THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
EDITORs:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoVINCE OF ST. JosEPH
Publishers: Sheed & Ward, Inc., New York City

VoL. III

OCTOBER, 1941

No.4

THE CONFLICT OF METHODS AT THE END OF
THE MIDDLE AGES 1

T

I

ffiS PAPER will deal with an historical fact, which has
been, to my mind, of major importance in the development of modern western thought: I mean the conflict
of methods that, at the end of the Middle Ages and above all
at the time of the new philosophy of Bacon and Descartes,
caused modern Physics, the modern explanation of nature's
phenomena, to seem radically and absolutely incompatible with
Aristotelian metaphysics and scholastic philosophy. I should
like briefly to examine the philosophical implications of this
fact. Perhaps the conclusion thus attained may shed some light
on the discussions of our age.
The conflict of which I speak had begun in the Middle
Ages-already in the 13th century. At that time it
as a conflict between the schools of Oxford and the schools
of Paris. The University of Paris was dominated by the
1 Paper read at the Ninth Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences,
held at,the New School for Social Research, New York, April 27, 1941.

527

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JACQUES M.ARITAIN

Aristotelian reform whose masters were Albert the Great and
Thomas Aquinas; its main task was to build up a synthesis of
traditional Christian thought by the light of a metaphysics
and a theology renewed, as to their conceptual systematization,
by the principles of Aristotle-of an Aristotle recast and baptized by Thomas Aquinas; its chief concern was, therefore,
metaphysical and theological. The University of Oxford was.
inspired, on the contrary, by the old Augustinian tradition, that
is, in brief, by Platonism (by a Platonism in which many
Aristotelian notions had a place); and, at the same time, the
Oxonians were dominated by the desire of applying the
Platonist-mathematical conception of the world to the explanation of physical phenomena. Both mathematics and experience
were their guiding rules. Even in philosophy and theology, the
influence of this logico-mathematical and empiricist trend of
mind played a major part. Already Roger Bacon asserted: "It
is impossible to know things of this world, unless mathematics
is known." And it is from his pen that the term" experimental
science" appears for the first time in the history of human
thought. Later on, in the 14th Century, many Doctors of the
University of Paris, John Buridan, Albertus of Saxony, Peter
of Ailly, Nicole Oresme, were to accept in philosophy the
Nominalist inspiration,
at the same time to prepare in
mechanics and physics the discoveries and the new concepts
which characterize modern science. They were the precursors
of Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo.

II
If we seek to bring to light the philosophical roots of the
question, we must first note that Aristotelian metaphysics and
the Aristotelian philosophy of nature-at least taken in their
genuine significance, in their true structure-did not intend to
explain phenomena, but to discover the ontological structure
of things and the hierarchy of essences in terms of intelligible
being. Starting from sense experience, they did not remain on
the plane of experience, but tried to perceive the intelligible transsensible features of the nature of things thanks to an analysis

THE CONFLICT

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529

grounded on the first intuitions of the intellect, above all on
the metaphysical' intuition of being; thus they conceived reality
in terms of substance and accident, of qualities, of causes-that
is, of the four genera of causes, the principal of which was final
causality.
Nevertheless, and that was the great misfortune of Aristotelianism, Aristotle himself and his mediaeval followers were not
content with this ontological or properly philosophical analysis.
Putting too great and too bold a confidence in the philosophical
intellect and the philosophical tools, they naturally extended
their ontological explanation of the supra-empirical structure
of things into an
of the empirical phenomena. In
point of fact their philosophy of nature, as is well known, was
both a philosophy of nature and a science, a scientific interpretation of the detail of phenomena. And this second part,
the scientific part, was condemned to failure. Still, in the
17th Century, the treatises of philosophy contained explanations (or pseudo-explanations) of ice-crystals, of the rainbow,
discussions on the vacuum, and so forth.
Now I arrive at the point which matters most to the present
issue. What is really new in the achievements of the science
which became predominant in the 16th and 17th centuries, of
"modern science," is properly speaking a physics of the physicomathematical type. (In other scientific domains which are not
thus absorbed by mathematics, modern science doubtless owes
its material or technical perfection, and an autonomous conceptual lexicon which permits infinite progress in the analysis
of phenomena as such, to the attraction exerted by physicomathematics on the other kinds of knowledge, which henceforth see in the former the exemplar of knowledge.)
In truth, the epistemological principles of the Ancients considered in their very nature could easily have adapted
themselves to the new physics; the logical type to which that
science corresponds, and of which astronomy was the best
example during antiquity, theoretically had its place set down
in the Scholastic synthesis of sciences. This logical type is
that of a science in a sense intermediary between Mathematics

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JACQUES MARITAIN

and Physics, but actually mathematical as regards its typical
mode of explanation, since what is jCYrmal and consequently
specifying in it (its formal object and its medium of demonstration) is mathematical. The explanatory deduction is mathematical. Physical reality, although of prime importance to it
as subject-matter, is basically, for it, a material reservoir of
facts and verifications. And thus, while natural philosophy may
be characterized as a physical knowledge properly philosophical
and ontological, or metaphysical by participation, the new
physics, on the contrary, according to the methodological principles of the Schoolmen, must be called a physical knowledge
properly mathematical, or a science formally mathematical and
materially physical: a forniula which, to my mind, condenses
all its properties./ Doubtless the conception of physico-mathematics that the French physicist Pierre Duhem (and Hirn
before him) defended was too mathematical and not sufficiently
physical, nevertheless Duhem was right in thinking that
phenomena can be analysed quantitatively without the existence of qualities being denied, and that the scientific method
derived from Galileo and Descartes can be used without its
involving in any way philosophical incompatibility with
Aristotle's metaphysics.
But in point of fact knowledge of a physico-mathematical
sort was limited amongst the Ancients and the Schoolmen to
certain very particular disciplines, such as astronomy or acoustics; their physics, as I previously noted, consisted in a natural
philosophy (philosophical knowledge of physical data) which
involved a physics of pure ·observation philosophically interpreted, and if certain medieval thinkers and scientists have
been the precursors of physico-:mathematics, the idea of establishing a universal mathematical interpretation of physical
reality by submitting the fluent detail of phenomena to the
science of number nevertheless remained foreign to the majority
of them.
Therefore, on the day when quantitative physics, having its
own specific character and possessed of its own exigencies,
moved to take its place within the order of sciences and to

THE CONFLICT

OF METHODS

531

proclaim its rights, it was to enter inevitably into conflict with
the philosophy of old-not only because· of the errors which
vitiated the latter in the experimental field, but also, and this
is more remarkable, because of the radical difference which
separates-with respect to what is genuine and legitimate in
each one of those two manners-the old manner of approaching
physical realities from the new manner of approaching them.

m
The errors I have just mentioned and which vitiated the
physics of old, singularly jeopardized, moreover, the position
of the defenders of Aristotle. Indeed, as much as Aristotle's
physics deserved, in the eyes of a Thomist, to be upheld in its
first principles (the theory of matter and form, of the continuous, of time, of life, etc.) -in all that part which actually
constitutes natural philosophy-just so much
Aristotelian
physics weak and insufficient in the part which tried to constitute an inductive science, and which applied to the experimental
analysis of the detail of phenomena. Let us briefly mention
here the errors in Aristotle's mechanics: the disregarding of
mass in dynamics and the insufficient mathematical analysis
of motion and of speed, the explanation of the motion of projectiles by the propagation in the air of a moving wave or by
so-called antiperistasis-a concept owed not to Aristotle but
to Simplicius-the belief in a difference of nature between
celestial motion, considered as circular, and terrestial motion,
considered as rectilinear, as well as between celestial bodies,
considered incorruptible and terrestial bodies considered
corruptible, the theory of heavy and light bodies; let us also
mention the errors of the medieval physics in the designation of
the simple constituents of bodies (the theory of the four
elements), the errors about light (considered instantaneous),
about the earth (for example, the denial of antipodes), and,
above all else, the errors of the Ptolemaic system in astronomy.
All these errors, however great they may have been from
the point of view of positive science, in reality provided only

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JACQUES MARITAIN

ineffectual weapons against Aristotelian metaphysics
and
natural philosophy, for they were not necessary consequences
drawn from the principles of Aristotle and were merely the
result of oversimple inductions which interpreted :p.aturaJ
phenomena in such a way as to conform to common appearances. But, at a superficial glance, it was all too easy to impute
to the philosophy of the Ancients the wrongs of their science.
And further, if on the one hand the hypotheses which treat of
the configuration of the physical world have only a secondary
and incidental importance for the pure intelligence, whose
metaphysical certainties do not depend in the least on the map
of the heavens, on the other hand these same hypotheseswithout speaking of their properly scientific value-are of
capital importance to the imagination. In this respect the
revolution caused in astronomy by the Copernican theory was
to play in the history of ideas a part which cannot be too highly
stressed. Widely exploited by the protagonists of mechanicist
philosophy, dramatized by Galileo's condemnation, it has taken
on amongst those thinkers who think as most men live, that is,
within the senses, the value of a revolution in the metaphysical
conception of the intelligible universe, while in truth it was but
a revolution in the scientific· representation of the visible universe. Because it shattered century-old habits of imagination,
it seemed to tear down all the science of the past; because it
showed that sensible appearances had misled common opinion
with regard to astronomy, it provided empirically-minded
philosophers with a pretext for despising the natural intuition
of first principles. Because it set back much further than did
the Ancients the limits of the corporeal world, making the
imagination
by immensity, there was a rush to assert
the infinity of the world, as though the ocean were not just as
finite. as a drop of water. Because it made of the earth a tiny
globe in the universe, and no longer the material center of the
spheres, that doctrine of finality was declared outdated which
held the human being as the ideal center of the creative intentions; as though the metaphysical hierarchy of essences were
linked to the volume of the earth or to its position, and as

THE CONFLICT

OF METHODS

588

though the divine Intelligence should have taken less care
of a little ball in motion than of a great pall at rest.
Finally, while "humiliating" man in the corporal order by
assigning him a habitat geometrically less honorable, it gave
him the opportunity of exalting himself infinitely in the spiritual
order, by considering himself as a sovereign thought which
hovers over the abyss of a nature in which everything is blind
necessity, and which measures it by its own knowledge. Thus
the very thinkers who introduced into modern philosophy the
principle of egooentricism and whose descendants were to make
truth revolve around the human mind, were to profess a
righteous indignation over the vanity of geocentricism, and
wrapped themselves in their humility to banish from science
the anthropomorphic consideration of final causes. If one
imagines that the universe is finite and that all corporeal
things are made for man, it is, wrote Descartes, " that instead
of knowing the perfections which belong really to us, one
attributes to other creatures imperfections they do not have,
so as to raise oneself above them," 2 and that, " entering into
an impertinent presumption, one wants to become part of the
counsel of God and with him to take charge of managing the
world, all of which causes an infinitude of vain worries and
annoyances." The belief in final causes, Spinoza will say,
derives only from the egoistic ambition of men " to use Nature
for their own blind cupidity and insatiable avarice": whence
a covey of illusions which could never have been dispelled
" unless mathematics, which does not deal with final causes but
only with essences and properties of geometric figures, had
shown men another rule of truth." And Laplace will write:
Seduced by the illusions of the senses and of selfishness, man long
considered himself the center of stellar motion, and his vain pride
was punished by the fear with which the stars inspired him. At
last, several centuries of work have pulled down the veil which
hid from his eyes the order of the world [it is a true revelation] ...
then he saw himself on a planet almost imperceptible in the solar
system, the vast extent of which is itself only a point in the
s Letten to

Elizabeth, September 15, 1645.

534

JACQUES MARITAIN

immensity of space. The sublime results to which this discovery
has led him are well equipped to console him for the rank it assigns
to the earth, by showing him his own greatness in the extreme
smallness of the basis which has helped him to measure the
heavens ....

IV
To settle the conflict which set up the new physics against
Aristotle's philosophy, would have required minds of exceptional vigor, capable of discerning behind the cloud of confusion
of which we have just spoken, the essential lines and fundamental compatabilities of the two disciplines, at the very
moment when both were least conscious of their limits-the
old being in the midst of decadence and the new still in the
process of formation. Unfortunately most of the Scholastics of
the 15th and 16th centuries had fallen as far from the metaphysical wisdom of Thomas Aquinas as from the scientific
initiatives of the 14th century, and, according to Melchior
Cano's expression, knew only how to wield long sticks. As for
the naturalists, captivated by their initial successes and deprived of metaphysical standards, it was not from them that one
could hope for an equitable appreciation of the elements of the
struggle. Both the former and the latter refused to distinguish
in fact between natural philosophy and experimental science.
The former, the Schoolmen, in spite of the warnings of St.
Thomas, related the fate of Aristotle's metaphysics to that of
the inductive hypotheses of antiquity, and the latter, the
naturalists, confused the newly born mathematical physics with
the most arbitrary metaphysics, with materialistic, hylozoistic,
cabalistic, or pantheistic, and, especially, with mechanistic
metaphysics.
It is well to insist on this last confusion whose influence
made itself felt on the entire development of modern science,
and which, at the outset, completely hid from the initiators
of the new physics the true nature of that science. Indeed they
thought that they were determining the ontological causes of
things, discovering the essence of bodies and the supreme reasons
of the physical order, in short, setting up a natural philosophy;

THE· CONFLICT

OF METHODS

535

since they were working, and this because of the very nature of
their science, with only quantitative standards, they were condemned from the first to admit only extension and motion as the
principles of the corporeal world. Thus it is not enough to note
that the physico-mathematical method was finally evolved by
anti-scholastic thinkers, whom the very excess of their confidence in the application of mathematics to sense-perceived
nature led instinctively to mechanism. We also must emphasize
that the natural and irrepressible drive of the intelligence
towards being and causes, when it met the physico-mathematical method must almost necessarily cause this discipline
to be mistaken for a natural philosophy. It is because of this
almost inevitable illusion that the new scientific method found
itself from the very beginning, by virtue of the historical
conditions of its genesis, quite ready to undergo the contamination of extraneous philosophies, and to become dependant
upon a metaphysics like the Cartesian mathematism-an
accident inversely resembling that which had linked Aristotle's
metaphysics to the erroneous theories of the physics of old.
But if physico-mathematics were a natural philosophy, if it
made manifest the essences and causes at work in the corporeal
world, then it would be a knowledge having the ontological
essence of physical reality as its proper and specifying object;
and from then on we would see subverted and destroyed the
genuine structure of this science. It would no longer be a
science jCYrmally mathematical and materially physical, it
would become a kind of monstrosity, a science which would be
at the same time jCYrmally physical and ontological as to its
specifying objects and formally mathematical as to its medium
of demonstration and explanation. The natural and necessary
proportion between the end and the means, between the specifying object and the explanatory tools in knowledge would be
broken.
That implies that physico-mathematics would cease being a
science properly speaking, and would rather become a kind of
practical discipline, a kind of art applying to pure sensorial
information gathered about the physical world, as to some

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JACQUES

.raw material, a method which elaborates them mathematically
and draws from them regulating formulae for human practice
and human industry. We may wonder whether modern civilization, in its bourgeois age, has not understood physics in this
way. The Marxist epistemology with its integral practicism,
does naught but push to extremes such a misconception of
science. There is in the human mind no specific energy of
knowledge (what the ancients called habitus), no intellectual
virtue, in other words, no internal quality of science which corresponds to " science," thus conceived and put to work. Such
a science, if it exisf;ed, would require of the physicist only a
certain mathematical training (which could be nothing more
than the habit or custom. of handling formulae) in combining
experiments and in working over their results to submit them
to the mathematical treatment. Yet as a matter of fact, it
is, for some strata of our contemporary culture, science thus
misconceived which is asked to supplant philosophical and
metaphysical wisdom, and to supply the supreme food of the
human mind. Thus truth is used for error, a delusive social
myth is built up with the help of the sciences of phenomena,
fallen from their true type, replacing philosophy in people's
minds and, at the same time, conceived as essentially practical. Scientists themselves are clearly conscious of the object
and limits of science, but in the common opinion of people,
the false idea of science to which I allude does not imply
any awareness of this very object and these very limits. It
is not surprising that the pedagogical use of such a " science"
so little cultivates reason in the masses which receive from it
their educating influences.

v
But let us leave this parenthesis, and come back to the consideration of physico-mathematics in its genuine logical nature,
and to the conflict that arose between this discipline and the
traditional philosophical disciplines, at the time of the Renaissance and at the time of Descartes. If the reflexions and distinctions I outlined in this paper are well grounded, we see how

THE CONFLICT

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587

the long-existing dissension which, in view of the infirmity of
human nature ordinarily separates metaphysicians from scientists, was then to become an irremediable opposition-existing
as it did between metaphysicians attached to .the knowledge
heritage of old, but in fact unfaithful to wisdom, unaware of
the methodological limitations of philosophical or ontological
explanation, and who wanted to set up a science of phenomena
by means of their pseudo-philosophical formulae, and scientists
dazzled by their new science, who wanted to set up a .prime
philosophy by means of their figures. The struggle. having been
brought onto the actual field of the study of phenomena, it
was easy to foretell which would be the vanquished. To sum
up, it is easily understood that for three principle reasons the
intellectual world must almost necessarily at the outset of the
modern era, have been the victim of a misunderstanding:
1) because of the introduction of quantitative physics, a
new science legitimate in itself and in no way essentially
incompatible with the old system of knowledge, but in actual
fact in conflict with that system;
2) because of the confusion of the natural philosophy and the
metaphysics of Aristotle, with the false hypotheses of the
science of the ancients;
8) because of a fundamental error on the nature of physicomathematics, itself taken for a philosophical or ontological
explanation of the world and made a fellow traveller of mechanistic metaphysics.
In truth, there is no conflict between physico-mathematics
and metaphysics or philosophy, because they do not only correspond to two fundamentally different methods of approaching
reality, but also aim at two different fields of knowledge, two
different formal and specifying objects within reality; each one
has its proper object, its proper aim, its proper field, and therefore its proper means of analyzing the subject matter belonging
in this field. Philosophy looks after essences and analyzes
things in terms of being. Physico-mathematics looks after a
mathematical reading or deciphering of phenomena. The two

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JACQUES MARITAIN

disciplines do not hunt on the same soil. Each one can develop
ad infinitum on its own planr without encountering the other.
Physico-mathematical analysis of sound can progress ad infinitum, on the plane of acoustics, without interfering with or
entering into conflict with the artistic or poetic laws developing
on their own plane of musical creation. Physico-mathematical
analysis of the particles composing the atom can progress ad
infinitum, on the plane of micro-physics, without interfering
with or entering into conflict with the ontological analysis of
corporeal reality and of intelligible properties of being, which
analysis progresses for its part on the plane of philosophy of
nature and metaphysics. Perhaps these considerations might
help settle the discussions on teleology which play an important
part in contemporary thought, above all in the biological
domain, and to show how the concept of finality has to be
removed, as an extraneous one, from experimental, particularly
from physico-mathematical science, and at the same time to
be maintained, as a legitimate and indispensable one, in philosophical and metaphysical knowledge. What seems to me to
be essential in this matter, is to emphasize this fact, that there
is a natural and inescapable proportion between means and
ends, methods and objects, and that, every time we deal with
genuine kinds of knowledge, the difference between m.ethods
presupposes as its very reason, as its very root, a more fundamental and more enlightening difference between objects.
JACQUES MARITAIN

Columbia University,
N6W York,N. Y.

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

T

I. INTRODUCTION

HE QUEST of man for unity and order is the mainspring of all that is history. For tranquillity of order
his wars have been waged; for order of mind his art
and culture ebb and flow; for unity with the Deity, there are
his religions, his churches, his homes, his schools. This search
for unity springs from his very nature. As an individual .
substance man is one, and the whole world about him must
contribute to that oneness, else it is meaningless. As a rational
creature endowed with an intellect whose work is the perception of relationships, man seeks unity in order, the stuff of
which relationships are made. As a being endowed with free
will, always acting for an ultimate end of his own choice, an
end which gives unity and purposiveness to his acts, man puts
order into his world of activity.
This continual quest of order on the part of man is admirably
illustrated, perhaps through sheer contrast, in that vastly
complex and somewhat disordered thing called society, the
broad realm of man's activities with his fellow creatures. More
particularly we refer to such activities of men as are the objects
of the social sciences-the relations of man to the material
necessities upon which depends his livelihood, and his relations
to the various groups to which, of choice or necessity, he and
his fellow men belong.
Order requires a certain unity, and unity derives from a
principle--a common source, a radical oneness. Socio-economic
relations being so manifestly complex, having neither the concreteness of the visible creation nor the absoluteness of the
spiritual world, have always challenged the ingenuity of man to
discover or invent principles of social order. Nor has man
shirked the task. There is, for instance, the individualist prin539

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LOUIS A. RYAN

ciple of Herbert Spencer: " Every man has freedom to do all
that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of
any other man." 1 The class principle finds this expression in
Karl Marx: " The economic structure of society is the real
foundation on which rise legal and political superstructures
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness." 2
Totalitarianism, as explained by Benito Mussolini, accepts the
state as principle: " Fascism conceives of the State as an
Absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups
are relative, only to be conceived in their relation to the State." 3
The racism of Hitler claims blood as the principle of social
structure: " All that is not race in this world is trash. All world
historical events, however, are only the expression of the race's
instinct of self-preservation in its good or in its evil meaning." 4
A very recent and even more universalist social philosophy
enuntiates its principle in the name of democracy which " is the
plentitude of heart-service to a highest religion embodying the
essence of all higher religions. Democracy is nothing more and
nothing less than humanism in theocracy and rational theocracy in universal humanism." 5
More in the realm of reason is justice as the natural principle
of society. It is stated thus by Aristotle: "Since in every art
and science the end aimed at is always good, so particularly in
this, which is the most excellent of all, the founding of civil
society, the good therein aimed at is justice; for it is this which
is for the benefit of all." 6
Nor does the Catholic Church, with her theology and supernatural philosophy of living, fail to propose a fundamental
principle for the social order. It is charity, love of neighbor.
H. Spencer, The Principles of Ethics (New York: 1897), II, 46.
K. Marx, The Critique of Political Economy (New York: 1904), p. 11.
• B. Mussolini, " The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," trans. from
Enciclopedia Italiana. International Conciliation, No. 306 (New York: 1935), p. IS.
'A. Hitler, Mein Kampf (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939), p. 406.
• The City of Man (New York: 1940), p. SS.
8 Aristotle, Politics (New York: Everyman's Library, 1921), Bk. III, c. 12, p. 88.
Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 79. a. 1.
1

2

C.ffARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

541

"These things I command you, that you love one another": 7
this Christian principle of living-love, the fulfilling of the
law-has been given modern application in the recent Papal
encyclicals <?n social problems. Pope Leo wrote: "For the
happy results we all long for must chiefly be brought about by
the plenteous outpouring of charity. . . ." 8 Pope Pius XI
noted that, " in effecting this reform, charity ' which is the bond
of perfection,' must play a leading part .... " 9 The present
Pontiff has spoken of the same need: "The first of these
pernicious errors, widespread today, is the forgetfulness of that
law of human solidarity and charity which is dictated and
imposed by our common origin and by the equality of rational
nature in all men . . . and by the redeeming Sacrifice offered
by Jesus Christ .... " 1:o
Charity as an ordering principle in society would seem to be
necessary both from the view of
modern disorder before
our eyes, as well as from the fact that the most talked of
remedy, justice, is unable to cope with the situation. The
modern disorder is both practical and speculative. The wars
waging throughout the world, the political, social, and economic
revolutions to which every· nation is in some way subjected,
are more than sufficient proof of the practical disorder. The
lack of order in the speculative world is illustrated by the.
ideologies in conflict, philosophies of force and self-interest that
waver between the impossible extremes of unity without order,
which is collectivism, and order without unity, which IS
individualism.
The inability of justice alone to achieve social peace is
pointed out by Pope Pius XI: " For justice alone, even though
most faithfully observed, can indeed remove the causes of
social strife, but can never bring about unity of hearts and
minds. Yet this union, binding men together, is the main
principle of stability in all institutions, no matter how perfect
xv. 17.
Encyclical Letter Rerum Novarum (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), p. 85.
Letter Quadragesimo Anno (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), p. 44.
•
10 Encyclical Letter Summi Pontificatus (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), p. 11.
8

542

LOUIS A. RYAN:

they may seem, which aim at establishing social peace and
promoting mutual aid. In its absence, as repeated experience
proves, the wisest regulations come to nothing." u Several
reasons may be adduced in proof of this.
Justice, from its very nature, has as its task to equalize
a debt. But the mere equalization of a debt owed to another
is not sufficient to restore social order in the present state
of things. Therefore justice alone is inadequate to perfect the
reform needed in society. Simple justice requires that men do
no injury to one another, that they pay their debts. But it is
not enough for social order that meU: do not injure one another;
they must help one another. Over and above paying a debt,
they must as social animals bestow the gift of mutual aid. 12
"For justice is about works done in respect of another person
under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship considers
the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a
gratuitous favor .... " 13 Society is so complex that the personal responsibility for injustices is often obscured, especially
in the highly developed system of private enterprise; and
secondly, even where the demands of justice are quite clear,
it is often morally impossible for individuals to right the wrongs
already existing. For, example, that a just wage must be a
living wage is an admission that not a few employers would be
willing to make; and yet in a highly competitive industry, one
in which their interests are inextricably woven, employers might
find it impossible to pay a living wage and still survive.
Besides this practical argument, there is another reason
for the inadequacy of justice to fill the bill of reforming the
social order. The common good requires communion, a union
of minds and hearts, and not merely an external communication
which provides for an orderly relation of objective reality to
the individual. Justice, concerned with the objective thing,
the jus, that which is owed to another, fosters communication
between individuals. But communication supposes a state of
Quadragesimo Anno. op. cit., p. 44.
Cf. St. Thomas, Ill Cont. Gent .• 117-18,
13 Summa Theol., II-II, q.
a. 3, ad lum.
11

12

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

543

separation between consciousnesses-he who owes something
to another has that which is not his own, while he to whom the
thing is owed is lacking something which belongs to him. The
equality is restored by the transferal of the object, the thing,
from one to the other. This transferal completes the function
of justice, regardless of the willingness of the debtor to part
with the thing or the appreciation of the one to whom it is
returned. On the other hand, communion involves participation, a union of consciousnesses. This participation, this communion, can take place only between person and person, and
not between person and thing as happens in justice. An end
common to person and person, the one loving and the one loved,
affords the basis for this union of consciousnesses, and since
all men share in the ultimate end of eternal beatitude to which
they are ordered by God, this end provides the supreme basis
for communion among men. Consequently, charity, which
effects the union of men with their ultimate end, through which
the interpenetration of
one loving and the one loved in God
is accomplished, is required for that communion of minds and
hearts of which social peace is born. 14
The following statement of Pope Pius XI might be urged
in objection: "All the institutions of public and social life
must be imbued with the spirit of justice, and this justice must
above all be truly operative. It must build up a juridical and
social order able to pervade all economic activity." 15 Certainly
such a " juridical and social order " achieved through justice,
as the Pontiff envisions, would provide peace. Through justice
alone, no; through justice informed by charity, yes, for the
same Holy Father urges: " Social charity should be, as it were,
the soul of this order." 16
The objection might be considered in another light. Since
the object of justice, particularly legal justice, is the common
good, and the maintenance of the common good insures social
order, it would seem that justice alone is sufficient. St. Thomas
"Cf. III Cont. Gent., 117.
York: 1938), pp. 184-93.
16 Op. cit., p.

2

Cf. also N. Berdyaev, Solitude and Society (New
16

Ibid.

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LOUIS A. RYAN

shows, however, that even the virtue which is ordered to the
common good is imperfect unless actuated by charity.
If we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end, then
we may speak of virtue being where there is no charity insofar as
it is directed to some particular good. If this particular good is not
a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is ordained
to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. . . . If, on the other hand,
this particular good be a true good, for instance the welfare of the
state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue, imperfect, however,
unless it be referred to the final and perfect good. Accordingly, no
strictly true virtue is possible without charity. 17

Having shown the necessity of charity for the reconstruction
of the social order, a brief treatment of its nature must be
introduced. Charity, is defined by St. Thomas as" a friendship
of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting
happiness." 18 It is, first of all, "friendship of man for God,"
with the two main elements of all friendship, similarity and
intercommunication or communion. Through his intellectual
nature on the natural plane, through sanctifying grace, the
theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, the infused moral
virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Ghost on the supernatural
level, man is like to God. The communion or intercommunication between friends is realized between God and man by the
life of grace inasmuch as by faith man comes to an adequate
though only imperfect knowledge of God a,s He· has revealed
Himself to man, and inasmuch as, by prayer, man communicates with God and God with man through the operation of the
gifts of the Holy Ghost. 19 St. Thomas summarizes the foundation of charity in these words: "The friendship of charity is
based on the fellowship of happiness, which consists essentially
in God, as the First Principle, whence it flows to all who are
capable of happiness." 20
Summa Theol., II-II, q.
a. 7.
Ibid., q.
a. 2.
19 Cf. L. M. Bond, 0. P., "A Comparison Between Human and Divine Friendship," THE THOl\1IST, III (1941), 98.
'20 Summa Theol., II-II, q.
a. 2.
17

18

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

545

Charity embraces a threefold object-God, self, and neighbor. " God is loved as the principle of good, on which the love
of charity is founded, while man, out of charity, loves himself
by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and
loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good." 21
In this operation, charity is singularly active, it is the driving
power, the form of all the other virtues. Since in morals the
form of an act is taken chiefly from its end, and since charity
directs the acts of all the other virtues to the ultimate end,
God, it is said to be the form of the other virtues, " not as
being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by
way of efficient cause, insofar as it sets the form on all." 22
Incidently this concept of charity as the form of all the driving
powers of living throws a new light on the word " reform "
as used in the recent statement of the Archbishops and Bishops
of the Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare
Conference, entitled The Church and Social Order: " When
we speak of the establishment of a right social order, we understand thereby a reform in the concept and organization of the
state respecting its responsibility for public welfare; secondly,
a reform in the other fundamental social institutions; and
thirdly, and quite emphatically, a reform or correction of
morals." (Author's italics.) 23
Whatever God requires of man is included in a precept. 24
He requires man to seek good in all his actions, especially
the good which is the goal of life, obtained through charity.
And as St. Thomas explains: " Since good is the object of
dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a means,
it is fitting that there should be two precepts of charity,
one whereby we are induced to love God as our end,
and another whereby we are led to love our neighbor for God's
sake, as for the sake of our end." 25 These two precepts are:
"' Ibid., a. 4; cf. q. 27. a. 8; q. 25, a. 1.
22 Ibid., q. 28. a. 8. ad !urn.
•• The Church and Social Order (Washington: N.C. W. C., 1940), p. 28.
Cf. Summa. Theol., IT-IT, q. 44, a. 1.
•• Ibid., q. 44, a. 8.

2•

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LOUIS A. RYAN

" Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,
and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind"; and
" Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." 26 On these two
commandments depend the whole Law and the prophets. 27
St. Thomas, in his opusculum De Duobus Praooeptis Caritatis,
beautifully shows how the Ten Commandments, the eternal
Magna Charta of human living, particularize the obligations of
charity, three precepts relating to the love of God, and seven
referring to the love of neighbor ,28
For a proper understanding and, especially, for the prudent
and fruitful application of the virtue and precept of charity,
the doctrine on the order in charity is of vital importance.
Who comes first in our affections-God or neighbor, God or
self, self or neighbor, parents or children, friends or enemies,
etc., etc.? The answer to all these extremely practical problems
which vex social thinkers today is to be found in the TwentySixth Question of St. Thomas' tract on charity in the Secunda
Secundae of the Summa Theologica. In the first article of that
question, the Angelic Doctor establishes the existence of an
order in charity. He reasons that wherever there is a principle
there is order, since "before" and "after," the requisites for
order, are used in relation to some principle. But in those things
which are loved out of charity there is a principle. Therefore
there is an order in charity. St. Thomas sums up his conclusion
thus: "There must be some order in things loved out of charity,
which order is in reference to the first principle of the love, which
is God." 29 The obligation of observing this order, of which we
shall see more later, is of divine precept. "The mode which is
essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which
prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is
essential to the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of
love to the thing beloved." 30
Matthew, xxii, 37, 38.
Ibid., 40.
Cf. Thd Commandments of God (London: 1987), pp. 27, 88-89.
•• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 26, a. l.
•• Ibid., q. 44, a. 8.
28

27

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL OIIDER

547

The necessity, nature, and obligation of charity having been
set forth, a statement of the problem of this paper is now
opportune. Because there is a great need of a reconstruction
of the social order, and because amidst a maze of conflicting
remedies the Church, in her traditional theology and in the
encyclicals of her modern Pontiffs on the social question,
teaches that charity is the " bond of perfection " that will
reunite society, and because an understanding of the order in
charity is essential for a proper appreciation of the profoundly
social acts and effects of the virtue and the vast problems con··
nected with them, it is proposed: first of all, to set forth the doctrine on the order in charity with special :reference to love of
neighbor as outlined by St. Thomas Aquinas; secondly, to
sketch the historical evolution of some modern theories of social
reconstruction which claim love in some shape or form as a principle of social order, viz., individualism, classism, statism, racism;
and lastly, to compare the Catholic doctrine with that of these
several modern " isms." It is an attempt to interpret social
thinking, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, in the light of that
tremendously important, often misunderstood, infallibly proclaimed thing, called love.
II. ORDER IN LOVE OF NEIGHBOR
In this section, the doctrine of St. Thomas on the order in
love of neighbor will be.brie:fly presented, in elucidation of that
great social bond which should be the soul of the new social
order, and in preparation for an examination of the sociologistic
concepts of love and self-interest which will be undertaken in
succeeding sections. The absolutely first consideration of the
order of charity has to do with the object, since the object
determines the order in human affairs. Following the treatment
of the object will come an explanation of the manne1· of the
love of neighbor-a search into the significance of those highly
important words, "as thyself." Lastly,, the problem of the
degrees of love of neighbor will be studied with a view to the
establishment of a precise-as precise as principles will per-

548

LOUIS A. RYAN

mit-determination of the order to be observed in the love of
all men, be they kinsfolk, friends, or enemies. Having understood the "why," "how," and" to what degree" of the virtue
of charity, we shall better appreciate the implications of contrary doctrines as they are presented later on, even before a
definite criticism of them is made.

*

*

*

Treating of the precept of charity, "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself," in answer to the question whether the
precept is fittingly expressed, St. Thomas replies affirmatively,
since the precept indicates both the reason for loving and the
mode or manl:l_er of love. The reason, he writes, " is indicated
in the word neighbor, because the reason why we ought to love
others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to
the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory." 31
Were all men of a keener intellect there would be no need of
giving this particular commandment on the love of neighbor.
The law of the love of God would have been sufficient. The
precepts are to the law what propositions are to the speculative
sciences in which the first principles virtually contain the conclusions. In moral affairs the end has the character of a principle, and the love of God is the end to which love of God is
ordained. But since some who know the principles are unable
to consider all that is virtually contained in them, it is necessary that for them scientific conclusions be traced to their ultimate principles. Thus, in the matter of charity, as St. Thomas
observes, " it behooved us to receive precepts not only of the
love of God but also of the love of our neighbor, on account of
those who are less intelligent, who do not understand that one
of these precepts is included in the other." 32
When St. Thomas says that the reason for loving according
to the second precept of the New Law is indicated in the word
neighbor, it is not to be understood that the motion of love falls
first upon the neighbor and through him to God. Charity
81

Summa Theol., II-IT, q. 44, a. 7.

•• Ibid., a.

