THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EmToRs: THE DoMINICANFATHERS oF THE PRoVINCE OF ST. JosEPH
Publishers: Sheed and Ward, Inc., New York City

VoL. VII

JULY, 1944

No.8

PATRISTIC SCHOOLS IN THE SUMMA

0

NE of the features of the Summa ·Theologica of St.
Thomas Aquinas which strikes the casual reader is
the wealth of references and quotations contained in
every question, every article. The same reader may conclude
that St. Thomas had in mind to make his masterpiece ·appear
exceedingly erudite, to bolster up his arguments, and this conclusion has resulted in a very lengthy series of tracts. The
student of the Summa readily concurs ,in the general admiration of the vast knowledge St. Thomas had of the literary
and intellectual heritage of the past. At the same time, he
is aware that the Angelic Doctor set out to give a brief, concise
and orderly exposition of the whole of Christian doctrine.
The Summa Theologica represented the perfection of his
thought. His intent was to avoid all useless questions and
arguments, to eliminate confusing and tiresome repetitions.
Consequently, he introduced into his work only those elements
which were necessary for developing an argument or clarifying a point of doctrine. Among those elements are included

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the authority, the testimony, of the Fathers and Doctors
of the Church.
St. Thomas manifested the highest respect and humility towards the Fathers and saintly Masters of the past. Often he
raised objections to their writings merely in order to justify
or to clarify their teaching. He was very conscious of the value
of ·authority and tradition in theology. He wove his own
thought closely into the framework already established by the
great intellectual pioneers. The Doctor
chose his
authorities very judiciously and quoted from them always
with a definite purpose in mind. Upon closer examination it
becomes clear that among these theologians of earlier periods
there were a few who exerted a direct and positive influence on
St. Thomas. They were his masters, while, at the same time
he brought their teaching to perfection.
All Patristic writers can be generally grouped under two
schools-that of Alexandria and that of Antioch. These theological traditions wielded a tremendous and permanent influence on the development of theology until well into the Middle
Ages. It is the purpose of this study to sketch the teaching,
methods, and importance of these schools. Obviously, only the
outstanding representatives of each can be treated here, and
those only in outline. Both those theologians who are genetically disciples of Alexandria and Antioch and others spiritually
is to discover
affiliated with them will be treated. The
what writers exercised the most profound and direct influence
on St. Thomas in his Summa Theologica, as well as how and in
what respect these two theological traditions entered into the
framework of his system.

I.

THE ScHooL oF ALEXANDRIA

Beginnings
The great Egyptian metropolis of Alexandria has been associated with learning and culture almost since the days of its
foundation by Alexander the Great in 331 B. C. By the second
century of the Christian era, it had developed into the para-

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mount intellectual metropolis of the world, the center for uniting the thought and influences of East and West. It is not
surprising that from the Christian community in this locale
there should arise a powerful movement toward the formation of a precise and scientific system of Christian thought.
This movement, appearing in history in the person of Clement
(150-c. fl15) , is properly known as the School of Alexandria,
a single systematic stream of Christian intellectual expression.
Its Hellenic and Judaic predecessors and contemporaries cannot correctly be labelled schools, since within these divisions
existed opposing doctrines and contradictory tendencies, e. g.,
Platonism and Stoicism.
The Gospel of Christ was proclaimed in a definite milieuPalestine in the reign of the Herods. Later it was propagated
abroad among the peoples of the Greco-Roman world, an
entirely distinct culture. Although Christianity itself was born
in Judaism, the Christian theology developed in a Hellenic environment. At Alexandria there was in addition the significant
factor of Hellenic Judaism. Converts from these philosophies
were very apt to retain tr.aces of their former doctrines and
often reacted vigorously in exaggerated defense of the Christian truths opposed to their previous errors. In orqer to understand the methods and expressions of the representatives ofthe
Christian school at Alexandria, it is necessary to preface the
study with a brief survey of the Greek philosophies and the
Jewish system in vogue in the second century.
Alexandria was a depot for a melange of doctrines. The
world at the time was witnessing the breakup of old beliefs and
the dissolution of traditional patterns of thought. Concomitantly, strenuous efforts were being made toward a reconstruction and renovation of the old order. Each group attempted
to analyze and solve in its own way the idealist and religious
problem, the perfection of man. Eclecticism in philosophy (and
syncretism in religion) was an open and universal practice.
Because the various Greek tendencies were the more powerful
and the more metaphysical of the two movements, we shall

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treat them first, and secondly Alexandrian Judaism, in order to
discover the characteristic teachings of the movements.
The predominant Greek philosophies were the Platonic systems (especially Neo-Platonism) and Stoicism. The latter was
a
moralism, but its dogma was built on a materialist
physics. God and the world were confused; the immaterial was
confounded with the sensible. The God of the Stoics tended to
be identified with the created and the finite. They taught a
metaphysics of immanence. In this system
there are no .pure spirits: all things are bodies, some more, others
less, refined. The mind, which is a body of a rather delicate nature, is identical with God who, just like a subtle fire, an eternal
ether, an imma-nent and hidden force diffused into the world, permeates and moves and rules it, and is its very soul. From God
came matter, which, after clothing Him as with a garment, must
aga.in be a.hsorbed into Him. From Him are also derived all the
forces of nature, even the very spirit of man .. He is, in the world,
the principle of all activity or energy, not in the sense that He imparts it and creates it from outside; it is He Himself, or, in the
strict sense of the word, it emanates from_Him. He is, then, by
way of pre-eminence, the .Aoyosthe seminal reason of the
universe; a universe which He governs by immutable laws, laws
proper to Himself; for He is identical with Fate and the fatal order
of the world, though at the same time He is reasonable, perfect,
exempt from all evil, and the author of all good things. 1

This materialistic Pantheism was considerably attenuated by
the second century A. D. through the growth of Stoicism into a
preponderantly religious and moral philosophy. Yet the influence of Stoicism will at times "check the flight of Christian
thought by loading it with its material imaginations." 2
Gradually absorbing Stoicism and surpassing it was the
powerful movement, dominant during the period of the beginnings of Christian theology, built upon Platonic elements, which
received the name of Neo-Platonism. This philosophy was
itself a reaction to the gnosis which was being erected by other
Tixeront, J., History of Dogmas, vol. I, p. 28.
LeBreton, S. J., Jules, History of the Dogma of the Trinity, vol. I, "The
Origins," p. 68.
1

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Greek doctrinal movements and the various Oriental religious
philosophies. It also failed to bring a solution to the intellectual and religious problems of the age.
In its development as a living doctrine Platonism had encountered many other influences and assimilated their ideas. It
assumed a more syncretist character, approaching the era of
the advent of systematic Christian theology through many
channels. . The Platonism of this period is far removed from
that of Plato and went through still further developments in
the succeeding decades, especially under Plotinus. ·It would
be far afield to discuss the progress of Platonism up to this
period. It is not to the point to consider it in any one system
but rather as an influence. For it was the method and pivotal
doctrines (of Platonism which influenced the early Christian
theologians.
The principal contributions of Platonism were a philosophy
of transcendence and a doctrine of dualism. God for the Platonists was so far removed from all creation as to be inaccessible. No predication could be made of the divinity which
would fittingly describe it. Every quality and perfection,
whether corporal or spiritual, that existed in the creature had
to be excluded from inherence in the divinity. The notion of
God remained absolutely indeterminate and mysterious. Such
excessive transcendence led to the postulating of a multiplicity
of intermediary beings between God and man. Neo-Platonism,
however, rejected these numerous divine emanations. The Platonist metaphysic of transcendence thus opposed the Stoic
philosophy of immanence.
Paralleling their efforts to refine the notion of God of all
elements of limitation and imperfection, the Platonists sought
to correct the Gnostic confusion of the spiritual and sensible
elements. They taught a dualism of the corporal and the
spiritual worlds. Sensible reality is an image, a reflection, of
the spiritual world. It is also considered a principle of imperfection-a thesis attributed to the infiltration of Oriental
notions into the Platonist tradition.

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The theories of divine transcendence and the relation of the
sensible to the spiritual order were powerful weapons of
thought. In the hands of many philosophers they were misused and exaggerated. It was left to the theologians of the
Church to employ these principles in the service of theology, to
correct their excesses, and to enrich the development of dogma
by their fruitful consequences. Platonism was a divine philosophy, or rather a theology. It concentrated on the things
above, the realm of the spiritual. The things of this world
were examined in the focus of the immaterial. Platonism sought
to understand the divine, to discover the secret of union with
it. Small wonder that it exerted a deep impression on devout
Christian thinkers.
Alexandria was the center of the most numerous and conspicuous Jewish assembly of the Diaspora-the Hellenistic
Jews. Contrary to the practice of their Palestinian brethren,
who severely rejected all foreign influences and shut themselves
up in the word of the Law, the Jews of the Dispersion were
by dint of circumstances forced to come to terms with the
Gentile culture in which they lived. They were faced with the
same problem which later confronted Christian thinkers-how
to expound their teaching in a manner palatable to the systematically precise and philosophical Greeks. The Alexandrine Jews
borrowed heavily from Greek terminology and thought in order
to enrich their own meager philosophy. The greatest exponent
of a doctrinal conciliation of Hellenism and Judaism was the
Jew, Phil9. It was Philonism which obtained at Alexandria in
the second century A. D. Since the Diaspora was the bridge
by which the Christian faith was diffused throughout the
civilized world, it is necessary to describe the salient features
of the Philonian teaching.
Philo did not possess any clearly defined system, but rather
his thought was stamped with certain ideas which gave direction to his speculations. Because of the influence of his Jewish
background, he conceived God as a concrete and personal
Being. God alone was properly good, just, and merciful.

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Happiness and joy were strictly the possessions of God. But
the goodness of God was diffusive and the reason for his role
as Creator.
If we inquire into the cause why God has constructed the universe, it seems to me that we can reply with an ancient that the
father and the maker of the world was good. . . . He derived the
inspiration of doing so from no one-no one existed but Himself;
but He knew for Himself that He should spread profusely the
riches of His graces on nature, which without a divine gift, could
not of itself have any good in it. 3

God, then, being the Creator is not the immanent law of
the universe of the Stoics. His goodness invites men to a participation in His perfections.
However, in the great field of
speculation left open by the poverty of Jewish philosophy, Philo
was deeply imbued with Platonism.
His God was entirely
transcendent and undetermined.
He was without any quality,
d:rrouy;, since to affirm such of Him would be to limit Him. He
is who is, True Being.
In Judaism the divine transcendence is not inculcated with less
force, but it has a distinctly moral character; it is the sanctity of
Jahve which isolates him, whereas, according to Philo, it is his ideal
grandeur. According to the Jewish prophets man cannot see God,
because he is impure and his lips are defiled: for Philo such contemplation is impossible because it exceeds the power of human
intelligence. According to Philo man can demonstrate, for example,
by the reign of order in the world, the existence of a. first cause,
which he calls God; man can go no further; God can neither be
known nor named by him. 4
All that human reason can do is to arrive at the knowledge that
there is a.cause of the universe; to wish to go further and to know
the nature and qualities of that cause is an extreme piece of folly.5
God does not resemble man; for he' is not like the heaven nor yet
not like the earth; for these things have determinate and material
forms; God, on the contrary, is not even comprehensible by the
spirit, except insofar as he exists: for what we understand of him,
apart from the fact of his existence, is nothing.•
8 " De op. mundi,"
Mangey, London,
'vol. I, 5.
• LeBreton, op. cit., p.
•" De Poster, Caini," 168, Mangey, vol. I,
• "Quod Deus sit immut.,"
Mangey, ibid.,

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Philo's insistence on the inadequacy of the human concept to
represent the divinity and the divine
is a point
which scarcely needed correction. No created idea or concatenation of ideas can claim to exhaust God, nor can it be
asserted truly that the divine reality is limited or circumscribed by the mode or content of our intellectual representations. Philo was too conscious of the supreme uniqueness of
God to allow such dishonor. The awareness of the analogy of
being, the inequality of essences, lies behind his refusal to
postulate any quality in the divine being in se. For quality, for
him, meant determination, the modifying of an essence. Consequently God, being simple and transcending every category of
being, could not be constituted and determined in any genus
or species. He is the most generic of beings, in His own class
above all genera. All other beings are unequal to Him, far
from Him in essence (as the Scholastics were to say, infinitely
distant from Him) . Any passage from this Being to others is
as from one genus to another. 7
On the other hand, Philo admits certain perfections in God.
He is eternal, immutable, free, omniscient, and omnipotent.
These perfections belong to Him properly and cannot be composed with created essence. There are other properties which
are possessed both by God and by man, such as goodness, justice, and wisdom. In God they exist as one with His essence,
in the sense that, being even greater, He. is their source; in
creatures they exist by participation.
God is the summit and the term and the supreme height of
happiness, not receiving his perfections from anything else, but diffusing over all things the particular goodness of that source of all
beauiy which is himself: for all the beauty in the world could
never have come into being if it had not been formed to the image
of that archetype which is truly beautiful, without origin, happy
and incorruptible. 8

In his love of philosophy Philo neglected much· of what God
had revealed of Himself to the chosen people, yet he did at7

Cf. "Leg. Alleg.," H, 86, ibid., 8!!. "De Sacrif. Abel," 9!!, ibid., 81.
De
sG, ibid., IM.

8 "

Cherub.:•

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tempt to check the tendency of Platonism to make of God a
bare abstracti()n, unknown and unknowable, which would lead
to the. extreme of agnosticism.
To establish contact with this transcendent Being, to explain
the work of crel'!-tionand the progress of man to God, Philo was
forced to adopt a theory of intermediaries, powers or forces.
His doctrine was drawn from a variety of sources: Platonic,
Stoic, mythological, Biblical. In his hierarchy of being,
At the head of the scale is God; in the second place is the Logos;
in the third and fourth the creative and the royal powers; in the
fifth, depending on the creative power, the power of beneficence; in
the sixth, deriving from the royal power, the power of punishment;
and finally in the seventh, the world composed by the ideas. 9

Correlative with this hierarchy of being is the hierarchy of
knowledge, ascending from that which attains to the exterior
world through the lower powers, the powers of mercy and command, the superior powers of creation and kingship, the Logos,
until God Himself is reached. 10 On the nature of these intermediaries, and a fortiori of the Logos, which is at once their
principle and the sum of all of them-whether they are divine
or ereated, infinite or finite-Philo is unable to decide. His
statements are contradictory, such as his description of the
Logos, who is " neither unbegotten like God, nor begotten like
us, but in an intermediary way." 11
It was inevitable that Philo's metaphysical principles should
profoundly affect his treatment of the contents of the Bible.
The written word of God was the jealously cherished heritage
of the Jewish nation. The attempts which were made, particularly within the ranks of the Diaspora, to fashion a philosophy were inspired by an apologetic purpose, to defend and
to expound in a rational system the truths of Sacred Writ. The
Jews were quite conscious of the peculiar character of this Book.
• "In Exod.," II, 68, Aucher, Venice, 18ftft-26, p. 516.
1 ° Cf. "De Confus. ling.," 97, Mangey, vol. I, 419.
"De fuga," 97 sqq., ibid.,
560. "Leg. Alleg.," ill, 100, ibid., 107.
11 " Quis rerum divinarum haeres.," 42.

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All agreed that it contained both an obvious or literal meaning
and a hidden or mystical sense. In their endeavors to understand and explain the doctrines and facts contained in the
Sacred Writings one or the other of these elements was emphasized. This accounts for the two Jewish systems of exegesis,
the Palestinian and the Alexandrian. Their differences were
not so much essential as modal, since at the bottom both
admitted a double sense in the Scriptures. It was rather that
the isolationist Palestinians held to the literal method of interpretation, while the cosmopolitan Alexandrians emphasized the
allegorical. The Jews of Palestine, as evidenced by the Scribes
and Pharisees, were bound up in the letter of the Law.
The Alexandrian method of interpretation, as best represented by Philo, was inspired by the desire to harmonize the
contents of the Scriptures with the teachings of Greek philosophy. The Alexandrians were ready to see in the Bible the
doctrines of the latter philosophy. Moses and the Greeks
taught' many points in common; in fact, these Jews felt that
the Greeks had borrowed some of their ideas from the Bible.
The Alexandrians found the method of the allegory a fruitful
instrument in the understanding of this harmony. The Stoics
had excessively allegorized the ancient mythology, seeing in its
characters and figures symbols of the moral and psychological
orders. However, Jewish and Philonian allegorism was predicated on the doctrinal transcendence of the Scriptures and the
idea of God. Etymologically, the allegory ((J).).o-ayopf.vw) signified the saying of one thing by which something else is understood. Thus whatever was found in the Bible which was
unworthy of God, unreasonable or contradictory, was not to
be taken in the literal but in the allegorical or figurative sense.
In this way certain laws and events were allegorized by Philo.
Yet he maintained both the body and the soul of the Scriptures, denying that the whole was an allegory. Philo's insistence on the exclusive presence of the soul or spiritual sense of
the Scriptures is especially apparent in the passages containing anthropomorphisms. The danger in this system to which

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many succumbed was to make this sense prevail to the exclu:sion of the literal and to maintain it as the sole true meaning.
The Christian Apologists made no attempt to construct a
theological system; 12 their aims did not require them to employ
a scientific exposition of the truths of Christianity according
to a well-defined logical method. Their use of philosophy was
of an incidental nature. They were not seeking a metaphysical
pattern but rather certain forms of expression, details apt for
illustrating Christian truths, without being concerned with the
perfection of the whole or the sequence of its parts. Some
Apologists were very disparaging toward the philosophical systems, whereas the greater number, themselves philosophers
before their conversion, saw their utility. St. Justin, a representative of the latter, advances a twofold explanation. The
truths which the philosophers realized in their teachings were
somehow borrowed or acquired from the Old Testament. 18 This
is the opinion already noted among the Alexandrian Jews. In
the second place, the Word, which existed from the beginning,
invisibly communicated truth to the minds of the philosophers
in some imperfect way and directed their teaching. 14 It seems
that this must be understood with reference to the powers of
the human mind as they more or less perfectly mirror the
Divine Intelligence. Insofar as the Apologists were influenced
by any one philosophical system it was Platonism.
The phenomenal spread of the Christian faith by the middle
of the second century, bringing it into contact with current
philosophies and enrolling under its banner many converts from
the latter, inspired a movement toward a more precise understanding of its content. Attempts were made to develop the
unexplored rational setting of the revealed truths, to form the
latter in exact theological concepts and definitions. With the
establishment of the Christian school at Alexandria/ 5 scientific
10 For a more complete treatment
cf. the excellent study of A. de Ia Barre in
Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, vol. I, pt. I, cols.
"Ecole Cbretienne
d'Alexandrie."
1 " Justin, A pol., II, 44, 59.
"Ibid., I, 5, 46; II, 8, 10, 13.
15 From early times there bad been at Alexandria a school of catechumens.
By

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theology made its successful debut. The lectures delivered by
the Masters there, especially by Clement and Origen, propelled
an intellectual movement and injected into Christianity a system or school of thought of major importance for the evolution
of theology. We shall try to outline here its general spirit.
The virus attacking the Christian body which the Alexandrian teachers rose up to counteract was false Gnosticism. It
was the most dangerous and deep-rooted philosophy in Alexandria. The reaction of the Christian scholars to the Gnostics'
errors in both reason and faith, together with the contact they
had with the philosophical streams already noted at Alexandria,
served to determine the character of their providential mission
in the development of theology. They were forced to a new
doctrinal approach; embracing
principles and a
special method.
False Gnosticism threw down the challenge by pretending to
the role of a universal synthesis. It was an effort made by
philosophic thought to transform Christianity into a religious
philosophy or, better, the attempt of religious thought to give
to the Christian mysteries a philosophic elucidation more profound than that of the faith. 16 The false gnosis being a science
the last half of the second century it had developed into an important school of
scientific theology, the Didiacalia. It enjoyed at least a semi-official approval, the
heads of the school being appointed and withdrawn by the bishop. The auditors
were of the most diverse kinds-students of every condition and age, pagans,
catechumens, baptized. The rudiments of the faith were taught to the catechumens
while a more substantial theology was imparted to Christians anxious to learn.
The bases of Catholic belief were discussed even in the presence of pagans. The
program of studies was indicated by St. Gregory in his Panegyric. First, a general
knowledge of the sciences was given, then a study and commentary on the writings of the poets and philosophers of every school except the Epicurean was made.
Plato and Aristotle
held in great authority. The teaching was characterized
by a moral bent, yet employing a dialectic method of distinguishing and defining
the fundamental notions- of religion and morality. The Alexandrian school was
placed in a milieu of idealist, eclectic, and moral tendencies of Gnostic and NeoPlatonist syncretism.· It reached its greatest fame under Origen but declined
considerably under his successors, notwithstanding the brilliance contributed by
Didymus the Blind. Its intellectual heritage was retained in the theology of the
Cappadocian Fathers, who perpetuated the truly traditional elements.
18 Cayre, A. A.; F., Manual of Patrology and History of Theology, vol. I, p. 101.

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of a higher order was sufficient to replace the data of revelation. The Gnostic was considered 'to ha.ve penetrated the obscurities and understood the mysteries. Gnosticism taught an
exaggerated notion of the inaccessible position of God and His
infinite separation from matter. On the other hand, their base
conception of matter accounted for the corruption of man and
the force drawing him away from God. They postulated a
series of intermediary beings of varying grades of perfection
which, emanating from the Great Silence or Abyss, served as
the bridge between this God and created beings, and as the
means of man's ascent to God.
To the Gnostic heresy championed by brilliant intellects and
adorned with a severe moral practice, the Church in the second
century opposed only her hierarchical
teaching
of the Apostles and their qualified successors, which gradually
overcame the danger. There was as yet no doctrinal tradition,
no system or rational synthesis of faith, no adequate theology
with which to meet the errors. The latter developed and
crystallized as a result of the controversies and the teaching of
the Masters at Alexandria. It was their mission to state precisely the root ideas of Christian theology, proposed under the
aegis of revelation, with the authority of a supernatural tradition, not only as a philosophical teaching but even as a theological doctrine. In the domain of reason they affirmed the
ontological transcendence of God, superior to all degrees of
being, and consequently a like logical transcendence, His preeminence over all categories of thought. They avoided the
excess of agnosticism by insisting against the Stoics and anthropomorphists upon the intimate presence of God to all beings as
fully consonant with His transcendence. Likewise, they taught
the knowledge of God through His creatures. Both of these
truths were clearly contained in the Scriptures. Far from isolating themselves from natural truths, they sought, while maintaining their distinction from the super-rational, to include
them in the frame of their synthesis, to indicate the possibility
of conciliation and a certain coherence with supernatural truths,

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tracing their authorship to God, the source of the entire intelligible order. It is useless to seek among the Alexandrians the
precision of thought and expression found later among the
Schoolmen of the Middle Ages. They frequently employed the
common terminology of the time, though not always with the
significations of the parent philosophies. For them, as for the
Apologist, the Christian deposit was the center of all learning;
truth and authority are based on Revelation. Philosophy
always holds a secondary place, the traditional. doctrine of the
Church serving as the point of departure.
On this basis they sought to work out the principles cover;;
ing the connection of the divine and human sciences. Concerning the utility of the latter there existed a twofold opinion. The
generality of Christians, often referred to as the simplices or
simpliciores, were opposed to them, whereas the more educated
faithful felt that they must be judiciously employed in. the
general Christian teaching. 17 Among the scholars themselves
there were differences of attitude toward
learning and
culture. Thus, though both were extraordinarily steeped in
it, Clement assumed a very favorable attitude while Origen
seldom gave it credit. Nevertheless, in the structure of their
thought, the Alexandrian theologians found place for reason's
products both ante and post fidem.
The human sciences were conceived as preambles or means
to true wisdom. Philosophy can be exceedingly useful in the
attainment of divine truth, as a preparation, a discipline, a disposing cause. This is the view of Clement. 18 Origen viewed
learning under the threefold division of ethical, physical, and
theoretical or contemplative. 19 These two masters taught a
method of ascending from the visible and the created to the
invisible and the uncreated, a method insisted upon by the
Scholastics and St. Thomas. 20
17 LeBreton, "Le desaccord de la foi populaire et de la theologie savante dans
L'Eglise chretienne de Hie siecle, Revue D'Histoire Ecclesiastique, XIX, 19!'t8.
19 Cf. Prolog. in Cant. OanticoTUm.
18 St. Clement, Stromata, I, !'tO.
•• St. Thomas, Opusculum LXIll, q. !'t, a. 8: . "Lumen fidei quod nobis infunditur, non destruit lumen naturalis cognitionis nobis naturaliter inditum, quamvis

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With faith as the point of departure, reason could be used
to build up a true gnosis. Knowledge deduced from the faith
is .the most certain of all. 21 It is to the truths of the faith as
the principles of the synthesis that human truths are attached.
In this way simple faith (7ricrn>) is enriched arid developed into
an understanding faith (yvwm>). This is the concept of theology, the vital and scientific evolution of faith, such as St.
Augustine, St. Anselm, and the Scholastics understood it. The
Alexandrians realized that the acceptance of the Christian belief still left open a wide field for further researches based on
the foundation of this belief and in which a sound philosophy
could be the instrument. The method of reasoning which they
used was Platonism.
It is not strange that the Alexandrian Fathers should have
favored the Platonist tradition. Even aside from the presence
autem naturalis lumen mentis humanae ·sit insufficiens ad manifestationem eorum
quae per fidem manifestantur, tamen impossible est quod ea quae per fidem nobis
traduntur divinitus, sint contraria his quae per naturam nobis sunt indita: oportet
enim alterum esse falsum: et cum utrumque sit nobis a Deo, Deus esset nobis
auctor falsitatis quod est impossible, sed magis, cum in imperfectis inveniatur aliqua
imitatio perfectorum, quamvis imperfecta; in his quae per naturalem rationem
cognoscuntur, sunt quaedam similitudines eorum quae per fidem tradita sunt.
Sicut autem sacra doctrina fundatur super lumen fidei, ita philosophia super lumen
naturale rationis. Unde impossible est quod ea quae sunt philosophiae, sint contraria iis quae sunt fidei, sed deficiunt ab eis; continent tamen quasdam similitudines
earum, et quaedam ad ·ea praeambula sicut natura praeambula est ad gratiam ....
In sacra doctrina, philosophia possumus tripliciter uti. Primo ad demonstrandum
ea quae sunt praeambula fidei. . . . Secundo ad notificandum per aliquas similitudines ea quae sunt fidei; sicut Augustinus in libris de Trinitate utitur multis
similitudinibus ex doctrinis philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandum Trinitatem.
Tertio, ad resistendum his quae contra fidem dicuntur, sive ostendendo esse falsa,
sive ostendendo non esse necessaria."
Ibid., ad 7: " Scientiae quae habent ordinem ad invicem, hoc modo se habent
quod una potest uti principiis alterius, sicut scientiae posteriores
priorum
scientiarum, sive sint superiores, sive inferiores. Unde Metaphysica, quae est
omnibus superior, utitur his quae in aliis scientiis sunt probata, et similiter Theologia, cum omnes aliae scientiae sint ei quasi famulantes et praeambulae in via
generationis, quamvis sint dignitate posteriores, potest uti principiis omnium
aliarum."
Cf. St. Albertus, Omnia Opera, t. XII, p. 2.
21 Cf. Clement, Stromata II, 11; I, 20.

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of Platonic influences at Alexandria and the fact that many of
these men, especially Clement and Origen, knew Plato directly,
the Platonic philosophy of itself was a most suitable instrument. Harnack rightly remarks that Platonism was not so
much a system as a spirit. Being mystics, the Alexandrians
quite inevitably would be attracted by the tone of the Platonist
philosophy, which represented being in hierarchy and which
was not so much concerned with explaining and understanding
the things of this world as in concentrating on those above
and the problem of attaining them. Such, in the opinion of
R. Arnou, is the secret of its lasting influence on Christian
thinkers. 22
Theology by definition is centered on God. It is in their
conception of God or in their manner of understanding Him
that various theologies are radically differentiated. There is a
twofold process in attaining an understanding of God. The
first emphasizes the divine' transcendence by negating or removing all created and therefore limited perfections from God
or qualifying their application. The other affirms the presence
of perfections in a supereminent and analogical way. The
Alexandrians, intent on maintaining the divine transcendence,
employed the negative method, while, unlike Philo, correcting
it with the affirmations of positive theology. Moreover, as areaction to the excesses of Neo-Platonism and the Gnostic exaggerations, the Alexandrians, as indeed all Patristic antiquity,
proclaimed the intimate presence of God in the world and His
accessibility to human knowledge. They were thus freed from
the peril of agnosticism and from the necessity of postulating
a series of intermediary beings. It is significant that the theology of the Alexandrian Doctors emphasized the divine element. This was most evident in their controversies, especially
the Trinitarian and Christological problems, which lie at the
core of any system of Catholic theology. It is too much to
demand from them an exactness of terminology and felicity of
•• R. Amou, " Platonisme des Peres," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, Xll,
pt. 2.

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expression anticipating and precluding later errors as such.
They staunchly upheld the distinctive personality of the Word,
the divinity of Christ, the real relations of origin in the Trinity.
Exaggerations due to the circumstances of controversy which
seemed to imply a subordinationist theory were more form of
expression than fact. It was to a great degree the intrusion
into dogma of some Platonic ideas that gave rise to this or
that Trinitarian or Christological error. As R. Arnou points
out:
In this sense, Plato can be called the father of heresies. However, he holds this paternity with Aristotle, the Stoics and other
profane philosophers. Greek philosophy, especially Plato, could
prepare spirits or even offer them the occasion to penetrate farther
in the comprehension of revealed truths and in coordinating them,
but it supposes revelation and follows it. Some have reversed the
role and made the part of philosophy preponderant. They are
heretics in the measure that, to explain dogma, they have preferred
the tradition of Plato to that of the Apostles. 23

The Scriptures were the theme upon which ecclesiastical science, theology, was founded. The attempts at a synthesis of
doctrine based on the written Revelation (and Tradition) as
the premise were influenced by the various philosophical and
other tendencies which entered into the interpretation of the
content of the Scriptures. Judaism and Christianity have
always presupposed the existence of a literal and a spiritual
sense, the result of belief in the transcendence of the Inspired
Word. Controversy and inclination impelled the Alexandrian
teachers to favor, sometimes exclusively, the sub-literal sense.
Allegorism, symbolism-the tendency to search for a deeper
meaning beneath the letter or the fact-characterized them.
It was a ready consequence of their theodicy. Platonic thought,
in addition to viewing God practically as in no way resembling
creatures, conceived of the spiritual and sensible worlds as
dualistically opposed, the sensible maintaining its inferior reality from the superior element. A far more attenuated opinion
•• Ibid.

2

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was professed by Origen and his disciples who, like St. Paul/ 4
saw the sensible as the image of the spiritual world. The Alexandrians were accustomed to see sensible things as symbols of
higher realities. Such a procedure was sanctioned by the Scriptures and Tradition. 25 To apply this principle of metaphysics to
Scripture as an absolute norm invited excesses. The Old Testament lost all but its representative value. Although the text
must be understood in its literal, historical meaning and then in
the spiritual sense, certain passages, in their literal sense seemingly unworthy of God and His elect, must be taken only in the
spiritual sense. The latter is ubiquitous, the lack of a corporal
sense being accidental. Yet, where the Fathers seem to deny
the literal sense, they are referring to the proper literal, not the
figurative sense.
The Alexandrians found it necessary to emphasize and defend the spiritual character of the Bible against pagan critics,
as did the Jews before them. Lacking a higher sense the Bible
would be a profane instrument, unworthy of God. From it the
Christians sought to erect their own philosophy. Allegorism
was profitable in refuting the Jews, who held that Christ did
not fulfill the prophecies to the letter, and in harmonizing the
Old and New Testaments. It was a reaction against excessive
literalism, from which Christian Millenarianism and anthropomorphism stemmed. The principles of metaphysical transcendence and Scriptural symbolism were fruitful instruments of
Christian thought. In the course of time they were refined and
made precise in their application. The sense of tradition, a
famous rule with Origen, kept these masters from many of the
excesses to which their system was susceptible. It is significant
that the great heresies concerning the fundamental tenets of
the Christian belief were not of their parentage.
The School of Alexandria boasts a long list of distinguished
theologians. Many of them were content merely to repeat the
teachings of the masters, especially Origen. We shall attempt
to study some of the most representative followers of this tradi" Romans, I,

•• Galatians, IV,

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tion, in whom are discovered positive contributions to the
progress of a doctrinal synthesis and who exerted an influence
on later theologians, in particular, the Angelic Doctor.

Clement of Alexandria (150-c. 215)
The earliest master of the Didiscalia whose writings have
survived is Clement of Alexandria. 26 This remarkable scholar
introduced into his lectures the intellectual drive of a prodigiously learned and truth-loving philosopher and the apostolic zeal of a con_vert. His strong attachment to philosophy
and the truths of sound reason was surpassed only by his
burning attachment to the faith and the Christian mysteries.
Despite his open admiration for the fruits of the Greek mind,
Clement strongly maintained the absolute superiority of the
Christian truth and the faith. He purposed to study reality in
its relationship to God. He was a mystic and a moralist,
endeavoring by his teaching to induce his hearers to attain that
exalted perfection, the deeply spiritual identity with the divine
in this life, which he conceived to be the true Christian vocation. His principles and method are revealed in his teaching
on certain questions.
Clement's doctrine on faith embraces all the essential notes.
Faith is the firm adherence of the mind, something entirely
intellectual and absolutely supernatural and
Clement
26 Titus
Flavius Clemens was born probably at Athens around 150 A. D. of
pagan parents. He received a very careful pagan Greek education. He travelled
extensively in Italy, Syria, Palestine, Egypt. At Alexandria he was drawn to the
Master Pantaenus. Following his conversion he was later ordained and succeeded
Pantaenus as head of the school about QOO A. D. During the persecution of
Septimus Severns (20Q-203) he fled to Cappadocia. He died sometime between
211 and 216 A. D.
The works of Clement comprise his Exhortation to the Greeks, The Tutor, and
The Stromata, three parts of an unfinished whole, envisioning apologetics, moral,
and dogma. Together with the lesser products-Quis dives salvetur, Hypotyposes
(Sketches) especially in the Adumbrationes in epistolas canonicas-they constitute
the sources of Clement's thought.
27 Stromata,
bk. IV, c. XXII: "If, then, we are to give the etymology of
knowledge, its signification is to be derived from I1Ta111s, placing; for our

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only vaguely defined faith in itself, considering it more as the
beginning of true knowledge. 28 Faith is the foundation of
religious knowledge which is its natural development, and the
first principle of salvation, not, however, advancing without
charity and the other virtues. The soul is united with the
invisible, the object of faith. No demonstration can ever cause
faith but only make it acceptable. 29 Faith, the condition of
this life, is crowned with vision in the life after death. 80 The
soul, which was formerly borne, now in one way, now in another, it settles in
objects. Similarly faith is to be explained etymologically, as the settling (urli<ns)
of our soul respecting that which is."
Ibid., bk. II, c. ill: ''Now the followers of Basilides regard faith as natural, as
they also refer it to choice, [rep1·esenting it] as finding ideas by intellectual comprehension without demonstration; while the followers of Valentinus assign faith to
us, the simple, but will have it that knowledge springs up in their own selves
(who are saved by nature) through the advantage of a germ of superior excellence, saying that it is as far removed from faith as the spiritual is from the
animal. Further, the followers of Basilides say that faith as well as choice is
proper according to every interval; and that in consequence of the supramundane
selection mundane faith accompanies all nature, and that the free gift of faith is
conformable to the hope of each. Faiili, then, is no longer the direct result of free
choice, if it is a natural advantage. . . . And the entire peculiarity and difference
of belief and unbelief will not fall under either praise or censure, if we reflect
rightly, since there attaches to it the antecedent natural necessity proceeding from
the Almighty. . . . But God, as I think, [according to these men] turns out to be
the distribution to men of natural powers, which has not as the foundation of
salvation voluntary faith."
Exhortation, c. I, IV.
•• Stromata, bk. II, c. VI: " Faith is the voluntary supposition and anticipation
of pre-comprehension."
Ibid., c. IV: " ... He, again, who has learned has already turned his preconception into comprehension. And if he who learns, learns not without a preconceived
idea which takes in what is expressed, that man has ears to hear the truth. . . . If,
then, faith is nothing else than a preconception of the mind in regard to what is
the subject of discourse . . . no one shall learn aught without faith, since no one
learns aught wiiliout preconception."
•• Stromata, II, c. II: " . . . And since choice is the beginning of action, faiili
is discovered to be the beginning of action, being the foundation of rational choice
in the case of anyone who exhibits to himself the previous demonstration through
faith. Voluntarily to follow what is useful, is the first principle of understanding.
Unswerving choice, then, gives considerable momentum in the direction of knowledge. The exercise of faith directly becomes knowledge, reposing on a sure
foundation. . . . "
80 Inatructor, bk. I, c. VI.
Stromata, II, c. VI; ibid., c. XII.

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supernatural character of this gift excludes any claim to it by
reason of one's previous intellectual assets, although Clement
recognizes the value the latter may have in the service of the
faith once received. 81 Clement's teaching on the role of reason
is important. As a pedagogue he searched the philosophers for
a starting point or for any help to be found among them. As a
theologian he attempted to explain the function of reason in
the edifice raised upon the principles of faith.
His profound knowledge of early literature enabled Clement to be
the first to expose with abundance, although with a pedagogical
and moral purpose, rather than apologetical and theological, the
relations of philosophy and Christianity, of reason and faith. He
was thus a pioneer and, thanks to him, the School of Alexandria
was able to carry out its providential mission.32
In Clement's plan the position of Greek philosophy ante
fidem is purely propedeutical. In itself it is inadequate to
attain universal truth. 38 Clement was among the first to discover its value in the service of God and His Truth. It had
prepared the Gentile world in a measure to accept the faith. 34
Philosophy is contributive to and useful in the attainment of
divine truth. 85 In accord with the practice of the third century, even among the pagans, Clement regarded philosophy in
a religious and moral light. Because of the intimate connection between the intellectual and the moral spheres, the
methods of philosophy were apt to discipline the spirit, to
purify and to instil virtue. Philosophy was for him not any
one system but the complex of the truths discovered by the
human reason; 86 it is the science of divine things and the prac81 Stromata, I, c. VI.
•• Cayre, op. cit., p. 179.
•• Stromata, VI, c. VII: " And they [the Greek philosophers] think that they
have hit the truth perfectly; but as we understand them, only partially. They
know, then, nothing more than this world."
Stromata, IT, c. IV.
•• Stromata, I, c. V: "Philosophy, therefore, was a preparation paving the way
for him who is perfected in Christ."
•• Stromata, I, c. XX; ibid., c. V; VI, c. XV. Cf. note 20, supra.
•• Stromata, I, c. VII: " . . . whatever has been well said by each of these
sects, which teach righteousness along with a science pervaded by piety-this
eclectic whole I call philosophy."

