THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoVINCE oF ST. JosEPH Publishers: Sheed and Ward, Inc., New York City VoL. VIII OCTOBER, 1945 No.4 THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE T HERE is within the human· a principle of activity whose end is reached only when he has acquired in a distinctive manner a knowledge of things, when by an act of its own it has caused to exist within himself the external object. This existence of the external object under a new mode of existence-an intentional existence-is knowledge. Knowledge, then, is the end of the intellect. But knowledge is a great antiphony: to understand it we must constantly refer to now this member, now that, between which there is a constant interplay of activity constituting knowledge. The perfection of knowledge exists only in one term of this transcendental relation, and as far as the other term-the object-is concerned, knowledge is only an extrinsic affection; yet knowledge is wholly determined in kind by the object. Since knowledge is determined by the object, since it is the intentional existence of the form of the object, we must expect in lmowledge that same stratification, that same irreducible 413 414 WILLIAM A. GERHARD difference in kind that we find in extramental being. Knowledge will not be a solid, homogeneous mass of ideas all of the same nature and all having the same end. As in the world we find men of action and men of contemplation, so in the knowledge which specifies these men we will find a radical difference. And as within these two general groups of humans we find many shades of difference, so too in the knowledge possessed by each class within these groups we will find kllowledge shading off into many differences. But always we must look to the object for the raison d' etre of these differences in knowledge (and activity of this knowledge). In the order of knowledge we must submit entirely to the object, we. must lose ourselves to it to save ourselves. The first and one of the most striking and irreducible differences in knowledge is that some kinds of knowledge are completed and perfected by the very· act of knowing, while other types of knowledge are of such a nature that they are truncated if not put into operation. 1 The former we shall call the product of the speculative in,tellect, and the latter that of the practical intellect. These are not two separate intellects, but two manifestations of the power of the same intellect. The answer to this mystery is to be found in a consideration of the object-the ultimate arbiter in all questions of knowledge. We call the practical and speculative intellect two manifestations of the power of the intellect rather than two potencies because for a formal difference of potencies there must be a 1 St. Thomas, In Boetium De Trinitate, q. V, a. 1: "Respondeo dicendum quod theoricus sive speculativus intellectus, in hoc proprie ab operativo sive practico distinguitur, quod speculativus habet pro fine veritatem quam considerat, practicus autem veritatem consideratam ordinat ad operationem tamquam in finem; et ideo dicit Philosophus 3 De Anima, quod differunt ad invicem fine; et in 2 Meta., dicitur, quod finis speculativae est veritas, finis operativae sive practicae actio. Cum igitur oporteat materiam fini esse proportionatam, oportet practicarum scientiarum materiam esse res illas quae a nostro opere fieri possunt, ut earum cognitio in operationem quasi in finem ordinari possit. Speculativarum vero scientiarum materiam oportet esse res quae a nostro opere non fiunt; unde earum consideratio in operationem ordinari non potest sicut in finem: et secundum harum rerum distinctionem oportet scientias speculativas distingui." THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE 415 formal difference in the aspects under which they consider the object; for instance, the natural philosopher differs in his knowledge formally from the physicist because the former considers ens in quantum mobile seu sensibile while the latter considers ens in quantum mensurabile. We have here not two distinct intellectual powers, but the same kind of potency exercising its function under two different modalities which, while specifically distinct, are not generically different. The physicist and the natural philosopher differ by reason of their respective habitus, and this difference in habitus is due to the formality under which the object is considered." So too in the case of the specula.tive and practical intellect: the matter proper to each of them is the true, for there is no activity of any knowing power which is not directed towards a knowledge of the true. The true is not considered under the same modality, not considered in a univocal manner in all operations of the intellect. Generically the practical and speculative intellect do not differ for they both are concerned with the same material object-the true. But the modality under which they consider the true differs. The speculative intellect considers the object as a pure object of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is through causes, and the knowledge proper to the exercise of the speculative intellect is a knowledge of the formal cause of the object. In the object the speculative intellect considers nothing but that which is the root of intelligibility, that by reason of which an object is determined to a certain place in the order of being, and consequently in the order of intelligibility-the formal cause. The formal cause of being is not primarily the root of goodness in an object, but rather is the radical principle of being and of intelligibility. The practical intellect, on the other 2 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 54, a. 1, ad 1: "Sicut in rebus materialibus diversitas specierum est secundum formam; diversitas autem generum est secundum materiam . . . . Ea enim sunt diversa genere, quorum est materia diversa: ita etiam diversitas objectorum secundum genus facit distinctionem potentiarum .... 