CHARITY

AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

549

essentially is a friendship between two people, the soul of the
individual man and God. Man loves things other than God
only so far as they pertain in some way to God-an extension
of the love of man for God in Himself. It is in this way
that all men, even one's enemies, fall within the great orbit of
charity.
Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of
himself and in this way friendship never extends but to one's friend:
secondly, it extends to someone in respect to another, as, when a
man has a friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all
belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him
in any way. Indeed, so much do we love our friends, that for their
sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us;
so that, in this way, the friendship of charjty extends even to our
enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to whom
the friendship of charity is chiefly directed. 33

It is upon this concept that the whole order of charity is
based. The fundamental reason for loving our neighbor is not
a common nature, common nation, common economic or social
goals-grounds adduced by the new humanitarianism, racism,
fascism, communism-but the common ground of divine life
which God grants to all who are His. 34 It is not the humanitarian notion of service through neighbor to God; rather it is
service to neighbor through God. "We do not reach God
•• Ibid., q. 23, a. 1, ad 2um.
•• In the opusculum, De Duobus Praec:eptis Caritatis, St. Thomas lists four things
which lead us to the love of our neighbor:
(1) The first is the love of God; because if "any man say: 'I love God,' and
hateth his brother, 'he is a liar" (I Jn., 4: 20).
(2) The second is God's
For Christ on the point of His departure
impressed on His. disciples this precept above all others: " This is my commandment, that ye love one another, even as I have loved you" (Jn., 15: 12).
(3) The third is our common nature: for as it is said (Ecdus., 13: 19), "every
animal loves its like." Wherefore seeing that all men are like in nature they
should love one another: and consequently to hate one's neighbor is not only
contrary to the divine law, but also to the law of nature.
(4) The fourth is the profit to be gained thereby: in as much as charity puts
whatever we have at another's service: for it is charity that unites the Church
and makes all things common (The Commandments of God [London, 1937], pp.
18-19).

550

LOUIS A. RYAN

through our neighbor, rather we reach our neighbor through
God. . . . There are no short cuts to altruism; we must go
the long, triangular way around, through God to neighbor." 85
After determining the object of love of neighbor, the manner
or mode of this love has to be treated. The very precept given
by Christ specifies how man should love his fellow-men-as
thyself. St. Thomas has succinctly explained the meaning of
this phrase:
The mode of love is indicated in the words as thyself. This does
not mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but
in like manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards
the end, namely, that he should love his neighbour for God's sake,
even as he loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his
neighbour is a holy love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love,
namely, that a man should not give way to his neighbour in evil,
but only in good things, even as he ought to gratify his will in good
things alone, so that his love for his neighbour may be a righteous
love. Thirdly, as regards the reason for loving, namely, that a man
should love his neighbour not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in
the sense of wishing his neighbour well, even as he wishes himself
well, so that his love for his neighbour may be a true love: since
when a man loves his neighbour for his own profit or pleasure, he
does not love his neighbour truly, but loves himself. 86

The norm of the love of neighbor is the love of self-of self

••w. Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa (New York: 1940), III, 68.
•• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 44, a. 7; In the opusculum, De Duobus PTeceytis
Caritatis, St. Thomas lists five points which should be observed in the love of
neighbor:
(1) The first is that we must love our neighbor as truly as we love ourselves;
and this we do if we love him for his own sake and not for ours. . . .
The second is that we must love him ordinately; that is to say, we must
not love him more than God, or as much as God, but in God even as thou must
love thyself ....
(S) The third is that we must love our neighbor efficaciously: since thou not
only lovest thyself, but thou dost endeavour to get good things for thyself, and
to avoid what is bad for thyself ....
(4) The fourth is that we must love our neighbor perseveringly, even as we
persevere in loving ourselves. . . .
(5) The fifth is that we should love our neighbor justly and holily, that is, not
with a sinful purpose, since neither should we love ourselves thus, seeing that by
doing so we lose God (Cf. The C0'1111TTUJ,11dmmtaof God, pp.

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

551

in order to God. "The love by which we love ourselves is the
form, the basis, of the friendship which we have for others." 37
It may immediately be objected that man cannot love himself
out of charity, since charity is a type of friendship, and friendship is ·between two persons; whereas in love of self but one
person is considered. If we consider charity under the general
notion of friendship, it is quite true to say that man is not a
friend to himself. He is preciously more than a friend. Friendship implies union; but a man, in self-love, more than being
united to another, is one with himself, and unity is greater
than union. On the other hand, if we speak of charity in its
specific nature, as denoting man's friendship with God in the
first place, and secondly, with the things of God, among which
is the man himself who has charity, then man can be said to
love himself. 38 Approaching charity in this light, it becomes
clear not only that the individual should love himself, but
also that he should love himself next to God and more than his
neighbor.
God is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity
is founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of
his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor
by reason of his fellowship in that good. Now fellowship is a reason
for love according to a certain union in relation to God. Wherefore
just as unity surpasses union, the fact that man himself has a
share of the divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that
another should be a partaker with him in that share. Therefore,
man, out of charity; ought to love himself more than his neighbour,
in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any evil of sin,
which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may free
his neighbour from sin. 89

The efficacy of the basic golden rule depends on this truth: we
do unto others as we do unto ourselves. St. Thomas quotes
Aristotle's comment in the Ethics: 40 "The origin of friendly
relations with others lies in our relations with ourselves." Without succumbing to Spencerian individualism, we can say that
Farrell, op. cit., p. 79.
•• Summa Theol., 11-II, q. 25, a. 4.

87

•• Ibid., q. 26, a. 4.

•• Ethics, Bk. IX. 4, 8.

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LOUIS A. RYAN

true altruism has as its basis a sound egoism, an egoism based
on the love of God.
Lest this establishing of self-love as a norm of man's social
relations be confused with erroneous notions prevalent in modern social theory, it is well to recall St. Thomas' distinction of
the three types of self-love. 41 He teaches that self-love may
stand in a threefold relation to charity. First of all, when a
man places his end in the love of his own personal good, as is
the case with individualist philosophies, self-love is contrary to
charity. When a man loves himself for the sake of God and in
God, it is included in charity. Thirdly, self-love is distinct from
charity, but not contrary to it, when a man loves himself from
the viewpoint of his own good, but not establishing his own
good as an ultimate end; thougb distinct from it, this self-love
is referable to charity.
A further explanation of the meaning of love of self is to be
found in the tract on charity in the Summa Theologica:
Love of self is common to all, in one way; in another way it is
proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to the wicked. For
it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks himself to
be. Now a man is said to be a thing in two ways: first, in respect
of his substance and nature, and this way all think themselves to
be what they are, that is, composed of soul and body. In this way,
too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, in so far as
they love their own preservation. Secondly, a man is said to be
something in respect of some predominance. . . . In this way, all
do not think themselves to be what they are .... Now the good
look upon their rational nature or the inward man as being the
chief thing in them, wherefore in this way they think themselves
to be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon their
sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward man, to hold the
first place. ·wherefore, since they know not themselves aright, they
do not love themselves aright, but love what they think themselves
to be. 42

The characteristics of true self-love are five, corresponding
to the five things which Aristotle proved proper to friendship.
11

Summa Theol .• 11-11, q. 19, a. 6.

'"Ibid .• q.

a. 7.

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

553

Just as every one wishes his friend to be and to live, desires good
things for him, does good things to him, takes pleasure in his company, and is at peace, of one mind, with him, sharing his joys and
sorrows, so also the good love themselves as to the inward man
because they wish his preservation in its integrity. They desire
spiritual goods for him; they do their best to obtain them; they
take pleasure in entering into their own hearts with the good
thoughts of the present, memory of past accomplishments, and
hope of future success, all fecund sources of spiritual pleasure;
finally, they are at peace, they experience no clashing of wills,
since their whole soul tends to one thing, God. 43
Having established that God is to be loved first of all out of
charity, secondly self, and then our neighbor, it now remains to
determine the order, if such there be, in the love of neighbor.
It was taught in the time of St. Thomas, and it is being taught
today, that one ought to love all neighbors equally as far as the
interior affection is concerned, but not as regards the outward
effect, in which a gradation of love is quite evident, and necessarily so. St. Thomas rejected this opinion as " unreasonable,"
and maintained that even as regards the interior affection we
ought to love one neighbor.more than another. The affection
of charity, which is an inclination of grace, is not less orderly
than the natural appetite which is the inclination of nature.
Grace perfects, it does not destroy nature. In the physical order
the natural inclination of a thing is proportioned to the act or
movement which is becoming to the inward nature of that thing.
So in the supernatural order, the inclination of grace which is
the effect of charity is proportionate to those actions which are
performed outwardly. The exterior act is in proportion to the
interior love. 44 Had Herbert Spencer appreciated this principle,
he would not have blamed the anomaly of a theoretical " ethics
of amity " and a practical " ethics of enmity " upon the true
Christian love of neighbor. 45
•• Cf. ibid.
•• Cf. ibid., q. 26, a. 6.
•• Cf. H. Spencer, Principles of Ethics (New York: 1897), I, 818-18; 822-!W.

554

LOUIS A. RYAN

Once the correspondence between the outward action and the
interior affection is evident, then a definite order in the love of
neighbor can be shown to exist, based upon the nature of the
virtue of charity itself. Order depends upon a principle, and
since in charity the principle of love is God and the person who
loves, the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness of the neighbor to one or the other of these terms. 46
The love of neighbor may, like every act, be considered in
relation to its object or to its agent. The relation to the object
is the basis for specific differences 47 in the love of neighbor,
while the relation to the subject or agent founds the differences
in the intensity of the love. Regarding the specific differences in
the love of neighbor, St. Thomas has this to say:
Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover.
Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance
with charity, as regards the love of our neighbour, depends on his
relation to God, so that, out of charity we should wish a greater
good to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity
wishes to all, viz., everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it has
various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it belongs to charity to wish God's justice to be maintained, in accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness. 48

The intensity of the love of neighbor, however, is measured
with regard to the man who loves. Since union is the secret
of love, " man loves those who are more closely united to him,
with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for them,
than. he loves those who are better as to the greater good he
wishes for them." 49
•• Summa. Theol., II-II, q. 26, a. 6.
" The words " specific differences " are not to be understood as implying different
species of charity. Charity is one because its end, namely the goodness of God, is
one; and the fellowship of everlasting happiness on which this friendship of God
is based, is also one. " Charity is simply one virtue. and not divided into several
species." (Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 28, a. 5.) Cajetan explains St. Thomas' use
of the words as implying not specific differences as such, but differences which are
reductively or by a similitude specific (specifica reductive seu similitudi?wrie).
a. 7.)
(Op. cit., II-II, q.
•• Summa. Theol., II-II, q. 26, a. 7.
•• Ibid.

555

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

A difficulty immediately presents itself if the above doctrine
stand alone. If the specific differences, or what we might term
the objective evaluations of love, be based on the relation of
our neighbor to God, and if the intensities of love spring from
our subjective affection for those united to us, how explain
the fact that we actually love and prefer
who are closely
connected to us more than others who, to all appearances, are
more virtuous and therefore closer to God? Is it simply a
matter of the intensity of the love, or is it an objective evaluation by which, for example, a man loves his mother more than
he loves the heroic saint? In the same article in which he lays
down the principles for the objectivity and intensity of love,
the Angelic Doctor gives two additional reasons for what seems
to be an objective diversity of the love of neighbor which is
in accordance with charity.
First, though the objective goodness of a neighbor is to be
estimated by his closeness to God, our love for some blood
relative, whose claim to virtue is not equal to that of a holier
person, may 170 nevertheless be greater than our love for the
latter. For there are some neighbors, i. e., blood relatives,
fellow countrymen, who are connected with us by their natural
origin; this connection cannot be severed since that origin
makes them to be what they are. "But,'' as St. Thomas
observes, " the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to
God, can come and go, increase and decrease. . . . Hence it
is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man who is more
closely united to one, to be better than another, and so reach
a higher degree of happiness." 51
There is yet another reason why, out of charity, we love
more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we
love them in more ways. We should loveallmenout of our common charity, but with some we have certain other friendships
over and above the common bond of charity. Even as the art
which is concerned with the. end commands the art concerned
•• Cf. Cajetan. Commentarium in Summam Theol., 11-11, q.
Summa 'l'heol., 11-11, q.
a. 7.

01

a. 7.

556

LOUIS A. RYAN

with the means, so charity commands each act of another
friendship, be it based on race, nationality, or mutual interest,
for these friendships should be, and in virtuous people are,
directed to the ultimate in friendship, which is the love of God.
" Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is
akin or connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman
or for any like reason that is referable to the end of charity,
can be commanded by charity, so that, out of charity both
eliciting and commanding, we love in more ways those who are
more closely connected with us." '52
In judging, therefore, of the order to be observed in the love
of neighbor, three elements cooperate in forming our estimation-the closeness of the neighbor to God, the number of
reasons for loving him, and the closeness of his union with self.
The last two reasons really converge into one, for the number
of reasons for loving our neighbor are considered only insofar
as they bring him closer to the one loving. Mere multiplication
of common ties, as, for example, membership of neighbors in
the Kiwanis and Rotary Clubs, in the same political party,
or automobile and golf associations, does not of itself constitute
a justification of greater love for one bound to self by these ties.
The relationships which give title to greater love are those
that bring the neighbor closer to the self than others not bound
to the self by these ties.
In applying these norms, it is to be noted, first of all, that
a judgment on the closeness of our neighbors to God is in
itself very difficult. Unless by reason of state or office or fixity
of life (as is the case with those in the religious and episcopal
state, those ordained to the priesthood, and the souls of the
faithful departed) certain people are marked as being close
to God, there is no very sure manner of determining which of
our neighbors are closer to God. And since virtue is not only
difficult of perception, but also transitory in the sense that it
may be forfeited by sin, the judgment is rendered the more
precarious. In treating of the virtue of humility, 58 St. Thomas
52

Ibid.

68

Ibid., q. 161, a. 8.

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

557

is very careful to speak of virtue which appears to be in others,
and because one cannot well judge of the virtue of others,
St. Thomas teaches that humility does not require that that
which is of God in one's self be subject to that which appears
to be of God in another (ei quod apparet esse Dei in altero) .
Accordingly, the most practical norm for judging of the
self's love for others is this: those who are more closely united
to the self are to be loved more out of charity. At first sight
this criterion seems highly egotistical and, moreover, contrary
to the norm originally laid down by the Angelic Doctor, namely,
that those who are closer to God are to be loved more out of
charity. However, if we conceive of the principle of the order
in charity for any particular person, not as God simply or the
self simply, but as the relationship between GoJ and the selfthe friendship itself and not merely the persons between whom
the friendship exists-then we can see how this criterion is
valid. On the part of the neighbor loved, it is not a question
of a mere relationship between himself and the one loving
(thou-ego) ; rather there is a proportional relationship
between himself and the principle, which is the friendship
existing between God and man, i. e., the one loving [thoucharity (ego-God)]. Similarly, in charity, the one loving, the
self, loves the neighbor more who is more closely connected
with him by ties of family, blood, country, or by some other
legitimate bond, not inasmuch as this or that tie bindE the
neighbor closer to the self as self alone (self-thou), but because
this or that tie, capable of being elevated and supernaturalized
in the love of God, actually, i£ imperated by charity, binds the
neighbor closer to the self as loving God [self-charity (thouGod) ].54
•• Cf. Cajetan, op. cit., 11-11, q. 44, a. 8: In eodem articulo dubium est de ratione
reddita in littera, scil., " cum ordo caritatis accipiatur secundum proportionem
dilectionis ad diligibile." Quoniam superius, dictum est quod ordo caritatis attenditur
penes duo, scil. diligentem et diligibile. Quomodo ergo nunc soli diligibili attribuitur?
Ad hoc dicitur quod verba litterae sunt intelligenda de diligibili simpliciter, vel
huic. Ita quod ordo caritatis meae accipitur secundum proportionem dilectionis
vel ad diligibile simpliciter, vel ad diligibile mihi. Ut sic quicumque ducatur ad
proportionem .diligentis ad diligibile, ut hie dicitur. Nee discrepat a supra-dictis;

558

LOUIS A. RYAN

This conception of charity is tremedously important, and
essential to an understanding of the role of love of neighbor
in the social order. It makes manifest how charity may gather
up and sanctify all the legitimate human ties and affections
binding men together in the exercise of social life. At the same
time, this truth discloses the root of the social " isms " contrary
to that of charity-individualism and collectivism. Once take
God out of the relationship between self and neighbor, and the
way is paved for two socially false princjples-either the self
assumes the prerogatives of the divinity which it has displaced
in the relationship, to the destruction of ordered (because the
principle has been destroyed) love of neighbor, as happens in
individualism; or the neighbors, at least taken together, are made
the ultimate end (because their relationship to God is gone),
to the destruction of the personality of the self, as happens in
collectivism.
The doctrine of the Angelic Doctor plus the elucidations and
distinctions of the more penetrating commentators on this
subject may be briefly recapitulated as follows:
First, we may love one person more than another in three
ways: (I) objectively, in that we love more him to whom we
wish the greater good; (2) appreciatively, in that we love
more him whom we prefer (simpliciter) and esteem more than
another, so that we fear more to lose his friendship than that
of another; (3) intensively, in that we love one more than
another with a warmer affection, with a greater intensity of act
and vehemence of wil1.55
With the help of these distinctions, the question as to
whether we should love more those who are better, i. e., closer
ad quae se i:emittens hie auctor voluit haec intelligi juxta supra determinata, quae
ad hanc brevem glossam reducuntur. Ordo enim caritatis ex parte diligibilis habet
ut propinquius Deo magis diligatur: ex parte autem diligentis habet ut propinquius mihi magis diligatur a me. Sed hie ordo reducitur ad proportionem dilectionis
ad diligibile: quia propinquius mihi est magis diligibile a me. Et propterea sicut
actus dilectionis respectu magis propinqui Deo est improportionatus objecto nisi
magis ametur quam minus propinquium; ita actus meae dilectionis respectu
domestici mei est improportionatus objecto nisi magis. ametur a me quam extraneus.
a.
•• Cf. Toletus, CO'f!l'mtmtariumin Summam S. Thomae, 11-11, q.

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

559

to God, or those who are more closely united to us, may be
resolved in the following conclusions:
(1) Those who are. better, the more virtuous, are to be
loved more in one way, tha:t is, objectively and directly, by a
love based on the spiritual goodness they already possess. We
ought to rejoice in the goodness possessed by them, to wish
them the greater beatitude that is due to them by reason of this
goodness. They are closer to God, more worthy, and therefore
we owe them more reverence, veneration and honor.
(2) Those who are more closely united to us are, all things
being equal, 56 to be loved more in all the other ways, viz.,
a) First of all, intensively. Love is a motion of the one
loving towards the one loved, and since the impetus of motion
falls more forcibly upon that which is closer than that which is
farther removed, so the motion of love for those closer to us is
more intense than that for others.
b) Secondly, appreciatively. Those should be loved more
who are loved by more titles, more modes of love or friendships
which are imperated by charity. And since those who are more
closely related to us are united to us by titles or friendships
over and above the common friendship of charity, they are to
be preferred before and esteemed more than others not so
closely related, insofar as these other relationships aa-e
imperated by charity. 57
c) Lastly, those who are more closely united to us may be
loved more objectively but indirectly: objectively in the sense
that we may wish them a greater goodness than others who,
though more virtuous, may yet lose the goodness which they
•• Cf. F. Sylvius, Commentarium in Totam Secundam Secundae S. Thomae
Aquinatia (Venice: 1726), III, ISO. Quando non omnia cetera sunt paria, potest
esse, quod magis debemus diligere et adjuvare meliores. . . .
67 Cf. Cajetan, op. cit., Conjunctiores secundum pluribus titulis magis diliguntur
quam alii: diliguntur enim tainquam aetemae vitae capaces, tanquam 'Consanguinei,
tanquam concives et familiares, etc. Et hoc· non solum dilectione naturali, sed
etiam charitativa: nam charitas. imperare potest actus aliarum amicitiarum, et eos
ad finem suum supematuralem ordinare; ergo qui . sic sunt conjunctiores, debent
magis diligi.

3

560

LOUIS A. RYAN

have; and indirectly, in that the good we wish those more
closely united to us is not yet possessed, in contrast, e. g., to the
objectively direct love of the saints in heaven who already
possess their
For the translation of these principles into social practice,
yet more qualifications have to be made (the threefold division
of unions into carnal, spiritual, and civil, the special principles
regulating the love of others according to these types, as well
as the variations in the obligation and order of charity according to the different kinds of necessity in which our neighbors
find themselves) all of which are vital to a comprehension of
the influence of charity in the social order. The consideration
of these, however, we shall leave to the final discussion where
we shall show their relation to the multiple "isms " that have
attempted to supplant the love of neighbor as the crowning,
all-pervasive principle of social structure.
For the present, we shall continue our review of the doctrine
on the order in charity treated by St. Thomas in the Summa
Theologica. 59 After answering the question as to whether we
ought to love more those who are better or those who are more
closely united to us, the Angelic Doctor proceeds to more
particular considerations
on the various kinds of union.
Man ought to love more those who are closely united to him.
Union is the norm of comparison} where it is a question of more
reasons for loving our neighbor, there are several unions to be
considered; where it is a question of only one relationship
compared to ,another, one union will be more intense orremiss.
In affirmative answer to the question " Whether we ought to
love more those who are connected with us by ties of blood,"
St. Thomas considers the nature of the union of blood relatives
in itself, and states that it is prior to and more stable than all
others, " because it is something affecting the very substance,
supervene and may cease altogether." 60
whereas other
•• Cf. B. H. Merkelbach, Su1TIIf/U1, Theologiae Mcwalia (Paris: 1985), I, 696-97.
•• Su1TIIf/U1, Theol., 11-11, q. 26.
•• Ibid., a. 8.

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

561

While the Angelic Doctor admits that other friendships may be
stronger because of something that is proper to each of them,
the friendship of kindred, because of this union of blood, is
more stable; and stability, the continuance of the perfection
which is act, is to be preferred to that which is transitory. Love
of kinsfolk would, then, all things being equal, come first in the
order of love of neighbor. Again it is grace building upon
nature.
But even within the family circle there are varying gradations of charity to be observed. Should a man, out of charity,
love his children more than his father? Should a man love
his mother more than his father? Should a man love his wife
more than his father and mother? The answers to these queries
are given by St. Thomas in his treatment of the order of
charity. Because a man's father is a principle of his being,
and so more like to God the first principle of all being, a man
ought to love his. father more than his children as far as the
reasons for loving are concerned. But considering the question
from the viewpoint of the union, a man ought to love his
children more than his father. Children are part of their
parents, and so the love of a father for his children is more
like a man's love for himself. The effective implications of
the effective love of father and children make the doctrine
clearer in a practical way. Since the debt due to a principle
is submission of respect and honor, and debt due to the effect
is one of influence and care, a man is .chiefly obliged to show
honor to his father, the principle, and care to his children, the
effebts of his
Regarding a man's love of father and
mother, if the father be considered precisely as father and the
mother precisely as mother, St. Thomas teaches that the father
ought to be loved more than the mother, since the father is an
active principle of generation and the mother a passive and
material principle. 62 That which is active is more perfect than
that which is passive. As for a man's love for his parents and
81

Cf. ibid., a. 9 c., ad 1um; Comm. in V Ephes., lect. 10.

as Ibid., a. 10.

LOUIS A. RYAN

his wife, he should love ·his parents more as principles, but on
the part of the union, he should love his wife more. 63
Passing from the family circle to that of a man's friends,
those who have been benefactors to him or those whom he has
benefited, since benefactors are principles of a man's good
in that they contribute to his spiritual or bodily welfare,
they are to be loved more as far as the reason for loving is
concerned than those whom a man benefits. On the part of the
connection between the benefactor and the beneficiary, however, those whom one benefits are to be loved more than one's
benefactor, because the act of giving is more perfect than the
receiving of gifts. "It is the lover's part to act, since he wills
and works the good of the beloved, while the beloved takes a
passive part in receiving good, so that to love surpasses being
loved, for which reason the greater love is on the part of the
benefactor." 64
The precept of charity obliges to the love of all neighbors,
enemies as well as kindred and friends. The love of one's
enemies may be understood in three ways: 65 first, the love of
enemies as such; secondly, the love of enemies as to their nature
but in general; and, thirdly, a special movement of love towards
enemies in particular. Obviously, charity does not oblige in the
first sense; love of that which is evil in another is incompatible
with the love of the greatest good, God. Man is bound to· love
his enemies as to their nature and in general, since they are
not contrary to him as men and they are capable of happiness.
As for the special movement of love towards enemies, it is not
absolutely required, but pertains to the perfection of charity.
Charity does require that· man be prepared in mind to love his
enemies individually, if the necesaity were to occur. Signs and
favors of love such as are shown to neighbors in general must
be shown to enemies as well .as to friends, but the favors or
signs of love which man shows to particular friends are not due
Ibid., a. 11.
Ibid., a.
85 Cf. ibid., q.
81
8'

a. 8.

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

568

to enemies, save in case of urgency. 66 "If thy enemy be hungry,
give him to eat; if he thirst, give him drink." 61
In summary, we have seen that the object of love of neighbor
is God. All neighbors fall within the ken of charity because
they are capable of possessing the eternal happiness of the
greatest good, and in our love we wish them a share in that
goal which is God. The manner or mode of love of neighbor
is expressed in the words, as thyself, which indicate that the
form which specifies man's love of self in God is that which
regulates his love of those about him. A profoundly significant
corollary of this is the truth that increase in charity is not so
much a question of ever-greater absorption in the service of
others, but rather a deepening of the love of God in oneself.
That more beneficial work for others often follows on this
intensity of self-love is quite true, but it is an effect, not a
cause of greater love. The diverse approximations of man's
neighbors to this norm of self-love provides the basis for an
order in the love of kindred, friends and even enemies. It is
always a question of going back to the principle, the love
whose end is God and whose subject is self.
The social implications of this doctrine are great, and were
it more fully understood and, practiced a new harmony would
soon pervade the structure of society. One in its object,
universal in its extension, hierarchical in its application, charity
is indeed the " soul " of a social order possessing unity in
diversity and diversity in unity.
LOUIS

A. RYAN, 0. P.

Dominican Ho'U8e uf Studies,
Washington, D. 0.

(Part II will appear in the next issue.)

•• Ibid., a. 9.
•• Proverbs, xxv, 21.

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS
I

I

MATHEMATICAL AND METAPHYSICAL ANALOGY
IN ST. THOMAS

T is a significant fact that St. Thomas, following Aristotle,
uses the words " analogy " and " proportion " interchangeably; that is, he takes them to be synonymous. For instance, in his Commentary/ on the Metaphysics we find the
expression " proportion or analogy "
vel analogia); 1 in his Commentary on the Ethics, the expression" according to analogy, that is, the same proportion" (secundum
analogiam, idest proportionem eamdem) ; 2 and lest there be
any doubt about the matter at all, in the Quaestiones Disputatae De V eritate we have the categorical statement that " according to analogy " means nothing else than " according to
proportion." 8 Ordinarily, however, we think of "proportion"
as being primarily and above all a mathematical term, and the
theory of proportion as belonging primarily and in the strict
sense to the science .of mathematics, and in particular to geometry. Hence if by "analogy" St. Thomas only means "proportion," then it would seem that if the theory of analogy has
any really scientific application in philosophy, this application
must consist in some sort of extension· of the .mathematical
notion of analogy into the domain of philosophical science. One
may well ask, however, how any such extension could possibly
be valid, for is it not true that in philosophy we are outside the
In V Metaph., lect. 8, Cathala ed., n. 879.
• In IV Ethic., lect. 7, n. 96. In his Commentaries on the Physics and the De
Coelo et Mundo of Aristotle, see also: I Phys., lect. 18, n. 7 (Leonine ed.); 1.18,
n. 9; I De C. et M., I. 14, ns . .3-4; ll, I. 11, n. 4; and in his Comp. Theol. see ch. 27.
Cf. also Opusc. De Prin. Nat., in fine.
8 Q. ft, 11, corpus.
1

564

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS

565

order of quantity in the ordinary mathematical sense? Is this
not especially true in metaphysics? Certainly, in philosophy we
have attained to a level of abstraction outside or above the
corporeal order, but where there are no bodies, how can there
be any quantity? Where there is no quantity, how can there be
any proportions or " analogies " in a truly scientific sense-in
any sense other than a merely literary or metaphorical one? If
"analogy" does have a truly philosophical role, that role must
be something more than, and other than, that of a mere figure
of speech, no matter how suggestive it may be. Nevertheless, it
is true that St. Thomas defines analogy in terms of proportion.
In fact, he says that " properly speaking, proportion is
nothing else than the relation of quantity to quantity, as for
instance, in the case of one (quantity) being the equal of
another, or the triple of it." 4 It is, as he says in the Summa
Theologica, " a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as the double, triple, and equal, are species of proportion." 5 Obviously, it is here a question of predicamental or
dimensive quantity, i.e., of that quantity which depends on
extension and is applicable only to bodies; so "proportion"
here signifies a definite, precise, determinate relation of one
dimensive quantity, continuous or discrete, to another, e. g.,
the relation of a surface to a surface or of a number to a
number. 6
Now this is proportion taken according to the first imposition
of the name. 7 In this sense proportion is univocal; it applies
only to the class of dimensive quantities, with respect to which
it always has the same meaning, namely, definite or fixed :relation of one quantity to another (certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram), and this holds whether the quantity in
• DeVer., q. 8, a. 1, ad 6um.
• I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4um.
• Number in the properly mathematical sense is an abstraction from real,
discrete, dimensive quantity, and therefore applies properly only to the latter.
(See below note H.)
1 See J. M. Ramirez:
"De Analogia ... ," in La Ciencia Tomista, vol. xxiv,
il·

566

JAMES F. ANDERSON

question be " commensurable " or " incommensurable." 8 Always it is a question of ratio in the strict Euclidean sense,9
namely of a determinate relation between dimensive quantities
or " magnitudes," whether commensurable or incommensurable.
The ratio need not be expressible in strict numerical units;
it may not be determinable by exact numerical calculation,
as in the case of the relation between the diagonal and the
side of a square. Nevertheless, mathematical ratio is always
formally univocal because:it has a formally
signification
wherever it is found.
Proportion or analogy in the mathematical sense is univocal.
The basic reason for this is that such analogy is restricted to the
genus or class of dimensive quantities, for a genus is predicated
of its inferiors according to a formality which is absolutely the
same in them all (secundum rationem omnino eamdem). Thus
"·animal " is predicated univocally of horse and of cow; it
designates a certain character formally identical in them both,
by reason of which they can be placed in the same class.1 ° For
instance, let us consider a typical mathematical proportion, or
what in Thomistic language is called a "proportionality," i.e.,
a proportion of proportions: thus
===
It is evident that
the common notion (triplicity) which is realized in both these
proportions is univocal; " triple " said of 6 in respect of is
identical in signification wiht " triple " said of 21 in respect of 7.
The same must be said of all strictly mathematical concepts;
they are all formally univocal because they apply only within
the order of dimensive quantity, whether continuous or discrete,
for in this sense of the term, quantity is generic, and every
genus is predicated univocally of the things that come under it.
Mathematical "proportions" (ratios) and "proportionalities" (proportions strictly so called) are analogies only as
regards the manner in which they are expressed. Formally and
intrinsically and properly they are not analogies, because they
See Euclid's Elements (Heath trans., 2nd ed., 1926), vol. II, p. 117.
Ibid., Book V, definitions iv, vi, and above all v.
10 St. Thomas Aquinas: IV Meta., lect. 1, n. 585 sq.; cf. X, lect. 8, n. 1966.

8

0

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS

567

do not conecrn concepts which are formally and intrinsically
and properly analogical. True, they exhibit an analogical
" form," and bear upon the relation between entities rather
than upon the entities themselves. It is true also that no notion
which is intrinsically analogical, that is to say, apt of its very
nature to be realized in the order of existence according to
essentially diverse modes, is found in them. Mathematical
ratios and proportions are not true analogies; they are " univocities " in the guise of true analogies. It is because they look so
much like analogies that they are so often mistaken for theman error which, pressed far enough, may undermine the whole
structure of a philosophy.
We have seen that St. Thomas defines analogy in terms of
" proportion," and that according to the first imposition of the
name proportion is nothing but a definite, fixed relation of one
dimensive quantity, continuous or discrete, to another, quantity of this sort being the proper subject of Diathematics. 11
Mathematical quantity is not the only sort of quantity.
Analogy, in the proper and philosophical sense, is not defined
in terms of mathematical quantity. If this were so, analogy
would be reduced to univocity. Analogy is not so defined
because quantity is twofold, being not only dimensive but
also "virtual"; and virtual quantity is quantity of power or
perfection. 12
Whereas dimensive quantity exists only in corporeal things,
virtual quantity exists in all things. Thus the name proportion,
11 Besides mathematical number
(which, being an abstraction from real discrete
dimensive quantity, is limited to that order), there is transcendental number, but
such number is not mathematieal but metaphysical, or, if you like, trans-mathematical. Those who argue that number (by which they mean mathematical
number) is really transcendental, for the simple reason that all things whatsoever
can be numbered (is not God Himself One and Three?) forget that only in the
transmathematical sense is number analogical. " Number" cannot be predicated
univocally of diverse orders of being. Thus a form is not " one" in the same
sense that a material individual is; and mathematical number applies properly only
to the latter type of being: it implies the division of matter, and it is univocal.
11 Summa Theol., I, q. ·
a. 1, ad lum; Q. D. de Ver., q. 29, a. 8 ("ad cujus
evidentiam . . .") .

568

JAMES F. ANDERSON

which was first imposed to signify the relation of one dimensive
quantity, continuous or discrete, to another, was extended to
signify any relation whatever of virtual quantity to virtual
qua:p.tity. This sort of quantity is transcendental; it "wanders
through " all the categories, for virtual quantity follows upon
being; from the fact that a thing is, it has virtual quantity as
regards its perfection in the order of being. 13
Virtual quantity resides first of all in the perfection of the
form or nature of a thing. Thus heat is called "great" because
of its intensity or perfection. Secondly, we find virtual quantity
in the effects of form, the first of which is being, for every thing
has being according to its form. The second effect of form,
however, is operation, for every agent acts through its form.
Hence there is virtual quantity both in the order of being
and in the order of operation; in the order of being inasmuch as
things of a more perfect nature have greater duration; in the
order of operation, inasmuch as such things have greater power
of acting. 14 So, finally, by extension, "proportion" came to
mean any relation whatsoever of one thing to another (quaelibet habitudo unius ad alteram) .15 Thus matter is said to be
"proportionate " to form; 16 the knowable object to the knowing faculty; 11 the effect to its cause; potency to act, and
'conversely. 18
Composite (as distinguished from simple) proportion entails
at least four terms, and is called "proportionality." In mathematics, "proportionality " designates the strict equality of two
relations, taking " equality " according to the first imposition
of the term in respect of mathematical quantities. When St.
Thomas defines proportionality as the equality of two propor18 Q. D. de V er., ibid. " . . . ex hoc quod dicitur
(i.e. quaelibet res) ens, consideratur in eo quantitas virtualis quantum ad perfectionem essendi."
14 Summa Theol., loc. cit.; cf. I-II, q. 52, a. 1; V Metapk., lect. 18, n. 1036-1038,
and I Sent., d. xix, q. 3, a. 1.
10 Summa Tkeol. I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4um; Q. D. de Ver., q. 8, a. 1, ad 6um.
1

"Q.D. de Ver., ibid.

11
18

Summa Theol. ill, Suppl. q. 92, a. 1, ad 6um.
Ibid. I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4um.