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tice of a virtuous Christian life. Moreover, Clement realized
the powerful instrument of thought the Greeks possessed in
their dialectic. Through it they were able to formulate their
teaching on various philosophical problems in precise, set terms,
formulas or dogmas (8Wypara). In opposing the errors of the
Greeks and the Gnostic heresies, Clement found it necessary to
adopt similar means to express his doctrine.
The value and importance of philosophy in the service of the
faith, of reason post fidem, in defense of the faith and as an
instrument in the deeper study which faith makes of its own
mysteries, is incomparable. Its apologetic role is considerable. 37
Beyond this is its office of aiding in the development of the
faith. This introduces the subject so dear to the thought of
Clement-the Christian Gnosis.
There were, at Alexandria, "gnostics," that is, Christians, who,
without denying the traditional dogmas, rejecting none of the
obedience due to the Church, aspire to a deeper and more learned
knowledge of the truths they profess.88
Clement, foremost among them, sought to fulfill these aspirations with his gnosis. He believed in the existence of a true
gnosis, which avoids the rationalism of the false gnostics and
the exclusive supernaturalism of narrow-minded Christians, and
which, though not necessary for salvation, leads to greater
perfection.
The very foundation, the principle and point of departure,
for Clement is the faith; it is the criterion of knowledge. 89
Christ is the base and the edifice of the faith and the gnosis. 40
As for the role of reason,
its actual part is to be the helpmate of faith in the study the latter
makes of its own deep mysteries; it must aid the faith to build itself
into a gnosis. True, the .doctrines of philosophy add nothing to
the light of Christian truths; but its methods and dialectics train
•• Stromata, I, c. XX; ibid., c. IX.
•• LeBreton, "Le desaccord de la foi ... " (v. note 17, supra).

•• Stromata, II, c. 4.
•o Stromata, VII, c. X.

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the mind and guide it in its seeking after truth, in its striving after
good, in its apostolic endeavors to spread good and truth. 41

The faith (7rlrrn<>) is generally understood by Clement as common faith, that of the simple Christians, which is sufficient for
salvation. This faith may be perfected by knowledge (yvw1m),
which seeks a fuller, more intimate understanding of the things
of God. The faith is essential, the gnosis its crowning. It is
the faith made precise, enriched and developed by means of
human learning. In this sense, a gnostic has been called a
simple believer arrived at maturity, a Christian who has drawn
out the virtualities contained in the faith. The 7rirm> and the
yvwut<> merely denominated two degrees of the Christian life, the
common and the perfect, not an essential difference. Baptism
contains this seed of Christian perfection. 42 Clement insisted
upon this idea in opposition to the heretical gnostics who
taught a determinist theory, a conception of essential differences founded on the diversity of nature of men. Some were
predestined to an inferior Christianity, others to the gnosis.
The false gnostics boasted a superior intelligence and considered
ordinary Christians as incapable of
children.
It is interesting to note the exalted and highly intellectual
perfection which Clement teaches is the vocation of the faithful. It is the normal development of the faith. 43 It perfects the
faith, purifies and increases love. 44 A right philosophy applied
to the data of the faith can educe further conclusions contained
in it. 45 The gnostic, then, is the perfect man, most likened to
Christ who was supremely perfect. 46 He pursues the good for
its own sake, preferring the knowledge of God to eternal salvation, if the two could be separated. For this knowledge springs
from faith under the impulse of love. Clement considered this
gnosis not as purely speculative knowledge but as a religious
" Tixeront, History of Dogmas, vol. I, p. 9l45, and references cited.
•• Instructor, I, c. VI. This idea of the Christian gnosis as the development of
faith was later also that of St. Anselm, St. Augustine and the Scholastics.
•• Stromata, V, c. I.
•• Stromata, VII, c. X; ibid., c. XL
•• Stromata, IV, c. XXI.
•• Stromata, II, c. XI; V, c. I.

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knowledge. 47 This edifice of the faith is not erected without
reference to grace, the gifts and charity. The perfection of
knowledge is ordained to the perfection of the integral man.
Charity is its principle. 48
In attempting to trace out his pattern of theology, in his
efforts to transform Revelation into a theology, faith into a
science, Clement not only insisted upon the faith as a cornerstone but insisted also that theological speculation be subject
to the Scriptures and to tradition. 49 It was a sound and fruitful principle, if not always followed by him. Clement's loose
theological synthesis is marked by two things, its method and
its championship of the divine transcendence.
The exalted notion of the Deity which has already been
noted as characteristic of the Alexandrian Masters, seems to be
the fulcrum of Clement's theology. It sharpened his attitude
towards the dangers of anthropomorphism and made him
keenly aware of the imperfections and limitations of our knowledge of God. · Mindful of the errors of his time, he strove to
maintain a pure and transcendent notion of the divinity. He
studied all things from a divine viewpoint, as proceeding from
God, manifesting the divine nature and serving to lead man
back to God through knowledge and love. He was conscious
more of the divine dissimilarity than of man's likeness to Him.
Clement's doctrine on the gnosis appears exaggerated, his ideal
of Christian perfection lofty, because his God is so transcendent. Man, as an image, only shares in the divine perfections
and must seek his perfection in a fuller sharing in God through
knowledge and love. The destiny of man is to realize in himStromata, IV, c. XXII; II, c. XIX.
•• Stromata, V, c. XII; VII, c. XI. It should be noted that there are sufficient
indications in Clement's works to deny that he subordinated the role of charity
and placed knowledge as the principle of union. He was lead into exaggerations
by zeal and a reaction to the heresies of Millenarianism and false gnosticism, but
they do not destroy his basic concept.
Stromata, VI, c. 15-16; I, c. 1.
•• Stromata, VII, c. 16: "He ceases to be a man of God and faithful to the
Lord, who discards with contempt the ecclesiastical tradition and yields to the
opinion of human heresies."
' 1

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self the divine similitude. 50 This will explain why Clement
emphasizes the divine element in Christ. He realized that any
humanizing of the Deity would also lower the God-man.
God is so unique in being and nature as almost to border on
abstraction. 51 It follows, then, that our knowledge of Him and
the expression of it are entirely inadequate and imperfect.
We know Him more as He is not than as He is. 52 The method
of attaining to true, though inadequate, knowledge of God is
by the negative way. Clement clung to the principles of negation in theology, denying the presence of both corporeal and
spiritual properties in order to maintain an absolutely simple
and unlimited Being. Yet he was conscious of the corrective
value of an affirmative theology. He attributed to God certain positive perfections attained through a knowledge of creatures which were analogically and supereminently applied to
the Supreme Being. 53 In this way he sought to preserve a
refined notion of God and the things intimately associated with
Stromata, IV, c. 22; II, espec. c. 19.
Stromata, II, c. 16; IV, c. 25; V, c. 10-12. Paedagogus, I, c. 8.
52 Stromata, II, c. 16:
"For the Divine Being cannot be declared as it exists;
but as we who are fettered in the flesh were able to listen, so the prophets spoke
to us; the Lord savingly accommodating Himself to the weakness of men."
Stromata, V, c. 11: " ... we may reach somehow to the conception of the
Almighty, knowing not what He is, but what He is not .... "
Ibid., c. 12; VI, c. 18; II, c. 10-ll.
53 Stromata, V, c. 11-12; I, c. 19.
This insistence on a negative theology, albeit
corrected by an affirmative method, is also the teaching of St. Thomas and the
Schoolmen. Cf. St. Thomas, De Potentia, q. 7, a. 5 totum; also loc. cit., ad 14:
" It -is because human intelligence is not equal to the divine essence that this
same divine essence surpasses our intelligence· and is unknown to 'us; wherefore
man reaches the highest point of his knowledge about God when he knows that he
knows him not; inasmuch as he knows that that which is .God transcends whatever
he conceives of him."
De Divinis N ominibus, Prologus: " ... Sed quia omnis similitudo creaturae ad
Deum deficiens est, et hoc ipsum quod Deus est, omne id quod in creaturis
invenitur, excedit; quidquid in creaturis a nobis cognoscitur, ad Deo removetur,
secundum quod in creaturis est; ut sic post omne illud quod intellectus noster ex
creaturis manductus de Deo concipere potest, hoc ipsum quod Deus est, remanet
occultum et ignotum ... et sic hoc ipsum quod Deus est, cum excedat illud quod a
nobis apprehenditur, nobis remanet ignotum."
Loc. cit., cap. I, lect. 3.
50

51

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Him, The charge of anthropomorphism could never be levelled
at him.
It follows quite naturally that symbolic and :figurative language would be used by this theologian, and hidden and
mysterious significations sought. Clement had much to say on
these subjects, Since his theological reasoning was in close
contact with the Scriptures, 54 his ideas on the latter can be
outlined. The Scriptures are the source of all true faith, 55
They are divinely inspired, 56 offering an irrefutable demonstration
the truth, superior in certitude to anything human
and rational." 7 Clement devotes much space 58 to explaining
the use of symbolism in
Scriptures, the employment of
signs and mysterious veils
teaching
divine doctrine, He
finds many reasons of convenience, of traditional authority,
many examples among the Egyptians and Greeks, Symbolism
is especially necessary because of the truths transmitted, which
are objects essentially mysterious, The Scriptures hide their
sense in order to
us diligent in the search
the truth
and in order not to injure the weak. Thus the parable is characteristic of the Scriptures and the teaching of Our Lord. He
sought to conduct men from the sensible to the intelligible
world, to lead them by these familiar conceptions to an understanding of spiritual realities. Clement describes the parable
as terminology
from what is secondary and auxiliary,
leading to what is principally intended, a formula rendering
superior realities efficaciously intelligible by means of secondary
notions. 59 The use of symbols in the Scriptures is explainable
Stro"nata, VII, c. 16-17.
Stromata, VII, c. 16.
56 Exhortation, IX; Stromata, I, c. 21.
57 Stromata, II, c. 4; VII, c. Hi:
58 Stromata, V.
59 Stromata, VI, c. 15:
"For many reasons, then, the Scriptures hide the sense.
54

55

First, that we may become inquisitive, and be ever on the watch for the discovery of the words of salvation. Then it was not suitable for all to understand, so
that they might not receive harm in consequence of taking in another sense the
things declared for salvation by the Holy Spirit. . . . Wherefore also He employed
metaphorical description; for such is the parable,-a narration based on some

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by the loftiness of the truth contained and the need for preserving the purity of the doctrine expressed. 6 ° Clement is an
apologete for the Scriptures, especially the Old Testament
against the gnostics. Defense of the Scriptures is a defense of
the true Christian philosophy. He tried to point out the truths
which the Scriptures and Greek wisdom held in common,
attributing a priority to the former. He uses the symbolic
method to justify the obscurity of Scripture.
It has been necessary to deal at some length with Clement
of Alexandria. He was essentially a man of transition, the
link between primitive Christianity of the Apostolic Fathers
and the Apologetes, and Origen and the Doctors of the Church.
He was truly the creator of ecclesiastical theology more than
anyone else responsible for the evolution of Christian faith and
teaching into a systematic body of truth with which to defend
and enrich the Christian deposit. He stoutly maintained the
supernaturality of faith. The mutual roles of reason and faith
he attempted to delineate. He held firmly to the principle of
the divine transcendence and insisted on the inadequacy of
human ideas and expressions. In his theology he employed
primarily the negative way restrained from excess by the positive method. These principles and methods had their influence
on Scriptural exegesis in the use of the allegorical sense and of
symbolism. Allegorism was fruitful in dissipating errors such
as Millenarianism. If Clement and the Alexandrine Masters
seemed at times radically to oppose the body to the spirit, they
did bring men to rise above purely material aspirations. The
metaphysical principle of transcendence, of the sensible as
subject which is not the principal subject, but similar to the principal subject, and
leading him who understands to that which is the true and principal thing."
Stromata, V, c. 4: "All then, in a word, who have spoken of divine things, both
Barbarians and Greeks, have veiled the first principles of things, and delivered the
truth in enigmas, and symbols, and allegories, and metaphors, and such like tropes."
60 Ibid., c. 8:
" ... Very useful, then, is the mode of symbolic interpretation for
many purposes; and it is helpful to the right theology, and to piety, and to the
display of intelligence, and the practice of brevity. and the exhibition of wisdom.
'For the use of symbolical speech is characteristic of the wise man ... .'"

Ibid., c. 9, 10, ll.

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image of the spiritual, together with the method of symbolic
exegesis were pregnant with advantages for Christian theology,
as well as dangers. Christian tradition avoided the latter, for
example, Origenism. Clement propelled a movement which
was taken up and developed by his successors, of whom the
most notable was his pupil and greatest follower-Origen.
Origen (185-c. 254)
Origen, the greatest disciple of Clement, the most notable
Master of the Didiscalia, was the most voluminous writer in
antiquity. 61 The influence of his dynamic intellect was felt in
the East and also among Latin theologians for centuries. Origen
became the subject of very bitter controversies and the highest
praise. The memory of few men and their works have met
with so varied a fate in the course of history. Origen was
strongly devoted to the Church and attached to ecclesiastical
tradition. He attacked a difficulty with boldness and proposed
his opinions with humility and docility. He perfected the work
of Clement. More than any individual theologian he gave
direction to the development of a truly scientific theology. This
great Master proposed to explain and defend the truths of the
faith embodied in the books of the Scriptures and interpreted
by ecclesiastical tradition.
The first step was to define the objects of faith and theology.
61 Origen was born at Alexandria of Christian parents about 185 A. D.
He received a Christian education from his father, St. Leonides, who had him learn the
Scriptures by heart. Origen was always seeking the hidden meanings. During the
persecution of Septimius Severns, he wished to share his father's martyrdom. At
this time he took over the headship of the Didiscalia from Clement. At the same
time he studied for a while under Ammonius Saccas in order to broaden his education and become familiar with the doctrines he had to refute. He learned
Hebrew and made a critical study of the Bible, resulting in the famous Hexapla
and Octapla. He made several journeys after 212 A. D. Falling into disfavor with
his bishop, Origen went to Cesarea in Palestine about 281 A. D. and opened a
theological school there. His fame and renown drew many scholars to him, e. g.,
Gregory Thaumaturgus. He su:llered severely for the faith in the persecution of
Decius'. He died in 258-255 A. D. Of his remaining works, the De Principiis represents the first Summa Theologica in history, a science consisting of rational conclusions based upon revelation.

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There are certain revealed truths which have been taught to
all, which have always been considered necessary even for the
pigriores.62 But over and above these are other matters not
explicitly contained in the faith, which are the object of theological speculation, the free investigation and research of the
studiosiores.63 "Faith attains the objective content of revealed
truths (quia sint) ; whilst theology deals with the cause and
mode of these truths (quomodo aut unde sint) ." " Ecclesiastical preaching sets the limits to the object of faith; everything
outside these limits is the object of theology." 64 These distinctions were very important, albeit not fully applied.
Associated with these is another principle of equal importance, which is echoed throughout Origen's entire writings. 65
It is the rule of faith as manifested through tradition. Origen
always had the highest respect for and docility toward the
traditional teaching of the Church. He considered it to be the
basis of his theology. The first rule of conduct is not to receive or teach anything as true except what " differs in no way
from ecclesiastical and apostolical tradition." 66 The faith of
•• They are: one God, author of the two Testaments, just and good; Jesus Christ
born of the Father before all creatures, His servant in creation, yet remaining God;
who became incarnate of a Virgin and the Holy Spirit, was truly born, suffered,
died, rose again, was taken up into heaven; the Holy Spirit associated in dignity
and, honor with the Father and Son, the inspirer of the Old Dispensation and the
New; the immortality of the soul, its reward or punishments; resurrection of the
body; free will; the struggle of the soul with the devil and his angels who truly
exist; the creation of the world in time and its future destruction; the inspiration
of the Scriptures, their apparent and their. hidden meanings; the existence of good
angels, God's ministers to men, De Prine,, preface, 4-10.
•• They are: Is the Holy Ghost engendered or not? Is He the Son of God? Is
the soul ex semine traduce, created ex nihilo, or pre-existent? What existed before the creation of the world? Are God and the spirits incorporeal (auwpaTa) ?
When were the angels created? What are they? Are devils fallen angels? Are
the stars animated or not? Listed in Cayre, op. cit., p. 210-211. Cf. De Prine.,
preface, 4-10.
•• Cayre, op. cit., p. 210. Cf. Dl!! Prine., preface, 2-8.
••" De Prine.," III, I, 1, Patrologia Graeca, XI, col. 249. "In Rom.," comment.
II, 11, P. G., XIV, col. 898. Ibid., V, 1, P. G., ibid., col. 1015. "In Matt.," ser.
187, P. G., XIII, col. 1787. Ibid., ser. 47, P. G., ibid., col. 1669.
•• De Prine., preface, 2.

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the Church is summed up in its baptismal symbol. The one
Origen used can only be gathered from his writings. 67 He did
not state with precision the depositaries of the faith and the
traditional teachings, nor explain fully the magisterium of the
Church. :Vet his life testified to his fidelity to it. He vigorously condemned the heretics, especially V alentinus, Basilides,
and Marcion, whom he called heterodox. 68
Origen proposed to justify and explain the traditional doctrine by the use of Scripture and the instrumentality of sound
philosophy. 69 With this intent he employed all the resources of
Hellenic philosophy in which he was versed. Like his mentor,
Clement, and his early teacher, Ammonius Saccas, Origen was
an eclectic. His ideas were rooted in Christian teaching,
although expressed in Platonic and Stoic terminology. The
philosophic vocabulary of the third century was filled with
terms stemming from these two philosophical traditions. 70
Origen believed with his predecessor that the philosophers had
somehow received their truth from Revelation. 71 Clement had
sung the praises of philosophy; he was attracted by its value in
the service of the faith. Origen, however, although he used it
extensively was far less enthusiastic. He appreciated its radical
inadequacy and insufficiency as compared to the faith. 72 He
67 " In Matt.," ser. 33, P. G., XIII, col. 1643-1644: "Quidam autenr .... "
"In
Joann. XXXII," 9, P. G., XIV, col. 783: "Ante omnia credito .... "
68 "In Matt. XII," 23.
P. G., XIII, col. 1038. "In Joan. II,'' P. G., XIV, col.
195.
69 De Prine., preface, 10.
70 Prat, F., Origene, Paris, 1907, pp. xiii-xiv:
"It is impossible to comprehend
anything of Origen's theories if he is regarded as being bound to any particular
school; the great fault of Origenism, in its various forms, has been its attempts to
find in his writings a logical and exhaustive development of a philosophical system."
Denis, J., De la Philosophie d'Origene, p. 59-60: "I do not believe that Origen
found any of his essential principles in Greek learning. He would have had the
same ideas had he not known the Stoics and Plato. But it is true that he often
took from the latter the dress in which his ideas are clothed . . . he certainly made
use of Greek philosophy for the better expression of his doctrines. . . . But as for
the ideas themselves, I· think that their source must be sought elsewhere."
71 " In Genesim," hom. XIV, 3, P. G., XII, col. 237-238.
72 Contra Celsum, III, 75; IV, 14.

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considered the most decisive charge against philosophy to be its
obvious powerlessness to correct the morals of its devotees. 78
Origen was imbued with the methods and spirit of the philosophers rather than their doctrines. His at times strong language belittling philosophy is the expression of the apologete
striving to answer the attacks of the pagan Celsus. For him,
the Christian truth was the best philosophy, true wisdom, a
coherent system. The Christian system was too noble to be
compared with the pagan teachings.
Faith and the knowledge of God are supernatural, being the
divine gift and in no way attainable by the human mind
alone. 74 It produces a supernatural assent of the mind. 75 The
wisdom '*hich is called divine is absolutely distinct from human
wisdom. 76 Revelation was necessary so that all men might
attain to the truth. Not only is the Christian belief not opposed
to reason, but it is most in accord with it and would be far
superior to all other systems even without reason. 77 It is in
accord with the natural desire implanted in every soul to know
God. 78
Faith establishes the unique place of God in the scheme of
reality. Origen did not feel compelled to attempt a proof of
this truth. He is no less insistent than Clement on the doctrine
of the divine transcendence. God is above all created categories; He is above truth, wisdom, and life; He is them in
Himself. He is above intelligence and being, superior to substance in dignity and power. 79 It was the teaching of Celsus
that by composing the notion of God with that of other beings
or by separating it from all others, or by analogy, knowledge of
God could be had. Origen, basing himself on the words of the
Scriptures that no one knows the Father but the Son and
those to whom the Son has revealed Him, maintained that the
knowledge of God is a grace, surpassing human nature, where•• Ibid., VI, 8.
•• Ibid., III, 14.
•• Ibid., I, 18; VI, 18-14; 10.
•• Ibid., 89.
•• Ibid., I, 11; 18.
•s De Prine., II, 11. Contra Celsum, III, 40; V, 48.
••" In Joan.," II,
P. G., XIV, col.
C. Celsum, VII, 88; VI, 64.

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fore the philosophers fell into so many errors concerning God.
But this knowledge has been given to some through the goodness of God and His love for the human race. 80
God is not so transcendent that nothing can be known about
Him. Origen insisted upon the nature of God insofar as reason can know it. He is simple and incorporeal, absolutely
immaterial, incorruptible, not part of the world or the world
itself. 81 He is goodness and life itself, essentially active. 82 He
is provident and condescends to help man, though remaining
immutable in His being. 83 God is absolutely impassible. Such
terms in the Bible as divine anger, repentance, et cetera are
mere figures that must be so understood. 84 The power of God
is, as it were, limited, not that He could not have produced
other than the present reality, but He is powerless to perform
contradictions or what is incompatible with His Nature. 85 Perfection consists in an ever closer likeness to God, a more and
more perfect sharing in God and in Christ. 86
The Trinity was the object of a great deal of theological discussion and official definition in the Eastern Church. Origen
clearly ta1,1ght the distinction of the Three Persons in God. He
opposed monarchianism. 87 He clearly taught the coeternity of
the Father and the Son, the latter engendered from all eternity
and not created. 88 He is the Son by participation in the Divine
Essence, not by grace and adoption. 89 Although the Son is
known properly only from the Scriptures, the Holy Spirit could
•• Ibid., VI, 44; 17; VII, 42-46. De Prine., II, 6.
De Prine., I, 1, 5-6; 2, 2. C. Celsum, VI, 65, 71. "In Joan.," XIII, 21,
P. G., XIV, col. 451, 454.
•• "In Joan.," XIII, 25, P. G., XIV, col. 412-413. "In Matt.," XV, 10, P. G.,
XIII, col. 1278-1283.
•• C. Celsum, IV, 5;' V, 12; VI, 71.
8 ' De Prine., II, 4, 4.
" In Jerem.," hom. XVIII, 6, P. G., XIII, col. 474-478.
86 De Prine., II, 9, 1.
C. Celsum, V, 28.
•• De Prine., I, 8; II, 6; III, 6; IV, 1.
87 " In Joan.," X, 21, P. G., XIV, col. 876.
Ibid., I, 23, P. G., ibid., col. 65.
88 Ibid., II, 1, P. G., XIV, col. 108-109.
"In Gen. fragm.," "in Euseb. Contra
Marcel.," I, IV, 22. De Prine., IV, 4, 1.
89 Sef,ecta in Psalm., hom. XIII, 184.
"In Matt.," XXVIII, 18, P. G., XVII, col.
809. De Prine., IV, I.
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not even have been suspected without them. 90 He is coetemal
and consubstantial with the Father and the Son. Origen was
doubtful not as to His creation but as to His :filiation.91 He
was not sure of the mode of bei:r;tg of the Holy Spirit, since St.
John wrote in his prologue omnia per ipsum (Word) facta sunt.
Although his· Trinitarian doctrine is filled with contradictions
and imprecisions, the constant tradition of the Church caused
him to acknowledge the Personality of the Holy Spirit. In this
he was more explicit than his predecessors. By reason of his
doctrine of transcendence, he seemed to subordinate the Word
to the Father, yet he insisted on the divine attributes of Christ.
Origen's purpose was to glorify the Son, to manifest His
equality with the Father. Although the incompleteness of his
thought and the lack of exactness in his terminology offered a
mine of material for latter condemnations, much of what he
wrote can be explained in an acceptable sense.92
The most famous and the most critically judged of Origen's
writings are those which contain his notions on Scripture. They
are the principal sources which characterize his method. An
outline of his Scriptural teaching and classifications will reveal
the great advantages (and at the same time the dangers) of
the method, which later Fathers tried to employ. 93 The inspiration of the Scriptures is a certainty, synonymous with their
divinity, both of which are 'proven by the divinity of Christianity.94 Unlike human works they are the product of a
special motion of God. 95 Origen did not explain the mode of
this inspiration, although it con.sists primarily in an illumination of the intelligence. 96
Inspired by Plato's trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit, he
found in the Scriptures a corporal, a psychic, and a spiritual
•• Ibid., I, 8.
"'Ibid., I, preface, 4. "In Joan.," IT, 6, P. G., XIV, col. 125.
92 Tixeront, La Theologie antiniceene, 9th ed., p. 809. Denis, J., op. cit., p. 1!!1•• Summary of Prat, F., "Origene," Diet. de la Bible, IV, col. 1870-1889.
•• De Prine., IV, 1, 6, s.
""Ibid., 1, 6. C. Celsum, lll, 81; VI, 7.
""Ibid., I, 48.

3

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sense.97 Unfortunately, he all too loosely defined each of these
senses. The corporal sense is variously referred to as the body,
the flesh, and the letter of the Scriptures, the grammatical, historical or sensible sense. Some parts of the Scriptures have no
corporal sense. By this he means the proper literal sense
whereby the words are understood in their proper signification.
He had in mind the many anthropomorphisms in the Bible
which should be taken as metaphors; various passages which
would express something unworthy of God if taken literally;
precepts impossible or unreasonable according to their obvious
sense.
The intermediary is the psychic or moral sense, such as is
found in St. Paul. 98 It embraces .whatever is capable of edifying the reader or listener. 99 This explains its frequent use in
homilies for popular edification. In practice, Origen neglects
this sense and reduces the Scriptures to their letter and spirit.
The psychic sense is more frequently absorbed by the
spiritual or pneumatic sense, otherwise called the sensus mysticus, allegoricus, spiritalis intelligentia. According to Origen's
explanation the spiritual sense includes the metaphorical or
:figurative, the typical, the consequent and even the accommodated senses.100 The spiritual sense was by far the most
important in the mind of Origen. 101 He frequently confused the
mode of signification with the objects signified by this sense.
Among these he enumerated all the theological doctrinal senses
directly or indirectly contained in the Scriptures and the accommodations, metaphors, and symbolism to which the historical
passages are susceptible.
•• De Prine., IV, 11-U. "Hom. V in Levit.," V, 1, 5, P. G., XII, col. 447, 455.
"Hom. XI in Num.,"
P. G., ibid., col. 641-645. "Hom. II in Levit.," P. G.,
ibid., col.
•• I Corinthians, IX, 9. De Prine., IV, 12.
•• "Hom. XVII in Gen.," 9, P. G., XII, col.
100 Origen refers to St. Paul:
Rom. XI, 4 (accommodated sense); I Cor. X, 4
(spiritual sense); X, 11 (typical sense); Col. II,
(shadow); Heb. VIII, 5 (O.T.N. T.); I Cor. IX, 9 (consequent).
Figurative and extended. sense: Q. Celsum,
IV, 87,
87; VI,
Spiritual sense: ·c. Celsum, IV, 44; VII, 60.
101

De Prine., II,

4; III, 5.

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The norms by which Origen sought to interpret the word of
God were solid bases for a sound exegesis. The fact remains
that they were not always followed or wisely applied. The
first rule is to explain the Scriptures in a manner worthy of
their Divine Author. 102 Being His work, they must reflect the
divine truth, unity, plenitude, and holiness. The interpreter
cannot allow anything false, contradictory or opposed to the
perfections of God/ 03 From the perfection of divine plenitude
Origen deduced the necessity of the spiritual sense, without
which the Scriptures would be unworthy of God and not
superior to human conceptions. 104
As a corollary, the literal sense must be abandoned when it
expresses something impossible or unworthy of God. Just when
this occurs Origen does not clearly determine. His examples of
passages justifying recourse to metaphors, allegory, etceterasuch as anthropomorphisms, prescriptions like plucking out
one's right eye-are supported by satisfactory reasons. 105 It is
easy to understand how this principle came to be abused.
The third great rule and the constant theme in Origen's
works is the insistence on the teaching of the Church as the
principal guide. It was the great safeguard of his own orthodoxy despite his bold intellectual wanderings. It also explains
the modesty and reserve with which he proposes his own
interpretations .106
This method maintains the transcendence of God and safeguards the divine perfections. Origen's use of symbolism rendered these concrete and vital while at the same time in no
102 "

In Num.," hom. XXVI, 8, P. G., XII, col. 774. "In Jerem.," hom. XII,

P. G., XIII, col. 878.
"Philocalia VI, secundo tomo in Evan. ,Matt.," P. G., XIII, col. 881.
In Num.," hom. XXVII, 1, P. G., XII, col. 782: "Non possumus hoc dicere
de Sancti Spiritus litteris, quod aliquid in eis otiosum sit aut superfluum, etiamsi
aliquibus
obscura." "In Psalmos," I, 4, P. G., XII, col. 1082. "In
Jerem.," hom. XXXIX, P. G., XIII, col. 548.
105 De Prine., IV, 12-17.
106 Ibid., IV, 9.
"In Matt.," serm. XLVI .• ·P. G., XIII, col. 1667: "Sed nos
illis credere non debemus, nee exire a prima et ecclesiastica traditione, nee aliter
credere nisi quemadmodum per successionem Ecclesiae Dei tradiderunt nobis."
108

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way diminishing them. In this way " he was not only a scholar
defending his exegetical ,methods; he was above all a deeply
religious man defending what he held to be most sacred." 107
In retrospect we can point out the principles which the great
Alexandrian Doctor contributed to the theological tradition.
He drew clear lines for the division of the objects of faith and
theology, both of which he firmly rooted in the Scriptures and
the teaching of the Church. Without depreciating its value
Origen emphasized the inadequacy of reason and philosophy
ante fidem. Yet with a sound philosophy the theologian can
proceed to investigate and solve those questions not explicitly
answered by the faith. He continues the teaching of Clement
on the divine transcendence. He places positive perfections in
God, present by essence. Christians are divided into two
exclusive classes according to the degree of their sharing in the
divine perfections. In the Trinity the divinity of the Persons
is taught, their coeternity and the eternal generation of the
Son. The coequality of the Persons was not so explicitly taught
until the fourth century. In his Trinitarian and Christological
teaching it is the divine element .which is brought out. Origen's
exegetical principles contained the seeds of true greatness. It
was left for later Masters to refine and develop them. Like
Clement, Origen's work was one of invention, defense and development. His enormous influence in both East and West was
largely a good influence. " The Eastern Church has never produced a bolder theological explorer, or rather pioneer, nor a
more stimulating sower of ideas." 108

The Cappadocian Fathers
The greatest of the disciples of Origen were the Cappadocian
Fathers, St. Basil the Great (c. 830-879), St. Gregory Nazianzen (c. 880-895), and St. Gregory Nyssa (c. 885-895) .109
LeBreton, " Le Desaccord ... ," (v. fn. 17, supra), p. 506.
Tixeront, History of Dogma/!, I, p. 284.
109 St. Basil the Great was born in 880 A. D. at Cesarea in Cappadocia.
His
paternal grandmother, Macrina, had been under the guidance of St. Gregory
Thaumaturgus and his maternal grandfather was a martyr. He studied at Cesarea,
107

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Bound by the ties of blood and friendship, they were brought
still closer together by the general unity of their doctrine. They
carried on the traditions of Alexandria and developed in harmony with orthodoxy the teaching of Origen, endeavoring to
avoid its excesses. At the same time they were very definitely
affected by the influence of the School of Antioch. Since their
doctrinal works are least famous for their mutual differences, it
will be of more advantage to treat their theology in genera]
from the viewpoint of the greater unity which it certainly
possessed.
While acknowledging the primacy of the Christian deposit of
faith, the Cappadocians sought to demonstrate this doctrine as
a self-sufficient whole, having its reasonable foundations, not
contradicting but surpassing reason. In order to present Christian teaching as a scientific system of theology, they enlisted
the services of the best philosophical thought, aware of the
role of reason in the explanation and exposition of the truths
Constantinople, and Athens. During these years he became the friend of Gregory
Nazianzen. They became monks. Together they published selected writings of
Origen, called the Philocalia. Basil became bishop of Cesarea in 870. Until his
death he fought political, ecclesiastical, and doctrinal difficulties. He died in 879.
Of his works the two important theological books are the Against Eunomius, de-fending the consubstantiality of t)le Son and the divinity of the Holy Spirit, and
On The Holy Spirit, proving the divinity of the Third Person.
St. Gregory of Nyssa, Basil's younger brother, was born at Cesarea about
885 A. D. He was taught by his brother who later made him bishop of Nyssa.
He was unsuited to administration and suffered under political troubles. He died
in 894. Gregory was a great thinker, a philosopher. He liked clearness and logic,
the spirit of systematization. Following his model, Origen, he proposed to reduce
to a coherent system the whole of Christian doctrine. He followed Origen's teachings closely. His more important works are Against Eunomius, Against ApoUinaris,
and The Oatechetical Discourse, his work of systematic theology, a fairly complete
exposition of Catholic doctrine.
St. Gregory of Nazianzen was born at Arianzus in Cappadocia about
A. D.
He studied at Ceasarea in Cappadocia, the town of the same name in Palestine, at
Alexandria, and at Athens. He was baptized in 860, followed the monastic life of
Basil but left to aid his father, the bishop of Nazianzus. Basil made him bishop
of Sasima which he never visited, and later he was patriarch of Constantinople for
a short time. He died about 890. Gregory shone as an orator. His greatest works
are his theological sermons, especially the five great Theological Discourses, which
treat of the difficult mysteries of faith.

