THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
Ol!, THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDIToRs:

THE DoMINICAN

FATHERs oF THE PRoviNCE oF ST. JosEPH

Publishers: Sheed and Ward, Inc., New York City

VoL. VIII

JULY, 194.1>

No.3

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT
great deal of contemporary thought has been vitiated
by what may be called a see-saw complex. By this is
meant the tendency of mind characteristic of many
modern philosophers and scientists to completely unbalance,
and even to turn upside down, the natural and necessary order
existing among things and persons. This inversion is particularly evident in that group of relations which are neither totally
real, nor solely logical, but mixed .. Among Scholastics such a
relation is termed non-mutual and is listed among those which
have as their foundation the exercise of causality so ordering
two terms to one another that one depends upon the other for
its being. But "whenever two terms are so related to one
another, that one depends upon the other, but not conversely,
there is a real relation in that which depends upon the other.
But in that upon which it depends there is only a relation of
reason. The reason for this is that it is impossible to consider
one thing as being referred to another without understanding

293

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PAUL FARRELL

also that there is an opposite :relation on the part of the other
term." 1
Non-mutual relations occur whenever " a relation in one
extreme is a reality; while in the other extreme it is an idea
only, and this happens when two extremes are not of the same
order . . . for instance, the term ' on the right ' is not applied
to a column, unless it stands on the right side of an animaL
Such a :relation is not really in the column, but in the animal." 2
Saint Thomas teaches that non-mutual relations exist between the object as it exists in a cognitive faculty and as it
exists in reality and between the Creator and creatures. Thus
there is a real relation of dependence in sense and intellectual
knowledge upon the realities existing in nature, for knowledge
is measured by reality. But since the things themselves are
outside this order of sensible and intellectual existence, there
is no real relation in them to knowledge, but only one of reason
in so far as they are apprehended as terms by the intellect.
So too, " as God is outside the whole order of creation, and aU
creatures are ordered to Him and not conversely, it is clear
that creatures are really related to God Himself. On the other
hand there is no real relation in God to creatures, but it is so
only in the mind in so far as creatures are referred to Him." 3
Thus traditional thought maintains that the human intellect
is measured by things and does not measure them in knowing
them; hence mind is dependent upon reality. Likewise it
teaches that the Divine Intellect is a measure, not a thing
measured; and, consequently, the relation existing between God
and things is one of dependence of things upon God.
Modern thought completely inverts these relations. It asserts
that the human intellect in knowing things causes their being,
goodness, and beauty. Thus the human mind is endowed with
the divine power of creation. Nor is there any reluctance to
extend this stolen power even to creating God Himself. As
one author puts it: " We also help to maintain and sustain
De Veritate, q. 4, a. 6; Summa Theol., I, q.
a. l.
• Summa Theol., I, q. 13, a. 7; Comm. in Meta., V, L. 17 .
• ibid.

1

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THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

the nature of God and are not merely His subjects
. God
Himself is involved in our acts and their issues . . . not only
does He matter to us but we matter to Him. He is in the strictest sense not a creator but a creature." 4
This attitude of mind did not mushroom into being overnight.
Rather, it is but one phase of a historical process which has
endured for more than six centuries. The theme and driving
force of this process has been the exaltation of man and the
humiliation of God. John the Baptist's pointed summary of
the motion of sanctity: " I must decrease; He must increase," 5
has suffered a radical alteration.
Now it is an obvious fact that the closer we bring an object
to a powerful light the more its imperfectons are made manifest.
Just so " the closer one approaches to God and knows Him
more, to that extent one sees Him as greater and oneself as less,
indeed almost nothing in comparison to God." 5 " Thus the
samt is not aware of his perfections but deeply conscious of
his imperfections, for he measures himself by Infinity.
On the other hand the more a man exalts himself the less
God becomes in his estimation. Such a man is certain of his
perfections and ready to excuse, or even to forget, his imperfections. Certainly, the reversal of God's position has no effect
in the real, concrete order, for God never changes. Neither
does the stark, rugged reality of human dependence lose any
of its force because it is denied. Any change that occurs is
limited to the depths of inner consciousness, and unfortunately,
some men have convinced themselves that they are
It is easy enough to stop measuring man by God and to exalt
him by pointing out his evident superiority over the rest of
the visible universe. But when the basis of the exaltation, the
power of the human mind, is itself obviously a combination of
perfection and imperfection, grave difficulties are encountered
by those who have dedicated themselves to the mission of
• S. Alexander, Space, Time, Deity, Macmillan, New York,
• John, III, 80.

•• St. Thomas, In Ephes., c. 5, L. 7.

pp. 888 ff.

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PAUL FARRELL

making men gods. Regal robes do not make an urchin a king;
neither can the human intellect be made anything more than a
puppet god by decking it out in the garb of divine attributes.
Something has to be done to give imperfection the appearance
of perfection; weakness must disguise itself as strength.
Shouting from the housetops that the human intellect creates
truth has a meager effect on men who realize through reflection
that the mind's grasp on truth is tenuous. Doubts and opinions
have always been more man's heritage than eternal truths and
certainties, and the pages of history are clouded more with the
gloomy despair of sceptics than they are brightened with the
joyful hopes of dogmatists. It is this tendency of the human
mind to doubt that had to be put into the crucible and remolded into a perfection.
Historically doubt has played an important role in the development of a truly great synthesis, the philosophy of Aristotle
and Saint Thomas. In this system doubt served as an instru:tnent to be employed in the search for truth, and like every
other instrument it was proportioned to, and measured by, its
end. Truth did not depend upon doubt; rather, doubt depended
upon truth and was subject to it. Apply the fallacy of inverted
relations and doubt emerges from the experiment with all the
attributes and perfections of truth.
The process of glorifying doubt was begun by Descartes. In
his hands doubt beca111e a battering ram pummelling the citadels of truth and certainty which for centuries had been deemed
impregnable. The senses, reason, first principles, testimony of
witnesses, all were shattered. Consciousness alone survived to
hurl back the advances of doubt. In fact it was in the consciousness of a doubting mind that Descartes found his first
certain principle.
While we thus reject all of which we can entertain the smallest
doubt, and even imagine that it is false, we easily, indeed, suppose
that there is neither God, nor sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves have neither hands nor feet, nor finally a body; but we
cannot in the same way suppose that we are not, while we doubt
of the truth of those things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving

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THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

that what doubts does not exist at the very time that it doubts ....
Accordingly, the knowledge, "I doubt, therefore I exist (Cogito,
ergo sum)" is the first and most impoJ.ltant certain principle that
occurs to me, who philosophize orderly. 6
What was before an instrument for the mind to use in its
search for truth became now the source and guarantee of truth.
Doubt for Descartes was so pregnant with truth that even God
Himself was extracted from its womb. " I doubt, therefore I
exist " gave him his first unshakable principle. " I doubt,
therefore God exists " was equally certain.
A glorified doubt gradually pushed truth out of human life
without doing violence to the purloined creative power of mind.
For the pragmatists of the nineteenth century utility, not truth,
became the criterion of knowledge. Philosophy, like science,
was considered to be nothing more than a collection of probable
hypotheses, commodious conventions destined for use. Today,
idealists are quite sure that, wherever science has progressed
the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which
the mind has put into nature. Philosophy is nothing more than
a method of constructing doubtful rational formulae to interpret some aspects of a mentally created world. Professor
Eddington explains the shadow land of a dubious reality as
follows:
To put the conclusion crudely-the stuff of the world is mind-stuff.
As is often the way with crude statements, I shall have to explain
that by " mind " I do not here exactly mean mind and by " stuff "
I do not at all mean stuff. Still this is about as near as we can
get to the idea in a simple phrase. 7
Bertrand Russell, spokesman of instrumentalism,

insists:

The practical man may be pardoned, if he comes to the conclusion
that truth is unattainable except when it is unimportant. Since
many philosophers are practical men in disguise, they have drawn
6 Rene Descartes,
Principia VII (quoted in Cartesianism, M. J. Mahony, S. J.,
Fordham Univ. Press, New York, 1925, p. 44).
1 A. S. Eddington,
The Nature of the Physical World, The Gifford Lectures,
The Macmillan Company, Cambridge, England:
At the
1927, New York:
University Press, p. 276.

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PAUL FARRELL

the inference that philosophy should not seek truth but should
concoct plausible reasons for useful error. Much modern philosophy
has been inspired by this thought.
On the other hand, science, which also professes to pursue truth,
has proved itself
useful. . . . Consequently some
philosophers have attached themselves to science, and have endeavoured to win some of its prestige for their own studies.
These two tendencies to make philosophy useful by the propagation of error, or respectable by incorporation in science-have
determined the main cleavage in twentieth century philosophy.
Adherents of the former tendency have discovered nothing true;
adherents of the latter, nothing useful. Perhaps the pursuit of
truth, like art, may be justified independently of utility; but no
eminent person would suscribe to such a doctrine. 8

Russell is well aware of the dangers involved in a scientific
methodology which projects probable concepts of utility upon
things. He writes:
Science has more and more substituted power-knowledge for loveknowledge, and as this substitution becomes completed, science
tends more and more to become sadistic. . . . The power conferred by science as a technique is only obtainable by something
analogous to the worship of Satan, that is to say by the renunciation of love. 9

As is the case with every instrument, doubt may be used for
edification or for destruction. Of late its use has been predominantly destructive to the extent of causing havoc in the
lives of men. Concentration on meeting the challenge of the
dangerous use of doubt has tended to obscure in the minds of
Scholastics its constructive features and legitimate applications.
Consequently, a review of the teachings of Saint Thomas
Aquinas on the role of doubt in the philosophical disciplines
and in faith, where its results have been most fruitful and also
8 Bertrand
Russell, "Philosophy of the Twentieth Century," an essay appearing
in Twentieth Century Philosophy, edited by D. D. Runes, Philosophical Library,
New York, 1943, pp. 227-228.
• Bertrand Russell, Scientific Outlook, p. 273, (quoted in The Modern Dilemma,
Christopher Dawson, Sheed & Ward, New York, 1933, p. 77).

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

299

most disastrous, will not be without interest to those who have
lost sight of the good uses of a valuable instrument.
St. Thomas did not devote any single work entirely to the
consideration of doubt. Nevertheless, scattered throughout his
philosophical and theological works are many passages, some
brief, others somewhat extended, in which he treats of doubt
under various aspects in so far as it is employed as a method of
investigation both in particular problems and in the general and
aU-embracing question of the validity of human knowledge.
An examination of other texts reveals that the concept of
doubt is truly analogical and one that is predicated primarily
of a process of doubting which St. Thomas following Aristotle
has called dubitatio admirationis. Such a doubt is natural and
is distinguished from artificial or methodical doubt, dubitatio
discussionis. Of this latter process the concept of doubt is
predicated secondarily by reason of the fact that it is ordained
to reinstate in consciousness the psychological reactions involved in the primary natural doubt.
Accordingly, the consideration of doubt is divided into two
principal parts: I. The Natural Doubt of Admiration, and
II. Methodical Doubt, or The Doubt of Discussion. Obviously,
since the concept of doubt is analogical, this division lacks the
perfect precision possible in univocal concepts. Consequently,
there will always be a wide field of coincidence in which the
considerations of natural and methodical doubts will overlap.
To avoid frequent and useless repetitions, several expedients
have had to be adopted. The basic elements common to both
processes o£ doubt are treated fully in the first part and are
applied summarily in the second part. Other common elements,
which play a more important role in methodical doubt than in
natural doubt, are discussed in a general way in the first part
and are considered more thoroughly in the second part, where
the emphasis is placed upon their contributions to methodical
doubt.
Moreover, since methodical doubt is an artificial device employed in the generation o£ intellectual knowledge, it was

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PAUL FARRELL

deemed advisable to indicate the exact correspondence between
the methodological elements and the psychological factors involved in the genesis of knowledge. Consequently, to avoid
repetitions and to facilitate the handling of the matter, these
psychological factors, which have an obvious bearing upon the
understanding of the nature of natural doubt, have been considered under their most general aspects precisely as they are
related to methodical doubt. This expedient ,required the reduction of many different factors to a basic common element, a
process which is not always accomplished without some distortion. In each case, however, the ultimate reductions have
been guided by the teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas. The
bases for the reductions have been indicated by incorporating
into the article the principle Aristotelean-Thomistic texts concerned with the subject under discussion.
Besides expediency a second factor has influenced tremendously the general structure upon which this article has been
constructed. In order to insure a faithful presentation of the
Thomistic teaching on the role of doubt in faith and in philosophy, pertinent texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas have been
incorporated into the article. Frequently the doctrinal content!'
of the texts employed are richer than the point under discussion
demands, and it seemed advisable to the writer to drain off
this surplus wealth immediately. Hence, the texts themselves
have molded to a great extent the basic outline of this article;
occasionally they have even determined the order of whole
sections; and not infrequently they have borne the brunt of
reporting and explaining the teaching they contain.
Thus, under the guiding light of Thomistic teaching and
under the oppressive mailed fist of necessity the following outline was constructed:
I. The Natural Doubt of Admiration
A. General Considerations
1. Integral Parts
a. Admiration
b. Cogitation
2. The Nature of the Doubt of Admiration

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

301

B. Particular Considerations
l. The Doubt of Admiration in the Philosophical Disciplines
a. The starting point of philosophical investigation
b. Ordained to science
c. A natural motion
2. The Doubt of Admiration in Faith
3. The Doubt of Admiration in Meditation
4. The Doubt of Admiration in Theology
II. Methodical Doubt, or The Doubt of Discussion
A. General Considerations
1. The Necessity of Methodical Doubt
2. The Nature of Dubitatio Discussionis
a. The formal elements
b. The material elements
i. In general
a. Opinions of others
,(3. Probable premises and arguments
y. Likenesses and differences
8. Common intentions
ii. In particular
a. Experience and common opinions
[3. Probable reasonings and the perfection of
knowledge
B. Particular Considerations
l. The Use of Methodical Doubt in Particular Problems
2. The Use of Methodical Doubt in More Universal
Matter
3. The Use of Methodical Doubt in the Most Universal
Matter
a. Not a sceptical doubt
b. Not a methodical positive doubt
c. A methodical negative doubt

I. NATURAL DOUBT OF ADMIRATION
A.

GENERAL

CoNSIDERATIONs:

Consider the psychological moment when the intellect is
confronted with a new problem to be solved. For example, a

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PAUL FARRELL

natural phenomenon has occurred which the intellect has not
previously experienced. In a confused way the mind recognizes
the phenomenon as a particular manifestation of the exercise
of causality involving an obvious effect requiring an explanation. What is the cause? Memory is searched in vain, for there
is nothing reserved in reason's storehouse which can serve as a
medium to link this effect with its proper explicative cause.
Similar phenomena and circumstances are recalled or imagined,
but minute examination reveals that reason cannot interpret
this new fact in terms of its already acquired synthesis of
knowledge. Several more or less probable hypotheses based on
previous experiences and bearing some relation to the. present
problem are constructed, and an attempt is made to determine
which, if any, may offer a possible explanation for the experimental data furnished by the senses. A tentative rational
formula combining and synthesizing the common features of
the various hypotheses may be formed and in the light of
rational principles applied to the phenomenon. Perhaps too, a
process of defining, dividing, or even reasoning from common
principles may be begun. In its search for the cause the intellect
will start from the effect considered under one of many aspects,
carry on a line of reasoning until it is evident that the solution
does not lie in this direction, and then discard this hypothesis
in favor of a new approach. Confronted with these diverse
views of i:ts subject matter the mind hesitates; it wavers back
and forth among the several possible contrary explanations,
analyzing one, applying another, and combining many into one
general formula. Anxious though it may be to arrive at a
solution, the reason is content to remain in suspense rather than
to
on any one explanation as long as convincing objective
evidence is lacking. This lack of decision or indetermination of
the intellect constitutes a doubt of a particular nature called
by Saint Thomas " the doubt of admiration." 10
10 The terminology employed, dubitatio admirationis and dubitatio discussionis,
has been taken from Summa Tkeol., III, q. fl7, a. 4, ad flum and III, q. 80, a. 4,
ad flum, where these intellectual doubts are distinguished from the doubts of
infidelity and incredulity.

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303

I. Integral Parts: admiration and cogitation

a. Admiration
This doubt of admiration is composed integrally of a state oi
mind, admiration, and a motion of mind, cogitation. Admiration in its simplest manifestation is an act of mind characterized
by curiosity and provoked by knowledge of an effect whose
cause is unknown to the intellect. St. Thomas defines it thus:
" Admiration is a kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which
comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either
is unknown to him, or surpasses his faculty of understanding." 11
It is to be noted that admiration presupposes both in time and
by nature the actual attainment of some truth by the intellect.
Likewise, it presupposes the capacity of the mind to perfect
its general and confused knowledge, and in this regard admiration stimulates the intellect to undertake a process of intellectual development. Thus admiration is not the knowledge of
a strange phenomenon, rather it is an act following upon this
knowledge applying the attention of reason to the examination
of the unknown or unusual elements.
·It is upon the fact of the existence of admiration in the mind,
a. fact of internal consciousness evident to all through reflection,
that the following dictum is based: All men desire to know. 12
In this regard admiration is to be viewed as the psychological
manifestation of the human intellect's ordination to truth, a
reaction of the natural appetite of the intellect, the very nature
of the intellect, seeking to attain its proper perfection. Moreover, admiration is an indication of the radical imperfection of
the human mind, which "considered in itself is all things
potentially, but is not reduced into act except through science
of these things, because it is actually none of these things
previous to the act of understanding them." 13 Analysis indicates that this note of imperfection is also inherent in the
11 Summa Theol., I-II,
q.
a. 8; see also I, q.
Sent. d. 18,'q. 1, a. 8; Cont. Gentes III, c. 101.
"St. Thomas, Comm. in Meta., I, L. 1.

18

Ibid.

a. 1; I, q. 105, a. 7; II

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PAUL FARRELL

nature of admiration. A sign of this is the fact that men have
signified events which surpass their powers of comprehension
by the word" miracle," a derivative of admiration. 14
Admiration is a distinctly hum.an property, an act connatural to the human intellect according to its state in this
life, and to it alone. For this reason St. Thomas used it as an
argument against the heresy of Apollinaris, who taught that
Christ lacked a rational soul. Because the argument of St.
Thomas contains a summary of all the essential notes of admiration, it is quoted in full:
Since, according to Apollinaris, the Word of God is the True God,
admiration can not belong to Him; for we wonder at those things
whose causes are unknown to us. 'Likewise admiration does not
belong to the sensitive soul, since it does not pertain to the sensitive
soul to be solicitous concerning the cognition of causes. But admiration was in Christ, as is evident from the Gospels. For it is said
that "Jesus hearing the words of the centurion wondered" (Matt.
VIII, 10). Consequently besides the divinity of the Word and the
sensitive soul it is necessary to place in Christ some principle
through which Christ could admire, namely the human mind. 15

The reasons assigned in this argument for the exclusion of
admiration from the Word and the sensitive soul of Christ have
a wider extension than merely to Christ Himself. Thus, because
of its imperfection arising from the fact that its source is
ignorance, admiration is not attributed to God; because of its
perfection, namely, that it is concerned with knowledge through
causes, it is denied to the brutes. What of those, however,
whose intellectual knowledge is in a state of perfection and yet
in some way imperfect? The angels and blessed in heaven have
perfect knowledge of those things which pertain essentiaily to
beatitude; nevertheless they are ignorant of certain phases of
the divine plan of governing the universe. Hence it seems that
the angels and blessed are apt subjects for admiration. St.
Thomas considered this difficulty when he treated the question
of the existence of counsel in .the blessed. Admiration demands
"Summa Theol., I, q. 105, a. 7; II-II, q. 180, a. 8; III, q. 15, a. 8.
Contra Gentes, IV, c. 88.

16

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305

that the intellect be ignorant of some truth, that is, that it be
in act but imperfectly so/ 6 whereas " there is simple nescience
(i.e. lack of act) in the mind of the blessed as regards the things
they do not know. ]h·om this nescience the mind of the angel
is cleansed . . . nor does there precede in them any research of
doubt, for they simply turn to God." 17 It is clear, then, that
admiration is man's natural inheritance rooted in the imperfection of the human intellect and springing from ignorance as
from an accidental cause. Any perfection it has is tendential,
accruing to it hy reason of its ordination to knowledge through
causes.
St. Thomas was not content to indicate the presence of admiration in Christ; he pressed the question to its roots seeking the
cause. Why did Christ permit Himself to wonder at the words of
the centurion? One may ask another question. If admiration
is a human property, and so far the analysis indicates that it is,
why be concerned with discovering a cause when it is already
present in the human nature of Christ? The reason for asking
the question is the fact that the state of Christ's knowledge
presents an obvious difficulty to maintaining that He wondered.
Christ's plentitude of science excluded ignorance, the source
from which admiration flows. Attacking the problem from the
point of view of the object of admiration St. Thomas answered:
There could be nothing new and unaccustomed in regard to Christ's
divine knowledge, whereby He saw things in the Word; nor as
regards His human knowledge whereby He saw things through
infused species. Yet things could be new and unwonted with regard
to His experimental knowledge, in regard to which new things could
occur to Him daily. Hence ... if we speak of Christ's experimental
knowledge wonder could be in Him. And He assumed this affection
for our instruction-that is, in order to teach us to wonder at the
fact that He Himself wondered." 18
1 ° Constat autern quod dubitatio
et admiratio ex ignorantia provenit. Cum enim
aliquos manifestos effectus videamus quorum causa nos latet, em·um tunc causam
admiramur. Comm. in Meta. I, L. Z. Ille qui quaerit scientiam non omnino ignorat;
sed secundum aliquid earn praecognoscit, vel in universali, vel in aliquo eius
effectu, vel per hoc quod audit earn laudari ... Summa Theol., I-II, q. Z7, a. z.
18 Ibid., III, q. 15,' a. 8.
17 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 76, a. Z.

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PAUL FARRELL

Confirmation of St. Thomas' conclusion is found in the words
of Saint Augustine: " Our Lord wondered in order to show us
that we, who still need to be so affected, must wonder. Hence
all these acts a:re not signs of a disturbed mind, but of a master
teaching." 19
This response raises a difficulty. Ignorance, the source of
admiration, is expelled from the reason only through certain
knowledge. Admiration, then, necessarily accompanies an act
of intellect lacking the objective evidence of first principles or
of scientific demonstrations. Consequently, since first principles
are few and demonstrations are acquired with difficulty, admiration should be a normal experience for men, and Christ's
efforts to teach us the necessity of wonder were unnecessary.
No one needs urging to perform an act which cannot be avoided.
The answer to this objection requires the formulation of a
distinction (implicit in the teaching of St. Thomas and a fact
of experience) between admiration as an act of the intellect
and admiration as a state of mind. The consideration thus far
has been limited to an analysis of the act, a distinctive property
of the human intellect's imperfect knowledge. The endurance
of this act, however, depends upon the dispositions of the
subject; and like every act of a faculty, once it has been stated
in consciousness, its exercise may be impeded or curtailed by
an act of will. In many cases admiration is stifled immediately
upon its appearance on the surface of the soul and with
its demise the natural impetus to intellectual development
vanishes.
10 St. Augustine,
Super Genesim Contra Manichaeos, cap. 8 (PL 34, 180). The
conclusion of Saint Thomas is confirmed also by St. Albert the Great: Dominus
certa nos dubitare permisit in via, ut mentes nostras alliciat ad concupiscendam
perfectam cognitionem in patria. Unde, Exod. XII, 10: Nee remanebit quidquam
ex eo usquB mane: si quid residuum fuerit, igne comburetis. Glossa Gregorii:
" Quod ex igne remanet,· igne comburimus: quia quod de mysterio incarnationis eius
penetrare vel intelligere non possumus, potestati Sancti Spiritus reservamus: ut
non superbe audeat vel contemnere vel denuntiare quae non intelligit, sed igni
tradat. Id est Spiritui Sancto relinquat, videlicet, donee omnia in futuro quolibet
in quo cognitus sit et cognoscat!'
Nee tamen interim nostra devotio sine exercitatione torpescat, secundum ilium quod praecedit, ibidem V. 9. St. Albertus

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307

OF DOUBT

St. Thomas has listed several reasons why the natural desire
of the intellect for science is not fulfilled;
Man naturally desires science. That some men do not zealously
seek this knowledge does not impugn this fact, since frequently
those who desire a definite end are prevented from pursuing that
end due to some cause, either on account of the difficulty of attaining the goal or because of other occupations. Thus even though all
men desire science, nevertheless all do not expend their efforts to
attain it because they are impeded by other things; either by
pleasures, or by the necessities of the present life, or finally because
their laziness induces them to avoid the arduous task of learning
step by step. 20

Christ's teaching, then, may be interpreted as an exhortation
to us to permit admiration to endure by purging ourselves of
its impediments. The reasons for the exhortation will be evident
when the precise role of wonder in intellectual development has
been determined.
b. Cogitation

While admiration is born to die an early death in some
forcing its way into the consideration of the mind for a :fleeting
moment only to be driven back into the deeper recesses of consciousness, in others it will endure as a state of mind impelling
its subject to consider the mysterious elements which have provoked wonder. A forceful word was employed by the ancients
to signify the intellectual act brought into being under admiration's urgings, cogitatio. The word has been preserved in
modern English as cogitation, and present usage applies it to
the act of thinking or reflecting and permits as a secondary
signification the act of meditating. Strictly speaking the word
is synonymous with none of these acts but is applied to them
by derivation to signify an act integral to all of them.
Etymologically cogitation is derived from cum-agitare, to
put many things in constant motion simultaneously, to hunt
Magnus, Mariale sive Questiones super
Omnia, Borgnet, Paris, 1898, vol. 37, p. 83.
2 ° Comm. in Meta., I, L. l.

Quest.

