GENERAL INDEX TO *THE THOMIST*
VOLUME 83 (2019)

ARTICLES

REVIEWS

REVIEWS (con.)

The Thomist 83 (2019): 493-519

FEMINIST CHRISTOLOGY: A NEW ICONOCLASM?

SARA BUTLER, M.S.B.T.

University of St. Mary of the Lake
Mundelein, Illinois

IN ITS SOME OF ITS best-known expressions, feminist Christology[1] is a contemporary version of iconoclasm.[2] Several leading Catholic feminist theologians, in fact, explicitly claim their identity as "iconoclasts" ("image-breakers") in their critique of Christian doctrine. They embark on a program of deconstruction and revision of Christian symbols because they believe that exclusively male representations of God and of Christ function as "idols" that legitimate male superiority over women.[3] They object to the iconic argument for reserving priestly

[1] There are many different "feminist Christologies," but most share a common method and explore similar themes. For an early report, see Anne E. Carr, "Feminist Views of Christology," *Chicago Studies* 35, no. 2 (1966): 128-40. For a more recent survey that includes the contributions of "new feminists," see Michele M. Schumacher, "Feminist Christologies," in *The Oxford Handbook of Christology*, ed. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 408-24.

[2] The link between the two is explored by Anglo-Catholic theologian Geoffrey Kirk, "The Language of Lite Religion," in *Quo vaditis: The State Churches of Northern Europe*, ed. John Broadhurst (Leominster, England: Gracewing, 1996), 88-91; and Orthodox theologian Kallistos Ware, "Man, Woman, and the Priesthood of Christ," in *Woman and the Priesthood*, ed. Thomas Hopko (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1983), 9-37, at 24-27. (In the 1999 edition of this book, Ware adopts a different position.)

[3] See, for example, Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 66; Anne E. Carr, "Is a Christian Feminist Theology Possible?" *Theological Studies* 43 (1982): 279-97, at 285 and 296-97; idem, *Transforming Grace: Christian Tradition and Women's Experience* (San Francisco: Harper & Row,1988), 134, 140-41; Elizabeth A. Johnson, *She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse* (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 36, 39-40, 45, 51, 243; Sandra M. Schneiders, *Women and the Word: The Gender of God in the New Testament and the Spirituality of Women* (New York: Paulist, 1986), 71; and Elisabeth

ordination to men—namely, that it is fitting that a priest be male in order to represent Christ vis-a-vis the Church—by questioning the theological significance of Christ's own maleness. Some conclude that granting this not only amounts to idolatry but also suggests that women are excluded from salvation.[4]

The idea that granting theological significance to Christ's maleness constitutes idolatry is not entirely without precedent. There was a dispute over how to reconcile belief in Christ's universal human nature with the significance of his concrete humanity, with its male character, during the iconoclastic controversy in the eighth and ninth centuries (726-843) in the Christian East.[5] The iconoclastic controversy had to do with inanimate icons of Christ, images on wooden panels, and the legitimacy not only of venerating them but even of "writing" them at all. For iconoclasts, an icon of Christ either excludes his divine nature or attempts to circumscribe it. They deny that Christ is circumscribed by the flesh and object that since he assumed "man in general," or flesh without distinguishing features, he cannot be portrayed.[6] The feminist Christologies I have in mind are con-

Schüssler Fiorenza, *Discipleship of Equals*: *A Critical Feminist Ekklesia-logy of Liberation* (New York: Crossroad, 1993), 137-38.

[4] See Ruether, *Sexism,* 116-38; Schneiders, *Women and the Word*, 4-5; Carr, "Feminist Views," 133); idem, *Transforming Grace*, 161; Johnson, *She Who Is*, 73, 153-54. Schneiders (*Women and the Word*, 72-73, 79) and Johnson (*She Who Is*, 297) cite an influential article by Anglican scholar Richard Norris, "The Ordination of Women and the 'Maleness' of the Christ," *Anglican Theological Review,* Supplementary Series, no. 6 (1976): 69-80.

[5] See Nonna Verna Harrison, "The Maleness of Christ," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 43, no. 2 (1998): 111-52 at 114-24; and Valerie Karras, "The Incarnational and Hypostatic Significance of the Maleness of Christ According to Theodore of Stoudios," *Studia Patristica* 32 (1996): 320-24, at 321-22. For the full scope of the controversy, see Christoph Schönborn, *God's Human Face: The Christ Icon*, trans. Lothar Krauth (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1994), 135-235; and John Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1974), 42-53 and idem, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1975; translation of *Le Christ dans la théologie byzantine*), 173-92.

[6] This second objection, found in the arguments to which St. Theodore responds, corresponds very closely to the feminist expressions of concern about Christ's "inclusive" humanity, both as it was assumed at the Incarnation and as it is transfigured in the eschaton.

cerned with which persons may be regarded as "icons" of Christ—males only, or both males and females.[7] For feminists as well as iconoclasts, Christ's humanity must be inclusive, so the claim that only males can function as his "icons" in the priesthood excludes females—not only from his humanity but also from salvation. Both, then, deal with purported deficiencies in visible representations of Christ.

These feminist and iconoclastic theologians both, in fact, raise questions about the reality, permanence, and character of the Incarnation.[8] While iconoclasts were initially concerned only with the veneration of icons, the debate they initiated was eventually recognized as a Christological controversy.[9] While feminist theologians were initially concerned chiefly with women's access to the ministerial priesthood, their critique has also given rise to questionable Christological claims.[10]

Saint Theodore the Studite (756-829), the leading champion of icons during the second phase of the iconoclastic controversy, is one of the few Fathers of the Church who took up the question of Christ's maleness.[11] I hope to show that St. Theodore's response to the iconoclasts of his day also meets the objections

[7] Some Christian artists attempt representations of an androgynous Jesus. See, for example, Janet McKenzie's "Jesus of the People" at http://www.janetmckenzie.com/prints.html.

[8] Meyendorff's description of the iconoclasts' concerns in *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought*, 184, seems to name those of feminist Christology as well.

[9] Ibid., 180.

[10] Some Christians influenced by this critique have rejected traditional images of Christ, certain of his names and titles, and even fundamental doctrines. Often, however, these same critics find in Jesus' person and example the subversion of "patriarchal" privilege. See Ruether, *Sexism*, 134-38; Carr, *Transforming Grace,* 160-61; and Elizabeth A. Johnson, "Redeeming the Name of Christ," in *Freeing Theology: The Essentials of Theology in Feminist Perspective*, ed. Catherine Mowry LaCugna (HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 115-37, at 126.

[11] See Karras, "Incarnational and Hypostatic Significance," 322; and Harrison, "Maleness of Christ," 118. It is of interest to note that St. Theodore considers the priest as an "icon" (*eikon*) and a "symbol" (*mimēma*) of Christ in his *Seven Chapters against the Iconoclasts,* IV. See Theodore the Studite, *Writings on Iconoclasm*, trans. and intro. by Thomas Cattoi, Ancient Christian Writers 69 (New York: The Newman Press, 2015), 126. For a commentary on this passage, see Ware, "Man, Woman, and the Priesthood of Christ," 24-27.

posed by feminist Christology. His appeal to Christ's birth from the Virgin Mary *Theotókos*, moreover, calls attention to the traditional way of claiming a role for women in the economy of salvation.

I. Feminist Christology[12]

I will take Rosemary Radford Ruether, Anne E. Carr, and Elizabeth A. Johnson as representatives of the feminist Christology that took shape in response to the iconic argument proposed to elucidate why priestly ordination is reserved to men.[13] As expressed in the 1976 Declaration of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith *Inter insigniores*,[14] the iconic argument appeals to St. Thomas Aquinas's teaching that sacramental signs "represent what they signify by natural resemblance."[15] The declaration (art. 5) explains:

> The same natural resemblance is required for persons as for things: when Christ's role in the Eucharist is to be expressed sacramentally, there would not be this "natural resemblance" which must exist between Christ and his minister if the role of Christ were not taken by a man: in such a case it would be difficult to see in the minister *the image of Christ*. *For Christ himself was and remains a man*.[16]

[12] In this essay, then, "feminist Christology" will designate the work of Ruether, Carr, and Johnson.

[13] Johnson (*She Who Is*, 281 n. 33) acknowledges indebtedness to Ruether's pioneering work. Carr and Johnson do not, however, adopt Ruether's method or share her radical rejection of the Christological councils; they intend to address the feminist critique from within the context of the Church's faith. Their analyses continue to influence the debate on the ordination of women to the diaconate. See Phyllis Zagano, "The Question of Governance and Ministry for Women," *Theological Studies* 68 (2007): 348-67, at 365: "But the iconic argument represents a naïve physicalism that reduces Christ's humanity to maleness and ignores the overwhelming fact that God became human in Christ."

[14] See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, *From "Inter Insigniores" to "Ordinatio Sacerdotalis": Documents and Commentaries* (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1998), 20-53. I will cite the text from this publication.

[15] IV *Sent.*, d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 4.

[16] *From "Inter Insigniores,"* 43 (emphasis added).

Advocates of women's ordination charge that this teaching functions, in practice, to justify male domination. According to sacred Scripture, they point out, women as well as men are made in the "image of God" (Gen 1:27) and, by virtue of baptism, are able to "image" Christ (cf. Rom 8:29; Gal 3:28). In appearing to St. Paul, in fact, Jesus identifies his male and female disciples with himself (Acts 9:2, 5; 22:4, 8; 26:15). For these authors, the problem is not just that priestly ordination is reserved to males. It is more fundamental still; it is the fact that the Church attaches theological significance to the sex or "maleness" of Jesus. Some contend that the iconic argument is novel, seriously flawed, and, on Christological grounds, heretical.[17]

I will mention, only to set aside, the mistake this feminist Christology makes by confusing different types of "resemblance" or "representation."[18] The "natural resemblance" required for holy orders to which the declaration appeals is neither our common humanity nor our configuration to Christ by grace, but the male sex, a sign given by nature.[19] In saying that the sacramental sign of holy orders should be a male because he represents Christ the mediator who is a male, the declaration draws on the teaching of St. Bonaventure.[20] As it points out, in the case of holy orders

[17] See Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Contemporary Roman Catholicism: Crises and Challenges* (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed & Ward, 1987), 37-38; Carr, *Transforming Grace,* 178; and Johnson, *She Who Is*, 167; and idem, "Imaging God, Embodying Christ: Women as a Sign of the Times," in *The Church Women Want: Catholic Women in Dialogue,* ed. Elizabeth A. Johnson (New York: Crossroad, 2002), 45-59, at 55.

[18] See, for example, Elizabeth A. Johnson, "Responses to Rome," *Commonweal* 123 (January 26, 1996): 11-12, at 11: "let it be plainly stated that women are icons of Christ, *imago Christi,* in every essential way. There is a natural resemblance between women and Jesus Christ in terms of a common humanity and participation in divine grace. To teach otherwise is a pernicious error that vitiates the power of baptism." Holy orders presupposes baptism, but it is another sacrament, and it has its own requirements, for it signifies Christ in his relation to the Church.

[19] See St. Thomas Aquinas, IV *Sent.,* d. 25, q. 2, a. 1. As St. Thomas explains, even though holy women—like prophets, judges, and abbesses— exercise spiritual authority, a woman is not a fitting sacramental sign for *holy orders*. The female sex does not disqualify women from leadership positions in other sacred or secular spheres.

[20] See IV *Sent.,* d. 25, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi ed., 4:649). Although some theologians make the case that St. Thomas would agree, he did not in fact propose this as the reason for reserving the priesthood to males. Saint Bonaventure, on the other hand, did link the

the minister who takes the role of Christ (acting "*in persona Christi capitis Ecclesiae*") enters himself into the sacramental sign, and because Christ "was and remains a man,"[21] it is fitting[22] that his representative be a male. On the mistaken supposition that the iconic argument constitutes the fundamental reason for the sacramental tradition, and that it unjustly discriminates against women,[23] many feminist theologians proceed to challenge its Christological foundations.

A) Three Claims of Feminist Christology

The following claims are characteristically made by the feminist Christology I have in mind.

(1) *Jesus' maleness is only one "historical particularity" among others, and it is not theologically significant,*[24] *although it has social-symbolic significance*. It cannot mean that God is male or that Jesus is the Incarnation of a divine male. It reveals nothing about the divine nature, for sex belongs to the created order.

requirement of a male candidate to the male sex of Christ and its nuptial significance. See Sara Butler, "The Priest as Sacrament of Christ the Bridegroom," *Worship* 66 (1992): 498-517.

[21] *From "Inter Insigniores,"* 43 (art. 5). The declaration goes on to say that Christ is "the firstborn of all humanity, of women as well as men. . . . Nevertheless, the Incarnation of the Word took place according to the male sex; this is indeed a question of fact."

[22] The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, like St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, supplies an argument from fittingness for a sacramental practice accepted as authoritative on the basis of an unbroken tradition, settled in canon law, and understood to represent the will of Christ.

[23] For a reply to these charges, see Sara Butler, *The Catholic Priesthood and Women: A Guide to the Teaching of the Church* (Chicago: Hillenbrand, 2007), chap. 3. Ruether acknowledges the fundamental reason, but she does not consider it a factor since she rejects the dominical foundation of the priesthood. (See her "Women Priests and Church Tradition," in *Women Priests: A Catholic Commentary on the Vatican Declaration,* ed. Leonard Swidler and Arlene Swidler [New York: Paulist Press, 1977], 234-36). Carr and Johnson tackle the iconic argument without adverting to the difference between the "fundamental reason" and the "theological argument."

[24] Feminist Christology uses "theological significance" to caution against suggesting that maleness is a property of the divine nature, or that the Incarnation of the divine Logos as a man rather than a woman is an ontological necessity. For both feminist and iconoclast Christology, "theological significance" also has to do with the problem of maleness as a permanent property of Christ's particular human nature.

Classical Christology, however, has promoted "the unwarranted idea that there is a necessary ontological connection between the maleness of Jesus' historical person and the maleness of the *Logos* as the male offspring and disclosure of a male God."[25] To offset this bias in favor of males, it is useful to explore how the scriptural symbol of Wisdom (*Sophia*), a female personification and attribute of God, functions as an equally legitimate biblical alternative.[26] As regards Jesus' human identity, he was, of course, a man. His male sex, however, has no more significance than his ethnicity or race or social class.[27] It is only one historical particularity among others.[28] What is significant is not Jesus' maleness but his "compassionate, liberating life in the world."[29] For the baptized, "imaging" Christ, or being "christomorphic," depends not on being male but on the moral choice to follow his example. His example of self-sacrificing love, in fact, reveals that Christ's maleness has a positive, "social-symbolic" value; it serves as a model for men who would otherwise claim "patriarchal" privilege and use their power to dominate women.[30]

[25] Ruether, *Sexism*, 117. According to Johnson, *She Who Is,* 35, "As visible image of the invisible God, the human man Jesus is used to tie the knot between maleness and divinity very tightly."

[26] See Ruether, *Sexism,* 57-61; Carr, *Transforming Grace,* 173-74; and Johnson, *She Who Is,* 86-100.

[27] According to Johnson ("Redeeming," 118), "The fact that Jesus of Nazareth was a man is not in question. . . . His sex is as intrinsic to his historical person as are his race, class, ethnic heritage, culture, Jewish religious faith, his Galilean village roots, and so forth." See also Rosemary Radford Ruether, *To Change the World: Christologies and Cultural Criticism* (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 47; idem, "The Liberation of Christology from Patriarchy," *New Blackfriars* 66 (1985): 324-35, at 332; and Carr, "Feminist Views," 132.

[28] Johnson proposes a "multi-polar anthropology" to deal with this question. See *She Who Is,* 154-56.

[29] Ibid., 73:"The image of Christ does not lie in sexual similarity to the human man Jesus, but in coherence with the narrative shape of his compassionate, liberating life in the world, through the power of the Spirit."

[30] See Ruether, *Sexism*, 136-38; Carr, *Transforming Grace,* 160-61; and Johnson, "Redeeming the Name of Christ," 126. For this reason, Ruether identifies Jesus himself as an "iconoclastic" prophet who manifests the *kenosis* of patriarchy.

(2) *What is theologically significant is Jesus' humanity, not his male sex*.[31] Christ assumed our human nature as a whole. His humanity, therefore, is necessarily inclusive of the female sex. This is the force of the soteriological principle enunciated in the early Church, "What was not assumed was not redeemed."[32] If Christ were incarnate only as a male, he could not represent women, and consequently could not redeem them.[33] But since the Church has always admitted women to baptism and included them among the redeemed, it must be admitted that his humanity is inclusive of females as well as males.

(3) *The "human man Jesus" was a male, but "the Christ"*[34]*—risen and transfigured in glory—transcends sexual identity*.[35] At his Resurrection, Jesus became "the Christ." The Christ, in contrast to Jesus, is not male. The transformation of his humanity

[31] Rosemary Radford Ruether, "Male Clericalism and the Dread of Women," *The Ecumenist* 11, no. 5 (1973): 65-69, at 65; Carr, *Transforming Grace,* 161; Johnson, *She Who Is,* 164-65.

[32] The principle is traced to St. Gregory Nazianzen's *Letter to Cledonius against Apollinaris* (Epistle 101). See Edward R. Hardy, ed. *Christology of the Later Fathers* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), 215-24, at 218. This argument is made by Ruether, "Male Clericalism," 65; and by Norris, "Ordination of Women and the 'Maleness' of the Christ." See also Carr, *Transforming,* 161.

[33] Ruether, with reference to the male priesthood, says, "If women cannot represent Christ, then it becomes questionable if Christ represents women" (*Contemporary Roman Catholicism*, 37). See also Carr, *Transforming Grace,* 161; and Johnson, "Redeeming," 120. In *She Who Is*, Johnson says, "To make of the maleness of Christ a christological principle is to deny the universality of salvation" (73).

[34] Contemporary New Testament scholars distinguish the "historical Jesus" from "the Christ," or the pre-Easter "Jesus" from the post-Easter "Christ." Theologians who hope to replace the vocabulary of Chalcedon (one person, two natures) for something more contemporary and intelligible sometimes use these names to distinguish Christ's human and divine natures. For the problem of supposing that the conceptual pairing "the historical Jesus/the Christ of faith" matches the conceptual pairing "humanity/divinity," see John P. Galvin's important essay, "From the Humanity of Christ to the Jesus of History: A Paradigm Shift in Catholic Christology," *Theological Studies* 55 (1994): 252-73, at 256-67. Feminist theologians who take this option (the historical Jesus/the Christ), also draw on the classical tradition of speaking of the "whole Christ (*totus Christus*)," i.e., the risen Christ together with his Body the Church.

[35] For Carr (*Transforming Grace*, 181), "the risen Christ is understood to have transcended all the particularities and limitations of earthly existence in the new life of the resurrection." For Johnson (*She Who Is,* 163), "Jesus has truly died, with all that this implies of change: he is gone from the midst of history according to the flesh."

escapes our imagination, but it is inclusive of humanity in all its variety. Christ has taken body in the Church, a pneumatological reality inclusive of the redeemed of both sexes. It is "naïve physicalism," then, to "collapse the totality of the Christ into the human man Jesus,"[36] and to assume that he "remains a man," as *Inter insigniores* asserts. Ruether puts it this way: "Christ, as a redemptive person and Word of God, is not to be encapsulated 'once-for-all' in the historical Jesus. The Christian community continues Christ's identity."[37]

B) Initial Assessment

How shall these three feminist claims be evaluated? Granted, being male is only one among Christ's distinctive human features, and it does not imply that the divine nature is characterized by sex; but this does not mean that his sexual identity has no more theological importance than his ethnicity or race or social class. Granted, what is central for faith in the Incarnation is Christ's true and full humanity, not his male sex, but true humanity includes rather than excludes sex. If Christ is able to act on behalf of women as well as men to merit our salvation, it is not because he is a male but because he is a divine person who has assumed our human nature. Granted, after the Resurrection the transfigured and glorified Christ is the Head of his Body, the Church, a pneumatological reality (the "whole Christ") which includes both men and women. This does not mean, however, that he abandoned his human nature at his Resurrection, or that he is simply identical with the Church.

The line of feminist Christology I am examining addresses two of the issues raised by the iconoclasts, namely, the consequences for Christ of assuming human nature "as a whole" and the deification of his human nature at the Resurrection. Whereas feminist Christology objects only to granting theological significance to Christ's *maleness*, iconoclasm questioned the reality,

[36] Johnson, *She Who Is,* 161.

[37] Ruether, *Sexism*, 138. See also Carr, "Feminist Views," 132; and Johnson, "Redeeming," 128-29.

permanence, and character of Christ's *humanity*. In light of St. Theodore's rebuttal of iconoclastic Christology, however, it becomes apparent that feminist Christology also calls into question the reality, permanence, and character of Christ's *humanity*. To the extent that both deviate from conciliar teaching on the hypostatic union, they undermine the doctrine of the Incarnation. The defense of icons identifies what is missing in feminist Christology and shows that some of its objections are based on a misreading of the Church's teaching.

II. Saint Theodore's Rebuttal of Iconoclastic Christology

The iconoclasts charged that Christians who wrote and venerated icons violated the biblical law against making graven images (Deut 5:7-9; Exod 20:3-4). Out of zeal for religious reform, and for political reasons as well, they destroyed the icons and persecuted the iconodules (or iconophiles, the "icon-lovers"). They also worked out a theological critique of icons, especially icons of Christ the Lord.[38] For the iconoclasts, any attempt to depict Christ "in the form of a servant" (Phil 2:7) amounts to idolatry. Icons, they said, either (1) portray only his humanity, to the exclusion of his divinity (which is Nestorianism); or (2) presume to depict his two unmixed natures (which is impossible, since his divinity is "uncircumscribable"); or (3) presume that his divinity is confused with his humanity

[38] The first period of the iconoclast controversy (726-787) was concerned chiefly with the legitimacy of writing and venerating icons. At a council held by 338 iconoclastic bishops at Hieria in 754, Emperor Constantine V condemned the veneration of icons as a Christological heresy (Schönborn, *God's Human Face,* 168). The Second Council of Nicaea (787) defended the veneration of icons but did not respond to this charge (Schönborn, *God's Human Face,* 200; Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology*, 46). The iconoclast controversy flared up again in 813 and lasted until the "victory of orthodoxy" in 843. During this period, the "Golden Age" of icon theology, iconodule theologians took up and answered the charge of Christological heresy. Saint John Damascene (675-749) belonged to the first generation of iconodule theologians and St. Theodore the Studite (759-826) to the second.

(which is Monophysitism).[39] If Christ is one person (*prosôpon*) "out of" two natures, one material and one immaterial but now inseparable, they asked, how can he be depicted at all?[40] They held, correctly, that Christ assumed human nature as a whole, but they also taught that his human nature was deified by its union with his divine nature and therefore became uncircumscribable. (*They* were the Monophysites!)[41] In their view, then, an icon that presumes to portray the deified countenance of Christ, either in his earthly life or as the Risen Lord, is an idol. The formula "out of" two natures favors the iconoclast position (i.e., the person [*prosôpon*] results from the union), whereas the formula "in" two natures preserves the doctrine that Christ's *hypostasis* is the preexisting *hypostasis* of the Word, "one of the Trinity."[42]

Saint Theodore the Studite successfully identified and refuted the iconoclasts' Christological errors in his three treatises *On the Holy Icons,* or *Antirrhêtikoi*.[43] These errors, which are common to iconoclasm and feminist Christology, concern (1) the distinction between "person" and "nature," (2) human nature as a

[39] This is the Christological dilemma posed to the iconodules by the Iconoclast Council of 754. See Schönborn, *God's Human Face,* 168-78; Meyendorff, *Christ*, 180-81.

[40] See Schönborn, *God's Human Face,* 171. A "strict Chalcedonian" would have taken exception to the iconoclasts' "*out of* two natures" because Chalcedon says that Christ "is to be acknowledged *in* two natures" (171, 177 n. 85). The Second Council of Constantinople (553) allowed for the expression "out of two natures," but only if it were used in accordance with its own doctrine regarding the one person of Christ. See *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei*, ed. Heinrich Denzinger, Peter Hünermann (hereafter DH), 429, canon 8.

[41] According to Meyendorff (*Christ,* 182), iconoclast Christology held that "the deification of the humanity of Christ suppresses the reality of the properly human natural character."

[42] See Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology*, 153. Schönborn (*God's Human Face,* 173-78) discusses this in some detail and places it in the larger context of the iconoclast controversy.

[43] For his three refutations, see *St. Theodore the Studite: On the Holy Icons*, trans. Catherine P. Roth (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1981). I will cite the texts from this translation. Since St. Theodore lays out his position in dialogue with his adversaries, I will rely on his report of the iconoclasts' objections. Roth (ibid., 7-17), provides an excellent introduction to St. Theodore's contribution. See also Schönborn's summary (*God's Human Face,* 219-35). For a more recent translation that includes Theodore's other anti-iconoclast writings, see Cattoi, trans., *Writings on Iconoclasm.*

universal and its existence in individual men and women, and (3) the permanence of the Incarnation. Saint Theodore's defense of icons responds to each of these; his teaching can be spelled out in six statements.

1. *An icon depicts Christ's person, not his natures*. The iconoclasts assumed that an icon intends to depict the personal countenance, or *prosôpon,* that results from the union of his divine and human natures. In their view, "Our Lord Jesus Christ is one person [*prosôpon*] *out of* two natures."[44] In other words, they regarded the one person as the result of the union rather than the subject of the Incarnation. In effect, they understood the divine *nature*, rather than the divine person of the Word, to be the subject of the Incarnation. When the divine nature assumed a human nature, it deified and suppressed the human nature. Christ, then, the person who results from this union, is uncircumscribable. The iconoclasts failed to distinguish Christ's *hypostasis* from his two natures.[45]

Saint Theodore replied that an icon depicts neither the divine nature nor the human nature but the person (*hypostasis*) of the pre-existing *Logos*,[46] "one of the Trinity,"[47] as man.[48] An icon

[44] Schönborn, *God's Human Face,* 171. In this, the iconoclasts were like the Monophysites who reasoned that Christ had a composite nature. For more on this, see Schönborn, *God's Human Face,* 109.

[45] See Meyendorff, *Christ*, 182. Schönborn points out (*God's Human Face,* 109) that the Monophysites suppose that the composite hypostasis is also a composite nature.

[46] As Meyendorff (*Byzantine Theology*, 153) explains, the Council of Chalcedon "did not clearly specify that the term hypostasis, used to designate [Christ's] identity, also designated the hypostasis of the pre-existing Logos." This was taught, however, by the Second Council of Constantinople (DH 424-30). Catholic scholars and ecumenists have reassessed the contribution of II Constantinople in recent years. The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (para. 468) explicitly asserts its teaching that "there is but one *hypostasis* [or person], which is our Lord Jesus Christ, one of the Trinity." See DH 424 and DH 432.

[47] St. Theodore identifies Christ as "one of the Trinity" in *On Holy Icons* I:2 (*PG* 99:332A) and III:A 19 (*PG* 99:400A). Schönborn points out (*God's Human Face,* 223) that he takes up the insight of Maximus the Confessor regarding the relation of person and nature in Christ, namely, "the very same properties that define Jesus as this specific man also render his divine person visible."

[48] See *On Holy Icons,* III:A 34 (*PG* 99:405B): "When anyone is portrayed, it is not the nature but the hypostasis which is portrayed." In defending the tradition of venerating

depicts "God-made-man," the Son of God who by reason of his Incarnation exists "in," not "out of," two natures.[49] It does not, as the iconoclasts charged, depict a "mere man," for the Word did not assume an individual man, a human person. Instead, an icon depicts Christ, a divine person who possesses a human nature and is in fact a man.[50] In saying this, St. Theodore appeals to "the Church's judgment" that "the *hypostasis* of the Word became a common hypostasis of the two natures."[51] He goes on to explain that Christ's human nature is anhypostatic: "This human nature does not have its existence in a self-subsisting and self-circumscribed person, apart from the hypostasis of the Word, but has its existence within that hypostasis."[52]

2. *An icon depicts Christ according to his humanity*. The iconoclasts denounced icons of Christ because they understood them to imply that the divine nature could be circumscribed. To respond, St. Theodore employs the communication of idioms.[53] The "hypostasis of Christ is circumscribable: not according to its

icons, the Second Council of Nicaea asserts: "He who venerates an image venerates in it the person [*hypostasin*] whom the image represents" (DH 601).

[49] According to the Council of Chalcedon (DH 302) "one and the same Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son, must be acknowledged *in* [not "out of"] two natures, without confusion or change, without division or separation."

[50] See *On Holy Icons* I:3-4 (*PG* 99:332B-333A). Defending this doctrine against Monophysitism, St. Theodore points out that Christ was "wrapped in swaddling clothes," "seen," "touched," and "crucified." The Son of God became "man," and he is also "a man"—but not a "mere man."

[51] *On Holy Icons* III:A 22 (*PG* 99:400D).

[52] Ibid. By "the Church's judgment" St. Theodore refers to the teaching of the Second Council of Constantinople that the one *hypostasis* is that of the pre-existing Word. The council did not use the terms "*anhypostasis*" and "*enhypostasis*," but it incorporated the content of this theory—introduced by Leontius of Jerusalem—into its Christological doctrine. Saint Theodore presupposes the doctrine of *enhypostasis* as a Christological standard, as do the iconoclasts with whom he is debating. For the development of this doctrine, see Dennis Michael Ferrara, "'Hypostatized in the Logos': Leontius of Byzantium, Leontius of Jerusalem, and the Unfinished Business of the Council of Chalcedon," *Louvain Studies* 22, no. 4 (1997): 312-27.

[53] The "communication" appears more starkly if one says "God the Word is circumscribable according to his humanity." One can distinguish what pertains to Christ according to his divinity from what pertains to him according to his humanity only if one identifies the *hypostasis* as the *hypostasis* of the Word. See St. Thomas Aquinas, *STh* III, q. 16, aa. 4 and 5.

divinity, which no one has ever beheld, but according to his humanity which is contemplated in an individual manner in it."[54] To refute the iconoclasts, he appeals to the teaching of Chalcedon: "the distinction between the natures was never abolished by their union but rather the character proper to each of the two natures was preserved as they came together in one person [*prosôpon*] and one hypostasis."[55] Now it is proper to human nature to be circumscribable.

3. *The Word assumed our human nature "as a whole," but it subsists in him as an individual human being*. The iconoclasts held that Christ was uncircumscribable, not only because they thought his flesh was deified by its assumption by the divine nature,[56] but also because it was the flesh of human nature "as a whole" or "man" in general. In other words, they interpreted "human nature" as "flesh without distinguishing features,"[57] and they denied that his human nature was concretely particularized or characterized. On these grounds, too, they denied that Christ could be depicted as a man. The human nature they attributed to him remained an abstraction, a "universal" in the manner of a Platonic idea.

Saint Theodore agreed that Christ assumed humanity in general; in his day, it was commonly understood that Christ, the New Adam, took on human nature as a whole, healing and restoring it. Theologians regarded the absence of a human hypostasis in Christ, in fact, as a soteriological necessity because it left his humanity "open," ensuring that all the members of the human family could share in its deification.[58] Saint Theodore

[54] *On Holy Icons* III:A 24 (*PG* 99:401A). See also ibid., III:A 13 (*PG* 99:396B): "For He who is incontainable was contained in the Virgin's womb; He who is measureless became three cubits tall . . . He who is timeless became twelve years old by increasing in age . . . He who is bodiless, when He had assumed a body, said to His disciples, 'Take, eat, this is my body'."

[55] Council of Chalcedon (DH 302).

[56] Schönborn, *God's Human Face,* 177.

[57] *On Holy Icons* III:A 15 (*PG* 99:396D).

[58] This has special importance in the soteriology of the Eastern Fathers. They developed the theme of the "marvelous exchange": Christ took on our humanity to give us his divinity. By assuming human nature as a whole, Christ makes room for our deification. See Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology,* 159: "God assumed humanity in a way

maintained, however, that by his Incarnation, Christ accepted the circumscription natural to his body.[59] While he assumed the totality of human nature, it subsists in him, that is, in his *hypostasis*, as an individual. He is not only "man," he is "a man."[60] "Generalities [like humanity]," he writes, "have their existence in particular individuals: for example, humanity in Peter and Paul."[61]

4. *Christ's male sex is proof that he is truly human*. According to St. Theodore, "[I]f Christ were uncircumscribable, as being without a body, He would also be without the difference of sex. But He was born male, as Isaiah says, from 'the prophetess': therefore He is circumscribed."[62] His maleness is "a necessary element of His Incarnation and a proof of the reality of that Incarnation."[63] One cannot write an icon of "human nature"! He writes, "Peter is not portrayed insofar as he is animate, rational, mortal, and capable of thought and understanding"—characteristics that define human nature.[64] He has to be distinguished from others of the same species. It is impossible to depict a generic human being, someone who is neither male nor female.[65] It is possible, however, to write an icon of Christ because he assumed human nature as a male; he has a proper name, Jesus.[66] His

which did not exclude any human hypostasis, but which opened to all of them the possibility of restoring their unity in Himself."

[59] As Karras explains ("Incarnational and Hypostatic Significance," 321), "the absence of a separate, human hypostasis in Christ does not for Theodore mean that the Son's assumption of humanity is generic or docetic in nature, as some of the iconoclasts would have it."

[60] *On Holy Icons* III:A 17 (*PG* 99:397BC).

[61] Ibid., III:A 15 (*PG* 99:396D). Saint Theodore abandoned a Platonizing view of humanity in general for Aristotelian categories, according to Schönborn (*God's Human Face,* 221, 229-30) and Meyendorff (*Byzantine Theology,* 47).

[62] *On Holy Icons* III:A 45 (*PG* 99:409D). The reference is to Isaiah 8:3. Isaiah's son was understood to be a type of Christ; see Isa 8:18.

[63] Karras, "Incarnational and Hypostatic Significance," 322.

[64] *On Holy Icons* III:A 34 (*PG* 99:405B).

[65] See ibid., III:A 45 (*PG* 99:409D): "Maleness and femaleness are sought only in the forms of bodies, since none of the differences which characterize the sexes can be recognized in bodiless beings."

[66] Ibid., III:A 18, 20 (*PG* 99:397D; 400A).

human nature is like ours in this respect, that it is characterized by sex.

5. *Christ's birth from a woman is also proof that he is truly human*. To underscore the reality of the Incarnation, St. Theodore appeals to the Virgin Mary, the *Theotókos*. Christ's birth from a woman demonstrates that he has a human nature like ours, one that can be depicted in icons. Echoing the tradition, he writes, "Christ is identical with His Father in respect to divinity, but identical with His mother in respect to his humanity,"[67] and he "comes from the uncircumscribable Father . . . but from a circumscribable mother."[68] In icons of the *Theotókos* (which the iconoclasts also opposed), the Virgin Mother has Christ with her; he is held in her arms, seated on her lap, or enclosed in a medallion on her breast or over her womb.

6. *The risen Christ retains his human nature*. When the iconoclast theologians maintained that Christ's divinized flesh was uncircumscribable, they had the risen Christ in mind. They appealed to the Apostle Paul, who said, "we once knew Christ according to the flesh, yet now we know him so no longer" (2 Cor 5:16).[69] Saint Theodore defends the traditional teaching that the divinization of Christ's flesh at the Resurrection does not spell the end of the Incarnation. "Christ is circumscribed even after His Resurrection,"[70] he writes. He cites the gospel accounts of the Lord's apparitions as evidence that deification did not suppress the individual characteristics of his human nature. He also appeals to the authority of Gregory the Theologian who taught that "Christ is now with the body He assumed in order to deify me by the power of his hominization."[71] To say otherwise is once again to fall into the error of Monophysitism.

[67] Ibid., III:B 2 (*PG* 99:417B).

[68] Ibid., III:A 39 (*PG* 99:408C). In III:A 54 (*PG* 99:413D) St. Theodore says: "Of whatever kind of being she is who gives birth, that which is born must be the same kind of being: since the mother of Christ is circumscribed, then Christ also is circumscribed, as her son, although He is God by nature."

[69] Ibid., II:41 (*PG* 99:381C).

[70] Ibid., II:41 (*PG* 99:384B).

[71] See also ibid., III:A 42-47 (*PG* 99:384B-388A).

III. Feminist Christology in Light of St. Theodore's Defense of Icons

Feminist Christology, like iconoclastic Christology, fails to grasp (or accept) the teaching of the Second Council of Constantinople on the hypostatic union,[72] so it does not address St. Theodore's first two points. As for his third and fourth points, it follows the faulty analysis of the iconoclasts, and it carries this analysis over to his sixth point. Because it fails to deal with his first two points, moreover, it fails to factor in his fifth point, namely, the essential role of the *Theotókos* in the Incarnation. As a consequence of this last omission, feminist Christology concludes that the divine economy of salvation privileges males over females, men over women. Let us see, then, how St. Theodore's rebuttal of iconoclastic Christology helps to identify problems in feminist Christology.

1. Saint Theodore's response to the iconoclasts of his day relies on the distinction between nature and person worked out in the Christological councils.[73] An icon depicts neither the divine nature nor the human nature, but the divine person (*hypostasis*) of the pre-existing Word, "one of the Trinity," as man. Christ's human nature has no independent personal existence, but exists within the *hypostasis* of the Word. Feminist Christology does not observe this distinction. It has little to say about the pre-existing divine person.[74] Instead, it takes the divine nature (or simply

[72] That is, it fails to identify the one person with the hypostasis of the pre-existing Word, and consequently ignores or misinterprets the communication of idioms. Unlike iconoclastic Christology, which tends towards Monophysitism, however, feminist Christology tends towards Nestorianism.

[73] See Alois Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition,* vol. 2, part 2 (London: Mowbray, 1995), 507: "For Chalcedonian christology after 451 . . . the one *hypostasis* was not to be considered as the end-product (*apostlesma*) of the union. Rather it is already present in the person of the Logos who exists in the divine nature, but who now in the Incarnation assumes a complete human nature."

[74] Feminist Christology refers to "the Word" or "Sophia" as Christological symbols, and expresses some ambivalence about the possibility of naming the three divine persons apart from the economy. See Ruether, *Sexism,* 68-71; Carr, *Transforming Grace,* 149; Johnson, *She Who Is,* 202-5. Ruether, in fact, does not accept the Christological and Trinitarian doctrine of the councils. In *The Christology of Rosemary Radford Ruether: A*

"God," undifferentiated as to person) to be the subject of the Incarnation. When it warns against the possibility of "a certain leakage of Jesus' male human nature into the divine nature,"[75] it betrays its affinity with the iconoclasts' view that Christ (the one person) is the product of a union of divine and human natures.[76] In addition, because it does not suppose that Christ's human nature exists in the hypostasis of the Word, it thinks of the human Jesus as having his own independent existence. Like Nestorianism, feminist Christology takes "Jesus" to be a human person,[77] distinct from "the Christ," who must be portrayed by both sexes because in the eschaton his humanity is inclusive. What is missing from the feminist reconstruction of Christology, then, is the person of the pre-existing Word, "one of the Trinity," the subject of the Incarnation.

2. Saint Theodore explains that an icon depicts Christ according to his human nature, rather than according to his divine nature. Given that feminist Christology does not distinguish the person of the Son from his divine nature, it has no way to acknowledge this. The appeal to the communication of idioms, however, is the correct response to the feminist suspicion that God or the divine nature is understood to be male apart from the Incarnation. It depends logically on the Chalcedonian doctrine of the hypostatic union, namely, that the one divine person—"one and the same Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son"—subsists

Critical Introduction (Mystic, Conn.: Twenty-Third Publications, 1988), 71, Mary Hembrow Snyder reports her belief that "classical christology at its zenith replaced the historical person of Jesus with a cosmological doctrine that issued from contemporary religious philosophy."

[75] Johnson, *She Who Is,* 152; see Ruether, *Sexism,* 117.

[76] See Johnson's description of the hypostatic union (*She Who Is,* 35) and Carr's description of Christ's person as "the mysterious unity of the divine and human" (*Transforming Grace,* 161). Both seem to identify Christ as the product of the coming together of the two natures, and to overlook the clarifications proposed by the post-Chalcedonian councils.

[77] In response to the Nestorian heresy, the Council of Ephesus taught "the Word, hypostatically uniting to himself the flesh animated by a rational soul, became man" (DH 250) See the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, para. 466: "Christ's humanity has no other subject than the divine person of the Son of God, who assumed it and made it his own, from his conception."

"in two natures," and that "the distinction between the natures was never abolished by their union."[78] Is feminist Christology able to confess with Chalcedon that Christ, who was "begotten from the Father before the ages" *according to his divine nature*, was "born of the Virgin Mary" *according to his human nature*?[79] If so, it should be able to recognize the solution to its dilemma: Christ is male not *according to his divine nature*, but *according to his human nature*, and the distinction between his two natures was not abolished by their union but the character proper to each was preserved.

3. Saint Theodore teaches that the Word assumed our human nature as a whole,[80] and feminist Christology agrees that this is what is theologically significant. Like iconoclastic Christology, however, it understands Christ's human nature in an abstract, "Platonizing" way, and regards its male character as irrelevant. For St. Theodore, human nature exists only in particular individuals.[81] It is impossible for the concrete, individual human nature assumed by the Son of God to be without sexual identity. If he did not have a human nature marked by sex,[82] Christ would not be truly human, "consubstantial with us." Being truly human, for Christ, does not exclude sex but presupposes it.[83]

[78] Council of Chalcedon (DH 302). In fact, like iconoclast Christology, feminist Christology suggests that the distinction between the natures *is* abolished in the eschaton.

[79] Ibid. (DH 301).

[80] According to *On Holy Icons* I:4 (*PG* 99:332D), "Christ did not become a mere man, nor is it orthodox to say that he assumed a particular man, but rather that He assumed man in general, or the whole human nature." *Gaudium et Spes* 22a reiterates this: "by His Incarnation the Son of God has united himself in some fashion with every man [*homine*]" (DH 4322).

[81] Harrison, "Maleness of Christ," 114-20, describes how this involves the problem of human universality and human particularity. She argues that what is "particular" in Christian revelation is an anchor, or starting point, that is open to a universal realization.