'Ad ea quae sunt genere altera, sunt etiam animae particulae aliae ': diversitas vero objectorum secundum speciem facit diversitatem actuum secundum speciem, et per consequens habituum: quaecumque autem sunt diversa genere, sunt etiam specie diversa: sed non convertitur .... " 416 WILLIAM A. GERHARD hand, considers primarily not the formal cause but rather the final cause. The final cause is the object, but considered under a different modality. In considering the final cause we are not considering the true as true, but rather as it is ordered to being posited in the existential order. At no time have we departed from the material object-the true-but our point of view has changed because we have shifted from a consideration of the object as intelligible to that of considering the object as it can be realized outside the intentional order. The practical intellect is still a knowing power, but the aspect of truth is not primary in its activity, for the modality of truth has been superseded by the aspect of goodness. As we have said, the movement of the practical intellect is not completed within the intentional order as is that of the speculative intellect; for its contemplation is but a locus in a movement that will be completed only when an act has been posited outside the order of thought. 3 How this dichotomy of the intellect's activity can occur may be elucidated by referring again to the object. If we remember that the intellect is as it were a mirror in which the world of reality is reflected, we can see that the intellect must be quite as complex as is the structure of being. Concomitantly with the act of existence, of being, come the attributes of intelligibility and goodness. By the very fact that an object exists it can be known and can serve as a perfection to some nature that is in potency to it. The three attributes, then, of being, 3 Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 11: "Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus practicus et speculativus non sunt diversae potentiae. Cujus ratio est, quia . . . quod accidentaliter se habet ad objecti rationem, quam respicit aliqua potentia non diversificat potentiam: accidit enim colorato, quod sit homo, aut magnum aut parvum; unde omnia hujusmodi eadem visiva potentia apprehenduntur. Accidit alicui apprehenso per intellectum, quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus et practicus; nam intellectus speculativus est qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem: practicus vero intellectus dicitur qui quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. Et hoc est, quod Philosophus dicit in 3 De Anima, quod speculativus differt a practico fine; unde et a fine denominatur uterque, hie quidem speculativus, ille vero practicus, id est operativus." THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE 417 intelJigibility, and goodness are inextricably bound together. Indeed, in many ways we may consider the good as having a supremacy over the true, for although in the primitive operation of a knowing power the true is, of course, sought under the modality of the true, yet it is sought because it is the connatural good of the knowing power. The true would not be sought if it were not the good, for only the good is desirable. The speculative intellect, however, seeks the good under the aspect of the true. So too the good could not be known by the practical intellect if in this note of desirability there were not included the note of truth-for we seek only what we know as good. The practical intellect seeks the true under the aspect of the good. It is, then, because of the complex and intertwined structure of being that the intellect must proceed in two distinct modes of operation. The true is always the object of the intellect, but certain truths are not of such a nature that they are complete when merely contemplated; they demand by their nature to bear a relationship to extramental existence; that is to say that they demand to be posited in the existential order. 4 Throughout this consideration of the difference between the speculative and practical intellects it should be borne in mind that the practical intellect is not concerned with the good in the same manner as is the will. The practical intellect is always a knowing power primarily-it is intellect. But since, besides the expression of the dynamism of the nature through the intellect, there is also a movement by the will-a power that seeks what is presented to it as good-outward toward objects, the need of direction being exercised on these movements of the will by the intellect is apparent; there must be a knowledge of the relationship between the means and ends. The good must 'Ibid., I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2: " ... Verum et bonum se invicem includunt. Nam verum est quoddam bonum; alioquin non esset appetibile: et bonum est quoddam verum; alioquin non esset intelligibile; sicut igitur objectum appetitus potest esse verum, inquantum habet rationem boni; sicut, cum aliquis appetit virtutem cognoscere: ita objectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus sub ratione veri: intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus." 418 WILLIAM A. GERHARD be known as an end, and with this end as a major premise a process of reasoning must take place by which appropriate means will be found to obtain this end-that is the work of the practical intellect. The most formal activity of the intellect is knowing, as exercised by the speculative intellect; but since between knowledge and desire there is an irreducible division due to the opposite movement of knowledge and desire -the former ad intra, the latter ad extra-and since the will is dependent in its functionings upon the data presented by the intellect, there must be added to the duties of the intellect that of directing the activity of the will to obtain its end. 5 Our concern here is primarily with knowledge as exercised by the practical intellect; but to understand this less formal aspect of the intellect, we must constantly have recourse to comparisons