XLIII,

in Opera

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PAUL FARRELL

for several things at the same time. Applied to the acts of man
its widest signification is inquisition and its primary use is to
signify the act of the sensitive cogitative faculty. 21 Due to the
unique position of this faculty at the summit of sensitive
activity it participates somewhat in the lowest perfection of
intellectual life, that is, in the discursive power of mind, and
for this reason it has been denominated particular reason. On
the other hand the inquisition of reason has been denominated
from the highest operation of this faculty, cogitation. 22 As the
word is used to designate intellectual operations, St. Thomas
indicates that it has a twofold signification: commonly to
signify any sort of consideration of the intellect; more properly
to indicate that consideration of the intellect which is accompanied by inquisition, before the intellect attains to the
tude of vision. Thus cogitation properly denominates the
motion of a deliberating mind, not yet perfected by the full
vision of truth. 23
The truth referred to in the definition is logical truth, the
term of the intellect's act of composing and dividing by affirming or denying. Cogitation takes place when the intellect has
been put into act either by its own proper object or by the will,
but has not yet been totally determined to one part of a
contradiction. Consequently a motion toward the opposite
remains and the intellect fluctuates between the two extremes
until sufficient rational evidence, if possible, has been acquired
to elicit assent. Cogitation, accordingly, like admiration, is a
21 Cogitatio
importat quamdam inquisitionem; dicitur enim cogitare quasi co
agitare, id est discurrere, et conferre unum cum altero. De V eritate, q. XIV, a. l,
!'lnd obj. See also Summa Theol., II-II, q. 2, a. 1, 1st obj. and resp.
22 Potentia
cogitativa est quod est altissimum in parte sensitiva, ubi attingit
quodammodo ad partem intellectivam ut aliquid participet ejus quod est in
intellectiva parte infirmum, scilicet discursum rationis. . . . Unde ipsa vis
cogitativa vacatur particularis ratio ... nee est nisi in homine, loco eius in aliis
brutis est aestimatio naturalis. Et ideo ipsa etiam universalis ratio, quae est in
parte intellectiva, propter similitudinem operationis, a cogitatione nominatur. De
Veritate, q. XIV, a. 1, ad 9um.
•• Cogitatio proprie dicitur motus animi deliberantis, nondum perfecti per plenam
visionem veritatis. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 2, a. 1.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

309

sign of the intellect's lack of determination, an inherent weakness which St. Thomas compares to the complete potency of
prime matter. 24
The presence or absence of cogitation and assent in those acts
of intellect concerned with composition and division serves as
a basis to distinguish one from the other. Thus, understanding
of first principles and scientific knowledge of conclusions demand a total intellectual adherence to one part of a contradiction on the basis of evidence proportioned to the nature of the
intellect, and consequently cogitation or discourse is impossible
in these acts. 25 In the generation of understanding of the
most general first principles cogitation is likewise impossible, for
at the very enunciation of such principles the mind grasps
the relation existing between subject and predicate and assents
to their conjunction. 26 The evidence required for intellectual
assent is discovered in the terms of the propositions themselves
inasmuch as the mind recognizes that the predicate is contained within the definition of the subject. For this reason
these principles are called immediate, to signify that there is
no prior principle which may be employed as a medium demonstrating the inherence of the predicate in the subject. 27
Among immediates, however, the terms of some propositions
concerned with the most general notions of being, unity, etc.
are known to all and assent follows upon their enunciation.
These principles are called " Dignities " or " Axioms " and
demand immediate assent without cogitation. The terms in
other immediate propositions, "Suppositions " or " Hypotheses," are not known to all and consequently are not assented
to when they are first affirmed. 28 With the exception of proComm. in Meta., I, L. 1; De V eritate, q. 14, a. 1; Summa Theol., I-II, q. 50, a. 6.
Actuum enim ad intellectum pertinentium quidam habent fumam assensionem
absque tali cogitatione; sicut cum aliquis considerat ea quae scit vel intelligit.
Summa Theol., Il-ll, q. 2, a. l.
20 Ibid.
Cum cogitatio discursum rationis importet, intelligens assensum sine
cogitatione habet; quia intellectus principiorum est, quae quisque statim probat
audita. Ill Sent. d. 23, q. 2, a. 2.
21 Posterior Analytics I, L. 4.
24

25

""Ibid.

2

:no

PAUL FARRELL

positions which are immediate in one science but have a medium
in a superior science, hypotheses, because they are immediate,
cannot be demonstrated. Assent follows upon declaration of
the definition of terms, a process which may involve rational
discourse. Such discourse, however, does not constitute cogitation strictly taken, which by its nature is ordained to the
attainment of logical truth, the term of judgment, and not to
the discovery of definition, the term of the understanding of
simple or incomplex essences. 29 The cogitation which occurs in
this case does not terminate; rather, it is terminated when the
intellect grasps the fact that the predicate falls within the
subject's defining formula. Further, it is the natural light of
the intellect itself which is the cause of its assent; any cogitation which may occur serves only as a disposition, a condition,
not a cause, permitting the intellect to exercise its own causality
by removing impediments. 80
In the generation of science, however, cogitation has an
important role to play in causing assent to the conclusion of a
demonstrative syllogism. The exercise of its causality is found
in the resolution of conclusions to prior and ultimately to
immediate principles, thus establishing as certain a rational
medium truly representative of real causes existing in the thing
on the basis of which the intellect assents to a proposition
affirming the existence of an attribute in its su·bject. 31
•• Cogitation may be involved in the attainment of a definition. This will occur
when the process of defining involves a definition through one cause serving as a
medium of demonstration manifesting a definition through another cause. See
Post. Anal., II, ll. 8 and 9. For the use of this mode of defining, see De Anima, I, 2.
30 The relation
of cogitation to the intellect's understanding of 2efinitions has
an important analogue in the relation of cogitation in theology to th"e formulation
of real definitions from scriptural descriptions and nominal definitions, a point
to be considered later.
31 Sciens habet et cogitationem
et assensum; sed cogitationem causantem assensum, et assensum terminantem cogitationem. Ex ipsa enim collatione (cogitatione)
principiorum ad conclusiones assentit conclusionibus resolvendo eas in principia,
et ibi figitur mstus cogitantis et quietatur. In scientia enim mot us rationis incipit
ab intellectu principiorum, et ad eumdem terminatur per viam resolutionis; et sic
non habet assensum et cogitationem ex aequo; sed cogitatio inducit ad assensum,
et assensWl qll!.ietat. De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1, c.; cf. III Sent. d. 28, q.
a. 2.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

311

Faith occupies a unique role among the acts of intellect involving a judgment, for cogitation exists both previous to and
simultaneously with a firm assent to revealed truths. Unlike
science, the assent of faith is not caused through cogitation but
by the will determining the intellect to adhere to a truth which
is neither evident to the mind nor capable of resolution to
immediate principles by the hmnan reason. Thus the cogitation preceding faith does not touch the substance of faith but is
limited to inclining a man to believe. 32 Because the revealed
truth exceeds the limits of the proper object of the intellect,
the essence of a corporeal thing, the intellect cannot assent of
itself. In so far, however, as the truth falls within the adequate
object, being, the intellect illumined by divine faith and under
the impe1ium of the will gives its assent. Since the vision of
evidf'nt truth by which the intellect connaturally is determined
is lacking, " its motion is not yet quieted, but it still has cogitation and inquisition concerning the things believed, even
though it most firmly assents to them. The reason for this is
the fact that the intellect is not satisfied nor determined to one
of itself, but rather it is terminated by an extrinsic force." 33
Thus. in understanding and science assent terminates cogitatirm; in the act of faith, however, a motion to the contrary may
exist simultaneously with a most firm assent.
32 Fides dicitur
non inquisitus assensus, inquantum assensus fidei vel consensus
non causatur ex inquisitione rationis; tamen non excluditur per hoc quin in
intellectu credentis remaneat aliqua cogitatio vel collatio de his quae credit.
Ibid., ad 2um.
Fides habet aliquid perfectionis, et aliquid imperfectioi).is; perfectio quidem est
ipsa fumitas, quae pertinet ad assensum; sed imperfectionis est carentia visionis,
ex qua remanet adhuc motus cogitationis in mente credentis. Ex lumine igitur
simplici, quod est fides, causatur id quod perfectionis est, scilicet assentire; sed
inquantum illud non perfecte participatur, non totaliter tollitur imperfectio intellectus; et sic motus cogitationis in ipso remanet inquietus. Ibid., ad 5um. Fides
non habet inquisitionem rationis naturalis demonstrantis id quod creditur; habet
tamen inquisitionem eorum per quae inducitur homo ad credendum: ... Summq
Theol., II-II, q. 2, a. l, ad lum.
Fides consistit media inter duas cogitationes; quarum una voluntatem inclinat
ad credendum, et haec praecedit fidem; ilia vero tendit ad intellectum eorum quae
iam credit; et haec est simul cum assensu fidei. III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2um.
33 De V eritate, q. 14, a. 1, c.; cf. III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, .c.

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PAUL FARRELL

This analysis of admiration and cogitation, the integral parts
of the doubt of admiration, though incomplete, is sufficient to
establish the major presuppositions essential to the understanding of St. Thomas' doctrine on the constructive uses of
doubt in the philosophical disciplines and in faith. Because
philosophy and faith, in themselves essentially different, may be
considered as one in so far as they have the common feature of
bearing a similar relation to admiration and cogitation, it is
possible to restate the full Thomistic teaching by emphasizing
the role of doubt in philosophy and by indicating in a general
way the application of St. Thomas' principles and conclusions to
the act of faith. However, since the relation is only similar and
not identical, it will be necessary from time to time to concentrate on the differences and not on the similarities to insure
that a proper applicaton has been made.
9.!. Nature of the Doubt of Admiration

As has been indicated, admiration, considered as a simple act
of an intellect not yet determined to one part of a contradiction,
is elicited by cognition of an effect of which the cause is hidden.
Admiration in turn calls forth cogitation, a motion of reason
deliberating on the evidence available in order to discover
sufficient reasons for the intellect to assent. A reciprocal action
occurs whenever cogitation uncovers some partial evidence
which the intellect has not previously considered. This discovery results in further stimulation of admiration, the action
of which is completely dependent upon the intellectual content
at any given moment. If reason's investigations are sufficiently
fruitful, wonder becomes a continued state of mind, a thirst for
certain knowledge constantly urging on the discourse of mind.
It is in this last stage of the exercise of mutual causality that
the natural doubt of admiration formally exists. Thus, indetermination of the intellect and a sustained motion of rational
inquiry ordained to the discovery of certain objective evidence
constitute the essential nature of the doubt of admiration.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

B. PARTICULAR

313

CoNSIDER...<\.TIONS

1. The Doubt of Admiration in the Philosophical Disciplines

a. Starting point of philosophy

This doubt of admiration has the remarkable property of
being the point of departure in every new scientific inquiry.
Consequently, it is an indispensable condition to the genesis
and progress of intellectual growth and to the development of
organized bodies of scientific knowledge. St. Thomas and Aristotle view it as the psychological source from which philosophy
and science have taken their origin.
It is due to their wonder that men at the very beginning began
and at the present time begin to philosophize. There is a difference,
however, in the methodology of the ancient philosophers and those
of the present day. In the beginning they wondered at a few
obvious difficulties which were immediately at hand in order that
they might come to a knowledge of their causes; afterwards they
advanced little by little from knowledge of the obvious to a search
for the hidden causes. Then they began to doubt about more
mysterious things, for example the phenomena of the moon,
its eclipse, and phases. . . . Likewise they doubted about the
eclipse of the sun, its motion, and its size. Concerning the stars they
doubted about their number and quantity; and finally they doubted
about the generation of the universe. Some have attempted to
explain this fact as having happened by chance; others attribute it
to the intellect and some even to love. But it is clear that the
process of doubting and admiring spring from ignorance, for when
we see obvious effects, the causes of which ate unknown to us,
then we wonder about their causes. . . . Because admiration
springs from ignorance, it is clear that the ancients were moved to
philosophize in order to escape their ignorance. And hence it is
that they zealously pursued science in order to know and not for
the sake of any utility. 34
b. Ordained to science

This text is part of a historical proof that knowledge through
first causes is sought for itself rather than for any practical
advantages. Our concern at the present moment is centered
84 Oomm.
Mett;t., I, L. 2. In Saint Thomas' text and in the text upon which
he commented the word " difficulties " is " dubitabilia."

314

PAUL FARRELL

upon the latter part of the text which contains a summary of
St. Thomas' teaching on the principle and goal of the doubt
of admiration. The source from which it flows is conscious
ignorance, that is, a lack of complete or perfect knowledge; the
term to which it is ordained is science, or knowledge through
causes. Just as no natural motion reflects upon its principle nor
denies its term, so too the doubt of admiration does not fall
upon the already acquired partial truth nor upon the possibility
of the attainment of science. The mind's capacity to know and
to acquire scientific knowledge is presupposed to the exercise
of admiration. The precise function of this doubt is to focus
the attention of the mind upon the search for the existence
of a hidden cause and for an as yet unknown demonstrative
medium linking an apparent effect with its proper cause. In
this regard it serves as an impelling force influencing the reason
to consider the difficulties surrounding a problem by stating
them as questions to be answered, to check and to analyze aU
possible solutions, and finally to decide on the proper medium
when sufficient evidence has been acquired. When this has been
done and when the mind has checked its conclusions by reducing them to immediate principles, the doubt of admiration
ceases. Its revival demands a restatement of the problem which
will include additional new or unaccustomed elements. For
example, a problem that has been solved in terms of second
causes may be considered again in order to determine the action
of principal causes, an addition which is sufficient to set into
play once more admiration and cogitation.
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas has reduced the questions
proposed by the doubt of admiration to four, corresponding to
the kinds of things we know.
The reason for this is that science is knowledge acquired through
demonstration. But demonstrative knowledge is acquired of those
things which were previously unknown, and concerning which we
state questions, because we are ignorant. Hence, it follows that
those things which are questioned are equal in number to the things
of which scientific knowledge is possible. But there are four things
to be
namely, whether a fact is true, why it is true,

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

815

whether a thing is, and what it is; to these four can be reduced
whatever is questionable or subject to scientific knowledge.35
Continuing, St. Thomas points out that, since science is
concerned solely with logical truth which is signified in an
enunciation, consequently only enunciations are questionable.
"Enunciations, however, are formed in a twofold manner; from
a noun and verb without an attribute, for example, man is; in
another way when an attribute is added, as when it is said,
man is white." 36 Thus when the doubt of admiration falls upon
a complex proposition, " whether the sun suffers eclipse or
not, then we are inquiring about the fact of a connection. That
our questioning ceases with the discovery that the sun does
suffer ec.lipse is an indication of this; and if we know from the
start that the sun suffers eclipse, we do not inquire (question)
whether it does so or not. On the other hand, when we know
the fact, we ask the reason for the fact." a'7 Questions concerned with simple propositions seek to ascertain the existence
of a thing, and following this " we inquire into its nature." 38
Following this consideration is the reduction of each of the
four questions to a search for the knowledge of the existence
and nature of a possible medium of demonstration. " We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking whether there is
a 'middle' or what the 'middle' is; for the 'middle' here is
precisely the cause, and it is the cause that we seek in all our
inquiries." as•
These texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas indicate the following
properties of the doubt of admiration:
1. Its principle is ignorance.
Its term is scientific knowledge, hence it exists only in the
second and third acts of the mind.
8. It ceases when science is acquired.
35

00'TIIIm. in Post. Anal., II, L. 1.

""Ibid.
37

Aristotle, Post. Anal., II, ch. 1, 89b

•• Ibid., ch. 1, 89b 84.

•••Ibid., ch. i, 90a 5-7.

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PAUL FARRELL

4. It is not concerned with previously acquired knowledge; nor
does it question reason's a:bility to know truth.
5. Its precise role is to focus the mind's attention upon the
search for a demonstrative medium.
c. Doubt of admiration a natural motion
The latter part of the text containing St. Thomas' argument
that knowledge of causes is sought for itself and not for the
sake of utility includes another attribute of the doubt of admiration which must be considered. " Because admiration springs
from ignorance, it is clear that the ancients were moved to
philosophize in order to escape ignorance. And hence it is that
they zealously pursued science in order to know and not for
the sake of any utility." 39 In the generation of science the
successive order of ignorance, admiration, cogitation, natural
doubt, and finally knowledge through causes constitutes a
natural motion from the imperfect to the perfect. An admiration which was not ordained to the" contrary and better state
of science " 40 was an impossibility for Aristotle and St. Thomas.
Thus, since the imperfect exists for the perfect and motion for
its term, an admiration which terminated not in truth but in
further admiration was unnatural:
As happens in natural generation and motions, every motion is
terminated in the 'contrary of that from which the motion begins.
Hence, since inquisition is a certain motion to science it is necessary
that it terminate in its contrary. . . . But since the inquisition of
science begins with admiration, it is necessary that it end at its
contrary which is of greater dignity, and according to a common
proverb, a better state. That the contrary is more worthy is
apparent in the fact that when men learn causes they cease to
wonderY
Contrast this view with a theory of liberal education gaining
vogue today which places the emphasis not on truth itself but
on the search for truth. It proposes to make free men out of
students by means of instruction at the hands of the authors of
•• Comm. in Meta., I, .L. 2.

•• Ibid.

01

lbid.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

317

"some hundred of the greatest books of European and American thought " 42 presenting every conceivable phase of philosophical, scientific, religious, and moral theory. A motto has
been adopted, " No way is impassable to courage," to inspire
the students to apply themselves diligently to the study of
books which raise " the persistent and humanly unanswerable
questions about the great themes in human experience." 43
A motto better adapted to the end of such education was
phrased by Saint Paul: Ever learning, and never attaining to
the substance of the truth. (2 Tim.: 3, 7), for the freedom this
theory establishes as its end is an absolute indetermination of
judgment. The product of this training is envisioned as performing in a democratic republic the highest functions. " These
functions consist in the intelligent free choice of the ends and
means of both our common and individual life." 44
During the course of his instruction the young liberal artist
is expected to construct " several distinct, complete, and independent meanings" of the great books, "each allowing the
other to stand hy its side and each supporting and complementing the other." 45 If a book does not permit such mangling,
it cannot be a great book, for masterpieces must have many
possible interpretations. The reason for this is that the books
themselves are not didactic, rather they present the author's
understanding and exposition of the truth only as he sees it.
This theory is by no means modern. Cicero stated its basic
assumption as O.Jle of the tenets of the later Academicians:
" The mere investigation of the things that are the most hidden
and most important has its delight. If we meet with anything
resembling truth, the mind is filled with a pleasure that wholly
befits a man." 46 The best defe11se and refutation of this position was written by St. Augustine. In his Contra Academicos
Licentius equates beatitude or living happily with living m
search of the truth 47 and defends the position as follows:
•• Catalogue of St. John's College, Annapolis, Md., 1989-1940, p.
.. Ibid., p.
italics mine.
•• Ibid., p.
•• Ibid., p.•• Cicero, Academica, Bk. II, ch. CLXI, No.
•• St. Augustine, Contra Academicos, Bk. I, ch.

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PAUL FARRELL

Man's happiness consists in seeking constantly for the truth; and
when he does this, he is truly attaining his ultimate end. Consequently, one who does not seek truth as diligently as he should
does not attain his end. On the other hand, whoever strives to the
best of his ability, as every man should do, to discover truth, is
happy even though he fails to find truth; for in doing this he fulfills
all the demands which human nature imposes upon him. The fact
that he does not discover truth is to be attributed to a defect in·
the gifts nature has bestowed upon him. Finally, would it not be
sheer folly to call a man miserable, who day and night incessantly
seeks truth as diligently as he can?
The review of this position indicates that the doubt of
admiration, a means given by nature to insure intellectual
development, has been elevated to the state rightfully belonging to doubt's end, truth. Truth itself has been forced to serve
its instrument, for only the delights of truth attained and the
hope of successful attainment in the future sustain man in his
search. In fact, it is impossible to begin the search without
possessing truth in some partial and imperfect way; thus alone
is admiration provoked, an indispensable condition to the
genesis of scientific knowledge.
There is a truth contained in the equating of living happily
with the search for truth. In itself admiration offers two
pleasures, the common pleasure which follows upon the good
exercise of a faculty and a special delight found only in the
search for knowledge. Considered formally as a desire for truth,
" wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it contains the hope
of getting the knowledge one desires." 48 Moreover " wonder
gives pleasure not because it implies ignorance but in so far as
it includes the desire of learning the cause, and in so far as the
wonderer learns something new." 49 As is evident, this pleasure
pertains to admiration only by reason of its end. Consequently,
to take away from man all hopes of acquiring truth by educating him to be a sceptic is to commit him to an inhuman quest
for the impossible and to deprive him of the greatest pleasure of
all, contemplation of the Truth.
••

Theol .• 1-11, q. 82, a. 7.

•• Ibid., ad lum.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

819

2. The Doubt of Admiration in Faith

By depriving the doubt of admiration of its natural term this
theory endows the search for an unattainable goal with a certain infinitude; an attribute which pertains only to the doubt
of admiration peculiar to the act of faith. The element invoking
admiration in faith is found in the very nature of faith, the
non-evidence of the object believed, an element incorporated in
Saint Paul's desc:r;iptive definition: Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for, the evidence of things which appear
not; 50 ; and presupposed in Saint Augustine's formula: To
believe is to cogitate with assent. 51
In the presence of the mysteries of faith reason wonders and
cogitates. It may even come to a deeper understanding of
certain aspects of the mystery, but it will never penetrate to
the hidden causes necessary for the full and perfect satisfaction
of the mind's desire. 52 The darkness of faith cannot be dispelled by the light of human reason. Consequently, the indetermination of intellect which initiated the search for a better
understanding still remains at the end of the search, demanding
once more an act of faith. To this quest the text may ·be
applied: " They who eat me hunger still and they who drink
me still thirst." 58
In order to pass from the general consideration of the doubt
of admiration in faith to the determination of its particular role,
it will be necessary to review the fundaments of St. Thomas'
teaching on the object and the subject of faith. St. Thomas
maintains that the object of faith considered from the aspect
of the thing believed is something simple, for here the reality
Heb1·ews, XI, 1.
For an analysis of Saint Augustine's definition see Saint Thoma.S, Summa
Theol., II-II, q. 2, a. 1. See also III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2.
52 Ac ratio quidem, fide illustrata, cum sedulo, pie, et sobrie quaerit, aliquam Deo
dante mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam assequitur tum ex eorum,
quae naturaliter cognoscit, analogia, tum e mysterium ipsorum nexu inter se et
cum fine hominis ultimo; nunquam tamen idonea redditur ad ea perspicienda instar
veritatum, quae proprium ipsius objectum constituunt. . . . (Denziger, 1796).
•• Ecclesiasticus, XXIV, !1!0.
50

51

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PAUL FARRELL

involved is First Truth. On the other hand, he insists, and in
this he departed from the opinion of his contemporaries, that
on the part of the subject believing the object is something
complex expressed in the manner of a proposition. Thus, faith
exists in the individual according to the mode of cognition
connatural to the human intellect. The foundation of this conclusion is stated by St. Thomas:
The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the
knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know
the truth by synthesis and analysis. . . . Hence things that are
simple in themselves, are known by the intellect with a certain
amount of complexity, just as on the other hand, the Divine Intellect knows, without any complexity, things that are complex in
themselves. [Applied to faith] on the part of the believer, ... the
object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition. 64

· Although the object of faith exists in the subject as a mental
proposition, our faith does not terminate in this sign or symbol
but in the thing itself, " for as in science we do not form propositions except in order to have knowledge about things through
their means, so it iSI in faith." 55 An indication of this is the
fact that in our recitation of the Apostle's Creed we do not
profess, "I believe that God is the Father," but rather, "I
believe in God, etc." It is in faith's piercing through the
formulae of revelation to the reality signified that the first,
imperfect union of the human intellect to First Truth is accomplished. This union is capable of perfection in proportion to the
subject's penetration of the meaning of the symbols, a process
in which the doubt of admiration plays its most important role.
When St. Thomas maintains that the object of faith is
simple he is speaking of the determining or specifying object,
in the light of which all other revealed truths are known. 56
•• Sumrna Theol., II-II, q. l, a. !il, c.
66 Ibid., ad £urn.
56 Every cognitive
habit and faculty has a twofold object: material, the things
that are known, e. g., conclusions of a science; and formal, the light by which
the material object is attained. Thus it is through the medium of demonstration
that scientific conclusions are known.

THE PORTALS

OF DOUBT

321

This light is called the formal o•bject; the truths attained by
means of it, the material object.
Accordingly, if we consider in faith the formal aspect of the object,
it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we
are speaking does not assent to anything unless it is revealed by
God. Hence the medium on which faith is based is the Divine
Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which
faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other
things, which nevertheless do not come under the assent of faith,
except as bearing some relation to God. 57
Thus First Truth bears to the truths materially believed a
relation similar to that which exists in a demonstration between
the middle term and the conclusions reached in virtue of the
middle. There is a difference, however, between a probative
medium and the formal motive of faith in :regard to the manner
in which each contains the derived truths. A demonstrative
medium contains the conclusion virtually; First Truth in faith
contains all others implicitly. 58 Thus, when one assents to the
formal motive of faith, faith is professed explicitly in God
revealing and in everything He has revealed in general. Consequently all particular revealed truths are assented to in this
act of faith actually, hut implicitly only.
St. Thomas insists that men are bound to have explicit faith
in certain of the truths listed under the material object of faith
but having an essential connection with the formal object in
so far as through them men are directly ordained to eternal
life. 59 This obligation differs from person to person according
to the role each plays in the economy of salvation; thus "men
of highe:r degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under
57

Ibid.

•• A thing is said to exist virtually when it is contained in something else of a
higher rank, but not according to its proper formality or determination, so that
it is really present according to the virtue or degree of perfection of its being, but
not formally so. A thing contained implicitly in another is actually or formally
present but in a confused way.
•• For the distinction between truths which pertain to faith per se and others
which pertain " solum in ordine ad alia" see Suwma Theol., II-II, q. l, a. 6,
ad lum. For the obligation of explicit belief, see Summa Theol., II-II, q.
aa. 5-8.