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS

569

tions/ 9 therefore, he is giving primarily its mathematical definition; but when he speaks of proportionality as the likeness of
two proportions/ 0 he is giving its properly metaphysical definition.21 Just as there is a simple proportion between 4 and 2,
and 20 and 10, in the
of dimensive quantity, so, in the
order of virtual quantity there is a simple proportion between
matter and form (in the physical order), and between essence
and existence (in the metaphysical order). And just as there
is equality in the proportions between 4 and 2, and 20 and 10,
so there is likeness in the proportions between matter and form,
and essence and existence (esse): matter : form, in the physical order, : : essence : existence, in the metaphysical order.
Indeed, proportion is · itself proportional. Thus proportion
of virtual quantity : proportion of dimensive quantity : : proportionality of virtual quantity : proportionality of dimensive
quantity. 22
Now it is true that St. Thomas sometimes gives mathematical
examples to explain metaphysical and theological analogy. 23 In
fact we find it very convenient to express such analogies in the
form of geometrical proportions; e. g.,
matter
form

potency
the created
the Uncreated
act ; participated being= unparticipated Being

Such formulas must not be interpreted in the quantitative
mathematical sense. As Penido says/ 4 philosophical analogy
differs toto coelo from mathematical analogy. Le Rohellec likewise warns us not to be. deceived by examples taken from arithmetic and geometry, lest the metaphysical problem of analogy
19

V Ethic., lect. 5, n. 989-940.

•• Q. D. de V er., q. 28, a. 7, ad 9um; IV Sent., d. xlix, q. 2, a. I, ad 6um.
•• See M. T.-L. Penido: Le Role de fanalogie en theologie dogmatique (Paris,
Vrin, I9SI), p. 28.

•• See Summa Theol., loc. cit.; Q. D. de Ver., q. 8, a. I, ad 6um; Ill Contra
Gentiles, ch. 54, in fine; In Boet. De Trin., q. I, a. 2, ad Sum; III Sent., d. I, q. 1,
a. 1, ad Sum. Cf. Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia (ed. Zammit, Rome, I984),
pp. 24-25.
•• E. g., In I Sent., d. XXXIV, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2um.
•• Op. cit., pp. 22-28.

570

.T.AMES F. .ANDERSON

be brought down to the mathematical level. 25 Mathematical
examples are here nothing but examples; their value is purely
illustrative.
Now " proportion " can be taken strictly or broadly. Strictly,
"proportion" designates the relation of two quantities, dimensive 01' virtual, according to a determinate excess or adequation.
If you have more than two terms, therefore, or even if you have
only two terms, the relation between which is not determinate
or 'finite, then in either case you will not have proportion in
the strict sense. Hence when St. Thomas denies that there is
any proportion between the finite and the infinite, between God
and creature, it is because they are not proportional to one
another in this strict, determinate, and finite way. 26 Broadly
considered, however, there is a proportion between two terms
which are even infinitely distant, and in this sense St. Thomas
admits a proportion between the creature and God. That is to
say, where "proportion" designates any relation whatsoever
of one thing to another, it can be truly said that there is a
propOTtion between the creature and God. 21
The crucial point is that proportion must and can not be
understood univocally. This means that proportion, in the
philosophical sense, cali.not be understood mathematically, for
if you take proportion mathematically, you are taking it according to the first imposition of the name-you are taking it
univocally. To take proportion univocally is to mathematicize
the doctrine of analogy. It is perfectly evidence that " proportion " is not univocal. In all things there are proportionsthere are relations and comparisons, but
there are as many modes of proportion as there are modes of
•• See his article, " De Fundamento ... ," in Divus Thomas (Placentiae),
vol.
(1926), 79.
•• E. g., this is evident in Q. D. de Ver., q. 2, a. 3, ad 4um; a. 11 (" unde
dicendum est ... "). Cf. Q. D. de Ver., q. 3, a. 1, ad 7um.
27 Summa Tkeol. I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 4um.
See also Q. D. de Ver., q. 8, a. 1,
ad 6um; q. 23, a. 7, ad 9um; Q. D. De potentia, q. 7, a. 10, ad 9um; Contra Gentiles,
c. 54, in fine; IV Sent., d. XLIX, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6um; Summa Theol. Ill, Suppl.,
q. 92, a. 1, ad 6um ("vel dicendum" ... ) .

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS

571

being. Proportion is itself proportional; analogy is itself analogical. It follows that there is something proportionately
common in all proportions. Thus by abstracting from all
particular proportions and types of proportion, we are left with
a notion in the highest degree universal, the notion of proporticmal likeness. This notion expresses the essence of analogy as
such. 28 It is the only kind of likeness we have in the only true
metaphysical analogy-analogy of proper proportionality.
Analogy of proper proportionality does not require that the
terms of the similar relations be really distinct. When we say
that God " is to " His Being as the creature " is to " its being, it
is evidence that the first relation is an identity. Nevertheless,
analogy of proper proportionality remains in effect, because it
concerns the likeness of relations-in this case, the perfect correspondence between essence and esse, both in respect of God
and of the creature. Indeed, the-analogy as such abstracts from
the fact that this instance of proportional likeness requires in
the case of the first proportion, identity, of the second, distinction. It likewise abstracts from the " distance," not merely
between the terms of the relations, but also between the relation.s themselves. St. Thomas states that that likeness which
consists in agreement of proportions obtains in the case of
things which are very "distant" from one another, as well as
between things which are not. Thus the likeness of proporticmality between 9l and 1, and 6 and 8 is no greater than that
between 9l and 1, and 100 and 50.29 The same applies to the
case noted above.
Whereas in a case of mathematical proportionality the
common notion is univocal in the two proportions, in a case of
metaphysical proportionality the common notion is analogical
in the strict sense in the two proportions. For instance:
matter
essence
· bemg
· t h at of potency---,---- =
.
t h e common notiOn
form
eXIstence
act, which is realized diversely in both proportions, because it
is here a question of two different orders of reality, the physical
•• See Ramirez, art. cit., p. 80.

•• Q.D. de Ver., q. !t, a. 11, ad 4um.

57fl

J .AMES F. .ANDERSON

and the metaphysical, hence of two essentially diverse modes
of being. 30 The analogous, says St. Thomas, is divided according to diverse modes (analogum dividitur secundum diversos
modos): 31 The community here is only relative or proportional.
The same applies to truth as attributed to the Div!ne Intelligence, the human intelligence, and to things: "the divine intellect is a measure that is not measured; natural things are
measures which are at the same time measured; but our intellect
is not a measure but only a thing that is measured." 112 So when
we use the expression" proportional likeness" to designate the
very essence of analogy, we are saying that the character of
analogy as such is not that of something common to the terms
in any given analogy, but to the relations between them.
Analogy is likeness of proportions, proportional likeness. 83 St.
Thomas, indeed, characterizes analogy as mutual likeness of
proportions (similitudo ad invicem proportionum) .34 The
essence of metaphysical analogy lies in proportionality.
All beings are proportionately one in being, yet every being
in respect of its esse, is diverse simply from every other being.
Thus· analogy is not a weak univocity. Nor is it merely the
least common denominator between univocal and equivocal
predication, for in the last analysis, analogy .is based on the
diversity of the act of being of all beings, of their esse, and the
similarity between the esse and suppositum (subject receiving
esse) of all beings. The relation between the act of being of one
essence and the act of being of another essence will always be
analogical by analogy of proper proportionality. This holds
even for beings of the same genus or species. The unity of all
beings in being is only proportional, consisting as it does only
in the analogical community of relations which all beings maintain with one another through their esse.35 Now only a true
•• Form is metaphysical, whereas form-matter is physical. Cf. De Ente et
Eaaentia, cap. IV, V.
81 I Sent., d. XXll, q. 1, a. 8, ad
so Q. D. de Ver., q. 1, a.
sa Cf. Penido, op. cit., pp.
•• Q. D. de Verr., q.
a. 11; q.
a. 7, ad 9um, et alibi.
•• See St. Thomas, Opusc. De Natura Generia, cap. 1; I Sent., d. XXXV,
q. 1, a. 4.

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578

analogy has scientifically certain or demonstrative value, and
we have a true analogy only where the members of the analogy
-the analogates-are somehow (i.e., proportionately) identical in a common term which is formally, entitatively, necessarily present in them. Without this inner, necessary connection
of being, the argument-by-analogy lacks a true middle terms. 86
The analogous form as common term in which all the analogates
share must be present in them formally, by intrinsic necessity.
Such is being, which is in the highest degree formal in all
things, 37 in all degrees, kinds, differences, and properties of
things, so that without it they would be nothing at all. If being
were univocal there would be only one essence, hence only one
being, hence no multiplicity, hence absolute monism. If being
were univocal, it would be a genus, but being is essentially included in everything of which it is predicated; hence it cannot
be limited by any difference (differentia); hence it cannot be a
genus. 38 The analogates of being, i. e., all things, are mutually
diverse and have unity only by reason of the fact that being is
present in them as their act. Thus metaphysical analogy is
rooted in the transcendental-ontological
relation in which all
beings stand to being as such, for being as being signifies only
being, pure act, no defect, no non-being, no potentiality. This
is why the ultimate basis of every analogy is the division of
being by potency and act. We have only to bear in mind the
fact that all' analogy presupposes multiplicity of being, inasmuch as in analogy a common
is predicated of several
inferiors. Remove plurality and you remove analogy, indeed,
even univocity, for the univocal predication of a common
character requires the existence of at least two things mutually
diverse. Without the real division of being by potency and act,
the multiplication of beings is impossible, and Parmenides'
dilemma remains.
•• Cf. Manser, "Die analoge Erkenntnis Gottes," in Divus Thomas (Frib.),
vol. 6 (1928), 398.
•• Summa Theol. 1-11, q. 94, a. 2; Q. D. de Pot., q. 8, a. 16, ad 4um, et alibi.
•• Summa Theol. I, q. 8, a. 5; I Cont. Gent., c. 25.

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JAMES F. ANDERSON

If a perfection is multiplied, it is divided, and if it is divided,
it is limited. Clearly, there can be a multiplication of acts, of
perfections or of forms only in the measure that the subjects
which receive them are multiplied. Our humanity, for instance,
would remain unique if there were no subjects or human individuals to multiply it. So, wherever there is the finite and the
multiple there is an act that is received, a capacity or subjective
potency which restricts that act in receiving it, and divides it in
communicating it to a plurality of diverse subjects. In a word,
wherever there is the finite and the multiple, there is real composition of potency and act. Where act is pure and unreceived
there is nothing but the limitless and the unique. 89
The distinction between essence and existence (esse) follows
upon that between potency and act: potency : act : : essence :
existence. Outside God there is a real distinction between the
first two; hence between the second two, taking essence as real
subjective potency (receptive capacity) and existence as ultimate act. If there is no real distinction between essence and
esse in things other than God, i. in all creatures, then there is
no analogy of .being. If being were not multiple, then being
would not be spoken of as multiple. Being would then be predicated of all things, of God and of creatures, in the same way
(secundum ration,em simpliciter eamdem). "Being" would
then signify the same order to being, viz., by identity, but where
there is no diverse order to being, predication remains entirely
univocal, and if being is univocal, then all other perfections are
it is a genus orlikewise univocal. Again, if being is
class, and if it is a class, then it is as such an ens rationis-a
pu;rely logical entity. If however being is a purely logical entity,
then there is no analogy. As we have seen, diversity in modes of
existing is required for analogy-and that, coupled with a certain unity, is all that is required. Remove the analogy of
being, however, and you remove all diversity in modes of existing, and hence all analogy. It is therefore clear that analogy is
based on the real division of being by potency and act.

e.,

•• See St. Thomas, Camp. Theol., c. 18; also I Coot. Gent., c. 48, and compare
c. 28 along with n, c. 52.

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS

575

Only in metaphysical· analogy, that is, in analogy of proper
proportionality, is the common analogous ratio, to wit, being,
formally and by intrinsic necessity present in all its analogates
as an " inhering form," so that Cajetan considers it the only
true analogy. 40
analogy bears on the likeness of
proportions or relations between diverse modes of being of
proportionately the same reality. Thus, essence : existence ::
potency : act (being) . The proportional likeness which is the
basis of metaphysical analogy is a similarity of dissimilars
(similitudo dissimilium) 41 founded not, as in the case of univocal likeness, on unity of species or genus, however distant,
but on diverse and unequal participation in an essential perfection proportionately common. 42 Analogical likeness is opposed
to all degrees of univocal likeness. Now the analogical perfection of analogical perfections is being. Being, like all transcendental concepts, is analogical by analogy of proper proportionality, for being is analogous by its very· essence and is
therefore apt to be realized in subjects which differ absolutely
and totally by their essence, as God and creatures do. 48 (It is of
course not analogous in the manner of a concept formally
univocal which can be applied " analogically " to diverse subjects, as in the case both of analogy of attribution and analogy
of metaphor .44 Being is found intrinsically in God and creature,
substance and accident, in all modes and types of being, no
matter how diverse.
When Aristotle defined metaphysics as the science of " being
as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its
own nature," 45 that is, the science of being and the transcendentals, the properties of all bejng as being, he set the theme
for all subsequent metaphysical speculation of a truly scientific
character. Aristotle well knew that all multiplicity and diversity
•• De Nominum Analogia, cap. 8.
41 See St. Thomas, Commentary
on Psalm xxxiv, v. 7.
02 Q. D. de Ver., q.
a. 11, ad
cf. Q. D. de Pot., q. 8, a. 4, ad 9um;
I Sent., d. XLVIII, q. 1, a. 1.
•• Cf. Maritain, Les Degres du Savoir, Paris
p.
.
.. Ibid., pp.
(Annexe IT).
•• .Aristotle, Meta. IV, 1 (Ro&s trans.).

4

576

JAMES F. ANDERSON

is proportionately or analogically one in being (in ens in
muni) . Both Aristotle and St. Thomas were clearly aware of
the fact that the unity of metaphysics, and hence its very
existence as a science, is made possible only through the reduc·
tion of its multiform objects (substance, accident, becoming,
the opposites, even non-being) to the analogical unity of being. 46
This reduction can be effected, for though being is diversely
participated in all things, it exists in them all as one common
thing (unum quid commune) . The unity of analogy is a unity
of relation, of ordination to being (habitudo ad esse). Being
exists in all that is; is, as such, one, true, good, something.
All entities, no matter how different, have an entitative ordination to being, to the one, the good, and the true. Thus we are
able to attain an analogy in which essentially diverse things are
proportionately one, because all such things agree in the same
transcendental relation-ordination to being-for they all have
being; are one, true, good, proportionately to their being. AU
beings, then, have a relation, a proportion, to being, and herein
they are all one. Even opposites (non-being herein included),
have a certain relation to being. As St. Thomas puts it, "it
must be said that something, according to analogy, is common
to being and non-being, for non-being itself is called being
analogically." 47 In analogous things not diverse realities are
considered, but diverse modes of being of the same reality. 48
Now that" same reality" is a reality that is proportionately one
in all its inferiors. Such is being; such is every metaphysical
object.
Penido is not reveling in hyperbole when he says that in the
doctrine of analogy lies " the salvation of metaphysics." 49 That
is true in a very proper and precise sense, for metaphysics is
the science of being, and being is analogical of its very nature.
•• Ibid., XI, 3, with St. Thomas' Commentary, lect. 3, and In IV Meta., lect. 1,
n. 534.
47 Q. D. de Ver., q. 2, a. ll, ad 5um: "Dicendum
quod enti et non enti aliquid
secundum analogiam convenit quia ipsum non-ens ens dicitur analogice."
48 Q. D. de Pot., q. 9, a. 2, ad 6um:
"In analogicis considerantur non diversae
realitates, sed diversi modi essendi eiusdem realitatis."
•• Penido, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS

577

It is clear that all properly metaphysical concepts are analogical, because they all stem from and are reducible to the concept
of being. All science is of being, of one sort or another, under
one aspect or another. 5° It is no less clear, therefore, that without the analogy of being there can be no scientific knowledge
of any sort, for although some scientific knowledge is possible
without any knowledge of the analogy of being, no scientific
knowledge is possible without the actual analogy of being.
Penido is speaking of the necessity of analogy for science in
general when he points out that the problem of the Divine
Names is only the theological aspect of a general questionthe possibility of science. " Science," he says, "must reduce the
multitude of things to unity, alone intelligible. [The multiple
as multiple is not intelligible.] But how can the same notion
apply to several realities? Either everything is equivocal,
heterogeneous, in which case science is impossible; or everything is univocal and homogeneous, . . . and science is a tautology. There you have the antinomy. And just as the ontological conflict was resolved by the concept of potentiality
intercalated between being and nothing, so likewise here, it
finds its solution in analogy, which is midway between the
univocal and the equivocal." 51 The " analogy of being" rests
on the fact that beings are really many and diverse, and yet at
the same time really (though only proportionately) one. Were
there no real unity in multiplicity or identity in diversity, there
would be no analogy of being, but if being were not intrinsically
analogical, there would not even be two beings really diverse.
To know that things are many, and yet at the same time somehow one, is to know, at least implicitly, that being is analogical.
H we knew the many were not somehow really one, we would
know science to be impossible, for scientific knowledge is common or universal knowledge, even when that knowledge bears
on ·particular sensible things. There is no science of the singular
•• St. Thomas, IV Metaph., lect. 1, n. 580: " ... Scientiae aliae, quae sunt de
entibus particularibus, considerant quidem de ente, cum omnia subjecta scientiarum
sint entia ... "; ct Aristotle, Metaph. IV, 1.
51 Op. cit., p. 77.

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JAMES F. ANDERSON

as singular, nor of the many as many. As the scholastics put it,
sense is of singulars, intellect of universals, 52 and science is the
work of intellect, whose very nature it is to seek oneness and
universality in the many and the particular.
It is the principle of analogy alone which "saves" metaphysics, and indeed really makes possible any and all science
properly so called. It is the principle of analogy alone which
solves the antinomy of the one and the many in all its varied
manifestations. Thus it is this principle, and this principle
alone, which enables us to avoid the pitfalls of monism and
anthropomorphism, on the one side, of pluralism and agnosticism on the other; it is by virtue of this principle alone that we
are not compelled to make the fatal choice between the opposing errors for which these names stand. It is because being is
really analogical and our knowledge of being analogical that
we do not have to choose between metaphysical and epistemological univocity, on the one hand, and metaphysical and
epistemological equivocity on the other. However, we would
fall into perhaps a greater error than either of these if we
allowed the discovery of this principle to be an occasion for
intellectual presumption or pride. This cannot happen so long
as we keep clearly in mind what this principle implies for our
knowledge, for the fact is that our analogical knowledge (the
only sort of knowledge we can have in metaphysics as well as
in theology), though certain and formal and proper so far as it
goes, does not" go" very far. To know this and the reason for
it, is already to be humbled.
Though it concerns the highest and most perfect objects,
analogical knowledge is very imperfect as knowledge. Analogical concepts do not abstract perfectly from their inferiors, as
univocal concepts do; hence they have not, like the latter, a
simple unity in respect of them, but only a proportional unity,
for the unity of those inferiors consists only in the community
of relations or proportions which they have with one another
•• E. g.: " Difl'ert sensus ab intellectu et ratione quia intellectus vel ratio est
universalium, quae sunt ubique et semper; sensus autem est singularium." (St.
Thomas, De Se:nsu et Sensato, l. 1.)

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS

579

through the possession of a common ·analogical perfection. It
is evident that all analogical knowledge ·is incomprehensive,
inexhaustive, non-definitive. (Only generic or specific objects
can be defined.) Analogical knowledge is in the highest degree
universal, and therefore in a precise sense indistinct. Metaphysical ideas are analogical ideas, and analogical ideas are not
at all " clear and distinct ideas " in the Cartesian sense. Only
univocal ideas are " clear and distinct." (That is why the
Cartesian mode of thought is incompatible with the metaphysical mode of thought properly so called.) When we measure the
actual content of our analogical knowledge against the absolutely inexhaustible intelligibility of its objects, we see at once
that that knowledge is slight even to the point of tenuity.
However, it is the most perfect sort of knowledge that we can
naturally have of such objects. It is not to be despised, therefore, or in any way undervalued, but cherished and sought for
to the extent of our powers. What St. Thomas says about our
knowledge of " divine things " is true also of our knowledge
of metaphysical things: "The human intellect desires and
loves more, and takes greater delight in, the knowledge of
divine things, although it can ascertain but little about them,
than in the perfect cognition which it has of the lowest
things." 53

n
ON BEING: ITS MEANING AND ITS ROLE IN
PHILOSOPHY
There is no doubt that the big word in Tbomist philosophy
is the word being. Ii being is a mere word, however, and if
every science is about being, under one aspect or another, then
we shall be in the uncomfortable position of having to admit
that every science is merely about words. Thus all " sciences"
will be reduced to grammar, and a pseudo-grammar at that,
since words themselves have no meaning apart from the ideas
""Ill Cont. Gent., cap. 25: lntellectus humanus magis desiderat et amat et
delectatur in <'ognitione divinorum, quamvis modicum de illis perspicere possit, quam
in perfecta cognitione quam habet de rebus infunis.

580

JAMES F. ANDERSON

they signify, nor ideas apart from the beings they represent.
What I wish to do here is to defend the doctrine that since
every science is concerned with being, under one aspect or
another, the term being is not a mere sound devoid of meaning,
but a name of the utmost significance.
We scholastics-especially we Thomists-are always talking
about "being." It is not at all remarkable that we sometimes
leave the impression that we really do not know what we are
talking about, that we have, in fact, so far hypnotized ourselves
with " being " that we actually use it as a sort of magic formula
to banish real doubts and circumvent real problems. I shall
try to show that this impression is not well-founded, that, whatever basis it may have in the teachings of ill-informed Thomists,
it has no basis in the teaching of Thomism itself.
One of the simplest and best ways to approach the problem
of being (extremely complex though it is, since the whole of
philosophy is bound up with it) is, I think, through grammarphilosophical or speculative grammar. Thus, grammatically,
" being " is the participle of the verb " to be."
A participle is a concrete term which implies two things: a
form and a subject of that form, a thing having that form.
Except in the case of subsistent forms, form is nothing in itself.
Form is nothing apart from the thing actualized or" informed";
it is merely the act whereby something exists as a determinate
thing. In technical language, that is, form is a quo-a "by
which "-and not a quod, not a subject or thing. Thus, although
we always speak of forms as if they were themselves things,
it is important to remember that in the natural order, at least,
forms are nothing at all apart from the realities which they
inform.
A participle, I said, is a concrete term which implies two
things, or rather two elements: a form and a subject receiving
it. For example, writing implies both the act of writing and
the subject who performs that act. There is no such thing as a
pure act of writing apart from someone that writes. In the same
way, being, considered as a participle, signifies something which
is composed of the form or act of being and of that which

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS

581

exercises that act. The act of being is what we mean by the
term existence (or better, existing), and the subj"ect exercising
that act is what we mean by the term essence. Thus being
always presents two aspects: the aspect of existence (act of
being), and the aspect of essence (subject exercising that act);
so essence and existence are nothing at all in themselves.
Existence, as act of being, is nothing at all apart from the
subject having being, just as writing as an act is nothing at all
apart from a writer. Similarly, essence, as subject of being, is
nothing at all apart from the act of being which that subject
exercises; no subject, as subject, exists; a subject exists only
in virtue of exercising the act of existence. Essence, then, like
existence, is a pure" by which "-a quo and not a quod. However, we speak of essence as if it were a thing, a reality on its
own account, whereas in fact essence is merely an element of
things-that by which things are what they are, as existence is
that by which things exist. Hence the error of those who, like
Santayana, make of essence a thing, a reality on its own account.1 Let us not be victimized by language; let us look to the
reality behind the word, inadequate and inexact as that word so
often is. To sum up: as a participle, being signifies something
which is composed of existence (in the sense stated above),
and of that which has existence. In other words, being always
presents an act-aspect and a subject-aspect. This already foreshadows what we have to say about being considered nominally
or as a noun.
From the metaphysical angle, perhaps the most important
point about nouns is that they signify things in their essenceaspect. (Participles, which are verb-forms, signify things in
their existential aspect. 2 ) Thus, simply to know the essence or
1 I submit
that Platonists, or Platonic-minded thinkers, regularly fall into this
error, that they overlook the duality in the very notion of being. Dropping out
the act-aspect, they are left with the subject-aspect. They therefore translate
" being " as " essence." This is indeed inevitable, for Platonism itself is a philosophy, not precisely of being but of essence-not of being qua being, but of
being qua intelligible, and this makes a world of difference.
• For definitions of the noun and the verb, see Aristotle: Periherm., I. ch.
16a
19; ch. 8, 16b 6, with St. Thomas' Commentary, lect. 4 and 5. Cf. Maritain, An
Introduction to Logic (N.Y., 1987), pp. 54-56.

582

JAMES F. ANDERSON

whatness of a thing designated by a noun is not to know
whether or not that thing exists. Indeed, no knowledge of the
existence of a thing is included in the knowledge of its essence.
I can know what man is without thereby knowing whether any
man exists or not. Names signify things through concepts, but
the knowledge of a thing grasped in the concept is, so far, only
a knowledge of its essence or some aspect thereof. As was said,
however, essence is nothing in itself; it is a mere " by which,"
not something that exists. For this very reason essence always
connotes existence, whether actual or possible. Thus, to consider being nominally is to consider it primarily from the standpoint of essence, yet with the implication of existence, whether
actual or only possible.
In which of these senses, then-as essence, or as existenceis being the proper object of metaphysics or first philosophy?
The answer is: in both senses. The being which is the object
of metaphysics is not being simply and solely in the participial
sense, or being as the act of being itself. This is evident if we
consider that being in this sense is an essential predicate in
respect of God alone, an accidental predicate in respect of all
other things, i. e., of all creatures, for in the case of God alone
is existence necessarily connected with essence. In respect of
no creature does essence necessarily imply existence. God alone
is the cause of His own existence; rather, God alone is His own
existence.
Now, being taken as a noun abstracts from the act of being
or existence itself, and signifies essence by connoting existence.
Being in this sense, therefore, is an essential predicate in respect
of all beings; it is predicable of absolutely all beings, not only
of all actual beings, but also, since it abstracts from the act of
existence, of all possible beings, and even of logical beings,
which have existence only in the mind. Thus, whereas being
in the participial sense, as signifying the very act of existence
itself, belongs to all beings other than God only contingently,
temporally, and mutably, in the nominal sense, as signifying
essence taken in abstraction from existence, being is necessary,
eternal, and immutable. Every being is necessarily, eternally,

TWO STUDI:tllS IN METAPHYSICS

588

and immutably constituted by its essential notes, just as man,
for instance, is necessarily, immutably, and from eternity, a
rational animal.
We should now be in a position to understand what is meant
by saying that the formal object of metaphysics is being as
being. Of course, if both "beings" in this formula have the
same meaning, then we have asserted a bare tautology. This,
however, is not the case, for, as we have seen, being always
presents a double aspect; it has two " faces." Thus the first
" being " in our formula is being taken as a noun; it is being as
signifying primarily essence, that is to say, being in the sense
of something common to all beings, hence predicable of all
beings-something in virtue of which each and every being is
what it is. The first " being " in the formula, then, is being
under the aspect of essence. The second " being" is being under
the ·aspect of existence, actual or possible. The expression
" being as being," therefore, means this: being, under the aspect
of essence, as existing or as capable of existing; Being is simply
that which is or can be. The" that which " gives us the essenceaspect, the " is or can be," the existence-aspect, actual or
possible.
The school of Aristotle and St. Thomas has always held that
there is a science which treats of being as being, its properties
and causes, that there is only one such science, namely metaphysics or first philosophy, that all the other sciences treat of
being not as being, but as of such and such a sort. Thus the
object of natural philosophy-what the ancients called physicais being as sensible and mobile. This object is attained by
formal abstraction of the first degree, namely by abstraction
from " singular matter " alone, i.e., from the individuating conditions of natural bodies. Hence natural philosophy treats of
the actions and passions of bodies, the laws of generation and
corruption, of movement. It considers mobile being precisely as
mobile. To use Maritain's expressions, 3 the "objective light"
under which it attains its object is a type of abstraction in the
• J. Maritain, A P'l'ejace to Metaphysics (N.Y., 1989), pp. 81-82.

584

JAMES F • .ANDERSON

sense of intellectual " visualisation" whereby the strictly singular and contingent characteristics of bodies are disregarded in
order to consider their common sensible and mobile and empirically ascertainable properties and qualities. Thus natural
philosophy abstracts from "singular matter," but not from
"sensible matter." Secondly, the object of metaphysics is
clearly not being under the aspect of quantity, whether continuous or discrete. This is the object of mathematics/ an
object attained by abstraction of the second degree, namely by
abstraction from all sensible matter, but not from "intelligible
matter," i.e., not from ideal quantity. 5 The objective light
under which mathematics attains its object, namely the mode of
abstracting and defining with intelligible matter alone, is a type
of intellectual visualisation whereby every reference to the
external senses and hence to sensible matter is removed. To
attain the veritable object of metaphysics, however, we must
advance beyond these two lower degrees of abstraction to the
third and highest degree, namely abstraction from all matter.
The intelligible light proper to this science is a type of intellectual visualisation whereby the object is grasped by the intelligence solely with reference to its own intrinsic intelligibility,
so that to have grasped what philosophers call" being as being"
is to have "in-spected" being itself in its own intrinsic
intelligibility .6
There is perhaps little danger of confusing the " being " of
the natural philosopher or that of the mathematician with the
" being " which is the object of metaphysics, but there are
certain other " beings " which are far more confusable. Thus the
vague being-in-general of common-sense perception is not at all
the being as being of the metaphysician, but it is, so to speak,
close enough to the being of the metaphysician to be easily
'Ibid., pp.
• Here it is a question not of quantity as a real accident of corporeal substance,
but of quantity (number or extension) considered in itself, ideally or abstractly.
Such quantity is an object of thought which cannot exist apart from sensible
matter, but which can be conceived apart from it. Sensible matter does not enter
into the definition of mathematical objects as such.
• Maritain, op. cit., p. 84.

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS

585

confused with it. The being of the metaphysician lies hidden in
the being of common knowledge and everyday experience. As
Maritain points out, 7 one must look for being where it is hidden,
namely in the most common being, which is found translated
and expressed by the most commonplace, the tritest of all
words-by the word " is." Again, being as known, or more
precisely, the known as known, is not the object of metaphysics,
but of logic. The proper object of logic is the ens rationis,
the object known, precisely as known, so that the formal aspect
under which logic considers things is that being which they have
in the mind itself-their intentional being. 8
This is a crucial point, for throughout the whole history of
thought there has been a tendency to identify real being, i. e.,
the actual being of things independently of thought, with intentional being, the being given to things in the mind by the mind
itself. Herein, I think, lies the root and source of idealism in
philosophy, the fundamental argument of which may be stated
as follows: being or the real is known only in idea; therefore the
real is idea. Of course we do not find this argument stated
explicitly in this form in books of idealist philosophy, but we
do often find something very much like it implied. A striking
modern example of this basic argument occurs in the " Appearance and Reality" of Mr. F. H. Bradley, the only real difference
being that instead of" idea," the predicate is here" experience."
"Anything i}\ no way felt or perceived," he says, " becomes for
me quite unmeaning "; whence he concludes that "for me experience is the same as reality." 9 The 1 argument, then, is this:
the real comes to me only in experience; therefore the real is
experience. Numerous other examples might be adduced. For
instance, we find fundamentally the same argument in Bosanquet/0 where we are presented with a sort of pan-logism (of
Hegelian inspiration, of course), arising from the identification
of real with intentional being. A far more interesting case is
that of Hegel himself. He sees no distinction between logic and
7 Ibid., p. 89.
• Op. cit., pp. 144-145.
"Ibid., pp. 88-86.
10 E. g., see 'The Principle of Individ'!Ullityand Value, Lect. ll.

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JAMES F. ANDERSON

metaphysics; indeed, his logic is metaphysics, not a metaphysic.
Here again we have the same false identification. What results
from it is a theory, not of being, but of pseudo-being. 11
Hegel proposed to exhibit in the most strictly scientific way
the so-called dialectical process of reality by taking his point
of departure from the idea of "Pure Being." Moreover, he
claimed that his whole " Science of Logic" was rationally compelling because rigorously deductive from beginning to end.
Now Being-Pure Being-he says, " is pure indeterminateness
and vacuity ... in fact, Being, indeterminate immediacy, is
Nothing-neither more nor less." 12 But Being and Nothing
(which are both equally nothing) unite, and the result is
Becoming! Now the Pure Being or Pure Nothing which Hegel
took to be the starting point of logic or metaphysics is not, in
fact, the starting point of either science. Hegel's Pure Being
is rather " being " grasped by that type of abstraction whereby
the mind abstracts universal wholes from their singular embodiments, passing thus to universals more and more extensive and
less and less comprehensive, more and more " wide " and less
and less "deep." It is, indeed, the ultimate term of this abstractive process-a mere ens rationis. As Hegel clearly saw,
being-in-general in the highest degree abstracted from every
determination whatsoever is equivalent to our thought of
"nothingness." Nothing at all can actually be deduced from
such a concept; it is as empty of content as any concept possibly
can be. If, therefore, we take being as the most universal, the
most empty and bare of our logical structures, we are making a
most serious mistake, for we shall then have approached the
confines of nothingness. Our philosophy will have been robbed
of philosophical content. Hegel's "Logic " is a logic which has
lost contact with reality, and his philosophy, being idealist, is
not truly speaking in the order of metaphysical science.
An idealist philosophy may be immensely interesting and
instructive in itself, but it will not be metaphysics precisely
because, so long as it remains true to its own character, it will
11
11

Cf. Maritain, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
Science of Logic, translated by Johnson and Struthers, vol. I, pp.