between it and the more formal or speculative activity of the intellect. And again we must begin our study by a consideration of the object of speculative knowledge. All objects of speculative knowledge share in the common property of being of such a nature that their ultimate perfection as objects of knowledge is attained when they have been known. They are pure formal causes and can be considered only as such, they have no trace of final causality about them. They have no other function than that of determining the intellect in its act of knowing; but within this field serving as the object of speculative knowledge, there is not a univocity but rather an analogy. All are objects of speculative knowledge but not all in the same way. Their aspects of intelligibility will differ and as these aspects differ, so the sciences, whose proper objects they are, will differ. Into speculative knowledge there must flow the attributes of both object and subject. The John of St. Thos., Cursus Philosophicus, Logica, IT, q. a. 1; Reiser, a, " ... Constat enim quod intra idem genus intelligendi et in eadem potentia potest dari cognitio veritatis et directio operis seu voluntatis, quia ad cognitionem per se sequitur inclinatio seu voluntas, et ita cognitio per se est directiva voluntatis in agendo .... Nee ratio boni, quasi respicit practicus intellectus, est bonum ut appetibile formaliter, sed ut dirigibile et cognoscibile, et sic non extrahitur a ratione veri; bonum enim etiam est verum et cognoscibile." 5 THE INTELLECTUAl, VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE 419 intellect is an immaterial power; that is to say that the origin of its activity is not dependent upon matter or its determinations, and in its terminal act we find a product, a concept, that is not bound in by any limitations derived from material conditions. Consequently the mode of being characteristic of knowledge is given by the action of the intellect; and that mode constitutes what we know as the intentional order of existence. It is an order of existence where the intelligible principle, the formal cause, of objects exists in a state of abstraction, freed from such material derivations as time, place, and motion, freed from the contingent existence which is proper to all forms embedded in matter. The mode of existence proper to the order of knowledge, the intentional order, is given by the intellect; but the intellect of itself is not determined in its activity, nor can it determine itself. For this we must look to the object. The object must be a necessary object; that is to say that it must necessarily be what it is. But necessity implies a denial of change, a denial of the possibility of passing from existence to non-existence. A necessary object is one that is immobile, that defies any change. Moreover it is in matter that we find the radical principle of change. It is the most intrinsic characteristic of matter that it tends of itself to be dissipated into indetermination, into confusion. Of itself matter is neither this nor that nor anything else. 6 It is the breeder of division, the barrier to union, the principle of limitation and of potentiality. Obviously matter cannot account for necessity: it is not because of its material principle that an essence is necessarily constituted in existence, but rather because of the formal, the determining principle. Here then in the field of speculative knowledge we are concerned only with one thing: the existence or non-existence of an essence. And according to its relationship to being, we allocate an essence at a fixed place in the hierarchy of speculative knowledge. The whole question of the speculative intellect when dealing with an object of knowledge is, 6 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII. 1029 a, 20-21: 1T'OCT0v p.7}7e tf..AAo J.L'Y}lifv A€"feTat ols WpurTat 70 Ov. AE"fW ll' il'h7Jv ;j Ka.IJ' avr7Jv p.{]n 420 WILLIAM A. GERHARD "What is the relationship of this essence to existence?" The whole speculative order is dominated by this point of view. But once we move on to ask a further question, once we are not seeking only what is or is not, but ask what ought a thing to be, we have entered into the field of the practical intellect. 7 Speculative knowledge has as its object the essences of things, their formal cause; its object may be called a pure object of knowledge. For an act of pure knowledge there is demanded a predetermination of the knowing subject-that of specification. For this specification of our act of knowledge the intelligibility of the object, its formal cause, must be introduced into our mind so that the mind may be determined in its activity. The existence of the act of knowledge is supplied by the operation of the mind; its specification is the role of the formal cause of the object. That is the most radical aspect of speculative knowledge: it is the intentional union of an object's formal cause with the mind. Once the two have been joined the completion of the act has been reached. But in practical knowledge a new element is introduced. There must be, indeed, an introduction into the mind of the formal cause of the act to be accomplished, for without such a determination there would be no reason for one act to be performed rather than another; but besides this there must be a further specification, it must be an existential determination. Practical knowledge not only presupposes a knowing faculty to be determined-as does speculative knowledge-but it pre_supposes also a tendency, a penchant to certain acts, that must also be specified. Consequently for practical knowledge there must not only be knowledge of an object, but that object must be known as good: the object as knowable specifies the cognitive activity; the object as good determines the tendency to action existing within the percipient subject. The need of this double determination in 7 John of St. Thos., Cursus Theologicus, I, disp. Hi, a. 1; Vives, 6, 4.37: " ... Et distinguitm verum speculativum a vero practico, quia verum speculativum