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of faith. Philosophy always remained an instrument. It was
even under suspicion since it was so often appealed to by the
heretics. The Fathers employed it as often as required to refute the heretics with their own weapon. Philosophy for them
meant the efforts of reason to understand more fully and expose
the truths of faith. In using philosophical terms such as oVa-ta,
cf>wt<;, mro(J"T(W't<;,they were not sanctioning any system but merely
employing them in their current popular meaning. Strict philosophy is found somewhat excessively only in Gregory of
Nyssa, who was more genuinely a philosopher, and to a far less
degree in St. Basil.
The great doctrinal source for the Cappadocian theology was
Holy Scripture. In their exegesis, which was under the form
of a religious commentary, the influence of both Alexandria and
Antioch are apparent. The representative of the former is especially Gregory of Nyssa, 110 while that of the latter is St. BasiP 11
Gregory of N azianzen made a moderate use of the allegorical
method. Their conflicts with the Arians who were trained in
the methods of Antioch forced these writers to a more scientific treatment of the Scriptures, while still remaining attached
to the allegorical interpretation. At the same time, realizing
the development taking place in theology and in order to
refute the objections of the Eunomians, they insisted upon the
importance of the allied principle of tradition.
The Cappadocian Fathers taught the incomprehensibility of
the Divine Being. Faith through Revelation and reason by
the contemplation of creatures can know the existence of God,
but of His essence we are ignorant. 112 Even the Scriptures do
110 Gregory of Nyssa set out to follow the literal method, boasting that he had
never violated the texts by figures and allegories. (P. G., XLIV, col. 121, 68.)
Yet in the Life of Moses he allegorizes to excess. (P. G., ibid., col. 297-430.) He
exposes the mystical sense of the Canticle of Canticles which he prefaces by praise
of Origen and a defense of the spiritual and anagogic senses. (P. G., ibid., col.
772.)
111 Although he cooperated with the Nazianzen Doctor in the Philocalia, in Hom..
Ill in Hexam.eron (also IX, 1) he rejects the abuse of allegorical interpretations of
Scriptlire.
112 Gregory Nyssa,." C. Eunom."
P. G., XLV, col. 933. Basil, CXXVIT, P. G.,
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not comprehend His nature. 113 However, through His energies
or operations many things about God are discerned. 114 Nor
does the incompleteness of our knowledge deprive it of truth. 115
Quite commonly, they describe analogies and affinities between
the visible and invisible worlds, a Platonic and Origenist tendency. The soul especially reflects its divine Creator and
Archetype. 116 Even the Trinity finds its illustrations in human
psychology.
The chief importance of the Cappadocians was their contribution to the Trinitarian question. It was their mission to
definitively affirm the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit.
They fixed the terminology expressing this fact as well as the
mutual relations of the Three Persons and their coexistence in
the divine Unity. They consecrated the Origenist distinction
of nature (orola,) and person (tnr6(J'T(t{Tts-)• St. Basil was the
pioneer, the others followed and completed his work. He distinguished between the common and the singular, teaching that
essence corresponds to the former and hypostasis to the latter
concept. 117 St. Basil asserted that because of the unity of nature, our knowledge of one Person leads to the understanding
of the others.
The Fathers of Cappadocia unanimously defended the
divinity of the Holy Spirit against the Pneumatomachi. He
was consubstantial and equal in dignity with the Father and
Son. The knotty question of His origin or procession was variously treated. St. Gregory Nazianzen found it impossible to
distinguish precisely how this procession differs from the generation of the Son. 118 St. Basil taught His procession from the
Father by the Son, which is also the formula of Gregory of
Nyssa. The latter went on to state that this power of the Son
Gregory Nyssa, op. cit. Gregory Naz., Orat. XXVIII, 5, 7, 17.
Basil, Ep. 1334, 1; Adv. Eunom. II, 32.
115 Basil, Ep. 1333, 2.
116 Basil, Hex. IX, 6.
Greg. Nyssa, "De An. et Res.," P. G., XLVI, col. 41;
"De Mortuis," P. G., ibid., col. 509.
117 Cf. Epistle 38.
118 Orat. XXXIX, 12; XXIII, 11, XXXI, 18.
118

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has been received from the Father, who, nevertheless, remains
the first principle. Such has always been .the characteristic
formula of Oriental theology.
Christology in the Cappadocian theology was occasioned by
the heresy of Apollinaris. For this reason the Cappadocians
insisted on the personal unity in Christ, a strong point in the
Alexandrian tradition. In this way they avoided the errors of
many Antiochenes, since they used similar Antiochene language
in affirming the reality and completeness of Christ's nature.
Against Apollinaris, 119 they taught the existence of a rational
soul in Christ; otherwise there would have been no redemption.
Following Origen, they used the term " two natures " existing
in a personal unity without confusion of their respective properties. This union is essential. 120 Origen had outlined the theory
of communication of idioms; the Cappadocians strongly emphasized it. 121 From it they developed the dogma of the
Each taught the redemptive purpose of the Incarnation.
Gregory of Nyssa insisted on its universal efficacy, .that Christ
embraced all humanity. The others spoke about the divine
image in man and his deification mChrist. 123 The Redemption
is consistent with God's attributes, displaying His power,
righteousness, wisdom, and goodness.
The nature and conditions of man were discussed in order
to refute the Manicheans, and consequently the position of free
will. This faculty was the result of man's creation as the image
of God. In misusing it, in rejecting the good, man weakened
but did not destroy it. The blessedness and privileges which he
enjoyed in his state before the Fall are called natural, though it
is not clear how these theologians understood this term. Their
teaching on inherited original sin is very vague. 124 However,
118 Greg. Naz., Orat. II,

!!S; XXXVII, 2. Greg. Nyssa, Antirrk. 11, 14, 24, 82.
Greg. Naz., Ep. 101.
111 Greg. Naz., Orat. XXX, 8. Greg. Nyssa, Ep. ad Tkeophil.
111 Greg. Naz., Ep. 101; Orat. XXIX, 4; cf. Ep. X.
118 Basil, De Bp.
IX, 88. Greg. Naz., Orr. I, 5; XXXIX, 17; XL, 45.
"'Greg. Nyssa, P. G., XLIV, col. 886, 887, 1184, 609. Basil, Hom. VIII. Greg.
Nez., Orat. XIX, 18.
110

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for the removal of all sin and for the attainment of salvation,
grace is absolutely necessary. 125 Likewise, the concurrence of
free will is required. Although admitting the importance of
grace and man's dependence on it, they are not too precise in
delineating the relations of one to another. Nor did they divide
adequately the natural and supernatural moral goods. Gregory
of Nyssa seemed to introduce grace only in the good action
itsel£.126 The Doctor of Nazianzen offered the most complete
treatment. Without God's grace it is impossible to will rightly,
to choose the good; the willing itself and the call to holiness
are from Him and not from our natural aptitude. Yet salvation is both His work and ours, demanding our cooperation. 127
The question of grace as such had not arisen at this time to
require an exactness of theological teaching. It was only
incidentally treated in the refutation of Manicheism.
The Cappadocian Fathers, although holding a position somewhere between the Alexandrian and the Antiochene traditions,
are more properly classed with the former school. Their authority in both Oriental and Latin theology was very great.
They were especially the Masters of St. John Damascene, who
frequently quoted St. Gregory Nazianzen. Their works are
cited throughout the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, who
lauds the authority of the N azianzen:
At the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous;
especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, whose
authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight that no one has
ever raised objection to his teaching .... 128

Through St. Ambrose, a student of the writings of St. Basil,
Cappadocian influence took hold in the West. These theologians were mystics whose notions were highly elevated, a
tendency which put them in contact with contemporary nonChristian thought which was Neo-Platonist in tone. Such
Basil, De Sp. Sancto, 18, 55; Hom. in Psalm. XXIX,
in Psal. XXXII,
Orat. dominica," IV, P. G., XLIV, col. 1165. · De lnstituto Christiano,
P. G., XLIV, col. 804.
107 Drat. XXXVII, 18, 15,
108 Summa Theol., I, q. 61, a. 8.
125

126" De

NICHOLAS

HALLIGAN

tendencies were developed more openly by Pseudo-Dionysius.
The Cappadocian endeavor to present a scientific theology produced, in the work of St. Gregory Nyssa, the finest Summa of
Christian thought between Origen and St. John Damascene.

II.

THE ScHooL oF ANTIOCH

Beginnings
In the forward march of Christian theology, the School of
Alexandria was complemented by the teaching of the great
scholars who followed the tradition of the School of Antioch.
The doctrine of the Church benefited by the best features of
both traditions. The Antiochene school did not possess the
vast intellectual heritage of Alexandria nor was it able to boast
an equal list of great masters. Its rise was occasioned by the
natural reaction to the exaggerations and errors of many Alexandrians. Although this school fell into disrepute after a comparatively short existence because of the heresies taught by its
disciples, its principles and method continued to be valued and
applied, especially in modern times.
Antioch, the great metropolis of Syria, was founded about
300 B. C. by the Seleucids as their capital. It soon became the
third city of the Roman world. Like Alexandria this Greek
city was a microcosm in itself. Its Jewish population became
very numerous and powerful. Their influence was felt by the
pagans. Later the early Christian community was affected by
much that was Jewish, because of this environment or because
many of the Christians were converts from Judaism. However,
it must be remembered that it was at Antioch that the faithful
first received the name of" Christians." The Christian Church
grew rapidly there and was able to send out missionaries and to
help the brethren elsewhere with alms. Very early it had
attained a privileged position by reai::ion of its numbers, the
authority and prestige of its bishops, and the firmness of its
teaching. Up until the middle of the third century, the Autiochene Church was not seriously troubled with heresy. The

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818

bishop had always been the vigilant custodian of orthodoxy.
The error of Docetism which was preached at Antioch in the
early second century was very vigorously opposed by St. Ignatius of Antioch. He insisted on the reality of Christ's flesh,
His sufferings, death, and resurrection.
At the end of the second century there existed at Antioch no
catechetical or theological school such as existed at Alexandria.
The teaching at Antioch was done by the Church. There were
no great Masters as in Egypt, but the Antiochene theologians
were the bishops of the place. However, since the time of St.
Ignatius, Antioch had added nothing to the world of thought
and the expression of doctrine. The first reference to any distinctly theological teaching was at the time of the condemnation of Paul of Samosata in 268 A. D. 129 He succeeded in
arousing the Christian world and launching a movement whose
repercussions were felt for a long time afterwards. It is difficult to state definitely that Paul represented a distinct school
of thought at Antioch. In opposition to the Alexandrian notion
of the Logos, he denied the divinity of Christ. God had merely
revealed Himself more fully to the Prophet Jesus. In God
there are not really Three Persons but One Person. Reason
(Aoyo.-) and Wisdom (uocpla) are distinguished in God not as
subsisting in themselves but merely as modes or attributes of
God. Christ was not God but a man united to Wisdom in an
accidental union whereby God dwells within Him. Other points
in this doctrine include
the value of personal deeds, opposed to the excellence resulting
from nature alone. What comes from nature has nothing meritorious nor superior; it is the effort of the will, the personal merit
that constitutes true greatness. Jesus is not God by nature: He is
more than that; He has become such by His virtue. On the other
hand, by its way of explaining the union of the man and the Word,
the system foreshadowed N estorianism. 180
129 Ignatius,
Ad Magnesios, XI; Ad Trallenses, IX; Ad Smyrnaeos, I-VI; Ad
Ephesios, XVIII. Bardy, "Paul de Samosate," Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense,
1929.
180 Tixeront, History of Dogmas, I, p. 403.

814

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Lucian of Antioch (martyred in 812 A. D.) , who was also
the teacher of Arius, certainly founded the school of Antioch
about 260 A. D. He is said to have studied in the schools of
Edessa and. Cesarea. Probably the influence of Origen at the
latter place attracted him to biblical studies. His exegetical
method differed from Origen's, especially in the importance he
assigned to the literal sense. The allegorical excesses found
among the Alexandrians and his own preference for Aristotelian
philosophy inclined him to this method. Through Lucian, the
Adoptianism of Paul of Samosata was linked with the teaching
of Lucian's pupil, Arius. They taught the existence of a created
Logos. Lucian lacked the sense of ecclesiastical tradition and
the mystical spirit which guided the great Alexandrians. Subordinationist tendencies filtered into Antiochene theology after
Lucian, the defined teaching of the Church notwithstanding.
Diodore of Tarsus (c. 330-c. 391)

Diodore of Tarsus, who succeeded to the See of Antioch in
878 A. D., was renowned for both virtue and learning. He had
a remarkably extensive knowledge which embraced all the sciences of his time. At the same time he had a disinterested zeal
for spreading the Faith by both word and pen. During his
lifetime he was considered one of the lights of orthodoxy. His
disciple, St. John Chrysostom, always held him in admiration.
It was another pupil, Nestorius, who drew from the Master's
teaching all its latent heresy.
In his exegesis Diodore founded those rational principles
which form an inseparable part of the Antiochene School. To
allegorism he opposed the literal sense, or theory, the search for
the spiritual
through the literal. In his writings against
Apollinaris in defense of the integrity of Christ's human nature, he used certain inexact and unfortunate expressions which
brought about his condemnation by synods held at Constantinople (499 A. D.) and Antioch (508 A. D.). Diodore was
inclined to exaggerate the distinction of the two natures in
Christ, nearly affirming two personalities. He held that the

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815

Son of God dwelt in the Son of David as in a temple, the man
born of Mary is not by nature but by grace the Son of God.
Such is also the manner of expression of those who later taught
the moral union of the natures in Christ. It cannot be said
that he consciously held these teachings in their heretical
sense.181
Before proceeding to treat in detail those few great representatives of the Antiochene tradition whose works have come
down to us more or less in their entirety, it will be useful to sum
up the characteristic tendencies which by the end of the fourth
century were clearly in evidence.
The principle of the literal method was a wise brake upon
the dangers of the Alexandrian exegesis. It, however, courted
the very proximate danger of rationalism. In giving too much
value to the letter, the spirit and the divine element of the
Scriptures were neglected. In place of the mystical purpose of
their rivals, the Antiochenes employed a moral teaching which
was salutary in the hands of a Chrysostom but savored of
Pelagianism in a Theodore. The penchant for Aristotelian
philosophy
induced, on the one hand, an extremely precise, positive, and
analytical research method, but, on the other hand, lacked inspiration and inclined to that species of rationalism which so easily
blunts the sense of tradition. 132
The Antiochenes were not particularly concerned with metaphysical speculation on the being of God or proofs of His existence. Diodore had proposed solely a cosmological proof in his
work Against Fate.188 They also taught a Providence extending to particulars. In their doctrine on the Trinity these
Masters depended more upon exegesis than upon metaphysical
arguments. They affirmed the distinction of Persons in the
Trinity, which they called hypostases, a term easily apt to
convey the notion of three different substances. Its misuse by
Paul of "Samosata, and the tendency of the Alexandrians to
181 Pirot, L., L'01!JUvre exegetique de Theodore de Mopsuestia, p. 88-84.
m Cayre, op. cit., p. !t99.
m Photius, P. G., CIII, col. 888.

816

NICHOLAS

HALLIGAN

admit a subordinationism lest the divine unity be sacrificed, led
the Antiochenes to oppose the Nicene bp.oovuw<>.
The historical study of Scripture arid the lofty conception of
human nature led to an emphasis on the humanity of Christ.
The Alexandrians had begun with the truth that He who
assumed human nature was personally God and had elevated
human nature to a vital union with Himself. The Antiochenes
took .as their starting point the truth of the reality and completeness of Christ's human experiences. Opposition to Apollinarism sharpened their Christological doctrine. The true and
complete human nature in Christ, His free will and the lack of
confusion of the two natures or of transformation of the human
into the divine nature were emphasized by the Antiochenes.
Their Aristotelian .conception of oixrla as an individual particular being made it difficult for them to conceive of a complete nature that was not at the same time personal. Those
who fell into heresy in this school did not fail to assert a true
moral and intellectual development in the humanity of Christ
as well as the presence of two distinct personalities.

Theodore of Mopsuestia (350-428)
Theodore of Mopsuestia was a pupil of Diodore and a fellow
student of St. John Chrysostom. As an independent thinker
and a systematic theologian, he was the greatest of the Masters
of Antioch. He erected a fully thought-out system on the nature and destiny of man, the Person and mission of Christ, as
well as on sin, the fall, free will, and grace, which is distinctly
Pelagian in tone. The Scriptures were the primary source of
Christian doctrine. They were inspired, but in different degrees. The highest degree is exemplified in the prophetical
books, which type is a sort of prophetical ecstasy. Entirely
unconscious of external reality, the prophet received in his own
mind certain spiritual impressions of things hidden or future,
which is true Biblical inspiration. Other books, such as
Proverbs, are of inferior inspiration,. called the spirit. of prudence. The inspiration of the Spirit truly influenced the sacred

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817

authors, but the variances in style are due to the individual
differences of the authors. To the Alexandrian exegesis Theodore opposed an excessive literalism. The historical books contain true history from which true spiritual lessons are to .be
deduced, not indiscriminately imposed. He recognized a limited
typical sense in the Holy Writings. 134 The Old Testament
obscurity results from the shadows and imperfect truths it contains, not the truth itself. Thus figurative language is used in
reference to its original object. 135 In his exegesis Theodore
gave no thought to tradition.
Theoretically, Theodore admits the authority of the Fathers and
of the Councils; in practice, in his exegesis, he never takes them
into account. He is rigorously and strictly personal in his work.
He places too much confidence in himself, and that was perhaps the
source of his errors.136
He was led to reduce greatly the number of Messianic psalms
and prophecies.
What is known of Theodore's doctrine concerning the Trinity
is in his firm opposition to the Arians and Pneumatomachi. He
taught the natural procession of the Holy Spirit from the
Father alone. It was especially his Christological teaching
which survived in manuscript and influence. An Antiochene,
Theodore was concerned with maintaining the truth of Christ's
human nature, avoiding a confusion of the two. Practically, he
was unable to separate personality from nature. Verbally he
preserved the unity of Person in Christ. 137 In reality, he taught
a dual personality, postulating a mere moral union. The Word
became flesh in appearance only, since the Word was not
changed into flesh. 138 He admitted a real ignorance in Christ
and a true progress m knowledge. The Godhead imparted
136 Pirot, L., op. cit., p.
Proem. in Jon.
137 P. G., LXVI, col. 985.
In Joel,
138 Ibid., col. 981, "De Incarnatione
Filii Dei," VIII: "When we distinguish the

13 •

185

natures we say that the nature of the God Word is complete, and that His Person
is also complete, since it cannot be said that a hypostasis is impersonal. (Similarly
we say) that the nature of the man is complete and his person complete also. But
when we consider the union we say that there is only one person."

818

NICHOLAS

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wisdom to Christ only gradually. [Theodore denied that God
was born of Mary. 139 She is called BEoTOKo-; because God dwells
in the man she bore. 140 ] He recognized three possible modes of
divine indwelling: by essence, which is the particular reward
of the Saints; by operation, which is had in all creatures; by
divine approval or complacency, which is had in Christ. God
dwelt in Christ as in a Son. 141 Although other men participate
partially in the grace of the Holy Spirit, Christ received the
plenitude. 142 Such a union made it easy for Christ to advance
in virtue. 143 Worship is due to Christ because of the One
assuming his operations. 144
In Theodore's system the Incarnation is viewed more as the
accomplishment of man's destiny than as his freedom from the
consequences of sin. The work of the Redemption was merely
moral in the sense that Christ became our model and showed
us the way. This fits in with the exalted notion of human
nature. Man is the link between the spiritual and t4e material,
the revealer of God in the bosom of creation. He has in himself
the powers necessary to accomplish his destiny, especially free
will, the power of self-determination, exercised in conjunction
with the guidance of the Spirit. Human nature, created liable
to change and mortality, and subject to the passions, is by the
Fall under the penalty of actual death, the opposition of the
passions, and inc;reased propensity to sin. Original sin is not
inherited as Adam's sin, but it is death, the result of one's own
transgressions. There is a very positive affinity between Theodore and Pelagius through Julian of Eclanum.
It is not necessary to discuss the teaching of the heretic
Nestorius. ·He represents the worst excesses to which the Autiochene school was susceptible. In him, rationalism in doctrine
and exegesis triumphed over the traditional teaching of the
Church.
180 Ibid., col. 997.
"" Ibid., col.
101 Ibid., col. 976.
1"
Ibid., col. 980.

us Ibid., col. 977, 986.
1"

Ibid., col. 991, 996.

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819

St. John Chrysostom (c. 344-4-07)

St. John Chrysostom was one of the most outstanding Greek
Fathers and the greatest Doctor and noblest representative of
the Antiochene School.145 He was not a theologian in the strict
sense of the term, but paramountly a moralist. His use of
theology was not speculative but for the purpose of practical
edification. A preacher, he was a man of action, a moralist. He
preached to those who wished to live good lives and were not
concerned with penetrating the deep mysteries o£ Christian
revelation. He believed that those who lived well would think
well. Theological controversies did not interest him. His lifetime spanned a period of quiet following the Arian disputes and
preceding the N estorian and Eutychian controversies.
The well of Chrysostom's ideas was the Holy Scriptures. He
had studied them under Diodore and Meletius of Antioch. His
sermons were constructed of two parts, doctrinal and moral.
The first opened with a text from Scripture upon which a literal
explanation was given in accordance with the Antiochene
exegesis and according to which the teachings of the Faith were
explained. The second part consisted of moral applications.
The method of literal exegesis to which St. John was attached
did not exclude all allegorism, but he insisted that its moderate
use be strictly founded upon the letter. His sense of tradition
as the rule of faith preserved him from the pitfalls into which
others fell.
St. John had a very lofty conception of God and His attributes. However, he did not analyze the latter in themselves
but viewed them in reference to man's journey to God. He was
a man of his school in the field of Christology, emphasizing the
105 St. John Chrysostom was hom at Antioch about 844 A. D.
He studied
rhetoric with Libanius and philosophy with Andragatius. In 870 he 'was baptized
and ordained lector. In 874 he retired into solitude for six years. He returned to
Antioch in 880 and was ordained priest in 886. In 897 he was called to the See
of Constantinople. Uncompromising with evil, he was forced into exile where he
died in 407. St. John was a brilliant and zealous preacher. His sermons and short
treatises are an inexhaustible source of his moral teaching.

4

NICHOLAS

HALLIGAN

duality of natures rather than the unity of Person in Christ.
The mode of this union Chrysostom did not attempt to state,
being content to use vague terms, common and indetermined
expressions. How Christ is one, only He knows. 146 Although
there are two distinct and unconfused natures in Him, there is
only one Christ. 147 It is this fact which Chrysostom insists
upon in accordance with the Faith. His realization of the
greatness of this mystery, as also of the Trinity, and his
humility, sense of tradition, and moral purpose drew him from
profound speculations on these truths and preserved him in
orthodoxy. Christ, consubstantial with the Father/ 48 took to
Himself our sinful flesh, though without sin.149 His was a true
human nature, not an appearance or fiction, in proof of which
He died and thereby also manifested its frailty. 15 ° Chrysostom
did not fail to exalt Christ's divine attributes, despite insistence
upon His human properties. The ignorance which Christ expressed concerning the Day of Judgment St. John interprets as
a prudent answer to a rash question. 151
The statements of St. Chrysostom about the Blessed Virgin
Mary are difficult to explain. His failure to call her ()w-roKo> is
understandable in view of the Antiochene dislike of the term.
However, he seemed to emphasize her human sentiments rather
than manifest her unique position in the divine economy. He
even went so far as to place in Mary certain unbecoming sentiments toward Christ. 152 It may be that his historical and literal
method led him to see Mary more as the mother of the man
than as the Mother of God.
"""Hom. XI in Jo.,"
P. G., LIX, col. 80.
3, P. G., LXII, col. !lSI sq. "Hom. VII
" 7 "Hom. VII in Ep. ad Philip.,"
cont. Anom.," 6, P. G., XLVIII, col. 765.
us" Hom. I in
P. G., LVII, col. I7.
"""Hom. XIII in Ep. ad Rom.," 5, P. G., LX, col. 5I5.
150 " In lllud:
Pater si est possibile," 4, P. G., LI, col. 87 sq. "Hom. in Ascen.,"
8, P. G., L, col. 446. "In Joan.," Hom. XI,
P. G., LIX, col. 80. Ibid., LXID,
I,
ibid., 349; ibid., LXVII, I,
ibid., 871; ibid., LXXXVII, I, ibid., 474.
151 " Hom. LXXVII in Matt.," P. G., LVIII, col.
152 " Hom. IV in Matt.," 5, P. G., LVII, col. 45. "Hom. XXI in
P. G.,
LIX, col. 180-131. "Hom. XLIV in Matt.," P. G., LVII, col. 468. Summa Theol.,
III, q.
a. 4, ad 3: "In verbis illis Chrysostomus excessit.... "

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321

In his teaching on the Redemption, St. John added nothing
to the traditional doctrine of the Church. The prime motive
for Christ's becoming Incarnate was the Redemption. 153 Christ
had voluntarily substituted Himself, in perfect accord with the
will of His Father, to accomplish our salvation, the work of
love. 154 The work of salvation was the deliverance from sin/ 55
yet its positive effect was to make men sons of God. 156 The
sacrifice which Christ made on the Cross has merited a superabundant e:fficacy.151
It is in regard to original sin and grace that the Antiochene
theological tradition strongly appears. It is here that the
source of Chrysostom's appeal to and authority over the Pelagians is found. St. Augustine often opposed the Pelagians who
cited St. Chrysostom, holding that they misinterpreted him. It
is true that the Doctor of Antioch was not analyzing the question of grace theologically with the rigid and exact precision of
that science. He had the practical purpose of exciting strong
personal moral action and effort in his listeners. His education
and environment influenced his expression. He insisted upon
the sovereign power of human liberty. Man had been created
but he abused his liberty and fell from his primitive state. With mortality came concupiscence, though in
itself it is not a fault or a sin. He insisted that human liberty
remains intact. Each one is responsible for his acts, chooses
his own rule of conduct. 159 God has manifested His mercy to
all in the same way. One person rejects and another accepts
"Hom. V in Ep. ad Hebr.," 1, P. G., LXIII, col. 478.
'"'"Hom. XI in Ep. II ad Cor.," 3, 4, P. G., LXI, col. 478. "Hom. LX in
Joan.," !t, 3, P. G., LIX, col. 330. "Hom. XXVI in Joan.," 1, 2, P. G., LIX, col.
158. "Hom. XV in Ep. ad Rom.," !t, P. G., LX, col. 543. "Hom. XX in Ep. ad
Ephes.," 2, P. G., LXII, col. 137.
155 "Hom. II in Ep. ad Gal.," 8, P. G., LXI, col. 646.
156 "Hom. XI in Joan.," 1, P. G., LIX, eo!. 79.
157 "Hom. X in Ep. ad Rom.," 2, P. G., LX, col. 477.
"Hom. XVII in Ep. ad
Hebr.," 2, P. G., LXIII, col. 129.
158 " Hom. XI ad popul. Antioch.," 2, P. G., LXIX, col.
159 "Hom. XIX in Ep. ad Rom.," 1, P. G., LX, col. 507. "Hom. XIX in Gen.,"
1, P. G., LIII, col. 158. "Hom. XX in Gen.," 8, P. G., LIII, col. 169.
153

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HALLIGAN

His grace, according to the individual's own will.160 Grace is
universally necessary for all actions in order that they be done
well or meritoriously. 161 Good is from us and from God. 162
Divine grace cooperates with us, performing the chief part in
our works but not alP 63 Following St. Paul on the point that
God works in us both to will and to do/ 64 on the other hand he
holds that we begin of ourselves to wish the good, to tend
toward it and to desire it, while God strengthens this intent
and desire and bestows the power to realize the good effectively.165 St. Chrysostom distinguished in God the voluntas
prima, by which He wills sinners not to perish, and voluntas
secunda, by which He wills their punishment-an anticipation
of the antecedent and consequent wills of St. John Damascene
and St. Thomas Aquinas. 166
St. John Chrysostom was the great moralist, the Doctor of
the spiritual life. As a theologian he is a witness to the Antiochene tradition, preserving its advantages and rescuing it from
complete disrepute by his lively sense of ecclesiastical tradition.
NICHOLAS HALLIGAN,

0. p.

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

(To be continued.)

160 " Hom. XVI in Ep. ad Rom.," 9, P. G., LX, col. 561. "Hom. XVIII in Ep.
ad Rom.," 5, P. G., LX, col. 579.
161 " Hom. XIV in Ep. ad Rom.," 7, P. G., LX, col. 582. "Hom. XXV in Gen.,"
7, P. G., Lill, col. 228. "Hom. I in Ep. ad Ephes.," 2, P. G., LXII, col. 18.
162 "Hom. X in Joan.," 1, P. G., LIX, col. 78.
188 "Hom. XIX in Ep. ad Rom.," I.
"Hom. XII in Ep. ad Hebr.," 8.
1 "' "Hom. Vill in Ep, ad Philip.," 1, 2.
16.• "Hom. XXV in Gen., 7. "Hom. XII in Ep. ad Hebr.," 8.
"Hom. VIII in
Ep. ad Philip.," 1, 2.
166 " De Fide Orth.," II, c. 29 c. fin., Summa Theol., I, q. 19, a. 6, ad I.

FUNCTIONS, FACTORS, AND FACULTIES

F

OR a modern psychologist, to speak of functions is a
matter of course, to discuss factors a necessity, to use
the term faculty forbidden. The typical attitude toward these notions is perfectly defined. The notions themselves are less well defined. One may tum over the pages of
many volumes and never come across a definition of " function." The interpretation of "factors " is a controversial question. The forbidden term " faculty " seems to correspond in
the minds of those who mention it-only to reject it-to a
definite meaning; this meaning, however, is false.
these circumstances it may not be useless to inquire
into the precise signification of these three terms. Such an
investigation seems the more indicated as the recently developed " factorial analysis '' has been viewed very differently
by those, on the one hand, who detest even the name of faculty,
and those, on the other hand, who believe this notion to be
perfectly legitimate and even indispensable. The first object
to the " factors," or at least to a certain interpretation of
because they apparently threaten to bring back the ideas of a
faculty-psychology; the latter welcome the new concept for the
same reason.
I shall endeavor to show that the fear of the first group is
as unfounded as the hope of the other. Particularly I want to
show;
(I) That the ostensible similarity between the two concepts
of faculty and factor is more apparent than real, and that
insofar as there is any relation it is not of the kind feared by
the one and praised by the other group;
·(2) That the theory of faculty which its enemies have in
mind is neither the one taught by the Scholastics of old nor
the one tnaintained by their followers of today, that this" most

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RUDOLF ALLERS

pernicious " idea exists mainly in the minds of its enemies, and
that in truth the faculty-psychology is something very different
from what its critics imagine it to be;
(3) That the modern and "scientific" psychologist has no
reason to fear the revival of faculty-psychology, simply because
this theory has never been abandoned and in fact underlies the
very concepts of any psychology, however scientific or modern
it may be.
In pursuit of this plan, I shall not attempt to render an
exhaustive account of the theory of faculties. Even less shall I
try to survey the already enormous literature on factorial
analysis and its achievements. On the first point, most textbooks on Thomistic philosophy or psychology give a satisfactory report. The second point can equally well be studied
without difficulty in current literature. I shall deal only with
those aspects of both these notions which are in need of clarification. The references, therefore, are merely illustrations.
They are not intended as a survey of all the various interpretations of the " factors of the mind " and even less as a discussion of the merits and peculiarities of the various methods used
in factorial analysis.
Usually the modern psychologist has nothing but contempt
for the notion of faculty. There is, however, one notable exception. R. S. Woodworth wrote this sentence: "If we substitute
for ' faculty ' a more modern-sounding word such as ' function'
there is nothing repugnant or absurd about this theory." 1
Everybody speaks of functions. But nobody seems to know
exactly what a function is. Since the word is " more modernsounding," it must have a particular significance which makes
it fit into the conceptual pattern of modern psychology.
If one searches for a definition, the results are meager.
Baldwin's Dictionary has this to say: "Function, in biology
and psychology: any normal activity, process, or performance
accomplished by an organism or an organ." Eisler identifies
1

R. S. Woodworth, Experimental Psychology, fld ed., New York; H. Holt, 19,89,

p. 178.

FUNCTIONS,

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325

function with " achievement, mode of action, ·or performance
of an organ; in psychology as a mental experience (seelisches
Erlebnis) as an action or reaction on the part of an ego." 2 He
tells us also that the term occurs first in Tommaso Campanella
and Ludovico Vives, and that the term functiones corporis was
used only as late as Descartes. Thus it would seem that the
notion is originally a psychological one and was transferred to
physiology, whereas one commonly thinks that psychology took
over the term from physiology. Gould's Medical Dictionary
defines function as " the normal or special action of a part of
the organism." 3
Although no definition is given in the textbooks on physiology and psychology, one can gather that the general use of
the term is rather in relation to " parts," that is, organs or
performances, than to the whole. It is true that one may say,
and does say in common parlance, of someone that his mind
functions all right, or normally, or that an organism functions
perfectly. But it seems that the term is used mainly and
properly in regard to some part the achievements of which are
to the advantage of a whole; thus the organ functions for the
whole organism. In the same sense we also say of a machine
that it functions satisfactorily, if it performs the services for
which it is designed and which are expected of it. Similarly, a
person may be said to function within the whole of an " organization"; an employee of the state has his " function," delegated
to him by the people or the ruler.
The main idea of function, therefore, apparently is that it
comprises a set of performances in the service of a greater
whole. A part of a body is considered an organ when and
insofar as it " functions " in such a sense. A mass of fat which
has been accumulated somewhere in the body is not usually
called an organ because it has no definite function; even though
it can be considered eventually as a stored reserve, to be con"R. Eisler, Woerterbuch der philosophischen Begrijje, 4th ed.,
p. 450.
3

Gould's Medical Dictionary, 5th ed., Philadelphia, 1941.

Vol. I,

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RUDOLF ALLERS

sumed in case of starvation, and even though it may be
anatomically characterized, it is not an organ in the proper
sense of the term because it has no definite function, that is,
has no proper performances of its own, and by its own activity,
which are helpful for the whole organism. To perform fo:r the
whole has been taken by 0. Schwarz as the very criterion of an
organ. 4
Physiology, however, speaks of functions also in cases in
which the performance is not bound to one definite organ. The
metabolic activities are described as functions. Parts of them
can be localized in certain organs; the hormones which regulate metabolism are produced in individual endocrine glands;
the transformation of the carbohydrates of food into glycogene
is mostly done in the liver, etc. But the general metabolic
processes, the oxygen intake and the output of carbonic acid,
the production of heat, and so on, result from the life processes
all the cells of the organism. Thus it would seem that there
are " functions " performed by the organism as a whole and
not by any of its parts.
Nonetheless, metabolism is but a partial function of the
organism. If we speak of metabolism, or discuss it in a separate chapter in a textbook on physiology, we disregard for the
time being most of the other functions, be they localized o:r
general. We may speak of the metabolism of an isolated
organ, e. g., of the heart. When we do so, we disregard the
circulatory function of the organ. The chapter on metabolism
disregards, for instance, the sensory functions, or the locomo• 0. Schwarz, "Da.s Problem des Organismus," · in PsychogeneseJ und Psychothempie komperliche:r Symptome, ed. 0. Schwarz, Vienna-Berlin, J. Springer, 19:'.!5,
p. 18: "Die Relation hat Richtung, die Struktur Sinn, das Organ eine Leistung,
und die memschliche Handlung einen Zweck." In a later work, the idea has become more definite: "Machines have achievements (Leistung), organs have functions in the service of the total organism because they are members (eingegliede:rt)
of the whole." Organs, therefore, function, but the total organism acts or behaves.
"An action is constituted by the active turning towards the environment, entailing an integration of several individual functions by central regulation." " Central,"
in this context, does not necessarily mean " achieved by the central nervo1.1!s
system." 0. Schwarz, Medizinische Anthropologie, Leipzig, 1929, Hirzel, pp. 48, 67.