TWO STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS

587

never penetrate to the order of being as being; it will be a
philosophy not of that which is as such, but of that which is or
can be thought. It will be not a philosophy of being as being,
but of being as intelligible essence. This is true of the most
respectable of all idealisms-the " objective idealism " of Plato,
but whoever follows the idealist way must take the inevitable
idealist consequences. For him who does so, ideas will not be
concepts whereby he touches directly the illimitable riches of
existence, but the very termini of his knowledge-whether, with
Plato, he proceeds to hypostasize them or not. The point is
this: a true realist philosophy is not content to stop with the
essence or with being as intelligible content; it must go on to
grasp the existence in its very dynamic actuality. Indeed, it
starts with dynamic actualities and stops only when it has found
their measure and their source in that supreme dynamic actuality which is God, and has known Him as perfectly as human
reason can.
JAMES

St. Anselm's College,
Manckuter, New Hampshire

F. ANDERSON

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
PART

II

THE END oF PoLITICAL AcTIVITY: THE CoMMON GooD

T

HIS is the second in a series of articles devoted to
understanding, as well as demonstrating, the truth that
Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of
government. In a prefatory note to the whole series, we pointed
out that" the word' democracy,' through its use in propaganda
of all sorts, has come to stand for almost anything that one
can be politically for or against." We mention this again in
order to remind the reader of our plea: that he " avoid a too
hasty or a too simple application of our thesis to current events,
... by not identifying Democracy with the existing governments
of England or the United States."
In this article, we shall try to answer that objection to our
theory, which argues from the unity of the common good as
the end of political activity to the impossibility of a moral
hierarchy of forms of government. We find it necessary, therefore, to begin by clarifying the terms in which. the objection
must be stated.
1. In the practical order, the last end is the first principle.
As the first truth is that without which no others can be known,
so the ultimate good is that upon which depends the goodness
of everything else we seek. But the last end is not the only
principle in the practical order. Just as, in speculative matters,
there are secondary truths-secondary in the sense that their
knowability depends on knowledge of the first truth-so, in
practical matters, there are subordinate ends, goods which are
sought for their own sake as well as for the ultimate good they
also serve as means. We customarily speak of such goods as
intermediate ends, thereby indicating their dual character: as

588

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

589

ends, though not ultimate; as means, though not merely so.
Such goods always function as secondary principles: as indispensable means, in the order of execution, to the achievement
of the ultimate good or last end. But they may also sometimes
function as first principles: as the ultimate good to be achieved
in a certain, restricted sphere of activity. Here is another point
of comparison between the practical and the speculative. The
principle of contradiction is the first principle, without qualification or restriction, whereas an axiom of geometry is a first
principle, though first only in a restricted subject-matter.
Similarly, the ultimate good is the last end simpliciter, but
other goods may be last ends secundum quid.
There is no difficulty about viewing the same good both as
an end secundum quid and as a means to the end simpliciter.
But not all intermediate ends are first principles, though all are
secondary principles. Thus, the moral virtues are intermediate
ends: they are indispensable means to happiness; they are also
perfections worth having for their own sake, and, as such, they
are bonum honestum, not bonum utile; but they are not also
first principles secundum quid because moral activity, without
qualification, is defined by happiness as the first principle
simpliciter. In contrast, the common good is not only an indispensable means to happiness, but also the end of political
activity as such. 35 It is, therefore, the first principle in a certain
sphere of moral activity, qualified as political, though happiness
remains the first principle of moral activity considered without
•• It may be objected that the virtues, moral and intellectual, can also be regarded
principles secundum quid. They are the proximate ends of education IllS a
special sphere of activity. But it should be noted that education is a special
sphere of activity, it is not moral activity taken without qualification. The sphere
of moral activity without qualification is the individual pursuit of happiness, and
here the virtues are always secondary principles: intermediate ends and indispensable means. Here, then, is the case in which an intermediate end cannot be
regarded as if it were just an end and not a means. Although the common good
is a means in the moral order, taken without qualification, it must also be regarded
as the end, and not a means, in the political order. Cf. Maritain, True Humanism
(New York: 1938), pp. 127ff., 142fl'., 169£1'.; also Freedom in
Modern World
(New York: 1986), pp. 42 ff., 47 ff.
as first

590

M. J. ADLER .AND WALTER FARREJ,J,

qualification. The distinction between politics and ethics as
practical sciences, as well as the subordination of politics to
ethics (analogous to the subordination of natural philosophy
to metaphysics), turns upon the double-edged fact that the
common good is a first principle secundum quid; for in having
its own first principle politics has a certain autonomy, yet it
is subordinate to ethics in that this first principle must also be
regarded as an indispensable means, as secondary in relation
to the first principle of ethics, which is happiness. The ordination of the common good to happiness does not prevent us
from seeing the analogous roles they play as first principles or
last ends, secundum quid and simpliciter. And this analogy can
be extended to include secondary principles: as moral virtue
is the indispensable means directly productive of happiness, so
good government is the indispensable means directly productive
of the common good. Viewing the political sphere in its limited
autonomy (whether as a department of practical science or as
a domain of moral activity) , we see that cfYmmon good and
good government are the basic terms, just as happiness and
virtue are the basic terms in ethics. 36
These terms are now sufficiently clear for us to state two
problems which concern political theory generally, and the
theory of Democracy in particular. The first problem is whether
the common good is the last end in the temporal order, as well
as the last end in the political sphere; or, in other words, whether
in the temporal order there is something more ultimate than
the common good, i. e., temporal and natural happiness, in contrast to eternal and supernatural beatitude. The second problem is whether there is only one end of political activity, or
•• Whether as principles of political1science, or as principles of political activity,
the common good and good government are related as primary and secondary: as
the end and its means. Analo,gous to virtue as good habit, good government is
not a mere means, but an intermediate end; it is a bonum konestum, not a bonum
utile, in ·the political order. When we speak of good government as an intermediate end in the political order, we are recognizing its status as a means to the
common good as the final end of that ordPA". This relationship is unaffected by the
fact that the common good and good government
both intermediate ends, and
to happiness as the final end aimplicittJr.
hence means, in

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

591

several alternative ends unequal in goodness; in other words,
whether " common good " has one signification, which is univocal, or several which are analogical. Once these questions are
asked, it is immediately apparent that the basic terms-happiness and common good-are far from clear, certainly not clear
enough to indicate self-evident answers. It should be apparent
also that the two problems are related. Though we shall deal
with the second of these problems in this Part, and reserve the
:first for Part III, it will be impossible not to anticipate here
matters which will be more fully discussed later.
The answer to the first problem is that there is a happiness
which is the end simpliciter in the temporal order, and that, in
the temporal order, the common good is the end only of political
activity, not of moral activity taken without qualification. The
answer to the second problem is that "common good" has both
univocal and analogical significance, signifying both a single
end of all political activity and also a set of alternative, unequal
ends. Upon the defensibility of these answers, the theory of
Democracy rests its case against objections which have, been
raised. Before we proceed, in this Part, to explain the answer
to the second problem, let us briefly review the objection which
posed the problem.
The notion of a hierarchy of forms of government, graded in
moral excellence, was considered objectionable. To say, as we
do, that Democracy is, on moral grounds,
best form of
government, presupposes such a hierarchy of good political
forms. 37 The objection was not to the opini()lfl, that democracy
is, under certain circumstances, better than monarchy or oligarchy, because it is a more efficient means for achieving the
common good; but to the conclusi()lfl,, which we hold to be
demonstrable, that Democracy is, absolutely speaking, better
than any other form of government, because it accomplishes
a greater common good than they can e:ffect.38
87 Vd. Part I, supra, in THE THOMIST, III, 8, pp. 415-422.
•• For the distinction between Democracy (in relation to Royal and Republican
forms of government) and democracy (in relation to monarchical, oligarchical,

5

592

M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

The reason for the objection can be simply stated. The goodness of government is as a means to the common good. The
common good is the last end in the order of political activity,
and just as there cannot be,more than one last end simplieiter,
so in any restricted sphere of activity there cannot be more
than one last end secundum quid. Now the end is the principle
of moral specification, dividing the means as good and bad
according as they serve or disserve it. Hence, there can be only
one moral distinction between governments as good and bad,and any further inequality among good forms of government
must be with respect to their efficiency as means to the same end.
The objection is not wholly false, for it insists upon part of
the truth: that there is a generic distinction between all good
and all bad forms of government, and that this can be made
only by reference to a single end, served or disserved. 39 The
objection is false only in what it neglects or denies, namely,
other significations of "common good," which represent a plurality of ends in the political order, capable of specifying the
diverse forms of government as morally unequal. Moreover,
good government is not a mere means. The place it occupies
in the order of political goods is analogous to that of virtue in
relation to happiness. Good government is an intermediate end
in the political order and has an intrinsic goodness, the goodness
of a bonum honestum. Hence a moral inequality may be discovered among forms of government, viewing them as ends
rather than as means. Since they are both ends and means,
there must be, of course, a perfect correlation between these
two ways of viewing them. 40
and other modes of government), vd. Part I, supra, loc. cit., pp.
for the
distinction between forms and modes of government, vd. fn. 12 supra; for the
discussion of the best relatively and the best absolutely, vd. pp.
•• Vd. Part I supra, loc. cit., p. 414.
•• The several sources of inequality among the virtues may be illuminating here
by way of comparison. The supernatural are superior to the natural virtues by
reason of the end they serve. The cognate end of the natural virtues is natural,
temporal happiness; the natural virtues may serve the higher end of eternal
beatitude, but they are not adequate means thereto. Here we find an inequality
in means which derives from an inequality of ends, related within the analogy of

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

593

But the objector may still argue that a plurality of common
goods (as ends in the political order) is impossible, and hence
that only a generic moral distinction between governments (as
good or bad) can be made; for, even though good forms of
government may have a certain intrinsic goodness because they
are ends as well as means, their status as intermediate ends
requires us to see their intrinsic inequality as ends in relation
to their inequality as means serving ultimate ends unequal in
grade of goodness. If, then, there is only one ultimate end in
the political order, there can be no moral inequality among
good forms of government. To support his contention here, the
objector argues that the end must be proportionate to the
nature of the agent. The unity of human nature entails the
unity of its end. The diversity of eternal beatitude and natural
happiness as ends does not violate this principle because this
diversity of ends is relative to human nature in radically different conditions: as supernaturally elevated by grace, and as
natural (whether in the hypothetical state of pure nature or
in the historic condition of fallen nature). But the common
good is entirely a temporal and natural end; as such, it can be
"known only from the nature whose end it is." 41 Here, then,
strict unity of nature makes a plurality! of ends impossible.
In principle, the objection is sound, but the application of'
this principle to the order of political activity requires certain
qualifications, not needed in the sphere of ethics. With respect
to the common good as end, the adequate agent is not a single
happiness as perfect and imperfect. In the purely natural domain, there is a
further inequality between the intellectual and the moral virtues due again to the
good being served: the intellectual virtues are less good because they serve to
make a man good only in a certain respect, not simply as a man; or, in other
words, they confer an aptitude for good activity of a special sort, whereas the
moral virtues dispose a man to live his whole life well. The analogy is instructive
because it shows us a generic distinction (between virtue and vice) in terms of
service and disservice of an , ultimate end, which is quite compatible with further
specific distinctions among virtues as morally unequal, both because of gradations
of goodness in diverse ends being served and also because of intrinsic inequality in
the goodness of the specific virtues as intermediate ends. Vd. Summa Tkeologica,

I-II, 66.
u Dr. Charles O'Neil, in The Nl!fW Scholasticism, XV, I, p. 79.

594

M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

man but a multitude of men as politically organized. Furthermore, whereas happiness is the well-being of a man, the welfare
of a single human life, the common good is the well-being of a
political community, the welfare of a multitude's social life.
The being which is the agent in the case of the common good,
the being in whose perfection the common good exists, is not
a human being witlwut qualification. Hence, as we shall see, a
plurality of common goods is not impossible by reason of incompatibility with the unity of human nature.
The points which we have made so far do not answer the
objection. Rather they indicate what is involved in answering the objection, whose falsity arises from the inadequacy of
its analysis of specifically political goods, relying on a too simple,
and unqualified, transposition of principles from the ethical to
the political domain. 41 " To present the more adequate analysis,
upon which our complete answer depends, we shall proceed, first,
to make precise the distinction of any common good from goods
which are not common; second, to define the mode of being of
the political common good in relation to human nature and the
nature of the state; third, to give an adequate account of means
and ends in the political order; then, to determine the one
(univocal) and the many (analogical) significations of "common good"; finally, in terms of all this, we shall be able to solve
.,. To his original objection (vd. loc. cit. fn. 41 supra), Dr. O'Neil has now
added a note on "The Unity of the Moral Order" (The New Scholasticism, XV,
8, pp. 280.:8). 'This note, and the question it raises, adds nothing to the main
point of Dr. O'Neil's earlier remarks, except, perhaps, a more tentative state of
mind about the whole problem. It does, however, confirm our judgment that Dr.
O'Neil's difficulties arise from an inadequate and erroneous understanding of means
and ends-difficulties, by the way, which should lead Dr. O'Neil to question St.
Thomas's account of the virtues, as well as the demonstrability of Democracy.
That we saw the point of Dr. O'Neil's original objection is indicated by the !act
that the question he now asks is sufficiently answered in this Part, though this
Part was written before the question was asked. The further consequences of
our answer will be developed in Part ill, in which, considering temporal happiness
and eternal beatitude, we shall deal with the plurality of last ends-a plurality
which does not in any way destroy the unity of the moral order, because that
unity is, and must be, proportionate to the unity of man who both is a perishable
substance and has an immortal soul.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

595

our problem by showing the moral hierarchy of good forms of
government as means productive of unequal common goods.
The last statement is not quite accurate. In this Part we shall
not be able to show the exiStence of such a hierarchy, but only
its possibility-as compatible with the generic distinction between all good and all bad forms of government, and as consistent with sound principles of practical philosophy. Showing
the existence of such a hierarchy, by validating the specifying
criteria, in themselves and as separated or combined, will be
the work of Parts IV and V.42 Furthermore, in this discussion,
we shall assume that. there is a happiness in the temporal order
as well as in the eternaL The truth of that assumption, and the
fuller analysis of the plurality of common goods in relation to
the unity of temporal happiness, belongs to Part III.
In order to examine the various significations of "common " as qualifying " good," and to determine with precision
the meaning of " common good " which is peculiar to political
discourse, we must first briefly consider the good itself in its
very essence-as appetible perfection.
Every good can and must be regarded in two ways: as the
object of some being's desire, natural or elicit; and as the perfection of some being's nature. In the first way, the good is. a
final cause and as such the term of operations tending to achieve
it. In the second way, the good is a formal cause of the greater
perfection in being which has been achieved through operation.
·As final cause, the good is an end, first in the order of intention.
As formal cause, the good is also an end, but last in the order
of execution. This distinction between the good as finis causa
and as finis ejjectus, not only correlates with the distinction between the good as desired and the good as enjoyed, but also
indicates a difference between two modes of the good's existence.
As desired, the good is a future contingent: it is a perfection
which a being does not now have, but can have through change.
Herein lies the distinction between the demonstrability and the demonstration
of the thesis about democracy, made in reply to Dr. O'Neil's objection. Vd. The
New Scholasticism, XV, 2, pp. 162-168.

596

M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

As enjoyed, the good exists, not potentially, but actually: It IS
a perfection now possessed. The convertibility of good with being must, therefore, be understood in terms of being's two
dimensions: potency .and act. 43
But not all the goods which are desired by a given being are,
when achieved, enjoyed as perfections added to that being's
existence. We desire change in other things as well as in ourselves. When we desire to change any of the operable things
of the physical world, our aim is to convert them somehow into
the greater perfection of our own being. Through material or
efficient causality, such changes contribute to our own perfection. Herein lies the distinction between goods which are
used and goods which are ·enjoyed, between extrinsic and intrinsic goods, between the type of good which is bonum utile
and the type which is bonum honestum, between all the economic
goods, which Aristotle called '' external," and virtuous habits or
activities, which Aristotle called " goods of the soul." 44
Furthermore, we desire not only our own perfection, but also
the perfection of other human beings, whose goodness we love
as we enjoy our own. In short, every good is an object of
desire, but every object of desire is not, when achieved, a good
enjoyed, for it may be a good used or a good loved, according
as it is the perfection (or change) of some material thing,
•• The good as object of desire is convertible with the potency of a being for
additional perfection; the good as enjoyed is convertible with the actual possession
of such possible perfections. We shall not here be concerned with the distinction
between real and apparent goods as objects of elicit desire, or with the foundation
of that distinction in reason's conformity to the natural good-the object of
natural desire. A discussion of these matters will be found in Dr. M. J. Adler's
"A Dialectic of Morals," Part VI, in The Review of Politics, ill, 3, pp. 354-65.
Here we shall always use the word " good " to refer to what is truly good. Furthermore, we shall restrict ourselves to the human good.
.. For the analysis of such goods as health and sensual pleasure, which Aristotle
called " goods of the body," vd. "A Dialectic of Morals," Zoe. cit., pp. 367-71.
Suffice it here to point out that they are not intrinsically human goods, and bona
hon611ta in the strict sense, even though both are perfections of man's being,
and even though pleasure is essentially enjoyable, not useful. Since our chief
concern here is with the analysis of social goods, and principally the common
good, we need not do more than indicate these adjacent distinctions.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCR.!\.CY

597

causally related to our own perfection, or according as it is the
perfection of some other human being which we " enjoy" by
that sympathetic extension of our own being through the union
of love. The division of enjoyment against use is adequate if
"enjoyment " be understood in these two related senses: primarily, the possession of perfection in ourselves; secondarily,
and by derivation, the possession by other human beings of
similar perfections, which we enjoy vicariously through love.
It is necessary to add here that the good which is an object of
desire may be a good already possessed (by ourselves or other
human beings), not as possessed, but only in so far as it can
be augmented or must be sustained by further activity on our
part. As possessed, it is not an object of desire, but an object
of proper enjoyment (i.e., of amour propre) or of vicarious
enjoyment (i.e., the love of others); only as capable of increase
or as needing preservation is there an object still to be achieved,
and hence some good desired.
Although the perfection of another human being (desired or
loved) is not an intrinsic good, in the strict sense in which one's
own perfection is immanent, neither is it an extrinsic good, in
the strict sense in which the perfection of material things renders
them useful to us. The strict distinction between extrinsic and
intrinsic goods, useful and properly enjoyable, is relative to our
own perfection. Properly to classify social goods, such as friends,
it is necessary, therefore, to group them with such intrinsic
goods as the virtues (because they are essentially human and
honesta, not utilia) , and yet to distinguish them by recognizing their separate mode of bemg, i.e., their existence as perfections of some other being. To do this, we can extend the meaning
of " intrinsic " to include both what is properly possessed and
what is only vicariously enjoyed through love; and within the
sphere of intrinsic goods, we can divide perfections according as
they are immanent or separate, with respect to the given
individual who desires, enjoys, or loves these goods. 45
•• The various distinctions can he summarized as follows. The unachieved good
is an object of desire. The achieved good is an object of use, enjoyment, or love.

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These preliminary considerations enable us now to ask what
the word "common" means as a qualifier of " good." In its
most general signification, the word " common " means any
unity in which a multitude somehow participates: the mode of
participation may not always be the same. Thus, a name is
common if it can be imposed upon many with some unity of
meaning; an essence or nature is common if it is the essence or
nature of many individuals, retaining an analogical unity
throughout this existential diversity; an idea or knowledge is
common if, through it, many minds know the same object. 46
The common as a unity shared by many involves a divided (or
multiplied) one and a united multitude. This type of unity is,
therefore, properly called a community, and the common is
said to be the communicable: that in which a multitude can
communicate or achieve some unity. Opposed to the common is
As achieved, the good is either the perfection of a human being or of some other
(material) thing; and the human perfection achieved is possessed either by the person who desired it, or some other person, fw whom it was dsired. Since the same
good may be, at different times Ol' in different respects, both desired and achieved,
the triple distinction among goods {as used, enjoyed, or loved) divides them into
three fundamental types: extrinsic (the· useful), intrinsic and immanent (the
enjoyable), intrinsic and separate (the lovable); and the intrinsic is divided against
the extrinsic as bonum honestum against bonum utile. If now we add the subordinate distinction among intrinsic immanent goods according to whether they are
possessed by man and brute in virtue of their common generic nature, or possessed
by man alone in virtue of his specific difference, we can exhaustively classify every
type of finite and partial good (thus excluding temporal happiness and beatitude
as immanent complete goods, and God as the transcendant, hence separate, infinite object of love). There are: external goods (extrinsic, useful); bodily goods
(intrinsically animal, and either useful as health or enjoyable as sensual pleasure) ;
goods of the soul (intrinsically human, immanent, and enjoyable); social goods
(intrinsically human, separate, and lovable). Cf. "A Dialectic of Morals," loc. cit.,
pp. 869-71; the classification there given is here improved by the consideration of
the good as loved, as well as of the good which is used and possessed. Vd. ibid.,
fn.
in which the account of love will be found ·inadequate or erroneous.
•• The multiplication of the essence or common nature in the many individuals
in which it exercises real existence does not affect its unity as one and the same
essence, absolutely considered, that is, considered apart from the exercise of either
real or intentional existence. Similarly, the multiplication of the essence as exercising intentional existence in many minds (qua idea or actual universal) does not
affect that unity or intentionality by which many minds are able to conceive the
same object.

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the individual which, as such, is indivisible and unique. Thus,
the proper name and the singul:;tr nature are individual in
signification or in being; both are incommunicable; they are
unique in belonging to one thing alone. The opposition of
individual and common is clear in the case of names and natures,
but some analysis is required to make it clear in the case of
goods. It would appear that there are two quite distinct meanings of "common" as applied to goods.
(I) A good may be common in the same way that a nature
is common. Just as a specific nature is an essential one existentially multiplied in individuals, so a good, as achieved, may be.
essentially the same though it exists actually only as multiplied
in the individuals perfected. When individuals having a specific
nature achieve the perfection proportionate to the potentiality
ofthatnature-the real good which is the object of their natural
desire-that good as achieved, or as desired, is a common good
in the sense that it is essentially the same good for all. It is in
this sense that St .. Thomas speaks of happiness as a common
good.47 Happiness is essentially the same for all men because
they are all essentially the same. What is true of happiness is
true of any of its constitutive parts: any partial good, the
possession of which is indispensable to the attainment of happiness, is a common good in this sense. This meaning of "common ".applies to goods as desired or achieved, and, as achieved,
enjoyed or used. But the fact that " common " in this sense
can be applied to extrinsic goods for man and intrinsic goods of
man-his immanent perfections-does not mean that all goods
of these two sorts are common in this sense. Apparent goods
are desired and achieved by individuals: goods that are not real
because they are not objects of natural desire. Moreover, some
perfections are proportionate to the individual, not the specific,
nature of this man. Hence we must distinguish between acci.. Now happiness
the end of the human species, since all men naturally desire
it. Therefore, happiness is a common good that can be attained by all men, unless
some obstacle occur to debar some from achieving it (Summa Ccmtra Gentiles,
III, 89). Cf. ibid., 44. Vd. also Summa Theol., I-II, q. 90, a.

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dentally individual and essentially common goods, and we must
qualify this opposition by noting that both are existentially
individual. Precisely because the commonness of the· good }).ere
rests upon the community of a nature, it must be true that such
common goods exist, as the nature does, only as multiplied m
individuals. 48
(2) A good may also be common in a way that no nature is
common. For whereas a common nature always exists immacommon and
nently in a number of individuals, a good may
•• If one is asked whether happiness and virtue are individual or common goods,
one cannot answer simply, because the dilemma, lacking proper qualifications, is
a false one. These goods are certainly individual as they exist: this man's happiness or his virtues are perfections of his· individual being and life. ·But they are
also common in that this man's happiness or virtues, being essentially human, are
essentially the same as that man's. Hence the answer to the question must be:
that they are essentially common and existentially individual. Cf. Summa Theologica,
IT-IT, 58, 7, ad 2.
In so far as health and a certain amount of wealth are indispensable constituents of natural, temporal
they, too, are essentially common, though
existentially individual, goods. With respect to wealth, as the class of all extrinsic
goods jOT man, which man desires to use for the sake of his immanent perfection
(the intrinsic goods of his individual being), there seems to be another meaning
of " common." Here " common " is said of these economic goods to distinguish
public from private property. Yd. Summa Theologica, IT-11, 61, 1, 2, 8. This is a
juridical sense of " common " which refers to those natural resources that belong,
in the first instance, to a community of persons. One of the works of distributive
justice is to divide such " common goods proportionately " among the members of
the community. Certain economic goods (whether natural resources or the products of labor) may be juridically common in the sense that they are commonly
used by a community, such as a family. But this does not mean that any determinate instance of such common goods is existentially common: two men cannot
breathe the same quantum of air, eat the same food, wear the same clothes, work
with the same tool, _at the same time. What is meant here is that a certain stock
of economic goods juridically belongs to a community to be divided among its
members for use, though in any actual use, any part of this stock is existentially
individual, i. e., is used by this one man at this time. Furthermore, the moral
fact that a man is obliged to use economic goods with regard for the well-being
of other men in his community, does not make such goods existentially co=on
as objects of use. Cf. Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World (New York: 1986),
Appendix L esp. pp. 204 ff.; and also Summa Theologica, 11-IT, 82, 5, ad 2; 66, 2.
We shall be able to reconsider this juridical meaning of "common goods" and
the moral obligation to make a common use of economic goods (i. e., for the service
of all), after we have analyzed the political meaning of " the common good."

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

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yet exist separately from the individuals for whom it is good.
Since this cannot be true of the types of good which are, as
achieved, either used or enjoyed (in the strict sense of" exclusive
individual possession") , it must be true of the remaining type
of good which, as desired or achieved, is an object of love, for
this is always the perfection of a being other than the person
who desires or loves. It is in this sense that St. Thomas speaks
of God as the supreme common good of all his creatures. 49 But
a friend may also be a separate common good in this
existentially separate from, and yet the common obiect of, the
many who love him. All social goods are separate common
goods, and in the temporal order the supreme good of this type
is that social good which is the well-being of a political association, for it is the perfect natural community.
There is, as we shall see, an important difference between the
way in which God or a human friend is a separate common
good and the way in which the state is a separate common
good; but before we proceed to more precise definitions, let us
summarize the distinction, so far seen, between the two radically different connotations of" common" as said of good. Let
us call the good which, as existentially individual, is common
to many because they have the same nature, the essentially
common good. Let us call the good which, as existentially individual, is common to many because they are directed to it or
by it, the existentially common good. In the first case, the good
is common because of a unity of essence in the :rpultitude. In
the second case, the good is common because of the unity of a
•• " The supreme good, namely, God, is the common good, since the good of all
things depends upon him; and the good whereby each thing is good is the particular
of that thing " (Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 17) . Here St. Thomas
divides the common against the particular, or individual, good on existential
grounds; for obviously the good whereby each of a number of things is good may
be an essentially common, though it cannot be an existentially common, good.
Thus, the beatific vision of God is the supreme essentially common good of all
human souls, whereas God as the cause of that vision, and as the object of its
knowledge and consequent love, is existentially separate from each of the blessed.
God' is the supreme existentially common good, or, in Maritain's language, the
transcendant separate common good.

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being-the perfection of which exists separately from each member of the multitude but unites them through being their common object. Of these two meanings of "common," the second
is peculiar to the sphere of the good, whereas the first is shared
by goods and natures. There is some justification, therefore,
for the emphasis in traditional usage; when the common good
is spoken of, what is usually meant is the separate common
good, the good we have called existentially common. 50
Let us now consider God and the state, the two supreme
separate common goods for man, the one supernatural and
eternal, the other natural and temporal. God is not only existentially separate but transcendant in the order of being, whereas
the state, though existentially separate, is also immanent in the
order of being. The state is a multitude as politically organized.
The existence of the state, and its temporal endurance, is
separate from the existence of any one, or more, of its individual
members, though obviously not from the existence of all at any
given time. 51 Whatever exists naturally in any way can have
more or less perfection of being; hence the state must have
some ,well-being proper to its nature. The well-being of the
state is the good of a unity which, in its very mode of existence,
is the unity of an organized multitude. The many, precisely as
members of the political community, participate in the goodness or well-being of the community they constitute through
association with one another. Here, then, is a very special mean•• Individual good is opposed to common good according to two principles: the
numerical principle which divides what is peculiar to one (the accidental) from
what is common to many (the essential); and the formal principle which divides
the good which inheres in the substantial being of a man from the good which
inheres in the accidental being of a community. It is according to the second, not
the first, principle that the common good of the state is opposed to the good of
the individual, whether that also be common, because essential, or private, because
accidental. St. Thomas makes the second point (about the formal difference),
though not the first point (about the numerical difference as related to the
accidental and the essential) : Bonum commune civitatis et bonum singulare unius
personae non differunt secundum multum et paucum, sed secundum formalem
differentiam (Summa Theologica, 11-11, 58, 7 ad 2) .
01 We shall give a fuller analysis of this fact in a subsequent
discussion of the
state's mode of being i,n relation to the being of its members. Vd. Section 9 infra.

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608

ing of " common , as said of a good. The common good, which
is identical with the well-being of the state, is a good common
to a multitude precisely because the many are organized into
a one. Though this one (an individually existing state) is
separate in its being from the existence of each of its individual
members, the goodness of this one is not only a perfection of
the state as a political association, but also a perfection of each
of its members who are, by nature, social animals and tend
naturally to political association. This common good is, therefore, both separa:te and immanent: as separate, it is an object
loved and worked for; as immanent, it is a social good possessed
and enjoyed. Nor is there any contradiction in the same good
being both existentially a common good and existentially an
individual good, for it is not both in the same aspect: it is
existentially common as separate, existentially individual as
immanent. 52 God is the separate common good of the whole
universe and of all its parts, but the goodness of God transcends
the goodness of the created universe as a whole. Only by causality, not by being, is the goodness of God immanent in
creatures. But precisely because the being of the state is the
being of an organized multitude, precisely because its individual
existence and their individual existence are interdependent, the
state is both a separate and an immanent good-at once a
goodness possessed by the whole as a perfection of association
itself, and a perfection enjoyed by the parts as needing and
tending toward such association. And in both ways it is a common good, for it is both a separate object for which the members
s• "The common good (communicatio in bene vivendo) is a different thing
from the mere aggregation of particular goods, and is not the peculiar good of
the whole which (like the species, for example, compared with the individual)
relates only to itself and sacrifices the parts to itself; it is- the common good of the
whole and its parts, a good which integrates particular goods in the whole in so
far as they are communicable (externally, in the natural manner of human communication here below), and as it is itself communicable to the parts--whether the
material prosperity of the State be in question, or its intellectual and moral
patrimony" (Maritain, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, New York, 1931:
p. 189, fn. 2) . The common good of which Maritain here speaks is not a good
common in any sense; for what he says applies only to the good which is identical
with the well-being of a community, and of the political community par ezoellence.

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

commonly work, and also a good essentially common to the
members, not only as organized, but also as specifically the
same in their natural and rational desire for social life.
There is justification, therefore, for regarding the well-being
of the state as that which, in the order of goods, most peculiarly
deserves the appellation " common" for it combines the aspects
of both a separate and an immanent good, and in these aspects
it is, respectively, both existentially and essentially common.
Though God is the supreme, transcendant, separate common
good, though temporal happiness and eternal beatitude are, in
their respective orders, the supreme, immanent, essentially common goods, the well-being of the political community has a
greater commonness than these. Traditional usage bears witness to this by the fact that when the phrase " the common
good " is used without qualification, explicitly or by context,
what is usually signified is the political common good, the last
end (the first principle secundum quid) in the political order.
H such usage requires further justification, it can be pointed out
that the political common good is not only a good which, as
possessed, is actually shared by many, but also that it is the
only good which, as an object of love, elicits a concordance of
many wills and, as an object of desire, requires the concerted
activity of many persons. 55 We shall, therefore, use the phrase
" common good " without qualification always to refer to the
political common good, the well-being of the political community.54
•• Happiness and virtue are shared by many only in the sense of an essential
community, but the state is an existential community whose well-being is shared
by many. It is true that a mutual friend is a good commonly loved, but a friend
need not be common to two or more, whereas the state must be, both as an
object of love and of desire. The political common good cannot be established in
existence, preserved, or augmented, except through a concordance of wills and
concerted action. In contrast, only the right direction of my own will and the
right regnlation of my own conduct is required for the attainment of virtue. It
is fitting, therefore, that we should regard as common, in the most complete sense,
that good which can neither have being in separation, nor objectivity in relation
to appetite, except through the cooperation of many in the formation of a community
and in
its
•• In fact, there is no other name for this good, whereas other goods, which are

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605

We have seen that the common good is a good of each man
individually, as well as the good of them all as an organized
multitude. The question, therefore, arises, how the common
good is related to other goods in the life of a single individual.
As individually possessed, the common good is not identical
with happiness, nor with virtue or any of the other partial goods
constitutive of happiness. That the common good is not identical with happiness is seen in the fact that it is a means to
happiness: happiness is the last end simpliciter in the temporal
and natural domain of human life, whereas the common good
is only a last end secundum quid (in the political order) and
hence, as an intermediate end, like virtue, it must be a means
to happiness. As the last end, happiness is that which leaves
nothing to be desired: it must, therefore, be the whole of goodsall good things. Boethius's definition of happiness as the state
of those made perfect by the possession of all good things,
applies analogically to temporal happiness and eternal beatitude
(in the one case, the possession is successive throughout the
extent of a whole life; in the other, it is simultaneous). Now,
being social by nature, man cannot lead a good human life
apart from the political community. A peaceful and benevolent
society is as indispensable to human happiness as the air a man
breathes, the natural resources he converts into consumable
wealth, his physical health, and his spiritual rectification through
virtue. Though happiness is often spoken of as the life of virtue,
for its highest manifestation is in good activity (activity in
accordance with virtue), the life of virtue requires more than
virtue as a cause: it is impossible apart from sufficient wealth
to sustain existence, sufficient health to facilitate activity, and
common in some sense, can be spoken of as God, happiness, virtue, public
property, etc. The Latin phrase " bonum commune" has much more ambiguity
than the English " common good." For " bonum commune " signifies " the good
in general "-the last end, formally defined as the infinite or unlimited good, in
contrast to every type of partial good; it also signifies happiness, concretely understood as the complete satisfaction of man's natural desires and, as such, common
to all members of the species; and it also signifies the political common good. The
Latin phrase " bonum communitatis " would be a more exact equivalent of the
· English phrase " common good " as we shall henceforth use it.