[82] That Christ is "one in being" with us is the teaching of Chalcedon (DH 301). Jonathan Baker argues that this misuse of Gregory of Nazianzen's soteriological principle leads to the conclusion that "to be male is not to be fully human." See *Consecrated Women?* ed. Jonathan Baker (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2004), 92-93 and 221 n. 319.

[83] Because Christian anthropology holds that body and spirit are one with a substantial unity (*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, para. 365), it understands bodily sex to be integral to the identity of the concrete individual. Humanity is both one in an identity of nature and two in its concrete embodiments. Being "fully human" and being male are not

4. Again, St. Theodore acknowledges the soteriological principle, "what was not assumed was not redeemed," but he would not divorce "the man Jesus" from "the Christ." The Christ portrayed in icons is the divine person, the Word who assumed our flesh as a male and rose from the dead in his glorified humanity. The claim of feminist Christology that Christ cannot save women if his maleness is theologically significant is based on several misconceptions.

First, the patristic Christological controversy in which this principle was formulated had to do with Christ's possession of the constitutive elements of human nature, and in particular with his assumption of a rational soul,[84] not with his sexual identification as male. It was proposed in order to establish that by his Incarnation the Word assumed *a complete human nature*. It also confirms the traditional teaching that by his Incarnation the Word assumed *human nature as a whole*. The Church teaches that human nature ("the flesh") is enhypostasized in the preexisting Word; it has no separate hypostasis, so it is not a human person. Jesus of Nazareth is the Word Incarnate; he is not a "mere man"; he is not "someone else."

Second, as St. Theodore points out, "Maleness and femaleness are sought only in the forms of bodies,"[85] and Christ is male, not female. A woman, as female, cannot be an "icon" of Christ as a sacramental sign, that is, she is not a natural symbol of Christ in his concrete humanity, for she embodies human nature in a different, complementary, way.[86] As Pope St. John Paul II explains, there are two ways of being a body.[87] Christ's maleness

alternatives; instead, being male is one of two ways of being human. See Pope St. John Paul II, *Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body,* trans. Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006), 156-65 (General Audiences of November 7 and 14, 1979).

[84] See Pope Damasus I (DH 149) and First Council of Constantinople (DH 151).

[85] *On Holy Icons,* III:A 45 (*PG* 99:409D).

[86] This has to do with sacramental symbolism, not the moral imitation or "imaging" of Christ to which women as well as men are called. For more on this distinction, see Michele M. Schumacher, "The Unity of the Two: Toward a New Feminist Sacramentality of the Body," in *Women in Christ: Toward a New Feminism,* ed. Michele M. Schumacher (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 201-31.

[87] See *Man and Woman*, 157 (General Audience of November 7, 1979).

is not an insignificant historical particularity, for human nature exists in him only as embodied. By questioning this, feminist Christology seems to endorse a soul/body dualism that risks denying the reality of the Incarnation.[88]

Third, the feminist argument that Christ cannot save women if he is incarnate only as a man fails to acknowledge that our salvation is accomplished by a divine person in and through the choices he made, in his humanity.[89] We are saved not only by his assumption of our human nature but also by his sacrificial death and glorious Resurrection. His Incarnation is the ontological precondition of his saving work, not the whole of it.[90]

5. Saint Theodore appeals to the *Theotókos* to underscore the reality of the Incarnation. The icons of the *Theotókos*, it seems, are themselves part of the Church's response to iconoclastic Christology. Since feminist Christology does not distinguish the person of the Son from his divine nature, it has no way of accounting for the Virgin Mary's office as "mother of God."[91] It

[88] This soul/body dualism identifies the person with the spiritual self and negates the meaning and value of the body.

[89] See St. Thomas Aquinas, *STh* III, q. 26, a. 2 ("Whether Christ, as Man [*quod homo*], Is the Mediator of God and Men [*hominum*]"). Jesus Christ, a divine person who has assumed our human nature, is able to represent the human race and act on our behalf. This is why his saving work is efficacious; it is not because he is a man rather than a woman.

[90] See *Gaudium et Spes* 22 (DH 4322). *GS* 22 integrates two soteriological perspectives: the "Eastern" view that attributes objective redemption principally to the Incarnation, and the "Western" view that emphasizes redemption by means of Jesus' saving Cross and Resurrection.

[91] See Elizabeth A. Johnson, *Truly Our Sister: A Theology of Mary in the Communion of Saints* (New York: Continuum, 2003). Johnson acknowledges that faith honors Mary as "Mother of God" (3, 75, 95, 117-18), but she chooses to explore her identity as "Mother of the Messiah," in part because she intends to retrieve the "historical Mary" and in part because she presumes that devotion to the "Mother of God" is "actually devotion to God the Mother" (77). For Johnson's account of the recent shift that took place in Mariology and its implications for the dogmas of the Virginal Conception and the Incarnation, see her "Mary and Contemporary Christology: Rahner and Schillebeeckx," *Église et théologie* 15 (1984): 155-82. Carr (*Transforming Grace*, 189) acknowledges Mary as the mother of God and "a religious symbol of enduring power in the tradition," but agrees, without rebuttal, that she is "an ambiguous figure for women today." For Ruether (*Sexism,* 154), "Mary's faith makes possible God's entrance into history," but "patriarchal theology" has generally not given her credit for this.

is ambivalent, in fact, about Mary's role in the economy of salvation. Rather than lift up the tradition that testifies to a woman's indispensable contribution to the Incarnation, feminist Christology relocates female human nature in the "inclusive" humanity of the risen Christ.

It is worth noting that the Catholic tradition asserts that either a man or a woman can represent humanity as a whole,[92] and that the Blessed Virgin Mary did represent the human race,[93] though not in the same way as Jesus Christ, of course, in the economy of salvation. Today's questions did not occupy St. Theodore, but St. Augustine and St. Thomas, to name only two Latin doctors, did address the problem raised by feminist Christology. They taught that the female sex was not excluded from the mystery of the Incarnation, but was represented by Mary, who alone gave Christ his human flesh. Saint Augustine writes, "Men, despise not yourselves: the Son of God became a man; despise not yourselves, women; the Son of God was born of a woman."[94] Saint Thomas quotes St. Augustine when he writes:

> Although the Son of God could have taken human flesh from whatever matter He willed, it was nevertheless most becoming [thus, an argument from fittingness] that He should take flesh from a woman. First, because in this way the entire human nature was ennobled. Hence Augustine says (*QQ, lxxxiii,* qu. 11), "It was suitable that man's liberation should be made manifest in both sexes. Consequently, since it behooved a man, being of the nobler sex, to assume, it was becoming that the liberation of the female sex should be

[92] According to Ruether ("Liberation," 333), it has been assumed that only a man can represent "generic humanity," so a feminist reconstruction will have to affirm the equal capacity of a female to represent the human race. If the implications of this have not always been appreciated, Pope St. John Paul II draws them out in his apostolic letter *Mulieris dignitatem* (1988), art. 4.

[93] The Church already has a tradition of viewing Mary's representative role. Saint Bernard begs her to say "yes" on our behalf in his famous homily "In Praise of the Virgin Mother" (*Hom.* 4:8-9). Saint Thomas, discussing the spiritual marriage that takes place between the Son of God and human nature, says "the Virgin's consent was besought in lieu of that of the entire human nature" (*STh* III, q. 30, a. 1).

[94] *De agone christianos*, 11 (*CSEL* 41 [1900], 99-138 at 115), cited by St. Thomas in *STh* III, q. 30, a. 4, ad 1. Saint Thomas thinks the male sex is nobler than the female, but he quotes St. Augustine to the effect that both are ennobled by the Incarnation.

manifested in that man being born of a woman." Secondly, because thus the truth of the Incarnation is made evident.[95]

According to St. Augustine, both sexes ought to be involved in the Incarnation and in the salvation of the human race. This theme, already present in the early analysis of the Virgin Mary as the New Eve to Christ's New Adam, eventually found expression in Christological terms. It is paramount, of course, in the doctrine of the *Theotókos.*

Anglican theologian Eric Mascall offers this careful doctrinal assessment:

> It was *male human nature* the Son of God united to His divine person; it was a *female human person* who was chosen to be His mother. On the other hand, no *male human person* was chosen to be the Messiah (To suppose so was the error of the adoptionists), and *no female human nature* was assumed by a divine person. Thus from one point of view the Incarnation exalts the male above the female while from another point of view it exalts the female sex above the male. In no woman has *human nature* been raised to the dignity which it possesses in Jesus of Nazareth, but in no male human person has there been given the dignity comparable to that which Mary enjoys as the Mother of God.[96]

As this analysis illustrates, the distinction between person and nature is essential to an explanation of the way God has involved both sexes in the economy of salvation.

6. According to St. Theodore, icons portray the Incarnate Word in his deified human nature. The Incarnation is not temporary but perduring, as the appearances of the Risen Lord testify. Feminist Christology bypasses the doctrine and grammar of the early Christological councils, uses Christ's names in place of his natures, and claims that while *Jesus* was a male, the *Christ*

[95] *STh* III, q. 31, a. 4 ("Whether the Matter of Christ's Body Should Have Been Taken from a Woman?"). Saint Thomas had already treated this question in his commentary on the *Sentences* (III *Sent.* d. 12, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 2). There too he argues that the Incarnation according to the male sex is fitting, not only because the male sex is nobler, but also because of the need to involve both sexes in the work of redemption: "Sed contra. Christus venit utrumque sexum salvare. Sed ipse fuit vir. Ergo debuit ex muliere carnem assumere."

[96] Letter to the Editor, "The Ministry of Women," in *Theology* 57, no. 413 (1954): 428, cited by George William Rutler in *Priest and Priestess* (Ambler, Penn.: Trinity Press, 1973), 35, and reprinted more recently in Baker, ed., *Consecrated Women?*, 28.

(i.e., the "whole Christ") transcends maleness. In other words, it denies that the character proper to his human nature was preserved in the eschaton and understands "the Christ" as a symbol of redeemed humanity. Like iconoclasm, feminist Christology holds that after his Resurrection Christ no longer has a human nature like ours.

According to St. Theodore's analysis, this error also follows from the failure to observe the distinction between person and nature in Christ. The mistake of feminist Christology becomes clear when it claims that the person of Christ is not "encapsulated 'once-for-all' in the historical Jesus," or warns against collapsing "the totality of the Christ into the human man Jesus."[97] Chalcedonian Christology, as interpreted by the post-Chalcedonian councils and taught by the magisterium, would say instead that an icon depicts Christ in (or "according to") his glorified human nature, not in his divine nature. His glorified or deified human nature retains its identity, which is male.[98] It is impossible to write an icon of Christ in his divine nature, but it *is* possible to write an icon of him in his deified human nature.

Inter Insigniores, article 5, sets out the traditional doctrine on the permanence of the Incarnation and the identity of the risen Christ, in his glorified humanity, with Jesus of Nazareth when it insists, "Christ himself was and remains a man." It rejects the view that "since Christ is now in the heavenly condition" the Incarnation according to the male sex is a matter of indifference. The distinction of sex is part of God's creative plan. This distinction so affects the identity of the human person that it is not suppressed in the state of glory, and this also holds true for

[97] See Johnson, *She Who Is*, 161; and Ruether, *Sexism*, 138. Carr (*Transforming Grace*, 180-81, 185) acknowledges that "the human figure of Jesus is clearly male," but wants to say that the Risen Christ, while "fully human," transcends "all the particularities and limitations of earthly existence."

[98] His deified human nature is *not* the same as his divine nature. See Galvin ("From the Humanity of Christ to the Jesus of History, 256-57): "'Jesus of history' is not equivalent to 'humanity of Christ,' however true it remains that his human nature is more susceptible to historical investigation than is his divinity. Similarly, 'Christ of faith' is not synonymous with 'divinity of Christ,' for in orthodox understanding the risen Lord does not shed his human nature in his exaltation."

Christ.[99] What Christians expect when they contemplate their own salvation is a continued existence, even the resurrection of their bodies, and the Lord's bodily resurrection is a promise and a cause of this.

CONCLUSION

Many feminist theologians reject the iconic argument proposed by the Catholic Church in support of the male priesthood, not only on the basis of their understanding of the doctrines of holy orders and Christian anthropology but also on Christological grounds. Some claim to be "iconoclasts" and propose a Christological dilemma analogous to the one proposed by iconoclast theologians of the eighth and ninth centuries. For the iconoclasts of the eighth and ninth centuries, icons of Christ "in the form of a servant" either exclude Christ's divine nature or attempt to circumscribe it. In any case, they hold that the risen Christ is no longer marked by the properties of his human nature. For feminist theologians Rosemary Radford Ruether, Anne E. Carr, and Elizabeth A. Johnson, icons that portray Christ as male imply that God (or the divine nature) is male and that women are excluded from the human nature Christ assumed and redeemed unless he is identified with the "whole Christ," Christ embodied in the Church. Since the body of the risen Christ includes all baptized Christians, it is no longer marked by the properties of his human nature. On this reading, women as well as men can serve as "icons" of Christ, that is, as priests.

The Second Council of Nicaea identified iconoclasm as a heresy and defended the tradition of writing and venerating icons, and St. Theodore the Studite, during the second phase of the iconoclast controversy, appealed to Christ's maleness as a proof of his true humanity. His defense of icons suggests how the challenges put by feminist Christology might be met. With regard to the feminist claim that Christ's maleness is only one "historical particularity," without theological significance, St. Theodore points out that it is impossible to write an icon of "humanity in

[99] See *From "Inter Insigniores,"* 45-47.

general." Human nature exists only in concrete, bodily forms, and in Christ's case, it is male. If he did not have a human nature marked by sex, Christ would not be *truly* human, for a human being is either male or female.[100] According to Chalcedonian Christology, his humanity retains its own properties; those properties are individuating characteristics which include the male sex. It is correct to say, then, that the Word of God is male, not female, according to his humanity. Feminist Christology provides its own answer to the charge that Christ's maleness supports male privilege, in fact, by noticing its social-symbolic significance.[101] By his teaching and example, Jesus subverts all patriarchal models of male behavior.

With the feminist claims that by his Incarnation Christ assumed humanity as a whole, that "what is not assumed is not redeemed," and that it is his humanity, not his maleness, that is theologically significant, St. Theodore would have no problem. He would add, however, that an icon portrays Christ *according to his humanity*, and that the distinction between his divine and human natures was never abolished. Christ is a divine person—"one of the Trinity," who assumed our human nature as a man, and whose humanity was deified in the Resurrection—not a "mere man" (or "human person"), Jesus, who has become divine.[102] He would also add that Christ takes his male human nature exclusively from his mother. This is both a guarantee of his true humanity and the source of her dignity.[103] Her motherhood reveals how God involves the female sex in the economy of salvation. The Virgin Mary alone of the whole human race has, as Christ's mother, a relationship of unparalleled

[100] For a discussion of contemporary Church teaching on this point, see Sara Butler, "Embodiment: Women and Men, Equal and Complementary," in *The Church Women Want: Catholic Women in Dialogue*, ed. Elizabeth A. Johnson (New York: Crossroad, 2002), 33-44.

[101] See above, n. 30.

[102] James T. O'Connor, "Modern Christologies and Mary's Place Therein: Dogmatic Aspect," *Marian Studies* 33 (1981): 51-75, shows how modern Christologies have influenced feminist reconstructions.

[103] See Verna Harrison, "The Fatherhood of God in Orthodox Theology," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 37 (1993): 185-212, for more on the tradition of comparing Mary's motherhood to God's fatherhood.

intimacy with him which extends even to her bodily assumption into heaven.

With regard to the permanence of Christ's humanity, including his male identity, in the eschaton, St. Theodore again appeals both to the Gospels and to the Council of Chalcedon. According to the Church's faith, in the Incarnation the Word united to his person a human nature like ours with the result that he really is consubstantial with us. The risen Christ has not shed his human nature. The Resurrection did not bring the Incarnation to an end.

The Thomist 83 (2019): 521-45

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS ON SALVATION, MAKING SATISFACTION, AND THE RESTORATION OF FRIENDSHIP WITH GOD[1]

RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE

Durham University
Durham, United Kingdom

THE THEMES OF "making satisfaction" and (to a lesser extent) "merit" in the thought of Thomas Aquinas are worth revisiting.[2] A number of scholars have claimed that the seeds of a penal understanding of salvation lie in Aquinas's notion of satisfaction. In contrast to St. Anselm, who operated with a strict distinction between punishment and making satisfaction, Aquinas, so they allege, would have blurred this distinction by introducing the notion of *poena satisfactoria*. In this manner Aquinas would have "paved the way" for a penal understanding of salvation. Gerald O'Collins, for instance, has argued that Aquinas's soteriology contributed to the development of "a monstrous version of redemption: Christ as

[1] An earlier version of this article was delivered during the annual Thomistic Circles Conference on the topic of "Salvation in Christ" on September 6, 2019 at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington D.C. I am most grateful to Fr. Dominic Legge and Fr. Dominic M. Langevin for their kind invitation to share my ideas and for constructive feedback on an earlier version of this article.

[2] I have dealt with Aquinas's soteriology in "St. Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas on 'Satisfaction': Or how Catholic and Protestant Understandings of the Cross Differ," *Angelicum* 80 (2003): 159-76; "'Bearing the Marks of Christ's Passion'—Aquinas's Soteriology," in Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 277-302; "The Saving Work of Christ" in Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 436-47; and more recently in "Protest Theism, Aquinas, and Suffering," in Karen Kilby and Rachel Davies, eds., *Suffering and the Christian Life* (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2020), 71-86.

the penal substitute propitiating the divine anger."[3] O'Collins further attempts to substantiate this claim by arguing that the language of divine appeasement is present throughout Aquinas's writings. Others see this alleged rupture with Anselm as a cause for quiet gratification: a reading in which Aquinas supposedly anticipates some of the views of the Reformers strengthens their status as legitimate exponents of the tradition.[4]

There are undoubtedly important differences between Anselm and Aquinas. For example, Aquinas, perhaps following William of Auvergne's own *Cur Deus homo*, allows for a plurality of models whereas Anselm offers only one. More importantly, in contrast to Anselm, Aquinas rightly emphasizes the need for our participation in Christ's redemptive work: through the intimate union between Christ and his Body, the faithful can share in the merits of Christ.[5] Thus, a genuine exchange can take place whereby Christ's suffering can be satisfactory for us because of his union as Head with us, his Body; and our sufferings can become a participation in Christ's, allowing us to become more

[3] Gerald O'Collins, *Christology: A Biblical, Historical and Systematic Study of Jesus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 207.

[4] In his recent book, *God as Sacrificial Love: A Systematic Exploration of a Controversial Notion* (Bloomsbury, 2018), Asle Eikrem, from the Norwegian School of Theology, aligns himself with the views expressed by Brandon Peterson ("Paving the Way? Penalty and Atonement in Thomas Aquinas's Soteriology," *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 15 [2013]: 265-83) that Aquinas contributed to a penal notion of the saving work of Christ: "I tend to agree with Branden Peterson who, against the interpretation provided by Rik Van Nieuwenhove, argues that Aquinas attached penal images to his notion of satisfaction. Together with Abelard, he thus paved the way for the later reformers' understanding of the sacrifice of Christ in terms of penal satisfaction" (*God as Sacrificial Love*, 26). The tendency to read Aquinas's soteriology in penal terms may be strengthened by (1) a forensic notion of salvation in which there is no intrinsic link between Christ's saving work and our "justification" understood (in Catholic terms) as transformation of the human person through participation in Christ's redeeming work; and (2) (and related to this) a theological context in which penance is no longer considered a sacrament, thus rendering opaque to interpreters the penitential aspect of Christ's Passion.

[5] *STh* III, q. 48, a. 2, ad 1: "The head and members are as one mystic person; and therefore Christ's satisfaction belongs to all the faithful as being his members." All translations from the *Summa theologiae* are from the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981).

Christ-like.[6] Moreover, as I will argue in this article, Aquinas will subtly but significantly recast Anselm's doctrine in light of charity and friendship with God, where demands of a just retribution are not as stringent as they would be amongst those who are not friends.

Before I delve into the main argument, a preliminary observation is in order. In my view, "making satisfaction" is neither the most innovative nor the most important theme in Aquinas's soteriology. The young Aquinas follows Peter Lombard (and early thirteenth-century Scholastics) in book 3 of his commentary on the *Sentences*, distinction 18, focussing primarily on the merit that Christ attains through his charity.[7] Distinction 19, however, offers a more diverse picture. Here Aquinas mentions other models, such as liberation from sin and the devil, redemption, and reconciliation. In distinction 20 we encounter the theme of making satisfaction (with one explicit reference to Anselm's *Cur Deus homo*).[8] References to making satisfaction and Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* surface more frequently in book 4, especially in the treatise on penance, where we find an entire *quaestio* dedicated to it.[9] This link between satisfaction and penitential practices is not without significance, as I hope to show in this article. Also, it is fair to say that Aquinas's emphasis on distinct models evolves. In his commentary on the *Sentences* merit is the most important model of salvation. The theme of making satisfaction dominates the discussion in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, chapter 55. By the time he writes the *Summa theologiae* III, question 48, Aquinas presents a balanced account, offering a richly diverse picture of models of atonement, such as merit, making satisfaction, redemption, and especially sacrifice, which now receives an attention it had not enjoyed in his earlier

[6] Van Nieuwenhove, "Bearing the marks of Christ's Passion," 277-302.

[7] The notion of "making satisfaction" (*satisfacere*) is conspicuously absent from Peter Lombard's Book III of *The Sentences.* Other Scholastic theologians before Aquinas paid more attention to the theme of making satisfaction. See *Summa Halensis* III, tract. 1, q. 1, cc. 4-6; tract. 5, q. 1, m. 3, c. 3; Bonaventure, III *Sent*., d. 20, a. un, qq. 2-5; Albert the Great, III *Sent*., d. 18, a. 14; d. 20, aa. 1 and 7.

[8] III *Sent*., d. 20, q. 1, a. 4 qcla., arg. 2.

[9] IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 1: "Satisfaction."

theological syntheses and which may very well be the most important one (as *STh* III, q. 48, a. 6, ad 3 appears to suggest).[10]

In what follows I want to consider whether a penal reading of Aquinas's soteriology is plausible. I will first deal, albeit briefly, with the issue of the language of divine anger; second, and in more detail, I will discuss the notions of satisfaction and *poena satisfactoria*.[11] After this I will treat of merit, charity, and meeting the demands of divine justice.

I. Language of Placating God

As indicated already, O'Collins argues that some of the terminology Aquinas uses suggests a vindictive notion of a God whose anger needs to be appeased. Brandon Peterson quite rightly points out—against O'Collins—that the language of divine appeasement in Aquinas (or in the Bible, as Aquinas interprets it) is metaphorical, and cannot be properly attributed to God. Talk of divine *placatio* should not be understood in terms of placating or changing God but rather as pleasing God.[12] The language of appeasement refers to a change in us and not in God. The Bible contains several passages in which all-too-human categories are attributed to God (anger, taking offence, jealousy,

[10] In developing the model of sacrifice he draws extensively on book 10 of St. Augustine's *The City of God,* as a key quotation from Augustine illustrates ("the visible sacrifice is the sacrament, i.e., the sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice"). It recurs in *STh* III, q. 22, a. 2; q. 48, a. 3, obj. 2; q. 60, a. 1; and earlier in II-II, q. 81, a. 7, ad 2. See also *In Rom.* 12:1 (Marietti ed., 957). The entire discussion in *In Rom.* 12:1-3 (Marietti ed., 953-65) is relevant to understanding Aquinas's theology of sacrifice. It is not hard to see why the quotation from Augustine appealed to Aquinas: it coheres well with his emphasis upon charity or intention rather than upon the actual suffering per se, and it links salvation with sacramentology. Albert briefly discusses sacrifice in the earlier III *Sent*., d. 4, a. 1; and d. 19, a. 2.

[11] Romanus Cessario, *The Godly Image. Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from Anselm to Aquinas* (Petersham, Mass.: St Bede Publications, 1990) remains the most insightful study on making satisfaction.

[12] Peterson, "Paving the Way," 279: "Rather than signalling the mollification of divine anger, Thomas uses *placo* to signal the creature's acting rightly in relation to the Creator, functioning within the proper order in which God delights."

etc.). A theologian, such as Aquinas, who is steeped in sacred Scripture will of course, adopt this language.

Before we rush to the conclusion that Aquinas is guilty of promoting an anthropomorphic (or even angry, vindictive) notion of God we must consider what he has to say about this kind of language when applied to God. In several places Aquinas makes the point that when we come across language in the Bible that suggests change in God we should interpret it as saying something about our world and how it is affected by God, rather than about God himself. We find an instance of this in the *Prima pars* (*STh* I, q. 9, a. 1, ad 3), when Aquinas responds to the objection that the Bible attributes change and movement to God, such as in James 4:8 ("Draw nigh to God, and he will draw nigh to you"). Aquinas answers that these things are said in Scripture of God metaphorically. He offers a simile: as the rays of the sun are said to enter a house, or to go out, "so God is said to approach us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of his goodness, or decline from him."

Similarly, when the Bible attributes anger to God this occurs "on account of a similitude of effect."[13] Anger is a passion for Aquinas, and this can only be metaphorically attributed to God,[14] and not properly.[15] The anger of God, then, refers to the *poenae* that we encounter in our world. I leave this notion of *poena* untranslated for now as I will come back to it shortly.[16]

[13] *STh* I, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2: "Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as his anger."

[14] *STh* I, q. 21, a. 1, ad 1. See F. J. A. De Grijs, "*Ira* as a divine metaphor," in Henk Schoot, ed., *Tibi soli peccavi: Thomas Aquinas on Guilt and Forgiveness* (Leuven: Peeters, 1996), 19-46.

[15] *STh* I, q. 19, a. 11: "anger is never attributed to God properly [*nunquam proprie*], since in its primary meaning it includes passion." Nor is punishment a sign that there is anger in God, as Aquinas explicitly states in ibid., ad 2: "punishment [*punitio*] is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves."

[16] Another passage that illustrates how language about God must at times be interpreted in terms of language about creation can be found in Aquinas's *Commentary on John* 12:39-40. John quotes Isaiah: "the Lord has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart." Aquinas explains that we should not take this passage at face value, as if God puts malice into us or forces us into sin. We should understand it as referring to the fact

If a literalist reading of Aquinas's use of concepts such as "anger" or "offense" can be easily dismissed, a second issue deserves more in-depth consideration. For Anselm satisfaction and punishment are mutually exclusive. Aquinas, on the other hand, introduces a hybrid terminology (as it was called by Eileen Sweeney)[17] by speaking of *poena satisfactoria* (as in *STh* I-II, q. 87, a. 7), often translated as "satisfactory punishment." In this manner, Aquinas, allegedly, imports penal elements into the concept of satisfaction, and distances himself from Anselm's views, thus "paving the way" for a penal notion of salvation.

II. *STH* III, Q. 48, A. 2: MAKING SATISFACTION (*PER MODUM SATISFACTIONIS*) AND *POENA SATISFACTORIA*

I am not convinced that the use of *poena satisfactoria* supports the claim that Aquinas contributes to a penal notion of salvation. In this section I will briefly recall how Aquinas characterizes making satisfaction before considering the notion of *poena satisfactoria* in greater detail.

In question 48, article 2 of the *Tertia pars*, Aquinas writes:

> He properly makes satisfaction for an offense who offers something which the offended one loves equally, or even more than he detested the offense. But by suffering out of love and obedience, Christ gave more to God than was required to compensate for the offense of the whole human race. First of all, because of the exceeding charity from which he suffered; second, on account of the dignity of his life which he laid down in atonement [*pro satisfactione*], for it was the

that God does not infuse grace due to our rebellious obstinacy. He offers a vivid metaphor: "It is like a person who closes the shutters of his house and someone says to him: 'You cannot see because you lack the light of the sun'. This would not be due to a failure of the sun but because he shut out the light of the sun." And he concludes: "In the same way we read here that they could not believe, because God blinded them, that is, they were the cause why they were deprived of sight." I use the translation by Fabian Larcher published as Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, vol. 36 of Latin/English edition of The Works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Lander, Wyo.: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2013).

[17] Eileen Sweeney, "Vice and Sin (Ia IIae, qq. 71-89)," in Stephen Pope, ed., *The Ethics of Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 151-68, esp. 157.

life of one who was God and man; third on account of the extent of the Passion, and the greatness of the grief endured, as stated above.[18]

The language of "offending" and "making satisfaction" for the sake of justice may, when taken in isolation, appear to strengthen the argument that Aquinas's soteriology gestures at a vindictive notion of God.[19] From his earliest theological synthesis, however, Aquinas describes "making satisfaction" in terms of a restoration of friendship (*restitutio amicitiae*) with God through penance.[20] Moreover, charity (or friendship for God) is not just the root of

[18] In *ScG* IV, c. 54 Aquinas summarizes the notion of making satisfaction as follows: "[T]he order of divine justice—as is clear from the foregoing—requires that God should not remit sin without satisfaction. But to satisfy for the sin of the whole human race was beyond the power of any pure man, because any pure man is something less than the whole human race in its entirety. Therefore, in order to free the human race from its common sin, someone had to satisfy who was both man and so proportioned to the satisfaction, and something above man that the merit might be enough to satisfy for the sin of the whole human race" (translation by Charles O'Neil, Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles. Book Four: Salvation* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). The terminology and logic remain closely indebted to Anselm, especially the reference to the two natures of Christ. In the *Summa theologiae* we find similar passages, such as *STh* III, q. 1, a. 2, where Aquinas states: "Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man."

[19] A number of scholars have claimed that the notion of "making satisfaction" is indebted to feudal categories in which vassals had to placate their over-lord for offending him. Aquinas states in a number of places that he considers "punishments" in terms of "paternal correction" (*In Heb.* 12:5-9 [Marietti ed., 679]); he characterises them as "a certain medicine" (ibid. [Marietti ed., 680]): "For just as medicine is bitter and repulsive when taken, yet its goal is sweet and desirable, so also discipline is heavy to endure but brings great fruit." Again: "He chastises, or scourges, not unto condemnation, but unto salvation." (ibid. [Marietti ed., 674]). Finally (ibid. [Marietti ed., 681]): "Punishments are a certain medicine. . . . For just as medicine is bitter and repulsive when taken, yet its goal is sweet and desirable, so also discipline is heavy to endure but brings great fruit" (translation by Fabian R. Larcher in Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Hebrews*, vol. 41 of Latin/English edition of The Works of St. Thomas Aquinas [Lander, Wyo.: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012]).

[20] In IV *Sent*. d. 15, q. 1, a. 3 sol. 1 we read: "the removal of an offense is the restoration of friendship; and so if there is something that blocks the restoring of friendship, satisfaction cannot even exist between men." All translations from Book IV are by Beth Mortensen, Saint Thomas Aquinas. *Commentary on the Sentences, Book IV*, Vols. 7-10 of Latin/English Edition of the Works of St Thomas Aquinas (Lander, Wyo.: The Aquinas Institute 2017).

merit; it also transforms the nature and exigencies of justice that apply to our (broken) relationship with God. Before I develop this in greater detail it is important to discuss the notion of *poena satisfactoria,* and whether or not Aquinas's use of this terminology constitutes a move toward a penal notion of salvation.

First, I need to make a rather elementary point regarding the translation of the word *poena*. It is usually translated as "punishment," which is, of course, one of its primary meanings. It can, however, also be translated quite simply as "pain" or "affliction." In that case it does not necessarily have penal connotations. The point is not without significance, as Peterson himself concedes, for if *poena* can be correctly translated as pain or suffering rather than as punishment, then his conclusions would be "circumvented." Aquinas would then distinguish between "satisfactory pain" and "punishment" in the strict sense of the word, and Anselm's strict dichotomy between satisfaction and punishment would be retained.[21]

There are at least some passages where we cannot meaningfully translate *poena* as punishment. For example, the following passage concerns almsgiving and raises the question of whether it is part of satisfaction. One of the objections asks whether it is meaningful to distinguish neatly between the different parts of satisfaction, namely, almsgiving, fasting, and prayer. Aquinas replies:

> *Poena* is called an evil inasmuch as it takes away some good because this is how evil injures a nature. . . . There is a different character of *poena* in almsgiving, which takes away riches, and in fasting, which takes away tasty things, and in prayer, which brings down a proud spirit's height by humility. And because of this there are different parts of satisfaction.[22]

It seems clear that *poena* simply refers to something that goes against our will ("pain," "deprivation," "affliction"), as Aquinas explicitly states in what follows, with a revealing reference to Anselm: "poena enim voluntati contrariatur, ut Anselmus dicit." *Poena* does not have any penal connotations in this passage.

[21] Peterson, "Paving the Way," 276 n. 53.

[22] IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qcla. 2, ad 3.

Indeed, the whole passage is part of a treatise on penance, and Aquinas is quite clear on the distinction between penance and punishment: the former we freely espouse (even though elements of it deprive us of pleasure and are painful),[23] the latter is inflicted against our will. To translate *poena* here as "punishment" instead of "pain," only makes sense if we are willing to call engaging in almsgiving and fasting, or saying prayers, a kind of punishment. That, however, is stretching both theological and linguistic boundaries beyond plausibility. In fasting, praying, and almsgiving we freely espouse certain deprivations (pains) but we are not being punished against our will.

Similarly, in question 87, article 7 of the *Prima secundae*, Aquinas mentions *medicinas poenales*—and it does not make sense to translate this as "medicinal punishments." A doctor who prescribes "bitter potions to his patients that he may restore them to health" (which is how Aquinas illustrates *medicinas poenales*) does not inflict punishment, nor is he acting in a vindictive manner. Examples could be multiplied.[24]

[23] Hence, Aquinas writes in *STh* I-II, q. 87, a. 6 that satisfactory *poena* is, absolutely speaking, against the will (because "pain" is abhorrent to all sentient beings) but in this particular instance and for this purpose, it is voluntary.

[24] In *STh* III, q. 68, a. 5, ad 1, Aquinas says that the *poena* Christ suffered was satisfactory for the sins of those who were to be baptized, "just as the *poena* of one member can be satisfactory for the sin of another member." Now Aquinas clearly states that punishment, unlike satisfaction, cannot be borne for sins of others. Punishment for sin is personal and cannot be meritorious, while making satisfaction and being deserving of merit are intrinsically linked. Again, *STh* III, q. 49, a. 3, obj. 2 raises the point that the fact that a *poena satisfactoria* is enjoined upon penitents seems to suggest that we have not been freed from the debt of punishment (*reatus poenae*). In the Blackfriars Edition Richard Murphy, O.P., translates *poena satisfactoria* quite correctly as "atoning penance" rather than as "satisfactory punishment" (which, it must be admitted, sounds odd at the best of times), as Shapcote had done in this context. "Atoning penance" is the correct translation because Aquinas is clearly discussing penitential—as distinct from penal—practices that derive their meaning and efficacy from Christ's atoning work. Through penances or sufferings of some kind (*per aliquid poenalitatis vel passionis*) we attain conformity to the suffering Christ, as Aquinas explains in his reply (*STh* III, q. 49, a. 3, ad 2).

It is unclear why Aquinas introduces the language of *poena satisfactoria*[25] but we can venture a guess which, if correct, would imply a surprising reversal of Peterson's claims. It can be argued that by introducing *poena satisfactoria* Aquinas actually softens the penal aspects within the tradition rather than (allegedly) strengthening them. According to Augustine, *all* afflictions or *poenae* (sickness, death, etc.) are punishments for sin from God, including for original sin.[26] Insofar as Aquinas accepts this,[27] he

[25] He would have come across an association of *poena* with satisfaction in a text from St. Ambrose that he quotes in IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 2, s.c. Aquinas writes: "Ambrose says, 'and *if faith*', that is, the consciousness of sin, *should fail, suffering makes satisfaction*" ("Ambrosius dicit in littera: *etsi fides*, idest peccati conscientia, *desit, poena satisfacit*"). The reference to Ambrose is from *Expos. on the Psalms 118,* littera 18, c. 2, on verse 137 (*CSEL* 62:396).

[26] See Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 1.1.

[27] I cannot develop this point within the constraints of this article but I suspect that Aquinas has an understanding of the nature of death (as "natural" occurrence) and other "defects" that is different from that of St. Augustine. *STh* I-II, q. 85, a. 5 seems unequivocal in stating that "death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin." However, Aquinas also teaches that death is a natural occurrence in finite, corporeal things (*STh* I-II, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3: "Death and other natural defects arise from the universal condition of nature"; see also *STh* I-II, q. 85, a. 6), which appears to qualify the traditional Augustinian position. Again, in *ScG* IV, c. 52 he toys with the idea that defects such as illness and death "are not penalties, but natural defects necessarily consequent upon matter. For necessarily, the human body, composed of contraries, must be corruptible." On the other hand, from a more transcendent perspective, they can probably (*probabiliter*!) be considered "penalties" (*ScG* IV, c. 52). Also, in *De Malo*, q. 5, a. 4 he introduces the notion of "concomitant affliction/punishment" (*poena concomitans*). In withdrawing original justice from our first parents many ills befall us concomitantly—in the way a judge may blind a criminal who then suffers a whole range of afflictions as a consequence of the deprivation of sight. Some of these ills, Aquinas, says, are not actual punishments as such: "And such ills are sometimes ordained as a remedy against future sin, or to develop the virtue either of the one who suffers the ill or of another, not as the punishment of any sin [*non ut poena peccati alicujus*]." Aquinas goes on to refer to John 9:3 (the man born blind). He concludes: "the very fact that human beings are in such a condition that such ills or deficiencies help them either to avoid sin or develop virtue is due to weakness of human nature, which results from the sin of our first parent. Just so, the fact that the body of a human being is so disposed as to need surgery in order to cure it belongs to its weakness. And so all these ills correspond to original sin as a concomitant punishment" (Thomas Aquinas, *On Evil*, trans. Richard Regan [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003], 244). Also, it seems likely that Aquinas has a different understanding of the inevitability of Christ's death. For Anselm, at least, Christ did not have to die, because he was free from sin altogether. Aquinas appears more

qualifies the penal aspect by the very introduction of *poena satisfactoria*. Some afflictions may acquire a satisfactory dimension if we freely espouse them, and thus the penal character that the tradition has associated with them is softened.

This becomes more evident when we recall that Aquinas distinguishes between three kinds of *poenae*.[28] There is punishment for sin *simpliciter* whereby each person is punished for his or her sin. This kind of *poena* is penal in the proper sense of the word, and Aquinas explicitly points out that it always involves a relation to sin in the one punished.[29] In other words, this kind of punishment pertains to the sinner only: "each one is punished for his own sin only [*pro peccato suo punitur*], because the sinful act is something personal."[30] For all his emphasis upon personalism and the need for personal transformation and incorporation in Christ, Aquinas's soteriology is not solely subjectivist. If sin had remained unredeemed (or if we fail to avail of the redemption offered by Christ) divine punishment would (will) ensue in accordance with divine justice. Sin destroys the right order in the universe; there is an objective dimension to it, and it therefore involves a *reatus ad poenam,* a debt or liability to punishment.[31] Here there is clearly an element of retributive justice in Aquinas's theology:[32] if sin remains unrecompensed, we will suffer

nuanced: "Christ's body was subject to the necessity of death and other like defects"—a "necessity which results from the principles of nature" albeit, of course, by divine consent (*STh* III, q. 14, a. 2). On the other hand, Christ freely assumes the defects of our nature, and cannot be said to be "contracting" them (*STh* III, q. 14, a. 3).

[28] *STh* I-II, q. 87, aa. 7-8

[29] *STh* I-II, q. 87, a. 7

[30] *STh* I-II, q. 87, a. 8.

[31] Even if sin had been remitted without satisfaction there would be something "inordinate" or disordered in the world (III *Sent*., d. 20, q. 1, qcla. 2, ad 1; and III *Sent*., d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 3, ad 3). While God for his part could have forgiven sins without Christ's satisfaction, this would have constituted a liberation from sin, but not redemption properly speaking, as III *Sent*., d. 20, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1 makes clear.

[32] In *ScG* III, c. 140, Aquinas deals with the question of whether our acts are punished or rewarded by God. He writes: "Hence, since human acts are subject to divine providence, just as things in nature are, the evil which occurs in human acts must be contained under the order of some good. Now this is most suitably accomplished by the fact that sins are punished [*quod peccata puniuntur*]. For in that way those acts which exceed the due measure are embraced under the order of justice which reduces to equality.

alienation from God, either here on earth (through the loss of charity) or perpetually, in hell.[33]

There is also medicinal *poena*, whereby we suffer the loss of a (bodily) good for the sake of spiritual health. Medicinal *poenae* are not penal properly speaking (*non proprie habent rationem poena*).[34] As we mentioned, Aquinas compares them to bitter potions we need to take in order to be healed.

Finally, there is *poena satisfactoria* whereby we willingly espouse deprivation or do penance on behalf of ourselves or others with whom we are united in charity. Thus, in answer to the question whether every *poena* is inflicted for sin, Aquinas, by introducing the notion of *poena satisfactoria*, is actually qualifying the traditional Augustinian teaching that all afflictions, bodily defects, and death are a punishment for (original) sin. Aquinas generally uses the word *poena* to refer to anything that goes against our will. Insofar, however, as we freely espouse it, it loses the strong penal dimension that the tradition has attributed to it. Hence he writes:

> Now when *poena* is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment [*de ratione poenae*]: for the nature of *poena* is to be against the will [*Est enim de ratione poenae quod sit contra voluntatem*]; and although *poena satisfactoria*, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and

But man exceeds the due degree of his measure when he prefers his own will to the divine will by satisfying it contrary to God's ordering. Therefore, it is necessary that human sins be given punishment of divine origin [*puniantur divinitus*] and, for the same reason, that good deeds receive their reward."

[33] Even sin that has been forgiven still needs to be "covered" by God: God does not reckon our sins. As Bruce Marshall has reminded us in an important contribution, this refers to the fact that even God cannot undo our past sins. Bruce Marshall, "*Beatus Vir:* Aquinas, Romans 4, and the Role of 'Reckoning' in Justification," in Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais, eds., *Reading Romans with St Thomas Aquinas* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 216-37. Marshall concludes: "When God declines to reckon or impute our sins to us, he does more than forego his undoubted right to punish us for our sin and corruption rather than change us for the better, important as that is. He overlooks what is odious to him, but which he cannot change, namely our past sinful acts themselves. He covers them, conceals them from his sight, and treats them as though they were not" (237).