PAUL FARRELL

obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith and to
believe them more explicitly." 60 Again it differs from time to
time according to the successive revelations by God making
explicit what had been previously implicitly believed, and
according to the definitions made by the Church since the
death of Saint John. 61 This unfolding or uncovering of truths
contained in the first revelations does not constitute a substantial increase of the original deposit, but rather an accidental
one in so far as only the number of truths explicitly believed
has been increased. 62 The Roman Pontiffs in exercising their
right and duty to protect and order the deposit of faith 63 have
defined propositions denied by heretics, indicating the exact
sense in which these truths must be believed and frequently
making explicit what previous ages had believed implicitly. To
them belongs the duty of " repeating again and again an old,
loved tale, savoring it, caressing it, allowing its perfume to
permeate the remotest corners of our souls." 64
The Church's pronouncements as well as the scriptural and
traditional sources from which she draws her dogmas are expressed as propositions and they are apprehended and retained
by the faithful according to the material complexity of subject,
verb, and predicate. These symbols of the faith do not reveal
the full reality of the intimate life of God; .rather they may be
likened to heavy veils which hide the splendor and clarity of
God's beauty, but reveal enough of the ordered and proportioned contours to assure us that His beauty is ineffable. Faith
is and must be obscure, for faith gives us truths which the
human mind unaided can never comprehend. It is in the darkness of faith that St. Thomas places the for:rnal reason of faith
on the part of the one believing.
The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken in two
Summa Theol., 11-11, q.
a. 6.
Ibid., q. 1, a. 7, a. 10; q.
a. 7.
•• Ibid., q. 1, a. 7.
•• Ibirl., q. 1, a. 10.
•• Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the S·umma, Sheed & Ward, New York,
1940, Vol. III, p. 9.
60
61

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there is one
formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. First Truth .... Secondly,
the formal aspect of matters of faith can be considered from our
point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is
that it is something unseen. 65

In the presence of the unknown, admiration and cogitation,
the integral parts of the doubt of admiration, arise impelling
the mind to seek a better understanding of the object. The first
principle, then, in the determination of the role of the doubt
of admiration in faith is the fact that cogitation is not something extrinsic to the faith; it is intimately conjoined as a
necessary condition of the diffusion, explication, and permanence of faith in man.
3. The Doubt of Admiration in

When the intellect considers the truth of faith under the
aspect of good, or when it is recognized that rational investigation of the intimate life of God is itself a good, the driving
and impelling force of a will informed by charity fixes the
intellect's attention on the search for a deeper penetration of
the revealed mystery. 66 In this way admiration and cogitation
assume that permanence demanded by the doubt of admiration
for the exercise of its causality. Faith in a cogitating intellect,
charity in an imperating will-thus all the elements necessary
for meditation are present. During the search the principle
imparting the force and vigor is charity in the will, whose
impulse is to the reality as it exists in itself. Nevertheless, the
intellect proceeds according to its proper mode, considering
its object, attempting to discern its hidden nature, seeking
analogies in the created order, etc. Beginning in faith and
sustained by charity, the act of meditation is ordained to contemplation, the grasping of God in a single act of intellect.
Thus, just as in the philosophical disciplines the doubt of
Summa Theal., II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2um.
Ibid., q. 180, a. 1. For a detailed account of the interaction of will and
intellect in meditation see, "·Meditation and the Search for God," James M.
Egan 0. P., The Thomiat, Vol. III, No. 8, pp. 450-468.
•G

06

824

PAUL FARRELL

admiration terminates in a better state, so too in faith it leads
to the most perfect form of human knowledge, an act of simple
apprehension in which God is contemplated as the Good, and
the motion of the mind ceases as charity embraces its object.
The reason for this is the fact that
although contemplation is essentially an act of the intellect, nevertheless it has its principle in the appetite, since it is through
charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And since
the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term
also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the
appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very
delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love.67
Nevertheless, the object contemplated still remains beyond
the comprehension of the intellect and the formal aspect of
"something unseen" still endures. Consequently, lacking the
termination of the act of the will, the cogitation of the mind
is halted by an act of faith, a second termination in a superior,
supernatural object. Admiration and cogitation in faith, precisely as they are natural intellectual motions and ordained to
science, have no natural term. A brief consideration of the-.
ology's role in faith will make this point evident.
4. The Doubt of Admiration in Theology

When the cogitation in faith proceeds according to a scientific
method aimed at explai,ning, defending, drawing out, or demonstrating the non-repugnance of the mysteries of faith, it is
called theology. Like every other science theology must have
certain principles in the light of which it judges its conclusions.
Theology's principles are assumed from the superior science
of God and the blessed in so far as through revelation these
principles have been made known to the faithful. Hence, the
light under which the theologian judges is derived from principles which, although evident in themselves, are non-evident
to him.
Proceeding scientifically the theologian will accept the fact of
""Summa Theol., 11-11 q. 180, a. 7, ad lum.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

825

the existence of his subject and the fact that certain attributes
inhere in that subject, truths known only through faith. The
questions provoked by the doubt of admiration will not fall
upon these facts in the science of theology, for these are the
truths presupposed to, and invoking, admiration which looks
ahead to the perfection of knowledge already acquired. In the
process of penetrating the meaning of these mysteries, the
mysteries themselves are the light in terms of which the
theologian will judge his progress and interpret his findings.
Just as admiration in the philosophical disciplines does not
reflect upon its source, the power of the human mind to know,
so too in faith the doubt of admiration does not question its
light. Such consideration pertains to the apologist, who judges
of the credibility of these mysteries under the light of natural
reason. Were the theologian to attempt to perform this task,
he would have to assume what is to be proved, judge what was
questioned by what was questioned.
The theologian's questions are limited to a consideration of
the nature of the subject in propositions affirming simple existence, and in complex enunciations to the search for the proper
cause or medium whereby a property exists in a subject. Employing the rules of definition (as stated in the Posterior
Analytics II, lessons 7 and 8, and in :Metaphysics VIII, lesson
4) he will seek, where possible, a demonstration manifesting
the essence of his subject, or he will proceed from a nominal
or descriptive definition as given in the theological sources
to a real definition through a progressively descending division
of superior genera and an ascending induction of specific differences known to him through a comparison of similar and dissimilar things. Likewise, the search for the proper cause will
be regulated according to the requirements of a probative
medium, namely, that it be universal, essential, and primary. 68
In both cases the doubt of admiration will lead to a superior
state of knowledge; the theologian will come to a fuller under•• Aristotle, Post. Anal. I, ch. 4, for statement,
explanation.

3

and following chapters

for

PAUL FARRELL

standing of the nature of the subject and he will discover a
truly scientific medium. But when the mind reflects upon its
knowledge it will be reminded that the transition from a
nominal definition to a real definition presupposes the existence
of its object, a fact known only through faith. Failure to
return to the initial supposition reduces the whole elaborate
process of definition to mere mechanical mental exercise, for
there can be no science of non-being. Again, when an attempt
is made to resolve a conclusion back to its principles in order
to test the validity of the demonstrative medium, reason will
also be reminded that it cannot do so without returning once
more to faith from which it has assumed its principles. First
Truth alone justifies and judges his conclusions.
Even though the doubt of admiration in faith has no natural
term, still no exigency or spiritual crisis is occasioned by this
lack. Throughout the search reason is sustained by the hope
of ultimate vision when the darkness of the unseen will give
way to the brilliance of full clarity, for faith is the substance
of things to be hoped for.

II. METHODICAL DOUBT
A.

GENERAL

CoNSIDERATIONS

I. Necessity

An abstract consideration of the nature of the doubt of
admiration made possible the charting of the direct course of
natural doubt from its inception in ignorance to its perfection
in a higher and more worthy state. It is clear from experience,
however, that doubt does not always run its natural course.
Frequently its initial ·beckonings elicit an energetic response
from the student who hastens to examine the details of the new
problem. With more or less ease and precision he states the
question. The terms are clear; the matter is tractable; an
answer is possible. All the circumstances are favorable to an
advancement in scientific knowledge. But unfortunately nothing of lasting value comes from this feverish dissipation of

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

327

energy. Like a forest fire that has spent its fury, the flames of
admiration burn intensely for a fleeting moment and then
slowly die out, leaving behind them the charred embers of an
unsolved problem. The student has slammed the doors of his
mind to the question and has plugged up his ears against the
Sibylline coaxings of the doubt of admiration.
Natural doubt is constantly subjected to a deadly barrage
from ·both the subject and the objects of knowledge. On the
subjective side, laziness, desire for pleasure, and solicitude for
the necessities of life have already been listed as the principal
causes blasting admiration from the minds of men. The first
two may be counteracted by discipline; the third demands a
remedy somewhat more difficult to apply-the necessities of
life must be provided.
There is another subjective obstacle which discipline of itself
can partly neutralize but never totally remove, and which no
amount of prosperity, however great it may be, will overcome.
Basically, it consists in a struggle between the human and
superhuman elements in us in which the doubt of admiration
is allied to the superhuman. 69 Admiration is the well-beaten
path that leads to science and wisdom, the towering peaks of
the contemplative life. Contemplation, of course, is the operaof man's most no'hle faculty, the speculative intellect.
Despite its nobility, however, this faculty is the weakest in man
who possesses it not according to its full perfection but in a
most imperfect way. Consequently, its exercise in the search
for science and wisdom
might be justly regarded as beyond human power, for in many
ways human nature is in bondage, so that according to Simonides
" God alone can have this privilege," and it is unfitting that man
should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. 70

Speculation is more superhuman than human; and consequently
•• For the details of the struggle consult Chas. De Koninck, Le Principe De
L'Ordre Nouveau in De La Primaute Du Bien Oommun. Editions de L'Universite
Laval, Quebec, 1948, pp. 88 :fl'.
70 Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, c. 2, 982 b 28-988 a 10.

328

PAUL FARRELL

metaphysics, the way to wisdom, has been called divine by
Aristotle and St. Thomas.
It is to the active life, the life of virtue and art, that man
is inclined by natural forces more impelling and more powerful
than the doubt of admiration, nature's goad to the contemplative life. In a remarkable passage St. Thomas has succinctly
stated the elements of the conflict, and has accurately appraised
the respective powers of the active and contemplative life to
rule the destinies of men.
The human life is that which is proportioned to man. In him is to
be found fi-rst of all sensitive nature, which he shares with the
brutes; practical reason, which is proper to him according to his
state; and speculative intellect, which is not found perfectly in man
as it is in the angels, but according to a certain participation of
his soul. Therefore the contemplative life is not properly human,
but superhuman. Likewise the life of pleasure which is concerned
with sensible goods is not human but bestial. Consequently, the
life properly human is the active life, which consists in the exercise
of the moral virtues. 71
In the face of this powerful opposition coming from the very
nature of the knowing subject, the doubt of admiration frequently withers away and dies. Again, on the part of the
object even more powerful opposition is encountered. Not even
Aristotle's quick-witted man may expect to spot ·the proper
cause with a breath-taking analysis of a situation in every
scientific investigation.. 72 Matter, motion, and time, to mention
a few perplexing topics, will cause not a few headaches and
perhaps even heartaches before they are mastered. And even
though the least hit of knowledge of superior things is more
lovable and desirable than all the science we may acquire of
inferior things, still the prerequisite that we know them in
some way before we can love them is not easily met. 73 To build
a stronger case, real genius, not to mention sanctity, is demanded of one who aspires to be distinguished from his fellow
Qttaes. Disp. De Virtut. Cardin., a. 1, corp.
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, c. 84.
13 Aristotle, Parts of Animals, I, c. 5, 645 a; St. Thomas, Contr& Gen. I, V.

71

12

THE PORTALS

OF DOUBT

329

men as a wise man, for whom the principle of his science is the
most perfect Being, the principal subject is the most perfect
Being, and the principle of his knowledge is the most imperfect
of concepts. Finally, the truths of faith offer the greatest
barrier of all. " Eye hath not seen nor ear heard " is applicable
in all its rigor to this divine knowledge that God has granted
to man. Human wisdom at its greatest does not even approach
it; for, after all, faith is God's knowledge of Himself.
Little wonder, then, that Aristotle seems to have taken a
special delight in making his readers and students aware of the
difficulties encountered in the discovery of truth. At every new
turn in his scientific inquiries he insists that they line up
behind him and peer over his shoulder, while he busies himself
with the task of disengaging the various problems to be analyzed. There is no mistaking the fact that there are difficulties
to be encountered when he is the teacher, for he never lets
anyone forget for a single moment that:
The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy.
An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to
attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not
collectively fail, but everyone says something true about the nature
of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to
the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed.
Therefore, since the truth seems to be like the proverbial door,
which no one can fail to hit, in this respect it must be easy, but
the fact that we can have a whole truth and not the particular
truth we aim at shows the difficulty of it. 74

The paragraph that follows has a'hout it a definite air of
"rubbing it in." When one is willing to concede that the investigation of truth has tremendous difficulties, subjective as
well as objective, he has an opportunity to preserve a wee bit
of his dignity by throwing the brunt of the difficulties back on
the object. But Aristotle will not leave him even this small
consolation:
As difficulties are of two kinds, the cause of the difficulty in attaining truth is not in the facts but in us. For as the eyes of the bat
74

Aristotle, Metaphysics, II, c. 1, 993 b 1-6.

330

PAUL FARRELL

are to the blaze of the day, so is the reason in our soul to the things
which are by nature most evident of all. 75

Aristotle and St. Thomas, as was expected of them, joined the
forces of the contemplative life, and among many services
rendered by them to this feeble warrior not the least by any
means was the discovery and development of reenforcements
for the doubt of admiration. Had they failed to do so, future
generations would he justified in suspecting that there was a
bit of the blarney attached to the following:
If reason is divine in comparison with man, the life in accordance
with it is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not
follow those who advise us that, being men, we should think of
human things, and being mortal of mortal things; but must, so far
as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to
live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small
in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything. . . . That which is proper to each thing is by nature best
and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life
according to reason is best and most pleasant, since reason more
than anything else is man. This life, therefore, is also the most
happy.7a

The reenforcement of the doubt of admiration was an artificial mode of inquiry molded according to the pattern of
admiration. The purpose of this methodology is to reinstate
the elements of natural doubt whenever necessary, and to sustain it during the intellectual search for truth by guiding
rational discourse to its proper goal. Fundamentally this process
is nothing more than a transformation of natural and spontaneous doubt into an artificial, voluntary doubt, one truly
methodical, the doubt of discussion. 77
£. 1'he Nature of Dubitatio Discussionis

The essential notion of the nature of dubitatio discussionis
may be reduced to two elements: (1) it induces and sustains
75

Ibid., 7-ll.

Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics X, c. 7, ll 77 b 30-1178 a 8.
77 The terminology
adopted was taken from St. Thomas, Summa Theol. III,
q. 27 a. 4 ad 2um; III, q. SO a. 4 ad 4um.
70

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

331

the natural doubt of admiration; (2) it is a work of art. Because it is an artefact the principle that art imitates nature
completely and totally dominates the construction of this
process of doubting. Inasmuch as artistic imitation is to be
found in two orders o.£ causality, namely, final and efficient, it
is possible to consider this doubt in either order of causes
separately from its consideration in the other order. This expedient of separate consideration has been adopted to facilitate
the explanation of the essential nature of the doubt of discussion. The analysis of its final cause, namely, the inducing
and sustaining of the doubt of admiration, will involve a statement of its formal elements; and the consideration of its construction will coincide with an analysis of its material factors,
the means employed to attain the end. Finally, to complete the
analysis of essential nature, certain properties, each of which
indicates a special necessity for the good use of the doubt of
discussion, will be enumerated.
a. Formal elements of the doubt of discussion

Because the doubt of discussion is a transformation or reinstatement of the natural doubt of admiration, the determination
of the former's formal constituents offers little difficulty. Admiration and sustained cogitation are the elements common to
both. The fact that the doubt of admiration is generated
spontaneously upon the presentation of something strange and
unaccustomed is sufficient to distinguish it from the reflex,
artistic doubt of discussion, the generation of which is subject
to voluntary control and depends upon the use of artificial
devices calculated to set off intellectual wonder and cogitation.
To some extent this difference has heen indicated in the terminology employed to designate each kind of doubt. Thus the
doubt of admiration has been called natural, to signify that it
is a property flowing from the very nature of the human intellect. On the other hand, the doubt of discussion has been
classified as methodical, to indicate that its genesis is to be
attributed not to nature alone but to art imitating nature. The
point to be stressed, however, is not so much the differences

332

PAUL FARRELL

between these two doubts as their similarities. The doubt of
discussion imitates the doubt of admiration and is ordained to
produce the latter's formal constituents, admiration and cogitation, two natural psychological operations of the human mind.
Hence the psychological realities involved in ·both processes of
doubt are specifically the same and all the properties which
have been indicated as belonging to the doubt of admiration
belong also to the doubt of discussion.
Unfortunately this fact has been subjected frequently to a
great deal of obscurity because of the false identification of the
term " methodical " with " :fictitious " and the subsequent distinction of fictitious from " real." As a result methodical doubt
has been liberated from the necessity of conforming to its
exemplar, the doubt of admiration, which is admittedly real,
and has been given free rein to plunge ahead in a search for a
medium, as it should, or to back up and trample upon truths
which can never be the proper objects of doubt.
This much at least should be dear; real doubt obviously is
not fictitious doubt in the sense of pretended doubt, and both
the natural doubt of admiration and the methodical doubt of
discussion are real or sincere processes of doubt falling upon an
as yet uncertain medium of demonstration in science or of
order in wisdom. Consequently, the identification of methodical
with fictitious or pretended doubt is impossible.
Nevertheless there is a sense in which fictitious may be
applied to methodical doubt. Every methodical doubt has art
for its principle and for this reason it is a fiction in the sense of
being something made or fashioned. Moreover, some methodical
doubts admit of a secondary and insignificant fictional character in so far as the doubt in question may involve an element
of pretense. Such a doubt arises when one who has certitude of
a truth acquired in one way abstracts from this certitude and
institutes an investigation to establish the same truth through
a different medium in order to acquire a greater certitude by
adding another argument o:r hy uncovering a scientific medium
to prove a conclusion derived from another source. In this
case the doubt's fictional element is purely negative, for even

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

888

though the truth may be considered as something yet to be
demonstrated, still it is never really doubted; rather it serves
throughout the investigation as a positive directive norm, the
goal to be attained.
Strictly speaking, therefore, this element of fiction which
reflects back upon the already acquired truth is purely accidental to methodical doubt, which must be aimed forward
to an unknown medium. Moreover, fiction in the sense of
pretense is limited to investigations in which the processes
of doubt are induced by a subject who already knows his
conclusion to be certain. It is not present in inquisitions concerned with conclusions known in a confused and imperfect
way. The essential nature of the doubt of discussion is something positive, a real, sincere doubt governed by definite
methodological rules based upon the nature of the human
intellect, and falling not upon what is already known to be
certain, but necessarily upon some unknown medium of
demonstration or of order.
b. Material elements of the doubt of discussion
i. In general
The formal constituents of the doubt of discussion, admiration and sustained cogitation, guarantee its proper use. Its
fruitful use, however, depends to a great extent upon the
material elements, the means utilized to excite and to sustain
its exemplar, the doubt of admiration. Hence the question
involved here is properly one of methodology.
Opinions of others
Aristotle was a pioneer in the investigation of logical
methods, an " inquiry in which it was not the case that part of
the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not;
nothing existed at all." 78 Therefore it was necessary for him
to point out that previous philosophers of nature had proceeded
in a ratlfer naive manner. In common with all latter-day phia.

•• Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, c. 84, 188 b 15-184 b 8.

334

PAUL FARRELL

losophers the first ones " began to philosophize due to theill'
wonder." Their admiration, however, was a gross and palpable
process, for it was directed at the "obvious difficulties." These
early investigators were travelling uncharted paths searching
for truth with their natural intellectual equipment and basing
their reasoning processes on facts of immediate experience.
Since they were first, they could not draw upon the opinions
of previous philosophers. Since they were born hundreds of
years too early, they lacked the advantages of Aristotle's art
of inquiry, such great advantages that Aristotle once took time
out from his lectures to remind his students of their indebtedness to him. Because of his discoveries his contemporaries and
successors in the investigation of truth no longer had to rest
content with having their wonder excited by obvious difficulties. Now they could manufacture their own, thanks to the
means he had given them " to raise searching difficulties on both
sides of a subject," an accomplishment that would enable them
"to detect more easily the truth and error about the several
points that arise." 79 The method belongs to that part of logic
which is called dialectics or topical reasoning.
(3. Probable premises

The immediate purpose of this kind of reasoning, as Aristotle
conceived it, was to enable one to argue from proba;ble premises
and to acquire the facility of avoiding self-contradiction when
one is attacked in argument. For the most part probable
79 Aristotle,
Topics, I, c. 2, 101 a 35-36. The treatment of dialectics has been
extended to include more than is necessary for the establishment of the material
elements of dubitatio discussionis. Because Aristotelean dialectics is concerned
primarily with probable reasonings it necessarily involves an element of doubt.
Consequently completeness of treatment demands that some consideration be given
to it. To avoid useless repetition, however, the expedient has been adopted of
working the treatment of dialectics into the body of the article at those points
where its work of preparing the mind for the generation of science is most obvious.
The more fruitful use of dialectics (e. g., in metaphysics and theology as the
backbone of the way of negation and excess----d. Summa Theol., I, q. 2, a. 3, and
q. 6, a. 2, and Contra Gen. I, c. 8--in the study of immaterial substances and as
the method employed to attain true similitudes of the divine substance) is beyond
the scope of this

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

335

premises were opinions that were generally accepted, i. e., by
every one, or by the majority, or by the most notable and
illustrious of the philosophers. Such a method, says Aristotle,
is obviously useful for mental gymnastics because it enables one
to argue more readily and easily about any subject proposed for
discussion.
A second use for the method is to ena:ble the arguer to meet
his opponents on the common ground of their own opinions and
convictions, a tete-a-tete made possible by the counting up of
the opinions held by most people followed by a selection of
weapons in the form of those probable premises which strike
one's fancy. A third benefit of dialectical proficiency, which
flows from its primary use, is an accurate description of Aristotle's own way of opening and carrying on a philosophical discussion. It is this use of the dialectical method in philosophical
investigations rather than in casual encounters with debaters
which must be considered before the material elements of the
doubt of discussion may be determined.
The generally accepted opinions of others constitute the basic
and most frequently used means of raising searching difficulties
on •both sides of a philosophical question; but they are not the
only means of inducing processes of doubt offered by the art of
dialectics. It is to the elements of dialectics that one must go
to discover these other means.
First of all, it is necessary to distinguish the subject, the
materials, and the elements of topical reasonings. 80 "The subjects on which reasonings take place are problems." 81 In the
Topics a dialectical problem is defined as "a subject of inquiry
that contributes either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and
knowledge, and that either by itself, or as a help to the solution
of some other such problem." 82 For the purpose of generating
arguments (and this is the primary purpose of dialectics) the
problem " must be something on which either the common
people hold no opinion either way, or the masses hold an opinion
contrary to that of the philosophers, or the philosophers to the
80

Aristotle,

Topics, I, c. 4.

81

Ibid., 101 b 16.

82

Ibid., I, c. 11, 104 b 1-3.

836

PAUL FARRELL

masses, or each of them among themselves." ss When it is
used for this purpose of producing a syllogistic argument in
the mind of an opponent, dialectics shies away from those
subjects which •border too closely upon the sphere of demonstration, or are too far removed from it, " for the former cases
admit of no doubt, while the latter involve difficulties too great
for the art of the trainer." 8 '
Such conditions, however, need not be verified when questions proper to the various sciences are examined dialectically.
In this case the proposition, which the demonstrator states
didactically by affirming or denying it, may be turned into a
dialectical problem by phrasing it as a question. 85 Once stated,
however, the indifference of the dialectician to either part of a
contradiction, regardless of the truth or falsity of the side
selected, comes into play. 86 This indifference to the truth or
error of the proposition chosen demands that the subject of a
dialectical argument be stated as a question and in this the
dialectician differs from the demonstrator, who must assume
true premises. 67 It is this indifference to truth or falsity which
permits the dialectician to construct difficulties to be doubted
on either side of a question in preparation for a scientific
demonstration.
A difference between the demonstrator and the dialectician
more fundamental than the diverse mode of stating the subject
is to 'he found in the quality of the propositions used in the
reasoning. The philosophical proposition must be true, that
of the dialectician needs only to be probable. 88 The dialectical
proposition
consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most
men or by the philosophers, i. e., either by all, or by most, or by
•• Ibid., 8-5.
"'Ibid., 105 a 8-5.
•• Ibid., c. 4, 101 b, 29-85.
•• Priar Analytics, I c. 1, 24 a 20-25; cf. St. Thomas, Posterior Analytics, I, I. 4,
and I. 19.

"'Ibid.
•• Topics, I, c. 14 105 b. SO; St. Thomas, Proemium to Post. Anal.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

337

the most notable of these, provided it be not contrary to the
general opinion . . .; dialectical propositions include views which
are like those generally accepted; also propositions which contradict
the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted,
and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized
arts. 89

In the process of inducing doubts such propositions enjoy frequent use. Examples will be given when the application of the
doubt of discussion in the various sciences is considered.
y. Study of likenesses and differences

Probable propositions constitute the proximate matter of
topical reasonings; the terms of the propositions are the :remote
matter or the elements. In dialectics they are four of the five
predicables, genus, specific difference, property, and accident.
Of the means devised by Aristotle to supply topical reasonings
two, namely, the discovery of the likenesses of things and the
investigation of all differences, are concerned in a special way
with these four elements.
The purpose of the study of likeness is to establish a generic
community among objects ·belonging to different species, and
among objects generically the same to discover
and
identical attributes. 90 This examination has a threefold utility:
(1) in inductive arguments" because it is by means of an induction of individuals in cases that are alike that we claim to bring
the universal in evidence ";
in hypothetical reasoning, for
it is a general opinion that among similars what is true of one
is true also of the others; (3) in defining, for it is on the basis
of similarity in individual cases that the genus of the object
is determined; moreover, different objects when examined from
the point of view of likeness frequently reveal a common note,
and " if we render as the genus what is common to all the cases,
we shall get the credit of defining not inappropriately." 91
""Ibid., I, c. 10, 104 a 9-15.
90 Topics, l, c. IS and c. 17.
91 Ibid., I, c. 18, 108 b 9-82.

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PAUL FARRELL

8. The use of commoh intentions

By combining these elements, the common intentions of
:reason, in accordance with the rules governing the discovery of
differences and likenesses, the dialectician constructs his propositions. Because these logical intentions are equivalent in extension to the totality of real beings which fall under the
consideration of the mind according to the modality of the
intentions, the dialectician's reasonings are coextensive with
those of the philosopher. 92 They differ in this, that the latter
demonstrates the real properties of being, whereas the dialectician reasons from principles derived from logical intentions
which are extraneous to the nature of things.
The propositions of dialectics may be utilized in the various
sciences by the dialectician himself proceeding according to the
rules governing his own science or they may be borrowed by the
metaphysician to deduce certain proofs. 93 In either case the
propositions are constructed from the common logical intentions of genus, difference, property, predication, contrariety,
etc. Thus the metaphysician uses these elements to dispute
against those who deny self-evident principles and to demonstrate them to the extent that this is possible. 94 Metaphysics
may use these common intentions in its own right, for its own
formal object extends to all being, both real and logicaL Particular sciences, however, may not use logical intentions in this
way, for their objects are determined to particular kinds of real
being from which their principles are derived, and to which they
are limited. 95
Any concluding that is done in the particular sciences from
principles involving logical intentions is the work of the dialectician, whose special function is to use his principles to deduce
proba:ble conclusions. Thus in psychology by utilizing the
principle that contraries belong to the same subject the dialecSt. Thomas, Metaphysics IV, l. l.
""John of St.. Thomas, Curs. Phil.., I., Log, ll P. Q. I, De Logica, a. 5.
9 ' Post. Anal.., I. I. 19.
95 In Lib. Boethii de Trinitate, Q. VI, a. l c.

92

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

339

tician may conclude to the fact that hate resides in the
cupiscible appetite because its contrary, love, is known to belong
to this subject. 96 Because the medium, contraries belong to the
same subject, is based upon the nature of the contrariety of
concepts, any attempted resolution of the conclusion to its
principles leads the investigator away from the intrinsic nature
of the subject and terminates his inquisition in a logical principle. In other words, he ends where he began, for the motion
of his discourse is circular from one common logical intention
to another. It is only in so far as this discourse is considered
from the point of view of the rules by which it is directed that it
may be called scientific. 97
Considered from the point of view of the material to which
these logical principles are applied, the inquisition cannot be
terminated by resolution to proper principles, for the medium
is extraneous to the subject. Consequently, demonstration is
impossible and the inquisition of reason which is ordained to
the discovery of a proper medium endures. 98 Nevertheless by
virtue of the fact that the logical principle which serves as a
medium establishing a community between the two other terms
is true and correctly applied, a probable conclusion may be
drawn by the dialectician in questions proper to a particular
science.
In this analysis of the principles and the uses of dialectics
three factors were emphasized, namely, the use of common
opinions as propositions, the construction of probable arguments on the basis of principles concerned with the predicables,
•• John of St. Thomas uses this example to illustrate the use of Logica Docens
in the particular sciences. Compare, however, St. Thomas' use of the same
example in Post. Anal., I, l. XIX (Vives). Strictly speaking, the example is
applicable only to John of St. Thomas' third use of logic or the proper use of Logica
Utens, when the dialectician proceeds to prove probable conclusions in the
particular sciences. St. Thomas in De Trinitate, q. VI, a. l, in treating of the
use of logical principles in other sciences states: Hie modus procedendi non potest
competere proprie alicui particulari scientiae, in quibus peccatum accidit, nisi ex
propriis procedatur. Convenit autem haec proprie fieri in metaphysica, et logica, eo
quod utraque scientia communis est, et idem subjectum quodammodo habent.
9 "' John of St. Thomas, Curs. Phil., I, Log. II P. Q. 1 De Logica, a. 5, ad £urn.
98 De Veritate, q. XV, a. 2 ad 3um; De Trinitate, q. VI, a. 1.