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

sufficient social peace and order to provide conditions for the
formation of virtues and their exercise. All the social goods, and
principally the common good, are both constitutive of happiness
(in that they satisfy certain natural needs), and also causative
of happiness (in that they contribute to the production of good
activity) .55 Hence, the common good is a partial good, contrasted with temporal happiness as the whole good of a human
life, and, among the partial goods, most closely related to virtue,
because like virtue, and unlike wealth or health, it is an intrinsically human good. Whereas the common good and virtue are,
as partial goods, essentially common to all men because of their
common nature, the common good is also existentially common
to all men who, as members of the same community, share its
fruits.
The truth of this analysis has been missed or obscured by
those who appeal to an unqualified opposition between individual and common good, or who too simply enumerate the
types of good as individual, common, and divine. 56 If the
phrase " common good " is used ambiguously to signify both
happiness (as essentially common) and the well-being of the
political community (as· existentially common), it is not true
to say that the common good is always greater than the individual good, and takes precedence over it in the order of
means and ends. For there is a parallel ambiguity in the phrase
"individual good": (a) as opposed to what is essentially a
common good, a good is individual if it is m;1ly accidentally
good-a good of or for this person according to the accidents
of his individual nature; and (b) as opposed to what is existentially a (separate) common good, a good is individual if
it exists immanently as perfecting this one person. Now, happiness is an individual good existentially and a common good
essentially. In the latter status, it is the supreme good in the
•• We shall return subsequently to a fuller discussion of the common good as an
end and as a means. Vd. Section 4 infra. Cf. "A Dialectic of Morals," loc. cit.,
pp. 891 ff.
•• Cf. fn. 48 supra. Vd. Summa Theologica, II-II, 58, 5; 6; 9 ad 8; 12; also 26, 2;
S; 4 ad 8.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

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temporal order and subordinates the common good as it subordinates virtue and every other partial good, though these also
may be essentially common goods.57 Common goods are superior
to individual goods only in the sense in which the latter are
accidental, not essential, human goods; and in this way not only
the common good but virtue and every other essential good subordinates individual goods. An adequate ordering of human
goods requires the subordination of the accidental to the essential, the partial to the complete (within the temporal order)
and the temporal to the eternal. By the first subordination,
individual goods (in one sense) must be ordered to the common
good, because it is essential; by the second subordination the
common good must be ordered to happiness (an individual good
in another sense) because happiness is the whole of which the
common good, wealth, health, virtue, etc., are constitutive parts;
by the third subordination, all temporal goods must be ordered
to divine goods (common in God's separate being, and individual
in each soul's immanent enjoyment of the beatific vision) because they are eternal. 58
57 In this clarification of ambiguous usage, we are forced to use " the common
good " to signify the political common good which, in the broader use of the phrase
" common good " is only one of the essentially common goods.
•• We are here concerned only to clarify the meaning of " common " as opposed
to " individual " good for the sake of indicating the place of the common good
in the total order of goods, especially its subordination to happiness. This is done
by viewing both happiness and the common good as essential individual goods (for
the common good is immanent as well as separate), and seeing them related as
whole and part, respectively. There is another problem, of course, about the subordination of the citizen to the state-the· apparent sacrifice of his well-being to
the welfare of the community-but we shall deal with this problem elsewhere.
Vd. Part III infra.
At least one thing is now clear. When we say that " the good of the whole is
greater than the good of the part," we must remember that this maxim requires
the subordination of the common good (a partial good) to happiness (the whole
good of a human life), as well as the subordination of the citizen to the state, in
certain respects. What these respects are remains to be seen, but we now see why
the subordination of man to the state cannot be complete and unqualified. If it
were, happiness would not be the temporal end simpliciter, and the common good
a temporal end only secundum quid; if it were, the common good (i. e., the state)
would not be a means to happiness. Those who make the error of identifying the
common good with happiness (falsely interpreting the truth that the common good

6

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

One other point remains to be clarified. We have spoken of
the common good as identical with the well-being of the state.
It is the goodness of a political community. This raises two
related questions. (I) Has the state any being apart from its
goodness? (2) In what sense can the common good be said
to be the end of the state, if it is the well-being of the state?
To answer these questions, we must consider, first, the mode
of being of the state, and, then, the common good as an end.
is at once the good of the whole and of its parts), or the worse error of regarding
the common good as the supreme good in the temporal order, subordinate only to
the Divine good, cannot save man from complete subordination to the State except
by reference to his supernatural destiny. Vd. Father John F. McCormick, "The
Individual and the State," in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical
The root of error here is the confusion of the good
.Association, XV, pp.
of the whole with the whole of goods, and of the good of a part with a partial good.
The truth that the whole good is always greater than any of its parts does not
mean that the good of the whole is greater than the good of its parts, but rather
the exact contrary, in view of the fact that the good of the whole (i.e. the common
good) is a partial good, and the good of the part (i.e. happiness) is the whole
of goods.
Nor is Maritain's distinction between individual and person enth·ely satisfactory,
if what is intended is a contrast between the individual good as temporal and the
personal good as eternal. " Every individu8!, considered in his formal aspect as a
constituent part of the State, is ordered to the common good of the State. But he
is ordered in the first place, as a person destined for immortality, to God Himself,
and on that score the State is but a means for him" (op. cit., p. 189, fn. 2). Cf.
Freedom in the Modern World (New York: 1986), pp. 46-54; True Humanism
(New York: 1988), pp.
199; Scholasticism and Politics (New York: 1940),
Ch. III. If, however, the individual is opposed to the personal as the accidental to
the essential or specific good, then we see how it can be said that the individual
good (qua accidental) is always subordinate to the common good (or any other
essential good), and that the common good (qua partial) is always subordinate to
the personal good (qua the whole essential human good) whether temporally, as
the good of the specific nature of man's composite being in this life; or etern8lly,
as the good of man's soul hereafter. The invariable subordination of the common
good to the personal good, thus understood (and in the temporal order without
any reference to man's supernatural destiny), still leaves the aforementioned
problem of the citizen's subordination to the state, as one to be solved by specifying
the respects which justify it. But the difficulties which have caused so much
controversy over Maritain's distinction between individual and person are removed
by this clarification of the ambiguities in the word " individual " (as opposed
both to the " essential " and to the existenti8lly " common ") and by the insight
that the personal good is individual in the second of these two oppositions rather
than the first, and also both temporal and eternal.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

609

3. Whatever exists must exist either as a substance or as an
accident; and if as an accident, either as the accident of a single
substance, or as the accident of a number of substances through
organizing this aggregate in some way. Some artificial forms
are accidents of the latter sort: they are forms of composition
and order by which, in the case of a house, for example, a number of substantial units are accidentally united to constitute
the work of art-an artificial whole. 59 Now the state is not a
substance any more than a house is; nor can it be the sort of
accident whose total existence is through inherence in a single
substance, such as a quality or quantity. Hence it would appear
that the state is a form of organization through which a substantial many becomes an accidental one, for the mode of unity
which a thing has conforms to its mode of being. 60
But though it is an accidental being-----having actuality
through a form of composition and order-the state is not an
artificial thing, as a house is. We know, in the first place, that
political activity is in the sphere of prudence, not art; and, in
the second place, we know that the state is natural, not merely
conventional. The precise sense in which the state is natural,
•• " The substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole.
For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence
to each of the parts of the body, is a form of composition and order, such as the
form of a house; and such a form is accidental " (Summa Theologica, I, 76, 8) .
60 " Those
things which are distinct in substance, and one according to an
accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one
nation, and many stones are one heap, which is a unity of composition or order"
(Summa Theologica, I-II, 17, 4). Cf. Maritain, The Things That Are Not Caesar's,
p. 139, fn. 2: "And this whole "-the State-" not being a substantial whole, like
a living organism, but a community of persons and families, ought to have regard
for the more fundamental rights which natural law confers on human personality
and domestic society. Otherwise it corrupts its own good." This fact, that the
state is an accidental being and an accidental one, confirms the truth that the
common good must be subordinate to temporal happiness, for the goodness of an
accidental whole is inferior to the goodness of a substantial whole, even though
the latter is, in a certain respect, a part of the former; for, as we have seen, the
former (the common good) is a constitutive part of the latter (happiness) in more
fundamental respects, i.e., in the order of essential, though existentially individual,
goods. Cf. fn. 58 supra. The good of an accidental whole is not greater than the
whole good of any of its substantial parts.

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as well as conventional, illuminates its mode of being. As we
have already seen, 61 the state is natural in the order of final
causality, and conventional in the order of efficient causality.
That man is by nature a political animal means that man cannot live well, cannot enjoy all the goods of a characteristically
human life, apart from political association. Hence, political
association is an indispensable means to human happiness; and
what is a necessary means to the natural end of human life has its
naturalness, as it has its necessity, from the final, not the efficient,
cause of its being. Such naturalness is not incompatible with
being .a product of reason in the order of efficient causes.
In the same passage in which Aristotle says that " the proof
that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual,
is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing," he
also says: "the man who first founded the state was the greatest
of benefactors." 62 The apparent inconsistency here is removed
by the distinction between final and efficien,t causality. States
are not prior in time to individuals, for it is by the rational
action of men in the exercise of prudence that states are instituted by men who associate for their common good. Here
" their common good " must be understood as signifying the
individual happiness of each, which is essentially common to
all .persons of human nature. But the association. itself is a
good (for it is an indispensable means to happiness), and a
common good both as the good of an organized multitude and
as a good for each of its members. Precisely because it is a good
of this sort, the state is natural as well as conventional, i. e.,
instituted by the work of reason in the sphere of prudence rather
than art.
The very being of the state thus seems to be the being of a
good. This would seem to be true of anything whose nature is
defined by reference to final causes. The nature of a law is to be
an ordination of reason for the common good; hence, we say
that an unjust law, or a law which is not ordained to the com61 Vd. Part I, supra, lac. cit., p. 417, 441, fn. 28.
•• Politics, I, 2, 1253'25-30.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

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mon good, is a perversion of law, or a law in name only. 68 But
unless this truth is somehow qualified, we cannot speak of good
or bad states, for "bad state " would be contradictory and
" good state " would be redundant in signification. A corrupt
or perverted state is not identical with anarchy, which is the
total annihilation or non-being of political association. Even
civil war is within the framework of civil life, though it almost
destroys the unity of peace which is the common good. If that
unity were entirely destroyed, a political revolution, accomplished through the violence of civil war, could not bring about
the transformation of one and the same community-from a
worse to a better, or a better to a worse, political form. The
being of a state cannot, therefore, be identical with its wellbeing (the common good), any more than the being of a man
is identical with his well-being (happiness). Just as man is
subject to good and bad development, to perfection through
virtue and corruption through vice, attaining happiness thereby
or losing it, so is the state subject to moral growth and decay.
But man is a substance and has a nature due to the efficient
causality of creation and generation, whereas the state is an
accidental being and seems to have a nature only by reference
to final causes, which makes its very being good. How, then,
can we distinguish between the good which the very existence
of the state seems to be, and the good which the state can have
or lose in the course of progressive development or corruption?
In order to solve this difficulty, we must, in the first place,
recall the distinction between the metaphysical and moral signification of "good." Whatever exists has a goodness convertible with its being. Whatever can change·through voluntary
operation can gain, or lose, perfections which are goods in relation to natural appetites (and potencies) for additional being.
63 "A tyrannical
law, through not being according to reason, is not a law,
absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; and yet in so far as it has
something of the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens being good " (Summa
Theologica, I-II, 92, ad 4) . Laws which are unjust " are acts of violence rather
than law, because, as Augustine says, a law that is not just, seems to be no law
at all " (ibid., 96, 4) .

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

Now the good which can be an object of desire for a voluntary
agent is the moral good; the good which is convertible with the
being a thing has is the metaphysical good. But a thing may
have both substantial and accidental being: first act and second
acts. Hence, we see that the moral good may also be a metaphysical good, when the perfection desired is achieved, for the
perfections desired and achieved by voluntary agents are accidental, i. e., second acts. But even substantial perfection may
be desired in the sense that a man desires to preserve his existence-the substantial being he has received by creation and
through generation. The fundamental difference here is that
the good which is convertible with man's first act of substantial
being is never an object of desire except as a good to be
preserved, whereas the goods which are convertible with man's
completion by second acts are objects of desire with respect to
attainment as well as preservation. These differences occasion
St. Thomas's distinction between the good simply and the good
relatively, which are respectively convertible with being relatively (second acts or accidental being) and being simply (first
act or substantial being) .64 Any human good can, therefore, be
regarded in two ways: metaphysically, as being possessed;
morally, as being desired. The good which must be regarded as
primarily metaphysical is the good of man's substantial existence
itself and with it, of course, the proper accidents of his nature;
for these goods are prior to voluntary operation and become
moral goods only secondarily as goods which, though possessed
without our effort, we nevertheless desire to preserve. In contrast, all those goods which are initially attained through our
own efforts should be regarded as primarily moral; they are only
secondarily metaphysical goods in so far as, once achieved, they
are perfections of our being; but even so they are also moral as
goods we seek to sustain in being.
But the state is itself an accidental being and a good initially
attained through the efforts of voluntary agents. It has neither
nature nor being apart from the social natures of the rational
•• Yd. Summa Theologica, I, 5, ad I.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

613

beings who institute and compose it. Unlike man, the state has
no metaphysical goodness (because it has no actual being) prior
to voluntary operation. But once it has been instituted and
exists, the state has a metaphysical goodness as an accidental
being, and this goodness is also moral in that it is an object of
desire and activity with respect to preservation. Furthermore,
just as a virtue, which is an accidental being and primarily a
moral good, can be augmented and diminished, as well as preserved, so the goodness of the state is subject to improvement
and corruption. It is possible, therefore, to say without inconsistency that the state, in so far as it exists in any degree of
perfection, or of corruption short of total annihilation, is the
common good which men must seek to preserve; and also that
the state can attain a greater common good than it now has,
or lose, in some degree, the perfection of communal life which
is convertible with its present grade of existence. Although the
state, in so far as it exists, is a good, we can speak of a bad state
as one which has changed or is changing for the worse (one
which, in the course of its individual history, has undergone or
is tending toward corruption) ; and we can speak of a good state
as one which, not only has preserved itself from corruption, but
is tending toward improvement, toward the attainment of a
greater common good than now exists.
One further step is required to solve our problem. We must
explain the sense in which we speak of the state, which is only
an accidental being, as a subject of change: as tending toward
improvement or corruption. When we have done this, we shall
be able to see how the common good can both be the state and
be its end.
To complete the solution we must, therefore, in the second
place, observe that the nature of the state is not, in every way,
identical with its being morally good. Habits and acts are subject to natural as well as to moral specification. As good habit,
a virtue has moral being; as habit, a virtue has the natural being
of an accident, the same type of natural being which a vice has.
Like virtue, and vice, the state has some natural being apart

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

from its goodness or badness, even though in its natural being
it always has some metaphysical goodness, just as a bad habit
is better, metaphysically, than no habit at all.65 But the state
is not like virtue, or vice, in one important respect: though both
are accidents, the state is, like some artificial forms, an accident
which cannot exist in a single substance, but only through
simultaneous inherence in many. If we examine a work of
art, such as a house, we find two senses in which this artificial
thing is natural: not that it ever exists as fully natural, but that
its coming to be and its endurance in being have roots in nature.
In the order of final causes, the house is natural in so far as a
domicile of some sort (whether it be specifically house or tent
or cave) is necessary to compensate for man's lack of protection
from the elements. A domicile is natural as a necessary means
to a naturally desired end, even though in the order of efficient
causality, it is also a voluntary work of art and not the result
of purely natural causes. This is the sense of natural in which
we have already discussed the nature of the state, which is also,
in the order of efficient causality, voluntary rather than natural.
In short, so far as coming to be is concerned, a house and a
state are partly natural (final causality) and partly voluntary
(efficient causality), in contrast to a plant which, in coming to
be, is entirely a product of natural causes. But there is another
sense in which a house is natural, now with respect to its being
rather than its generation. The matter of which it is composed
must ultimately consist of natural substances. We regard a
house, not as a substance, but as substantial, in so far as it
endures in being only so long as the substances of which it is
composed endure. Furthermore, just as the accidental unity,
•• The metaphysical goodness of a bad state will be understood if it is remembered that the state is a more perfect mode of association than the family or the
village. The annihilation of the state, with the consequent return of its members
to less perfect modes of association, is a worse evil than its corruption. That a
bad state is better than anarchy or than pre-political forms of social life indicates
that the metaphysical goodness of the state as a certain type of accidental being
(i. e., a certain mode of association) can be separated from the moral criteria by
which we distinguish good and bad states.

.THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

615

signified by "white man" is placed in the category of substance by reduction to its substantial component, so a house is,
by similar reduction, in the category of substance. On the part
of its matter, the house is a substance, or, more precisely, a
plurality of substances; on the part of its form, the house is an
accidental unity and being. Hence, with respect to its persistence in being, the house is partly natural (material causality)
and partly artificial (formal causality), in contrast to a real
substance which is natural with respect to both matter and
form. Like the house, the state persists in being through the
endurance of the men who compose it; it is thus substantial on
the part of its matter, a plurality of substances; but it is not
a substance because this plurality is a one only through an
accidental form, the convention of association. Hence, with
respect to persistence in being, the state is partly natural (material causality) and partly conventional (formal causality) , in
contrast to a real substance which not only is, but is one,
through a substantial form.
By summating its four causes, we now see that the state is
natural in two ways, not one, where before we considered the
state as natural only in the order of final causality. 66 In so far
as it exists naturally, in terms of its material causes, the state
can be subject to change in moral quality, i.e., in the grade of
perfection of its formal cause. The same multitude of men
(defining sameness here by the continuity of generations) can
be more or less perfectly organized in that unity of peace which
is the common good. Since the unity of the state as an accidental
being comes from its organizing principle, its formal cause,
diversity of political forms, differing in grade of excellence, must
•• In the order of efficient and final causality, the state is like a work of useful
art: coming to be, through voluntary action, as a means to a natural end. In the
order of material causality, the state is like a work of useful art in that it persists
in being through the existence of natural substances, though here there is a radical
difference .between the types of substances involved: inorganic vs. human. In the
order of formal causality, the state is like a work of useful art in that its unity in
being is only accidental, due to an accidental form of composition and order, but
here again there is a radical difference between the type of order which is the work
of prudence and the type which is the work of art.

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M. J. ADLER .AND W .ALTER FARRELL

be correlative with degrees of unity in the state, degrees of perfection in the common good.67 Moreover, the state's potentiality
for political change, progressive or corruptive, is on the part of
its matter, residing in the natural potentialities of its human
components for various forms of political organization. Hence,
there is no difficulty about the state's being an accident (formally) and also being subject to change (materially) in so far
as it is composed of substances with a range of potentialities
for social life. Nor is there any difficulty about the state's being
naturally a good (in the order of final causality) and also being
subject to moral change through voluntary action (in the order
of efficient causality) .68
The analogy between the state and a work of useful art, such
as a house, helps us to see one further characteristic of the
state. It is not only a moral being (in that, like virtue, it is a
being relatively and a good simply) , but also a moral person.
By reduction to the natural substances which compose it, a
house is regarded as an inorganic thing, quasi-substantial because its unity is accidental. By similar reduction, the state
67 In the order of final causality, the end is also a principle of unity, being the
source of concordant wills and concerted action, without which the state could
neither come into being nor be preserved in being. That there must be two
of unity in the state follows from the fact that it is not natural in two orders of
causality: efficient and formal.
•• We are now able to see a natural basis for the existential unity and commonness of the common good. We .said earlier that "a good may also be common in
a way that no nature is common " (p. 600 supra). That statement must now be
qualified by noting the fact that the accidental form of organization-the form of
composition and order through which a multitude is associated in a single community-is both one form and the accident of many substances. If it were not one,
and if it did not inhere in many substances, the multitude would not be associated
in the accidental unity which is the state. An artificial form which organizes a
plurality of substances into a single work of art (e. g., a house) is, as a single
accident, inherent in many; the same must be true of the political form as an
organizing accident; the only difference between the two being that the artificial
form is a passive accident of inorganic substances, whereas the political form exists
accidentally in a multitude of men through the active quality of their habits. Cf.
"A Dialectic of Morals," loc. cit., pp. 889 ff. As the political form is, existentially,
a one and yet in a many, so the good of the entity thus constituted as an accidental
being, is existentially a single good (of the organized whole as such) and also a
good commonly enjoyed by each member of the multitude. Cf. fn. 50 supra.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

617

must be regarded as a living thing, again quasi-substantial because· its unity is accidental. The human beings who compose
the state are natural persons. The personality of the state is
derived from the rational natures of its members. But because
its unity is accidental and in the moral order, we speak of the
state as a moral person, just as we speak of the house as an
artificial substance, because its unity is accidental and in the
order of artistic production. These modes of speech are not
metaphorical, but analogical, though the analogy is one of attribution (by material causality), not proportionality. Just as a
natural person is a voluntary agent, exercising reason and will,
so the state, as a moral person, is, analogically, a voluntary
agent, and exercises, again analogically, reason and will. Of
course, there is no action by the state which is not the action
of individual men (i.e., of natural persons), but the action of
individual men qua isolated individuals is never the action of
the state. The action of the state is the action of men in their
corporate capacities, whether as rulers or ruled. Just as a multitude politically organized constitutes the state in being, so the
action of this organized multitude constitutes the state's activity.
Just as political activity on the part of each individual is only
such activity as is performed in virtue of a political status, a
role derived from membership in the community, so the action
of the state is not constituted by any sort of activity on the
part of the men who compose it, but only by their political
actions. 69 Finally, wherever there is a mode of action there is
•• Obeying the law is just as much political activity as making or enforcing it;
and the action of the state is just as much constituted by the political activity of
the ruled as by the governing operations of those who hold ruling offices. This
fact does not deny real diversity in political status nor the hierarchy of political
functions. The powers and responsibilities of the citizen are not the same as the
powers and responsibilities of the legislator. But though only some members of the
community are empowered, and have the responsibility, to make laws for the common good, all its members are required to act for the common good by obeying the
law. Governmental action, in short, is not the only mode of political action; and
when the state is falsely identified with its governors, the action of the state is
erroneously confused with governmental operations. If, speaking loosely, we say
that the state makes law, we should counteract the error involved by also saying
that the state obeys law. Strictly speaking, legislators make law, and all citizens

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

a principle of agency. Thus, the virtues as stable habit formations
are the principles of moral activity on the part of the individual.
In the case of the state, as an organized multitude, the institutions of government are the principles of specifically political
activity. The institutions of government assign political status
to every member of the community, distribute powers and
responsibilities, prescribe duties and functions. Since a man cannot act politically except in terms of his political status, and the
powers and functions thereto appertaining, the institutions of
government are the proximate principles of such action. 70 Moreover, like habits, the institutions of government (including always the status of the ruled as well as the status of rulers) , are
stable formations, the enduring principles of countless acts by
many individuals. One form of government differs from another according to the way in which these institutions are determined, the way in which rulers and ruled are politically related,
etc. But every good form of government is a means to the common good, in the same way that every good habit is a means
to happiness: it is the proximate principle of good political
activity, on the part of the natural person as a political agent,
or on the part of the state as a moral person.
We are now prepared to summarize the foregoing analysis
by showing how it is true, on the one hand, that the state is
the common good and as such the end of good government and
good political activity; and, on the other, that the end of the
state is the common good. As we pointed out earlier, 71
the
difficulties here are due to ambiguities in such words as "comshould obey law: the action of the state, rightly viewed, is the resultant of these
two modes of political activity. The reason why we persist in saying that the
state makes law, and seldom, if ever, say that the state obeys law, is because the
authority of the law is derived from its end, the common good of the state.
•• This does not deny that the individual's habits, good or bad, are also principles
of his political activity: they are an indispensable, but never a sufficient, cause. It
is only through justice, generally conceived (i.e., the moral virtues in their social
aspect), that a man acts politically; but general justice (or, what is the same,
political justice) is the virtue of the individual, not in isolation, but as a member
of the community, having therein a definite status.
u Vd. Part I, supra, Zoe. cit., pp. 427-428.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

619

mon good," "state," and "government." These are now sufficiently clarified to effect a resolution.
There are two distinct meanings of " common good " as the
end of political activity; and there are three ways in which
" state " must be viewed.
The common good is either existential or ideal. In so far as
the state exists, the political common good exists in some
degree of perfection. In so far as the imperfection of the state
permits progressive development, there is a greater common
good to be achieved than now exists. The existential common good must not be regarded as a good merely in the
metaphysical sense (as convertible with the actual being of the
state) for it is also an object of desire and effort: the state
must be preserved in whatever degree of well-being it now
possesses. In contrast, however, the ideal common good is a
good primarily in the moral sense, for it is always a perfection
not yet achieved in the political order (and, as such, convertible
with the state's potential, not actual, being). Furthermore,
the preservation of an existing imperfect good is always for the
sake of attaining the more perfect good that is relative to unrealized potencies. The bare existence of the state is a good
which must be sustained in being in order to achieve the additional perfections that develop the state's capacity for complete well-being. Hence the ideal common good is the primary
object of political activity; the existential common good is a
secondary object, for the work of preservation is ordered to the
work of progress.
In the practical order, the three fundamental terms are end,
agent, and means. The state can be viewed in each of these
three ways. In so far as it exists, and has some degree of wellbeing which is convertible with the existential common good,
the state is an end of political activity. In so far as its agency
is constituted by the political activity of its members for a
greater common good than now exists, the state is also an agent
working for an end. And in so far as the common good, existential or ideal, is not the last end simpliciter in the temporal
order, but an intermediate end, the state is also a means.

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

Hence the traditional statement that the common good is the
end of the state must be given two distinct interpretations
according as the end is saiJ as the end of an agent or as the
end of a means. Thus, for example, happiness is the end of man
as an agent; it is not the end of man as a means, but of the
virtues. But the state, unlike man, is both an agent and a
means. The end cannot be the same in the two cases. When
the state is viewed as a means, the end is not the political common good, but happiness, which is also a common good, in a
different sense already noted. 72 When the state is viewed as
an agent, the end is the political common good, primarly as
ideal, secondarily as existentiaL But the existing state is also
an end; in whatever degree of well-being it possesses, it is the
existential common good. W"ith respect to the state as an end,
the agent is man as member of the community, and the means
are political activity and the institutions of government as the
principles of agency. The statement that the common good is
the state does not conflict therefore, with the statement that
the common good is the end of the state, for the meanings of
"common good" and "state" are not the same. Nor need
there be any confusion due to the fact that with respect to the
common good (existential or ideal) as the end of political
activity, the men who compose the community are the primary
agents, whereas the state, not being a real person, is the agent
only in an analogical and derivative sense. 73 The only difficulty
72 In this case, the political common good, convertible
with the well-being of the
state, is a means to happiness as the essential good common to each man qua man.
73 There is certainly
no difficulty about regarding the existential common good,
as well as the ideal common good, as the end of the state as agent, even though
this requires us to say that the state works for the preservation of its well-being
as well as for its improvement. A man works both to preserve himself in virtue
and to augment his character by additional virtue.
Although, metaphysically, the real person is always the primary agent, and the
state, as a moral person, is only an agent secondarily and by derivation, nevertheless, practically, the state is the only adequate agent with respect to the common
good as an end. The individual man as suck is not a political agent at all; the
individual man is only a political agent in his political status as a member of the
community; and even so he must join with other political agents to act effectively
for the common good. Hence, the individual man, even as member of the com-

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

621

which seems to arise concerns the state as a means, for the
existential common good can be regarded as a means to the
ideal common good, in so far as it is to be preserved, not for its
own sake, but as a condition of progress toward greater political
perfection. This difficulty is removed by seeing that the proximate end of the existing state as means is the ideal common
good still to be achitwed, whereas the ultimate end of the common good, existential or ideal, is happiness. When we view the
state as a means, we must note whether the end being ,considered is the ideal common good or happiness; and when we
view the state as a means to happiness, we must note whether
the means being considered is the state as it now exists imperfectly or the state as· it can exist in some greater degree of
perfection. 74
4. The distinction between the existential and the ideal common good is related to a fundamental point in Thomistic political theory. St. Thomas, speaking of the king as principally
concerned " with the means by which the multitude subject to
him may live well," says that this concern is threefold: " first
of all, to establish a virtuous life in the multitude subject to
second, to preserve it once established; and third, to promote its greater perfection." 75 Now, the state or common good
is not identical with happiness, but like virtue it is one of the
means which enable men to lead the life of virtue. Hence, the
munity, is by himself inadequate as an agent acting for the common good. The
adequate agent is the organized multitude as a whole, i.e., the state. Cf. fn. 58
aupra. We said at the very beginning that "the being which is the agent in the
case of the common good, the being in whose perfection the common good exists,
is not a human being without qualificatirm" (p. 594 11Upra). We have seen that the
being in whose perfection the common good exists is a human being cmly as qualified
by union with others through political organization. Vd. fn. 68 supra. And we now
see that the being which is the agent in the case of the common good is a human
being cmly as qualified by cooperation with others in political activity. Hence, as
we promised to show (p. 594 IIUpra), " a plurality of common goods is not impossible by reason of incompatibility with the unity of human nature."
•• This last point becomes important subsequently when we consider the grades
of goodness of the common good as end, in relation to the degrees of efficiency of
less and more perfect states as means to happiness.
•• De Regimine Principum, I, 15.

M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

three aims of political activity, on the part of any political agent,
not merely the king, must be strictly understood in the foHowing manner: (1) to establish the state, to bring the political
common good into being; (2) to preserve the state once established, to sustain the existential common good in whatever
grade is convertible with the existing state's well-being; and
(8) to promote the perfection of the state, to work for the
attainment of the ideal common good that is the fullest development of the state's potentialities, or of human potentialities for
political life. According as the state is brought into existence,
an indispensable means to human happiness is established; according as it is sustained in being, this indispensable condition
of the life of virtue is preserved; according as it is developed
toward its own ·characteristic perfection, the virtuous life is
more thoroughly promoted by political means. 76
The generic distinction between all good and all bad states
cannot be made in terms of the existential common good as
•• Whereas Aristotle considered the common good primarily as finia effectua, a good
achieved, St. Thomas considered the common good primarily as finis cauaa, as a
good to be preserved and promoted. Cf. L. Lachance, 0. P., L'Humanisme Politique
de Saint ThO'TTUUf (Ottawa: 1939), pp. 473 fl'. Both considerations are indispensable
to an adequate political theory, since the existential common good to be preserved
must be analyzed both as finis effectua and as finis cauaa. More than any other
political writer. John Stuart Mill. in his Essay on Representative Government,
combines both points of view. He nses the terms order and progress to name the
two related ends of political activity: " Order is the preservation of all kinds and
amounts of good which already exist, and Progress consists in the increase of them "
(op. cit., Ch. II). Furthermore, as he points out, these two ends are functionally
related: "Progress includes· Order, but Order does not include Progress. Progress
is a greater degree of that of which Order is less. Order, in any sense, stands only
for a part of the prerequisites of good government, not for its idea and essence. . ..
Order, thns considered, is not an additional end to be reconciled with Progress, but
a part and means of Progress itself" (ibid.). Or, in other words, the primary end
of political activity is the ideal common good, the end of progressive action, whereas
the existential common good, the end of preservative action, is secondary in that
it mu.St always be regarded as a means or condition of further political developments. The three concerns of the king (or, what is the same, the three objectives
of political activity) which St. Thomas enumerates are named by him in the order
of temporal priority: the state must first be instituted, then sustained, and then
improved. This is the order of execution. In the order of intention, the enumeration
would be reversed, for the ultimate end precedes what are ends only conditionally
and as means.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

628

finis efjectus. Apart from their motion toward or away from a
single end, existing states can be arranged only according to the
degree of achieved goodness, with the best existing state at one
the worst at the other, for, as we have seen, even
extreme
the worst state has a certain grade of political goodness convertible with its actual being. 77 Unity of end, and distinction
between motion toward and motion away from this single end,
is required for the generic classification of states as good and
bad. The common good as finis causa, and here especially the
ideal common good, provides what is required.
All good states are generically alike in being in motion toward
a common good greater than that which is convertible with
their present actual well-being-the term of this progrssive
motion consisting in the ideal common good, absolutely speaking, i.e., the maximum perfection which can be achieved in the
political order. This can also be said in terms of the activity of
the primary agents and in terms of the forms of government
through whose institutions, as the principles of agency, such
activity occurs: good political activity on the part of any agent,
ruler or ruled, aims at the ideal common good and seeks to
preserve the existing common good for the sake of its attainment; good forms of government set up the stable institutional
means whereby political activity is directed to these ends. 78
In sharp contrast, all bad states are generically alike in being
corruptive of the existing common good, and hence in motion
away from the ideal common good, since the preservation of
the state in its present well-being, however imperfect, is a
necessary condition of progress toward its greater well-being.
This, too, can be said in terms of the activity of primary agents
and in terms of governmental forms: bad political activity,
aiming at the accidental good of the agents, be they rulers or
71 The order of states,
from monarchy to tyranny, set up by Plato in The
Republic, VIII-IX, ·appears to be of this sort. There is no generic distinction
between good and bad; each of the six forms of government is regarded as better
or worse than another; the four intermediate forms being both better than some
and worse than others.
78 Vd. Section 8, aupra; at p. 609.

7

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

ruled, tends to destroy the existing common good; and a good
form of government is perverted by such misuse of its institutions.79
5. The theory of Democracy requires, however, more than a
generic distinction between states as good and bad, or between
forms of government as rightly used and perverted. It requires
us to show that the several, specifically distinct, forms of government are capable of being morally ordered as good, better,
and best. 80 This moral gradation of forms of government can
79 Three things should be noted here.
In the first place, we do not define bad
political activity as directed toward the individual good of the agents, as opposed
to the common good of the state, because happiness and virtue are individual goods,
and if political activity were directed toward them as ultimate ends, it would have
to aim at the common good of the state as at an indispensable means; therefore,
we must define the end of bad political activity as that individual good which is
accidental rather than essential, and thus opposed to the existential. common good
of the state and to the essential common good of the individual man. In the
second place, misrule is not the only form of bad political activity; criminal
action is another type of activity for the accidental good of the individual and
opposed both to his own essential good, and the common good of the state; hence
the definition of bad political activity is the same whether the agents be rulers or
ruled. In the third place, the bad forms of government are not distinct in definition
from the good forms; whatever institutional elements define a given good form of
government are also present in bad forms of the same species, but these institutional elements are perverted to a wrong use; thus, to use the familiar traditional
distinction between monarchy and tyranny as an example, both have the same
definition (the institution of rulership by one man), but tyranny corrupts this
institution by the use of its powers and privileges for the accidental good of the
ruler. Just as a virtue and its related vices all have the same definition as habits
subjected in a given power, differing morally with respect to end, so a good and a
bad state may have the same form of government, which is rightly v.sed in the
one case, i.e., for the due end. and perverted in the other.
80 It must be remembered here that the thesis to be proved is in opposition to
the notion that the several forms of government can be ordered only as more or
less efficient means to one and the same end which generically distinguishes all
good states from bad.
In a recent article, '' St. Thomas Aquinas and Popular Sovereignty " (Thought,
XVI, 62, pp. 473-92), Father Wilfrid Parsons reiterates the traditional position to
which we are opposed, namely, that the only distinction among governments, on
moral grounds, is the generic distinction of the good forms from the bad, and that
the several good forms, as species, are all equal morally. But Father Parsons
departs from the tradition in that he defines good government not merely in terms
of " a rule for the !!Ommon good," for he adds, as indispensable elements, two

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

625

be accomplished or, · by reference to a moral hierarchy of ends,
one form of goverm_. _nt being better than another in terms of
the end which is achieved by political activity through its characteristic institutions. The common good as finis causa cannot
serve this purpose, because it is the end which determines
whether any form of government is well-used or perverted: the
ideal common good, absolutely speaking, is the same end for
every good form of government; and, though the existential
common good may differ in the case of different forms of government, it is, as finis causa, as a good to be preserved, only a
secondary end-a means to the ideal common good. But if
there is a plurality of existential common goods, differing intrinother notions: (1) that the rule must be "representative of the people," and (!'l)
that it must be "derived for the ruler immediately from the community itself."
Such (generic) good government, Father Parsons insists, is not identical with
democracy, but with "popular sovereignty."
It may be monarchical in species
(rule by one man), aristocratic (rule by the worthy few), or democratic ("rule
by the people ") . Whereas the traditional generic distinction between good and
bad government, in terms of " rule for the common good," can be supplemented
by specific moral distinctions among good governments, in terms of elements of
justice; Father Parson's version of the traditional position makes such supplementation impossible. His analysis, it seems to us, is wrong on two counts: first, by
insisting on constitutionality (rule derived from the· community) he fails to comprehend the sort of justice which can exist in a strictly non-constitutional government (i. e., under what Aristotle calls " personal rule ") ; second, by failing to
insist upon universal suffrage (i. e., by failing to equate " the people " with all
members of the community), he is unable to comprehend the sort of justice in
which Democracy exceeds Republican government. He has, in short, identified the
essence of good government with the grade of justice inherent in the Republican
form, which is not enough to constitute the best form of government, and is too
much to represent the least perfect of the good forms. In consequence, of course,
he has confused forms of government (classified according to principles of justice)
with modes of governmental operation (classified according to the distribution of
ruling offices). We will return to these matters demonstratively in Parts IV and
V, wherein we shall consider critically the sort of texts Father Parsons cites as
supporting his position, and the kind of reasoning which argues for it. Here
suffice it to say that Father Parsons' theory cannot possibly account for the
dynamics of political history-for the obvious facts of political progress and for the
complex processes of political corruption. This, by itself, is enough to make the
theory untenable. Vd. fn. 107 and 110, infra. Cf. C. W. Mcllwain, Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern (Ithaca, 1940). The history of constitutionalism
reveals that the notion of " popular sovereignty " neither represents nor exhausts
the essence of good government.

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

sically in grade of political perfection achieved, then these, as
finis effectus, can constitute a hierarchy of ends correlative with
a moral ordering of specifically distinct forms of government. 81
Fully to explain such a hierarchy of governmental forms, differing specifically according to the grade of common goodness
achieved, it is necessary to examine the existential common
good as finis efjectus, and to see how its characteristic excellence in each case is related to the specific characteristics of the
form of government in that case. We must analyze the common
good as an achieved end, and understand how a form of
government is the means directly productive of this end.
The relation between happiness and virtue provides an instructive parallel. Happiness as constituted by the possession
of all good things includes virtue among the partial goods possessed by the happy man in the course of a complete life. Regarding happiness as the whole of temporal goods, we must
regard every type of partial good as a conJftitutive means to
happiness, for the whole cannot be possessed except through
the attainment of its parts. As a constitutive means, virtue
(intellectual or moral) is not more indispensable than any other
constitutive means, even though it is bonum honestum and has
intrinsically greater worth as a good than such goods as wealth,
health, and pleasure. The primacy of virtue among partial goods
(and here the emphasis must be upon the moral virtues and
prudence) , is in the functional, as opposed to the constitutive,
relation of means to ends. Whereas a constitutive means stands
81 The several good forms of government, specifically distinct, will be correlative
with the several kinds of good state: The grade of achieved common good, which
is convertible with the degree of well-being of the existing state, will vary with
the grade of goodness in each form of government. The reason for this co-variation
will be presently indicated in an analysis of the functional relationship of a form
of government, as means, to the existential common good, as achieved end. It
should be noted here, however, that the fact of political progress involves not only
a distinction between an existential and an ideal common good, but also some
gradation among existential common goods in degree of perfection attained. The
only question concerns the precise character of these degrees of perfectionwhether the less perfect is related to the more perfect as the child is to the man
or as brute is to man; or, in other words, whether the variation is continuous or
discontinuous (i. e., as· in a hierarchy of essential species) .