[34] *STh* I-II, q. 87, a. 7.

for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently, it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect.[35]

The claim that Aquinas's introduction of the notion of *poena satisfactoria* involves a move toward a penal notion of salvation is therefore unconvincing. He plainly distinguishes it from *poena simpliciter*, which is, indeed, clearly penal.[36] If anything, the concept of *poena satisfactoria* nuances the penal elements within the broader Augustinian tradition: if all afflictions are on account of original or personal sin, *poena satisfactoria* takes the edge off this penal element: in freely espousing them in an act of penance (on our own behalf or on behalf of others) the penal element attached to those *poenae* largely dissolves. My argument can thus be briefly summarized by stating that penal interpretations of the way Aquinas understands Christ's saving work confuse *poena simpliciter* with *poena satisfactoria*. The latter is applicable to Christ (with qualifications, given his sinlessness) but not the former.

The qualification in the previous sentence is important. It should be remembered that the text just quoted is taken from question 87, article 6 of the *Prima secundae*, which is in the middle of a discussion of sin (its causes, effects, and varieties, such as venial and mortal). Undoubtedly, there is a close connection between Aquinas's understanding of making satisfaction and penance. This does not mean, however, that we can apply everything he says about our making satisfaction (in *STh* I-II, q. 87) to Christ. A key difference, of course, is that Christ is not liable for the debt of punishment (the very topic of q. 87) for he

[35] *STh* I-II, q. 87, a. 6.

[36] See also *ScG* III, c. 158: "Now if somebody imposes the penalty on himself by his own will, he is said to make satisfaction to God. . . . But, if he does not exact this penalty [*poenam*] of himself, then, since things subject to divine providence cannot remain disordered, this penalty will be inflicted upon him by God [*poena infligetur ei a Deo*]. Such a punishment is not called one of satisfaction [*nec talis poena satisfactoria*], since it is not due to the choice of the one who suffers it; but it will be called purificatory [*purgatoria*]." Also IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 1, a. 1: "Although making satisfaction in itself is owed, nevertheless, to the extent that the person making satisfaction performs his work voluntarily [*voluntarie*], it has the nature of something freely done on the part of the doer."

is sinless. Insofar as the category of *poena satisfactoria* has any penal connotations they can only apply to us, and not to the sinless Christ who is not liable to punishment,[37] which is always personal if understood as *poena simpliciter*.[38] Besides, if God were to punish the innocent Christ on our behalf, he would, by Aquinas's standards, be guilty of brutality.[39] Finally, one of the main reasons why a penal reading of "making satisfaction" cannot be accurate is the fact that it would void penitential practices of all meaning, for they rely on charity to be meritorious in the first place; and there cannot be charity without a free decision to engage in these practices. This objection also applies to Christ's satisfactory work.

It is a credit to Peterson that he addresses the link between Christ's will and *poena* squarely. If Aquinas's soteriology moves toward a penal notion of Christ's saving work then there must be a strong sense in which his suffering goes against his will. This is, after all, the distinguishing mark of punishment (as distinct from penance): it is inflicted against our (rational) will. The problem with Peterson's account is that he appears to identify the "natural" component of Christ's will (which was reluctant to suffer) with his "rational" human will, allowing him to write, "satisfactory punishment is punishment since it, to some extent and in a certain respect, contravenes the will, and Christ's (human) will is no exception."[40]

This strikes me as a problematic claim. First of all, in making satisfaction we engage in practices that to some extent go against our inclinations, but overall we consent to them. Punishment, on the other hand, implies a *stronger* opposition to our will. While we willingly engage in penance (even though it contravenes our will to some extent) if we are punished it goes against our will

[37] This is the gist of *STh* I-II, q. 87, a. 7, obj. 3 and its reply. See also J. B. M. Wissink, "Satisfaction As Part of Penance," in Henk Schoot, ed., *Tibi soli peccavi: Thomas Aquinas on Guilt and Forgiveness* (Leuven: Peeters, 1996), 75-95.

[38] *STh* I-II, q. 87, a. 8: "each one is punished [*punitur*] for his own sin only."

[39] See *STh* II-II, q. 159, a. 2: those who inflict punishment upon another, not because of some fault that person has committed, but because of the pleasure they take in him or her being hurt, are guilty of extreme cruelty, even beastliness (*bestialitas*).

[40] Peterson, "Paving the Way," 276

without qualification. Hence, for Peterson's argument to stand he should demonstrate that Christ's Passion went against Christ's will in the stronger sense.

However, there cannot possibly be any opposition, or even tension, between Christ's human will and the divine will. There is, of course, an abhorrence of suffering and death in Christ's lower sensitive nature. Christ's will, however, understood as the rational part of his soul, desired the Passion on our behalf. Already in his commentary on the *Sentences* Aquinas makes it clear that Christ's human will was in complete conformity with the divine will. Admittedly, Aquinas makes a distinction between *voluntas ut ratio* and *voluntas ut natura*.[41] The former always conforms perfectly to the divine will. The latter, which includes our lower sensuality, did not always conform to the divine will (or Christ's rational will as human): Christ's "natural" will was repulsed by the prospect of suffering. This tension between Christ's sensual nature and his reason (*contrarietas sensualitatis ad rationem*) did not result in a vehement shunning of one power from the other (*non violenta refusio in Christo de potentia in potentiam*).[42] The Father gave to the man Christ the will and the charity by which he wanted to suffer (*Christo homini voluntatem dando, et caritatem, ex qua pati voluit*), thereby pre-empting any hint of "cruelty" on the part of God.[43] Time and again Aquinas reiterates that Christ wanted to suffer out of supreme charity (*ex maxima caritate pati voluit*).[44] Since there is, indeed, a harmony

[41] III *Sent*., d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 1. Aquinas would have come across this distinction in Peter Lombard, III *Sent*., d. 17; and William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tr. 6, c. 1.

[42] III *Sent*., d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 2; see also *STh* III, q. 18, a. 6 (Blackfriars translation): "Although Christ's instinctive and his sensuous will [*voluntas divina et voluntas sensualitatis*] may have desired something other than what was desired by the divine will and his will as modified by judgement, nevertheless this did not constitute incompatibility [*contrarietas*] of wills."

[43] III *Sent*., d. 20, q. 1, a. 5, qcla. 1. He writes (ibid., ad 1): "God has not delivered Christ to death as if he coerced him to die but by giving him a good will by which he freely wanted to die; and therefore it does not follow that there is any cruelty in God."

[44] III *Sent*., d. 20, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1. Similarly, in *STh* III q. 47, aa. 1 and 2 Aquinas reiterates that Christ died by his own will (*STh* III, q. 47, a. 1, ad 3: *voluntarie mortuus*), quoting John Chrysostom: "what took place was voluntary, and eliminates all suspicion of opposition to the Father" (*STh* III, q. 47, a. 2, ad 1). It is just because Christ voluntarily

between the will of the human Christ and the divine will, the argument that Christ's saving work on the Cross is somehow penal cannot be sustained.

In order to bolster the argument outlined so far, I will discuss briefly the notion of merit, which is the first category under which Aquinas discusses Christ's saving work in his main theological syntheses. I will argue that Aquinas's emphasis upon charity as friendship with God transforms the way he conceives of the manner in which Christ's saving work meets divine justice.

III. Merit, Charity, and Justice

I will restrict myself to discussing the role of charity in Aquinas's understanding of merit and making satisfaction, leaving a whole range of important aspects undiscussed.[45] In book 3 of the *Sentences* commentary (III *Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2) Aquinas deals with the question of whether Christ could merit. Aquinas argues that merit falls broadly under the category of justice. In general terms we merit when we act or do something in such a way that something is due to us.[46]

It is, however, only when an action is performed out of charity (*actio ex caritate facta*) that it is proportionate to receiving the

underwent his Passion (as Isa. 53 confirms) and because his will had been in-formed by charity that he could merit (III *Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 5): "Cum igitur Christus passionem suam voluntarie sustinuerit (oblatus enim est quia ipse voluit, Is. 53) et voluntas ista caritate fuerit informata, non est dubium quod per suam passionem meruerit."

[45] For example, his evolving views on merit in the *Summa theologiae* and the concept of *ordinatio* in his mature works; the connection between grace and merit; the distinction between merit *ex congruo* and *ex condigno*; or the problem of the merit of first grace. For a thorough discussion of how Aquinas's views on merit evolve in light of his increasingly dynamic and intrinsicist notion of grace, see the classic study by Joseph Wawrykow, *God's Grace and Human Action: "Merit" in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1995).

[46] III *Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 5: "facere aliquid sibi debitum." Aside from the two parties involved, merit contains a third aspect, namely, the actual reward (*merces*) for the meritorious deed. In the *Sentences* commentary Aquinas conceives of the relation between the meritorious deed and the reward in terms of proportional equality, characteristic of distributive justice, in contrast to a quantitative equality, which applies to commutative justice. In the *Summa theologiae* he adopts a different perspective, for there he associates salvation with commutative justice (which focuses on restoring an equal balance).

reward of eternal life. Through such an action we merit *ex condigno*, with a certain rightful claim. Christ who performed all his actions with charity therefore merited *ex condigno*.[47] When discussing the relation between the action and the reward Aquinas emphasizes the central role charity occupies in establishing an equivalence between them:

> There must be an equivalence between the action and the reward. I do not mean an equivalence according to equality of quantity, which pertains to commutative justice, such as in buying and selling, but according to an equality of proportion, as demanded in distributive justice, according to which God bestows his eternal rewards. Now, the action proportionate to eternal life is an action performed with charity [*Actio autem proportionata ad vitam aeternam est actio ex caritate facta*]. Thus one can merit *ex condigno* those things that pertain to eternal life. Works done, however, without charity fall short of this proportion.[48]

But why exactly is charity essential in merit—so much so that we cannot merit properly without charity or friendship for God?[49] The answer is that charity transforms the nature and dynamic of the manner in which the broken relationship with God is to be restored. Consider a later passage (IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, qcla. 4), where we read:

> Now, since in everything that is freely given the primary reason of giving is *love*, it is impossible that someone should cause such a debt to himself if he lacks friendship. And therefore since all goods, both temporal and eternal, are given to us by divine generosity, no one can acquire the debt of receiving any of them, except through charity for God. And this is why works done without charity are not meritorious condignly.

[47] Condign merit is based upon a debt or claim to receive (*debitum recipiendi*). Congruous merit implies that the giver should give according to what befits him (*secundum decentiam ipsius*). Congruent merit is merit in the weak or improper sense, and it depends as much on God's merciful willingness to reward our efforts as it does on divine justice.

[48] III *Sent*., d. 18, q. 1, a. 2. Article 3 reiterates this idea. It asks whether Christ could merit from the instance of his conception onwards. The answer is that because Christ from the very beginning of his conception was moved by charity (in an indivisible, nonsuccessive manner) he could merit.

[49] See III *Sent*., d. 18, q. 1, a. 2.

Consider the following example. If Francis performs an act of restitution for hurting or offending Clare, he will not merit anything, nor restore his friendship with Clare, unless his restitution is shaped and informed by feelings of genuine friendship. If he is merely making an indifferent "repayment" without regard to their mutual friendship it will not be considered meritorious. Francis will have failed, quite literally, to give Clare her due *as a friend*.[50] In other words, it is not the actual gift or compensation that is of primary importance but rather what it signifies, namely, the attempt to restore the friendship.[51] If the aspect of friendship is lacking it becomes a mere repayment but cannot possibly be considered a gift worthy of reward. The same applies to our relationship with God: because God, in his radical generosity, has invited us to become friends with him (i.e., in charity) we now actually have a "claim" of some kind over God that we could not conceivably have outside the context of friendship. Friendship comes with a set of obligations, and God in his astonishing generosity (manifested above all in the bestowal of his Son) has condescended to assume these. On the basis of friendship, God has therefore caused a debt from himself to us.[52]

[50] In the words of Daniel Schwartz, *Aquinas on Friendship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 136: "It is one's reaching out to the giver with a friendly will that entitles one to the benefits." I have benefited from Schwartz's study, especially from chapters 6 and 7. Incidentally, the central role of charity explains why IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, qcla. 1 suggests that we cannot make satisfaction for one sin while retaining another. Because satisfaction is primarily about the restoration of friendship, it cannot take place if obstacles remain, "just as neither would a man make satisfaction who threw himself at another's feet and then gave him another slap."

[51] III *Sent*., d. 18, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1. It is therefore no surprise that actions by which we merit are genuinely gratuitous: they are not primarily performed for the sake of the reward but rather for the sake of love itself. The symbolic or intentional aspect of the saving work of Christ (or, indeed, our own practices of penance) explains the appeal that St. Augustine's dictum from *The City of God,* book 10 would have had for Aquinas: "the visible sacrifice is the sacrament, i.e., the sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice." Aquinas must have come across this text (which informs his soteriological model of sacrifice in his final works) quite late in life; he then quotes it time and again (see n. 10).

[52] This may seem a radical reading, as if God becomes a debtor to us. It is implied to some degree, however, by the fact that Aquinas characterizes "merit" on the basis of charity as "*condign*" (and not merely as "*congruous*"); see n. 46. Again, when Aquinas writes (in IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, qcla. 4) that "however great is the good work done

In short, we obtain forgiveness from God (and ultimately eternal life) when we make satisfaction on the condition that this occurs within an overall context of friendship, which is the root of any meritorious action.

It is certainly a daring theological move to claim that because we are friends with God we acquire some kind of "claim" over him.[53] Admittedly, speaking of "claims" over God must be nuanced: the claim we have is itself a gift from God in the first place. There is, in other words, a pneumatological circularity operative here. Charity itself is a gift from God. More particularly, it is a way in which the Holy Spirit (one of whose personal names is Gift)[54] comes to dwell in us.[55] Through receiving the gift of charity or friendship, our actions informed by them acquire a meritorious character whereby we can receive further rewards from God—ultimately culminating in being given the gift of eternal life.

Again, even though Aquinas uses the language of condign merit there is no strict equivalence; but among friends this is not required.[56] Especially among friends who are not entirely on an

without charity, it does not make it so that the one doing it has a debt of receiving anything from God, properly speaking" (*a Deo faciens debitum habeat*), the implication is, of course, that one who does merit with charity is owed something from God, properly speaking. Having said this, it remains true that for Aquinas, as for Augustine, God crowns (and rewards) only his own gifts.

[53] IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, qcla. 4, ad 1: "No work of ours is able to merit anything by quantity of its own goodness, but from the power of charity [*sed ex vi caritatis*], which causes those things that belong to friends to be shared. Hence, however great is the good work done without charity, it does not make it so that the one doing it has a debt of receiving anything from God, properly speaking."

[54] *STh* I, q. 38.

[55] *STh* I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2; see also *STh* I-II, q. 114, a. 3: "the value of its [=a meritorious work] merit depends upon the power of the Holy Spirit moving us to life everlasting according to John 4:14: '[The water that I shall give him] shall become in him a fount of water springing up into life everlasting.' And the worth of the work depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a person, being made a partaker of the divine nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: 'If sons, heirs also.'"

[56] In relation to satisfaction Aquinas writes in IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 1, a. 5, qcla. 2: "It should be said that for satisfaction a man must be reconciled to his neighbor, just as to God. Now reconciliation is nothing other than the repairing of friendship. But while the cause of friendship's dissolution remains, friendship cannot be repaired; which cause

equal footing there is therefore an element of *acceptatio* by the higher one:[57] "equality in making satisfaction to God is not according to equivalence, but rather according to his acceptance."[58] In a sense this places the bar both higher and lower: higher, in the sense that the restoration of friendship requires charity; a mere restitution will not do. Lower, on the other hand, because the restoration of a friendship does not require that the same demands be met as those that would apply in retributive justice among those who are strangers.[59]

indeed was the inequality caused by an unjust taking or keeping. And so the person who does not restore what was wrongly taken or kept cannot make satisfaction, nor be reconciled to God. But it should be known that, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* VIII [14.1163b15], friendship does not always require the equal, but what is possible. And so if anything has been taken that cannot possibly be restored, the will of restoring it with as much restitution as is possible suffices according to the condition of both to the judgement of good men."

[57] *STh* III, q. 85, a. 3, ad 1.

[58] IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, qcla. 2: "Aequalitas autem in satisfactione ad Deum non est secundum aequivalentiam, sed magis secundum acceptationem ipsius." In relation to "acceptance" and "*aequalitas*" he writes in IV *Sent*., d. 15, q. 1, a. 2: "among those honors that are for parents or gods, even according to the Philosopher [*Nic. Ethic.* 9.14.1164b15], it is impossible to render the equivalent according to quantity; but it is enough that a man render what he can: for friendship does not require an equivalent except according as it is possible. And this is also a certain kind of equal, namely, according to proportionality: for just as what is due to God is related to himself, so is whatever this man can render related to him. And this is how the form of justice is preserved in some way, and it is the same on the part of satisfaction." Such an *acceptatio* should not be read in light of later notions of *acceptatio*. For Aquinas, the context of friendship between God and humans purges this notion of any legalistic or forensic dimensions it might have. IV *Sent*., d. 20, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 3 is also relevant: *poena satisfactoria* has the power of making satisfaction mostly by reason of charity with which a man endures it. It is precisely because greater charity is manifested in making satisfaction for someone other than for oneself that less *poena* is required.

[59] Also, among friends the compensation will not be determined by an external party, such as a judge; rather, the offender will freely take it upon herself. In making satisfaction we freely embrace penance in marked contrast to the retribution of punishment, which is imposed. The following quotation brings out some of these connections (*STh* III, q. 85, a. 3): "Penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the

The significance of this emphasis upon charity or friendship is fundamental for understanding Aquinas's notion of satisfaction—and for recognizing that interpreting satisfaction in penal terms as somehow meeting the demands of a vindictive God is untenable. When discussing satisfaction as part of the sacrament of penance (*STh* III, q. 90. a. 2), he writes:

> Now it has been said above (*STh* III, q. 85, a.3 ad 3) that an offense is atoned otherwise in penance than in vindictive justice. Because, in vindictive justice the atonement is made according to the judge's decision, and not according to the discretion of the offender or of the person offended; whereas, in penance, the offense is atoned according to the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against whom the sin was committed, because in the latter case we seek not only the restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive justice, but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship [*sed magis reconciliatio amicitiae*], which is accomplished by the offender making atonement according to the will of the person offended.

In penance satisfaction is made (and justice met) according to radically different standards and criteria. The reason for this difference is the friendship between God and humans, which changes the dynamic of "retribution" altogether.

By way of conclusion I would like to mention Aquinas's discussion as to how divine justice and mercy relate to one another. When dealing with the objection that God cannot remit what appertains to his justice, Aquinas makes an important observation:

> God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against his justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred denarii, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. . . . Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fullness thereof.[60]

offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is part of justice."

[60] *STh* I, q. 21, a. 3, ad 2.

The reference to the parable of the workers in the vineyard (Matt 20) is no coincidence. In that story, God bestows an equal reward on all workers, even though some started much later, and others worked all day. This may clash with our natural sense of justice; it is, however, simply an illustration of God's infinite generosity. A different kind of justice operates among friends than among those who are not on friendly terms.

All acts of divine justice are predicated upon God's prior generosity, goodness, and mercy, if only because there is no proportion between God and creatures—for we have received everything from God, including our very being. Yet charity, itself a gift from God, creates a kind of proportion. This is the ultimate foundation of Aquinas's profound statement "the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon."[61]

Conclusion

In recent years a number of scholars have claimed that Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of salvation contains penal elements. Some (e.g., O'Collins) even claim that both through the language he adopts and the introduction of the notion of *poena satisfactoria* (in marked contrast to Anselm for whom *poena* and *satisfactio* are mutually exclusive) Aquinas may have contributed to importing a vindictive notion of divine justice into soteriology. Others welcome this interpretation, seeing Aquinas's alleged incipient penal notion of salvation as a precursor to later Calvinist doctrine, in which penal substitution becomes the dominant paradigm to understand Christ's saving activity.

[61] *STh* I, q. 21, a. 4: "Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will—which is the ultimate end. . . . So in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes."

In this article I have tried to refute these claims. First, I have demonstrated that the language of divine anger and *placatio* is biblical in origin and should not be taken at face value. Aquinas emphasizes that these concepts are used metaphorically, and that they do not properly apply to God. On the contrary, they relate to his created effects. For instance, talk of God abandoning us should be interpreted as saying something about humans moving away from God through sin.

The introduction of *poena satiafactoria* deserves a more in-depth refutation. Here I have argued, first, that we should not translate *poena* as "punishment" in all instances, which suggests that we cannot take the introduction of the term *poena satisfactoria* as evidence that Aquinas introduces a penal dimension into his theory of making satisfaction. More fundamentally (going beyond issues of translation) I have indicated that this very concept may actually be one of the ways in which Aquinas nuances the penal elements present within the Augustinian tradition. Our afflictions, which Augustine considered to be "punishments" for original sin, may actually acquire a "satisfactory" or penitential character in Aquinas's reading. Thus, rather than strengthening the penal character of the tradition, Aquinas's notion may actually qualify it. Finally, a penal reading of Aquinas's theory of making satisfaction has to demonstrate that in Christ the human and the divine wills are opposed to one another. This is, after all, what distinguishes making satisfaction from punishment: while the former is "voluntary simply but involuntary in some respect" (insofar as every act of penance implies deprivation of some kind, which our sensible nature therefore resists), it pertains "to the nature of punishment to be against the will" without qualification.[62] Now, Aquinas is at pains throughout his writings to demonstrate that Christ's human and divine wills are not in opposition, as I have shown. Thus, the claim that Aquinas introduces a penal element in his understanding of Christ's saving work fails at a basic level.

In the final part of the article I have considered the notion of "merit." It undoubtedly deserves a fuller treatment in its own

[62] *STh* I-II, q. 87, a. 6.

right. My main purpose in dealing with it, no matter how briefly, was twofold. First, I wanted to indicate that Aquinas's soteriology cannot be reduced to the notion of making satisfaction. As in a symphony, every movement or model (merit, satisfaction, redemption, sacrifice) is multi-layered and recalls previous elements, with a cumulative effect (see, e.g., *STh* III, q. 48, a. 6, ad 3). The model of "merit" receives primary attention in his commentary on the *Sentences*; in the *Summa theologiae* Aquinas presents a holistic picture, perhaps crowned by the (more biblical) notion of sacrifice. Only in the *Summa contra gentiles* is "making satisfaction" the main model.

Second, I have argued that we need to be more attentive to the role that charity plays in Aquinas's account of merit. As is well-known, charity is the root of merit. What is not so well-known is that charity (or friendship with God) radically transforms the notion of *justice* that is being met in Christ's saving activity (and in our penitential practices insofar as we are united with, and incorporated into, Christ). In plain English, retribution acquires an entirely different dimension among those who are on friendly terms with one another, as distinct from those who are not. Here strict equivalence does not matter; what matters is divine acceptance. It is here that Aquinas parts ways with Anselm. Anselm considered the self-gift of Christ sufficient to outweigh the number and gravity of our sins, given the lofty value of the person of Christ as the sinless Son of God.[63] Aquinas subtly shifts the focus to a far less transactional and more interpersonal dimension: through charity (or friendship with God) Christ's satisfaction compensates for sin and restores our friendship with God in accordance with standards that prevail among friends. In short, once we recall the nature of merit, and more in particular the role of charity in it, the assertion that Aquinas claims that Christ has to meet the demands of a vindictive deity becomes even less plausible. Given the importance of charity, making satisfaction is not in the first place about meeting divine justice but rather about restoration of friendship (cf. *STh* III, q. 90, a. 2), and this applies to both

[63] Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* 2.14.

Christ's Passion and our practices of making satisfaction insofar as we are in union with Christ. In short, the central role charity occupies in Aquinas's soteriology explains why God's justice is always predicated upon divine mercy, and why penal readings are less than convincing.

The Thomist 83 (2019): 547-88

THREE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY THOMIST SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF A HERETICAL POPE: CAJETAN, CANO, AND BELLARMINE

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

University of Saint Thomas
St. Paul, Minnesota

ANY CHRISTIAN ECCLESIOLOGY that recognizes an external magisterial authority has to reckon with the question, what happens if that authority tries to teach definitively something that is contrary to the faith—in other words, heresy? Theoretically, the question is of perennial interest; historically, it occasionally has been a very lively one.[1]

[1] One can see this lively debate surrounding the cases of Popes Honorius in the seventh century and John XXII in the fourteenth century. See Georg Kreuzer, *Die Honoriusfrage im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit* (Stuttgart: A. Hiersemann, 1975). For a detailed presentation of the controversy surrounding Pope John XXII, see Jared Wicks, S.J., "The Intermediate State: Patristic and Medieval Doctrinal Development and Recent Receptions," in *The Hope of Eternal Life: Common Statement of the Eleventh Round of the U.S. Lutheran-Catholic Dialogue,* ed. Lowell G. Almen and Richard J. Sklba (Minneapolis, Minn.: Lutheran University Press, 2011), 159-70. In the nineteenth century the issue of papal heresy was also vigorously discussed in the debates over papal infallibility before and during the First Vatican Council. Prior to the council, theologians such as Peter le Page Renouf (1822-97) and Ignaz von Döllinger (1799-1890) wrote pamphlets on the question of the *papa haereticus*, arguing that Pope Honorius had been condemned for heresy. During the council some bishops in the minority, such as Karl Josef von Hefele (1809-93) and Augustin Verot (1804-76), objected to the ultramontane doctrine because they thought it ignored the cases of popes like Honorius and Vigilius, who had in their opinion taught error. See Mansi, *Collectio conciliorum recentiorum* (Arnhem: H. Welter, 1927), 52: col. 83; cols. 295-300. In our own day, some theologians have made a stir in accusing Pope Francis of heresy. While, in my judgment, these last are wrong, the very existence of these false accusations shows the ongoing relevance of the theories of our three authors for helping the Church to discern faithful teaching from unfaithful.

In Catholic theology the question tends to be centered on the pope (though it could just as easily be posed of a council). The possibility of papal heresy was commonly treated in medieval reflections on canon law and ecclesiology and was generally affirmed in the Thomist school. In the sixteenth century, three Thomist theologians, Cajetan, O.P. (1468-1534), Melchior Cano, O.P. (1509-60), and St. Robert Bellarmine, S.J. (1542-1621), took up the question in the context of conciliarism and the Reformation. This article will examine the views of these three theologians about which kinds of papal teachings are subject to error and which are not, and about whether and how the Church could depose a heretical pope. To this end, this article will treat each theologian's understanding of papal infallibility, since each of the authors thought that there are conditions under which God necessarily protects the pope from teaching error. It also will examine their understanding of the limits of papal infallibility. This article will treat the three authors' assessments of popes who have been accused of heresy in order better to understand their theory of the *papa haereticus,* but it will prescind from analyzing whether their historical judgment is correct. Finally, it will treat whether and under what conditions a pope could be a heretic and the process by which the Church can be freed from a heretical pope.

I. THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Gratian's *Concordia discordantium canonum* appeared around A.D. 1140, and it was a kind of medieval "Denzinger" containing a collection of authoritative texts.[2] Gratian's work presents a series of texts concerned with the limits of papal authority. Perhaps the best known is the following canon, known by its *incipit*, *Si Papa*, written by St. Boniface, apostle to the Germans and a martyr:

> If the Pope, negligent of his own and of his brothers' salvation, is discovered slack and remiss in his deeds, and silent, moreover, in the cause of good when

[2] Yves M.-J. Congar, "Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Infallibility of the Papal Magisterium (*Summa Theologiae*, II–II, q. 1, a. 10)," *The Thomist* 38 (1974): 90.

he should speak, which last is the more harmful to himself and to others, then no less does he lead countless people along with him in a throng to their first slave of hell, he himself to be beaten with many stripes together with Satan for all eternity. Here no mortal presumes to rebuke his faults, because he, the one who is to judge all, is to be judged by none, unless he be found straying from the faith.[3]

Gratian had both received and transmitted a basic tension in the Church's doctrine of the papal magisterium. This tension can be seen in the two propositions: "the one who is to judge all, is to be judged by none," and "unless he be found straying from the faith."[4] Gratian also holds that a person does not fall into heresy by simply holding erroneous doctrine. One has to hold this error pertinaciously after being corrected.[5] Gratian not only presents papal heresy as theoretically possible, but he seems to have thought that it had occurred and gives the unhistorical example of Pope Anastasius II (r. 496-98).[6] While *Si Papa* is clear that the pope could be judged for a deviation from the faith, it also leaves much unsaid. It does not sanction any particular method for judging a pope for heresy, nor who may judge the pope, nor when the pope may be judged (e.g., after a rebuke), nor in what condition a pope finds himself when

[3] "Si papa suae et fraternae salutis negligens reprehenditur inutilis et remissus in operibus suis, et insuper a bono taciturnus, quod magis officit sibi et omnibus, nichilominus innumerabiles populos cateruatim secum ducit, primo mancipio gehennae cum ipso plagis multis in eternum uapulaturus. Huius culpas istic redarguere presummit mortalium nullus, quia cunctos ipse iudicaturus a nemine est iudicandus, nisi deprehendatur a fide deuius" (Gratian, *Concordantia discordantium canonum, Decretum*, part 1, d. 40, c. 6 [Aemilius Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici* (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1955), 1:146]). English translation by James M. Moynihan, *Papal Immunity and Liability in the Writings of the Medieval Canonists* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1961), 26.

[4] Klaus Schatz, *Papal Primacy: From Its Origins to the Present*, trans. John A. Otto and Linda M. Maloney (Collegeville, Minn: The Liturgical Press, 1996), 95.

[5] Gratian, *Concordantia discordantium canonum*, part 2, cause 24, q. 3, c. 31 (Friedberg, ed., 1:998); Moynihan, *Papal Immunity*, 50.

[6] Gratian, *Concordantia discordantium canonum*, part 1, d. 19, c. 9, q. 1 (Friedberg, ed., 1:64); Moynihan, *Papal Immunity*, 49 n. 23.

judged (e.g., is he still the pope or is he a heretic who was deposed *ipso facto*?).

Si Papa ensured that the issue of papal heresy was a common theme in the canonistic debates of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[7] The issue was in fact so common that the papal magisterium itself recognized the truth contained in it. Thus, Pope Innocent III (r. 1198-1216) stated that

> For faith is so necessary to me, that, while I have only God for my judge in other sins, I am able to be judged by the Church only on account of the sin which is committed against faith. For he who does not believe is already judged.[8]

A similar view was also held by Pope Innocent IV (r. 1243-54) who, in his commentary on Gratian, approved of the doctrinal content of *Si Papa*.[9] In the sixteenth century, Pope Paul IV (r. 1555-59) reconfirmed the essential content of *Si Papa* in the bull *Cum ex apostolates officio* (1559).[10]

The various schools of theology in the Middle Ages were one in accepting the doctrine that a pope can be a heretic. Dominican and Thomist theologians took up the issue in their ecclesiological writings, and this became more pronounced during their fights first with conciliarists and later with Protestants. Saint Thomas Aquinas clearly affirmed the pope's infallibility in certain matters, such as promulgating a new creed and canonizing a saint.[11] At the same time, he affirmed that it is

[7] Moynihan, *Papal Immunity*, 141-42. Brian Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9. Thierry Sol, "Nisi deprehendatur a fide devius: L'immunité du pape de Gratien à Huguccio," *Ius ecclesiae* 31 (2019): 189-202.

[8] "In tantum mihi fides necessaria est, ut quum de ceteris peccatis solum Deum judicem habeam, propter solum peccatum, quod in fide committitur, possem ab ecclesia judicari. Nam qui non credit, jam judicatus est" (Innocent III, *Sermo II in consecratione pontificis maximi* [*PL* 217, col. 656]).

[9] Moynihan, *Papal Immunity*, 115.

[10] *Bullarum, diplomatum et privilegiorum sanctorum romanorum pontificum taurinensis*, ed. Seb. Franco et Henrico Dalmazzo (Turin, 1857), 6:551.

[11] *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 10. Ulrich Horst, *The Dominicans and the Pope: Papal Teaching Authority in the Medieval and Early Modern Thomist Tradition* (Notre Dame, Ind.:

possible for the pope to err as a person.[12] In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Thomist school followed Aquinas in maintaining that the pope's teaching is protected from error in certain conditions, although these conditions were not always laid out with great clarity.[13] Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (c. 1260-1323), Petrus de Palude, O.P. (ca. 1275–1342), Guido Terreni, O.Carm. (d. 1342), Juan de Torquemada, O.P. (1388-1468), and St. Antoninus, O.P. (1389-1459) all affirm that the pope can teach infallibly. Many of these Thomist theologians, however, also explicitly hold that the pope can err doctrinally or be a heretic when teaching as a "singular" or "particular" person.[14] Many of these authors either explicitly cite *Si Papa* as

University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 20. Congar, "Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Infallibility of the Papal Magisterium," 93.

[12] *Quodlibet* IX.8.

[13] Hervaeus Natalis, O.P., *De potestate papae,* in *In quatuor libros Sententiarum commentaria. Quibus adiectus est eiusdem auctoris tractatus De postestate papae* (1647; reprint, Farnborough: Gregg, 1966), 365. Petrus de Palude, O.P., *Tractatus de potestate papae*, ed. P. T. Stella (Zürich: Pas-Verlag, 1966), 191. Guido Terreni, *Quaestio de magisterio infallibili romani pontificis*, ed. Bartolomé María Xiberta y Roqueta (Münster: typis Aschendorff, 1926), 16, 25, lib. 2, c. 112. Juan de Torquemada, O.P., *De inerrantia romani pontificis ex cathedra definientis suffragium praeclarissimi Card. Jo. Turrecremata O.P. legati pontificii ad concilium Basileense deinde ad concilium florentinum latinorum oratoris ex aureo illius opere summa de potestate papali depromptum et Rev. patribus concilii Vaticani exhibitum* (Turin: P. H. F. Marietti, 1870), lib. 2, c. 109. Saint Antoninus, O.P., *Summa theologica* (Graz: Akademische Drucku. Verlagsanstalt, 1959), 3:364-65.

[14] Hervaeus Natalis, *De potestate papae*, 365; Petrus de Palude, *Tractatus de potestate papae*, 196; St. Antoninus, *Summa theologica*, 3:1207-8; Juan de Torquemada, *Summa de ecclesia ...: una cum eiusdem apparatu, nunc primum in lucem edito, super decreto Papae Eugenij IIII. in Concilio Florentino de unione Graecorum emanato* (Venice: Apud Michaelem Tramezinum, 1561), lib. 2, c. 102; Terreni, *Quaestio de magisterio infallibili romani pontificis*, 28, 30. Tierney reads Terreni as holding a position that the pope simply cannot err (Brian Tierney, *Origins of Papal Infallibility, 1150-1350: A Study on the Concepts of Infallibility, Sovereignty and Tradition in the Middle Ages* [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988], 245). Terreni is at pains, however, to be clear that the pope is only infallible when defining a matter of faith for the universal Church.

one of their sources for this teaching[15] or admit that popes have in fact been deficient in living the faith in some respect.[16] For these authors, once the pope commits incorrigible heresy, the pope ceases to be pope *ipso facto*.[17] They also hold that the pope is the highest authority in the Church and cannot be judged by anyone, including a council.[18] Nevertheless some, like Petrus de Palude, St. Antoninus, and Torquemada, think that a council can recognize officially the *de facto* situation in the Church that there is no pope.[19]

In the sixteenth century, there were two different theological fights over the nature of the papal teaching office, and our three authors explicitly responded to both. The first was between papalists and conciliarists; the second was between Protestant and Catholic theologians. Conciliarism arose in the fourteenth century, and it gained momentum during the great Western Schism (1378-1417). The basic position of all conciliarists is that a general council of the Church is higher in authority than the pope. In the sixteenth century, conciliarism found able defenders in men such as Jacques Almain (ca. 1480-1515) and John Mair (ca. 1467-1550).[20] Central to their argument that a

[15] St. Antoninus, *Summa theologica*, 3:1207; Juan de Torquemada, O.P., *A Disputation on the Authority of Pope and Council* (Blackfriars Publications, 1988), 48; Petrus de Palude, *Tractatus de potestate papae*, 195.

[16] Hervaeus Natalis, *De potestate papae*, 365; Juan de Torquemada, *Summa de ecclesia*, lib. 4, c. 19-20. Torquemada's account of Honorius in book four is at odds with his account in book two. On this apparent contradiction, see Kreuzer, *Die Honoriusfrage im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit*, 132-33.

[17] Petrus de Palude, *Tractatus de potestate papae*, 195. Juan de Torquemada, O.P., *A Disputation on the Authority of Pope and Council*, 47. St. Antoninus, *Summa theologica*, 3:1208.

[18] Petrus de Palude, *Tractatus de potestate papae*, 196.

[19] Ibid., 196, 200; St. Antoninus, *Summa theologica*, 3:1208-9; Juan de Torquemada, O.P., *A Disputation on the Authority of Pope and Council*, 47; Juan de Torquemada, *Summa de ecclesia*, 1. III, c. 8 ad 4, fol. 282r.

[20] Francis Oakley, "Almain and Major: Conciliar Theory on the Eve of the Reformation," *American Historical Review* 70 (1965): 673-90; idem, *The Conciliarist Tradition: Constitutionalism in the Catholic Church 1300-1870* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 111-40; Friedrich Merzbacher, "Die Kirchen und Staatsgewalt bei Jacques Almain," in H. Lentze and I. Ganipl, eds., *Speculum juris et ecclesiarum: Festschrift für Willibald M. Plöchl zum 60* (Vienna: Herder, 1967), 301-12.

council is superior to a pope is the possibility that individual popes could become heretics and be judged and deposed by a general council.[21] This ability to judge and depose a heretical pope, they argue, demonstrates that a council is in fact superior to a pope. Moreover, the conciliarists held that a general council could judge and depose the pope not only in the case of heresy, but also for other immoral crimes in which he scandalizes the Church.[22] Lastly, they read Luke 22:32, "I have prayed for thee [Peter], that thy faith fail not," not as a guarantee of either the pope's public or his personal faith, but rather as a promise that the universal Church cannot err.[23]

At the same time, Protestant theologians began to reject or reformulate almost every doctrine concerning those visible properties that are constitutive of the Church's hierarchical and sacramental structure. This entailed that the discussion of papal infallibility and heresy was no longer treated in the medieval ecclesiological context. For Martin Luther (1483-1546) the papacy is the office of the antichrist; the pope is "the devil's bishop and the devil himself."[24] While Luther retained the medieval view that popes could doctrinally err,[25] as early as the

[21] Jacque Almain, *Tractatus de autoritate ecclesiae et conciliorum generalium,* in *Gersonii opera omnia,* ed. Ellies Du Pin (Antwerp: Sumptibus Societatis, 1706), 2: cols. 1005, 1007; John Mair, *Disputatio de authoritate concilii supra pontificem maximum* in *Gersonii opera omnia,* ed. Ellies Du Pin (Antwerp: Sumptibus Societatis, 1706), 2: cols. 1144-45.

[22] Almain, *Tractatus de autoritate ecclesiae et conciliorum generalium*, 2: col. 1108; Mair, *Disputatio de authoritate concilii supra pontificem maximum*, 2: col. 1135.

[23] Mair, *Disputatio de authoritate concilii supra pontificem maximum*, 2: col. 1142.

[24] Martin Luther, *Matthäus Kapitel 18–24 in Predigten ausgelegt 1537–1540*, WA 47:425. English *What Luther Says*, entry 370. Luther held his view prior even to breaking from the Church. See *Vorlesung über den Römerbrief* [1515/1516], WA 56:417.

[25] Remigius Bäumer, *Martin Luther und der Papst* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1987), 24; idem, "Luthers Ansichten über die Irrtumsfähigkeit des Konzils und ihre theologiegeschichtlichen Grundlagen," *Wahrheit und Verkundigung, Festschrift fur Michael Schmaus*, ed. Leo Scheffczyk, Werner Dettloff, and Richard Heinzmann (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schoningh, 1967), 2:987ff.; Gerhard O. Forde, "Infallibility Language and the Early Lutheran Tradition," in Paul C. Empie, T. Austin

Leipzig disputation (1519) he came to reject the medieval view that the pope is infallible in certain circumstances.[26] John Calvin (1509-64) and the Anglican William Laud (1573-1645) were no less clear than Luther in rejecting the infallible authority of the pope,[27] holding that when the pope is teaching in union with a council he can still err in matters of faith or morals.[28] While generally speaking Protestants were not interested in the theoretical aspects of the *papa haereticus* like their medieval predecessors, they were very interested in demonstrating that popes had in fact been heretics. In the *Acta Augustana*, for example, Luther repeatedly alleged that popes had erred and taught contrary to the Scriptures.[29] In the *Magdeburg Centuries*, Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520-75) and Joannes Oporinus (1507-68) repeatedly charged various popes with heresy.[30] In

---

Murphy, and Joseph A. Burgess, *Teaching Authority & Infallibility in the Church* (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Pub. House, 1980), 121.

[26] Luther, *Ad dialogum Silvestri Prieratis de potestate papae*, WA 1:647-686; idem, *Resolutio Lutheriana super propositione sua decima tertia de potestate papae*, WA 2:199, 15; idem, *An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation*, LW 44:133. On Luther and the papacy, see Scott H. Hendrix, *Luther and the Papacy: Stages in a Reformation Conflict* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 47-48, 67, 69, 181; Bäumer, *Martin Luther und der Papst*, 24-26; Luther, *Von den Konziliis und Kirchen*, WA 50:509-653. Luther stated, "Sicut non credam Thomam Aquinatem esse sanctum, licet a Papa canonisatum, non sum Haereticus" (Luther, *Assertio omnium articulorum M. Lutheri per bullam Leonis X*, WA 7:149.35-36).

[27] John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, IV.7.28 (The Library of Christian Classics, vols. 20-21, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles [Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960], 2:1146).