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PAUL FARRELL

particularly genus and difference, and finally the use of common
logical conceptions as media in concluding to probable truths
in the particular sciences. It is principally these uses of logica
utens and docens that dialectics contributes as part of a methodology ordained to perform the valuable service " of raising
searching difficulties on both sides of a question."
ii. In particular

Obviously any methodology concerned with the investigation
of truth must be based ultimately upon the nature of the
human intellect, the cause of logical truth. Consequently, the
structure of an artificial method of stimulating inquisition will
be regulated according to the nature of the operations of the
mind in Its search for truth. For be purposes of this article'it
is convenient to consider these operations under two headings:
(1) in so far as they are dependent upon experience; (2) in so
far as the intellect gradually acquires perfection by passing
from confused and indistinct knowledge to the perfect knowledge of science and wisdom. The linking up of the three
methodological factors contributed by dialectics with these
general considerations of intellectual operations will constitute
the major part of the consideration of the material elements of
the doubt of discussion.
a.

Experience and the common opinions of others

Aristotle stated briefly the starting point in any consideration
of intellectual operations when he wrote:
Mind is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually
it is nothing until it has thought. What it thinks must be in it
just as characters may be said to be on a writing table on which as
yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens
with mind. 99

The process of actualizing the intellect by its proper object,
88 On the Soul, Bk. Til,
c. 4,
b 80 fl'. For proper interpretation of the
metaphor "tabula rasa " in terms of active and passive potentiality see St.
Thomas, De Magistro, Art. I.

T!Th PORTALS OF DOUBT

341

the universal nature of material things, involves the various
steps of sense perception, memory, " and out of frequently
repeated memories of the same things develops experience, for
a number of memories constitutes a single experience." From
experience again, "originate the skill of the craftsman and the
knowledge of the man of science. . . ." 1 w
In the process of acquiring knowledge, then, the intellect is
objectively dependent upon experience. Aristotle has seen in
the lack of experience a fertile source of error:
Lack of experience diminishes our power of taking a comprehensive
view of the admitted facts. Hence those who dwell in intimate
association with nature and its phenomena grow more and more
able to formulate, as the foundations of their theories, principles
such as to admit of a wided anr1 coherent development; while those
whom devotion to abstract discussion has rendered unobservant of
the facts are too ready to dogmatize on the basis of a few
observations. 101
Experience through intimate association, however, is not
always possible, especially in problems of a more abstract
nature than those of natural philosophy. There is another
alternative to which one may have recourse in order to acquire
the necessary inductive facts. When personal experience is
lacking the deficiency may be supplied through second-hand
experience by calling into counsel the opinions ·and discoveries
of other investigators. Aristotle had a great deal of confidence
in the powers of the human mind to grasp truth; individuals
might fail, but groups of individuals pooling the results of their
investigations enjoyed remarkable success.
The investigation of truth is in one way hard, in another easy.
An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to
attain the truth adequately, while on the other hand, we do not
collectively fail, but everyone says something true about the nature
100 Post. Analytics, Bk. II, c. 19, 100 a 5-HI. The whole chapter should be read
and compared with Metaphysics A. 980 a 28 fl'. See also the commentaries of St.
Thomas on both and Post. Anal., II c. 290 a, 27-30; I c. 31, 88 a, 39-45; St. Thomas,
Metaph., IV 1. 6 n. 959, Post. Anal., 1. 80 (Leonine).
101 GeneTation and Corruption, Bk. I, c. 2, 816 a 5-10.

4

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PAUL FARRELL

of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing
to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed. 102
One who has perused Physics II, chapters 3-7, quite thoroughly
will lay aside the book convinced that Aristotle entertained no
doubts concerning the number and nature of the causes of
things. He will be at least mildly surprised to read in the
Metaphysics that although
we have studied the causes sufficiently in our work on nature, yet
let us call to our aid those who have attacked the. investigation of
being and philosophized about reality before us. For obviously they
too speak of certain principles and causes; to go over their views,
then, will be of profit to the present inquiry, for we shall either
find another kind of cause, or be more convinced of the correctness
of those which we now maintain. 103
The foundations of physics were not tottering when Aristotle
wrote this passage, for here the doubt is purely
involving an abstraction from certitude obtained on one score
in order to obtain another argument for adhering to the truth.
The conclusion of his inquisition,_ of course, was the discovery
through an analysis of many opinions that
even as we have said before ... all men seem to seek the causes
named in the Physics, and that we cannot name any beyond these;
but they seek these vaguely; and though they have all been
described before, in a sense they have not been described at all.
For the earliest philosophy is, on all subjects, like one who lisps,
since it is young and in its beginning.m
This procedure of conjuring up the shades of the
and giving them a hearing in the philosophical court of judgment is part of the general Aristotelean process of inducing
doubts, and the opinions which are analyzed,
approved, or reprobated belong to the difficulties or dubitabilia
of a question. The classification of these opinions as points
to be doubted is justified on two scores. First of all, they are
••• Metaphysics, Bk. II, ch. 1, 998 b 1-5; see also the epilogue to Sophistiool
Refutatioos, ch. 84. ISS b 15 11.
10 " Metaphysics Bk. I, ch. s, 98S b
""Metaphysics, Bk. I, c. 9, 99S a 18-16.

THE PORTALS

OF DOUBT

343

not accepted by the investigator as certain conclusions, but
rather as opinions to be analyzed, tested, and weighed carefully
to determine accurately their degree of probability. For the
philosopher the authority of the one speaking has little probative value; for him it is the weakest of arguments. His
interest primarily is in determining the truth of what has been
said. 105 The second reason for the acceptance of these opinions
as dubitabilia follows from the first. The matter to be analyzed
in this case is not reality but symbols of reality, the truth of
which must be judged by the investigator. Fundamentally, the
opinions of others are a substitute for personal experience, and
just as sense perceptions and phantasms of reality are objects
to be judged and not the immediate cause of intellectual knowledge, so, too, the opinions of others must be submitted to the
activity of reason in order that the intellect may exercise its
causality.
The words of the teacher, heard or seen in writing, have the same
relation in causing knowledge in the intellect as anything outside
the mind has, because from both the intellect takes the meaning. 106

It is the intelligible content or meaning of the symbols that
becomes the object of doubt in so far as the investigator is in
some way ignorant of it. And just as ignorance of reality
touches off admiration in the philosopher of nature, so too
imperfect knowledge of the meaning of others' opinions on the
subject induces the same psychological reactions. The process
of doubting occurs when the inquirer attempts to interpret the
meaning of the words in terms of his already acquired synthesis
of knowledge.
Now the process of reasoning in one who arrives at the cognition
of an unknown through personal discovery is the application of
general, self-evident principles to definite matters, and proceeding
from them to particular conclusions, and from these to others. 107

Likewise, he who learns through the opinions of others must
St. Thomas, Physics, VIII, l. 8; Summa Theol., I, q. l, a. 8, ad 2um.
De Magistro, Art. I, ad llum.
107 Ibid.
See also ad 2um and Sum.
105
100

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PAUL FARRELL

apply known principles to the words in order to pierce through
them to their meaning and finally to the reality signified, " for
the cognition of principles and not the cognition of symbols
causes in us a knowledge of conclusions." 108 It is this application of more general principles to particular matters, a process
involving a passage from a general and confused knowledge to
a particular and perfect one, that is unknown to the investigator and consequently the cause of his admiration and indetermination to either part of a contradiction.
The assembling of the opinions of others in order to induce a
process of doubt concerning their intelligible contents is one of
the material elements, a part of the artificial methodology of
the doubt of discussion. As such it is ordained not to a display
of dialectical finesse 'hut to the ultimate discovery of truth ..
Patterned after the operations of the mind in its search for a
medium of demonstration or order, its proximate end is to
supply the necessary inductive facts not already contained in
the investigator's experience. Actually it is far more than a
substitute for personal experience, for " the words of the teacher
have a closer relation to causing knowledge than have the perceivable things outside the mind, inasmuch as words are symbols of intelligible content." 109 The opinions of others are
already stamped with the marks of intellectual operations and
weighted down with the signposts of a completed discourse
of reason. For this reason a critical examination of the opinions
of others has been a source of many advantages for philosophical investigatorso Aristotle and St. Thomas have graciously
acknowledged their indebtedness to their predecessors:
In the consideration of truth. one man is aided by another in a
twofold way, both directly and indirectly. He is helped directly by
those who have discovered the truth, for, as has been said, although
each one of our predecessors has discovered a small segment of
truth, nevertheless, the discoveries taken collectively lead later
philosophers to a great knowledge of the truth. Indirect aid is
afforded insofar as the errors of the early philosophers have given
their successors the occasion of exercising their minds in order that
108

Ibid., ad 2um.

100

Ibid., ad llum.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

845

through diligent discussion truth might appear more readily.
Consequently the Philosopher says that it is just for us to be
grateful not only to those who, as we think, have discovered the
truth and whose opinions we embrace, but also to those who have
expressed superficial views in the investigation of truth, even
though we do not follow their opinions, because they too have
given us considerable aid in determining beforehand certain mental
exercises to be performed in the search for the truth. 110
Following the intellectual course laid down by predecessors
has definite advantages, but they pale into insignificance in
comparison with the advantages to be obtained by charting a
new course past the obvious shoals with the aid of a map
indicating the landmarks and safe channels. Thus far the
consideration of the use of opinions has been limited to the
process of assembling and analyzing their meaning. There is a
further use for them which adds over and above the process
of assembling and analysis a definite method of handling their
meanings. St. Thomas has given this second use a highly
significant name, dubitationes emergentes. 111 An approximate
translation would read, processes of doubt from which (truth)
emerges. This method envisions the lining up of opinions into
opposing ranks and pitting one against the other. Pro and Con,
Yes and No, Thesis and Antithesis, are various formulae that
have been used to designate this process.
An excellent example of the use of dubitatio e'IT/,ergens is
found in article 1 of St. Thomas' De Magistro. First of all a
problem is stated: Whether man can teach another and be
called a teacher, or God alone? After this eighteen difficulties
are proposed denying the ability of men to teach one another
and their right to the name of teacher. Holy Scriptures, Saint
Augustine's De Magistro and De Libero Arbitrio, Boethius'
Consolations, and Plato's Meno are drawn upon to build the
defenses of the negative side. Then follow six contradictory
arguments drawn from Holy Scriptures, the Gloss, Saint Augustine's Contra Manichaeos, and Aristotle's Metaphysics. Master
Metaphysics, Bk. n, 1. 1.
Metaphysics, Bk. III, 1. 1, in the discussion of the fourth reason for using
doubts in metaphysics.
HO
"

1

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PAUL FARRELL

debater as he was, St. Thomas' statement of these udbitabilia
constitutes a trenchant and incisive compendium of the historical roots of problems troubling his
The very words in which he formulated objections are understood
only in the light of the history of contemporary error. He fought
no windmills; he set up no men of straw in order to knock them
down. He dealt with living issues. He was in touch with his age
upon all its intellectual wants and aspirations. 112
Difficulties of the caliber St. Thomas demanded could not be
stated without considerable research and diligent deliberation.
St. Thomas was sparing neither in scholarship nor concentration, for he was convinced, as was Aristotle, that the solution
of the difficulties (dubitationum) is the discovery of the truth.
It is expedient for him who wishes to grasp a certain truth to solve
the difficulties (dubitationes) , for the solution of difficulties is the
discovery of the truth, and consequently the reasons contained in
contrary opinions are of tremendous value in the attainment of
science.113
Because his De Magistro was given as a public disputation
which was regulated by ironclad rules ofprocedure, St. Thomas
did not immediately sift the stated dubitabilia in order to
extract the true from the false; rather he entered upon the
presentation of his own teaching on the subject. In this he
departed from the Aristotelean philosophical method which
completed the statement of difficulties with arguments for or
against the expressed opinions. Nevertheless, his own response
in the 'body of the article was definitely molded on the pattern
of " dubitationes emergentes." As a matter of fact the first part
of the response is given over to a further statement of difficulties in more universal matters. The question of the acquisition of knowledge is shown to be intimately connected with the
problems of the eduction of natural forms and the generation
of habits. Two divergent schools of thought on these questions
are pitted against one another, one insisting that all forms are
119
118

Br. Azarias, Essays Educational, D. H. McBride & Co., Chicago, 1896, p. 89.
Nichom. Ethics, Bk. VII, 1. 2; In Lib. de Caelo, I, 1. 22.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

847

derived from a separate form; the other, that forms are innate
in the subject. A refutation of tp_e errors of these opinions
follows, and thus by solving the difficulties St. Thomas prepares
the way for the introduction of Aristotle's "middle course
between these two positions." Upon this foundation St. Thomas
built the edifice of his doctrine, for the middle term was already
evident in the solution of the difficulties.
{3. Probable reasoning and the perfection of knowledge

In his response St. Thomas completely unravels the skein
of the problem, strips it of all its accidental tangles, and reveals
the single thread that enables the student to view the question
in its entirety and in all its ramifications. Expert teacher, he
leads the minds of his students step by step from ignorance to
perfect knowledge with the facility and deftness of an experienced guide. There are no sudden, blinding flashes of genius
to thrill the student at the expense of lea,ving his mind uninstructed. Nor is there any attempt made to cram a ready-made
conclusion into a disorderly mind as an overcoat is jammed into
an overstuffed trunk by a last-minute packer. The teacher's
function is to teach; the student's to learn. But first the teacher
himself must learn, and when he has done that his teaching
becomes a matter of intelligently presenting what he has learned
in the manner in which he has learned it.
Hence one man is said to teach another because the teacher proposes to another by means of signs the discursive process which
he himself goes through by natural reason, and thus the natural
reason of the pupil comes to a cognition of the unknown through
the aid of what is proposed to him with the aid of instruments.m
In the genesis of knowledge reason must pass from the imperfect state of potency to the perfect state of act not immediately but mediately and gradually.
And because to know something indistinctly is the medium between
pure potency and perfect act, therefore when our intellect proceeds
from potency to act that which is confused rather than what is
distinct occurs to it first of all. But then there is complete science
1"

De MagiatTo, Art. I, corp.

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PAUL FARRELL

in act, when the mind arrives through resolution to a distinct
knowledge of principles and elements. And this is the reason why
confused things rather than distinct are known to us before anything else.U5
Confused knowledge as distinguished from perfect knowledge
implies that what is known contains within itself potentially
and indistinctly something else which is the subject of further
rational investigation. Now in intellectual knowledge
the fact that universals are confused is clear, because the universals
contain within themselves their species in potency; and he who
knows something in a universal knows that thing indistinctly . . .
for he who knows animal does not know irrational except potentially.116

In passing from the state of potency to the act of confused
knowledge the intellect takes its first big step in the direction of
science and wisdom, and in taking the step the intellect leans
heavily upon a sturdy crutch, the process of constructing arguments based upon common characteristics. The form of this
argument is simple enough, A : B : : B : C. The following concrete example, as calm is in the sea so is windlessness in the air,
was given by Aristotle to indicate the usefulness of this process
in uncovering the generic note that must be given first in every
definition. 117
By constructing an argument employing such a proportion
and then pitting against it another argument .based upon the
differences of the objects compared a further purification of
the confused concept can be made. This process envisions the
inducing of a second doubt upon the first construction based
on similarities, which of course is only probable and therefore
subject to a real doubt, the correction of its hastily drawn
synthesis by the new inductive facts discovered through an
examination of differences, and finally an inquisition in which
the doubt of reason falls upon a possible medium to synthesize
Physics, Bk. I, I. 1.
Ibid . .
117 Topics, Bk. I, ch. 17, 108 b 24-26.

115

11•

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

349

the newly acquired knowledge. An example of the use uf this
method has been given by St. Thomas in his analysis of one
of the proofs given by Aristotle to the fact that the confused
knowledge of universal wholes is prior in us to the cognition
of particulars in the intellectual order. Aristotle's argument
stated that just as a sensible whole is more known in sense
knowledge, so too the universal, an intelligible whole inasmuch
as it contains its inferiors as potential parts, is more known to
the intellect. Against this St. Thomas urges the obvious fact
that the use of whole in the argument is equivocal and consequently " whole " cannot be used as a middle term. However,
dubitatio emergens has not backfired on Aristotle this time.
SL Thomas let him rest in peace by salvaging the parts of his
argument and using them as the material parts of a new construction built on a more solid foundation, a new middle term
which takes into account the differences between a universal
and an integral whole.
An integral whole and a universal whole have this common feature,
that both are confused. For just as he who has apprehended a
genus does not know the species distinctly but only potentially;
so too he who has just seen a. house does not yet know how to
distinguish its parts. Consequently, this same ratio of confusion,
which is the cause why a whole is prior known to us, is preserved in
both wholes. Obviously then, the philosopher's argument is based
upon the common ratio, confused, and not composed.U8
When the intellect's construction has safely withstood all the
attacks of adverse arguments, and reason stands convinced
that it has knowledge which is at least probably adequate to
reality, the process of perfecting this knowledge continues. An
investigation of the proper principles of the thing follows, and
it is here that the doubt of discussion really goes to work. Now
the inquisition of reason is directed toward the discovery of a
medium, a bridge which will enable the intellect to span the
chasm between confused and distinct knowledge.
Science is the goal of the inquiry and consequently the
thought of the searcher must be cast in the rigid mold of a
110

Physics, Bk. I, l. l.

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PAUL FARRELL

demonstrative syllogism. The conclusion is already known to
some extent, as a fact of experience or with that imperfect
knowledge in which a particular is known in its universal. In
the latter case the conclusion is known beforehand in its principles as an effect is known to pre-exist virtually in itscause.n 9
It is the work of the premises of the syllogism to bring the
cause, the principle, into contact with the conclusion in order
that the causality of the principle in generating science may be
exercised. Premises, however, are not just picked out of the
air; they have to be sought diligently. In this search the process
of inducing doubts through arguments based on principles
derived from the common conceptions of reason plays an
· important psychological role.
From the point of view of logical relations the subject and
predicate of the conclusion contain within themselves the basis
for affirming or denying the inherence of the latter in the
former. The contents of both concepts must be examined
minutely to reveal this medium. Likewise, considered from the
point of view of generating science in the investigator, the
middle constitutes the precise point at which the conclusion is
subjected to the causality of the more
principles
contained in the premises. The all-important thing, then, is to
unearth this medium by digging deeply into the intelligible
contents of the major and minor terms, a task which requires
the complete, undivided attention of the mind. It is here that
proba:ble arguments render one of their most valuable services
in forcing the mind to consider these terms and these alone.
An example of the use of such an argument will be helpful in
grasping its precise function. In his consideration of the question, " Whether. the goodness of the will depends upon the
eternal law," St. Thomas argues in the Sed contra:
Augustine says that sin is any deed, word, or desire against the
eternal law. But malice of the will is the root of sin. Therefore,
since malice is contrary to goodness, the goodness of the will
depends upon the eternal Iaw.120
119
100

St. Thomas, Post. Anal., Bk. I, I. 2, at en.d.
Summa Theol., 1-11, q. 19, a. 4, Bed contra. (Italics mine.)

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351

By virtue of an application to malice and goodness of the
common logical principle that contraries are concerned with the
same subject, St. Thomas linked together goodness of the will
and the eternal law. Any attempt to resolve this principle
back to its source takes the mind away from the things considered and brings it back into the realm of the intentions of
reason. Moreover, the fact that any conclusion at all was reached
other than the general one that goodness and malice are concerned with the same subject can only be attributed to St.
Thomas' theological knowledge formulated in St. Augustine's
definition. In other words the conclusion is known not by
reason of the middle term but by reason of something extraneous to it. Hence the conclusion is proba:ble and the conjunction of subject and predicate is still subject to doubt. Nevertheless, since the definition of sin is true, and the logical
principle and its application to the particular matter are true,
the conclusion possesses a high degree of probability, an encouraging sign for a wearied investigator, if nothing else. The
chasm has been spanned-tentatively,
of course; and even
though reason has not constructed any massive concrete bridge
to make the crossing, still it can use this single cable to swing
back and forth in its examination of the subject and the
predicate.
Arguments of this kind do far more than merely establish a
probable nexus between two concepts. By their very nature
they serve as psychological forces impelling the reason to continue the search for a rational medium of demonstration, a
medium which will stand the test of resolution to the ultimate
term, the understanding of principles in the light of which the
conclusion may be judged.
Whenever the inquisition of reason does not lead to the ultimate
term, but reason persists in the inquisition itself, namely when
the inquirer remains indifferent to either part of a contradictionand this happens when reason proceeds through probable principles- ... , then the rational process is distinguished from demonstration. And in this way one can proceed rationally in every

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PAUL FARRELL

science, in order that from probables the way to necessary conclusions may be prepared. 121
Thus, while reason persists in the inquisition, admiration and
cogitation continue to exercise their causality on the mind.
The same effect of focussing the attention of the mind on
the search for the medium may be induced by using probable
arguments which lead to conclusions opposite to the ones already
known in a non-scientific manner. In considering the question,
whether hatred is caused by love, 122 St. Thomas establishes the
affirmative as a probable conclusion based on the authority of
St. Augustine. Against this conclusion, which is being subjected
to scientific examination, St. Thomas urges: One of contraries
is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries,
therefore etc. There is plenty of work to be done in solving a
difficulty of this sort, and the work has to be done on nothing
else than the concepts hatred and love which contain the muchdesired medium.
It is not always necessary to have recourse to logical
tions to produce this effect, for the use of common principles
of real being in argumentation leaves the mind partially indetermined and persisting in its inquisition. Arguments of this
kind are likewise dialectical " not because they proceed from
logical terms, but because they proceed in the manner of logic,
namely from commons and probables, which is proper to the
dialectical syllogism." us
An example of such an argument is found in Aristotle's proof
that physics treats of nature in both senses of matter and form.
The principle employed as the medium of this syllogism is
common-art imitates nature.
If on the other hand art imitates nature, and it is the part of the

same art to know the form and the matter up to a point (here two
examples are given) ... if this is so, it would be the part of
physics to know nature in both senses.124
De T1-initate, q. 6, a. 1.
n• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 29, a. !!.
'""Physics, Bk. III, I. 7.
12 ' Physics, Bk. II, ch. 2, 194 a 21-26.
121

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

353

3. Properties of the Doubt of Discussion

The doubt of discussion is
by the following
properties, each of which indicates a special necessity of inducing processes of doubt in scientific investigations. First, in
forcing the mind to focus its attention upon the dubitabilia of
a question and in impelling a rational inquiry by arousing
admiration and a sustained cogitation, this doubt paradoxically
gives to the mind that freedom of thought necessary for concluding truly. The difficulties surrounding a problem, both
those that arise from subjective causes as well as those which
flow from the very nature of the problem, were likened by St.
Thomas to bonds encircling and enchaining the intellect. That
the intellect may recover that liberty of movement and impartiality of judgment required for an objectively true discussion,
these chains must be burst asunder. Delivery demands that
just as he who wishes to break a corporal bond must first of all
inspect the bond and the manner in which it has been forged, so
too he who wishes to solve the difficulties (dubitationes) must first
examine all the difficulties and their causes.125
Doubt is more frequently regarded as a bond enslaving the
mind than as the force which breaks these bonds asunder. The
picture of doubt as an enslaving chain, of course, is perfect
provided that the background is moral activity. For in this
setting human actions must cease when doubt makes its appearance. Doubt decked out in the garb of a liberator is definitely
out of place here. But it is right at home in the setting of
speculative activity. A confusion of doubt's role in these two
orders results in tragedy. When doubt arises men must stop
acting and start thinking, not vice versa.
Ultimately all of doubt's powers in freeing the mind are to
be attributed to one of its parts, admiration. As an act of the
mind admiration is to be found as the starting point in every
rational investigation, for " it is due to their wonder that men
began and now begin to philosophize." There is an element of
'""Metaphysics, Bk. III, I. I.

354

PAUL FARRELL

fear in admiration, because " he who is amazed shrinks at
present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him,
fearing to fall short of the truth, but inquires into the future." 126
Once more the garb of the liberator will fall from the shoulders ·
of doubt, if this fear in intellectual admiration is confused with
the fear of admiration in the appetites: the latter is a passion,
a species of fear closely allied to stupor, both of which are
concerned with some evil that has assumed tremendous proportions in human estimation. He who is overcome by admiration or stupor " both fears to judge at present and to inquire
into the future." 127 For one who fears the truth, then, or who
cannot endure the task of thinking, admiration of the appetites
is the death of intellectual life.
Secondly, the doubt of discussion has the advantage of orientating the mind by esta:blishing the goal of the inquisition and
putting the mind on the road to that goal. One who has undertaken a search for the truth without first considering the
dubitabilia may be likened to a traveller who has .undertaken
a journey without knowing just where he is going.
And this is so, because as the end of the journey is that which is
intended by the one travelling, so the exclusion of doubt is the end
which is intended by the one seeking for the truth. But it is clear
that he who does not know where he is going cannot directly get
to any definite place except by chance. Likewise, neither can any
one directly look for· truth unless he has first examined the
difficulties.128
Finally, the doubt of discussion makes it possible for the
investigator to recognize his goal when he has attained it. Of
course, it remains within the realm of the possible, the hazardously possible, for a philosopher to arrive at the solution of his
problem without having examined the dubitabilia. Most frequently, however, his is the sad plight of the tourist who has
reached his destination, fails to recognize it, and hence doesn't
know whether to go sight-seeing or to arrange for more transportation.
128

127

Summa Theol., I-II, q. 41, art. 4, ad 5um.
Ibid.
us St. Thomas, Metaphysics, Bk. III, I. I.

355

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

Just as from the fact that one does not know exactly where he is
going, it follows that when he arrives at the place which he sought,
he doesn't know whether he should sit down and take a rest or
keep right on going, so likewise when someone does not know the
difficulties, he cannot know when he discovers the truth, because
he does not know the end of his inquisition, the solution of the
difficulties.
On the other hand one who has doubted often and well has no
trouble in recognizing his goal "which is dear to him who :first
learns the difficulties," 129 the signposts on the road to truth.
In the light of these statements the following assumes axiomatic proportions:
For those who wish to investigate the truth it is necessary to doubt
well before they go to work. . . . And this because the later
investigation of the truth is nothing else than the solution of the
prior doubts. 130

B. PARTICULAR
l.

The Use of Methodical Doubt in the Particular Sciences

This dictum may ·be applied in aU its rigor within the limits
of the particular branches of the philosophical disciplines. He
who wishes to investigate the truths of logic, physics, psychology, ethics, and politics has full freedom to apply the tests of
doubt to all the conclusions of these sciences. There is a certain
amount of restriction placed upon him, however, ·by reason of
the fact that each science has its own proper questions, responses, and disputations. 131 Proper questions in the various
sciences are concerned only with the propositions
premises
from which a conclusion is demonstrated of the genus subject
and with those conclusions which flow from the principles of
the science. In regard to the latter, 'nam_ely, the
the scientist must be prepared t·) answer all questions and to
enter into disputes with those who throw doubt upon them.
Not all his premises, however, may be questioned with the
expectation of a scientific answer. Those basic truths of a

or

120

Ibid.

