de los objetos de las potencias espirituales con que gusta la sabiduría y amor y comunicación de Dios. . . . Todas las cuales cosas se reciben y asientan en este sentido del alma, que, como digo, es la virtud y capacidad que tiene el alma para sentirlo, poseerlo y gustarlo todo, *administrádoselo las cavernas de las potencias, así como al sentido común de la fantasía acuden con las formas de sus objetos los sentidos corporales*, y él es receptáculo y archivo de ellas; por lo cual este sentido común del alma, que está hecho receptáculo y archivo de las grandezas de Dios, está tan ilustrado y tan rico, cuanto alcanza de esta alta y esclarecida posesión” (*Llama 3*, 69; emphasis added).

nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the ‘common sense’ is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore, whatever is visible or audible. Hence the ‘common sense’, although one faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses.²⁸

Thus, Aquinas clarifies in another place: “The interior sense is called ‘common’ not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.”²⁹ For example, in the case of seeing, by the common sense,

all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight is completed, and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.³⁰

This perception occurs concomitantly with the act of seeing. We perceive that we are seeing something *in the very act* of seeing that something. The reason for this is that there is not another object that specifies the act. If there were two objects, then we would be talking about two different acts. However, the only object here is that which is seen. This same object is considered more formally by the common sense, and hence, “we see that we see” or we perceive that we see. This understanding of consciousness is very far from being a wholly new doctrine. Aristotle had already said in his *Ethics* that,

he who sees, perceives that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears, and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other activities, similarly there

²⁸ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2 (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, ed. John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcon, trans. Laurence Shapcote [Lander, Wy.: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012]).

²⁹ *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 1.

³⁰ *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 2.

is something which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we think, that we think.³¹

But in order to explain the last part of this text from Aristotle, we must turn to the second part of the analogy. Therein, that proportion between the external senses and common sense is applicable to the “sense of the soul” and the spiritual powers of the human person. We already know that the common sense does not have an object different from the object of the external senses. The latter offers the objectual content to the former. Similarly, the spiritual faculties offer their objectual content to the “sense of the soul” or what we call consciousness. (A very similar idea will reemerge in Wojtyła’s understanding of consciousness as nonintentional.) The dissimilarity in the analogy is that in the case of consciousness of spiritual acts, consciousness itself does not seem to be a different faculty because it does not seem possible for the human person to know the same object of the intellect with greater formality. This is the reason why John of the Cross is very careful, saying that the “sense of the soul” or consciousness is given *through our spiritual faculties, and in them*. Thus, the awareness we have of our spiritual acts must be made possible by the acts of intellectual knowledge that inform them.

This careful analogy also accounts for another Carmelite distinction which has made its way into *The Acting Person*. According to Teresa of Avila, it is one thing to experience or receive a given grace, it is another to be able to understand what this grace is all about, and it is yet another to be able to explain

³¹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.9.1170a27-1170b1 (*The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. R. McKeon [New York: Random House, 1941]).

it.³² Exactly these three things will be the key to Wojtyła's philosophical approach. *The Acting Person* is all about understanding and explaining the experience of one's free action as that which reveals man's personal and rational mode of being.

IV. THE ASPECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN *THE ACTING PERSON*

Inspired by John of the Cross, building upon Aquinas, and in dialogue with Scheler, Wojtyła overcomes the German philosopher's identification between person and consciousness by elucidating, in lived experience, that consciousness is only an aspect of the human person. He further establishes that consciousness belongs to the accidental order as a property of human acts. To explain with some detail how *The Acting Person* reaches these conclusions, we need to analyze its point of departure (the *qua ratione* and the *qua modo* consciousness is always consciousness of something) and show that all of the above is built upon Thomistic foundations. In all this process, Wojtyła makes explicit and recuperates elements of the traditional philosophy of consciousness that were either forgotten or not seen together.

A) *The Point of Departure*

Wojtyła argues that since one's mode of acting follows from one's mode of being—*operari sequitur esse*—reflecting on conscious acting in voluntary action reveals the mode of being conscious proper to the human person.³³ Acting consciously

³² "Una merced es dar el Señor la merced y otra es entender qué merced es y qué gracia; otra es saber decirla y dar a entender como es" (Teresa de Jesús, *Libro de la vida* [Madrid: Algaba Ediciones, 2007], 161).

³³ Wojtyła is convinced that the metaphysical realm is the crucial arena wherein the contemporary anthropological and ethical debate should take place. He locates his

refers to a free act of the will that is made possible and is conditioned by the intellect's practical judgment, but consciousness of acting signifies the perception or experiential awareness concomitant to that act of the intellect.

In *The Acting Person*, Wojtyła opposes a thesis claimed by most phenomenologists, according to which acts of consciousness are by their very nature intentional. Although he does not deny the fact that consciousness is always consciousness of something, he disagrees with the claim that consciousness is intentional in the same sense the intellect is.³⁴ In doing so, he first clarifies the ontological status of consciousness, explaining that the *qua ratione* consciousness is always consciousness of something. Furthermore, he elucidates the mode of being conscious that belongs to the human person, because of his

entire book in this very realm by founding it on the Thomistic and metaphysical principle *operari sequitur esse*: "In its basic conception, the whole of *The Acting Person* is grounded on the premise that *operari sequitur esse*: the act of personal existence has its direct consequences in the activity of the person (i.e., in action). And so action, in turn, is the basis for disclosing and understanding the person" (Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," in idem, *Person and Community*, 260 n. 6). Some may be stunned to hear that *The Acting Person* has anything to do with metaphysics. Yet, this astonishment should vanish upon reading Wojtyła's explicit words about this book. Indeed, according to him, *The Acting Person* is devoted to the metaphysical sense and mystery of the person: "I devote my very rare free moments to a work that is close to my heart and devoted to the metaphysical sense and mystery of the person. It seems to me that the debate today is being played on that level. The evil of our times consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed in a pulverization, of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person. This evil is even much more of the metaphysical order than of the moral order. To this disintegration, planned at times by atheistic ideologies, we must oppose, rather than sterile polemics, a kind of 'recapitulation' of the inviolable mystery of the person. I firmly believe that the truths attacked compel with more urgency the recognition of those who are often the involuntary victims of it" (Karol Wojtyła, "Letter to Henri De Lubac February 1968" in *At the Service of the Church*, trans. A. Englund [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993], 171-72; emphasis added).

³⁴ See Wojtyła, *Acting Person*, 33-34.

rational nature. He does so by explaining that the *qua modo* consciousness is always consciousness of something.

B) “*Qua Ratione*”

To clarify the ontological status of consciousness within the accidental order, Wojtyła begins by explaining that when he speaks of the acts of the will or the acts of the intellect, he is talking about the actualization of a power (*potentia*) of the soul. For this reason, strictly speaking, it is incorrect to speak of acts of consciousness. Consciousness is neither a faculty nor a whole act of a given faculty, but only a concomitant dimension of an act of the faculties of knowledge.

One should distinguish between the experience whereby in the act of knowing something I also perceive that I am knowing it (as when in the act of seeing something, I also perceive that I am seeing it), and the experience of objectifying the previous act of knowledge, in order to attain the essence or nature of that previous act. Following the inspiration of John of the Cross, Wojtyła uses this distinction in order to clarify that consciousness can be neither the proximate nor the remote subject of an action. Consequently, experience shows that those who reject the substantial unity of man, in identifying person and consciousness, incur the well-known fallacy *pars pro toto*. An adequate comprehension of consciousness reveals it as a kind of *cum-scientia* that is concomitant to human knowledge.

This clarification allows Wojtyła to distinguish three things: (1) having an awareness or lived experience of being the subject of an action (consciousness of one's actions and self-consciousness), (2) knowing oneself intellectually as the subject of an action (intentional and intellectual knowledge of the nature of one's actions and self-knowledge), and (3) being the

subject or *suppositum* of the action.³⁵ These three distinctions allow for an experiential view of the human person that takes into account internal and external experience without prejudice to the substantial unity of man. At the same time, this view of the human person locates consciousness and self-consciousness at the accidental level as a concomitant dimension of an action.

Wojtyła distinguishes the intentional act of the intellect, whereby one objectifies something (reaching in this manner an essential induction), from the awareness one has of this very intellectual action. Such a distinction is key in order to develop what I would call a 'realistic semantics'.³⁶ Within this kind of semantics, the conceptual meaning of a thing is like a formal sign that signifies the thing as it is in its real nature. For this reason, Wojtyła argues that consciousness receives all of its signifying contents "from the outside," namely, from the operation of the intellect, whereby one objectifies something intentionally, and apprehends its form as the form of another.³⁷

³⁵ See *ibid.*, 44.

³⁶ Without providing any textual reference, Wojtyła appeals to Aristotle to clarify the meaning of induction in *Acting Person*, 14. Some texts one could consult are Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.3.1139b28-31; *Posterior Analytics* 2.13.97b7-8.

³⁷ "[C]onsciousness mirrors human actions in its own peculiar manner—the reflection intrinsically belongs to it—but does not cognitively objectivize either the actions or the person who performs them, or even the whole 'universe of the person,' which in one way or another is connected with man's being and acting. Nevertheless, the acts of consciousness as well as their resultant are obviously related to everything that lies beyond them, and especially to the actions performed by the personal ego. This relation is established by means of the consciousness, which is constituted by the meanings of the particular items of reality and of their interrelationships. When we speak of the aspect of consciousness that refers to meanings, and at the same time state that consciousness as such has no power of cognitive objectivation, we come to the conclusion that the whole of human cognition—the power and the efficacy of active comprehension—closely cooperates with consciousness. Consciousness itself is thus conditioned by this power and efficacy—it is conditioned, so to speak, by the cognitive potentiality. . . . The power and the efficacy of active understanding allows us to ascertain the meaning of particular things and to intellectually incorporate them, as well

Although concomitant consciousness reflects as in a mirror the acts of the human person as well as their content, consciousness is not intentional because it does not make the knower in act one with the thing known in act, nor does it confer intentional being to the representation through which one knows the *res significata*.

In this way, Wojtyła's reflections in *The Acting Person* are *transphenomenal*. Instead of being restricted to phenomena given as objects of consciousness, *The Acting Person* digs into (*wydowyc*) the ontological reality of the human person as an *esse reale in rerum natura*, that is to say, into the very being of the human person as it is, independently of one's knowledge and one's awareness of that same being.³⁸

These clarifications are of the uttermost importance for a realistic anthropology capable of giving an account of moral perfectionism that is both phenomenological and metaphysical. Indeed, this realistic semantics establishes the adequate link between lived experience and metaphysical notions. The latter

as the relations between them, 'into' our consciousness. For to 'understand' means the same as to 'grasp' the meaning of things and their interrelations. Insofar as all this is alien to consciousness the whole process of active comprehending neither proceeds in it nor is owing to it. The meanings of things and of their relations are given to consciousness, as it were, from outside as the product of knowledge, which in turn results from the active constitution and comprehension of the objective reality and is accumulated by man and possessed by him by various means and to different degrees" (Wojtyła, *Acting Person*, 35).

³⁸ "This concept [*suppositum*] serves to express the subjectivity of the human being in the metaphysical sense. By 'metaphysical,' I mean not so much 'beyond-the-phenomenal' as 'through-the-phenomenal,' or 'transphenomenal'. Through all the phenomena that in experience go to make up the whole human being as someone who exists and acts, we perceive—somehow we must perceive—the subject of that existence and activity" (Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 222). This explanation echoes Aquinas's claim that even though we know physical realities through experience, metaphysics is transphysical. See Aquinas, *Super Boet. De Trin.* III, q. 5, a. 1, c. 3 (*Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P. M. Edita*, vol. 50 [Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Éditions Du Cerf, 1992]).

are given in experience, even if they go beyond experience when they explain it through their causes.

C) "*Qua modo*"

The mode (*qua modo*) in which the human person is conscious of something corresponds to his rational mode of being. Since the nature of consciousness in man is rational, he experiences rationally the world around him, as well as his own self. This human or rational way of experiencing is manifested by the twofold function of consciousness: the mirroring and the reflexive functions. Mirroring consciousness accentuates the objective dimension of that which is experienced, that is to say, the fact that it is something other than myself. Mirroring consciousness underlines this objective dimension because it allows for introspection of the contents or meanings deposited in consciousness by the intellect's act of understanding (induction or simple apprehension). Among such contents, one should count the objective knowledge one has of one's own self.³⁹

On the other hand, reflexive consciousness accentuates my own subjectivity in the act of knowing something. Thanks to reflexive consciousness, I experience that I am the subject doing the knowing, the willing, or the feeling.⁴⁰ In other words, reflexive consciousness helps to furnish the experience by which one is aware of one's own subjectivity or selfhood. By means of this function of consciousness, its objective contents are referred

³⁹ See Wojtyła, *Acting Person*, 42-44.

⁴⁰ "[T]he *reflexive trait* or *reflexiveness* of consciousness denotes that consciousness, so to speak, turns back naturally upon the subject, if thereby the subjectiveness of the subject is brought into prominence in experience" (*ibid.*, 43).

to one's I in such a way that I can say that "they are mine" or "for me."⁴¹

Wojtyła explains this reflexive function of consciousness by pointing at the lived experience of its absence when a strong and intense passion takes over. In this "emotionalization of consciousness," one loses that certain "distance" from one's passion that is granted by the act of the intellect whereby one knows his own passion, interpreting it and judging it, in order to govern it politically.⁴² Since consciousness is a concomitant dimension of an act of knowing, when the intellect is blinded by passion and impeded in the exercise of its own act, consciousness cannot exercise its reflexive functioning. This passion is no longer lived as something "happening in me," but just as "something happening," as if this passion has lost its proper contact with one's own I.⁴³ Expressions such as being "drunk with vengeance," "possessed by anger," or "blinded by rage," illustrate this very point. However, in normal circumstances, in which the act of the intellect is not hindered by such a strong passion, the presence of the reflexive function of consciousness provides for the lived experience of one's I as the responsible efficient cause of one's actions.

D) Building upon Thomistic Foundations

Wojtyła's understanding of consciousness finds its remote roots in Aristotle. The latter was already aware, as was pointed out, that the human person has a certain interior perception of

⁴¹ "Consciousness allows us not only to have an inner view of our actions (immanent perception) and of their dynamic dependence on the ego, but also to *experience these actions as actions and as our own*" (ibid., 42).

⁴² See ibid., 53-54.

⁴³ See ibid., 54-55.

his own actions and his own existence.⁴⁴ Aquinas follows this lead from the Stagirite but integrates also many insights from St. Augustine.⁴⁵ Inserting himself within this tradition,⁴⁶ Aquinas

⁴⁴ See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.9.1170a27-1170b1.

⁴⁵ The influence of books 10 and 15 of Augustine's *De Trinitate* can already be seen in Aquinas's youthful commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis*, ed. M. F. Moos, vol. 3 [Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1956]). Therein, Aquinas already appeals to the distinction between *cogitare*, *discernere*, and *intelligere* in order to speak about a certain intuition or perceptual awareness of one's soul, a presence of the soul to itself. Such presence is a certain knowledge that does not take place under the aspect of being a object (*in ratione objecti*). Indeed, it is not a complete act of the intellect. And it does not require the agent's intention. See *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5. Aquinas is well aware that this way of explaining *intelligere* does not coincide with Aristotle's, for whom to understand (*intelligere*) signifies a complete act of the intellect whereby another's form is received. What Aristotle calls *intelligere* corresponds more to what Augustine understands by *cogitare*. See *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, ad 2.

⁴⁶ Perhaps the one text where Aquinas elaborates the key point of the synthesis between Aristotle and Augustine is *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 8. The context of this question is reminiscent of John of the Cross' discussion on the sense of the soul: memory, intellect, and will having God as their object. Aquinas asks whether the soul knows itself through its own essence or some intelligible species abstracted. While the first affirmation is from Augustine, the second comes from Aristotle. Aquinas will not answer with "either . . . or" but with "both . . . and." He does so thanks to a distinction found in book 9 of Augustine's *De Trinitate*: one thing is the particular knowledge of one's soul, and another thing is the knowledge of its nature. Aquinas clarifies that by means of the first we are aware of our particular soul, we have self-consciousness. And we have that awareness without any need of abstracted intelligible species because of the very ontological conditions of our soul (see *De Verit.*, q. 8, ad 1 and 14). This is the sense in which Augustine is right. However, Aristotle is also right: we get to know the nature of our soul by means of abstracted species. But another thing quite interesting takes place in this question. Aquinas begins to use the verb *percipere* to refer to this experiential awareness, to that knowledge of the particular existent. Hence, what in the *Commentary on the Sentences* was called "intuition" begins to be called quite consistently "perception." Both terms refer to a sort of knowledge in which the intention of the agent is not needed; a knowledge wherein reality is not known *in ratione objecti*. This is exactly the kind of experiential knowledge that one attests when

systematically uses the verb *percipere* in order to pinpoint one's conscious awareness of a given phenomenon.⁴⁷ He does not consider consciousness as a faculty, but rather as a concomitant perception or knowledge (*cum-scientia*) that accompanies our actions, and that results from the interaction of different faculties. Hence, we already saw, thanks to St. John of the Cross, that at the sensible level there is a certain consciousness of one's seeing explained by the faculty of common sense. Since nothing forbids that different faculties may consider the same object under different degrees of formality,⁴⁸ common sense—a faculty superior to the external senses—has the capacity to consider the same object of sight but with a greater formality. For this reason, it belongs to common sense to *perceive* the intentions of the senses, just as when one sees that he is seeing.⁴⁹

Aquinas shows that consciousness is neither a faculty nor a whole act of a given faculty, but only a concomitant dimension of an act of the faculties of knowledge. He does so, explaining the following distinction. On the one hand, in the act of knowing something, I *perceive* that I am knowing it, as when in the act of seeing something, I perceive that I am seeing it. On the other hand, this perception is distinct from the act of objectifying the previous act of knowledge in order to attain the essence or nature of the latter act.⁵⁰ Indeed, Aquinas, just like Wojtyła, distinguishes the (nonintentional) experiential per-

one realizes that it is possible to perceive or to be aware of one's soul without knowing its nature or essence (see *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 9).

⁴⁷ "Indeed, perception signifies a certain experiential knowledge [*experimentalem notitiam*]" (*STh* I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2).

⁴⁸ See *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.

⁴⁹ See *STh* I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 2.

⁵⁰ "Therefore, the act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one perceives [*percipit*] that one wills, and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power" (*STh* I, q. 87, a. 4; emphasis added).

ception of the act of the will from the intentional and objectifying act of the intellect, whereby one reflects on the previous perception in order to attain the essence of the act already executed, thereby apprehending the essence of the will itself.

The same applies for the act of the intellect. On the one hand, there is an experiential awareness of the fact that I am understanding, within the very act of understanding something.⁵¹ On the other hand, the intellect has the capacity to perform a second act, and to reflect on the act already executed.⁵² The key to understanding the difference between these two situations is that *acts are distinguished by their objects*.⁵³ This is why the act whereby one understands the stone, and the one whereby one understands the nature of understanding a stone *sub ratione actus*, are different acts. In the second case, there are two objects (object₁: the stone; object₂: the act of understanding the stone). On the other hand, in the first case, there is only one object, namely, the stone. For this reason, when there is only this one object, one can speak of a perception or experiential awareness that is concomitant to the very action.

In this sense, according to Aquinas, Augustine is completely right: the human soul is not to see itself as if it were absent. There is already a *perception* of our soul, which serves as the terrain for the reflections that aim to get at its essence. The soul

⁵¹ In this sense, Aquinas says, “eadem operatione intelligo intelligibile et intelligo me intelligere” (*I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2).

⁵² And in this sense, Aquinas says, “Unde alius est actus quo intellectus intelligit lapidem, et alius est actus quo intelligit se intelligere lapidem” (*STh* I, q. 87, a. 3, ad 2; cf. Wojtyła, *Acting Person*, 44).

⁵³ “Cum enim actus distinguantur per objecta, oportet dicere diversos actus qui terminantur ad objecta diversa.” (*I Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4).

is to discern itself as present.⁵⁴ Hence, Augustine did not intend to say that the soul knows its essence through itself, for something whose essence is already known is already discerned as different from other things. Augustine was referring, instead, to the presence, the experiential awareness or consciousness that we have of our own selves.⁵⁵ Aquinas appeals to such an experiential awareness in key moments of his anthropology.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ “Let the spirit [*mens*] not go for a look at itself as if it were absent, but rather take pains to discern itself as present. Let it not try to learn itself as if it did not know itself, but rather to discern itself from what it knows to be other” (Augustine, *De Trinitate* 10.9.12 [PL 42]).

⁵⁵ “Ex quo dat intelligere quod anima per se cognoscit seipsam quasi praesentem, non quasi ab aliis distinctam” (*ScG* III, c. 46 [Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles: Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei Contra Errores Infidelium*, ed. P. Marc, C. Pera, P. Caramello, vv. 2-3 (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1961)]). According to Aquinas, Augustine’s intention is to explain that the human *mens* knows itself through its own existence. The soul *perceives* his acting and his being. Since the soul acts through itself, it knows its existence through itself: “Sic igitur, secundum intentionem Augustini, mens nostra per seipsam novit seipsam in quantum de se cognoscit quod est. Ex hoc enim ipso quod percipit se agere, percipit se esse; agit autem per seipsam, unde per seipsam de se cognoscit quod est” (*ScG* III, c. 46). For this reason Aquinas also says: “Someone might answer by referring to Augustine’s statement, that ‘the spirit ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself’; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpretation by adding that ‘it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things.’ Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says: ‘If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence’” (*STh* I, q. 93, a. 7 ad 4).