[28] Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, IV.9.9 and 10; William Laud, *A Relation of the Conference between William Laud . . . and Mr. Fisher, the Iesuite . . . with an Answer to such Exceptions as A. C. a Catholic, i.e. John Sweet? attributed also to John Fisher . . . "True Relations of Sundry Conferences", etc.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1839), 227.

[29] Luther, *Acta Augustana*, WA 2:10; LW 31:265. WA: 2:21; LW 31:282.

[30] Matthias Flacius Illyricus and Joannes Oporinus, *Ecclesiastica historia: integram ecclesiae Christi ideam, quantum ad locum, propagationem, persecutionem, tranquillitatem, doctrinam, haereses, ceremonias, gubernationem, schismata, synodos, personas, miracula, martyria, religiones extra ecclesiam, & statum imperij politicum attinet, secundum singulas centurias, perspicuo ordine complectens: singulari diligentia & fide ex uetustissimis & optimis historicis, patribus, & alijs scriptoribus congesta; per*

effect, the Protestant theologians retained the medieval Catholic doctrine of the possibility of papal heresy, while rejecting that the pope can infallibly define a matter of faith in certain limited situations. It is in the context of both conciliarism and the Protestant Reformation that Cajetan, Cano, and Bellarmine discuss the problem of heretical popes.

II. CAJETAN, O.P. (1469-1534)

Probably the most important defender of papal infallibility in the first half of the sixteenth century was Tommaso de Vio, called Cajetan after his birthplace, Gaeta in Italy. Cajetan entered the Dominican order in 1484 and taught philosophy and theology at Padua, Pavia, and Rome. He served as Master General of the Dominican order from 1508 to 1518, and during his tenure he proved to be a vigorous opponent of conciliarists. He attended the Lateran Council in 1512, was created a cardinal in 1517, and was nominated bishop of Gaeta in 1519.[31] In October 1518, Pope Leo X sent Cajetan to meet with Luther, but he failed to persuade Luther to remain in the Church of Christ.[32] Cajetan dealt with papal infallibility and error principally in four works.[33] He first defended papal infallibility

---

aliquot studiosos & pios uiros in urbe Magdeburgica . . . (Basel: Per Ioannem Oporinum, 1560-74), 2:212 558, 559, 560, 627; 3:165, 277, 278.

[31] On Cajetan's life, see Marie-Joseph Congar, "Bio-Bibliographie de Cajetan," *Revue Thomiste* 17 (1934-35): 1-49. For a bibliography of Cajetan's works, see Harm Klueting, "Thomas de Vio Cajetan," in *Thomistenlexikon*, ed. David Berger and Jorgen Vijgen (Bonn: Verlag Nova et Vetera, 2006), 71-78.

[32] Gerhard Hennig, *Cajetan und Luther: Ein historischer Beitrag zur Begegnung von Thomismus und Reformation* (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1966); *Cajetan Responds: A Reader in Reformation Controversy*, ed. Jared Wicks, S.J. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1978); Jared Wicks, S.J., *Cajetan und die Anfänge der Reformation* (Mu̇nster: Aschendorff, 1983); Cajetan and Charles Morerod, *Cajetan et Luther en 1518: Edition, traduction et commentaire des opuscules d'Augsbourg de Cajetan* (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1994).

[33] On Cajetan's ecclesiology, see J. D. M. Maes, O. P., "Le pouvoir pontifical d'après Cajetan," *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* 12 (1935): 705-21; V.-M. Pollet, O.P.,

in two works written against conciliarism, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii* (1511) and *Apologia de comparata auctoritate papae et concilii* (1512). Additionally, he discussed papal infallibility and error in his *Commentaria in Summa theologiae* (1518) while commenting on question 1, article 10 of the *Secunda secundae*. Finally, Cajetan defended the papacy against the attacks of Luther in *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis* (1521).[34]

Cajetan holds that Christ is the head of the whole Church, but after his death and resurrection he made Peter his vicar over the Church on earth.[35] By divine institution, the Roman pontiffs are the successors to Peter in this office[36] and hold it for the purpose of strengthening "the faithful amid the turbulence of uncertainty and questioning which arise concerning the faith."[37] When the pope acts as the supreme teacher of the faithful in solemnly defining the faith for the whole Church, he cannot

---

"La doctrine de Cajetan sur l'Église," *Angelicum* 11 (1934): 514-32; 12 (1935): 223-44; Anton Bodem, *Das Wesen der Kirche nach Kardinal Cajetan: Ein Betrag zur Ekklesiologie im Zeitalter der Reformation* (Trier: Paulinus, 1971); Ulrich Horst, *The Dominicans and the Pope: Papal Teaching Authority in the Medieval and Early Modern Thomist Tradition*, 40-41; idem, *Juan de Torquemada und Thomas de Vio Cajetan: Zwei Protagonisten der païpstlichen Gewaltenfulle* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012), 111-82; idem, *Papst, Konzil, Unfehlbarkeit: d. Ekklesiologie d. Summenkommentare von Cajetan bis Billuart* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1978), 24-26.

[34] Cajetan, O.P., *Commentaria in Summa theologiae,* in *Summa theolgiae cum commentariis Thomae De Vio Caietani ordinis praedicatorum, Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita* (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1882-1906), 8:24-25; idem, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii* and *Apologia de comparata auctoritate papae et concillii,* in Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii. Cum apologia eiusdem tractatus,* ed. V. M. J. Pollet (Rome: Angelicum, 1936); idem, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis (1521),* ed. Friedrich Lauchert, in Corpus Catholicorum 10 (Mu̇nster in Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1925).

[35] Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 11 (Pollet, ed., 91); idem, *Apologia de comparata auctoritate papae et concillii*, c. 7 (Pollet, ed., 244); idem, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis*, c. 1 (Lauchert, ed., 2).

[36] Cajetan, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis*, c. 7 (Lauchert, ed., 48); c. 12 (Lauchert, ed., 66).

[37] "firmare vero fideles fluctantes in ambiguitatibus et questionibus, que circa fidem emergent" (Cajetan, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis*, c. 13 [Lauchert, ed., 84]).

err.[38] Cajetan primarily grounds Peter and his successors' ability to make an infallible judgment for the universal Church concerning the faith in Christ's prayer: "I have prayed for thee [Peter], that thy faith fail not" (Luke 22:32). Christ's prayer, however, only guarantee's the pope's ability to make infallible definitions, and not any other aspect of the Petrine faith or teaching.[39]

In order for the pope to define something infallibly, Cajetan thinks that certain conditions must be met.[40] First, the definition must be what he describes as a "definitive judgment" (*iudicio definitivo*) or a "final determination" (*finalis determinatio*).[41] Second, the object of infallibility must pertain to matters of faith or morals. In fact, Cajetan does not use the term "faith and morals," but typically employs instead the term "the Christian

[38] Cajetan, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis*, c. 13 (Lauchert, ed., 83). "Papa tamen, iudicando et definiendo quid tenendum ab Ecclesia sit de fide, errare non potes" (Cajetan, *Commentaria in Summa theologiae* [Leonine ed., 25]). Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 9 (Pollet, ed., 67).

[39] Cajetan, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis*, c. 13 (Lauchert, ed., 83).

[40] For a fuller treatment of Cajetan's conditions, see Christian D. Washburn, "Papal Infallibility, Vatican I, and Three 16th Century Views," *Annuarium historiae conciliorum* 44 (2012): 143-70; Jose Arturo Dominguez Asensio, "lnfalibilidad y 'determinatio de fide' en la polemica anticonciliarista del Cardenal Cayetano," *Communio* (Seville) 14 (1981): 1-50, 205-26; idem, "Infalibilidad y 'determinatio de fide' en la polemica antiluterana del Cardenal Cayetano," *Archivo teológico granadino* 44 (1981): 5-61.

[41] Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 9 (*definitiva sententia fidei* [Pollet, ed., 67]) (*finalis sententia* [Pollet, ed., 68]); c. 11 (*infallibile Papae iudicium* [Pollet, ed., 87]); idem, *Apologia de comparata auctoritate papae et concillii*, c. 11 (*finalis determinatio* [Pollet, ed., 263]) (*ultima decisio fidei* [Pollet, ed., 265]) (*finalis determinatio* [Pollet, ed., 268]) (*sententiae definitivae* [Pollet, ed., 272]) (*finalis determinatio* [Pollet, ed., 274]); idem, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis*, c. 13 (Lauchert, ed., 83); idem, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 11 (Pollet, ed., 86); idem, *Commentaria in Summa theologiae* (Leonine ed., 24).

faith" (*de fide Christiana*) or the "faith" (*de fide*)[42] to describe the object of infallibility. It is clear, however, that he includes doctrines concerning morals and secondary objects of infallibility.[43] Third, this definition must also be for the whole Church and not just for part of it.[44] The final criterion is that the pope must act in his office as supreme judge and not in some other capacity.[45] Cajetan, however, does not have a special term for this role. Instead, he typically uses the term "Supreme Pontiff" (*summus pontifex*) to designate the pope's role, either when he infallibly defines a matter of faith or morals, or when he issues disciplinary acts.

For Cajetan, there are two significant limitations to papal teaching authority which are binding on all popes: divine law and previous infallible statements of the magisterium. All definitive papal judgments must conform to sacred Scripture and apostolic Tradition, neither of which can change.[46] Cajetan, following Aquinas, makes it clear that neither the Church nor the pope can contradict divine law on an issue like fornication.[47] Moreover, it is important to note that for Cajetan, an infallible decision never establishes a new faith; it simply makes explicit that which was formerly implicit.[48] For Cajetan, then, papal infallibility is fundamentally in service to the divine Word and not master of it. Moreover, the pope is also limited by all previous infallible definitions, whether made by ecumenical

[42] Cajetan, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis*, c. 13 (Lauchert, ed., 83); idem, *Commentaria in Summa theologiae* (Leonine ed., 25); idem, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 9 (Pollet, ed., 67).

[43] On the extent of the object of infallibility in Cajetan, see Washburn, "Papal Infallibility, Vatican I, and Three 16th Century Views," 153-54.

[44] Cajetan, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis*, c. 13 (Lauchert, ed., 85).

[45] Ibid., c. 13 (Lauchert, ed., 83).

[46] Cajetan, *Apologia de comparata auctoritate papae et concillii*, c. 11 (Pollet, ed., 271).

[47] Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 16 (Pollet, ed., 106).

[48] Cajetan, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis*, c. 13 (Lauchert, ed., 85).

councils[49] or previous popes.[50] Therefore, if a pope were to contradict either revelation or previous infallible definitions, he would be a heretic.

Cajetan distinguishes sharply between when a pope issues an infallible definition and when he is acting as a "singular person" (*singularis persona*).[51] This term *singularis persona* was often used by medieval Thomist theologians and is sometimes translated as a "private person."[52] This translation is misleading since it could be understood to mean that the pope is not acting in any official capacity as pope. It is common today to think of the pope speaking on faith and morals in a number of different roles, such as private theologian, bishop of Rome, patriarch of the western church, and supreme pontiff.[53] In modern terms, the pope acting as a "private theologian" would signify that this activity is not magisterial in any respect. It would be used for something like Benedict XVI writing his trilogy on Jesus.[54] These distinctions in the capacities in which the pope can act are made in order to help distinguish various levels of teaching authority; however, they are still reducible to only infallible and fallible teachings. Similarly Cajetan has only two categories: the

[49] Cajetan, *Apologia de comparata auctoritate papae et concillii*, c. 7 (Pollet, ed., 252).

[50] Cajetan, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis*, c. 13 (Lauchert, ed., 85). Cajetan, *Apologia de comparata auctoritate papae et concillii*, c. 11 (Pollet, ed., 267).

[51] Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 9 (Pollet, ed., 67); idem, *Apologia de comparata auctoritate papae et concillii*, c. 6 (Pollet, ed., 256); idem, *Commentaria in Summa theologiae* (Leonine ed., 25).

[52] Ulrich Horst, *Zwischen Konziliarismus und Reformation: Studien zur Ekklesiologie im Dominikanerorden* (Roma: Istituto Storico Domenicano, 1985), 28; idem, *Juan de Torquemada und Thomas de Vio Cajetan*, 177.

[53] Ioachim Salaverri, *Sacrae theologiae summa: Iuxta constitutionem apostolicam "Deus scientiarum Dominus,"* 5th ed. (Madrid: Biblioteca de autores Cristianos, 1962), 1:693.

[54] "It goes without saying that this book is in no way an exercise of the magisterium, but is solely an expression of my personal search 'for the face of the Lord'" (Benedict XVI, *Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration* [New York: Random House Large Print, 2007], xxiii-xxiv).

pope acting as the supreme pontiff infallibly defining a matter of faith for the whole Church, and everything else (whether magisterial or not), which he designates with the term "singular person."[55] Only the former is infallible, while the latter is able to err.[56] Thus, Cajetan holds that the pope as a singular person can err and become a heretic.[57] Moreover, for Cajetan Christ's prayer in Luke 22:32 applied both to Peter's personal faith and to his public faith, but with respect to Peter's successors it applies only to their public faith.[58]

Compared with Cano or Bellarmine, Cajetan spends relatively little time defending popes from accusations of error. He defends Peter from the charge of heresy by arguing that Peter's denial was a sin against charity rather than a heretical act.[59] He defends Pope Marcellinus (d. 304), who allegedly sacrificed to idols during the persecution of Diocletian, by arguing that he acted heretically only in an "exterior act" of idolatry. Cajetan's basic position is that both Peter and Marcellinus used heretical words or deeds out of the fear of death and so did not really commit formal heresy but sinned only in an external act.[60]

The conciliarist Almain gave a number of examples of seemingly contradictory propositions found in papal decrees in order to show that popes had taught error. Among these were Nicolas III and Celestine III.[61] John XXII, Almain argued, had "judicially" defined that Christ and the apostles owned property in common while Nicholas III defined the contradictory.

[55] Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 9 (Pollet, ed., 69).

[56] "Papa ut singularis persona possit errare in fide; ut Papa tamen, iudicando et definiendo quid tenendum ab Ecclesia sit de fide, errare non potest" (Cajetan, *Commentaria in Summa theologiae* [Leonine ed., 25]).

[57] Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 11 (Pollet, ed., 86); Cajetan, *Commentaria in Summa theologiae* (Leonine ed., 25); Schatz, *Papal Primacy*, 123.

[58] Cajetan, *De divina institutione pontificatus romani pontificis*, c. 13 (Lauchert, ed., 83).

[59] Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 27 (Pollet, ed., 188-89).

[60] Ibid.

[61] Jacques Almain, *Authority of the Church*, X, in *Conciliarism and Papalism*, ed. J. H. Burns and Thomas M. Izbicki (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 179.

Cajetan responds that Almain made two basic errors. First, Cajetan denies that Nicholas had "determined judicially" that the apostles owned nothing in common. Second, Cajetan thinks that Almain made an error in his interpretation of Nicholas's decree since Nicholas admitted that Christ had a purse and therefore owned property.[62] Cajetan also responded to the apparent contradiction between Innocent III and Celestine III over whether it would be lawful for one to enter upon a second marriage, if one's first spouse had fallen into heresy. Cajetan here does not deny that Celestine III was in serious doctrinal error, but he argues that the language of the two decrees shows that neither pope intended to give a definitive answer.[63] Finally, Cajetan also devotes one of his opuscula, *Misuse of Scripture—Response to Charges against the Holy See* (1519), to defending various popes from the Protestant accusations of heresy for misinterpreting Matthew 16.[64]

For what kind of sin can the pope lose his office, according to Cajetan? He emphatically rejects the view of the conciliarists, who extended the sins for which a pope can be deposed beyond heresy. Cajetan holds with *Si Papa* that there is only one sin, the sin of heresy, that is the exception to the first see's immunity from judgment.[65] He further rejects the view of Torquemada, who argued that a secret (*occultus*) or merely internal heresy places one outside the Church by a sort of self-deposition.[66] Cajetan thinks that a merely internal sin of heresy is insufficient for the loss of the papal office.[67] He likens the case of a secretly heretical pope to that of a secretly heretical bishop, arguing that

[62] Cajetan, *Apologia de comparata auctoritate papae et concilii*, c. 11 (Pollet, ed., 266).

[63] Ibid.

[64] Cajetan, *Misuse of Scripture - Response to Charges against the Holy See*, in Wicks, ed., *Cajetan Responds*, 99-104.

[65] Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 27 (Pollet, ed., 176-77).

[66] Torquemada, *Summa de Ecclesia*, lib. 4, par. 2, c. 20.

[67] Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, c. 19 (Pollet, ed., 124); c. 20 (Pollet, ed., 126).

such a bishop is not automatically deprived of his office simply on account of the sin of secret heresy, no matter how obstinate. This internal sin would be known only to God, and the Church cannot judge what it is incapable of knowing.[68]

Cajetan also does not think that a merely external heresy is sufficient for the pope to be deposed. He rejects, for example, that a pope who is coerced to affirm something heretical is really a heretic, since the act is involuntary. Thus, such a pope would not lose his office.[69] Cajetan also rejects the view that a pope can lose his office for a nonobstinately held external heresy. If a pope is willing to be corrected, he is not to be deposed. Cajetan argues that the sin of heresy, whether secret or external, does not cause one to lose all relation to the Church. This is because baptism, by which one becomes a member of the Church, imparts three effects upon our souls: a sacramental character, the virtue of faith, and the virtue of charity.[70] As long as the sacramental character remains, the individual does not lose entirely his relationship with the Church even if he loses faith and charity.[71] For this reason, a pope still adheres in some way to the Church and has the capacity for jurisdiction.[72] Just as sinful priests retain the power to consecrate the Eucharist, so too the sinful pope retains his jurisdiction.[73]

There are two more elements that are necessary for the pope to lose his office. First, the external heresy must be manifest. The pope might affirm a heresy externally in such a way that no one is around to hear him, and therefore does not lose his office.[74] Second, for the pope to be deposed, he must also have

[68] "Propter quod talis haereticus non est excommunicatus; non enim potest Ecclesia excommunicare quod non potest iudicare" (ibid., c. 19 [Pollet, ed., 121]).

[69] Ibid., c. 23 (Pollet, ed., 150).

[70] "ideo sciendum est quod baptismus, quo primum regeneramur et pertinemus ad lesu Christi corpus mysticum quod est Ecclesia, tres, quantum ad propositum spectat, facit in anima nostra effectus. Primo, imprimit characterem indelebilem: secundo, fidem: tertio, caritatem" (ibid., c. 22 [Pollet, ed., 140]).

[71] Ibid. (Pollet, ed., 142).

[72] Ibid. (Pollet, ed., 143-44).

[73] Ibid. (Pollet, ed., 141); ibid., c. 23 (Pollet, ed., 150-51).

[74] Ibid., c. 19 (Pollet, ed., 124).

committed "incorrigibility or obstinate perseverance in heresy" (*incorrigibilitas seu perseverantia obstinata in haeresi*).[75]

How then is the Church to rid itself of an incorrigibly heretical pope (*papa haereticus*) according to Cajetan? First, Cajetan rejects Torquemada's view that a heretical pope loses his office *ipso facto* in a sort of self-deposition.[76] Second, Cajetan rejects the view of the conciliarists that a council is superior to a pope and can thus judge a heretical pope.[77] In part, he rejects this idea based on the witness of Scripture. When, for example, Christ said to Peter alone, as distinct from the other apostles, "Feed my sheep" (John 21:17), he made Peter the chief shepherd over the other apostles, thereby establishing the "monarchic government of the Church."[78]

Nevertheless, Cajetan thinks that a council is an appropriate way of dealing with a heretical pope. In normal circumstances, according to Cajetan, only the pope can convene an ecumenical or perfect council (*concilium perfectum*). In a perfect council the pope is either personally present or present through his legates.[79] In extraordinary circumstances, however, "a perfect council according to the present state of the Church" (*concilium perfectum secundum praesentem Ecclesiae statum*) can be called, even against the wishes of the pope.[80] Cajetan holds that there are two extraordinary circumstances that would require this second kind of perfect council: (1) the pope is a heretic, or (2) the results of a papal election are unclear.[81] In either case such a council would be "perfect according to the present state of the Church," since a pope simply could not lead it. In these two extraordinary circumstances the cardinals, the emperor, and the

[75] Ibid., c. 22 (Pollet, ed., 149).
[76] Ibid. (Pollet, ed., 140).
[77] Ibid., c. 20 (Pollet, ed., 126).
[78] Ibid., c. 7 (Pollet, ed., 48-53).
[79] Ibid., c. 16 (Pollet, ed., 105).
[80] Ibid. (Pollet, ed., 107).
[81] Ibid. (Pollet, ed., 107-8).

bishops can call such a council.[82] Cajetan also theorizes that a pope could give to the cardinal electors the power of deposing a heretical pope, just as he gave to them the power of electing the pope.[83]

In order to explain how a council can depose a pope yet not be superior to the pope, Cajetan has recourse to a distinction between having a power over the pope and having a power over the conjunction of the papal office and a particular pope.[84] He notes that the making of a pope depends in part on two human powers: that of the electors who elect a pope, and that of him who accepts his election.[85] It is only in the conjunction between these two human powers that the Church comes to have a new pope. After all, if one wants to be the pope but is not elected, he will not be the pope, and if one is elected but refuses the papacy, he will not be the pope. One has both to be elected by others and freely to accept the election in order to be the pope. Cajetan argues that the unmaking of the pope is similar. When the Church destroys this conjunction, it is not the case that these human powers have authority over the power of the papacy as such, for those powers come only directly from Christ. Instead, the Church only has authority over the conjunction of a particular individual and the papal office.[86]

Cajetan notes that this conjunction between the papal office and a particular person may come to an end in one of three ways: death, abdication, or deposition.[87] In the case of abdication, the pope cannot unilaterally resign his office. His resignation has to be accepted by the Church.[88] Cajetan likens the pope's election to the making of a bishop. The ordinand's willful acceptance of being consecrated a bishop does not make him a bishop; it simply makes him capable of being a bishop. It

[82] Ibid. (Pollet, ed., 108).
[83] Ibid, c. 21 (Pollet, ed., 135-36).
[84] Ibid., c. 20 (Pollet, ed., 127).
[85] Ibid. (Pollet, ed., 128).
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid. (Pollet, ed., 131).
[88] Ibid., c. 21 (Pollet, ed., 136).

is the consecration of the ordinand that makes him a bishop.[89] So, too, the acceptance of the papacy makes one capable of being pope, but the papacy is actually conferred by the electors. The electors are an active principle, and the candidate is a passive principle.

Cajetan calls this power of a council to unlink a person from the papal office a "ministerial power" (*potestas ministerialis*).[90] It is "ministerial" because God does not deprive the pope of his office *ipso facto*; rather, God uses the mediation of a council to deprive the pope of his office. Cajetan does not explain this process in any detail. Presumably it would involve an investigation or trial to verify whether the pope was indeed an incorrigible heretic. Until this process is completed, a manifest and incorrigible heretic remains the head of the Church. Cajetan also holds that the Church must first admonish the pope twice. He bases this on his reading of Titus 3:10-11, "As for a man who is factious, after admonishing him once or twice, have nothing more to do with him, knowing that such a person is perverted and sinful; he is self-condemned."[91] Thus after admonishing the pope twice, he is to be shunned, which Cajetan interprets as deposition from the papal office.

Cajetan's positions that a pope with occult heresy does not lose the papal office *ipso facto* and that the Church can depose a heretical pope (*papa haereticus*) had prominent Thomist defenders into the twentieth century, such as John of St. Thomas, O.P. (1589-1644), Domingo Báñez, O.P. (1528-1604), the Carmelites of Salamanca (Salmanticenses), Charles-René Billuart, O.P. (1685-1757), Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. (1877-1964), and Charles Journet, O.P. (1891-1975).[92]

[89] Ibid. (Pollet, ed., 135).

[90] Ibid., c. 20 (Pollet, ed., 125).

[91] Ibid., c. 23 (Pollet, ed., 152-53).

[92] John of St. Thomas, O.P., *Cursus theologicus in Summam theologicam d. Thomæ* (Paris: lib. Vives, 1883), 7:258-64; Domingo Báñez, O.P., *Scholastica commentaria in Secundam secundae angelici doctoris s. Thomae. Quibus, quae ad fidem, spem, & charitatem spectant; clarissimè explicantur* (Douay: Ex Typographia Petri Borremans,

III. MELCHIOR CANO, O.P. (1509-60)

Melchior Cano, a Spanish Dominican, studied under Francisco de Vitoria, O.P. (1483-1546) at Salamanca, where he eventually succeeded him as a professor.[93] He was therefore an important figure in the renewal of Thomism that took place in Salamanca in the sixteenth century.[94] Cano attended the Council of Trent in the second and third periods as the theologian for Charles V, and his interventions are marked by a careful attention to positive theology that distinguished the Salamancan tradition.[95] In his *De locis theologicis*[96] he

1584), 3:46, 56-59; Carmelites of Salamanca, *Collegii salmanticensis cursus theologicus: Summam theologicam angelici doctoris d. Thomae complectens,* ed. Carolo Amabili De La Tour-d'Auvergne-Lauraguais (Paris: V. Palme, 1870), 11:246, 251-52; Charles-René Billuart, O.P., *Summa sancti Thomae hodiernis academiarum moribus accommodata sive cursus theologiae, juxta mentem divi Thomae, insertis pro re nata digressionibus in historiam eccliesiasticam* (Paris: Victorem Lecoffre, 1886), 5:174-75; Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *De Christo salvatore* (Rome and Turin: Marietti, 1946), 232; Charles Journet, O.P., *The Church of the Word Incarnate: An Essay in Speculative Theology* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 483-84.

[93] Vicente Beltran de Heredia, O.P., "Melchior Cano en la universidad de Salamanca," *Ciencia Tomista* 48 (1933): 178-208; J. Sanz y Sanz, *Melchor Cano: Cuestiones fundamentales de crítica histórica sobre su vida y sus escritos* (Madrid: Editorial Santa Rita, 1959); Romanus Cessario and Cajetan Cuddy, *Thomas and the Thomists: The Achievement of Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 89.

[94] Joaquin Tapia, *Iglesia y teologia en Melchor Cano (1509-1560): Un protagonista de la restauración eclesical y teológica en la España del siglo XVI* (Rome: Iglesia Nacional Española, 1989).

[95] *Concilium tridentinum: Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatuum nova collection*, Edidit Societas Goerresiana, ed. Stephanus Ehses (Freiburg im Breisgau: B. Herder, 1961), 7/1:261-64; 366.16; 387-90; 498.35; 534.12; 539.29; Horst, "Die Dominikanerschule von Salamanca und das Konzil von Trient," 100; Rafael Gonzalez, "La doctrina de M. Cano en su relectio de sacramentis y la definicion del tridentino sobre la causalidad de los sacramentos," *Revista espanola de teologia* 5 (1945): 477-96.

[96] On Cano's *Loci*, see Albert Lang, *Die theologische Prinzipienlehre der mittelalterlichen Scholastik* (Freiburg: Herder, 1964); idem, *Die Loci theologici des Melchior Cano und die Methode des dogmatischen Beweisses* (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1974); Bernhard Kœrner, *Melchior Cano De locis theologicis: Ein Beitrag zur theologischen Erkenntnislehre* (Graz: Styria-Medienservice, 1994); Eugene Marcotte, *La nature de la théologie d'après Melchior Cano* (Ottawa: Scolasticat Saint-Joseph, 1949);

enumerates and explains ten theological *loci* or sources used by theologians: (1) sacred Scripture, (2) apostolic Tradition, (3) the Catholic Church, (4) councils, (5) the Roman Church, (6) the Fathers of the Church, (7) Scholastic theologians, (8) natural reason, (9) philosophers, and (10) history. In the fifth *locus*, Cano takes up the issue of the pope's teaching office, including papal infallibility.[97]

For Cano, Christ constituted Peter the pastor of the universal Church on earth.[98] In this capacity, Peter could not err when he confirmed Christ's sheep, the Church, in the faith. For Cano, Christ's prayer in Luke 22:32, "I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail; and when you have turned again, strengthen your brethren," is foundational. Christ's prayer is always efficacious; therefore, Cano argues that Peter's faith, whether public or personal, will not fail.[99] Moreover, Christ willed that after the death of Peter, the Church should have successors with the gift to teach without err.[100] Christ willed that Peter's successsors have the same gift so that in the future new controversies of the faith could be resolved.[101]

For Cano the pope can teach infallibly on a matter of faith when certain conditions are met. First, the object of the

---

Günter Frank and Stephan Meier-Oeser, *Hermeneutik, Methodenlehre, Exegese: zur Theorie der Interpretation in der frühen Neuzeit* (Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog, 2011).

[97] Horst, *Papst, Konzil, Unfehlbarkeit*, 73-74; Ulrich Horst, *Unfehlbarkeit und Geschichte: Studien zur Unfehlbarkeitsdiskussion von Melchior Cano bis zum I. Vatikanischen Konzil* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1982); Elmar Klinger, *Ekklesiologie der Neuzeit: Grundlegung bei Melchior Cano u. Entwicklung bis zum 2. Vatikan Konzil* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1978); Ulrich Horst, *Die Lehrautorität des Papstes und die Dominikanertheologen der Schule von Salamanca* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003), 98-104; Juan Belda Plans, "La infalibilidad 'ex cathedra' del Romano Pontífice según Melchor Cano. Estudio de las condiciones de la infalibilidad en cuanto al modo," *Scripta theologica* 10 (1978): 519-75.

[98] Melchior Cano, O.P., *De Locis Theologicis Libri Duodecim*, lib. 6, c. 2 ([Salamanca: Mathias Gastius, 1563], 212).

[99] Ibid. (Salamanca ed., 214); ibid., lib. 6, c. 8 (Salamanca ed., 238).

[100] Ibid., lib. 6, c. 2 (Salamanca ed., 215).

[101] Ibid., lib. 6, c. 3 (Salamanca ed., 218).

definition must pertain to faith or morals.[102] Cano, like Cajetan, typically speaks of the pope as not being able to err "in the faith" (*in fide*).[103] It is clear, however, that he thinks that doctrines concerning morals fall under the faith.[104] Moreover, it is clear that this includes both primary and secondary objects of infallibility.[105] Second, the pope must be trying to resolve an issue for the universal Church and obliging the faithful to believe this doctrine. It is often the case that popes give their opinion on a doctrinal question without obligating the faithful to hold it.[106] Moreover, popes often respond to the private questions of this or that bishop, explaining their opinion on the subject but without giving a doctrine which requires the faithful to believe.[107] Third, it is only the definition of faith that is infallible. Cano writes,

> in the decrees of pontiffs, two things are to be distinguished; one is the intention and conclusion of the decree; the other is the reason given for that conclusion. In the conclusion, the pontiffs cannot err if they are deciding a question of faith from the apostolic tribunal.[108]

Cano's point is that only the definition (*conclusio*) of faith, and not the reasons presented for this definition, is infallible. Cano gives two hypothetical examples to explain what he means. If, for example, a pope were to define as a matter of faith that Mary was a perpetual virgin and used the passage from Ezekiel, "to the closed gate" (Ezek 44:1-4), to support this doctrine, only the definition of the doctrine would be infallible and not the scriptural argument supporting that doctrine.[109] Finally, Cano thinks that the pope must act in his capacity as the public

[102] Ibid., lib. 5, c. 5 (Salamanca ed., 191-92).

[103] "Demonstraturus igitur Apostolicam eandemque Romanam sedem errare in fide non posse" (ibid., lib. 6, c. 3 [Salamanca ed., 212]).

[104] Ibid., lib. 5, c. 5 (Salamanca ed., 190-96).

[105] Ibid. (Salamanca ed., 191, 195).

[106] Ibid., lib. 6, c. 8 (Salamanca ed., 231).

[107] Ibid., lib. 6, c. 8.7 (Salamanca ed., 232).

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid.

judge of the Church (*publicus Ecclesiae iudex*) and not as a private man (*homo privatus*).[110]

Cano, like Cajetan, is clear that there are authorities prior to the papal magisterium and therefore that there are limitations on papal teaching. The first among these is the Word of God as contained in sacred Scripture and apostolic Tradition. The sacred Scriptures have divine authority and do not depend on the Church for their authority.[111] The sacred Scriptures in all their parts were written under the assistance of the Holy Spirit[112] and therefore contain no errors whatsoever, unlike magisterial statements which may contain errors. Apostolic Tradition is also a form of divine revelation and as such has the authority of God himself.[113] The papal magisterium is bound to God's Word and may not change it. In addition, the papal magisterium is bound to the infallible decrees of previous pontiffs and ecumenical councils.[114] Moreover, the magisterium should not interpret sacred Scripture as if it were engaged in pagan "divinization" but must adhere to the authoritative interpretation of the Fathers of the Church.[115] The magisterium is also bound to the consensus of the various schools of theology; a rejection of a thesis unanimously held by the various schools and pertaining to faith and morals is either heretical or proximate to heresy.[116]

Like Cajetan, Cano distinguishes rather sharply between when the pope is teaching infallibly and when he teaches in any

[110] Ibid., lib. 6, c. 8 (Salamanca ed., 230).

[111] Ibid., lib. 2, c. 8, ad 4 (Salamanca ed., 30-32).

[112] Ibid., lib. 2, c. 17 (Salamanca ed., 84-85).

[113] Ibid., lib. 3. c. 3 (Salamanca ed., 107).

[114] Ibid., lib. 6, c. 8 (Salamanca ed., 230).

[115] Ibid., lib. 7. c. 4 (Salamanca ed., 263). On the authority of the interpretation of Scripture by the Fathers of the Church, see Christian D. Washburn, "The Catholic Use of the Scriptures in Ecumenical Dialogue," *Verbum Domini and the Complementarity of Exegesis and Faith* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., 2014), 72-78.

[116] "Concordem omnium theologorum scholae de fide aut moribus sententiam contradicere, si haeresis non est, at haeresi proximum est" (Cano, *De locis theologicis*, lib. 8, c. 4 [Salamanca ed., 270]).

other capacity. Cano does not use the terms "particular person" (*persona particularis*), "singular person" (*singularis persona*), or "private teacher" (*doctor privatus*) to describe the noninfallible teaching office of the pope, preferring instead the terms "private man" (*homo privatus*) or "learned man" (*homo doctus*).[117] For Cano there are two types of doctrinal errors that the pope can make: "personal error" (*error personalis*) as a private man, or "judicial error" (*error iudicialis*) in his capacity as pope infallibly defining something.[118] The personal error is described as private while the judicial error is described as public. This use of the term "private" may give the impression that the pope's private error is not made in his papal office, but this is not so. It is clear that Cano means that the pope acting as pope can make a doctrinal error except when he is infallibly defining a doctrine of faith or morals. A judicial error for Cano is impossible since the category "judicial" is restricted to infallible definitions; every other type of error is a personal one regardless of how official. Like Cajetan, Cano holds that while Christ's prayer preserved both Peter's personal and public faith,[119] it only preserves a later pope's public faith when he speaks infallibly for the universal Church. Cano explains:

> [T]he inner faith of the Roman Pontiff is not necessary for the Church, nor can a secret and private error of the pope harm the Church of Christ. Therefore, it is not necessary that God always assists in the conservation of the interior faith of the Roman pontiffs. But so long as they decide that which the faithful must believe, and while they direct the faith of the Church of Christ, they do not fail but shall be preserved by the divine hand.[120]

[117] Ibid., lib. 6, c. 8 (Salamanca ed., 230).

[118] Ibid. (Salamanca ed., 229).

[119] Ibid., lib. 6. c. 8 (Salamanca ed., 238).

[120] "Non enim fides interior Romani pontificis ecclesiae est necessaria: nec illius occultus & privatus mentis error ecclesiae Christi nocere potest. Quapropter non est necesse, ut in interioris fidei conservatione Romanis pontificibus Deus semper assistat. At, quod, dum ea decernunt, quae fidelibus credenda sunt, dumque ecclesiam Christi in fide dirigunt, non deficiant, sed divina manu teneantur" (Cano, *De locis theologicis*, lib. 6, c. 8 [Salamanca ed., 240]).

Cano concludes that "it cannot therefore be denied that the supreme pontiff can be a heretic."[121]

Cano tries to steer a middle course between two extremes. He rejects the view that because the pope has sometimes erred in the past, he cannot be infallible in any circumstance. He also rejects the view that the pope can never err in either his personal or his public faith. Such a view appeared first in the sixteenth century and was popularized by Dutch theologian Albert Pigge (ca. 1490-1542),[122] who not only defended the infallibility of papal definitions but also thought that the pope could not err in his personal faith.[123] Pigge does not deny that it is possible for the pope to make serious errors in the faith, but he argues that Christ protects a pope from becoming a pertinacious heretic.[124] Pigge seems unconcerned about the untraditional nature of his view, even freely admitting that his view is contrary to *Si Papa*, the canonists, and "all theologians."[125] Pigge argues that Christ's prayer in Luke 22:32 not only protected Peter's personal and public faith from error, but also protects the public and personal faith of Peter's

[121] Ibid. (Salamanca ed., 240).

[122] Hubert Jedin argues that Pigge was not the author of his view, but rather it was Augustin von Alfeld, O.F.M (1480-ca. 1535) who first proposed the idea in 1520 (Hubert Jedin, *Studien uber die schriftstellertätigkeit Albert Pigges* [Mu̇nster in Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1931], 136). For a bibliography of Pigge's works, see Wilbirgis Klaiber, comp., *Katholische Kontroverstheologen und Reformer des 16. Jahrhunderts,* Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte 116 (Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1978), 230-31. On Pigge's ecclesiology, see Remigius Bäumer, "Das Kirchenverständnis Albert Pigges: Ein Beitrag zur Ekklesiologie der vortridentinischen Kontroverstheologie," in *Volk Gottes: Zum Kirchenverständnis der katholischen, evangelischen und anglikanischen Theologie. Festgabe für Josef Höfer*, ed. Remigius Bäumer and Heimo Dolch (Freiburg: Herder, 1967), 306-22.

[123] Albert Pigge, *Hierarchiae ecclesiasticae assertio per Albertvm Pighivm Campensem, D. Ioannis Vltraiecten[sis] præpositum, ab ipso autore sub mortem diligenter recognita, nouaq́[ue] accessione passim locupletata . . . Vnà cum Indice rerum præcipuarum locupletissimo* (Cologne: Novesianus, 1551), lib. 4, c. 8, fol. 167^{r}.

[124] Ibid., fol. 170^{r}.

[125] Ibid., fol. 167^{r}.

successors.[126] Pigge offers a detailed defense of how popes such as Marcellinus, Liberius, Felix II, Anastasius II, John XXII, Benedict XI, Honorius I, and Boniface VIII were not pertinacious heretics.[127]

Cano rejects Pigge's view on several grounds. He rightly regards it as a theological novelty in the Church.[128] He also thinks that it comes at a cost. In order for Pigge to justify his position, he has to attack everyone who came before him, including the sixth ecumenical council, which had condemned Honorius for heresy. Cano explicitly criticizes Pigge for distorting the historical evidence and impugning the integrity of Gratian and the sixth council. Cano warns that

> those who defend lightly and without discernment the authority of the Supreme Pontiff on any matter and in every trial, weaken, do no favor to the authority of the Apostolic See. They do not strengthen it, but rather ruin it. . . . What strength will they have to fight heretics who see them defend the pontifical authority based not on reason but on affection and who does not do so to obtain light and truth with the force of arguments but to attract the feelings and will of others? Peter does not need our flattery or our lies.[129]

Moreover, Cano thinks not only that it is possible for popes to be heretics, but that some had engaged in doctrinal error in the past. Cano examines fourteen popes who are alleged by conciliarists or Protestants to have engaged in doctrinal error, and he attempts to show whether and in what sense they were heretics. In most of the cases, he is able to show that they were

[126] Ibid.

[127] Ibid., fol. 174. On the question of Honorius in Pigge, see Kreuzer, *Die Honoriusfrage im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit*, 137-45.

[128] "aec verò Alberti opinatio, nova quidem in ecclesia est" (Cano, *De locis theologicis*, lib. 6, c. 8 [Salamanca ed., 239]).

[129] "Nunc illud breviter dici potest, qui summi pontificis omne de re quacunque iudicium temerè ac sine delectu defendunt: hos sedis Apostolicae auctoritatem labefactare, non fovere: evertere non firmare. Nam ut ea praetereamus, quae paulò antè in hoc capite explicata sunt, quid tandem adversum haereticos disputando ille proficiet, quem viderint non iudicio, sed affectu patrocinium auctoritatis pontificiae suscipere, nec id agere ut disputationis suae vi lucem ac veritatem eliciat, sed ut se ad alterius sensum voluntatemque convertat? Non eget Petrus mendacio nostro, nostra adulatione non eget" (ibid., lib. 5, c. 5 [Salamanca ed., 196]).

not pertinacious heretics. In the cases of Marcellinus and Liberius, he argues that they were not formal heretics since they acted under duress.[130]

Cano also attempts to defend several popes from more serious charges of heresy; these are cases in which popes had taught doctrines contrary to that of other popes. He defends John XXII, for example, from the charge of formal heresy for having taught that the souls that die before the general judgment do not enjoy the beatific vision. Beginning in 1331, Pope John XXII delivered a series of sermons in which he argued that the purified souls of the dead only have a vision of the humanity of Christ and do not enjoy the face-to-face vision of God until the Resurrection.[131] This view was condemned by his successor, Benedict XII (r. 1334-42), in the constitution *Benedictus Deus* (issued January 29, 1336), which infallibly defined that souls that die before the general judgment do indeed enjoy the beatific vision.[132] Cano thinks that there are two reasons that John is not a formal heretic. First, Cano argues that John XXII cannot be a heretic for denying this doctrine since the Church had not yet defined anything on the topic.[133] Second, John did not issue an infallible definition on the subject. Nevertheless, Cano does think that this pope made a serious doctrinal error which contradicted Benedict's

[130] Ibid., lib. 6, c. 8 (Salamanca ed., 239).

[131] For more on this, see Christian D. Washburn, "*Nothing Unclean Will Enter Heaven*: Justification and Eschatology," in *Justified in Jesus Christ: Evangelicals and Catholics in Dialogue* (Bismarck, N.D.: University of Mary Press, 2017), 295-96; Jared Wicks, S.J., "Appendix IV: The Intermediate State: Patristic and Medieval Doctrinal Development and Recent Receptions," in Almen and Sklba, eds., *The Hope of Eternal Life,* 159-70.