130

Ibid.

131

Post. Analytics, Bk. I, l. 20.

356

PAUL FARRELL

particular science which must be assumed from a superior
science are excluded, for no science can demonstrate its own
principles.
There is a limit, then, to the questions which may be put to each
man of science; nor is each man of science bound to answer all
inquiries on each subject, but only such as fall within the defined
field of his own science. 132

If a disputant with a geometrician goes outside these bounds
"he will be at fault, and obviously cannot refute the geometrician except accidentally." 133
Since the process of inducing doubts is in a very real sense
an argument with one's self as the opponent, the consideration
of the use of dubitatio discussionis in the particular sciences
is limited to an examination of the method of doubting employed in the discovery of conclusions proper to each science.
Thus qualified, the analysis given above of the nature and
formal elements of the doubt of discussion may be applied here.
That Aristotle and Saint Thomas did apply such a doubt is
evident to any one who has examined their scientific tracts.
At every stage of the logical development of a science, with
the introduction of every new investigation, the opinions of
the ancients were examined, the difficulties of the question were
stated, and not infrequently one or more dialectical arguments
were used either to point out the way to a possible solution
or to separate the true from the false opinions. Because of its
obvious general application the following text was selected to
illustrate the use of the doubt of discussion in the particular
sc1ences.
In approaching a particular ethical problem concerned with
the nature of continency, St. Thomas comments on Aristotle's
text:
The philosopher lays down the mode of proceeding. And he says
that it is necessary to proceed in this matter as in other discussions,
132

153

Aristotle, Post. Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 12, 7'7 b 6-9.
Ibid., l. 10-12.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

357

namely, that, after we have posited those things which seem probable . . . , we must first induce processes of doubt (inducamus
dubitationes), and thus we shall show all those things which are
especially probable about these subjects; and if not all, because it
is not within man's power that nothing should escape his mind, we
shall indicate the greater part of, and the most important of, them;
for, if in any matter the difficulties are solved, and some probables
are left as if true, the question has been sufficiently determined. 134

An examination of the inquisition that follows reveals that
the method employed includes:
a. assembling the best and most authoritative opinions on the
matter.
b. the statement of proper questions, i. e., objective difficulties
concerned with the various causes of continency.
c. the use of both sophistic and dialectical arguments based on
common principles, real and logical.
d. the focussing of doubts upon these probable arguments in
order to separate the more probable ones. The statement
of Aristotle on this phase of the process is interesting:
" Of such kind are the difficulties that arise; some of these
points must be refuted and others left in possession of the
field; for the solution of the difficulty is the discovery of
the truth." 135
Moreover the text of St. Thomas indicates that this method
has not been devised for this one instance due to the particular
contingencies of ethical problems. Rather, it is here applied
"as in other discussions." There is a difference, however, in
the use of opinions in ethics and in the other philosophical disciplines. As a general rule, arguments from authority are the
weakest kind of arguments in philosophy. Nevertheless a certain gradation of value is to be found in the philosopher's
acceptance of authoritative opinions. In those sciences, for
example, mathematicS' and natural philosophy, whose subject
matter possesses a more or less rigid necessity and is capa:ble
of perfect demonstration, opinions have little or no probative
value and their use is confessedly preparatory rather than
'"' Nick. Ethics, Bk. VII, I. I.
Aristotle, Nick. Ethics, Bk. Vll, ch. S, 1146 b 6-8.

135

5

358

"PAUL FARRELL

demonstrative. This is not the case, however, in the moral
sciences, whose matter, human acts, virtues, goods, etc. are
decidedly contingent because of the element of free choice
which necessarily enters into each human act.
The general principle regulating the type of certitude to be
sought in the various sciences has been stated by St. Thomas:
" The mode of manifesting truth in each science must be convenient to that which is subjected as matter in that science." 186
Now just and honorable acts, the matter of ethiGs, are not
considered to be the same concrete kinds of acts in every
instance nor in every place. There is considerable divergence
of opinion in regard to their nature and to their origin, in convention or in rational nature. Moreover, the secondary matter
of ethics, external goods, does not receive the same evaluation
by all men and not even by the same man at all times. Because
the matter lacks universality and necessity, therefore
we must be content in speaking of such subjects and with such
premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with
the same kind of premises (we must be content) to reach conclusions no better. 137

On the principle that each man judges the things he knows
and of these things he judges well, the opinions of just men
carry a great deal of weight in moral matters.
We should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish
but from· the wise; just as it is the task of a person whose sense
of taste is in good order to judge whether a thing is palatable. 188

Finally, an examination of Aristotle's solution of the problem's difficulties reveals that the inducing of doubts is a continued process, that is, it is not limited to the beginning of
the investigation but continues to accompany the mind throughout the discourse, a guarantee of sustained interest and a check
against the possibility of concluding too hastily on insufficient
Nick. Ethics, Bk. I, 1. 8.
Aristotle, Nick. Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 8, 1094 b 18-1095 a 18.
138 Summa Tkeol., I-II, q. !!, a. 1 ad lum.

136

137

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

359

evidence. Thus, this doubt fashioned at the beginning of the
rational inquiry and carried through the whole discourse is
truly a doubt of discussion molded according to the pattern
of the natural doubt of admiration.
2. Use of the Doubt of Discussion in More Universal Matter

The same process of inducing doubts has been employed by
Aristotle and St. Thomas in the establishment of the first
principles in particular sciences, an application of methodical
doubt in more universal matter. An example of this use is to
be found in the first hook of Aristotle's tract On the Soul. After
his statement of the difficulties involved in the determination
of the mode of inquiry proper to psychology, Aristotle began
his consideration of the nature of the soul. He opened the
examination with the following words:
For our study of the soul it is necessary, while formulating the
problems of which in our further advance we are to find the solutions, to call into council the views of our predecessors who have
declared any opinion on the subject, in order that we may profit
by whatever is sound in their suggestions and avoid their errors.139
The reasoning involved in such an undertaking belongs to
that part of the art of dialectical argumentation which is concerned with the establishment of first principles in the various
sciences.
For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles of
the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are the
prius of everything else! It is through the opinions generally held
on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this
task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic; for
dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the
principles of all inquiries.140
To this use of methodical doubt may be applied the literal
sense of Aristotle's dictum: "We should enter the chambers
100

Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, ch. 2, 408 b 20-28.

uo Topics, Bk. I, ch. 2, 101 a 87-101 b 5.

360

PAUL FARRELL

of knowledge through the portals of doubt . . . by making preliminary examination of the difficulties to be solved." 141
3. The Use of Doubt of Discussion in Most Universal Matters

The following text appears at the beginning of St. Thomas'
commentary on Aristotle's discourse to manifest the principles
of metaphysics. It is a continuation of the enumeration of
the qualities of doubt considered a:bove:
On account of these reasons it was Aristotle's custom in almost all
his works to preface his inquisition or determination of truth with
dubitationes emergentes. But in the other books he placed his
doubts one by one before each one of the determinations; here,
however, he lays down his doubts, all of them, at once. The reason
for this is that, because the other sciences consider truth in a
particular way, it pertains to them to doubt about the individual
truths in a particular way, but this science, just as it is ordained
to a universal consideration of truth, so too universal doubt of
truth pertains to it. 142

Although the primary purpose of this passage is to explain
Aristotle's placing all the points to be doubted at once instead
of treating of them at different stages of the development of
the tract as was done in the particular sciences, the reason
assigned for this procedure, " to metaphysics pertains universal
doubt of truth," raises the question of the limitations of
methodical doubt. Are the basic presuppositions necessary for
all scientific knowledge among those truths which can be made
the object of doubt? In other words, is the general rule, " for
those who wish to investigate truth it is necessary to doubt well
before they start their inquisition," of universal application or
does it admit of exceptions?
From the texts of St. Thomas the following dubitabilium
may he constructed:
For those who wish to investigate truth it is necessary to doubt
well before they start their inquisition.
" 1 Silvester Maurus, Aristotelis Opera Omnia, Vol. IV. Metaphysicorum,
book
III, lecture 1. (Quoted in R. E. Brennan 0. P., General Psychology, p. 5.)
""St. Thomas, Metaphysics, Bk. ill, I. L

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

861

But this science, metaphysics, is ordained to a universal consideration of truth.
Therefore, to Metaphysics falls the task of doubting universally
of truth.
The texts are definite. Saint Thomas insists that universal
doubt has its place in the consideration of truth under its most
universal aspect. But what is the nature of this doubt?
a. Not a sceptical doubt
Scepticism is the state of mind of one who denies all possibility of attaining any truth and certainty. For him both of
these are mere illusions. The extreme of this position is represented in the doctrine and activity of Heraclitus' disciple,
Cratylus, whose conversations were reduced to a frantic wave
of the finger because he doubted that he existed long enough,
if he existed at all, to answer any questions. This state of mind
has been epitomized in Cicero's statement of Chius Metrodorus'
dictum:
I deny that we know, whether it be a question of our knowing
something or knowing nothing. Furthermore, I deny that we know
just what it is to know or not to know, and by no means do we
know whether something or nothing exists.
St. Thomas insists that such a doubt is impossible, for:
1. There is one principle which cannot be doubted really but
only vocally. In discussing the principle of contradiction established 'by Aristotle as the most certain of all principles to which
demonstrations are reduced as to an ultimate starting point
(Meta. Bk. IV, ch. 8, 1005 b 18 ff.), St. Thomas points out the
impossibility of mentally adhering to the contradictory of this
proposition.

It is impossible for anyone to think that the same thing can be
and not be at the same time, even though certain ones have maintained that Heraclitus held this opinion. It is true, of course, that
Heraclitus said this; nevertheless he could not think so. For it is
not necessary, that whatever someone says, must also be so conceived in his mind.

362

PAUL FARRELL

Continuing, St. Thomas points out that the impossibility of
mentally adhering to both of these contradictories is based upon
the fact that
in thinking something to be and not to be at the same time, one
will have at the same time contrary opinions. And therefore contraries will be simultaneously inhering in the same subject, which
is impossible. 143

2. The principle of contradiction is
naturally :first in the second operation of the intellect, namely, the
act of composing and dividing. Nor can anyone understand anything according to this operation, unless he has :first understood
this principle. 144

Hence this principle is presupposed to every judgment including that of universal sceptiCism.
3. Further, the very admission of universal doubt contradicts its universality, and the words used in expressing this
doubt may be turned into an argument against this position .
it can be shown that it is
. . . in this way (argumentatively)
impossible for the same thing to be and not to be; but only if he
who denies this principle on account of some difficulty says something, that is, signifies something with a name. But should he say
nothing, it is foolish to argue with him who uses no reason in speaking. For such a one . . . who signifies nothing will be like unto
a plant. 145
b. Not a methodical positive doubt

A methodical positive doubt is a state of mind of one who,
convinced for some reason of a certain truth, a:bstracts from
the certitude he has in order to instigate a scientific investigation of the very foundations of his conclusion. Such is the
state of mind of a theologian, who under faith firmly adheres
to the truth of God's existence but induces doubts in order to
discover a rational medium for a scientific demonstration. He
prefaces his consideration of the matter with the question,
103

Metaphysics, Bk. IV, l. 2.

144

Ibid.

145

Ibid. at . end.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

868

"Does God Exist?," advances arguments to the contrary, and
then proceeds to investigate philosophical principles which may
be used in proving the proposition from inductive facts. During the inquisition he considers the truth in question as scientifically uncertain until a demonstrative medium has been
uncovered. Father Montagne, 0. P., proposes an interesting
description of the state of niind of such a doubter.
A doubt of this kind is possible and capable of solution provided
that it is placed upon a particular truth. In this case there are,
as it were, in the man who doubts two persons: the first excites the
doubt and asks the question; the second furnishes as props to the
first truth certain other truths-facts or principles which the doubt
has not fallen upon, and which the two persons accept equally,
and in the light of which it is possible for them to solve all the
difficulties that have been proposed. Continuing, he points out
that such a doubt cannot be levelled against the fundamental
principle of thought, for in this case " all truth has been cast into
question, and consequently the one who would propose such a
problem would not be able to find in himself another person whose
role would be to hold in reserve and to furnish him with certain
principles to be employed in the solution. Such a doubling up
of persons, necessary however if the problem is to be solved, becomes impossible." us
One may discredit this account as highly imaginative; nevertheless the figurative construction, " Les deux personnages,"
has a solid foundation in St. Thomas, for whom the conflict,
pictured personally above, takes place between the interior and
exterior reasons.
In distinguishing the different kinds of common principles St.
Thomas points out that the common conceptions, dignities, or
axioms have something in common with the other principles of
demonstration (petitio and suppositio) and something peculiar
to themselves. The common element is that all are evident in
themselves.
But it is proper to these principles (dignities) that not only is it
106 "

Le Doute Methodique

Thomiste, Vol. 18 (1910), pp.

Selon St. Thomas."

1\llontagne, 0. P., in Revue

364

PAUL FARRELL

necessary for them to be per se true, but also it is necessary that
they be seen to be true. For no one can think their contraries. 147
With this property of the axioms as a fundament, St. Thomas
distinguished them from petitions and suppositions, which can
be confirmed by exterior reason, i. e., by some argumentation.
But the common conception of the soul is not related to external
reason, because it cannot be proved by any argumentation;
hut to that reason which is in the soul, because by the light of
natural reason it is immediately made known. The fact that it
is not related to exterior reason is clear, because no syllogism
can be constructed to prove the common conceptions of the
soul. 148
For St. Thomas exterior reason has several concrete significations, but it is clear that in this text argumentation or demonstrative syllogism is signified. Consequently, petitio and suppositio
have some sort of demonstrative medium through which they
may be proved. These are the principles of particular sciences
which, even though they cannot be demonstrated in their own
science, since they are prior to everything else, nevertheless are
capable of demonstration by a superior science or at least of
manifestation through probable arguments. When methodical
doubt is focussed on these truths, the doubt, of course, falls
upon an unknown medium. In such cases a positive methodical
doubt is a useful, legitimate instrument for guiding the mind
in its inquisition.
It is clear also from the text that the cognition of the dignities or axioms pertains to the interior reason, for these truths
are known immediately by the light of natural reason, that is,
they are made known by the power of the active intellect.
In this case the active intellect is not regarded
as the intellective potency itself, but as a certain habit (understanding) by which man from the power of the active intellect's
light naturally knows indemonstrable principles.149
147 Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, l. 18.
""Ibid.
u• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 51,
1.

art.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

365

Because axioms are not known through exterior reason, the
proximate objective cause of certitude in their regard cannot
be a medium of demonstration, but is the very truth of the
proposition itself; subjectively, the cause of certitude is the
nature of the active intellect as it is informed and perfected
by the habit of understanding. From this it is evident why a
common conception cannot be contradiCted nor submitted to a
positive doubt hy the interior reason; for it is repugnant that
one and the same nature, the intellect which embraces as true
such a principle, should deny its own nature's proper perfection,
the discovery of truth, by denying or doubting really the truth
it has grasped.
Certain things are so true that their opposite cannot be grasped by
the intellect, and therefore they cannot be opposed by interior
reason, but only by exterior reason, which is through the voice. 150

In summary: A universal sceptical doubt proposes to abstract
from the certitude already possessed of the very fundaments of
knowledge in order to institute a scientific investigation concerning them. Since it is universal it must embrace every truth;
sint!e it proposes to doubt, it must doubt something, either the
truths themselves or an extrinsic demonstrative medium. Now
certain truths lack a medium, and consequently the truths
themselves must be doubted. But, as has been shown, the
common conceptions, axioms, or dignities cannot be doubted.
St. Thomas was not asking the metaphysician to do the impossible when he stated that metaphysics employed universal doubt
in its inquisitions.
One who professes to doubt positively of all truth is confronted with the following alternatives: (I) Either he must
admit that his doubt is insoluble and in this he commits himself to the impossible position of waving his finger like Cratylus; or (2) he may attempt to escape universal scepticism, as
did Descartes, at the intolerable cost of a flagrant contradiction, naJilely doubting the power of the active intellect to know
160

Post. Anal., Bk. I, I. 18.

366

PAUL FARRELL

truth, and then admitting the truth of a proposition advanced
by this doubtful faculty; or (3) he must realize the impossibility
of maintaining his position and abandon it in favor of selfevident prineiples concerning the foundations of human knowledge, the very entrance to the mansions of philosophy. 151 There
is hut one medium between scepticism and dogmatism, contradiction.
Unfortunately some have been willing, even eager, to take
this last road to knowledge. Those who have taken it seem
to have spent most of :their time trying unsuccessfully to
escape its consequences. Others have seen clearly the foolishness
of embracing a contradiction at the 'beginning of philosophy
and then dogmatizing their doubt into a universal principle.
To escape this foolishness they did not become Aristotelean
dogmatists, rather they fooled everybody including themselves
by making contradictions the very essence of things and
thought.
c. Methodical negative doubt
From this analysis it should be clear that, when St. Thomas
affirms that universal doubt concerning truth pertains to metaphysics, he is not advising a metaphysician to approach his
subject matter by constructing a positive doubt concerning the
basic principles of all philosophy. But the question still remains
unanswered; just what kind of doubt is possible in metaphysics?
Briefly stated, the ahswer is, this doubt may be classified as a
methodical, negative doubt. " Negative " indicates that the
mind in its investigation never abstracts from the power of the
human intellect to discover truth, from the fact of one's existence, nor from the certitude of the principle of contradiction.
The basis for this congerie of propositions which cannot be
doubted positively is a distinction placed upon the principle of
151 Sicut circa ipsum introitum domus, qui omnibus patet et prima occurit, nullus
decipitur, ita etiam in consideratione veritatis; nam ea, per quae intratur in
cognitionem aliorum, nota sunt omnibus et nullus circa ea decipitur; huiusmodi
enim sunt prima prin,cipia naturaliter nota ut non esse simul affirmare et negare,
et quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et similia. Meta., Bk. VIII, I. l.

THE PORTALS OF DOUBT

867

contradiction. Objectively considered, this principle is the
objective evidence of a thing expressed as a judgment; subjectively, it is logical truth, which demands the existence of
a knowing subject capa:ble of grasping the truth. Modem
Scholastics have called the power of the mind to know truth
prima conditio, the existence of a knowing subject, primum
factum, and the principle of contradiction, primum principium.
The arguments of the ancients establishing the principle of
contradiction as indubitable are valid likewise for the fact and
the condition, for these two are contained implicitly in the
former.
In order to understand the nature of doubt when qualified as
negative, one must recall that there is an order among the
dignities. St. Thomas teaches that the principle of contradictipn is first in this order:
all demonstrations reduce their propositions to this principle as
to the last opinion common to all; for it is by nature first and the
dignity of all dignities. . . . The reason for this is that, since
the operation of the intellect is twofold: one which knows quiddities
. . . and the other which composes and divides; in both operations
there must be something which is first . . . (in the first act of the
intellect the concept of being is first) ... and because this princi'ple, it is impossible to be and not to be at the same time, depends
upon the understanding of being . . . this principle is first by
nature in the second operation of the intellect. 152
Secondary dignities, inas:r;nuch as they lack a medium of
demonstration, cannot be the object of a positive doubt; nevertheless there is a sense in which they may be doubted, not as
the doubt falls upon
proposition but precisely as it falls
upon an external medium, probative but not demonstrative.
For the first philosopher attempts to manifest them in the manner
in which this can be done, namely by contradicting those who
deny them,. through those media which must be admitted by the
ones denying, and not through more known principles.158
Thus indirectly by reduction to the first principle, the principle
of contradiction, a process involving the indication of the
150

Metaphysics, Bk. IV, I. 6.

153

Post. Anal., I, I. 20.

368

PAUL FARRELL

absurdity of their contradictories, these dignities may be manifested to be true, The methodical doubt that is employed is
concerned with the means that make this :reduction possible.
The principle of contradiction, the primum factum, and the
prima conditio do not admit of such a doubt, for there is no
prior principle to which they may be reduced, nor any medium
which does not presuppose their truth. Thus the impossibility
of any external direct proof is based on the fact that any
attempted argumentation necessarily depends upon these truths
for its own truth, and consequently begs the question. 154 In a
very broad sense they may be subjected to a negative methodical doubt and be proved quasi experimentaliter in so far as
the mind attempting to doubt discovers that this is impossible.
Hence, the statement of St. Thomas that universal doubt
pertains to metaphysics must be qualified in each instance
according to the material upon which the doubt falls. The
portals of doubt are spacious, perhaps even inviting to some.
But it is necessary to keep always in mind that there are many
portals, not one, save by analogous unity. To attempt to force
an entrance into the mansions of science and wisdom by using
indiscriminately any door at all is to expose oneself to the
danger of running into a blank wall or getting lost in a blind
passageway.
PAUL FARRELL,

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

, •• Meta., Bk. IV, l. 6.

0. P.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST
BY JOHN OF ST. THOMAS
Translated from the Latin by
JAMES

M. EGAN, O.P. and WALTER D. HuGHES, O.P.

CHAPTER II*
THE DISTINCTION

BETWEEN

THE GIFTS AND THE VmTUEs

l. The existence of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost is certain from
the texts of Scripture adduced in the foregoing chapter. 1 They are
OUTLINE OF CHAPTER II:

*
I.

THE GIFTS

AND THEIR SUPERNATURAL

CHARACTER

(1)

A. Proof from Scripture

B. Credence, Necessary Concerning Gifts Found in Both Christ and the
Faithful
l. According to the opinions of some theologians

(4)
2. According to the doctrine of John of St. Thomas (5)
a) Corroborated by Saints and Scholastics (6)
C. Difficulties concerning these supernatural gifts (7)
l. Relative to their being habits
2. Relative to their being distinct from the theological and moral
virtues

II.

THE GIFTS AS HABITS

A. Stability of the gifts (8)
1. As principles of acts (9)
Connaturalizing the soul with the supernatural

order (10)

B. Objection: The Gift of Prophecy a transient motion
C. Reply: The Gifts of the Holy Ghost
1. Abiding principles (13).
2. For the appraisal and judgment of divine things (14-15)
3. Not for the manifestation of the Spirit as the charisms, but as
principles necessary for salvation through the motion of the
Holy Ghost (16)

Ill.

THE GIFTs As DISTINCT

FROM THE THEoLoGicAL

AND

A. The Virtues
l. As acquired (17)
2. As infused, both theological and moral (18)

369

MoRAL VmTUl!lS

870

JOHN OF ST.

supernatural and infused, beyond the reach of human achievement.
Coming down from heaven as divine benefactions, they are given
to men through the grace of God and through His Spirit. The
supernatural character of other graces, faith and charity for exB. The opinion of Scotus
L The identifying of the Gifts and the Virtues (19)
2. His opinion concerning the Gifts in the intellect and the theological
virtues (20)
8. His lack of an opinion about the Gifts in the will (21)
C. The doctrine, of St. Thomas on the distinction between the Gifts
and the Virtues (2ft)
l. Theological conclusion
a) The distinction between the Gifts in the intellect and Faith
and Hope (23)
i) An objection: Diverse gifts with Faith and vision (24)
ii) Reply: Permanency of present gifts (25)
b) The distinction between the gifts and Charity (26)
c) The distinction between the gifts in the will and the corresponding virtues (27)
2. Argument from the nature of the Gifts (28)
a) The distinction from the virtues of both the gifts in the intellect
and those in the will (29)
b) The basis of the distinction in the new regulative impulse of
the Holy Ghost (30-31)
IV.

The Objections and Replies

(3ft)

A. The first objection (33)
l. Reply (84-35)
2. First resumption (36)
3. Reply (37-38)
4. Second resumption (39)
5. Reply (40)

B. The second objection (41)
l. Reply (42-48)
2. First resumption (44-45)
8. Reply (46-47)
4. Second resumption (48)
5. Reply (49-52)
c. The third objection (58)
:l. Reply (54-55)
2. First resumption (56)
3. Reply (57-59)
4. Second resumption (60)
5. Reply (61-64)
1

Cf. paragraphs

2 and 4.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

871

ample, is proved from similar texts of Scripture, the sole font of
men's knowledge of such graces. Moreover, from the fact that
Scripture affirmed that faith and charity were bestowed by God,
St. Augustine could prove against the Pelagians the supernatural
. character of these graces. In this same way, therefore, it may be
inferred that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are supernatural.
2. The basic fact that Scripture treats of the Gifts of the Holy
Ghost as supernatural is easily established. The gifts found in
Christ 2 were described by Isaias as coming from the Holy Ghost:
And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom,
and of understanding, etc. . . . and he shall be filled with the
spirit of the fear of the Lord. 8 • Appropriate only to supernatural
and infused gifts, this text cannot be applied to acquired virtues
in the natural order. Hence only at the price of destroying the
faith may anyone deny that these gifts in Christ were gifts of
grace, and therefore supernatural. Moreover, the gifts in Christ
and in others are essentially the same. Ascribed to others as well
as to Christ, these same gifts are said to be given through the
Spirit as gifts of God. For the Spirit shall fill him with the spirit
of wisdom and understanding, 4 while to one .indeed by the Spirit
is given the word of wisdom and to another the word of knowledge,
according to the same spirit, 5 as St. Paul affirmed. These three
gifts, wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, are supernatural,
since they are given through the Spirit. It may be noted, however,
that the Apostle is writing of the charisms, which, though supernatural, can be had without sanctifying grace.
8. These gifts are likewise described in the book of Ecclesiasticus
with the addition of fear and counsel, or prudence as it is called.
The fear of the Lord is a crown of wisdom, filling up peace and the
fruit of salvation, and it has seen arid numbered her, but both are
the gifts of God. Wisdom shall distribute knowle¢ge and understanding of prudence, and exalts the glory of those who hold her.
Wisdom and fear are called gifts of God, and knowledg.e and understanding are said to be derived from wisdom. All are supernatural
gifts. Fear, moreover, according to this same passage, is the
beginning of wisdom, the root of wisdom, while love drives out
Cf. IDa, q. 18, a. 5.
• Isaias xi, 2.
• Eccleaiasticua,xv, 5.

• I Corinthians, xii, 8.
• Ecclesiasticus, i, 22-!W.