⁵⁶ In his dispute against the Averroists, he argues: “But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands . . . it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses” (*STh* I, q. 76, a. 1). Moreover, in his dispute

For this reason, Wojtyła's mentor in Rome, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, teaches that in the writings of Aquinas, one is to distinguish *psychological* consciousness from moral conscience.⁵⁷ And this is why Wojtyła says that his own understanding of consciousness follows the lead of Aquinas.

To be sure, in accordance with the didactic nature of his writings, Aquinas first teaches the deepest metaphysical premises that go to the heart of a given question. This may

against Avicenna's theory of multiple substantial souls in man, he appeals to the lived experience of the intensity of a sensible operation hindering another operation of an intellectual nature, or to the fact that one intellectual operation can reverberate into the sensible potencies: "The following example also attests to this, namely, that when the operation of one power is intense, that of another is impeded; and contrariwise, there is an overflowing of one power into another, which would occur only if all the powers were rooted in one and the same essence of the soul" (*Q. D. De Anima*, q. un, a. 11 [Thomas Aquinas, *Opera omnia*, vol. 24, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima*, ed. B. C. Bazán (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Editions Du Cerf, 1996)]). As he says elsewhere, "this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one" (*STh I*, q. 76, a. 3).

⁵⁷ "Conscientia moralis differt a conscientia psychologica, quae est actus quo anima nostra suasque proprias operationes et affectiones *percipit*" (Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Beatitudine. De Actibus Humanis et Habitibus: Comentarium in Summam Theologicam S. Thomae Ia-IIa qq. 1-54* [Turin: Marietti, 1951], 373). Note that Garrigou-Lagrange has used very precisely the verb *percipere* as well. Scholastics such as Joseph Greth also spoke about consciousness. In fact, he did so anticipating what Wojtyła called efficacy or the lived experience of being the efficient cause of one's actions. According to Greth, the concept of cause is immediately abstracted from the internal experience of our own actions. The internal experience of being the efficient cause of our own actions is reflected in consciousness. Indeed, consciousness offers us an infallible testimony of this experience. "Conceptus causae immediate ex *experientia interna* abstrahitur tamquam objectivam realitatem habens. Infallibili *conscientiae* testimonio constat nos producere in nobis (intelligendo, volendo, etc) et in aliis rebus (tangendo, movendo, percutiendo) diversas realitates, quae esse accipiunt a nobis, dependenter a nostra actione, et clare percipimus effectum non tantum esse post actionem, sed ex actione nostra" (Iosephus Greth, *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, vol. 2 [Barcelona: Herder, 1946], 146-47; emphasis added).

make it difficult for the reader to see his emphasis on lived experience. Thus, Wojtyła says that it would *seem* that there is no place in Aquinas's thought for lived experience.⁵⁸ However, he promises that if we overcome this appearance and look deeper, we will see something different. Unlike most modern and contemporary philosophers, Aquinas offers the correct interplay between faculties that accounts for a realistic theory of consciousness and self-consciousness. The importance of Aquinas's proposal is that it accounts for man's substantial unity, it places consciousness in the accidental order, and it identifies consciousness neither with the human person nor with one of his faculties. Since consciousness is not the person nor one of his faculties, to show the particular faculties, thanks to which the whole of human consciousness and self-consciousness takes shape, and to stop right there without going as far as modern and contemporary philosophers do, is actually to offer an adequate theory of consciousness. For this reason, Wojtyła says that Aquinas "shows us the particular faculties, both spiritual and sensory, thanks to which the whole of human consciousness and self-consciousness—the human personality in the psychological and moral sense—takes shape, but that is also where he stops."⁵⁹

Considering that phenomenologists like Max Scheler deny the classical distinction between faculties, and end up identifying the human person with consciousness, it is very important to be able to locate consciousness in the accidental order: "If consciousness and self-consciousness characterize the person, then they do so only in the accidental order, as derived from the

⁵⁸ "[W]hen it comes to analyzing consciousness and self-consciousness—which is what chiefly interested modern philosophy and psychology—there *seems* to be no place for it in St. Thomas' objectivistic view of reality" (Wojtyła, "Thomistic Personalism," in *idem, Person and Community*, 170; emphasis added).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 170-71.

rational nature on the basis of which the person acts.”⁶⁰ Against modern and contemporary views on consciousness, Wojtyła, exactly like Aquinas, wants to show the particular faculties or dynamisms thanks to which the whole of human consciousness and self-consciousness takes shape. Thus, in a section entitled “Consciousness Is Not an Autonomous Subject,” he explains:

Disclosing consciousness in the totality of human dynamisms and showing it as the constitutive *property of action* we strive to understand it, but always in its relation to the action, to the dynamism and efficacy of the person. This manner of seeing and interpreting consciousness . . . protects us from conceiving it as an independent, self-contained subject.⁶¹

This is exactly what is manifested in experience, according to Wojtyła, when one reflects on conscious acting, in order to understand what consciousness of acting is all about. His seminal idea according to which reflecting on conscious acting in voluntary action reveals the mode of being conscious proper to the human person is entirely in accord with Aquinas. Indeed, the latter explains that,

⁶⁰ Ibid., 170. Note how, in Wojtyła’s view, traditional Thomistic philosophy has a theory of consciousness that is more precise from the metaphysical point of view than most modern and phenomenological accounts of consciousness: “The traditional conception of *actus humanus* was in fact, as we already remarked, a tributary, not only of an epistemologically realistic position, but also of a metaphysical standpoint. *It conceived consciousness* [emphasis added] as something that was incorporated and subordinate, as it was dissolved in man’s actions and his being, the being of a rational nature; *though man existed and acted consciously, it was not in consciousness that his being and acting had their specific origin.* In this connection we have to keep in mind that our own stand on that question is also clearly against any tendency to attribute absolute significance to consciousness. We want, however, to bring out and, so to speak, to expose the fact that consciousness constitutes a specific and unique *aspect in human action*” (Wojtyła, *Acting Person*, 30).

⁶¹ Wojtyła, *Acting Person*, 33; emphasis added.

Those things which are in the soul by their essence, are known through *experimental knowledge* in so far as through acts man has experience of their inward principles: thus we *perceive* the will when we are willing; and we *perceive* life in the vital operations.⁶²

Moreover, as we have seen, Wojtyła's claim regarding the nonintentional character of consciousness is directly dependent on Aquinas's distinction between the experiential perception of the act and the intentional and objectifying act of the intellect, whereby one reflects on the previous perception in order to attain the essence of the act already executed. Furthermore, Wojtyła speaks of concepts as the signifying contents one perceives in consciousness when reflecting upon them. And this is also dependent upon the Thomistic understanding of consciousness, and on the Thomistic understanding of concepts as formal signs, that is to say, signs that exhaust their being in signifying. Concepts are signs that represent something other than themselves, but they do so silently, without adverting to their own presence immediately.⁶³ For this reason, Wojtyła argues that consciousness receives all of its signifying contents from the outside, namely, from the operation of the intellect whereby one objectifies something intentionally, and apprehends its form as the form of another.⁶⁴ This allows for a realism that truly is 'transphenomenal' and that avoids Scheler's disturbing ethical conclusions.

⁶² "[I]lla quae sunt per essentiam sui in anima, cognoscuntur experimentali cognitione, in quantum homo experitur per actus principia intrinseca, sicut voluntatem percipimus volendo, et vitam in operibus vitae" (*STh* I-II, q. 112, a. 5, ad 1; emphasis added).

⁶³ "Species enim intelligibilis est quo intellectus intelligit, non id quod intelligit, nisi per reflexionem, in quantum intelligit se intelligere id quod intelligit" (*Q. D. de Anima*, q. un., a. 2, ad 5). Cf. Antonio Millán-Puelles, *Fundamentos de filosofía* (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 2001), 99.

⁶⁴ See Wojtyła, *Acting Person*, 35.

CONCLUSION

These reflections have elucidated the main coordinates of Wojtyła's Thomistic understanding of consciousness. In my judgment, while drawing on the sources mentioned above (Scheler, Aquinas, and John of the Cross), Wojtyła is original in his own theory of consciousness, especially in his distinction between the reflective and the reflexive functions. But his own thinking is always a renewal in the sources of tradition, and in continuity with those sources. Therefore, his originality differs radically from Kant's *sapere aude*.⁶⁵ In his own contribution, Wojtyła recuperates traditional elements that were either forgotten, or not seen together.

Obviously, the aspect of consciousness is but one aspect of that integral vision of the human person offered in *The Acting Person*. A similar study could be done on the other aspects (efficacy, transcendence, and integration in the person and between persons). Such a study would contribute to a better understanding of his philosophical anthropology as well as his theological views in *Man and Woman He Created Them*.

⁶⁵ As is known, Kant sums up with this motto the spirit of modernity, a spirit that Wojtyła does not share: "Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. *Sapere aude*. 'Have the courage to use your own reason!'—that is the motto of enlightenment" (Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment," trans. L. White Beck, in *On History*, ed. L. White Beck [New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963], 3).

ON THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THEOLOGY IN THE
SUMMA HALENSIS AND ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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“So now we accord faith to the things done in time for our sakes.” – Augustine, *De trinitate* 4.24

DOMINICAN AND FRANCISCAN views on “the nature of theology” are often pitted against one another. The Franciscan approach is seen as primarily practical rather than speculative, oriented toward the will or affect, Christocentric, attuned to history; the Dominican method is primarily speculative rather than practical, oriented toward the intellect, theocentric, attuned to being. Whatever the merit of such comparisons,¹ on the issue of the “subject matter” of theology—what theology is properly about, that is, its proper “object”—the positions adopted by the *Summa halensis*² (associated with,

¹ See Bruce Marshall’s helpful insight regarding their deeper similarity in “*Quod scit una vetula*: Aquinas on the Nature of Theology,” in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 6.

² Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologiae (Summa halensis)*, 4 vols. (Quaracchi, Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924-48). As Walter Principe explains, “an important theological work written after 1240, the so-called *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, was long thought to be Alexander’s own work. In recent decades, however, scholarly opinion has concluded that, however great the influence of Alexander on the composition of this *Summa*, his own authentic teaching must be sought in the *Glossa* and in his *Quaestiones* rather than in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*” (Walter H. Principe, *Alexander Hales’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union* [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1967], 15). Nevertheless, since it is still assumed that much of it is

though not exclusively authored by, Alexander of Hales,³ and the earliest theoretical treatment on the Franciscan side)⁴ and Thomas Aquinas exhibit a remarkable degree of agreement, despite *prime facie* appearances to the contrary. Specifically, the *Halensian* definition makes explicit what remains rather more implicit for Thomas, namely, the affirmation that theological science has as its “formal object” (*ratio*) the Christ-centered, self-revelation of the Trinity in salvation history, as recorded in Scripture.⁵

I. THE FORMAL OBJECT IN THE *SUMMA HALENSIS*: TRINITY REVEALED IN CHRIST’S “WORKS OF RESTORATION”

The *Summa halensis* begins its discussion of what theological science is by distinguishing broadly three dimensions or “valences” of theology.⁶ It “comes forth from God” (*ex Deo*)

Alexander’s actual writing and as a whole it reflects his influence—and thus is thoroughly Halensian—we will refer to this text throughout as the *Summa halensis*.

³ For background on Alexander see V. Doucet in, Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quattuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi XII–XV (Quaracchi, 1951–57), 1.7*–75*.

⁴ As “founder of the Franciscan school,” Alexander “gave the school its body of teachings and its characteristic spirit” (Jacques Guy Bougerol, *Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure* [Patterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1963], 15). “Among the earliest scholastics to engage Aristotle’s newly translated writings, in particular, the *Metaphysics*,” he had a profound effect on the evolution of Scholastic theology in the second quarter of his century, and certainly ranks among the scholastic luminaries of the entire thirteenth (Christopher M. Cullen, “Alexander of Hales,” in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone [Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2002], 104).

⁵ The topic of this investigation falls within a larger question, often dubbed “the nature of theology” and in particular its scientific and sapiential status, much discussed by medieval Scholastics and even more by their subsequent commentators and researchers. On this topic, M.-D. Chenu’s classic *La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1957) considers the relationship between the *Summa halensis* and Thomas on the issue of the scientific character of theology, but does not treat the particular comparison pursued here; the case is similar with A. Oliva’s *Les débuts de l’enseignement de Thomas d’Aquin et sa conception de la “sacra doctrina”* (Paris, 2006).

⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Gloss in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum*, l. 3, d. 23: 7. “To believe is ‘from Christ’ (*Christo*) as efficient cause, and ‘to Christ’ (*Christum*) as object and ‘in Christ’ as end.”

and “leads back to God” (*ad Deum*)—an *exitus-reditus* dynamic redolent of the structure of Thomas’s *Summa theologiae*.⁷ Inserted between these, though, is the claim that theology is also “about God” (*de Deo*).⁸ Significantly, the *Summa halensis* likens this dimension of theology to what it calls “first philosophy or metaphysics,” which considers the “cause of causes.” But, just as significantly, the *Summa halensis* notes that the comparison “limps,” for while both philosophy and theology are “about God,” unlike metaphysics, theology considers God as “the mystery of the Trinity” and according “to the sacrament of human salvation” (*sacramentum humanae reparationis*), this last phrase especially signaling a crucial theme of Halensian theology.

This portentous comparison between theology and philosophy will return, but first the *Summa halensis* distinguishes between two different ways in which theology can be “about” God: *circa quam* and *de qua*.⁹ The subject matter (*materia*) “*circa quam*” of a science is everything that it treats or considers, while the subject matter (*materia*) “*de qua*” is its principal intention (*principalis intentio*).¹⁰ The difference might be captured in the phrases “what it considers or discusses” (*circa quam*) and “what it is principally about” (*de qua*),¹¹ or as Donneaud puts it, *l’objet concerné* and the *l’objet d’intention*.¹²

⁷ Since Chenu made this claim about the *Summa theologiae* in 1964, there has been considerable debate about this. See Guy Mansini, “Tight Neo-Platonist Henology and Slack Christian Ontology: Christianity as an Imperfect Neo-Platonism,” *Nova et Vetera* [English ed.] 8 (2010): 593-611.

⁸ *Summa halensis*, q. 1, c. 2 (Quaracchi ed., 1:5). For the same *a Deo–de Deo–ad Deum* distinction, see Blanco’s edition and study of questions on this very topic (“La quaestio *De doctrina theologiae* del ms. Vat. Lat. 782: Introducción y edición,” ed. F. Chavero Blanco, *Carthaginensia* 15 [1999]: 49-72, at 56).

⁹ *Summa halensis*, q. 1, c. 3 (Quaracchi ed., 1:6): “Materia dupliciter accipitur in scientiis: de qua et circa quam.”

¹⁰ *Summa halensis*, q. 1, c. 3, ad 3 (Quaracchi ed., 1:6-7).

¹¹ In his *Théologie et intelligence de la foi* (Paris: Parole et silence, 2006), Henry Donneaud offers a brief expository description of the *Summa halensis*’s discussion of “le sujet de la Théologie” (149-52), but does not consider the specific question at issue here.

¹² *Ibid.*, 52.

Regardless, it is the latter sense that primarily interests the *Summa halensis*. So what is the principal intention or “*de qua*” subject matter of theology? What is theology primarily about? In order to answer this question, the *Summa halensis* considers three different twelfth-century answers to this question: Is it “signs and things” as the Lombard had claimed, following Augustine? Or is it “the whole Christ, Head and Body, Christ and the Church,” as apparently held by Robert of Melun and others,¹³ and later embraced by Robert Grosseteste,¹⁴ Robert Kilwardby, and even Bonaventure?¹⁵ Or, as Hugh of St. Victor argued, is it the “works of restoration,” that is, salvation history, centered on the incarnate and crucified Christ? The evaluation of these proposals in the *Summa halensis* is shaped by the above-noted analogy between theology and philosophy, and the attempt to push the similarity as far as possible. For this reason, as will be apparent presently, the *Summa halensis* finds these twelfth-century proposals, as stated, to be insufficient and seems to set them aside.

The *Summa halensis* begins to formulate its own answer to the question by describing how the distinction between *circa quam* and *de qua* subject matter functions within Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics:

The subject matter which [First Philosophy] is about (*circa*) [i.e., what it considers] is everything—whence it is said to concern all things, since it considers being (*circa ens*), according to its every difference, according to the different divisions of being, namely, being in potency, being in act, being as one and many, being as subject and accident, and so on—but the matter, about which (*de*) is its intention, is being as one in act, which is the first substance, on which all beings depend.¹⁶

¹³ See James McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste*, Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 136.

¹⁴ For a nuanced account of how Grosseteste handled this issue, see James R. Ginther, *Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste*, ca. 1229/30-1235 (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2004), chap. 3.

¹⁵ See J. Weisheipl, “The Meaning of ‘*Sacra Doctrina*’ in *Summa Theologiae* 1 q. 1,” *The Thomist* 38 (1934): 75.

¹⁶ *Summa halensis*, intro., q. 1, c. 3, ad 3 (Quaracchi ed., 1:6-7): “Quemadmodum est dicere de Philosophia Prima quod materia circa quam est sunt omnia unde et dicitur esse de omnibus, quia est circa ens secundum omnem sui differentiam, secundum

To paraphrase: while the *circa quam* subject matter of metaphysics is all beings, its principal intention or *de qua* subject matter is being itself (*esse*), or “first being” (*ens primum*). Pursuing an analogy with theology, the *Summa halensis* claims that theology’s *de qua* subject matter is God. So, its initial response, singling out Hugh of St. Victor’s proposal in particular, is to object thus:

To the contrary . . . theology is a science about [*de*] God; so, it is a science about [*de*] the cause of [emphasis added] the works of both creation and restoration. The subject of sacred Scripture is thus not “the works of restoration,” but rather their cause itself, i.e., God.¹⁷

The principal (i.e., *de qua*) subject matter of theology must be God, and the Victorine proposal,¹⁸ along with the others from the twelfth century, seems to be abandoned.

But here the analogy with Aristotelian metaphysics breaks down, as the *Summa halensis* well knows. It notes that Aristotle had also claimed that “A single science is one whose domain is a single genus, whose parts and essential properties it considers *per se*.”¹⁹ Accordingly, every genuine science must not only have

differentes divisiones entis, scilicet ens potentia, ens actu, ens unum et multa, ens substantia et accidens, et hujusmodi materia vero de qua intentio, est ens actu unum, quod est substantia prima, a qua omnia dependent.” See also *De doctrina theologiae* (Vat. Lat. 782), member III.9 (Chavero Blanco, ed., 55-56): “First Philosophy is said to be about all things, since it is about being (*ente*), to which all things are reduced; for it considers being (*ens*) according to common intentions and first of all in so far as it is divided into being in potency and being in act, and one and many, in substance and accidents; yet principally its *materia* is substance (*substantia*) and chiefly the first substance on which all beings depend.”

¹⁷ *Summa halensis*, intro., q. 1, c. 3, I. 2 (Quaracchi ed., 1:5): “Theologia est scientia de Deo; ergo est scientia de causa operum conditionis et reparationis; non igitur materia divinarum Scripturarum erunt opera reparationis, sed magis ipsa causa, quae Deus est.”

¹⁸ Elisabeth Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte: Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halesiana* (Munich: Max Huber Verlag, 1964), 26: “Nevertheless, in the definition of the subject matter of theology in the *Summa Halesiana* the salvation-historical does not stand on the same level as with Hugh of St. Victor, since the *divina substantia* as such stands now in the forefront of knowledge, while before [with Hugh] it had primarily to do with the knowledge of God’s salvation-historical action toward human beings.”