[132] Benedict XII in the constitution *Benedictus Deus* (DH 1000-1002). Catholic theologians see this as an early example of an infallible declaration. See Klaus Schatz, "Welche bisherigen päpstlichen Lehrentscheidungen sind 'ex cathedra'? Historische und theologische Oberlegungen," in *Dogmengeschichte und katholische Theologie* (Würzburg: Echter, 1985), 404-22. Klaus Schatz, *Vaticanum I, 1869-1870* (Paderborn: F. Schoningh, 1992), 3:331-39.

[133] Cano, *De locis theologicis*, lib. 6, c. 8 (Salamanca ed., 230).

constitution. Similarly, Cano defends Pope Celestine III (r. 1191-98), who held that a marriage is dissolved when one spouse falls into heresy. Cano argues that Celestine was not a heretic since the Church had not yet issued a solemn definition on the topic. Cano, however, freely admits that Celestine's teaching was a serious doctrinal error contrary both to the gospel and to the decree of Pope Innocent III (r. 1198-1216).[134] In both of these cases Cano's defense is basically that the popes were involved in serious doctrinal error, but were not heretics, since they did not attempt to define a doctrine contrary to an already defined doctrine of the Church.

For what kind of sin can the pope lose his office, according to Cano? He does not think that the pope can lose his office for sins other than heresy.[135] With Cajetan, Cano rejects Torquemada's opinion that a pope loses his office on account of a merely secret or internal heresy, arguing that although secret heretics (*haeretici occulti*) do not retain "the perfect unity of the body of the Church" they retain a certain visible unity such as a visible union in the sacraments.[136] Like Cajetan, Cano argues that just as a bishop does not lose jurisdiction on account of secret heresy, so too a pope does not lose his jurisdiction on account of secret heresy.[137] It is only by external heresy that one can be separated from the Church and lose one's office as pope.[138]

How then is the Church to rid itself of an incorrigibly heretical pope (*papa haereticus*)? Cano rejects the conciliarist view that a council is superior to the pope and can therefore depose him.[139] Since Cano also rejects Torquemada's view that the pope loses his office *ipso facto* for external heresy, he has to

[134] Ibid.

[135] Ibid. (Salamanca ed., 239-40).

[136] Ibid., lib. 4, c. 2 (Salamanca ed., 127); ibid., lib. 4, c. 6 (Salamanca ed., 158).

[137] "Nam summum pontificem, episcopos caeterosque ecclesiae ministros potestate ac iurisdictione per haeresim abditam interioremque privari: non modò non certum, sed ne probabile quidem esse, maxima auctoritate Theologi affirmant" (ibid., lib. 4, c. 6, ad 12 [Salamanca ed., 159]).

[138] Ibid., lib. 4, c. 2 (Salamanca ed., 128).

[139] Ibid., lib. 5, c. 5 (Salamanca ed., 177-78).

find another way to depose the pope. The pope remains the head of the Church until he is deposed by the Church.[140] Even though Cano repeatedly and approvingly cites Cajetan, he is silent on Cajetan's theory of the "ministerial power" of the Church for undoing the conjunction between a pope and the papacy. Instead Cano holds that the Church is able to judge the individual who has voluntarily rejected the papacy by virtue of his external heresy. Thus, the Church is simply rendering a judgment of the *de facto* situation of the Church. Cano's argument for this position is appealing in its simplicity. He argues first that the doctrine contained in *Si Papa* that a pope can be deposed for heresy is simply the teaching of the Church. Second, he thinks that this position is confirmed by "the practice of our ancestors," and he cites the spurious fifth Roman Synod under Symmachus and Constantinople III's anathematization of Pope Honorius as a heretic as confirmation of this teaching.[141]

IV. ST. ROBERT BELLARMINE, S.J. (1542-1621)

Saint Robert Bellarmine joined the Jesuit order in 1560 and was ordained a priest in 1570. He was appointed as a professor to teach Scholastic theology at the Jesuit College in Louvain, where in 1570 he began a series of lectures on Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* that lasted for six years.[142] The notes of these lectures were preserved, and Bellarmine, like

[140] Ibid., lib. 4, c. 2 (Salamanca ed., 127-28).

[141] Ibid., lib. 6, c. 8 (Salamanca ed., 239-40).

[142] For a list of his lectures on the *Summa,* see Sebastian Tromp, S.J., "Conspectus chronologicus praelectionum, quas habuit s. Robertus Bellarminus in collegio S. I. Lovaniensi et collegio Romano," *Gregorianum* 16 (1935): 97-105. Bellarmine's lectures are contained in Robert Bellarmine, *In 3. Partem Summae S. Thomae de Aquino,* Louvain, ca. 1576-1577, Bibliothèque Royale Albert I^{er}, KBR 4243, fols. 1^{r}-260^{v}. Also found in "Commentaria in Summa Theologiae D. Thomae. Copia transciptionis facta a R.P.S. Tromp, S.I.", a typewritten copy at the Archives of the Gregorian Pontifical University: APUG, Fondo Tromp, nn. 2419-30.

Cajetan, dealt with the issues of both papal infallibility and heresy in his commentary on question 1, article 10 of the *Secunda secundae*. His views at this point are consistent with those of his later published works;[143] they also show a dependence on the Jesuit Thomist Francisco de Toledo's (1532-96) notes on the *Summa,* which Bellarmine had borrowed and copied out by hand when still a student.[144]

Upon falling ill in 1576, he was sent to Rome to recover and was made the professor of controversial theology at the Collegium Romanum, where he lectured on controversial theology for eleven years, from 1576 to 1587. The result of these lectures was his *Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos* (hereafter *De contro-*

[143] Bellarmine, *In secundam secundae d. Thomae commentaria: Articulus decimus (1574)*, in: ARSJ Opp. N.N. 233 fol. 43r-4r. These are reproduced by Bishop Thomas Löhr as an appendix in the unpublished version of his dissertation. The published version of his dissertation does not include these texts. Thomas Löhr, *Die Lehre Robert Bellarmins von allgemeinen Konzil* (Excerpta ex dissertatione in Pont. Univ. Gregoriana, Limburg, 1986). I would like to thank Fr. Thomas Dietrich for sharing these scans with me. See also Horst, *Papst, Konzil, Unfehlbarkeit*, 170-76.

[144] Toledo's text was not published until the nineteenth century. For Toledo's commentary on *STh* II-II, q. 1, a. 10, see Francisco de Toledo, *In Summam theologiae s. Thomae Aquinatis enarratio*, ed. Iosephus Paria, S.J. (Rome: S. Congregationis de Propaganda Fide, 1870), 2:40-73. It was once held that Bellarmine copied out these notes in 1562 while still at the Roman College, thus giving evidence of his theological precocity: James Brodrick, S.J., *The Life and Work of Blessed Robert Francis Cardinal Bellarmine* (London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, Ltd., 1928), 1:37; Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet, *Auctarium bellarminianum: Supplément aux oeuvres du cardinal Bellarmin* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1913), ix. Brodrick's dating, however, does not seem to be accurate. Tromp has shown that this text dates to Bellarmine's days at Florence: Sebastian Tromp, "De manuscriptis praelectionum lovaniensium s. Roberti Bellarmini S. I. Chronologia et problemata annexa," *Archivium Historicum Societatis Jesu* 2 (1933): 189. Both Biersack and Dietrich have followed Tromp's dating: Manfred Biersack, *Initia Bellarminiana: Die Prädestinationslehre bei Robert Bellarmin S.J. bis zu sienen löwener Vorlesungen 1570-1576,* Historische Forschungen im Auftrag der historischen Kommission der Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literatur, vol. 15 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1989), 35. Thomas Dietrich, *Die Theologie der Kirche bei Robert Bellarmin* (Paderborn: Bonifatius, 1999), 27.

versiis), which he published in three volumes in 1586, 1588, and 1593.[145]

Bellarmine divided *De controversiis* into fifteen controversies, roughly following the outline of the Creed.[146] He deals with the problem of a heretical pope in two places. The first is in the fourth book, which is entitled "On the Supreme Spiritual Power of the Pope" found in the third controversy, "The Roman Pontiff as Head of the Church Militant." The first half of this book deals with the pope as the supreme judge of doctrinal controversies, and there is an extensive discussion of the pope's infallibility in matters of faith and morals. In the second half, Bellarmine deals with various accusations of papal heresy.[147] He returns to the issue of papal heresy in the fourth controversy, entitled "On the Church Militant." Here Bellarmine is principally concerned with responding to the arguments of conciliarists like Jean Gerson (1363-1429), Mair, and Almain that a council can judge a pope in the case of heresy and other sins, thereby demonstrating that it is superior to a pope. Bellarmine's Thomism is considered eclectic by some, but on ecclesiological issues he is squarely within the Thomist

[145] Brodrick, *Life and Work*, 1:132. Aimé Richardt, *Saint-Robert Bellarmin, 1542-1621: le défenseur de la foi* (Paris: F.-X. de Guibert, 2004), 186 n. 4.

[146] Robert Bellarmine, *Disputationes Roberti Bellarmini politiani societatis Jesu, de controversiis christianae fidei, adversus hujus temporis haereticos* (Paris: Triadelphorum, 1613) (Paris ed., 1:sig. bij^{r}). Hereafter cited as *De controversiis.* Unless otherwise noted, citations refer first to the number of the controversy, then the book within the controversy, and the chapter within the book; volume and column numbers in the Paris edition are given in parentheses.

[147] For a bibliography, see Anita Mancia, "Bibliografia sistematica e commentata degli studi sull'opera Bellarminiana dal 1900 al 1990," in *Roberto Bellarmino arcivescovo di Capua, teologo e pastore della riforma Cattolica*, ed. Gustavo Galeota (Capua: Istituto Superiore di Scienze Religiose, 1990), 1:159-87. There are a few works, however, that in part or in whole deal with the pope's spiritual power. See F. Segarra, S.J., "San Roberto Belarmino y el primado del romano pontife," *Razón y fe* 92 (1930): 5-21; J. I. Corboy, S.J., *The Doctrine of the Infallibility of the Pope in Bellarmine and his Influence on the Definition in the Vatican Council* (Excerpta ex dissertatione in Pont. Univ. Gregoriana, Rome, 1961); Dietrich, *Die Theologie der Kirche bei Robert Bellarmin*, 380-418.

tradition. He frequently expresses agreement with Thomist ecclesiologists such as St. Antoninus, Torquemada, Petrus de Palude, Cajetan, Melchior Cano, and Petro de Soto, O.P. (1495/1500-1563).

Bellarmine holds that the pope is the head of the Church and that he is the supreme teacher of the faithful. In this capacity, "the Supreme Pontiff is not able to err when he teaches the whole Church in those matters which pertain to faith."[148] Bellarmine calls this position "most certain" (*certissima*) and states that it is "the general opinion of nearly all Catholics."[149] He thinks that the opposite opinion (i.e., that the pope *qua* pontiff is able to teach heresy publicly) seems "completely erroneous and proximate to heresy, so that it might well be declared heretical by the Church."[150] Bellarmine founds his position on sacred Scripture, which, he contends, explicitly teaches this doctrine. He turns to Luke 22:31-32, arguing that in this passage Christ grants to Peter protection from formal heresy both when infallibly defining a matter of faith and as a particular person.[151]

Bellarmine further identifies a number of necessary and limiting criteria for an infallible definition. The first criterion is that the pope must be acting in his capacity as the supreme judge (*summus iudex*) or supreme pontiff (*summus pontifex*), and not in some other capacity.[152] Second, the supreme pontiff must intend to resolve an issue definitively for the Church. It is only the definition and not supporting arguments for the definition that are infallible.[153] Third, the object of the definition must pertain to a matter of faith or morals. Bellarmine gives several examples of things that fall into this category,

[148] "Summus Pontifex cùm totam Ecclesiam docet in his quae ad fidem pertinent nullo casu errare potest" (Bellarmine, *De controversiis*, 3.4.3 [Paris ed., 1: col. 795]).

[149] Ibid., 3.4.2 (Paris ed., 1: col. 794).

[150] Ibid. (Paris ed., 1: col. 795).

[151] Ibid., 3.4.3 (Paris ed., 1: col. 796).

[152] Ibid., 3.4.2 (Paris ed., 1: col. 793).

[153] "multa esse alia in epistolis decretalibus, quae non faciunt rem aliquam esse de fide, sed solùm opiniones Pontificum de ea re nobis declarant" (ibid., 3.4.14 [Paris ed., 1: col. 839]).

including, in the language of later theology, both primary and secondary objects of infallibility.[154] Fourth, the pope's definition must be intended for the universal Church.[155] A papal act that does not meet these conditions is not infallible.

Bellarmine is clear that both the Word of God and infallible pronouncements by previous popes and councils place limits on what the pope can teach magisterially. The sacred Scriptures in all their parts were written under the assistance of the Holy Spirit and therefore contain no errors whatsoever.[156] Bellarmine asserts that all magisterial statements are subordinate to the authority of the Bible, and he even describes five ways in which the sacred Scriptures are fundamentally different from and superior to magisterial decrees.[157] Sacred Scripture, for example, is without error in all things, whereas noninfallible magisterial statements may contain and have in fact contained errors.[158] Apostolic Tradition also has the authority of God himself. Prior definitive magisterial statements are also a limit on papal infallibility. For Bellarmine, infallible conciliar decrees confirmed by the pope are immutable (*immutabilia*), definitive (*definitiva*), and not subject to revision or recession, even by the pope himself.[159] So the pope is bound not only by his predecessors' infallible decrees but by conciliar decrees.

Like Cajetan and Cano, Bellarmine sharply distinguishes between two ways that a pope can act: he can act as supreme pontiff infallibly defining or as a particular person (*persona particularis*). Bellarmine does not use the expression "singular person" in this context like Cajetan and Torquemada, preferring the terms "private teacher" (*doctor privatus*), "particular teacher" (*doctor particularis*), or "particular person"

[154] On the extent of the object of infallibility in Bellarmine, see Washburn, "Papal Infallibility, Vatican I, and Three 16th Century Views," 165-67.

[155] Bellarmine, *De controversiis*, 3.4.3 (Paris ed., 1: col. 795).

[156] Ibid. 4.2.12 (Paris ed., 2: col. 87).

[157] Ibid. (Paris ed., 2: cols. 86-88).

[158] Ibid. (Paris ed., 2: col. 87).

[159] Ibid. 4.2.13 (Paris ed., 2: col. 90); 4.2.11 (Paris ed., 2: col. 85).

(*persona particularis*).[160] He describes the error that the pope as a particular person makes as "personal error" (*error personalis*) and the type of error the pope as pontiff makes as a "judicial error" (*error iudicialis*).[161] For Bellarmine the former is possible, but the latter is not. Like Cajetan and Cano, there are only two basic categories: when the pope acts as a supreme pontiff infallibly defining an article of faith, and everything else which is subject to error.

Unlike either Cajetan or Cano, Bellarmine adopts a position similar to Pigge's position that the pope cannot be a pertinacious heretic even as a particular person, calling this opinion "probable and pious," but he admits that it is "not certain" and that it is contrary to the "common opinion."[162] This position met with a mixed reception amongst early Thomist Jesuits. Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548-1617), for example, also considers it pious and probable, whereas Cardinal Francisco de Toledo, S.J. (1532-96) explicitly repudiates it as fanciful and contrary to the tradition.[163] In any case, Bellarmine's "pious" position is often misunderstood as entailing that the pope cannot teach anything erroneous, but Bellarmine clearly thinks that popes can and have made serious doctrinal errors. Indeed, Bellarmine freely acknowledges both that the pope *qua* pontiff can err on factual questions[164] and

[160] *doctor particularis* (ibid., 3.4.2 [Paris ed., 1: col. 793]; 3.4.12 [Paris ed., 1: col. 830]); *doctor privatus* (ibid., 3.4.2 [Paris ed., 1: col. 793]; 3.4.12 [Paris ed., 1: col. 830]); *persona particularis* (ibid., 3.4.2 [Paris ed., 1: col. 793]).

[161] Ibid., 3.4.4 (Paris ed., 1:801); 3.4.7 (Paris ed., 1: col. 805).

[162] "Probabile est, pieque credi potest, summum Pontificem, non solùm ut Pontificem errare non posse, sed etiam ut particularem personam haereticum esse non posse, falsum aliquid contra fidem pertinaciter credendo" (ibid., 3.4.6 [Paris ed., 1: col. 805]); "sententia probabilis est, & defendi potest facilè, ut postea suo loco ostendemus. Quia tamen non est certa, & communis opinio est in contrarium" (ibid., 3.2.30 [Paris ed., 1: col. 691]).

[163] Francisco Suárez, S.J., *De fide*, disp. 10, sect. 6, 11, in *Opera omnia* (Paris: apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1856), 12:319. Cardinal Francisco de Toledo, S.J., *Francisci Toleti . . . In Summam theologiae s. Thomae Aquinatis enarratio: Ex autographo in bibliotheca collegii Romani asservato* (Rome: Typis S. Congreagationis de Propaganda Fide, 1869), 2:71.

[164] Bellarmine, *De controversiis*, 3.4.2 (Paris ed., 1: col. 793).

that the pope as a particular person can err through "ignorance even in matters of faith and morals," just like any other human teacher.[165] His position is not that the pope as a particular person cannot be a heretic in any sense, but only that the pope as a particular person cannot be a heretic by "pertinaciously" (*pertinaciter*) believing something contrary to the faith.[166] His point, to use modern terminology, is that the pope as a particular person can be a material heretic, but he will not be a formal heretic. Bellarmine notes, however, that it would be interesting to see what new theological explanations would be required if a pope as a particular person were found actually to be a pertinacious heretic.[167] This reflection may seem odd given his position, but this shows that Bellarmine was humble enough to realize that his "pious" view may be incorrect.

Bellarmine makes several arguments for his pious position. First, he extends Christ's prayer beyond Peter's role in infallibly confirming his brethren's faith to the pope's personal faith. Thus, he rejects Cajetan's and Cano's position that Christ's prayer was limited to those occasions when the pope is intending to "strengthen your brethren." Second, Bellarmine thinks that God will providentially arrange matters in such a way that this evil should never befall the Church. After all,

[165] "SECUNDO, posse Pontificem, ut privatum Doctorem errare, etiam in quaestionibus iuris universalibus tam fidei, quàm morum, idque ex ignorantia, ut aliis Doctoribus interdum accidit" (ibid.).

[166] "Probabile est, pieque credi potest, summum Pontificem, non solùm ut Pontificem errare non posse, sed etiam ut particularem personam haereticum esse non posse, falsum aliquid contra fidem pertinaciter credendo" (ibid., 3.4.6 [Paris ed., 1: col. 805]).

[167] Ibid., 3.2.30 (Paris ed., 1: col. 691). Pope Clement VIII (r. 1592-1605) once informed Bellarmine that he was going to define in favor of the Dominican position against the Jesuit position in the matter of grace. Bellarmine told Pope Clement that he would do no such thing and predicted to Cardinal Del Monte that the pope would die if he attempted to do such a thing. Interestingly, Clement VIII died not long after, no doubt confirming in Bellarmine's mind his own theory. Robert Bellarmine, *Autobiografia (1613): Con Sinossi dei dati cronologici della Biografia di Bellarmino e delle sue pubblicazioni*, ed. Gustavo Galeota, S.J., and Pasquale Giustiniani (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1999), 78. Brodrick, *Life and Work*, 2:56, 111.

Bellarmine argues, God could make a heretic speak the truth just as he made Balaam's ass speak, but Bellarmine does not think this would be in accord with his providence.[168] Third, he argues, as we will see, that the fact that there has never been an instance of a pope being a pertinacious heretic suggests that there will never be one.[169]

Bellarmine offers a much lengthier defense of individual popes from the charge of pertinacious heresy than either Cajetan or Cano, examining some forty popes who had been accused of heresy by various conciliarist and Protestant theologians. In some cases, he explains that the pope is guilty of some sinful weakness rather than the sin of heresy. With Cajetan and Cano, Bellarmine does not think that Pope Marcellinus and Pope Liberius were heretics, since their actions were coerced. He does, however, hold that both popes sinned gravely.[170]

There were, however, more serious examples in which there were at least apparent contradictions between popes. Both conciliarists and Protestants had alleged, for example, that John XXII's *Extravagantes* contradicted Nicholas IV's *Exiit* when it defined that Christ did own property.[171] Bellarmine notes that this is only an apparent contradiction, since Nicholas says that at some time Christ taught perfect poverty while John XXII taught that other times he held property.[172] Bellarmine is also forced to deal, however, with a real contradiction between John XXII and Benedict XII. Bellarmine admits, like Cano, that John XXII's thesis was incorrect, but he offers two basic reasons why John XXII was not a heretic. First, the Church had not defined the matter before *Benedictus Deus*.[173] Second, John XXII never intended to define his opinion but was investigating it "in order to discover the truth."[174] What is clear from this third example

[168] Bellarmine, *De controversiis*, 3.4.6 (Paris ed., 1: col. 805).

[169] Ibid.

[170] Ibid., 3.4.8 (Paris ed., 1: col. 813); ibid., 3.4.9 (Paris ed., 1: col. 814).

[171] DH 930-31.

[172] Bellarmine, *De controversiis*, 3.4.14 (Paris ed., 1: col. 840-41).

[173] Ibid. (Paris ed., 1: col. 842).

[174] "sed solùm disserere ad veritatem investigandam" (ibid.).

is that Bellarmine thinks that the pope did make a very serious doctrinal error, even if it was not heretical yet. In effect his explanation is that the doctrine was not yet defined and that John did not pertinaciously hold to his private opinion, since he eventually recanted his teaching in the bull *Ne super his* (December 3, 1334).[175]

For what kind of sin can the pope lose his office, according to Bellarmine? First, he rejects the view of the conciliarists that a pope can be judged for misdeeds other than heresy. Instead he accepts the doctrine contained in *Si Papa* that there is only one exception to the principle that the first see is judged by no one, and that exception is for the case of heresy. Second, it is not any form of heresy, but only manifest formal heresy that causes the pope to lose his office. With Cajetan and Cano, Bellarmine rejects Torquemada's view that a pope who is a secret heretic loses *ipso facto* membership in the Church, and he does so for reasons similar to both Cajetan and Cano.[176]

How then is the Church to rid itself of an incorrigibly heretical pope (*papa haereticus*)? Bellarmine rejects the view of the conciliarists that a council can judge and depose a pope for heresy, since the pope is absolutely above a council.[177] He also rejects Cajetan's doctrine of the "ministerial power" (*potestas ministerialis*) of a council, since he thinks that in reality this amounts to a form of conciliarism. He notes that when a thing is made, the action is exercised over the matter of the thing that is going to be, not over the composite which does not yet exist. When a thing is destroyed, however, the action is exercised over a composite. Therefore, when cardinals elect the pontiff, they do not exercise their authority over the pontiff, since the pope does not yet exist. Were a council to depose a pope, however, it would necessarily exercise authority over the composite, that is, the pope. Moreover, Bellarmine turns Cajetan's principal

[175] DH 990-91.

[176] Bellarmine, *De controversiis*, 3.2.30 (Paris ed., 1: col. 691).

[177] Ibid., 4.2.17 (Paris ed., 2: col. 95).

support for his position, Titus 3:10-11, against him. He notes that Paul does not require a judgment of the Church after the two admonitions; rather, the heretic is simply to be shunned immediately.[178]

Instead Bellarmine holds that a heretical pope loses the papacy *ipso facto,* and therefore the Church can judge him:

> A pope who is a manifest heretic ceases per se to be pope and head, just as he ceases per se to be a Christian and member of the body of the Church: therefore, he can be judged and punished by the Church.[179]

There are three points to make about Bellarmine's position. First, he describes this position as the "true" and "common" opinion because it is held in the Church by "all the ancient fathers," *Si Papa*, and Pope Innocent III.[180] He notes that the common opinion is also held by "learned men of our age," including John Driedo (1480-1535) and Cano.[181] In Bellarmine's opinion, Constantinople III's judgment of Honorius confirms this. It is striking that although Bellarmine absolves Honorius from the charge of heresy, he still holds that the fact that an ecumenical council judged him means that it must be possible to judge a heretical pope, even if the council was mistaken in its judgment about the particular facts.[182]

At first blush, it may seem odd and contradictory for Bellarmine simultaneously to hold his "probable and pious" opinion that a pope cannot be a heretic even as a particular person and to hold that the true and common opinion is that a heretical pope should be judged. Strictly speaking these two views are not contradictory. It is after all a doctrine of the Church that anyone, whether pope or layman, who falls into manifest and pertinacious heresy is no longer a member of the Church. The pope himself is not exempted from this divine law.

[178] Ibid., 3.2.30 (Paris ed., 1: col. 692).

[179] "Est ergo QUINTA opinio vera; Papam haereticum manifestum, per se desinere esse Papam & caput; sicut per se desinit esse Christianus & membrum corporis Ecclesiae: quare ab Ecclesia posse eum iudicari & puniri" (ibid. [1: col. 694]).

[180] Ibid. (Paris ed., 1: col. 691).

[181] Ibid.

[182] Ibid.

One can simultaneously hold that a pope who is a manifest and pertinacious heretic is not a member of the Church and that God has and will providentially prevent such an occurrence. This is like holding that anyone, including the Blessed Virgin, who commits a mortal sin and dies unrepentant will descend immediately to hell after the particular judgment. God, however, gave Mary graces such that she never committed such a sin.

Second, Bellarmine holds that in the act of incorrigible and manifest heresy the pope *ipso facto* loses his office. In this respect, he follows Torquemada. Thus, Bellarmine can state plainly that the "Church can judge a heretical pope"[183] without being guilty of conciliarism, since the Church is not judging the pope at all but is judging, rather, a heretic. For Bellarmine, the council would merely issue a declaratory statement that the former pope has alienated himself from the papacy.

Third, Bellarmine agrees with both Thomists and conciliarists that the solution to this problem of a heretical pope is to hold a general council. Indeed, he lists "the suspicion of heresy in the Roman Pontiff"[184] as one of the six reasons that a general council may be called. A general council has the duty to issue a declaratory sentence that the pope is no longer pope if he is found to be a heretic.[185] For Bellarmine, this position is confirmed by the fact that Constantinople III judged Honorius. Bellarmine also thinks that local councils can deal with this problem. He recognizes that this was lawfully done in the Church in the past, and he gives several examples. Pope Marcellinus, according to some accounts, was condemned for apostasy by three hundred bishops at the Council of Sinuessa.[186] During the council the assembled fathers stated to Marcellinus, "You will be judge, and will either judge yourself or absolve

[183] Ibid., 3.2.27 (Paris ed., 1: col. 681).

[184] Ibid. 4.1.9 (Paris ed., 2: col. 13).

[185] Ibid.

[186] W. T. Townsend, "The So-Called Symmachian Forgeries," *The Journal of Religion* 13 (1933): 165-74. Moynihan, *Papal Immunity*, 3.

yourself, we only being present . . . for you are both judge and accused." While this story is part of the Symmachian forgeries, Bellarmine's comment upon it reveals that he thought that a local council could deal with the problem of a heretical pope. He writes,

> Marcellinus was accused of an act of infidelity, in which case a council can examine the case of the Pontiff. If the council were to find that he was really an infidel, it can declare him outside the Church and condemn him.[187]

Bellarmine explains that the bishops did condemn Marcellinus, but only after the pope had condemned himself and, in that act, abdicated the papacy.

Such a council is not a perfect council (*concilium perfectum*), that is, a council with the pope as its head; instead it is an imperfect council (*concilium imperfectum*).[188] Such imperfect councils can provide the Church with a new head, since the Church already has the power to choose a papal successor and frequently exercises it.[189] Unfortunately, Bellarmine offers little detail of how this would happen practically.

Bellarmine then considers the opinion held by a number of medieval canonists, such as Alanus Anglicus (fl. ca. 1190–ca. 1210), that a pope can voluntarily subject himself to a council.[190] Bellarmine holds that "the supreme pontiff cannot entrust to either a council or anyone else compulsory judgment over himself but only advisory judgments."[191] After all, as Bellarmine notes, the supreme power of the pope is of divine right, and not even the pope himself can dispense with a divine law. So the

[187] "Respondeo PRIMO, Marcellinum fuisse accusatum de actu infidelitatis, in quo casu potest Concilium discutere causam Pontificis, & si inveniat, revera esse infidelem, potest declarare eum esse extra Ecclesiam, & sic damnare" (ibid., 4.2.19 [Paris ed. 2: col. 100).

[188] Ibid., 4.1.14 (Paris ed., 2: col. 26).

[189] Ibid. (Paris ed., 2: col. 27).

[190] Richard M. Fraher, "Alanus Anglicus and the *Summa induent sancti*," *Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law* 6 (1976): 47-54.

[191] "Summus Pontifex non potest committere, neque Concilio, neque ulli homini supra se judicium coactivum, sed tantum discretivum" (Bellarmine, *De controversiis*, 4.2.18 [Paris ed., 2: col. 99]).

pope is not able to subject himself to the coercive power of the Church; he can only be judged by God alone.[192] Moreover, if the pope were to subject himself coercively to another, it would follow that he would be both a superior and an inferior at the same time and in the same respect, which is inherently contradictory. In the case of heresy or of immorality, the pope cannot voluntarily subject himself to a coercive judgment of the Church or council without violating divine law.

SUMMARY

While Cajetan, Cano, and Bellarmine, like their medieval Thomist predecessors, do not all use the same terminology, they share a basic doctrinal consensus on several points. All three agree that the pope can teach infallibly and without error in certain limited circumstances and that these teachings are binding on the universal Church. They also agree that the infallibility of the papal magisterium is part of the content of divine revelation and the result of Christ's prayer in Luke 22:32. They agree moreover that the pope is bound to revelation and to the infallible definitions of previous pontiffs and councils. They hold in common that the pope can fall into serious doctrinal error by teaching contrary either to revelation or to previous infallible definitions. Moreover, all three, like their Thomist predecessors, agree that a pope can only be tried for the sin of heresy and not for other sins and that the council is not above the pope. All three think that a council is the best practical means to deal with a pope who is under the suspicion of heresy.

There are significant points of difference, however. Bellarmine departs from Cajetan and Cano in holding that God will providentially arrange things in such a way that the pope will never be a pertinacious heretic. Nevertheless, Bellarmine recognizes that his is not "the common opinion of the church."

[192] Ibid. (Paris ed., 2: col. 100).

Bellarmine holds that not one pope had yet fallen into manifest and pertinacious heresy. Cajetan holds that the Church exercises a ministerial power over the conjunction of the pope and the papacy but not over the pope as such; Cano and Bellarmine, however, hold that the Church could judge a *heretical* pope.

Cajetan, Cano, and Bellarmine provide insight not only on the nature and extent of papal power, but also its limits. Their teaching on the primacy of God's word and the authority of tradition also helps us to better understand *Dei Verbum* 10: "the teaching office [of the Church] is not above the word of God, but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on."

The Thomist 83 (2019): 589-637

THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEPARATED SOULS AS INCOMPLETE HUMAN PERSONS

DANIEL D. DE HAAN
Oxford University
Oxford, United Kingdom

BRANDON DAHM
Franciscan University of Steubenville
Steubenville, Ohio

IN RECENT YEARS an old Thomistic debate on the separated soul has been resurrected. All parties to the debate agree that, for Thomas Aquinas, the separated soul (*anima separata*) designates the rational soul of a human person which survives the death of the human, and that, prior to the resurrection, the rational soul subsists in itself unnaturally apart from the body of which it is the substantial form *in statu viae*. According to some Thomists, called "corruptionists," the separated soul is not a person. Contrary to the corruptionists, other Thomists, called "survivalists," contend that the separated soul is a person. Both views seem to have a point, and neither side seems able to convince the other.[1] Corruptionism is the exegetically stronger

References to Thomas Aquinas's works are from the following editions: *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia* (Leonine, 1882–); vol. 22/1-3, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* (=*De Verit*); vol. 23, *Quaestiones disputatae de malo* (=*De Malo*); vol. 24/1, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* (=*Q. D. De Anima*); vol. 24/2, *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis* (=*De Spir. Creat.*); vol. 25/1-2, *Quaestiones de quolibet* (=*Quodl.*); vol. 42, *Compendium theologiae* (=*Comp. Theol.*); vol. 43, *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* (=*De unitate intel.*); *Scriptum super libros sententiarum* ed. Mandonnet and Moos, 4 vols. (Lethielleux, 1929-1947) (= *Sent.*); *Summa theologiae* (Editiones Paulinae, 1962) (=*STh*); *Summa contra Gentiles*, tt. 2-3. ed. Marc and others (Marietti Editori, 1961) (=*ScG*); *Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura,* ed. Cai, 2 vols., 8th rev. ed. (Marietti Editori, 1953) (=*In Cor.*); *Quaestiones disputatae*, t. 2, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, ed. Pession (Marietti Editori, 1949) (=*De Pot.*); *Quaestio disputata 'De unione Verbi incarnati'* ed. Obenauer and others (Frommann-Holzboog, 2011) (= *De unione Verbi*). All translations are our own unless noted otherwise.

[1] Most corruptionists are responding in some way to Eleonore Stump's account of survivalism; see esp., "Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the

position with respect to the texts of Aquinas; survivalism's strength rests in the clarity with which it draws attention to the person-like features of the separated soul.

We aim to carve out a middle way. In this article, we argue on Thomistic grounds that the separated soul is an *incomplete person*. We defend this novel position by drawing upon Aquinas's application of a distinction between a complete and incomplete "this something" (*hoc aliquid*) to human nature and the rational soul, respectively.[2] We show that Aquinas's metaphysics of personhood is framed by his quixotic metaphysics of the rational soul as an *incomplete hoc aliquid*. Because he holds that the separated rational soul is an *incomplete hoc aliquid* and is part of an entity that performs rational operations, his metaphysical principles entail that the entity constituted by the separated rational soul is an incomplete person. Consequently, our position has the fortuitous result that the views presented by corruptionists and survivalists are both partially correct, but

Soul," in *Die menschliche Seele: Brauchen wir den Dualismus?* ed. Bruno Niederbacher and Edmund Runggaldier (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2006): 153-74. Patrick Toner and Turner Nevitt provide the best defenses of corruptionism. For a defense of corruptionism against Stump's objections, see Patrick Toner, "St. Thomas Aquinas on Death and the Separated Soul," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 26 (2009): 121-38. For a distinctive and powerful argument against survivalism, see Turner Nevitt, "Aquinas on the Death of Christ: A New Argument for Corruptionism, *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 90 (2016): 77-99. Unfortunately, we are not able to address Nevitt's objection in this article. The best defense of survivalism to date is Mark Spencer, "The Personhood of the Separated Soul," *Nova et vetera* 12 (2014): 863-912. Toner, Spencer, and Nevitt provide detailed surveys of the literature.

[2] To be precise, Aquinas does not distinguish between complete and incomplete senses of a *hoc aliquid*, but our distinction tracks what he does say, which is that, unlike humans and other paradigm cases of a *hoc aliquid*, the soul is a *hoc aliquid* insofar it is able to subsist *per se*, but not in the sense of having a complete species in itself. *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1 (Leon. ed., 9.286-90): "Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc aliquid ut per se potens subsistere, non quasi habens in se completam speciem, set quasi perficiens speciem humanam ut est forma corporis. Et sic simul est forma et hoc aliquid." Giuseppe Butera invokes the idea of an *incomplete person* in his alternative account of survivalism; our account of an incomplete person is substantively different (Butera, "Incomplete Persons: Thomas Aquinas on Separated Souls and the Identity of the Human Person," in *Distinctions of Being*, ed. Nikolaj Zunic [Washington, D.C.: American Maritain Association, 2013], 61-82).

incomplete; the separated soul after death is not a person *simpliciter*, but it is an incomplete person.

Our argument proceeds in two stages. In the first part of the article we identify and explain Aquinas's three criteria for personhood: subsistence, rationality of the supposit, and completeness. Satisfying these criteria is individually necessary and jointly sufficient for any being to be a person. Said otherwise, any being that satisfies these criteria also satisfies the Boethian definition of person that Aquinas appropriates, "an individual substance of a rational nature."[3] The subsistence criterion requires that a person be a *per se* subsistent individual. The rationality-of-the-supposit criterion requires that a person be a supposit that performs rational operations in virtue of the rationality of its nature. And the completeness criterion requires that a person be complete or whole. In the second part of the article, we argue that the separated soul as understood by Aquinas satisfies each of these criteria. Yet, it satisfies them imperfectly and therefore must be qualified as an *incomplete* person instead of a person *simpliciter*.

I. Criteria of Personhood

We find in Aquinas three criteria that a being must satisfy to be a person: a person must have *per se* subsistence, have the rationality of a supposit, and be complete. Our explanation of these criteria requires situating Aquinas's account of personhood in the context of his multifaceted metaphysics. We include many details, both textual and conceptual, for two reasons. First, Aquinas's view is complex and an adequate understanding of his account of personhood requires the details. Second, at times the debate between survivalists and corruptionists has operated within a limited reading of Aquinas's metaphysics; for instance, many scholars emphasize matter and form composition to the

[3] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1, obj. 1; q. 29, a. 4; q. 34, a. 3, ad 1; q. 40, a. 3; *ScG* IV, c. 38; *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 1, ad 3; q. 9, a. 2; *De unione Verbi*, aa. 1-2.

exclusion of other orders of act-potency composition.[4] Our detailed explication of Aquinas's metaphysics of the person corrects the sometimes truncated presentations of Aquinas's views.

A) A Person Is a per se Subsistent Individual

In this section we explain Aquinas's subsistence criterion for personhood by examining his account of person as an individual substance. Aquinas's account of personhood in the *Prima pars* of the *Summa theologiae* distinguishes two principal meanings of the term "substance" (*substantia*); it is the second that pertains to his understanding of person as an *individual substance*.[5] First, "substance" can signify the essence or quiddity of a particular thing which its definition signifies. Aquinas appropriates Avicenna's quasi-definition of substance as an essence or quiddity to which it does not belong to receive its existence (*esse*) in another.[6] For instance, the human essence is defined as being a rational animal, a substance that is composed of two *essential principles* of rational soul and organic body, that is, of animating rational substantial form and common matter—not *this* flesh and *these* bones, but flesh and bones. The second meaning of "substance" denotes a subject that subsists in the genus or category of substance. When this sense of substance is taken as an individual or particular substance, as the Boethian definition of person designates, then such things are called "primary substances" (*primae substantiae*). Aquinas observes that in addition to signifying primary substance, an individual in the genus substance can be called a "thing of nature" (*res naturae*), a "subsistence"

[4] For a detailed study of Aquinas's view, see Carlos Bazán, "The Human Soul: Form *and* Substance? Thomas Aquinas' Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 64 (1997): 95-126.

[5] John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), chaps. 7-9.

[6] Ibid., 228-37.

(*subsistentia*), a "hypostasis," and a "supposit" (*suppositum*).[7] The first three notions signify some real aspect belonging to individual substances, but here Aquinas explains that the term "supposit" signifies individual substances as a second intention or logical taxon, as genus and species do for univocal kinds. Elsewhere, Aquinas also employs the term "supposit" in an ontological sense that includes *esse* and is equivalent to "hypostasis," where a rational supposit is a person.[8] Unless otherwise stated, we use "supposit" in the *esse* inclusive and ontological sense.

Just as Aquinas clarifies the relevant sense of "substance" proper to a person, namely, to be a singular or individual subsistence which subsists in itself as a particular thing with a nature, he also elucidates the meaning of individuality and the distinct ways it is manifested in the case of the divine, angelic, and human persons. Again, we focus on the individuality of persons as it pertains to humans.

In the *Summa theologiae* Aquinas identifies two special ways of being an individual that are identified by the terms "hypostasis" and "person." Even though universals and particulars are found in every category, individuals belong to the category of substance in a certain special way (*speciali quodam modo*).[9] This is because a substance is individuated in itself, while accidents are individuated in their subject, which is a substance, and so individuals in the category of substance have a special name, such as "hypostasis" or "primary substance." Similarly, and in a still more special and perfect way (*specialiori et perfectiori modo*), individuals that are rational substances are called "*persons*." This is because "actions pertain to individuals" ("actiones autem in singularibus sunt"), and the highest and most perfect mode of action belongs to individuals of a rational nature. So, the *sui generis* form of individuality exhibited by persons is bound up

[7] *STh* I, q. 29, aa. 1-2; q. 77, a. 8; q. 84, a. 7, ad 1; *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 10, ad 13; a. 19, ad 2; *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 1.

[8] *De unione Verbi*, a. 1; *Quodl.* II, q. 2, a. 2. See below, n. 24; Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 238-53.

[9] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1.

with their *sui generis* personal, that is, rational, operations, and this directs our attention to the rational nature of these individuals.

In the next section we confront head-on the rational nature characteristic of persons, but a few anticipatory remarks concerning rationality are required to clarify the individuality of persons. For Aquinas, the actions of rational substances do not always issue forth as nonrational determinate acts of their nature, for their rational nature enables them to have dominion over their own actions; persons can act of themselves as self-determining agents. This is why individuals of a rational nature have a special name even among individual substances, and this name is "person." It is in virtue of these rational and voluntary operations that we recognize the powers of intellect and will that are grounded in the rational nature of human persons. Consequently, we can say—though Aquinas did not—that these rational and self-determining operations are personal operations, indicative of the personal powers of the personal nature of the rational supposit or human person that performs its personal operations. We identify persons through their personal operations.

It is for these reasons that Aquinas claims that "person" signifies that which is most perfect in all of nature ("persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura").[10] Persons are the acme of creation; they are individuals of the highest existent actuality and unity, which enables them to participate more perfectly in creation insofar as they can by nature rationally and freely determine their actions and thereby exhibit their resemblance to the divine as being created in the image and likeness of God.[11] In sum, these two special ways of being an individual enter into the definition of person: "individual substance" signifies a singular in the category of substance, and

[10] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 3.

[11] *STh* I, q. 35, aa. 1-2; q. 93, a. 5.