FUNCTIONS,

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827

tive activities; it considers them only insofar as any such function is directly involved, e. g., because of its needing so and so
many calories.
The notion of function, therefore, retains its signification.
It refers to a "part"; but this part must not be understood
only in a strictly anatomical sense. In fact, the idea of
" organ ., has to be somehow corrected or enlarged. One may
speak of the blood, or of all the white blood corpuscles as one
" organ," although there is no anatomically circumscribed place
where this " organ " is located. Or the many lymphatic glands
may be spoken of as one organ; it is more customary to refer to
them as an " organ-system," but this only a terminological
nicety; in fact they form one organ.
The anatomical definition of an " organ " as a well ·defined,
separable part of the body, characterized by a definite microstructure, is therefore insufficient, at least in regard to its signification in physiology. There are not only anatomical but
also " functional " parts, or, if this name should appear redundant in a discussion of " function," one may speak of " performative " parts. But, as the name of " partial functions " is
quite common, so one may speak of " functional parts."
One using such terms as " functional parts " seems to come
into serious conflict with an idea which plays an increasingly
important role in today's discussions on problems of physiology-or pathology-and of psychology as well. I refer, of
course, to the " holistic " trend in these fields. The organism
"fup.ctions as a whole"; the mind" functions as a whole." To
speak of partial functions and to treat them as if they were
independent entities is tantamount to misunderstanding the
real problem and doing violence to the facts.
Connected with this criticism is another, of different origin,
submitted by the ". holistic " school and by others. Anyone
speaking of partial functions in psychology is accused by these
critics of " reification," of " substantializing fictitious entities,"
of taking a name, coined for the sake of convenience or, even
worse, taken over from popular psychology, for a reality, and

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thus of falsification of the "given." But no holist, however
extreme, has as yet accused physiologists of " reification " when
the latter speak of the liver as a reality, or of its performances,
e. g., the production of bile, as real functions. Of course not;
because we can see the liver, we can measure the amount of
bile. But perception cannot be " seen " and neither can an act
of will; when one speaks of measuring them, he uses this term,
perhaps, in a non-genuine sense. At least, whatever is measured is not the " thing " itself but some other phenomenon,
such as stimuli, or some change in visible reality, some aspect
of behavior which is then traced back to a mental function for
the existence of which there is no proof.
The primary reason for this attitude is presumably the
incapacity or the unwillingness to recognize any reality outside the extended, spatial, and material world. This incapacity
or unwillingness obviously contributed in a large degree to the
success of the theory of cerebral localization. The immaterial
entities, whether called faculties or performances of the mind,
were apparently transformed by this idea into functions of subdivisions of the brain, equivalent, at least in the thoughts of
some, to real organs possessing a relative independence. Now
this theory has been to a large extent discredited. The whole
conception of strict localization and of functional units, such as
reflexes, is in fact crumbling. Reflexes are neither as immutable
nor as independent as they had been believed to be. Centers
are not what the discoverers of localization claimed. In truth,
there was never an ahsolute certainty regarding centers as
" seats " of definite nervous or mental functions. The whole
theory of localization would not have developed at all in the
way it did, if certain elementary demands of logic had been
followed. What are the facts? The findings obtained by experiment and clinical analysis can be summarized by saying
that it is certain that the intactness of certain brain regions is
a necessary condition for certain achievements. It is, of course,
absolutely true that stimulation of the· so-called motor region
of the brain produces contraction of muscles and that the vari-

FUNCTIONS,

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ous groups of the latter are " represented " in well defined spots
on the cortex. It is equally true that certain lesions produce
with great regularity-although
perhaps not invariably-certain defects. But this does not prove that the respective parts
of the cortex are the " seats " of any such functions.
Like
every general hypothesis, this one results from a syllogism of
which the empirical findings form the minor. The major, however, is the preconceived idea that every distinguishable performance must be attributed to an equally distinguishable part
of the body. This major proposition is nothing else but what
Rudolf Virchow called " the anatomical idea in medicine."
Biological sciences, including medicine, have moved since Virchow's time from a prevalently anatomical to a prevalently
" functional " viewpoint.
As we shall see later, one of the criticisms raised against the
theory of faculties consists in this: that this theory is based 'on
an illegitimate analogy between bodily functions and the organs
where they " reside " on one hand, and mental performances on
the other. The history of "cerebral localization" seems to
show that the same fallacy, if fallacy it is, may be committed
also in the opposite direction.
The idea of defining functions by the organs to which the
former belong, then, is not satisfactory.
If there are striking
coincidences, there are also cases in which this parallel does not
hold. We are, therefore, more or less thrown back to the stage
of pre-scientific, popular distinctions.
These must, of course,
be corrected in many instances. Thus, it would not do to
separate heat production and metabolism in homoiothermic
animals, although to retain a certain body temperature and to
provide nourishment seem at first sight to be very different
performances on the part of the organism. In the main, however, we have apparently no other means of distinguishing
functions than their phenomenal differences.
One may object that there is no need to make any such
divisions for other reasons than those of convenience and research. Convenience is served because subsuming a number of

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RUDOLF ALLERS

elementary or complex phenomena under one name is a timesaving procedure and proves harmless as long as one avoids
"reification." For research purposes, we have to select certain
facts and isolate them if we want to study them at alL But
we must keep in mind that any such isolation is artificial, that
in truth there is no such thing as "the functions of the liver"
but only the liver functioning within the total context of the
organism. We can indeed study the liver separated from the
organism in the kind of experiment in which a "surviving"
organ is made the subject of research; we may, for instance,
determine what becomes of a chemical compound sent through
the liver, and answer many similar questions. We may presume that the liver will behave in the same way also when
functioning as an organ in the strict sense, that is, within the
context of the organism. But we never can be absolutely sure
of this. Our presumptions must be tested on the intact
orgamsm.
This " holistic " view is, as we know, not at all newo The
ancients and also Aquinas emphasized that a :part of the body
when separated from the rest ceases to be what it was in :relation to the other parts and the whole. An eye separated from
the body is no longer an eye in the proper sense, just as a corpse
is no longer a man, even though we may speak, indulging in
some kind of sentimental illusion, of the corpse as " the deceased." In truth he has not only deceased but has ceased
to be.
But even the most consistent holism cannot fail to recognize,
and not for reasons of methodology alone, that the whole is
capable of manifold and obviously different performances. The
usual formula refers to the different performances as so many
different " aspects " of the one whole, or states that the whole
is capable of various functions according to the inner and outer
conditions to which it responds.
The last-named conception has its indubitable value. It
:recognizes not only that the organism :responds as a whole,
however much one or the other " aspect " may stand in the

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881

foreground; it recognizes also that it responds to the total situation. Admitting this, we have also to admit that we cannot
know beforehand which " aspects " of the situation may be
relevant, nor can we claim that the order or degree of relevance
will be always the same. On the contrary, it becomes eminently
possible that relevance has no fixed and unchangeable value
but varies with the total condition of the organism. Previous
influences may have altered permanently or temporarily the
way in which an organism responds to a situation. To this
corresponds on the level of mental response and human behavior the complex of the many difficult questions centering
around notions like " set," " attitude," " experience," etc.
Under such circumstances, there remains only one method
by which to arrive at a somewhat reliable knowledge of the
interrelations between situation and performance, situation referring here to inner as well as to outer conditions. The one
procedure promising results is statistical analysis.
Statistics has been, since it began to develop from Bernouilli's
tiiJJ.e, the one procedure apt for dealing with facts the determinants of which are too numerous and too little known to
permit the establishment of " laws " like those of physics.
The increasing use of statistics is the result not only of the
great progress this branch of mathematics has made in recent
times, but also in part of the growing need for such procedures.
This need became greater on one hand because of practical
necessities. The development of insurance of all kinds is the
best-known example; but there are innumerable other practical
problems which demand the use of statistical methods. Some
of these methods had to be developed and were developed
solely for the sake of dealing with one or another problem and
later proved capable of much wider application. On the other
hand, it was realized that many phenomena, especially those
related to human existence, are of such complex structure that,
for the time being or for all time, the statistical approach is
the only possible one.
When statistics began to develop, its main concern was with

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RUDOLF ALLERS

frequency, and, therefore, with the probability of such or such
an event J appening. In recent times the method of correlations has permitted the extension of statistics to quantitative
expression of the relations obtaining between events of different
kind. The correlation establishes a relation between frequencies; if two phenomena stand in correlation one to the other,
it can be presumed that there is some link between the two.
If, furthermore, the correlation applies not only to frequency
but also to quantity; that is, if not only the phenomenon A is
associated with a certain regularity with the phenomenon B,
but also the magnitude of A, whatever this figure may mean,
is correlated to the magnitude of B, there is reason to assume a
definite interdependency of the two. But the correlation does
not indicate anything about the nature of this interdependence.
A may be a partial cause of B, or vice versa, or they may both
be effects of a third known or unknown phenomenon C. Least
of all does the computation of correlations enable us to make
any statement as to the nature of this C.
According to the " holistic" interpretation, everything within
an organism is related somehow with everything else within it.
But this relation may be so distant that it does not show in
correlational calculus. Personality being a unit, there must be
some relation between, say, the ability to do mental arithmetic and a preference for the paintings of Perugino over those
of Luca Signorelli. But if we were to test the arithmetical
ability a11.d the
for paintings in a great number of
persons, it ·is doubtful that any correlation would result, let
alone one of significant magnitude. This seems a pretty reliable prediction; the absence of such a correlation is credible
without carrying out the tests. It is credible because a prescientific analysis of the two performances shows them to be
very different in kind.
However, were I to claim that by pre-scientific analysis,
simply by reflecting on the procedure of mentally solving arithmetical problems, I discovered all or at least the most relevant
conditions for such an achievement, I might be very much mis-

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taken. I might, of course, be right insofar as my own mind is
concerned; but I might be quite wrong if I were to generalize.
There are persons who do mental arithmetic mainly by means
of visualization; they figure out the problems, as it were, on an
imagined paper with an imagined pencil. This does not enable
one to say that visual imagination is a necessary condition for
this achievement.
On the other hand, anyone can predict
that a certain capacity for retention is a necessary condition;
no one can solve any problem if he is unable to remember the
problem or the partial steps towards its solution.
Correlational computation, like any other statistical procedure, does not permit any conclusion about an individual. Its
figures refer to averages. Suppose one finds a very high correlation between two types of achievement-to be concrete, between the number of solutions in certain tests and others
concerning the clarity of mental visual images. Then it is
correct to say that the latter property enters as a relevant
condition into the total set of conditions on which depends the
first achievement. But this discovery does not preclude the
possibility that another person, devoid of such imagery, may
also do very well in the first series of tests; there are many
such tests which can be done by reasoning. 5
If there is found in the results of several series of tests a
correlation between some pair of them, although the numerical
value may be rather different, we are invariably led to presume
some underlying determinant 6 common to the types of achievement tested. This has been stated clearly by Cyril Burt/ so
5 See the remark of Cyril Burt: " I myself was once assured by a psychological
investigator that I had a good visuo-spatial imagery because I excelled most other
testees in tasks to test this ability; actually, I solved them all by rapidly converting them into verbal form-a trick which I long ago acquired to compensate for
my weak visualization."
The Factors of the Mind, New York, 1941, Macmillan,
p. 812, note. This observation, incidentally, serves to emphasize the need for
introspective reports, whenever obtainable, even in apparently simple test situations.
6 I use the neutral term " determinant " in order not to prejudice anything concerning interpretation, as would be the case were I to speak of " cause," nor to
employ the term "factor," the meaning of which has still to be elucidated.
7 The Factors of the Mind, p. 4 f.

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RUDOLF ALLERS

that a brief summary of his remarks will serve best as an
introduction to the following discussion.
The psychologist, so Dr. Burt says, is able only to state
partial dependences, the degree of which is measured by a
coefficient of correlation. C. Spearman spoke of " the system
of correlation . . . as expressing the hidden underlying cause of
the variations investigated." 8 This hidden underlying cause,
the same that J. S. Mill called the" common connecting fact of
causation," is now regularly designated by the name "factor."
It is evident, and Dr. Butt does not fail to point out, that in
considering the " factor " as "expressing the underlying cause,"
the level of mere factuality is already left behind; by speaking
of causes we pass over to the level of interpretation.
One must absolutely agree with the eminent English psychologist when he emphatically declares (p. 256) : " Factors
as such must be defined, not by trying to identify them with
concrete causal entities but by specifying the operations by
which they are to be obtained." In other words, a factor has
primarily a signification only within a definite system of statistical operations. This being the case, it is in no way astonishing to find that the procedure of factorial analysis allows for a
wide application. As Burt has shown, it may be used equally
well to establish correlation between various mental operations
or trace them back to some "general factor," and to establish
types of personalities.
In regard to subsequent discussions it may be well to point
out here that factorial analysis yields results which have nothing at all to do with the notion of" faculty." Thus the analysis
of tests of the functions of the vestibular organ and of balance
uncovers nine different factors, among which are two combinations of semicircular canals, kinesthetic sensitivity and response,
tensions reinforcing response, and a visual factor. 9 Or the
8 C. Spearman, "The Proof and Measurement of the Association between Two
Things," American Journal of Psychology, 1904, XV, 74.
• R. I. Bass, " An Analysis of the Components of Tests of Semicircular Canal
Function and of Static and Dynamic Balance," Res. Quart. Am. Ass. Health. Phys.
Educ., 1939, X, 33.

FUNCTIONS,

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study of " verbal abilities " establishes factors like memory for
rote learning, word fluency (implying two sub-factors), verbal
relation (with two or three components), fluency in oral speech,
facility in attaching appropriate names and symbols, speed of
articulatory movements. 10
No commentary is needed to show that these factors cannot have anything in common with the traditional notion of
"faculty." Nor can this be the case with the eight factors
allegedly determining memory abilities. 11 They are: a general
recognition memory factor for words, three different visual factors, a logical factor involved in learning word meaning, and
three more the significance of which did not become clear.
Incidentally, the logical factor itself is of a complex nature.
The procedures by which such a general factor is computed
do no more than demonstrate the "existence" of the factor.
Whether it " exists " otherwise than within the particular " statistical discourse " is another question which will demand our
attention later. In any case, the factor is statistically significant, but has as such no real significance. This was recognized many years ago by Dr. T.V. Moore, when he remarked
that " the tetrade equation only proves the fact of the existence
of this general factor. It tells us nothing of its nature." 12
On the other hand, there are some authors who believe that
the factors should be given a definite concrete significance.
When they speak of " abilities " of the mind, or identify one or
the other factor with, e. g., " general intelligence," they do more
than just give a convenient name to a statistically significant
magnitude. They proceed towards the same " reification," not
indeed of a name but a figure, of which they accuse their predecessors. " The student of factor-analysis in psychology is
tempted to reify the factors named, and to visualize a logical
analysis as a physical separation, tacitly assuming that, if dis10

J. B. Carroll, "A Factor Analysis of Verbal Abilities," Psychometrica, 1941,

VI,
11 H. B. Carlson, "Factor
Analysis of Memory Abilities,'' 1/mmal of Ercpdimental Psychology, 1987, XXI, 477.
10 T. V. Moore, "The General Factor in Intelligence," Proceeding8 of the Catholic Philo8ophical A88ociation,
V,

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RUDOLF ALLERS

tinct abilities are ever to be discovered, they will be concrete
and separable ' organs ' like the heart or the lungs, and that
the ' mental mechanisms ' which form them will be localized in
separate ... cortical areas." 13 That the latter hope is rather
illusory, has been pointed out above.
The inclination characterized by Burt and indeed found in
many psychologists is the result of other motives besides the
desire for concreteness and the hope of discovering tangible
"causes." Apart from the often unnoticed but nonetheless
influential trend towards a materialistic interpretation as alone
" scientific," there are other ideas at work which I do not hesitate to call prejudices, in the sense that they determine as
preconceived and therefore unexamined principles the whole
attitude of the scientist or psychologist. Generally speaking,
these prejudices may be summarized in what may be aptly
called the " idolatry of the scientific method," wherein " scientific " is taken in the extremely narrow sense of " physicalistic."
This particular prejudice rests on the quite unproved assumption that a reliable knowledge of reality can be obtained only
by methods fashioned on the pattern of physics. For this
assumption there is no proof whatsoever. Rather, the various
attempts at building up a "scientific" sociology, history, or
psychology might be used as proof to the contrary. The phrase
that "we have not yet advanced far enough" or not yet developed adequate procedures for making, e. g., sociology" truly
scientific," is meaningless. First it must be demonstrated that
such procedures are adequate to the subject matter. This
demonstration, I hold, is impossible. 14
C. Burt, op. cit., p. 17. See also ibid., p. 21.
Dr. Burt seems, I am glad to notice, to hold similar opinions. Although he
too would like to discover definite " neural events " as the basis of mental phenomena and thus render them more tangible, as it were, he is fully aware of the
difference in kind between physics and psychology. He writes, for instance: "I
myself should argue that, if simplicity is a reason for the acceptance of an explanation in a simple science, simplicity is a reason against its acceptance in a science
whose subject-matter is highly complex." Op. cit., p. 25. I am not quite sure
whether Dr. Burt would agree that complexity is not a merely quantitative difference; but if he did, his position would be rather like the one I believe to be
inevitable if any true progress in sciences of man and mind is to be realized.
18

14

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337

Some psychologists claim that distinguishable properties
must also be separable. To consider " the attribute not as a
part of the concrete individual, but only as an aspect " is regarded as tantamount to " nothing less than a denial of the
validity of scientific method." w In this statement, two feaOne is the naive identification of
tures deserve attention.
" scientific " with the methodological principles of physics; the
other is the manifest incapacity for understanding what Scholastic philosophy calls a " real distinction."
This incapacity
explains to a large extent the misinterpretations of the idea of
faculties.
The fact that the factors cannot be identified with or related
to any definite " primary abilities " or elementary functions,
whether of the mind or of the nervous system, in no way invalidates their practical usefulness. For instance, factorial analysis
may enable us to discover certain aspects of a testing situation
through which the tests may be rendered more effective, more
revealing, and more homogeneous. The critical remarks submitted here are not at all directed against factorial analysis as
a method; they question only a certain type of interpretation.
Philosophy has nothing to say on ascertained facts, but much
on hypothetical interpretations.
Thus factors are, as Dr. Burt justly emphasizes, " in their
essential nature principles of classification . . . rendered more
discriminative and exact by being cast in quantitative form ";
they are " logical principles rather than psychological principles." 15
14 " R. B. Cattell, "Measurement
versus Intuition in Applied Psychology," Character and Personality, 1937, VI, U4. The contemptuous manner in which this
author deals with the notions of " structure " and " configuration " shows incidentally his utter inability to think along any other lines than those of physicalism.
Not that the proponents of structure or Gestalt psychology are not guilty of exaggerations and misstatements, but unprejudiced judgment must admit that in their
work there is much of value for general psychology.
15 C. Burt, op. cit., p. 101, 103.
Perhaps a word ought to be said by way of
justification for the extensive use I make of Dr. Burt's work notwithstanding the
existence of numerous other treatises on the subject of factorial analysis. The reason is simple: Dr. Burt is practically the only one who gives any consideration to

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Because of this nature of the factors they can be used to
classify not only tests and traits but also personalities, or even
data not pertaining to psychology at all. In fact, those students of factorial analysis who refer the factors to ultimate
processes or elements of the nervous system classify by means
of psychological analysis non-psychic data which are of a purely
hypothetical character, it is true, but are nonetheless
real by these authors. Even Burt feels that he has to recur to
such hypothetic entities as " bonds." If one takes account of
the rapid changes going on in neurophysiology, a little more
caution seems advisable. Mental facts are, after all, observable,
eithe:t: directly in introspection or indirectly in their manifestations, e. g., in tests; but " neural events " and individual structures of the brain are not. Nor is it a necessary assumption
that individual differences as observable in mental achievements have \o be traced back to structural, anatomical differences of the brain. On one and the same excellent piano
one may play well or in an execrable manner. If Sir Charles
Sherrington is right in his theory-and there is much to be
said for it-that the brain is the " organ of liaison " between
mind and matter, the individual differences in intelligence and
other "abilities" may have also a non-cerebral origin.16 This
does not, of course, amount to denying that the brain, especially by its eventual defectiveness, does not play a determinant role; the idea submitted is only that the plus-variations
need not depend on any " richness " of the brain.
This part of the discussion may be suitably closed by one
more quotation from Dr. Burt's book: "To resolve a testperformance into ' g ' and ' s ' no more demonstrates the existence of a general and a specific ' ability ' than describing a
breeze as north:.west implies the combination of two currents
from separate quarters of the sky." 17
the underlying methodological, gnoseological, and metaphysical questions; perhaps
he is, among the psychologists, the only one whose philosophical training, it would
seem, enables him to see and efficiently to discuss these problems.
18 Sir Charles Sherrington, Man on His Nature, New York, 1941, Macmillan.
u Burt, op:cit., p, !49.

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However incomplete the survey on the problems of factorial
analysis be, it shows clearly, I think, that the factors which
result from such analysis can in no sense be used for the demonstration of any real " abilities," " capacities," or " faculties."
The idea that the factors might supply an empirical demonstration of the " existence " of faculties or that they imply the
threat of bringing back the " untenable " theory of faculties, of
which the mere spectre makes the " scientific " psychologist
shudder, is " untenable" itself. Because of the last-mentioned
fear, some of the psychologists working with factorial analysis
are at pains to show that the factors have nothing in common
with the faculties. In truth, they have no need to worry about
this danger; it exists only in the minds of those who misinterpret factors on the one hand and faculties on the other. To
illustrate, C. Spearman criticizes Thurstone because the latter's
views " lead back to an untenable revival of the ancient doctrine of faculties." 18 Or the method itself is questioned because
of the aforesaid danger. 19
As a non-Scholastic representative of those who consider
factors as a revival of faculties, and rather welcome than reject
this idea, one may name C. C. Pratt. His concention of faculties is rather questionable. Here, however, it suffices to quote
the closing passage of his article: 20 " The argument . . . has
been that the concept of ' faculties,' in the sense of mental
capacities distributed along quantitative continua and revealed
phenomenologically as act-qualities, is of the utmost importance for any psychology which does not restrict itself to
sensory existentialism; and that a methodical program of scientific inquiry into the principles of human faculty is offered . . .
by Spearman."
18 C. Spearman, "Thurstone's
Work Reworked," Journal of Educational Psychology, 1989, XXX, 1. See also H. Rogosin, "Scientific Method in Current
Psychology," Philosophy of Science (1942), IX, 188: " The mathematical studies
of Thurstone, etc. suggest a recrudescence of the belief in the ' facultative ' treatment of mental functions."
18 A. Anastasi, "Faculties
and Factors," Psychological Bulletin, 1985, XXXV;
891.
•• C. C. Pratt, "Faculty Psychology," Psychological Revietw, 1929, XXXVI, 142.

840

RUDOLF ALLERS

Dr Ro E. Brennan may represent
Scholastic viewpoint.
" The orientation
the entire field of psychometrics towards
an explicit recognition of the faculty theory is best seen when
we examine some . . . conclusions that emerge from mental
measurements." There is agreement, the author says, on
points: (1) "there are established differences in the way that
man operates"; (2) "each difference represents at least a general tendency to act
a particular way"; (8) "
such general tendencies are
we substitute ' faculty '
" " H,
for ' general tendency ' . we arrive at a formulation not only
in accordance but
identical
the one
traditional
faculty-psychology." 21
If, however, the meaning of "factors" is as has been stated
above,
the hopes of Pratt nor the claims
Brennan
remain tenable.
cannot, by factorial analysis, "prove"
the existence of a faculty. Neither is a factor necessarily
cative
a faculty. It may be,
it does not have to be.
criterion of a
its existence
as wen as the proof
must be sought
on the
hand, the existence
faculty can be demonstrated,
of a
a
performances pertaining to this
1s
general factor for
l:o be expected. Such a general factor, discovered after the
existence
a faculty has been demonstrated, may serve as a
of empirical confirmation. It may, eventually, also happen
that factorial analysis
teac:h us that· one or the other performance we credited to a certain
does not belong there
or does not depend on
one
exclusively or chiefly.
is, so far as I can see, aU that faculty-psychology is
entitled to expect from factorial analysis. This, to repeat once
more,. does not at all invalidate the method. The method
indubitably is one of the greater achievements in the field
psychometrics.
there are many things to be done in
psychology which have no relation to the question of the
faculties.
0

0

21

256.

•

R. E. Brennan, Thomistic Psychology, New York, 1941, Macmillan, pp. !'l53-

FUNCTIONS,

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AND FACULTIES

341

But many, perhaps the majority, of the psychologists working in the line of factorial analysis believe that the factors are
indicative of " abilities," " hidden underlying causes," 22 "
mary traits " and such. And so these psychologists really
come somehow closer to faculty-psychology than they care to
do. But that which they fear they approach, and from which
they so anxiously want to keep away, is a mere figment of their
imagination, and not the faculty-psychology as it existed and
exists.
It has been pointed out by many defenders of faculty-psychology that the theory which was ridiculed by Locke and
finally abolished by Herbart is not the classical doctrine; Many
speak as does C. C. Pratt, who writes: " In the hands of C.
Wolff and the later phrenologists, the doctrine of faculties fell
into disrepute." The "later phrenologists " indulged, undoubtedly, in utterly fantastic interpretations; but in principle they
were not worse than their " scientific " successors with their
strictly localized centers, their neural events, and nervous
bonds. But Wolff truly does not deserve to be classed with
these phrenologists. Nor is it so sure that it is his fault that
the theory of faculties presented itself to the minds of its
critics as an obsolete, nonsensical construction. Wolff seems to
share the fate of many other authors of the past; he is often
quoted, oftener misquoted, and seldom, if at all, read.
Few of the critics of faculty-psychoJogy state what they think
this theory to be. They are satisfied with criticizing it. W.
James called it "vague and erroneous"; 23 McDougall, "long
discredited." 24 It consists of " gross, unanalyzed terms of a
popular psychology" 25 and it is even "most pernicious." 26
22 See, for instance, "V. Stephenson,
" The Foundations of Psychometry," Psychometrica, 1986, I, 208. " That these few fundamental factors-their number, incidentally, varies from one to twenty-account for, explain, or are the cause of, all
human conduct."
28 W. James, Principlew of Psychology, New York, 1890, Holt, Vol. I, p. 28.
•• W. McDougall, Outline of Psychology, New York, 1928, Scribner's, p. 18.
25 G. T. Ladd and R. S. Woodworth,
Elements of Psychophysical Psyr:hology,
New York, 1911, Scribner's, p. 274.
26 M. Bentley,
The Field of Psychology, New York, 1924, Appletor,-Century, p.
85.

RUDOLF ALLERS

This sounds very disconcerting. But what the nature of this
awful invention is, remains unsaid. The list of depreciating
remarks could be made much longer. There is no need for
completeness. One statement more, however, must be reported
because it reveals a rather curious mentality, at least curious in
a scientist. The theory of faculties, we read, " is vanishing
from the world of expert thought, and no more need be said
about it than that it is false and would be useless to human
welfare if true." 27
The objections against faculty-psychology are ably summarized by J. S. Moore and H. Gurnee, " Modem scientific
psychology has," so these authors write, " rejected absolutely
the entire faculty conception" because ·(1) the division into
based on a false
faculties is an artificial, not a natural,
analogy with the organs of the body, and the mind works as a
unit, not as a collection of separate faculties; (2) the reference
to faculties merely classifies mental states but does not explain
them; (8) the conception of faculties as causes or forces is a
confusion of the empirical point of view with the metaphysical. 21
The first of these objections against the theory of faculties
contains two different criticisms. Fir.st, that the division in
faculties is artificial; second, that it disregards the unity of the
mind because based on a ·false analogy with bodily organs.
Both these remarks seem little to the point,
To take the second first, one may recall that the " division "
into organs, although suggested by anatomy, .does not destroy
the unity of the organism. The holistic interpretation does
not deny that the liver has its particular function, distinct from
those of the heart or the kidney, and so on. We have seen also
• 7 E. L. Thomdike, Educational Prychology, Vol. I, New York, 1908, Lemcke &
Bruechner, p. 174. Italics mine. Two expressions in this quotation deserve attention. First, the notion of " expert thought"; secondly, the idea that a truth which
is " useless to human welfare," can be simply put aside. Who is to decide, one
wants to know, what truths are useful and what are not for human welfare.
•• J. S. Moore and H. Gumee, The Foundatiom of Paychology, Princeton, 1988,
Princeton University ;press, p; 9.

FUNCTIONS,

FACTORS, AND FACULTIES

848

that there are distinguishable functions which cannot be related
simply to an· anatomically defined organ. The distinction of
functions and not of organs is the real analogy.
emphasizes that certain faculties indeed can be " localized "
and related to definite organs, but others cannot, and are nonetheless distinct and distinguishable entities. 29 H faculties are
sometimes spoken of as " organs " of the soul, they are given
this name not because of an analogy with bodily organs, but
because of the original signification of the word; the faculties
are " tools " of the soul, something by means of which the soul
executes certain operations.
Why any division into faculties, or the one usually accepted
by the Thomistic school, should be " artificial " is not easy to
see. Rather, one is inclined to call it but too "natural." In
fact, this is the reproach made by some; the theory is rejected
because of its pertaining to" popular psychology." Now; it is
improbable that popular psychology should hit on an artificial
division. ll, on the other hand, the mere establishing of any
division whatsoever is considered artificial, as set over against
the " unity " of the mind, one may agree with this statement.
But then it is directed against a division in " abilities " or
" functions " as well. And some kind of division is inevitable,
because we cannot study a complex unit otherwise than by
distinguishing, be it only in way of a preliminary methodological procedure, at least according to various " aspects." But we
have seen that even among the modem and scientific psychologists there are some who are anxious to maintain the reality of
the " underlying causes " and refuse to speak of mere " aspects."
Thus it would seem that this first objection does not carry
any real weight. The question whether the notion of faculties
entails any " division " in the strict sense of the word will
occupy us later. But it surely entails or amounts to an attempt
at classification of mental operations.
The faculty-psychology has often been criticized for provid•• See, for instance, In II de anima 1, IV, ad c. II, 418 b 29, ed. Pirotta,
No. 269.

844

RUDOLF ALLERS

ing only a principle of classification and, as the basis thereof, a
description but not an explanation. Especially, E. B. Titchener
found fault with faculty-psychology because" the subsumption
under them [faculties] of the ideas, feelings, impulses, etc. which
are really given in introspection, does not help us ... towards
an understanding " and is " at best a merely descriptive psychology and can never rise to the level of explanation." 30
When Titchener and his contemporaries spoke of " explanation " they had two ideas in tb.eir minds. One was the establishing of strict relations between mental and neural processes;
the other was the reduction of " complex " mental states to
more elementary ones. The latter principle prevailed in sensistic and associationistic psychologies as they were prevalent
then. It is not to be gainsaid that similar ideas are still alive
in many psychological conceptions of today, although there
are sufficient reasons for abandoning both types of ideas, at
least i:Q.sofar as they are considered true " explanatory" principles. If it is true that at first the reaction against sensism
and associationism went too far, it is not less true that the
range in which these principles apply is infinitely smaller than
many psychologists thought and still think.
One may therefore ask what the meaning of " explanation "
in psychology is supposed to be. Fifty years ago W. Dilthey
proclaimed that " we explain nature, but understand the mind."
This is not the place to raise the question whether there is anything like an explanation of nature in the sense envisioned by
the scientists and philo,sophers of two generations ago, or even
one generation ago. It would seem as if Kirchhoff's famous
formula, that a law of nature is the simplest description of
phenomena, has come to be accepted more and more generally.
Explanation, if attempted at all, is left to philosophical speculation. The well-known works of Eddington and Jeans bear
witness to this tendency. Of course, the scientists prefer to do
their own philosophizing; they have not yet forgotten the truly
•• E. B. Titchener, E:cperimental Psychology, New York, 1905, Macmillan, Vol. I,
p. 188.

FUNCTIONS,

FACTORS,

AND FACULTIES

345

unjustified "imperialistic" inroads certain philosophers made
into the field of science. Historical facts, however unpleasant,
have no relevance in philosophical systematization. It would
be wise to shelve definitely the various speculations on natural
philosophy on the part of the followers of Schelling, Hegel, and
also of some Neo-Scholastics. The errors of individual philosophers are no more to be blamed on philosophy than the
mistakes of scientists on science.
When, therefore, we come to the question of explanation in
psychology, the problem here too is mainly a philosophical one.
In this regard I have to take exception to a view proposed by
Dr. Burt. He writes: "Just as we cannot deduce the essential character of the elementary processes in the retina from a
mere analysis of colour equations, so we cannot determine the
nature of intelligence without supplementary evidence from
anatomy, physiology, and genetics." 31
It is obviously true that we cannot deduce the nature of
retinal processes from the color equations. Neither can we
deduce the nature of " neural events " from other observation
of mental phenomena. But neither can we deduce the color
equation or the way intelligence operates from any, however
detailed, knowledge of physiological processes. Such a knowledge will be, of course, very interesting, but it will not teach
us anything on the "nature" of intelligence. No analysis of
retinal processes can ever tell us that there is something like
color; no knowledge of brain anatomy or physiology can ever
tell us that there is something like reasoning. These facts have
to be experienced in the only field where they are found, i. e., in
introspection. If there is any discoverable and univocal relation between brain processes and mental states, it may be
helpful in arranging for certain investigations ,or it may serve
as a method of checking on introspective data, but it will never
advance our understanding of things mental even the fraction
of an inch.
If it is a criticism to say that any psychology remains on
81

Op. cit., p.

846

RUDOLF ALLERS

the level of description and does not progress towards explanation, this criticism applies to all psychologies of any type whatsoever. In this regard,
is not in the least
worse than all the other psychologies. The many so-called
explanations which have been proposed are, without any
exceptions, purely hypothetical or, to be more correct, fictitious.
So far, the reproaches raised against faculty-psychology are
either untenable or do not refer to this theory in its particular
nature. Before other criticisms can be reviewed, .it is necessary
to state briefly and clearly what the essence of faculty-psychology is, and also what it is not but is believed to be by those
who either are not acquainted with the facts or have created
in their minds an idea which has no counterpart in the history
of psychology.
The following paragraphs are not intended to say anything
new on the notion of faculties. They are·only meant to summarize, for the sake of the present discussion, some few points
which are of importance. To report in detail on the Thomistic
conception is the more unnecessary since this has been done
effectively by Dr. Hart, and the essentials of the theory are
stated in most treatises on Thomism. 82
The historians of psychology have acknowledged that the
theory of faculties never amounted to any real division of the
mind or the soul into separable entities. Aristotle, the father
of the theory," asserted the idea of the unity of the soul, since
neither of the faculties . . . is capable of operating in independence of the rest." 38 " A unitary soul was capable of acting
in a variety of ways, but entered fully in .each of its various
activities at various times. This conception is closely related
to a view ... thl:\t each function is the function not of a part or
element in the organism but of the whole organism." 34
•• C. A. Bart, The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faetdty, Washington, D. C.,
1980, Catholic University of America Press. See also C. A. Dubray, The Theory
of PII'!Jchical Dispositions, Psychol. Rev. Mon. Supp. No. SO, 1905. ' R. E. Brennan,
Thomistic PII'!Jchology, New York, 1941, Macmillan, pp. 288-259.
38 0. Klemm, A History of PII'!Jchology, New York, 1914, p. 49.
•• G. Murphy, A Historical Introduction to Modern PII'!Jchology,New York, 1929,
Harcourt Brace, p. 89.

FUNCTIONS,

FACTORS, AND FA,CULTIES

847

The modern authors just quoted show a better understanding of faculty-psychology than did Locke, with whose ironical
remarks the fight against the theory started. " We may as
properly say that the singing faculty sings ... as that the will
chooses or that the understanding conceives." 85 But Locke
does not mention any author who would have said what Locke
criticizes. No doubt many used such expressions; we use them
to-day, even within scientific
But we are aware,
and our predecessors were not less aware, of the fact that we
use these expressions only as convenient abbreviations. No
physiologist, however much he miity be convinced of the
" holistic " view, ever will say that "the organism, by means of
the liver, produces bile." He simply says that the liver produces bile. Nor did Aristotle or St. Thomas or any other see
why they should express themselves in such a cumbrous and
roundabout ·manner and incessantly repeat that the human
mind or the human soul performs this or that activity, by
means of something called faculty. 36
·
Concerning especially the idea that the faculties were conceived as " parts of the soul," one has to consider that the term
" part " is indeed used by St. Thomas, but in a very different
respect. " The faculties are called parts, not of the essence of
the soul, but of its total power, as one would say that the
power of the governor of a province is a part of the total
37
power of the
This is something utterly different from
J. Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, Bk. ll, c. XXI, § 17.
•• Not that Aristotle or his medieval followers forgot to mention the thorough
dependence of the faculties on the one soul to which they belong but of which
they are not properly "parts." It suffices to refer to, e. g., Q. D. de Anima, q. un.,
a. 18, c.: "Potentia [one bows that St. Thomas n-:ver uses the term faculty, but
always speaks of potentiae animae] nihil aliud est quam principium operationis
81

alicuius sive sit actio sive sit pasaio; non quidem principium quod est aubjectum
agenB aut patiBnll, Bed id quo agens agit vel patiens patitur." Also: "Potentia
animae nihil aliud est quam proximum principium operationis animae." Summa
'Tkeologica I, q. 78, a. 4, corp.
•• "Potentiae animae dicuntur partes non essentiae animae Bed totalis virtutis
eius; aicut si diceretur quod potentia ballivi est parB totius potestatis regiae." Q. D.
de SpiritualibullOreaturis,q. un., a. 11, ad 10.

348

RUDOLF ALLERS

considering the soul " composed " of relatively independent or
even separable "parts."
Thus the Scholastics would have been in perfect agreement
with Locke and would not have felt that the latter's criticism
applied to them at all. Nor is the conception of faculties and
their relation to the whole in any way different in C. v. Wolff.
It is, therefore, not easy to see why this philosopher is considered the "founder of modern faculty-psychology." 88 What
Wolff says is, in fact, not other than what Aquinas had taught.
It suffices to quote here one passage of his Psychologia empirica: " In the same sense as any active potency is customarily
called generically a faculty, so also must the active potencies
of the soul be called its faculties .." 39
•• G. Murphy, p.
•• I quote the lengthy title of this work in full, because it gives some idea of
the real scope and intention Wolff had in mind: Psychologia empirica methodo
scientifica pertractata, qua ea, quae de anima humana indubia experientiae fide
constant, continentur et ad solidam philosophiae universae practicae ae theologiae
naturalis tractationem via stemitur. Frankfurt a. Leipzig,
Quemadmodum
potentia activa in genere Facultas dici solet (§ 76 Ontologia); ita etiam potentiae
activae animae Facultates ipsius appellantur. Pt. I, Sec. II, c. I, §
p.
Wolff
remarks, in an additional note, that there is no inconvenience in including the
passive potencies too under the name of faculties. The passive potencies do not
condition any activity in the proper sense. They cannot, therefore, be made substantial entities. This remark of the Psychologia empirica shows that there is little
of a tendency to " substantialize " the faculties. Be it noted, in passing, that the
emphasis laid by Wolff, in the subtitle he chose, on the indubia experientiae fides
makes him less of an a-prioristic rationalist than the usual discussion one reads of
his system would lead one to suppose.
The passage in the Philosophia Prima s. Ontologia, ed. nov. Frankfurt, Leipzig,
1786, Pt. II, Sec. II, c.
§ 716, p. 588, reads: Possibilitas agendi dicitur Potentia
simpliciter: subinde cum addito Potentia activa: possibilitas vero patiendi potentia
passiva appellatur. Tribuitur nempe enti potentia quatenus per ea quae eidem
insunt, actio concipitur possibilis; potentia autem patiendi quatenus per ea quae
eidem insunt pati potest. Potentia activa vocatur etiam Facultas. On the possible
in general, see Ibid., Pt. I, Sec. II, c. 1, § 85.
Wolff's ontology has been ably treated in a slender volume by H. Pichler, Ueber
Chr. Woljjs Ontologie; Leipzig, 1910, Duerr. An exhaustive study of the whole
philosophy of Wolff may be found in M. Campo, Cristiano Wolff e il Razionalismo
precritico,
Vol., Milan, 1989, Vita e Pensiero (Universita Cattolica del Sacro
Cuore: Scienze Filosofiche, Vol. XXX). This work does not consider Wolff's
psychology in particular, except insofar as it is related to the general principles and

FUNCTIONS,

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349

Wolff fully realizes that the origin of the notion of faculty
is not in the field of empirical observation, except insofar as
that we are made aware in that field of irreducible differences
between mental states; the true origin is in metaphysics. Therefore he refers to his Ontologia for further information. But the
" metempirical " origin of a notion does not preclude its applicability and usefulness also in the field of observable data.
On the whole, the conception of Wolff is the same as the
Aristotelian-Thomistic one, that "the soul is one in act and
multiple in potency;" 40 The multiplicity of potencies must be
assumed because of the diversity of operations.
The difficulty which apparently most of the critics of facultypsychology encounter, and which proves to be an obstacle to
their correctly understanding the basic notions, is probably the
assertion that the faculties are really distinct from one another
and really distinct from the soul. It is hardly necessary to
point out that this proposition was not held by all medieval
thinkers; especially towards the end of the Middle Ages there
were many who either followed Scotus and admitted only a
" formal distinction," or denied the existence of any distinction
between the soul and its powers. 41
problems of his philosophy. A thorough treatment of Wolffian psychology is still a
desideratum.
The faculties are, according to Wolff, not only potentiae of the one and indivisible soul. They are specific expressions of one uniform and fundamental power
of the soul. There is but one vis animae, and the faculties are its modifications.
The one vis, so to speak, flows out through different channels. One must admit
that this conception is not too distant from modern notions of "mental energy,"
found, e. g., in Spearman, Burt, and others. See Psychologia Rationalis, etc., Frankfurt, Leipzig, 1734, §§ 66, 67, 81.
Wolff was so little willing to consider the faculties as "parts " of the soul that he
expressly refutes this opinion. The soul, he asserts, is a simple substance; if we were
to attribute to it a number of real powers, it would be a composed substance.
Ibid.,§ 57.
Wolff has even a faint idea of measuring the powers of the mind; these powers
exist in degrees. "Je mehr man den Zusammenhang der Wahrheiten einsiehet, ie
mehr hat man Vernunft." VernuenftigeJ Gedanken von Gott, Welt und Seele, I,
§ 370.
ed. Pirotta: anima una actu
•• In II de Anima, ad c. II; 414 b 10; 1, IV, no.
et multiplex in potentia.
41 The various conceptions on this matter are briefly reviewed by F. Suarez,

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RUDOLF ALLERS

The last opinion was obviously also Herbart's. He is often
quoted as having dealt the death blow to faculty-psychology.
It is, however, interesting to inquire into Herbart's reasons
for his absolute condemnation of the idea of facilities. His
antagonism is based purely and exclusively on metaphysical
principles. His opposition to the notion of faculty is but the
special form his general view takes on when applied to problems of the soul. He holds that the concept of a thing with
several inhering properties is self-contradictory; one cannot be
many. A plurality of properties is incompatible with the unity
of things.
In other words, Herbart no less than any medieval scholar
started from ontological speculations. In this respect he proves
to be of the same mind as any Nominalist. This is indeed
rather suggestive. One is tempted to assume that the reasons
of the modem and scientific psychologists too are mainly philosophical, metaphysical, and that their rejection of facultypsychology has more to do with their often unacknowledged
and unconscious metaphysical background than with any facts
or metaphysical principles.
Locke could not, notwithstanding his ironical comments,
deny the existence of innate powers of the soul. The faculties
he threw out in the first book are, and not even very surreptitiously, reintroduced in the second. He covers this up somehow by using the term "powers " instead of " faculties "; but
this is in truth only going back to the original terminology and
does not imply any material alteration of the idea. 42
de Anima II, c. 1, opp. Vol. III, Paris 1856, Vives, p. 57'tf. "Prima opinio eat
nullo modo distingui potentias ab anima, sed ipaam ease suum intellectum, auum
sensum, etc. Ita Gregoriua (Arimin.) Gabriel (Biel), ... Occam, .. .Saxonia (Joan.
de) ... Marsiliua (Patav.), ... Buridanua. Secunda opinio est diatingui formaliter
non vera realiter. Ita Scotua ... Thomas de Garbo ... Tertia opinio ait potentias
animae vegetantia ab ea non diatmgui, maxime vera aenaitivaa atque intellectivaa,
sic Bonaventura ... , Durandua (a St. Pore.)." The last opinion, held by Suarez
himself and attributed also to Aquinas, is that the powers are really distinct from
the soul. As one sees, all authors quoted as adhering to the first opinion belong
to the Nominalistic school. As in many other instances, here too the modems are
descendants of the late medieval Nominalists.
•• See C. A. Hart, op. cit., p. 99. The reference is to Locke's Essay, Bk. II,
c. !!1, § 17.