¹⁹ Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1.28 (trans. G. R. G. Mure, 1928).

one principal (*de qua*) subject matter, but it must also have essential (that is, *per se*) knowledge of that object, and then be able to analyze it according to its essential properties and parts. The *Summa halensis* recognizes, though, that that theologian does not have the benefit of an essential definition of God, with regard to “the mystery of the Trinity.” Citing the above text from Aristotle, it thus argues that theology must take a different tack: with respect to “the very divinity and Trinity of persons,” in theology “there is another way of knowing.” In fact, it is the inverse of the Aristotelian. Rather than beginning with a known essence and analyzing its essential characteristics, the theologian must begin with revealed characteristics and reason back to the divine essence. Citing the authority of Dionysius (whose corpus was undergoing a revival of interest in the first half of the thirteenth century), the *Summa halensis* puts it thus:

The “subject about which” [*de qua*] can be taken in three ways, according to the words of Dionysius in *The Celestial Hierarchy*: “All understanding of the divine is divided by the heavenly intelligence into three: essence, power, and activity.” According to this, if we take the subject of sacred Scripture in the sense of (1) “activity,” we can say that it is “the works of restoration” of humankind. If, however, we take the subject of sacred Scripture in the sense of (2) “power,” we shall say that it is Christ, who is “God’s power and God’s wisdom” (1 Cor 1:24). If, finally, we take the subject of sacred Scripture in the sense of (3) “essence,” we shall say that it is God, or the divine substance. Whence, for this reason, theology is a science about [de] the divine substance which must be cognized through Christ in the works of restoration.” (Emphasis added)²⁰

²⁰ *Summa halensis*, intro., q. 1, c. 3, resp. (Quaracchi ed., 1:6): “‘Materia de qua’ potest assignari tripliciter, secundum illud B. Dionysii, in Hierarchia angelica: ‘In tria dividuntur supermundana ratione omnes divini intellectus: in essentiam, virtutem et operationem.’ Secundum hoc ergo, si assignemus materiam divinarum Scripturarum secundum rationem operationis, dicemus quod materia divinarum Scripturarum sunt opera reparationis humani generis. Si vero assignemus materiam divinarum Scripturarum secundum rationem virtutis, dicemus quod materia divinarum Scripturarum est Christus, qui est Dei virtus et Dei sapientia, I Cor. 1,24. Si vero assignemus materiam divinarum Scripturarum secundum rationem essentiae, dicemus quod materia divinarum Scripturarum est Deus sive divina substantia. Unde secundum hoc Theologia est scientia de substantia divina cognoscenda per Christum in opere reparationis.” See also *De doctrina theologiae* (Vat. Lat. 782) (Chavero Blanco, ed., 27): member III.8: “According to some, the *materia* of theology is assigned doubly: namely,

So theology must proceed from knowledge of divine action to knowledge of divine power, and then to knowledge of the divine substance itself,²¹ “so that we might know power through operation, and through that power, the very substance of divinity, Rom. 1:20: ‘*For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. His eternal power also and divinity.*’”²²

The significance of this passage is perhaps not immediately evident. Deploying the Dionysian triad of essence-power-activity, the *Summa halensis* seems initially to be designating three different foci or subject matters of theology, which seem simply juxtaposed or conjoined on equal footing with one another. That is, considering divine activity, the subject matter is the works of restoration; considering divine power, it is Christ; considering the divine essence, it is God. At first glance the formula seems to be an unwieldy amalgamation of disparate elements. But it can be argued that the final, summarizing sentence (italicized above), which turns out to be the technical “Halensian definition of theology,” is in fact a synthesis of these three elements into a particular ordered relationship. As in Aristotelian metaphysics (according to the Halensian treatment),

the *materia* about which (*de qua*) and the *materia* around which (*circa quam*). The *materia de qua* is assigned by a threefold reason or difference, namely, of essence, of power and of operation, according to that text of Dionysius in *The Celestial Hierarchy*: ‘all divine understanding is divided into three by a super-mundane reason’: in essence, power (*virtus*), and operation. The *materia* of divine Scripture, therefore, according to the reason of operation, are the works of reparation (*opera reparacionis*); according to the reason of power [the *materia* of divine Scripture] is Christ, ‘the power and wisdom of God’ (I Cor 1:24); according to the reason of essence [the *materia* of divine Scripture] is God or the divine essence. Theology is thus the science (*sciencia*) of the divine essence, which must be understood (*cognoscenda*) through Christ in the works of reparation. The *materia circa quam* is determined by things and signs, and in this way is said to be about all things.”

²¹ In his *Quaestiones disputatae antequam esset Frater*, Alexander of Hales makes the same point: “Inter haec tria enim, essentia, potentia, et operatio, notior nobis est operatio: per operationem enim venimus in cognitionem potentiae, et per potentiam in cognitionem essentiae” (Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae ‘antequam esset frater,’* Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica medii aevi, vols. 19-21 [Quaracchi, Florence: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1960], q. 45, n. 31 [20:771]).

²² *Summa halensis*, intro., q. 1, c. 1, ad 4 (Quaracchi ed., 1:3-4).

the principal subject matter of theology must be the first substance, the highest cause; unlike metaphysics, though, this first substance is the triune God. This is the *Summa halensis*'s innovation over the twelfth-century proposals, in light of which it finds them inadequate. Yet it does not reject them entirely. In particular, it singles out the Victorine proposal for a specific purpose.²³ In light of theology's necessarily unique "way of knowing," which begins with divine activity *ad extra*, the *Summa halensis* makes the Christological "works of restoration" crucial to its definition of theology.

How exactly do these Christ-centered acts of God in salvation history function in theology? If, as just noted, the mystery of the Trinity itself is the proper subject matter of theology, what role does divine activity *ad extra* play? Intriguingly, the *Summa halensis* seems to pursue further a certain analogy with Aristotelian metaphysics, introducing the notion of a *ratio* of a science, namely, the aspect or respect under which something is perceived or known. This is often translated as the "formality" or "formal object" of a science. So, just as metaphysics treats all existing things from the perspective of being itself, insofar as they have being and under that aspect, such that being (*esse*) is its *ratio*, so theology proceeds analogously:

Even if, therefore, [theology] considers all things, yet [it does not do so] according to all their different *rationes*, but according to one *ratio*, which is so that humanity, renewed through the sacraments of the Incarnation . . . may, through things to be used, discover the things to be enjoyed: the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the immutable good.²⁴

²³ It seems noteworthy that the *Summa halensis* does not attempt to salvage the other twelfth-century options—neither the Lombardian "signs and things" nor the "whole Christ" of Robert of Melun—in the same way. Rather, it relegates these to the category of the *circa quam*—that which theology treats, not what it is about.

²⁴ *Summa halensis*, q. 1, c. 3, ad 5 (Quaracchi ed., 1:7): "etsi agat de omnibus, non tamen secundum rationes diferentes omnium, sed secundum unam rationem, quae est ut homo reparatus per sacramenta incarnationis, quae est res inter fruenda et utenda constituta, per utenda perveniat ad fruenda, quae sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, incommutabile bonum" (my thanks to James R. Ginther for correcting my initial translation of this text).

Theological science has a single *ratio*, a single, unifying “formality” under, or through, or from the perspective of which it considers all that it treats or discusses, but especially through which it treats its principal, *de qua*, subject matter, namely, the Trinity *in se*. As if for emphasis, the passage concludes by repeating that theology treats its principal object, “not in every way or according to every *ratio*, but according to its own mode and *ratio*, as was said.”²⁵

Combining these two texts, we might say that theology’s formal object (*ratio*) is the revelation of the Trinity’s salvation-historical *activity*, revealing especially divine *power*, in the Incarnation.²⁶ The Christ-centered works of restoration are thus not a specific set of things or items theology knows, but the means by which, or the light in which, it knows the Trinity. In the words of the *Summa halensis*, the Trinitarian divine substance “must be known through Christ in the works of restoration” (*cognoscenda per Christum in opere reparationis*).²⁷

At this point, it may be helpful to summarize. First, the *Summa halensis* affirms that the triune God *in se* is the proper and principal subject matter of theology. Just as metaphysics considers many, indeed all beings, yet its principal subject matter is being *qua* being, so theology considers many things (*circa quam*), but its principal *de qua* subject matter is the Trinity. This appears to introduce a genuinely speculative aspect to the Halensian notion of theology, which at least complicates the standard view of Franciscan theology as primarily practical rather than speculative.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Of course, grace is necessary for this knowledge of the Incarnation and of the Trinity through divine activity *ad extra*: “To that which was objected, that one can arrive cognition of God through [divine] operations, I say that this is true sometimes; but for the comprehending of the Trinity or the Incarnation, no one can arrive [at cognition] through some [divine] operation without grace; for reason does not have the power for this” (*Quaestiones disputate*, q. 13, n. 17 [Quaracchi ed., 19:167]).

²⁷ Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte*, 25 “Theology, according to the *SfA*, deals thus with the knowledge of the divine being [*Wesenserkenntnis*] of the Trinitarian God, known through Christ in his saving work [*Erlösungswerk*], though one must take the *opus restaurationis* more in the broad sense that Hugh of St. Victor gave it.”

Second, the Christocentric “works of restoration” do not function here as additional parts of the proper subject matter of theology; they are not merely other things that theology considers (*circa quam*) in addition to God. Nor are they simply the basis on which theology speculates about God.²⁸ Rather, they are the formality (*ratio*) under which the Trinity is known speculatively. That is, they are tantamount to revelation. The *Summa halensis* says, as noted, that “the *materia de qua* of sacred Scripture is the divine substance, which *must be* known *through* Christ, *in* the work of restoration” (emphasis added).²⁹ To paraphrase: the principal *de qua* subject matter is the Trinity insofar as the Trinity is revealed in the saving work of Christ. Elsewhere the *Summa halensis* says as much: “the highest cause, i.e., God, is revealed [*declaratur*] through the work of restoration, through the power of Christ, so that we might know in the *work*, power, and in the *power, divinity*.”³⁰

It may be helpful, by way of contrast, to note how Bonaventure handles the issue in his brief “summa” of theology, the *Breviloquium*:

From this it is evident that theology, though admittedly broad and varied in matter, is nevertheless a single science. Its subject, as that from which all things come, is God; as that through which all things exist, Christ; as that for which all things are done, the work of restoration; as that by which all things are united, the one bond of love joining heaven and earth; as that with which the whole content of the canonical books is concerned, the body of faith as

²⁸ In his *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, Donneaud notes correctly that “Christ is well integrated into the definition of the subject of theology,” but he seems to underplay the role of Christ when he adds “but secondary in relation to God, as the medium through which God is known” (150). Two points should be stressed in response. First, Donneaud omits altogether the Victorine notion of “works of restoration,” which the *Summa halensis* links inseparably to Christ in this discussion. Second, it is not sufficient to call Christ merely the medium of divine self-revelation. Rather, the *Summa halensis*’s notion of a formality or formal object (*ratio*) makes Christ and the “works of restoration” a genuine dimension of the very object or subject matter of theology.

²⁹ *Summa halensis*, intro., q. 1, c. 3, ad 3 (Quaracchi ed., 1:6-7): “Materia vero de qua est sacra Scriptura est divina substantia cognoscenda per Christum in opere reparationis.”

³⁰ *Summa halensis*, intro., q. 1, c. 3, ad 2 (Quaracchi ed., 1:6): “quia summa causa, quae Deus est, declaratur per opus reparationis, per virtutem Christum.”

such; as that with which all the books of the commentaries are concerned, the body of faith as intelligible. (Trans. emended; emphasis added)³¹

As the added emphases show, Bonaventure's "definition" of theology has much in common with the *Summa halensis* (and some form of direct dependence seems likely), beginning with God *in se* before moving on to Christ and the works of restoration, as well as to other things. But by contrast, the Seraphic Doctor seems merely to list, without any formal interrelation, these various things that theological science considers as its possible subject matter.³²

Third, the *Summa halensis* introduces, not only the notion of a *ratio*, but the corresponding distinction between formal and material objects in theology. As metaphysics treats the "cause of causes" or "first being" (*ens primum*) as its principal material object (and other all kinds of beings secondarily), but treats all these *qua* being, that is, insofar as they stand under the *ratio* of *esse*, so theology operates similarly. For the *Summa halensis*, theology is a science with a principal, material object, the triune God, and a formal object by which the Trinity is known, namely, as revealed in Christ-centered salvation history.³³

II. DIVINE ACTIVITY, POWER, ESSENCE IN GREGORY OF NYSSA

Before looking at Thomas on this matter, it may be illuminating to glance (all too briefly) at a single patristic precedent to

³¹ *Breviloquium* 1.1.4 (trans. Dominic V. Monti, Works of St. Bonaventure 9 [St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 2005], 29).

³² The case is similar in this text from the prologue of the *Breviloquium*, 4.2: "It is appropriate [that Scripture should have this three-fold sense over and above the literal sense] to [Scripture's] subject matter which deals with God, with Christ, with the works of redemption, and with the content of belief. In terms of its substance, its subject is God; in terms of its virtue, Christ; in terms of the action described, the works of redemption; and in terms of all these together, the content of belief" (Monti, trans., 14).

³³ See *De doctrina theologiae* (Vat. Lat. 782), member III.9 (Chavero Blanco, ed., 58): "Similarly, we ourselves can say that theology first of all is about (*de*) God, [and] about other things according to common intentions, namely, insofar as they are the works of God (*opera Dei*) and insofar as they are the ways (*viae*) to cognizing and possessing God; and in this way they fall into the *ratio* of the intelligible (*in rationem intelligibilis*)."

this medieval discussion, namely, that found in Gregory of Nyssa. Familiarity with Gregory's theology may have sparked interest in the intriguing constellation of terms from the Dionysian corpus, on to which Alexander latched: divine essence, power, activity. In his debate with Eunomius, Gregory critiqued the Eunomian claim to grasp and comprehend the very essence of God through the notion of unbegottenness (*agen[n]ētos*). Yet Gregory does not thereby relinquish all claims to genuine knowledge of God. Rather, he posits an unbreakable link, visible in the Dionysian text above, between the divine essence (οὐσία) *ad intra* and the common divine power (δύναμις) and activity (ἐπιτήδευμα) or energy (ἐνέργεια) of the three persons *ad extra*, a link that secures genuine (though not comprehensive or exhaustive) knowledge of (perhaps better, encounter or engagement with) the Trinity. Especially in his short work *To Ablabius*, Gregory insists on this particular epistemic relationship between experience of economic activity and knowledge of the immanent essence.³⁴ As Khaled Anatolios has noted in this regard, “[o]ur knowledge of God,” for Gregory, “is gained not from our capacity to identify and noetically ‘encompass’ the divine nature but rather from our perception of the ‘activities’ (*energeiai*) of the transcendent divine ‘power’ (*dynamis*).”³⁵ This may well be one of Gregory's most important contributions to Christian theology, since “perhaps more profoundly than any modern theologian, Gregory of Nyssa offers the most thoroughgoing explanation of why it must be that we only encounter the Trinity through the trinitarian economy.”³⁶

³⁴ Anatolios sums up Gregory's theological epistemology, with its crucial linking of the divine nature (*physis*) and activity (*energeiai*): “we can only encounter the divine nature in its active outwardness, but we cannot supplant its own innermost act of self-standing, which is the source of its outward self-presencing” (Khaled Anatolios, *Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian Dogma* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2011], 230).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 229. See also Michele Barnes, *The Power of God: “Dynamis” in Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001).

³⁶ Anatolios, *Retrieving Nicaea*, 230.

Given the probable influence of Gregory of Nyssa on the Dionysian corpus, it is tantalizing to ponder the possibility of the *Summa halensis* latching onto this Nyssan notion, via Dionysius, in order to articulate its conception of theological science. Be that as it may, what is noteworthy here is not merely an interesting and perhaps underappreciated link between patristic and Scholastic theology—an example indeed of the way in which medieval Scholastics everywhere presumed and built upon the achievements of their patristic forebears. Of equal if not greater significance is the fact that the *Summa halensis* offers a Scholastic refinement and development of this Nyssan-Dionysian notion by making divine activity *ad extra* not simply the basis for Trinitarian speculation *ad intra*, but integral to the proper “subject matter” of theology, as the “formal object” (*ratio*) of theology,³⁷ viewed now as a science in an Aristotelian framework.

III. THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE NATURE OF THEOLOGY

The Halensian *cum* Nyssan-Dionysian view of theology acquires additional interest when compared with that of St. Thomas Aquinas. The value of this comparison is reciprocal, since it not only underscores the significance of the Halensian method, its possible influence, and the light it sheds on the mid-thirteenth-century discussion at Paris, but also highlights an underappreciated dimension of Thomas’s own thought.

In question 1, article 4 of the prologue to book 1 of his *Scriptum* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, Thomas distinguishes three different senses in which the “subject matter” of theology might be understood.³⁸ The same threefold distinction is basically reproduced in the first question of the *Summa theologiae*, though divided between articles 3 and 7.

³⁷ Gössmann, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte*, 25: “Thus is the salvation-historical dimension taken directly into the definition of theology [*Gegenstandsbestimmung*]. It provides knowledge of the divine essence, not in the modest way of Aristotelian *prima philosophia*, but rather in its Trinitarian fullness.”

³⁸ I *Sent.*, pro., q. 1, a. 4: “I respond that ‘subject’ has at least three considerations [*comparationes*] with respect to science” (my translation).

For Thomas, the first meaning of subject matter is that which is principally intended, that is, the “principal material object.” This is what theology is properly about and in both works Thomas insists, as did the *Summa halensis*, that the principal material object is God:³⁹ “Sacred doctrine [treats] . . . of God primarily.”⁴⁰

Second, Thomas speaks of a *ratio* or formal consideration through which theology considers God in himself: that is, theology’s formality or formal aspect.⁴¹ In the *Scriptum*, he speaks rather tersely of the “inspiration of faith” (*inspirationem fidei*) as this *ratio*: “This science [i.e., theology] differs from all the other sciences in this, that it proceeds according to the inspiration of faith.”⁴² But this notion receives far more explicit attention in the *Summa theologiae*: “The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but rather with regard to a formal aspect of the object [*rationem formalem obiecti*].”⁴³ Again: “properly speaking, the object of a power or habit is the formality under which [*sub cuius ratione*] all things are related to that power or habit.”⁴⁴ In the *Summa*, Thomas offers the notion of “revelation” as the

³⁹ See *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7; and *I Sent.*, pro., q. 1, a. 4: “The second consideration is that the knowledge of the subject is principally attended to in a science. Hence, because this science is principally related to the knowledge of God, they argued that God is its subject.”

⁴⁰ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.

⁴¹ *STh* II-II, q. 2, a. 2: “two things can be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1). One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is ‘to believe in God’; since as stated above (q. 1, a. 1) nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is ‘to believe God,’ since, as stated above (q. 1, a. 1) the formal object of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent for Its sake to whatever he believes.”

⁴² *I Sent.*, pro., q. 1 a. 4: “Haec enim scientia in hoc ab omnibus aliis differt, quia per inspirationem fidei procedit.” In the edition of Thomas’s Prologue to the *Sentences* which Oliva produces, he does not comment on this sentence (see Oliva, *Les débuts de l’enseignement*, 328, ll. 32-34).

⁴³ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3: “Est enim unitas potentiae et habitus consideranda secundum obiectum, non quidem materialiter, sed secundum rationem formalem obiecti.”

⁴⁴ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7.

ratio or formality, seemingly equivalent to “inspiration” in the *Scriptum*: “because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed [*divinitus revelata*], whatever can be revealed by God [*divinitus revelabilia*] possesses the one *ratio* of a formal object [*una ratione formali obiecti*] of this science.”⁴⁵ The Dominican Thomist commentatorial tradition (following a comment in *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2) deployed a terminological distinction on this point between a “formal object *quo*” and a “formal object *quod*.”⁴⁶ The distinction can be explained as follows: “God as First Truth constitutes both the medium (the mediating formal object or formal object *quo*) and the distinct subject (the terminative formal object or formal object *quod*) of theological faith.”⁴⁷ The distinction here is between two distinct aspects of *how* God is known. God is known in the modality of that which (*quod*) is true (*verum*) or as the First Truth (*prima veritas*); this is the formal object *quod*. But God is known as First Truth only as divinely revealed, that is, as the divine light mediating the Truth which God is; this is the formal object *quo*.⁴⁸

Third, Thomas mentions all the other things which theology treats (what the *SH* called the *materia circa quam*) under their twelfth-century labels: “signs and things,” the “whole Christ,”

⁴⁵ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3: “Quia igitur sacra Scriptura considerat aliqua secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata, secundum quod dictum est, omnia quaecumque sunt divinitus revelabilia, communicant in una ratione formali obiecti huius scientiae.” Again, *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2: “treated of by this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation” (“considerare sub una ratione, in quantum scilicet sunt divinitus revelabilia”). My thanks to the anonymous reviewer who helpfully noted how the notion of *revelabilia* secures for Thomas the broadest possible scope for theological inquiry.

⁴⁶ See M.-M. Labourdette, O.P., “La vie théologique saint Thomas,” *Revue Thomiste* 58 (1958): 597-622, esp. 607-13.

⁴⁷ Reinhard Hütter, “Faith Enlightening Sacred Theology,” *The Thomist* 74 (2010): 369-405, at 399-400; see also Gregory F. LaNave, “Why Holiness Is Necessary for Theology: Some Thomistic Distinctions,” *The Thomist* 74 (2010): 440-41.

⁴⁸ On the commentatorial tradition on these distinctions, see R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *The One God*, chap. 1 (Ex Fontibus Company, 2005); and Romanus Cessario, O.P., *Christian Faith and the Theological Life* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 56-57 (my thanks to the anonymous reviewer for this reference and for the clarification regarding the formal object).

and the “works of restoration.”⁴⁹ Thomas rejects these as the primary subject matter of theology: “Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far as they are referable to God as their beginning or end.”⁵⁰ Thus he permits them to be considered as the subject matter of theology, in a secondary sense,⁵¹ insofar as they are related to God as their source and end or under the aspect of that relationship, that is, *sub ratione Dei*, as Thomas puts it in article 7 of question 1.⁵²

In sum, for Thomas, God is the principal material object of theology, known under the dual formality of divinely revealed (formal object *quo*) truth (formal object *quod*). As Thomas himself puts it: “the object of every cognitive habit includes two things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect (*formalis ratio*) of the object.”⁵³ Less technically, it might be said that, first and foremost, theology knows God as divinely revealed truth. Everything else that theology may consider (what the *SH* called the *materia circa quam*) is treated secondarily under that same formality of their revealed source and end in God.

⁴⁹ *I Sent.*, pro., q. 1, a. 4: “The first is that whatever things are in the science ought to be contained under the subject. Hence, those considering this condition posited things and signs to be the subject of this science; but some said the whole Christ, that is, head and members; in as much as whatever is treated in this science would seem to be reduced to this.”

⁵⁰ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.

⁵¹ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7: “Some, however, looking to what is treated in this science, and not to the *ratio* under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to be something other than God—that is, either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God” (“*Quidam vero, attendentes ad ea quae in ista scientia tractantur, et non ad rationem secundum quam considerantur, assignaverunt aliter subiectum huius scientiae, vel res et signa; vel opera reparationis; vel totum Christum, idest caput et membra. De omnibus enim istis tractatur in ista scientia, sed secundum ordinem ad Deum*”).

⁵² LaNave, “Why Holiness Is Necessary for Theology,” 440.