"rational nature" is added to denote a singular rational substance that performs rational and voluntary operations.[12]

Aquinas draws our attention to additional hallmarks of the individuality proper to persons: incommunicability and distinctiveness. These features are introduced in his division of the common, formal, and material significations of person. In the *Prima pars* (*STh* I, q. 29, a. 4) he distinguishes the general meaning of a term from the more determinate meaning it has in diverse instances. We first consider individuality of persons in light of the common signification of "person" and then turn to the formal and material significations. The common meaning of "animal" as such is not the same as the more determinate meaning of "animal" as applied to humans; the former does not include rationality, the meaning of "human animal" does. Similarly, the common signification of "person" means "an individual substance of a rational nature" ("quod persona, communiter sumpta, significat substantiam individuam rationalis naturae"), but this common meaning acquires a more determinate signification in the case of human, angelic, and divine persons. Common to each of these instances of persons is "individual" which signifies that which is undivided in itself, but is distinct from others ("individuum autem est quod est in se indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum") or, drawing on Richard of St. Victor, is incommunicable and distinct from others ("incommunicabilis et ab aliis distincta").[13]

For Aquinas, principles of individuality in created things have two functions.[14] First, they are principles of subsistence, for a

[12] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1.

[13] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 4; q. 29, a. 3, ad 4; *De Pot*., q. 9, a. 2, ad 12.

[14] Although matter is often referred to as *the* principle of individuation, other principles also do individuating work according to Aquinas; *STh* I, q. 29, q. 4, refers to "this flesh, these bones, and this soul" as "the individuating principles of a man" (*principia individuantia hominem*). Further, in *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1, ad 2, Aquinas argues that the act of existing has a connection to individuation. For the exegetical debate on individuation by matter and *esse*, see Joseph Owens, "Thomas Aquinas," in *Individuation in Scholasticism*, ed. J. Gracia (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1994), 174-94; Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 351-75.

common nature does not subsist of itself except as it subsists in an individual. This is why the principles of individuality for human persons include determinate matter and actual existence (*actus essendi*). Second, the principles of individuality provide, in the case of material creatures like humans, the principles for the individuation of a species or that through which a supposit is distinguished from other individuals of the same common nature or *infima species*.[15]

In his treatment of the Incarnation in his commentary on book three of the *Sentences* Aquinas distinguishes three caveats pertaining to the incommunicability that belongs to the intelligibility (*ratio*) of person: *partis*, *universalis*, and *assumptibilis*. First, a person cannot be communicated to another in the way parts belong to wholes. As Mark Spencer notes, "Personal incommunicability requires being complete, not a part, since parts communicate themselves to wholes."[16] Second, a person cannot be transferred to others in the way a universal is shared among individuals of the same nature. Third, a person cannot be assumed into the personhood of another such that it thereby ceases to have proper personhood in itself, akin to the way the substance of water ceases to be a substance in itself when its nature and powers are integrated into the substance of an animal.[17]

We now consider individuation in light of more determinate significations. Aquinas distinguishes two types of signification:

> Formally what is signified by a term is that which the term was principally intended to signify, which is the *ratio* of the term. As this term "human" signifies something composed from a body and a rational soul. Materially what is signified through a term is that by which the *ratio* is maintained [*salvatur*]. As this term "human" signifies something that has a heart, brain, and other such parts without which the body cannot be animated by a rational soul.[18]

[15] *De Pot*., q. 9, a. 5, ad 13.

[16] Spencer, "The Personhood of the Separated Soul," 888.

[17] III *Sent*., d. 5, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2.

[18] *De Pot*., q. 9, a. 4.

Formally, "person" signifies something subsistent and distinct in nature, and in the case of the human person, it means something subsistent and distinct in human nature. To be clear, "person" does not formally signify a nature absolutely, because if it did then "the term 'human' and the term 'human person' would signify the same thing, which is obviously false; for the term 'person' formally signifies incommunicability or the individuality of someone subsisting in a nature"[19]

The material signification of "human person" pertains to a distinct entity subsisting in human nature, and this "something individuated and distinguished from others through individual matter."[20] So, for Aquinas, "human person" signifies not merely the nature or essence common to the human species, but also the individualizing principles of the essence that constitute *this* individual human person. For, "person" signifies a primary substance or a *this something* (*hoc aliquid*) that subsists in a nature.[21]

> For soul, flesh, and bone belong to the *ratio* of a human, but *this* soul, *this* flesh, and *this* bone belong to the *ratio* of *this* human. And therefore hypostasis and person add individual principles to the *ratio* of an essence; nor are they the same as the essence in things composed from matter and form.[22]

The hypostasis or person is distinct from the essence in things composed of form and matter, for Socrates is *this* human person due to individuating principles which are unique to him and cannot belong to more than one human being. Aquinas identifies the person or supposit with the individual whole, where the nature or essence is its formal part.[23]

[19] *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 6.

[20] *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 4. See *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1, ad 1.

[21] III *Sent.*, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3: "Natura enim, secundum quod hic loquimur, est quidditas rei quam significat sua definition. Persona autem est *hoc aliquid* quod subsistit in natura illa." See Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 240-41.

[22] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3.

[23] *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 56. Aquinas holds that the supposit or person is distinct from its essence in all hylomorphic entities, and he claims, in most texts, that essence and supposit are not distinct in angels. In these cases essence and supposit seem to be *formal*

Our exploration of the human person as individual substance has revealed that Aquinas thinks persons are both subsisting and complete individuals. As individual substances, persons are fundamental entities that exist of themselves and not in another. Human persons are not parts or principles of substances, but wholes that have both their natures and individuating principles united. Insofar as a person must be complete, we treat it under the completeness criterion, but insofar as it must exist of itself, it must satisfy the subsistence criterion:

Subsistence criterion: If a being is a person, then it is a *per se* subsistent individual.

This statement of the subsistence criterion is intended to encapsulate the preceding as a shorthand for Aquinas's complex account instead of a proposition to be abstracted from the details. The subsistence criterion is a requirement of all individual substances, but in the next section we turn to what separates persons from other *per se* subsistent individuals: rationality.

B) A Person Is a Rational Supposit

Thus far we have explored the "individual substance" component of the definition of "person" and have seen that a person is an individual substance or a *this something* (*hoc aliquid*) that subsists *per se*. In this section, we explore the "rational nature" component of the definition, and what is required for a person to be a rational agent. We show that Aquinas's account of the rational nature of the person is committed to two conditions; taken together these conditions comprise what we call the

determinations of the angel distinct from its *esse* (See III *Sent*., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3; *ScG* IV, c. 55; *De Pot*., q. 9, a. 1; *De Spir. Creat*., a. 5, ad 9; *STh* I, q. 3, a. 3). But in *Quodl.* II, q. 2, a. 2 Aquinas says the essence and supposit are distinct in angels and he does not treat the *supposit* as a formal principle distinct from *esse*; here he distinguishes the individualizing principles of the angel from the principles of its essence, which allows him to include the angel's *actus essendi* in the meaning of its supposit. See Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 238-53.

"rationality-of-the-supposit criterion." First, there is the rationality of the nature, powers, and operations of the person. Second, there is Aquinas's thesis that all operations or actions belong to supposits (*actiones sunt suppositorum*).

We begin with what rational nature adds to person as a *per se* subsistent individual. As with "substance" and "individual," Aquinas introduces a number of clarifications to the way "rational nature" relates to his doctrine of person. First, he frequently remarks that the notion of "person" simply adds nothing but "rational nature" to "hypostasis" or "supposit."[24] So a rational supposit or a supposit with a rational nature is a person; consequently, "supposit" and "person" are coextensive in every *per se* subsistent with a rational nature.

Second, "person signifies a certain nature with a certain mode of existence." The nature proper to persons is the most exalted or dignified kind of nature, namely, any nature that is intellectual in its genus. Similarly, the mode of existence proper to persons is the most exalted or dignified mode of existence, namely, something that exists in itself.[25] As we saw before, the dignity of an intellectual nature refers to a person's exalted mode of *cognition* and *action*; for rational substances exist *per se* and act *per se* insofar as they alone have dominion over their actions and so can act or not act.[26] Aquinas interprets the notion of "rational nature" in the Boethian definition of person analogously to mean any mode of intelligence, whether it be human, angelic, or divine. This is because Aquinas prefers to identify "rationality" *sensu stricto* with the specifically human mode of intelligence which, unlike divine and angelic intelligence, is discursive and receives its proper object through sensation.[27]

[24] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1; *De Pot.*, q. 9, aa. 1-2.

[25] *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 3.

[26] *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 1, ad 3: "Nam solae substantiae rationales habent dominium sui actus, ita quod in eis est agere et non agree."

[27] *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 2, ad 10: "rationale est differentia animalis, secundum quod ratio, a qua sumitur, significat cognitionem discursivam, qualis est in hominibus, non autem in Angelis nec in Deo. Boetius autem sumit rationale communiter pro intellectuali, quod dicimus convenire Deo et Angelis et hominibus." *STh* I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 4: "Deus potest

Third, Aquinas states that the meaning of "nature" as rational or intellectual that is contained in the definition of person does not mean nature in the sense of a principle of motion treated by natural philosophy. Rather, nature here signifies the *differentia* that manifests the form of a thing; for the *differentia* is derived from the special form of a thing which completes the definition that signifies a thing's essence.[28] As with "person," Aquinas is employing all of these notions—"substance," "individual," "rational," "intellectual," "nature," "form," "*differentia*"—analogously so as to capture the nonunivocal likeness—what is similarly dissimilar—in human, angelic, and divine persons ("persona dicitur de Deo et creaturis, non univoce nec aequivoce, sed secundum analogiam").[29]

Fourth, all persons are individual substances of a rational nature, but as used here, "rational nature" is not an ultimate *differentia*; rather, it admits of divisions into the ultimate *differentiae* that, analogously speaking, signify the forms that differentiate the modes of intelligence proper to human nature, angelic nature, and divine nature.[30] The human person finds its ultimate *differentia* as a supposit of a rational nature in its rational soul. The rational soul is the substantial form of the body, but it is also able to subsist and operate without the body after death. Accordingly, the rational soul of the human person is intellectual of itself and falls within the genus of intellectual substances.[31]

These four clarifications figure into Aquinas's account of the rational nature that is specific to human persons, but they only touch on the rationality of that nature; they do not address what or who the agent is that performs these rational operations. For this we must turn to Aquinas's thesis that operations belong to a supposit. Aquinas's more general account of the supposit that

dici *rationalis naturae*, secundum quod ratio non importat discursum, sed communiter intellectualem naturam." See *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 3, ad 1; II *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2.

[28] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 4.

[29] I *Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2.

[30] *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 2, ad 12; *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 7, esp. ad 1 and ad 4; *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 15.

[31] *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 7, esp. ad 17 and ad 18.

operates is orthogonal to his views on persons and the rationality of their nature, for there are many kinds of supposits that operate which are neither persons nor agents that perform rational operations. However, we cannot fully understand the rationality of persons—who are individual *per se* subsistent entities of a rational nature—independent from Aquinas's thesis that operations, including rational operations, belong to a supposit.

Aquinas frequently states his thesis that actions or operations belong to supposits (*actiones sunt suppositorum*) and not to their nature or essential principles, such as the rational soul which is the substantial form of the human person. The essential principles are those by which the supposit operates in the ways it operates as seeing, hearing, and understanding through exercising its diverse powers.[32] The following are some representative texts of Aquinas's thesis:

> But who it is that acts is a person or supposit, because acts are of the individual.[33]

> [Grace] is ordered to good action, and actions belong to supposits or individuals. Hence action, and as a consequence grace which is ordained to [action], presuppose the hypostasis [or supposit] which operates.[34]

> An operation is attributed to the hypostasis as the operator, [however] it is attributed to the nature as the principle of operation. For an operation does not receive its species from the operator, but from the principle of the operation;

[32] *De unione Verbi*, a. 1, ad 16 (Obenauer, ed., 42): "quod actio est suppositi secundum aliquam naturam vel formam. Et ideo non solum diversificantur actiones secundum diversitatem suppositorum, sed etiam secundum diversitatem naturae vel formae: sicut etiam in uno et eodem homine alia actio est videre et alia audire propter diversas potentias" ("Action is of a supposit according to some nature or form. And therefore actions are not only diversified according to the diversity of supposits, but also according to the diversity of nature or form. Just as in one and the same human one action is to see and another is to hear because of diverse powers"). See *STh* I, q. 40, a. 1, ad 3; III *Sent*., d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1. For interesting studies on this principle in Aquinas and others, see Alain de Libera, "When Did the Modern Subject Emerge?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 82 (2008): 181-220, esp. 210; Brian T. Carl, "Action, Supposit, and Subject: Interpreting *actiones sunt suppositorum*," *Nova et vetera* 17 (2019): 545-65.

[33] III *Sent*., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 1.

[34] *STh* III, q. 7, a. 13.

hence in one operator there are diverse operations according to the species proper to diverse principles of operation, as to see and to hear in humans.[35]

In creatures, acts are of the supposits, [for] an essence does not act, but is the principle of acts in the supposit[36]

To act is not attributed to the nature as agent, but to the person, for acts belong to supposits or singulars, according to the Philosopher. Nevertheless action is attributed to the nature as to that whereby the person or hypostasis acts. Hence, although the nature is not properly said to rule or serve, every hypostasis or person may be properly said to be ruling or serving in this or that nature.[37]

Actions pertain to supposits and to wholes, but not, strictly speaking, to [their] parts and to [their] forms or their powers. For it is not proper to say that a hand hits, but that a man does with his hand, and neither is it proper to say that heat heats, but that the fire heats by its heat.[38]

There is always something or someone who performs operations, and strictly speaking the essential principles do not perform operations but instead provide the principles of the nature by virtue of which something or someone acts as it does. Consequently, rational operations are performed by supposits of a rational nature; any supposit that performs rational operations will thereby be a rational supposit, that is, a person.

Aquinas's understanding of the thesis that *actiones sunt suppositorum* is more complicated than it may seem at first sight; it will be fruitful to explicate its bearing on the human person. We find in Aquinas two kinds of elucidations for his thesis that operations belong to the supposit; the first is phenomenological or experiential and the second is ontological. The experiential clarification pertains to supposits that are persons and it can be found in various places, perhaps most prominently in Aquinas's well-known claim against the Averroists that it is this human that understands (*hic homo intelligit*). Whenever a human sees, hears, understands, or wills he knows that he is the one, the unified

[35] *De Verit.*, q. 20, a. 1, ad 2.
[36] I *Sent.*, d. 5, q. 1, a. 1.
[37] *STh* III, q. 20, a. 1, ad 2.
[38] *STh* II-II, q. 58, a. 2.

agent, who is seeing, hearing, understanding, or willing whatever it is that is seen, heard, understood, or done voluntarily.[39]

We can understand better the complementary ontological basis for Aquinas's thesis as it pertains to the human person and the rational soul by elucidating the three metaphysical conditions that are necessary for a supposit, namely, the (i) actual existence and (ii) substantial unity or wholeness of (iii) an individualized nature.[40] We treated the third condition above; individual actions belong to individual supposits (*actiones sunt suppositorum singularium*), which ontologically ground and individuate them, and preeminent among individuals are those persons who perform individual rational and voluntary actions.[41] We find the first condition on display in Aquinas's arguments that it is impossible for the existence (*esse*) that belongs to the hypostasis

[39] *De Verit.*, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3; q. 10, a. 8; *STh* I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2; q. 75, a. 4; q. 76, a. 1; I-II, q. 18, a. 5, ad 2; q. 112, a. 5, ad 1; *In II Cor.*, c. 12, lect. 1 (Marietti ed., 448); *ScG* II, c. 73; III, c. 46; *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 85; *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 2, and ad 2; *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 3; *De unitate intel.*, c. 3.

[40] III *Sent.*, d. 6, q. 2: "Ens enim subsistens est quod habet esse tamquam ejus quod est, quamvis sit naturae vel formae tamquam ejus quo est. Unde nec natura rei nec partes ejus proprie dicuntur esse, si esse praedicto modo accipiatur; *similiter* autem nec accidentia, sed suppositum completum, quod est secundum omnia illa" ("For subsisting being is that which has existence as it is *that which is*, although it is of nature or form as it is *that by which it is*. Hence, neither the nature of a thing nor its parts are properly said to exist [if existence is accepted in the aforementioned way], similarly neither are accidents, but [only] the complete supposit, [it is] *that which is* according to all of those"). *Quodl.* IX, q. 2, a. 2 (Leon. ed., 94.58-95.67): "Esse ergo proprie et vere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti. Huic autem attribuitur esse duplex. Vnum scilicet esse quod resultat ex hiis ex quibus eius unitas integratur, quod est proprium esse suppositi substanciale. Aliud esse est supposito attributum preter ea quae integrant ipsum, quod est esse superadditum, scilicet accidentale, ut esse album attribuitur Sorti cum dicimus: Sortes est albus" ("Thus, existence is only properly and truly attributed to a thing that subsists in itself. Yet there are two sorts of existence attributed to a subsisting thing. One is the supposit's proper substantial existence, which results from that which makes it one whole. But besides that which makes it whole, there is another existence attributed to a supposit, viz. an additional or accidental existence. Whiteness, for instance, is an accidental existence attributed to Socrates when we say, 'Socrates is white'" (*Thomas Aquinas's Quodlibetal Questions*, trans. Turner Nevitt and Brian Davies [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020], 96-97; translation modified). See Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 257-59.

[41] *STh* III, q. 20, a. 1, ad 2; q. 7, a. 13; III *Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.

or person in itself to be multiplied in one and the same hypostasis or person, for no being can have more than one act of existence.[42] And this act of existence is that whereby a substantial unity or a whole individual, that is, a supposit, actually exists. This last point also pertains to the second condition concerning the substantial unity or wholeness of the supposit. The basic ontological sense of the supposit signifies more than "nature" or "essence" or "substance," for unlike these notions, which are indeterminate with respect to the individuating determinations of *this* human, the notion of a supposit includes these determinations. And sometimes Aquinas employs a sense of "supposit" that not only denotes the substantial individuating determinations of *this* human, but even includes the *esse* and accidents (e.g., intellectual and sentient powers, *habitus*, and operations) of the individual. This *esse*-inclusive and accident-inclusive sense of supposit signifies not simply the individuated substance of *this* human *sans* its accidental determinations, but of *this* human Socrates, who actually exists, lives in Athens, is bearded, is *this* height, is married to Xanthippe, and exercises his power of intellect in dialectical arguments with Glaucon.[43] This sense of supposit draws our attention to what constitutes a whole individual, namely, something (*hoc aliquid*) actualized by *esse*, a substantial nature, and accidents.[44]

[42] *STh* I, q. 76, a. 1: "sic enim aliquid est ens, quomodo et unum." See *STh* III, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1; *STh* III, q. 50, a. 5.

[43] *Quodl.* II, q. 2, a. 2 (Leon. ed., 217.97-102): "In Angelo autem non est omnino idem, quia aliquid accidit ei preter id quod est de ratione sue specie, quia et ipsum esse angeli est preter eius essenciam seu naturam et alia quedam ei accident, que omnia pertinent ad suppositum, non autem ad naturam" ("But in an angel they are not entirely the same because something outside what belongs to the intelligible structure of its species is accidental to it, both because the very being of an angel is outside its essence or nature, and some other characteristics which belong entirely to the supposit are accidental to it but not to the nature") (*Quodlibetal Questions I and II*, trans. Sandra Edwards [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983], 83). See *De unione Verbi*, a. 1.

[44] *Quodl.* II, q. 2, a. 2 ad s.c. (Leon. ed., 218.159-69): "quod natura dicitur constituere suppositum etiam in compositis ex materia et forma, non quia natura sit una res et suppositum alia res (hoc enim est secundum opinionem dicentium quod natura speciei sit forma tantum, que constituit suppositum sicut totum), set quia secundum modum

It is crucial that we keep distinct Aquinas's account of the *supposit*—in both the *esse* indifferent and inclusive senses—as the metaphysical unity of a whole individual, from the way Aquinas identifies different *subjects* of inherence for the sentient and the intellectual powers of human persons. The sentient powers have the rational soul and body of the hylomorphic composite as their subject, but the intellectual powers—possible intellect, agent intellect, and will—have only the rational soul and not the hylomorphic composite as their immediate subject.[45] Of course, for Aquinas, this account is complicated by his metaphysics of the twofold composition of act and potency, wherein matter is in potency with respect to formal act, and the nature constituted from matter and form is in potency to its act of existence.[46] In the case of humans, Aquinas argues that even though the same *esse* actualizes and unites the rational soul and body of the individual human supposit, the rational soul *as* form and body *as* matter do not participate in this *esse* in the same way. In humans, the whole individual supposit is constituted not merely through the participation of its nature in *esse*, for within the composition of its hylomorphic nature matter participates in *esse* by virtue of matter's participation in the *esse* of the formal act of the rational soul. When the human body is corrupted at death, the very same form—that is, the rational soul, but now as an incomplete nature—continues to subsist through its participation in the same act of existence which *in statu viae* actualized a complete

significandi natura significatur ut pars, ratione supra dicta, suppositum uero ut totum; natura significatur ut constituens, et suppositum ut constitutum" ("that in composites of matter and form also a nature is said to constitute a supposit, not because a nature is one thing and a supposit another (for this is the case according to the opinion of those who say that the nature of a species is only the form which constitutes the supposit as a whole), but because according to the manner of signifying, a nature is signified as a part for the aforesaid reason and a supposit is signified as a whole. A nature is signified as what constitutes, a supposit as what is constituted") (Edwards, trans., *Quodlibetal Questions I and II*, 84).

[45] *STh* I, q. 76, a. 8, ad 4; *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 89; *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1; *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 4, ad 3.

[46] *ScG* II, cc. 52-54.

nature.[47] But this does not mean that *in statu viae* there are two substantial unities or individual wholes, the human person composed of its hylomorphic nature and *esse* along with the *per se* subsistent soul and *esse* composite. Aquinas argues that even though the rational soul has subsistent existence—insofar as its *esse* does not depend on the body and it has operations and powers that transcend matter—it actualizes matter by virtue of its act of existence and therein shares *esse* which actualizes the one existing composite of soul and body, that is, the one actually existing human being.[48]

To address perspicuously the personhood of the separated soul we must keep in mind Aquinas's distinction between the *supposit* and the kinds of *subjects of inherence* of sentient and intelligent powers and operations. The human *qua* subject of inherence is not the subject of understanding for it is the rational soul *qua* subject of inherence that grounds the intellectual power for understanding. The human *qua* supposit is what, or rather who, it is that understands.[49] And it is the supposit that is the ultimate metaphysical unity or individual whole, the something or someone that performs operations. That is to say, the actions are of the supposit and not of the essential principles or subjects of inherence of the supposit's nature that enable these actions—whether they be the sentient actions enabled by hylomorphic composite subject or the intelligent actions enabled by the rational soul alone as subject.[50] It is this distinction that

[47] *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 1 (esp. ad 6); a. 9, ad 3 and ad 4.

[48] *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 2, ad 3 and ad 5.

[49] This crucial distinction is overlooked both by survivalists, like Stump ("Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution"), and by corruptionist responses to them, like Toner ("St. Thomas Aquinas on Death and the Separated Soul," 129-30, 132-34). Aquinas's distinction is also overlooked in de Libera, "When Did the Modern Subject Emerge?"; Marilyn McCord Adams and Cecilia Trifogli, "Whose Thought Is It? The Soul and the Subject of Action in Some Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century Aristotelians," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 85 (2012): 624-47; Cecilia Trifogli, "Giles of Rome against Thomas Aquinas on the Subject of Thinking and the Status of the Human Soul," *Documenti e Studi* 23 (2012): 221-44.

[50] Just as a single divine person can perform operations grounded in two distinct natures, so also can a human person perform rational and sentient operations even if they

underscores Aquinas's nuanced anthropology against the Averroists.[51]

> Understanding is an operation of the human soul insofar as it transcends the order [*superexcedit proportionem*] of corporeal matter, and therefore [understanding] is not achieved through any corporeal organ. Nevertheless, we can say that the conjunction itself, that is, the human, understands, inasmuch as the soul, which is its formal part, has this proper operation, as the operation of any part is attributed to the whole. For a human sees with his eye, walks with his feet, and similarly understands through his soul.[52]

In the previous section we considered the way the subsistence criterion reveals that every person is a *per se* subsistent individual or *hoc aliquid*. The rationality-of-the-supposit criterion adds two crucial conditions to Aquinas's doctrine of the person not addressed by the subsistence criterion. First, the rationality of the nature reveals that the kind of *per se* subsistence of the person must be of a rational nature, which grounds rational powers and rational operations in the case of human and angelic creatures. But more is needed. The condition concerning the rationality of the nature by itself fails to specify what or who it is that performs these rational operations in virtue of the rational powers of a rational nature. Aquinas's thesis that operations are of the supposit supplies his account of the rationality of the nature with the needed clarification that it is the supposit, not the nature, that operates rationally; having a rational nature is not sufficient, for rational operations—like all operations—are performed by the supposit.[53] We can encapsulate these complex doctrines from Aquinas with the rationality-of-the-supposit criterion.

are grounded differently in one and the same nature of the rational animal. See *STh* III, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4.

[51] *ScG* II, c. 73; *STh* I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2; q. 76, a. 1; *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 85; *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 2; *De unitate intel.*, c. 3.

[52] *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 2, ad 2 (Leon. ed., 30.326-35).

[53] I *Sent.*, d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; d. 11, q. 1, a. 2; III *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, ad 9; d. 5, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3; d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 3, ad 25; *De unione Verbi*, a. 1, ad 11 and ad 16; *STh* I, q. 36, a. 3, ad 1; q. 39, a. 5, ad 1; I-II, q. 75, a. 2; *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 2.

Rationality-of-the-Supposit Criterion: If a being is a person, then it is a supposit that performs rational operations in virtue of the rationality of its nature.

C) A Person Is Complete

The previous two sections on the subsistence and the rationality of the supposit criteria both touch on the third criterion of personhood: completeness. It is in Aquinas's statements that a person must be complete that we find the textual heart of the corruptionist position. Corruptionists object that the survivalist thesis goes explicitly against certain doctrines of Aquinas, who even states that since the soul is a part of the human, "the soul is not the whole human, and I am not my soul."[54] Indeed, on a number of occasions Aquinas explicitly addresses the question of whether the separated soul is a person ("anima separata sit persona") and provides principled reasons for rejecting the survivalist thesis. He addresses this question head-on in his early commentary on book three of the *Sentences*. The first objection contends, like the survivalists, that the separated soul is a person since it satisfies Boethius's definition of a person. The third objection argues that the rational soul is a *this something* (*hoc aliquid*), and a *this something* of a rational nature is a person ("sed hoc aliquid in natura rationali est persona"). Here we see Aquinas substitute *hoc aliquid* where "individual substance" is usually found in the definition of person. Against these objections, the second *sed contra* contends, as the corruptionists do, that person has the intelligibility of being complete and whole, and since the soul is a part, the soul does not meet the intelligibility of a person.[55] So we find in Aquinas's own texts the survivalist-corruptionist debate, presented in its most sophisticated metaphysical form, articulating the best

[54] *In I Cor.* 15, lect. 2 (Marietti ed., no. 924): "anima autem cum sit pars corporis hominis, non est totus homo, et anima mea non est ego."

[55] III *Sent*., d. 5, q. 3, a. 2, s.c. 2: "Praeterea, persona habet rationem completi et totius. Sed anima est pars. Ergo anima non habet rationem personae." III *Sent*., d. 5, q. 3, a. 3: "et hoc est contra rationem personae, quae maximam completionem importat."

principled reasons for and against each view. Which side does Aquinas take?

Aquinas's response reiterates points we have already seen. Because the soul is united to the body as the form of matter, the soul is only part of human nature and not a kind of nature in itself. And since, as was introduced in the *sed contra*, the intelligibility of a part is contrary to the intelligibility of a person, the separated soul is not able to be called "a person."[56] Properly speaking the separated soul is not a substance of some nature; it is a principal part of human nature.[57] Even though the rational soul is a *this something*, it remains a part of human nature and parts cannot be persons, even if the part is a *this something*; the intelligibility of a person requires that a person be whole and complete.[58] Finally, Aquinas assigns greater dignity to the human person over the rational soul insofar as the former is more complete.[59] Indeed, elsewhere in the *Sentences* Aquinas states that the intelligibility of the person evinces maximal completion ("rationem personae, quae maximam completionem importat").[60] In the *Sentences*, Aquinas unequivocally and explicitly defends a corruptionist position.

[56] III *Sent*., d. 5, q. 3, a. 2: "Alia est opinio Aristotelis . . . quod anima unitur corpori sicut forma materiae: unde anima est pars humanae naturae, et non natura quaedam per se: et quia ratio partis contrariatur rationi personae . . . ideo anima separata non potest dici persona: quia quamvis separata non sit pars actu, tamen habet naturam ut sit pars" ("The other opinion is that of Aristotle, [who holds] that the soul is united to the body as form to matter. Hence, the soul is a part of human nature and is not some nature in itself. And because the aspect of a part is contrary to the aspect of a whole . . . therefore the separated soul is not able to be called a person, because although when [the soul] is separated it is not actually a part, nevertheless it has the nature as to be a part").

[57] III *Sent*., d. 5, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod anima separata, proprie loquendo, non est substantia alicujus naturae, sed est pars naturae."

[58] III *Sent*., d. 5, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3: "quod anima rationalis dicitur hoc aliquid per modum quo esse subsistens est hoc aliquid, etiam si habeat naturam partis; sed ad rationem personae exigitur ulterius quod sit totum et completum." See III *Sent*., d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad s.c.; *ScG* II, c. 55; *De Pot*., q. 9, q. 3, ad 13; *STh* III, q. 16, a. 12, ad 2.

[59] III *Sent*., d. 5, q. 3, a. 2, ad 5.

[60] III *Sent*., d. 5, q. 3, a. 3: "trahitur ad aliquod completius, ipsum incompletum existens, ut patet ex praedictis, et hoc est contra rationem personae, quae maximam completionem importat."

In later works such as *De potentia Dei* and the *Summa theologiae* we find concise recapitulations of similar survivalist objections and corruptionist responses.

[Obj. 14] The soul that is separated from the body through death is not said to be a person; nevertheless it is an individual substance of a rational nature. Therefore this is not a fitting definition of person.

[Ad 14] The separated soul is a part of rational nature, namely of human [nature], and not a whole rational human nature. Therefore it is not a person.[61]

[Obj. 5] The separated soul is an individual substance of a rational nature. But it is not a person. Therefore this definition of person is unsuitable.

[Ad 5] The soul is a part of the human species, and therefore, although it can be separated, still because it retains the nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance which is a hypostasis or primary substance; just as neither can hands nor any other parts of a human. And so neither the definition nor the name of person befits it.[62]

Aquinas's view is therefore clear and consistent: The separated soul, because it is a part and "retains the nature of unibility," is not a person. Even in the face of strange consequences, like St. Peter no longer being a person, Aquinas stands his ground and explains that when we pray to St. Peter we are speaking by synecdoche.[63] According to Aquinas, if something is a person it must be complete or a whole.

We now have our criteria for personhood:

[61] *De Pot*., q. 9, a. 2, obj. 14: "anima separata a corpore per mortem, non dicitur esse persona; et tamen est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Non ergo haec est conveniens definitio personae." *De Pot*., q. 9, a. 2, ad 14: "anima separata est pars rationalis naturae, scilicet humanae, et non tota natura rationalis humana, et ideo non est persona."

[62] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1, obj. 5: "anima separata est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Non autem est persona. Inconvenienter ergo persona sic definitur." *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 5: "anima est pars humanae speciei, et ideo, licet sit separata, quia tamen retinet naturam unibilitatis, non potest dici substantia individua quae est hypostasis vel substantia prima; sicut nec manus, nec quaecumque alia partium hominis. Et sic non competit ei neque definitio personae, neque nomen." See *STh* I, q. 75, a. 4, obj. 2 and ad 2.

[63] III *Sent*., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6; IV *Sent*., d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 2.

Subsistence: If a being is a person, then it is *per se* subsistent individual.

Rationality of the Supposit: If a being is a person, then it is a supposit that performs rational operations in virtue of the rationality of its nature.

Completeness: If a being is a person, then it is complete or a whole.

If a created being meets all of these criteria, then it is a created person. At this point, the texts of Aquinas clearly favor a corruptionist position, but in the next part of this essay we argue that the separated soul meets each of these criteria of personhood in some substantive way. We start by stating our position, and then argue that the separated soul satisfies each of the criteria, even if only incompletely.

II. Our View: A Separated Soul Is an Incomplete Person

In this second part we argue that the separated soul is an "incomplete person." As we have seen, Aquinas's account of personhood depends on his metaphysics of a *hoc aliquid*: if a being is a person, then it is a rational *hoc aliquid*. A central claim in our argument is that Aquinas's metaphysical distinctions that pertain to a rational *hoc aliquid* also frame his metaphysics of the person. Consequently, because Aquinas countenances the notion of an incomplete *hoc aliquid* in the case of the rational soul—for it is known to be subsistent *per se* in virtue of its rational operations even though it is incomplete according to its species—his metaphysics of the person is thereby committed to the notion of an *incomplete person*, which is what the separated rational soul is as a rational incomplete *hoc aliquid*. We defend our view by arguing that the separated soul satisfies, in a principled and qualified way, the three criteria for personhood. It satisfies the subsistence criterion by being an incomplete *hoc aliquid* that subsists *per se*. It satisfies the rationality-of-the-supposit criterion by being the supposit of rational operations in virtue of the rationality of its incomplete nature. And it incompletely satisfies the completeness criterion by being complete in four of the five orders of completeness we identify.

A) A Separated Soul Is a per se Subsistent Individual

In this section we argue that the separated soul satisfies the subsistence criterion of personhood by considering Aquinas's response to the question of whether the rational soul is both a form and a *hoc aliquid*.

One of the important endeavors of the thirteenth-century Scholastics was to reconcile the newly received Aristotelian psychology—mediated principally through the innovative neo-Aristotelian lenses of Avicenna, Averroës, and others—with the traditions of theological anthropology of St. Augustine, St. John Damascene, and others. Such an enterprise produced numerous eclectic theological and philosophical anthropologies. Aquinas inherited these elaborate traditions and engaged in the debates that sought to reconcile two doctrines. First, that the human rational soul is, like all Aristotelian souls, the substantial form and first actuality of the organic body, which confers upon the whole animal its fundamental nature, bodily organization, organs, and powers for vegetation, movement, cognition, passion, and action. And second, that after death the rational soul of a human person can subsist in itself apart from the body. A central issue in this thirteenth-century debate is the question of whether the separated soul is *both* a *hoc aliquid*, that is, an individual or primary substance, and a substantial form, that is, a part of an individual substance.[64] This is the question that opens Aquinas's

[64] "For Thomas the soul is a substantial form of a kind unknown to Aristotle. Instead of leaving the noetic problem in a state of indetermination, as did Aristotle's texts, Thomas proposed an interpretation of those texts that overcame the *aporiae* and allowed him to attribute intellection to the individual human soul. The analysis of the intellectual operation led him to establish that the soul has operational independence, at least at that level, and consequently, that it must also have existential independence vis-a-vis the body. The human soul is a subsistent substantial form, a form of matter but not a material form. This new kind of substantial form is not found in Aristotle's philosophy, but it was established through a process of philosophical analysis that was perfectly consistent with Aristotelian principles" (Bazán, "The Human Soul," 117). See Carlos Bazán, "13th Century Commentaries on *De Anima*: From Peter of Spain to Thomas Aquinas," in *Il commento filosofico nell'occidente latino (secoli XIII–XV)*, ed. Gianfranco Fioravanti and others (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002): 119-84; Sander de Boer, *The Science of the Soul: The*

Quaestiones disputatae De anima: Whether the human soul can be a form and a *hoc aliquid*? ("Et primo queritur utrum anima humana possit esse forma et hoc aliquid").[65]

Aquinas's response begins with the proper meaning of *hoc aliquid*: an individual in the genus or category of substance. As Aristotle states in the *Categories*, a primary substance signifies a *hoc aliquid*. Furthermore, an individual in the genus of substance that subsists of itself is also something complete in some species of substance. So, properly speaking, *hoc aliquid* signifies (1) an individual in the genus of substance that subsists in itself (*subsistere per se*) and (2) is complete in the nature of its species. One way to think about these conditions is as two types of completeness: to subsist in oneself is to have *existential completeness* and to be complete in one's species is to have *essential* or *specific completeness*. Accidents, like the powers of intellect and vision, do not meet either condition; they merely *inhere* in a substance. But hands and feet, like the rational soul, are not accidents; they are distinct kinds of substantial parts which *subsist*.[66] Because hands, feet, and other separable features of animals cannot subsist of themselves as complete instances of a species—that is, they do not completely participate in the nature of some substance—they are not called primary substances, but parts of a substance; such parts belong neither to a species nor to a genus of substance except by reduction (*nisi per reductionem*).[67] What distinguishes subsistent parts like hands

Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's De Anima, c.1260-c.1360 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013). On this point, Robert Pasnau seconds Bazán's contention, adding: "It is particularly misleading to suggest that [Aquinas's] theory is just an unhappy marriage of Christianity and Aristotelianism. There is nothing specifically Christian about the thesis that the soul survives death—we might just as well refer to this as a Platonic thesis. And it is no departure from Aristotle to treat the intellect as separable from the body, since Aristotle is quite explicit, on many occasions and to the considerable embarrassment of many Aristotle scholars . . . that the intellect can exist independently of the body" (Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 414 n. 27).

[65] *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1 (Leon. ed., 3.1–3).

[66] *STh* I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1.

[67] *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1 (Leon. ed., 7.197-207) and ad 13 (Leon. ed., 12.434-41).

and feet from the rational soul is that separated hands and feet are only so called *equivocally* apart from the substance in which they subsist as parts, whereas the separated soul remains a rational soul apart from the body of which it is the substantial form. Because the rational soul lacks specific completeness, it seems that it cannot be a *hoc aliquid*. But Aquinas, surprisingly, concludes that the separated soul is a *hoc aliquid*.

Aquinas arrives at his answer by working through the mistakes of his predecessors' views on the human soul. He begins with a critique of Empedocles and Galen, who denied that the soul has these two types of completeness, since they understood the soul to be a mere harmony or complex congeries of elemental qualities, and so neither subsistent in itself nor complete in species. Aquinas argues that their view is untenable with respect to vegetative and sensitive souls because both ground operations that transcend the active and passive qualities of elemental matter, and so *a fortiori* these material elemental qualities are totally inadequate for explaining the intellectual operations grounded by the rational soul which completely transcend all materiality.

> It is necessary that the intellectual soul be able to act *per se* inasmuch as it has its proper operation without involving the body [*absque corporis communione*]. And because each thing acts according as it is actual, it is necessary that the intellectual soul have complete existence *per se* [*habeat esse per se absolutum*] not dependent on a body. For forms which have their existence dependent on matter or a subject do not have *per se* operations.[68]

Aquinas claims arguments of this kind led later philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, to hold that the intellectual part of the soul is something *per se* subsistent. But this is where Plato and Aristotle part ways, for Plato, according to Aquinas, also maintained that the *per se* subsistent soul in itself has specific completeness, because a human is not essentially a composite of soul and body, and that the soul's conjunction with a body is akin to the way a pilot is related to a ship. Aquinas rejects the view he

[68] *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1 (Leon. ed., 8.242-50).

ascribes to Plato and argues instead that the soul is what animates or gives life to the body, and thereby gives the human body its vital act of existing. Following Aristotle's own line of argumentation from *De Anima* II, Aquinas contends that this account of soul satisfies Aristotle's criteria for being a form, and so the human soul is the form of the body that gives the body and its parts their species as constituents of a human. And this is why when the human dies and the soul leaves the body, the bodily parts only equivocally retain the names eyes, hands, feet, and so forth. The essential unity of body and soul in one complete nature and its substantial—and so not mere accidental—corruption at death, are all characteristics that are true of humans that the soul as pilot model cannot explain.[69]

Based on this line of argumentation, Aquinas concludes that the rational soul is a *hoc aliquid* since it can subsist *per se*, not as having a complete species in itself, but as perfecting the human species as the form of the body.[70] Hence, the rational soul of the human person is simultaneously a substantial form and a *hoc aliquid*, albeit not a complete *hoc aliquid*. Aquinas then illustrates the intelligibility of his conclusion with a presentation of the hierarchy of forms in nature according to their ascending ontological and operational transcendence over the matter they actualize—a hierarchy that proceeds from the forms of elements, to mixed bodies, vegetative souls, sentient souls, and finally human souls. "The human soul," he writes elsewhere, "is situated at the boundary line between corporeal and incorporeal substances, as though it existed on the horizon of eternity and time, it approaches to the highest by withdrawing from the lowest."[71] This is why he claims that human souls resemble separate substances insofar as by their intellectual operations humans can cognize immaterial things, but human souls also differ from separate substances insofar as the very nature of the

[69] *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1. See *Q. D. De Anima*, aa. 9-10.

[70] *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1 (Leon. ed., 9.286-90). See above, n. 2.

[71] *ScG* II, c. 81 (James Anderson, trans., *Summa contra Gentiles Book II: Creation*, [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975], 265). See *ScG* IV, c. 11.

intellectual power grounded in the human rational soul must acquire its cognition of immaterial things from sense cognition of material things.

Aquinas concludes—following the Aristotelian heuristic principle that the mode of being of operations reveals the mode of being of powers and ultimately the nature of the soul that grounds them—that the soul's mode of existing can be known from its operations. Since intellectual operations transcend materiality, the rational soul's act of existing transcends and does not depend upon the body. However, because the perfection of human operations requires intellectual operations that obtain their objects from the sensory operations of embodied powers of sensation, the human only has specific completeness insofar as the human soul is united to the body as its form. This is why Aquinas says that the human soul is itself established on the boundary line dividing corporal from incorporeal separate substances. As Carlos Bazán astutely pointed out, for Aquinas, this *operational contrast* of essential dependence and existential independence is grounded in an *ontological contrast* of essential dependence and existential independence.[72] Just as the *per se* intellectual operations of the human person are existentially independent of the body though essentially depend upon the bodily senses for their object, so also the intellectual soul, which grounds these intellectual powers and operations, is existentially independent of the body, yet essentially depends upon the body for the perfection of a complete human person.