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

627

to its end in a relation of material causality, a functional means
is related to its end by efficient causality. One type of partial
good may thus function as a means to
type of partial
good as end (e.g., wealth for the sake of health. health for the
sake of activity, good activity for the sake of virtue or virtue
for the sake of good activity), but only virtue is the functional
means directly productive of the last end, of happiness itself
as the whole of goods. The reason is clear as soon as we remember that happiness cannot be constituted as a mere aggregate
of goods: it is all good things in a right order and in due proportion to one another. 82 Only when every type of good is
ordered according to its use or worth, only when it is duly'
proportioned to the other parts of happiness and to the whole
of which it is a part, is it possible for a man to possess all good
things in the course of his life. Now moral virtue is an habitual
right ordering of desires; hence moral virtue, with prudence, is
the principle of the right choices which must be made on every
occasion if happiness is to be achieved. Even though a man
cannot be judged happy until his life is completed, we know
that he is becoming happy if his character is formed by virtue.
Because virtue is related to happiness as its directly productive
means, the degree of happiness in the process of becoming is
•• There is a further reason, which should be mentioned. Happiness, being the
welfare of a whole life, cannot be achieved by a single good act. That is why the
virtues, as stable habits, must be the means directly productive of happiness, even
though it remains true, of course, that the virtues themselves are pr6duced by good
activity. Vd. "A Dialectic of Morals," loc. cit., p. 376. Just as the virtues are the
enduring source of the multiplicity of good acts without which happiness cannot be
achieved in the course of a whole life, so the stable institutions of government are
the enduring source of the multiplicity of political acts without which the common
good cannot be achieved in the life of the state, which is temporally so much more
extensive than the life of a man. The fact that good political activity is necessary
to establish the institutions of just government does not alter the fact that the
common good, which is convertible not merely with the momentary well-being of
the state, but with its enduring welfare, cannot be directly produced by such
activity. The cause must be equal to its effect in stability and endurance. Hence,
the institutions of government, as the principles of political activity (analogous to
the virtues as the principles of individual action) , are the cause proportionate to
the common good as effect.

M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

correlative with the degree of virtue possessed. As a man's
character is. so is his end. 88
Now, like happiness. the common good is a whote of goods.
As the last end in the political order, it is the whole constituted
by every type of socialgood, goods which can be enjoyed by
individuals only as members of a community. The use of natural
resources and geographical benefits corresponds to such goods
as wealth and health in the case of individual happiness; 84 the
cultural development of the community by all those institutions
which socialize the life of reason corresponds to intellectual virtue and activity in the case of happiness; good government and
good political activity correspond to moral virtue and virtuous
action. 85 Each type of social good is a part of the common good,
and a constitutive means thereto. The state, whose actual wellbeing is convertible with the existential common good as a whole,
is thus seen to be constituted by more than purely political
institutions and activity. 86 Every type of social good is a constitutive means to the common good which, in existence, is the
state's well-being, and among these good government is only
one. But, like happiness, the common good is not a mere aggregate of goods: it can be achieved only through a right ordering
of its several constitutive parts. The various types of social
good must be functionally related to one another in due pro89 For a fuller account
of the types of partial good, for a thorough analysis of
the fourfold dimensionality of the means-end relationship, and for a demonstration
that virtue is productive of happiness, vd. "A Dialectic of Morals," loc. cit., pp.
373-76; and 376-80.
•• Vd. De Regimine Principum, II, 1-4, wherein St. Thomas considers such factors
as climate and health, agriculture, industry and trade, as partial social goods
constitutive, in part, of the common good.
85 To make the comparison complete, recreational
facilities should be mentioned
as corresponding to pleasure as a partial good constitutive of happiness. Vd. De
Regimine Pri"tcipum, II, 4.
86 Cf. Part I, supra, loc. cit., pp. 440-443, wherein we distinguished
between the
state, in its narrower signification, as the community in its purely political aspect,
and the state, more broadly understood, as including economic and cultural aspects.
Although the common good is the end of political activity, it is not wholly constituted by such activity and the governmental institutions through which it is
directed.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

portion and right subordination, and, above all, because they
are social goods, they must be rightly sh?-red by all the members
of the community through just distribution. In no other way,
can the common good as a whole be at once the good of the
community and of its members. When, in traditional speech,
the common good is epitomized by the phrase " unity of peace,"
the right order and distribution of social goods is signified as
essential to the common good as a whole, for a whole which is
not a mere aggregate can be constituted as a unity only through
arder, and that unity can be shared by many in peace only
through just distribution. The unity of peace is not one aspect
or part of the common good; rather it is the common good as
the complexly constituted well-being in which a multitude
shares.
Although good government is merely one of the social goods
constitutive of the state's well-being, it is also, like moral virtue
in relation to happiness, the one partial good which stands in
special relation to the common good as its productive means.
Whatever is productive of the unity of peace-of the activities
of a multitude peacefully cooperating in the attainment of the
various social goods-is productive of the common good, constituted by those goods as ordered and shared. Government
functions to produce the common good in so far as, through its
institutions, it orders men to one another in their cooperative
pursuit of the social goods, justly proportions the social goods
to one another (as components of the whole), and justly distributes them (as an ordered whole shared by an ordered multitude). Justice, said Aristotle, is the principle of order in states.
The goodness of government as the means productive of the
common good is convertible with its justice. 87 As virtue is both
87 " Justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration
of justice ... is
the principle of order in political society" (Politics, I,
1253'7). And St. Thomas
says: " The welfare and safety of a multitude formed into a society is the preservation of its unity, which is called peace, and which, if taken away, the benefits of
social life are lost. . . . The chief concern of the ruler of a multitude, therefore,
should be to procure the unity of peace" (De Regimine Principum, I,
. Cf.
ibid., I, 15. These two statements are not inconsistent; for the unity of peace is
impossible without the administration of justice, which is the principle of civil

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

a constitutive and the productive means of happiness, so political justice (in which consists the moral goodness of government)
is not only a part of the common good, but the source of its
coming to be and the mainstay of its endurance. 88
Two points should now be clear. First, good government, as
a part of the common good and, even more so, as its indispensable productive means, is itself an intermediate end in the
political order. One of the marks of good political activity is
that it establishes and maintains the institutions of just government. As good acts form the virtues which, as intermediate
ends, · are means to happiness through directing activity to
happiness as the ordered whole of goods which can be possessed
in a complete life, so good· political acts shape the institutions
of just government which, as intermediate ends, are means to
the common good through directing political activity to the
order. The state is a peaceful association of men (as opposed to a unity imposed
by the coercions of violence) only through justice. This is further confirmed by
St. Augustine's conception of a people as "not any crowd of persons, but the
assembly of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for
the common good" (De Civ. Dei, IT,
Without justice a multitude cannot be
peacefully unified in fellowship. " Remota itaque j'U8titia, quid mnt regna, nisi
magna latrocinia?" (De Civ. Dei, IV, 4.) Cf. Part I, mpra, loc. cit., p. 417.
According to St. Thomas, " peace is the work of j'U8tice indirectly, in so far as
justice removes the obstacles to peace; but it is the work of charity directly, since
charity, by its very nature, causes peace" (Summa Theologica, IT-IT, 29, 3 ad 3).
Cf. Francis E. McMahon, "A Thomistic Analysis of Peace," in THE THOMIST, I,
pp.
But the common good is not identical with peace, but with the
unity of peace or what might be more accurately expressed as the peace of a
unified multitude. Social peace is a condition prerequisite to the attainment of
the ultimate peace of the individual, imperfectly on earth, perfectly hereafter. In
its ultimate signification, peace is identical with happiness, and this is the work
of charity, of love rightly directed toward the good; in its social signification, peace,
or the unity of peace (i. e., the peace of a unified multitude) is the work of justice.
Hence, peace (i. e., happiness) is the work of justice indirectly, in so far as justice,
working for social peace (i. e., the common good) removes obstacles to happiness;
it is also the work of justice remotely, albeit now directly, in so far as the common
good positively contributes to the happiness of individual men. When we say that
justice is the cause of the unity of peace, the emphasis should be placed on the
word " unity " for it is this word which signifies that the peace being considered
is the social peace of an organized multitude, i. e., the common good.
88 Vd. fn.
mpra. " A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the
end by one and the same cause" (Summa Theol., I-ll, q. 93, a. 6, ad 3um) .

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

681

total well-being of the state as the ordered whole of social goods
which can be shared by a multitude. 89 Second, viewing the
existential common good as finis effectus, we see that there
must be a correlation between the degree of justice in a form of
government and the grade of well-being which is the realized
common good of the state. But, in this connection, there are
two important differences between the diverse forms of government and the species of moral virtue. One is that the several
cardinal virtues can and must be possessed together; .it is of
their very essence to be conjunctive. The other is that in whatever degree, approaching perfect integrity, the moral virtues are
possessed, the variation in degree is primarily a continuous
variation in intensity, so that the correlation is between the
strength of the virtues and the degrees of happiness in process
of being achieved. In contrast, the several forms of government
cannot co-exist in the same community: it is of their very
essence to be disjunctive and successive. Furthermore, although
one form of government may be more or less just than another,
the variation here is not in the intensity of the same justice,
but according to lack or possession of a distinct element of
political justice. Hence, the forms of government are related
as species in a moral hierarchy, analogous to the natural hierarchy of species of composite substance. The correlation, therefore, is between the specific grade of justice in the several forms
of government and the specific grade of existential common good
achieved in the community thus governed. As Royal, Republican, and Democratic governments are ordered in a moral hierarchy, so accordingly there is a moral hierarchy of existential
common goods-i. e., the common good of the Royal kind of
state being not only less than, but specifically different from,
89 Political justice
(i. e., the justice of government) is thus seen to be both a
final and an efficient cause of good political activity. Vd. Part I, supra, loc. cit.,
p. 417. Cf. p. 443, where it is said: "A form of government may be the end or
objective of political activity, and the good which is thus aimed at must be conceived as a common good." i.e., as a social good; " but ·the form of government
may also be viewed as a means to the 'well-being of the state when that is considered in its larger sense as connoting more than the political .'organization of the
multitude." Cf. fn. 86 supra.

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

the common good of the Republican kind of state, and similarly
in the case of Republican and Democratic. In short, the moral
specification of kinds of state, and their hierarchy as morally
unequal, arises from viewing them as a diversity of ends (a
diversity of existential common goods as finis efjectus), and not
from referring
to a diversity of ends (a diversity of ideal
common goods as finis causa). And the moral specification of
forms of government, also hierarchized as morally unequal, is
intrinsically determined by the distinct elements of justice
which, according to their presence or absence, define several
species; as well as extrinsically determined by the correlation,
through efficient causality, between each species of government,
according to its grade of political justice, and each kind of state,
according to the grade of its existential common good. 90
We have now reached a solution of the difficulty which made
our thesis (that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form
of government) appear to be indemonstrable. We have not yet
demonstrated that thesis, but we have at least shown it to be
demonstrable by answering an objection which relied for its
force upon an inadequate account of the common good. To
9 ° Fully to understand
what is here being said, the reader must remember the
specification of Royal, Republican, and Democratic government, according to three
elements of justice, which can here "be briefly named as: A: the just exercise of
political power; B: the just constitution of political power; and C: the just
distribution of political status. Vd. Part I, supra, Zoe. cit., pp. 418-422. Using these
letters to signify the distinct elements, and parentheses to signify an element not
possessed, we can symbolize the three species of government as follows: I., i.e.,
Royal: A (B, C); IT, i.e., Republican: AB (C); ITI, i.e., Democratic: ABC. I,
II, and III are ordered hierarchically, as are the three species of living substance
(plant, brute, man) . As plant signifies vegetative life exclusively, as brute> signifies
sensitive life exclusively, though that includes the vegetative, and as man signifies
the rational life, including both the vegetative and the sensitive, so Royal· signifies
government which can be just exclusively in the way power is exercised, Republican
signifies government which can be just exclusively in the way power is constituted,
though that can include the justice of its proper exercise, and Democratic signifies
government which can be just in the distribution of status, as well as with respect
to the other factors. The hierarchy of governments is a moral hierarchy because
the essential differences by which specification takes place are in the moral· order,
i.e., they are elements of political justice. Cf. Part I, supra, loc. cit., p. 438, and
fn. 24.

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633

demonstrate the thesis, we must prove that the elements of
justice, which we have used to specify three forms of government, are separable and cumulatively combinable, as specifying
differences must be to set up a hierarchy, moral or naturaJ.9 1
But to defend its demonstrability, we had only to show that a
moral gradation in forms of government does not violate the
unity of the common good, as the end of political
even
though it involves a plurality of common goods, as diverse and
unequal ends correlative with the diverse and unequal species
of government. That has now been accomplished by the basic
distinction between the ideal and the existential common good,
between the common good as finis causa and the common good
as finis effectus; for the unity of the former as an end is the
single principle for distinguishing all good from all bad governments and states, whereas the plurality of the latter as ends
(but now in a different sense, effectus, not causa) is correlative
with the plurality of unequally just governments. As the objection pointed out, it would be impossible to specify forms of
government as morally unequal by reference to a plurality of
ends to be achieved, diverse and unequal ideal common goods.
But, as we have shown, it is not impossible to specify forms of
government as morally unequal by regarding them as correlative with a plurality of ends already achieved, diverse and
unequal existential common goods. 92 We have shown that the
91 This will be the main work of Parts IV and V infra.
•• Good is a transcendental term, predicable analogically rather than univocally.
The analogy of, "goodness, like the analogy of being, involves an inequality among
the various species or modes which it subsumes. Hence, whenever a number of
things participate in an analogy, whether of being or of goodness, they must be
ordered hierarchically. Vd. Summa Theologica, I, 5, 5; cf. 6, ad 3. The qualification
of good by common does not alter the analogical character of good, any more than
the qualification of being by corporeal alters the analogical character of the being
that is said of corporeal substances · diverse in species. To say of each of the
several distinct grades of well-being (of the specifically distinct kinds of state)
that it is is a co=on good (existential, finis effectus), is to recognize the analogy
of ·common goodness in which these diverse kinds of state participate, as the
unequal members of a moral hierarchy. That the goodness which is convertible
with the natural grade of being of a man and the goodness which is convertible
with. the natural grade of being of a brute are unequal and analogical is a fact

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

necessity for this correlation lies in the functioning of governmental institutions as the principal means productive of the
common good that is achieved at any
The grade of
goodness in the existing effect (the grade of the common good
as finis effectus) must be proportionate to the grade of goodness
in its productive cause (the grade of political justice in each
form of government). And, finally, since forms of government
are themselves intermediate ends in the political order, their
specification by distinct elements of justice, separable and cumulatively combinable, also permits them to be viewed as a moral
hierarchy of ends, in the sense of finis causa. 98
which should enable us to understand that the common good achieved in a Royal
state and the common good achieved in a Republican state are unequal and
analogical, even though in the first case the goodness is not the result of voluntary
achievement, and in the second case it is. It might be more fitting, therefore, to
compare the analogy of the common good with the analogy of happiness in which
temporal .happiness and eternal beatitude participate unequally. It is a more
perfect parallel, not only because the analogical goods being compared are; in both
cases, the ends of voluntary action, but · also because the inequality of the ends
achieved is proportionate to the inequality of the causes (natural and supernatural
virtue, in the case of happiness; diverse forms of government, in the case of the
common good) . And these causes are themselves unequally good within the analogy
ot goodness, whether goodness be attributed to them as productive means or as
intermediate ends. Finally, if one compare any existential common good with the
ideal common good, the analogy is primarily with respect to their mode of being
(actual and potential), and only secondarily with respect to their grade of goodness.
Cf. Maritain, True Humanism, pp. 131 fl'.;.and St. Thomas, In Pol., VII, 3; Summa
Theologica, 11-11, 61, I, ad I.
•• That a form of government is· specified by principles of justice indicates that
it is a bonum honestum, and that it can be an end having intrinsic moral worth,
not merely a• means having extrinsic utility. As an end, a form of government may
be either an already achieved good to be preserved, or an ideal good to be attained.
In either case, a form of government is an end in the sense of finis causa, just as
the common good as an end to be preserved or attained is finis ccMa;a, though in
the first case it must also be existential and finis effectus. Political activity working
for progress must, therefore, aim not only at an ideal common good (to be
attained) and at the existential common good (to be preserved as a condition of
progress), but it must aim also at an ideal form of government, correlative with
the ideal common good to be attained, and at the existing form of government
correlative with the existential common good to be preserved. Thus we see the sense
in which a form ,of government, as existing or ideal, is a finis causa of political
activity, as intermediate end and productive means. But this must not lead us to
confuse the two ways in which forms of government can be ordered in a moral

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

635

6. Two things remain for discussion to conclude the analysis
of the common good in the Theory of Democracy. The first is
the problem of putting together the two classifications of government, of relating the generic distinction between good and bad
government to the several specific distinctions among good
governmental forms. 94 The second concerns the dynamism of
political change, the steps of progress and the processes of corruption in the political order. 95 We shall treat briefly of these
matters in the order indicated. 96
(1) The problem of relating the one generic and the three
specific distinctions is focused by the ambiguity of the trahierarchy: primarily, though extrinsically, by correlation with the grades of existential common good which they effectively establish in being; secondarily,
though intrinsically, as intermediate ends (finis causa), unequal because specified
by principles of justice.
The crucial difference between the Theory of Democracy and the traditional
classification of governments should now be perfectly clear. According to traditional
theory, there is only a generic moral distinction among forms of government: as
rightly used or perverted. The several forms of government which can be good
are specified by non-moral criteria: by the number of rulers, or by the aspect of
the common good being ·emphasized. According to the first mode of specification,
monarchy, is supposed to be best because most efficient in procuring and sustaining
the unity of peace; according to the second mode of specification, the mixed regime
is supposed to be best because combining the three aspects of the common good
which each of the pure forms of government stresses; even so, the mixed regime
is best because it most efficiently realizes all aspects of the common good. Hence,
in neither case, is one form of government morally better than another, either
intrinsically as a .bonum honestum, or extrinsically by correlation with a higher
grade of achieved common good (note: not a fuller realization of the same, univocal, grade of common good) . Once forms of government are seen to be specified
by principles of justice, once they are understood as the effective means for producing diverse existential common goods (as finis effectus), the classification of
specific forms of government, and kinds of states, is radically shifted. It ceases
to be a prudential ordering in terms of efficiency with respect to the same end; it
becomes a moral ordering in terms of the achieved goodness of diverse ends, and
in terms of the intrinsic worth of their correlative means.
•• Vd. Part I, supra, loc. cit., pp.
96 Vd. ibid. The second of these problems is inseparable
from the first, because
the generic distinction depends on the ideal common good which is the end of
progressive action, and progress itself must be understood in terms of the various
grades of existential common good through the successive achievement of which a
community is transformed from one kind of state to another, and better, kind.
•• These matters will be more fully ·discussed in Parts IV- VI, infra.

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

ditional phrase: "rule for the common good." Aristotle and St.
Thomas used the criterion expressed by this phrase to make the
generic distinction. 97 But because neither Aristotle nor St.
Thomas recognized the possjbility of specific moral distinctions
among good forms of government, 98 they did not distinguish
between the just exercise of political power (i.e., effecting an
existential common good) as one of the three elements of political justice and the right use of political institutions (i. e., aiming
at the ideal common good) as the trait which divides good from
bad government generically. The phrase, " rule for the common
good," -generalized to mean a just exercise of political power
on the part of any political agent, not simply rulers or officeholders-has this ambiguity because of the fundamental distinction between the common good as finis effectus and as finis
By making the generic distinction, according to this criterion, Aristotle departs
from the Platonic ·ordering of the six forms of government from best to worst.
" The true forms of government," says Aristotle, " are those in which the one, or
the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments
in which the rule is with a view to the private interest, whether of the one or the
few or the.many, are perversions" (Politics, III, 7,
Cf. ibid., III, 6,
U79°17-!U; and also Ethics, VIII, 10. St. Thomas follows Aristotle on this point
without modification. " If, therefore, a group of free men is governed by their
ruler for the common good of the group, that government will be right and just ....
If, however, the government is organized, not for the common good of the group,
but for the private interest of the ruler, it will be an unjust and perverted government " (De Regimine ·Principum, I, 1) .
98 The very heading of Ch.
of De Regimine Principum, I, " It is more expedient that. a multitude of men living together be ruled by one man rather than
by many " (italics ours), reveals that St. Thomas makes subordinate distinctions
among good forms of government in prudential .terms--in terms of their efficiency
or degree of utility in achieving the one end that is the .same for all good forms of
government. Cf. fn. 93 supra. Thus, he writes: , "It is manifest that what is itself.
one can more efficaciously bring about unity than several. . . . ·Therefore, the rule
of one man is more useful than the rule of many " (italics ours) . It should be
noted, furthermore, that in this chapter, St. Thomas says that " the chief concern
of the ruler should be to procure the unity of peace " (italics ours), whereas in
Ch. 15, he speaks of the ruler's threefold concern; the establishment, the preservation, and the improvement of the common good. If the word " prpcure " as used
in Ch.
is intended to signify the improvement of the common good, as well as
its establishment and preservation, then it would be difficult for St. Thomas to
avoid the unhappy consequences of an ambiguous use of the criterion expressed
by " rule for the common good."

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

637

causa. Failing to make that distinction, Aristotle and St.
Thomas used the criterion expressed by this phrase, to divide
true from perverted governments, but they used it in a sense
which either emphasized the common good as finis effectus
(Aristotle), or failed to exclude the common good as finis
effectus (St. Thomas) .99 Hence the traditional analysis is not
merely inadequate, but somewhat confused.
We have used the criterion (just exercise of politwal power)
as one of three separable and cumulatively combinable elements
of political justice. We have symbolized it as the A factor; the
B factor being just constitution of political power; the C factor
being just distribution of political status .100 Our analysis will
be as confused as the traditional account unless we can separate
the A factor which, taken by itself, specifies the least perfect of
the good forms of government, from the generic factor (still to
be named and symbolized) that qualifies all good governments. 101
It may be thought that such separation is not necessary because, since the A factor is the minimal condition of justice in
government, it must be possessed not only by the least perfect
of the good forms, but by the superior forms as well. This would
seem to be indicated by the symbolization of the three forms!: A (B, C); II: AB (C); ill: ABC. It appears that A is
common to all three; hence, it may be asked, why is not this A
factor the principle of the generic distinction between all the
true forms and their perversions?
There are two reasons why this is impossible. The first is
that the three good forms cannot be morally specified or ordered in a moral hierarchy unless the common goods which are
the achieved ends (finis effectus) of each are themselves diverse
and unequal within the analogy of common goodness. That being so, the A factor is not univocal in the three cases; but a
generic difference must be univocal, at least in so far as it
•• Vd. fn. 76 and 98 supra.
Vd. ·Part I, supra, loc. cit., pp. 418-422.
101 It was such inadequacy
of analysis, with consequent confusion, that Father
Farrell detected in Dr. Adler's original memorandum, The I{emonstration of
Democracy. Vd. Part I, supra, loc. cit., pp. 1405 fl'.
100

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

divides one set of species from another; hence the presence of
the A factor in the moral character of each of the three good
forms of government cannot be the root of generic di:fferentiation.10a- The second reason is that, if the three specific factors
can be separately corrupted in the perversion of the good forms,
then it is at least conceivable that, in the perversion of III
(specified by ABC) , bad forms of government will occur in
which A is conjoined with the corruption of B or C or both. If
we symbolize the corruption of the elements of justice by small
letters, Democracy would seem to be capable of three degrees
of corruption, indicated by ABc, Abc, and abc. That seeming
to be possible, how can A be regarded as the root of generic
. differentiation, since two of the three possible corruptions of
Democracy retain the A factor? Hence, paradoxically, the attempt to use the A factor to make the generic distinction (because it is present in all three of the good forms) must result in
the denial, or violation, of any generic distinction (because some
of the perversions of the morally best form are also characterized by the presence of this same factor) . Our task, therefore,
is double: we must not only formulate the generic criterion in
a manner clearly distinct from what is signified by A, but also
consider whether the perversions of Democracy, symbolized by
ABc and Abc, are possible.
The problem is solved by distinguishing the generic from the
specific meaning of " rule for the common good," according as
the common good is understood as existential or ideal, finis
effectus or finis causa. In its generic signification, "rule for the
common good " means that whatever elements of justice are
present in the moral character of the specific forms of government
are all being directed toward the end of progress; or, in other
words, that political activity through governmental institutions
(whether on the part of the primary agents, i.e., real persons,
or on the part of the state) aims at the ideal common good to
be achieved, as well as works for
preservation of the ex' 02 The point here about analogy and univocity will be more fully· discussed very
shortly.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

639

istential common good for the sake of progress. In its specific
signification, "rule for the common goo9." means that political
power has been justly employed with the result that a common
good, of some grade of perfection, exists; or, in other words, the
A factor is indicated as the cause of the state's minimum wellbeing; hence, when this factor is the only cause of the state's
well-being, the least perfect common good is achieved as a result; and when it is combined with one or both of the remaining
factors (B and C) , the actual well-being of the state is increased
-more perfect grades of common good are achieved. Since the
common good must first be achieved, and exist in some grade,
before it can be improved, or preserved for the sake of improvement-since, in the order of generation, the common good as
finis effeatus is prior to the common good as finis causa 108 -the
generic factor must be understood as qualifying each of the
specific factors which is already present; for once they are
present and effectively establish the state in some grade of wellbeing, they can also be directed to the state's improvement, i. e.,
its motion from a less to a more perfect grade of well-being.
Therefore, the generic factor should be represented as an exponent which either does or does not qualify the significance of
of the specific factors. The presence or absence of this
exponent divides each of the good forms of government from its
characteristic perversions, and thus all the good forms are
univocally distinguished from all the corruptions.
Let us summarize this analysis by using the letter x, as an
exponential factor, to symbolize the generic criterion of political
goodness. The three good forms of government will then be
represented in the following manner, and the symbols thus
interpreted.
I: Ax (B, C): Royal government, through which the least grade
of common good is effected by the just exercise of
103 This is 'not inconsistent with the fact that, in the logical order, i.e., the order
of analysis, the common good as finis causa, being the source of generic distinction,
must be prior to 'the common good as finis effectus, which is involved in the
specific distinctions.

8

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

political power, A; and in which that achieved common good is also an end (finis causa) to be preserved for the sake of attaining the ideal common
good. (Here the B and C factors are not corruptible
for they have not yet come into being as political
institutions; and, since they are non-existent, they
cannot be directed to a further end; hence the exponential factor, x, does not qualify their significance.)
II: AxB" (C): Republican government, through which the next
grade of common good is effected by the just exercise of political power, A, combined with the just
constitution of political power, B; and in which that
achieved common good is also an end to be preserved for the sake of attaining the ideal common
good. (What was said before about the factors in
parentheses applies here.)
III: AxBxcx:

Democratic government, through which the highest
grade of common good is effected by the just exercise, A, of justly constituted, B, political power,
combined with the just distribution of political
status, C; and in which that achieved common good
is also an end to be preserved for the sake of attaining the ideal common good.

The following commentary is necessary to interpret what is
here set forth. The generic factor (symbolized by the exponent
x) has univocal signification throughout. In every case, it is
the same qualification of existing governmental institutionsthat political activity is being directed, through them, to the
ideal common good (both by the work· of preservation and by
the work of improvement). This univocity is not affected by
the fact that the proximate stage of improvement is not the
same in Case I and Case II, for example, because the ultimate
term of improvement, the end which defines the motion of
progress, is the same: the ideal common good, absolutely considered. Nor is it affected by the fact that it qualifies factors
which are specifically distinct from one another, for the meaning
of x remains the same whether it is the exponent of A or B or C:
it signifies that a just constitution, achieving a certain grade of

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

641

common good, is directed beyond this achievement to the ideal
common good not yet attained; or that a just distribution of
status, beyond achieving a higher grade of common good, is
similarly directed. The only difficulty here arises with respect
to the meaning of x as applied to A. How can the A factor (just
exercise of political power) ever exist apart from x (the direction
of political activity toward the ideal common good) ? And, on
the other hand, if the A factor be totally corrupted, i. e., totally
lost, how can the state exist at all? If the least good state is one
in which A is the only factor operating to effect a common good,
then the total negation of this factor, symbolized by a, must
result in the annihilation of the state, the non-being of a common good. Hence we see that the corruption of the Royal state,
Ax (B, C), cannot be understood in terms of what is signified by
a (B, C). There must, therefore, be a mean term between Ax
and a.
This difficulty is solved when we realize that, in the process
of corruption, the B and C factors can be totally lost as well as
diminished, whereas the A factor can only be diminished, but
never totally lost, even though it approach the vanishing point;
for when its vanishing point is reached, the state itself
to
be, and no common good remains to be mulcted for the private
interests of the miscreants. Even the worst tyrant works against
anarchy, and so long as he succeeds there must be some political
action which keeps the state in being. Such action usually takes
the form of obedience to the tyrant's decrees; and this action,
on the part of the members of the community, is a just exercise
of their political power, even though the decrees themselves are
unjust and deleterious to the common good. When the justice
of civil obedience reaches the vanishing point, civil war occurs,
and the very being of the state is in peril. In short, whereas Ax
signifies the just exercise of political power on the part of both
rulers and ruled, the absence of x signifies that the rulers are
exploiting the common good, and that the state continues to
endure only because some of its members, i.e., the ruled, continue to act justly, even though the justice of their action must

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

be qualified by its relativity to an unjust state. 103 " Here, then, is
the mean term between Ax and a, and we shall symbolize it by
a. There is no problem about Bx and b, or Cx and c, for constitutionality or distributive justice may be totally lost.as well
as attentuated. When Republican or Democratic governments
undergo corruption, the negation of x first results in the attentuation of A (symbolized by a); concurrently there must be some
attentuation of B and C (symbolized by B and C) ; and subsequently there may result the total loss of B and C (symbolized by b and c) . In other words, none of the elements of
justice can continue undiminished when political action is no
longer directed to the ideal common good; but neither can that
element of justice which is ·an exercise of political power for the
existing common good ever be totally lost; for if it be not sustained (by the action of the ruled, if not by the action of the
rulers) , the political malefactors cannot aggrandize their private
interests by despoiling or looting the fruits of the common good,
convertible with the state's existence in some degree of wellbeing, however reduced or depleted that may be. To succeed in
their nefarious enterprise, tyrants must obtain obedience and
cooperation from the people they misrule, whether by force or
guile, for without this wraith of justice, the bad state does not
even imitate a political community, and the tyrant cannot
privately profit at the expense of the common good/ 04
And, finally, we see that Ax has only an analogical unity of
meaning as it occurs in the absence of B and C, i.e., with them
108 " Vd. Summa
Theol., I-II, q.
a. I, ad 4um. Cf. Ibid., q. 95, a. 4. Vd.
also Politics III, 17, US7b 86-40.
1 "' Thus, we see the impossibility
of the perversions of Democracy symbolized
by ABc and Abc; and also the impossibility of the perversion of Republican government symbolized by Ab (C). Vd. p. 689 supra. As a matter of fact, even abc, aBC,
aB (C), etc., are impossible. According to the aiJ.alysis given above, the only perversions which are possible in reality 1are: of AxBxcx, aBC, aBc, and abc; of
AxBx (C), aB (C) and ab (C); and of Ax (B, C), a (B. C). These symbolizations
h1dicate that when 'x is negated, the A factor must be attenuated, a, and the other
factors which have already been realized, must either be attenuated (e. g., B) or
lost (e. g., b). The negation 'of x causes a transformation in all of the factors to
which it has been attached, but not the same transformation ill all at any given
moment.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

643

in potentiality, symbolized by (B) and (C); or as conjoined
with the presence of Bx, or Bx and ex. (The same must be
said for Bx in the absence of ex or conjoined with its presence.)
This follows from the fact that the achieved common good is
only analogically the same in these three cases. The just exercise of political power is not univocally the same in the case
in which that power is also justly constituted and in the case
in which it is not; nor is a just constitution of political power
univocally the same in the case in which political status is justly
distributed and in the case in which it is not. 105
105 The parallelism
between the hierarchy of specific natures and the moral
hierarchy of forms of government is thus fulfilled. Plants 'and brute animals are
both vegetative, but animals are vegetative eminenter because their vegetative
powers are conjoined, and elevated by cooperation, with the higher sensitive powers;
similarly, both brutes and men are sensitive, but men are sensitive eminenter, because they are rationally sensitive. The addition of the sensitive to the vegetative,
or the rational to the sensitive, nature is not an extrinsic conjunction, but a :penetrating and transforming one. We affirm 'this truth when we recognize that the
powers of the lower nature are not present simply, but eminently, in the higher;
and' this also means that plant and animal vegetation, brute and human sensitivity,
are analogical, not univocal, by the analogy of inequality, of course, not the analogy
of strict proportionality. The three species 1of soul participate in the generic nature
of soul (as the principle of life), though unequally, because they confer less or
more 'perfect grades of life upon the matter they inform. So the three forms of
government participate in the generic moral quality· of goodness in political institutions, a quality which derives from the ultimate end (finis causa) being served;
but they are unequally good because they effect less or more perfect grades of
common good (finis effectus). Furthermore, no element of justice is univocally
common to two or more forms, being present simpliciter in the inferior form and
eminenter in the superior form. Finally, it should be noted that what is a specifying characteristic, differentiating a form of government from its inferior, is also
an element further differentiated by the characteristic which specifies its superior:
thus, just constitution is like sensitivity: as sensitivity both differentiates brute
from plant life and also constitutes a nature that is subject to further differentiation
by rationality, so the just constitution of political power both differentiates
Republican from Royal government, and constitutes a form of government which
can be further differentiated by the just distribution of political status. As only
the animal nature is capable of being ·either rational or irrational (and,
so being,
is either specifically human or brutal), so only constitutional government can involve a 'just or an unjust distribution of citizenship (for there are no citizens in
the Royal state), and is thus specifically either Democratic or Republican.
supra. The fact 'that the hierarchy of living substances can be
Cf. fn. 90 and
perfectly represented by the symbols we have used to represent the hierarchy of