372

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

sin. It surely could not do this unless it were supernatural and
could dispose to justification.
That the gift of fortitude is infused and supernatural is derived
from a passage in the book of the Maccabees, for the success of
war is not in the multitude of the army, but strength comes from
heaven; 7 and from the Forty-third Psalm, for they did not get
possession of the land by their own sword; neither did their own
arm save them, but Thy right hand and Thy arm and the light of
Thy countenance; 8 as well as in Exodus, the Lord is my strength
and my praise. 9
Likewise, the gift of counsel finds mention in the Psalms, thy
justifications are my counsel. 10 Of the works of counsel, St. Paul
wrote: Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the
Lord, yet I give a counsel as one having obtained mercy from the
Lord; 11 and it is written in the Gospel according to St. Matthew,
Not all can accept this teaching; but those to whom it has been
givenP
Finally, concerning the spirit of the gift of piety there is the text:
Train thyself unto piety. For bodily training is of little profit,
while piety is profitable in all respects, since it has the promise of
the present life as well as of that which is to comeY This passage
can refer only to supernatural piety, to which is annexed the
promise of eternal happiness. Nor can that text be so aptly understood of the virtue of piety as it is of the gift of which Isaias wrote.
To this furthermore can be added the words of Job, Behold piety
itself is wisdom. 14 Thus many read the Greek text, among whom
may be noted St. Augustine, although the Vulgate has Behold the
fear of the Lord, that is wisdom. 15
4. As may be inferred from the foregoing paragraphs, it is a
matter of Faith that the seven gifts which were in Christ were
supernatural, since Isaias expressly and literally wrote of Christ.
It is also a matter of Faith that these supernatural gifts were given
to others. For although Origen 16 insinuates that this sevenfold
• I Maccabees, iii, 19.
10 Matthew, xix, 11.
8 Psalm :xliii, 4.
13 I Timothy, iv, 8.
0 Exodu..•, xv,
10 Psalm cxviii,
14 Job, xxviii,
11 I Corinthians, vii,
10 Sermon ill de Tempore, MPL, XXXVIII.
16 Homily VI on Numbers, MPG, XII, 668 and Homily ill on Isaias, MPG,
Xill,
Cf. translation of St. Jerome, MPL, XXIV, 910.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

373

power descended upon Christ alone and Tertulian 17 would seem to
agree with him, nevertheless, it seems that these authors are
writing only in a comparative sense. They are rendering more
forceful the significance of the words of the Prophet, And there
shall rest upon him, etc., by affirming that these gifts did not
descend upon others in that fullness or with that permanence with
which they were in Christ, in whom that sevenfold Spirit remained
without interruption from the instant of His conception. Some
more recent authors are of the opinion that it is a matter of faith
that Christ had the seven supernatural gifts; that others have them
is for them not a matter of Faith, but only a most certain opinion,
whose contrary is temerarious, since it is against the common
opinion of the Fathers and the Scholastic theologians. This opinion
is advanced by Lorca in his disputation on the question of the
gifts. 18 Martinez affirmed in his commentary on St. Thomas 19 that
to deny the presence of the gifts in the faithful, if not temerarious,
is at least proximate to error.
5. Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that the fact of the presence
of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost in the faithful and of their supernatural character is so much a part of the Faith that the opposite
would be heresy. For in the texts cited, with the exception of that
from Isaias, Sacred Scripture makes express mention of the gifts
as they are in the faithful. It is written in Ecclesiasticus, He shall
fill him with the spirit of wisdom and of understanding/ 0 and in the
Book of Wisdom, I have called and the spirit of wisdom came upon
me. 21 Of the gift of understanding it is written, a good understandContra Judaeos, c. 9, MPL, II,
Disputation
on question 68 of the First of the Second Part of the Summa
Theologica. Peter de Lorca, 1554-1606, Cistercian theologian, later Superior General
of his Order in Spain and intimate of Philip III, was the author of Commentaria
and disputations in 1-IIae, 11-IIae and illa partem Divi Thomae, Compluti,
1614-1616. Cf. Hurter, Nomenclator, 8e Edit., ill, p.
19 First difficulty on 1-IIae q. 68, a. 1. Joannes Gonzalez Martinez,
Doctor at
Complutensis, was a bitter opponent of Thomistic doctrines. He is not to be
confused with Joannes Martinez, Dominican Rector of the College of Alcala, when
John of St. Thomas was there, Prior at Madrid, Toledo, Segovia, who succeeded
John of St. Thomas as confessor to Philip IV. Cf. P. Beltran de Heredia, 0. P.,
La Enselanza de Sto. Tomas en Alcala, La Ciencia Thomista, T. XII, 1915, p.
407-408, and Antonius, Bibliotheca Hispana Nova, Madrid, 1788, t. II p. 568.
2 ° Cf. Ecclesiasticus, xv, 5.
21 Wisdom, vii, 7.
11

18

6

374

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

ing to all who do iU·2 The other texts adduced expressly witness the
fact that the gifts, such as fortitude, fear, and piety, are in the
faithful.
There is also to be found evidence that the Church confirms this
doctrine since in the hymn of the Holy Ghost occur the words:
" Thou are seven-fold in gifts " and again, " give to Thy faithful
who trust in Thee the sacred seven-fold." 23 It is certain, therefore,
that these sacred gifts are gratuitously given by the Holy Ghost,
since they are begged for from God, and prayer, according to St.
Augustine, is " a most clear testimony of grace." They are supernatural because they are called sacred and special gifts of the
Holy Ghost. Who would claim that the Church would ask for gifts
for the faithful which would not be
to them?
6. The- common consent of saints and Scholastics agrees with
this. They write of these gifts as being the most evident of the
gifts given to the faithful. For example, St. Augustine, 24 St.
Ambrose, 25 St. Gregory, 26 St. Jerome, 27 St. Cyril,28 St. Cyprian, or
the author who wrote concerning the important works of Christ/ 9
and many other saints agree in this teaching, while all the Scholastics concur, following Peter Lombard 30 and St. Thomas. 81
7. The supernatural character of the gifts and their presence
in the faithful is a certainty. Difficulties may arise, however, on
•• Psalm ex, 9.
•• At Terce of Pentecost and in the Sequence of the Mass for Pentecost. Cf.
A. Byrnes, O.P., Hymna of the Dominican Missal and Breviary, St. Louis, 1948,
pp. 188 and 144.
,.. Sermon XVII De Sanctia, MPL, XXXIX, 1525; II De Doctrina Christiana,
c. 7, MPL, XXXIV, 89; 1 Sermon on the Mount, MPL, XXXIV, 1284.
•• Ill De Sacramentis, c. 2. MPL XVI, 484; In Psalm cxviii, 8, MPL, XV, 1207;
1 De Spiritu Sancto, c. 20, MPL, XVI, 740.
••1 De MOTalibua, c.U, MPL, LXXV, 544; 11 De Moralibua, c. 86, MPL, LXXV,
592. Oommentaria in Ezechiel XIX, MPL, LXXVI, 1158.
17 Commentaria in laaiaa XI, MPL, XXIV, 144.
26 Lib. 11 in laaiaa, MPG, LXX, 810.
•• Libur de Cardinalibua Operibua. Christi, MPL, CLXXXIX, 1658. In the
Migne Patrology this work is attributed to Ernaldus Bonaevallis, Abbot, d. 1156.
" Vir fuit non obscurae famae," though the name of this contemporary of St.
Bernard of Clairvaux is all but lost. Emaldus' work was attributed to St. Cyprian
even after the death of John of St. Thomas. Cf. edition Nicholai Rigalt, p. 898-,
Paris, 16t8.
•• Ill Sententiarum, d. 24.
81

I-ll, q. 68.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

875

two points. The first concerns the genus of these gifts. The question turns on their position in the categl?ry of habits as well as
on their distinction from the charisms, which are given in a transient manner. Since it is not absolutely certain from Scriptural
evidence that the gifts are distinct from the virtues, a second
difficulty arises in distinguishing these gifts from the theological and
moral virtues, both infused and acquired.
The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are Habits

8. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits and not merely acts
or dispositions given in a transient manner like the light of prophecy
and the other charisms. This is the common opinion of Scholastics,
who follow St. Thomas. There are some, however, as Lorca notes,
who think that these gifts are not habits but merely certain special
acts of virtue.
The fundamental reason for considering them habits is the testimony in Sacred Scripture that they are given in a .permanent
fashion. Isaias affirms that The spirit of the Lord shaU rest upon
Him, the spirit of wisdom and knowledge, etc. 82 Concerning the
same Holy Spirit, through whom these gifts are given, it is noted
in the Gospel according to St. John he will dwell with you, and be
in you. 88 Therefore, these gifts have a state of permanency.
9. My second point is that these gifts are given for operations
siinilar to those functions for which virtues are established in the
intellect and will. This is quite evident in the case of wisdom and
knowledge, fortitude and piety, for these gifts have operations and
acts of cognition; while fortitude, piety, and fear elicit acts of
principles of action. Wisdom and knowledge, for example, elicit
acts of cognition; while fortitude, piety and fear elicit acts or'
volition. As virtues, wisdom and fortitude are habits which elicit
their own proper acts. Therefore, as gifts, wisdom, as welt as
knowledge, fortitude, and the rest may be called habits, since they
too are principles eliciting their own proper acts.
10. My third point is that these gifts are given so that a man
may operate with a certain connaturality toward things divine, and,
moved by an impulse of the Holy Ghost, as St. Thomas teaches, 34
he may, as it were, have contact with divinity. Now, no one can
81

laaitu, xi, !!.

•• John, xiv, 17.

"'I-ll, q. 68, a. S; TI-ll, q. 45.

376

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

be rendered connatural to divine things-no one can be in a measure
spiritualized and deified-unless he is properly disposed by a permanent and habitual inclination. An ability which a man enjoys
in a transient sort of way does not bring with it that special ease
of connaturality. It does not dispose a man to execute new acts
with the naturalness which the stability of a habit provides. Since,
then, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost bring a special connaturality to
divine things and a certain ease in responding to the impulse of
the Holy Ghost, they must be habitual and permanent dispositions.
Briefly summarized, the reasoning of St. Thomas is as follows:
the gifts dispose a man to obey the instigation and impulse of the
Holy Ghost, just as the moral virtues dispose his appetite to
obey the reason. Hence, since the moral virtues are habits because
they dispose the appetite to obey reason, the gifts must be habits
disposing a man to follow and to obey the impulse. of the Holy Spirit.
11. However, there arises an objection to this conclusion on the
grounds that prophecy is not a habit but a light given in a passing
manner to the prophet, as St. Thomas proves. 35 Yet it furnishes a
principle which elicits the knowledge of the prophecy. Since in
this life a man does not have a clear knowledge of the principles
from which prophetical knowledge is deduced-the vision of the
divine essence, the source. of prophetical knowledge-it is evident
that the principles of the act need not be a habit. Likewise, the
gifts of the Holy Ghost do not of themselves suppose a permanent
principle of knowledge from which they are derived. They are
given for a man to follow the impulse of the Holy Ghost just as
the moral virtues are given so that he may follow reason, as St.
Thomas asserts. In the inference that the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are habits like the moral virtues there seems to be an erroneous
argument of similarity. Using the same logic, the opposite conclusion should be reached. The moral virtues follow the dictates of
reason, as manifested through the habit of prudence or synderesis.
The gifts, for their part, follow the dictates of the Holy Spirit as
manifested through an impulse. That impulse is evidenced, not
through a habit, but through a passing act, as is clear in the case
of prophecy.
Hence to obey this impulse there is no need for an habitual
disposition. The appetite needs a habitual disposition to obey
""II-II, q. 171, a. 1.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

377

reason. Reason in turn is disposed through the habit of prudence
containing the seeds and principles of aU the virtues. But it is not
so with the gifts. The impulse of the Holy Ghost in which the
principles and directive forces of the gifts are contained is not
manifested in an habitual but rather in a transient manner. Therefore, just as prophecy is not given as a habit since it does not
presuppose habitual knowledge of its principles, so neither are the
gifts of the Holy Ghost habits, since they do not assume that
their principles are known through a habit but through an impulse.
12. This fact is confirmed in the other graces " gratis datae,"
such as the working of miracles, the grace of healing, in which habits
are not established in the soul, but actual motions suffice.36 The
same would apply then to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, for whose
exercise an actual divine motion without an infused habit would
suffice. Further evidence for this is derived from the fact that the
Apostle enumerates the utterance of wisdom and the utterance of
knowledge among the graces "gratis datae" which are given in
the same Spirit. Yet from the very text the argument is derived
for the existence of the gifts. The gifts then are graces "gratis
datae," and hence not habits.
13. In reply, it must be conceded that the prophetic light is
given only transiently and not as a habit, for the reasons alleged
by ·St. Thomas and cited above. 37 The Gifts of the Holy Ghost,
on the other hand, postulate in the soul principles permanently
known by which they are regulated. Though the gifts are directed
by the Holy Ghost, the purpose of His impulse is not to manifest
the truth of objects, either intellectually or imaginatively conceived,
as is the case with prophecy. According to St. Augustine, even an
impulse which the human mind unknowingly receives is sufficient.
There is required merely an interior movement, a divine stimulation, by which God moves man to the immediate experience of
tasting and seeing that the Lord is sweet. Thus God becomes
deeply rooted in souls and makes them connatural with divine
things. These supernatural objects are known in this life through
faith, which is an abiding habit, determining in a way both charity
and the Gifts of the Holy Ghost .
. By this connaturality and intimate union to things divine, a man
is made capable of penetrating more profoundly divine things and
•• II-II, q. 177 and q. 188,

37

Cf. paragraph 11, note 35.

378

JOHN OF ST •. THOMAS

the mysteries of Faith, of judging according to either secondary or
ultimate causes, and of taking practical counsel in his actions.
In this way the four gifts are formed in his mind. The gift of
understanding is for the penetration and proper appraisal of things
divine. The gifts of wisdom, science, and counsel are for judging
concerning divine things, according to either ultimate and proximate causes or the norms of practical action.
The impulse which moves to the formation of such knowledge
attains to the principles upon which it is founded, either through
faith in this life, or-more permanently-through the beatific vision
in the next. There is no comparison here with prophecy and its
relation to the things prophesied, since prophecy is not founded
upon faith nor regulated by it in the formation of its knowledge.
For although prophecy is usually found in the faithful it may be
found in others, Balaam, for example. The purpose of prophecy is
the formation of a vision either in the intellect or in the imagination. It engenders certitude through an imaginary representation,
with definite lineaments. Yet its object may not be seen intuitively,
for the gift ca:n coexist with faith. It is not necessary, then, for
the formation of the image in prophecy that the principles of the
vision be clearly seen .. For the objects of prophecy are contained in
the vision of the divine essence as their principle. They are, therefore, communicated in an extrinsic light, by which the prophecies
are manifested without regress to their principle.
14. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are not given for the formation
of any vision, either i:n the intellect or in the imagination, concerning matter' pertaining to faith. They are given rather for the
appraisal and judgment of these things according to an habitual
principle. For example, ma:n may discern the credibility or the
suitability of some mysteries of faith and attain a correct estimate
of them. He knows that these mysteries are worthy of belief and
should not be doubted because of any mere af>pearance of error.
Then too he has a sort of connatural experience of them and a
taste of divine things which is acquired through charity. From this
connaturality, the gift of wisdom judges of divine things, as St.
Thomas teaches. 38 Prudence gives counsel in actions and according to a correct estimation of things to be believed, while the gift
of understanding penetrates these matters of faith. 39

••n-n, q. 45.

a• Cf. II-II, q. 8, a. !il.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

879

15. In heaven, where faith no longer remains, and in the soul
of Christ, in whom there was no need for faith, the gifts bring
about the penetration and the judgment of supernatural things
outside the beatific vision. They are not ordained to the judgment
of the credibility of such things. Rather they are ordered to the
judging of the appropriateness of divine things to human and
created needs. They proceed from a savor, a taste, and a connaturality to supernatural things, which shall be explained later.
The divine impulse, therefore, moves to the further knowledge and
ordering of those things known essentially through faith. The case
of prophecy. is not the same. For the purpose of prophecy is the
formation of a vision concerning things whose principles do not
appear in the vision.
For this reason, the gifts are given as habits while prophecy is
not. Since the aforementioned gifts are habits, the gifts in the
sensitive appetite, such as fortitude, piety, and fear, are likewise
habits.
At the same time it must be admitted that these gifts are perfected and increased from a sort of illumination given through
rapture of prophecy. This, however, is not an essential postulate
of the nature of the gifts but a superabundant light. The gifts
are absolutely necessary for salvation, while this enlightenment
is not.
16. In reply to the second objection, or confirmation of the first
as it is called, it should be noted that 40 prophecy and the other
gifts " gratis datae " are given for the manifestation of the Spirit.
They can be founded upon principles higher than themselves and
to which they do not attain. For this reason they require a light
or a divine motion given in a transient manner, not founded upon
noF contained :in the vision of the principles. On the other hand,
the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, like charity to which they are annexed,
are necessary for salvation. Hence, like charity, they are regulated
through principles known by faith: Yet they are aroused, brought
to consciousness, and made ready for action by a special impulse
of the Holy Ghost. It may be concluded, therefore, that they can
be granted as habits, in a permanent fashion, just as faith and
charity.
The citation from St. Paul, To one through the spirit is given
•• Cf. II-TI, q. 89, a. 3, ad 8.

380

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

the utterance of wisdom, and to another t"he utterance of knowledge,H undoubtedly has to do with the charisms. These are given
for the manifestation of the spirit. The grace of manifesting the
Spirit is not given to all, for all are not given the ability to utter
such words. Nevertheless, the wisdom and knowledge which underlie these manifestations are gifts of the Holy Spirit.
The Gifts Differ from the Theological and Moral Virtues
17. The Gifts are habits which differ from both the theological
and moral virtues. There is no doubt that they differ from the
acquired virtues, which are of the natural order, since it has been
that the Gifts are supernatural. While the acquired
virtues of the natural order could be found in a state of pure and
integral nature, the Gifts could have no place there, since they
are supernatural. From their separability, then, the distinction of
the virtues and Gifts may be inferred.
18. The distinction of the infused virtues and the Gifts of the
Holy Ghost, however, provides no little difficulty. These infused
virtues are both moral and theological-a basic point of agreement
for all.
19. In his famous opinion relative to this difficulty, Scotus 42
maintains that the Gifts are not distinct from the virtues but are
substantially the same as the virtues. They are called gifts merely
because of a particular designation or office. This opinion numbers among its adherents Gabriel,4 3 Palacios,4 4 and others among
the more ancient writers. Among the more recent authors may be
included Lorca 45 and Vasquez. 46 The latter holds that both opinions may be considered probable, and cannot determine which is
the more true-though he considers St. Thomas' arguments of little
efficacy and attempts to disprove them.
"I Corinthians, xii, 8.
•• In Ill Sententiarum, d. 84.
'"In Ill Sententiarum, d. 84, a. 2. Gabriel Biel, d. 1495, nominalist professor at
ltibingen, author of Super Quatuor libros Sententiarum, Monte Ferrato, 1582.
•• Palacios, Michael de t c. 1600, professor of philosophy and theology at Salamanca, author of Disputationes theologicae in IV Libros Sententiarum. Cf. N.
Antonio, Bibliotheca Hispana Nova, Madrid 1783, vol. II, p. 143. Hurter, Nomenclator, Ed. 8, vol. III col. 148. Vigouroux, Dictionaire de la Bible, IV, col. 1962.
•• In Ill Sententiarum, d. 25, men. 2.
•• In Ill Sententiarum, d. 89, c. 1 and 2.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

381

Furthermore, Scotus does not admit that the infused moral
virtues are distinct from the acquired virtues, nor are they superadded to them. Yet, it cannot be denied that the Gifts of the Holy
Ghost are infused, for that is the evident meaning of Scripture
and the consent of the Church bears it out. By antonomasia, these
habits are called Gifts, since they are given in a special way by
the Holy Ghost-poured forth by God so that a man may be filled
with the Gifts of the Holy Ghost and it may be said of him: And
the spirit of the fear of the Lord shall fill him,#1 or You Hhall fill
htim with the spirit of the Lord, of wisdom and understanding. 48
In Scripture, being filled with the Holy Ghost indicates the infusion
of supernatural gifts.
Since these statements cannot be denied, it would seem difficult
for Scotus to explain what sort of habits these gifts really are. Of
the seven gifts, some pertain to the intellect: wisdom, knowledge,
understanding, counsel; and some are in the will: fortitude, piety,
and fear of the Lord. Of the first four Scotus has a facile explanation, since he thinks that they pertain to the theological virtues.
Moreover he does not think that wisdom is an act of the intellect,
but of charity, inasmuch as it gives a savor and a taste of faith, or
a sort of delectable knowledge. From another point of view he
reduces wisdom to hope, since by wisdom the soul delights in
as He is in Himself and as He satisfies human aspirations.
Moreover, he reduces the gifts of knowledge and understanding
to faith, since it is within the province of faith to penetrate and
judge of the things which it believes. Even Father Suarez 49 considers it neither evident nor certain that the gift of understanding
is· a supernatural gift completely distinct from faith, although he
favors the distinction of the virtues and gifts. How certain this
fact actually is will be evident from the argument against Scotus.
Scotus gives no decision on the gift of counsel, yet he might have
reduced it to faith, since faith is practical and capable of being a
counsellor.
To what infused virtue Scotus reduces those Gifts of the
Holy Ghost which pertain to the will-fortitude, piety, and fear
of the Lord-I have no idea. He does not reduce them to theological
47 Isaias, xi, 8.
•• Ecclesiasticus, xv, 5.
•• 1 de Gratia, lib.
c. 19, n. 11.

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

virtues, since the acts of fortitude and fear can neither be acts of
charity or hope nor elicit them. They cannot be identified with
the acts of the acquired virtues of fortitude, fear, and piety, since
the gifts are supernatural and infused by the Holy Ghost and
hence transcend the natural order. Furthermore, according to
Scotus the acts of piety and fortitude cannot be infused, since he
denies that there can be any such thing as an infused moral virtue.
To what virtue, then, do these acts belong, and from what virtue
do they proceed?
Scotus would perhaps deny that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are
supernatural and infused, but this is contrary to Scripture. Or
perhaps he would care to affirm that the acquired virtues are
infused into a just man merely as an accidental addition-and hence
called gifts. Then, these gifts would have no place in the soul of a
man proficient in moral virtue, nor would such a man receive the
Gifts of the Holy Ghost when he was raised to the supernatural
order. All this is absurd. For the more perfected a man was in the
acquired virtues, in that proportion he would lack them by infusion,
while the less proficient and sinners would not lack them, precisely
because they were sinners.
22. Whatever Scotus' opinion may be, the doctrine stated here
is that of St. Thomas. 50 In the Book of the Sentences he distinguishes the Gifts of the Holy Ghost from the virtues, expressly
mentioning the infused moral virtues. This is the opinion of the
disciples of St. Thomas and of theologians in general, who are
mentioned by Suarez in the place already cited 51 and by Montensios and Martinez 52 and others in their commentaries on this
question. Authority for this distinction may be found in St.
Gregory. 53 He clearly distinguishes the theological virtues and the
Gifts of the Holy Ghost from the moral virtues. This distinction
rests upon a twofold argument. The first is a theological deduction from Scripture. The second, somewhat a priori, proceeds from
the proper and formal nature of the gifts themselves.
•• Cf. I-II, q. 68, a. 1; In Ill Sententiarum, d. 34, l, l.
61 Op. cit., c. 15 num. 9.
•• In I-II, q. 68. Ludovicus Montensios, Doctor at Complutensi, called the
" clear doctm·," taught for 36 years and died in 1621. He was the author of
Commentaria in 1-11 Divi Thomae Aquinatis, 2 vols., Compluti 1621-1622. Cf.
Antonius, Bibliotheca Hispana Nova, Madrid 1788, II, p. 435.
53 11 De Moralibus, c. 36, MPL, LXXV, 593.

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888

23. The Gifts which pertain to the intellect-wisdom, knowledge,
understanding, and counsel-cannot be identified with the theological virtues, nor can the other three Gifts, which are related
to the sensitive appetite, be identified with the moral virtues.
Therefore, the Gifts are distinct from the virtues.
The proof of the principle establishing this conclusion rests
upon the fact that neither all the Gifts nor any one of them can
be identified with faith and hope. This in turn rests upon the
hypothesis that it is a matter of faith that the Gifts were found in
Christ Our Lord. To resolve this hypothesis we have the witness
of Isaias: And a flower shall rise out of his root. And the spirit
of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding.54 Since Christ had the beatific vision He could have
neither faith nor hope. ·Hence the gifts in Christ are definitely distinguished from faith and hope. The Gifts, moreover, which are in
the faithful are of the same nature as those which were in Christ,
since, from the same text of Isaias in which the gifts are ascribed
to Christ, the Fathers of the Church and the theologians have concluded that they are present in the faithful. From the fact that
seven gifts are enumerated there, seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost
are attributed to the faithful. On the basis of this same text the
office of the Holy Ghost is said to be sevenfold. Therefore, just
as in Christ the gifts were distinguished from the virtues, so they
are distinct in the faithful.
24. The only rebuttal to this argument can be found in the
assertion that in Christ the gifts of wisdom, understanding, and
knowledge are distinct from faith, while in the faithful they are
identified with faith and hope. It may be alleged that in Him
infused knowledge is identified with charity, while in the faithful,
during this life, the Gifts cannot be distinguished from faith and
hope. However, gifts similar to those in the soul of Christ will be
given to the souls in heaven.
All this presupposes, of course, two kinds of gifts. There are
those in us which are identified with faith, and those which are
not the same as faith, as those in the soul of Christ, since there
could be no faith in the soul of Christ.
25. This rebuttal is completely without basis in fact. No conclusions may be drawn concerning the Gifts unless they have their
"' Isaias, xi, 1 ft.

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

source either in Holy Scripture or in the Fathers of the Church.
Nowhere in Scripture are two kinds of gifts mentioned, one type
for this life and another for heaven. That is a pure fictioJ?.. It is
brought forward to defend an opinion which should be completely
rejected, since it can be defended upon no other pretext. Furthermore, if the gifts in this life and those of heaven differ, it would
be necessary that present gifts should be done away with in the
future_ life. It is certain, however, that holy fear will remain in
heaven, since it has been said, The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever. 5 5 And of wisdom, it is said, It is glorious and
never fades away; 56 while of piety St. Paul affirms That is profitable
in all respects, since it has the promise of the present life as well
as of that which is to come. 51 Therefore, the piety of this life will
not cease in heaven. The same may be said for the other gifts
according to the statement of St. Ambrose: 58 "The Holy Spirit,
glowing with the full breathing forth more abundantly upon those
heavenly spirits." These seven gifts are surely none other than the
ones which we have in this life. The same gifts, therefore, which we
have here below will remain in heaven. If they cannot be identified
with faith and hope in heaven, neither can they be identified with
faith and hope in this life.
St. Paul's statement that knowledge will be destroyed 59 may
seem to contradict this. But it is commonly applied to that part
of knowledge which is purely material to the reasoning process,
merely the reflection upon the phantasms, and not a part of the
habit of knowledge itself.
Once it has been proved that the gifts related to the intellect are not identified with faith and hope, it naturally follows
that they cannot be identified with charity either. Nor should
the other gifts be made one with the moral virtues. Charity cannot
be the same as wisdom, since undoubtedly wisdom is substantially
and intrinsically an act of the intellect-for to be wise is to know.
Men are called wise who understand and judge correctly. Who is
wise and will keep these things, and will understand the mercies of
the Lord. 60
In mentioning Wisdom, Scripture describes it as an illumination
Psalm xviii, 10.
'" Wisdom, vi, 13.
57 1 Timothy, iv, 8.