So, unlike the human person which is a *hoc aliquid* that is complete insofar as it subsists in itself and is a complete instance of the species human, the rational soul is not a complete *hoc aliquid*, even though it has existential completeness, because it lacks specific completeness as an incomplete manifestation of the human species. Consequently, the rational soul is an incomplete *hoc aliquid*. Although incomplete, insofar as it is an existentially complete *hoc aliquid*, it satisfies the subsistence criterion. What kind of being is the separated soul, this separated incomplete *hoc*

[72] Bazán, "The Human Soul," 122-26.

aliquid, insofar it can subsist in itself but fails to be a complete instance of its species? This is a question not simply about the meaning of words, but about what the metaphysics of this entity requires of our categories in order to understand and identify it. In the next section, we work towards an answer to this question.

B) A Separated Soul Is a Rational Supposit

The incomplete *hoc aliquid* that is the separated soul satisfies the subsistence criterion, but does it satisfy the rationality-of-the-supposit criterion? We have already noted that if a being is a person it must both perform rational operations in virtue of its rational nature and be the supposit that performs these rational operations. We start with the first condition. When separated from the body the human soul still performs rational operations.[73] Indeed, Aquinas claims that despite being imperfect with respect to its nature, the separated soul's acts of understanding attain a higher mode of understanding after death.

> The soul united to the body is in a certain way more perfect than when it is separated, as this is according to the nature of its species. But with respect to its intelligible act it has a certain perfection when separated from the body, which it cannot have as long as it is united to the body. This is not unfitting because intellectual operation is proper to the soul insofar as it transcends the capacity of the body (*supergreditur corporis proportionem*). For the intellect is not the act of any organ of the body.[74]

> The intellect requires the assistance of sense while it is subject to imperfect cognition, insofar as it depends on phantasms, but not when it is subject to the more perfect mode of cognition which is proper to the separated soul, just as a human requires milk as an infant but not as an adult.[75]

[73] *STh* I, q. 89, aa. 1-6; I-II, q. 67, a. 2; *De Verit.*, q. 19, a. 1; *ScG* II, c. 81; *Q. D. De Anima*, aa. 15, 17-20.

[74] *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 17, ad 1 (Leon. ed., 150.150-59).

[75] *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 19, ad 19 (Leon. ed., 167.370-76). See *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1, ad 7; John Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on the Separated Soul's Natural Knowledge," *Thomas Aquinas: Approaches to Truth*, ed. J. McEvoy and M. Dunne (Portland, Ore.: Four Courts Press, 2002), 114-40.

So, although the separated soul constitutes only the formal part of human nature, the separated soul nevertheless remains rational and enables rational powers and operations. The separated soul, then, clearly satisfies the first condition, but does it meet the second condition of being the supposit of these rational operations? To answer this question, we return to the relation between *hoc aliquid* and personhood and show how our account avoids a problem.

The metaphysics of the person depends upon and is framed by the metaphysics of the *hoc aliquid*, but the metaphysics of the person also introduces something to the metaphysics of the *hoc aliquid*. We have already seen that, for Aquinas, a person, in virtue of being a rational and self-determining agent, is necessarily a rational supposit of rational operations. So, while a *hoc aliquid* must meet two conditions—existential and specific completeness—being a person requires something more, namely, being a supposit of rational operations. Earlier we presented Aquinas's view that the rational soul *sensu stricto* is never a supposit of operations, but is always a formal principle of a supposit—both *in statu viae* and as separated. However, because the separated incomplete *hoc aliquid* that survives death performs operations, it therefore seems that the separated soul is a rational supposit, and so meets a central criterion for being a person.

An objection looms. If the incomplete *hoc aliquid* that is the separated soul is able to perform rational operations when it is apart from the body, and so meets all the criteria for being a rational supposit, then that same rational soul as an incomplete *hoc aliquid* must be a rational supposit *in statu viae* as well. But this would entail the absurdity that *in statu viae*, when the soul and body are united, there are two supposits performing intellectual operations: there is the *complete hoc aliquid* that is the human person performing intellectual operations, and there is the *incomplete hoc aliquid* or rational soul that is also a supposit performing intellectual operations. This has been called the "too many thinkers" problem, because it seems to place two thinkers in the body-soul composite corresponding to the two supposits, which is absurd and inconsistent with Aquinas's

rejection of the assumptibility of persons by persons.[76] Because we hold that the separated soul is an incomplete person, the objection could also be re-characterized as a too-many-persons problem.

The objection fails, however, because it conflates, without any rationale, some crucial distinctions. First, we have already explicated Aquinas's reasons for maintaining that the rational soul *in statu viae* is not a supposit and so not a person. Second, our argument is not that the rational soul is a supposit because it is an incomplete *hoc aliquid*. The conditions for being a supposit are distinct from and amplify the conditions for being a *hoc aliquid*; so even though the rational soul as such always meets the conditions for being an incomplete *hoc aliquid*, the rational soul only satisfies the conditions for being a supposit after the death of the human person. Accordingly, the real issue is: Why does the rational soul only meet the rationality-of-the-supposit criterion after it is separated from the body?

Even this formulation of the problem leaves ambiguous what is meant by "rational soul" and "separated soul." It is important

[76] We find early statements of this concern as the "too many minds objection" in Sydney Shoemaker, "I—Sydney Shoemaker: Self, Body, and Coincidence," *Aristotelian Society Supplement* 73 (1999): 291; unnamed in Trenton Merricks, *Objects and Persons* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 48 n. 9; adapted from Shoemaker to an objection against corruptionism for the first time (as far as we know) in David Hershenov and Rose Koch-Hershenov, "Personal Identity and Purgatory," *Religious Studies* 42 (2006): 440; and as the "thinking-soul problem" in Eric Olson, *What We Are* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 169. Some have responded that corruptionism can answer the problem (see Patrick Toner, "St. Thomas Aquinas on Death and the Separated Soul," 133; and idem, "St. Thomas Aquinas on the Problem of Too Many Thinkers," *The Modern Schoolman* 89 [2012]: 209-22) and others have argued that Aquinas's metaphysics needs to be changed either according to a nonstandard monist interpretation (see Eric Hagedorn, "Is Anyone Else Thinking My Thoughts? Aquinas's Response to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem," *Proceedings of the ACPA* 84 [2011]: 275-86) or to include immediate resurrection to answer a "Two-Person Problem" version of the objection (see Christina Van Dyke, "I See Dead People: Disembodied Souls and Aquinas's Two-Person Problem," *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy* 2 [2014]: 25-45). Toner ("St. Thomas Aquinas on Death and the Separated Soul") turns the objection against Stump's constitution account of survivalism; his objection is addressed by Spencer, "Personhood of the Separated Soul," 907.

to recognize that Aquinas frequently employs these and related terms metonymically, which only presents a difficulty when his readers fail to notice when he is doing so; for such readers the term "separated soul" conceals from their view the complex "whole" to which it belongs, a "whole" comprised of a separated rational soul actualized by *esse*, which grounds intellectual powers and operations. Strictly speaking, the rational soul alone (i.e., *sans* its *esse*, powers, and operations) does not become a supposit of operations, for the separated rational soul alone cannot exist and *a fortiori* it cannot become a supposit. So what does become a supposit?

As we have seen, the rationality-of-the-supposit criterion requires more than the essential principles of a nature. A supposit also requires nonessential principles, and in the most inclusive ontological sense of supposit this includes *esse* and accidents. Accordingly, the entity that survives death is not the rational soul alone, but the rational soul that is actualized by its *esse* and which grounds intellectual powers, *habitus*, and operations. Keeping in mind all of these crucial distinctions—which the objection from the too-many-persons problem conflates—we will henceforth follow Aquinas in metonymically calling this incomplete composite entity of *esse*, rational soul, and accidents that results from the death of a human the "*anima separata*." We will henceforth reserve the term "rational soul" to denote that substantial formal part distinct from *esse*, matter, and accidents which is the formal principle common to both the hylomorphic nature of the human supposit *in statu viae* and the *anima separata*. What *survives* death is the composition of *esse*, rational soul, intellectual powers, *habitus*, and operations. Our contention is that the *anima separata qua* incomplete rational supposit is what *results* from the death of the human person; prior to death there is only the human person and so no incomplete rational supposit that could survive death. The *anima separata* is not a newly generated entity; it is a reduced entity.

Two points are sufficient for showing why the *anima separata*—the unified composite entity that results from death—is a supposit. First, and as we have seen, the individual entity that

subsists *per se* and is the supposit of operations must be an actualized whole, an integrated individual unity. The rational being that is actualized and unified as a subsistent entity through *esse* is the rational supposit or person. When the rational soul is united to the body, the actualized unity and whole is the complete human person because the very *esse* of the rational soul is the *esse* of the body, and so of the composite individual as well. And Aquinas contends, as we have seen, that the rational soul continues to be actualized by the same *esse* once it is separated from the body after death. But only in this separated state does the rational soul, the incomplete *hoc aliquid*, become the part of the reduced entity which results from death, namely, the *anima separata*, which is an incomplete rational supposit. The rational soul is not an incomplete supposit *in statu viae* because its existential actuality *in statu viae* is received and distributed beyond the substantial form of the rational soul to the material body, which thereby together constitute the whole composite unity of the human person. While the rational soul as such is an *incomplete hoc aliquid* it is never a supposit, either *in statu viae* or after death. After death, however, the *anima separata* becomes the only actually existing unified "whole" even though it is a radically incomplete whole *qua* rational animal nature insofar as it fails to communicate its existential and formal actuality as substantial form to a material body. It is this epicenter of actualized existence and unity that is required for there to be an individual whole agent that can be the supposit of operations; this actualized unified whole requires more than the rational soul taken on its own, but is found in the composite entity we have called the *anima separata*.[77]

The second point follows on the first. Aquinas maintains that after death there is something performing rational operations, and whatever it is, it is not the *esse* alone, it is not the rational soul alone, and it is not any of the intellectual powers on their own, for none of these exists apart from some actually existent

[77] *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 1 (Leon. ed., 13.376-14.400); *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 14; *STh* I, q. 75, a. 6.

unified whole or integrated composite entity. It is some separated incomplete composite entity alone which can be the actually existent entity that performs the intellectual operations Aquinas ascribes to the *anima separata*. But in order to perform operations, especially intellectual operations, a thing must be a supposit, for operations belong to a supposit. Aquinas unequivocally endorses each of these claims.[78] What he does not say—in part because he never asks about it—is what is clearly entailed by his theses taken together: that the *anima separata* must be a supposit of rational operations, otherwise there would be no unified composite entity that performed these operations; these operations would belong to no thing or no one. Aquinas clearly maintains that there are rational operations performed by the *anima separata* in virtue of the rationality of its incomplete nature and he gives us no reason to think the rational operations of the *anima separata* are an exception to his thesis that *actiones sunt suppositorum*. Consequently, we must conclude that the *anima separata* is a supposit, and because it performs rational operations it is a rational supposit of an incomplete rational nature. The *anima separata* therefore meets both the subsistence criterion and the rationality-of-the-supposit criterion.

By demonstrating that the *anima separata* is a rational supposit that performs rational operations in virtue of the rationality of its incomplete nature, we are one step closer to establishing that the *anima separata* is an incomplete person. But even the conclusion that the aforementioned independent commitments of Aquinas entail that the *anima separata* is a

[78] *STh* III, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4: "esse et operari est personae a natura, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam esse pertinet ad ipsam constitutionem personae: et sic quantum ad hoc se habet in ratione termini. Et ideo unitas personae requirit unitatem ipsius esse completi et personalis. Sed operatio est quidam effectus personae secundum aliquam formam vel naturam. Unde pluralitas operationum non praeiudicat unitati personali" ("To exist and to operate belong to a person by nature, but in different ways. For to exist pertains to the very constitution of a person, and in this respect it has the character of a terminus. And therefore the unity of a person requires the unity of a complete and personal existence. But operation is a certain effect of a person according to some form or nature. Hence a plurality of operations is not incompossible with personal unity").

rational supposit advances the debate between the survivalists and corruptionists about the proper identity of the *anima separata* by providing a more adequate metaphysical characterization of the complex entity hidden from view by the often unrecognized metonymic use of *anima separata*.

So far we have demonstrated that the *anima separata* is a rational supposit of an incomplete rational nature. In the remainder of this article we shall advance beyond this conclusion to argue that this incomplete rational supposit is not just an incomplete something but is an incomplete someone who is an incomplete person. To establish this conclusion, we must address the most important objection which Aquinas himself provides to defend his own conclusion that the *anima separata* is not a person *simpliciter*, namely, that a core feature of personhood is its exemplary perfection or completeness—a feature that is clearly lacking in the incomplete *hoc aliquid* that constitutes the *anima separata*.

C) A Separated Soul Is Incompletely Complete

Aquinas explicitly denies personhood to the incomplete *hoc aliquid* that is the *anima separata* because it fails to be perfect or complete; this seems to entail that the notion of an "incomplete person" is an oxymoron—a contradiction in terms. In this section, we deal with this most serious objection to our view.

The first issue we must address is the incompleteness of Aquinas's enquiry into the relevant modes of completeness that characterize the *anima separata*, for in the absence of a sufficiently detailed account of the ways in which the *anima separata* is or is not complete, one cannot adequately judge whether it falls short of the completeness criterion of personhood. Our investigation of the rational operations, *per se* subsistence, formal principle, supposit, and the incomplete rational nature or species of the *anima separata* has identified five orders (or modes) of completeness (or perfection) that are relevant to the question of personhood and enrich the details of the completeness criterion for personhood. First, Aquinas infers

that the *anima separata* is complete in some sense on the basis of its perfect intellectual operations; so the *anima separata* has operational completeness. Second, the *anima separata* has subsisting or existential completeness, because it is a *per se* subsistent individual, which provides Aquinas's rationale for holding that it is an incomplete *hoc aliquid*. Third, even though it is an incomplete *hoc aliquid*, the *anima separata* has formal completeness. The substantial form that informs the body remains itself, that is, a formal principle of human nature, once separate from the body.[79] Fourth, the *anima separata* has the integrity, wholeness, and unity of a supposit that operates rationally; so the *anima separata* has the completeness of a supposit. Finally, the *anima separata* lacks specific completeness. A human being that is complete according to its species includes a body, but the *anima separata* does not animate a body. So, the *anima separata* is specifically incomplete; however, it is complete operationally, formally, existentially, and as a supposit.

Aquinas denies personhood to the *anima separata* on the grounds that it lacks completeness of species. But what his argument overlooks is that the *anima separata* satisfies four of the five modes of completeness most relevant to personhood. Furthermore, we will show that a more comprehensive examination of these modes of completeness relevant to the personhood of the *anima separata* reveals that Aquinas's arguments against the personhood of the *anima separata* are inadequate and therefore inconclusive. We begin with the operational perfection of the *anima separata* and then address the other modes of completeness; this more comprehensive enquiry, we argue, provides sufficient justification for concluding with Aquinas that the *anima separata* is not a person *simpliciter*, but we go beyond Aquinas's texts in concluding it is an incomplete person.

Independent of the problem of personhood, the incompleteness of the *anima separata* raises other questions for Aquinas. In question 4, article 5 of the *Prima secundae* Aquinas asks whether

[79] See Spencer, "Personhood of the Separated Soul," 905.

the body is necessary for happiness; the following are two objections he raises:

[Objection 1] It seems that the body is required for beatitude. For the perfection of virtue and grace presuppose the perfection of nature. But beatitude is the perfection of virtue and grace. However, the soul without the body does not have the perfection of nature, since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part separated from its whole is imperfect. Therefore, the soul without the body cannot be beatified [*beata*].

[Objection 2] Beatitude is a certain perfect operation, as stated above, but a perfect operation follows on perfect existence, because nothing operates except according as it is a being in actuality [*ens in actu*]. Therefore, since the soul does not have perfect existence when it is separated from the body—just as no part [is complete] when it is separated from its whole—it seems that a soul without a body cannot be beatified.[80]

On Aquinas's account of beatitude or happiness, God seen in the intellectual vision is alone sufficient for happiness.[81] The incompleteness of the *anima separata* therefore presents a difficulty: How can part of the human person have perfect *human* happiness? In reply to the first objection, Aquinas explains that the *anima separata* has the perfection by which happiness is attained, which is through a perfect intellectual operation that does not require the body. But, he notes, the *anima separata* lacks the perfection of being the form of a body. To the second objection he responds:

[Ad 2] The way the soul is related to its existence is different from the way other parts [are related to existence] [*anima aliter se habet ad esse quam aliae partes*]. For the existence of the whole [*esse totius*] is not that of any of its parts, hence either the parts entirely cease to exist when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal [cease to exist] when the animal is destroyed; or, if [the parts] remain, they have a different actual existence [*habent aliud esse in actu*], just as a part of a line has a different existence from that of the whole line. But the existence of the composite remains with the human soul after the destruction

[80] *STh* I-II, q. 4, a. 5, obj. 1 and obj. 2.

[81] *STh* I-II, q. 3, a. 8. In question four, Aquinas examines a number of things that seem necessary for happiness; he concludes that the intellectual vision of God alone is required for the essence of perfect happiness.

of the body, and this is because the existence of the form is the same [as the existence of] the matter, and this is the existence of the composite [*quia idem est esse formae et materia, et hoc est esse composite*]. But the soul subsists in its own existence, as was shown in the First Part [*STh* I, q. 75, a. 2]. Hence it follows that after its separation from the body [the soul] has perfect existence and so it can have a perfect operation, although it does not have the perfect nature of the species [*licet non habeat perfectam naturam specie*].[82]

The *anima separata*, then, has perfect existence and can have perfect operations despite failing to have the perfect nature of its species. What justifies Aquinas's claim that an entity can have some but not other modes of completeness? Why is Aquinas's reply not an *ad hoc* solution inconsistent with his hylomorphic anthropology? Answering such questions will elucidate for us the other kinds of completeness that the *anima separata* satisfies.[83]

Earlier we briefly encountered Aquinas's introduction of the metaphysics of participation into his account of the unity of the human person. In his most detailed division of the modes of participation in his commentary on Boethius's *De hebdomadibus*, Aquinas claims that matter participates in form according to the second mode of participation, whose unifying feature is the participation of potency in act.[84] Aquinas explains in the *Summa contra gentiles* (II, c. 53): "whatever participates in something is compared to the thing participated in as potency to act, for through that which is participated the participator is actualized in such a way." This metaphysics of participation is applied to the soul and body in the *Quaestiones disputatae De anima*. After

[82] *STh* I-II, q. 4, a. 5, ad 2.

[83] In this article we make good on a promissory note I (Dahm) made in "Distinguishing Desire and Parts of Happiness: A Response to Germain Grisez," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 89 (2015): 97-114 (see 111-12), in which I dealt with two of Germain Grisez's objections to Aquinas's view that God alone is the ultimate end. In that article I argued that the beatified, separated soul attains the essence of perfect happiness. I was unable adequately to reply to a follow-up objection concerning the incongruity of a part, incomplete being, or nonperson attaining perfect human happiness. This article fills out the sketch of a reply offered there.

[84] For an account of the relation between Aquinas's Neoplatonist participation metaphysics and Aristotelian act–potency metaphysics, see Daniel De Haan, "Aquinas on *actus essendi* and the Second Mode of Participation," *The Thomist* 82 (2018): 573-609.

developing his account of soul as both *hoc aliquid* and form in his *responsio* to the first article, which we explicated above, Aquinas replies to two objections concerning the rational soul, body, and their shared *esse*. The details of the objections are not important for our purposes, but the replies are:

[Ad 17] Although existence is the most formal of all [principles], it is also the most sharable, even though it is not shared in by inferior and superior [beings] in the same way. And therefore the body participates in the soul's existence but not as perfectly as the soul [participates in existence] [*Sic ergo et corpus esse anime participat, set non ita nobiliter sicut anima*].[85]

[Ad 18] Although the soul's existence is also in a certain way the body's [existence], nevertheless the body cannot achieve participation in the soul's existence according to its total nobility and power. And therefore there is some operation of the soul in which the body does not share.[86]

What we noted before, Aquinas makes explicit here: The body and the soul share the same *esse*, but the body has being by participating in an *esse* that is more perfectly participated in by the rational soul. Thus the very *actus essendi* of the human composite or whole is still participated in by the *anima separata* after death, even though the *anima separata* is specifically incomplete. Accordingly, the *anima separata* has existential and formal completeness because the very same *esse* and rational soul which perfect the human person also perfect the *anima separata*. Aquinas contends that these two modes of completeness are sufficient for the *anima separata* to have perfect intellectual operations, and thus also operational completeness. Based on our argument from the last section, we can now see that because the *anima separata* has operational completeness—as an agent that can perform the perfect intellectual operation required for the beatific vision—the *anima separata* must therefore also have the perfection or completeness of a rational supposit.

[85] *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1, ad 17 (Leon. ed., 12.467-72).

[86] *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1, ad 18 (Leon. ed., 12.473-78). See *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 9, ad 3 and ad 4.

Let us return to Aquinas's argument that the separated soul is not a person, now with a clearer conception of the distinct but interconnected orders of completeness relevant to the personhood of the *anima separata*. Again, his argument from the *Summa theologiae* is as follows:

> [Ad 5] The soul is a part of the human species, and therefore, although it can be separated, still because it retains the nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance which is a hypostasis or primary substance; just as neither can hands nor any other parts of a human. And so neither the definition nor the name of person befits it.[87]

The soul is a *part* of the human species even when it exists on its own, because it retains the unibility of a substantial form. The reason Aquinas suggests for why this bars it from being an individual substance or hypostasis is the same reason that other parts of substances, like hands or feet, cannot be hypostases, and so cannot be persons. But Aquinas's analogy here between the separated soul and other subsistent parts is a distraction from his cogent argument for why the *anima separata* is not a person.

The analogy is a distraction because it misleadingly suggests that the separated soul is like other substantial parts in ways that are relevant to personhood; Aquinas in fact gives us plenty of reasons to distinguish the separated soul from other parts of substances in light of the criteria for personhood. Hands, feet, and other parts of the human substance clearly lack the existential, formal, and operational completeness common to human persons and *animae separatae*. They lack existential completeness because the soul's relation to existence is not the same as that of the other parts.[88] This is why these other parts of the substance corrupt and cease to exist when they are separated from the whole; they do not retain the same *esse* as the soul does. But they also fail to preserve, for at least three reasons, the formal perfection of the rational soul which is common to the human substance and the *anima separata*. First, as Aquinas often repeats,

[87] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 5.
[88] *STh* I-II, q. 4, a. 5, ad 2.

separated hands and feet are only so-called hands and feet equivocally,[89] whereas this is not true of the rational soul common to the human person and the *anima separata*, which is the very same formal principle. Second, the *anima separata* does not lose its individuality as these other separated parts do. Crucial to personhood is a kind of individuality that precludes assumptibility (*assumptibilis*).[90] This individuality remains with the *anima separata* without a material principle of individuation because the act of existing (*esse*) and individuation (*individuatio*) of a thing are always found together.[91] Since the *anima separata* has the act of existing of the whole being and this act of existing does not cease when it is separated from the body, neither does the soul's individuation cease when the body corrupts. The *anima separata* retains the individuation of the human person, something that cannot be said of other parts. Third, the unibility of the *anima separata* itself is unlike the unibility of other parts, since the lacking part is united by participating in the *esse* the soul already has. The soul is a part and not the whole of a human being, but it is also the part that communicates the *esse* of the whole. Thus the soul is a very special kind of part and any comparison drawn between the soul and another part of the human being needs to be qualified in a way not found in Aquinas's elliptical argument in the *Summa theologiae*.

This does not mean the survivalists are right. The cogency of Aquinas's arguments that the *anima separata* is not a person does not rest on his comparisons between the rational soul and other subsistent parts like hands and feet, but rather on the crucial claim that no subsistent parts of a substance, whether rational soul or hands and feet, have the complete nature of that substance, and persons have a complete nature. What Aquinas's objection to the personhood of the *anima separata* fails to address is what the other modes of completeness preserve despite the

[89] *ScG* IV, c. 37.

[90] *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 2.

[91] *Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1, ad 2 (Leon. ed., 10.350-59); *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 9, ad 4 (Leon. ed., 96.353-64).

incompleteness of the nature or species of the *anima separata*. Because the *anima separata* maintains existential and rational formal completeness it can still have operational completeness, which is why Aquinas can ascribe to the *anima separata* the perfect intellectual operations he does, and why he cannot and does not ascribe the same operations to separated hands and feet. And, as we have demonstrated already, because Aquinas ascribes rational operations to the *anima separata*, we must conclude that it is the rational supposit that performs these rational or intellectual operations. In other words, the *anima separata* is rational or intellectual in every respect that counts for designating any being as having a rational nature except for its being incomplete with respect to its species.

What this investigation reveals is that the *anima separata* is a rational supposit which meets four out of the five modes of completeness required for personhood. It is for these reasons that we conclude that Aquinas's arguments against the personhood of the *anima separata* can only show that the *anima separata* is not a person *simpliciter*. Furthermore, because the *anima separata* does satisfy the subsistence criterion, the rationality-of-the-supposit criterion, and four out of the five modes required to meet the completeness criterion, we conclude there are substantive reasons for introducing a principled distinction between "complete persons" and "incomplete persons" to provide an adequate characterization of the metaphysical character of the *anima separata*—just as Aquinas introduced a principled distinction between a complete *hoc aliquid* and an incomplete *hoc aliquid* to provide an adequate characterization of the metaphysical character of the rational soul. Failing to meet one of the modes of completeness excludes an entity from category inclusion in the paradigm, but satisfying all but one of the five modes of the completeness criterion is sufficient for inclusion in a qualified *incomplete* version of the paradigm. Because the *anima separata* clearly satisfies the latter conditions, we therefore conclude that the *anima separata* is an "incomplete person."

III. The *Anima Separata* Is an Incomplete Person: Objections and Responses

Corruptionists and survivalists alike might reasonably worry that all of this has been a distraction from the real objection. Granting that the *anima separata* is an incomplete rational *hoc aliquid* and even granting that it has a kind of perfect being as a rational supposit of perfect intellectual operations, it still does not follow that "incomplete person" is a coherent idea. Aquinas clearly holds that persons are complete *simpliciter*, and even if something is a very special part or unique incomplete composite entity, it cannot be a person. One version of this worry claims that the notion of an incomplete person is unnatural.

In response we point out that, for Aquinas, death is rather unnatural and to survive death is extraordinarily unnatural.[92]

[92] Aquinas also identifies various ways in which death is natural and the survival of the rational soul after death is natural. On the myriad philosophical and theological ways in which death is natural and unnatural for humans, see *De Malo*, q. 5, aa. 4-5; *ScG* II, cc. 79-81; III, c. 48; IV, cc. 79-82; *Comp. Theol.* I, c. 84; cc. 151-52; *Q. D. De Anima*, aa. 1, 14; *STh* I, q. 75, a. 6; q. 97, aa. 1 and 4; I-II, q. 85, aa. 5-6; q. 94, a. 5, ad 2; III, q. 50, aa. 3-5). Death is natural for humans insofar as matter tends to the dissolution and corruption of the human composite of soul and body. Death is unnatural insofar as all individual beings by nature seek to preserve their existence (*STh* I-II, q. 85, a. 6). Death is especially unnatural for humans insofar as our substantial form, the rational soul, is incorruptible (*Q. D. De Anima*, a. 14, obj. 2 and ad 2). It is natural for the rational soul *qua* incorruptible *hoc aliquid* to persist after death, yet it is unnatural for the rational soul *qua* substantial form to persist forever after death without animating a body (*ScG* IV, cc. 79-82). The details of Aquinas's account of human death go beyond the aims of this article; nevertheless, it will be instructive to note briefly what implications our account of incomplete persons has for understanding human death. Strictly speaking it is the composite and not its substantial principles of form and matter that corrupt. Since death is a form of substantial corruption, whatever corrupts is what dies and whatever persists beyond death via the same existential and rational animating principles (*Q. D. De Anima*, a. 14, ad 9-ad 11) is what survives: "vivere enim viventibus est esse" (*Q. D. De Anima*, a. 1, ad 8; a. 14, ad 8). What is peculiar to human death is the persistence after death of the unified and incorruptible living entity composed of the human's *esse*, rational soul, intellectual powers, *habitus*, and operations, that is, the constituents of the *anima separata*. Because the human person corrupts when the human dies, the complete human person does not survive death. What constitutes the *anima separata* does survive death; however, the *anima separata qua* incomplete person does not survive death for it is the

What the survivalists propose is a view, like substance dualism, that makes death too natural because persons live on as persons without their body. The notion of an incomplete person does not misrepresent death but draws attention to its unnaturalness by articulating a precise metaphysics of this unnatural incomplete being. In short, the idea of an incomplete person, like a soul surviving death without a body, is indeed unnatural. And it is fitting for it to be unnatural, for our understanding of *animae separatae* should respect the dead by neither exaggerating their personal continuity with their complete lives as human persons, as survivalists do, nor completely depersonalizing them, as corruptionists do.

Another way to articulate this difficulty is to object that the idea of an incomplete person introduces an *ad hoc* expansion of Aquinas's category of person. Our response to this "category-expansion objection" is twofold.

First, our categorization of the *anima separata* does go beyond Aquinas's texts and explicit categories; Aquinas denies personhood of the *anima separata* and the texts seem to leave no space for the category of an incomplete person. On this score, we concede that the exegetical case for corruptionism is indestructible; no textual case can be made to save the survivalist's view. Second, we have nevertheless demonstrated that in order to address the rational soul and its survival after death Aquinas himself introduced important expansions to his own metaphysical category of the *hoc aliquid* to include a distinction between a complete *hoc aliquid* and an incomplete *hoc aliquid*. The enquiries that led Aquinas to make such distinctions and expand the category of the *hoc aliquid* in order to accommodate the peculiar reality that is the rational soul suggest *both* that categories, for Aquinas, do not dictate the nature of reality but that categories must be revised in order adequately to capture the contours of reality, *and* that for Thomists a similar enquiry into

result of the death and corruption of the human person. In short, the death of the human person results in the survival of the constituents of the *anima separata* which subsists as an incomplete person.

the personhood of the *anima separata* might require a similar expansion of categories, for two similar reasons.

The first is Aquinas's own metaphysics of the person, which depends upon his metaphysics of the *hoc aliquid*. The very reasons Aquinas provides for expanding the category of the *hoc aliquid* to permit the categorization of the rational soul by what we termed an incomplete *hoc aliquid* apply no less to the category of person. Moreover, it is not clear how one could in a principled way both endorse Aquinas's account of an incomplete *hoc aliquid* and yet reject our notion of an incomplete person. If an incomplete person is an *ad hoc* expansion of the category "person," then there is no principled way to defend Aquinas's account of an incomplete *hoc aliquid* from a similar charge of being an *ad hoc* expansion of the category *hoc aliquid*. Both *hoc aliquid* and "person" are paradigmatic cases of metaphysical wholes of a complete nature, and since Aquinas uniquely permits there to be an incomplete *hoc aliquid* in the case of the rational soul we think this metaphysical commitment, and others treated in this essay, require his metaphysics to make similar room for an incomplete person in the case of the *anima separata*. Consequently, the survivalist or corruptionist who wishes to uphold the category-expansion objection against the idea of an incomplete person either needs to reject Aquinas's idea of an incomplete *hoc aliquid*—without which Aquinas's doctrine of an *anima separata* cannot survive—or needs to articulate a principled reason why there can be an incomplete *hoc aliquid* but not an incomplete person.

The second reason that our enquiry into the *anima separata* requires an expansion of the category of "person" is the personal operations ascribed to the *anima separata* by Aquinas, which must therefore be a rational supposit of personal operations. To make the philosophical case for the personhood of any entity, Aquinas's Aristotelian heuristic demands we start our enquiry with the objects and operations that are more known to us and on this basis we can determine the powers and nature of the supposit that ground and enable the exercise of these operations with respect to their objects. To establish theoretically whether a

particular supposit is of the rational nature required for being a person, we begin with the objects and operations that are rational operations directed towards rational or intelligible objects. We do not begin with the theoretical conclusion that something is a person or of a rational or personal nature and then infer that such an entity must have personal operations. Because the rationality of a nature is a condition for the personhood of a supposit, and since we only arrive at the rationality of a nature through the rationality of its powers, operations, and objects, we must be able first to identify the personal operations and their objects, and these must be at least rational operations. Consequently, if we can identify rational operations of a supposit, then we have sufficient grounds for identifying personal operations which lead to a theoretical justification for the ascription of personhood to that supposit. Accordingly, our identification of the rational or personal operations of a being supports the theoretical conclusion that the supposit performing those operations is a rational supposit and so also a person. Aquinas's ascription of rational operations, which are thereby personal operations, to the *anima separata* entails that there is some supposit that performs these personal operations, and it too must in some sense be a rational supposit, that is, a person. But, due to its incomplete nature, that is, due not to any rational or intellectual incompetency but to its not being the form of an organic body, it cannot be a complete person. It is therefore no more, but also no less, than an incomplete person.

Preserving the personhood of the separated soul in this incomplete way avoids many of the problems that face corruptionism, which often take the form of unfitting consequences concerning the *anima separata*. The following list, though long, is not meant to be exhaustive, but it does point out the caliber of the bullet the corruptionist must bite.

1. If corruptionism is true, then nonpersons can be friends.[93]
2. If corruptionism is true, then persons ask nonpersons to pray.[94]
3. If corruptionism is true, then nonpersons pray.[95]
4. If corruptionism is true, then a nonperson is judged for the acts of a person, is punished or rewarded based on the acts of a person, and receives ultimate punishment or ultimate reward.[96]
5. If corruptionism is true, then a nonperson has perfect human happiness.[97]
6. If corruptionism is true, then nonpersons are apostles, prophets, judges, and holy confessors.[98]
7. If corruptionism is true, then a nonperson performs the kinds of acts it seems that only persons can do, e.g., intellectual acts, free acts, acts of knowledge of their nature.[99]

[93] The saints in heaven have charity (*STh* I-II, q. 67, a. 6), which is friendship with God (*STh* II-II, q. 23, a.1). One might think it is only slightly less problematic that the saints retain other virtues (while others retain vices).

[94] *STh* II-II, q. 83, a. 4.

[95] *STh* II-II, q. 83, a. 11.

[96] *ScG* IV, c. 91. Stump makes this argument against corruptionism in "Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution," 159. Toner replies by arguing, persuasively, that Aquinas accepted these consequences: Patrick Toner, "St. Thomas Aquinas on Punishing Souls," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 71 (2012): 103-16. Even if Toner is exegetically correct, our view provides a more reasonable account in which nonpersons are not ultimately punished or rewarded in a human way.

[97] Stump amplifies this objection, "So something that God loves in union with him, the separated soul of Dominic, God ceases to hold in loving union with himself in heaven when Dominic is resurrected. For no fault on the part of the separated soul of Dominic, the bliss the separated soul had in loving union with God terminates, never to be resumed. Does the separated soul know and fear this loss of union with God? Or is the separated soul in the beatific vision of heaven in a state of ignorance about its future loss of beatitude?" ("Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution," 160). For a treatment of Aquinas's account of the happiness of the separated soul, see Brandon Dahm, "Distinguishing Desire and Parts of Happiness."

[98] For example, from Aquinas's sermon, *Beata gens,* in *The Academic Sermons*, trans. Mark-Robin Hoogland, C.P. (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010): "It is true that all the saints reign with God, but the apostles reign in a special way" (310); "Likewise, we find in heaven most righteous judges, namely, the prophets who preached justice; these were the ones hungering for justice, and therefore they are satisfied now" (311); "Likewise, we find some who live in solace, like the holy confessors who mourned while they were in the world and did great penance. You have seen Anthony [of Egypt] and Benedict, who lived in tears and great, austere penance, and who now experience joy and consolation" (ibid.).

[99] See *supra* II.B on the separated soul as a rational supposit.

8. If corruptionism is true, then a nonperson either (i) performs all of these acts without any "I" reference or (ii) has false "I" references in its acts.[100]
9. If corruptionism is true, then referencing a nonperson by the name of the person it was a part of is acceptable.[101]

By expanding Aquinas's category of person, as he did with *hoc aliquid*, we avoid all of these difficulties.

Conclusion

In this essay we have argued the *anima separata* satisfies Aquinas's three criteria for personhood in a principled but incomplete way. We have contended this provides sufficient grounds for concluding that the *anima separata* is an incomplete person. Unlike survivalism, we can accept Aquinas's denial of personhood to the *anima separata*, so long as it is piously reinterpreted as a rejection of personhood *simpliciter*. Unlike corruptionism, we can provide a more precise metaphysical account of what and who the *anima separata* is and avoid the many problematic consequences entailed by the austere accounts of the *anima separata* defended by most corruptionists. We

[100] If there are self-referencing thoughts, e.g., "I'm praying for Dominic," or "My prayers are efficacious," these would be false, since there is no "I" according to corruptionism. One way of dealing with this difficulty with respect to memory is to appeal to "quasi-memories," which are, "memory–like experiences that don't entail that the possessor is recalling his own experiences" (Hershenov and Koch–Hershenov, "Personal Identity and Purgatory," 441). This argumentative move is found in the personal-identity literature; however, it fails if episodic memories—or other self-referential thoughts—essentially include self-recognition (e.g., "I prayed" over "someone prayed") excluded by these quasi-memories. One's stance on what is essential to self-referential thoughts will affect one's appraisal of this objection. We contend that having false self-referential thoughts is unsuitable for someone experiencing the beatific vision. For another view, see Butera, "Incomplete Persons," 73.

[101] Aquinas clearly thought synecdoche explained how a nonperson could be called by a person's name, e.g., III *Sent*., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6; IV *Sent*., d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 2. Corruptionists follow Aquinas; see Nevitt, "Aquinas on the Death of Christ," 97. We include this point not because the corruptionist answer utterly fails, but because it remains a difficulty for corruptionism. It is a loss in a relationship to discover that St. Peter, whom you have been asking for intercession and loving, is not a person.

conclude that the strongest arguments against the personhood of the *anima separata* only show that it is not a person *simpliciter*, but fail to exclude that it is an incomplete person. Our conclusion will not be the final word in this debate, but we do hope our essay contributes an advance over the limitations—exegetical and conceptual—of the debate so far and provides a cogent defense of a distinctive position that so far has only been addressed incompletely.[102]

[102] We gratefully acknowledge the detailed feedback and objections we received on various iterations of this essay from Brian Carl, Turner Nevitt, Jacob Wood, Mark Spencer, Jason Eberl, Fr Dominic Langevin, O.P., and the anonymous readers for *The Thomist*.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Achievement of Hans Urs von Balthasar: An Introduction to His Trilogy. By MATTHEW LEVERING. Foreword by CYRIL O'REGAN. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019. Pp. xxii + 253. $29.95 (paper). ISBN 978-0-8132-3175-4.

As the title indicates, Levering's book is a contribution to the still-growing literature on Hans Urs von Balthasar—an innovative contribution, as we will see. What the title does not suggest to readers is the equally important contribution Levering's book makes to a larger argument over how different sorts of Catholic theologians can help (including by disputation) each other in the twenty-first century—specifically, theologians sympathetic to Thomas Aquinas (like Levering) and those more sympathetic to a kind of post-Thomist *ressourcement* (like Balthasar). I am deeply sympathetic to each of Levering's aims—providing a charitable reading of Balthasar and doing so in service of a theological project that holds together *ressourcement* theology and Aquinas. However, by this review's end, I will suggest that Levering's book also embodies a tension between these two important contributions—a tension that is as helpful as Levering's innovative reading of Balthasar's achievement in the book's title.

Before making this case, it should be said that this is an eminently readable book. As Cyril O'Regan's helpful Foreword puts it, "Levering draws attention away from how much he actually knows and generously invites the far less learned reader to be a co-traveler on a voyage of discovery" (xvii). Scholars should value the book for the bibliographies alone. But this book will be readable by undergraduate majors and graduate students—and, perhaps even more importantly nowadays, the book is readable by Levering's peers in theological fields other than systematics who are trying to figure out what in God's name systematic theologians nowadays are arguing about. It is a remarkable rhetorical accomplishment—and, as O'Regan also puts it, "a far more Thomistic than Balthasarian pedagogy" (xvii).

Levering bookends his treatment of Balthasar with an introduction and epilogue that describe his aims. On the side of introducing Balthasar, Levering's focus is on "setting forth in painstaking detail the concrete arguments that von Balthasar makes" (8) in the three introductory volumes of each series within Balthasar's trilogy—the aesthetics, dramatic, and logic. Levering knows that a full-scale introduction (like those offered by Aidan

Nichols and Edward Oakes [13-14]) would involve much more than the volumes of the trilogy he covers here. But—and here is a transition to the second achievement of this book—this introduction (unlike others) is "for the theologically educated readers who mistrust von Balthasar [like some Thomists] or who mistrust Balthasar's critics [like some Balthasarians]" (15). This is "an" (not "the") introduction. And it is as much an introduction to "Catholic theology today" as it is to von Balthasar's theology.

How then to introduce Balthasar's achievement in light of this end? Levering's strategy is ingenious. Focus on the first volume of each multi-volumed part of Balthasar's trilogy—the aesthetics, the theodrama, and the theologic—rather than the subsequent volumes within each part which raise their own critical issues (15). Then read each of these volumes as a response to one major modern thinker: Kant (for the aesthetic), Hegel (for the theodrama), and Nietzsche (for the theologic). Then show that each first volume of Balthasar's trilogy can be read as what Levering calls a Kantian critique of Kant, a Hegelian critique of Hegel, and a Nietzschean critique of Nietzsche (17)—I would say, a critical absorption of Kant, Hegel, or Nietzsche into Balthasar's Trinitarian and Christological theology. Thus, each of Levering's three parts (embracing the three parts of Balthasar's trilogy) is similarly structured: an introduction to the key thesis; an overview of relevant texts by Kant or Hegel or Nietzsche; a survey of the first volumes of each of the three parts of Balthasar's trilogy showing how each part builds on some agreements along with the multiple disagreements with Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche.