FUNCTIONS,

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The moderns are more or less in the same situation. C.
Spearman says by way of characterization of the actual stand
on the question: " For although nowadays all psychologists
join heartily enough in condemning the faculties, most are but
renouncing the old name whilst retaining the old thing. Under
some such title as Power, Capacity, Ability, are hidden ideas
which are not essentially distinct from the old conceptions of
the faculties." 43 Spearman himself has written a justly famous
work, entitled The Abilities of Man. But he feels that his
conception is different from the openly avowed or the masked
theory of faculties. It had been commonly assumed, so the
eminent English psychologist avers, that the ability to attend
to printed numbers would run parallel to the ability to attend
to vocational duties; and many similar such parallels or identities of " function " were assumed. But this assumption needed,
at least, some corroborating evidence. Here is the point where
factorial analysis was developed. The main novelty of the
viewpoint is stated by Spearman thus: " The notion of faculties had been based on differences in the form of mental operations. An obvious amendment was to take also into account
the differences in content." 44 This may be true, not of faculties
in the traditional sense, but of "functions " as they were treated
in current psychology. In the former, however, the distinction
of faculties rests, as one well knows, not on a formal characteristic of operations alone, but also on the objects, or as Spearman prefers to say, the content of these operations. The
principle of distinction is secundum operationes et objecta.
It is a hopeless task to discover any author of the distant or
more recent past who would actually have held the kind of
theory concerning faculties against which the psychologists of
the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries direct their attacks,
nor anyone whose ideas might fit the caricature drawn by
Locke.
•• C. Spearman, "G and after-A School to End Schools," Pyackologies of 1930,
Worcester, 1930, Clark University Press, p. 809.
.
" Op. cit., p. 841.

6

RUDOLF ALLERS

The name of faculty seems to have been used first by Campanella. He is reported to have used this term as synonymous
with power or vis. 45 He also, apparently, is the first to submit
a division into three great classes (different from the various
ternaries of St. Augustine) , reminiscent of the division adopted
much later by N. Tetens and made famous by Kant's use of it.
The three powers of the mind, or Seelenvermoegen, of Tetens
are: Verstand, (or V ernunft) , Wille, Gefuehl. But neither
Tetens nor Kant ever conceived of these powers as parts of the
mind, let alone the soul.
Nor has any of their predecessors, so far as I can find out,
ever proposed a theory like the one criticized. It must have
originated in the minds not of the attacked but of the attackers.
And it can have originated there only because of certain metaphysical principles.
It should not be forgotten that denying a metaphysical
proposition is tantamount to uttering one. As one cannot disprove any thesis on economics by referring to principles of
chemistry, so one cannot invalidate a proposition of metaphysical intent by referring to facts of science or of psychology.
It is quite correct to say that the theory of faculties is
primarily speculative. But so is the denial of its truth.
All facts which are pointed out by the critics of faculty-psychology are fully recognized by this very theory. None of its
defenders thought to deny the essential unity of the mind, or
to establish the faculties as so many independent entities, or to
pretend that " the will chooses," unless in the sense of an abbreviated method of expression. No one has emphasized this more
than St. Thomas. " To understand is, properly spoken, not an
achievement of the intellect but of the soul by means of the
intellect, as warming is not an achievement of warmth but of
the fire by means of warmth." 46
'"Brucker, Historia critica philosophiae, Vol. IV, Pt. II, Lipsiae, 1744, p. 129:
" Quartum praedicamentum est vis s. facultas quae est potentia essentialis virtus,
ad actum et actionem emergens. Reducuntur autem omnes facultates ad potestativas, cognoscitivas, et appetitivas."
•• Q. D. de Veritate, q. 10, a. 9, ad S. "Quod intelligere proprie loquendo non

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Suppose, now, that a notion like the one of faculties is inescapable. Why it should be will be inquired into immediately.
What is the minimum of tenets pn which a faculty-psychology in agreement with the general principles of Thomistic
philosophy has to insist?
There are, I think, not more than three such fundamental
propositions:
(1) There are faculties. The mental operations being distinct, and so also their objects (or" contents"), the potencies
which are the proximate causes of these different operations
must be distinct too. Although inherent in the one substance
of the human person, they must be really distinct from one
another and from the whole to which they belong, be this whole
called soul, or consciousness, or mind, or organism.
(2) These faculties are divided at least into two groups
fundamentally distinct in genere. The thesis that the rational
faculties are essentially different in kind, in operation, and also,
naturally, in their proper objects must be maintained.
It may be questionable whether the distinction between the
vegetative and the sensory faculties is of equally fundamental
importance. To make the distinction seems natural enough.
But it is conceivable that the main difference, namely the direct
awareness of the sensory operations on the part of the mind,
as set over against the " unconsciousness " of the purely vegetative operations, is of secondary importance. One may admit
that such a conception has little to be said in its favor, and
also that it is hard, even impossible, to imagine a state of affairs
in which the difference between the two classes of faculties
would be abolished. But there is no cogent metaphysical reason for declaring this notion impossible. We are concerned
here not with listing what may be asserted with certainty in
regard to the nature of the faculties, but with what must be
asserted if the fundamental principles of Thomism are to
remain intact.
est intellectus sed animae per intellectum; sicut nee calefacere est caloris sed ignis
per calorem."

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RUDOLF ALLERS

In this respect, it is obvious that a denial of the essential
difference between the rational and the non-rational faculties
must result in a breaking down of the whole system; the principle of individuation by matter, the interpretation of the universals, the evidence of the first principles of reason, and many
other basic propositions would fall if this thesis were abandoned.
(8) There is a fundamental difference between cognitive
faculties-and of course their operations--on the one hand, and
appetitive or orectic faculties on the other. This distinction
must be maintained because it is intimately related to the idea
of freedom.
This distinction will encounter hardly any opposition. Even
the physiologist distinguishes between the " afferent " and the
" efferent " branch of the reflex or neuronic arc. His view is
corroborated by the findings of the anatomist who describes
" receptory " and " effectory " organs.
The fundamental tenets of Thomism remain quite unshaken,
even if it is admitted that there are more or fewer faculties
than are listed in the traditional psychologies. It does not
alter the whole conception of Thomistic anthropology if we
should be compelled by the evidence of facts to abandon, for
instance, the differentiation between imagination and memory,
or to draw the dividing line otherwise than we have been accustomed to do. Just as it does not make any difference whether
" touch " is one sense or faculty or whether under this name
there are comprised several distinct faculties, like the sense of
pressure, thermaesthesia, the sense of pain, kinaesthesia, somaesthesia, perhaps pallaesthesia, perhaps even more senses.
The question of the number of faculties is one of empirical
observation and careful analysis of facts. The three theses
listed above, however, are indispensable.
It should not prove difficult to show that these three propositions are perfectly compatible with any findings whatsoever
brought forth by direct introspective observation or by experimental analysis.
Ultimately, to repeat this once more, it is introspection, the
psychologist's immediate knowledge of the functioning of the

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mind, which supplies him with the only criterion he can find.
This, of course, is not conceded by the " scientific " psychologists. But it is a principle according to which they themselves
act.
What is, for instance, the meaning of the expression that is
used, in working out factors or " vectors " of the mind, with
regard to shifting the basis of calculation-or, as the technical
term reads, to "rotating the axis "-until the resulting figures
become " psychologically significant? " 45 When is anything
"psychologically significant?" Whatever the mathematical details be, significance refers ultimately to the " universe of discourse" of psychology. To be meaningful, a term must, in
firial analysis, apply to something of common experience. Even
though this experience may not be " public " in the sense of
being a demonstrable physical experiment, it is one common to
all men, and a statement about such things is perfectly intelligible. Intelligibility, be it said in passing, does not mean that
a statement must be evident and acceptable to everyone. Statements about colors may be intelligible, because they refer to a
sense experience, but to a blind person they are not acceptable
or credible, because the immediate experience is lacking. Blindness, however, is a defect not limited to the eye of the body.
Whether a figure found by some statistical method is relevant
or not cannot be decided by statistics. A high correlation is,
of course, suggestive of some underlying reality. But whether
it is truly indicative of such reality is a question to be answered
by other methods. I know of parts in the European Alps where
statistics would indubitably discover a high correlation between
the number of cats kept and the frequency of trespassing
against the game laws; at the same time there would be a negative correlation between the last figure and the number of dogs.
Whether these findings have any significance at all can be
ascertained only if one knows that the game laws, for many
generations, forbade the keeping of dogs, that these laws, natur•• L. L. Thurstone, The V ectOTs of the Mind, Chicago, 1985, Chicago University

Press.

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RUDOLF ALLERS

ally, proved an incitement for unlawful hunting, and that these
habits, having become " mores " and passed on from generation
to generation, are back of the statistical figure. At the same
time, there may be, within the same population, a marked
preference for a certain pattern of fabric worn by the women.
The correlation with other traits will be equally high. But this
fact is caused by purely accidental influences, such as a wholesale house "dumping" some shop-worn articles on the peasants.
The correlation has no sociological significance.
It is the same with psychological data. Whether there is
significance or not, however suggestive the figures, must be
determined through an analysis of the total situation. But the
total situation must first be present to the inquirer.
Before reaching the conclusion one more point deserves brief
comment. In works on factorial analysis one comes across the
expression that this or that factor "exists." This phrase is
obviously suggestive of the erroneous interpretation referred to
before. If " existing " is taken to mean that the factor proves
the presence of a real " ability " of the mind, one soon begins
considering it also a " proof " for the existence of faculties.
This term of "existing factors," however, has primarily a
purely mathematical significance. The factor "exists" as a
'lolution of an equation is said to exist. The conditions of
such an existence are the faultlessness of computation and the
observance of all the cautelae to be used in statistics.
It is quite another thing to claim that the factor is indicative
of something real. On this the factor as such does not tell us
anything; To be meaningful in this sense, the factor must be
of such a nature as to make plausible its correspondence to
some real property. Whether this be the case is a question
difficult to answer and .surely not answerable by means of
another statistical inquiry. It is perfectly possible that there
may be meaningless factors.
The factors as such, I have pointed out, cannot supply us
with a "proof" for the existence of faculties. But a certain
indication that something like faculties must be assumed m3;y

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be deduced not from the factors one finds but from those which
one does not find.
really functioning as a
I£ the mind-or the
unit in an absolute sense, then it would seem that any performance whatsoever ought to be positively and significantly
correlated to any other. This, as we know, is not the case.
The whole method of correlation and factorial analysis rests on
the supposition that such a universal factor will not be found.
The "general" factor, to be significant, must not be too general.
Thus, factorial analysis does not prove the existence of faculties, but it proves the existence of an idea, very little if at all
different from the notion of faculties, in the minds of those
psychologists who developed factorial analysis and used it so
successfully.
Whenever we try to give an account of the way the mind
functions we are forced to use terms like " function," or
"ability," or "faculty." It is undeniable that the mental operations differ from one another. This obvious fact is also the
reason why the figuring of correlation of factors is meaningful.
It rests on the supposition that certain operations belong together, and others do not, or not to the same degree. There
are differences not only in kind but also in kinship, and this
notwithstanding the fact that the mind operates as a unity and
cannot be split into parts of even a relatively independent
existence. When the physiologist speaks of " integration " and
co-ordination, when the psychologist speaks, e. g., of "sentiments " being " organized around an emotional nucleus," or
of attitudes and their mutual relations, they presuppose that
there
functions which may, eventually, combine in this way
or in that way, although they never are independent of one
another or of the whole.
These are elementary facts which no psychology ever can
ignore. One may call statements concerning these facts "merely
descriptive"; but description is the indispens!tble basis of all
further investigation.
It is true that the theory of faculty
gives no " explanation."
But neither does any other psy-

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chology. The so-called explanations are either unjustified,
hypothetical, and even fantastic translations of statements on
observable facts into a non-psychological language, or they are
mere rewordings of these statements in the language of psychology, substituting some new terms for the names of directly
observable data. Or, finally, explanation is, openly or disguisedly, of a metaphysical nature.
The modern scientist, and following his lead the modern
psychologist too, show a marked reluctance to admit, within
their proper fields, any idea even faintly reminiscent of metaphysics. They recognize, of course, that metaphysics may have
to inquire into the ultimate foundations and problems even of
the special sciences, provided that metaphysics can be proven
to be a legitimate undertaking and not a collection of " meaningless propositions." The psychologist, in particular, claims
that his field stands in exactly the same relation to metaphysics
as any other field, of physics or of chemistry. But this is
where the mistake is made.
Psychology does not stand to philosophy in the same relation and at the same distance as physics stands. The failure
to arrive at a consistent and satisfactory conception of psychology, its subject matter and its task, on the basis of assimilating it to physics, ought to be a warning sign. No matter
how much the statistical methods are developed, no matter
how closely the terminology and methodology are fashioned on
the patterns of science, psychology inevitably remains a discipline sui generis and different in many respects from science.
The much-cherished name of " scientific psychology " is either
but the expression of the legitimate and obvious desire to be
as critical of results, as careful in observation, and as conscientious in method as science has been and is, or it expresses
the pretension and hypothetical assumption that there is a perfect " unity of science," that is, that the same principles and
methods can
applied everywhere. In the first instance the
name is redundant; in the second it is utopian. It is utopian
not because it anticipates a state to be realized in a far off

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future or to be approached asymptotically, but because it rests
on an utter misconstruction of the facts.
Not only is it true that, as Dr. Burt said in a remark quoted
before, the principle of simplicity is legitimate and useful only
in a field of relatively simple structure, and that therefore to
make the simplicity of a theory a criterion or, at least, an indication of its truth, is fallacious in psychology; 46 it is true also
that many other principles which prove to be helpful in physics
are not at all so in psychology.
It has been emphasized very forcibly, although not discovered, by M. Heidegger that in all philosophical questioning
there is a unique coincidence of three terms which, in science
and in many other special disciplines, fall apart. That about
which the question is, that wherefrom the answer is expected,
and that which asks the question are one and the same. Philosophy asks about being; and being-at least that is Heidegger's claim-is encountered primarily in our own being;
therefore to know being we address the question to ourselves;
and we are, obviously, also the one who questions.
Whether Heidegger's position is correct or not, when it is
submitted as characterizing philosophy, it is evidently the position in which the psychologist inevitably finds himself placed. 41
Even if he gathers his materials from" objective" observation,
under carefully controlled conditions, of others and their behavior, responses, and so on, and abstains from using any introspective data-often much to the disadvantage of his own
•• Dr. Jon. Cohn, many years ago, in a motto he placed on the title of a work
dealing with dialectics, coined the phrase: simplex sigillum nee veri nee falsi. There
is, indeed, no a-priori reason why a formula descriptive of a certaiu set of natural
phenomena should be "truer" when simpler. This is a mere prejudice, born either
of a rationalistic or a positivistic conception. In the notion of Denkoekonomie as
used by E. Mach and his followers, both tendencies are blended in a rather curious
manner.
•• M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Halle a. S. 19'29, Niemeyer, p. 5 f. Perhaps this
fact is the reason, or one of the reasons, why one frequently wonders iu reading
Heidegger, whether one is moving in the field of pure ontology or of psychology.
And this notwithstanding the author's attempt to define precisely the liue separating the two fields, op. cit., p. 45 ff.

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RUDOLF ALLERS

conclusions-he has ultimately to refer all these data to his
personal experience, because this is the only way to find out
about their " psychological significance." 48
The very categories in which any statement of things mental
is couched are originally derived from self-experience and must
constantly be referred back to it to retain their " psychological
significance." The physicist is not concerned with the ultimate
significance of any name he uses; he can define his terms within
his particular universe of discourse. He is not conceFned with
objective reality, as the metaphysician understands this term,
but with phenomena and their relations. His formulae are
true whether he believes in Natural Realism, or in Subjective
Idealism. Not so the psychologist.
One may think the so-called " understanding " (verstehende)
psychology a dead-end road, to set out on which might be
calamitous for psychology. I do not want to discuss this point.
But I want to submit that the name and the underlying view
reveal an aspect of psychology which is too often forgotten.
All endeavor to achieve knowledge is motivated by man's
unquenchable desire to understand the world in which he lives
and of which he forms a part. Knowledge which did not contribute to this goal would not be knowledge. The remark of
Thorndike, quoted above, that there might be a truth " useless
for. human welfare " rests on a total misconception of the nature of truth and of human welfare too. Man cannot be separated from his welfare. To know as much as possible is part of
man's welfare. But knowledge sometimes lets us see more
deeply into reality, and sometimes remains on the surface.
Science, contrary to a common belief which scientists have
•• R. Hoenigswald said in his Principien detr Denkpsyckologie, 2nd ed., Leipzig,
1929, Teubner, that the only difference between introspection or self-observation
and the data supplied by a psychological experiment is that in the second case the
function achieved by one person in the first case is divided between the two persons involved, the observer and the experimenter. This author had in mind, of
course, experiments in which the observer reports on his experiences. But his
statement applies, in truth, to all psychological experiments--unless they be not
psychological at all but merely neurophysiological-because
the meaning or significance of the data collected can be elucidated only on the basis of the experimenter's self-knowledge.

FUNCTIONS,

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861

taken the greatest pains to foster, does not penetrate into the
depths of being.
There are differences between the various branches of knowledge even on the level of " empiriology ," to borrow this term
from Maritain. The subject matter of psychology is, so to
speak, more intimately connected with the last riddles of reality
than is physics. 49
Whether the psychologist acknowledges this fact or not, it
exists, and it does not cease to influence his mode of thought.
He cannot get rid of a certain number of philosophical ideas,
because they are inextricably linked up with the subject matter
he studies. One of these ideas is the idea of faculties.
When Spearman commented on the habit of avoiding a name
but continuing to imply the existence of the thing, he meant
this remark as a criticism of the average psychologist's mentality, reproaching him for not achieving a perfect clarity on
this point. But nobody can deal with psychological problems
without classifying the various performances of the mind, and
nobody can classify performances without conceiving of the
thing which performs as being able to do so. The physicist can
dispense with such ideas because he does not deal with things
in their totality but only with the quantifiable aspect of them,
or rather not even with this aspect but with the relations obtaining between the various aspects of things, provided these
aspects can be stated in the language of magnitudes.
Certainly the mind functions as a unit. That is exactly what
the theory of faculties presupposes. But the mind does not
display at once all the modes of functioning of which it is
•• It is rather unfortunate that the words " science " and " scientific " have come
to signify only knowledge of the type of physics.
the nature of which
either forbids or at least renders difficult the application of physicalistic categories,
or whose advances are not noticeably furthered by the introduction of so-called
scientific procedures, may
as rich in valuable information and as reliable in
their statements as any other couched in mathematical symbols. This narrow use
of the term " science " creates also certain misunderstandings, since neither the
French, nor the Italian, nor the German langnage knows of such restrictions. They
have retained the original meaning of scientia. Psychologic scientifique is opposed
in French to popular and uncritical ideas on the mind, but it does not mean
restriction to physicalistic methodology.

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RUDOLF ALLERS

capable. If the mind were so functioning in its totality that it
would get directly, by its very substance, in touch with the
situation within which its function is displayed, it could not
perform in one way now and in another then. There must be
something in the mind enabling it to perform differently according to the needs either of the situation or of its own innermost
nature. This something, obviously, corresponds to what we
are accustomed to call an accident. And these accidents of the
mind are the faculties.
I cannot see how any psychologist can do without an assumption of such a kind. Whether he calls it a faculty or some
other name does not make any difference. He cannot avoid
thinking along such lines, simply because the facts force him
to do so.
Nonetheless, the faculty is nothing one can directly observe.
The distinction between substance and accident is not one of
empirical science. Nor does it play any role in" science." But
it does play an important role in psychology, because psychology is of a nature different from that of physics.
The theory of faculties which so horrifies the modern psychologist that its revival appears to him as a real danger for his
particular science exists nowhere but in the mind of these
psychologists. They have created the spectre, and then they
tremble that it might come back. It will not because it has no
reality.
Nor is there any danger that factorial analysis will bring
back this fictitious faculty psychology. What never existed
cannot be brought back. But, on the other hand, neither can
factorial analysis be used as an argument in favor of faculty
psychology.
Faculty psychology does not need to be buttressed by any
argument. It is not only the natural, it is the inevitable and
fundamental attitude, or rather the formulation of this attitude, underlying any endeavor whatsoever to achieve clarity on
and to attain knowledge of things mental.
Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

RUDOLF ALLERS

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY
(Concluded)

V. THE PLACE oF HuMILITY AMONG THE VmTUEs
In a previous installment* we have endeavored to give a
clear idea of humility itself. It remains to correlate it with the
other virtues, to determine its place and rank among them, and
its similarities to several of them. We know that it inheres in
the will and influences especially the lower irascible appetite;
but what is its exact position? Is it an intellectual, theological,
or moral virtue? If moral, is it cardinal, or merely reducible to
one of the cardinal virtues? And if the last hypothesis be true,
is it a subjective, integral, or potential part of that cardinal
virtue?
We can discard at once the possibility that humility is an
intellectual virtue. Despite the peculiar intellectual preparation it requires due to its dependence on self-knowledge, its
function is to moderate the passion and affection of hope. It
pertains essentially not to the cognoscitive but to the appetitive
side of the soul. But is it theological? It is the formal motive
which gives rise to this question. Subjection to God out of
reverence for Him seems allied to the motives of the theological
virtues/ 35 which by their objects reach out to God and touch
Him. As charity loves God because of His infinite goodness,
as faith believes in God because of His infinite veracity and
infallibility, so humility subjects itself to God because of His
infinite authority as Creator, Provider, Uplifter, and Redeemer
of man.
Vol. VII, No. 2 (April 1944), pp. 185 ff.
Cf. IV Sent., d. 88, q. 8, a. 8, ad 6: " ... humilitas videtur virtutibus [theologicis] propinquissirna esse, quia per earn homo se ex reverentia Deo subjicit, et per
consequens alii propter Deurn. . .. "
*THE THOMIST,

185

363

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SEBASTIAN

CARLSON

On close inspection, the argument loses all its force. Humility, indeed," regards principally the reverence by which one
is subjected to God." 136 Yet this is its formal motive, not the
formal object, which is not God Himself as in the case of the
theological virtues, but the moderation of the irascible appetite
in its elan toward the excellent. Moreover, the formal motive
of humility, if one considers it carefully, is not the divine
authority itself, i.e., God as He is infinitely superior to His
creatures, but rather the reverence which He inspires, the obligation which the soul feels to follow His guidance. Hence lowliness of heart is not one of the theological virtues, since ,neither
its object nor its motive attains God Himself.
Surely humility ought to be ranked, then, on the next lower
grade, for the praises accorded it by the Fathers and Doctors,
and the titles with which they grace it, seem to imply that it
is as indispensable as the cardinal or princip'al virtues themselves. It is called the foundation of the spiritual life, the root
and cause of all the virtues, their mother, nurse, and chaperon.
Its role in the Redemption is unique.
As Augustine says, " The entire life of Christ on earth, through
the humanity he deigned to assume, was an instruction in right
living." 137 But it was His humility that He proposed
for
our imitation, saying, " Learn of me, for I am meek and humble of
heart." 138 And Gregory 139 says that " the keynote of our redemption is found to be the humility of God." 140

Thomas did not hesitate to write that " the whole New Law
consists in two things: in humility and meekness." 141 Judged
136 "Humilitas
enim praecipue respicit reverentiam, qua quis subjicitur Deo."Art. 4, arg. 1.
138 Matt., xi, 29.
131 De vera religione, Cap. XVI, 32. M L 34, 135.
139 Liber regulae pastoralis, III, Cap. XVII (Admonit. XVIII) . M L 77, 78 B.
100 " Sicut Augustinus dicit, ' tota vita Christi in terris, per hominem quem
suscipere dignatus est, disciplina morum fuit.' Sed praecipue humilitatem suam
imitandam proposuit, dicens, 'Discite a_me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde.' Et
Gregorius dicit quod 'argumentum redemptionis nostrae inventa est humilitas
Dei.' "-Art. 5, arg. 4.
101 We give the whole passage:
"Et quid est illud: 'Discite a me quia mitis
sum et humilis corde ' ? Tota enim lex nova consistit in duobus: in mansuetudine

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

365

by its role in the spiritual life, too, humility certainly seems to
be " principal." It conforms the soul· to reason in a matter
about which the soul is restive and balky, the appetite for
excellence; and it has to do with one of the principal passions,
hope. 142 As a m;:ttter of fact, if it is the custodian and groundwork of all the virtues, strengthening them by its own strength,
it seems even more important than the four ordinarily named
as principal.
But that it cannot be ranked among them is evident as soon
as the nature of the cardinal virtues is called to mind. 143 They
are good habits that help the soul act reasonably in its most
basic operations, which are the hardest to keep within the
limits of the moral law. They are "the hinges upon which a
man's life swings; they are the root virtues to which all the
other perfect or complete virtues can be reduced." 144 ' Just as
true peace in man's noblest faculty, the mind, tranquilizes the
whole soul and even the body, so these virtues, because they
moderate man's most important activities, directly produce in
each voluntary faculty a general tendency to be subject to
reason in all its acts. 145
This tendency naturally varies with the activity it qualifies.
Thus, with regard to man's social intercourse, it takes the form
of an inclination to give others their due; with regard to the
passions, it appears as a repression and check of those that tend
et humilitate. Per mansuetudinem homo ordinatur ad proximum. Unde Psalmus
Per humili(101: 1): 'Memento, Domine, David, et omnis mansuetudinis
tatem ordinatur ad se, et ad Deum. Isaias
'Super quem requiescit spiritus
meus, nisi super quietum et humilem? ' Unde humilitas facit hominem capacem
Dei."-Comment. in Matt., XI, n. 8, p. 168a.
"" Cf. Summa Theol., I-11, q.
a. 4, corp.
"" For St. Thomas' refusal to admit humility into the company of the cardinal
virtues cf.: Summa Theol., I-11, q. 61, a. 8, arg. 11-11, q. 141, a. 7, arg. 8, & ad 8.
III Semt., d. 88, q.
a. 1, quaest. 4, ad 8.· De virtutibus in communi, q. unica,
De virtutibus cardinalibus, q. unica, a. 1, arg. 18, & ad 18.
a.
, .. Farrell, op. cit., II,
"" Cf. Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 187, a.
corp;: "Virtus principalis est cui principaliter adscribitur aliquid quod pertinet ad laudem virtutis, inquantum scilicet
exercet illud circa propriam materiam in qua difficillimum et optimum est illud
observare."

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SEBASTIAN

CARLSON

to be excessive, and as a tonic for those that might hold the
soul back· from the good of reason. Fortitude, for example, is
a cardinal virtue because it confirms and strengthens the soul in
circumstances in which it is most difficult to be firm and strong,
namely, in imminent danger of death. Patience also hardens the
soul, but only so far as the little crises entailed by daily life
and the rubbing of elbows with one's fellowmen are concerned.
Although this is difficult enough, it is far easier than attacking
a tank with a torch, or facing a firing squad; and therefore
patience is not a cardinal virtue.
The same ·holds true for humility, the chief operation of
which is repression. It keeps restive hope from leaping the
pale of reason; and though the curbing of lust for glory and
honor is hard enough, it is only " medium hard " in comparison
with .the difficulty of restraining the appetite for food, hard
drink, and sex pleasure. " Anger and hope do not move a man
as the fear of death does." 146 Hence, though the matter of
humility is one of the soul's basic activities-hope, the elan of
the soul toward what is convenient to it-yet, because it does
not deal with what is most basic and primitive, the individual's
urge to preserve his own life and that of the species to which
he belongs, it is not a cardinal virtue. As for the fact that it
regulates a principal passion, St. Thomas says:
The objects of hope are higher than the objects of concupiscence,
and, because of this, hope is placed as a principal passion in the
irascible. But the objects of concupiscence and touch-delectation
move the appetite more vehemently, because they are more natural.
Hence temperance, which sets up moderation in these things, is a
principal virtue [but not humility].147
Lastly, while humility roots, guards, and strengthens all the
"""Non enim ita movent hominem ira et spes, sicut timor mortis."-De
virtutibus in communi, q. unica, a. U, ad 26.
107 " Ea quorum est spes sunt altiora his quorum est concupiscentia; et, propter
hoc, spes ponitur passio principalis in irascibili. Sed ea quorum est concupiscentia
et delectatio tactus, vehementius movent appetitum: quia sunt magis naturalia. Et
ideo temperantia, quae in his modum statuit, est virtus principalis."-Summa
Theol., 11-11, q. 141, a. 7, ad S.

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

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virtues, it does so only indirectly, by doing away with their
greatest obstacle, pride, which " creeps into good works, to
destroy them." 148 It does not directly strengthen them in the
way that a cardinal virtue confirms the .other virtues over
which it has influence: by subjecting the most important
activity of some faculty to the reins of reason, thus preparing
the entire faculty for the good work of the secondary virtues in
less important operations. 149
If humility is not a cardinal virtue, it must at least belong to
one of them-to prudence, justice, fortitude, or temperanceas an integral, subjective, or potential part. In order that an
act of virtue be perfect, many conditions must be fulfilled,
many things presupposed. Thus, prudence requires the use of
reason, intelligence, circumspection, foresight, docility, caution,
memory, and shrewdness. Such prerequisites for moral activity
are the integral parts of a virtue. Secondly, all the principal
virtues except fortitude are general virtues, divided into several
subjective parts or species, as temperance into abstinence,
sobriety, chastity, and virginity. Thirdly, each of the four has
grouped around it those secondary habits for whose operations
it has broken the tough soil of the soul, and which imitate but
fall short of its own way of functioning-its potential parts. 150
Since humility is more than a condition necessary for a perfect act of virtue, being a specific habit with its proper formal
object and motive, it cannot be merely an integral part; and
since its matter is not principal but secondary, it cannot be a
subjective one. It must, therefore, be a potential part; but of
which of the four cardinal virtues? Certainly not of prudence,
which is essentially an intellectual virtue; 151 nor Of justice, of
which the principal function is not to rationalize the appetite
1 ' 8 " Alia quippe quaecunque
iniquitas in malis operibus exercetur ut fiant;
superbia vero etiam bonis operibus insidiatur ut pereant." St. Augustine, Regula,
n. 2. M L 88, 1879.
1 .. Cf. Ill Sent., d. 88, q. 2, a. 1, quaest. 4, ad 8; De virtutibus in communi, q.
unica, a. 12, ad 26.
16 ° Cf. Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 48, a. 1, .corp.
161 lbid., q. 47, a. 1.

7

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SEBASTIAN CARLSON

interiorly but to pay a debt to God or neighbor; nor of fortitude, since " humility represses more than it uses hope or confidence in itself," 152 whereas fortitude supports and enkindles
the soul. It must be annexed to temperance, whose office it is
to restrain the appetite, to repress the eager outward movement of the heart toward sense pleasures. 153 Indeed, in the
manner in which it attains its object, humility resembles only
temperance, which primarily checks passion and reins it in,
whipping it into ardor merely on occasion and secondarily. 154
This identity of manner being the essential and ·formal reason
why a secondary virtue is reduced to a principal/ 55 the fact
that temperance resides in the concupiscible part of the sense
appetite while humility is in the will as irascible, does not
assign the latter to a place with magnanimity under fortitude. 156 ·
For" any virtue that produces moderation in any matter, and
represses the appetite in its tendency toward some object, can
be placed as a potential part of temperance." 157
Where among the potential parts of temperance is humility
to be found? The Angelic Doctor locates it as the first part of
moderation, modestia, " the virtue which moderates things that
present ordinary difficulties." 15 s It reduces to order those
unruly movements of the soul which have not already been
tempered by either continency (which deals with the motions
of a will disturbed violently by the sex appetite), or meekness
(which soothes anger's burning desire for revenge). Of these
unruly tendencies, there are four left:
Of which one is the elan of the soul toward excellence, which
humility moderates. A second is the desire of things pertaining to
152 " Humilitas
autem plus. reprimit spem vel fiduciam de seipso quam ea
utatur."-Art. 2, ad 8.
155 Cf. Art. 4, ad 2.
158 Ibid.,· q. 141, a. 2, corp.
156 Cf. Art. 4, ad 2 & ad 8.
1 "' Cf. Art. 4, corp.
157 " ••• quaecunque virtus moderationem quandam operatur in aliqua materia et
refraenationem appetitus in aliquid tendentis, poni potest pars temperantiae, sicut
virtus ei adjuncta."-Summa Theol., q. 144, a. unic., corp.
158 " ••• virtus moderativa
eorum quae mediocrem habent difficultatem."Faucher, op. cit., note to II-II, q. 160, a. 1.

THE VffiTUE OF HUMILITY

369

knowledge; in this, studiosity, to which curiosity is opposed, acts as
moderator. There is a third [decorum], which pertains to the movements and acts of the body: namely, that they be done decently
and honestly, both in play and at serious times. But the fourth
[modesty] is what pertains to outward apparel, for example clothes
and other like things. 159
This moderation is not a special virtue in the sense that
humility is, but something generic. 160 It is the name for a
group of special virtues whose common motif is the restraining
of the soul in those urges which are not as hard to control as
its primitive craving for the pleasures of touch, but which offer
genuine difficulty because of their insubordination. Under
moderation, consequently, is to be classed humility, "inquantum scilicet humilitas nihil aliud est quam quaedam moderatio
spiritus." 161

VI. THE RANK OF HUMILITY
In the moral section of the Summa, there is a query Thomas
makes over and over again: Is such and such a virtue the
greatest of them all? It was natural to make the same inquiry
about humility, and, because of the difficulties encountered in
it, the problem should be discussed here. No attempt, of course, will be made to prove that lowliness of heart
is the most excellent of all; that would be absurd. But we shall
endeavor to assign humility a place in harmony with the particular excellence attributed to it by Christ and the Christian
tra,dition.
159 "Quorum unum est motus animi ad aliquam excellentiam; quem moderatur
humilitas. Secundum autem est desiderium eorum quae pertinent ad cognitionem;
in hoc moderatur studiositas, quae opponitur ,curiositati. Tertium autem, quod
pertinet ad corporales motus et actiones: ut scilicet ·decenter et honeste fiant tam
in his quae serio quam in his quae ludo agnntur. Quartum autem est quod pertinet
ad exteriorem apparatum: puta, in vestibus et in aliis hujusmodi."-Summa Theol.,
II-II, q. 160, a.
corp.
160 Ibid., ad
" Sub modestia continentur diversae virtutes, quae a diversis
assignantur. Unde nihil prohibet modestiam esse circa ea quae requirunt diversas
virtutes." Moderation is an arbitrary grouping of virtues.
161 Art. 4. corp.

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CARLSON

If, recalling the praises which the Fathers and early theologians ·of the Church gave to humility, we ponder the importance that Christianity has assigned to that virtue, and if,
on the other hand, we think of the indispensability of many
others, even disregarding the theological-of religion and obedience for example-we hesitate to say what rank humility should
hold among them. Remembering, too, their connection naturally in prudence and supernaturally in charity, and the fact
that it is impossible to have any of them if the very least is
lost, while the possession of a single one of them secures the
presence of the whole radiant galaxy-remembering all this, we
become almost afraid to consider lowliness of heart nobler than
any of its companions.
Furthermore, St. Thomas' own position, on the surface at
least, is not clear. 162 In his treatise on humility, he assigns it
first place after the theological and intellectual virtues and justice, particularly legal justice. 163 But previously he had called
religion greater than all the moral virtues; 164 had· maintained
that obedience was to be preferred to other moral virtues; 165
that the first place after justice belongs to fortitude; 166 that the
virtue of mercy was to be preferred to all the other virtues
which regard one's neighbor, implying that it was above even
justice! 167
To dispel the intellectual smoke screen that these apparently
cenflicting statements·cast over the truth, it will be necessary
to proceed step by step: to see what virtues are certainly of
nobler rank than humility; then to state precisely the principle
that will be employed to grade those remaining; lastly, to apply
the principle in each case that offers difficulty.
1 "" Note that we say "on the surface."
We have endeavored in the following
pages to explain the "contradictions" in the text of St. Thomas, which arise from
the fact that each of these virtues is superior to others from some one formal aspect.
168 Cf. Art. 5, COTp.
16 • Cf. Summa Theol., 11-II, q. 81, a. 6.
1 "" Ibid., q. 104, a. S.
186 Ibid., q. 128, a. 12.
1 "' Ibid., q. SO. a. 4.