55

1 de Spiritu Sancto, c. ZO, MPL, XVI, 740.
I Corinthians, xiii, a.
60 Psalm cvi, 43.
58

5'

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

.885

or a light: I chose to have her instead of a light, for her light
cannot be put out. 61 In that same chapter the spirit of wisdom
I wi.Yhed and understanding was
is ascribed to understanding:
given me: and I called upon God and the spirit of wisdom came
upon me. 62 St. Augustine affirmed that" wisdom pertains to reason
and reason alone can receive it.'' 63
To reduce wisdom to charity and to an act of the will, because
it is described as a tasting or savoring, would entail the destruction
of the essence of wisdom, whose act obviously is related to understanding and knowledge. This understanding is had with a pleasantness or suavity for either of two reasons. First, there is the delight
which accompanies contemplation, especially when that contemplation proceeds through the highest causes. This delight is found
even in that wisdom which is not a gift, but a savoring knowledge
acquired by human power. Secondly, although the gift of wisdom
is formally in the intellect, it presupposes an act of charity by reason
of which a man has a love for divine things and experiences in
himself some manner of loving union with God. Through this
experience of divine things he is able to judge of them-but this
is the burden of a later article.
'l7. Likewise, the gift of counsel cannot be identified with faith,
despite the fact that it too is practical. Certainly the gift of counsel
was found in Christ according to the enumeration of Isaias 64 and
yet in Christ there was no virtue of faith. The other gifts which
are related to the sensitive appetite, fortitude, piety, and fear,
might seem to be easily reduced to the corresponding virtues, perhaps to fortitude, piety, or the worship of God-which would seem
to embrace the reverential fear. These gifts in the sensitive appetite,
however, are directed by the gifts in the intellect-wisdom, knowledge, and counsel. For that reason they are distinct from the moral
virtues, which are regulated by prudence. The gifts are higher than
prudence, which regulates the moral virtues. They do not even
have the same moral aspect. For morality depends upon a regulative principle; if that principle is varied the moral aspect is
changed· correspondingly and consequently the very nature of the
virtue.
'lB. The second argument to establish the difference between
61 Wisdom, vii, 10.
•• Ibid., vii, 7.

•• Sermon S de Tempore, MPL, xxxviii.
•• Isaias, xi,

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

the gifts and the virtues proceeds from the very nature of these
gifts. The Scriptures record that these gifts are given to the faithful
as " breathings " through a special divine inspiration and movement
of the Holy Ghost. If the gifts were not in us through a special
inspiration of the Holy Ghost it would be foolish to call them
" breathings " and not to use the same name for the other virtues.
Inspiration or divine movement has a two-fold purpose: either to
enable a man to follow the command or rule of -reason, or to
follow a higher principle, the divine impulse. This latter is higher
than human reason and higher than anything understood according
to merely human capacity.
When God moves us to follow the commands of reason and the
rules of acquired and infused prudence the result is human virtue
regulated at that level of morality which parallels a humanly prudent manner of acting. If God moves the soul to follow a command
and rule higher than that of prudence, a rule which is measured
by the scope of the Holy Ghost alone, then other habits on a loftier
moral plane than mere huml:!n virtue are demanded. These are
called the Gifts of the Holy Ghost. Some of them reside in the
intellect, whose function it is to measure and direct; others are
rooted in the will and they prepare for the intellectual gifts and
follow them.
29. The formal distinction founded upon the different illuminations of the divine light is more readily understood in the case of
the gifts which reside in the intellect. For under the aegis of Divine
Wisdom there comes a spirit of understanding, holy, one, manifold. 68
This understanding is in itself one, but manifold in its participation.
From this same div.ine wisdom are derived infused knowledge,
prophecy, faith, and many other illuminations essentially diverse.
In enumerating these latter, first place goes to the gifts which have
as their purpose the consideration of the mysteries of faith and
divine things. They proceed from a hidden impulse of the Holy
Ghost affixing and uniting the soul to Himself. They make the soul
understand and judge rightly concerning the mysteries of faith
according to our love and experience of things divine, and also
in accord with their own essential suitableness.
In the exercise of these gifts, mystical theology is founded. By
the affection and fusion of man to the divine, his perception in•• Wisdom, vii, 22.

THE GlFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

387

creases, as if through an internal experience--according to St. Paul:
Do you seek a proof of Christ who speaks within me? 66
By reason of this interior illumination. and experience of divine
things and the mysteries of faith, the soul thus stirred is further
inflamed to pursue the life of virtue in a way which far transcends
the tendencies of those virtues themselves. He now follows a higher
rule and measure, under the interior impulse of the Holy Ghost,
whose illuminations are his standards of faith.
This exchange of standards engenders new moral aspects and
dimensions. There is a decided difference in the pursuit of the
divine ultimate when it is regulated by human zeal and industry,
or even by the infused virtues, and when it is formed acording to
the rule and measure of the Holy Ghost. For example, although the
forward progress of a ship may be the same, there is a vast difference
in its being moved by the laborious rowing of oarsmen and its
being moved by sails filled with a strong breeze. We read in the
Gospel of St. Mark that Our Lord saw his disciples straining at the
oars.67 They were making proKress in the way of the Lord only at
the expense of great labor, since each was proceeding by his own
power and industry through his own ordinary virtues. However,
when the Spirit fills the soul interiorly, and measures it by His
rule, then without labor and in a new-found freedom of the heart
the soul moves rapidly like a sail filled with a breeze. The Psalms
testify to this: I have run the way of thy commandment when
thou dir:lst enlarge my heart; 68 and again: Thy good spirit shall
lead me into the right land. 69
30. From all this it follows that the gifts are distinct from the
virtues with a diversity over and above that founded on a difference
of divine influx in the order of efficient causality. For even the
theological and infused moral virtues as well as prophecy and the
other charisms proceed from a divine influence and are divinely
infused on the part of efficient causality. The gifts are, moreover,
distinguished from the virtues by their very nature. They have a
very different regulative principle and measure, and in the order .
of morality an object measured by a higher rule differs from the
same object when it is measured by an inferior principle.
•• II Corinthians, xiii, 8.
Mark, vi, 48.

67

68 Psalm cxviii, 82.
•• Psalm cxlii, 10.

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

Cajetan 70 notes quite pointedly in this connection that there is
in the soul a threefold principle moving it to good, that is, according to a moral rule and not only efficiently. The first principle is
the human mind endowed with the natural light of reason and
prudence. The second is the human mind adorned with the light
of grace and faith, but still limited to its human capacity, zeal,
and industry. The third is the human mind as it is impelled by the
impulse of the Holy Ghost. This new impulse not only moves it
efficiently. It also rules over the human mind and directs it to
actions far exceeding human capacity and the meager standards
of human industry and zeal. In this manner the unction of the
Holy Ghost teaches us all things. 71 Motions proceeding from the
first principle are in direct relationship to the acquired virtues.
Movement under the aegis of the second principle corresponds to
the infused virtues. Human activity sponsored by the third principle is linked in a relationship to the gifts, measured and moving
upon a higher plane.
:31. Hence in those gifts pertaining to the intellect there is not
merely a diverse illumination or infusion of light in the order of
efficient causality. There is in addition, by the impulse of the
Spirit, a diverse formal mode of knowing as well. The truth of the
mysteries of faith springs not only from the testimony of God
revealing or in virtue of a light manifesting a particular truth.
Adherence to the truth is now mystically fortified by a loving
experience of the supernatural, and a union with God. For this
reason the gifts are called both wisdom, or knowledge, or counsel,
and likewise the spirit of wisdom, the spirit of counsel, and the
spirit of knowledge. The name of spirit is applied to a" breathing"
which is an affections disposition of the will. It connotes an affection for knowledge and for counsel, a, loving and mystical wisdom,
loving and mystical knowledge, and counsel. These are special
virtues of the Spirit.
In his explanation of the passages of Holy Scripture in which the
force and spirit of the gifts is revealed, St. Thomas has striven to
make clear the distinction of the gifts and the human virtues.
Finally, these virtues and spirits of virtues, these enkindlings
and illuminations of the Holy Ghost, presuppose grace and charity.
•• Comm.entaria in I-ll, q, 68, a. I.
71 Cf. John, ii,

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THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

They are found only in the soul in the state of grace, since they are
founded upon loving union of the soul to God.
32. To amplify the foregoing explanation of the gifts it will
prove useful to consider and confute those opinions opposed to the
teaching of St. Thomas. These objections may be formulated under
two headings. First, there is an opinion which strikes at the foundation for St. Thomas' distinction between the virtues and the
gifts. With this opinion the present objections and replies are
concerned. Secondly, some objections attempt to prove that the
gifts do not have acts which are distinct from the acts of the
theological and infused virtues. They allege further that the
diversity of the gifts is not sufficiently explained. These latter
objections will be dealt with in the articles devoted to each particular gift.

The Objections Against the Arguments of St.

72

33. The first objection proceeds from the teaching of Duns
Scotus. It affirms that there is no convincing argument by which
the difference between the gifts and the theological and moral
virtues may be proved. Consequently, it maintains that no such
distinction should be made.
If any argument could prove this distinction it would be the one
advanced by St. Thomas. He argues that whatever is moved is
moved in proportion to its disposition for receiving motion, its
obediential power. A man can be moved either through reasonto which the virtues in their human mode dispose him-or through
a higher mover-God. Therefore, it is necessary that he be disposed to receive the divine motion proceeding from the inspiration
from God.
According to the present objection, even this argument is not
convincing. The conclusion of St. Thomas, then, cannot be entertained. The weakness of the argument arises from the fact that
even through the theological and moral virtues-faith, hope, love,
and penance-man is moved towards justification by divine motion
and inspiration. With His Grace, God touches the heart of a man
through the illumination of the Holy Ghost in such a way that it
•• For the sake of clarity many of the paragraphs. of the sections have been
rearranged. The secondary numbers given are those of the Vives Edition, 1885.

7

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

cannot be said that the one receiving the inspiration does absolutely
nothing. 73 Yet for a man to follow and obey this motion, this
inspiration, this illumination of the Holy Spirit, no special gifts are
required. The theological and moral virtues are sufficient. If the
gifts are not necessary for following this inspiration and illumination of the Holy Ghost, the whole argument of St. Thomas fails.
For he insists that a man needs special gifts other than the virtues
to be disposed to be moved easily under the inspiration and motion
of the Holy Ghost.
34. The reply: There can be no doubt that some illumination
and inspiration of the Holy Ghost is necessary for the theological
and infused moral virtues. However, this illumination which is
ordered to salvation and is a prerequisite for justification is of two
kinds. The first kind is an imperfect and general sort of motion.
The second is perfect and altogether special.
Although the entire supernatural order may be called special in
contradistinction to the natural order, yet even within the supernatural order there are both common and special helps in matters
pertaining to salvation. The theological virtues together with the
other divine assistance ennobling the intellect cannot sufficiently
penetrate and know all things conducive to salvation. Faith of
itself serves only to bring about a consent to things revealed by
God. Although it is elevated above the natural order, faith alone
is not sufficient to penetrate and to know the suitability and
foundation of the truths believed. It cannot" know to what extent
they are worthy of belief, or how deeply they should be impressed
upon the heart. Nor can reason and human argument penetrate
and judge supernatural mysteries. Although the credibility of the
mysteries can be proved with evidence, nevertheless, even when
convinced of the credibility of the things of faith, the mind is not
sufficiently attracted either to believe them, to adhere to them, or
to act upon them. An interior, spiritual impulse is required to move
a man to believe, love, and act upon the things of faith.
35. (36) This situation becomes apparent when anyone is
tempted by doubts in matters of faith. At first he is not easily
quieted. Then suddenly he finds such complete serenity that it
seems to him that those same things are so certain that nothing
could be more sure. In that case there is more than a penetration
•• Cf. Council of Trent, session 4, chapter 5. Denziger 794, 814.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

891

and understanding of the things of faith; there is the spirit of
understanding, a spiritual, loving understanding.
In the story of St. Cecilia it is recorded that her husband, Valerian, when he stood before Pope Urban, saw the old man holding
in his hands a tablet upon which was written: One God, One
Faith, One Baptism. When the old man asked him, " Do you
believe this?," Valerian cried in a loud voice, "There is nothing
more truly to be believed." What could have moved Valerian to
understand so suddenly that there was nothing more truly to be
believed? There must have been some interior impulse and illumination of the Holy Ghost enkindling in him a love for those mysteries
whose fire enlightened his mind so that he could say that there
was nothing more truly to be believed.
That is not an uncommon experience. Yet the source of this
serenity, the cause of such understanding and counsel, the root of
this quieting of temptation from the fear of God, is not known.
Although the source is unknown, it must be the Spirit, who breathes
where He will, and you hear His voice and you do not know where
it comes from or where it goes.14
36. (34) Though it is evident that a motion, an illumination
and an inspiration are required from all the infused virtues, the
objection might be advanced that St. Thomas is not concerned in
his proof with all the illuminations and inspirations of the Holy
Ghost. He refers rather to an inspiration and divine motion productive of a particular and extraordinary effect superior to the
virtues. This is evident from the proof he takes from Aristotle's
Eudomian Ethics: 75 "For those who are moved according to a
divine instinct, there is no need to take counsel according to human
reason." This is the text commonly cited by those who would infer
that the gifts perfect a man to higher acts than the acts of the
virtues.
If this is admitted, a more pressing objection may be urged
against St. Thomas from his doctrine in another place. 76 There
he teaches that the gifts are the common endowments of all who
have charity, and that they are necessary for salvation. 77 Yet these
•• Cf. 1 ohn, iii, 8.
•• XII Eudomian Ethics, c. 14, 22 (1248 a 32).
76 I-ll, q. 68, a. 5, ad 1.
77 Ibid., a. 2.

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

extraordinary movements are inspirations to unusual works which
exceed the virtues. Such unusual acts are not to be found in all
the just. Many live in simplicity according to a prosaic life devoid
of extraordinary activities. Therefore, these extraordinary works
are not necessary. Indeed, the mere observance of the commandments, by acts of virtue, suffices for salvation. If then the Gifts
of the Holy Ghost are given for extraordinary works, they are not
necessary for salvation. But if they are necessary, then they are
not distinct from the virtues.
37. There are two aspects of the question about extraordinary
works being necessary for salvation. Works may be ordinary or
extraordinary either on the part of the works themselves or on the
part of the one performing them. In itself, an act may not be out
of the ordinary. Yet a soul subject to deficiencies, confronted with
obstacles and enemies and hostile forces may not attain to all the
requisites for salvation. Hence, absolutely speaking, extraordinary
works are not required for salvation. Remarkable things need not
be revealed to the soul, nor need it perform unusual deeds. However, if such works are accomplished the operation of the Holy
Ghost shines forth more brightly in them. For example, if anyone,
in the spirit of fortitude, not only approaches his enemies unafraid
but unarmed slays a thousand of them with the jawbone of an
ass as Samson, did, he has been inspired by the Holy Spirit and
gives evidence of the acts of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost:T8
38. Such actions are not absolutely required for salvation. Yet
there are acts, related to the same object and material of the same
virtues, which are extraordinary and special because of the agent's
infirmity and deficiencies. Fulfilling the commandments is, of
course, sufficient for salvation. But if that observance is to be
full and complete, the Holy Ghost must help the soul in the midst
of so many obstacles and defects. Human reason and the virtues
do not suffice, unless an impulse of the Holy Ghost supplementing
human infirmity and conquering all difficulties is added. The good
Spirit shall lead me into the right land. 19
39. It might be objected that there are some who could attain
salvation without these difficulties and impediments. Adults who
die immediately after baptism, or those who die as soon as they
'"Cf. Judges, xv, 15.

•• Psalm cxlii, 10.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

898

come to the use of reason would not meet them. Therefore, even
.under the subjective aspect of personal deficiencies in accomplishing
extraordinary works the gifts are not necessary for salvation.
40. It may accidentally happen that someone may be saved
without having actually exercised the gifts. The occasion for their
exercise might not be present, just as the opportunity for the
exercise of the virtues may be wanting. Nevertheless, it is not
right to conclude that absolutely and essentially speaking the
virtues are not necessary for salvation. No more so, then, is it
logical to conclude that the gifts are not necessary. Accidentally,
for want of opportunity, the gifts and virtues may not be used.
However, there remains an habitual inclination-found even in
children-and a promptitude of the soul for carrying out these
movements of the Holy Ghost should the occasion demand.
41. The second objection: As alleged by St. Thomas and the
theologians, the fundament for distinguishing the gifts from the
virtues is not specific and essential. Therefore, the gifts are substantially virtues. The inference is evident. For if the gifts and
the virtues differ only accidentally, they are substantially the same.
The objection fortifies its premises that the gifts and virtues
differ only accidentally from the fact that they differ only on the
part of the efficient cause, that higher mover to whose touch the
Gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose. But the order of efficient causality
is extrinsic and accidental, not formal and substantial. Now evidently different efficient causes can produce the same effect. For
example, fire may be produced by another fire, by the rays of the
sun, or by spontaneous combustion.
49l. Reply: The gifts and virtues do not merely differ accidentally. The gifts differ from the viitues both from the point
of view of the mover or the efficient cause, and from the point
of view of the regulative principle and measure. In distinguishing
the gifts from the virtues by means of their definition, St. Thomas 80
affirms that in the definition of virtue the words "a quality by
which a man lives rightly" mean a right living according to the
limitation of reason. By this phrase he distinguishes the definition
of virtue from the definition of the gifts. In the latter definition the
notion of right living should be understood as right living according
to a divine measure which is above human capacity. Therefore,
•• I-ll, q. 68, a. 1, ad S.

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JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

the disposition mentioned in ·connection with a man being readily
movable by the Holy Ghost is not to be understood as limited to
the efficient movement, but as applying to the regulating and
measuring principle as well. Under this aspect the gifts are similar
to the moral virtues, since the virtues dispose the rational sense
appetites to obey reason. Reason functions as the moving and
regulating principle of the virtues. As habits the virtues are dispositions through which the will is disposed to be obedient to
reason. The reason, in turn, moves the will by presenting and
delimiting its object. The good as measured by reason, then, is
the formal object of the virtues.
43. ( 46) Similarly, the gifts are habits or dispositions of the
intellect and the will. They dispose these faculties to follow the
impulse of the Holy Ghost, who regulates and delimits the objects
of the gifts. His ordination constitutes the formal object of the
gifts and specifies the good and the true according to the standards
of divine illumination and not according to the standards of human
re::tson. From it, as from an enkindling breath, which is an affection
for divine things, there is born a more intimate penetration of the
supernatural and a total dependence upon God. The Psalmist
admonishes, Cast thy care upon the Lord and he shaU sustain thee;
he shaU not suffer the just to waver for ever.81
Where reason adorned with virtues may fluctuate and fail, it is
God's own counsel to cast one's cares upon the Lord. His Spirit
nourishes, sustains and guards the faithful lest they fail. For His
gifts are their nourishment and their sustenance.
44-45. (42-43) The claim has been made that the superior
mover in the matter of the gifts is not in the efficient order but in
the formal order. However, even if this moving principle were in
the formal order it would follow that the gifts are merely higher
types of virtues. It would be illogical to conclude that the gifts
are not virtues. :Moreover, St. Thomas asserts that the gifts are
dispositions necessary for the action of the mover. But if this mover
is in the order of formal causality, no such disposition is required.
For, over and above its own nature, a receiver required no special
disposition to render it passive to a new form. Therefore, in proving that the gifts are dispositions, St. Thomas necessarily involved
the order of efficient causality. Consequently, he was advancing an
81

Psalm liv, iS.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

895

accidental and not an essential difference between the virtues and
the gifts.
46. (47) In response to the latter part of this argument it should
be noted that the superior moving principle referred to brings about
a virtue higher than the limitations of reason will allow. Broadly
speaking, it may be called a virtue, as St. Thomas concedes, since
it is a good habit. However, it is called a gift, in contradistinction
to the virtues, because it is above anything due to human reason.
47. (48) Moreover, a virtue is a disposition moved and regulated
by reason. It is specified and delimited by its object and not merely
by its efficient cause. The will is thus disposed to its object according to the regulation of the reason. By the name " mover," then, is
meant the formal cause regulating and specifying. In the specification of this cause some disposition is necessary. Such a disposition is not for the introduction of a form; it is a habit in the
soul. Since reason may fail to perform ,the specification properly,
the motion and impulse of the Holy Ghost enters into the soul.
48. (44) However, according to some there seems to be no reason
why the theological and moral virtues themselves do not suffice
for the higher motion of the Holy Ghost. The gifts are concerned
with the same matter as the infused virtues, for example, the gift
of fortitude and the infused virtue of fortitude, counsel and infused
prudence, understanding, knowledge and faith. All deal with these
matters within the supernatural order. A new virtue is not required,
therefore, that a man be moved in a. higher way. All that seems
to be necessary is a more intense and more perfect mode of acting
in the same virtue. It has already been admitted that heroic and
common virtues, the purgative virtues and those of the soul which
has been tried do not differ except according to the more and
the less. Why then cannot the same be maintained with regard to
the virtues and the gifts? The spirit of fortitude by which Samson
killed a thousand men with a jawbone, although more excellent and
strengthened by a more perfect assistance from God, would not
differ, then, from the virtue of fortitude by which many soldiers
conquer in battle.
49. This final resumption under the second objection is not valid.
The disposition even of the infused virtues does not suffice for the
reception of the motion of the Holy Ghost. Distinct habits are
""I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

896

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

required, since the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to supply for
the deficiency of human reason, even when it is adorned with the
virtues. Since, therefore, the virtues are limited and specified by
the good as regulated and attained through human reason, whatever
disposes to acts and accomplishments superior to reason demands
another habit outside the limits and specific nature of human virtue.
A further consideration must be entertained. Whatever exceeds
human nature goes beyond it either by reason of
supernatural
character of the matter at hand, the object of the action, or by
reason of superiority in the mode of acting. Supernatural things
attained in this life are measured by human limitations and actions.
They are apprehended and desired according to human capacity.
Supernatural goods are known through faith; through prudence and
the other moral virtues direction is given to supernatural acts.
However, because of the limited essence of these virtues, the intellect does not penetrate the mysteries of faith, except in an imperfect
manner and according to the analogy of natural things. In many
respects, therefore, the understanding of those things is deficient.
The soul requires either a theological argument, which is subject
to a thousand opinions, fallacies, and defects, or it requires a light,
a celestial impulse, by which it may be directed by the Holy Ghost.
50. Likewise, infused prudence, moderating and judging actions
in the supernatural order, fails in many respects if it proceeds and
judges only according to the capacity of human reason. Its deficiency must be supplied by a divine impulse and motion which
directs and regulates it. It is fitting, then, that there be in the
will and in the sensitive appetites a disposition proportionate to
the movement of the Holy Ghost. Human reason according to its
own manner of acting cannot operate on such a plane. The divine
impulse must supply what is lacking in the process of the human
reason, even when that reason is helped and augmented by the
infused theological virtues. Moreover, by ennobling the sensitive
appetite to obey and follow a higher divine impulse, the gifts compensate for the deficiencies of the moral virtues, which incline a
man towards good, but only according to the limitations of human
reason.
51. Furthermore, the gifts and the virtues deal with the same
objects. And, of course, only a more intense and perfect act and
not a new virtue is required so long as the action remains within

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

397

the limits of human powers and attainments in the supernatural
order. However, the example adduced of the heroic, purgative
virtues of the tried soul does not remain within the bounds of
human reason. Certainly some higher power than any human virtue
is necessary for a man to be moved beyond the merely human
manner of acting and to be directed to acts in which human reason
fails. The impulse of the Holy Ghost must fill the breach when
human reason can go no further. This special assistance is called
a gift both because it is gratuitously given to raise the faculty to
the supernatural order and because it supplements the deficiencies
of the faculty.
52. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas. 83 He distinguishes the
matter from the manner in human actions. The acts of the virtues
are performed in a human manner and in this respect the gifts
surpass the virtues. :For it is connatura:I to human nature to perceive divine things only according to an image found in creatures
and in the darkness of analogy. Thus faith proceeds. However, the
Gift of Understanding so illuminates the mind concerning the things
that have been heard that a man receives a foretaste of the beatific
vision. St. Thomas, 84 therefore, distinguishes the gifts from the
infused virtues. For although the infused virtues are substantially
divine gifts their mode of acting is human and inferior to that of
the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
53. The third objection: It sometimes happens that even in the
theological virtues a thing is done which is beyond the common and
ordinary manner of proceeding. Yet in that case there is not
required any gift higher than the virtue itself. Furthermore, the
theological virtues are superior to the gifts 85 and hence no gift is
more powerful than they. Gifts are not necessary, therefore, because
of any extraordinary work in the sphere of the theological virtues.
The fact of unusual occurrences in the sphere of the theological
virtues is proved by the existence of a faith which moves mountains, to which St. Paul referred, 86 and a charity so great that it
overcomes death. These virtues, at least, involve extraordinary
actions.
In Ill Sententiarum, d. 34, q. 1, a. l.
•• Ibid., ad 2.
85 I-II, q. 68, a. 8.
""Cf. I Corinthians, xiii, 2.

88

898

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

The statement that the virtues are sufficient for their own acts
is evidenced by the fact that no works of faith or charity are so
perfect and excellent that faith and charity themselves,' are not
equal to them. Of faith it is said, it is like a grain of mustard seed, 81
and you will say to the mountain, remove from hence, and it will
remove. 88 This is not a gift of the Holy Ghost distinct from faith.
Nor is that charity which gives its body to be burned 89 a gift
distinct from the charity greater than which no one has than he
who would lay down his life for his friends. 90
54. It must be admitted, in reply to this argument, that there
are extraordinary actions even in the sphere of theological virtues.
For this very purpose, there are gifts corresponding to the virtues:
Understanding corresponds to Faith/ 1 the gift of Fear to Hope,S2
and the gift of Wisdom to Charity. 93
While the gifts are superior to the moral virtues, they serve the
theological virtues by supplementing them. The theological virtues
join the soul to its ultimate end, while the gifts serve to move it
and lead it to that end. Thy spirit shall lead. me into the right
land; 94 His wind shall blow and the waters shall run. 95
Come, 0 south wind, blow through my garden and let its aromatical spices flow. 96 This flowing is related to motion toward an
end, and not to the rest or quiet in it. The gifts have a certain
essential superiority over the virtues which are concerned with the
means to the end. For the gifts move men in a higher way in the
very things in which these virtues fail.
55. (57) However, the gifts cannot be essentially superior to the
virtues which join the soul immediately to God. 97 For motion of
the Holy Ghost, to which the gifts are subservient, has as its
purpose union with God as the last end. Therefore, the gifts
corresponding to the theological virtues help them with their proper
object and certain allied matters.
For example, the Gift of Understanding is given for the penetration of the mysteries of faith and divine things. Yet this penetraMatthew, xii, 81; Luke, xiii, 19; xvii, 6.
Matthew, xvii, 19.
•• Ibid., q. 15.
80 I Corinthiam, xiii, 8.
•• Psalm cxlii, 9.
•• John, xv, 18.
•• Psalm cxlvii, 18.
01 IT-II, q. 8 and 9.
•• Canticle of Canticles, iv, 16.
02 Ibid., q. 19.
•• I-ll, q. 68, a. 8.
87
88

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

899

tion is not an immediate and complete understanding. Attaining
to the credibility of mysteries, it judges their appropriateness or
the meaning of articles by· discerning them from errors. Furthermore, it determines the interpretation of Scripture-he opened their
minds, that they might understand the Scriptures. 98 The Gift of
Knowledge is bestowed so that the soul may attain to the causes
of the credibility of mysteries and their inner consistency. It disposes and prepares the mind to believe more firmly. The Gift of
Fear is concerned with one's own nothingness. It subjects the
soul to the divine eminence and restrains the soul to its proper
proportions so that it will not be presumptuous but rather prepared
to be wholly dependent upon God. Wisdom judges according to
the savor of divine things, and it discerns supernatural things in
the love of God.
All these gifts serve the virtues. They assist them by preparing
for acts of virtue, not by arousing the theological virtues to an
essentially more perfect act. No works of faith and charity are so
perfect that they cannot in essence be accomplished by those
virtues. But the object can be dealt with more perfectly when the
virtues are assisted by the gifts. For the virtues are not sufficient
to dispose and prepare themselves with respect. to that object.
Therefore, the gifts should be distinguished from the theological
virtues, since although they are concerned with the same object,
they do not view it under the same formality or light.
56. (54) Another objection may be raised concerning other
virtues: fortitude, for example. When Samson killed a thousand
men this deed exceeded neither the sphere nor the essence of the
virtue of fortitude. Fortitude. inclines a man to sustain difficulties
and attack danger wherever that attack is evidently justified either
by human reason or by. an impulse of the Holy Ghost. However,
it requires a special help when the work is great and extraordinary.
But it is one thing to need an extraordinary help and quite another
to require a special virtue or habit. The ordinary virtue together
with the extraordinary assistance should suffice for the task. How
then can it be shown that extraordinary tasks require a Gift of
the Holy Ghost distinct from the virtues?
This is especially true since unusual works happen but rarely
and are done by only a few. There is even less reason, then, to
08

Luke, xxiv, 45.