⁵³ *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 1: “*cuiuslibet cognoscitivi habitus obiectum duo habet, scilicet id quod materialiter cognoscitur, quod est sicut materiale obiectum; et id per quod cognoscitur, quod est formalis ratio obiecti.*”

As noted, the *Summa theologiae* spreads this discussion over different articles in question 1 of the *Prima pars*. Article 7 has the first sense, the principal material object, in view, along with the secondary material objects, but does not stress the formality of revelation: “In sacred science, all things are treated of under the aspect of God [*sub ratione Dei*]: either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science [*subiectum huius scientiae*].”⁵⁴ Article 3, on the other hand, as noted above, stresses explicitly the notion of revelation as the formality (formal object *quo*): “whatever can be revealed by God [*divinitus revelabilia*] possesses the one *ratio* of a formal object [*una ratione formali obiecti*] of this science.”⁵⁵ In the first question, then, Thomas does not bring together what we are calling the formal and material objects of theological science as explicitly as he might have. This perhaps has led to an insufficient appreciation of their unity. He does, however, unite them in the *Scriptum*, if rather tersely: “But if we wish to find a subject which comprehends all these, we can say that *the subject of this science is the divine being knowable through inspiration*” (emphasis added).⁵⁶ If “through inspiration” here is equivalent to “divinely revealed,” which seems likely, then we could restate the *Scriptum*’s formula in the *Summa*’s terms as follows: the principal material object or subject matter of theology is God, known through the formality or formal object of revelation.

⁵⁴ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7.

⁵⁵ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 3; cf. *ibid.*, ad 2.

⁵⁶ *I Sent.*, q. 1, a. 4: “Si autem volumus invenire subjectum quod haec omnia comprehendat, possumus dicere quod ens divinum cognoscibile per inspirationem est subjectum huius scientiae. Omnia enim quae in hac scientia considerantur, sunt aut Deus, aut ea quae ex Deo et ad Deum sunt, in quantum huiusmodi.” The last part—“all things which are considered in this science are either God, or those things which are from God [*ex Deo*] or [ordered] to God [*ad Deum*]”—is strikingly similar to the *Summa halensis*’s division of three “valences.” See *Summa halensis*, q. 1, c. 2 (Quaracchi ed., 1:5) “For all things which are considered in this science are either God, or those things which are from God [*ex Deo*] or [ordered] to God [*ad Deum*], in as much as they are this kind of thing.”

IV. COMPARING THE *SUMMA HALENSIS* AND THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE*

If this is the case, then a striking structural parallel emerges between this Thomistic formula and the Halensian formula noted above (“God, known through Christ in the works of restoration”). Both formulas unite a principal material object (i.e., God) with a principal formality through which the material object is known (i.e., revelation), the Halensian formula being more explicitly Christocentric.⁵⁷ It should also be noted that Thomas agrees with the *Summa halensis* that theology cannot “presuppose [knowledge of] the essence of God”; it must “make use of [God’s] effects, either of nature or of grace,” in place of a definition of the divine essence.⁵⁸ Or again: “through certain effects of the divine [activity], man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God.”⁵⁹ This clearly points to the need for revelation that both Alexander and Thomas affirm. The question is, what precisely and fully does Thomas mean by the formality (*ratio*) of *revelata*? Does it have any overlap with the Halensian formality?

Prime facie, the answer might seem to be clearly negative. In both the *Scriptum* and the *Summa*, Thomas quite explicitly sets aside both “Christ” and “the works of restoration” as candidates

⁵⁷ In this light, we might illustrate our argument by making explicit in Thomas’s statement in article 7 that which seems to be implied in its current form: “In sacred science, all things are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God Himself [*known through revelation*, as article 3 states] or because they refer to God as their beginning and end.”

⁵⁸ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7, obj. 1: “It seems that God is not the object of this science. For in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (*De fide orth.* 1.4): ‘It is impossible to define the essence of God.’ Therefore God is not the object of this science.” Thomas concedes the point in the reply to the objection: “Although we cannot know in what consists the essence of God, yet in this science we make use of His effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause.”

⁵⁹ *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 1: “per aliquos divinitatis effectus homo adiuvatur ad tendendum in divinam fruitionem.”

for the proper object or subject matter of theology.⁶⁰ In fact, as Joseph Wawrykow has poignantly pointed out, in the question on sacred doctrine in the *Summa*, “the focus remains squarely on God”—rather than Christ.⁶¹ Wawrykow notes that “Thomas prefers in q. 1 to talk of *God* revealing the truths necessary for salvation (a.1), of *God* providing the subject matter of sacred doctrine (a. 7), of *God* providing its formal unity (a. 3). Indeed . . . Thomas would seem to go out of his way to deny the importance of Christ.”⁶²

Nonetheless, the Halensian and Thomistic notions of the formality (*ratio*) of *revelata* or *revelabilia* are in fact quite similar.⁶³ It is useful to note the “strategic” references to Christ in the prologues of the various parts of the *Summa*. When at the

⁶⁰ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7: “Quidam vero, attendentes ad ea quae in ista scientia tractantur, et non ad rationem secundum quam considerantur, assignaverunt aliter subiectum huius scientiae, vel res et signa; vel opera reparationis; vel totum Christum, idest caput et membra. De omnibus enim istis tractatur in ista scientia, sed secundum ordinem ad Deum” (“Some, however, looking to what is treated in this science, and not to the formality under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to be something other than God—that is, either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God”).

⁶¹ See also Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 39: “Evidently the concern [in *ST* I, q. 1. a. 7] is to bring out the theocentricity of Christian doctrine.”

⁶² Joseph Wawrykow, “Wisdom in the Christology of Thomas Aquinas,” in Kent Emery, Jr., and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 189-90. On this question, see also Edward Schillebeeckx, *L'économie sacramentelle du salut: Réflexion théologique sur la doctrine sacramentaire de saint Thomas, à la lumière de la tradition et de la problématique sacramentelle contemporaine*, trans. Yvon van der Have (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2004 [1952]). Michel Corbin, *Le chemin de la théologie chez Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974); Eugene F. Rogers, Jr., *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Jean-Marc Laporte, “Christ in Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae*: Peripheral or Pervasive?” *The Thomist* 67 (2003): 221-48; Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Le Christ en ses mystères: La vie et l'oeuvre de Jésus selon saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 2 vols. (Paris: Desclée, 1999).

⁶³ In the remainder of his article, Wawrykow suggests reasons for the importance of Christ in Thomas’s conception of theology (Wawrykow, “Wisdom in the Christology of Thomas Aquinas,” 191ff.).

outset of entire *Summa* Thomas speaks of Christ as “our way of reaching God” (*STh* I, q. 2, proem.), and then refers, at the outset of the *Tertia pars*, to the knowledge of Christ as “the consummation of the whole enterprise of theology” (*STh* III, prol.), we may suggest a Christocentrism, wherein Christ is not only the way to the Father soteriologically, but also epistemically too—or better, refuse the dichotomy: Christ as the salvific way to God includes the knowledge he reveals of the Trinity.

Similarly, in his *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, Thomas stresses the Christological mediation of all knowledge of God, calling Christ “the root and fountain of our knowledge of God,”⁶⁴ and insisting that “no one can gain knowledge of the Father except by his Word, which is the Son.”⁶⁵ He then cites the so-called “Johannine thunderbolt” of Matthew 11:27—“No one knows the Father except the Son”—in order to conclude that:

just as when a man wants to reveal himself through the word of his heart, uttering it in audible sounds, he clothes his inner word with the garments of writing or of speech. And in the same way, God, wanting to disclose himself to men, reveals himself in flesh and in time by his Word which he conceives from eternity. And so no one can arrive at knowledge of the Father except through the Son.⁶⁶

These texts helpfully play up the sometimes neglected Christocentrism of Thomas’s theology, at least as it comes into view in this Gospel commentary. This raises an important consideration, pertaining to the issue of genre and method of proceeding. Gilles Emery has suggested that Thomas distinguishes “the pathway by which we discover the Trinity . . . from the way in which theological understanding lays out the revealed mystery.”⁶⁷ Thomas pursues the former in his biblical commentaries, especially on John’s Gospel, and also in the

⁶⁴ *In Ioan.* 17:25 (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of St. John*, Fabian R. Larcher, O.P. [Albany, N.Y.: Magi Books, Inc., 1998], no. 2267-68).

⁶⁵ *In Ioan.* 14:6 (Larcher, trans., no. 1847).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Emery, *Trinitarian Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, 9.

Summa contra Gentiles, while the latter is found in the *Summa theologiae*. In this light, it is intriguing to note the following from the *Commentary on John*:

[I]t is natural to man to know the power and the nature of things from their actions; and therefore our Lord fittingly says that the sort of person he is can be learned from the work he does. So since he performs divine works by his own power, we should believe that he has divine power within him.⁶⁸

It is striking that the same patristic pattern of moving from economic, divine activity to divine power, and then to the immanent divine nature, noted above in Gregory, Dionysius, and the *Summa halensis*, is apparent here too. As Emery explains, in “his biblical commentaries, in close contact with his patristic sources. . . . Thomas establishes the primary reality (the divinity of the persons) *on the basis of* the secondary reality” (emphasis added), namely, the activity of the persons in the economy of salvation.⁶⁹ In short, “the action of the persons in the economy leads to the discovery and disclosure of a truth concerning the Trinity itself.”⁷⁰ By contrast, Thomas’s “practice in the *Summa Theologiae* is to explain the secondary reality (our salvation) from the primary reality (the divinity of the Son and the Spirit).”⁷¹ In this light, then, the absence of explicit Christological and salvation-historical references may well be a function of genre and of typical Scholastic abbreviation, wherein what does not absolutely need to be made explicit is often left unsaid and simply assumed as read or as supplied by the reader. In the *Summa*, Thomas can simply refer to the formality of revelation, without needing to note the Christocentric, salvation-historical “shading” of his theological epistemology. Nonetheless, one can concur with Emery’s claim that “behind the *ordo disciplinae* of the *Summa*, Thomas was seriously concerned to recapture the patristic roots of

⁶⁸ *In Ioan.* 5:36 (no. 817); cited in Emery, *Trinitarian Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, 11).

⁶⁹ Emery, *Trinitarian Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, 13.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

Trinitarian doctrines and their foundation in the economy of salvation.”⁷²

However, the most useful point to make in this regard begins with a comment found in article 7 of question 1. After concluding that God is the principal material object of theology, Thomas adds the following: “This is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is about God [*de Deo*].”⁷³ His point seems to be that theology is about God, has God as its subject matter, in the same way as the articles of faith do.⁷⁴ So, how or in what sense are the articles of faith *de Deo*?

In his *ex professo* treatment of faith in the *Secunda secundae*, questions 1-5, Thomas distinguishes between God *in se*, under the title *prima veritas*, or First Truth, which in itself is absolutely simple, and the articles of faith, which are the composite and complex, linguistically formulated propositions about God (*de Deo*) that rational creatures must employ in order to have some form of genuine knowledge of God.⁷⁵ The articles of faith were widely understood by Thomas and his contemporaries as the authoritative summary of divine revelation found in Scripture (itself the *regula fidei* for Thomas).⁷⁶ Put simply, the articles are the “creeds, understood as a summary of Scripture.”⁷⁷

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ *STh* I, q. 1, a. 7.

⁷⁴ Joseph Goering, “Christ in Dominican Catechesis,” in Emery and Wawrykow, eds., *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans*, 127ff. The notion of the “articles of faith” originated in the twelfth century, but only received serious attention beginning in the early thirteenth century.

⁷⁵ *ST* II-II, q. 1, a. 2: “the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in I, 85, 5. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity.”

⁷⁶ Bruce D. Marshall, “Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian,” *The Thomist* 53 (1989): 353-406, at 375: “The articles of faith in turn function as the linguistic embodiment of faith’s formal object only insofar as they express the central content of Scripture, which is itself the *regula fidei*.”

⁷⁷ Marshall, “Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian,” 374.

Faith, for Thomas, has both of these as its object: on the one hand, “as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of faith is something simple, namely [God, the First Truth]”; on the other hand, “as regards the believer, and in this respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition,” namely, the articles of faith.⁷⁸ As Bruce Marshall has noted, the “object of faith takes the shape for us of an assortment of mutually fit propositions, which Thomas calls the articles of faith.”⁷⁹ Thus, the object of faith “has a definite and distinctive content: God the *prima veritas*, as revealed in the language of Scripture and creed” and distilled propositionally in the articles of faith.⁸⁰

For Thomas, moreover, these two objects are linked together by the notion of revelation. The First Truth’s self-revelation to rational creatures occurs through the medium of the articles of faith; that is, the articles mediate the First Truth’s self-disclosure. As Thomas puts it: “if we consider . . . the formal aspect of the object [*formalem rationem obiecti*], it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything [that is, to any particular article of faith], except because it is revealed by God [*a Deo revelatum*].”⁸¹ Or again: “the formal object [*formale obiectum*] of faith is the First Truth *insofar as it is manifested* in the Sacred Scriptures and in the doctrine of the Church which proceeds from the First Truth” (emphasis added).⁸² (In both of these texts, the commentatorial tradition’s distinction between the

⁷⁸ *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 2.

⁷⁹ Marshall, “Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian,” 375. See *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 6: “Matters of Christian faith [*credibilia fidei Christianae*] are said to be distinguished into articles insofar as they are divided into certain parts having a mutual fitness.”

⁸⁰ Marshall, “Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian,” 375: “For Thomas, the truth of the faith is contained in Holy Scripture diffusively and in various ways, some of which are obscure. Hence it often requires dedicated and prolonged study to draw out (*eliciendum*) the truth of the faith from Scripture. The teachings of Holy Scripture needed to be summarily collected and put forth in a clear manner so that all the people might believe them. Indeed, says Thomas, “[The Creed] is not added to Holy Scripture, but rather is taken up (*sumptum*) from Holy Scripture.”

⁸¹ *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 1.

⁸² *STh* II-II, q. 5, a. 3.

“formal object *quod*,” God as First Truth, and the “formal object *quo*,” having been divinely revealed, is readily apparent.) As is evident, Thomas bundles the *prima veritas* and the articles of faith together under the label “formal object” or the “formal aspect of the object” of faith.

From the perspective of the *Summa halensis*, one might argue that the relationship between the First Truth and the articles of faith should be seen as bivalent or reciprocal. On the one hand, in a way that the *Summa halensis* does not seem to touch on at all, Thomas sees the First Truth functioning as the formality (“formal object *quo*”) or formal aspect (*ratio formalis*) in relationship to the articles of faith. That is, the articles themselves are believed and thus known materially in the light of, or on the basis of, their relationship to the First Truth. That is, seen in the light of the First Truth the articles of faith acquire a certain luminosity and credibility for faith. In this way, the *prima veritas* is the “that whereby”⁸³ the articles are known. This is what Thomas seems to have in mind here: “faith adheres to all the articles of faith by reason of one medium [*unum medium*], viz. on account of the First Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the Church who has the right understanding of them.”⁸⁴ Or here: “The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken . . . on the part of the thing believed, and thus there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.”⁸⁵

On the other hand, in a manner strikingly similar to the *Summa halensis*, the relationship for Thomas runs the other way. From the perspective of the wayfaring believer (*quoad nos*, that is), theological science has knowledge of its proper and primary object (viz., the Trinity) via the articles of faith. That is, reversing the statement above, the articles of faith function as the formality (a kind of “formal object *quo*”) or formal aspect (*ratio formalis*), in relationship to the First Truth. The articles

⁸³ *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 1.

⁸⁴ *STh* II-II, q. 5, a. 3, ad 2.

⁸⁵ *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2.

are the “that whereby”⁸⁶ the First Truth is known by faith in this life. Thomas seems to imply as much when he says, as quoted above, that “the formal object [*formale obiectum*] of faith is the First Truth *insofar as it is manifested* in the Sacred Scriptures and in the doctrine of the Church” (emphasis added).⁸⁷

At one point in the discussion of faith, Thomas brings together these two valences in the object of faith in an elegantly limpid statement:

Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.⁸⁸

Here, what the *Summa halensis* called “Christ and the works of restoration” Thomas describes as Christ, sacraments, and creatures. On the one hand, their credibility is secured by the *prima veritas*; on the other hand, they themselves provide noetic access to God.

The significance of all this is not far to seek. As the text just quoted demonstrates, precisely as derived from and thus as a summary of Scripture, the articles of faith are arguably a summary of salvation history centered on Christ. In Halensian terms, they recount Christ and “the works of restoration.” That this is the case for Thomas can be inferred from the fact that in 3 of the 5 works where he discusses the articles of faith (*Compendium theologiae*, *Expositio primae decretalis*, *Lenten Collationes*) he divides them into those that treat of the humanity of *Christ* and those that deal with the divinity of *Christ*, thus giving all the articles a Christological “shading.” In another place he even refers to Christ himself as the “*prima veritas*.”⁸⁹ At one point in the *Summa*, by contrast, he refers to

⁸⁶ *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 1.

⁸⁷ *STh* II-II, q. 5, a. 3.

⁸⁸ *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

⁸⁹ *Quodl.* II, q. 4, a. 1, sed contra [3]: “Human beings are obligated to believe the first truth more than to believe visible signs. But while Christ might have done no miracles nevertheless he, being true God, was the *prima veritas*. Therefore even if he

those that pertain to the “divine majesty” and those that pertain to Christ’s humanity,⁹⁰ perhaps giving the (false) impression that the latter might not be the formal aspect of the former. Just a few articles later in the same question, though, Thomas brings the two together in a striking comment that confirms our argument:

Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation, by *Whom we have access* to the glory of the sons of God, according to Rm. 5:2. Hence it is written (Jn. 17:3): *This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.* Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ’s human nature, which is the *mystery of godliness* (1 Tim. 3:16).⁹¹

Thomas’s insistence on the eternal mediating role of the humanity of Christ in granting access to beatific knowledge of the divinity confirms his deep Christocentrism.

If for Thomas, as suggested here, the formality of revelation, on the side of the human knower, can be identified with the articles of faith, themselves Christocentric and derived from salvation history as recorded in Scripture,⁹² then there seems to be a significant, perhaps surprising degree of agreement between the Halensian and Thomistic views on theology’s material and formal objects, and indeed the very nature of theology itself. Put simply, the claim advanced here is that the Thomist notion of a “mediating formal object, or formal object *quo*” of human knowledge of God, should be expanded or “unpacked” in the manner of the *Summa halensis*’s definition of theology: a science about God, who must be cognized through Christ in the works of restoration.⁹³

had done no miracles he would still have to be believed.” See *STh* III, q. 43, a. 1, ad 3; *In Ioan.* 1:14 (no. 188); 1:17, no. 207.

⁹⁰ *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 5: “some [of the matters of Christian faith] pertain to the divine majesty, some pertain to the mystery of the humanity of Christ.”

⁹¹ *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 8.

⁹² *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 9.

⁹³ *Summa halensis*, intro., q. 1, c. 3, resp.

CONCLUSION

In an important article on the “articles of faith” in the Middle Ages, Joseph Goering asks: “How should we make sense of the impression that Christ was relatively unimportant in medieval Dominican theology? Surely this once-widely-held opinion is not simply perverse and without any basis in the medieval evidence.”⁹⁴ Perhaps the benefit of viewing Thomas and the *Summa halensis* side by side is to make more apparent the Christological dimension of Thomas’s discussion of the nature of theology and thus to help alleviate this false impression. The claim that knowledge of God for Thomas is mediated by Christ is often made.⁹⁵ This comparison with the *Summa halensis* provides a clearer sense of how this is the case.

It may well be that the enduring value of the more explicit Halensian formula is that it keeps united what later on became separated and then even opposed,⁹⁶ namely, the metaphysical and the salvation-historical, the theocentric and the Christocentric dimensions of Scholastic theology.⁹⁷ In the fifteenth

⁹⁴ Goering, “Christ in Dominican Catechesis,” 135.

⁹⁵ See Cessario, *Christian Faith and the Theological Life*, 69: “Christ himself stands at the center of the entire process. For it is Christ who teaches both angels and men, and who fully communicates divine Truth to the world. The articles of faith serve as instruments of this universal outpouring of doctrine from God.” This passage is quoted in Hütter, “Faith Enlightening Sacred Theology,” 399-400, where we find this helpful summary of much of the proceeding: “God as First Truth constitutes both the medium (the mediating formal object or formal object *quo*) and the distinct subject (the terminative formal object or formal object *quod*) of theological faith. Simultaneously, faith as human understanding, by way of acts of judgment, operates with the indispensable help of the instrument of propositions (secondary material objects), that is, a divinely received *doctrina* the ultimate source and center of which is Christ.”

⁹⁶ Perhaps, as James R. Ginther has suggested in a private correspondence, the *Summa halensis* reflects a transition point in the development of thirteenth-century discussions of “theology as a science.” Whereas in the first four decades or so of the century, the central question was using Aristotelian frameworks to describe the material object of theology, by mid-century the focus shifted toward “methods to know and explore that subject matter,” that is, the formal object or ratio of theological science.

⁹⁷ The Second Vatican Council’s “Dogmatic Constitution on Revelation” seems to have the same unity in view when it stresses that “the deepest truth about God” is revealed in Christ, standing at the center of salvation history, as recorded in Scripture:

century, when theologians like Jean Gerson, Denys the Carthusian, and Nicholas of Cusa, were “searching for jewels in the decaying body of scholastic thought,”⁹⁸ they gestured at figures like Alexander of Hales as examples for what should be recovered and valorized.⁹⁹

“This plan of revelation is realized by deeds and words having an inner unity: the deeds wrought by God in the history of salvation manifest and confirm the teaching and realities signified by the words, while the words proclaim the deeds and clarify the mystery contained in them. By this revelation then, the deepest truth about God and the salvation of man shines out for our sake in Christ, who is both the mediator and the fullness of all revelation” (*Dei Verbum* 2).