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

To complete our discussion of the generic and specific
factors, in relation to and separation from each other, we turn
now to the problems raised by political change. Let us first
consider the processes of political corruption, and then the
motions of progress.
The primary cause of corruption is the same in every case,
because all perverted forms of government are generically alike
in being exploited for accidental, individual goods as the ultimate ends of action (finis causa), regardless of the difference in
these institutions according to the specific form of the government being misused, and regardless of the difference in the type
of accidental good, or of the particular role of the individual
who
his end in terms of it. What is univocally the
same in every case is a turning away from the true end (i.e.,
the ideal common good as finis causa of political activity).
What is not the same in every case is the apparent good toward
which the political agent wrongly turns; nor need the political
status or function of this agent be the same in every case.
The secondary causes of corruption consist in the attentuation or total loss of the several specific factors of goodness in
political regimes, with the important exception, already noted,
in the case of the A factor, which can only be attenuated, not
lost. When political agents turn away from the true end of
political activity, they no longer seek to preserve the existential
common good, in whatever grade it is effected by the existing
institutions of government. Such preservation is never an end
in itself, but only for the sake of progress. Furthermore, the
preservation of the common good, as it exists, is usually incompatible with the effort to exploit it for private interests, except,
as noted, in the extreme case in which the least degree of
_government forms [Plant: A(B, C); Brute: AB (C); Man: ABC], with every
consequence of such hierarchical ordering the same in both cases, should cause us
to wonder how such a parallelism can exist, ·in view of the fact that the State is,
ontologically speaking, an accidental being, and not a substance. Vd. M. J. Adler,
"The Solution of the Problem of Species," in 'THE THOMIST, III, 2, 279-879. This
is a metaphysical question of great interest, but it does not concern us here. We
shall return to its consideration in Part VI infra.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

645

common good must be preserved, in no more than an attenuated form, for the state itself to endure and for its fruits to be
appropriated, rather than distributed. These things being so,
corrupt forms of government can be distinguished specifically
in the same way as the true forms are specifically distinguished.
Each form of government is differently subject to processes of
corruption, which are relative to the grade of common good
achieved through its characteristic institutions, even though the
primary, or generic, cause of corruption is always the same.
The important point to remember here is that institutions cannot be perverted until they exist; elements of political justice
cannot be attenuated or destroyed until, in the course of political
change, they have first been realized. The retrogressive motion
of political corruption must, therefore, be seen in relation to the
progressive motion of political improvement. And this means
that the more primitive a state is (the less justice that is achieved
by such regimes) , the less susceptible it is to corruption. The
more advanced a society is politically, the greater the opportunity for political decay, both in the variety of perversions and
their extent.
The following diagram summarizes this account of the stages
and causes of political corruption.
Good Governments
I: Royal:

Perverted Governments
I1: a{B, C)

II: Republican: A•B•(C)

TII: Democratic: AxBxcx

Note
The letters in parentheses indicate potential factors, i. e., factors
which have not yet come into existence. The italicized a indicates

646

M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

the attentuation of the one factor which cannot be totally lost.
The italicized B and C indicate the attentuation of these factors,
whereas the small letters b and c indicate their total loss. The diagram makes apparent that the negation of the generic factor x
does not always have the same effect. The effect varies according
to the grade of common good already achieved, symbolized by the
factors present in the character of the several good governments,
and according to the extent to which corruption has taken place.
The first degree of corruption always involves the attenuation of
the A factor, symbolized by a, but thisis not the same on all three
levels, for on level III, the attentuation of A is accompanied by the
attentuation of B and C, whereas on level II, it is accompanied by
the attentuation only of B; and on level I, the attentuation of A
may be the sole perversion. Furthermore, whereas only one degree
of perversion is possible with respect to I, two degrees are possible
with respect to II, the second being the attentuation of A accompanied by the loss of B; and three degrees of perversion are possible
with respect to III, the second being the attenuation of A, accompanied by the attentuation of B and the loss of C; the third being
the attenuation of A accompanied by the loss of both Band C. The
subscript numbers attached to the Roman numerals in the columns
to the right thus signify the retrogressive stages through which a
form of government can go in the process of corruption. The horizontal motion from left to right is the initial step of corruption,
what we have called the direct, or first degree of, perversion; the
oblique motion to the right and upward indicates the steps by
which the corruption becomes more complete, approaching the
vanishing point in every case.
This diagram must not be misinterpreted as portraying the actual
historic motions of political change, progressive or retrogressive. It
is rather a purely formal map of the routes which such change can
take. It indicates the main stages through which a political community can pass in developing or decaying, but it does not record
the actual motions; nor could they be recorded in a simple diagram,
for they are not ever uniformly progressive or retrogressive. Progress may occur either in the downward path in the left column, or
by lateral motion from right to left, or by oblique motion from
right to left and downward-the latter two usually being motions
caused by violent revolution.
We shall not pause here to describe the precise character of
each of the perverted forms. That can be better done in Parts
IV, V, and VI subsequently, when we undertake the fuller

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

647

analysis, as well as the demonstration of, the specificity of the
three forms which can either be good or perverted. 106 Here
suffice it to point out that the location of a form in the left or
the right column is determined by the presence or absence (by
negation) of the generic exponent x; and that the further
location of each form on a given plane, according to its subscript
number, is determined by the number of specific factors which
have been attenuated or lost. The inequality of II1 and III2,
or of I1, II2, and Ills, as perversions is proportional to the
inequality of I, II, and III as good forms of government, though
the order is inverse. As III is superior in goodness to II, because
II lacks the C factor which III possesses, so II1 is not as bad
as III2 because the loss of the C factor, once achieved, is worse
than the mere absence of this factor, i.e., its being in potentiality;
furthermore, the attentuation of the A and B factors is greater
in III2 than II1. The partial equality of IL and III2 is indicated
by their being placed on the same horizontal level; that III2
lies to the right of II1 indicates that it is a more extensive corruption, which is due to the fact that it is the perversion of a
better state in the second degree.
Finally, we see that the traditional saying, that the worst
perversion of government is the opposite of the best, is abso106 Furthermore,
the present account of political change is non-historical. As
already pointed out (in the Note attached to the diagram), we are here concerned
only with the formal analysis of the stages of progress or corruption-with the
definition of the points between ·which such political change can take place. The
traditional account of political dynamics is inadequate because its formal definition
of the points between which ·change can take place is incomplete, due to the inadequacy in the traditional classification of good states and their perversions. Vd.
fn. 107 infra. But the present analysis will be misunderstood if its attempt to be
adequate formally is mistaken as an effort to be historically adequate. The motions
of political history are never simply forward or backward; they are interrupted by
all sorts of see-sawing back and forth; they are usually cyclical as well as rectilinear,
and the composition of these two types of motion results in a spiral motion forward.
Vd. "The Demonstration of Democracy," in the Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association, XV: Note 47. In Parts IV, V, and VI of the
present work, we shall not only deal concretely with the various types of perversion to which each good form of government is susceptible, but we shall also
try to describe the actual motions of corruption as these have occurred, for the
most part, in history.

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

lutely false. For if III be best, then the worst perversion is
clearly Ills, which is the most complete corruption of the best.
Speaking diagrammatically, the truth is that the worst is not
the direct opposite of the best, but the furthest removed from
the best. Even if we restrict our attention to the direct opposites (the first stages of perversion: III1, II1, and I1) , the
traditional remark, made in terms of tyranny as opposed to
monarchy (on the supposition that monarchy is best, for whatever reasons), still is false: for the direct opposite, or first perversion, of the best government is better than the direct opposite, or first perversion, of the least good government, in the
same proportion as the best is better than the least good, and
for the same reason: more elements of justice in the common
good susceptible of decay, and more still retained in that first
stage of corruption. The falsity of the traditional statement
about the worst being opposite to the best follows from the
falsity of the traditional analysis: its inadequacy with respect to
specific moral distinctions, and its confusion of the two significations of "rule for the common good." Only on the sort of
suppositions which make it possible to say that monarchy is
the best form of government because rule by one is more efficient in effecting or improving the common good, can it be said
that tyranny is worst, because one man can misrule, can despoil
or exploit the common good, more efficiently than many. But
if monarchy is not even a distinct form of government, because
the numerical distribution of ruling offices determines only an
accidental mode of government which can occur in any form,
and if forms of government are not graded according to efficiency,
but according to intrinsic elements of justice and the grade of
common good these effect, then the worst perversion is furthest
removed from the best form, and the direct opposite of the best
form is the least perversion. 107
107 In fairness to Aristotle, it must be pointed out that he says, in one place,
that the worst is furthest removed from the best (Politics, IV,
even
though, in another, he inconsistently says that the opposite of the best is worst
(ibid.,
. St. Thomas, however, simply says that " the worst is opposed to
the best," and therefore " just as the government of a king is the best, the govern-

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

649

Although the primary cause of corruption is the same in every
case, i.e., the alienation of political action from its due end
(signified by the negation of the generic exponent x), and although we can enumerate the secondary causes of corruption,
in terms of the several specific factors which can be attenuated
or lost, we cannot formulate the aetiology of progress merely
by reference to the objectives of political activity. While it is
true that the direction of political activity toward the ideal
common good is a cause of progress; and even true that this is
the essential cause, in so far as political developments are voluntarily and intentionally achieved; nevertheless, political progress may be prompted or facilitated by the operation of all
sorts of accidental causes, such as improvements in the physical
conditions of human life, alterations in economy, the discoveries
and inventions which produce fundamental changes in the
human community by altering the modes of communcation.
There are also basic spiritual changes in human civilization,
such as the advent and spread of Christianity, which transform
the very atmosphere of political life, and condition every phase
of political activity .108 Finally, political progress may be effected
peacefully or it may depend upon resort to revolutionary violence; in the latter case, progress may consist in a motion from
right to left in the diagram, horizontally, or obliquely downward;
and such motions cannot be accounted for in terms of the x facment of a tyrant is worst " (De Regimine P1incipum. I, 3) . This statement is
correct on St. Thomas's suppositions, indicated in the text above; but the suppositions are false. Apart from questions of truth and falsity, 'with respect to the
traditional analysis and the one here being presented, the radical difference between these two analyses should be clear to the reader in terms of the radical
divergence between the two accounts of political corruption. Just as the traditional
theory seems to us to be inadequate in its understanding of progress, so does it
fail to penetrate the manifold phenomena of corruption. Both are due to the same
defects of analysis; unless the existential and the ideal common good are distinguished, unless specific moral gradations in forms of government are understood in
terms of the common good as finis effectus, the motions of political change, forward
or backward, cannot be rendered intelligible in the light of principles. Political
dynamism is too complex to be formulated by a too simple classification of
governments and their perversions.
us Vd. "The Demonstration ·of Democracy," loc. cit., notes 51, 52, 53.

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M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

tor. Our present discussion is, therefore, limited to the simple
cases in which progress occurs as a downward motion in the
left column, and in which the ideal common good, as an objective of political activity, is a cause, even though not sufficient
by itself. Here, as before, our aim is analytical not historical.
We shall return to historical considerations, and to the details
of aetiology, in Parts IV, V, and VI. 109
With respect to progress, only one problem needs to be discussed here. It would appear, on the one hand, that the transition from the Royal to the Republican state, and the transition
from the Republican to the Democratic state, are both progressive motions, though the ideal common good which terminates these two motions is not the same in both cases; and,
on the other hand, it would appear that there can be no meaning to the exponential factor x (signifying the direction of
activity toward the ideal common good) in the case of the
Democratic state, for, this being the best state, the ideal is
already achieved once it exists. These two apparent difficulties
are aspects of the same problem. To remove them, we have to
distinguish several senses in which the ideal common good can
be understood as the term of progress.
In the first place, we must distinguish between an ideal which
is the proximate term of a progressive development and the
ideal which is the ultimate term of all progress. According to
the significance of the generic criterion of good political activity,
a Royal state is not generically good unless it aims to supersede
itself by setting up Republican institutions; and a Republican
state is not generically good unless it aims to supersede itself
by setting up Democratic institutions.no Now, then, the com109

Vd. fn. 106 supra.

no In aiming to supersede

itself the Royal state must work to create the conditions (economic, physical, educational, etc.), relative to which a better form of
government (i. e., Republican) would be best; similarly, the Republican ·state must
work to create the conditions, relative to which a better form of government (i. e.,
Democratic) would be best. The best government, absolutely speaking,· is also the
form of government which is best relative to the best conditions. Vd. Part I, supra,
loc. cit., pp. 432-435. Cf. Essay on RBpresentative Government, Ch. IV, wherein
Mill argues that, although certain inferior conditions may justify Royal government

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

651

mon good which can be effected by Republican institutions is
ideal relative to the existential common good of a Royal state;
similarly, in the case of the common good which can be effected
by Democratic institutions, in relation to the existential common good of a Republican state; these relative ideals are the
proximate ends of progressive change. Beyond them is the
absolute ideal-the ultimate end of such change. The plurality
of such relative ideals does not violate the principle that the
common good as finis causa must be one, in order to establish
the unity of the generic distinction; because these relative ideals
are subsumed by the absolute, as the ultimate term of motion
subordinates the proximate terms, which are really only halfway
marks that the motion traverses to reach its goal.m
(i.e., nonconstitutional rule) as best relative to those conditions, a benevolent
despot is one who not only acts for the present well-being of the community, but
one who also seeks to improve the conditions of the people so that, in the future,
Republican rather than Royal government will be the best relatively.
111 This distinction between the ,one ideal common good, as the absolute term of
political progress, and the many ideal common goods, as the relative stages through
which such development passes, must not be confused with the distinction between
the best government absolutely and the best government relative to the contingent
circumstances of an historic community. The relativity is not the same in both
cases: when we speak of a government as being best relative to the contingent
circumstances of a particular community, we are considering the grade of political
institutions which can be achieved by this community at a given time; when we
speak of the common good which is the next, or proximate, stage of political
development, as being relatively ideal, we are considering, not the institutions
which should now be achieved, but those which, should next be reached in the
course of progress. That which is the best form of government absolutely, however,
is also the form of government which is correlative with the absolutely ideal common good-the ultimate term to be reached by progress.
In this connection, it should be noted that the progressive step from the least
perfect state, A (B, C), to its proximate superior, AB (C), is only analogically,
not univocally, the same as the step from the less perfect state, AB (C), to the
most perfect, ABC. In the first case, constitutional government is instituted to
replace the exercise of merely de facto power; in the second case, constitutional
government is itself perfected ·by distributive justice with respect to political status,
especially citizenship. Here there is '.a parallelism between evolution in the natural
order and progress in the moral order, which accords with the parallelism between
the natural and the moral hierarchies: the transition from plants to brutes entails
the emergence of some cognitive power; the transition from brutes to men entails
the perfection of cognition by the addition of reason.

M. J. ADLER AND WALTER FARRELL

In the second place, we must recognize that, although Democratic government is best absolutely, the pGlitical perfection it
can effect may be less or more fully realized in the existential
common good of the Democratic state. Hence, even when the
Democratic state exists, the ideal common good may still remain to be achieved in its fullness. As a relative end, the Democratic state, in any degree of realization, is the proximate term
of progress in the transition from the Republican state. .But
the fullest realization of the political perfection that is possible
under the Democratic form is the ideal common good absolutely,
the ultimate term of progress which is the objective of good
political activity in the Democratic state, as well as in inferior
states.m This will always be the case because, in the nature of
man's earthly condition, the ideal commonwealth will never be
perfectly embodied in any temporal community. Democracy is
not, like Plato's state, a city in the skies. It has already begun
to exist on earth. But the conditions for its perfect flowering
impose such a burden upon the weakness of the flesh, that the
human spirit will struggle throughout the rest of history to
bring Democracy to mature fruition. For when the ideal common good is fully achieved, when human potentialities for
political life are perfectly actualized in the community of men,
the motion of history must itself be at an end. The end which
is the origin of every good intention is also the complete good
in which execution culminates.
WALTER FARRELL,

O.P.

Dmninican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

MoRT1MER

(Part Ill will appear in the next issue.)

112

Cf. Part I. suJYTa, loc. cit., pp. 436-440.

J. ADLER

University of Chicago,
Chicago, Illinois

BOOK REVIEWS
The City of Man. Issued by: HERBERT AGAR, FRANK AYDELOTTE, G. A.
BoRGESE, liERMANN BROCH, VAN WYcK BROOKS, ADA L. CoMsTocK,
WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT, DoROTHY CANFIELD FISHER, CHRISTIAN
GAuss, OscAR JASzi, ALVIN JoHNSON, HANs KoHN, THOMAS MANN,
LEWIS MUMFORD, WILLU.M ALLAN NEILSON, REINHOLD NIEBUHR,
GAETANO SALVEMINI. New York: The Viking Press, 1940. Pp. 113.
$1.00.
This very small book is described by its publishers as the outcome of
collective thinking by a group of persons profoundly concerned about the
future of civilization; it states their faith and hope. Though very small, the
book is important by reason of the men and women who have sponsored
it; the extended examination of it which will be given here has however,
quite another basis than the importance of the editors of the hook. This
work must be analyzed carefully, evaluated solidly and judged with unyielding justice, for its compact thesis represents one of the most serious
intellectual threats yet to be offered to western civilization. Mechanically,
and logically, the book is split into three parts: the :first is a" Declaration"
which contains the thesis of the sponsors of the work; the second, a
" Proposal," is a detailed plan for the furthering and execution of this
thesis; the third, a "Note," gives the historical genesis of the Declaration
and the Proposal. The book is much more intelligible if its parts are read
in reverse order. The history is a plain matter-of-fact statement of the
origin of the thesis, the Proposal, smacking somewhat of the grandiose and
the utopian, is yet quite clear and orderly in the plans it lays down, while
the Declaration, frankly apocalyptic, concentrates much more intensely on
phrasing than on clarity of thought.

*

*

*

The story of the two documents (pp. 97-113), the Declaration and the
Proposal, goes back well over two years and is dated by the catastrophes
suffered by democratic countries beginning with Munich in 1938. The story
begins with an exchange of ideas by a small group of friends; by May,
1939, the motives and intentions of this group had been stated in the form
of a memorandum. Let it be said here that those motives and intentions
were of the noblest. It was proposed to institute in America a " Committee
on Europe " consisting of a small number of the most prominent intellectual
and political exiles from Europe and a majority of American thinkers and
scientists. It was hoped that the work of the committee " would supply

653

654

BOOK REVIEWS

the statesmen of a period of reconstruction with decisive material in all
fields of national and international affairs," even down to such details
as the relations between the churches and the state, of the family and the
city, eugenics, tradition and initiative in education, with a complete willingness to go into much greater detail if it should seem beneficial.
The reasons that inspired the formation of this committee were decidedly
concrete. There was the actual condition of Europe, the opportunity offered
to America in its possession of confidence, optimism, American scholars, and
prominent European personalities. More strong, perhaps, in its motive
power, was the realization that the events of the past twenty years were
in great part due to the action of a misled intelligentsia. Some reparation
is certainly called for; this committee was visualized as offering the intellectual elite a chance to take their proper place and do their proper work in
the affairs of the world. The leading committee was to consist of not more
than fifteen men to be provided with staffs of scholars and students.
Though the Memorandum was circulated among friends, the work was
slowed down by the outbreak of war; soon it became obvious that there
were many parallel efforts being made along the same line, but, because
these somewhat rival efforts were not as sweeping in their consideration
of what were considered essential criteria, the work of the original Committee was continued and a letter of invitation sent out in March, 1940.
This letter outlined the motives and aims of the Committee to a limited
number of prospective collaborators.
A meeting of the Committee was held in May, 1940, at which the name
was changed to a " Committee of Fifteen," a plan of work discussed, and a
subcommittee appointed to draft the statement of the ideas and purposes
which prevailed during this meeting. Another conference in August of 191.0
discussed the work of the subcommittee and· approved it as a Declaration
and a Proposal-the remainder of this book. Here too, William Allan
Neilson was elected chairman; his assistants, Herbert Agar, W. Y. Elliot,
Lewis Mumford, and G. A. Borgese, secretary, make up the Executive
Board.
Before going on to the Proposal, there are several significant things to
be noted in this historical note. First of all is the make-up of the Executive
Board, with particular emphasis on the distinctive work of the particular
officers. Another is the fact that the letter of invitation had among its
original signers, Robert M. Hutchins; a name that henceforth disappears
altogether. Then, too, there are many statements made in the course of
the historical note that leave little doubt as· to which way the wind was
blowing. It is noted, for example, on p. 106, that "no definition or redefinition of democracy is practically or logically tenable without its premise
in a statement of fundamental religious beliefs." On p. 100 the opportunity
of America was summed up in terms of American confidence, optimism,

BOOK REVIEWS

655

scholars and European personalities-odd ingredients for the fundamental
statement aimed at by the Committee. On p. 108 it is insisted that:
At last the intelligentsia should be taken down to the earth from the midair
between clouds and earth where it has hovered for centuries, content with the
worship of undefined or approximately defined deities such as Justice, Freedom,
Democracy, and be put to a real, steady, and substantial work through which
those venerable and significant abstractions may become the pulp and nerve of
practical statesmanship in a day to come.

*

*

*

The Proposal (pp. 75-96}, which is the working plan outlined in the
second part of the book, takes the wraps off some of the dark horses that
stalked the historical note, but not all the wraps. It proposes a supergroup of super-experts; not an original idea, by any means, but rather a
haunting dream since the opening of the scientific era. Dr. Carrel proposed such a super-scientific group for quite another purpose in his Man The
Unknown; undoubtedly other super-scientific groups will be planned again in
the future when men come face to face with the difficulties that are outside
the field of science. This particular super-group of super-experts is to consist
really of four groups of experts working under the central committee. The
experts are to study the four leading issues of American and world democracy, namely, the constitutional, economic, and international-all converging toward the common apex of freedom and the dignity of the human
personality-and the common base which is moral belief and the religious
faith of the community.
The experts studying the constitutional issue will concern themselves with
the relations between democracy and individual liberties. It is necessary to
have a definition of liberty and a constitutional reform both in the field
of liberty and duty and in the relations between legislative and executive
power. These things cannot be founded but on the spirit of a new religion.
The religious issue contemplates the relations between the community as
a whole and the separate churches. It asks for definite tenets embodying
the universal religion of Democracy, which shall underlie each and all of
them. The e:Kperts then must investigate what limits are set by the religion
of freedom and determine of what God we talk. They must determine
what religious and ethical traditions are of greater or lesser value for the
preservation and growth of the democratic principle. These same religious
experts will explore the issue of education. The two, religion and education,
are at bottom one and the same for " education in western democracy has
been the substitute for a national and supra-national religion."
The experts in economics will outline in detail the law of the common
wealth, the era of distributive justice.
The group on the international issue will call for a definite law of international, or supra-national, order and the sovereignty of mankind. We

9

666

BOOK REVIEWS

need a universal law first promulgated to all humanity; it is entrusted to
the good will of the groups progressively disposed to adopt it and then it
is to be enforced on the rebels, finally to become the common peace and
freedom of all the peoples of the earth.

*

*

Coming from such a group of American thinkers, the Declaration (pp.
Il-78) with which this book begins, is a momentous document. It begins
with a statement of the world today, bitterly condemnatory of Nazism and
ruthlessly critical of the decay of democracy in America. This latter is
described as the disintegration of what had been a strenuous unity of
thought and action, a rule for life and death, a faith militant and triumphant. Among the causes of the disintegration are mentioned educational
relativism which doubted all values, science shirking spiritual issues and
promising material delights while withholding the fulfillment of the promise
to an ever imminent future, thus goading the masses to despair. America is
held out as the hope of the world if it renews the faith and hope that once
made it strong and takes a stand against the enslavers of Europe. The
finger of accusation for the world's plight is pointed at the heralds of
antichrist, irresponsible artists and scientists, intellectual leaders and their
pupils,' the ruling classes and statesmen of the world, along with all contemporaries who accepted this culture and immersed themselves in it. The
present peril and challenge is accepted as an ordeal by tyranny; in opposition to it is offered the ancient, imperishable dream of man.
With this introductory material out of the way, the Declaration quickly
gets down to the business in hand. The order of procedure is not at all
evident; as far as long study can unearth it, it would seem to be about
like this:
(I) Affirmations on the goal of man, on war and peace, and on the City
of Man (including its definition, structure, nature and history,
method and genesis).
(2) The total character of the City of Man and its place as the source
of·morals.
{3) Its religious and apocalyptic character.
(4) The fate of the churches.
(5) The common creed of the new religion.
{6) Sociology and economics of Democracy.
(7) The leadership of America.
AFFIRMATIONS

(pp. 20-27)

There is no distinction between the individual and collective meaning
and goal of human life. Both consist in progress and growth in intellect
and action; for this an essential pre-requisite is universal peace. Man's

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BOOK REVIEWS

effort is, in fact, endless; there is no perfectibility which leads to an ultimate and unchanging perfection for mankind to live in happily ever after.
Milleniums are the infinity of man's dream enclosed in brief myths, and
each horizon opens into another. There is, however, a distinction between
the perpetuity of chance and struggle and the inevitability of slaughter
and arson.
War is chaos and horror. It is now returning from standards of epic piety
and chivalric honor to the indiscriminate atrocity of primal murder. Peace
is the harmony of strong souls, not the fightless impotence of slaves; its
price is readiness to fight. It is founded only on the unity of man under
one law and government and is the sine-qua-non of advance beyond the
present threat and ruin.
The City of Man is a nation of Man embodied in the Universal State,
the State of States, a necessity because the national states have built no
eternal pattern of collective life. Its structure will preclude small nations,
for these have freedom only as a gift from stronger states; and it will bar
the giant states whose very size bids for the anarchy of violence and conquest. All centralized structures must fall into small federal units; all
states, deflated and disciplined, must align themselves under the law of
the world-state if the world is to have peace.
It opposes universality to totalitarianism, republican unity to autarchic
despotism; that this is feasible is indicated by the existence of the Swiss
and American federations. Its method will be regional centralization ·which
will distribute power to the smallest unit, and world-wide authority assuring the cooperation of all. These two· elements, the centripetal and peripheral, are essential to each other. With one or the other submerged, there
results tyranny or chaos; together they give a working base for freedoman order that is strong and flexible.
Before this State of States can come into existence, it is probable that
there will be a greater spread of the area of destruction-. In the first stages
of reconstruction there must be leadership with power enduring until the
laggards in barbarism or inertia are educated to the full responsibility of
their coming freedom. All men of good will will work to make the interval
of preparation short; all will be ready when the heresy of nationalism is
conquered and the absurd architecture of the present world is dismantled.
Then there will be a Universal Parliament representing people, not states;
a fundamental body of law for all the planet in matters of interregional
interests; an elected President of mankind embodying, for a limited term,
common authority and common law; and a federal force to strike at
anarchy and felony.
CITY oF MAN AS ToTAL AND A SouRcE oF MoRALS

(pp. 27-82)

Universal and total democracy is a principle of liberty and life which
man's dignity opposes to total autocracy's principle of slavery and death.

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BOOK REVIEWS

There is no other principle of liberty and life possible because this alone
combines law, equality and justice.
This is the ancient hope of man, its unity resting on three principles.
The first of these is universal participation in government; this is the
foundation of law. The second is that the state is the agent of collective
human purposes, the servant of the conunon good; the unity of the people
is the permanent source of power. This is the foundation of equality.
The third, the fundamental principle, is that democracy is a community
of persons. Its vigor rests on the cultivation and discipline of the person;
its quality is the quality of education which it imparts to citizens and
exacts from them. This is the foundation of justice.
The enemies of democracy now say that it rests on opinion, having no
conviction; so it becomes necessary to make a new foundation on the rock
of conviction. Such convictions as determine its character are that there is
no liberty but one-the right, which is a duty, of making oneself and others
free through absolute allegiance to the final goal of man; there is no comfort
but one-pride in duty performed.
RELIGious

AND APocALYPTIC

CHARAcTER

(pp. 88-45)

Democracy, as a harmony subordinated to a plan, a purposive organism,
must be redefined. It can be so defined as the plenitude of heart-service to
a highest religion embodying the essence of all higher religions. Democracy
is hum'anism in theocracy and rational theocracy in universal humanism.
In this new religion of democracy the value of the individual is ultimate;
the community must be ordered to promote the welfare and fulfillment of
each person. But there is no individual good life outside society and the
single citizen must strive toward a communal good which is beyond itself
as it is beyond any single community and any passing generation. Everything must be within, nothing against, nothing outside humanity. A dictatorship of humanity on the basis of law for the protection of human
dignity is the only rule from which there is hope for life. The only means
to attain this universality is positive legislation. That is the only means
to describe the relations of individual rights and social duties. No liberty
can be granted to whosoever threatens the divine spirit in man and above
man.
This universal democracy, in an interpretation suited to the modern
mind, is the spirit Christ called the Holy Ghost. It is ultimately sacred;
Christ Himself marked the limits of tolerance and charity when He insisted
that blasphemy against the Holy Ghost (that is, universal democracy) will
not be forgiven. This religion of the Holy Ghost is the spirit of the New
Testament of which a United States president spoke saying there is
universal belief in it. There is this belief, even in those who were never

BOOK REVIEWS

659

under the direct influence of Scripture, who reject all transcendent belief
and cling to rational knowledge and scientific experiment alone.
This universal religion was anticipated by sages and saints of all ages;
its substance matured out of whatever rose highest in man's speculations
and hopes, through the prophets of Israel, the religious geniuses of Asia,
Greek poetry and philosophy, Rome, the Catholic Church, the Protestant
insurrection, Humanism, Renaissance, the revolutions, the era of liberalism
down to the optimistic philosophies of enlightenment. Each and all contain
humanity and redemption; each and all are comprehended under the allembracing and all-interpreting religion of the Spirit.
No one of these reached the universality of the religion of the Spirit;
but none wilfully conflicted with the basic tenets on which the world religion
of the Spirit is founded. The Catholic Church is so serious an offender
against this world religion that pious Catholics of former ages would have
called its present state a Babylonian captivity; the saints and doctors
against Avignon were more articulate than Catholics of today. Catholics
who are freedom-loving and justice-loving, whenever they can awaken to
the examples of braver ages, will see to it some day that humility in faith
be no longer the lure to servility in politics and that allegiance to the
City of God be disentangled from bondage to the Vatican City as a foreign
potentate in feud or trade with other potentates.
The Religion of the Spirit acknowledges the incorruptible
of
truth underlying the surfaces and errors of the separate confessions which
have risen from the common ground of ancient and medieval civilization.
In this acknowledgment is the foundation of religious freedom in democracy.
Democracy, in the catholicity of its language, interprets and justifies the
separate creeds as- its own vernaculars.
FA'l'E OF THE CHURCHES

(pp. 45-46)

None of these vernaculars can take the place of the universal language
which expresses the common belief of man. The latter explains and annexes
all dogmas as symbols. The churches anathematize as heresy the symbolical meaning that is dogma's inmost truth. We shall not turn from a
higher and vaster religion to lesser ones. The old cults will have the protection of democracy; no church can be officially acknowledged as a religion
of the state; no church can be granted primacy or privileges above others,
in fact, the desire for such is a measure of its inadequacy to the fundamental principle of democracy. Separation of church and state is the base
from which arises the supremacy of world-humanism and world-democracy-the catholicity of the common creed which embraces and interprets
every lesser faith.

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THE CoMMON CREED (pp. 46-48)

This common creed of the world religion is already in existence and to
its center all higher minds already point. Its yoke is as easy as it is inevitable; its doctrines are as plain as they are undebatable. The doctrines
of this common creed can be summarized in the following propositions:
(1) A divine intention governs the universe, call it God, deity, Holy
Ghost, Absolute, Logos, or Evolution.
(2) The direction of this intention is from matter to life, from life to
spirit, from chaos to order, from blind strife and random impulse
to conscience and moral law.
(8) In the universe we know, the human species is the spearhead of the
divine intention; man is the necessary ally of "that power that
makes for righteousness."
(4) Man's growth, progress or evolution is toward the radiance of an
angel.
(5) If the divine intention is to be fulfilled, the pursuit of good under
the inspiration of faith, hope, and charity must imply resistance
to evil-battle when necessary.
{6) Life is service and death a gate to life--whatever the destiny of
the individual in the " undiscovered country." For individual life
is humble in the knowledge of its limits under the all human
dogma of fallibility.
{7) Individual life has meaning only by participation in the unlimited
past into the illimitable future; no one man or race or generation
can embody the heritage and the promise of man.
SociOLOGY

AND EcoNOMICS

(pp. 48-58)

In general the sociology and economics of the new order are comprised
in the tenets of the common creed just listed, in the Golden Rule and in
Paul's injunction "Be ye members one of another." Religion or doctrine
cloaking injustice and misery on earth under the promise of some transcendent bliss deserves Marx's scorn. Earth is a laboratory where the
validity of the eternal ideas are tested under the limits of space and time;
here and now the divine intention which governs the universe must be
enforced in the field of action as it stands supreme in the heaven of the
creed.
In particular, this new sociological and economic order is the American
dream. It is not capitalism, which made freedom the murderer of equality;
it is not communism, which made equality the strangler of freedom; it is
not resurgent feudalism or corpm·ative economy which promise peace and
order in a compulsory fixity of everyone wherever birth or chance happened

BOOK REVIEWS

661

to place him. In fact, corporations and guilds, as advocated by clerical
and political groups of the Right, are pious nicknames of Fascism, lures
for weary men anxious to be free from freedom.
The American dream is none of these. It demands that all know that
they have inherited the earth; there is no place for non-working owners
above working non-owners. It demands awareness that the problem of
production (which is one of power) is superseded by the problem of distribution (which is one of justice). It demands an economy that is pluralistic and flexible. The primary centers must be transferred from metropolitan centers to villages. There must be federal aggregations, each for a
special purpose: of sport, industry, education, art, administration, trade.
These could collect, around focal points, the energies radiating from smaller
communities. The factory will take the place held by the military barracks
in the pre-human era: youth will be enlisted for a limited term, learn in
federal factories, in public works, and on communal farms the skill of
production.
Here slavery will be anathema an.d partnership the rallying cry. Distribution of service, assigning to each one his share of labor and leisure must
make unemployment a forgotten nightmare. Private property must be
admitted as biologically inevitable and socially useful. But the Bill of
Rights must be supplemented by a Bill of Duties stating that no private
property can be tolerated outside the framework of just social use; thus
are limits set to the accumulation of wealth and its transmission. Morals
will have primacy over economics, not vice versa. Injustice must be
fought as soon as it rears its head; no quarter must be given to the paradox
of moral man in immoral society, of poverty in the midst of plenty.
Bread must know no fear; love and parenthood must unlearn fear and
shame.
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP (pp. 58-66)
America has the necessary and inevitable mission to bring this new order
and new religion about. No one else is strong and free enough to show
the way to social reform and universal order. America is really chosen by
objective circumstances of history for a privilege which is a service, a
right which is a duty. Rulership by the wisest and strongest is the prescribed path to equality of all if the strong can learn wisdom and if the
rulership is accepted in the spirit of reluctance and devotion that Plato
suggests. In the family of nations a firm hand is required over the children
to be matured, the sick to be cured, the maniacs to be confined, and the
criminals to be apprehended. Yet the final goal can never be forgotten;
justice, which is the common good, can never be perverted into the interest
of the stronger. American leadership is world trusteeship. Pax Americana
is a preamble to Pax Humana.