tantum regulatur per id quod est vel non est in re, verum autem practicum non regulatur per esse vel non esse rei, sed per id quod deberet esse juxta debitum et modum humanum ... " THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE 4fll psychic beings arises from the greater indetermination they enjoy by reason of their greater In things devoid of knowledge the tendencies to action are very narrow; they can follow only a very limited course of action because their nature does not allow them to entertain within themselves another form-when they receive another form as such, the original ceases to exist. But psychic beings in an act of knowledge have joined to themselves, in an act of knowledge, the form of another object as such. For non-psychic beings we have but to supply the proper conditions for their nature to act-we have only to determine the tendency. In psychic beings the tendency cannot be determined until the subject has been joined to the object in an act of knowledge. We can seek only what we know to be good. 8 In practical knowledge, therefore, we find the specific object to be the final cause, the good; and, consequently, we find in practical knowledge a reference to existence that is not found in speculative knowledge. Speculative knowledge is not primarily interested in existence; as a matter of fact, speculative knowledge abstracts from existence and considers the pure intelligibility of objects. Consequently in speculative knowledge there is always a priority of concept over judgment. In practical knowledge, however, the process is reversed. The object of practical knowledge is not the true as such, but the good. The good always demands e:xistence, we never find the good until we have found the act of existence. And only in the judgment do we find the existence included as an essential attribute. The concept as such is not concerned directly with existence; it is a pure formal cause determining the cognitive faculty alone. The judgment is directly concerned with existence, and consequently with the good, for nothing can be called good until it is fully constituted in the existential order. Hence, in the judgment we find the elements necessary for the double determination demanded in practical knowledge: there is an act of knowledge which is of such a nature that it determines 8 Y. Simon, Critique de la Connaissance Morale, pp. 9-11. WILLIAM A. GERHARD the appetitive tendency residing within the knowing being. This judgment is said to be of such a nature as to determine the appetitive faculty, for it is not concerned with knowing the truth as such but rather with knowing the truth as desirablethe good. John of St. Thomas remarks that there is great need of distinguishing carefully between speculative and practical knowledge since even an act of knowledge is a certain work, and also every work has a certain element of truth in it. Hence, merely to say that practical knowledge has to do with operari and speculative knowledge with cognoscere, is ambiguous. For a clear distinction between these two types of knowledge we must distinguish between the specific function of the two types of knowledge, between their matter and the type of their movement. We cannot call practical knowledge that which brings about a work in any manner whatsoever; it must be a knowledge of such sort that it finds its full perfection in directing, according to rules, operations that result in some work. Speculative knowledge is such only when its activity is one whose purpose is solely to know; it is not at all concerned with directing actions, but finds its perfection once it has arrived at knowledge. The matter about which practical knowledge concerns itself should be such that it must needs have rules for directing and fashioning it, and not only for knowing it. Hence the principles of practical knowledge, since they derive from a matter that is capable of being fashioned and worked, will be essentially different from those of speculative knowledge. For speculative knowledge always either has as matter a pure object of speculation or considers its object not as a matter of operation but only as matter of knowledge. Because of the difference in the matter considered by the speculative and practical intellect, and the difference in approach of these two habitus, the entire orientation of practical and of speculative thought is different. Hence, when we speak of the two types of knowledge being determined by the end, we mean that we do not consider the matter only from the end intended by the THE INTELLECTUAL VffiTUE OF PRUDENCE 428 knower-we do not mean that speculative knowledge could become practical merely by the knower determining that he would put this knowledge to use. The speculative and practical principles are irreducible by reason of their very nature, for they progress differently. Speculative knowledge has one function, to remove ignorance; it proceeds by a method of resolution; by abstraction from existence it comes to know the formal cause, the principle of intelligibility in the object. Practical principles, on the contrary, are destined by their nature to be realized in actual existence. They are the principles followed by the practical intellect in directing the activity that results in some work. Practical principles have one aim, to bring about existence, to be realized in the existential order. For instance, the principles of the carpenter are orientated towards making an object of furniture; the principles of this art do not proceed by resolution of principles into their causes, but by composition of principles in such wise that they may be realized as perfectly as possible in the production of a work. 9 • John of St. Thos., Log., II, q. 1, a. 4; Reiser, a, 40: "Sed cum ipsa veritatis cognitio sit etiam quoddam opus, et rursus quodlibet opus sit etiam aliqua veritas, oportet valde formaliter inter haec distinguere. Non enim practicum dicitur, quod efficit quomodocumque opus seu elicit operationem, sed quod dirigit ad opus et illud per regulas ordinat