Here I can only give some tastes of this movement. The first volume of Balthasar's theological aesthetic *The Glory of the Lord* appropriates Kant's "transcendental apperception" (which Levering unpacks using Kant's first and especially third critiques) but "whereas for Kant the unchanging ground that unifies all phenomenon in our concepts is our consciousness, for von Balthasar it is the divine Persons' self-surrender in love as manifested in the objective form of Christ" (69). The first volume of von Balthasar's *Theo-Drama* appropriates elements of Hegel's drama of Spirit in his philosophy of religion, the sublation of epic and lyric in the drama of Hegel's aesthetics, and the role of the German people as bearers of "the Christian principle" in Hegel's philosophy of history. But Balthasar also criticizes Hegel at each stage, particularly because "Hegel has no notion of the living Lord, Jesus Christ, who personally and freely 'can give the Christian a genuine mission by enabling him to share charismatically in his saving act'" (115). Finally, the first volume of the *Theo-Logic* takes the reader through six of Nietzsche's key works before arguing that Nietzsche's will-to-power must be replaced by the will to love, a Trinitarian and Christological self-surrender rather than an empty will to power.

This, as Levering knows, is not the way all the first volumes of Balthasar's trilogy are explicitly structured. Hegel is clearly central to the *Theo-Drama*.

But more of a case has to be made for Kant and Nietzsche—and (O'Regan's Foreword is again helpful on this) Levering makes this case, showing how even Kant's self-constituting subject and Nietzsche's erotically dying subject can be saved by Christ. But Levering is not aiming to "introduce" by simply repeating what Balthasar says—and he is not writing treatises on Kant, Hegel, or Nietzsche. His aim is to show how Balthasar can *criticize* Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche on some of *their own terms*: a Kantian critique of Kant, a Hegelian critique of Hegel, and a Nietzschean critique of Nietzsche.

This is precisely what Levering hopes Balthasarians and Thomists can do to each other. He wisely does not aim at agreement between the two—the book is thus for "both [Balthasar's] admirers and critics (while *remaining* admirers or critics)" (20). Admittedly too, Levering does periodically criticize Balthasar's Kantian critique of Kant, Hegelian critique of Hegel, and Nietzschean critique of Nietzsche. For example, Levering wonders whether Balthasar imports too much of Hegel's dialectic into the being of God (212-13). And he finds Balthasar's Nietzschean critique of Nietzsche basically correct, without granting all of Balthasar's particular judgments about the relationship between love and truth (201, 213). But, by the book's end, it is hard to know whether to call these and other criticisms "Balthasarian critiques of Balthasar" or "Thomist critiques of Balthasar"—and it really makes little difference for the main argument Levering is making.

Where does this leave us with regard to Levering's second aim? The epilogue's climax is a revisiting of "the internecine struggle" between—in three stages—pre-Vatican II Scholastic and liberal and *ressourcement* theologies, the post-Vatican II eclipse of Scholastic theology combined with the dominance of liberal over *resssourcement* theologies, and today's arguments between *ressourcement* and Thomistic theologies (along with their common antipathies to liberal theologies). Levering hopes that his reading moves this current argument forward, calling students of Aquinas and Balthasar into mutually critical because loving communion. Thus, "the basic projects of neo-scholasticism and *ressourcement* can be complementary, even if they remain quite distinct and even if much mutual criticism will fruitfully take place" (227).

Indeed Levering does model how one Thomist can take Balthasar seriously—for example, by paying "painstaking" attention not only to particular texts by Balthasar but also particular texts that Balthasar himself cites or assumes (Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche). But it is precisely here that there is an instructive tension between Levering's ingenious introduction to Balthasar's trilogy through Kant and Hegel and Nietzsche, and his welcome effort to bring Balthasarians and Thomists into loving (including mutually critical) dialogue. On the one hand, the introduction through Kant and Hegel and Nietzsche is an introduction to Balthasar's engagement with an important piece of the modern world: the great Germanic tradition that constituted Balthasar's modern (shall we say largely "liberal"?) world from Kant through

Hegel to Nietzsche. On the other hand, the "internecine struggle" is more intramural. To state that Thomists and Balthasarians share an antipathy to liberal theology is correct, but seems to pull the rug from under the point of the powerful reading of Balthasar's Kantian critique of Kant, Hegelian critique of Hegel, and Nietzschean critique of Nietzsche. Would we not need Scholastic (including Thomist) readings of Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche to generate common and uncommon grounds with Balthasar's readings of these moderns? Levering could plausibly argue that this is a key challenge he leaves for Thomists: how can we engage in critical discussion with these competing modern philosophies—and do it better than von Balthasar? This is a discussion already begun piecemeal, but Levering seems to demand more—perhaps a more holistic theology of modernity that shows how its brokenness (Kant and Hegel and Nietzsche, after all, do not agree with each other) can be saved.

If so, Levering's strategy opens another door: does not Levering's reading of Balthasar's evangelically modern critique of modernity generate a mutually critical dialogue with modernist and liberal theologies as well as Thomism and *ressourcement* theologies? Admittedly, this would require more description of why Kant-Hegel-Nietzsche are an exemplary modern triumvirate (as I and perhaps Levering would be prepared to argue) rather than merely one German-language triad in a multi-linguistic world. In any case, this would create an agenda well beyond what a single book could accomplish. But my point is that I think Levering's effort to bring the Balthasarian and Thomist world into mutually loving (including critical) dialogue opens this door as well.

I think that Levering could grant such questions, while arguing that a brief, readable book can only do so much. We can be grateful for Levering's astute and compendious reading of Balthasar, along with his demonstration of how Catholic theologies can treat each other as members of the same Body rather than vying over who sits at Christ's right hand.

JAMES J. BUCKLEY

Loyola University Maryland
Baltimore, Maryland

Cajetan's Biblical Commentaries: Motive and Method. By MICHAEL O'CONNOR. St. Andrews Studies in Reformation History. Leiden: Brill, 2017. Pp. xvi + 302. $174.00 (hardback). ISBN: 978-90-04-32506-7.

The extended confrontation between late medieval Scholasticism and the emergent biblical humanism of the late-fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries is a momentous and riveting affair, a cornerstone of modern intellectual history with considerable relevance for today. It is also an affair not yet free of stereotypes and facile oppositions. Beyond any doubt, stultified intransigence in the Scholastic establishment at times worked to barricade theology against the healthy ventilation of a superior but threateningly independent learning. The image of Erasmus, armed with his gargantuan erudition and unanswerable wit, toying with obstructionist Schoolmen like Martin Dorp (or still more Edward Lee), represents the widely held picture of the clash. Just as recent scholarship has begun to contest the common, overly polemicized depiction of the Enlightenment period—demonstrating the existence of a significant moderate party, the so-called Catholic Enlightenment (Ulrich Lehner)—so too important mediating figures may be found in the antecedent age of humanism. The great Cardinal Cajetan certainly belongs among this number.

Just as the biblical commentaries of Aquinas have only recently begun to command the attention of scholars, so Cajetan's reputation has been overly invested in his philosophical and systematic writings. Few recognize that in 1523, at the age of fifty-five, having already distinguished himself as a theologian and churchman of the highest rank, the former master of the Dominican Order began a vast humanistic labor of biblical study, to which he consecrated the last eleven years of his life, producing nearly 3,000 pages of translation and commentary, covering nearly the whole Bible (he omitted Revelation and the Song of Songs, since he despaired of rendering their literal sense, and he passed over the deuterocanonical books, holding their canonical status to be problematic, as had Jerome). October 12-14, 2018, marked the five-hundredth anniversary of Cajetan's epic meeting with Luther at Augsburg; and it has often been supposed that Cajetan's ultimate turn to the Scriptures was a calculated response to the Lutheran crisis. Although it appears that Cajetan may have undertaken his commentary project with direct papal support, the final result was no bulwark against the Protestant threat, and the work was not well received. More than once, the theologians of Paris aggressively attacked and denounced the commentaries, which were ultimately submitted to Rome for investigation. Luther reportedly joked that in the end Cajetan himself had become a Lutheran.

Michael O'Connor's recent monograph recounts this whole story with clarity and concision, and it serves as a very useful introduction to the subject. Born of an unpublished dissertation completed twenty years ago at Oxford, the study also contains material included in several earlier articles. It is neatly organized into eight chapters, divided into three parts. The first part contains

two chapters providing the necessary historical background. The second part, also two chapters, explores Cajetan's motive in writing. The third and longest part offers four chapters detailing the concrete exegetical method Cajetan used in his commentaries.

The argumentative heart of the book comes in the third and fourth chapters. Here, addressing the question of motive, O'Connor advances his real thesis, hoping to remedy a perception of the commentaries as an explicit "Counter-Reformation" production. In fact, as he shows, this is far from a polemical corpus. Admittedly, Cajetan was already an unusually irenic voice in a polemical age, as Erasmus discovered with admiration. (The humanist reversed his view of the cardinal as an obstructionist after reading his treatise *De divina institutione pontificatus Romani pontificis*. Erasmus said that if Luther were attacked by six hundred such books, which illuminate the subject without stirring up riots, the whole world would thirst for learning.) The cardinal was, nevertheless, quite capable of trenchant critique when occasion required. The word "Lutherans" appears only four times in the commentaries, however, and Cajetan's interests simply seem to be elsewhere (e.g., correcting the Vulgate and explaining the literal sense). His discussions of Paul's letters, for instance, are not preoccupied with setting the record straight on the question of justification, nor does the commentary on Matthew 16:18-19 mount any major defense of contested papal claims (as the long work read by Erasmus in 1521 had done). Cajetan's career as a controversialist, in fact, appears largely to have concluded with a position paper on the Eucharist, which he wrote in 1525 at the request of Clement VII. This must not be understood to suggest that Church reform was not at the center of Cajetan's commentary project, however. On the contrary, O'Connor contends that reform through scriptural learning was already one of Cajetan's announced priorities, well before the irruption of controversy with Luther. It was not inevitable that Cajetan should one day focus entirely on the Scriptures, O'Connor says. Nevertheless, the Dominican's whole ecclesiastical career did serve him as a preparation.

Cajetan's long-held commitment to Church reform is carefully discussed in the opening chapters, on the historical setting. His interventions at the Fifth Lateran Council (1512) are especially significant in this regard, particularly for the way they distinguished him from other reform-minded, humanist contemporaries like Giles of Viterbo. Worthy of special note in O'Connor's presentation of Cajetan the reformer is the move (in line with recent scholarship) to dissociate him from the Dominican observant movement, planting him solidly in the conventual camp. Those familiar with the classic image presented in Mortier's *Histoire des maîtres généraux* will thus be surprised to find a more moderate and measured Cajetan—but also a more sympathetic depiction of the conventual perspective, including the possibility of a firm commitment to reform. Evidently, the coexistence and cooperation

of these two movements are more nuanced and interesting than is often imagined.

Another contrast to Mortier's encomiastic account is O'Connor acceptance of a somewhat unflattering (though not compromising) characterization of the precocious Dominican's extraordinary rise to power. Rather than establishing himself simply by the sheer force of his dazzling intellect (e.g., the celebrated debate with Pico, which O'Connor dismantles as something less than the legend), the fledgling Tommaso de Vio was very much the beneficiary and favorite of a powerful ecclesiastical patron: Cardinal Oliviero Carafa, cardinal protector of the Order, who effectively prepared, then strong-armed, Cajetan's election as master general. The character that emerges is both principled and stringent, but far from a radical. Cajetan appears as a man of great personal merit and almost boundless energy; irenic and given to scholarship, yet deeply animated by pastoral interests and politically implicated; enormously endowed, though far from an all-capable solitary agent; raised to the highest posts of power, but far from a great political success.

This complex image fits well with the commentaries themselves, which are remarkable and many-sided, and which, like the man, enjoyed no great triumph in the end. The four chapters on Cajetan's actual exegetical method expose the different facets of this complexity, and O'Connor's summary nicely captures the overall effect.

> Cajetan's method was a hybrid: he employed 'scholastic' methods of textual division (e.g., his approach to the structure of the psalms), as well as 'humanistic' methods of textual criticism (e.g., correcting the Vulgate in the light of Hebrew and Greek sources); he allowed the dogmas of the Church to determine his reading of problematic verses (e.g., Rom 5:12 on original sin), while also allowing the clear sense of the text to challenge long-established customs (e.g., on marriage); he revered Aquinas as a master and teacher without parallel, and he held Erasmus in great respect and deferred to his linguistic acumen and scriptural sensitivity; he drew on the teachings of the Christian fathers (though perhaps not as conspicuously as his detractors would have liked) while also sitting at the feet of the rabbis; he was capable of venturing bold and imaginative interpretations of the ancient text, all the while submitting his writings to the judgment of the papacy. Cajetan's methodological blend (which was not untypical of high Renaissance Rome) was in service of his guiding pastoral motive: to use the most adequate tools available in order to open up the Bible, and to make the inspired word accessible to the learned reader and to preachers and teachers of the Christian faith. (237)

If Cajetan's "methodological blend" was indeed the flavor *du jour* in high Renaissance Rome, it is perhaps not surprising that it quickly ran through eighteen printings in the 1530s and 1540s. The shelf life was short, however,

and soon the commentaries were "applauded neither by heretics nor by Catholics" (239), to quote Cardinal Pietro Sforza Pallavicino (1607-77). After having incited a couple of spurts of theological resistance in the mid-sixteenth century, an inconclusive Roman investigation of Cajetan's commentaries eventually fizzled out, and the works were left to be forgotten. The Herculean effort never entered the cardinal's legacy.

Seen from a distance, the most striking thing revealed in Cajetan's biblical commentaries is not the blend of Scholasticism and humanism—which is indeed fascinating, important, and suggestive—but a sharper paradox. On the one hand, the biblical commentator showed himself audaciously independent in his opinions. Cajetan, in fact, adopted some positions still quite shocking to Catholic sensibilities today, notably on marriage and the canon. Such open distance from both the Tradition and magisterial teaching excuses some of the establishment hostility, which was not simply benighted theological opposition to every salubrious text-critical suggestion. In another very important regard, however, Cajetan the biblical commentator was anything but independent. In contrast to other biblical humanists of the period, like his Dominican confreres Agostino Giustiniani and Santi Pagnini, for instance, Cajetan was not truly equipped for the humanistic task at hand. He thus relied heavily upon the opinions of experts and was even forced to make use of secretaries more competent in the biblical languages.

What we witness in the biblical commentaries of Cajetan is thus something dramatically different from the situation of Aquinas in his role as *magister in sacra pagina*. In the view of Gilbert Dahan and others, the thirteenth century saw the first birth of exegesis as a specialized academic discipline; by the dawn of the sixteenth century, with the arrival of the new philological skill set, the work of interpretation had already become so specialized an affair that it was no longer possible to hold it together with a full dialectical training and expertise—even for a Renaissance man with the time, talent, and interest. If joined to dogmatic theology in a single giant figure, scriptural science had become a second career. Hence: Cajetan the *Summa* commentator (1497-1520), followed by Cajetan the Bible commentator (1523-34). Overwhelming as this twin work of exposition is, it would be difficult to argue that both careers were equally august and fruitful. The neat succession of one brand of theology followed by another is a revealing image, however.

Scholasticism was never out-argued. It was simply shamed and retired as a new culture of erudition took its place. When Dorp and Lee resisted Erasmus for his mocking treatment of theology in the *Praise of Folly*, they rightly saw that this was more than the mockery dished out to other quarters. The philologist meant to teach theologians their trade with a *nouvelle théologie*. (There are obvious parallels here with the way the "Christian humanism" of De Lubac & Co. later surmounted neo-Scholasticism by sheer force of wider reading, an alternative skill set, and radically different tastes.) If the old guard could not finally keep pace, Cajetan himself represents an important example

of how to bridge the divide, namely, through engaged collaboration. O'Connor quotes Cicero, beloved by the Italian humanists and evidently an inspiration for Cajetan as well: "We are not born for ourselves alone. . . . We ought therefore to . . . contribute to the common good of humankind by reciprocal acts of kindness, by giving and receiving from one another, and thus by our skill, our industry and our talents work to bring human society together in peace and harmony" (60).

In the modern age, from its very dawn in the sixteenth century, the integrated work of theology has irremediably become a corporate enterprise. To this extent, virtuoso displays of towering erudition can be a dangerous distraction. Cajetan's experience in this regard, his simultaneous confidence in the opinions of the experts and bold readiness to try to decide for himself, reveals an intellectual attitude well-balanced between what Thomas Reid distinguished as the "social" and the "solitary operation of the mind." Above all, however, Cajetan's final deference to ecclesial authority constitutes his highly individual yet collaborative work as more than a merely social exercise. Theology as Cajetan practiced it was an act of the Church.

The humanists empowered the Church to hear the sacred Scriptures speaking with a vital new voice. Some theologians plugged their ears; others like Cajetan strained with all their might to listen. If the exegetical guild today, heir to those biblical humanists of the past, remains scarred, even defined by the obstinate theologians who did not wish to let a new learning make the Scriptures speak anew, perhaps the ultimate lesson to learn from Cajetan's second life as a biblical scholar lies in the theologian's fearless conviction in the power of Scripture, studied with all the intellectual tools at our disposal, to reform and renew the life of the Church.

ANTHONY GIAMBRONE, O.P.

École biblique et archéologique française
Jerusalem, Israel

Wagering on an Ironic God: Pascal on Faith and Philosophy. By THOMAS S. HIBBS. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2017. Pp. xi + 204. $44.95 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-4813-0638-6.

Thomas Hibbs's exploration of Pascal's thought offers an important corrective to a common tendency that takes Pascal's *Pensées* as the idiosyncratic, private musings of a solitary thinker. In Hibbs's work, Pascal emerges not as a lonely genius but as a thinker very much in conversation with the philosophical tradition, especially René Descartes and Michel de

Montaigne. In particular, Hibbs shows how Pascal engages in a three-cornered conversation with Montaigne and Descartes about God, irony, and the best way of life, especially in relation to the figure of Socrates. After engaging *Wagering on an Ironic God*, readers will find their encounters with Pascal complicated and enriched.

Hibbs presents a conversation among teachers about the content and means of philosophical pedagogy. Each of these thinkers—Pascal, Descartes, and Montaigne—writes so as to draw readers into a particular way of life, and they all face a common challenge: their readers are disinclined to take up the forms of self-understanding required by their conceptions of the best way of life. So, they also each turn to Socrates, the philosophical teacher par excellence, who found himself in the same pedagogical conundrum: how can a teacher communicate a way of life to those whose self-understandings incline them to construe that way of life as more a threat than a promise?

Socrates famously chose irony as the right pedagogical tool for the task. Against a view of irony inspired by Richard Rorty that sees it as dissolving detachment to any enduring commitment, Hibbs follows the account of irony found in Charles Griswold's and Jonathan Lear's discussions of Socrates. As Hibbs develops these insights, irony is a "capacity for transcendence" (14), a disruption that causes one to note the gap between the actual and the ideal. Irony acts as a veil, hiding a deeper wisdom while at the same time indicating it. The ironic mode of discourse allows the teacher to draw the learner toward one perspective that contains in itself a redirection toward another; and it also allows the teacher to move the learner by appeal to the learner's desire to harmonize an apparent dissonance that the ironic discourse suggests.

As Hibbs tells the story, Montaigne, Descartes, and Pascal all look to Socrates as a model, both in terms of his desire to move his interlocutors to adopt a whole way of life and with regard to his ironic method. But despite their areas of common agreement, these three thinkers engage in contentious disputes. Insofar as their understandings of the best way of life diverge, so do their ironic pedagogies differ.

In particular, Hibbs focuses on their differences over the roles played by philosophy and theology, reason and faith, in the quest for the good life. Montaigne, for example, uses irony to lead his readers back from a search for supernatural transcendence to the meanings that are immanent in the varied and fragmented pursuits of an ordinary human life. Descartes ironically uses skepticism against itself in pursuit of the "public goods of science and technology" (191), and so seeks to compartmentalize and sideline the importance of any sort of supernatural theology. Pascal, finally, construes the relation of revelation and reason ironically, so as to invite the reader into a life of religious devotion in which one's desires and character are so transformed by an encounter with the Eucharistic Christ that one can live with hope, even while conscious of one's finite, sometimes miserable, human condition.

After an introductory chapter with an initial exposition of these central themes, Hibbs turns in the next two chapters to the texts of Montaigne and Descartes, beginning each with a discussion of the role of Socrates in the relevant texts. For Montaigne, Socrates is a model of the reconstruction of philosophy into a practical mode of self-examination, eschewing metaphysical and theological distractions to focus on attaining a life of relative equanimity in the face of death's inevitability. But he replaces Socrates's erotic longing for transcendence with a restriction of attention to the immanent, and so he offers his essays as the matter for spiritual exercises that can prepare the reader for an art of living consisting in a kind of self-exploration aimed at the new goal of "authenticity" (43).

Montaigne also knows that many of his readers will be tempted away from this path by a desire for the certainty offered by speculative philosophy, especially in its Aristotelian form. To combat this possibility, Montaigne leads his learner through an ironic reversal of Aristotle's metaphysics. After beginning with an affirmation of Aristotle's dictum that all men by nature desire to know, Montaigne considers the multivariate forms of experience and their resistance to any reduction to a universal knowable by reason. The ironic contrast between the beginning and subsequent assertions in Montaigne's essay opens a cognitive gap that suggests a turn to the practical as its resolution. Montaigne thus leads the reader away from a pursuit of the knowledge of nature or natural ends and toward an exploration of the reader's own unique individuality. As a consequence, Montaigne also teaches the attentive reader that fragmentation is more basic than wholeness, that the self is no more than a "shifting series of events" (58). In the end, though Montaigne does not follow Socrates in his erotic pursuit of the Good, he does endeavor to imitate Socrates's ironic pedagogy to initiate his readers into a way of life that abandons claims to speculative wisdom and finds happiness solely in the immanent.

Descartes, by contrast, intends to achieve just that speculative wisdom to which Socrates and Montaigne, in their different ways, disown any claim. Descartes offers a "new science of virtue" (69), to be secured by his new scientific methods and their results. This new science will replace the never-ending task of Socratic self-examination with real and final knowledge. Hibbs admits that the question of the best way of life and the use of ironic pedagogy are less obvious on the surface of Descartes's work than they are in Montaigne's. But he insists that attention to the "arts of writing" (ibid.) can reveal these concerns in Descartes's texts. He points, for example, to Descartes's aim to cultivate in readers their own appropriation of the philosophical practices he models and to his uses of understatement and indirection. As an example of the latter, Hibbs points to Descartes's critique of astonishment in the *Passions of the Soul*, a move Hibbs takes as an ironic attack on the Platonic and Aristotelian claim that philosophy begins in wonder. Descartes intends to replace that understanding of philosophy with a

vision of knowledge as constructed and productive. More importantly, Descartes takes an ironic stance toward theology, both praising it and marginalizing it. He thus offers a new science of virtue and a new candidate for the best way of life in which supernatural theology is not so much rejected as simply ignored.

Like the other two thinkers in the conversation, Pascal aims to induce in his readers a certain kind of self-knowledge that can allow them to participate in the best way of life. But his relations to Montaigne and Descartes are complicated. Pascal shares Montaigne's conviction that the pursuit of wisdom is a never-ending task, not a project to be completed by discovering better methods. But Pascal, a brilliant mathematician like Descartes, shares with the latter an interest in method, order, and even skepticism. Like Descartes, Pascal values inquiry in mathematics and the sciences; but he also comes to the conviction that the oddity of one part of the world's seeking understanding of the whole itself calls for inquiry. According to Hibbs, this inquiry leads Pascal to the conviction that "human life has the structure of a quest" (127). This realization already marks a departure from Montaigne's resistance to construing a human life in terms of a narrative whole. But it also reveals significant differences from Descartes. The *Meditations*, for example, might be read as a quest narrative but one in which the quest is definitively achieved; after the end of the *Meditations*, all that remains is a bit of tidying up as the inquirer follows out the deductive path to the last goals of human knowledge. Pascal ironically reverses the movement of the Cartesian quest. Rather than a movement that overcomes an immature and transitory moment of wonder, Pascal's quest leads ever deeper into wonder and contemplation.

The never-ending task of cultivating wonder follows from the feature of Pascal's thought that Hibbs calls his "residual teleology" (131). Pascal does not commit himself to Aristotelian or Scholastic claims to metaphysical or natural teleology, but he does insist on an intrinsic teleological structure in human action and desire. Hibbs connects Pascal's vision to Augustine's claim that "the weight of our desires is rooted in an ineradicable and unquenchable desire for the infinite, for a happiness that cannot be lost and that fulfills all our longing" (ibid.).

Pascal famously revels in various paradoxes resulting from the combination of finite, embodied human being and the human orientation to the infinite. Those sorts of paradoxes are not well-suited to Descartes's geometric methods, and Pascal recognizes the mismatch, especially as he contrasts Descartes's approach with a method of *finesse* more characteristic of Montaigne. Unlike Descartes, Pascal rejects the notion that one method of inquiry suffices for all the subjects one might investigate. Instead, he admits a place for Descartes's method in mathematics but insists on the necessity of other methods in the inquiry into the human inquirer. In particular, he develops the notion of *finesse* and takes advantage of his own work in projective geometry to imagine ways in which an inquirer can bring disparate

and apparently conflicting phenomena under one explanation, both of which leave ample room for the use of irony.

Substantively, Pascal also departs from Montaigne and Descartes, and Hibbs considers these departures in his last chapter, especially through a rereading of Pascal's most notorious argument, the wager. Against these other two thinkers, Pascal denies that philosophy is sufficient for the best way of life. Hibbs takes as his key text Pascal's aphorism about philosophy and Christianity: "Philosophers: they astonish the ordinary run of men. Christians: they astonish the philosophers" (1). On Hibbs's reading, this aphorism participates in a double irony, based on the gaps between, first, ordinary men and philosophers, and, then, between philosophers and Christians. Keeping these ironic contrasts in mind, Hibbs argues, can reveal the nature of the wager, defuse an objection against it, and provide a cogent alternative to the typically modern dichotomy between deistic and voluntaristic conceptions of God.

Hibbs argues that the wager presents the question of God's existence as a practical question about the best way of life. Pascal employs a number of ironic strategies in his presentation of the argument. He both appeals to and subverts self-interested reasoning, for example; and he leads the reader to see that the "question about God is a question about me" (152). The wager intends to elicit a transformation in behavior and moral vision that can move the inquirer into association with the Church and the sacraments, the only sufficient means for initiation into the best way of life.

But the success of the wager invites an objection. Hibbs formulates this objection in terms of the problem of hope: Is not a reasonable hope confined within the temporal reality we know to obtain? He points out that both Montaigne and Descartes attempt to address this question "within the flow of time" (174). Montaigne does so "by an embrace of the flow that in a paradoxical way renders fluidity static" (ibid.), since his insistence on the episodic character of human life means that real change is not possible; the new is just one more instance of the constant difference that marks human events. Descartes, on the other hand, seeks in scientific method and its advance a guide to the achievement of progress that can lend intelligibility to our hopes and desires. But, according to Hibbs, Pascal rejects both of these approaches, convinced that a genuine hope requires a relation to eternity and not only the evanescent succession of temporal moments. In other words, if Pascal's arguments are correct, the objection can succeed only at the cost of eliminating all hope; the choice is not between eternal and temporal hope but between hope and despair.

Descartes's temporal hope does bear some connection to the divine, but Pascal is deeply at odds with the Cartesian concept of God. On Hibbs's telling, Cartesian rationalism construes God in either a deistic or voluntaristic mode. Pascal breaks through this dichotomy by proposing a God who relates to the world through an ironic pedagogy. Against Descartes's claim to have a maximally clear and distinct concept of the divine essence, Pascal insists that

God is hidden. But his hiddenness serves a pedagogical purpose, allowing him to draw his creatures to himself through the transformation of their desires and characters as they confront the gaps between themselves as they are and as they could be, and between the ways in which they perceive the presence of God and the ways in which they confront his absence. This divine and ironic pedagogy continues in a more perfect form in Christian revelation, which invites its hearers to a way of life through its prophecies, types, figures, sacraments, and, above all, its proclamation of the Incarnation. Thus, the best way of life ultimately calls for incorporation into the Church, the body of Christ; philosophy is not sufficient. Just as philosophy exploits the gaps in ordinary interpretations of human experience to call its students to a way of life, so Christianity ironically points to the gaps in philosophical interpretations to call its practitioners to a sure hope, grounded in the hidden presence of the eternal in time.

Hibbs's book has many strengths and deserves a reading by anyone interested in his triumvirate of modern thinkers. In my judgment, his attempt to foreground the question of the best way of life in these three thinkers and his presentation of their pedagogical aims promise real and important insight, and he makes good on that potential in his chapters on Montaigne and Pascal (though slightly less so in his treatment of Descartes's use of irony). Some aspects of his treatment of Pascal also call for further remarks. In particular, one might appreciate some assessment of whether Pascal's "residual teleology" of human action is, in the long run, intelligible without a larger, metaphysical context. Likewise, some readers may wonder why Pascal's presentation of the question of God's existence in the wager does not end in a pragmatic interpretation of religion. On a less significant note, the text suffers from some repetition (for example, compare 14-15 with 188 and 34-35 with 140) that sometimes disappoints the reader's hopes for deeper treatments of some of the very interesting themes broached in the first overview.

RANDALL G. COLTON

Kenrick-Glennon Seminary
Saint Louis, Missouri

Aristotle on Female Animals: A Study of the "Generation of Animals." By SOPHIA M. CONNELL. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. xv + 437. $126.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-107-13630-4.

Though long regarded as the "teacher of those who know," Aristotle has come to be viewed with suspicion, even outright disdain, because of the way

some of his claims rankle contemporary sensibilities. Some of the more egregious offenses concern his remarks about women: that they are "inferior to men" or that they are "mutilated versions of men." These jarring statements have led some to dismiss particular treatises, such as the *Politics*, or even whole collections, such as his biological works. In her *Aristotle on Female Animals*, Sophia Connell gives a thorough and careful analysis of the *Generation of Animals* (*GA*) that warns against such a facile reading. Most prominent in her defense is her opposition to the feminist allegations that Aristotle's philosophy is a thoroughly misogynist one. She warns us that such is not at all the case. She is also at pains to warn against simply interpreting Aristotle's biology through the lens of his more abstract texts, which risks obscuring the empirical details that characterize them, details she carefully articulates. Thus, Connell's work is not just in opposition to misreadings of Aristotle; it also offers a helpful introduction to the intricacies of his biological study.

Before proceeding through the individual chapters of the *GA*, Connell in part 1 frames her study according to various methodological concerns. Chapter 1 addresses what she takes to be the fundamental feminist complaint concerning Aristotle's biology: it is part of a rigid hierarchical system that sets forth a superior male political position. Granting that Aristotle exhibits a sexist understanding—one, she argues, that deserves some appreciation for the historical setting in which it developed—she denies that this motivates his philosophical project. She further warns that modern feminism, overly driven by its own concerns, can exhibit its own anachronistic agenda that misstates or misses the essential points of Aristotle's biology. Her aim is not simply to confront such an approach but rather to help the "scholar with feminist sympathies to broaden our knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy" (52).

In her second chapter, Connell critiques a more traditional approach to Aristotle's biology that emphasizes that simple complementary contributions to generation made by male and female may be understood in terms of form and matter, respectively. She cautions that this tends to follow the more general insights we are liable to find in the *Metaphysics* and *Physics*, works that she argues are more indebted to the *Posterior Analytics*. By contrast, the *GA*, as a much more empirical work, is not so programmatically driven but is more indebted to the approach described in the *Topics*. The pattern of the *GA* seems to be to identify general characterizations of generation, which are refined in particular instances in the later chapters. This is achieved not simply by proceeding from general principles but also by seeking to articulate "reasons relating to outcomes (teleology)" (83) in its concluding discussions, deliberately including exceptional cases, such as insects, which, Aristotle claims, generate spontaneously. This makes it clear that the *GA* tends to the specific rather than the general, the empirical rather than the theoretical. As such, its interpretation ought not to rely on Aristotle's more theoretical studies.

Part 2 aims to reassess the generative role of the female in Aristotle's biology. Connell begins, in chapter 3, by noting how others, such as Hippocrates and Galen, argued that the female produces semen as does the male, with the stronger of the two "determining the outcome in terms of sex and inheritance" (98). Though this is seemingly a satisfactory explanation from a feminist perspective, in that both generative contributions are understood on equal terms, Connell warns on Aristotelian principles that this scheme is unable to explain the unity of the whole animal. She notes that Aristotle does recognize a female semen, countering the common supposition that the female contribution is merely passive or material. She goes on to assert that the female contribution is complementary rather than competitive, as the materialist alternative proposes.

Chapter 4 develops a more complete response to the supposition that the female contributes the matter of generation, which receives the male's formal contribution. She locates the textual basis for this in what she calls the "craft model," in *Physics* II, which describes wood that is made into a chair by the imposition of form. She then presents an alternative from Hippocrates that describes a more dynamic possibility, according to which the female contribution involves feeding the embryo in its subsequent growth, the idea being that the material contribution somehow unfolds by its own dynamism. Beyond either possibility, she shows how Aristotle's approach characterizes the female contribution according to two stages: (1) at the point of conception, where the contributed matter can be said to be passive while yet having a dynamic potential concerning the embryo's growth until (2) the appearance of the fetal heart, at which point the further dynamic potential of its blood begins to develop various organs (149). So rather than contributing inert matter that becomes the passive element of a final product or that supplies its own increase, the female contribution ensures the dynamic possibility of a living entity that is able to develop itself in all of its living complexity.

Part 3 reassesses the male contribution in light of this more dynamic understanding of its female counterpart. Chapter 5 helps explicate the formative aspect of the female contribution to generation, particularly as regards wind eggs, which are developed but incomplete wholes. This result seems to invite the conclusion that where the female contributes the nutritive soul, the male provides the sentient soul, a proposal Connell is quick to counter. First, this supposes that these two souls are wholly separable; second, "it imagines, in its most simplified form, that a portion of soul can be handed over or supplied by the male parent" (173). While the male semen is the basis of Aristotle's account of the formation of the soul in the embryo, Connell notes that it "does not thereby possess form or soul" in itself. The father's soul is only the source of the change as it develops in the offspring, a source that must also be understood in terms of the female's contribution to the offspring.

Before proceeding with the details of Aristotle's account, chapter 6 reviews a number of different interpretations of the male contribution to generation in order to clarify his account more fully. At this point, Connell changes her interlocutors. She no longer concerns herself with the abstract metaphysical or feminist readings, though the latter seem to linger somewhat, and instead she takes up the more biologically focused reading—a transition that she might have noted more explicitly. The first of these more focused readings is "theological vitalism," which appeared in Christian and Islamic readings of Aristotle. Though it is certainly part of a substantial tradition, it is not what the Stagirite intended. This vitalism alleges that "*pneuma*, the active physical component of male semen, is analogous to *aithêr*, the fifth element, which allows the cyclical movement of the heavens" (187). This association, Connell argues, has led to a whole tradition of interpretation that reads the *GA* as saying that such *pneuma* is the divine breath, a claim she eschews: "the hotness of semen is analogous to *aithêr* not because it is an earthly version of the heavenly element, but because it is 'more divine' than those elements taken on their own" (191). Other interpretations that we may group under the ambit of materialism claim that the male semen reduces to purely physical terms, which she dismisses here for a variety of reasons, one of the most prominent being that the male role "is the efficient cause of substantial change" (203), which involves more than just material causation. Of course, final causality is one of the most important elements in Aristotle's account of biological entities, a factor many other readings seem to ignore. Here Connell only introduces it, warning that it ought not be considered too soon lest we fail to appreciate all the intricacies that it helps to explain. The implicit admonition is that with Aristotle we must carefully take in hand what materialism overlooks and what vitalism presumes to explain in order to cultivate a proper appreciation for what nature itself discloses.

In part 4, which concerns the "generation in lower animals and particular instances," Connells's analysis becomes more difficult to follow, not because of any lack of precision or clarity on her part but because of the proliferation of details that arise in the latter chapters of the *GA*. Because of the depth of the analysis, her response to the basic feminist objections has receded into the background. Thus we are able to appreciate that while Aristotle's study can be made to respond to his more rhetorical, feminist, detractors, it really aims at a more fundamental objective: an inquiry into the intricacies of biology. In chapter 7, Connell focuses on elements of the *GA* that will allow her to develop the teleological aspects of animal generation. She first highlights Aristotle's distinction between what profits an individual animal and what profits the species in its future individuals. This is a key point as regards a telic appreciation of the species, which concerns the reciprocal relation between male and female. The offspring benefit neither father nor mother as individuals but both together as a species. Connell then follows Aristotle's analysis of this point over the hierarchy of species. Higher animals are those

whose offspring are more complete at birth, which makes clear the significance of the female contribution to gestation. The more complete the offspring at birth—that is, the greater the contribution of the female in carrying the embryos to term—the higher the animal. This should help ameliorate the worry about female inferiority in Aristotle's biology. Examples of "lower species" are fish, where "the male sprinkles milt on eggs after they have been laid" (247); the deficiency here is that the eggs, both before and after fertilization, are subject to various environmental factors, such as predators, that might inhibit or prevent their complete gestation. Next, Connell notes that Aristotle deems gestation in the very lowest of species to be "spontaneous," as among "testacea" and various insects (though not bees), where neither the concocted female matter nor the male semen contributes to the result. Yet even in this anomalous case where generation depends on such exogenous principles, there is still an analogous sense in which the male and female contribute, in a complementary way, to an identifiable *telos*: the continuance of the species.

Having explored the complementary generative teleological contributions of the two parents, chapter 8 turns to what we might call their "competing" roles. This specifically concerns the determination of the offspring's gender. Connell highlights Aristotle's actual opposition to the claim that the female represents a "generative failure," simply because this overlooks the female's positive contribution in the provision of proper matter understood in dynamic terms. Granting the relative weakness of the female *menses*, Connell still insists that we must appreciate Aristotle's account of the female's contribution evident in the possibility of female offspring. Connell summarizes his rejection of Democritus's rival view, which claims this is simply a question of the relative strengths of the competing parental semen, if only because of the empirical fact that children of both sexes are liable to resemble either parent in various ways. She also emphasizes Aristotle's rejection of *pangenesis*, which says the offspring's parts are determined by relative competing parts of its parents: this claims that the whole result is simply the sum of its parts, which clearly overlooks teleological determinations of the whole organism. She argues that Aristotle's answer is that "a relevant balance (*summetria*) between male and female contributions causes sexual differentiation" (271). This balance is determined by the relative heat of the parent's contribution, relative, that is, to each other within their respective ranges as determined by their species. If the result of generation is female, this does not mean that the mother's contribution is warmer than that of the father, but that her contribution is relatively high for the female norm of the species while his is relatively low within the male norm. Here again, Connell emphasizes that Aristotle's account ought not to be understood by the "craft model" drawn from *Physics* II, but by the "culinary analogy": a lopsided cake may not be the fullness of what it ought to be, but it is still a cake. Similarly, female offspring might not be the fullness of a male issue, but it is still a fully formed individual

of that species. (A modern way to appraise the relative contributions of male and female is according to the distinction of dominant and recessive genes. In contrast, Aristotle identifies the relative strength of the male according to specifically developed philosophical principles.) Connell concludes that for Aristotle, given that the female contribution is necessary for the continuance of the species, we might say that a female offspring is "both disabled and differently abled" (291).

In chapter 9, Connell presents a refinement in Aristotle's account of generation concerning specific resemblances between offspring and their various progenitors. Having identified the relative heat of the parents' semen as the determinants of the offspring's gender, she now identifies their *kinêseis* as the determining factors of its particular features. After a fairly lengthy consideration of alternative theories, such as those of Balme, Henry, and Cooper, and then an exhaustive examination of the possible mechanisms of these factors, she presents a graded scale as to how these *kinêseis* determine the various features of the offspring, as those of the male or female gain mastery over their counterpart. The most significant part of this discussion is how, according to Connell, *kinêseis* "shape the parts of offspring and when these fail they allow for a falling back onto ancestral . . . *kinêseis*" (298-99). Though Aristotle only seems to describe the role of paternal grandparents, she argues that *kinêseis* "operating in heredity are neither form nor matter and therefore can come from both male and female parents" (321). So, at a more fine-grained level, she indicates how the female contribution to generation is not, as the "craft model" proposes, merely passive, but exercises a reciprocal determination with its male counterpart.

In chapter 10, Connell accounts for Aristotle's incorporation of material necessity into his account of animal generation. The difficulty is to explain how matter, which is governed by its own nonbiological necessity, still supports the telic actions of animal generation. Opposing those interpretations that allege Aristotle simply subsumes material powers under biological teleology, she highlights his explicit reliance on them "particularly when it comes to accounting for deformity" (334). Aristotle gives deformity a fairly wide interpretation: anything that "does not measure up to the best animal—the human male" (338). In such concise terms, this frames her presentation of a twofold account of deformity. The first case involves a whole species whose offspring are relatively incomplete in that they fail to resemble their parents as well as they might, say, by being blind or having undifferentiated digits (353). Her point is not that such species lack a *telos*, but that they seem to face extra impediments to its realization, both in their generation and in their subjection to environmental factors. The second case concerns the variation within a species along the lines she developed in the prior chapter. This has to do with the hereditary resemblance between the offspring and either of its parents (or more distant generations) according to the relative strength of their *kinêseis*. Although Aristotle insists on the superiority of the male's contribution in

generation, Connell reminds us that this derives from his metaphysical considerations rather than purely sexist motives. Further, as Connell has certainly emphasized, Aristotle himself consistently asserts the female's necessary and dynamic contribution in the generation of offspring.

In her brief concluding chapter, certainly worth reading in itself, Connell summarizes the main points of her study, highlighting the complementary contribution of both sexes to generation. Having carefully guided us through the *GA*, she notes how we are able to appreciate Aristotle's identification of the role of the female in generation, as well as the broader empirical intricacies of his study. In this, she suggests how we might read him as the "teacher [not only] of those who know" but also of those who would seek to understand—if we are so disposed.

BRIAN CHRZASTEK, O.P.

Pontifical Faculty of the Immaculate Conception
Washington, D.C.