*

*

*

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Obviously the evaluation of such a document as the Declaration of this
book is not easy and cannot be exhaustive; for the Declaration is, at the
same time, political, ethical, religious, sociological, and economic. Perhaps
it will be sufficient for an appreciation of the character of this product of
collective thinking to examine some of the fundamental notions upon which
the whole thesis is explicitly based.
The sponsors of this declaration are, by explicit statement, working in
the interests. of western civilization, of democracy, of humanity. Their
condemnations of Nazism, Fascism, Communism and the abuses of democracy leave little to be desired in the way of scathing repudiation. They
speak in terms long familiar and sacred to the peoples of the west: the
dignity of man, the ultimate value of the individual, the common good,
the divine intention directing the universe, justice, law, equality, freedom,
and so on. If, by any chance, the Declaration they have here sponsored
destroys or attacks these sacred things, then we can legitimately conclude
that the majority of the signers of this Declaration have been duped by a
cleverer mind; they have been sold a bill of goods altogether different from
what they asked for. The imputation, in such a case, is not on their
nobility of purpose, their sincerity, their courageous attack on crucial issues,
but on their intellectual acumen.
This declaration speaks feelingly of the dignity of man, the meaning of
human life and the ultimate value of the individual. In actual fact, it
denies dignity to man, meaning to life, and value to the individual. It
insists, for example that the goal of an individual's life is growth and
progress in intellect and action through endless effort with no individual
attainment to mark its successful close. The individual is asked to strive
endlessly that he might grow; though of course, as he gets old his growing
will stop and as death comes there will be nothing to look forward to.
Yes, it is said that life is a service and death a gate to life, whatever the
destiny of the individual after death; but it is also insisted that individual
life has meaning only by participation in the unlimited past into the illimitable future. It is said that the ·value of the individual is ultimate and
the community must promote the welfare of each person; but it is also said
that the. single citizen must strive toward a communal good which is
beyond himself, that everything must be within, nothing against, nothing
outside humanity. In other words, there is no individual goal to give
individual meaning to an individual's life. The individual man exists only
for a mass entity, a communal purpose. For him, there is no liberty but
the right to make himself and others free by adhering with absolute allegiance to the final goal of man, that is, to a process of growth indistinct
from that of the community, the end beyond himself.
What of the dignity of man that is insisted on in the words of this
Declaration? No basis is assigned for it; it is taken as. a fundamental

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668

assumption. Yet the one basis possible for it is explicitly denied. A man
has dignity precisely because he is a superior, he is in command of his
own life to his own supreme purpose; he can use the things about him,
while he can be used by absolutely nothing else in the universe. He has
an end, an individual end, of his own; he is not the tool or instrument of
some other end. This is precisely what is denied in this Declaration; the
bright goals he thinks he is aiming at are dreams wrapped up in brief
myths, milleniums. He exists, not for his own goal, but for the goal of that
vague community called humanity; he is the necessary ally of some vague
power; he has no liberty but to hold fast to this non-personal end that
renders his life individually meaningless. He is, in actual fact, used by
the community; and he exists for no other purpose.
What of the freedom of man? According to the Declaration, its basis is
universal and total democracy; there is no other principle. Thus the principle of man's freedom is something outside the individual, an extrinsic grant
not a natural characteristic. It exists that man might work to the end beyond
himself which is within humanity. That is not what the peoples of the
west have meant by
To them, freedom has meant the capacity to
choose between means that lead to the individual goal which perfects the
individual life; it has meant a natural capacity, one that flows from man's
spiritual nature. To their minds, man, because he could know the universal
truth, could desire the universal, unlimited good; so in the face of the
partial, limited goods of the physical world he was free, free to ac·cept or
reject their proferred goodness. It has been a freedom worth fighting for,
one that could be defended against any odds for it could never be taken
by assault; it could be lost only by surrender.
What of the moral order upon which human life is based? If it have a
religious source, then, according to the Declaration, it must come from the
highest religion which embodies all higher religions, the religion of the
Spirit, Democracy. But it need not have a religious source. In the concrete,
then, it is stated that the foundation of law is universal participation in
government; the foundation of equality is that the state is the agent of collective human purposes; the foundation of justice is that democracy is a
community of persons. The words are familiar, but the concepts are
altogether strange. By "law," the peoples of the west have understood
reason's ordered precept to a common good or to the divine good; to them,
its foundation has been the intelligence that is back of order, its force has
been its reasonableness, its challenge has been reason's demand, its proof
has been open to the mind of every man. Is the implication here that
where there is no universal participation in government, there is no law?
If so, this is a canonization of anarchy. To the men of the west, equality
has flowed from the common nature of all men, from their undying spirits,
each worth a king's ra.nSom, from the supremacy of their individual goals,

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from their individual mastery of their own lives, from their natural immunity to being used as tools of anyone or anything, however great, however high-sounding, however organized; not from the fact that the state is
the agent of collective human purposes. Equality, like freedom, comes
from within man; it is not granted him from without. Justice, to us of the
west, is not the result of democracy's peculiar nature; it is the demand
of the mastery of the individual man. Each man has rights, not given him
by an outside agency, but pertaining to his very person precisely because
he has an end of his own and consequent obligations; he has important,
individual things to get done, and he has the consequent right to do them
unimpeded.
The Declaration insists that there is a divine intention directing the
universe. Yet it also insists that there is nothing outside, everything
within, humanity. Among the names given this divine intention is that of
Holy Ghost; yet the Holy Ghost is described as universal democracy; as a
deity, universal democracy is ultimately sacred and Christ Himself forbade
blasphemy against it. The divine intention, then, directing the universe is
universal democracy which, as we are told, has never as yet existed. The
words are familar, as always, but the concepts they cloak make their use
a mockery to the intelligence of men of the twentieth century.
I submit that on the basis of the words of this Declaration, its sponsors
have attacked the meaning of human life, the dignity of the individual
and his ultimate value, the moral code by which he lives, his freedom, his
equality, his claim to justice, and the God in Whom he hopes.
A mind clever enough to sell such a program of destruction to American
thinkers would see deeply enough to discern the outstanding enemy of his
thesis. He would concentrate the full bitterness of his attack on the
Catholic Church as the unflinching defender of ·these things at whatever
cost, in whatever age and against whatever enemy or combination of
enemies. That is, as a matter of fact, what has happened in this book
(pp. 40-48) .
The basic error of the Church, it is said, is the identification of the
Church as a temporal kingdom with the " kingdom of God " of Christian
and prophetic expectation. Historically this is ridiculous. No Christian
has ever supposed that the Kingdom of God did not exist during the early
centuries when the Church had no slightest pretentions to temporalities
and eked out its existence hidden in dark places like a hunted animal. No
historian dates the beginning of the Kingdom of God from the gratuitous
grants of land that originally made up the papal territory; no historian
traces the foundation of the Kingdom of God to the benefactors who made
those grants. No one made the mistake of thinking the Kingdom of God
had gone out of existence during the long years when the Pope was the

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666

prisoner of the Vatican with no more than a garden to call his own. Yet in
all these times, the Church as a temporal kingdom did not exist.
From this alleged, but utterly false, identification of the temporal kingdom of the Church with the Kingdom of God, it is maintained, comes the
unwarranted aura of unqualified holiness, the historical usurping the sanctity of the eternal. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The holiness
of the Church lies in the holiness of the divine truth of which it is the
custodian, the hoiiness of the divine helps its ministers, and the holiness of
those of its children who dare to follow the example of the Master without
stint. The first two of these are holy because they are divine; the third,
because these men and women have approached so close to divinity.
Laid down as the fundamentals of the rest of the attack, these first two
points are, as a matter of fact, abandoned in order that the political
argument might be launched untrammeled. One gets the definite impression
that these first two were really red herrings dragged across the argument
to give it an air of objectivity; certainly they have nothing to do with the
rest of the attack. The real charge is that the Church has been political,
or rather that it has been on the wrong side of politics; the sponsors of this
document are worried that it will be made a subordinate ally of the political
plans of the Nazis and Fascists, whereas, according to their statement of
the fate of the churches, it should be made the subordinate ally of the
political plans of world democracy. The fact is, of course, that the Church
is by its nature not political in this fashion or that, but super-political;
its task has not to do with the states or nations or masses, but with
individual men.
The attack is suported by historical " evidence "-the Church has often
proved Roman, French, Spanish, Austrian. The authors have perhaps
forgotten that kingdoms were lost to the Church because it would not compromise the truth it guarded, that matters of faith and morals have come
through the erosive action of two thousand years without a scratch of
error or the false smoothness of defection. The Church is pilloried because
its. spiritual totalitarianism was the pattern and tool of political totalitarianism. The inference is, of course, that political totalitarianism had never
entered the mind of man until the Church appeared and then only in the
two-thousandth year of its history. It is a tool and has hitched its wagon
to the Fascist's star; for, of course, the papal condemnations of totalitnrian
corruption of youth, of the philosophy of state supremacy, of the corruption of morals, and the violence of injustice are not to be taken seriously
though they were paid for in blood and are still being made and still
being paid for. Tears are shed over the fate of "Republican" Spain,
though earlier in the book, and later, Communism is bitterly condemned;
would all be forgiven if Communism changed its badge to Republicaliism?

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Perhaps more important than the actual charges against the Church is
the manner in which they are made. A whiff of incense is tossed in the
face of the Church in the early pages of the book as the necessary smile of
greeting to modem broad-mindedness. The actual attack starts off with
a kind of objective calmness, though there is no delay in falsifying the
charges; little by little the attack gains momentum and loses rationality
until it comes to a climax of frothing madness, screeching to modem
Catholics to revolt from the Vatican City as a foreign potentate in feud
or trade with other potentates.
The notion persists that the majority of the sponsors of this document
were sold down the river. One wonders, reasonably, if they would conacioualy be partners to this sort of unfounded fury. The Syllabus of Errora,
for example, is quoted as a challenge to the liberal world of the Reformation and the Renaissance and a contribution to political and social
obscurantism. If all the sponsors had read the Syllabus of Errors, surely
one of them would have thought to tabulate the subjects treated there and
would have come up with this list of things defended: divine character of
Scripture and its guardianship by the Church, revelation, the certitude of
faith, the union of belief and action, the divinity of Christ, the· death and
resurrection of Christ, the sacraments, the Church, the stability of truth
and the independence of religious truth from the varying condition of
science. Surely, had all of them read the Syllabus, some one of these
thirteen sponsors would have questioned whether this papal document was
a challenge to any kind of true liberalism. One wonders, reasonably,
whether, had they not been duped, the sponsors of this document would
have subscribed, to such foul phrases as: " The Fuehrers and enslavers
can endorse some of these promises; if not of plenty, of equality in misery
and of security in the dusk of the manger" (p. Sf.!). It it hardly consonant
with the American temperament to hide the corruption of a truth behind
the cloak of a sacred word, to indulge in a small boy's vulgarity by such
blasphemous balderdash as the identification of the Holy Ghost with democracy, much less, tongue in cheek, call Christ as a witness to the blasphemy.
For the rest, the document pretty well refutes itself. The sociological
and economic programs suffered from the same defect that has haunted the
socialist dream from the beginning, the defect inherent in the product of
men who have been accurately described as amateurs. These authors have
shown little knowledge of human nature; they are amateurs when they
suppose that a world-wide power will be quietly laid aside once the reign
of justice is established by force, that the reign of justice without blemish
will be established on a world wide scale, that justice will be found where
there is a universal governmental assignment of every detail of labor and
leisure, that men can be adequately. ruled when there is no other law but
civil law.

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Fundamentally, the error of this book is a combination of the modem
naively complete confidence in governmental action and the world-wide
drift to totalitarianism. " Humanity " has been substituted for " Aryan
Race" or "Communist Party," the scope is a little wider, but all else is
unchanged; the individual is sunk in the mass, the single citizen's life is
stripped of meaning, government is made a divinity with its own political
religion whose opponents are heretics-criminals or maniacs to be dealt
with accordingly; the mastery of truth, .of action, of life and death is in
the hands of the human super-legislator. This book represents one of the
earliest and most concrete conquests of Hitlerism in America.
WALTER FARRELL,

O.P.

Dominican House of Studiea,
Wa8hington, D. a.

Philosophy for Our Times. By C. E. M. JoAD. London-New York: Th.
Nelson & Sons, 1940. Pp. 367, with index.
Written in an impressive and mostly non-technical language this book
emphasizes the need of philosophical reflection in these our days. Mankind
has a mastery of means and is ignorant of ends. Religion and, morals are
falling into decay.· Psychoanalysis and other factors destroy understanding
of the difference between good and evil, and preach the dangerous doctrine
of the harmfulness of suppressing impulses. "Foreheads are defiantly low."
The snobbery of culture has been replaced by the snobbery of anti-culture.
It is a time which more than any is in need of philosophy. Philosophy has
to provide a counterweight against the dreariness and essential indifference
in regard to values characteristic of the scientific view.
Dr. Joad then proceeds to analyze the world of commonsense and to
point out the difficulties this view implies. The corrections and enlargement
by science are neither ultimately nor exhaustively true. Science deals with
only one kind of reality; it leaves out other aspects. Chap. IV states " that
science tells us a little about some things and that there are no things about
which it tells us everything." Also, science not less than commonsense presupposes the activity of the mind. This activity has to supply the principles
for the interpretation of the behavior .of the things we experience. Since
the materialistic cosmogony is demonstrably defective and science is unable to give a satisfactory account of mind, the world as envisioned by
physics is essentially an abstraction leaving out everything of which science
cannot· render a.Ccount. As mind, so value is excluded from the scientific
world-picture. Nor does science ever explain that of which it renders account.
The teleological viewpoint is forced on the observant mind by the facts
themselves, but it is outside the scope of science.

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The reality grasped by science being incomplete, defective, and unsatisfactory, one has to look out for another view truer to reality and more
satisfying to the !needs of the mind. Part IT, "Constructive,'' defends the
notion of the reality of values. Contrary to the prevailing subjectivistic
view, the author holds that values are objective and real. Truth and beauty
are objective. The statement that truth is subjective must be given up as
self-contradictory. If truth has no objectivity, this statement too, and all
other statements become subjective and relative. That is, there is no truth
at all. Appreciation of beauty and moral judgments lean never be exhaustively analyzed into statements about individual feelings of approval. There
are ultimate values, namely Goodness and Truth and Beauty. Although
salutary, health is no ultimate good, and much less ultimate are harmful
false goods like money and power. In a long chapter of 20 pages the author
attempts to show that there is an immediate and specific apprehension of
values. His arguments are too long to be reproduced, but they deserve
serious consideration. Once the objectivity of values is recognized, the
position of hedonism in ethics becomes untenable, and a system of objective
rules for the right conduct of life a necessity. One has to distinguish between pleasures, to make reason the judge of the goodness of appetition.
Goodness and happiness cannot be achieved unless behavior. be controlled
by reason. Politics refers to the same set of problems as does ethics.
Politics has to determine the nature of the community in which the good
life as revealed by ethics can be lived. The State is the political instrument
for an ethical end. In itself the State is nothing. Absolutism which makes
the State an,end in itself has to be rejected. Not power, imperial or military, not wealth, or liberty makes a State great. Liberty too may be misused. As criteria for'national excellence one may consider the provision of
social services and the production of great men.
There is a postscript, dealing with religion and man's need of it. Dr.
Joad acknowledges that the existence of a personal God, revealing Himself
to man 'is possible or even probable. He does not, however, belive that
there is any philosophical proof for God's existence, and being concerned
with philosophy only he omits further reference to the problem. Secondly,
the need of the times is for a ;code of living; and the Christian churches
seem to the author not capable of providing such a code adequate to the
present situation. Thirdly, he declares himself unable to .see how a good
God can be the creator of a world of suffering. It is not a little astonishing
to see a penetrating mind stumble over such .trivial objections, the more so
since Dr. Joad's ideas seem to lead inevitably into a theonomic conception
of the world.
RuDoLF ALLERs.
Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

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669

An Essay on Nature. By FREDERICKJ. E. WooDBRIDGE. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1940. Pp. xii + 351, with index. $3.00.
Not often does the student of philosophy come across a work whose main
thought may be summarized in one short formula. It needs a wise mind
and a clear one to coin a word which condenses and, at the same time,
illuminates the thought of a lifetime with one single sentence. Professor
Woodbridge is one of these rare minds. His last book is an impressive
defense of metaphysics and of the supernatural by one who is essentially
and thoroughly a naturalist. The supernatural is nature transubstantiated.
Theology is science transubstantiated.
Such is the eminent
own
formula and the briefest statement of his main idea. The supernatural is
therefore not the goal of the quest for knowledge, but it is the justification
and the foundation of the quest for happiness. Because transubstantiated,
the terms of knowledge,
they remain extrinsically and inevitably
the same, refer to a different substance when used in the theological universe of discourse. This discourse is, however, not of the "ideal" but of
the supernatural, that is, of being, no less than when we speak of nature.
One feels tempted to apply to Professor Woodbridge's philosophy, although
in a much modified way, the famous Kantian saying, that he had to
destroy knowledge to make faith possible. With this author it is rather that
knowledge had to be preserved for the sake of ensuring faith.
Nature is what we perceive. There is no convincing reason for turning
the percept into a symbol of something else. Our perceiving capacities are
limited, but we become aware of these limitations only in perception. The
dependence of knowledge on the organization of our bodies does not dethrone mind, nor do we lose our souls when we discover the use of words.
Words and formulae do not represent a second world, truer than the one
of percepts, and Sir Arthur Eddington's famous two tables are no argument
at all, since Sir Arthur never in his life wrote upon a " scientific table."
Scientific objects are, Professor Woodbridge contends, the most amusing
fictions ever invented. Natural philosophy, being the reflections suggested
to the mind by the perceived world, engenders mathematics and science.
Natural science gives birth to scientific language; it is the source not the
offspring of the latter.
Without being a " naive realist," the author insists on the right of the
visible world and the space which is its order. Light and space are the two
great fundamental principles. All our knowledge ultimately rests on light
and on space. Our language talks of them. They are laws of nature, as is
time, and we are parts of the same nature. Again, our language pictures
nature in its temporality. There are things that move; but there is no
event "moving." Nor does the inability of man destroy nature's working.
At a given moment the events of nature are synchronized, whether we can

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ascertain this or not. Causal explanation does not do away with teleology;
they are not opposed but correlated. All our knowledge is bound up with
time and thus with history. Neither mathematics nor language is" applied"
to nature; they stem from 'her. We can never escape reality because we are
reality too and because reality ia. Justifying nature's ways and knowing
them are two different things. The only true problem is how to enlarge our
knowledge of nature's ways. Morality pertains to nature not less than anything else, although nature'" does not intend moral order, but rather subtends it." Nature is the only object of knowledge, but there are things as
necessary as knowledge 'to which not knowledge but faith is the adequate
answer. Ceremonial cult is the expression of the acknowledgment of the
supernatural, and religion is the personal acceptance of this acknowledgment.
It is the pursuit of happiness which reveals the supernatural. The dualism
of knowledgment and happiness is fundamental in human existence. Knowledge discovers nature, but does not justify it. This justification the mind
demands, faith supplies. The supernatural is the justification of nature.
RUDOLF

ALI..ERs.

Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

E:x;perienceand Substance. By DEWITT H. PARKER. Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1941. Pp. x + 871, with index. $8.00.
The title indicates the two main sets of problems: experience refers to
knowledge, substance to metaphysics. The general viewpoint is idealistic,
although not without some peculiarities. The basic metaphysical conception
is monadistic and finitistic. There is much of Kantianism, but it is modified
so as to go farther beyond Hume than Kant himself does. Parallel to the
idealistic trend runs a definitely antinominalistic and, therefore, antipositivistic strain. The latter becomes particularly noticeable in Chapters XXIV, dealing with the theory of relations and the problem of causality.
Hume's solution is rejected because it does not afford any explanation of
the note of necessity
to all awareness of causal relations. These
chapters also contain an interesting analysis of probability and of many
of the statements, common. among philosophers of science, regarding the
philosophical implications of modern physics, especially the relativity theory,
the notion of statistical law, and the general bearing of science on philosophy.
Substance is characterized by being subject, never
independent,
causally efficient, conserved through change. These characteristics apply to
what Parker calls the matrix self; they do not apply to matter as conceived
by materialistic metaphysics. Experience is substance, and substance is only
an experience. Existence ,can be credited only to what is actually in ex-

BOOK REVIEWS

671

perience, neither possible nor past events have existence, nor have universals
existence apart from the concreta in which they are discovered. The universals are timeless objects, not however eternal. The eternal reveals itself
to an examination of the levels of causality, of which there are three. There
is first the personal level, secondly, the level of biological causation, and
finally, underlying the other two, the physico-chemical level which is referred to as the " Omega system." The higher level depends in its
and in its functioning on the next lower level. The lowest level, on which
all being and eventing depends is the eternal level. Eternal and Omega
system are identified.
The reader, at this point, may recall that a similar notion has been proposed, under perhaps not dissimilar conditions of general mentality and
problematics, once before in the history of human thought. This reviewer,
at least, cannot help remembering the curious notion of David of Dinant
who identified prime matter with God Himself. And back of David's mind
there may have been a dilemma not unlike the one which apparently determines Professor Parker's somewhat startling assertion. The question is
how to co-ordinate the fact that the inferior level undubitably conditions
the functioning and the existence of the beings of the higher levels, on one
hand and the equally impressive and evident ontological superiority of
higher levels on the other. David and Parker solve the difficulty by locating, as it were, ontological eminence in the level of being which apparently
is the most necessary and most general. But the relation of foundationthe higher being founded on the lower-is by far not the same as the relation of ontological superiority. Dr. Parker holds that metaphysics cannot
do without the notion of God, as the source of being or of creation, the
unifying factor keeping together the disparate elements of the universe,
and as the "locus for truth."
This God is very unlike the God of theology. Although the idea of
providence is acknowledged, it is restricted by man's own efforts. Evil is
considered as an inevitable feature of creation (which reminds one somewhat of certain ideas in Schelling's later philosophy).
A short chapter summarizes the author's ideas on values, to which he
devoted a volume some years ago. Value is seen as in relation to desire,
whose satisfaction it is. This does not mean, however, that the interest
nature of values, as in R. B. Perry's philosophy, is accepted. Rather, the
relation between the two conceptions may be likened to the one obtaining
between Kantian idealism and a psychologistic distortion of this philosophy,
a view which would posit the origin of law and order of reality in the
individual human mind and its functioning.
Professor Parker's book is no easy reading. It raises difficult questions
and deals with them in a manner too thorough for the casual reader. But

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BOOK REVIEWS

it is an exceedingly interesting reading for any serious student of philosophy
and for anyone who wants to find out how the modern mind wrestles with
philosophical problems, old and new. The author's sympathy lies-if such a
statement may be made in regard to the views of a philosopher-more with
the problems of the Beautiful 4nd the Good than with those of mere
knowledge. There is something- of the artist, especially of the -musician, in
the way he looks at things, and also in the way he marshalls his ideas. Some
chapters may not inaptly be compared to a piece with complicated counterpoint, something like a Bachian fugue. Goethe, in his later years, or any of
his younger Romantic friends, would have spoken of Dr. Parker, probably,
as eine musikalische Natur. But he is, for all this, a true philosopher whose
ideas deserve serious consideration. However little one may agree with his
fundamental viewpoints, there is much one may learn from his studies.
His work may be recommended especially to all those concerned about
the place of science within the totality of knowledge.
RUDOLF ALLERS.

Catholic University uf America,
Washington, D. C.

BRffiF NOTICES
ANNOUNCING: A Dialectic of Morals: Towards the Foundations of Political
Philosophy. By MoRTIMER J. ADLER. The Review of Politics, Notre
Dame University, Notre Dame, Indiana.
This latest work of Dr. Adler appeared originally in the pages of The
Review of Politics. In it Dr. Adler proceeds "dialectically against those
who say there is no moral knowledge; who say that good and bad, right
and wrong, are entirely matters of opinion; who say, as a consequence, that
might makes right in the sphere of politics." This dialectical treatment of
morality is lively and interesting, for, as Dr. Adler says, "The dialectic of
morals which I shall now proceed to outline is not an imaginary process.
It is rather a distillation of actual arguments which President Hutchins and
I have had with students in courses devoted to the reading of great works
in ethics and politics." Publication is promised for October.

Man's Triumph With God in Christ. By FREDERICK A. HoucK. St. Louis:
with Index.
Herder, 1940. Pp.
Widespread ignorance, error and indifference in matter of religion, and
large-scale atheistic trends in our modern life are the occasion of this
latest book of Father Houck. A summary of the chapter titles-Knowability of God; The God-Man; Man, the Image of God; The End and Purpose of Man; The Mystical Body of Christ and Blissful Eternity-will
indicate the book's scope as definitely broad. In spite of the excellent
choice of sources, the same as the Council of Trent, the very breadth of
the author's intention demands that some of these subjects receive sketchy
attention. It is regrettable that St. Thomas is made to speak for himself
in long quotations from the Summa Theologica and the Summa Contra
Gentiles. While St. Thomas speaks the truth, very often it is a truth
which, unexplained, will be unintelligible to the average reader.

The Divine Crucible of Purgatory. By MoTHER MARY OF ST. AusTIN.
Revised and edited by Nicholas Ryan, S. J. New York: P. J. Kenedy
and Sons, 1940. Pp. viii + 185. $!U5.
The reality of the fire of Purgatory is a paramount issue in this book.
The first of its two sections is dedicated to the establishment of the conclusion that the fire is only metaphorical. As such, the sensible suffering
of the souls in Purgatory is caused by infused knowledge, in a manner
similar to the sufferings of the soul immersed in the "dark night." Just
as the soul on earth is purified by this infused contemplation, so too the

678

674

BRIEF NOTICES

souls in purgatory are purified and prepared for the beatific vision in much
the same way. The meditations, which comprise the second and major portion of the book, trace and -describe the progress of the departed soul
through the sufferings of the " dark night," the silence of the " twilight "
and, finally, the soul's transformation and union with God. Comparisons to
the sufferings of Christ and of the Church Militant add to the clarity and
practicality of the meditations. The conclusion of the first section will undoubtedly be considered by many as untenable-and with reason-but the
utility of the meditations for souls who already have a fair grasp of the
principles of the ascetical life will be nuestioned by few.
Science, Philosophy and Religion: A Symposium. New York: Conference
on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, 1941. Pp. 443. $1.50.
As most of our readers know, this volume contains the papers read at the
Conference -On Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the
Democratic Way of Life, held in New York City, on September 9-11,
1940. Many of the papers are simply learned articles on their authors'
special subjects, with a few introductory or concluding remarks on democracy. There are some very valuable papers, especially those by Finkelstein, Sorokin, Adler, Maritain, Van Wyck Brooks, and Johnson. The
papers of this first conference give us very little opportunity of judging
the success or failure of the
itself. Success or failure can be
judged only by those who were present at the discussion of the papers.
Van Wyck Brooks, in his introductory paper, quotes a statement released
to the press at the end of the conference by a special Committee; part of
the statement reads as follows: " As the discussion at the Conference proceeded, it became obvious that the various groups of philosophers, as well
as the scientists of different fields, were being drawn more closely together.
The scientists who presented papers were able to issue a common statement of their views. The philosophers narrowed the area of disagreement
among themselves. Thomists recognized the position of Logical Positivism
as applicable to the field of science, though they denied its applicability to
other fields. Logical Positivists seemed to recognize the right of Thomists
and other philosophers to carry on their speculations and arrive at conclusions, but denied that the term " knowledge " could be applied to such
speculations." In other words, the Thomists were able to grant much; the
Logical Positivists were willing to grant nothing. Unfortunately, many of
the philosophers and theologians were definitely on the side of the Positivists. However, it is good to know that a clear-cut division is appearing
between those who maintain the validity of philosophical and theological
knowledge, as knowledge, and those who deny validity to any type of
thinking that it not positivisitic.

BRIEF NOTICES

675

Sa{nt Thomas Aquinas. By GERALD VANN, 0. P. London: J. M. Dent &
Sons, 1940. Pp. i.x + 182. 6s.
Fr. Vann, leaning heavily on the historical researches of Gilson and
Dawson, presents an interpretation of the actual position of St. Thomas
Aquinas. To the Angelic Doctor he looks for the needed synthesis between
eastern and western culture, for a corrective to the exaggerated contemplative and activist theories of these two worlds. To prove his thesis he
is led to show that Thomas is not the chilly rationalist moderns portray
him to be; in his life and teaching there is ample room for the intuitive,
the contemplative, the mystical. The work gives a well-rounded picture
of Thomas the man, of his intellectual environment and of the work he
accomplished. This last section, which should have been the strongest part
of the book, is really the weakest, for the nature of the non-rational
elements of the Thomistic synthesis is too cursorily treated.
Wars of Families of Minds. By WILLIAM L. BRY:AN. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1940. Pp. xv + 143, with index. $2.00.
The title of this work expresses completely the author's intention in
writing it: he shows that there are families of minds, the unschooled man,
the scholar (who may belong to the sceptics, the scientists, or the philosophers), and the poets; he also points out that these families of minds
are at war with one another. Numerous instances of intellectual combats
are cited. The author seems to think that these conflicts are inevitable.
He does not study the careers of those men who have been successful in
many fields, although he does mention a few names. Most noticeable is
the omission of the religious-minded, among whom many examples of
harmony could have been discovered. In his Introduction, the author
touches on the reasons for the division of human minds into families; they
are valid reasons and should serve as the theme of frequent consideration
for those who tend to become one-sided in their mental outlook.
A Guide to the Intellectual History of Europe from St. Augustine to Marx.
By FREDERICK B. ARTZ. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1941. Pp. xix + 140,
with index. $1.75.
The purpose of this volume is to enable the student to read and understand some of the most important books of the European intellectual
tradition. There is a wide choice of books; the author prefaces each study
with a few bibliographical references, then gives a list of questions on the
sections of the books to be read. Unfortunately, the title is much too
pretentious in view of the authors studied. Plato and Cicero are included
before St. Augustine. Why not, then, Aristotle and the Bible? Roger
Bacon is the only representative of scholastic thought.
Such omissions
may be justifiable; but, then, this is not a guide to the intellectual history
of Europe. Rather it is an aid to the reading of certain important books
in the western tradition.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Bradshaw, M. J. Philosophical Foundations of Faith. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xi+ 254, with index. $!!.50.
Brennan, R. E., 0. P. Thomistic Psychology. New York, Macmillan, 1941.
Pp. xxvi + 401, with index. $8.00.
Burke, Kenneth. The Philosophy of Literary Form. Louisiana State University Press, 1941. Pp. xvi + 455, with index. $8.00.
Ducasse, C. J. Philosophy as a Science. New York: Oskar Piest, 1941.
Pp. xx + 242, with index. $8.00.
Edman, Irwin and Schneider, H. W. Landmarks in Philosophy. New York:
Reynald and Hitchcock, 1941. Pp. x + 1008, with index. $4.00.
Einstein, Ira. The Ethics of 'J'olerance. New York: King's Crown Press,
1941. Pp. 87. $1.50.
Farrell, Walter, O.P. A Companion to the Summa, I: The Architect of the
Universe. New York, Sheed & Ward, 1941. Pp. 457, with index. $8.50.
Frank, Philipp. Between Physics and Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. 288, with index. $!!.75.
Galvao de Sousa, J. P. 0 Positivismo Juridico e 0 Direito Natural. Sao
Paulo, Brazil, 1940. Pp. 101.
Leclercq, Jacques. Marriage and the Family. (Trans. by T. R. Hanley,
0. S. B.) New York: Pustet, 1941. Pp. xx + 895, with index. $4.50.
Les Methodes scientifiques dans l'education. 2ieme Congres annuel, 18-!!1
juin, 1941. Les Parents et l'en.fant. Ottawa: Les Editions du Levrier.
Pp. 207.
Magid, H. M. English Political Pluralism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. 100, with index. $1.25.
Manchester, F. and Shepard, 0. Irving Babbitt, Man and Teacher. New
York: Putnam's Sons, 1941. Pp. xiii + 887. $8.00.
Niebuhr, Reinhold. The Nature and Destiny of Man, I: Human Nature.
New York: Scribner's Sons, 1941. Pp. xii + 806, with indices. 2.75.
Shute, Clarence. The Psychology of Aristotle. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xiv + 148, with index. $!!.00.

676

INDICES OF VOLUME III (1941)
INDEX OF AUTHORS
PAGE
279
ADLER, M. J. Solution of the Problem of Species
897,588
--- and FARRELL, WALTER. Theory of Democracy
95
ALLERS, R. The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars
-' -. Review of The Philosophy of Physiccil Science by A.
885
Eddington .
887
---. Review of Physics and Recility by K. Riezler .
507
Review of Man on His Nature by C. Sherrington .
667
Review of Philosophy for Our Times by C. E. M. Joad
669
Review of An Essay on Nature by F. J. E. Woodbridge .
670
Review of Experience and Substance by D. H. Parker .
564
ANDERSON, J. F. Two Studies in Metaphysics .
54
BoND, L. M. A Comparison Between Human and Divine Friendship
8
BRENNAN, R. E. Modem Psychology and Man .
DELLA PENTA, J. C. Review of Adversity's Noblemen by C. E.
518
Trinkhaus .
450
EGAN, J. M. Meditation and the Search for God .
---. Review of The Steps of Humility of Bernard of Clairvaux.
891
Translated with Introduction and Notes by G. B. Burch
FARRELL, W. and ADLER, 1\'[. J. The Theory of Democracy . . 897,588
--. Review of The City of Man .
658
McGuiNESS, J. I. The Distinctive Nature of the Gift of Under217
standing
MARITAIN, J. Concerning a" Critical Review" .
45
--. The Conflict of Methods at the End of the Middle Ages
527
88
MULHERN, P. F. The Rejection and Protection.of Faith .
MURPHY, T. A. Review of Greek Popular Religion by M.P. Nilsson . 167
---. Review of From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism
and the Historical Process by W. F. Albright .
510
164
RYAN, J. K. Review of Language and Reality by W. M. Urban .
RYAN, L. A. Charity and the Social Order: I .
539
ScHWARTZ, C. Review of A Companion to the Summa, Ill by Walter
Farrell .
380
VEATCH, H. B. Some Suggestions on the Respective Spheres of Science and Philosophy .
177
WJ1ITTA.KER, J. F. The Position of Mathematics in the Hierarchy of
Speculative Science .
467

677

678

INDICES OF VOLUME Ill

{1941)

INDEX OF ARTICLES

PAGE
Charity and the Social Order: I. L. A. RYAN .
. 539
Concerning a "Critical Review." J. MARITAI.N .
45
Democracy, The Theory of--. W. FARRELL and M. J. ADLER . 897,588
Faith, The Rejection and Protection of--. P. F. MULHERN .
33
Friendship, A Comparison Between Human and Divine --. L. 'M.
BoND
54
Man, Modern Psychology and --. R. E. BRENNAN .
8
Mathematics, The Position of -- in the Hierarchy of Speculative
Science. J. F. WHITTAKER .
467
Meditation and the Search for God. J. M. EGAN .
450
Metaphysics, Two Studies in--. J. F. ANDERSON
564
Methods, The Conflict of -- at the End of the Middle Ages.
J. MARITAIN .
527
Particulars, The Intellectual Cognition of --. R. ALLERS .
95
Philosophy, Some Suggestions on the Respective Spheres of Science
177
and --. H. B. VEATCH .
Problem of Species, Solution of--. M. J. ADLER .
279
Psychology, Modern-- and Man. R. E. BRENNAN
8
Science, Some Suggestions on the Respective Spheres of -- and
Philosophy. H. B. VEATCH .
177
Social Order, Charity and the--: I. L.A. RYAN .
589
Understanding, The Distinctive Nature of the Gift of --. J. I.
McGuiNEss
·
217
INDEX OF BOOKS REVIEWED
ALBRIGHT, W. F. From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism
and the Historical Process (Murphy) .
BURcH, G. B. The Steps of Humility of Bernard of Clairvaux
(Egan)
The City of Man (Farrell) .
EDDINGTON, A. The Philosophy of Physical Science (Allers}
FARRELL, WALTER. A Companion to the Summa, III: The Fullness of
Life (Schwartz} .
JoAD, C. E. M. Philosophy for Our Times (Allers) .
NILSsON, M. P. Greek Popular Religion (Murphy)
PARKER, D. H. Experience and Substance (Allers)
RIEZLER, K. Physics and Reality (Allers) .
SHERRINGTON, C. Man on His Nature (Allers} .
ThiNKHAUs, C. E. Adversity's Noblemen {Della Penta)
URBAN, W. M. Language and Reality (Ryan) .
WoODBRIDGE, F. J. E. An Essay on NatuTe (Allers)

END oF VoLuME Ill

510
391
653
885
380
667
167
670
387
507
518
164
669