et habet pro fine, ita quod non solum sit operatio elicita, sed etiam objectum seu materia, quae in sui executione et ut efficiatur, regulis directionis ad faciendum indigeat, et non solum regulis ad sciendum; semper enim sciri et fieri distinguuntur in speculativo et practico. Nee speculativum dicitur quod cognoscit quomodocumque veritatem, ·sed quod tan tum intendit cognoscere, non vero ulterius facere, nee dirigit, ut faciat, sed ut sciat et ut ignorantiam effugiat. Unde ut sit speculativum, requiritur, quod vel materia ejus operabilis non sit, sicut qui considerat Deum et angelum aut coelum, etc., vel si sit operabile, non ut operabile, sed ut scibile et tamquam verum quoddam attingatur. Ut autem sit practicum, requiritur, ut materia sit operabilis et ut modo operabili attingatur. Unde Philosophus cum distinguit practicum et speculativum ex fine, non loquitur de fine solum ex parte intelligentis et operantis actualiter, sed ex fine intento ex vi ipsorum principiorum et regularum, quibus utitur aliqua scientia. Si enim sunt principia solum manifestantia veritatem et quasi illuminantia et fugantia ignorantiam, speculative procedunt. Si autem non solum manifestant veritatem, sed dirigunt ad hoc, ut fiat et constituatur in esse, sunt practica et ordinant praxim, intelligendo nomine praxis generaliter objectum practicae cognitionis. Unde principia speculativa dicuntur resolutiva, quia solum respiciunt veritatem, ut resolvitur cognoscibiliter in sua principia; principia autem 424 WILLIAM A. GERHARD The practical intellect like the speculative intellect has habitus which perfect it by giving it a second nature. Corresponding to the habitus of first principles of the speculative order we have a habitus of the first principles of the practical order. This has been called traditionally synderesis. It differs from the habitus of first speculative principles by reason of the fact that its knowledge pertains to the direction of the action of another faculty, that of the will. It perceives the self-evident principle of the practical order: " Do good and avoid evil." Hence in one of the very first principles of the practical order we have a reference to its role as a directing agent of operations destined to produce something in the existential order; the habitus of synderesis perceives the general ends to be sought by man in his actions. 10 The intellect as such, however, is not capable of production; it can only know and direct. Its role in production, therefore, will be to direct the operations of those powers capable of producing, be they the acts of the will or the acts necessitated to produce a work of some art. 11 This is another way of pointing out the fact that the movement of practical thought is compositive. The object of practical knowledge is not given to it in the same manner as is the object of speculative knowledge: in speculative knowledge the object is determined, and it is the object that impresses its intelligibility practica dicuntur compositiva, quia respiciunt veritatem seu entitatem ut ponendam . esse.... " In 10 John of St. Thos., Curs. Theol., I-II, disp. 16, a. 2; Vives, 6, 459: "Practicum enim non regulat suam veritatem penes id quod est vel non est in re, sicut speculativum, sed penes convenientiam ad finem naturae rationalis, quia practicum dicit ordinem et directionem ad operandum, et regulandum aliam potentiam extra intellectum, scilicet voluntatem, et actus liberos, qui e» voluntate derivantur, aut participantur etiam in aliis potentiis. Unde talis veritas cum sit directiva et regulativa operationum, distinctam difficultatem habet in intellectu, quam veritas speculativa quae solum respicit id quod est vel non est, non quod conveniens vel disconveniens est fini. Et sic principia practica non sistunt in ipso cognoscere, sicut speculativa, sed respiciunt ipsum operari recte operatione alterius potentiae. . .. " 11 Sum1na Theol., I, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1: "Intellectus practicus est motivus, non quasi exequens motum, sed quasi dirigens ad motum. Quod convenit ei secundum modum suae" apprehensionis." THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE 425 on the mind, which is undetermined until it receives the form of the object. In practical knowledge the progression is reversed: the object is not determined, but rather is undetermined and awaits the impression of the form. That is why it was said that the matter about which the practical intellect concerns itself is capable of modifications, of being fashioned. The matter which is the object of the practical intellect is contingent, and stands in need of the impression of a form by the knowing subject. In the objects of the practical intellect, therefore, we will find the matter contingent and undetermined; the formal and determining principle must be sought in the judgment of the practical intellect which the subsequent operation of the agent seeks to impress upon the indeterminate matter. 12 The matter about which the practical intellect concerns itself is not invariable as is the case in the realm of the speculative intellect, and hence in the case of the practical intellect we will find that the "originative causes" of the objects are on their material side presented by the physical matter--as in arts-or the moral matter-in cases where prudence must be appliedwhile the formal or determining cause must be a judgment of our own making. Every time an artist applies himself to painting a picture or a man begins to determine some course of action to be followed in carrying on his life, he must spend a certain time in deliberating about the means he should use. In other words, practical knowledge not only allows but demands deliberation and choice. On the contrary, in speculative knowledge neither deliberation nor choice is permitted, for in this knowledge the mind is wholly subject to the object-in speculative knowledge the only function of the mind is to affirm or 12 John of St. Thos., Curs. Theol., I-II, disp. 16, a. 4: Vives 6, 469: "Ad id quod dicitur materiam horum actuum practicorum versari circa objecta contingentia, respondetur versari quidem circa contingentia ex parte materiae, non ex parte regulationis, quae pertinet ad rationem formalem, haec enim semper respicit aliquid certum et infallibile practice, quia etsi deficere possit et falsificari in re, tamen modo operandi prudentialiter aut artificiose non fallitur, prudenter enim proceditur humano modo, etsi aliquando erretur in re ... !' 