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

871

This procedure will show us that, in the Angelic Doctor's
mind, humility is truly superior to all the moral virtues except
justice, even to religion. But it will also show us the sense in
which this conclusion is true-the particular way in which
humility is nobler than other virtues. It would be foolish to
maintain that it is unqualifiedly superior, since it is evident
that in some sense religion, for instance, must be superior.
With regard to the theological and .intellectual virtues, there
is no problem. Humility is inferior, because humility is not as
closely connected as they are with the attaining of man's last
end. The purpose of virtue is to help reason arrive at its goal,
and hence the theological virtues, which reach up to man's last
end, God Himself, and take hold of Him, are the greatest of all.
Next will be those good habits which assist reason to see and
determine upon the best means for arriving at its goal-the
intellectual virtues; and after them those that facilitate all that
man does interiorly and exteriorly to move toward his goalthe virtues perfecting the appetites. 168 Since it is in this last
category that humility is found, it is undeniably of less dignity
than those of the first and second.
The question, then, resolves itself to this: What is the rank
of humility among the moral virtues? Whereas the function of
the theological virtues is to enable man to attain God, his last
end, and the function of the intellectual virtues is to understand the means of arriving at that end, the function of these
moral virtues is to control man's activity toward his goal by
regulating it according to right reason: to assist and guide all
his appetitive faculties in their operations.
A little thought will make it clear that there are various viewpoints from which the perfection of the virtues can be regarded,
and that their rank will vary with each consideration. They
168 Cf. Art. 5, corp.: "Bonum humanae virtutis in ordine rationis consistit.
Qui
quidem principaliter attenditur respectu finis. Unde virtutes theologicae, quae
habent ultimum finem pro objecto, sunt potentissimae. Secundario autem attenditur
prout secundum rationem finis ordinantur ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec quidem
ordinatio essentialiter consistit in ipsa ratione ordinante; participative autem in
appetitu per rationem ordinato."

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might, for instance, be judged in the light of the potencies in
which they inhere, or in the light of their formal objects, or in
the light of their greater or less necessity to different individuals, or in the light of the wider or narrower extent to which
they control man's appetition, his activity toward his goal. It
is from the last viewpoint that the relative perfection of the
virtues will be determined here. To what degree does humility
influence human life as it is consciously directed to its end? If
this extent is greater than that of the other moral virtues, then
lowliness of heart is, in this one way at least, more perfect
than they.
Legal justice, which inclines the individual to give the community of which he is a part everything that is its due, controls man's activity toward his goal in its universality. In
other words, there is no operation, however secret and personal, be it thought or desire or delectation, which escapes the
watchful eye of legal justice, despite the fact that in itself it
always· involves relationship with another person. 169 The reason for this is that even acts which themselves have no bearing
on others whatsoever, affect in many ways the person who performs them, being the begetters, sustainers, or disrupters of
habits. Strongly though obliquely, like indirect lighting, they
influence his life as a member of society. Legal justice, then,
has universal control of human operation, and sanctions only
those personal and internal acts which will help or at least not
hinder man in his relationship to the community. To put it
more philosophically, legal justice controls every act of the
appetite, rational, sensile, concupiscible, and irascible. There is
a distant parallel in the stern hand that human prudence holds
over the diet and exercise of a marriage-minded debutante.
The primacy of justice over the other moral virtues is easily
seen. Whereas it regulates, directly or indirectly, the whole of
human appetition, most others regulate merely one phase of it.
Thus, sobriety keeps desire for inebriating liquor within reasonable bounds; studiosity enkindles or quiets intellectual curi169

Ibid., & II-II, q .. 128, a. 12, corp.

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OF HUMILITY

373

osity; veracity encourages one to reveal himself in his social
contacts as he really is.170
Humility, on the other hand, like legal justice, is a universal
virtue. We have seen that its material object is everything.
It makes one act reasonably in any and every line of activity,
whether there is question of passion or affection of the will, or
operation toward God or neighbor. But it cannot surpass or
even equal the role of legal justice. Its office being merely to
subject the soul to what is above it, it only disposes man to subordinate himself completely and wholeheartedly to justice's universal control of the appetite. This it is able to do because,
subjecting man to God out of reverence for Him, it sees in the
refusal of the appetite to be under reason's control the deathblow to its submission to God. Yet humility here surpasses the
other moral virtues, which effect this willing subjection of the
soul in some one particular field alone. 171
The theological and intellectual virtues, then, and justiceat least legal justice-are surely loftier than humility. What
is the principle which St. Thomas uses as his measuring-rod?
The discussion just finished contains it: One moral virtue is
than another if it subjects the appetite more universally
to the intellect's determination that its ultimate goal is to be
pursued in every act. In other words, one way of grading the
virtues is to discover how extensively they bring reason into
human action, how widely they participate in the " good of
reason." Humility will be greater than any virtue which shares
the good of reason less than it. Succinctly, it is to be ranked
according to how reasonably it makes a man act. Let us apply
this principle to each of the virtues about which the text of the
Summa causes difficulty: to mercy, ;particular justice, fortitude,
religion, and obedience.
First, mercy, which is compassion or sorrow for another's
misery, constraining one to lend all the assistance in his power.
It is called the greatest of virtues by St. Thomas, second only to
charity, "quia misericordia maxime superioris est." 172 Those
17

°Cf. Art. 5, corp.

ln

Ibid.

172

Summa Theol., II-II, q. 30, a. 4, corp.

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SEBASTIAN CARLSON

five words are to be noted carefully. They make it evident
that the Saint credits mercy with this exalted rank not for what
it is formally in itself, but for something that is quite incidental
to it-the superiority of the merciful to those whom they are
led to compassionate and assist. Giving implies abundance;
receiving implies deficiency.
Superiority exists for the purpose of bringing to their goal
inferiors who are themselves incapable of achieving it, or who
cannot do so without great difficulty. This, the supplementing
of the defects of inferiors, is essential to the notion of superiorship, since it is its very raison d' etre. But superiorship as
found in man is wholly accidental to him. Considered as a
creature, he exists not to supply the defects of others, but to be
subject. The very word creature connotes dependence upon a
Creator. Insofar, then, as the circumstances of another's misery
make a creature a superior, his noblest act, .next to an act of
charity, is an act of mercy toward his" subject." But because
he is a creature before he is a superior, because the former qualification is essential to him while the latter is purely accidental,
humility, which follows immediately on his subjection to God
as a creature, is more proper to him than mercy, which follows
on his superiority over others. Lowliness of heart is, therefore,
more excellent a thing than mercy. Moreover; the fact that
mercy is the property and characteristic of a superior, proving
that he has something which the person who is the object of
his charity lacks, indicates nothing about mercy's participation
in the good of reason. Mercy subjects the will to the good of
reason in the one narrow matter of another's miseries, humility
does so in all matters. 173
There is still less difficulty about particular justice, but here
the conclusion is against humility, not for it. The only reason
the question comes up at all is St. Thomas' statement that
" after the theological virtues, and the intellectual ones, which
regard reason itself, and after justice, especially legal justice,
m Cajetan, Commentarium, in II-11, q. 161, a. a: XXV fin!,.

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

875

humility is greater than the rest." 174 The conclusion is indeed
absolute that justice, i. e., all justice, is before humility; but the
emphasis on legal justice causes a shadow of doubt to. arise.
Cajetan clears it away easily, and it is not only his interpretation but certainly Thomas' meaning. 175
The root reason whence the excellence of particular justice over
humility springs, is the same that the ·author gave before: that
justice as a virtue is good not only for the one possessing it, but
is directly for the good of another. For this is the greatest work
of justice and is considered as worthy of the greatest praise ....
But humility is directly the good only of its possessor, like other
moral virtues which regard the passions.... 176
Moreover, he goes on to say, humility postulates particular
justice as an accident postulates its substance. The subjection
of the will to God supposes that the good of reason demands
God be given what is His. H the rational faculty saw no reason for rendering everyone his due, it would be irrational and
immoral to offer subjection to anyone, even to the divine Being;
it would be a lowering of man's condition, " vileness of soul and
human deformity." 177 Particular justice is, then, to be classed
above lowliness of heart.
17 '" ••• post virtutes theologicas et virtutes intellectuales, quae respiciunt ipsam
rationem, et post justitiam, praesertim legalem, potior ceteris est humilitas."-Art.
5, corp.
176 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. U, corp.:
" ... etiam si loquamur de
justitia particulari, praecellit inter alias virtutes morales, duplici ratione: ... quia
scilicet est in nobiliori parte animae, idest in appetitu rationali ... [et quia] aliae
virtutes laudantur solum secundum bonum ipsius virtuosi: justitia autem laudatur
secundum quod virtuosus ad alium bene se habet; et sic justitia quodammodo est
bonum alterius. . . . "
178 " • • • radix unde excellentia justitiae particularis supra humilitatem pullulat,
est ilia quam. . . . Auctor superius docuit: quia scilicet justitiae virtus est bona
non solum habenti, sed directe est ad bonum alterius (hoc enim maximum: virtutis
opus, et praecipua laude dignum censetur, ut patet in locis allegatis); humilitas
autem non directe nisi habentis est bonum, sicut et caeterae virtutes morales quae
circa passiones ponuntur."-Cajetan, Commentarium, in II-II, q. 161, a. 5: XIV.
171 Ibid.:
" ... humilitas praesupponit justitiam, sicut accidens substantiam;
appetitus enim per modum subditi ad Deum et id quod Dei est; supponit justitiam,
qua homo Deo, et id quod ex parte se habet hominis, ei quod ex parte se tenet Dei,
jus suum tribuit. . . . Humilitas, nisi super justitia fundetur, qua unicuique jus
suum debetur, vilitaa animi et deformitaa humana esset."

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A close study of the article in the Summa on the rank of
fortitude 178 is necessary in order to coordinate it with the
paralJel article on humility. We notice that though the title
of the former is general-Utrum fortitudo praecellat inter
omnes virtutes-Thomas in the foreword to the question limits
himself to the place of fortitude among the cardinal virtues;
and that in the article his conclusion is merely that fortitude
precedes temperance. ·" Hence among the cardinal virtues prudence is the greatest; second, justice; third, fortitude; fourth,
temperance. And after these, the other virtues." 179 Does this
place fortitude above humility? We think not. Note that the
Doctor is employing here, though in different words, the principle that we ourselves are using: that its participation in the
good of reason determines the nobility of a virtue. Applying
this to justice, he establishes its precedency, inasmuch as it
executes this good of reason, i.e., inasmuch as it "orders all
the acts of all the virtues of man to his social end, the common
18o

Justice executes this good [of reason], inasmuch as it pertains to
it to place the good of reason in all things human. But other
virtues [merely] conserve this good, inasmuch as they moderate the
passions, lest the latter lead man away from the good of reason.
And, among these, fortitude holds the principal place. 181

Note the lacuna. Justice perfects the will, fortitude moderates passion. Between the two, there is room for any willvirtue that shares the good of reason
fully than fortitude.
There is room, hypothetically, for obedience, for religion, for
humility. The first two are not our concern here, but what
of humility? Again our principle; again our conclusion: the
178

11-11, q. US, a. 12.

"Unde, inter virtutes cardinales, est potior prudentia; secunda, justitia; tertia,
fortitudo; quarta, temperantia. Et, post has, caeterae virtutes."-Ibid., corp.
' 8 °Farrell, op. cit., ill, 175.
181 " Justitia autem est hujus boni factiva, inquantum scilicet ad ipsam pertinet
ordinem rationis ponere in omnibus rebus humanis. Aliae autem virtutes sunt
conservativae hujus boni, inquantum scilicet moderantur passiones, ne abducant
hominem a bono rationis. Et, in ordine harum, fortitudo tenet locum praecipuum
... "-Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 128, a. 12, corp.
179

THE VffiTUE OF HUMILITY

877

good of reason is shared more fully by humility than it is by
fortitude, because the latter makes nian subject himself to
the good of reason in the face of danger of death, whereas
"humility renders man rightly subject or wide open to the
good of reason, n,ot in this or that matter, but universally." 182
It follows that lowliness of heart is to be preferred among the
moral virtues even to the cardinal one of fortitude.
With regard to religion, there are great difficulties in the
way of a correct solution. Thomas reasons to its eminence
thus: What is near the last end, is better than something
farther away from it. Now the purpose of all the virtues is to
produce acts which will bring man closer to God, his final end.
Among the virtues, religion produces acts that have as their
object the worship of the Deity, and hence it brings man
straight to God Himself. "Et ideo religio praeeminet inter
alias virtutes morales." 188 These words seem to be flatly contradicted by others later on: "Et
post justitiam, praesertim legalem, potior caeteris [virtutibus moralibus] est humilitas." 184 At any rate, the two articles have divided the best of
the Commentators, Cajetan and John of St. Thomas. It is
perhaps significant that the latter maintained the supremacy
of religion over lowliness of heart. 185
The difficulties that becloud the issue are mainly two: the
fact that humility is concerned with the good of the individual,
not the good of another, while religion has as its object God
Himself; and the fact that religion is a potential part of justice,
which excels lowliness of heart and determines jts morality. 186
It is true that humility achieves directly only the good of its
possessor, by regulating his irascible appetite, whereas ·religion
aims directly at God and His worship. But even though the
latter strives to pay God the debt of honor and esteem due
189 " Humilitas reddit hominem recte subditum seu patulum bono rationis, non in
hac vel ilia materia, sed universaliter."-Cajetan,
Oommentarium, in II-II, q. 161,
a. 5: XXV. Cr. Art. 5, corp.; ibid., ad fl.
18 ' Art. 5, corp.
183 Summa Theol., 11-II, q. 81, a. 6.
185 cr. Oursus Theologicus, Tomus VII, in II-IIam, Disp. XIX, a. 6, n. 25.
186 Supra, p. 375 (note 177) .

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CARLSON

Him, it does not succeed. Its act does not attain to God as the
acts of the theological virtues do; 187 rather, it reverts to the
soul eliciting it. The divine Being is only the finis cui of religion.
In worshipping God, we do not in reality attain God in those acts
by which we are said to worship Him, but we attain ourselves or
things outside of us. . . . In truth, the act of worship attains ourselves or things that are ours, offering them to God.188
Hence the partial superiority that religion has over humility in
concerning itself with operations and not passions or affections
is considerably lessened by the fact that these operations
directly touch only the soul eliciting them, not God at Whom
they are aimed.
As for the dependence of humility on justice as an accident
on its substance and the close connection of justice and religion,
these facts are here irrelevant. Humility depends, it is true,
on justice, but not on religion. The formal motive of the latter
is indeed reverence for God, as is the formal motive of humility.
Yet the latter does not borrow it from religion, as will be seen
later. 1811 Both have as their principle filial fear. 190
Finally,. to apply our principle: we aver that the good of
reason is more widely participated by humility than it is by
religion, for, whereas religion renders man's will and all his
faculties subject to the good of reason in the one matter of
God's worship, humility renders man subject to that good not
only so far as God is concerned, but also so far as one's neighbor
and oneself, one's reason, will, sensitive appetite, and body are
concerned. Religion has a special and high place among the
moral virtues, singled out from them by its closeness to the
ultimate goal of human life; but from the viewpoint of extenCf. Summa Theol., IT-II, q. 81, a. 5, corp.; ibid., ad
colendo Deum, non Deum secundum rem attingimus actibus iliis quibus
ilium colere dicimur, sed attingimus nos ipsos aut res extra; quamvis grammaticaliter
colere Deum attingere Deum significet, pro quanto ly 'colere' significat terminari
ad Deum. Secundum tamen veritatem rei, actus colendi ad nos aut nostra attingit,
offerendo ilia Deo."-Cajetan, Commentarium, in IT-II, q. 81, a. 5.
189 Infra, pp. 886-890.
190 Infra, pp. 899-408.
187

188 " •••

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879

sion and participation in the good of reason, it is inferior to
humility. 191
Lastly, a word about obedience. There is less difficulty here,
and apparently no doubt about the mind of St. Thomas:
humility is to be ranked above it. In the first place, the conclusion of his article on the place of obedience 192 is strictly
limited. "The virtue of obedience, which for God's sake despises one's own will, is more praiseworthy than other moral
virtues which for God's sake despise other goods." 198 In other
words, obedience is nobler than virtues which lead man to despise created things less excellent than human freedom. But
humility contemns not only one's own will, but everything conceivable as excellent that .could possibly disturb its subjection
to God. And-to apply our principle for the last time-there
is more of the good of reason in lowliness of heart, since obedience renders the wiil subject to that good only in those matters ·
which are the objects of precepts given by competent authority
or which here and now are looked upon by the will formally
and precisely under the aspect of being a duty; 194 whereas
humility renders the entire appetite subject to the good of
reason in all matters, since the motive of subjection to God
reverence for Him is universally applicable and utterly
unrestricted.
As an interesting conclusion to this section, we append a list
of the virtues mentioned above, as graded by Cajetan 195 according to the principle of extensive participation in the good
of reason. They will rank in dignity as follows: the theological
virtues; the 'intellectual virtues, including prudence; legal justice; particular justice; humility; fortitude; temperance; religion;
obedience; mercy. It is as startling a lineup as a disclosure of
191
192

Cf. Cajetan, CCYTTVmentarium,in II-II, q. 16i, a. 5: XXV.
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 104, a. 8.

103 " • • • laudabilior est obedientiae virtus, quae propter Deum contemnit propriam voluntatem, quam aliae virtu,tes morales, quae propter Deum alia bona
contemnunt."-Ibid., corp.
Ibid., a. 2, corp.
1116 Commentarium, in II-II, q. 161, a. 5: XXIV, XXV; esp. XXV jim.

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ages in a community of nuns. But its very strangeness brings
us back to the truth already emphasized: we are not trying to
prove that_ humility is absolutely the most excellent of all the
moral virtues; rather, we are endeavoring to discover why
Christian tradition places it so high among the virtues. The
reason is, as we have seen, its uniquely wide participation in
the. good of reason, the fact that, subjecting the entire appetite
out of reverence for God, it renders it docile to the voice of
reason.

vn. HuMILITY, MAGNANIMITY, AND PHILOTIMIA
From the decline of Greek philosophy to the thirteenth century, and from the decline of Scholasticism till only a few years
ago, the study of magnanimity suffered almost universal neglect. The very word, magnanimous, is misunderstood todayso much so that in a recent authoritative translation of Aristotle megalopsychia appears as " pride " 196-and· is interpreted
as meaning broadminded or liberal. Perhaps the nature of the
virtue is responsible for its neglect and misapprehension, presenting as it does a most amazing paradox.
Superficially considered, it seems to be an antipode of humility.197 Studied carefully, it approaches so close to the latter
as to be almost indistinguishable from its secondary function pf
stoking hope. Seen in act, it again appears to be locked in
a death struggle with lowliness of heart, for it involves an
advance toward what is truly great, with confidence in one's
own powers, whereas under the same circumstances humility
recoils, sure of its own impotence and worthlessness. 198
Magnanimity may be described as the mark of a man who
grapples with great things and seeks out honor and glory,
confident in his own power and ability. 199 According to Aris196 The Works of Aristotle translated into English under the Editorship of W. D.
Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908-1981), VoL IX, "Ethica Nicomachea," iv, 8
passim. Cf. note ibid.
197 Cf. infra.
108 Cf. infra.
199 Cf. Summa Theol., 11-II, q. U9, aa. 1-8.

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totle, it makes him ungrateful, ironic, hard to live with, even
scornful of others. 200 In the eyes of his fellows, the great man
may seem as swollen up with pride as a penny balloon with
wind. To the casual observer, he is the brother of Lucifer and
an archenemy of the humble Christ.
When it is known more intimately, however, magnanimity
shows itself in far more lovely light. Though it fires the soul
to seek what is absolutely great-not merely what is great in
proportion to the limited talents of ordinary men-it moderates
this impulse according to the dictates of right reason and hence
is a virtue. In its quest of excellence, it does not aim directly
at honor and glory; they cannot be its object, because from its
lofty height it sees that, outside its usefulness as a means to
virtue, the regard of men is something small and negligible. Its
purpose is rather the achievement of all manner of deeds which
in themselves and independently of the will and desire of the
magnanimous man, merit the highest respect and veneration. 201
As for the unamiable effects that magnanimity has, these too
are seen to be anything but unamiable if considered closely.
The man of great soul appears at times to be ungrateful, but
only because he dislikes to receive favors so extensive that he
cannot hope to repay and surpass them. This, St. Thomas
assures us, belongs to the very perfection of gratitude, in which
he wishes to excel, as he does in all the virtues. 202 In conversation "he uses irony [irony for the Schoolmen meant self-disparagement, not sarcasm], not as it is opposed to truth, so that
he affirms of himself abject things that are untrue, or denies
great things that are true; but because he does not reveal his
entire greatness." 203 He is well liked by his friends, but not by
every chance acquaintance, " since he altogether avoids adula200 Ethica Nicomachea iv, 8. 1124b 25-1125a 12. Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 129.
a. 8, arg. 5.
201 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 129, a. 8. N. B. answers to all objections.
202 Ibid., ad 5.
203 " • • • utitur ironia, non secundum quod opponitur
veritati, nt scilicet dicat
de se aliqua vilia, quae non sunt, vel neget aliqua magna, quae sunt; sed quia non
totam magnitudinem suam monstrat ... "-Ibid.

SEBASTIAN CARLSON

tion and pretence [so necessary with the ' smart set '], which
pertain to smallness of soul. Nevertheless he gets along well
with aU, both great and little, as he should " 204 -in other words,
according to all the demands of charity and the social virtues.
Finally, his "scorn" for others is not contempt for their lack
of greatness, but for their defects. 205 And it is scorn in the
sense,
before, of an orderly love. He honors the good
in every man and prefers it to his own deficiency.
There is here no opposition to humility; magnanimity is commendable both in itself and in its unusual characteristics. Indeed, it and humility seem to approach and blend together, like
shadows. They are in the same part of the soul, the irascible
appetite. They have the same material object: remotely, every
excellence; proximately, the appetite for arduous good. They
possess the same formal object, the rationalizing of hope. They
bridle the heart when it kicks at the traces of reason; they whip
it to its utmost strength when it recoils from duty. Both of
them keep the limitations of character dearly in view, and
know the height to which they must attain and beneath which
they must not falL What then is the distinction between them,
if there can be one?
The question is even more disquieting when asked of philotimia and humility. Philotimia, the Jude of the virtues, the
little sister of magnanimity, is the regulator of the ordinary
man's thirst for honor. It helps John Doe and Mary Smith,
and the millions of insignificant people all over the world whom
history never names, to pursue the life to which Providence has
called them, to avoid sinful ambition, and remain firm in the
midst of the difficulties that their vocations entail. AU that is
true of magnanimity is true of it, when foreshortened and
duced from the extraordinarily great and arduous to what is
••• " . . . quia omnino vitat adulationem et simulationem, quae pertinent ad
animi parvitatem. Convivit tamim omnibus et magnis et parvis, seciiD.dum quod
oportet ... "-lbid.
205 Ibid., ad 4:
" Similiter etiam magnanimitas contemnit alios sec1mdum quod
deficiunt a donis Dei; non enim b..ntum alios appretiatm quod pro eis aliquid
indecens faciat:'

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888

middling and commonplace. Not that John Doe's talents,
hardships, and sweating victories are insignificant before God,
but only that in comparison with what is involved in the government of a state or the conduct of a war, for example, they
pale a:qd take on their true proportions.
But why posit a special virtue to do what lowliness of heart
can evidently do through its secondary act? Again, the real
distinction between humility and a virtue similar· to it must be
questioned. ·
Detailed scrutiny reveals that the differences between magnanimity, philotimia, and humility are as fundamental as their
likenesses are superficial. Their proximate material objects are
indeed the same: hope, the appetition of the excellent. But,
even though the remote matter of each is honor, it is distinguished by the fact that humility is concerned with every good
conceived of as an excellence, magnanimity only with things
objectively great, 206 _ philotimia with any objective excellence
that merits the ordinary esteem of men.
For its formal object, humility has chiefly the restraining of
hope's tendency to go beyond reason, while it is the strengthening of the soul against despair and the urging of it to a reasonable quest of honor that magnanimity and philotimia have
principally in view.207 For its formal motive, humility in repressing the presumption of hope looks to reverence for God
and submission to Him; in hardening hope, the other two look
to the obtaining of man's own good, lest by despair he become
unworthy of what is proportionate to his talents. 208
As to the mode or general type of their activity, humility represses the soul, and hence is reduced to temperance; magnanimity and philotimia confirm and impel ·the appetite, hence
are reduced to fortitude. In their reaction to a desirable excellence, humility, measuring its deficiency with the height of the
work at hand, moves from it-or toward it-as unworthy; the
other two move toward it as being worthy, since the talents
••• Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 161, a. 1, corp.; ad 8; q. 129, a. 1, corp.
••• Cf. Art. 2, ad 8.
••• Cf. Art. 1, corp.; ad 8.

8

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SEBASTIAN CARLSON

given by God are in direct proportion to the end to be attained.
Thus the attitude of magnanimity to lofty good, e. g., the honor
and esteem of men, is that it is worthy of them, account being
taken of the gifts the soul itself possesses, great virtue, for example, or specialized learning. But humility, account being
taken of man's nothingness, looks on itself as unworthy of any
good. As far as persons are concerned, magnanimity "despises " others to the extent that they do not measure up to
the talents given them; it does not regard them, in other words,
so highly as to do anything in their regard not becoming itself.
But humility honors all men and looks upon them as SUJ?eriors,
seeing in them God's wonderful gifts and an image of Him. 209
Magnanimity and philotimia have their abode in the sensibleirascible appetite; 210 humility resides in the will and disposes
the lower irascible to follow the voice of reason. Moreover,
both the habit and frequent acts of humility are necessary to
everyone for salvation; but its sisters, though they must exist
habitually in every soul, need be reduced to act, indeed can be
reduced to act, only if and when circumstances demand it.
John Doe may live and die and attain everlasting happiness
without a single act of magnanimity.
Lastly, as to their definitions, which sum up essentially all
their other differences, magnanimity is that moral virtue which
makes a person of great ability, natural or infused, tend to
great works worthy of great honor. Philotimia is that which
inclines a person of ordinary abilities, both natural and infused,
to the accomplishment of good in proportion to those abilities.
Humility is that by which a person, considering his deficiencies,
holds himself to what is lowly, according to his measure, out
of reverence for God.
The three virtues are, then, utterly different when considered
from a speculative point of view. But there is one more difficulty: how can they be reconciled in the practical order? How
can a man decide that in general his attitude toward life should
••• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 129, a. S, ad 4.
210 Ibid., I-II, q. 60, a. 5, corp.; II-II, q. 129, a. 1, ad 1, 2; q. 184, a. 4, ad 1.

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385

he one of endeavor to perform great deeds for the Church or
society, or one of self-effacement and content with circumstances as they are? How can he determine, moreover, here
and now in this particular opportunity for extraordinary action,
that he is to accept ·or refuse it?
The answer lies in his knowledge of self and his experience,
for magnanimity and philotimia as well as humility depend on
self-knowledge. 211 The more thorough that knowledge, the
more easily can one settle upon the becoming line of action.
If experience has taught one, for instance, that he is capable
of leading men and has administrative and military genius, he
should have no scruple, all things being equal, in accepting a
generalship in his country's army. If a diplomat has done well
in a minor position and realizes that a mere fraction of his
talent has been called into play in the fulfilling of his duties, he
may quite blamelessly seek a far more important and exacting
assignment. Past experience, then, in similar or even far more
trivial lines, is one norm for the choice between advance toward
the excellent or abstention from it.
Another norm is the individual's constitutional makeup. Not
only has magnanimity, like all the virtues, definite effects on
soul and body; soul and body may also have strong dispositions
toward magnanimity, and indicate that a young man or woman
has been intended by divine Providence as its special instrument. As physical traits, Thomas, following Aristotle, 212 mentions a slow gait that is the effect not of corpulency, weakness,
or disease, hut of a habitually absorbed reason; gravity of voice;
a deliberate manner of enunciation, not affected hut natural. 218
One's outstanding social position, as membership in a family
that for generations has given its children to the church or
state, or even one's great wealth, are further hints that should
make the young person ponder his future seriously. 214
Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 133, a. fl, corp.; ad 1.
Ethica Nicomachea iv, 3. 119!5a 13-15.
213 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 129, a. 3, arg. 3 & ad 3.
210 Ibid., ad fl, 4.
211
212

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Again, constant preoccupation with the thought of great
things-not mere day-dreaming, but practical scheming that
seems to cry aloud for realization-is a sign not to be neglected.215 If a man's brain,and heart insistently clamor that he
achieve what the world holds in greatest esteem/ 16 and if the
means to do so lie within his own power or in the power of his
friends or associates, 217 God Himself is in all probability at the
root of his inclination, and not pride or ambition.
Finally, if the Christian is moved to perform even ordinary
actions not simply because they are virtuous and demanded by
reason, but even more because they are excellent things that .
somewhat slake his thirst for the accomplishment of what is
loftiest in every virtue, he may deeply suspect that his soul
is meant for greater things, and should in gratitude to God
investigate where his talents can best serve the community. 218
Thus even in the practical problems of daily life, self-knowledge assists in making the choice between magnanimity or
philotimia accompanied by humility, or of humility alone retreating out of reverence for God from what is above its
measure.

VIII.

HUMILITY

AND RELIGION

Humility is such a simple thing that the Christian easily
distinguishes it from all the vices that copy it, and reduces it
unerringly to practice. But speculatively, as these pages have
shown, it is a theological nightmare. It controls passion, but
is subjected in the ·will. Its material object embraces things
both material and spiritual, created and eternal. Demanding
subjection to God and others, apparently paying them this
subjection as a debt, it is strong in resemblances to virtues of
the justice
but is annexed to temperance.
Dismayed by this heterogeneity, some theologians 219 refuse
to consider it a true unit and maintain that it is not one virtue
017 Ibid., a. 6, corp.
018 Ibid., a. 4.
Ibid., aa. 1, 2.
219 E. g., the Salmanticenses.
Supra, p. 159 (note 72).

"'"Ibid., a. 4, ad 1; a. 6, corp. fin.
016

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

887

but several hearing the same name, just as there are several
with the common name of temperance: abstinence, sobriety,
virginity, and chastity. There is, first, an acquired humility
of the sense appetite that has as its object the reasonable functioning of hope in the pursuit of excellence. Its matter is goods
of the material order, its motive merely the moral attractivethat reason sees in a humble life. A purely personal
quality, it does not produce subjection to others; it is reduced
to temperance as a potential part. A second acquired humility,
subjected in the will, has as its object submission to every
created superior, and pays this submission as a debt of reason.
It is reducible either to justice-where it would be only one
phase of that potential part called observance-or to temperance, with which it agrees in attaining its object by repression
of the appetite. Its motive is the same as that of the first
species. The third and noblest humility, likewise inhering in
the will, is not acquired by man's efforts but infused by God,
and motivated by reverence for the designs of His Providence.
It has nothing to do with passion nor with one's fellow men
(or other intellectual creatures), but subjects man to God in
his hope for excellence above the material plane. It is reduced
to justice.
It extends beyond the limits of one's own good, to give God
what belongs to Him by the submission mentioned above: as
:religion repays Him by worship. and obedience by conformity to
the divine precept. 220

This distinguishing of three humilities is erudite and intriguing, but it is hardly good theology. It attempts to split an
atom that has no parts to be split into, and multiplies being
without necessity. It is the desperate theory of scholars confused (a) by the needlessness of any virtue in the will assisting
it to attain· its own good; (b) by the apparent impossibility of
sso " • • . extenditur ultra limites boni proprii ad reddendum Deo quod suum est
per praedictam subjectionem: sicut religio reddit per cultum, et oboedientia per
op. cit., Tract. XII,
conformitatem ad divinum praeceptum."-Salmanticenses,
Disput. II, Dubium II, n. 54. See also the references given in note 72.

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the appetition of excellence by the lower irascible; (c) by the
fact that humility seems to be just as much. concerned with
external human relations (the object of justice) as it is with
the passion and affection of hope; and (d) by the identity of its
formal motive and that of religion.
The problems presented by the inherence of humility in the
will and by its similarity to justice have been thrashed out
sufficiently already. 221 That even the sense appetite can thirst
for such an " immaterial " good as superiority is borne out
empirically by natural history, for example by the wolf's fierce
maintenance of his leadership in the pack, and speculatively
by the fact that man's fourth and highest inner sense, known
as the judicative power, can be moved by the intellect to esteem
any good of reason, however spiritual, as a good of nature, i. e.,
as something convenient to the whole man, and to present it as
such to the lower irascible appetite. 222
There is no necessity, then, for three habits of humility, one
reducible to temperance and situated in the lower appetite, one
reducible to justice and inhering in the will, the last infused by
God. Neither is lowliness of heart essentially subject to religion, despite the fact that its formal motive is subjection to
God out of reverence for Him. This does give it a certain similarity to latria; but humility cannot be described technically as
" a religious virtue," a virtue " permeated with religion." 223
The doctrine of some theologians that it derives its motive from
religion, and their claim that this is the teaching of the Angelic
Doctor, must be denied. 224
Religion is the moral virtue which inclines man to give God
the cult due to Him as the first principle of all things. Its
material object is our subjection to God and all our internal
221 Supra, pp. 143-144.
••• Josephus Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae (7th ed.;
Freiburg: Herder and Co., 1937), I, 394 (n. 503, 4; cf. 511).
••• Marmion, op. cit., p.
Cf. the references in the footnote.
224 Cf. Blasius Schutz, Die Demut, ihr Wesen und ihre Stellung in der Moral
(Fribourg [Switzerland],
p.
Odon Lottin, L' A me du culte (Louvain,
pp. 40-49; Marmion, op. cit., pp.
(esp. p. 224).

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

389

and external acts, insofar as they protest the divine excellence.
Its matter is, in other words, the worship of God. Its formal
object is to establish, so far as it is possible, equality between
this cult and God's right to it; to attempt to pay man's debt
of worship to the supreme Being. Its formal motive is not
only the special reasonableness of this endeavor, but above all
reverence for the Creator. " To revere God is an act of the
gift of fear. But it pertains to religion to do certain things
because of reverence for God." 225
It does not follow from this that religion lends its motive to
humility. It is true that religion can imperate an act
humility, but it is just as true that humility can imperate an
act of religion. The affirmation that Thomas,
having
attached humility to temperance and obedience to observance,
reduced both these virtues to religion, 226 is entirely gratuitous.
The Saint seems never to
associated
religion, save
way of comparison. Thus, in answering
objection that man is not forced to humble himself before the
divine in all men because that would be to worship
he
implies that the reverence given to God
religion is exactly
the same as that given Him by humility, even though thP case
is different in the reverence due to men. 227
Furthermore, there is no philosophical reason for subjecting
humility to religion. Neither virtue is specified by reverence
for God alone; that is merely a partial object of both. Both,
consequently, can be activated by the same
225 " Revereri Deum est actus doni tim oris.
Ad religionem au tern pertinet facere
ad l.
aliqua propter divinam reverentiam."-Summa Theol., II-II, q. 81, a.
226 Cf. Lottin,
op. cit., p. 49, note l: " ... a pres a voir rattache l'humilite a ia
temperance, l'obeissance a !'observance, saint Thomas s'est vu amene, par !'evidence
de Ia n§alite, a rapporter ces vertus a Ia religion. La parente est en efl'et
in deniable."
227 Cf. Art. 3, arg. 1 & ad 1:
" ... humilitas praecipue consistit in subjectione
hominis ad Deum. Sed id quod debetur Deo, non est homini exhibendum; ut patet
in omnibus actibus latriae. Ergo homo per humilitatem non debet se homini subjicere." "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non solum debemus Deum revereri in
seipso; sed etiam id quod est ejus, debemus revereri in quolibet: non tamen eo
modo reverentiae quo reveremur Deum. Et ideo per humilitatem debemus nos
subjicere omnibus proximis propter Deum . . . latriam tamen soli Deo debemus
exhibere."

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any prejudice to their formal distinction. For one and the
same motive can have various effects, as friendship leads to fear
of losing the friend and to extreme self-sacrifice for him. In
the same way, reverence for God leads to the universal moderation of the irascible appetite by humility and to the adoration
of God by religion. Influenced by the fear of offending God by
sin because he loves Him, man is led on the one hand to continue paying this reverence as a debt that he owes God; and his
endeavor to do so becomes an act of religion. 2 :?JS On the other
hand, motivated by the same filial fear, man sees in unrestrained appetition of excellence an immediate cause of the
separation from God that he fears; and his consequent subjection of the appetite to reason is an act of humility.
Humility can be called a " religious virtue," therefore, only
metaphorically and improperly; yet it and religion spring from
the same deep source, the fear of God. Because of common
parentage, the features of one resemble those of the other.
They have the faces of sisters. 229
To sum up: humility is neither magnanimity nor philotimia;
nor is it a potential part of justice, nor something essentially dependent upon religion, the most important virtue annexed to
justice. But its association with the second cardinal virtue is
most intimate; it is the serf of legal justice, and depends for
its moral uprightness on the presuppositions of particular
justice.
IX. THE DEGREES OF HUMILITY
In the sixth article of his tract on humility in the Summa,
Thomas discusses the degrees of lowliness of heart as they were
assigned by Saints Benedict, Anselm, and Bernard. 230 We have
••• Cf. III Smt., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, quaest. 1, ad 8: "Revereri inquantum hujusmodi est actus timoris. Sed exhibere reverentiam inquantum est Deo debitum, est
proprie latriae."
229 Infra, pp. 899-408, "Humility
and the Gift of Fear."
••• Art. 6, arg. 1: St. Benedict, Regula, Cap. VII. M L 66, 871 B-874 C.
Ibid., arg. 8: St. Anselm, De Similitudinibus, Cap. C-CIX, esp. Cap. CIX.
M L 159, 665 B-669 A.
Ibid., arg. 4: St. Bernard, Sermo in Octava Epipkaniae, n. 4 (M L 188, 154 A, B.),
quoted by St. Thomas as the Glossa Ordinaria, in Matt. 8: 15. Cf. M L 114, 82.