⁹⁸ R. W. Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*, vol. 2, *The Heroic Age* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 88.

⁹⁹ As Philipp W. Rosemann recently observed, it was Alexander, “not Albert the Great, Bonaventure, [or] Thomas Aquinas” who “was for a long time afterward regarded as the most acclaimed master of the thirteenth century” (*The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard’s ‘Sentences’* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007], 61). See also the remarks of John Gerson, *Opera omnia: Epistola Lugdunum missa cuidam fratri Minori* (Paris, 1606), vol. 1, 554. “The doctrine of Alexander is of a wealth surpassing all expression. It is said that someone asked St. Thomas what was the best manner of studying theology; he replied that it was by attaching oneself to a Master. ‘And to which Doctor?’ he was asked again. ‘To Alexander of Hales,’ the Angelic Doctor replied.”

“A PARTICULARLY AGITATED TOPIC”:
AQUINAS AND THE FRANCISCANS ON THE SUBJECT OF
THEOLOGY IN THE MID-THIRTEENTH CENTURY

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YVES CONGAR, delineating the different parts of the understanding of theology in the Golden Age of Scholasticism in his *History of Theology*, comments that the subject of theology was “a particularly agitated topic,” and indicates no fewer than seven opinions proffered by the tradition and maintained by the masters of the medieval schools.¹

The significance of the topic may be opaque to readers untrained in the demands of Aristotelian *scientia*, and even those readers at home with Scholastic theology may be bemused to hear discussions of such a topic called “particularly agitated.” There is an historical reason for this: by the early fourteenth century the Franciscans, following Duns Scotus, were voicing an agreement with the Dominicans—whether following Albertus Magnus or Thomas Aquinas—that the subject of theology is God. This became the common inherited position of the tradition. Any other definition seems to be an historical

¹ Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., *A History of Theology*, trans. and ed. Hunter Guthrie (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968), 124ff. More recent detailed work on the topic may be found especially in Henry Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi au XIIIème siècle* (Paris: Parole et silence, 2006). The possibilities offered by the tradition and inherited by the authors we will be considering here are (1) the whole Christ (*totus Christus*), (2) things and signs (*res et signa*), (3) works of restoration/reparation (*opera restorationis/reparationis*), (4) God (*Deus*), and (5) the things of faith (*credibile*).

curiosity, or an indication of a specific tendency of a school of theology. Thus, for example, Congar lumps Alexander of Hales, Odo Rigaud, and Bonaventure into a “synthetic” category, implying that their treatments of the topic are governed by an attempt to include as many as possible of the traditional identifications of the subject of theology in their own definitions.² Again, when Odo or Bonaventure speak of “the whole Christ” as the subject of theology, it is sometimes taken as a sign of a Christocentric trend in their Franciscan theology, different from the theocentric trend of their Dominican contemporaries.³

The twentieth century saw an explosion of Thomistic discussions of “the nature of *sacra doctrina*,” including lengthy analyses of question 1 of the *Summa theologiae*. Article 7, on the subject of theology, comes in for its fair share of treatment—but the range of possible answers is frequently left out of account. On the basis of this literature one might conclude that, for the Thomist, it is important, critically important, that God be recognized as the subject of theology, but it is not so important to examine ways in which one might think of the whole Christ, or the works of reparation, and so on, as the subject.⁴ These things are relegated to the category of

² Donneaud repeats this classification in a section entitled “A Synthetic Definition of the Subject of Theology”: “Posing the question of the subject of *theologia*, Odo responds in a way characteristic of the Franciscan school of Paris, directly inspired by the *Summa halensis*: after having enumerated several possible solutions set forth in the earlier tradition, rather than choosing one of them over the others, he tries to hold them together by means of certain philosophical distinctions pertaining to the very notion of ‘subject’” (Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, 298). Of course, the desire piously to harmonize traditional authorities is hardly confined to the Franciscan masters, and Donneaud even refers to Aquinas’s solution in the *Scriptum* as “synthetic.”

³ For a very helpful treatment of the “theocentric” and “Christocentric” qualities of the positions of Aquinas and Alexander of Hales, see Boyd Taylor Coolman, “On the Subject-Matter of Theology in the *Summa halensis* and St. Thomas Aquinas,” *The Thomist* 79 (2015): 439-66. For background on the importance of a definition of the subject of theology, see James R. Ginther, “The Subject Matter of Theology,” in idem, *Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30-1235* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2004), 33-51.

⁴ Many important studies of the nature of *sacra doctrina* in Aquinas do not even mention the range of possible definitions of the subject of theology, or dismiss them as

the “matter” of theology: they are indeed things we talk about in theology, but they belong to theology only by their reference to God. Such a view dominates even in a work like that of Marie-Dominique Chenu, which deliberately considers other thirteenth-century treatments of the nature of theology.⁵ There are exceptions, most notably those that explicitly treat the parallel question in Aquinas’s Parisian *Scriptum* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.⁶

The bulk of this article is an examination of the doctrine of the subject of theology as it is found in three prominent Franciscans at the University of Paris, writing just before Aquinas: Alexander of Hales, Odo Rigaud, and Bonaventure. In each case the focus will be on how these authors construe the material and formal aspects of the subject, and what it is that leads them to espouse the views they do. A Thomist easily

not really pertinent to the question. See, e.g., Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *The One God: A Commentary on the First Part of St. Thomas’s Theological Summa*, trans. Dom Dede Rose (St. Louis and London: B. Herder Book Company, 1943); James A. Weisheipl, O.P., “The Meaning of *sacra doctrina* in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1,” *The Thomist* 38 (1974): 49-80; J.-P. Torrell, “La savoir théologique chez saint Thomas,” in idem, *Recherches thomasiennes: Études revues et augmentées* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2000), 121-57; Gerald F. Van Ackeren, *Sacra Doctrina: The Subject of the First Question of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Rome: Officium Libri Cath, 1952); Brian Davies, *Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary* (New York: Oxford, 2014); nor is there any essay on the topic in the appendices of the Blackfriars translation of the *Summa theologiae*. The most famous attempt in the twentieth century to include another description of the subject of theology, besides God, on Thomistic grounds was Emile Mersch, “L’objet de la théologie et le *Christus totus*,” *Recherches de sciences religieuses* 26 (1936): 129-57, reprised in idem, *The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Theology of the Mystical Body in Scripture and Tradition*, trans. John R. Kelley (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938).

⁵ Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle* (3d ed.; Paris: J. Vrin, 1957). Chenu says little about the subject of theology, focusing instead on the mode of proceeding and the question of subalternation.

⁶ E.g., William A. Wallace, O.P., *The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology* (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1962), esp. 15-70; Michel Corbin, *La chemin de la théologie chez Thomas d’Aquin* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), esp. 240-65 and 767-82; Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, passim. As noted above, Donneaud applies the tag “synthetic” to the solution in the *Scriptum*—and even notes that Aquinas gives a more complete recital of the possibilities offered by the tradition than do Odo, Albert, or Bonaventure (Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, 751).

distinguishes the *materia* of a science from the *objectum formale quo*, or formal aspect, of that science, but the two are a little more blended when one is speaking about the *objectum formale quod*, or subject proper: that is, the subject is both what the science is about (material) and that which unifies and orders the science (formal). We will see that the Franciscan authors share Aquinas's concern for identifying the most formal aspect of the subject, and distinguishing it from the most material aspect, though their solutions do not necessarily coincide with his. The final section and conclusion of the article will compare the results of this research to what one finds in Aquinas's doctrine of the subject of theology, both in the *Summa theologiae* and in the Parisian *Scriptum*. The point is not to take issue with the Thomist conviction about the definition of the subject of theology as "God," but to enrich it by seeing how it relates to the concerns of these three Franciscan authors.

The texts considered here are as follows: (1) the introductory tract of the *Summa halensis*, commonly said to be written under the influence of Alexander of Hales, though not necessarily by him, and composed between 1236 and 1245;⁷ (2) the prologue and first distinction of a *Lectura* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard by Odo Rigaud, composed between 1240 and 1245; (3) a *Quaestio de scientia theologiae* by Odo Rigaud, composed between 1245 and 1248;⁸ (4) the prologue, especially question 1, to a commentary on the *Sentences* by Bonaventure, composed around 1250-52;⁹ (5) the prologue, especially question 4, of Aquinas's Parisian *Scriptum* on the *Sentences*,

⁷ Alexandri de Hales, *Summa Theologica*, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (Florence: Quaracchi, 1924).

⁸ For the texts of Odo see Leonardo Sileo, *Teoria della scienza teologica: Quaestio de scientia theologiae di Odo Rigaldi e altri testi inediti (1230-1250)*, 2 vols. (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1984). The texts of Odo are given in volume 2; Sileo's commentary occupies volume 1. In references to Odo's texts below, parenthetical numbers refer to paragraph numbers in Sileo's edition.

⁹ S. Bonaventurae, *Opera theologica selecta*, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, editio minor, vol. 1, *Liber I. Sententiarum* (Florence: Quaracchi, 1934). Translations are taken from Bonaventure, *Commentary on the Sentences: Philosophy of God*, trans. R. E. Houser and Timothy B. Noone, Works of St. Bonaventure 16 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 2013).

composed in the mid-1250s;¹⁰ and (6) question 1, articles 3 and 7, of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, composed between 1265 and 1267.¹¹ There are two uncertainties about these texts that have some bearing on the topic. First is the question of the authorship of this portion of the *Summa halensis*. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the author as Alexander, though it may well not be. Second is the question of which text was composed first: this portion of the *Summa halensis* or Odo Rigaud's *Lectura* on the *Sentences*. This pertains to the study because, as we will see, there are close similarities and significant differences between the formulations of these texts concerning the subject of theology. Does Odo repeat Alexander but go beyond him, or does Alexander take Odo's more extended treatment and refine it to its most important elements? The question would be more important if we were trying to identify a progression in Franciscan thought on our topic, so that there would be a trajectory from Alexander to Odo and culminating in Bonaventure's formulation, which could then be compared to Aquinas. But we need not commit ourselves to any such progression. It is more important simply to identify the key concerns and formulations of these authors—the vision of each about what it is important to say on the topic. It is this richer array of opinions that will provide the backdrop for considering Aquinas's formulations.

I. EXPOSITION OF THE FRANCISCAN POSITIONS

A) Alexander of Hales

Alexander of Hales begins the *Summa halensis* with an introductory tract consisting of four questions, following the

¹⁰ Adriano Oliva, *Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la sacra doctrina. Avec l'édition du prologue de son commentaire des Sentences*, Bibliothèque thomiste 58 (Paris, J. Vrin, 2006).

¹¹ S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, ed. P. Caramello (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1950). Two other texts consulted and mentioned but not considered in detail are part 1, chapter 1 of Bonaventure's *Breviloquium* and question 2 of the prologue of Aquinas's *Lectura romana*.

Aristotelian order of questions about a science: whether it is a science, whether it is distinguished from other sciences, what the science is about, and what the mode of the science is (further divided into four questions).¹² The topic of the subject of theology occupies chapter three of this tract, “Of what is the science of sacred Scripture?” Well aware of the contributions of the Fathers and of his more immediate predecessors, Alexander raises the possibility that this science is about the works of reparation,¹³ or God, or things and signs, or Christ and the Church. His main move in resolving the question is to make a distinction between *materia de qua* (or *materia de qua intentio*)¹⁴ and *materia circa quam*. Alexander does not define what he means by *materia circa quam*, but he describes it by means of a comparison with metaphysics. The *materia circa quam* of metaphysics is all things, because metaphysics treats of all things according to various divisions, such as act and potency, substance and accidents, etc. So the *materia circa quam* of the science of sacred Scripture is anything that falls within sacred Scripture, which may be summed up as things and signs, or the whole Christ.¹⁵

The heart of Alexander’s view of the topic lies in the *respondeo*, where he expands on the *materia de qua*, or the subject proper.

The “subject about which” (*de qua*) can be taken in three ways, according to the words of Dionysius in *The Celestial Hierarchy*: “All understanding of the divine is divided by the heavenly intelligence into three: essence, power, and activity.” According to this, if we take the subject of sacred Scripture in the

¹² It is striking, considering that Alexander concludes that theology is not an Aristotelian science, that he approaches the topic in such an Aristotelian way.

¹³ Hugh of St. Victor identifies the matter of Scripture as *opera reparationis*. All of the authors considered here take this as one of the traditional proposals for the subject of theology (though Bonaventure mentions it only in the *Breviloquium*, not in the *Sentences* commentary), though they sometimes call it the *opera restorationis*. For the purposes of this article, I will translate both Latin forms as “works of reparation.”

¹⁴ The expressions *materia de qua intentio* and *materia de qua principalis intentio* occur in Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologiae* I, tract. Intro., q. 1, c. 3, ad 3, in a comparison of Scripture and metaphysics.

¹⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologiae* I, tract. Intro., q. 1, c. 3, ad 3 and 6; cf. *ibid.*, obj. 6.

sense of (1) “activity,” we can say that it is “the works of restoration” of humankind. If, however, we take the subject of sacred Scripture in the sense of (2) “power,” we shall say that it is Christ, who is “God’s power and God’s wisdom” (I Cor. 1:24). If, finally, we take the subject of sacred Scripture in the sense of (3) “essence,” we shall say that it is God, or the divine substance. Whence, for this reason, theology is a science about (*de*) the divine substance which must be cognized through Christ in the works of restoration.¹⁶

The last line of this quotation gives the most succinct summation of his position: the *materia de qua* is “the divine substance which must be cognized through Christ in the works of restoration.”¹⁷ Congar, noting that Alexander combines the opinions of several authorities in this solution, denotes it as “synthetic.” The appellation obscures Alexander’s reasoning. Alexander is not making a happy synthesis (forced or not) of the traditional authorities. Rather, he takes as his guiding authority Pseudo-Dionysius in *The Celestial Hierarchy* (11.2): “all understanding of the divine is divided by the heavenly intelligence into three: essence, power, and operation.”¹⁸ The essence of the subject of theology is God (or, the divine substance), the power is Christ, and the operation is Christ’s works, that is, the works of reparation. In this view, what we encounter is not the subject’s essence, nor its power; rather, we encounter its operation. But that operation must be understood as revelatory of a power, and that power itself is the power of an essence. In other words, in theology we encounter the works of reparation, and understand them as revelatory of Christ and Christ as revelatory of the divine substance. Alexander points us to the way in which God reveals himself to us, and the way we ascend from what we encounter to the divine itself.

Both *materia circa quam* and *materia de qua* are very material descriptions of the subject of theology, and Alexander is not ostensibly concerned to distinguish clearly between

¹⁶ Translation taken from Coolman, “On the Subject-Matter of Theology,” 444.

¹⁷ Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologiae* I, tract. intro., q. 1, c. 3: “Theologia est scientia de substantia divina cognoscenda per Christum in opere reparationis.”

¹⁸ Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologiae* I, tract. intro., q. 1, c. 3: “In tria dividuntur supermundana ratione omnes divine intellectus: in essentiam, virtutem et operationem.”

material and formal aspects of the subject; however, the distinction is there to be uncovered. There is no doubt that the *materia circa quam* is simply material: everything in Scripture, as a matter of fact, belongs to the distinction between things and signs, and is encompassed in the whole Christ. No formality is suggested here; “things and signs” and “the whole Christ” are descriptions of the material ensemble that happens to be contained in Scripture. The *materia de qua*, however, is a blend of the formal and the material. Materially, it is the subject of intention: the principal thing attended to in theology is the divine substance known through Christ in the works of reparation. Alexander is turning the attention of his reader not to the divine substance simply, but to the divine substance as made known, as self-revealing. Such a view is harmonious with an explicit definition of the formal aspect of theology as revelation (as we will see in Aquinas), but it is worth noting this is not entirely Alexander’s point. He is not concerned here to say that something belongs to theology because it is revealed, but rather than what we are talking about in theology is the self-revealing God, who reveals himself in Christ and in the works of reparation. For Alexander, the formal aspect of the subject of theology does not require special attention as to a formal object *quo*, but is adequately seen in terms of the subject proper.

B) Odo Rigaud

Odo Rigaud presents two different texts that are pertinent to our topic: the first question of his *Lectura* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, and a *Quaestio de scientia theologiae*. The *Lectura* begins, after the prologue, with the question, “what is the subject of theology?” The *Quaestio* follows the pattern of Alexander’s *Summa* closely, moving from “whether theology is a science” to “how is it distinct” and “what is its subject.”

In the *Lectura* Odo formulates a distinction between two ways of regarding any subject: that which is the object of the knower’s intention (*illud circa quod versatur intentio*; loosely, “subject of intention”) and that which is treated in the investigation (*illud circa quod versatur tractatus*; loosely,

“subject of treatment”). The former is the subject properly speaking, while the latter is an assortment of things that pertain to the subject. In theology, the subject properly speaking is—perhaps echoing the *Summa halensis*—“the divine substance manifested through Christ in the works of reparation”;¹⁹ the assortment of things pertaining to the subject are summarized as things and signs.²⁰ The text in the later *Quaestio* is as follows:

There are several ways to assign the subject of any science: either that toward which the principal intention is turned, or that toward which the execution is turned. . . . In theology there is one subject of intention, namely Christ, or God; but the subject of execution can be manifold, namely the works of creation and re-creation, precepts or counsels and all such things, insofar as they direct someone to the end intended--but principally the works of reparation.

It is commonly said by others²¹ that the subject can be regarded as twofold, namely the subject “de quo” and the subject “circa quod.” The subject “de quo” of theology can be considered threefold, namely according to substance, power, and operation. . . .

There are authorities who say that God is the subject, and that Christ is the subject, and that the works of reparation are the subject. But if we are speaking of the subject proper, which is treated in the whole science, no one of these three attains the complete *ratio* of the subject, which comprehends these three. Wherefore if we wish to determine the subject according to its complete *ratio*, let us say that the one subject of theology is Christ, by reason of members and head, by reason of divinity and humanity, insofar as he is creator, formator, and restorer. . . .

The subject “circa quod” can be called “things and signs,” or commands.

Regarding the subject *de quo* Odo gives the tripartite subject of the *Summa halensis*, but he adds two points of interest. First, he makes more explicit his rationale for having a tripartite subject: “for it is through the operation that one comes to know the

¹⁹ Odo Rigaud, *Lectura super Sententias*, I, d. 1, lib. 1, p. 1, q. 1: “subiectum totius theologiae est divina substantia manifestanda per Christum in opere restorationis” (Sileo, ed., 12).

²⁰ Rigaud, *Lectura* I, d. 1, lib. 1, p. 1, q. 1, ad 1 (Sileo, ed., 13).

²¹ Rigaud, *Quaestio*, p. 1, q. 3 (Sileo, ed., 80). Though it is certainly the teaching of the *Summa halensis*, it is not clear how widespread this teaching was. Sileo claims against Pergamo and Doucet that it was in fact a common opinion in the schools (Sileo, ed., 80 n. 24).

power, and through the knowledge of the power that one comes to the knowledge of the substance.”²² Second, he offers one single subject possessing the complete rationale of the tripartite subject, namely, the whole Christ, or “Christ in terms of members and head, divinity and humanity, as creator, formator, and restorer.”²³

Each of these three ways of distinguishing the subject—one in the *Lectura* (subject of intention vs. subject of treatment) two in the *Quaestio* (subject of principal intention vs. subject of execution; subject *de quo* and subject *circa quod*)—deserves comment.

The doctrine of the *Lectura* is not very different from the doctrine of the *Summa halensis*. The subject of intention corresponds to Alexander’s *materia de qua* and the subject of treatment to Alexander’s *materia circa quod*. In the replies to the objections three things are said about the subject of intention: it is the proper subject, it is the focus of discourse (and so can be the same as the end of the discourse), and it is one. Three things are also said about the subject of treatment: it is things and signs insofar as they are related to the subject proper, it is the matter out of which the discourse is constituted (and so cannot be the end of the discourse), and it is multiple. With respect to the last point Odo distinguishes theology from metaphysics: as in metaphysics, the matter of theology can in a sense be said to be all things, but whereas metaphysics regards things as they are reducible to God as their efficient cause, theology regards them as they are reducible to God as their final cause.²⁴ The key difference with Alexander here is that Odo gives more consideration to the matter of theology. He is more concerned than Alexander to see the formal intelligibility of that matter, which he describes in terms of its relation to the divine substance and its reduction to God as to its end. For Odo, it is not enough to recognize God as a self-revealing subject; the

²² Rigaud, *Quaestio*, p. 1, q. 3 (Sileo, ed., 80): “nam per operationem est cognoscere virtutem, et per cognitionem virtutis est devenire in cognitionem substantiae.”

²³ Rigaud, *Quaestio*, p. 1, q. 3 (Sileo, ed., 81).

²⁴ Rigaud, *Lectura* I, d. 1, lib. 1, p. 1, q. 1, ad 5 (Sileo, ed., 17).

matter itself of theology derives its intelligibility from the formal subject.²⁵

Turning to the first distinction in the *Quaestio* (subject of principal intention vs. subject of execution), the mention of “principal intention” here may seem to suggest precisely the same doctrine as the *Lectura*, but this is misleading. In the *Lectura* the subject of intention is the tripartite subject, while in the *Quaestio* the subject of principal intention is Christ, or God. Similarly, the subject of treatment is defined by the *Lectura* as in the first place things and signs, while the subject of execution is defined in the *Quaestio* as in the first place the works of reparation—and it is not *prima facie* obvious that these two senses of the subject are the same. Telling here is the *Quaestio*’s correlation of the subject of principal intention with the ultimate end and the subject of execution with the proximate ends. Odo clarifies this with the example of house-building: the subject of principal intention is the final product, the house itself, while the subject of execution is those things (wood, stone, etc.) that are necessary to the building of the house. In theology, the works of reparation are those things that principally need to be treated in order to come to the principal reality, which is Christ or God. In short, the relationship of the subject of execution to the subject of principal intention is that of operation to power or substance. With this distinction in the *Quaestio*, Odo is distinguishing not the subject proper and the matter of theology, but two different senses of subject applied to the subject proper. What the *Lectura* and the *Summa halensis* had combined in one the *Quaestio* splits apart.