426 WILLIAM A. GERHARD deny what is presented to it. Hence we cannot speak of the truth of the practical intellect as being a conformity between the mind and the object, for we can speak of truth being thus constituted only where the object is necessary and immutable; in the object of the practical intellect, as we have said, the formal or determining part of the object is impressed by the mind. 13 What then is practical truth? In the knowledge of the practical reason we find that it always has reference to desire. Why should the practical reason add to its cognitive function the activity of directing operation to a certain end? Because there is desire for that particular end, because that object is a final, and not just a formal, cause. Hence as Aristotle says, the practical reason will not be concerned with affirming and denying, but rather with pursuing and avoiding in accordance with desire. However, desire must be further determined, for though there may be a desire for the production of some work of art or to perform some moral act, yet we cannot achieve either end before we have made a choice of the means leading to that end. Hence there must be a choice which is the result of a certain amount of deliberation plus the original for that end. Choice, therefore, is the determination of desire through a process of reasoning whereby we come to choose the means suitable to attain the end sought by the appetite. 14 The principles of choice are appetite and reasoning, not pure reasoning but always reasoning with some end in view, the end being the object of the appetite. This reasoning always has some activity in view, the direction of the appetite in its seeking of the goal. The choice is never concerned with an end as such, since the end is determined by the nature of the agent; but rather with those means which lead to the end. Hence good choice will depend both upon the reason and upon oe TOVTWII TO p,'Ev 0€ Ao"'(uTrtK6v. rO 'YaP {3ovA€VeuBat Kat A.o"Ylfeuflat raVrOP, oVOds OE [3ouA.eVerat 1rep'i. rWv p.1] ev0£XOf.kePWP lii\A.ws 13 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VI. 1139 a, ll-14: f:rrtUT'YJf.kOVt.KOv TO 14 Aristotle, Nich. Eth., VI. 1149 a, 3-5: 8p,oAO"fWS TV 6pereL TV: opcf>fl. roii lie 7rpaKTLKoii Kal otav'IITLKoii 7} a"A110wz THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE appetite perfected by moral virtue. There can be no good choice without the contribution from each of these components.16 To which of these factors shall the primacy be given? It appears that the primacy should be granted rather to the appetite than to the reason as it guides the appetite. The object of choice is never the true or the false; these attributes do not permit of being chosen or rejected-they are capable of being affirmed or denied. And affirming or denying is the act of the intellect. The object of choice is the good or the bad, and they are the objects of the appetite. Hence in the matter of choice the intellect shares hy reason of the fact that in practical knowledge it is joined most intimately with the appetite. That the intellect participates as a cause in choice is due to the fact that in the :field of means wherein choice takes place there is need for the appetite to be aided by a process of reasoning whereby the best and most advantageous course may be taken to reach the proper end. 16 Practical knowledge is concerned with the existential order, with positing some act in that order either in the form of a transient action as in the arts, or in the form of an immanent action as in prudential activity. It is concerned with existence but it is not concerned with what now exists, but with what will come to be. It is a knowledge concerned with determining "lpsius electionis sunt principia ' 5 St. Thomas, In Nick. Etk., VI, Lect. 1: appetitus et ratio quae est gratia alicujus, idest quae ordinatur ad aliquid operabile sicut ad finem. Est enim electio appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem. Unde ratio proponens finem, et ex eo procedens ad ratiocinandum, et appetitus tendens in finem, comparatur ad electionem, per modum causae. Et inde est quod electio dependet ab intellectu sive mente, et ab habitu morali, qui perficit vim appeti:tivam, ita quod non est sine utroque eorum." '" St. Thomas, In Nick. Eth., VI, Lect. "Quia enim electio principium actus, et electionis principia sunt appetitus et ratio sive intellectus sive mens, quae mediante electione principia sunt actus, consequens est, quod electio sit intellectus appetitivus, ita scilicet quod electio sit essentialiter actus intellectus, secundum quod ordinat appetitum vel sit appetitus intellectivtas, ita quod electio sit essentialiter actus appetitus, secundum quod dirigitur ab intellectu. Et hoc verius est: quod patet ex objectis. Objectum enim electionis est bonum et malum, sicut et appetitus: non autem verum et falsum, quae pertinet ad intellectum. Et tale principium est homo, scilicet agens, eligendo propter intellectum et appetitum." 428 WILLIAM A. GERHARD future existence in either the order of artifacts or of moral activity. 