400

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

postulate special habits in all the just. Nor is there a satisfactory
answer in the claim that the works are above the limitations of
human reason. Even when a man is moved to these special actions,
he is moved according to right reason, although it has been illuminated by an impulse of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, the gifts are
not superior to the human reason when that reason is illuminated
by the Holy Ghost. In other words, the ordinary virtues together
with a spedal help are sufficient.
57. (59) There are some things which exceed the measure and
essence of human virtue as judged by the rule of prudence, in
matters attainable by human procedure and reasoning. The formal
and specific essence of the moral virtue is taken from the rule and
measure by which it is judged-for morality is nothing other than
a measure of things to be done. It is certain, then, that wherever
there is a variation in the morality and the measure, there is a
corresponding change in the virtue. Reason clothed with virtue
but confined to the light and direction of a merely human manner
of proceeding cannot offer a rule of life comprehending the totality
of means to salvation. For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful,
and our counsels uncertain. 99
In many things, therefore, men should give themselves into the
hands of Divine Prudence to be ruled by its impulse, which is a
higher and more certain and more comprehensive measure than
their own reason. For human difficulties arise either from the
multitude and the magnitude of the objects or from the nothingness
and infirmity of the person who is unable to comprehend all the
details of life even in the natural order. The Gifts of the Holy
Ghost alone can lead him to this comprehension.
58. (60) Great and unusual deeds can be accomplished by
human effort and industry. Even in a theological virtue which
presupposes supernatural faith, there may be more intense works
of virtue, exceeding the limits and essence of human moral virtue.
Such acts, even within their own proper sphere, require a more
excellent grace and a more perfect assistance from God. Yet even
in the supernatural order they are always founded upon human
reason and limited by human industry.
There are, moreover, great and extraordinary works which despite one's own· effort and diligence are unattainable. They require
•• Wirdom, ix, 14.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

401

an impulse superior to human direction and effort. That impulse
constitutes a higher morality and regulative principle. To that
morality should correspond a principle in the will which inclines
it to the new and higher standard. According to human standards,
Samson would have to be judged temerarious in attacking a
thousand men with only the jawbone of an ass. By the same
standards, i.t would have been judged wrong for him to break
down the columns of the building to kill himself and others. The
same might be said in the case of St. Apollonia who threw herself
into the fire. According to the higher rule, however, these actions
are judged good. Therefore, there is a distinct moral aspect.
59. (58) Furthermore, extraordinary help of a kind that varies
the morality of an act is not given as connatural to virtues which
are specified by a diverse moral rule. Nor is this help such that
it lifts the virtues out of their own sphere of morality. Then it
would be neither proportionate nor connatural to the soul. If this
help is to be given proportionately and connaturally, new habits
in the soul transcending the morality of ordinary virtues are required. These habits are ealled the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Of course, even in extraordinary work a man is moved by his
:reason. His reason must be regulated by a rectifying principle
transcending the scope of human effort, even in the supernatural
order. This regulative principle varies the morality of the virtues
subject to it.
60. (55) Finally, it may be argued that if the gifts are given
for extraordinary actions above the common rule of reason and of
human virtue, it is not within a man's power or judgment to act
through these gifts when he chooses. Experience testifies that men
do not act according to the gifts every time they wish. Therefore,
they act through the gifts as through the charisms like prophecy,
which is not a habit but a transient grace. 100
Men are instruments of God moved by Him to actions to which
of themselves they are not suited. To this action of an instrument,
St. Thomas 101 compares the works of the gifts. Through them men
passively receive divine things and are moved by the Holy Ghost
rather than move and act of themselves. Whoever are led by the
Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. 102 St. Thomas 103 uses this
100

II-II, q. 171, a. l.

102

101

I-II, q. 68, a. 3, ad 2.

103

Romans, viii, 14,
I-II, q. 68, a. L

402

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

testimony to prove that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are. found in
the faithful and make them amenable to the movement of the
Holy Ghost. Therefore, those gifts are not enduring habits in
the faithful. They are passing graces when given for miraculous
purposes. If they are given to the faithful as habits then they do
not exceed the essence and limitation of ordinary virtues.
61. (62) Some think that the acts of the gifts, especially in
exterior matters, are miraculous acts, not under the control of men.
To the rejoinder that reason has no need for habits to perform these
actions-since habits can be used at will-they reply that this is
understood of habits which are subject to reason and regulated by
common rules.
If this were the case, St. Thomas 104 would have proved in vain
that there are no habits of prophecy and miracles, because men do
not have the power of prophesying and of working miracles at wilL
Against him it might be alleged that there might be habits of
prophecy and miracles. For, according to these theologians, there
·could be habits outside the subjection of reason and common rules
which could be used at wilL
However, according to the testimony of St. Thomas 105 the Gifts
of the Holy Ghost are given as habits not as an impulse moving
the soul but for a special obedience by which the soul is subject
to the motion of the Holy Ghost. This obedience and disposition
which is a preparation for habitual subjection to the Holy Ghost
should :remain constant in the faithful. However, its exercise
depends upon a motio:Q. and actual impulse which is not within
the power of man. It is in his power, however, to be always prepared to obey, to' be docile to the Holy Ghost. My heart is Teady,
0 God, my heart is ready. I will sing, and will give praise with my
glory. 106 It is not within human power to arouse and to excite that
glory, yet the heart of man may be prepared to sing in harmony
with God's movements. Being subject to Him is the greatest chant,
since In Thou is my song forever. 101
62. (64) When St. Thomas compares the motion through the
Gifts of the Holy Ghost to the motion of an instrument, he does
not apply it in all its aspects. Rather, he uses it from the point
of view that a man needs the actual impulse of God to perform
10 •
105

II-II, q. 171, a. 1 and q. 178.
I-II, q. 68.

100
107

Psalm ci, 2.
Psalm lxx, 6.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

403

any actions. Through the gifts he performs works exceeding his
own power. For the same reason other supernatural things are
said to be as instruments in the faithfuL Indeed all creatures are
said to be as instruments of God. They depend upon His actually
moving them. But men are not called instruments because they
are purely inanimate and merely serving ministerially. For in lesser
creatures there is no principle eliciting actions as a principal cause
nor is there operation through an intrinsic principle. There is only
a principle ministerially serving the motion of the principle agent,
so that the whole is moved by another.
68. (65) The final statement is that men are rather in the position of passively receiving divine things than in the position of
moving themselves. Of course, they are voluntarily passive and
obedient to the divine motion. To be obedient and passive in this
way is not precisely to be like something inanimate. It is rather
to operate actively by receiving divine things· by being led by the
same Spirit.
64. (66) :Finally, other difficulties about each gift might be
raised against this doctrine. In the case of the intellectual gifts it
might be argued that their essence does not differ from that of
faith. Moreover, it may be alleged that these in the will do not
differ from the other virtues. It is not expedient here, however,
to explain the nature and difference of each gift. That will be done
in the subsequent chapters.

(To be continued.)

BOOK REVIKWS
Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth.
York: Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp.

By ERIC FRANK.
with index.

New

Dr. Frank has tried to carry water on both shoulders, and much philosophical understanding and religious truth has been spilled in the attempt
In the hope that a discussion of the problem envisaged in the title of this
" philosophical study . . . might contribute toward a clarification of our
present difficulties," Dr. Frank has addressed an appeal to modern
" understanding that finds itself in search of a faith." His vigorous notation of philosophical trends leaves little doubt that difficulties exist, but
his conciliation of the " conflict between religion and philosophy " is
inadequate.
However, Dr. Frank has produced many aphorisms and even whole
passages which are remarkably perspicuous. His refractions of truth are in
striking contrast to the opinions of many modern philosophers and his
unhesitant intuition of the errors of both Positivism and Idealism place
him in a position to appreciate a truly synolistic approach to philosophical
problems. His judgments are substantiated by profuse annotations which
evidence his wide acquaintance with philosophical literature.
Dr. Frank offers allegiance to no school and no individual philosopher
is recognized as his pedagogue. Whether he sits in the shadow of
Emmanuel Kant or walks toe to heel behind Soren Kierkegaard cannot
be definitely determined from these pages. But there can be little doubt
that his judgments suffer from an inherited epistemological myopia and
that his steps are guided by naturalism in its frustrated perfection.
Although his intellectual genealogy may be uncertain, his present contribution to the heritage of human learning may be described, at least by an
allegory. Precedent for these Bryn Mawr lectures now compiled in book
form may be found in the " Advice from a Caterpillar " in the fifth chapter
of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. With a mushroom as his rostrum,
the caterpillar engaged Alice in scintillating dialectic. However, he offered
her little consolation in her distress at being only three inches high, for
he was of no greater stature himself. As a reward for Alice's patient attention, the caterpillar made the parting comment that if she were to eat of
one side of the perfectly round mushroom, she would shrink, if she ate
of the other, she would grow. With even less than a "spontaneous feeling" of faith to guide her in her quandary, Alice chewed. a piece of the
mushroom she had taken in her right hand. The effect was disastrous.
Her chin was so close to her shoe tops that she could scarcely nibble a bit

404

BOOK REVIEWS

405

from the other side of the mushroom. When she had swallowed the second
morsel she grew-distorted.
The dialectic of these essays is circular, self-contradictory, and futile.
The reader is as likely to be stunted by specious philosophical principles as
to thrive because of the surcharging of his ethico-religious consciousness.
For, while the imperious assurances of a vague and generic religious faith
become more peremptory, the very fundaments of credibility in religious.
truth are being undermined by a latent Kantian antinomy. Confronted
with numerous uncanny contradictions, a cautious reader will have as much
difficulty in eliminating the errors from the author's really worth-while
statements as he would in anathematizing a dream or excommunicating a
ghost. Of a few of these errors, therefore, he would do well to be
forewarned.
The :first of these six essays treats of The Nature of Man, the "proper
study" of modern philosophy. This initial step in the resolution of the
" conflict between philosophy and religion " begins with a historical conspectus of the damage wrought to the concept of man by both the natural
sciences and the "empirical knowledge of history." From the time of the
discovery that man is not the master of the universe until the promulgation of the contemporary theory that he is a slave of animal instincts,
the generally accepted interpretation of human nature has become progressively more incompatible with any ethico-religious notions. As a result,
religious tenets are considered a threat to the progress of science and a·
subterfuge of philosophers too timorous to take their destiny in their own
hands.
To this modern attitude Dr. Frank's :first essay opposes a series of arguments calculated to dethrone man's own estimate of himself by pointing
out to him the limitations of his sovereignty in thought and action. The
practical experience of his created existence, his moral limitations, and the
biological phenomenon of death should so impinge upon man's vaunted
regency of all things that he would come to realize his " :final limitation
which makes even the concepts of religion appear to him in a new light."
This type of argumentation is valid and useful, as evidenced by St. Augustine's conversion of England many centuries ago, but it may be easily
vitiated by internal contradictions and a recourse to " concepts of religion " which are confused and inadequate.
Contradictions and adulterated religious ideas abound in these pages.
For the idea that religious belief is " a childish delusion that serves to
satisfy man's emotional needs" modern man is expected to substitute a
" spontaneous feeling " which " is precisely what in religion is called faith."
Moreover, according to the doctrine of this essay, for a man to appreciate
the limits of his created existence he must come to realize that " the particular historical situation " into which he is born constitutes his " unalter-

8

406

BOOK REVIEWS

able fate by which his free will is impaired. . . . " Even man's natural
faculties are said to be limited by their " historical moment " since " the
rational supposition of a truth that, once established by reason, remains
one and the same at all times and for all men, is contrary to the facts:
veritas emporis "filia." All this confusion concerning human nature is based
upon the unwarranted assumption that " the fundamental fact from which
all philosophy has to start in its interpretation of man is neither thought
alone nor nature alone, but the dialectical conflict of the two, their irreconcilable antinomy." If man's free will is impaired, his intellect ordained
to a chimera called truth, and his whole being on the rack between thought
and nature, how can God be " felt " ? If such is the state of human understanding for an evangelizer it seems far-fetched indeed to expect modern
philosophers to subscribe to religious concepts in "the quintessence of their
truth" and "their full philosophical meaning, which remains valid even
for the modern intellect."
To this modern intellect as it " puzzles over the origin of the idea of
God," Dr. Frank addresses his second essay, The Existence of God. The
" proof " this essay offers is at once commonplace and false. Since
" modern man, who no longer has faith, will never be convinced of God's
existence through such artificial and complicated argumentations " as have
been the stock in trade of philosophers for centuries, this essay proposes
in a new form what may be called the argument from folly. For, as Holy
Scripture points out, it is only in the heart of a fool that the " real proof
of God " is formulated as " the agonized attempt to deny God."
The arguments of philosophers are reviewed and rejected in these pages,
because " they merely transpose the act of faith into the medium of
rational thinking." The cosmological argument is labelled as without merit
because Positivists would be unwilling to take the " step from a contingent and relative world to an unconditioned cause ... to leap into the
unkown Absolute." The argument from design is found inadequate because it naively omits the possibility of " blind forces " which are ultimate realities for so many moderns. The ontological argument, however,
receives partial approbation, principally because the author has failed to
grasp its fundamental philosophical principle. Moreover, •Pascal, James,
and Kierkegaard are found worthy of benign treatment since " they recognized the fact that the existence of God cannot b.e proved to the modern
sceptic who no longer believes in God."
When all these arguments have been found wanting the argument from
folly remains, for it is based on the " fundamental epistemological fact:
The heart has its reasons which Reason does not know." Although pure
subjectivism is rejected, the crude emotional proof offered can have
other source. Moreover, the object of this argument from folly can be no
more than man's fictional wrestling with his own concepts. The argument

no

BOOK REVIEWS

407

from " the agonized attempt to deny God " offers neither proof nor conviction, since it would offer no certitude to "modern man, who puzzles
about the origin of the idea of God," unless he were first firmly to believe
that God had created a race of schizophrenics.
The fallacy of this argument is both metaphysical and methodological.
The logical vice of ignoratio elenchi is apparent in the transition from an
attempt to prove God's existence to a consideration of his intimate nature;
the metaphysical error flows from a misunderstanding of the primary
principles of human reason.
Moreover, in this essay the author fails not only as a seer but as a
scholar. The meaning of at least one question is completely distorted.
Wrenched from its context in the Contra Gentiles a garbled passage which
refers to entirely different matter is alleged as a preface to St. Thomas'
demonstrative proofs for the existence of God. Such a gross misinterpretation brings suspicion upon all the annotations to the generalizations of
these essays.
The third essay, entitled Creation and Time, is on the whole the most
satisfactory of the series. It elaborates the point, not often emphasized,
that "our modern concept of history, no matter how rationalized and
it may be, still rests on that concept of historical time which
was inaugurated by Christianity."
To substantiate this contention the
concepts of creation and time are subjected to a brief review. Much
entangled phraseology is employed to explain these concepts, and at times
it seems that the author has negated the very position he would establish.
Moreover, like St. Augustine, the author seems to understand the notion
of time until he attempts to explain it. Such statements as man's "apprehension of the present is merely the consciousness of an absence of the
present, of transitoriness " and " time is the outgrowth of our imagination;
therefore the soul is essentially connected with time " do little to clarify
notions of time, which are already quite confused. Finally, it is only a
faulty notion of
that the author could view as a concept which,
" although it cannot rationally e11.plain the riddle of human existence, serves
to point to it and to make man aware of it."
Certainly the full theological concept of creation has not been delineated
in these pages, but if the exposition here given " keeps alive in man a
sense of his own mysterious place within that creation," it will have
accomplished a function not altogether futile.
Whatever good may have been achieved in the previous essay is destroyed by the fourth brief treatise, on Truth and Imagination. For "the
concept of creation, in spite of its religious and philosophical importance,
proves to be an idea of imagination," and " imagination, under the influence of our emotions and practical interests, makes reality appear in a
fashion not in keeping with sober experience." But imagination, according

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to the doctrine of this essay, must not be spurned as deceptive or wholly
inferior to reason. For "in terms of imagination" a man must express his·
relation to God, since all rational knowledge, " even the most elevated,
always remains a form of human existence, which as such differs essentially
from its objects." If "essentially" is here taken as distinguished from the
concept already contained in a " mode of human existence," this statement
constitutes a denial of the basic principle of human knowledge: the form
of the intellect is identical with the form of the object. If by " essentially" is actually meant "existentially," the statement is redundant and
inconclusive. From this it is apparent that the fundamental error of this
essay is the utter confusion of what a man knows with the way he knows
it. So long as this critique of knowledge attempts to anticipate the act
of knowing, no consistent notion of ideogenesis can be worked out.
Without injustice to the author, it cannot be denied that there are statements in this essay which express certain aspects of the truth, but since
no consistent· explanation of the relation between imagination and truth
can be extracted from these pages, this entire essay must stand under the
censure of integral truth.
With his usual mastery of effects and tenuous contact with their causes,
Dr. Frank offers an essay on His-tory and Destiny, which is a melange of
historical observations and religious misconceptions. Heterodox theological
notions such as would confuse Providence with that part of it called
Predestination and would even mistake Christ for the Third Person of the
Most Holy Trinity are not apt to give a reliable explanation of historical
phenomena, however ably these latter may be described. Dr. Frank's
description of the " opposition of Caesar and Christ " is admirable. Yet
if this opposition is merely the "symbolic expression" of the "polar
tension between religion and reason," it is deprived of the very substance
of its being. Christianity may be said to have introduced ideas whose
vitality is felt even in rationalism and naturalism; Christ may be lauded as
the protagonist in " events that were to shake the world to its foundations " and His greatness may surpass human narration; but such encomia
are merely a subtle way of taking up stones against Christ not for His
good works but for His claiming to be divine. Eulogies of Christ's mission and its effect are no more than deceptions if the Son of God is
considered as another prophet of the " Jewish-Christian religion."
Moreover, if the "problem of history and destiny is identical with that
of freedom and necessity," Dr. Frank cannot hope for a satisfactory solution by sidestepping the problem of God's necessary efficiency in every act
of human freedom. The subterfuge of a " belief in the creative freedom
of the human spirit " in no way gives to man a proper understanding of
" the fact that whatever he may do of his own free will is at the same
time an ultimate necessity." Although he protests that " freedom, in so

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409

far as it is truly creative and effective, must consist solely in the recognition of a superior necessity and in obedience to its law," Dr. Frank leaves
unexplained God's initiative and consummation of human acts. In this he
leaves unsolved the problem of history and destiny.
In the final essay of this series, entitled Letter and Spirit, the reader is
presented with ideas which he cannot renounce " even if they are not
substantiated by objective facts." The reader will have little difficulty
in believing that no objective fact could corroborate the statement that
" freedom of will does not mean only choice between given possibilities,
rather it means the very creation of such possibilities." Yet he need not
agree with this nor many of the other propositions alleged in this essay.
In this treatise the metaphor of the letter and spirit used by St. Paul
" in formulating the ultimate secret of Christianity " receives its obviously
proper exegesis but several of the conclusions derived from this explanation
are without foundation. For example, the term " letter " used in obloquy
is certainly misapplied to the " objective canon and strict dogma of the
Catholic Church." Moreover, the terms " sovereign volition," " spiritual
freedom," and " free personality " are no less confusing than such statements as: "God as spirit is essentially personality."
Throughout this essay, as at times in other essays, Dr. Frank has,
perhaps unwittingly, usurped the function of a theologian. The consideration of realities not in their proper formalities but as a " cipher of the
Absolute " is not " the perennial task of philosophy " but the proper sphere
of theological inquiry. However, theology's "faith seeking understanding"
must be based on a solid foundation. The interpolation of a few supernatural concepts into a naturalistic procedure merely confuses the source
and direction of both philosophy and theology. "Throughout these lectures, belief h;t.S proved to be the ultimate ground <>.f fundamental concepts" yet "at the bottom of faith, there is doubt." Faith based on
supernatural grace gives certitude, faith and admixture of doubt based on
natural understanding gives only opinion. Modern man is not likely to
turn to such opinion for a solution of " the conflict between philosophy
and religion." Opinion, therefore, is offered to modern man as the source
of philosophy and the principle of the resolution of the alleged antinomy
between faith and science.
Philosophical fallacies and religious misconceptions, however, are not the
only errors of this "philosophical study." There are mistakes in the
literary and scholarly apparatus. The annotations are not always accurate,
for example part of note four in Chapter Four is not correct, while note
two of the same chapter misconstrues the structure of the articles of the
Summa Theologica. Grammatical errors are surprisingly numerous-first
person plural pronouns run rampant and unidentified throughout. Despite
" numerous changes " with a view to publication, the literary style of these

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essays still has on the gingham edged with taffeta it wore to Bryn Mawr.
The devices of rhetoric and logic which are employed are the ordinary
instruments of those who, as Aristotle asserts, prefer "to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man rather than to accomplish it without seeming
to do so."
The task of a wise man is certainly not accomplished in these essays.
For all their profession of religious truth the general tenor of these essays
may be described as materialistic, in so far as that term implies a judging
of the greater by the less. For faith " must come to terms " with science
and philosophy is made the arbiter of all truth. Both as lectures and as
essays these treatises on philosophy may have been of polemic value against
certain notions of "modern man," but they cannot fail to cause confusion
in the mind of any reader who expects a consistent presentation of truth.
WALTER

Dominican House of
Washington, D. C.

D. HuGHEs, O.P.

BRIEF NOTICES
Thomistic Bibliography: 1920-1,0. By VERNON J. BoURKE, Ph. D. St.
312, with
Louis, Missouri: The Modern Schoolman, 1945. Pp. viii
indices. $3.00.

+

Undoubtedly, this is one of the most valuable works for the student of
Thomism to appear in this country during the war. It is designed to carry
on the work of the Bibliographie Thomiste, which was edited by the
French Dominicans, P. Mandonnet and J. Destrez. It follows the divisions
of this work: I. Life and Personality of St. Thomas; IT. Works of St.
Thomas; ill. Philosophical Doctrines; IV. Theological Doctrines; and V.
Doctrinal and Historical Relations. An Introduction explains the rationale
of the bibliography, the method of using it, and gives a chronology of the
life of St. Thomas as well as a chronological list of his writings. The items
in the bibliography appeared during the years 1920-40, although in some
important instances the compiler has wisely included works of a later date.

A Survey of Catholic Literature. By S. J. BROWN and T. McDERMOTT.
Milwaukee.: Bruce Publishing Co., 1945. Pp. 249, with index. $2.50.
The authors have attempted the huge task of conveying in a limited
space a notion of the vast riches of Catholic literature. In accomplishing
this task, they cover the field several times, first from the strictly bibliographical standpoint, then by a brief historical survey from the beginning
of the Christian era to the preseJ;tt. Part Two covers the Ages of FaithMedieval literature. and Old English, Scottish and Irish literature. Part
Three makes a sharp transition to North and South America. The work
concludes, in Part IV, with a more detailed survey of the Catholic literary
revival in France, England, Ireland, and the other European countries.
The book will probably be considered unscientific by scholars and too
factual by the general reader. The authors have chosen an extremely
broad definition of literature, which relieves them of the burden of judging
the works from a literary viewpoint. Nevertheless, such a general survey
is of worth, especially in listing the important Catholic authors of countries
whose literature is unknown to us in translation; perhaps it may arouse a
demand for translations of some of these authors.

411

BRIEF NOTICES

Poland and Russia. The Last Quarter Century. By ANN Su CARDWELL.
New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944. Pp. ix
fl51, with Appendices
and Index.

+

According to Thucydides facts carry their own judgment and the art of
the historian is that of precise statement. Mrs. Cardwell endorses this view
and in her recounting of Polish-Soviet relations reduces her personal interpretative remarks to a minimum. In this instance, at least, the facts speak
with a surprising eloquence. The greater part of the book deals with the
war years, in which Poland has been almost without interruption the battleground of armies and the debating ground of diplomacy. In time to come,
Mrs. Cardwell's work and the documents with which she gives it authenticity may assume rightful place as history. Here and now, in the yet
unsettled conditions of our time, they are polemic, a powerful plea for
Poland, an indictment of Soviet Russia.

The God of Love. By J. K. HAmoN. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944.
Pp. flOO. $U5.
In this work the author of The God of Reason has attempted to build a
gangplank into the Bark of Peter. This is not the usual book of apologetics;
it does not have a general appeal, for the author has in mind a definite
reader group, of which the typical member is the modem man who " stands
where Pilate stood, in despair of knowing the truth, in doubt of there
being any absolute truth." For this reason it would be unjustifiable to
criticize the book apart from this intention.
Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that the book's potential effectiveness
suffers from the streamlined presentation demanded by the limitation of
space. Such problems as: Man and His World, The Existence of God,
Natural Religion, The Failure of Philosophy, The Failure of Civilization,
Revelation Probable, The Resurrection, and The Church, are discussed
within the limits of two hundred pages. More than half the book is dedicated to the task of clearing the ground, removing old habits of thought
and prejudices, disposing the reader for the more theological and scriptural
part on the quest for the God of Love. Throughout, Mr. Haydon's scientific background is skillfully utilized; he exposes many of the half truths
of modem science which hold captive the pragmatists of our day. There
are few places in the book where the reader is not under the strain of following sharp argumentation. Probably The God of Love would attract
more readers to the Bark of Peter if the author had made his gangplank
more commodious by building into it a better treatment on the theological
virtue of charity.