Turning to the distinction between the subject *de quo* and the subject *circa quod* in the *Quaestio*, what is particularly striking is Odo’s introduction of the single definition of the subject of theology as, effectively, “the whole Christ.”²⁶ Odo

²⁵ Donneaud (*Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, 304) rightly observes that since Odo defines the formality of theology as distinct from metaphysics precisely on teleological grounds, the unity of subject ascribed to God in theology is due not so much to God in himself as to God as the practical end of theology.

²⁶ The topic of the whole Christ is raised in the *Lectura*, in response to the objection that this is indeed the subject. Odo’s brief response is that “the whole Christ” is just a

expresses dissatisfaction with the tripartite subject for “no one of these three attains the complete *ratio* of the subject, which comprehends all three.”²⁷ Instead Odo proposes the whole Christ (though he does not use precisely that expression). The works of creation pertain to Christ as creator; other data of theology (written material such as examples, precepts, admonitions, and counsels) pertain to Christ as “formator”; and the rest of the material of theology pertain to him as redeemer (that is, through the grace of the virtues and the sacraments, and through glory). The explanation is succinct, but the weight of it depends on the extent to which Odo here regards the whole Christ in a formal or in a material way. One could take him to mean that Christ properly contains in himself all the matter of theology. This cannot be a sufficient explanation, though, for this would turn the subject *de quo* into a comprehensive subject *circa quod*, and this is precisely what Odo does not wish to do. Somehow, “the whole Christ” describes the formal subject of theology. Henry Donneaud takes this to mean that the whole Christ synthesizes the tripartite subject.²⁸ The difficulty with such a reading is that, as noted above, Odo has just weakened the unity of the tripartite subject by distinguishing between the subject of principal intention and the subject of execution. Whatever Odo is expressing here, it is not simply a restatement of Alexander’s Dionysian doctrine. So the whole Christ is not the subject of theology as the thing intended, nor as the encompassing material subject. Instead Odo’s focus is on Christ as bearing the *ratio* of the various material elements of theology. Everything of which theology speaks has to be in some way predicated of Christ.

This last is perhaps Odo’s most distinctive contribution to the topic. The implication of this interpretation of “the whole Christ” in a formal sense seems to be that we do not in theology

combination of Christ as *virtus* and the works of reparation (namely, the mystical body created by his redemption) as *operatio*. There is no special intelligibility that “the whole Christ” gives to theology; we still conceive of the subject as the substance revealing itself through power and operation.

²⁷ Rigaud, *Quaestio*, p. 1, q. 3 (Sileo, ed., 81).

²⁸ Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, 346.

speak, for example, of divinity itself but of divinity in Christ, or of the sacraments themselves but of the sacraments of Christ, or of the virtues themselves but of the virtues of Christ, etc.—or at least theology speaks of these things only as Christ is the principle of them. Odo does not tell us that he is proposing such a strongly formal Christocentric conception of what theology is about; but if he is not, it is not clear that his formulation advances his reader's understanding of the formal unity of the subject of theology—what makes something an apt subject of theology.

C) *Bonaventure*²⁹

Unlike Alexander and Odo, Bonaventure does not go through the standard Aristotelian questions in speaking of a science—whether it is a science, in what way is it distinct, what is the subject, etc. Instead, in the *Sentences* prologue he talks about the four causes of “*iste liber*,” that is, Lombard's *Sentences*. The most pertinent question for our topic is the first one he raises, concerning the material cause of theology. Like Alexander and Odo, he raises a threefold distinction, but not under the rubric of the Dionysian framework that they use.

The subject of a science or doctrine can be understood in three ways: In one way, what is called the subject of a science is that to which everything in the science is reduced as to its *root principle*. In a second way, the subject is that to which everything in the science is reduced as to an *integral whole*. In a third way, the subject is that to which everything in the science is reduced as to a *universal whole*. . . . The subject to which everything is reduced as to a principle is *God* himself. The subject to which all the conclusions in this book are reduced as to an integral whole is *Christ*, understood as including both divine nature and human nature, or the created and uncreated, which are treated in the first two books, and Christ as including head and members, which are treated in the other two books. I take integral whole in a wide sense, one that includes many things, not only as components, but also through unification and through order. The subject to which everything is

²⁹ For a more comprehensive analysis of Bonaventure's doctrine on the nature of theology, see Gregory F. LaNave, “Bonaventure's Theological Method,” in J. A. Wayne Hellmann, J. A. Hammond, and Jared Goff, eds., *A Companion to Bonaventure* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2013), 81-120.

reduced as to a universal whole we can describe by using two terms conjunctively or disjunctively. In this way, the subject is things and signs, and here a sign is called a sacrament. Or we can describe it using one term. In this way, the subject is the *object of belief*, as the object of belief passes over into intelligibility by the addition of reasoning. This is the way to understand the subject of this book, properly speaking.³⁰

Later, in the *Breviloquium* (*Brev.* 1.1), Bonaventure shows that he is aware of Alexander and Odo's Dionysian distinction regarding the subject, but it is not in evidence in the *Sentences* commentary. His threefold distinction here requires some analysis.

The "universal whole" is so called because it is predicated of in the same way of every part of the whole. Drawing a comparison, Bonaventure says that the universal whole of geometry is immobile, continuous quantity. In other words, this universal whole designates that which makes something to be part of a science. A line, or a shape, belongs to geometry because it is an immobile, continuous quantity. And something belongs to theology because it is something believed that passes over into intelligibility by the addition of reasoning. It follows as well that it is this aspect, the universal whole, that demarcates one science from another, and in the case of theology distinguishes it from both faith and Scripture. For example, God as he is reasoned to as the First Cause of beings is not part of theology, because the universal whole—"object of belief as it passes over into intelligibility by the addition of reasoning"—is not predicated of him (i.e., as First Cause he is not an object of belief).

The "integral whole" is so called because it is predicated not of any part of the science, but only of the whole. It recognizes the distinction of parts and their interrelation. In architecture, "house" is an integral whole: one doesn't predicate "house" of any one part (the wall is not properly called a "house"), but only of all the parts integrated together. In theology, the integral whole is the whole Christ. This is easily seen if one

³⁰ Bonaventure, *Commentary on the Sentences: The Philosophy of God*, trans. R. E. Houser and Timothy B. Noone, Works of Saint Bonaventure (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 2013), 3-4.

equates theology with Lombard's *Sentences*, because Christ combines divinity (book 1), humanity (book 2), head (the source of grace, book 3), and members (the communication of grace, i.e., the sacraments, book 4). But this is more than a material agglomeration; as Bonaventure says, the integral whole "includes many things, not only as components, but also through unification and through order."

The "root principle" (*principium radicale*) is so called because it is the irreducible element that lies at the base of a science: in grammar, it is the letter; in geometry, it is the point. The telling mark of this principle is that one cannot go behind it to anything more fundamental. In theology, this is God.

The matter Bonaventure treats of separately, in a response to an objection. He distinguishes here between *materia ex qua*, *materia in qua*, and *materia circa quam*. The first is matter properly speaking; the third is more properly denoted as "object."³¹

As mentioned above, Bonaventure in the *Breviloquium*, composed a few years later, cites Alexander's/Odo's tripartite division as one way to speak of the subject of theology. Here, in the *Sentences* commentary, the threefold division serves a different purpose; indeed, one could say that it serves three different purposes, as each of the ways of identifying the subject can be seen apart from the others—something not possible in the Dionysian division.

By naming the root principle "God," Bonaventure evokes the *substantia* of the tripartite subject, but really it is a placeholder for the whole material disclosive subject. He notes the objection that God is not the subject because there is more treated in the *Sentences* than God (so, God might well be called the subject of the first book, but not of the others). He acknowledges the force of this objection but says, "While this book does not treat only the substance of God, it treats God in his substance and in his works. Therefore, God is not the subject considered as the whole of what is treated, but is the subject as the principle of

³¹ Bonaventure, *I Sent.*, pro., q. 1, ad 2.

what is treated.”³² The works of God—for example, the sacraments—are included in theology because God is their principle. *Virtus* and *operatio* are included within this definition of the subject, but they need not be mentioned explicitly; mentioning the *substantia* is sufficient.

Bonaventure’s definition of the whole Christ as the integral whole of theology evokes Odo’s appeal to the whole Christ. Both of them are looking for a way to point to a single subject of theology, a single subject whose “parts and passions” are talked about in this science. Both of them find that “the whole Christ” fulfills that requirement, in that it contains everything that theology talks about. However, they construe this in slightly different ways. Odo places the weight of the formality of the subject on the whole Christ. He is not interested here in a purely material agglomeration of the things that theology talks about, which fall under the category of the *materia circa quod*. Rather, the point is that all of these things belong to Christ, and by seeing them in Christ, we see their formality. Bonaventure, by contrast, gives a more material account of the integral whole: all the various *materia* of theology belong to the integral whole because Christ encompasses them all. He does not give them their strict formality; however, it is by virtue of their inclusion in Christ that we see their relationship to each other. What is important for theology is not that we understand divinity as solely the divinity of Christ, but that we see the relationship of that divinity to creation, grace, the sacraments, etc.³³

³² I *Sent.*, pro., q. 1, ad 1.

³³ Bonaventure does not give the same kind of treatment of the strict matter of theology as we find in Alexander and Odo. For the last two, one of the things one distinguishes in the subject of theology is the *materia circa quod*. Bonaventure mentions that category, but only in a reply to an objection, and he is more interested in it as the object of theology than as in any sense the subject. The *materia circa quod* of a science is for him the object of a power of the knower—it is the *terminus* of the act of knowing rather than that of which things in the science are predicated.

If it seems odd that Bonaventure, good Franciscan, would have backed off from Odo’s Christocentric understanding of theology, there is another way to read him that I would like to suggest, though an exploration of it goes beyond the scope of this article. Contemporary Bonaventure scholars agree that two central themes of his thought are the divine expressiveness—the metaphysical claim that underlies the sense of the divine

The “universal whole” is for Bonaventure the subject of a science, properly speaking.³⁴ He offers two versions of it: contained in a single term, it is the object of belief as it passes over into intelligibility by the addition of reasoning; considered in two terms, it is things and signs. He places greater weight on the former—not surprisingly, in that a single, comprehensive term will be more useful than a double term. He is trying to accomplish here what Odo tried to accomplish in the *Quaestio*: the identification of a single formal subject of the science of theology. For Odo this is “the whole Christ,” while for Bonaventure it is the *credibile prout transit in intelligibile per additionem rationis*. The difference is that Bonaventure’s solution is more strictly formal. The universal whole is not that subject-matter of which things in the science are predicated, but the formal aspect that allows one to identify the parts of the science as belonging to it. Odo is collapsing the threefold disclosive subject of the *Summa halensis* into one united, multifaceted subject. Bonaventure, by contrast, is highlighting the distinctive formal aspect of the subject.³⁵ That he sees this as

manifestation throughout creation—and the essentially Christic character of that expressiveness. One of his reiterated themes is “the uncreated, incarnate, inspired Word,” “Word” being defined as “expressive similitude.” Surely, Bonaventure has a thoroughly Christic sense of the way that God is known. Recognizing this, one might wonder whether the mention of the whole Christ in the *Sentences* prologue is not as purely material as it might seem. That is, Christ so often appears in Bonaventure’s work as manifesting the divine that it seems possible that he intends the same thing here: the whole Christ is to be considered not purely in itself but as expressive of God—the integral whole being what it is as a manifestation of the root principle. If this is so, then Bonaventure’s threefold division is really twofold: the formal aspect (universal whole) and a material content that may be considered either in its fundamental reality (root principle) or in the determinate way it manifests itself (integral whole). But at this point, this can only be a suggestion.

³⁴ There is some ambiguity here in the translation, which reads, “This is the way to understand the subject of this book, properly speaking,” and seems to refer to the threefold distinction of the subject. The Quaracchi editors seem by contrast to understand “this way” (*hoc modo*) to refer specifically to the third element of the distinction, the “universal whole.” This seems to accord well with the fact that Bonaventure is not here adopting Alexander’s threefold division of the subject.

³⁵ In Thomistic terms, there is a turn here from looking at the formality of the subject in terms of the formal object *quod* (Odo’s “the whole Christ”) to looking at it in

formally distinctive of theology is verified in the *Breviloquium*, where he says that the subject *de quo* of books of the canon is *credibile ut credibile*, while the subject *de quo* of the books of the expositors is *credibile ut intelligibile*.

This is the heart of Bonaventure's contribution on the topic, but it is worth considering also how Bonaventure understands things and signs to be the universal whole of theology. The inclusion of things and signs in the definition of the subject of theology among the Franciscans generally is one of the strongest *prima facie* arguments for a description of the Franciscan view as "synthetic." That is, it serves little purpose on its own. Both Alexander and Odo relegate it to the *materia circa quod*, the set of things that theology talks about without in any way contributing to a stronger formal sense of the subject. The first reading of Bonaventure may well suggest that for him it holds an even weaker place. He has displayed a proper piety to the authorities by including God, the whole Christ, and the *credibile* in his definition of the subject of theology; since other authorities propose things and signs as the subject, one might suspect that Bonaventure includes it as part of the definition simply out of piety. At any rate, while the *credibile prout transit in intelligibile* is a refined identification of the most formal aspect of theology, things and signs do not seem to be able to bear the same weight.

Such a reading misses the significance of what Bonaventure is saying here. He treats of things and signs more fully in his response to the third and fourth objections:

Things and signs can be taken in a general way. If so taken, they pertain neither to a special science, nor to a particular book, nor to the same science. Things and signs can be taken in a second way, as they enter into the notion of the object of belief. When taken in this way, just as there is one virtue and one habit covering all the objects of belief, whether they are things or signs, for example, faith, so there is one special science covering everything to the extent that they enter into this notion, whether they are things or signs.

A second reply: We speak of things and signs in two ways: absolutely, or in relation to enjoyment or what is the source of enjoyment. In the first way,

terms of the formal object *quo* (Bonaventure's "the object of belief, as the object of belief passes over into intelligibility by the addition of reasoning").

things and signs pertain to different special sciences; but in the second way they pertain to one science or doctrine. Consequently, just as there is one science and one book about all beings in so far as they are reduced to one first being, so there is one science about all things and signs, in so far as they are reduced to one thing: the Alpha and Omega.

In a way, things and signs do hold for Bonaventure the place of the *materia circa quod*, the mass of things that theology talks about—at least, everything in theology is either a thing or a sign. But more importantly, identifying the matter of theology as things and signs highlights the fact that everything theology considers can fall under the category of sign, can be seen properly not simply in itself but as it is reduced to God as Alpha and Omega. Everything that is, insofar as it has a semiotic quality, belongs to theology. It is therefore possible to read this passage not as a pious effort to include authorities, but as expressive of a conviction about created beings that is pertinent to their inclusion within the subject of theology.

II. AQUINAS AND THE FRANCISCANS

A) Aquinas's Position

Aquinas deals with the topic of the subject of theology in both the *Scriptum super sententiis* and the *Summa theologiae*; the treatments are consistent, but display different concerns. In the *Scriptum*, Aquinas distinguishes three senses of the subject:

The subject has at least three comparisons to a science. The first is that whatever is in the science must be contained under the subject. . . . The second comparison is that knowledge of the subject is principally intended in the science. . . . The third comparison is that through the subject the science is distinguished from all others. . . .³⁶

In theology, these are (1) things and signs, or the whole Christ; (2) God; (3) the things of faith, or the works of reparation. If a single definition of the subject is sought, it is the divine being as

³⁶ Thomas Aquinas, I *Sent.*, pro., q. 1, a. 4 (translation in Wallace, *Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology*, 26).

it is knowable through inspiration.³⁷ In the *Summa*, these three senses are present, but divided between two articles. In the first (*STh* I, q. 1, a. 3), Aquinas considers the formal aspect of theology; in the second (*STh* I, q. 1, a. 7), he distinguishes the matter and the subject. In sum, the formal aspect of theology is that it proceeds in the light of revelation and deals with all that is divinely revealable, the matter is the array of things we talk about in theology,³⁸ and the subject is God, and all things *sub ratione Dei*, as they are referred to God as their beginning and end.³⁹

It should be noted that this definition of the subject proper is lacking if we consider it in a merely material sense, for in that way it is susceptible of consideration by more than one science. Natural theology, as well as *sacra doctrina*, is about God and all things related to God as their beginning and end. Natural theology considers this subject in the light of natural reason, and therefore considers God primarily as the cause of creatures—“beginning and end” in this case meaning “first efficient cause” and “final cause”—and considers creatures precisely in light of this causality—that is, as creatures. *Sacra doctrina*, on the other hand, considers its subject also in the light of revelation, and therefore considers God not only as cause but as revealer and considers creatures in the different ways in which they are related to him: as vestiges and images of him, as capable of sharing in his life, as being ordained to the vision and love of him—thus a broader sense of what “beginning and end” mean.

³⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *I Sent.*, pro., q. 1, a. 4.

³⁸ In the *Summa*, this comprises things and signs, the works of reparation, and the whole Christ. All these options for the subject of theology are reduced by Aquinas here to the matter. He clearly escapes the charge Congar levels against the Franciscans, of proposing a synthetic solution.

³⁹ Aquinas’s *Lectura romana*, pro., q. 2 asks whether God is the subject of this science, and gives the answer of the *Scriptum*: God is the subject, and everything that is not God that is spoken of in theology insofar as it pertains to God—coming from him as its principle or leading to him as its end. Perhaps what is most striking about his treatment here is that he mentions none of the other traditional possibilities. The objections do not suggest that things and signs, or the whole Christ, etc., are really the subject of theology, but simply that God cannot be so described.

As Donneaud rightly points out, Aquinas's threefold distinction in the *Scriptum* anticipates his later distinction between the material object, the formal object *quod*, and the formal object *quo*. By the time of the *Summa*, these can be separated into different questions, so that the question of the subject of theology comes to be about the formal object *quod*, which is the principal extramental reality known in theology, and everything else only insofar as it can be considered "part" of that formal object.

B) Comparison with the Franciscans

All of the theologians we have looked at here clearly identify God as the ultimate subject of theology. Furthermore, Aquinas's designation of the subject proper as that the knowledge of which is principally intended is very similar to Odo's language, and even Alexander's. And though by the *Summa* any real significance for "the whole Christ" disappears for Aquinas, each of these authors give space for Christ as the way to God in their description of the subject. As Coolman rightly points out, Aquinas regards the articles of faith as suitable matter of the subject of theology, for God expresses his revelation through them, and when they are known it is truly God who is known—not just truths about God, but God himself, by our participation in him. Thus the significance Alexander had located in the works of reparation, Aquinas locates in the articles of faith. And if for Alexander the works of reparation reveal the power that belongs to Christ, for Aquinas "the articles of faith are arguably a summary of salvation history centered on Christ."⁴⁰ In this way, there is indeed a good deal of congruence between the two.

Furthermore, as the following chart shows, Aquinas's formulation in the *Scriptum* differs in terminology but is strikingly similar to Bonaventure's in the *Sentences* commentary.

⁴⁰ Coolman, "On the Subject-Matter of Theology," 463.

	Bonav.: Category name	Bonav.: In theology this is	Aquinas: Category name	Aquinas: In theology this is
The matter, considered most comprehensively	Integral whole	The whole Christ	Everything contained in the science	Things and signs, or the whole Christ
The fundamental subject	Root principle	God	That which is principally intended in the science	God
The aspect that defines something as belong to the science	Universal whole	The things of belief, or things and signs	That by which the science is distinguished from all others	The things of belief, or the works of reparation (or, being known through inspiration)

The connection between Bonaventure’s “universal whole” and what Aquinas comes to call the “formal object *quo*” is most striking, since it reflects a kind of interest in the formality of theology that is absent from Alexander and Odo. But Bonaventure’s designation of this as the subject proper is different from the way Aquinas regards it—in both the *Summa* and the *Scriptum*, God is the subject proper.⁴¹

CONCLUSION

What has emerged from this study is that while Aquinas’s Parisian Franciscan contemporaries recognize parts of the same comprehensive solution, they construe the heart of the question of the subject of theology in slightly different ways. For Alexander, the subject of theology is surely God, but God considered as intrinsically made known—that is, through the

⁴¹ Though there is not space to examine the topic here, one cannot underestimate the importance of the shift in Aquinas from *credibile* in the *Scriptum* to *revelabilia* in the *Summa* (I, q. 1, a. 3). In brief, there is a great difference between regarding the light under which the subject of theology is considered as things that have to be believed (i.e., because they are revealed) and things as they are related to revelation (i.e., not just things that are revealed but everything as it relates to revelation).

works of reparation, which reveal the power of Christ, which reveals the divine being. The point is not so much to identify a single extramental reality that is the principal thing known, but the reality of God as manifesting himself in salvation history. Odo pays some attention to the subject of intention, but his innovative move in designating the whole Christ as the single subject has to do not with intention but with formality: in Christ are all those qualities that as such are the things to be known in theology. Bonaventure continues the move toward a more strict consideration of the formality of the subject, but he does not place it in the whole Christ, which he describes in a more material fashion. His sense of formality is satisfied by what Aquinas will call the formal object *quo*, the aspect or light under which everything in theology is considered—for Bonaventure, the *credibile* as coming to be understood.⁴²

Although Thomists are inclined to construe any identification of the subject of theology with the whole Christ, or things and signs, etc., as a confusion of the material and the formal sense of the subject, it is evident from this analysis that none of the Franciscans considered here are satisfied with describing the subject of theology simply as the matter. They all emphasize the formal quality necessary in the subject of theology. Therefore, simply talking about some one of the things that theology considers does not make our discourse theology—one can talk about Jesus Christ without being a theologian.