17 Consequently, as we have said above, the cause of the infallibility of practical knowledge cannot be found in the object of practical knowledge. But to have the habitus of practical knowledge, to supply a foundation of necessity such as is demanded for the constitution of any intellectual habitus rendering the reason infallible in a certain department of activity, there must be some basis of necessity outside of the mind itself. Since the objects of the practical intellect are not necessary objects having an essential reference to existence as have the essences considered by speculative knowledge, practical knowledge cannot be judged true or false according as it affirms or denies the existence or non-existence of objects. Hence the relation of objects to existence cannot serve as the basis of the infallibility of practical truth. The practical intellect is concerned with regulating and guiding activity in performing works of some kind. It deals with rules of making and doing, with the proper method of bringing things into existence. Each thingbe it a work of art or a moral act-has certain rules flowing from its very essence according to which it must be generated. The duty of the practical intellect is to formulate judgments in accordance with the rules of action that this particular work of art or moral act demands, if it is to be produced properly. Hence the work of the practical intellect is not to know what is, but what ought to be, and what ought to be in a particular case. Of course, due to the difference of the matter to be dealt with, the rules applying to works of art and to moral acts differ intrinsically. Both artistic and moral matter are alike in that they are indeterminate and stand in need of determination by the reception of a formal principle which will be the result of a judgment of the practical intellect: that which should be done here and now according to the demands of the present situation. In free or moral acts we use as a measuring stick to ascertain 11 Aristotle, Nick. Eth., VI, 1139 b, 7-9: ovi'i€ 'YtLP f3ovXdrraL 7repl Toii 'YE'YOVOTOS d.XXtt 7rEpl TOii EO'O}LEVOV Kal evi5E')(O}Llvav TO 15e 'YE'YOVOS OVK ev/5exeTaL }LTJ "fEvluOat. THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE their correctness the conformity that exists between the judgment of the practical reason and the demands of a well orientated appetite. The appetite must be sound and must by reason of moral virtue, which strengthens its natural bent, incline towards the ends proper to human nature; in accordance with the demands made by these ends the practical intellect must form its judgments whereby the appetite will be guided in its movement toward this end. Hence we say that in the order of the practical intellect the final cause serves in the capacity of a first principle, for in all practical reasoning our one aim is to attain to the end sought by the appetite. The end serves as a major premise and according to this major premise we fashion the other judgments used in om practical reasoning. The means and all reasoning about the means have being and intelligibility only insofar as they are connected with the end. Likewise in the field of arts-mechanical or liberalthe truth of the practical intellect is determined by its conformity to the end proposed by that art. The rules of art resulting from the reasoning of the practical intellect perfected by the habitus of art, are true or false insofar as they conform to the demands made by the end sought by each art. The end of a shoemaker's art is to make shoes to protect the feet. He will be a good shoemaker who can formulate the best judgments to attain to this end. The truth of artistic work is in a conformity between the practical judgment and the end proposed by the particular artistic habitus one possesses. 18 18 John of St. Thos., Curs. Theol., I-II, disp. Hi, a. 4; Vives, 6, 467: " . Istae virtutes non versantur circa veritatem necessariam, et infallibilem practice, id est, secundum conformitatem ad ipsas regulas quibus res practicata dirigitur. Proprie enim intellectus practicus est mensurativus operis faciendi, et regulativus. Et sic ejus veritas non est penes esse, sed penes id quod deberet esse juxta regulam, et mensuram talis rei regulandae. Alia est autem mensura actionis liberae ut Iibera, alia rei ut artificiosae, et factibilis. Actus ut liber mensuratur lege, et dictamine recto, et sic dicitur ejus veritas sumi per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum, hoc est, per conformitatem ad regulam per quam appetitus redditur rectus, quae regula est lex, et rectus finis cui conformari debet appetitus, eo quod finis in Effectus autem artificiosus practicis se habet ut principium in speculativis. mensuratur, et regulatur regulis artis, et per ordinem ad illas sumitur ejus veritas. Regulae autem artis sunt praecepta, quae traduntur de aliquo artefacto faciendo 2 430 WILLIAM A. GERHARD In the field of moral fact the truth of practical judgments consists in a relationship of conformity between a rightly directed appetite and a judgment of the practical intellect perfected by the virtue of prudence. But it seems that we are in a vicious circle, for we call a rightly directed appetite one which proceeds in its operations according to the rules formulated by prudence; and we say that the truth of the prudential judgment consists in its conformity to a rightly directed appetite. Since in practical matters the material element is always contingent and hence gives no assurance, rather militates against the full realization in it of the precepts of the practical judgment, we find that the basis of infallibility can be found only in the rules according to which we proceed in fashioning and shaping this matter. In actions of the will it is quite possible that the will does not attain to the end chosen by it, since moral acts may be impeded in many ways; but the fact that the will does not gain this end does not invalidate the truth of the practical judgment by which the will was directed in a certain way to gain its end. The infallibility of this truth depends on whether the practical judgment had formulated rules of action in accordance with the end sought. Practical truth is certain and infallible if the intellect has arrived by its judgment at true and proportionate rules of action and direction. The truth of the practical intellect does not depend upon whether the end is achieved, but upon whether the true and proper mode of proceeding was known by the intellect after deliberation and counselling. So, too, in art it happens that the truth of the artistic judgment is not determined by the success of the work, for it may fail because of many reasonspoor paint, poor marble, bad chisels or brushes, etc.