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

891

seen that he used Bernard's division in the Commentary on St.
Matthew's Gospel. 281 In the Summa he shows that it is .not
essential,
from the nature of humility, but purely accidental, made by comparison with the ranks of men, who are
superior, equal, or inferior to oneself.282 As for Anselm's seven
grades, he finds them reducible to two of the twelve given by
Benedict. 288 Since he pays the' most attention to the latter's
division, we shall follow his example.
A word must be said first about the text of the article. In
citing the twelve degrees proposed by St. Benedict's Rule/ 84
Thomas evidently did not have the Rule itself to refer to, for
he gives them in inverse order. His first degree, "Always. to
display humility in heart and body," is Benedict's twelfth. 235
Yet, he certainly wished to follow the original order and
thought he was doing so. He states explicitly that it was the
Rule which listed the twelve grades/ 36 and reverence for the
great work would have prevented him from altering it. Moreover, he answers the second objection (that the order of the
degrees is obviously inconvenient, since the exterior traits of
humility are mentioned before the interior, whereas all virtues
naturally proceed from what is interior to what is exterior)
with a defense of the order as he gave it, and without calling
the integrity of his text into question.
Where did the vitiated text come from? Dom Lambot, in an
interesting article in the Revue Benedictine, 287 maintains that
Thomas had at hand 'only a copy of the capitula. This was a
sort of preface prefixed posthumously to the famous treatise
De Humilitate et Superbia, as an index and aid to the reader
in following Bernard when he lists the degrees of pride and
231 Supra, note 181.
••• Cf. Art. 6, arg. 8 & ad 8 .
... Cf. Art. 6, ad 4.
""' Cf. Art. 6, arg. 1.
••• " Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguuntur duodecitJ gradus humilitatis, qui
in Regula beati Benedicti ponuntur: quorum primus est ' corde et corpore semper
humilitatem ostendere,' defixis in terram aspectibus."-Art. 6, arg. 1.
••• Cf. the preceding note.
•••" L'ordre et le texte des ' degres d'humilite' dans s. Thomas,'' XXXIX
(1927)' 129-185.

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notes their inverse correspondence to the traditional twelve degrees of humility. This short preface, still extant but not from
the hand of Bernard himself, summarized the chapter on
humility in Benedict's Rule, retaining the essential wording of
each degree. A comparison of it with the list in the article in
the Summa leaves no doubt, Dom Lambot affirms, as to St.
Thomas' source.
How did it happen that Aquinas followed a text in which the
order of the degrees was inverted? The answer is not far to
seek. The capitula consists of two columns, in the first of
which the grades of humility are listed (and therefore numbered) inversely, so as to correspond with the opposite degrees
of pride. Some scribe, ignorant perhaps of the source of the
"index," at all events unable to understand the retrograde
order in the first column, reversed the numerals or deleted
them. Since the capitula, according to Lambot, was almost the
only part of the Rule of St. Benedict known in the Schools,
it is probable that St. Thomas found the erroneous version of
it in his manuscript of St. Bernard's works, at the head of
the treatise De Humilitate et Superbia, which he knew and
quoted. 233
However that may be, the preposterous list did not foil the
Angelic Doctor. For some unaccountable but happy reason,
he begins his commentary on it 239 from the twelfth degree of
his own text (Benedict's first), thus employing it in its original
order. He does not defend the thesis that the degrees represent
strictly the soul's development; he observes that the first six
grades are interior qualities pertaining in one way or another
to humility, the last six its external manifestations. He states
expressly that some of the degrees imply acts flowing directly
from other virtues, obedience and patience for example, and
shows that, though not elicited by humility, they are imperated
by it. "As one vice springs from another, so, in the natural
order, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of another." 240
••• Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 162, a. 4, arg. 4.

••• Cf. Art. 6, corp. init.
ordine, actus unius

uo " . • . sicut unum vitium oritur ex alio; ita, naturali
virtutis procedit ex
alterius."-Art. 6, ad 1.

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The whole article is a splendid example of the marvellous
Scholastic genius for analysis. In order that the matter under
discussion may be completely before the reader's eyes, the
twelve grades are first quoted. 241 Then criticism is leveled
against their convenience. Objections are raised against their
general arrangement and certain details; 242 they are condemned
as contradicting the degrees given by Ambrose and Bernard; 243
finally, the possibility of any complete enumeration whatsoever
is questioned. 244 No sed contra is needed, the weight of Benedict's authority itself making up for the omission of the usual
argument from authority.
But it is above all at the body of the article that the student
marvels. In a few clear, incisive lines, Thomas first sums up
his entire doctrine on humility. 245
I answer: we must say that, as is clear from what has been said
before, humility consists essentially in the appetite, insofar as one
restrains the impetuosity of his soul, lest it tend inordinately toward great things. But it has its rule in knowledge, namely, that a
man must not esteem himself above what he is. And the principle
of each of these elements is the reverence one has toward God.
Now from the interior disposition of humility, there proceed certain
exterior signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that
which is hidden within, as occurs also in the other virtues; for " a
man is known by his look, and a wise man by his countenance." 246

No better exposition of the very heart and marrow of humility,
we firmly believe, has ever been expressed in theological lanNevertheless, for all its profundity, it is so simply
worded that the youngest seminarian can hardly fail to under241 Arg. I.
••• Arg. 1, 2.
••• Arg. 8, 4.

•u Arg. 5.
245 Ecclus. 19:26.

••• "Respondeo:
dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, humilitas essentialiter in appetitu consistit, secundum quod aliquis refraenat impetum animi sui, ne
inordinate tendat in magna; sed regnlam habet in cognitione, ut scilicet aliquis non
se existimet esse supra id quod est. Et utriusque principium et radix est reverentia
quam quis habet ad Deum. Ex interiori autem disposit.ione humilitatis, prcicedunt
quaedam exteriora signa in verbis et factis et gestibus, quibus id quod interius latet
manifestatur, sicut et in ceteris virtutibus accidit: nam 'et visu cognoscitur vir, et
ab occursu faciei sensatus,' ut dicitur."

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SEBASTIAN CARLSON

stand it. Yet it is but an introduction to the rest of the article,
the groundwork for an analysis of the various inner characteristics and outward manifestations of the virtue. Thomas
shows how each of the elements he has mentioned finds its
expression in one or more of the twelve degrees. To afford a
better view of this exposition, we give it in diagram form. (See
Figure I.)
Thus Thomas not only stamps the mark of his approval on
Benedict's doctrine; he also shows how that doctrine corresponds to his own. Or rather, in deep humility, he finds the
final approval for his own teaching in that of the great monk,
analyzing it and handing it down to posterity with a commentary that will make it ever better understood and loved.
These degrees do not mark an advance in humility alone.
Because of the connection of the virtues, the presence of the
more lofty among them in a soul signifies the presence of great
sanctity. Advanced humility especially
great charity.
This, the verdict of all orthodox spiritual writers, 247 is of course
the verdict of St. Thomas.
The more humility a man has, the more he loves God and despises his own excellence, and the less he attributes to himself; so,
the more charity a man has, the more humility he
too. 24 fl Whoever is an imitator of childlike innocence, is greater; for the humbler
one is, the higher he is, since "he who humbleth himself shall be
exalted." 249, 25o

The degree of humility corresponds to the degree of charity;
but why? Because God gives His grace to the humble, answer
the sacred writers, the Fathers, the theologians, throughout the
207 Cf., e. g., Garrigou-Lagrange,
Les trois conversions et les trois voies (Paris,
1988)' pp. 184, 185.
••• "Ergo quanto magis habet homo de humilitate, tanto magis diligit Deum, et
magis excellentiam sui contemnit, et tanto minus sibi attribuit: sic quanto homo
plus habet de charitate, habet etiam magis de humilitate."-Comment.
in Matt.,
Cap. XVTII, n. 1, p.
post med.
••• " Quicunque est imitator puerilis innocentiae, hie major est, quia quanto
humilior, tanto altior: quia' qui se humiliat, exaltabitur.' "-Ibid.
••• Luke, xiv, 11.

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395

early centuries; but their explanations of the latter statement
are sketchy and unsatisfying. St. Thomas is clear and complete.
First, why are love of God and lowliness of heart so closely
connected? To explain this, the Angelic Doctor has recourse
to the opposition of pride and charity; and when he shows that
these two are directly contrary, we understand the close bond
of love and humility. After the words cited in the paragraph
above, " the humbler one is, the higher' he is," he continues:
But this can be called into question, since it does not seem to be
true, because perfection consists in charity, and only where there
is greater charity is there greater perfection. It must be said [in
answer] that humility necessarily accompanies charity. And you
can see this if you consider who the humble man is. For whereas
there are two things in pride, inordinate affection and an inordinate
esteem of self, the contrary is true of humility, since it does not
consider its own excellence. Likewise, it does not deem itself
worthy. This follows necessarily on charity. For everyone seeks
that excellence which he loves. Therefore, the more a man has of
humility [lege "charity"?], the more he loves God, and despises his
own excellence, and attributes less to himself. Thus, the more a
man has of charity, the more he has of humility." 251

Humility is so intimate with charity because, in the humble,
love of God has excluded love of self, and an appreciation of
God's excellence has excluded an over-appreciation of man's
excellence. This reasoning is expressed more clearly in another
passage.
videtur enim quod hoc non sit verum, quia per' 61 " Sed potest esse quaestio:
fectio est in charitate; ergo ubi major charitas, ibi major perfectio.-Dicendum,
quod charitatem necessario comitatur humilitas. Et potestis hoc videre si consideretis quis sit humilis. Sicut enim in superbia sunt duo, affectus inordinatus et
aestimatio inordinata de se; ita e contrario in humilitate, quia propriam excellentiam
non considerat. Item non reputat se dignum. !stud de necessitate sequitur ad
charitatem. Omnis homo cupit excellentiam quam diligit. Ergo quanto magis habet
homo de humilitate, tanto magis diligit Deum, et magis excellentiam sui contemnit,
et tanto minus sibi attribuit: sic quanto homo plus habet de charitate, habet etiam
magis de humilitate."-Comment. in Matt., loc. cit. St. Thomas' reasoning seems
to demand that the last sentence read, "Ergo quanto magis habet homo de
charitate . . . " instead of " . . . de humilitate." It is an error· that might easily
have been made by some medieval copyist, even by Thomas himself.

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CARLSON

Charity dispels inordinate passion in three ways. First in regard
to
which is an inordinate appetite for one's own excellence.
For one seeks his own excellence inordinately when it is not enough
for him to be contained in the grade given to him by God. And
therefore it is said, " The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off
from God." 252 Which indeed happens when he is unwilling to be
contained under the rule of the divine ordination. And this is
repugnant to charity, by which one loves God above all,253

Charity is opposed to pride as directly as love of God is opposed
to love of self; and humility is as intimate with charity as subjection to God is with love of Him. As we have seen, a creature's perfection consists in its subjection to its superidr; the
perfection of man's love for God therefore consists in subjection
to Him-which is humility.
A simple phrase in the text quoted above from the commentary on Matthew's Gospel provides a clue to the philosophical solution of the question. Everyone seeks that excellence which he loves. Love God, and you will seek Him. Love
self, and you will seek yourself. The reason, then, for the close
relationship of lowliness of heart and charity is the radication
of all passions and affections in love. We desire and hope for
and delight in only what we love. Charity is love of God. 254
If love is right, appetition will be right, and reasonable appetition of one's own excellence is humility. In a word, if love is
ordinate, the hope it enkindles will be ordinate.
In the Summa, the 4-ngelic Doctor assigns the reason for the
intimacy of the two virtues from a theological viewpoint.
Humility increases as filial fear of God increases, for, as will be
seen in the next chapter, it depends on that fear for its very
Ecclus., x, 14.
• • • charitas
repellit inordinatam passionem, quantum ad tria. Primo
quidem quantum ad superbiam, quae est inordinatus appetitus propriae excellentiae.
Tunc autem inordinate suam excellentiam quis appetit, quando non sufficit ei contineri in eo gradu, qui sibi est a Deo praestitus. Et ideo dicitur Eccl., 10: 'Initium
superbiae hominis, apostatare a Deo.' Quod quidem fit, dum homo non vult
contineri sub regula ordinationis divinae. Et hoc repugnat charitati, qua quis
super omnia Deum diligit." Comment. in 1 Cor., Cap. XIII, Lect. TI (vv. 4, 5),
p. 364b ante med.
••• Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. flll, aa. 1, fl.
252

253 "

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397

being. But filial fear grows only as charity does-hence the
direct proportion in the augmentation ·of the latter and of
humility.
It is necessary that filial fear, by which one dreads to offend God
or be separated from him, increase with the increase of charity, as
every effect increases with the increase of its cause; for the more
one person loves another, the more he fears to offend him and to
be separated from him. 255

This receives its final clarification from Thomas' answer to a
second question: Exactly why is humility so strong a magnet
of God's love? Because it removes the greatest obstacle of that
love, which is pride-here is the answer in a word. But it resolves itself back to humility's subjection: God's love is ever
going out to the sou]; the more the soul is subjected to Him by
humility, as ripening wheat to the sun by the withdrawal of
clouds from the sky, the more it receives the warm beams of
His love, the more it matures in grace and charity.
Christ commended humility especially, because it most of all removes pride, the impediment to man's salvation-which salvation
consists in this, that a man tend to things heavenly and spiritual;
from which he is impeded while he spends his energies in becoming
magnified in earthly things. And therefore the Lord, to remove
this impediment of salvation, showed by the example of His
humility that outward excellence is to be despised. Thus humility
is as it were a disposition to the free access of man to spiritual and
divine goods.256
In this lies the grandeur of humility.

To go back to the Ian-

255 " Timor
autem filialis necesse est quod crescat, crescente charitate, sicut
efl'ectus crescit crescente causa: quanta enim aliquis magis diligit aliquem, tanto
magis timet eum offendere et ab eo separari."-Summa Theol., II-II, q. 19, a. 10,
corp.
256 " Ideo
Christus praecipue nobis humilitatem commendavit, quia per hoc
maxime removetur impedimentum humanae salutis: quae consistit in hoc quod
homo ad caelestia et spiritualia tendat; a quibus homo impeditur dum in terrenis
magnificari studet. Et ideo Dominus, ut impedimentum salutis auferret, exteriorem
celsitudinem contemnendam monstravit per humilitatis exempla. Et sic humilitas
est quasi quaedam dispositio ad liberum accessum hominis in spiritualia et divina
bona." Art. 5, ad 4.

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SEBASTIAN CARLSON

guage of St. Bernard and adopt his favorite metaphor of the
spiritual marriage, humility assures the immediate flooding of
the soul with grace because it opens it to the generative action
of the divine Spouse, Whose burning desire is to beget in it the
perfect image o£ Himself. "Super quem requiescet spiritus
meus nisi super quietum et humilem? " 257
Here the true function of humility with regard to other
virtues is explained. It is that which removes from the soul
the greatest obstacle to the infusion and increase of the virtues:
pride. Its worth is the worth of a removens · prohibens, no
more, no less. It is in this sense that humility is the foundation of all the virtues, and that which conserves them in being.
This is the explanation of the terminology used by the Fathers
in eulogizing lowliness of heart; this is the necessary qualification with which their praises are to be conditioned.
As the ordered assemblage of the virtues is compared by a certain metaphor to, a building, so likewise that which is first in
acquiring the virtues is compared to a foundation, which is the
first thing laid in the work of construction. Now the virtues are
truly infused by God. Hence the first in the acquisition of the
virtues can be understood in two ways.
In one way, after the manner of a removens prohibens. And in
this way, humility holds first place, inasmuch as it expels pride,
which God resists, and renders man subject and always wide open
to the inpouring of divine grace, inasmuch as it empties out the
swelling of pride. . . . And according to this, humility is called the
foundation of the spiritual edifice.
In another way, ·something is first among the virtues directly:
namely, that by which one approaches to God. Now the first approach to God is by faith, according to that of. Hebrews: "He that
cometh to God, must believe." 258 And according to this, faith is
placed as a foundation in a nobler way than humility. 259
257 Isa, lxvi, 2, according to the version at times followed by St. Thomas.
Cf.,
however, infra, note 266.
••• Heb., xi, 6.
••• " Sicut ordinata virtutum congregatio per quandam similitudinem aedificio
comparatur; ita etiam illud quod est primum in acquisitione virtutum, fundamento
comparatur, quod primum in aedificio jacitur. Virtutes autem vere infunduntur a
Deo. Unde primum in acquisitione virtutum potest accipi dupliciter.-Uno modo,

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

899

Thus St. Thomas gives us an exact description of the role
of humility in the spiritual life. Three ·simple phrases sum up
his doctrine: removens prohibens; ess.e subditum; esse patulum ·
ad suscipiendum influxum divinae gratiae. And fundamentally
they are one. The friendship with God which we call charity
of its very nature implies humble subjection: it is' a friendship
of master and slave, of Creator and creature.·

X. HUMILITY AND THE GIFT OF FEAR
So far all our study has done nothing more than clarify the
notion of humility, of its grandeur and beauty, of its rank and
station among the other virtues. It is time that we look to see
if the virtue is enough of itself to fight man's battle against
pride; if the irascible appetite is perfected sufficiently by it to
ascend to the fearful elevation of-man's divinely allotted place
in the universe and not attempt one single step beyond; or if
lowliness of heart alone would fail miserably in the face of
man's supernatural end.
If he were left to himself, man under God's ordinary premotion and concurrence could arrive safely at his natural goal.
His intellect and will, strengthened 'by the virtues,· would assure
his ultimate perfection. But he has been lifted up above himself and orientated toward an end infinitely higher. The
natural virtues .are no longer sufficient, so supernatural ones
have been given to him.
And although this second perfection is ·greater than the first, yet
the first is held in a more perfect manner by .man than the second;
for the first is held by man as a complete possession, but the second
as an imperfect one, since we know and love God (by the superper modum removentis prohibenso Et sic, humilitas primum locum tenet: .inquantum scilicet expellit superbiam, cui Deus resistit, et praebet hominem subditum, et
semper patulum ad suscipiendum influxum divinae gratiae, inquantum evacuat
inflationem superbiaeo o o o Et, secundum hoc, humilitas dicitur spiritualis aedificii
fundamentumo-Alio modo est aliquid primum in virtutibus, directe: per quod
scilicet jam ad Deum acceditur o Primus autem accessus ad Deum est per fidem;
secundum illud Hebro: 'Credere oportet accedentem ad Deumo' Et, secundum
hoc, fides ponitur fundamentum nobiliori modo quam humilitas."-Arto 6, ad!.

9

400

SEBASTIAN

CARLSON

natural virtues) imperfectly. . . . Now that which possesses a
nature or form only imperfectly, cannot operate by itself, unless it
be moved by something else. . . . Consequently man can operate
by the judgment of reason with regard to things that are subject
to human reason, namely in face of the end connatural to him ....
But in face of his ultimate supernatural end, toward which reason
moves according as it is somewhat and imperfectly informed by the
theological virtues, the movement of reason does not suffice, unless
there is present from above the instinct and motion of the Holy
Spirit. 260
Hence the insufficiency of the supernatural virtues alone for
salvation, and the utter need for aid from God Himself, which
we call the Gifts; and attribute to the Holy Ghost. Instead
of preparing the soul for the successful and prompt action of
reason as the virtues do, they prepare it for the action of
Divinity: for prompt, easy movement under the inspiration of
God. "As the appetites of man are made obedient, easily
subordinate to reason by the moral virtues, so the whole man
is made obedient, easily subordinate, readily moved by the
Holy Ghost through the gifts." 261
They are principles of action, habits, as the virtues are; but
they operate in a way not human but divine, making man
resemble the angels in their immediate application of principle
to act, without the laborious steps of ratiocination, deduction,
and inference: making the intellect pierce swiftly, instantly to
the heart of truth, the will penetrate without hesitation to
the highest good.
•e.o" Et quamvis haec secunda perfectio sit major quam prima, tamen prima
perfectio perfectiori modo habetur ab homine quam secunda: nam prima
habetur ab homine, quasi plena possessio; secunda autem, quasi imperfecta:
imperfecte enim diligimus et cognoscimus. . . . Sed id quod imperfecte habet
naturam .aliquam, vel formam, aut virtutem, non potest per se operari, nisi ab
altero moveatur. . . . Sic igitur, quantum ad ea quae subsunt humanae rationi, in
ordine scilicet ad finem connaturalem homini, homo potest operari per judicium
rationis. . . . Sed, in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio
movet secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte informata per virtutes theologicas: non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio
Spiritus Sancti." Summa Theol., I-II, q. 68, a. 2, corp.
261 Farrell, op. cit., ll, p. 241.

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401

The astonishing beauty of this whole a<;tion of the Holy Ghost in
us is not the marvel of divine action-we have long known the
infinite possibilities of God; it is the fact that these actions are ours.
The mode of acting is God's, the very possibility of the action
comes from God, but it is our reason that intuitively penetrates,
judges, counsels; it is our action that plunges instantly to the heart
and perfection of good. That vital assimilation of truth and goodness can come from no other but ourselves.262
Having seen briefly the perfection of the Gifts, we return to
the imperfection of the virtues, and with them, of humility.
The question asked above is answered. Humility, even supernatural humility, is insufficient alone. That the irascible appetite may be kept to the appetition of ordinate excellence, it
must be perfected by another habit, a gift of God which will
dispose it and the whole man to submit to Him promptly and
easily when He moves man to abandon all quest for excellence
save in Himself.
Which of the seven Gifts can this be? St. Thomas repeats
the answer of St. Augustine.
The principal reason for repressing the presumption of hope is
found in reverence for God, which makes man attribute to himself
no more than what belongs to him according to the rank he has
been allotted by God. Hence humility seems to imply principally
the subjection of man to God. And because of this, Augustine
attributes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to
the gift of fear,263 by which man reveres God.264
According to the Angelic Doctor, then, acts of humility spring
not only from the will operating through the virtue but also
from the will operating under the Holy Ghost through His
Gift of Fear. For Thomas, the divine Spirit is the Spirit of
262 Ibid., pp. fWl-248.
••• De sermone Domini in monte, Lib. I, Cap. IV (n. 11). M L 84, 1284.

••• " Sed in reprimendo praesumptionem spei, ratio praecipua sumitur ex reverentia divina, ex quo contingit ut homo non plus sibi attribuat quam sibi competat secundum gradum quem est a Deo sortitus. Unde humilitas praecipue videtur
importare subjectionem hominis ad Deum. Et propter hoc Augustinus humilitatem,
quam intelligit per paupertatem spiritus, attribuit dono timoris, quo homo Deum
reveretur." Art. 2, ad 8.

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CARLSON

Humility, changing proud meri into little children and dwelling
in their breast. 265 The poor of spirit are the humble, who are
poor or lowly of heart by their. own will and by the operation of
the Spirit, because " humility gives the Holy Ghost," Who
favors the poor and the fearful.266 Isaias, says Aquinas, mentioned specially and separately that Christ was filled with the
spirit of Fear, lest men should think Him puffed up with pride
over the greatness of the other Gifts. 267 "Fear exCludes the
principle of pride, wherefore it is given against pride. Nor
does it follow from this that it is identical with the virtue of
humility, but.that it is the latter's principle." 268
These citations not only show that it is Fear which corresponds to humility, but also give some notion of the nature of
the Gift itself. It is a supernatural habit of the rational appetite making man easily movable by the Holy Ghost, to the
end that he may reverence God and dread separation from
Him by sin.269 It is not servile, but filial or chaste fear, since
the very purpose of a Gift is to make man easily movable by
the Spirit.
But in order that a thing be easily movable by a mover, it is re••• Cf. Comment. in Matt., Cap. XVIII, n. I, p. !!4Sb p-rop. fon.: "' Et advocans
Jesus parvulum ' . . . per parvulum intelligitur Spiritus Sanctus, qui facit parvulos,
quia est spiritus humilitatis. ' Ponam spiritum meum in medio vestri.' (Ezechiel,
xxxvi, !!7.) "
••• Cf. ibid., Cap. V, n. 2 (v. S), p. 1!!a fon.: "Ergo 'beati pauperes,' scilicet hi,
qui parum habent de
superbiae. Vel accipitur spiritus pro voluntate hominis.
Quidam enim sunt necessitate humiles, et isti non sunt beati, sed qui humilitatem
all'ectant. Tertio accipitur pro Spiritu Sancto; unde ' Beati pauperes spiritu,' qui
humiles sunt per Spiritum Sanctum. Et istae duae quasi ad idem redeunt. Et
dicit, ' pauperes spiritu,' quia humilitas dat Spiritum Sanctum: ' Ad quem respiciam
nisi ad pauperculum, et contritum spiritu, et trementem sermones meos? ' (Isaias
lxvi, 2.) "
'"'Cf. Comment. in Iaa., Cap. XI, p. 475 B, ante fon. (in the Parma edition:
" ' Et replebit eum spiritus timoris Domini.' (Iaa., xi, S.) . . . Dicitur autem
specialiter, quod replevit eum spiritus timoris, ne ex magnitudine donorum superbus
credatur, sicut primus angelus."
••• " Timor excludit principium superbiae, propter quod datur contra. superbiam.
Nee tamen sequitur quod sit idem cum virtute humilitatis; sed quod sit principium
ejus.''-Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 19, a. 9, ad 4.
••• Ibid., corp.

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

408

quired first of all that it be subject to that mover, not opposed to
it; for the opposition of a movable thing to its mover hinders motion. But filial or chaste fear accomplishes this (subjection to
God), inasmuch as by it we revere God, and refuse to withdraw
ourselves from Him.270
So the Gift to which humility corresponds is the awe of the
child of God for his Father. Inasmuch as all fear is a shrinking
from some evil, it flees from the evil of offending God because
He is so immeasurably good to men, and from the evil of separation from Him. It reveres rather than trembles, being less
selfish than the servile fear ·which dreads the loss of God because He is one's own good. It seeks intimacy rather than
separation, as .the lover seeks the caress of his beloved, in awe
of her goodness and beauty.
This is the Fear which-so .far as it
to humilityis the divine habit perfecting the soul in its elan to the excellent, setting up in the will a permanent disposition to acts of
perfect self-restraint in the face of
good, acts here and
now beyond the possibility of moral virtue, but easily accomplished under the motion of the Holy (;host.
Precisely what are the relations between Fear and humility?
First, in general, Fear is the principle of humility, presenting
to it its formal motive. This is evident from the nature of
pride, which seeks excellence inordinately, and rebels against
subjection to God. Such rebellion is directly opposed to filial
fear, which of its essence reveres God. Thus, Fear excludes the
very prindple of pride; as St. Gregory puts it, it is the Spirit' a
gift given against pride. 271
Nor does it follow from this that it is identical with the virtue of
humility, but that it is the' latter's principle. For the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are the principles of the intellectual and moral
virtues. 272
no " Ad hoc autem quod aliquid sit bene mobile ab aliquo movente, primo requiritur ut sit ei subjectum, non repugnans: quia ex repugnantia mobilis ad
movens impeditur motus. Hoc autem facit timor filialis vel castus, inquantum per
ipsum Deum reveremur, et refugimus nos ipsi subducere."-Ibid., corp.
m Moralia, IT, Cap. XLIX (n. 77). M L 75, 59!l D-598 A.
... " Nee tamen sequitur quod sit idem cum virtute humilitati.S; sed quod sit

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CARLSON

How Fear is the principle of humility, giving it its formal
motive, namely reverential awe and therefore subjection to
God, is explained by Thomas profoundly and beautifully.
Since it pertains to filial fear to show God reverence and to be
subject to Him, that which follows upon this subjection pertains to
the gift of fear. Now from the fact that one subjects himself to
God, he ceases seeking to be magnified in himself or anyone else
except in God. And therefore from the fact that one fears God
perfectly, it follows that one does not seek to be magnified in himself by pride, and that one does not seek to be magnified in exterior
goods, namely honors and riches. 273

This is the reason why in his treatise on humility Thomas
insists over and over on the importance of the element of reverence and subjection. Such an attitude toward God results in
reasonable repression of the irascible appetite, which is the
formal object of humility.
Though not identical, the Gift and the virtue are alike in
many respects. Both regard reverence for God. Both repress
the irascible appetite. That they nevertheless differ widely is
seen from their different fields of activity, 274 and especially from
their distinct formal objects.
The gift of fear is distinguished from humility, granted the two are
very similar, because even though humility proceeds from subjection and reverence for God to refrain the passions of daring, and
presumption and pride ... yet formally and directly, humility does
not produce the reverence and motion of flight which fear elicits;
but from its participation of fear humility represses and moderates
principium ejus. Dona enim Spiritus Sancti sunt principia virtutum intellectualium
et moralium."-Summa Theol., II-II, q. 19, a. 9, ad 4.
273 " Cum enim ad timorem filialem pertineat
Deo reverentiam exhibere et ei
subditum esse: id quod ex hujusmodi subjectione consequitur pertinet ad donum
timoris. Ex hoc autem quod aliquis Deo se subjicit, desinit quaerere in seipso vel
in aliquo alio magnificari nisi in Deo. Hoc enim repugnaret perfectae subjectioni
ad Deum. . . . Et ideo ex hoc quod aliquis perfecte timet Deum, consequen:s est
quod non quaerat magnificari in seipso per superbiam, neque etiam quaerat magnificari in exterioribus bonis, sc., honoribus et divitiis .... "-Ibid., art. 1!2, corp.
270 The field of the Gift is far wider than that of the virtue, for the former corresponds not only to humility but tci temperance and all its potential parts, as well
as to theological hope:

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

405

presumptuous hope, lest one presume too greatly on himself; and
thus humility directly modifies passion, namely the passion of hope.
. . . But the fear which is a gift does not modify passion directly,
but is concerned with God by way of reverence, falling back into
itself from the greatness of His excellence.275

We might simplify and summarize this by saying that whereas
reverence for God is the formal motive of humility, it is the
formal object of Fear.
Looking at the correspondence of the Gift and virtue more
in particular, we see that humility does not correspond to
Fear directly, but only indirectly, as temperance does. In
itself, Fear is concerned with God, being unwilling to offend
Him. It corresponds directly therefore to theological hope, for
it dreads to withdraw itself from the help man hopes to have
by God's goodness. "And hence filial fear and hope cling
together and mutually perfect each other." 276 But secondarily
and indirectly, Fear is concerned with all the things that one
must flee to avoid sin, among which are the pleasures and desires moderated by temperance, to preserve which man needs
indeed the very strongest motives of fear. 277 Hence the matter
of the Gift of Fear as it regards temperance is every motion
of the soul, sensible or suprasensible, that needs checking and
curbing.
And this is evident, since fear has of itself the most universal ·of
motives, namely in all things to subject itself to God and to have
••• "Et distinguitur (donum timoris) etiam ab humilitate, licet valde similis sit,
quia etsi humilitas procedat ad refraenandum passiones audaciae, et praesumptionem, et superbiani ex subjectione, et reverentia ad Deum ... tamen formaliter,
et directe humilitas non facit ipsam reverentiam, et motum fugae, quem elicit
timor, sed ex illius participatione humilitas reprimit, et moderatur spem praesumptivam, ne aliquis de se nimis magnifice prae.Sumat, et sic directe moderatur passionem humilitas, scil., motum spei. Timor autem qui est donum non moderatur
directe passiones, sed circa Deum versatur per modum reverentiae, resiliens in se a
magnitudine eminentiae illius."-John of St. Thomas, op. cit., Tome VI (in I-II),
Disput. XVIII, Art. VI, n. 48.
••• "Et ideo timor filialis et spes sibi invicem cohaerunt, et se invicem perficiunt."-Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 19, a. 9, ad 1.
277 Ibid., q. 141, a. 1, ad 3.

41!)6

SEBASTIAN

CARLSON

reverence for Him; wherefore it can embrace any matter that calls
upon the soul for repression, that the passions may be refrained.
And all this is the matter of temperance, either in its principal
matter ... or in the other adjoined (matters) that are less
dpal, as in moderating anger, daring, hope, presumption, etc. 218

We see that the correspondence of Fear to humility is indirect,
being of the same type as its correspondence to the cardinal
virtue of temperance.
The nature of the latter :relation wiU be understood better if
the relations of Fear to theological hope, and indeed to aU the
virtues, are investigated in contrast to its relations with temperance. Fear corresponds to hope by :reason of the object it
reveres and to Whom, it subjects itself; and thanks to this
subjection it represses the presumption opposed to hope. It
can correspond to every virtue inasmuch as it avoids and :flees
any offense of God whatsoever. But it corresponds to temperance because of the effects which it, Fear, produces in the soul,
just as all fear does. Temperance directly represses pleasure,
which dilates and expands heart and soul; but Fear represses
pleasure indirectly, by contracting and shrinking the soul, as
the experience of daily life bears witness, and thus keeps the
soul from the exuberation and overabundance of desire and
delectation. 279
And it is not only these two passions, the ones more directly
connected with the sense of touch, that are chilled by Fear, no:r
the accompanying emotions of the wilL Hope in both the
inferior and superior appetites receives a severe check, too; and
hence the appetite for excellence is well presided over by the
Gift of
Because its motivating principle, the divine
Spirit, is loftier and infinitely stronger than the human p:rin••• " lEt hoc patet, quia timor habet de se universalissimlllm motiV1ll:m, sc. in
omnibus se Deo subjicere, et reverentiam ad eum habere; ergo omnem :materiam
co:mplecti potest, quae restrictione animi mdiget, ut passiones refrenentm. JEt haec
tmnt omnis materia temperantiae, sive in materia princip!!li . . . sive in !!liis
adjooctis, quae soot minus prin.cipales, ut in moder11.11daira, audacia, spe,
tlm\le, etc .•.. " John of St. Thomas, loc. cit., n. .
.. 9 Ibid., lll.ll. 52-.!li!J. a. n. i'ilL

••• lGW..

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

407

ciples, the reason and will, which employ the virtue of humility,
the Gift enables man to act as a rational creature raised to
divine sonsliip where, left to himself, he would inevitably fall
intosh!.
One thing more should be remarked. Though the correspondence of the Gift to humility .is indirect, it is, so to say,
more direct even in its indirectness
its correspondence to
temperance. As Thomas says,
the inordinate magnifying of man either in himself or in other
things [which is contrary both to humility and to the Gift] is more
directly opposed to subjection to .God, which filial fear produces,
than extrinsic delectation. This is, however, opposed to fear
consequenti; since he who reveres God and is subject to him, does
not delight in things other than God.281
In the case of the former: Fear is repressing what is directly
opposed to it and what is in the same part of the appetite, the
irascible; in the case of the latter, it is repressing pleasure and
desire, whkh oppose it only ex consequenti.
To sum up, Fear corresponds to humility because it has the
power, under the inspiration of the Giver of all gifts, to produce the same acts that humility produces; but it will succeed
in circumstances where humility would fall short. Fear, with
its roots in faith, hope, and charity, 282 and guided especially
by Wisdom 288 -Fear, moved by. the thought of man's infinite
181 " Directius opponitur subjectioni ad Deum, quam facit timor :6lialis, indebita
magnificatio hominis vel in seipso vel in aliis rebus, quam delectatio extranea.
Quae tamen opponitur timori, ex consequenti: quia qui Deum reveretur et ei
,subjicitur, non delectatur in allis a Deo." Summa Tkeol., 11-II, q. 19, a. 12, ad 2.
282 Cf. ibid., a. 9, ad 4; I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 8. Filial fear' is founded on charity
·
because of its very nature it presupposes love, and on hope because it would not
fear to be separated from God tmless it could hope that it would one day receive
the full union with God of which its earthly union is but the seed and the be-ginning. As for faith, it is the cause of filial fear, "quo quis timet separari a Deo,
vel quo quis refugit se Deo comparare, reverendo ipsuin: inquantum, per fidem,
hanc existimationem habenius de Deo, quod sit quoddam immensum et altissimum
bonum, a quo sepatari est pessimum, et cui velle aequari est malum. . • • [Timoris]
filialis est causa fides formata, quae per caritatem facit hominem Deo adhaerere et
ei subjici."-Summa Theol., II-II, q. 7, a. 1, corp.
••• Ibid., I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 5.

408

SEBASTIAN

CARLSON

distance from God 284 and of His divine excellence, 285 moved no
less by love for Him 286 than by horror of offending Him 287 Fear, thus motivated, turns from all that can separate the
soul from Him, from all that, in other words, can destroy its
subjection to Him. Therefore it flies from every inordinate
seeking of excellence, this being directly contrary to the subjection it wills to preserve. 288
From this Fear, then, flows constantly the motive for
humility, 289 namely, reverence for God; and when man under
the influence of this motive produces any act of humility, this
act is one of the Fruits of the Spirit, attributed to Him as the
giver of actual grace. 290 But when an act of humility is of the
utmost perfection, produced under the inspiration of the Holy
Spirit by the Gift of Fear, it corresponds to the first Beatitude,
that of poverty.
From the fact that a man fears God perfectly, it follows that he
does not seek to be magnified in himself by pride, and that he does
not seek to be magnified in exterior things, namely honors and
riches, both of which things pertain to poverty of spirit, inasmuch
as poverty of spirit can be understood either as the emptying out
of a swollen and haughty spirit, as Augustine expounds it/ 91 or also
as the abandonment of temporal things, which is accomplished by
the Spirit-that is, by one's own will through the instinct of the
Holy Spirit, as Ambrose 292 and Jerome 293 expound it. 294
•u Ibid., 11-11, q. 19, a. 11, ad 8.
••• Ibid., 1-11, q. 68, a. 4, ad 5.
••• Ibid., 11-11, q. 19, a. !l, ad 8.

••• Ibid., corp.
288 Ibid., art. 12 corp.

••• What was said about Fear in the last paragraph is the ultimate analysis and
final explanation of the formal motive of humility.
••• Gal. 5:28. Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 70, aa. 1, 2. It is to be noted that this
Fruit is probably not the "modesty" mentioned by St. Paul (Gal. v, 28), "which
observes moderation, in all words and deeds," as St. Thomas says. (Ibid., art. 8,
corp. ante fin.) Nor is it necessary to attempt to find some other of the twelve
that will correspond to it. The Pauline list is not intended to be complete; " potuisaernt vel plurea, vel etiam pauciorea fructua ernumeraTi" (ibid., ad 4); to complete it,
one would have to name the acts of all the infused moral virtues.
291 De sermone Domini in monte, I, Chap. IV (n. 11). M L 84, 1284.
••• Expositio Evang. sec. Luc., V, n. 50 (in 6: 20). M L 15, 1650 A.
••• Comment. in Evang. Matt., I (in 5: 8). M L 26, 84 A.
••• " Et ideo ex hoc quod aliquis perfecte timet Deum, consequens est quod non

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

XI.