Of greatest concern to our authors is the subject of theology, in its formal sense. Their formulations of this vary, but all of them agree that the subject of theology is God, and God as he comes to meet us, whether in the works of restoration, the articles of faith, or the whole Christ. Donneaud is one contemporary author who finds this distinction important. He

⁴² For this reason, I would maintain that Donneaud is incorrect in saying that Aquinas in the *Scriptum* introduced a new criterion of the subject, namely, that by which one science is distinguished from others. The wording differs from Bonaventure, but this is essentially what Bonaventure means by the “universal whole”: the formal aspect of a thing that makes it part of this science rather than that.

extols Aquinas's solution both for emphasizing the substantial unity of the subject of theology, and for identifying a single extramental reality that indicates how theology surpasses the other sciences. When the subject is defined in the threefold way of Alexander, one has to define each as the way the other is known, or the unity of theology is lost. But if one does this, it becomes hard to see how theology can incorporate within itself anything other than what is known in the works of reparation. The Thomist solution, with its single subject of God and plural subordinate subjects of things in their relation to God is preferable, for it allows one to consider, for example, both the way God is the efficient cause of the creature and the way the Word is the exemplary cause, and the way union with God is the final cause of the rational creature. Odo's reinterpretation of "the whole Christ" allows for this broader spectrum of consideration: anything pertinent to the dimensions we find in Christ falls within the subject of theology. The problem is that in this solution the whole Christ is not a single extramental subject that can be known; it is hard to see how it can be more than an assemblage of the material objects that constitute the subject. As Donneaud says, to say that the subject of theology is the whole Christ, in Odo's sense, makes it easier to see the Christian character of theology, but at the expense of the whole point of a subject—a unified reality that is the principal *intentio* of the knower.⁴³

The way to escape this critique is to ascribe a formal value to "the whole Christ." I have suggested ways in which both Odo and Bonaventure can be read this way. The subject of theology is God, expressed in Christ—not in propositions about Christ (a la Aquinas), or in the works of Christ (a la Alexander), but in the whole Christ.⁴⁴

Congar's distinction between the kind of solution offered by the Franciscans and that offered by Aquinas—much like the popular view of Franciscan theology as Christ-centered and

⁴³ See Donneaud, *Théologie et intelligence de la foi*, 754-58.

⁴⁴ This is Bonaventure's distinctive theological claim: insofar as a thing is Christophanic—insofar as it bears the expressive power of the divine Word—insofar as Christ is in it—that thing is part of theology.

Aquinas's theology (or Dominican theology more generally) as God-centered—is warranted (slightly) by the texts, but it is far too facile a distinction. As a matter of fact, the authors I have considered here are asking much the same questions, and are coming to answers that bear great similarities—which may indicate that there is not a huge range of permissible opinion on these matters. On the more central question of the subject of theology there is on one level universal agreement: everyone says that God is the subject. Going further than this requires a deeply metaphysical conversation about the relation of things to God or to the whole Christ. The solution cannot help but reflect one's conviction about the relationship of creation, revelation, and Christ. If the topic is not today an agitated one, it deserves to be.

BOOK REVIEWS

Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science and Thomas Aquinas. By MICHAEL DODDS. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012. Pp. 328. \$70.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-8132-1989-9.

Although no one can deny that the scientific revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was an unmixed blessing in terms of the advance of technology, medicine, and our more detailed knowledge of the natural world, in terms of natural philosophy and metaphysics its effects have been more ambiguous. An exclusive focus on quantifiable forces has blinded us to many modes of natural causality, modes of long standing among the ancient and medieval philosophers. Furthermore, insofar as theology has often presupposed certain truths of or at least modeled itself on natural science, the scientific revolution likewise handicapped us in our attempts to understand divine causality. In *Unlocking Divine Action*, Michael Dodds first defends these claims—which have in various ways been canvassed before—but then goes much further: Dodds argues that, in spite of this legacy, there are signs that recent science is returning to the older, broader understanding of causality, and thereby equipping philosophers and theologians observing science to “unlock” divine action.

The first two chapters are directed toward the claim that science since around the time of Newton narrowed our understanding of what it is to be a cause. The first chapter covers the prescientific understanding of causality as presented by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. In what amounts to a gloss on books 1 and 2 of the *Physics*, Dodds lays out carefully, and yet with minimal jargon, the four causes and chance, finding the delicate balance of precision and accessibility. The second chapter discusses the project of Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and others as they decided either to truncate, ignore, or explicitly reject the notions of formal and final causality in favor of a constricted notion of efficient causality, where the only agent worthy of consideration is that of a quantifiable, and therefore measurable, force emanating from and acting on ultimate particles. This part of the book does not break new ground, but its clarity and its manifest relevance as a premise make it worthwhile.

In the third chapter Dodds makes a connection often missed: an effect of the success and dominance of Newtonian science was an application of its notion of causality to both natural and sacred theology. God’s causality could only be that of a force acting on atoms; any other consideration was as

obsolete as Aristotle's substantial forms and geocentric universe. Thinking of God as just another source of forces—in fact, one that interfered with the very order he himself had established—caused perplexity among many scientists, philosophers, and theologians about how God could interact with the cosmos. Likewise, it led many to reject the possibility of miracles because of the apparently incoherent view of nature that divine intervention suggested. The clockmaker God of the Deists, the liberal theologians following Bultmann, and the pantheist-leaning process theologians all agreed, under the influence of the force-paradigm, that God was forbidden miracles. Further, in an effort to uphold the “autonomy of creation” and to avoid imputing a violent coercion of our wills to God, they even felt compelled to reduce or limit divine omnipotence and omniscience. God ended up “locked out” of nature.

The remaining four chapters of the book are devoted to picking this lock. In chapters 4 and 5 Dodds shows how many discoveries in contemporary science—that is, science in the last century or later, since the advent of quantum theory—are opening scientists' minds to other possibilities of the idea of causality. These two chapters are divided according to a crucial distinction about the relation between science and theology. On the one hand, a theologian might import a theory from science, basing theological conclusions on it as on a premise. On the other hand, a theologian might incorporate the ideas hinted at, or even fundamentally presupposed, in a scientific theory.

Chapter 4 follows attempts at the former *vis-à-vis* divine action, as pursued in recent decades by several philosophers, the majority of whom (one quickly notices from the footnotes) are in various ways affiliated with the Vatican Observatory and Berkeley's Center for Theology and Natural Sciences. That said, this survey is by no means narrow; in fact, although one has the impression that many of the writers considered are Christians, Catholics are not a majority. The theories in contemporary science that Dodds identifies as suggesting formal and final causality span the full range of natural science, from the anthropic principle in cosmology, to quantum indeterminacy in microphysics, to self-organization, emergentism, and chaos theory as applied within physics and biology as a whole and to evolution in particular. Recent thinkers—such as R. J. Russell, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, Nancey Murphy, etc.—have taken these theories as givens and deduced from them how God's action in the natural world should be understood. As praiseworthy as Dodds finds these approaches as “explorations . . . seeking to make divine action intelligible and acceptable to a contemporary scientific audience” (133-34), they all nevertheless have their shortcomings. Again one finds the narrow understanding of agency leading to philosophical and theological errors, inasmuch as it amounts merely to nuanced versions of “god of the gaps” positions, and often ends up making God less than God. In addition, Dodds suggests that this approach is fundamentally wrongheaded insofar as it makes theology dependent on an inherently revisable theory: “[I]f a particular scientific interpretation changes or is superseded, the theology that

incorporates it will be invalidated" (136). This point is particularly noteworthy given the popularity (even among Thomists) of the indeterminism allegedly embedded within quantum theory; many may not be aware that what they are taking for settled science is just one (albeit common) interpretation of quantum theory (the Copenhagen interpretation). However, Dodds's key objection to the theory-incorporation approach, to which he returns repeatedly throughout the remainder of the book, is that it still assumes that God is a "univocal cause," meaning a cause of the same order as forces, and therefore a cause competing for the same explanatory space. For instance, many of the philosophers Dodds treats propose that the agency of a subatomic particle, which quantum theory itself says is inherently unpredictable, is in fact triggered by a direct divine intervention, as though God were a sort of supernatural vector. On occasion it is unclear whether Dodds is right about whether all of these thinkers are making this mistake—in particular, those who speak of "information" as being of divine origin and not a form of energy—but he is surely correct in asserting that these thinkers do not give any clear sign that they are thinking in terms of a higher order of causality than univocity.

The core of the book, and Dodds's most important contributions, are in chapters 5 and 6, which take a second route in showing that science now has, or seems to be groping toward, a broader notion of causality than it did in the Newtonian era. To make this case, Dodds takes a closer look at Aristotle and St. Thomas in order to show how the principles of natural philosophy and metaphysics, as they articulated them, are in many ways the keys contemporary scientists need in order to understand themselves and the possibility of divine action in nature. In returning to the sources, these chapters deepen Dodds's previous discussions of univocal versus nonunivocal causality or, as he sometimes calls it, "analogical causality." Saint Thomas usually calls this "universal" and "equivocal" causality, though Dodds for some reason avoids this language. Because divine existence and action must be one, and the fount of all other existence and action, God's agency must be radically different from that of any creature, and he must be both transcendent and immanent. This insight paves the way for properly understanding God's supreme causality and its noninterference with natural causality, since it removes the need for discovering a "causal joint" where God steps into the history of secondary causes and effects. Just as a pair of perpendicular vectors together combine to produce a diagonal motion, "only among univocal causes is an action partly from one cause and partly from the other," whereas "the effect of a transcendent primary cause and a secondary cause is wholly from both" (156). A primary agent acts at a higher level than other agents do, but still within and through the instrumentality of those others, such as forces, and in such a way as to respect the proper causality belonging to these forces, and without itself being a force. Dodds shows that the vast majority of theists trying to engage modern science assume that God is a univocal cause while paying lip service to his transcendence; in practice they appear to have a shallow grasp of what transcendence is.

In the final, brief chapter Dodds discusses providence (specifically in human affairs and the “problem of evil”), the efficacy and purpose of prayer, and miracles; he notes how these three matters pose particular difficulties for those thinking exclusively in terms of univocal causality. He then shows, in outline, how a recognition of God’s nonunivocal position in the causal order makes the freedom of the will more intelligible. For instance, God can move the will without coercing it precisely because he is not a univocal cause. If a higher-order agent is the source of a lower-order agent’s very nature, then the former can cause the latter, even a free agent, to act in accordance with its own nature, that is, freely. Dodds is somewhat more obscure in his treatment of miracles, however; he says that, on St. Thomas’s account, no miracle is a “violation of nature or against (*contra*) nature, but rather ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ (*praeter*) nature” (248), but this seems to be true only if “nature” is taken in a rather extended sense to mean the “supremely universal nature, dependent on God in relation to all creatures” (253). This distinction might have merited a lengthier discussion.

One might make a few modest criticisms about the pedagogy in this volume. First, given the centrality of the notion of univocal causality, and the frequency with which the term itself is employed, combined with the foreignness of the terminology, Dodds would have done well to have defined it as soon as he began using it. The clearest statement of the meaning of the term is well into the book (155), after the term has already been used dozens of times. The matter is all the more urgent given the fact that Dodds’s Thomistic readers may think he means something other than he does, given that St. Thomas consistently uses the expression “univocal cause” for an agent that is the same in species with its effect, and hence receives the same name with the same meaning (as Dodds himself admits at the end of the book [266]); this notion is significantly more determinate than Dodds’s intention, and it took this reader some time to get a feel for the usage. Second, much more should have been said to explain the origin of and evidence for some of the scientific theories discussed. For example, while the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is all but common knowledge, in part because it is the dominant view of particle physics, the notion of emergence is far less familiar, less dominant, and far more subversive of reductionist materialism. Emergentism is not only new, but it does not receive the press that quantum theory and even the anthropic principle do. An extended treatment of some clear examples of macro-properties that many physicists believe cannot be understood in a reductive way would have given the reader a concrete sense of how science is changing. Likewise, a greater consideration of the views of the manifold critics of emergence would have been in order. Thirdly, the presentation of the book suffers from what one might call a distracting demonstration of scholarship. It is possible to over-document a position, and Dodds frequently succumbs to the temptation of redundant quotations (even from the same author). Related to this, occasionally Dodds’s careful reporting of a view, whether that of St. Thomas or of a contemporary

thinker, misses an opportunity to convince the reader. For example, to explain God's transcendence Dodds asserts that "creatures are really related to God" (170) but not vice versa, yet he does not help the reader to grasp this by comparing it to the relation between a knower and the thing he knows (as do St. Thomas and Aristotle).

It is common nowadays for both philosophers of science and even theologians to think that one can only take science as a given and at face value, and let its work be the measure of theirs. Science has become the queen of the sciences. *Unlocking Divine Action* is a rare challenge to this view, because it reminds us that science is essentially tentative, and therefore always changing. The science of one generation declares that only one sort of causality is scientific, and that this must rule our theology; a later generation rejects this assumption. Had science not changed its story, philosophers and theologians could have insisted it should; an implicit lesson of this book is that philosophy and theology should not be afraid to judge the other sciences, provided that this be done prudently and only when on firm ground. Dodds has done philosophers, theologians, and scientists interested in their interrelation a great service. Few philosophers are sufficiently well versed in the currents of contemporary science to bring them together and present them in an orderly way. Dodds's project is praiseworthy not only for its deepening of the dialogue between faith and science, but also for suggesting that "we may need to move beyond empirical science as such and engage a philosophy of nature that can field broader questions about the natural world" (184). This brings St. Thomas and Aristotle back into the conversation.

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Ethics as a Work of Charity: Thomas Aquinas and Pagan Virtue. By DAVID DECOSIMO. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2014. Pp. 354 + xiii. \$58.50 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-8047-9063-5.

Although Thomas Aquinas undeniably asserted that non-Christians can cultivate virtues, some scholars have argued that such "virtues" can be no more than isolated dispositions. Aquinas, on this view, was an Augustinian at heart and not the Aristotelian that tradition makes him out to be. David Decosimo, rejecting attempts to pigeonhole Aquinas as either an Aristotelian or an Augustinian, argues that the proper interpretation of Aquinas's moral theory in general and of his view of pagan virtue in particular is not as *either* Aristotelian or Augustinian but *both/and*: Aquinas, Decosimo argues, "[strives] to be Aristotelian by being Augustinian and vice versa" (41).

Taken apart from any explanatory context, the content of the claim that Aquinas “strives to be Aristotelian by being Augustinian and vice versa” is not immediately clear. What Decosimo appears to mean by it, however, is this: Aquinas sees human nature, like all of God’s creation, as a genuine good, and understands that by man’s working toward the fulfillment of his created nature, he in a way participates in God. The “in a way” is important; Decosimo distinguishes (albeit without as much elaboration as one might wish for) between “creational” and “redemptive” participation in the divine (65). The former is the participation in the divine that one achieves through the pursuit of natural flourishing; the latter is the union with God attained in supernatural beatitude. Thus, Aquinas does not view human nature as depraved, but as genuinely good, and he regards the pursuit of natural fulfillment as a kind of participation in God—albeit incomplete and imperfect. So, Aquinas’s appreciation of the goodness of man’s created nature makes him an Aristotelian; and his understanding of God as the end of all striving makes him Augustinian. Since he sees pursuit of human fulfillment as a way of pursuing God, his very Aristotelianism is Augustinian and vice versa.

Decosimo’s central aim is to show that Aquinas was not an “Augustinian” with respect to virtue, that is, he recognized that the pagan could cultivate genuine virtues. Against recent interpreters, Decosimo argues that Aquinas’s pagan could cultivate virtues that are “perfect, simple, and true” (140). It is incoherent, he maintains, to claim that the pagan’s virtues are “disconnected” or that they are mere dispositions (chap. 4). The pagan’s virtues are fully deserving of the name, though capable of a further perfection. Decosimo’s Aquinas is thus Aristotelian insofar as he recognizes genuine virtues in the pagan, yet since he realizes that these lesser virtues are only a first step in the moral life he is also Augustinian. Because this conclusion is consistent with traditional readings of Aquinas, a casual observer might assume that Decosimo has contributed nothing new to the debate about the possibility of pagan virtue. But any such assumption would be incorrect. Decosimo’s interpretation of Aquinas has many novel elements. The most novel element of all is the way that he approaches the question of pagan virtue.

Debates about Aquinas’s view of pagan virtue tend to get mired in a host of interrelated questions: whether religion is a natural virtue, what Aquinas understood man’s “natural end” to be, how original sin affects nature, and so forth. There is a good reason for this: if the virtues are unified, so that to possess one is to possess them all, then the thesis that the pagan could possess virtue amounts to a thesis that the pagan could possess the virtue of religion. Similarly, the claim that the pagan can cultivate virtues implies that the pagan can successfully pursue his natural good, but whether or not Aquinas would concede this seems to depend at least in part on how he defines “natural good.” And so on. The most unique feature of Decosimo’s approach is that he manages to postpone questions like these until after he has already made his case for pagan virtue. He argues that Aquinas’s pagan could possess virtues that are “true, perfect, and simple” solely on the basis of an analysis of the

terms Aquinas uses (117). He contends that whenever Aquinas uses the term “human moral virtue,” he is referring exclusively to virtues that “perfectly satisfy the *ratio* of virtue,” that is, to virtues that are “perfect, unified, and true” (116). Since Aquinas also uses “human moral virtue” interchangeably with “moral virtue,” “social virtue,” and “virtue,” Decosimo in turn concludes that “these and what I have called ‘human moral virtue’ all refer to one thing—which satisfies the perfect *ratio* of virtue and which Thomas declares perfect” (132). Finally, since Aquinas uses these terms to describe pagan virtue, it follows that pagan virtue also satisfies the perfect *ratio* of virtue. This unique approach enables Decosimo to argue, before tackling the thorny questions that have plagued other scholars, that Aquinas recognized the possibility of robust pagan virtues.

After offering his initial argument, Decosimo addresses several of Aquinas’s texts and in doing so deals with many of the aforementioned thorny interpretive questions. I will restrict my discussion here to Decosimo’s interpretation of Aquinas’s view of the pagan’s final end. As Decosimo rightly recognizes, the key to any account of good pagan action will lie in explaining how it is that the pagan can perform genuinely good acts. Decosimo proposes a truly original answer to this question: the pagan has a collection of beliefs about his final end which together comprise his final end conception (FEC) (209). Any given FEC will contain some true and some false beliefs. Decosimo carves out a space for good human action by arguing that “in ordaining an act to her final end, a person need not count as ordaining it to all (or each) of the particular beliefs that constitute her FEC. . . . Each member of the set of beliefs comprising the FEC need not be implicated in every act ordained to the FEC” (211). So, if Christopher Hitchens’s FEC contains “the weak should be protected,” “literary productions are good,” and “religious belief is destructive,” and if in a given instance he engages only the first two and not the third, his act will be referred to his FEC but nonetheless be genuinely good (212).

Decosimo’s proposed account of the pagan’s final end is bound to be controversial, and I myself am not convinced by it. However, it is important to remember that his defense of pagan virtue does not depend on this any more than it depends on other interpretive solutions he proposes. While I maintain that more work needs to be done to determine whether Aquinas intends “human moral virtue” in the highly specific sense Decosimo proposes, I also believe that Decosimo approaches these questions in the right way. Some “Thomist” scholarship is so loosely tied to Thomas Aquinas that one strains to find any real connection. This is not true of Decosimo. Throughout his work, he conscientiously considers Aquinas’s own text and his own words. The sort of close textual reading that he engages in is one that makes productive discussion possible.

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Catholic Bioethics for a New Millennium. By ANTHONY FISHER. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp. 346. \$30.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-521-25324-6.

Anthony Fisher's first book brings together a collection of previously published essays and conference presentations on a variety of hotly debated topics in Catholic medical ethics. It was probably no easy task for Fisher to decide what to include, since he has published extensively on bioethics over the last twenty-five years. While Fisher begins the book with three chapters on methodological questions (culture, conscience, and cooperation), the heart of the book consists of six chapters on controversial issues that preoccupied much of bioethics, especially Catholic medical ethics, at the turn of the millennium. Chapters 4-6 focus on aspects of the abortion debate (e.g., "when human life begins," embryo experimentation, and pre-natal testing), and chapters 7-9 take up questions "at the other end of life" (8) (e.g., transplantation, medically assisted nutrition and hydration, and euthanasia). The final two chapters employ the case-study method to examine two types of Catholic participation in the public square, namely, how Catholic healthcare facilities and Catholic politicians may serve the authentic common good of contemporary Western societies.

Fisher argues his views vigorously and at times polemically, not unexpectedly for a work in bioethics with a strong constructive approach on a variety of neuralgic issues. He is most nuanced and generous on the issues (e.g., in the chapters on transplantation and Catholic political participation) where the disputed viewpoints within the Catholic tradition tend to be less rancorous, or where he takes a more exegetical and pastoral approach (as in the chapter on euthanasia). However, most noteworthy about the book is not its arguments about the controversial issues. For the most part Fisher does not aspire to novel takes on the issues, but stakes out in an intelligent, sophisticated, and at times pithy way—ground well-trodden by the kinds of Catholic bioethicists typically associated with Catholic Church-sponsored bioethics centers (e.g., Anscombe/Linacre Bioethics Centre, Pontifical Academy for Life).