-but by its conformity to the end proposed by the particular art. The artistic judgment is true and infallible so long as in its direction conformiter ad finem artis, sicut illae regulae recte disponunt de fabricanda navi, vel domo, quae conformiter ad finem navis, qui est navigare, vel ad finem domus, qui est habitare, traduntur." THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE 481 of the artistic activity it is conformed to the end proposed by the art. Incidental failures do not invalidate the truth of the artistic judgment. Falsity could arise only if the judgment were of such nature that it resulted in direction of the activity in a manner that was contrary to the ends proposed by the art. To return now to answer our difficulty that we seem to reason in a vicious circle when we say that for practical truth we need rectitude of the appetite and that rectitude of the appetite presupposes_ practical truth, we can say that by rectitude of the appetite we mean here not the functionings of the appetite as being ruled and directed in its choice of means by the judgments of the practical intellect, but rather we mean an appetite that anteriorly to the operation of prudence has been properly orientated toward the ends demanded by its nature through the acquisition of moral virtues. For prudential judgments presuppose the knowledge of the ends sought by moral virtue, since these ends serve as the principles whence prudence deduces its reasonings. Neither prudence nor art is concerned with reasoning about ends-they presuppose the ends and use them as the basis for their further activity. Prudence and art are concerned in their activity with a choice of the means suited to· obtain these ends. There is no vicious circle-we merely must understand what we mean when we use the term " rectitude of appetite." 19 19 John of St. Thos., Curs. Tkeol., I-II, disp. 16, a. 4; Vives, 6, 468: "Respondetur ergo sine dubio esse certum, quod in istis virtutibus practicis infallibilitas earum practice, non speculative sumenda et ita veritas earum non est regulanda per id quod est, vel non est in re. Revera enim hoc est contingens, et potens aliter se habere, et deficere, sed infallibilitas sumitur in ordine, et conformitate ad regulam. Quare licet in his virtutibus materia non sit necessaria, sed contingens, et ita ex parte materiae non sint istae virtutes infallibiles in regulando, non in essendo, nee in ipso eventu rei: hie enim saepius potest deficere, quamvis ipsa regulatio, et directio firma sit, et recta in suo genere. Verbi gratia, in voluntariis, seu quae per voluntatem agenda sunt, et in finem perducenda, si consideretur ipse eventus, et ipsa pervenio ad finem, est aliquid contingens, et fallibile; imo quia ita fallibile, indiget directione, et gubernatione. Haec autem directio utitur regula certa, et recta, non quae sit certa in assecurando eventu, sed in assecurando modum procedendi, quia est certum, et infallibile, quod qui in rebus ita contingentibus utitur consilio, et facit diligentiam quam potest, bono modo procedit. Similiter in arte 432 WILLIAM A. GERHARD We have already mentioned frequently art and prudence. They are two habitus which together with synderesis perfect the practical intellect in its working. Aristotle distinguished art and prudence according as their modes of proceeding differed. He noted that art was concerned with making while prudence was concerned with doing. These terms share in an analogical, not a univocal community. For prudence is concerned with action that does not pass out of the doer himselfit is perfected in the very act of doing, hence it is immanent action. Art, on the contrary, is concerned with fashioning external matter, with making some thing outside of the agent himself-hence it is action properly so called, transient action. We have then two distinct habitus for they concern themselves in their operation with two different types of activity: prudence is a habitus for doing, for regulating the appetites, in accordance with right reason; while art is a habitus for making m accordance with the precepts of reason. 20 bene stat, quod aliquando ipsum artefactum non bene fiat, vel ex indispositione materiae, vel ex imperfectione agentis aut instrumenti operantis, tamen regulatio, et mensuratio ipsa artis, est certum, et infallibile quod est conformes ideae, et fini artis, et ad ilium determinate dirigit ex se, et formaliter, licet ab extrinseco, et non ex vi ipsius regulae sit defectibilis. . . . Cum ergo dicitur quod si sumitur veritas practica in agibilibus, et moralibus per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum, committimus circulum, cum rursus appetitus rectus sumatur ex regula, respondetur quod conformitas ad appetitum rectum in prudentia non intelligitur per ordinem ad appetitum rectum, qui consequitur se prudentiam, et est effectus ejus, sed per ordinem ad appetitum rectum, qui antecedit prudentiam, et est principium ejus. Nam prudentia supponit rectam intentionem finis, et ex fine tamquam ex principio consilium, et judicium sumit de mediis, et dirigit ipsam electionem, et executionem, et intentio rectificata finis se habet, ut principium prudentiae, electio autem recta, et praestitutio medii, quod eligi debet est effectus prudentiae .... Cum ergo dicitur quod veritas prudentiae sumitur per conformitatem ad rectum appetitum intelligitur ad rectum appetitum secundum rectam intentionem finis, a qua principium sumit prudentia, quia in ordine ad rectum finem regulat prudentia quod recte disponendum est. Cum vero dicitur quod appetitus rectus sumitur a prudentia, intelligitur de appetitu recto rectitudine electionis et mediorum .... " 20 Aristotle, Nich. Eth., VI, 1140 a, 2-6: hepov ll' l, x, 1{1 can be used, to represent the qualities, and the letters x, y, z to represent the individual subjects. An expression such as