409

SUMMARY AND CoNcLusiON

What has been said of the tract on humility in the Summa .
should enable the reader to realize how perfectly St. Thomas
coordinated and developed the traditional doctrine passed
down to him. In the six-article Question, there is enough
thought to make a Cajetan smack the lips of his intellect,
enough spiritual dynamite to rid Washington of most of its
Congressmen. Fortunately, we do not have to go outside the
text for its most perfect resume. The recapitulation at the
beginning of Article VI renders any other attempt superfluous.
Humility consists essentially in the appetite, insofar as one restrains the impetuosity of his soul, lest it tend inordinately toward
great things. But it has its rule in knowledge, namely, that a man
must not esteem himself above what he is. And the principle of
each of these elements is the reverence one has toward God. Now
from the interior disposition of humility there proceed certain external signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that
which is hidden within. 295

It would be a fine thing to end this study with these last
words ringing in our ears, and the memories of a knotted trail
laboriously followed. But gratitude prompts us first to discharge a debt that the world owes St. Thomas, and to the
present has left unpaid: the duty of forming an estimate of
his personal contribution to the traditional doctrine of his age.
To try to pay the obligation in full would be a stupendous
undertaking, like discharging war debts. It would be necessary
to study the works of every prominent Christian theologian
from the first century to the thirteenth, and dig into the
dustiest parts of the universities of Europe. World circumquaerat magnificari in seipso per superbiam, neque etiam quaerat magnificari in
exterioribus bonis, scilicet honoribus et divitiis, quorum utrumque pertinet ad
paupertatem spiritus, secundum quod paupertas spiritus intelligi potest vel exinanitio
inflati et superbi spiritus, ut Augnstinus exponit, vel etiam abjectio temporalium
rerum, quae fit spiritu, id est, propria voluntate, per instinctum Spiritus Sancti, ut
Ambrosius et Hieronymus exponunt."-Summa Theol., II-II, q. 19, a.
corp.
••• Summa Theol., II-II, q. 161, a. 6.

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SEBASTIAN CARLSON

have made this impossible, of course, but it is still
within our power to take the first steps: to list the greatest
writer-saints of the Western Church; to select those who seem
to have treated more fully than others of humility; and to
compare their dc;>ctrine with that of Aquinas.
Such a study should give us a rough idea of how much of
the latter's teaching is traditional, how much the fruit of his
own genius. But when, in the following paragraphs, the statement is made that this or that point is peculiar to one of the
writers studied, or that some clarification was not known before his time, there is no intention of giving him credit individually. Probably he has merely restated the conclusion of
his contemporaries. The fine synthesis given us by the Angelic
Doctor, for instance, may well have been conceived in his mind
alone; on the other hand, it may be only arepetition, in his own
words and styJe, of what was common teaching' in his day.
Our lack of knowledge, however, demands that we call it the
" doctrine of St. Thomas "; and the same is to be said for the
others. Careful study indicates that the works of Augustine,
Cassian, Benedict, Gregory the Great, and Bernard o£ Clairvaux are best suited for our purpose.
Common to them and to all Christian writers is the doctrine
that humility is something virtuous when it submits the soul
reasonably to God and other men; thQ.t it is morally evil, and
in fact the worst type of pride, when it is the fawning exterior
of hypocrisy. But no attempt was made to define humility
precisely, and thus distinguish it from closely allied virtues, till
Bernard's birth foreshadowed the Scholastic age. The bad
effects of this vagueness are seen in the not infrequent confusion by early writers of humility and fear, compunction and
justice, even of numility and charity. Bernard
humility
as the virtue by which a man, truthfully acknowledging what
he is, becomes in his own eyes worthless. Briefly, it is contempt of self. Unfortunately, this definition is not universally
applicable, since the ordinary beginner in the spiritual life is
incapable o£ much self-contempt. Nor is it complete, for it

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

411

confines itself to the intellectual element. Thomas ·alone has
given us a formula that differentiates humility from all else,
especially from justice, from which it is specifically distinct only
by reason of its formal motive, reverence for God.
As to the part of the soul in which the virtue inheres, Augustine is unclear, Gregory entirely unconcerned. Cassian and
Bernard attribute it to the reason. Thomas denies this, because humility's function is evidently to control the elan of the
appetite; he shows that it is subjected principally in the will
qua irascible. But the error of Cassian and Bernard discloses
the common doctrine of all-the indispensability of self-knowledge for lowliness of heart. Augustine insisted on this more
than on any other element, while Gregory and Bernard preferred to dwell upon the contempt of self that should characterize those advanced in love of God.
The mysterious link between humility and grace led the
early theologians to attribute to the former a sort of secondary
function in the active seeking of the perfection of charity. Principally the virtue fights against pride, but, that danger once
avoided, it advances ever higher in the love of God. Bernard
expressed himself in similar language, though he also attributed
the quest for perfect sancity to what he termed magnanimity.
necessary second act ofhumility
Thomas, too, saw as an
the encouraging of souls inclined to despair of their power and
ability, to live lip ,to the gifts withwhich God endowed them.
Such precision is due to Aquinas' understanding of tlie essential act of the virtue. It is not self-knowledge, nor self-subjection, nor self-contempt, but hope kept reasonable out of reverence for God: the ordinate appetition of one's own excellence.
It is, then, not a " passive but an " active " virtue. .Hope is
an elan of the soul toward a goal difficult to achieve; and, controlled or running wild, an elan is still an elan. The nature of
pride, too, clarified for Thomas this aspect of humility; for
pride is above all else motion toward what is above one's
allotted place.
He paints more precisely, too, that aspect of· humility which,

412

SEBASTIAN

CARLSON

because of its subjection to God and reverence for Him, despises all earthly greatness; for he shows that this scorn is not a
blind, unreasoning thing, but an ordered contempt, even an
ordered love. What is earthly is to be looked down upon only
insofar as it is or can be a threat to one's subordination to God;
inasmuch as it is a help to salvation, it merits our love as the
created exemplar of a divine Idea.
Augustine in his De Virginitate, Cassian in his Conferences,
Gregory in his Homilies, Bernard in his sermons and especially
in his treatise De Humilitate et Superbia, had said much about
the extent of humility, showing how the Christian must be
subject not only to God but also to his every neighbor. But
Thomas in a few words reduced their examples and long discussions to principle: Humility subjects itself to God and to
all there is of God in others. His application of this principle
made immediately clear what was perhaps never clear before:
that to deem oneself the worst of all men and the greatest
sinner is not of precept, but of counsel.
It is needless to say that the reduction of humility to the
cardinal virtue of temperance, as a species of moderation, is
proper to St. Thomas. Indeed, there had been no previous
attempt to correlate humility to the other virtues; Gregory had
made the only progress by showing (and that merely by inference) that humility is outside and beyond the moral virtues, as
pride is outside and beyond the capital sins or vices, as their
" mother " and " queen." Perhaps the notion of humility would
be clearer in the minds of the Catholic laity today if theologians
and ascetical writers insisted on it more as a restriction of the
elan of the appetite to the limits of reason than as a quality
entailing the lowering of the eyes and external submission.
As there seems to have been no progress in the categorization
of humility, so there seems to have been none until after Bernard in the explanation of the lofty titles of humility and in
the determination of its rank among the virtues. Thomas
alone explains adequately the titles of foundation, of root and
strengthener of the other virtues; he ·alone assigns it a definite

THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

418

place, under justice but above the remaining moral virtues,
even above religion, fortitude, and temperance. He alone
enunciates the basic reason why humility plays such an important role in the spiritual life: because it is the destroyer of
pride, the greatest obstacle to grace, therefore the opener of the
soul to the inflow of divine love, therefore the sine qua non of
the other virtues. It was Thomas alone, too, who finally clarified the relation of humility to justice, with which Bernard
seems to have partially identified it; to magnanimity, which, in
contrast to Bernard, he distinguished clearly from humility;
and to the Gift of Fear, with which theologians had always
associated it.
The Angelic Doctor, moreover, solved the difficulties of the
connection between lowliness of heart and charity. The reason for their close relationship is to be sought in the radication
of all passions and affections in love. We desire and hope for
and delight in only what we love. Charity is love of God. If
love is right, appetition will be right, and appetition of one's
own excellence is humility. In a word, if love is ordinate, the
hope it kindles will be ordinate. The same line of thought is
suggested in saying that love of God excludes exaggerated love
of self and accordingly demands humility, which alone can
preclude such an inordination.
We will end our study with a reference to Augustine's concept of the" humility of God": The Word of God, the second
Person of the blessed Trinity, humbled Himself before His
Father not only in His incarnate life on earth, but from eternity. In a few words, Thomas shows that humility cannot be
attributed properly and formally to a Being Who is in no way
subject; and therefore not to the Word. Yet this qualification
of Augustine's thought leaves its mystic content intact. To
kindle our weak love of a God Who loves us infinitely, we may
indeed think of the Word as from all eternity subjecting Himself to the decree of His Father: determining to conceal the
splendor of His Divinity, in the fullness of time, beneath the
rags of humanity; to empty Himself and take the form of a

414

SEBASTIAN

CARLSON

servant, becoming man to die on a cross for the sins
an
ungrateful world. " Humiliavit seipsum usque ad mortem,
mortem autem cruds." This, the humility of God the Word,
is the divine Idea the Christian must gaze upon and understand and imitate, because his Master was meek and humble
of heart.
SEBASTIAN CARLSON,

Dominican HoWle of Studiu,
River FMut.lllinois.

0. p.

BOOK REVIEWS
Education at the Crossroads. By JACQUES MARlTAIN. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1948. Pp. X + ao, with index. $2.00.
The University and the Modem World. By ARNoLDS. NAsH. New York:
The
Co., 1944. Pp. xxiv + 812. $2.50.
Liberal Education. By 'MARK VAN DoREN. New York: Henry Holt and
Co., 1944. Pp. xi + 186, with index. $2.50.
What is Education? By EDWARD LEEN, C. S. Sp. New York, Sheed & Ward,
1944. Pp. 288. $8.00.
We are being forced to think; for that we should be grateful to God.
Especially, we are being forced to think about our educational ideals and
procedures; for education in the broadest sense is the best means- given us
to revolt against conditions that seem to be imposed upon us by the course
of history. In that revolt we proclaim our mastery of history under God.
Thinking will be of little use to us, however, if it is not straight thinking.
The best guarantee of straight thinking is plenty of discussion, guided by
the traditional principles of Catholic Faith and human reason. Such discussion is a, real necessity among Catholic educators; it must be carried on
without fear of the consequences. There is reason to fear the consequences;
our complacency has been great, which accounts for the blindness that has
come upon us. We have, in fact, fallen into a way of thinking that Fr.
Leen rightly condemns: " It is but reasonable to expect that a Catholic
school should give a Christian formation. It would be a great mistake to
think that it noes this because it is staffed with Catholic teachers, offers
facilities for the frequentation of the Sacraments, and has each day half-anhour's doctrinal instruction sandwiched in between the other subjects fu the
scholastic programme " (p. 79-80} .
If we are certain that Catholic education is perfect, we need not engage in
discussion of it; if, on the contrary, we have even the slightest doubt about
our own integrity as Catholic teachers, we are obliged to seek out the
defects and ask God for the grace to remedy them. This advice is necessary; for, when we shall see how very far astray we have wandered, we
shall need the strength of Divine grace to give us the courage to admit
our defections and set about the remedying of them.
The four books chosen for this review represent four distinct points of
view; a consideration of them may give us a chance to clarify our own
notions about Catholic education.
In "Education at the Crossroads," M. Jacques Maritain is presenting

415
10

416

BOOK REVIEWS

what might be called the liberal Catholic viewpoint. By " liberal " here we
mean the view of those who believe that the best way to approach nonCatholics is to show them how close they are to the Catholic faith. It must
be kept in mind that this particular work of Maritain was given originally
as " The Terry Lectures " at Yale University; they were directed, it must
be presumed, to a predominantly non-Catholic audience. This would explain why many things were not said by an outstanding Catholic thinker.
It does not excuse some of things that were said.
It is generally agreed that the whole world is standing at the crossroads. What are those roads, where do they lead? One is the road that
leads to God, through Jesus Christ and His Church; the other is the road
that leads to chaos and perdition. Everyone must make his choice of these
roads, educationalists not excepted. In speaking of this crisi§, then, a
Catholic thinker, even though his audience were non-Catholics, should be
expected to make this clear. The choice is not between a humanistic type
of education no matter how complete and integral and hte chaotic thing
know as education today, but between an integral Catholic education and
any other kind.
There is a more fundamental difficulty behind this attitude of mind.
Several of the recent Holy Fathers have made it clear that in the present
crisis it is prudent for us to call upon all men of good will, all who believe
in God alone, or in God and His Divine Son, to join with us in stemming the
tide of destruction. Note the word "prudent." All those who deny the
divinity of Christ and of His Church are objectively wrong; this denial and
the gradual secularization of life that has historically followed upon it are
the causes of our chaos. Nevertheless, there are many outside the Catholic
Church who are subjectively justified in the sight of God and living by His
grace; we have no way of knowing just who they are, as we have no way
of knowing for certain that we ourselves are worthy of praise or blame in
the judgment of God. Yet, it is prudent to judge that if Catholics lead the
fight for the preservation of the rights of God, His Church, and the
temporal civilization that has grown up under Catholic influences, these
men of good will will be inspired by God to join us in the task.
Some Catholic thinkers have deduced two conclusions from the advice
of the Holy Father, both of which are, I believe, alien to his thought. The
first is, that an appeal must be made to non-Catholics to join us because we
cannot accomplish the task of ourselves. Even as a statement of fact, this
has a defeatist sound; as a theoretical statement it is false. It may be true
that Catholics are so little inspired by the love of Christ that they will not
respond wholeheartedly to the directives of the Holy See. But tomorrow
God could raise up enough apostolic souls to win
world back to Him.
Perhaps all that is needed is eager desire and prayer on our part for such a

BOOK REVIEWS

417

happy event. Certainly, an idea that Christ's Church is no longer capable
of winning the world to Christ is a very poor preparation for God's mercy.
The second false conclusion drawn from the Holy Father's directive is
that we must look for a common basis of agreement between Catholics and
non-Catholics on a theoretical level. Instead of basing ourselves on the
dark judgment of faith that there are men of good will in the world who are
not members of the Catholic Church, we start to look for a common basis
in the objective teachings of Jews, Protestants and Catholics .. There the
danger lies, grave danger. This tendency is partially expressed by M.
Maritain in the following passage: " There does exist, indeed, among the
diverse great metaphysical outlooks, if they recognize the dignity of the
spirit, and among the diverse forms of Christian creeds, or even of religious
creeds in general, if they recognize the divine destiny of man, a community
of analogy as concerns practical attitudes and the realm of action, which
makes possible a genuine human cooperation " (p. 7) . It is clear that
Maritain is concerned with unity of action, in the practical sphere; yet his
formulation of the principle of unity is in the theoretical ·sphere. He is
applying the analogy of common proportionality in the realm of philosophy
and faith in a way that it does not apply. The idea of man that governs the
philosophical principles of education is a mere logical abstraction that can
cover " the most orthodox religious forms of thought " as well as the " mere
humanistic ones." But with such an abstraction the very practical activity
of educating a human being for his true end is impossible. A vague, generalized education is all that can be hoped for from such an analogously
common idea.
More dangerous is the formula: " the analogy of faith." It is bad enough
to attenuate the notion of man; to seek the proportionately common in the
realm of faith is destructive both of faith and education. There is only one
faith: the Greeks did not possess it, the Jews lost it, the protestants and the
humanists perverted it. It is the faith of Jesus Christ and of His Church.
Again, there is only one creed, only one Church; to talk about inter-credal
or inter-Church cooperation on the basis of the proportionately common is
to turn the reality of Christ's revelation and of His Church into a logical
abstraction. If a non-Catholic believes in God and in His Divine Son, as he
should, that is, unto salvation, he believes in them by Catholic faith, not
by some analogously common faith. It he does not believe as he should,
then we must bend all our prayers and our efforts to bring him to the true
faith, not by showing how close he is to it, but by showing how far from it
he is. And, in fact, there is an infinite gulf between the true faith and the
religious opinions of mankind.
One of the practical consequences of this tendency to seek the proportionately common is seen in Maritain's discussion of the role of theology

418

BOOK REVIEWS

in higher education. " With regard to non-denominational colleges, the
practical solution would depend on the recognition of the pluralist principle
in such matters. Theological teaching would be given, according to the
diversity of creeds, by professors belonging to the main religious denominations, each addressing the students of his own denomination. And of course,
those students who nurture a bias against theology would be released from
attending these courses and allowed to remain incomplete in wisdom at
their own pleasure" (p. 75). By contrasting the student who does not
feel like studying theology with those who do study theology (any theology
at all) there is created the impression that a complete wisdom can be attained without a true theology; for here again we must insist that there is
only one theology, which takes its principles from revealed truth held by
divine faith.
Many of M. Maritain's suggestions for changes in the general educational
set-up are excellent, though they add little to what has already been proposed by Hutchins, Adler, and the authorities of St. John's College, Annapolis. Yet all these writers have had to discuss the fundamental problems
of education half-heartedly and offer half-truths for their solutions, because
they were addressing audiences that could not stand the whole truth. It is
well for us to remember that when we read their books. We shall find much
good in them, materially speaking; the vital spirit and tlie formal element
of education can be, after Christ, only the Spirit of Christ. We shall return
to this point again.
Mr. Nash's The University and the Modern World represents a rather
strict protestant view of the educational problem and its solution. His work
is divided into three parts: The Plight of the Liberal Democratic University;
The Totalitarian University: A True Diagnosis but a False Remedy; Towards Reconstruction. These titles clearly forecast the trend of the book.
The first two sections are excellent, except for one point. While on the
surface, Mr. Nash is discussing only two totalitarianisms, Nazism and
Communism, he succeeds in rhetorically linking up a third totalitarianism
with them, Catholicism. He does this by characterizing Nazism and Communism as scholasticisms. It is then very easy to associate the scholasticism
of the Middle Ages with the two modern forms. Mr. Nash is obviously
uneasy about the power of Catholic thought in the modern world. He goes
very far out of his way to criticise the opinion of Whitehead that the
scholastics of the Middle Ages prepared the way for the development of
modern science.
In the third part of his work, Mr. Nash presents two suggestions that
will contribute to the reconstruction of the university in the modern world.
First of all we must recognize the social character of thinking, or rather
of the origins of thinking. The author distinguishes between the psychology

BOOK REVIEWS

419

and the sociology of knowledge. There is no doubt that one's social environment does influence thought, though not to the ·extent admitted by Mr.
Nash. In fact, it is still the individual, singularly blessed, no doubt, that
can penetrate the social character of his own and others' thought. Traditionally, this social aspect of thought has been treated by other sections of
philosophy besides psychology and by theology.
We can heartily agree with the author's final suggestion; we need, he
says, a speculum mentis, an integral view, that is specifically Christian. As
one of the aims of Christian scholarship, he suggests: " To work towards an
intellectual synthesis for the twentieth century which, as an interpretation
of human life and destiny, can be set over against the positivistic, the Marxist,
the liberal humanitarian W eltanschauungen now current in the liberal
democratic world. Such a speculum mentis will be dialectical between the
poles of unity and freedom. Like Scholasticism it will derive its unity from
its theological basis which will provide its presuppositions. But it will
differ from Scholasticism in that the specifically theological sections of such
a map will not determine the nature and character of the (non-theological)
sections. God, not theology, or any other system is sovereign" (p. 298).
The last statement is true, but cannot mean much to one who denies that
God can establish a Church and guarantee its' inerrancy in matters of faith
and morals. Mr. Nash's observation about scholasticism shows that he is
unacquainted with it except at second-hand and through the eyes of nonCatholic writers. In its best representatives, Scholasticism never attempted
to dictate the conclusions of the 9ther sciences. St. Thomas' preoccupation with Aristotelianism, for example, can be explained on the ground
that he wanted to penetrate the reality of things in themselves according
to their proper formalities. St. Thomas, better than any other thinker,
knew that every reality can be viewed under a twofold aspect-as it is in
itself, with a proper nature determined by God, and as it is in relation to
the whole universe ·and ultimately to God. The only one who can penetrate
the order of all things to God is the theologian; the determination of the
proper-formalities of things belongs to the philosopher, the scientist, the
artist, the politician, and so forth. There is no evidence that St. Thomas
ever dictated a conclusion in any field of learning, unless it were a theological conclusion; he would, however, not admit that the theological aspect
of reality conflicted with the scientific, artistic, sociological, political, or any
other. A theology that ignores philosophy and derides the use of reason,
as protestant theology did from the start, is quite incapable
building up
a speculum mentis without dictating theologically to the lower sciences.
Only a theology that allows reason the utmost play in the domains that are
proper to it can attain the aim of unity with freedom.
Mark Van Doren in his Liberal Education has given us a well-written and

BOOK REVIEWS

persu11sive defense of his subject. Again we meet with vague generalities
about the ends of education; with such statements as " But that is what
education at the top does call for-each, man becoming more than he is "
(p. 17} . Strangely enough there are constant hints of the Catholic synthesis with the regretful judgment that it is out-of-date. He lays his
finger on the heart of the educational problem in his initial chapter "Nobody Thinks He is Educated": by this confession, the ordinary man means
that " he does not find in himself a reasonably deep and clear feeling about
the bearings upon one another, and upon his own mind, of three things, to
name not more: art, science, and religion. He has never been at the
center from which these radiate-if there is a center" (p. 11}.
Although Mr. Van Doren is rather vague about the end of man, he has
the traditional notion of the formal and material components of human
nature. Hence,· his discussion of liberal education is valuable for Catholic
educationalists, who have accurate notions of all these elements and yet
do not have much appreciation of the liberal arts. " St. Augustine paid his
education the compliment of saying that as a result of it he could read
anything that was written, understand anything he heard said, and say
anything he thought" (p. 76}. Here, obviously, St. Augustine is speaking
of his liberal education, obtained before he became a Catholic, but never
abandoned by him when he turned to the pursuit of eternal Truth. It is
with that part of education that Mr. Van Doren is concerned; and what he
has to say is important. The chief concern of a liberal education is the
liberal arts. They fall midway between the useful and the fine arts. " The
liberal arts are always, and properly, left in a middle position between
those with which we manipulate objects and those with which we create
them-or, if man cannot in reality create, with which we render individual
things, such as a hero in story or a form in painting, more luminous than
they were. The liberal arts are the specifically intellectual arts " (p. 73) .
Mr. Van Doren, does not ignore the problem of the relation between the
intellectual and the moral virtues. He rejects the present tendency to look
upon intellectual training and moral training as two distinct functions of
education. There is a danger of separating character from intellect:
" Doubtless no one would deny that the world should be saved from
ignorance. But a popular form of ignorance is the belief that life can be
ordered by those who do not know what they are doing; fervor is enough "
(p. 63} . This is another way of making the point we insisted on earlier:
subjectively, there are many men in the world who are justified in the
sight of God; that does not mean that their ideas are objectively right.
Ignorance may excuse a man in the sight of God, it does not prevent him
from being a danger to his fellow-men. Failure to realize the moral character of intellectual activity is another dangerous error, which Mr. Van

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421

Doren avoids. " Character is both intellectual and moral.
But they
are mutually dependent, and at specific points, as for instance at the point
where the moral virtue of desiring or willing to be taught must precede
being taught, and where only courtesy det:ides that learning shall take
place. It is moral virtue which makes a pupil studious rather than curious
.. , . ; which makes the scholar brave enough for genuine enquiry" (p. 64),
It is foolish to look for ways and means of training character by extracurricular activities, when we have the chance to mold the moral character
of a student in every one of his class activities. All intellectual activity in
the concrete is moral activity; it can have its vices and its virtues. The
moral and spiritual attitude of a student towards his intellectual operations
is more important in the long run than the success of those operations. A
man can be a better man, even intellectually, by making a mistake in a
mathematical calculation, than by being correct.
Catholic educators must meet the challenge thrown down by the presentday advocates of traditional liberal education. However, they must also
beware of thinking that the liberal arts are the vitalizing principle of
education, that Catholic education can be saved through the liberal arts
training. The vital principle of Catholic education is the faith; the liberal
arts are merely instruments, necessary instruments, we believe, for the full
application of the faith to all the fields of knowledge. The Catholic faith is
the center to which Mr. Van Doren unwittingly refers; the work of manifesting it as the center belongs to theologians and they have not as yet done
the work as fully as they should.
After reading a few pages of Fr. Leen's book, one becomes conscious
of the challenge in his title: What is Education? He does not attempt to
define a vague thing that could be common to all men, or even most men;
he frankly states that in the present order of things there is only one true
education. In this he is merely echoing the Sovereign Pontiffs, who do not
hesitate to point out to the world· that salvation is through the Catholic
Church and its educational system. Of course we should expect such outspokenness from Fr. Leen, who is primarily a theologian. Most Catholic
writers realize that the ultimate judgment on education must come from
the Catholic faith and its chief instrument, Catholic theology; yet they
persist in talking about a Catholic philosophy of education. Perhaps they
feel that the general public would npt listen to them if they spoke in the
name of theology. The books we are reviewing refute that idea: Mr. Nash
explicitly looks to theology for the needed synthesis of modern knowledges;
Mr. Van Doren must continually, though tentatively, refer to scholastic
theology to complete his picture of liberal education. The latter says expressly: "But in human history there has seldom been a greater need for
slow, deep thinking on a level comparable to that which theology once

BOOX REVIEWS
dominated" (P. 35). There is a hint here that theology, or theologians, are
no longer capable of this "slow, deep thinking"; we know that is false,
though in fact theologians do not fulfill their traditional function of ordering
all things to God.
Fr. Leen, then, is a theologian looking at the problem of education; he
is also an Irishman conscious of the fact that many brilliant Irish Catholic
writers of the last few decades fell away from their Church and dedicated
their gifts to falsehood. He lays the blame for this on the shoulders of
ed_ucationalists. He has a shrewd eye for the defects of our educational
system; most important, however, is his clear view of the meaning of an
integral education. He tries, and with considerable success, to manifest the
Catholic faith as a center around which all other knowledges revolve. In the
light of Christian tradition he determines the relative value and distinctive
place in the educational set-up of moral training, vocational preparation,
intellectual formation, scientific knowledge, philosophy and art. Much more
could be said on all these subjects; for example the chapters on the particular sciences and art do not sufficiently analyse these great modern educative forces in the light of theology and philosophy. What Dr. Leen says
about them is true enough, and probably adequate for the type of secondary
education he is mainly concerned with; much more light must be thrown
on them for the sake of the specialists in the field of science and art.
Dr. Leen also bravely faces the question of women's education; his solution may not be popular, but it is unquestionably the traditional Catholic
one. Men and women are different; they have different functions in life;
they should be educated differently.
The discussion of religious education will probably be more striking to
Fr. Leen's Irish readers than to ourselves. There have been several attempts to reform the teaching of religion in the primary and secondary
grades that follow closely the suggestions of the author; notably the work
of Sr. Jane Marie, 0. P. in her Christian Religion Series (Milwaukee:
Bruce). Notable, also, is Fr. Leen's defense of the Christian classics for use
in Latin courses. Their neglect is due to the fundamental idea, handed
down from the Renaissance, that the form of a literary production is much
more important than its content. On that premiss, Cicero is more valuable
than St. Augustine; but for a Catholic graduate to know Cicero and be
ignorant of St. Augustine, is an injustice and a condemnation of a system
that calls itself Christian.
There is one noticeable weakness in Fr. Leen's book; in fact, it is found
in all four of the books we. are considering. They all cling to the unjustinature. In the
fiable distinction between individual and person in
writings of some modern Thomists these words have lost all precise
philosophical meaning and have become almost symbols for all that is
ignoble and noble in human nature.

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428

M. Maritain is a foremost exponent of the distinction; let us see how he
uses it: " The notion of personality thus involves that of wholeness and
independence. To say that a man is a person is to say that in the depth
of his being he is more a whole than a part and more independent than
servile" (p. 8). Note the relation established between being" a part" and
" servile." There is no justification for this. In itself this statement is
simply false; in the depths of his (created) being, man is more a part than
a whole. Man is a whole only in reference to himself; for St. Thomas,
person is a subsisting whole, whose parts are: his nature, his individuating
principles, his existence. Man is not a whole in respect to his parents,
brothers and sisters, he is part of a greater whole-the family; man is not
a whole in respect to his fellow-citizens-he is part of the greater wholethe nation; man is not a whole in respect to the rest of the universe-he is
a part of a universal common good; even in the supernatural order man is
a child of God, sharing with others the Common Good of the divine Essence.
Note now how individuality is explained: "Now it should be pointed out
that personality is only one aspect or one pole of the human being. The
other pole is-to speak the Aristotelian language-individuality,
whose
prime root is matter. The same man, the same entire man who is in one
sense a person, or a whole made independent by his spiritual soul, is also,
in another sense, a material individual, a fragment of a species, a part of
the physical universe, a single dot in the immense network of forces and
influences, cosmic, ethnic, historic, whose laws we must obey " (p. 9) .
Well might Mr. Van Doren say that we have a difficult time placing man
in his right place since we have lost all knowledge of the angels. All
Thomists admit that the angels are not individuated by matter; in fact,
they are specifically, not numerically distinct from one another. Yet each
of them is " a single dot in the immense network of forces and influences "
that together form the universe.
This distinction between person and individual may seem too abstruse to
have' any practical value; actually its practical value is immense. There is
no possibility for a realistic view of man
his relation to the rest of the
universe if that distinction is distorted. Actually, the good coming to man
as a person, a whole, enclosed within himself, is slight; the plenitude of
goodness comes to him only in sharing it with others-the common good
the family, the nation, the world, the universe, the Supreme Common
Good, which is grasped in the beatific vision.
Fr. Leen, I believe, unconsciously hits upon the fundamental fault of
Catholic Education, and hence of all education. "The catechism is a
simple compendium of theology in a convenient, correct and condensed
form. It is hard to see why, being but this, it is expected to produce such
great effects on souls. In seminaries, students in their theological course

4fl4

BOOK REVIEWS

make an intensive study of all the matter contained in brief in the catechism. Theology can exert a spiritualizing effect on the soul-but it does
not necessarily do so. Ordinarily it is not expected to have this effect. The
students, as a rule, do not seek in theological science the inspiration of
their spiritual life. For them theology is something to learn and to know.
It is approached as a science. The best theologians are not necessarily the
most spiritual men " (p. 1il) . How true and how false that statement is!
How true of the contemporary teaching of theology, how false of the traditional! Take, for instance, the last sentence. Who are the theologians of
the Church? The Fathers and Doctors officially designated by her. And
they must be canonized saints. Once more a valuable distinction of St.
Thomas is being wrested to our own destruction. St. Thomas distinguished the intellectual and moral virtues, theology and the theological
virtues. The chief aim of theology is scientific exposition of the truths
of faith. But certainly he did not expect us to apply this theoretical
distinction in the practical order. Every step in the acquisition of theological wisdom should contribute to our love of God and neighbor; if it
fails to do this it is being wrongly imparted or wrongly imbibed. St.
Thomas places the psychological origin of theology in the cogitatio that
accompanies the assent of faith; its culmination he finds in the beatific
vision. Moreover any cultivation of theology that would hinder the work·
ings of the higher Wisdom of the Holy Ghost would be a waste of time for
the individual, though accidentally it might benefit the Church or the
faithful.
When theology is taught vitally, then there will be some hope for a
revitalization of all education. We must remember that the great developments in literature, the arts, the particular sciences, mathematics, have
taken place since the reformation and the renaissance; no deep theological
thinking has been devoted to them. They are taught in our schools
almost as they are taught in secular schools, where they contribute time
and again to the destruction of the faith of Catholics. We cannot bring
them unpurified into our own schools without turning these schools into
dens of thieves. They must first of all be
by theologians who are
expert philosophers; only then can we be sure that they are contributing
to the total picture of the universe that we wish to present to our students.
With a few obvious reservations we can echo the plea of Mr. Nash:
"What, therefore, is the conclusion of the matter? It is that the Christian
Churches need a fellowship of lay theologians or Christian scholars who
would view it as part of their vocation as a Christian intelligentsia to
create a Christian world view within which the conclusion of the specialized
subjects of the university curriculum could be given their ultimate meaning
in
of a specifically Christian philosophy of man and his relation to

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425

the historical process. The task is one in which all Christian scholars
whether they be natural scientists, social scientists, historians, philosophers,
literary critics anp the like are called to cooperate. It is nothing less than
the creation of a Christian speculum mentis, which, on the one hand,
avoids the Charybdis of the liberal <;onception of the complete autonomy
of each academic subject and, on the other, the Scylla of totalitarian
scholasticisms in which facts have to be twisted into a dogmatic framework"
(p. 287). We believe that such a gigantic task can be accomplished by
Catholic theologians with the cooperation of experts in all fields of knowledge. It must be accomplished if we are to redeem the intellect of the
world for Christ.
JAMES M. EGAN, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

BRIEF NOTICES
The Nature of Martyrdom. By JAMES EnwARD SHERMAN. Paterson, N.J.:
St. Anthony Guild Press,
Pp. xiii +
with index.
Martyrdom has always been considered in the Church as the highest
manifestation of one's faith and love for Christ; the martyrs were held in
veneration from the beginnings of Christianity. The faithful have ever
seen in the blood of martyrs the seed of the Church. When the Church is
vitally struggling against the evil and the corruption of the world, it is
subject to attacks by the world and many of its children are called upon to
sacrifice their lives. The struggle goes on till the Church is victorious and a
period of peace descends. The Church is once more on the march and her
martyrs are multiplying. Fr. Sherman's book is a careful and detailed
study of the dogmatic and moral elements in the nature of martyrdom.
The author defends the opinion that a Catholic soldier who sacrifices his
life in a just war for the defense of his country and orders the sacrifice to
the love of Christ as well as of his country is in the strict sense a martyr.

The Eucharist. By FRANCOIS MAURIAC. New York: Longmans, Green &
Co., 1944. Pp. 75. $1.50.
This little book contains the reflections of the author on the liturgical
functions of Holy Thursday. The aim is not primarily dogmatic, although
much solid doctrine is contained in it. The author ranges over his own
childhood experiences, the lives of the saints, the pages of literature, and
gathers a host of inspiring thoughts that add to one's appreciation of what
happened and still happens on the day before Christ died for us.

Notre Dame dans ma vie. By M.-V. BERNADOT, 0. P. Ed. du Cerf, distributed by Levrier, Ottawa-Montreal, 1937. Pp.
The title indicates accurately· the whole contents of this book, and is
developed comprehensively and beautifully. What place does the Blessed
Virgin hold in our spiritual life? That of a Mother. She does for us in a
spiritual manner everything that an earthly mother does for her child: gives
it birth, nourishes it, supplies it with materials for growth. Mary is our
Mother is an eminent way; through her we have the life of grace, through
her it is increased. She prepares and teaches us to pray with joy and faith.
It is she who defends our spiritual life from the attacks of the demon, the

4i7

BRIEF NOTICES

world, and even from ourselves. She unites us to God and leads us to perfection. The wisdom contained in this book is the gift of the Mother to
her child.

*

*

*

*

We are happy to learn that a new analytical bibliography of Thomistic
literature is in process of publication. Accordip.g to information we have
received, Dr. Vernon J. Bourke, learning that no supplement to the Bibliographie thomiste of Mandonnet-Destrez (ending with the year 19it0) was
planned by the original publishers, and assured of their wish to see the
work undertaken, has compiled a list of over 4,000 titles covering the years
1920-1940. There are four indices, and the book is so arranged according
to categories that it will serve as a supplement to Mandonnet. Dr. Bourke
has added a critical introduction on the chronology and authenticity of the
works of St. Thomas, with some useful information about the various
editions of these works.
The book is being printed as a supplement to Volume XXI of The
Modern Schoolman, and will run some two hundred and eighty-eight pages.
It is promised for the end of July of this year and priced at $2.00 in paper,
or $it.50 in cloth.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Berdyaev, Nicholas. Slavery and Freedom. New York: Scribner's, 1944
Pp. 271, with index. $2.75.
Bernanos, Georges. Plea for Liberty. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc.
1944. Pp.
$8.00.
Cardwell, Ann S. Poland and Russia. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1944
Pp ix +
with index.
Chapman, Dom John. The Four Gospels. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1944
Pp. 85. $1.25.
Franciscan Institute Publications, No. 1. The Tractatus de Successivis
Attributed to William Ockham. Edited by Philotheus Boehnef, O.F.M.
St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1944. Pp. xi+ 122.
Hamm, V. M. Pico della Mirandola: Of Being and Unity. (Translated from
the Latin, with an introduction) Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press, 1948. Pp. 84.
Jessup, B. E. Rational Value Meanings. Eugene, Oregon: The University
of Oregon Press, 1948. Pp. 175, with index.
Johnson, F. E. (Ed.). Religion and the World Order. New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1944. Pp.
with index. $2.00.
McGarrigle, F. J., S. J. My Father's Will. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1944. Pp. xii +
with index. $2.75.
Maciver, R. M. (Ed.) Group Relations and Group Antagonisms. New
York: Harper Brothers, 1944. Pp.
with index. $2.00.
McSweeney, A. J., C. P. The Social Role of Truth According to St.
Thomas Aquinas. (The Catholic University of America: Philosophical
Series, Vol. LXXVI), Washington, D. C.; The Catholic University
Press, 1948. Pp. xii + 157.
Maritain, Jacques. ChrU!tianity and Democracy. New York: Scribner's,
1944. Pp. 98. $1.25.
Mumford, Lewis.
Condition of Man. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and
Co., 1944. Pp. x + 467, with index. $5.00.
Plumpe, J. C. Mater Ecclesia: An Inquiry into the Concept of the Church
Mother in Early Christianity. (Catholic University of America:
Studies in Christian Antiquity, No. 5), Washington, D. C.: The
Catholic University Press, 1948. Pp. xxi + 149, with index.
Sencourt, Robert R. Carmelite and Poet: A Framed Portrait of St. John of
with index.
York: The Macmillan Co., 1944. Pp.
the Cross.
$8.00.
Spellman, Francis J. The Risen Soldier. New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1944. Pp. 89. $1.00.

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