What makes this book noteworthy—and very difficult to review—is that it seeks to be "all things to all people." Anthony Fisher plays many roles: he is a Dominican, a lawyer, a philosopher, a bishop, and a pastor. The book is an amalgam of genres: at times he argues as a philosopher, at other times he writes as a bishop offering guidance to his flock, at times he speaks as a casuist, at times as a public intellectual proffering pithy slogans, at times as a biblical exegete, at times as a lawyer, and at times as a pastor. And at times he integrates many of those roles in a masterful way. However, if the reader does not appreciate that different chapters of the book have rather different audiences and approach issues in diverse way, the book may well seem somewhat disjointed. The unity of the book does not lie in a particular genre or mode of argumentation.

What unites *Catholic Bioethics for a New Millennium* is Fisher's reference to himself as one of the "John Paul II generation" (1). This is no mere pious reference. Every chapter in the book seems to draw as extensively as possible on the thought of Pope St. John Paul II. The index has at least five times as many references to the works of John Paul as any other thinker. The encyclical *Evangelium vitae* (*The Gospel of Life*) receives far more citations than any other document, and Fisher dubs it John Paul's "bioethical charter" (4). Back in 1995 when *Evangelium vitae* first appeared, Fisher appraised it as "undoubtedly the most authoritative statement of Christian bioethics to date" ("Theological Aspects of Euthanasia," in *Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives*, ed. John Keown [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 330 n. 22). In addition, Fisher displays the influence of John Paul in his strong integration of issues of sexuality and the family (and John Paul's *Theology of the Body*) with biomedical issues. Even the title of the book is an allusion to a work of John Paul, namely his apostolic letter *Novo millennio inuente* (*At the Beginning of the New Millennium*). As such, this book is an excellent introduction to issues in bioethics from the perspective and in the spirit of a "John Paul II Catholic" philosopher, theologian, and ethicist.

The opening two chapters seek to place a renewed Catholic bioethics in relation to contemporary Western culture. In the first chapter Fisher (like John Paul II) acknowledges some of the great goods of contemporary culture—particularly the advances of modern medicine. But he is also acutely aware of the perversities of contemporary culture—the banalization of sexuality and the body (he has a section entitled "The Castration of a Civilization" [17]), and the ascendancy of a modern notion of freedom that legitimates the killing of weak and helpless human beings (he has two sections with "culture of death" in the title [19, 20]). He is well aware that Catholicism's traditional natural law ethic of the pre-Vatican II period is no longer sufficient as Catholicism's witness to contemporary society, and thus echoes the "efforts of recent popes and theologians to recover a sense of the distinctively Catholic-Christian in morality" (94). In arguing for a more prophetic or confessional ethics in an increasingly post-Christian society, he echoes the message of *Evangelium vitae*. In the final sections of the opening chapter, he sketches four key themes for the renewal of a Catholic (biomedical) ethics, namely: (a) a richer engagement with Scripture (e.g., Spohn and Ashley), (b) a renewed and more theological natural law ethic and account of human action and intentionality (e.g., Anscombe and Grisez), (c) a fuller account of the importance of moral character and the virtues and moral traditions (e.g., Hauerwas, MacIntyre, Taylor), and (d) a more distinctively Catholic-Christian conception of the moral life (e.g., Nichols, Melina, von Balthasar). The philosophers and theologians whom Fisher cites most often as important are Romanus Cessario, Stanley Hauerwas, Russell Hittinger, Terence Kennedy, Herbert McCabe, Alasdair MacIntyre, Oliver O'Donovan, and especially Servais Pinckaers.

Fisher's second chapter repeats the form of the first chapter on the specific issue of conscience. First he diagnoses the problems with certain modern understandings of conscience and suggests how they might be corrected and repaired. While he spends much energy critiquing some contemporary exponents of a problematic view of conscience (James Keenan gets sustained attention), it is clear that the problem with these authors is that they have actually not adequately departed from the paradigm of conscience that was found in the manuals, as Thomists such as MacIntyre, Pinckaers, and Cessario have argued. Fisher follows them in seeking to reunite discussions of conscience into a broader Thomistic view of practical reason.

In the third chapter he takes up the complex question of cooperation in others' wrongdoing. This chapter was originally part of an exchange with Cathleen Kaveny at a Linacre Centre conference, and it makes for an excellent introduction to the topic of cooperation in evil in the Catholic tradition. In this chapter Fisher also provides the background for his casuistical (in the good sense) use of the principle of cooperation in discussing dilemmas faced by Catholic healthcare administrators and politicians in the final two chapters (which principle is unfortunately not noted in the indices).

In chapters 4-6 we see Fisher wading into two aspects of the abortion issue debated extensively over the last forty years: delayed hominization, and the destruction of human embryos for experimental purposes. The first of these chapters is devoted to a response to Norman Ford's *When Did I Begin?* Ford advocated a "delayed hominization" view of embryogenesis, one highly influential among many Catholic moral theologians who were impressed by its scientific seriousness. However, as it turns out the scientific element of Ford's book is highly problematic, and Fisher does a polite job of showing why and how this is the case. In chapters 5 and 6 he looks at the contemporary practices of embryo experimentation and prenatal screening, seeing the former as a wedge for destroying human embryos for almost any purposes, and finding in the latter a "search and destroy mission" of prenatal human beings who are unwanted for one reason or another (e.g., the baby has a disability or is the wrong gender). For one who takes seriously the principle that human life should be protected from the moment of conception, these are grave evils, and Fisher seeks to educate his readers about the wide practice of these evils in modern laboratories and hospitals.

When Fisher comes to "end of life" issues in chapters 7-9, broader themes of theological anthropology and a "theological politics" come to the fore. That is, he focuses on what constitutes adequate ways of understanding the nature of human persons and their relationships with one another, specifically when it comes to the issues of organ transplantation and artificial nutrition and hydration. Fisher clearly recognizes the complexities of both these issues: on the matter of transplantation, he is at his most generous, seeking to appreciate a wide variety of perspectives on the issue, in part perhaps because he realizes that he cannot cover all the nuances of these questions, and that these nuances will at various times lead to a variety of appropriate responses;

on the issue of nutrition and hydration for patients like Terri Schiavo, he is more confident in his approach, and his creativity in this chapter involves thinking outside the typical bioethical categories on larger questions about the significance of eating practices in relation to Christian theology.

The final two chapters of the book turn to case-study method. Fisher invents extended cases about situations faced by Catholic healthcare leaders and Catholic legislators to illustrate how both of these groups may remain faithful to the principles of the gospel of life in the complex dilemmas they face. These are very fine and creative chapters, and may well be the most engaging and useful chapters for Catholic professionals who are not inclined to more theoretical discussions in theology and ethics but wish to think through the issues as Catholics.

Overall, this is a fine work on a variety of questions in Catholic bioethics. However, it is by no means an introduction to the area, as it ignores many fundamental considerations in Catholic biomedical ethics. It never introduces and lays out principles like that of totality or of double effect or of ordinary vs. extraordinary treatment, nor does it provide an overview of issues like the common good or distributive justice in healthcare ethics. But of course that is not Fisher's goal, as he quite clearly sees this book instead as a Catholic participant in contemporary debate on neuralgic issues in bioethics.

Perhaps the one significant weakness of the book as an introduction to a "John Paul II Catholic" approach to bioethics is that it is not as evangelical as it could be. While it is not uncommon for authors to preach to the choir, it is unfortunate that most of the chapters of *Catholic Bioethics for a New Millennium* originated in presentations to healthcare centers sponsored by the Vatican or bishops' groups. Fisher at times focuses unduly on the kinds of examples apt to please a less-than-diverse audience. For example, in his chapter on cooperation, the five key examples concern abortion (two times), contraception, sterilization, and providing needles for illicit drug use. While these are indeed key issues for Catholic thought on cooperation in wrongdoing, so are a host of economic and political issues as regards a consumerist culture and distributive justice; and Fisher's John Paul II Catholic perspective would be stronger had he integrated these elements more fully into his analyses. The most "ecumenical" chapters in the book—e.g., on transplantation and on suicide—originated in papers presented to more diverse audiences.

Even so, Fisher is clearly an articulate evangelical witness for the "gospel of life," and an intellectually formidable exponent of the Catholic tradition. This is an extraordinarily fine treatment of a John Paul II approach to bioethics.

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La sapienza è amicizia nella Summa theologica di Tommaso d'Aquino. By WOJIECH JANUSIEWICZ. Rome: Città Nuova, 2012. Pp. 346. 19€ (paper). ISBN: 978-88-311-4814-6.

This rich and suggestive (though somewhat repetitive) study originated as a doctoral dissertation defended at the Pontifical Lateran University under the direction of noted Italian theologian Piero Coda. The presentation unfolds in three parts. The first treats “The Sources of Thomas’s Thought on Friendship.” The second traces Thomas’s discussion of love and, in particular, the love that is friendship. Here the author makes the cogent case that Thomas draws upon the approaches of Plato and especially Aristotle, while transforming their views in the light of biblical revelation. Thus Platonic *eros* is repositioned in light of God’s elective and prevenient grace while Aristotle’s *philia* is transformed by the audacious Good News of God’s call to friendship in Christ. As Janusiewicz affirms early in his study (and by way of anticipation of his conclusion): “Friendship, founded upon the communication of divine mysteries in Christ, not only represents one of the themes of the *Summa Theologiae*, it is the *Summa*’s methodological principle and architectonic” (30).

In this quotation we find adumbrated what will be developed at length in the third part of the study: “Love as Friendship and the Architecture [L’Architettura] of the *Summa Theologiae*.” The author provides a careful analysis of various proposals regarding the *Summa*’s structure, from Chenu and Congar to Persson and Patfoort. He then offers his own synthetic proposal which takes as its hermeneutic key question 26, article 3 of the *Prima secundae*, which he goes so far as to call the “*Summissima Summae*” (272). He draws upon the distinctions Thomas presents there between *dilectio*, *caritas*, *amor*, and *amicitia* and correlates them, respectively, to the *Prima pars*, the *Tertia pars*, the *Prima secundae*, and the *Secunda secundae*.

Whether the case the author makes is a cogent one I leave to the judgment of Thomistic specialists. What I myself find appealing and convincing is his distinctly Christological reading of the *Summa*. Not only does he insist that the *Summa* is a work of theology, whose teaching is presented in the light of revelation; he further stipulates that God’s revelation is Christomorphic. Jesus Christ is both the fulfillment and the recapitulation of all God’s dealings with humanity. Grace, which God abundantly bestows on his creation, is ever the grace of Christ, the grace of filiation. Thus the entire *Summa* must be read in the full light of the *Tertia pars*.

An interesting intimation of this thesis is provided by the conclusions to the *Prima pars* and the *Secunda secundae*. Each concludes with “Amen.” But the “Amen” itself follows upon a Christological doxology: [*Jesus Christus, Dominus noster*] “*qui est super omnia benedictus Deus in saecula*.” Such an ending is not a pious decoration affixed to the structure, but stands as revelatory of the scope and thrust of Thomas’s entire work.

Janusiewicz casts a wide net in a laudable attempt to present Jesus Christ as the fulfillment of all God's promises. He probes the biblical and patristic sources that Thomas drew upon, as well as the Greek philosophers with whom he was directly or indirectly in dialogue. He goes even further and examines extant Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Indic literature, seeking traces of ancient man's quest for salvation and immortality. In so doing he even seems to posit some direct acquaintance with these texts on the part of early patristic authors and, through them, on the part of Thomas. Though the suggestion is intriguing, I do not see that the author provides adequate support for his proposal. Nonetheless, his passionate search for seeds of Wisdom in ancient literature as propaedeutic to the gospel is welcome.

Alongside this stress upon continuity and fulfillment, one finds equal insistence upon transformation and the Christian *novum*. Here, for example, is how Janusiewicz describes Thomas's ecclesiology: "the Church coincides with the new humanity, inaugurated in the person of Jesus and present in history as the body of Christ vivified by the grace of its Head" (158). What he postulates is that, in revising Plato and Aristotle in the light of Christian revelation, Thomas is in effect offering a new vision of experience and reality, an "ontology of friendship," wherein those made in the image of God are reborn to a new, supernatural mode of existence. Incorporated into Christ, they live in friendship with God and with their fellow members of Christ's body.

In some ways the book's title, "Wisdom Is Friendship," does not bring out fully the specificity of its argument. Perhaps, "Friendship in Christ Is True Wisdom" would do greater justice to the author's intent. However, Janusiewicz makes abundantly clear that friendship with Jesus does not make him a "partner" (271). Jesus remains ever the Head and we the members of his body. Christ's Headship is never so manifest as in the Eucharist where he himself becomes food for our journey and pledge of future glory.

The *res tantum* of the Eucharist is the unity of the body of Christ, Head and members. The Eucharist fosters the ever greater conformity of the members to the Head, "until we all attain to the unity of the faith and the knowledge of the Son of God, to mature manhood, to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ" (Eph 4:13). Concluding his argument that all of the *Secunda pars* should be read in light of the *Tertia pars*, read "under the sign of Christ" (273), Janusiewicz asserts, "the articles on the Eucharist make precise that the center of the new morality is the living Christ, present and recognized as friend in the sacrament" (307).

As it happens, the author's Doktorvater, Piero Coda, has himself recently published a small gem of a book, *Contemplare e condividere la luce di Dio: la missione della Teo-logia in Tommaso d'Aquino* (Città Nuova, 2014). For Coda, the silence into which Thomas entered towards the end of his life was intimately related to his contemplation of the Eucharist. To be sure, the Eucharist was always the inspiration, source, and soil of his thought (152), but now it had become, as it were, the form of his theology. Indeed, his very body was conformed to the Eucharist. After having written so well about the

Eucharist, Thomas, by his silence, communicated to others, in a still more eloquent way, the One whom he contemplated.

These books of Janusiewicz and Coda are worthy contributions to our renewed appreciation of the Angelic Doctor's ongoing gift to the Church.

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A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq: Riccoldo da Montecroce's Encounter with Islam. By RITA GEORGE-TVRTKOVIĆ. Turnhout: Brepols, 2012. Pp. 248. \$116.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-2-503-53237-0.

Riccoldo da Montecroce's *Book of Pilgrimage*, translated from Latin at the end of Rita George-Tvrtković's *A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq*, depicts the spiritual geography in which the medieval Dominican lived his missionary vocation throughout the Middle East. Even when Riccoldo finds himself east of the New Testament lands, such as in Baghdad or Persia, his spiritual geography retains its hold over his imagination: "Near this same city," he writes, "beyond the river of paradise, is the very renowned and very famous monastery of St Matthew, where the seat of the Jacobite patriarch is located. They say three hundred monks are there. We went there and found men of great abstinence and great prayer. For every day, in addition to another general office which is very long, they pray the entire psalter while standing" (201).

Riccoldo embarks on a sort of religious tourism, going from town to town seeking the nearest Dominican or other Western Christian house of prayer or studies, marveling at the devotions of the local Christians, and investigating the local church architecture and archeology. This Christian anchoring follows from his self-conception as a missionary and pilgrim. Not surprisingly, Riccoldo documents his spiritual geography in terms of the local history of the faith. For instance, as large parts of these Islamic lands were once Christian (something of which he is frequently reminded, to his great lamentation), he records formerly great churches or monastic cells reduced to stables, turned into mosques, or fallen down due to disrepair. And he describes the peoples he meets, such as the Kurds, with reference to their religious trajectory: "First the Kurds were Chaldeans, then they were Christians, and then they became Saracens" (200).

In the first chapter, "Riccoldo *in situ*," George-Tvrtković notes the lack of sources on Riccoldo's early years, turning then to the era's Dominican missions overseas and their relationship to Riccoldo's own vocation. Chapter

2, "Beyond Polemic," introduces readers to the variety of genres, all common to the Middle Ages, that Riccoldo uses, including epistles and the medieval *itinerarium* or travel accounts. This is followed by a chapter on "Muslim Works of Perfection," which centers on the friar's eyewitness accounts of Muslims living their faith, including their high levels of hospitality, social harmony, and charitableness. One issue that is raised here is the extent to which Riccoldo reads "Islam on its own terms" (68) or simply relates to it as an exercise in Christian apologetics. The next chapter, "I Read It in Arabic!" emphasizes Riccoldo's pride at reading the Arabic Qur'an. George-Tvrtković situates his reading of the Muslim holy book within medieval European culture, and refers to Roger Bacon, William of Tripoli, Thomas Aquinas, and others on Islam. The friar mentions at times how he had read the Qur'an "in God's presence" (86). The fifth chapter, "Questioning Salvation History," focuses on Riccoldo's spiritual crisis precipitated by the fall of the Crusader state of Acre in 1291. Angry at God for what happened, he keenly felt heaven's abandonment of Christendom. Chapter 6 brings things together with "Riccoldo's Theology of Islam," which George-Tvrtković bases on his first-hand experience of the religion. She also tries to link his experience and resulting theology with modern thinkers on interreligious dialogue. The two appendices include English translations of Riccoldo's "Five Letters on the Fall of Acre (1291)" and "The Book of Pilgrimage."

George-Tvrtković devotes considerable time to interreligious dialogue, and much less to Riccoldo's spiritual geography. Rather than reflecting on the friar's full vision, she provides readers with a very well-developed sense of her comparative theology, or theology of religions, via her otherwise comprehensive and focused reading of Riccoldo. She offers a fine analysis of other aspects of the friar's writings, highlighting his long-term struggle to understand salvation history.

George-Tvrtković's focus on interreligious dialogue serves the discussion well when she looks at how the deeply pious and authentic religious spirit of the Muslim peoples Riccoldo encountered troubled him profoundly. If the Qur'an were so deceitful and the Bible so truthful, why were Muslims so much better than Christians at certain religious practices, such as praying and forgiving others? The author characterizes Riccoldo's frame of mind well: he "abruptly and frequently vacillates between praising Muslims as loving and forgiving, and then criticizing them as violent and merciless" (64). He was consistent in his inconsistency, and George-Tvrtković finds much meaning here, in the deepest part of Riccoldo's spiritual crisis, as he had to work out why Christians were on the losing end for so long.

The notion of "the Other," that favorite concept of the contemporary American academic, appears frequently, as the author regards Riccoldo as working through his own encounter with the Otherness of the Muslims. She argues that modern concepts of the Other and of interreligious dialogue were present, at least piecemeal and undeveloped, in Riccoldo and a few other standard bearers of the tradition.

George-Tvrtković notes that in many ways Riccoldo's confusion and honesty are benchmarks for reading the Dominican, interreligious dialogue of his day, because his confusion and honesty were based on his first-person experience. She reminds us many times that most medieval churchmen who wrote on Islam, such as Peter the Venerable or Thomas Aquinas, had no first-hand experience of the religion, and were simply passing on the outlooks of earlier perspectives (Ramon Llull and William of Tripoli are mentioned as notable exceptions). Riccoldo's reliance on his own experience sets him apart from most of his contemporaries and links him to present preoccupations and ways of doing theology, including today's various contextual theologies. The author adroitly simplifies the medieval friar's thought process down to a few issues that took years for him to resolve: "For Riccoldo, all of salvation history hinges on the question of whether or not the Qur'an is the word of God, for if the Qur'an is in fact the word of God, then the view of history Riccoldo held previously is no longer valid" (76).

One of the strengths of the book is its comparison of Riccoldo to a host of other writers of his time, highlighting where his thought stood in relation to medieval mentalities on Islam and on travel. George-Tvrtković situates him in his era, comparing his travel writing to other productions of the same genre from the time, and his letters to other examples of letter writing. Even as a product of his society and religious surroundings, the medieval Dominican sometimes proved the exception to the rule.

A little more on the nature of the Crusades, and their theological underpinning in connection to a theology of history, which was such a preoccupation of Riccoldo, would have aided the discussion, as at times readers are treated to a rather narrow background to medieval history and religiosity. The driving force behind Riccoldo's spiritual crisis was the fall of Acre in 1291, the end of the Crusading dream, so more background on how this concerned the Dominican's faith would help to elucidate his spiritual crisis.

Likewise, an investigation of the prevailing notion of pilgrimage—both the Crusaders and Riccoldo saw themselves as pilgrims—would have given readers a greater understanding of the long-term goals of medieval Christendom vis-à-vis the Islamic world. Medieval Westerners are too often depicted as hell-bent on conquering the Muslims when in fact the Church called for the conversion of non-Christians, as exemplified by the missionary attempts of Saints Francis and Dominic, both of which proved influential on Riccoldo's own decision to go east.

By way of looking at Riccoldo and his struggles and inconsistency, George-Tvrtković considers the struggling and inconsistent Western Christian understanding of Islam. Other medievals shared the friar's doubt and frustration over Islam's advances at the expense of Christianity, as well as his belief that Islam was an evil religion at odds with Christianity. The author helpfully exposes the hostile stance towards other religions that one finds at the heart of medieval interreligious dialogue, as was the case with Riccoldo.

After all, hadn't the Dominican gone to the Middle East to convert the Muslims to Christianity, as he felt certain of the perfidious and heretical nature of Islam and its prophet?

Despite certain drawbacks of the book, the author succeeds in her goal of underscoring the complexity of the medieval understanding of Islam. Riccoldo da Montecroce exemplifies what happened when one brave, genuine Christian believer personally encountered countless devout Muslims. His missionary experiences seemed to have raised a host of unexpected questions.

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